natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The lack of coordination within the services of the Commission was reported earlier in the CourtŐs special report on humanitarian aid in a general sense and more specifically for Angola (3). 
Bristen p samordning inom kommissionens avdelningar, bde allmnt taget och mera specifikt fr Angola, har rapporterats tidigare i revisionsrttens srskilda rapport om humanitrt bistnd (3).
By the end of 1998 the responsibilities within the newly created common service for external relations (SCR) were not yet clear. 
Vid utgngen av 1998 var ansvarsfrdelningen inom den nyligen grundade gemensamma tjnsten fr yttre frbindelser (SCR) nnu inte klar.
Instrument National indicative programmes (EDF) Article 255 (EDF) Emergency aid (Article 254/B 7-2 1) Budget line Ń Rehabilitation (B 7-5 0 7 6/6 4 1 0) Budget line Ń Southern Africa (B 7-3 2 1 0) Co-financing (budget) (B 7-5 0 1 0) Food aid (budget) B 7-2 0) Responsibility Geographic units Initially VIII/6, later VIII/G/4 ECHO VIII/G/4 Initially geographic unit, later VIII/G/4 VIII/B/2 VIII/B/1 (1) COWI Report, Angola Country Case Study, July 1997. 
Instrument Nationella vgledande program (EUF) Artikel 255 (EUF) Katastrofbistnd (artikel 254/B7Đ2 1) Budgetpost Đ terhmtning (B7Đ5 0 7 6/6 4 1 0) Budgetpost Đ Sdra Afrika (B7Đ3 2 1 0) Samfinansiering (budget) (B7Đ5 0 1 0) Livsmedelsbistnd (budget) B7Đ2 0) Ansvar Geografiska enheter Ursprungligen VIII/6, senare VIII/G/4 ECHO VIII/G/4 Ursprungligen geografisk enhet, senare VIII/G/4 VIII/B/2 VIII/B/1 (1) COWI Report, Angola Country Case Study, juli 1997.
(2) Council Resolution of 3 December 1993 following which six countries were selected by the Council in May 1994 (Ivory Coast, Mozam-3 bique, Ethiopia, Peru, Costa Rica and Bangladesh). () Special Report No 2/97, paragraphs 3.8 to 3.12 (OJ C 143, 12.5.1997). 
(2) Rdets resolution av den 3 december 1993 i enlighet med vilken rdet i maj 1994 valde ut sex lnder (Elfenbenskusten, Moambique, Etio-3 pien, Peru, Costa Rica och Bangladesh). () Srskild rapport nr 2/97, punkterna 3.8Đ3.12 (EGT C 143, 12.5.1997).
19.4.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 113/11 Human resources 47. 
19.4.2000 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 113/11 Personal 47.
The European Parliament, in a resolution of 4 November 1993, doubted whether the Commission was able to administer such extensive programmes in so many countries with no additional staff and with very tight deadlines. 
I en resolution av den 4 november 1993 tvivlade Europaparlamentet p att kommissionen var i stnd att administrera s omfattande program i s mnga lnder utan ngon ytterligare personal och med mycket snva tidsfrister.
It therefore stressed the need for extra staff and expertise to be deployed to enable the policy to be properly coordinated and to guarantee the sustainability of the measures. 
Parlamentet betonade drfr behovet av att ytterligare personal och experter skulle avdelas fr att mjliggra en ordentlig samordning av strategin och fr att garantera tgrdernas varaktighet.
The need for extra human resources for SIA has been met by setting up technical support units (TSU) with technical assistants. 
Behovet av ytterligare personal fr SIA har tillfredsstllts genom att man inrttat enheter fr tekniskt bistnd med tekniska experter.
They have often done a good job but the expansion of the programme and its complexity would have justified setting aside (even if temporarily) specific resources inside the services of the Commission in order to secure coherence and coordination of planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting. 
Dessa har ofta gjort ett bra arbete, men utvidgningen av programmet och dess komplexitet hade rttfrdigat en tilldelning av srskilda resurser (ven om dessa hade varit tillflliga) inom kommissionen fr att skerstlla enhetlighet och samordning vid planering, vervakning, bedmning och rapportering.
The lack of human resources, especially in the field, was mentioned by the Court earlier, e.g. in its Annual Report for 1997 (1). 
Bristen p personal, srskilt p fltet, har nmnts av revisionsrtten tidigare, i dess rsrapport fr 1997 (1).
In the Delegation in Mozambique the situation was particularly bad due to vacancies and a general lack of resources, which made it impossible to deal with the volume of funds and projects. 
