natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
52 The EDP for Portugal was abrogated in June 2017. 
52 Frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott fr Portugal hvdes i juni 2017.
No of MS 
Antal medlemsstater
Table 3 - Measuring the number of years needed to reach the MTO for Euro area MS with high levels of debt to GDP in 2017 49 Member State Average change i n SB (2014-2018) MTO Distance to MTO Number of years needed to reach the MTO (SPs 2017) (SB 2017-MTO2017) (based onSB for2017and average a djustment for 2014-2018) Belgium Ireland Spain France Italy Portugal 0.3 0.8 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.25 -1.5 -0.8 -3.1 -2.0 -2.1 -2.1 5.0 0.9 No convergence 14.9 No convergence 8.7 Note: The outcome of the structural balance for Portugal and France in 2017 and the projection for 2018 have been revised upwards significantly in the Spring 2018 forecast. 
Tabell 3 Đ Bedmning av antalet r som krvs fr att uppn det medelfristiga budgetmlet fr de medlemsstater i euroomrdet som har stora skulder i frhllande till BNP 2017 50 Medlemsstat Genomsnittlig frndring av strukturellt saldo (2014Đ2018) Medelfristigt budgetml Avstnd till medelfristigt budgetml Antal r som krvs fr att uppn det medelfristiga budgetmlet (Stabilitetsprogram 2017) (Strukturellt saldo 2017 Đ medelfristigt budgetml 2017) (baserat p det strukturella saldot fr 2017 och genomsnittliga anpassningar 2014Đ2018) Belgien Irland Spanien Frankrike Italien Portugal 0,3 0,8 -0,3 0,1 -0,2 0,2 0,0 -0,5 0,0 -0,4 0,0 0,25 -1,5 -0,8 -3,1 -2,0 -2,1 -2,1 5,0 0,9 Ej konvergens 14,9 Ej konvergens 8,7 Anmrkning: Utfallet fr Portugals och Frankrikes strukturella saldon 2017 och prognosen fr 2018 har frbttrats betydligt i vrprognosen 2018.
Source: SB - AMECO 2017; MTO set by Member States using Spring Forecast 2017 revised in 2016 to be applied in 17-19; Distance from MTO and Years to MTO based on ECA calculations. 
Klla: Strukturellt saldo Đ Ameco 2017. Medelfristigt budgetml som faststllts av medlemsstaterna med hjlp av vrprognosen 2017, ndrat 2016 och ska tillmpas 2017Đ2019.
Moreover, the Commission does not apply the preventive arm requirements to Member States under the corrective arm, although there is no clear legal stipulation to that effect. 
Vidare tillmpar kommissionen inte kraven fr den frebyggande delen p medlemsstater som omfattas av den korrigerande delen, ven om det inte finns ngra tydliga rttsliga bestmmelser om detta.
The Commission’s interpretation is that the corrective arm allows the headline deficit to be brought below 3 % by cyclical recovery alone, with no obligatory improvement in the structural balance. 
Kommissionens tolkning r att den korrigerande delen tillter att det nominella underskottet tas ned till under 3 % enbart genom konjunkturuppgng, utan ngon obligatorisk frbttring av det strukturella saldot.
At the same time, for several Member States the Commission has recommended repeated multi-year extensions of deadlines for exiting the excessive deficit procedure (EDP), much longer than envisaged in the Treaties. 
Samtidigt har kommissionen nr det gller flera medlemsstater rekommenderat upprepade flerriga frlngningar av tidsfrister fr att lmna frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott, mycket lngre n vad som avsgs i frdragen.
As a result, Member States under the corrective arm do not have to fulfil the requirements they would otherwise have to observe if they were under the preventive arm. 
Till fljd av detta behver medlemsstater som omfattas av den korrigerande delen inte uppfylla de krav som de skulle ha behvt iaktta om de omfattades av den frebyggande delen.
The Commission at one point sought consent of Member States to address these inconsistencies, but the issue has not been res olved. 
medlemsstaternas samtycke till att ta itu med dessa inkonsekvenser, men problemet har inte lsts.
Particularly weak results seen in the most highly indebted Member States 84. 
Srskilt svaga resultat har konstaterats i de mest skuldsatta medlemsstaterna 84.
