natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
35.Otherinitiativesofastructuralnaturehavenotalwayshad theexpectedimpact.Thisapppliestothesecond-generationagree-ments (see definition in paragraph 4) which aim, through the setting-up of joint ventures, to preserve the fishing opportunities available to the Community fleet, to maintain a certain level of Community employment (2) and to transfer fishing vessels to the waters of third countries. 
Andra initiativ med strukturell inriktning har inte alltid haft avsedd effekt. Det gller bl.a. fr andra generationens avtal (se definitionen i punkt 4), vars ml r att genom upprttandet av samfretag bevara gemenskapsflottans fngstrttigheter, bibehlla en viss sysselsttningsgrad (2) i gemenskapen och frflytta fiske-enheter till tredje lands vatten.
The only agreement of importance was signed with Argentina (162 million euro); this allowed the transfer of 32 vessels and the safeguarding of about 1 000 Community jobs, until Argentina decided to increase the minimum number of Argentinian seamen to be included in the crews of these vessels (in the long term, this measure could affect 600 Community jobs). 
Det enda avtalet av strre betydelse slts med Argentina (162 miljoner euro). Det innebar att trettio-tv fartyg frflyttades och cirka tusen arbetstillfllen kunde bibehllas inom gemenskapen, tills Argentina kade minimiantalet argentinska sjmn som skulle finnas ombord p dessa fartyg (p sikt kan denna tgrd komma att pverka 600 arbetstillfllen inom gemenskapen).
Thelimitedimpactofthistypeofagreementcanbeattributedto a lack of interest on the part of the third countries and the depletion of fish stocks. 
Denna typ av avtal har begrnsade effekter, vilket beror p bristande intresse frn tredje lands sida och p att fiskbestndet hller p att sina.
Allinall,beforeStructuralFundaidisgrantedtotheCom-munity fleet fishing under international agreements, the Commission and the Member States should set clear objectives. 
Sammanfattningsvis borde kommissionen och medlemsstaterna definiera tydliga ml innan medel frn strukturfonderna avstts till gemenskapens fiskeflotta genom de internationella avtalen.
The vari-ousaspectsofthecommonfisheriespolicycouldbemademore consistent, in particular with the Structural Funds. 
Den gemensamma fiskeripolitikens olika delar borde kunna samordnas bttre, framfr allt med strukturfonderna.
Given the risks faced by the Community, in particular in the event of the non-renewal of the agreements, it is especially important under these agreementsfortheretobestrategicplanningandfortheimple-mentation of the measures to develop a stable fishing sector to be monitoredeffectively. 
Strategisk planering och effektiv vervakning av genomfrandet av tgrderna som syftar till att utveckla en stabil fiskerisektor r srskilt viktiga i dessa avtal med tanke p de risker gemenskapen utstts fr framfr allt om avtalen inte frnyas.
Coordination of Community policies 37. 
Samordning av gemenskapens politikomrden 37.
Some of the countries that are signatories of an international fisheries agreement also benefit from other Community policies, such as development aid financed by the Community budget or by the European Development Fund (EDF). 
Vissa lnder som undertecknat ett internationellt fiskeavtal drar ven nytta av andra delar av gemenskapens politik, som t.ex. utvecklingsbistnd som finansieras via gemenskapsbudgeten eller Europeiska utvecklingsfonden (EUF).
It is therefore necessary to ensure that there is consistency between and coordination of the measures taken in the fisheries and development fields (2). 
Det r allts ndvndigt att samordna och koordinera tgrderna p fiskeri-och utvecklingsomrdet (2).
(1) The CommissionŐs ÔIfremerŐ evaluation, p. 
(1) Kommissionens utvrdering ÓIfremerÓ, s.
(2) Council Conclusions 11784/97 of 4 November 1997. 
(2) Rdets slutsatser 11784/97, 4 november 1997.
C 210/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 27.7.2001 38. 
C 210/10 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 27.7.2001 38.
In some third countries, the income earned from the international fisheries agreements may form a substantial portion of the national revenue: for example in 1998, this proportion was 15,2 % in Mauritania and 12,7 % in So Tom. 
I vissa lnder utanfr gemenskapen kan inkomsten frn de internationella fiskeavtalen utgra en betydande del av national-inkomsten. r 1998 var denna andel 15,2 % i Mauretanien och 12,7 % i So Tom och Prncipe.
