natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
32 33 On the other hand, we found that the efficiency ratio calculated for the ESSN does not include all of the costs directly associated with the project, and in particular the expenses incurred by the Turkish MoFSP that supports the projectŐs implementation through the Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations. 
30 kvot med andra projekt fr grundlggande behov som kommissionen finansierat i regionen och fann att dessa projekt i genomsnitt hade en effektivitetskvot p 79:2133.  andra sidan fann vi att den effektivitetskvot som rknats fram fr ESSN inte omfattade alla kostnader som var direkt frknippade med projektet, som de utgifter som betalats av det turkiska ministeriet fr familje-och socialpolitik som r inblandat i projektet genom stiftelserna fr socialt std och solidaritet.
These Foundations receive the applications from refugees to join the ESSN, assess their eligibility and conduct household visits, acting through around 1 000 offices in Turkey. 
Dessa stiftelser tar emot flyktingars anskningar om anslutning till ESSN, bedmer anskningarna och gr hembesk och agerar genom cirka 1 000 kontor runtom i Turkiet.
We also identified the following potential efficiency gains for the ESSN. (a) This project is implemented by a UN organisation that can claim up to 7 % of the total direct project costs to compensate for indirect costs incurred, e.g. management and administration costs incurred at the headquarters level. 
Vi sg ven fljande mjligheter att gra ESSN mer effektivt: a) Projektet genomfrs av ett FN-organ som har rtt att f 7 % av de sammanlagda direkta projektkostnaderna i ersttning fr indirekta kostnader, som frvaltnings-och administrationskostnader p huvudkontorsniv.
We found that this percentage, although in accordance with the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement34 between the Commission and the UN, is normally applicable to projects that have a much lower budget. 
Denna procentandel r i enlighet med det finansiella och administrativa ramavtalet34 mellan kommissionen och FN, men vi fann att denna procentandel oftast gller fr projekt som har en mycket mindre budget.
Because of the large scale of this project35, the budgeted indirect costs for the two phases was Ű64 million36. 
Eftersom detta projekt var s stort35 uppgick de budgeterade indirekta kostnaderna fr de tv faserna till 64 miljoner euro36.
Despite the size of this amount, no supporting evidence was provided to demonstrate that this cost was reasonable and had been kept to the absolute minimum37. 
Trots denna hga summa fanns det inga underlag som kunde visa att denna kostnad var rimlig och att man hade frskt hlla den nere37.
Instead, it was set to the upper limit. (b) The funding of the ESSN is transferred from the UN implementing partner to the bank through a local implementing partner. 
I stllet lg den p maxgrnsen. b) Medlen till ESSN verfrs frn den utfrande FN-partnern till banken genom en lokal genomfrandepartner.
Considering that funds could be transferred directly to the bank without channelling them through the local Article 19.4 of the general conditions of the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement. 
Fr att verfra medlen tar den lokala genomfrandepartnern I urvalet ingick bde faktiska och budgeterade effektivitetskvoter. Artikel 19.4 i de allmnna villkoren i det finansiella och administrativa ramavtalet.
Projects funded by ECHO have an average budget of Ű9 million under the Facility and Ű2 million worldwide. 
Projekt finansierade av Echo har en genomsnittlig budget p nio miljoner euro i faciliteten och p tv miljoner euro i vriga vrlden.
The percentage of indirect costs was 7 % under the first phase of the ESSN and 6.5 % under the second phase. 
Procentandelen fr indirekta kostnader var 7 % under ESSN:s frsta fas och 6,5 % i den andra.
This was a requirement under the technical annex of the Humanitarian Implementation Plan 2016 which mentioned ÔThe ESSN will, at a minimum, include the following distinctive features: (...) Overhead costs should be kept to an absolute minimum and duly justified.Ő 28 34 35 36 37 
Detta var ett krav i den tekniska bilagan till 2016 rs humanitra genomfrandeplan dr det angavs att ESSN skulle uppfylla fljande minimikrav: Indirekta kostnader ska hllas s lga som mjligt och vara vederbrligen motiverade. 33 34 35 36 37
implementing partner, the need for this fee was not sufficiently demonstrated by the Commission. 
Med tanke p att medlen hade kunnat verfras direkt till banken utan att g via den lokala genomfrandepartnern hade kommissionen inte p ett tillfredsstllande stt motiverat behovet av denna avgift.
