natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Table 3 - Cost comparison of high-speed versus conventional rail: Venice Đ Trieste 31 Design configuration Design speed (km/h) Cost (billion euro) Travel time (min) Savings (million euro/min) 300 km/h new high-speed line 300 7.5 55 570 Upgraded conventional line 200 1.8 65 Source: ECA. 
Tabell 3 Đ Kostnadsjmfrelse mellan hghastighetstrafik och konventionell trafik: VenedigĐTrieste 33 Utformning Hastighet som banan r byggd fr (km/h) Kostnad (miljarder euro) Restid (min) Besparingar (miljoner euro/min) Ny hghastighetsbana fr 300 km/h 300 7,5 55 570 Ombyggd konventionell bana 200 1,8 65 Klla: Revisionsrtten.
This practice applied in Italy and Germany is not used in the other Member States we visited: only the proposed construction of a high-speed line is assessed, and no consideration is made of whether any section, or even the entire line, actually needs to be capable of supporting very high-speed services, or whether an upgrade of the conventional line would also satisfy the specific project objectives. 
Denna praxis som tillmpas i Italien och Tyskland anvnds inte i de andra medlemsstater som vi beskte: endast det freslagna byggandet av en hghastighetsbana bedms, och man vervger inte huruvida ngot avsnitt, eller till och med hela banan, verkligen behver kunna hantera mycket hga hastigheter, eller huruvida en ombyggnad av den konventionella banan ocks skulle rcka fr att uppn projektets specifika ml.
We also analysed cost-efficiency by assessing the relationship between the investment costs and the real time saved on the audited high-speed lines (Table 4). 
Vi analyserade kostnadseffektiviteten genom att bedma frhllandet mellan investeringskostnaderna och den tid som faktiskt sparades genom de granskade hghastighetsbanorna (tabell 4).
Our analysis shows that the cost per minute saved is on average 90 million euro per minute of travel time saved, with values ranging from 34.5 million euro (on the Eje Atlntico high-speed line) to 369 million euro (on the Stuttgart-Munich high-speed line). 
Vr analys visar att kostnaden per sparad minut i genomsnitt r 90 miljoner euro per minut sparad restid, men detta varierar frn 34,5 miljoner euro (p hghastighetsbanan Eje Atlntico) till 369 miljoner euro (p hghastighetsbanan StuttgartĐMnchen).
Table 4 - Cost of the audited high-speed line per km and per minute saved 32 Audited line Length (km) Total cost (million euro) Travel time saved (minutes) Cost per minute saved (million euro) Berlin-Munich 671 14 682 140 104.87 Stuttgart-Munich 267 13 273 36 368.69 Rhin-Rhne 138 2 588 75 34.51 LGV Est Europenne 406 6 712 130 51.63 Madrid-Barcelona - French Border 797 12 109 305 39.70 Eje Atlntico 165 2 596 75 34.61 Madrid-Galicia 549 7 684* 110 69.85 Madrid-Len 345 5 415 95 57.00 Milan-Venice 273 11 856 49 241.96 Turin-Salerno 1 007 32 169 192 167.55 Total/average 4 618** 109 084 1 207 90.38 * The analysis of cost estimate for the entire line, and travel time include the overlapping 133 km of Madrid-Len HSL (excluding the Guadarrama tunnel). ** The Munich-Verona stretch, with its length of 445 km, brings the total km of lines audited to 5 063 km. Source: ECA. 
Tabell 4 Đ Kostnad fr den granskade hghastighetsbanan per km och per sparad minut 34 Granskad bana Lngd (km) Total kostnad (miljoner euro) Sparad restid (minuter) Kostnad per sparad minut (miljoner euro) BerlinĐMnchen 671 14 682 140 104,87 StuttgartĐMnchen 267 13 273 36 368,69 RhenĐRhne 138 2 588 75 34,51 LGV Est Europenne 406 6 712 130 51,63 MadridĐBarcelonaĐfranska grnsen 797 12 109 305 39,70 Eje Atlntico 165 2 596 75 34,61 MadridĐGalicien 549 7 684* 110 69,85 MadridĐLen 345 5 415 95 57,00 MilanoĐVenedig 273 11 856 49 241,96 TurinĐSalerno 1 007 32 169 192 167,55 Totalt/genomsnitt 4 618** 109 084 1 207 90,38 * Analysen av kostnadsuppskattningen fr hela banan och restiden inbegriper de verlappande 133 km av hghastighetsbanan MadridĐLen (med undantag fr Guadarrama-tunneln). ** Med strckan MnchenĐVerona, som r 445 km lng, blir det totala antalet granskade kilometer 5 063 km.
