natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It is to be hoped that this pilot exercise will enable the Commission to extend the process of devolution of authority and responsibility to Delegations. 
Frhoppningsvis kommer pilotprogrammet att ge kommissionen mjlighet att utvidga processen, som innebr att ansvar och befogenheter verlts till delegationerna.
Strategy and planning 43. 
Strategi och planering 43.
The CommissionŐs strategy for the assistance to Palestinian society is set out in: (1) Palestinian Development Fund (PDF), Centre for Private Enterprise Development(CPED). 
Kommissionens strategi fr std till Palestina fastsls i (1) Palestinska utvecklingsfonden, Centrum fr utveckling av privata fretag.
(2) PHC, technical assistance for customs administration (PLE/97/11). 
(2) PHC, tekniskt bistnd till tullmyndigheten (PLE/97/11).
31.1.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 32/11 (a) Country Strategy Papers (CSP), which state the general long-term strategy; (b) triennial National Indicative Programmes (NIP), which formulate the mid-term sectoral strategies; (c) annual financing plans, in which projects to be funded are identified. 
31.1.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 32/11 a) landsvisa strategiska dokument (Country Strategy Papers, CSP), ivilkadenlngsiktigastrateginfaststlls, b) treriga nationella vgledande program (NVP), i vilka den sek-torsvisastrateginformuleraspmedellngsikt,och c) rliga finansieringsplaner, i vilka projekt som skall finansieras identifieras.
This strategy is developed within the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and of the Palestinian Development Plan, prepared by the PA with the support of the World Bank, and which constitutes the basis of the international donor communityŐs strategy. 
Denna strategi utvecklas inom ramen fr EuropaĐMedelhavspartnerskapet och palestinska utvecklingsprogrammet som utarbetats av PA med std av Vrldsbanken och som utgr basen fr den internationella givargemenskapens strategi.
In the 1996-1998 NIP no performance indicators or quantified objectives were set out, with a view to assessing the degree of progress made in the implementation of EU cooperation policy towards Palestinian society. 
I de nationella vgledande programmen 1996Đ1998, angavs inga resultatindikatorer och inga kvantifierade ml stlldes upp i avsiktattbedmaivilkengradmanframgngsriktgenomfrt EU:s samarbetspolitik fr Palestina.
Although there was a description of past assistance, both the NIP and its update, relating to 1997-1999, lacked an assessment of the lessons learnt from previous experiences, which should be taken into account in the context of the planned activities. 
Fastn det fanns en beskrivning av det bistnd som lmnats tidigare, saknades det, bde fr det nationella vgledande programmet och dess uppdaterade efterfljare fr ren 1997Đ1999, en utvrdering av den lrdom som dragits av tidigare erfarenheter som man borde ta hnsyn till i samband med de planerade tgrderna.
Moreover, the issue of coordination with the strategies of other donors was not addressed (1). 
Dessutom tog man inte upp problemet med samordning med andra bistndsgivares strategier (1).
For these documents, compared to the past, the consultation procedure with the Member States, which takes place notably at the Med-Committee level, has been set out in more detail in order to take their observations better into account. 
I dessa dokument har den rdgivande processen med medlemsstaterna, som framfr allt ger rum p Med-kommitt-niv, faststllts mer detaljerat n tidigare fr att man bttre skall kunna ta hnsyn till deras sikter.
The PAŐs institution building capacity is a key priority of the programme. 
PA:s frmga att bygga upp myndigheter r det som prioriteras hgst i programmet.
The Court, while acknowledging the support recently given by the Commission to the preparation of the abovementioned report ÔStrengthening Palestinian Public InstitutionsŐ, notes that up to now the Commission has started projects in this field, but achieved few concrete results. 
Revisionsrtten, som visserligen medger att kommissionen nyligen bidragit med std vid frfattandet av ovannmnda rapport om frstrkning av Palestinas offentliga institutioner, noterar att kommissionen hittills har pbrjat projekt inom detta omrde, men uppntt f konkreta resultat.
Most results have been in the form of the supply of equipment to the Palestinian institutions, whereas little progress has been made on the more substantial issue of upgrading the structures, systems and administrative capacities of the Palestinian institutions. 
De flesta resultaten har gllt leveranser av utrustning till de palestinska institutionerna, men sm framsteg har gjorts nr det gller den viktigare frgan om att uppgradera strukturer, system och administrativ kapacitet vid de palestinska institutionerna.
In this respect, the failure of the project OT/96/03 to provide technical assistance to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) was particularly serious (see paragraphs 77-79) . 
