natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In accordance with the Council Regulation, the Commission contracted independent consultants to carry out an evaluation of the programme. 
I enlighet med rdets frordning slt kommissionen avtal med oberoende konsulter om utvrderingar av programmet.
The final evaluation report from the consultants will be published shortly. Even though the Commission has monitored and managed the risks associated with the implementation of the programme, a full and final audit, as mandated by Article1(4)oftheCouncilRegulation,isalsoplanned. 
Konsulternas slutliga utvrderingsrapport kommer att publiceras inom kort. ven om kommissionen har vervakat och hanterat de risker som r frenade med genomfrandet av programmet, planeras ven en fullstndig och slutlig revision enligt artikel 1.4 i rdets frordning.
INTRODUCTION Scope of the audit 5. Although the Court recognises the significant risk inherent in the programme, its observations do not fully take account of the dynamics of managing the risk in the programmeŐs implementation. 
INLEDNING Granskningens omfattning 5. ven om revisionsrtten erknner att det finns en omfattande risk frbunden med programmet, beaktar den i sina iakttagelser inte till fullo dynamiken i att hantera riskerna i samband med genomfrandet av programmet.
The Commission, in applying point 3.16 of the Memorandum of Understanding, was forced to suspend deliveries on two occasions during the first half of 1999, each for a period of one month. 
Kommissionen var genom till-lmpning av punkt 3.16 i samfrstndsavtalet vid tv tillfllen underdenfrstahalvanav1999tvungenatttillflligtavbryta leveranser, bda gngerna under en mnads tid.
Inevitably, this has had an impact on the CommissionŐs ability to respect the delivery schedule referred to by the Court. 
Detta har ofrnkomligen inverkat p kommissionens frmga att iaktta den leveranstid som revisionsrtten hnvisar till.
The following factors were taken into consideration when the possibility of launching a food-aid programme to Russia was considered. (a) IntheRussianFederation31%ofthepopulationisunderthe poverty line and after a particularly poor harvest of cereals and the severe financial crisis of August 1998, the European Union considered that the situation did justify some form of external assistance. (b) After information was provided by some of the EU Member States, the World Bank and the other donor, and after a fact-finding mission was sent to Moscow, the European Union concluded that Russia was unable to carry out normal commercial imports for the winter and that she had no financial resources to import food from abroad. (c) In the event, the low economic and budgetary opportunity cost of supplying food products from EU intervention stocks made a food aid programme an attractive alternative to direct balance of payments support. Sales of the food could provide budgetary support and effective targeting could solve the affordability problems for vulnerable groups. THE COMMISSIONŐS REPLIES 
Fljande faktorer beaktades nr mjligheten att infra ett program fr livsmedelsstd till Ryssland vervgdes: a) I Ryssland lever 31 % av befolkningen under fattigdoms-strecket och efter en srskilt dlig spannmlsskrd och den allvarliga finansiella krisen i augusti 1998 ansg Europeiska unionen att situationen motiverade ngon form av externt std. b) Sedan information hade tillhandahllits av en del av EU:s medlemsstater, Vrldsbanken och den andra givaren, och sedan endelegationhadesntstillMoskvafratttaredapfakta, fastslog Europeiska unionen att Ryssland inte kunde genomfra ngon normal kommersiell import fr vintern och att landet inte hade ngra ekonomiska resurser att importera livsmedel frn utlandet. c) I sjlva verket gjorde den lga ekonomiska och budgetmssiga alternativkostnadenfrattlevereralivsmedelsprodukterfrn EU:s interventionslager att ett program fr livsmedelsstd utgjorde ett attraktivt alternativ till ett direkt std till betalningsbalansen.
25.1.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 25/15 Following the formal food aid request from the Russian Government on 12 November 1998, and in the light of a food aid programme being launched by the other major donor, the European Union finally took the decision to supply agricultural products to the Russian Federation. 
KOMMISSIONENS SVAR 25.1.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 25/15 Efter den ryska regeringens formella begran om livsmedelsstd den 12 november 1998 och mot bakgrund av ett program fr livsmedelsstd som infrdes av den andra strre givaren fattade Europeiska unionen slutligen beslutet att leverera jordbrukspro-duktertillRyssland.
The programme was designed to meet two basic needs: Ń availability of food, by increasing supplies and thereby keeping prices at an Ôaffordable levelŐ, Ń affordability,byusingcounterpartfundstospeedupthepay-ment of pensions arrears. 
