ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
Steve, in desperate need of money, decided to hold up a local convenience store. Determined not to harm anyone, he carried a toy gun that resembled a real gun. In the store, he pointed the toy gun at the clerk and demanded money. A customer who entered the store and saw the robbery in progress pulled his own gun and fired at Steve. The bullet missed Steve but struck and killed the clerk. Steve was charged with felony murder. His best argument for being found NOT guilty is that he 
A. did not intend to kill.
B. did not commit the robbery because he never acquired any money from the clerk.
C. did not intend to create any risk of harm.
D. is not responsible for the acts of the customer.
Answer: D
Client consulted Lawyer about handling the sale of Client's building, and asked Lawyer what her legal fee would be. Lawyer replied that her usual charge was $100 per hour, and estimated that the legal work on behalf of Client would cost about $5,000 at that rate. Client said, "Okay; let's proceed with it," and Lawyer timely and successfully completed the work. Because of unexpected title problems, Lawyer reasonably spent 75 hours on the Lawyer reasonably spent 75 hours on the matter and shortly thereafter mailed Client a bill for $7,500, with a letter itemizing the work performed and time spent. Client responded by a letter expressing his good-faith belief that Lawyer had agreed to a total fee of no more than $5,000. Client enclosed a check in the amount of $5,000 payable to Lawyer and conspicuously marked, "Payment in full for legal services in connection with the sale of Client's building." Despite reading the "Payment in full..." language, Lawyer, without any notation of protest or reservation of rights, endorsed and deposited the check to her bank account. The check was duly paid by Client's bank. A few days later, Lawyer unsuccessfully demanded payment from Client of the $2,500 difference between the amount of her bill and the check, and now sues Client for that difference. What, if anything, can Lawyer recover from Client? 
A. Nothing, because the risk of unexpected title problems in a real-property transaction is properly allocable to the seller's attorney and thus to Lawyer in seller's attorney and thus to Lawyer in this case. 
B. Nothing, because the amount of Lawyer's fee was disputed in good faith by Client, and Lawyer impliedly agreed to an accord and satisfaction. 
C. $2,500, because Client agreed to an hourly rate for as many hours as the work reasonably required, and the sum of $5,000 was merely an estimate. 
D. The reasonable value of Lawyer's services in excess of $5,000, if any, because there was no specific agreement on the total amount of Lawyer's fee. 
Answer: B
Pauline and Doris own adjacent parcels of land. On each of their parcels was a low-rise office building. The two office buildings were of the same height. Last year Doris decided to demolish the lowrise office building on her parcel and to erect a new high-rise office building of substantially greater height on the parcel as permitted by the zoning and building ordinances. She secured all the governmental approvals necessary to pursue her project. As Doris's new building was in the course of construction, Pauline realized that the shadows it would create would place her (Pauline's) building in such deep shade that the rent she could charge for space in her building would be substantially reduced. Pauline brought an appropriate action against Doris to enjoin the construction in order to eliminate the shadow problem and for damages. Pauline presented uncontroverted evidence that her evaluation as to the impact of the shadow on the fair rental value of her building was correct. There is no statute or ordinance (other than the building and zoning ordinances) that is applicable to the issues before the court. The court should 
A. grant to Pauline the requested injunction.
B. award Pauline damages measured by the loss of rental value, but not an injunction. 
C. grant judgment for Doris, because she had secured all the necessary governmental approvals for the new building. 
D. grant judgment for Doris, because Pauline has no legal right to have sunshine continue to reach the windows of her building. 
Answer: D
Dumont, a real estate developer, was trying to purchase land on which he intended to build a large commercial development. Perkins, an elderly widow, had rejected all of Dumont's offers to buy her ancestral home, where she had lived all her life and which was located in the middle of Dumont's planned development. Finally, Dumont offered her $250,000. He told her that it was his last offer and that if she rejected it, state law authorized him to that if she rejected it, state law authorized him to have her property condemned. Perkins then consulted her nephew, a law student, who researched the question and advised her that Dumont had no power of condemnation under state law. Perkins had been badly frightened by Dumont's threat, and was outraged when she learned that Dumont had lied to her. If Perkins sues Dumont for damages for emotional distress, will she prevail? 