When the agreement with Senegal expired in 1997, the Commission was unable to accept the price requested. 
Nr avtalet med Senegal lpte ut 1997 kunde kommissionen inte acceptera det pris som begrdes.
Furthermore, the Commission should ensure that its own departments act in coordination with one another when implementing all the policies likelytoaffecttheEUŐsrelationswithdevelopingcountries,pur-suant to Article 178 of the Treaty and the Lom Convention. 
Kommissionen borde samordna sina avdelningars arbete vad gller all politik som kan pverka Europeiska unionens relationer med utvecklingslnder, i enlighet med artikel 178 i frdraget och Lomkonventionen.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS Management shortcomings 40. 
GENOMF RANDET AV AVTALEN Brister i frvaltningen 40.
For the most part, they have to deal with two types of difficulty, which they have not always managed to settle satisfactorily: the financing of development projects and the implementation of projects for the satellite surveillance of vessels. 
De stlls i huvudsak infr tv slags svrigheter som inte alltid har kunnat lsas inom utskottet, nmligen finansieringen av utvecklingsprojekt och genomfrandet av projekt fr vervakning av fartygen via satellit.
The CommissionŐs negotiating hand has been weakened where the agreements do not contain a clause providing for the compulsory exchange of scientific information, the stopping of paymentsintheeventofdisputesortheadjustmentoffinancial componentswhenmeasuresaretakenthatmayaffectthefishing opportunities. 
Kommissionens frhandlingsposition har frsvagats nr det inte funnits ngon bestmmelse om att vetenskaplig information skall utbytas, att betalningarna skall stoppas vid eventuella tvister eller att de ekonomiska aspekterna skall justeras vid tgrder som kan pverka fiskerttigheterna.
In 1998 and in 1999, for example, Morocco sus-pendedcephalopodfishingfortwomonthsongroundsrelating to the biology of the species, in addition to the two monthsŐ stop already agreed by the parties involved. 
Av skl som hade att gra med arternas biologi, stllde Marocko in fisket av blckfiskar i tv mnader under 1998 och 1999, utver de tv mnaders stopp av fisket som parterna redan hade kommit verens om.
The Commission will remain committed to paying Morocco the full financial compensation, even for the period covered by this unilateral suspension, not provided for by the agreement. 
Kommissionen blev tvungen att betala ut fullstndig ekonomisk ersttning till Marocko, ven fr den period d fisket ensidigt stoppats och sominteomfattadesavavtalet.
Theagreementsincludeclausesstipulatingthatpartofthe financial compensation may be devoted to financing specific measures and to training, with the aim of contributing to the sustainable development of the fishing sector in the third country. 
Enligt vissa bestmmelser i avtalen kan en del av den ekonomiska ersttningen anvndas till att finansiera srskilda tgrder och utbildning, om dessa har som mlsttning att bidra till en hllbar utveckling av fiskerisektorn i tredje land.
If this (1) Commission letter 000405 of 4 March 1997 to the Senegalese authorities. is the case, it would be logical for those managing the agreements to be informed of how these clauses have been applied. 
Om s r fallet, (1) Kommissionens brev 000405 av den 4 mars 1997, stllt till de senegalesiska myndigheterna. voredetlogisktattdesomfrvaltaravtaleninformerasomhur medlen anvnds.
However, since the third countries consider that these agreements are above all commercial in nature, giving access to territorial waters in return for financial compensation, they regard the financing of such measures as more or less optional. 
Tredje lnder anser emellertid att avtalen framfr allt r av kommersiell natur, som ger tillgng till territorialvatten mot ekonomisk ersttning, och att finansieringen av dylika tgrder r frivillig.
As a consequence, some of these countries (2) do not allow outside checks and so the Commission does not have any information on the use of these funds. 
Fljaktligen accepterar vissa av lnderna (2) inte ngon extern kontroll och kommissionen har slutligen inte tillgng till ngon information om hur medlen har anvnts.
If such clauses are to be included in these agreements, the Commission should make them more legally binding and improve their monitoring, for example by inserting clauses concerning checks or payments which are dependent on the progress made. In any case, a clearer distinction needs to be made between the commercial aspects and the development aid aspects. 
