ncoop57/mmmlu huggingface dataset:
Broker needed a certain rare coin to complete a set that he had contracted to assemble and sell to Collecta. On February 1, Broker obtained such a coin from Hoarda in exchange for $1,000 and Broker's signed, written promise to re-deliver to Hoarda "not later than December 31 this year" a comparable specimen of the same kind of coin without charge to Hoarda. On February 2, Broker consummated sale of the complete set to Collecta. On October 1, the market price of rare coins suddenly began a rapid, sustained rise; and on October 15 Hoarda wrote Broker for assurance that the latter would timely meet his coin-replacement commitment. Broker replied, "In view of the surprising market, it seems unfair that I should have to replace your coin within the next few weeks." 177. For this question only, assume the following facts. Having received Broker's message on October 17, Hoarda sued Broker on November 15 for the market value of a comparable replacement-coin as promised by Broker in February. The trial began on December 1. If Broker moves to dismiss Hoarda's complaint, which of the following is Broker's best argument in support of the motion? 
A. Broker did not repudiate the contract on October 17, and may still perform no later than the contract deadline of December 31. 
B. Even if Broker repudiated on October 17, Hoarda's only action would be for specific performance because the coin is a unique chattel. 
C. Under the doctrine of impossibility, which includes unusually burdensome and unforeseen impracticability, Broker is temporarily excused by the market conditions from timely performance of his coin-replacement obligation. 
D. Even if Broker repudiated on October 17, Hoarda has no remedy without first 17, Hoarda has no remedy without first demanding in writing that Broker retract his repudiation. 
Answer: A
Broker needed a certain rare coin to complete a set that he had contracted to assemble and sell to Collecta. On February 1, Broker obtained such a coin from Hoarda in exchange for $1,000 and Broker's signed, written promise to re-deliver to Hoarda "not later than December 31 this year" a comparable specimen of the same kind of coin without charge to Hoarda. On February 2, Broker consummated sale of the complete set to Collecta. On October 1, the market price of rare coins suddenly began a rapid, sustained rise; and on October 15 Hoarda wrote Broker for assurance that the latter would timely meet his coin-replacement commitment. Broker replied, "In view of the surprising market, it seems unfair that I should have to replace your coin within the next few weeks." 177. For this question only, assume the following facts. Having received Broker's message on October 17, Hoarda sued Broker on November 15 for the market value of a comparable replacement-coin as promised by Broker in February. The trial began on December 1. If Broker moves to dismiss Hoarda's complaint, which of the following is Broker's best argument in support of the motion? For this question only, assume the following facts. After receiving Broker's message on October 17, Hoarda telephoned Broker, who said, "I absolutely will not replace your coin until the market drops far below its present level." Hoarda then sued Broker on November 15 for the market value of a comparable replacement-coin as promised by Broker in February. The trial began on December 1. If Broker moves to dismiss Hoarda's complaint, which of the following is Hoarda's best argument in opposing the motion? 
A. Hoarda's implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in enforcement of the contract required her to mitigate her losses on the rising market by suing promptly, as she did, after becoming reasonably apprehensive of a prospective breach by Broker. 
B. Although the doctrine of anticipatory breach is not applicable under the prevailing view if, at the time of repudiation, the repudiatee owes the repudiator no remaining duty of performance, the doctrine applies in this case because Hoarda, the repudiatee, remains potentially liable under an implied warranty that the coin advanced to Broker was genuine. 
C. When either party to a sale-of-goods contract repudiates with respect to a performance not yet due, the loss of which will substantially impair the value of the contract to the other, the aggrieved party may in good faith resort to any appropriate remedy for breach. 
D. Anticipatory repudiation, as a deliberate disruption without legal excuse of an ongoing contractual relationship between the parties, may be treated by the repudiatee at her election as a present tort, actionable at once. 
