ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
A law of the state of Wonatol imposed a generally applicable sales tax payable by the vendor. That law exempted from its provisions the sale of "all magazines, periodicals, newspapers, and books." In order to raise additional revenue, the state legislature eliminated that broad exemption and substituted a narrower exemption. The new, narrower exemption excluded from the state sales tax only the sale of those "magazines, periodicals, newspapers, and books that are published or distributed by a recognized published or distributed by a recognized religious faith and that consist wholly of writings sacred to such a religious faith." Magazine is a monthly publication devoted to history and politics. Magazine paid under protest the sales tax due on its sales according to the amended sales tax law. Magazine then filed suit against the state in an appropriate state court for a refund of the sales taxes paid. It contended that the state's elimination of the earlier, broader exemption and adoption of the new, narrower exemption restricted to sacred writings of recognized religious faiths violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. In this case, the court will probably rule that 
A. Magazine lacks standing to sue for a refund of sales taxes imposed by a generally applicable state law because Article III of the Constitution precludes taxpayers from bringing such suits. taxpayers from bringing such suits.
B. the Eleventh Amendment bars the state court from exercising jurisdiction over this suit in the absence of a law of Wonatol expressly waiving the state's immunity.
C. the new, narrower exemption from the state sales tax law violates the establishment clause of the First and Fourteenth Amendments by granting preferential state support to recognized religious faiths for the communication of their religious beliefs. 
D. the new, narrower exemption from the state sales tax law violates the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it imposes a prior restraint on nonreligious publications that are required to pay the tax. 
Answer: C
Defendant was prosecuted for bankruptcy fraud. Defendant's wife, now deceased, had testified adversely to Defendant during earlier bankruptcy proceedings that involved similar issues. Although the wife had been crossexamined, no serious effort was made to challenge her credibility despite the availability of significant impeachment information. At the fraud trial, the prosecutor offers into evidence the testimony given by Defendant's wife at the bankruptcy proceeding. This evidence should be 
A. admitted, under the hearsay exception for former testimony. 
B. admitted, because it is a statement by a person identified with a party. 
C. excluded, because it is hearsay not within any exception. 
D. excluded, because Defendant has the right to prevent use of his spouse's testimony against him in a criminal case.
Answer: A
Mermaid owns an exceptionally seaworthy boat that she charters for sport fishing at a $500 daily rate. The fee includes the use of the boat with Mermaid as the captain, and one other crew member, as well as fishing tackle and bait. On May 1, Phinney agreed with Mermaid that Phinney would have the full-day use of the boat on May 15 for himself and his family for $500. Phinney paid an advance deposit of $200 and signed an agreement that the deposit could be retained by Mermaid as liquidated damages in the event Phinney canceled or failed to appear. For this question only, assume the following facts. At the time of contracting, Mermaid told Phinney to be at the dock at 5 a.m. on May 15. Phinney and his family, however, did not show up on May 15 until noon. Meantime, Mermaid agreed at 10 a.m. to take Tess and her family out fishing for the rest of the day. Tess had happened to come by and inquire about the possibility of such an outing. In view of the late hour, Mermaid charged Tess $400 and stayed out two hours beyond the customary return time. Phinney's failure to appear until noon was due to the fact that he had been trying to charter another boat across the bay at a lower rate and had gotten lost after he was unsuccessful in getting such a charter. Which of the following is an accurate statement concerning the rights of the parties? 
A. Mermaid can retain the $200 paid by Phinney, because it would be difficult for Mermaid to establish her actual damages and the sum appears to have been a reasonable forecast in light of anticipated loss of profit from the charter. 
B. Mermaid is entitled to retain only $50 (10% of the contract price) and must return $150 to Phinney.
C. Mermaid must return $100 to Phinney in order to avoid her own unjust enrichment at Phinney's expense.
D. Mermaid must return $100 to Phinney, because the liquidated-damage clause under the circumstances would operate as a penalty. 
Answer: A
Mermaid owns an exceptionally seaworthy boat that she charters for sport fishing at a $500 daily rate. The fee includes the use of the boat with Mermaid as the captain, and one other crew member, as well as fishing tackle and bait. On May 1, Phinney agreed with Mermaid that Phinney would have the full-day use of the boat on May 15 for himself and his family for $500. Phinney paid an advance deposit of $200 and signed an agreement that the deposit could be retained by Mermaid as liquidated damages in the event Phinney canceled or failed to appear. For this question only, assume the following facts. On May 15 at 1 a.m., the Coast Guard had issued offshore "heavy weather" warnings and prohibited all small vessels the size of Mermaid's from leaving the harbor. This prohibition remained in effect throughout the day. Phinney did not appear at all on May 15, because he had heard the weather warnings on his radio. Which of the following is an accurate statement? 
