ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
Palko is being treated by a physician for asbestosis, an abnormal chest condition that was caused by his on-the-job handling of materials containing asbestos. His physician has told him that the asbestosis is not presently cancerous, but that it considerably increases the risk that he will ultimately develop lung cancer. Palko brought an action for damages, based on strict product liability, against the supplier of the materials that contained asbestos. The court in this jurisdiction has ruled against recovery of damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress in the absence of physical harm. If the supplier is subject to liability to Palko for damages, should the award include damage for emotional distress he has suffered arising from his knowledge of the increased risk that he will develop lung cancer? 
A. No, because Palko's emotional distress did not cause his physical condition. 
B. No, unless the court in this jurisdiction recognizes a cause of action for an increased risk of cancer. 
C. Yes, because the supplier of a dangerous product is strictly liable for the harm it causes. 
D. Yes, because Palko's emotional distress arises from bodily harm caused by his exposure to asbestos. 
Answer: D
Police received information from an undercover police officer that she had just seen two men (whom she described) in a red pickup truck selling marijuana to schoolchildren near the city's largest high school. A few minutes later, two police officers saw a pickup truck fitting the description a half block from the high school. The driver of the truck matched the description of one of the men described by the undercover officer. The only passenger was a young woman who was in the back of the truck. The police saw her get out and stand at a nearby bus stop. They stopped the truck and searched the driver. In the pocket of the driver's jacket, the police found a small bottle of pills that they recognized as narcotics. They then broke open a locked toolbox attached to the flatbed of the truck and found a small sealed envelope inside. They opened it and found marijuana. They also found a quantity of cocaine in the glove compartment. After completing their search of the driver and the truck, the police went over to the young woman and searched her purse. In her purse, they found a small quantity of heroin. Both the driver and the young woman were arrested and charged with unlawful possession of narcotics. If the driver moves to suppress the use as evidence of the marijuana and cocaine found in the search of the truck, the court should 
A. grant the motion as to both the marijuana and the cocaine.
B. grant the motion as to the marijuana but deny it as to the cocaine.
C. deny the motion as to the marijuana but grant it as to the cocaine.
D. deny the motion as to both the marijuana and the cocaine.
Answer: D
Police received information from an undercover police officer that she had just seen two men (whom she described) in a red pickup truck selling marijuana to schoolchildren near the city's largest high school. A few minutes later, two police officers saw a pickup truck fitting the description a half block from the high school. The driver of the truck matched the description of one of the men described by the undercover officer. The only passenger was a young woman who was in the back of the truck. The police saw her get out and stand at a nearby bus stop. They stopped the truck and searched the driver. In the pocket of the driver's jacket, the police found a small bottle of pills that they recognized as narcotics. They then broke open a locked toolbox attached to the flatbed of the truck and found a small sealed envelope inside. They opened it and found marijuana. They also found a quantity of cocaine in the glove compartment. After completing their search of the driver and the truck, the police went over to the young woman and searched her purse. In her purse, they found a small quantity of heroin. Both the driver and the young woman were arrested and charged with unlawful possession of narcotics. If the young woman moves to suppress the use as evidence of the heroin, the court should 
A. grant the motion, because she did not fit the description given by the informant and her mere presence does not justify the search. 
B. grant the motion, because the police should have seized her purse and then obtained a warrant to search it. 
C. deny the motion, because she had been a passenger in the truck and the police had probable cause to search the truck. 
D. deny the motion, because she was planning to leave the scene by bus and so exigent circumstances existed. 
Answer: A
Len owned two adjoining parcels known as Lot 1 and Lot 2. Both parcels fronted on Main Street and abutted a public alley in the rear. Lot 1 was improved with a commercial building that covered all of the Main Street frontage of Lot 1; there was a large parking lot on the rear of Lot 1 with access from the alley only. Fifteen years ago, Len leased Lot 1 to Tenny for 15 years. Tenny has continuously occupied Lot 1 since that time. Thirteen years ago, without Len's permission, Tenny began to use a driveway on Lot 2 as a better access between Main Street and the parking lot than the alley. Eight years ago, Len conveyed Lot 2 to Owen and, five years ago, Len conveyed Lot 1 to Tenny by a deed that recited "together with all the appurtenances." Until last week, Tenny continuously used the driveway over Lot 2 to Tenny's parking lot in the rear of Lot 1. Last week Owen commenced construction of a building on Lot 2 and blocked the driveway used by Tenny. Tenny has commenced an action against Owen to restrain him from blocking the driveway from Main Street to the parking lot at the rear of Lot 1. The period of time to acquire rights by prescription in the jurisdiction is ten years. If Tenny loses, it will be because 
