Worst-case Equilibria
In a system in which noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model in which several agents share a very simple network leads to some interesting mathematics, results, and open problems.

title: On a conjecture related to geometric routing
abstract: We conjecture that any planar 3-connected graph can be embedded in the plane in such a way that for any nodes s and t, there is a path from s to t such that the Euclidean distance to t decreases monotonically along the path. A consequence of this conjecture would be that in any ad hoc network containing such a graph as a spanning subgraph, two-dimensional virtual coordinates for the nodes can be found for which the method of purely greedy geographic routing is guaranteed to work. We discuss this conjecture and its equivalent forms show that its hypothesis is as weak as possible, and show a result delimiting the applicability of our approach: any 3-connected K3,3-free graph has a planar 3-connected spanning subgraph. We also present two alternative versions of greedy routing on virtual coordinates that provably work. Using Steinitz's theorem we show that any 3-connected planar graph can be embedded in three dimensions so that greedy routing works, albeit with a modified notion of distance; we present experimental evidence that this scheme can be implemented effectively in practice. We also present a simple but provably robust version of greedy routing that works for any graph with a 3-connected planar spanning subgraph.

title: The 1-Steiner Tree Problem
abstract: We present an O ( n 2 ) algorithm for finding the point on the plane which, if added to a given set of n points, will result in the shortest possible spanning tree.

title: On certain connectivity properties of the Internet topology
abstract: We show that random graphs in the preferential connectivity model have constant conductance, and hence have worst-case routing congestion that scales logarithmically with the number of nodes. Another immediate implication is constant spectral gap between the first and second eigenvalues of the random walk matrix associated with these graphs. We also show that the expected frugality (overpayment in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism for shortest paths) of a random graph is bounded by a small constant.

title: On the Difficulty of Designing Good Classifiers
abstract: It is a very interesting and well-studied problem, given two point sets W, B\(\subseteq\)ℜn, to design a linear decision tree that classifies them —that is, no leaf subdivision contains points from both B and W — and is as simple as possible, either in terms of the total number of nodes, or in terms of its depth. We show that, unless ZPP=NP, the depth of a classifier cannot be approximated within a factor smaller than 6/5, and that the total number of nodes cannot be approximated within a factor smaller than n1/5. Our proof relies on a simple connection between this problem and graph coloring, and uses recent nonapproximability results for graph coloring. We also study the problem of designing a classifier with a single inequality that involves as few variables as possible, and point out certain aspects of the difficulty of this problem.

title: Algorithms, Games, and the Internet
abstract: Over the past fifty years, researchers in Theoretical Computer Science have sought and achieved a productive foundational understanding of the von Neumann computer and its software, employing the mathematical tools of Logic and Combinatorics. The next half century appears now much more confusing (half- centuries tend to look like that in the beginning). What computational artifact will be the object of the next great modeling adventure of our field? And what mathematical tools will be handy in this endeavor?

title: Optimum Grip of a Polygon
abstract: It has been shown by Baker, Fortune and Grosse that any two-dimensional polygonal object can be prehended stably with three fingers, so that its weight (along the third dimension) is balanced. Besides, in this paper we show that form closure of a polygon object can be achieved by four fingers (previous proofs were not complete). We formulate and solve the problem of finding the optimum stable grip or form closure of any given polygon. For stable grip it is most natural to minimize the forces needed to balance through friction the object''s weight along the third dimension. For form closure, we minimize the worst-case forces needed to balance any unit force acting on the center of gravity of the object. The mathematical techniques used in the two instances are an interesting mix of Optimization and Euclidean geometry. Our results lead to algorithms for the efficient computation of the optimum grip in each case.

title: Topological Queries

title: Reducibility among equilibrium problems
abstract: We address the fundamental question of whether the Nash equilibria of a game can be computed in polynomial time. We describe certain efficient reductions between this problem for normal form games with a fixed number of players and graphical games with fixed degree. Our main result is that the problem of solving a game for any constant number of players, is reducible to solving a 4-player game.

title: The complexity of recognizing polyhedral scenes
abstract: Given a drawing of straight lines on the plane, we wish to decide whether it is the projection of the visible part of a set of opaque polyhedra. Although there is an extensive literature and reports on empirically succesful algorithm: for this problem, there has been no definite result concerning its complexity. In this paper we show that, rather surprisingly, this problem is NP-complete. This is true even in the relatively simple case of trihedral scenes (no four planes share a point) without shadows or cracks. Despite this negative result, we present a fast algorithm for the important special case of orthohedral scenes (all planes are perpendicular to one of the three axes) with a fixed number of "possible" objects.

title: The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
abstract: We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recently-established equivalence between polynomial time solvability of normal form games and graphical games, establishing that these kinds of games can simulate a PPAD-complete class of Brouwer functions.