natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The selection procedure was not based on specific selection criteria and did not result in a ranking of projects. 
Urvalsfrfarandet byggde inte p ngra srskilda urvalskriterier och ledde inte till att projekten rangordnades.
Germany (Saxony) The selection of projects under measures 321 and 322 was generally19 carried out at two subsequent levels: first at local level by ‘coordination groups’, and then at central level by the managing authority. 
Tyskland (Sachsen) Urvalet av projekt inom tgrderna 321 och 322 gjordes i regel19 p tv p varandra fljande niver: frst lokalt av ÓsammanordningsgrupperÓ och sedan centralt av frvaltningsmyndigheten.
The managing authority provided coordination groups their own dedicated budget under which they could fund projects. 
Frvaltningsmyndigheten gav samordningsgrupperna en egen srskild budget inom vilken de kunde finansiera projekt.
Project applications could be passed on to the central level only if they received a positive vote from the coordination group. 
Projektan-skningarna kunde g vidare till den centrala nivn endast om de fick ett positivt omdme av samordningsgruppen.
19 Only in exceptional cases (e.g. temporary direct funding for school projects) was project selection carried out directly at central level by the managing authority. 
19 Endast i undantagsfall (t.ex. tillfllig direkt finansiering till skolprojekt) gjordes projekturvalet direkt centralt av frvaltningsmyndigheten.
47 Poland did not set selection criteria under measure 125, which finances water infrastructure to protect agricultural land from floods. 
47 Polen faststllde inga urvalskriterier inom tgrd 125, som finansierar vatteninfrastruktur som skyddar jordbruksmark frn versvmningar.
In this context, the managing authority did not prioritise the most cost-effective projects; for example, two projects were both approved although their cost-effectiveness ratio was vastly different (150 euro compared to almost 10 000 euro of public support per protected ha). 
Frvaltningsmyndigheten prioriterade inte de kostnadseffektivaste projekten Đ t.ex. godkndes tv projekt trots att det var mycket stor skillnad p projektens kostnadsnyttofrhllande (150 euro jmfrt med nstan 10 000 euro i offentligt std per skyddad ha).
48 Examples were identified where selection criteria were established (in Italy (Sicily), Poland and Romania). 
48 Vi hittade exempel p nr urvalskriterier hade faststllts (i Italien (Sicilien), Polen och Rumnien).
However, in Italy (Sicily), the selection criteria were effectively applied only under sub-measure 125-A, as all eligible projects were approved under the other audited measures. 
Men i Italien (Sicilien) tillmpades urvalskriterierna i praktiken endast inom deltgrd 125-A eftersom alla stdberttigande projekt godkndes inom de andra tgrder som granskades.
In Poland and Romania, the selection criteria were generally in line with RDP objectives and a minimum threshold was used to ensure the quality of the selected projects. 
I Polen och Rumnien stmde urvalskriterierna i regel verens med mlen i landsbygdsprogrammen och man anvnde ett minsta trskelvrde fr att garantera kvaliteten p de utvalda projekten.
However, the selection criteria were not always related to the projects’ contribution to the RDP objectives (see Box 9). 
Urvalskriterierna gllde dock inte alltid projektens bidrag till mlen i landsbygdsprogrammen (se ruta 9).
Observations 28 Examples of selection criteria which did not prioritise the projects based on their contribution to RDP objectives Poland A selection criterion used under measures 322/323 was designed to first promote larger projects and then (later in the programming period) smaller projects, with the aim of ‘ensuring balanced access to EU funds’. 
Iakttagelser 28 Exempel p urvalskriterier som inte prioriterade projekt utifrn deras bidrag till mlen i landsbygdsprogrammet Polen Ett urvalskriterium som anvndes inom tgrderna 322/323 var utformat s att det frst frmjade strre projekt och sedan (senare under programperioden) mindre projekt fr att man skulle Ógarantera jmn tillgng till EU-medelÓ.
This was not stated in the RDP. 
Detta nmndes inte i landsbygdsprogrammet.
Italy (Sicily) Under sub-measure 125-B, which finances irrigation systems, the selection criteria were not quantifiable and did not prioritise projects aimed at saving water in areas where there was a greater need to reduce water losses. 
Italien (Sicilien) Inom deltgrd 125-B, som finansierar bevattningssystem, var urvalskriterierna inte kvantifierbara och prioriterade inte projekt som syftade till att spara p vattnet i omrden dr det fanns ett strre behov av att minska vattenfrlusterna.
