ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
Spender owed Midas $1,000, plus interest at 8% until paid, on a long-overdue promissory note, collection of which would become barred by the statute of limitations on June 30. On the preceding April 1, Spender and Midas both signed a writing in which Spender promised to pay the note in full on the following December 31, plus interest at 8% until that date, and Midas promised not to sue on the note in the meantime. Midas, having received some advice from his nonlawyer brother-in-law, became concerned about the legal effect of the April 1 agreement. On May 1, acting pro se as permitted by the rules of the local small claims court, he filed suit to collect the note. For this question only, assume that on January 2 of the following year Midas's suit has not come to trial, Spender has not paid the note, Midas has retained a lawyer, and the lawyer, with leave of court, amends the complaint to add a second count to enforce the promise Spender made in the April 1 agreement. Does the new count state a claim upon which relief can be granted? 
A. Yes, because Spender's failure to pay the note, plus interest, on December 31 makes Midas's breach of promise not to sue before that date no longer material. 
B. Yes, because Spender's April 1 promise is enforceable by reason of his moral obligation to pay the debt. 
C. No, because such relief would undermine the policy of the statute of limitations against enforcement of stale claims. 
D. No, because Spender's April 1 promise was lawfully conditioned upon Midas's forbearing to sue prior to December 31. 
Answer: D
Which of the following acts by the United States Senate would be constitutionally IMPROPER?
A. The Senate decides, with the House of Representatives, that a disputed state ratification of a proposed constitutional amendment is valid. 
B. The Senate determines the eligibility of a person to serve as a senator.
C. The Senate appoints a commission to adjudicate finally a boundary dispute between two states.
D. The Senate passes a resolution calling on the President to pursue a certain foreign policy.
Answer: C
While driving his car, Plaintiff sustained injuries in a three-car collision. Plaintiff sued the drivers of the other two cars, D-l and D-2, and each defendant crossclaimed against the other for contribution. The jurisdiction has adopted a rule of pure comparative negligence and allows contribution based upon proportionate fault. The rule of joint and several liability has been retained. The jury has found that Plaintiff sustained damages in the amount of $100,000, and apportioned the causal negligence of the parties as follows: Plaintiff 40%, D-l 30%, and D-2 30%. How much, if anything, can Plaintiff collect from D-l, and how much, if anything, can D-l then collect from D-2 in contribution? 
A. Nothing, and then D-l can collect nothing from D-2. 
B. $30,000, and then D-l can collect nothing from D-2. 
C. $40,000, and then D-l can collect $10,000 from D-2. 
D. $60,000, and then D-l can collect $30,000 from D-2. 
Answer: D
Hal and Wan owned Blackacre as joint tenants, upon which was situated a two-family house. Hal lived in one of the two apartments and rented the other apartment to Tent. Hal got in a fight with Tent and injured him. Tent obtained and properly filed a judgment for $10,000 against Hal. The statute in the jurisdiction reads: Any judgment properly filed shall, for ten years from filing, be a lien on the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the judgment is rendered. Wan, who lived in a distant city, knew nothing of Tent's judgment. Before Tent took any further action, Hal died. The common-law joint tenancy is unmodified by statute. Wan then learned the facts and brought an appropriate action against Tent to quiet title to Blackacre. The court should hold that Tent has 
A. a lien against the whole of Blackacre, because he was a tenant of both Hal and Wan at the time of the judgment. 
B. a lien against Hal's undivided onehalf interest in Blackacre, because his judgment was filed prior to Hal's death. 
C. no lien, because Wan had no actual notice of Tent's judgment until after Hal's death. 
D. no lien, because Hal's death terminated the interest to which Tent's lien attached. 
Answer: D
In litigation on a federal claim, Plaintiff had the burden of proving that Defendant received a notice. Plaintiff relied on the presumption of receipt by offering evidence that the notice was addressed to Defendant, properly stamped, and mailed. Defendant, on the other hand, testified that she never received the notice. Which of the following is correct? 
