natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Low efficiency of the allocation procedure 27. 
Tilldelningsfrfarandet var inte srskilt effektivt 27.
The allocation procedure was cumbersome in design and subject to delays and inefficiencies in practice. 
Tilldelningsfrfarandet var krngligt till sin utformning och blev frsenat och ineffektivt i praktiken.
The allocation procedure for ERF I set out in EU legislation was as follows: Ń by 1 June the Commission was required to inform Member States of their estimated allocations for the following year, Ń Member States had until 1 October to submit a request for co-financing, Ń the Commission was required to approve requests for co-financing within three months (i.e. at the latest by the end of December), a Commission decision on co-financing had to be approved, Ń the Commission was required to make an initial payment (i.e. 50 % of the sum due) as soon as it had adopted a decision on co-financing (with subsequent interim and final payments). 
Det tilldelningsfrfarande som faststllts fr ERF I i EU:s lagstiftning sg ut p fljande stt: Ń Senast den 1 juni skulle kommissionen meddela medlemsstaterna vilka belopp som kunde berknas komma att ansls fr pfljande r. Ń Medlemsstaterna skulle lmna in sin anskan om medfinansiering senast den 1 oktober. Ń Kommissionen skulle godknna anskningarna om medfinansiering inom tre mnader (dvs. senast vid utgngen av december), och ett kommissionsbeslut om medfinansiering mste godknnas.
In the context of the distribution of resources to each Member State, it is unclear what role the request for co-financing was intended to play. 
Inom ramen fr frdelningen av resurser till varje medlemsstat r det oklart vilken roll anskan om medfinansiering skulle spela.
As explained in paragraph 18 above, allocations were based exclusively on asylum and refugee figures. 
Ssom frklaras i punkt 18 ovan grundades tilldelningen uteslutande p uppgifterna om antalet asylskande och flyktingar.
(1) Article 3 of Decision 2004/904/EC. 
(1) Artikel 3 i beslut 2004/904/EG.
(2) Article 17(3) of Decision 2004/904/EC. 
(2) Artikel 17.3 i beslut 2004/904/EG.
(3) Article 14(2) of Decision 2000/596/EC. 
(3) Artikel 14.2 i beslut 2000/596/EG.
In practice the timetable for allocation and payment was subject to significant delays. 
I praktiken blev tidsplanen fr tilldelning och betalning kraftigt frsenad.
In each year there were two, not one, Commission decisions on co-financing: a first decision based on the draft budget for the coming year, and a revised decision based on the budget that was finally adopted. 
Varje r fattades tv och inte ett kommissionsbeslut om medfinansiering: ett frsta beslut grundat p budgetfrslaget fr det kommande ret och ett reviderat beslut grundat p den budget som slutligen antogs.
These decisions were typically taken several weeks after the relevant steps in the budgetary procedure. 
Dessa beslut fattades vanligtvis flera veckor efter berrda etapper i budgetfrfarandet.
For ERF 2003 the example below illustrates the timetable for all Member States in practice. 
Nr det gller ERF 2003 visar exemplet nedan hur tidsplanen fr samtliga medlemsstater sg ut i praktiken.
Ń In April 2002 the 2003 preliminary draft budget had been adopted by the Commission Ń The 2003 draft budget was established by the Council on 22 July 2002. 
Ń I april 2002 hade det preliminra budgetfrslaget fr 2003 antagits av kommissionen. Ń Budgetfrslaget fr 2003 faststlldes av rdet den 22 juli 2002.
Ń On 19 September 2002 the Commission adopted the decision on the preliminary allocation of funds to the Member States. 
Ń Den 19 september 2002 antog kommissionen beslutet om den preliminra tilldelningen av medel till medlemsstaterna.
Ń Following the preliminary allocation of funds, the Member States had to submit their requests for co-financing. 
Ń Efter den preliminra tilldelningen av medel var medlemsstaterna skyldiga att lmna in en anskan om medfinansiering.
Ń The 2003 final budget was adopted on 19 December 2002. 
Ń Den slutliga budgeten fr 2003 antogs den 19 december 2002.
Ń On 20 December 2002 the Commission approved the decision on co-financing, which was based on the preliminary allocations communicated to the Member States in September 2002. 
Ń Den 20 december 2002 godknde kommissionen beslutet om medfinansiering, vilket baserades p den preliminra tilldelning som meddelades medlemsstaterna i september 2002.
Ń On 12 February 2003 the Commission adopted the decision on the final allocation of funds to the Member States. 
Ń Den 12 februari 2003 antog kommissionen beslutet om den slutliga tilldelningen av medel till medlemsstaterna.