A. Yes, if Dumont's action was extreme and outrageous. 
B. Yes, because Perkins was frightened and outraged. 
C. No, if Perkins did not suffer emotional distress that was severe. 
D. No, if it was not Dumont's purpose to cause emotional distress. 
Answer: C
Dumont, a real estate developer, was trying to purchase land on which he intended to build a large commercial development. Perkins, an elderly widow, had rejected all of Dumont's offers to buy her ancestral home, where she had lived all her life and which was located in the middle of Dumont's planned development. Finally, Dumont offered her $250,000. He told her that it was his last offer and that if she rejected it, state law authorized him to that if she rejected it, state law authorized him to have her property condemned. Perkins then consulted her nephew, a law student, who researched the question and advised her that Dumont had no power of condemnation under state law. Perkins had been badly frightened by Dumont's threat, and was outraged when she learned that Dumont had lied to her. If Perkins asserts a claim based on misrepresentation against Dumont, will she prevail? 
A. Yes, if Dumont knew he had no legal power of condemnation. 
B. Yes, if Dumont tried to take unfair advantage of a gross difference between himself and Perkins in commercial knowledge and experience. 
C. No, if Dumont's offer of $250,000 equaled or exceeded the market value of Perkins's property. 
D. No, because Perkins suffered no pecuniary loss. 
Answer: D
State Y employs the Model Penal Code or American Law Institute test for insanity, and requires the state to prove sanity, when it is in issue, beyond a reasonable doubt. At Askew's trial for murder, he pleaded insanity. The state put on an expert psychiatrist who had examined Askew. He testified that, in his opinion, Askew was sane at the time of the murder. Askew's attorney did not introduce expert testimony on the question of sanity. Rather, he presented lay witnesses who testified that, in their opinion, Askew was insane at the time of the murder. At the end of the trial, each side moves for a directed verdict on the question of sanity. on the question of sanity. Which of the following correctly describes the judge's situation? 
A. She may grant a directed verdict for the defense if she believes that the jury could not find the prosecution to have proved sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
B. She may grant a directed verdict for the prosecution if she believes that Askew's witnesses on the insanity question are not believable.
C. She may not grant a directed verdict for the defense, because the state had expert testimony and the defense only lay witnesses. 
D. She may grant a directed verdict for the prosecution if she is convinced by their experts that Askew was sane beyond a reasonable doubt.
Answer: A
Trelawney worked at a day-care center run by the Happy Faces Day Care Corporation. At the the Happy Faces Day Care Corporation. At the center, one of the young charges, Smith, often arrived with bruises and welts on his back and legs. A statute in the jurisdiction requires all day-care workers to report to the police cases where there is probable cause to suspect child abuse and provides for immediate removal from the home of any suspected child abuse victims. Trelawney was not aware of this statute. Nevertheless, he did report Smith's condition to his supervisor, who advised him to keep quiet about it so the day-care center would not get into trouble for defaming a parent. About two weeks after Trelawney first noticed Smith's condition, Smith was beaten to death by his father. Trelawney has been charged with murder in the death of Smith. The evidence at trial disclosed, in addition to the above, that the child had been the victim of beatings by the father for some time, and that these earlier beatings had been responsible for the marks that Trelawney had seen. Smith's mother had been aware of the beatings but had not stopped them because she was herself afraid of Smith's father. Trelawney's best argument that he is NOT guilty of murder is guilty of murder is 
A. he was not aware of the duty-to-report statute.
B. he lacked the mental state necessary to the commission of the crime.
C. his omission was not the proximate cause of death.
D. the day-care corporation, rather than Trelawney, was guilty of the omission, which was sanctioned by its supervisorylevel agent. 
