Cartel

The Italian word cartello, which means a "leaf of paper" or "placard" and is itself derived from the Latin charta, which means "card," is where the word cartel first appeared. Price fixing, bid rigging, and output reductions are examples of cartel conduct. The majority of jurisdictions have banned these activities because they are considered anti-competitive behavior. In the 18th and 19th centuries, laissez-faire (liberal) economic principles predominated in Europe and North America. In previously free-market industries, cartels first emerged around 1870. When two or more companies decide not to compete with one another, it is called a cartel. This behavior can take many different forms, such as price fixing, market sharing, bid rigging, or limiting the output of goods and services. This includes such behavior in regards to real estate concerns.
Following 1945, a global prohibition on cartels resulted from American-promoted market liberalism. Sales and purchasing cartels band together against the cartel's clients or vendors. Tactic collusion (implicit collusion), in which smaller businesses independently determine their pricing and market shares in reaction to the same market conditions without direct communication, is the least restrictive type of price cartel. In general, cartel agreements are unstable economically since there is a motivation for members to defraud by selling below the agreed-upon price. Due to cheating punishment mechanisms like price wars or financial penalties, many cartels that attempt to determine commodity prices fail over time.
A cartel is an agreement of corporations or divisions of companies with similar interests to control output and prices. It also refers to a group of producers. The Sherman Act of 1890, which forbids price fixing, market-sharing, output limits, and other anti-competitive behavior, was the first anti-cartel law to be put into effect. Identifying and dismantling cartels can be done through economic analysis and leniency programs. The goal of economic study is to find any differences in market behavior between cartel-engaged enterprises that are suspected and those that are not. Leniency programs were initially implemented in the US in 1978 and successfully reformatted in 1993.
The use of leniency program penalties vary depending on the regulations of the individual countries and is proportional to cartel earnings and years of violation. However, generally speaking, compared to those who come out later, the first company or person to collaborate will receive the most reduced punishment. Lysine, citric acid, sodium gluconate, stainless steel, and bulk vitamins are all lenders to worldwide cartels. Even though they have a negative impact on the markets they affect, export cartels are lawful in almost all governments.
Consumers may experience higher costs, fewer options, and lower quality as a result of cartel behavior. Businesses and people that participated in or sought to participate in cartels may be subject to significant fines under the Commerce Act. A person who runs a business without permission may be imprisoned for up to 7 years. A cartel might have members in it in a variety of ways. Participation in cartel behavior includes:
* establishing a contract
* seeking to reach a consensus
* executing the agreed-upon behavior
* assisting and facilitating the agreed-upon conduct.
=== Price control ===
When two or more businesses agree on the prices they will charge in order to avoid competing with one another, this is known as price fixing. Price fixing involves agreements between rivals to fix any portion of a price or to establish prices using a predetermined formula, in addition to agreements between rivals to set a specific price for goods or services.
=== Rigging of bids ===
When there is an understanding among some or all of the bidders about who should win a bid, it is referred to as bid rigging or collusive tendering. In order to support the suggested winner, potential bidders may choose not to submit a bid, or bidders may agree on the amounts that each party will submit. Such a contract forbids free and fair competition, making it unlikely for procurers to provide their clients, consumers, and, in some situations, taxpayers, with the best value for their money.
=== Market partnering ===
When businesses get together to divide up markets rather than fighting for the same clients, market sharing happens. This may be relevant to the sale of a certain product, a location, or a certain demographic of customers.
=== Limiting production ===
When two or more rival buyers or sellers decide to stop, restrict, or limit the products or services they are purchasing or selling—or the products or services that would probably be bought and sold—they are said to be restricting output.
=== How can I prevent cartel behavior? ===
* Make sure you and your personnel are aware of the Commerce Act's requirements. Keep track of who has participated in Act training.
* Think carefully about your competitors, particularly if subcontracting is involved.
* Never negotiate prices, discounts, or any other price-related issues with your competitors (unless it is a specific sub-contract you are discussing).
* Never consent to any sort of output restriction or customer or regional market distribution amongst rivals.
* Never trade information with your rivals about prices, future production goals, customer profiles, or the markets you serve.
* You should oppose right away if another company contacts you to talk about pricing, client distribution, contract bids, or output limitations. Immediately leave the conversation and get in touch with the Commerce Commission.
* Examine internal documentation, rules, and processes to ensure they comply with the Commerce Act, and obtain outside legal counsel if necessary.
* If you learn of any anti-competitive behavior, get in touch with the Commerce Commission right away.
* We've produced a simple tutorial that you can post on your company noticeboard or share internally via your intranet.
== Legality ==
You may safeguard your company from cartel action with the assistance of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). A cartel is a collection of companies that decide to cooperate rather than go head-to-head. Price fixing, market sharing, bid-rigging, output control, and price fixing are the four main types of cartel action. When all suppliers agree to raise prices simultaneously and more significantly than what seems logical, this is a sign of price fixing. They might be in writing, spoken, or just a signal like a "wink and a nod," but it is unlikely that they would be against the law.