A. Len owned both Lot 1 and Lot 2 until eight years ago.
B. Tenny has access to the parking lot from the alley.
C. mere use of an easement is not adverse possession.
D. no easement was mentioned in the deed from Len to Owen.
Answer: A
Dewar, a developer, needing a water well on one of his projects, met several times about the matter with Waterman, a well driller. Subsequently, Waterman sent Dewar an unsigned typewritten form captioned "WELL DRILLING PROPOSAL" and stating various terms the two had discussed but not agreed upon, including a "proposed price of $5,000." The form concluded, "This proposal will not become a contract until signed by you [Dewar] and then returned to and signed by me [Waterman]." Dewar signed the form and returned it to Waterman, who neglected to sign it but promptly began drilling the well at the proposed site on Dewar's project. After drilling for two days, Waterman told Dewar during one of Dewar's daily visits that he would not finish unless Dewar would agree to pay twice the price recited in the written proposal. Dewar refused, Waterman quit, and Dewar hired Subbo to drill the well to completion for a price of $7,500. In an action by Dewar against Waterman for damages, which of the following is the probable decision? 
A. Dewar wins, because his signing of Waterman's form constituted an acceptance of an offer by Waterman. 
B. Dewar wins, because Waterman's commencement of performance constituted an acceptance by Waterman of an offer by Dewar and an implied promise by Waterman to complete the well. 
C. Waterman wins, because he never signed the proposal as required by its terms. 
D. Waterman wins, because his commencement of performance merely prevented Dewar from revoking his offer, made on a form supplied by Waterman, and did not obligate Waterman to complete the well. 
Answer: B
In an action brought against Driver by Walker's legal representative, the only proofs that the legal representative offered on liability were that: (1) Walker, a pedestrian, was killed instantly while walking on the shoulder of the highway; (2) Driver was driving the car that struck Walker; and (3) there were no living witnesses to the accident other than Driver, who denied negligence. Assume the jurisdiction has adopted a rule of pure comparative negligence. If, at the end of the plaintiff's case, Driver moves for a directed verdict, the trial judge should 
A. grant the motion, because the legal representative has offered no specific evidence from which reasonable jurors may conclude that Driver was negligent. 
B. grant the motion, because it is just as likely that Walker was negligent as that Driver was negligent. 
C. deny the motion, unless Walker was walking with his back to traffic, in violation of the state highway code. 
D. deny the motion, because, in the circumstances, negligence on the part of Driver may be inferred. 
Answer: D
Smith joined a neighborhood gang. At a gang meeting, as part of the initiation process, the leader ordered Smith to kill Hardy, a member of a rival gang. Smith refused, saying he no longer wanted to be part of the group. The leader, with the approval of the other members, told Smith that he had become too involved with the gang to quit and that they would kill him if he did not accomplish the murder of Hardy. The next day Smith shot Hardy to death while Hardy was sitting on his motorcycle outside a restaurant. Smith is charged with first-degree murder. First-degree murder is defined in the jurisdiction as the intentional premeditated killing of another. Second-degree murder is all other murder at common law. If Smith killed Hardy because of the threat to his own life, Smith should be found 
A. not guilty, because of the defense of duress. 
B. not guilty, because of the defense of necessity. 
C. guilty of first-degree murder.
D. guilty of second-degree murder.
Answer: C
Ohner and Planner signed a detailed writing in which Planner, a landscape architect, agreed to landscape and replant Ohner's residential property in accordance with a design prepared by Planner and incorporated in the writing. Ohner agreed to pay $10,000 for the work upon its completion. Ohner's spouse was not a party to the agreement, and had no ownership interest in the premises. For this question only, assume the following facts. At Ohner's insistence, the written Ohner-Planner agreement contained a provision that neither party would be bound unless Ohner's law partner, an avid student of landscaping, should approve Planner's design. Before Planner commenced the work, Ohner's law partner, in the presence of both Ohner and Planner, expressly disapproved the landscaping design. Nevertheless, Ohner ordered Planner to proceed with the work, and Planner reluctantly did so. When Planner's performance was 40% complete, Ohner repudiated his duty, if any, to pay the contract price or any part thereof. If Planner now sues Ohner for damages for breach of contract, which of the following concepts best supports Planner's claim? 
A. Substantial performance.
B. Promissory estoppel.
C. Irrevocable waiver of condition.
D. Unjust enrichment.
Answer: C
Arnold and Beverly owned a large tract of land, Blackacre, in fee simple as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. While Beverly was on an extended safari in Kenya, Arnold learned that there were very valuable coal deposits within Blackacre, but he made no attempt to inform Beverly. Thereupon, Arnold conveyed his interest in Blackacre to his wife, Alice, who immediately reconveyed that interest to Arnold. The common-law joint tenancy is unmodified by statute. Shortly thereafter, Arnold was killed in an automobile accident. His will, which was duly probated, specifically devised his one-half interest in Blackacre to Alice. Beverly then returned from Kenya and learned what had happened. Beverly brought an appropriate action against Alice, who claimed a one-half interest in Blackacre, seeking a declaratory judgment that she, Beverly, was the sole owner of Blackacre. In this action, who should prevail? 
