Guilt for Non Humans TeesRep Teesside s Research Repository
Year: 2018

We argue that the emotion of guilt, in the sense of actual harm done to others from inappropriate action or inaction, is worthwhile to incorporate in evolutionary game models, as it can lead to increased cooperation, whether by promoting apology or by inhibiting defection. The study thereof can then transpire to abstract and concrete populations of nonhuman agents.  Theorists conceive of shame and guilt as belonging to the family of self conscious emotions (Lewis 1990) (Fischer and Tangney 1995) (Tangney and Dearing 2002) invoked through self reflection and self evaluation. Though both have evolved to promote cooperation, guilt and shame can be treated separately. Guilt is an inward private phenomenon, though it can promote apology, and even spontaneous public confession. Shame is inherently public, though it may too lead to apology and to the request for forgiveness (Smith 2008,  Shame, however, hinges on being caught, failing to deceive, and the existence of a reputation mechanism. The philosopher Martin Buber (Buber 1957) underlined the difference between the Freudian notion of guilt, based on internal conflicts, and existential guilt, based on actual harm done to others, which is the sense we are considering here. On transgression or error, the self renders judgment on itself. This self evaluation may be explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious. Shame and guilt typically arise from the blaming self judgment about one's negative personal attributes (shame) or about negative harmful personal behaviour or failure to act to prevent harm (guilt) Shame is often conducive to hiding and anger, and guilt is often conducive to admission and reparative action. Guilt is considered empathic whereas shame not (Tangney et al. 2013, pp. 485 502) We leave out shame for now, because it involves reputation, and concentrate on guilt instead. To avoid or attempt to prevent blame assignment that might result from inappropriate action or inaction, there exists a guilt mechanism concerned not just with a posteriori guilt for a harm actually intended, but functions as well a priori, preventing harm by wishing to avoid guilt. A posteriori outward admission of guilt may serve to pre empt punishment, whenever harm detection and blame become foreseeable. We know too that guilt may be alleviated by private confession (namely to a priest or a psychotherapist) plus the renouncing of past failings in future. Because of their private character, such confessions and atonements, given their cost (prayers or fees) render temptation defecting less probable. Public or open confession of guilt can be coordinated with apology for better effect, and the cost appertained to some common good (like charity) or as individual compensation to injured parties. More generally, Frank has suggested humans have been endowed during evolution with the means to solve problems of commitment by means of "moral sentiments" to wit, those of anger, contempt, disgust, envy, greed, shame, and guilt (Frank 1988, pp. 46, 53) Moral sentiments help solve such problems because honest manifestation of certain emotions make commitments more credible. In particular, the promises of an agent known to be prone to guilt are therefore trustworthier. Heightened anger towards non confessed guilt might be triggered by intention recognition, thereby putting pressure on guilt admission. Exhibition of guilt proneness by an agent may assuage other agents that defection by the agent was not intended, even when it might be clear it was not, since intention ascription by others is not perfect. If intentions provide such a role in determining due apology, how can one read an offender's mental states? We regularly judge the mental states of others, and the notion of mens rea in criminal law depends on this ability. An offender's emotions, namely feelings of guilt, provide a measure of his mental states (Smith 2008, p. 96) Fake emotions better be discerned, of course. (Smith 2008, ) elaborates on detecting and distinguishing guilt, shame, embarrassment, remorse, and regret. From (Smith 2008, pp. 101 103) we quote, abridging: 'According to (Rawls 1971) "shame is the emotion evoked by shocks to our self respect" but we feel guilty when we "act contrary to [our] sense of right and justice." Both involve our sense of morality, but in guilt "we focus on the infringement of just claims of others and the injury we have done to them, and on their probable resentment and indignation should they discover our deed." In shame "we feel struck by the loss to our self esteem and our inability to carry out our aims: we sense the diminishment of self from our anxiety about the lesser respect that others may have for us and from our disappointment with ourself for failing to live up to our ideals." A single wrongdoing might provoke feelings of both shame and guilt, but the primary distinction involves the emphasis on either my disappointment with myself (shame) or my concern for the victims and norms I have transgressed (guilt) [p. 102] Understood in accordance with the earlier description, guilt would seem like an appropriate emotional component of apology because it accompanies the recognition of wrongdoings as such. When we identify and share a commitment to the value underlying a transgression, guilt would appear to designate the corresponding emotion. As an undesirable emotion, guilt also spurs us to undertake the reform and redress likely to free us from its clutches.  