natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Audit scope and approach 09 The EU is continuously working to improve the security of EU borders, which is an important topic for EU citizens. 
Revisionens inriktning och omfattning samt revisionsmetod 09 EU arbetar kontinuerligt fr att frbttra skerheten vid sina grnser, ngot som r en viktig frga fr EU:s medborgare.
Considering the increasing pressure at the EU external borders caused by recent security and migratory situations, our audit aimed at identifying aspects in the design and use of these systems that can help border guards do their job more efficiently. 
Med tanke p det kande trycket p EU:s yttre grnser p grund av den senaste tidens skerhets-och migrationssituationer syftade vr revision till att identifiera aspekter av utformningen och anvndningen av dessa system som kan hjlpa grnskontrolltjnstemn att utfra sitt jobb p ett mer effektivt stt.
Furthermore, our observations and recommendations can help target the EU funding that will be made available in the next multi annual financial framework in support of these systems. 
Dessutom kan vra iakttagelser och rekommendationer bidra till att rikta den EU-finansiering som tillgngliggrs i nsta flerriga budgetram fr att stdja dessa system.
10  11   12 13 We assessed how well the systems (both national and central components of the EU systems) allowed the border guards and other officials to check individuals entering the Schengen area at authorised border crossing points6.These include land border crossing points, sea ports and airports (which, for some Member States, are the only external EU borders). 
10 Ľ 11 Ľ Ľ 12 13 Vi bedmde hur vl systemen (bde nationella och centrala komponenter i EU-systemen) gr det mjligt fr grnskontrolltjnstemn och andra tjnstemn att kontrollera enskilda personer som reser in i Schengenomrdet vid tilltna grnsvergngar6. Dessa inbegriper grnsvergngar p land, vid kusthamnar och p flygplatser (vilka fr vissa EU-medlemsstater r de enda yttre EU-grnserna).
This audit question was broken down into the following sub-questions: Are the EU information systems for internal security well designed to facilitate efficient border checks? 
Denna revisionsfrga delades in i fljande delfrgor: r EU:s informationssystem fr inre skerhet vl utformade och frmjar effektiva grnskontroller?
Are the EU information systems for internal security providing border guards with relevant, timely and complete information during border checks? 
Ger EU:s informationssystem fr inre skerhet grnskontrolltjnstemn relevant, aktuell och fullstndig information under grnskontroller?
Our audit covered the following five systems: the Schengen Information System (SIS II); the Visa Information System (VIS); Eurodac (European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database - fingerprint comparison system); the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) and the Passenger Name Record systems (PNR). 
Vr revision omfattade fljande fem system: Schengens informationssystem (SIS II), Informationssystemet fr viseringar (VIS), Eurodac (den europeiska databasen ver asylskandes fingeravtryck Đ systemet fr jmfrelse av fingeravtryck), det europeiska grnsvervakningssystemet (Eurosur) och systemen fr passageraruppgifter (PNR-uppgifter).
14 We reviewed and analysed the strategic documents, evaluations and statistics relating to the five systems covered by our audit, as well as a variety of documents relating to their implementation at both national and EU level. 
14 Vi granskade och analyserade strategiska dokument, utvrderingar och statistik med anknytning till de fem system som omfattas av vr revision liksom en mngd dokument som rr genomfrandet av dem p bde nationell niv och EU-niv.
In addition, we visited border checkpoints and interviewed border authorities in Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Poland. 
Dessutom beskte vi grnsvergngar och intervjuade grnsmyndigheter i Finland, Frankrike, Italien, Luxemburg och Polen.
We also interviewed staff of DG HOME, Frontex and eu-LISA. 
Vi intervjuade ven personal vid GD Migration och inrikes frgor, Frontex och eu-Lisa.
15 We also conducted a survey of EU border guards in 28 EU Member States and 4 Schengen associated states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) to obtain their views as users of the systems. 
15 Vi genomfrde drutver en underskning bland grnskontrolltjnstemn i EU:s 28 medlemsstater och fyra Schengenassocierade lnder (Island, Liechtenstein, Norge och Schweiz) fr att f deras synpunkter som anvndare av systemen.
We received 951 replies. 
Vi fick 951 svar.
14 Observations The information systems’ design facilitates efficient border checks, but resolving weaknesses takes a long time 16 We assessed whether the Schengen States we visited had set up the information systems as and when required by the relevant EU legislation. 