Cost-benefit analyses are not used as a tool for decision-making in the Member States 49. 
Lnsamhetsanalyser anvnds inte som ett verktyg fr beslutsfattande i medlemsstaterna 49.
As high-speed lines are expensive investments, it is crucial to correctly analyse all major costs and benefits upfront before deciding whether or not to build. 
Eftersom hghastighetsbanor r dyra investeringar r det avgrande att korrekt analysera alla stora kostnader och frdelar p frhand, innan beslut fattas om bygget.
When used correctly, cost-benefit analyses (CBAs) make it possible to assess a projectŐs social return on investment and its social desirability and usefulness before any decision is taken. 
Om lnsamhetsanalyser anvnds p rtt stt gr det att bedma den sociala avkastningen p investeringen fr ett projekt samt dess nskvrdhet och anvndbarhet ur samhllssynpunkt innan ngot beslut fattas.
Net contributions to social welfare (e.g. through benefit-to-cost ratios exceeding 1, i.e. where benefits exceed costs) under a broad variety of demand (e.g. high versus low traffic growth) and supply scenarios (e.g. high-speed line construction versus upgrade of conventional lines) are needed to support a positive decision. 
Ett nettobidrag till samhllets vlfrd (t.ex. genom att nytto-kostnadsfrhllandet r ver 1, dvs. nyttan r strre n kostnaden) ven vid mycket olika scenarier fr efterfrgan (t.ex. hg eller lg trafiktillvxt) och tillgng (t.ex. bygge av hghastighetsbanor eller ombyggnad av konventionella banor) krvs fr att stdja ett positivt beslut.
The Court asked an external expert to make a comparative analysis of the various CBAs linked to the audited high-speed lines. 
Revisionsrtten bad en extern expert att gra en jmfrande analys av de olika lnsamhetsanalyserna med koppling till de granskade hghastighetsbanorna.
The expert concluded that CBAs are generally used merely as a compulsory administrative step, rather than as a tool for better decision-making and stakeholder inclusion. 
Experten drog slutsatsen att lnsamhetsanalyser vanligen helt enkelt anvnds som ett obligatoriskt administrativt steg, snarare n som ett verktyg fr bttre beslutsfattande och involvering av aktrer.
We found the following examples noteworthy. (i) A CBA with a negative economic net present value was accepted for EU co-funding of project No 2007-FR-24070-P (concerning the East Section of the Rhin Đ Rhne high-speed line) in France. 
Nedanstende exempel r vrda att nmna. i) En lnsamhetsanalys med negativt ekonomiskt nettonuvrde godkndes fr EU-medfinansiering av projekt nr 2007-FR-24070-P (avseende det stra avsnittet av hghastighetsbanan RhenĐRhne) i Frankrike.
For another French high-speed rail project (project No 2010-FR-92204-P, concerning the upgrade of the existing line between Mulhouse and the border to allow operations of high-speed trains and intercity express) no CBA had been performed, but the project did receive EU funding. (ii) No CBAs had been carried out when the decision was made to build the Halle/LeipzigĐErfurtĐEbensfeld and Stuttgart-Wendlingen-Ulm sections in Germany. 
Fr ett annat franskt hghastighetsjrnvgsprojekt (projekt nr 2010-FR-92204-P, avseende ombyggnaden av den befintliga banan mellan Mulhouse och grnsen fr att mjliggra trafik med hghastighetstg och intercity express) gjordes inte ngon lnsamhetsanalys, men projektet fick EU-finansiering. ii) Inga lnsamhetsanalyser hade gjorts nr beslutet fattades om att bygga avsnitten Halle/LeipzigĐErfurtĐEbensfeld och StuttgartĐWendlingenĐUlm i Tyskland.
