Adaptive Randomized Smoothing: Certified Adversarial Robustness for Multi-Step Defences

Authors: saiyue  lyu
shadab  shaikh
frederick  shpilevskiy
evan  shelhamer
mathias  lécuyer
Venue: NeurIPS_cc_2024_Conference
Published: 2024-05-15 05:03:39

Abstract: We propose Adaptive Randomized Smoothing (ARS) to certify the predictions of our test-time adaptive models against adversarial examples.
ARS extends the analysis of randomized smoothing using $f$-Differential Privacy to certify the adaptive composition of multiple steps.
For the first time, our theory covers the sound adaptive composition of general and high-dimensional functions of noisy inputs.
We instantiate ARS on deep image classification to certify predictions against adversarial examples of bounded $L_{\infty}$ norm.
In the $L_{\infty}$ threat model, ARS enables flexible adaptation through high-dimensional input-dependent masking.
We design adaptivity benchmarks, based on CIFAR-10 and CelebA, and show that ARS improves standard test accuracy by  1 to 15\% points.
On ImageNet, ARS improves certified test accuracy by up to 1.6% points over standard RS without adaptivity. Our code is available at [https://github.com/ubc-systopia/adaptive-randomized-smoothing](https://github.com/ubc-systopia/adaptive-randomized-smoothing).

Main paper: 
 introduction: 
 Despite impressive accuracy, deep learning models still show a worrying susceptibility to adversarial attacks. Such attacks have been shown for a large number of tasks and models (Costa et al., 2023; Chakraborty et al., 2018) , including areas where security and safety are critical such as fraud detection (Pumsirirat and Liu, 2018) or autonomous driving (Cao et al., 2021) .Several rigorous defences have been proposed to certify robustness. Randomized Smoothing (RS) (Lécuyer et al., 2019; Cohen et al., 2019) does so by averaging predictions over noisy versions of the input at test time, and as such can scale to large deep learning models. However, RS has its limitations: it is inflexible and either degrades accuracy or only certifies against small attacks.To address these shortcomings and improve robustness, there has been a recent push to develop defences that adapt to inputs at test time Croce et al. (2022) , including for RS (Alfarra et al., 2022a; Súkeník et al., 2021; Hong et al., 2022) . Most such adaptive defences are heuristic, unproven, and subject to improved attacks (Croce et al., 2022; Alfarra et al., 2022a; Hong et al., 2022) , running the risk of reverting to a hopeless cat and mouse game with attackers (Athalye et al., 2018; Tramer et al., 2020) , or only provide limited adaptivity (Súkeník et al., 2021; Hong et al., 2022) and gain ( §5).We (re)connect RS to Differential Privacy (DP), after its abandonment for a tighter analysis via hypothesis testing (Cohen et al., 2019) , and introduce Adaptive Randomized Smoothing (ARS) to provide test-time adaptivity while preserving rigorous bounds. Specifically, we analyze RS through the lens of f -Differential Privacy (f -DP), and use this connection to leverage a key strength of DP: the end-to-end analysis of multi-step adaptive computation using composition results ( §2).We use ARS to design two-step defence against L ∞ adversaries on image classification (Figure 1 ), which is a challenging setting for RS Blum et al. (2020) . The first step computes an input mask that Step M2 takes masked input w(m1) ⊙ X and adds noise to get m2. Base classifier g post-processes a weighted average of m1, m2 to output a label. RS reduces to σ2 = σ and w(.) = 1 (no M1).focuses on task-relevant information. This reduces the dimension of the input, which is then passed to the second step for prediction. Thanks to this adaptive dimension reduction, the second step makes its prediction on a less noisy image, improving the performance and certification radius ( §3).We evaluate our adaptive randomized smoothing method in three settings ( §4). For image classification, we first design a challenging benchmark based on CIFAR-10, and we show that ARS can improve accuracy by up to 15%. For spatially-localized face attribute classification on the CelebA dataset, we show that ARS improves accuracy by up to 7.7%. For large-scale image classification on ImageNet, ARS maintains accuracy and improves certified accuracy by up to 1.6%. 
theory for adaptivity via differential privacy: 
 After introducing the necessary background and known results on RS and DP ( §2.1), we reconnect RS to its DP roots by showing that the tight analysis of Cohen et al. (2019) can be seen as PixelDP (Lécuyer et al., 2019) using f -Differential Privacy (Dong et al., 2019; 2022) , a hypothesis testing formulation of DP ( §2.2). This connection lets us leverage composition results for f -DP to analyze multi-step approaches for provable robustness to adversarial examples, which we name Adaptive Randomized Smoothing (ARS) ( §2.3). We leverage ARS to design and analyze a two-step defence against L ∞ -bounded adversaries ( §2.4), which we then instantiate as a deep network ( §3).2.1 Related Work: Adversarial Robustness, Randomized Smoothing, and Differential Privacy Adversarial Examples (Szegedy et al., 2014) : Consider a classifier g : X → Y, and input X. An adversarial example of radius r in the L p threat model, for model g on input X, is an input X + e such that g(X + e) ̸ = g(X), where e ∈ B p (r), where B p (r) ≜ {x ∈ R d : ∥x∥ p ≤ r} is the L p ball of radius r. These inputs or attacks are made against classifiers at test time. For more on the active topics of attack and defence, we refer to surveys (Li et al., 2023; Costa et al., 2023; Chakraborty et al., 2018) on current attacks and provable defences. In general, provable defences do not focus on the largest-scale highest-accuracy classifiers, with the notable exception of randomized smoothing.Randomized Smoothing (RS) (Lécuyer et al., 2019; Cohen et al., 2019) is a scalable approach to certifying model predictions against L 2 -norm adversaries. Specifically, it certifies robustness to any attack ∈ B 2 (r X ). The algorithm randomizes a base model g by adding spherical Gaussian noise to its input, and produces a smoothed classifier that returns the class with highest expectation over the noise: y + ≜ arg max y∈Y P z∼N (0,σ 2 I d ) g(X + z) = y . The tightest analysis from Cohen et al. (2019) uses hypothesis testing theory to show that, with p + , p -∈ [0, 1] such that P(g(X + z) = y + ) ≥ p + ≥ p -≥ max y-̸ =y+ P(g(X + z) = y -), the certificate size r X for prediction y + is:EQUATIONwhere Φ -1 is the inverse standard Gaussian CDF, p + lower-bounds the probability of g(X + z) = y + (the most probable class), and p -upper-bounds the probability of