ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
The legislature of State X is debating reforms in the law governing insanity. Two reforms have been proposed. Proposal A would eliminate the insanity defense altogether. Proposal B would retain the defense but place on the defendant the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Opponents of the reforms argue that the proposals would be unconstitutional under the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Which of the proposed reforms would be unconstitutional?
A. Both proposals.
B. Neither proposal.
C. Proposal A only.
D. Proposal B only.
Answer: B
A federal statute appropriated $7 million for a nationwide essay contest on "How the United States Can Best Stop Drug Abuse." The statute indicates that its purpose is to generate new, practical ideas for eliminating drug abuse in the United States. Contest rules set forth in the statute provide that winning essays are to be selected on the basis of the "originality, aptness, and feasibility of their ideas." The statute expressly authorizes a first prize of $1 million, 50 second prizes of $100,000 each, and 100 third prizes of $10,000 each. It also states that judges for the contest are to be appointed by the President of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate, and that all residents of the United States who are not employees of the federal government are eligible to enter and win the contest. A provision of the statute authorizes any taxpayer of the United States to challenge its constitutionality. In a suit by a federal taxpayer to challenge the constitutionality of the statute, the court should 
A. refuse to decide its merits, because the suit involves policy questions that are inherently political and, therefore, nonjusticiable. 
B. hold the statute unconstitutional, because it does not provide sufficient guidelines for awarding the prize money appropriated by Congress and, therefore, unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the contest judges. 
C. hold the statute unconstitutional, because its relationship to legitimate purposes of the spending power of Congress is too tenuous and conjectural to satisfy the necessary and proper clause of Article I. 
D. hold the statute constitutional, because it is reasonably related to the general welfare, it states concrete objectives, and it provides adequate criteria for conducting the essay contest and awarding the prize money.
Answer: D
Fran, who was driving at an excessive speed, applied her brakes to stop at a traffic light. Due to damp, fallen leaves, her car skidded and came to a halt perpendicular to the roadway. Sid, who was also driving at an excessive speed and was immediately behind Fran, saw Fran's car perpendicular to the roadway. Although Sid had sufficient distance to come to a slow, controlled stop, he decided not to slow down but, rather, to swerve to the left in an effort to go around Fran's car. Due to oncoming traffic, the space was insufficient and Sid's car collided with Fran's car, severely injuring Fran. Fran filed a personal injury action against Sid in a jurisdiction in which contributory negligence is a bar to recovery. Will Fran prevail? 
A. Yes, if the jury finds that Sid was more than 50% at fault. 
B. Yes, if the jury finds that Sid had the last clear chance. 
C. No, if the jury finds that Fran's conduct was in any way a legal cause of the accident. 
D. No, if the jury finds that, in speeding, Fran assumed the risk. 
Answer: B
Sal owned five adjoining rectangular lots, numbered 1 through 5 inclusive, all fronting on Main Street. All of the lots are in a zone limited to one- and two-family residences under the zoning ordinance. Two years ago, Sal conveyed Lots 1, 3, and 5. None of the three deeds contained any restrictions. Each of the new owners built a one-family residence. One year ago, Sal conveyed Lot 2 to Peter. The deed provided that each of Peter and Sal, their respective heirs and assigns, would use Lots 2 and 4 respectively only for one-family residential purposes. The deed was promptly and properly recorded. Peter built a one-family residence on Lot 2. Last month, Sal conveyed Lot 4 to Betty. The deed contained no restrictions. The deed from Sal to Peter was in the title report examined by Betty's lawyer. Betty obtained a building permit and commenced construction of a twofamily residence on Lot 4. Peter, joined by the owners of Lots 1, 3, and 5, brought an appropriate action against Betty to enjoin the proposed use of Lot 4, or, alternatively, damages caused by Betty's breach of covenant. Which is the most appropriate comment concerning the outcome of this action? 
A. All plaintiffs should be awarded their requested judgment for injunction because there was a common development scheme, but award of damages should be denied to all. 
B. Peter should be awarded appropriate remedy, but recovery by the other plaintiffs is doubtful. 
C. Injunction should be denied, but damages should be awarded to all plaintiffs, measured by diminution of market value, if any, suffered as a result of the proximity of Betty's two-family residence. 
D. All plaintiffs should be denied any recovery or relief because the zoning preempts any private scheme of covenants.
Answer: B
Kelly County, in the state of Green, is located adjacent to the border of the state of Red. The communities located in Kelly County are principally suburbs of Scarletville, a large city located in Red, and therefore there is a large volume of traffic between that city and Kelly County. While most of that traffic is by private passenger automobiles, some of it is by taxicabs and other kinds of commercial vehicles. An ordinance of Kelly County, the stated purpose of which is to reduce traffic congestion, provides that only taxicabs registered in Kelly County may pick up or discharge passengers in the county. The ordinance also provides that only residents of Kelly County may register taxicabs in that county. Which of the following is the proper result in a suit brought by Scarletville taxicab owners challenging the constitutionality of this Kelly County ordinance? 
