natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It is the lower price generated by the initial sale and export which is transmitted by the Member States and used by the Commission. 
Det r detta lgre pris som betalas vid den ursprungliga frsljningen och exporten som medlemsstaterna frmedlar och som kommissionen anvnder.
This lower price does not reflect the market value of raw tobacco and therefore it can not be used to reflect the tobacco quality; (c) the prices used by the Commission in the comparison did not always reflect the total payments made by first processors to producers for their tobacco. 
Det lgre priset speglar inte marknadsvrdet p rtobak och kan drfr inte anvndas som ett mtt p tobakens kvalitet. c) De priser som kommissionen anvnde i sin jmfrelse terspeglade inte alltid de totala betalningar som gjordes av de fretag som utfr den frsta bearbetningen till producenterna fr deras tobak.
For example they did not include the additional amounts sometimes paid by first processors to growers or benefits in kind (which can account for up to 28 % of the price); (d) the Commission made errors in comparing import and export prices because the prices used for imports are on a CIF (cost insurance freight) basis whereas the export prices of EU tobacco are on a FOB (free on board) basis. 
Till exempel ingick inte de tillggsbelopp som de fretag som utfr den frsta bearbetningen ibland betalar till odlarna och inte heller naturafrmner (som kan utgra upp till 28 % av priset). d) Kommissionen begick ett misstag nr den jmfrde import-och exportpriser eftersom de priser som anvnds fr import grundar sig p cif (kostnad, frskring, frakt) medan exportpriserna p EU-tobak grundar sig p fob (fritt ombord).
The CommissionŐs advisory Committee (9) indicated that price was affected by factors other than quality such as movements in exchange rates, stock levels and major releases of stock onto the world market by non-EU producers. 
Kommissionens rdgivande kommitt (9) uppgav att priset pverkades av andra faktorer n kvalitet, till exempel frndringar i vxelkurser, lagerniver och strre frislppande av lager p vrldsmarknaden av producenter utanfr EU.
Moreover, it had advised the Commission that the absence of an objective quality grading system was an obstacle to implementing a policy which relied on measuring quality. 
Dessutom hade den ppekat fr kommissionen att avsaknaden av ett objektivt graderingssystem fr kvaliteten utgjorde ett hinder nr man infrde en politik som byggde p mtning av kvaliteten.
Because of these failings the CommissionŐs market analysis did not provide policy-makers with a sufficiently comprehensive and balanced understanding of the market to guide their selection of the market measures. 
P grund av dessa brister gav inte kommissionens marknadsanalys de politiskt ansvariga en tillrckligt heltckande och balanserad bild av marknaden som kunde vgleda dem nr de skulle vlja marknadstgrder.
The possibility of alternative cultivation 31. 
Mjlighet till alternativ odling 31.
The Commission argued that, in some cases, alternative cultivation was not possible. 
Kommissionen hvdade att det i vissa fall inte var mjligt med alternativ odling.
For example in Greece, sun-cured varieties were grown under conditions that made the growing of alternative crops impossible. 
Till exempel i Grekland odlades soltor-kade sorter under villkor som gjorde odlingen av andra grdor omjlig.
However, a pilot project (10) for the Commission concluded in 1995 that various alternative crops could be grown with good results (11). 
Men inom ett pilotprojekt (10) som utfrdes fr kommissionens rkning kom man 1995 fram till att olika alternativa grdor skulle kunna odlas med goda resultat (11).
The CommissionŐs analysis did not take into account changes in the character of the market 32. 
I kommissionens analys beaktade man inte marknadens frndrade karaktr 32.
The post 1998 CMO continued to be based on the assumption that first processors were independent in setting the terms of the cultivation contract prices negotiated with producers. 
Den gemensamma organisationen av marknaden efter 1998 fortsatte att grunda sig p antagandet att de fretag som utfr den frsta bearbetningen fritt kunde faststlla prisvillkoren fr odlingskontrakten som frhandlades fram med producenterna.
This assumption was unrealistic since the situation had changed. 
Det var ett orealistiskt antagande eftersom situationen hade frndrats.
There had been a concentration of purchasing in the hands of a small number of multinational first processors, merchants and manufacturers and the latter had become increasingly dominant in price setting. 
Inkpen hade koncentrerats till ett litet antal multinationella fretag som utfr den frsta bearbetningen, handlare och tillverkare, och de senare hade blivit alltmer dominerande nr det gllde att stta priser.