Programmet var avsett att fylla tv grundlggande behov, nmligen Ń tillgng p livsmedel genom att ka leveranserna och drigenom hlla priserna p en verkomlig niv, Ń betalningsfrmga genom att anvnda motpartsmedel fr att skynda p betalningen av utestende pensionsskulder.
One of the major aims of the programme was to ensure that the local markets were not disrupted. 
Ett av de frmsta syftena med programmet var att se till att det inte skapades obalans p de lokala marknaderna.
To achieve this, the Russian Federation and the Commission sought to use the existing systems for the distribution and processing of the food supplies. 
Fr att stadkomma detta efterstrvade Ryssland och kommissionen att anvnda de befintliga systemen fr distribution och bearbetning avlivsmedel.Huvudsakligenanvndesryskaaktrerfrdistribu-tion i Ryssland och livsmedelsbearbetningen utfrdes lokalt.
In doing so, the programme has not had a negative impact on the private sector. 
P det sttet har programmet inte haft ngon negativ inverkan p den privata sektorn.
On the contrary, the food supply programme has provided Russiantransportandindustrywithalifelinetosurviveand recover from the economic recession. 
Tvrtom har programmet gjort det mjligt fr den ryska transport-och industrisektorn att verleva och terhmta sig frn den ekonomiska recessionen.
With bad harvests and the collapse of the processing industry there is no doubt that food reserves in Russia were low. 
Efter dliga skrdar och bearbetningsindustrins sammanbrott r det ingen tvekan om att livsmedelsreserverna i Ryssland var sm.
The EU food supply programme together with those of the other donor soughttoincreasethesupplyoffoodstuffs.Byredistributingthe majority of the sale proceeds to State pensioners, one of the poorest sections of Russian society was better enabled to purchase the increased supplies available on the market. 
Genom att den strsta delen av frsljningsintkterna terfrde-lades till pensionrerna fick en av de fattigaste samhllsgrupperna i Ryssland bttre mjlighet att kpa de frndenheter som numera i hgre grad finns tillgngliga p marknaden.
The exports referred to by the Court would have been subject to irreversible contracts entered into by the Russian private sector. 
Den export som revisionsrtten hnvisar till avsg oterkalleliga kontrakt ingngna av den ryska privata sektorn.
Point 3.9 of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) specifically permits the export of goods similar to those supplied under the programme where the contracts for such exports have been concluded prior to 1 October 1998. 
I punkt 3.9 i samfrstndsavtalet medges srskilt export av varor liknande dem som levereras genom programmet i de fall kontrakten fr sdan export ingicks fre den 1 oktober 1998.
The products delivered under the programme were supplied to regions which are not traditional markets for commercial imports. 
De produkter som levererades inom ramen fr programmet tilldeladesregionersomintertraditionellamarknaderfrkom-mersiell import.
Furthermore, as indicated in paragraph 35 of the report, the sale price of meat was often higher than that of commercial imports. 
Enligt punkt 33 i rapporten var frsljningspriset p ktt dessutom ofta hgre n priset fr den kommersiella importen.
The fact that EU exports to Russia were maintained in 1999 for beef meat and even increased for pigmeat at the same time as the food aid was arriving is further evidence that there was a real need for this aid. 
Det faktum att EU fortsatte att exportera ntktt till Ryssland under 1999 och att exporten av grisktt till och med kade samtidigt som livsmedelsstdet anlnde r ytterligare bevis fr att detta std verkligen behvdes.
The Commission had no time to examine in depth whether the list of regions presented by the Russian authorities really reflected the needs of the regions. 
Kommissionen hade inte tid att ingende underska huruvida den lista ver regionernas behov som de ryska myndigheterna presenterade verkligen verensstmde med verkligheten.
However, the list was examined during the negotiations on the MoU in coordination with the experts of the Delegation in Moscow. 
Listan granskades emellertid under frhandlingarna om samfrstndsavtalet i samverkan med experterna frn delegationen i Moskva.
Not only Moscow and St Petersburg were excluded but also several other regions, as they were not considered to be among those in need. 
Inte bara Moskva och S:t Petersburg utan ven flera andra regioneruteslts,eftersomdeinteansgstillhradebehvande.
This was also one of the main reasons for the exclusion of Moscow and St Petersburg and was also the reason why the lists of destinations were regarded with inflexibility. 
