ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
Pat sustained personal injuries in a three-car collision caused by the concurrent negligence of the three drivers, Pat, Donald, and Drew. In Pat's action for damages against Donald and Drew, the jury apportioned the negligence 30% to Pat, 30% to Donald, and 40% to Drew. Pat's total damages were $100,000. Assume for this question only that a state statute provides for a system of pure comparative negligence, joint and several liability of concurrent tortfeasors, and contribution based upon proportionate fault. If Pat chooses to execute against Donald alone, she will be entitled to collect at most 
A. $70,000 from Donald, and then Donald will be entitled to collect $40,000 from Drew. 
B. $30,000 from Donald, and then Donald will be entitled to collect $10,000 from Drew. 
C. $30,000 from Donald, and then Donald will be entitled to collect nothing from Drew. 
D. nothing from Donald, because Donald's percentage of fault is not greater than that of Pat. 
Answer: A
Pat sustained personal injuries in a three-car collision caused by the concurrent negligence of the three drivers, Pat, Donald, and Drew. In Pat's action for damages against Donald and Drew, the jury apportioned the negligence 30% to Pat, 30% to Donald, and 40% to Drew. Pat's total damages were $100,000. Assume for this question only that the state has retained the common-law rule pertaining to contribution and that the state's comparative negligence statute provides for a system of pure comparative negligence but abolishes joint and several liability. If Pat chooses to execute against Donald alone, she will be entitled to collect at most 
A. $70,000 from Donald, and then Donald will be entitled to collect $40,000 from Drew. 
B. $30,000 from Donald, and then Donald will be entitled to collect $10,000 from Drew. 
C. $30,000 from Donald, and then Donald will be entitled to collect nothing from Drew. 
D. nothing from Donald, because Donald's percentage of fault is not greater than that of Pat. 
Answer: C
Tess Traviata owed Dr. Paula Pulmonary, a physician, $25,000 for professional services. Dr. Pulmonary orally assigned this claim to her adult daughter, Bridey, as a wedding gift. Shortly thereafter, on suffering sudden, severe losses in the stock market, Dr. Pulmonary assigned by a signed writing the same claim to her stockbroker, Margin, in partial satisfaction of advances legally made by Margin in Dr. Pulmonary's previous stock-market transactions. Subsequently, Traviata, without knowledge of either assignment, paid Dr. Pulmonary the $25,000 then due, which Dr. Pulmonary promptly lost at a horse track, although she remains solvent. Assuming that Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code does NOT apply to either of the assignments in this situation, which of the following is a correct statement of the parties' rights and liabilities? 
A. As the assignee prior in time, Bridey can recover $25,000 from Traviata, who acted at her peril in paying Dr. acted at her peril in paying Dr. Pulmonary. 
B. As the sole assignee for value, Margin can recover $25,000 from Traviata, who acted at her peril in paying Dr. Pulmonary. 
C. Neither Bridey nor Margin can recover from Traviata, but Bridey, though not Margin, can recover $25,000 from Dr. Pulmonary. 
D. Neither Bridey nor Margin can recover from Traviata, but Margin, though not Bridey, can recover $25,000 from Dr. Pulmonary. 
Answer: D
Patten suffered from a serious, though not immediately life-threatening, impairment of his circulatory system. Patten's cardiologist recommended a cardiac bypass operation and referred Patten to Dr. Cutter. Cutter did not inform Patten of the 2% risk of death associated with this operation. Cutter defended his decision not to mention the risk statistics to Patten because "Patten was a worrier and it would significantly lessen his chances of would significantly lessen his chances of survival to be worried about the nonsurvival rate." Cutter successfully performed the bypass operation and Patten made a good recovery. However, when Patten learned of the 2% risk of death associated with the operation, he was furious that Cutter had failed to disclose this information to him. If Patten asserts a claim against Cutter based on negligence, will Patten prevail? 
A. No, if Cutter used his best personal judgment in shielding Patten from the risk statistic. 
B. No, because the operation was successful and Patten suffered no harm. 
C. Yes, if Patten would have refused the operation had he been informed of the risk. 
D. Yes, because a patient must be told the risk factor associated with a surgical procedure in order to give an informed consent. 