(9) The Standing Group on tobacco set up under the Advisory Committee on Specialist Products pursuant to Commission Decision 98/235/EC. 
(9) Stndiga kommittn fr tobak som inrttades av den rdgivande kommittn fr specialiserade produktionsgrenar enligt kommissionens beslut 98/235/EG.
This Group comprises experts representing producers, traders, first processors, manufacturers and consumers. 
Denna kommitt bestr av experter som fretrder producenter, handlare, fretag som utfr den frsta bearbetningen, tillverkare och konsumenter.
(10) Commission Decision C(92) 3126 3.12.1992 for a pilot and demonstration project according to Article 8 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4256/88 (OJ L 374, 31.12.1988, p. 
(10) Kommissionens beslut nr C(92) 3126/ fr ett pilot-och demonstrationsprojekt enligt artikel 8 i rdets frordning (EEG) nr 4256/88 (EGT L 374, 31.12.1998, s.
(Project No 92.EL.06002). 
(Projekt nr 92.EL.06002.)
(11) Helmico SA (1995) Final Report on Project No 92 EL.06002. 
(11) Helmico SA (1995) Slutrapport om projekt nr 92 EL.06002.
C 41/8 EN Official Journal of the European Union 17.2.2005 33. 
C 41/8 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 17.2.2005 33.
The Directorates-General for Agriculture and Fisheries received, in February 1997, a joint letter from producers and cooperative unions indicating that the problem of low prices was attributable to the oligopolistic structure of the processing market but this matter was not investigated at the time. 
Generaldirektoratet fr jordbruk och generaldirektoratet fr fiske fick i februari 1997 ett gemensamt brev frn producenter och kooperativfrbund som hvdade att problemet med lga priser berodde p bearbetnings-marknadens oligopolstruktur, men denna frga undersktes inte vidare vid den tidpunkten.
The CourtŐs audit subsequently found out that anti-competitive practices existed (see paragraphs 61 to 71). 
Vid revisionsrttens granskning visade det sig sedan att det frekom konkurrensbegrnsande metoder (se punkterna 61Đ71).
In its Special Report No 8/1993, the Court had already noted that the increasing involvement of producer groups in first processing had permitted them to limit manufacturersŐ influence over prices. 
I srskild rapport nr 8/1993 hade revisionsrtten redan konstaterat att producentsammanslutningarnas kade inblandning i den frsta bearbetningen hade gjort att de kunde begrnsa tillverkarnas inflytande ver priserna.
The CommissionŐs 1996 analysis did not recognise the negative implications for competition arising from the prohibition, in 1993, of such groups from carrying out first processing (12). 
I kommissionens analys frn 1996 tillstod man inte att frbudet frn 1993 fr sdana sammanslutningar att utfra den frsta bearbetningen fick negativa fljder fr konkurrensen (12).
Insufficient alignment of agriculture and other policies 34. 
Otillrcklig anpassning av jordbruk och annan politik 34.
The tobacco CMO contains policy objectives and measures which affect other policy areas. 
Den gemensamma organisationen av marknaden fr tobak innehller politiska ml och tgrder som pverkar andra politikomrden.
It is important to ensure coherence between them and this is usually achieved through inter-service consultation. 
Det r viktigt att se till att de r samstmda, och detta sker vanligtvis genom samrd mellan avdelningar.
Not all relevant services however, were consulted during the preparation of the CommissionŐs proposals (Directorate-General for Development, Directorate-General for Competition). 35. 
Dock hlls inget samrd med alla berrda avdelningar under utarbetandet av kommissionens frslag (generaldirektoratet fr bistnd och generaldirektoratet fr konkurrens). marknaden fr tobak.
5). CMO. The Court noted that, for the 1998 reform, the Commission did not fully take account of the Directorate-General for the EnvironmentŐs reservations. 
Revisionsrtten konstaterade att kommissionen nr det gller 1998 rs reform inte fullt ut beaktade de reservationer som generaldirektoratet fr milj hade gjort.
However, it was the main argument for its proposal for phasing out raw tobacco production subsidies presented to the Gteborg European Council in 2001. 
Detta var dock det frmsta argumentet fr kommissionens frslag att avveckla subventionerna till produktionen av rtobak, vilket lades fram fr Europeiska rdet i Gteborg 2001.
The Commission failed to draw CouncilŐs attention to the advice given by the Directorate-General for Customs and Indirect Taxation (Taxation and Customs Union DG) that, subsidies impact on retail prices (reduce them). 
