ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
Agitator, a baseball fan, has a fierce temper and an extremely loud voice. Attending a baseball game in which a number of calls went against the home team, Agitator repeatedly stood up, brandished his fist, and angrily shouted, "Kill the umpires." The fourth time he engaged in this conduct, many other spectators followed Agitator in rising from their seats, brandishing fists, and shouting, "Kill the umpires." The home team lost the game. Although no violence ensued, spectators crowded menacingly around the umpires after the game. As a result, the umpires were able to leave the field and stadium only with the help of a massive police escort. For his conduct, Agitator was charged with inciting to riot and was convicted in a jury trial in state court. He appealed. The state supreme court reversed his conviction. In its opinion, the court discussed in detail decisions of the United States Supreme Court dealing with the First Amendment free speech clause as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. At the end of that discussion, however, the court stated that it "need not resolve how, on the basis of these cases," the United States Supreme Court would decide Agitator's case. "Instead," the court stated, "this court has always given the free-speech guarantee of the state's constitution the broadest possible interpretation. As a result, we hold that in this case, where no riot or other violence actually occurred, the state constitution does not permit this conviction for incitement to riot to stand." The United States Supreme Court grants a writ of certiorari to review this decision of the state supreme court. In this case, the United States Supreme Court should 
A. affirm the state supreme court's decision, because Agitator's ballpark shout is commonplace hyperbole that cannot, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, be punished. 
B. remand the case to the state supreme court with directions that it resolve the First and Fourteenth Amendment freespeech issue that it discussed in such detail.
C. dismiss the writ as improvidently granted, because the state supreme court's decision rests on an independent and adequate state law ground. 
D. reverse the decision of the state supreme court, because incitement to violent action is not speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Answer: C
The day after Seller completed the sale of his house and moved out, one of the slates flew off the roof during a windstorm. The slate struck Pedestrian, who was on the public sidewalk. Pedestrian was seriously injured. The roof is old and has lost several slates in ordinary windstorms on other occasions. If Pedestrian sues Seller to recover damages for his injuries, will Pedestrian prevail? 
A. Yes, because the roof was defective when Seller sold the house. 
B. Yes, if Seller should have been aware of the condition of the roof and should have realized that it was dangerous to persons outside the premises. 
C. No, because Seller was neither the owner nor the occupier of the house when Pedestrian was injured. 
D. No, if Pedestrian knew that in the past slates had blown off the roof during windstorms. 
Answer: B
On April 1, Owner and Buyer signed a writing in which Owner, "in consideration of $100 to be paid to Owner by Buyer," offered Buyer the right to purchase Greenacre for $100,000 within 30 days. The writing further provided, "This offer will become effective as an option only if and when the $100 consideration is in fact paid." On April 20, Owner, having received no payment or other communication from Buyer, sold and conveyed Greenacre to Citizen for $120,000. On April 21, Owner received a letter from Buyer enclosing a cashier's check for $100 payable to Owner and stating, "I am hereby exercising my option to purchase Greenacre and am prepared to close whenever you're ready." Which of the following, if proved, best supports Buyer's suit against Owner for breach of contract? 
A. Buyer was unaware of the sale to Citizen when Owner received the letter and check from Buyer on April 21.
B. On April 15, Buyer decided to purchase Greenacre, and applied for and obtained a commitment from Bank for a $75,000 loan to help finance the purchase. 
C. When the April 1 writing was signed, Owner said to Buyer, "Don't worry about the $100; the recital of  $100 to be paid' makes this deal binding." 
D. Owner and Buyer are both professional dealers in real estate.
Answer: A
On April 1, Owner and Buyer signed a writing in which Owner, "in consideration of $100 to be paid to Owner by Buyer," offered Buyer the right to purchase Greenacre for $100,000 within 30 days. The writing further provided, "This offer will become effective as an option only if and when the $100 consideration is in fact paid." On April 20, Owner, having received no payment or other communication from Buyer, sold and conveyed Greenacre to Citizen for $120,000. On April 21, Owner received a letter from Buyer enclosing a cashier's check for $100 payable to Owner and stating, "I am hereby exercising my option to purchase Greenacre and am prepared to close whenever you're ready." Assume that, for whatever reason, Buyer prevails in the suit against Owner. Which of the following is Buyer entitled to recover? 
A. Nominal damages only, because the remedy of specific performance was not available to Buyer. 
B. The fair market value, if any, of an assignable option to purchase Greenacre for $100,000. 
C. $20,000, plus the amount, if any, by which the fair market value of Greenacre on the date of Owner's breach exceeded $120,000. 
