ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
John's father, Jeremiah, died in Hospital. Hospital maintains a morgue with refrigerated drawers a bit larger than a human body. Jeremiah's body was placed in such a drawer awaiting pickup by a mortician. Before the mortician called for the body, a Hospital orderly placed two opaque plastic bags in the drawer with Jeremiah's body. One bag contained Jeremiah's personal effects, and the other contained an amputated leg from some other Hospital patient. It is stipulated that Hospital was negligent to allow the amputated leg to get into Jeremiah's drawer. The mortician delivered the two opaque plastic bags to John, assuming both contained personal effects. John was shocked when he opened the bag containing the amputated leg. John sued Hospital to recover for his emotional distress. At the trial, John testified that the experience had been extremely upsetting, that he had had recurring nightmares about it, and that his family and business relationships had been adversely affected for a period of several months. He did not seek medical or psychiatric treatment for his emotional distress. Who should prevail? 
A. John, because of the sensitivity people have regarding the care of the bodies of deceased relatives. 
B. John, because hospitals are strictly liable for mishandling dead bodies. 
C. Hospital, because John did not require medical or psychiatric treatment. 
D. Hospital, because John suffered no bodily harm. 
Answer: A
Able was the owner of Greenacre, a large tract of land. Able entered into a binding written contract with Baker for the sale and purchase of Greenacre for $125,000. The contract required Able to convey marketable record title. Baker decided to protect his interest and promptly and properly recorded the contract. Thereafter, but before the date scheduled for the closing, Charlie obtained and properly filed a final judgment against Able in the amount of $1 million in a personal injury suit. A statute in the jurisdiction provides: "Any judgment properly filed shall, for ten years from filing, be a lien on the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the judgment is rendered." The recording act of the jurisdiction authorizes recording of contracts and also provides: "No conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value and without notice unless the same be recorded according to law." There are no other relevant statutory provisions. At the closing, Baker declined to accept the title of Able on the ground that Charlie's judgment lien encumbered the title he would receive and rendered it unmarketable. Able receive and rendered it unmarketable. Able brought an appropriate action against Baker for specific performance of the contract and joined Charlie as a party. In this action, the judgment should be for 
A. Able, because in equity a purchaser takes free of judgment liens. 
B. Able, because the contract had been recorded. 
C. Baker, because Able cannot benefit from Baker's action in recording the contract. 
D. Baker, because the statute creating judgment liens takes precedence over the recording act. 
Answer: B
Post sued Dint for dissolution of their yearlong partnership. One issue concerned the amount of money Post had received in cash. amount of money Post had received in cash. It was customary for Dint to give Post money from the cash register as Post needed it for personal expenses. Post testified that, as he received money, he jotted down the amounts in the partnership ledger. Although Dint had access to the ledger, he made no changes in it. The ledger was admitted into evidence. Dint seeks to testify to his memory of much larger amounts he had given Post. Dint's testimony is 
A. admissible, because it is based on Dint's firsthand knowledge. 
B. admissible, because the ledger entries offered by a party opponent opened the door. 
C. inadmissible, because the ledger is the best evidence of the amounts Post received. 
D. inadmissible, because Dint's failure to challenge the accuracy of the ledger constituted an adoptive admission. 
Answer: A
In a signed writing, Nimrod contracted to purchase a 25-foot travel trailer from Trailco for $15,000, cash on delivery no later than for $15,000, cash on delivery no later than June 1. Nimrod arrived at the Trailco sales lot on Sunday, May 31, to pay for and take delivery of the trailer, but refused to do so when he discovered that the spare tire was missing. Trailco offered to install a spare tire on Monday when its service department would open, but Nimrod replied that he did not want the trailer and would purchase another one elsewhere. Which of the following is accurate? 
A. Nimrod had a right to reject the trailer, but Trailco was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to cure the defect. 
