natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It is funded from the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund. 
Det mste finnas ett program fr varje fond inom sammanhllningspolitikens omrde, det vill sga Europeiska regionala utvecklingsfonden, Europeiska socialfonden och Sammanhllningsfonden.
The European Regional Development fund aims to reinforce economic and social cohesion within the European Union by redressing the main regional imbalances through financial support for the creation of infrastructure and productive job‐creating investment, mainly for businesses. 
Europeiska regionala utvecklingsfondens ml r att strka den ekonomiska och sociala sammanhllningen inom Europeiska unionen genom att avhjlpa de strsta regionala obalanserna via ekonomiskt std till infrastruktursatsningar och produktiva jobbskapande investeringar, frmst fr fretag.
The European Social Fund aims to strengthen economic and social cohesion within the European Union by improving employment and job opportunities, mainly through training measures, encouraging a higher level of employment and the creation of more and better jobs. 
Europeiska socialfonden syftar till att strka den ekonomiska och sociala sammanhllningen inom Europeiska unionen genom att frbttra sysselsttningsmjligheterna, huvudsakligen genom utbildningstgrder, och frmja en hg sysselsttningsniv och fler och bttre arbetstillfllen.
The Expert group on European Structural and Investment Funds (EGESIF) was created in the Commission with the aim of providing advice to the Commission on issues in relation with the implementation of programmes adopted and implemented in accordance with the European Structural and Investment Funds Regulations. 
Ordfrklaringar 07 Expertgruppen fr europeiska struktur-och investeringsfonder kom till inom kommissionen i syfte att ge kommissionen rd om genomfrandet av program som antagits och genomfrts i verensstmmelse med frordningarna om de europeiska struktur-och investeringsfonderna.
It is one of the two groups replacing the Coordination Committee of the Funds (the second one being COESIF – the Coordination Committee for European Structural and Investment Funds). 
Den r en av de tv grupper som erstter Samordningskommittn fr fonderna (den andra r Samordningskommittn fr de europeiska struktur-och investeringsfonderna).
Financial corrections aim to protect the EU budget from the burden of erroneous or irregular expenditure. 
Finansiella korrigeringar syftar till att skydda EU:s budget frn felaktiga och oriktiga utgifter.
For expenditure subject to shared management, recovering payments incorrectly made is primarily the responsibility of Member States. 
Vid utgifter med delad frvaltning r det i frsta hand medlemsstaternas ansvar att terkrva felaktiga utbetalningar.
Financial corrections can be made by withdrawing irregular expenditure from Member States’ expenditure declarations or through recoveries from beneficiaries. Financial corrections can also be imposed by the Commission. 
Finansiella korrigeringar kan gras genom att oriktiga utgifter dras av frn medlemsstaternas utgiftsredovisningar eller genom att medel terkrvs frn stdmottagare. ven kommissionen kan besluta om finansiella korrigeringar.
Partnership agreements are agreements entered into between the European Commission and each Member State for the 2014‐2020 programming period. 
Partnerskapsavtal r verenskommelser som har ingtts mellan Europeiska kommissionen och varje medlemsstat fr programperioden 2014Đ2020.
They set out the national authorities’ plans on how to use funding from the European Structural and Investment Funds and outline each country’s strategic goals and investment priorities, linking them to the overall aims of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth. 
Dr anges de nationella myndigheternas planer fr hur medlen frn de europeiska struktur-och investeringsfonderna ska anvndas och varje lands strategiska ml och investeringsprioriteringar som kopplas till de vergripande mlen fr Europa 2020-strategin fr smart och hllbar tillvxt fr alla.
They also include details of any ex‐ante conditionalities and performance management frameworks. 
Dr anges ocks nrmare uppgifter om eventuella frhandsvillkor och ramar fr resultatstyrning.
They are prepared by the Member State in a dialogue with the Commission and must be adopted by the Commission. 
Avtalen utarbetas av medlemsstaten i en dialog med kommissionen och ska antas av kommissionen.
Glossary 08 Programme period: The multi–annual framework within which cohesion policy expenditure is planned and implemented. 
Programperiod: Den flerriga ram inom vilken utgifterna fr sammanhllningspolitiken planeras och genomfrs.
Services of general economic interest are economic activities that public authorities identify as being of particular importance to citizens, and that would not be supplied (or would be supplied under different conditions) if there were no public intervention. 