Detta var ocks ett av de frmsta sklen till att utesluta Moskva och S:t Petersburg och det var ven sklet till att listorna ver destinationer inte var flexibla.
The question of the urgency of the programme has been confirmed by the Council of the EU in Regulation (EC) No 2802/98 authorising the programme and also by the action of the other main donor. 
Programmets brdskande natur har bekrftats av rdet i frordning (EG) nr 2802/98, dr programmet antas, och ven genom den andra stora givarens agerande.
The Ministry of Agriculture was the representative of the Russian Government at the negotiations on the Memorandum of Understanding, although the Commission had requested the presence, in addition to that of the Ministry of Agriculture, not only of the Ministry of Finance, but also the Ministries of Transport and Health and the State Customs Committee. 
Jordbruksministeriet fretrdde den ryska regeringen vid frhandlingarna om samfrstndsavtalet, trots att kommissionen hade begrt att frutom jordbruksministern inte bara finansministern utan ven transport-och hlsovrdsministrarna samt den statliga tullkommittn skulle nrvara.
In the final analysis, it was for the Russian Government to decide which Ministries represented it during the negotiations. 
Slutligen var det dock den ryska regeringen som skulle besluta vilka ministerier som skulle fretrda den under frhandlingarna.
The original MoU negotiated at the beginning of December 1998 did not contain any omissions by reference to the original Commission proposal which only foresaw delivery of the goods to the Russian frontier. 
I det ursprungliga samfrstndsavtal som frhandlades fram i brjan av december 1998 hade ingenting utelmnats i frhllande till kommissionens ursprungliga frslag, som bara freskrev leverans av varorna till den ryska grnsen.
Taking into account the limited time for execution,itwasindispensablethattheMoUalreadynegotiated be operational as early as possible. 
Med tanke p den begrnsade tid som stod till frfogande fr genomfrandet var det ndvndigt att det redan framfrhandlade samfrstndsavtalet blev operativt s tidigt som mjligt.
The additional MoU was necessary to complete the arrangements required for internal monitoring imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 2802/98, and its entry into force was required only with effect from the time the goods started to arrive at the Russian frontier. 
Det kompletterande samfrstndsavtalet, som var ndvndigt fr att komplettera de arrangemang fr intern uppfljning som freskrivs i rdets frordning (EG) nr 2802/98, behvdes frst frn och med den tidpunkt d varorna skulle brja anlnda vid den ryska grnsen.
Alongwiththeotherdonor,theCommissionsoughtforthe largerpartofthecounterpartfundstobemadeavailabletothe Russian Federation pension funds. The Commission had nevertheless taken the precaution that any release of the funds to the pension funds would be subject to prior approval from the joint working group and therefore from the Commission services. 
Tillsammans med den andra givaren efterstrvade kommissionen att strre delen av motpartsmedlen skulle gras tillgngliga frRysslandspensionsfonder.Kommissionenhadeickedesto mindre vidtagit den frsiktighetstgrden att varje frigrande av medel till pensionsfonderna skulle godknnas i frvg av den gemensamma arbetsgruppen och drmed av kommissionen.
The Commission services carried out checks on the statute, systems and control mechanisms of the pension funds before any of the counterpart funds were released. 
Kommissionen genomfrde kontroller av pensionsfondernas stadga, system och kontrollmekanismer innan ngra motpartsmedel frigjordes.
The viability of the financial systems was validated with other donors and international organi-sationshavingdealingswiththeStatepensionfunds.TheCom- mission was reassured that the pension funds are also subject to the audit of the Audit Board of the Russian Federation. The efficacy of the choice made has been confirmed by many control and monitoring missions undertaken on behalf of the Commission services. 
De finansiella systemens brkraft kontrollerades tillsammans med andra givare och internationella organisationer som hade verenskommelser med de statliga pensionsfonderna. Kommissionen frskrades om att pensionsfonderna ven granskas av Rysslands revisionsorgan. tgrdernas ndamlsenlighet har bekrftats av mnga kontroll-och uppfljningsuppdrag som har genomfrts fr kommissionens rkning.
C 25/16 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 25.1.2001 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMME Resources deployed by the Commission 16. 
C 25/16 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 25.1.2001 GENOMF RANDEAVPROGRAMMET Medel som anslagits av kommissionen 16.
As the increased level of risk became apparent the Commission was obliged by the legislative authority to monitor and audit the flow of food and of the resulting finances generated by the sales in Russia. 
