natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Through the APSA, the African Union (AU) and mandated sub-regional organisations (SROs) have access to tools which help them to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. 
Genom Apsa har AU och de bemyndigade subregionala organisationerna tillgng till verktyg som hjlper dem att frebygga, hantera och lsa konflikter.
In our audit, we examined the EUŐs support for the APSA. 
Vi granskade EU:s std till Apsa.
We assessed whether EU support was well designed and targeted, whether it contributed to sustainable results, and whether it was implemented well. 
Vi bedmde om EU:s std hade utformats och riktats vl, om det hade bidragit till bestende resultat och om det hade genomfrts vl.
We audited contracts whose total value exceeded Ű100 million, which were concluded by the Commission in the period from 2014 to 2016. 
Vi granskade kontrakt med ett totalt vrde p ver 100 miljoner euro som kommissionen hade ingtt mellan 2014 och 2016.
Overall we conclude that the EUŐs support for the APSA has had a poor effect and needed refocusing. 
Generellt drar vi slutsatsen att EU:s std till Apsa har haft mycket sm effekter och behver f en ny inriktning.
Although a broad strategic framework is in place, we found that EU support for APSA had long been focused on contributing to its basic operational costs. 
Trots att en bred strategisk ram har infrts konstaterade vi att EU:s std till Apsa lnge hade varit inriktat p att bidra till de grundlggande driftskostnaderna.
Due to weak financial ownership of the APSA by the African Union, the APSA has been for many years heavily dependent on the support of donors. 
Apsa har p grund av AU:s bristflliga ekonomiska egenansvar under mnga r varit starkt beroende av givarstd.
EU has financially contributed to the APSA's components, but the quality of the capacities of these components varies considerably and several challenges remain. 
EU har bidragit ekonomiskt till Apsas olika komponenter, men kvaliteten p komponenternas kapacitet varierar kraftigt, och mnga utmaningar kvarstr.
We found that the EU did not set clear priorities for EU support for the APSA and its strategy lacked a long-term vision for the evolution of its support. 
Vi konstaterade att EU inte hade faststllt tydliga kriterier fr sitt std till Apsa och att EU:s strategi saknade en lngsiktig vision fr hur det ska utvecklas.
The EU supported the AUŐs plans for achieving financial independence in order to be able to take on a growing proportion of operational costs for the APSA, but implementation was still at an early stage. 
EU stdde Afrikanska unionens planer p att bli ekonomiskt oberoende fr att kunna st fr en vxande andel av driftskostnaderna fr Apsa, men genomfrandet var nnu i sin linda.
V. We also found that six of the fourteen contracts we audited, which mainly concerned staff costs, had delivered most of the expected results by the time of the audit. 
V. Vi konstaterade ocks att sex av de 14 kontrakt som vi granskade, och som huvudsakligen gllde personalkostnader, hade levererat merparten av de frvntade resultaten vid tidpunkten fr revisionen.
Two had only partially and one had not delivered. 
Tv hade endast levererat delvis och ett hade inte levererat alls.
In five cases, implementation delays meant that we could not assess whether the contract had delivered or not. 
I fem fall innebar frseningar i genomfrandet att vi inte kunde bedma huruvida kontraktet hade uppfyllts.
3 hampered the delivery of the EUŐs support. 
genomfrandet av EU:s std.
During the period audited, financing instruments were not always used coherently. 
Under den granskade perioden anvndes inte alltid finansieringsinstrument konsekvent.
On the basis of the observations in this report, the Court recommends that: i. the Commission and the EEAS foster AU ownership of the APSA in order to achieve financial independence and refocus EU support away from supporting operational costs towards capacity-building measures, and ii. the Commission makes interventions consistently results-based, reduces delays in contracting and retroactive financing, improves monitoring and makes coherent use of financing instruments. 
Utifrn iakttagelserna i denna rapport rekommenderar revisionsrtten att i. kommissionen och Europeiska utrikestjnsten frmjar Afrikanska unionens egenansvar fr Apsa s att den kan bli ekonomiskt oberoende och riktar EU:s std till kapacitetsuppbyggande tgrder i stllet fr till driftskostnader, ii. kommissionen gr insatserna genomgende resultatbaserade, minskar frseningarna i kontraktstilldelningen och den retroaktiva finansieringen, frbttrar vervakningen och anvnder finansieringsinstrument p ett konsekvent stt. 3
INTRODUCTION The APSA 1. 
