natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Even though the EU has provided 96.5 million euro to upgrade the conventional line, journeys from Brussels to Luxembourg 22 21 Article 22 of the CEF Regulation, and Article 38(3) of the TEN-T Regulation. currently take up to 3 hours and 17 minutes. 
Fastn EU har anslagit 96,5 miljoner euro fr att bygga om den konventionella banan tar resor frn Bryssel till Luxemburg fr nrvarande upp till tre timmar och 17 minuter.
This is more than twice the objective set in 2003, and almost one hour slower than in 1980, when the same distance was covered in 2 hours and 26 minutes. 
Detta r mer n dubbelt s lng tid som det ml som faststlldes 2003, och nstan en timme lngsammare n 1980 d samma strcka tillryggalades p tv timmar och 26 minuter.
As a result, many potential passengers simply travel by road; (ii) Spain has invested in a new high-speed rail network. 
Till fljd av detta vljer mnga potentiella passagerare helt enkelt vgtransporter. ii) Spanien har investerat i ett nytt hghastighetsnt.
To support it in doing so, the EU has invested more than 14 billion euro in Spanish high-speed lines already since 1994. 
Fr att stdja Spanien i detta har EU redan investerat mer n 14 miljarder euro i spanska hghastighetsbanor sedan 1994.
Trains in Spain traditionally used a wider gauge than the rest of Europe, but for the most part, the Spanish high-speed network uses the standard gauge found in the rest of the EU. 
Tg i Spanien har traditionellt krts p en bredare sprvidd n i vriga Europa, men fr det mesta anvnds samma standardsprvidd som i resten av EU i det spanska hghastighetsntet.
However, three of the audited lines (the Eje Atlntico; part of the Madrid Đ Galicia high-speed line; and the Madrid Đ Extremadura high-speed line), still use the traditional wider gauge. 
P tre av de granskade banorna (Eje Atlntico, en del av hghastighetsbanan MadridĐGalicien, och hghastighetsbanan MadridĐ Extremadura) anvnds dock fortfarande den traditionella bredare sprvidden.
This impacts performance: the maximum operating speed is limited to 250 km/h (far below the maximum operating speed of 300 km/h for high-speed operations in Spain), and the services are provided either by wide-gauge rolling stock, or by specific variable-gauge trains. 
Detta inverkar p prestandan: hgsta krhastighet r begrnsad till 250 kilometer/timme (lngt under hgsta krhastighet p 300 kilometer/timme fr hghastighetstrafik i Spanien), och tjnsterna tillhandahlls antingen med rullande materiel fr bred sprvidd eller specifika tg som kan anpassas utifrn sprvidd.
These trains need Ňgauge changersÓ: there were 20 such gauge changers in Spain in January 2017. 
Fr dessa tg krvs ÓsprviddsvxlarÓ: i januari 2017 fanns det 20 sdana sprviddsvxlar i Spanien.
These gauge changers cost up to eight million euro each, and the EU provided 5.4 million euro in co-financing to support their construction. 
Sprviddsvxlarna kostar upp till tta miljoner euro per styck, och EU tillhandahll 5,4 miljoner euro i medfinansiering fr att stdja byggandet av dem.
Although international agreements have been signed to confirm the political will to establish connections, and although an incentive of 40 % co-funding is available under the CEF Regulation, Member States do not build high-speed lines if they are not considered a national priority, even if such a line is situated on a transnational corridor and is completing the core network. 
Trots att internationella avtal har undertecknats fr att bekrfta den politiska viljan att upprtta frbindelser, och trots att ett incitament som bestr i 40 % medfinansiering finns tillgngligt enligt FSE-frordningen, bygger medlemsstaterna inte hghastighetsbanor om de inte anses vara en nationell prioritet, ven om en sdan bana r belgen i en transnationell korridor och utgr en del av stomntet.
This limits the EU added value of the EU co-funding provided as cross-border links generate the highest EU added value. 
