natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
A high share of registered candidates were relocated, despite shortcomings in the relocation process 48 A high share of all the candidates registered on the schemes in Greece and Italy (80 % and 89 % respectively) were actually relocated. 
En stor andel av de registrerade kandidaterna omplacerades, trots brister i omplaceringsprocessen 48 En stor andel av alla de skande som var registrerade i mekanismerna i Grekland och Italien (80 % respektive 89 %) omplacerades faktiskt.
49 Nevertheless, we found a number of operational weaknesses in the relocation processes (Box 3 and Figure 6). 
49 Trots det hittade vi ett antal operativa brister i omplaceringsprocessen (ruta 3 och figur 6).
25 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns Box 3 Operational weaknesses in the relocation process The Relocation Decisions had to be adopted quickly in September 2015, before procedures had been established or the necessary structures were in place (to register, transport and accommodate relocation candidates). 
26 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden Ruta 3 Operativa brister i omplaceringsprocessen Omplaceringsbesluten mste antas snabbt i september 2015, innan processen hade faststllts eller de ndvndiga strukturerna kommit p plats (fr att registrera, transportera och inhysa omplaceringskandidater).
It was therefore not clear how to proceed; for example, who should perform security and medical checks and how? 
Det var drfr inte helt klart hur man skulle g till vga. Exempelvis uppstod frgan om vem som skulle genomfra skerhets-och hlsokontroller, och p vilket stt?
Key stakeholders did not agree upon operating protocols until later (in summer 2016 in Greece and at the end of 2016 in Italy). 
Centrala berrda parter kom inte verens om arbetsrutiner frrn senare (sommaren 2016 i Grekland och i slutet av 2016 i Italien).
The majority of rejections were justified on public order or national security grounds, in accordance with the Relocation Decisions. 
De flesta avslagen motiverades med hnvisning till allmn ordning eller nationell skerhet, i enlighet med omplaceringsbesluten.
However, the explanations given were often generic, without detailed justification of individual cases. 
De frklaringar som lmnades var dock ofta allmnna och saknade utfrliga motiveringar fr enskilda renden.
The number of rejections was higher for Greece than for Italy owing to the different security profiles of eligible migrants. 
Antalet avslag var hgre fr Grekland n fr Italien p grund av de behriga migranternas olika skerhetsprofiler.
Greece channelled rejected candidates to the national asylum system, whereas Italy offered them for relocation to another Member State. 
Grekland vidarebefordrade avvisade kandidater till det nationella asylsystemet, medan Italien erbjd dem fr omplacering till en annan medlemsstat.
Some Member States applied restrictive preferences with no basis in the Decisions (e.g. no Eritreans in Bulgaria, only candidates with ID and travel documents in Czechia). 
Vissa medlemsstater tillmpade restriktiva preferenser som saknade grund i besluten (t.ex. inga eritreaner i Bulgarien eller enbart kandidater med id-handlingar och resehandlingar i Tjeckien).
It took EASO a long time to develop a preference matching system. Scheduled for operation in October 2016, the project was not completed until relocation was over and, although tested in Greece, it was never deployed in either Greece or Italy. 
Projektet, som enligt planen skulle inledas i oktober 2016, var inte slutfrt frrn omplaceringen var ver, och ven om det testades i Grekland anvndes det aldrig vare sig i Grekland eller Italien.
Candidates were spread throughout Italy and Greece rather than kept together. 
Kandidaterna spreds ver Italien och Grekland snarare n att hllas samman.
Accommodating them in dedicated relocation facilities would have sped up processing of their applications by facilitating various steps, including the mandatory health checks and cultural orientation sessions. As the Decisions set no binding preliminary relocation targets, pledging by receiving Member States was initially slow, but gradually picked up pace as implementation progressed. 
Om de hade inackorderats i srskilda omplaceringsanlggningar hade det lett till att deras anskningar hade behandlats snabbare genom att flera steg hade underlttats, dribland de obligatoriska hlsokontrollerna och informationsmtena om landets kultur. Eftersom det i besluten inte anges ngra bindande preliminra mlvrden fr omplaceringar verkstlldes mottagarmedlemsstaternas utfstelser inledningsvis lngsamt, men takten kade gradvis nr genomfrandet framskred.
Some Member States were more proactive than others. 
Vissa medlemsstater var mer proaktiva n andra.
Insufficient monitoring after relocation and no structure for voluntary relocation 50 The Commission, together with EASO and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), monitored the implementation of the relocation schemes, especially the number of actual transfers. 
