ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
The School Board of the city of Rulb issued a rule authorizing public school principals to punish, after a hearing, students who engage in violations of the board's student behavior code. According to the rule, violators of the behavior code may be punished in a variety of ways including being required to sit in designated school confinement rooms during all school hours, with their hands clasped in front of them, for a period of up to 15 school days. Teddy, a fifth grade student in Rulb Elementary School, was charged with placing chewed bubble gum on a classmate's chair, a violation of the student behavior code. He had never violated the code before and was otherwise an attentive and well-behaved student. After a hearing on the charges, Teddy's principal determined that Teddy had violated the behavior code in the manner charged, and ordered Teddy to spend the next 15 school days in the school confinement room with his hands clasped in front of him. Teddy's parents file suit in federal court challenging, solely on constitutional grounds, the principal's action in ordering Teddy to spend the next 15 school days in the school confinement room with his hands clasped in front of him. Which of the following arguments would be most helpful to Teddy's parents in this suit? 
A. Because the school board rule limits the freedom of movement of students and subjects them to bodily restraint, it denies them a privilege and immunity of citizenship guaranteed them by Article IV, Section 2. 
B. Because the school board rule is substantially overbroad in relation to any legitimate purpose, it constitutes a facial violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
C. Because application of the school board rule in this case denies the student freedom of movement and subjects him to bodily restraint in a manner grossly disproportionate to his offense and circumstances, it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
D. Because the school board rule is enforced initially by administrative rather than judicial proceedings, it constitutes a prohibited bill of attainder. 
Answer: C
Davidson and Smythe were charged with burglary of a warehouse. They were tried separately. At Davidson's trial, Smythe testified that he saw Davidson commit the burglary. While Smythe is still subject to recall as a witness, Davidson calls Smythe's cellmate, Walton, to testify that Smythe said, "I broke into the warehouse alone because Davidson was too drunk to help." This evidence of Smythe's statement is 
A. admissible as a declaration against penal interest.
B. admissible as a prior inconsistent statement.
C. inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. 
D. inadmissible, because the statement is not clearly corroborated. 
Answer: B
On March 1, Hotz Apartments, Inc., received from Koolair, Inc., a letter offering to sell Hotz 1,200 window air conditioners suitable for the apartments in Hotz's buildings. The Koolair offer stated that it would remain open until March 20, but that Hotz's acceptance must be received on or before that date. On March 16, Hotz posted a letter of acceptance. On March 17, Koolair telegraphed Hotz to advise that it was revoking the offer. The telegram reached Hotz on March 17, but Hotz's letter did not arrive at Koolair's address until March 21. As of March 22, which of the following is a correct statement? 
A. The telegram revoking the offer was effective upon receipt.
B. The offer was revocable at any time for lack of consideration.
C. The mail was the only authorized means of revocation.
D. Under the terms of Koolair's offer, Hotz's attempted acceptance was ineffective. 
Answer: D
A statute of the state of Illitron declares that after five years of continuous service in their positions all state employees, including faculty members at the state university, are entitled to retain their positions during "good behavior." The statute also contains a number of procedural provisions. Any state employee who is dismissed after that five-year period must be given reasons for the dismissal before it takes effect. In addition, such an employee must, upon request, be granted a postdismissal hearing before an administrative board to seek reinstatement and back pay. The statute precludes any other hearing or opportunity to respond to the charges. That post-dismissal hearing must occur within six months after the dismissal takes effect. The burden of proof at such a hearing is on the state, and the board may uphold the dismissal only if it is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. An employee who is dissatisfied with a decision of the board after a hearing may appeal its decision to the state courts. The provisions of this statute are inseverable. A teacher who had been employed continuously for seven years as a faculty member at the state university was dismissed. A week before the dismissal took effect, she was informed that she was being dismissed because of a charge that she accepted a bribe from a student in return for raising the student's final grade in her course. At that time she requested an immediate hearing to contest the propriety of her dismissal. Three months after her dismissal, she was granted a hearing before the state administrative board. The board upheld her dismissal, finding that the charge against her was supported by a preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing. The faculty member did not appeal the decision of the state administrative board to the Illitron state courts. Instead, she sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court to the effect that the state statute prescribing the procedures for her dismissal is unconstitutional. In this case, the federal district court should 
A. dismiss the suit, because a claim that a state statute is unconstitutional is not ripe for adjudication by a federal court until all judicial remedies in state courts provided for by state law have been exhausted. 