Besides, no such fees were charged under the second cash-assistance project in our sample (project 3 Đ CCTE). 
Dessutom togs inga sdana avgifter ut i det andra kontantstdsprogrammet i vrt urval (projekt 3, CCTE).
Furthermore, the local implementing partner charges a further 7 % flat rate for indirect costs. (c) The level of pre-financing paid is not appropriate. 
Utver detta debiterade den lokala genomfrandepartnern ytterligare 7 % som en fast avgift fr indirekta kostnader. c) En ofrklarligt stor andel av medlen betalas ut i frskott.
In accordance with the legal framework governing the partnership between the EU and the UN, the Commission must pay pre-financing of 80 % of the total contracted amount before projects start. 
Enligt de rttsliga ramar som styr samarbetet mellan EU och FN ska kommissionen betala en frfinansiering motsvarande 80 % av det totala kontrakterade beloppet innan projekten startar.
We found that this level of pre-financing is not adapted to the specific spending patterns of both of the audited cash-assistance projects (the ESSN and the CCTE). 
Enligt vad vi kunde se var denna frskottsutbetalda andel inte anpassad efter utbetalningsmnstret i ngot av de granskade kontantstdsprojekten (ESSN och CCTE).
For example, under the ESSN, Ű278 million for phase 1 and Ű520 million for phase 2 were paid upfront to the implementing partner. 
Fr ESSN fick till exempel genomfrandepartnern 278 miljoner euro i frskott fr fas 1 och 520 miljoner fr fas 2.
However, the funds were to be disbursed on a linear basis over 16 and 13 months respectively. 
Detta trots att medlen skulle betalas ut i lika stora delar under 16 respektive 13 mnader.
Under the CCTE phase 2, the Commission paid a Ű40 million advance in December 2017, whereas the first payment round is expected at the end of September 2018. 
Fr fas 2 av CCTE betalade kommissionen ut 40 miljoner euro i frskott i december 2017, trots att den frsta utbetalningen frvntas gras frst i slutet av september 2018.
The eventual interest generated on the advance payments is kept by the implementing partners and is not reinvested in the ESSN or the CCTE. 
Eventuell rnta p dessa frskottsbetalningar behlls av genomfrandepartnerna och terinvesteras inte i ESSN eller CCTE.
Implementation delays undermined the efficiency of most audited projects Timeliness is an important aspect of efficiency. 
Frseningar i genomfrandet undergrvde effektiviteten i de flesta granskade projekt Att tidsplaner fljs r en viktig aspekt nr det gller effektivitet.
It can also have an impact on cost efficiency because when a project is delayed, administrative costs such as rents and salaries may still have to be paid, which could lead to less funding being available for the final beneficiaries. 
Det pverkar ven kostnadseffektiviteten eftersom administrativa kostnader som hyra och lner kan behva betalas ven om ett projekt r frsenat, vilket kan leda till att mindre pengar gr till de faktiska bidragsmottagarna.
Nine out of ten audited projects were delayed and had to be extended, on average by 60 %38. 
Nio av tio granskade projekt hade blivit frsenade och fick drfr frlngas med i genomsnitt 60 %38.
In one case, the initial budget was revised upwards and in three cases, the budget was reduced because some of the planned activities could not be implemented (see Annex III A). 
I ett fall justerades den ursprungliga budgeten upp, och i tre fall fick man minska budgeten eftersom en del av de planerade insatserna inte kunde genomfras (se bilaga III A).
We identified several reasons for these delays. 
Vi kunde se flera orsaker till dessa frseningar.
In five cases, the delays were mainly caused by technical and administrative constraints associated with the projects, such as the unavailability of the necessary technical equipment or of experienced staff to implement the 29 38 On average, projects were initially planned for 12 months and were extended by 7 months. 
I fem fall orsakades frseningarna frmst av tekniska och administrativa hinder frknippade med projekten, exempelvis att det inte gick att f tag p den tekniska utrustning eller den personal med rtt erfarenhet som behvdes fr att genomfra dem.
projects. In one case, the Commission granted an extension to allow a better transfer of activities to the national system. 
I ett fall godknde kommissionen en frlngning fr att verksamheten p ett bttre stt skulle kunna lmnas ver till det nationella systemet.
