ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
Price sued Derrick for injuries Price received in an automobile accident. Price claims that Derrick was negligent in (a) exceeding the posted speed limit of 35 m.p.h., (b) failing to keep a lookout, and (c) crossing the center lineDerrick testified on his own behalf that he was going 30 m.p.h. On cross-examination, Price's counsel did not question Derrick with regard to his speed. Subsequently, Price's counsel calls Officer to testify that, in his investigation following the accident, Derrick told him that he was driving 40 m.p.h. Officer's testimony is
A. admissible as a prior inconsistent statement.
B. admissible as an admission.
C. inadmissible, because it lacks a foundation. 
D. inadmissible, because it is hearsay, not within any exception
Answer: B
Congress provides by statute that any state that fails to prohibit automobile speeds of over 55 miles per hour on highways within the state shall be denied all federal highway construction funding. The state of Atlantic, one of the richest and most highway-oriented states in the country, refuses to enact such a statuteWhich of the following potential plaintiffs is most likely to be able to obtain a judicial determination of the validity of this federal statute?
A. A taxpayer of the United States and the state of Atlantic who wants his state to get its fair share of federal tax monies for highways, and who fears that, if it does not, his state taxes will be increased to pay for the highway construction in the state of Atlantic that federal funds would have financed. 
B. Contractors who have been awarded contracts by the state of Atlantic for specific highway construction projects, which contracts are contingent on payment to the state of the federal highway construction funds to which it would otherwise be entitled. 
C. An automobile owner who lives in the state of Atlantic and regularly uses its highway system.
D. An organization dedicated to keeping the federal government within the powers granted it by the Constitution.
Answer: B
Congress provides by statute that any state that fails to prohibit automobile speeds of over 55 miles per hour on highways within the state shall be denied all federal highway construction funding. The state of Atlantic, one of the richest and most highway-oriented states in the country, refuses to enact such a statuteThe strongest argument that can be made in support of the constitutionality of this federal statute is that
A. the states ceded their authority over highways to the national government when the states accepted federal grants to help finance their highways.
B. the federal government can regulate the use of state highways without limitation because the federal government paid for some of their construction costs.
C. Congress could reasonably believe that the 55-m.p.h. speed limit will assure that the federal money spent on highways results in greater benefit than harm to the public.
D. a recent public opinion survey demonstrated that 90 percent of the people in this country support a 55-m.p.h. speed limi
Answer: C
Congress provides by statute that any state that fails to prohibit automobile speeds of over 55 miles per hour on highways within the state shall be denied all federal highway construction funding. The state of Atlantic, one of the richest and most highway-oriented states in the country, refuses to enact such a statuteThe federal statute relating to disbursement of highway funds conditioned on the 55-m.p.h. speed limit is probably
A. unconstitutional.
B. constitutional only on the basis of the spending power.
C. constitutional only on the basis of the commerce power.
D. constitutional on the basis of both the spending power and the commerce power
Answer: D
Defendant visited a fellow college student, James, in James's dormitory room. They drank some beer. James produced a box containing marijuana cigarettes and asked if Defendant wanted one. Defendant, afraid of being caught, declined and urged James to get rid of the marijuana. James refused. Shortly thereafter, both went out to get more beer, leaving the door to James's room standing open. Making an excuse about having dropped his pen, Defendant went back into James's room. Still apprehensive about their being caught with the marijuana cigarettes, he took the cigarettes and flushed them down the toilet. He was sure James was too drunk to notice that the cigarettes were missing. Defendant is charged with larceny and burglary (the latter defined in the jurisdiction as breaking and entering the dwelling of another with intent to commit any felony or theft). He should be found guilty of 
