natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In many locations in southern Europe, water use by agriculture is unsustainably high: for example, in certain regions of Spain ‘irrigation and water management constitute one of the greatest threats to nature conservation’ (4). 
I stora delar av sdra Europa r jordbrukets vat-tenkonsumtion ohllbart stor, exempelvis i vissa regioner i Spanien, dr konstbevattningen och frvaltningen av vattenresurserna utgr ett av de strsta hoten fr naturvrden (4).
Furthermore, irrigation is often accompanied by intensification i.e. higher use of fertilisers and pesticides (5). 
Dessutom tfljs konstbevattning ofta av intensifiering, dvs. kat bruk av gdnings-och bekmpningsmedel (5).
Maize production, encouraged by higher compensatory payments than is paid for other cereals, is also often environmentally negative, since it requires more water and agro-chemicals than the cereals it replaces. 
Majsproduktionen, som uppmuntras genom hgre kompensationsbelopp n fr andra spannml, r ofta negativ fr miljn eftersom den krver mer vatten och kemikalier n de spannml den erstter.
Maize production is concentrated in the south of Europe, where water resources are scarce and nitrate pollution problems are growing, albeit they are still below the EU average. 
Majsproduktio-nen r koncentrerad till sdra Europa, dr vattenresurserna r begrnsade och problemen med nitratfrorening vxer, ven om de fortfarande ligger under genomsnittet i EU.
However, sunflower cultivation causes nitrate leaching problems, because the soil is left bare for much of the season — 250 days per annum, compared with the average of 144 days per annum for other crops (6). With regard to durum wheat, the high rate of support paid for cultivation, and the continuous expansion of the (1) See in particular A. J. Oskam, R. Vijftigschild and C. Graveland, ‘Additional EU Policy Instruments for Plant Protection Products’, Wagenin-2 gen Pers Wageningen, 1998. () Eurostat and European Commission, ‘Agriculture, Environment, Rural Development: Facts and Figures — A Challenge for Agriculture’, July 1999, chapter ‘Water and agriculture: contribution to an analysis of a 3 critical but difficult relationship’, p. 
Saken r emellertid den att solrosodling leder till problem med kvvelckage eftersom marken ligger bar under s lng tidĐ250 dagar per r, att jmfra med i genomsnitt 144 dagar per r fr vriga grdor (6) Nr det gller durumvete har det hga odlingsstdet och den kontinuerliga utvidgningen av (1) Se srskilt A. J. Oskam, R. Vijftigschild och C. Graveland, ÓAdditional EU Policy Instruments for Plant Protection ProductsÓ, Wageningen 2 Pers, Wageningen, 1998. () Eurostat och Europeiska kommissionen, ÓAgriculture, Environment, Rural Development : Facts and Figures Đ A Challenge for Agriculture, Juli 1999, KapitletÓ Water and agriculture: contribution to an analysis 3 of a critical but difficult relationshipÓ, s.
407. () BirdLife International, ‘Economic appraisal and EU funds’, Sandy, Bed-5 fordshire, UK, 1994, p. 
407. () BirdLife International, ÓEconomic Appraisal and EU fundsÓ, Sandy, 5 Bedfordshire, Frenade kungariket, 1994, s.
3. () G. Tucker, ‘Priorities for bird conservation in Europe: the importance of the farmed landscape’, quoted in ‘Farming and birds in Europe’, 6 1997, p. 
3. () G. Tucker, ÓPriorities for bird conservation in Europe: the importance of the farmed landscapeÓ, citerad i ÓFarming and birds in EuropeÓ, 6 1997, s.
105. () Institut français de l’environnement, ‘Indicateurs sur les relations entre agriculture et environnement au niveau national’, Paris, 1996, p. 
105. () Institut Franais de lŐEnvironnement, ÓIndicateurs sur les relations entre agriculture et environnement au niveau nationalÓ Paris, 1996, s.
2. zones designated for payment of this aid, have resulted in the loss of rare dry shrub steppes in Spain, to the detriment of wildlife (7). 15. 
