natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission and Council’s enforcement of the corrective arm has therefore been in line with the Treaty and, moreover, has led to a steady reduction in the number of Member States under an excessive deficit procedure since 2014. 
Kommissionen och rdet har drfr tillmpat den korrigerande delen enligt frdraget, vilket dessutom har lett till en stadig minskning av antalet medlemsstater som omfattas av frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott sedan 2014. 4
Finally, the ECA’s focus on these Member States is also selective, ignoring both the large number of Member States at or approaching their MTO under the preventive arm and the highly indebted Member States, such as Cyprus and Ireland, that have made good progress. 
Revisionsrtten r ocks selektiv nr den inriktar sig p dessa medlemsstater, och den bortser bde frn det stora antal medlemsstater som har uppntt eller nrmar sig sina medelfristiga budgetml enligt den frebyggande delen och de hgt skuldsatta medlemsstater, ssom Cypern och Irland, som har gjort goda framsteg.
X. The Commission conducts a thorough analysis of all Member States’ Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCPs) and publishes its findings in the SCP assessments. 
X. Kommissionen gr en grundlig analys av alla medlemsstaters stabilitets-och konvergensprogram och offentliggr sina iakttagelser i bedmningarna av stabilitets-och konvergensprogrammen.
As regards fiscal measures, the Commission carries out an independent and thorough assessment of the yields of any fiscal measures. 
Vad gller finanspolitiska tgrder gr kommissionen en oberoende och grundlig bedmning av resultaten av eventuella finanspolitiska tgrder.
Further transparency and hence potential scrutiny is provided 4 through the Commission making available for each country the impact of discretionary measures (current/capital revenue as well as current/capital expenditure) and the level of one-offs in the AMECO database since spring 2014. 
Kommissionen skapar kad insyn och drmed mjligheter till kontroll genom att fr varje land tillhandahlla uppgifter om effekterna av de tgrder som den vidtagit inom ramen fr sitt bedmningsutrymme (lpande inkomster/kapitalinkomster och lpande utgifter/kapitalutgifter) samt nivn fr tillflliga poster i Ameco-databasen sedan vren 2014.
While an element of judgement is unavoidable in a given instance, the Commission believes that the wide-ranging assembly of information provides a check against any systematic biases or inaccuracies. 
Vissa bedmningsaspekter r oundvikliga i vissa fall, men kommissionen anser att den omfattande information som finns tillgnglig gr det mjligt att kontrollera om det frekommer eventuella systematiska avvikelser eller felaktigheter.
Nevertheless, the Commission accepts that there has been room for improvement in terms of transparency over the estimation of fiscal measures and, to that end, engaged in intensive discussions with Member States during the course of 2017 to improve the accuracy and transparency of the assessments of such measures. 
Kommissionen instmmer dock i att det finns utrymme fr frbttringar av insynen i uppskattningen av finanspolitiska tgrder, och frde i det syftet omfattande diskussioner med medlemsstaterna under 2017 fr att gra bedmningarna av sdana tgrder mer exakta och ppna.
The Commission is constantly seeking to improve the communication of the rationale underlying its recommendations and will consider specific proposals from the ECA. 
Kommissionen strvar stndigt efter att frbttra kommunikationen om den logiska grunden fr sina rekommendationer och kommer att vervga specifika frslag frn revisionsrtten.
The Commission will also consider these alongside any relevant recommendations made by the ECA at the conclusion of its European Semester audit. 
Kommissionen kommer dessutom att vervga dessa tillsammans med eventuella relevanta rekommendationer frn revisionsrtten nr den har avslutat sin revision av den europeiska planeringsterminen.
The Commission disagrees that the design of the framework needs to be tightened. 
Kommissionen hller inte med om att ramens utformning behver stramas t.
Specifically, the Commission does not accept the first recommendation as Regulation 1466/97 explicitly provides for the 0.25% of GDP allowable margin of deviation and the Commission cannot impose restrictions, i.e. on the accumulation of non-significant deviations, that conflict with the Regulation. 
Kommissionen godtar nrmare bestmt inte den frsta rekommendationen, eftersom frordning (EG) nr 1466/97 uttryckligen freskriver 0,25 % av BNP som en tilltlig avvikelsemarginal, och kommissionen kan drfr inte infra begrnsningar, dvs. fr ackumulering av ej betydande avvikelser, d detta strider mot frordningen.