The decision to build them was political, and a CBA was only made at a later stage (ex post) to demonstrate socio-economic profitability. (iii) Most studies in Spain, irrespective of the region and project characteristics, showed very similar results and a relatively low benefit-to-cost ratio (of around one). 
Beslutet att bygga dem var politiskt och en lnsamhetsanalys gjordes frst senare (i efterhand) fr att visa p socioekonomisk lnsamhet. iii) De flesta analyser i Spanien, oberoende av region och projektegenskaper, uppvisade mycket liknande resultat och ett relativt lgt nytto-kostnadsfrhllande (kring ett).
In reality, some projects have only a limited chance of viability from a social cost-benefit perspective (for example, the ŇVenta de Baos Đ LenÓ high-speed rail section was non-viable from a socio-economic perspective across various sensitivity scenarios), but they are being built nevertheless. (iv) Since 2007, no update has been made to the Brenner axis CBA. 
Faktum r att vissa projekt bara har en begrnsad mjlighet att bli lnsamma ur ett socialt kostnads-nyttoperspektiv (till exempel var hghastighetsavsnittet Venta de BaosĐLen inte lnsamt ur ett socioekonomiskt perspektiv baserat p olika knslighetsscenarier), men trots det byggs de. iv) Sedan 2007 har inte ngon uppdatering gjorts av lnsamhetsanalysen fr Brennerleden.
In the 2007 analysis, the cost-benefit factor was 1.9. 
I analysen frn 2007 var kostnads-nyttofaktorn 1,9.
In the meantime, the planning and construction of the Brenner Base Tunnel project has already been delayed by around eleven years: its completion was initially expected by 2016, but now it is not expected until 2027. 
Under tiden har planeringen och bygget av Brennerbastunneln redan frsenats med cirka elva r: inledningsvis skulle den frdigstllas 2016, men nu frvntas detta inte ske frrn 2027.
Most recent data reveals that the projected cost for the tunnel will be around 9.3 billion euro (taking into account the inflation rate). 
De senaste uppgifterna avsljar att den prognostiserade kostnaden fr tunneln r cirka 9,3 miljarder euro (med hnsyn tagen till inflationen).
Between the preliminary estimates of 2002 and the estimate of 2013, costs increased by 46 % (from 5.9 billion euro to 8.6 billion euro), and freight traffic is now projected to decrease. 
Mellan de preliminra berkningarna 2002 och uppskattningen 2013 har kostnaderna kat med 46 % (frn 5,9 miljarder euro till 8,6 miljarder euro), och godstrafiken tros nu minska.
These factors reduce the benefit-to-cost ratio very strongly, and makes the 2007 CBA data on passenger numbers and freight traffic 33 
Dessa faktorer minskar nytto-kostnadsfrhllandet avsevrt och innebr att uppgifterna om passagerarantal och godstrafik i lnsamhetsanalysen frn 2007 35
unrealistic. This was not questioned by the INEA, which is managing this on behalf of the Commission. 
Detta ifrgasattes inte av Inea, som skter detta p uppdrag av kommissionen.
For the 2015 CEF calls for proposals, the INEA introduced a specific assessment of costs and benefits before agreeing to provide CEF support. 
Infr 2015 rs anskningsomgngar till Fonden fr ett sammanlnkat Europa (FSE) infrde Inea en specifik bedmning av kostnader och nytta innan std beviljades.
We consider that this will help to improve the quality of decision-making upfront. 
Vi anser att detta kommer att bidra till att frbttra kvaliteten p beslutsfattandet p frhand.
However, the INEA (as well as the Managing Authorities in case of cohesion policy expenditure under shared management) is currently not assessing the cost per minute saved, or the cost of upgrading the existing conventional rail line as alternative to the proposed new high-speed line before agreeing to spend EU co-funding. 
Dock bedmer Inea (samt de frvaltande myndigheterna i frga om sammanhllningspolitiskt std med delad frvaltning) fr nrvarande inte kostnaden per sparad minut eller kostnaden fr att bygga om befintlig konventionell jrnvg som ett alternativ till freslagna nya hghastighetsbanor innan samtycke till EU-medfinansiering ges.
Cost overruns, construction delays and delayed entry into service: a norm instead of an exception 52. 
