nlp-thedeep/humsetbias huggingface dataset:
The monetization of land has not only created private property and a burgeoning rental market, especially in areas of high fertility farmland; it has also generated a market for wage labour. For those living in the Alel area, and in other fertile areas where lands have been monetized, there are often few other options. In these areas, and in other areas where land is still accessible for free through customary claims, with wages depressed and pressures on cash resources extremely high, old systems of collective labour have apparently ended. Nafir, a traditional communal labour system on household farms for self consumption, has been replaced with ajar, working on farms for cash, or nuz, sharecropping
When people returned after 2007, Luo landholders distributed areas of wild land to formerly displaced people to clear for cultivation. Since 2010, cashrich investors have targeted the area for large scale land purchase. This rate of land privatization has increased since about 2012. Land has been reclaimed from returnee settlers, and new owners have begun to charge rent, sell plots to cash investors and turn their new private property into large individually owned farms. Renting land, formerly a relatively unusual phenomenon, has become common, in particular for very poor farmer residents in Alel.
South Sudan, along with many of its neighbouring countries in north east Africa, faces a seemingly intractable economic crisis. Cycles of civil war and brokered elite peace deals since 2013 have entrenched widespread economic breakdown with locally specific dynamics. This has resulted in increased security surveillance, repression and control. It has also encouraged sustained armed recruitment and out migration across national borders for survival
In Aweil and Khartoum, people debate the extraverted border control policies of the European Union in relation to a wider global framing of race, poverty, education and discrimination, raising the question of whether there is intrinsic human worth.171 Many young people emphasize how Africans are restricted from migration, education and aspiration.
Continued bureaucratic access impediments hamper humanitarian operations in Renk, Renk County. The stand off and protests by youth group continues to impede humanitarian response in Renk County. The youth protest over employment issues deteriorated on 22 October, when they issued new threats to humanitarian partners in Renk and this will have negative impact on vulnerable people. All international humanitarian agency staff were evacuated from Renk and humanitarian assets left behind worth $400 000 were destroyed by the youth in Renk. Similar threats have been registered in Bentiu, Malakal, Pibor, Torit, and Yambio.
UNICEF is appealing for US$180 million to sustain the provision of life saving services for women and children in South Sudan.
Borderland residents and migrants are clear that there can be no real political reform without reform of this economy. This is because the power of local military authorities and state elites rests, to a significant extent, on the financial and military resources they gained  ( and still gain )  from their exploitation of cheap local labour as agricultural and military workers.
114 governance meetings held  ( IOM CCCM ) .
Many young people find themselves trapped in paid agricultural or market work in order to balance the risks and demands of everyday life and invest in their personal and family well being and education. This cheap waged labour serves the interests of the local and national individuals who have monopolized land and trade wealth, including powerful political military elites and their economic and military investments
Torrential rains, extensive flooding, and conflict have disrupted people's access to food and strained the ability of WFP and partners to reach remote locations on a regular basis.
In close coordination with Camp Coordination and Camp Management  ( CCCM )  Cluster and the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Coordination  ( OCHA ) , IOM CCCM mobile teams were mobilized and deployed to flood affected areas to understand the situation of IDPs and respond to their needs.
This information network, and the new online opportunities for discussion of cultural, social and political issues and the economic crisis, are crucial for maintaining social security among young migrant men and women. Online forums are, however, only available to the people with time and money to access them.
Military and security work in the wider region relies on mobile young men and women whose economic and educational aspirations have been cut off at home. A significant lack of other waged work in the civil sector, and very limited paths to expensive, often privatized secondary and higher education, work together to create a large pool of poor but aspiring young people who see the possibilities for education and security in the army, which is the main employer across South Sudan
17,100 mt of food and nutrition assistance distributed*  [ WFP ]
There is little belief in the prospects for peace and structural reform of the political economy in South Sudan in the near future
Trainings were paired with input distributions to create a knowledge base among the targeted communities. As a complementary activity, World Vision rehabilitated markets infrastructure to provide conducive environment that promotes local economy and facilitate commerce and marketing of locally produced crops, livestock and other products produced locally in the Melut where market systems are beginning to function.
Humanitarian or developmental work focused on agricultural subsistence, individual resilience and entrepreneurship does not necessarily help young people navigate the exploitative and volatile rural market economy. With limited access to investment capital, the risks of economic and climactic shocks destroying investments, the threat of land expropriation, and a general lack of healthcare and good education in rural areas, most young men and women have few prospects of building independent and secure livelihoods.
Women's groups were supported with treadle pumps  ( water pumps )  and watering cans to enhance kitchen garden production
Lack of education, secure employment and life prospects combine to drive young men and women onward across borders, towards Egypt, Libya and Europe.
COVID 19 control measures are also likely to continue affecting livelihoods, markets, and trade. This will affect household incomes, reduce their purchasing power, and limit their access to food.
