natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
However, until 2017 there was no framework for coordinating all EU actions addressing radicalisation in order to identify potential synergies between funds. 
Fram till 2017 fanns det dock ingen ram fr samordning av alla EU:s tgrder mot radikalisering i syfte att identifiera potentiella synergieffekter mellan medel.
It was only in 2017 that DG Migration and Home Affairs carried out a mapping of EU-funded projects addressing radicalisation. 
Frst 2017 gjorde GD Migration och inrikes frgor en kartlggning av EU-finansierade projekt mot radikalisering.
This meant that until then the Commission did not have a consolidated list of counter-radicalisation actions financed by the different EU funds. 
Det innebar att kommissionen fram till dess inte hade en konsoliderad lista ver tgrder mot radikalisering som finansierades med olika EU-medel.
Even then, this mapping process was limited to actions managed centrally by the Commission and did not include those managed by Member States in their national programmes. 
Men kartlggningen begrnsades till tgrder som frvaltades centralt av kommissionen och omfattade inte tgrder som ingick i medlemsstaternas nationella program och som frvaltades av dem.
Interviews with the EU IRU at Europol and the European Strategic Communications Network identified opportunities for better coordination between EU-funded actions: Europol suggested that there was an opportunity for greater synergy by coordinating the timing and content of counter-narrative campaigns with the removal of terrorist material from the internet; the European Strategic Communications Network suggested it would benefit from access to EuropolŐs analysis of trends in terrorist propaganda (to the extent this is For example, by means of monthly reports since October 2016 on progress towards an effective and genuine Security Union, and through the July 2017 Comprehensive Assessment of EU Security Policy. 21 11 
Vid vra intervjuer med EU IRU vid Europol och det europeiska ntverket fr strategisk kommunikation identifierades fljande mjligheter till bttre samordning mellan EU-finansierade tgrder: Europol menade att fler synergieffekter skulle kunna uppns om man samordnade tajmningen av och innehllet i motbudskapskampanjer med avlgsnandet av terroristmaterial frn internet. Till exempel genom mnatliga rapporter sedan oktober 2016 om framstegen mot en ndamlsenlig och verklig skerhetsunion och genom den vergripande bedmningen av EU:s skerhetspolitik frn juli 2017.
permitted under the Administrative Agreement between the Commission and Europol), and also from greater involvement in VOX-Pol12, an EU-funded research project. 
Det europeiska ntverket fr strategisk kommunikation menade att det skulle ha nytta av tillgng till Europols analys av trender inom terroristpropaganda (i den mn det r tilltet enligt den administrativa verenskommelsen mellan kommissionen och Europol) och ocks av strre delaktighet i VOX-Pol12, som r ett EU-finansierat forskningsprojekt.
This information would enable it to provide governments with better advice on developing communication strategies and producing counter-narrative campaigns. 
Med hjlp av denna information skulle det kunna ge regeringar bttre rd om hur kommunikationsstrategier tas fram och motbudskapskampanjer utformas.
The RAN is not used to its full potential 28. 
RAN utnyttjas inte till sin fulla potential 28.
Although the RAN brings useful benefits from acting at European level, we found that this added value is not maximised in practice13: The RAN could produce more practical outputs, for example by analysing practices in Member States (e.g. by means of more on-site visits) and drawing up a detailed comparative inventory of the approaches implemented in each Member State. 
Trots att RAN ger frdelar genom insatser p EU-niv, konstaterade vi att detta mervrde inte maximeras i praktiken13: RAN skulle kunna generera mer praktisk output, exempelvis genom att analysera metoder i medlemsstaterna (t.ex. genom fler besk p plats) och upprtta en detaljerad jmfrande frteckning ver de tillvgagngsstt som anvnds i varje medlemsstat.
The 2014 ŇCommunication on preventing radicalisation to terrorismÓ refers to the RAN Collection - first published in 2014 - as a repository of best practices. 
I meddelandet frn 2014 om att frhindra radikalisering som leder till terrorism kallas RAN:s sammanstllning Đ som publicerades frsta gngen 2014 Đ fr en samling av bsta praxis.
However, the introduction to the RAN Collection states that the practices included are only meant to be informative and inspiring. 
Men i inledningen till RAN:s sammanstllning anges att de metoder som nmns i den endast r tnkta som informations-och inspirationsklla.
Also, we found that entries in the RAN Collection do not have sufficient information on how the project was financed to allow interested parties to identify potential sources of EU funding for the types of project they are considering. 
