The Sun. — 1862-03-11 (London, England)

ARMIES.  The Revue Contemporaine publishesan article, by Comte de Latour,',on the important question of the part which cavalry is likely to play in future wars, now that fire-arms have acquired a range far superior to that of former days. Many professional men, since the last Italian war, have expressed the opinion that the number of cavalry ought to be considerably reduced, since the long range will prevent its ever repeating those brilliant charges which won for it an undying reputation in the fields of Rossbach, Hanna, Marengo, Austerlitz, and Essling. Before a mass of cavalry, they argue, can be brought near enough to a square or a battery, it will be crushed by the overwhelming power of ordnance rendered effective at a distance of 2,000 yards, and muskets with a sure range of 800. At Solferina, for instance, the 1 Austrian cavalry, which attempted to charge Gen. 1 Desvauxis squadrons, could not even deploy under the murderous tire of the French rifled guns, which I ploughed their deep ranks. Henceforth, then, according to the adversaries of cavalry, the duties of that art will be reduced to escorts, foraging, and skirmishing parties, and pursuing the enemy after a battle. Comte de Latour is not of that opinion. The proportion of cavalry, he observes, in modern armies is about one-fourth in time of peace, and one-sixth in time of war. In the latter case, France would probably have 100,000 horse in an army of 700,000 men, and this would not be too much. The effect of a well-served artillery will always be terrible, whenever it can enfilade close masses; but it will be much less effective against a cavalry-force masked by woods or ravines, or even concealed at a distance of 1,000 yards by a thick veil of dust and smoke. In such a case, cavalry may resolutely charge a battery; andv this it m its ay even do nehen quite exposed, prod it makes approach in skirmishing order, so that, instead of presenting a deep mass, it may only oppose scattered points to the showers of grape and shot directed against it by the battery. This manoauvre is now I adopted by the infantry, and must shortly be also by cavalry, when, our author believes, it will regain all its superiority of former days, and be able, as before, to extinguish a murderous artillery-fire in the open field, execute offensive movements when there is a long distance to be gone over, break an attacking column, complete the defeat of a wavering army, change a check into a rout, make numerous off and surround singleparti that the opinions now generally held regarding the power of the new fire-arms are vastly es. prisoners, T he and Count ficuntds exaggerated, and shows that many more men were lost in the great battles of the Empire than in the last Italian campaign. At lost 30 per cent., the Austriansute the French lost 14 per cent. At Wagram the loss of the Austrians Austerlitz z per th e c eßussiansnt . of ot h eir army ; was 14, that of the French 13 per cent. At La As Moak°. wa the Russians lost 44 per cent.; at Waterloo the allies lost 31 per cent,, the French 36 per cent. At Magenta, on the contrary, the Austrian loss was not more than 8 per cent., that of the French only 7 ; at Solferino the Austrians sustained a similar loss, and the Franco-Sardinians only lost one-tenth. This may be explained by the fact that a long range obliges the projectile to describe a large curve; thus, according to M. d Azemar, if the column of the Place Vendome were placed between the gun and the mark, the latter being at a distance of 2,500 yards, the projectile would pass clean over the monument without touching it. Count de Latour very justly observes that when the new musket was invented, the same predictions of the future uselessness of artillery Were made as are now brought against cavalry, and concludes with other arguments tending to prove the importance of this section of a regular and well-appointed army.  Tim