natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It explained during the audit that additional adjustments relative to the matrix would create a stop-start adjustment pattern and could lead to large adjustments which might be considered punitive or deter Member States from implementing structural reforms. 
Den frklarade vid revisionen att ytterligare anpassningar i frhllande till matrisen skulle skapa ett ryckigt anpassningsmnster och kunna leda till stora anpassningar som skulle kunna ses som bestraffande eller avskrcka medlemsstater frn att genomfra strukturreformer.
In its description of the effects of the investment clause33, the Commission shows that the convergence time will increase, but claims that the effect of the allowances will have been eliminated by the last year of the programme period. 
I sin beskrivning av investeringsklausulens effekter33 visar kommissionen att konvergenstiden kommer att ka, men hvdar att effekten av undantagen kommer att ha eliminerats till programplaneringsperiodens sista r.
Its calculation is based on the assumption that the average adjustment will amount to 0.5 pp of GDP per year, and that the Member State’s initial distance to the MTO is 1.5 % of GDP. 
Dess berkning baseras p antagandet att den genomsnittliga anpassningen kommer att uppg till 0,5 procentenheter av BNP per r, och att medlemsstaternas inledande avstnd till det medelfristiga budgetmlet r 1,5 % av BNP.
Without the investment allowance, the MTO would be reached in 3 years at that pace. With the investment 33 See various simulations of clauses in the Commission SGP Vade Mecum 2017, Annex 14. % OF GDP 
Med undantaget fr investeringar p 0,5 % av BNP skulle ytterligare ett r Se olika simuleringar av klausuler i kommissionens SGP Vade Mecum (handledning om stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten) 2017, bilaga 14.
On this basis, the Commission claims that even without compensatory measures in the following years, the effects of clauses will have been eliminated by the end of the programme period (see Figure 4). 
Med detta som grund hvdar kommissionen att klausulernas effekter, ven utan kompletterande tgrder de fljande ren, kommer att ha eliminerats vid slutet av programplaneringsperioden (se figur 4).
However, in reality the average 0.5 % adjustment is not achieved owing, among other factors, to the significant deviation margin. 
I sjlva verket uppns dock inte den genomsnittliga anpassningen p 0,5 %, bland annat p grund av marginalen fr betydande avvikelser.
It will be further extended when the effects of other allowances (reform and unusual events) are taken into account. 
Den kommer att frlngas ytterligare nr effekterna av andra undantag (reformer och ovanliga hndelser) beaktas.
In the case of one country, the cumulative non-pension allowances for all purposes reached 1.2 % of GDP in 2015-17 (see Table 1). 
Nr det gller ett land utgjorde de kumulativa undantagen (ej pensionsrelaterade) fr alla syften 1,2 % av BNP under 2015Đ 2017 (se tabell 1).
The effect is that the approved investment allowance leads to increased overall spending in the subsequent years, regardless of what happens to the level of investment spending. 
Effekten r att det godknda undantaget fr investeringar leder till kade totala utgifter under de fljande ren, oavsett vad som hnder med investeringsniverna.
The total increase in current spending can therefore surpass the approved investment allowance several times over, until the MTO is finally reached34. 
Den totala kningen av de lpande utgifterna kan drfr g om det godknda undantaget fr investeringar flera gnger om till dess att det medelfristiga budgetmlet till slut uppntts34.
Implementation of the structural reform clause 48. 
Genomfrande av strukturreformsklausulen 48.
As with the investment clause, the structural reform allowance results in an increase in permitted spending not only in the year for which it is approved but also in subsequent years (when compared to the original path), and therefore lengthens the convergence time for reaching the MTO. 
Precis som med investeringsklausulen leder undantaget fr strukturreformer till att de tilltna utgifterna kar, inte bara det r som undantaget godkndes fr utan ven de fljande ren (nr de jmfrs med den ursprungliga utgiftskurvan), och frlnger drfr tiden fr uppnendet av konvergens med det medelfristiga budgetmlet.
The Commission decided that the structural reform allowance does not need to correspond to the actual budgetary costs of implementing the reform35. 
Kommissionen beslutade att undantaget fr strukturreformer inte behver motsvara de faktiska budgetkostnaderna fr genomfrande av reformen35.
The Regulation on the other hand clearly requires that a cost-benefit analysis is needed for reform to qualify for See Commission SGP Vade Mecum 2017, Annex 14, simulation 2, p. 
Enligt frordningen krvs  andra sidan tydligt att en kostnads-nyttoanalys genomfrs fr att reformerna ska kunna Se kommissionens SGP Vade Mecum 2017, bilaga 14, simulering 2, s.