14 Iakttagelser Informationssystemens utformning frmjar effektiva grnskontroller, men det tar lng tid att avhjlpa brister 16 Vi bedmde om de Schengenstater vi beskte hade inrttat informationssystemen p det stt och vid den tidpunkt som tillmplig EU-lagstiftning krver.
We also examined the Schengen evaluation mechanism and the extent to which the Schengen States had used the available EU funding to set up and improve their national systems. 
Vi granskade ven utvrderingsmekanismen fr Schengen och i vilken utstrckning Schengenstaterna hade anvnt tillgnglig EU-finansiering fr att inrtta och frbttra de nationella systemen.
Information systems were generally in line with EU requirements but did not operate with equal efficiency 17 18 19 15 While each Schengen State is solely responsible for protecting its own borders, effective cooperation between them to protect the area requires a certain level of harmonisation of border checks. 
Informationssystemen verensstmde i allmnhet med EU:s krav, men alla fungerade inte lika effektivt 17 18 19 15 Varje Schengenstat br sjlv ansvaret fr att skydda de egna grnserna, men ett effektivt samarbete mellan dem fr att skydda omrdet krver en viss harmonisering av grnskontrollerna.
Minimum governance requirements help ensure the consistency and quality of border checks and of the data entered in the information systems. 
Minimikrav fr styrning bidrar till att skerstlla enhetlighet och kvalitet nr det gller grnskontroller och de uppgifter som matas in i informationssystemen.
Each Schengen State must set up its own complementary national systems, which connect to the central EU systems. 
Varje Schengenstat mste inrtta sina egna kompletterande nationella system som kopplas till de centrala EU-systemen.
The Schengen States we visited had all done so in line with the requirements defined in the relevant legislation. 
De Schengenstater vi beskte hade alla gjort detta i linje med de krav som faststlls i den tillmpliga lagstiftningen.
Nevertheless, we found that, while all the systems met the common minimum requirements, not all national systems were equally efficient. 
Trots detta konstaterade vi att alla nationella system inte var lika effektiva, fastn de uppfyllde de gemensamma minimikraven.
The following paragraphs provide some examples of this. 
I fljande punkter ges ngra exempel p detta.
Some countries do not make all the functions offered in the central EU systems available through their national systems, thus reducing the efficiency of border checks. 
Vissa lnder tillgngliggr inte alla funktioner som erbjuds i de centrala EU-systemen genom de nationella systemen, vilket gr grnskontrollerna mindre effektiva.
For example, the central SIS II system offers the option to store and check fingerprints. 
I det centrala SIS II-systemet ges exempelvis mjligheten att lagra och kontrollera fingeravtryck.
This is important because it is not always possible to uniquely identify a person from basic personal data such as a name or a date of birth. 
Detta r viktigt eftersom det inte alltid gr att gra en unik identifiering av en person enbart utifrn grundlggande personuppgifter som namn och fdelsedatum.
Such data can be forged, or a person can refuse to provide it. 
Sdana uppgifter kan frfalskas och vissa personer kan vgra att uppge dem.
Fingerprints make it possible to identify a person with a much higher degree of certainty. 
Fingeravtryck gr det mjligt att identifiera en person med mycket strre skerhet.
However, the option perform biometric searches on the basis of fingerprints stored in SIS is not yet available in all Schengen States’ national systems, as some require more time than others to implement the necessary technical solutions. 
Mjligheten att utfra biometriska skningar utifrn fingeravtryck som r lagrade i SIS finns dock nnu inte i alla Schengenstaters nationella system, eftersom vissa krver mer tid n andra fr att infra de ndvndiga tekniska lsningarna.
When fingerprint identification was available at the central level, only 10 Schengen States confirmed that they were ready to use it. 
Nr fingeravtrycksidentifiering var tillgnglig p central niv var det enbart tio Schengenstater som bekrftade att de var redo att anvnda den.
20 21 In the case of SIS II, Schengen States can either access and submit queries to the central database or create their own national copies for this purpose. 
21 Nr det gller SIS II kan Schengenstaterna antingen f tkomst till och gra skningar i den centrala databasen eller skapa egna nationella kopior fr detta ndaml.
While most of them operate their own national copies, some (Denmark, Finland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Slovenia) connect directly to the European database. 
De flesta anvnder egna nationella kopior, men vissa (Danmark, Finland, Liechtenstein, Norge och Slovenien) kopplar upp sig direkt mot den europeiska databasen.