Detta begrnsar det europeiska mervrdet av EU:s medfinansiering, eftersom grnsverskridande frbindelser skapar det hgsta europeiska mervrdet.
In addition, when links are missing and not built on time, this may have a high cost for society23. 
Nr frbindelser saknas och inte byggs i tid kan det dessutom fra med sig hga kostnader fr samhllet23.
The Commission has no power to enforce cross-border projects 31. 
Kommissionen har ingen befogenhet att kontrollera efterlevnaden av grnsverskridande projekt 31.
Major cross-border high-speed rail projects require particular attention from the EU. 
Stora grnsverskridande hghastighetsbaneprojekt krver srskild uppmrksamhet frn EU.
The Commission currently lacks the necessary instruments to intervene effectively if delays on one side of a border hamper the timely use of high-speed rail infrastructure built on the other side of the border. 
Kommissionen saknar fr nrvarande ndvndiga instrument fr att ingripa p ett ndamlsenligt stt om frseningar p en sida av en grns frhindrar att hghastighetsinfrastrukturen som byggts p den andra sidan av grnsen tas i drift i tid.
Moreover, the possibilities for all stakeholders to oppose works are manifold, and may cause delays, or even to stop projects previously agreed upon. 
25 22 23 och kan orsaka frseningar eller till och med stoppa projekt som man tidigare har kommit verens om.
There were several examples noted where the outputs created in one Member State will not be effective for at least another two further decades, because of works not having been completed in a neighbouring Member State (see Box 1). 
Vi noterade flera exempel dr output i en medlemsstat inte kommer att vara ndamlsenlig frrn om minst tv rtionden, eftersom arbetet inte har slutfrts i en angrnsande medlemsstat (se ruta 1).
24 Box 1 Đ Poorly connected national networks, and their impact 1. 
26 Ruta 1 Đ Bristflligt sammanlnkade nationella nt och deras inverkan 1.
Munich-Veronastretch,andtheBrennerBaseTunnel(BBT):divergingconstructionpriorities and timescales between Austria, Italy and Germany led to a patchwork of different capacities and potential bottlenecks on the whole Scandinavian-Mediterranean corridor until at least 2040. 
StrckanMnchenĐVeronaochBrennerbastunneln(BBT):avvikandebyggprioriteringaroch tidsplaner mellan sterrike, Italien och Tyskland ledde till ett lapptcke av olika kapaciteter och potentiella flaskhalsar i hela korridoren SkandinavienĐMedelhavet fram till tminstone 2040.
To reduce the number of trucks crossing the Alps each day, the EU has been already investing in the BBT, a part of the ŇMunich Đ VeronaÓ stretch, since 198624. Austria and Italy have been building the tunnel with 1.58 billion euro of EU co-funding. 
Fr att minska antalet lastbilar som korsar alperna varje dag har EU redan investerat i BBT, en del av strckan MnchenĐVerona, sedan 198624. sterrike och Italien bygger tunneln med 1,58 miljarder euro i EU-medfinansiering.
Galleria di Base del Brennero Đ Brenner Basistunnel BBT SE - Asse Ferroviario Monaco Đ Verona; Elaborazione tecnica del progetto, Rapporto 2002; Eisenbahnachse Mnchen Đ Verona - Technische Aufbereitung, 2002. 
24 Galleria di Base del Brennero Đ Brenner Basistunnel BBT SE Đ Asse Ferroviario Monaco Đ Verona, Elaborazione tecnica del progetto, Rapporto 2002, Eisenbahnachse Mnchen Đ Verona Đ Technische Aufbereitung, 2002.
The tunnel works in Austria and Italy will be completed by 2027, but there is little construction activity on the northern access route, which is mostly in Germany. 
27 Tunnelarbetena i sterrike och Italien kommer att slutfras senast 2027, men byggverksamheten p den anslutande strckan norrifrn, som frmst ligger i Tyskland, r ringa.
The route has not even been designed yet, and will not be completed before 2035 (Austria), or even 2040 (Germany). 