Answer: B
A statute of the state of Orrington provides that assessments of real property for tax purposes must represent the "actual value" of the property. The Blue County Tax Commission, in making its assessments, has uniformly and consistently determined the "actual value" of real property solely by reference to the price at which the particular property was last sold. In recent years, the market values of real property in Blue County have been rising at the rate of 15% per year. Owner is required to pay real estate taxes on her home in Blue County that are 200% to 300% higher than those paid by many other 200. owners of similar homes in similar neighborhoods in that county, even though the current market values of their respective homes and Owner's home are nearly identical. The reason the taxes on Owner's home are higher than those imposed on the other similar homes in similar neighborhoods is that she bought her home much more recently than the bought her home much more recently than the other owners and, therefore, it is assessed at a much higher "actual value" than their homes. Persistent efforts by Owner to have her assessment reduced or the assessments of the others raised by the Blue County Tax Commission have failed. Owner has now filed suit against the Blue County Tax Commission, charging only that the tax assessment on her property is unconstitutional. The strongest constitutional argument to support Owner's claim is that the comparative overvaluation of Owner's property by the Blue County Tax Commission in making tax assessments over time 
A. deprives Owner of the equal protection of the laws.
B. deprives Owner of a privilege or immunity of national citizenship.
C. constitutes a taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
D. constitutes an ex post facto law.
Answer: A
Plaza Hotel sued Plaza House Hotel for infringement of its trade name. To establish a likelihood of name confusion, Plaintiff Plaza Hotel offers a series of memoranda which it had asked its employees to prepare at the end of each day listing instances during the day in which telephone callers, cab drivers, customers, and others had confused the two names. The memoranda should be 
A. excluded, because they are more unfairly prejudicial and confusing than probative. 
B. excluded, because they are hearsay not within any exception. 
C. admitted, because they are records of regularly conducted business activity. 
D. admitted, because they are past recollection recorded.
Answer: B
Walter, a 16-year-old, purchased an educational chemistry set manufactured by Chemco. Walter invited his friend and classmate, Peter, to assist him in a chemistry project. Referring to a library chemistry book on explosives and finding that the chemistry set contained all of the necessary chemicals, Walter and Peter agreed to make a bomb. During the course of the project, Walter carelessly knocked a lighted Bunsen burner into a bowl of chemicals from the chemistry set. The chemicals burst into flames, injuring Peter. In a suit by Peter against Chemco, based on strict liability, Peter will 
A. prevail, if the chemistry set did not contain a warning that its contents could be combined to form dangerous explosives. 
B. prevail, because manufacturers of chemistry sets are engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity. 
C. not prevail, because Walter's negligence was the cause in fact of Peter's injury. 
D. not prevail, if the chemistry set was as safe as possible, consistent with its educational purposes, and its benefits exceeded its risks. 
Answer: D
While walking home one evening, Harold, an off-duty police officer, was accosted by Jones, a stranger. Jones had been drinking and mistakenly thought Harold was a man who was having an affair with his wife. Intending to frighten Harold but not to harm him, Jones pulled out a knife, screamed obscenities, and told Harold he was going to kill him. Frightened and reasonably believing Jones was going to kill him and that using deadly force was his only salvation, Harold took out his service revolver and shot and killed Jones. Harold is charged with murder. Harold's claim of self-defense should be 
A. sustained, because Harold reasonably believed Jones was planning to kill him and that deadly force was required. 
B. sustained, because the killing was in hot blood upon sufficient provocation. 
C. denied, because Jones did not in fact intend to harm Harold and Harold was incorrect in believing that he did. 
D. denied, because Harold was not defending his home and had an obligation to retreat or to repel with less than deadly force. 
Answer: A
Anna entered a hospital to undergo surgery and feared that she might not survive. She instructed her lawyer by telephone to prepare a deed conveying Blackacre, a large tract of undeveloped land, as a gift to her nephew, Bernard, who lived in a distant state. Her instructions were followed, and, prior to her surgery, she executed a document in a form sufficient to constitute a deed of conveyance. The deed was recorded by the lawyer promptly and properly as she instructed him to do. The recorded deed was returned to the lawyer by the land record office, Anna, in fact, recovered from her surgery and the lawyer returned the recorded deed to her. Before Anna or the lawyer thought to inform Bernard of the conveyance, Bernard was killed in an auto accident. Bernard's will left all of his estate to a satanic religious cult. Anna was very upset at the prospect of the cult's acquiring Blackacre. The local taxing authority assessed the next real property tax bill on Blackacre to Bernard's estate. Anna brought an appropriate action against Bernard's estate and the cult to set aside the conveyance to Bernard. If Anna loses, it will be because 
A. the gift of Blackacre was inter vivos rather than causa mortis.
B. the showing of Bernard's estate as the owner of Blackacre on the tax rolls supplied what otherwise would be a missing essential element for a valid conveyance.
