natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
(45) Regulation (EC) No 1760/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 204, 11.8.2000, p.1) established a system for identifying and registering bovine animals individually. 
(45) I Europaparlamentets och rdets frordning (EG) nr 1760/2000 (EGT L 204, 11.8.2000, s.
Court noted that the system could not guarantee the traceability of cattle moved between Member States or between Member States and third countries. 
1) upprttas ett system fr identifiering och registrering av enskilda ntkreatur. revisionsrtten konstatera att systemet inte garanterar att det gr att spra ntkreatur som frflyttas inom gemenskapen eller ver gemenskapens yttre grnser.
This covers around three million head per year (around 4 % of the total herd). 
Frflyttningarna gller 3 miljoner kreatur per r (omkring 4 % av antalet djur).
In addition, there are still some weaknesses in its implementation in the Member States (46). 
Dessutom r tillmpningen av systemet i medlemsstaterna bristfllig (46).
In the case of sheep (the species mainly affected by the 2001 crisis) and pigs, identification was compulsory from 1 January 1995 until November 2003, but only for batches of animals (47). 
Nr det gller fr, som drabbades mest av krisen 2001, liksom svin, var frn den 1 januari 1995 till och med november 2003 identifiering endast obligatorisk fr partier (47).
During the crisis the HVO pointed out that the system of batch identification had been poorly applied in three out of the four Member States affected by FMD (48). 
OAV konstaterade i samband med krisen att systemet fr identifiering i parti hade tillmpats p ett bristflligt stt i tre av de fyra medlemsstater som hade drabbats av mul-och klvsjuka (48).
The fact that Community regulations did not require sheep to be identified individually, and that there were also shortcomings in the system of batch identification, hampered the tracing of animals that were suspected of being infected and so delayed their slaughter. 
Att gemenskapslagstiftningen inte krvde enskild identifiering av fr och att identifieringen av dem i parti var bristfllig hindrade sprningen av misstnkta djur och frsenade drigenom att de slaktades.
In the United Kingdom sheep that should have been slaughtered were not killed, so adding to the risk of the virus spreading. 
I Frenade kungariket slaktades inte fr som borde ha blivit slaktade, vilket kade riskerna fr att viruset skulle spridas.
(46) Special report No 6/2004 of the Court of Auditors on the organisation of the system for the Identification and registration of bovine animals in the European Union (OJ C 29, 4.2.2005, p. 1). 
(46) Revisionsrttens srskilda rapport nr 6/2004 om infrandet av systemet fr identifiering och registrering av ntkreatur inom Europeiska unionen (EUT C 29, 4.2.2005, s. 1).
(47) Council Directive 92/102/EEC of 27 November 1992 concerning the identification and registration of animals (OJ L 355, 5.12.1992, p. 
(47) Rdets direktiv 92/102/EEG av den 27 november 1992 om identifikation och registrering av djur (EGT L 355, 5.12.1992, s.
Individual identification of sheep was made compulsory by Council Directive 2003/85/EC (OJ L 306, 22.11.2003, p. 
Identifiering av enskilda fr blev obligatorisk genom rdets direktiv 2003/85/EG (EUT L 306, 22.11.2003, s.
1). Commission Decision 2000/678/EC required the Member States to establish a database of pig holdings and movements of pigs. 
1). I kommissionens beslut 2000/678/EG (EGT L 281, 7.11.2000, s.
(48) The HVOŐs report on the audit visit to Ireland from 14-17 May 2001 said that before the FMD outbreak Council Directive 92/102/EEC had not been implemented in Ireland as far as sheep and goat identification was concerned. 
(48) Se OAV:s rapport frn dess besk i Irland 14Đ17 maj 2001: Fre utbrottet av mul-och klvsjuka hade rdets direktiv 92/102/EEG inte infrts i Irland nr det gller identifiering av fr och getter.
See also the HVOŐs final report following an inspection visit to the United Kingdom from 12 to 16 March, pp. 9 and 10, ÔCouncil Directive 92/102/EEC requires identification of small ruminants (sheep and goats) as to their holding of origin (although not on an individual basis). 
Se ocks slutrapporten efter OAV:s inspektionsbesk i Frenade kungariket den 12Đ16 mars, s. 9 och 10: Enligt rdets direktiv 92/102/EEG krvs att sm idisslare (fr och getter) registeras p sin ursprungsanlggning (men inte som enskilda djur).
This Directive should have been transposed into national legislation by 1 January 1995. 
Detta direktiv skulle ha infrlivats i den nationella lagstiftningen senast den 1 januari 1995.
