SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Missile Defense Defend and Deter Act 
of 2016''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) It is in the highest strategic interest of the United 
        States to field a fully operational missile defense system to 
        defend against threats from intercontinental ballistic missiles 
        (ICBMs) of rogue nations, including North Korea and Iran.
            (2) In the past year, the Democratic People's Republic of 
        Korea tested a nuclear weapon and an intercontinental ballistic 
        missile and has made claims that it now possesses the ability 
        to miniaturize a nuclear warhead.
            (3) The ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) element of the 
        ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) is one of the most 
        critical capabilities needed to defend the United States 
        against threats from intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
        conventional and nuclear.
            (4) The test program of the Missile Defense Agency provides 
        vital data to demonstrate the operational effectiveness, 
        suitability, and survivability of the ballistic missile defense 
        system, and it contributes to United States nonproliferation 
        goals by sending a very credible message to the international 
        community on the ability of the United States to defeat 
        ballistic missiles in flight, thus reducing their value to 
        potential adversaries.

SEC. 3. REQUIRED TESTING BY MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY OF GROUND-BASED 
              MIDCOURSE DEFENSE ELEMENT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
              SYSTEM.

    (a) Testing Required.--Except as provided in subsection (c), not 
less frequently than once each fiscal year, the Director of the Missile 
Defense Agency shall administer an intercept flight test of the ground-
based midcourse defense element of the ballistic missile defense 
system.
    (b) Requirements.--The Director shall ensure that each test carried 
out under subsection (a) provides, when possible, for one or more of 
the following:
            (1) Validation of the operational effectiveness of the 
        ground-based midcourse defense element of the ballistic missile 
        defense system.
            (2) Use of assets in their operational configuration 
        against an inventory of targets to assess all aspects of 
        ground-based midcourse defense elements of the ballistic 
        missile defense system performance in a variety of flight test 
        regimes.
            (3) Use of operational doctrine and real-world constraints.
            (4) Evaluation of new concepts of operations and exercising 
        tactics, techniques, and procedures.
            (5) Mechanisms to assure the confidence of members of the 
        Armed Forces in the basic design of the ground-based midcourse 
        defense element of the ballistic missile defense system, its 
        hit-to-kill effectiveness, and its inherent operational 
        capability.
    (c) Exceptions.--
            (1) Nonintercept test.--The Director may forgo a test under 
        subsection (a) in a fiscal year if the Secretary of Defense, in 
        consultation with the Director, determines that conducting the 
        test would--
                    (A) jeopardize national security;
                    (B) not be successful due to specific ground-based 
                midcourse defense components needing a nonintercept 
                test; and
                    (C) likely lead to failure due to impractical time 
                considerations.
            (2) Funding.--The Director may forgo a test under 
        subsection (a) in a fiscal year if the Secretary of Defense, in 
        consultation with the Director, determines that the test is not 
        sufficiently funded.
            (3) National security waiver.--
                    (A) In general.--The Director may forgo a test 
                under subsection (a) in a fiscal year if the Secretary 
                of Defense, in consultation with the Director of the 
                Missile Defense Agency, Director of National 
                Intelligence, and the Commander of United States 
                Northern Command (NORTHCOM), determines that the 
                provision of testing as described in that subsection is 
                detrimental to the national security interests of the 
                United States.
                    (B) Notice required.--
                            (i) In general.--Not later than 30 days 
                        after forgoing a test pursuant to subparagraph 
                        (A), the Secretary shall submit to the 
                        congressional defense committees notice 
                        regarding the foregone test.
                            (ii) Elements.--Notice submitted under 
                        clause (i) shall include the following:
                                    (I) The rationale for forgoing the 
                                test.
                                    (II) The national security 
                                interests of the United States 
                                preventing the test.
                                    (III) A plan to complete the 
                                intercept test in the following fiscal 
                                year, which does not affect testing in 
                                following fiscal years.
                            (iii) Form.--Each notice under clause (ii) 
                        shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but 
                        may include a classified annex.
    (d) Congressional Defense Committees Defined.--In this section, the 
term ``congressional defense committees'' has the meaning given that 
term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.
Output: Missile Defense Defend and Deter Act of 2016 This bill requires the Department of Defense (DOD) Missile Defense Agency to administer an intercept flight test of the ground-based midcourse defense element of the ballistic missile defense system at least once each fiscal year.  Each test shall provide for:   validation of the defense element's operational effectiveness; use of assets in their operational configuration against an inventory of targets to assess performance in a variety of flight test regimes;  use of operational doctrine and real-world constraints;  evaluation of new concepts of operations, tactics, and techniques; and  mechanisms to assure the confidence of members of the Armed Forces in the basic design of the ground-based midcourse defense element, its hit-to-kill effectiveness, and its operational capability.   The Agency may forgo a test if:   it would jeopardize national security, not be successful due to specific ground-based midcourse defense components needing a non-intercept test, and likely fail due to impractical time considerations; or  funding is insufficient.  The Agency also may forgo a test if DOD determines that the testing is detrimental to U.S. national security interests and provides notice to Congress.