Answer: C
Alice owned a commercial property, Eastgate, consisting of a one-story building rented to various retail stores and a very large parking lot. Two years ago, Alice died and left Eastgate to her nephew, Paul, for life, with remainder to her godson, Richard, his heirs and assigns. Paul was 30 years old and Richard was 20 years old when Alice died. The devise of Eastgate was made subject to any mortgage on Eastgate in effect at the time of Alice's death. When Alice executed her will, the balance of the mortgage debt on Eastgate was less than $5,000. A year before her death, Alice suffered financial reverses; and in order to meet her debts, she had mortgaged Eastgate to secure a loan of $150,000. The entire principal of the mortgage remained outstanding when she died. As a result, the net annual income from Eastgate was reduced not only by real estate taxes and regular maintenance costs, but also by the substantial mortgage interest payments that were due each month. Paul was very dissatisfied with the limited benefit that he was receiving from the life estate. When, earlier this year, Acme, Inc., proposed to purchase Eastgate, demolish the building, pay off the mortgage, and construct a 30-story office building, Paul was willing to accept Acme's offer. However, Richard adamantly refused the offer, even though Richard, as the remainderman, paid the principal portion of each monthly mortgage amortization payment. Richard was independently wealthy and wanted to convert Eastgate into a public park when he became entitled to possession. When Acme realized that Richard would not change his mind, Acme modified its proposal to a purchase of the life estate of Paul. Acme was ready to go ahead with its building plans, relying upon a large life insurance policy on Paul's life to protect it against the economic risk of Paul's death. Paul's life expectancy was 45 years. When Richard learned that Paul had agreed to Acme's modified proposal, Richard brought an appropriate action against them to enjoin their carrying it out. carrying it out. There is no applicable statute. The best argument for Richard is that 
A. Acme cannot purchase Paul's life estate, because life estates are not assignable. 
B. the proposed demolition of the building constitutes waste.
C. Richard's payment of the mortgage principal has subrogated him to Paul's rights as a life tenant and bars Paul's assignment of the life estate without Richard's consent.
D. continued existence of the one-story building is more in harmony with the ultimate use as a park than the proposed change in use.
Answer: B
Doppler is charged with aggravated assault on Vezy, a game warden. Doppler testified that, when he was confronted by Vezy, who was armed and out of uniform, Doppler believed Vezy was a robber and shot in self-defense. The state calls Willy to testify that a year earlier, he had seen Doppler shoot a man without provocation and thereafter falsely claim self-defense. Willy's testimony is 
A. admissible, as evidence of Doppler's untruthfulness. 
B. admissible, as evidence that Doppler did not act in self-defense on this occasion. 
C. inadmissible, because it is improper character evidence. 
D. inadmissible, because it is irrelevant to the defense Doppler raised. 
Answer: C
Eddie worked as the cashier in a restaurant. One night after the restaurant had closed, Eddie discovered that the amount of cash in Eddie discovered that the amount of cash in the cash register did not match the cash register receipt tapes. He took the cash and the tapes, put them in a bag, gave them to Rita, the manager of the restaurant, and reported the discrepancy. Rita immediately accused him of taking money from the register and threatened to fire him if he did not make up the difference. Rita placed the bag in the office safe. Angered by what he considered to be an unjust accusation, Eddie waited until Rita left the room and then reached into the still open safe, took the bag containing the cash, and left. Eddie is guilty of 
A. larceny.
B. embezzlement.
C. either larceny or embezzlement but not both.
D. neither larceny nor embezzlement.
Answer: A
A grand jury returned an indictment charging Daniels with bank robbery, and when he could not make bond he was jailed pending trial. He had received Miranda warnings when arrested and had made no statement at that time. The prosecutor arranged to have Innis, an informant, placed as Daniels's cellmate and instructed Innis to find out about the bank robbery without asking any direct questions about it. Innis, once in the cell, constantly boasted about the crimes that he had committed. Not to be outdone, Daniels finally declared that he had committed the bank robbery with which he was charged. At Daniels's trial, his attorney moved to exclude any testimony from Innis concerning Daniels's boast. The motion should be 