D. The amount, if any, by which the fair market value of Greenacre on the date of Owner's breach exceeded $100,000.
Answer: D
Alpha and Beta owned Greenacre, a large farm, in fee simple as tenants in common, each owning an undivided one-half interest. For five years Alpha occupied Greenacre and conducted farming operations. Alpha never accounted to Beta for any income but Alpha did pay all real estate taxes when the taxes were due and kept the buildings located on Greenacre insured against loss from fire, storm, and flood. Beta lived in a distant city and was interested only in realizing a profit from the sale of the land when market conditions produced the price Beta wanted. Alpha died intestate survived by Hera, Alpha's sole heir. Thereafter Hera occupied Greenacre but was inexperienced in farming operations. The result was a financial disaster. Hera failed to pay real estate taxes for two years. The appropriate governmental authority held a tax sale to recover the taxes due. At such sale Beta was the only bidder and obtained a conveyance from the appropriate governmental authority upon payment of an amount sufficient to discharge the amounts due for taxes, plus interest and penalties, and the costs of holding the tax sale. The amount paid was one-third of the reasonable market value of Greenacre. Thereafter Beta instituted an appropriate action against Hera to quiet title in and to recover possession of Greenacre. Hera asserted all defenses available to Hera. Except for the statutes related to real estate taxes and tax sales, there is no applicable statute. In this lawsuit, Beta is entitled to a decree quieting title so that Beta is the sole owner in fee simple of Greenacre 
A. because Beta survived Alpha.
B. because Hera defaulted in the obligations undertaken by Alpha.
C. unless Hera pays Beta one-half of the reasonable market value of Greenacre.
D. unless Hera pays Beta one-half of the amount Beta paid for the tax deed.
Answer: D
Eighteen-year-old Kenneth and his 14year-old girlfriend, Emma, made plans to meet in Kenneth's apartment to have sexual intercourse, and they did so. Emma later told her mother about the incident. Kenneth was charged with statutory rape and conspiracy to commit statutory rape. In the jurisdiction, the age of consent is 15, and the law of conspiracy is the same as at common law. Kenneth was convicted of both charges and given consecutive sentences. On appeal, he contends that his conspiracy conviction should be reversed. That conviction should be 
A. affirmed, because he agreed with Emma to commit the crime. 
B. reversed, because Emma could not be a conspirator to this crime. 
C. reversed, because the crime is one that can only be committed by agreement and thus Wharton's Rule bars conspiracy liability. 
D. reversed, because one cannot conspire with a person too young to consent.
Answer: B
Sam decided to kill his boss, Anna, after she told him that he would be fired if his work did not improve. Sam knew Anna was scheduled to go on a business trip on Monday morning. On Sunday morning, Sam went to the company parking garage and put a bomb in the company car that Anna usually drove. The bomb was wired to go off when the car engine started. Sam then left town. At 5 a.m. Monday, Sam, after driving all night, was overcome with remorse and had a change of heart. He called the security officer on duty at the company and told him about the bomb. The security officer said he would take care of the matter. An hour later, the officer put a note on Anna's desk telling her of the message. He then looked at the car but could not see any signs of a bomb. He printed a sign saying "DO NOT USE THIS CAR," put it on the windshield, and went to call the police. Before the police arrived, Lois, a company vice president, got into the car and started the engine. The bomb went off, killing her. The jurisdiction defines murder in the first degree as any homicide committed with premeditation and deliberation or any murder in the commission of a common-law felony. Second-degree murder is defined as all other murder at common law. Manslaughter is defined by the common law. Sam is guilty of 
A. murder in the first degree, because, with premeditation and deliberation, he killed whoever would start the car. 
B. murder in the second degree, because he had no intention of killing Lois. 
C. manslaughter, because at the time of the explosion, he had no intent to kill, and the death of Lois was in part the fault of the security officer. 
D. only attempted murder of Anna, because the death of Lois was the result of the security officer's negligence. 
Answer: A
The state of Green imposes a tax on the "income" of each of its residents. As defined in the taxing statute, "income" includes the fair rental value of the use of any automobile provided by the taxpayer's employer for the taxpayer's personal use. The federal government supplies automobiles to some of its employees who are resident in Green so that they may perform their jobs properly. A federal government employee supplied with an automobile for this purpose may also use it for the employee's own personal business. Assume there is no federal legislation on this subject. May the state of Green collect this tax on the fair rental value of the personal use of the automobiles furnished by the federal government to these employees? 
A. No, because such a tax would be a tax on the United States. 
B. No, because such a tax would be a tax upon activities performed on behalf of the United States, since the automobiles are primarily used by these federal employees in the discharge of their official duties. 