I detta avseende var det srskilt allvarligt med misslyckandet inom projekt OT/96/03 att tillhandahlla tekniskt std till det palestinska lagstiftande rdet (PLC) (se punkterna 77Đ79).
The Commission has not yet been able to set up a pipeline of projects, to be identified, prepared, approved and launched in a continuous process. 
Kommissionen har nnu inte kunnat ta fram en kedja av projekt p olika stadier som skall identifieras, frberedas, godknnas och igngsttas i en kontinuerlig process.
Instead, many projects are prepared and decided under pressure, in order to commit the large volume of budgetary funds available annually. 
I stllet frbereds och godknns mnga projekt under pressande frhllanden, eftersom man vill gra taganden fr de stora mngder budgetmedel som finns tillgngliga fr ret.
Most of the decisions and commitments for projects are actually made at the end of the financial year. 
De flesta beslut om och taganden fr projekt grs faktiskt vid slutet av budgetret.
Project preparation: taking into account risks, constraints and procedural implications 48. 
Projektfrberedelser: att ta hnsyn till risker, restriktioner och procedurmssiga fljder 48.
Preparation was inadequate for some projects decided in the early 1990s (2); this was partly due to the fact that, at that time, the PA did not yet exist, ECRO had not yet been established and the programme had to be managed from Brussels. 
Frberedelserna var otillrckliga fr vissa projekt som godkndes i brjan av 1990-talet (2), vilket delvis berodde p att PA vid den tidpunkten nnu inte existerade, p att ECRO inte hade upprttats och p att programmet mste administreras frn Bryssel.
However, inadequate preparation has also been observed for more recent projects (3). 
Emellertid har frberedelserna varit otillrckliga ven vid nyare projekt (3).
A significant reason for this is the pressure on the Commission to commit all available funds by the end of the year (see paragraph 47). 
En viktig orsak till detta r den press som stts p kommissionen fr att gra taganden fr alla tillgngliga medel vidretsslut(sepunkt47).
In particular, the technical unit responsible for implementation should be closely associated with project preparation; currently, this is often not the case. 
Framfr allt mste den tekniska enhet som ansvarar fr genomfrandet delta i projektfrberedelserna p nra hll, men fr nrvarande frekommer detta sllan.
The creation of the SCR and the splitting of the project cycle have exacerbated this unsatisfactory situation. 
Upprttandet av SCR och uppdelningen av projektcykeln har frvrrat den otillfredsstllande situationen.
In 1999, some financing proposals, for a total of 9,5 million euro of EU financing, were presented to the Med-Committee, for the Member States representativesŐ consideration, before all the Commission units involved were agreed; as a result, these proposals required further work, after the positive opinion from the Committee, but before the CommissionŐs decision (4). 
Finansieringsfrslag p totalt 9,5 miljoner euro frn EU lades 1999 fram fr Med-kommittn s att medlemsstaternas representanter kunde beakta dem, innan alla berrda enheter vid kommissionen hade samtyckt.
At the operational level of the projects the coordination mechanisms do not work as effectively as they should to take account of the intense donor activity and the huge influx of funds. 
P projektens operativa niv fungerar samordningsmekanismerna inte s effektivt som de borde fr att ta hnsyn till bistndsgivarnas intensiva aktivitet och det enormt stora infldet av medel.
The audit has shown cases where, since the aid pledged by the Commission for a certain action did not come with the expected rapidity, the Palestinian authorities turned to other donors to obtain the funding. 
Granskningen har visat p fall dr de palestinska myndigheterna vnt sig till andra bistndsgivare, eftersom det bistnd som kommissionen utlovat fr en srskild tgrd inte blev verklighet s snabbt som frvntat.
The CommissionŐs preparation has thus been done in vain, which implies a waste of its resources (see paragraphs 77-79, 81, 82). 
Kommissionens frberedelsearbete hade sledes gjorts frgves, vilket innebr ett slseri med resurser (se punkterna 77Đ79, 81, 82).
In general, the logical framework analyses annexed to the Financing Proposals examined lack a thorough risk/constraint assessment. 
I allmnhet saknas det en noggrann bedmning av risker och restriktioner i de logiska strukturanalyser som bifogas finansieringsfrslagen.
For some of the projects examined (5), specific procedural implications and constraints on the ground were not taken into account, with the consequence that subsequently implementation was blocked or delayed; this in turn has contributed to reducing disbursements. 
