ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
Owner owned a hotel, subject to a mortgage securing a debt Owner owed to Lender One. Owner later acquired a nearby parking garage, financing a part of the purchase price by a loan from Lender Two, secured by a mortgage on the parking garage. Two years thereafter, Owner defaulted on the loan owed to Lender One, which caused the full amount of that loan to become immediately due and payable. Lender One decided not to foreclose the mortgage on Owner's hotel at that time, but instead brought an action, appropriate under the laws of the jurisdiction and authorized by the mortgage loan documents, for the full amount of the defaulted loan. Lender One obtained and properly filed a judgment for that amount. A statute of the jurisdiction provides: "Any judgment properly filed shall, for ten years from filing, be a lien on the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the judgment is rendered." There is no other applicable statute, except the statute providing for judicial foreclosure of mortgages, which places no restriction on deficiency judgments. Lender One later brought an appropriate action for judicial foreclosure of its first mortgage on the hotel and of its judgment lien on the parking garage. Lender Two was joined as a party defendant, and appropriately counterclaimed for foreclosure of its mortgage on the parking garage, which was also in default. All procedures were properly followed and the confirmed foreclosure sales resulted as follows: Lender One purchased the hotel for $100,000 less than its mortgage balance. Lender One purchased the parking garage for an amount that is $200,000 in excess of Lender Two's mortgage balance. The $200,000 surplus arising from the bid paid by Lender One for the parking garage should be paid 
A. $100,000 to Lender One and $100,000 to Owner. 
B. $100,000 to Lender Two and $100,000 to Owner. 
C. $100,000 to Lender One and $100,000 to Lender Two. 
D. $200,000 to Owner.
Answer: A
Kontractor agreed to build a power plant for a public utility. Subbo agreed with Kontractor to lay the foundation for $200,000. Subbo supplied goods and services worth $150,000, for which Kontractor made progress payments aggregating $100,000 as required by the subcontract. Subbo then breached by refusing unjustifiably to perform further. Kontractor reasonably spent $120,000 to have the work completed by another subcontractor. Subbo sues Kontractor for the reasonable value of benefits conferred, and Kontractor counterclaims for breach of contract. Which of the following should be the court's decision? 
A. Subbo recovers $50,000, the benefit conferred on Kontractor for which Subbo has not been paid. 
B. Subbo recovers $30,000, the benefit Subbo conferred on Kontractor minus the $20,000 in damages incurred by Kontractor. 
C. Kontractor recovers $20,000, the excess over the contract price that was paid by Kontractor for the performance it had bargained to receive from Subbo. 
D. Neither party recovers anything, because Subbo committed a material, unexcused breach and Kontractor received a $50,000 benefit from Subbo for which Subbo has not been paid. 
Answer: C
The Rapido is a sports car manufactured by the Rapido Motor Co. The Rapido has an excellent reputation for mechanical reliability with one exception, that the motor may stall if the engine has not had an extended warm-up. Driver had just begun to drive her Rapido in city traffic without a warm-up when the engine suddenly stalled. A car driven by Troody rearended Driver's car. Driver suffered no external physical injuries as a result of the collision. However, the shock of the crash caused her to suffer a severe heart attack. Driver brought an action against the Rapido Motor Co. based on strict liability in tort. During the trial, the plaintiff presented evidence of an alternative engine design of equal cost that would eliminate the stalling problem without impairing the functions of the engine in any way. The defendant moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence. This motion should be 
A. denied, because the jury could find that an unreasonably dangerous defect in the engine was a proximate cause of the collision. 
B. denied, if the jury could find that the Rapido was not crashworthy. 
C. granted, because Troody's failure to stop within an assured clear distance was a superseding cause of the collision. 
D. granted, if a person of normal sensitivity would not have suffered a heart attack under these circumstances.
Answer: A
Pedestrian died from injuries caused when Driver's car struck him. Executor, Pedestrian's executor, sued Driver for wrongful death. At trial, Executor calls Nurse to testify that two days after the accident, Pedestrian said to Nurse, "The car that hit me ran the red light." Fifteen minutes thereafter, Pedestrian died. As a foundation for introducing evidence of Pedestrian's statement, Executor offers to the court Doctor's affidavit that Doctor was the intern on duty the day of Pedestrian's death and that several times that day Pedestrian had said that he knew he was about to die. Is the affidavit properly considered by the court in ruling on the admissibility of Pedestrian's statement? 
