natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
If, in spring of t, revisions to the structural balance mean that the Member State is estimated to have been a distance of 0.5% of GDP below its MTO in year t-1, it is in the Commission's view too late to revise the requirement. 
Om revideringarna av det strukturella saldot under vren r t innebr att medlemsstatens avstnd uppskattas till 0,5 % av BNP, dvs. under det medelfristiga budgetmlet r t-1, r det enligt kommissionens sikt fr sent att revidera kravet.
The Member State will already have enacted the budget for year t based upon the Commission telling it that no adjustment was required. 
Medlemsstaten kommer redan att ha antagit budgeten fr r t, baserat p att kommissionen sagt att ingen anpassning krvdes.
It would therefore breach the Member State's legitimate expectations as to the required level of budgetary adjustment on which it would be assessed if the Commission were to impose a larger requirement. 
Detta skulle fljaktligen innebra att principen om medlemsstaternas berttigade frvntningar skulle sidosttas nr det gller den ndvndiga budgetanpassning som de skulle bedmas mot om kommissionen skulle infra ett hgre krav.
In fact, this level of unpredictability would severely undermine the credibility of the SGP framework in the eyes of national politicians. 
Faktum r att en sdan grad av ofrutsgbarhet allvarligt skulle undergrva stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens trovrdighet hos de nationella politikerna.
It is also problematic to base the requirement on the projected distance to the MTO in the year in which the requirement applies, as this projection is itself a function of the requirement. In any event, in-year revisions based on updated projections will not give the Member States sufficient advance notice when setting their budgetary policy. 
Det r ocks problematiskt att basera kravet p det frvntade avstndet till det medelfristiga budgetmlet under det r som kravet gller, eftersom en sdan prognos i sig r en fljd av kravet. rliga revideringar som grundas p uppdaterade prognoser innebr dessutom att medlemsstaterna inte underrttas i tillrckligt god tid nr de lgger upp sin budgetpolitik.
To complete the picture, Member States' requirements are not revised upwards due to an improvement in the Commission's assessment of the cyclical conditions. 
Fr att komplettera bilden revideras medlemsstaternas krav inte uppt till fljd av en frbttring av kommissionens bedmning av konjunkturlget.
As per replies to paragraphs 58 and 59, this is because it would violate the legitimate expectations of the Member State as to the required level of fiscal adjustment when designing and setting their national budgetary policy. 
Ssom anges i svaren p punkterna 58 och 59 r sklet att detta skulle innebra att principen om medlemsstaternas berttigade frvntningar sidostts angende de ndvndiga finanspolitiska korrigeringarna nr de utformar och faststller sin nationella budgetpolitik.
61. The transition from ESA95 to ESA2010 meant that the requirement for a given year may have been calculated using ESA 95 while the assessment of the fiscal effort was made using ESA 2010. 
61. vergngen frn ENS 95 till ENS 2010 innebr att kravet fr ett visst r kan ha berknats med ENS 95, medan bedmningen av den finanspolitiska insatsen gjordes med ENS 2010.
This is unavoidable unless Member States’ requirements were to potentially all be overhauled based on recalculations under ESA 2010. 
Detta r oundvikligt om inte alla medlemsstaternas ml skulle ha ndrats baserat p en omrkning enligt 11
In any case, given the way the matrix behind the requirement is built, it is unlikely that the computation of the requirements based on ESA2010 would have led to changes. 
Med tanke p hur den matris som ligger till grund fr kraven r uppbyggd r det i alla hndelser osannolikt att berkningen av kraven utifrn ENS 2010 skulle ha frndrat ngot.
There is no inconsistency in indicators or measurements made across years. 
Det finns inga inkonsekvenser hos indikatorerna eller i mtningarna mellan ren.
For instance, when the fiscal effort for 2014 was assessed using ESA 2010, the figures for both 2014 and 2015 are calculated under ESA 2010. 
Om den finanspolitiska insatsen fr 2014 bedmdes med ENS 2010, berknas till exempel siffrorna fr bde 2014 och 2015 enligt ENS 2010.
The Commission considers that the scenario presented by the ECA is only illustrative, as it is naturally difficult to extrapolate future outcomes for individual Member States based on the aggregate impact of a historical recession on the euro area. 
Kommissionen anser att det scenario som revisionsrtten presenterar endast r illustrativt, eftersom det naturligtvis r svrt att extrapolera framtida utfall fr enskilda medlemsstater baserat p den aggregerade effekten av en historisk recession i euroomrdet.
