natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
A frequent type of reprogramming of OPs is to transfer a financial allocation between OPs or priority axes within OPs. 
En vanlig typ av ndring av operativa program r verfring av anslag mellan operativa program eller insatsomrden inom operativa program.
In general, a 2007BG161PO005 2007CZ05UPO001 2007CZ161PO004 2007CZ161PO006 2007ES16UPO001 2007ES16UPO003 2007IT051PO002 2007IT161PO007 2007IT161PO008 2007IT161PO011 2007HU161PO002 2007HU161PO006 2007HU161PO007 2007RO051PO001 2007RO161PO002 2007RO161PO004 2007SK05UPO001 2007SK161PO004 2007SK161PO006 Number of versions 
2007BG161PO005 2007CZ05UPO001 2007CZ161PO004 2007CZ161PO006 2007ES16UPO001 2007ES16UPO003 2007IT051PO002 2007IT161PO007 2007IT161PO008 2007IT161PO011 2007HU161PO002 2007HU161PO006 2007HU161PO007 2007RO051PO001 2007RO161PO002 2007RO161PO004 2007SK05UPO001 2007SK161PO004 2007SK161PO006 Antal versioner
Nine out of the 20 OPs in our sample transferred funds to or received funds from other OPs. 
I nio av de 20 operativa programmen i vrt urval verfrde man medel till eller tog emot medel frn andra operativa program.
For most OPs (eight out of the nine), the transfer was less than 10 % of the initial EU contribution to the OP. 
I merparten av de operativa programmen (tta av de nio) var verfringen mindre n 10 % av deras ursprungliga EU-bidrag.
However, for one Slovak OP ŇCompetitiveness and Economic GrowthÓ, the EU contribution to the OP increased by 25.4 %. 
Men till ett slovakiskt operativt program, ÓKonkurrenskraft och ekonomisk tillvxtÓ, kade EU:s bidrag med 25,4 %.
Member States also transferred funding between priority axes, which in some cases resulted in significant changes from the initially programmed amounts (see Box 4). 
Medlemsstaterna frde ocks ver medel mellan insatsomrden, vilket i en del fall resulterade i betydande ndringar jmfrt med de ursprungligen planerade beloppen (se ruta 4).
In one Hungarian OP changes in the financial allocation did not result in a change in the target value of the performance indicator (see Box 5). 
I ett ungerskt operativt program resulterade inte ndringar av anslagen i ngon ndring av mlvrdet fr resultatindikatorn (se ruta 5).
33 Box 4 - Significant transfers of EU contributions between priority axes For a Czech ERDF OP ŇEnterprise and InnovationÓ funding for Priority 3.2 ŇDevelopment of CompaniesÓ was increased by 52.2 % (from 663 million to over 1 billion euros) and for Priority 3.4 ŇInnovationÓ by 35.8 % (from 680.1 million to 923.7 million euros) to accelerate absorption. 
34 Ruta 4 Đ Betydande verfringar av EU-bidrag mellan insatsomrden I det tjeckiska operativa programmet Ófretag och innovationerÓ inom Eruf kades medlen till prioritering 3.2 ÓfretagsutvecklingÓ med 52,2 % (frn 663 miljoner euro till ver 1 miljard euro) och till prioritering 3.4 ÓinnovationÓ med 35,8 % (frn 680,1 miljoner euro till 923,7 miljoner euro) fr att pskynda utnyttjandet.
For Italian ERDF OP ŇSicilyÓ funding for Priority 6 ŇSustainable Urban DevelopmentÓ increased by 17.5 % (from 539.5 to 634 million euros) to help speed up absorption. 
I det italienska operativa programmet ÓSicilienÓ inom Eruf kades medlen till prioritering 6 Óhllbar stadsutvecklingÓ med 17,5 % (frn 539,5 till 634 miljoner euro) fr att pskynda utnyttjandet.
Box 5 Đ Significant transfers of EU contribution between priority axes without proportional adjustment of target value of the performance indicator The Hungarian ERDF OP for Environment and Energy was revised four times. In 2012, a transfer was made from another OP, whereas in 2013, 2015 and 2016, transfers between priority axes were made. 