C. Yes, because the tax is imposed on the employees rather than on the United States, and the tax does not discriminate against persons who are employed by the United States. 
D. Yes, because an exemption from such state taxes for federal employees would be a denial to others of the equal protection of the laws.
Answer: C
Orderly, a male attendant who worked at Hospital, had sexual relations with Patient, a severely retarded person, in her room at Hospital. In a tort action brought on Patient's behalf against Hospital, Patient will 
A. not prevail, if Orderly's actions were outside the scope of his employment. 
B. not prevail, if Patient initiated the relationship with Orderly and encouraged his actions. 
C. prevail, if Orderly was an employee of Hospital. 
D. prevail, if Hospital failed to use reasonable care to protect Patient from such conduct. 
Answer: D
Passenger is suing Defendant for injuries suffered in the crash of a small airplane, alleging that Defendant had owned the plane and negligently failed to have it properly maintained. Defendant has asserted in defense that he never owned the plane or had any responsibility to maintain it. At trial, Passenger calls Witness to testify that Witness had sold to Defendant a liability insurance policy on the plane. The testimony of Witness is 
A. inadmissible, because the policy itself is required under the original document rule. 
B. inadmissible, because of the rule against proof of insurance where insurance is not itself at issue. 
C. admissible to show that Defendant had little motivation to invest money in maintenance of the airplane.
D. admissible as some evidence of Defendant's ownership of or responsibility for the airplane.
Answer: D
Opal owned several vacant lots in ABC Subdivision. She obtained a $50,000 loan from a lender, Bank, and executed and delivered to Bank a promissory note and mortgage describing Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The mortgage was promptly and properly recorded. Upon payment of $10,000, Opal obtained a release of Lot 2 duly executed by Bank. She altered the instrument of release to include Lot 5 as well as Lot 2 and recorded it. Opal thereafter sold Lot 5 to Eva, an innocent purchaser, for value. Bank discovered that the instrument of release had been altered and brought an appropriate action against Opal and Eva to set aside the release as it applied to Lot 5. Opal did not defend against the action, but Eva did. The recording act of the jurisdiction provides: "No unrecorded conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value without notice, who shall first record." The court should rule for 
A. Eva, because Bank was negligent in failing to check the recordation of the release. 
B. Eva, because she was entitled to rely on the recorded release. 
C. Bank, because Eva could have discovered the alteration by reasonable inquiry. 
D. Bank, because the alteration of the release was ineffective. 
Answer: D
Jones, a marijuana farmer, had been missing for several months. The sheriff's department received an anonymous tip that Miller, a rival marijuana farmer, had buried Jones in a hillside about 200 yards from Miller's farmhouse. Sheriff's deputies went to Miller's farm. They cut the barbed wire that surrounded the hillside and entered, looking for the grave. They also searched the adjacent fields on Miller's farm that were within the area enclosed by the barbed wire and discovered clothing that belonged to Jones hanging on a scarecrow. Miller observed their discovery and began shooting. The deputies returned the fire. Miller dashed to his pickup truck to escape. Unable to start the truck, he fled across a field toward the barn. A deputy tackled him just as he entered the barn. As Miller attempted to get up, the deputy pinned his arms behind his back. Another deputy threatened, "Tell us what you did with Jones or we will shut you down and see your family on relief." Miller responded that he had killed Jones in a fight but did not report the incident because he did not want authorities to enter his land and discover his marijuana crop. Instead, he buried him behind the barn. Miller was thereafter charged with murder. If Miller moves to suppress his admission about killing his neighbor, the court should 
A. grant the motion, because Miller did not voluntarily waive his right to silence. 
B. grant the motion, because the statement was the product of the warrantless entry and search of Miller's farm. 
C. deny the motion, because the deputy was in hot pursuit when he questioned Miller. 
D. deny the motion, because Miller was questioned during a police emergency search. 
Answer: A
Jones, a marijuana farmer, had been missing for several months. The sheriff's department received an anonymous tip that Miller, a rival marijuana farmer, had buried Jones in a hillside about 200 yards from Miller's farmhouse. Sheriff's deputies went to Miller's farm. They cut the barbed wire that surrounded the hillside and entered, looking for the grave. They also searched the adjacent fields on Miller's farm that were within the area enclosed by the barbed wire and discovered clothing that belonged to Jones hanging on a scarecrow. Miller observed their discovery and began shooting. The deputies returned the fire. Miller dashed to his pickup truck to escape. Unable to start the truck, he fled across a field toward the barn. A deputy tackled him just as he entered the barn. As Miller attempted to get up, the deputy pinned his arms behind his back. Another deputy threatened, "Tell us what you did with Jones or we will shut you down and see your family on relief." Miller responded that he had killed Jones in a fight but did not report the incident because he did not want authorities to enter his land and discover his marijuana crop. Instead, he buried him behind the barn. Miller was thereafter charged with murder. If Miller moves to exclude the introduction of Jones's clothing into evidence, the court should 