A. The jury must find that the notice was received.
B. The jury may find that the notice was received.
C. The burden shifts to Defendant to persuade the jury of nonreceipt.
D. The jury must find that the notice was not received, because the presumption has been rebutted and there is uncontradicted evidence of nonreceipt. 
Answer: B
In a medical malpractice suit by Payne against Dr. Dock, Payne seeks to introduce a properly authenticated photocopy of Payne's hospital chart. The chart contained a notation made by a medical resident that an aortic clamp had broken during Payne's surgery. The resident made the notation in the regular course of practice, but had no personal knowledge of the operation, and cannot remember which of the operating physicians gave him the information.The document is 
A. admissible as a record of regularly conducted activity.
B. admissible as recorded recollection.
C. inadmissible as a violation of the best evidence rule.
D. inadmissible, because it is hearsay within hearsay. 
Answer: A
Parr sued Davis for damages for physical injuries allegedly caused by Davis's violation of the federal civil rights law. The incident occurred wholly within the state of Chippewa but the case was tried in federal court. The Chippewa state code says, "The common-law privileges are preserved intact in this state." At trial, Davis called Dr. Webb, Parr's physician, to testify to confidential statements made to him by Parr in furtherance of medical treatment for the injuries allegedly caused by Davis. Parr objects, claiming a physicianpatient privilege. The court should apply 
A. state law and recognize the claim of privilege.
B. federal law and recognize the claim of privilege.
C. state law and reject the claim of privilege.
D. federal law and reject the claim of privilege.
Answer: D
In a prosecution of Dahle for assault, Wharton is called to testify that the victim, Valerian, had complained to Wharton that Dahle was the assailant. Wharton's testimony is most likely to be admitted if Wharton is 
A. a doctor, whom Valerian consulted for treatment. 
B. a minister, whom Valerian consulted for counseling. 
C. Valerian's husband, whom she telephoned immediately after the event. 
D. a police officer, whom Valerian called on instructions from her husband. 
Answer: C
Betty Bower, an adult, asked Jeff Geetus to lend her $1,000. Geetus replied that he would do so only if Bower's father, Cash, would guarantee the loan. At Bower's request, Cash mailed a signed letter to Geetus: "If you lend $1,000 to my daughter, I will repay it if she doesn't." On September 15, Geetus, having read Cash's letter, lent $1,000 to Bower, which Bower agreed to repay in installments of $100 plus accrued interest on the last day of each month beginning October 31. Cash died on September 16. Later that same day, unaware of Cash's death, Geetus mailed a letter to Cash advising that he had made the $1,000 loan to Bower on September 15. Bower did not pay the installments due on October 31, November 30, or December 31, and has informed Geetus that she will be unable to make repayments in the foreseeable future. On January 15, Geetus is entitled to a judgment against Bower for which of the following amounts? 
A. Nothing, because if he sues before the entire amount is due, he will be splitting his cause of action. 
B. $300 plus the accrued interest, because Bower's breach is only a partial breach. 
C. $1,000 plus the accrued interest, because Bower's unexcused failure to pay three installments is a material breach. 
D. $1,000 plus the accrued interest, because the failure to pay her debts as they come due indicates that Bower is insolvent and Geetus is thereby entitled to accelerate payment of the debt. 
Answer: B
Betty Bower, an adult, asked Jeff Geetus to lend her $1,000. Geetus replied that he would do so only if Bower's father, Cash, would guarantee the loan. At Bower's request, Cash mailed a signed letter to Geetus: "If you lend $1,000 to my daughter, I will repay it if she doesn't." On September 15, Geetus, having read Cash's letter, lent $1,000 to Bower, which Bower agreed to repay in installments of $100 plus accrued interest on the last day of each month beginning October 31. Cash died on September 16. Later that same day, unaware of Cash's death, Geetus mailed a letter to Cash advising that he had made the $1,000 loan to Bower on September 15. Bower did not pay the installments due on October 31, November 30, or December 31, and has informed Geetus that she will be unable to make repayments in the foreseeable future. For this question only, assume that Bower's entire $1,000 debt is due and that she has failed to repay any part of it. In an action by Geetus against Cash's estate for $1,000 plus accrued interest, which of the following, if any, will serve as (an) effective defense(s) for Cash's estate? I. There was no consideration to support Cash's promise, because he did not receive any benefit. II. Cash died before Geetus accepted his offer. III. Cash died before Geetus notified him that his offer had been accepted. 