Strckan har inte ens utformats nnu, och kommer inte att slutfras frrn 2035 ( sterrike) och s sent som 2040 (Tyskland).
Unlike Austria and Italy, Germany sees little interest in destinations such as Innsbruck or Verona, which do not play a key role for Germany for everyday working traffic. 
I motsats till sterrike och Italien har Tyskland inte ngot strre intresse av destinationer som Innsbruck eller Verona, som inte har ngon central roll i Tyskland nr det gller vardaglig arbetstrafik.
As a result, it has not made a priority of constructing the northern access route, even though the route supports the goal of establishing a core network by 2030. 
Till fljd av detta har Tyskland inte gjort det till en prioritet att bygga den anslutande strckan norrifrn, trots att den r en del av mlet att inrtta ett stomnt senast 2030.
This means that it will take more than half a century before the investments are actually used, and that more than 1,5 billion euro is considered largely ineffective for more than two decades. 2. 
Detta innebr att det kommer att ta mer n ett halvt rhundrade innan investeringarna faktiskt anvnds, och att mer n 1,5 miljarder euro betraktas som i stort sett ondamlsenliga under mer n tv rtionden. 2.
Portugal-Spainconnection(Extremadura) A high-speed rail connection was planned to connect Lisbon and Madrid. 
FrbindelsenPortugalĐSpanien(Extremadura) En frbindelse med hghastighetsbana planerades fr att lnka samman Lissabon och Madrid.
Despite 43 million euro of EU co-funding already having been paid to Portugal for studies and preparatory works, no high-speed cross-border rail connection is available. 
Trots att 43 miljoner euro av EU-medfinansiering redan har betalats ut till Portugal fr studier och frberedande arbete finns det ingen grnsverskridande hghastighetsfrbindelse.
The conventional rail line stops in Evora. 
Den konventionella jrnvgsbanan slutar i vora.
At the time of the audit, the works on the Portuguese side had started, while the works on the high-speed line on the Spanish side stopped about six kilometres from the border, as indicated by the arrow in Picture 1. 
Vid tidpunkten fr revisionen hade arbetena p den portugisiska sidan inletts, medan arbetena med hghastighetsbanan p den spanska sidan slutade ungefr sex kilometer frn grnsen, ssom visas av pilen i bild 1.
Even though the policy framework was particularly geared towards completing the core network by 203025, many policy weaknesses remain to be tackled. 
Trots att den politiska ramen srskilt inriktades p att slutfra stomntet senast 203025 finns det fortfarande mnga brister att ta itu med.
For example, when assessing the cross-border works for the Brenner Base Tunnel (BBT), we noted the following. (i) Procurement is a major issue for cross-border TEN-T projects: there are no guidelines on how to reduce inherent procedural risks; there is no single legal framework for cross-border projects; tendering documents, contracts and accounting systems differ, also in their language, for works on Austrian and Italian territory; the procedures for settling disputes are not the same. (ii) There are no simplified procedures to facilitate and accelerate implementation (e.g. Ňone-stop shopsÓ, as already suggested by the Court in Special Report No 23/201626); there is no single body streamlining the formalities on both sides of Article 38(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013. 
Nr vi bedmde de grnsverskridande anlggningsarbetena fr Brennerbastunneln (BBT) noterade vi till exempel fljande: i) Upphandling r ett stort problem fr grnsverskridande TEN-T-projekt: det finns inga riktlinjer fr hur man ska minska de inneboende frfarandemssiga riskerna, det finns ingen gemensam rttslig ram fr grnsverskridande projekt, upphandlingsdokument, kontrakt och redovisningssystem skiljer sig t, ven nr det gller sprk, fr anlggningsarbeten p sterrikes och Italiens territorium, och frfarandena fr att lsa tvister r inte desamma. ii) Det finns inga frenklade frfaranden fr att underltta och pskynda genomfrandet (t.ex.
