ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
Oscar purchased a large bottle of No-Flake dandruff shampoo, manufactured by Shampoo Company. The box containing the bottle stated in part: "CAUTION--Use only 1 capful at most once a day. Greater use may cause severe damage to the scalp." Oscar read the writing on the box, removed the bottle, and threw the box away. Oscar's roommate, bottle, and threw the box away. Oscar's roommate, Paul, asked to use the No-Flake, and Oscar said, "Be careful not to use too much." Paul thereafter used No-Flake twice a day, applying two or three capfuls each time, notwithstanding the label statement that read: "Use no more than one capful per day. See box instructions." The more he used No-Flake, the more inflamed his scalp became, the more it itched, and the more he used. After three weeks of such use, Paul finally consulted a doctor who diagnosed his problem as a serious and irreversible case of dermatitis caused by excessive exposure to the active ingredients in No-Flake. These ingredients are uniquely effective at controlling dandruff, but there is no way to remove a remote risk to a small percentage of persons who may contract dermatitis as the result of applying for prolonged periods of time amounts of No-Flake substantially in excess of the directions. This jurisdiction adheres to the traditional common-law rules pertaining to contributory negligence and assumption of risk. Based upon the foregoing facts, if Paul sues Shampoo Company to recover damages for his dermatitis, his most promising theory of liability will be that the No-Flake shampoo 
A. had an unreasonably dangerous manufacturing defect.
B. had an unreasonably dangerous design defect.
C. was inherently dangerous.
D. was inadequately labeled to warn of its dangers.
Answer: D
Oscar purchased a large bottle of No-Flake dandruff shampoo, manufactured by Shampoo Company. The box containing the bottle stated in part: "CAUTION--Use only 1 capful at most once a day. Greater use may cause severe damage to the scalp." Oscar read the writing on the box, removed the bottle, and threw the box away. Oscar's roommate, bottle, and threw the box away. Oscar's roommate, Paul, asked to use the No-Flake, and Oscar said, "Be careful not to use too much." Paul thereafter used No-Flake twice a day, applying two or three capfuls each time, notwithstanding the label statement that read: "Use no more than one capful per day. See box instructions." The more he used No-Flake, the more inflamed his scalp became, the more it itched, and the more he used. After three weeks of such use, Paul finally consulted a doctor who diagnosed his problem as a serious and irreversible case of dermatitis caused by excessive exposure to the active ingredients in No-Flake. These ingredients are uniquely effective at controlling dandruff, but there is no way to remove a remote risk to a small percentage of persons who may contract dermatitis as the result of applying for prolonged periods of time amounts of No-Flake substantially in excess of the directions. This jurisdiction adheres to the traditional common-law rules pertaining to contributory negligence and assumption of risk. If Paul asserts a claim for his injuries against Shampoo Company based on strict liability in tort, which of the following would constitute a defense? I. Paul misused the No-Flake shampoo. II. Paul was contributorily negligent in continuing to use No-Flake shampoo when his scalp began to hurt and itch. III. Paul was a remote user and not in privity with Shampoo Company. 
A. I only.
B. I and II only.
C. II and III only.
D. Neither I, nor II, nor III. (D) Neither I, nor II, nor III. 
Answer: D
Oscar purchased a large bottle of No-Flake dandruff shampoo, manufactured by Shampoo Company. The box containing the bottle stated in part: "CAUTION--Use only 1 capful at most once a day. Greater use may cause severe damage to the scalp." Oscar read the writing on the box, removed the bottle, and threw the box away. Oscar's roommate, bottle, and threw the box away. Oscar's roommate, Paul, asked to use the No-Flake, and Oscar said, "Be careful not to use too much." Paul thereafter used No-Flake twice a day, applying two or three capfuls each time, notwithstanding the label statement that read: "Use no more than one capful per day. See box instructions." The more he used No-Flake, the more inflamed his scalp became, the more it itched, and the more he used. After three weeks of such use, Paul finally consulted a doctor who diagnosed his problem as a serious and irreversible case of dermatitis caused by excessive exposure to the active ingredients in No-Flake. These ingredients are uniquely effective at controlling dandruff, but there is no way to remove a remote risk to a small percentage of persons who may contract dermatitis as the result of applying for prolonged periods of time amounts of No-Flake substantially in excess of the directions. This jurisdiction adheres to the traditional common-law rules pertaining to contributory negligence and assumption of risk. If Paul asserts a claim against Oscar for his dermatitis injuries, Oscar's best defense will be that 