B. Nimrod had a right to reject the trailer and terminate the contract under the perfect tender rule.
C. Nimrod was required to accept the trailer, because the defect could be readily cured. 
D. Nimrod was required to accept the trailer, because the defect did not substantially impair its value. substantially impair its value. 
Answer: A
Oker owned in fee simple two adjoining lots, Lots 1 and 2. He conveyed in fee simple Lot 1 to Frank. The deed was in usual form of a warranty deed with the following provision inserted in the appropriate place: "Grantor, for himself, his heirs and assigns, does covenant and agree that any reasonable expense incurred by grantee, his heirs and assigns, as the result of having to repair the retaining wall presently situated on Lot 1 at the common boundary with Lot 2, shall be reimbursed one-half the costs of repairs; and by this provision the parties intend a covenant running with the land." Frank conveyed Lot 1 in fee simple to Sara by warranty deed in usual and regular form. The deed omitted any reference to the retaining wall or any covenant. Fifty years after Oker's conveyance to Frank, Sara conveyed Lot 1 in fee simple to Tim by warranty deed in usual form; this deed omitted any reference to the retaining wall or the covenant. There is no statute that applies to any aspect of the problems presented except a recording act and a statute providing for acquisition of title after ten years of adverse possession. All conveyances by deeds were for a consideration equal to fair market value. The deed from Oker to Frank was never recorded. All other deeds were promptly and properly recorded. Lot 2 is now owned by Henry, who took by intestate succession from Oker, now dead. Tim expended $3,500 on the retaining wall. Then he obtained all of the original deeds in the chain from Oker to him. Shortly thereafter, Tim discovered the covenant in Oker's deed to Frank. He demanded that Henry pay $1,750, and when Henry refused, Tim instituted an appropriate action to recover that sum from Henry. In such action, Henry asserted all defenses available to him. defenses available to him. If judgment is for Henry, it will be because 
A. Tim is barred by adverse possession.
B. Frank's deed from Oker was never recorded.
C. Tim did not know about the covenant until after he had incurred the expenses and, hence, could not have relied on it. 
D. Tim's expenditures were not proved to be reasonable and customary.
Answer: D
While Prudence was leaving an elevator, it suddenly dropped several inches, causing her to fall. An investigation of the accident revealed that the elevator dropped because it had been negligently maintained by the Acme Elevator Company. Acme had a contract with the owner of the building to inspect and maintain the elevator. Prudence's fall severely aggravated a preexisting physical disability. If Prudence sues Acme Elevator Company for damages for her injuries, she should recover 
A. nothing, if Acme could not reasonably have been expected to foresee the extent of the harm that Prudence suffered as a result of the accident. 
B. nothing, if the accident would not have caused significant harm to an ordinarily prudent elevator passenger. 
C. damages for the full amount of her disability, because a tortfeasor must take its victim as it finds her. 
D. damages for the injury caused by the falling elevator, including the aggravation of her preexisting disability. 
Answer: D
Dix is on trial for killing Vetter. The prosecutor calls Winn to testify that after being shot, Vetter said, "Dix did it." Before the testimony is given, Dix's lawyer asks for a hearing on whether Vetter believed his death was imminent when he made the statement. Before permitting evidence of the dying declaration, the judge should hear evidence on the issue from 
A. both sides, with the jury not present, and decide whether Winn may testify to Vetter's statement. 
B. both sides, with the jury present, and decide whether Winn may testify to Vetter's statement. 
C. both sides, with the jury present, and allow the jury to determine whether Winn may testify to Vetter's statement. 
D. the prosecutor only, with the jury not present, and if the judge believes a jury could reasonably find that Vetter knew he was dying, permit Winn to testify to the statement, with Dix allowed to offer evidence on the issue as a part of the defendant's case. 