Answer: B
Perkins and Morton were passengers sitting in adjoining seats on a flight on Delval Airline. There were many empty seats on the aircraft. During the flight, a flight attendant served Morton nine drinks. As Morton became more and more obviously intoxicated and attempted to engage Perkins in a conversation, Perkins chose to ignore Morton. This angered Morton, who suddenly struck Morton. This angered Morton, who suddenly struck Perkins in the face, giving her a black eye. If Perkins asserts a claim for damages against Delval Airline based on negligence, Perkins will 
A. not recover, because a person is not required by law to come to the assistance of another who is imperiled by a third party. 
B. not recover, if Perkins could easily have moved to another seat. 
C. recover, because a common carrier is strictly liable for injuries suffered by a passenger while aboard the carrier. 
D. recover, if the flight attendants should have perceived Morton's condition and acted to protect Perkins before the blow was struck. 
Answer: D
Perkins and Morton were passengers sitting in adjoining seats on a flight on Delval Airline. There were many empty seats on the aircraft. During the flight, a flight attendant served Morton nine drinks. As Morton became more and more obviously intoxicated and attempted to engage Perkins in a conversation, Perkins chose to ignore Morton. This angered Morton, who suddenly struck Morton. This angered Morton, who suddenly struck Perkins in the face, giving her a black eye. If Perkins asserts a claim for damages against Delval Airline based on battery, she will 
A. prevail, because she suffered an intentionally inflicted harmful or offensive contact. 
B. prevail, if the flight attendant acted recklessly in continuing to serve liquor to Morton. 
C. not prevail, because Morton was not acting as an agent or employee of Delval Airline. 
D. not prevail, unless she can establish some permanent injury from the contact. 
Answer: C
Terrorists in the foreign country of Ruritania kidnapped the United States ambassador to that country. They threatened to kill her unless the President of the United States secured the release of an identified person who was a citizen of Ruritania and was held in a prison of the state of Aurora in the United States pursuant to a valid conviction by that state. The President responded by entering into an agreement with Ruritania which provided that Ruritania would secure the release of the United States ambassador on a specified date in return for action by the President that would secure the release of the identified person held in the Aurora prison. The President then ordered the governor of Aurora to release the prisoner in question. The governor refused. No federal statutes are applicable. Which of the following is the strongest constitutional argument for the authority of the President to take action in these circumstances requiring the governor of Aurora to release the Aurora prisoner?
A. The power of the President to conduct the foreign affairs of the United States includes a plenary authority to take whatever action the President deems wise to protect the safety of our diplomatic agents.
B. The power of the President to appoint ambassadors authorizes him to take any action that he may think desirable to protect them from injury because, upon appointment, those officials become agents of the President. agents of the President. 
C. The power of the President to negotiate with foreign nations impliedly authorizes the President to make executive agreements with them which prevail over state law.
D. The duty of the President to execute faithfully the laws authorizes him to resolve finally any conflicts between state and federal interests, making the determination of such matters wholly nonjusticiable. 
Answer: C
Damson was charged with murder, and Wagner testified for the prosecution. On crossexamination of Wagner, Damson seeks to elicit an admission that Wagner was also charged with the same murder and that the prosecutor told her, "If you testify against Damson, we will drop the charges against you after the conclusion of Damson's trial." The evidence about the prosecutor's promise is 
A. admissible, as proper impeachment of Wagner. 
B. admissible, as an admission by an agent of a party-opponent. 
C. inadmissible, because the law encourages plea-bargaining. 
D. inadmissible, because the evidence is hearsay not within any exception. 
Answer: A
On November 1, Debbit, an accountant, and Barrister, a lawyer, contracted for the sale by Debbit to Barrister of the law books Debbit had inherited from his father. Barrister agreed to pay the purchase price of $10,000 when Debbit delivered the books on December 1. On November 10, Barrister received a signed letter from Debbit that stated: "I have decided to dispose of the book stacks containing the law books you have already purchased. If you want the stacks, I will deliver them to you along with the books on December 1 at no additional cost to you. Let me know before November 15 whether you want them. I will not sell them to anyone else before then." On November 14, Barrister faxed and Debbit received November 14, Barrister faxed and Debbit received the following message: "I accept your offer of the stacks." Debbit was not a merchant with respect to either law books or book stacks. Debbit is contractually obligated to deliver the stacks because 
A. Barrister provided a new bargained-for exchange by agreeing to take the stacks.
B. Debbit's letter (received by Barrister on November 10) and Barrister's faxmessage of November 14 constituted an effective modification of the original sale-of-books contract.