In three cases, constraints linked to the legal and regulatory framework imposed by the Turkish authorities on NGOs impeded the timely implementation of the projects39. 
I tre fall var det de turkiska myndigheternas lagar och regler som icke-statliga organisationer mste flja som utgjorde hinder fr att f projekten genomfrda i tid39.
Consequently, EU projects implemented by INGOs, which had been working in Turkey until that date, experienced significant delays or reductions in the scope of their activities. 
Detta ledde till att projekt som genomfrdes av internationella icke-statliga organisationer, som tidigare varit verksamma i Turkiet, blev avsevrt frsenade eller till att insatsernas omfattning fick minskas.
Where appropriate, the Commission provided a flexible response by granting contract extensions and in some cases by revising the initial targets set. 
Dr s var lmpligt visade kommissionen prov p flexibilitet och godknde kontraktsfrlngningar och justerade i vissa fall de ml som angetts frn brjan.
The Commission also faced difficulties in obtaining the Turkish authoritiesŐ approval for the involvement of INGOs at funding stage. 
Det var ven svrt fr kommissionen att f de turkiska myndigheternas tillstnd att lta internationella icke-statliga organisationer delta i finansieringsfasen.
For instance, the MoFSP did not agree to authorise INGOs to carry out certain key protection activities, namely case management and household visits. 
Ministeriet fr familje-och socialpolitik ville till exempel inte ge internationella icke-statliga organisationer tillstnd att handlgga renden och gra hembesk, vilka r viktiga uppgifter ur skyddssynpunkt.
The Commission had to cancel four projects with a total budget of Ű14 million even though they were considered relevant for funding to address the pressing need for protection of the refugee population. 
Kommissionen fick stlla in fyra projekt med en sammanlagd budget p 14 miljoner euro, trots att de ansgs relevanta att finansiera fr att mta flyktingars akuta skyddsbehov.
Box 6 presents examples of delays and difficulties faced by projects. 
I ruta 6 ges exempel p frseningar och svrigheter som ptrffades i projekten.
30 Box 6 Đ Examples of delays and difficulties faced by projects Project 2 Đ Providing protection and durable solutions to refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey A key activity under project 2 was to assist the Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) with the verification, update and correction of the registration data of 2.7 million Syrian refugees. 
32 Ruta 6 Đ Exempel p frseningar och svrigheter i projekten Projekt 2 Đ Erbjuda skydd och varaktiga lsningar fr flyktingar och asylskande i Turkiet Ett viktigt arbete som ingick i projekt 2 var att bist det turkiska generaldirektoratet fr migrationshantering med kontroll, uppdatering och ndring av registrerade uppgifter om 2,7 miljoner syriska flyktingar.
This project was implemented by a UN Agency. 
Detta projekt genomfrdes av ett FN-organ.
The start of the verification exercise was delayed by seven months. The main reasons for the delays were the consequences of the July 2016 attempted coup, which led to internal changes within government institutions following the suspension of senior officials in the DGMM and additional security constraints. 
De frmsta orsakerna till frseningarna var kuppfrsket i juli 2016 som ledde till interna frndringar inom de offentliga institutionerna som en fljd av att hgre 39 Mnga icke-statliga organisationer har ftt stnga efter regeringsdekret eller har ftt se sin verksamhet starkt begrnsad genom mycket hrdare tillmpning av befintliga lagar eller genom nya lagar som infrts.
For example, some INGOs had difficulties renewing their registration, opening bank accounts and obtaining work permits or the newly introduced cooperation permit for an INGO to work with local implementing partners. 
Vissa internationella icke-statliga organisationer har till exempel haft svrt att frnya sin registrering, ppna bankkonton och f arbetsvisum eller det nyligen infrda samarbetstillstndet som de mste ha fr att samarbeta med lokala genomfrandepartner.
There were shortcomings in monitoring cash-assistance projects and in measuring results Monitoring is the regular examination of expenditure, activities and results, which provides up-to-date information on whether projects are progressing as intended. 
Det fanns brister i vervakningen av kontantstdsprojekt och mtningen av resultat Med vervakning avses regelbunden granskning av utgifter, verksamhet och resultat, vilket ger aktuell information om huruvida projekten fortskrider enligt plan.
Firstly, we examined whether the monitoring of humanitarian projects was comprehensive and timely. 