Answer: A
Police received an anonymous tip that Tusitala was growing marijuana in her backyard, which was surrounded by a 15-foot high, solid wooden fence. Officer Boa was unable to view the yard from the street, so he used a police helicopter to fly over Tusitala's house. Boa identified a large patch of marijuana plants growing right next to the house and used this observation to obtain a search warrant. Tusitala is prosecuted for possession of marijuana and moves to suppress use of the marijuana in evidence. The court should 
A. grant the motion, because the only purpose of Boa's flight was to observe the yard. 
B. grant the motion, because Tusitala had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage around her house and the police did not have a warrant. 
C. deny the motion, because a warrant is not required for a search of a residential yard. 
D. deny the motion, because Tusitala had no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial observation. 
Answer: D
Buyem faxed the following signed message to Zeller, his long-time widget supplier: "Urgently need blue widgets. Ship immediately three gross at your current list price of $600." Upon receipt of the fax, Zeller shipped three gross of red widgets to Buyem, and faxed to Buyem the following message: "Temporarily out of blue. In case red will help, am shipping three gross at the same price. Hope you can use them." Upon Buyem's timely receipt of both the shipment and Zeller's fax, which of the following best describes the rights and duties of Buyem and Zeller? 
A. Buyem may accept the shipment, in which case he must pay Zeller the list price, or he must reject the shipment and recover from Zeller for total breach of contract. 
B. Buyem may accept the shipment, in (B) Buyem may accept the shipment, in which case he must pay Zeller the list price, or he may reject the shipment, in which case he has no further rights against Zeller. 
C. Buyem may accept the shipment, in which case he must pay Zeller the list price, less any damages sustained because of the nonconforming shipment, or he may reject the shipment and recover from Zeller for total breach of contract, subject to Zeller's right to cure. 
D. Buyem may accept the shipment, in which case he must pay Zeller the list price, less any damages sustained because of the nonconforming shipment, or he may reject the shipment provided that he promptly covers by obtaining conforming widgets from another supplier. 
Answer: B
Members of a religious group calling itself the Friends of Lucifer believe in Lucifer as their Supreme Being. The members of this group meet once a year on top of Mt. Snow, located meet once a year on top of Mt. Snow, located in a U.S. National Park, to hold an overnight encampment and a midnight dance around a large campfire. They believe this overnight encampment and all of its rituals are required by Lucifer to be held on the top of Mt. Snow. U.S. National Park Service rules that have been consistently enforced prohibit all overnight camping and all campfires on Mt. Snow because of the very great dangers overnight camping and campfires would pose in that particular location. As a result, the park Superintendent denied a request by the Friends of Lucifer for a permit to conduct these activities on top of Mt. Snow. The park Superintendent, who was known to be violently opposed to cults and other unconventional groups had, in the past, issued permits to conventional religious groups to conduct sunrise services in other areas of that U.S. National Park. The Friends of Lucifer brought suit in Federal Court against the U.S. National Park Service and the Superintendent of the park to compel issuance of the requested permit. As a matter of constitutional law, the most appropriate result in this suit would be a decision that denial of the permit was 
A. invalid, because the free exercise clause of the First Amendment prohibits the Park Service from knowingly interfering with religious conduct. 
B. invalid, because these facts demonstrate that the action of the Park Service purposefully and invidiously discriminated against the Friends of Lucifer. 
C. valid, because the establishment clause of the First Amendment prohibits the holding of religious ceremonies on federal land. 
D. valid, because religiously motivated conduct may be subjected to nondiscriminatory time, place, and manner restrictions that advance important public interests. 
Answer: D
Park sued Davis Co. for injuries suffered in the crash of Park's dune buggy, allegedly caused by a defective auto part manufactured by Davis Co. Davis Co. claims that the part was a fraudulent imitation, not produced by Davis Co. Which of the following is NOT admissible on the issue of whether the part was manufactured by Davis Co.? 
