natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
According to the OECD, between July 1998 and February 1999 Russia exported 1,04 Mio tonnes of cereals, thus exceeding the record volume of 1997/1998, and was a net exporter of cereals during the second half of 1998 (6). Although it was not established that exports to Russia took place in violation of the Memorandum, it must, however, be noted that the European Union adopted a programme of food aid to Russia at the very moment when Russian cereals exports were reaching record levels. 
Enligt OECD exporterade Ryssland 1,04 miljoner ton spannml mellan juli 1998 och februari 1999, vilket slunda verskred rekordmngden frn 1997/1998, och Ryssland utgjorde drmed en nettoexportr av spannml under andra halvret 1998 (6). ven om man inte kunnat faststlla att det frekommit export frn Ryssland i strid med memorandumet mste man konstatera att Europeiska unionen beslutat om ett program fr livsmedelsstd till Ryssland samtidigt som den ryska spannmlsexporten slog nytt rekord.
Following the devaluation of the rouble, the Commission particularly feared that there would be a substantial drop in Russian imports of meat (7). 
Kommissionen befarade srskilt att den ryska kttimporten till fljd av devalveringen av rubeln skulle minska kraftigt (7).
However, it overestimated the duration ofthefinancialcrisisinRussiaand,attheendof1998,Commu-nity exports of pigmeat to Russia had already returned to their pre-August 1998 level. 
Kommissionenverskattadedockdenryskaekonomiskakrisens varaktighet och i slutet av 1998 var gemenskapens export av grisktt till Ryssland redan tillbaka p samma niv som fre augusti 1998.
When the pigmeat supplied under the programme arrived in Russia, it had to compete with commercial imports (see paragraph 35). 
Nr det grisktt som levererats inom ramen fr programmet anlnde till platsen kom det att konkurrera med den kommersiella importen (se punkt 35).
Disregarding food aid, EU exports to Russia in 1999 were, in fact, relatively stable in the case of beef and even increased relative to previous years in the case of pigmeat (see Table 2). 
Effekten av hjningen av exportbidraget fr grisktt och frlngningen av exportlttnaderna fr Rysslandbidrogihggradtilldennasituation.Bortsettfrnlivs-medelsstdetvarEU:sexporttillRyssland1999isjlvaverket relativt stabil vad betrffar ntktt och kade till och med i frhllande till fregende r nr det gller grisktt (se tabell 2).
Table 2 Exports of meat from the EU to Russia (1997 to 1999) Year Exports of beef Total Excluding aid Total (tonnes) Exports of pigmeat Excluding food aid 1997 1998 1999 427 403 260 282 535 521 (1) 358 988 335 984 591 000 (2) 532 500 397 071 (2) Including approximately 450 500 t subject to export refunds. (1) Based on applications for export licences. 
Tabell 2 Frndringar i EU:s export av ktt till Ryssland (1997Đ1999) r Export av ntktt Totalt 427 403 260 282 535 521 (1) Utan std 397 071 Totalt 358 988 335 984 591 000 (2) (ton) Export av grisktt Utan livsmedelsstd 532 500 1997 1998 1999 (1) Grundas p anskningar om exportlicens (2) Varav cirka 450 500 ton tnjutit exportbidrag Klla: Generaldirektoratet fr jordbruk.
(1) See ÔBackground note for the Agricultural Council of 28 September 2 1998.Ő () For example, price regulations varied from region to region, the main cereal-producing regions speculated on price rises by banning exports 3 to other regions. () In the World BankŐs opinion Russia was in a position to import cereals and meat, in view of the state of its balance of trade. 