This led to the high ranking of projects in areas not affected by water shortages and the low ranking of projects in areas affected by a serious lack of water. 
Det ledde till att projekt i omrden som inte var drabbade av vattenbrist rankades hgt och till att projekt i omrden som var drabbade av allvarlig vattenbrist rankades lgt.
Romania A selection criterion under measure 322 prioritised applicants that had not previously received EU support for a similar investment, although this criterion did not reflect the extent to which the project met the RDP objectives. 
Rumnien Ett urvalskriterium inom tgrd 322 prioriterade skande som inte tidigare hade ftt EU-std fr en liknande investering, trots att detta kriterium inte speglade i vilken omfattning projektet uppfyllde mlen i landsbygdsprogrammet.
49 Cost-effectiveness criteria prioritising projects offering the highest value for money were identified only in Germany (Saxony) (see Box 10), although these were not applied in practice. 
49 Endast i Tyskland (Sachsen) hittade vi exempel p kriterier avseende kostnadseffektivitet som prioriterade de projekt som gav strst valuta fr pengarna (se ruta 10), men de tillmpades inte i praktiken.
An example of cost-effectiveness criterion being set, but not applied in practice Germany (Saxony) Under measure 125, the German authorities set four selection criteria, to be applied to the population of eligible projects in the case of insufficient budget. 
Ett exempel p att ett kriterium avseende kostnadseffektivitet faststlldes men inte tillmpades i praktiken Tyskland (Sachsen) Inom tgrd 125 faststllde de tyska myndigheterna fyra urvalskriterier som skulle tillmpas p populationen av stdberttigande projekt om budgeten inte skulle rcka.
One of them was a simple cost-effectiveness ratio which prioritised projects costing less per linear metre of forest road built. 
Ett av dem var ett enkelt kostnadsnyttofrhllande som prioriterade projekt som kostade mindre per lpmeter anlagd skogsvg.
However, once the deadline for receiving project applications had elapsed (towards the end of the 2007-2013 programming period), additional funds were shifted to measure 125. 
Men nr tidsfristen fr att ta emot projektanskningar hade gtt ut (mot slutet av programperioden 2007Đ2013) flyttades kompletterande medel ver till tgrd 125.
With sufficient budgetary resources available, all applications were granted funding, and so the ranking produced using this selection criterion was never put into effect. 
Eftersom tillrckliga budgetresurser fanns tillgngliga beviljades alla anskningar finansiering, vilket innebar att den rangordning som gjordes med hjlp av urvalskriteriet aldrig anvndes i praktiken.
Box 10 Box 9 
Ruta 10 Ruta 9
Observations 29 Checks on the reasonableness of costs and public procurement procedures did not effectively limit the risk of excessive project costs 50 High aid rates, which are common in infrastructure measures, result in little or no risk for project promoters. 
Iakttagelser 29 Kontrollerna av kostnadernas rimlighet och frfarandena fr offentlig upphandling begrnsade inte risken fr alltfr stora projektkostnader p ett ndamlsenligt stt 50 Hga stdsatser, som r vanliga inom infrastrukturtgrder, innebr liten eller ingen risk alls fr de projektansvariga, vilket minskar incitamentet att begrnsa projektkostnaderna.
It is therefore particularly important that Member States establish proportionate requirements and checks for ensuring reasonableness of costs. 
Drfr r det srskilt viktigt att medlemsstaterna faststller proportionerliga krav och kontroller fr att frskra sig om att kostnaderna r rimliga.
The Member States audited generally relied on the use of reference prices and public procurement procedures to ensure the reasonableness of the investment costs20. 
De granskade medlemsstaterna frlitade sig i allmnhet p att anvndningen av referenspriser och frfaranden fr offentlig upphandling skulle garantera att investeringskostnaderna var rimli-ga20.
However, these tools were not adequately applied, as the Court has already noted in its previous reports21. 
Men de verktygen anvndes inte korrekt, vilket vi redan har konstaterat i tidigare rapporter21.
Details of the main weaknesses identified by this audit are provided below. 
Nedan finns nrmare uppgifter om de strsta brister som vi konstaterade vid revisionen.
51 Although widely used, the systems based on reference prices had serious limitations, mainly because the reference prices were provided by construction companies and were thus likely to overstate the real market prices following negotiations or competitive tenders. 
51 De system som grundas p referenspriser hade stora begrnsningar, ven om de anvndes flitigt, framfr allt drfr att referenspriserna tillhandahlls av byggnadsfretag och drmed sannolikt lg ver de reella marknadspriserna efter frhandlingar eller konkurrensutsatta upphandlingar.
