SECTION 1. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Military operations in Afghanistan have cost American 
        taxpayers more than $200,000,000,000 in deficit spending since 
        2001.
            (2) Particularly given current record deficits, high 
        unemployment, and proposed reductions in domestic spending, the 
        United States should ensure future war expenditures in 
        Afghanistan do not add to the deficit and ensure that resources 
        are not squandered on waste, fraud, abuse, or corruption in 
        Afghanistan.
            (3) United States military and nonmilitary operations in 
        Afghanistan, including those conducted by contractors, must be 
        subject to the highest standards of transparency and 
        accountability, and subject to the review of appropriate 
        inspectors general.
            (4) According to the most recent Army Mental Health 
        Advisory Team Assessment, one in five soldiers surveyed in 
        Afghanistan reports having psychological problems.
            (5) The United States needs a comprehensive strategy to 
        counter the global threat posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates 
        in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, North Africa, and elsewhere around 
        the world.
            (6) A massive, open-ended United States military presence 
        in Afghanistan is unlikely to advance, and may undermine, 
        United States efforts to eliminate the safe haven for al Qaeda 
        in Pakistan and combat al Qaeda globally.
            (7) Rather than engaging in a nation-building effort in 
        Afghanistan, the United States should begin reducing troop 
        levels in Afghanistan and transition to a sustainable 
        counterterrorism policy.
            (8) President Obama announced on December 1, 2009, that 
        United States troops would begin to be withdrawn from 
        Afghanistan in July 2011.
            (9) The United States remains committed to providing long-
        term economic, diplomatic, and political support to the people 
        of Afghanistan, and to supporting the emergence of a 
        legitimate, effective government in Afghanistan.
            (10) The United States will continue to provide economic, 
        development, and political support for women's rights, 
        education, and leadership in Afghanistan.
            (11) The August 20, 2009, presidential election in 
        Afghanistan was characterized by widespread fraud, and there 
        are credible reports of widespread corruption.
            (12) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral 
        Michael Mullen, has acknowledged that the greatest threat in 
        Afghanistan today is the ``lack of legitimacy in the 
        government--at all levels'' and that the United States Armed 
        Forces cannot solve the legitimacy problem.
            (13) General McChrystal has acknowledged that United States 
        partnerships with ``polarizing and predatory'' powerbrokers, 
        including in the Afghan National Security Forces, compromise 
        the ability of the United States to address the lack of 
        legitimacy in the Afghanistan Government.

SEC. 2. PLAN FOR THE SAFE, ORDERLY, AND EXPEDITIOUS REDEPLOYMENT OF 
              UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN.

    (a) Plan With Timetable Required.--Not later than January 1, 2011, 
or 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, whichever is 
earlier, the President shall submit to Congress a plan for the safe, 
orderly, and expeditious redeployment of United States Armed Forces 
from Afghanistan, including military and security-related contractors, 
together with a timetable for the completion of that redeployment and 
information regarding variables that could alter that timetable.
    (b) Status Updates.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
submittal of the plan required by subsection (a), and every 90 days 
thereafter, the President shall submit to the Congress a report setting 
forth the current status of the plan for redeploying United States 
Armed Forces from Afghanistan.
    (c) Recommendations on Contractor Oversight.--
            (1) Recommendations required.--Not later than 90 days after 
        the date of the enactment of this Act, the Special Inspector 
        General for Afghanistan Reconstruction shall, in consultation 
        with the Inspector General of the Department of Defense and the 
        Inspector General of the Department of State--
                    (A) issue recommendations on measures to increase 
                oversight of contractors engaged in activities relating 
                to Afghanistan that have a record of engaging in waste, 
                fraud, or abuse; and
                    (B) report on the status of efforts of the 
                Department of Defense and the Department of State to 
                implement existing recommendations regarding oversight 
                of such contractors.
            (2) Elements of recommendations.--The recommendations 
        issued under paragraph (1)(A) shall include recommendations for 
        reducing the reliance of the United States on security 
        contractors or subcontractors responsible for the deaths of 
        Afghan civilians and on Afghan militias, contractors, 
        subcontractors, or other armed groups that are not part of the 
        Afghan National Security Forces.
Output: Directs the President, by the earlier of January 1, 2011, or 90 days after the enactment of this Act, to submit to Congress a plan for the safe, orderly, and expeditious redeployment of U.S. Armed Forces from Afghanistan, including military and security-related contractors, together with a timetable for the completion of such redeployment and information regarding variables that could alter that timetable. Requires plan updates every 90 days.

Directs the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction to: (1) issue recommendations for increasing oversight of contractors in Afghanistan that have a record of engaging in waste, fraud, or abuse; and (2) report on the status of efforts of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the State Department to implement existing recommendations regarding oversight of such contractors. Requires the recommendations issued to include recommendations for reducing U.S. reliance on security contractors or subcontractors responsible for the deaths of Afghan civilians and on Afghan militias, contractors, subcontractors, or other armed groups that are not part of the Afghan National Security Forces.