Where Schengen States use national copies of SIS II, these must be synchronised with the central European database at all times in order to ensure that border checks are based on the most up-to-date information. 
Om Schengenstater anvnder nationella kopior av SIS II mste de hela tiden vara synkroniserade med den centrala europeiska databasen fr att skerstlla att grnskontrollerna grundas p den mest aktuella informationen.
However, in two of the countries in our sample (Poland and France), evaluations have indicated discrepancies between records in the national copies and in the central database. 
I tv av lnderna i vrt urval (Polen och Frankrike) har dock utvrderingar visat p bristande verensstmmelse mellan uppgifter i de nationella kopiorna och i den centrala databasen.
22 We also found that certain legal constraints at the Member State level (rules on data protection and national security) prevented the efficient sharing of human resources. 
22 Vi konstaterade ven att vissa rttsliga begrnsningar p medlemsstatsniv (regler om dataskydd och om nationell skerhet) frhindrade effektiv gemensam anvndning av personal.
In fact, border guards visiting another Schengen country (e.g. to assist in reinforced controls during the migration crisis in Greece and Italy) are not allowed to use that country’s national systems. 
Faktum r att grnskontrolltjnstemn som besker ett annat Schengenland (t.ex. fr att bist vid strkta kontroller under migrationskrisen i Grekland och Italien) inte fr anvnda det landets nationella system.
As a matter of principle, they cannot conduct controls independently, but only assist the national border guards. 
I princip kan de inte utfra kontroller sjlvstndigt utan enbart bist de nationella grnskontrolltjnstemnnen.
While they may provide varying degrees of help on the second line of control (e.g. a Schengen State might use an expert on forged documents from another Schengen State), they can provide only limited help during the document checks at border checkpoints (at the first line of control). 
De kan bist med hjlp av varierande grad under den frdjupade kontrollen (t.ex. kan en Schengenstat anvnda en expert p frfalskade handlingar frn en annan Schengenstat), men de kan enbart bidra med begrnsad hjlp vid kontrollerna av handlingar vid grnsvergngar (under primrkontrollen).
Another barrier is the linguistic challenges linked to working in another Schengen State. 
Ett annat hinder r de sprkliga utmaningarna i samband med arbete i en annan Schengenstat.
23 The benefit border guards derive from the systems depends on how well trained they are to use them. 
23 De frdelar grnskontrolltjnstemn fr genom systemen beror p hur vlutbildade de r i att anvnda dem.
We found that there was no training environment for SIS II and VIS implemented at national level in the Member States we visited, so border guards had to practise on these “live” rather than in a “safe” environment where they could experience features and scenarios that they do not encounter frequently on the job (e.g. a hit identifying a suspected terrorist at a border checkpoint, or a missing minor). 
Vi konstaterade att det inte hade infrts ngon utbildningsmilj fr SIS II eller VIS p nationell niv i de medlemsstater som vi beskte, varfr grnskontrolltjnstemnnen var tvungna att anvnda dessa ÓliveÓ i stllet fr i en ÓskerÓ milj dr de skulle kunna f erfarenhet av funktioner och scenerier som de
These can have several causes, such as fingerprints of insufficient quality, connectivity issues or problems reading the visa. 
inte stter p srskilt ofta p jobbet (t.ex. en trff som identifierar en misstnkt terrorist vid en grnsvergng eller en frsvunnen minderrig person).
Delays in the implementation of Eurosur and PNR prevented border authorities from sharing important information 24 For Eurosur and PNR, the implementation arrangements were different to those systems developed and managed by eu-LISA. 
Frseningar i genomfrandet av Eurosur och PNR gjorde att grnsmyndigheter inte kunde dela viktig information 24 Nr det gller Eurosur och PNR skilde sig genomfrandearrangemangen t frn de system som utvecklats och frvaltas av eu-Lisa.
For differing reasons, the implementation of both systems suffered from some missed deadlines and delays. 
Av olika anledningar drabbades genomfrandet av de bda systemen av en del verskridna tidsfrister och frseningar.
As a result, important information that these systems were intended to provide remained unavailable for several months. 
Till fljd av det var viktig information som dessa system var tnkta att tillhandahlla otillgnglig under flera mnaders tid.