A. The contract is discharged because of impossibility, and Phinney is entitled to return of his deposit. 
B. The contract is discharged because of mutual mistake concerning an essential fact, and Phinney is entitled to return of his deposit. 
C. The contract is not discharged, because its performance was possible in view of the exceptional seaworthiness of Mermaid's boat, and Phinney is not entitled to return of his deposit. 
D. The contract is not discharged, and Phinney is not entitled to return of his deposit, because the liquidated-damage clause in effect allocated the risk of bad weather to Phinney. 
Answer: A
Eight years ago, Orben, prior to moving to a distant city, conveyed Blackacre, an isolated farm, to his son, Sam, by a quitclaim deed. Sam paid no consideration. Sam, who was 19 years old, without formal education, and without experience in business, took possession of Blackacre and operated the farm but neglected to record his deed. Subsequently, Orben conveyed Blackacre to Fred by warranty deed. Fred, a substantial land and timber promoter, paid valuable consideration for the deed to him. He was unaware of Sam's possession, his quitclaim deed, or his relationship to Orben. Fred promptly and properly recorded his deed and began removing timber from the land. Immediately removing timber from the land. Immediately upon learning of Fred's actions, Sam recorded his deed and brought an appropriate action to enjoin Fred from removing the timber and to quiet title in Sam. The recording act of the jurisdiction provides: "No conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value and without notice unless the same be recorded according to law." In this action, Fred should 
A. prevail, because a warranty deed for valuable consideration takes priority over a quitclaim deed without consideration. 
B. prevail, because Orben's subsequent conveyance to Fred revoked the gift to Sam. 
C. lose, because Sam's possession charged Fred with notice. 
D. lose, because the equities favor Sam. 
Answer: C
Brown owned Blackacre, a tract of undeveloped land. Blackacre abuts Whiteacre, a tract of land owned by Agency, the state's governmental energy agency. At Whiteacre, Agency has operated a waste-to-electricity recycling facility for 12 years. Blackacre and Whiteacre are in a remote area and Whiteacre is the only developed parcel of real estate within a ten-mile radius. The boundary line between Blackacre and Whiteacre had never been surveyed or marked on the face of the earth. During the past 12 years, some of the trucks bringing waste to the Agency facility have dumped their loads so that the piles of waste extend from Whiteacre onto a portion of Blackacre. However, prior to the four-week period during each calendar year when the Agency facility is closed for inspection and repairs, the waste piles are reduced to minimal levels so that during each of the four-week closures no waste was, in fact, piled on Blackacre. Neither Brown nor any representative of Agency knew the facts about the relation of the boundary line to the waste piles. The time for acquiring title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is ten years. Last year, Brown died, and his son, Silas, succeeded him as the owner of Blackacre. Silas became aware of the facts, demanded that Agency stop using Blackacre for the piling of waste, and, when Agency refused his demand, brought an appropriate action to enjoin any such use of Blackacre in the future. If Agency prevails in that action, it will be because 
A. the facts constitute adverse possession and title to the portion of Blackacre concerned has vested in Agency.
B. Brown's failure to keep himself informed as to Agency's use of Blackacre and his failure to object constituted implied consent to the continuation of that use. consent to the continuation of that use.
C. the interest of the public in the conversion of waste to energy overrides any entitlement of Silas to equitable remedies.
D. the power of eminent domain of the state makes the claim of Silas moot.
Answer: A
Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He had been stopped while driving a car and several pounds of cocaine were found in the trunk. In his opening statement, defendant's counsel asserted that his client had no key to the trunk and no knowledge of its contents. The prosecutor offers the state motor vehicle registration, shown to have been found in the glove compartment of the car, listing Defendant as the owner. The registration should be 
A. admitted, as a statement against interest. 
B. admitted, as evidence of Defendant's close connection with the car and, therefore, knowledge of its contents. 
C. excluded, unless authenticated by (C) excluded, unless authenticated by testimony of or certification by a state official charged with custody of vehicle registration records. 
D. excluded, as hearsay not within any exception. 
Answer: B
Donald was arrested in Marilyn's apartment after her neighbors had reported sounds of a struggle and the police had arrived to find Donald bent over Marilyn's prostrate body. Marilyn was rushed to the hospital where she lapsed into a coma. Despite the explanation that he was trying to revive Marilyn after she suddenly collapsed, Donald was charged with attempted rape and assault after a neighbor informed the police that she had heard Marilyn sobbing, "No, please no, let me alone." At trial, the forensic evidence was inconclusive. The jury acquitted Donald of attempted rape but convicted him of assault. While he was serving his sentence for assault, Marilyn, who had never recovered from the coma, died. Donald was then indicted and tried on a charge of felony murder. In this common-law jurisdiction, there is no statute that prevents a prosecutor from proceeding in this manner, but Donald argued that a second trial for felony murder after his original trial for attempted rape and assault would violate the double jeopardy clause. His claim is 