Moreover, the 0.25% deviation is prescribed by the Regulation in order to take account of the difficulty of the structural balance computations and the inherent uncertainty in budgetary policy-making and execution. 
Syftet med avvikelsen p 0,25 % som freskrivs i frordningen r dessutom att ta hnsyn till svrigheter i berkningen av strukturella saldon och den inneboende oskerheten i upplggningen och genomfrandet av budgetpolitiken.
These factors can lead to a Member State deviating from their target due to matters outside of the control of government. 
Dessa faktorer kan leda till att en medlemsstat avviker frn sitt ml p grund av frgor som str utanfr regeringens kontroll.
As regards the matrix, the categorisation of parameters already sets higher requirements for more heavily indebted Member States. 
Vad gller matrisen faststlls redan hgre krav fr mer kraftigt skuldtyngda medlemsstater i kategoriseringen av parametrarna.
This notwithstanding, as part of a wider review of the use of flexibility required under the Commonly Agreed Position with Member States, the Commission is currently examining the efficacy of the matrix, including the various requirements. 
Oavsett detta, och som ett led i den bredare granskningen av anvndningen av flexibilitetsklausulerna enligt den gemensamt verenskomna stndpunkten med medlemsstaterna, undersker kommissionen fr nrvarande matrisens ndamlsenlighet, inbegripet de olika kraven.
While the Commission agrees that the unusual events clause provisions should only apply to costs directly related to the events in question, it does not accept the recommendation that the temporary deviation under the structural reform clause should be directly linked to costs as it considers that the required adjustment would weaken the effectiveness of the structural reform clause. 
Kommissionen hller visserligen med om att klausulens bestmmelser om ovanliga hndelser endast br vara tillmpliga p kostnader med direkt anknytning till hndelserna i frga, men godtar inte rekommendationen att tillflliga avvikelser enligt klausulen om strukturreformer br vara direkt kopplad till kostnaderna eftersom den anser att de krvda anpassningarna skulle gra strukturreformsklausulen mindre ndamlsenlig.
The temporary deviation under the structural reform clause is not directly linked to the actual budgetary costs of the reform because some very beneficial structural reforms do not always create significant direct budgetary costs, while such reforms carry substantial economic or political costs. 
Tillflliga avvikelser enligt strukturreformsklausulen r inte direkt kopplade till de faktiska budgetkostnaderna fr reformer, eftersom vissa mycket gynnsamma strukturreformer inte skapar ngra strre direkta budgetkostnader, men dremot medfr betydande ekonomiska eller politiska kostnader.
The Commission does not agree that the accumulation by Member States of the 0.25% of GDP allowable margin for deviation can be tackled within the existing legal framework, since this provision is specifically provided for in Article 6(3) of Regulation 1466/97. 
Kommissionen instmmer inte i att medlemsstaters ackumulering av den tilltna avvikelsemarginalen p 0,25 % frn BNP kan hanteras inom den befintliga rttsliga ramen, eftersom denna bestmmelse srskilt freskrivs i artikel 6.3 i frordning nr 1466/97. Kommissionen 5
The inherently nominal nature of the EDP, with its focus upon the 3% headline deficit threshold, limits the Commission’s capacity to enforce structural targets under the corrective arm. 
Den inneboende nominella karaktren hos frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott, som inriktas p att uppn mlet att det samlade underskottet inte ska verskrida 3 %, begrnsar kommissionens mjligheter att driva igenom strukturml inom den korrigerande delen.
The Commission has in the past put forward options for seeking to ensure that structural adjustment requirements are delivered under the corrective arm, specifically by envisaging revision of the EDP recommendation in cases of positive economic surprises relative to the scenario underlying the initial recommendation, but Member States have not supported this suggestion. 
Kommissionen har tidigare freslagit alternativ fr att frska se till att strukturanpassningskraven uppfylls inom den korrigerande delen, srskilt genom ett frslag om att se ver rekommendationerna inom ramen fr frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott i hndelse av positiva ekonomiska verraskningar jmfrt med det scenario som underbygger de ursprungliga rekommendationerna, men detta frslag har inte vunnit std bland medlemsstaterna.
However, the Commission is open to the possibility to revisit this issue and build support for such proposals among the Member States. 
Kommissionen r dock beredd att terkomma till denna frga och skapa std fr sdana frslag bland medlemsstaterna.
Please see reply to paragraph VIII. 
Se svaret p punkt VIII.
The Commission has since 2017 been engaged with Member States in developing a process seeking to improve the accuracy and transparency of the estimation of fiscal measures. 