A. burglary only.
B. larceny only.
C. both burglary and larceny.
D. neither burglary nor larceny.
Answer: B
Henry hated Wanda, his former wife, for divorcing him and marrying John a short time thereafter. About a month after Wanda married John, Henry secretly entered Wanda and John's rented apartment during their absence by using a master key. Henry placed a microphone behind the nightstand in the bedroom of the apartment, drilled a hole in the nearby wall, and poked the wires from the microphone through the hole into the space in the wall, with the result that the microphone appeared to be connected to wires going into the adjoining apartment. Actually the microphone was not connected to anything. Henry anticipated that Wanda would discover the microphone in a few days and would be upset by the thought that someone had been listening to her conversations with John in their bedroom. Shortly thereafter, John noticed the wires behind the nightstand and discovered the hidden microphone. He then called Wanda and showed her the microphone and wires. Wanda fainted and, in falling, struck her head on the nightstand and suffered a mild concussion. The next day John telephoned Henry and accused him of planting the microphone. Henry laughingly admitted it. Because of his concern about Wanda and his anger at Henry, John is emotionally upset and unable to go to work. If Wanda asserts a claim against Henry based on infliction of mental distress, the fact that John was the person who showed her the microphone will
A. relieve Henry of liability, because John was careless in so doing. 
B. relieve Henry of liability, because John's conduct was the immediate cause of Wanda's harm. 
C. not relieve Henry of liability, because Henry's goal was achieved. 
D. not relieve Henry of liability, because the conduct of a third person is irrelevant in emotional distress cases
Answer: C
Trease owned Hilltop in fee simple. By his will, he devised as follows: "Hilltop to such of my grandchildren who shall reach the age of 21; and by 55 this provision I intend to include all grandchildren whenever born." At the time of his death, Trease had three children and two grandchildren. Courts hold such a devise valid under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. What is the best explanation of that determination?
A. All of Trease's children would be measuring lives.
B. The rule of convenience closes the class of beneficiaries when any grandchild reaches the age of 21.
C. There is a presumption that Trease intended to include only those grandchildren born prior to his death.
D. There is a subsidiary rule of construction that dispositive instruments are to be interpreted so as to uphold interests rather than to invalidate them under the Rule Against Perpetuities
Answer: A
Trease owned Hilltop in fee simple. By his will, he devised as follows: "Hilltop to such of my grandchildren who shall reach the age of 21; and by 55 this provision I intend to include all grandchildren whenever born." At the time of his death, Trease had three children and two grandchildrenWhich of the following additions to or changes in the facts of the preceding question would produce a violation of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities?
A. A posthumous child was born to Trease.
B. Trease's will expressed the intention to include all afterborn grandchildren in the gift.
C. The instrument was an inter vivos conveyance rather than a will.
D. Trease had no grandchildren living at the time of his death
Answer: C
Victim, injured by Driver in an auto accident, employed attorney First to represent him in the matter. Victim was chronically insolvent and expressed doubt whether he could promptly get necessary medical treatment. Accordingly, First wrote into their contract his promise to Victim "to pay from any settlement with Driver compensation to any physician who provides professional services for Victim's injuries." The contract also provided that First's duties were "nonassignable." First immediately filed suit against Driver. Victim then sought and received medical treatment, reasonably valued at $1,000, from Doctor, After receiving a bill from Doctor for $1,000, Victim immediately wrote Doctor explaining that he was unable to pay and enclosing a copy of his contract with First. Victim then asked First about payment of this bill, but First requested a release from their employment contract, stating that he would like to refer Victim's claim to attorney Second and that Second was willing to represent Victim in the pending lawsuit. Victim wrote a letter to First releasing him from their contract and agreeing to Second's representation. A copy of this letter was sent to Doctor. Second subsequently promised First to represent Victim and soon negotiated a settlement of Victim's claim against Driver which netted $1,000, all of which was paid by Victim to creditors other than Doctor. Victim remains insolvent but failed to inform Doctor of First's promise. "In an action by Doctor against Victim to recover $1,000, Doctor's best theory of recovery is that Doctor