According to the ACCC, cartels form when rivals decide to restrict the types or quantities of goods and services offered in order to raise prices or prevent price declines. This is referred to as market sharing and bid rigging. The statute outlaws participation in cartels. Both private citizens and commercial entities are in violation of the law. Each criminal cartel offense or civil infraction has a maximum fine or penalty for corporations equal to the greater of: r $10,000,000.
A cartel is a business entity established through a formal agreement between a number of producers of an item or service in order to control supply, set pricing, or both. Cartels are rivals in the same field and work to lessen competition by regulating prices. While some cartels are established to control the cost of lawfully traded goods and services, others are found in illicit markets like the drug trade. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is a coalition of 13 oil-producing nations with the goal of coordinating and harmonizing their national petroleum policies. The leadership of the country where the cartel operates frequently determines how strong it is.
The agreement benefits the cartel's members at the expense of consumers and competition. A cartel is a legally recognized arrangement between a number of producers of an item or service to control supply, set pricing, or both. Members of cartels who agree on prices, terms, and output form them for their mutual profit. Cartels are prohibited by American law and are subject to antitrust regulations.A cartel is a business entity established through a formal agreement between a number of producers of an item or service in order to control supply, set pricing, or both. Cartel members may agree on prices, total industry output, market shares, client allocation, territory allocation, bid-rigging, and the split of profits even though they are independent companies or nations.
=== Key Lessons ===
* A cartel is a group of separate companies or organizations that band together to fix prices on goods or services.
* In the same industry, cartels compete against one another, and they work to lessen that competition by coordinating pricing.
* Cartels employ a variety of strategies, such as supply reduction, price fixing, collusive bidding, and market carving.
* Cartels are widely seen as being against the law and advocates of anti-competitive behavior.
* Consumers are harmed by cartel behavior because of higher pricing and a lack of transparency.
=== Recognizing a cartel ===
In contrast to a monopoly, when a single organization or firm controls all or almost all of the market share for a specific good or service, a cartel has less control over an industry. While some cartels are established to control the cost of lawfully traded goods and services, others are found in illicit markets like the drug trade. Under American antitrust laws, cartels are prohibited in the United States.
Consumers suffer from cartels since their existence leads to increased costs and a limited supply. When there is proof of price-fixing, output limits, market allocation, bid-rigging, or the submission of collusive bids, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recognizes and pursues cartels.
=== Competitive Bidding ===
When businesses coordinate their bids on project or procurement contracts for the acquisition of products or services, this practice is known as collusive tendering.
=== Cartel Agreement Types ===
A cartel agreement may impede, limit, or foster fictitious competition. A cartel's members may enter into several kinds of agreements, such as:
=== A price cap ===
Price cartels uphold or establish a minimum pricing strategy where members are prohibited from offering goods or services for less than the floor price. Members can also be mandated to agree on a price increase and forgo discount pricing.
=== Market portion ===
To ensure a balanced flow of revenue, a cartel may split its customers or geographical areas among its members. Members might not be able to share consumers with other members or sell outside of a specific region. Depending on the area or clients they serve, members of the cartel could also have limitations on the products they can supply.
=== Condition of Delivery ===
The formal terms of distribution, such as mode, locations, and timing, as well as billing and interest payments, may be agreed upon by cartel members.
=== Production and Output ===
Cartels may impose production standards on their members, driving up prices for goods and services.
=== Benefits and Drawbacks of Cartels ===
Cartels are created in order to fix prices, establish trading conditions, assign trade zones, or obtain economies of scale. Cartels may not be challenged on their pricing or production, and their power frequently rests on the leadership of the country in which they operate. The agreement benefits the cartel's members at the expense of consumers and competition.
==== Pros ====
* gives its members monopoly-like power
* Utilizing economies of scale allows members to save.
* To increase profits, goods and services are sold at higher margins.
==== Cons ====
* operate as a barrier to entry and serve to deter new entrants into the market
* Price fixing and a lack of innovation are caused by a lack of competition.
* Prices for goods or services that are above market value have an effect on consumers.
* Market inefficiencies and cartels
Consumers suffer, and cartels hurt economic performance. The ability of a cartel to increase prices above the level of competition while decreasing output determines the cartel's success. Due to the absence of market forces, consumers may opt to pay a price above that of the competition or forego the commodity or service altogether.
The pressure on the cartel members to control costs or innovate is lessened when it protects its members from full exposure to competitive market forces. This has a negative impact on productivity in a market economy.
=== The largest cartel in the world ===
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is a coalition of 13 oil-producing nations with the goal of coordinating and harmonizing their national petroleum policies in order to maintain oil market stability.
Because it is protected by American foreign trade rules, its operations are legal.
Midway through the 2000s, controversy prevented the U.S. the effort by Congress to label OPEC a criminal cartel and punish it.
