natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Although this evaluation pinpointed weaknesses and set out useful conclusions and recommendations on the management and monitoring of the agreements, the Commission is still studying whether and how to implement these findings. 
Vid utvrderingen upptcktes svagheter samt utarbetades slutsatser och rekommendationer fr frvaltningen och vervakningen av avtalen. Trots detta vervger kommissionen fortfarande hur dessa eventuellt kunde omsttas i praktiken.
For the Community, the added value of some agreements is higher than others and, in some cases, it is even negative. 
Vissa avtal ger gemenskapen ett strre mervrde n andra och i ngra fall r slutresultatet till och med negativt.
In terms of the value of the catch, one euro spent on financial compensation represented 0,9 euro for the Greenland Agreement and 3,4eurofortheMauritaniaAgreement(seeAnnexIII).Without calling into question the very existence of the fisheries agreements, an ongoing monitoring system and an analysis of their cost-benefit ratio could enable this situation to be clarified. 
En euro som betalas ut i ekonomisk ersttning motsvarade ett vrde av fngsten p 0,9 euro i avtalet med Grnland och 3,4 euro i avtalet med Mauretanien (se bilaga III). Utan att ifrgastta fiskeavtalens existens, borde en kontinuerlig vervakning och en analys av kostnadseffektiviteten kunna klargra situationen.
Between 1993 and 1999 there was a 42 % increase in the appropriations for payments under these agreements. 
Mellan 1993 och 1999 kade anslagen fr betalningar fr dessa avtal med 42 %.
The same period saw a slight decline in the fishing opportunities offered by the agreements. 
Under samma period minskade fiskerttigheterna enligt avtalen ngot.
As pointed out above, the increase in the cost to the budget can in part be attributed to various factors (such as the increase in the rates of financial compensation under some agreements, or the depletion of fish stocks). 
Som redan nmnts ovan kan den kade budgetbelastningen delvis frklaras av olika faktorer (som t.ex. hgre ersttningsniver i vissa avtal eller minskade fiskbestnd).
As regards the technical data sheets drawn up by the Commission for each individual agreement, four of the eight sheets examined by the Court did not contain data on catch quantities and none of them contained information on the value of these catches. 
Nr det gller de tekniska specifikationsmallar som kommis-sionentarframfrvarjeavtal,visadedetsigattifyraavttamal- lar som revisionsrtten granskade, saknades kvantitativa uppgifter om fngsterna och inte i ngon blankett angavs fngsternas vrde.
Although these data sheets contain certain aspects of a cost-benefit analysis and have improved since they were first introduced, some of the key data are still too vague to allow a meaningful analysis. 
Fastn dessa mallar innehller vissa delar av en kostnads-och effektivitetsanalys och trots att de har frbttrats sedan de frst infrdes, r vissa viktiga uppgifter fortfarande alltfr vaga fr att en frdjupad analys skall kunna gras.
They also fail to satisfy the requests made by the Council, referred to in paragraph 13. 
De ger inte heller ngot svar p de frgor som rdet har stllt, och som redan nmnts i punkt 13.
Underutilisation of the agreements 19. 
Avtalen underutnyttjas 19.
The CommissionŐs evaluation of these estimates ought to bethebasisfortheagreementstobenegotiated,giventheimpact they may have on the cost to be negotiated, on the balance of fish stocks and on the level of take-up of fishing opportunities. 
Kommissionens utvrderingar av dessa berkningar br utgra utgngspunkten fr avtalsfrhandlingarna, p grund av deras eventuella inverkan p de kostnader som skall frhandlas, fiskbestndets balans och utnyttjandegraden fr fiskerttigheterna.
In practice, the Member StatesŐ fishing fleets tend to overestimate their needs, which may lead to extra cost for the agreement, but also to underutilisation of the catch opportunities provided for by the agreement. 