Tjnster av allmnt ekonomiskt intresse r ekonomisk verksamhet som de offentliga myndigheterna anser r srskilt viktig fr medborgarna och som inte kan tillhandahllas (eller skulle tillhandahllas p andra villkor) utan offentliga insatser.
Executive summary 09 IState aid is any aid granted by a Member State which distorts or could distort competition by giving certain enter‐ prises an advantage, in‐so‐far as it affects trade between Member States. 
Sammanfattning 09 IStatligt std r std som beviljas av en medlemsstat och som snedvrider eller skulle kunna snedvrida konkurrensen genom att vissa fretag fr en frmn, i den mn stdet inverkar p handeln mellan medlemsstaterna.
In principle, State aid is prohibited in order to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. 
Statligt std r i princip frbjudet fr att skerstlla att den inre marknaden fungerar korrekt.
However, aid of a certain size, in certain sectors, geographi‐ cal areas or in special circumstances, may be compatible with the internal market. 
Dock kan statligt std av en viss storlek, inom vissa sektorer, geografiska omrden eller under srskilda omstndigheter nd vara frenligt med den inre marknaden.
During the period 2010 to 2014, Member States have granted an average of 76.6 billion euro of State aid per year, excluding aid to the financial sec‐ tor, to the railway sector and to public services such as postal services. 
Under perioden 2010Đ2014 beviljade medlemsstaterna i genomsnitt 76,6 miljarder euro i statligt std per r, exklusive std till finanssektorn, jrnvgssektorn och offentliga tjnster ssom posttjnster.
This corresponds to over 0.5 % of EU Member States’ GDP. 
Detta motsvarar ver 0,5 % av medlemsstaternas BNP.
II Cohesion policy is one of the main spending areas in the EU budget. 
II Sammanhllningspolitiken r ett av de strsta utgiftsomrdena i EU:s budget.
For the 2014‐2020 programme period the total budget for the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Cohesion Fund (CF) and the European Social Fund (ESF) amounts to 352 billion euro, up from 347 billion euro in the 2007‐2013 programme period. 
Fr programperioden 2014Đ2020 uppgr den sammanlagda budgeten fr Europeiska regionala utvecklingsfonden (Eruf), Sammanhllningsfonden och Europeiska socialfonden (ESF) till 352 miljarder euro, en kning frn 347 miljarder euro under programperioden 2007Đ2013.
According to Com‐ mission estimates, ERDF/CF and ESF spending accounted for more than one‐quarter of State aid granted in the EU in the 2007‐2013 period. 
Enligt kommissionens uppskattning stod utgifterna fr Eruf/Sammahllningsfonden och ESF fr mer n en fjrdedel av det statliga std som beviljades i EU under perioden 2007Đ2013.
III Through this audit, we assessed for the 2007‐2013 programme period the level of non‐compliance with State aid rules in cohesion policy and the extent to which the Commission was aware of the causes of non‐compliance. 
III Under revisionen bedmde vi, fr programperioden 2007Đ2013, omfattningen av bristande efterlevnad av reglerna fr statligt std inom sammanhllningspolitiken samt i vilken utstrckning kommissionen var medveten om orsakerna till den bristande efterlevnaden.
We also examined whether the actions undertaken by the Commission for the 2014‐2020 programme period will strengthen its and the Member States’ capacity to prevent, detect and correct infringements of State aid rules. 
Vi granskade ocks om de tgrder som kommissionen har vidtagit fr programperioden 2014Đ2020 kommer att strka dess egen och medlemsstaternas kapacitet att frhindra eller upptcka och korrigera vertrdelser av reglerna fr statligt std.
IV Over the 2010‐2014 period, the Commission and the Court of Auditors detected infringements of State aid rules in a significant number of our audits; State aid errors in ERDF and CF were an important factor contributing to our esti‐ mated level of error in cohesion policy. 
IV Under perioden 2010Đ2014 upptckte kommissionen och revisionsrtten vertrdelser av reglerna fr statligt std vid ett stort antal revisioner, och fel vid statligt std inom Eruf och Sammanhllningsfonden var en viktig faktor som bidrog till vr uppskattning av felnivn inom sammanhllningspolitiken.
We found that the Commission’s own audits and monitoring in the cohesion area resulted in a detection rate which was similar to our own findings. 
Vi fann att kommissionen upptckte ungefr lika stor andel fel vid sina revisioner och sin vervakning inom sammanhllningspolitiken som vi gjorde vid vra revisioner.
The audit authorities in the Member States, on the other hand, detected infringements of State aid rules at a far lower rate than either the Commission or us. 