Ń In February and March 2003 submission and analysis of revised requests for co-financing. 
Ń I februari och mars 2003 verlmnades och analyserades omarbetade anskningar om medfinansiering.
Ń On 20 March 2003 the Commission took a revised decision on co-financing, which was based on the final budget adopted, increasing the Member StatesŐ allocations by 3 million euro. 
Ń Den 20 mars 2003 fattade kommissionen ett nytt beslut om medfinansiering som grundades p den slutliga antagna budgeten, vilket innebar att medlemsstaternas tilldelning kade med 3 miljoner euro.
The Commission only made payments to Member States after approval of the second, revised, Commission decisions on co-financing. 
Kommissionen betalade ut pengar till medlemsstaterna frst nr det andra reviderade kommissionsbeslutet om medfinansiering hade godknts.
These delays in Commission payments triggered delays in payments by Member States to final beneficiaries, as most Member States could only pay once they had received their share of the Fund. 
Dessa frseningar i kommissionens betalningar innebar att medlemsstaternas betalningar till de slutliga stdmottagarna frsenades, eftersom de flesta medlemsstaterna inte kunde betala frrn de hade tagit emot sitt bidrag frn fonden.
C 178/8 EN Official Journal of the European Union 31.7.2007 32. 
C 178/8 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 31.7.2007 32.
In general, projects started before the first payments from the Member States had been received. 
I allmnhet startade projekt innan de frsta betalningarna frn medlemsstaterna hade tagits emot.
In those cases final beneficiaries had to pre-finance their expenditure: expenditure undertaken before the approval of the Member StateŐs request for co-financing was ineligible for funding under ERF I. This constraint favoured financially stronger organisations and discouraged smaller organisations from making further applications. 
I dessa fall var de slutliga stdmottagarna tvungna att till en brjan sjlva bekosta sina utgifter: utgifter som hade uppkommit innan medlemsstaternas anskan om medfinansiering hade godknts var inte berttigade till std enligt ERF I. Denna restriktion gynnade ekonomiskt starka organisationer och avskrckte mindre organisationer frn att lmna in ytterligare anskningar.
Under ERF II there have been some modifications in these arrangements: Ń the deadlines in paragraph 27 above have all been extended, with a view to resolving the problem in ERF I, Ń sums disbursed after 1 January of the year in question may be eligible for support by the Fund regardless of when the request for co-financing is approved (cf paragraph 32 above), Ń besides a 50 % initial payment, there may be an interim payment of up to 50 %, compared with 30 % in ERF I. Different interpretation of ERF rules by Member States 34. 
Dessa arrangemang har i viss mn ndrats i ERF II: Ń De tidsfrister som anges i punkt 27 ovan har alla frlngts fr att problemet i ERF I skall kunna lsas. Ń Belopp som betalats ut efter den 1 januari under ret i frga kan berttiga till std frn fonden oavsett nr anskan om medfinansiering godknns (se punkt 32 ovan).
It may also include Ôgeneral or vocational training and help with resettle-mentŐ (1). 
Den kan ocks innebra Óallmn eller yrkesinriktad utbildning samt hjlp med teranpassningenÓ (1).
The Council recognised that Ôpractical support is needed to create or improve conditions enabling refugees and displaced persons to take an informed decision to leave the territory of the Member State and return home, should they so wishŐ (2). 
Rdet har konstaterat att Ókonkret std behvs fr att skapa eller frbttra frutsttningarna fr de flyktingar och frdrivna personer som s nskar att i full vetskap fatta informerade beslut om att lmna medlemsstaternas territorium och att tervnda till sitt ursprungs-landÓ (2).
In some Member States the repatriation measure was to a large extent used to pay asylum seekersŐ return air fares. 
I vissa medlemsstater anvndes tgrden tersndande i stor utstrckning till att betala de asylskandes flygbiljett hem.
Major interpretation differences existed in the Member States over who could apply for repatriation assistance. 
Frgan om vem som kunde anska om std fr tersndande tolkades mycket olika av medlemsstaterna.
The funding of failed asylum seeke rs was co-financed by the Fund, even when the decision to return home was not a voluntary one (3). 
Fonden medfinansierade asylskande som hade ftt avslag p sin anskan ven i de fall d beslutet att tervnda hem inte var frivilligt (3).
This voluntary element (1) is highlighted in the ERF rules and has been reinforced in ERF II (4). 
Detta frivilliga inslag (1) betonas i ERF-bestmmelserna och har strkts i ERF II (4).
Likewise, the definition of eligible persons whose return to their country of origin might be funded is inadequate, as illustrated below. 
