Repository: google/osv-scanner
Pull request #606 (2023-10-24 20:01:41)

fix: trim leading and trailing newlines off SARIF output
I don't know a lot about SARIF so maybe these are required but that would be surprising to me whereas trimming these off make it a bit consistent for editors and such.

Obviously if these are required then lets close this PR

codecov-commenter: ## [Codecov](https://app.codecov.io/gh/google/osv-scanner/pull/606?src=pr&el=h1&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=github&utm_content=comment&utm_campaign=pr+comments&utm_term=google) Report
> Merging [#606](https://app.codecov.io/gh/google/osv-scanner/pull/606?src=pr&el=desc&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=github&utm_content=comment&utm_campaign=pr+comments&utm_term=google) (60fe2d5) into [main](https://app.codecov.io/gh/google/osv-scanner/commit/c00f630aa0b909a34626ff540c136a26d4e5ec01?el=desc&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=github&utm_content=comment&utm_campaign=pr+comments&utm_term=google) (c00f630) will **not change** coverage.
> The diff coverage is `100.00%`.

```diff
@@           Coverage Diff           @@
##             main     #606   +/-   ##
=======================================
  Coverage   80.61%   80.61%           
=======================================
  Files          78       78           
  Lines        5334     5334           
=======================================
  Hits         4300     4300           
  Misses        866      866           
  Partials      168      168           
```


| [Files](https://app.codecov.io/gh/google/osv-scanner/pull/606?src=pr&el=tree&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=github&utm_content=comment&utm_campaign=pr+comments&utm_term=google) | Coverage Δ | |
|---|---|---|
| [internal/output/sarif.go](https://app.codecov.io/gh/google/osv-scanner/pull/606?src=pr&el=tree&utm_medium=referral&utm_source=github&utm_content=comment&utm_campaign=pr+comments&utm_term=google#diff-aW50ZXJuYWwvb3V0cHV0L3NhcmlmLmdv) | `90.42% <100.00%> (ø)` | |



Patch:
diff --git a/internal/output/fixtures/sarif-commit-output.md b/internal/output/fixtures/sarif-commit-output.md
index 550ef1e..4c38018 100644
--- a/internal/output/fixtures/sarif-commit-output.md
+++ b/internal/output/fixtures/sarif-commit-output.md
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-
 **Your dependency is vulnerable to [OSV-2023-72](https://osv.dev/list?q=OSV-2023-72)**.
 
 
@@ -58,4 +57,3 @@ Add or append these values to the following config files to ignore this vulnerab
 id = "OSV-2023-72"
 reason = "Your reason for ignoring this vulnerability"
 ```
-
diff --git a/internal/output/fixtures/sarif-output.md b/internal/output/fixtures/sarif-output.md
index 08fe8b8..872e19b 100644
--- a/internal/output/fixtures/sarif-output.md
+++ b/internal/output/fixtures/sarif-output.md
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-
 **Your dependency is vulnerable to [CVE-2022-24713](https://osv.dev/list?q=CVE-2022-24713)**
 (Also published as:  [RUSTSEC-2022-0013](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2022-0013),  [GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8), ).
