@inproceedings{johnson2024dauth,
author = {Johnson, Matthew and Singanamalla, Sudheesh and Durand, Nick and Jang, Esther Han Boel and Sevilla, Spencer and Heimerl, Kurtis},
title = {dAuth: A Resilient Authentication Architecture for Federated Private Cellular Networks},
year = {2024},
isbn = {9798400706141},
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
address = {New York, NY, USA},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3651890.3672263},
doi = {10.1145/3651890.3672263},
abstract = {We present dAuth, an approach to device authentication in private cellular networks which refactors the responsibilities of authentication to enable multiple small private cellular networks to federate together to provide a more reliable and resilient service than could be achieved on their own. dAuth is designed to be backwards compatible with off-the-shelf 4G and 5G cellular devices and can be incrementally deployed today. It uses cryptographic secret sharing and a division of concerns between sensitive data stored with backup networks and non-sensitive public directory data to securely scale authentication across multiple redundant nodes operating among different and untrusted organizations. Specifically, it allows a collection of pre-configured backup networks to authenticate users on behalf of their home network while the home network is unavailable. We evaluate dAuth's performance with production equipment from an active federated community network, finding that it is able to work with existing systems. We follow this with an evaluation using a simulated 5G RAN and find that it performs comparably to a standalone cloud-based 5G core at low load, and outperforms a centralized core at high load due to its innate load-sharing properties.},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2024 Conference},
pages = {373–391},
numpages = {19},
keywords = {LTE, 5G, authentication, cellular networks, secret sharing, community networks},
location = {Sydney, NSW, Australia},
series = {ACM SIGCOMM '24}
}