C. disappointing Bernard's devisee would violate the religious freedom provisions of the First Amendment to the Constitution.
D. delivery of the deed is presumed from the recording of the deed.
Answer: D
In a prosecution of Doris for murder, the government seeks to introduce a properly authenticated note written by the victim that reads: "Doris did it." In laying the foundation for admitting the note as a dying declaration, the prosecution offered an affidavit from the attending physician that the victim knew she was about to die when she wrote the note. The admissibility of the note as a dying declaration is 
A. a preliminary fact question for the judge, and the judge must not consider the affidavit. 
B. a preliminary fact question for the judge, and the judge may properly consider the affidavit. 
C. a question of weight and credibility for the jury, and the jury must not consider the affidavit. 
D. a question of weight and credibility for the jury, and the jury may properly consider the affidavit. 
Answer: B
As Paul, a bartender, was removing the restraining wire from a bottle of champagne produced and bottled by Winery, Inc., the plastic stopper suddenly shot out of the bottle. The stopper struck and injured Paul's eye. Paul had opened other bottles of champagne, and occasionally the stoppers had shot out with great force, but Paul had not been injured.Paul has brought an action against Winery, Inc., alleging that the bottle that caused his injury was defective and unreasonably dangerous because its label did not warn that the stopper might suddenly shoot out during opening. The state has merged contributory negligence and unreasonable assumption of risk into a pure comparative fault system that is applied in strict products liability actions. If the jury finds that the bottle was defective and unreasonably dangerous because it lacked a warning, will Paul recover a judgment in his favor? 
A. No, if the jury finds that a legally sufficient warning would not have prevented Paul's injury. 
B. No, if a reasonable bartender would have realized that a stopper could eject from the bottle and hit his eye. 
C. Yes, with damages reduced by the percentage of any contributory fault on Paul's part. 
D. Yes, with no reduction in damages, because foreseeable lack of caution is the reason for requiring a warning. 
Answer: A
Swatter, a baseball star, contracted with the Municipal Symphony Orchestra, Inc., to perform for $5,000 at a children's concert as narrator of "Peter and the Wolf." Shortly before the concert, Swatter became embroiled in a highly publicized controversy over whether he had cursed and assaulted a baseball fan. The orchestra canceled the contract out of concern that attendance might be adversely affected by Swatter's appearance. Swatter sued the orchestra for breach of contract. His business agent testified without contradiction that the cancellation had resulted in Swatter's not getting other contracts for performances and endorsements. The trial court instructed the jury, in part, as follows: "If you find for the plaintiff, you may award damages for losses which at the time of contracting could reasonably have been foreseen by the defendant as a probable result of its breach. However, the law does not permit recovery for the loss of prospective profits of a new business caused by breach of contract." On Swatter's appeal from a jury verdict for Swatter, and judgment thereon, awarding damages only for the $5,000 fee promised by the orchestra, the judgment will probably be 
A. affirmed, because the trial court stated the law correctly. 
B. affirmed, because the issue of damages for breach of contract was solely a jury question. 
C. reversed, because the test for limiting damages is what the breaching party could reasonably have foreseen at the time of the breach. 
D. reversed, because under the prevailing modern view, lost profits of a new business are recoverable if they are established with reasonable certainty. 
Answer: D
Road Lines is an interstate bus company operating in a five-state area. A federal statute authorizes the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to permit interstate carriers to discontinue entirely any unprofitable route. Road Lines applied to the ICC for permission to drop a very unprofitable route through the sparsely populated Shaley Mountains. The ICC granted that permission even though Road Lines provided the only public transportation into the region. Foley is the owner of a mountain resort in the Shaley Mountains, whose customers usually arrived on vehicles operated by Road Lines. After exhausting all available federal administrative remedies, Foley filed suit against Road Lines in the trial court of the state in which the Shaley Mountains are located to enjoin the discontinuance by Road Lines of its service to that area. Foley alleged that the discontinuance of service by Road Lines would violate a statute of that state prohibiting common carriers of persons from abandoning service to communities having no alternate form of public transportation. The state court should 
A. dismiss the action, because Foley lacks standing to sue. 
B. direct the removal of the case to federal court, because this suit involves a substantial federal question. 
C. hear the case on its merits and decide for Foley because, on these facts, a federal agency is interfering with essential state functions. 
D. hear the case on its merits and decide for Road Lines, because a valid federal law preempts the state statute on which Foley relies. 