Although the majority of people believe OPEC to be a cartel, its members insist it is actually an international organization with a legitimate, ongoing, and essential role.
=== Observation on Drug Cartels ===
Drug trafficking organizations do technically fall under the concept of a cartel, notably in South America, and are frequently referred to as "drug cartels." They are loosely connected organizations that establish rules among themselves to regulate the cost and availability of an item, in this case, illegal drugs.
The Medellin Cartel, which Pablo Escobar oversaw from the 1980s until his death in 1993, is probably the best-known illustration of this. The cartel was well-known for bringing copious amounts of cocaine into the country and for its ruthless tactics.
=== What Sort of Industries Support Cartels? ===
Cartels frequently perform best in oligopolies, which are markets with a small number of enterprises that are interconnected in terms of their output and pricing strategies. Each member has some market power thanks to the modest number of members. The foundation for understanding how cartels arise and what impact they have on the economy comes from the theory of "cooperative" oligopoly.
=== How Is Collusion in Cartels Provable? ===
Open or overt acts of collaboration are necessary for a cartel to form. Members of cartels who agree on prices, terms, and output form them for their mutual profit.
=== What American laws govern cartel activity? ===
Since cartel conduct deprives consumers and other market participants of the benefits of competition, anti-trust laws like the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act govern cartels in the United States.
=== the conclusion ===
A cartel is a legally recognized arrangement between a number of producers of an item or service to control supply, set pricing, or both. To achieve economies of scale, cartels frequently fix pricing, specify trading conditions, and distribute trade or market share rules. Antitrust laws govern cartels in the United States and make them unlawful.
== Medellin Cartel ==
The Medelln Cartel was a drug trafficking and terrorist group in Colombia. Pablo Escobar was the organization's founder and leader, and it ran from 1972 to 1993. At its peak, the Cali Cartel was the major rival of the Medellin Cartel, which smuggled three times as much cocaine. The group was infamous for once controlling the illegal cocaine trade, but it was also known for using violence for political ends. Escobar established the Medellin Cartel, which at its peak was involved in the daily trafficking of 300 kilograms of cocaine.
The State began working with organized crime groups like Escobar and the Ochoas in the 1980s as a result of kidnappings committed by guerrilla groups. As a result, private armies financed by cartels were formed to battle rebels and defend local elites against kidnappings. Pablo Escobar started putting a lot of money into the group in 1984 to pay for tools, instruction, and weapons. The MAS's public relations and legal front were handled by ACDEGAM, a second paramilitary organization that was founded the next year. By the middle of the 1980s, Escobar had more control over Medelln after establishing the "Oficina de Envigado," a company that collected illegal debts.
Federal Drug Task Force surveillance of the gang was initiated once U.S. officials learned about their operations. These activities led to the arrest of a small number of Colombian cartel leaders. By 1993, Colombia's National Police and the CIA had either captured or killed the majority of fugitives. The Medellin Cartel adopted the route through Central America to travel to the US once the Bahamian government began to crack down on the drug trade. According to a previous DEA investigation, the cartel was permitted to utilize Nicaragua as a "warehouse" for its operations thanks to protection from the FSLN, the Sandinista party.
Barry Seal was killed in February 1986 as a result of a contract the cartel placed on him after learning of his activities as an informant. On March 16 of the same year, Ronald Reagan used surveillance images acquired on Seal during a national television address. Due to his adamant anticommunist stance, the CIA ignored the connection between the Medellin Cartel and Manoel Noriega. The reduction and later termination of Soviet Union subsidies during the 1980s nearly destroyed the Cuban economy. Several of these supporters were subjected to the cartel's "bend or break" tactics, which included threats of violence, extortion, and bribes.
As a result, Escobar launched a violent campaign to pressure the Colombian government by carrying out a string of kidnappings, killings, and other violent deeds with his group, Los Extraditables. According to some estimates, the number of people slain at the height of the cartel's operations was over 3,500. Guillermo Cano Isaza, a journalist from Colombia who exposed Pablo Escobar's criminal past, was assassinated on December 17, 1986, in Bogotá by men on motorcycles. In August 1989, gunmen opened fire on presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán during a rally in Soacha. Police shot and killed former president Julio César Turbay Ayala's daughter Diana Turbay, the main editor of the magazine Hoy por Hoy, during a rescue attempt in January 1991.
It is thought that La Oficina de Envigado is a partly successor to the Medelln organization. Don Berna established it as Pablo Escobar's enforcement arm, but they split off after he was overthrown. Numerous pieces of popular culture have both included and referenced the cartel.Pablo Escobar established and oversaw the Medellin Cartel, a significant and well-organized Colombian drug cartel and terrorist group that had its roots in Medellin, Colombia. It is frequently described to as the first significant "drug cartel," so named because Escobar and several other Colombian traffickers formed a partnership to form the organization's highest levels. Carlos Lehder, Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha, Juan David Ochoa Vasquez, and Jorge Luis Ochoa Vasquez were all present. From 1972 through 1993, the cartel was active in Bolivia, Colombia, Panama, Central America, Peru, the United States, and Canada. Although it began as a network of smugglers in the early 1970s, the organization didn't start trafficking cocaine until 1976. The Medellin Cartel made up to US$60 million per day in narcotics earnings at the height of its activities, when it was smuggling several tons of cocaine into various nations every week.
