ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
Innes worked as a secretary in an office in a building occupied partly by her employer and partly by Glass, a retail store. The two areas were separated by walls and were in no way connected, except that the air conditioning unit served both areas and there was a common return-air duct. Glass began remodeling, and its employees did the work, which included affixing a plastic surfacing material to counters. To fasten the plastic to the counters, the employees purchased glue, with the brand name Stick, that was manufactured by Steel, packaged in a sealed container by Steel, and retailed by Paint Company. In the course of the remodeling job, one of Glass' employees turned on the air conditioning and caused fumes from the glue to travel from Glass through the air conditioning unit and into Innes' office. The employees did not know that there was common ductwork for the air conditioners. Innes was permanently blinded by the fumes from the glue. The label on the container of glue read, "DANGER. Do not smoke near this product. Extremely flammable. Contains butanone, toluol, and hexane. Use with adequate ventilation. Keep out of the reach of children." The three chemicals listed on the label are very toxic and harmful to human eyes. Steel had received no reports of eye injuries during the 10 years that the product had been manufactured and sold."If Innes asserts a claim against Paint Company, the most likely result is that she will
A. recover if she can recover against Steel.
B. recover, because Innes was an invitee of a tenant in the building. 
C. not recover unless Paint Company was negligent.
D. not recover, because the glue came in a sealed package
Answer: A
Innes worked as a secretary in an office in a building occupied partly by her employer and partly by Glass, a retail store. The two areas were separated by walls and were in no way connected, except that the air conditioning unit served both areas and there was a common return-air duct. Glass began remodeling, and its employees did the work, which included affixing a plastic surfacing material to counters. To fasten the plastic to the counters, the employees purchased glue, with the brand name Stick, that was manufactured by Steel, packaged in a sealed container by Steel, and retailed by Paint Company. In the course of the remodeling job, one of Glass' employees turned on the air conditioning and caused fumes from the glue to travel from Glass through the air conditioning unit and into Innes' office. The employees did not know that there was common ductwork for the air conditioners. Innes was permanently blinded by the fumes from the glue. The label on the container of glue read, "DANGER. Do not smoke near this product. Extremely flammable. Contains butanone, toluol, and hexane. Use with adequate ventilation. Keep out of the reach of children." The three chemicals listed on the label are very toxic and harmful to human eyes. Steel had received no reports of eye injuries during the 10 years that the product had been manufactured and sold.". If Innes asserts a claim against Glass, the most likely result is that she will
A. recover, because a user of a product is held to the same standard as the manufacturer. 
B. recover, because the employees of Glass caused the fumes to enter her area of the building. 
C. not recover, because Glass used the glue for its intended purposes. 
D. not recover, because the employees of Glass had no reason to know that the fumes could injure Innes
Answer: D
When Esther, Gray's 21-year-old daughter, finished college, Gray handed her a signed memorandum stating that if she would go to law school for three academic years, he would pay her tuition, room, and board and would "give her a $1,000 bonus" for each "A" she got in law school. Esther's uncle, Miller, who was present on this occasion, read the memorandum and thereupon said to Esther, "and if he doesn't pay your expenses, I will." Gray paid her tuition, room, and board for her first year but died just before the end of that year. Subsequently, Esther learned that she had received two "A's" in the second semester. The executor of Gray's estate has refused to pay her anything for the two "A's" and has told her that the estate will no longer pay her tuition, room, and board in law school.In an action by Esther against Miller on account of the executor's repudiation of Gray's promise to pay future tuition, room, and board, which of the following would be Miller's strongest defense?