B. hold the statute unconstitutional, because the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt the facts constituting good cause for termination of a state employee. 
C. hold the statute unconstitutional, because a state may not ordinarily deprive an employee of a property interest in a job without giving the employee an opportunity for some kind of a predismissal hearing to respond to the charges against that employee. 
D. hold the statute constitutional, because the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles state employees who have a right to their jobs during good behavior only to a statement of reasons for their dismissal and an opportunity for a post-dismissal hearing. 
Answer: C
Dorfman's dog ran into the street in front of Dorfman's home and began chasing cars. Peterson, who was driving a car on the street, swerved to avoid hitting the dog, struck a telephone pole, and was injured. If Peterson asserts a claim against Dorfman, will Peterson prevail? 
A. Yes, because Dorfman's dog was a cause in fact of Peterson's injury. 
B. Yes, if Dorfman knew his dog had a propensity to chase cars and did not restrain it. 
C. No, because a dog is a domestic animal. 
D. No, unless a statute or ordinance made it unlawful for the owner to allow a dog to be unleashed on a public street. 
Answer: B
Dower, an inexperienced driver, borrowed a car from Puder, a casual acquaintance, for the express purpose of driving it several blocks to the local drug store. Instead, Dower drove the car, which then was worth $12,000, 100 miles to Other City. While Dower was driving in Other City the next day, the car was hit by a negligently driven truck and sustained damage that will cost $3,000 to repair. If repaired, the car will be fully restored to its former condition. If Puder asserts a claim against Dower based on conversion, Puder should recover a judgment for 
A. $12,000.00 
B. $3,000.00 
C. $3,000 plus damages for the loss of the use of the car during its repair. 
D. nothing, unless Dower was negligent and his negligence was a substantial cause of the collision. 
Answer: A
Miller's, a department store, had experienced a growing incidence of shoplifting. At the store's request, the police concealed Best, a woman who was a detective, at a vantage point above the women's apparel fitting rooms where she could see into these rooms, where customers tried on clothes. Detective Best saw Davis enter a fitting room, stuff a dress into her pocketbook, leave the fitting room, and start for the street door. By prearranged signal, Best notified another police officer near the door, who detained Davis as Davis started to go out into the street. Davis was placed under arrest, and the dress was retrieved from her purse. Davis is charged with shoplifting. Her motion to prevent the introduction of the dress into evidence will be 
A. granted, because the police should have secured a search warrant to search her bag. 
B. granted, because a customer has a reasonable expectation of privacy while using a department store fitting room. 
C. denied, because the search and seizure were made incident to a valid arrest based on probable cause. 
D. denied, because Detective Best could see into the room and thus Davis's activities were legitimately in plain view. 
Answer: B
Deland operates a bank courier service that uses armored trucks to transport money and securities. One of Deland's armored trucks was parked illegally, too close to a street intersection. Pilcher, driving his car at an excessive speed, skidded into the armored truck while trying to make a turn. The truck was not damaged, but Pilcher was injured. Pilcher has brought an action against Deland to recover damages for his loss resulting from the accident. The jurisdiction follows a pure comparative negligence rule. In this action, Pilcher should recover 
