natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
31 Unlike in the regular asylum procedure, the vulnerability assessment is crucial in the Greek fast-track border procedure, as applicants considered vulnerable have their geographical restriction lifted and are channelled to the regular/accelerated procedure on the mainland. 
31 Till skillnad frn det reguljra asylfrfarandet r srbarhetsanalysen avgrande vid det grekiska pskyndade grnsfrfarandet, eftersom skande som anses vara srbara fr sina geografiska restriktioner hvda och vidarebefordras till det reguljra/pskyndade frfarandet p fastlandet.
95 Since 2016, Frontex has been able to coordinate and organise forced return operations on its own initiative. 
95 Sedan 2016 har Frontex kunnat samordna och organisera insatser fr ofrivilligt tervndande p eget initiativ.
However, to allow it to better plan such operations, Member States would need to systematically provide robust and timely operational information on a regular basis (e.g. up-to-date data on third-country nationals eligible for return, their country of origin, numbers in pre-removal detention centres, end date of their detention, etc.). 
Fr att Frontex ska kunna planera sdana insatser bttre mste medlemsstaterna dock systematiskt och regelbundet tillhandahlla gedigen och aktuell operativ information (t.ex. uppdaterade uppgifter om tredjelandsmedborgare som kommer i frga fr tervndande, deras ursprungsland, antalet som befinner sig i slutna frvar infr avvisning och slutdatum fr frvar).
96 Since FrontexŐs mandate was extended in 2016, there have been two EU-instruments for forced return activities (AMIF NPs and Frontex return support). 
96 Sedan Frontex mandat frlngdes 2016 har det funnits tv EU-instrument fr insatser vid ofrivilligt tervndande (Amifs nationella program och Frontex std vid tervndande).
The two EU funding structures have existed in parallel to finance the same type of forced return activities (joint operations, national operations and scheduled commercial flights). 
EU:s tv finansieringsstrukturer har parallellt finansierat samma typ av insatser fr ofrivilligt tervndande (gemensamma insatser, nationella insatser och reguljrflyg).
In the context of low returns, this leads to FrontexŐs potential to offer return support being unharnessed (Box 8). 
Vid f tervndanden leder det till att Frontex potential att erbjuda tervndandestd inte utnyttjas (ruta 8).
39 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns Box 8 Example of insufficient coordination between Frontex and AMIF support for forced return operations Greece seldom organised joint return operations before 2018, as it did not have its own framework contract for charter planes. 
Ruta 8 Exempel p bristande samordning mellan std frn Frontex och Amif till insatser fr ofrivilligt tervndande Grekland organiserade sllan gemensamma tervndandeinsatser fre 2018, eftersom landet inte hade ngot eget ramavtal fr charterflyg.
Instead, it participated in the joint operations of other Member States. In 2018, Greece concluded its own framework contract, but has so far used it only for national operations funded by AMIF NP, instead of organising joint operations with other Member States to make better use of plane capacity. 
I stllet deltog landet i andra medlemsstaters gemensamma insatser. r 2018 slt Grekland sitt eget ramavtal, men har hittills enbart anvnt det fr nationella insatser som finansierats genom Amifs nationella program i stllet fr att organisera gemensamma insatser med andra medlemsstater fr att dra bttre nytta av flygplanskapaciteten.
97 There is no structure for coordinating AMIF and Frontex action. 
97 Det finns ingen struktur fr samordning av Amifs och Frontex insatser.
Frontex is not involved in programming AMIF return actions and does not have access to information on AMIF NPs or the relevant projects funded under AMIF. 
Frontex deltar inte i programplaneringen av Amifs tervndandeinsatser och har inte tillgng till information om Amifs nationella program eller de relevanta projekt som finansieras genom Amif.
Potential of Frontex return support unrealised 98 Since the Member States have not fully harnessed the FrontexŐs potential to support return operations (Figure 9), the Agency has not been in a position to make full use of its increased budget for return support since its mandate was extended. 
Potentialen hos Frontex tervndandestd har inte utnyttjats 98 Eftersom medlemsstaterna inte till fullo har utnyttjat Frontex potential att stdja tervndandeinsatser (figur 9) har byrn inte maximalt kunnat utnyttja sin kade budget fr tervndandestd sedan dess mandat frlngdes.
40 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns Figure 9 Đ Use of Frontex budget for return support (in million euros) 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2015 2016 2017 2018 Unused initial budget Executed regular budget commitments 13.2 28.1 38.5 13.5 53.1 4.4 49.4 Source: ECA,basedonFrontexdata. 