On the Northern Bahr el Ghazal borders with Sudan, and across the region, labour markets are closely controlled by elites with a monopoly on economic and military power. The cheap labour of young people is an essential ingredient for the success of their business and agricultural interests. The interests of this class of people control the migrant pathways that young migrants must negotiate during their attempts to escape the borderland. For these local elites, the current borderland system a semi captive population and regulated border regime works for their own economic betterment.
The military sector now dominates paid employment options for aspirational young people in South Sudan, especially for young men.
The political and economic crises in South Sudan through the 2010s have transformed the political economy of the country and had a serious impact on the life prospects for many young people.
Increased flooding in Ulang that has led to increased IDPs in our catchment areas leading to increased consumption of supplies.
The key drivers of food insecurity in the region were dry spells, floods, incidents of intercommunal conflict, and market price shocks.
Social / physical distancing and wearing mask is another major challenge. i.e. during the travel through boat and among the patients in hospitals etc. Community do not believe that COVID exist and hence do not comply guidelines. Similarly, community also expect cash benefits during the awareness campaigns.
Access due to the rain, flood and rising water levels impeding COVID 19 activities. Similarly, long distance and hot sun also cause challenge to access neighbourhoods.
The gray security status in the Bentiu PoC declared by UNMISS  ( United Nations Mission in South Sudan )  after the PoC youth Threaten to harm any staff from Equatoria, Uganda and Kenya that goes to work in the PoC.
Following the declaration of the COVID 19 pandemic, IOM in coordination with hub management committees, implemented a number of measures to protect the residents and staff. Measures include strict access control, installation of additional hand washing stations, adjusting modality of facility maintenance in the accommodation areas, and creation of self isolation accommodation blocks. During this period  ( 2020 )  there was a significant decline in the number of visiting humanitarian staff due to COVID 19 related travel restrictions by the Government of South Sudan.
COVID 19 funding is reported a major challenge. Some partners have already scaled down activities as well as reduced their staff. World Vision has temporarily suspended operation in Renk County following the Protest by youths.
Following the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan in September 2019, and the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity in February 2020, opportunities for improvements in the lives of the most vulnerable are expected to emerge. However the needs of vulnerable populations continued to compound in quarter two with COVID 19 and associated restrictions significantly affecting humanitarian service delivery in South Sudan.
Loss of livelihood and food – farms and homes submerged in water. Lack of safe domestic water.
Thre is a lack of mosquito net in the admission wards at the POC  ( Protection of Civilians  ) . Insecurity in some of the areas like Ulang is affected provision of services
Increase demand of Health services for the IDPs and host communities because of health facility remains closed in Mangala.
There is Stock out of anti malarial anti biotics, anticonvulsants, analgesics drugs and lack of mosquitos nets. Cold chains and delivery equipment's, need to be improved in different health facilities.
Older persons tend to take less priority in emergency situations the focus is often put on children, therefore older people can feel sometimes abounded by the government and humanitarian agencies. This lack of protection can result in increasing in abuse.
Rain and rising floods water affect the integrated outreach activities in the field. Damage to the WASH facilities is caused due to the flood in different health facilities.
During this period, Budi, Kapoeta North, and Kapoeta South will be classified in Emergency  ( IPC Phase 4 )  acute food insecurity, while the rest of the countries will be classified in Crisis  ( IPC Phase 3 )  acute food insecurity. Food insecurity is expected to be severe among households whose food stocks will have run out and they will be relying on markets for food purchases. In the pastoral areas, livestock are expected to return near homesteads thus increasing availability of livestock products such as milk, even as some green harvest and wild foods become seasonally available towards the end of this period.
The impact of COVID 19 on the volume of traded commodities in the main market in Juba County was apparent and resulted in high prices. The COVID 19 pandemic also pushed large number of people out of jobs and many businesses were closed leaving a substantial proportion of the population with little or no access to food.
Food insecurity was driven by high food prices, unusually heavy rainfall resulting in flooding that caused livestock deaths and destroyed crops, as well as the negative impacts of the COVID 19 pandemic on the lives and livelihoods of the population. The situation was further exacerbated by reported incidences of fall armyworm and desert locusts that further reduced crop yields. Insecurity in Budi and parts of Torit county also negatively affected livelihoods especially trade and markets.
Conflict is likely to increase in pastoral areas as increased competition for resources is expected to start during this period. While the food insecurity is likely to affect the whole population, it is expected to be more severe among recent returnees.
During this period, all counties were classified in Crisis  ( IPC Phase 3 )  acute food insecurity, except for Kapoeta North which were classified in Emergency  ( IPC Phase 4 )  acute food insecurity.
6 confirmed cases in the community have been designated as survivors;  [  EBOLA UPDATE IN DRC  ( as of 30th October 2020 )  ]
The last confirmed case was reported on 28 the September in Makanza Health Zone.  [  EBOLA UPDATE IN DRC  ( as of 30th October 2020 )  ]
Monitoring the FRC  ( Free residual chlorine )  levels at the taps stands in the different sectors, and the concentration of chlorination should maintain at 0.5 1mg/L as the point of collection.