Although the organization was once known for controlling the illegal cocaine trade, it was also infamous for using violence for political ends and waging an asymmetrical war against the Colombian government, primarily through bombings, kidnappings, the random killing of law enforcement officers, and political assassinations. When it was at its greatest, the Medellin Cartel—a global drug trafficking group with headquarters in Colombia's Valle del Cauca department—smuggled three times as much cocaine as its major rival, the Cali Cartel. In the past, Pablo and the Medellin Cartel had a deal with the Cali Cartel whereby Cali controlled New York City, while Medellin controlled Miami and both agreed to share Los Angeles and Houston. The Medellin Cartel was making more than $5 billion a year at this point.
=== 1970s through early 1980s ===
The illegal cocaine trade, especially among smugglers, became a big issue for law enforcement in the late 1970s and a significant source of income for criminals. Drug lord Pablo Escobar created a criminal organization that, at its peak, moved about 300 kilos of cocaine per day by protecting other smugglers who worked with him and distributed cocaine for the cartel in New York City and then Miami. Escobar oversaw the large-scale importation of coca paste into Colombia during the cartel's peak from Andean countries like Bolivia and Peru. From there, the coca paste was processed into cocaine hydrochloride in jungle labs before being flown into the United States at rates of up to 15 tons per day.
A military takeover in Chile in 1973 resulted in a harsh crackdown on the country's drug smugglers. Drug dealers were forced to take alternative routes as a result; one such route was through the center of Colombia. The incidence and social acceptance of illegal activity peaked at the same time in Colombia. Together, these two factors had a role in the formation of the Medellin Cartel in 1976.
Cocaine replaced coffee as the main export from Colombia by 1982. Around this time in the early 1980s, guerrilla kidnappings prompted the State to work with criminal organizations like Escobar and the Ochoas. Carlos Lehder's kidnapping and the 1981 kidnapping of the Ochoas' sister prompted the establishment of cartel-funded private armies to fight off guerrillas who were attempting to either kidnap local peasants or redistribute their lands to them or extort the gramaje money that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia attempted to steal.
=== Kill those who kidnap. ===
The Muerte a Secuestradores paramilitary group was created in Puerto Boyaca at the end of 1981 and the beginning of 1982 by representatives of the Medellin Cartel, the Cali Cartel, the Colombian military, Texas Petroleum, the Colombian legislature, small industrialists, and wealthy cattle ranchers to protect their economic interests and the local elite from kidnapping and extortion. By 1983, the MAS death squads had killed 240 political targets in Colombia, primarily farmers, community leaders, and elected officials.
The Asociacion Campesina de Ganaderos y Agricultores del Magdalena Medio was established the next year to manage the organization's operations and public relations while serving as a legitimate front for numerous paramilitary organizations. ACDEGAM threatened anyone interested in organizing for labor or peasants' rights and attempted to advance anti-labor laws. The MAS, which would kill or attack anyone suspected of being a "subversive," backed up the threats. ACDEGAM also constructed roads, bridges, and health facilities in addition to schools, the claimed goal of which was to create a "patriotic and anti-Communist" learning environment. ACDEGAM's main office managed paramilitary recruiting, weapon storage, communications, propaganda, and medical services.
ACDEGAM and MAS had experienced tremendous expansion by the middle of the 1980s. Pablo Escobar started transferring a lot of money to the group in 1985 to pay for tools, instruction, and weapons. Money that had been allocated for social programs was cut off and instead used to support the MAS. AKM, FN FAL, Galil, and HK G3 modern battle rifles were bought from the military, INDUMIL, and drug-funded private transactions. The company operated a communications center with computers and collaborated with the state telecom agency. They had 30 pilots and a variety of fixed-wing and helicopter aircraft. To instruct in paramilitary training facilities, British, Israeli, and American military instructors were hired.
=== early to late 1980s ===
Escobar established the "Oficina de Envigado," a criminal debt collection agency, at the town hall of Envigado, a small municipality neighboring to Medellin where Escobar was raised, around this period in the mid-80s, further strengthening his influence on the city. When drug traffickers failed to pay him back, Escobar used the municipal office to hire "sicarios," or hired murderers, to kill them. Escobar was well known for showing off his wealth, and from 1987 and 1993, he appeared on Forbes' list of billionaires seven years in a row. Escobar was known for investing profits from the drug trade in luxury goods, property, and works of art. He is also said to have stashed his money in "hidden coves," allegedly burying it on his farms and under floors in many of his homes. His opulent multimillion-dollar "Hacienda Napoles" estate had its own zoo, and he reportedly ate from solid gold dinner sets.