Figur 9 Đ Utnyttjande av Frontex budget fr tervndandestd (i miljoner euro) 43 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2015 2016 2017 2018 Outnyttjad ursprunglig budget Genomfrda ordinarie budgettaganden 13,2 28,1 38,5 13,5 53,1 4,4 49,4 Klla: Revisionsrtten, p grundval av uppgifter frn Frontex.
99 As shown in Figure 10, Greece and Italy are among the Member States not making full use of FrontexŐs potential32. 
99 Som visas i figur 10 r Grekland och Italien bland de medlemsstater som inte fullt ut utnyttjar Frontex potential32.
32 In particular for national return operations (Greece), when organising joint return operations using the new Greek national framework contract (Greece), participating in joint operations (Italy) or with scheduled flights (Greece and Italy). 
32 I synnerhet fr nationella tervndandeinsatser (Grekland), vid organisering av gemensamma tervndandeinsatser som anvnder det nya grekiska nationella ramavtalet (Grekland), vid deltagande i gemensamma insatser (Italien) eller med reguljrflyg (Grekland och Italien).
Average direct cost per returnee covered by Frontex 100 We noted that operational challenges are affecting the cost-efficiency of charter operations (Figure 10). (i) Owing to the risk of absconding, there is a need to act quickly once a migrant is ready to be returned; there is no time to wait for the charter flight to be full. 
45 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden 100 Vi noterade att operativa utmaningar pverkar kostnadseffektiviteten hos charterinsatser (figur 10). i) P grund av risken fr att personer avviker mste man agera snabbt nr en migrant r redo att skickas tillbaka, man kan inte vnta p att charterflyget ska bli fullt.
This results in unused capacity (43 %) on chartered aircrafts, particularly since a large aircraft with sufficient flight range must be used for long-distance return operations to Africa or Asia. (ii) Actual passenger numbers are often lower than planned (67 % in 2018) due to the lack of necessary travel documents, last-minute renewed asylum claims, absconders, etc. (iii) Many staff members must accompany returnees (escorts, monitors, observers, medical personnel, etc.). (iv) Return operations are also hampered by difficult cooperation with the third countries33. 101 In general, scheduled flights are more cost-efficient than charter flights. 
Det leder till outnyttjad kapacitet (43 %) p chartrade flygplan, i synnerhet eftersom ett stort flygplan med tillrcklig rckvidd mste anvndas fr tervndandeinsatser med lnga avstnd till Afrika eller Asien. ii) Det faktiska passagerarantalet r ofta lgre n planerat (67 % r 2018) p grund av att ndvndiga resedokument saknas, asylanskningar frnyas i sista minuten, avvikanden sker etc. iii) En stor mngd personal mste ledsaga de tervndande (ledsagare, vervakare, observatrer, vrdpersonal etc.). iv) tervndandeinsatserna hindras ven av svrigheter i samarbetet med tredjelnder33.
On the other hand, approximately one third of scheduled flight return operations got cancelled, mainly due to returnee refusals, the absence of travel documents, absconding, court decisions or captain refusals. 
101 Generellt r reguljrflyg mer kostnadseffektiva n chartrade flygplan.  andra sidan blev uppskattningsvis en tredjedel av tervndandeinsatserna via reguljrflyg instllda, frmst p grund av tervndande som vgrade ka, saknade resedokument, avvek, domstolsbeslut eller flygkaptener som vgrade flyga.
42 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns 33 For example: Algeria and Morocco do not accept charter flights and prefer bilateral deals to EU readmission agreements. 
33 Till exempel: Algeriet och Marocko accepterar inte charterflyg och fredrar bilaterala avtal framfr EU:s tertagandeavtal.
Algeria sometimes requires the return of an individual to be completed within 24 hours of the issuance of travel documents, which is not feasible. 
Algeriet krver ibland att en person ska ha tervnt inom 24 timmar frn det att resedokumenten utfrdas, vilket inte r genomfrbart.
IranŐs Constitution prohibits the return of its citizens against their will, which makes their forced return impossible. 
Irans konstitution frbjuder att dess medborgare tersnds mot deras vilja, vilket omjliggr ofrivilligt tervndande.
The Tunisian authorities only accept returnees from Italy and Germany via charter flights under the respective bilateral readmission agreements. 
