natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Box 6 - Delays in establishing a Command, Control, Communication and Information System (C3IS) for the African Standby Force The EU supported the development of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the management of African-led peace support operations with the C3IS contract. 
Ruta 6 Đ Frseningar i inrttandet av ett system fr ledning, kontroll, kommunikation och information (C3IS) fr den afrikanska beredskapsstyrkan EU gav genom C3IS-kontraktet std till utvecklingen av den afrikanska beredskapsstyrkan (ASF) och frvaltningen av afrikanskledda fredsfrmjande insatser.
The C3IS was a key priority in the 2011 to 2013 APSA Roadmap. 
C3IS var en nyckelprioritering i frdplanen fr Apsa 2011Đ2013.
It was designed to enable the AU to rapidly deploy strategic and operational communications. 
Syftet med den var att AU snabbt skulle kunna stta in strategiska och operativa kommunikationsmedel.
For example, it would allow the AU in Addis Ababa to convey orders and to generate reports and maps for managing operations on the ground. 
Till exempel skulle AU i Addis Abeba kunna frmedla order och upprtta rapporter och kartor fr fltinsatser.
The AU completed its financing proposal in February 2013 and signed an agreement for Ű12.5 million of EU support in February 2014. 
AU frdigstllde sitt finansieringsfrslag i februari 2013 och ingick en verenskommelse p 12,5 miljoner euro i EU-std i februari 2014.
The EU funded retroactively the AU CommissionŐs preparatory activities undertaken since March 2013 and delegated management of the complex procurement procedure to the AU Commission to promote AU ownership of the system. 
EU finansierade AU-kommissionens frberedande aktiviteter sedan mars 2013 retroaktivt och delegerade frvaltningen av det komplexa upphandlingsfrfarandet till AU-kommissionen fr att frmja AU:s egenansvar fr systemet.
However, this resulted in long delays in the procurement procedure, which was still ongoing at the time of our audit. 
Det resulterade dock i stora frseningar i upphandlingsfrfarandet, som fortfarande pgick vid tidpunkten fr revisionen.
The EU extended the implementation period for the contract to 67 months from the 24 months originally planned. 
EU frlngde genomfrandeperioden fr kontraktet till 67 mnader, frn de ursprungligen planerade 24 mnaderna.
This delay had a negative impact on other activities planned. 
Frseningen pverkade andra planerade verksamheter negativt.
For example, one of the principal components of an essential African Standby Force training exercise (AMANI Africa II, also supported by the EU) was abandoned. 
Till exempel stlldes en av de viktigaste delarna in i en vning av stor betydelse som den afrikanska beredskapsstyrkan hll (Amani Afrika II, som ocks fick std av EU).
Financing instruments were not always used coherently 56. 
Finansieringsinstrument anvndes inte alltid konsekvent 56.
Neither the European Commission nor the EEAS had analysed the comparative advantages of all the instruments at their disposal in the area of peace and security (paragraph 9). 
Varken Europeiska kommissionen eller Europeiska utrikestjnsten hade analyserat de komparativa frdelarna med alla instrument som stod till deras frfogande p omrdet fr fred och skerhet (punkt 9).
We found that the instruments were not always used coherently. 
Vi konstaterade att instrumenten inte alltid anvndes konsekvent.
The APF is well suited for financing short-term needs, since its funding cycles last two to three years. 
Den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika r vl lmpad att finansiera behov p kort sikt, eftersom dess finansieringscykler varar mellan tv och tre r.
We found cases of short-term APF contracts being used to finance long-term staff posts, for example, under the JFA Salaries contracts (paragraph 39). 
Vi konstaterade fall dr kortfristiga kontrakt med den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika hade anvnts till att finansiera lngtidstjnster, till exempel i lnekontrakten inom det gemensamma finansieringsarrangemanget (punkt 39).
In this case, the use of revolving 1-2 year contracts weakened human resources management and meant that the numbers and types of staff posts were renegotiated almost yearly. 
I detta fall frsvagade anvndningen av revolverande ett-till tvrskontrakt personalfrvaltningen och innebar att tjnsternas antal och typ omfrhandlades nstan varje r.
This contributed to delays in contracting (paragraph 53) and to job insecurity, leading to loss of experienced staff. 
Det bidrog till frseningar i kontraktstilldelningen (punkt 53) och till otrygga anstllningar, vilket ledde till att man frlorade erfaren personal.
