natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the case of MFA this concerns the relevance of the conditions to broader political objectives, e.g. EU accession (see paragraph 44). 
I frga om makroekonomiskt std gller det villkorens relevans fr strre politiska ml, t.ex. anslutning till EU (se punkt 44).
In the case of SAF this relates to the justification of the global amount of the assistance and its division into instalments (see paragraph 20). 
I frga om strukturanpassningsstd gller det motiveringen av det samlade stdbeloppet och dess uppdelning i delbetalningar (se punkt 20).
Where conditions in agreements are common, the CommissionŐs monitoring makes use of work carried out by the IMF and the World Bank. 
Dr verenskommelsernas villkor r gemensamma anvnder kommissionen vid sin vervakning det arbete som utfrts av Internationella valutafonden och Vrldsbanken.
The CommissionŐs own monitoring is intermittent. 
Kommissionens egen vervakning r oregelbunden.
It is focused on the need to check the fulfilment of conditions in order to approve the disbursement of the funds rather than ongoing monitoring of the economic and political conditions of the country (see paragraphs 52 to 55). 73. 
Den r inriktad p behovet av att kontrollera att villkoren uppfylls fr att man skall kunna godknna utbetalningen av medel, snarare n p en kontinuerlig vervakning av de ekonomiska och politiska frhllandena i landet (se punkterna 52Đ55).
Although the specific conditions of the individual programmes have to be fulfilled before payments can be made, it is understandable that, in practice, the Commission needs a certain margin of manoeuvre in judging the real efforts of the beneficiary State towards the achievement of macroeconomic policy and reform objectives. 
73. ven om de srskilda villkoren fr de enskilda programmen mste vara uppfyllda innan betalningar kan gras r det frsteligt att kommissionen i praktiken behver en viss marginal nr den skall bedma det stdmottagande landets verkliga anstrngningar fr att uppfylla mlen betrffande den makroekonomiska politiken och reformerna.
However, the non-fulfilment of some conditions and the problems encountered were not always established in a transparent enough manner and corrective action was not always asked for with sufficient persistence (see paragraphs 22 to 27 and 42 to 45). 
Vissa villkor uppfylldes inte och det uppstod problem, vilket emellertid inte alltid faststlldes p ett tillrckligt ppet stt, och man insisterade inte alltid tillrckligt p korrigerande tgrder (se punkterna 22Đ27 och 42Đ45).
Recommendation 3 74. 
Rekommendation 3 74.
The Commission should make its decision-making clearer by establishing written guidance for the various phases of the management of macroeconomic assistance. 
Kommissionen br gra sitt beslutsfattande tydligare genom att upprtta en skriftlig handledning fr de olika stadierna av det makroekonomiska stdets frvaltning.
It should also more clearly document its considerations when deciding the content of the financing agreements with the beneficiary countries, as well as when deciding the disbursements on the basis of the assessment of the conditions stipulated in the agreement. 
Den br ocks tydligare dokumentera sina vervganden nr den fattar beslut om innehllet i finansieringsverenskommelserna med de stdmottagande lnderna, samt nr den fattar beslut om utbetalningar utifrn bedmningen av de villkor som faststllts i verenskommelsen.
The Commission should document its justification for waivers in situations where conditions are not fulfilled. 
Kommissionen br dokumentera sin motivering till att man till-lter undantag frn villkoren i situationer dr villkoren inte har uppfyllts.
Assessment of partner governmentŐs budgetary and accounting processes 75. 
Bedmning av partnerregeringarnas budget-och redovisningsfrfaranden 75.
The quality of the budgetary processes in the beneficiary States plays a crucial role during the whole reform process and should be a key condition when attributing untied budgetary support. 
Kvaliteten p budgetfrfarandet i de stdmottagande lnderna spelar en mycket viktig roll under hela reformprocessen och br vara ett nyckelvillkor vid tilldelningen av obundet budgetstd.
A high degree of transparency, accountability and external control of the management of public resources is vital for ensuring good governance and in helping to combat fraud and corruption (see paragraph 50). 