=== governmental ties ===
The CIA's support for right-wing paramilitary groups and dictatorships during the latter years of the Cold War increased the number of left-wing guerrillas in Latin America, which prompted the Cartel to look for new allies while being compelled to engage in corruption outside of Colombia for political protection.
Ties with the government of Colombia
Evidence was gathered, compiled, and presented to a grand jury, resulting in indictments, arrests, and prison sentences for those convicted in the United States. However, very few Colombian cartel leaders were actually taken into custody as a result of these operations. Rather, non-Colombians conspiring with the cartel were the "fruits" of the operations.
However, by 1993 most, if not all, cartel fugitives had been either captured or found and killed by the Colombian National Police, who had been trained and assisted by specialized military units and the CIA. Most Colombians targeted, as well as those named in such indictments, lived and stayed in Colombia, or fled before indictments were unsealed.
Juan Diego Arcila Henao, who had been freed from a Colombian prison in 2002 and had fled to Venezuela to escape "Los Pepes'" retribution, was the last of Escobar's lieutenants to be assassinated; however, he was shot and killed in his Jeep Cherokee as he left the garage of his residence in Cumana, Venezuela, in April 2007.
Although it is widely accepted that Los Pepes played a significant role in the assassination of cartel members over the past 21 years, it is still debatable whether this mantle is simply a ploy to avoid political fallout from the involvement of both the Colombian and US governments in these killings.
=== Partnerships with the CIA ===
Because the money from these operations was used to fight the Sandinista government, the Kerry Committee report came to the conclusion that the CIA gave the Contras the political cover they needed to smuggle cocaine into the US. Additionally, the same report revealed that Juan Matta-Ballesteros, the middleman between the Medellin Cartel and the Guadalajara Cartel who was in charge of the majority of the logistics for moving cocaine from Colombia to Mexico, was working with the Contras.
Things started to change after the report was published as the CIA was forced to save face in the scandal. The agency blamed the cocaine smuggling to the Colombian guerrillas and investigated the links between the Medellin Cartel and the left-wing organizations, making the right-wing paramilitaries in Colombia turn against the Medellin Cartel, helping to form the Los Pepes death squad.
The CIA, once one of Noriega's allies, was one of the minds behind Operation Just Cause, which effectively ended Noriega's term and led to his arrest. The end of the Panamian connection was one of the hardest hits on the Cartel operations, speeding up its decline. The removal of support for Manuel Noriega, who was prosecuted for conspiracy with drug smuggling activities between 1989 and 1990, was another action from the CIA to clean up its image.
=== Ties with the government of Nicaragua ===
The Medellin Cartel chose to travel through Central America to reach the US because Carlos Lehder's Norman's Cay strategy was abandoned in 1982 when the Bahamian government began pursuing the drug trade. In 1985, the DEA forced the pilot to take pictures of the cartel's landing stripes in Nicaragua after learning about Barry Seal's connections to both the Medellin Cartel and the FSLN.
In March 1986, President Ronald Reagan used surveillance images from Seal's undercover mission that showed Escobar, Gacha, Nicaraguan government official Federico Vaughan, and several other men loading a plane with cocaine. Knowing Seal's activity as a DEA informant, the cartel put a contract on him and had him murdered in February 1986.
=== Ties with the government of Panamia ===
The Medellin Cartel was looking for new locations to use as a stopover due to the conflict in remote areas of Nicaragua and Colombia, and Manoel Noriega agreed to use Panama as one such location in exchange for bribes and a share of the profits. Additionally, the links between him and the Cartel ensured that Panama could be used as a stopover due to the conflict in remote areas of Nicaragua and Colombia.
Because of his virulent anticommunist stance, the CIA chose to ignore the connection between Noriega and the Medellin Cartel; but, as the Cartel's involvement became known, the agency decided to withdraw its support for Noriega.
=== Relations with the government of Cuba ===
As the cocaine smuggling to the USA was doing billions of dollars, the Cuban intelligence helped managing Nicaraguan operations and the island's government agreed using Cuba as one of the stopovers for the Cartel. Carlos Lehder, the Cartel's responsible for ensuring that the cocaine would reach Florida, testified that, as the drug smuggling to the USA was doing billions of dollars, the Cuban intelligence helped managing Nicaraguan operations and the island's government agreed using Cuba as one of the
=== Aversion to extradition ===
The implementation of an extradition treaty between the United States and Colombia, which allowed any Colombian suspected of drug trafficking to be extradited to the US and to be tried there for their crimes, was a major problem for the cartel because the drug traffickers had little access to their local power and influence in the US and a trial there would most likely result in I
When police operations started to result in significant losses, some of the major drug lords themselves were temporarily forced out of Colombia, forcing them into hiding from which they ordered cartel members to kill important proponents of the extradition treaty. However, the cartel used a "bend or break" strategy towards several of these supporters, using bribery, extortion, or violence.
