natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Financial cooperation with the Mediterranean countries, Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia 2.17. Interest-rate subsidies are provided for under the following: financial cooperation in respect of all Mediterranean non-member countries (16) (MNCs), certain protocols relating to financial and technical cooperation concluded by the Community with southern Mediterranean countries (17) (SMCs), financial and technical measures to support the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership(18) (MEDA, which replaced MNCs and SMCs as of 1 January 1997), and certain financial protocols concluded by the Community with Malta (19), Cyprus (20) and Slovenia (21). 
Ekonomiskt samarbete med lnderna i Medelhavsomrdet, Cypern, Malta och Slovenien 2.17 Rntesubventioner frekommer i det ekonomiska samarbetet med samtliga icke-medlemslnder i Medelhavsomrdet (16) (PTM); i vissa avtal om ekonomiskt och tekniskt samarbete som slutits av gemenskapen med de sdra medelhavslnderna(17) (PMS); i de finansiella och tekniska stdtgrderna fr reformering av ekonomiska och sociala strukturer inom ramen fr partnerskapet mellan Europa och Medelhavsomrdet(18) (Meda, som erstter de tv frstnmnda tgrderna frn den 1 januari 1997) och i vissa protokoll om ekonomiskt samarbete som slutits av gemenskapen med Malta (19), Cypern (20) och Slovenien (21).
(16) Council Regulation (EEC) No 1763/92 of 29 June 1992 concerning financial cooperation in respect of all Mediterranean non-member countries (OJ L 181, 1.7.1992, p. 
(16) Rdets frordning (EEG) nr 1763/92 av den 29 juni 1992 om ekonomiskt samarbete med avseende p samtliga icke-medlemslnder i Medelhavsomrdet, (EGT L 181, 1.7.1992, s.
5), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1735/94 of 11 July 1994 (OJ L 182, 16.7.1994, p. 
5), ndrad genom rdets frordning (EG) nr 1735/94 av den 11 juli 1994 (EGT L 182, 16.7.1994, s.
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1762/92 of 29 June 1992 on the implementation of the protocols on financial and technical cooperation concluded by the Community with Mediterranean non-member countries (OJ L 181, 1.7.1992). 
Rdets frordning (EEG) nr 1762/92 av den 29 juni 1992 om genomfrandet av protokollen om ekonomiskt och tekniskt samarbete som slutits av gemenskapen med icke-medlemslnder i Medelhavsomrdet (EGT L 181, 1.7.1992).
Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 of 23 July 1996 on financial and technical measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (OJ L 189, 30.7.1996, p. 
Rdets frordning (EG) nr 1488/96 av den 23 juli 1996 om finansiella och tekniska stdtgrder (Meda) fr reformering av ekonomiska och sociala strukturer inom ramen fr partnerskapet mellan Europa och Medelhavsomrdet (EGT L 189, 30.7.1996, s.
Ń Council Regulation (EEC) No 939/76 of 23 April 1976 concluding the financial protocol and the protocol laying down certain provisions relating to the agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and Malta (OJ L 111, 28.4.1976, p. 
Ń Rdets frordning (EEG) nr 939/76 av den 23 april 1976 om slutande av ett ekonomiskt protokoll och ett protokoll om faststllandet av vissa bestmmelser angende avtalet om upprttande av en associering mellan Europeiska ekonomiska gemenskapen och Malta (EGT L 111, 28.4.1976, s.
1), Ń Council Decision 89/378/EEC of 12 June 1989 concerning the conclusion of a protocol on financial and technical cooperation between the European Economic Community and Malta (OJ L 180, 27.6.1989, p. 
Ń Rdets beslut 89/378/EEG av den 12 juni 1989 om slutandet av ett protokoll om ekonomiskt och tekniskt samarbete mellan Europeiska ekonomiska gemenskapen och Malta (EGT L 180, 27.6.1989, ( ( ( ( 17 18 19 ) ) ) 20 s.
152). 29.7.1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 217/7 OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE MANAGEMENT, ENTRY IN THE ACCOUNTS AND CONTROL OF INTEREST-RATE SUBSIDIES 3.1. 
29.7.1999 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 217/7 IAKTTAGELSER OM F RVALTNING, REDOVISNING OCH KONTROLL AV RNTESUBVENTIONER 3.1 I tabell 1 tas 13 tgrder upp och EIB frvaltar nio av dem.
The comments in paragraphs 3.2 to 3.7 only apply to the subsidies for which the EIB acts as the CommissionŐs agent. 