In other cases, the RIPs had been used to address short-term needs, to which they are less well suited. 
I andra fall hade de regionala vgledande programmen anvnts till att tillgodose behov p kort sikt, fr vilket de r mindre vl lmpade.
The European Commission and EEAS have not set up a coordination framework covering all their instruments in the area of peace and security. 
Europeiska kommissionen och Europeiska utrikestjnsten har inte inrttat ngon ram fr samordning av alla sina instrument p omrdet fr fred och skerhet.
To this end, they decided that the cost of non-military staff of the regional organisations supported by the EU should be transferred from the APF to the RIPs. However, this decision was taken after the RIPs had been adopted, making it more difficult to implement. In the end, the transfer was postponed to January 2018; (b) involving the regional EU delegations in reviewing the regional APSA Support Programme work plans financed under the APF to ensure that these complement the RIP-funded programmes; (c) since 2017, including the regional EU delegations in the APSA Support ProgrammeŐs steering committee. 
Sedan 2015 har de dock vidtagit tgrder fr att f den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika och de regionala vgledande programmen att komplettera varandra p ett mer ndamlsenligt stt, srskilt genom att a) frtydliga hur tjnster vid de subregionala organisationerna finansieras; fr det ndamlet beslutade de att den kostnad fr icke-militr personal vid de regionala organisationerna som EU str fr skulle fras ver frn den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika till de regionala vgledande programmen; beslutet fattades dock efter det att de regionala vgledande programmen hade antagits, vilket gjorde det svrare att genomfra, och till sist skts verfringen upp till januari 2018, b) involvera de regionala EU-delegationerna i versynen av de regionala arbetsplaner fr Apsas stdprogram som finansieras inom den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika fr att 32 33 skerstlla att de kompletterar de program som de regionala vgledande programmen finansierar, c) sedan 2017 inkludera de regionala EU-delegationerna i styrkommittn fr Apsas stdprogram.
Monitoring and reporting mechanisms were set up, but did not provide sufficient information on results 59. 
Mekanismer fr vervakning och rapportering inrttades men gav inte tillrckligt med information om resultat 59.
The Commission had set up monitoring and reporting mechanisms for all the contracts we audited. 
Kommissionen hade inrttat vervaknings-och rapporteringsmekanismer fr alla de kontrakt som vi granskade.
These included the periodic submission of narrative and financial reports (mostly half-yearly), regular steering committee meetings, and independent external audits of expenditure. 
I dem ingick regelbunden inlmning av beskrivande och finansiella rapporter (vanligen tv gnger om ret), regelbundna styrkommittmten och oberoende externa revisioner av utgifter.
In practice the CommissionŐs monitoring mechanisms were affected by weaknesses and did not provide sufficient information on results. 
I praktiken hade kommissionens vervakningsmekanismer brister och gav inte tillrckligt med information om resultat.
We found the following examples in the contracts we audited: (a) the planned outputs were not specific or not measurable in six out of the fourteen contracts. 
I de kontrakt vi granskade fann vi fljande exempel p brister: a) Den planerade outputen hade inte preciserats eller var inte mtbar i sex av de 14 kontrakten.
In some of these cases, the underlying activities did not relate directly to the outputs; (b) some of the indicators drawn up for twelve of the contracts listed inputs and activities, rather than setting outputs to achieve, and were therefore of limited use for monitoring purposes. 
I en del av dessa fall hade de underliggande aktiviteterna inget samband med outputen. b) Vissa av de indikatorer som hade faststllts fr tolv av kontrakten listade input och aktiviteter snarare n output som skulle uppns och var drfr av begrnsad vervakningsnytta.
In other cases, baselines and targets needed to measure progress were missing; (c) in three cases, the fact that the contracts were signed on the very last days of their implementing periods meant that retroactive financing made monitoring provisions irrelevant in practice; (d) the reports prepared by the AU and the SROs often arrived late. 
I andra fall saknades referensvrden och ml som krvdes fr att framsteg skulle kunna mtas. c) Tre kontrakt undertecknades under genomfrandeperiodens allra sista dagar, vilket fick till fljd att den retroaktiva finansieringen gjorde vervakningsbestmmelserna irrelevanta i praktiken. d) De rapporter som utarbetades av AU och de subregionala organisationerna var ofta sena.
For six contracts, these reports did not contain sufficient details on contractual outputs and indicators. 
Nr det gllde sex kontrakt innehll inte dessa rapporter tillrckligt med uppgifter om output och indikatorer enligt kontrakten.