I praktiken har medlemsstaternas fiskeflottor en tendens att verskatta sina behov, vilket kan leda till en alltfr hg kostnad fr avtalet eller ocks ett underutnyttjande av de fngstmjligheter som faststllts i avtalet.
This underutilisation may to some extent be explained by the shipownersŐ wish to safeguard for themselves the possibility of fishing in these waters, even if the latterarenoteconomicallyviable.Theirinterestisspeculativein so far as, even where the fishing opportunities available to Community fishermen are not fully used, the Community pays financial compensation for the total catches initially provided for. 
En sdan verskattning frklaras delvis av fartygsgarnas nskan att bevara mjligheten att fiska i dessa vatten, ven om detta inte r ekonomiskt lnsamt.
By way of example, two of the agreements (Senegal, Greenland) were underused, despite price increases at recent renewals. 
Som exempel kan tv avtal nmnas (med Senegal och Grn-land), som underutnyttjats trots kostnadskningar vid nyligen genomfrda frnyelser.
The Senegal Agreement continues to be underused: in addition to the longer period of the new Agreement (1997 to 2001), the total Community contribution has increased by 33 % per year. 
Avtalet med Senegal underutnyttjas fortfarande: utver det nya avtalets lngre lptid (1997Đ2001) har gemenskapens totala bidrag kat med 33 % per r.
This has been criticised by the CommissionŐs own Financial Controller (1). 
Kommissionens styrekonom (controller) har kritiserat detta (1).
Furthermore,thisAgreement(2)coversthenewcategoryoffish-ing, Ôpelagic freezer trawlersŐ, which has not been used at all, but the cost of which has been borne by the Commission. 
Avtalet (2) omfattar dessutom en ny fiskekategori som kallas Óflyttrlare med kylmjligheterÓ, som inte anvnts verhuvudtaget, men vars kostnader tckts av kommissionen.
The problem is that the Commission pays an overall amount for each agreement, without the costs being divided up between the various fishing categories. 
Den betalar nmligen en totalsumma fr varje avtal utan att kostnaderna frdelas mellan de olika fiskekategorierna.
As a result, even if one of the fishing categories (belonging under the same agreement) is underused or notusedatall,thisdoesnotleadtoareductionintheoverallcost borne by the Commission. 
Detta innebr att den totala kostnad som kommissionen str fr inte minskar, ven om en av fiskekategorierna i ett visst avtal inte utnyttjas fullt ut eller inte anvnds alls.
The Greenland Agreement, for its part, has been underused in the main fishing categories (cod and redfish). 
Avtalet med Grnland karakteriseras fr sin del av att de viktigaste fiskekategorierna (torsk och drakhuvudfisk) underutnyttjas.
The CommissionŐs technical data sheets (3) pointed out that, owing to the low utilisation rate, the costs involved had not brought any benefit in terms of catches for most of the fishing possibilities provided for by the 1995 to 2000 Agreement. 
I kommissionens tekniska specifikationsmallar (3) uppges att de kostnader som uppsttt p grund av underutnyttjandet inte har medfrt ngon nytta i form av fngster betrffande strsta delen av de fngstmjligheter som berknats i avtalet 1995Đ2000.
The scientific data available show that the underuse of this Agreement is largely due to a severe depletion of fish stocks. 
Tillgngliga vetenskapliga uppgifter visar att underutnyttjandet av avtalet till stor del beror p att fiskbestndet drastiskt har minskat.
The EU has therefore paid for catches which potentially did not exist, i.e. for ÔpaperŐ fish (see the Table). 
Europeiska unionen har allts betalat fr fngster som kanske inte finns, dvs. fr fiskar som endast finns p papperet (se tabell).
In the meantime, the agreement with Greenland was renewed in 2000, without the Commission taking sufficient accountofitshighcost,theOctober1999evaluationorevenits technical data sheets. 
Under tiden har avtalet med Grnland frnyats r 2000, utan att kommissionen i tillrcklig utstrckning tagit hnsyn till de hga kostnaderna, utvrderingen frn oktober 1999 eller sina tekniska mallar.
