natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
EUCAP Sahel Niger had supplied equipment to this COR, but we observed that it was not operational because the equipment was not in place: - There were no chairs in the CORŐs room, half of the tables were missing and the air conditioning was not working. - The beneficiaries could not show us the computers provided, the printer did not function because there was no toner and the equipment installed for radio communications was not working. - The two vehicles which should have been at the disposal of the COR to enable it to respond quickly to emergencies had hardly been used and one of them was irreparably damaged, and had been so since 2014. 43 44 
Eucap Sahel Niger hade tillhandahllit utrustning till det hr centrumet men vi konstaterade att centrumet inte var operativt eftersom utrustningen inte var p plats: - Det fanns inga stolar i centrumets rum, hlften av borden saknades och luftkonditioneringen fungerade inte. - Stdmottagarna kunde inte visa upp de datorer som hade tillhandahllits, skrivaren fungerade inte eftersom det inte fanns toner och den installerade utrustningen fr radiokommunikation fungerade inte. - De tv fordon som skulle st till det operativa centrumets frfogande fr att snabbt kunna reagera p ndsituationer hade knappt anvnts och ett av dem hade irreparabla skador sedan 2014.
None of the indicators used in the EUCAP Sahel Missions mentioned the relevance of the tasks to accomplishing the objectives45. 
Ingen av de indikatorer som anvnds i Eucap Sahel-uppdragen nmner uppgifternas betydelse fr att uppn mlen45.
There were also no indicators on which to base an assessment of the outcomes or impact of tasks. The monitoring and evaluation of the MissionsŐ activities were inadequate and not focused on impact 57. 
Det fanns heller inga indikatorer som kunde ligga till grund fr en bedmning av uppgifternas utfall eller effekt. vervakningen och utvrderingen av uppdragens verksamheter var bristfllig och inte inriktad p effekter 57.
EUCAP Sahel Niger did not have procedures in place to systematically document and monitor the planning and implementation of its activities. 
Eucap Sahel Niger hade inga fasta rutiner fr att systematiskt dokumentera och vervaka planeringen och genomfrandet av sina verksamheter.
It developed project fiches and planned to keep systematic records of trainees who had already attended courses, monitor presence lists and collect and assess participantsŐ course evaluations. 
Man utvecklade projektdokument och planerade att fra systematiska register ver deltagare som genomgtt kurser, vervaka nrvarolistor och samla in och bedma deltagarnas kursutvrderingar.
EUCAP Sahel Mali created appropriate procedures for documenting and monitoring activities and outputs during its first mandate. 
Eucap Sahel Mali skapade lmpliga frfaranden fr att dokumentera och vervaka verksamheter och output under det frsta mandatet.
The EEAS requires the Missions to provide the following information: - weekly and monthly reports with information on budgetary implementation, human resources and general events that have occurred; - six-monthly reports to compare the progress made in tasks with the baseline set in the OPLAN as well as with the progress reported in previous six-monthly reports; - around six months before each mandate ends, strategic reviews of the security situation in the country, the EUŐs and other stakeholdersŐ involvement, the MissionsŐ results and their future approach; - special reports on specific topics. 
Utrikestjnsten krver att uppdragen tillhandahller fljande information: - Vecko-och mnadsrapporter med information om budgetgenomfrande, personalresurser och allmn hndelserapportering. - Halvrsrapporter som gr att framsteg som gjorts i uppgifterna kan jmfras med angivna utgngsvrden i Oplan liksom med de framsteg som rapporterats i tidigare halvrsrapporter.
We analysed these documents and observed that: - reporting on outputs is not clearly linked to indicators and benchmarks set in advance, and - the EEAS and the Missions did not systematically assess the impact of the MissionsŐ activities. 
Vi analyserade dessa dokument och noterade att - rapporteringen om output inte hade ngon tydlig koppling till p frhand faststllda indikatorer och riktmrken, - utrikestjnsten och uppdragen inte systematiskt bedmde effekterna av uppdragens verksamheter.
Neither Mission operated good systems for evaluating activities during the period audited. 
Inget av uppdragen hade ngra vl fungerande system fr utvrdering av verksamheterna under den tid som granskades.
During its second mandate, the Mission in Mali developed an evaluation system with an increased focus on outputs, outcome, impact, sustainability and efficiency. 
Under sitt andra mandat utvecklade uppdraget i Mali ett utvrderingssystem med kat fokus p output, utfall, effekter, hllbarhet och effektivitet.
As this system had only recently been put in place, it was too early to assess its results. 
Eftersom systemet nyligen hade infrts var det fr tidigt att bedma resultaten av det.
