ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
A jurisdiction has the following decisional law on questions of principal and accomplice liability: CASE A: Defendant, a hardware store owner, sold several customers an item known as a "SuperTrucker," which detects police radar and enables speeders to avoid detection. When one of the devices broke down and the speeder was arrested, he confessed that he often sped, secure in the knowledge that his "SuperTrucker" would warn him of police radar in the vicinity. Held: Defendant guilty as an accomplice to speeding. CASE B: Defendant told Arnold that Defendant had stored some stereo equipment in a self-storage locker. He gave Arnold a key and asked Arnold to pick up the equipment and deliver it to Defendant's house. Arnold complied, and removed the equipment from the locker, using the key. In fact, the equipment belonged to Defendant's neighbor, whose locker key Defendant had found in the driveway. Held: Defendant guilty as an accomplice to burglary. CASE C: Tooley, a city council member, accepted a bribe from Defendant in exchange for his vote on Defendant's application for a zoning variance. A statute prohibits the taking of bribes by public officials. Held: Defendant not guilty as an accomplice to Tooley's violation of the bribery statute. CASE D: Defendant, an innkeeper, sometimes let his rooms to prostitutes, whom he knew to be using the rooms to ply their trade. He charged the prostitutes the same price as other guests at his inn. Held: Defendant not guilty as an accomplice to prostitution. In this jurisdiction, conviction for statutory rape requires proof of the defendant's knowledge that the victim is underage. Howard, who knew that Sarah was underage, encouraged George, who was unaware of Sarah's age, to have sex with Sarah. Howard has been charged as an accomplice to statutory rape. He should be 
A. convicted on the authority of Case A.
B. convicted on the authority of Case B.
C. acquitted on the authority of Case C.
D. acquitted on the authority of Case D.
Answer: B
A jurisdiction has the following decisional law on questions of principal and accomplice liability: CASE A: Defendant, a hardware store owner, sold several customers an item known as a "SuperTrucker," which detects police radar and enables speeders to avoid detection. When one of the devices broke down and the speeder was arrested, he confessed that he often sped, secure in the knowledge that his "SuperTrucker" would warn him of police radar in the vicinity. Held: Defendant guilty as an accomplice to speeding. CASE B: Defendant told Arnold that Defendant had stored some stereo equipment in a self-storage locker. He gave Arnold a key and asked Arnold to pick up the equipment and deliver it to Defendant's house. Arnold complied, and removed the equipment from the locker, using the key. In fact, the equipment belonged to Defendant's neighbor, whose locker key Defendant had found in the driveway. Held: Defendant guilty as an accomplice to burglary. CASE C: Tooley, a city council member, accepted a bribe from Defendant in exchange for his vote on Defendant's application for a zoning variance. A statute prohibits the taking of bribes by public officials. Held: Defendant not guilty as an accomplice to Tooley's violation of the bribery statute. CASE D: Defendant, an innkeeper, sometimes let his rooms to prostitutes, whom he knew to be using the rooms to ply their trade. He charged the prostitutes the same price as other guests at his inn. Held: Defendant not guilty as an accomplice to prostitution. Larson, a plastic surgeon, agreed to remove the fingerprints from the hands of "Fingers" Malloy, whom Larson knew to be a safecracker. Larson charged his usual hourly rate for the operation. Afterward, Malloy burglarized a bank safe and was convicted of burglary. Charged with burglary, Larson should be 
A. convicted on the authority of Case A.
B. convicted on the authority of Case B.
C. acquitted on the authority of Case C.
D. acquitted on the authority of Case D.
Answer: A
Congressional hearings determined that the use of mechanical power hammers is very dangerous to the persons using them and to persons in the vicinity of the persons using them. As a result, Congress enacted a statute prohibiting the use of mechanical power hammers on all construction projects in the United States. Subsequently, a study conducted by a private research firm concluded that nails driven by mechanical power hammers have longer-lasting joining power than hand-driven nails. After learning about this study, the city council of the city of Green enacted an amendment to its building safety code requiring the use of mechanical power hammers in the construction of all buildings intended for human habitation. This amendment to the city of Green's building safety code is 
A. unconstitutional, because it was enacted subsequent to the federal statute. 
B. unconstitutional, because it conflicts with the provisions of the federal statute. 
C. constitutional, because the federal statute does not expressly indicate that it supersedes inconsistent state or local laws. 
