natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This patchwork system has been constructed without proper coordination across borders: high-speed lines crossing national borders are not amongst the national priorities for construction, even though international agreements have been signed and provisions have been included in the TEN-T Regulation requiring core network corridors to be built by 2030. 
Anlggning av hghastighetsbanor som korsar nationella grnser r inte ngot som prioriteras p nationell niv, trots att internationella avtal har undertecknats och att bestmmelser som krver att stomntskorridorerna ska byggas fram till 2030 har inbegripits 7 i TEN-T-frordningen.
This means a low EU added value of the EU co-funding of high-speed rail infrastructure investments. 7 
Det innebr att det europeiska mervrdet av EU:s medfinansiering av investeringar i jrnvgsinfrastruktur fr hghastighetstrafik r lgt.
V. The quality of the assessment of real needs in the Member States is low, and the alternative solution of upgrading existing conventional lines is not often given due consideration, even though the savings achieved when this option is used can be significant. 
V. Kvaliteten p bedmningen av verkliga behov i medlemsstaterna r lg, och den alternativa lsningen som bestr i att bygga om befintliga konventionella banor vervgs ofta inte i tillrcklig utstrckning, trots att de besparingar som detta alternativ medfr kan vara betydande.
The decision to build high-speed lines is often based on political considerations, and cost-benefit analyses are not used generally as a tool to support cost-efficient decision-making. 
Beslut om att bygga hghastighetsbanor grundas ofta p politiska vervganden, och lnsamhetsanalyser anvnds inte allmnt som ett verktyg till std fr kostnadseffektivt beslutsfattande.
High-speed rail infrastructure is expensive, and is becoming more so: on average, the lines we audited cost 25 million euro per km (not taking into account the more expensive tunnelling projects). 
Jrnvgsinfrastruktur fr hghastighetstrafik r dyr och blir hela tiden dyrare. P de banor vi granskade var kostnaden i genomsnitt 25 miljoner euro per kilometer (ej inrknat de dyrare tunnelprojekten).
The costs involved could in fact have been far lower, with little or no impact on operations. 
Kostnaderna hade i sjlva verket kunnat vara mycket lngre, med liten eller ingen inverkan p driften.
This is because very high-speed lines are not needed everywhere they have been built. 
Detta beror p att banor fr mycket hga hastigheter inte behvs p alla platser dr de har byggts.
The cost of a line increases proportionally with the design speed, and infrastructure capable of handling very high-speed operations (300 km/h or more) is particularly costly. 
Kostnaden fr en bana kar proportionellt med den hastighet banan byggs fr, och infrastruktur som kan klara av mycket hga hastigheter (300 km/h eller mer) r srskilt kostsam.
Such high speeds, however, are never reached in practice: trains run on average at only around 45 % of the lineŐs design speed on the lines audited, and only two lines were operating at an average speed above 200 km/h, and none above 250 km/h. 
Sdana hga hastigheter uppns dock aldrig i praktiken: p de banor som granskats r tgens genomsnittliga krhastighet bara cirka 45 % av den hastighet banan r byggd fr. P enbart tv banor lg genomsnittshastigheten ver 200 kilometer/timme och inte p ngon bana versteg den 250 kilometer/timme.
We also analysed the cost per minute saved by the introduction of high-speed rail. 
Vi analyserade ven kostnaden per intjnad minut genom infrandet av hghastighetstrafik p jrnvg.
We found that four of the ten lines we audited will cost more than one hundred million euro per minute saved. 
Vi konstaterade att fyra av de tio granskade banorna kommer att kosta mer n hundra miljoner euro per insparad minut.
The highest figure is on the Stuttgart Đ Munich line, which will cost 369 million euro per minute saved. 
StuttgartĐMnchen-banan str fr det strsta beloppet: den kommer att kosta 369 miljoner euro per insparad minut.
Cost overruns, which are covered by national budgets, and delays were the norm instead of the exception. 
Budgetverskridanden, som tcks av nationella budgetar, och frseningar var snarare regel n undantag.
