natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
However, Community legislation does not lay down procedures or conditions under which VAT identification numbers must be cancelled, for example in cases where traders are involved both in legal economic activity and in fraudulent operations. 
I gemenskapslagstiftningen faststlls dock inga frfaranden fr hur eller under vilka villkor momsregistreringsnummer ska annulleras, till exempel i de fall d nringsidkare bedriver en laglig ekonomisk verksamhet samtidigt som de r inblandade i ett bedrgeri.
Such cases are subject to diverse national legislation and practice. 
Sdana fall omfattas av olika nationella bestmmelser och frfaranden.
Difficulties in cross-border prosecution 88. 
Svrigheter att beivra brott ver en grns 88.
During its audit missions, the Court was informed that in some of the Member States (4), it is very difficult to prosecute persons involved in fraudulent schemes, for example participating in chains set up for carousel fraud, where only other Member States are defrauded. 
Under granskningsbesken informerades revisionsrtten om att det i vissa medlemsstater (4) r mycket svrt att tala personer som r inblandade i bedrgerier, till exempel om de r en lnk i en kedja som har inrttats fr ett karusellbedrgeri dr det endast r andra medlemsstater som utstts fr bedrgeriet.
The UK National Audit Office (NAO) reported (5) that Danish tax authorities had informed them that they suspected some Danish companies were involved in supply chains with missing traders in the UK. 
Det nationella revisionsorganet i Frenade kungariket rapporterade (5) att danska skattemyndigheter hade meddelat sina misstankar om att ngra danska fretag var inblandade i leveran-trskedjor med skenfretag i Frenade kungariket.
However, there was no tax loss in Denmark and therefore only limited criminal investigations could be undertaken. 
I Danmark blev det ingen skattefrlust och drfr var mjligheterna att inleda en brottsutredning begrnsade.
(3) Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax. 
(3) Rdets direktiv 2006/112/EG av den 28 november 2006 om ett gemensamt system fr mervrdesskatt.
(4) France and Luxembourg. 
(4) Frankrike och Luxemburg.
(5) See paragraph 4.32 of the Comptroller and Auditor GeneralŐs Standard Report dated 7 July 2006 and published alongside the 2005 to 2006 Accounts of HM Revenue & Customs. 
(5) Se punkt 4.32 i styrekonomens och riksrevisorns standardrapport av den 7 juli 2006 som offentliggjordes tillsammans med Ó2005Đ06 Accounts of HM Revenue & CustomsÓ.
C 20/18 EN Official Journal of the European Union 25.1.2008 90. 
C 20/18 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 25.1.2008 90.
The German Federal Court of Auditors reported (1) that no mutual agreements with other Member States had been reached in order to prosecute intra-Community VAT fraud. 
Det tyska federala revisionsorganet rapporterade (1) att inga msesidiga verenskommelser hade trffats med andra medlemsstater fr att beivra gemenskapsinternt momsbedrgeri.
The existence of such agreements were, according to German legislation, the precondition for prosecuting traders involved in this type of fraud. 
Att det finns sdana verenskommelser var enligt tysk lagstiftning en frutsttning fr att nringsidkare som r inblandade i denna typ av bedrgeri ska kunna talas.
The Convention on the protection of the European CommunitiesŐ financial interests (2) stipulates that each Member State is to establish effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties in their national law to combat fraud and to cooperate effectively with other Member States. 
Konventionen om skydd av Europeiska gemenskapernas finansiella intressen (2) freskriver att varje medlemsstat ska faststlla effektiva, proportionella och avskrckande straffrttsliga pfljder i sin nationella lagstiftning fr att bekmpa bedrgerier och samarbeta effektivt med vriga medlemsstater.
Article 1 of the Convention provides that it also applies in cases where fraud results in the illegal diminution of the resources of the EU budget. 
Enligt artikel 1 i konventionen gller detta ocks i de fall d bedrgeriet leder till att medel frn EU:s budget minskas p ett olagligt stt.
However, according to an explanatory report (3) on the Convention adopted by the Council, VAT was excluded from its scope (4). 
Enligt en frklarande rapport (3) rrande konventionen som antagits av rdet omfattas dock inte moms av konventionen (4).
Action to prevent intra-Community VAT fraud cannot be effectively targeted by Member States, or the Commission, until they have reliable estimates of fraud occurring, including information about the economic sectors most concerned. 
Varken medlemsstaterna eller kommissionen kan vidta ngra tgrder fr att frhindra gemenskapsinterna momsbedrgerier frrn de har tillgng till tillfrlitliga uppskattningar av de bedrgerier som frekommer, dribland information om de ekonomiska sektorer som berrs mest.