D. constitutional, because the long-term safety of human habitations justifies some additional risk to the people engaged in their construction. 
Answer: B
Under a written agreement Superpastries, Inc., promised to sell its entire output of baked buns at a specified unit price to Bonnie's Buns, Inc., a retailer, for one year. Bonnie's Buns promised not to sell any other supplier's baked buns. For this question only, assume the following facts. Shortly after making the contract, and before Superpastries had tendered any buns, Bonnie's Buns decided that the contract had become undesirable because of a sudden, sharp decline in its customers' demand for baked buns. It renounced the agreement, and Superpastries sues for breach of contract. Which of the following will the court probably decide? 
A. Bonnie's Buns wins, because mutuality of obligation was lacking in that Bonnie's Buns made no express promise to buy any of Superpastries' baked buns. 
B. Bonnie's Buns wins, because the agreement was void for indefiniteness of quantity and total price for the year involved. 
C. Superpastries wins, because Bonnie's Buns' promise to sell at retail Superpastries' baked buns exclusively, if it sold any such buns at all, implied a promise to use its best efforts to sell Superpastries' one-year output of baked buns. 
D. Superpastries wins, because under the applicable law both parties to a sale-ofgoods contract impliedly assume the risk of price and demand fluctuations. 
Answer: C
Under a written agreement Superpastries, Inc., promised to sell its entire output of baked buns at a specified unit price to Bonnie's Buns, Inc., a retailer, for one year. Bonnie's Buns promised not to sell any other supplier's baked buns. For this question only, assume the following facts. The parties' contract included a provision for termination by either party at any time upon reasonable notice. After six months of performance on both sides, Superpastries, claiming that its old bun-baker had become uneconomical and that it could not afford a new one, dismantled the bun-baker and began using the space for making dog biscuits. Superpastries' output of baked buns having ceased, Bonnie's Buns sued for breach of contract. Bonnie's Buns moves for summary judgment on liability, and Superpastries moves for summary judgment of dismissal. Which of the following should the court rule? 
A. Summary judgment for Bonnie's Buns, because as a matter of law Superpastries could not discontinue production of baked buns merely because it was losing money on that product. 
B. Summary judgment for Superpastries, because its cessation of baked-bun production and Bonnie's Buns' awareness thereof amounted as a matter of law to valid notice of termination as permitted by the contract. 
C. Both motions denied, because there are triable issues of fact as to whether Superpastries gave reasonable notice of termination or whether its losses from continued production of baked buns were sufficiently substantial to justify cessation of production. 
D. Both motions denied: Superpastries may legally cease production of baked buns, but under the circumstances it must share with Bonnie's Buns its profits from the manufacture of dog biscuits until the end of the first year. 
Answer: C
Dirk is on trial for the brutal murder of Villas. Dirk's first witness, Wesley, testified that in her opinion Dirk is a peaceful and nonviolent person. The prosecution does not crossexamine Wesley, who is then excused from further attendance. Which one of the following is INADMISSIBLE during the prosecution's rebuttal? 
A. Testimony by Wesley's former employer that Wesley submitted a series of false expense vouchers two years ago.
B. Testimony by a police officer that Dirk has a long-standing reputation in the community as having a violent temper.
C. Testimony by a neighbor that Wesley has a long-standing reputation in the community as an untruthful person.
D. Testimony by Dirk's former cell mate that he overheard Wesley offer to provide favorable testimony if Dirk would pay her $5,000. 