Budgetverskridanden, frsenade byggen och frsenat idrifttagande: regel snarare n undantag 52.
Based on the data available to us, we estimate that aggregate cost overrun at 5.7 billion euro at project level, and 25.1 billion euro at line level (44 % and 78 %, respectively). 
Baserat p de uppgifter vi har tillgng till uppskattar vi att budgetverskridandena sammanlagt uppgick till 5,7 miljarder euro avseende projekt, och 25,1 miljarder euro avseende banor (44 % och 78 %).
Three projects out of 30 assessed had significant cost overruns of more than 20 % of the initial estimates and all audited high-speed lines had cost overruns of more than 25 % (Table 5). 
Tre av 30 granskade projekt hade avsevrda budgetverskridanden p mer n 20 % av de inledande uppskattningarna och alla granskade hghastighetsbanor hade budgetverskridanden p mer n 25 % (tabell 5).
The German lines had the highest cost overruns: the cost overrun of the Stuttgart-Munich line reached 622.1 %. 34 
De tyska banorna hade de strsta budgetverskridandena: budgeten fr banan StuttgartĐMnchen verskreds med 622,1 %. 36
Table 5 - Overview of costs per km and comparison with estimates 35 Audited line Total length (km) Total cost (million euro)** Initial estimated cost (million euro) Actual cost overrun (%) Initial construction cost per km (million euro) Final completion cost per km (million euro) Berlin-Munich 671 14 682 8 337 76.1 % 12.4 21.9 Stuttgart-Munich 267 13 273 1 838 622.1 % 6.9 49.7 Rhin-Rhne 138 2 588 2 053 26.1 % 14.9 18.8 LGV Est Europenne 406 6 712 5 238 28.1 % 12.9 16.5 Madrid-Barcelona-French Border 797 12 109 8 740 38.5 % 11.0 15.2 Eje Atlntico 165 2 596 2 055 26.3 % 12.5 15.7 Madrid-Len 345 5 415 4 062 33.3 % 11.8 15.7 Madrid-Galicia* 416*** 5 714*** n/a n/a n/a 13.7*** Turin-Salerno* 1 007 32 169 n/a n/a n/a 31.9 Milan-Venice* 273 11 856 n/a n/a n/a 43.4 *No cost estimates available at line level, so impossible to estimate potential overruns. **As of the time of the audit and also for non-completed lines: Stuttgart-Munich, Madrid-Galicia and Milan-Venice. ***Calculated on a stretch Medina del Campo-Galicia and therefore excluding the 133 km of overlap with Madrid-Len HSL. Source: ECA. 
Tabell 5 Đ versikt ver kostnader per km och jmfrelse med uppskattningar 37 Granskad bana Total lngd (km) Total kostnad (miljoner euro)** Inledningsvis uppskattad kostnad (miljoner euro) Faktiskt budget-verskridande (%) Inledande byggkostnad per km (miljoner euro) Slutlig byggkostnad per km (miljoner euro) BerlinĐMnchen 671 14 682 8 337 76,1 % 12,4 21,9 StuttgartĐ Mnchen 267 13 273 1 838 622,1 % 6,9 49,7 RhenĐRhne 138 2 588 2 053 26,1 % 14,9 18,8 LGV Est Europenne 406 6 712 5 238 28,1 % 12,9 16,5 MadridĐ BarcelonaĐ franska grnsen 797 12 109 8 740 38,5 % 11,0 15,2 Eje Atlntico 165 2 596 2 055 26,3 % 12,5 15,7 MadridĐLen 345 5 415 4 062 33,3 % 11,8 15,7 MadridĐ Galicien* 416*** 5 714*** Đ Đ Đ 13,7*** TurinĐSalerno* 1 007 32 169 Đ Đ Đ 31,9 MilanoĐ Venedig* 273 11 856 Đ Đ Đ 43,4 * Kostnadsuppskattningar saknas fr banor s det r omjligt att uppskatta budgetverskridanden. ** Vid tidpunkten fr revisionen och fr ej slutfrda banor: StuttgartĐMnchen, MadridĐGalicien och MilanoĐVenedig. *** Berknat p strckan Medina del CampoĐGalicien och innefattar drfr inte de 133 km som verlappar med hghastighetsbanan MadridĐLen.