 
@@ -138,4 +137,3 @@ Add or append these values to the following config files to ignore this vulnerab
 id = "CVE-2022-24713"
 reason = "Your reason for ignoring this vulnerability"
 ```
-
diff --git a/internal/output/sarif.go b/internal/output/sarif.go
index 50b9367..c58dc80 100644
--- a/internal/output/sarif.go
+++ b/internal/output/sarif.go
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ func stripGitHubWorkspace(path string) string {
 
 // createSARIFHelpText returns the text for SARIF rule's help field
 func createSARIFHelpText(gv *groupedSARIFFinding) string {
-	backtickSARIFTemplate := strings.ReplaceAll(SARIFTemplate, `""`, "`")
+	backtickSARIFTemplate := strings.ReplaceAll(strings.TrimSpace(SARIFTemplate), `""`, "`")
 	helpTextTemplate, err := template.New("helpText").Parse(backtickSARIFTemplate)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Panicf("failed to parse sarif help text template: %v", err)


Test patch:
diff --git a/internal/output/fixtures/test-vuln-results-a.sarif b/internal/output/fixtures/test-vuln-results-a.sarif
index dc61f46..9337e0f 100644
--- a/internal/output/fixtures/test-vuln-results-a.sarif
+++ b/internal/output/fixtures/test-vuln-results-a.sarif
@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@
                 "GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8"
               ],
               "help": {
-                "text": "\n**Your dependency is vulnerable to [CVE-2022-24713](https://osv.dev/list?q=CVE-2022-24713)**\n(Also published as:  [RUSTSEC-2022-0013](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2022-0013),  [GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8), ).\n\n\n## [RUSTSEC-2022-0013](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2022-0013)\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eDetails\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n\u003e The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the `regex` crate did not\n\u003e properly limit the complexity of the regular expressions (regex) it parses. An\n\u003e attacker could use this security issue to perform a denial of service, by\n\u003e sending a specially crafted regex to a service accepting untrusted regexes. No\n\u003e known vulnerability is present when parsing untrusted input with trusted\n\u003e regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e This issue has been assigned CVE-2022-24713. The severity of this vulnerability\n\u003e is \"high\" when the `regex` crate is used to parse untrusted regexes. Other uses\n\u003e of the `regex` crate are not affected by this vulnerability.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Overview\n\u003e \n\u003e The `regex` crate features built-in mitigations to prevent denial of service\n\u003e attacks caused by untrusted regexes, or untrusted input matched by trusted\n\u003e regexes. Those (tunable) mitigations already provide sane defaults to prevent\n\u003e attacks. This guarantee is documented and it's considered part of the crate's\n\u003e API.\n\u003e \n\u003e Unfortunately a bug was discovered in the mitigations designed to prevent\n\u003e untrusted regexes to take an arbitrary amount of time during parsing, and it's\n\u003e possible to craft regexes that bypass such mitigations. This makes it possible\n\u003e to perform denial of service attacks by sending specially crafted regexes to\n\u003e services accepting user-controlled, untrusted regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Affected versions\n\u003e \n\u003e All versions of the `regex` crate before or equal to 1.5.4 are affected by this\n\u003e issue. The fix is include starting from  `regex` 1.5.5.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Mitigations\n\u003e \n\u003e We recommend everyone accepting user-controlled regexes to upgrade immediately\n\u003e to the latest version of the `regex` crate.\n\u003e \n\u003e Unfortunately there is no fixed set of problematic regexes, as there are\n\u003e practically infinite regexes that could be crafted to exploit this\n\u003e vulnerability. Because of this, we do not recommend denying known problematic\n\u003e regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Acknowledgements\n\u003e \n\u003e We want to thank Addison Crump for responsibly disclosing this to us according\n\u003e to the [Rust security policy][1], and for helping review the fix.\n\u003e \n\u003e We also want to thank Andrew Gallant for developing the fix, and Pietro Albini\n\u003e for coordinating the disclosure and writing this advisory.\n\u003e \n\u003e [1]: https://www.rust-lang.org/policies/security\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\n\n## [GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8)\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eDetails\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n\u003e \u003e This is a cross-post of [the official security advisory][advisory]. The official advisory contains a signed version with our PGP key, as well.\n\u003e \n\u003e [advisory]: https://groups.google.com/g/rustlang-security-announcements/c/NcNNL1Jq7Yw\n\u003e \n\u003e The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the `regex` crate did not properly limit the complexity of the regular expressions (regex) it parses. An attacker could use this security issue to perform a denial of service, by sending a specially crafted regex to a service accepting untrusted regexes. No known vulnerability is present when parsing untrusted input with trusted regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e This issue has been assigned CVE-2022-24713. The severity of this vulnerability is \"high\" when the `regex` crate is used to parse untrusted regexes. Other uses of the `regex` crate are not affected by this vulnerability.