natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The three new Member States added another 14 million tonnes, so that global production in the EU 15 reached 205,3 million tonnes in 1996/1997 and stayed at approximately the same level in the following marketing year. 
De tre nya medlemsstaterna tillfrde ytterligare 14 miljoner ton s att den sammanlagda produktionen inom EU-15 under 1996/97 ndde 205,3 miljoner ton och lg kvar p ungefr samma niv under det pfljande regleringsret.
In 1998/1999, a new record harvest in the EU 15 of 208 million tonnes has been reached. 
En ny rekordskrd p 208 miljoner ton har uppntts i EU-15 fr 1998/99.
The introduction of a single aid rate for oilseeds and cereals, as suggested in Agenda 2000, runs the risk of oilseeds being partly replaced by cereals, as the crop yields and prices of the latter are higher than those of oilseeds. 4.7. 
Om en enhetlig stdsats infrs fr oljevxter och spannml ssom fresls i Agenda 2000, finns en risk att oljevxterna delvis erstts med spannml, eftersom bde avkastning och pris fr den senare ligger hgre n fr oljevxter.
This global situation hides quite different developments within the Member States (see Table 4). 
4.7 Bakom den vergripande situationen dljer sig en mycket olikartad utveckling i skilda medlemslnder (se tabell 4).
The relative stability of total production during the transitional period was due to the fact that the significant increase in German production by comparison with the pre-reform 1989-1992 period was counterbalanced by a corresponding decrease in Spain (drought) and France. 
Den sammanlagda produktionens relativa stabilitet under vergngstiden berodde p att den tyska produktionens avsevrda kning jmfrt med perioden 1989Ń92 fre reformen uppvgdes av en motsvarande nedgng i Spanien (torka) och Frankrike.
In the first two years of full application of the reform (1996-1997) France and Spain returned to pre-reform production levels, while GermanyŐs rising trend continued. 
Under de frsta tv ren d reformen tillmpades fullt ut (1996Ń97) gick Frankrike och Spanien tillbaka till produktionsniverna fre reformen, medan Tysklands stigande trend fortsatte.
This shows that, had it not been for the exceptionally unfavourable production conditions in Spain and France, the observed jump in total production would already have occurred during the transitional period. 
Detta visar att om inte produktionsfrhllandena i Spanien och Frankrike hade varit ovanligt ogynnsamma s skulle den konstaterade stegringen i den sammanlagda produktionen redan ha intrffat under vergngstiden.
Given the fact that cereal yields are continually increasing, the main means of limiting production is by imposing compulsory set-aside. 
4.8 Mot bakgrund av att spannmlsavkastningen kontinuerligt kar, r bsta sttet att begrnsa produktionen att infra ett obligatoriskt uttag av mark.
Indeed, since set-aside was introduced, it has reduced production by about 86 million tonnes in total (between 1993 and 1997). 
Sedan man brjat med uttag av mark har det i sjlva verket minskat produktionen med sammanlagt cirka 86 miljoner ton (mellan 1993 och 1997).
The argument that world prices that were temporarily higher than internal prices would cause supply shortages in the EU led to the set-aside rate being reduced from 15 % to 12 % in the third year of the reform. 
Argumentet att vrldsmarknadspriserna som fr en kort tid lg hgre n priserna p den inre marknaden skulle resultera i utbudsbrist inom EU ledde till att stdsatsen fr uttag av mark snktes frn 15 % till 12 % under reformens tredje r.
In the fourth year the rate went down to 10 % and was then fixed at 5 % for the 1997/1998 and 1998/1999 marketing years. 
Under fjrde ret sjnk satsen till 10 % och faststlldes sedan till 5 % fr regleringsren 1997/98 och 1998/99.
When compared with a production of more than 200 million tonnes (1997/1998), the effect of such a low set-aside rate is minimal. 