With current COVID 19 Pandemic Outbreak, WASH partners should increase the coverage of hand washing facilities within the PoCs community.
Other Wash intervention like increasing the access for clean water and improving the water storage in the affected individuals should be made urgently by distributing the water storage containers that will be the only way to mitigate this problem and stope the HEV outbreak.
Food insecurity was driven by insecurity mainly in Kajo Keji, Morobo, Yei and Lainya counties, movement restrictions related to the COVID 19 with resultant negative impacts on trade and markets, devaluation of the local currency resulting in high prices of food, and excessive rainfall that resulted in atypical flooding which reduced crop yields and displaced some populations.
During the year 2020 health cluster HRP partners covered 69 counties out of 79 which is 87% of the targeted counties to be reached. There were 14 counties reached by single partner, 21 counties reached by 2 partners, 14 counties reached by 3 partners, 16 counties reached by 4 or 5 partners and 4 counties reaches by 6 or7 partners.
In Upper Nile State, all the counties are classified in either Crisis  ( IPC Phase 3 )  or Emergency  ( IPC Phase 4 )  acute food insecurity across all the analysis periods, with the lean season projection period being the worst. This persistent acute food insecurity is attributed to climatic shocks such as flooding and dry spells, limited livelihood opportunities, high food prices, poor infrastructure, and lack of adequately functioning markets.
Between December 2020 and March 2021, an estimated 1.55 million people  ( 78.3% of the population )  are likely to be in Crisis  ( IPC Phase 3 )  or worse acute food insecurity, of which 822,000 people will likely be in Crisis  ( IPC Phase 3 )  acute food insecurity, 719,000 people will likely be in Emergency  ( IPC Phase 4 )  acute food insecurity, and 11,000 people will likely be in Catastrophe  ( IPC Phase 5 )  in Pibor County in Pibor Administrative Area.
Intensified sub national violence often by highly organized and well  armed youth that includes revenge killings and counter attacks have continued to result in the loss of life, destruction of property, population displacement, deliberate disruption of livelihoods, the loss of livestock, and has restricted access to food sources.
Additionally, the macro economic crisis has continued to result in currency devaluation and high food prices, which has negatively impacted on households'purchasing power and reduced their access to food.
This  ( floods )  damaged homes and public infrastructure, destroyed crops, increased post harvest losses, restricted the gathering of wild foods, resulted in considerable population displacement, disrupted market functionality, led to high commodity prices, and significant loss of livestock due to starvation and disease.
In 2020, Jonglei has experienced compounded shocks across most of the counties which include: an intensification of conflict that resulted in loss of life and assets, displacement, disruption and destruction of livelihoods; a second consecutive year of exceptional 40 – 50 year high floods that submerged human settlements, farmlands and pasturelands as well as disrupted markets and delivery of humanitarian assistance to the flood affected populations; the continuing and worsening macro economic crisis that is resulting in food price hikes due to the devaluation of the South Sudanese Pound; and the indirect effects of COVID 19 that have disrupted livelihoods as well as slowed and restricted the flow and delivery of both commercial and humanitarian supplies and services.
Some 107 incidents directly impacted sectors of humanitarian action, primarily health  ( 32 per cent ) , nutrition  ( 23 per cent )  and food security and livelihoods  ( 19 per cent ) .
Tombek are mainly IDPs from Jonglie while Muni community were affected displaced within their own areas. However, most of them have lost their cereal crop and ground nuts and Bor IDPs have lost everything. This exposes them, especially the vulnerable children, elderly, lactating and pregnant women to malnutrition. Exposure to wild weather, rains and mosquitoes, snakes, crocodiles etc. are a real risk of malaria, upper respiratory tract infections, snake venoms and physical injury or death from crocodile attacks.
Cooperative forms of employment, agricultural production, and mutual social and financial support have all been under significant pressure for generations during the long wars in South Sudan. The increasing monetization of borderland agricultural production and market labour, however, combined with a chronic economic crisis, are undermining the practical possibilities of collective work and atomizing borderland society.
During the FGDs, women reported lack of dignity kits and unavailability of sanitary materials in the markets. Few girls reported that they do not attend a school during the menstrual cycle  [ IRNA Report:  [ Melut IDP settlements, Upper Nile ] ,  [ 12 13 January 2021 ] |
Many people, especially women and rural residents, have no access to phones and instead rely on local radio  ( such as Akol Yam FM in Aweil )  and on hearsay news in the street. Young men who have never travelled northward go with friends who were born in Darfur or Khartoum in order to learn the ropes. Those who do have phones struggle with the cost of direct calls or even the expense of texting someone to set a time for an internet voice call. Short and limited conversations are ‘really very painful' for many people, particularly for residents who cannot read, and therefore cannot read Facebook, and who have lost contact with friends in Khartoum who they fear are taking the ‘desperate journey to Europe'.