The Commission should ensure that the Member StatesŐ fishing fleets undertake actually to make use of the catch opportunities, so as to avoid unnecessary costs. 
Kommissionen borde skerstlla att medlemsstaternas fiskeflottor tar sig att verkligen utnyttja fngstmjligheterna, s att ondiga kostnader kan undvikas.
One solution could be to requirethemtolodgeguaranteesortopayahigheradvance(4)in order to deter purely speculative applications. 
En mjlig lsning vore att be dem stlla garantier eller betala ett strre frskott (4) fr att undvika anskningar som endast r spekulativa.
There needs to be close cooperation between the Commission and the Member Statesinthisrespect. 
I denna frga r ett nra samarbete mellan kommissionen och medlemsstaterna viktigt.
(1) Letter from the Financial control DG sent to the Fisheries DG on 5 2 October 1997. 
(1) Brev frn GD Ekonomistyrning till GD Fiske daterat den 5 oktober 2 1997.
(3) Agreement lasting from 1 May 1997 to 30 April 2001. 
(3) Avtalet lper frn den 1 maj 1997 till den 30 april 2001.
(4) Commission working paper of 2 February 2000, p. 
(4) Kommissionens arbetsdokument av den 2 februari 2000, s.
9. () Usually, the owners of tuna fishing vessels have to pay fees calculated on the basis of 20 euro per tonne, with a minimum catch which varies from one agreement to another. 
9. () Fartygsgare som innehar fiskefartyg avsedda fr att fiska tonfisk skall vanligtvis betala avgifter som berknas p basis av 20 euro per ton, med en minimiavgift som varierar mellan olika avtal.
In this context, this amount is called an ÔadvanceŐ. 
I detta sammanhang kallas beloppet fr ÓfrskottÓ.
At the end of the fishing period, there is a settlement procedure and, if the catch is higher than foreseen, the shipowner paysthedifference.Theadvance,bycontrast,isnotrefunded. 
Det skall betalas av fartygsgaren i utbyte mot fisketillstndet. Vid slutet av fiskeperioden inleds ett avslutningsfrfarande och om fngsten verskrider vad som verenskommits betalar fartygsgaren mellanskillnaden.
C 210/8 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 27.7.2001 Quota available/fishing opportunity Greenland (t) (all species) Ń Utilisation Ń Percentage Financial compensation (mio EUR) 37,7 Source: Internal Commission document of 2 February2000. 
C 210/8 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 27.7.2001 Tillgnglig kvot/fngstmjlighet Grnland (ton) (samtliga arter) Ń utnyttjande Ń i procent Ekonomisk ersttning (miljoner euro) 1995 267 144 80 330 30,0 37,7 1996 267 294 148 588 55,6 37,7 1997 253 294 142 388 56,1 37,7 1998 250 034 128 786 51,5 37,7 1999 239 309 90 004 37,6 37,7 Klla: Kommissionens interna dokument av den 2 februari 2000.
Sharing out the financial burden 24. 
Frdelningen av den ekonomiska brdan 24.
The costs to be shared consist of financial compensation paid by the Community and a fee paid by the private shipowners wanting to fish in the waters of third countries (see also above). 
De kostnader som skall delas bestr av en ekonomisk ersttning som utbetalas av gemenskapen och en avgift som betalas av privata fartygsgare som vill fiska i tredje lands vatten (se ven ovan).
The share of the financing which the Community has had to bearoutofpublicfundscanbeputat85,7%ofthetotalcostof theagreementsinvolvingfinancialcompensation(1).Inthelight of the intentions it has expressed in the past (2), the Commission should investigate the advisability, methods and consequences of sharing out the costs in a more balanced manner. 