other classes.While sound, RS is static during testing even though attacks may adapt. Recent work aims to make RS adapt at test time (Súkeník et al., 2021; Alfarra et al., 2022a; Hong et al., 2022) . While pioneering, these works are restricted in either their soundness or their degree of adaptation and resulting improvement. Súkeník et al. (2021) soundly adapt the variance for RS by the distance between test and train inputs. However, this only provides minimal adaptivity, with only minor improvement to certification. Alfarra et al. (2022a) adapt the variance for RS to each test input, but the analysis is not end-to-end, and hence not sound (Súkeník et al., 2021) (except for their memory-based edition, but this requires storage of all examples). UniCR (Hong et al., 2022) adapts the noise distribution for RS, primarily to the data distribution during training, and optionally to input during testing. The train-time adaptation is sound, but the test-time adaptation is not due to the same issue raised by Súkeník et al. (2021) . We propose ARS to advance certified test-time adaptivity: our approach is sound and high-dimensional to flexibly adapt the computation of later steps conditioned on earlier steps by differential privacy theory.Differential Privacy (DP) is a rigorous notion of privacy. A randomized mechanism M is (ϵ, δ)-DP if, for any neighbouring inputs X and X ′ , and any subset of possible outputs Y ⊂ Range(M), Lécuyer et al. (2019) , we define neighbouring based on L p norms: X andP(M(X) ∈ Y) ≤ e ϵ P(M(X ′ ) ∈ Y) + δ. FollowingX ′ in R d are L p neighbours at radius r if X -X ′ ∈ B p (r).RS was initially analyzed using (ϵ, δ)-Differential Privacy (Lécuyer et al., 2019) . Intuitively, the randomized classifier M(X) ≜ g(X + z), z ∼ N (0, σ 2 I d ) acts as a privacy preserving mechanism (the Gaussian mechanism) that provably "hides" small variations in X. This privacy guarantee yields a robustness certificate for the expected predictions.f -DP (Dong et al., 2019) is a notion of privacy that extends (ϵ, δ)-DP, and defines privacy as a bound on the power of hypothesis tests. Appendix A provides more details on f -DP. The main result we leverage is Theorem 2.7 of Dong et al. (2022) that for a Gaussian mechanismEQUATIONWe leverage two key properties of f -DP. First, f -DP is resilient to post-processing. That is, if mechanism M is f -DP, proc • M is also f -DP. Second, f -DP is closed under adaptive composition. We refer to §3 in Dong et al. (2022) for the precise definition and use their Corollary 3.3: the adaptive composition of two Gaussian mechanisms G µ1 -DP and G µ2 -DP is itself G µ -DP withEQUATIONf -DP is distinct from the f -divergence from information theory. Dvijotham et al. ( 2020) use fdivergence bounds between the noise distribution centred on the original input and centred on any perturbed input. This improves RS by broadening the noise distributions and norm-bounds on the adversary that RS can support. In contrast we focus on f -DP, which captures enough information to reconstruct any divergence by post-processing (Proposition B.1. in Dong et al. (2019) ). Our main objective is different: we leverage f -DP composition properties to enable multi-step deep learning architectures that adapt to the input at test time with robustness guarantees.We reconnect RS with DP, using f -DP to yield results as strong as that of Equation (1). We start with a general robustness result on f -DP classifiers, which we later build on for our main result. Proposition 2.1 (f -DP Robustness). Let M : X → Y be f -DP for B p (r) neighbourhoods, and let M S : X → arg max y∈Y P(M(X) = y) be the associated smoothed classifier. Let y + ≜ M S (X) be the prediction on input X, and let p + , p -∈ [0, 1] be such that P(M(X) = y + ) ≥ p + ≥ p -≥ max y-̸ =y+ P(M(X) = y -). Then:f (1 -p + ) ≥ 1 -f (p -) ⇒ ∀e ∈ B p (r), M S (X + e) = y + Proof. See Appendix B1.Let us now instantiate Proposition 2.1 for Gaussian RS (see §2.1):Corollary 2.2 (RS from f -DP). Let M : X → g(X + z), z ∼ N (0, σ 2 I d ), and M S : X → arg max y∈Y P(M(X) = y) be the associated smooth model. Let y + ≜ M S (X) be the prediction on input X, and let p + , p -∈ [0, 1] be such that P(M(X) = y + ) ≥ p + ≥ p -≥ max y-̸ =y+ P(M(X) = y -). Then ∀e ∈ B 2 (r x ), M S (X + e) = y + , with:r X = σ 2 Φ -1 (p + ) -Φ -1 (p -) .Proof. See Appendix B2. Sketch: M is a Gaussian mechanism, and is G r σ -DP for any r (B 2 (r) neighbourhood). We apply Proposition 2.1 and maximize r such that G r σ (1-p + ) ≥ 1-G r σ (p -).While Proposition 2.1 is new, so far we have only used it to reprove the known result of Corollary 2.2. So why is this connection between f -DP and robustness useful? Our key insight is that we can leverage adaptive composition results at the core of DP algorithms to certify multi-step methods that adapt to their inputs at test time. Such adaptive defences have seen recent empirical interest, but either lack formal guarantees, or provide only limited adaptivity in practice ( §5). For the first time we derive a sound and high-dimensional adaptive method for certification.We formalize adaptive multi-step certification as follows. Consider k randomized Gaussian mechanisms M 1 , . . . , M k (our adaptive steps), such that m i ∼ M i (X|m <i ), and for all r ≥ 0 we have that M i is G r/σi -DP for the B 2 (r) neighbouring definition. Note that the computation M i can depend on previous results, as long as it is G r/σi -DP. Further consider a (potentially randomized) post-processing classifier g(m 1 , . . . , m k ) = y ∈ Y.Theorem 2.3 (Main result: Adaptive RS). Using definitions above, let M :X → g(m 1 , . . . , m k ) ∈ Y, (m 1 , . . . , m k ) ∼ (M 1 (X), . . . , M k (X|m <k )), and the associated smoothed model be M S : X → arg max m∈Y P(M(X) = y). Let y + ≜ M S (X) be the prediction on input X, and let p + , p -∈ [0, 1] be such that P(M(X) = y + ) ≥ p + ≥ p -≥ max y-̸ =y+ P(M(X) = y -). Then ∀e ∈ B 2 (r x ), M S (X + e) = y + , with:r X = 1 2 k i=1 1 σ 2 i Φ -1 (p + ) -Φ -1 (p -) .Proof. By adaptive composition of Gaussian DP mechanisms (Equation ( 3)), M is G µ -DP with µ = k i=1 r 2 σ 2 i = r k i=1 1 σ 2 i. We can then apply Corollary 2.2 with σ = 1/k i=1 1 σ 2 i .We focus on Gaussian RS, but a similar argument applies to general f -DP mechanisms for which we can compute f i at any r, and the composition f i ⊗ • • • ⊗ f k , potentially using numerical techniques such as that of Gopi et al. (2021) . For Gaussian noise, Theorem 2.3 leverages strong results from DP to provide a perhaps surprising result: there is no cost to adaptivity, in the sense that k independent measurements of input X with Gaussian noise (without adaptivity) of respective variance σ 2 i