Answer: A
Amos owned Greenfield, a tract of land. His friend Bert wanted to buy Greenfield and offered $20,000 for it. Amos knew that Bert was insolvent, but replied, "As a favor to you as an old friend, I will sell Greenfield to you for $20,000, even though it is worth much more, if you can raise the money within one month." Bert wrote the following words, and no more, on a piece of paper: "I agree to sell Greenfield for $20,000." Amos then signed the piece of paper and gave it to Bert. Three days later, Amos received an offer of $40,000 for Greenfield. He asked Bert if he had raised the $20,000. When Bert answered, "Not yet," Amos told him that their deal was off and that he was going to accept the $40,000 offer. The next week, Bert secured a bank commitment to enable him to purchase Greenfield. Bert immediately brought an appropriate action against Amos to compel Amos to convey Greenfield to him. The following points will be raised during the course of the trial. I. The parol evidence rule. II. Construction of the contract as to time of performance. III. Bert's ability to perform. Which will be relevant to a decision in favor of Bert? 
A. I only.
B. I and II only.
C. II and III only.
D. I, II, and III. 
Answer: D
Modality City has had a severe traffic problem on its streets. As a result, it enacted an ordinance prohibiting all sales to the public of food or other items by persons selling directly from trucks, cars, or other vehicles located on city streets. The ordinance included an inseverable grandfather provision exempting from its prohibition vendors who, for 20 years or more, have continuously sold food or other items from such vehicles located on the streets of Modality City. Northwind Ice Cream, a retail vendor of ice cream products, qualifies for this exemption and is the only food vendor that does. Yuppee Yogurt is a business similar to Northwind, but Yuppee has been selling to the public directly from trucks located on the streets of Modality City only for the past ten years. Yuppee filed suit in an appropriate federal district court to enjoin enforcement of this ordinance on the ground that it denies Yuppee the equal protection of the laws. In this case, the court will probably rule that the ordinance is 
A. constitutional, because it is narrowly tailored to implement the city's compelling interest in reducing traffic congestion and, therefore, satisfies the strict scrutiny test applicable to such cases. 
B. constitutional, because its validity is governed by the rational basis test, and the courts consistently defer to economic choices embodied in such legislation if they are even plausibly justifiable. 
C. unconstitutional, because the nexus between the legitimate purpose of the ordinance and the conduct it prohibits is so tenuous and its provisions are so underinclusive that the ordinance fails to satisfy the substantial relationship test applicable to such cases. 
D. unconstitutional, because economic benefits or burdens imposed by legislatures on the basis of grandfather provisions have consistently been declared invalid by courts as per se violations of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Answer: B
Doe, the governor of State, signed a death warrant for Rend, a convicted murderer. Able and Baker are active opponents of the death penalty. At a demonstration protesting the execution of Rend, Able and Baker carried large signs that stated, "Governor Doe - Murderer." Television station XYZ broadcast news coverage of the demonstration, including pictures of the signs carried by Able and Baker. If Governor Doe asserts a defamation claim against XYZ, will Doe prevail? 
A. Yes, because the signs would cause persons to hold Doe in lower esteem. 
B. Yes, if Doe proves that XYZ showed the signs with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth that Doe had not committed homicide. 
C. No, unless Doe proves he suffered pecuniary loss resulting from harm to his reputation proximately caused by the defendants' signs. 
D. No, if the only reasonable interpretation of the signs was that the term "murderer" was intended as a characterization of one who would sign a death warrant. 
Answer: D
Doe, the governor of State, signed a death warrant for Rend, a convicted murderer. Able and Baker are active opponents of the death penalty. At a demonstration protesting the execution of Rend, Able and Baker carried large signs that stated, "Governor Doe - Murderer." Television station XYZ broadcast news coverage of the demonstration, including pictures of the signs carried by Able and Baker. If Doe asserts against XYZ a claim for damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, will Doe prevail? 