A. grant the motion, because the deputies had not obtained a warrant. 
B. grant the motion, because the deputies' conduct in its entirety violated Miller's right to due process of law. 
C. deny the motion, because Miller had no expectation of privacy in the fields around his farmhouse. 
D. deny the motion, because the clothing was not Miller's property.
Answer: C
Passenger departed on an ocean liner knowing that it would be a rough voyage due to predicted storms. The ocean liner was not equipped with the type of lifeboats required by the applicable statute. Passenger was swept overboard and drowned in a storm so heavy that even a lifeboat that conformed to the statute could not have been launched. In an action against the operator of the ocean liner brought by Passenger's representative, will Passenger's representative prevail? 
A. Yes, because the ocean liner was not equipped with the statutorily required lifeboats. 
B. Yes, because in these circumstances common carriers are strictly liable. 
C. No, because the storm was so severe that it would have been impossible to launch a statutorily required lifeboat. 
D. No, because Passenger assumed the risk by boarding the ocean liner knowing that it would be a rough voyage. 
Answer: C
The King City zoning ordinance contains provisions restricting places of "adult entertainment" to two specified city blocks within the commercial center of the city. These provisions of the ordinance define "adult entertainment" as "live or filmed nudity or sexual activity, real or simulated, of an indecent nature." Sam proposes to operate an adult entertainment establishment outside the twoblock area zoned for such establishments but within the commercial center of King City. When his application for permission to do so is rejected solely because it is inconsistent with provisions of the zoning ordinance, he sues the appropriate officials of King City, seeking to enjoin them from enforcing the adult entertainment provisions of the ordinance against him. He asserts that these provisions of the ordinance violate the First Amendment as made applicable to King City by the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, the court hearing Sam's request for an injunction would probably hold that the adult entertainment provisions of the King City zoning ordinance are 
A. constitutional, because they do not prohibit adult entertainment everywhere in King City, and the city has a substantial interest in keeping the major part of its commercial center free of uses it considers harmful to that area. 
B. constitutional, because adult entertainment of the kind described in these provisions of the King City ordinance is not protected by the free speech guarantee of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
C. unconstitutional, because they prohibit in the commercial area of the city adult entertainment that is not "obscene" within the meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
D. unconstitutional, because zoning ordinances that restrict freedom of speech may be justified only by a substantial interest in preserving the quality of a community's residential neighborhoods.
Answer: A
On June 1, Seller and Buyer contracted in writing for the sale and purchase of Seller's cattle ranch (a large single tract), and to close the transaction on December 1. Assume the following facts. On October 1, Buyer told Seller, "I'm increasingly unhappy about our June 1 contract because of the current cattle market, and do not intend to buy your ranch unless I'm legally obligated to do so." If Seller sues Buyer on October 15 for breach of contract, Seller will probably 
A. win, because Buyer committed a total breach by anticipatory repudiation on October 1. 
B. win, because Buyer's October 1 statement created reasonable grounds for Seller's insecurity with respect to Buyer's performance. 
C. lose, because the parties contracted for the sale and conveyance of a single tract, and Seller cannot bring suit for breach of such a contract prior to the agreed closing date. 
D. lose, because Buyer's October 1 statement to Seller was neither a repudiation nor a present breach of the June 1 contract. 
Answer: D
On June 1, Seller and Buyer contracted in writing for the sale and purchase of Seller's cattle ranch (a large single tract), and to close the transaction on December 1. Assume the following facts. Buyer unequivocally repudiated the contract on August 1. On August 15, Seller urged Buyer to change her mind and proceed with the scheduled closing on December 1. On October 1, having heard nothing further from Buyer, Seller sold and conveyed his ranch to Rancher without notice to Buyer. On December 1, Buyer attempted to close under the June 1 contract by tendering the full purchase price to Seller. Seller rejected the tender. If Buyer sues Seller for breach of contract, Buyer will probably 
A. win, because Seller failed seasonably to notify Buyer of any pending sale to Rancher. 
B. win, because Seller waived Buyer's August 1 repudiation by urging her to retract it on August 15. 
C. lose, because Buyer did not retract her repudiation before Seller materially changed his position in reliance thereon by selling the ranch to Rancher. 
D. lose, because acceptance of the purchase price by Seller was a concurrent condition to Seller's obligation to convey the ranch to Buyer on December 1.
Answer: C