2. de geografiska omrden som kan komma i frga fr std resulterat i att sllsynta torra buskstpper i Spanien har gtt frlorade, vilket har drabbat djur-och vxtlivet (7). 15.
Moreover, it was foreseen that aid would only be paid for land which had normally been used for arable crops before the reform. 
Vidare var tanken att std skulle betalas ut enbart fr mark som fre reformen normalt hade anvnts fr odling av jordbruksgrdor.
This was intended both to place a ceiling on Community expenditure and to protect environmentally valuable extensive pastures from conversion to arable crops. 
Avsikten med detta var dels att begrnsa EU:s utgifter, dels att skydda miljmssigt vrdefulla extensivt betade marker frn att omvandlas till kermark.
In Sweden, an official evaluation observed that the introduction of arable aid has favoured production of cereals more than pasture, which has had a negative environmental impact (8). 
I en officiell svensk utvrdering noteras att odlingsstdet har gynnat spannmlsproduktion mer n vallodling, ngot som har inverkat negativt p miljn (8).
Similar results have been observed in Spain. 
Liknande resultat har iakttagits i Spanien.
An unfavourable environmental effect of the new regime stems from the fact that support allocation favours high yield regions and disfavours low yield regions. 
En negativ miljkonsekvens av den nya ordningen kommer av att stdtilldelningen gynnar regioner med hg avkastning och missgynnar regioner med lg avkastning.
The pre-reform high yields were achieved by certain intensive practices now formally recognised by the 5EAP as unsustainable. 
De hga avkastningarna fre reformen hade uppntts med sdana intensiva metoder som enligt tgrdsprogrammet numera formellt anses vara ohllbara.
In such regions, low rates of area aid perpetuate the poor long-term viability of farming. This puts the environmentally beneficial effects of certain farming systems at risk, where the marginalisation or abandonment of land is a concern. 
Detta innebr att effekterna av vissa jordbruksmetoder som r gynnsamma fr miljn stts p spel, i de fall dr det finns problem med marginalisering eller att mark verges.
For example, within the region of Campania (Italy), rates of arable aid vary from ECU 446/ha in the fertile district of Napoli Pianura, to ECU 88/ha in the poor district of Salerno Montagna Interna (1995/1996). 
Som exempel kan nmnas att odlingsbidraget inom den italienska regionen Campania varierar mellan 446 ecu/ha i det brdiga distriktet Napoli Pianura och 88 ecu/ha i distriktet Salerno Montagna Interna, dr jordmnen r smre (uppgifterna avser 1995/96).
Set-aside 17. 
Arealuttag 17.
The reform introduced a set-aside requirement obliging arable farmers to withdraw a proportion of their land from production. 
Genom GJP-reformen stlldes krav p jordbrukarna att de skulle lgga en viss andel av sin mark i trda.
Set-aside has high environmental potential (9). 
Arealuttag har en stor miljpotential (9).
7 () Study by F. Suárez and J. Oñate, 1994, quoted in Tucker, ‘Farming and 8 birds in Europe’, 1997, p. 
7 () Underskning av F. Surez och J. Oate, 1994, citerad i Tucker, ÓFar-8 ming and birds in EuropeÓ, 1997, s.
102. () Swedish Board of Agriculture, ‘Proposals for a programme for monitoring and evaluating the environmental effects of the Common Agri-9 cultural Policy’, 1997, p. 
102. () Jordbruksverket, ÓFrslag till program fr uppfljning och utvrdering av miljeffekterna av den gemensamma jordbrukspolitikenÓ, 9 1997, s.
For Spain, see Tucker, p. 
Fr Spanien, se Tucker, s.
102. () See in particular, Institute of Terrestrial Ecology, ‘Managing set-aside land for wildlife’, Huntingdon, 1993. 
102. () Se srskilt Institute of Terrestrial Ecology, ÓManaging set-aside land for wildlifeÓ, Huntingdon, 1993.
Conversely, set-aside can present environmental risks as noted by the OECD, ‘The environmental effects of agricultural land diversion schemes’, Paris, 1997. 
