ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
The police had, over time, accumulated reliable information that Jason operated a large cocainedistribution network, that he and his accomplices often resorted to violence, and that they kept a small arsenal of weapons in his home. One day, the police received reliable information that a large brown suitcase with leather straps containing a supply of cocaine had been delivered to Jason's home and that it would be moved to a distribution point the next morning. The police obtained a valid search warrant to search for and seize the brown suitcase and the cocaine and went to Jason's house. The police knocked on Jason's door and called out, "Police. Open up. We have a search warrant." After a few seconds with no response, the police forced the door open and entered. Hearing noises in the basement, the police ran down there and found Jason with a large brown suitcase with leather straps. They seized the suitcase and put handcuffs on Jason. A search of his person revealed a switchblade knife and a .45-caliber pistol. Jason cursed the police and said, "You never would have caught me with the stuff if it hadn't been for that lousy snitch Harvey!" The police then fanned out through the house, looking in every room and closet. They found no one else, but one officer found an Uzi automatic weapon in a box on a closet shelf in Jason's bedroom. In addition to charges relating to the cocaine in the suitcase, Jason is charged with unlawful possession of weapons. Jason moves pretrial to suppress the use as evidence of the weapons seized by the police and of the statement he made. As to the Uzi automatic weapon, Jason's motion to suppress should be 
A. granted, because the search exceeded the scope needed to find out if other persons were present. 
B. granted, because once the object of the warrant the brown suitcase had been found and seized, no further search of the house is permitted. 
C. denied, because the police were lawfully in the bedroom and the weapon was immediately identifiable as being subject to seizure. 
D. denied, because the police were lawfully in the house and had probable cause to believe that weapons were in the house.
Answer: A
Plaintiff is suing Doctor for medical malpractice occasioned by allegedly prescribing an incorrect medication, causing Plaintiff to undergo substantial hospitalization. When Doctor learned of the medication problem, she immediately offered to pay Plaintiff's hospital expenses. At trial, Plaintiff offers evidence of Doctor's offer to pay the costs of his hospitalization. The evidence of Doctor's offer is 
A. admissible as a nonhearsay statement of a party.
B. admissible, although hearsay, as a statement against interest. 
C. inadmissible, because it is an offer to pay medical expenses. 
D. inadmissible, because it is an offer to compromise. 
Answer: C
Sam and two of his friends were members of a teenage street gang. While they were returning from a dance late one evening, their car collided with a car driven by an elderly woman. After an argument, Sam attacked the elderly woman with his fists and beat her to death. Sam's two friends watched, and when they saw the woman fall to the ground they urged Sam to flee. Sam was eventually apprehended and tried for manslaughter, but the jury could not decide on a verdict. If Sam's companions are subsequently tried as accomplices to manslaughter, they should be 
A. acquitted, because Sam was not convicted of the offense. 
B. acquitted, because they did not assist or encourage Sam to commit the crime. 
C. convicted, because they urged him to flee. 
D. convicted, because they made no effort to intervene. 
Answer: B
Employer retained Doctor to evaluate medical records of prospective employees. Doctor informed Employer that Applicant, a prospective employee, suffered from AIDS. Employer informed Applicant of this and declined to hire her. Applicant was shocked by this news and suffered a heart attack as a result. Subsequent tests revealed that Applicant in fact did not have AIDS. Doctor had negligently confused Applicant's file with that of another prospective employee. If Applicant sued Doctor for damages, on which of the following causes of action would Applicant recover? I. Invasion of privacy. II. Negligent misrepresentation. III. Negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
A. III only.
B. I and II only.
C. II and III only.
D. I, II, and III.
Answer: A
Gourmet, a famous chef, entered into a written agreement with his friend Deligor, a well-known interior decorator respected for his unique designs, in which Deligor agreed, for a fixed fee, to design the interior of Gourmet's new restaurant, and, upon Gourmet's approval of the design plan, to decorate and furnish the restaurant accordingly. The agreement was silent as to assignment or delegation by either party. Before beginning the work, Deligor sold his decorating business to Newman under an agreement in which Deligor assigned to Newman, and Newman agreed to complete, the GourmetDeligor contract. Newman, also an experienced decorator of excellent repute, advised Gourmet of the assignment, and supplied him with information confirming both Newman's financial responsibility and past commercial success. Is Gourmet obligated to permit Newman to perform the Gourmet-Deligor agreement? 