Iakttagelserna i punkterna 3.2Ń3.7 berr endast de rntesubventioner fr vilka kommissionen lmnat fullmakt till EIB.
Amounts received by beneficiaries 3.2. The amount of aid actually received by final beneficiaries is determined by the behaviour of the financial intermediaries, who may retain part of the subsidy by manipulating the level of the interest rate or other features of the loans they propose (such as fees, exchange rates or value dates). 
Beloppen som stdmottagarna erhller 3.2 Det std som de slutliga stdmottagarna faktiskt erhller beror p hur de finansiella mellanhnderna agerar. De kan dela p rntesubventionen genom att anvnda sig av rntenivn eller andra faktorer fr det ln som de erbjuder (t.ex. arvoden, vxelkurs eller valutering).
However, where the Commission has delegated the management of interest subsidies, it does not check the terms governing the loans in cases where they are paid out by financial intermediaries and, moreover, generally does not even possess the information needed for this purpose. 
3.3 Nr kommissionen delegerar frvaltningen av rntesubventionerna kontrollerar den emellertid inte villkoren fr de ln som i frekommande fall betalas ut av de finansiella mellanhnderna. I allmnhet frfogar kommissionen inte ens ver ndvndig information om detta.
Furthermore, the fact that interest-rate subsidies may not be paid out by all members of the banking system, but only by a restricted number of intermediaries selected by the EIB, is likely to affect competition within the sector. 
Det faktum att utbetalningarna av rntesubventionerna inte kan gras av banksystemet som helhet, utan endast av ett antal mellanhnder som EIB vljer ut, kan pverka konkurrenssituationen i sektorn.
In cases where loans are directly back-to-back with borrowings, the spread between the rates needs to be checked. 
3.4 I vissa fall dr utlningen r direkt kopplad till inlning br skillnaden mellan in-och utlningsrntan kontrolleras.
In the case of ECSC loans, all the benefits the Commission gains in its capacity as a first-class borrower, including cases where it is able to obtain more advantageous refinancing for operations already under way, are passed on to its own borrowers. 
Nr det gller EKSG-lnen fr kommissionen vidare alla de frdelar som den tnjuter i egenskap av lntagare av frsta graden till sina egna lntagare, ocks nr den kan f en bttre terfinansiering av pgende tgrder.
No provision is made in the contracts for the terms to be adjusted to enable borrowers to benefit from more advantageous terms in the event that market conditions improve. 
Kontrakten innehller ingen omfrhandlingsklausul som gr det mjligt fr ln-tagarna att tnjuta frdelaktigare villkor om marknaden utvecklas i positiv riktning.
As regards loans financed from the EIBŐs own resources, the rates for such loans are not compared with those in the market. 
3.5 Nr det gller EIB:s utlning frn sina egna medel jmfrs inte rntesatserna med marknadsrntorna.
Given that the EIB enjoys special privileges (22) and has a monopoly over the allocation of certain subsidies, the competition mechanism does not guarantee that its margins are in accordance with the regulations laid down in its statutes (23). 
Eftersom EIB tnjuter srskilda frdelar (22) och har ensamrtt p distributionen av vissa rntesubventioner garanterar konkurrenssituationen inte att EIB:s marginaler verensstmmer med dess stadga (23).
This matter also has a bearing on the volume of administrative expenditure that is reinvoiced (24) by the EIB in respect of its management of operations under mandate from and on behalf of the Commission. 
Fr vrigt har denna frga ocks ett samband med storleken p det belopp fr administrativa kostnader som EIB vidarefakturerar (24) avseende frvaltning av transaktioner med fullmakt och fr kommissionens rkning.
Observations were made in this regard in the CourtŐs Annual Reports concerning the financial years 1994 (paragraphs 8.36 to 8.43) and 1993 (paragraphs 10.26 to 10.30). 
Iakttagelser om detta har gjorts i revisionsrttens rsrapporter fr budgetren 1994 (punkterna 8.36Ń8.43) och 1993 (punkterna 10.26Ń10.30).
The Commission, which on occasion has no knowledge of the projects or the final beneficiaries, is thus faced with a fait accompli. 
Kommissionen, som ibland inte ens knner till varken projekten eller de slutliga stdmottagarna, stlls allts infr fullbordat faktum.
Decisions to grant subsidies may also be taken by the Commission on the basis of information provided by the EIB, but in practice this merely involves the Commission rubbber-stamping the proposals submitted to it by the EIB (25). 3.7. 
Det hnder ocks att kommissionen, p grundval av information som kommer frn EIB, fattar beslut om beviljande av std, men i praktiken bekrftar kommissionen bara de frslag som lggs fram fr den (25).