Eftersom den kade risken blev uppenbar frpliktade den lagstiftande myndigheten kommissionen att flja upp och granska livsmedelsfldet och de tillgngar som skapades genom frsljningarna i Ryssland.
Other similar programmes were better resourced. 
Andra liknande program hade bttre resurser.
It would have been better if the Budgetary Authority had provided for sufficient personnel resources to manage such a complex programme. 
Det skulle ha varit bttre om budgetmyndigheten hade srjt fr tillrckliga personalresurser fr att klara ett sdant komplicerat program.
Mobilisation of foodstuffs 18. 
Anskaffande av varorna 18.
Considering that the first deliveries commenced in March, and taking into account the various suspensions and delays which the programme encountered, the Commission services consider thatthemobilisationofgoodstookplacewithinthetimeframe originally foreseen in the Memorandum of Understanding. 
Med tanke p att de frsta leveranserna pbrjades i mars och med hnsyn till de olika tillflliga avbrott och frseningar som programmet rkade ut fr, anser kommissionen att anskaf-fandet av varor skedde inom den tidsram som ursprungligen hade planerats i samfrstndsavtalet.
In some cases, notably that of skimmed-milk powder, delays were deliberate and reflected the desire on the Russian side to receive the food at a time when it would be needed. 
I vissa fall, i synnerhet fallet med skummjlkspulver, var frseningarna avsiktliga och terspeglade den ryska sidans nskan att ta emot livsmedlet nr det behvdes.
In effect, at the end of 1999, within nine months of commencement, 97 % of the largest EU food aid programme ever had been delivered to the Russian frontier. 
I slutet av 1999 hade faktiskt 97 % av EU:s strsta program fr livsmedelsstd ngonsin levererats till den ryska grnsen inom nio mnader frn det att leveranserna pbrjades.
The fact that only 58 % in value of products were delivered to their final destination at the end of 1999 was because the Russian authorities proceeded with mass interim storage of high value products (beef, pork, and skimmed-milk powder) which was contrary to the technical annex to the MoU. 
Det faktum att bara 58 % av produkterna, sett till vrdet, hade levererats till sina slutdestinationer i slutet av 1999 berodde p att de ryska myndigheterna i stor omfattning mellanlagrade produkter med hgt varuvrde (ntktt, grisktt och skummjlkspulver), vilket stred mot den tekniska bilagan till samfrstndsavtalet.
With the exception of pigmeat, all the suspensions mentioned were imputable to the Russian authorities, either as a result of their unwillingness to accept the intervention standards, which had already been made clear in the MoU, or their unwillingness to reach an early negotiated resolution of difficult issues which arose during implementation. 
Med undantag fr grisktt berodde alla de omnmnda tillflliga avbrotten p de ryska myndigheterna, antingen som en fljd av deras ovilja att godta interventionskraven, som redan hade klargjorts i samfrstndsavtalet, eller deras ovilja att n en snabb frhandlingslsning p svra frgor som uppkom under genomfrandet.
The timing of the deliveries was influenced by the large quantities of products which had to be mobilised and the need to minimise the risk of port congestion and consequent claims for demurrage costs 21. 
Tidpunkten fr leveranserna pverkades av de stora kvantiteter av produkter som mste anskaffas och behovet att minimera risken fr verbelastning i hamnar och drp fljande krav p extra liggedagspengar.
The quantities indicated in the Council Regulation were indicated as maximum possible quantities and as such were not quantities promised to the Russian authorities. 
21.Dekvantitetersomangesirdetsfrordningavserstrsta mjliga kvantiteter och var som sdana inte kvantiteter som utlovats till de ryska myndigheterna.
Despite the delays the programme encountered, it remains the case that 97 % of the quantities foreseen under the programme was delivered within the space of nine months. 
Trots de frseningar som programmet drabbades av r det fortfarande s att 97 % av de kvantiteter som planerats inom ramen fr programmet levererades under loppet av nio mnader.
On 22 December 1999 the Commission therefore considered that its mandate covering the physical delivery of food products had been met and accordingly decided not to carry over the credits necessary to mobilise the maximum quantities possible. 
Den 22 december 1999 ansg kom-missionendrfrattdessuppdragvadgllerdenfysiskaleveran- sen av livsmedelsprodukter hade fullgjorts och beslutade fljaktligen att inte verfra de anslag som krvdes fr att anskaffa de strsta mjliga kvantiteterna.
Transport of products 22. 
Transport av produkterna 22.