A. Judgment for Scarletville taxicab owners, because the fact that private passenger automobiles contribute more to the traffic congestion problem in Kelly County than do taxicabs indicates that the ordinance is not a reasonable means by which to solve that problem. 
B. Judgment for Scarletville taxicab owners, because the ordinance unduly burdens interstate commerce by insulating Kelly County taxicab owners from out-ofstate competition without adequate justification. 
C. Judgment for Kelly County, because the ordinance forbids taxicabs registered in other counties of Green as well as in states other than Green to operate in Kelly County and, therefore, it does not discriminate against interstate commerce. 
D. Judgment for Kelly County, because Scarletville taxicab owners do not constitute a suspect class and the ordinance is reasonably related to the legitimate governmental purpose of reducing traffic congestion. 
Answer: B
Paul sued Donna for breach of contract. Paul's position was that Joan, whom he understood to be Donna's agent, said: "On behalf of Donna, I accept your offer." Donna asserted that Joan had no actual or apparent authority to accept the offer on Donna's behalf. Paul's testimony concerning Joan's statement is 
A. admissible, provided the court first finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Joan had actual or apparent authority to act for Donna. 
B. admissible, upon or subject to introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding by the jury that Joan had actual or apparent authority to act for Donna. 
C. inadmissible, if Joan does not testify and her absence is not excused. 
D. inadmissible, because it is hearsay not within any exception.
Answer: B
A city ordinance requires a taxicab operator's license to operate a taxicab in King City. The ordinance states that the sole criteria for the issuance of such a license are driving ability and knowledge of the geography of King City. An applicant is tested by the city for these qualifications with a detailed questionnaire, written and oral examinations, and a practical behind-the-wheel demonstration. The ordinance does not limit the number of licenses that may be issued. It does, however, allow any citizen to file an objection to the issuance of a particular license, but only on the ground that an applicant does not possess the required qualifications. City licensing officials are also authorized by the ordinance to determine, in their discretion, whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on an objection before issuing a license. Sandy applies for a taxicab operator's license and is found to be fully qualified after completing the usual licensing process. Her name is then posted as a prospective licensee, subject only to the objection process. John, a licensed taxicab driver, files an objection to the issuance of such a license to Sandy solely on the ground that the grant of a license to Sandy would impair the value of John's existing license. John demands a hearing before a license is issued to Sandy so that he may have an opportunity to prove his claim. City licensing officials refuse to hold such a hearing, and they issue a license to Sandy. John petitions for review of this action by city officials in an appropriate court, alleging that the Constitution requires city licensing officials to grant his request for a hearing before issuing a license to Sandy. In this case, the court should rule for 
A. John, because the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires all persons whose property may be adversely affected by governmental action to be given an opportunity for a hearing before such action occurs. 
B. John, because the determination of whether to hold a hearing may not constitutionally be left to the discretion of the same officials whose action is being challenged. 
C. city officials, because John had the benefit of the licensing ordinance and, therefore, may not now question actions taken under it. 
D. city officials, because the licensing ordinance does not give John any property interest in being free of competition from additional licensees. 
Answer: D
Homer lived on the second floor of a small convenience store/gas station that he owned. One night he refused to sell Augie a sixpack of beer after hours, saying he could not violate the state laws. Augie became enraged and deliberately drove his car into one of the gasoline pumps, severing it from its base. There was an ensuing explosion causing a ball of fire to go from the underground gasoline tank into the building. As a result, the building burned to the ground and Homer was killed. In a common-law jurisdiction, if Augie is charged with murder and arson, he should be 
A. convicted of both offenses.
B. convicted of involuntary manslaughter and acquitted of arson.
C. convicted of arson and involuntary manslaughter.
D. acquitted of both offenses.
Answer: A
Bye Bye telegraphed Vendor on June 1, "At what price will you sell 100 of your QTModel garbage-disposal units for delivery around June 10?" Thereafter, the following communications were exchanged: 1. Telegram from Vendor received by Bye Bye on June 2: "You're in luck. We have only 100 QT's, all on clearance at 50% off usual wholesale of $120 per unit, for delivery at our shipping platform on June 12." 2. Letter from Bye Bye received in U.S. mail by Vendor on June 5: "I accept. Would prefer to pay in full 30 days after invoice." 3. Telegram from Vendor received by Bye Bye on June 6: "You must pick up at our platform and pay C.O.D." 4. Letter from Bye Bye received in U.S. mail by Vendor on June 9: "I don't deal with people who can't accommodate our simple requests." 5. Telegram from Bye Bye received by Vendor on June 10, after Vendor had sold and delivered all 100 of the QT's to another buyer earlier that day: "Okay. I'm over a barrel and will pick up the goods on your terms June 12." Bye Bye now sues Vendor for breach of contract. Which of the following arguments will best serve Vendor's defense? 