A. The fact that the defective part bears Davis Co.'s insignia or trademark.
B. Testimony that the part was purchased from a parts house to which Davis Co. regularly sold parts.
C. The part itself and a concededly genuine part manufactured by Davis Co. (for the jury's comparison).
D. A judgment for another plaintiff against Davis Co. in another case involving substantially similar facts.
Answer: D
Anna entered into a valid written contract to purchase Blackacre, a large tract of land, from Jones for its fair market value of $50,000. The contract was assignable by Anna. Anna duly notified Jones to convey title to Anna and Charles, Charles being Anna's friend whom Anna had not seen for many years. When Anna learned that Charles would have to sign certain documents in connection with the closing, she prevailed upon her brother, Donald, to attend the closing and pretend to be Charles. Anna and Donald attended the closing, and Jones executed an instrument in the proper form of a deed, purporting to convey Blackacre to Anna and Charles, as tenants in common. Donald pretended that he was Charles, and he signed Charles's name to all the required documents. Anna provided the entire $50,000 consideration for the transaction. The deed was promptly and properly recorded. Unknown to Anna or Donald, Charles had died several months before the closing. Charles's will, which was duly probated, devised "All my real estate to my nephew, Nelson" and the residue of his estate to Anna. Anna and Nelson have been unable to agree as to the status or disposition of Blackacre. Nelson brought an appropriate action against Jones and Anna to quiet legal title to an undivided one-half interest in Blackacre. The court should hold that legal title to Blackacre is vested 
A. all in Jones.
B. all in Anna.
C. one-half in Anna and one-half in Jones.
D. one-half in Anna and one-half in Nelson.
Answer: C
Staff, Inc., a flour wholesaler, contracted to deliver to Eclaire, a producer of fine baked goods, her flour requirements for a one-year period. Before delivery of the first scheduled installment, Staff sold its business and "assigned" all of its sale contracts to Miller, Inc., another reputable and long-time flour Miller, Inc., another reputable and long-time flour wholesaler. Staff informed Eclaire of this transaction. For this question only, assume that when Miller tendered the first installment to Eclaire in compliance with the Staff-Eclaire contract, Eclaire refused to accept the goods. Which of the following arguments, if any, legally support(s) Eclaire's rejection of the goods? I. Executory requirements contracts are nonassignable. II. Duties under an executory bilateral contract are assumable only by an express promise to perform on the part of the delegatee. III. Language of "assignment" in the transfer for value of a bilateral sale-of-goods contract affects only a transfer of rights, not a delegation of duties. 
A. I only.
B. II and III only.
C. I and II and III.
D. Neither I nor II nor III.
Answer: D
Staff, Inc., a flour wholesaler, contracted to deliver to Eclaire, a producer of fine baked goods, her flour requirements for a one-year period. Before delivery of the first scheduled installment, Staff sold its business and "assigned" all of its sale contracts to Miller, Inc., another reputable and long-time flour Miller, Inc., another reputable and long-time flour wholesaler. Staff informed Eclaire of this transaction. For this question only, assume that Eclaire accepted Miller's delivery of the first installment under the Staff-Eclaire contract, but that Eclaire paid the contract price for that installment to Staff and refused to pay anything to Miller. In an action by Miller against Eclaire for the contractual amount of the first installment, which of the following, if any, will be an effective defense for Eclaire? I. Eclaire had not expressly agreed to accept Miller as her flour supplier. II. Eclaire's payment of the contractual installment to Staff discharged her obligation. III. Staff remained obligated to Eclaire even though Staff had assigned the contract to Miller. 
A. I only.
B. II only.
C. I and III only. (C) I and III only.
D. Neither I nor II nor III.
Answer: D
On October 22, Officer Jones submitted an application for a warrant to search 217 Elm Street for cocaine. In the application, Officer Jones stated under oath that he believed there was cocaine at that location because of information supplied to him on the morning of October 22 by Susie Schultz. He described Schultz as a cocaine user who had previously supplied accurate information concerning the use of cocaine in the community and summarized what Schultz had told him as follows: the previous night, October 21, Schultz was in Robert Redd's house at 217 Elm Street. Redd gave her cocaine. She also saw three cellophane bags containing cocaine in his bedroom. The warrant was issued and a search of 217 Elm Street was conducted on October 22. The search turned up a quantity of marijuana but no cocaine. Robert Redd was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana. Redd moved to suppress the use of the marijuana as evidence contending that Susie Schultz was not in 217 Elm Street on October 21 or at any other time. If, after hearing evidence, the judge concludes that the statement in the application attributed to Susie Schultz is incorrect, the judge should grant the motion to suppress 