A. Alice, because Arnold and Beverly were tenants in common at the time of Arnold's death. 
B. Alice, because Arnold's will severed the joint tenancy. 
C. Beverly, because the joint tenancy was reestablished by Alice's reconveyance to Arnold. 
D. Beverly, because Arnold breached his fiduciary duty as her joint tenant. 
Answer: A
At the time of his death last week, Test owned Blackacre, a small farm. By his duly probated will, drawn five years ago, Test did the following: (1) devised Blackacre "to Arthur for the life of Baker, then to Casper"; (2) gave "all the rest, residue and remainder of my Estate, both real and personal, to my friend Fanny." At his death, Test was survived by Arthur, Casper, Sonny (Test's son and sole heir), and Fanny. Baker had died a week before Test. Title to Blackacre is now in 
A. Arthur for life, remainder to Casper. 
B. Casper, in fee simple. 
C. Sonny, in fee simple. 
D. Fanny, in fee simple.
Answer: B
Gyro, an expert in lifting and emplacing equipment atop tall buildings, contracted in a signed writing to lift and emplace certain air-conditioning equipment atop Tower's building. An exculpatory clause in the contract provided that Gyro would not be liable for any physical damage to Tower's building occurring during installation of the air-conditioning equipment. There was also a clause providing for per diem damages if Gyro did not complete performance by a specified date and a clause providing that "time is of the essence." Another clause provided that any subsequent agreement for extra work under the contract must be in writing and signed by both parties. With ample time remaining under the contract for commencement and completion of his performance, Gyro notified Tower that he was selling his business to Copter, who was equally expert in lifting and emplacing equipment atop tall buildings, and that Copter had agreed to "take over the Gyro-Tower contract." If Tower refuses to accept Copter's services, which of the following clauses in the GyroTower contract will best support Tower's contention that Gyro's duties under the contract were not delegable without Tower's consent? 
A. The exculpatory clause.
B. The liquidated-damage clause.
C. The "time is of the essence" clause. 
D. The extra-work clause.
Answer: A
Gyro, an expert in lifting and emplacing equipment atop tall buildings, contracted in a signed writing to lift and emplace certain air-conditioning equipment atop Tower's building. An exculpatory clause in the contract provided that Gyro would not be liable for any physical damage to Tower's building occurring during installation of the air-conditioning equipment. There was also a clause providing for per diem damages if Gyro did not complete performance by a specified date and a clause providing that "time is of the essence." Another clause provided that any subsequent agreement for extra work under the contract must be in writing and signed by both parties. With ample time remaining under the contract for commencement and completion of his performance, Gyro notified Tower that he was selling his business to Copter, who was equally expert in lifting and emplacing equipment atop tall buildings, and that Copter had agreed to "take over the Gyro-Tower contract." For this question only, assume that Tower orally agreed with Gyro to accept Copter's services and that Copter performed on time but negligently installed the wrong airconditioning equipment. Will Tower succeed in an action against Gyro for damages for breach of contract? 
A. Yes, because Tower did not agree to release Gyro from liability under the Gyro-Tower contract. 
B. Yes, because Tower received no consideration for the substitution of Copter for Gyro. 
C. No, because by accepting the substitution of Copter for Gyro, Tower effected a novation, and Gyro was thereby discharged of his duties under the Gyro- Tower contract. 
D. No, because the liquidated-damage clause in the Gyro-Tower contract provided only for damages caused by delay in performance. 
Answer: A
Allen owned Greenacre in fee simple of record on January 10. On that day, Maria loaned Allen $50,000 and Allen mortgaged Greenacre to Maria as security for the loan. The mortgage was recorded on January 18. Allen conveyed Greenacre to Barnes for a valuable consideration on January 11. Maria did not know of this, nor did Barnes know of the mortgage to Maria, until both discovered the facts on January 23, the day on which Barnes recorded Allen's deed. The recording act of the jurisdiction provides: "No unrecorded conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value without notice, who shall first record." There is no provision for a period of grace and there is no other relevant statutory provision. Maria sued Barnes to establish that her mortgage was good against Greenacre. The court should decide for 