can be averaged to one measurement of varianceσ 2 = 1/ k i=1 σ -2 i .To show this, we can use a weighted average to minimize variance (see e.g., Equation 4 in Honaker (2015) ), withc j = σ -2 j / k i=1 σ -2 i yielding σ 2 = k j=1 c 2 j σ 2 j = k j=1 σ -2 j / k i=1 σ -2 i 2 = 1/ k i=1 σ -2 i .The ARS r X from Theorem 2.3 is identical to that of one step RS from Corollary 2.2 using this variance: adaptivity over multi-step computation comes with no decrease in certified radius.How can we leverage the multi-step adaptivity from Theorem 2.3 to increase certified accuracy? We focus on two-step certified defence against L ∞ -bounded attacks to increase accuracy by adaptivity. Previous work already notes that RS applies to L ∞ -bounded attackers (Lécuyer et al., 2019; Cohen et al., 2019) , using the fact that∀X ∈ R d , ∥X∥ 2 ≤ √ d∥X∥ ∞ , and hence that X -X ′ ∈ B ∞ (r ∞ ) ⇒ X -X ′ ∈ B 2 ( √ d • r ∞ ).Using Corollary 2.2, this yields:EQUATIONWhile L ∞ -specific RS theory exists (Yang et al., 2020) , further work by Blum et al. (2020) has found that Gaussian RS performs advantageously in practice. However, Blum et al. (2020) ; Kumar et al. (2020) ; Wu et al. (2021) show that the √ d dependency cannot be avoided for a large family of distributions, leading the authors to speculate that RS might be inherently limited for L ∞ certification of predictions on high dimensional images. To side-step this issue, we use two-steps adaptivity to first select subsets of the image important to the classification task (thereby reducing dimension), and then make the prediction based on the selected subset. Formally: Proposition 2.4 (Adaptive RS for L ∞ ). Define the following pair of (adaptive) mechanisms:M 1 : X → X + z 1 ≜ m 1 , z 1 ∼ N (0, σ 2 1 I d ) (5)Then, with any function w : R d → [0, 1] d (interpreted as a mask):EQUATION)where ⊙ is the element-wise product; and the final prediction function g : m 1 , m 2 → Y.Consider the mechanism M that samples m 1 ∼ M 1 , then m 2 ∼ M 2 , and finally outputs g(m 1 , m 2 ); and the associated smoothed classifier M S : X → arg max y∈Y P(M(X) = y). Let y + ≜ M S (X) be the prediction on input X, and let p + , p -∈ [0, 1] be such thatEQUATIONProof. Consider any X,X ′ s.t. X -X ′ ∈ B ∞ (r ∞ ). We analyze M 1 and M 2 in turn. ∥X -X ′ ∥ 2 ≤ √ d∥X -X ′ ∥ ∞ , so X -X ′ ∈ B 2 ( √ dr ∞ ), and M 1 is G µ1 -DP with µ 1 = r ∞ √ d σ1 . ∥w(m 1 ) ⊙ X -w(m 1 ) ⊙ X ′ ∥ 2 = ∥w(y 1 ) ⊙ X -X ′ ∥ 2 ≤ ∥w(y 1 )∥ 2 ∥X -X ′ ∥ ∞ so X -X ′ ∈ B 2 (∥w(y 1 )∥ 2 r ∞ ) and M 2 is G µ2 -DP with µ 2 = ∥w(y1)∥2r ∞ ∥w(y1)∥2σ2/ √ d = r ∞ √ d σ2 . Applying Theorem 2.3 with (r ∞ ) 2 d σ 2 1 + (r ∞ ) 2 d σ 2 2 = r ∞ d 1 σ 2 1 + 1 σ 2 2concludes the proof.Important remarks. 1. w(.) is a masking function, adaptively reducing (if w i (m 1 ) ≪ 1) the value of X i and thereby the attack surface of an L ∞ attacker. This reduces the effective dimension of the input to M 2 . 2. Reducing the dimension enables a reduction in the noise variance in M 2 , at fixed privacy guarantee G µ2 . The variance reduction is enabled for all dimensions in the input, even those that are not masked (w i (m 1 ) ≈ 1). As a result, the variance of the noise in M 2 scales as ∥w(m 1 )∥ 2 2 ≤ d. The more masking, the lower the variance. It may help to consider the change of variables σ ← σ/ √ d in Equation (4), and σ 1,2 ← σ 1,2 / √ d in Proposition 2.4, to remove d from r ∞ X and scale the noise variance with d. For RS (Equation (4)), the noise variance scales as d. For ARS, only Equation (5) (the first step) suffers from variance scaled by d, while the second step's variance (Equation ( 6)) scales as ||w(m 1 )|| 2 2 , which can be much smaller than d when a large part of the image is masked. Reduced variance translates into higher accuracy, as well as p + and p -being further apart, for a larger r ∞ X . 3. The variance reduction due to masking applies in the translation from the B ∞ (r ∞ ) bound on the attack to the B 2 (r) sensitivity used in ARS. This variance reduction would not apply to an L 2 -bounded adversary (an attack that only changes pixels with mask values of one yields no sensitivity improvement). Hence, our two-steps ARS architecture for L ∞ -bounded adversaries does not reduce to bounding L ∞ with L 2 as the traditional RS application does, and our gains come explicitly from variance reduction enabled by adaptive masking against an L ∞ attack.Question: Does the paper discuss the limitations of the work performed by the authors? Answer: [Yes] Justification: We identify limitations in Section 5 and in particular call out computational overhead and the need to assess the combination of ARS with other improvements to RS (which are compatible in principle, but require experiment to measure and verify).Guidelines:• The answer NA means that the paper has no limitation while the answer No means that the paper has limitations, but those are not discussed in the paper. • The authors are encouraged to create a separate "Limitations" section in their paper.• The paper should point out any strong assumptions and how robust the results are to violations of these assumptions (e.g., independence assumptions, noiseless settings, model well-specification, asymptotic approximations only holding locally). The authors should reflect on how these assumptions might be violated in practice and what the implications would be. • The authors should reflect on the scope of the claims made, e.g., if the approach was only tested on a few datasets or with a few runs. In general, empirical results often depend on implicit assumptions, which should be articulated. • The authors should reflect on the factors that influence the performance of the approach.For example, a facial recognition algorithm may perform poorly when image resolution is low or images are taken in low lighting. Or a speech-to-text system might not be used reliably to provide closed captions for online lectures because it fails to handle technical jargon. • The authors should discuss the computational efficiency of the proposed algorithms and how they scale with dataset size. • If applicable, the authors should discuss possible limitations of their approach to address problems of privacy and fairness. • While the authors might fear that complete honesty about limitations might be used by reviewers as grounds for rejection, a worse outcome might be that reviewers discover limitations that aren't acknowledged in the paper. The authors should use their best judgment and recognize that individual actions in favor of transparency play an important role in developing norms that preserve the integrity of the community. Reviewers will be specifically instructed to not penalize honesty concerning limitations. 