As a consequence of the current flooding situation, major supply routes, including the Juba – Bor road, are no longer passable for commercial trucks. To ensure essential commodities can still reach flood affected locations, the Logistics Cluster is temporarily offering bi monthly river movements from Juba to Bor until the road becomes fully accessible.
Over the reporting period, transport of 275 mt of Early Recovery, Food Security, General Operations, General Program, Health, Logistics, Nutrition, Protection, Shelter and WASH cargo to 28 locations was facilitated on behalf of 29 organizations, of which 55 percent was moved by river.
A shortage of health professionals also leaves the country at acute risk. This has been compounded by the departure of many humanitarian actors from the country.
Assess and address WASH needs in the border counties – Akobo; Pochalla; Boma; Kapoeta East
Review and update the contingency stocks for cholera investigation and case management kits
The camp chairmen of D 1, D 2 insisted on the uselessness of vegetables and cereals seeds distribution, as there is no place for agriculture. For the last distribution, the community ate the seeds directly.
5.29 million people  ( 45% of the population )  facing Crisis  ( IPC Phase 3 )  or worse acute food insecurity.  ( January 2020 )  40,000 in Catastrophe 1.11 million in Emergency 4.14 million Crisis
According to WFP/FAO, it is estimated that up to 73,400 ha of cropland is damaged with Twic East, Panyijar & Mayendit experiencing the highest percentage of damage with up to 711,000 animals affected  ( FAO ) . As of 21st October, 856,000 persons have been affected, 389,000 displaced across 37 counties  ( with 11 counties ranked as highest priority for response on either side of the River Nile ) .
Four complaint and feedback mechanisms were established in Pibor town, Gumuruk, Likuangole, and Verteth. 800 Dignity Kits have been allocated for distribution, but an additional 3,123 Dignity Kits are needed in Pibor.  ( Situation Report No. 3, as of 26 February 2021 )
As a best practice we  [ FSL Cluster ]  engaged lead farmers to enhance project sustainability as well as the local agriculture extension officer conducting capacity building, and women participation that encourage self reliance.
One key driver of out migration by young people from rural communities in South Sudan is the search for education. Young migrant workers generally look both to support their siblings and fund their own educational ambitions. Unless they take up military or security work  ( which is only available to young men ) , however, employment options are limited.
The challenges during implementation included:  poor storage facilities leading to post harvest losses, inaccessibility due to poor road and communication network, delayed pipeline on procurement and delivery. Additionally the outbreak of livestock diseases, logistical challenges, limited livestock vendors, flooding and COVID 19 pandemic restrictions affected the project.
In Wau, IOM supported an interstate dialogue to create peaceful coexistence among the farming and cattle keeping communities, attended by 92 members  ( 32 women, 60 men ) . In addition, IOM conducted an inter communal dialogue in Jur River County, attended by 35 people  ( 5 women, 30 men ) .
This borderland political economy therefore had two main effects. First, it traps the workers who cannot afford to escape the daily stress and insecurity, in particular those with dependent elderly family and children whose everyday upkeep is expensive and whom they cannot leave. These trapped people are a useful pool of cheap labour for wealthier residents. Second, it creates a pool of desperate young people, who want better lives but are trapped in South Sudan. This is the foundation for military and migrant labour pathways across the region.
Local analysis of this system often produces a strong critique of the middle and upper classes, which benefit from their monopoly on political economic power, exploiting rather than investing in the country.
It is normal that with the onset of the dry season, before the rains, there is competition amongst livestock keepers over access to good pasture and water. Traditionally this has often resulted in localized conflict and often mediated by local traditional cattle camp and higher level chieftain authorities. However, conflict related to livestock  ( mostly cattle raiding )  has escalated in recent years.
The rise in wage labour, however, along with increasing insecurity  ( due to land alienation, markets and currency shifts, and daily low pay ) , means that most poorer residents are increasingly trapped into dependence on these wealthy landowners. Poor workers rely on extremely short term or day to day loans and costs. For a small tea and coffee business, renting chairs, tea making equipment, borrowing charcoal, and renting market space all come with high interest rates from 10–30 per cent on a month term even when loans are made by church groups or other market workers. ( 2020 )
Despite the ongoing insecurity, relief agencies in Warrap have provided life saving assistance including emergency food, health, nutrition, and WASH support to people affected by communal violence and conflict in several locations of Tonj East in recent weeks.
After the 2005 peace agreement, men and families that had been able to profit from the conflict those who found employment in the humanitarian industries  ( paid in USD ) , lucrative commands within the SPLA and SPLM/A administrations, or in industry and business in northern Sudan began to invest their cash in large privately owned cattle herds. These owners, who are often based in Aweil town or outside the region, and whose children are generally pursuing higher education or employment elsewhere, rely on a cash dependent labour force to manage their herds. This is, however, a relatively new system of wage labour that has created a market for exploitation. With options in the borderland limited, farm owners have a captive and dependent labour pool.