INLEDNING Apsa 1.
The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is a set of institutions, legislation and procedures designed to address conflict prevention and promote peace and security on the African continent. 
Den afrikanska freds-och skerhetsstrukturen (Apsa) r en uppsttning institutioner, lagar och frfaranden som syftar till att frebygga konflikter och frmja fred och skerhet p den afrikanska kontinenten.
The Constitutive Act of the African Union1 lays down the legal basis for the APSA. 
I Afrikanska unionens konstituerande akt1 anges den rttsliga grunden fr Apsa.
The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, adopted by the AU member states in 2002, defines its structure, objectives and principles. 
I protokollet om inrttandet av Afrikanska unionens freds-och skerhetsrd, som antogs av AU-medlemsstaterna 2002, faststlls dess organisation, ml och principer.
Ten African sub-regional organisations (SROs), to which their respective member states conferred a mandate to act in the area of peace and security, also play a role in the APSA. Eight are Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and two are Regional Mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution (RMs)2. 
Tio afrikanska subregionala organisationer, som berrda medlemsstater har gett mandat att agera p omrdet fred och skerhet, spelar ocks en roll i Apsa. tta r regionala ekonomiska gemenskaper (REC), och tv r regionala mekanismer fr frebyggande, hantering och lsning av konflikter (RM)2.
Cooperation between these organisations and the AU under the APSA are subject to the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity3. 
Samarbetet mellan dessa organisationer och AU inom Apsa omfattas av subsidiaritets-och komplementaritetsprinciperna3.
At the centre of the APSA is the Peace and Security Council, established by the AU member states as a Ňstanding decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflictsÓ. 
I centrum fr Apsa str freds-och skerhetsrdet som inrttats av AU:s medlemsstater som ett permanent beslutsorgan fr frebyggande, hantering och lsning av konflikter.
It is supported by the African Union Commission, a Panel of the The AU was created in 2000 as the successor to the Organisation for African Union. 
Det fr std av Afrikanska unionens kommission, en expertpanel, ett kontinentalt system fr tidig varning, en afrikansk beredskapsstyrka och en fredsfond4 (figur 1).
In 2017, all 55 African countries were members of the African Union. 
Alla 55 afrikanska lnder var medlemmar av Afrikanska unionen 2017.
RECs: The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
Regionala ekonomiska gemenskaper: Arabiska Maghrebunionen (AMU), Sahel-Saharalndernas gemenskap (CEN-SAD), Gemensamma marknaden fr stra och sdra Afrika (Comesa), stafrikanska gemenskapen (EAC), Centralafrikanska staternas ekonomiska gemenskap (Eccas), Vstafrikanska staters ekonomiska gemenskap (Ecowas), den mellanstatliga utvecklingsmyndigheten (Igad) och Sdra Afrikas utvecklingsgemenskap (SADC).
RMs: The Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) and the North African Regional Capability (NARC). 
Mekanismer fr frebyggande, hantering och lsning av konflikter: stra Afrikas mekanism fr samordning av reservtrupper (EASFCOM) och Nordafrikas freds-och skerhetskapacitet (NARC).
Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the area of peace and security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa, Article IV. 4 1 2 3 
Artikel IV i samfrstndsavtalet om samarbete inom omrdet fr fred och skerhet mellan Afrikanska unionen, de regionala ekonomiska gemenskaperna och samordningsmekanismerna fr stafrikas och Nordafrikas regionala beredskapsbrigader. 4 1 2 3 4 Enligt protokollet om inrttandet av Afrikanska unionens freds-och skerhetsrd.
Figure 1 - Components of the African Peace and Security Architecture at the level of the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) Standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts within the African Union African Union Commission (AUC) -> Support to the PSC and its subsidiary bodies -> Implementation and follow-up of PSC decisions -> Together with PSC, coordination of the SROs activities Panel of the Wise -> Support the PSC and AUC Chairperson, particularly in the area of conflict prevention -> Advice, mediation and preventive diplomacy Continental Early Warning System -> Facilitation of the anticipation and prevention of conflicts -> central observation & monitoring centre -> linked observation and monitoring units of the SROs African Standby Forces -> Standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components in their countries of origin -> Participate in Peace support missions decided on by the PSC or intervention authorized by the AU Assembly African Peace Fund -> to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security Source: European Court of Auditors based on the AU Protocol of 2002. 