A. I only.
B. II only.
C. I and III only.
D. Neither I nor II nor III.
Answer: D
At Darrow's trial for stealing an automobile, Darrow called a character witness, Goode, who testified that Darrow had an excellent reputation for honesty. In rebuttal, the prosecutor calls Wick to testify that he recently saw Darrow cheat on a college examination. This evidence should be 
A. admitted, because Darrow has "opened the door" to the prosecutor's proof of bad character evidence. 
B. admitted, because the cheating involves "dishonesty or false statement." 
C. excluded, because it has no probative value on any issue in the case. 
D. excluded, because Darrow's cheating can be inquired into only on crossexamination of Goode. 
Answer: D
The Federal Family Film Enhancement Act 100. assesses an excise tax of 10% on the price of admission to public movie theaters when they show films that contain actual or simulated scenes of human sexual intercourse. Which of the following is the strongest argument against the constitutionality of this federal act?
A. The act imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.
B. The act is not rationally related to any legitimate national interest.
C. The act violates the equal protection concepts embodied in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment because it imposes a tax on the price of admission to view certain films and not on the price of admission to view comparable live performances.
D. The act imposes a tax solely on the basis of the content of speech without adequate justification and, therefore, it is prohibited by the freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment. 
Answer: D
Desmond fell while attempting to climb a mountain, and lay unconscious and critically injured on a ledge that was difficult to reach. Pearson, an experienced mountain climber, was himself seriously injured while trying to rescue Desmond. Pearson's rescue attempt failed, and Desmond died of his injuries before he could be reached. Pearson brought an action against Desmond's estate for compensation for his injuries. In this jurisdiction, the traditional common-law rules relating to contributory negligence and assumption of risk remain in effect. Will Pearson prevail in his action against Desmond's estate? 
A. Yes, if his rescue attempt was reasonable. 
B. Yes, because the law should not discourage attempts to assist persons in helpless peril. 
C. No, unless Desmond's peril arose from his own failure to exercise reasonable care. 
D. No, because Pearson's rescue attempt failed and therefore did not benefit Desmond. 
Answer: C
At a party for coworkers at Defendant's home, Victim accused Defendant of making advances toward his wife. Victim and his wife left the party. The next day at work, Defendant saw Victim and struck him on the head with a softdrink bottle. Victim fell into a coma and died two weeks after the incident. This jurisdiction defines aggravated assault as an assault with any weapon or dangerous implement and punishes it as a felony. It defines murder as the unlawful killing of a person with malice aforethought or in the course of an independent felony. Defendant may be found guilty of murder 
A. only if the jury finds that Defendant intended to kill Victim.
B. only if the jury finds that Defendant did not act in a rage provoked by Victim's accusations.
C. if the jury finds that Defendant intended either to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm.
D. if the jury finds that the killing occurred in the course of an aggravated assault.
Answer: C
In preparation for a mountain-climbing expedition, Alper purchased the necessary climbing equipment from Outfitters, Inc., a retail dealer in sporting goods. A week later, Alper fell from a rock face when a safety device he had purchased from Outfitters malfunctioned because of a defect in its manufacture. Thereafter, Rollins was severely injured when he tried to reach and give assistance to Alper on the ledge to which Alper had fallen. Rollins's injury was not caused by any fault on his own part. If Rollins brings an action against Outfitters, Inc., to recover damages for his injuries, will Rollins prevail? 
A. No, unless Outfitters could have discovered the defect by a reasonable inspection of the safety device. 
B. No, because Rollins did not rely on the representation of safety implied from the sale of the safety device by Outfitters. 