En hg grad av insyn och ppenhet, redovisningsskyldighet och extern kontroll avseende frvaltningen av offentliga resurser r av yttersta vikt fr att man skall skerstlla en god frvaltningssed och fr att underltta bekmpningen av bedrgerier och korruption (se punkt 50).
Recommendation 4 76. 
Rekommendation 4 76.
The CommissionŐs monitoring of the quality of financial management in beneficiary countries should be considerably improved and all relevant DGs should be involved. 
Kommissionens vervakning av kvaliteten p den ekono-miskafrvaltningenidestdmottagandelndernabrfrbttras avsevrt och alla ansvariga generaldirektorat br vara delaktiga.
The Commission should take fully account of any work carried out by the BWI in this respect whenever the Commission is going to rely on their work. 
Kommissionen br ta full hnsyn till det arbete som Bretton Woods-institutionerna utfr i detta avseende i samtliga fall dr kommissionen skall frlita sig p deras arbete.
23.5.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 121/15 Evaluations 77. 
23.5.2002 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 121/15 Utvrderingar 77.
The absence of evaluations (MFA) or their limited scope (SAF) means that the Commission has not yet fully implemented its general policy for the evaluation of Community expenditure programmes. 
Avsaknaden av utvrderingar (makroekonomiskt std) eller deras begrnsade omfattning (strukturanpassningsstd) innebr att kommissionen nnu inte fullt ut har genomfrt sin allmnna policy fr utvrdering av gemenskapens utgiftsprogram.
The Commission therefore does not benefit systematically from the possibilities of a structured learning process (see paragraphs 61 to 65). 
Kommissionen drar drfr inte systematiskt nytta av de mjligheter som ges av en strukturerad lrandeprocess (se punkterna 61Đ65).
Recommendation 5 78. 
Rekommendation 5 78.
The Commission should regularly carry out comprehensive evaluations in order to identify what lessons can be learned for policy-making, particularly as regards the suitability of reform programmes, the relevance of its conditions to the reform process and the alleviation of the social costs of the reform programmes. 
Kommissionen br regelbundet utfra heltckande utvrderingar fr att identifiera vilka lrdomar som kan dras infr upplggningen av politiken, srskilt vad gller reformprogrammens lmplighet, hur relevanta dessa villkor r fr reformprocessen och i vilken mn reformprogrammens sociala kostnader kan minskas.
This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its meeting of 7 March 2002. 
Denna rapport har antagits av revisionsrtten vid dess sammantrde i Luxemburg den 7 mars 2002.
C 121/16 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 23.5.2002 Country Year started Amount committed SAF 1992 to 2000 Total per country SAF from Protocols SAF from MEDA funds Total SAF from MEDA funds per country Total Funds under 1 SAF as % of MEDA funds Payments made under MEDA 1996 to 2000 Amount still open under MEDA Amount still open under Protocols 70 2 Algeria 1996 125 70 95 30 20 35 1 Algeria 1992 3 Jordan 4 Jordan 5 Jordan SAF I 6 Jordan SAF II 7 Morocco 8 Morocco 1996 120 230 200 100 80 180 120 254 656 71 % 18 % 100 80 9 Tunisia 10 Tunisia 11 Tunisia (SAF I) 12 Tunisia (SAF II) 13 Tunisia Sante 14 Lebanon 1992 40 1996 20 1996 100 1998 80 1999 40 1999 50 40 20 TOTAL 955 355 182 1 770 30 470 130 35 (1) All dotations, including SAF and non-SAF development programmes. Source: Court of Auditors based on Commission data. 