Movements in budgetary balances and debt ratios in the individual Member States of a monetary union are much more important than those in aggregate or average indicators 53. 
Rrelser i budgetsaldon och skuldkvoter i de enskilda medlemsstaterna i en monetr union r mycket strre n rrelserna i aggregerade eller genomsnittliga indikatorer53.
This is because incentives for fiscal discipline are weaker in a monetary union, as countries do not have to watch their own balance of payment positions, yet the negative external effects of their fiscal policies on related countries are larger. 
Detta beror p att incitamenten fr budgetdisciplin r svagare i en monetr union p grund av att lnderna inte mste vervaka sin egen betalningsbalans, samtidigt som deras finanspolitiks negativa externa effekter p berrda lnder r strre.
For this reason, the most important developments are in the highly indebted EU countries (which we consider as those with a debt ratio above 90 %). 
Av denna anledning hittar vi den viktigaste utvecklingen i de mest skuldsatta EU-lnderna (vilket vi anser r lnder med en skuldkvot som verstiger 90 %).
Moreover, it is important to also look at Member States under the corrective SGP arm in this period (2014-2018). 
Vidare r det ven viktigt att granska medlemsstater som omfattas av stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens korrigerande del under denna period (2014Đ2018).
It is logical to assume that the criteria for the preventive arm should provide a floor for the adjustment requirements under the corrective arm. 
Det r rimligt att anta att kriterierna fr den frebyggande delen br ange en lgsta niv fr anpassningskraven inom ramen fr den korrigerande delen.
In that sense the former are relevant for the latter. 
I den bemrkelsen r de frstnmnda relevanta fr de sistnmnda.
The picture that arises is a cause for concern (see Chart 8). 
Den bild som framtrder ger anledning till oro (se diagram 8).
50 53 In this context, comparing the EU aggregates with the United States and Japan has very limited value. 
51 53 I detta sammanhang r det av begrnsat intresse att jmfra EU:s aggregerade uppgifter med Frenta staterna och Japan.
The EU has neither extensive public debt nor taxation powers. 
EU har varken omfattande offentliga skulder eller beskattningsrtt.
Chart 8 - Average requirement (based on matrix54) and average adjustment (change in SB) 2014-2017 Source: SB from AMECO, March 2018, Requirements from Commission Spring assessments 2015, 2016, 2017. 
Diagram 8 Đ Genomsnittliga krav (baserat p matrisen54) och genomsnittlig anpassning (frndring i strukturellt saldo) 2014Đ2017 Klla: Strukturellt saldo frn Ameco, mars 2018, krav frn kommissionens vrbedmningar 2015, 2016 och 2017.
It is also set to reach its MTO in 2018 and its debt-to-GDP ratio is declining fast55. 
Det planerar ven att uppn sitt medelfristiga budgetml 2018, och skuldkvoten i frhllande till BNP minskar snabbt55.
Cyprus is at its MTO in 2018.This, combined with the recovery, set its debt ratio on a downward trajectory, albeit a slow one56 (see Chart 9). 
Cypern befinner sig vid sitt medelfristiga budgetml 2018. Detta, i kombination med terhmtningen, fick skuldkvoten att brja minska, om n lngsamt56 (se diagram 9).
The average requirement for Member States under the EDP, assuming the matrix of the preventive arm is applied. 
Det genomsnittliga kravet fr medlemsstater som omfattas av frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott, om vi frutstter att matrisen fr den frebyggande delen tillmpas.
The observation remains valid also when comparing debt to disposable national income, although the decline is somewhat smaller. 
Detta konstaterande r ven giltigt vid jmfrelser av skuld och disponibel nationalinkomst, ven om minskningen r ngot mindre.
Cyprus structural balance was strongly positive in 2014, far above its MTO, meaning it has approached its MTO in 2017 from above. 
Cyperns strukturella saldo var mycket positivt 2014, lngt ver det medelfristiga budgetmlet, vilket innebr att Cypern har nrmat sig sitt medelfristiga budgetml 2017 ovanifrn.