Kommissionen lyckades inte uppmrksamma rdet p det rd som generaldirektoratet fr skatter och tullar (GD Skatter och tullar) hade gett om att subventioner pverkar konsumentpriser (minskar dem).
The effect on retail prices is amplified by the excise duty policy adopted by most tobacco producing Member States, who apply a lower rate of duty to their own tobacco. 
Effekten p konsumentpriserna blir nnu strre genom den punktskattepolitik som antagits av de flesta tobaksproducerande medlemsstaterna, som tillmpar en lgre skattesats p sin egen tobak.
For example, France applied the minimum rate of excise duty to dark-tobacco cigarettes manufactured locally. 
Till exempel tillmpade Frankrike en minimipunktskattesats p cigaretter gjorda av mrk tobak som tillverkas lokalt.
This is 20 % lower than the rate applied to imported light-tobacco cigarettes. 
Det r 20 % lgre n den skattesats som tillmpas p importerade cigaretter av ljus tobak.
In this way, Member States favour their national cigarette brands, containing a large proportion of subsidised tobacco (13). 
P s stt gynnar medlemsstaterna sina nationella cigarettmrken som till stor del innehller subventionerad tobak (13).
Authori-tative sources, such as the World Health Organisation and the World Bank (14), consider that lower prices increase consumption levels and by association, the level of tobacco-related disease. 
Enligt officiella kllor som Vrldshlsoorganisationen och Vrldsbanken (14) innebr lgre priser att konsumtionen kar, och drmed ocks antalet tobaksrelaterade sjukdomar.
THE CMO HAS NOT ACHIEVED THE DESIRED IMPACT The various measures have not achieved their objectives 38. 
DEN GEMENSAMMA ORGANISATIONEN AV MARKNADEN HAR INTE UPPNTT NSKAD EFFEKT Mlen fr de olika tgrderna har inte uppntts 38.
The Court examined whether, overall, the measures introduced since the 1998 reform had achieved the objectives set and found that they had either not been as successful as intended in many respects or impact could not be measured to determine whether they had been successful or not. 
Revisionsrtten underskte om de tgrder som infrts sedan reformen 1998 totalt sett hade lett till att de faststllda mlen uppntts och fann att de antingen inte hade varit s framgngsrika i mnga avseenden som det var meningen eller att effekten inte kunde mtas fr att avgra om de hade varit framgngsrika eller inte.
The impact of aid on growersŐ income cannot be assessed 39. 
Stdets effekt p odlarnas inkomster kan inte bedmas 39.
By compensating for the greater costs involved, the premium system was intended to help make EU tobacco more marketable and thus achieve a fair income. 
Genom att bidragssystemet kompenserar fr hjda kostnader var syftet med det att bidra till att gra EU-tobaken mer marknadsmssig och drigenom garantera producenterna en sklig inkomst.
The Commission did not define what constitutes a Ôfair incomeŐ from growing tobacco, set quantifiable targets for improvement or ensure that appropriate information on production costs, prices and income from reliable sources was received in order to measure impact. 
Kommissionen definierade inte vad som utgr en Ósklig inkomstÓ frn tobaksodling, faststllde inte ngra kvantifierbara ml fr frbttringar och sg inte heller till att relevant information om produktionskostnader, priser och inkomster frn tillfrlitliga kllor samlades in fr att mta effekten.
It was therefore unable to evaluate the impact of premium on growersŐ income overall and their standard of living (15). 
Drfr kunde kommissionen inte bedma bidragets effekt p odlarnas inkomster totalt sett och p deras levnadsstandard (15).
(13) This situation is confirmed by the Court of JusticeŐs ruling of 27 February 2002, Case C-302/00 Commission v French Republic, concerning differential taxation of dark and Virginia type tobacco. 
(13) Denna situation bekrftas av Europeiska domstolens avgrande av den 27 februari 2002, ml C-302/00 kommissionen mot Franska republiken, om differentierad beskattning av mrk tobak och tobak av Virginiatyp.
(14) The WHO Framework Convention on tobacco control, World Bank economics of tobacco toolkit: ÔEconomic analysis of tobacco demandŐ. (15) The evaluation report referred to by the Commission does not take into account income from secondary activities which is necessary to evaluate growers income overall and their standard of living. 
(14) The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, World Bank Economics of tobacco toolkit: ÓEconomic Analysis of Tobacco Demand.Ó (15) I den utvrderingsrapport som kommissionen hnvisar till beaktas inte inkomster frn biverksamheter, vilket r ndvndigt om man skall utvrdera odlarnas samlade inkomster och deras levnadsstandard.
