There is no moral ought and no prudential ought
Year: 2020

s of Presented Papers Title: Wondering about What You  According to Jane Friedman, attitudes like wondering, inquiring, and suspending judgement are question directed. Call such attitudes interrogative attitudes (IAs) Friedman insists that all IAs are governed by an Ignorance Norm: Necessarily, if one knows Q at t, then one ought not have an IA towards Q at t. However, I argue that a central premise Friedman relies on in her argument actually undermines (rather than supports) the claim that IAs are not governed by the Ignorance Norm. I conclude that Friedman's conception of IAs should be rejected.  Samuel  Akrasia's Scope: The Sufficiency of Aristotelian Moral States to Combat Socratic Denial Abstract: Aristotle and Plato report that Socrates denies the moral state of akrasia's possibility that is, Socrates denies that moral agents make mistakes willingly, but rather asserts that they do so as a result of ignorance. Aristotle's account of akrasia in Nicomachean Ethics seems to refute Socrates' stance. However, Aristotle presents akrasia with a limited scope or reach, as a moral state concerned only with the objects of sophrosune. Thus we might conclude that Aristotle does not refute Socrates' position entirely, affirming akrasia as an actual moral state, but only when the objects of sophrosune are concerned. This conclusion is wrong, for Aristotle provides space for moral states distinct from akrasiaproper within the domains of virtues other than sophrosune. These moral states are distinguished from akrasia proper in that they have different objects alongside their respective virtues, but similar in that they share a psychological explanation.  Phenomenal Concepts and the Science of Consciousness Author: Dylan Black  Scientifically literate physicalists in the philosophy of mind often endorse the phenomenal concept strategy in response to the explanatory gap. Although defenders of the phenomenal concept strategy believe that phenomenal states are identical to physical/functional states, they generally deny the possibility that science can reveal the physical/functional identity of phenomenal states. In this paper I defend the consistency of the phenomenal concept strategy with the possibility that science will discover the physical/functional identity of phenomenal states. I argue that correct applications of phenomenal concepts imply that certain functional concepts apply, placing functional constraints on what might count as the neural correlates of consciousness. Specifically I propose that a cognitive process is a mental representation only if, under the right circumstances, it makes its content available to the cognitive systems to which it belongs.  A Pragmatic Methodology for the (Queer)  Elaine M. Blum IPA Fall 2017 Meeting 10 11 November 2017 4  The purpose of this project is to articulate an account of the self that recognizes the full range of its gendered embodiments. To do this, I commit myself to taking the lives and experiences of LGBTIA+ individuals as the starting point for theorizing, as well as the measure of success for my theorizing. My The purpose of this project is to articulate an account of the self that recognizes the full range of its gendered embodiments. To do this, I commit myself to taking the lives and experiences of LGBTIA+ individuals as the starting point for theorizing, as well as the measure of success for my theorizing. My aim is to find a notion of self that does justice to the complexities and contradictions of queerness. My hypothesis is twofold. First, I argue that pragmatic methodologies, which emphasize the social self, achieve this aim. Second, not only does pragmatism do justice to queer lives, but it reveals that the self itself is queer. What it is to be, express, embody, or live as a self in any of its gendered embodiments is to be queer.  What If God Makes Hard Choices?   This paper explores the implications for classical theism of the possibility that God makes "hard choices." A choice between two actions is hard if the chooser believes that each action is better than the other in some respects, but believes neither that one action is better overall than the other nor that the two actions are equally valuable overall. Even an omniscient God might be forced to make hard choices if, as seems plausible, "better than," "worse than," and "equal in value to" do not exhaust the relevant value relations that one action can bear to another. This paper seeks to show that, if God does make hard choices of a certain sort, then God can be essentially perfectly rational and still have morally significant freedom. This is important because maximal praiseworthiness both requires morally significant freedom and, like perfect rationality, is required for divinity in the classical sense.  The Z.13 Thesis and the Unity of Substance Author: Tyler Eaves  In Metaphysics Zeta 13, Aristotle appears to be arguing for a problematic conclusion. He appears to be arguing that no universal can be substance and this is problematic because two commonly held interpretations of Aristotle's metaphysics are that forms are substance indeed they are the primary substances and that forms are universal in that there is one form that, together with bits of matter, constitute the members of a given species of natural object. I will argue that this apparent inconsistency is just that apparent by offering reasons, from both internal and external to Z.13, for thinking that Aristotle has not contradicted himself at all and that what he says in Z.13 is quite in keeping with the larger theory of substance developed in the central books.  Is Tranquility the Final Telos for Epicurus?  Alex R Gillham Abstract: Scholarly consensus takes Epicurus to posit tranquility as the final end. On this reading, all actions must aim toward the elimination of bodily pain and mental turmoil. If this is the final telos, then the state in which M finds herself simply cannot improve once M secures tranquility; to say that tranquility is the final telos is to say that once one achieves it, there is nothing more outside of it to seek. But it is mistaken to take Epicurus to posit tranquility as the final end of human actions. Since the gods can experience goods over and above tranquility, and since Epicurus exhorts humans to become godlike IPA Fall 2017 Meeting 10 11 November 2017 5 by doing the same thing, tranquility cannot be the final telos. Both human and divine actions can aim at some end more final and complete than mere non disturbance, which means that Epicurus cannot take tranquility to be the final telos.  Against Empedoclean Teleology: The Roles of Love, Strife, and Chance Author:  Although Aristotle treats Empedocles as an opponent of teleological explanation, there are places in the fragments that seem to attribute teleological activity to Empedocles' cosmic forces, Love and Strife. This has led some interpreters to treat Empedocles as a teleologist. I challenge such teleological interpretations of Empedocles by examining key texts that seem to suggest teleology, arguing particularly that Empedocles' analogies are meant to show how order can emerge by chance as if it were purposefully arranged. Then, I provide an interpretation of Empedocles on chance to support an anti teleological reading of Empedocles. Ultimately, I argue that chance emerges when earth, water, air, fire, and mortal mixtures act on their own, without the total control of the forces over them. Moreover, I suggest that such chancy activity, with Love's commitment to mixing unlikes in innumerably many ways, can explain how complex life forms can emerge without any planning.  The Brotherhood of Nature in the Gorgias Author: Kevin S.  Recent scholarship on the Gorgias has tended to focus on the relationship between Socrates and Callicles. Some scholars have suggested a common ground between the Socratic and Calliclean positions; others have suggested instead that the two positions have little in common. In this essay, I attempt to supplement such interpretations by focusing on the theme of nature (physis) and by offering a reading of Gorgias 481b 486d, i.e. the two speeches by Socrates and Callicles, respectively, at the beginning of their interchange. I argue that insufficient attention has been paid to the strange format of Socrates' speech and to Callicles' understanding of nature. It is only when these topics have been examined that we are in the proper position to evaluate whether there are points of philosophical contact between Socrates and Callicles.  Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude Type Matters Author: Liz Jackson  In this paper, I argue that the relationship between belief and credence is a central question in epistemology. This is because the belief credence relationship has significant implications for a number of current epistemological issues. I focus on three controversies: permissivism, disagreement, and pragmatic encroachment. I argue that the implications of each debate depend on whether the relevant attitude is belief or credence. This means that (i) epistemologists should pay attention to whether they are framing questions in terms of belief or in terms of credence and (ii) the success or failure of a reductionist project in the belief credence realm has significant implications for epistemology generally.  Why Self Promises are Problematic IPA Fall 2017 Meeting 10 11 November 2017 6  Alida Liberman  I argue that self promises cannot be understood as genuine promises. First, the possibility of unilateral release from a self promise undermines the force of the obligation.  While these cases establish