Aggregate cost overruns for the lines and projects we audited were 5.7 billion euro at project level, and 25.1 billion euro at line level (44 % and 78 %, respectively). 
Sammanlagt uppgick budgetverskridandena fr de banor och projekt som vi granskade till 5,7 miljarder euro p projektniv, och 25,1 miljarder euro p banniv (44 respektive 78 %).
Delays at project and line level were also significant: eight of the 30 projects we audited had been delayed by at least one year, and five lines (half of the sample audited) had experienced delays of more than one decade. 
Frseningar p projekt-och banniv var likas betydande: tta av de 8 30 projekt vi granskade hade frsenats med minst ett r, och fem banor (halva granskningsurvalet) hade frsenats med mer n ett rtionde.
Paying careful attention to the elements above could save hundreds of millions of euros, and ensure that good use is made of lines which are built. 
Om ordentlig hnsyn hade tagits till ovanstende hade hundratals miljoner euro kunnat sparas, och man hade kunnat skerstlla att de hghastighetsbanor som byggs utnyttjas p ett bra stt.
To gain insight into how high-speed rail benefits EU citizens, we also analysed and compared door-to-door travel times, prices and number of connections for high-speed rail 8 and its competitors (air transport, conventional rail and road transport). 
Fr att f inblick i hur hghastighetstrafik p jrnvg gagnar EU:s invnare analyserade vi ven restider drr till drr, priser och antalet avgngar fr hghastighetsjrnvg jmfrt med konkurrerande transportslag (flyg, konventionell jrnvg och vgtransport).
Combined with effectively regular services, these factors could allow high-speed rail to increase its market share. 
I kombination med regelbunden trafik skulle dessa faktorer kunna bidra till att ka marknadsandelen fr hghastighetstrafik p jrnvg.
Intermodal competition is fierce, and it affects the sustainability of high-speed lines: high-speed rail does not compete on an equal basis with other transport modes. 
Den intermodala konkurrensen r hrd och pverkar hghastighetsbanornas ekonomiska hllbarhet: hghastighetsbanor konkurrerar inte med andra transportstt p lika villkor.
We assess sustainability of the EU co-funding to be at risk. 
Vi bedmer att hllbarheten nr det gller EU:s medfinansiering r hotad.
Judging by a benchmark, a high-speed line should ideally have nine million passengers per year to be successful. 
Enligt ett riktmrke br en hghastighetsbana under idealiska frhllanden ha nio miljoner passagerare per r fr att den ska vara framgngsrik.
However, on three of the seven completed high-speed lines we audited, the number of passengers carried was far lower. 
Nr det gller tre av de sju slutfrda hghastighetsbanorna som vi granskade var antalet passagerare dock betydligt lgre.
The infrastructure cost of these lines was 10.6 billion euro, to which the EU provided around 2.7 billion euro. 
Infrastrukturkostnaden fr dessa banor var 10,6 miljarder euro, varav 2,7 miljoner euro kom frn EU.
This means that there is a high risk of ineffective spending of EU co-funding on these lines. 
Det innebr att det finns en stor risk fr att EU:s medfinansiering av dessa banor varit ondamlsenlig.
Our assessment of the number of people living in the catchment areas of the audited lines indicates that nine of the 14 audited lines and cross-border connections did not have enough potential passengers to be successful. 
Vr utvrdering av antalet invnare som bor i upptagningsomrdena fr de granskade banorna visar att det vid nio av 14 banor och grnsverskridande frbindelser inte finns tillrckligt med potentiella passagerare fr att satsningen ska vara framgngsrik.
These include the three lines indicated above carrying a lower number of passengers compared to the benchmark of nine million. 
Dessa omfattar de tre banor som nmns ovan, som transporterar ett lgre antal passagerare jmfrt med riktmrket p nio miljoner.
X. In 2010, we issued a report calling for urgent action to lift all technical, administrative and other barriers to rail interoperability. 