All figures are expressed in nominal terms. 
Alla sifferuppgifter tillhandahlls i nominella termer.
Delays at project level were also significant: eight of the 30 projects we audited had been delayed by at least one year, and half of the lines (five lines out of the ten audited) had experienced delays of more than one decade. 
Frseningarna p projektniv var likas betydande: tta av de 30 projekt vi granskade hade frsenats med minst ett r, och hlften av banorna (fem av de tio banor vi granskade) hade frsenats med mer n tio r.
The Milan-Venice line is forecast to have the longest delay compared to initial estimates (18 years). 
Banan MilanoĐVenedig kommer troligen att f den lngsta frseningen jmfrt med de inledande uppskattningarna (18 r).
The highest project cost overrun was 83 %, for the ŇStuttgart 21Ó station (Picture 2), which received 726.6 million euro in grants from the EU. 
Det strsta budgetverskridandet fr ett projekt var 83 % fr stationen ÓStuttgart 21Ó (bild 2), som fick 726,6 miljoner euro i bidrag frn EU.
Picture 2 - Construction works on the Stuttgart 21 station Source: ECA. 
Bild 2 Đ Byggarbeten p stationen Stuttgart 21 Klla: Revisionsrtten.
For this project, because of unrealistic initial cost estimates for tunnelling in a densely populated city centre, and insufficient assessments of geological, environmental and local community cultural heritage aspects, construction costs have soared. 
Byggkostnaderna fr det hr projektet har skjutit i hjden p grund av att de inledande uppskattningarna av kostnaderna fr tunnelarbeten i ett ttbefolkat stadscentrum var orealistiska och bedmningarna av aspekter ssom geologi, milj och lokala kulturarv var otillrckliga.
The total construction costs of 4.5 billion euro estimated in 2003 has been increased to 6.5 billion euro in 2013 and to 8.2 billion euro (latest estimate available in January 2018). 
De totala byggkostnaderna p 4,5 miljarder euro som uppskattades 2003 hade kat till 6,5 miljarder euro 2013 och senast till 8,2 miljarder euro (den senaste uppskattningen i januari 2018).
This means that there is a difference of 3.7 billion euro from the original agreement. 
Skillnaden r allts 3,7 miljarder euro jmfrt med det ursprungliga avtalet.
So far, all funding partners have refused to cover more than the costs set in the original funding agreement. 
Hittills har alla finansieringspartner vgrat att tcka kostnader utver dem som angavs i det ursprungliga finansieringsavtalet.
There will also be a significant delay in completing the works for this station, as it was originally planned that the construction works would be completed by 2008. 
Slutfrandet av arbetena med stationen kommer ocks att frsenas avsevrt, d det ursprungligen var planerat att byggarbetena skulle vara klara 2008.
The start was already delayed from 2001 to 2009, and current estimations are that the works will be completed by 2025. 36 
Redan starten frsenades frn 2001 till 2009, och enligt de senaste uppskattningarna kommer arbetet att vara slutfrt 2025. 38
Finally, for 18 projects32, we also assessed how long it took for the lines to actually enter into service once the EU co-funded works had been completed. 
Fr 18 projekt32 bedmde vi slutligen ocks hur lng tid det tog innan banorna faktiskt togs i drift efter att de EU-medfinansierade arbetena hade slutfrts.
For six projects, entry into operations happened not later than one month after the end of construction works. 
Fr sex projekt skedde idrifttagandet senast en mnad efter att byggarbetena var klara.
For two projects, entry into service had been delayed by around one year; for six projects, the delay was two years; for another, the delay was four years; while two projects in Germany will be delayed by eight years (these projects were finished by the end of 2015, and it is currently estimated that the line will not be in operation before the end of 2023). 
Fr tv projekt frsenades idrifttagandet med ungefr ett r. Fr sex projekt var frseningen tv r och fr ett annat fyra r. Tv projekt i Tyskland kommer dock att frsenas med tta r (dessa projekt slutfrdes i slutet av 2015 och just nu uppskattas att banan inte kommer att tas i drift fre utgngen av 2023).