Effekterna av en s lg stdsats fr uttag av mark r minimala om de jmfrs med en produktion p ver 200 miljoner ton (1997/98).
However, it also becomes clear that reducing production to levels closer to internal-market needs (i.e. at present, a reduction of about 30 million tonnes would be required) by means of set-aside alone may call for drastic set-aside levels, which would encourage farmers to further intensify production on the remaining land thus offsetting the intended reduction of production. 4.9. 
Emellertid r det ocks tydligt att en minskning av produktionen till en niv som bttre motsvarar den inre marknadens behov (fr nrvarande skulle en minskning p cirka 30 miljoner ton behvas) enbart genom uttag av mark kan komma att krva drastiska uttagsniver, vilket skulle fungera som ett incitament fr jordbrukarna att ytterligare intensifiera produktionen p den mark som r kvar i bruk och drmed uppvga den avsedda produktionsminskningen.
In addition, the set-aside rates are submitted for a Council decision one year in advance and are based on an estimated cereals balance of marketing year n and projected figures for marketing years n+ 1 and n+ 2. 
4.9 Dessutom framlggs stdsatsen fr uttag av mark fr rdet fr beslut ett r i frvg, och baseras p en uppskattad spann-mlsrest frn regleringsr n och prognosticerade siffror fr regleringsren n+1 och n+2.
However, at the end of marketing year n (in June) the Commission will not have reliable information on the year concerned (reliable Eurostat figures are available only two years later), nor can the future situation be forecast with sufficient accuracy. 
Emellertid har kommissionen i slutet av regleringsr n (i juni) inte tillgng till tillfrlitlig information om ret i frga (tillfrlitliga data frn Eurostat blir tillgngliga frst tv r senare), och den framtida situationen kan inte heller frutses med tillrcklig precision.
The arbitrariness of this system was revealed in 1997, when the Council demanded that the Commission present a proposal fixing the set-aside rate at 5 % (17). 
Systemets godtycklighet framkom 1997, d rdet bad kommissionen framlgga ett frslag som bestmde en stdsats fr uttag av mark p 5 % (17).
(17) Council document No 9462/97 of 27 June 1997, compromise package on prime and related amounts for 1997/1998. 
(17) Rdets dokument nr 9462/97 av den 27 juni 1997, Kompromissen om krispaketet och de drmed sammanhngande tgrderna.
If figures subsequently proved incorrect, the system would be destabilised rather than stabilised and a supply shortage or surplus could result. 
Om siffrorna senare visade sig vara felaktiga skulle systemet destabiliseras istllet fr att stabili-seras, och resultatet skulle kunna bli ett utbudsunderskott eller -verskott.
Indeed, at the end of the 1997/1998 marketing year the low set-aside rate of 5 % again led to higher production and resulted in intervention stocks amounting to 14,5 million tonnes, the second highest level since the 1993 to 1994 period. 
Mycket riktigt ledde den lga stdsatsen fr uttag av mark p 5 % i slutet av regleringsret 1997/98 n en gng till hgre produktion och resulterade i interventionslager p sammanlagt 14,5 miljoner ton, den nst hgsta nivn sedan perioden 1993Ń94.
Based on the production for 1998 to 1999 (see paragraph 4.6), intervention stocks may again reach pre-reform levels. 4.14. 
Med utgngspunkt i produktionen fr 1998Ń99 (se punkt 4.6) kan interventionslagren terigen n samma niver som fre reformen.
The comparison shows that Community cereals benefited by increased production of animal feed. 
4.14 Denna jmfrelse visar att gemenskapsspannmlen gynnades av den kade produktionen av djurfoder.
However, the change in the composition of animal feed also shows how readily one ingredient may be substituted with another, when relative prices change. 
Emellertid visar frndringen i djurfodrets sammansttning ocks hur snabbt en bestndsdel kan bytas ut mot en annan d de inbrdes priserna frndras.
Prices Producer prices 4.15. One of the principles on which the CAP was founded at the Stresa Conference was that of a Single Market. 
