natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It underlined Article 4.2 of the Treaty on European Union states that national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State. 
Den betonade behovet av att I artikel 4.2 i frdraget om Europeiska unionen anges att den nationella skerheten ocks i fortsttningen ska vara varje medlemsstats eget ansvar.
Article 67 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states that the Union shall endeavour to ensure a high level of security. 
I artikel 67 i frdraget om Europeiska unionens funktionsstt anges att unionen ska verka fr att skerstlla en hg skerhetsniv.
Articles 82 to 89 provide for police and judicial cooperation. 
Artiklarna 82Đ89 innehller bestmmelser om polissamarbete och straffrttsligt samarbete.
The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 30 November 2005, 14469/4/05, adopted on 15 December 2005. 
Europeiska unionens strategi fr kampen mot terrorism, 30 november 2005, 14469/4/05, antagen den 15 december 2005.
6 1 2 3 4 COM(2015) 185 final of 28 April 2015 ŇThe European Agenda on SecurityÓ. 
7 1 2 3 4 COM(2015) 185 final, 28.4.2015, Europeiska skerhetsagendan.
the importance of penalising terrorists and their backers, and of cutting their access to funds, firearms and explosives. 
Den understrk vikten av att straffa terrorister och deras finansirer och att stoppa deras tillgng till pengar, vapen och sprngmnen.
Various EU institutions and bodies are involved in EU counter-terrorism. 
Olika EU-institutioner och EU-organ deltar i EU:s kamp mot terrorism.
Through its communications, the Commission contributes to the EU strategy adopted by the Council in the form of Council conclusions. 
Genom sina meddelanden bidrar kommissionen till den EU-strategi som rdet antagit i form av rdets slutsatser.
It also initiates legislative acts on combating terrorism for negotiation and adoption by the European Parliament and the Council5. 
Den tar ven initiativ till lagstiftningsakter om bekmpning av terrorism som Europaparlamentet och rdet frhandlar om och antar5.
It is responsible for the sound financial management of EU funds and for coordinating its various directorates-general and monitoring its agencies in providing support for Member States. 
Den ansvarar fr att frvaltningen av EU:s medel r sund och fr samordning av sina olika generaldirektorat och vervakning av sina byrers std till medlemsstaterna.
The Commissioner for the Security Union works under the guidance of the First Vice-President and supports the work of the Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship in ensuring the CommissionŐs security response to terrorism. 
Kommissionren med ansvar fr skerhetsunionen arbetar under ledning av frste vice ordfranden och bistr kommissionren med ansvar fr migration, inrikes frgor och medborgarskap med skerstllandet av kommissionens skerhetstgrder mot terrorism.
The role of the CouncilŐs Counter-Terrorism Coordinator is to follow up the overall implementation of the EUŐs counter-terrorism strategy and to ensure the EU plays an active role in the fight against terrorism. 
Rdets samordnare fr kampen mot terrorism har till uppgift att flja upp det vergripande genomfrandet av EU:s strategi fr kampen mot terrorism och se till att EU spelar en aktiv roll i den kampen.
The Commission deploys a wide range of actions to help Member States address radicalisation 4. 
Kommissionen vidtar en mngd olika tgrder fr att hjlpa medlemsstaterna att bekmpa radikalisering 4.
Addressing radicalisation is a key component of the fight against terrorism. 
Att bekmpa radikalisering r en avgrande faktor i kampen mot terrorism.
The majority of suspects involved in the recent terrorist attacks in Europe were European citizens who had been radicalised6. 
Merparten av de misstnkta i de senaste terrorattackerna i Europa r europeiska medborgare som radikaliserats6.
In its Communications on supporting Member States in addressing radicalisation that leads to terrorism7, the Commission takes the view that radicalisation is usually the result of a combination of factors. 
I sina meddelanden om std till medlemsstaterna i kampen mot radikalisering som leder till terrorism7 anser kommissionen att radikalisering i regel r Till exempel Europaparlamentets och rdets direktiv 2017/541/EU av den 15 mars 2017 om bekmpande av terrorism (EUT L 88, 31.3.2017, s.
State of Play: June 2017. 
Lgesrapport: juni 2017.
COM(2005) 313 final of 21 September 2005 ŇTerrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisationÓ; COM(2013) 941 final of 15 January 2014 ŇPreventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism: strengthening the EUŐs responseÓ; and COM(2016) 379 final of 14 June 2016 ŇSupporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremismÓ. 
