ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
Congress recently enacted a statute imposing severe criminal penalties on anyone engaged in trading in the stock market who, in the course of that trading, takes "unfair advantage" of other investors who are also trading in the stock market. The statute does not define the term "unfair advantage." There have been no prosecutions under this new statute. The members of an association of law school professors that is dedicated to increasing the clarity of the language used in criminal statutes believe that this statute is unconstitutionally vague. Neither the association nor any of its members is currently engaged in, or intends in the future to engage in, trading in the stock market. The association and its members bring suit against the Attorney General of the United States in a federal district court, seeking an injunction against the enforcement of this statute on the ground that it is unconstitutional. May the federal court determine the merits of this suit? 
A. Yes, because the suit involves a dispute over the constitutionality of a federal statute. 
B. Yes, because the plaintiffs seek real relief of a conclusive nature an injunction against enforcement of this statute. 
C. No, because the plaintiffs do not have an interest in the invalidation of this statute that is adequate to ensure that the suit presents an Article III controversy. 
D. No, because a suit for an injunction against enforcement of a criminal statute may not be brought in federal court at any time prior to a bona fide effort to enforce that statute.
Answer: C
Rachel, an antique dealer and a skilled calligrapher, crafted a letter on very old paper. She included details that would lead knowledgeable readers to believe the letter had been written by Thomas Jefferson to a friend. Rachel, who had a facsimile of Jefferson's autograph, made the signature and other writing on the letter resemble Jefferson's. She knew that the letter would attract the attention of local collectors. When it did and she was contacted about selling it, she said that it had come into her hands from a foreign collector who wished anonymity, and that she could make no promises about its authenticity. As she had hoped, a collector paid her $5,000 for the letter. Later the collector discovered the letter was not authentic, and handwriting analysis established that Rachel had written the letter. In a jurisdiction that follows the common-law definition of forgery, Rachel has 
A. committed both forgery and false pretenses.
B. committed forgery, because she created a false document with the intent to defraud, but has not committed false pretenses, since she made no representation as to the authenticity of the document. 
C. not committed forgery, because the document had no apparent legal significance, but has committed false pretenses, since she misrepresented the source of the document. 
D. not committed forgery, because the document had no apparent legal significance, and has not committed false pretenses, since she made no representation as to authenticity of the document. 
Answer: C
Mom rushed her eight-year-old daughter, Child, to the emergency room at Hospital after Child fell off her bicycle and hit her head on a sharp rock. The wound caused by the fall was extensive and bloody. Mom was permitted to remain in the treatment room, and held Child's hand while the emergency room physician cleaned and sutured the wound. During the procedure, Mom said that she was feeling faint and stood up to leave the room. While leaving the room, Mom fainted and, in falling, struck her head on a metal fixture that protruded from the emergency room wall. She sustained a serious injury as a consequence. If Mom sues Hospital to recover damages for her injury, will she prevail? 
A. Yes, because Mom was a public invitee of Hospital's. 
B. Yes, unless the fixture was an obvious, commonly used, and essential part of Hospital's equipment. 
C. No, unless Hospital's personnel failed to take reasonable steps to anticipate and prevent Mom's injury. 
D. No, because Hospital's personnel owed Mom no affirmative duty of care.
Answer: C
Buyer, Inc., contracted in writing with Shareholder, who owned all of XYZ Corporation's outstanding stock, to purchase all of her stock at a specified price per share. At the time this contract was executed, Buyer's contracting officer said to Shareholder, "Of course, our commitment to buy is conditioned on our obtaining approval of the contract from Conglomerate, Ltd., our parent company." Shareholder replied, "Fine. No problem." Assume that Conglomerate orally approved the contract, but that Shareholder changed her mind and refused to consummate the sale on two grounds: (1) when the agreement was made there was no consideration for her promise to sell; and (2) Conglomerate's approval of the contract was invalid. If Buyer sues Shareholder for breach of contract, is Buyer likely to prevail? 