Priser Producentpriser 4.15 En av de principer som den gemensamma jordbrukspolitiken grundades p vid Stresakonferensen var principen om en Óenhetlig marknadÓ.
Price support was organised on the unjustified assumption that a single market would require, inter alia, uniform prices (19). 
Prisstdet utformades p det ogrundade antagandet att en enhetlig marknad bland annat erfordrar enhetliga priser (19).
However, a single price for cereals is not a condition for a single market; it would occur only if cereals were a homogeneous product traded under conditions of perfect competition. 
Ett enhetligt spannmlspris r emellertid inte ett villkor fr en enhetlig marknad. Detta skulle endast intrffa om spannml vore en homogen produkt som handlades under perfekta konkurrensfrhllanden.
Reality proved and continues to be different (20). 
Verkligheten visade sig vara annorlunda, och r s fortfarande (20).
The market prices of the various cereals and of the different qualities of any one cereal varied between and within Member States within the margin between artificial target and intervention prices. 
Marknadspriserna fr de olika spannmlsslagen och fr de olika kvaliteterna av samtliga spannmlsslag varierade mellan och inom medlemsstaterna inom den marginal som finns mellan de konstgjorda rikt-och interventionspriserna.
Trade is organised by a very limited number of large trading companies, hence the primary market meets the criteria governing an oligopsony, rather than those for perfect competition. 
Handeln organiseras av ett mycket begrnsat antal stora handelsfretag. Den primra marknaden uppfyller drfr kriterierna fr en oligopsoni snarare n kriterierna fr perfekt konkurrens.
Intervention in the form of public storage was needed to keep prices high via the artificial reduction of market supply. 
Intervention i form av offentlig lagring blev ndvndig fr att hlla priserna uppe genom en konstgjord minskning av utbudet p marknaden.
Because intervention suppressed the price signals which would have transferred supplies from areas with surpluses to those with shortage, regional imbalances in cereal supplies had to be redressed by means of transfers of intervention cereals organised by the Commission at high cost. 
Eftersom interventionen undertryckte de prissignaler som skulle ha verfrt lager frn verskottsomrden till underskottsomrden, var man tvungen att rtta till obalanserna i spannmlsutbudet genom verflyttning av interventionsspannml som organiserades av kommissionen till hg kostnad.
The introduction in 1992 of a single target and a single intervention price for all kinds of cereals, albeit at a lower level, did nothing to make the COM work better. 
Infrandet av ett enhetligt riktpris och ett enhetligt interventionspris fr alla spannmlsslag 1992 gjorde inte att den gemensamma organisationen av marknaden fungerade bttre, ven om priserna lg p en lgre niv.
4.16. On the basis of the unrealistic assumption of uniform prices, it was expected that market prices would follow closely the reduction in institutional prices. 
4.16 Med utgngspunkt i det orealistiska antagandet om enhetliga priser frvntade man sig att marknadspriserna nra skulle flja de institutionella prisernas nedgng.
However, owing to bad harvests worldwide in 1994 and 1995, world market prices remained exceptionally high. 
Emellertid lg vrldsmarknadspriserna p grund av dliga skrdar ver hela vrlden 1994 och 1995 kvar p en exceptionellt hg niv.
Consequently, EU market prices also remained well above the new target price. Graph 1 illustrates this with regard (19) Commission, Documentation Europenne Priodique 6/1982: La politique agricole de la Communaut europenne, troisime dition, Luxem-Consumption 4.11. 
Diagram 1 illustrerar detta nr det gller de genomsnitt-(19) Kommissionen, Documentation Europenne Priodique 6/1982: ÓLa politique agricole de la Communaut europenneÓ, troisime dition, 20 Luxembourg ISBN 92Ń825Ń3001Ń8, s.15. () Tangermann Stefan, Eurostat, ÓAgricultural price trends in the ECÓ, Konsumtion 4.11 Tabell 1 visar en tydlig kning av konsumtionen p den inre marknaden frn och med regleringsret 1993/94.
