Neoconservatism isn't conservatism, or the answer . "Neoconservatives were the boat people of the McGovern revolution that was itself the political vehicle of the moral, social, and cultural revolutions of the 1960s."    A key to understanding neoconservatism is that it is not a sibling or an "update" of traditional conservatism. To see it that way will only mislead you. Neoconservatism's roots have sprouted from the left more than the right. The current GOP "may be Reaganite in its tax policy, but it is Wilsonian in its foreign policy, FDR in its trade policy, and LBJ all the way in its spending policies. Pragmatism is the order of the day. The Republican philosophy might be summarized thus: "To hell with principle; what matters is power, and that we have it, and that they do not."    But when one becomes one's enemy, who won?    Conservatives are nationalists. Neoconservatives are internationalists. Conservatives are protectionists. Neoconservatives are free traders. Conservatives see the culture war as essential. Neoconservatives see it as a distraction. Conservatives believe in defending the land militarily and project our ideals by example. Neoconservatives believe in defending it offensively and projecting our ideals by force.    The neoconservatives and presidential candidate George W. Bush were a match on domestic policy in 2000 (Bush didn't propose a single spending cut in his campaign), but it appears that they hijacked his foreign policy, whatever it used to be. (Given the events of his presidency, it's a startling reminder that this same president couldn't name four world leaders when he was quizzed during the 2000 campaign.) That foreign policy was the defense and advancement of world democracy, something that has never been America's aim. The only proactive foreign policy we've ever had was the Truman Doctrine, a stance we took when the Soviet menace showed itself to be aggressive and a real threat to the United States, our allies, and our real interests. The Clinton interventions, misguided as they were, were at least brief and limited, nothing that risked expansion into a long-term, regional conflict. The same cannot be said of Iraq.    Mr. Buchanan gives a chapter-length history of Islam and Europe, setting the scene for 9/11. The following war in Afghanistan was just and necessary, and quite a diplomatic masterpiece, one that could have been the foundations for better relations with the Middle East, which had shown considerable support for our efforts against al Qaeda. Iran, an al Qaeda enemy, voluntarily offered help in Afghanistan, but Bush soon after named it among the "axis of evil". The neocons had attached their agenda to the unclear war on terror to advance a war on Iraq, a war that the neocons had pursued for years, and to be followed with a frightening series of wars throughout the region. The war on terror evolved into a quest for worldwide democracy, buffered with a moral imperative that our diseased culture violates in almost every way, and with the unrealistic belief that the Middle East wants democracy, even though they've never chosen it themselves. Mr. Buchanan also offers a study of terrorism, and what a touchy thing it is: the weapon of the weak, the reaction to empire, the stuff of martyrdom.    With new bases in central Asia, the invasion of Iraq, and talk of much more war, the neocons were starting to frighten the world. China, now surrounded by U.S. bases, began building and tailoring its military for our encirclement, and leading the all-offense neocons to believe that war with them could be expected, even though their going to war with us would have been suicide. China wasn't just preparing for us: it was reacting to us. The neocons were reacting to a world of their own making: filled with nations that wouldn't war with us if they were democratic. This is utterly divorced from conservatism, historic American foreign policy, and moral, Constitutional, and realistic restraint. Perhaps it's for the best in the long term that Iraq didn't turn out; that madness seems to be coming to an end. Even the neocons seem to believe that failure is now an option.    Mr. Buchanan then turns to the domestic issues: the disaster of free trade, the continuance of big government, and the imperial judiciary. However, about all you'll find is that neoconservatives are a problem in the sense that they're not the solution. Cultural issues have given them plenty of chances to fight and solidify their base, but they've been silent, and often quick to fund whatever nonsense demanded funding to keep the issue from open debate and away from the hands of the Democrats. Neoconservatives seem to have concluded that big government gets votes, and that social issues are a distraction. But the culture war truly began with the horrid Warren court, while Congress didn't use its Constitutional power to hold it back. The neoconservative GOP seems too focused on bad foreign and economic policy to be concerned with the judicial usurpation of power it wasn't meant to have. Neoconservatism hasn't corrected wrongs; it has created more of them.    I was hoping for some answers to an overall question I've had about neoconservatism: where is all of this going? How do massive debts get paid when spending is out of control and manufacturing is sent overseas? Where does peace begin after perpetual war? Mr. Buchanan doesn't offer anything here but the question. Perhaps that's for the neocons themselves. Perhaps even they don't know.    "Where the Right Went Wrong" could be the prequel to "State of Emergency" in that this book is a good summary of Bush's first term, whereas the latter defines the pressing issue of the second. However, this book includes an afterward, written in early 2005, summarizing the voters' response to the electric 2004 election, and defining the battle lines within the GOP between traditional conservatives and neoconservatives, the fighting between which began almost as soon as the 2004 returns were in
Output: POS