KOM(2005) 313 slutlig, 21.9.2005, Rekrytering till terrorism: faktorer som bidrar till radikalisering med kat vld, COM(2013) 941 final, 15.1.2014, Att frhindra radikalisering som leder till terrorism och vldsam extremism: en skrpning av EU:s insatser och COM(2016) 379 final, 14.6.2016, Att stdja det frebyggande arbetet mot radikalisering som leder till vldsinriktad extremism.
describes a web of social ŇpushÓ factors (e.g. marginalisation and exclusion) and ideological ŇpullÓ factors (e.g. abuse of religious narratives by recruiters to justify acts of violence). 
I det senaste meddelandet frn kommissionen beskrivs ett nt av sociala ÓnegativaÓ faktorer (t.ex. marginalisering och utestngning) och ideologiska ÓpositivaÓ faktorer (t.ex. rekryterare som missbrukar religisa budskap och symboler fr att motivera vldshandlingar).
The Commission takes the view that supporting Member States in their fight against radicalisation is a multi-faceted and complex challenge which can only be met through a combination of actions across several policy areas and by bringing together stakeholders at local, regional, national and European levels8. These actions are financed by various funds such as the Internal Security Fund, the Horizon 2020 Programme, The Justice Programme, Erasmus+ and the European Social Fund (ESF). 
Kommissionen anser att arbetet med att stdja medlemsstaterna i deras kamp mot radikalisering r en mngfasetterad och komplex utmaning som endast kan mtas genom en kombination av tgrder p mnga olika politikomrden och genom att berrda parter sammanfrs p lokal, regional, nationell och europeisk niv8. tgrderna finansieras med medel frn olika hll, till exempel frn Fonden fr inre skerhet, Horisont 2020-programmet, programmet Rttsliga frgor, Erasmus+ och Europeiska socialfonden (ESF).
None of these funds has addressing radicalisation as a specific objective. 
Inga av dessa medel har bekmpning av radikalisering som specifikt ml.
The CommissionŐs diverse actions are managed by eight of its directorates-general, Europol, Eurojust and the Member States (see Annex). 
Kommissionens mnga olika tgrder frvaltas av tta av dess generaldirektorat, Europol, Eurojust och medlemsstaterna (se bilagan).
The CommissionŐs approach to supporting Member States in addressing radicalisation is shown in Figure 1. 
Kommissionens stt att stdja medlemsstaterna i kampen mot radikalisering visas i figur 1.
Figure 1 - How the Commission supports Member States in addressing radicalisation 9 Developing knowledge of radicalisation and sharing practices Countering terrorist propaganda Promoting inclusive and resilient societies Identifying and dealing with radicalised people Addressing radicalisation in countries outside Europe Source: ECA 6. 
Figur 1 Đ Hur kommissionen stder medlemsstaterna i kampen mot radikalisering 10 Utveckla kunskap om radikalisering och dela metoder Frmja inkluderande och motstndskraftiga samhllen Motverka terroristpropaganda Bekmpa radikalisering i lnder utanfr Europa Identifiera och hantera radikaliserade personer Klla: Europeiska revisionsrtten.
Horizon 2020 provides research grants for developing knowledge of radicalisation. 
Horisont 2020 beviljar forskningsbidrag till utveckling av kunskap om radikalisering.
Research topics include contemporary radicalisation trends and the development of a comprehensive approach to violent radicalisation. 
Bland forskningsmnena ingr aktuella radikaliseringstendenser och utveckling av en heltckande strategi mot vldsinriktad radikalisering.
Good practices are exchanged through initiatives such as the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) (see Box 1). 
God praxis utbyts genom initiativ som ntverket fr kunskapsspridning om radikalisering (RAN) (se ruta 1).
Online terrorist propaganda is countered, for example, through the EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) based in Europol, the EU Internet Forum and the European Strategic Communications Network (see Box 2). 
Terroristpropaganda p ntet motverkas, till exempel, genom EU-enheten fr anmlan av innehll p internet (EU IRU), som r baserad vid Europol, EU:s internetforum och det europeiska ntverket fr strategisk kommunikation (se ruta 2).
10 Box 1 - Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) The RAN was established in 2011. 
11 Ruta 1 Đ Ntverket fr kunskapsspridning om radikalisering (RAN) RAN inrttades 2011.
It connects practitioners around Europe, such as psychologists, teachers, social workers, police, prison and probation officers, who work directly with those vulnerable to radicalisation, and with those who have already been radicalised. 
Det knyter samman yrkesverksamma runtom i Europa, till exempel psykologer, lrare, socialarbetare, poliser, kriminalvrdare och vervakare, som arbetar direkt med dem som lper risk att radikaliseras och med dem som redan har radikaliserats.