Theoriginaltransportcostsforryedidnotincludethecosts of transport from an internal point of storage to the port of exit as, at the time of preparation of these estimates, the precise location to be used and quantities to be drawn from each location were unknown. 
De ursprungliga transportkostnaderna fr rg inkluderade inte transportkostnaderna frn en intern lagringsplats till utfr-selhamnen, eftersom det nr dessa berkningar gjordes var oknt exakt vilken plats som skulle anvndas och vilka kvantiteter som skulle tas frn varje plats.
Had the quantities used, as quite often is the case, been located close to ports, then the estimates would have been more accurate. 
Om de anvnda kvantiteterna hade legat nra hamnar, som ofta r fallet, skulle berkningarna ha varit mer exakta.
In the event, the stocks chosen for shipment were often located inland and the transport costs were therefore higher than initially foreseen. 
I sjlva verket lg de lager som valdes ut fr leverans ofta i inlandet och transportkostnaderna blev drfr hgre n vad som hade frutsetts frn brjan.
For skimmed-milk powder and pigmeat the divergence between estimated cost and actual cost was due to a lack of previous experience in the purchase (pigmeat) and transport (milk powder) of such products. 
Fr skummjlkspulver och grisktt berodde skillnaden mellan berknad kostnad och verklig kostnad p brist p tidigare erfarenhet av inkp (grisktt) och transport (mjlkpulver) av sdana produkter.
The Commission has always been conscious of the need to verify that the amounts invoiced for monitoring were correct, and for this reason the SCR commissioned an independent audit of the invoices of the monitoring companies. 
Kommissionen har alltid varit medveten om behovet att kontrollera att de belopp som faktureras fr uppfljning r korrekta och av den anledningen bestllde Gemensamma tjnsten fr yttre frbindelser en oberoende granskning av fakturorna frn de bolag som stod fr uppfljningen.
This audit report concluded that there were no grounds for disallowing work performed by these monitoring companies. 
I denna granskningsrapport fastslogs att det inte fanns ngra skl fr att inte godknna det arbete som dessa bolag hade utfrt.
See also the reply to paragraph 37, for details of the controls put inplacebytheCommission. 
Se ven svaret p punkt 37 fr nrmare information om de kontroller som kommissionen infrde.
The Baltic ports were used, simply because from the outset itwasevidentthattheRussianportsalonewouldnotbeableto absorb the quantities in question. 
De baltiska hamnarna anvndes helt enkelt drfr att det frn brjan var uppenbart att de ryska hamnarna inte ensamma skulle kunna ta emot de kvantiteter det var frga om.
Discharge and transit costs for quantitiespassingviatheBalticportswerefortheaccountofthe Russian authorities. 
Lossnings-och transiteringskostnader fr kvantiteter som passerade genom de baltiska hamnarna skulle betalas av de ryska myndigheterna.
Additionally, an offer for delivery to St Petersburg which did not include discharge of the cargo cannot be compared with an offer for Riga or Muuga where discharge and transit on Baltic territory was included. 
Drtill kommer att ett anbud om leverans till S:t Petersburg som inte inkluderar lossning av lasten inte kan jmfras med ett anbud tillRigaellerMuugadrlossningochtransiteringpbaltisktter-ritorium var inkluderad.
No instances of demurrage were recorded at Muuga and very limited instances at Riga, indicating a high level of efficiency at these ports. 
Det har inte noterats ngra extra liggedagar i Muuga och ett mycket begrnsat antal i Riga, vilket tyder p en hg effektivitetsniv i dessa hamnar.
Nevertheless, the Commission was aware of the monopolistic situation in Muuga and imposed alternative ports wherever possible. 
Kommissionen var icke desto mindre medveten om monopolsituationen i Muuga och freskrev alternativa hamnar nr s var mjligt.
25.1.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 25/17 25.TheportcongestionwhicharoseduringtheperiodJuly/ August was not due to an insufficient analysis of the handling capacities of the port or insufficient coordination with the other donors,butsimplyduetothefactthattheRussianoperator insisted on shortening the delivery schedule for the third tranche of cereals. 
25.1.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 25/17 25. Den verbelastning i hamnen som uppstod under perioden juliĐaugusti berodde inte p otillrcklig analys av hamnens han-teringsfrmga eller otillrcklig samordning med de andra givarna, utan helt enkelt p det faktum att den ryska aktren insisterade p att frkorta tiden fr leveransen av den tredje delsndningen av spannml.