Escobar and the group he led known as Los Extraditables began a violent campaign to pressure the Colombian government by carrying out a series of kidnappings, murders, and narco-terrorist actions. The cartel had issued death threats to the Supreme Court Judges, asking them to denounce the Extradition Treaty, but the warnings were disregarded.
Supposed connection to the M-19
=== Luis Lehder ===
Some speculated at the time that the M-19's raid on the Colombian Supreme Court in November 1985, which precipitated the Palace of Justice siege, was motivated by the cartel's desire to intimidate the court; others contend that the alleged cartel-guerrilla relationship was unlikely to occur at the time because the two organizations had been engaged in numerous standoffs and confrontations.
=== Assassinations ===
Escobar and his associates made it clear that whoever opposed them would risk being killed along with their families, so the cartel carried out thousands of assassinations throughout the country as a form of intimidation. Some estimates put the total number of deaths at around 3,500 during the height of the cartel's activities, including over 500 police officers in Medellin, but the full list is impossible to compile due to the limitation of the judiciary power in Colombia.
One of the first cartel homicides was that of Luis Vasco and Gilberto Hernandez, two DAS agents who had detained Pablo Escobar in 1976.
On April 30, 1984, two gunmen on motorcycles approached Rodrigo Lara's vehicle in the middle of traffic on a highway in Bogota, Colombia, and started shooting. Lara was the minister of justice at the time.
Tulio Manuel Castro Gil, a Superior Judge who was investigating Escobar for the murder of two DAS agents who had been imprisoned in 1977 together with his cousin Gustavo Gaviria, was assassinated in July 1985, not long after Escobar had been charged.
On July 31, 1986, assailants shot and killed Hernando Baquero Borda, a justice of the Supreme Court who also served as a rapporteur and supporter of the Extradition Treaty with the United States.
On November 17, 1986, assassins in a green Renault 18 pulled up next to Jaime Ramirez Gomez's red Mitsubishi Montero on his way to Bogota and opened fire, killing Ramirez instantly while leaving his wife and two sons unharmed. Ramirez was a police colonel and the head of the anti-narcotics unit of the National Police of Colombia.
* Guillermo Cano Isaza, the director of El Espectador who made Escobar's criminal record public, was assassinated by assassins on motorcycles in Bogota on December 17, 1986.
* In October 1987, a shooter killed Jaime Pardo Leal, a presidential candidate and leader of the Patriotic Union party.
* Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos was abducted and murdered in Medellin in January 1988 by armed men.
* Antioquia's governor, Antonio Roldan Betancur, was assassinated in a car bombing in July 1989.
* In August 1989, gunmen killed Waldemar Franklin Quintero, the commander of the Antioquia police, in Medellin.
* The assassination of presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan took place in Soacha in August 1989, the same day that the cartel shot and killed the commander of the Antioquia police.
* After charging Escobar with Guillermo Cano's murder, Carlos Ernesto Valencia, a superior judge, was assassinated by gunmen in August 1989.
* In November 1989, assailants in Bogota killed journalist and Jorge Enrique Pulido TV director Jorge Enrique Pulido.
* Although the gunshot found in her body came from a police helicopter, Diana Turbay was a journalist, the chief editor of the Hoy por Hoy magazine, and the daughter of former president Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala. She was killed by Colombian military during a rescue attempt in January 1991.
* In May 1991, assailants shot and assassinated Enrique Low Murtra, the minister of justice, in downtown Bogota.
* Superior Judge Myriam Rocio Velez was assassinated by gunmen in September 1992, just before she was about to sentence Escobar for the murder of Galan.
* In the DAS Building Bombing, which claimed the lives of 52 innocent bystanders and was directed at Miguel Maza Marquez, Miguel managed to escape unscathed.
* The cartel lieutenants were also attacked by Los Pepes in 1993, just before Escobar passed away.
* Since Juan Diego Arcila Henao's murder in 2007, the most, if not all, of Escobar's lieutenants who were not in prison have been murdered by the Los Pepes vigilante group or the Colombian National Police Search Bloc.
* DEA operatives believed that their four-pronged "Kingpin Strategy," which targeted senior cartel figures in particular, played a significant component in the organization's demise.
== Organizations and Cartels ==
Colombian drug kingpin and narcoterrorist Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria (1949–2 December 1993) was born. The Medelln Cartel, which dealt in powder cocaine, was founded by him and he served as its single head. DAS Building and Avianca Flight 203 explosions are thought to have been planned by Escobar. As one of Colombia's most renowned drug lords, Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria was a household name. 1993, one day after Escobar turned 44, saw the death of the drug lord by Colombian police.
For offering luxuries to the underprivileged, he was viewed as a "Robin Hood-like" character by many Colombians. Escobar is thought to have began his criminal career by stealing tombstones and sandblasting their inscriptions. At the age of 20, he stopped attending school and started working in organized crime. The "Robin Hood Paisa" moniker came to him as a result of his involvement in philanthropy. Escobar killed presidential hopeful Luis Carlos Galán and Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara-Bonilla.
