natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
16 Box 3 - The ups and downs of a regional early warning system An early warning system is a system of tools and procedures used for collecting and analysing data in order to anticipate and prevent conflicts. 
Ruta 3 Đ Svngningar i ett system fr tidig varning Ett system fr tidig varning r ett system med verktyg och frfaranden som anvnds till att samla in och analysera uppgifter i syfte att frutse och frhindra konflikter.
Central and regional early warning systems are key to the functioning of the APSA. 
Centrala och regionala system fr tidig varning r av avgrande betydelse fr Apsas funktion.
In the central region of Africa, such a system, called ŇMcanisme d'Alerte Rapide d'Afrique CentraleÓ (MARAC), was set up in 2007. 
17 system kallat ÓMcanisme dŐAlerte Rapide dŐAfrique CentraleÓ (Marac) 2007.
The EU provided funds from the EDF for expanding the system, installing IT and communications systems and hiring and training staff members. 
EU tillhandahll medel frn EUF fr att utvidga systemet, installera it-och kommunikationssystem och anstlla och utbilda personal.
A network of 30 correspondents was set up across several central African states. 
Ett ntverk av 30 kontaktpersoner inrttades i flera centralafrikanska stater.
Several of the stakeholders we interviewed referred to MARACŐs effective and positive contribution to conflict anticipation and prevention. 
Flera av de intressenter som vi intervjuade nmnde Maracs ndamlsenliga och positiva bidrag till att frutse och frhindra konflikter.
However, after EU support ended in 2016, the SRO did not comply with the agreed requirement to continue to finance staff for the early warning system and the capacity that had been built up was lost. 
Men efter det att EU:s std upphrde 2016 uppfyllde inte den subregionala organisationen det verenskomna kravet att fortstta finansiera personal till systemet fr tidig varning, och den kapacitet som hade byggts upp gick frlorad.
Only minimal financial support was provided under the African Peace Facility during 2017 and by the time of our audit, MARACŐs staff numbers had dropped to the pre-EU support level. 
Endast ett minimalt ekonomiskt std gavs inom den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika under 2017, och vid tidpunkten fr revisionen hade antalet anstllda vid Marac minskat till den niv som rdde innan EU gav sitt std.
Only a skeleton staff of three people remained (compared to the 15 needed for it to operate at full capacity) and its network of correspondents was no longer active. 
Endast en minimipersonalstyrka p tre personer terstod (jmfrt med de 15 som krvs fr att systemet ska kunna fungera med full kapacitet), och ntverket av kontaktpersoner var inte lngre aktivt.
We also expected to see provisions in contracts for both reducing overall financing and moving away from support for operational staff and towards funding specialised staff. 
Vi rknade ocks med att f se kontraktsbestmmelser om bde minskad total finansiering och en vergng frn std till driftspersonal till finansiering av specialiserad personal.
With the AU and the SROs taking over day-to-day running costs32, the EU could then focus on adding value by financing staff trained in specialist skills, such as conflict prevention and resolution. 
Om AU och de afrikanska subregionala organisationerna tog ver kostnaderna fr den lpande driften32 skulle EU kunna fokusera p att tillfra ett mervrde genom att finansiera personal med specialistkompetens, ssom konfliktfrebyggande och konfliktlsning.
In most of the contracts we audited this was not the case. 
I merparten av de granskade kontrakten var detta inte fallet.
However, Box 4 shows an example where this approach succeeded. 
I ruta 4 ger vi dock ett exempel p nr detta tillvgagngsstt lyckades.
Box 4 - Increasing the added value of EU support In 2015 donors paid for all short-term staff of the AU CommissionŐs Peace and Security Department under a Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA) Salaries contract. 
Ruta 4 Đ ka EU-stdets mervrde r 2015 betalade givare fr all korttidsanstlld personal vid AU-kommissionens freds-och skerhetsavdelning enligt ett gemensamt finansieringsarrangemang fr lnekontrakt.
Following discussion with the EU and the other donors, in 2017 the AU Commission reduced the number of staff members funded under the donor-funded JFA from 200 to 172 and increased the proportion of staff costs to be met by AU member states33. 
Efter en diskussion med EU och de vriga givarna minskade AU-kommissionen 2017 antalet anstllda som I utvrderingen av den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika 2013 rekommenderades att EU borde underska mjligheterna att tillsammans med AU utarbeta en plan fr hur AU successivt skulle kunna ta ansvar fr tjnster och driftskostnaderna fr viktiga Apsa-komponenter som d finansierades genom APF.