A. Yes, because the agreement contained no prohibition against assignment or delegation. 
B. Yes, because Gourmet received adequate assurances of Newman's ability to complete the job. 
C. No, because Deligor's duties were of a personal nature, involving his reputation, taste, and skill. 
D. No, because Deligor's purported delegation to Newman of his obligations to Gourmet effected a novation. 
Answer: C
Gourmet, a famous chef, entered into a written agreement with his friend Deligor, a well-known interior decorator respected for his unique designs, in which Deligor agreed, for a fixed fee, to design the interior of Gourmet's new restaurant, and, upon Gourmet's approval of the design plan, to decorate and furnish the restaurant accordingly. The agreement was silent as to assignment or delegation by either party. Before beginning the work, Deligor sold his decorating business to Newman under an agreement in which Deligor assigned to Newman, and Newman agreed to complete, the GourmetDeligor contract. Newman, also an experienced decorator of excellent repute, advised Gourmet of the assignment, and supplied him with information confirming both Newman's financial responsibility and past commercial success. If Gourmet allows Newman to perform and approves his design plan, but Newman fails without legal excuse to complete the decorating as agreed, against whom does Gourmet have an enforceable claim for breach of contract? 
A. Deligor only, because Deligor's agreement with Newman did not discharge his duty to Gourmet, and Newman made no express promise to Gourmet. 
B. Newman only, because Deligor's duty to Gourmet was discharged when Deligor obtained a skilled decorator (Newman) to perform the Gourmet-Deligor contract. 
C. Newman only, because Gourmet was an intended beneficiary of the Deligor- Newman agreement, and Deligor's duty to Gourmet was discharged when Gourmet permitted Newman to do the work and approved Newman's design. 
D. Either Deligor, because his agreement with Newman did not discharge his duty to Gourmet; or Newman, because Gourmet was an intended beneficiary of the Deligor-Newman agreement. 
Answer: D
Plaintiff sued Defendant Auto Manufacturing for his wife's death, claiming that a defective steering mechanism on the family car caused it to veer off the road and hit a tree when his wife was driving. Defendant claims that the steering mechanism was damaged in the collision and offers testimony that the deceased wife was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Testimony concerning the wife's intoxication is 
A. admissible to provide an alternate explanation of the accident's cause.
B. admissible as proper evidence of the wife's character.
C. inadmissible, because it is improper to prove character evidence by specific conduct. 
D. inadmissible, because it is substantially more prejudicial than probative.
Answer: A
Otis owned in fee simple Lots 1 and 2 in an urban subdivision. The lots were vacant and unproductive. They were held as a speculation that their value would increase. Otis died and, by his duly probated will, devised the residue of his estate (of which Lots 1 and 2 were part) to Lena for life with remainder in fee simple to Rose. Otis's executor distributed the estate under appropriate court order, and notified Lena that future real estate taxes on Lots 1 and 2 were Lena's responsibility to pay. Except for the statutes relating to probate and those relating to real estate taxes, there is no applicable statute. Lena failed to pay the real estate taxes due for Lots 1 and 2. To prevent a tax sale of the fee simple, Rose paid the taxes and demanded that Lena reimburse her for same. When Lena refused, Rose brought an appropriate action against Lena to recover the amount paid. In such action, Rose should recover 