A. Paul was contributorily negligent.
B. Paul assumed the risk.
C. Oscar had no duty toward Paul, who was a gratuitous donee. 
D. Oscar had no duty toward Paul, because Shampoo Company created the risk and had a nondelegable duty to foreseeable users. 
Answer: A
A statute of the state of Wasminia prohibits the use of state-owned or state-operated facilities for the performance of abortions that are not "necessary to save the life of the mother." That statute also prohibits state employees from performing any such abortions during the hours they are employed by the state. Citizen was in her second month of pregnancy. She sought an abortion at the Wasminia State Hospital, a state-owned and state-operated facility. Citizen did not claim that the requested abortion was necessary to save her life. The officials in charge of the hospital refused to perform the requested abortion solely on the basis of the state statute. Citizen immediately filed suit against those officials in an appropriate federal district court. She challenged the constitutionality of the Wasminia statute and requested the court to order the hospital to perform the abortion she sought. In this case, the court will probably hold that the Wasminia statute is 
A. unconstitutional, because a limit on the availability of abortions performed by state employees or in state-owned or state-operated facilities to situations in which it is necessary to save the life of the mother impermissibly interferes with the fundamental right of Citizen to decide whether to have a child. 
B. unconstitutional, because it impermissibly discriminates against poor persons who cannot afford to pay for persons who cannot afford to pay for abortions in privately owned and operated facilities and against persons who live far away from privately owned and operated abortion clinics. 
C. constitutional, because it does not prohibit a woman from having an abortion or penalize her for doing so, it is rationally related to the legitimate governmental goal of encouraging childbirth, and it does not interfere with the voluntary performance of abortions by private physicians in private facilities. 
D. constitutional, because the use of stateowned or state-operated facilities and access to the services of state employees are privileges and not rights and, therefore, a state may condition them on any basis it chooses. 
Answer: C
Oscar, owner of Greenacre, conveyed Greenacre by quitclaim deed as a gift to Ann, who did not then record her deed. Later, Oscar conveyed Greenacre by warranty deed to Belle, who paid valuable consideration, knew nothing of Ann's claim, and promptly and properly recorded. Next, Ann recorded her deed. Then Belle conveyed Greenacre by quitclaim deed to her son Cal as a gift. When the possible conflict with Ann was discovered, Cal recorded his deed. Greenacre at all relevant times has been vacant unoccupied land. The recording act of the jurisdiction provides: "No unrecorded conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value without notice, who shall first record." No other statute is applicable. Cal has sued Ann to establish who owns Greenacre. The court will hold for 
A. Cal, because Ann was a donee. 
B. Cal, because Belle's purchase cut off Ann's rights. 
C. Ann, because she recorded before Cal. 
D. Ann, because Cal was a subsequent donee. 
Answer: B
While Driver was taking a leisurely spring drive, he momentarily took his eyes off the road to look at some colorful trees in bloom. As a result, his car swerved a few feet off the roadway, directly toward Walker, who was standing on the shoulder of the road waiting for a chance to cross. When Walker saw the car bearing down on him, he jumped backwards, fell, and injured his knee. Walker sued Driver for damages, and Driver moved for summary judgment. The foregoing facts are undisputed. Driver's motion should be 
A. denied, because the record shows that Walker apprehended an imminent, harmful contact with Driver's car. 
B. denied, because a jury could find that Driver negligently caused Walker to suffer a legally compensable injury. 
C. granted, because the proximate cause of Walker's injury was his own voluntary act. 
D. granted, because it is not unreasonable for a person to be distracted momentarily. 
Answer: B
In which of the following situations is the defendant most likely to be convicted, even though he did not intend to bring about the harm that the statute defining the offense is designed to prevent? 