Frst underskte vi om 33 tjnstemn inom generaldirektoratet fr migrationshantering avsattes, samt nya skerhetsbestmmelser.
31 instance, the project initially suffered from a lack of experienced staff in the verification centres, problems with the performance of the DGMM database and internet connectivity issues. 
I brjan av projektet fanns det till exempel inte tillrckligt med erfaren personal i kontrollcentren, och det var prestandaproblem med migrationsdirektoratets databas och problem med internetuppkopplingen.
These difficulties led to two modifications of the contract providing a 12-month extension followed by a Ű8 million budget increase. 
Dessa svrigheter ledde till tv kontraktsndringar, frst en frlngning p tolv mnader fljt av en budgetkning p tta miljoner euro.
Project 8 - Mitigating risks of key protection concerns of refugee population The audited project is aimed at improving the protection of vulnerable refugees through case management, individual protection assistance and the provision of information and legal assistance. 
Projekt 8 Đ Minska de frmsta riskerna fr flyktingbefolkningen Syftet med det granskade projektet var att frbttra skyddet fr utsatta flyktingar genom individuell rendehantering, individuella skyddsinsatser och tillhandahllande av information och juridiskt bistnd.
It was launched in 2017 and is a continuation of a previous project already funded by the Commission and implemented by the same INGO since 2015. 
Projektet inleddes 2017 och var en fortsttning p ett tidigare projekt som finansierats av kommissionen och som genomfrts av samma internationella icke-statliga organisation sedan 2015.
From the beginning, the implementing partners faced difficulties in obtaining authorisations from the Turkish authorities to operate in the initially planned locations (Gaziantep, Ankara and Sanliurfa) and in obtaining the cooperation permits necessary to work with local NGOs. 
Redan frn brjan hade genomfrandepartnerna problem med att f tillstnd frn de turkiska myndigheterna att bedriva verksamhet p de platser som man frst hade planerat (Gaziantep, Ankara och Sanliurfa) liksom med att f de samarbetstillstnd som man mste ha fr att samarbeta med lokala icke-statliga organisationer.
Consequently, the project was extended from 13 to 22 months, its activities were restructured and its budget was reduced by 20 %, as the implementing partner was unable to operate in Ankara. 
Som en fljd av detta fick projektet frlngas frn 13 till 22 mnader, arbetet fick struktureras om och budgeten fick minskas med 20 % eftersom genomfrandepartnern inte kunde utfra sitt arbete i Ankara.
Project 10 - Support to most vulnerable refugee women and girls The aim of the project was to provide enhanced access to safe spaces and specialised services for women and girls by establishing and running dedicated centres. 
Projekt 10 Đ Std till de mest utsatta kvinnorna och flickorna i flyktingbefolkningen Syftet med projektet vara att ge kvinnor och flickor bttre tillgng till trygga platser och specialiserade tjnster genom att inrtta och driva srskilda center.
A local implementing partner in charge of 6 of the 20 ECHO funded centres was closed down by a governmental executive order. 
En lokal genomfrandepartner som drev sex av de 20 Echo-finansierade centren fick stnga efter ett regeringsdirektiv.
The UN Agency, as the main implementing partner, asked DG ECHO to partially suspend the projectŐs activities for five months, with the aim of transferring the activities to other local partners. 
FN-organet som var huvudsaklig genomfrandepartner bad GD Europeiskt civilskydd och humanitra bistndstgrder att delvis lta verksamheten ligga p is i fem mnader s att man kunde hitta andra lokala partner som kunde ta ver.
The Commission put in place an appropriate framework for monitoring humanitarian projects. 
Kommissionen hade inrttat en lmplig ram fr vervakning av humanitra projekt.
It visited all audited projects, at least once, in accordance with its own guidelines. 
Alla granskade projekt hade beskts minst en gng enligt kommissionens egna riktlinjer.
The project monitoring allowed Commission staff in the field and in headquarters to follow project operations continuously. Lack of access to primary data for cash assistance programme However, we found that monitoring of the two cash-assistance projects was limited because the Commission and its UN implementing partners did not have access to original beneficiary data (i.e. list of eligible beneficiaries with their names, ID numbers and addresses). 