two-step ars for l ∞ certification of image classification: 
 Figure 1 shows our deep learning architecture based on Proposition 2.4. The first step, M 1 , adds noise to input X and post-processes the result into a mask w(m 1 ). The second step, M 2 , takes masked input w(m 1 ) ⊙ X and adds noise. Finally, the base classifier g post-processes a weighted average of m 1 , m 2 to output a label. The whole model is trained end-to-end on the classification task. In RS, only the path going through M 2 is present. This is equivalent to setting σ 2 = σ and w(.) = 1, with no M 1 . In both cases, the final predictions are averaged over the noise to create the smoothed classifier. The ARS architecture introduces several new components, which we next describe.Budget Splitting: the noise budget σ (Figure 1 ; red) is split to assign noise levels to the two steps M 1 and M 2 . We parameterize ARS with the same σ as standard RS then split it by the f -DP composition formula from Equation (3). In practice, we assign σ 1 ≥ σ to M 1 , and thenσ 2 = 1/ 1 σ 2 -1 σ 2 1. We set σ 1 by either fixing it to a constant or learning it end-to-end.Masking: the mask model w(•) takes the noisy image from M 1 and predicts a weighting (one value in [0, 1] per input pixel) that is multiplied with the input element-wise (denoted ⊙ in Proposition 2.4).The model is a U-Net architecture, which makes pixel-wise predictions, and acts as a post-processing of M 1 in the f -DP analysis. Our masking enables test-time adaptivity to reduce the noise variance for M 2 , via the mask's dependence on the input through m 1 .Mechanism output averaging: to fully leverage both steps' information, we take a weighted average of the outputs m 1 and m 2 before passing the result to the base classifier g. For a particular input pixel i, denote X i the value of pixel, w i ∈ [0, 1] its mask weight (we omit the explicit dependency on m 1 in w for compactness), and m 1,i , m 2,i the respective values output by M 1 and M 2 . Then, the final value of pixel i in the averaged input will be Xi≜ c 1,i m 1,i + c 2,i m 2,i . We set c 1,i , c 2,i such that Xi is the unbiased estimate of X i with smallest variance. First, we set c 1,i + w i c 2,i = 1, such that E[ Xi ] = c 1,i X i + c 2,i w i X i = X i . Second, we minimize the variance. Notice that V[ Xi ] = c 2 1,i σ 2 1 + c 2 2,i ∥w∥ 2 2 σ 2 2 = (1 -w i c 2,i ) 2 σ 2 1 + c 2 2,i ∥w∥ 2 2 σ 2 2 :this is a convex function in c 2,i minimized when its gradient in c 2,i is zero. Plugging back into the constraint to get c 1,i , we obtain the following weights:c 1,i = ∥w∥ 2 2 σ 2 2 σ 2 1 w 2 i +∥w∥ 2 2 σ 2 2 , and c 2,i = σ 2 1 wi σ 2 1 w 2 i +∥w∥ 2 2 σ 2 2 .The averaged noisy input X is finally fed to the base classifier g for prediction. The smoothed classifier M S averages predictions (over noise draws) over the entire pipeline. The parameters of w and g (and σ 1 if not fixed) are learned during training and are fixed at inference/certification time.Question: For each theoretical result, does the paper provide the full set of assumptions and a complete (and correct) proof? Answer: [Yes] Justification: We present the theoretical results in Section 2, where we cover the main results, and provide Appendix B with further detailed assumptions and proofs. Guidelines:• The answer NA means that the paper does not include theoretical results.• All the theorems, formulas, and proofs in the paper should be numbered and crossreferenced. • All assumptions should be clearly stated or referenced in the statement of any theorems.• The proofs can either appear in the main paper or the supplemental material, but if they appear in the supplemental material, the authors are encouraged to provide a short proof sketch to provide intuition. • Inversely, any informal proof provided in the core of the paper should be complemented by formal proofs provided in appendix or supplemental material. • Theorems and Lemmas that the proof relies upon should be properly referenced. 
