natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission considers that, in conjunction with the activities of the GNP Committee, the regular checks conducted by its departments into the reliability and suitability of statistical sources, the comparability of definitions, rules (based on ESA compatibility) and results and the exhaustiveness of national accounts (cross-checking of different sources, existence of a set of adjustments considered satisfactory) are sufficient to guarantee the correct and satisfactory application of the GNP Directive. 
Fullfljande av harmoniseringen ndamlsenlig kontroll p gemenskapsniv 85Đ91. Kommissionen anser att dess regelbundna kontroller av statistikkllornas tillfrlitlighet och likvrdighet, av jmfrbarheten i reglernas och resultatens definitioner (i verensstmmelse medENS),fullstndighetenimedlemsstaternasnationalrkenska-per (insamlingar frn olika kllor, tillfredsstllande justeringar) samt arbetet i BNI-kommittn gr det mjligt att tillmpa BNI-direktivet p ett korrekt och tillfredsstllande stt.
The document referred to by the Court in paragraph 86 (CPNB/267, ÔMinutes of the meeting of the GNP Committee held in February 1999Ő, point 11.2) sets out the response of the GNP Committee to a draft statement by the Statistical Programme Committee concerning the quality of national accounting data. 
Det dokument som revisionsrtten hnvisar till i punkt 86 (dokument CPNB/267, protokoll frn BNI-kommittns mte i februari 1999, punkt 11.2) innehller BNI-kommittns reaktioner p ett utkast till uttalande frn kommittn fr det statistiska programmet om kvaliteten p uppgifterna i nationalrkenskaperna.
To this end, it stressed the need to employ measured language so as not to create the impression that action to improve GNP data had been completed. On the other hand, the Committee did not question the validity of the GNP data on which the lifting of the reservations was based. The Commission acknowledges that further efforts will be required to improve both the description of the checks conducted and the documentation of the corresponding dossiers. 
BNI-kommittn ville betona den kontinuerliga karaktren i pro-cessenmedfrbttringavstatistikochnationalrkenskaper.Dr- fr betonade kommittn vikten av att anvnda mttfulla ordalag fr att inte ge intryck av att arbetet med att frbttra BNI r helt frdigt. Dremot ifrgasatte inte BNI-kommittn giltigheten i de BNI-uppgifter som motiverade att frbehllen drogs tillbaka. Kommissionen r medveten om att ytterligare insatser br gras framver fr att bttre redovisa och dokumentera kontrollerna.
The Commission can only endorse the CourtŐs call for own resources to be based on ESA 95, particularly as it proposed this solution at the time of the adoption of ESA 95 in 1996. 
Kommissionen instmmer helhjrtat i revisionsrttens rekommendation om att de egna medlen skall grundas p ENS 95,srskiltsomkommissionenfreslogdennalsning1996nr ENS 95 antogs.
25.1.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 25/1 I (Information) COURT OF AUDITORS SPECIAL REPORT No 18/2000 concerning the programme to supply agricultural products to the Russian Federation, together with the CommissionŐs replies (submitted pursuant to Article 248(4), second subparagraph, of the EC Treaty) (2001/C 25/01) CONTENTS EXECUTIVESUMMARY........................................................ ........... 
25.1.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 25/1 I (Meddelanden) REVISIONSRTTEN SRSKILD RAPPORT nr 18/2000 om programmet fr leverans av jordbruksprodukter till Ryska federationen samt kommissionens svar (i enlighet med artikel 248.4 andra stycket i EG-frdraget) (2001/C 25/01) INNEHLLSF RTECKNING SAMMANFATTNING..........................................................
2 INTRODUCTION............................................................. 
INLEDNING.................................................................
5 3 PREPARATIONOFTHEPROGRAMME............................................ 
Mlen fr programmet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6-14 3 Analysis of needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11 3 Preparation of the legal base and implementation framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Budgetmedel.............................................................. Medelsomanslagitsavkommissionen.......................................... Anskaffandeavvarorna.....................................................
12-14 5 IMPLEMENTATIONOFTHEPROGRAMME ........................................ 
Produkternasfrsljningspris ..............................................
15 5 ResourcesdeployedbytheCommission......................................... 
Produkternaskvalitetochanvndning .......................................
42-47 9 IMPACTOFTHEPROGRAMME ................................................. 
Motpartsmedlen...........................................................
48-54 10 Onthepriceoffoodstuffs ................................................... 
SLUTSATS..................................................................