While average consumption in the four years before the reform was about 138 million tonnes, it increased within the EU 12 to 152,1 million tonnes in the four years after the reform. 
Den genomsnittliga konsumtionen lg p cirka 138 miljoner ton under de fyra ren fre reformen, och kade sedan till 152,1 miljoner ton inom EU-12 under de fyra ren efter reformen.
4.12. The greater proportion of Community cereals is used for animal feed (62 %) and the increase in internal consumption is due mainly to the fact that their use for animal feed and industrial purposes has increased. 
4.12 Strsta delen av gemenskapsspannmlen anvnds till djurfoder (62 %), och den kade konsumtionen p den inre marknaden beror frmst p att anvndningen av spannml till djurfoder och industriella ndaml har stigit. kningen frn de fyra ren som fregick reformen till de fyra ren efter uppgick till ungefr 12 % i genomsnitt.
Human consumption accounted for just 24 % of total consumption in 1996/1997. It rose by 6 % within the EU 12. 
Livsmedelskonsumtion utgjorde endast 24 % av den sammanlagda konsumtionen under 1996/97, och steg med 6 % inom EU-12.
The increasing use of Community cereals for animal feed is explained by the growing production of compound animal feed (11 % increase since 1992/1993) and the narrowing price gap between the price of Community cereals and the world market price for cereal substitutes (e.g. corn gluten, manioc, and sweet potatoes), which made EU cereals more competitive. 
4.13 Den kande anvndningen av gemenskapsspannml till djurfoder frklaras av den stigande produktionen av djurfoderblandningar (11 % kning sedan 1992/93) och den minskande prisskillnaden mellan gemenskapsspannmlen och vrldsmarknadspriset fr spannmlssubstitut (t.ex. majsgluten, maniok och stpotatis), vilket gjorde spannml frn EU mer konkurrenskraftig.
While in 1992 to 1993 the average price of cereal substitutes was just 68 % of the average price of cereals, the ratio increased to 83 % in 1996 to 1997. 
Under 1992Ń93 uppgick det genomsnittliga priset fr spannmlssubstitut endast till 68 % av det genomsnittliga spannmls-priset, men kade till 83 % under 1996Ń97.
The result was that in 1997 animal feed consisted of 55 % cereals, 20 % substitutes and 25 % of proteins. 
Till fljd av detta bestod djurfodret under 1997 till 55 % av spannml, till 20 % av substitut och till 25 % av protein.
In the year prior to the reform these ratios were 46 %, 26 % and 28 % (18) respectively. 
Under ren fre reformen lg dessa kvoter p 46 %, 26 % respektive 28 % (18).
Tangermann Stefan, Eurostat, Agricultural price trends in the EC, ISBN ( 18 ) DG VI working document VI-7316-96. 92-826-5049-9. 
( 18 ) Arbetsdokument frn GD VI, nr VI-7316Ń96. ISBN 92Ń826Ń5049Ń9.
8.7.1999 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 192/15 to the average producer prices for all cereals (unit values calculated by Eurostat). 
8.7.1999 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 192/15 liga producentpriserna fr samtliga spannmlsslag (enhetsvrden Konsumentpriser berknade av Eurostat).
Nevertheless, market prices in the various Member States did not follow this general trend to the same extent. 
4.17 Marknadspriserna i de olika medlemsstaterna fljde dock inte denna allmnna trend i samma utstrckning.
The market price for common wheat, the main cereal, remained quite high in Spain and Italy, and even above the average intervention price of ECU 155/t (21) in 1992, which was used as the reference level for the reform (see Graph 2). 
Marknadspriset fr vete, det viktigaste spannmlsslaget, lg kvar p en tmligen hg niv i Spanien och Italien och lg till och med ver det genomsnittliga interventionspriset p 155 ecu/ton (21) under 1992, vilket anvndes som referensniv fr reformen (se diagram 2).