C 121/16 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 23.5.2002 1 Algeriet 2 Algeriet 3 Jordanien 4 Jordanien 5 Jordanien (SAF I) 6 Jordanien (SAF II) 7 Marocko 1992 70 1996 125 1995 30 1995 20 1996 100 1999 80 1993 80 1996 120 1992 40 1996 20 1996 100 1998 80 1999 40 1999 50 70 95 30 20 35 8 Marocko 9 Tunisien 10 Tunisien 11 Tunisien (SAF I) 12 Tunisien (SAF II) 13 Tunisien (Sant) 14 Libanon 120 120 Land Belopp fr vilka det gjorts Startr SAF-taganden Totalt per land SAF frn protokoll SAF frn Meda-medel Totalt SAF frn Meda-medel per land Totala medel ur Meda 1 (1) (1996Đ2000) SAF i % av Meda-medel Utfrda betalningar (Meda) 1996Đ2000 Belopp fr vilka det inte gjorts taganden (Meda) Belopp fr vilka det inte gjorts taganden (protokoll) TOTALT 955 355 182 1 770 30 470 130 35 (1) Alla tilldelade medel, inbegripet utvecklingsprogram bde med SAF och utan SAF.
1995 30 1995 20 1996 100 1999 80 1993 80 195 30 30 250 12 % 30 0 0 0 280 50 955 220 50 600 428 51 % 27 % 34 % 80 0 0 0 0 0 ANNEX I FINANCIAL EVOLUTION SAF 1992 TO 2000 120 120 100 80 40 50 600 100 40 40 40 20 MEDA 1 ( ) (1996 to 2000) (Mio EUR) 
1992Đ2000 195 30 30 250 12 % 30 0 0 0 230 200 100 80 180 120 254 656 71 % 18 % 100 80 280 50 955 220 50 600 428 51 % 27 % 34 % 80 0 0 0 0 0 40 20 BILAGA I STRUKTURANPASSNINGSST DETS (SAF) FINANSIELLA UTVECKLING 1992Đ2000 100 80 40 50 600 100 40 40 40 20 (Miljoner euro)
23.5.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 121/17 ANNEX II MACROFINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THIRD COUNTRIES Details on disbursements 1998 to 2000 Decisions 1997 to 2000 250 100 200 60 40 80 35 20 265 (2) 150 980 220 Disbursements 1998 1999 2000 (Mio EUR) Total A. EU ACCESSION COUNTRIES Bulgaria III Bulgaria III Bulgaria IV Romania IV B. WESTERN BALKANS Bosnia I Bosnia I FYROM FYROM FYROM Kosovo Kosovo Montenegro Montenegro C. NEW INDEPENDENT STATES Armenia Armenia Georgia Georgia Ukraine III 125 125 15 (February) 125 (December) 125 I II II (February) TOTAL LOANS TOTAL GRANTS 180 85 28 8 110 10 403 18 (December: loan) (December: grant) (July: loan) (August: grant) 4 9 58 121 15 (December) (September) (July) 28 12 110 19 58 704 118 40 15 10 (December: grant) (December: loan) 60 (September) 100 100 (June) 100 10 (December: 25 grant) (1) 10 (December: 20 loan) (1) 15 10 (December: 10 loan) (1) 20 (December: 20 grant) (1) 20 (March: grant) 20 15 (August: grant) 15 7 (August: grant) 7 13 (December: 13 grant) (1) (1) Payment request in 2000, disbursement in January 2001. 
23.5.2002 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 121/17 Beslut 1997Đ2000 A. EU:S KANDIDATLNDER Bulgarien III 250 125 Bulgarien III 125 Bulgarien IV 100 Rumnien IV 200 B. VSTRA BALKAN Bosnien I 60 Bosnien I F.d. jugoslav. rep. Makedonien I 40 15 F.d. jugoslav. rep. Makedonien II 80 F.d. jugoslav. rep.
(2) Common decision for Armenia and Georgia. 
(2) Gemensamt beslut fr Armenien och Georgien.
C 121/18 EN Official Journal of the European Communities ANNEX III FULFILMENT OF CONDITIONS Kosovo 1. 
C 121/18 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning BILAGA III UPPFYLLANDE AV VILLKOREN Kosovo 1.
In Kosovo the strict respect of all conditions was not considered necessary for the decision of the Commission to propose the disbursement of the second instalment of the grant to the RegionŐs budget (15 million euro). 
I Kosovos fall ansgs det ndvndigt att alla villkor strikt respekterades fr att kommissionen skulle kunna besluta att fresl en utbetalning av den andra delbetalningen av bidraget till regionens budget (15 miljoner euro).
