Adlerian and Constructivist Psychotherapies: A Constructivist Perspective

This article seeks to contribute to a greater dialogue between Adlerian and Constructivist psychotherapies by discussing (a) the many similarities between Adlerian and Constructivist camps in terms of philosophical, theoretical, and practical considerations, (b) some unique features of individual psychology that may augment specific approaches in Constructivist psychotherapy, (c) some of the unique features of constructivism that Adlerians may find enriching to their approach, and, (d) how this integrative dialogue may relate to the contemporary context of theoretical integration. These are exciting times as psychotherapy theorists and practitioners seek to draw from different perspectives to solidify their philosophical assumptions regarding human nature and to become more efficient counselors in their dayto- day practices. The purpose of this article is to contribute to a continuing dialogue between Adlerians and constructivists (Jones, 1995; Master, 1991; Scott, Kelly, & Brandon, 1995). While both camps have much in common, we believe each perspective also has unique features to offer the other.  The similarities between Adlerian and Constructivist approaches to psychotherapy can be discussed along philosophical, theoretical, and practical considerations. The commonalities provide rich and fertile common ground for an integrative dialogue. Philosophical Similarities Phenomenology. Both Adlerians and construedvists tend to adhere to a phenomenological framework. Both camps point to Kant (1781/1966) and Vaihinger (1911/1924) as formative philosophical influences. For constructivists, Kant provides the philosophical basis for their view of the human mind as an active and proactive construer of reality (Mahoney, 1988a,b, 1991; Neimeyer, 1995). This constructive view of the mind coincides with the phenomenological position of intentionality as developed by Brentano (1874/ 1973) and Husserl (1931/1962). The early constructivist, George Kelly (1955) also looked to Vaihinger's philosophy of "as if with its emphasis on a purposive mind as a source for his notion of an anticipatory mind as theorized in personal construct psychology. Constructivists also suggest that even though a person constructs a mental representation of reality, there is not a oneto- one correspondence between the mental representation and reality. However, constructivists point out that for the person to adapt and survive, mental representations must approximate reality. Hence, constructivists tend to embrace Popper's (1983) critical realism and Campbell's (1987) evolutionary epistemology. The person's continuous interaction with the world enables the development of the self (Mahoney, 1991; Mahoney & Lyddon, 1988). Hence, constructivists view the individual as a continuous self-in-process (Guidano, 1987, 1991). Adler, likewise, looked to Vaihinger's philosophy of "as if as a source for his phenomenological and ideological view of human nature (Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956). The fictional goals that a person erects are interpretations of the world as experienced by the individual. Although these fictions are not a one-to-one correspondence to reality, they enable a person to move purposely toward selected goals. Because these fictional goals are never realized, Adlerians tend to view the individual not as static, but as one who is in continuous movement, always becoming (Ansbacher & Ansbacher, 1956). Holism. The holistic approach of both Adlerians and constructivists provides fertile soil for an integrative dialogue, particularly in the area of what both camps consider to be false dichotomies. Mahoney (1991), for example, in his discussion of the history of ideas, suggests that such distinctions as ontology/epistemology, structure/function, mind/body, and subjective/objective involve false dichotomies that misrepresent the holistic, organic functioning of the human being. …