Movement restriction of pastoralists and their herd, including across borders, poses a great risk of animal disease outbreaks. This is due to possible disruption of strategic movements e.g. from wet to dry season grazing areas. During the wet season, restrictions in movement would also result in livestock being held areas infested by ticks, tsetse flies, mosquitoes, internal parasites etc.
In particular, many women have struggled to access good land, or cannot cultivate the land that they do have because they lack the money to address immediate needs  ( for example, food )  while they invest time and energy in cultivation. ( 2020 )
The monetization of land, life and work in this reconstructed borderland has undermined local social security, built an economy that strongly benefits new cash rich elites, and created forms of insecurity and dependency that are useful to military and government authorities. They are able to exploit desperate young people in military and migrant work, within and beyond the borders of South Sudan. ( 2020 )
Large areas of South Sudan will be at the peak of the rains through August – September that is also a time when there is a high prevalence of diseases.As much as possible, animals must be vaccinated according to the seasonal calendar. In areas affected and cut off by flooding there is increased chances of animal disease outbreaks. Animals are generally stressed and conditions are conducive for outbreaks of diseases such as parasitaemia  ( internal and external )  haemorrhagic septicaemia, anthrax, foot rot  ( infectious pododermatitis ) , leptospirosis and, foot and mouth disease among others. Additionally, rangelands are also inundated by flood waters resulting in possible deaths of animals due to starvation.
As compared to February April 2019, the proportion of the population facing Crisis  ( IPC Phase 3 )  or worse acute food insecurity has also decreased by 6 percent. ( February 2020 )
South Sudan is already expecting to have 6.5 million people facing severe food insecurity  ( IPC 3 or worse )  by the peak of the lean season May – July projected by the January IPC analysis. With the arrival now of COVID 19 there is a fear of a Triple Menace: in some locations desert locust damage to crops and pasture is highly likely with a second wave of swarms already in the country and the forecast of ‘above normal' rainfall and flooding for the second consecutive year.
In the past 10 years, with the increase in the number of small arms and other weapons within communities, and the civil war  ( 2013 – 2018 ) , there has been an intensification of conflict, disruption of livelihoods and in the of delivery of essential services, and continuing levels of insecurity.
During the process of reconstruction since 2005, as families rebuilt their homes and lives, residents sought a careful balance between self production during the wet agricultural season and wage labour  ( for cash )  during the dry season. Wage labour included clearing new farmlands for other farmers, working in markets selling imported and locally produced goods, or harvesting cash crops such as sesame and groundnut for commercial farmers. Harvesting is low wage labour and was paid at a daily rate of SSP 300  ( roughly USD 1.00 on the local market )  in the 2019 season
Many young men and women, born in displacement and with primarily urban skill sets, struggled to re establish homes and small village businesses. Military recruitment of underemployed young men continued between 2005 to 2012  ( when South Sudan and Sudan fought a shorter border conflict ) . This was first undertaken by militias affiliated with the South Sudan Defence Forces  ( SSDF ) , a militia coalition that had fought the SPLA during the 1983–2005 war and hoped to be integrated into the post peace army and security services.
Later, the Sudan People's Liberation Army  ( SPLA )  took over recruitment on the disputed border between Sudan and South Sudan as tensions escalated between 2008 and 2012.
South Sudanese families have faced several cumulative cycles of conflicts and mass recruitments, displacement and flight, and return resettlements and reconstructions over the last thirty years. This immediate personal and family history is not just a massive societal and political challenge, it has also fundamentally reshaped economies across the country.
People in the Northern Bahr el Ghazal region on the north west border with Darfur have spent years rebuilding their lives, homes and family security after cycles of regional conflict and famine raiding by the Murahaleen a militia organized by Baggara  ( Misseriya and Rizeigat )  pastoral communities in southern Darfur and Kordofan, funded by the Khartoum government in the 1980s.
