Forecast Violence and insecurity have been a consistent aspect of life on the Colombia  Venezuela border for many decades, and will likely continue to be regardless of the evolution of the COVID 19 crisis. However, in the current context, changes in the security and livelihoods of the indigenous people in these regions of Venezuela in the near future will likely be influenced by any potential relaxation of the border restrictions. This, in turn, is highly dependent on a number of interrelated variables, including the spread of the virus, the potential distribution of a vaccine, the economic conditions within Venezuela and the region, improvements in the health sector and political relations between the Colombian and Venezuelan governments. As with the future of the virus itself, the intersection of these issues and their impact on the opening of the border is generally a matter of speculation, and there is little strong evidence to support any particular direction. As such, an assessment of the future trajectory of the security and livelihoods context within indigenous community must start with an assumption that the border will remain restricted for at least the remainder of 2020. Within this context, it is difficult to anticipate any scenario that does not include an ongoing deterioration in the humanitarian conditions of these communities. All the drivers of the border dynamics will likely remain the same, namely; an ongoing demand for the use the informal trails by Venezuelans wanting to return home; a potential demand from Venezuelans seeking to enter Colombia; a context of shortages for a range of goods inside Venezuela that supports the black market for smuggled goods; and strong established criminal enterprises that will adapt and violently compete to take advantage of new opportunities presented by the border closures. As with the impact of the closures themselves, the capacity for communities to manage these challenges will differ depending upon their location, society and economy. Specifically, those communities closer to larger population centers and with access to humanitarian support agencies, such as in the states of Zulia and Táchira, may cope relatively better than more remote communities in Apure and Amazonas. Moreover, as with many humanitarian issues that form part of the complex emergency within Venezuela, the response is hampered by weak governmental institutions that are underfunded, focused on the higher population centers, and are often directed to higher priority government requirements such as perceived external military threats. In addition, with respect to indigenous communities, this response is further undermined by a lack of government policies with a clear understanding of the unique requirements of indigenous communities, a poor understanding and lack of respect for indigenous rights, and a lack of indigenous representation in government authorities. Even these issues do not take into account the highly politicized and insecure nature of indigenous policy in general, where fear of reprisals can make some communities hesitant to bring forward their concerns and issues. These external pressures and challenges faced by the indigenous communities does not negate their own agency in determining their future. Many communities are reaching out to the international community for support and working towards improving their access to food, health care, water and sanitation. However, when faced with the additional impacts of the broader humanitarian emergency, as well as those associated with COVID 19 and the government response, the only likely scenario is a steady decline in all humanitarian indictors within these indigenous border communities.