Official identification of small ruminants in UK, by means of an ear tag bearing the registration number of the holding of birth, has only been compulsory for animals born since 1 January 2001 (the date upon which the Directive was actually transposed for these animals in the UK). 
Officiell identifiering av sm idisslare i UK, genom ett ronmrke med registreringsnumret fr fdelseanlggningen, r endast obligatorisk fr djur fdda efter den 1 januari 2001 (det datum nr direktivet verkligen infrlivades fr dessa djur i UK).
In the absence of an official tagging system, a mixture of unofficial permanent means of identification and temporary identification is used. 
Eftersom det saknats ett officiellt mrksystem anvnds en blandning av inofficiella permanenta och tillflliga identifieringar.
The vast majority of animals moving through markets are marked with coloured dyes. 
Den allra strsta delen av djur som passerar marknader r mrkta med frger.
There is no compulsory requirement for sheep to be accompanied by any form of official documentation during routine movementsŐ; See also the HVOŐs report on its inspection in France from 2 to 6 April 2001, which stated that the national emergency centre (the FMD unit), together with the local emergency centres, had made a great effort to trace animals, both inside and outside France (...). 
Det finns inget officiellt krav p att fr skall tfljas av ngon form av officiell dokumentation vid rutinmssiga frflyttningar. Se ocks OAV:s rapport om en inspektion i Frankrike den 2Đ6 april 2001: Stora anstrngningar har gjorts av den nationella kriscentra-len (avdelningen fr mul-och klvsjuka) tillsammans med lokala beredskapscentraler fr att spra djur i Frankrike och utomlands. (...)
Their efforts had been compromised by (a) the weaknesses in the controls at various levels, (b) the incomplete implementation of Council Directive 92/102/EEC (presence of small unregistered flocks with unidentified animals and (c) unavailable, missing or defective information in the ANIMO system. 
Anstrngningarna har frsvrats av a) bristerna i existerande kontroller p olika niver (...), b) att inte rdets direktiv 92/102/EEG infrts i sin helhet (frekomst av sm flockar av icke registrerade djur tillsammans med oidentifierade djur) och c) uppgifter i Animosystemet som inte var tillgngliga, som saknades eller var felaktiga.
C 54/14 EN Official Journal of the European Union 3.3.2005 37. 
C 54/14 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 3.3.2005 37.
The Community rules (49) also allowed Member States not to include on the compulsory list (which they are required to compile and update) of all farms in their territory holding animals, small holdings with a maximum of three sheep or goats for which the farmers do not claim premiums. 
Vidare tillt gemenskapslagstiftningen (49) att medlemsstaterna i det obligatoriska registret ver jordbruksfretag p dess territorium som hller djur Đ ett register som de skall upprtta och uppdatera Đ lt bli att ta upp sm jordbruksfretag med hgst tre fr eller getter som inte uppfdaren begr bidrag fr.
In the Netherlands, for example, the responsible authority discovered in the course of the epidemic that 18 000 small holdings or individuals with only a very small number of animals were neither registered nor known, constituting an additional risk that it might not be possible to trace in time all the animals that had to be slaughtered. 
I Nederlnderna upptckte den ansvariga myndigheten under krisen att 18 000 sm jordbruksfretag eller enskilda med endast ett mycket begrnsat antal djur varken var registrerade eller knda, vilket utgr ytterligare en risk fr att man inte i tid kan spra upp alla djur som skall slaktas.
The HVO found the same problem in France. 
Samma problem pvisades av OAV i Frankrike.
Uncorrected deficiencies in the ANIMO system before the crisis 38. 
Brister i Animosystemet hade inte tgrdats fre krisen 38.
In 1990, the Community rules (50) introduced a computerised system linking veterinary authorities, one of the main aims being to facilitate exchange of information on animal movements between the competent authorities of the regions of origin and the responsible authorities in the Member State of destination. 
Genom genomskapslagstiftning (50) infrdes 1990 ett datasystem fr att knyta samman veterinrmyndigheter i syfte att underltta informationsutbyte om djurfrflyttningar mellan ansvariga myndigheter i ursprungsomrdet och i den medlemsstat dit frflyttningen sker.
This system is called ANIMO (51). 
Detta system kallas Animo (51).
The Commission developed the model message to be transmitted by this system in 1991 (52). 
Kommissionen utformade1991 en mall fr meddelanden som skall verfras via systemet (52).
Before the 2001 crisis the HVO had already pointed out that the ANIMO messages contained no mention of the transit points used during the transport of animals between a Member State of consignment and a Member State of destination. 
