ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
Alford was a suspect in a homicide committed during a robbery of a liquor store. Barber was a friend of Alford. Police telephoned Barber and asked if he would help locate Alford. Barber agreed and met the police officers at headquarters later that night. After a discussion during which police asked questions about Alford and the homicide, Barber said that he wanted to get something "off his chest" and advised the officers that he was in on the robbery but that Alford had shot the owner of the store without his permission or prior knowledge. The officers then for the first time gave Barber his Miranda warnings. Barber was indicted for felony murder. He moved to prevent the introduction of his statement into evidence. His motion should be
A. granted, because Barber was effectively in custody and entitled to receive Miranda warnings at the beginning of the discussion. 
B. granted, because Barber's rights to counsel and to due process were violated by the interrogation at police headquarters. 
C. denied, because his statement was freely and voluntarily given and he was not entitled to Miranda warnings. 
D. denied, because by visiting headquarters voluntarily, Barber waived his right to receive Miranda warnings at the beginning of the discussion
Answer: C
The federal government has complete jurisdiction over certain parkland located within the state of Plains. To conserve the wildlife that inhabits that land, the federal government enacts a statute forbidding all hunting of animals in the federal park. That statute also forbids the hunting of animals that have left the federal park and have entered the state of Plains. Hanson has a hunting license from the state of Plains authorizing him to hunt deer anywhere in the state. On land within the state of Plains located adjacent to the federal park, Hanson shoots a deer he knows has recently left the federal land. Hanson is prosecuted for violating the federal hunting law. The strongest ground supporting the constitutionality of the federal law forbidding the hunting of wild animals that wander off federal property is that
A. this law is a necessary and proper means of protecting United States property.
B. the animals are moving in the stream of interstate commerce.
C. the police powers of the federal government encompass protection of wild animals.
D. shooting wild animals is a privilege, not a right
Answer: A
Poe ordered some merchandise from Store. When the merchandise was delivered, Poe decided that it was not what he had ordered, and he returned it for credit. Store refused to credit Poe's account, continued to bill him, and, after 90 days, turned the account over to Kane, a bill collector, for collection. Kane called at Poe's house at 7 p.m. on a summer evening while many of Poe's neighbors were seated on their porches. When Poe opened the door, Kane, who was standing just outside the door, raised an electrically amplified bullhorn to his mouth. In a voice that could be heard a block away, Kane called Poe a "deadbeat" and asked him when he intended to pay his bill to Store. Poe, greatly angered, slammed the door shut. The door struck the bullhorn and jammed it forcibly against Kane's face. As a consequence, Kane lost his front teeth."If Poe asserts a claim based on defamation against Kane, will Poe prevail?
A. Yes, if Kane's remarks were heard by any of Poe's neighbors. 
B. Yes, because Kane's conduct was extreme and outrageous. 
C. No, unless Kane knew that Poe owed no money to Store. 
D. No, unless Poe suffered some special damage
Answer: D
Poe ordered some merchandise from Store. When the merchandise was delivered, Poe decided that it was not what he had ordered, and he returned it for credit. Store refused to credit Poe's account, continued to bill him, and, after 90 days, turned the account over to Kane, a bill collector, for collection. Kane called at Poe's house at 7 p.m. on a summer evening while many of Poe's neighbors were seated on their porches. When Poe opened the door, Kane, who was standing just outside the door, raised an electrically amplified bullhorn to his mouth. In a voice that could be heard a block away, Kane called Poe a "deadbeat" and asked him when he intended to pay his bill to Store. Poe, greatly angered, slammed the door shut. The door struck the bullhorn and jammed it forcibly against Kane's face. As a consequence, Kane lost his front teeth.""If Poe asserts a claim based on intentional . If Poe asserts a claim based on intentional infliction of emotional distress against Kane, will Poe prevail?
A. Yes, because Kane's conduct was extreme and outrageous. 
B. Yes, because Kane was intruding on Poe's property. 
C. No, unless Poe suffered physical harm. 
D. No, if Poe still owed Store for the merchandise.
Answer: A
Poe ordered some merchandise from Store. When the merchandise was delivered, Poe decided that it was not what he had ordered, and he returned it for credit. Store refused to credit Poe's account, continued to bill him, and, after 90 days, turned the account over to Kane, a bill collector, for collection. Kane called at Poe's house at 7 p.m. on a summer evening while many of Poe's neighbors were seated on their porches. When Poe opened the door, Kane, who was standing just outside the door, raised an electrically amplified bullhorn to his mouth. In a voice that could be heard a block away, Kane called Poe a "deadbeat" and asked him when he intended to pay his bill to Store. Poe, greatly angered, slammed the door shut. The door struck the bullhorn and jammed it forcibly against Kane's face. As a consequence, Kane lost his front teeth."If Kane asserts a claim of battery against Poe, will Kane prevail?