experiments: 
 We evaluate on standard and L ∞ -certified test accuracy. Certified accuracy at radius r ∞ is the percentage of test samples that are correctly classified and have anL ∞ certificate radius r ∞ X ≥ r ∞ . Standard accuracy is obtained for r ∞ = 0.Datasets We evaluate on CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky, 2009) in §4.1, CelebA (Liu et al., 2015) (specifically the unaligned HD-CelebA-Cropper edition) in §4.2, and ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009) in §4.3. We measure adaptivity on CIFAR-10 and CelebA by designing challenging benchmarks requiring adaptivity, and measure scalability on ImageNet.Models We choose the standard ResNet (He et al., 2016) models as base classifiers g with ResNet-110 for CIFAR-10 and ResNet-50 for CelebA and ImageNet. For ARS, our mask model w is a simplified U-Net (Ronneberger et al., 2015) (see Appendix C.1 for details). For the noise budget, we find that a fixed budget split performs reliably, and so in all experiments we split byσ 1 = σ 2 = √ 2σ.Methods We compare to standard and strong static methods, design a baseline specifically for our masking approach, and evaluate the only sound input-dependent methods prior to ARS. Cohen et al. is the standard approach to RS (Cohen et al., 2019) . UniCR (Hong et al., 2022) learns the noise distribution for RS during training but is static during testing (while they propose an input-adaptive variant, it is not sound so we restrict our comparison to the training variant). We tune hyper-parameters, and perform a grid search for β (the parameter of the noise distribution) to maximize certified accuracy. We find that β = 2 (Gaussian), or β = 2.25 (close to a Gaussian, σ = 1.0, k = 48  42.5 (2.1)  45.1 (1.2)  44.3 (0.2)  34.1 (1.0)  47.6 (2.0)  σ = 0.25, k = 64  71.6 (0.9)  73.1 (3.2)  67.8 (0.5)  64.1 (0.8)  77 (1.8)  σ = 0.5, k = 64  63 (1.6)  62.5 (1.7)  58.7 (0.2)  45.1 (1.1)  69.9 (1.2)  σ = 1.0, k = 64  41.3 (1 Input dimension is a key challenge in L ∞ certification using RS (see §2.4). We design our 20kBG benchmark to vary this parameter without affecting the task: we superimpose CIFAR-10 images onto a larger distractor background from the 20k background images dataset Li et al. (2022a) . The backgrounds are split into train and test sets, and resized to k × k pixels (where k ≥ 32). The CIFAR-10 image (of dimensions 32 × 32 × 3) is then placed at random along the edges of the background image to maximize spatial variation. The spurious background increases the dimension (= k × k × 3) of the input when k > 32, making L ∞ certification with RS more challenging, but is uninformative for the task of CIFAR-10 by construction. Our mask model (M 1 ) needs to learn to ignore the background to reduce the effective dimension of the input. For computational reasons, we run all certification results on a 200 sample subset of the CIFAR-10 test set. Appendix D shows extended results, details about hyperparameter tuning (C.3), and results on larger test-sets (D.1). We set the failure probability of the certification procedure to 0.05, use 100 samples to select the most probable class, and 50,000 samples for the Monte Carlo estimate of p + .Table 1 summarizes the standard accuracy (r = 0) of each approach on the different settings. We vary σ in {0.25, 0.5, 1.0} and k in {32, 48, 64, 96} to show the effect of noise levels and dimensionality on the accuracy of different approaches (k = 32 corresponds to original CIFAR-10 images). Figure 2 shows the certified test accuracy at different radii r ∞ for ARS and all baselines we consider.We make three observations. First, ARS outperforms all the baselines under distractor backgrounds (k > 32). Static mask is slightly better at k = 32, probably because CIFAR-10 images lack enough "irrelevant" information for ARS to discard. This is precisely why we introduce this benchmark, where we explicitly add such irrelevant information to input images. Indeed, at k > 32, we observe that the standard accuracy of ARS improves, translating to an improved certified accuracy at all certification levels, since more accurate and confident predictions give a larger certified radius r ∞ .Second, as we grow the input dimension k, the accuracy of ARS remains either stable or increases, whereas that of other baselines goes down, resulting in an increasing gap. For instance, at σ = 1.0, the gap between ARS and the best baseline is 1.3% points for k = 32, 2.5% points for k = 48, 8.2% points for k = 64 and 15% points for k = 96. As k grows, the amount of relevant information (a 32 × 32 × 3 CIFAR-10 image) remains the same, whereas the amount of spurious background information increases. ARS' mask is able to rule out spurious pixels, reducing the noise in the second step (Figure 3 ). Thanks to this masking, ARS is much less sensitive to increases in dimensionality.Third, we observe that except k = 32, ARS improves over all the baselines in low (σ = 0.25) to high (σ = 1.0) noise regimes. In fact, this trend continues to persist in higher noise regimes (Appendix D). Similar to previous observations, we notice that as we increase σ, other baselines's accuracy drops significantly whereas ARS accuracy drops much less, displaying higher noise tolerance.ARS training and inference requires additional computation. To certify a single input (k = 32), Cohen et al. (2019) takes ∼12 seconds while ARS takes ∼26 seconds (as measured on an NVIDIA A100 80Gb GPU). This 2× overhead does however yield improved certified accuracy.To evaluate ARS on a more realistic task with natural spatial variation, we use the CelebA face dataset in its unaligned version. We focus on the "mouth slightly open" (label 21) binary classification task because mouth location and shape vary. The input part relevant to this task is likely well-localized, which affords an opportunity for the mask model to reduce the effective input dimension. The dataset consists of images with varied resolution, and meta-data about the position of different features, including the mouth. To create a challenging benchmark, we randomly crop all images to 160 × 160 pixels, which creates spatial variation in the mouth's position. The only crop constraint is that the mouth is ≥ 10 pixels from the edge to ensure sufficient input to solve the task. Figure 5 shows example images from the test set, their respective masks from ARS, and the baseline static mask. Figure 4 shows the certified accuracy for ARS, Cohen et al. (2019) , and static mask, for three levels of the noise σ. First, both baselines perform very similarly. We can see from Figure 5 that the static mask is approximately identity (notice the ≥ 0.99 scale), with only very slight dimming on the edges. This is because the mouth is not centred in our benchmark, so there is no one-size-fits-all mask. Second, ARS is able to predict a sparse mask that focuses on areas likely to have the mouth. The mask adapts to each input at test time, which is what enables the sparsity without performance degradation. Third, this sparse mask leads to a large noise reduction, enabling ARS to drastically improve both standard and certified accuracy. For instance, with σ = 0.5, ARS improves the standard accuracy from 91.0% to 94.3% (a 3.3 point improvement), while the certified accuracy at r ∞ = 0.004 jumps from 45.0% to 79.3% (a more than 30 point improvement!). At lower noise (σ = 0.25) there is still an increase in standard accuracy from 94.3% to 97.0%, and an increase in certified accuracy from 68.3% to 84.7% at r ∞ = 0.002). At larger noise (σ = 1.0), ARS sees significant increases (7.7% points in standard accuracy, and from 21.3% to 49.3% in certified accuracy at r ∞ = 0.008).To evaluate the scalability of ARS we experiment on ImageNet (without any modification) with σ = 0.25, 0.5, 1.0. For each noise level, we compare with Cohen et al. (2019) , which we reproduce for this large-scale setting. We evaluate two versions of ARS: our regular setting (End-To-End); and a version that fixes the base classifier to the model trained as in Cohen et al. (2019) , and only trains our mask model for 10 epochs (Pretrain). The certified accuracy is plotted in Figure 6 and the standard accuracy is reported in Table 3 .When only training the mask model, certified accuracy remains close to that of Cohen et al. (2019) at all radii and noise levels. ARS trained end-to-end improves both standard and certified accuracy.Setting/Approach The standard accuracy (at r = 0) increases from 57.2% to 57.4% and from 43.6% to 44.5% when σ = 0.5 and σ = 1, respectively. For σ = 0.25, standard accuracy for ARS is close but slightly lower than Cohen et al. (2019) , while the pretrained ARS outperforms Cohen et al. (2019) from 66.5% to 67.4%. Appendix F discusses other ARS improvements without certification.Certified accuracy increases at larger σ. For instance at σ = 0.5, ARS improves certified accuracy at r ∞ = 0.001 from 48.9% to 50.5%. At larger noise σ = 1.0, ARS improves certified accuracy at r ∞ = 0.005 from 21.7% to 23.1%. This shows that ARS' adaptivity generalizes outside of the specialized benchmarks we designed, and can scale to large datasets and complex classification tasks. 2021)), or leverage DP-SGD (Abadi et al., 2016) to analyze defences that update by test-time optimization (Alfarra et al., 2022b; Hwang et al., 2022; Mao et al., 2021) . Going further, one could leverage the vast DP literature to extend ARS, enabling fully-adaptive variance defences inspired by Alfarra et al. (2022a) by leveraging privacy odometers (Rogers et al., 2016; Lécuyer, 2021; Whitehouse et al., 2023) .To conclude: we introduced Adaptive Randomized Smoothing (ARS) to reconnect RS with DP theory, to propose a new two-step defence for deep image classification, and to rigorously analyze such adaptive defences that condition on inputs at test time. This framework opens promising avenues for designing models that are adaptively and soundly robust with provable guarantees about their updates on natural and adversarial inputs.Proposition 2.1 (f -DP Robustness). Let M : X → Y be f -DP for B p (r) neighbourhoods, and let M S : X → arg max y∈Y P(M(X) = y) be the associated smooth classifier. Let y + ≜ M S (X) be the prediction on input X, and let p + , p -∈ [0, 1] be such that P(M(X) = y + ) ≥ p + ≥ p -≥ max y-̸ =y+ P(M(X) = y -). Then:f (1 -p + ) ≥ 1 -f (p -) ⇒ ∀e ∈ B p (r), M S (X + e) = y +Proof. Let us first consider any runner-up class y -. Calling M the random variable for M's prediction, consider the rejection rule ϕ = 1{M = y -}, where 1 is the indicator function. Denoting α ≜ E M(X) (ϕ), and using the fact that M is f -DP for B p (r) neighbourhoods, we have that ∀e ∈ B p (r):EQUATIONwhere the last inequality is because α= E M(X) (ϕ) = P(M(X) = y -) ≤ p -, and f is non- increasing so f (α) ≥ f (p -) and hence 1 -f (α) ≤ 1 -f (p -).Let us now consider the predicted class y + . Keeping the same notations, and defining the ruleEQUATIONPutting Equations ( 8) and ( 9) together, we have thatP(M(X +e) = y + ) ≥ f (1-p + ) ≥ 1-f (p -) ≥ P(M(X + e) = y -)and thus m S (X + e) = y + .Note that we do not have to chose a rule ϕ ∈ {0, 1}, but could instead return any number in [0, 1], such as the logits of the base classification model, yielding the following definition for the smoothed classifier M S : X → arg max y∈Y E(M(X) y ).Proposition 2.2 (RS from f -DP). Let M : X → g(X + z), z ∼ N (0, σ 2 I d ), and M S : X → arg max y∈Y P(M(X) = y) be the associated smooth model. Let y + ≜ M S (X) be the prediction on input X, and let p + , p -∈ [0, 1] be such that P(M(X) = y + ) ≥ p + ≥ p -≥ max y-̸ =y+ P(M(X) = y -). Then ∀e ∈ B 2 (r x ), M S (X + e) = y + , with:r X = σ 2 Φ -1 (p + ) -Φ -1 (p -) . Proof. X :→ X + z, z ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) is a Gaussian mechanism. By Equation (2), for the B r (r) neighbouring definition, it is G r σ -DP. By post-processing M is also G r σ -DP. Applying Proposition 2.1, we have that G r σ (1 -p + ) ≥ 1 -G r σ (p -) ⇒ ∀e ∈ B 2 (r), m S (X + e) = y + . Let us find r X = sup {r : G r σ (1 -p + ) ≥ 1 -G r σ (p -)}. Since G r σ (.) as a function of r is monotonously decreasing this will happen at G r X σ (1 -p + ) = 1 -G r X σ (p -), that is: Φ Φ -1 (p + ) - r X σ = 1 -Φ Φ -1 (1 -p -) - r X σ ⇒ Φ -1 (p + ) - r X σ = -Φ -1 (1 -p -) + r X σ ⇒ Φ -1 (p + ) - r X σ = Φ -1 (p -) + r X σ ⇒ r X = σ 2 Φ -1 (p + ) -Φ -1 (p -) ,where the first implication holds because by symmetry of the standard normal 1 -Φ(x) = Φ(-x), and because Φ is strictly monotonous ; the second because similarly,Φ -1 (1 -p) = -Φ -1 (p).the rest of hyperparameters same as for k = 32, 48, 64. Note that for k = 96, we could not get the standard accuracy to improve upon random baseline for σ = {0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.5}, despite extensively tuning the learning rate.k σ = 0.12 σ = 0.25 σ = 0.5 σ = 0.75 σ = 1.0 σ = 1. For UniCR, we tune β (the parameter of the generalized normal distribution for the noise) using σ = 0.75 and k = 48 as the testbed. We perform grid search on β and find that β = 2.0 or β = 2.25 (Gaussian and close to a Gaussian, but with a wider more and shorted tails) perform best. For each k, σ setting, we train 3 models with β = 2.25 and 2.0 and choose the β giving highest mean standard accuracy. The chosen β for each setting is given in Table 5 . For each setting we also tune optimizer hyper-parameters. At k = 32, we use SGD optimizer. We use a learning rate of 0.01, momentum of 0.9 and weight decay of 0.0005 with a step learning rate scheduler (30 step and γ = 0.1). At k = 48, 64, 96 we use training batch size 256, 100 epochs, and AdamW optimizer. We use a learning rate of 0.001 with step learning rate scheduler (30 step size and γ = 0.5). We show here full sweep of results for CIFAR-10 Bg20k benchmark for k = 32, 48, 64, 96 and σ = 0.12, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.5 for all our baselines and ARS. Similar to results presented in Table 1 , we report the mean accuracy and standard deviation over three seeds. The baseline results in Table 6 are lower than those reported by Cohen et al. (2019) (Figure 6 ). This is a result of our certifying over a smaller subset of the test set (the released code from Cohen et al. ( 2019)1 uses a subset of size 500, while the paper says the certification was on the full test set). In Table 7 we report the standard accuracy (r = 0) on the same 500 samples subset of the CIFAR-10 test set as used in the code released by Cohen et al. (2019) . We show results for k = 32, which is the plain CIFAR-10 task, using both the hyper-parameters from Cohen et al. (2019) , our own optimized hyper-parameters (the most notable change is that we use AdamW), and ARS. We make three observations. First, as it turns out, our 200 samples subset used for results in Table 6 Table 7 : k = 32 standard accuracy (r = 0) on CIFAR-10 (20kBG). We report the mean accuracy and standard deviation over three seeds. We compare three approaches: Cohen et al. (2019) trained with the hyper-parameters they report in their GitHub repository, Cohen et al. (2019) trained with the hyper-parameters we report in 4, and ARS. We train models with each approach at σ = 0.12, 0.25, 0.5, 1.0. The corresponding models are certified on 200, 500, and 10,000 samples.is more challenging, and accuracy values are systematically