As most of these constructions are backed up by international agreements between the Member States concerned and the EU, and since the high-speed lines are on international corridors, the progress of works is supervised by EU co-ordinators at corridor level and examined in Ňcorridor forumsÓ. 
Eftersom de flesta av dessa byggen har std av internationella avtal mellan berrda medlemsstater och EU, och eftersom hghastighetsbanorna terfinns i internationella korridorer, vervakas arbetenas framsteg av EU-samordnare p korridorsniv och granskas i ÓkorridorforumÓ.
These coordinators have a privileged view of what is, or is not, working along a corridor (and they report regularly on the changes needed27), but they also have no legal power. 
Samordnarna har en verlgsen versikt ver vad som fungerar i en korridor, och vad som inte gr det, (och de rapporterar regelbundet om de frndringar som krvs27), men de har inte ngon lagstiftande befogenhet.
In addition to lacking coordination of cross-border implementation, a number of other aspects are lacking: (i) there are no Ňsingle-corridor entitiesÓ to monitor results and impacts on a long term basis for future high-speed rail investments; (ii) there is no time-barring to limit the quantity and duration of legal or administrative action, and no single entity for hearing appeals; and (iii) the assessment of progress of works on a corridor is based on common key performance indicators which are still output-based28. 
Utver bristande samordning av grnsverskridande genomfrande saknas ett antal andra aspekter: i) Det finns inte ngra Óenheter fr enskilda korridorerÓ som vervakar Artikel 38.3 i frordning (EU) nr 1315/2013.
Special Report No 23/2016 ŇMaritime transport in the EU: in troubled waters Đ much ineffective and unsustainable investmentÓ. 
Srskild rapport nr 23/2016 Sjtransporten inom EU: p stormigt hav Đ till stora delar ondamlsenliga och ohllbara investeringar.
Decision-making lacks reliable cost-benefit analyses ŇVery high speedÓ is not needed everywhere 37. 
Beslutsfattandet saknar tillfrlitliga lnsamhetsanalyser ÓMycket hg hastighetÓ behvs inte verallt 37.
High-speed rail infrastructure is expensive: on average, the lines we audited cost 25 million euro per km (not taking into account the more expensive tunnelling projects), with the overall costs for the BBT as high as 145 million euro per km. 
P de banor vi granskade var kostnaden i genomsnitt 25 miljoner euro per kilometer (ej inrknat de dyrare tunnelprojekten), med totalkostnader fr Brennerbastunneln p s mycket som 145 miljoner euro per km.
Costs are rising over time: the most recent constructions (Milan-Venice and Stuttgart-Munich) are indicating values above 40 million euro per km because of scarcity of land, the crossing of urban nodes, viaducts and extensive tunnelling. 
Kostnaderna kar med tiden: i de senaste byggena (MilanoĐ Venedig och StuttgartĐMnchen) uppgr kostnaderna till mer n 40 miljoner euro per km p grund av bristen p mark, korsning av urbana knutpunkter, viadukter och omfattande tunnlar.
However, costs could be lower with little impact on rail operations. 
Dock skulle kostnaderna kunna snkas med liten pverkan p jrnvgstrafiken.
High speeds are clearly an important characteristic of high-speed rail30: they are the factor which allows high-speed rail to compete with air travel and balances the ease of using a private vehicle for the last few miles of a journey. 
Hga hastigheter r en viktig egenskap hos hghastighetstrafiken p jrnvg30: det r det som gr att hghastighetsjrnvgen kan konkurrera med flygtrafiken och kompensera fr bekvmligheten med att anvnda egen bil de sista kilometrarna av en resa.
The performance of the high-speed rail system is, however, not only determined by the maximum theoretical speed which can be achieved on a line, but also by the real speed which travellers experience. 
hos jrnvgssystemet fr hghastighetstrafik bestms dock inte bara av den hgsta teoretiska hastigheten som kan uppns p en bana, utan ocks av den faktiska hastigheten fr resenrerna.
We therefore analysed the Ňspeed yieldÓ on the audited high-speed lines, focusing on total travel times and average speeds. 