25 Eurosur was developed by Frontex (the European component) and by the Member States (the national components). 
25 Eurosur utvecklades av Frontex (den europeiska komponenten) och av medlemsstaterna (de nationella komponenterna).
Its end-user interface is the same for all participating national authorities. 
Slutanvndargrnssnittet r detsamma fr alla deltagande nationella myndigheter.
The system is intended to enhance cooperation between Frontex and the EU Member States to improve their awareness of and responsiveness to the situation at the EU’s external borders. 
Systemet syftar till att strka samarbetet mellan Frontex och EU-medlemsstaterna, fr att ka deras medvetenhet och reaktionsfrmga nr det gller situationen vid EU:s yttre grnser.
Member States should contribute with information about the situation at their borders (known as their “national situational pictures”, showing information on unauthorised border crossings, cross-border crime, crisis situations and other events relevant to the control of the external borders) in order to build up shared intelligence and a picture of the Europe-wide situation. 
Medlemsstaterna ska bidra med information om situationen vid sina grnser (vilket kallas Ónationella situationsbilderÓ och ger information om obehriga grnspassager, grnsverskridande brottslighet, krissituationer och andra hndelser av relevans fr kontrollen av de yttre grnserna) i syfte att ta fram gemensam underrttelseinformation och f en bild av den Europaomfattande situationen.
This is useful, for example, for prioritising the deployment of border guards or detecting suspicious vehicles/vessels. 
Detta r exempelvis anvndbart fr att prioritera utstationering av grnskontrolltjnstemn och upptcka misstnka fordon eller fartyg.
26 The delays in relation to Eurosur concerned the creation of National Coordination Centres (NCCs). 
26 Frseningarna nr det gllde Eurosur rrde inrttandet av nationella samordningscentraler.
NCCs coordinate information exchange between all the authorities responsible for external border surveillance. 
Nationella samordningscentraler samordnar informationsutbytet mellan alla myndigheter med ansvar fr att vervaka de yttre grnserna.
The Eurosur regulation required Member States to establish their NCCs by December 2014. 
Enligt Eurosur-frordningen skulle medlemsstaterna inrtta sina nationella samordningscentraler senast i december 2014.
However, an evaluation nearly four years later found that several Member States were still not fully compliant with the requirements7. 
I en utvrdering som genomfrdes nstan fyra r senare konstaterades det dock att flera medlemsstater fortfarande inte uppfyllde kraven till fullo7.
In addition only half of the Member States were sharing voluntary information about their deployment of surveillance resources and additional information from their national situational pictures. 
Dessutom delade bara hlften av medlemsstaterna frivillig information om anvndningen av vervakningsresurser och ytterligare information hmtad frn deras nationella situationsbilder.
27 The implementation of Eurosur was also behind schedule at EU level. 
27 Genomfrandet av Eurosur var ven frsenat p EU-niv.
Frontex did not obtain the required security certification for its network until the end of 2017 – three years after the entry into force of the legislation. 
Frontex erhll inte ndvndig skerhetscertifiering fr sitt ntverk frrn i slutet av 2017 Đ tre r efter lagstiftningens ikrafttrdande.
Without this certification, it was not possible to share classified information over the Eurosur network. 
Utan certifieringen var det omjligt att dela skerhetsskyddsklassificerade uppgifter via Eurosur-ntverket.
The delays in the implementation of Eurosur meant that the EU-wide situational picture was incomplete, which hindered cooperation between the Member States. 
Frseningarna nr det gller genomfrandet av Eurosur innebar att den EU-omfattande situationsbilden var ofullstndig, vilket hindrade samarbetet mellan medlemsstaterna.
28 PNR is not yet fully operational. 
28 PNR r nnu inte helt operativt.
Unlike the other systems, it was set up by means of a directive rather than a regulation. 
Till skillnad frn de andra systemen inrttades det genom ett direktiv och inte en frordning.
Consequently, it was left up to the Member States to set up their own PNR systems separately, without any common European platform. 
Fljaktligen var det upp till medlemsstaterna att inrtta sina egna PNR-system separat, utan ngon gemensam europeisk plattform.
The decision in favour of decentralised implementation was mainly driven by a lack of consensus on the protection, storage and disclosure of personal data. 
Beslutet till frmn fr ett decentraliserat genomfrande drevs frmst p av bristande samfrstnd om skydd, lagring och utlmnande av personuppgifter.
Fourteen Member States failed to implement the rules on Passenger Name Record data on time8. 