Kommissionen har sedan 2017 arbetat tillsammans med medlemsstaterna med att utveckla en process fr att gra uppskattningen av finanspolitiska tgrder mer exakt och ppen.
The Commission is open to amending the Code of Conduct to reflect any necessary changes from this process, if Member States agree. 
Kommissionen r ppen fr en ndring av uppfrandekoden fr att avspegla eventuella ndvndiga ndringar till fljd av denna process, om medlemsstaterna samtycker till det.
However, it will be important that any such changes distinguish between the differing nature of revenue and expenditure measures. 
Det r dock viktigt att se till att sdana eventuella ndringar avspeglar skillnaderna mellan tgrder p inkomst-och utgiftssidan.
The indicators used in the Commission’s assessments of compliance are based upon the most recent Commission forecast and the latest validated Eurostat data. 
De indikatorer som kommissionen anvnder i sina efterlevnadsbedmningar baseras p kommissionens senaste prognoser och validerade Eurostatuppgifter.
The fiscal requirements are set a year in advance in order to allow the Member State to formulate their budgetary policy. 
De finanspolitiska kraven faststlls ett r i frvg s att medlemsstaterna fr tid p sig att utforma sin budgetpolitik drefter.
The requirements are based upon the most favourable vintage only as far as the calculation of the distance to the MTO is concerned, whereas the matrix requirements are updated only in a limited number of well-justified circumstances based on the unfreezing principles. 
Kraven grundas endast p de mest gynnsamma rgngarna av data i berkningarna av avstndet till de medelfristiga budgetmlen, medan matriskraven endast uppdateras under ett begrnsat antal vl motiverade omstndigheter baserat p principerna om frigrande.
While the concept of exceptionally bad times does not appear in the Regulation, nor do several of the other categories. 
Begreppet exceptionellt dliga tider finns inte med i frordningen, vilket ven gller flera av de andra kategorierna.
In fact, the Regulation only mentions good times and bad times, not even referring to the possibility of normal times. 
I frordningen nmns i sjlva verket endast goda tider och dliga tider, och den hnvisar inte ens till normala tider.
This reflects the reality that the Regulation does not and cannot provide the level of detail necessary to implement every aspect of the framework and the Commission must decide how to operationalise the legislative provisions. 
Detta avspeglar det faktum att frordningen varken r eller kan vara tillrckligt detaljerad fr att genomfra alla aspekter av ramen, och kommissionen mste drfr bestmma hur de rttsliga bestmmelserna ska genomfras i praktiken.
The reason why no adjustment is sought in such circumstances is that the imposition of fiscal consolidation measures when cyclical conditions are so weak could end up being counter-productive, i.e. the negative impact on activity could result in an even worse budgetary outcome. 
Sklet till att inga anpassningar efterstrvas under sdana omstndigheter r att infrandet av finanspolitiska konsolideringstgrder nr konjunkturfrhllandena r s svaga skulle kunna motverka sitt eget syfte, dvs. de negativa verkningarna p aktiviteten skulle kunna leda till ett nnu smre budgetresultat.
The matrix is not meant to allow a decline in the structural balance during sharp recessions. 
Matrisen r inte avsedd att tillta en minskning av de strukturella saldona vid kraftiga recessioner.
While for situations of negative growth rates, the matrix uses words “no adjustment needed," in practice this means that the structural balance requirement is set to 0. 
Vid negativa tillvxtsiffror anvnds visserligen orden Óingen anpassning behvsÓ, men i praktiken innebr detta att kraven fr strukturella saldon stts till 0.
The ECA does not indicate how a more consistent differentiation of the matrix categorisations could be implemented. 
Revisionsrtten frklarar inte hur det skulle vara mjligt att uppn en mer konsekvent differentiering av matrisens kategorier.
However, the requirement for an adjustment greater than 0.5% of GDP has always been implemented as 0.6% of GDP, with no adjustments higher than this recommended under normal times. 
Kraven p en strre anpassning n 0,5 % av BNP har dock alltid genomfrts som 0,6 % av BNP, eftersom hgre justeringar n s inte rekommenderas under normala tider.
Again, it should be noted that the categorisation of cyclical conditions contained in the matrix was proposed by the Commission but fully agreed with Member States through the Commonly Agreed Position on Flexibility. 