lower (by about 2% points) than over 500 samples and the full test set (10k samples). Using the same 500 samples subset yields accuracy values very close to those reported by Cohen et al. (2019) on their hyper-parameters. Second, over all samples sizes 200, 500, and 10k, our hyper-parameters significantly improve the accuracy of RS (by about 3% points consistently), confirming that we are making a fair comparison between the best RS models we could find and ARS. Third, at k = 32 ARS provides modest improvements over tuned RS, as CIFAR-10 images are well cropped and low-dimensional, providing less opportunity for dimension reduction through masking, and hence lower ARS improvements.Figure 12 , Figure 13 , Figure 14 and Figure 15 shows figures of different stages in our ARS architecture (Figure 1 ). In all of these figures, 1 st row corresponds to input images X, 2 nd row corresponds to images right after M 1 , 3 rd row corresponds to ARS masks, 4 th row corresponds to element-wise Table 8 : Standard Accuracy (r = 0) on CelebA (unaligned and cropped). We report the mean accuracy and standard deviation over three seeds.We show here a full set of results for the CelebA benchmark over all σ = 0.12, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.5 for Cohen et al. ( 2019), static masking, and ARS. Similarly to the results in Table 2 , we report the mean standard accuracy and standard deviation over three seeds in Table 8 . The certified accuracies are plotted in Figure 17 .We see that at all σ, ARS has the highest standard accuracy. An interesting observation is that on ImageNet, ARS yields larger improvements to the test accuracy without certification. We follow the certification procedure of Cohen et al. (2019) , which first determines the predicted class, and then certifies it if and only if the probability of this predicted class is such that p + ≥ 0.5 (that is, it groups all other classes into one non-predicted class). If this is not the case, the prediction will count as not certified at r = 0, even if the predicted class is still correct. We keep this procedure for consistency with prior work, but on a task with a large number of classes like in ImageNet, the accuracy at r = 0 can be much lower as the non-certified accuracy.We noticed that ARS significantly improves this non certified accuracy, while not improving the accuracy at r = 0 as much (see Section 4.3). In effect ARS leads to more correct predictions, but this (correct) predicted class has p + < 0.5, so the accuracy at r = 0 does not increase. Table 9 shows this effect by comparing the test accuracy (no certification at all) across all methods. Under ARS, the test accuracy increases from 68.5% to 70.1% when σ = 0.25, from 60.7% to 64.2% when σ = 0.5, and from 47.9%to 53.8% for σ = 1.0. In summary, ARS achieves best test accuracy (without certification) for all the noise levels. This suggests that ARS helps more than shown by the default certification approach, and that a finer analysis that accounts for the probability of all classes could yield further improvements in certified accuracy.1. Claims Question: Do the main claims made in the abstract and introduction accurately reflect the paper's contributions and scope? Answer: [Yes] Justification: The abstract and introduction identify the purpose of our paper and our theoretical, technical, and empirical contributions. We provide theoretical results in Section 2 with detailed proofs, and comprehensive experimental results in Section 4 to support our technical claims and contributions for test-time adaptive certification for robustness. Our choice of theoretical framework, task scope, and evaluation datasets are all present in the abstract.Guidelines:• The answer NA means that the abstract and introduction do not include the claims made in the paper. • The abstract and/or introduction should clearly state the claims made, including the contributions made in the paper and important assumptions and limitations. A No or NA answer to this question will not be perceived well by the reviewers. • The claims made should match theoretical and experimental results, and reflect how much the results can be expected to generalize to other settings. • It is fine to include aspirational goals as motivation as long as it is clear that these goals are not attained by the paper.Question: Does the paper fully disclose all the information needed to reproduce the main experimental results of the paper to the extent that it affects the main claims and/or conclusions of the paper (regardless of whether the code and data are provided or not)?Answer: [Yes] Justification: The method is described in the text, and to ensure sufficient detail, we additionally provide appendices and supplementary material that includes the anonymized code for our method. The experiments identify their settings and hyperparameters, such as noise levels and input image dimensions, and these settings can be verified by inspection of the results for our method and the baselines like Cohen et al. (2019) . By relying on standard base models, such as ResNet-50, our work is made more reproducible by following the conventions of existing papers. For modeling specific to our contribution, such as a the mask model, we have taken care to provide more detail in the appendix. Our adaptivity benchmarks, while our own design, are simple to implement (through padding and cropping) and our choices of how to transform the base public datasets are described in the text. In addition, we have incorporated reviewers feedback in the camera ready version. Guidelines:• The answer NA means that the paper does not include experiments.• If the paper includes experiments, a No answer to this question will not be perceived well by the reviewers: Making the paper reproducible is important, regardless of whether the code and data are provided or not. • If the contribution is a dataset and/or model, the authors should describe the steps taken to make their results reproducible or verifiable. • Depending on the contribution, reproducibility can be accomplished in various ways.For example, if the contribution is a novel architecture, describing the architecture fully might suffice, or if the contribution is a specific model and empirical evaluation, it may be necessary to either make it possible for others to replicate the model with the same dataset, or provide access to the model. In general. releasing code and data is often one good way to accomplish this, but reproducibility can also be provided via detailed instructions for how to replicate the results, access to a hosted model (e.g., in the case of a large language model), releasing of a model checkpoint, or other means that are appropriate to the research performed. • While NeurIPS does not require releasing code, the conference does require all submissions to provide some reasonable avenue for reproducibility, which may depend on the nature of the contribution. For example (a) If the contribution is primarily a new algorithm, the paper should make it clear how to reproduce that algorithm.• The experimental setting should be presented in the core of the paper to a level of detail that is necessary to appreciate the results and make sense of them. 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broader impacts: 
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 Appendix:  


Decision: This paper introduces a two-step method for providing robustness certificates of smoothed classifiers using tools from differential privacy (f-DP) for multi-step composition of the guarantees. The proposed framework uses adaptive dimension reduction to improve robustness guarantees. 