A. correct, because he was acquitted of the attempted rape charge. 
B. correct, because he was convicted of the assault charge. 
C. incorrect, because Marilyn had not died at the time of the first trial and he was not placed in jeopardy for murder. 
D. incorrect, because he was convicted of the assault charge. 
Answer: A
Ogle owned Greenacre, a tract of land, in fee simple. Five years ago, he executed and delivered to Lilly an instrument in the proper form of a warranty deed that conveyed Greenacre to Lilly "for and during the term of her natural life." No other estate or interest or person taking an interest was mentioned. Lilly took possession of Greenacre and has remained in possession. Fifteen months ago, Ogle died, leaving a will that has been duly admitted to probate. The will, inter alia, had the following provision: "I devise Greenacre to Mina for her natural life and from and after Mina's death to Rex, his heirs and assigns, forever." Administration of Ogle's estate has been completed. Mina claims the immediate right to possession of Greenacre. Rex also asserts a right to immediate possession. In an appropriate lawsuit to which Lilly, Mina, and Rex are parties, who should be adjudged to have the right to immediate possession? 
A. Lilly, because no subsequent act of Ogle would affect her life estate. 
B. Mina, because Ogle's will was the final and definitive expression of his intent. 
C. Mina, because Lilly's estate terminated with the death of Ogle. 
D. Rex, because Lilly's estate terminated with Ogle's death and all that Ogle had was the right to transfer his reversion in fee simple. 
Answer: A
Devlin was charged with murder. Several witnesses testified that the crime was committed by a person of Devlin's general description who walked with a severe limp. Devlin in fact walks with a severe limp. He objected to a prosecution request that the court order him to walk across the courtroom in order to display his limp to the jury to assist it in determining whether Devlin was the person that the witnesses had seen. Devlin's objection will most likely be
A. sustained, because the order sought by the prosecution would violate Devlin's privilege against self-incrimination. 
B. sustained, because the order sought by the prosecution would constitute an illegal search and seizure. 
C. denied, because the order sought by the prosecution is a legitimate part of a proper courtroom identification process. 
D. denied, because a criminal defendant has no legitimate expectation of privacy. 
Answer: C
A statute of the state of Kiowa provided state monetary grants to private dance, theater, and opera groups located in that state. The statute required recipients of such grants to use the granted monies for the acquisition, construction, and maintenance of appropriate facilities for the public performance of their performing arts. The last section of the statute conditioned the award of each such grant on the recipient's agreement to refrain from all kinds of political lobbying calculated to secure additional tax support for the performing arts. The strongest constitutional basis for an attack upon the validity of the last section of the statute would be based upon the 
A. commerce clause.
B. obligation of contracts clause.
C. Fifth Amendment.
D. First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Answer: D
Penkov suffered a severe loss when his manufacturing plant, located in a shallow ravine, was flooded during a sustained rainfall. The flooding occurred because City had failed to maintain its storm drain, which was located on City land above Penkov's premises, and because Railroad had failed to maintain its storm drain, which was located on Railroad land below Penkov's premises. The flooding would not have occurred if either one of the two storm drains had been maintained properly. Penkov sued Railroad to recover compensation for his loss. The evidence in the case established that the failures of the two drains were caused by the respective negligence of City and Railroad. There is no special rule City and Railroad. There is no special rule insulating City from liability. In his action against Railroad, Penkov should recover 
A. nothing, because he should have joined City, without whose negligence he would have suffered no loss. 
B. nothing, unless he introduces evidence that enables the court reasonably to apportion responsibility between City and Railroad. 
C. one-half his loss, in the absence of evidence that enables the court to allocate responsibility fairly between City and Railroad. 
D. all of his loss, because but for Railroad's negligence none of the flooding would have occurred. 
Answer: D
Smith asked Jones if he would loan him $500, promising to repay the amount within two weeks. Jones loaned him the $500. The next day Smith took the money to the race track and lost all of it betting on horse races. He then left town for six months. He has not repaid Jones. Smith has committed 
A. both larceny by trick and obtaining money by false pretenses (although he can only be convicted of one offense).
B. larceny by trick only.
C. obtaining money by false pretenses only.
D. neither larceny by trick nor obtaining money by false pretenses.
Answer: D
Assume that Congress passed and the President signed the following statute: "The appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court shall not extend to any case involving the constitutionality of any state statute limiting the circumstances in which a statute limiting the circumstances in which a woman may obtain an abortion, or involving the constitutionality of this statute." The strongest argument against the constitutionality of this statute is that 
A. Congress may not exercise its authority over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a way that seriously interferes with the establishment of a supreme and uniform body of federal constitutional law.