As per reply to paragraph 66, the simulations are somewhat speculative, relating to a hypothetical case that has not occurred in practice and also do not take into account the possible impact of the country-specific minimum benchmarks, which would not allow the granting of the structural reform and investment clauses in many Member States. 
I likhet med svaret p punkt 66 r simuleringarna ngot spekulativa eftersom de rr ett hypotetiskt fall som inte har intrffat i praktiken. Dessutom beaktas inte de mjliga effekterna av de landsspecifika minimiriktmrkena, vilka skulle medfra att mnga medlemsstater inte skulle beviljas strukturreforms-och investeringsklausulerna.
In the Commission’s view, the ECA’s observation does not present a complete picture. 
Enligt kommissionens sikt ger revisionsrttens iakttagelse inte en komplett bild.
Firstly, at a general level, when designing both the matrix and the allowances under the flexibility clauses, the Commission conducted extensive analysis. 
Fr det frsta, och generellt, genomfrde kommissionen en omfattande analys nr den utformade bde matrisen och undantagen enligt flexibilitetsklausulen.
In the former case, this included examining the historical distribution of output gaps. 
I det frstnmnda fallet underskte kommissionen den historiska frdelningen av produktionsgap.
In the latter case, the Commission provided Member States with a number of illustrative simulated scenarios for the design of the flexibility allowances, based on the benchmark adjustment of 0.5% of GDP being implemented (thus assuming no use of the 0.25% of GDP deviation margin). 
I det sistnmnda fallet frsg kommissionen medlemsstaterna med ett antal belysande simulerade scenarier fr utformningen av flexibilitetsundantagen, som baserades p antagandet att anpassningen av riktmrket p 0,5 % av BNP genomfrdes (vilket i sin tur frutstter att avvikelsemarginalen p 0,25 % av BNP inte anvnds).
A number of these illustrative simulations are published in an annex to the Vade mecum. 
Ett antal av dessa belysande simuleringar finns med i en bilaga till Vade mecum.
Secondly, in assessing individual Member States' applications for the flexibility clauses, the Commission assesses their distance to the MTO to ensure that it is reachable by the end of the programme period, assuming the benchmark annual adjustment. 
Nr kommissionen granskar medlemsstaternas anskningar om flexibilitetsklausulerna bedmer den fr det andra deras avstnd till det medelfristiga budgetmlet fr att frskra sig om att det r mjligt att n till slutet av programperioden, med hnsyn till den rliga anpassningen av riktmrket.
See replies to paragraphs 66, 67 and 69. 
Se svaren p punkterna 66, 67 och 69.
It should be noted that the Commission has consistently flagged this issue of revisions to SB projections through dedicated charts in its assessment of the Stability and Convergence Programmes. 
Det br noteras att kommissionen konsekvent har lyft fram frgan om revideringar av prognoserna fr strukturella saldon genom srskilda diagram i sin bedmning av stabilitets-och konvergensprogrammen.
While the Commission is not given the power to enforce such targets for convergence to the MTO, the Commission does analyse and comment on Member States’ revisions to their expected date of achievement of the MTO, as can be seen in the Staff Working Documents and DBP assessments published in each surveillance round. 
Kommissionen har inte befogenhet att driva igenom sdana konvergensml gentemot de medelfristiga budgetmlen, men analyserar och kommenterar medlemsstaternas revideringar av de frvntade datumen fr uppfyllande av de medelfristiga budgetmlen, vilket framgr av arbetsdokumenten frn kommissionens avdelningar och de bedmningar av utkasten till budgetplaner som offentliggrs under varje vervakningsrunda.
The Commission thus holds the Member States accountable, but cannot take procedural steps under the current legal framework. 
Kommissionen hller sledes medlemsstaterna ansvariga, men kan enligt den gllande rttsliga ramen inte vidta frfarandemssiga tgrder.
It is unclear how the matrix could be designed in such a way as to ensure ex ante that all Member States, regardless of the distance to the MTO will reach it in the fourth year of the programme, given that the projections for where the structural balance will be after three years are almost certainly likely to be wrong (this is the unavoidable nature of macroeconomic forecasting). 
Det r oklart hur matrisen skulle kunna utformas p ett stt som gr att alla medlemsstater, oavsett var de befinner sig i frhllande till det medelfristiga budgetmlet, skulle uppn det under det fjrde ret av programperioden, med tanke p att prognoserna fr de strukturella saldona efter tre r med strsta sannolikhet skulle vara felaktiga (det r en oundviklig aspekt av makroekonomiska prognoser).