It explains that one of the reasons why this is not feasible is that direct costs are considered to be difficult to measure. 
Den frklarar att en av anledningarna till varfr detta inte r genomfrbart r att direkta kostnader anses vara svra att mta.
The Commission also argues that "there may be other costs associated with introducing such a reform that go beyond the direct fiscal costs, for example economic and political costs”. 
Kommissionen hvdar ven att det kan finnas andra kostnader som r frknippade med infrandet av en sdan reform som gr utver de direkta finanspolitiska kostnaderna, t.ex. ekonomiska och politiska kostnader.
32 34 35 
32 34 35
the allowance36. For major pension system reforms, it clearly indicates that the allowance should be limited to actual costs. 
rknas fr undantaget36. Fr stora reformer av pensionssystemen anges i frordningen tydligt att undantaget br begrnsas till de faktiska kostnaderna.
Instead, the Commission exercises discretion in setting the level of the allowance (within the limits approved by ECOFIN), as long as the reform is expected to have a long-term impact on growth and therefore positive budget impacts, despite such effects being much more difficult to measure than the actual budget costs of the reform. 
I stllet fr kommissionen gra bedmningar vid faststllandet av undantagsnivn (inom de grnser som godknts av Ekofinrdet) s lnge som reformen frvntas f en lngsiktig inverkan p tillvxten och drmed positiva budgetkonsekvenser, trots att sdana effekter r mycket svrare att mta n de faktiska budgetkostnaderna fr reformen.
In this way, the “standard reform allowance” acts as an incentive for reforms rather than an instrument to cover their costs 37. 
P detta stt fungerar standardundantaget fr reformer som ett incitament fr reformer snarare n som ett instrument fr att tcka kostnaderna fr dessa37.
However, the Commission has many other policy instruments to encourage Member States to implement structural reforms, including its budgetary resources. 
Kommissionen har dock mnga andra politiska instrument fr att uppmana medlemsstaterna att genomfra strukturreformer, dribland dess budgetmedel.
The Commission will apply the clause in the ex post assessment if the planned reforms are fully implemented38. 
Kommissionen kommer att tillmpa klausulen vid efterhandsutvrderingen av om de planerade reformerna har genomfrts fullt ut38.
When clauses are granted ex ante, the CSR states that if the planned reform is fully implemented, the ex post assessment of compliance deducts the clause from the fiscal requirement39. 
Nr klausuler beviljas p frhand freskrivs i de landsspecifika rekommendationerna att om den planerade reformen genomfrs fullt ut dras klausulen av frn det finanspolitiska kravet39.
In the case of Italy in spring 2017, the Commission granted the permitted deviation but did not transparently assess whether all reforms presented in Italy’s National Reform Programme of 2015, for which flexibility had been asked, were fully implemented. 
Nr det gllde Italien vren 2017 beviljade kommissionen den tilltna avvikelsen men gjorde ingen transparent bedmning av om alla reformer som presenterades i Italiens nationella reformprogram 2015, fr vilka flexibilitet begrdes, hade genomfrts till fullo.
Regulation No 1466/97, Article 3(2)(c) requires that SCPs contain a cost-benefit analysis of major structural reforms which will have direct long-term positive budget effects, including raising potential sustainable growth. 
I landsrapporten frn 2017 rapporteras att ngra I artikel 3.2 c i frordning nr 1466/97 krvs att stabilitets-och konvergensprogrammen inbegriper en kostnads-nyttoanalys av strre strukturreformer som har direkta lngsiktiga positiva budgeteffekter, bland annat genom att ka den potentiella hllbara tillvxten.
The Commission explained that: “given the acknowledged difficulty surrounding accurately quantifying the impact of structural reforms, a political decision was taken to follow a more generic approach, which carries the benefits of being more efficient, communicable and speedy in terms of delivery. 
Kommissionen frklarade att mot bakgrund av den erknda svrigheten med att p ett precist stt kvantifiera inverkan av strukturreformer fattades ett politiskt beslut om att flja en mer allmn strategi, som har frdelen av att vara mer effektiv, kommunicerbar och snabb nr det gller frverkligandet.
This approach involves the provision of a standard allowance based on a reform or package of reforms being assessed (or verified) as suitably significant. 
Denna strategi omfattar tillhandahllande av ett standardundantag som baseras p en reform eller ett reformpaket som bedms (eller bekrftats) vara betydande i lmplig omfattning.
The main focus of the Commission's assessment of an application for the structural reform clause is therefore the sustainability-enhancing nature of the reform package.” 
Huvudfokus fr kommissionen bedmning av en tillmpning av klausulen om strukturreformer r drfr reformpaketets hllbarhetsfrmjande karaktr.