Situationen var srskilt dlig inom delegationen i Moambique p grund av obesatta tjnster och en allmn brist p resurser, vilket gjorde det omjligt att klara av alla fonder och projekt.
Furthermore, the administration of this Delegation was generally poor. 
Dessutom var administrationen av denna delegation i allmnhet dlig.
Responsibilities were not clear and were frequently reshuffled, in a manner detrimental to any order or continuity. 
Ansvarsfrdelningen var inte tydlig och man gjorde ofta omfrdelningar, vilket hmmade varje form av kontinuitet.
It was therefore virtually impossible to find documents and to account properly for the actions executed. Feedback to the budgetary authorities 49. 
Det var drfr s gott som omjligt att hitta dokument och p vederbrligt stt redogra fr de tgrder som genomfrts. terkoppling till den budgetansvariga myndigheten 49.
Information available on the way reporting was done to the Council on the progress made has been scarce for both actions financed by the EDF or by the budget. 
Det har funnits otillrckligt med information om hur man rapporterat till rdet om vilka framsteg som gjorts, bde vad gller tgrder finansierade av EUF och sdana som finansieras med budgetmedel.
Annual Reports are requested by Regulation (EC) No 2258/96 for actions financed by the budget. 
I frordning (EG) nr 2258/96 krvs att rliga rapporter skall framlggas fr budgetfinansierade tgrder.
Only one report was submitted, in 1997. 
Endast en sdan rapport har lagts fram, r 1997.
However, this report is not evaluative as stipulated in Article 9 of the Regulation. 
Denna rapport r emellertid inte utvrderande p det stt som krvs i artikel 9 i frordningen.
It merely describes and lists for each country the actions undertaken the previous year and briefly mentions proposed actions for the coming year. 
Rapporten innehller fr varje land endast en beskrivning och upprkning av de tgrder som vidtagits under fregende r och en kort sammanfattning av de tgrder som freslagits fr fljande r.
No mention is made of experience gained, lessons learned or problems encountered, be it from the few evaluations made in respect of individual projects or from the CommissionŐs own monitoring. 
Ingenting nmns om de erfarenheter som gjorts, nya insikter eller problem som man sttt p, varken i de f bedmningar som gjorts av enskilda projekt eller de som utgr frn kommissionens egen vervakning.
Apart from this report, the Commission has prepared a list summarising all deci (1) OJ C 349, 17.11.1998, paragraphs 5.28 to 5.31. sions and payments from the EDF and the specific budget lines for rehabilitation. 
Utver denna rapport har kommissionen frberett en lista som (1) EGT C 349, 17.11.1998, punkterna 5.28Đ5.31. sammanfattar alla beslut och utbetalningar frn EUF och de srskilda budgetposterna fr terhmtning.
The Parliament, in its resolution of November 1993, called on the Commission to report back to it on implementation with an assessment of the results for each country receiving rehabilitation aid. 
Europaparlamentet bad i sin resolution i november 1993 kommissionen inkomma med en rapport om genomfrandet tillsammans med en bedmning av resultaten fr varje land som mottar teranpassningsstd.
This was not done in a systematic manner. 
Detta gjordes inte p ngot systematiskt stt.
Before the programme was expanded the requested report should have been presented. 
Den begrda rapporten borde ha lagts fram innan programmet utvidgades.
The requested assessment of the results could not possibly be made without information available as a result of careful monitoring. 
Den bedmning av resultaten som begrts kunde omjligen gras utan information som erhllits genom noggrann vervakning.
The Commission should control the monitoring process and document what has been done at Delegation level as well as keeping central services informed. 
Kommissionen br kontrollera vervakningsfrfarandet och dokumentera vad som har gjorts p delegationsniv samtidigt som man hller de centrala avdelningarna informerade.
In particular, in the light of the weaknesses and the often poor quality of the Ôfirst level monitoringŐ performed by the implementing agents (as documented in progress and financial reports), the CommissionŐs monitoring is essential. 
I synnerhet, i ljuset av svagheterna och den ofta dliga kvaliteten p vervakningen p grsrotsniv som genomfrs av de verkstllande organen (ssom dokumenteras i lgesrapporterna och de ekonomiska rapporterna), r kommissionens vervakning av avgrande betydelse.
However, for most countries reviewed there was no documentation available on the monitoring performed by the CommissionŐs staff and many projects had not been visited at all by them. 