A. Yes, because Poe had not first asked Kane to leave the property. 
B. Yes, if Poe knew that the door was substantially certain to strike the bullhorn. 
C. No, if Kane's conduct triggered Poe's response. 
D. No, because Kane was an intruder on Poe's propert
Answer: B
Eureka, Inc., inventor of the LBVC, a laser-beam vegetable chopper, ran a television ad that described the chopper and said, "The LBVC is yours for only $49.99 if you send your check or money order to Box 007, Greenville. Not available in stores." Gourmet, who owned a retail specialty shop, wrote Eureka, "What's your best firm price for two dozen LBVCs?" Eureka sent a written reply that said in its entirety, "We quote you for prompt acceptance $39.99 per unit for 24 LBVCs." Gourmet subsequently mailed a check to Eureka in the appropriate amount, with a memo enclosed saying, "I accept your offer for 24 LBVCs."A contract would arise from these communications only if
A. both parties were merchants.
B. Eureka had at least 24 LBVCs in stock when Gourmet's check and memo were received.
C. Gourmet's check and memo were mailed within three months after his receipt of Eureka's letter.
D. Gourmet's check and memo were mailed within a reasonable time after his receipt of Eureka's letter.
Answer: D
Eureka, Inc., inventor of the LBVC, a laser-beam vegetable chopper, ran a television ad that described the chopper and said, "The LBVC is yours for only $49.99 if you send your check or money order to Box 007, Greenville. Not available in stores." Gourmet, who owned a retail specialty shop, wrote Eureka, "What's your best firm price for two dozen LBVCs?" Eureka sent a written reply that said in its entirety, "We quote you for prompt acceptance $39.99 per unit for 24 LBVCs." Gourmet subsequently mailed a check to Eureka in the appropriate amount, with a memo enclosed saying, "I accept your offer for 24 LBVCs."For this question only, assume the following facts: Eureka shipped 24 LBVCs to Gourmet after receiving his check and memo, and with the shipment sent Gourmet an invoice that conspicuously stated, among other things, the following lawful provision: "These items shall not be offered for resale at retail." Gourmet received and read but disregarded the invoice restriction and displayed the 24 LBVCs for resale. Eureka has a cause of action against Gourmet for breach of contract only if
A. Eureka, as inventor of the LBVC, was not a merchant. 
B. the invoice restriction was a material alteration of preexisting terms.
C. Eureka's written reply that quoted $39.99 per LBVC but did not contain a restriction on retail sales, was not an offer that Gourmet accepted by ordering 24 LBVCs. 
D. Gourmet was consciously aware when taking delivery of the goods that the television ad had said, "Not available in stores.
Answer: C
Downs was indicted in state court for bribing a public official. During the course of the investigation, police had demanded and received from Downs's bank the records of Downs's checking account for the preceding two years. The records contained incriminating evidence. On the basis of a claim of violation of his constitutional rights, Downs moves to prevent the introduction of the records in evidence. His motion should be
A. granted, because a search warrant should have been secured for seizure of the records. 
B. granted, because the records covered such an extensive period of time that their seizure unreasonably invaded Downs's right of privacy. 
C. denied, because the potential destructibility of the records, coupled with the public interest in proper enforcement of the criminal laws, created an exigent situation justifying the seizure. 
D. denied, because the records were business records of the bank in which Downs had no legitimate expectation of privacy
Answer: D
Three states, East Winnetka, Midland, and West Hampton, are located next to one another in that order. The states of East Winnetka and West Hampton permit the hunting and trapping of snipe, but the state of Midland strictly forbids these activities in order to protect snipe, a rare species of animal, from extinction. The state of Midland has a state statute that provides, "Possession of snipe traps is prohibited. Any game warden finding a snipe trap within the state shall seize and destroy it." Snipe traps cost about $15 each. Prentis is a resident of West Hampton and an ardent snipe trapper. She drove her car to East Winnetka to purchase a new improved snipe trap from a manufacturer there. In the course of her trip back across Midland with the trap in her car, Prentis stopped in a Midland state park to camp for a few nights. While she was in that park, a Midland game warden saw the trap, which was visible on the front seat of her car. The warden seized the trap and destroyed it in accordance with the Midland statute after Prentis admitted that the seized item was a prohibited snipe trap. No federal statutes or federal administrative regulations apply.""For this question only, assume that Prentis demonstrates that common carriers are permitted to transport snipe traps as cargo across Midland for delivery to another state and that in practice the Midland statute is enforced only against private individuals transporting those traps in private vehicles. If Prentis challenges the application of the Midland statute to her on the basis only of a denial of equal protection, the application of the statute will probably be found
A. constitutional, because the traps constitute contraband in which Prentis could have no protected property interest. 
B. constitutional, because there is a rational basis for differentiating between the possession of snipe traps as interstate cargo by common carriers and the possession of snipe traps by private individuals. 