C. Barrister's fax-message of November 14 operated to rescind unilaterally the original sale-of-books contract.
D. Debbit's letter (received by Barrister on November 10) waived the bargained-for consideration that would otherwise be required.
Answer: B
On November 1, Debbit, an accountant, and Barrister, a lawyer, contracted for the sale by Debbit to Barrister of the law books Debbit had inherited from his father. Barrister agreed to pay the purchase price of $10,000 when Debbit delivered the books on December 1. On November 10, Barrister received a signed letter from Debbit that stated: "I have decided to dispose of the book stacks containing the law books you have already purchased. If you want the stacks, I will deliver them to you along with the books on December 1 at no additional cost to you. Let me know before November 15 whether you want them. I will not sell them to anyone else before then." On November 14, Barrister faxed and Debbit received November 14, Barrister faxed and Debbit received the following message: "I accept your offer of the stacks." Debbit was not a merchant with respect to either law books or book stacks. For this question only, assume that on November 12 Debbit told Barrister that he had November 12 Debbit told Barrister that he had decided not to part with the stacks. Will this communication operate as a legally effective revocation of his offer to deliver the stacks? 
A. Yes, because Barrister had a pre-existing obligation to pay $10,000 for the law books. 
B. Yes, because Debbit was not a merchant with respect to book stacks. 
C. No, because Debbit had given a signed assurance that the offer would be held open until November 15. 
D. No, because by delaying his acceptance until November 14, Barrister detrimentally relied on Debbit's promise not to sell the stacks to anyone else in the meantime. 
Answer: B
Seller owned Blackacre, improved with an aging four-story warehouse. The warehouse was built to the lot lines on all four sides. On the street side, recessed loading docks permitted semi-trailers to be backed in. After the tractors were unhooked, the trailers extended into the street and occupied most of one lane of the street. Over the years, as trailers became larger, the blocking of the street became more severe. The municipality advised Seller that the loading docks could not continue to be used because the trailers blocked the street; it gave Seller 90 days to cease and desist. During the 90 days, Seller sold and conveyed Blackacre by warranty deed for a substantial consideration to Buyer. The problem of the loading docks was not discussed in the negotiations. Upon expiration of the 90 days, the municipality required Buyer to stop using the loading docks. This action substantially reduced the value of Blackacre. Buyer brought an appropriate action against Seller seeking cancellation of the deed and return of all monies paid. Such action should be based upon a claim of 
A. misrepresentation.
B. breach of the covenant of warranty.
C. failure of consideration.
D. mutual mistake.
Answer: A
Prescott sued Doxie for fraud. After verdict for Prescott, Doxie talked with juror Wall about the trial. Doxie's motion for a new trial would be most likely granted if Wall is willing to testify that he voted for Prescott because he 
A. misunderstood the judge's instructions concerning the standard of proof in a fraud case.
B. was feeling ill and needed to get home quickly.
C. relied on testimony that the judge had stricken and ordered the jury to disregard.
D. learned from a court clerk that Doxie had (D) learned from a court clerk that Doxie had been accused of fraud in several recent lawsuits.