Fr de flesta lnder som granskades fanns det emellertid ingen dokumentation tillgnglig angende den vervakning som genomfrts av kommissionens personal och mnga projekt hade verhuvudtaget inte beskts av dem.
Unfortunately, not even checks or reviews of the monitoring reports prepared by them were documented. 
Olyckligtvis hade inte ens kontrollerna eller granskningarna av de vervakningsrapporter de utarbetat dokumenterats.
This means that there was generally no regular feedback within the services of the Commission on the ongoing SIA programmes. 
Detta innebr att det i allmnhet inte frekom ngon regelbunden terkoppling inom kommissionens avdelningar angende de pgende SIA-programmen.
Admittedly, in some cases such as Somalia, Angola and the Congo, reports were often not available as the security situation made visits difficult and sometimes even impossible. 
Det br dock tillsts att det i vissa fall, ssom i frga om Somalia, Angola och Kongo ofta inte fanns ngra rapporter att tillg, eftersom skerhetslget frsvrade, och ibland till och med omjliggjorde besk.
IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS Introduction 54. 
GENOMF RANDE AV TGRDER Inledning 54.
Following the CommissionŐs communication of May 1993, the programmes should be quick to implement and take a maximum of two years to complete. 
Till fljd av kommissionens meddelande frn maj 1993 borde programmen kunna tas i bruk snabbt och ta maximalt tv r att slutfra.
They should concentrate on repairing basic infrastructure quickly without any new investment. 
De br koncentrera sig p terstllande av grundlggande infrastruktur snabbt och utan nya investeringar.
One reason for the slow rate of implementation is that the planning of programmes and projects was (at least initially) not properly done (see paragraphs 55 to 63). 
En orsak till det lngsamma genomfrandet r att planeringen av program och projekt (tminstone till en brjan) inte gjordes ordentligt (se punkterna 55Đ63).
C 113/12 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 19.4.2000 Planning and budgeting 55. 
C 113/12 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 19.4.2000 Planering och budgetering 55.
The majority of SIA projects had been prepared and proposed by NGOs which were interested in taking part in the rehabilitation programmes in the different countries. 
Strsta delen av SIA-projekten hade frberetts och freslagits av enskilda organisationer som var intresserade av att delta i ter-hmtningsprogrammen i de olika lnderna.
The relative abundance of funds available and the marketing of the new concept resulted in hundreds of proposals right from the beginning for the then five eligible countries. 
De relativt stora belopp som var disponibla och marknadsfringen av det nya konceptet gav redan frn inledningen upphov till hundratals frslag fr de d fem stdberttigade lnderna.
The project proposals were reviewed by the Commission, particularly by the Delegations in the countries concerned. 
Frslagen till projekt granskades av kommissionen, framfr allt av delegationerna i de berrda lnderna.
The Delegations discussed the NGOsŐ proposed activities, their locations and the related budgets with the local authorities. 
Delegationerna diskuterade de enskilda organisationernas freslagna tgrder, orterna dr de skulle genomfras och deras budgetar med de lokala myndigheterna.
However, due to insufficient human resources, most of the Delegations and the governments were not in a position to deal with this huge task adequately. 
P grund av personalbrist var de flesta delegationerna och den lokala ledningen inte i stnd att skta denna enorma uppgift p ett tillfredsstllande stt.
It also usually took a long time to recruit and install technical assistance to deal with appraisal and monitoring of programmes. 
Det tog ven lng tid att rekrytera och installera tekniska experter fr att handha bedmning och vervakning av program.
In the meantime there was great political pressure to get programmes started, so many project proposals were accepted more or less as presented by the NGOs without sufficient critical appraisal. 
Under tiden fanns det en stor politisk press fr att inleda program, varfr mnga projektfrslag godkndes mer eller mindre i den form de lades fram av de enskilda organisationerna, utan ngon tillrcklig kritisk bedmning.
The technical and financial specifications for such projects were often not well based on the facts on the ground. 
De tekniska och finansiella specifikationerna fr sdana projekt grundades ofta inte i tillrcklig utstrckning p rdande frhllanden ute p fltet.
This has frequently necessitated changes in the nature of actions, their locations, the target groups and the budgets. 
Detta har ofta lett till att man varit tvungen att ndra tgrdernas karaktr, orterna fr genomfrande av dem, deras mlgrupper och budgetar.
There were also instances where projects were interrupted from time to time and even completely stopped. 
Det frekom ven tillfllen dr projekt tidvis avbrts eller till och med stoppades helt.
A project in Eritrea on malaria control included a budget for drugs amounting to ECU 125 000. 