Ruta 5 Đ Betydande verfringar av EU-bidrag mellan insatsomrden utan motsvarande justering av mlvrdet fr resultatindikatorn Det ungerska operativa programmet fr milj och energi inom Eruf sgs ver fyra gnger. r 2012 gjordes en verfring frn ett annat operativt program, medan verfringar mellan insatsomrden gjordes 2013, 2015 och 2016.
Funds were reallocated to priorities with projects which could be implemented faster. 
Medel omfrdelades till prioriteringar med projekt som kunde genomfras snabbare.
As a result the EU contribution to Priority 5 ŇEfficient Energy UseÓ was increased by 390 % (from 131.2 to 642.6 million euros). 
Det ledde till att EU:s bidrag till prioritering 5 Óeffektiv energianvndningÓ kades med 390 % (frn 131,2 till 642,6 miljoner euro).
At the same time, the target value for the indicator Ôenergy resources saved through energy efficiencyŐ was reduced in 2012 to less than a third from 11 to 2.7 petajoules per year, but was not reviewed when additional funding was allocated to the priority axis. 
Samtidigt minskades 2012 mlvrdet fr indikatorn Óenergiresurser som sparats genom energieffektivitetÓ till mindre n en tredjedel, frn 11 till 2,7 petajoule per r, men det sgs inte ver nr ytterligare finansiering frdelades till insatsomrdet.
The examples above illustrate that the focus on absorption and spending the money fast pose a risk to achieving better results when disbursing EU funds. 
Exemplen ovan visar att fokus p anslagsutnyttjande och snabb anvndning av pengarna medfr en risk fr att de bsta resultaten inte uppns nr EU-medlen betalas ut.
Increasing the EU co-financing rate boosts absorption but reduces the value that can be obtained from EU funds 54. 
En kning av EU:s medfinansieringssats driver p utnyttjandet men minskar det vrde som kan uppns med EU-medlen 54.
Increasing the EU co-financing rate helps Member States speed up the absorption rate and reduces the amount of funds at risk of de-commitment. 
Att ka EU:s medfinansieringssats hjlper medlemsstaterna att pskynda utnyttjandet och minskar de belopp som riskerar att tertas.
In this way, a Member State can be reimbursed at the revised rate for all previously declared expenditure. 
P det viset kan en medlemsstat f alla tidigare redovisade utgifter ersatta till den ndrade satsen.
Increasing the co-financing rate allows the immediate and quick absorption of funds with retroactive effect. 
En kning av medfinansieringssatsen gr att medel omedelbart och snabbt kan utnyttjas med retroaktiv verkan.
An increase in the co-financing rate eases pressure on the national budget as the Member StateŐs initial planned contribution to the OP is reduced, however it reduces the overall value of the OP. 
En kning av medfinansieringssatsen minskar trycket p den nationella budgeten, eftersom medlemsstatens ursprungligen planerade bidrag till det operativa programmet minskar, men den minskar det operativa programmets vergripande vrde.
This means that the scale (number or size) of the interventions is also reduced, unless Member States continue to invest the funding originally planned at national level. 
Det betyder att insatsernas omfattning (antal eller storlek) ocks minskar, svida inte medlemsstaterna fortstter att investera de medel som ursprungligen planerats p nationell niv.
As a result this may have a negative impact on objectives and results that can be achieved by the OPs which in turn affects the value that can be achieved by the disbursed EU funds. 
Detta kan f en negativ effekt p de ml och resultat som kan uppns genom de operativa programmen, vilket i sin tur pverkar det vrde som kan uppns genom de utbetalade EU-medlen.
More than half of the OPs in our sample (11 OPs out of 20) were programmed from the start at the maximum EU co-financing rate laid down in the Regulation43. 
Mer n hlften av de operativa programmen i vrt urval (11 av 20) planerades frn brjan med EU:s hgsta medfinansieringssats enligt frordningen43.
For eight OPs, the co-financing rate was increased during the period. 