In general, the EU staff we interviewed had a good overview of the implementation of the contracts, although this knowledge was not always included in reports. 
Den EU-personal som vi intervjuade hade i allmnhet en god verblick ver genomfrandet av kontrakten, men denna kunskap terspeglades inte alltid i rapporterna.
For the contracts audited, the EU Commission had not yet performed any ŇResults-Oriented Monitoring (ROM)Ó missions59. 
34 Vad betrffar de granskade kontrakten hade EU-kommissionen nnu inte gjort ngra besk fr att genomfra Óresultatorienterad vervakning (ROM)Ó59.
33 contract. This meant that the limited availability of information on results from the AU and the SROs was not compensated for from other sources. 
Det innebar att den begrnsade tillgngen p information om resultat frn AU och de subregionala organisationerna inte kompenserades med hjlp av andra kllor.
The AU member states set up the APSA to be a structural, long-term response to the challenges to peace and security on the African continent. 
AU:s medlemsstater inrttade Apsa som ett strukturellt, lngsiktigt svar p freds-och skerhetsutmaningarna p den afrikanska kontinenten.
Through the APSA, the AU and mandated SROs have access to tools which help them to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. 
Genom Apsa har AU och de bemyndigade subregionala organisationerna tillgng till verktyg som hjlper dem att frebygga, hantera och lsa konflikter.
The EU provided support for the APSA out of the European Development Fund. 
EU har gett Apsa std genom Europeiska utvecklingsfonden.
We audited the EUŐs support over the three years 2014 to 2016 and found that it has had a poor effect and needed refocusing. 
Vi granskade EU:s std under tre r, mellan 2014 och 2016, och konstaterade att det har haft mycket sm effekter och behver riktas om.
The EU did not set clear priorities for its support and its strategy lacked a long-term vision for the evolution of its support. For example, during the period audited, it did not focus sufficiently on the transition from paying salaries to targeting capacity-building to ensure the long-term success of EU support. 
EU faststllde inte tydliga kriterier fr sitt std och saknade i sin strategi en lngsiktig vision fr hur det skulle utvecklas. Under den granskade perioden fokuserade EU exempelvis inte tillrckligt p vergngen frn lneutbetalningar till inriktning p kapacitetsuppbyggnad fr att skerstlla EU-stdets lngsiktiga framgng.
The shortfall in contributions by the AU member states to the AU budget and the Peace Fund left the APSA heavily dependent on the support of donors, including the EU. 
Underskottet i AU-medlemsstaternas bidrag till AU:s budget och fredsfonden gjorde Apsa starkt beroende av givarstd, inbegripet EU-std.
The EU supported the AUŐs plans for achieving financial independence for the APSA, formalised in the AUŐs 2016 decision, but implementation was still at an early stage (paragraphs 16 to 30). 
EU stdde Afrikanska unionens planer p att uppn ekonomiskt oberoende fr Apsa, i enlighet med AU:s formella beslut frn 2016, men genomfrandet var nnu i sin linda (punkterna 16Đ30).
We found that around half of the EU-funded contracts had either mostly or partially delivered the expected results at the time of the audit. 
Vi konstaterade att cirka hlften av de EU-finansierade kontrakten hade levererat merparten eller delar av de frvntade resultaten vid tidpunkten fr revisionen.
The EU has supported reforms to improve the financial, operational and institutional capacity of the AU and SROs, but these reforms have yielded few results to date. 
EU har gett std till reformer fr att frbttra AU:s och de subregionala organisationernas ekonomiska, operativa och institutionella kapacitet, men reformerna har hittills gett sm resultat.
The capacity of the APSAŐs components varied considerably and was challenged by a lack of political commitment and by limited funding (paragraphs 32 to 50). criteria: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. 
Den resultatorienterade vervakningen r Europeiska kommissionens externa vervakningssystem med ett tydligt fokus p resultat. Utvalda EU-finansierade projekt bedms av externa experter enligt fyra DAC-kriterier: relevans, effektivitet, ndamlsenlighet och hllbarhet.
See https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/results-oriented-monitoring_en. 
Se https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/results-oriented-monitoring_en.
We audited all fourteen contracts concluded between 2014 and 2016 under which the EU supported the APSA. 
Vi granskade alla de 14 kontrakt som hade ingtts mellan 2014 och 2016 och som reglerade EU:s std till Apsa.