A. The parties did not manifestly intend a contract.
B. Gray's death terminated the agreement.
C. The agreement was oral.
D. The agreement was divisible.
Answer: C
When Esther, Gray's 21-year-old daughter, finished college, Gray handed her a signed memorandum stating that if she would go to law school for three academic years, he would pay her tuition, room, and board and would "give her a $1,000 bonus" for each "A" she got in law school. Esther's uncle, Miller, who was present on this occasion, read the memorandum and thereupon said to Esther, "and if he doesn't pay your expenses, I will." Gray paid her tuition, room, and board for her first year but died just before the end of that year. Subsequently, Esther learned that she had received two "A's" in the second semester. The executor of Gray's estate has refused to pay her anything for the two "A's" and has told her that the estate will no longer pay her tuition, room, and board in law school.In an action against Gray's estate for $2,000 on account of the two "A's," if the only defense raised is lack of consideration, Esther probably will
A. succeed under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
B. succeed on a theory of bargained-for exchange for her father's promise
C. not succeed, because the $1,000 for each "A" was promised only as a bonus. 
D. not succeed, because Esther was already legally obligated to use her best efforts in law school.
Answer: B
In Polk's negligence action against Dell arising out of a multiple-car collision, Witt testified for Polk that Dell went through a red light. On cross-examination, Dell seeks to question Witt about her statement that the light was yellow, made in a deposition that Witt gave in a separate action between Adams and Baker. The transcript of the deposition is self-authenticating. On proper objection, the court should rule the inquiry 
A. admissible for impeachment only.
B. admissible as substantive evidence only.
C. admissible for impeachment and as substantive evidence.
D. inadmissible, because it is hearsay, not within any exception.
Answer: C
In 1965 Hubert Green executed his will which in pertinent part provided, "I hereby give, devise, and bequeath Greenvale to my surviving widow for life, remainder to such of my children as shall live to attain the age of 30 years, but if any child dies under the age of 30 years survived by a child or children, such child or children shall take and receive the share which his, her, or their parent would have received had such parent lived to attain the age of 30 years." At the date of writing his will, Green was married to Susan, and they had two children, Allan and Beth. Susan died in 1970 and Hubert married Waverly in 1972. At his death in 1980, Green was survived by his wife, Waverly, and three children, Allan, Beth, and Carter. Carter, who was born in 1974, was his child by Waverly. In a jurisdiction which recognizes the common law Rule Against Perpetuities unmodified by statute, the result of the application of the rule is that the
A. remainder to the children and to the grandchildren is void because Green could have subsequently married a person who was unborn at the time Green executed his will. 92
B. remainder to the children is valid, but the substitutionary gift to the grandchildren is void because Green could have subsequently married a person who was unborn at the time Green executed his will. 
C. gift in remainder to Allan and Beth or their children is valid, but the gift to Carter or his children is void. 
D. remainder to the children and the substitutionary gift to the grandchildren are valid
Answer: D
Siddon worked as a private duty nurse and on occasion worked in Doctors' Hospital. The hospital called Registry, the private duty referral agency through which Siddon usually obtained employment, and asked that in the future she not be assigned to patients in Doctors' Hospital. Registry asked the hospital why it had made the request. Doctors' Hospital sent a letter to Registry giving as the reason for its request that significant amounts of narcotics had disappeared during Siddon's shift from the nursing stations at which she had worked. If Siddon asserts a claim based on defamation against Doctors' Hospital, Siddon will
A. recover, because the hospital accused Siddon of improper professional conduct. 
B. recover if Siddon did not take the narcotics.
C. not recover if narcotics disappeared during Siddon's shifts.
D. not recover if the hospital reasonably believed that Siddon took the narcotic
Answer: D
Zeller contracted in writing to deliver to Baker 100 bushels of wheat on August 1 at $3.50 a bushel. Because his suppliers had not delivered enough wheat to him by that time, Zeller on August 1 had only 95 bushels of wheat with which to fulfill his contract with Baker. If Zeller tenders 95 bushels of wheat to Baker on August 1, and Baker refuses to accept or pay for any of the wheat, which of the following best states the legal relationship between Zeller and Baker?
