The Liverpool Standard and General Commercial Advertiser. — 1845-08-19 (Liverpool, Merseyside, England)

CROWN COURT—THURSDAY. (Before Mr. Baron Rolfe.) The following gentlemen were sworn on the grand jury : Sir Thomas Bernard Birch, Bart., Hazles, Foreman. Sir Peter Hesketh Fleetwood. Bart., M P., Fleetwood. Peter Greenall, Esq., M.P., St. Helen's. William Birley, E,q., Kirkham. William Bolling, Esq., Briton-le-Moors. William Brown, Esq., Liverpool. Elias Chadwick, Esq., Swinton Hall. Edward Every Clayton, Esq.. Carr Hall. Thomas Eastwood, Esq.. Brindle Lodge. John Fletcher, Esq., Vale Bank. William Gale, Esq., Lightburne House. Joseph Langton, sq , Liverpool. Thomas Littledale, jun., Esq., Claremont. John Naylor, Esq , Liverpool. Richard Newsham, Esq., Preston. William R thb -ne, Esq., Grcenbank. Alfred Hudson Royds, Esq., Brown Hill. Samuel Sandbach, E-q., Aigbutth. John Swainson, Esq., Halton Hall. Samuel Taylor, Esq., Ecclestone Hall. Joseph Brooks Yates, Esq West Dingle. Joseph Ridgway, Esq., Wallsuches. Sir Thomas Braneker, Knt., Liverpool. His Lordship, in delivering his charge, dwelt, in his opening remarks, on the unusual number of prisoners, and the brutal character of the offences to be tried at the present assizes. His lordship then referred to education as tending to humanize the mind, and prevent crimes of that description, and proceeded to observe, on the cases of homicide, (twelve in number,) in the calendar. The learned baron said that it appeared to him that almost all the cases are nearly of the same description—all cases of death resulting from brutal violence. These are often cases which it is exceedingly difficult, by any satisfactory decision a priori, to class either within the crime of murder or of manslaughter—the distinction in such cases being one not so much of principle as of degree. Parties may act with brutal violence towards one another upon little provocation. They may quarrel, go out and fight, and the result may be death. Is that manslaughter or murder ?  It is a question often very difficult of solution. The only way to decide it is this, to say that in those cases where the violence has been of a character that to any man, ra tionally reasoning, it must be evident the result would be death, undoubtedly that is murder. It is commonly said the distinction is where a deadly weapon has been used. That is perhaps an illustration of the rule instead of the rule itself, for there may be brutal violence used without  any deadly weapon, and in my opinion, that is as much murder as if a dagger or pistol had been used. On the other hand, there might, by possibility, be other cases in which death may result from violence with a stick or stone, and in which it is not safe to charge it as a case of murder ; for although death may ensue, death does not ordinarily ensue, and the parties may have intended to resort to violence and not have  contemplated  murder  bought up, charging  the grave offence of murder, and the evidence goes to satisfy you there was not any such extreme violence as to lead to the probability that the party must have contemplated the probable fatal result of the violence, it will be your duty to return it as manslaughter only. On the other band, if by the use of a deadly weapon, or extreme violence by a stick or stone, such as would lead you to suppose a fatal result must have been contemplated, and death ensues, then, undoubtedly, you must find a bill for murder. There is one case of a woman charged with the murder of her child by drowning. In that case there is no doubt of the act being done perfectly deliberately, but  there may be extreme doubt whether that woman was not in a state of entire insanity. If the grand jury do not see their way to that conclusion, they must find a bill for  and witnesses were called, several of whom gave an opinion as to the market price of iron about the time of the sale and immediately afterwards. Mr.