Query: pramanasamuccaya

title: Another Interpretation of Pramanasamuccaya 1.11ab by Prajnakaragupta and His Forerunners
abstract: Dignaga holds the epistemological theory that our cognition possesses mental images in itself, so called sakaravijnanavada and argues that cognition has two forms (dvirupata) i.e. the appearance of the cognition itself (svabhasa) and the appearance of the object (visayabhasa) He tries to prove this in his Pramanasamuccaya (PS) 1.11 and its autocommentary Pramanasamuccayavrtti (PSV) In this article, I would like to reconsider the argument, especially the one in PS(V) 1.11ab, and show a different interpretation from the commonly accepted one. After briefly looking at PS(V) we will examine the interpretation in Prajnakaragupta's Pramanavarttikalamkara (PVA) and then trace it back to Devendrabuddhi's Pramanavarttikapanjika (PVP) Sakyabuddhi's Pramanavarttikatika (PVT) and Jinendrabuddhi's Pramanasamuccayatika (PST)

title: Problems with Recollection in the First Chapter of the Pramanasamuccaya

title: Niscaya as a Perceptual Function: Dharmakirti's Interpretation of Pramanasamuccaya 1.9b
abstract: Niscaya is generally considered to mean cognition or a cognitional function that relates to determining an object, and is regularly translated as "determination," "ascertainment," or "judgment," among other similar terms. According to common understanding, this kind of cognition implies a choice between contradictory alternatives that are created through conceptual construction. This close relation between niscaya and conceptual construction has been often discussed both inside and outside of Buddhism. However, for Dharmakirti, who defined perception (pratyaksa) as non conceptual and non erroneous cognition, niscaya cannot be a function of perceptual cognition. In fact, he states that perception does not possess the function of niscaya in the context of ascertaining cognition (niscayapratyaya) which is known as "perceptual judgment" and is a conceptual cognition that occurs immediately after perception and involves ascertaining the perception's contents. 1) However, in the third chapter of Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttika (PV) there are some occurrences of the word niscaya that might refer to perceptual functions. This usage is derived from Dignaga's Pramanasamuccaya (PS) 1.9b, but later commentators have interpreted this in various ways. In this paper, I will examine Dharmakirti's theory, comparing PV with his later opus, Pramanaviniscaya (PVin) 2)

title: Dignaga on air or How to get hold of supersensible objects by means of a credible person With preliminary remarks on the composition of the Pramanasamuccaya

title: Meditations on the Retrieval of Lost Texts with Special Reference to the Sankhya Section of Pramanasamuccaya, Chapter 2
abstract: Due to the eminent position Dignaga holds in the history of Buddhist and Indian philosophy, it is clear that scholars concerned with these fields are interested in knowing exactly what this famous thinker had to say. I consider it therefore of primary importance to regain as much as possible of Dignaga's works in their original language. With this in mind, I have been an active participant in the efforts to regain Dignaga's original texts, efforts that, in the modern academic context, have been continuing for over a hundred years.2 My special focus in this endeavour has been the second chapter of the Praman. asamuccaya; the particular task I have been working on is a reconstruction of this chapter's Sanskrit text. When I started working on this text, I did so in a rather non reflective way. The circumstances were too inviting. Not only did a photocopy of a Sanskrit manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on the Praman. asamuccaya become available, I was given the chance to work on this sensational material in close cooperation with two specialists in the field, Ernst Steinkellner and Helmut Krasser. The huge quantity and high quality of the newly available material and the special working conditions I met with will make you easily understand that I jumped head over heels into my work without much pondering and theoretical reflection of what it means to reconstruct a text in general nor in this specific case. One thing, however, was clear to me from the outset: It would be of major importance to meticulously document the data upon which my

title: Dharmakirti's Interpretation of Pramanasamuccaya I9 An Analysis of Pramanavarttika III 320 352

title: Dharmakirti's intention to quote Pramanasamuccaya III 12

title: Actuality and potentiality in Dignaga's understanding of immediate perception (nirvikalpaka pratyaksa) according to his Pramanasamuccaya and Alambanapariksa
abstract: Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences On the one hand, Dignaga supposes in his Pramanasamuccaya (part 1) that immediate perceptual experience at every given moment has as its object something that never goes beyond its own actually present content and thus may characterise only itself (svalaksana) In that respect, svalaksana appears as a kind of mere presence, sheer momentary actuality. It cannot undergo any external influence or exercise its own influence on other svalaksanas. In other words, it cannot be extended to things other than itself, as is the case of mental constructions. First, I would like to ask whether there is a potentiality in the act of immediate perception according to the Pramanasamuccaya. On the other hand, in the Alambanapariksa, cognition is an entirely interior process manifests itself as a sense organ to an internal cognisable form. Second, I would like to dwell on the question concerning whether an immediate perception of svalaksanas, free from mental constructions, is still possible in the Alambanapariksa.

title: Exegetical Problems of Pramanasamuccaya 1.9: Dignaga and Jinendrabuddhi@ deigunagatozinendorabutsudei

title: Exegetical Problems of Pramanasamuccaya 1.9 Dignaga and Jinendrabuddhi