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Overview\n\u003e \n\u003e The `regex` crate features built-in mitigations to prevent denial of service attacks caused by untrusted regexes, or untrusted input matched by trusted regexes. Those (tunable) mitigations already provide sane defaults to prevent attacks. This guarantee is documented and it's considered part of the crate's API.\n\u003e \n\u003e Unfortunately a bug was discovered in the mitigations designed to prevent untrusted regexes to take an arbitrary amount of time during parsing, and it's possible to craft regexes that bypass such mitigations. This makes it possible to perform denial of service attacks by sending specially crafted regexes to services accepting user-controlled, untrusted regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Affected versions\n\u003e \n\u003e All versions of the `regex` crate before or equal to 1.5.4 are affected by this issue. The fix is include starting from  `regex` 1.5.5.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Mitigations\n\u003e \n\u003e We recommend everyone accepting user-controlled regexes to upgrade immediately to the latest version of the `regex` crate.\n\u003e \n\u003e Unfortunately there is no fixed set of problematic regexes, as there are practically infinite regexes that could be crafted to exploit this vulnerability. Because of this, we do not recommend denying known problematic regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Acknowledgements\n\u003e \n\u003e We want to thank Addison Crump for responsibly disclosing this to us according to the [Rust security policy](https://www.rust-lang.org/policies/security), and for helping review the fix.\n\u003e \n\u003e We also want to thank Andrew Gallant for developing the fix, and Pietro Albini for coordinating the disclosure and writing this advisory.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\n\n---\n\n### Affected Packages\n\n| Source | Package Name | Package Version |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| lockfile:/path/to/sub-rust-project/Cargo.lock | regex | 1.5.1 |\n\n## Remediation\n\n\n\nTo fix these vulnerabilities, update the vulnerabilities past the listed fixed versions below.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n\n| Vulnerability ID | Package Name | Fixed Version |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8 | regex | 1.5.5 |\n| RUSTSEC-2022-0013 | regex | 1.5.5 |\n\n\n\nIf you believe these vulnerabilities do not affect your code and wish to ignore them, add them to the ignore list in an\n`osv-scanner.toml` file located in the same directory as the lockfile containing the vulnerable dependency.\n\nSee the format and more options in our documentation here: https://google.github.io/osv-scanner/configuration/\n\nAdd or append these values to the following config files to ignore this vulnerability:\n\n\n`/path/to/sub-rust-project/osv-scanner.toml`\n```\n[[IgnoredVulns]]\nid = \"CVE-2022-24713\"\nreason = \"Your reason for ignoring this vulnerability\"\n```\n\n",
-                "markdown": "\n**Your dependency is vulnerable to [CVE-2022-24713](https://osv.dev/list?q=CVE-2022-24713)**\n(Also published as:  [RUSTSEC-2022-0013](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2022-0013),  [GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8), ).\n\n\n## [RUSTSEC-2022-0013](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2022-0013)\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eDetails\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n\u003e The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the `regex` crate did not\n\u003e properly limit the complexity of the regular expressions (regex) it parses. An\n\u003e attacker could use this security issue to perform a denial of service, by\n\u003e sending a specially crafted regex to a service accepting untrusted regexes. No\n\u003e known vulnerability is present when parsing untrusted input with trusted\n\u003e regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e This issue has been assigned CVE-2022-24713. The severity of this vulnerability\n\u003e is \"high\" when the `regex` crate is used to parse untrusted regexes. Other uses\n\u003e of the `regex` crate are not affected by this vulnerability.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Overview\n\u003e \n\u003e The `regex` crate features built-in mitigations to prevent denial of service\n\u003e attacks caused by untrusted regexes, or untrusted input matched by trusted\n\u003e regexes. Those (tunable) mitigations already provide sane defaults to prevent\n\u003e attacks. This guarantee is documented and it's considered part of the crate's\n\u003e API.\n\u003e \n\u003e Unfortunately a bug was discovered in the mitigations designed to prevent\n\u003e untrusted regexes to take an arbitrary amount of time during parsing, and it's\n\u003e possible to craft regexes that bypass such mitigations. This makes it possible\n\u003e to perform denial of service attacks by sending specially crafted regexes to\n\u003e services accepting user-controlled, untrusted regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Affected versions\n\u003e \n\u003e All versions of the `regex` crate before or equal to 1.5.4 are affected by this\n\u003e issue. The fix is include starting from  `regex` 1.5.5.