Redan fre krisen 2001 hade OAV emellertid ppekat att det inte i Animomeddelandena nmndes var transiteringen gde rum under frflyttningen av djur mellan en avsndande och en mottagande medlemsstat.
The farm of origin did not appear in the model message either. The Court, too, had already drawn attention to the deficiencies of the system, in its special report on classical swine fever (53). 
Det ursprungliga jordbruksfretaget angavs inte heller i meddelandemallen. ven revisionsrtten konstaterade bristerna i detta system i sin srskilda rapport om svinpest (53).
Despite the HVO and the Court advocating changes to the regulations on these points, the Commission had not proposed any revision of the ANIMO system. 
Trots de ndringar av bestmmelserna som freslagits av OAV och revisionsrtten hade kommissionen inte lmnat ngot frslag till versyn av Animosystemet.
(49) Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra-Community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to the completion of the internal market, Article 18 (OJ L 224, 18.8.1990, p. 
(49) Artikel 18 i rdets direktiv 90/425/EEG av den 26 juni 1990 om veterinra och avelstekniska kontroller i handeln med vissa levande djur och varor inom gemenskapen med sikte p att frverkliga den inre marknaden (EGT L 224, 18.8.1990, s.
(50) Directive 90/425/EEC, article 20. 
(50) Direktiv 90/425/EEG, artikel 20.
(51) The ANIMO system was introduced in 1990 following the abolition of veterinary controls within the Union. 
(51) Animosystemet infrdes 1990 nr veterinrkontrollerna inom gemenskapen upphrde.
It concerns all animals (not just cattle) and animal products. 
Det omfattar alla djur (inte endast ntkreatur) och det som produceras av och med dem.
The system is based on the sending of messages from the veterinary unit of origin to the unit of destination. 
Systemet baseras p att det skickas ett meddelande frn den ursprungliga veterinrenhe-ten till den mottagande enheten.
The messages give only the total number of animals per category being moved, without mentioning the individual identifications of the animals. 
I meddelandet anges endast det totala antalet djur per kategori som frflyttas, men de enskilda djuren identifieras inte.
(52) Commission Decision 91/637/EEC of 3 December 1991 establishing the model for the message to be transmitted by means of the computerised network ŐANIMOŐ (OJ L 343, 13.12.1991, p. 
(52) Kommissionens beslut 91/637/EEG av den 3 december 1991 om faststllande av en mall fr de meddelanden som skall verfras via det datoriserade systemet Animo (EGT L 343, 13.12.1991, s.
(53) Special Report No 1/2000 concerning classical swine fever, paragraph 29. 
(53) Srskild rapport nr 1/2000, punkt 29.
During the 2001 crisis, following the confirmation of the first outbreak in the United Kingdom, the other Member States did indeed need to trace the sheep that they had imported from that country over the previous month, in order to be able to increase surveillance of animals that were potentially carrying the virus. 
Under krisen 2001, nr det frsta utbrottet i Frenade kungariket bekrftats, behvde vriga medlemsstater f fram vilka fr som importerats drifrn under den senaste mnaden fr att kunna hja vervakningen av dessa djur som skulle kunna vara smittbrare.
It was crucial to know the holding of origin of the animals and the transit points. 
Det var absolut ndvndigt att knna till det ursprungliga jordbruksfretaget och var djuren transiterat.
During the 2001 crisis these two omissions caused delays in locating and slaughtering animals suspected of being contaminated (see Box 2). 
Dessa tv brister innebar att lokaliseringen och slakten av djur som misstnktes vara smittade frsenades under krisen 2001 (se ruta 2).
The ministry of agriculture in the Netherlands told the Court that compulsory details of transit points would have made control of the disease much more effective, especially during the critical initial phase of the crisis. 
Nederlndernas jordbruksministerium angav srskilt till revisionsrtten att obligatorisk angivelse av transiteringsver-gng skulle ha gjort bekmpningen av sjukdomen mycket effektivare, srskilt under den kritiska inledningsfasen.
Box 2 Court identified problems with tracing animals During the crisis the authorities in the United Kingdom experienced problems in tracing the farms of origin for sheep exported to other Member States and determining whether the sheep were from contaminated farms, because that information was not given in the ANIMO messages. 
Ruta 2 Svrigheter att spra djur som revisionsrtten kunnat konstatera Under krisen var det svrt fr myndigheterna i Frenade kungariket att flja spret tillbaka till det ursprungliga jordbruksfretag varifrn de fr som exporterats till vriga medlemsstater hrstammade, liksom att faststlla om fren i frga kom frn ett smittat fretag eftersom dessa uppgifter inte angavs i Animomeddelandena.