48-50 10 On the private sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
BILAGA....................................................................
C 25/2 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 25.1.2001 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In 1998 the Russian Federation was simultaneously affected by poor harvests and a financial crisis. 
C 25/2 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 25.1.2001 SAMMANFATTNING 1998 drabbades Ryska federationen samtidigt av en dlig skrd och en ekonomisk kris.
As a result of the crisis the European Union (EU) feared that its agricultural exports might fall substantially, as the Russian Federation was its second largest meat export market. 
Till fljd av denna kris fruktade Europeiska unionen (EU) att dess export av jordbruksprodukter skulle minska kraftigt, eftersom Ryssland utgjorde dess andra strsta marknad fr export av ktt.
In response to a request from the Russian Government, the Council decided, in December 1998, to supply agricultural products to the neediest regions of the Russian Federation free of charge(seeparagraph1). 
Till fljd av en anskan frn den ryska regeringen beslutade rdet i december 1998 att gratis leverera jordbruksprodukter till de mest behvande regionerna i Ryska federationen (se punkt 1).
The programme was not to be allowed to impede EU agricultural exports to Russia (some of them subsidised), nor to disturb the local market. 
Programmet fick inte utgra ett hinder fr EU:s delvis subventionerade export av jordbruksprodukter till Ryssland eller skapa obalans p den lokala marknaden.
For that reason the selling price of the products was not to be lower than that of similar products obtained locally or imported from the EU. 
Produkternas frsljningspris fick sledes inte vara lgre n frsljningspriset p liknande lokala produkter eller produkter som importerades frn EU.
As for the neediest regions, for which these products were intended, they hoped to have them as cheaply as possible. 
De mest behvande regionerna, fr vilka produkterna var avsedda, ville ha produkterna till lgsta mjliga pris.
At the same time, the Russian authorities also wanted to maximise the sales revenue in order to use it for social measures (see paragraph 2). 
Samtidigt ville de ryska myndigheterna ocks maximera frsljningsinkomsterna fr att ansl dem till sociala tgrder (se punkt 2).
The Court found that there had been no prior analysis of needs. 
Revisionsrtten konstaterade att det inte hade genomfrts ngon frhandsanalys av behoven.
Moreover, Russia exported cereals in 1999. 
Dessutom exporterade Ryssland spannml r 1999.
Even though the EU feared a drop in its meat exports to Russia, they in fact increased in 1999, partly due to the export refunds whose impact the Commission had underestimated (see paragraphs 6 to 11). 
Trots att EU fruktade en minskning av sin kttexport till Ryssland kade denna 1999, bland annat tack vare exportbidragen, vilkas effekter underskattats av kommissionen (se punkterna 6Đ11).
Collection of the counterpart funds generated by the sale of these products was often delayed, mainly because of the difficulty of selling the meat. 
De motpartsmedel som frsljningen av dessa produkter inbringade erhlls ofta fr sent, vilket framfr allt berodde p svrigheter att avyttra kttet.
Regions which had problems in paying the funds within the time allowed, and were already among the neediest, were also threatened with financial penalties by the Russian federal authorities. 
Regionerna, som redan hrde till de mest utarmade, hade svrigheter att betala in dessa medel inom de givna tidsfristerna och hotades dessutom av ekonomiska sanktioner frn de ryska federala myndigheterna.
Furthermore, the Commission was more concerned with optimum collection of these funds than with their utilisation (see paragraphs 14 and 42 to 47). 
Vidare har kommissionen snarare koncentrerat sig p en optimal insamling av dessa medel n p anvndningen av dem (se punkterna 14 och 42Đ47).
Generally speaking, the impact of the programme was reduced because: Ń the Commission agreed to the Russian federal authoritiesŐ making a link between the allocation of aid to regions and the latterŐs ability to provide a financial guarantee, even though the programme was supposed to give priority to assisting the neediest regions (see paragraphs 11 and 53), Ń asthesellingpriceofthemeatwasveryhigh,inordertopre-vent its competing with Community imports, and with local produce as well, the meat remained in storage in Russia for many months and the consignments, although very expensive, thus had no significant impact on the local market in 1999, even though at the end of 1998 the Council had considered it imperative that the products reach their destination assoonaspossible(seeparagraphs35and36). 