I tta operativa program kades medfinansieringssatsen under perioden.
Table 2 shows the increase in the EU co-financing rate and the decrease in the national contribution. 
Tabell 2 visar kningen av EU:s medfinansieringssats och minskningen av det nationella bidraget.
For these eight OPs the total reduced national contribution amounts to 4.8 billion euros. 
Fr dessa tta operativa program uppgr det totala minskade nationella bidraget till 4,8 miljarder euro.
34 43 Annex III to Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. 
35 43 Bilaga III till frordning (EG) nr 1083/2006.
Table 2 Đ Decrease in national contribution as a result of increase in the co-financing rate 35 Member State Operational Programme Initial EU co-financing rate (in %) Revised EU co-financing rate (in %) Decrease of national contribution (in million euro) Romania Environment 80 85 302.1 Bulgaria Environment 81 85 75.5 Spain Research, Development and Innovation (R&D&I) for and by Enterprises Đ Technology Fund 67 75 356.8 Knowledge-based economy 70 80 259.0 Italy Calabria FSE 50 75 286.8 Security for development 50 75 386.0 Calabria 50 75 999.4 Sicily 50 75 2 179.8 Total 4 845.4 Note: The regulatory maximum EU co-financing rate is 85 % for Bulgaria and Romania, 80 % for Spain and 75 % for Italy. Source: ECA. 
Tabell 2 Đ Minskning av det nationella bidraget till fljd av kad medfinansiering 36 Medlemsstat Operativt program Ursprunglig EU-medfinansierings- sats (i %) ndrad EU-medfinansierings- sats (i %) Minskning av det nationella bidraget (miljoner euro) Rumnien Milj 80 85 302,1 Bulgarien Milj 81 85 75,5 Spanien Forskning, utveckling och innovation (FoU och innovation) fr och av fretag Đ teknikfonden 67 75 356,8 Kunskapsbaserad ekonomi 70 80 259,0 Italien Kalabrien ESF 50 75 286,8 Skerhet fr utveckling 50 75 386,0 Kalabrien 50 75 999,4 Sicilien 50 75 2 179,8 Totalt 4 845,4 Obs.: Den lagstadgade hgsta EU-medfinansieringssatsen r 85 % fr Bulgarien och Rumnien, 80 % fr Spanien och 75 % fr Italien.
Member States introduced private contributions to increase their rates of absorption, but this also resulted in reduced interventions 57. 
Medlemsstaterna infrde privata bidrag fr att ka sina utnyttjandegrader, men det ledde ocks till frre insatser 57.
The Member StatesŐ share of national co-financing may either be provided through a national public contribution only or may also contain a private contribution. 
Medlemsstaternas nationella medfinansiering kan antingen best av enbart ett nationellt offentligt bidrag eller ocks innehlla ett privat bidrag.
Where the programme contains a private contribution, the OP financing plan44 takes into account the funding provided by private sector grant recipients. 58. 
Nr programmet innehller ett privat bidrag ska finansieringsplanen44 fr det operativa programmet inkludera de medel som tillhandahlls av bidragsmottagarna i den privata sektorn.
An increase in private contributions can help absorb funding quicker as they complement national public expenditure to be reimbursed as part of EU co-financing and/or replace the national public contribution needed to match the EU co-financing. 
58. kade privata bidrag kan bidra till ett snabbare anslagsutnyttjande eftersom de kompletterar nationella offentliga utgifter som ska ersttas som ett led i EU:s medfinansiering och/eller erstter det nationella offentliga bidrag som behvs fr att matcha EU:s medfinansiering.
The effect is immediate and has a one-off positive impact on absorption of EU funds by increasing the amount of eligible expenditure available for reimbursement. 
Effekten r omedelbar och har en positiv engngseffekt p utnyttjandet av EU-medel genom att det belopp fr stdberttigande utgifter som finns tillgngligt fr ersttning kar.
However, since part of the private contribution is expenditure that would have been incurred irrespective of the public contribution, the replacement of the public contribution with the private reduces overall the 44 Article 37(e) of Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. Member StatesŐ investment. 