A. Defendant was the president of an aspirin manufacturing company. A federal inspector discovered that a large number of aspirin tablets randomly scattered of aspirin tablets randomly scattered through several bottles in a carton ready for shipment were laced with arsenic. Defendant is charged with attempted introduction of adulterated drugs into interstate commerce.
B. Defendant struck Victim in the face with a baseball bat, intending to inflict a serious injury. Victim died after being hospitalized for three days. Defendant is charged with murder. 
C. Defendant burglarized a jewelry store, intending to steal some diamonds. As he entered the store, he short-circuited the store's burglar alarm system, thereby preventing a warning of his entry to police. The smoldering wires eventually caused a fire that destroyed the store. Defendant is charged with arson. 
D. Defendant wanted to frighten Victim's friend by placing a plastic rattlesnake in his lunch box. When Victim mistakenly took the lunch box and opened it, believing it to be his own, the plastic rattlesnake popped out. As a result of the fright, Victim suffered a heart attack and died. Defendant is charged with manslaughter. manslaughter. 
Answer: B
Happy-Time Beverages agreed in writing with Fizzy Cola Company to serve for three years as a distributor in a six-county area of Fizzy Cola, which contains a small amount of caffeine. Happy-Time promised in the contract to "promote in good faith the sale of Fizzy Cola" in that area; but the contract said nothing about restrictions on the products that Happy-Time could distribute. Six months later, Happy-Time agreed with the Cool Cola Company to distribute its caffeinefree cola beverages in the same six-county area. If Fizzy Cola Company sues Happy-Time for breach of their distribution contract, which of the following facts, if established, would most strengthen Fizzy's case? 
A. Cool Cola's national advertising campaign disparages the Fizzy Cola product by saying, "You don't need caffeine and neither does your cola." 
B. Since Happy-Time began to distribute Cool Cola, the sales of Fizzy Cola have dropped 3% in the six-county area. 
C. Prior to signing the contract with Fizzy Cola Company, a representative of Happy-Time said that the deal with Fizzy would be "an exclusive." 
D. For many years in the soft-drink industry, it has been uniform practice for distributors to handle only one brand of cola. 
Answer: D
Dove is on trial for theft. At trial, the prosecutor called John and May Wong. They testified that, as they looked out their apartment window, they saw thieves across the street break the window of a jewelry store, take jewelry, and leave in a car. Mrs. Wong telephoned the police and relayed to them the license number of the thieves' car as Mr. Wong looked out the window with binoculars and read it to her. Neither of them has any present memory of the number. The prosecutor offers as evidence a properly authenticated police tape recording of May Wong's telephone call with her voice giving the license number, which is independently shown to belong to Dove's car. The tape recording of May Wong's stating the license number is 
A. admissible, under the hearsay exception for present sense impressions. 
B. admissible, as nonhearsay circumstantial evidence. 
C. inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. 
D. inadmissible, because May Wong never had firsthand knowledge of the license number. 
Answer: A
Diggers Construction Company was engaged in blasting operations to clear the way for a new road. Diggers had erected adequate barriers and posted adequate warning signs in the vicinity of the blasting. Although Paul read and understood the signs, he entered the area to walk his dog. As a result of the blasting, Paul was hit by a piece of rock and sustained Paul was hit by a piece of rock and sustained head injuries. The jurisdiction follows the traditional common-law rules governing the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and last clear chance. In an action by Paul against Diggers to recover damages for his injuries, Paul will 
