Conceptions of Learning and Understanding Learning at Work

Recent research on learning in work situations has focussed on concepts such as ‘productive learning’ and ‘pedagogy of vocational learning’. In investigating what makes learning productive and what pedagogies enhance this, there is a tendency to take the notion of learning as unproblematic. This paper argues that much writing on workplace learning is strongly shaped by peoples’ understandings of learning in formal educational situations. Such assumptions distort attempts to understand learning at work. The main focus of this paper is to problematise the concept of ‘learning’ and to identify the implications of this for attempts to understand learning at work and the conditions that enhance it. An alternative conception of learning that promises to do more justice to the richness of learning at work is presented and discussed. For several years now, the adult and vocational learning research group at University of Technology, Sydney, (now known as OVAL Research1), has been pursuing a systematic research agenda centred on issues about learning at work (e.g. Boud & Garrick 1999, Symes & McIntyre 2000, Beckett & Hager 2002). The OVAL research group’s two most recent seminar series have been focussed on ‘productive learning’ and ‘pedagogy of vocational learning’. Both of these topics reflect a concern with conditions that enhance rich learning in work situations. In attempting, however, to characterise what makes learning productive and what pedagogies enhance this, there may be a tendency to take the notion of learning as unproblematic. I have elsewhere argued that common understandings of learning uncritically incorporate assumptions that derive from previous formal learning experiences (Hager forthcoming). Likewise Elkjaer (2003) has recently pointed out how much writing on workplace learning is strongly shaped by the authors’ understandings of learning in formal educational situations. The main focus of this paper is to problematise the concept of ‘learning’ and to identify the implications of this for attempts to understand learning at work and the conditions that enhance it. A key claim is that government policies that impact significantly on learning at work commonly treat learning as a product, i.e. as the acquisition of discrete items of knowledge or skill. The argument is that these policies thereby obstruct attempts to develop satisfactory understandings of learning at work. 1 The Australian Centre for Organisational, Vocational and Adult Learning Research. (For details see www.oval.uts.edu.au) Problematising the Concept of Learning Although learning is still widely treated as an unproblematic concept in educational writings, there is growing evidence that its meaning increasingly is being contested. For instance Brown & Palincsar (1989, p. 394) observed: “Learning is a term with more meanings that there are theorists”.  (1999, p. 6) noted “....that the very definition of learning is contested, and that assumptions that people make regarding its nature and where it takes place also vary widely.” According to Winch “.....the possibility of giving a scientific or even a systematic account of human learning is ..... mistaken” (1998, p. 2). His argument is that there are many and diverse cases of learning, each subject to “constraints in a variety of contexts and cultures” which precludes them from being treated in a general way (1998, p. 85). He concludes that “... grand theories of learning .... are underpinned ... invariably ... by faulty epistemological premises” (Winch, 1998, p. 183). Not only is the concept of learning disputed amongst theorists, it seems that even those with the greatest claims to practical knowledge of learning may be deficient in their understanding. Those bastions of learning, higher education institutions can trace their origins back into the mists of time. If anyone knows from experience what learning is it should be them. Yet the recent cyber learning debacle suggests otherwise. Many of the world’s most illustrious universities have invested many millions of dollars setting up suites of online courses in the expectation of making large profits from offcampus students. According to Brabazon (2002), these initiatives have manifestly failed since prospective students were not prepared to pay the fees. Many of these online courses are now available free as a backup resource for on-campus students. Brabazon’s analysis is that these university ‘experts’ on learning have confused technology with teaching and tools with learning. The staggering sums of money mis-invested in online education certainly shows that universities may not be the experts in learning that they think they are. We can take Brabazon’s analysis a step further. The reason why tools were confused with learning, I argue, is that learning is not a well understood concept at the start of the 21st century. Perhaps it is in a similar position to the concept of motion at the end of the middle ages. Of course, motion is one of the central concepts in physics, just as learning is a central concept in education, and the social sciences generally. For a long time, understanding of motion was limited by adherence to the Aristotelian attempt to provide a single account of all motion. Aristotle proposed a second-order distinction between natural and violent motions. It was the ‘nature’ of all terrestrial bodies to have a natural motion towards the centre of the universe (the centre of the earth); but bodies were also subject to violent motions in any direction imparted by disruptive, external, ‘non-natural’ causes. So the idea was to privilege one kind of motion as basic and to account for others in terms of non-natural disruptions to this natural motion. The Aristotelian account persisted for so long because it was in accord with ‘common sense’ ideas on motion. Everyone was familiar with motion and thought that they understood it. Likewise, everyone has experienced formal schooling and this shapes how they understand learning. Thus, the type of learning that is familiar to everyone gains privileged status. The worth of other kinds of learning is judged by how well they approximate the favoured kind (Beckett & Hager 2002, section 6.1). The dominance of this concept of learning is also evident in educational thought, where there has been a major focus on learning in formal education settings. This dominant view of learning also fits well with ‘folk’ conceptions of the mind (Bereiter 2002). Real progress in understanding motion came when physicists departed from ‘common sense’ ideas and recognised that there are many different types of motion – falling, projectile, pendulum, wave, etc. each requiring their own account. Likewise, it seems there are many types of learning and things that can be learnt – propositions, skills, behaviours, attitudes, etc. Efforts to understand these may well require a range of theories each with somewhat different assumptions. The Monolithic Influence of Viewing Learning as a Product There is currently a dominant view of learning that is akin to the Aristotelian view of motion in its pervasive influence. It provides an account of supposedly the best kind of learning, and all cases of learning are judged by how well they fit this view. This dominant view of learning – the ‘common sense’ account – views the mind as a ‘container’ and ‘knowledge as a type of substance’ (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). Under the influence of the mind-as-container metaphor, knowledge is treated as consisting of objects contained in individual minds, something like the contents of mental filing cabinets.