The Sun. — 1869-05-13 (London, England)

CALCUAFT. But if he committed any minor offence, such as inciting to the murder of a prince, he would not be removable, except by a special Act of Parliament. The LORD CHANCELLOR can strike off a magistrate by the stroke of his pen ; a judge can be removed on the petition of 'both Liming-of radiaauout ,but a mayor, a mop,  holding magisterial office for only two years, cannot, however outrageous his conduct, be disposed of • unless the Three Estates of the Realm concur in dealing with him. This is really as needless an expenditure of force as setting a steam-hammer to crack nuts. Besides, it involves a serious delay, during which the delinquent might be outdoing his previous proceedings by still more monstrous achievements. Mr. EASTWICK very properly asked if the Government intended to legislate for such a cams omi.ssus as this. Mr. BRUCE not very happily replied that the Government had no such intention, for " legislation ought not to be influenced by passing events." This seems to us very like an absurdity on the part of a Government which was prepared to take so extreme a course as legislating against a particular person. We now know that the law is defective ; we know that in consecuence of this defect the Government may be exposed to an unpleasant dilemma.. It would seem to be but common prudence that, in order to avoid falling into that dilemma again, the defect in the law should be supplied. We did not know of it until " passing events " brought it to light. Not to profit by the lesson which they have taught us would be unwise, woull be unstatesmanlike.  ME. KNATCIIBtLL-HUGESSEN'S bill "for the establishment of County Financial Boards is superior in some respects to previous measures of the kind. In the first place, it possesses the charm of simplicity, consisting of only twenty clauses ; whereas io legislator has hitherto been able to elaborate a Financial Boards Bill with less than six times that number. Previous measures have dealt with a great variety of complex details, but the Government reduces the reform to one of general principles. In the next place, it is not designed to apply the permissive principle to the case of CoOnty Financial Boards, as was done by Mr. WYLIj., and in this respect the course adopted by the Government is probably the best. Thepermissive principle isone that may be adopted with great advantage in numerous instances, but in all legislation affecting jurisdiction and government it is desirable that there should be one uniform rule. A Permissive Financial Boards Act would undoubtedly give rise to fierce county disputes touching the advisability of adopting its provisions; and as the Act might be accepted in one county and rejected in another, an injurious diversity of county government would not improbably be the result. In legislation of this, kind, it is better that Parliament should act directly, and give a final decision which would be applicable throughout England and Wales. At present the functions of the county magistrates at quarter sessions are of two kinds—the trialof prisoners and the administration of the county finances. The Government proposes that the justices retain their judicial power precisely as at present, but the administration of the county is to be taken out of their hands and entrusted to a Financial Board, consisting partly of magistrates and partly of representatives elected by the boards of guardians. To all these provisions no exception can be taken. But at this point the merits of the Government bill terminate. In the most important particular—the constitution of the Board—the measure is thoroughly unsatisfactory, and, indeed, worse than any of its predecessors. Thebill proposes that the representatives be elected in proportion of one to every union with a rental of £50,000 ; two when the rental is between i:50,000 and £lOO,OOO ; three when the sum exceeds this last figure; and four when it is over £150,000. No union, whatever be its rental, can return more than four members to the Board. The result of these stipulations will be that, on the average, the Financial Boards will number five magistrates to every single representative chosen by the guardians. This is simply ignoring the whore principle for which the advocates of the reform contend. Mr.