Blix couldn't take the candy from a baby -- just too kind. . &quot;Disarming Iraq&quot; is Hans Blix's thought-provoking and historically-important memoir of the few but critical months leading up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, during which he tried to paint a clear picture -- for the UN and the world -- of his inspection team's findings, claiming no need for urgency and lobbying for diplomacy.      The polarized atmosphere was palpably tense: while the U.S., the UK and Spain insisted that Iraq was not responding to inspections, France, Germany and Russia asserted with equal force that the inspection program had never been fully explored.       Parting the raging waters (for a few weeks, anyway) was the quintessential diplomat Hans Blix. As it reads, he was too diplomatic, unwilling to state his results confidently for fear that it might drive UN policy. It didn?t help that he had a few doubts of his own; that in spite of not finding any &quot;smoking guns&quot; in terms of banned weapons, he still sensed that Iraq was playing a cat-and-mouse game. Either the regime's odd narcissism allowed it to believe that it did not have to comply with the UN, or it was hiding something. Either way, Blix's hesitation was enough to set the stage for Colin Powell's historic February 5, 2003 presentation of evidence of WMD?s in Iraq, which was more or less the proverbial point of no return.      Apparently, what Mr. Blix was trying to tell us -- before he was drowned out by the noisy din of a fearful and overzealous media -- is now common knowledge about WMD?s in Iraq: Blix's commission failed to find anything not because the Iraqis succeeded at hiding the weapons, moving them ahead of inspections, but because the weapons really weren?t there. Iraq had disarmed at the end of the Gulf War in 1991, just as they?d claimed. The UN inspection program had worked -- without knowing it.      So how did the war move forward under false pretenses? According to Blix, &quot;a deficit of critical thinking&quot; was to blame. He speculates that our Congress would never affirm the use of force merely to end a reign of terror (even though Blix himself wishes for a UN resolution against brutal dictatorships). The Bush administration had to justify war in Iraq by linking it to terror, and since there was no real link, it had to capitalize on the &quot;theoretical&quot; link of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.      This is as far as his speculation goes. Where the phrase &quot;military industrial complex&quot; would seem most natural and expected -- followed by a salacious tell-all about Bush, Cheney and nefarious links to Saudi oil -- Blix cleverly sidesteps the issue of America's impatient itch for war by feigning ignorance. Giving Blix the benefit of the doubt, perhaps he prefers to be thought of as naive and not sensational.      Needless to say, Dr. David Kelly's death (the British scientist who leaked to the BBC that the British government had &quot;sexed up&quot; a document alleging Iraq's nuclear capabilities) was an &quot;unfortunate suicide&quot; -- and not the work of a shadow government. (The entire document, by the way, turned out to be a forgery.)      At least Blix observed the &quot;horse trading&quot; (&quot;intense economic and diplomatic pressures&quot;) our government used to obtain votes from other countries -- votes needed to pass the UN resolution authorizing the use of force -- as well as he disapproved the Bush administration?s spying on UN delegations while on their diplomatic visits to New York. Blix had other objections to U.S.-led efforts, but they are all based on facts and evidence, and are in defense of IAEA (a previous inspection organization, also headed by Blix) and UNMOVIC (the UN's Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission).      Interestingly, the largest setback to diplomacy was related to a 167-page &quot;cluster&quot; document released by Blix in early March of 2003, which summarized all the inspections for the three preceding months. Unfortunately for France and Germany, American and British members of UNMOVIC leaked pre-release draft copies of the document. In other words, France and Germany had much less time to prepare their official reactions to the cluster document than their British and American counterparts. Their positions, in favor of renewed inspections, were not as compelling.      While Blix?s passion is definitely enough to carry his memoirs, one can easily see why it was so difficult for Americans to take Mr. Blix seriously: he lacks that forcible personality that commands respect. Even so, he is gifted with an even temperament, a good sense of humor, and a deeply-imbued sense of integrity, all important qualities for diplomacy. Although he may have been the only individual capable of peaceably bridging the large gap between the UN and Iraq, in retrospect it may have been asking too much from some of our leaders to match Blix?s diplomatic efforts in their reasonableness and patience
Output: POS