It aims to help and empower front-line practitioners (rather than policymakers and academics) in countering radicalisation or reintegrating violent extremists by: - promoting exchanges of experience, e.g. at meetings and conferences; - encouraging the use of relevant practical tools; - disseminating information and expertise. 
Det syftar till att hjlpa och strka yrkesverksamma i frontlinjen (snarare n beslutsfattare och forskare) nr det gller att motverka radikalisering eller terintegrera vldsamma extremister genom att - frmja erfarenhetsutbyte, till exempel vid mten och konferenser, - uppmuntra anvndning av relevanta praktiska verktyg, - sprida information och sakkunskap.
The RAN Centre of Excellence provides coordination and support for the RAN. 
RAN:s kompetenscentrum svarar fr samordning och stder RAN.
It uses its expertise to guide the nine RAN Working Groups (thematic groups in which practitioners meet to exchange ideas, knowledge and experiences), offer tailor-made support (e.g. workshops and training courses) to individual countries, and disseminate knowledge and practices. 
Det anvnder sin sakkunskap fr att vgleda de nio RAN-arbetsgrupperna (tematiska grupper dr yrkesverksamma mts fr att utbyta ider, kunskaper och erfarenheter), erbjuda enskilda lnder skrddarsytt std (t.ex. workshoppar och utbildningskurser) och sprida kunskaper och metoder.
The Centre is managed by a contractor and financed by an ŇInternal Security Fund Đ PoliceÓ contract totalling Ű25 million for the 2015-2019 period. 
Centrumet frvaltas av en kontraktspart och finansieras genom ett kontrakt med polisdelen av Fonden fr inre skerhet som uppgr till totalt 25 miljoner euro fr perioden 2015Đ2019.
Box 2 - Countering terrorist propaganda EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) The EU IRU was set up on 1 July 2015 and is located within the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) at Europol. 
Ruta 2 Đ Motverkande av terroristpropaganda EU-enheten fr anmlan av innehll p internet (IRU) EU IRU inrttades den 1 juli 2015 och ingr i det europeiska centrumet mot terrorism (ECTC) vid Europol.
It has a budget of Ű4.5 million for 2017. 
Den har en budget p 4,5 miljoner euro fr 2017.
The EU IRU aims to counter online radicalisation and recruitment by terrorists by flagging online terrorist content and alerting the service providers that host it, such as YouTube (Google), Microsoft, Facebook and Twitter, by means of an assessment, that will enable them to decide whether to remove such content. 
EU IRU har som ml att bekmpa radikalisering p ntet och rekrytering av terrorister genom att rapportera terroristinnehll p ntet och underrtta internetleverantrer som frmedlar sdant innehll, till exempel YouTube (Google), Microsoft, Facebook och Twitter, med hjlp av en bedmning som gr det mjligt fr dem att besluta huruvida de ska ta bort sdant innehll.
In agreement with Member States, it focuses on Islamist terrorist propaganda, which cuts across borders. 
Enligt verenskommelse med medlemsstaterna r den inriktad p islamistisk terroristpropaganda, som r grnsverskridande.
11 The EU IRU also provides expertise on internet based communication to support Member StatesŐ investigations and provides strategic analysis to identify terrorist threats. 
12 EU IRU tillhandahller ocks sakkunskap om internetbaserad kommunikation till std fr medlemsstaternas utredningar och gr strategiska analyser fr att identifiera terroristhot.
EU Internet Forum In December 2015 the Commission launched the EU Internet Forum financed by the ŇInternal Security Fund Đ PoliceÓ. 
EU:s internetforum I december 2015 startade kommissionen EU:s internetforum som finansieras av Fonden fr inre skerhet Đ polisdelen.
By means of meetings and conferences, the Forum brings together governments, Europol, internet companies, the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, the European Strategic Communications Network and the RAN. 
Genom mten och konferenser sammanfr forumet regeringar, Europol, internetfretag, EU:s samordnare fr kampen mot terrorism, det europeiska ntverket fr strategisk kommunikation och RAN.
It has two objectives: - to reduce accessibility to terrorist content online; - to empower civil-society partners to increase the volume of effective alternative narratives online. 
Det har fljande tv ml: - Att reducera tkomsten till terroristrelaterat innehll p ntet. - Att strka det civila samhllets partner fr att ka antalet effektiva motbudskap p ntet.
European Strategic Communications Network The European Strategic Communications Network is a network where EU Member StatesŐ experts share good practices on strategic communications. 