51 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 Ireland Average requirement (2014-2017) Portugal Average adjustment (2014-2017) Belgium France Italy Spain Cyprus 54 55 56 % of GDP 
52 1,0 0,8 0,6 0,4 0,2 0,0 -0,2 -0,4 Irland Genomsnittligt krav (2014Đ2017) Portugal Genomsnittlig anpassning (2014Đ2017) Belgien Frankrike Italien Spanien Cypern 54 55 56 % avBNP
Chart 9 - Public debt relative to GDP in 2014 and 2018 52 Debt (% GDP) 14 0% 13 0% 12 0% 11 0% 10 0% 90% 80% 70% 60% Ireland 10 5% Belgium France 95% Portugal Italy 13 2% Spain 10 0% Cyprus 20 14 10 7% 13 1% 10 7% 20 18 69% 10 3% 97% 12 4% 13 1% 97% 98% Source: AMECO, March 2018. 
Diagram 9 Đ Offentlig skuld i frhllande till BNP 2014 och 2018 53 Skuld (% av BNP) 140 % 130 % 120 % 110 % 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % Irland 105 % Belgien Frankrike 95 % Portugal Italien 132 % Spanien 100 % Cypern 20 14 107 % 131 % 107 % 20 18 69 % 103 % 97 % 124 % 131 % 97 % 98 % Klla: Ameco, mars 2018.
Belgium has made some progress towards its MTO, but much less than required by the matrix. 
Belgien har gjort vissa framsteg mot att uppn sitt medelfristiga budgetml, men i mycket mindre utstrckning n vad som krvs enligt matrisen.
By end-2018, it is forecast to be still approximately 1.5 pp away from the MTO, which has recently been revised down. 
Enligt prognosen kommer Belgien i slutet av 2018 fortfarande att befinna sig cirka 1,5 procentenheter frn det medelfristiga budgetmlet, som nyligen har nedjusterats.
Assuming that in the coming years it continues to adjust at the average rate for 2014-2018, it will need 5 years to reach the MTO (see also Table 3). 
Om vi antar att Belgien under de kommande ren fortstter med anpassningar i samma genomsnittliga takt 2014Đ2018 kommer det att krvas fem r fr att n det medelfristiga budgetmlet (se ven tabell 3).
Portugal’s SB has, on average, improved only slightly in this period, and remains some 2 pp of GDP away from MTO, although the latest Spring Forecast 2018 update indicates a significant improvement in Structural balance for 2017. 
Portugals strukturella saldo har i genomsnitt endast frbttrats ngot under den hr perioden och ligger kvar p cirka 2 procentenheter av BNP frn det medelfristiga budgetmlet, ven om den senaste uppdateringen av vrprognosen 2018 tyder p en betydlig frbttring av det strukturella saldot fr 2017.
If 2017 was an exception year and the previous years are indicative of the average speed of adjustment, it would need almost 9 years to reach the MTO. 
Om 2017 var ett undantag och de fregende ren ger en indikation om den genomsnittliga anpassningstakten skulle landet behva nstan nio r fr att n det medelfristiga budgetmlet.
If the more recent structural balance improvements reported in the Spring 2018 forecast can be sustained and continue to exceed the matrix requirements, it would reach its MTO within a more reasonable time frame. 
Om de senaste frbttringarna av det strukturella saldot som rapporteras i vrprognosen 2018 hller i sig och fortstter att verstiga matriskraven kommer landet att n sitt medelfristiga budgetml inom rimligare tid.
But of concern are the developments in three large countries: Italy, France and Spain. 
Utvecklingen i tre stora lnder ger dock anledning till oro: Italien, Frankrike och Spanien.
Here the adjustments were substantially below the requirements of the matrix, and at that pace it will not facilitate convergence towards MTOs in a reasonable time. 
I dessa lnder lg anpassningarna lngt under kraven enligt matrisen, och i den takten kommer de inte att underltta konvergens mot de medelfristiga budgetmlen inom rimlig tid.
In our view, large deviations of adjustment in fiscal balances for Member States under the corrective arm, differently from those under the preventive arm, are of material importance for the credibility of the overall SGP framework. 
Vi anser att stora avvikelser nr det gller anpassningen av budgetsaldon fr medlemsstater som omfattas av den korrigerande delen, till skillnad frn dem som omfattas av den frebyggande delen, r av vsentlig betydelse fr hela stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens trovrdighet.