Several counties have elevated levels of poor and borderline food consumption including Juba  ( 91 percent  ) , Akobo  ( 96 percent  ) , Canal/Pigi  ( 100 percent  ) , Nyirol  ( 94 percent  ) , Pibor  ( 97 percent  ) , Rumbek North  ( 96 percent  )  Bailet  ( 94 percent  ) , Maban  ( 99 percent  )  and Nagero  ( 95 percent  )  where 9 in 10 households consumed very poor diets. Similarly, at least 8 in 10 households in the counties of Kajo keji, Lainya, Terekeka, Magwi, Ayod, Awerial, Rumbek Centre, Wulu, Yirol East, Leer, Malakal, Ulang, Raja, Wau and Ibba had nutritionally inadequate diets consisting mostly of cereals with very little else during the week preceding the assessment. ( December 2019 )
Financial intermediation is weak and access to finance continues to be a major constraint on firm level competitiveness, resilience to shocks, and growth. The National Bureau of Statistics, Integrated Business and Enterprise Survey  ( 2019 )  indicate that 44% of sampled firms reported having an SSP checking account and 10% have a foreign currency account. However, firms essentially do not use the formal financial system to access finance and hardly any businesses take formal loans   even among large firms. Only about 3% of firms have taken a bank loan over the past three years, and even among large firms, this share is only 6%. Similarly, businesses say they cover losses from shocks through loans or gifts from family and friends  ( 67% )  or using earnings or cutting salaries  ( 30% ) . A mere 7% said they had borrowed from a bank, again with no higher use of credit among large firms. While almost all loan applications require collateral, whose value is usually more than double the loan value, the land market is undeveloped, further constraining access to finance. In addition, property rights are not established and legislation allowing the use of chattels does not exist.
In Juba, the depreciation of the SSP led to a rise in the cost of food basket by about 42% between August to mid September 2020. These developments have led to a rise in the share of food expenditure, leaving households little to no resources to cover non food needs, and depressing demand for the many self employed South Sudanese offering non food goods and services. There is a real risk that these price hikes will result in widespread poverty and force more people into a position where they depend on food assistance.
Protection: Funded: 43%, Unmet: 57%
Inflation was high but declining in the pre COVID 19 period. According to official data from the South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics, inflation had declined to 38% in May 2020 from 69% in December 2019, continuing a downward trend that started in the second half of 2019 after inflation peaked at 171% in October 2019. However, these trends are not supported by data from alternative sources as prices of essential commodities spiked starting in the first quarter of 2020, probably reflecting COVID 19 effects.
In situations when women seek assistance after being exposed to such violence, the locally prevalent and the INGO paths when addressing SGBV cases look more similar than one would anticipate. Based on reconstructions by national and expatriate staff working in health facilities in Akobo and Pibor, as well as by speaking to young female respondents, it seems that women seeking assistance navigate across both domains, because INGO/state and customary practices around sexual violence are intertwined.
Violence against women and girls, particularly sexual violence, is prevalent in South Sudan. For international agencies, as well as the Nuer and Murle communities, rape and sexual violence against women and girls is unacceptable. A representative of a Western government in Juba interviewed for this study affirmed this, stating: “if someone has committed sexual violence against a woman there must be an immediate intervention. There can be no impunity. This is non negotiable.'37 A member of a chief court38 in Pibor town   whose mandate is to harmonize Murle, Anyuak, Jiye and Kachepo customary law in former Boma State   said that sexual violence is taken very seriously, and should be responded to with three years' imprisonment, according to the penal code of South Sudan. These kinds of statements are often accompanied with a certain frustration around the fact that many cases of violence are thought to go unreported.
The COVID 19 response benefited approximately 28,160 households  ( 140,800 individuals )  who were provided with household WASH items such as such as soap and buckets with tap for handwashing; buckets without tap for water storage; Aquatabs for water treatment; PuR for water purification and chlorine for community handwashing facilities.
While the legitimate concerns of senior organizational staff, cluster members, the MoGEI and donors, all of whom were based in Juba, about the payment of double incentives were properly addressed, from the community's perspective, although locally based teachers were consulted, the outcome did not appear to take into account their wishes. It must be noted, that the payment of teacher's incentives can be a touchy political issue in many communities, resistance to such changes can reflect other issues not related to education, including pressure from local leaders, and could have a negative impact on how the community interpreted these changes. Nonetheless, the consequences of this decision are not insignificant for teachers: while they may be materially more wealthy than others in Akobo, they still live close to the edge, and less frequent or delayed incentive payments would affect their ability not only to meet their own needs, but also to fulfil their obligations to other members of their families or social networks.Lastly, resources linked to services including incentives can be deeply political and contentious particularly when it comes to the aid community directly paying incentives to teachers and health providers. The aid community's transition in payment structure may not have taken into account the unintended consequences on the horizontal relationships of reciprocity and accountability that teachers themselves were operating within and affected populations could not easily access information or raise concerns.