Figur 1 Đ Den afrikanska freds-och skerhetsstrukturens olika komponenter p AU-niv Expertpanelen -> Std till PSC och ordfranden fr AUC, srskilt vad betrffar konfliktfrebyggande -> Rd, medling och frebyggande diplomati Kontinentalt system fr tidig varning -> Underlttar frutseende och frebyggande av konflikter -> Centralt observations-och vervakningscentrum -> Kopplar samman observations-och vervakningsenheter vid de subregionala organisationerna Klla: Europeiska revisionsrtten, baserat p AU-protokollet frn 2002.
The APSA aims to provide the framework and tools for the AU and SROs to play an active role in preventing and resolving conflicts in Africa, which have different causes (Box 1). 
Apsa ska ge AU och de afrikanska subregionala organisationerna en ram och verktyg s att de kan spela en aktiv roll fr att frebygga och lsa konflikter i Afrika som har olika orsaker (ruta 1).
6 Box 1 - The causes of conflicts According to the Institute of Security Studies, state weakness is the principal source of insecurity in Africa5. 
Ruta 1 Đ Konfliktorsaker Enligt institutet fr skerhetsstudier r svaga stater den frmsta orsaken till oskerheten i Afrika5.
Against that backdrop, individual conflicts are caused by a complex mix of factors, but three main triggers have been identified: government transitions, inter-state contestation, and violent extremist movements. 
6 enskilda konflikter av en komplex blandning av faktorer, men tre huvudsakliga utlsande faktorer har identifierats: regeringsskiften, mellanstatliga tvister och vldsbejakande extremistrrelser.
Contested government transitions are a major source of conflict. 
Omtvistade regeringsskiften r en viktig klla till konflikt.
There are huge financial benefits to holding elected office, and governance systems are often weak. 
De ekonomiska frdelarna med att vara frtroendevald r mycket stora, och frvaltningssystemen har ofta brister.
Violence associated with elections has increased in recent years. 
Vldet i samband med val har kat de senaste ren.
In Africa, antagonism between states (inter-state contestation) is common. 
Antagonism mellan stater (mellanstatliga tvister) r vanliga i Afrika.
Such antagonism often manifests itself in states supporting violence in adjacent countries in order to further their own political goals. 
Den tar sig ofta uttryck i att stater underblser vld i grannlnder fr att frmja sina egna politiska ml.
This may take the form of clandestine cross-border military operations, or the covert or open provision of support to insurgents on the other side of the border. 
Det kan ske i form av hemliga grnsverskridande militroperationer eller dolt eller ppet std till rebeller p andra sidan grnsen.
Many conflicts conventionally regarded as ŇinternalÓ are actually triggered or sustained by foreign influence of this kind. 
Mnga konflikter som traditionellt betraktas som ÓinternaÓ r i sjlva verket utlsta eller hlls vid liv genom utlndskt inflytande av detta slag.
Violent extremist movements cause a great deal of violent conflict in Africa. 
Vldsbejakande extremistrrelser ligger bakom en hel del vpnade konflikter i Afrika.
Once they gain a foothold, they tend to spread across borders: for example, violence by militants in Libya, Mali, north-eastern Nigeria, and Somalia has spread into neighbouring countries, with further attacks taking place in countries including Algeria, Burkina Faso, Kenya and Uganda6. 
Nr de har ftt fotfste tenderar de att sprida sig ver grnserna: till exempel har militanta gruppers vld i Libyen, Mali, nordstra Nigeria och Somalia spridits till grannlnderna, och ytterligare attacker har gt rum i till exempel Algeriet, Burkina Faso, Kenya och Uganda6.
The AU and the SROs intervened under the APSA framework in 28 out of the 67 violent conflicts (42 %) occurring in Africa during 2016. 
AU och de afrikanska subregionala organisationerna ingrep inom ramen fr Apsa i 28 av de 67 vpnade konflikter (42 %) som pgick i Afrika 2016.
The interventions took the form of diplomacy, mediation and peace-support operations, or a combination of the three. 
Ingripandena skedde i form av diplomati, medling och fredsfrmjande insatser, eller en kombination av alla tre.
Evaluations of these 28 interventions indicated that 21 of them were at least partly successful in either preventing or de-escalating conflict7 (Box 2). 
Utvrderingar av de 28 insatserna visade att 21 tminstone delvis hade lyckats frebygga en konflikt eller trappa ner konflikten i frga7 (ruta 2).