A. Vendor's telegram received on June 2 was merely a price quotation, not an offer. 
B. Bye Bye's letter received on June 5 was not an acceptance because it varied the terms of Vendor's initial telegram.
C. Bye Bye's use of the mails in response to Vendor's initial telegram was an ineffective method of acceptance.
D. Bye Bye's letter received on June 9 was an unequivocal refusal to perform that excused Vendor even if the parties had previously formed a contract.
Answer: D
At a party, Diane and Victor agreed to play a game they called "spin the barrel." Victor took an unloaded revolver, placed one bullet in the barrel, and spun the barrel. Victor then pointed the gun at Diane's head and pulled the trigger once. The gun did not fire. Diane then took the gun, pointed it at Victor, spun the barrel, and pulled the trigger once. The gun fired, and Victor fell over dead. A statute in the jurisdiction defines murder in the first degree as an intentional and premeditated killing or one occurring during the commission of a common-law felony, and murder in the second degree as all other murder at common law. Manslaughter is defined as a killing in the heat of passion upon an adequate legal provocation or a killing caused by gross negligence. The most serious crime for which Diane can properly be convicted is 
A. murder in the first degree, because the killing was intentional and premeditated and, in any event, occurred during commission of the felony of assault with a deadly weapon. 
B. murder in the second degree, because Diane's act posed a great threat of serious bodily harm. 
C. manslaughter, because Diane's act was grossly negligent and reckless. 
D. no crime, because Victor and Diane voluntarily agreed to play a game and each assumed the risk of death.
Answer: B
Abel owned Blackacre in fee simple. Three years ago, Abel and Betty agreed to a monthto-month tenancy with Betty paying Abel rent each month. After six months of Betty's occupancy, Abel suggested to Betty that she could buy Blackacre for a monthly payment of no more than her rent. Abel and Betty orally agreed that Betty would pay $25,000 in cash, the annual real estate taxes, the annual fire insurance premiums, and the costs of maintaining Blackacre, plus the monthly mortgage payments that Abel owed on Blackacre. They further orally agreed that within six years Betty could pay whatever mortgage balances were then due and Abel would give her a warranty deed to the property. Betty's average monthly payments did turn out to be about the same as her monthly rent. Betty fully complied with all of the obligations she had undertaken. She made some structural modifications to Blackacre. Blackacre is now worth 50% more than it was when Abel and Betty made their oral agreement. Betty made her financing arrangements and was ready to complete the purchase of Blackacre, but Abel refused to close. Betty brought an appropriate action for specific performance against Abel to enforce the agreement. The court should rule for 
A. Abel, because the agreements were oral and violated the statute of frauds. 
B. Abel, subject to the return of the $25,000, because the arrangement was still a tenancy. 
C. Betty, because the doctrine of part performance applies. 
D. Betty, because the statute of frauds does not apply to oral purchase and sale agreements between landlords and tenants in possession. 
Answer: C
A statute of State X permits a person's name to appear on the general election ballot as a candidate for statewide public office if the person pays a $100 filing fee and provides proof from the State Elections Board that he or she was nominated in the immediately preceding primary election by one of the state's two major political parties. It also permits the name of an independent candidate or a candidate of a smaller party to appear on the general election ballot if that person pays a filing fee of $1,000, and submits petitions signed by at least 3% of the voters who actually cast ballots for the office of governor in the last State X election. State X maintains that these filing requirements are necessary to limit the size of the election ballot, to eliminate frivolous candidacies, and to help finance the high cost of elections. Historically, very few of State X's voters who are members of racial minority groups have been members of either of the two major political parties. Recently, a new political party has been formed by some of these voters. Which of the following constitutional provisions would be most helpful to the new political party as a basis for attacking the constitutionality of this statute of State X? 