Definitionen av stdberttigade personer vilkas hemresa till ursprungslandet fr finansieras r ocks otillrcklig, vilket illustreras i exemplet nedan.
Positive examples of ERF management 37. 
Positiva exempel p ERF-frvaltning 37.
Despite problems in the set-up and management of the ERF, there were numerous examples of good management systems. 
Trots problemen med att inrtta och frvalta ERF fanns det mnga exempel p bra frvaltningssystem.
Monitoring and remedial action by the Commission had insufficient results 38. 
Kommissionens vervakning och korrigerande tgrder gav otillrckliga resultat 38.
The Member States are responsible for the selection, financial management and administration of projects. 
Medlemsstaterna ansvarar fr urvalet, den ekonomiska frvaltningen och administrationen av projekt.
The Council Decision is intended to provide Member States with the necessary freedom to implement the programme according to their needs. 
Rdsbeslutet syftar till att ge medlemsstaterna den frihet som krvs fr att genomfra programmet efter deras behov.
In the first instance, Member States are required to take responsibility for the financial control of an action. 
I det frsta fallet skall medlemsstaterna ansvara fr den ekonomiska kontrollen av en tgrd.
In particular, they must ensure that the funds are used in accordance with the principle of sound financial management. 
Framfr allt mste de se till att medlen anvnds i enlighet med principen om sund ekonomisk frvaltning.
In spite of that, the Commission itself is charged with ensuring that Member States have smoothly functioning management and control systems so as to make certain that Community funds are efficiently and correctly used. 
Trots detta r det kommissionens ansvar att se till att medlemsstaterna frfogar ver frvaltnings-och kontrollsystem som fungerar smidigt fr att kunna garantera att gemenskapsmedlen utnyttjas effektivt och korrekt.
(3) The European Council on Refugees and Exiles distinguishes between voluntary, mandatory and forced return: Ôit is important to distinguish between voluntary repatriation of persons who freely choose to exercise their right to return to their country of origin or habitual residence and those who do not have a legal basis for remaining and consent to returnŐ. 
4) r det viktigt att skilja mellan tervndande av personer som av fri vilja vljer att utva sin rtt att tervnda till ursprungslandet eller den stadigvarande vistelseorten och dem som inte har rttslig grund fr att stanna kvar och samtycker till att tervnda.
(4) Article 4(1) of Decision 2004/904/EC. 
(4) Artikel 4.1 i beslut 2004/904/EG.
In the United Kingdom, failed asylum seekers from Central European countries such as the Czech Republic and Poland, who had sought asylum before EU accession, accounted for the highest numbers of persons whose return flights were funded by the ERF in 2003 (i.e. 332 Czech nationals and 125 Polish nationals). 
Tjeckien och Polen, som hade skt visum fre EU-intrdet och som hade ftt avslag p sin anskan, fr det strsta antalet personer vilkas flygresa hem finansierades av ERF 2003 (dvs. 332 tjeckiska och 125 polska medborgare).
Germany and Sweden introduced a well thought-out management system, including procedures, forms and reports, which allowed the national authority to handle a large number of projects. 
Tyskland och Sverige infrde ett vl genomtnkt frvaltningssystem som innehll frfaranden, blanketter och rapporter, vilket innebar att den nationella myndigheten kunde hantera ett stort antal projekt.
In addition, close monitoring of the projects ensured timely support to final beneficiaries. 
En noggrann vervakning av projekten var en garanti fr att de slutliga stdmottagarna fick std i tid.
Germany and Sweden applied the stricter interpretation of eligible groups, and only funded recognised refugees who were permitted to reside in one of the Member States but who had decided to return to their home countries. 
Tyskland och Sverige tillmpade en striktare tolkning av stdberttigande grupper och gav medel endast till erknda flyktingar som hade rtt att uppehlla sig i en medlemsstat, men som hade beslutat att tervnda till sitt hemland.
In contrast, the United Kingdom and Italy mainly used the repatriation measure to fund failed and rejected asylum seekers, excluding those who had been granted indefinite leave to remain or refugee status. 
Frenade kungariket och Italien dremot anvnde tgrden tersndande frmst till att ge medel till asylskande som hade ftt avslag p sin anskan och uteslt drmed dem som hade beviljats permanent uppehllstillstnd eller flyktingstatus.
(1) Article 4(4) of Decision 2000/596/EC. 
(1) Artikel 4.4 i beslut 2000/596/EG.
(2) Preamble 7 of Decision 2000/596/EC. 
(2) Skl 7 i beslut 2000/596/EG.