France, under the corrective arm, has hardly improved its SB in 2014-2018 (Table 3). 
Frankrike, som omfattas av den korrigerande delen, har knappt frbttrat sitt strukturella saldo alls 2014Đ2018 (tabell 3).
With a distance to the MTO of 2.7 pp of GDP at end-2018, and assuming the average adjustment speed from 2014-2018, it will need 15 years to reach the MTO. 
Om avstndet till det medelfristiga budgetmlet r 2,7 procentenheter av BNP i slutet av 2018, och om man frutstter att den genomsnittliga anpassningstakten r densamma som 2014Đ2018, kommer Frankrike att behva 15 r fr att n sitt medelfristiga budgetml.
France’s debt to GDP continued to increase in this period. 
Frankrikes skuldkvot i frhllande till BNP fortsatte att ka under denna period.
Italy (under the preventive arm) and Spain (under the corrective arm) experienced a large deterioration in their structural balances in the same period, and are now far from the MTO: Italy by 2 pp and Spain by more than 3 pp. 
De strukturella saldona i Italien (som omfattas av den frebyggande delen) och Spanien (som omfattas av den korrigerande delen) frsmrades kraftigt under samma period, och de r nu lngt frn det medelfristiga budgetmlet: Italien med 2 procentenheter och Spanien med mer n 3 procentenheter.
They have not achieved progress in debt reduction, despite the expansion of their economies. 
De har inte uppntt ngra framsteg i frga om skuldminskning, trots tillvxten i deras respektive ekonomier.
In that period, in all three large countries, growth was outpacing potential and the output gap closing. 
Under samma period, i alla tre stora lnder, versteg tillvxten potentialen och produktionsgapet minskade.
The latter is projected to be positive in Italy and Spain in 2018, and only slightly negative in France (see Chart 10, 11 and 12). 
Det senare frvntas vara positivt i Italien och Spanien 2018, och endast ngot negativt i Frankrike (se diagram 10, 11 och 12).
The three countries have additionally issued more than half of total euro area public debt. 
Dessa tre lnder har dessutom emitterat mer n hlften av euroomrdets sammanlagda offentliga skuld.
Chart 11 – GDP, potential GDP and output gap evolution in Italy (2014-2018) 54 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 2014 2015 GDP growth France 2016 2017 Potential GDP growth 2018 Output gap 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 2014 2015 GDP growth Italy 2016 2017 Potential GDP growth 2018 Output gap Source: AMECO, March 2018. percentage percentage 
Diagram 10 Đ Utveckling av BNP, potentiell BNP och produktionsgap i Frankrike (2014Đ 2018) 55 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 2014 BNP-tillvxt 2015 Frankrike 2016 2017 2018 Potentiell BNP-tillvxt Produktionsgap Klla: Ameco, mars 2018. procent
Chart 12 – GDP, potential GDP and output gap evolution in Spain (2014-2018) Source: AMECO, March 2018. 
Diagram 11 Đ Utveckling av BNP, potentiell BNP och produktionsgap i Italien (2014Đ2018) Klla: Ameco, mars 2018.
The ECB recently noted the absence of progress in fiscal consolidation in indebted euro area countries. 
ECB noterade nyligen bristen p framsteg nr det gller budgetkonsolidering i skuldsatta lnder i euroomrdet.
In its 2017 Financial Stability Review, it observed: “...improving headline balances mask underlying fiscal vulnerabilities and an overall slight loosening in the fiscal stance for the euro area over the 2017-19 horizon. 
I sin Financial Stability Review (versyn av den finansiella stabiliteten) frn 2017 konstaterade ECB fljande: Frbttringar av nominella saldon dljer underliggande srbara offentliga finanser och en allmnt mindre stram finanspolitik fr euroomrdet 2017Đ 2019.
Fiscal efforts continue to fall short of commitments under the Stability and Growth Pact in several euro area countries (see Chart 8). 
Finanspolitiska insatser uppfyller fortfarande inte tagandena inom ramen fr procent procent stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten i flera lnder i euroomrdet (se diagram 8).
The projected deterioration of structural balances in 2017-19 in a number of countries may further challenge compliance with the medium-term objectives”59. 