Vi konstaterade ocks att posterna i RAN:s sammanstllning inte innehller tillrckligt med information om hur projektet finansierats fr att berrda parter ska kunna identifiera potentiella kllor till EU-finansiering fr de typer av projekt som de vervger.
The Commission has not analysed the reasons why the RAN is used less by some countries than by others (see Figure 4). 
Kommissionen har inte analyserat sklen till varfr vissa lnder anvnder RAN mindre n andra (se figur 4).
This difference in use may be explained by different countriesŐ perceptions of terrorism as a threat, the RANŐs focus on particular types of terrorism, its bottom-up approach (i.e. keeping policy makers informed of practitionersŐ perspectives) or its use of English as the main language during meetings. No record is kept of changes over time in participation rates by different Member States. The VOX-Pol project aims to network research activities on online extremism in order to result in better-informed policy agendas at national, European and international levels. 
Skillnaden i anvndning kan frklaras av lnders olika syn p terrorismen som hot, RAN:s fokus p vissa typer av terrorism, dess bottom-up-strategi (dr beslutsfattare informeras om de yrkesverksammas perspektiv) eller dess Projektet VOX-Pol syftar till att upprtta ntverk fr forskningsverksamhet om extremism p ntet i syfte att f bttre underbyggda politiska agendor p nationell, europeisk och internationell niv. Detta bekrftas av vr enkt.
8 out of 13 (62 %) survey respondents who expressed an opinion felt that the RAN approach could add more value. 
Av de 13 svarande som uttryckte en sikt ansg 8 (62 %) att RAN skulle kunna tillfra ett strre mervrde.
Figure 4 - RAN Working Group participants since October 2015 Source: ECA, based on Commission data. 
Figur 4 Đ Deltagare i RAN:s arbetsgrupper sedan oktober 2015 Frre n 30 deltagare 30Đ60 deltagare Fler n 60 deltagare 24 Klla: Europeiska revisionsrtten p grundval av uppgifter frn kommissionen.
The Commission tries to increase awareness of EU-funded projects by encouraging project participants to disseminate results through a RAN Working Group. 
Kommissionen frsker ka medvetenheten om EU-finansierade projekt genom att uppmuntra projektdeltagare att sprida resultat via en RAN-arbetsgrupp.
For example, out of 20 ISEC-funded projects14 which have ended since 2011 (when the RAN was set up), and which the Commission assessed as good, very good or excellent, it proposed dissemination through the RAN for 16 of them. 
Av 20 ISEC-finansierade projekt14 som har slutfrts sedan 2011 (d RAN inrttades), och som kommissionen bedmde som bra, mycket bra eller utmrkta, freslog den exempelvis att 16 skulle spridas via RAN.
However, we found that for over half of these projects this did not happen in practice. 
14 konstaterade vi emellertid att detta inte skedde i praktiken.
At the time of our audit only 7 of these projects (44 %) had actually been presented to a RAN Working Group, workshop or conference. 
Vid tidpunkten fr granskningen hade endast sju av dessa projekt (44 %) faktiskt presenterats fr en arbetsgrupp, workshop eller konferens inom RAN.
The Belgian authorities informed us that practitioners from small organisations on the ground without links to government (e.g. networks of local groups of foreign fightersŐ mothers) are not sufficiently involved in the RAN to ensure a genuine bottom-up approach. 
De belgiska myndigheterna informerade oss om att yrkesverksamma frn sm organisationer p fltet utan kopplingar till regeringen (t.ex. ntverk av lokala grupper av mammorna till utlndska stridande) inte r tillrckligt delaktiga i RAN fr att en verklig bottom-up-strategi ska skerstllas.
The RAN aims to improve bottom-up communication from practitioners to policymakers. 
RAN syftar till att frbttra kommunikationen nedifrn och upp, det vill sga frn yrkesverksamma till beslutsfattare.
However, less than half of respondents to a survey of RAN practitioners carried out by the RAN itself in 2016 felt that the RAN had helped them to influence policymakers. 
Men i en enkt som RAN genomfrde 2016 bland yrkesverksamma inom ntverket ansg mindre n hlften av de svarande att RAN hade hjlpt dem att pverka beslutsfattare.
In addition, four respondents to our survey suggested that the link between the RAN and policymakers could be strengthened, for example by formal exchanges of approaches and ideas. 
Fyra av dem som svarade p vr enkt freslog ocks att kopplingen mellan RAN och beslutsfattare borde strkas, till exempel genom formella utbyten av tillvgagngsstt och ider.
It can take too long for needs identified at practitioner level to find their way into the CommissionŐs policy framework. 