Ett projekt fr malariakontroll i Eritrea omfattade en budget fr lkemedel till ett belopp p 125 000 ecu.
After the start of the project, it was discovered that the World Health Organisation (WHO) had included enough drugs in their separate programme. 
Efter att projektet inletts upptckte man att Vrldshlsoorganisationen (WHO) inkluderat tillrckligt med lkemedel i sitt separata program.
Although the files did not contain any request to use the ECU 125 000 for something else, some ECU 80 000 was in fact used for other purposes. 
Trots att handlingarna inte innehll ngon begran om att f anvnda nmnda 125 000 ecu fr ngot annat, utnyttjades cirka 80 000 ecu i sjlva verket till andra syften.
Another project, also in Eritrea, aimed at the resettlement of refugees. 
Ett annat projekt, ocks i Eritrea, syftade till terflyttning av flyktingar.
After the contract for ECU 1,7 million had been signed, it was discovered that the land identified for the resettlement was already occupied by others. 
Efter att avtalet till ett belopp p 1,7 miljoner ecu hade undertecknats, upptcktes att det markomrde som valts ut fr terflyttningen redan var upptaget av andra.
By then expatriate staff had already been recruited and some vehicles and other equipment purchased. 
Vid denna tidpunkt hade man redan rekryterat utlandsstationerade tjnstemn och anskaffat en del fordon och annan utrustning.
The project had to be terminated after an amount of ECU 287 000 had been spent. 
Man blev tvungen att avsluta projektet efter att 287 000 ecu hade anvnts.
There is still an outstanding claim from the NGO to be settled. In the Congo, a social infrastructure project included a significant element for rural actions. 
Den enskilda organisationen har fortfarande en utestende fordran som terstr att reglera. I Kongo omfattade ett projekt som gllde den sociala infrastrukturen en betydande del som gllde landsbygdstgrder.
As it was found subsequently that priority should be given to chemicals for purification of the water supply in Kinshasa, no funds remained available for rural actions. 
Nr man senare fann att kemikalier fr rening av vattentillgngarna i Kinshasa borde prioriteras terstod inga medel fr landsbygdstgrder.
In Angola, large sums were allocated to NGO projects which did not have clear objectives. 
I Angola tilldelades stora summor enskilda organisationers projekt som inte hade ngon klar mlsttning.
This gave the NGOs considerable autonomy and changes were subsequently made without substantive justification by the Delegation, or any changes to the budgets. 
Detta gav de enskilda organisationerna en betydande autonomi och ndringar gjordes utan att detta frankrades hos delegationen eller utan att ngra ndringar gjordes i budgetarna.
One project was reduced from two municipalities to one because of security problems and the number of beneficiaries was reduced from 23 000 to 8 000 families. 
Ett projekt skars ned frn att omfatta tv kommuner till en p grund av skerhetsproblem, varvid antalet mottagare minskade frn 23 000 till 8 000 familjer.
Although this change was reported to the Delegation, no changes were made to the budget of ECU 810 000. 
Trots att denna ndring rapporterades till delegationen gjordes inga ndringar i budgeten p 810 000 ecu.
In Mozambique, an amount of ECU 1,95 million was decided on for Ôreinsertion of young people in three provincesŐ in August 1994. 
I Moambique beslutades i augusti 1994 om ett belopp p 1,95 miljoner ecu fr terflyttande av unga personer i tre provinser.
The financial agreement was signed in June 1995. 
Finansieringsverenskommelsen undertecknades i juni 1995.
The projectŐs target was to find employment for unemployed young-sters. 
Projektets syfte var att finna sysselsttning fr arbetslsa unga.
To date no funds have been committed. 
Till dags dato har inga specifika medel avsatts.
The Government no longer finds the project relevant, but no proposals for reorienting the project have been made. The commitment should be cancelled. 
Regeringen anser inte lngre projektet vara aktuellt, men inga frslag till ominriktning av projektet har gjorts. tagandet borde dras tillbaka.
Although many NGOs performed satisfactorily, a significant number of them did not have enough resources or experience for the sectors in which they were to operate to prepare proper project proposals or to easily recruit the required manpower, be it expatriate or local expert. 
Trots att mnga enskilda organisationer gjorde ett tillfredsstllande arbete, hade ett betydande antal av dem inte tillrckliga resurser eller tillrcklig erfarenhet inom de sektorer de skulle verka fr att frbereda ordentliga frslag till projekt eller fr att ltt kunna anstlla den personal som behvdes, vare sig det var frga om utlandsstationerade tjnstemn eller lokala experter.