At the same time, the ratio of support staff to professional staff funded under this contract was reduced from 1:1 to nearly 1:2. 
Samtidigt minskades frhllandet mellan andelen stdpersonal och krnverksamhetspersonal som finansierades enligt kontraktet frn 1:1 till nstan 1:2.
The target from 2017 onwards is 1:334. 
Mlet fr 2017 och framt r 1:334.
The allocation of EU support was not sufficiently prioritised 27. 
Frdelningen av EU-std prioriterades inte tillrckligt 27.
Aware of the risk to EU citizens of conflicts in Africa (violent terrorism, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, and organised crime), the EU has started to channel its support towards preventing such conflicts from happening, and resolving them when they The 2013 APF evaluation recommended that ŇThe EU should explore options to jointly develop with the AU a plan for the latter to progressively assume responsibility for staff positions and the operating costs of key APSA components currently financed through the APFÓ. 
EU r medvetet om vilka risker konflikter i Afrika innebr fr EU-medborgarna (vldsbejakande terrorism, tillgng till massfrstrelsevapen och organiserad brottslighet) och har drfr brjat inrikta sitt std p att frhindra att de uppstr och p att lsa dem nr det nd sker35.
In line with the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness36 and the principles set out in the JAES, the EU has in general provided support for the APSA in accordance with the needs expressed by the AU and the SROs in the APSA roadmap. 
I verensstmmelse med Parisfrklaringen om bistndseffektivitet36 och de principer som faststllts i den gemensamma strategin EU-Afrika har EU i regel gett std till Apsa i enlighet med de behov som AU och de afrikanska subregionala organisationerna angett i frdplanen fr Apsa.
However, the needs defined were very broad and the priorities not specific or clear. 
De behov som angavs var dock mycket allmnna, och prioriteringarna var varken specifika eller tydliga.
The EEAS and the Commission did not draw up specific EU funding priorities or develop guidelines for allocating resources to the various APSA components. 
Europeiska utrikestjnsten och kommissionen faststllde inga specifika prioriteringar fr EU:s finansiering eller riktlinjer fr frdelningen av resurser till Apsas olika komponenter.
Annex II shows the example of the decision-making procedure of the African Peace Facility. 
I bilaga II ges exempel p beslutsfrfarandet inom den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika.
We analysed the fourteen contracts audited to see how they reflected the priorities set for the APSA. 
Vi analyserade de 14 granskade kontrakten fr att ta reda p hur de speglade de prioriteringar som faststllts fr Apsa.
We found that in eight cases the way in which funds were presented in the contractsŐ budgets made it impossible to see how much money had been allocated to each of the APSA pillars or priorities. 
I tta fall konstaterade vi att det stt som medlen presenterades p i kontraktens budgetar gjorde det omjligt att se hur mycket pengar som hade frdelats till var och en av Apsas pelare eller prioriteringar.
We also found that the individual contracts had a wide scope in terms of targeting priorities: eleven of the fourteen contracts targeted at least four of the five APSA strategic priorities (Annex III). 
Vi konstaterade ocks att de enskilda kontrakten hade en bred inriktning p prioriteringar: elva av de 14 kontrakten var inriktade p minst fyra av de fem strategiska prioriteringarna fr Apsa (bilaga III).
Risks associated with allocating more funds to regional organisations 30. 
Risker med att frdela mer medel till regionala organisationer 30.
In the latest programming period, the EU decided to channel a greater proportion of total funding for the APSA through the RIPs (paragraph 10). 
Under den senaste programperioden beslutade EU att kanalisera en strre andel av de totala medlen till Apsa genom de regionala vgledande programmen (punkt 10).
The aim was to give SROs a greater role in decision-making, in line with the principle of subsidiarity. 
Syftet var att ge de afrikanska subregionala organisationerna en strre roll i beslutsfattandet, i enlighet med subsidiaritetsprincipen.
19 the funding for the APSA support programme. We found there to be risks associated with this change. (a) The SROs did not, at the time of our audit, have sufficient staff members with the necessary skills to manage the additional funding effectively. (b) The regional institutional framework is very complex. 
Vi konstaterade att vissa risker var frenade med denna frndring. a) De afrikanska subregionala organisationerna hade vid tidpunkten fr revisionen inte tillrckligt med personal med ndvndig kompetens fr att kunna frvalta de ytterligare medlen p ett ndamlsenligt stt. b) Den regionala institutionella ramen r mycket komplex.