A. nothing, because Deland was not an active or efficient cause of Pilcher's loss. 
B. nothing, if Deland was less negligent than Pilcher. 
C. his entire loss, reduced by a percentage that reflects the negligence attributed to Pilcher. 
D. his entire loss, because Deland's truck suffered no damage. 
Answer: C
Roberts, a professional motorcycle rider, put on a performance in a privately owned stadium during which he leaped his motorcycle over 21 automobiles. Spectators were charged $5 each to view the jump and were prohibited from using cameras. However, the local television station filmed the whole event from within the stadium without the knowledge or consent of Roberts and showed the film in its entirety on the evening newscast that day. Roberts thereafter brought suit to recover damages from the station for the admittedly unauthorized filming and broadcasting of the act. The television station raised only constitutional defenses. The court should 
A. hold against Roberts, because the First and Fourteenth Amendments authorize press coverage of newsworthy entertainment events. 
B. hold against Roberts, because under the First and Fourteenth Amendments news broadcasts are absolutely privileged. 
C. find the station liable, because its action deprives Roberts of his property without due process. 
D. find the station liable, because the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not deprive an entertainer of the commercial value of his or her performances. 
Answer: D
Stirrup, a rancher, and Equinox, a fancier of horses, signed the following writing: "For $5,000, Stirrup will sell to Equinox a gray horse that Equinox may choose from among the grays on Stirrup's ranch." Equinox refused to accept delivery of a gray horse timely tendered by Stirrup or to choose among those remaining, on the ground that during their negotiations Stirrup had orally agreed to include a saddle, worth $100, and also to give Equinox the option to choose a gray or a brown horse. Equinox insisted on one of Stirrup's brown horses, but Stirrup refused to part with any of his browns or with the saddle as demanded by Equinox. If Equinox sues Stirrup for damages and seeks to introduce evidence of the alleged oral agreement, the court probably will 
A. admit the evidence as to both the saddle and the option to choose a brown horse.
B. admit the evidence as to the saddle but not the option to choose a brown horse.
C. admit the evidence as to the option to choose a brown horse but not the promise to include the saddle.
D. not admit any of the evidence.
Answer: B
Parker sues Dix for breach of a promise made in a letter allegedly written by Dix to Parker. Dix denies writing the letter. Which of the following would NOT be a sufficient basis for admitting the letter into evidence?
A. Testimony by Parker that she is familiar with Dix's signature and recognizes it on the letter.
B. Comparison by the trier of fact of the letter with an admitted signature of Dix.
C. Opinion testimony of a nonexpert witness based upon familiarity acquired in order to authenticate the signature.
D. Evidence that the letter was written in response to one written by Parker to Dix.
Answer: C
Green contracted in a signed writing to sell Greenacre, a 500-acre tract of farmland, to Farmer. The contract provided for exchange of the deed and purchase price of $500,000 in cash on January 15. Possession was to be given to Farmer on the same date. On January 15, Green notified Farmer that because the tenant on Greenacre wrongfully refused to quit the premises until January 30, Green would be unable to deliver possession of Greenacre until then, but he assured Farmer that he would tender the deed and possession on that date. When Green tendered the deed and possession on January 30, Farmer refused to accept either, and refused to pay the $500,000. Throughout the month of January, the market value of Greenacre was $510,000, and its fair monthly rental value was $5,000. Will Green probably succeed in an action against Farmer for specific performance? 
A. Yes, because the court will excuse the delay in tender on the ground that there was a temporary impossibility caused by the tenant's holding over. 