Certified robustness (CR) as a field began from connections to DP, and this paper returns to those roots. Reviewers found the ideas and tools to be very interesting, and their combinations to be novel. The reviewers also highlighted that the work was likely to spark the interest of CR researchers, which could lead to a broad impact on the subfield. I recommend that the authors add their discussion of alternative norms to the paper so that readers are clear of the limitations and avenues for future work.

Reviews: review: paper_summary: paper_summary: The paper uses tools from differential privacy (f-DP relating privacy to hypothesis testing, and also compositional rule of DP) to design a differentially private  2-step mechanism. The first step is interpreted here as creating a mask, and the second step is the "standard randomized smoothing" on the masked input, so it potentially greatly reduces the dimensionality.
strength_weakness: strength_weakness: ^
questions: questions: -
limitations: limitations: -
paper_summary: paper_summary: This paper proposes a framework to derive robustness certificates for smoothed classifiers based on f-differential privacy (f-DP). The framework achieves the same tight certificate for Gaussian smoothed classifiers as Cohen et al. (2019), while enabling analysis of adaptive multi-step smoothing mechanisms using the adaptive composition theorem for f-DP. To demonstrate the framework, the authors design a two-step smoothing mechanism that effectively performs adaptive (input-dependent) dimension reduction to achieve robustness against $\ell_\infty$-bounded perturbations. Experiments on three datasets demonstrate substantial improvement over baselines in some cases.
strength_weakness: strength_weakness: The proposed adaptive masking smoothing mechanism does not achieve significant improvements in certified robustness over baselines in many cases, especially for CIFAR-10 (Fig 2) and ImageNet (Fig 6). There is a more pronounced improvement for CelebA, however I wonder if this is related to the fact that the masking model is trained under supervision or whether the masking smoothing mechanism is simply a better fit for CelebA? This could perhaps be investigated by repeating the experiment without using the mouth location metadata. 

Given the (at times) marginal improvement of the adaptive masking smoothing mechanism, it would be interesting to understand how it compares along other dimensions, like computational efficiency and model size. It’s noted (line 324) that the mechanism is less efficient and uses a larger model, however it would be good to quantify to better understand the trade-offs.

Theorem 2.3 applies for a composition of randomized Gaussian mechanisms, which may be limiting given the range of mechanisms studied in the DP literature. I expect the theorem could be adapted for other mechanisms, but I wonder whether this would result in a tractable radius?
questions: questions: - To better understand the generality of the approach: can a certified radius be derived for a composition of heterogeneous f-DP mechanisms (not necessarily all Gaussian)?

- Is there an intuitive explanation for the larger gap in certified accuracy between ARS and Cohen et al. for CelebA versus ImageNet? 

- Are results available for a non-uniform split of the noise budget (line 223)?
limitations: limitations: Yes, limitations are addressed adequately in Section 5.
paper_summary: paper_summary: This work presents the first sound composition of randomized smoothing. Based on the novel theoretical results, this work presents the first sound way to compose a mask generator with the Gaussian sampling required for randomized smoothing, thereby reducing the effective dimension and improves the certification of randomized smoothing. This work opens up the possibility of more complex compositions for randomized smoothing, which is attempted before without soundness and great success. To this end, this work serves a good milestone in the field of randomized smoothing.
strength_weakness: strength_weakness: The main inadequacy I spot is its experimental design, specifically Section 4.3. While Section 4.1 and 4.2 are interesting and validates some of the claims made, Section 4.3 presents the main benchmark in the field of randomized smoothing. However, the authors only present the results on ImageNet with $\sigma=0.5$, while the main practice in the feild is to report results on \{cifar-10, ImageNet\} times \{$\sigma=0.25, 0.5, 1.0$\}. I request the authors to present the full benchmark for comparison.

In addition, to compare with Cohen et al., the masking trick could also be applied to certiify $L_2$ robustness. It is not clear why the authors only report $L_\infty$ robustness in the paper.
questions: questions: See weaknesses.
limitations: limitations: The authors adequately addressed the limitations.
paper_summary: paper_summary: The paper introduces Adaptive Randomized Smoothing (ARS), an innovative theoretical extension of Randomized Smoothing (RS) based on f-Differential Privacy (f-DP) to enhance the robustness certification of machine learning models. Empirical results demonstrate that ARS surpasses both standard RS and its variants in robustness certification metrics.

The authors present a solid theoretical framework and conduct thorough experimental evaluations. Despite ARS inheriting certain inherent constraints of RS, the method represents a significant advancement, offering a fresh approach to augment RS through budget decomposition.
strength_weakness: strength_weakness: 1. As an enhancement of RS, ARS is subject to the same fundamental limitations, notably the requirement for a substantial sample size to attain satisfactory robustness certification. The authors acknowledge this constraint within the limitations section of the paper.
questions: questions: 1. Does the theoretical framework extend to alternative norm types, such as L1 or L2 norms?
limitations: limitations: See weaknesses and questions.

Comments: comment: I greatly appreciate your discussion regarding the potential for extension to other norms. I think it would be most beneficial to include this revised discussion in the next version of your manuscript. I will keep my score for recommendation.
Thanks for the detailed rebuttal from authors. This generally clears my previous concerns. I maintain my previous score.
Thanks for the detailed responses to my questions. I have decided to raise my score for soundness and the overall rating. It will be interesting to see further exploration of this framework, particularly as advancements are made in f-DP.
Thanks for the rebuttal.

I think the experiment in 11 b is maybe a bit too artificial to convince me about the proposed method, but I am already convinced anyway :-) I keep my rating.