In Spain (Extremadura), Italy (Sicily) and Poland, the audit identified that average savings of 30 % to 40 % compared to the reference prices were normally obtained following a tender procedure. 
I Spanien (Extremadura), Italien (Sicilien) och Polen konstaterade vi vid revisionen att det i regel gick att gra besparingar p i genomsnitt 30Đ40 % jmfrt med referenspriserna efter ett anbudsfrfarande.
52 Only in Romania were reference prices established on the basis of actual transactions between the government and construction companies. 
52 Det var bara i Rumnien som referenspriser faststlldes p grundval av faktiska transaktioner mellan regeringen och byggnadsfretag.
Prices were, however, available only for a limited range of public works and had not been updated since 2009. 
Priser fanns dock endast tillgngliga fr ett begrnsat utbud av offentliga bygg-och anlggningsarbeten och hade inte uppdaterats sedan 2009.
The managing authority of Germany (Saxony) automatically accepted deviations of up to 50 % compared to the reference prices, without performing further inquiries. 
Frvaltningsmyndigheten i Tyskland (Sachsen) godknde automatiskt avvikelser p upp till 50 % frn referenspriserna utan att underska saken nrmare.
53 While the risk of using inflated reference prices may be mitigated when the final costs are established based on a fair, competitive tender, there is no safeguard for projects that are not subject to a competitive tender (as is the case for certain measures and beneficiaries in Spain (Extremadura) and Italy (Sicily)) and in cases where the public procurement procedures are affected by serious weaknesses. 
53 Risken fr uppdrivna referenspriser kan visserligen minskas nr de slutliga kostnaderna faststlls p grundval av ett rttvist konkurrensutsatt anbudsfrfarande, men det finns ingen garanti nr det gller projekt som inte har valts ut via ett konkurrensutsatt anbudsfrfarande (vilket r fallet med vissa tgrder och stdmottagare i Spanien (Extremadura) och Italien (Sicilien)) och i de fall dr frfarandena fr offentlig upphandling har allvarliga brister.
54 The audit identified several such weaknesses that hindered fair competition and the reasonableness of costs (see Box 11). 
54 Vid revisionen konstaterade vi flera sdana brister som medfrde att det inte gick att garantera en rttvis konkurrens och rimliga kostnader (se ruta 11).
20 Article 24(2)(d) of Commission Regulation (EU) No 65/2011 of 27 January 2011 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, as regards the implementation of control procedures as well as cross-compliance in respect of rural development support measures (OJ L 25, 28.1.2011, p. 
20 I artikel 24.2 d i kommissionens frordning (EU) nr 65/2011 av den 27 januari 2011 om till-lmpningsfreskrifter fr rdets frordning (EG) nr 1698/2005 vad gller kontroller och tvrvillkor i samband med std fr landsbygdsutveckling (EUT L 25, 28.1.2011, s.
8) specifies that Member States should verify the reasonableness of project costs submitted as part of the administrative checks on applications for support. 
8) anges att medlemsstaterna ska granska huruvida de angivna kostnaderna r rimliga som en del av de administrativa kontrollerna av stdanskningarna.
Furthermore, Article 24(2)(c) of the same regulation specifies that Member States should check the compliance of the operation for which support is requested with applicable national and Union rules on, in particular, and where relevant, public procurement, State aid and other appropriate obligatory standards established by national legislation or established in the rural development programme. 
I artikel 24.2 c i samma frordning anges dessutom att medlemsstaterna ska granska huruvida insatsen i frga, i de fall detta r relevant, r frenlig med nationella regler och EU-regler om offentlig upphandling, statligt std, andra obligatoriska normer i den nationella lagstiftningen eller i landsbygdsutvecklingsprogram- met.
21 ECA annual reports, Special Report No 6/2013 ‘Have the Member States and the Commission achieved value for money with the measures for diversifying the rural economy?’, Special Report No 22/2014 and Special Report No 23/2014, ‘Errors in rural development spending: what are the causes, and how are they being addressed?’ (http:// eca.europa.eu). 
21 Revisionsrttens rsrapporter, srskild rapport nr 6/2013 Har tgrderna fr att diversifiera ekonomin p landsbygden gett medlemsstaterna och kommissionen valuta fr pengarna?, srskild rapport nr 22/2014 och srskild rapport nr 23/2014 Fel i landsbygdsutvecklingsutgifter: Vad beror de p och hur tgrdas de? (http://eca.europa.eu).