Generellt sett minskade programmets verkningsgrad av fljande skl: Ń Kommissionen accepterade att de ryska federala myndigheterna frdelade stdet p grundval av regionernas frmga att stlla ekonomiska garantier, trots att programmet frmst var avsett att stdja de mest behvande regionerna (se punkterna 11 och 53). Ń Eftersom kttets frsljningspriser var mycket hga fr att undvika konkurrens med gemenskapens import samt ven med den lokala produktionen, blev detta ktt under flera mnader kvar i lager i Ryssland och leveranserna fick, trots att de var mycket kostsamma, inga anmrkningsvrda effekter p den lokala marknaden 1999, trots att rdet i slutet av 1998 ansg att det var mycket viktigt att produkterna kom fram s snart som mjligt (se punkterna 35Đ36).
The principal declared objective, of improving the precarious situation of the Russian people and regularising agricultural markets by supplying to the neediest regions agricultural products that were to reach their destination in the shortest time possible, was only partially achieved. 
Det huvudsakliga mlet att frbttra den prekra situation som det ryska folket befann sig i och att stabilisera jordbruksmarknaderna genom att jordbruksprodukter s snart som mjligt levererades till de mest behvande regionerna har endast uppntts till en liten del.
The aid was not essential, in so far as Russia was able to obtain supplies on the international market by leaving private operators to take the necessary action. 
Stdet var inte oumbrligt i den mening att Ryssland kunde klara sig p den internationella marknaden genom att ge de privata operatrerna fria hnder.
If the intention was that Russia should be given food aid, a humanitarian programme on a smaller scale that targeted the neediest social groups would have been more appropriate. 
Om avsikten var att bevilja Ryssland livsmedelsstd, hade det varit lmpligare med ett mindre omfattande program fr humanitrt bistnd med inriktning p de mest behvande befolkningsgrupperna.
As regards the desire to keep the Russian export market, the aim was achieved more effectively and at proportionately lower cost by means of export refunds (see paragraphs 55 to 61). 
Vad betrffar nskningen att bevara den ryska exportmarknaden har denna uppfyllts effektivare och till en proportionellt sett lgre kostnad med hjlp av exportbidragen (se punkterna 55Đ61).
INTRODUCTION Programme objectives 1. 
INLEDNING Mlen fr programmet 1.
In 1998 the cereal harvest in Russia was particularly poor (1). 
1998 var spannmlsskrden i Ryssland srskilt mager (1).
In August of the same year the country was hit by a serious financial crisis as well. 
I augusti samma r drabbades landet dessutom av en allvarlig ekonomisk kris.
On 6 November 1998 the USA decided to grant food aid to Russia. 
Frenta staterna beslutade den 6 november 1998 att tilldela Ryssland livsmedelsstd.
The European Union (EU) also wanted to secure its presence there, Russia being its second most important meat export market (2). 
Ocks Europeiska unionen nskade skerstlla sin nrvaro i regionen, eftersom Ryssland utgjorde dess andra strsta marknad fr export av ktt (2).
In response to the Russian GovernmentŐs request of 12 November 1998 the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 2802/98 (3) of 17 December 1998, making provision for the free supply of agricultural products to the neediest regions of the Russian Federation. 
Som svar p den ryska regeringens begran av den 12 november 1998 antog rdet den 17 december 1998 frordning (EG) nr 2802/98 (3) om gratis leverans av jordbruksprodukter till de hrdast drabbade regionerna i Ryska federationen.
Selling these products on local markets was to create a counterpart fund to finance social measures. 
Avsikten var att frsljningen av dessa produkter p de lokala marknaderna skulle ge upphov till motpartsmedel fr att finansiera sociala tgrder.
Since this operation was to help redress a precarious situation among the Russianpeople,andatthesametimeregulariseagriculturalmar-kets in Russia, the Council considered it imperative that the aid reach its destination as soon as possible. 
Med tanke p att denna tgrd skulle bidra till att frbttra den prekra situation som det ryska folket befann sig i och samtidigt stabilisera jordbruksmarknaderna i Ryssland ansg rdet att det var absolut ndvndigt att stdet kom fram s snart som mjligt.
The programme must not be allowed to impede EU agricultural exports to Russia (some of them subsidised), nor to disturb the local market. 
Programmet fick inte hindra EU:s delvis subventionerade jordbruksexport till Ryssland eller skapa obalans p den lokala marknaden.
In addition, since the Regulation (Article 1(4)) stipulated that the revenue was to be earmarked for social measures, the Russian authorities wanted to obtain the maximum possible counterpart funds in order to use them as budget support. 