Escobar spent the middle of the 1980s attacking the Colombian judicial system. In an effort to kill Galán's successor Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, Escobar detonated a bomb on Avianca Flight 203. Escobar was imprisoned in La Catedral, which he later turned into his own private prison and which had a football field, a huge dollhouse, a bar, a Jacuzzi, and a waterfall. Escobar acquired or built a large number of homes and safe houses after becoming affluent. On Isla Grande, Escobar also had a sizable vacation home.
The compound contained a mansion, flats, courtyards, a landing strip for a helicopter, reinforced windows, tiled floors, and an incomplete structure. In Medellin, Colombia, on December 2, 1993, Pablo Escobar's body was discovered in a home. The Colombian police, the American government, and Escobar's nemesis, the Cali Cartel, all threatened him. Attempting to get onto the roof, he was shot and killed. She accused Santo Santofimio of participating in the 1985 siege of the Palace of Justice, which Escobar had funded in order to assail the Colombian Supreme Court by M-19 communist insurgents.
After his passing in 1993, Mara Henao de Escobar, his widow, and her three children left Colombia. With two Colombian cocaine dealers, Henao is charged with money laundering. The book by Nicolas Escobar Marroqun gives readers a first-person account of the specifics of his father's life and exposes the fundamentally destabilizing impact of his passing on the family. At the urging of a few of his kin, Escobar's body was unearthed on October 28, 2006, so that a DNA sample could be collected for an unborn child. A private menagerie at Hacienda Nápoles was home to four hippos that Escobar kept there.
After Escobar's death, they were thought to be too challenging to grab and move. In Puerto Triunfo, Antioquia, as of the start of 2014, 40 hippos were reportedly present.A cartel is an organization of businesses that has decided to lower output and fix prices in an effort to boost profits. Because it makes certain products unavailable or prohibitively expensive, this agreement is bad for customers. A common example of a cartel is the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). On September 10–14, 1960, at the Baghdad Conference, OPEC was established. Various agreements and laws have been pursued by a number of nations to reduce the influence of OPEC on the world oil market.
The NOPEC Act, which was introduced in 2019, is discussed in this paper from the Congressional Research Service. The website of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) External provides general information about gas as well as documents like the GECF Annual Statistical Bulletin. In order to find solutions to lessen the members' susceptibility to a supply disruption, the IEA External was founded in 1974. OAPEC is committed to fostering greater collaboration among its participants. Each member of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) is a shareholder in APICORP, which provides funding for cooperative petroleum projects.
There are 70 members of the World Petroleum Council from both OPEC and non-OPEC nations. Natural gas is supported by the International Gas Union as a component of a sustainable energy system.
== OPEC ==
Data from 1994 to 2014 are used to examine whether OPEC behaves as a cartel and influences oil prices as a result of member coordination. The results indicate there is no evidence of cartel conduct because there is no cointegration between the members' and OPEC's production. Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela formed OPEC in 1960. The organization's mission is to coordinate and harmonize petroleum policies, according to OPEC laws. Regarding OPEC's stability as a cartel, there doesn't appear to be a strong consensus in the empirical literature.
Whether OPEC is a cartel or not is still up for debate in the literature as a whole. One viewpoint is that because of their production cuts and market dominance, OPEC is to blame for the majority of the increases in oil prices. Another thinks that with the 1973 oil crisis, OPEC's power to regulate the price of oil considerably decreased. In particular during the output rationing phase, Gulen (1996) finds indications of output coordination among OPEC countries (1982–1993). According to Smith (2005), the market structure of OPEC is a cross between a cartel and an uncooperative oligopoly.
Kisswani (2014) investigates the claim that OPEC takes political interests into account when deciding how much oil to produce. In this essay, I review OPEC's production practices and investigate the idea that the group behaves in a cartel-like manner. I use quarterly and monthly data for the years 1994 through 2014. After that, I run causality analyses on OPEC production and oil prices to look for any indications of cartel activity. In this study, I assess whether OPEC members are acting in a cartel fashion by looking at whether or not their production decisions are coordinated, following Dahl and Yücel (1991) and Gulen (1996). The graphs illustrate differences in members' output over time, with some members increasing output while others decreasing productivity.
Jeff Colgan is associate professor of political science and director of the Climate Solutions Lab at Brown University. He says recent events have put a lot of strain on the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Oil has always glued the two countries together, creating incentives for them to cooperate. U.S. politicians are talking again about "NOPEC" legislation, which would remove OPEC's immunity from anti-cartel laws. OPEC might well be a cartel in a legal sense, but its attempts to collude are highly ineffective.
Saudi Arabia has some market power on its own, but OPEC "collusion" has not added to that. The biggest threat the U.S. can make is to withdraw military protection, but carrying out that threat is something that can only be done once, and would destroy what's left of the relationship. Washington could also withhold intelligence from the Saudis, restrict access to financial markets, or refuse to sell certain weapons.
