natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The findings of these two audits were taken into account when preparing the CourtŐs Special Report. 
Resultaten av dessa tv granskningar har tagits i beaktande vid utarbetandet av revisionsrttens srskilda rapport.
It concentrated on the two main instruments used, the 1998 SPP and the ESC programmes which were launched in 2000. The commitments for each country related to these Country Czech Republic Estonia Latvia Lithuania Hungary Poland Slovenia Slovakia Bulgaria Romania SPP 1998 7,0 3,0 3,0 3,0 7,0 9,0 3,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 ESC 2000 17,5 10,1 10,5 14,0 27,0 137,0 5,0 6,3 15,0 88,0 330,4 ESC 2001 13,6 6,0 9,0 15,6 31,0 170,0 3,0 18,4 37,1 109,0 412,7 ESC 2002 6,3 3,7 4,5 1,6 41,5 197,6 5,8 16,5 14,0 106,6 398,1 (million euro) Total 44,4 22,8 27,0 34,2 106,5 513,6 16,8 48,2 73,1 310,6 1 197,2 56,0 Source: European Court of Auditors. 
Tabell 1 taganden fr det srskilda frberedande programmet (SPP) och programmen fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning (ESC) Land Tjeckien Estland Lettland Litauen Ungern Polen Slovenien Slovakien Bulgarien Rumnien SPP 1998 7,0 3,0 3,0 3,0 7,0 9,0 3,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 ESC 2000 17,5 10,1 10,5 14,0 27,0 137,0 5,0 6,3 15,0 88,0 330,4 ESC 2001 13,6 6,0 9,0 15,6 31,0 170,0 3,0 18,4 37,1 109,0 412,7 ESC 2002 6,3 3,7 4,5 1,6 41,5 197,6 5,8 16,5 14,0 106,6 398,1 (miljoner euro) Totalt 44,4 22,8 27,0 34,2 106,5 513,6 16,8 48,2 73,1 310,6 1 197,2 56,0 Klla: Europeiska revisionsrtten.
Total 14. 
Totalt 14.
As the ESC programmes funded from the 2000 budget were only contracted towards the end of 2002, the investment projects to be funded from the ESC programme had had virtually no impact yet on the ground by that time. 
Kontrakt tecknades fr de program fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning som finansierades frn budgeten fr 2000 frst mot slutet av 2002, vilket ledde till att de investeringsprojekt som skulle finansieras genom programmet fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning nnu inte hade ngon ptaglig effekt vid denna tidpunkt.
The CourtŐs audit therefore did not cover the second objective of the ESC programmes, that of achieving a cohesion impact (see paragraph 9). 
Revisionsrttens granskning omfattade drfr inte det andra mlet fr programmen fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning, det vill sga att n en sammanhllningseffekt (se punkt 9).
THE OVERALL APPROACH OF USING THE PHARE PROGRAMME TO PREPARE CANDIDATE COUNTRIES FOR MANAGING THE STRUCTURAL FUNDS The choice of Phare made preparation of Candidate Countries for the ERDF and ESF more difficult 15. 
DEN VERGRIPANDE STRATEGIN ATT ANVNDA PHARE-PROGRAMMET F R ATT F RBEREDA KANDIDATLNDERNA F R F RVALTNINGEN AV STRUKTURFONDERNA Valet av Phare gjorde det svrare att frbereda kandidatlnderna fr ERUF och ESF 15.
The Phare programme has contributed in two ways to preparing Candidate Countries for managing the Structural Funds: (a) (b) financing Twinning projects, where experts in the area of the Structural Funds from the administrations of the Member States work in the relevant ministries of the Candidate Countries. 
Phare-programmet har bidragit till att frbereda kandidatlnderna fr frvaltningen av strukturfonderna p tv stt: a) Genom finansiering av partnersamverkansprojekt, dr experter p strukturfonder frn medlemsstaternas administrationer arbetar inom de berrda ministerierna i kandidatlnderna.
To a lesser degree technical assistance from consultancy firms has also been funded; enabling Candidate Countries to Ôlearn by doingŐ through familiarising them with procedures, which the Commission intended should increasingly resemble those of the Structural Funds. 
Dessutom har tekniskt std frn konsultfirmor finansierats i mindre utstrckning. b) Genom att gra det mjligt fr kandidatlnderna att Ólra under arbetets gngÓ och gra dem frtrogna med frfaranden som kommissionen vill skall bli nnu mer lika frfarandena fr strukturfonderna.
Funds were directed to investments that pilot-test and demonstrate the instruments and structures to be used after accession. 