A. not prevail, if Diggers exercised reasonable care to protect the public from harm. 
B. not prevail, because Paul understood the signs and disregarded the warnings. 
C. prevail, because Paul was harmed by Diggers's abnormally dangerous activity. 
D. prevail, unless Paul failed to use reasonable care to protect himself from harm. 
Answer: B
Pike sued Day City Community Church for damages he suffered when Pike crashed his motorcycle in an attempt to avoid a cow that had escaped from its corral. The cow and corral belonged to a farm that had recently been left by will to the church. At trial, Pike seeks to ask Defendant's witness, Winters, whether she is a member of that church. The question is 
A. improper, because evidence of a witness's religious beliefs is not admissible to impeach credibility. 
B. improper, because it violates First Amendment and privacy rights. 
C. proper, for the purpose of ascertaining partiality or bias. 
D. proper, for the purpose of showing capacity to appreciate the nature and obligation of an oath. 
Answer: C
Radon is a harmful gas found in the soil of certain regions of the United States. A statute of the state of Magenta requires occupants of residences with basements susceptible to the intrusion of radon to have their residences tested for the presence of radon and to take specified remedial steps if the test indicates the presence of radon above specified levels. The statute also provides that the testing for radon may be done only by testers licensed by a state agency. According to the statute, a firm may be licensed to test for radon only if it meets specified rigorous standards relating to the accuracy of its testing. These standards may easily be achieved with current technology; but the technology required to meet them is 50% more expensive than the technology required to measure radon accumulations in a slightly less accurate manner. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) does not license radon testers. However, a federal statute authorizes the EPA to advise on the accuracy of various methods of radon testing and to provide to the general public a list of testers that use methods it believes to be reasonably accurate. WeTest, a recently established Magenta firm, uses a testing method that the EPA has stated uses a testing method that the EPA has stated is reasonably accurate. WeTest is also included by the EPA on the list of testers using methods of testing it believes to be reasonably accurate. WeTest applies for a Magenta radon testing license, but its application is denied because WeTest cannot demonstrate that the method of testing for radon it uses is sufficiently accurate to meet the rigorous Magenta statutory standards. WeTest sues appropriate Magenta officials in federal court claiming that Magenta may not constitutionally exclude WeTest from performing the required radon tests in Magenta. In this suit, the court will probably rule in favor of 
A. WeTest, because the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution requires Magenta to respect and give effect to the action of the EPA in including WeTest on its list of testers that use reasonably accurate methods. 
B. WeTest, because the supremacy clause of (B) WeTest, because the supremacy clause of the Constitution requires Magenta to respect and give effect to the action of the EPA in including WeTest on its list of testers that use reasonably accurate methods. 
C. Magenta, because the federal statute and the action of the EPA in including WeTest on its list of testers that use reasonably accurate methods are not inconsistent with the more rigorous Magenta licensing requirement, and that requirement is reasonably related to a legitimate public interest. 
D. Magenta, because radon exposure is limited to basement areas, which, by their very nature, cannot move in interstate commerce. 
Answer: C
Bitz, an amateur computer whiz, agreed in writing to design for the Presskey Corporation, writing to design for the Presskey Corporation, a distributor of TV game systems, three new games a year for a five-year period. The writing provided, in a clause separately signed by Bitz, that "No modification shall be binding on Presskey unless made in writing and signed by Presskey's authorized representative." Because of family problems, Bitz delivered and Presskey accepted only two game-designs a year for the first three years; but the games were a commercial success and Presskey made no objection. Accordingly, Bitz spent substantial sums on new computer equipment that would aid in speeding up future design work. In the first quarter of the fourth year, however, Presskey terminated the contract on the ground that Bitz had breached the annualquantity term. In Bitz's suit against Presskey for damages, the jury found that the contract had been modified by conduct and the trial court awarded Bitz substantial compensatory damages. Is this result likely to be reversed on appeal? 
A. Yes, because the contract's no-oralmodification clause was not expressly waived by Presskey. 
B. Yes, because the contract's no-oralmodification clause was a material part of the agreed exchange and could not be avoided without new consideration. 
C. No, because the contract's no-oralmodification clause was unconscionable as against an amateur designer. 
D. No, because Presskey by its conduct waived the annual-quantity term and Bitz materially changed his position in reasonable reliance on that waiver. 