De tunisiska myndigheterna godtar enbart tervndande frn Italien och Tyskland med chartrade flygplan inom ramen fr lndernas respektive bilaterala tertagandeavtal.
Turkey does not apply the third-country nationals clause of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement in practice. 
Turkiet tillmpar inte klausulen om tredjelandsmedborgare i tertagandeavtalet mellan EU och Turkiet i praktiken.
Only Afghanistan accepts temporary EU travel documents. 
Endast Afghanistan godtar tillflliga EU-resedokument.
Nigeria (and many other African countries) do not have a complete register of their citizens, which makes their identification difficult. 
Nigeria (och mnga andra afrikanska lnder) har inget fullstndigt register ver sina medborgare, vilket gr det svrt att identifiera dem.
Long asylum processing times persist despite increased capacity and irregular migrant returns remain low 102 We assessed the impact of the EU support actions at the national level by examining whether the asylum and return procedures had become more swift and effective, looking at the: (a) average processing times between key stages of the asylum procedure (see Figure 11); (b) clearing of the backlog of pending asylum applications; (c) share of appeals overturning the first-instance asylum decisions; (d) number of actual returns compared to the number of return decisions issued; (e) average processing times between the key stages of the return procedure (see Figure 12). Figure 11 Đ Asylum procedure 43 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns Asylum application made Asylum application registered Lodging Interview First instance decision Issuance of travel document Appeal decision Source: ECA. 
46 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden Fortfarande lnga asylhandlggningstider trots kad kapacitet, och f irreguljra migranter tervnder 102 Vi bedmde den inverkan som EU:s stdtgrder haft p nationell niv genom att underska huruvida asyl-och tervndandefrfarandena hade blivit snabbare och mer effektiva, och vi tittade p a) genomsnittliga handlggningstider mellan viktiga etapper i asylfrfarandet (se figur 11), b) undanrjningen av efterslpningen av pgende asylanskningar, c) antalet verklaganden som upphvde asylbesluten i frsta instans, d) antalet faktiska tervndanden jmfrt med antalet tervndandebeslut som utfrdats, e) genomsnittliga handlggningstider mellan viktiga etapper i tervndandefrfarandet (se figur 12). Figur 11 Đ Asylfrfarandet Klla: Revisionsrtten.
Figure 12 Đ Return procedure Return decision Source: ECA. 
Figur 12 Đ tervndandefrfarandet Klla: Revisionsrtten.
Detention Voluntary departure AVRR Identification Forced return 103 Over the course of the crisis, most irregular migrants coming to Europe have arrived in either Italy or Greece. 
47 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden 103 Under krisen har de flesta irreguljra migranter som kommit till Europa anlnt till antingen Italien eller Grekland.
The two Member States have evolved from countries of transit to countries where migrants apply for asylum. 
De tv medlemsstaterna har utvecklats frn att vara transitlnder till att vara lnder dr migranter sker asyl.
Given that the current situation in the two countries is different, we present our findings on asylum procedures for each separately. 
Med tanke p att den aktuella situationen i de tv lnderna r olika presenterar vi vra resultat om asylfrfarandena fr varje land separat.
Furthermore, the asylum data collected and analysed do not allow for a direct comparison of the Greek and Italian asylum systems. 
Vidare medger inte de asyluppgifter som samlats in och analyserats en direkt jmfrelse mellan de grekiska och italienska asylsystemen.
The entire Greek asylum system remains overloaded despite major growth in processing capacity Backlog rising despite growth in processing capacity 104 The Greek Asylum Service (GAS) became operational in June 2013. 
Hela det grekiska asylsystemet frblir verbelastat trots kraftigt kad handlggningskapacitet Efterslpningen kar trots kad handlggningskapacitet 104 Den grekiska asylmyndigheten inledde sin verksamhet i juni 2013.
With the support of AMIF EMAS, the AMIF NP, EASO and the UNHCR, its workforce has grown in recent years, increasing its capacity to process first-instance decisions (see Figure 13). 
Med std av Amifs katastrofbistnd, Amifs nationella program, Easo och UNHCR har dess arbetsstyrka vuxit de senaste ren, vilket har kat kapaciteten att fatta beslut i frsta instans (se figur 13).
Apart from the difficulty in recruiting qualified staff, another factor limiting GASŐ further growth is the acute lack of working space (Box 9). 
Vid sidan av svrigheten att rekrytera kvalificerad personal r en annan faktor som begrnsar den grekiska asylmyndighetens fortsatta tillvxt den akuta bristen p arbetsutrymme (ruta 9).