Den frvntade frsmringen av strukturella saldon 2017Đ2019 i ett antal lnder kan ytterligare frsvra uppfyllandet av de medelfristiga budgetmlen59.
Mixed performance in Member States with debt levels between 70-90 % in 2014-2018 95. In this group, two countries surpassed the requirements from the matrix: Germany and Croatia. 
Tv lnder i denna grupp vertrffade kraven enligt matrisen: Tyskland och Kroatien. sterrike och, i mindre utstrckning, Frenade kungariket r nra att uppfylla sina krav.
Slovenia did not adjust on average, while Hungary has implemented a highly expansionary fiscal policy (see Chart 13). 
Slovenien gjorde i allmnhet inga anpassningar, medan Ungern har genomfrt en mycket expansiv finanspolitik (se diagram 13).
Chart 13 - Average requirement (based on matrix) and average adjustment (change in SB) 2014-2017 in countries with moderately higher public debt 56 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 Germany Average requirement (2014-2017) Croatia Average adjustment (2014-2017) Hungary Slovenia Austria United Kingdom Source: AMECO, March 2018. 
Diagram 13 Đ Genomsnittliga krav (baserat p matris) och genomsnittlig anpassning (frndring i strukturellt saldo) 2014Đ2017 i lnder med ngot strre offentlig skuld 57 0,8 0,6 0,4 0,2 0,0 -0,2 -0,4 -0,6 Tyskland Genomsnittligt krav (2014Đ2017) Genomsnittlig anpassning (2014Đ2017) Ungern Slovenien sterrike Kroatien Frenade kungariket Klla: Ameco, mars 2018.
Note: Croatia average requirements based on three years - 2015-2017. 
Anmrkning: Kroatiens genomsnittliga krav grundas p tre r: 2015Đ2017.
The Member States that adjusted their structural balances have also seen a substantial reduction in their debt ratios: Germany’s debt dropped by 14 pp of GDP, Austria’s by 8 pp and Croatia’s by 9 pp. 
De medlemsstater som anpassade sina strukturella saldon har ven kunnat se en betydande minskning av sina skuldkvoter: Tysklands skuld minskade med 14 procentenheter av BNP, sterrikes med 8 procentenheter och Kroatiens med 9 procentenheter.
The reduction in the debt level was small in the United Kingdom, reflecting the high starting structural deficit, although it improved substantially in this period. 
Skuldminskningen var liten i Frenade kungariket, vilket terspeglar det stora inledande strukturella underskottet, ven om det frbttrades betydligt under denna period.
On average, debt reduction in this group was substantially higher than in the group of highly indebted Member States (with exception of Ireland in that group) (see Chart 14). % of GDP 
58 Skuldminskningen var i genomsnitt betydligt hgre i denna grupp jmfrt med gruppen av kraftigt skuldsatta medlemsstater (med undantag fr Irland i den gruppen) (se diagram 14).
Chart 14 - Public debt to GDP in countries with moderately higher debt 2014-2018 57 Debt (% GDP) 90% 85% 80% 75% 70% 65% 60% 20 14 Germany Hungary Slovenia Austria Croatia United Kingdom 20 18 75% 75% 80% 84% 86% 87% 61% 72% 74% 76% 77% 85% Source: AMECO, March 2018. 
Diagram 14 Đ Offentlig skuld i frhllande till BNP i lnder med ngot strre skulder 2014Đ 2018 Skuld (% av BNP) 90 % 85 % 80 % 75 % 70 % 65 % 60 % 20 14 Tyskland Ungern Slovenien sterrike Kroatien Frenade kungariket 20 18 75 % 75 % 80 % 84 % 86 % 87 % 61 % 72 % 74 % 76 % 77 % 85 % Klla: Ameco, mars 2018.
A sharp worsening in two Member States with low debt 97. 
En kraftig frsmring i tv medlemsstater med lga skulder 97.
Romania, with a low debt level of 39.4 % of GDP was above its MTO in 2014, but is now heading towards an exceptional worsening in SB by about 4 pp of GDP from 2014 to 2018. 
Rumnien, som har en lg skuldniv p 39,4 % av BNP, lg ver sitt medelfristiga budgetml 2014, men r nu p vg mot en exempells frsmring av det strukturella saldot med omkring 4 procentenheter av BNP mellan 2014 och 2018.