B. Yes, because time is ordinarily not of the essence in a land-sale contract. 
C. No, because Green breached by failing to tender the deed and possession on January 15. 
D. No, because Green's remedy at law for monetary relief is adequate. 
Answer: B
Green contracted in a signed writing to sell Greenacre, a 500-acre tract of farmland, to Farmer. The contract provided for exchange of the deed and purchase price of $500,000 in cash on January 15. Possession was to be given to Farmer on the same date. On January 15, Green notified Farmer that because the tenant on Greenacre wrongfully refused to quit the premises until January 30, Green would be unable to deliver possession of Greenacre until then, but he assured Farmer that he would tender the deed and possession on that date. When Green tendered the deed and possession on January 30, Farmer refused to accept either, and refused to pay the $500,000. Throughout the month of January, the market value of Greenacre was $510,000, and its fair monthly rental value was $5,000. For this question only, make the following assumptions. On January 30, Farmer accepted a conveyance and possession of Greenacre and paid the $500,000 purchase price, but notified Green that he was reserving any rights he might have to damages caused by Green's breach. Farmer intended to use the land for raising cattle and had entered into a contract for the purchase of 500 head of cattle to be delivered to Greenacre on January 15. Because he did not have possession of Greenacre on that date, he had to rent another pasture at a cost of $2,000 to graze the cattle for 15 days. Green had no reason to know that Farmer intended to use Greenacre for raising cattle or that he was purchasing cattle to be grazed on Greenacre. In an action by Farmer against Green for damages, Farmer is entitled to recover 
A. nothing, because by paying the purchase price on January 30, he waived whatever cause of action he may have had. 
B. nominal damages only, because the market value of the land exceeded the contract price. 
C. $2,500 only (the fair rental value of Greenacre for 15 days). 
D. $2,500 (the fair rental value of Greenacre for 15 days), plus $2,000 (the cost of grazing the cattle elsewhere for 15 days). 
Answer: C
Able, owner of Blackacre and Whiteacre, two adjoining parcels, conveyed Whiteacre to Baker and covenanted in the deed to Baker that when he, Able, sold Blackacre he would impose restrictive covenants to prohibit uses that would compete with the filling station that Baker intended to construct and operate on Whiteacre. The deed was not recorded. Baker constructed and operated a filling station on Whiteacre and then conveyed Whiteacre to Dodd, who continued the filling station use. The deed did not refer to the restrictive covenant and was promptly and properly recorded. Able then conveyed Blackacre to Egan, who knew about Able's covenant with Baker to impose a covenant prohibiting the filling station use but nonetheless completed the transaction when he noted that no such covenant was contained in Able's deed to him. Egan began to construct a filling station on Blackacre. Dodd brought an appropriate action to enjoin Egan from using Blackacre for filling station purposes. If Dodd prevails, it will be because 
A. Egan had actual knowledge of the covenant to impose restrictions.
B. Egan is bound by the covenant because of the doctrine of negative reciprocal covenants.
C. business-related restrictive covenants are favored in the law.
D. Egan has constructive notice of the possibility of the covenant resulting from the circumstances.
Answer: A
While walking on a public sidewalk, Anson was struck by a piece of lumber that fell from the roof of Bruce's house. Bruce had hired Chase to make repairs to his roof, and the lumber fell through negligence on Chase's part. If Anson brings an action against Bruce to recover damages for the injury caused to him by Chase's negligence, will Anson prevail? 
A. Yes, under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. 
B. Yes, if Chase's act was a breach of a nondelegable duty owed by Bruce to Anson. 
C. No, if Chase was an independent contractor rather than Bruce's servant. 
D. No, if Bruce exercised reasonable care in hiring Chase to do the repair work. 
Answer: B
Owen contracted to sell Vacantacre to Perry. The written contract required Owen to provide evidence of marketable title of record, specified a closing date, stated that "time is of the essence," and provided that at closing, Owen would convey by warranty deed. Perry paid Owen $2,000 earnest money toward the $40,000 purchase price. The title evidence showed that an undivided one-eighth interest in Vacantacre was owned by Alice. Perry immediately objected to title and said he would not close on Owen's title. Owen responded, accurately, that Alice was his daughter who would be trekking in Nepal until two weeks after the specified closing date. He said that she would gladly deed her interest upon her return, and that meanwhile his deed warranting title to all of Vacantacre would fully protect Perry. Owen duly tendered his deed but Perry refused to close. Perry brought an appropriate action to recover the $2,000 earnest money promptly after the specified closing date. Owen counterclaimed for specific performance, tendering a deed from himself and Alice, who had by then returned. The court will hold for 