X. r 2010 offentliggjorde vi en rapport i vilken vi efterlyste omedelbara tgrder fr att undanrja samtliga tekniska, administrativa och vriga hinder fr driftskompatibilitet p jrnvgsomrdet.
However, we found that these barriers still persist in 2018. 
Vi konstaterar dock att dessa hinder fortfarande kvarstr 2018.
The rail passenger market is not open in France and Spain. 
Persontrafikmarknaden r inte ppen i Frankrike och Spanien.
There is on-track competition in Italy and, to a limited extent, in Austria; in these Member States, services were more frequent and of higher quality, whereas ticket prices were lower. 
Det rder konkurrens p banorna i Italien och, i begrnsad omfattning, i sterrike. I dessa medlemsstater var tidtabellerna ttare och tjnsterna av hgre kvalitet samtidigt som biljettpriserna var lgre.
Integrated ticketing systems, and greater attention paid to monitoring and standardising customer satisfaction and punctuality data, could further improve the passenger experience. 
Integrerade biljettsystem, och strre fokus p bevakning och standardisering av uppgifter 9
For a successful continuation of EU co-funding for high-speed rail infrastructure in the next programming period, we recommend that the Commission should take a number of steps. 
Fr en framgngsrik fortsttning p EU:s medfinansiering av jrnvgsinfrastruktur fr hghastighetstrafik under nsta programperiod rekommenderar vi att kommissionen vidtar ett antal tgrder.
These include: (i) carrying out realistic long-term planning; and agreeing with the Member States the key strategic stretches to be implemented first, with close monitoring and enforceable powers to ensure that commitments to complete the core EU high-speed rail network are respected; 9 (ii) making EU co-funding support linked to earmarked strategic priority projects, effective on-track competition and achievement of results; (iii) simplifying cross-border constructions with regard to tendering procedures, the use of Ňone-stop-shopsÓ for the formalities, and the lifting of all remaining barriers; (iv) actions to improve seamless high-speed rail operations for passengers, such as, for example, e-ticketing, simplification of track access charges and improving the reporting to citizens on punctuality and customer satisfaction data. 
Dessa omfattar fljande: i) Utarbeta en realistisk, lngsiktig plan och enas med medlemsstaterna om de viktigaste strategiska strckor som ska genomfras frst, i kombination med noggrann vervakning och befogenheter fr efterlevnadskontroll fr att se till att taganden om att slutfra EU:s stomjrnvgsnt med hghastighetsbanor respekteras. ii) Se till att EU:s medfinansiering kopplas till ronmrkta strategiska prioriterade projekt, ndamlsenlig konkurrens p banorna och uppnende av resultat. iii) Frenkla grnsverskridande byggprojekt med avseende p upphandlingsfrfaranden, anvndning av gemensamma kontaktpunkter fr formaliteter och undanrjande av alla terstende hinder. iv) Vidta tgrder som frmjar sammanhngande och smidig hghastighetstrafik p jrnvg fr passagerarna, genom till exempel e-biljettfrsljning och frenklade banavgifter, och frbttra rapporteringen till medborgarna av uppgifter om punktlighet och kundnjdhet.
10 INTRODUCTION High-speed rail in Europe 1. 
10 INLEDNING Jrnvg fr hghastighetstrafik i Europa 1.
High-speed rail in Europe took off after the 1974 petrol crisis. 
Hghastighetstrafiken i Europa fick ett uppsving efter oljekrisen 1974.
EuropeŐs energy dependency threatened internal mobility, so several Member States decided to develop a safe, fast, comfortable and ecological mode of transport in the form of high-speed rail lines. 
Europas energiberoende hotade den inre rrligheten, s flera medlemsstater beslutade sig fr att utveckla ett skert, snabbt, bekvmt och ekologiskt transportstt i form av jrnvgslinjer fr hghastighetstrafik.
Italy was the first European country to inaugurate a high-speed rail line: the line from Florence and Rome opened in 1977. 
Italien var det frsta europeiska landet som invigde en hghastighetsbana: banan frn Florens och Rom ppnade 1977.