Kommissionen vill terigen ppeka att matrisens kategorisering av konjunkturlgen freslogs av kommissionen, men den godkndes fullstndigt av medlemsstaterna genom den gemensamt verenskomna stndpunkten gllande flexibilitet. 6
The Commission considers that the differentiation in the matrix pointed out by ECA is not inconsistent. 
Kommissionen anser inte att den tskillnad i matrisen som revisionsrtten pekar p r inkonsekvent.
With the exception of the categories of very bad and exceptionally bad times, the adjustments are clustered around the 0.5% benchmark in order that the matrix does not distance itself too far from the Regulation. 
Med undantag fr kategorierna mycket dliga och exceptionellt dliga tider, r anpassningarna samlade kring riktmrket p 0,5 %, s att matrisen inte avviker fr mycket frn frordningen.
The design of the level of adjustment within the categories reflects two further practical factors. 
Utformningen av anpassningsnivn inom kategorierna avspeglar dessutom tv ytterligare praktiska faktorer.
Firstly, if the minimum level of granularity is accepted to be 0.1% of GDP, there is a limited degree of differentiation that can be achieved while staying within reasonable parameters of the benchmark. 
Om den lgsta granularitetsnivn anses vara 0,1 % av BNP kan fr det frsta endast en begrnsad grad av differentiering uppns inom riktmrkets rimliga parametrar.
Secondly, the Commission wanted to avoid creating overly large threshold effects, in order to avoid a situation where small revisions to what is ultimately an unobservable variable, i.e. the output gap, lead to large changes in the prescription for Member State's budgetary strategy. 
Fr det andra ville kommissionen inte skapa alltfr stora avgrnsningseffekter fr att undvika en situation dr sm revideringar av en variabel som faktiskt inte r mjlig att observera, dvs. produktionsgapet, leder till stora frndringar i utformningen av medlemsstaternas budgetstrategier.
Thirdly, the observation appears to confuse the Commission’s replies in relation to the potential political costs associated with structural reforms with the reasoning underlying the matrix outlined above. 
Fr det tredje verkar revisionsrtten i sin iakttagelse blanda ihop kommissionens svar p de mjliga politiska kostnaderna i samband med strukturreformer med det resonemang som ligger till grund fr matrisen.
Finally, as regards the assertion that growth being faster than potential is the ideal time to implement reforms, it should be noted that under the bad times category, the level of the output gap 6 could remain as low as -3%, indicating that although the output gap is closing (i.e. growth exceeds potential) the economy is still in a challenging cyclical position. 
Vad gller pstendet att situationer dr tillvxten gr snabbare n potentialen r det idealiska tillfllet att genomfra reformer, br det noteras att i kategorin dliga tider kan produktionsgapet ligga p en s lg niv som Đ 3 %, vilket tyder p att ven om produktionsgapet minskar (dvs. tillvxten gr om potentialen) befinner sig ekonomin fortfarande i ett utmanande konjunkturlge.
The Commission did conduct analysis when setting the parameters for the matrix. 
Kommissionen genomfrde en analys nr den faststllde matrisens parametrar.
The matrix is based on the pooled distribution of output gaps for 28 EU Member States, between 1986 and 2014, according to the Commission 2014 autumn forecasts. 
Matrisen grundas p den sammanlagda frdelningen av 28 medlemsstaters frdelning av produktionsgapet, mellan 1986 och 2014, enligt kommissionens hstprognoser 2014.
It excludes the largest (negative) output gap from either 2009 or 2010, on the basis that these years reflect the most unusual circumstances experienced in the medium-term past and cannot therefore be thought to constitute part of a typical economic cycle. 
Det strsta (negativa) produktionsgapet frn antingen 2009 eller 2010 undantas, eftersom dessa r avspeglar de mest ovanliga omstndigheterna i det frflutna p medellng sikt, och drfr inte kan anses ing i normala konjunkturfrhllanden.
The historical distribution indicates the frequency with which each category of matrix adjustment will be required, which has obvious implications for reaching the MTO. 
Den historiska frdelningen visar hur ofta det kommer att bli ndvndigt att justera varje kategori i matrisen, vilket har uppenbara konsekvenser fr uppnendet av de medelfristiga budgetmlen.
Recent internal Commission simulations being conducted as part of a formal review of flexibility as required by the Commonly Agreed Position confirm an average matrix adjustment based on the cyclical conditions of just under 0.5% of GDP since 2000. 
Interna simuleringar som kommissionen nyligen genomfrt som ett led i den normala versynen av flexibiliteten, vilket r ett krav enligt den gemensamt verenskomna stndpunkten, bekrftar en genomsnittlig justering av matrisen baserat p konjunkturfrhllandena p strax under 0,5 % av BNP sedan 2000.