A. Yes, because Buyer's promise to buy, bargained for and made in exchange for Shareholder's promise to sell, was good consideration even though it was expressly conditioned on an event that was not certain to occur. 
B. Yes, because any possible lack of consideration for Shareholder's promise to sell was expressly waived by Shareholder when the agreement was made. 
C. No, because mutuality of obligation between the parties was lacking when the agreement was made. 
D. No, because the condition of Conglomerate's approval of the contract was an essential part of the agreed exchange and was not in a signed writing. 
Answer: A
Buyer, Inc., contracted in writing with Shareholder, who owned all of XYZ Corporation's outstanding stock, to purchase all of her stock at a specified price per share. At the time this contract was executed, Buyer's contracting officer said to Shareholder, "Of course, our commitment to buy is conditioned on our obtaining approval of the contract from Conglomerate, Ltd., our parent company." Shareholder replied, "Fine. No problem." Assume the following facts. Shareholder subsequently refused to consummate the sale on the ground that Buyer had neglected to request Conglomerate's approval of the contract, which was true. Conglomerate's chief executive officer, however, is prepared to testify that Conglomerate would have routinely approved the contract if requested to do so. Buyer can also prove that it has made a substantial sale of other assets to finance the stock purchase, although it admittedly had not anticipated any such necessity when it entered into the stock purchase agreement. If Buyer sues Shareholder for breach of contract, is Buyer likely to prevail? 
A. Yes, because the condition of Conglomerate's approval of the contract, being designed to protect only Buyer and Conglomerate, can be and has been waived by those entities. 
B. Yes, because Buyer detrimentally relied on Shareholder's commitment by selling off other assets to finance the stock purchase. 
C. No, because the express condition of Conglomerate's approval had not occurred prior to the lawsuit. 
D. No, because obtaining Conglomerate's approval of the contract was an event within Buyer's control and Buyer's failure to obtain it was itself a material breach of contract.
Answer: A
Buyer, Inc., contracted in writing with Shareholder, who owned all of XYZ Corporation's outstanding stock, to purchase all of her stock at a specified price per share. At the time this contract was executed, Buyer's contracting officer said to Shareholder, "Of course, our commitment to buy is conditioned on our obtaining approval of the contract from Conglomerate, Ltd., our parent company." Shareholder replied, "Fine. No problem." Assume the following facts. Shareholder is willing and ready to consummate the sale of her stock to Buyer, but the latter refuses to perform on the ground (which is true) that Conglomerate has firmly refused to approve the contract. If Shareholder sues Buyer for breach of contract and seeks to exclude any evidence of the oral condition requiring Conglomerate's approval, the court will probably 
A. admit the evidence as proof of a collateral agreement.
B. admit the evidence as proof of a condition to the existence of an enforceable obligation, and therefore not within the scope of the parol evidence rule. 
C. exclude the evidence on the basis of a finding that the parties' written agreement was a complete integration of their contract.
D. exclude the evidence as contradicting the terms of the parties' written agreement, whether or not the writing was a complete integration of the contract. 
Answer: B
At Dove's trial for theft, Mr. Wong, called by the prosecutor, testified to the following: 1) that from his apartment window, he saw thieves across the street break the window of a jewelry store, take jewelry, and leave in a car; 2) that Mrs. Wong telephoned the police and relayed to them the license number of the thieves' car as Mr. Wong looked out the window with binoculars and read it to her; 3) that he has no present memory of the number, but that immediately afterward he listened to a playback of the police tape recording giving the license number (which belongs to Dove's car) and verified that she had relayed the number accurately. Playing the tape recording for the jury would be 
A. proper, because it is recorded recollection. 
B. proper, because it is a public record or report. 
C. improper, because it is hearsay not within any exception. 
D. improper, because Mrs. Wong lacked firsthand knowledge of the license number.
Answer: A
For ten years, Vacationer and Neighbor have owned summer vacation homes on adjoining lots. A stream flows through both lots. As a result of a childhood swimming accident, Vacationer is afraid of water and has never gone close to the stream. Neighbor built a dam on her property that has completely stopped the flow of the stream to Vacationer's property. In a suit by Vacationer against Neighbor, will Vacationer prevail? 