A. granted, because Daniels's privilege against self-incrimination was violated. 
B. granted, because Daniels's right to counsel was violated. 
C. denied, because Daniels had received Miranda warnings. 
D. denied, because Daniels was not interrogated by Innis. 
Answer: B
Pamela sued Driver for damages for the death of Pamela's husband Ronald, resulting from an automobile collision. At trial, Driver calls Ronald's doctor to testify that the day before his death, Ronald, in great pain, said, "It was my own fault; there's nobody to blame but me." The doctor's testimony should be admitted as 
A. a statement against interest.
B. a dying declaration.
C. a statement of Ronald's then existing state of mind.
D. an excited utterance.
Answer: A
Clerk is a clerical worker who has been employed for the past two years in a permanent position in the Wasmania County Public Records Office in the state of Orange. Clerk has been responsible for copying and filing records of real estate transactions in that office. Clerk works in a nonpublic part of the office and has no contact with members of the public. However, state law provides that all real estate records in that office are to be made available for public inspection. On the day an attempted assassination of the governor of Orange was reported on the radio, Clerk remarked to a coworker, "Our governor is such an evil man, I am sorry they did not get him." Clerk's coworker reported this remark to Clerk's employer, the county recorder. After Clerk admitted making the remark, the county recorder dismissed him stating that "there is no room in this office for a person who hates the governor so much." Clerk sued for reinstatement and back pay. His only claim is that the dismissal violated his constitutional rights. In this case, the court should hold that the county recorder's dismissal of Clerk was 
A. unconstitutional, because it constitutes a taking without just compensation of Clerk's property interest in his permanent position with the county. 
B. unconstitutional, because in light of Clerk's particular employment duties his right to express himself on a matter of public concern outweighed any legitimate interest the state might have had in discharging him. 
C. constitutional, because the compelling interest of the state in having loyal and supportive employees outweighs the interest of any state employee in his or her job or in free speech on a matter of public concern. 
D. nonjusticiable, because public employment is a privilege rather than a right and, therefore, Clerk lacked standing to bring this suit. 
Answer: B
Slalome, a ski-shop operator, in a telephone conversation with Mitt, a glove manufacturer, ordered 12 pairs of vortex-lined ski gloves at Mitt's list price of $600 per dozen "for delivery in 30 days." Mitt orally accepted the offer, and immediately faxed to Slalome this signed memo: "Confirming our agreement today for your purchase of a dozen pairs of vortex-lined ski gloves for $600, the shipment will be delivered in 30 days." Although will be delivered in 30 days." Although Slalome received and read Mitt's message within minutes after its dispatch, she changed her mind three weeks later about the purchase and rejected the conforming shipment when it timely arrived. On learning of the rejection, does Mitt have a cause of action against Slalome for breach of contract? 
A. Yes, because the gloves were identified to the contract and tendered to Slalome. 
B. Yes, because Mitt's faxed memo to Slalome was sufficient to make the agreement enforceable. 
C. No, because the agreed price was $600 and Slalome never signed a writing evidencing a contract with Mitt. 
D. No, because Slalome neither paid for nor accepted any of the goods tendered. 
Answer: B
A burglar stole Collecta's impressionist painting valued at $400,000. Collecta, who had insured the painting for $300,000 with Artistic Insurance Co., promised to pay $25,000 to Snoop, a full-time investigator for Artistic, if he effected the return of the painting to her in good condition. By company rules, Artistic permits its investigators to accept and retain rewards from policyholders for the recovery of insured property. Snoop, by long and skillful detective work, recovered the picture and returned it undamaged to Collecta. If Collecta refuses to pay Snoop anything, and he sues her for $25,000, what is the probable result under the prevailing modern rule? 
A. Collecta wins, because Snoop owed Artistic a preexisting duty to recover the picture if possible. 
B. Collecta wins, because Artistic, Snoop's employer, had a preexisting duty to return the recovered painting to Collecta. 