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Mitigations\n\u003e \n\u003e We recommend everyone accepting user-controlled regexes to upgrade immediately\n\u003e to the latest version of the `regex` crate.\n\u003e \n\u003e Unfortunately there is no fixed set of problematic regexes, as there are\n\u003e practically infinite regexes that could be crafted to exploit this\n\u003e vulnerability. Because of this, we do not recommend denying known problematic\n\u003e regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Acknowledgements\n\u003e \n\u003e We want to thank Addison Crump for responsibly disclosing this to us according\n\u003e to the [Rust security policy][1], and for helping review the fix.\n\u003e \n\u003e We also want to thank Andrew Gallant for developing the fix, and Pietro Albini\n\u003e for coordinating the disclosure and writing this advisory.\n\u003e \n\u003e [1]: https://www.rust-lang.org/policies/security\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\n\n## [GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8)\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eDetails\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n\u003e \u003e This is a cross-post of [the official security advisory][advisory]. The official advisory contains a signed version with our PGP key, as well.\n\u003e \n\u003e [advisory]: https://groups.google.com/g/rustlang-security-announcements/c/NcNNL1Jq7Yw\n\u003e \n\u003e The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the `regex` crate did not properly limit the complexity of the regular expressions (regex) it parses. An attacker could use this security issue to perform a denial of service, by sending a specially crafted regex to a service accepting untrusted regexes. No known vulnerability is present when parsing untrusted input with trusted regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e This issue has been assigned CVE-2022-24713. The severity of this vulnerability is \"high\" when the `regex` crate is used to parse untrusted regexes. Other uses of the `regex` crate are not affected by this vulnerability.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Overview\n\u003e \n\u003e The `regex` crate features built-in mitigations to prevent denial of service attacks caused by untrusted regexes, or untrusted input matched by trusted regexes. Those (tunable) mitigations already provide sane defaults to prevent attacks. This guarantee is documented and it's considered part of the crate's API.\n\u003e \n\u003e Unfortunately a bug was discovered in the mitigations designed to prevent untrusted regexes to take an arbitrary amount of time during parsing, and it's possible to craft regexes that bypass such mitigations. This makes it possible to perform denial of service attacks by sending specially crafted regexes to services accepting user-controlled, untrusted regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Affected versions\n\u003e \n\u003e All versions of the `regex` crate before or equal to 1.5.4 are affected by this issue. The fix is include starting from  `regex` 1.5.5.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Mitigations\n\u003e \n\u003e We recommend everyone accepting user-controlled regexes to upgrade immediately to the latest version of the `regex` crate.\n\u003e \n\u003e Unfortunately there is no fixed set of problematic regexes, as there are practically infinite regexes that could be crafted to exploit this vulnerability. Because of this, we do not recommend denying known problematic regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Acknowledgements\n\u003e \n\u003e We want to thank Addison Crump for responsibly disclosing this to us according to the [Rust security policy](https://www.rust-lang.org/policies/security), and for helping review the fix.\n\u003e \n\u003e We also want to thank Andrew Gallant for developing the fix, and Pietro Albini for coordinating the disclosure and writing this advisory.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\n\n---\n\n### Affected Packages\n\n| Source | Package Name | Package Version |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| lockfile:/path/to/sub-rust-project/Cargo.lock | regex | 1.5.1 |\n\n## Remediation\n\n\n\nTo fix these vulnerabilities, update the vulnerabilities past the listed fixed versions below.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n\n| Vulnerability ID | Package Name | Fixed Version |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8 | regex | 1.5.5 |\n| RUSTSEC-2022-0013 | regex | 1.5.5 |\n\n\n\nIf you believe these vulnerabilities do not affect your code and wish to ignore them, add them to the ignore list in an\n`osv-scanner.toml` file located in the same directory as the lockfile containing the vulnerable dependency.\n\nSee the format and more options in our documentation here: https://google.github.io/osv-scanner/configuration/\n\nAdd or append these values to the following config files to ignore this vulnerability:\n\n\n`/path/to/sub-rust-project/osv-scanner.toml`\n```\n[[IgnoredVulns]]\nid = \"CVE-2022-24713\"\nreason = \"Your reason for ignoring this vulnerability\"\n```\n\n"