Regardless of displacement status or location, the average severity of WASH needs across South Sudan remained, as in Round 23 and Round 24, at Level 4  ( Alert ) . Throughout the country, 50 counties were classified as Level 4, 27 as Level 3 and only one, Magwi, in Level 2. Nevertheless, important differences were observed between population groups, settings, and regions and the different composite indicators. Great Bahr el Ghazal  ( GBeG )  11 and Greater Upper Nile  ( GUN )  12 also had severity rankings of Level 4  ( averaging 3.8 and 3.7 respectively ) , though the severity per indicator varied by states. Greater Equatoria  ( GE )  had the lowest overall severity ranking at 3.4. ( December 2019 )
According to the OCHA 16, armed clashes/ cattle raiding were reported in Lainya, Central Equatoria; Torit, Eastern Equatoria; Maiwut, Upper Nile; and Tonj, Warrap in August 219, resulting in displacements, market and trade disruptions and suspension of humanitarian activities. Clashes and ambushes between signatories and non signatories of the peace agreement also continued although at a lower scale and intensity than before ( December 2019 )
The decision making process around which the aid community and national government sought to manage the distribution of teachers' incentives in Akobo is an example of the gap between the AAP framework as policy and its implementation. Since teachers have low and infrequently paid salaries by the Ministry of General Education and Instruction  ( MoGEI )  incentives paid by donors and NGOs usually represent their only form of income. According to respondents in town, prior to August 2019 when interviews were conducted, two organizations  ( organizations 1 and 2 )  funded through different mechanisms were providing incentives to teachers in Akobo. When it turned out that some of the teachers   reportedly 52 out of 331   were receiving incentives from both organizations, it was agreed at the Juba level by the MoGEI, the donor and the Education Cluster that to address the double payments a single organization would take over the distribution of all teachers' incentives in Akobo. This was part of a larger donor funded programme, IMPACT, which was covering teacher incentives in other parts of South Sudan.
In Akobo, if a Nuer man is known to have behaved against socially accepted values, for example if he is thought to be guilty of theft, adultery, domestic violence or even murder, people will not immediately talk about it in public. But when this person engages in important public rituals, such as the marking or marriage of his child, the wives of the members of his age set will gather to sing songs about all his wrongdoing in public. 27 This can have serious consequences for the status and social standing of one's descendants, as in the future, his sons or daughters may struggle to find a family who will allow their children to marry them or accept them in positions of responsibility within the community. As a result, among the Nuer, women do have the means to hold individuals to account for transgressing social norms, using public shaming as a strong deterrent against breaking social rules.
The decline over the past few decades in the ability of administrative chiefs to hold youth to account is undeniable. The pivotal causes of this are civil war and social change. During the second civil war  ( 1983 2005 )  the SPLM/A introduced the Civil Administration of the New Sudan  ( CANS )  including the local administrators who to some extent competed with chiefs.22 Particularly during times of civil war, chiefs in many areas of South Sudan were forced to engage in unpopular activities such as recruitment of fighters and collection of food. During civil wars, armed groups and government actors appointed chiefs and in some cases punished and even killed chiefs for their lack of cooperation or  ( perceived )  collaboration with the enemy
Logistics: Funded: 51%, unmet: 49%
The modern state in South Sudan is governed primarily by urbanized, male elites. Rural areas are interwoven with this elite in complicated ways. Networks based on reciprocal relationships link individuals and communities at the local level with the political elite at the state and the national level as well as urban and rural contexts. The rise of political leaders in South Sudan is dependent on both their ability to attract and redistribute scarce state resources, as well as to mobilise young men from rural areas, who expect that they and their communities will benefit from these resources
IOM estimated funding gaps of USD 2.5 M for S NFI pipeline and USD 2 M for the WASH Pipeline to replenish supplies and support the emergency flood responses 2020.
From the WASH pipeline approved requests, 22  ( 39% )  were for flood and COVID 19 responses in Bor South, Gogrial East, Juba, Fangak, Malakal, Mundri East, Mundri West, Mvolo, Nyirol, Panyijar, Rumbek, Terekeka, Tonj South, Twic East, Wau and Yirol East.
IOM Core Pipeline prepositioned 925 metric tons of critical items to key IOM logistic hubs in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, Rumbek, and Wau. Prepositioning is a vital activity of Core Pipeline as it serves to anticipate increased demand for emergency WASH and S NFI supplies during the five to six months of rainy season.
The risk of COVID 19, Ebola, cholera, hepatitis E, measles, meningitis, malaria, and yellow fever are ever present. Currently, there are outbreaks of hepatitis E, measles, malaria, cholera, and yellow fever in parts of the country or in neighboring countries.
Among businesses, four in five  ( 81% )  reported a decrease in income, including 59% who said income had declined by half or more. Among the largest activity groups, those active in hospitality were particularly likely to report a loss of at least half of their incomes  ( 76% ) . The considerable levels of income loss are mirrored in recent household survey data  ( Table 12 ) .35
Since 2018, with the commencement of the Beyond Bentiu Response  ( BBR )  missions in Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei states, the use of the Common Transport Services trucks shifted to encompass deliveries of relief items to medium distance destinations.
The loss of income caused by the pandemic has taken a toll on welfare. Many households experience the pandemic as a series of shocks that affect health, business activities, jobs, and prices. The loss of income caused by the pandemic has taken a toll on welfare. Floods, crime, and violence have added additional challenges for households struggling to maintain a livelihood. Among those affected by the crisis, most took action to try to mitigate shocks – most often, through a new income generating activity, or through help from their friends and family. However, despite these efforts, food insecurity remains very high. While it is at worrisome levels even among those households that report no losses due to the pandemic, it is yet more pronounced among those who have suffered adverse effects.