The Commission has not yet developed a successful common approach on how to achieve this. 
Kommissionen har nnu inte tagit fram ngot framgngsrikt gemensamt tillvgagngsstt fr hur detta ska uppns.
In its resolution of 12 December 2006 on promoting activities in the field of value added tax, the Contact Committee (5) mandated a working group to produce recommendations for a single model for estimating VAT losses. 
I sin resolution av den 12 december 2006 om frmjande av verksamheter p omrdet fr mervrdesskatt uppdrog kontaktkommittn (5) t en arbetsgrupp att lmna rekommendationer i syfte att ta fram en enda modell fr berkning av momsfrluster.
Such a common approach would also allow Member States to determine whether the fight against fraud was genuinely successful, or whether tackling VAT fraud just resulted in it being displaced to other economic sectors or other Member States. 
Ett sdant gemensamt arbetsstt skulle ocks gra det mjligt fr medlemsstaterna att avgra om bedrgeribekmpningen faktiskt har varit framgngsrik eller om denna kamp endast leder till att bedrgeriet flyttar till andra ekonomiska sektorer eller andra medlemsstater.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Conclusions 94. 
SLUTSATSER OCH REKOMMENDATIONER Slutsatser 94.
Despite new arrangements introduced in 2004, administrative cooperation between Member States in the field of VAT is still not intensive enough to cope with intra-Community VAT evasion and fraud. 
Trots de nya arrangemang som infrdes 2004 r det administrativa samarbetet mellan medlemsstater p omrdet fr mervrdesskatt nnu inte tillrckligt intensivt fr att klara gemenskapsinternt momsundandragande och gemenskapsinternt momsbedrgeri.
(1) Bundesrechnungshof, Bemerkungen 2002 zur Haushalts-und Wirtschaftsfhrung des Bundes, Ziffer 74 (Strafverfolgung bei innerge-meinschaftlichem Umsatzsteuerbetrug). 
(1) Bundesrechnungshof, Bemerkungen 2002 zur Haushalts-und Wirt-schaftsfhrung des Bundes, Ziffer 74 (ÓStrafverfolgung bei innerge-meinschaftlichem UmsatzsteuerbetrugÓ).
(2) The Convention was drawn up in 1995 on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on the European Union (OJ C 316, 27.11.1995, p. 
(2) Konventionsomutarbetades1995pgrundvalavartikelK.3ifrdra-get om Europeiska unionen (EGT C 316, 27.11.1995, s.
(3) OJ C 191, 23.6.1997, p. 
(3) EGT C 191, 23.6.1997, s.
(4) The problem was already described in Special Report No 9/98, paragraphs 2.3 to 2.9. 
(4) Problemet beskrevs redan i punkterna 2.3Đ2.9 i srskild rapport nr 9/98.
(5) The Contact Committee consists of the heads of the Supreme Audit Institutions of the European Union. 
(5) Kontaktkommittn bestr av cheferna vid de nationella revisionsorganen i Europeiska unionen.
So far, most Member States have not fully exploited the possibilities provided by the Community legislation to devolve competence and responsibility for direct contacts with tax authorities in other Member States to their local or regional tax offices (see paragraphs 19 to 23). 
Hittills har merparten av medlemsstaterna inte fullt ut utnyttjat de mjligheter som finns i gemenskapslagstiftningen att delegera behrighet och ansvar fr direkta kontakter med skattemyndigheter i andra medlemsstater till sina lokala eller regionala skattekontor (se punkterna 19Đ23).
The exchange of information upon request, a major instrument of administrative cooperation between Member States, is affected by a high proportion of late replies and by the absence of interim replies. 
Utbyte av information p begran, som r ett viktigt instrument fr administrativt samarbete mellan medlemsstater, pverkas av den hga andelen sena svar och av att det inte lmnas ngra preliminra svar.
The frequency of late replies varies, however, considerably between Member States (see paragraphs 24 to 31). 
Antalet sena svar varierar dock betydligt mellan medlemsstaterna (se punkterna 24Đ31).
Most of the delays in responding to requests occur due to a lack of priority given to requests by local tax offices. 
De flesta frseningarna nr det gller att lmna svar beror p att frfrgningarna inte prioriteras av de lokala skattekonto-ren.
Weaknesses in the monitoring systems and/or in the organisational set-up of Central Liaison Offices in some Member States are other reasons which also contribute to delays (see paragraphs 32 to 42). 