Om sdana bestmmelser faktiskt ingr i avtalen br kommissionen frstrka deras juridiskt bindande karaktr och frbttra uppfljningen av dem, t.ex. genom att infoga bestmmelser om kontroll eller om att utbetalning skall ske i frhllande till vilkaframstegsomgjorts.tminstonebrmantydligareskilja mellan de kommersiella aspekterna och utvecklingsbistndet.
Some agreements provide for voluntary or compulsory landing of catches in the partner country, in order to contribute to employment in the fishing sector. 
I vissa avtal faststlls att fngsten obligatoriskt eller frivilligt skall lossas i avtalspartens land, i syfte att bidra till sysselsttningen inom fiskerisektorn.
For the Morocco Agreement, the Court found, on the basis of random sampling, that the practice of European vessels unloading and reloading their entire catch had occurred in four of the five cases examined in the period from 4 December 1998 to 2March1999.Eveniftheaimistoobtainareductioninthe licence fee, this practice cannot be justified: there is no point whatsoever in frozen fish being systematically unloaded and then reloaded at a Moroccan port when it is intended to be sold elsewhere. 
Vad gller avtalet med Marocko konstaterade revisionsrtten, utifrn ett slumpmssigt urval, i fyra fall av fem som granskades mellan den 4 december 1998 och den 2 mars 1999 att hela lasten lossats och sedan lastats ombord igen p EU-fartygen. ven om det handlar om att f ner avgiften kan denna praxis inte rttfr-digas. Att fryst fisk systematiskt lastas av och p fartyg i en marockansk hamn, fastn den skall sljas p en annan marknad, r inte meningsfullt.
The Commission should ensure that the agreements are applied literally but also that the shipowners interpret them in a common-sense manner. 
Kommissionen borde vervaka den bokstavliga tillmpningen av avtalen, men ven att fartygsgarna i praktiken tolkar dem p ett rationellt stt.
Control shortcomings 48. 
Brister i kontrollen 48.
The Commission has set up an Inspection and Control Unit within the Fisheries DG to supervise the application of Community regulations, and the monitoring thereof, concerning the activities of the Member StatesŐ fishing fleets in the waters of third countries. 
Kommissionen har inrttat en enhet fr inspektion och kontroll inom generaldirektoratet fr fiske, fr att kontrollera tillmpningen och vervakningen av genomfrandet av gemenskapens frordningar om medlemsstaternas fiskeflottors aktivitet i tredje lands vatten.
The UnitŐs inspectors regularly attend national inspec-tionsintheMemberStatesasobservers. 
Inspektrerna i denna enhet r regelbundet nrvarande som observatrer vid nationella inspektioner i medlemsstaterna.
(2) The countries concerned are those coming under the scope of the audit referred to in paragraph 8. 
2 ( ) Avser lnder som omfattas av granskningen som nmns i punkt 8.
27.7.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 210/11 49. 
27.7.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 210/11 49.
This Unit would perform better if it were to lay down detailed control objectives and specific checks for the international fisheries agreements. 
Denna enhet skulle bli effektivare om man faststllde detaljerade kontrollml och srskilda granskningar fr de internationella fiskeavtalen.
Moreover, there has not always been adequate follow-up of the infringements detected during the UnitŐs inspections in the Member States. 
En systematisk uppfljning av de vertrdelser som upptckts vid enhetens inspektioner i medlemsstaterna skerstlls fortfarande inte.
Furthermore, Article 1 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/ 93 (1) requires Member States to introduce the necessary measures to ensure the effectiveness of the common fisheries policy and also covers the activities of EU fishing vessels operating in the waters of third countries. 
I artikel 1 i frordning (EEG) nr 2847/93 (1) faststlls att medlemsstaterna mste infra ndvndiga tgrder fr att skerstlla den gemensamma fiskeripolitikens effektivitet, ven vad gller Europeiska unionens fiskefartygs verksamhet i tredje lands vatten.
Articles 2 to 5 require Member States to carry out inspections and monitoring of fishing vessels. 
I artiklarna 2 och 5 faststlls att medlemsstaterna skall inspektera och vervaka fiskefartygen.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Cost-benefit ratio 54. 
SLUTSATSER OCH REKOMMENDATIONER Kostnadseffektivitet 54.
Even though the Commission made an evaluation in 1999 of the international fisheries agreements and has introduced technical data sheets for use when an agreement is being negotiated orrenegotiated,thishasenabledneitherongoingmonitoringnor a detailed cost-benefit analysis of each agreement to be made. 