There are ten SROs with a mandate in peace and security, with overlapping memberships. 
Det finns tio afrikanska subregionala organisationer med ett mandat inom fred och skerhet, med verlappande medlemskap.
On average, AU states are members of at least two SROs and some states belong to as many as four. 
I snitt r AU-staterna medlemmar i minst tv subregionala organisationer, och vissa stater tillhr s mnga som fyra.
The lack of clarity leaves some African states unwilling to commit to their SROs, leading to weaknesses in capacity. 
Oklarheten gr att vissa afrikanska stater r ovilliga att engagera sig i sina subregionala organisationer, vilket leder till brister i kapaciteten.
The EU CommissionŐs strategy to deal with this complex regional framework was to support one joint RIP in each region; the EU currently funds the SROs under three RIPs. (c) Four of the ten SROs with a mandate in peace and security are not covered by a RIP and two of these four will continue to receive funding under the APF. 
EU-kommissionens strategi fr att hantera denna komplexa regionala ram var att stdja ett gemensamt regionalt vgledande program i varje region. Fr nrvarande finansierar EU de subregionala organisationerna inom tre regionala vgledande program. c) Fyra av de tio subregionala organisationerna med ett mandat inom fred och skerhet omfattas inte av ett regionalt vgledande program, och tv av dessa fyra subregionala
In addition, EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa funds capacity-building measures for one SRO (the Intergovernmental Authority on Development) and for organisations outside the APSA framework (for example, the Sahel G537). 
Dessutom finansierar EU:s frvaltningsfond fr ndtgrder i Afrika kapacitetsuppbyggande tgrder fr en subregional organisation (den mellanstatliga utvecklingsmyndigheten) och fr organisationer utanfr Apsas ram (t.ex. Sahel G537).
This could undermine the coherence of the EUŐs funding approach. (d) there is a risk that a reduced role for the AU may weaken overall coherence and coordination of EU support to the APSA. (e) despite the significant increase in the amounts allocated to peace and security measures under the RIPs the number of staff working in the relevant regional EU delegations had not increased accordingly. 
Detta skulle kunna underminera samstmmigheten i EU:s finansieringstrategi. d) Det finns en risk fr att minskat inflytande fr AU kan frsvaga den vergripande samstmmigheten i och samordningen av EU:s std till Apsa. e) Trots den betydande kningen av anslagen till freds-och skerhetstgrder inom de vgledande programmen hade antalet anstllda i de berrda regionala EU-delegationerna inte kat i motsvarande grad.
For example, there were no military experts on the staff of the delegations to ECOWAS and ECCAS, meaning that these delegations were relying on military expertise made available by EU Member StatesŐ embassies. 
Till exempel fanns det inga militra experter bland personalen p delegationerna till Ecowas och Eccas, vilket innebar att dessa delegationer frlitade sig p militr expertis som EU-medlemsstaterans ambassader stllde till frfogande.
Despite EU support, the APSA faces several challenges and its operation depends on continued external support 31. 
Trots EU:s std str Apsa infr flera utmaningar, och dess funktion r beroende av fortsatt externt std 31.
In this section, we examine whether EU support contributed to results being achieved. 
I detta avsnitt undersker vi huruvida EU:s std bidrog till att resultat uppnddes.
We look at the extent to which EU-funded contracts delivered support according to the objectives set for those contracts. 
Vi tittar p i vilken utstrckning EU-finansierade kontrakt levererade std i enlighet med de ml som stllts upp fr kontrakten.
We also examine the challenges faced by the different components of the APSA. 
Vi undersker ocks de utmaningar som de olika komponenterna av Apsa str infr.
Finally, we assess whether the EEAS and the Commission had identified and addressed risks to the sustainability of the results of EU support. 
Slutligen bedmer vi huruvida Europeiska utrikestjnsten och kommissionen hade identifierat och hanterat risker fr att resultaten av EU-stdet inte skulle bli bestende.
Half of the contracts had delivered at the time of the audit 32. 
Hlften av kontrakten hade levererat resultat vid tidpunkten fr revisionen 32.
Six of them, which mainly concerned staff costs, had mainly delivered their overall expected results by the time of the audit. 
Sex av dem, som huvudsakligen gllde personalkostnader, hade till strsta delen levererat de vergripande frvntade resultaten vid tidpunkten fr revisionen.
However, we did not have sufficient information to judge whether each individual output had been achieved (paragraphs 59 and 60). 
37 21 bedma huruvida varje enskild output hade uppntts (punkterna 59 och 60).