Medlemsstaternas revisionsmyndigheter upptckte  andra sidan mycket frre vertrdelser av reglerna fr statligt std n bde kommissionen och vi.
This indicates that, so far, audit authorities have not focused sufficiently on State aid in the course of their audits. 
Detta tyder p att revisionsmyndigheterna hittills inte har fokuserat tillrckligt p statligt std under sina revisioner.
VDuring the 2007‐2013 programme period the Commission did not record the State aid errors it detected or those reported by Member States in a way which allowed it to perform a proper analysis. 
VUnder programperioden 2007Đ2013 registrerade kommissionen inte de fel vid statligt std som den upptckte eller som medlemsstaterna rapporterade p ett stt som gjorde det mjligt fr den att gra en ordentlig analys.
Such an analysis could have helped the Commission to develop more focused and tailor‐made preventive measures for Member States and programmes. 
En sdan analys skulle ha hjlpt kommissionen att ta fram bttre riktade och skrddarsydda frebyggande tgrder fr medlemsstaterna och programmen.
Executive summary 10 VI Member States indicate in the application for projects of a significant financial size (‘major projects’) whether they consider that the investment involves State aid and this information can be verified by the Commission. 
Sammanfattning 10 VI Medlemsstaterna anger i sina anskningar om projekt av betydande ekonomisk storlek (s kallade strre projekt) om de anser att investeringen inbegriper statligt std och om denna information kan kontrolleras av kommissionen.
Particularly in the beginning of the 2007‐2013 programme period, the Commission did not systematically verify major projects for State aid compliance. 
Srskilt i brjan av programperioden 2007Đ2013 kontrollerade kommissionen inte systematiskt huruvida strre projekt fljde reglerna fr statligt std.
There is a risk that some EU co‐financed major projects are incompatible with the internal market, also due to the fact that prior to 2012, and the clarification provided by the Leipzig Halle judgment, Member States rarely notified investments in infrastructure to the Commission. 
Det finns en risk fr att ngra EU-medfinansierade strre projekt inte r frenliga med den inre marknaden, ocks p grund av att det fre 2012 Đ och frtydligandet genom domen i Leipzig Halle-mlet Đ var ovanligt att medlemsstaterna anmlde investeringar i infrastruktur till kommissionen.
In order to mitigate this risk for the future, the Commission stepped up its internal preventive measures and it introduced an alternative approval procedure including an Independent Quality Review for the 2014‐2020 programme period. 
Fr att i framtiden minska denna risk skrpte kommissionen sina interna frebyggande tgrder och infrde ett alternativt godknnandefrfarande med en oberoende kvalitetsgranskning fr programperioden 2014Đ2020.
This alternative procedure is not designed always to provide legal certainty for Member States with regard to State aid compliance at the time the major project decision is taken. 
Detta alternativa frfarande r inte utformat fr att alltid ge medlemsstaterna rttslig skerhet om huruvida reglerna om statligt std har fljts nr beslutet om det strre projektet fattas.
That certainty can only be obtained on the basis of a Member State notification fol‐ lowed by a Commission State aid decision. 
Sdan skerhet kan endast uppns efter det att en medlemsstat har gjort en anmlan till kommissionen som drefter har beslutat i frgan om statligt std.
VII The Commission has taken actions to simplify the applicable State aid legislation for the 2014‐2020 programme period which have resulted in a reduction of administrative burden and more transparency, but have also increased Member States’ responsibilities for designing and implementing aid measures. 
VII Kommissionen har vidtagit tgrder fr att frenkla den tillmpliga lagstiftningen om statligt std fr programperioden 2014Đ2020, vilket har lett till att den administrativa brdan har minskat och insynen kat, men ocks kat medlemsstaternas ansvar fr att utforma och genomfra stdtgrder.
Member States getting more respon‐ sibility risks increasing the number of State aid errors: the Commission’s monitoring has shown that Member States made many mistakes in the design and implementation of aid schemes in the 2007‐2013 programme period. 
Nr medlemsstaterna fr strre ansvar finns det en risk fr att antalet fel vid statligt std kar, och kommissionens vervakning har visat att medlemsstaterna begick mnga misstag vid utformningen och genomfrandet av stdordningarna under programperioden 2007Đ 2013.
To mitigate this risk, the Commission has taken actions to promote Member States’ administrative capacity in the area of State aid, including the introduction of pre‐conditions for State aid systems to promote the efficient and effec‐ tive implementation of European Structural and Investment Funds (‘ex ante conditionalities’). 
