Query: Low carbon service supply chain

title: Analyzing a stochastic dual channel supply chain under consumers' low carbon preferences and cap and trade regulation
abstract: Environmental contamination has become a serious issue for the health and survival of living things. Also, how to decide the marketing strategy under low carbon regulation is a significant and realistic problem for enterprises. This paper analyzes a two echelon dual channel supply chain model by considering emission sensitive stochastic demand under governments' mandatory cap and trade regulation and consumers' low carbon preferences. By considering the products' compatibility, the proposed model illustrates some key channel strategies to gain more managerial insights for the members of the chain. The results show that the arrival pattern of the consumer affects significantly the economic order quantity of the members and profit of the supply chain. The compatibility of the product is proved to be a key factor in determining the optimal channel strategy for the members of the supply chain. The proposed model identifies two regions of the compatibility parameter which is preferable to all the members of the supply chain. When the compatibility of the product in an online channel is extremely high, the addition of the online channel can be accepted by the manufacturer and the whole supply chain with a retailer is disadvantageous. The analytical results assure that under the emission sensitive stochastic demand, the decentralized dual channel strategy can be coordinated successfully by adopting buyback contracts and reduction task sharing contract to originate a win win outcome for all the members of the supply chain. Finally, the numerical results show that the introduction of a dual channel strategy is profitable when consumers' low carbon preference is higher and the product has lower initial emissions.

title: Supply Chain Pricing and Coordination for New Energy Vehicles Considering Heterogeneity in Consumers' Low Carbon Preference
abstract: Given consumers' willingness to pay different prices for new energy vehicles (NEVs) and traditional vehicles, we construct a utility model of ordinary and green consumers. We establish pricing game models for centralized and decentralized decisions in an NEV's supply chain in order to study the impact of changes in consumers' low carbon preference heterogeneity on supply chain pricing and member profit. The results show that consumers' low carbon preferences and the ratio of green consumers increases with the ex factory and selling prices of NEVs. An increase in the percentage of green consumers under centralized decision making will reduce the total profit of the supply chain. Manufacturers' profits under decentralized decision making are greater than the dealers' profits, and the sum of the two members' profits under decentralized decision making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision making. We design a revenue sharing contract to eliminate the double marginal effect.

title: Decision and Coordination of Low Carbon E Commerce Supply Chain with Government Carbon Subsidies and Fairness Concerns
abstract: More low carbon products help fight climate change and environmental problems. Governments consider encouraging the manufacturer's initiative of producing low carbon products by providing subsidies. However, when the manufacturer sells low carbon products through the e commerce platform, fairness concerns arise because of the profit difference. So, this paper builds game models to study decision behavior in the low carbon e commerce supply chain when the manufacturer receives government carbon subsidies and has fairness concerns. Our findings show that consumers' preference for low carbon products will be conducive to the operation of the supply chain. So it is necessary to popularize low carbon products. The effect of government subsidies on supply chain decisions is different from fairness concerns. Government subsidies are positive factors in the supply chain operation, which can stimulate the manufacturer to make low carbon products as expected and choose the high quality high price development mode. This will help improve the profit of enterprises in the supply chain but cannot effectively stimulate the e commerce platform to increase its service level. By contrast, the manufacturer's fairness concerns are negative factors, which make the manufacturer prefer to adopt a low quality low price development mode to improve their utility. This offsets the positive effect of government subsidies. It turns out that the profit of both node enterprises and the supply chain system has declined. But, fairness concerns are an important way to express the manufacturer's demand. Finally, the joint allocation contract of cost and profit designed by comprehensively considering the effect of government subsidies and fairness concerns can make the supply chain coordinated. However, even as positive factors, only within a specific range do government subsidies help coordinate the supply chain, but not the more, the better.

title: Past, present, and future low carbon supply chain management: A content review using social network analysis
abstract: The aim of this study is to identify the past, present, and future research trends for low carbon supply chain (LCSC) management. The literature on low carbon supply chain management has expanded, however, a systematic review of lessons learned and future research opportunities is necessary. We do this using a review of the literature and social network analysis. The data for this study consists of English articles published by multiple databases found through the Web of Science and Scopus. We reviewed, collected, and sorted articles from 124,793 publications and then identified 2199 as being relevant to the scope of work for this study. Next, we utilized a social network analysis of the data. The results uncovered six main domains of LCSC: sustainability, climate change, green supply chain management, supply chain management, innovation, sustainable development, and environmental management. Contributions of this study include the development of these domains along with several important themes. The insights uncovered by our analysis primarily focus on LCSC modelling, low carbon energy, and carbon emission measurements. Numerous sustainability management practices are associated with low carbon energy use and actions to avoid increasing the rate of climate change. Paradoxically, we find limited evidence in the literature on how the LCSC practices can achieve integrated levels of performance that should also include carbon performance indicators.

title: Designing Buy Online and Pick Up in Store (BOPS) Contract of Dual Channel Low Carbon Supply Chain considering Consumers' Low Carbon Preference
abstract: Nowadays, buy online and pick up in store (BOPS) is a popular sales project to promote product sales. Implementing BOPS in the dual channel low carbon supply chain (DLSC) can not only improve low carbon manufacturers' profit but also reduce energy consumption in it. This paper focuses on how to design the contract which can ensure the implementation of BOPS in the DLSC consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer considering consumers' low carbon preference. Based on the analysis of game theory, two kinds of BOPS contract (MW contract with the dominant manufacturer making decision on wholesale price and RW contract with the dominant retailer making decision on wholesale price) with fixed compensation are designed and compared to obtain the better contract which is more effective on the implementation of BOPS. The findings show that MW contract is better than RW contract for the DLSC to implement BOPS. When consumers' low carbon preference and BOPS preference and the anti cross price elasticity are high enough, the DLSC can implement BOPS under the MW contract because it has Pareto efficiency on the profit of the original DLSC. We further find the sales price is decreasing in consumers' low carbon preference and anti cross price elasticity, while the wholesale price is increasing in consumers' low carbon preference. Finally, the results are verified by numerical examples.