Markuttag kan ocks resultera i milj-risker, ngot som noteras i OECD, ÓThe environmental effects of agricultural land diversion schemesÓ, Paris, 1997.
8.12.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 353/9 of set-aside, in France environmental considerations ‘have not yet been of great concern’ (2). 
8.12.2000 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 353/9 roll (2).
For example, nitrate leaching is often a problem if soil is left bare, but the initial French prescription permitted set-aside to be maintained as bare soil, and even when revised, the prescription did not require a green cover to be in place before 1 May, although nitrate leaching is most significant during the winter months. 
Exempelvis r kvvelckage ofta ett problem om marken fr ligga bar, men enligt de ursprungliga franska anvisningarna fick uttagen mark ligga bar, och inte ens i den reviderade versionen krvs mer n att vxttcke skall finnas senast den 1 majĐdetta trots att det mest omfattande kvvelckaget sker under vinterm-naderna.
In Spain, farmers are required to regularly either plough or spray their land, practices which can contribute to soil erosion and pesticide pollution. 
I Spanien mste jordbrukarna regelbundet antingen plja eller bespruta sin mark, vilket kan bidra till markerosion respektive bekmpningsmedelsfrorening.
Specification and enforcement by Member States of prescriptions on care of set-aside land 18. 
Medlemsstaternas specifikation och efterlevnad av anvisningar fr arealuttag 18.
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2293/92 requires Member States to ‘apply appropriate measures which correspond to the specific situation of the land set aside from the outset so as to ensure the protection of the environment’ (1). 
Enligt rdets frordning (EEG) nr 2293/92 skall medlemsstaterna Óredan frn brjan vidta lmpliga tgrder mot bakgrund av det specifika tillstndet fr den uttagna marken s att skyddet av miljn skerstllsÓ (1).
The Commission should have followed up this requirement in order to ensure its application by Member States. 
Kommissionen borde ha kontrollerat att medlemsstaterna efterlever detta krav.
However, whereas some Member States have realised the environmental potential of set-aside, others have not (see Table 4). 
Vissa medlemsstater har insett arealuttagets miljpotential, andra inte (se tabell 4).
For example, whereas Denmark has introduced detailed and comprehensive prescriptions for the care Table 4 Are prescriptions specified on care of set-aside land? 
Som exempel kan nmnas att man i Danmark har infrt detaljerade och heltckande anvisningar fr arealuttag, medan miljverv-gandena i Frankrike nnu inte har spelat ngon framtrdande-Tabell 4 r anvisningarna specificerade fr arealuttag?
(Regulation (EC) No 762/94, Article 3(3)) Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom Source: Data obtained by ECA from Member States. 
(Frordning (EEG) nr 726/94 Đ Art. 3.3) Belgien Danmark Tyskland Grekland Spanien Frankrike Irland Italien Luxemburg Nederlnderna sterrike Portugal Finland ja Sverige ja Frenade kungariket ja Klla: Uppgifterna har erhllits av revisionsrtten frn medlemsstater.
If prescriptions not obeyed, how often have penalties been applied/what is their monetary value ? 
Om anvisningarna inte fljs, hur ofta har straffavgifter tillgripits/vilket r penningvrdet?
(1994 to 1998) Not known 27 cases / ECU 11 000 Never / Nil No data available No data available No data available Four cases/ECU 4 522 in 1997 No data available Four cases / ECU 27 684 ‘Few’ cases / ECU 11 000 No data available Not known 42 cases / ECU 7 357 98 cases / ECU 71 000 233 cases / ECU 81 215 No Reply from Member State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Reply from Member State Yes Yes Yes (2) D. J. Ansell and S. A. Vincent, ‘An evaluation of set-aside management in the European Union with special reference to Denmark, France, Germany and the UK’, Centre for Agricultural Strategy, University of Reading, Reading, 1994, p. 