World Peace Foundation, "African Politics, African Peace", 2016. 
Eftersom detta inte ledde ngon vart, gav Ecowas order World Peace Foundation, African Politics, African Peace (afrikansk politik, afrikansk fred), 2016.
APSA Impact Report 2016, Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, October 2017. 
APSA Impact Report 2016 (Apsas effektrapport 2016), institutet fr freds-och skerhetsstudier, Addis Abebas universitet, oktober 2017.
The AU member states created the African Peace Fund to raise finance for the AU peace support missions and peace and security operational activities8. 
AU-medlemsstaterna inrttade den afrikanska fredsfonden fr att skaffa finansiering till AU:s fredsbevarande uppdrag och operativa verksamhet fr fred och skerhet8.
Funding was to come mainly from the AU budget, with the possibility of further funding in the form of voluntary contributions from other sources. 
Medlen skulle frmst komma frn AU:s budget, med mjlighet till ytterligare medel i form av frivilliga bidrag frn andra kllor.
However, fewer than half African states paid their contributions to the AU budget on time and in full9, resulting in a shortfall of 33 % over the 2011 to 2015 period10. 
Men frre n hlften av de afrikanska staterna betalade hela sitt bidrag till AU:s budget i tid9, vilket resulterade i ett underskott p 33 % under perioden 2011Đ201510.
As a result, donors fund much of the AU budget11 (54 % in 201712). 
Det har ftt till fljd att givare finansierar en stor del av AU:s budget11 (54 % r 201712).
In addition, only a small proportion of the AU budget is paid into the African Peace Fund. 
Dessutom gr endast en liten del av AU:s budget till den afrikanska fredsfonden.
The AU member states agreed to increase funding of the African Peace fund to 12 % of the AUŐs regular budget by 2014. 
AU:s medlemsstater beslutade att ka medlen till den afrikanska fredsfonden till 12 % av AU:s ordinarie budget senast 2014. r 2016 motsvarade dock det inbetalda beloppet 7 % av den ordinarie budgeten (dvs. mindre n 6 miljoner euro)13.
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article 21. 
Den innehller fem strategiska prioriteringar: Artikel 21 i protokollet om inrttandet av Afrikanska unionens freds-och skerhetsrd.
By December 2016, only 25 of the AUŐs 54 member states had paid their 2016 contributions in full. 
I december 2016 hade endast 25 av AU:s 54 medlemsstater betalat hela sitt bidrag fr 2016.
Source: H.E. Paul Kagame ŇReport on the Proposed Recommendations for the Institutional Reform of the African UnionÓ, 29 January 2017, p. 
Klla: H.E. Paul Kagame Report on the Proposed Recommendations for the Institutional Reform of the African Union (rapport om de freslagna rekommendationerna till institutionell reform av Afrikanska unionen), 29 januari 2017, s.
African Union, ŇBackground Paper on Implementing the Kigali Decision on Financing the UnionÓ, September 2016. 
Afrikanska unionen, Background Paper on Implementing the Kigali Decision on Financing the Union (bakgrundsdokument om genomfrandet av beslutet frn Kigali om finansiering av unionen), september 2016.
The AUŐs USD 446 million (around Ű395 million) annual budget (2017) corresponds to around 0.018 % of the AUŐs total GDP (Ű2.257 trillion in 2016). 
AU:s rliga budget (2017) p 446 miljoner US-dollar (cirka 395 miljoner euro) motsvarar omkring 0,018 % av AU:s totala BNP (2 257 miljarder euro 2016).
This excludes peace support operations in Somalia. 
Hri ingr inte fredsfrmjande insatser i Somalia.
See AU Executive Council Decision on the Budget of the African Union for the 2017 Financial Year, Doc. 
Se beslut frn AU:s verkstllande rd om Afrikanska unionens budget fr budgetret 2017, Doc.
AU Peace Fund, Securing Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa, August 2016. 
AU Peace Fund, Securing Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa (AU:s fredsfond, att skra frutsgbar och hllbar finansiering fr fred i Afrika), augusti 2016.
It has five strategic priorities: conflict prevention; crisis and conflict management; post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building; strategic security issues14; and coordination and partnerships within the APSA framework. 
8 konfliktfrebyggande, kris-och konflikthantering, teruppbyggnad efter konflikter och fredsskapande verksamhet, strategiska skerhetsfrgor14 och samordning och partnerskap inom Apsa-ramen.
EU support to the APSA 8. 