31.7.2007 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 178/9 39. 
31.7.2007 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 178/9 39.
Overall, the Commission carried out monitoring visits for ERF I but could not always ensure sound management practices in all Member States. 
Rent generellt gjorde kommissionen vervakningsbesk som gllde ERF I, men kunde inte alltid garantera att sunda frvaltningsrutiner anvndes i samtliga medlemsstater.
According to ERF II (1), the Commission is to carry out regular monitoring in co-operation with the Member States, including evaluating the impact of actions and their complementarity with other Community instruments. 
Enligt ERF II (1) skall kommissionen regelbundet vervaka fonden i samarbete med medlemsstaterna, och ocks utvrdera hur verkningsfulla insatserna har varit och bedma deras komplementaritet med andra gemenskapsinstrument.
In the light of the projects it visited, the Court can state that the ERF produced some positive changes in national efforts, mainly with regard to testing innovatory projects and integrating their results into national strategies. 
Mot bakgrund av de projekt som revisionsrtten beskte kan den konstatera att ERF stadkom vissa positiva frndringar av de nationella insatserna, frmst nr det gllde att prva innovativa projekt och infrliva resultaten av dem i nationella strategier.
One successful United Kingdom project concerned a one-to-one refugee mentoring scheme, whereby volunteer mentors, who are nationals of the host country assist refugees to adapt and integrate into the society of the country granting them asylum. 
Ett framgngsrikt projekt i Frenade kungariket gllde ett individuellt mentorsystem fr flyktingar. Projektet bestr i att frivilliga mentorer, som r medborgare i vrdlandet, hjlper flyktingar att anpassa sig till och integreras i samhllet i det land som beviljat dem asyl.
A personal integration scheme was designed which included language training, getting to know the city of residence and persons outside the refugee community, learning how to handle administrative issues and assistance with finding employment. 
Varje flykting fick ett individuellt integrationsprogram dr det ingick sprkutbildning, samt att lra knna bostadsorten och personer utanfr flyktinggrup-pen, att lra sig att hantera administrativa frgor och f hjlp med att hitta anstllning.
The project is now being financed with national funds In the United Kingdom the Court detected serious shortcomings (e.g. an inadequate audit trail on project selection, insufficient monitoring of projects). 
Projektet finansieras numera med nationella medel. I Frenade kungariket upptckte revisionsrtten allvarliga brister (t.ex. en otillrcklig verifieringskedja nr det gllde projekturval, otillrcklig projektvervakning).
Prior to the CourtŐs audit in early 2005, the Commission had carried out one monitoring visit in 2002 and one ex post audit in 2003. 
Fre revisionsrttens granskning i brjan av 2005 hade kommissionen gjort ett vervakningsbesk 2002 och en granskning i efterhand 2003.
Nonetheless, several shortcomings observed have not yet been resolved. 
Trots det har flera av de brister som konstaterades nnu inte tgrdats.
As already discovered by the Commission during a monitoring visit to Austria, certain core tasks of the management of the ERF actions had been delegated by the national authority to a private company. 
Ssom kommissionen redan hade upptckt under ett vervakningsbesk i sterrike hade vissa centrala uppgifter i frvaltningen av ERF-tgrderna delegerats av den nationella myndigheten till ett privat fretag.
This is not in conformity with the Financial Regulation as regards delegation of tasks to third parties. 
Detta r inte i enlighet med budgetfrordningen nr det gller delegering av uppgifter till tredje part.
The corrective action recommended by the Commission was implemented late. 
Den korrigerande tgrd som kommissionen rekommenderade vidtogs sent.
Furthermore it was restricted to municipalities, thus excluding other potential applicants from taking part in the ERF. 
Dessutom var den begrnsad till kommuner, vilket innebar att andra potentiella skande uteslts frn att delta i ERF.
The CourtŐs aim was to analyse whether the creation of the ERF had resulted in a change in national spending in the area of asylum. 
Syftet med revisionsrttens granskning var att analysera huruvida inrttandet av ERF hade medfrt frndringar i de nationella utgifterna p asylomrdet.
However, information was limited, both in the Member States and at the Commission. 
Informationen var dock begrnsad bde i medlemsstaterna och vid kommissionen.
This was partly due to the fact that most Member States did not have specific budget lines for expenditure on refugees or asylum seekers in their national budgets. 
Det berodde delvis p att de flesta medlemsstaterna inte hade ngra srskilda budgetposter fr utgifter fr flyktingar eller asylskande i sina nationella budgetar.
It was thus not possible to draw a final conclusion on this point. 