Commonly Agreed position on Flexibility in the Stability and Growth Pact; ECOFIN Council of the EU;14345/15; Brussels,30November2015,Section3.1.,p.6. 
Gemensamt verenskommen stndpunkt om flexibilitet inom stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten, EU:s Ekofinrd, 14345/15, Bryssel, den 30 november 2015, avsnitt 3.1, s. 6.
33 36 37 38 39 Commonly Agreed position on Flexibility in the Stability and Growth Pact; Section 3.3.(iv.). 
Gemensamt verenskommen stndpunkt om flexibilitet inom stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten, avsnitt 3.3 iv). 33 36 37 38 39
We found a lack of sufficient information and assessment (both ex ante and ex post) by the Commission of the direct fiscal costs and the long-term benefits underpinning certain clauses. 
Vi fann att det saknades tillrcklig information och tillrckliga bedmningar (svl p frhand som i efterhand) frn kommissionen om de direkta finanspolitiska kostnaderna och de lngsiktiga frdelar som ligger till grund fr vissa klausuler.
For example, Italy was granted two structural reform clauses for a total of 0.5 % of GDP in 2016; however, the deviation did not correspond to verifiable direct and indirect fiscal costs for the reforms as estimated by Italy. In 2016 the deviation was twice as large as the costs and no costs were forecast in the adjustment period (2017-2019). 
Exempelvis beviljades Italien tv strukturreformklausuler fr sammanlagt 0,5 % av BNP r 2016, men avvikelsen motsvarade inte verifierbara direkta och indirekta finanspolitiska kostnader fr reformerna som Italien uppskattat. r 2016 var avvikelsen dubbelt s stor som kostnaderna och inga kostnader frutsgs under anpassningsperioden (2017Đ2019).
We further found that the Commission had insufficiently estimated the economic impact related to the clauses. 
Vi fann vidare att kommissionen p ett otillrckligt stt hade uppskattat den ekonomiska inverkan med anknytning till klausulerna.
Examples of simulations using the QUEST model40 do exist but, in some cases, the Commission should have requested more analysis and justification from Member States where they had provided insufficient information. 
Exempel p simuleringar som anvnder sig av QUEST-modellen40 finns, men kommissionen borde i vissa fall ha begrt mer utfrliga analyser och motiveringar frn medlemsstaterna nr de hade lmnat otillrcklig information.
In the case of Italy’s structural reform clause of 0.4 % of GDP from 2016, the national authorities estimated the long-term positive GDP impacts of the reforms and provided them to the Commission. 
Nr det gller Italiens strukturreformklausul p 0,4 % av BNP frn 2016 uppskattade de nationella myndigheterna reformernas lngsiktigt positiva effekter p BNP och lmnade dessa till kommissionen.
In spring 2015 the Commission assessed that the authorities’ forecasted positive impacts on GDP to be ‘plausible’. 
Vren 2015 bedmde kommissionen att myndigheternas prognoser om positiva effekter p BNP var rimliga.
However, we did not obtain sufficient evidence to substantiate the Commission’s checks. 
Vi fick dock inte tillrckliga bevis fr att kunna bekrfta kommissionens kontroller.
Afterwards, the Commission produced its own impact estimates in December 2015 and revised them in April 2016, in part due the long-term nature of the projections and the related uncertainties of certain assumptions. 
Eftert uppskattade kommissionen sjlv effekterna i december 2015 och ndrade dem i april 2016, delvis p grund av prognosernas lngsiktiga karaktr och oskerheten kring vissa antaganden.
No estimates were produced at the time of the ex post assessment of the clause (i.e. in Spring 2017). 
Det gjordes inga uppskattningar i samband med efterhandsbedmningen av klausulen (dvs. vren 2017).
These estimates are indicative at best and generally uncertain, making them inadequate to serve as a criterion for assessing ex post the eligibility of clauses. 
Dessa uppskattningar r som bst en fingervisning och r allmnt oskra, vilket gr dem otillrckliga fr att tjna som kriterium fr efterhandsbedmning av klausulers behrighet.
As regards the investment clause granted to Italy (0.25 % of GDP), the impact on GDP had not been estimated. 
Vad gller den investeringsklausul som beviljats Italien (0,25 % av BNP) hade inverkan p BNP inte uppskattats.
The implementation of the unusual events clause 55. 
Genomfrandet av klausulen fr ovanliga hndelser 55.
Flexibility is allowed for deviations due to unusual events such as a refugee influx, natural disasters or security threats 41. 