On account of this they were not able to give Member States that had imported sheep timely warning of the risk of infection. 
De kunde drfr inte i tid varna de medlemsstater som hade importerat fr om smittorisken.
Due to the lack of adequate information the Member States of destination had to carry out preventive culling of all sheep identified as having been imported from the United Kingdom, as it was impossible to differentiate between suspect sheep and others. 
Till fljd av otillrcklig information var de mottagande medlemsstaterna tvungna att genomfra slakt i frebyggande syfte av samtliga fr som importerats frn Frenade kungariket och som kunde identifieras eftersom det inte gick att skilja ut misstnkta fr frn fr som inte var misstnkta.
The absence of a trail for the sheep was evidence of the difficulties experienced by the responsible authorities in France in tracing the French farms that were the ultimate destination of sheep imported from the United Kingdom. 
Avsaknaden av system fr att spra fr visade p de franska myndigheternas svrigheter att finna de jordbruksfretag i Frankrike som var slutmottagare av fr som importerats frn Frenade kungariket.
The animals had transited via a stopping point close to the farm in France (Mayenne) which, three weeks later, was found to be the site of an outbreak, following the importation of infected British sheep. 
Dessa djur hade transiterat via ett stopp i nrheten av det jordbruksfretag i Frankrike (Mayenne) som visade sig vara drabbat av ett utbrott tre veckor senare, efter import av brittiska smittade fr.
The time taken to find the documents delayed precautionary action. 
Den tid som gick t fr att terfinna dokumenten gjorde att skyddstgrderna frsenades.
Restrictions on animal movements throughout Member StatesŐ territories 42. 
Begrnsningar av djurfrflyttningar inom medlemsstaternas samlade territorium 42.
Directive 85/511/EEC requires immediate imposition of restrictions on animal movements in protection and surveillance areas of a minimum radius of 10 km around infected farms, in order to limit the risks of an epidemic spreading. 
Fr att begrnsa riskerna fr att en epizootisk sjukdom sprider sig anges i direktiv 85/511/EEG att djurfrflyttningar omedelbart skall begrnsas i skydds-och vervakningszoner med en minsta radie p 10 km som skall upprttas runt smittade jordbruksfretag.
These measures were implemented in the United Kingdom, but the restrictions alone could not contain the spread of the epidemic in view of the extent of contamination before the first outbreak had even been detected. 
Dessa tgrder genomfrdes i Frenade kungariket men var i sig inte tillrckliga fr att hejda att den epizootiska sjukdomen spred sig p grund av omfattningen av den nedsmittning som gt rum redan innan det frsta utbrottet upptcktes.
3.3.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 54/15 43. 
3.3.2005 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 54/15 43.
In the United Kingdom a nationwide ban on animal movements was not introduced until three days after the epidemic had been officially confirmed. 
Frenade kungariket stoppade inte djurfrflyttningar inom hela landets territorium frrn tre dagar efter det att epidemin officiellt hade bekrftats.
On the basis of Article 10(4) of Directive 90/425/EEC the Commission, for its part, adopted Decision 2001/190/EC, banning movements of animals in Member States other than the United Kingdom. 
P grundval av bestmmelserna i artikel 10 fjrde stycket i direktiv 90/425/EEG antog kommissionen beslut 2001/190/EG som frbjd djurfrflyttningar i alla medlemsstater utom Frenade kungariket.
According to the NAO report, another 62 premises were believed to have been infected in seven other counties in the interval between confirmation of the first outbreak and the introduction of the ban on livestock movements in the United Kingdom (54), with an increase in the scale of the epidemic (and, therefore, its cost) which university epidemiologists estimated to be twice what it would have been had restrictions been imposed on the same day that the disease was confirmed (55). 
Enligt rapporten frn National Audit Office (det nationella revisionsorganet) smittades fler n 62 jordbruksfretag i sju andra grevskap mellan det att det frsta utbrottet bekrftades och att djurfrflyttningarna inom Frenade kungariket stoppades (54), vilket kade epidemins omfattning Đ och drmed kostnaderna fr den Đ som av epidemiologer vid universitet berknats till mer n det dubbla n vad de skulle ha blivit om man antagit begrnsningar samma dag som sjukdomen bekrftades (55).
COMMISSION ACTION DURING THE CRISIS Effective supervision by the Commission 44. 