Two more contracts had partially delivered outputs and one contract had clearly not delivered the expected outputs. 
Ytterligare tv kontrakt hade delvis levererat output, och ett kontrakt hade klart och tydligt inte levererat den frvntade outputen.
In five cases, implementation delays meant that we could not assess whether the contract had achieved the expected outputs or not (paragraph 53 and Annex IV). The APSA faces several challenges 33. 
I fem fall innebar frseningar i genomfrandet att vi inte kunde bedma om den frvntade outputen enligt kontraktet hade levererats eller inte (punkt 53 och bilaga IV) Apsa str infr flera utmaningar 33.
Stakeholders and donors have high expectations of the APSA. 
Intressenter och givare har hga frvntningar p Apsa.
Assessments38 have concluded that the AU and the SROs play an important role in addressing conflicts in Africa. 
I flera bedmningar38 har slutsatsen dragits att AU och de subregionala organisationerna spelar en viktig roll nr det gller att hantera konflikter i Afrika.
The APSA has a potential to become an effective framework for peace and security in Africa, although it faces many difficult challenges and needs further development of its capacities, its instruments and its overall operation. 
Apsa har potential att bli en ndamlsenlig ram fr fred och skerhet i Afrika, trots att man str infr mnga svra utmaningar och behver vidareutveckla sin kapacitet, sina instrument och sin vergripande funktion.
Challenges for the APSA include the following: (a) the financial and institutional capacity of the key bodies involved (the AU and the SROs) need to be strengthened; (b) specific steps are needed to overcome the lack of political will to address certain issues and crises39; (c) there is no mechanism to enforce decisions; (d) there is a need for better cooperation between different bodies and institutions; (e) the relationship between the AU and the SROs should be clarified, particularly regarding subsidiarity40; (f) there should be better coordination with complementary initiatives such as the African Governance Architecture41. 
Apsa str infr fljande utmaningar: a) Den finansiella och institutionella kapaciteten vid de viktigaste berrda organen (AU och de subregionala organisationerna) behver strkas. b) Srskilda tgrder behvs fr att tgrda bristen p politisk vilja att frska lsa vissa problem och kriser39. c) Det finns ingen mekanism fr att verkstlla beslut. d) Samarbetet mellan olika organ och institutioner behver bli bttre.
The African Peace Fund did not cover the cost of operating the APSA as had been planned (paragraphs 5 and 6). 
Den afrikanska fredsfonden tckte inte kostnaderna fr att driva Apsa som planerat (punkterna 5 och 6).
Paragraphs 36 to 47 present challenges to the operation of the components of the APSA and the contribution of EU support. 
I punkterna 36Đ47 presenteras utmaningar nr det gller driften av Apsas olika komponenter och EU-stdets bidrag.
The application of the principle of subsidiarity and the question of leadership between AU and the SROs remains a highly sensitive issue. 
Det har begrnsat kvaliteten p och Tillmpningen av subsidiaritetsprincipen och frgan om ledarskap nr det gller AU och de subregionala organisationerna r alltjmt en mycket knslig frga.
A precise definition of roles and responsibilities of institutions on the national, regional, continental and multilateral levels is therefore crucial for the effective implementation of the APSA. 
Fr att Apsa ska kunna genomfras p ett ndamlsenligt stt r det drfr av avgrande betydelse att roller och ansvarsomrden fr institutioner p nationell, regional, kontinental och multilateral niv faststlls exakt.
2010 and 2013 APF evaluations recommended clarifying the application of the principle of subsidiarity. 
I utvrderingar av den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika 2010 och 2013 rekommenderades att tillmpningen av subsidiaritetsprincipen skulle frtydligas.
However, there was little progress in this regard: the APSA roadmap for 2016-2020 still highlighted the lack of common understanding of the principles of subsidiarity as one of APSAŐs weaknesses. 
Framstegen hrvidlag har dock varit sm: i frdplanen fr Apsa fr perioden 2016Đ2020 framhlls fortfarande bristen p samsyn p subsidiaritetsprincipen som en av Apsas svagheter.
The African Governance Architecture is a platform for dialogue between the various stakeholders who are mandated to promote good governance and strengthen democracy in Africa. 
Den afrikanska strukturen fr samhllsstyrning r en plattform fr dialog mellan de olika intressenter som har i uppdrag att frmja god samhllsstyrning och strka demokratin i Afrika.
See http://aga-platform.org/about. 
Se http://aga-platform.org/about.