A. the amount paid, because a life tenant has the duty to pay current charges. 
B. the present value of the interest that the amount paid would earn during Lena's lifetime.
C. nothing, because Lena's sole possession gave the right to decide whether or not taxes should be paid. 
D. nothing, because Lena never received any income from the lots. 
Answer: D
Plaintiff Construction Co. sued Defendant Development Co. for money owed on a costplus contract that required notice of proposed expenditures beyond original estimates. Defendant asserted that it never received the required notice. At trial Plaintiff calls its general manager, Witness, to testify that it is Plaintiff's routine practice to send cost overrun notices as required by the contract. Witness also offers a photocopy of the cost overrun notice letter to Defendant on which Plaintiff is relying, and which he has taken from Plaintiff's regular business files. On the issue of giving notice, the letter copy is 
A. admissible, though hearsay, under the business record exception. 
B. admissible, because of the routine practices of the company. 
C. inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. 
D. inadmissible, because it is not the best evidence of the notice.
Answer: B
Plaintiff sued Defendant under an age discrimination statute, alleging that Defendant refused to hire Plaintiff because she was over age 65. Defendant's defense was that he refused to employ Plaintiff because he reasonably believed that she would be unable to perform the job. Defendant seeks to testify that Employer, Plaintiff's former employer, advised him not to hire Plaintiff because she was unable to perform productively for more than four hours a day. The testimony of Defendant is 
A. inadmissible, because Defendant's opinion of Plaintiff's abilities is not based on personal knowledge. 
B. inadmissible, because Employer's statement is hearsay not within any exception. 
C. admissible as evidence that Plaintiff would be unable to work longer than four hours per day.
D. admissible as evidence of Defendant's reason for refusing to hire Plaintiff.
Answer: D
A federal statute provides that the cities in which certain specified airports are located may regulate the rates and services of all limousines that serve those airports, without regard to the origin or destination of the passengers who use the limousines. The cities of Redville and Greenville are located adjacent to each other in different states. The airport serving both of them is located in Redville and is one of those airports specified in the federal statute. The Redville City Council has adopted a rule that requires any limousines serving the airport to charge only the rates authorized by the Redville City Council. Airline Limousine Service has a lucrative business transporting passengers between Greenville and the airport in Redville, at much lower rates than those required by the Redville City Council. It transports passengers in interstate traffic only; it does not provide local service within Redville. The new rule adopted by the Redville City Council will require Airline Limousine Service to charge the same rates as limousines operating only in Redville. Must Airline Limousine Service comply with the new rule of the Redville City Council? 
A. Yes, because the airport is located in Redville and, therefore, its city council has exclusive regulatory authority over all transportation to and from the airport. 
B. Yes, because Congress has authorized this form of regulation by Redville and, therefore, removed any constitutional impediments to it that may have otherwise existed. 
C. No, because the rule would arbitrarily destroy a lucrative existing business and, therefore, would amount to a taking without just compensation. 
D. No, because Airline Limousine Service is engaged in interstate commerce and this rule is an undue burden on that commerce.
Answer: B
While approaching an intersection with the red light against him, Motorist suffered a heart attack that rendered him unconscious. Motorist's car struck Child, who was crossing the street with the green light in her favor. Under the state motor vehicle code, it is an offense to drive through a red traffic light. Child sued Motorist to recover for her injuries. At trial it was stipulated that (1) immediately prior to suffering the heart attack, Motorist had been driving within the speed limit, had seen the red light, and had begun to slow his car; (2) Motorist had no history of heart disease and no warning of this attack; (3) while Motorist was unconscious, his car ran the red light. On cross motions for directed verdicts on the issue of liability at the conclusion of the proofs, the court should 
A. grant Child's motion, because Motorist ran a red light in violation of the motor vehicle code. 
B. grant Child's motion, because, in the circumstances, reasonable persons would infer that Motorist was negligent. 
C. grant Motorist's motion, because he had no history of heart disease or warning of the heart attack. 
D. deny both motions and submit the case to the jury, to determine whether, in the circumstances, Motorist's conduct was that of a reasonably prudent person. 