Negative emotions can have a deterrent value in that potential offenders may resist urges to commit offenses if they wish to avoid the unpleasant feelings of guilt or shame that may accompany their deed. Negative emotions may also serve rehabilitative objectives because an experience of guilt may move an offender to reform her behaviour. 1 Mens rea, the intention or knowledge of wrongdoing that constitutes part of a crime, as opposed to the action or conduct of the accused. Compare with actus reus, action or conduct that is a constituent element of a crime, as opposed to the mental state of the accused. ORIGIN: mid 19th cent. Latin, literally 'guilty mind. Furthermore, according to (Tangney et al. 2013, ) guilt prone individuals are inclined to manage anger constructively, and disinclined toward aggression. And they are less prone to defection and noise. Guilt is the quintessential moral emotion: it promotes the acknowledgment of wrongdoing, the acceptance of responsibility, and the taking of reparative action. Expressions of guilt restore equanimity, reaffirm fairness, and compensate transgressions. Guilt leads to positive intraand interpersonal processes, especially in contexts requiring cooperation.  A posteriori guilt, on the other hand, would be evolutionarily advantageous because conducive to increased amount/possibility of apology, and we've seen apology is advantageous. Also apology reduces the pain of guilt. Evolutionarily, guilt is envisaged as an in built mechanism that tends to prevent wrong doing because of the internal self suffering it creates, and, should the wrong doing have taken place, it puts internal pressure on confession (admitting the wrong) and follow up costly apology and penance, plus an expectation of forgiveness, so as to alleviate and dispel the internal suffering produced by guilt (Fessler and Haley 2012, pp. 7 36) (Tangney et al. 2013, pp. 485 502) Using the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and Ultimatum games (Ketelaar and Tung Au 2003, pp. 429 453) found that guilt is a key factor in increasing cooperation among players. It would pay for guilt to have spread once it appears, on two counts: as an inhibition mechanism and as a forgiveness stimulus. A third count, in our view, is that counterfactually thinking about guilt or shame is useful to prevent their future arising, a process of self cleansing or selfdebugging (Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavanski, 1994) Counterfactual thinking, in turn, arises to explain causality in general, being subsequently used to handle guilt and self improvement. Hence, guilt dealing mechanisms seem to be evolutionarily advantageous for cooperation. It seems clear that an evolutionary anthropological case about guilt has been made and accepted in the literature for intention recognition. Intentionality matters crucially to distinguish intended actions from noise, from accidental actions, and from side effects, since non intended harms should be discounted because they are unavoidable, and a revenge arms race would be pernicious to all. The notion of intentionality is ascribed to agents, and in particular to gods and nature spirits. The latter ones have the power to exercise justice with regard to acts of killing animals and slashing cultivars (which are living beings) When it doesn't rain, or some tragedy happens, it is ascribed to wrath of the gods or animal spirits symbolised by totems. Performing human or other sacrifices is meant to atone and apologise for the harm done to other living beings. That's how guilt has arisen evolutionarily, as humans know that the spirits know what you did (and even about thoughts and memories inside your head about doing it on purpose) though no one might have witnessed your deed. Guilt and apology are primed by their moral disapproval and by revenge. Population morality in turn arises for a great number of reasons (namely starting with mutualism and following on to contractualism) plus in particular making sure that one's intentions can be explained and do follow the accepted rules and exceptions. The literature on morality already makes the case in detail, albeit according to distinct schools of thought. Some of these are clos