The worsening of demand and market access is a significant concern, given that even prior to the crisis, households, market traders, and business alike perceived these as a key obstacle.31 Inability to obtain required inputs was a cause of revenue loss for 13% of households, while restrictions on traveling or transporting goods affected a little more than one in ten households.
The main business obstacles today are the same as what respondents expressed when surveyed in 2019, but with the exception of insecurity, they have tightened. When surveyed in mid 2019, households, market traders, and businesses consistently identified insecurity, bad roads, access to funding, and low demand as their main obstacles. When re surveyed in June 2020, businesses and traders flagged the same constraints, but were likely to say that the constraints had become more difficult to navigate. A notable and welcome exception is that businesses were more likely to report an improvement in the security situation  ( 44% )  than a deterioration  ( 28% ) . Surveys in 2019 did not directly ask about inflation as an obstacle, while in 2020, inflation was the third most frequently cited obstacle among market traders, and the second most frequently cited among businesses, and 70% of businesses felt that its impact had worsened.
A majority of market traders explained that they had fewer customers on a typical market day  ( 63% ) , and that individual customers bought less  ( 60% ) , resulting in lower overall sales  ( 58% ) . Among businesses, most  ( 73% )  said that demand for their products had declined, and every other business  ( 52% )  said that it had dropped by half or more. While most businesses reported such a substantial drop in demand, larger businesses  ( 57% )  were somewhat more likely to experience it than micro businesses  ( 48% ) , and those in hospitality  ( 63% )  more so than those in other large activity groups.
Households report some difficulties in accessing markets, health care, and education.
For instance, the latest IOM WHO estimates show that 23.7% of IDPs and 25.4% of returnees live in settlements located more than 5km from a functional health facility while 0.3% of IDPs and 0.5% of returnees live in settlements that are within the 5km range of facilities with only limited functionality. The states with the largest health access gaps in terms of population are Upper Nile  ( 25.1% of IDPs and returnees live in settlements more than 5km from the closest functional health facility ) , Jonglei  ( 26.9% of IDPs and returnees )  and Warrap  ( 31.5% of IDPs and returnees ) .
In addition to flooding, the heightened conflict intensity has been a major driver of displacement. According to DTM event tracking data, more than 170,000 IDPs got displaced due to sub national and inter communal violence between January and early October 2020. Another 230,000 got displaced due to floods. The majority of displacement events tracked by DTM occurred in Warrap, Jonglei and Central Equatoria states.
South Sudan has had 1.6 million internally displaced persons  ( IDPs )  who arrived between 2014 and 2020 and about 1.5 returnees who reached their areas of habitual residence since 2016.
The vast majority of IDPs  ( 94% )  were previously displaced only within South Sudan whereas the remaining 6% were previously displaced abroad. Likewise, most of the returnees arrived from within the country  ( 67% )  while 33% returned to their areas of habitual residence from displacement abroad, mainly Uganda.
Access to basic hygiene has improved but many households lack improved water, sanitation and hygiene facilities, reflecting the general lack of service delivery.
In addition, 24% of the households with a physically/mentally disabled/chronically ill or injured member faced severe food insecurity. Food insecurity was shown to be higher among households without access to general food distribution in the last month preceding the survey, facing severe food insecurity  ( 27% ) , and lower among households that benefited from the general food distribution  ( 23 % ) .
COVID 19 exacerbated the food insecurity situation, with the disruption of supply chains and increase in market prices. Based on the FAO's Integrated Food Security Phase Classification  ( IPC ) , acute food insecurity increased during 2020 from 45% of households falling into acute food insecurity category in January, to 51% for the period February to April, and to 55% during the period May July 2020.
Disaggregating by state shows that Jonglei state has the highest percentage of households which rely on food assistance  ( 24% )  followed by Unity state  ( 19% )  and Upper Nile  ( 8% )  in that order.
Household food insecurity remains high in South Sudan and the percentage of moderately and severely food insecure households have increased over time. The high levels of food insecurity are driven by the insecurity which caused population displacements and livelihood disruptions; climatic shocks, including floods, have over the years led to crop destruction that impeded households' access to various food sources such as wild foods, fish and livestock products.
The states with the high proportion of households with at least one member who migrated include Jonglei  ( 39% ) , Unity  ( 37% )  and Upper Nile  ( 35% )   ( see Figure 17 ) . Migration is mainly driven by insecurity, food scarcity, and poor access to social services, among others. While rural urban migration is good for skilled persons who are able to get better paying jobs and improve their livelihoods, it might have negative consequences for the unskilled, who after failing to obtain better opportunities may resort to the next available occupations, including crime. In this analysis, the data shows the destination of emigrants and what they are doing.
At the same time, COVID 19 restrictions affected access to schools and hospitals, disrupted humanitarian programs, and reduced market activity, including cross border trade.