I vissa av de granskade projekten (5) togs ingen hnsyn till specifika procedurfrgor och restriktioner p fltet, vilket ledde till att genomfrandet i ett senare skede blockerades eller frsenades och detta har i sin tur bidragit till att utbetalningarna blivit mindre.
(2) European Gaza Hospital, PHC. 
(2) Europeiska sjukhuset i Gaza, PHC.
(3) Cargo-handling facility (PLE/99/0217), social rehabilitation pro-4 gramme for Palestinian ex-detainees (PLE/99/02). () Gaza solid waste consolidation (PLE/99/01), primary health care (PLE/ 99/0215), social rehabilitation programme for Palestinian ex-detainees 5 (PLE/99/02). () CPED, MSP I-II, counter-terrorist assistance to the PA. 
(3) Enheten fr lasthantering (PLE/99/0217), socialt rehabiliteringspro-4 gram fr palestinier som tidigare varit hktade (PLE/99/02). () Press fr fast avfall i Gaza (PLE/99/01), primr hlsovrd (PLE/99/ 0215), socialt rehabiliteringsprogram fr palestinier som tidigare varit 5 hktade (PLE/99/02). () CPED, MSP I-II, anti-terroriststd till PA.
C 32/12 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.1.2001 52. 
C 32/12 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 31.1.2001 52.
For both the ninth and 10th Conventions with UNRWA, the Commission was late in concluding the negotiations, with the result that fund transfers to UNRWA were significantly delayed (1). 
Bde vid den nionde och tionde verenskommelsen med UNRWA var kommissionen sen med att avsluta frhandlingarna, vilket ledde till att verfringen av medel till UNRWA frsenades ptagligt (1).
In the case of the 10th Convention, a significant reason for the delay was an internal debate within the Commission about the extent to which the ECŐs contribution to UNRWAŐs General Fund should be specifically earmarked to identified items. 
Nr det gller den tionde verenskommelsen var en viktig anledning till frseningen en intern diskussion i kommissionen om i vilken omfattning EG:s bidrag till UNRWA:s allmnna fond skulle ronmrkas srskilt fr identifierade utgiftsposter.
As earmarking a contribution to the General Fund would be neither appropriate nor feasible, the debate was purely academic and time-consuming. 
Eftersom det varken var lmpligt eller ens mjligt att ronmrka ett bidrag till den allmnna fonden, var diskussionen endast teoretisk och tidsdande.
Contrary to the final decision not to earmark, the text of the Convention in a number of articles allows earmarking, in particular on the CommissionŐs reporting requirements. 
I motsats till det slutliga beslutet om att inte gra ngon ronmrkning, tillter konventionstexten i flera paragrafer sdan ronmrkning, det gller srskilt dem som avser kommissionens rapporteringskrav.
UNRWA reports on specified parts of its programmes which happen, incidentally, to amount to approximately the amount of the CommissionŐs contribution. 
UNRWA rapporterar om srskilda delar av sina program, som av en hndelse rkar uppg till ungefr det belopp som kommissionen bidragit med.
This reporting is, however, purely notional as the CommissionŐs funds are co-mingled with all other donorsŐ contributions to the General Fund (2). 
Denna rapportering r emellertid endast symbolisk, eftersom kommissionens medel blandas med alla andra bistndsgivares bidrag till den allmnna fonden (2).
In the case of the Local Rural Development Programme (LRDP), the Commission insisted on separate reporting by UNDP, which is the implementing agency. 
Nr det gller det lokala programmet fr landsbygdens utveckling insisterade kommissionen p att FN:s utvecklingsprogram UNDP, som r det organ som skter genomfrandet, skulle rapportera programmet separat.
This requires UNDP to create special management information and accounting systems. 
Detta krver att UNDP mste skapa srskilda system fr frvaltningsinformation och bokfring.
At the end of 1999, the UNDP office in Jerusalem was still unsure of the form this information should be presented in. 
Vid slutet av 1999 var man vid UNDP:s kontor i Jerusalem fortfarande osker p i vilken form denna information skulle lggas fram.
As the EU contribution is by far the largest part of the project financing, it would be preferable for the Commission, together with UNDP, to have definedonesinglemanagementreporting,monitoringandcon-trolsystemforthewholeprogramme. 
Eftersom EU bidrar med den i srklass strsta delen av projektets finansiering, hade det varit bttre om kommissionen tillsammans med UNDP hade definierat ett enda system fr fr-valtningsrapportering, vervakning och kontroll fr hela programmet.
Performance indicators 54. 
Resultatindikatorer 54.
Performance indicators are necessary to enable assessments to be made of whether or not the objectives of programmes are being met, results are being achieved, and whether the Commission services are performing adequately. 