Box 9 Lack of working space at the Greek Asylum Service In Athens, GASŐ central services occupy an old building with cramped offices. 
49 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden Ruta 9 Brist p arbetsutrymme vid den grekiska asylmyndigheten I Aten sitter den grekiska asylmyndighetens centrala enheter i en gammal byggnad med trnga kontor.
Interview, registration and the Dublin unit offices are outside the main building in containers, where files are stacked on the floor for lack of space. 
Kontoren fr intervjuer, registreringar och Dublinenhetens kontor finns i containrar utanfr huvudbyggnaden, dr mappar ligger i travar p golvet p grund av brist p utrymme.
Space constraints were also visible during our audit visit to the hotspots on Lesbos and Samos. 
Man kunde ven se bristen p utrymme vid vrt revisionsbesk p mottagningscentrumen p Lesvos och Samos.
106 The overall number of pending cases at first instance almost doubled between mid-2017 and the end of 2018, and there was a sharp increase in the number of cases older than 6 months (Figure 14). 
106 Det totala antalet pgende renden i frsta instans nstan frdubblades mellan mitten av 2017 och slutet av 2018, och det skedde en kraftig kning av antalet renden som var ldre n sex mnader (figur 14).
Figure 14 Đ First-instance cases pending in Greece 70 000 60 000 50 000 40 000 30 000 20 000 10 000 0 Jan 2017 Jan 2018 Dec 2018 Less than 6 months More than 6 months This figure covers both the mainland and the islands but does not include the backlog at the pre-registration stage for which we have not obtained data from the national authorities. 
Figur 14 Đ Pgende renden i frsta instans i Grekland 70 000 60 000 50 000 40 000 30 000 20 000 10 000 0 Jan 2017 Jan 2018 Dec 2018 Mindre n sex mnader Mer n sex mnader Denna siffra omfattar svl fastlandet som arna, men inkluderar inte efterslpningen i frhandsregistreringsetappen, som vi inte har ftt ngra uppgifter om frn de nationella myndigheterna.
Source: ECA, based on data from EASO. 
Klla: Revisionsrtten, p grundval av uppgifter frn Easo.
107 The EU-Turkey statement of 18 March 2016 has had a major impact on the asylum situation in Greece. 
107 Uttalandet frn EU och Turkiet av den 18 mars 2016 har haft stor inverkan p asylsituationen i Grekland.
The irregular border crossings from Turkey to Greece have declined drastically (see Figure 15). 
De irreguljra grnspassagerna frn Turkiet till Grekland har minskat kraftigt (se figur 15).
At the same time, however, GAS has been placed under considerable strain as the vast majority of third-country nationals are applying for international protection in Greece since the closure of the Balkan route. 
50 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden fr stora pfrestningar i och med att de allra flesta tredjelandsmedborgarna ansker om internationellt skydd i Grekland eftersom Balkanrutten stngts.
108 In response to the EU-Turkey statement, a fast-track border procedure34 was introduced on the Greek islands. 
108 Som svar p uttalandet frn EU och Turkiet infrdes ett pskyndat grnsfrfarande34 p de grekiska arna.
It was designed as a complement to the existing regular and accelerated asylum procedures (see flowchart in Figure 16). 
Det utformades som ett komplement till de befintliga reguljra och pskyndade asylfrfarandena (se fldesplanen i figur 16).
The backlog of first-instance pending cases on the islands stood at 24 533 at the end of March 201935. 
De pgende renden som slpade efter i frsta instans p arna uppgick till 24 533 i slutet av mars 201935.
34 For applicants governed by the EU-Turkey statement, i.e. those who arrived on the Greek islands after 20 March 2016, except those categorised as vulnerable and Dublin family reunification cases. 
34 Fr skande som omfattas av uttalandet frn EU och Turkiet, det vill sga de som anlnde till de grekiska arna efter den 20 mars 2016, frutom de som kategoriseras som srbara samt renden som rr familjeterfrening enligt Dublinfrordningen.
For the first time, the concept of a Ňsafe third countryÓ applies for applicants of a nationality with a recognition rate of over 25 %, including Syrians, to facilitate quick returns. 
Fr frsta gngen gller konceptet Óskert tredjelandÓ skande av en nationalitet med en andel godknda asylanskningar som verstiger 25 %, inbegripet syrier, i syfte att underltta fr snabba tervndanden.