(1) Se ÓBackground note for the Agricultural Council of 28 September 2 1998Ó. () Till exempel variation i prisregleringarna mellan regionerna, de strsta spannmlsproducerande regionerna spekulerade i priskningar genom 3 att frbjuda export till andra regioner. () Vrldsbanken ansg att Ryssland framfr allt med tanke p sin han-delsbalansvaristndattimporteraspannmlochktt;seÓOutlook 4 for Russian AgricultureÓ, Vrldsbanken, 1999. () Kllor: ÓEuropean Union Heads of Mission Assessment on the Situation of Russian Agriculture, Harvest and Food AidÓ, september 1999 5 och ÓThe Association of Russian Agricultural Reform FundsÓ. () Srskilt det frmsta ryska fretaget inom spannmlshandeln ÓOGOÓ och ÓInstitute for the State of the Agrarian Market (ISAM)Ó.
25.1.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 25/5 11. 
25.1.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 25/5 11.
Neither did the Commission make a detailed examination of the supply situation in the various beneficiary regions proposed by the Russian authorities. 
Kommissionen genomfrde inte heller ngon ingende underskning av frsrjningssituationen i de olika stdmottagande regioner som freslagits av de ryska myndigheterna.
For example, there is no objective factor, except, perhaps, privileged contacts with the federal authori-ties,tojustifythechoiceofcertainregions(1).TheCommission was mainly content to exclude the Moscow and St Petersburg regions from those that were eligible (2), so as not to penalise European exporters, estimating that 85 % to 90 % of EU meat exports went to these regions. 
Det finns exempelvis inget objektivt element, frutom goda kontakter med de federala myndigheterna, som motiverar valet av vissa regio-ner(1).Kommissionennjdesighuvudsakligenmedattutesluta Moskva och Sankt Petersburg frn de stdberttigade regio-nerna(2),frattintemissgynnadeeuropeiskaexportrerna, eftersom man uppskattade att 85 till 90 % av EU:s kttexport gick till dessa regioner.
These imported products do not necessarily remain in these regions, however, because the big meat-processing factories situated in these regions in fact sell their products all over the Federation (3). 
De importerade produkterna stannar dock inte ndvndigtvis i dessa regioner eftersom den omfattande kttin-dustrin i dessa regioner i sjlva verket sljer sina produkter inom hela federationen (3).
Preparation of the legal base and implementation framework 12. 
Utformning av den rttsliga grunden och ramen fr genomfrandet 12.
The legal framework for the programme was prepared very quickly, because of the supposed urgency of the programme. 
Den rttsliga ramen fr programmet utarbetades snabbt p grund av att programmet ansgs vara av brdskande natur.
The Russian Government submitted its request in November 1998, the Council adopted the Regulation for this operation in December and the Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding governing the implementation of the programme in January 1999. 
Den ryska regeringen lade fram sin anskan i november 1998. Rdet antog frordningen om tgrden i december och kommissionen undertecknade ett avtalsmemorandum om genomfrandet av programmet i januari 1999.
The Commission negotiated the Memorandum with theRussianMinistryofAgriculturewithouthavinganopportu-nitytoconsulttheMinistryofFinancewhich,however,playsan essential role in the collection of counterpart funds (see paragraphs 42 to 47). 
Kommissionen frhandlade fram detta memorandum med det ryska jordbruksministeriet utan att kunna rdgra med finansministeriet, som dock har en betydande roll vid uppbrden av motpartsmedel (42Đ47).
The Commission drew up the operational procedures for the programme, together with the Russian authorities, on an ad hoc basis. 
Kommissionen faststllde tillflliga operativa frfaranden tillsammans med de ryska myndigheterna.
As some aspects were not covered in this first Memorandum, signed on 20 January 1999, the Commission negotiated a supplementary Memorandum with the Russian authorities in February 1999 in order, in particular, to take into account the CouncilŐs demand that monitoring and controls should take place on Russian territory. 
D det frsta avtalsmemorandumet som undertecknades den 20 januari 1999 uppvisade vissa brister frhandlade kommissionen i februari 1999 fram ett tillggsmemorandum med de ryska myndigheterna, bland annat fr att ta hnsyn till rdets krav p att skerstlla uppfljning och kontroll i Ryssland.
It was only in July 1999 that both parties accepted the terms of reference of the Russia-European Commission working group (set up to assist programme implementation) laying down additional implementing rules. 