A. is a creditor beneficiary of the employment contract between Victim and First.
B. is a donee beneficiary of the employment contract between Victim and First.
C. provided services essential to the preservation of Victim's health.
D. has a claim based upon an implied-in-fact contract with Victi
Answer: D
Victim, injured by Driver in an auto accident, employed attorney First to represent him in the matter. Victim was chronically insolvent and expressed doubt whether he could promptly get necessary medical treatment. Accordingly, First wrote into their contract his promise to Victim "to pay from any settlement with Driver compensation to any physician who provides professional services for Victim's injuries." The contract also provided that First's duties were "nonassignable." First immediately filed suit against Driver. Victim then sought and received medical treatment, reasonably valued at $1,000, from Doctor, After receiving a bill from Doctor for $1,000, Victim immediately wrote Doctor explaining that he was unable to pay and enclosing a copy of his contract with First. Victim then asked First about payment of this bill, but First requested a release from their employment contract, stating that he would like to refer Victim's claim to attorney Second and that Second was willing to represent Victim in the pending lawsuit. Victim wrote a letter to First releasing him from their contract and agreeing to Second's representation. A copy of this letter was sent to Doctor. Second subsequently promised First to represent Victim and soon negotiated a settlement of Victim's claim against Driver which netted $1,000, all of which was paid by Victim to creditors other than Doctor. Victim remains insolvent but failed to inform Doctor of First's promise. ". In an action by Doctor against First upon First's employment contract with Victim, First is likely to argue in defense that
A. the anti-assignment clause in First's contract with Victim is void as against public policy.
B. First has relied to his detriment on Victim's letter of release.
C. third parties cannot acquire valid claims under an attorney-client contract.
D. Doctor has not materially changed his position in reliance upon First's employment contract
Answer: D
Victim, injured by Driver in an auto accident, employed attorney First to represent him in the matter. Victim was chronically insolvent and expressed doubt whether he could promptly get necessary medical treatment. Accordingly, First wrote into their contract his promise to Victim "to pay from any settlement with Driver compensation to any physician who provides professional services for Victim's injuries." The contract also provided that First's duties were "nonassignable." First immediately filed suit against Driver. Victim then sought and received medical treatment, reasonably valued at $1,000, from Doctor, After receiving a bill from Doctor for $1,000, Victim immediately wrote Doctor explaining that he was unable to pay and enclosing a copy of his contract with First. Victim then asked First about payment of this bill, but First requested a release from their employment contract, stating that he would like to refer Victim's claim to attorney Second and that Second was willing to represent Victim in the pending lawsuit. Victim wrote a letter to First releasing him from their contract and agreeing to Second's representation. A copy of this letter was sent to Doctor. Second subsequently promised First to represent Victim and soon negotiated a settlement of Victim's claim against Driver which netted $1,000, all of which was paid by Victim to creditors other than Doctor. Victim remains insolvent but failed to inform Doctor of First's promise. ""In an action by Doctor against First upon First's employment contract with Victim, if First attempts to use Victim's release as a defense, Doctor is likely to argue that 
A. the release was ineffective, because Doctor had impliedly assented to the Victim-First contract. 
B. the release was ineffective, because Victim would thereby be unjustly enriched. 56 
C. there was no consideration for Victim's release of First.
D. First's contract duties were too personal to be effectively delegated to Second
Answer: A
Victim, injured by Driver in an auto accident, employed attorney First to represent him in the matter. Victim was chronically insolvent and expressed doubt whether he could promptly get necessary medical treatment. Accordingly, First wrote into their contract his promise to Victim "to pay from any settlement with Driver compensation to any physician who provides professional services for Victim's injuries." The contract also provided that First's duties were "nonassignable." First immediately filed suit against Driver. Victim then sought and received medical treatment, reasonably valued at $1,000, from Doctor, After receiving a bill from Doctor for $1,000, Victim immediately wrote Doctor explaining that he was unable to pay and enclosing a copy of his contract with First. Victim then asked First about payment of this bill, but First requested a release from their employment contract, stating that he would like to refer Victim's claim to attorney Second and that Second was willing to represent Victim in the pending lawsuit. Victim wrote a letter to First releasing him from their contract and agreeing to Second's representation. A copy of this letter was sent to Doctor. Second subsequently promised First to represent Victim and soon negotiated a settlement of Victim's claim against Driver which netted $1,000, all of which was paid by Victim to creditors other than Doctor. Victim remains insolvent but failed to inform Doctor of First's promise. "In an action by Doctor against Second, Second is most likely to argue on these facts that