+                "text": "**Your dependency is vulnerable to [CVE-2022-24713](https://osv.dev/list?q=CVE-2022-24713)**\n(Also published as:  [RUSTSEC-2022-0013](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2022-0013),  [GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8), ).\n\n\n## [RUSTSEC-2022-0013](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2022-0013)\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eDetails\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n\u003e The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the `regex` crate did not\n\u003e properly limit the complexity of the regular expressions (regex) it parses. An\n\u003e attacker could use this security issue to perform a denial of service, by\n\u003e sending a specially crafted regex to a service accepting untrusted regexes. No\n\u003e known vulnerability is present when parsing untrusted input with trusted\n\u003e regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e This issue has been assigned CVE-2022-24713. The severity of this vulnerability\n\u003e is \"high\" when the `regex` crate is used to parse untrusted regexes. Other uses\n\u003e of the `regex` crate are not affected by this vulnerability.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Overview\n\u003e \n\u003e The `regex` crate features built-in mitigations to prevent denial of service\n\u003e attacks caused by untrusted regexes, or untrusted input matched by trusted\n\u003e regexes. Those (tunable) mitigations already provide sane defaults to prevent\n\u003e attacks. This guarantee is documented and it's considered part of the crate's\n\u003e API.\n\u003e \n\u003e Unfortunately a bug was discovered in the mitigations designed to prevent\n\u003e untrusted regexes to take an arbitrary amount of time during parsing, and it's\n\u003e possible to craft regexes that bypass such mitigations. This makes it possible\n\u003e to perform denial of service attacks by sending specially crafted regexes to\n\u003e services accepting user-controlled, untrusted regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Affected versions\n\u003e \n\u003e All versions of the `regex` crate before or equal to 1.5.4 are affected by this\n\u003e issue. The fix is include starting from  `regex` 1.5.5.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Mitigations\n\u003e \n\u003e We recommend everyone accepting user-controlled regexes to upgrade immediately\n\u003e to the latest version of the `regex` crate.\n\u003e \n\u003e Unfortunately there is no fixed set of problematic regexes, as there are\n\u003e practically infinite regexes that could be crafted to exploit this\n\u003e vulnerability. Because of this, we do not recommend denying known problematic\n\u003e regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Acknowledgements\n\u003e \n\u003e We want to thank Addison Crump for responsibly disclosing this to us according\n\u003e to the [Rust security policy][1], and for helping review the fix.\n\u003e \n\u003e We also want to thank Andrew Gallant for developing the fix, and Pietro Albini\n\u003e for coordinating the disclosure and writing this advisory.\n\u003e \n\u003e [1]: https://www.rust-lang.org/policies/security\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\n\n## [GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8)\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eDetails\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n\u003e \u003e This is a cross-post of [the official security advisory][advisory]. The official advisory contains a signed version with our PGP key, as well.\n\u003e \n\u003e [advisory]: https://groups.google.com/g/rustlang-security-announcements/c/NcNNL1Jq7Yw\n\u003e \n\u003e The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the `regex` crate did not properly limit the complexity of the regular expressions (regex) it parses. An attacker could use this security issue to perform a denial of service, by sending a specially crafted regex to a service accepting untrusted regexes. No known vulnerability is present when parsing untrusted input with trusted regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e This issue has been assigned CVE-2022-24713. The severity of this vulnerability is \"high\" when the `regex` crate is used to parse untrusted regexes. Other uses of the `regex` crate are not affected by this vulnerability.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Overview\n\u003e \n\u003e The `regex` crate features built-in mitigations to prevent denial of service attacks caused by untrusted regexes, or untrusted input matched by trusted regexes. Those (tunable) mitigations already provide sane defaults to prevent attacks. This guarantee is documented and it's considered part of the crate's API.\n\u003e \n\u003e Unfortunately a bug was discovered in the mitigations designed to prevent untrusted regexes to take an arbitrary amount of time during parsing, and it's possible to craft regexes that bypass such mitigations. This makes it possible to perform denial of service attacks by sending specially crafted regexes to services accepting user-controlled, untrusted regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Affected versions\n\u003e \n\u003e All versions of the `regex` crate before or equal to 1.5.4 are affected by this issue. The fix is include starting from  `regex` 1.5.5.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Mitigations\n\u003e \n\u003e We recommend everyone accepting user-controlled regexes to upgrade immediately to the latest version of the `regex` crate.