Inte frrn i juli 1999 godknde de bda parterna de specifikationer som utarbetats av arbetsgruppen Ryssland Đ Europeiska kommissionen (som inrttats fr att underltta genomfrandet av programmet) och som faststllde ytterligare regler fr genomfrandet.
As regards the counterpart funds, the Commission agreed to allocate 80 % of them to paying off the pension fund arrears, which was a priority of both the Russian Government and the InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF).Despitethevolumeoffunds to be collected, the international communityŐs concern over the lack of transparency in Russian public finance and the numerous irregularities revealed at this time by the Russian Court of Auditors in the management of pension funds, the Commission did not make an analysis of this fundŐs function, its current and projected financial statute and its precise utilisation before taking this decision of principle (see paragraph 42). 
Betrffande motpartsmedlen accepterade kommissionen att ansl 80 % av dessa till betalning av utestende belopp till pensionsfonden, vilket prioriterades bde av den ryska regeringen och av IMF. Trots omfattningen av de medel som skulle uppbras, vrldssamfundets oro ver den begrnsade insynen i de ryska offentliga finanserna och de mnga oriktigheter i frvaltningen av pensionsfonderna som konstaterats av det ryska revisionsorganet vid samma tidpunkt analyserade kommissionen inte fondens verksamhet, dess aktuella och framtida finansiella stllning eller villkoren fr anvndning av fonden innan man fattade detta principbeslut (se punkt 42).
(1) World Bank report ÔOutlook for Russian agricultureŐ, October 1999. (2) Poverty rates in these regions outside urban centres are, however, amongst the highest in Russia; these regions received American food 3 aid. () Part of the meat supplied by the EU was, moreover, processed in these regions. 
(1) Rapport frn Vrldsbanken: ÓOutlook for Russian AgricultureÓ, okto-2 ber1999. ()Dessaomrdenutanfrstdernaharlikvlblanddehgstafattig-3 domstalen i Ryssland och erhll livsmedelsstd frn Frenta staterna. ( ) En del av det ktt som levererades av EU bearbetades fr vrigt i dessa regioner.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMME Budgetary resources 15. 
GENOMF RANDE AV PROGRAMMET Budgetmedel 15.
In the CommissionŐs view, it would have been preferable for the programme to have been financed on the basis of 1999 appropriations, but the Council and the Parliament preferred to use unused appropriations from the 1998 budget (4). 
Enligt kommissionen skulle det ha varit bst att finansiera detta program med hjlp av anslag fr budgetret 1999. Rdet och parlamentet fredrog dock att anvnda outnyttjade anslag ur 1998 rs budget (4).
Since it was not possible to effect any budgetary commitments in 1998, the Commission requested the carryover of 400 million euro from the1998financialyearto1999.Atthebeginningof1999,while awaiting the Budgetary AuthorityŐs formal decision on the carry-over of appropriations, the Commission found itself in a situation where it was impossible to start the programme, because of the absence of appropriations. 
D inget budgettagande kunde gras 1998 begrde kommissionen att 400 miljoner euro skulle verfras frn budgetret 1998 till 1999. I brjan av 1999, innan budgetmyndigheten formellt fattat beslut om verfring av anslag, var det omjligt fr kommissionen att inleda programmet p grund av att man saknade anslag.
It then transferred 10 million euro from article B1-3 1 2 ÔSchool milkŐ to article B1-3 1 5 ÔFood aid for RussiaŐ. 
Kommissionen verfrde d 10 miljoner euro frn artikel B1Đ3 1 2 ÓGratis utdelning av mjlk till skoleleverÓ till artikel B1Đ3 1 5 ÓLivsmedelsbistnd till RysslandÓ.
Resources deployed by the Commission 16.Thedecisionsonhowtheprogrammewastobeimple-mentedweretakencentrally,inBrussels.NeitherDGAgriculture nor DG External Relations nor the Delegation in Moscow were given any additional resources with which to implement it. 