Gemenskapens andel av finansieringen grs med offentliga medel och kan uppskattas till 85,7 % av den totala kostnaden fr avtalen med ekonomisk ersttning (1). Med tanke p de avsikter som uttryckts tidigare (2) borde kommissionen underska mjligheterna till, medlen fr och konsekvenserna av en jmnare frdelning av kostnaderna.
Indispensable information 26. 
Oumbrlig information 26.
Lastly, in spite of the weaknesses pointed out in the preceding paragraphs, the Commission was not able to draw up a complete balance sheet of the costs and benefits of the international fisheries agreements since the last evaluation, made in 1999: it was able to supply data on costs but not for the value of the catches nor for their direct or indirect impact (on jobs, for example). 
Slutligen, trots de brister som tagits upp i fregende punkter, har kommissionen inte kunnat visa upp ngon fullstndig sammanstllning av de internationella fiskeavtalens kostnader och frdelar sedan den senaste utvrderingen som gjordes 1999. Kommissionen har lmnat uppgifter om kostnaderna, men inte om vare sig vrdet av fngsterna eller deras direkta eller indirekta effekter (t.ex. p sysselsttningen).
In commercial negotiations, however, as is the case with the international fisheries agreements, it is absolutely vital for these figures to be available. 
Sdan information r emellertid oumbrlig vid affrsmssiga frhandlingar, som t.ex. de som rr de internationella fiskeavtalen.
Furthermore,initsResolutionof15May1997(3),theEuro-pean Parliament called on the Commission to draw up a set of guidelines to enable a uniform procedure when evaluating the implementation of expiring protocols on fishing opportunities or preparing for negotiations on new protocols or agreements. 
I sin resolution av den 15 maj 1997 (3) uppmanade Europaparlamentet kommissionen att utarbeta riktlinjer fr att gra det mjligt att tillmpa ett enhetligt frfarande vid utvrderingen av genomfrandet av fiskeprotokoll efter att dessa slutat glla och vid frberedandet av frhandlingar om nya protokoll eller avtal.
1 () The CommunityŐs share in the financing of the total cost of the fisheries agreements, for 1992 and 1997 respectively, was 82 % and 84 % for Morocco, 73 % and 82 % for Mauritania, 89 % and 90 % for Sene-2 gal and 100 % (constant figure) for Greenland. 
(1) Gemenskapens andel av finansieringen av totalkostnaden fr fiskeavtalen var fr 1992 och 1997 82 % respektive 84 % fr Marocko, 73 % respektive 82 % fr Mauretanien, 89 % respektive 90 % fr Senegal 2 och 100 % (konstant) fr Grnland.
(3) COM(96) 488 of 30 October 1998. () Minutes of the European Parliament, Resolution on international fish-eriesagreements,15May1997,A4-0149/1997. 
(3) KOM(96) 488, 30 oktober 1998. () Europaparlamentets protokoll, resolution om internationella fiskeavtal, 15.5.1997, A4Đ0149/1997.
During the period 1993 to 1999, there was a slight decline in the fishing opportunities, because of their reduction under the Morocco Agreement, as well as their stability or slight increase in other agreements(4). 
Under perioden 1993Đ1999 minskade fiskerttigheterna ngot, bl.a. p grund av att de minskades i avtalet med Marocko, samti-digtsomdevarofrndradeellerkadengotiandraavtal(4).
Nevertheless, during the same period the payment appro-priationsdevotedtotheagreementsincreased,whichconfirms the CommissionŐs wish to ensure that these fishing opportunities have a more stable basis. 
Under samma period kade emellertid betalningsbemyndigandena fr avtalen, vilket bekrftar kommissionens vilja att uppn stabilitet vad gller fiskerttigheterna.
In the 12 months following the expiry of the EU-Morocco Agreement on 30 November 1999, there was a substantial overall decrease in the fishing opportunities provided for by the agreements, notably at the expense of the Spanish and Portuguese fishermen. 