Medel avsattes till investeringar som tjnade som pilotfall och demonstrerade de instrument och strukturer som skall anvndas efter anslutningen.
(18) Most commitments for the ESC included a Twinning component. 
(18) De flesta av tagandena fr programmen fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning inbegrep en partnersamverkansdel.
In a limited number of cases, a separate commitment was made for a Twinning project in relation to ESC. 
I ngra f fall gjordes ett separat tagande fr ett partnersamverkansprojekt som hade att gra med ekonomisk och social sammanhllning.
These projects were also examined by the Court and are included in Table 1. 
Dessa projekt granskades ocks av revisionsrtten och finns med i tabell 1.
20.1.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 15/9 16. 
20.1.2005 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 15/9 16.
The support of institution-building for managing the Structural Funds through Twinning and technical assistance reflected what had been the primary role of the Phare programme from its beginnings: the provision of human resource expertise to assist countries in making the transition to functioning market economies and eventual membership of the European Union. 
Stdet till institutionsuppbyggnad fr frvaltning av strukturfonderna genom partnersamverkan och tekniskt std speglade vad som varit Phares roll nda sedan dess inrttande: att tillhandahlla sakkunskap p omrdet mnskliga resurser fr att bist lnder i vergngen till fungerande marknadsekonomier och slutligen medlemskap i Europeiska unionen.
However, the use of Phare for the Ôlearning by doingŐ approach to institution-building for the Structural Funds was more problematic. 
Att anvnda Phare fr Ólrande under arbetets gngÓ nr det gller institutionsuppbyggnad fr strukturfonderna var dock mer problematiskt.
The Commission chose not to propose a new instrument and regulation for preparing Candidate Countries for managing the ERDF and ESF. 
Kommissionen valde att inte fresl ett nytt instrument och en ny frordning fr att frbereda kandidatlnderna fr frvaltningen av ERUF och ESF.
As a result, since Phare differed significantly from the Structural Funds in terms of implementing structures, programming, procedures, implementation mechanisms and control systems, the Phare programme could not be used so effectively to familiarise Candidate Countries with Structural Fund procedures. 
Eftersom Phare skilde sig kraftigt frn strukturfonderna i frga om genomfrandestrukturer, programplanering, frfaranden, genomfrandemekanismer och kontrollsystem, ledde detta till att Phare-programmet inte kunde anvndas s effektivt fr att gra kandidatlnderna frtrogna med frfarandena fr strukturfonderna.
The approach taken for preparing Candidate Countries for managing the ERDF and ESF was very different from that taken in relation to the Cohesion Fund and the EAGGF. 
Den strategi som valts fr att frbereda kandidatlnderna fr frvaltningen av ERUF and ESF skilde sig mycket frn den som valts fr sammanhllningsfonden och EUGFJ.
As noted in paragraph 6, the Commission established completely new pre-accession instruments in relation to these Funds, ISPA, managed by Directorate-General Regional Policy, and Sapard, managed by Directorate-General Agriculture. 
Som nmnts i punkt 6 upprttade kommissionen helt nya franslutningsinstrument fr dessa fonder, Ispa, som frvaltas av Generaldirektoratet fr regionalpolitik, och Sapard, som frvaltas av Generaldirektoratet fr jordbruk.
Sapard aims primarily at contributing to the implementation of the acquis communautaire in the common agricultural policy and at adaptation of the agricultural sector and rural areas. 
Sapard skall i frsta hand bidra till att gemenskapens regelverk tillmpas inom den gemensamma jordbrukspolitiken och anpassa jordbrukssektorn och landsbygdsomrden.
The Sapard Regulation provides for Structural Fund multiannual programming and EAGGF financial control procedures. 
I frordningen om Sapard finns freskrifter om flerrig programplanering ssom inom strukturfonderna och om frfaranden fr finansiell kontroll ssom av EUGFJ.
The management of Sapard was based, firstly, on multiannual programming and, secondly, on implementation through the decentralisation of functions to the beneficiary countries with only ex post controls from the Commission. 
Frvaltningen av Sapard byggde dels p flerrig programplanering, dels p genomfrande med decentralisering av verksamheter till mottagarlnderna med endast efterhandskontroller gjorda av kommissionen.
Phare complemented these new instruments by fulfilling its traditional role of institution-building through funding Twinning expertise from the Member States conversant with the Cohesion Fund and the EAGGF. 
Phare kompletterar dessa nya instrument genom sitt traditionella institu-tionsuppbyggnadsarbete och finansieringen av experter p partnersamverkan frn de medlemsstater som var insatta i sammanhllningsfonden och EUGFJ.