We found that contracts were not always managed efficiently. 
Vi konstaterade att kontrakten inte alltid frvaltades effektivt.
Ten of the contracts were signed late, which meant that the availability of funds was not timely and predictable. 
Tio av dem ingicks sent, vilket innebar att man inte fick tillgng till medel inom faststlld tid och p ett frutsgbart stt.
This led to the loss of some experienced staff and resulted in delays in the implementation of the APSAŐs activities (paragraphs 52 to 55). 
Det ledde till frlust av en del erfaren personal och frseningar i genomfrandet av Apsas aktiviteter (punkterna 52Đ55).
We also found that while monitoring mechanisms were in place, they did not operate well, for example when contracts were financed retroactively. 
Vi konstaterade ocks att vervakningsmekanismer fanns p plats men att de inte fungerade vl, till exempel nr kontrakt finansierades retroaktivt.
Reporting was incomplete and did not provide sufficient information about results. 
Rapporteringen var ofullstndig och gav inte tillrckligt med information om resultat.
We noted some improvements in these respects from 2015 (paragraphs 56 to 60). 
Vi konstaterade vissa frbttringar p detta omrde frn 2015 (punkterna 56Đ60).
Timeframe: end 2020. 
Tidsram: slutet av 2019.
This Report was adopted by Chamber III, headed by Mrs Bettina JAKOBSEN, Member of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 26 June 2018. 
Denna rapport antogs av revisionsrttens avdelning III, med ledamoten Bettina Jakobsen som ordfrande, vid dess sammantrde i Luxemburg den 26 juni 2018.
The EEAS and Commission present a joint information note to the relevant Council working groups (e.g. COAFR) 2. 
Utrikestjnsten och kommissionen presenterar en gemensamm informerande not fr de berrda rdsarbetsgrupperna (t.ex. arbetsgruppen fr Afrika) 2.
The EEAS and Commission assess the request and decide jointly on the appropriateness of funding the request 2. 
Utrikestjnsten och kommissionen bedmer begran och beslutar gemensamt om det r lmpligt att bevilja finansiering 2.
The Political and Security Committee and relevant Council working groups are informed * for a period of up to 12 months for interventions which by their nature, require immediate support -> 2 weeks 3. Commission internal decision making process with Commission Decision (DEC) needed in case of new PSO -> 2 Đ 3 months Source: European Court of Auditors based on the APF action programme 2014-2016, Appendix 1. 
Kommittn fr utrikes-och skerhetspolitik och berrda rdsarbetsgrupper informeras * Nr det gller en period p upp till tolv mnader fr insatser som till sin karaktr krver omedelbart std -> 2 veckor -> 2Đ3 mnader Klla: Europeiska revisionsrtten, p grundval av bilaga 1 till handlingsprogrammet 2014Đ2016 fr den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika.
To provide the AUC and RECs/RMs with high quality and timely external expertise for facilitating the implementation of programmes related to the Action Plan of the Peace and Security Partnership. 
Frse AUC och REC/RM med extern expertis av hg kvalitet och i rtt tid fr att frmja genomfrandet av program med koppling till handlingsplanen fr partnerskapet fr fred och skerhet.
A particular focus will be the development of the APSA, via individual long-term assignments, as well as via short-term technical assistance in a wide range of crisis prevention/resolution and post crisis activities, including policy formulation. 
Ett srskilt fokus kommer att ligga p utvecklingen av Apsa, via enskilda lngtidsuppdrag, samt via kortsiktigt tekniskt std inom en stor mngd olika aktiviteter fr krisfrebyggande/krislsning och aktiviteter efter en kris, inbegripet utformning av politik.
When needed, this technical assistance could also support strengthening the coherence between the APF and RIPs in the peace and security area. 
Vid behov kan detta tekniska std ocks g till en frstrkning av samstmmigheten mellan APF och RIP p omrdet fr fred och skerhet.
To see the AUC Peace and Security Department continue to be the driving force of the AU Peace and Security Agenda on the continent, through an enhanced capacity and organisation in line with its ambitions African Union Liaison offices (AU LO) are non-permanent structures of the African Union present in the most security and peace relevant regions in Africa. 
Se till att AU-kommissionens freds-och skerhetsavdelning fortstter att vara den drivande kraften i AU:s agenda fr fred och skerhet p kontinenten, genom en frstrkt kapacitet och organisation i linje med dess ambitioner. Afrikanska unionens kontaktkontor r Afrikanska unionens icke-permanenta strukturer p plats i de mest skerhets-och fredsrelevanta regionerna i Afrika.