Flexibilitet medges fr avvikelser p grund av sdana ovanliga hndelser som en tillstrmning av flyktingar, naturkatastrofer eller skerhetshot41.
The Commission must assess whether such events justify flexibility or not. 
Kommissionen mste bedma huruvida sdana hndelser motiverar flexibilitet eller ej.
The related clauses do not have a ceiling. 
De tillhrande klausulerna har inget tak.
As with investment and structural reform clauses, the Commission does not increase adjustment requirements in the years after granting the clause, so as to offset the increase in spending due to the unusual event. 
Precis som med investerings-och strukturreformklausulerna hjer kommissionen inte anpassningskraven under ren efter beviljandet av klausulen fr att jmna ut de kade utgifterna p grund av den ovanliga hndelsen.
When assessing the expenditure allowed under the clauses, we found that certain preventive expenditure had been allowed ex ante (for example, preventive action on public buildings in Italy in 2017), despite deviating from the principle in the Vade Mecum requiring that it relate directly to the event42. 
Vid bedmningen av de utgifter som tillts enligt klausulerna fann vi att vissa frebyggande utgifter hade tilltits p frhand (exempelvis frebyggande tgrder vid offentliga byggnader i Italien r 2017) trots att detta avviker frn principen i handledningen som anger att utgifterna ska relatera direkt till hndelsen42.
In its replies, the Commission argues that if this expenditure were not incurred, it would be excluded ex post. 
I sina svar hvdar kommissionen att om denna utgift inte hade uppkommit skulle den ha uteslutits i efterhand.
We believe that, in this particular event, it should have been considered ineligible since it was not directly linked to the actual event. 
Vi anser att utgifterna, fr denna srskilda hndelse, inte borde ha tilltits eftersom de inte var direkt relaterade till den faktiska hndelsen.
Selection of the most favourable indicators from several vintages 58. 
Urval av de mest frdelaktiga indikatorerna frn flera datargngar. 58.
Another relaxation of the framework stems from the use of the most favourable data from several vintages for making decisions at various points of the procedure, instead of the latest available, which are the most reliable. 
En annan lttnad avseende ramen hrstammar frn anvndningen av de mest frdelaktiga uppgifterna frn flera datargngar fr beslut vid olika etapper i frfarandet i stllet fr de senast tillgngliga, vilka r mest tillfrlitliga.
The most favourable in this context means indicators requiring the smallest adjustment. 
Mest frdelaktiga avser i detta sammanhang indikatorer som krver den minsta anpassningen.
The Commission measures the distance to the MTO in a given year by comparing the MTO with the SB of the previous year, doing so by using the most favourable of different vintages, instead of comparing it with the SB of that year. 
Kommissionen mter avstndet till det medelfristiga budgetmlet ett visst r genom att jmfra det medelfristiga budgetmlet med fregende rs strukturella saldo, och detta grs genom att man anvnder den mest frdelaktiga av de olika datargngarna, i stllet fr att Artikel 5.1 punkt 13 och artikel 9.1 punkt 13 i frordning nr 1466/97.
For 35 42 Commission SGP Vade Mecum 2017, paragraph 4, p. 
Kommissionens SGP Vade Mecum 2017, punkt 4, s.
example, in assessing the DBPs in November 2017, the Commission could have taken into account the improved macroeconomic prospects. 
Exempelvis kunde kommissionen, vid bedmningen av utkasten till budgetplaner i november 2017, ha beaktat de frbttrade makroekonomiska utsikterna.
Furthermore, in the assessments of spring 2014, spring 2015 and spring 2016, the Commission selected the most favourable indicators from a mix of vintages that were not comparable since they were based on the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts (ESA) 95 and 2010. 
Vidare valde kommissionen, vid bedmningarna som gjordes vren 2014, vren 2015 och vren 2016, de mest frdelaktiga indikatorerna frn olika datargngar som inte var jmfrbara eftersom de baserades p det Europeiska nationalrkenskapssystemet (ENS) 95 och 2010.
During this transitional phase, the mixing of such vintages may have led to diverging positions from those that would have emerged had the indicators used been based on a common standard. 
Under denna vergngsfas kan blandningen av datargngar ha lett till andra stllningstaganden n dem som skulle ha framkommit om de anvnda indikatorerna hade baserats p en gemensam standard.
The cumulative effect of clauses and the significant deviation margin prevents attainment of the MTO in a reasonable time 62. 
Den sammanlagda effekten av klausuler och marginalen fr betydande avvikelser frhindrar att det medelfristiga budgetmlet uppns inom rimlig tid 62.