In one other case (the Figueres Đ Perpignan cross-border line between Spain and France), even though the whole line was finished, it could not be used until 22 months later since it was not connected to the rest of the network on both ends. 
I ett annat fall (den grnsverskridande banan FigueresĐPerpignan mellan Spanien och Frankrike) kunde banan inte anvndas frrn efter 22 mnader, trots att hela banan var frdig, eftersom den inte var ansluten till resten av ntverket i ngon av ndarna.
A citizenŐs view: a real-life assessment of travel times, prices and connections, of passenger-services and of stations and their catchment area Travel times and ticket prices, are important factors for success 59. 
Ur medborgarsynvinkel: en verklighetsbaserad bedmning av restider, priser och avgngar, passagerarservice samt stationer och deras upptagningsomrden Restider och biljettpriser r viktiga framgngsfaktorer 59.
We examined the competitiveness of high-speed rail by asking a travel agent to research the cheapest return ticket prices, travel times and number of connections on given days for both business and tourist profiles on the audited lines. 
Vi bedmde konkurrenskraften hos hghastighetstrafiken p jrnvg genom att be en resebyr underska de billigaste biljettpriserna tur-och retur, restider och antal avgngar under vissa dagar fr bde affrs-och privatresor p de granskade banorna.
A summary of our methodology and the relevant data are in Annex VI. 
En sammanfattning av vr metod och relevanta uppgifter finns i bilaga VI.
This allowed us to calculate average prices per kilometre and minute of travel. 
P s stt kunde vi berkna genomsnittliga priser per kilometer och resminut.
Ticket prices may vary widely (e.g. according to the time of day, and the availability of special offers). 
Biljettpriserna kan variera stort (t.ex. beroende p tid p dygnet och om det finns ngra specialerbjudanden).
However, this work was done on a sufficient scale (data on more than 5 000 return trips was collected) to allow us to realistically assess the options for travelling between the origin and destination pairs on the audited lines. 
Dock gjordes detta arbete i en sdan skala (uppgifter om fler n 5 000 tur-och returresor samlades in) att vi kunde gra realistiska bedmningar av alternativen fr resor mellan avreseorter och resml p de granskade banorna.
The following messages came out of this analysis. (i) On speed: High-speed rail is often much faster (on average 30 % to 50 % of travel time) than conventional rail. 
Analysen gav nedanstende resultat. i) Hastighet: Hghastighetstrafik p jrnvg r oftast mycket snabbare (i genomsnitt 30Đ50 % av restiden) n konventionell jrnvgstrafik.
Air travel (from take-off to landing) is faster than high-Eleven of the thirty audited projects are either still ongoing, or were not implemented properly, leading to significant decommitments of EU funding. 
Flygresor (frn start till 11 av de 30 projekt som vi granskade pgr fortfarande, eller har inte genomfrts ordentligt, vilket leder till att stora delar av EU-finansieringen dras tillbaka.
For one completed project, the entry into service date was not set at the time of the audit. 37 32 
Ett slutfrt projekt saknade datum fr idrifttagning vid tidpunkten fr revisionen. 39 32
speed rail. However, when assessing real total travel time from city centre to city centre, including the travel to the airport and boarding procedures, high-speed rail is often competitive. (ii) On ticket prices: High-speed rail is often much cheaper than air travel. 
Men om man bedmer den faktiska totala restiden frn stadscentrum till stadscentrum, inbegripet tiden det tar att ta sig till flygplatsen och ombord p flygplanet, r hghastighetstrafik p jrnvg ofta konkurrenskraftig. ii) Biljettpriser: Resor med hghastighetsjrnvg r ofta billigare n flygresor.
Last-minute bookings for both transport modes are more expensive than tickets booked in advance. 
Bokningar i sista minuten r dyrare n biljetter som bokas i frvg fr bda transportstten.
In Germany, ticket prices on the Stuttgart-Munich high-speed line are lower than conventional rail ticket prices. (iii) The number of high-speed rail services offered varies considerably during the year. 
I Tyskland r biljettpriserna p hghastighetsbanan StuttgartĐ Mnchen lgre n biljettpriserna p konventionell jrnvg. iii) Antalet hghastighetsavgngar varierar stort under ret.