Observations 30 Examples of public procurement procedures that hindered transparency, fair competition and reasonableness of costs Spain (Extremadura) The managing authority arbitrarily decided to award to a state-owned construction company contracts for 18 % (i.e. some 14 million euro) of the allocation to measure 125. 
Iakttagelser 30 Exempel p frfaranden fr offentlig upphandling som stod i vgen fr insyn, rttvis konkurrens och rimliga kostnader Spanien (Extremadura) Frvaltningsmyndigheten beslutade godtyckligt att tilldela ett statsgt byggnadsfretag kontrakt fr 18 % (eller cirka 14 miljoner euro) av anslaget till tgrd 125.
However, the authorities could not provide any evidence to support such justifications. 
Men myndigheterna kunde inte lgga fram ngra bevis som styrkte det.
The project costs were reimbursed based on a price list agreed between the company and the national authorities. 
Projektkostnaderna ersattes utifrn en prislista som fretaget och de nationella myndigheterna hade enats om.
While this procedure may be quicker than organising a tender, it does not ensure that the prices obtained are in line with market prices. 
Det hr frfarandet gr kanske snabbare n om man skulle anordna ett anbudsfrfarande, men det garanterar inte att de priser som man fr r i linje med marknadspriserna.
This was the case of an audited project, having an estimated cost of 11 million euro, for which 48 out of 100 scoring points were awarded based on vague criteria, such as ‘the knowledge of the project, the area and the quality of the proposal’, ‘the respect of safety rules’, ‘the environmental measures’ and ‘other improvement proposed’. 
Ocks nr formella anbudsfrfaranden anordnades var tilldelningskriterierna ibland otydliga och gick drfr inte att kontrollera. S var det i ett granskat projekt med en uppskattad kostnad p 11 miljoner euro som fick 48 av 100 pong utifrn vaga kriterier, t.ex.
Romania The audit also identified poorly defined award criteria. 
Rumnien Vid revisionen hittade vi ocks dligt definierade tilldelningskriterier.
For example, the ‘shortest duration of the works’ was used as an award criterion in 9 out of the 11 projects reviewed, without indicating acceptable timeframes or checking whether the proposed durations were realistic. 
Till exempel anvnde man kriteriet Ókor-tast tid fr att genomfra bygg-och anlggningsarbetenaÓ i nio av de elva granskade projekten utan att ange vad som var en acceptabel tidsram eller kontrollera om den freslagna tidstgngen var realistisk.
The duration indicated in the winning offers and subsequent contracts was largely exceeded in practice, with works lasting up to eight times longer than the contractual term (24 months instead of 3 months). 
Den tidstgng som angavs i de vinnande anbuden och efterfljande kontrakt verskreds kraftigt i praktiken: bygg-och anlggningsarbetena varade upp till tta gnger lngre n vad som hade angetts i kontraktsvillkoren (24 mnader i stllet fr tre).
Adverse weather conditions could only partially explain such delays. 
Ogynnsamma vderfrhllanden kunde endast delvis frklara dessa frseningar.
Italy (Sicily) Contracts for public works were awarded through competitive tenders using a methodology that resulted in the automatic exclusion of the lowest offers22, which were disregarded as ‘abnormal’ without further analysis. 
Italien (Sicilien) Kontrakten avseende offentliga bygg-och anlggningsarbeten tilldelades genom konkurrensutsatta anbudsfrfaranden dr man anvnde en metod som ledde till att de lgsta anbuden automatiskt uteslts22, vilka avfrdades och klassades som ÓavvikandeÓ utan ngon vidare analys.
This procedure did not allow for selection of the most economical offer and, in general, does not provide an incentive for the bidders to offer their lowest price. 
Frfarandet hindrade att det sparsammaste anbudet valdes ut och sporrar inte anbudsgivare att erbjuda sitt lgsta pris.
22 In line with Article 86.1 of the Italian public procurement law 163/2006, this procedure consists of four steps: (1) excluding the top and bottom 10 % of the offers received; (2) calculating the average of the ‘rebates’ (i.e. discounts as compared to the estimated value of the contract) of the remaining offers; (3) adding to this average the variance of the rebates which are above the average; and (4) awarding the tender to the offer proposing a rebate just under the value of the rebate as calculated after step 3. Box 11 
22 I enlighet med artikel 86.1 i Italiens lag om offentlig upphandling 163/2006 omfattar detta frfarande fyra steg: 1) utesluta 10 % av de hgsta och lgsta mottagna anbuden, 2) berkna genomsnittet fr rabatterna (dvs. nedsttningar jmfrt med det uppskattade vrdet p kontraktet) p de terstende anbuden, 3) till detta genomsnitt lgga de olika rabatter som ligger ver genomsnittet, 4) frdela kontraktet till den anbudsgivare som erbjuder en rabatt som ligger strax under vrdet p den rabatt som berknades efter steg 3. Box 11
Observations 31 Sustainability-related requirements did not take into account the useful life of the investments 55 The sustainability of financed investments is a key factor in achieving project and wider RDP objectives. 