35 At the pre-registration stage: 2 389 cases; at the scheduled interview stage: 14 132 cases; at the end of the process: 8 012 cases. 
35 I frhandsregistreringsetappen: 2 389 renden, i etappen med den planerade intervjun: 14 132 renden och i slutet av processen: 8 012 renden.
Family reunification Processing times are getting longer 109 Asylum processing times Đ from registration to appeal decision Đ lengthened in 2018 across all asylum procedures in Greece (Figure 17). 
Handlggningstiderna blir allt lngre 109 Handlggningstiderna fr asylrenden Đ frn registrering till verklagandebeslut Đ blev lngre under 2018 i alla asylfrfaranden i Grekland (figur 17).
Figure 17 Đ Overview of processing times by asylum procedure (in days) 48 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns Days 2016 2018 2016 2018 2016 2018 From registration to lodging 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 28 50 60 60 31 94 94 52 118 215 142 58 241 303 171 243 From lodging to 1st instance decision From appeal to 1st appeal decision No data available for processing times at the appeal stage at the accelerated procedure and the cases at the level of administrative courts of appeal and Council of State. Source: ECA,basedondatafromGASandtheGreekAppealAuthority. 
Figur 17 Đ versikt ver handlggningstider per asylfrfarande (i dagar) Dagar 52 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden 2016 2018 28 50 31 52 215 171 8 58 2016 2018 60 94 11 142 241 243 2016 2018 60 94 303 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Frn registrering till anskan Frn anskan till beslut i frsta instans Frn verklagande till verklagandebeslut i frsta instans Det finns inga uppgifter om handlggningstider fr verklaganden vid det pskyndade frfarandet och fr renden som verklagas till kammarrtter och statsrdet.
110 GAS or EASO staff conduct the interviews for the fast-track border procedure on the five Greek islands with hotspots. Although the national legislation sets very tight deadlines (the asylum interview should be conducted within one day of lodging and the first-instance decision taken within one day of the interview), average processing times have nevertheless increased from year to year (Box 10). 
110 Personalen vid den grekiska asylmyndigheten eller Easo gr intervjuer fr det pskyndade grnsfrfarandet p de fem grekiska ar dr det finns hotspots. ven om det i den nationella lagstiftningen faststlls mycket snva tidsfrister (asylintervjun ska genomfras inom en dag frn det att anskan lmnas in, och beslutet i frsta instans ska fattas inom en dag frn det att intervjun grs) har de genomsnittliga handlggningstiderna nd kat frn r till r (ruta 10).
49 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns Box 10 Issues affecting the efficiency of the fast-track border procedure The fast-track border procedure involves many stakeholders (the Reception and Identification Service, Frontex, Ministry of Health doctors, the police, GAS and EASO), making good coordination between them essential. 
53 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden Ruta 10 Problem som pverkar det pskyndade grnsfrfarandets effektivitet Det pskyndade grnsfrfarandet inbegriper mnga berrda parter (mottagnings-och identifieringsmyndigheten, Frontex, lkare frn hlsovrdsministeriet, polisen, den grekiska asylmyndigheten och Easo), vilket frutstter att samordningen mellan dem r god.
A bottleneck at any stage upsets the efficiency of the whole process. 
En flaskhals i ngon av etapperna str effektiviteten i hela processen.
In 2018, for example, the shortage36 of Ministry of Health doctors Đ as the only ones entitled to conduct vulnerability assessments Đ at the hotspots affected the efficiency of the whole procedure, thereby increasing the backlog. 
Exempelvis pverkade 2018 bristen36 vid mottagningscentrumen p lkare frn hlsovrdsministeriet Đ de enda som r behriga att genomfra srbarhetsanalyser Đ effektiviteten hos hela frfarandet, vilket kade efterslpningen.
Another example is the different identification numbers issued by Ministry of Health doctors and the Reception and Identification Service. 
Ett annat exempel r de olika identifikationsnummer som utfrdats av lkare frn hlsovrdsministeriet och mottagnings-och identifieringsmyndigheten.
This complicated the identification of vulnerable asylum seekers and the processing of their cases. 
Detta frsvrade identifieringen av utsatta asylskande och handlggningen av deras renden.
The vast majority of applicants (74 % in 2018) are categorised as vulnerable37 and excluded from the fast-track border procedure. 
Den absoluta merparten skande (74 % r 2018) kategoriseras som utsatta37 och undantas frn det pskyndade grnsfrfarandet.