Similarly, when the Commission receives reports from the EIB concerning the progress of investments under way, which is not always the case, they are not analysed. 
3.7 Nr kommissionen fr rapporter frn EIB om hur pgende investeringar framskrider, vilket fr vrigt inte alltid r fallet, analyseras inte dessa.
The CommissionŐs interest in these documents is all the less as it believes that it is unnecessary to repeat the work already done by the EIB, that the main risk connected with these operations is that of loans not being recovered, a matter that is meticulously monitored by the EIB and, lastly, that the cost to the budget in these cases is often relatively low, especially in cases where subsidies are accompanied by other more costly measures. Effectiveness of the subsidies 3.8. 
Kommissionen intresserar sig inte i ngon hgre grad fr dessa rapporter av fljande skl: den anser att den inte br gra om det som EIB redan har gjort; att den huvudsakliga risken med dessa transaktioner r att lnen inte terbetalas, en aspekt som mycket noggrant vervakas av EIB och slutligen att de budgetmssiga utgifterna i sammanhanget ofta r relativt sm Ń srskilt nr det gller rntesubventioner som r kopplade till andra mer kostsamma tgrder.
In the case of most measures the subsidy rates bear no direct relation to market rates, which vary greatly over time and according to the country concerned, and are not based on an analysis to determine the threshold above which the subsidy is likely to be truly effective. 
Rntesubventionernas effektivitet 3.8 Fr de flesta tgrderna har rntesubventionernas niv inget direkt samband med marknadsrntorna, eftersom dessa varierar mycket ver tiden och mellan olika lnder. De faststlls inte heller p grundval av ngon analys av det grnsvrde frn vilket rntesubventionen skulle vara verkligt effektiv.
(23) Article 2 of the Statutes of the EIB, which refers to Article 198, of the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
(23) Artikel 2 i EIB:s stadga, som hnvisar till artikel 198e i Frdraget om upprttandet av Europeiska gemenskapen.
It is stated that the EIB shall, operating on a non-profit-making basis, grant loans and give 24 guarantees. () The EIB is entitled to receive a management fee for administering certain operations to cover the actual managerial costs incurred. 
Dr faststlls att EIB bevil-24 jar ln och garantier utan vinstsyfte. ( ) Fr att frvalta vissa transaktioner har EIB rtt att ta ut en frvalt-ningsavgift som skall tcka de verkliga kostnader som uppsttt vid denna frvaltning.
The Court has never received satisfactory information enabling it to obtain assurance on an independent basis that this regulation has been 25 respected. () The Commission prepares the files itself when cooperation with Mediterranean countries is involved. 
Revisionsrtten har aldrig erhllit tillrcklig information fr att p ett oberoende stt kunna frskra sig om att denna 25 regel respekterats. () Nr det gller samarbete med lnderna i Medelhavsomrdet handlgger kommissionen rendena sjlv.
( 22 ) Protocol on the privileges and immunities of the European Communities, annexed to the Treaty of Brussels of 8 April 1965. 
( 22 ) Protokoll om Europeiska gemenskapernas immunitet och privilegier, bifogat Brysselfrdraget av den 8 april 1965.
C 217/8 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 29.7.1999 3.9. As far as most of the measures involved are concerned, the objectives are defined in an extremely general manner. 
C 217/8 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 29.7.1999 3.9 Fr de flesta berrda tgrder definieras mlen p ett mycket vergripande stt.
In practice, the Commission is content to draw up a list of projects implemented and sums spent. 
3.10 I praktiken njer sig kommissionen med att gra frteckningar ver genomfrda projekt och utbetalade belopp.
But the latter promote such aid in the light of their own interests (for example, to attract worthwhile new customers or develop the loyalty of existing customers), which, while not conflicting with them, are not necessarily the same as the EUŐs objectives. 3.11. 
De sistnmnda frmjar stdet med hnsyn till sina egna intressen (till exempel fr att dra till sig nya intressanta kunder eller fr att skapa lojalitet hos redan befintliga kunder), vilka kanske inte str i motsats till EU:s ml men inte heller ndvndigtvis verensstmmer med dem.
With regard to the two measures conceived specifically to create jobs (TF SMEs and Article 56 of the ECSC Treaty), the number of jobs created is used as a criterion for judging their efficiency. 
3.11 Fr de tv tgrder dr skapande av arbetstillfllen r ett villkor (den tillflliga lnemjligheten fr sm-och medelstora fretag och rntesubventioner enligt artikel 56 i EKSG-frdraget) anvnds antalet skapade arbetstillfllen som effektivitetskriterium.