Answer: C
In a jurisdiction without a Dead Man's Statute, Parker's estate sued Davidson claiming that Davidson had borrowed from Parker $10,000, which had not been repaid as of Parker's death. Parker was run over by a truck. At the accident scene, while dying from massive injuries, Parker told Officer Smith to "make sure my estate collects the $10,000 I loaned to Davidson." Smith's testimony about Parker's statement is 
A. inadmissible, because it is more unfairly prejudicial than probative. 
B. inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. 
C. admissible as an excited utterance.
D. admissible as a statement under belief of impending death.
Answer: B
Landholder was land-rich by inheritance but money-poor, having suffered severe losses on bad investments, but still owned several thousand acres of unencumbered timberland. He had a large family, and his normal, fixed personal expenses were high. Pressed for cash, he advertised a proposed sale of standing timber on a choice 2,000-acre tract. The only response was an offer by Logger, the owner of a large, integrated construction enterprise, after inspection of the advertised tract. Assume the following facts. Logger offered to buy, sever, and remove the standing timber from the advertised tract at a cash price 70% lower than the regionally prevailing price for comparable timber rights. Landholder, by then in desperate financial straits and knowing little about timber values, signed and delivered to Logger a letter accepting the offer. If, before Logger commences performance, Landholder's investment fortunes suddenly improve and he wishes to get out of the timber deal with Logger, which of the following legal concepts affords his best prospect of effective cancellation? 
A. Bad faith.
B. Equitable estoppel.
C. Unconscionability.
D. Duress.
Answer: C
Landholder was land-rich by inheritance but money-poor, having suffered severe losses on bad investments, but still owned several thousand acres of unencumbered timberland. He had a large family, and his normal, fixed personal expenses were high. Pressed for cash, he advertised a proposed sale of standing timber on a choice 2,000-acre tract. The only response was an offer by Logger, the owner of a large, integrated construction enterprise, after inspection of the advertised tract. Assume the following facts. Logger offered a fair price for the timber rights in question, and Landholder accepted the offer. The 2,000-acre tract was an abundant wild-game habitat and had been used for many years, with Landholder's permission, by area hunters. Logger's performance of the timber contract would destroy this habitat. Without legal excuse and over Landholder's strong objection, Logger repudiated the contract before commencing performance. Landholder could not afford to hire a lawyer and take legal action, and made no attempt to assign any cause of action he might have had against Logger. If Logger is sued for breach of the contract by Landholder's next-door neighbor, whose view of a nearby lake is obscured by the standing timber, the neighbor will probably 
A. lose, as only an incidental beneficiary, if any, of the Logger-Landholder contract. 
B. lose, as a maintainer of nuisance litigation. 
C. prevail, as a third-party intended beneficiary of the Logger-Landholder contract. 
D. prevail, as a surrogate for Landholder in view of his inability to enforce the contract.
Answer: A
A federal statute with inseverable provisions established a new five-member National Prosperity Board with broad regulatory powers over the operation of the securities, banking, and commodities industries, including the power to issue rules with the force of law. The statute provides for three of the board members to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. They serve seven-year terms and are removable only for good cause. The other two members of the board were designated in the statute to be the respective general counsel of the Senate and House of Representatives Committees on Government Operations. The statute stipulated that they were to serve on the board for as long as they continued in those positions. Following all required administrative procedures, the board issued an elaborate set of rules regulating the operations of all banks, securities dealers, and commodities brokers. The Green Light Securities Company, which was subject to the board's rules, sought a declaratory judgment that the rules were invalid because the statute establishing the board was unconstitutional. In this case, the court should rule that the statute establishing the National Prosperity Board is 
A. unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards having broad powers that are quasi-legislative in nature, such as rulemaking, must be appointed by Congress. 