Shortly afterwards, France inaugurated its own ŇTrains  Grande VitesseÓ lines. 
Kort drefter invigde Frankrike sina egna ÓTrains  Grande VitesseÓ-banor.
GermanyŐs first high-speed lines, served by ŇIntercity ExpressÓ (ICE) trains, opened in the early 1990s, whereas SpainŐs ŇAlta Velocidad EspaolaÓ (AVE) high-speed service commenced operations in 1992. 2. 
Tysklands frsta hghastighetsbanor, som trafikerades av ÓIntercity ExpressÓ-tg (ICE), ppnade under tidigt 1990-tal, och Spaniens hghastighetstrafik ÓAlta Velocidad EspaolaÓ (AVE) togs i drift 1992. 2.
There is currently no single European high-speed rail network: instead, different operational models exist in different Member States (Figure 1). 
Det finns fr nrvarande inget gemensamt europeiskt jrnvgsnt fr hghastighetstrafik. I stllet har man olika operativa modeller i olika medlemsstater (figur 1).
For example, there are mixed high-speed systems (in France, Spain and Italy) and fully mixed high-speed lines (Germany, Austria and two sections in Italy). 
Exempelvis finns det blandade hghastighetssystem (i Frankrike, Spanien och Italien) och helt blandade hghastighetsbanor (Tyskland, sterrike och tv avsnitt i Italien).
Figure 1 - Operational models for high-speed rail traffic 11 Model 1: Exclusive Exploitation High Speed Trains Conventional Trains High Speed Tracks Conventional Tracks Model 2: Mixed High Speed High Speed Trains Conventional Trains High Speed Tracks Conventional Tracks Model 3: Mixed Conventional High Speed Trains Conventional Trains High Speed Tracks Conventional Tracks Model 4: Fully Mixed High Speed Trains Conventional Trains High Speed Tracks Conventional Tracks Source: De Rus, G. (ed.), I. Barrn, J. Campos, P. Gagnepain, C. Nash, A. Ulied and R.Vickerman (2009): Economic Analysis of High-Speed Rail in Europe. 
Figur 1 Đ Operativa modeller fr hghastighetstrafik p jrnvg 11 Modell 1: Exklusivt utnyttjande Hghastighetstg Konventionella tg Hghastighetsspr Konventionella spr Modell 2: Blandad hghastighet Hghastighetstg Konventionella tg Hghastighetsspr Konventionella spr Modell 3: Blandad konventionell Hghastighetstg Konventionella tg Hghastighetsspr Konventionella spr Modell 4: Helt blandad Hghastighetstg Konventionella tg Hghastighetsspr Konventionella spr Klla:De Rus, G. (ed.), I. Barrn, J. Campos, P. Gagnepain, C. Nash, A. Ulied och R. Vickerman (2009): Economic Analysis of High Speed Rail in Europe (ekonomisk analys av jrnvg fr hghastighetstrafik i Europa).
The EUŐs high-speed rail network is growing in size and in rate of utilisation 3. 
EU:s jrnvgsnt fr hghastighetstrafik vxer bde nr det gller storlek och utnyttjandegrad 3.
At the end of 2017, the EU had 9 067 km of high-speed lines (Figure 2; Annex I provides a detailed map). 
I slutet av 2017 fanns det 9 067 kilometer hghastighetsbana i EU (i figur 2, bilaga I, finns det en detaljerad karta).
This network is expanding: 1 671 km are currently under construction. 
Ntet vxer: 1 671 kilometer hller fr nrvarande p att byggas.
all planned high-speed rail infrastructure investments have been completed, Spain will have the second-longest high-speed rail network in the world, after China. 
Nr alla planerade investeringar i jrnvgsinfrastruktur fr hghastighetstrafik har slutfrts kommer det nst lngsta jrnvgsntet fr hghastighetstrafik (efter Kina) att finnas i Spanien.