Avtalet mellan Europeiska unionen och Marocko lpte ut den 30 november 1999, och under defljandetolvmnadernaminskadefiskerttigheternaiavtaleti betydande grad, vilket bl.a. pverkade spanska och portugisiska fiskarenegativt.
Supply to the market and aid to employment 30. 
Frsrjningen av marknaden och sysselsttningsstd 30.
The fisheries agreements aim to ensure supplies to a market which on the whole has a shortage, and to safeguard jobs. 
Fiskeavtalen syftar till att frsrja en marknad som har ett stort underskott, samt till att bevara arbetstillfllen.
The Commission does not have up-to-date figures on the impact of each agreement on these two aspects, which, moreover, are not systematically analysed in the technical data sheets referred to above. 
Kommissionen har inte tillgng till korrekt och aktuell information om varje avtals effekt i dessa tv avseenden. De analyseras fr vrigt inte heller systematiskt i de tekniska specifikationsmallar som nmnts ovan.
In order systematically to measure the impact of the agreements on the supply to the market and on employment, suitable criteria and indicators need to be defined (for example: data on landingsandcatchesintermsoftheirquantityandvalue;direct or indirect jobs). 
Fr att systematiskt kunna mta avtalens effekter p frsrjningen av marknaden och p sysselsttningen, mste man definiera lmpliga kriterier och indikatorer (t.ex. uppgifter om hur mycket som lossats, mtt i kvantitet och vrde, om fngsternas kvantitet och vrde, om antalet direkta och indirekta arbetstillfllen).
27.7.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 210/9 andthereforetoanticipatewhattheeffectsofthiswouldbe.In this context, the non-renewal of the agreement with Morocco in 1999 had considerable economic and social repercussions (about 7 000 direct jobs and 470 vessels) in the regions of Europe which were heavily dependent on it (in particular, Spain and Portugal). 
27.7.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 210/9 drmed frutsga effekterna av detta. I detta sammanhang kan nmnas att det faktum att avtalet med Marocko inte frnyades 1999 fick betydande ekonomiska och sociala konsekvenser i vissa regioner (framfr allt i Spanien och Portugal), som i hg grad var beroende av avtalet (cirka 7 000 direkta arbetstillfllen och 470 fartyg).
Restructuring strategy 32. 
Omstruktureringsstrategi 32.
The structural aspect of the common fisheries policy aims in particular to achieve: (a)abalancebetweenthecapacitiesofthefishingfleetsandfish stocks; (b) promotion of the development of the regions that are dependent on fishing; (c) elimination of surplus capacities; (d) the construction and modernisation of fleets, under certain conditions. 
Strukturdelen av den gemensamma fiskeripolitiken syftar bl.a. till att a) uppn jmvikt mellan fiskeflottornas kapacitet och fiskbestndet, b) stdja utvecklingen av de regioner som r beroende av fiske, c) eliminera verskottskapaciteten, d) bygga upp och modernisera flottorna, under vissa frutsttningar.
This aspect of Ôstructural measuresŐ is linked, amongst other things, to that of the international fisheries agreements, and thus clear, consistent objectives need to be set and the measures taken need to be closely coordinated. 
Denna del av ÓstrukturtgrdernaÓ hnger bl.a. samman med de internationella fiskeavtalen, vilket krver en tydlig definition av konsekventa ml och en nra samordning av vidtagna tgrder.
During the negotiations for the International Fisheries Agreement with Morocco in 1994 and 1995, it was found that fish stocks in Moroccan waters were tending to become depleted and that the fishing sector in Morocco was being developed. 
Vid frhandlingarna om det internationella fiskeavtalet med Marocko 1994Đ1995 konstaterades att fiskbestndet i de marockanska vattnen tenderade att minska och att utvecklingen av Marockos fiskerisektor hll p att avmattas.
This oughttohavepromptedapolicyofgraduallyrestructuringthe fleets of the Member States operating in these waters, as the Commission stated during the negotiations. 