Answer: D
Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a state tax law, alleging that it violated the equal protection clauses of both the United States Constitution and the state constitution. The state supreme court agreed and held the tax law to be invalid. It said: "We hold that this state tax law violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and also the equal protection clause of the state constitution because we interpret that provision of the state constitution to contain exactly the same prohibition against discriminatory legislation as is contained in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." The state sought review of this decision in the United States Supreme Court, alleging that the state supreme court's determination of the federal constitutional issue was incorrect. How should the United States Supreme Court dispose of the case if it believes that this interpretation of the federal Constitution by the state supreme court raises an important federal question and is incorrect on the merits? 
A. Reverse the state supreme court decision, because the equal protection clause of a state constitution must be construed by the state supreme court in a manner that is congruent with the meaning of the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution. 
B. Reverse the state supreme court decision with respect to the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution and remand the case to the state supreme court for further proceedings, because the state and federal constitutional issues are so intertwined that the federal issue must be decided so that this case may be disposed of properly. 
C. Refuse to review the decision of the state supreme court, because it is based on an adequate and independent ground of state law. 
D. Refuse to review the decision of the state supreme court, because a state government may not seek review of decisions of its own courts in the United States Supreme Court. 
Answer: B
A federal statute prohibits the construction of nuclear energy plants in this country without a license from the Federal Nuclear Plant Siting Commission. The statute provides that the Commission may issue a license authorizing the construction of a proposed nuclear energy plant 30 days after the Commission makes a finding that the plant will comply with specified standards of safety, technological and commercial feasibility, and public convenience. In a severable provision, the Commission's enabling statute also provides that the Congress, by simple majorities in each house, may veto the issuance of a particular license by the Commission if such a veto occurs within 30 days following the required Commission finding. Early last year, the Commission found that Safenuke, Inc., met all statutory requirements and, therefore, voted to issue Safenuke, Inc., a license authorizing it to construct a nuclear energy plant. Because they believed that the issuance of a license to Safenuke, Inc., was not in accord with the applicable statutory criteria, a majority of each of the two houses of Congress voted, within the specified 30-day period, to veto the license. On the basis of that veto, the Commission refused to issue the license. Subsequently, Safenuke, Inc., sued the Commission in an appropriate federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the Commission's refusal to issue the license. In this suit, the court should hold the congressional veto of the license of Safenuke, Inc., to be 
A. invalid, because any determination by Congress that particular agency action does not satisfy statutory criteria violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution because it constitutes the performance of a judicial function by the legislative branch. 
B. invalid, because Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution has been interpreted to mean that any action of Congress purporting to alter the legal rights of persons outside of the legislative branch must be presented to the President for his signature or veto. 
C. valid, because Congress has authority under the commerce clause to regulate the construction of nuclear energy plants. 
D. valid, because there is a compelling national interest in the close congressional supervision of nuclear plant siting in light of the grave dangers to the public health and safety that are associated with the operation of such plants.
Answer: B
A jurisdiction has the following decisional law on questions of principal and accomplice liability: CASE A: Defendant, a hardware store owner, sold several customers an item known as a "SuperTrucker," which detects police radar and enables speeders to avoid detection. When one of the devices broke down and the speeder was arrested, he confessed that he often sped, secure in the knowledge that his "SuperTrucker" would warn him of police radar in the vicinity. Held: Defendant guilty as an accomplice to speeding. CASE B: Defendant told Arnold that Defendant had stored some stereo equipment in a self-storage locker. He gave Arnold a key and asked Arnold to pick up the equipment and deliver it to Defendant's house. Arnold complied, and removed the equipment from the locker, using the key. In fact, the equipment belonged to Defendant's neighbor, whose locker key Defendant had found in the driveway. Held: Defendant guilty as an accomplice to burglary. CASE C: Tooley, a city council member, accepted a bribe from Defendant in exchange for his vote on Defendant's application for a zoning variance. A statute prohibits the taking of bribes by public officials. Held: Defendant not guilty as an accomplice to Tooley's violation of the bribery statute. CASE D: Defendant, an innkeeper, sometimes let his rooms to prostitutes, whom he knew to be using the rooms to ply their trade. He charged the prostitutes the same price as other guests at his inn. Held: Defendant not guilty as an accomplice to prostitution. Lipsky, a college student, purchased narcotics from Speed, whom he believed to be a "street person" but who was in fact an undercover police agent. Lipsky has been charged as an accomplice to the sale of narcotics. He should be 
A. convicted on the authority of Case A.
B. convicted on the authority of Case B.
C. acquitted on the authority of Case C.
D. acquitted on the authority of Case D.
Answer: C