Fastn kommissionen 1999 gjorde en utvrdering av de internationella fiskeavtalen och dessutom infrde tekniska specifikationsmallar d man frhandlar fram eller omfrhandlar ett avtal, gr det varken att flja upp eller p ett djupgende stt analysera kostnadseffektiviteten fr varje avtal.
As a result, the Commission can neither identify nor remedy the weaknesses detected by the Court (lack of good-quality information on the fish stocks situation, on the financial compensation which is calculated without taking into account the rate of utilisation of the agreements, on the return obtained or expected from these agreements, etc.), which give rise to extra costs (see para-graphs13to18). 
Drfr kan kommissionen varken identifiera eller korrigera de brister som revisionsrtten upptckt (ingen information av god kvalitet om fiskbestndet, om ekonomisk ersttning som berknas utan hnsyn till i vilken grad avtalen utnyttjas, avtalens berknade och verkliga avkastning etc.). Dessa brister leder till kade kostnader (sepunkterna13Đ18).
55. of the fisheries agreements involving financial compensation. 
55. naderna fr avtalen med avgifter.
At the same time, the fishing opportunities offered by some agreements are not used to the full, leading to extra cost for the Community budget. 
Samtidigt utnyttjas de fngstmjligheter som erbjuds i vissa avtal inte fullt ut, vilket leder till kade kostnader fr gemenskapens budget.
For want of a detailed analysis of the economic and financial value of these agreements, it is impossible to pass judgement on their usefulness (see paragraphs 19 to 27). 
Eftersom det inte gjorts ngon frdjupad analys av det ekonomiska och finansiella intresset med dessa avtal, kan man inte bedma om detta r vl-grundat(sepunkterna19Đ27).
Ń The Commission should analyse whether it would be expedient to share out the costs in a more balanced manner, how best to achieve this and what the consequences would be. 
Ń Kommissionen br analysera om det r mjligt att frdela kostnaderna jmnare, hur detta skall uppns och fljderna av omfrdelningen.
The aim of such a study would also be to analyse the relationship betweenthecostofafishinglicenceandtheamountofturn-over resulting from it. The Commission should also take measures to ensure actual take-up of the fishing opportunities offered by these agreements. 
Mlet med en sdan studie skulle bl.a. vara att analysera sambandet mellan kostnaden fr fiskelicenser och den omsttning den leder till. Kommissionen br ocks vidta tgrder fr att garantera att de fiskerttigheter som avtalet ger utnyttjas effektivt.
Possible solutions that could be considered include the lodging of guarantees, payment of higher advances by the shipowners, or payment, by either the Commission or the shipowners, only for actual catches. 
Bland tnkbara lsningar kan nmnas utstllande av garantier, hjda frskottsbetalningar fr fartygsgarna samt betalningar endast p basis av faktiska fngster bde fr kommissionen och fartygsgare.
The intended purpose of the agreements 56. 
Avtalens ndaml 56.
Somefisheriesagreementsincludeacommercialaspect,i.e. an access fee, whilst at the same time being intended to contribute to the development of the fishing sector in the third country. 
Vissa fiskeavtal omfattar en kommersiell del, dvs. rtten att utnyttja fiskresurserna mot betalning, samtidigt som avtalen skall bidra till utvecklingen av tredje lnders fiskerisektorer.
In some cases, the development aid funds are additional to the financial compensation, a practice which is contrary to the principle of budgetary specification. 
Ibland kompletterar utvecklingsbistnd den ekonomiska ersttningen, vilket strider mot budgetprincipen om specificering.
The intended purposes of two Com-munitypoliciesarethuscloselyintertwined,makingitdifficultto The Commission currently finances about 80 % of the cost 
Kommissionen finansierar fr nrvarande cirka 80 % av kost-
C 210/12 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 27.7.2001 assess what impact they each have. 
C 210/12 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 27.7.2001 frsvrar utvrderingen av deras respektive effekter.
The inclusion of development activitiesinanagreementofacommercialnaturemakesiteven harder to distinguish between the responsibilities of the Commission and those of the third countries (see paragraphs 37 to 39). fleets concerned and make provision for the necessary accom-panyingmeasures. 
Att utvecklingsbistnd ingr i ett kommersiellt avtal bidrar till att ansvarsfrdelningen mellan kommissionen och tredje land blir otydlig (se punkterna 37Đ39). fiskeripolitik, inleda en effektiv omstrukturering av gemenskapens fiskeflottor i frga och vidta de stdtgrder som r ndvndiga.