UNMIK had not been able to make the progress expected in consolidating the budget. 
FN:s vergngsfrvaltning i Kosovo (UNMIK) hade inte kunnat gra de frvntade framstegen med att konsolidera budgeten.
The public utilities were a major problem on the expenditure side (e.g. inadequate billing system for electricity) (2). 
Allmnnyttiga fretag utgjorde ett stort problem p utgiftssidan (t.ex. olmpligt elfakturerings-system) (2).
In the absence of an increase in budgetary revenue there was a continuing need for a high level of budgetary support. 
Nr budgetinkomsterna inte kade fanns det ett fortsatt behov av ett stort budgetstd.
In June 2000 there was a real danger of a cash shortage in the Kosovo budget and international donors were asked to provide cash. 
I juni 2000 frelg en verklig fara fr kassabrist i Kosovos budget och internationella bidragsgivare ombads tillfra kontanter.
The second instalment was released because of these urgent financing needs. 
Den andra delbetalningen frigjordes p grund av dessa akuta finansieringsbehov.
However, this speedy disbursement compromised the principle of macroeconomic conditionality, in spite of the Commission coming to the overall conclusion that the specific conditions attached to the EU budgetary support were met Ôto a large extentŐ. 
Denna snabba utbetalning ventyrade emellertid principen om makroekonomiskt villkorat std, ven om kommissionen kom fram till den vergripande slutsatsen att de srskilda villkoren i samband med EU:s budgetstd till stor del hade uppfyllts.
Bulgaria 2. 
Bulgarien 2.
The CourtŐs audit in Bulgaria in April 2001 revealed that in the area of bank privatisation the State bank Biochim was still not yet sold, as it should have been according to the conditions. 
Vid revisionsrttens granskning i Bulgarien i april 2001 framkom det p omrdet bankprivatisering att den statliga banken ÓBiochimÓ fortfarande inte hade blivit sld, vilket den borde ha blivit enligt villkoren.
Representatives of the Ministry of Finance, the IMF and the World Bank expressed their view that the condition regarding the sale of the State bank Biochim was unrealistic. 
Fretrdare fr finansministeriet, Internationella valutafonden och Vrldsbanken uppgav att de betraktade villkoret om frsljningen av den statliga banken ÓBiochimÓ som orealistiskt.
The World BankŐs representatives also commented that they did not consider it a good idea to specify that individually named enterprises should be privatised at a specific date, as this could have an adverse effect on the sales price. 
Vrldsbankens fretrdare kommenterade ocks att de inte ansg det vara ngon god id att specificera att enskilda, namngivna fretag skulle privatiseras fre ett visst datum, eftersom detta skulle kunna ge en negativ effekt p frsljningspriset.
In the environment area Bulgaria was required to adopt legislation in full conformity with the EU directive on environmental impact assessment. 
P miljomrdet skulle Bulgarien anta lagstiftning som var helt i verensstmmelse med EU:s direktiv om miljkonsekvensbedmning.
In April 2000 the delegation considered that the condition was not met. 
I april 2000 ansg delegationen att villkoret inte var uppfyllt.
In July 2000 DG ECFIN judged that the condition has not been fulfilled in formal terms but Ôthere has nevertheless been substantial progress towards achieving thisŐ. 
I juli 2000 bedmde GD Ekonomi och finans att villkoret inte formellt hade uppfyllts, men att det nd hade gjorts vsentliga framsteg mot att uppn villkoret.
It was the assessment of DG ECFIN that progress was sufficient to allow the release of a second instalment.HoweverbyApril2001althoughanewlawonenvironmentalimpactassessmenthadbeendrafted,ithad still not been adopted by the Bulgarian parliament. 
Framstegen var enligt GD Ekonomi och finans bedmning tillrckliga fr att man skulle kunna frigra en andra delbetalning. I april 2001 hade emellertid det bulgariska parlamentet nnu inte antagit den nya lagen om miljkonsekvensbedmning, trots att ett lagfrslag hade utarbetats.
