ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
For several weeks Mater, a wealthy, unemployed widow, and Nirvana Motors, Inc., negotiated unsuccessfully over the purchase price of a new Mark XX Rolls-Royce sedan, which, as Nirvana knew, Mater wanted her son Dilbert to have as a wedding gift. On April 27, Nirvana sent Mater a signed, dated memo saying, "If we can arrive at the same price within the next week, do we have a deal?" Mater wrote "Yes" and her signature at the bottom of this memo and delivered it back to Nirvana on April 29. On May 1, Mater wrote Nirvana a signed letter offering to buy "one new Mark XX Rolls-Royce sedan, with all available equipment, for $180,000 cash on delivery not later than June 1." By coincidence, Nirvana wrote Mater a signed letter on May 1 offering to sell her "one new Mark XX Rolls-Royce sedan, with all available equipment, for $180,000 cash on delivery not later than June 1." These letters crossed in the mails and were respectively received and read by Mater and Nirvana on May 2. For this question only, assume the following facts. On May 4, Mater and Nirvana Motors both signed a single document evidencing a contract for the sale by Nirvana to Mater, "as a wedding gift for Mater's son Dilbert," a new Mark XX Rolls-Royce sedan, under the same terms as previously stated in their correspondence. On May 5, Mater handed Dilbert a carbon copy of this document. In reliance on the prospective gift, Dilbert on May 20 sold his nearly new Cheetah (an expensive sports car) to a dealer at a "bargain" price of $50,000 and immediately informed Mater and Nirvana that he had done so. On May 25, however, Mater and Nirvana Motors by mutual agreement rescinded in a signed writing "any and all agreements heretofore made between the undersigned parties for the sale-and-purchase of a new Mark XX Rolls-Royce sedan." Later that day, Nirvana sold for $190,000 cash to another buyer the only new Mark XX Rolls-Royce that it had in stock or could readily obtain elsewhere. On June 1, Dilbert tendered $180,000 in cash to Nirvana Motors and demanded delivery to him "within a reasonable time" of a new Mark XX RollsRoyce sedan with all available equipment. Nirvana rejected the tender and denied any obligation. If Dilbert sues Nirvana for breach of contract, which of the following will the court probably decide? 
A. Dilbert wins, because his rights as an assignee for value of the May 4 MaterNirvana contract cannot be cut off by agreement between the original parties. 
B. Dilbert wins, because his rights as a third-party intended beneficiary became vested by his prejudicial reliance in selling his Cheetah on May 20. 
C. Nirvana wins, because Dilbert, if an intended beneficiary at all of the MaterNirvana contract, was only a donee beneficiary. 
D. Nirvana wins, because it reasonably and prejudicially relied on its contract of mutual rescission with Mater by selling the only readily available new Mark XX Rolls-Royce sedan to another buyer. 
Answer: B
Jones, who was driving his car at night, stopped the car and went into a nearby tavern for a drink. He left the car standing at the side of the road, projecting three feet into the traffic lane. The lights were on and his friend, Peters, was asleep in the back seat. Peters awoke, discovered the situation, and went back to sleep. Before Jones returned, his car was hit by an automobile approaching from the rear and driven by Davis. Peters was injured. Peters sued Davis and Jones jointly to recover the damages he suffered resulting from the accident. The jurisdiction has a pure comparative negligence rule and has abolished the defense of assumption of risk. In respect to other issues, the rules of the common law remain in effect. Peters should recover 
A. nothing, if Peters was more negligent than either Davis or Jones. 
B. nothing, unless the total of Davis's and Jones's negligence was greater than Peters's. 
C. from Davis and Jones, jointly and severally, the amount of damages Peters suffered reduced by the percentage of the total negligence that is attributed to Peters. 
D. from Davis and Jones, severally, a percentage of Peters's damages equal to the percentage of fault attributed to each of the defendants. 
Answer: C
Under the rule allowing exclusion of relevant evidence because its probative value is substantially outweighed by other considerations, which of the following is NOT to be considered? 
A. The jury may be confused about the appropriate application of the evidence to the issues of the case.
B. The evidence is likely to arouse unfair prejudice on the part of the jury.
C. The opponent is surprised by the evidence and not fairly prepared to meet it.
D. The trial will be extended and made cumbersome by hearing evidence of relatively trivial consequence.
Answer: C
On June 1, Buyem, Inc., a widget manufacturer, entered into a written agreement with Mako, Inc., a tool maker, in which Mako agreed to produce and sell to Buyem 12 sets of newly designed dies to be delivered August 1 for the price of $50,000, payable ten days after delivery. Encountering unexpected expenses in the purchase of special alloy steel required for the dies, Mako advised Buyem that production costs would exceed the contract price; and on July 1 Buyem and Mako signed a modification to the June 1 agreement increasing the contract price to $60,000. After timely receipt of 12 sets of dies conforming to the contract specifications, Buyem paid Mako $50,000 but refused to pay more. Which of the following concepts of the Uniform Commercial Code, dealing expressly with the sale of goods, best supports an action by Mako to recover $10,000 for breach of Buyem's July 1 promise? 
A. Bargained-for exchange.
B. Promissory estoppel.
C. Modification of contracts without consideration.
D. Unconscionability in the formation of contracts.
Answer: C
Twenty years ago, Test, who owned Blackacre, a one-acre tract of land, duly delivered a deed of Blackacre "to School District so long as it is used for school purposes." The deed was promptly and properly recorded. Five years ago, Test died leaving Sonny as his only heir but, by his duly probated will, he left "all my Estate to my friend Fanny." Last month, School District closed its school on Blackacre and for valid consideration duly executed and delivered a quitclaim deed of Blackacre to Owner, who planned to use the land for commercial development. Owner has now brought an appropriate action to quiet title against Sonny, Fanny, and School District. The only applicable statute is a provision in the jurisdiction's probate code which provides that any property interest which is descendible is devisable. In such action, the court should find that title is now in 
A. Owner.
B. Sonny.
C. Fanny.
D. School District.
Answer: C