A. Yes, if the broadcast showing the signs caused Doe to suffer severe emotional distress. 
B. Yes, because the assertion on the signs was extreme and outrageous. 
C. No, unless Doe suffered physical harm as a consequence of the emotional distress caused by the signs. 
D. No, because XYZ did not publish a false statement of fact with "actual malice." 
Answer: D
On July 18, Snowco, a shovel manufacturer, received an order for the purchase of 500 snow shovels from Acme, Inc., a wholesaler. Acme had mailed the purchase order on July 15. The order required shipment of the shovels no earlier than September 15 and no later than October 15. Typed conspicuously across the front of the order form was the following: "Acme, Inc., reserves the right to cancel this order at any time before September 1." Snowco's mailed response, saying "We accept your order," was received by Acme on July 21. As of July 22, which of the following is an accurate statement as to whether a contract was formed? 
A. No contract was formed, because of Acme's reservation of the right to cancel. 
B. No contract was formed, because Acme's order was only a revocable offer. 
C. A contract was formed, but prior to September 1 it was terminable at the will of either party. 
D. A contract was formed, but prior to September 1 it was an option contract terminable only at the will of Acme. 
Answer: A
On July 18, Snowco, a shovel manufacturer, received an order for the purchase of 500 snow shovels from Acme, Inc., a wholesaler. Acme had mailed the purchase order on July 15. The order required shipment of the shovels no earlier than September 15 and no later than October 15. Typed conspicuously across the front of the order form was the following: "Acme, Inc., reserves the right to cancel this order at any time before September 1." Snowco's mailed response, saying "We accept your order," was received by Acme on July 21. For this question only, assume the following facts. Acme did not cancel the order, and Snowco shipped the shovels to Acme on September 15. When the shovels, conforming to the order in all respects, arrived on October 10, Acme refused to accept them. Which of the following is an accurate statement as of October 10 after Acme rejected the shovels? 
A. Acme's order for the shovels, even if initially illusory, became a binding promise to accept and pay for them. 
B. Acme's order was an offer that became an option after shipment by Snowco.
C. Acme's right to cancel was a condition subsequent, the failure of which resulted in an enforceable contract. 
D. In view of Acme's right to cancel its order prior to September 1, the shipment of the shovels on September 15 was only an offer by Snowco. 
Answer: A
At a country auction, Powell acquired an antique cabinet that he recognized as a "Morenci," an extremely rare and valuable collector's item. Unfortunately, Powell's cabinet had several coats of varnish and paint over the original finish. Its potential value could only be realized if these layers could be removed without damaging the original finish. Much of the value of Morenci furniture depends on the condition of a unique oil finish, the secret of which died with Morenci, its inventor. A professional restorer of antique furniture recommended that Powell use Restorall to remove the paint and varnish from the cabinet. Powell obtained and read a sales brochure published by Restorall, Inc., which contained the following statement: "This product will renew all antique furniture. Will not damage original oil finishes." Powell purchased some Restorall and used it on his cabinet, being very careful to follow the accompanying instructions exactly. Despite Powell's care, the original Morenci finish was irreparably damaged. When finally refinished, the cabinet was worth less than 20% of what it would have been worth if the Morenci finish had been preserved. If Powell sues Restorall, Inc., to recover the loss he has suffered as a result of the destruction of the Morenci finish, will Powell prevail? 
A. Yes, unless no other known removal technique would have preserved the Morenci finish. 
B. Yes, if the loss would not have occurred had the statement in the brochure been true. 
C. No, unless the product was defective when sold by Restorall, Inc. 
D. No, if the product was not dangerous to persons. 
Answer: B
Two adjacent, two-story, commercial buildings were owned by Simon. The first floors of both buildings were occupied by various retail establishments. The second floors were rented to various other tenants. Access to the second floor of each building was reached by a common stairway located entirely in Building 1. While the buildings were being used in this manner, Simon sold Building 1 to Edward by warranty deed which made no mention of any rights concerning the stairway. About two years later Simon sold Building 2 to Dennis. The stairway continued to be used by the occupants of both buildings. The stairway became unsafe as a consequence of regular wear and tear. Dennis entered upon Edward's building and began the work of repairing the stairway. Edward demanded that Dennis discontinue the repair work and vacate Edward's building. When Dennis refused, Edward brought an action to enjoin Dennis from continuing the work. Judgment should be for 
A. Edward, because Dennis has no rights in the stairway. 
B. Edward, because Dennis's rights in the stairway do not extend beyond the normal life of the existing structure. 
C. Dennis, because Dennis has an easement in the stairway and an implied right to keep the stairway in repair. 
D. Dennis, because Dennis has a right to take whatever action is necessary to protect himself from possible tort liability to persons using the stairway. 