Det kan ta alltfr lng tid innan behov som identifierats av yrkesverksamma p fltet tas upp i kommissionens politiska ram.
For example, the issue of radicalisation in prisons has been discussed since 2011 at practitioner level (e.g. prison and probation staff, teachers and social workers) by the RAN Prison and Probation Working Group. 
Exempelvis har frgan om radikalisering i fngelser diskuterats sedan 2011 bland yrkesverksamma p fltet (t.ex. kriminalvrdspersonal och vervakare, lrare och socialarbetare) i RAN:s arbetsgrupp fr fngelse och skyddstillsyn.
However, it was not until 2015 that the Commission identified specific actions financed by the Justice Programme to address this issue. 
Men det var frst 2015 som kommissionen identifierade srskilda tgrder som finansieras av programmet Rttsliga frgor fr att komma till rtta med denna frga.
The CommissionŐs framework for assessing results is insufficiently developed 29. 
Kommissionens ram fr resultatbedmning r inte tillrckligt utvecklad 29.
We examined whether the Commission has performance indicators for assessing the effectiveness of its overall support and whether realistic targets were set. 
Vi granskade huruvida kommissionen har resultatindikatorer fr att bedma ndamlsenligheten i sitt vergripande std och huruvida realistiska ml hade faststllts.
We examined whether indicators measure not only activity, but also real progress achieved towards the overall objective of helping Member States address radicalisation that leads to terrorism. 
Vi granskade huruvida indikatorerna inte bara mter verksamhet utan ocks reella framsteg som grs mot det vergripande mlet att hjlpa medlemsstaterna att motverka radikalisering som leder till terrorism.
At the level of individual actions, we examined whether the Commission assesses the effectiveness of its support in order to find out what works and where, and what does not work and why. 
Nr det gller enskilda tgrder granskade vi huruvida kommissionen bedmer ndamlsenligheten i sitt std fr att ta reda p vad som fungerar var och vad som inte fungerar och varfr.
The Commission needs this information to be able to: 24 
Kommissionen behver denna information fr att kunna 25
25 respond to requests from the European Parliament to evaluate the EUŐs strategy for combating radicalisation and recruitment to terrorist groups15; improve and adjust its policy and support continuously in response to changes in the threat situation and usersŐ needs; disseminate and scale up examples of successful projects to maximise synergies (and avoid disseminating ineffective or counter-productive project results); demonstrate to citizens that the initiatives are likely to be effective. 
26 svara p nskeml frn Europaparlamentet om att EU:s strategi fr att bekmpa radikalisering och rekrytering till terroristgrupper ska utvrderas15, frbttra och anpassa sin politik och sitt std fortlpande som svar p frndringar av hotbilden och anvndarnas behov, sprida och utka exemplen p framgngsrika projekt fr att maximera synergieffekterna (och undvika att sprida icke ndamlsenliga eller kontraproduktiva projektresultat), visa fr medborgarna att initiativen sannolikt r ndamlsenliga.
The Commission does not evaluate its overall success in achieving policy goals 30. 
Kommissionen utvrderar inte sina vergripande framgngar med att uppn de politiska mlen 30.
We found that the Commission had not sufficiently developed its framework for assessing whether its policy for supporting Member States in addressing radicalisation is effective and offers value for money. 
Vi konstaterade att kommissionen inte tillrckligt hade utvecklat sin ram fr bedmning av huruvida dess politik fr att stdja medlemsstaterna i kampen mot radikalisering r ndamlsenlig och effektiv.
For example, the Commission has not: broken down the overall objectives of its counter-radicalisation policy into more specific and measurable objectives; established appropriate indicators and targets for EU funds used, in order to measure performance in addressing radicalisation; provided a comprehensive overview of EU-financed counter-radicalisation actions (see paragraph 26); fully set out the cost of addressing radicalisation. The 2014 ŇCommunication on preventing radicalisation to terrorismÓ included no information on amounts of funding. The Commission explained that actions would be implemented using existing resources, but did not specify which ones. 
Kommissionen har exempelvis inte delat upp de vergripande mlen fr sin politik mot radikalisering i mer specifika och mtbara ml, faststllt lmpliga indikatorer och delml fr EU-medel som anvnds, fr att mta resultat i kampen mot radikalisering, gett en samlad bild av EU-finansierade tgrder mot radikalisering (se punkt 26), angett de totala kostnaderna fr att bekmpa radikalisering; meddelandet frn 2014 om att frhindra radikalisering som leder till terrorism innehll ingen information om finansieringsbelopp; kommissionen frklarade att tgrderna skulle genomfras med befintliga resurser men preciserade inte vilka; meddelandet Att stdja det frebyggande arbetet mot radikalisering som leder till vldsinriktad extremism frn 2016 innehll viss information om finansiering och kostnader, och det gjorde ven arbetsdokumentet frn Se till exempel Europaparlamentets resolution av den 25 november 2015 om att frhindra att EU-medborgare radikaliseras och rekryteras av terroristorganisationer.