A. Zeller has a cause of action against Baker, because Zeller has substantially performed his contract. 
B. Zeller is excused from performing his contract because of impossibility of performance.
C. Baker has a cause of action against Zeller for Zeller's failure to deliver 100 bushels of wheat.
D. Baker is obligated to give Zeller a reasonable time to attempt to obtain the other five bushels of wheat.
Answer: C
A federal statute sets up a program of dental education. The statute provides that the Secretary of Health and Human Services "shall, on a current basis, spend all of the money appropriated for this purpose" and "shall distribute the appropriated funds" by a specified formula to state health departments that agree to participate in the program. In the current year Congress has appropriated $100 million for expenditure on this program. In order to ensure a budget surplus in the current fiscal year, the President issues an executive order directing the various cabinet secretaries to cut expenditures in this year by 10 percent in all categories. He also orders certain programs to be cut more drastically because he believes that "they are not as important to the general welfare as other programs." The President identifies the dental education program as such a program and orders it to be cut by 50 percent. Assume that no other federal statutes are relevant. To satisfy constitutional requirements, how much money must the Secretary of Health and Human Services distribute for the dental education program this year?
A. $50 million, because the President could reasonably determine that this program is not as important to the general welfare as other programs. 
B. $50 million, because as chief executive the President has the constitutional authority to control the actions of all of his subordinates by executive order. 
C. $90 million, because any more drastic cut for the program would be a denial of equal protection to beneficiaries of this program as compared to beneficiaries of other programs. 
D. $100 million, because the President may not unilaterally suspend the effect of a valid federal statute imposing a duty to spend appropriated monies
Answer: D
Powers sued Debbs for battery. At trial, Powers's witness Wilson testified that Debbs had made an unprovoked attack on Powers. On cross-examination, Debbs asks Wilson about a false claim that Wilson once filed on an insurance policy. The question is
A. proper, because the conduct involved untruthfulness. 
B. proper provided that the conduct resulted in conviction of Wilson.
C. improper, because the impeachment involved a specific instance of misconduct. 
D. improper, because the claim form would be the best evidence
Answer: A
On March 31, Selco and Byco entered into a written agreement in which Selco agreed to fabricate and sell to Byco 10,000 specially designed brake linings for a new type of power brake manufactured by Byco. The contract provided that Byco would pay half of the purchase price on May 15 in order to give Selco funds to "tool up" for the work; that Selco would deliver 5,000 brake linings on May 31; that Byco would pay the balance of the purchase price on June 15; and that Selco would deliver the balance of the brake linings on June 30. On May 10, Selco notified Byco that it doubted that it could perform because of problems encountered in modifying its production machines to produce the brake linings. On May 15, however, Selco assured Byco that the production difficulties had been overcome, and Byco paid Selco the first 50 percent installment of the purchase price. Selco did not deliver the first 5,000 brake linings on May 31, or at any time thereafter; on June 10, Selco notified Byco that it would not perform the contractWhich of the following correctly states Byco's rights and obligations immediately after receipt of Selco's notice on May 10?
A. Byco could treat the notice as an anticipatory repudiation, and had a cause of action on May 10 for breach of the entire contract 
B. Byco could treat the notice as an anticipatory repudiation, and could sue to enjoin an actual breach by Selco on May 31. 
C. Byco had no cause of action for breach of contract, but could suspend its performance and demand assurances that Selco would perform. 
D. Byco had no cause of action for breach of contract, and was required to pay the installment of the purchase price due on May 15 to preserve its rights under the contract.
Answer: C
On March 31, Selco and Byco entered into a written agreement in which Selco agreed to fabricate and sell to Byco 10,000 specially designed brake linings for a new type of power brake manufactured by Byco. The contract provided that Byco would pay half of the purchase price on May 15 in order to give Selco funds to "tool up" for the work; that Selco would deliver 5,000 brake linings on May 31; that Byco would pay the balance of the purchase price on June 15; and that Selco would deliver the balance of the brake linings on June 30. On May 10, Selco notified Byco that it doubted that it could perform because of problems encountered in modifying its production machines to produce the brake linings. On May 15, however, Selco assured Byco that the production difficulties had been overcome, and Byco paid Selco the first 50 percent installment of the purchase price. Selco did not deliver the first 5,000 brake linings on May 31, or at any time thereafter; on June 10, Selco notified Byco that it would not perform the contractWhich of the following is NOT a correct statement of the parties' legal status immediately after Selco's notice on June 10?