Figure 2 - Length of national high-speed rail networks in the EU Đ growth over time 12 10 000 9 000 8 000 7 000 6 000 5 000 4 000 3 000 2 000 1 000 0 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Germany Spain France Italy other EU Source: EU Statistical Pocketbook 2017; UIC. 
Figur 2 Đ Lngd p nationella jrnvgsnt fr hghastighetstrafik i EU Đ tillvxt ver tid 12 10 000 9 000 8 000 7 000 6 000 5 000 4 000 3 000 2 000 1 000 0 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Tyskland Spanien Frankrike Italien vriga EU Klla: EU Statistical Pocketbook 2017 (EU:s statistik i pocketutgva 2017) och UIC.
Note: This chart includes only lines (or sections of lines) on which trains can exceed 250 km/h at some point during their journey. 4. 
Anmrkning: Detta diagram inbegriper enbart banor (eller banavsnitt) dr tg kan kras fortare n 250 kilometer/timme ngon gng under resan. 4.
The number of passengers using high-speed rail in Europe is growing steadily: from roughly 15 billion passenger-kilometres1 (pkm) in 1990, demand reached more than 124 billion pkm in 2016. In 2015, high-speed rail services accounted for more than a quarter (26 %) of all rail passenger travel in the Member States where high-speed services are available. 
Antalet passagerare som reser med hghastighetstg i Europa kar stadigt: frn grovt rknat 15 miljarder personkilometer1 1990 kade efterfrgan till ver 124 miljarder personkilometer 2016. r 2015 stod hghastighetstrafiken fr mer n en fjrdedel (26 %) av all persontrafik p jrnvg i de medlemsstater dr hghastighetstrafik bedrivs.
EU policies for high-speed rail Transport policy 5. 
EU:s politik fr hghastighetsbanor Transportpolitik 5.
The Trans-European Networks for Transport (TEN-T) programme2 plays a key role in the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. 
Programmet fr det transeuropeiska transportntet (TEN-T)2 spelar en central roll i Europa 2020-strategin fr smart och hllbar tillvxt fr alla.
It serves the goals of economic development, regional competitiveness, regional and social cohesion, and environmental sustainability. 
Det gynnar mlen nr det gller ekonomisk utveckling, regional konkurrenskraft, regional och social sammanhllning och miljhllbarhet.
TEN-TŐs objectives include the interconnection and interoperability of national transport networks, the optimal integration and interconnection of all transport modes, and the efficient use of infrastructure. 6. 
Mlen med TEN-T inbegriper samtrafikfrmga och driftskompatibilitet hos nationella transportnt, optimal integration och samtrafikfrmga mellan alla transportstt och effektivt utnyttjande av infrastruktur. 6.
The latest Commission 2011 Transport White Paper (WP)3 has set the following specific passenger traffic targets for high-speed rail4: (i) By 2030, the length of the existing high-speed rail network should be tripled so that, by 2050, most medium-distance passenger transport should be by rail (a 50 % shift of medium-distance intercity passenger and freight journeys from road to rail). High-speed rail should grow faster than air transport for journeys of up to 1 000 km, and by 2050, all core network airports should be connected to the rail network, preferably by high-speed services. 
I kommissionens senaste vitbok om transport3 frn 2011 faststlls fljande specifika persontrafikml fr hghastighetstrafiken p jrnvg4: i) Tredubbla den nuvarande strckningen av jrnvgsntet fr hghastighetstrafik fram till 2030 s att, senast 2050, flertalet passagerartransporter p medellnga strckor sker med tg (en verflyttning av Personkilometer r ett mtt som fs fram genom att man kombinerar antalet passagerare i hghastighetstrafiken p jrnvg per r med resans lngd, i syfte att optimera mtningen av anvndningen av hghastighetstrafiken p jrnvg.
To advance on these goals, in December 2013, the EU adopted a new transport infrastructure policy5 that aims to close the gaps between the transport networks of Decision No 1692/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 1996 on Community guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network (OJ L 228, 9.9.1996, p. 1). 
