The Telegram. — 1900-10-09 (Weymouth, Dorset, England)

MICHAEL HICKS-BEACH RS the British Admiral.  In the Far East the diplomacy of the Government was equally at fault. Briefly the crisis in China arose out of the cession of Kiao-Chow to Germany as a reparation for the murder of some German mission aries. Great Britain, being asked for money, endeavoured to secure certain codcessions—amongst other things that Talienvian, a port immediately abutting on Port Arthur, should be a treaty port. Hence arose "the legend of Talien wan." The country suddenly discovered an uncontrollable passion for this place, of which it had only heard a. few days before, and kiir MICHAEL HICKS•BEACH talked boldly about our demand being persisted in even "at the risk of war." Russia not unnaturally took up the challenge, and secured both Port Arthur and Talien-wan for herself. The Government, on the principle of "any port in a storm," rushed for Wei-hai-wei, and, having secured it, neutralised its commercial value by a gratuitous pledge to Germany, thou sent out a commision to enquire into its value as a Naval station—a subject on which they seemed to have been profoundly ignorant.  But perhaps one of the most humiliating parts of the story is the way in which British ships were withdrawn from Port Arthur. By the Treaty of Tientsin wo have the right to send warships to that port, yet long before Russia got a lease to Port Arthur Lord SALISBURY almost apologised to Russia for sending ships there. This humiliation will long be remembered against us by our enemies abroad, and after it all talk of votes given to the Liberal Party at this Election being cast for KRUGER may be thrown to the winds. The surrender of British interests in Tunis, Siam, and Madagascar under the name of " graceful concessions," an 4 the Government's Indian Frontier policy supply further instances, if such are needed, of the incompetence of tbe Unionist Ministry to carry on the business of the country successfully.  Without repeating the now old story of their deplorable lack of foresight in South Africa, it is now established that the blame which was cast upon the Intelligence Department of the War Office should have been borne by the Government, who apparently had not the common honesty to confess their faults. A very strong light has been thrown upon the state of mind (or, rather, of ,ibsence of mind) in which they entered upon the war by the recent publication of the memorandum prepared fur the War Office sixteen months before the war broke out by Genl. Sir J. C. Aito.koti, the head of the Intelligence Department. A ccipy of this document was captured by the Boers after the abandonment of Dundee. It is dated June, 1899, and shows that the armaments of the Boers were well known to the Army authorities, but not apparently to the Government or to its inner Committee of Defence. Well might Mr. BALFOUR say that "the man in the street knew as much as the man in the Cabinet," and Lord SALISBURY ask "bow on earth they were to Icolc through piano cases." The fact is the Government was ignoract—not because they could not look through a piano case or "see through a stone wall," but because they neglected their duty and did not, apparently, read the information prepared by their own officials. The issue is, however, before the electorate, or as many of them as are not disfranchised by the Tory tactics. If the electorate' condone the five years' failure to maintain British interests abroad and to fulfil social pledges at home, the fault will be largely due to.the cloud of misrepresentation and fable with which the Tory party has covered up its ghastly failures. The victory which will have been won will be' a victory for a party false to its pledges of 1 social eeform, a victory for bungling diplomacy, a victory, in short, for ministerial incapacity and political trickery