In addition, currency movements worked against the drop of institutional prices in national currencies thus putting the level of price guarantee higher. 
Dessutom motverkade valutarrelser de institutionella prisernas nedgng i nationella valutor och hjde drmed nivn p prisga-rantin.
The high price levels in Italy and Spain are mainly due to the traditional supply deficit of home-grown cereals in these two Member StatesŐ markets. 
De hga prisniverna i Italien och Spanien beror frmst p den traditionella bristen p inhemskt odlad spannml p dessa bda medlemsstaters marknader.
The drought which hits Mediterranean countries every three or four years (Spain) and the initial set-aside (Italy) further aggravated the supply situation. 
Den torka som drabbar Medelhavslnderna vart tredje eller fjrde r (Spanien) och det ursprungliga uttaget av mark (Italien) frvrrade utbudssituationen ytterligare.
Low public stocks in the other Member States and relatively high transport costs in relation to cereal prices appear to have prevented cereals from other Member States from being put on the Spanish and Italian markets and thereby bringing prices down. 
De sm offentliga lagren i de andra medlemsstaterna och de relativt hga transportkostnaderna i frhllande till spannmlspriserna frefaller ha hindrat spannml frn andra medlemsstater att placeras p de spanska och italienska marknaderna och drigenom tvinga ner priserna.
The reform also equalised target and intervention prices for different cereals, even though market prices continued to vary quite substantially between one kind of cereal and another (see Graph 3). 
4.18 Reformen likstllde ocks rikt-och interventionspriserna fr olika spannmlsslag, ven om marknadspriserna fortsatte att variera ganska mycket mellan olika spannmlsslag (se diagram 3).
On average, durum wheat is the most expensive cereal on the market, being 40 % more expensive than the cheapest, rye. 
I genomsnitt r durumvete det dyraste spannmlsslaget p marknaden. Priset ligger 40 % hgre n fr den billigaste spannmlen, rg.
Owing to differing production structures and market situations, cereal prices also differ between Member States, as Table 5 shows. 
P grund av att produktionsstrukturerna och marknadssitua-tionerna skiljer sig t, varierar ocks spannmlspriserna mellan medlemsstaterna, vilket framgr av tabell 5.
In 1997 and 1998, owing to good harvests in Europe, cereal prices dropped to the intervention-price level and intervention buying recommenced. 
Under 1997 och 1998 sjnk spannmlspriserna p grund av goda skrdar i Europa till interventionsprisnivn och interventionskp inleddes terigen.
Under such conditions it is not the market which determines what cereal is produced, but the intervention price. 
Under sdana frhllanden r det inte marknaden som bestmmer vilket spannmlsslag som produceras, utan interventionspriset.
At this fixed price the farmer will choose the cereal which gives him the highest yield at the lowest production cost, irrespective of the level of market supply. 
Vid detta faststllda pris kommer jordbrukaren att vlja det spannmlsslag som ger honom hgsta avkastning till lgsta produktionskostnad, oavsett omfattningen av utbudet p marknaden.
21 () This amount is in ÔgreenŐ ecu. 
21 () Detta belopp r i ÓgrnaÓ ecu.
To obtain budgetary ecu, this figure has first to be converted with the ÔgreenŐ exchange rate applying to agricultural products into the national currency and then, re-converted with the official market exchange rate into ecu. 
Fr att f budgetmssiga ecu mste siffran frndras med hjlp av den ÓgrnaÓ kursen, jordbruksomrk-ningskursen, till den nationella valutan och sedan rknas om med hjlp av den officiella kursen till ecu.
From 1 February 1995 onwards the existing difference of 20,75 % between the ÔgreenŐ ecu and the budgetary ecu has been abolished by increasing the amount by the same difference. 