C. Snoop wins, because Collecta will benefit more from return of the $400,000 benefit more from return of the $400,000 painting than from receiving the $300,000 policy proceeds. 
D. Snoop wins, because the preexisting duty rule does not apply if the promisee's (Snoop's) duty was owed to a third person. 
Answer: D
Oren owned Purpleacre, a tract of land, in fee simple. By will duly admitted to probate after his death, Oren devised Purpleacre to "any wife who survives me with remainder to such of my children as are living at her death." Oren was survived by Wen, his wife, and by three children, Cynthia, Cam, and Camelia. Thereafter, Cam died and by will duly admitted to probate devised his entire estate to David. Cynthia and Camelia were Cam's heirs at law. Later Wen died. In appropriate lawsuit to which Cynthia, Camelia, and David are parties, title to Purpleacre is at issue. In such lawsuit, judgment should be that title to Purpleacre is in 
A. Cynthia, Camelia, and David, because the earliest vesting of remainders is favored and reference to Wen's death should be construed as relating to time of taking possession. 
B. Cynthia, Camelia, and David, because the provision requiring survival of children violates the Rule Against Perpetuities since the surviving wife might have been a person unborn at the time of writing of the will. 
C. Cynthia and Camelia, because Cam's remainder must descend by intestacy and is not devisable. 
D. Cynthia and Camelia, because the remainders were contingent upon surviving the life tenant. 
Answer: D
Allen and Bradley were law school classmates who had competed for the position of editor of the law review. Allen had the higher grade point average, but Bradley was elected editor, largely in recognition of a long and important largely in recognition of a long and important note that had appeared in the review over her name. During the following placement interview season, Allen was interviewed by a representative of a nationally prominent law firm. In response to the interviewer's request for information about the authorship of the law review note, Allen said that he had heard that the note attributed to Bradley was largely the work of another student. The firm told Bradley that it would not interview her because of doubts about the authorship of the note. This greatly distressed Bradley. In fact the note had been prepared by Bradley without assistance from anyone else. If Bradley asserts a claim against Allen based on defamation, Bradley will 
A. recover, because Allen's statement was false. 
B. recover, if Allen had substantial doubts about the accuracy of the information he gave the interviewer. 
C. not recover, unless Bradley proves (C) not recover, unless Bradley proves pecuniary loss. 
D. not recover, because the statement was made by Allen only after the interviewer inquired about the authorship of the note. 
Answer: B
Sue Starr, a minor both in fact and appearance, bought on credit and took delivery of a telescope from 30-year-old Paul Prism for an agreed price of $100. Upon reaching her majority soon thereafter, Starr encountered Prism and said, "I am sorry for not having paid you that $100 for the telescope when the money was due, but I found out it was only worth $75. So I now promise to pay you $75." Starr subsequently repudiated this promise and refused to pay Prism anything. In an action for breach of contract by Prism against Starr, Prism's probable recovery is 
A. nothing, because Starr was a minor at the time of the original transaction. 
B. nothing, because there was no consideration for the promise made by Starr after reaching majority. 
C. $75.00 
D. $100.00 
Answer: C
Sue Starr, a minor both in fact and appearance, bought on credit and took delivery of a telescope from 30-year-old Paul Prism for an agreed price of $100. Upon reaching her majority soon thereafter, Starr encountered Prism and said, "I am sorry for not having paid you that $100 for the telescope when the money was due, but I found out it was only worth $75. So I now promise to pay you $75." Starr subsequently repudiated this promise and refused to pay Prism anything. For this question only, assume that Starr bought the telescope from Prism after reaching her majority and promised to pay $100 "as soon as I am able." What effect does this quoted language have on enforceability of the promise? 