The Commission considered the environmental condition to be fulfilled in the context of the loan (bringing legislation into full conformity with the EU directive on the EIA). 
Kommissionen ansg att vad lnet betrffade var miljvillkoret uppfyllt (anpassning av lagstiftningen s att den fullt ut verensstmmer med EU:s direktiv om miljkonsekvensbedmning).
However in the regular report on BulgariaŐs progress towards accession prepared by DG Enlargement (November 2000) the Commission stated that further legal changes will be needed to fully conform to EU requirements on the EIA. 
I den terkommande rapport om Bulgariens framsteg i anslutningsfrberedelserna som GD Utvidgning utarbetat (november 2000) uppgav kommissionen emellertid att det krvs ytterligare lagndringar fr att lagstiftningen helt och fullt skall verensstmma med EU:s krav vad gller miljkonsekvensbedmning.
Concerning the previous loan to Bulgaria, decided in 1997 (250 million euro), the Commission considered splitting the second instalment in two, as the conditions for preparation for the European Union were only partly met. 
Nr det gller det tidigare lnet till Bulgarien, som beviljades 1997 (250 miljoner euro), vervgde kommissionen att dela upp den andra delbetalningen i tv delar, eftersom de villkor som avsg frberedelserna fr ett EU-medlemskap endast delvis var uppfyllda.
However, the information resulting from the monitoring process was finally not taken into account and the whole amount was disbursed. 
Emellertid tog man till sist ingen hnsyn till de uppgifter som kom fram genom vervakningsprocessen och hela beloppet betalades ut.
23.5.2002 (1) There are important concerns of equity, as locals employed by the UN are exempted from taxation under the UN convention. 
23.5.2002 (1) Ett betydande orosmoment gllde en rttvisefrga, eftersom FN:s lokalt anstllda r befriade frn skatt enligt FN-konventionen.
UNMIK has tried (letter of 25 May 2000 by Mr Kouchner to the Secretary-General of the UN), so far without success, to propose that in the specific case of Kosovo these exemptions would not be applied. 
UNMIK har, hittills utan framgng, frskt att (i en skrivelse av den 25 maj 2000 frn Kouchner till FN:s generalsekreterare) fresl att denna skattebefrielse inte skulle tillmpas nr det gller Kosovo.
(2) See report concerning the financial accounts of the European Agency for Reconstruction and the implementation of aid for Kosovo for the year 2000 (OJ C 355, 13.12.2001). 
(2) Se rapporten om rkenskaperna fr Europeiska byrn fr teruppbyggnad och genomfrandet av bistndet till Kosovo under 2000 (EGT C 355, 13.12.2001).
23.5.2002 EN Official Journal of the European Communities Montenegro 6. 
23.5.2002 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning Montenegro 6.
In November 2000 a first report was produced by a consultant which pointed out major problems with regard to budget transparency and completeness (e.g. Ôcash figures do not give a true picture of budget executionŐ). 
I november 2000 utarbetade en konsult en frsta rapport dr stora problem ppekades nr det gller budgetprocessens ppenhet och fullstndighet (exempelvis uppgavs att kassauppgifterna inte ger en sann bild av hur budgeten verkstllts).
In the final report the consultant concluded that ÔMontenegro has made substantial progress Ń greater in some areas than in others Ń in meeting the conditionsŐ. 
I slutrapporten drog konsulten slutsatsen att Montenegro har gjort vsentliga framsteg Đ strre framsteg p vissa omrden n p andra Đ nr det gller att uppfylla villkoren.
Concerning the condition ÔEnhancement of fiscal and budgetary transparencyŐ the report noted on the one hand that ÔMontenegro has fully met the conditions relating to budget classificationŐ and on the other hand that Ônevertheless, Montenegro still has some way to go in meeting international standards for fiscal transparencyŐ (Montenegro only complied with three out of 20 of the IMFŐs code of good practices principles on fiscal transparency). 