D borde man ha inlett en successiv omstruktureringspolitik av de EU-flottor som fiskar i dessa vatten, vilket kommissionen uppgav vid frhandlingarna.
A policy of this kind would have allowed the gradual implementation of restructuring mea-sures(suchastheredeploymentofvessels)andofsocialmeasures to limit the effects on the Community fishing sector; it would also havemadetheCommunityfleetslessdependentonthisAgree-ment. 
En sdan politik hade gjort det mjligt att stegvis infra omstruktureringstgrder (som t.ex. en omstllning av fartygen) och tgrder av social natur fr att begrnsa effekterna p gemenskapens fiskerisektor.
The sectorŐs stability and sustainable development could thus have been safeguarded. 
P detta stt hade sektorns stabilitet och hllbara utveckling kunnat skerstllas.
As it was, out of a total of 125 new boats (in particular Spanish and Portuguese) having fished in Moroccanwaters(the1995to1999Agreement),54werefound to have been constructed using European Community co-financing. 
Emellertid kan man konstatera att av totalt 125 nya btar (framfr allt spanska och portugisiska) som fiskade i de marockanska vattnen (avtalet 1995Đ1999) hade 54 samfinansierats av Europeiska gemenskapen.
The Commission, in partnership with the Member States, had not set any clear objectives for the granting of the (Structural Fund) aid for the construction of new vessels nor had it monitored the subsequent use of this aid. 
Kommissionen hade inte tillsammans med medlemsstaterna definierat tydliga ml fr frdelningen av stdet (som kom frn strukturfonderna) till byggandet av nya fartyg. Den hade inte heller fljt upp deras anvndning.
There are two ques-tionswhichspringtomindhere:wasthisinstrumentanintegral part of an overall plan for restructuring the Member StatesŐ fishing fleets? 
Tv frgor kan stllas: Har detta instrument varit en integrerad del av en vergripande plan fr omstrukturering av medlemsstaternas fiskeflottor?
Was the decline in the number of fishing licences, as reflected in the decrease in the number of vessels from 590 to 477 between 1996 and 1999, the sole outcome of the implementation of the restructuring objective? 
Minskningen av antalet fisketillstnd terspeglar minskningen av antalet fartyg frn 590 till 477 enheter mellan 1996 och 1999, men r den det enda resultatet av genomfrandet av omstrukturerings-mlet?
Thus, for some agreements, the Commission was not able to show any relationship between the negotiating aim and the common fisheries policy objective to reducethefishingeffortinCommunitywaters(1).Thereisthus still a lack of consistency between these two aspects of the common fisheries policy. 
Fr vissa avtal har kommissionen inte heller kunnat pvisa ngot samband mellan mlet fr frhandlingarna och mlet fr den gemensamma fiskeripolitiken, dvs. att minska fisket i gemenskapens vatten (1). Samordningen av dessa bda aspekter av gemenskapens fiskeripolitik skerstlls drmed inte alltid.
Furthermore, the construction of the vessels was undertaken without any systematic check as to whether the catch capacities were appropriate for the resources covered by the agreements. Since the expiry of the Moroccan Agreement and the consequent discontinuation of fishing in Moroccan waters, the fleets concerned have, on certain conditions, received indemnities that are co-financed by the Community and are intended to offset the corresponding losses in income. 
Dessutom har fartyg byggts utan att man systematiskt har verifierat att fngstkapaciteten och de bestnd som omfattas av fiskeavtalen r anpassade till varandra. Sedan avtalet med Marocko lpte ut och fisket i de marockanska vattnen slutade, erhller de berrda flottorna p vissa villkor ersttning som gemenskapen samfinansierar. Denna ersttning skall tcka motsvarande inkomstfrluster.
For 2000, the amount budgeted for these indemnities was 124 million euro, 59 million euro of which was financed by the Community budget. 
Fr r 2000 var budgeten fr denna ersttning 124 miljoner euro, varav 59 miljoner euro finansierades av gemenskapen. 35.