A. because the application contains a material statement that is false.
B. because of the false statement and because no cocaine was found in the house.
C. only if he also finds that Susie Schultz's statement was a deliberate lie.
D. only if he also finds that Officer Jones knew the statement was false.
Answer: D
The Personnel Handbook of Green City contains all of that city's personnel policies. One section of the handbook states that One section of the handbook states that "where feasible and practicable supervisors are encouraged to follow the procedures specified in this Handbook before discharging a city employee." Those specified procedures include a communication to the employee of the reasons for the contemplated discharge and an opportunity for a pretermination trial-type hearing at which the employee may challenge those reasons. After a year of service, Baker, the secretary to the Green City Council, was discharged without receiving any communication of reasons for her contemplated discharge and without receiving an opportunity for a pretermination trial-type hearing. Baker files suit in federal district court to challenge her discharge solely on constitutional grounds. Which of the following best describes the initial burden of persuasion in that suit? 
A. The Green City Council must demonstrate that its personnel handbook created no constitutionally protected interest in city employment or in the procedures by which such employment is terminated.
B. The Green City Council must demonstrate that Baker's termination was for good cause.
C. Baker must demonstrate that state law creates a constitutionally protected interest in her employment or in the procedures by which her employment is terminated.
D. Baker must demonstrate that she reasonably believed that she could work for Green City for as long as she wished.
Answer: C
Dean was prosecuted in federal court for making threats against the President of the United States. Dean was a voluntary patient in a private psychiatric hospital and told a nurse, shortly before the President came to town, that Dean planned to shoot the President. The nurse reported the threat to FBI agents. Dean's motion to prevent the nurse from testifying is likely to be 
A. successful, because the statement was made in a medical setting. 
B. successful, because the nurse violated a confidence in reporting the statement. 
C. unsuccessful, because the statement was not within any privilege. 
D. unsuccessful, because Dean had not been committed involuntarily by court order. 
Answer: C
Able, who owned Blackacre, a residential lot improved with a dwelling, conveyed it for a valuable consideration to Baker. The dwelling had been constructed by a prior owner. Baker had inspected Blackacre prior to the purchase and discovered no defects. After moving in, Baker became aware that sewage seeped into the basement when the toilets were flushed. Able said that this defect had been present for years and that he had taken no steps to hide the facts from Baker. Baker paid for the necessary repairs and brought an appropriate action against Able to recover his cost of repair. If Baker wins, it will be because 
A. Able failed to disclose a latent defect.
B. Baker made a proper inspection.
C. the situation constitutes a health hazard.
D. Able breached the implied warranty of habitability and fitness for purpose.
Answer: A
Gardner's backyard, which is landscaped with expensive flowers and shrubs, is adjacent to a golf course. While Driver was playing golf on the course, a thunderstorm suddenly came up. As Driver was returning to the clubhouse in his golf cart, lightning struck a tree on the course, and the tree began to fall in Driver's direction. In order to avoid being hit by the tree, Driver deliberately steered his cart onto Gardner's property, causing substantial damage to Gardner's expensive plantings. damage to Gardner's expensive plantings. In an action by Gardner against Driver to recover damages for the harm to his plantings, Gardner will 
A. prevail, because, although occasioned by necessity, Driver's entry onto Gardner's property was for Driver's benefit. 
B. prevail, for nominal damages only, because Driver was privileged to enter Gardner's property. 
C. not prevail, because the lightning was an act of God. 
D. not prevail, because Driver's entry onto Gardner's property was occasioned by necessity and therefore privileged. 
Answer: A