Management shortcomings 58. 
Brister i frvaltningen 58.
The present management of the fisheries agreements by the Commission departments is purely administrative. 
Kommissionsavdelningarnas nuvarande frvaltning av fiskeavtalen r helt och hllet administrativ.
It lacks consistency, mainly because of the intertwining of the aims of most of the agreements and because their legal framework is not very strict (see paragraphs 42 to 46). 
Den knnetecknas av bristande samordning som bl.a. beror p att mlsttningarna r otydliga i de flesta avtalen och att de i juridiskt hnseende inte r direktbindande(sepunkterna42Đ46).
The Commission should ensure the reciprocal application of the agreements and, if need be, make them stricter (clause stipulating checks or payment dependent on the progress made). 
Kommissionen br se till att avtalen tillmpas msesidigt och vid behov frstrka deras juridiskt bindande karaktr (bestmmelse om kontroll eller betalning beroende p vilka framsteg som gjorts).
Control shortcomings 59. 
Brister i kontrollen 59.
The Court has identified a number of weaknesses in the inspection activities carried out by the Commission and by the MemberStates(seeparagraphs47to52). 
Revisionsrtten har identifierat ett antal svagheter vad gller kommissionens och medlemsstaternas kontroller (se punkterna 47Đ52).
Ń The Commission and the Member States should be encouraged to work together on drawing up guidelines on the detailed arrangements for the checks to be carried out by the Member States. 
Ń Kommissionen och medlemsstaterna br uppmuntras till att samordna riktlinjerna fr hur kontrollerna i detalj skall utfras av medlemsstaterna.
The inspection and monitoring activities carried out by the Commission departments could be more effective if objectives were set, the activities better planned andifpreviousfindingswerefollowupmoreclosely. 
Kommissionsavdelningarnas kontroll och uppfljning skulle kunna bli effektivare om man faststllde ml, planerade tgrderna och bttre fljde upp tidigare konstateranden.
Ń If a clearer distinction were to be made between these two intended purposes, it would be possible to measure their costs and benefits, to compare these agreements on the same basis and to identify those which were most burdensome. 
Ń En tydligare uppdelning mellan dessa tv mlsttningar skulle gra det mjligt att mta kostnader och frdelar, att jmfra avtalen p samma grunder och identifiera dem som kostar mest.
It is essential that their various aims be defined and translated into practice. 
Det r av yttersta vikt att deras huvudsakliga ml definieras och omstts i praktiken.
The Commission departments should take action to ensure that the various Community policies are consistent with one another. 
Kommissionens avdelningar br vidta tgrder fr att se till att gemenskapens olika politikomrden samordnas.
However, their impact on the supply to the market and on employment is not systematically analysed and the Commission does not have any up-to-date figures. 
Deras effekter p frsrjningen av marknaden och p sysselsttningen analyseras emellertid inte systematiskt och kommissionen har inte tillgng till uppdaterad, korrekt information.
There could be greater consistency between the common fisheries policyŐs structural aspect and the international fisheries agreements (see paragraphs28to36). 
Samordningen mellan de strukturella aspekterna och de internationella fiskeavtalen br frbttras (se punkterna 28Đ36).
This strategy should also be based on an analysis of changing trends whose impact could prove to be important (for example, the depletion of fish stocks). 
Strategin br ocks grundas p analyser av utvecklingstendenser med betydande effekter (t.ex. minskande fiskbestnd).
This would make it possible to anticipate the intervention measures that needed to be taken by the public authorities. 
P s stt skulle de tgrder som krvs av de offentliga myndigheterna kunna frutses.
When the Commission finds that a third country has been able to develop its own fishing sector, the Community, in partnership with this third country, should promote a sustainable fishingpolicy,startrestructuringtheCommunityfishing The international fisheries agreements have to a certain extent This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its meeting of 6 and 7 June 2001. 
Nr kommissionen konstaterar att ett tredje land har kunnat utveckla sin egen fiskerisektor br gemenskapen, tillsammans med landet i frga, arbeta fr en hllbar De internationella fiskeavtalen har i viss grad bidragit till att Denna rapport har antagits av revisionsrtten vid dess sammantrde i Luxemburg den 6 och 7 juni 2001.