A. Byco has a cause of action for total breach of contract because of Selco's repudiation, but that cause of action will be lost if Selco retracts its repudiation before Byco changes its position or manifests to Selco that Byco considers the repudiation final. 
B. Byco can bring suit to rescind the contract even if it elects to await Selco's performance for a commercially reasonable time.
C. Byco can await performance by Selco for a commercially reasonable time, but if Byco awaits performance beyond that period, it cannot recover any resulting damages that it reasonably could have avoided. 
D. Byco has a cause of action for breach of contract that it can successfully assert only after it has given Selco a commercially reasonable time to perform.
Answer: D
A state statute provides that persons moving into a community to attend a college on a full-time basis may not vote in any elections for local or state officials that are held in that community. Instead, the statute provides that for voting purposes all such persons shall retain their residence in the communities from which they came. In the state the age of majority is 18. Which of the following is the strongest argument to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of this state statute?
A. A state does not have an interest that is sufficiently compelling to justify the exclusion from voting of an entire class of persons.
B. There are less restrictive means by which the state could assure that only actual residents of a community vote in its elections.
C. Most persons moving to a community to attend college full time are likely to have attained the age of majority under the laws of this state.
D. On its face this statute impermissibly discriminates against interstate commerce
Answer: B
At a time when Ogawa held Lot 1 in the Fairoaks subdivision in fee simple, Vine executed a warranty deed that recited that Vine conveyed Lot 1, Fairoaks, to Purvis. The deed was promptly and duly recorded. After the recording of the deed from Vine to Purvis, Ogawa conveyed Lot 1 to Vine by a warranty deed that was promptly and duly recorded. Later, Vine conveyed the property to Rand by warranty deed and the deed was promptly and duly recorded. Rand paid the fair market value of Lot 1 and had no knowledge of any claim of Purvis. In an appropriate action, Rand and Purvis contest title to Lot 1. In this action, judgment should be for
A. Purvis, because Purvis' deed is senior to Rand's. 
B. Rand, because Rand paid value without notice of Purvis' claim. 
C. Purvis or Rand, depending on whether a subsequent grantee is bound, at common law, by the doctrine of estoppel by deed. 
D. Purvis or Rand, depending on whether Purvis' deed is deemed recorded in Rand's chain of title
Answer: D
Dillon held up a gasoline station. During the robbery he shot and killed a customer who attempted to apprehend him. Dillon was prosecuted for premeditated murder and convicted. Thereafter, he was indicted for armed robbery of the station. Before the trial, his attorney moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that further proceedings were unconstitutional because of Dillon's prior conviction. The motion to dismiss should be
A. granted, because once Dillon was convicted on any of the charges arising out of the robbery, the prosecution was constitutionally estopped from proceeding against Dillon on any charge stemming from the same transaction. 
B. granted, because the double jeopardy clause prohibits a subsequent trial on what is essentially a lesser included offense. 
C. denied, because there is no constitutional requirement that all known charges against Dillon be brought in the same prosecution. 
D. denied, because estoppel does not apply when the defendant is charged with violating two different statutes. 
Answer: C
Ellis, an electrical engineer, designed an electronic game known as Zappo. Ellis entered into a licensing agreement with Toyco under which Toyco agreed to manufacture Zappo according to Ellis's specifications and to market it and pay a royalty to Ellis. Carla, whose parents had purchased a Zappo game for her, was injured while playing the game. Carla recovered a judgment against Toyco on the basis of a finding that the Zappo game was defective because of Ellis's improper design. In a claim for indemnity against Ellis, will Toyco prevail?