A. The First Amendment.
B. The Thirteenth Amendment.
C. The Fourteenth Amendment.
D. The Fifteenth Amendment.
Answer: C
Defendant is on trial for the murder of his father. Defendant's defense is that he shot his father accidentally. The prosecutor calls Witness, a police officer, to testify that on two occasions in the year prior to this incident, he had been called to Defendant's home because of complaints of loud arguments between Defendant and his father, and had found it necessary to stop Defendant from beating his father. The evidence is 
A. inadmissible, because it is improper character evidence. 
B. inadmissible, because Witness lacks firsthand knowledge of who started the quarrels. 
C. admissible to show that Defendant killed his father intentionally.
D. admissible to show that Defendant is a violent person.
Answer: C
Alex and Brenda owned in fee simple Greenacre as tenants in common, each owning an undivided one-half interest. Alex and Brenda joined in mortgaging Greenacre to Marge by a properly recorded mortgage that contained a general warranty clause. Alex became disenchanted with land-owning and notified Brenda that he would no longer contribute to the payment of installments due Marge. After the mortgage was in default and Marge made demand for payment of the entire amount of principal and interest due, Brenda tendered to Marge, and Marge deposited, a check for one-half of the amount due Marge. Brenda then demanded a release of Brenda's undivided one-half interest. Marge refused to release any interest in Greenacre. Brenda promptly brought an action against Marge to quiet title to an undivided one-half interest in Greenacre. In such action, Brenda should 
A. lose, because Marge's title had been warranted by an express provision of the mortgage. 
B. lose, because there was no redemption from the mortgage. 
C. win, because Brenda is entitled to marshalling. 
D. win, because the cotenancy of the mortgagors was in common and not joint.
Answer: B
The police had, over time, accumulated reliable information that Jason operated a large cocainedistribution network, that he and his accomplices often resorted to violence, and that they kept a small arsenal of weapons in his home. One day, the police received reliable information that a large brown suitcase with leather straps containing a supply of cocaine had been delivered to Jason's home and that it would be moved to a distribution point the next morning. The police obtained a valid search warrant to search for and seize the brown suitcase and the cocaine and went to Jason's house. The police knocked on Jason's door and called out, "Police. Open up. We have a search warrant." After a few seconds with no response, the police forced the door open and entered. Hearing noises in the basement, the police ran down there and found Jason with a large brown suitcase with leather straps. They seized the suitcase and put handcuffs on Jason. A search of his person revealed a switchblade knife and a .45-caliber pistol. Jason cursed the police and said, "You never would have caught me with the stuff if it hadn't been for that lousy snitch Harvey!" The police then fanned out through the house, looking in every room and closet. They found no one else, but one officer found an Uzi automatic weapon in a box on a closet shelf in Jason's bedroom. In addition to charges relating to the cocaine in the suitcase, Jason is charged with unlawful possession of weapons. Jason moves pretrial to suppress the use as evidence of the weapons seized by the police and of the statement he made. As to the switchblade knife and the .45-caliber pistol, Jason's motion to suppress should be 
A. granted, because the search and seizure were the result of illegal police conduct in executing the search warrant. 
B. granted, because the police did not inform Jason that he was under arrest and did not read him his Miranda rights. 
C. denied, because the search and seizure were incident to a lawful arrest. 
D. denied, because the police had reasonable grounds to believe that there were weapons in the house. 
Answer: C
The police had, over time, accumulated reliable information that Jason operated a large cocainedistribution network, that he and his accomplices often resorted to violence, and that they kept a small arsenal of weapons in his home. One day, the police received reliable information that a large brown suitcase with leather straps containing a supply of cocaine had been delivered to Jason's home and that it would be moved to a distribution point the next morning. The police obtained a valid search warrant to search for and seize the brown suitcase and the cocaine and went to Jason's house. The police knocked on Jason's door and called out, "Police. Open up. We have a search warrant." After a few seconds with no response, the police forced the door open and entered. Hearing noises in the basement, the police ran down there and found Jason with a large brown suitcase with leather straps. They seized the suitcase and put handcuffs on Jason. A search of his person revealed a switchblade knife and a .45-caliber pistol. Jason cursed the police and said, "You never would have caught me with the stuff if it hadn't been for that lousy snitch Harvey!" The police then fanned out through the house, looking in every room and closet. They found no one else, but one officer found an Uzi automatic weapon in a box on a closet shelf in Jason's bedroom. In addition to charges relating to the cocaine in the suitcase, Jason is charged with unlawful possession of weapons. Jason moves pretrial to suppress the use as evidence of the weapons seized by the police and of the statement he made. As to Jason's statement, his motion to suppress should be 
A. granted, because the entry by forcing open the door was not reasonable. 
B. granted, because the police failed to read Jason his Miranda rights. 
C. denied, because the statement was volunteered. 
D. denied, because the statement was the product of a lawful public safety search. 
Answer: C