Vi analyserade drfr ÓhastighetsutnyttjandetÓ p de granskade hghastighetsbanorna med fokus p totala restider och genomsnittshastigheter.
Investment in high speed lines is only justified if high-speed yields can be achieved: the larger the population base (future demand) and the greater the travel time elasticity31 and speed yield, the greater the benefits of developing a high-speed line. 
Investeringar i hghastighetsbanor r endast berttigade om ett hgt hastighetsutnyttjande kan uppns: ju strre befolkningsbas (framtida efterfrgan), restidselasticitet31 och hastighetsutnyttjande, desto strre frdelar med att utveckla en hghastighetsbana.
This analysis of the speed yields on the lines we audited (Annex V) indicated that, on average along the course of a line, trains run at only around 45 % of the lineŐs design speed. 
Enligt den hr analysen av hastighetsutnyttjandet p de banor som vi granskade (bilaga V) kr tgen i genomsnitt med bara cirka 45 % av den hastighet som banan r byggd fr.
Only two lines operate at average speeds of more than 200 km/h, and no lines operate at an average speed above 250 km/h. 
Endast tv banor har genomsnittliga hastigheter p ver 200 km/h och inga banor har en genomsnittlig hastighet p ver 250 km/h.
The cross-border Figueres-Perpignan section also only operates at 36 % of its design speed, because it accommodates mixed traffic. 
Den grnsvergripande strckan FigueresĐPerpignan krs med en hastighet p endast 36 % av den hastighet som banan r byggd fr, eftersom blandad trafik krs p banan.
Average speed so far below the design speed indicates that an upgraded conventional line would have been enough to achieve the objectives set, at a much lower cost and raises questions as to sound financial management. 
En genomsnittlig hastighet som ligger s lngt under den hastighet som banan r byggd fr innebr att en ombyggd konventionell bana hade rckt fr att uppn de uppsatta mlen, till en mycket lgre kostnad, vilket vcker frgor om sund ekonomisk frvaltning.
Lines with maximum speeds of up to 160 km/h are at least 5 % cheaper to build than lines with speeds above that limit. 
Banor med hgsta hastigheter p upp till 160 km/h kostar minst 5 % mindre att bygga n banor med hastigheter ver denna grns.
This means that tunnels need to be wider, which is more expensive. 
Det innebr att tunnlar mste vara bredare, vilket r dyrare.
Also, the cost of a ŇmixedÓ high-speed line (combined passenger and freight traffic) is higher than for a passenger-only high-speed line, as gradients and curve radiuses make corridor alignments less flexible, and usually these need more land. 
Dessutom r kostnaden fr en ÓblandadÓ hghastighetsbana (kombinerad person-och godstrafik) hgre n fr en hghastighetsbana fr endast persontrafik, eftersom gradienter och kurvradier gr korridordragningen mindre flexibel, och en blandad hghastighetsbana krver vanligen mer mark.
Maintenance costs for mixed lines will also be higher, as more intensive use is made of the infrastructure. 
Underhllskostnaderna fr blandade banor r ocks hgre eftersom infrastrukturen anvnds mer intensivt.
A study indicated this difference to be up to 5 %, and up to 13 % if the passenger-only line is limited to a speed of 250 km/h (Figure 5). 
Enligt en studie r skillnaden upp till 5 %, och upp till 13 % om hastigheten p en bana fr endast persontrafik begrnsas till 250 km/h (figur 5).
29 Figure 5 - Differences in construction costs of high-speed lines 30 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% 100 % 95 % 95 % 92 % 91 % 87 % 350 KM/H M I X E D 350 KM/H P A S S E N G ER 300 KM/H M I X E D 250 KM/H M I X E D 300 KM/H P A S S E N G ER 250 KM/H P A S S E N G ER Source: 2009 RAVE Study of 5.8.2009 of the University of Lisbon; comparison with a mixed 350 km/h high-speed line (100 baseline). 