17.2.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 41/9 The producersŐ dependence on aid has not changed 40. 
17.2.2005 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 41/9 Producenternas beroende av std har inte frndrats 40.
The premium represents around 75 % of producersŐ income from tobacco production but has reached nearly 95 % for production of one variety in Italy. 
Bidraget motsvarar cirka 75 % av producenternas inkomster frn tobaksproduktionen men har ntt nstan 95 % fr produktionen av en sort i Italien.
The variable element of premium was intended to provide an incentive to producers to improve quality in order to increase the value of their product thus reducing their dependence on aid. 
Den rrliga delen av bidraget hade som syfte att uppmuntra producenterna att frbttra kvaliteten fr att hja vrdet p produkten och p s stt minska beroendet av std.
The Commission assumed that the costs to the producer of improving quality would be covered by the variable premium and higher sales prices and thus reduce dependence on subsidies. 
Kommissionen antog att producentens kostnader fr att frbttra kvaliteten skulle kunna tckas av det rrliga bidraget och hgre frsljningspriser och drigenom minska beroendet av subventioner.
The evidence available to the Commission however showed the contrary. 
De uppgifter som kommissionen hade tillgng till visade dock det motsatta.
The information available at the Commission in 1998 indicated that, even for the better quality tobacco, the sales prices communicated by Member States, along with the EU premium did not cover the costs of production (see also paragraph 48). 
Den information som fanns tillgnglig vid kommissionen 1998 visade att ven nr det gllde tobak av hgre kvalitet tckte inte de frsljningspriser som medlemsstaterna meddelade, tillsammans med EU-bidraget, produktionskostnaderna (se ven punkt 48).
Furthermore, there is no information available showing to what extent the different measures of the CMO would have reduced the dependence on subsidies. 
Dessutom finns det ingen information tillgnglig som visar i vilken omfattning de olika tgrderna inom den gemensamma organisationen av marknaden skulle ha snkt beroendet av subventioner.
The most recent market information shows that EU average sales prices in 2003 were lower than in 2002 making producers more dependent on subsidies in 2003 than in 2002. 
Den senaste marknadsinformationen visar att EU:s genomsnittliga frsljningspriser under 2003 var lgre n 2002, vilket gjorde producenterna mer beroende av subventioner 2003 n 2002.
The impact of aid on the improvement of tobacco quality 42. 
Stdets effekt p frbttringen av tobakskvaliteten 42.
The Directorate-General for Agriculture considered that improvements in quality within each variety group could be measured by increases in the quantity of tobacco produced of the higher grades. 
Enligt generaldirektoratet fr jordbruk skulle man kunna mta frbttringar av kvaliteten inom varje sortgrupp genom att titta p kningarna av den kvantitet av hgkvalitetstobak som producerades.
This however, required a clear definition of quality standards and performance to be measurable on a constant basis. 
Men detta frutsatte att det fanns en klar och tydlig definition av kvalitetsnormerna och att resultatet skulle kunna mtas kontinuerligt.
Several factors militated against this. 
Flera faktorer talade emot detta.
Firstly, there is no standard grading system and there are variations between Member States in the way in which grades are established for the same varieties of tobacco. 
Fr det frsta finns det inget standardiserat graderingssystem, och det finns skillnader mellan medlemsstater nr det gller vilka normer som faststlls fr samma tobakssorter.
Secondly, in order to measure quality improvements over time, it is necessary to take into account the composition of producer groups and the characteristics of their production. 
Fr det andra r det ndvndigt att beakta sammansttningen av producentsammanslutningar och knnetecknen fr deras produktion fr att kunna mta frbttringar av kvaliteten ver tiden.
The effect of a low-quality producer leaving a group, would be to increase the quality of the group concerned even though there would be no improvements of production by producers as a whole. 
Effekten av att en lgkvalitetspro-ducent lmnar en sammanslutning skulle vara att kvaliteten inom den berrda sammanslutningen hjdes ven om det inte skulle ske ngra frbttringar av produktionen av producenterna som helhet.
It was not possible to measure the quality improvements because of the changes which occurred in producer groups. 
Det gick inte att mta kvalitetsfrbttringarna p grund av frndringarna i producentsammanslutningarna.
For example, the 1998 reform introduced minimum size requirements for producer groups which resulted in significant reorganisation. 