\n\u003e \n\u003e Unfortunately there is no fixed set of problematic regexes, as there are practically infinite regexes that could be crafted to exploit this vulnerability. Because of this, we do not recommend denying known problematic regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Acknowledgements\n\u003e \n\u003e We want to thank Addison Crump for responsibly disclosing this to us according to the [Rust security policy](https://www.rust-lang.org/policies/security), and for helping review the fix.\n\u003e \n\u003e We also want to thank Andrew Gallant for developing the fix, and Pietro Albini for coordinating the disclosure and writing this advisory.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\n\n---\n\n### Affected Packages\n\n| Source | Package Name | Package Version |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| lockfile:/path/to/sub-rust-project/Cargo.lock | regex | 1.5.1 |\n\n## Remediation\n\n\n\nTo fix these vulnerabilities, update the vulnerabilities past the listed fixed versions below.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n\n| Vulnerability ID | Package Name | Fixed Version |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8 | regex | 1.5.5 |\n| RUSTSEC-2022-0013 | regex | 1.5.5 |\n\n\n\nIf you believe these vulnerabilities do not affect your code and wish to ignore them, add them to the ignore list in an\n`osv-scanner.toml` file located in the same directory as the lockfile containing the vulnerable dependency.\n\nSee the format and more options in our documentation here: https://google.github.io/osv-scanner/configuration/\n\nAdd or append these values to the following config files to ignore this vulnerability:\n\n\n`/path/to/sub-rust-project/osv-scanner.toml`\n```\n[[IgnoredVulns]]\nid = \"CVE-2022-24713\"\nreason = \"Your reason for ignoring this vulnerability\"\n```\n",
+                "markdown": "**Your dependency is vulnerable to [CVE-2022-24713](https://osv.dev/list?q=CVE-2022-24713)**\n(Also published as:  [RUSTSEC-2022-0013](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2022-0013),  [GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8), ).\n\n\n## [RUSTSEC-2022-0013](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2022-0013)\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eDetails\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n\u003e The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the `regex` crate did not\n\u003e properly limit the complexity of the regular expressions (regex) it parses. An\n\u003e attacker could use this security issue to perform a denial of service, by\n\u003e sending a specially crafted regex to a service accepting untrusted regexes. No\n\u003e known vulnerability is present when parsing untrusted input with trusted\n\u003e regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e This issue has been assigned CVE-2022-24713. The severity of this vulnerability\n\u003e is \"high\" when the `regex` crate is used to parse untrusted regexes. Other uses\n\u003e of the `regex` crate are not affected by this vulnerability.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Overview\n\u003e \n\u003e The `regex` crate features built-in mitigations to prevent denial of service\n\u003e attacks caused by untrusted regexes, or untrusted input matched by trusted\n\u003e regexes. Those (tunable) mitigations already provide sane defaults to prevent\n\u003e attacks. This guarantee is documented and it's considered part of the crate's\n\u003e API.\n\u003e \n\u003e Unfortunately a bug was discovered in the mitigations designed to prevent\n\u003e untrusted regexes to take an arbitrary amount of time during parsing, and it's\n\u003e possible to craft regexes that bypass such mitigations. This makes it possible\n\u003e to perform denial of service attacks by sending specially crafted regexes to\n\u003e services accepting user-controlled, untrusted regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Affected versions\n\u003e \n\u003e All versions of the `regex` crate before or equal to 1.5.4 are affected by this\n\u003e issue. The fix is include starting from  `regex` 1.5.5.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Mitigations\n\u003e \n\u003e We recommend everyone accepting user-controlled regexes to upgrade immediately\n\u003e to the latest version of the `regex` crate.\n\u003e \n\u003e Unfortunately there is no fixed set of problematic regexes, as there are\n\u003e practically infinite regexes that could be crafted to exploit this\n\u003e vulnerability. Because of this, we do not recommend denying known problematic\n\u003e regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Acknowledgements\n\u003e \n\u003e We want to thank Addison Crump for responsibly disclosing this to us according\n\u003e to the [Rust security policy][1], and for helping review the fix.\n\u003e \n\u003e We also want to thank Andrew Gallant for developing the fix, and Pietro Albini\n\u003e for coordinating the disclosure and writing this advisory.\n\u003e \n\u003e [1]: https://www.rust-lang.org/policies/security\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\n\n## [GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8)\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eDetails\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n\u003e \u003e This is a cross-post of [the official security advisory][advisory]. The official advisory contains a signed version with our PGP key, as well.