A. Barnes, because he paid valuable consideration without notice before Maria recorded her mortgage. 
B. Barnes, because Maria's delay in recording means that she is estopped from asserting her priority in time. 
C. Maria, because Barnes did not record his deed before her mortgage was recorded. 
D. Maria, because after the mortgage to her, Allen's deed to Barnes was necessarily subject to her mortgage. 
Answer: C
Park sued Dunlevy for copyright infringement for using in Dunlevy's book some slightly disguised house plans on which Park held the copyright. Park is prepared to testify that he heard Dunlevy's executive assistant for copyright matters say that Dunlevy had obtained an advance copy of the plans from Park's office manager. Park's testimony is
A. admissible as reporting a statement of an employee of a party opponent.
B. admissible as a statement of a co- conspirator.
C. inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. 
D. inadmissible, because there is no showing that the assistant was authorized to speak for Dunlevy. 
Answer: A
Congress enacted a statute providing grants of federal funds for the restoration and preservation of courthouses that were built before 1900 and are still in use. The statute contains an inseverable condition requiring that any courthouse restored with the aid of such a grant must be equipped with ramps and other facilities necessary to accommodate physically handicapped people. A law of the state of Blue requires public buildings in Blue to have ramps and other facilities for handicapped people. It exempts from those requirements any building that is more than 70 years old if the State Board of Architects finds that the installation of such facilities would destroy the architectural integrity of the building. The Red County Courthouse in the state of Blue was built in 1895 and is still in use. It does not contain ramps or other special facilities for handicapped people. The State Board of Architects has determined that the installation of those facilities would destroy the architectural integrity of the building. Nevertheless, the County Board of Red County applies for a federal grant to restore and preserve that county's courthouse. If the County Board of Red County restores the Red County Courthouse with the aid of a federal restoration and preservation grant, is the board bound to install ramps and other facilities for handicapped people in that building? 
A. Yes, because Congress may impose reasonable conditions related to the public welfare on grants of federal funds to public bodies when the public bodies are free to accept or reject the grants. 
B. Yes, because the rights of handicapped and disabled people are fundamental rights that take precedence, as a constitutional matter, over considerations of architectural integrity. 
C. No, because the Constitution does not authorize the federal government to direct the actions of the states or any of their political subdivisions with respect to matters affecting their own governmental buildings. 
D. No, because any acceptance of this condition by the Red County Board of Supervisors would, as a matter of law, be considered to be under duress. 
Answer: A
Arnold decided to destroy an old warehouse that he owned because the taxes on the structure exceeded the income that he could receive from it. He crept into the building in the middle of the night with a can of gasoline and a fuse and set the fuse timer for 30 minutes. He then left the building. The fuse failed to ignite, and the building was not harmed. Arson is defined in this jurisdiction as "The intentional burning of any building or structure of another, without the consent of the owner." Arnold believed, however, that burning one's own building was arson, having been so advised by his lawyer. Has Arnold committed attempted arson? 
A. Yes, because factual impossibility is no defense. 
B. Yes, because a mistake of law even on the advice of an attorney is no defense. 
C. No, because his mistake negated a necessary mental state. 
D. No, because even if his actions had every consequence he intended, they would not have constituted arson. 
Answer: D
"Look-alike drugs" is the term used to describe nonprescription drugs that look like narcotic drugs and are sold on the streets as narcotic drugs. After extensive hearings, Congress concluded that the sale of look-alike drugs was widespread in this country and was creating severe health and law enforcement problems. To combat these problems, Congress enacted a comprehensive statute that regulates the manufacture, distribution, and sale of all nonprescription drugs in the United States. Which of the following sources of constitutional authority can most easily be used to justify the authority of Congress to enact this statute? 
A. The spending power.
B. The commerce clause.
C. The general welfare clause.
D. The enforcement powers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Answer: B
Peter and Donald were in the habit of playing practical jokes on each other on their respective birthdays. On Peter's birthday, Donald sent Peter a cake containing an ingredient that he knew had, in the past, made Peter very ill. After Peter had eaten a piece of the cake, he suffered severe stomach pains and had to be taken to the hospital by ambulance. On the way to the hospital, the ambulance driver suffered a heart attack, which caused the ambulance to swerve from the road and hit a tree. As a result of the collision, Peter suffered a broken leg. In a suit by Peter against Donald to recover damages for Peter's broken leg, Peter will 
A. prevail, because Donald knew that the cake would be harmful or offensive to Peter. 
B. prevail, only if the ambulance driver was negligent. 
C. not prevail, because Donald could not reasonably be expected to foresee injury to Peter's leg. 
D. not prevail, because the ambulance driver's heart attack was a superseding cause of Peter's broken leg. 
Answer: A
Decker, charged with armed robbery of a store, denied that he was the person who had robbed the store. In presenting the state's case, the prosecutor seeks to introduce evidence that Decker had robbed two other stores in the past year. This evidence is 
A. admissible, to prove a pertinent trait of Decker's character and Decker's action in conformity therewith. 
B. admissible, to prove Decker's intent and identity. 
C. inadmissible, because character must be proved by reputation or opinion and may not be proved by specific acts. 
D. inadmissible, because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
Answer: D