Europaparlamentets och rdets beslut nr 1692/96/EG av den 23 juli 1996 om gemenskapens riktlinjer fr utbyggnad av det transeuropeiska transportntet (EGT L 228, 9.9.1996, s. 1).
COM(2011) 144 final of 28.3.2011 ŇRoadmap to a Single European Transport Area Đ Towards a competitive and resource-efficient systemÓ. 
Frdplan fr ett gemensamt europeiskt transportomrde Đ ett konkurrenskraftigt och resurseffektivt transportsystem (KOM(2011) 144 slutlig, 28.3.2011).
In conjunction with these, the EU has set ambitious carbon emission reduction targets for the coming decades (see also paragraph 22). 
I samband med dessa har EU faststllt ambitisa ml fr minskade koldioxidutslpp de kommande rtiondena (se ven punkt 22).
Member States, to remove bottlenecks that still hamper the smooth functioning of the internal market, and to overcome technical barriers (e.g. incompatible standards for railway traffic). 
Fr att vi ska gra framsteg mot dessa ml antog EU i december 2013 en ny transportinfrastrukturpolitik5 som syftar till att f bukt med klyftorna mellan medlemsstaternas transportnt, avlgsna flaskhalsar som fortfarande frhindrar en vlfungerande inre marknad och verbrygga tekniska hinder (t.ex. ofrenliga standarder fr jrnvgstrafik).
The Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) instrument6, adopted at the same time, supports these objectives financially. 
Instrumentet Fonden fr ett sammanlnkat Europa (FSE)6, som antogs samtidigt, stder dessa ml ekonomiskt.
Cohesion policy 8. 
Sammanhllningspolitiken 8.
Since 2000, the Structural Funds have been required to operate in a manner consistent with other EU policies, such as transport7. 
Sedan 2000 har strukturfondernas verksamhet varit tvungen att verensstmma med andra politikomrden i EU, till exempel transport7.
Under both the ERDF and the CF Regulations, support has been provided to investments contributing to the establishment and development of TEN-T networks8, as well as to transport infrastructure projects of common interest9. 
I enlighet med bde Eruf-frordningen och frordningen om sammanhllningsfonden har std lmnats till investeringar som bidrar till upprttande och utbyggnad av TEN-T-nt8 samt transportinfrastrukturprojekt av gemensamt intresse9.
Under the current 2014-2020 cohesion-policy framework, the EU cohesion-policy funds still support transport infrastructure but, to increase the effectiveness of EU co-funding, Ňex-ante conditionalitiesÓ have been introduced. 
Enligt den nuvarande sammanhllningspolitiska ramen 2014Đ2020 stder EU:s sammanhllningspolitiska fonder fortfarande transportinfrastruktur, men fr att gra EU:s Europaparlamentets och rdets frordning (EU) nr 1315/2013 av den 11 december 2013 om unionens riktlinjer fr utbyggnad av det transeuropeiska transportntet (EUT L 348, 20.12.2013, s.
From 2000 to 201710, the EU provided 23.7 billion euro in grants to co-finance high-speed rail infrastructure investments, as well as 4.4 billion euro in support to install ERTMS Regulation (EU) No 1316/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility (OJ L 348, 20.12.2013, p. 
1). Europaparlamentets och rdets frordning (EU) nr 1316/2013 av den 11 december 2013 om inrttande av Fonden fr ett sammanlnkat Europa (EUT L 348, 20.12.2013, s.
Article 2(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds (OJ L 161, 26.6.1999, p. 
Artikel 2.5 i rdets frordning (EG) nr 1260/1999 om allmnna bestmmelser fr strukturfonderna (EGT L 161, 26.6.1999, s.
Article 2(1) (b) of Regulation (EC) No 1783/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 1999 on the European Regional Development Fund (OJ L 213, 13.8.1999, p. 
Artikel 2.1 b i Europaparlamentets och rdets frordning (EG) nr 1783/1999 av den 12 juli 1999 om Europeiska regionala utvecklingsfonden, (EGT L 213, 13.8.1999, s.