A. No, because it is hearsay not within any exception. 
B. No, because it is irrelevant since dying declarations cannot be used except in prosecutions for homicide. 
C. Yes, because, though hearsay, it is a statement of then-existing mental condition. 
D. Yes, because the judge may consider hearsay in ruling on preliminary questions. 
Answer: D
John is a licensed barber in State A. The State A barber licensing statute provides that the Barber Licensing Board may revoke a barber license if it finds that a licensee has used his or her business premises for an illegal purpose. John was arrested by federal narcotics enforcement agents on a charge of selling cocaine in his barbershop in violation of federal laws. However, the local United States Attorney declined to prosecute and the charges were dropped. Nevertheless, the Barber Licensing Board commenced a proceeding against John to revoke his license on the ground that John used his business premises for illegal sales of cocaine. At a subsequent hearing before the board, the only evidence against John was affidavits by unnamed informants, who were not present or available for cross-examination. Their affidavits stated that they purchased cocaine from John in his barbershop. Based solely on this evidence, the board found that John used his business premises for an illegal purpose and ordered his license revoked. In a suit by John to have this revocation set aside, his best constitutional argument is that 
A. John's inability to cross-examine his accusers denied him a fair hearing and caused him to be deprived of his barber license without due process of law.
B. the administrative license revocation proceeding was invalid, because it denied full faith and credit to the dismissal of the criminal charges by the United States Attorney. 
C. Article III requires a penalty of the kind imposed on John to be imposed by a court rather than an administrative agency.
D. the existence of federal laws penalizing the illegal sale of cocaine preempts state action relating to drug trafficking of the kind involved in John's case.
Answer: A
Driver was driving his car near Owner's house when Owner's child darted into the street in front of Driver's car. As Driver swerved and braked his car to avoid hitting the child, the car skidded up into Owner's driveway and stopped just short of Owner, who was standing in the driveway and had witnessed the entire incident. Owner suffered serious emotional distress from witnessing the danger to his child and to himself. Neither Owner nor his property was physically harmed. If Owner asserts a claim for damages against Driver, will Owner prevail? 
A. Yes, because Driver's entry onto Owner's land was unauthorized. 
B. Yes, because Owner suffered serious emotional distress by witnessing the danger to his child and to himself. 
C. No, unless Driver was negligent. 
D. No, unless Owner's child was exercising reasonable care. 
Answer: C
Vendor owned Greenacre, a tract of land, in fee simple. Vendor entered into a valid written agreement with Purchaser under which Vendor agreed to sell and Purchaser agreed to buy Greenacre by installment purchase. The contract stipulated that Vendor would deliver to Purchaser, upon the payment of the last installment due, "a warranty deed sufficient to convey the fee simple." The contract contained no other provision that could be construed as referring to title. Purchaser entered into possession of Greenacre. After making 10 of the 300 installment payments obligated under the contract, Purchaser discovered that there was outstanding a valid and enforceable mortgage on Greenacre, securing the payment of a debt in the amount of 25% of the purchase price Purchaser had agreed to pay. There was no evidence that Vendor had ever been late in payments due under the mortgage and there was no evidence of any danger of insolvency of Vendor. The value of Greenacre now is four times the amount due on the debt secured by the mortgage. Purchaser quit possession of Greenacre and demanded that Vendor repay the amounts Purchaser had paid under the contract. After Vendor refused the demand, Purchaser brought an appropriate action against Vendor to recover damages for Vendor's alleged breach of the contract. In such action, should damages be awarded to Purchaser? 
A. No, because the time for Vendor to deliver marketable title has not arrived. 
B. No, because Purchaser assumed the risk by taking possession. 
C. Yes, because in the absence of a contrary express agreement, an obligation to convey marketable title is implied. 
D. Yes, because the risk of loss assumed by Purchaser in taking possession relates only to physical loss.
Answer: A
The state of Red sent three of its employees to a city located in the state of Blue to consult with a chemical laboratory there about matters of state business. While in the course of their employment, the three employees of Red negligently released into local Blue waterways some of the chemical samples they had received from the laboratory in Blue. Persons in Blue injured by the release of the chemicals sued the three Red state employees and the state of Red in Blue state courts for the damages they suffered. After a trial in which all of the defendants admitted jurisdiction of the Blue state court and fully participated, plaintiffs received a judgment against all of the defendants for $5 million, which became final. Subsequently, plaintiffs sought to enforce their Blue state court judgment by commencing a proper proceeding in an appropriate court of Red. In that enforcement proceeding, the state of Red argued, as it had done unsuccessfully in the earlier action in Blue state court, that its liability is limited by a law of Red to $100,000 in any tort case. Because the three individual employees of Red are able to pay only $50,000 of the judgment, the only way the injured persons can fully satisfy their Blue state court judgment is from the funds of the state of Red. Can the injured persons recover the full balance of their Blue state court judgment from the state of Red in the enforcement proceeding they filed in a court of Red? 
A. Yes, because the final judgment of the Blue court is entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of Red. 
B. Yes, because a limitation on damage awards against Red for tortious actions of its agents would violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
C. No, because the Tenth Amendment preserves the right of a state to have its courts enforce the state's public policy limiting its tort liability. 
