Who views online extremism? Individual attributes leading to exposure

Who is likely to view materials online maligning groups based on race, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, political views, immigration status, or religion? We use an online survey (N 1⁄4 1034) of youth and young adults recruited from a demographically balanced sample of Americans to address this question. By studying demographic characteristics and online habits of individuals who are exposed to online extremist groups and their messaging, this study serves as a precursor to a larger research endeavor examining the online contexts of extremism. Descriptive results indicate that a sizable majority of respondents were exposed to negative materials online. The materials were most commonly used to stereotype groups. Nearly half of negative material centered on race or ethnicity, and respondents were likely to encounter such material on social media sites. Regression results demonstrate African-Americans and foreign-born respondents were significantly less likely to be exposed to negative material online, as are younger respondents. Additionally, individuals expressing greater levels of trust in the federal government report significantly less exposure to such materials. Higher levels of education result in increased exposure to negative materials, as does a proclivity towards risk-taking.  While the Internet has obvious benefits, its uncensored nature also exposes users to extremist ideas some find vile, offensive, and disturbing. Authorities consider online extremism a threat to national security and note the need for research on it (e.g. Hussain & Saltman, 2014; Levin, 2015; The White House, 2015). While scholars are discussing strategies for countering the effects of extremism (Helmus, York, & Chalk, 2013; Neumann, 2013), few have investigated who is exposed to extremist materials (for exceptions, see Hawdon, Oksanen, & R€  2014; R€ as€anen et al., 2015). Yet, we must understand who sees extremist materials if we are to effectively limit exposure or disseminate countermessages. Moreover, since youth appear to be most vulnerable to extremist messages (Oksanen, Hawdon, Holkeri, N€ asi, & R€ as€ anen, 2014; Onuoha, 2014; Torok, 2016), there is an enhanced need to investigate what online behaviors place them at risk for exposure. To help guide efforts in combatting online extremism by ). understanding who sees these materials, we use a sample of youth and young adults to investigate the behavioral and attitudinal factors that lead to exposure. We frame the analysis using routine activity theory (RAT), which argues that crimes occur when a motivated offender, a suitable target, and a lack of capable guardians converge in time and space (Cohen & Felson, 1979). The theory explains how victims’ activities can expose them to dangerous people, places, and situations. We also extend RAT by incorporating insights from social learning theory (Akers, 1977). Specifically, we consider if those who distrust government are more likely to view extremist messages because their ideology leads them to frequent online environments where extremist opinions are posted. Therefore, we focus on two research questions: R1: What behaviors place youth and young adults at risk of being virtually proximate to extremist materials? R2: Does the lack of trust in the government increase exposure to extremist materials, all else being equal? By identifying behaviors and attitudes that lead to extremism, our research will help authorities design strategies to counter its effects. M. Costello et al. / Computers in Human Behavior 63 (2016) 311e320 312 The current study, which was approved by the Intuitional Review Boards (IRBs) of the universities involved in the project aswell as the National Institute of Justice, begins with a discussion of online extremism. We then review RAT and extend it by considering insights from social learning theory. We then predict exposure to online hate materials among a sample of 1029 youth and young adults. We conclude by considering the implications of our research. 1. Online extremism: its nature, types, and dangers The phenomenon we consider is a type of cyberviolence (see Wall, 2001) and goes bymany names: online extremism, online hate, or cyberhate. We consider online hate or extremism to be the use of information computer technology (ICT) to profess attitudes devaluating others because of their religion, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, or some other characteristic. As such, online hate material is a distinct form of cyberviolence as abuse is aimed at a collective identity rather than a specific individual (Hawdon et al., 2014). Contrasting exposure to online hate with cyberbullying, R€ as€ anen andhis colleagues (forthcoming) argue, that: exposure to online hate material does not attack the individual in isolation; instead, this form of violence occurs when individuals are unwittingly exposed to materials against their will that express