A. Second made only a gratuitous promise to First.
B. at the time Second promised to represent Victim, Doctor was only a member of an unidentified class of beneficiaries. 
C. there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that Doctor was either a creditor or donee beneficiary of Second's promise to First.
D. there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that Doctor substantially changed his position in reliance on Second's promise
Answer: C
Peters sued Davis for $100,000 for injuries received in a traffic accident. Davis charged Peters with contributory negligence and alleged that Peters failed to have his lights on at a time when it was dark enough to require them.Davis calls Bystander to testify that Passenger, who was riding in Peters's automobile and who also was injured, confided to Bystander at the scene of the accident that "we should have had our lights on." Bystander's testimony is
A. admissible as an admission of a party opponent.
B. admissible as a declaration against interest.
C. inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. 
D. inadmissible, because it is opinion
Answer: C
Peters sued Davis for $100,000 for injuries received in a traffic accident. Davis charged Peters with contributory negligence and alleged that Peters failed to have his lights on at a time when it was dark enough to require them.Davis offers to have Bystander testify that he was talking to Witness when he heard the crash and heard Witness, now deceased, exclaim, "That car doesn't have any lights on." Bystander's testimony is
A. admissible as a statement of present sense impression
B. admissible, because Witness is not available to testify. 
C. inadmissible as hearsay, not within any exception. 
D. inadmissible, because of the Dead Man's Statute.
Answer: A
Owner and his employee, Driver, consult Attorney about a motor vehicle collision resulting in a suit by Litigant against Owner and Driver as joint defendants. Attorney calls Irving, his investigator, into the conference to make notes of what is said, and those present discuss the facts of the collision and Owner's insurance. Owner thereafter files a cross-claim against Driver for indemnity for any damages obtained by LitigantLitigant calls Driver to testify in Litigant's case in chief to admissions made by Owner in the conference. On objection by Owner, the court should rule that Driver's testimony is
A. admissible, because of the presence of persons in the conference other than Attorney and Owner. 
B. admissible, because Driver is an adverse party in the lawsuit. 
C. inadmissible, because of the attorney-client privilege. 
D. inadmissible, because the best evidence is Irving's notes of the conference
Answer: C
Owner and his employee, Driver, consult Attorney about a motor vehicle collision resulting in a suit by Litigant against Owner and Driver as joint defendants. Attorney calls Irving, his investigator, into the conference to make notes of what is said, and those present discuss the facts of the collision and Owner's insurance. Owner thereafter files a cross-claim against Driver for indemnity for any damages obtained by LitigantDriver calls Irving in his defense against the cross-claim. He seeks to have Irving testify to an admission made by Owner in the conference. On objection by Owner, the court should rule that Irving's testimony is
A. admissible, because the attorney-client privilege does not apply, in suits between those conferring with him, to joint consultations with an attorney. 
B. admissible, because the attorney-client privilege does not apply to testimony by one who does not stand in a confidential relationship with the person against whom the evidence is offered. 
C. admissible, because the conference was not intended to be confidential, since it concerned anticipated testimony in open court. 