D. No, because the employees of Red were negligent and, therefore, their actions were not authorized by the state of Red. 
Answer: A
Martha's high school teacher told her that she was going to receive a failing grade in history, which would prevent her from graduating. Furious, she reported to the principal that the teacher had fondled her, and the teacher was fired. A year later, still unable to get work because of the scandal, the teacher committed suicide. Martha, remorseful, confessed that her accusation had been false. If Martha is charged with manslaughter, her best defense would be that she 
A. committed no act that proximately caused the teacher's death.
B. did not intend to cause the teacher's death.
C. did not act with malice.
D. acted under extreme emotional distress.
Answer: A
Plaintiff sued Defendant for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident. Which of the following would be ERROR?
A. The judge allows Defendant's attorney to ask Defendant questions on crossexamination that go well beyond the scope of direct examination by Plaintiff, who has been called as an adverse witness. 
B. The judge refuses to allow Defendant's attorney to cross-examine Defendant by leading questions.
C. The judge allows cross-examination about the credibility of a witness even though no question relating to credibility has been asked on direct examination.
D. The judge, despite Defendant's request for exclusion of witnesses, allows Plaintiff's eyewitness to remain in the courtroom after testifying, even though the eyewitness is expected to be recalled for further cross-examination.
Answer: D
Phil is suing Dennis for injuries suffered in an automobile collision. At trial Phil's first witness, Wanda, testified that, although she did not see the accident, she heard her friend Frank say just before the crash, "Look at the crazy way old Dennis is driving!" Dennis offers evidence to impeach Frank by asking Wanda, "Isn't it true that Frank beat up Dennis just the day before the collision?" The question is 
A. proper, because it tends to show the possible bias of Frank against Dennis. 
B. proper, because it tends to show Frank's character. 
C. improper, because Frank has no opportunity to explain or deny. 
D. improper, because impeachment cannot properly be by specific instances. 
Answer: A
Thirty years ago Able, the then-record owner of Greenacre, a lot contiguous to Blueacre, in fee simple, executed and delivered to Baker an instrument in writing which was denominated "Deed of Conveyance." In pertinent part it read, "Able does grant to Baker and her heirs and assigns a right-of-way for egress and ingress to Blueacre." If the quoted provision was sufficient to create an interest in land, the instrument met all other requirements for a valid grant. Baker held record title in fee simple to Blueacre, which adjoined Greenacre. Twelve years ago Charlie succeeded to Able's title in fee simple in Greenacre and seven years ago Dorcas succeeded to Baker's title in fee simple in Blueacre by a deed which made no mention of a right-of-way or driveway. At the time Dorcas took title, there existed a driveway across Greenacre which showed evidence that it had been used regularly to travel between Main Road, a public road, and Blueacre. Blueacre did have frontage on Side Road, another public road, but this means of access was seldom used because it was not as convenient to the dwelling situated on Blueacre as was Main Road. The driveway originally was established by Baker. Dorcas has regularly used the driveway since acquiring title. The period of time required to acquire rights by prescription in the jurisdiction is ten years. Six months ago Charlie notified Dorcas that Charlie planned to develop a portion of Greenacre as a residential subdivision and that Dorcas should cease any use of the driveway. After some negotiations, Charlie offered to permit Dorcas to construct another driveway to connect with the streets of the proposed subdivision. Dorcas declined this offer on the ground that travel from Blueacre to Main Road would be more circuitous. Dorcas brought an appropriate action against Charlie to obtain a definitive adjudication of the respective rights of Dorcas and Charlie. In such lawsuit Charlie relied upon the defense that the location of the easement created by the grant from Able to Baker was governed by reasonableness and that Charlie's proposed solution was reasonable. Charlie's defense should 
A. fail, because the location had been established by the acts of Baker and Able. 
B. fail, because the location of the easement had been fixed by prescription. 
C. prevail, because the reasonableness of Charlie's proposal was established by Dorcas's refusal to suggest any alternative location. 
D. prevail, because the servient owner is entitled to select the location of a right- of-way if the grant fails to identify its location.
Answer: A
Computers, Inc., contracted in writing with Bank to sell and deliver to Bank a mainframe computer using a new type of magnetic memory, then under development but not perfected by Computers, at a price substantially lower than that of a similar computer using current technology. The contract's delivery term was "F.O.B. Bank, on or before July 31." Assume that Computers tendered the computer to Bank on August 15, and that Bank rejected it because of the delay. If Computers sues Bank for breach of contract, which of the following facts, if proved, will best support a recovery by Computers? 
A. The delay did not materially harm Bank.
B. Computers believed, on the assumption that Bank was getting a "super deal" for its money, that Bank would not reject because of the late tender of delivery. 