In order, therefore, for Phare to be effective in preparing Candidate Countries for managing the Structural Funds, it was necessary for the Commission to establish a high degree of coordination between Directorate-General Enlargement and these two Directorates-General. 
Utformningen av Phare-programmen fr ekonomisk och social kandidatlnderna fr frvaltningen av strukturfonderna var det drfr ndvndigt fr kommissionen att i hg grad samordna Generaldirektoratet fr utvidgning och dessa tv generaldirektorat.
However, while there was initially good cooperation between them in setting up the SPP, the approach taken in 1999 to preparing ESC programmes for funding in 2000 differed significantly from the approach favoured by Directorate-General Regional Policy. 
I brjan, nr det gllde att inrtta det srskilda frberedande programmet, var samarbetet mellan dem gott, men den strategi som valdes 1999 fr att frbereda programmen fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning fr finansiering r 2000 skilde sig betydligt frn den strategi som Generaldirektoratet fr regionalpolitik fredrog.
Thus Directorate-General Enlargement emphasised a Ôregional approachŐ to the Structural Funds, insisting that all Candidate Countries target funds on a small number of regions using regional development plans drawn up for these regions. 
Generaldirektoratet fr utvidgning fresprkade en Óregional strategiÓ fr strukturfonderna, och insisterade p att alla kandidatlnder skulle inrikta medlen p ett litet antal regioner och anvnda regionala utvecklingsplaner som utarbetats fr dessa regioner.
By concentrating funding in this way, the Directorate-General aimed to increase the impact of the limited Phare funding available. 
Genom att koncentrera finansieringen p detta stt ville generaldirektoratet ka effekten av de begrnsade tillgngliga Phare-medlen.
This approach, however, did not take into account two key aspects of Structural Fund implementation mechanisms. 
Med detta arbetsstt tog man dock inte hnsyn till tv viktiga aspekter av mekanismerna fr genomfrande av strukturfonderna.
In the first place, it did not take into account the specific regional planning framework of the Structural Funds (19): (a) in countries made up of more than one NUTS II region, the Structural Funds are to be implemented through a Community Support Framework (20) involving a number of sectoral and regional programmes, the latter being managed by regional bodies; and (b) in countries where the whole country corresponds to one NUTS II region, the Structural Funds are to be implemented through a Single Programming Document (SPD) managed by national ministries. 
Frst och frmst tog man inte hnsyn till strukturfondernas specifika regionala ram fr planering (19): a) I lnder som bestr av mer n en NUTS II-region skall strukturfonderna genomfras genom en gemenskapsstdram (20) vilket inbegriper ett antal sektorsvisa och regionala program, dr de senare frvaltas av regionala organ. b) I lnder dr hela landet motsvarar en NUTS II-region skall strukturfonderna genomfras genom ett samlat programplaneringsdokument frvaltat av nationella ministerier.
Four of the eight acceding countries from central and eastern Europe fall into this category (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia). 
Fyra av de tta anslutningslnderna frn Central-och steuropa tillhr denna kategori (Estland, Lettland, Litauen och Slovenien).
(19) The ÔNomenclature of Territorial Units for StatisticsŐ (NUTS) divides countries into NUTS I (national), NUTS II (regional) and NUTS III (county) levels. 
(19) ÓNomenklaturen fr statistiska territoriella enheterÓ (NUTS) delar upp lnder i niverna NUTS I (nationell), NUTS II (regional) och NUTS III (subregional).
In larger countries with more than one NUTS II region, the NUTS II level is normally the level for which Structural Fund regional operation programmes are established. 
I strre lnder med mer n en NUTS II-region, r NUTS II-nivn vanligtvis den niv fr vilken strukturfondernas regionala operativa program upprttas.
However, in small countries the whole country may only correspond according to this classification to a NUTS II level. 
I sm lnder kan dock hela landet enligt denna klassificering motsvara en NUTS II-niv.
(20) Community Support Frameworks are the strategic documents required by the Structural Fund Regulation and are designed to provide coordination of all Community structural assistance in the regions concerned. 
(20) Gemenskapens stdramar r de strategiska dokument som krvs enligt frordningen om strukturfonderna och utformas fr samordning av alla gemenskapens strukturstd i de berrda regionerna. sammanhllning skilde sig frn strukturfondernas ml 1 frfarandena fr 18.
C 15/10 EN Official Journal of the European Union 20.1.2005 21. 
C 15/10 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 20.1.2005 21.
By insisting on regionally focused programmes even in smaller countries, lower levels of government were brought into managing Phare funds although they lacked the capacity to do so and would not in any case be required to perform such a function under the Structural Funds after accession. 