The Mission in Niger recruited staff to start on evaluation work in May 2017. 
Uppdraget i Niger rekryterade personal fr att pbrja utvrderingsarbete i maj 2017.
Furthermore, neither of the EUCAP Sahel Missions has been subject to an independent external evaluation. 
Vidare hade inget av Eucap Sahel-uppdragen varit freml fr en oberoende extern utvrdering.
Stakeholders and beneficiaries had a positive view of the MissionsŐ activities and of their coordination role 61. 
Berrda parter och stdmottagare hade en positiv syn p uppdragens verksamheter och deras samordnande roll 61.
We interviewed beneficiaries of the EUCAP Sahel MissionsŐ training, advice and equipment, and a variety of stakeholders in internal security in Niger and Mali. 
Vi intervjuade mottagare av utbildning, rdgivning och utrustning frn Eucap Sahel-uppdragen och olika berrda parter p omrdet inre skerhet i Niger och Mali.
The overall assessment of the activities carried out by the EUCAP Sahel Missions was positive. 
De gav en vergripande positiv bedmning av Eucap Sahel-uppdragens verksamheter.
Stakeholders and beneficiaries appreciated the availability of the MissionsŐ staff to give advice or provide services that were not available from national sources. In Niger, the security forces and government representatives pointed to the value of the EUCAP Sahel MissionsŐ longer-term presence compared with that of many other donors. 
Berrda parter och stdmottagare uppskattade tillgngligheten hos uppdragets personal som kunde ge rd och tillhandahlla tjnster som inte kunde erhllas frn nationella kllor. I Niger framhll fretrdarna fr skerhetsstyrkorna och regeringen vrdet av att Eucap Sahel-uppdragen r nrvarande under lngre tid jmfrt med mnga andra givares insatser.
Both Missions also provided information and advice in support of other EU instruments and the wider activities of the EU and its member states. 
Bda uppdragen tillhandahll ocks information och rdgivning till std fr andra EU-instrument och EU:s och medlemsstaternas verksamheter ur ett bredare perspektiv.
For example, the Missions contributed to the design of EU Trust Fund for Africa projects, gathered information on migratory flows, and mapped EU activities connected with migration. 
Exempelvis bidrog uppdragen till utformningen av projekt med std frn EU:s frvaltningsfond fr ndtgrder i Afrika, 39 samlade information om migrationsstrmmar och kartlade EU:s verksamheter med koppling till migration.
Donors and other stakeholders in Niger and Mali highlighted the important role played by both EUCAP Sahel Missions in coordinating activities in the security sector. 
Givare och andra berrda parter i Niger och Mali understrk den viktiga roll som Eucap Sahel-uppdragen spelar genom att samordna verksamheter inom skerhetssektorn.
Both Missions set up bodies to improve coordination with the national authorities, which experienced problems initially but were broadly successful. 
Bda uppdragen inrttade organ fr att frbttra samordningen med de nationella myndigheterna, vilka hade problem i brjan men var framgngsrika p det stora hela.
coordination and cooperation with other donors and stakeholders. 
De inrttade ven bra mekanismer fr samordning och samarbete med andra givare och berrda parter.
In Mali, this included formal donor mapping, which gives full details of proposed (but not yet financed), planned, ongoing and completed projects in the security sector in Mali. 
I Mali innefattade det en formell kartlggning av givare, med fullstndiga uppgifter om freslagna (men nnu inte finansierade), planerade, pgende och avslutade projekt inom skerhetssektorn i Mali.
The Council created EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUCAP Sahel Mali to address the weak capacity of the forces responsible for internal security. 
Rdet inrttade Eucap Sahel Niger och Eucap Sahel Mali fr att rda bot p den svaga kapaciteten hos de styrkor som ansvarar fr den inre skerheten.
In both countries, the staff of the Missions did not have access to adequate operational guidance and training. 
Uppdragens personal har inte i ngot av lnderna haft tillgng till tillfredsstllande operativ vgledning och utbildning.
Each EUCAP Sahel Mission spent considerable time and resources on setting up its own systems and procedures, which were often not adapted to the local conditions. 
Vart och ett av Eucap Sahel-uppdragen gnade avsevrd tid och resurser t att inrtta sina egna system och frfaranden, som i mnga fall inte var anpassade till de lokala frhllandena.
The EEAS and the Commission, responsible for managing civilian CSDP Missions, did not provide enough support and in some cases applied procedures that were unsuited to the working conditions on the ground (see paragraphs 25 to 30). 