For the first time, the Commission launched a significant deviation procedure in May 2017, and stepped it up in November 2017. 
Kommissionen inledde fr frsta gngen ett frfarande fr betydande avvikelser i maj 2017 och intensifierade det i november 2017.
Estonia, with a debt level of only 10.7 % of GDP in 2014, was above its MTO in 2014. 
Estland, med en skuldniv p enbart 10,7 % av BNP 2014, lg ver sitt medelfristiga budgetml 2014.
It has seen its SB decline by 1.4 pp of GDP from 2014 to 2018, mostly in 2017. 
Landets strukturella saldo minskade med 1,4 procentenheter av BNP mellan 2014 och 2018, mest under 2017.
The Commission considers the factors contribution to this decline to be very different in nature from those of Romania given the overall fiscal situation in both Member States including the exceptionally low level of public debt (9.1 % of GDP in 2018) in Estonia. 
Kommissionen anser att de faktorer som bidrar till minskningen r mycket annorlunda till sin karaktr jmfrt med dem i Rumnien med tanke p det samlade finanspolitiska lget i bda lnderna och den exceptionellt lga nivn p den offentliga skulden (9,1 % av BNP 2018) i Estland.
An imbalance between sustainability and cyclical considerations 99. 
Obalans mellan hllbarhets-och konjunkturaspekter 99.
In its recent communications on the newly introduced margin of appreciation, the Commission has stressed the importance of balancing fiscal sustainability and anticyclical considerations in setting fiscal targets 60. 
I sina senaste meddelanden om det nyligen infrda utrymmet fr sknsmssiga bedmningar har kommissionen betonat vikten av att skapa balans mellan finanspolitisk hllbarhet och konjunkturutjmnande aspekter nr finanspolitiska ml faststlls60.
However, a recent analysis by the Commission itself showed that this is not being done in highly indebted Member States (those with sustainability risk on the right side of the Chart 15). 
En frsk analys som kommissionen sjlv har gjort visar dock att detta inte grs i kraftigt skuldsatta medlemsstater (de med hllbarhetsrisker p hger sida i diagram 15).
In these countries the output gap is effectively closed or is even positive, but fiscal effort to improve fiscal sustainability is missing61. 
I dessa lnder har produktionsgapet eliminerats eller r till och med positivt, men det saknas finanspolitiska insatser fr att frbttra de offentliga finansernas hllbarhet61.
In 2016 the Commission pointed to such a trade-off: “The general definition of an appropriate fiscal stance has to take into account stabilisation and sustainability needs. 
59 60 r 2016 pekade kommissionen p en sdan kompromiss: Den allmnna definitionen av en lmplig finanspolitisk inriktning mste ta hnsyn till stabiliserings-och hllbarhetsbehov.
As discussed below, sometimes, the existence of trade-offs between these two dimensions can require a balancing act between the need to provide direct support to the economy while not ignoring the sustainability of public finances in the medium run.” (p. 
Ssom diskuteras nedan kan ibland frekomsten av kompromisser mellan dessa tv dimensioner krva en balansgng mellan behovet av att tillhandahlla direktstd till ekonomin och att samtidigt inte ignorera hllbarhet hos de offentliga finanserna p medellng sikt.
116, ‘Report on Public Finance in the EMU 2016’ of European Commission). 
(Report on Public Finances in EMU 2016 [rapport om offentliga finanser i EMU 2016], Europeiska kommissionen, s.
Source: This is a simplified chart from Commission Communication titled "2018 DBPs: Overall assessment", European Commission, 2017. 
Klla: Detta r ett frenklat diagram frn kommissionens meddelande Utkast till budgetplaner 2018: Samlad bedmning, Europeiska kommissionen, 2017.
Output Gap - AMECO March 2018; Change in Structural Primary Balance - COM autumn forecast 2017; S1 indicator from "2018 DBPs: Overall assessment", European Commission, 2017. 
Produktionsgap Đ Ameco, mars 2018. Frndring i strukturellt primrsaldo Đ kommissionens hstprognos 2017. S1-indikatorn frn Utkast till budgetplaner 2018: Samlad bedmning, Europeiska kommissionen, 2017.