Genom att man insisterade p att programmen skulle vara regionalt inriktade ven i mindre lnder, brjade Phare-medel frvaltas p lgre frvaltningsniver trots att man dr saknade frmga att gra det och trots att man under inga omstndigheter skulle behva fullgra en sdan funktion inom strukturfonderna efter anslutningen.
Thus, Directorate-General Regional Policy stated in 2001: ÔThere has been quite a lot of confusion concerning the role of the regions with regard to the programming and implementation of the Structural Funds. 
Generaldirektoratet fr regionalpolitik faststllde allts 2001 att det hade frekommit en hel del frvirring vad gller regionernas roll i frga om programplanering och genomfrande av strukturfonderna.
The Ňtarget regionÓ approach has contributed to this basic misunderstanding by initiating a process of programming and setting up Regional Development Agencies at sub-regional levelŐ (21). 
Strategin med ÓmlregionerÓ har bidragit till detta grundlggande missfrstnd genom att man drigenom har inlett en process dr man programplanerar och inrttar byrer fr regional utveckling p nivn under den regionala (21).
Latvia for the ESC 2000 programme was required by the Commission to concentrate the funds on one or two target regions. 
Kommissionen krvde att Lettland fr 2000 rs program fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning skulle rikta in medlen p en eller tv mlregioner.
The Latvian authorities accordingly decided to focus them on two of LatviaŐs five county level regions, Latgale and Zemgale. 
De lettiska myndigheterna beslutade d att satsa p tv av Lettlands fem regioner p subregional niv, Latgale och Zem-gale.
This was despite the weak programming and implementation capacity in both regions. 
Detta gjordes trots den svaga frmgan nr det gller programplanering och genomfrande i dessa bda regioner.
In 2001, the Commission, recognising these weaknesses, and mindful of the urgent need to improve capacity in the central administration, switched to nationally managed sectoral programmes. 
Kommissionen, som erknde dessa svagheter och uppmrksammade att det fanns ett akut behov att frbttra frmgan i den centrala administrationen, gick 2001 ver till nationellt frvaltade sektorsprogram.
Secondly, three of the four Member States (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal) which worked through CSFs and were beneficiaries of the Cohesion Fund had largely implemented their Structural Funds allocations over the programming period 1994 to 1999 through sectoral operational programmes rather than regional operational programmes (22). 
Fr det andra hade tre av de fyra medlemsstater (Grekland, Irland, Portugal), som arbetade genom gemenskapsstdramar och mottog medel frn sammanhllningsfonden, i stor utstrckning genomfrt sina strukturfondsmedel ver programperioden 1994Đ1999 genom verksamhetsprogram p sektorsniv istllet fr verksamhetsprogram p regionniv (22).
This led Directorate-General Regional Policy to conclude that a similar sectoral approach should have been adopted for at least Candidate Countries of a similar size to these Member States (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia) which would have CSFs and be beneficiaries of the Cohesion Fund when designing ESC programmes. 
Av detta drog Generaldirektoratet fr regionalpolitik slutsatsen att man borde ha arbetat p sektorsniv i tminstone de kandidatlnder (Bulgarien, Slovakien, Tjeckien, Ungern) som r storleksmssigt lika dessa medlemsstater och att de skulle ha gemenskapsstdramar och vara mottagare av std frn sammanhllningsfonden nr de planerade program fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning.
A sectoral approach was also the most realistic approach to follow given the centralised administrative structure of these countries. 
Att arbeta p sektorniv var ocks det mest realistiska arbetssttet med tanke p den centraliserade administrativa strukturen i dessa lnder.
In addition, it was clear that any enlargement taking place between 2002 and 2006 would result in a shorter period for the Candidate Countries to programme and implement Structural Funds. 
Dessutom var det tydligt att all utvidgning under ren 2002Đ2006 skulle resultera i att kandidatlnderna fick kortare tid p sig fr att programplanera och genomfra strukturfonderna.
This meant that there was a need, particularly given the limited capacity in Candidate Countries, to simplify programming as much as possible. 
Detta betydde att det, srskilt med tanke p kandidatlndernas begrnsade kapacitet, fanns ett behov av att frenkla programplaneringen s mycket som mjligt.
As a result the approach followed by Directorate-General Regional Policy when in 2001 it came to (21) Synthesis Paper arising from Twinners Seminar, ÔPreparations for the Structural Funds in the Candidate CountriesŐ held on 15 and 16 March 2001 in Brussels. 