Vad betrffar villkoret om kad ppenhet och insyn i de offentliga finanserna och budgetprocessen uppgavs det i rapporten dels att Montenegro till fullo har uppfyllt villkoren avseende budgetklassificering, dels att det nd terstr en del fr Montenegro att gra nr det gller att flja internationella normer fr ppenhet i de offentliga finanserna (Montenegro fljde endast 3 av de 20 principer om ppenhet och insyn i de offentliga finanserna som upptas i Internationella valutafondens uppfrandekodex [Code of Good Practices, principles on Fiscal Transparency]).
The consultant did not make a clear recommendation for or against a disbursement decision. 
Konsulten gav ingen tydlig rekommendation fr eller emot ett beslut om utbetalning.
The CommissionŐs proposal to the Economic and Financial Committee concerning the disbursement of the second instalment (under certain conditions), was, however, made even before this final report was available. 
Kommissionens frslag till Ekonomiska och finansiella kommittn om en utbetalning av den andra delbetalningen (p vissa villkor) framlades emellertid innan denna slutrapport fanns tillgnglig.
The Commission carried out its own mission to Montenegro at the beginning of December 2000 and also found that Ôsubstantial progress had been made in a number of areas while more action is needed in othersŐ (e.g. unsatisfactory progress in strengthening of the role of the Ministry of Finance; little progress with regard to the reform of income taxation and clearance of arrears; expenditure control not satisfactory). 
Kommissionen beskte sjlv Montenegro i brjan av december 2000 och fann ven den att vsentliga framsteg hade gjorts p ett flertal omrden medan fler insatser behvdes p andra omrden (t.ex. otillfredsstllande framsteg nr det gller att strka finansministeriets roll, f framsteg nr det gller reformen av inkomstbeskattningen och regleringen av utestende skulder, samt ej tillfredsstllande utgifts-kontroll).
To a certain extent the conditions were renegotiated and softened so that Montenegro could comply with them already in December 2000. 
Villkoren omfrhandlades och mjukades upp i viss utstrckning s att Montenegro skulle kunna uppfylla dem redan i december 2000.
As planned the Commission disbursed 12,95 million euro in January 2001. 
Kommissionen betalade som planerat ut 12,95 miljoner euro i januari 2001.
Jordan 7. 
Jordanien 7.
The analysis prepared by the Commission concerning the release of the first instalment of JordanŐs SAF II explained that the introduction of VAT had been delayed but nevertheless concluded that the related condition is complied with. 
I kommissionens analys betrffande frigrandet av den frsta delbetalningen av etapp II av strukturanpassningsstdet till Jordanien (SAF II) angavs det att infrandet av mervrdesskatt hade frdrjts, men man drog nd slutsatsen att det drmed frbundna villkoret var uppfyllt.
Tunisia 8. 
Tunisien 8.
For TunisiaŐs SAF 1, instalment two, an analysis by the Commission of how far conditions had been met concluded that a condition relating to the offer for sale of five public companies had been fulfilled although only two such operations had been carried out. 
Fr den andra delbetalningen av etapp I av strukturanpassningsstdet till Tunisien (SAF I) drog kommissionen, i sin analys av i vilken utstrckning villkoren hade uppfyllts, slutsatsen att ett villkor avseende utbjudande till frsljning av fem offentliga fretag hade uppfyllts, trots att endast tv av dessa operationer hade genomfrts.
The Commission released instalment two of TunisiaŐs SAF 1 in December 1997 after the financial controllerŐs signature was obtained, even though it was recognised that five conditions had been only partially fulfilled. 
Kommissionen frigjorde den andra delbetalningen av etapp I av strukturanpassningsstdet till Tunisien i december 1997 efter att controllerns underskrift hade erhllits, trots att man medgav att fem villkor endast delvis var uppfyllda.
This money was transferred in euro to the Tunisian Central Bank. 
Dessa pengar verfrdes i euro till den tunisiska centralbanken.
According to the Financing Agreement the corresponding value in dinars was then to be transferred to the budget following the double signature of the national coordinator and the Head of Delegation (1). 
I enlighet med finansieringsverenskommelsen verfrdes sedan motsvarande vrde i dinarer till budgeten efter underskrift av bde den nationella samordnaren och chefen fr delegationen (1).