However, the Commission presents the results in statistical terms, without analysing the causal connection between the jobs created and the subsidies paid out. 
Kommissionen presenterar emellertid resultaten i statistiska termer, utan att analysera orsakssambandet mellan skapade arbetstillfllen och utbetalade rntesubventioner.
For most measures the Commission enters the subsidies it pays to the EIB in the accounts without checking the related calculations, even when the subsidies concerned were paid in advance and calculated in present value terms. 
Bokfringen av rntesubventionerna 3.12 Kommissionen bokfr de rntesubventioner den betalar ut, fr det mesta till EIB, utan att kontrollera berkningarna ens nr rntesubventionerna betalas ut i frskott och nuvrdesberknas.
In the case of the general budget and the EDFs (the situation is different as regards the ECSC operating budget), expenditure on interest-rate subsidies is entered in the accounts at the time the respective commitments are entered into and then when the respective payments are made. 
3.13 Nr det gller den allmnna budgeten och EUF (situationen r annorlunda fr EKSG:s driftsbudget) bokfrs utgifterna fr rntesubventioner nr tagandena fr dem ings och drefter nr utbetalningarna sker.
When the amounts paid to the EIB correspond to the total sum of the present value of the subsidies in respect of a loan lasting several years (see paragraph 2.15), the Bank enters the portion relating to subsequent financial years under its liabilities for as long as it holds this portion (subsidies received in advance amounted to ECU 361,6 million on 31 December 1997), as it could be required to pay part of it back to the EC or the EDF, for example, in the event of early repayment of the corresponding loans. 
Nr betalningarna till EIB r lika stora som samtliga nuvrdesberknade rntesubventioner fr ett flerrigt ln (se punkt 2.15), tar EIB upp motsvarande del p skuldsidan i balansrkningen fr kommande budgetr s lnge banken innehar den (321,6 miljoner ecu hade mottagits i frskott fr rntesubventioner per den 31 december 1997). Detta grs eftersom EIB skulle kunna bli tvungen att terbetala en del till EG eller EUF till exempel om motsvarande ln inlstes i frtid.
On the other hand, neither the EC nor the EDF have any sort of indicator (for example, to denote claims or forecast claims) which would require them to focus their attention on what becomes of these subsidies once paid, as the corresponding amounts are not entered on the assets side of the EC (26) or EDF balance sheets. 
Dremot frfogar varken EG eller EUF ver ngot nyckeltal (till exempel fordringar eller budgeterade fordringar) som krver en fokusering p vad som hnder med rntesubventionerna nr de vl har utbetalats, eftersom motsvarande belopp inte frekommer p tillgngssidan av EG:s (26) eller EUF:s balansrkningar.
In connection with the TF SMEs, the problem is different, as the subsidies were paid globally in advance (ECU 93,5 million between 1994 and 1996), basically for reasons of budgetary availability, and were paid over to the beneficiaries by the EIB (ECU 93,4 million) between 1995 and 1998. 
3.14 Nr det gller den tillflliga lnemjligheten fr sm och medelstora fretag r problemet annorlunda eftersom rntesubventionerna som helhet betalats ut i frskott (93,5 miljoner ecu mellan 1994 och 1996). Detta har gjorts frmst p.g.a. att budgetmedlen funnits tillgngliga och de har betalats vidare till stdmottagarna av EIB (93,4 miljoner ecu) mellan 1995 och 1998.
The time lag involved is not discernible in the EUŐs financial statements. 
Resultatet blir en tidsfrskjutning som inte framgr av EU:s rsredovisningar.
At 31 December 1997 subsidies that had still not been paid over to beneficiaries amounted to ECU 0,1 million. 
Den 31 december 1997 uppgick de rntesubventioner som nnu inte utbetalats till stdmottagarna till 0,1 miljoner ecu.
In addition, the interest earnings generated by the funds held on current account at the EIB (some ECU 9 million) have not been established as budgetary revenue. 
Dessutom har rnteinkomsterna frn de medel som finns p inlningskonto i EIB (cirka 9 miljoner ecu) inte faststllts som budgetinkomster.
3.15. With regard to NCI earthquake loans, and Madeira, the subsidies are paid over on each interest maturity date. 
3.15 Fr NGI Ń jordbvning och Madeira betalas rntesubventionerna ut varje gng rntorna frfaller till betalning.
Furthermore, the unaccrued amounts that are to be paid at a later date, which amounted to ECU 6,1 million for NCI earthquake loans and ECU 3,3 million for Madeira on 31 December 1997, are not shown outside the balance sheet. 