A. None.
B. It makes the promise illusory.
C. It requires Starr to prove her inability to pay.
D. It requires Prism to prove Starr's ability to pay.
Answer: D
Beach owned a tract of land called Blackacre. An old road ran through Blackacre from the abutting public highway. The road had been used to haul wood from Blackacre. Without Beach's permission and with no initial right, Daniel, the owner of Whiteacre, which adjoined Blackacre, traveled over the old road for a period of 15 years to obtain access to Whiteacre, although Whiteacre abutted another public road. Occasionally, Daniel made repairs to the old road. The period of time to acquire rights by prescription in the jurisdiction is ten years. After the expiration of 15 years, Beach conveyed a portion of Blackacre to Carrol. The deed included the following clause: "together with the right to pass and repass at all times and for all purposes over the old road." Carrol built a house fronting on the old road. The road was severely damaged by a spring flood, and Carrol made substantial repairs to the road. Carrol asked Daniel and Beach to contribute one-third each to the cost of repairing the flood damage. They both refused, and Carrol brought an appropriate action to compel contribution from Beach and Daniel. In this action, Carrol will 
A. lose as to both defendants.
B. win as to both defendants.
C. win as to Beach, but lose as to Daniel. 
D. win as to Daniel, but lose as to Beach. 
Answer: A
Prine sued Dover for an assault that occurred March 5 in California. To support his defense that he was in Utah on that date, Dover identifies and seeks to introduce a letter he wrote to his sister a week before the assault in which he stated that he would see her in Utah on March 5. The letter is 
A. admissible, within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. 
B. admissible, as a prior consistent statement to support Dover's credibility as a witness. 
C. inadmissible, because it lacks sufficient probative value. 
D. inadmissible, because it is a statement of belief to prove the fact believed. 
Answer: A
Maple City has an ordinance that prohibits the location of "adult theaters and bookstores" (theaters and bookstores presenting sexually explicit performances or materials) in residential or commercial zones within the city. The ordinance was intended to protect surrounding property from the likely adverse secondary effects of such establishments. "Adult theaters and bookstores" are freely permitted in the areas of the city zoned industrial, where those adverse secondary effects are not as likely. Storekeeper is denied a zoning permit to open an adult theater and bookstore in a building owned by him in an area zoned commercial. As a result, Storekeeper brings suit in an appropriate court challenging the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance. Which of the following statements regarding the constitutionality of this Maple City ordinance is most accurate? 
A. The ordinance is valid, because a city may enforce zoning restrictions on speech-related businesses to ensure that the messages they disseminate are acceptable to the residents of adjacent property. 
B. The ordinance is valid, because a city may enforce this type of time, place, and manner regulation on speech-related businesses, so long as this type of regulation is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. 
C. The ordinance is invalid, because a city may not enforce zoning regulations that deprive potential operators of adult theaters and bookstores of their freedom to choose the location of their businesses. 
D. The ordinance is invalid, because a city may not zone property in a manner calculated to protect property from the likely adverse secondary effects of adult theaters and bookstores. 
Answer: B
Kingsley was prosecuted for selling cocaine to an undercover police agent. At his trial, he testified that he only sold the drugs to the agent, whom Kingsley knew as "Speedy," because Speedy had told him that he (Speedy) would be killed by fellow gang members unless he supplied them with cocaine. The prosecution did not cross-examine Kingsley. As rebuttal evidence, however, the prosecutor introduced records, over Kingsley's objection, showing that Kingsley had two prior convictions for narcotics-related offenses. The court instructed the jury concerning the defense of entrapment and added, also over Kingsley's objection but in accord with state law, that it should acquit on the ground of entrapment only if it found that the defendant entrapment only if it found that the defendant had established the elements of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Kingsley was convicted. On appeal, Kingsley's conviction should be 
A. reversed, because it was an error for the court to admit the evidence of his prior convictions as substantive evidence. 
B. reversed, because it was a violation of due process to impose on the defense a burden of persuasion concerning entrapment. 
C. reversed, for both of the above reasons. 
D. affirmed, because neither of the above reasons constitutes a ground for reversal. 
Answer: D