They were also often too much oriented towards emergency aid with little experience in the field of development. 
De var ven ofta alltfr inriktade p katastrofbistnd och hade liten erfarenhet av utveckling.
As a result low quality projects were undertaken based on wrong assumptions about grass root involvement and the local administrationsŐ capacities to take over the operations. 
Till fljd av detta inleddes projekt med kvalitativa brister som grundade sig p felaktiga antaganden om deltagande p grsrotsniv och lokalfrvaltningarnas frmga att ta ver verksamheten.
Such projects are unlikely to prove sustainable. 
Det r osannolikt att sdana projekt kommer att visa sig vara hllbara.
In other cases the planning and appraisal were of good quality. 
I andra fall var planeringen och bedmningen kvalitativt hgtstende.
These were often the less sophisticated projects, such as water points with hand pumps which followed on as continuations or extensions of projects which had been started/implemented before SIA under already existing rehabilitation programmes and co-financing. 
Detta gllde ofta fr de projekt som inte var s invecklade, ssom vattenposter med handpumpar som utgjorde en fortsttning p eller utvidgning av projekt som inletts/genomfrts fre SIA inom ramen fr redan befintliga terhmtningsprogram och samfinansiering.
The mid-term evaluation for Haiti described the selection of actions as ÔexemplaryŐ. 
Bedmningen efter halva tiden fr Haiti beskrev urvalet av insatser som exemplariskt.
Due to the use of many NGOs, the existence of several donors and the lack of proper coordination in all the countries, the system of planning and location of projects was rather fragmented and unintegrated. 
P grund av utnyttjandet av mnga enskilda organisationer, de mnga bistndsgivarna och bristen p samordning i alla lnder var systemet fr planering och lokalisering av projekt relativt splittrat och oenhetligt.
This led to parallel implementing structures, procurement systems and reporting systems at national level. 
Detta ledde till parallella strukturer fr genomfrande, inkpssystem och rapporteringssystem p nationell niv.
Furthermore, projects were often too scattered to allow a country-wide impact. 
Dessutom var projekten ofta alltfr splittrade fr att f landsomfattande verkningar.
Involvement of beneficiaries 64. 
Stdmottagarnas deltagande 64.
The local (grass-roots) involvement of the beneficiaries in decisionmaking and implementation is a precondition for most aid programmes. 
Stdmottagarnas deltagande i beslutsfattande och genomfrande p lokal (grsrots-)niv r en frutsttning fr de flesta bistndsprogram.
Such involvement takes, and should be allowed to take time to have a chance of success and sustainability. Unfor- 
Ett dylikt deltagande tar tid, och br ven f gra detta fr att programmet skall ha en chans att lyckas och ge
In Ethiopia and Eritrea, the governments and local authorities have been more involved in both the implementation and the monitoring processes. 
I Etiopien och Eritrea har regeringen och de lokala myndigheterna deltagit bde i genomfrande-och vervakningsfrfarandet i strre utstrckning.
Government involvement has sometimes been considered too time consuming by the Delegations. 
Delegationerna har ibland ansett inblandning av regeringen vara alltfr tidsdande.
The generally acknowledged role of NGOs working in developing countries is to act as a facilitator during the implementation of projects. 
Den allmnt erknda rollen fr enskilda organisationer som arbetar i utvecklingslnder r att fungera som en underlttande faktor under genomfrandet av projekt.
This makes successful transfer of knowledge and sustainability of the actions less likely. 
Detta minskar sannolikheten fr en framgngsrik verfring av kunskap och fr att tgrdernas verkningar skall bli varaktiga.
It has also created tensions with local authorities who normally are in favour of using as few expatriates as possible. 
Det har ven lett till spnningar med lokala myndigheter, som vanligtvis fresprkar att s f utlandsstationerade tjnstemn som mjligt anvnds.
In Haiti beneficiaries of some agricultural projects were asked to participate in projects of which they did not know the final aim, the expected results, management modalities and financial arrangements. 
I Haiti ombads vissa mottagare av std frn jordbruksprojekt att delta i projekt vars slutliga syfte, frvntade resultat, frvaltningssystem och finansiella arrangemang de inte knde till.
Involvement of the population in decision-making and reception/evaluation of the results has not been established and NGOsŐ project proposals are too often vague on this subject (1). 
Inv-narnas deltagande i beslutsfattande och mottagande/utvrdering av resultaten har inte faststllts och de enskilda organisationernas frslag r ofta alltfr vaga p denna punkt (1).