Det europeiska ntverket fr strategisk kommunikation Det europeiska ntverket fr strategisk kommunikation r ett ntverk dr experter i EU:s medlemsstater delar god praxis fr strategisk kommunikation.
The ŇInternal Security Fund - PoliceÓ provided grants of Ű2.2 million to finance their activities for the period from January 2015 to September 2017. 
Fonden fr inre skerhet Đ polisdelen gav bidrag p 2,2 miljoner euro till finansieringen av deras verksamhet mellan januari 2015 och september 2017.
Inclusive and resilient societies are promoted by means of projects financed by the ŇInternal Security Fund Đ PoliceÓ such as STRESAVIORA (see Box 3). 
Inkluderande och motstndskraftiga samhllen frmjas genom projekt som finansieras av Fonden fr inre skerhet Đ polisdelen, ssom Stresaviora (se ruta 3).
In addition, projects financed by Erasmus+ and the European Social Fund also aim to strengthen resilience and reach out to disadvantaged communities. Although their objectives are much broader and are not specifically designed to address radicalisation, they indirectly help to prevent it. 
Dessutom syftar projekt som finansieras av Erasmus+ och Europeiska socialfonden ocks till att strka motstndskraften och n ut till missgynnade grupper. ven om deras ml r mycket bredare och inte specifikt syftar till att bekmpa radikalisering, hjlper de indirekt till i det frebyggande arbetet.
9 The European Strategic Communications Network evolved from the Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team (SSCAT). 
9 Det europeiska ntverket fr strategisk kommunikation utvecklades frn rdgivande gruppen fr strategisk kommunikation rrande Syrien (SSCAT).
The Commission supports Member States in identifying and dealing with radicalised people by facilitating exchanges of information between Member StatesŐ law enforcement authorities (e.g. through the Schengen Information System). 
Kommissionen stder medlemsstaterna i deras arbete fr att identifiera och hantera radikaliserade personer genom att frmja informationsutbyte mellan medlemsstaternas brottsbekmpande myndigheter (t.ex. genom Schengens informationssystem ).
It also supports the development of exit strategies to help people disengage from radicalised environments and re-integrate into society by means of rehabilitation and de-radicalisation projects funded by the Justice Programme. 
Den stder ocks framtagandet av exitstrategier fr att hjlpa mnniskor att lmna radikaliserade miljer och teringreras i samhllet genom projekt fr teranpassning och avradikalisering som finansieras av programmet Rttsliga frgor.
Radicalisation in countries outside Europe is addressed both by dedicated counter-terrorism measures and mainstreaming in other measures. 
Radikalisering i lnder utanfr Europa bekmpas bde genom srskilda tgrder mot terrorism och genom integrering av sdana tgrder i andra tgrder.
This includes programmes financed by the European Development Funds, Erasmus+, the European Neighbourhood Instrument and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. 
I detta ingr program som finansieras av Europeiska utvecklingsfonden, Erasmus+, det europeiska grannskapsinstrumentet och instrumentet som bidrar till stabilitet och fred.
AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH Audit scope 11. 
REVISIONENS INRIKTNING OCH OMFATTNING SAMT REVISIONSMETOD Revisionens inriktning och omfattning 11.
We examined whether the Commission appropriately managed its support for Member States in addressing radicalisation leading to terrorism. 
Vi granskade huruvida kommissionen p ett lmpligt stt frvaltade sitt std till medlemsstaterna fr att bekmpa radikalisering som leder till terrorism.
The aim was to answer the following questions: Does the Commission provide Member States with relevant support? 
Mlet var att besvara fljande frgor: Ger kommissionen medlemsstaterna relevant std?
In order to answer this question, we assessed whether the CommissionŐs policy objectives and actions were designed in such a way as to reflect Member StatesŐ needs. 
Fr att besvara den frgan bedmde vi om kommissionens politiska ml och tgrder hade utformats s att de speglade medlemsstaternas behov.
12 Box 3 - STRESAVIORA STRESAVIORA I involved researchers who identified the need for young people to become more resilient, express their own opinions, engage in debate, and stand up for themselves. 
13 Ruta 3 Đ Stresavoria I Stresaviora I medverkade forskare som konstaterade att unga mnniskor behvde bli mer motstndskraftiga, uttrycka sina egna sikter, delta i debatten och st upp fr sig sjlva.
It included those in their direct social environment (e.g. parents, teachers and police officers) whose awareness needed to be raised. 
Projektet inbegrep personer i deras direkta sociala omgivning (t.ex. frldrar, lrare och poliser), vilkas medvetenhet behvde hjas.