Eftersom frordningen (artikel 1.4) freskrev att intkterna skulle anvndas till sociala tgrder nskade de ryska myndigheterna dessutom f ut s mycket motpartsmedel som mjligt fr att kunna anvnda dem som budgetstd.
OJ L 349, 24.12.1998, p. 
(3) EGT L 349, 24.12.1998, s.
25.1.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 25/3 Programme components 3. 
25.1.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 25/3 Programmets bestndsdelar 3.
This complex, ambitious programme provided for the supply of 1,85 million tonnes of food products with a value of 377,7 million euro to around 50 regions out of the 89 administrative entities that constitute the Russian Federation. 
Detta ambitisa och komplexa program gllde leverans av 1,85 miljoner ton livsmedelsprodukter till ett vrde av 377,7 mil-jonereurotillettfemtiotalregionerblandde89administrativa enheter som utgr Ryska federationen.
Cereals and rice accounted for approximately 40 % of the total value, against 50 % for meat products, with skimmed-milk powder making up the balance. 
Spannml och ris stod fr cirka 40 % av det totala vrdet, ktt fr nra 50 %, medan resten utgjordes av skummjlkspulver.
With the exception of pigmeat, which was bought on the Community market, all the products were taken from intervention stocks. 
Med undantag av griskttet, som kptes p gemenskapsmarknaden, hrrrde samtliga produkter frn interventionslager.
The costs of monitoring (mobilisation in Europe and distribution in Russia) and transporting the products to the Russian border were charged to the Community budget. 
Kostnaderna fr transport av dessa produkter till den ryska grnsen och kostnaderna fr vervakningen (i samband med mobiliseringen i Europa och utdelningen i Ryssland) belastade gemenskapsbudgeten.
Taking into account the savings on storage costs and export refunds, which are estimated at 71,5 million euro, the net total cost of the programme financed with EAGGF appropriations was estimated at 411,1 million euro (see Table1). 
Efter att man rknat in besparingarna i utgifterfrlagringochexportbidrag(uppskattningsvis71,5mil-joner euro) berknades den totala nettokostnaden fr detta program, som finansierades med EUGFJ-anslag, till 411,1 miljoner euro (se tabell 1).
Estimated programme cost Wheat Rye500000299000001250000042400000 Rice5000017500000250000020000000 Table 1 Product Quantity Value(1) Transportasfaras Toalcost Beef Pork Skimmed-milk powder Total 150 000 100 000 50 000 1 850 000 75 000 000 110 000 000 39 500 000 377 700 000 30 000 000 20 000 000 2 500 000 92 500 000 Total net cost 105 000 000 130 000 000 42 000 000 470 200 000 12 400 000 Đ 71 500 000 411 100 000 (in tonnes) (in EUR) Russian frontier (in EUR) (cost in EUR) 1 000 000 105 800 000 25 000 000 130 800 000 Technical assistance, monitoring, audit and evaluation Savings on storage costs and export refunds (1) Estimated accounting value at the level of intervention stocks as of end-September 1998, except for pork, where the price taken was the market price at the time of estimation. 
1 000 000 500 000 50 000 150 000 100 000 105 800 000 29 900 000 17 500 000 75 000 000 25 000 000 12 500 000 2 500 000 30 000 000 20 000 000 130 800 000 42 400 000 20 000 000 110 000 000 105 000 000 130 000 000 Klla: Generaldirektoratet fr jordbruk.
Given the significant inherent risks of implementing this pro-gramme(1)theCourtŐsauditmainlycentredonitsimplementa- tion in Russia. 
P grund av de omfattande inneboende riskerna i samband medgenomfrandetavdettaprogram(1)koncentreradesrevi-sionsrttens granskning frmst p dess genomfrande i Ryssland.
As the Commission had made provision for the delivery of the products during the first six months of 1999 (point 3.11 of the Memorandum of Understanding), the on-the-spot audit was carried out in the second half of 1999, at the Commission and its Delegation in the country, on the premises of the (1) See Council Regulation (EC) No 2802/98 of 17 December 1998: Ô... despite all the precautions which have been and will be taken, the operation inevitably involves inherent risksŐ (OJ L 349, 24.12.1998, p. 12). 