This has limited the quality and effectiveness of the PSCŐs decisions. 
23 ndamlsenligheten i freds-och skerhetsrdets beslut.
This is exacerbated by the lack of political will of some states to take a position on issues which they do not recognise as being in their interest, or if they do not wish to openly confront a fellow member state43. 
Detta frvrras av att vissa stater saknar politisk vilja att ta stllning i frgor som de inte anser ligger i deras intresse eller fr att de inte ppet vill konfrontera en annan medlemsstat43.
African Union Commission 38. 
Afrikanska unionens kommission 38.
The AU Commission implements PSC decisions and its Peace and Security Department (PSD) supports the other pillars of the APSA as well as other peace and security programmes, such as the demarcation of borders, and the strategy on small arms and light weapons. 
AU-kommissionen genomfr freds-och skerhetsrdets beslut, och dess freds-och skerhetsavdelning (PSD) stder Apsas vriga pelare liksom andra program fr fred och skerhet, ssom utstakning av grnser och strategin fr handeldvapen och ltta vapen.
The PSD also coordinates relations between the AU and the SROs on peace and security matters. 
Freds-och skerhetsavdelningen samordnar ocks frbindelserna mellan AU och de subregionala organisationerna nr det gller freds-och skerhetsfrgor.
The PSD has an important role in the APSAŐs operation, but inadequate funding by the AU left two-thirds of its posts vacant. 
Freds-och skerhetsavdelningen har en viktig roll i Apsas verksamhet, men otillrcklig finansiering frn AU har lett till att tv tredjedelar av dess tjnster inte har tillsatts. r 2010 frskte EU, AU och andra internationella partner f bukt med detta genom att inrtta en gemensam finansieringsmekanism kallad det gemensamma finansieringsarrangemanget (JFA)44.
Institute for Peace and Security Studies, ŇThe African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC): Challenges and Policy OptionsÓ, March/April 2017. 22 42 43 
Institutet fr freds-och skerhetsstudier, The African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC): Challenges and Policy Options (Afrikanska unionens freds-och skerhetsrd [PSC]: utmaningar och politiska alternativ), mars/april 2017.
This covered the salary costs of additional 172 Ňshort-termÓ staff members of the PSD (Figure 5). Although not all of the posts were filled, the additional staff members allowed the PSD to continue to function45. Figure 5 - AU Commission Peace and Security Department posts and vacancies Source: Minutes of the 11th Steering Committee meeting on the Joint Financing Arrangement for support to the employment of AUC personnel working in the Peace and Security Programme, April 2017, and PSD staff overview, July 2016. 
Figur 5 Đ Tjnster och vakanser vid AU-kommissionens freds-och skerhetsavdelning 24 Typ av kontrakt Tillsatta tjnster Ej tillsatta tjnster Totalt Anmrkningar AU:s ordinarie budget 25 42 67 Rekryteringsprocessen fr nyckeltjnster startade fjrde kvartalet 2016 Korttidsanstllning (JFA) 137 35 172 12 tjnster dr rekrytering pgr Utstationering 12 12 Uppskattning mars 2017 Totalt 174 77 251 Klla: Protokollet frn det elfte mtet i styrkommittn fr det gemensamma finansieringsarrangemanget fr std till anstllning av personal vid AU-kommissionen inom freds-och skerhetsprogrammet, april 2017, och versikt ver personalen vid freds-och skerhetsavdelningen, juli 2016.
The PSD has a limited number of ŇprofessionalÓ staff dealing with core peace and security issues of the African continent. 
Freds-och skerhetsavdelningen har ett begrnsat antal ÓkrnverksamhetsanstlldaÓ som arbetar med centrala freds-och skerhetsfrgor fr den afrikanska kontinenten.
Figure 6 shows the type of staff and how they were funded in 2016. 
Figur 6 visar personaltyper och hur de finansierades 2016.
The main task of the staff is to fulfil the APSAŐs broad 2016-2020 roadmap, a document which specifies 5 strategic priorities, 32 specific objectives and 116 outputs. 
Personalens frmsta uppgift r att utfra Apsas omfattande frdplan fr 2016Đ2020, ett dokument med fem strategiska prioriteringar, 32 srskilda ml och 116 olika typer av output.
The inadequate amount of resources allocated and the policy of Ňshort-termÓ staff recruitment (paragraph 57) make this a difficult task. 
De otillrckliga anslagen och policyn att rekrytera ÓkorttidsanstlldaÓ (punkt 57) gjorde att detta blev en svr uppgift.