Utrikestjnsten och kommissionen, som har ansvaret fr frvaltningen av civila GSFP-uppdrag, gav inte tillrckligt std och i vissa fall tillmpades frfaranden som var olmpliga med hnsyn till arbetsfrhllandena p fltet (se punkterna 25Đ30).
38 Recommendation 1 Đ Take measures to improve the operational efficiency of Missions The EEAS should: - provide the Missions with practical guidance on operational procedures, standard templates that can be adapted to local circumstances, examples of best practice from earlier Missions and training; The Commission should: - move towards delegating the power to authorise purchases to the Head of Mission, subject to ex post checks by the Commission; 
Rekommendation 1 Đ Vidta tgrder fr att frbttra uppdragens operativa effektivitet Utrikestjnsten br - frse uppdragen med praktisk vgledning om operativa frfaranden, standardmallar som kan anpassas till lokala frhllanden, exempel p bsta praxis frn tidigare uppdrag samt utbildning. 40
39 The EEAS and the Commission should: - improve support to the Missions by providing equipment from the common warehouse and expanding the role of the Missions Support Platform. Target Date: End of 2018. 
Utrikestjnsten och kommissionen br - frbttra stdet till uppdragen genom att tillhandahlla utrustning frn det gemensamma lagret och ge plattformen fr uppdragsstd en utvidgad roll. Mldatum: Slutet av 2018.
The most important resource of the Missions is their staff, yet only three-quarters of posts were occupied on average. 
Uppdragens viktigaste resurs r deras personal, och nd var bara tre fjrdedelar av tjnsterna tillsatta i genomsnitt.
The posts most difficult to fill were those reserved for staff seconded from EU member states (see paragraphs 31 to 33). 
De tjnster som var svrast att tillstta var de fr personal som utstationeras frn medlemsstaterna (se punkterna 31Đ33).
Recommendation 2 Đ Improve the occupancy rate of staff posts in the Missions The EEAS should find solutions that will allow Mission vacancies to be filled quickly and efficiently, for example proposing longer secondments to the Missions from the EU member states, using contract staff more widely and preparing general calls for contributions which can be used to draw up reserve lists of potential staff to speed up deployment when vacancies arise. 
41 Rekommendation 2 Đ ka andelen tillsatta tjnster i uppdragen Utrikestjnsten br hitta lsningar som gr att lediga tjnster i uppdragen kan tillsttas snabbt och effektivt, till exempel genom att fresl lngre utstationeringar till uppdragen frn EU:s medlemsstater, anvnda kontraktsanstllda i strre omfattning och frbereda allmnna bidragsinfordringar som kan anvndas fr att upprtta reservlistor ver potentiell personal fr att snabba p utplaceringen nr vakanser uppstr.
Target Date: End of 2018. 
Mldatum: Slutet av 2018.
The MissionsŐ two-year mandates encourage short-term planning and the annual budgets often make the equipment and services procurement cycle unmanageably short. 
Uppdragens tvriga mandat uppmuntrar till korttidsplanering, och de rliga budgetarna gr att tiden ofta r orimligt knapp fr processen att upphandla utrustning och tjnster.
Other stakeholders in the Sahel and the beneficiaries of support consider that the scope of the tasks in Niger and Mali means that the Missions are needed for the medium to long-term. 
Andra berrda parter i Sahel och stdmottagarna anser att omfattningen av uppgifterna i Niger och Mali innebr att uppdragen behvs p medellng till lng sikt.
At the same time, even though the Missions are not intended to become permanent bodies in the host countries, the EEAS has not made a provision for a clear exit strategy (see paragraphs 34 and 35). 
Samtidigt har utrikestjnsten, trots att uppdragen inte r avsedda att bli permanenta organ i vrdlnderna, inte freskrivit ngon tydlig strategi fr tillbakadragandet (se punkterna 34 och 35)
40 Recommendation 3 Đ Set mandates and budgets to match operations and provide for an exit strategy The EEAS should propose mandates for the Missions that allow them to meet their objectives, and define a clearer path towards an exit strategy. 
42 Rekommendation 3 Đ Ange mandat och budgetar som passar fr insatserna och se till att det finns en strategi fr tillbakadragandet Utrikestjnsten br fresl mandat fr uppdragen som gr att de kan uppn sina ml, och ge tydligare vgledning om en strategi fr tillbakadragandet.
The Commission should set budgetary periods that match operational necessities. 
Kommissionen br faststlla budgetperioder som r avpassade fr de operativa behoven.
Target Date: End of 2019. 
Mldatum: Slutet av 2019.
The EUCAP Sahel Missions strengthened capacity in the internal security forces through providing training courses, equipment and advice. 