Otillrcklig vervakning efter omplacering och ingen struktur fr frivillig omplacering 50 Kommissionen, tillsammans med Easo och Internationella organisationen fr migration (IOM), vervakade genomfrandet av omplaceringssystemen, i synnerhet antalet faktiska verfringar.
Data on registrations, absconders and rejections was also collected, but the reporting on these aspects has not been harmonised between Greece and Italy. 
Uppgifter om registreringar, avvikare och avslag samlades ocks in, men rapporteringen om dessa aspekter har inte harmoniserats mellan Grekland och Italien.
51 Preliminary results collected by the Commission in February 2018 showed high asylum recognition rates among the relocated migrants in the receiving Member States. 
51 Preliminra resultat som kommissionen samlat in i februari 2018 visade en hg andel godknda asylanskningar bland de omplacerade migranterna i mottagarmedlemsstaterna.
They also showed relatively high rates of post-relocation secondary movements in certain Member States, although most do not collect information on this aspect. 
De visade ven en relativt hg andel sekundra frflyttningar i vissa medlemsstater efter omplacering, ven om de flesta inte samlar in information om denna aspekt.
52 The Commission has not monitored the situation in the countries of relocation since February 2018. 
52 Kommissionen har inte vervakat situationen i omplaceringslnderna sedan februari 2018.
The data we collected from the receiving Member States in April and May 2019 confirms the observations made in the previous paragraph (Figure 7). 
De uppgifter som vi samlade in frn mottagarmedlemsstaterna i april och maj 2019 bekrftar iakttagelserna i fregende stycke (figur 7).
53 The temporary relocation schemes expired in September 2017. No consensus has yet been reached on the CommissionŐs proposal for a permanent relocation system. 
53 De tillflliga omplaceringsmekanismerna lpte ut i september 2017. nnu har ingen samsyn ntts nr det gller kommissionens frslag om ett permanent omplaceringssystem.
In the absence of an agreed relocation mechanism at the EU level, voluntary relocation is taking place on an ad hoc basis, mainly for migrants who disembarked in Italy and Malta. 
D det saknas en verenskommen omplaceringsmekanism p EU-niv avgrs frivilliga omplaceringar frn fall till fall, huvudsakligen fr migranter som landsatts i Italien och Malta.
27 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns Figure 7 Đ High share of secondary movements among migrants relocated to certain Member States1 100 % 50 % 0% Lithuania Slovakia Portugal Estonia Have left after relocation (% and absolute value) 86 % (332) 81 % (13) 56 % (869) 44 % (90) Spain did not provide data. 
17 Artikel 21 i Europaparlamentets och rdets frordning (EU) nr 516/2014 av den 16 april 2014. 100 % 50 % 86 % (332) 81 % (13) 56 % (869) 44 % (90) 0% Har lmnat landet efter omplacering (% och ett absolut vrde) Litauen Slovakien Portugal Estland Spanien lmnade inga uppgifter.
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands and Romania did not collect data on this aspect. 
Belgien, Bulgarien, Kroatien, Cypern, Finland, Frankrike, Tyskland, Irland, Lettland, Malta, Nederlnderna och Rumnien samlade inte in uppgifter om denna aspekt.
The % share in Estonia included resettled migrants. 
Procentandelen i Estland inbegrep vidarebosatta migranter.
1 28 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns 55 Although the original budget was Ű160 million for the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework, total allocations for AMIF EMAS increased and stand at Ű1.1 billion up until the 2019 annual work programme (AWP). 
29 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden 55 Den ursprungliga budgeten var 160 miljoner euro i den flerriga budgetramen fr 2014Đ2020, men de totala anslagen fr Amifs katastrofbistnd kade och uppgr till 1,1 miljarder euro fram till det rliga arbetsprogrammet fr 2019.
As shown in Figure 8, Greece and Italy are the two biggest recipients of AMIF EMAS funding. 
Som visas i figur 8 r Grekland och Italien de tv strsta mottagarna av finansiering genom Amifs katastrofbistnd.
Figure 8 Đ AMIF EMAS grants in Member States (in million euros) 132 25 127 25 2017 2018 2019 AMIF EMAS AWP allocations 415 403 2014 2015 2016 Member States with no AMIF EMAS funding were not eligible or did not apply for funding. 
Figur 8 Đ Bidrag genom Amifs katastrofbistnd i medlemsstaterna (i miljoner euro) Medlemsstater som inte fick medel genom Amifs katastrofbistnd var inte berttigade till eller anskte inte om finansiering.