(1994Đ98) Ej knt 27 fall/11 000 ecu Aldrig/Noll Inga uppgifter Inga uppgifter Inga uppgifter 4 fall/4 522 ecu 1997 Inga uppgifter 4fall/27684ecu f fall/11 000 ecu Inga uppgifter Ej knt 42 fall/7 357 ecu 98 fall/71 000 ecu 233 fall/81 215 fall Inget svar frn ja ja ja ja ja ja ja ja ja ja Inget svar frn medlemsstat medlemsstat 1 ( ) Kommissionens frordning (EG) nr 2293/92, artikel 3.3, EGT L 221, 6.8.1992, s 19.
C 353/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 8.12.2000 Livestock 19. 
C 353/10 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 8.12.2000 Boskap 19.
Reform in the beef sector aimed at ‘the encouragement of extensive production through increased premia but with the introduction of strict stocking limits’ (1). 
Inom ntkttssektorn syftade GJP-reformen till att frmja extensiv produktion genom hjda bidrag parallellt med infrande av strikta grnser fr djurbesttningarna (1).
The Community aimed both to place a ceiling on expenditure, and to combat ‘the rising trend towards intensification’ (2), by limiting the number of animals per hectare for which the basic animal premiums are paid (3). 
EU ville bde stta ett tak fr utgifterna och motverka tendensen mot allt intensivare ntkttsproduktion (2), genom att stta en grns fr antalet djur per hektar fr vilka grundlggande rliga bidrag betalas ut (3).
The farmer is paid on a per animal basis up to a maximum stocking density per hectare of 2 livestock units (LU); an additional ‘exten-sification premium’ is paid when the stocking density is less than 1,4 LU/ha. 
Jordbrukarna fr numera bidrag per djur upp till en hgsta djurtthet av 2 djurenheter per hektar. Dessutom utbetalas ett extra extensifieringsbidrag om djurttheten r lgre n 1,4 djurenheter per hektar.
However, in practice Community rules allow a farmer to keep as many animals as he wishes, provided he limits his claim to the eligible number. 
I praktiken medger EU-reglerna emellertid att jordbrukarna hller hur stora djurbesttningar de vill, frutsatt att de begrnsar sina bidragsanskningar till det bidragsberttigande antalet djur.
Producers’ organisations were quick to identify this weakness: one advised its members, ‘Having done your sums, if you discover that your CAP stocking rate is just over 1,4 LU/hectare, it may pay you not to claim on a few animals, in order to qualify for the bonus on all the rest’ (4). 
Producentorganisationerna sg snabbt den hr svagheten, och en av dem gav sina medlemmar fljande rd: ÓOm du kommer fram till att din GJP-djurtthet ligger precis ver 1,4 djurenheter per hektar kan det lna sig att lta bli att ska bidrag fr ngra djur s att du kan f extra bidrag fr resten av demÓ (4).
With regard to small producers, Council Regulation (EEC) No 2066/92 specifies that ‘a producer shall be exempt from the application of the stocking density if the number of animals held on his holding and to be taken into account for determining the stocking density is not more than 15 LUs’ (5). 
Nr det gller mindre producenter sgs i rdets frordning nr 2066/92 att Óen producent skall medges undantag frn tilllmpningen av denna djurtthetsfaktor om det antal djur p hans fretag som skall anvndas vid berkningen av djurttheten r hgst 15 djurenheterÓ (5).
This concession undermines the impact of the measure: for example, in Portugal, 90 % of cattle holdings are exempt (6). 
Detta undantag underminerar tgrdernas verkan: i Portugal r exempelvis 90 procent av fretagen undantagna (6).
Furthermore, although this concession was intended by the Council to benefit small producers, Commission rules permit large and intensive producers to benefit from it (7): every producer, regardless of size, can receive premiums on his first 15 LUs, even if he has no pasture or forage area. anticipated a change in management practices in response to these rules (8). 
Trots att ministerrdets avsikt med det hr undantaget var att gynna mindre producenter medger kommissionens regler dessutom att ven fretag som gnar sig t storskalig intensiv produktion beviljas undantag (7) alla producenter, oavsett storlek, kan f bidrag fr sina frsta 15 djurenheter ven om de inte har ngra betesmarker eller foderarealer.