Answer: C
Deeb was charged with stealing furs from a van. At trial, Wallace testified she saw Deeb take the furs. The jurisdiction in which Deeb is being tried does not allow in evidence lie detector results. On cross-examination by Deeb's attorney, Wallace was asked, "The light was too dim to identify Deeb, wasn't it?" She responded, "I'm sure enough that it was Deeb that I passed a lie detector test administered by the police." Deeb's attorney immediately objects and moves to strike. The trial court should 
A. grant the motion, because the question was leading. 
B. grant the motion, because the probative value of the unresponsive testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
C. deny the motion, because it is proper rehabilitation of an impeached witness. 
D. deny the motion, because Deeb's attorney "opened the door" by asking the question. 
Answer: B
Park sued Officer Dinet for false arrest. Dinet's defense was that, based on a description he heard over the police radio, he reasonably believed Park was an armed robber. Police radio dispatcher Brigg, reading from a note, had broadcast the description of an armed robber on which Dinet claims to have relied. The defendant offers the following items of evidence: I. Dinet's testimony relating the description he heard. II. Brigg's testimony relating the description he read over the radio. III. The note containing the description Brigg testifies he read over the radio. Which of the following are admissible on the issue of what description Dinet heard? 
A. I and II only.
B. I and III only.
C. II and III only.
D. I, II, and III. 
Answer: D
Aris was the owner in fee simple of adjoining lots known as Lot 1 and Lot 2. He built a house in which he took up residence on Lot 1. Thereafter, he built a house on Lot 2, which he sold, house and lot, to Baker. Consistent with the contract of sale and purchase, the deed conveying Lot 2 from Aris to Baker contained the following clause: In the event Baker, his heirs or assigns, decide to sell the property hereby conveyed and obtain a purchaser ready, willing, and able to purchase Lot 2 and the improvements thereon on terms and conditions acceptable to Baker, said Lot 2 and improvements shall be offered to Aris, his heirs or assigns, on the same terms and conditions. Aris, his heirs or assigns, as the case may be, shall have ten days from said offer to accept said offer and thereby to exercise said option. Three years after delivery and recording of the deed and payment of the purchase price, Baker became ill and moved to a climate more compatible with his health. Baker's daughter orally offered to purchase the premises from Baker at its then fair market value. Baker declined his daughter's offer but instead deeded Lot 2 to his daughter as a gift. Immediately thereafter, Baker's daughter sold Lot 2 to Charles at the then fair market value of Lot 2. The sale was completed by the delivery of deed and payment of the purchase price. At no time did Baker or his daughter offer to sell Lot 2 to Aris. Aris learned of the conveyance to Baker's daughter and the sale by Baker's daughter to Charles one week after the conveyance of Lot 2 from Baker's daughter to Charles. Aris promptly brought an appropriate action against Charles to enforce rights created in him by the deed of Aris to Baker. Aris tendered the amount paid by Charles into the court for whatever disposition the court deemed proper. The common-law Rule Against Perpetuities is unmodified by statute. Which of the following will determine whether Aris will prevail? I. The parol evidence rule. II. The Statute of Frauds. III. The type of recording statute of the jurisdiction in question. IV. The Rule Against Perpetuities. 
A. I only.
B. IV only.
C. I and IV only.
D. II and III only.
Answer: B
After waiting until all the customers had left, Max entered a small grocery store just before closing time. He went up to the lone clerk in the store and said, "Hand over all the money in the cash register or you will get hurt." The clerk fainted and struck his head on the edge of the counter. As Max went behind the counter to open the cash register, two customers entered the store. Max ran out before he was able to open the register drawer.On this evidence Max could be convicted of 
A. robbery.
B. assault and robbery.
C. attempted robbery.
D. assault and attempted robbery.
Answer: C