Men eftersom en del av det privata bidraget r utgifter som 44 Artikel 37 e i frordning (EG) nr 1083/2006. hade uppkommit oavsett det offentliga bidraget, innebr det faktum att det offentliga bidraget erstts av ett privat bidrag att medlemsstaternas totala investering minskar.
As indicated above (see paragraph 55) this reduces the scale of intervention to achieve the Cohesion policy objectives. 
Ssom ppekades ovan (se punkt 55) minskar detta omfattningen p insatsen fr att n de sammanhllningspolitiska mlen.
At the start of the programme period none of the 20 OPs in our sample included a private component in their OP financing plan. 
I brjan av programperioden innehll inte den ursprungliga finansieringsplanen fr ngot av de 20 operativa programmen i vrt urval en privat komponent.
By the end of the programme period five OPs introduced a private contribution, thereby reducing the national public contribution at the same time. 
I slutet av programperioden infrde fem operativa program ett privat bidrag och minskade drigenom samtidigt det nationella bidraget.
Table 3 shows the private contribution introduced and the theoretical EU contribution that this could release. 
Tabell 3 visar det privata bidrag som infrdes och det teoretiska EU-bidrag som detta skulle kunna frigra.
Table 3 Đ Private contribution replacing the public contribution and theoretical EU contribution generated 36 Member State OP Private contribution introduced (million euro) Co-financing rate (%) Theoretical EU contribution generated by private contribution (million euro) Spain Research, Development and Innovation (R&D&I) for and by Enterprises Đ Technology Fund 500.5 75 375.4 Czech Republic Enterprises and Innovations 472.5 85 401.6 Environment 97.2 85 82.7 Hungary Environment and Energy 85.1 85 72.3 North Hungary 54.2 85 46.0 Note: The theoretical EU contribution generated by including private expenditure is calculated by applying the EU co-financing rate to the private contribution. 
Tabell 3 Đ Privata bidrag som erstter det offentliga bidraget och teoretiskt EU-bidrag som genereras 37 Medlemsstat Operativt program Privat bidrag (miljoner euro) Medfinansieringssats (%) Teoretiskt EU-bidrag som genererats av privata bidrag (miljoner euro) Spanien Forskning, utveckling och innovation (FoU och innovation) fr och av fretag Đ teknikfonden 500,5 75 375,4 Tjeckien Fretag och innovationer 472,5 85 401,6 Milj 97,2 85 82,7 Ungern Milj och energi 85,1 85 72,3 Norra Ungern 54,2 85 46,0 Obs.: Det teoretiska EU-bidrag som genereras av inkludering av privata utgifter berknas genom att EU:s medfinansieringssats tillmpas p det privata bidraget.
The final contribution generated by private expenditure will be known only at the time of closure. 
Det slutliga bidrag som genereras av privata utgifter blir knt frst vid avslutandet.
Phasing of projects reduces the risk of de-commitment if projects are not entirely completed at closure 60. 
Fasindelning av projekt minskar risken fr tertagande om projekt inte har slutfrts helt vid avslutandet 60.
The 2007-2013 regulatory framework provided for the implementation of a major project45 over two programme periods, i.e. dividing a project into two stages, between the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 programme periods 46. 
I den rttsliga ramen fr 2007Đ2013 faststlldes att strre projekt45 skulle genomfras under tv programperioder, det vill sga att de skulle delas upp i tv etapper mellan programperioderna 2007Đ2013 och 2014Đ202046.
Although the General Regulation provided only for the phasing of major projects, the CommissionŐs closure guidelines went even further, extending the principle of phasing to non-major projects with a value of at least 5 million euros 47. 
Trots att den allmnna frordningen freskrev att endast strre projekt skulle fasindelas gick kommissionens riktlinjer fr avslutande nnu lngre och utvidgade principen till projekt med ett vrde p minst 5 miljoner euro47.
The benefit of phasing is that it reduces the risk that on-going major projects which are non-functional by 31 March 2017 (i.e. the date for submitting closure documents), or by 31 March 2019 at the very latest48, are considered ineligible and the corresponding EU funding is not used. 