Besluten om hur programmet skulle genomfras fattades centraliserat till Bryssel. Varken generaldirektoratet fr jordbruk, generaldirektoratet fr yttre frbindelser eller delegationen i Moskva tilldelades ngra ytterligare medel fr genomfrandet.
The American Embassy in Moscow had a staff of around 20 persons to manage similar aid, with more decisional freedom. 
Den amerikanska ambassaden i Moskva, som frsetts med ver ett tjugotal personer fr att frvalta ett liknande std, frfogade dremot ver ett stort oberoende i frga om beslutsfattande.
Whereas it, for example, decided price adjustments or product destinations on a weekly basis, the only major change decided upon by the Commission (to change the regions eligible), required the authorisation of two Members of the Commission and took more than two months. 
Medan denna t.ex. beslutade om prisjusteringar eller produkternas destinationer p veckobasis krvde den enda strre ndringen av de stdberttigade regioner som faststllts av kommissionen tv kommissionsledamters befullmktigande och tog ver tv mnaderattgenomfra.
Mobilisation of foodstuffs 17. 
Anskaffande av varorna 17.
At the end of 1998, in its financial forecasts, the Commission made provision for an average budget of 110 EUR /100 kg for the supply of pigmeat. 
I slutet av 1998 hade kommissionen i sina budgetberkningar uppskattat att kostnaden fr leverans av grisktt i genomsnitt skulle uppg till 110 euro/100 kg.
The average price for this meat, ex-slaughterhouse, on the Community market in 1999 was, in fact,112EUR/100kg.However,thepricepaidwithinthepro-gramme framework amounted to an average of 150,5 EUR/ 100 kg. 
I sjlva verket lg genomsnittspriset fr detta ktt med slakthuset som utgngspunkt p 112 euro/100 kg p gemenskapens marknad 1999. Det pris som betalades inom ramen fr programmet uppgick emellertid i genomsnitt till 150,5 euro/100 kg.
The CommissionŐs pigmeat forecasts did not take into account the costs of freezing, packaging, handling, transport and storage. 
Kommissionens berkningar rrande grisktt tog inte hnsyn till kostnaderna fr frysning, frpackning, hantering, transport och lagring.
The cost of the consignments of pigmeat was 31,4 % greater (per tonne) than the CommissionŐs forecasts. 
Kostnaderna fr leverans av grisktt verskred kommissionens berkningar med 31,4 % (perton).
The Council Regulation clearly stated that it was imperative that products should reach their destination as soon as possible, and the Memorandum concluded with the Russian authorities provided that the Commission would endeavour to supply the 4 ( ) SeetheCommissionŐsreplytoparagraphs2.16and2.17oftheCourtŐs annual report concerning the financial year 1998 (OJ C 349, 3.12.1999, p. 
I rdets frordning fastslogs att produkterna mste komma fram s snart som mjligt och det avtalsmemorandum som ingtts med de ryska myndigheterna freskrev att kommissionen skulle anstrnga sig fr att genomfra leveransen av produkterna i de ryska hamnarna eller vid grnsvergngarna till Ryssland under frsta halvret 1999. I mitten av juli 1999 hade endast 45 % av 4 ( ) Se kommissionens svar p punkterna 2.16Đ2.17 i revisionsrttens rsrapport fr budgetret 1998 (EGT C 349, 3.12.1999, s.
C 25/6 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 25.1.2001 products to the Russian ports or the Russian border during the first half of 1999. 
C 25/6 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 25.1.2001 dessa produkter kommit fram till Ryssland.
By mid-July 1999, only 45 % of these products hadarrivedinRussia.Bytheendof1999,89%ofthevolumeof products, but only 58 % of their value, in terms of the initial programme, had been delivered to the beneficiary regions. 
I slutet av 1999 hade 89 % av produkternas volym, men endast 58 % av deras vrde, levererats till de stdmottagande regionerna jmfrt med det ursprungliga programmet.