A. Yes, if the damming unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment of Vacationer's property. 
B. Yes, if Neighbor intended to affect Vacationer's property. 
C. No, because Vacationer made no use of the stream. 
D. No, if the dam was built in conformity with all applicable laws. 
Answer: A
Corp, a corporation, owned Blackacre in fee simple, as the real estate records showed. Corp entered into a valid written contract to convey Blackacre to Barbara, an individual. At closing, Barbara paid the price in full and received an instrument in the proper form of a deed, signed by duly authorized corporate officers on behalf of Corp, purporting to convey Blackacre to Barbara. Barbara did not then record the deed or take possession of Blackacre. Next, George (who had no knowledge of the contract or the deed) obtained a substantial money judgment against Corp. Then, Barbara recorded the deed from Corp. Thereafter, George properly filed the judgment against Corp. A statute of the jurisdiction provides: "Any judgment properly filed shall, for ten years from filing, be a lien on the real property then owned or subsequently acquired by any person against whom the judgment is rendered." Afterward, Barbara entered into a valid written contract to convey Blackacre to Polly. Polly objected to Barbara's title and refused to close. The recording act of the jurisdiction provides: "Unless the same be recorded according to law, no conveyance or mortgage of real property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value and without notice." Barbara brought an appropriate action to require Polly to complete the purchase contract. The court should decide for 
A. Polly, because George's judgment was obtained before Barbara recorded the deed from Corp. 
B. Polly, because even though Corp's deed to Barbara prevented George's judgment from being a lien on Blackacre, George's filed judgment poses a threat of litigation. 
C. Barbara, because Barbara recorded her deed before George filed his judgment. 
D. Barbara, because Barbara received the deed from Corp before George filed his judgment.
Answer: D
City enacted an ordinance banning from its public sidewalks all machines dispensing publications consisting wholly of commercial advertisements. The ordinance was enacted because of a concern about the adverse aesthetic effects of litter from publications distributed on the public sidewalks and streets. However, City continued to allow machines dispensing other types of publications on the public sidewalks. As a result of the City ordinance, 30 of the 300 sidewalk machines that were dispensing publications in City were removed. Is this City ordinance constitutional? 
A. Yes, because regulations of commercial speech are subject only to the requirement that they be rationally related to a legitimate state goal, and that requirement is satisfied here. 
B. Yes, because City has a compelling interest in protecting the aesthetics of its sidewalks and streets, and such a ban is necessary to vindicate this interest. 
C. No, because it does not constitute the least restrictive means with which to protect the aesthetics of City's sidewalks and streets. 
D. No, because there is not a reasonable fit between the legitimate interest of City in preserving the aesthetics of its sidewalks and streets and the means it chose to advance that interest. 
Answer: D
Plaintiff's estate sued Defendant Stores claiming that Guard, one of Defendant's security personnel, wrongfully shot and killed Plaintiff when Plaintiff fled after being accused of shoplifting. Guard was convicted of manslaughter for killing Plaintiff. At his criminal trial Guard, who was no longer working for Defendant, testified that Defendant's security director had instructed him to stop shoplifters "at all costs." Because Guard's criminal conviction is on appeal, he refuses to testify at the civil trial. Plaintiff's estate then offers an authenticated transcript of Guard's criminal trial testimony concerning the instructions of Defendant's security director. This evidence is 