Granskningsmlet var dels att kontrollera programmets ndamlsenlighet och effekt, dels att granska hur kommissionen fullgjort sina taganden betrffande transporterna av produkterna till sina destinationer, insamlingen av motpartsmedel och skerstllandet avattdessaanvndesfrdendamlsomfreskrivits.Eftersom kommissionen planerat att leverera produkterna under frsta halvret 1999 (punkt 3.11 i avtalsmemorandumet) genomfrdes granskningen p platsen under andra halvret 1999 vid kommissionen och dess delegation p platsen, vid de behriga ryska (1) Se rdets frordning (EG) nr 2802/98 av den 17 december 1998: Ótgr-deninnebr,trotsalladefrsiktighetstgrdersomharvidtagitseller kommer att vidtas, ett oundvikligt risktagandeÓ (EGT L 349, 24.12.1998, s.
Meetings were also arranged in Moscow with counsellors from embassies of Member States and the United States of America, local representatives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). 
Likas har det organiserats sammantrden i Moskva med medlemsstaternas och Frenta staternas ambassadrd, Internationella valutafondens (IMF) och Vrldsbankens lokala repre-sentationskontorsamtmedFN:slivsmedels-ochjordbruksorga- nisation (FAO).
PREPARATION OF THE PROGRAMME Analysis of needs 6. 
UTFORMNINGEN AV PROGRAMMET Analys av behoven 6.
At the meeting of the Agriculture Council of 28 September 1998, the Commission stated that there were no food shortages in Russia and that on a macroeconomic level there was enough money to buy foodstuffs. It also pointed out that most analysts considered that Russian food imports would resume as soon as 
Vid rdets (jordbruk) sammantrde den 28 september 1998 uppskattade kommissionen att det inte rdde ngon brist p livs-medeliRysslandochattdeturmakroekonomisksynvinkelfanns tillrckligtmedpengarfrattkpalivsmedel,samtppekadeatt de flesta analytiker ansg att den ryska livsmedelsimporten skulle
The actual need for such a programme formed the subject of an extensive debate in Russia, with semi-public trade organisations in favour and private-sector operators and the groups in favour of the economic reforms against. 
Det verkliga behovet av ett sdant program blev freml fr en omfattande debatt i Ryssland, i vilken de halvstatliga handels-organisationerna uttalade sitt std fr programmet, medan operatrerna inom den privata sektorn och de grupper som fresprkade ekonomiska reformer stllde sig negativa.
Despite warnings from the World Bank, the Commission did not analyse the negative impact that such a programme might have on the emerging private sector (local producers, new private operators). 
Trots varningar frn Vrldsbanken analyserade kommissionen inte vilka negativa konsekvenser ett sdant program skulle kunna f fr den privata sektor som hller p att utvecklas (lokala producenter, nya privata aktrer).
Neither did it attempt to assess how far internal trade barriers were affecting the supply of cereals, even though in November 1998 the FAO had expressed the view that if there were any shortages in Russia, they would be local and attributable to the existence of these internal barriers (2). 
Kommissionen frskte heller inte uppskatta i vilken mn de interna handelshindren pverkade spannmlsfrsrj-ningen, trots att FAO i november 1998 konstaterade att eventuella brister i Ryssland skulle vara lokala och bero p dessa interna handelshinder(2).
8. Although the supply of cereals on the Russian market was actually lower in 1998, there is no evidence to show that Russia could not have resorted to imports, despite the financial crisis of August 1998 (3). 
8. ven om utbudet av spannml p den ryska marknaden faktiskt var mindre 1998 finns det inga bevis fr att Ryssland trots den ekonomiska krisen i augusti 1998 inte hade kunnat frlita sig p import (3).
Moreover, the problem for a large part of the population was not so much food shortages as lack of money to buy food (4). Furthermore, according to Russian cereals experts (5), the official statistics underestimated cereal stocks by 10 % to 20 %, especially as regards production capacity and the stocks held by private operators. 
Vidare utgjordes problemet fr en stor del av befolkningen inte s mycket av livsmedelsbrist som av avsaknad av pengarattkpalivsmedelfr(4).Ryskaspannmlsexperter(5) anserfrvrigtattdenofficiellastatistikenunderskattarspann-mlslagren med 10 till 20 %, srskilt vad gller de privata aktrernas produktionskapacitet och lager.
Article 3.9 of the Memorandum prohibits the export, for the duration of the programme, of products of the same kind as those supplied by the EU, except in cases where the contracts were signed before 1 October 1998. 
Avtalsmemorandumets artikel 3.9 frbjuder export av produkter av samma typ som de som levereras av EU under programperioden, utom i de fall dr avtalen ingtts fre den 1 oktober 1998.