Furthermore, the stocking density rules have had some negative environmental consequences. 
Dessa regler har ven ftt en del negativa konsekvenser fr miljn.
In the Ebro Valley in Aragon (Spain) where cattle fattening units are concentrated and stocking rates clearly exceed 2 LUs/ha, producers have nevertheless benefited from beef premiums by renting pasture in the nearby Pyrenees. 
I Ebro-dalen i Aragonien (Spanien) finns det mnga uppfdningsenheter fr ntboskap och djurttheten r betydligt hgre n 2 djurenheter per hektar. Producenterna har emellertid trots detta kunnat f ntboskapsbidrag genom att arrendera betesmarker i de nrbelgna Pyrenerna.
The environment has suffered thereby not only from the continued intensification of production in the Ebro Val-ley, but also through the effective abandonment of mountain pasture zones (9). 
Drigenom har miljn drab-bats, inte bara genom att intensifieringen av produktionen i Ebro-dalen har fortsatt utan ocks genom att betesmarker i bergen i praktiken har vergivits (9).
In the sheep and goat sector the establishment of the COM in 1980 led to a substantial increase in livestock numbers: from 81 million in 1970 to 113 million in the EU-12 of 1990. 
Inrttandet av den gemensamma organisationen av marknaden fr fr-och getktt 1980 medfrde att antalet djur kade avsevrt: frn 81 miljoner 1970 till 113 miljoner 1990 i ett EU med 12 medlemsstater.
The introduction of individual farmer quota restrictions in 1991 stabilised the size of flocks, but at levels which are unsustainable in some localities (10). 
Sedan begrnsningar fr de enskilda jordbrukarnas kvoter infrdes 1991 har antalet djur inom EU stabiliserats, men i en del omrden p niver som r ohllbara (10).
The consequence is overgrazing — i.e. uprooting and destruction of vegetation — which results in loss of biodiversity and soil erosion. Overgrazing is still problematic in parts of Greece, Ireland and the United Kingdom (11). 
Detta leder till verbetningĐdvs. att vegetationen rycks upp och frstrs, vilket i sin tur orsakar markerosion och minskad biologisk mngfald. verbetning r fortfarande ett problem i delar av Grekland, Irland och Frenade kungariket (11).
Regulations in both the beef and veal and sheep and goats COMs permit Member States to apply ‘eco-conditionality’ rules, i.e. to impose appropriate COM-relevant environmental protection restrictions on farmers, and to withhold Community aid from farmers who do not conform to such measures. 
Enligt frordningar rrande de gemensamma organisationerna av marknaden fr svl ntktt som fr-och getktt kan medlemsstaterna stlla miljvillkorĐdvs. lgga jordbrukare relevanta miljskyddsbegrnsningar enligt de gemensamma organisationerna av marknaden, och avst frn att betala ut EU-std till jordbrukare som inte anpassar sig till dessa tgrder.
However, these measures have not had a great impact (12). 
Dessa tgrder har emellertid inte ftt srskilt stor effekt (12).
To date only Greece and the United Kingdom have introduced such measures (see Tables 5 and 6).’ 22. 
Hittills r det bara Grekland och Frenade kungariket som har brjat tillmpa sdana villkor (se tabellerna 5 och 6).
Thus, the practical impact of the stocking density restrictions has been generally limited; for example, a study in the United Kingdom found that only 20 % of beef farmers, when surveyed, (8) M. Winter and Gaskell, ‘The effects of the 1992 reform of the CAP on the countryside of Great Britain’, 1997. 
(8) 9 () 10 () 11 () M. Winter och Gaskell, ÓThe effects of the 1992 reform of the CAP on the countryside of Great BritainÓ, 1997.
C. Varela-Ortega and J. M. Sumpsi, chapter on Spain in ‘CAP and the Rural Environment in Transition’, Wageningen, 1998, pp 201 to 239. 