C. Yes, unless Alper was negligent in failing to test the safety device. 
D. Yes, because injury to a person in Rollins's position was foreseeable if the safety device failed. 
Answer: D
Pitt sued Dill for damages for back injuries received in a car wreck. Dill disputed the damages and sought to prove that Pitt's disability, if any, resulted from a childhood horseback riding accident. Pitt admitted the childhood accident, but contended it had no lasting effect. Pitt calls Dr. Webb, an orthopedist who had never examined Pitt, and poses to Webb a hypothetical question as to the cause of the disability that omits any reference to the horseback riding accident. The question was not provided to opposing counsel before trial. The best ground for objecting to this question would be that 
A. Webb lacked firsthand knowledge concerning Pitt's condition.
B. the hypothetical question omitted a clearly significant fact.
C. hypothetical questions are no longer permitted.
D. sufficient notice of the hypothetical question was not given to opposing counsel before trial.
Answer: B
Daggett was prosecuted for murder of Vales, whose body was found one morning in the street near Daggett's house. The state calls Witt, a neighbor, to testify that during the night before the body was found he heard Daggett's wife scream, "You killed him! You killed him!" Witt's testimony is 
A. admissible as a report of a statement of belief.
B. admissible as a report of an excited utterance.
C. inadmissible, because it reports a privileged spousal communication. 
D. inadmissible on spousal immunity grounds, but only if the wife objects. 
Answer: B
Plaintiff was a passenger in a car that was struck in the rear by a car driven by First. The collision resulted from First's negligence in failing to keep a proper lookout. Plaintiff's physician found that the collision had aggravated a mild osteoarthritic condition in her lower back and had brought on similar, but new, symptoms in her neck and upper back. Six months after the first accident, Plaintiff was a passenger in a car that was struck in the rear by a car driven by Second. The collision resulted from Second's negligence in failing to keep a proper lookout. Plaintiff's physician found that the second collision had caused a general worsening of Plaintiff's condition, marked by a significant restriction of movement and muscle spasms in her back and neck. The physician believes Plaintiff's worsened condition is permanent, and he can find no basis for apportioning responsibility for her present worsened condition between the two automobile collisions. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against First and Second. At the close of Plaintiff's evidence, as outlined above, each of the defendants moved for a directed verdict in his favor on the ground that Plaintiff had failed to produce evidence on which the jury could determine how much damage each defendant had caused. The jurisdiction adheres to the common-law rules regarding joint and several liability. Plaintiff's best argument in opposition to the defendants' motions would be that the defendants are jointly and severally liable for Plaintiff's entire harm, because 
A. the wrongdoers, rather than their victim, should bear the burden of the impossibility of apportionment. 
B. the defendants breached a common duty that each of them owed to Plaintiff.
C. each of the defendants was the proximate cause in fact of all of Plaintiff's damages.
D. the defendants are joint tortfeasors who aggravated Plaintiff's preexisting condition.
Answer: A
Darby was prosecuted for sexually abusing his 13-year-old stepdaughter, Wendy. Wendy testified to Darby's conduct. On cross-examination, defense counsel asks Wendy, "Isn't it true that shortly before you complained that Darby abused you, he punished you for maliciously ruining some of his phonograph records?" The question is 
A. proper, because it relates to a possible motive for Wendy to accuse Darby falsely. 
B. proper, because Wendy's misconduct is relevant to her character for veracity. 
C. improper, because the incident had nothing to do with Wendy's truthfulness. 
D. improper, because it falls outside the scope of direct examination. 
Answer: A
David entered the county museum at a time when it was open to the public, intending to steal a Picasso etching. Once inside, he took what he thought was the etching from an unlocked display case and concealed it under his coat. However, the etching was a photocopy of an original that had been loaned to another museum. A sign over the display case containing the photocopy said that similar photocopies were available free at the entrance. David did not see the sign. Burglary in the jurisdiction is defined as "entering a building unlawfully with the intent to commit a crime." David is guilty of 