Iakttagelser 31 Hllbarhetskrav tog ingen hnsyn till investeringarnas livslngd 55 De finansierade investeringarnas hllbarhet r central fr att projektmlen och de mer vidstrckta mlen i landsbygdsprogrammet ska uppns.
Sustainability is a particular concern with infrastructure investments due to their long expected useful life23, the large number of users, the need to ensure continued access to public services and the high costs associated with both the initial investment and subsequent maintenance. 
Hllbarhet r srskilt viktigt nr det gller infrastrukturinvesteringar med tanke p den lnga livslngd som frvn-tas23, det stora antalet anvndare, behovet av att garantera fortsatt tillgng till offentliga tjnster och de hga kostnader som det rr sig om bde vid den frsta investeringen och vid det efterfljande underhllet.
Various studies have shown that the costs of restoring infrastructure that has fallen into disrepair are much higher than the costs of retaining initial quality levels24. 
Olika underskningar har visat att kostnaderna fr att upprusta infrastruktur som har frfallit r mycket hgre n kostnaderna fr att upprtthlla den ursprungliga kvalitetsnivn24.
The benefits of adequate maintenance planning extend beyond financial considerations, as they also have an impact on the quality of life and safety standards. 
Frdelarna med lmplig planering fr underhll strcker sig lngre n finansiella vervganden eftersom de ven pverkar livskvaliteten och skerhetsnormer.
The existence of an adequate maintenance plan and a dedicated budget are therefore vital to the effectiveness of these investments. 
Att det finns en lmplig underhllsplan och en srskild budget r drfr avgrande fr att investeringarna ska bli ndmlsenliga.
56 None of the audited Member States had asked beneficiaries to submit a detailed maintenance plan setting out the regular and extraordinary maintenance requirements and costs. 
56 Ingen av de granskade medlemsstaterna hade bett stdmottagarna att lmna in en detaljerad underhllsplan med en beskrivning av kraven p och kostnaderna fr regelbundet och extra underhll.
Beneficiaries were not required to earmark funds for maintenance or to indicate the financing sources to be used. 
Stdmottagarna behvde inte ronmrka medel fr underhllet eller ange vilka finansieringskllor som skulle anvndas.
57 In Romania, the national audit office highlighted the potential unsustainability of RDP-funded investments in social and cultural infrastructure, as, once the project is complete, the beneficiaries may have difficulties in financing the related activities from the local budget. 
57 I Rumnien ppekade det nationella revisionsorganet att landsbygdsut-vecklingsfinansierade investeringar i social och kulturell infrastruktur kanske inte var hllbara eftersom stdmottagarna kan f svrt att finansiera de tillhrande verksamheterna frn den lokala budgeten nr projektet vl r avslutat.
This risk was subsequently confirmed, as the beneficiaries of more than half of the 191 projects checked by the paying agency in 2014 could not prove that the activities planned were actually carried out following the completion of the project. 
Denna risk bekrftades senare eftersom stdmottagarna i mer n hlften av de 191 projekt som granskades av det utbetalande organet 2014 inte kunde visa att de planerade verksamheterna verkligen bedrevs efter det att projektet hade avslutats.
58 The risk that project outputs and results may not be sustainable was also found in the case of rural roads in Italy (Sicily), where the managing authority intended to use the 2014-2020 RDP to support the rehabilitation costs for roads which had been built or rehabilitated using EU funds just some 10 years earlier25. 
58 Risken fr att projektens output och resultat kanske inte blir hllbara konstaterades ven nr det gllde landsvgar i Italien (Sicilien), dr frvaltningsmyndigheten tnkte anvnda landsbygdsprogrammet fr 2014Đ2020 till att ge std till upprustningskostnaderna fr vgar som hade byggts eller upprustats med hjlp av EU-medel bara cirka tio r tidigare25.
This suggests that roads may have deteriorated substantially in a relatively short timeframe due to a lack of adequate maintenance. 
Det tyder p att vgarna kan ha frsmrats kraftigt p relativt kort tid p grund av dligt underhll.