Brister i vervakningssystem och/eller de organisatoriska arrangemangen vid de centrala kontaktkontoren i vissa medlemsstater r andra skl till frseningarna (se punkterna 32Đ42).
Evaluations show that cooperation leads to results. 
Utvrderingar visar att samarbete ger resultat.
Where requests are answered in accordance with the rules, they often allow to reveal or confirm the existence of fraud and may result in the collection of additional VAT. 
D frfrgningar besvaras i enlighet med reglerna leder detta ofta till att man upptcker eller bekrftar att det frekommer bedrgeri, vilket kan leda till att kompletterande moms uppbrs.
However, there are some concerns that the quality of information exchanged on suspected missing traders is not always sufficient to serve as a basis for successful legal action against the fraudsters (see paragraphs 43 to 49). 
Det finns emellertid viss oro fr att kvaliteten p den utbytta informationen om misstnkta skenfretag inte alltid r tillrcklig fr att kunna anvndas som grund fr rttsliga tgrder mot bedragare p ett framgngsrikt stt (se punkterna 43Đ49).
Broad obligations to inform other Member States have been set, but in practice exchange is limited to certain categories of information which are at the discretion of Member States. 
Omfattande skyldigheter att informera andra medlemsstater har faststllts, men i praktiken r utbytet begrnsat till vissa kategorier av information som medlemsstaterna fr bestmma.
Furthermore, information provided spontaneously is not always systematically exploited (see paragraphs 50 to 56). 
Information som lmnas spontant anvnds heller inte alltid systematiskt (se punkterna 50Đ56).
VIES, the system for information exchange, has serious weaknesses. 
Vies, systemet fr informationsutbyte, har allvarliga brister.
Delays in collecting and capturing accurate data and problems in correcting wrong data undermine its usefulness. 
Frseningar nr det gller insamling och inmatning av korrekta uppgifter och problem nr felaktiga uppgifter ska korrigeras minskar nyttan med det.
The system contains data on intra-Community supplies only, but not on intra-Community acquisitions. 
Systemet innehller endast uppgifter om gemenskapsinterna leveranser, men inte om gemenskapsinterna frvrv.
Though a decision to upgrade the system was taken in 2004, progress in implementing new features is slow (see paragraphs 57 to 70). 
Trots att ett beslut fattades att modernisera systemet 2004 tar det lng tid att infra nya funktioner (se punkterna 57Đ70).
Tools available for a multilateral control approach are rarely used, although Community funding is provided through the Fiscalis programme (see paragraphs 71 to 77). 
Tillgngliga instrument fr multilaterala kontroller anvnds sllan trots gemenskapsfinansiering genom Fiscalisprogrammet (se punkterna 71Đ77).
Most of the proposals made by the Commission through the Standing Committee on Administrative Cooperation to improve exchange of information between Member States were not followed (see paragraphs 78 to 83). 
De flesta av de frslag som kommissionen lade fram via stndiga kommittn fr administrativt samarbete fr att frbttra informationsutbytet mellan medlemsstater fljdes inte (se punkterna 78Đ83).
25.1.2008 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 20/19 103. 
25.1.2008 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 20/19 103.
Recommendations 104. 
Rekommendationer 104.
Member States should encourage more direct communication between local inspection staff as an effective way to speed up the exchange of information. 
Medlemsstaterna br uppmuntra att en direktare kommunikation mellan lokal inspektionspersonal ger rum oftare fr att informationsutbytet ska pskyndas p ett effektivt stt.
It would at the same time help to increase the intensity of cooperation and the quality of the information exchanged. 
Det skulle samtidigt bidra till att svl intensiteten i samarbetet som kvaliteten p den utbytta informationen kade.
More efficient monitoring of exchanges of information between Member States is necessary to ensure that problems are swiftly identified and tackled and that each Member State provides effective assistance to other Member States. 
En effektivare vervakning av informationsutbyten mellan medlemsstater r ndvndig om man ska kunna garantera att problem snabbt identifieras och tgrdas och att varje medlemsstat ger ett effektivt std till andra medlemsstater.
The procedures for exchanges of information without prior request need to be clarified. 
Rutinerna fr informationsutbyte utan fregende begran mste frtydligas.
Information which is provided spontaneously should be systematically exploited by Member States. 
Information som ges spontant br systematiskt utnyttjas av medlemsstaterna.
To improve VIES, action should be taken to (a) radically shorten the timescale for collecting and capturing data; (b) ensure that inaccurate data are swiftly corrected; (c) improve the functioning of the validation of VAT numbers; (d) enhance the possibilities for cross-checks, for example by including data on intra-Community acquisitions; and (e) grant broader direct access to data to enable multilateral consultations. 