Source: ECAcalculationbasedontheEUCommissiondata,asatMarch2019.Mapbackground Š OpenStreetMap contributors licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 licence (CC BY-SA). 
Klla: Revisionsrttens berkning, p grundval av kommissionens uppgifter frn mars 2019. Kartbakgrund Š OpenStreetMap, p licens genom Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 licence (CC BY-SA).
As such, EMAS played a key role in supporting implementation of the relocation schemes in Greece and Italy by funding the pre-registration of relocation candidates (in Greece), reception facilities and the transfers of eligible relocation candidates. 
Katastrofbistndet spelade drfr en viktig roll vid genomfrandet av omplaceringssystemen i Grekland och Italien genom att finansiera frhandsregistreringen av omplaceringskandidater (i Grekland), mottagningsanlggningar och verfringen av behriga omplaceringskandidater.
57 At the same time, EMAS has become the CommissionŐs key strategic instrument for rebalancing support towards the countries most affected by the migration crisis, particularly Greece, through complementing their national programme envelopes19. 
57 Samtidigt har katastrofbistndet blivit kommissionens viktigaste strategiska instrument fr att balansera om std till de lnder som drabbats vrst av migrationskrisen, i synnerhet Grekland, genom att komplettera anslagen till deras nationella program19.
58 Some EMAS projects therefore do not address only urgent and specific needs, but complement the AMIF NPs by funding longer-term structural activities with embedded capacity-building components. 
58 Ngra katastrofbistndsprojekt tgrdar drfr inte enbart brdskande och srskilda behov, utan kompletterar Amifs nationella program genom att de p lngre sikt finansierar strukturella verksamheter med inbyggda delar fr kapacitetsuppbyggnad.
The Commission also highlighted this in its impact assessment20. 
Kommissionen lyfte ven fram detta i sin konsekvensbedmning20.
59 We examined six EMAS projects: three in Greece and three in Italy. 
59 Vi underskte sex katastrofbistndsprojekt (EMAS): tre i Grekland och tre i Italien.
In each country, one project related to asylum, one to returns and one to relocation. 
I varje land handlade ett projekt om asyl, ett om tervndande och ett om omplacering.
A detailed assessment can be found in Annex II. 
En utfrlig bedmning finns i bilaga II.
60 We found all six projects examined relevant to the identified needs. 
31 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden 60 Vi fann att samtliga sex projekt som undersktes var relevanta fr de konstaterade behoven.
The objectives set for each sampled project were clear in terms of what the action should achieve. 
De ml som sattes upp fr varje projekt i urvalet var tydliga nr det gllde vad tgrden skulle stadkomma.
As regards the deliverables, all sampled projects focused on immediate outputs, but not on results and impact. 
Nr det gllde resultat fokuserade alla projekt i urvalet p omedelbar output, men inte p resultat och utfall.
The exception was EMAS-IT-1, which did not even have output indicators (Box 4). 
EMAS-IT-1 var ett undantag och hade inte ens ngra outputindikatorer (ruta 4).
30 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns Box 4 Example of a project with no output and outcome indicators EMAS-IT-1 supports the police immigration offices (ŇquestureÓ) by funding language support and equipment. 
Ruta 4 Exempel p ett projekt utan outputoch utfallsindikatorer EMAS-IT-1 bistr polisens invandringskontor (ÓquestureÓ) genom att finansiera sprkligt std och utrustning.
The evaluation committee concluded that the output of the proposed action should be explicitly stated with appropriate indicators set corresponding to the actionŐs objectives (e.g. daily/monthly average of asylum applications processed per questura). 
Utvrderingskommittn kom fram till att den freslagna tgrdens output br anges tydligt och ha lmpliga indikatorer som motsvarar tgrdens ml (t.ex. dagligt/mnatligt genomsnitt av behandlade asylanskningar per questura).
Such indicators would allow performance to be properly monitored and achievements assessed. 
Sdana indikatorer skulle gra det mjligt att korrekt vervaka prestation och bedma vad som uppntts.
The grant agreement was not modified according to the evaluation committeeŐs request and focused only on inputs (e.g. number of translators provided, quantities of equipment delivered) without setting any performance targets. 
Bidragsavtalet ndrades inte i enlighet med utvrderingskommittns begran och fokuserade enbart p input (t.ex. antalet versttare som tillhandahlls och mngden utrustning som levererats) och angav inga prestationsmlvrden.