In addition, if a Member State was very far from MTO at the time of the programme, this could imply very large fiscal adjustments in order to try and close the gap in the four year period. 
Om en medlemsstat dessutom befinner sig mycket lngt frn sitt medelfristiga budgetml vid tidpunkten fr programmet kan detta leda till mycket stora finanspolitiska korrigeringar fr att frska tcka luckan under fyrarsperioden.
This could prove counter-productive. 
Detta kan visa sig vara kontraproduktivt.
The Commission and the Member States have through extensive discussions developed a common agreement to establish the level of detail necessary to implement every aspect of the SGP framework, such as establishing the Commonly Agreed Position on Flexibility. 
Kommissionen och medlemsstaterna har frt omfattande diskussioner och har enats om en gemensam verenskommelse fr att faststlla den detaljniv som krvs fr att genomfra varje aspekt av ramen fr stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten. Ett exempel p det r den gemensamt verenskomna stndpunkten om flexibilitet.
The purpose of such work is not to weaken SGP framework, but rather to make broad objectives of the Regulation operational. 
Syftet med detta r att inte frsvaga ramen, utan snarare att stta upp breda ml enligt den gllande frordningen.
This observation is not relevant for assessment of performance of the preventive arm of SGP. 
Denna iakttagelse r inte relevant fr bedmningen av hur den frebyggande delen av stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten har fungerat.
The analysed sample includes the structural and primary balance dynamics of Member States which were in the Excessive Deficit Procedure during the analysed period (i.e. Spain and France from 2009 onwards), but the corrective arm has a separate set of rules. 
Det analyserade exemplet rr dynamiken hos strukturella saldon och primra strukturella saldon hos medlemsstater som omfattades av frfarandet vid alltfr stora verskott under den analyserade perioden (dvs. Spanien och Frankrike frn 2009 och framt), men den korrigerande delen har egna regler.
The Commission recalls that the ECA has published a separate special report in 2016 on ‘Further improvements needed to ensure effective implementation of the excessive deficit procedure’, where the Commission provided its formal replies. https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR16_10/SR_EDP_EN.pdf 78. 
Kommissionen pminner om att revisionsrtten offentliggjorde en separat srskild rapport 2016, Ytterligare frbttringar krvs fr att garantera att tillmpningen av frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott r ndamlsenlig, dr kommissionen lmnade sina formella svar. https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR16_10/SR_EDP_SV.pdf 78.
The Commission considers that the progress towards achieving MTO has continued in recent years, albeit at a less pronounced scale as in the in the initial recovery stage when twelve Member States exited EDP. 
Kommissionen anser att framstegen mot att uppn de medelfristiga budgetmlen har fortsatt under senare r, dock i en mindre uttalad grad jmfrt med i brjan av terhmtningen, d tolv medlemsstater avslutade frfarandet vid alltfr stora verskott.
The Commission considers that the estimates of structural balances of 2014 and 2018 are not fully comparable to make a judgement on the rate of progress in structural balance for Members States not at their MTO between 2014 and 2018. 
Kommissionen anser att uppskattningarna av de strukturella saldona fr 2014 och 2018 inte r helt jmfrbara fr att det ska vara mjligt att bedma framstegen nr det gller de strukturella saldona fr medlemsstater som inte hade uppntt sitt medelfristiga budgetml mellan 2014 och 2018.
2014 estimates of structural balances are based on historical data and incorporates actual fiscal measures taken in 2014. 
Uppskattningarna av de strukturella saldona 2014 grundas p historiska uppgifter och omfattar de finanspolitiska tgrder som faktiskt vidtogs under 2014.
The Commission considers that its positions on the euro area fiscal stance are balanced to reflect the fiscal position of each Member State. 
Kommissionen anser att dess stndpunkter om euroomrdets finanspolitiska inriktning r balanserade fr att avspegla varje medlemsstats finanspolitiska stllning.
The Member States not at MTO are expected to take fiscal measures to comply with the SGP, while some Member States above the MTO are suggested to use fiscal space available to them to support economic growth. This is evidenced in the Commission’s 12 
De medlemsstater som inte befinner sig vid sitt medelfristiga budgetml frvntas vidta finanspolitiska tgrder fr att uppfylla stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten, medan de medlemsstater som ligger ver sitt medelfristiga budgetml rekommenderas att anvnda det tillgngliga finanspolitiska utrymmet fr att stdja ekonomisk tillvxt.