C. Computers' delay in tender was caused by a truckers' strike.
D. A usage in the relevant trade allows computer sellers a 30-day leeway in a specified time of delivery, unless the usage is expressly negated by the contract. 
Answer: D
Computers, Inc., contracted in writing with Bank to sell and deliver to Bank a mainframe computer using a new type of magnetic memory, then under development but not perfected by Computers, at a price substantially lower than that of a similar computer using current technology. The contract's delivery term was "F.O.B. Bank, on or before July 31." Assume the following facts. After making the contract with Bank, Computers discovered that the new technology it intended to use was unreliable and that no computer manufacturer could yet build a reliable computer using that technology. Computers thereupon notified Bank that it was impossible for Computers or anyone else to build the contracted-for computer "in the present state of the art." If Bank sues Computers for failure to perform its computer contract, the court will probably decide the case in favor of 
A. Computers, because its performance of the contract was objectively impossible. 
B. Computers, because a contract to build a machine using technology under development imposes only a duty on the builder to use its best efforts to achieve the result contracted for. 
C. Bank, because the law of impossibility does not apply to merchants under the applicable law. 
D. Bank, because Computers assumed the risk, in the given circumstances, that the projected new technology would not work reliably. 
Answer: D
Defendant was charged with attempted murder of Victor in a sniping incident in which Defendant allegedly shot at Victor from ambush as Victor drove his car along an expressway. The prosecutor offers evidence that seven years earlier Defendant had fired a shotgun into a woman's home and that Defendant had once pointed a handgun at another driver while driving on the street. This evidence should be
A. excluded, because such evidence can be elicited only during cross-examination. 
B. excluded, because it is improper character evidence. 
C. admitted as evidence of Defendant's propensity toward violence.
D. admitted as relevant evidence of Defendant's identity, plan, or motive.
Answer: B
Art, who owned Blackacre in fee simple, conveyed Blackacre to Bea by warranty deed. Celia, an adjoining owner, asserted title to Blackacre and brought an appropriate action against Bea to quiet title to Blackacre. Bea demanded that Art defend Bea's title under the deed's covenant of warranty, but Art refused. Bea then successfully defended at her own expense. Bea brought an appropriate action against Art to recover Bea's expenses incurred in defending against Celia's action to quiet title to Blackacre. In this action, the court should decide for 
A. Bea, because in effect it was Art's title that was challenged. 
B. Bea, because Art's deed to her included the covenant of warranty. 
C. Art, because the title Art conveyed was not defective. 
D. Art, because Celia may elect which of Art or Bea to sue. 
Answer: C
Alex contracted for expensive cable television service for a period of six months solely to view the televised trial of Clark, who was on trial for murder in a court of the state of Green. In the midst of the trial, the judge prohibited any further televising of Clark's trial because he concluded that the presence of television cameras was disruptive. Alex brought an action in a federal district court against the judge in Clark's case asking only for an injunction that would require the judge to resume the televising of Clark's trial. Alex alleged that the judge's order to stop the televising of Clark's trial deprived him of property his investment in cable television service without due process of law. Before Alex's case came to trial, Clark's criminal trial concluded in a conviction and sentencing. There do not appear to be any obvious errors in the proceeding that led to the result in Clark's case. After Clark's conviction and sentencing, the defendant in Alex's case moved to dismiss that suit. The most proper disposition of this motion by the federal court would be to 
A. defer action on the motion until after any appellate proceedings in Clark's case have concluded, because Clark might appeal, his conviction might be set aside, he might be tried again, and television cameras might be barred from the new trial. 
B. defer action on the motion until after the Green Supreme Court expresses a view on its proper disposition, because the state law of mootness governs suits in federal court when the federal case is inexorably intertwined with a state proceeding. 
C. grant the motion, because the subject matter of the controversy between Alex and the defendant has ceased to exist and there is no strong likelihood that it will be revived. 
D. deny the motion, because Alex has raised an important constitutional question  whether his investment in cable service solely to view Clark's trial is property protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Answer: C
Traveler was a passenger on a commercial aircraft owned and operated by Airline. The aircraft crashed into a mountain, killing everyone on board. The flying weather was good. Traveler's legal representative brought a wrongful death action against Airline. At trial, the legal representative offered no expert or other testimony as to the cause of the crash. On Airline's motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the legal representative's case, the court should 
A. grant the motion, because the legal representative has offered no evidence as to the cause of the crash. 
B. grant the motion, because the legal representative has failed to offer evidence negating the possibility that the crash may have been caused by mechanical failure that Airline could not have prevented. 
C. deny the motion, because the jury may infer that the aircraft crashed due to Airline's negligence. 
D. deny the motion, because in the circumstances common carriers are strictly liable. 
Answer: C