A. admissible as a statement of an agent of a party-opponent.
B. admissible, because the instruction from the security director is not hearsay. 
C. admissible, although hearsay, as former testimony. 
D. inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception.
Answer: D
Mrs. Pence sued Duarte for shooting her husband from ambush. Mrs. Pence offers to testify that, the day before her husband was killed, he described to her a chance meeting with Duarte on the street in which Duarte said, "I'm going to blow your head off one of these days." The witness's testimony concerning her husband's statement is 
A. admissible, to show Duarte's state of mind. 
B. admissible, because Duarte's statement is that of a party-opponent. 
C. inadmissible, because it is improper evidence of a prior bad act. 
D. inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. 
Answer: D
The state of Brunswick enacted a statute providing for the closure of the official state records of arrest and prosecution of all persons acquitted of a crime by a court or against whom criminal charges were filed and subsequently dropped or dismissed. The purpose of this statute is to protect these persons from further publicity or embarrassment relating to those state proceedings. However, this statute does not prohibit the publication of such information that is in the possession of private persons. A prominent businessman in Neosho City in Brunswick was arrested and charged with rape. Prior to trial, the prosecutor announced that new information indicated that the charges should be dropped. He then dropped the charges without further explanation, and the records relating thereto were closed to the public pursuant to the Brunswick statute. The Neosho City Times conducted an investigation to determine why the businessman was not prosecuted, but was refused access to the closed official state records. In an effort to determine whether the law enforcement agencies involved were properly doing their duty, the Times filed suit against appropriate state officials to force opening of the records and to invalidate the statute on constitutional grounds. Which of the following would be most helpful to the state in defending the constitutionality of this statute? 
A. The fact that the statute treats in an identical manner the arrest and prosecution records of all persons who have been acquitted of a crime by a court or against whom criminal charges were filed and subsequently dropped or dismissed.
B. The argument that the rights of the press are no greater than those of citizens generally.
C. The fact that the statute only prohibits public access to these official state records and does not prohibit the publication of information they contain that is in the possession of private persons.
D. The argument that the state may seal official records owned by the state on any basis its legislature chooses.
Answer: C
Nora, executive director of an equal housing opportunity organization, was the leader of a sit-in at the offices of a real estate management company. The protest was designed to call attention to the company's racially discriminatory rental practices. When police demanded that Nora desist from trespassing on the company's property, she refused and was arrested. In Nora's trial for trespass, the prosecution peremptorily excused all nonwhites from the jury, arguing to the court that even though Nora was white, minority groups would automatically support Nora because of her fight against racism in housing accommodations. If Nora is convicted of trespass by an all-white jury and appeals, claiming a violation of her constitutional rights, the court should 
A. affirm the conviction, because Nora was not a member of the class discriminated against. 
B. affirm the conviction, because peremptory challenge of the nonwhites did not deny Nora the right to an impartial jury. 
C. reverse the conviction, because racially based peremptory challenges violate equal protection of the law. 
D. reverse the conviction, because Nora was denied the right to have her case heard by a fair cross section of the community. 
Answer: C
Arthur's estate plan included a revocable trust established 35 years ago with ABC Bank as trustee. The principal asset of the trust has always been Blackacre, a very profitable, debt-free office building. The trust instrument instructs the trustee to pay the net income to Arthur for life, and, after the death of Arthur, to pay the net income to his wife, Alice, for life; and, after her death, "to distribute the net trust estate as she may appoint by will, or in default of her exercise of this power of appointment, to my son (her stepson), Charles." Arthur died 30 years ago survived by Alice and Charles. Arthur had not revoked or amended the trust agreement. A few years after Arthur's death, Alice remarried; she then had a child, Marie; was widowed for a second time; and, last year, died. Her will contained only one dispositive provision: "I give my entire estate to my daughter, Marie, and I intentionally make no provision for my stepson, Charles." Marie is now 22 years old. The common-law Rule Against Perpetuities is unmodified by statute in the jurisdiction. There are no other applicable statutes. Charles brought an appropriate action against Marie to determine who was entitled to the net trust estate and thus to Blackacre. If the court rules for Marie, it will be because 