Fr att minska denna risk har kommissionen vidtagit tgrder fr att frmja medlemsstaternas administrativa kapacitet p omrdet fr statligt std. Bland annat har man infrt villkor fr statliga stdsystem fr att frmja ett effektivt och ndamlsenligt genomfrande av europeiska struktur-och investeringsfonder (s kallade frhandsvillkor).
However, the Member States which were considered not to be fulfilling these conditions are not necessarily those where the Commission found most problems in the past. 
De medlemsstater som inte ansgs uppfylla dessa villkor r dock inte ndvndigtvis de medlemsstater dr kommissionen tidigare har funnit mest problem.
VIII The Court recommends that: (a) The Commission should impose corrective actions where aid measures are not in compliance with State aid rules. (b) (i) The Commission should use MAPAR to record irregularities in a way that allows easy analysis of, for exam‐ ple, their type, frequency, seriousness, geographical origin and cause. 
VIII Revisionsrtten lmnar fljande rekommendationer: a) Kommissionen br besluta om korrigerande tgrder nr stdtgrder inte fljer reglerna fr statligt std. b) i) Kommissionen br anvnda MAPAR fr att registrera oriktigheter p ett stt som gr det mjligt att enkelt analysera till exempel deras typ, frekvens, allvar, geografiska ursprung och orsak.
The database should equally contain information on the follow‐up of these irregularities (such as financial corrections imposed). (ii) With regard to IMS, the Commission should adapt the database’s structure so that information on irregulari‐ ties such as State aid can be extracted and analysed across Member States and type. (iii) DG COMP should be given access to all relevant information on State aid irregularities contained in MAPAR and IMS on a regular basis. (iv) Using the information available in its databases, the Commission should follow up every two years on Member States’ capacity to comply with State aid rules by carrying out analyses of, for example, the type, frequency, seriousness, geographical origin and cause of State aid errors detected by the Commission itself or by Member State authorities. The Commission should use these exercises for monitoring purposes and to direct support activities such as providing training to the Member States where they are most needed. 
Databasen br ven innehlla information om uppfljningen av dessa oriktigheter (som de finansiella korrigeringar som har tillmpats). ii) Nr det gller IMS br kommissionen anpassa databasens struktur s att information om oriktigheter som gller statligt std kan plockas fram och analyseras fr alla medlemsstater och typer. iii) GD Konkurrens br regelbundet f tillgng till all relevant information i MAPAR och IMS om oriktigheter som gller statligt std. iv) Genom att utnyttja informationen i sina databaser br kommissionen vartannat r flja upp medlemsstaternas kapacitet att flja reglerna fr statligt std genom att analysera till exempel typ, frekvens, allvar, geografiskt ursprung och orsak i frga om fel vid statligt std som kommissionen sjlv eller medlemsstaternas myndigheter upptcker. Kommissionen br gra detta i vervakningssyfte och fr att styra stdinsatser, ssom utbildning, till de medlemsstater dr de behvs bst.
Ac‐ cess should be granted only on a need‐to‐know basis. (e) If the ex ante conditionality concerning State aid is not fulfilled by the end of 2016, the Commission should use its powers to suspend payments to the Member States concerned until they have rectified all significant shortcomings. 
Tillgng br endast beviljas anvndare med behovsenlig behrighet. e) Om frhandsvillkoret som gller statligt std inte har uppfyllts i slutet av 2016 br kommissionen utnyttja sin befogenhet att hlla inne betalningar till de berrda medlemsstaterna tills de har korrigerat alla betydande brister.
Introduction 12 01 Competition policy seeks to ensure that companies compete with each other on an equal footing – on the basis of their products and prices – without receiving unfair advantages. 
Inledning 12 01 Konkurrenspolitiken strvar efter att skerstlla att fretag konkurrerar med varandra p lika villkor Đ med sina produkter och priser Đ utan att de fr orttvisa frmner.
Since the EU’s single market guarantees free trade in goods and services across the Union, competition policy is regulated at European level1. 
Eftersom den gemensamma marknaden garanterar fri rrlighet fr varor och tjnster i hela unionen, regleras konkurrenspolitiken p EU-niv1.
State aid rules are a key aspect of the EU’s competition policy. 
Reglerna fr statligt std utgr en central aspekt av EU:s konkurrenspolitik.