2016 Communication “Towards a Positive Fiscal Stance for the Euro Area” which specifically states “Member States in the Excessive Deficit Procedure and others still needing to progress towards their medium-term budgetary objective should continue to do so, as recommended to them.” 
Detta framgr av kommissionens meddelande Mot en positiv finanspolitisk inriktning i euroomrdet frn 2016, dr det uttryckligen anges att Ómedlemsstater som omfattas av frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott, och andra medlemsstater som fortfarande mste uppn sitt medelfristiga budgetml, br fortstta p denna vg i enlighet med rekommendationernaÓ.
The Commission stresses that the outturn data for 2017, on which the final assessment of compliance is based, show significant improvement in Member States’ performance, with the number of compliant countries quadrupling compared to the initial projections based on the Spring Forecast 2017. 
Kommissionen betonar att utfallssiffrorna fr 2017, som den slutliga efterlevnadsbedmningen grundas p, visar p betydande frbttringar av medlemsstaternas resultat. Antalet medlemsstater som fljer matrisen har i sjlva verket fyrdubblats jmfrt med de ursprungliga uppskattningarna baserat p vrprognosen 2017.
In addition, the aggregate numbers mask important differences in individual Member States’ fiscal positions relative to the MTO. 
De aggregerade siffrorna dljer dessutom stora skillnader i enskilda medlemsstaters finanspolitiska stllning i frhllande till de medelfristiga budgetmlen.
Finally, the sample of Member States excludes the high-performing Member States, i.e. those that are at the MTO. 
Slutligen har de medlemsstater som gjort bst ifrn sig, dvs. de som befinner sig vid sitt medelfristiga budgetml, utelmnats frn urvalet.
As Member States who have achieved their MTO are also compliant with the provisions of the preventive arm, this gives a more accurate picture of overall compliance across all countries. 
Eftersom medlemsstater som har uppntt sina medelfristiga budgetml ocks fljer den frebyggande delens bestmmelser, ger detta en mer korrekt bild av den vergripande efterlevnaden fr samtliga lnder.
The fiscal performance of the Member States under the corrective arm of the SGP does not provide an accurate assessment of performance of the preventive arm of the SGP, since these two SGP arms have separate sets of rules. 
Medlemsstaternas finanspolitiska resultat inom stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens korrigerande del ger inte en korrekt bedmning av deras resultat inom paktens frebyggande del, eftersom paktens tv delar har separata regler.
See reply to paragraph 77 regarding ECA report on Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
Se svaret p punkt 77 vad gller revisionsrttens rapport om frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott.
The corrective arm of the SGP is governed by a separate Regulation to the preventive arm. 
Stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens korrigerande del regleras av en annan frordning n frordningen om den frebyggande delen.
The inherently nominal nature of the corrective arm of the SGP, with its focus on the 3% of GDP threshold contained in the Treaty, means that although the Commission seeks structural adjustment from the Member States under the EDP recommendations, the Commission is not in a position to step up the procedure once the Member State meets the headline targets. 
Den inneboende nominella karaktren hos paktens korrigerande del, som inriktas p grnsen p 3 % av BNP enligt frdraget, innebr att ven om kommissionen vill f medlemsstaterna att gra strukturella anpassningar enligt rekommendationerna i frfarandet vid alltfr stora verskott, kan den inte snabba p frfarandet nr medlemsstaten vl uppnr de totala mlen.
The Commission gave justification for the extensions of deadlines for exiting the excessive deficit procedure in particular cases in its reply to the special report of the ECA of 2016 on ‘Further improvements needed to ensure effective implementation of the excessive deficit procedure’. https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR16_10/SR_EDP_EN.pdf 85. 
Kommissionen motiverade frlngningarna av tidsfristerna fr att avsluta frfarandet vid alltfr stora verskott i vissa specifika fall i sina svar p revisionsrttens srskilda rapport frn 2016, Ytterligare frbttringar krvs fr att garantera att tillmpningen av frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott r ndamlsenlig. https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR16_10/SR_EDP_SV.pdf 85.
The corrective arm makes it possible for Member States to follow a strategy of only achieving the headline targets on the back of improving macroeconomic conditions without delivering the required fiscal effort. 