Fr att frbttra Vies br tgrder vidtas fr att a) radikalt frkorta tidsperioden fr insamling och inmatning av uppgifter, b) se till att oriktiga uppgifter snabbt korrigeras, c) frbttra hur validering av momsregistreringsnummer fungerar, d) frbttra mjligheterna till dubbelkontroller, till exempel genom att uppgifter om gemenskapsinterna frvrv frs in i Vies, e) ge en mer omfattande direkt tillgng till uppgifter fr att mjliggra multilaterala konsultationer.
The introduction of harmonised rules for withdrawing VAT numbers from traders involved in fraudulent activities should be considered. 
Man br vervga att infra harmoniserade regler fr terkallande av momsregistreringsnummer frn nringsidkare som r inblandade i bedrgerier.
Having comparable data on intra-Community VAT evasion would contribute to a better targeted cooperation between Member States. 
Att ha tillgng till jmfrbara uppgifter om gemenskapsinternt momsundandragande skulle bidra till att samarbetet mellan medlemsstater blev mer mlinriktat.
A common approach needs to be developed by the Commission together with the Member States to quantifying and analysing VAT evasion. 
Kommissionen mste tillsammans med medlemsstaterna ta fram ett gemensamt arbetsstt fr att mta och analysera momsundandragande.
It should be considered how to improve cross-border prosecution of intra-Community VAT fraud in the Member States, for example by changing the CouncilŐs current interpretation of the Convention on the protection of the European CommunitiesŐ financial interests which does not include VAT revenue. 
Man br vervga hur man kan frbttra beivrandet av gemenskapsinternt momsbedrgeri ver en grns i medlemsstaterna, till exempel genom att ndra rdets nuvarande tolkning av konventionen om skydd av Europeiska gemenskapernas finansiella intressen som inte omfattar momsintkter.
With regard to the Commission proposal for an additional horizontal regulation on mutual administrative assistance for the protection of the financial interests of the Community (1), the Court recalls its recommendation (2) that the Commission should make an effort to propose a simplification and consolidation of Community anti-fraud legislation with a view to avoiding duplications and overlapping or contradictory provisions. 
Med hnsyn till kommissionens frslag till ytterligare en vergripande frordning om msesidigt administrativt bistnd fr att skydda gemenskapens ekonomiska intressen (1) pminner revisionsrtten om sin rekommendation (2) om att kommissionen ska gra en anstrngning fr att lgga fram ett frslag till frenkling och konsolidering av gemenskapens lagstiftning om bedrgeribekmpning i syfte att undvika verlappande eller motstridiga bestmmelser.
Existing weaknesses in cooperation between the Commission and the Member States could be addressed in the framework of such an overhaul. 
Befintliga brister i samarbetet mellan kommissionen och medlemsstaterna skulle kunna rttas till inom ramen fr en sdan omarbetning.
This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its meeting of 8 November 2007. 
Denna rapport har antagits av revisionsrtten vid dess sammantrde i Luxemburg den 8 november 2007.
For the Court of Auditors Hubert WEBER President (1) COM(2006) 473. 
Fr revisionsrtten Hubert WEBER Ordfrande (1) KOM(2006) 473.
(2) See paragraph 36 of Opinion No 8/2005 on a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on mutual administrative assistance for the protection of the financial interests of the Community against fraud and any other illegal activities (OJ C 313, 9.12.2005, p. 1). 
(2) Se punkt 36 i yttrande nr 8/2005 om ett frslag till Europaparlamentets och rdets frordning om msesidigt administrativt bistnd fr att skydda gemenskapens ekonomiska intressen mot bedrgerier och all annan olaglig verksamhet (EUT C 313, 9.12.2005, s. 1).
The CourtŐs analysis is in line with the assessment made by the Commission in a communication published in May 2006 (1): the legal framework for administrative cooperation in the field of VAT was reinforced some years ago (2), but the Member States do not yet make sufficient use of the new possibilities offered, and the level of administrative cooperation is not commensurate with the size of intra-Community trade. 
Revisionsrttens analys verensstmmer med den bedmning kommissionen gjorde i ett meddelande som offentliggjordes i maj 2006 (1). Den rttsliga ramen fr administrativt samarbete p omrdet mervrdesskatt strktes fr ngra r sedan (2), men medlemsstaterna utnyttjar inte i tillrcklig utstrckning de nya mjligheter som erbjuds och nivn p det administrativa samarbetet str inte i proportion till handeln inom gemenskapen.