Resultatindikatorer behvs fr att man skall kunna bedma om programmets ml uppns, om frvntade resultat uppns och om kommissionens avdelningar arbetar p ett tillfredsstllande stt.
In the context of a programme where external constraints as described above can disrupt significantly the implementation of the programme, it is important for the Commission to identify some indicators that refertothosepartsforwhichithasdirectresponsibility.Itisonly in this way that it can separate out its own performance and determine whether it is performing as well as it should, notwith-standingwhathappensinthoseareasoverwhichithasnodirect control. 
Nr det gller program, dr sdana yttre omstndigheter som beskrivits ovan, i hg grad kan stra genomfrandet av programmet, r det viktigt fr kommissionen att identifiera ngra indikatorer som avser sdana delar som den sjlv har direkt ansvar fr. Endast p detta stt kan man skilja ut det resultat som beror p den egna arbetsinsatsen och faststlla om den r s bra som den borde vara, oavsett vad som hnder p de omrden ver vilka kommissionen inte har ngon direkt kontroll.
The Commission has not, however, identified any such indicators against which its own performance 1 () For example, the first transfer for 1999 under the 1999-2001 Convention was not made until the end of October 1999. 
Kommissionen har emellertid inte identifierat ngra sdana indikatorer mot vilka dess eget resultat vad gller frvaltningen av program (1) Den frsta verfringen fr 1999 under verenskommelsen 1999Đ2001 gjordes t.ex. inte frrn i slutet av oktober 1999.
As the Commission is a major donor to UNRWA, and as UNRWA is chronically 2 short of funds, such delays cause difficulty to UNRWA. () On the issue of earmarking, see also the CourtŐs Special Reports No 2/97 on humanitarian aid (OJ C 143, 12.5.1997, p. 
Efter-somkommissionenrenavUNRWA:sstrstabidragsgivareoch UNRWA alltid har ont om medel frsvrar sdana frseningar 2 UNRWA:s arbete. () Betrffande ronmrkning se ocks revisionsrttens srskilda rapport nr 2/97 om humanitrt bistnd (EGT C 143, 12.5.1997, s.
1), and No 5/98 on reconstruction in former Yugoslavia (OJ C 241, 31.7.1998, p. 
1), och nr 5/98 om teruppbyggnaden av f.d. Jugoslavien (EGT C 241, 31.7.1998, s.
In such circumstances, there can too easily be a tendency to consider that it is the external constraints within which the Commission has to try to implement the programme that are the main reasons for all failures of implementation. 
Under sdana omstndigheter kan det ltt uppst tendenser till att anse att de yttre omstndigheter under vilka kommissionen mste frska genomfra programmet, r huvudorsaken till alla misslyckanden med genomfrandet.
For example, the CommissionŐs report on the lack of progress with the implementation of the programme (3) highlights a number of constraints affecting the programme, but makes virtually no reference to shortcomings in its own management. 
I kommissionens rapport (3) framgr det att endast f framsteg gjorts med genomfrandet av programmet och man pekar p flera omstndigheter som pverkat programmet, men det grs praktiskt taget inga hnvisningar till brister i kommissionens egen frvaltning.
Project implementation Timing of action and responsiveness 56. 
Genomfrandet av projekt Val av tidpunkt fr handling och reaktion 56.
The Palestinian situation, for the reasons explained above, requires quick action and the ability to respond effectively to changing circumstances. 
Av de anledningar som tagits upp tidigare krver den palestinska situationen att man handlar snabbt och att man kan reagera effektivt vid ndrade frhllanden.
However, as described in paragraphs 57-59 and 66-83, project implementation has often been marked by long delays caused by cumbersome procedures within the Commission, or by management deficiencies. 
Projektgenomfrandet har emellertid ofta knnetecknats av lnga frseningar som orsakats av tungrodda frfaranden inom kommissionen eller av brister i frvaltningen ssom framgr av punkterna 57Đ59 och 66Đ83.
For some of the projects examined (4), the services in charge of implementation have taken action without proper consideration of the practical consequences of their decisions; procedural arguments have also hindered implementation. 
I ngra av de granskade projekten (4) har de avdelningar som varit ansvariga fr genomfrandet handlat utan vederbrlig hnsyn till de praktiska fljderna av sina beslut.
Publicprocurement 57. 
Offentlig upphandling 57.
The majority of the projects examined have experienced delays and blockages in the various procedures related to the preparation and implementation of invitations to tender for tech-nicalassistance(5)andforequipment(6).Thishadanegative impact on project activities and results and contributed to reducing disbursements. 