Eucap Sahel-uppdragen strkte de interna skerhetsstyrkornas kapacitet genom att tillhandahlla utbildningskurser, utrustning och rdgivning.
Both Missions worked to make their activities sustainable, but with little success. 
Bda uppdragen strvade efter att gra sina verksamheter hllbara, men med liten framgng.
This was partly due to lack of ownership or political will in the host countries, and partly because the Missions did not devote adequate resources to ensuring sustainability and following up on the practical application and use of the training given and the equipment supplied (see paragraphs 37 to 54). 
Det berodde delvis p att vrdlnderna saknade egenansvar eller politisk vilja och delvis p att uppdragen inte avsatte tillrckliga resurser fr att skerstlla hllbarhet och flja upp den praktiska tillmpningen och anvndningen av den utbildning och den utrustning som tillhandahllits (se punkterna 37Đ54).
Recommendation 4 Đ Increase focus on sustainability The Missions should focus resources on making activities sustainable, by withdrawing, as appropriate, from successful activities as soon as feasible to encourage autonomy in the ISFs and avoid over-reliance, focusing instead on providing support and back-up, and by following up the use made of training given and equipment provided. 
Rekommendation 4 Đ kat fokus p hllbarhet Uppdragen br rikta in sina resurser p att gra verksamheterna hllbara, dels genom att, dr s r lmpligt, dra sig tillbaka ur framgngsrika verksamheter s snart som det r grligt fr att uppmuntra de interna skerhetsstyrkornas egenansvar och undvika ett alltfr stort beroende och istllet fokusera p att tillhandahlla std och uppbackning, dels genom att flja upp hur den utbildning och utrustning som tillhandahllits anvnds.
The Missions made only limited and slow progress towards achieving their objectives. 
Uppdragen gjorde endast begrnsade och lngsamma framsteg mot att uppn sina ml.
However, the indicators defined for measuring the MissionsŐ progress were inadequate. 
Men de indikatorer som angivits fr att mta uppdragens framsteg var ocks bristflliga.
Most of the indicators drawn up for Niger could not be used to measure progress because they simply listed activities set for the tasks. 
De flesta indikatorer som angivits fr Niger kunde inte anvndas fr att mta framsteg eftersom de helt enkelt bara radade upp de verksamheter som ingick i uppgifterna.
The indicators for Mali were better, but did not include quantified targets. 
Indikatorerna fr Mali var bttre men innehll inga kvantifierade ml.
The indicators did not provide a good basis for measuring the effectiveness of the tasks or the contribution made towards achieving objectives (see paragraphs 55 and 56). 
Indikatorerna gav inte en bra grund fr 43 att mta hur ndamlsenliga uppgifterna var eller i vilken mn de bidragit till att uppn mlen (se punkterna 55 och 56).
Neither Mission operated good systems for evaluating activities during the period audited neither had they been subject to an independent external evaluation (see paragraphs 57 to 60). 
Inget av uppdragen hade bra fungerande system fr att utvrdera verksamheter under den granskade perioden, och de hade heller inte varit freml fr ngon oberoende extern utvrdering (se punkterna 57Đ60).
41 Recommendation 5 Đ Improve indicators, monitoring and evaluation The EEAS should: - set RACER (Relevant, Acceptable, Credible, Easy and Robust) indicators that focus on quantified outputs and on outcomes of the MissionsŐ activities and that are linked to the relevance to the MissionsŐ mandates; - set targeted benchmarks which can be set to demonstrate progress towards achieving objectives; - provide guidance and training to the Missions on monitoring and evaluation; - make external evaluations of the Missions and more comprehensive assessments of their impact. 
Rekommendation 5 Đ Frbttra indikatorerna, vervakningen och utvrderingen Utrikestjnsten br - faststlla indikatorer som uppfyller Racer-kriterierna (dvs. r relevanta, accepterade, trovrdiga, enkla och solida), fokuserar p kvantifierad output och utfall av uppdragens verksamheter och r relevanta fr uppdragens mandat, - faststlla specifika riktmrken som kan anvndas fr att pvisa framsteg mot att uppn mlen, - ge uppdragen vgledning och utbildning om vervakning och utvrdering, - gra externa utvrderingar av uppdragen och mer vergripande bedmningar av deras effekter.
This Report was adopted by Chamber III, headed by Mr Karel PINXTEN, Member of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 24 April 2018. 
Denna rapport antogs av revisionsrttens avdelning III, med ledamoten Karel Pinxten som ordfrande, vid dess sammantrde i Luxemburg den 24 april 2018.
EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories Since 2006 Ongoing CSDP Missions and Operations EUROPEAN UNION CSDP MISSIONS & OPERATIONS 2017 ANNEX I 1 *EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine Since 2005 EUAM Ukraine Since 2014 EUFOR ALTHEA Bosnia Herzegovina Since 2004 Military Missions/Operations Civilian Missions EUMM Georgia Since 2008 EULEX Kosovo Since 2008 EUBAM RAFAH Palestinian Territories Since 2005 EU NAVFOR MED Since 2015 military Missions & Operations civilian Missions EUTM Mali Since 2013 EUBAM Libya Since 2013 EUAM Iraq Since 2017 EUCAP SAHEL Mali Since 2014 EU NAVFOR Atalanta Since 2008 More than 5,000 people currently deployed EUCAP SAHEL Niger Since 2012 Source: EEAS. 
Fr revisionsrtten Klaus-Heiner Lehne ordfrande Eupol Copps de palestinska territorierna Sedan 2006 Pgende GSFP-uppdrag och insatser: *EU BAM Moldavien och Ukraina Sedan 2005 BILAGA I 1 Eufor Althea Bosnien och Hercegovina Sedan 2004 Eunavfor MED Sedan 2015 Eucap Sahel Mali Sedan 2014 EUTM Mali Sedan 2013 Eulex Kosovo Sedan 2008 EUMM Georgien Sedan 2008 Militra uppdrag/insatser Civila uppdrag Klla: Europeiska utrikestjnsten.
EUTM RCA Central African Republic Since 2016 EUTM Somalia Since 2010 Objectives: Keeping the peace, preventing conflicts, strengthening international security, supporting the rule of law, preventing human trafficking and piracy. EUCAP Somalia Since 2012 *This MissionisnotmanagedwithinCSDPstructures, butits objectivesareverysimilartotheotherMissions, soweincludeithere. 
EU BAM Rafah de palestinska territorierna Sedan 2005 EUAM Ukraina Sedan 2014 EUTM Somalia Sedan 2010 Eucap Somalia Sedan 2012 Ml: Bevara freden, frebygga konflikter, strka internationell skerhet, stdja rttsstatsprincipen och frebygga mnniskohandel och sjrveri.
Š European External Action Service - EEAS, January 2018 
Š Europeiska utrikestjnsten, januari 2018
ANNEX II Extracts from Council Decisions (CFSP) 2016/1172 (Niger) and 2017/50 (Mali) 1 EUCAP Sahel Niger EUCAP Sahel Mali Mandate To support the capacity building of the Nigerien security actors to fight terrorism and organised crime. 
BILAGA II 1 Utdrag ut rdets beslut (Gusp) 2016/1172 (Niger) och 2017/50 (Mali) Eucap Sahel Niger Eucap Sahel Mali Mandat Uppdraget inrttas till std fr frstrkning av de nigeriska skerhetsaktrernas kapacitet att bekmpa terrorism och organiserad brottslighet.
To conduct a civilian Mission in Mali in support of the Malian internal security forces (ISFs) (police, gendarmerie, national guard). 
Att inleda ett civilt uppdrag i Mali, till std fr Malis interna skerhetsstyrkor (polisen, gendarmeriet och nationalgardet).
Aim -enable the Nigerien authorities to define and implement their own National Security Strategy; -contribute to the development of an integrated, multidisciplinary, coherent, sustainable, and human-rights-based approach among the various Nigerien security actors in the fight against terrorism and organised crime; -in addition, assist the Nigerien central and local authorities and security forces in developing policies, techniques and procedures to better control and fight irregular migration. - allow the Malian authorities to restore and maintain constitutional and democratic order and the conditions for lasting peace in Mali; - restore and maintain State authority and legitimacy throughout the territory of Mali by means of an effective redeployment of its administration. 
Syfte -hjlpa de nigeriska myndigheterna att faststlla och genomfra sin egen nationella skerhetsstrategi, -bidra till utvecklingen av en integrerad tvrvetenskaplig, konsekvent och hllbar strategi med respekt fr mnskliga rttigheter hos de olika nigeriska skerhetsaktrerna i kampen mot terrorism och organiserad brottslighet, -dessutom bist de nigeriska centrala och lokala myndigheterna och skerhetsstyrkorna vid utvecklingen av strategier, metoder och frfaranden fr att bttre kontrollera och bekmpa irreguljr migration. - mjliggra fr de maliska myndigheterna att terupprtta och bibehlla den konstitutionella och demokratiska ordningen samt frutsttningarna fr en varaktig fred i Mali, - terupprtta och bibehlla statens auktoritet och legitimitet p hela det maliska territoriet genom en effektiv omstrukturering av dess frvaltning.