61 We found no overlap between projects financed under EMAS on the one hand and the AMIF NPs or EASO/Frontex operations on the other hand. 
61 Vi fann ingen verlappning mellan projekt som finansierades inom ramen fr katastrofbistndet  ena sidan och Amifs nationella program eller Easos/Frontex insatser  andra sidan.
62 However, two of the six examined EMAS projects did not address urgent and specific needs (EMAS-GR-2 and EMAS-IT-1), but rather substituted actions in the AMIF NPs by funding longer-term structural activities with embedded capacity-building components (Box 5). 
62 Tv av de sex underskta projekten tgrdade dock inte brdskande och srskilda behov (EMAS-GR-2 och EMAS-IT-1), utan ersatte snarare tgrder inom ramen fr Amifs nationella program genom att de p lngre sikt finansierar strukturella verksamheter med inbyggda delar fr kapacitetsuppbyggnad (ruta 5).
31 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns Box 5 EMASŐ shift from emergency response to longer-term structural support EMAS-GR-2 funded forced returns of irregular migrants by the Hellenic Police from December 2015 to November 2016. 
32 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden Ruta 5 Katastrofbistndets vergng frn ndsituationer till strukturellt std p lngre sikt EMAS-GR-2 finansierade de ofrivilliga tervndanden av irreguljra migranter som den grekiska polisen verkstllde frn december 2015 till november 2016.
However, such standard long-term return activities are covered by the national budget. 
Sdana lngsiktiga standardinsatser p tervndandeomrdet tcks dock av den nationella budgeten.
An AMIF NP project on forced returns retroactively covered the whole period from 2014 to 2019 (excluding the period covered by EMAS). 
Ett projekt fr ofrivilligt tervndande inom ramen fr Amifs nationella program tckte retroaktivt hela perioden frn 2014 till 2019 (exklusive den period som tcks av katastrofbistndet).
This shows that there was no urgent need for emergency funding. 
Detta visar att det inte fanns ngot brdskande behov av katastrofbistnd.
EMAS-IT-1 will run for 18 months. 
EMAS-IT-1 kommer att lpa i 18 mnader.
Apart from IT equipment, the support also includes the purchase of cars and furniture. 
Vid sidan av it-utrustning inbegriper stdet ven inkp av bilar och mbler.
Instead of focusing on the most overburdened questure facing long waiting times to register asylum claims, the project aims to strengthen the capacity of all questure in Italy, including those with no urgent need for support. 
I stllet fr att fokusera p det questure som r mest verbelastat och har lnga vntetider fr registrering av asylanskningar, syftar projektet till att strka kapaciteten vid samtliga questure i Italien, ven de som inte har brdskande behov av std.
While this action may still help Italy clear the backlog of asylum applications, such a project would have been more opportune had it been implemented in 2016/2017, when asylum registrations in Italy were at their peak. 
Samtidigt som denna tgrd fortfarande kan hjlpa Italien att komma ifatt med asylanskningarna skulle ett sdant projekt ha kommit mer lgligt om det hade genomfrts 2016/2017, nr asylregistreringarna i Italien var som allra flest.
However, it only started in September 2018, when asylum registrations were already significantly down on previous years. 
Den pbrjades dock inte frrn i september 2018, nr asylregistreringarna redan sjunkit markant jmfrt med tidigare r.
No activity had yet taken place by the time of the audit visit at the end of February 2019 due to ongoing public procurement procedures. 
Vid tidpunkten fr revisionsbesket i slutet av februari 2019 hade ingen verksamhet nnu gt rum p grund av pgende offentliga upphandlingsfrfaranden.
63 In July 2017, the Commission earmarked additional AMIF EMAS funding to Italy of up to Ű100 million, which was used to also finance projects EMAS-IT1 and EMAS-IT-2. 
63 I juli 2017 ronmrkte kommissionen ytterligare finansiering genom Amifs katastrofbistnd till Italien med upp till 100 miljoner euro, vilket ven anvndes till att finansiera projekten EMAS-IT1 och EMAS-IT-2.
However, there was no structured mechanism that would fairly distribute EMAS funds among Member States in the event of requests for project funding exceeding the available budget. 
Det fanns dock ingen strukturerad mekanism fr rttvis frdelning av katastrofbistndet mellan medlemsstater om anskningarna om projektfinansiering skulle verstiga den tillgngliga budgeten.
If all eligible Member States applied for AMIF EMAS grants to fund similar activities (national forced returns, AVRR or enhancing the capacity of police stations), the EMAS budget would soon become exhausted. 