02 A company which is granted State aid no longer competes on an equal foot‐ ing. 
02 Ett fretag som beviljas statligt std konkurrerar inte lngre p lika villkor.
For this reason, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that State aid is in principle incompatible with the internal market2. 
Av denna orsak anges i frdraget om Europeiska unionens funktionsstt (EUF-fr-draget)2 att statligt std i princip r ofrenligt med den inre marknaden.
However, there are areas and circumstances where the market does not work as it should; gaps exist where certain needs are not provided for. 
Det finns emellertid omrden och omstndigheter dr marknaden inte fungerar som den borde, och det finns luckor dr vissa behov inte blir tillgodosedda.
To accommodate public policy goals, the Treaty provides a list of State aid categories which shall or may be compatible with the internal market3. 
Fr att tillgodose de allmnna politikmlen innehller frdraget en frteckning ver kategorier av statligt std som r eller kan vara frenliga med den inre marknaden3.
The Commission has created several rules to govern aid granted under these categories. 
Kommissionen har utarbetat flera regler fr att hantera std som beviljas inom dessa kategorier.
What is State aid and what is its financial importance in the EU? 
Vad r statligt std och vilken r dess finansiella betydelse fr EU?
03 The Treaty defines State aid as any aid granted by a Member State which distorts or could distort competition by giving certain companies an advantage, provided that it affects trade between Member States. 
03 Frdraget definierar statligt std som std som ges av en medlemsstat, av vilket slag det n r, som snedvrider eller hotar att snedvrida konkurrensen genom att gynna vissa fretag, om det pverkar handeln mellan medlemsstater.
For aid to be considered as State aid, all of the criteria set out in the definition must be fulfilled. 
Fr att std ska anses vara statligt std mste alla kriterier i definitionen vara uppfyllda.
These criteria are listed in Table 1. 
Dessa kriterier finns upprknade i tabell 1.
1 Article 26 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
1 Artikel 26 i frdraget om Europeiska unionens funktionsstt (EUF-frdraget).
2 Article 107(1) TFEU. 
2 Artikel 107.1 i EUF-frdraget.
3 Article 107(2) TFEU : ‘The following shall be compatible with the internal market...’ (for example : aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters). 
3 Artikel 107.2 i EUF-frdraget: ÓFrenligt med den inre marknaden r...Ó (t.ex. std fr att avhjlpa skador som orsakats av naturkatastrofer).
Article 107(3) TFEU : ‘The following may be considered to be compatible with the internal market...’ (for example : aid to promote culture and heritage conservation). 
Artikel 107.3 i EUF-frdraget ÓSom frenligt med den inre marknaden kan anses ...Ó (t.ex. std fr att frmja kultur och bevara kulturarvet).
Introduction 13 Criteria for characterising aid as State aid Criterion and explanation The aid is granted by the state or through state resources. 
Inledning 13 Kriterier fr att std ska karakteriseras som statligt std Kriterium och frklaring Stdet beviljas av staten eller med hjlp av statliga medel.
‘State resources’ are any resource provided by a Member State authority or an entity owned or controlled by the state1. 
Statliga medel r medel, av vilket slag de n r, frn en myndighet i en medlemsstat eller ett fretag som gs eller kontrolleras av staten1.
Examples 1 Subsidies, tax exemptions or guarantees. 
Exempel 1 Subventioner, skattebefrielse eller garantifrbindelser.
2 The aid is granted to undertakings. An undertaking is any entity which engages in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status or the way it is financed2. 
2 Stdet beviljas fretag. Ett fretag r varje enhet som utvar ekonomisk verksamhet, oavsett enhetens rttsliga form och sttet fr dess finansiering2.
An economic activity is the offering of goods or services on a market3. 
Ekonomisk verksamhet r att tillhandahlla varor eller tjnster p en marknad3.
A company that manufactures cars, a charity that supplies food or a government company that offers postal services. 
Ett fretag som tillverkar bilar, en vlgrenhets-organisation som serverar mat eller ett statligt fretag som tillhandahller posttjnster.
An advantage is any economic benefit which the undertaking would not have obtained under normal market conditions4. 
En frmn r varje ekonomisk frdel som fretaget inte skulle ha erhllit under normala marknadsfrhllanden4.
4 The advantage granted is selective. 
4 Den beviljade frmnen r selektiv.
Any measure to grant aid that is not open to all undertakings operating within a Member State on an equal basis is selective. 
Alla frfaringsstt fr att bevilja std som inte r ppna p lika villkor fr alla fretag som r verksamma i en medlemsstat r selektiva.