A. Yes, because as between Ellis and Toyco, Ellis was responsible for the design of Zappo. 
B. Yes, because Toyco and Ellis were joint tortfeasors. 
C. No, because Toyco, as the manufacturer, was strictly liable to Carla. 
D. No, if Toyco, by a reasonable inspection, could have discovered the defect in the design of Zappo
Answer: A
While crossing Spruce Street, Pesko was hit by a car that she did not see. Pesko sued Dorry for her injuries. At trial, Pesko calls Williams, a police officer, to testify that, 10 minutes after the accident, a driver stopped him and said, "Officer, a few minutes ago I saw a hit-and-run accident on Spruce Street involving a blue convertible, which I followed to the drive-in restaurant at Oak and Third," and that a few seconds later Williams saw Dorry sitting alone in a blue convertible in the drive-in restaurant's parking lot. Williams' testimony about the driver's statement should be
A. admitted as a statement of recent perception.
B. admitted as a present sense impression.
C. excluded, because it is hearsay, not within any exception. 
D. excluded, because it is more prejudicial than probative
Answer: C
The Kernel Corporation, through its president, Demeter Gritz, requested from Vault Finance, Inc., a short-term loan of $100,000. On April 1, Gritz and Vault's loan officer agreed orally that Vault would make the loan on the following terms: (1) The loan would be repaid in full on or before the following July 1 and would carry interest at an annual rate of 15 percent (a lawful rate under the applicable usury law); and (2) Gritz would personally guarantee repayment. The loan was approved and made on April 5. The only document evidencing the loan was a memorandum, written and supplied by Vault and signed by Gritz for Kernel, that read in its entirety: "April 5 In consideration of a loan advanced on this date, Kernel Corporation hereby promises to pay Vault Finance, Inc., $100,000 on September 1.  Kernel Corporation  By /s/ Demeter Gritz  Demeter Gritz, President" Kernel Corporation did not repay the loan on or before July 1, although it had sufficient funds to do so. On July 10, Vault sued Kernel as principal debtor and Gritz individually as guarantor for $100,000, plus 15 percent interest from April 5. "At the trial, can Vault prove Kernel's oral commitment to repay the loan on or before July 1?
A. Yes, because the oral agreement was supported by an independent consideration. 
B. Yes, because the evidence of the parties' negotiations is relevant to their contractual intent concerning maturity of the debt. 
C. No, because such evidence is barred by the preexisting duty rule. 
D. No, because such evidence contradicts the writing and is barred by the parol evidence rule
Answer: D
The Kernel Corporation, through its president, Demeter Gritz, requested from Vault Finance, Inc., a short-term loan of $100,000. On April 1, Gritz and Vault's loan officer agreed orally that Vault would make the loan on the following terms: (1) The loan would be repaid in full on or before the following July 1 and would carry interest at an annual rate of 15 percent (a lawful rate under the applicable usury law); and (2) Gritz would personally guarantee repayment. The loan was approved and made on April 5. The only document evidencing the loan was a memorandum, written and supplied by Vault and signed by Gritz for Kernel, that read in its entirety: "April 5 In consideration of a loan advanced on this date, Kernel Corporation hereby promises to pay Vault Finance, Inc., $100,000 on September 1.  Kernel Corporation  By /s/ Demeter Gritz  Demeter Gritz, President" Kernel Corporation did not repay the loan on or before July 1, although it had sufficient funds to do so. On July 10, Vault sued Kernel as principal debtor and Gritz individually as guarantor for $100,000, plus 15 percent interest from April 5. "At the trial, can Vault prove Gritz's oral promise to guarantee the loan?
A. Yes, because Gritz signed the memorandum. 
B. Yes, because, as president of the debtorcompany, Gritz is a third-party beneficiary of the loan. 
C. No, because there was no separate consideration for Gritz's promise. 
D. No, because such proof is barred by the Statute of Frauds
Answer: D