\n\u003e \n\u003e [advisory]: https://groups.google.com/g/rustlang-security-announcements/c/NcNNL1Jq7Yw\n\u003e \n\u003e The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the `regex` crate did not properly limit the complexity of the regular expressions (regex) it parses. An attacker could use this security issue to perform a denial of service, by sending a specially crafted regex to a service accepting untrusted regexes. No known vulnerability is present when parsing untrusted input with trusted regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e This issue has been assigned CVE-2022-24713. The severity of this vulnerability is \"high\" when the `regex` crate is used to parse untrusted regexes. Other uses of the `regex` crate are not affected by this vulnerability.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Overview\n\u003e \n\u003e The `regex` crate features built-in mitigations to prevent denial of service attacks caused by untrusted regexes, or untrusted input matched by trusted regexes. Those (tunable) mitigations already provide sane defaults to prevent attacks. This guarantee is documented and it's considered part of the crate's API.\n\u003e \n\u003e Unfortunately a bug was discovered in the mitigations designed to prevent untrusted regexes to take an arbitrary amount of time during parsing, and it's possible to craft regexes that bypass such mitigations. This makes it possible to perform denial of service attacks by sending specially crafted regexes to services accepting user-controlled, untrusted regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Affected versions\n\u003e \n\u003e All versions of the `regex` crate before or equal to 1.5.4 are affected by this issue. The fix is include starting from  `regex` 1.5.5.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Mitigations\n\u003e \n\u003e We recommend everyone accepting user-controlled regexes to upgrade immediately to the latest version of the `regex` crate.\n\u003e \n\u003e Unfortunately there is no fixed set of problematic regexes, as there are practically infinite regexes that could be crafted to exploit this vulnerability. Because of this, we do not recommend denying known problematic regexes.\n\u003e \n\u003e ## Acknowledgements\n\u003e \n\u003e We want to thank Addison Crump for responsibly disclosing this to us according to the [Rust security policy](https://www.rust-lang.org/policies/security), and for helping review the fix.\n\u003e \n\u003e We also want to thank Andrew Gallant for developing the fix, and Pietro Albini for coordinating the disclosure and writing this advisory.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\n\n---\n\n### Affected Packages\n\n| Source | Package Name | Package Version |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| lockfile:/path/to/sub-rust-project/Cargo.lock | regex | 1.5.1 |\n\n## Remediation\n\n\n\nTo fix these vulnerabilities, update the vulnerabilities past the listed fixed versions below.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n\n| Vulnerability ID | Package Name | Fixed Version |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| GHSA-m5pq-gvj9-9vr8 | regex | 1.5.5 |\n| RUSTSEC-2022-0013 | regex | 1.5.5 |\n\n\n\nIf you believe these vulnerabilities do not affect your code and wish to ignore them, add them to the ignore list in an\n`osv-scanner.toml` file located in the same directory as the lockfile containing the vulnerable dependency.\n\nSee the format and more options in our documentation here: https://google.github.io/osv-scanner/configuration/\n\nAdd or append these values to the following config files to ignore this vulnerability:\n\n\n`/path/to/sub-rust-project/osv-scanner.toml`\n```\n[[IgnoredVulns]]\nid = \"CVE-2022-24713\"\nreason = \"Your reason for ignoring this vulnerability\"\n```\n"
               }
             },
             {
@@ -44,8 +44,8 @@
                 "GHSA-c3h9-896r-86jm"
               ],
               "help": {
-                "text": "\n**Your dependency is vulnerable to [CVE-2021-3121](https://osv.dev/list?q=CVE-2021-3121)**.\n\n\n## [GO-2021-0053](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2021-0053)\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eDetails\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n\u003e Due to improper bounds checking, maliciously crafted input to generated Unmarshal methods can cause an out-of-bounds panic. If parsing messages from untrusted parties, this may be used as a denial of service vector.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\n\n---\n\n### Affected Packages\n\n| Source | Package Name | Package Version |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| lockfile:/path/to/go.mod | github.com/gogo/protobuf | 1.3.1 |\n\n## Remediation\n\n\n\nTo fix these vulnerabilities, update the vulnerabilities past the listed fixed versions below.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n\n| Vulnerability ID | Package Name | Fixed Version |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| GO-2021-0053 | github.com/gogo/protobuf | 1.3.2 |\n\n\n\nIf you believe these vulnerabilities do not affect your code and wish to ignore them, add them to the ignore list in an\n`osv-scanner.toml` file located in the same directory as the lockfile containing the vulnerable dependency.\n\nSee the format and more options in our documentation here: https://google.github.io/osv-scanner/configuration/\n\nAdd or append these values to the following config files to ignore this vulnerability:\n\n\n`/path/to/osv-scanner.toml`\n```\n[[IgnoredVulns]]\nid = \"CVE-2021-3121\"\nreason = \"Your reason for ignoring this vulnerability\"\n```\n\n",