De flesta granskade projekten har drabbats av frseningar och blockeringar i samband med olika frfaranden fr att frbereda och genomfra anbudsinfordringar fr tekniskt bistnd (5) och fr utrustning (6). Detta hade en negativ effekt p projektets tgrder och resultat och bidrog till att minska utbetalningarna.
The Commission services consider that a tendering procedure should on average take six to nine months. 
Kommissionens avdelningar anser att ett anbudsfrfarande i genomsnitt br ta sex till nio mnader.
For two of the projects audited, extensions of the Financing Agreements became necessary only because of delays in procedures related to invitations to tender (7). 
I tv av de granskade projekten blev det ndvndigt att frlnga finansieringsverenskommelsen endast drfr att frfarandena i samband med anbudsinfordran frsenats (7).
The delays have often been caused by communication and coordination difficulties between ECRO and the central services, (3) Justification for the transfer of appropriation No 53A/99 (1999 Noten-4 boom procedure), SEC(1999) 1608 final, p. 
Frseningarna har ofta orsakats av kommunikations-och samordningssvrigheter mellan ECRO och de centrala avdelningarna samt mellan olika avdelningar i Bryssel. I vissa av de (3) Motivering fr anslagsverfring nr 53A/99 (1999 rs Notenboom-4 frfarande), SEK(1999) 1608 slutlig, s.
26. () European Gaza Hospital, CPED, technical assistance to the PLC, insti-5 tutional capacity building, counter-terrorist assistance to the PA. () School construction, MSP III, technical assistance to the PLC, PHC, 6 European Gaza Hospital. () MSP I-II, university equipment, institutional capacity building, school 7 construction. () MSP I-II, university equipment. 
26. ()EuropeiskasjukhusetiGaza,CPED,teknisktbistndtillPLC,upp-5 byggnad av myndigheter, anti-terroristbistnd till PA. () Byggande av skolor, MSP III, tekniskt bistnd till PLC, PHC, Europe-6 iska sjukhuset i Gaza. () MSP I-II, universitetsutrustning, uppbyggnad av myndigheter, bygg-7 ande av skolor. () MSP I-II, universitetsutrustning.
31.1.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 32/13 and between different services in Brussels. In some of the cases examined, the Commission services did not take action for months; the relevant files did not provide any information about the reasons (1). 
31.1.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 32/13 granskade fallen vidtog kommissionens avdelningar inga tgrder p flera mnader. I akterna fr fallen i frga fanns ingen information om anledningarna till detta (1). vervakning och rapportering 60.
The geographical desk at the RELEX DG (formerly DG I. B) should be the focal point for coordination and the flow of information on the programme between the different Commission services involved. 
Det geografiska kontoret vid Generaldirektoratet fr yttre frbindelser (tidigare GD I B) skulle st i centrum fr samordningen och informationsfldet betrffande programmet mellan olika berrda kommissionsavdelningar.
In the current state of the information systems, it is only possible to compile a complete list by examining the accounting records for each budget heading manually and extracting the individual transactions. 
Som informationssystemen ser ut nu, kan man endast f fram en fullstndig frteckning om man gr igenom bokfringen fr varje budgetrubrik manuellt och letar fram de enskilda transaktionerna.
Since ECRO only has a list of the projects financed under the three main budget headings, but no complete list of the projects funded under all the budget headings, it has no means of monitoring the latter systematically, but only on a case by case basis. 
ECRO har ingen fullstndig frteckning ver projekt som finansieras under samtliga budgetrubriker, utan endast en frteckning ver projekt som finansieras under de tre huvudsakliga budgetrubrikerna. vervakningen kan drfr inte gras av samtliga projekt p ett systematiskt stt, utan endast projekt fr projekt.
Also, ECROandtheMEDAteamdonothaveup-to-dateinformation on the financial progress of projects, or online access to Sincom. 
ECRO och Meda-teamet har dessutom inte tillgng till uppdaterad information om hur projekten fortskrider ur ekonomisk synvinkel och inte heller till Sincom on-line.
In some cases the reporting provisions in the Financing Agreement were inadequate or unclear, resulting in delays in the payments, blockages and ineffectiveness in the implementing phase (3). 
I vissa fall var rapporteringsbestmmelserna i finansieringsverenskommelserna otillrckliga eller oklara, vilket ledde till frsenade betalningar, blockeringar och ineffektivitet under genom-frandefaserna (3).
Evaluation 64. 
Utvrdering 64.