Query: moral responsibility of artificial Intelligence

title: Moral responsibility and action in the use of artificial intelligence in construction
abstract: Rapid increases in processing power and speed of computing coupled with development of self learning algorithms capable of autonomous decision making are central to current technological developmen.

title: Moral agency without responsibility? Analysis of three ethical models of human computer interaction in times of artificial intelligence (AI)
abstract: Philosophical and sociological approaches in technology have increasingly shifted toward describing AI (artificial intelligence) systems as (moral) agents, while also attributing 'agency' to them. It is only in this way so their principal argument goes that the effects of technological components in a complex human computer interaction can be understood sufficiently in phenomenological descriptive and ethical normative respects. By contrast, this article aims to demonstrate that an explanatory model only achieves a descriptively and normatively satisfactory result if the concepts of (moral) agent' and (moral) agency' are exclusively related to human agents. Initially, the division between symbolic and sub symbolic AI, the black box character of (deep) machine learning, and the complex relationship network in the provision and application of machine learning are outlined. Next, the ontological and action theoretical basic assumptions of an 'agency' attribution regarding both the current teleology naturalism debate and the explanatory model of actor network theory are examined. On this basis, the technical philosophical approaches of Luciano Floridi, Deborah G. Johnson, and Peter Paul Verbeek will all be critically discussed. Despite their different approaches, they tend to fully integrate computational behavior into their concept of (moral) agency. By contrast, this essay recommends distinguishing conceptually between the different entities, causalities, and relationships in a human computer interaction, arguing that this is the only way to do justice to both human responsibility and the moral significance and causality of computational behavior.

title: The Search for a Moral Metaphysics in Artificial Intelligence Robot Medicine: The Responsibility of an Electronic Human in Medicine

title: Artificial Intelligence and Moral Reasoning: Shifting Moral Responsibility in War?
abstract: It is no longer merely far fetched science fiction to think that robots will be the chief combatants, waging wars in place of humans. Or is it? While artificial intelligence (AI) has made remarkable strides, tempting us to personify the machines "making decisions" and "choosing targets" a more careful analysis reveals that even the most sophisticated AI can only be an instrument rather than an agent of war. After establishing the layered existential nature of war, we lay out the prerequisites for being a (moral) agent of war. We then argue that present AI falls short of this bar, and we have strong reason to think this will not change soon. With that in mind, we put forth a second argument against robots as agents: there is a continuum with other clearly nonagential tools of war, like swords and chariots. Lastly, we unpack what this all means: if AI does not add another moral player to the battlefield, how (if at all) should AI change the way we think about war?

title: Is Corporate Responsibility Relevant to Artificial Intelligence Responsibility
abstract: Several theorists have suggested that it is possible to understand and elucidate the moral responsibility of artificial intelligence (AI) agents by using the notion of corporate moral responsibility as a model. We argue that there are differences between corporations and AI agents that make the notion of corporate moral responsibility an inappropriate model for AI agent moral responsibility. We discuss both the moral arguments that purport to show that corporations should or should not be held morally responsible, and the metaphysical arguments that purport to show that a corporation is the kind of entity that can be held morally responsible. We show that these arguments either are wrong or are inapplicable in the context of AI agents.

title: Moral Authority and Artificial Intelligence
abstract: This paper looks at the relationship between Artificial intelligence and moral authority. It explores the important concepts related to moral authority, such as power, authority, responsibility, and morality, but also defines what a thinking machine will look like in human society. What the paper determines is that it is difficult to trust machines that do not show emotion, but thinking machines without emotion will still have an important role in society and that when emotional AIs are achievable, they will be able to achieve moral authority. Philosophy 495 A: Seminar

title: Is it possible to be a moral Artificial Intelligence? The problem of moral and legal responsibility in A. I.

title: The ethical, legal and social implications of using artificial intelligence systems in breast cancer care
abstract: Breast cancer care is a leading area for development of artificial intelligence (AI) with applications including screening and diagnosis, risk calculation, prognostication and clinical decision support, management planning, and precision medicine. We review the ethical, legal and social implications of these developments. We consider the values encoded in algorithms, the need to evaluate outcomes, and issues of bias and transferability, data ownership, confidentiality and consent, and legal, moral and professional responsibility. We consider potential effects for patients, including on trust in healthcare, and provide some social science explanations for the apparent rush to implement AI solutions. We conclude by anticipating future directions for AI in breast cancer care. Stakeholders in healthcare AI should acknowledge that their enterprise is an ethical, legal and social challenge, not just a technical challenge. Taking these challenges seriously will require broad engagement, imposition of conditions on implementation, and pre emptive systems of oversight to ensure that development does not run ahead of evaluation and deliberation. Once artificial intelligence becomes institutionalised, it may be difficult to reverse: a proactive role for government, regulators and professional groups will help ensure introduction in robust research contexts, and the development of a sound evidence base regarding real world effectiveness. Detailed public discussion is required to consider what kind of AI is acceptable rather than simply accepting what is offered, thus optimising outcomes for health systems, professionals, society and those receiving care.

title: The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and

title: Corporate social irresponsibility: humans vs artificial intelligence
abstract: The supposedly radical development of artificial intelligence (AI) has raised questions regarding the moral responsibility of it. In the sphere of business, they are translated into questions about AI and business ethics (BE) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) The purpos of this study is to conceptually reformulate these questions from the point of view of two possible aspect changes, namely, starting from corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) and starting not from AIs incapability for responsibility but from its ability to imitate human CSR without performing typical human CSI.  The author draws upon the literature and his previous works on the relationship between AI and human CSI. This comparison aims to remodel the understanding of human CSI and AIs inability to be CSI. The conceptual remodelling is offered by taking a negative view on the relation. If AI can be made not to perform human like CSI, then AI is at least less CSI than humans. For this task, it is necessary to remodel human and AI CSR, but AI does not have to be CSR. It is sufficient that it can be less CSI than humans to be more CSR.  The previously suggested remodelling of basic concepts in question leads to the conclusion that it is not impossible for AI to act or operate more CSI then humans simply by not making typical human CSIs. Strictly speaking, AI is not CSR because it cannot be responsible as humans can. If it can perform actions with a significantly lesser amount of CSI in comparison to humans, it is certainly less CSI.  This paper is only a conceptual remodelling and a suggestion of a research hypothesis. As such, it implies particular morality, ethics and the concepts of CSI and AI.  How this remodelling could be done in practice is an issue of future research.  The author delivers the paper on comparison between human and AI CSI which is not much discussed in literature.