A. burglary and larceny.
B. burglary and attempted larceny.
C. larceny.
D. attempted larceny.
Answer: C
Insurance is provided in the state of Shoshone only by private companies. Although the state insurance commissioner inspects insurance companies for solvency, the state does not regulate their rates or policies. An insurance company charges higher rates for burglary insurance to residents of one part of a county in Shoshone than to residents of another section of the same county because of the different crime rates in those areas. Foster is a resident of that county who was charged the higher rate by the insurance company because of the location of her residence. Foster sues the insurance company, alleging that the differential in insurance rates unconstitutionally denies her the equal protection of the laws. Will Foster's suit succeed? 
A. Yes, because the higher crime rate in Foster's neighborhood demonstrates that the county police are not giving persons who reside there the equal protection of the laws. 
B. Yes, because the insurance rate differential is inherently discriminatory. 
C. No, because the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not applicable to the actions of these insurance companies. 
D. No, because there is a rational basis for the differential in insurance rates. 
Answer: C
Jack, a bank teller, was fired by Morgan, the president of the bank. Jack decided to take revenge against Morgan, but decided against attempting it personally, because he knew Morgan was protected around the clock by bank security guards. Jack knew that Chip had a violent temper and was very jealous. Jack falsely told Chip that Chip's wife, Elsie, was having an affair with Morgan. Enraged, Chip said, "What am I going to do?" Jack said, "If it were my wife, I'd just march into his office and blow his brains out." Chip grabbed a revolver and rushed to the bank. He walked into the bank, carrying the gun in his hand. One of the security guards, believing a holdup was about to occur, shot and killed Chip. If charged with murder of Chip, Jack should be found 
A. guilty, based upon extreme recklessness. 
B. guilty, based upon transferred intent. 
C. not guilty, because he did not intend for Chip to be shot by the security guard. 
D. not guilty, because he did not shoot Chip and he was not acting in concert with the security guard. 
Answer: A
Jack, a bank teller, was fired by Morgan, the president of the bank. Jack decided to take revenge against Morgan, but decided against attempting it personally, because he knew Morgan was protected around the clock by bank security guards. Jack knew that Chip had a violent temper and was very jealous. Jack falsely told Chip that Chip's wife, Elsie, was having an affair with Morgan. Enraged, Chip said, "What am I going to do?" Jack said, "If it were my wife, I'd just march into his office and blow his brains out." Chip grabbed a revolver and rushed to the bank. He walked into the bank, carrying the gun in his hand. One of the security guards, believing a holdup was about to occur, shot and killed Chip. If charged with attempted murder of Morgan, Jack should be found 
A. guilty, because he intended to kill Morgan and used Chip to carry out his plan. 
B. guilty, because he was extremely reckless as to Morgan. 
C. not guilty, because Morgan was never in imminent danger of being killed. 
D. not guilty, because Chip, if successful, would be guilty of no more than manslaughter and an accessory cannot be guilty of a higher crime than the principal. 
Answer: A
Sally told Michael she would like to have sexual intercourse with him and that he should come to her apartment that night at 7 p.m. After Michael arrived, he and Sally went into the bedroom. As Michael started to remove Sally's blouse, Sally said she had changed her mind. Michael tried to convince her to have intercourse with him, but after ten minutes of her sustained refusals, Michael left the apartment. Unknown to Michael, Sally was 15 years old. Because she appeared to be older, Michael believed her to be about 18 years old. A statute in the jurisdiction provides: "A person commits rape in the second degree if he has sexual intercourse with a girl, not his wife, who is under the age of 16 years." If Michael is charged with attempting to violate this statute, he is 
A. guilty, because no mental state is required as to the element of age. 
B. guilty, because he persisted after she told him she had changed her mind. 
C. not guilty, because he reasonably believed she had consented and voluntarily withdrew after she told him she had changed her mind. 
D. not guilty, because he did not intend to have intercourse with a girl under the age of 16. 
Answer: D