Following the publication of the above-mentioned communication in May 2006, a political debate has been launched with all the parties concerned on an anti-fraud strategy at European level. 
Efter det att ovannmnda meddelande offentliggjordes i maj 2006 inleddes en politisk debatt med alla berrda parter om en bedrgeribekmpningsstrategi p europeisk niv.
Besides the Standing Committee on Administrative Cooperation (3) Ń whose discussions and decisions have a more technical nature Ń a more policy oriented Anti Tax Fraud Strategy-Group has been created. 
Utver stndiga kommittn fr administrativt samarbete (3), vars diskussioner och beslut r av ett mer tekniskt slag, har en mer strategiinriktad arbetsgrupp mot skattebedrgerier inrttats.
Decisions on administrative cooperation at the Community level can only be taken by a unanimous vote of all Member States. 
Beslut om administrativt samarbete p gemenskapsniv kan bara fattas genom ett enhlligt antagande frn alla medlemsstater.
With regard to the framework for the exchanges of information without prior request, Article 18 of Council Regulation 1798/2003 Ń as confirmed in Article 5 of Commission Regulation 1925/2004 Ń expressly provides that each Member State shall determine whether it will take part in the exchange of a particular (sub)category of information, and how it will do this. 
Med beaktande av ramen fr informationsutbyte utan fregende begran, dvs. artikel 18 i rdets frordning (EG) nr 1798/2003 om informationsutbyte, som bekrftas i artikel 5 i kommissionens frordning (EG) nr 1925/2004, anges uttryckligen att varje medlemsstat ska faststlla om den ska delta i utbytet av en srskild (under)kategori och om den tnker gra det p ett automatiskt eller strukturerat automatiskt stt.
This text was the result of a political compromise, necessary to obtain unanimity in the Council (as required for acts based on Article 93 of the Treaty). 
Denna text r resultatet av en politisk kompromiss som krvdes fr att n enhllighet i rdet (enligt kravet fr rttsakter som grundar sig p artikel 93 i frdraget).
20. 
IAKTTAGELSER 20.
Ń Ń The statistics communicated by the Member States show: an increase of information exchange requests amongst the EU-15 in the period after 1.1.2004, compared to the period before that date, and a rapid development of the exchange of information requests between EU-15 and EU-10. 
I statistikuppgifterna frn medlemsstaterna framgr fljande: Ń En kning av informationsutbytena p begran mellan EU-15 under perioden efter den 1 januari 2004, jmfrt med perioden fre detta datum, och Ń en snabb utveckling av informationsutbytena p begran mellan EU-15 och EU-10.
(1) Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee concerning the need to develop a co-ordinated strategy to improve the fight against fiscal fraud, COM(2006) 254 of 31.5.2006. 
(1) Meddelande frn kommissionen till rdet, Europaparlamentet och Europeiska ekonomiska och sociala kommittn om behovet av att utarbeta en samordnad strategi fr att frbttra kampen mot skattebedrgeri KOM(2006) 254, 31.5.2006.
(2) CouncilRegulation(EC)No1798/2003of7October2003onadmin-istrative cooperation in the field of VAT (OJ L 264, 15.10.2003, p. 
(2) Rdets frordning (EG) nr 1798/2003 av den 7 oktober 2003 om administrativt samarbete i frga om mervrdesskatt och om upphvande av frordning (EEG) nr 218/92 (EUT L 264, 15.10.2003, s.
1) and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1925/2004 of 29 October 2004 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No 1798/2003 concerning administrative cooperation in the field of VAT (OJ L 331, 5.11.2004, p. 
1) och kommissionens frordning (EG) nr 1925/2004 av den 29 oktober 2004 om faststllande av tillmpningsfreskrifter fr vissa bestmmelser i rdets frordning (EG) nr 1798/2003 angende administrativt samarbete i frga om mervrdesskatt (EUT L 331, 5.11.2004, s.
(3) This Standing Committee on Administrative Cooperation (SCAC) has been established in accordance with Article 44 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1798/2003 to assist the Commission in implementing the Council Regulation. 
(3) Stndiga kommittn fr administrativt samarbete har inrttats i enlighet med artikel 44 i rdets frordning (EG) nr 1798/2003 fr att bist kommissionen vid genomfrandet av rdets frordning.
25.1.2008 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 20/21 21. 
25.1.2008 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 20/21 21.
Despite the increase of the information exchanges, the level of administrative cooperation in these years was not commensurate with the size of intra-Community trade (1). 
Trots det kade informationsutbytet stod inte det administrativa samarbetet under dessa r i proportion till handeln inom gemenskapen (1).