A. Owen, because Alice's deed completing the transfer was given within a reasonable time. 
B. Owen, because his warranty deed would have given Perry adequate interim protection. 
C. Perry, because Owen's title was not marketable and time was of the essence. 
D. Perry, because under the circumstances the earnest money amount was excessive.
Answer: C
A statute provides: A person commits the crime of rape if he has sexual intercourse with a female, not his wife, without her consent. Dunbar is charged with the rape of Sally. At trial, Sally testifies to facts sufficient for a jury to find that Dunbar had sexual intercourse with her, that she did not consent, and that the two were not married. Dunbar testifies in his own defense that he believed that Sally had consented to sexual intercourse and that she was his common-law wife. At the conclusion of the case, the court instructed the jury that in order to find Dunbar guilty of rape, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he had sexual intercourse with Sally without her consent. The court also instructed the jury that it should find the defendant not guilty if it found either that Sally was Dunbar's wife or that Dunbar reasonably believed that Sally had consented to the sexual intercourse, but that the burden of persuasion as to these issues was on the defendant. The jury found Dunbar guilty, and Dunbar appealed, contending that the court's instructions on the issues of whether Sally was his wife and whether he reasonably believed she had consented violated his constitutional rights. Dunbar's constitutional rights were 
A. violated by the instructions as to both issues.
B. violated by the instruction as to whether Sally was his wife, but not violated by the instruction on belief as to consent. 
C. violated by the instruction on belief as to consent, but not violated by the instruction as to whether Sally was his wife. 
D. not violated by either part of the instructions.
Answer: B
Star, who played the lead role in a television soap opera, was seriously injured in an automobile accident caused by Danton's negligent driving. As a consequence of Star's injury, the television series was canceled, and Penn, a supporting actor, was laid off. In an action against Danton, can Penn recover for his loss of income attributable to the accident? 
A. Yes, because Danton's negligence was the cause in fact of Penn's loss. 
B. Yes, unless Penn failed to take reasonable measures to mitigate his loss. 
C. No, unless Danton should have foreseen that by injuring Star he would cause harm to Penn. 
D. No, because Danton's liability does not extend to economic loss to Penn that arises solely from physical harm to Star. 
Answer: D
On December 1, Broker contracted with Collecta to sell her one of a certain type of rare coin for $12,000, delivery and payment to occur on the next March 1. To fulfill that contract, and without Collecta's knowledge, Broker contracted on January 1 to purchase for $10,000 a specimen of that type coin from Hoarder, delivery and payment to occur on February 1. The market price of such coins had unexpectedly fallen to $8,000 by February 1, when Hoarder tendered the coin and Broker repudiated. On February 25, the market in such coins suddenly reversed and had stabilized at $12,000 on March 1. Broker, however, had failed to obtain a specimen of the coin and repudiated his agreement with Collecta when she tendered the $12,000 agreed price on March 1. Later that day, after learning by chance of Broker's dealing with Collecta, Hoarder telephoned Collecta and said: "Listen, Broker probably owes me at least $2,000 in damages for refusing wrongfully to buy my coin for $10,000 on February 1 when the market was down to $8,000. But I'm in good shape in view of the market's recovery since then, and I think you ought to get after the so-and-so." If Collecta immediately sues Broker for his breach of the Broker-Hoarder contract, which of the following will the court probably decide? 
A. Broker wins, because Collecta, if a beneficiary at all of the Broker-Hoarder contract, was only an incidental beneficiary. 
B. Broker wins, because as of March 1 neither Hoarder nor Collecta had sustained any damage from Broker's repudiation of both contracts. 
C. Collecta wins, because she was an intended beneficiary of the BrokerHoarder contract, under which damages for Broker's repudiation became fixed on February 1. 
D. Collecta wins, because she took an effective assignment of Hoarder's claim for damages against Broker when Hoarder suggested that Collecta "get after the so-and-so." 
Answer: A