EU:s std till Apsa 8.
The EU identified peace and security on the African continent as one of its priorities and defined the core principles of its approach in 199615. 
EU beslutade att fred och skerhet p den afrikanska kontinenten r en prioritering och faststllde de grundlggande principerna fr sin politik 199615.
It has reiterated these principles and its own interest in focusing on peace and security on the African continent in several high-level conflict prevention and security strategies16, most recently in the 2016 EU Global Strategy17. In 2007, the AU and the EU launched the Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES) as a framework for cooperation and policy dialogue, and highlighted the importance of peace and security to both unions. 
EU har upprepat dessa principer och ppekat att man har ett egenintresse av att fokusera p fred och skerhet p den afrikanska kontinenten i flera hgnivstrategier fr konfliktfrebyggande och skerhet16, senast i EU:s globala strategi fr 201617. r 2007 antog AU och EU den gemensamma strategin EUĐAfrika som en ram fr samarbete och politisk dialog och understrk betydelsen av fred och skerhet fr bda unionerna.
Since then, the JAES action plans have prioritised making APSA operational. 
Sedan dess har man i handlingsplanerna fr den gemensamma strategin EUĐAfrika prioriterat att gra Apsa operativt.
The EU provides its financial support for the development of the APSA through the European Development Fund (EDF)18. 
EU ger sitt ekonomiska std till utvecklingen av Apsa genom Europeiska utvecklingsfonden (EUF)18.
The main channel of EDF support comes through the Strategic security issues include the illegal flow of small arms and light weapons; counter-improvised explosive device/explosives management; weapons of mass destruction disarmament and non-proliferation; counter-terrorism measures; illicit financial flows; the integration of AfricaŐs Integrated Maritime Strategy into APSA; and the combat of transnational organised crime and cyber-crime. 
De viktigaste kanalerna fr EUF-stdet r den fredsbevarande Strategiska skerhetsfrgor inbegriper det illegala fldet av handeldvapen och ltta vapen, bekmpning av improviserade sprngladdningar/sprngmneshantering, nedrustning och icke-spridning av massfrstrelsevapen, terrorismbekmpning, olagliga finansiella flden, infrlivande av Afrikas integrerade havspolitik i Apsa och bekmpning av grnsverskridande brottslighet och it-brottslighet.
EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace Building Conflict Prevention and Beyond (SEC/96/32) sets out the basic approach towards the conflicts in Africa (importance of political analysis of structural root causes, focus on structural stability), the list of measures EU could undertake in various conflict situations, and the approach for the future (conflict prevention, early warning system, cooperation with AU and regional organisations as well as the UN, enhancement of African peace-keeping capabilities). 
I EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace Building Conflict Prevention and Beyond (EU och problemet med konflikter i Afrika: fredsbyggande tgrder, konfliktfrebyggande med mera) (SEK/96/32) anges den grundlggande strategin fr konflikterna i Afrika (betydelsen av politisk analys av underliggande strukturella orsaker och fokus p strukturell stabilitet), en lista ver tgrder som EU skulle kunna vidta i olika konfliktsituationer och det framtida tillvgagngssttet (konfliktfrebyggande, system fr tidig varning, samarbete med AU och regionala organisationer och FN samt frstrkning av Afrikas fredsbevarande resurser).
For example Communication on Conflict prevention (COM(2001) 211); 2003 European Security Strategy; The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises (JOIN(2013)30). 
Till exempel meddelandet frn kommissionen om konfliktfrebyggande (KOM(2001) 211), den europeiska skerhetsstrategin frn 2003 och EU:s vergripande strategi fr externa konflikter och kriser (JOIN(2013) 30).
2016 Global Strategy for the European UnionŐs Foreign and Security Policy Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. 
En global strategi fr Europeiska unionens utrikes-och skerhetspolitik Đ Delade visioner, gemensamma tgrder: Ett starkare Europa (2016).
The EDF is the EU's main instrument for providing development aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and to overseas countries and territories. 
EUF r huvudinstrumentet fr EU:s utvecklingsbistnd till stater i Afrika, Karibien och Stillahavsomrdet och utomeuropeiska lnder och territorier.
Established by means of an internal agreement in 1959, it is financed by direct contributions from EU Member States, and remains 14 15 16 17 18 
Den inrttades 1959 genom ett internt avtal, finansieras med direkta bidrag frn EU:s medlemsstater och ingr inte i EU14 15 16 17 18