Figur 5 Đ Skillnader i byggkostnader fr hghastighetsbanor 31 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% 100 % 95 % 95 % 92 % 91 % 87 % 350 KM/H BLANDAD 350 KM/H PASSAGERARE 300 KM/H BLANDAD 250 KM/H BLANDAD 300 KM/H PASSAGERARE PASSAGERARE 250 KM/H Klla: 2009 RAVE-studie, 5.8.2009, Lissabons universitet, jmfrelse med en blandad hghastighetsbana fr 350 km/h (utgngsvrde: 100).
Choosing the most appropriate option can save millions of euros. 
Att vlja rtt alternativ kan spara miljontals euro.
This is not justified by the speed data: there are currently 13 stops on the conventional rail line between Munich and Verona with 41 minutes of stopping time at stations (12.6 % of total travel time). 
Detta berttigas inte av uppgifterna om hastigheten: det finns just nu 13 stationer p den konventionella jrnvgen mellan Mnchen och Verona med 41 minuters stillastende p stationerna (12,6 % av den totala restiden).
At present, the journey from Munich to Verona for passengers takes 5 hours and 24 minutes. Even if the travel time should come down to around 3.5 hours once the Brenner high-speed line is completed, the average speed on this line will still be just 115 km/h, still too low to provide a convincing argument for building a fully fledged high-speed line. 
Just nu tar resan mellan Mnchen och Verona passagerarna fem timmar och 24 minuter. ven om restiden minskar till kring 3,5 timmar nr Brenner-hghastighetsbanan r klar blir den genomsnittliga hastigheten p banan bara 115 km/h, vilket fortfarande r fr lgt fr att vara ett vertygande argument fr att bygga en fullfjdrad hghastighetsbana.
Cost-efficiency checks are rare 45. 
Kontroller av kostnadseffektivitet r sllsynta 45.
High-speed rail infrastructure is more costly than conventional rail, both to build and to maintain. 
Jrnvgsinfrastruktur fr hghastighetstrafik kostar mer n konventionell jrnvg, bde att bygga och att underhlla.
In given circumstances, however, very high-speed services, operating at 300 km/h or more, may provide limited additional travel time savings, compared to trains running on upgraded conventional lines. 
Under vissa omstndigheter kan dock trafik med mycket hga hastigheter, 300 km/h eller mer, ge begrnsade ytterligare restidsminskningar jmfrt med jrnvgstrafik p ombyggda konventionella banor.
Therefore, the option of upgrading existing conventional lines to increase speeds, rather than building a very high-speed line, should also be considered, as it could result in significant cost savings. 
Drfr br alternativet att bygga om konventionella banor fr att ka hastigheterna, i stllet fr att bygga banor fr mycket hga hastigheter, ocks vervgas eftersom det kan ge avsevrda kostnadsbesparingar.
A good practice exists in Italy and Germany: projects for which a preparatory phase has already been launched or legal obligations have arisen are re-assessed before each new programming phase to verify that their features still address current needs. 
God praxis finns i Italien och Tyskland: projekt vars frberedande fas redan har inletts eller dr rttsliga skyldigheter har uppsttt omprvas fre varje ny programmeringsfas fr att skerstlla att egenskaperna fortfarande motsvarar det aktuella behovet.
This project review process highlights how design choices lead to substantial savings with limited impact on performance. 
Den hr processen fr att granska projekt framhller hur utformningsval leder till avsevrda besparingar som har liten effekt p prestandan.
For example, the project review carried out for the Venice-Trieste section concluded that configuring the line differently could save 5.7 billion euro but add just 10 minutes to the trip, i.e. a saving of 570 million euro for each additional minute of travel time (Table 3). 
Exempelvis drogs i projektgranskningen av strckan VenedigĐTrieste slutsatsen att en annan konfiguration av banan skulle kunna spara 5,7 miljarder euro och bara gra resan tio minuter lngre, dvs. en besparing p 570 miljoner euro fr varje extra resminut (tabell 3). 32