Answer: D
Despondent over losing his job, Wilmont drank all night at a bar. While driving home, he noticed a car following him and, in his intoxicated state, concluded he was being followed by robbers. In fact, a police car was following him on suspicion of drunk driving. In his effort to get away, Wilmont sped through a stop sign and struck and killed a pedestrian. He was arrested by the police. Wilmont is prosecuted for manslaughter. He should be 
A. acquitted, because he honestly believed he faced an imminent threat of death or severe bodily injury. 
B. acquitted, because his intoxication prevented him from appreciating the risk he created. 
C. convicted, because he acted recklessly and in fact was in no danger. 
D. convicted, because he acted recklessly and his apprehension of danger was not reasonable. 
Answer: D
Ody, owner of Profitacre, executed an instrument in the proper form of a deed, purporting to convey Profitacre "to Leon for life, then to Ralph in fee simple." Leon, who is Ody's brother and Ralph's father, promptly began to manage Profitacre, which is valuable income-producing real estate. Leon collected all rents and paid all expenses, including real estate taxes. Ralph did not object, and this state of affairs continued for five years until 1987. In that year, Leon executed an instrument in the proper form of a deed, purporting to convey Profitacre to Mona. Ralph, no admirer of Mona, asserted his right to ownership of Profitacre. Mona asserted her ownership and said that if Ralph had any rights he was obligated to pay real estate taxes, even though Leon had been kind enough to pay them in the past. Income from Profitacre is ample to cover expenses, including real estate taxes. In an appropriate action to determine the rights of the parties, the court should decide 
A. Leon's purported deed forfeited his life estate, so Ralph owns Profitacre in fee simple. 
B. Mona owns an estate for her life, is entitled to all income, and must pay real estate taxes; Ralph owns the remainder interest. 
C. Mona owns an estate for the life of Leon, is entitled to all income, and must pay real estate taxes; Ralph owns the remainder interest. 
D. Mona owns an estate for the life of Leon and is entitled to all income; Ralph owns the remainder interest, and must pay real estate taxes. 
Answer: C
Homer and Ethel were jointly in possession of Greenacre in fee simple as tenants in common. They joined in a mortgage of Greenacre to They joined in a mortgage of Greenacre to Fortunoff Bank. Homer erected a fence along what he considered to be the true boundary between Greenacre and the adjoining property, owned by Mitchell. Shortly thereafter, Homer had an argument with Ethel and gave up his possession to Greenacre. The debt secured by the mortgage had not been paid. Mitchell surveyed his land and found that the fence erected a year earlier by Homer did not follow the true boundary. Part of the fence was within Greenacre. Part of the fence encroached on Mitchell's land. Mitchell and Ethel executed an agreement fixing the boundary line in accordance with the fence constructed by Homer. The agreement, which met all the formalities required in the jurisdiction, was promptly and properly recorded. A year after the agreement was recorded, Homer temporarily reconciled his differences with Ethel and resumed joint possession of Greenacre. Thereafter, Homer repudiated the boundary line agreement and brought an appropriate action against Mitchell and Ethel to quiet title along the original true boundary. In such action, Homer will 
A. win, because Fortunoff Bank was not a party to the agreement. 
B. win, because one tenant in common cannot bind another tenant in common to a boundary line agreement. 
C. lose, because the agreement, as a matter of law, was mutually beneficial to Ethel and Homer. 
D. lose, because Ethel was in sole possession of said premises at the time the agreement was signed. 
Answer: B
At the trial of an action against Grandmother on behalf of Patrick, the following evidence has been introduced. Grandson and his friend, Patrick, both aged eight, were visiting at Grandmother's house when, while exploring Grandmother's house when, while exploring the premises, they discovered a hunting rifle in an unlocked gun cabinet. They removed it from the cabinet and were examining it when the rifle, while in Grandson's hands, somehow discharged. The bullet struck and injured Patrick. The gun cabinet was normally locked. Grandmother had opened it for dusting several days before the boys' visit, and had then forgotten to relock it. She was not aware that it was unlocked when the boys arrived. If the defendant moves for a directed verdict in her favor at the end of the plaintiff's case, that motion should be 
A. granted, because Grandmother is not legally responsible for the acts of Grandson. 
B. granted, because Grandmother did not recall that the gun cabinet was unlocked. 
C. denied, because a firearm is an inherently dangerous instrumentality. 
D. denied, because a jury could find that Grandmother breached a duty of care she owed to Patrick. 
Answer: D