26 funding and costs, as did the July 2017 ŇComprehensive Assessment of EU Security PolicyÓ16. However: (i) some actions, such as the projects financed by the ŇInternal Security Fund Đ PoliceÓ, are omitted; (ii) some actions are not costed, notably the EU IRU, the EU Internet Forum, the Civil Society Empowerment Programme and the European Strategic Communications Network; (iii) funding information for the various actions covers different periods; (iv) no distinction is made between the costs of actions which are specifically designed to address radicalisation (e.g. the Ű25 million for the RAN Centre of Excellence) and those which are not, but which nevertheless help to prevent it (e.g. the Ű25.6 billion from the European Social Fund to foster the social inclusion of disadvantaged groups). 
kommissionens avdelningar om en vergripande bedmning av EU:s skerhetspolitik16; men i) vissa tgrder, ssom de projekt som finansieras av Fonden fr inre skerhet Đ polisdelen, har utelmnats, ii) vissa tgrder har inte kostnadsberknats, det gller framfr allt EU IRU, EU:s internetforum, programmet fr att strka civilsamhllets stllning och det europeiska ntverket fr strategisk kommunikation, iii) finansieringsinformationen om de olika tgrderna tcker olika perioder, iv) det grs ingen tskillnad mellan kostnaderna fr tgrder som specifikt syftar till att bekmpa radikalisering (t.ex. beloppet p 25 miljoner euro till RAN:s kompetenscentrum) och kostnaderna fr tgrder som inte gr det men som nd hjlper till att frebygga radikalisering (t.ex. beloppet p 25,6 miljarder euro frn Europeiska socialfonden fr att frmja social inkludering av missgynnade grupper).
As a result, there is no overall report covering the cost and achievements of EU-financed counter-radicalisation actions. 
Drfr finns det ingen vergripande rapport om kostnaderna fr och resultaten av EU-finansierade tgrder mot radikalisering.
Instead, the issues are covered in various reports which describe what has been done rather than measuring success in achieving policy goals (see Box 8). 
I stllet tas dessa frgor upp i olika rapporter som beskriver vad som har gjorts snarare n mter om de politiska mlen har uppntts (se ruta 8).
Box 8 - Examples of reports which describe what has been done rather than measure success in achieving policy goals The final implementation report on the EU Internal Security Strategy 2010-2014 described what had been done to support Member States in addressing radicalisation, but did not assess effectiveness17: - the establishment of the RAN in September 2011; - the adoption of the January 2014 ŇCommunication on preventing radicalisation to terrorismÓ; 16 17 SWD(2017) 278 of 26 July 2017 ŇComprehensive Assessment of EU Security PolicyÓ. 
27 Ruta 8 Đ Exempel p rapporter som beskriver vad som har gjorts i stllet fr att mta om de politiska mlen har uppntts I slutrapporten om genomfrandet av strategin fr inre skerhet i Europeiska unionen 2010Đ2014 beskrevs vad som hade gjorts fr att stdja medlemsstaterna i att hantera radikalisering men bedmdes inte ndamlsenligheten17 i - inrttandet av RAN i september 2011, 16 17 SWD(2017) 278, 26.7.2017, om en vergripande bedmning av EU:s skerhetspolitik.
COM(2014) 365 final of 20 June 2014 ŇThe final implementation report of the EU Internal Security Strategy 2010-2014Ó. 
COM(2014) 365 final, 20.6.2014, Slutrapport om genomfrandet av strategin fr inre skerhet i Europeiska unionen 2010Đ2014.
In DG Migration and Home AffairsŐ 2016 annual activity report, the performance tables on the ŇInternal Security Fund Đ PoliceÓ contain information on the number of counter-narratives produced. 
I GD Migration och inrikes frgors rliga verksamhetsrapport fr 2016 innehller resultattabellerna fr Fonden fr inre skerhet Đ polisdelen information om antalet motbilder som skapats.
The EU IRU reports periodically on the amount of terrorist content removed from the internet. 
EU IRU rapporterar regelbundet om den mngd terroristinnehll som har tagits bort frn internet.