Answer: D
Test owned Blackacre, a vacant one-acre tract of land in State. Five years ago, he executed a deed conveying Blackacre to "Church for the purpose of erecting a church building thereon." Three years ago, Test died leaving Sonny as his sole heir at law. His duly probated will left "all my Estate, both real and personal, to my friend Fanny." Church never constructed a church building on Blackacre and last month Church, for a valid consideration, conveyed Blackacre to Developer. Developer brought an appropriate action to quiet title against Sonny, Fanny, and Church, and joined the appropriate state official. Such official asserted that a charitable trust was created which has not terminated. In such action, the court should find that title is now in 
A. Developer.
B. Sonny.
C. Fanny.
D. the state official.
Answer: A
Mr. Denby was charged with the sale of narcotics. The federal prosecutor arranged with Mrs. Denby for her to testify against her husband in exchange for leniency in her case. At trial, the prosecution calls Mrs. Denby, who had been granted immunity from prosecution, to testify, among other things, that she saw her husband sell an ounce of heroin. Which of the following statements is most clearly correct in the federal courts? 
A. Mrs. Denby cannot be called as a witness over her husband's objection.
B. Mrs. Denby can be called as a witness but cannot testify, over Mr. Denby's objection, that she saw him sell heroin. 
C. Mrs. Denby can refuse to be a witness against her husband.
D. Mrs. Denby can be required to be a witness and to testify that she saw her husband sell heroin.
Answer: C
Freund, a U.S. west-coast manufacturer, gave Wrench, a hardware retailer who was relocating to the east coast, the following "letter of introduction" to Tuff, an east-coast hardware wholesaler. hardware wholesaler. This will introduce you to my good friend and former customer, Wrench, who will be seeking to arrange the purchase of hardware inventory from you on credit. If you will let him have the goods, I will make good any loss up to $25,000 in the event of his default. /Signed/ Freund Wrench presented the letter to Tuff, who then sold and delivered $20,000 worth of hardware to Wrench on credit. Tuff promptly notified Freund of this sale. Which of the following is NOT an accurate statement concerning the arrangement between Freund and Tuff? 
A. It was important to enforceability of Freund's promise to Tuff that it be embodied in a signed writing.
B. By extending the credit to Wrench, Tuff effectively accepted Freund's offer for a unilateral contract. 
C. Although Freund received no consideration from Wrench, Freund's promise is enforceable by Tuff. 
D. Freund's promise is enforceable by Tuff whether or not Tuff gave Freund seasonable notice of the extension of credit to Wrench.
Answer: D
The legislature of the state of Gray recently enacted a statute forbidding public utilities regulated by the Gray Public Service Commission to increase their rates more than once every two years. Economy Electric Power Company, a public utility regulated by that commission, has just obtained approval of the commission for a general rate increase. Economy Electric has routinely filed for a rate increase every ten to 14 months during the last 20 years. Because of uncertainties about future fuel prices, the power company cannot ascertain with any certainty the date when it will need a further rate increase; but it thinks it may need such an increase sometime within the next 18 months. Economy Electric files an action in the federal district court in Gray requesting a declaratory judgment that this new statute of Gray forbidding public utility rate increases more often than once every two years is unconstitutional. Assume no federal statute is relevant. In this case, the court should 
A. hold the statute unconstitutional, because such a moratorium on rate increases deprives utilities of their property without due process of law. 
B. hold the statute constitutional, because the judgment of a legislature on a matter involving economic regulation is entitled to great deference. 
C. dismiss the complaint, because this action is not ripe for decision. 
D. dismiss the complaint, because controversies over state-regulated utility rates are outside of the jurisdiction conferred on federal courts by Article III of the Constitution. 
Answer: C
Daniel is on trial for evading $100,000 in taxes. The prosecution offers in evidence an anonymous letter to the IRS, identified as being in Daniel's handwriting, saying, "I promised my mother on her deathbed I would try to pay my back taxes. Here is $10,000. I'll make other payments if you promise not to prosecute. Answer yes by personal ad saying,  OK on tax deal.' " The letter is 
A. admissible, as a statement of present intention or plan. 
B. admissible, as an admission of a party opponent. 
C. inadmissible, because it is an effort to settle a claim. 
D. inadmissible, because the probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. 
Answer: B