Om alla stdberttigade medlemsstater anskte om Amifs katastrofbistnd fr att finansiera liknande verksamheter (nationella ofrivilliga tervndanden, frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning eller strkt kapacitet vid polisstationer) skulle budgeten fr katastrofbistnd snart vara uttmd.
64 The Commission has proposed including emergency assistance under shared management with Member States in the new financial framework 2021-202721. 
64 Kommissionen har freslagit att Amifs katastrofbistnd ska inkluderas under delad frvaltning med medlemsstaterna inom den nya budgetramen fr perioden 2021Đ202721.
Only two of the six examined AMIF EMAS projects fully achieved their targets 65 The planned objectives for EMAS-GR-3 and EMAS-IT-2 were achieved in full, while they were met partially for EMAS-GR-1, EMAS-GR-2 and EMAS-IT-3 (Box 6). 
Endast tv av de sex underskta Amif-projekten fr katastrofbistnd uppndde helt och hllet sina mlvrden 65 De planerade mlen fr EMAS-GR-3 och EMAS-IT-2 uppnddes till fullo, medan de uppnddes delvis fr EMAS-GR-1, EMAS-GR-2 och EMAS-IT-3 (ruta 6).
EMAS-IT-1 is still in the early phase of implementation (Box 5 and Annex II). 
EMAS-IT-1 r fortfarande i ett tidigt skede av genomfrandet (ruta 5 och bilaga II).
32 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns Box 6 Examples of AMIF EMAS projects that did not fully achieve their objectives EMAS-GR-2: The Hellenic Police did not meet its targets, forcibly returning only 121 third-country nationals against a target of 1 080. 
33 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden Ruta 6 Exempel p Amif-projekt fr katastrofbistnd som inte till fullo uppndde sina ml EMAS-GR-2: Den grekiska polisen uppndde inte sina mlvrden och tersnde endast 121 tredjelandsmedborgare med tvng medan mlet var 1 080.
By contrast, the IOM exceeded expectations, returning 1 464 third-country nationals (as opposed to the 1 000 planned) in assisted voluntary returns. 
IOM vertrffade dremot frvntningarna och gav bistnd till 1 464 tredjelandsmedborgare (jmfrt med de 1 000 som planerats) som tervnde frivilligt.
This project also underspent, utilising 65 % (Ű1.7 million) of the original amount allocated (Ű2.5 million). 
Detta projekt spenderade ven mindre n vad som budgeterats, och utnyttjade 65 % (1,7 miljoner euro) av det belopp som ursprungligen anslagits (2,5 miljoner euro).
EMAS-IT-3: The target of accommodating an average of 1 310 relocation candidates over 12 months could not be reached, as there were fewer actual relocation candidates than forecast. 
EMAS-IT-3: Mlvrdet om att inhysa i genomsnitt 1 310 omplaceringskandidater under tolv mnader gick inte att uppn, eftersom det fanns frre faktiska omplaceringskandidater n vad man frutsptt.
Moreover, the migrants eligible for relocation were spread throughout Italy. 
Vidare var de migranter som var berttigade till omplacering utspridda ver hela Italien.
It was therefore a challenge to transfer them to dedicated relocation centres, which ended up hosting a mix of migrants, including those not eligible for relocation. 
Det var drfr en utmaning att verfra dem till srskilda omplaceringscentrum, som till slut rymde olika typer av migranter, dribland sdana som inte var berttigade till omplacering.
As a result, the amount incurred for this project was less than planned, utilising 63 % (Ű9.7 million) of the original amount allocated (Ű15.3 million). 
De faktiska kostnaderna fr projektet blev drfr lgre n planerat, och 63 % (9,7 miljoner euro) utnyttjades av det belopp som ursprungligen anslagits (15,3 miljoner euro).
66 Although EMAS-IT-2 exceeded its targets three months before the end of the implementation period, it must be said that the targets were relatively modest considering the number of return decisions issued and the number of irregular migrants staying in Italy. 
34 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden 66 ven om EMAS-IT-2 vertrffade sina mlvrden tre mnader innan genomfrandeperioden upphrde mste det sgas att mlvrdena var relativt blygsamma, med tanke p det antal tervndandebeslut som utfrdats och antalet irreguljra migranter som uppehller sig i Italien.
Performance of the AVRR programme in Italy is affected by a number of issues, which we analyse in Box 12. 
Genomfrandet av programmet fr frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning i Italien pverkas av ett antal problem som vi analyserar i ruta 12.