B. Congress may only regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases initially arising in federal courts.
C. the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may only be altered by constitutional amendment.
D. the statute violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Answer: A
The federal statute admitting the state of Blue to the Union granted Blue certain public lands, and established some very ambiguous conditions on the subsequent disposition of these lands by Blue. This federal statute also required the new state to write those exact same conditions into its state constitution. One same conditions into its state constitution. One hundred years later, a statute of Blue dealing with the sale of these public lands was challenged in a state court lawsuit on the ground that it was inconsistent with the conditions contained in the federal statute, and with the provisions of the Blue Constitution that exactly copy the conditions contained in the federal statute. The trial court decision in this case was appealed to the Blue Supreme Court. In its opinion, the Blue Supreme Court dealt at length with the ambiguous language of the federal statute and with cases interpreting identical language in federal statutes admitting other states to the union. The Blue Supreme Court opinion did not discuss the similar provisions of the Blue Constitution, but it did hold that the challenged Blue statute is invalid because it is "inconsistent with the language of the federal statute and therefore is inconsistent with the identical provisions of our state constitution." If the losing party in the Blue Supreme Court seeks review of the decision of that court in the United States Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court should 
A. accept the case for review and determine the validity and interpretation of the federal statute if it is an important and substantial question.
B. ask the Blue Supreme Court to indicate more clearly whether it relied on the state constitutional provision in rendering its decision.
C. decline to review the case on the ground that the decision of the Blue Supreme Court rests on an adequate and independent state ground.
D. decline to review the case because a decision by a state supreme court concerning the proper disposition of state public lands is not reviewable by the United States Supreme Court.
Answer: A
Trawf, the manager of a state fair, contracted 100. with Schweinebauch, a renowned hog breeder, to exhibit Schweinebauch's world champion animal, Megahawg, for the three weeks of the annual fair, at the conclusion of which Schweinebauch would receive an honorarium of $300. Two days before the opening of the fair, Megahawg took sick with boarsitis, a communicable disease among swine, and, under the applicable state quarantine law, very probably could not be exhibited for at least a month. Upon learning this, Trawf can legally pursue which of the following courses of action with respect to his contract with Schweinebauch? 
A. Suspend his own performance, demand assurances from Schweinebauch, and treat a failure by Schweinebauch to give them as an actionable repudiation. 
B. Suspend his own performance and recover damages from Schweinebauch for breach of contract unless Schweinebauch at once supplies an undiseased hog of exhibition quality as a substitute for Megahawg.
C. Terminate his own performance and treat Megahawg's illness as discharging all remaining duties under the contract.
D. Terminate the contract, but only if he (Trawf) seeks promptly to obtain for the exhibit a suitable substitute for Megahawg from another hog owner. 
Answer: C
The manager of a department store noticed that Paula was carrying a scarf with her as she examined various items in the blouse department. The manager recognized the scarf as an expensive one carried by the store. Paula was trying to find a blouse that matched a color in the scarf, and, after a while, found one. The manager then saw Paula put the scarf into her purse, pay for the blouse, and head for the door. The manager, who was eight inches taller than Paula, blocked Paula's way to the door and asked to see the scarf in Paula's purse. Paula produced the scarf, as well as a receipt for it, showing that it had been purchased from the store on the previous day. The manager then told Paula there was no problem, and stepped out of her way. If Paula brings a claim against the store based on false imprisonment, the store's best defense would be that 
A. by carrying the scarf in public view and then putting it into her purse, Paula assumed the risk of being detained. 
B. the manager had a reasonable belief that Paula was shoplifting and detained her only briefly for a reasonable investigation of the facts.
C. Paula should have realized that her conduct would create a reasonable belief conduct would create a reasonable belief that facts existed warranting a privilege to detain.
D. Paula was not detained, but was merely questioned about the scarf. 
Answer: B
A proposed federal statute would prohibit all types of discrimination against black persons on the basis of their race in every business transaction executed anywhere in the United States by any person or entity, governmental or private. Is this proposed federal statute likely to be constitutional? 
A. Yes, because it could reasonably be viewed as an exercise of Congress's authority to enact laws for the general welfare. 
B. Yes, because it could reasonably be viewed as a means of enforcing the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
C. No, because it would regulate purely local transactions that are not in interstate commerce. 
D. No, because it would invade the powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. 
Answer: B
Sam told Horace, his neighbor, that he was going away for two weeks and asked Horace to keep an eye on his house. Horace agreed. Sam gave Horace a key to use to check on the house. Horace decided to have a party in Sam's house. He invited a number of friends. One friend, Lewis, went into Sam's bedroom, took some of Sam's rings, and put them in his pocket. Which of the following is true? 
A. Horace and Lewis are guilty of burglary.
B. Horace is guilty of burglary and Lewis is guilty of larceny.
C. Horace is guilty of trespass and Lewis is guilty of larceny.
D. Lewis is guilty of larceny and Horace is not guilty of any crime.
Answer: D