C. unconstitutional, because the state cannot demonstrate a compelling public purpose for making this differentiation between common carriers and such private individuals. 
D. unconstitutional, because interstate travel is a fundamental right that may not be burdened by state law
Answer: B
Three states, East Winnetka, Midland, and West Hampton, are located next to one another in that order. The states of East Winnetka and West Hampton permit the hunting and trapping of snipe, but the state of Midland strictly forbids these activities in order to protect snipe, a rare species of animal, from extinction. The state of Midland has a state statute that provides, "Possession of snipe traps is prohibited. Any game warden finding a snipe trap within the state shall seize and destroy it." Snipe traps cost about $15 each. Prentis is a resident of West Hampton and an ardent snipe trapper. She drove her car to East Winnetka to purchase a new improved snipe trap from a manufacturer there. In the course of her trip back across Midland with the trap in her car, Prentis stopped in a Midland state park to camp for a few nights. While she was in that park, a Midland game warden saw the trap, which was visible on the front seat of her car. The warden seized the trap and destroyed it in accordance with the Midland statute after Prentis admitted that the seized item was a prohibited snipe trap. No federal statutes or federal administrative regulations apply.""For this question only, assume that a valid federal administrative rule, adopted under a federal consumer product safety act, regulates the design of snipe traps. The rule was issued to prevent traps from causing injury to human beings, e.g., by pinching fingers while persons were setting the traps. No other federal law applies. Which of the following best states the effect of the federal rule on the Midland state statute?
A. The federal rule preempts the Midland state statute, because the federal rule regulates the same subject matter: snipe traps. 
B. The federal rule preempts the Midland state statute, because the federal rule does not contain affirmative authorization for continued state regulation. 
C. The federal rule does not preempt the Midland state statute, because the Midland state statute regulates wild animals, a field of exclusive state power. 
D. The federal rule does not preempt the Midland state statute, because the purposes of the federal rule and the Midland state statute are different.
Answer: D
Orris had title to Brownacre in fee simple. Without Orris' knowledge, Hull entered Brownacre in 1950 and constructed an earthen dam across a watercourse. The earthen dam trapped water that Hull used to water a herd of cattle he owned. After 12 years of possession of Brownacre, Hull gave possession of Brownacre to Burns. At the same time, Hull also purported to transfer his cattle and all his interests in the dam and water to Burns by a document that was sufficient as a bill of sale to transfer personal property but was insufficient as a deed to transfer real property. One year later, Burns entered into a lease with Orris to lease Brownacre for a period of five years. After the end of the five-year term of the lease, Burns remained on Brownacre for an additional three years and then left Brownacre. At that time Orris conveyed Brownacre by a quitclaim deed to Powell. The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 yearsAfter Orris's conveyance to Powell, title to Brownacre was in
A. Hull.
B. Orris.
C. Burns.
D. Powell
Answer: A
Orris had title to Brownacre in fee simple. Without Orris' knowledge, Hull entered Brownacre in 1950 and constructed an earthen dam across a watercourse. The earthen dam trapped water that Hull used to water a herd of cattle he owned. After 12 years of possession of Brownacre, Hull gave possession of Brownacre to Burns. At the same time, Hull also purported to transfer his cattle and all his interests in the dam and water to Burns by a document that was sufficient as a bill of sale to transfer personal property but was insufficient as a deed to transfer real property. One year later, Burns entered into a lease with Orris to lease Brownacre for a period of five years. After the end of the five-year term of the lease, Burns remained on Brownacre for an additional three years and then left Brownacre. At that time Orris conveyed Brownacre by a quitclaim deed to Powell. The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is 10 yearsAfter Orris's conveyance to Powell, title to the earthen dam was in
A. the person who then held title to Brownacre in fee simple.
B. Burns, as purchaser of the dam under the bill of sale. 
C. the person who then owned the water rights as an incident thereto.
D. Hull, as the builder of the dam
Answer: A
An issue in Parker's action against Daves for causing Parker's back injury was whether Parker's condition had resulted principally from a similar occurrence five years before, with which Daves had no connection. Parker called Watts, his treating physician, who offered to testify that when she saw Parker after the latest occurrence, Parker told her that before the accident he had been working full time, without pain or limitation of motion, in a job that involved lifting heavy boxes. Watts's testimony should be
A. admitted, because it is a statement of Parker's then existing physical condition. 
B. admitted, because it is a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. 
C. excluded, because it is hearsay, not within any exception. 
D. excluded, because Parker is available as a witness
Answer: B
West, a witness in a contract case, testified on direct examination that four people attended a meeting. When asked to identify them, she gave the names of three but despite trying was unable to remember the name of the fourth person. The attorney who called her as a witness seeks to show her his handwritten notes of the part of his pretrial interview with her in which she provided all four names. The trial court is likely to consider the showing of the notes taken as