C. Varela-Ortega och J. M. Sumpsi, kapitlet om Spanien i ÓCAP and the Rural Environment in TransitionÓ, Wageningen, 1998, s. 201Đ239.
V. Clements, Macaulay Land Use Institute, ‘Sheep Economy: Rethinking the subsidy system’, in Reforesting Scotland, No 15, 1996, p. 
V. Clements, Macaulay Land Use Institute, ÓSheep Economy: Rethin-king the subsidy systemÓ, i ÓReforesting ScotlandÓ, nr 15, 1996, s.
In Ireland, ‘There is now widespread evidence that considerable damage has been done to large areas of hill and mountain ... due to overgrazing by sheep following the dramatic expansion in sheep numbers since 1980. 
I Irland finns det nu omfattande bevis fr att stora hglands-och bergsomrden har ftt avsevrda skador till fljd av verbetning som en konsekvens av den dramatiska kningen av antalet fr sedan 1980.
Such areas have been degraded through erosion with severe devegetation and the resulting loss of characteristic fauna and flora, with damaging consequences also for water quality, fisheries and tourism’ (B. Kearney, G. Boyle, J. Walsh, ‘Final Report on Evaluation of the Compensatory Allowances Scheme in Ireland’, Dublin, 1995, p. 
De berrda omrdena har drabbats av erosion och vegetationsskador och drav fljande frlust av karakteristisk fauna och flora, vilket fr negativa konsekvenser ven fr vattenkvaliteten, fisket och turismen (B. Kearney, G. Boyle och J. Walsh, ÓFinal Report on Evaluation of the Compensatory Allowances Scheme in IrelandÓ, Dublin, 1995, s.
For beef and veal see OJ L 328, 29.12.1993, p. 
Fr ntktt, se EGT L 328, 29.12.1993, s.
7, Council Regulation (EC) No 3611/93, Article 1(3). 
7Đ8, rdets frordning (EG) nr 3611/93, artikel 1.3.
For sheepmeat and goatmeat see OJ L 30, 3.2.1994, p. 
Fr fr-och getktt, se EGT L 30, 3.2.1994, s.
9, Council Regulation (EC) No 233/94, Article 1(3). 
9, rdets frordning (EG) nr 233/94, artikel 1.3.
8.12.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 353/11 Table 5 Eco-conditionality rules in the beef and veal CMO Have eco-conditionality rules been introduced by national authorities ? 
8.12.2000 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 353/11 Tabell 5 Miljvillkor fr de gemensamma marknadsorganisationerna fr nt-och kalvktt Har miljvillkoren infrts av nationella myndigheter?
(Regulation (EC) No 3611/93 Article 1(3)) If eco-conditionality rules introduced, how often have penalties been applied/what is their monetary value ? 
(Frordning (EEG) nr 3611/93 Art. 1.3) Om miljvillkoren har infrts, hur ofta har straffavgifter tillgripits/vilket r beloppet?
Not known Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not known Not applicable Not applicable 10 to 15 cases / value not known Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom Source: Data obtained by ECA from Member States. 
Ej knt ej tillmpligt ej tillmpligt ej tillmpligt ej tillmpligt ej tillmpligt ej tillmpligt ej tillmpligt ej tillmpligt ej tillmpligt ej tillmpligt Ej knt ej tillmpligt ej tillmpligt 10Đ15 fall/beloppet oknt Belgien Danmark Tyskland Grekland Spanien Frankrike Irland Italien Luxemburg Nederlnderna sterrike Portugal Finland Sverige Frenade kungariket Klla: Uppgifterna har erhllits av revisionsrtten frn medlemsstater.
No reply from Member State No No No No No No No No No No No reply from Member State No No Yes Table 6 Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland Sweden United Kingdom Source: Data obtained by ECA from Member States. 
Inget svar frn medlemsstat nej nej nej nej nej nej nej nej nej nej Inget svar frn medlemsstat nej nej ja Har miljvillkor infrts av nationella myndigheter? (Frordning (EEG) nr 233/94 Art.
C 353/12 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 8.12.2000 25. 
C 353/12 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 8.12.2000 25.