Frdelen med fasindelning r att det minskar risken fr att pgende strre projekt som inte fungerar den 31 mars 2017 (dvs. sista datum fr att lmna in avslutandedokument) eller senast den 31 mars 201948 anses icke stdberttigande och att motsvarande EU-medel inte anvnds.
Nine out of 1449 OPs in our sample opted to phase major projects or projects above 5 million euros. 
Nio av 1449 operativa program i vrt urval valde att genomfra strre projekt eller projekt p ver 5 miljoner euro i faser.
The use of phasing reduced the risk of EU co-financing for these projects of 4.5 billion euros (3.8 billion euros for major projects and 0.7 billion euros for non-major projects over 5 million euros) would not be used in the 2007-2013 programme period. 
Fasindelningen minskade risken fr att EU-medfinansieringen till dessa projekt p 4,5 miljarder euro (3,8 miljarder euro till strre projekt och 0,7 miljarder euro till projekt p ver 5 miljoner euro) inte skulle utnyttjas under programperioden 2007Đ2013.
While phasing is beneficial to absorption and acknowledges that on-going project implementation does not stop at programme end, a recent audit revealed that phasing in Major projects comprise an economically indivisible series of works, activities or services fulfilling a precise technical function and having clearly identified aims and whose total cost exceeds 50 million euro, or 75 million euro in the case of a transport project. 
Genomfrandet i faser r positivt fr utnyttjandet och ett konstaterande av att det pgende projektgenomfrandet inte upphr vid programmets slut, men en revision nyligen Strre projekt bestr av ett antal ur ekonomisk synpunkt odelbara arbeten, aktiviteter eller tjnster som fyller en precis, teknisk funktion och har tydligt angivna syften och vilkas totala kostnad verstiger 50 miljoner euro, eller 75 miljoner euro nr det gller ett transportprojekt.
Article 40(d) of Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. 
Artikel 40 d i frordning (EG) nr 1083/2006.
Fourteen out of 20 OPs in our sample had major projects or projects over 5 million euro. 
14 av de 20 operativa programmen i vrt urval hade strre projekt eller projekt p ver 5 miljoner euro.
37 45 46 47 48 49 
38 45 46 47 48 49
Retrospective projects were used to absorb EU funding but represent a considerable risk of deadweight 63. 
Retroaktiva projekt anvndes till att utnyttja EU-medel men innebr en betydande risk fr ddviktseffekter 63.
Retrospective projects or operations are those which have incurred expenditure or are completed before EU co-financing has been formally applied for or awarded, i.e. they are financed retrospectively. 
Retroaktiva projekt eller insatser r projekt eller insatser som har haft utgifter eller som slutfrs innan man formellt har anskt om eller beviljats EU-medfinansiering, det vill sga att de finansieras retroaktivt.
Retrospective projects are another means of absorbing funding by creating additional new expenditure or by substituting ineligible expenditure. 
Retroaktiva projekt r ett annat stt att utnyttja medel genom att skapa fler nya utgifter eller byta ut icke stdberttigande utgifter.
There are clear risks to value for money with retrospective projects as they are often selected, initiated or carried out without having been expressly linked to a programmeŐs objectives or to specific legal requirements linked to EU assistance. 
Det finns uppenbara risker att man inte fr valuta fr pengarna med retroaktiva projekt eftersom de ofta vljs ut, inleds eller genomfrs utan en tydlig koppling till ett programs ml eller till specifika rttsliga krav fr att f EU-std.
In its guidance on retrospective EU assistance51 the Commission discourages their use as they entail a high risk of non-compliance with the relevant Union and national rules. 
I sin vgledning om retroaktivt EU-std51 avrder kommissionen frn anvndning av dem eftersom de medfr en stor risk fr att tillmpliga EU-regler och nationella regler inte fljs.
It also poses a risk of deadweight, since these projects would have been implemented even without the EU funding. 