A. Alice's life estate and general power of appointment merge into complete ownership in Alice.
B. the Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to general powers of appointment.
C. the jurisdiction deems "entire estate" to be a reference to Blackacre or to Alice's general power of appointment. 
D. Alice intended that Charles should not benefit by reason of her death.
Answer: C
Tenant rented a commercial building from Landlord, and operated a business in it. The building's large front window was smashed by vandals six months before expiration of the Tenant-Landlord lease. Tenant, who was obligated thereunder to effect and pay for repairs in such cases, promptly contracted with Glazier to replace the window for $2,000, due 30 days after satisfactory completion of the work. Landlord was then unaware of the Tenant-Glazier contract. Glazier was aware that the building was under lease, but dealt entirely with Tenant. Sixty days after Glazier's satisfactory completion of the window replacement, and prior to the expiration of Tenant's lease, Tenant, then insolvent, ceased doing business and vacated the building. In so doing, Tenant forfeited under the lease provisions its right to the return of a $2,000 security deposit with Landlord. The deposit had been required, however, for the express purpose (as stated in the lease) of covering any damage to the leased property except ordinary wear and tear. The only such damage occurring during Tenant's occupancy was the smashed window. Glazier's $2,000 bill for the window replacement is wholly unpaid. Assuming that Glazier has no remedy quasi in rem under the relevant state mechanic's lien statute, which of the following would provide Glazier's best chance of an effective remedy in personam against Landlord? 
A. An action in quasi contract for the reasonable value of a benefit unofficiously and non-gratuitously conferred on Landlord.
B. An action based on promissory estoppel.
C. An action based on an implied-in-fact contract.
D. An action as third-party intended beneficiary of the Tenant-Landlord lease.
Answer: A
Tenant rented a commercial building from Landlord, and operated a business in it. The building's large front window was smashed by vandals six months before expiration of the Tenant-Landlord lease. Tenant, who was obligated thereunder to effect and pay for repairs in such cases, promptly contracted with Glazier to replace the window for $2,000, due 30 days after satisfactory completion of the work. Landlord was then unaware of the Tenant-Glazier contract. Glazier was aware that the building was under lease, but dealt entirely with Tenant. Sixty days after Glazier's satisfactory completion of the window replacement, and prior to the expiration of Tenant's lease, Tenant, then insolvent, ceased doing business and vacated the building. In so doing, Tenant forfeited under the lease provisions its right to the return of a $2,000 security deposit with Landlord. The deposit had been required, however, for the express purpose (as stated in the lease) of covering any damage to the leased property except ordinary wear and tear. The only such damage occurring during Tenant's occupancy was the smashed window. Glazier's $2,000 bill for the window replacement is wholly unpaid. Assume the following facts. Upon vacating the building, Tenant mailed a $1,000 check to Glazier bearing on its face the following conspicuous notation: "This check is in full and final satisfaction of your $2,000 window replacement bill." Without noticing this notation, Glazier cashed the check and now sues Tenant for the $1,000 difference. If Tenant's only defense is accord and satisfaction, is Tenant likely to prevail? 
A. No, because Glazier failed to notice Tenant's notation on the check. 
B. No, because the amount owed by Tenant to Glazier was liquidated and undisputed. 
C. Yes, because by cashing the check Glazier impliedly agreed to accept the $1,000 as full payment of its claim. 
D. Yes, because Glazier failed to write a reservation-of-rights notation on the check before cashing it.
Answer: B
Defendant is on trial for robbing a bank in State A. She testified that she was in State B at the time of the robbery. Defendant calls her friend, Witness, to testify that two days before the robbery Defendant told him that she was going to spend the next three days in State B. Witness's testimony is 
A. admissible, because the statement falls within the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. 
B. admissible, because a statement of plans falls within the hearsay exception for then-existing state of mind. 
C. inadmissible, because it is offered to establish an alibi by Defendant's own statement. 
D. inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception. 
Answer: B