Deliveries of wheat, rye and rice were practically complete, but only two thirds of the beef and half of the pigmeat and skimmed-milk powder had been delivered. 
Leveranserna av vete, rg och ris hade praktiskt taget slutfrts, men endast tv tredjedelar av ntkttet och hlften av griskttet och skummjlkspulvret hade levererats.
The Commission was, in fact, obliged to suspend mobilisation of the products for almost four weeks until the Russian authorities accepted the CommunityŐs safety, hygiene and health certification procedures. 
Kommissionen blev i sjlva verket tvungen att avbryta anskaf-fandet av produkter under nstan fyra veckor, tills de ryska myndigheterna accepterade gemenskapens frfaranden fr skerhet, hygien och hlsointyg.
Mobilisation of the products was subsequently suspended for more than a month, because of the difficulty of reaching a settlement between the Commission and the Russian authorities on the pricing mechanism. 
Anskaffandet av produkter avbrts drefter under mer n en mnad p grund av svrigheter att n fram till en verenskommelse mellan kommissionen och de ryska myndigheterna rrande prissttningsmekanismen.
Additionally, deliveries of pigmeat were suspended for some time because of the Belgian dioxin crisis (see paragraph 40) and it was not until July 1999 that the Russian health authorities accepted the delivery of milk powder. 
Vidare avbrts leveranserna av grisktt under en tid p grund av den belgiska dioxinkrisen (se punkt 40) och de ryska myndigheterna godknde inte leveransen av mjlkpulver frrn i juli 1999.
Because of these delays almost half the grain arrived during or after the harvest, large amounts of meat arrived during the summerwhendemandforthisproductwasatitsweakestandit was impossible for the full programme to be carried out. 
P grund av dessa frseningar kom nra hlften av spannmlen fram under eller efter skrden, stora mngder ktt kom fram p sommaren, d efterfrgan p denna produkt r som lgst, och programmet kunde inte genomfras i sin helhet.
The totals of the contracts for monitoring in Europe and in Russia rose from 2 million euro to 5,5 million euro and from 4 million euro to 8,8 million euro respectively. 
Beloppet fr dessa avtal om vervakning i Europa och Ryssland hjdes frn 2 till 5,5miljonereurorespektivefrn4till8,8miljonereuro.
On 22 December 1999 the Commission decided to break off the programme. 
Den 22 december 1999 beslutade kommissionen avbryta programmet.
Since the Commission was unable to use all the carryovers of appropriations before the end of the 1999 year, an amount of 64,5 million euro lapsed. 
Eftersom kommissionen inte kunde anvnda samtliga verfrda anslag fre slutet av budgetret 1999 frfll ett belopp p 64,5 miljoner euro.
In consequence, even though most of the grain had already been delivered, the 41 500 tonnes of pigmeat, 11 550 tonnes of beef and 5 000 tonnes of skimmed-milk powder initially promised to the Russian authorities for an overall value of more than 71,2 million euro were not delivered. 
Medan strre delen av spannmlen redan hade levererats, levererades sledes inte 41 500 ton grisktt, 11 550 ton ntktt och 5 000 ton mjlkpulver till ett sammanlagt vrde av ver 71,2 miljoner euro, som ursprungligen lovats de ryska myndigheterna.
Since the programme no longer had to finance the transport of these products, the total cost of implementation was thus reduced by 74,4 million euro relative to the forecasts (see Table 3). 
Eftersom programmet inte lngre behvde finansiera transporten av dessa produkter minskade sledes dess totala genomfrandekostnad med 74,4 miljoner euro jmfrt med berkningarna (se tabell 3).
(2) Commission estimate. 
(2) Kommissionens berkning.
C 25/8 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 25.1.2001 Transport of products 22. 
C 25/8 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 25.1.2001 Transport av produkterna 22.
The actual cost of transporting the milk powder was approximately 93 % higher than the initial estimate. 
Denfaktiskatransportkostnadenfrmjlkpulververskred den ursprungliga uppskattningen med 93 %.
