Glasgow Courier. — 1846-06-25 (Glasgow, Strathclyde, Scotland)

LORD CHIEF-BARON and Mr. Justice WIGHTMAN were of opinion that Mr. Justice Cresswell was right in the view he bad taken of the case at the trial. It was proved that the insurer took poison while in an unsound state of mind. The words in the policy were, "should commit suicide;" and the question related to the meaning of those words. Did they mean the act of a party responsible and capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, or did they mean the act of one who produced his own death while his judgment was perverted by disease, was insane upon every point but that one which caused destruction? What was meant by the word " suicide ?" It was a very modern One; it was first met with in 'Hale's Pleas of the Crown." It was in Blackstone, and in nearly every dictionary, and they rendered it" self-murder"--" the slaying of oneself." Moore, in his book printed in 1790, said there were many exceptions to the general rule of guilt; for although every person who terminated his existence by his own hand committed suicide, yet he did not always commit self-murder. If a man killed himself involuntarily, he came under the legal definition of accidental death. The word had never been used by any law-writer but in the sense of criminally taking away one's own life. Hale defined suicide to be committed when a man of age and discretion, and comps math?, voluntarily killed himself. The question, however, was really what was the meaning of the parties to the policy. The words were, "commit suicide i" hut would that infer the committal of a crime?—' or die by duelling, or by the hands of justice." The latter portion infers a criminal act, not a result of Insanity. The object of the policy generally was to make a provision for the family, and the insurer was protected against accidents. The plaintiffs in error said that if a lean retained just enough intelligence to produce death by competent means, but was deprived of all moral sense, the policy was void. He could not think that the insurer so meant. If his intellect was gone wholly or partially, there could be no difference, for in law a man was either responsible or irresponsible; the gradations were scarcely perceivable. An insane man could no more commit suicide than he could murder, and whether an insane man could intend anything true matter requiring the gravest consideration. Insanity produces delusion, and should a man then mistake an instrument of death for one of music, and instead of playing kill himself; should a man fancy himself an apostle, and so think it his duty to die the death of a martyr—where was the destruction? Some clear and simple rule on this subject ought to be laid down. In his opinion, if death came, whether by affecting the senses or affecting the reason, the insurance office was liable under this policy. If the act was not the act of a sane and reasonable creature, but the event of any delusion, it was not the act of the man. He was, however, sorry to say, that the opinion of the majority of the Court was at variance with Lhat of his brother Wightmau and his own. Baron Parke, Alderson, and Rolfe, and Mr. Justice Patteson were in favour of the plaintiffs in error. The distinction between felon suicide and not felon suicide seemed to show that suicide did not contemplate a criminal act. The meani .1g of the words were, if the man should kill himself: no other question should have been put. If a man voluntarily killed himself, it was of no consequence whether he was sane or not. The judgment of the court below for the present defendant in error must, therefore, be reversed.