14 medlemsstater underlt att genomfra reglerna om passageraruppgifter i tid8.
They were supposed to comply with the directive9 by 25 May 2018. 
De skulle efterleva direktivet9 senast den 25 maj 2018.
However, by the end of March 2019, 10 months after the deadline, Spain, the Netherlands and Finland still had not notified the Commission of any measures taken nationally to implement PNR10. 
I slutet av mars 2019, tio mnader efter tidsfristen, hade dock Spanien, Nederlnderna och Finland fortfarande inte underrttat kommissionen om tgrder som vidtagits nationellt fr att genomfra PNR10.
30 PNR requires passenger data to be transmitted from all flights into and out of the Schengen area. 
30 PNR krver att passageraruppgifter verfrs fr alla flygningar till och ut ur Schengenomrdet.
At the time of our audit, none of the Member States visited, except Luxembourg, had concluded agreements for this purpose with all relevant airlines. 
Vid tidpunkten fr vr revision var det inte ngon av de medlemsstater vi beskte, frutom Luxemburg, som hade slutit avtal fr detta ndaml med samtliga berrda flygbolag.
31 PNR was designed as an important tool to prevent, detect and investigate terrorism and other forms of serious crime. 
31 PNR utformades som ett viktigt verktyg fr att frebygga, frhindra, upptcka och utreda terrorism och andra former av grov brottlighet.
Comparing PNR data with information contained in security databases allows the relevant authorities to detect dangerous individuals. 
Genom att jmfra PNR-uppgifter med information i skerhetsdatabaser kan berrda myndigheter upptcka farliga personer.
32 Since PNR only collects passengers’ identification and travel data, it needs other databases to verify whether a given passenger poses a security threat. 
32 Eftersom PNR enbart samlar passagerarnas identifierings-och reseuppgifter behvs andra databaser fr att kontrollera om en viss passagerare utgr ett skerhetshot.
Most Member States use SIS II for this purpose. 
De flesta medlemsstater anvnder SIS II fr detta ndaml.
However, the regulation allows for different interpretations. 
Frordningen medger dock olika tolkningar.
For example, France has interpreted the SIS II regulation in a way that does not allow it to use SIS II queries on passenger lists. 
Exempelvis har Frankrike tolkat SIS II-frordningen p ett stt som inte tillter det att gra SIS II-skningar med passagerarlistor.
In practice, this means that when checking passenger lists for suspected terrorists, France only uses information from its national databases. 
I praktiken innebr det att man i Frankrike enbart anvnder information frn de nationella databaserna nr man letar igenom passagerarlistor efter misstnkta terrorister.
known to other European authorities but not to the French authorities, their PNR check will not detect that person. 
Om det finns en registrering om en misstnkt person i SIS II, och den misstnkta r knd av andra europeiska myndigheter men inte de franska myndigheterna, kommer deras PNR-kontroll inte att upptcka den personen.
Schengen evaluations assess national border checks, but resolving weaknesses takes a long time 33 Since 2013, the Schengen States and the Commission have been jointly responsible for implementing the monitoring and evaluation mechanism provided for in the rules on the Schengen area (the “Schengen Acquis”). 
Schengenutvrderingar bedmer nationella grnskontroller, men det tar lng tid att avhjlpa brister 33 Sedan 2013 har Schengenstaterna och kommissionen gemensamt varit ansvariga fr att genomfra den vervaknings-och utvrderingsmekanism som faststlls i reglerna om Schengenomrdet (Schengenregelverket).
The aim of the mechanism is to ensure that the Schengen States apply the Schengen rules effectively, consistently and transparently. 
Syftet med mekanismen r att skerstlla att Schengenstaterna tillmpar Schengenreglerna p ett ndamlsenligt, enhetligt och transparent stt.
We examined whether the aim of the mechanism is being achieved. 
Vi underskte om mlet med mekanismen uppns.
34 The current multiannual evaluation programme was established in 2014 for the 2015-2019 period and covers all 26 Schengen countries. 
34 Det nuvarande flerriga utvrderingsprogrammet inrttades 2014 fr perioden 2015Đ2019 och omfattar samtliga 26 Schengenstater.
Each country is evaluated once during the five-year period 35 Box 1 describes a standard evaluation visit. 
Varje land utvrderas en gng under femrsperioden. 35 I ruta 1 beskrivs ett vanligt utvrderingsbesk.