B. unconstitutional, because all members of federal boards exercising executive powers must be appointed by the President or in a manner otherwise consistent with the appointments clause of Article II. 
C. constitutional, because the necessary and proper clause authorizes Congress to determine the means by which members are appointed to boards created by Congress under its power to regulate commerce among the states. 
D. constitutional, because there is a substantial nexus between the power of Congress to legislate for the general welfare and the means specified by Congress in this statute for the appointment of board members.
Answer: B
By a writing, Oner leased his home, Blackacre, to Tenn for a term of three years, ending December 31 of last year, at the rent of $1,000 per month. The lease provided that Tenn could sublet and assign. Tenn lived in Blackacre for one year and paid the rent promptly. After one year, Tenn leased Blackacre to Agrit for one year at a rent of $1,000 per month. Agrit took possession of Blackacre and lived there for six months but, because of her unemployment, paid no rent. After six months, on June 30 Agrit abandoned Blackacre, which remained vacant for the balance of that year. Tenn again took possession of Blackacre at the beginning of the third and final year of the term but paid Oner no rent. At the end of the lease term, Oner brought an appropriate action against both Tenn and Agrit to recover $24,000, the unpaid rent. In such action Oner is entitled to a judgment 
A. against Tenn individually for $24,000, and no judgment against Agrit. 
B. against Tenn individually for $18,000, and against Agrit individually for $6,000. 
C. against Tenn for $12,000, and against Tenn and Agrit jointly and severally for $12,000. 
D. against Tenn individually for $18,000, and against Tenn and Agrit jointly and severally for $6,000. 
Answer: A
In a trial to a jury, Owner proved that Power Company's negligent maintenance of a transformer caused a fire that destroyed his restaurant. The jury returned a verdict for Owner in the amount of $450,000 for property loss and $500,000 for emotional distress. The trial judge entered judgment in those amounts. Power Company appealed that part of the judgment awarding $500,000 for emotional distress. On appeal, the judgment should be 
A. affirmed, because Power Company negligently caused Owner's emotional distress. 
B. affirmed, because harm arising from emotional distress is as real as harm caused by physical impact. 
C. reversed, because the law does not recognize a claim for emotional distress incident to negligently caused property loss. 
D. reversed, unless the jury found that Owner suffered physical harm as a consequence of the emotional distress caused by his property loss.
Answer: C
Bill owned in fee simple Lot 1 in a properly approved subdivision, designed and zoned for industrial use. Gail owned the adjoining Lot 2 in the same subdivision. The plat of the subdivision was recorded as authorized by statute. Twelve years ago, Bill erected an industrial building wholly situated on Lot 1 but with one wall along the boundary common with Lot 2. The construction was done as authorized by a building permit, validly obtained under applicable statutes, ordinances, and regulations. Further, the construction was regularly inspected and passed as being in compliance with all building code requirements. Lot 2 remained vacant until six months ago, when Gail began excavation pursuant to a building permit authorizing the erection of an industrial building situated on Lot 2 but with one wall along the boundary common with Lot 1. The excavation caused subsidence of a portion of Lot 1 that resulted in injury to Bill's building. The excavation was not done negligently or with any malicious intent to injure. In the jurisdiction, the time to acquire title by adverse possession or rights by prescription is 10 years. Bill brought an appropriate action against Gail to recover damages resulting from the injuries to the building on Lot 1. In such lawsuit, judgment should be for 
A. Bill, if, but only if, the subsidence would have occurred without the weight of the building on Lot 1. 
B. Bill, because a right for support, appurtenant to Lot 1, had been acquired by adverse possession or prescription. 
C. Gail, because Lots 1 and 2 are urban land, as distinguished from rural land and, therefore, under the circumstances Bill had the duty to protect any improvements on Lot 1. 
D. Gail, because the construction and the use to be made of the building were both authorized by the applicable law. 
Answer: A