KOMMISSIONENS INSATSER UNDER KRISEN Kommissionens vervakning var ndamlsenlig 44.
Commission staff were available 24 hours a day throughout the crisis. 
Under krisen kunde kommissionens enheter ns 24 timmar om dygnet.
Comparisons of the dates of inspections carried out by the HVO and crises arising show that, as far as the crisis itself was concerned, the HVO succeeded in carrying out inspections at the opportune time, even if it meant postponing other planned visits to later dates. 
En jmfrelse mellan datumen fr OAV:s inspektioner och de uppkomna kriserna visar att OAV, nr det gller sjlva krisen, lyckades gra sina inspektioner vid rtt tidpunkt, ven om det innebar att planerade besk fick skjutas upp till ett senare datum.
Normal procedures were speeded up during the crisis and HVO inspection reports were available within two months of its consideration of the comments of other departments of the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection and the replies from Member States. 
Under krisen skyndade man p de normala frfarandena och OAV:s inspektionsrapporter fanns tillgngliga inom tv mnader, efter det att man tagit hnsyn till kommentarer frn andra avdelningar inom Generaldirektoratet fr hlsa och konsumentskydd liksom till medlemsstaternas svar.
Deficiencies in control arrangements and in the implementation of them in the Member States 46. 
Brister i bekmpningsstrategin och tillmpningen av den i medlemsstaterna 46.
Some deficiencies which the HVO had found in the control arrangements in the United Kingdom (the country most affected by the crisis) could not, however, be dealt with promptly, (54) See The 2001 Outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, 21 June 2002, p. 14, paragraph 1.8, ÔBetween confirmation and a national movement ban being imposed on 23 February another 62 premises are believed to have been infectedŐ. 
Trots detta hann vissa brister i bekmpningsstrategin som OAV ptalat i frga om Frenade kungariket, det land som var hrdast drabbat av krisen, inte tgrdas i tid eftersom detta (54) The 2001 Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease, rapport av controllern och riksrevisorn om 2001 rs utbrott av mul-och klvsjuka, punkt 1.8, dr det sgs att mellan bekrftelsen och infrandet av ett nationellt frbud fr frflyttningar den 23 februari tros ytterligare 62 grdar hasmittats.
(55) Foot-and-Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry Report, Dr Iain Anderson quoting Professor Woolhouse of Edinburgh University, p. 
(55) Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to be learned Inquiry; rapport om erfarenheterna av mul-och klvsjukeepidemin 2001, Dr. Iain Anderson som citerar professor Woolhouse vid universitetet i Edinburgh, s.
60. because they required fundamental revision of the measures in question by the Commission and the Member States. 
60. krvde att kommissionen och medlemsstaterna gjorde en grundlggande versyn av de aktuella tgrderna.
These deficiencies merit attention because, in fact, they potentially concern other Member States. 
Bristerna frtjnar att uppmrksammas eftersom de kan komma att berra andra medlemsstater.
The main ones are: (a) a significant shortage of government vets, (b) the effectiveness of the control arrangements relied on farmers notifying the disease immediately, (c) in some cases, unacceptable delays in identifying suspected cases, confirming them and slaughtering and disposing of the animals in question (56). 
De viktigaste r: a) Stor brist p statligt anstllda veterinrer. b) En bekmpningsstrategi vars effektivitet r beroende av att uppfdarna genast anmler sjukdomen. c) Oacceptabla drjsml i ngra fall fr att identifiera, bekrfta, slakta och destruera misstnkta fall (56).
During the audit the Court also identified shortcomings similar to those found by the HVO. 
Revisionsrtten har vid sin granskning konstaterat liknande brister som de som konstaterades av OAV.
They are described below. 
De redovisas nedan.
Reduced veterinary services 48. 
Frre veterinrer 48.
In its 1989 report the Commission said (57) that the success of abandoning preventive vaccination depended on the availability of a finely-tuned system of government veterinary supervision. 
I sin rapport frn 1989 ansg kommissionen (57) att en frutsttning fr att med framgng kunna verge systemet med frebyggande vaccinering var att det fanns ett effektivt vervakningssystem med statligt anstllda veterinrer.
Although the Council instituted a series of disease controls that qualified for Community funding, there was no Community funding for veterinary controls on non-endemic diseases, and FMD was, therefore, excluded. 
Samtidigt som rdet har infrt ett antal kontroller av sjukdomar som berttigar till gemenskapsbidrag har det inte infrts ngot gemenskapsstd till veterinrkontroller av icke-endemiska sjukdomar, vilket innebr att mul-och klvsjuka utesluts.