At Brown University, Jeff Colgan is an associate professor of political science and the head of the Climate Solutions Lab. The U.S.-Saudi relationship, according to him, has been severely strained by recent events. The two nations have traditionally been bound together by oil, which encourages cooperation. Politicians in the United States are once more discussing "NOPEC" legislation, which would end OPEC's protection from anti-cartel laws. Although OPEC may technically be a cartel, its collusion efforts are largely ineffectual.
Saudi Arabia already has some market influence, but OPEC's "collusion" hasn't increased it. The biggest threat the U.S. can make is to cease military protection, but doing so would end the partnership as it currently exists and could only be done once. Washington may potentially refuse to sell certain weapons, block access to financial markets, or withhold intelligence from the Saudis.U.S. legislators have reacted angrily to last week's OPEC declaration that they would be reducing oil production. They contend that by maintaining higher oil prices, OPEC and its most important member, Saudi Arabia, were assisting Russia. At Brown University, Jeff D. Colgan is the head of the Climate Solutions Lab and the Richard Holbrooke Associate Professor of Political Science. I had an email conversation with him to learn more about how his book, "Partial Hegemony: Oil Politics and International Order," contributes to understanding the present OPEC issue.
You talk of "oil for security" agreements, whereby oil-producing nations like Saudi Arabia collaborate with the US on energy in exchange for security. Why are Saudi Arabia and other nations less pleased with these agreements?
A: Saudi diplomats claim that their country offers the United States a number of advantages, such as keeping the price of oil in dollars (which helps keep the dollar as the world's reserve currency) and buying a lot of weaponry from American defense firms. Americans, on the other hand, aren't as convinced about those "benefits" after seeing what the Saudis do with those weapons in Yemen and other places, and Washington is growing increasingly frustrated with the Saudi refusal to influence world oil prices in the direction it desires; instead, the Saudis appear to be assisting Russia by maintaining oil prices. Recent events have put a lot of strain on the relationship, in addition to other long-standing irritants from the Saudi perspective, like U.S. backing for Israel. These tensions can be seen to some extent in the U.S.'s relations with other Gulf monarchy, such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.
A: Can the United States and Saudi Arabia maintain their current political and economic ties?
A: Over the past 80 years, the U.S.-Saudi partnership has weathered numerous ups and downs. The 1973 oil embargo against the United States and the 9/11 attacks in 2001, in which 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis, are only two examples of the historically notable low points. The two nations have long been intertwined by oil, which provides strategic and financial incentives for them to work together despite existing conflicts. But lately, it appears like the relationship is more strained than ever. Saudi Arabia's reputation has been severely damaged by the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, the terrible war in Yemen, and now the support for Vladimir Putin.
Q. Politicians in the United States are once more discussing "NOPEC" legislation, which would end OPEC's protection from anti-cartel laws in the country. You counter that OPEC is not in fact a cartel. What is it, why is it not?
A: OPEC may very easily fall under the legal definition of a cartel, which is a group of producers who band together to try to limit supply and control pricing. However, due of how futile its attempts at collusion are, OPEC is not a cartel in the economic sense. OPEC member nations violated their production quotas a staggering 96 percent of the time, month by month, from 1982, the year OPEC initially implemented production quotas, through 2009, the year my investigation came to a conclusion. Saudi Arabia already has some market influence, but historically speaking, OPEC's "collusion" hasn't increased that influence. Simply put, there isn't much of a correlation between OPEC nations' actual oil production and quota announcements. Despite what OPEC has said, the majority of OPEC members, with the exception of a few extremely wealthy oil-producing nations like Saudi Arabia, are urgently striving to produce and sell as much oil as they possibly can.
You contend that the importance of punishments in the political system of the world is underappreciated. Are there any practical ways for the United States to penalize Saudi Arabia?
A: That is still up in the air. The biggest threat the U.S. can make is to cease military protection, but doing so would end the partnership as it currently exists and could only be done once. In the absence of such action, Washington may take other measures, such as withholding intelligence from the Saudis, limiting access to financial markets, or refusing to supply specific types of weapons. However, these measures would also have drawbacks for the United States.
As the world approaches a post-carbon economy, what will happen to American relations with oil-producing nations?
A: On some level, that is the trillion-dollar question. Like the majority of oil analysts, I anticipate a robust global oil demand for at least another ten years, and even then, a certain segment of the global oil market is probably going to be around for a very long time. Even if electric vehicles become widely used for land transportation, oil is simply too crucial as a petrochemical feedstock and a transportation fuel for at least certain applications, including jet fuel. However, certain nations, particularly those that produce expensive oil like that found in Venezuela or Canada, may eventually see their oil profits decrease to a trickle. Additionally, even while some low-cost oil producers, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, will likely continue to export oil at a profit for many years to come, their strategic relevance to the United States may suddenly fall. There are some indications that those nations are already starting to plan for a time when they will no longer be able to rely on American military protection to ensure their national sovereignty.