Ej upplupna belopp som skall utbetalas senare, som uppgick till 6,1 miljoner ecu fr NGI Ń jordbvning och 3,3 miljoner ecu fr Madeira den 31 december 1997, tas inte upp vid sidan av balansrkningen.
3.16. The three preceding paragraphs show that the same economic situation is presented in the accounts in different ways, depending on the technical set-up of the operations. 
3.16 De tre fregende punkterna visar att samma ekonomiska verklighet tar sig olika uttryck i rkenskaperna beroende p hur verksamheten lagts upp rent tekniskt.
It is therefore difficult to gain an understanding of the situation by examining the financial statements. 
Det r svrt att f grepp om situationen genom att granska rsredovisningarna.
CONCLUSION 4.1. As regards the sound financial management of the subsidies, the Commission should: Ń ensure that where intermediaries are used, they do not receive unreasonable levels of remuneration and that certain financial institutions have not been favoured over other competitors, but have been selected in a satisfactorily transparent and equitable manner, Ń evaluate their efficiency by measuring the rate of achievement of the set objectives, wherever possible (see paragraph 3.9), and by determining the real impact of the subsidies (see paragraphs 3.10 to 3.11). 
SLUTSATS 4.1 Nr det gller rntesubventionernas sunda ekonomiska frvaltning borde kommissionen Ń nr den anvnder sig av mellanhnder frskra sig om att dessa inte uppbr orimliga arvoden, samt att urvalet gjorts under tillrckligt stor insyn och p ett rttvist stt s att vissa finansiella institutioner inte gynnats p konkurrenternas bekostnad, Ń utvrdera deras effektivitet genom att, nr s r mjligt, mta i vilken grad de faststllda mlen har uppntts (se punkt 3.9) samt genom att faststlla rntesubventionernas verkliga effekt (se punkterna 3.10Ń3.11).
(26) The CourtŐs Statement of Assurance concerning activities financed from the general budget for the financial year 1997 (OJ C 349, 17.11.1998 paragraphs 8.6 to 8.7). 
(26) Revisionsrttens revisionsfrklaring fr verksamheten i samband med den allmnna budgeten fr budgetret 1997, punkterna 8.6Ń8.7 (EGT C 349, 17.11.1998).
The Commission should also check the calculations and verify the appropriateness of the discount rates applied (see paragraph 3.12). 
Kommissionen borde dessutom kontrollera berkningarna samt hur relevanta de gjorda nuvrdesberkningarna r (se punkt 3.12).
4.3. When the EIB is involved in the distribution of subsidies (see Table 1), the Commission carries out hardly any controls and relies excessively on its agent. 
4.3 Nr EIB skter frdelningen av rntesubventionerna (se tabell 1), gr kommissionen nstan ingen kontroll alls och litar i alltfr hg grad p den som ftt fullmakten.
Given that delegating management is not tantamount to delegating responsibility, the Commission should: Ń ensure that the amounts of the subsidies correspond to the aid actually received by the final beneficiaries, net of the stipulated margins (see paragraphs 3.2 to 3.5), This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors 1999. Ń ensure on a systematic basis that the planned investments are eligible and that the beneficiaries meet the requisite conditions (see paragraph 3.6), Ń ensure in good time that the investments made or being made are in line with estimates (see paragraph 3.7). 
Eftersom en delegering av frvaltningen inte r detsamma som en delegering av ansvaret borde kommissionen Ń frskra sig om att rntesubventionerna motsvarar det std som faktiskt erhllits av de slutliga stdmottagarna, med avdrag fr faststllda marginaler (se punkterna 3.2Ń3.5), Ń systematiskt frskra sig om att de planerade investeringarna r stdberttigade och att stdmottagarna uppfyller faststllda villkor (se punkt 3.6), Ń i god tid frskra sig om att gjorda investeringar eller pgende sdana motsvarar faststllda planer (se punkt 3.7).
4.4. This set of problems requires horizontal treatment. The Commission should introduce centralised control of the financial management of interest-rate subsidies, and even of banking-type instruments in general, to ensure greater homogeneity in the management of the instruments involved and their presentation in the financial statements. 
4.4 Alla dessa problem br behandlas p ett vergripande stt. Kommissionen br inrtta en centraliserad kontroll av den ekonomiska frvaltningen av rntesubventionerna och t.o.m. av bank-instrument i allmnhet, s att frvaltningen av dessa instrument i hgre grad blir homogen, ven nr det gller framstllningen i rsredovisningarna.