STRESAVIORA II aims to implement the tools for increasing resilience that were developed during the first phase of the project in two cities in each of five EU countries (Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden). 
Stresaviora II syftar till tillmpning av de verktyg fr att ka motstndskraften som utvecklades under den frsta fasen av projektet i tv stder i var och en av fem EU-lnder (Belgien, Frankrike, Tyskland, Nederlnderna och Sverige).
The project concerns all types of radicalisation (not just Islamist), and so could be extended to other parts of Europe with different needs. 
Projektet gller alla typer av radikalisering (inte bara islamistisk) och skulle drfr kunna utvidgas till andra delar av Europa med andra behov.
The project receives funding of Ű0.7 million from the ŇInternal Security Fund Đ PoliceÓ. 
Projektet finansieras med 0,7 miljoner euro frn Fonden fr inre skerhet Đ polisdelen.
Are the actions financed by the different EU funds coordinated to make the most of any synergies? 
Samordnas de tgrder som finansieras med de olika EU-medlen s att eventuella synergieffekter utnyttjas p bsta stt?
In order to answer this question, we assessed whether the Commission had the necessary procedures for coordinating its support. 
Fr att besvara den frgan bedmde vi om kommissionen hade infrt de frfaranden som krvdes fr att samordna stdet.
Has the Commission put in place a framework to assess the effectiveness and value for money of its support? 
Har kommissionen infrt en ram fr att bedma ndamlsenligheten och effektiviteten i sitt std?
In order to answer this question, we examined whether the Commission had set up the necessary framework of indicators and reports to assess whether its policy is effective and offers value for money. 
Fr att besvara den frgan granskade vi huruvida kommissionen hade infrt den ram med indikatorer och rapporter som krvs fr att bedma om dess politik r ndamlsenlig och effektiv.
We also examined whether assessments of individual actions measured not only activity, but also effectiveness. 
Vi granskade ven huruvida man i bedmningar av enskilda tgrder mtte inte bara verksamhetsmngd utan ocks ndamlsenlighet.
Our focus was mainly on the period from 2014 onwards, to coincide with the start of the 2014-2020 funding periods for the CommissionŐs funds and programmes. 
Vrt fokus lg framfr allt p perioden frn 2014 och framt, vilket sammanfll med starten p finansieringsperioden 2014Đ2020 fr kommissionens medel och program.
We focused mainly on the management of actions within the EU whose primary purpose was to prevent and counter radicalisation, but we also took into account actions which pursue broader objectives, such as the social inclusion of disadvantaged groups. 
Vi riktade framfr allt in oss p frvaltningen av tgrder inom EU med huvudsyfte att frhindra och motverka radikalisering, men vi tog ven hnsyn till tgrder med bredare ml, ssom social inkludering av missgynnade grupper.
We did not examine information systems (e.g. the Schengen Information System) for exchanging information between Member States on details of radicalised individuals. 
Vi granskade inte informationssystem (t.ex. Schengens informationssystem) fr informationsutbyte mellan medlemsstater om detaljerade uppgifter om radikaliserade personer.
Audit approach 14. 
Revisionsmetod 14.
Our audit fieldwork was carried out from November 2016 to March 2017. 
Granskningsarbetet p fltet genomfrde vi frn november 2016 till mars 2017.
We based our observations on the following sources of evidence: a review of documentation on policies, procedures and actions relating to support for Member States in addressing radicalisation; interviews with Commission directorates-general that manage EU funds and tools for addressing radicalisation, as well as with the RAN Centre of Excellence, the EU IRU at Europol, and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (an organisation which promotes the sharing of knowledge and ideas on counter-terrorism); 13 
Vra iakttagelser bygger p fljande beviskllor: En genomgng av dokumentation om strategier, frfaranden och tgrder avseende std till medlemsstater i kampen mot radikalisering. Intervjuer med de av kommissionens generaldirektorat som frvaltar EU-medel och verktyg fr att bekmpa radikalisering samt med RAN:s kompetenscentrum, EU IRU vid Europol och det internationella centret fr terrorismbekmpning (en organisation som frmjar utbyte av kunskaper och ider om terrorismbekmpning).
a survey we sent out to counter-terrorist focal points in all the Member StatesŐ Permanent Representations to the EU. 
14 En enkt som vi skickade till kontaktpunkterna mot terrorism vid alla medlemsstaters stndiga representationer vid EU.
15 out of 28 counter-terrorist focal points completed the survey, i.e. a response rate of 54 %. 
Enkten besvarades av 15 av 28 kontaktpunkter mot terrorism, vilket r en svarsfrekvens p 54 %.