Nr Generaldirektoratet fr regionalpolitik r 2001 kom att frhandla med kandidatlnderna (21) Sammanfattande dokument frn seminarium fr samverkanspartner, ÓPreparations for the Structural Funds in the Candidate CountriesÓ, som hlls den 15Đ16 mars 2001 i Bryssel.
(22) In Ireland for the 1994 to 1999 programming period 100 % of the funds were implemented through sectoral programmes in industry, economic infrastructure, human resources, environmental services, tourism, transport, agriculture and rural development, local development, fisheries, and technical assistance. 
(22) Fr programperioden 1994Đ1999 genomfrdes i Irland 100 % av medlen genom sektorprogram inom industri, ekonomisk infrastruktur, mnskliga resurser, miljtjnster, turism, transporter, jordbruk och landsbygdsutveckling, lokal utveckling, fiske och tekniskt std.
In Portugal 78 % and in Greece 68 % of funds were implemented through sectoral operational programmes. 
I Portugal genomfrdes 78 % och i Grekland 68 % av medlen genom sektoriella operativa program.
(Source: Report from the Commission: 11 Annual Report on the Structural Funds (1999), Volume II, Annex 7, COM(2000) 698 final, Brussels, 13 November 2000). negotiate with Candidate Countries on the number and type of operational programmes which would be drawn up to implement Objective 1 was that each new Member State should have only one regional operational programme covering the entire country. 
(Klla: Rapport frn kommissionen: Strukturfonderna 1999 Đ Elfte rsrapporten, Volym II, Bilaga 7, KOM(2000) 698 slutlig, Bryssel, 13 november 2000). om hur mnga och vilket slags operativa program som skulle upprttas fr genomfrande av ml 1, arbetade man drfr utifrn tanken att varje medlemsstat endast skulle ha ett regionalt operativt program som gllde hela landet.
This was in contrast to the individual regional operational programmes for each eligible area, the assumption on which Directorate-General Enlargement had based its programming of Phare ESC for 2000. 
Detta gick stick i stv med idn med ett individuellt regionalt operativt program fr varje berrt omrde, som Generaldirektoratet fr utvidgning hade utgtt frn i sin programplanering av Phare-programmet fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning fr 2000.
It was only in the second half of 2000 in the context of drawing up the 2001 ESC programmes that Directorate-General Enlargement adjusted its annual programming guidelines for ESC investments to better reflect Directorate-General Regional Policy approaches (23). 
Det var inte frrn under andra halvret 2000, nr Generaldirektoratet fr utvidgning hll p att utforma 2001 rs program fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning, som det ndrade sina riktlinjer fr den rliga programplaneringen av investeringar i ekonomisk och social sammanhllning s att de bttre skulle terspegla de tillvgagngsstt som Generaldirektoratet fr regionalpolitik anvnder (23).
Nevertheless a significant portion of the funding under 2001 ESC programmes continued to be devoted to programmes which were primarily regional rather than sectoral in character. 
En betydande del av medlen i programmen fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning 2001 fortsatte dock att gnas t program som var mer regionala n sektoriella.
Since these regional programmes continued to concentrate on a limited number of target regions, although nearly all regions in the Candidate Countries will be eligible for Objective 1 support under the Structural Funds, those regions which did not benefit from such programmes were less well prepared for Structural Funds. Even if the managing authorities in the Candidate Countries for the period 2004 to 2006 will be central ministries, regional bodies will nevertheless still have at least a limited role to play in their implementation as intermediary bodies. 
Eftersom dessa regionala program fortsatte att inriktas p ett begrnsat antal mlregioner, trots att nstan alla regioner i kandidatlnderna kommer att vara berttigade till ml 1-std frn strukturfonderna, var de regioner som inte hade ngra sdana program inte lika vl frberedda fr strukturfonderna. ven om frvaltningsmyndigheterna i kandidatlnderna fr perioden 2004Đ2006 kommer att vara centrala ministerier, kommer nd regionala organ att ha tminstone en begrnsad roll i genomfrandet av strukturfonderna som frmedlande organ.
At the level of the central ministries, as part of its policy of keeping the number of implementing authorities to a minimum, the Commission encouraged Candidate Countries to have only one implementing agency responsible for managing the ESC programmes. 
I kommissionens policy att hlla nere antalet genomfrande myndigheter till ett minimum ingick att uppmuntra kandidatlnderna att p ministerieniv endast ha ett ansvarigt genomfrandeorgan fr frvaltningen av programmen fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning.
Thus the Phare Review stated that Ôthe target will be to have (...) one implementing agency for ESCŐ. 
I versynen av Phare faststlldes att mlet kommer att vara att ha ett genomfrandeorgan fr de ekonomiska och sociala sammanhllningsprogrammen.