When the benchmark for annual convergence of 0.5 pp of GDP was set, the average SB of Member States with a deficit was 2.9 % of GDP43, and their average MTO was -0.5 % of GDP. 
Nr riktmrket fr rlig konvergens faststlldes till 0,5 procentenheter av BNP per r var det genomsnittliga strukturella saldot i medlemsstater som hade underskott 2,9 % av BNP43, och deras genomsnittliga medelfristiga budgetml var -0,5 % av BNP.
This implied that the MTO would be reached in about five years, assuming average macroeconomic conditions in that period. 
Det innebar att det medelfristiga budgetmlet skulle uppns p cirka fem r, under frutsttning att de genomsnittliga makroekonomiska villkoren var genomsnittliga under perioden.
This would be also roughly the convergence time for Member States exiting the EDP, assuming that the headline balance and SB coincide at that point (see Box 1). 
Det skulle ven i grova drag vara konvergenstiden fr medlemsstater som lmnade frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott, frutsatt att det totala saldot och det strukturella saldot sammanfaller vid denna tidpunkt (se ruta 1).
36 Box 1 - What is a reasonable time frame for reaching the MTO under the preventive arm? 
37 Ruta 1 Đ Vad r en rimlig tidsram fr att uppn det medelfristiga budgetmlet inom ramen fr den frebyggande delen?
The preventive arm regulation does not clearly specify the timeframe for reaching the MTO, although it mentions an “adjustment path sufficient to achieve the medium-term budgetary objective over the cycle” (Article 5(1) of the Regulation No 1466/97). 
I frordningen om den frebyggande delen faststlls inte ngon tydlig tidsram fr uppnendet av det medelfristiga budgetmlet, ven om det nmns att Óanpassningsbanan r tillrcklig[...] fr att det medelfristiga mlet ska kunna uppns under cykelnÓ (artikel 5.1 i frordning nr 1466/97).
The same article, when explaining the requirements of the structural reform clause, states “that the budgetary position is expected to return to the medium-term budgetary objective within the programme period.” 
I samma artikel, nr en frklaring ges av kraven fr strukturreformklausulen, fastsls att Óde offentliga finanserna frvntas terg till det medelfristiga budgetmlet inom programperiodenÓ.
37 The Commission used far more precise language, relating to the conditions for an investment clause, in its 2015 flexibility communication: “MTO must be reached within the four-year horizon of the current Stability or Convergence programme.” The following considerations suggest that a reasonable deadline for achieving the MTO should be no longer than 4-5 years: - At the time when the preventive arm regulation was adopted and introduced (1997-1999), the average structural balance deficit for euro area countries was below 2 % of GDP. 
Kommissionen anvnde ett mycket mer precist sprkbruk, om villkoren fr en investeringsklausul, i sitt meddelande frn 2015 om flexibilitet: Ó[...] det medelfristiga budgetmlet ska uppns inom de fyra r som medlemsstatens nuvarande stabilitets-eller konvergensprogram varar.Ó Fljande vervganden tyder p att en rimlig tidsfrist fr att uppn det medelfristiga budgetmlet inte br vara lngre n 4Đ5 r: Đ Nr frordningen om den frebyggande delen antogs och infrdes (1997Đ1999) var det genomsnittliga strukturella underskottet fr lnderna i euroomrdet mindre n 2 % av BNP.
With the defined benchmark for annual adjustment at 0.5 % of GDP, the structural budget deficit would have been eliminated (i.e. be “close to balance or in surplus”) within 4 years. - The purpose of the preventive arm is to create scope for automatic stabilisers to operate freely while keeping the headline budget deficit below the 3 % ceiling. 
Med det faststllda riktmrket fr rlig anpassning p 0,5 % av BNP skulle det strukturella budgetunderskottet ha eliminerats (dvs. vara Ónra balans eller i verskottÓ) inom fyra r. Đ Syftet med den frebyggande delen r att skapa utrymme s att de automatiska stabilisatorerna kan verka fritt samtidigt som det totala budgetunderskottet hlls under taket p 3 %.
For example, in the euro area, there were only 4 years with growth higher than 1 % between the 2001-2002 recession and the next crisis. - The debt rule under the SGP requires that the debt-to-GDP ratio fall by an average over three years of 1/20 of the excess between the actual debt ratio and 60 % of GDP. 
Exempelvis var det i euroomrdet enbart fyra r med en tillvxt som verskred 1 % mellan recessionen 2001Đ2002 och nsta kris. Đ Enligt skuldkriteriet i stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten ska skuldkvoten i frhllande till BNP ver tre r minska med i genomsnitt 1/20 av verskottet mellan den faktiska skuldkvoten och 60 % av BNP.