title: The Low Carbon Supply Chain Coordination Problem with Consumers' Low Carbon Preference
abstract: In this paper, we study the supply chain coordination problem between a manufacturer and a retailer regarding consumers' low carbon preferences. The retailer considers the market demand to determine the order quantity; the manufacturer chooses how to reduce emissions according to the retailer's order quantity. We consider four cases, including the non emission abatement, the emission abatement of decentralized decision making, the centralized decision making and the retailer providing a cost sharing contract. By comparing the four cases, we find that the case of a retailer providing a cost sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain, achieving a Pareto improvement for the manufacturer and retailer. In addition, we use the Rubinstein bargaining model to determine the cost sharing ratio. Finally, numerical simulations are given to analyze the impact of the cost sharing ratio on the equilibrium results, including the profit and the emission abatement level. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of the cost sharing ratio and consumers' low carbon awareness on the profits of the members in the supply chain. We find that the equilibrium results, including the order quantity, the emission abatement level and the profits of the members in the supply chain under contract, are higher than the ones under centralized decision making. The results show that in the higher low carbon awareness market, retailers should formulate a reasonable cost sharing ratio to achieve emission reduction coordination.

title: Coordination of Closed Loop Supply Chain with Dual Source Supply and Low Carbon Concern
abstract: Considering the impact of dual source supply and low carbon manufacturing on a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) system, this article constructs a CLSC model with two competitive dominant upstream suppliers and one following a downstream (re )manufacturer, then coordinates supply chain through cost sharing contract. Based on the industrial case in the area of power battery, we analyze the optimal strategies under competition, cooperation, and coordination structures separately and then investigate the influences of emission reduction effort and collection efficiency on supply chain performance. The results reveal that collection of used products can positively affect the (re )manufacturer's profit but has opposite impact on the new component supplier. Besides, recycling is beneficial to both low carbon consumers' utility and social welfare, but hurts the total profit of CLSC because of the high investment cost of collection. Therefore, the paper designs a cost sharing contract, which is of applicability and efficiency for both economic and environmental development. Furthermore, it can also increase the profit of CLSC up to cooperation case and improve each member's profit, eliminating double marginal effect and achieving supply chain coordination.

title: Supply Chain Strategy Analysis of Low Carbon Subsidy Policies Based on Carbon Trading
abstract: The low carbon economy has become the focus of global attention and scientific measurement standards with the concepts of low energy consumption, low pollution, and sustainable development. More and more attentions are paid to the research of low carbon supply chains. Based on a two level low carbon supply chain in the context of carbon trading, a Stackelberg game model was established for government subsidies to determine a coordinated and balanced solution for supply chains in situations dominated by manufacturers. The optimal strategies for low carbon technology innovation are analyzed within the context of governmental subsidies. This study's conclusions are as follows: (1) When government subsidies are in place, regardless of who the government subsidies are meant for, manufacturers and retailers that do not generate carbon emissions will transfer the subsidies to the companies that generate carbon emissions by adjusting wholesale prices and retail prices to maximize their own profits. (2) When consumer prices are sensitive, the government's optimal subsidy intensity increases as consumers' low carbon preferences increase. When consumer prices are not sensitive, the government should not provide any subsidies. (3) When consumers' low carbon preferences are weak, the retail price of products will decrease with the increase in subsidies; when consumers' low carbon preferences are strong, the opposite dynamic occurs.

title: Game analysis for the impact of carbon trading on low carbon supply chain
abstract: The emergence of carbon trading will affect low carbon behavior in manufacturers. To analyze the impact of carbon trading on low carbon supply chain (LCSC) under different production modes, we developed a game model between low carbon products and ordinary products. Based on the game model, the impact of carbon trading on unit retail price, sales volume, sales profit and consumer surplus are comparatively analyzed from different production modes of low carbon manufacturers. Results show that: 1) Carbon trading could increase the unit retail price of ordinary products and low carbon manufacturers will also raise the unit retail price of low carbon products to obtain more revenue under the competitive market environment. 2) The carbon trading will promote the sales volume of low carbon products when the manufacturer only produces low carbon products. However, in the case of a manufacturer producing two products simultaneously, the carbon trading could promote the sale of low carbon products only when the environmental impact ratio of the unit ordinary product to the unit low carbon product is greater than a certain threshold. 3) The impact of carbon trading on profit is related to the environmental impact ratio of the two kinds of unit products. 4) The government could adjust the impact of carbon trading on consumer surplus through carbon credit.

title: Governmental cap regulation and manufacturer's low carbon strategy in a supply chain with different power structures
abstract: Considering the cap and trade regulation and manufacturer's two types of strategies: adopting green technology (GT) and purchasing carbon credits (PC) we develop game models to investigate the manufacturer's production and emission abatement decisions as well as the governmental emission cap regulation in a supply chain with three power structures (Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) Retail Stackelberg (RS) and Vertical Nash (VN) and analyze how a manufacturer's low carbon strategy changes with the various governmental cap under the three supply chain power structures. The main conclusions are as follows. If the manufacturer adopts green technology strategy, supply chain power structure will not affect social welfare. High consumer's low carbon preference is more beneficial to the social welfare, the government should advocate the consumer's preference for low carbon product. If the manufacturer purchases carbon credits, the government under the power structure of VN will gain the most social welfare.