Ordering concepts and measures of the good life

The terms 'quality-of-life', 'wellbeing' and 'happiness' denote different meanings; sometimes they are used as an umbrella term for all of value, and the other times to denote special merits. This paper is about the specific meanings of the terms. It proposes a classification based on two bi-partitions; between life 'chances' and life 'results', and between 'outer' and 'inner' qualities. Together these dichotomies imply four qualities of life: 1) livability of the environment, 2) life-ability of the individual, 3) external utility of life and 4) inner appreciation of life. This fourfold matrix is applied in three ways: firstly to place related notions and alternative classifications, secondly to explore substantive meanings in various measures for quality of life and thirdly to find out whether quality-of-life can be measured comprehensively. This last question is answered in the negative. Current sum-scores make little sense. The most inclusive summary measure is still how long and happily people live. There are many words that are used to indicate how well we are doing. Some of these signify overall thriving; currently the terms 'quality of life' and 'wellbeing' are used for this purpose, and sometimes the word 'health' . In the past the terms 'happiness' and 'welfare' were more commonly used. There are several problems with these terms. One problem is that these terms do not have an unequivocal meaning. Sometimes they are used as an umbrella for all that is good, but on other occasions they denote specific merit. For instance: the term 'wellbeing' is used to denote the quality of life-as-a-whole and to evaluate lifeaspects such as dwelling conditions or employment chances. Likewise, the phrase 'quality-of-life' refers in some contexts to the quality of society and in other instances to the happiness of its citizens. There is little view on a consensus on the meaning of these words; the trend is rather to divergence. Over time, connotations tend to become more specific and manifold. Discursive communities tend to develop their own quality-of-life notions. The second problem is in the connotation of inclusiveness. The use of the words as an umbrella term suggests that there is something as 'overall' quality of life, and that specific merits can be meaningfully added in some wider worth; however that holistic assumption is dubious. Philosophers have never agreed on one final definition of quality-of-life, and in the practice of empirical quality-of-life measurement we see comparisons of apples and pears. The above problem of many meanings is partly caused by the suggestion of inclusiveness. One of the reasons why the meanings become more specific is that the rhetoric of encompassingnes crumbles when put to practice. The broad overall meaning appears typically unfeasible in measurement and decision making. Hence connotations tend to become more specific and diverse. As result, rhetoric denotation of the overall good requires new terms periodically. New expressions pop up as against more narrow meanings. For instance, in the field of healthcare the term 'quality of life' emerged to convey the idea that there is more than mere quantity of survival time. Likewise, the word 'wellbeing' came into use in contrast to sheer economic 'welfare' . Yet, in the long run these new term fall victim to their success. Once they Correspondence to: Prof. Dr. Ruut Veenhoven Erasmus University Rotterdam, Faculty of Social Sciences, P.O.B. 1738 3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands. www2.eur.nl/fsw/research/veenhoven are adopted as a goal for policy, analysts and trend watchers start extracting palpable meanings and make the concepts ever more ‘multi-dimensional’. Obviously, this communicative practice causes much confusion and impedes the development of knowledge in this field. In reaction, there have been many proposals for standard definitions . Unfortunately, this has not really helped. Firstly, such scientific definitions hardly affect the common use of language. Secondly, they add to the confusion, because scholars are not able to agree on one meaning either, for instance, McCall 1975) defines quality-of-life as 'necessary conditions for happiness', while (Terhune 1973) defines it as subjective satisfaction itself. Likewise, Colby (1987) describes wellbeing as 'adaptive potential', whereas Jolles & Stalpers ( define it as 'basic commend to life'. Elsewhere I have listed fifteen definitions of happiness (Veenhoven 1984:16-17). Recently Noll (1999) listed many meanings of quality of life in nations. Since we cannot really force the use of words, we can better try to clarify their use. We can elucidate the matter by distinguishing different meanings. An analytic tool for this purpose is proposed in this article. First a fourfold classification of qualities of life is presented (§ 1). By means of this taxonomy common terms and distinctions are placed (§ 2). The matrix is then used to chart substantive meanings in common measures of the good life (§ 3). Next the question is raised whether we can meaningfully speak about comprehensive quality of life (§ 4). 1. GROUPING QUALITIES OF LIFE Terms like 'quality of life', 'wellbeing' and 'happiness' denote evaluations. When sorting out what kind of evaluation they aim at, we must establish what thing is evaluated by what standard. 1.1 Quality of what life? In the case of 'quality of life' the object of evaluation is 'life'. Mostly that life is an individual life, the quality of life of a person. Yet the term is also used for aggregates, for instance when we speak about the quality-of-life of women. In that case the term refers usually to the average of individuals. Sometimes the term is used in reference to humanity as a whole. In this context the object of evaluation is mostly the average individual, and the long-term destiny of the species. The evaluation then concerns 'human life', rather than 'human lives'. The term 'quality of life' does not refer exclusively to human life. It is also used for animals, for instance in discussions about conditions of slaughter cattle. At a higher level of abstraction it is also used for all life. Quality of life is then the condition of the entire ecosystem. Ecological propagandists like this confusion of object matter, because it suggests that protection of endangered species is also good for the individual human. The terms 'wellbeing' and 'happiness' denote even more varied objects of evaluation, because they are also used in reference to social systems. When speaking about the 'public wellbeing' or the 'happiness of the nation' we often aim at the collective level, how well society functions and maintains itself. Propagandists also exploit this ambiguity, in this case as a means to disguise differences in interest between individuals and society. In this paper I focus on the quality of individual human lives. As we will see, that is difficult enough. Ruut Veenhoven 2 Four qualities of life