-                "markdown": "\n**Your dependency is vulnerable to [CVE-2021-3121](https://osv.dev/list?q=CVE-2021-3121)**.\n\n\n## [GO-2021-0053](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2021-0053)\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eDetails\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n\u003e Due to improper bounds checking, maliciously crafted input to generated Unmarshal methods can cause an out-of-bounds panic. If parsing messages from untrusted parties, this may be used as a denial of service vector.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\n\n---\n\n### Affected Packages\n\n| Source | Package Name | Package Version |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| lockfile:/path/to/go.mod | github.com/gogo/protobuf | 1.3.1 |\n\n## Remediation\n\n\n\nTo fix these vulnerabilities, update the vulnerabilities past the listed fixed versions below.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n\n| Vulnerability ID | Package Name | Fixed Version |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| GO-2021-0053 | github.com/gogo/protobuf | 1.3.2 |\n\n\n\nIf you believe these vulnerabilities do not affect your code and wish to ignore them, add them to the ignore list in an\n`osv-scanner.toml` file located in the same directory as the lockfile containing the vulnerable dependency.\n\nSee the format and more options in our documentation here: https://google.github.io/osv-scanner/configuration/\n\nAdd or append these values to the following config files to ignore this vulnerability:\n\n\n`/path/to/osv-scanner.toml`\n```\n[[IgnoredVulns]]\nid = \"CVE-2021-3121\"\nreason = \"Your reason for ignoring this vulnerability\"\n```\n\n"
+                "text": "**Your dependency is vulnerable to [CVE-2021-3121](https://osv.dev/list?q=CVE-2021-3121)**.\n\n\n## [GO-2021-0053](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2021-0053)\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eDetails\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n\u003e Due to improper bounds checking, maliciously crafted input to generated Unmarshal methods can cause an out-of-bounds panic. If parsing messages from untrusted parties, this may be used as a denial of service vector.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\n\n---\n\n### Affected Packages\n\n| Source | Package Name | Package Version |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| lockfile:/path/to/go.mod | github.com/gogo/protobuf | 1.3.1 |\n\n## Remediation\n\n\n\nTo fix these vulnerabilities, update the vulnerabilities past the listed fixed versions below.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n\n| Vulnerability ID | Package Name | Fixed Version |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| GO-2021-0053 | github.com/gogo/protobuf | 1.3.2 |\n\n\n\nIf you believe these vulnerabilities do not affect your code and wish to ignore them, add them to the ignore list in an\n`osv-scanner.toml` file located in the same directory as the lockfile containing the vulnerable dependency.\n\nSee the format and more options in our documentation here: https://google.github.io/osv-scanner/configuration/\n\nAdd or append these values to the following config files to ignore this vulnerability:\n\n\n`/path/to/osv-scanner.toml`\n```\n[[IgnoredVulns]]\nid = \"CVE-2021-3121\"\nreason = \"Your reason for ignoring this vulnerability\"\n```\n",
+                "markdown": "**Your dependency is vulnerable to [CVE-2021-3121](https://osv.dev/list?q=CVE-2021-3121)**.\n\n\n## [GO-2021-0053](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2021-0053)\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eDetails\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n\u003e Due to improper bounds checking, maliciously crafted input to generated Unmarshal methods can cause an out-of-bounds panic. If parsing messages from untrusted parties, this may be used as a denial of service vector.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\n\n---\n\n### Affected Packages\n\n| Source | Package Name | Package Version |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| lockfile:/path/to/go.mod | github.com/gogo/protobuf | 1.3.1 |\n\n## Remediation\n\n\n\nTo fix these vulnerabilities, update the vulnerabilities past the listed fixed versions below.\n\n### Fixed Versions\n\n| Vulnerability ID | Package Name | Fixed Version |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| GO-2021-0053 | github.com/gogo/protobuf | 1.3.2 |\n\n\n\nIf you believe these vulnerabilities do not affect your code and wish to ignore them, add them to the ignore list in an\n`osv-scanner.toml` file located in the same directory as the lockfile containing the vulnerable dependency.\n\nSee the format and more options in our documentation here: https://google.github.io/osv-scanner/configuration/\n\nAdd or append these values to the following config files to ignore this vulnerability:\n\n\n`/path/to/osv-scanner.toml`\n```\n[[IgnoredVulns]]\nid = \"CVE-2021-3121\"\nreason = \"Your reason for ignoring this vulnerability\"\n```\n"
               }
             }
           ],