A. a proper attempt to introduce recorded recollection.
B. a proper attempt to refresh West's recollection.
C. an improper attempt to lead the witness.
D. an improper attempt to support West's credibility
Answer: B
While hospitalized, Marsh asked her attorney to draw a deed conveying her home to her son, Simon. While Marsh remained in the hospital, the deed was drawn, properly executed, and promptly and properly recorded. On being informed of the existence of the deed, Simon told his mother, "I want no part of the property; take the deed right back." Marsh recovered and left the hospital, but shortly thereafter, before any other relevant event, Simon died intestate. Marsh brought an appropriate action against Simon's heirs to determine title. If Marsh wins, it will be because
A. the court will impose a constructive trust to carry out the intent of the deceased son.
B. the presumption of delivery arising from the recording is not valid unless the grantee has knowledge at the time of the recording.
C. Simon's declaration was a constructive reconveyance of the land.
D. there was no effective acceptance of delivery of the deed.
Answer: D
Plummer, a well-known politician, was scheduled to address a large crowd at a political dinner. Just as he was about to sit down at the head table, Devon pushed Plummer's chair to one side. As a result, Plummer fell to the floor. Plummer was embarrassed at being made to look foolish before a large audience but suffered no physical harm. If Plummer asserts a claim against Devon for damages because of his embarrassment, will Plummer prevail?
A. Yes, if Devon knew that Plummer was about to sit on the chair. 
B. Yes, if Devon negligently failed to notice that Plummer was about to sit on the chair. 
C. No, because Plummer suffered no physical harm along with his embarrassment. 
D. No, if in moving the chair Devon intended only a good-natured practical joke on Plummer
Answer: A
In a writing signed by both parties, Paul Plannah, a renowned architect, agreed for a fee of $25,000 to design and supervise construction of a new house for Phoebe Threedee, a famous sculptor, the fee to be paid upon completion of the house. Plannah and Threedee got along poorly, and, when the design plans were about two-thirds complete, they had a heated argument over the proper location of a marble staircase. Hoping to avoid such encounters, Plannah, without Threedee's knowledge, assigned to Donna Drafty, a newly licensed architect practicing solo, "all of my rights and duties under my design and construction supervision contract with Threedee." Drafty expressly promised Plannah to carry out the work to the best of Drafty's ability."For this question only, assume that Threedee, on learning of the assignment, refused to allow Drafty to proceed as architect and brought an action against Plannah to compel him to resume and complete performance of the contract. Is Threedee entitled to such relief?
A. Yes, because Plannah's services under the contract are unique. 
B. Yes, because Plannah has personally completed two-thirds of the design work. 
C. No, because the Plannah-Threedee contract is one for personal services by Plannah. 
D. No, because Plannah effectively delegated his remaining duties under the PlannahThreedee contract to Draft
Answer: C
In a writing signed by both parties, Paul Plannah, a renowned architect, agreed for a fee of $25,000 to design and supervise construction of a new house for Phoebe Threedee, a famous sculptor, the fee to be paid upon completion of the house. Plannah and Threedee got along poorly, and, when the design plans were about two-thirds complete, they had a heated argument over the proper location of a marble staircase. Hoping to avoid such encounters, Plannah, without Threedee's knowledge, assigned to Donna Drafty, a newly licensed architect practicing solo, "all of my rights and duties under my design and construction supervision contract with Threedee." Drafty expressly promised Plannah to carry out the work to the best of Drafty's ability."". For this question only, assume that Threedee allowed Drafty to proceed with the design work but that Drafty without legal excuse abandoned the project shortly after construction began. Which of the following legal conclusions are correct? I. Plannah is liable to Threedee for legal damages, if any, caused by Drafty's default. II. Drafty is liable to Threedee for legal damages, if any, caused by Drafty's default. III. Threedee is indebted to Drafty, on a divisible contract theory, for a prorated portion of the agreed $25,000 architect's fee promised to Plannah.
A. I and II only
B. I and III only
C. II and III only
D. I, II, and II
Answer: A
There is high and persistent unemployment in the industrialized state of Green. Its legislature therefore enacted a statute requiring every business with annual sales in Green of over $1 million to purchase each year goods and/or services in Green equal in value to at least half of its sales in Green Which of the following parties most clearly has standing to contest the constitutionality of this statute of Green in federal court?
A. A business in another state that supplies from that other state 95 percent of the goods and services bought by a corporation that has annual sales in Green of $20 million.
B. A corporation selling $300,000 worth of goods in Green but presently purchasing only $10,000 in goods and services in Green. 
C. The governor of an adjacent state on behalf of the state and its residents.
D. The owner of high-grade, secured bonds issued by a corporation with sales in Green of $10 million that currently purchases only $1 million in goods and services in Green.
Answer: A