Till exempel infrdes det med 1998 rs reform ett minimistorlekskrav fr pro-ducentsammanslutningar, vilket ledde till en stor omorganisering.
Also, membership of most producer groups changes from year to year. 
Dessutom frndras medlemskapet i de flesta producentsammanslutningar varje r.
The way in which producer groups are organised can work against modulation of the variable premium. Whereas the objective of the variable premium is to provide an incentive to grow better quality tobacco, reality can be different: if all the producers in a group are producing the same quality (grade) of a particular variety the total variable premium available to the group for that variety will be apportioned equally between them (see also paragraph 9). 
Det stt p vilket producentsammanslutningar r organiserade kan motverka en differentiering av det rrliga bidraget. ven om mlet med det rrliga bidraget r att uppmuntra odling av tobak av hgre kvalitet kan verkligheten se annorlunda ut: om alla producenter i en grupp producerar samma kvalitet (grade-ring) av en srskild sort frdelas det totala rrliga bidraget som finns tillgngligt fr sammanslutningen fr den tobakssorten jmnt mellan dem (se ven punkt 9).
The same applies if producers of a poorer grade of the same variety group together. 
Samma sak gller om producenterna av en lgre kvalitet av samma sort gr samman.
The members of both groups will get the same amount of variable premium even though the quality they are producing is different. 
Medlemmarna i bda sammanslutningarna fr samma belopp av det rrliga bidraget trots att de producerar olika kvalitet.
These observations show that, contrary to its objective, the premium system is not necessarily an incentive to improve quality: it allows producers to maximise aid without improvement in quality and as shown in certain cases, identified by the Court and the Commission services, there is no difference in premium payments between good and bad producers. 
Dessa iakttagelser visar att bidragssystemet inte ndvndigtvis innebr en uppmuntran att frbttra kvaliteten, vilket strider mot mlet: det gr det mjligt fr producenter att maximera stdet utan att frbttra kvaliteten. Som framgr av vissa fall, som revisionsrttens och kommissionens avdelningar har upptckt, r de bidrag som betalas ut till bra och dliga producenter lika stora.
The rates of premium are inconsistent with the quality of tobacco 45. 
Bidragssatserna motsvarar inte tobakskvaliteten 45.
Differentiation of premium between variety groups was intended to encourage the cultivation of the higher quality varieties: higher premiums would be paid for higher quality as it involved higher production costs. 
Syftet med differentieringen av bidraget mellan olika sortgrupper var att uppmuntra odling av tobakssorter av hgre kvalitet: hgre bidrag skulle ges fr hgre kvalitet eftersom den hgre kvaliteten medfrde hgre produktionskostnader.
This would have required annual modifications of premium levels when justified by changes in costs and income. 
Detta skulle ha krvt att man varje r justerade bidragsniverna nr det motiverades av frndringar i kostnader och inkomster.
Since 1993 however, premium levels set by the Council have remained largely unchanged. 
Men sedan 1993 har de bidragsniver som rdet har faststllt i stor utstrckning varit ofrndrade.
In the absence of sufficiently detailed costs and income information from the Commission, the Court made its own analysis to verify the correlation between the level of premium paid, the quality of tobacco production and production costs. 
Eftersom revisionsrtten inte fick tillrckligt ingende information om kostnader och inkomster frn kommissionen gjorde revisionsrtten en egen analys fr att kontrollera sambandet mellan nivn p det bidrag som betalats ut, kvaliteten p tobaksproduktionen och produktionskostnader.
For the year 1998, it used data obtained specifically from Greece in relation to production costs and such data as was available from the Commission on sales prices. 
Nr det gller 1998 anvnde revisionsrtten uppgifter som srskilt erhllits frn Grekland i frga om produktionskostnader och uppgifter frn kommissionen om frsljningspriser.
This analysis was based uniquely on Greece as it provided the most complete data set for EU tobacco varieties. 
Analysen grundades enbart p Grekland, eftersom landet hade de mest fullstndiga uppgifterna om de sorter som produceras inom EU.
In view of the intention to reward quality and the higher costs involved in achieving it via the premium system, the Court sought to compare the quality of tobacco (which the Commission considered to be reflected in sales prices) with production costs and the level of premium paid. 
Med tanke p avsikten att belna kvalitet och de hgre kostnader som det innebar att uppn denna via bidragssystemet frskte revisionsrtten jmfra kvaliteten p tobaken (som enligt kommissionen skulle avspeglas i frsljningspriserna) med produktionskostnader och nivn p det utbetalade bidraget.