The Commission cannot demonstrate how effective its individual actions actually are 32. 
Kommissionen kan inte visa hur ndamlsenliga enskilda tgrder i sjlva verket r 32.
We found that assessments of Commission actions to help Member States address radicalisation often measure achievements in terms of amount of activity (e.g. the number of meetings held or documents produced) rather than effectiveness (e.g. the knowledge acquired by RAN participants, how they applied it, and its impact on their job). 
Vi konstaterade att bedmningar av kommissionens tgrder fr att hjlpa medlemsstaterna bekmpa radikalisering ofta mter resultat uttryckt i verksamhetsmngd (t.ex. antal mten som hllits eller dokument som tagits fram) i stllet fr ndamlsenlighet (t.ex. kunskap som deltagare i RAN frvrvat, hur de har tillmpat den och effekten p deras jobb).
The recent ŇComprehensive Assessment of EU Security PolicyÓ also highlighted the need to evaluate the results and effectiveness of actions which aim to prevent terrorism. 
I den vergripande bedmning av EU:s skerhetspolitik som gjordes nyligen framhlls ocks behovet av att resultaten av och ndamlsenligheten i tgrder som syftar till att frhindra terrorism utvrderas.
Consequently, as the following paragraphs show, the Commission cannot demonstrate how effective EU-funded counter-radicalisation actions actually are. 
Som framgr av punkterna nedan kan kommissionen drfr inte visa hur ndamlsenliga EU-finansierade tgrder mot radikalisering i sjlva verket r.
Evaluations are planned for projects funded by the ŇInternal Security Fund Đ PoliceÓ. 
Utvrderingar r planerade fr projekt som finansieras av Fonden fr inre skerhet Đ polisdelen.
However, projects often lack effectiveness indicators. 
Projekten saknar dock ofta indikatorer fr ndamlsenlighet.
For example, out of the five successful project proposals in response to the 2014 call for proposals on radicalisation (see paragraph 19(b)), the Commission considered that three of these18 had scarce, vague or basic evaluation and monitoring strategies, and lacked indicators for measuring how effective projects actually were. 
Till exempel ansg kommissionen att tre18 av de fem projektfrslag som var framgngsrika i 2014 rs inbjudan att lmna frslag om radikalisering (se punkt 19 b) hade otillrckliga, vaga eller elementra strategier fr utvrdering och vervakning samt saknade indikatorer fr mtning av hur ndamlsenliga de i sjlva verket var.
For ISEC (the fund which preceded the ŇInternal Security Fund Đ PoliceÓ), the Commission reviewed the final report19 for each project and described the results achieved in terms of concrete outputs. 
Nr det gllde ISEC (det program som fregick Fonden fr inre skerhet Đ polisdelen) granskade kommissionen slutrapporten19 om varje projekt och beskrev de uppndda resultaten uttryckt i konkret output.
It also assessed the quality of results, i.e. whether they were useful and transferable, and whether and how they should be disseminated. 
Kommissionen bedmde ven kvaliteten p resultaten, det vill sga huruvida de var anvndbara och verfrbara och huruvida de borde spridas och i s fall hur.
reviews did not provide an evidence-based evaluation of project impacts. 
Men dessa granskningar var inga evidensbaserade utvrderingar av projektens effekter.
In the absence of effectiveness indicators actually built into a project, they recorded the reviewerŐs judgement of how effective it was likely to be. 
Eftersom indikatorer fr ndamlsenlighet inte hade byggts in i projekten registrerades granskarens bedmning av hur ndamlsenligt projektet sannolikt skulle bli.
The EU IRU at Europol flags online terrorist content and refers it to the service providers that host it so that they can remove it. 
EU IRU vid Europol rapporterar terroristinnehll p ntet och underrttar de internetleverantrer som frmedlar det s att de kan ta bort det.
Performance is measured in terms of the amount and proportion of referred content which is removed by service providers (see Figure 5). 
Resultat mts uttryckt i den mngd och andel anmlt innehll som tas bort av internetleverantrer (se figur 5).
These statistics have the following limitations: They do not show how much content was removed solely as a result of the EU IRUŐs actions. 
Denna statistik har fljande begrnsningar: Den visar inte hur mycket innehll som tagits bort enkom till fljd av EU IRU:s tgrder.
Indeed, the EU IRU may ask internet companies to remove terrorist propaganda which has also been flagged by Member States20. 
EU IRU kan nmligen be internetfretag ta bort terroristpropaganda som ocks har rapporterats av medlemsstaterna20.