Drfr gick det inte att dra ngon definitiv slutsats om denna punkt.
The mid-term evaluation (2) did not examine the additionality of the Fund, but focused instead on how far Member States had co-financed the individual ERF projects. 
I halvtidsrapporten (2) undersktes inte fondens additionalitet, utan den inriktades i stllet p i hur stor utstrckning medlemsstaterna hade medfinansierat enskilda ERF-projekt.
The final report has not been examined as it had not been adopted at the time the audit was carried out. 
Den slutliga rapporten har inte granskats eftersom den inte hade antagits nr granskningen utfrdes.
Some indicators of the impact of actions with regard to persons concerned by the three measures were available, but they were not monitored systematically. 
Vissa indikatorer nr det gller insatsernas effekt p personer som berrdes av de tre insatserna var tillgngliga, men de bevakades inte systematiskt.
Similarly, the Commission used Eurostat data on refugees for analysis purposes, but did not systematically compare them with data received from the Member States. 
P ett liknande stt anvnde kommissionen Eurostats uppgifter om flyktingar i analyssyfte, men dessa jmfrdes inte systematiskt med de uppgifter som tagits emot frn medlemsstaterna.
(1) Article 27 of Decision 2004/904/EC. 
(1) Artikel 27 i beslut 2004/904/EG.
(2) Justice and Home Affairs DG, Mid-term Evaluation of the European Refugee Fund, Final Report, December 2003. 
(2) GD Rttsliga och inrikes frgor, halvtidsrapport av Europeiska flyktingfonden, slutlig rapport, december 2003.
In other cases the ERF had a positive effect on national asylum policy, as it triggered the creation ex novo of national programmes. 
I andra fall hade ERF en positiv effekt p den nationella asylpolitiken eftersom den innebar att nationella program skapades ex-novo.
The European Refugee Fund allocated its resources according to statistical data. 
Europeiska flyktingfonden tilldelade medel p grundval av statistiska uppgifter.
The Court found that these data were not complete, consistent, comparable and reliable. 
Revisionsrtten konstaterade att dessa uppgifter inte var fullstndiga, konsekventa, jmfrbara och tillfrlitliga.
It took the Commission until 2005, after several years of preparatory actions, to propose a regulation on the harmonisation of statistics (see paragraphs 20 to 22). 
Det drjde nda till 2005, efter flera r av frberedande arbete, innan kommissionen lade fram ett frslag till frordning om harmonisering av statistik (se punkterna 20Đ22).
Certain implementing rules were published late by the Commission, leaving the Member States without clear instructions in the start-up phase of the ERF. 
Vissa regler fr genomfrandet offentliggjordes sent av kommissionen, vilket innebar att medlemsstaterna stod utan tydliga anvisningar under ERF:s inledningsfas.
The cumbersome administrative process for the allocation of funds led to payment delays in the Member States (see paragraphs 26 to 33). 
Den krngliga administrativa processen fr tilldelning av medel ledde till betalningsfrseningar i medlemsstaterna (se punkterna 26Đ33).
The Council Decision lacked clarity in defining the ERF key terms (e.g. eligible target groups or fundable measures, see paragraphs 34 to 36). 
Rdsbeslutet var otydligt nr det gllde definitioner av nyckeltermer i ERF (t.ex. stdberttigande mlgrupper eller finan-sierbara tgrder, se punkterna 34Đ36).
The Commission did not always guide Member States to help them avoid ambiguities in the interpretation of the rules. 
Kommissionen gav inte alltid vgledning till medlemsstaterna fr att hjlpa dem att undvika tvetydigheter vid tolkningen av reglerna.
Although no systematic misuse of the rules was observed, they were not applied in an equal way by the Member States. 
Inget systematiskt missbruk av reglerna upptcktes, men de tillmpades inte p samma stt av medlemsstaterna.
The Commission could not always ensure sound management practices in the Member States (see paragraph 39). 
Kommissionen kunde inte alltid garantera att sunda frvaltningsrutiner anvndes i medlemsstaterna (se punkt 39).
There were limited data available on the impact of the ERF on national efforts in the area of asylum (see paragraphs 40 to 42). 
De tillgngliga uppgifterna om ERF:s effekt p de nationella insatserna p asylomrdet var begrnsade (se punkterna 40Đ42).
The Italian National Asylum Programme was made possible thanks to ERF co-funding, and aims to receive and assist asylum seekers and refugees throughout the national territory. 
Italiens nationella asylprogram blev mjligt tack vare medfinansiering frn ERF. Det syftar till att ta emot och bist asylskande och flyktingar ver hela det nationella territoriet.