The 0.25% margin is contained in the Regulation and the Commission cannot impose restrictions, i.e. on the accumulation of non-significant deviations that conflict with the Regulation. 
Marginalen p 0,25% freskrivs i frordningen och kommissionen kan inte infra begrnsningar, dvs. fr ackumulering av ej betydande avvikelser, d detta strider mot frordningen.
Indeed, the language in the EFB report is notably ambiguous regarding the need for a change in the legislation in order to introduce its proposals to limit the effect of multiple deviations. 
Den europeiska finanspolitiska nmndens rapport r helt klart tvetydig rrande behovet av lagstiftningsndringar fr att infra sina frslag om att begrnsa effekten av flera avvikelser.
The Commission does not agree that the application of its discretion in making its assessments, specifically to apply economic judgement, in any way weakens the framework. 
Kommissionen hller inte med om att ramen p ngot stt frsvagas till fljd av att den tillmpar sitt bedmningsutrymme, vilket srskilt gller ekonomiska bedmningar.
Firstly, under Article 6(3) of Regulation 1466/97, the Commission has a margin of discretion when considering departures from the fiscal adjustments implied by the matrix. 
Artikel 6.3 i frordning nr 1466/97 medger kommissionen ett utrymme fr sknsmssig bedmning vid bedmningen av avvikelser frn de finanspolitiska justeringar som fljer av matrisen.
In this regard, there is no automaticity in the Regulation in reaching the conclusion of a significant deviation. 
I detta avseende finns det ingen automatik i frordningen fr att dra slutsatser om frekomsten av betydande avvikelser.
Secondly, the SGP, including the preventive arm, should not be understood as merely a static set of individual rules to be mechanically applied to any given event. 
Fr det andra br stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten, inbegripet dess frebyggande del, inte uppfattas som en enkel och statisk uppsttning av individuella regler som ska tillmpas mekaniskt p en viss hndelse.
Rather it represents a system of economic and fiscal governance, designed to help ensure prudent macroeconomic and fiscal policy-making over the medium to long-term. 
Pakten utgr snarare ett system fr ekonomisk och finanspolitisk styrning, som r utformat fr att bidra till att skerstlla en frsiktig makroekonomisk politik och finanspolitik p medellng till lng sikt.
The nature of macroeconomic policy-making ensures that unanticipated events will arise and the economic governance framework needs to be flexible enough to be able to respond to and accommodate such developments. 
Den makroekonomiska politikens karaktr innebr i sig att ovntade hndelser kan uppst, och den ekonomiska styrningsramen mste drfr vara tillrckligt flexibel fr att det ska vara mjligt att bemta och anpassa sig till sdana hndelser.
In fact, were the framework unable to do so, the credibility of the SGP as a viable tool for economic governance and policy-making would be undermined. 
Om ramen inte skulle 7 kunna gra detta skulle stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens trovrdighet som ett praktiskt verktyg fr ekonomisk styrning och politik i sjlva verket undergrvas.
At all times therefore, it is important for the Commission to use its economic judgement to ensure a sensible application of the rules, rather than engaging in a purely mechanical approach that is divorced from the prevailing macroeconomic circumstances. 
Det r drfr viktigt att kommissionen i alla lgen anvnder sitt ekonomiska omdme fr att se till att reglerna tillmpas p ett lyhrt stt, i stllet fr att anvnda en rent mekanisk strategi som inte verensstmmer med de rdande makroekonomiska frhllandena.
Common reply to paragraphs 32 and 33. 
Gemensamt svar p punkterna 32 och 33.
The 2017 CSRs were intended to achieve the two objectives of strengthening the ongoing recovery and ensuring fiscal sustainability, while remaining short and simple. 
Syftet med de landsspecifika rekommendationerna 2017 var att uppn de tv mlen att strka den pgende terhmtningen och skerstlla finanspolitisk hllbarhet, samtidigt som de r kort och enkelt hllna.
This translated into the fiscal CSRs not including recommendations for the required adjustment for 2018, in contrast to past practice. 
Drfr innehll de landsspecifika finanspolitiska rekommendationerna inga rekommendationer om den krvda anpassningen fr 2018, till skillnad frn tidigare praxis.
This was ultimately a political decision which took into account a number of considerations. 
Detta var i sista hand ett politiskt beslut, dr ett antal vervganden beaktades.