Inte tillrcklig tillgng till primruppgifter om kontantstdsprogrammet Vi fann dock att vervakningen av de tv kontantstdsprogrammen var begrnsad eftersom kommissionen och de FN-organ som genomfrde projekten fr kommissionens rkning inte fick tillgng till de ursprungliga uppgifterna om bidragsmottagare (det vill sga en lista med namnen p alla som har rtt till bidrag, samt deras ID-nummer och adress).
The MoFSP holds this data, but refused to share it with the UN and the Commission, citing Turkish data-protection legislation. 
Dessa uppgifter finns hos ministeriet fr familje-och socialpolitik, men ministeriet vill inte lmna ut dem till FN och kommissionen med hnvisning till turkisk dataskyddslagstiftning.
Instead, the UN implementing partner received anonymised data, where each beneficiaryŐs name and ID number had been replaced by a unique number generated by the local implementing partner. 
I stllet fr FN-genomfrandepartnern anonymiserade uppgifter, dr bidragsmottagarnas namn och ID-nummer ersatts med ett unikt nummer som genererats hos den lokala genomfrandepartnern.
This lack of access to primary data held by the MoFSP limited the UN partnersŐ, and thus the CommissionŐs, capacity to carry out their monitoring and oversight functions efficiently and effectively. 
Att de inte fick tillgng till primruppgifterna hos ministeriet begrnsade FN-partnernas, och drmed ven kommissionens, mjligheter att utfra sina vervaknings-och tillsynsuppgifter effektivt och ndamlsenligt.
The UN implementing partners were obliged to adapt their internal control framework to the lack of access to key primary data. 
FN-genomfrandepartnerna var tvungna att anpassa sina interna kontrollramar efter det faktum att de inte hade tillgng till viktiga primruppgifter.
They put in place additional triangulation controls to substantiate the anonymised data received and reconcile them with the anonymised payments data received from the bank. 
De infrde extra trianguleringskontroller fr att underbygga de anonymiserade uppgifterna som man hade ftt och stmde av dessa mot de anonymiserade uppgifterna om utbetalningar som man ftt frn banken.
Despite these additional controls, the UN implementing partners were unable to track beneficiaries from registration to payment. 
Trots dessa extra kontroller kunde FN-genomfrandepartnerna inte flja 34 bidragsmottagarna frn registrering till utbetalning.
We consider this to be a significant weakness in the monitoring of the cash-assistance program. 
Vi anser att detta r en vsentlig brist i kontrollen av kontantstdsprogrammen.
As part of our audit procedures and in accordance with our audit rights, we requested access to the primary ESSN and CCTE data from the MoFSP. 
Som en del av vra revisionsrutiner och i enlighet med vra revisionsbefogenheter begrde vi att f tillgng till primruppgifter om ESSN och CCTE frn ministeriet fr familje-och socialpolitik.
This access was denied and we could only access the anonymised data held by the UN implementing partners. 
Vr begran avslogs och vi fick endast tillgng till de anonymiserade uppgifter som FN-genomfrandepartnerna ftt.
Consequently, we could not establish the full audit trail from the registration of eligible refugees to the payments made under these two projects. 
Drfr kunde vi inte skapa ngon verifieringskedja frn registrering av bidragsberttigade flyktingar fram till utbetalningarna i dessa tv projekt.
Annex VIII shows the data-access limitations for the different stakeholders involved. 32 
I bilaga VIII beskrivs p vilket stt tillgngen till uppgifter var begrnsad fr de olika inblandade aktrerna.
Weaknesses in the Facility results framework As regards the Facility results framework, we identified the following weaknesses: (a) Baseline and target values for high-level indicators of the Facility, to allow an objective measurement of the progress achieved, had not been established yet. 
Brister i facilitetens ram fr resultatmtning Nr det gller facilitetens ram fr resultatmtning observerades fljande brister: a) Utgngsvrden och mlvrden fr facilitetens hgnivindikatorer, som skulle gra det mjligt att mta uppndda framsteg p ett objektivt stt, hade nnu inte faststllts.
In addition, there were no intermediate milestones to track progress at mid-term; (b) The actual contribution of the Facility towards the aggregated high-level indicators40will be difficult to isolate. 
Det fanns heller inga delml s att man kunde flja upp arbetet under projektens gng. b) Hur mycket faciliteten har bidragit med till de sammanstllda hgnivindikatorerna40 kommer att vara svrt att urskilja.