Det finns ven en risk fr ddviktseffekter eftersom dessa projekt ocks skulle ha genomfrts utan EU-finansieringen.
Of the four Member States we visited, three (Italy, Hungary and Romania) stated that they used retrospective projects (see Box 6). 
Av de fyra medlemsstater som vi beskte uppgav tre (Italien, Ungern och Rumnien) att de anvnde retroaktiva projekt (se ruta 6).
Box 6 Đ Use of retrospective projects and expenditure The Managing Authority for the Italian OP ŇSiciliaÓ indicated that in 2014 total eligible cost for retrospective projects amounted to 437.3 million euros. 
Ruta 6 Đ Anvndning av retroaktiva projekt och utgifter Den frvaltande myndigheten fr det italienska operativa programmet ÓSicilienÓ frklarade att den totala stdberttigande kostnaden fr retroaktiva projekt uppgick till 437,3 miljoner euro 2014.
For 2015 it estimated that such expenditure would potentially amount to 250 million euros. 
Fr 2015 uppskattade den att utgifterna skulle kunna uppg till 250 miljoner euro.
50 Special Report No 36/16 ŇAn assessment of the arrangements for closure of the 2007-2013 cohesion and rural development programmesÓ, Table 5. 
Se tabell 5 i srskild rapport nr 36/16 En bedmning av arrangemangen fr avslutande av sammanhllnings-och landsbygdsutvecklingsprogrammen 2007Đ2013.
Member States are not obliged to report to the Commission on the expenditure declared retrospectively. 
Medlemsstaterna r inte skyldiga att rapportera till kommissionen om de utgifter som redovisats retroaktivt.
As a result, the Commission is not aware of the volume and financial impact of expenditure declared retrospectively, despite the clear risks to such funding. 
Drfr knner kommissionen inte till storleken p och de finansiella effekterna av utgifter som redovisas retroaktivt, trots de uppenbara riskerna med dem.
Our work undertaken for the statement of assurance shows that many Member States use retrospective expenditure and that EU co-financing of retrospective projects is likely to be significant for the 2007-2013 period. 
Vrt arbete infr revisionsfrklaringen visar att mnga medlemsstater anvnder retroaktiva utgifter och att EU:s medfinansiering av retroaktiva projekt sannolikt kommer att vara betydande perioden 2007Đ2013.
As part of our work for the 2015 Annual Report, we identified errors relating to expenditure on retrospective projects (see Box 7). 
Under vrt arbete med rsrapporten fr 2015 identifierade vi fel avseende utgifter fr retroaktiva projekt (se ruta 7).
Box 7 Đ Ineligible expenditure incurred by retrospective project An Italian project to improve the sewage system in a municipality was approved and financed with national resources. 
40 Ruta 7 Đ Icke stdberttigande utgifter i retroaktiva projekt Ett italienskt projekt fr att frbttra avloppssystemet i en kommun godkndes och finansierades med nationella resurser.
The project expenditure amounting to 2.5 million euros was subsequently included under the OP ŇCampaniaÓ as a project for retrospective co-financing. 
Projektutgifterna p 2,5 miljoner euro inkluderades senare i det operativa programmet ÓKampanienÓ som ett projekt fr retroaktiv finansiering.
During our audit, we identified a change in the scope of a public procurement contract resulting in a breach of the relevant provisions. 
Under revisionen konstaterade vi att ett offentligt upphandlingskontrakts omfattning hade ndrats, vilket resulterade i en vertrdelse av de gllande bestmmelserna.
Consequently, nearly 30 % of the declared expenditure was considered ineligible and should have not been declared for co-financing. 
Nstan 30 % av de redovisade utgifterna ansgs drfr icke stdberttigande och skulle inte ha redovisats fr medfinansiering.
Operations (consisting of one or several projects) that have started to 52 Paragraph 6.19 of the 2008 annual report, Chapter 6 ŇCohesionÓ. 
Insatser (bestende av ett eller flera projekt) som har brjat ha utgifter 52 Punkt 6.19 i kapitel 6 Sammanhllning i rsrapporten fr 2008.