Their role is to support the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the AU Commission, to participate in follow up mechanisms provided by peace agreements and to support their implementation. 
Deras roll r att stdja freds-och skerhetsrdet (PSC) och AU-kommissionen, delta i uppfljningsmekanismer som inrttas genom fredsavtal och stdja genomfrandet av dem.
African Union Liaison offices (AU LO) are non-permanent structures of the African Union present in the most security and peace relevant regions in Africa. 
Afrikanska unionens kontaktkontor r Afrikanska unionens icke-permanenta strukturer p plats i de mest skerhets-och fredsrelevanta regionerna i Afrika.
To ensure that the AUC Peace and Security Department continue to be the driving force of the AU Peace and Security Agenda on the continent, through an enhanced capacity and organization in line with its ambitions. 
Se till att AU-kommissionens freds-och skerhetsavdelning fortstter att vara den drivande kraften i AU:s agenda fr fred och skerhet p kontinenten, genom en frstrkt kapacitet och organisation i linje med dess ambitioner.
The objective of the intervention is to strengthen the capacity and efficiency of the AUC, RECs and RMs to prevent and/or respond to crises in Africa. The action focused on activities required to enable the AUC and the RECs/RMs to sustain their activities and to finalise and politically endorse the key African peace and security strategies, such as the APSA Roadmap. 
Syftet med insatsen r att strka kapaciteten och effektiviteten vid AU-kommissionen, REC och RM fr att frebygga och/eller reagera p kriser i Afrika. tgrden fokuserade p aktiviteter som r ndvndiga fr att AUC och REC/RM ska kunna upprtthlla verksamheten och frdigstlla och politiskt godknna de viktigaste afrikanska freds-och skerhetsstrategierna, ssom frdplanen fr Apsa.
To contribute to peace and security in Africa, thus providing the necessary conditions and pre-requisite for development, in line with the AU's objective to 'Silence the Guns by 2020'. 
Att bidra till fred och skerhet i Afrika, och drmed tillhandahlla de ndvndiga villkoren och frutsttningarna fr utveckling, i enlighet med AU:s ml om att stridigheter ska upphra till 2020 (ÓSilence the Guns by 2020Ó).
To reduce effects of conlicts and violence through institutionalised, coordinated prevention and management and establishment of peace architecture for resilient communities. 
Att minska effekterna av konflikter och vld genom institutionaliserade och samordnade frebyggande tgrder och frvaltningstgrder samt inrttande av en fredsstruktur fr motstndskraftiga samhllen.
To provide a technical assistance team (long term and short term expertise) to play an advisory role, to manage and supervise project EU ECOWAS PSS Relevance for the APSA Adequacy of design Other design aspects (e.g. lessons learnt, coordination and monitoring framework) Timeliness of contract signature Implementation and monitoring Implementation of activities Reporting and Monitoring Results and their sustainability Results achieved Sustainability concerns 368246 ECOWAS Grant - Strengthening Peace, Security and Stability in West Africa RIP Central Africa 380850 ECOWAS Grant - Strengthening Peace, Security and Stability in West Africa II To support ECOWAS to execute its conflict prevention and resolution mandate in a sustainable way notably by executing a shift from a reactive to a preventive mode in acquiring increased strategic, operational, and management capacities Grant funds three projects: 1. 
Att tillhandahlla ett team fr tekniskt std (lngsiktig och kortsiktig expertis) som ska ha en rdgivande roll och frvalta och vervaka projektet EU Ecowas PSS Att hjlpa Ecowas att verkstlla sitt mandat fr konfliktfrebyggande och konfliktlsning p ett hllbart stt, srskilt genom en vergng frn en reaktiv till en preventiv metod fr att ka den strategiska, operativa och frvaltningsrelaterade kapaciteten. Bidraget finansierar tre projekt: 1.
Management of Small Arms and light weapons in Nigeria (complementing the ECOWAS EU Small Arms project, most of budget), 2. 
Hantering av handeldvapen och ltta vapen i Nigeria (kompletterar Ecowas-EU:s projekt fr handeldvapen, merparten av budgeten). 2.
Study tour to Lyon for West African Police Information Systems initiative (WAPIS), 3. 
Studieresa till Lyon fr fretrdare fr det vstafrikanska informationssystemet fr polisen (Wapis). 3.