D. inadmissible, because Owner has not waived the attorney-client privilege.
Answer: A
Dave is a six-year-old boy who has a well-deserved reputation for bullying younger and smaller children. His parents have encouraged him to be aggressive and tough. Dave, for no reason, knocked down, kicked, and severely injured Pete, a four-year-old boy. A claim for relief has been asserted by Pete's parents for their medical and hospital costs and for Pete's injuries.If the claim is asserted against Dave's parents, the most likely result is that they will be
A. liable, because parents are strictly liable for the torts of their children. 
B. liable, because Dave's parents encouraged him to be aggressive and tough. 
C. not liable, because a six-year-old cannot commit a tort. 
D. not liable, because parents cannot be held liable for the tort of a child
Answer: B
Dave is a six-year-old boy who has a well-deserved reputation for bullying younger and smaller children. His parents have encouraged him to be aggressive and tough. Dave, for no reason, knocked down, kicked, and severely injured Pete, a four-year-old boy. A claim for relief has been asserted by Pete's parents for their medical and hospital costs and for Pete's injuries.If the claim is asserted against Dave, the most likely result is that Dave will be
A. liable, because he intentionally harmed Pete. 
B. liable, because, as a six-year-old, he should have known that his conduct was wrongful. 
C. not liable, because a child under seven is not liable in tort. 
D. not liable, because he is presumed to be under his parents' control and they have the sole responsibility
Answer: A
On March 1, Green and Brown orally agreed that Brown would erect a boathouse on Green's lot and would dig a channel from the boathouse across Clark's lot to a lake. Clark had already orally agreed with Green to permit the digging of the channel across Clark's lot. Brown agreed to begin work on the boathouse on March 15, and to complete all the work before June 1. The total price of $10,000 was to be paid by Green in three installments: $2,500 on March 15, $2,500 when the boathouse was completed, and $5,000 when Brown finished the digging of the channel."Assume that Green tendered the $2,500 on March 15, and that Brown refused to accept it or to perform. In an action by Green against Brown for breach of contract, which of the following can Brown successfully use as a defense? I. The Clark-Green agreement permitting the digging of the channel across Clark's lot was not in writing. II. The Green-Brown agreement was not in writing. 
A. I only
B. II only
C. Both I and II
D. Neither I nor II
Answer: D
On March 1, Green and Brown orally agreed that Brown would erect a boathouse on Green's lot and would dig a channel from the boathouse across Clark's lot to a lake. Clark had already orally agreed with Green to permit the digging of the channel across Clark's lot. Brown agreed to begin work on the boathouse on March 15, and to complete all the work before June 1. The total price of $10,000 was to be paid by Green in three installments: $2,500 on March 15, $2,500 when the boathouse was completed, and $5,000 when Brown finished the digging of the channel."Assume that Green paid the $2,500 on March 15 and that Brown completed the boathouse according to specifications, but that Green then refused to pay the second installment and repudiated the contract. Assume further that the absence of a writing is not raised as a defense. Which of the following is/are correct? I. Brown has a cause of action against Green and his damages will be $2,500. II. Brown can refuse to dig the channel and will not be liable for breach of contract.
A. I only
B. II only
C. Both I and II
D. Neither I nor I
Answer: B
On March 1, Green and Brown orally agreed that Brown would erect a boathouse on Green's lot and would dig a channel from the boathouse across Clark's lot to a lake. Clark had already orally agreed with Green to permit the digging of the channel across Clark's lot. Brown agreed to begin work on the boathouse on March 15, and to complete all the work before June 1. The total price of $10,000 was to be paid by Green in three installments: $2,500 on March 15, $2,500 when the boathouse was completed, and $5,000 when Brown finished the digging of the channel.Assume that Green paid the $2,500 on March 15, that Brown completed the boathouse, that Green paid the second installment of $2,500, and that Brown completed the digging of the channel but not until July 1. Assume further that the absence of a writing is not raised as a defense. Which of the following is/are correct? I. Green has a cause of action against Brown for breach of contract. II. Green is excused from paying the $5,000.
A. I only
B. II only
C. Both I and II
D. Neither I nor I
Answer: A