hatred or degrading attitudes toward a collective to which they belong. That is, hate materials denigrate groups; it is not an attack that focuses on individuals. Extremists, both individuals and organized groups, champion their cause, recruit members, advocate violence, and create international extremist communities through websites, blogs, chat rooms, file archives, listservers, news groups, internet communities, online video games, and web rings (Amster, 2009; Burris, Smith, & Strahm, 2000; Franklin 2010; Hussain & Saltman, 2014). Organized hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan have used the web since its public inception (Amster, 2009; Gerstenfeld, Grant, & Chiang, 2003), but individuals maintaining sites or commenting online have surpassed organized groups as the main perpetrators (Potok, 2015). Given the nature of our analysis (self-reported exposure to online hate materials), we cannot determine if the material to which the respondents refer was posted by a formal group or an individual; nevertheless, the respondents claim the site expressed hatred toward some collectivedthe essence of our definition of online hate materials. It is important to realize exposure to online hate material may not be victimizing, per se. Some people actively seek such materials, and they would not be “victimized” in the traditional sense of the word. Others, however, come upon this material inadvertently. Even when the material is found accidently, we should not overstate the dangers these materials pose. Many people view hate materials without experiencing negative consequences, and most hate messages do not directly advocate violence (Douglas, McGarty, Bliuc, & Lala, 2005; Gerstenfeld et al., 2003; Glaser, Dixit, & Green, 2002; McNamee, Peterson, & Pe~ na, 2010). Nevertheless, exposure to hate materials correlates with several problematic behaviors and attitudes (Subrahmanyam & Smahel, 2011). For example, members of targeted groups can experience mood swings, anger, and fear after exposure (Tynes, 2006; Tynes, Reynolds, & Greenfield, 2004). In addition, exposure to online hate materials is inversely related to social trust (Nasi et al., 2015). Long-term exposure to hate materials can reinforce discrimination against vulnerable groups (Cowan & Mettrick, 2002; Foxman & Wolf, 2013) and lead to an inter-generational perpetuation of extremist ideologies (Perry, 2000; Tynes, 2006). In some cases, exposure to online hate materials is directly linked to violence, including acts of mass violence and terror (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2011a; for a list of deadly attacks see Freilich, Belli, & Chermak., 2011; The New America Foundation International Security Program 2015). Recently, exposure to extremist ideology has been implicated in recruiting youth to extremist causes, including terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). It is therefore important to understand who is likely to be exposed to these materials. 2. Correlates of exposure The limited number of existing studies analyzing exposure to online hate and extremism rely on Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activity theory (RAT) and its recent revisions. RAT argues that crimes occur when a motivated offender, a suitable target, and a lack of capable guardians converge in time and space (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Individuals’ activities can place them in danger by bringing them into contact with potential offenders and into environments that lack guardians who could confront those offenders (see Cohen & Felson, 1979; Miethe & Meier, 1990). In addition, individuals’ routines influence how attractive they are to offenders, and the probability of victimization increases as target attractiveness increases (Cohen & Felson, 1979). While there are complicating factors for applying RAT to the online world (see Tillyer & Eck, 2009; Yar, 2005, 2013), the cyberlifestyle-routine activities perspective (Eck & Clarke, 2003; Reyns, 2013; Reyns, Henson, & Fisher, 2011) overcomes some of these problems. Most notably, while cybervictims and offenders do not converge in time and space as victims and offenders do in the offline world, they nevertheless come into virtual contact through their networked devices (Reyns et al., 2011). The asynchronous nature of cyberviolence is clearly seen with exposure to hate material. Those posting hate materials can offend people across spaces and time because, once materials are posted, people can become exposed to them without ever directly interacting with offenders. The primary factor likely resulting in hate material exposure is proximity to “offenders.” More precisely, given the asynchronous nature of the Internet, proximity to the virtual places where offenders have been is the primary determinant of exposure. In the language of RAT, victimization should be related to factors leading one into dangerous places. As noted above, one need not directly encounter an offender; instead, one only need a