As for the transport costs for rye, they were 40 % higher than forecast (see Table 3), because the forecasts had not allowed for carriage of the product totheCommunityportforshipment.Thefinancialforecastsin respect of the cost of the programme which were submitted to the Budgetary Authority by the Commission therefore underestimated the cost of the deliveries of milk powder, rye and pigmeat (see paragraph 17). 
Vad gller transportkostnaderna fr rg verskred dessa berkningarna med 40 % (se tabell 3), eftersom de inte hade tagit hnsyn till transporten av produkten till gemenskapens hamn fre ilastningen. I de budgetberkningar avseende kostnaden fr programmet som kommissionen verlmnade till budgetmyndigheten underskattades sledes kostnaden fr leveranserna av mjlkpulver, rg och grisktt (se punkt 17).
The Commission entrusted to a monitoring company the task of checking the quantities and quality of the products removed from intervention stores by carriers. 
Kommissionen uppdrog t ett kontrollfretag att granska kvantiteten och kvaliteten p de produkter som transportrerna hmtat frn interventionslager.
There were delays in forwarding the beef, because the company in question did not have enough staff to monitor the loading of the goods which, in France, were spread among some 30 warehouses. 
Vid transporten av ntktt skedde frseningar som berodde p att detta fretag inte frfogade ver tillrckligt med anstllda fr att vervaka lastningen av detta gods som, i Frankrike, var utspritt ver ett trettiotal lager.
Almost 40 % of the deliveries were shipped via Baltic ports. 
Nra 40 % av leveranserna transporterades via baltiska hamnar.
Approximately 25 % of cereal deliveries were routed via Muuga (Estonia), although handling charges there are higher than at Riga or St Petersburg. The higher costs, which were mainly due to the monopoly control exercised over the port facilities (1), were borne by the beneficiary (see paragraph 26). 
Cirka 25 % av spannmlsleveranserna passerade genom Muuga (Estland)trotsattutgifternafrgodshanteringrhgredrni RigaellerSanktPetersburg.Dessahgreutgifter,somhuvudsak-ligen berodde p den monopoliserade kontrollen ver hamninfrastrukturen (1), bars av stdmottagaren (se punkt 26).
Betteranalysisofthehandlingandstoragecapacitiesonthe spot and better coordination with the Americans would have enabledtheCommissiontoavoidsomeofthecongestioninthe ports. 
En bttre analys av beredskapen fr godshantering och lagring p platsen samt bttre samordning med amerikanerna hade gjort det mjligt fr kommissionen att undvika verbelastning av hamnarna.
Some meat was also transported as far as the Urals by lorries coming from Europe, i.e. more than 2 000 km inside the Russian borders. 
Vidare transporterades en del ktt med lastbilar frn Europa tillUralbergen,dvs.ver2000kminnanfrdenryskagrnsen.
Since the Russians did not bear these costs, the transport costs due to the European operators, port handling charges and demurrage (4,5 million euro) were deducted by the Commission from the overall budget allocated for the supply of products to the neediest regions. 
Eftersom den ryska sidan inte tagit p sig dessa utgifter drog kommissionen av transportkostnaderna fr de europeiska aktrerna, utgifterna fr godshantering vid hamnarna och extra liggedagar (4,5miljonereuro)frndemedelsomtilldelatsfrleveransav produkter till de mest behvande regionerna.
The European carriers experienced considerable delays in payment and in the release of their bank guarantees by the intervention bodies. 
De europeiska transportrerna drabbades av avsevrda frseningar i samband med interventionsorganens utbetalning och frigrelse av deras bankgarantier.
These delays were partly to blame for the increases in the level of the bids for the subsequent tranches of the operation as operators tried to cover the additional costs incurred. 
Dessa frseningar var en del av orsaken till de hjda anbudsniverna fr de sista delbetalningarna av tgrden, varigenom aktrerna frskte terindriva de kostnader som uppkommit p detta stt.