The Sun. — 1861-11-08 (London, England)

LONDON, FRIDAY, NOV. 8, 1861.  The Federalists seem specially unfortunate in their attacks, and we can hardly wonder they are so slow to make the forward movement in the centre, when every attempt elsewhere is almost certainly followed by defeat. The affair at Edward's Ferry seems, in point of losses, to have been only second to the more disastrous one at Bull's Run. Rout, a deadly rout was the result; panic there was in the proper sense none, for the flight was from a danger but too real and pressing. One shudders indeed at the account of native Americans shooting down from the top of a bluff upon their brethren plunging into the strong current of the Potomac to escape from their deadly fire. In none of the encounters have the Cainite character of the war stood out more painfully than in this murderous attack and repulse. As usual the Federalists seem to have gone forward in utter ignorance of what force was in the neighbourhood on the other side the river. Very singular is it in this war, how much better the Confederates seem to be aware of what is doing in the Federalist camp, what their numbers are and so forth, than vice versa. It is as if the inhabitants north of the Thames could not learn what was going on at Norwood, with all the facilities of one language and of pre-existing friendly relations. It seems evident that the Marylanders so strongly sympathise with the rebels that the South can obtain all the information they need, while the North knows nothing South of the lines covered by its troops; even within range of their glasses, hills and woods effectually cover bodies of troops superior in numbers to their own. The South is evidently best served by voluntary scouts.  The bait which induced the Federals to cross the river appears to have been the report, by a scouting party of their own, of a small Confederate force on the other side the river which might be easily captured. It was thought that 300 men, with a reserve force of 100, might effect the capture. Even for this attempt the means of crossing tl e powerful stream were absurdly insufficient— utterly so should they have to recross in haste. They had only one boat, holding sixteen persons, and two holding four:or five each ; and that though a7canal close at hand could furnish all the boats required. The expected small body of Confederates was not found, but while the Federals, who had crossed, were waiting orders, they were attacked, and fell back on the reserve party of 100. By two o'clock in the afternoon greater numbers of Federals crossed, Colonel BAKER taking the command, and his force numbering about 1,800 men. They had one rifled cannon and two mountain howitzers, all of which were lost in the engagement. But what strikes us most is the want of strategic skill. Thera was, we are told, no want of courage, unless it were on the part of some of those in command. The enemy had no artillery but muskets only, yet they so placed themselves, and the others were so placed, that old Brown Bess was a deadly weapon. The field was bordered on three sides by " thick woods,"and from these in front of the Federal lines— which therefore seems to have marched on a wood— a severe fire was opened. " The cannoniers and artillery horses attached to the field pieces were all shot down at this opening discharge, and the infantry suffered heavily. The guns managed to fire only about half a dozen rounds. Only occasional glimpses of the enemy were obtained, while the enemy's fire was directed, though only musketry, with fearful precision." " As each new line was formed the rebel volleys would seem to meet them and separate them, as if by lightning strokes, into broken and scattered groups." It was a " concentrated fire" from thick woods, rendering retaliation impossible. It reminds us of scenes north of the Potomac, in which WASHINGTON, when a loyal subject of