SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Secret Service Protective Privilege 
Act of 1999''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The physical safety of the Nation's top elected 
        officials is a public good of transcendent importance.
            (2) By virtue of the critical importance of the Office of 
        the President, the President and those in direct line of the 
        Presidency are subject to unique and mortal jeopardy--jeopardy 
        that in turn threatens profound disruption to our system of 
        representative government and to the security and future of the 
        Nation.
            (3) The physical safety of visiting heads of foreign states 
        and foreign governments is also a matter of paramount 
        importance. The assassination of such a person while on 
        American soil could have calamitous consequences for our 
        foreign relations and national security.
            (4) Given these grave concerns, Congress has provided for 
        the Secret Service to protect the President and those in direct 
        line of the Presidency, and has directed that these officials 
        may not waive such protection. Congress has also provided for 
        the Secret Service to protect visiting heads of foreign states 
        and foreign governments.
            (5) The protective strategy of the Secret Service depends 
        critically on the ability of its personnel to maintain close 
        and unremitting physical proximity to the protectee.
            (6) Secret Service personnel must remain at the side of the 
        protectee on occasions of confidential conversations and, as a 
        result, may overhear top secret discussions, diplomatic 
        exchanges, sensitive conversations, and matters of personal 
        privacy.
            (7) The necessary level of proximity can be maintained only 
        in an atmosphere of complete trust and confidence between the 
        protectee and his or her protectors.
            (8) If a protectee has reason to doubt the confidentiality 
        of actions or conversations taken in sight or hearing of Secret 
        Service personnel, the protectee may seek to push the 
        protective envelope away or undermine it to the point at which 
        it could no longer be fully effective.
            (9) The possibility that Secret Service personnel might be 
        compelled to testify against their protectees could induce 
        foreign nations to refuse Secret Service protection in future 
        state visits, making it impossible for the Secret Service to 
        fulfill its important statutory mission of protecting the life 
        and safety of foreign dignitaries.
            (10) A privilege protecting information acquired by Secret 
        Service personnel while performing their protective function in 
        physical proximity to a protectee will preserve the security of 
        the protectee by lessening the incentive of the protectee to 
        distance Secret Service personnel in situations in which there 
        is some risk to the safety of the protectee.
            (11) Recognition of a protective function privilege for the 
        President and those in direct line of the Presidency, and for 
        visiting heads of foreign states and foreign governments, will 
        promote sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need 
        for probative evidence.
            (12) Because Secret Service personnel retain law 
        enforcement responsibility even while engaged in their 
        protective function, the privilege must be subject to a crime/
        treason exception.
    (b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are--
            (1) to facilitate the relationship of trust and confidence 
        between Secret Service personnel and certain protected 
        officials that is essential to the ability of the Secret 
        Service to protect these officials, and the Nation, from the 
        risk of assassination; and
            (2) to ensure that Secret Service personnel are not 
        precluded from testifying in a criminal investigation or 
        prosecution about unlawful activity committed within their view 
        or hearing.

SEC. 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF PROTECTIVE FUNCTION PRIVILEGE.

    (a) Admissibility of Information Acquired by Secret Service 
Personnel While Performing Their Protective Function.--Chapter 203 of 
title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 
3056 the following:
``Sec. 3056A. Testimony by Secret Service personnel; protective 
              function privilege
    ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
            ``(1) Protectee.--The term `protectee' means--
                    ``(A) the President;
                    ``(B) the Vice President (or other officer next in 
                the order of succession to the Office of President);
                    ``(C) the President-elect;
                    ``(D) the Vice President-elect; and
                    ``(E) visiting heads of foreign states or foreign 
                governments who, at the time and place concerned, are 
                being provided protection by the United States Secret 
                Service.
            ``(2) Secret service personnel.--The term `Secret Service 
        personnel' means any officer or agent of the United States 
        Secret Service.
    ``(b) General Rule of Privilege.--Subject to subsection (c), 
testimony by Secret Service personnel or former Secret Service 
personnel regarding information affecting a protectee that was acquired 
during the performance of a protective function in physical proximity 
to the protectee shall not be received in evidence or otherwise 
disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any 
court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or 
other authority of the United States, a State, or a political 
subdivision thereof.
    ``(c) Exceptions.--There is no privilege under this section--
            ``(1) with respect to information that, at the time the 
        information was acquired by Secret Service personnel, was 
        sufficient to provide reasonable grounds to believe that a 
        crime had been, was being, or would be committed; or
            ``(2) if the privilege is waived by the protectee or the 
        legal representative of a protectee or deceased protectee.
    ``(d) Concurrent Privileges.--The proximity of Secret Service 
personnel to a protectee engaged in a privileged communication with 
another shall not, by itself, defeat an otherwise valid claim of 
privilege.''.
    (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The analysis for chapter 
203 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the 
item relating to section 3056 the following:

``3056A. Testimony by Secret Service personnel; protective function 
                            privilege.''.

SEC. 4. APPLICATION.

    This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall apply to any 
proceeding commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act.
Output: Secret Service Protective Privilege Act of 1999 - Amends the Federal criminal code to prohibit testimony by Secret Service personnel or former personnel regarding information affecting a protectee (defined as the President, Vice President, and specified other officials) that was acquired during the performance of a protective function in physical proximity to the protectee from being received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof. 
Makes exceptions: (1) with respect to information that, at the time it was acquired by Secret Service personnel, was sufficient to provide reasonable grounds to believe that a crime had been, was being, or would be committed; or (2) if the privilege is waived by the protectee or the legal representative of a protectee or deceased protectee. 
Specifies that the proximity of Secret Service personnel to a protectee engaged in a privileged communication with another shall not, by itself, defeat an otherwise valid claim of privilege.