The Sun. — 1844-11-20 (London, England)

COLERIDGE—Suppose the plea had set forth the warrant was issued according to the ancient usages of Parliament, should we not be bound to consider it legal ? Mr. KELLY apprehended not, unless the plea set forth that the form had been used at the time of Magna Charta. If it had not, it was contrary to Magna Charta, and, therefore, unless legalised by Act of Parliament, was void. Now, if the warrant were insufficient in itself, he contended that the defendant could not go to the averments of the plea to help it. If a man resisted his arrest under a lawful warrant, and killed the officer, he was guilty of murder-4 the warrant were unlawful it would be justifiable homicide. Now, suppose the plaintiff had resisted, and killed the officer, could it be said to him, " True, the warrant is bad upon the face of it, but then there was behind it a resolution of the House of Commons, of which you could know nothing, inasmuch as it was not set forth in the warrant ; and, therefore, you must be hanged for murder." But, even suppose reference could be made to the averments, he submitted that in these pleas there were no averments which were sufficient to help the warrant. All that was averred was, that the warrant was issued by the proper officer of the House to the proper officer for service, but it left the question of the form of the warrant completely untouched. Now he apperehended that the house of Commons possessed no peculiar privileges of pleading ; they must plead like other people, and tierefore they ought in express terms to have alleged that, according to the usages of Parliament, it was their privilege to arrest upon such a warrant, and even that would have been insufficient unless it was also alleged that such usage had existed at the time of Magna Charta. But, supposing the warrant might be aided by the averment, and that the averments were sufficient, then came the question, had the House of Commons the right to arrest a person to compel him to give evidence, or to arrest him upon a mere charge, without having previously adjudged him guilty of contempt? He apprehended that no such power existed. They had power to summon a witness, and if he refused to obey that summons, they could adjudge him guilty of contempt for such refusal, and imprison him for the contempt; and magistrates possessed the same power; but there was no power to apprehend party for the purpose of bringing h inn up in custody to compel him to give evidence. No doubt all courts had the power of issuing a subpoena to compel the attendance of a witness, and on his refusal to come to attach him for contempt, and punish him for his refusal by imprisonment; but they had no more power by law to apprehend persons and bring them up in custody as witnesses than they had when they were brought into Court to compel them to speak by the application of the torture. If a witness were actually in Court and refused to come forward, no doubt the Court had the power of compelling him to come forward, but the Court had no right to send for him into the next parish, and arrest Mtn to compel him to give evidence, although it might adjudge ih guilty of contempt, and arrest and attach him focatlat contempt, but they could not order him to he arrested and brought u answer a charge ofp to oTfhce opinowirneorn contended cont for on the part of the nemoupst. e power of at once arresting and imprisoning was of the Queen's subjects without any cause assigned atn all— a power which the Court would be slow in admitting.