Frn den 1 februari 1995 har den existerande skillnaden p 20,75 % mellan grna ecu och budgetmssiga ecu avskaffats genom att beloppet kats med samma skillnad.
Consumer prices 4.20. One of the reasons for replacing price support by direct-income support for farmers by means of area-aid payments was to shift the burden of financing farm incomes from the consumer to the taxpayer. 
4.20 Ett av sklen till att erstta prisstdet med ett direkt inkomststd till jordbrukare i form av arealstdsbetalningar var att flytta ver kostnaderna fr finansieringen av jordbrukarnas inkomster frn konsumenten till skattebetalaren.
Without doubt cereal purchasers benefited from decreased prices after the reform; for final consumers, however, it is rather difficult to measure the effects of lower cereal prices on food prices. 
Nr det gller de slutliga konsumenterna r det dock ganska svrt att mta de lgre spannmlsprisernas inverkan p livsmedelspriserna.
Even in the case of bread, its share of the sale price is between 2 % and 4 % only (22). 
Till och med fr brd ligger dess andel av frsljningspriset endast mellan 2 % och 4 % (22).
Indeed, prices for principal foodstuffs, such as bread have followed the same trend as before the reform (see Table 6). 
Mycket riktigt har priserna fr de viktigaste livsmedlen ssom brd fljt samma trend som fre reformen (se tabell 6).
Prices for pasta, however, seem to have decreased slightly, but according to Italian producers this was the consequence of harsh competition between them, rather than a direct consequence of lower cereal prices. Although cereal prices affect the price of compound feed more than the price of goods for human consumption, actual lower meat prices may be influenced more by exceptional situations (BSE crises(23) and swine fever), rather than by cheaper inputs for compound feed. 
Priserna fr pasta frefaller dremot ha minskat ngot, men enligt italienska producenter r detta snarare ett resultat av stark konkurrens dem emellan n av lgre spannmlspriser. ven om spannmlspriserna pverkar priset fr foderblandningar mer n priset fr varor som r avsedda fr livsmedelsbruk, r det mjligt att de rdande lga kttpriserna i strre utstrckning r resultatet av exceptionella omstndigheter (BSE-kriserna (23) och svinpesten) n av billigare bestndsdelar fr foderblandningar.
Lower prices noted for chicken, however, may be the result of lower feed prices (24). 4.21. 
De lgre priser som har konstaterats fr kyckling kan dock bero p lgre foderpriser (24).
A recent report by the Commission bringing together the findings of a series of impact analyses of the reform proposals made in Agenda 2000 (25) predicts that the price reduction for cereals, beef and milk products will reduce consumersŐ food bills by about 1,9 %. 
4.21 I en ny kommissionsrapport dr resultaten frn en serie analyser av konsekvenserna av reformfrslagen i Agenda 2000 sammanstlls (25), uppskattas att konsumentens livsmedelsnota kommer att minska med cirka 1,9 % p grund av prisnedstt-ningen p spannml, ntktt och mjlkprodukter.
The absolute advantage is estimated to be about ECU 12 500 million per year. 
I absoluta tal uppskattas vinsten uppg ens till cirka 12 500 miljoner ecu per r.
However it appears to the Court that in practice the benefit to the consumer is unlikely even to (22) According to information collected from consumer associations. 
Det frefaller emellertid revisionsrtten som om konsumen-(22) (23) 24 () 25 () Enligt information frn konsumentfreningar.
(23) See the CourtŐs Special Report No 19/98 of 4.12.1998 on BSE (OJ 24 C 383, 9.12.1998). () The Court was unable to find any significant reduction in consumer prices which could have been clearly linked to the reduction in institutional prices. 
Se revisionsrttens srskilda rapport nr 19/98 av den 4 december 1998 om BSE (EGT C 383, 9.12.1998). Revisionsrtten hittade ingen signifikant snkning av konsumentpriserna som klart kunde sttas i samband med snkningen av de institutionella priserna.