Den korrigerande delen gr det mjligt fr medlemsstaterna att flja en strategi som gr ut p att endast uppfylla de totala mlen genom att frbttra de makroekonomiska frhllandena, men utan att gra de ndvndiga finanspolitiska insatserna.
It is to be noted that the Commission and Council in the EDP recommendations prescribe fiscal efforts that are consistent with those of the preventive arm in structural terms. 
Det br noteras att kommissionen och rdet i sina rekommendationer inom ramen fr frfarandet fr alltfr stora underskott freskriver finanspolitiska insatser som verensstmmer med de finanspolitiska insatser i strukturella termer som krvs enligt den frebyggande delen.
However, it is not possible to instigate procedural measures if the Member State meets their headline targets. 
Det r dock inte mjligt att vidta frfarandemssiga tgrder om medlemsstaterna uppfyller sina totala ml.
The overriding nature of the corrective arm is nominal as it is based upon the 3% of GDP headline deficit threshold contained in the Treaty. 
Den korrigerande delen har en nominell inriktning och baseras p att det samlade underskottet inte ska verskrida 3 % av BNP enligt frdraget.
The Commission considers that averaging efforts from the corrective and preventive arm does not therefore accurately reflect the requirement effectively binding on Member States. 
Kommissionen anser att ett genomsnitt av insatserna inom den korrigerande och den frebyggande delen inte avspeglar det krav som faktiskt r bindande fr medlemsstaterna.
The most recent data indicate a significant improvement in Portugal’s structural balance in recent years, with an improvement of 2% of GDP recorded between 2013 and 2017, leaving it 1.4% of GDP from the MTO. 
De senaste uppgifterna visar p en betydande frbttring av Portugals strukturella saldo under de senaste ren, med en frbttring p 2 % av BNP mellan 2013 och 2017, vilket innebr att Portugal ligger p 1,4 % av BNP frn det medelfristiga mlet.
France and Spain were under the corrective arm for almost all of the period in question, meaning that the matrix requirements were of no procedural consequence. 
Frankrike och Spanien omfattades av den korrigerande delen under nstan hela den ifrgavarande perioden, vilket innebr att matriskraven inte fick ngra frfarandemssiga konsekvenser.
The Commission considers that the adjustment speed under the corrective arm does not inform about the effectiveness of the preventive arm of the SGP, since it is guided by a different set of tools. 
Kommissionen anser att anpassningstakten inom den korrigerande delen inte visar hur ndamlsenlig stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens frebyggande del r, eftersom den styrs av en annan verktygsuppsttning.
See reply to paragraph 83 regarding the extension of EDP deadlines. 13 
Se svaret p punkt 83 nr det gller frlngningar av tidsfristerna fr frfarandet vid alltfr stora verskott.
Estonia’s structural balance weakening in 2017 has not breached the requirements of the preventive arm. 
Att Estlands strukturella saldo frsvagades 2017 innebr inte att landet inte har uppfyllt den frebyggande delens krav.
The Commission considers that its use of flexibility, including the margin of appreciation, has been proportionate, appropriate and economically justified. 
Kommissionen anser att den har anvnt flexibiliteten, inbegripet marginalen fr uppskattningar, p ett proportionellt, lmpligt och ekonomiskt motiverat stt.
It was only relatively recently that the unusual features of the recovery of the European economy argued for caution in applying fiscal consolidation. 
Det var frst helt nyligen som ovanliga inslag i den europeiska ekonomins terhmtning motiverade frsiktighet i den finanspolitiska konsolideringen.
In particular, the lack of inflationary pressures, large current account surplus for the euro area and persistently high levels of unemployment in some Member States pointed to the continuing degree of slack in the economy. 
I synnerhet bristen p inflationstryck, det stora bytesbalansverskottet i euroomrdet och den ihllande hga arbetslsheten i ngra medlemsstater visade p en fortsatt trghet i ekonomin.
Given these concerns, along with a rise in geo-political uncertainty, the Commission believed that a prudent application of the fiscal rules would seek to ensure that overly large fiscal adjustments did not endanger what was a still fragile recovery in many Member States. 
Med tanke p dessa problem, tillsammans med den kade geopolitiska oskerheten, ansg kommissionen att en frsiktig tillmpning av de finanspolitiska reglerna var den lmpliga lsningen fr att se till att alltfr stora finanspolitiska justeringar inte ventyrade den fortfarande brckliga tillvxten i mnga medlemsstater.