natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
While the Commission financed a Project Preparation Facility (PPF) in 1999 of between 2 million and 3 million euro for each Candidate Country to provide technical assistance to improve the pipeline of projects for ESC funding in 2000 and 2001, most countries struggled to make effective use of this instrument. 
Medan kommissionen finansierade en projektberedningsfond 1999 om mellan 2 och 3 miljoner euro fr varje kandidatland fr att ge tekniskt std fr att frbttra kanaliseringen av projekt som skulle finansieras av programmen fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning 2000 och 2001, kmpade de flesta lnderna fr att anvnda detta instrument effektivt.
Beneficiaries at both national and local level often did not coordinate sufficiently with the consultants preparing the projects, which in some cases reduced the quality of the projects prepared. 
Mottagare bde p nationell och lokal niv samordnade ofta inte tillrckligt med de konsulter som frberedde projekten, vilket i vissa fall frsmrade kvaliteten p de frberedda projekten.
Apart from this 1999 PPF, no other horizontal programme covering all countries was established by the Commission for preparing later ESC programmes and, more importantly, developing a pipeline of projects for the Structural Fund financing. 
Frutom projektberedningsfonden 1999 infrde kommissionen inget vergripande program som gllde alla lnderna fr att frbereda senare program fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning och, nnu viktigare, utveckla en kanal fr projekt som skall finansieras genom strukturfonder.
Moreover, most Candidate Countries allocated few or no resources to developing project pipelines for the Structural Funds from their national Phare programmes. 
Dessutom anslog de flesta kandidatlnderna f eller inga resurser till att utveckla projektkanaler fr strukturfonderna frn sina nationella Phare-program.
Delays in programme implementation 46. 
Frseningar i programgenomfrandet 46.
Although Phare rules allow three years after the commitment of funds for programmes to be fully implemented and disbursed (Ôn+3Ő project cycle timeframe), the disbursement rate for the ESC commitments made in 2000 was only 71,7 %, including advance payments, at the end of 2003 (see Table 3). 
Enligt reglerna fr Phare r det tilltet att fullt ut genomfra program och ta emot utbetalningar fr dem tre r efter tagandet av medlen (tidsram fr projektcykler Ón+3Ó), men i slutet av 2003 ndde utbetalningar fr taganden fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning som ingtts 2000 endast upp till 71,7 %, inklusive frskottsbetalningar (se tabell 3).
This slowed down efforts to improve administrative capacity in preparation for the ERDF and the ESF. 
Detta har bromsat anstrngningarna att frbttra den administrativa frmgan nr det gller frberedelserna fr ERUF och ESF.
It also highlighted the weaknesses in administrative capacity and the need for more assistance. 
Det visade ocks p den svaga administrativa frmgan och behovet av ytterligare std.
The Twinning component of the 1998 Special Preparatory Programme only got underway towards the end of 1999 and therefore did not generally have an impact until the first half of 2001. Although twinners had been needed to assist in drawing up the preliminary National Development Plans, in all cases they took up their positions after the September 1999 deadline for the submission of the first draft. 
Partnersamverkansdelen i det srskilda frberedande programmet 1998 kom inte igng frrn mot slutet av 1999 och hade drfr allmnt inte ngon effekt frrn frsta halvret 2001. ven om samverkanspartnerna hade behvts i utarbetandet av de preliminra nationella utvecklingsplanerna tilltrdde de i samtliga fall efter sista inlmningsdatum fr det frsta utkastet i september 1999.
These delays were in part due to Twinning being a new instrument as well as weaknesses on the part of the Candidate CountriesŐ administrations. 
Dessa frseningar berodde delvis p att partnersamverkan var ett nytt instrument och delvis p svagheter i kandidatlndernas administration.
However, the SPP technical assistance contracts in most cases were only signed in the second half of 1999. 
Kontrakten om tekniskt std inom det srskilda frberedande programmet tecknades dock i de flesta fall inte frrn andra halvret 1999.
Countries in most cases experienced difficulties in drawing up project fiches of an acceptable quality for the ESC programmes and had recourse for assistance to the Commission Delegations and consultancy firms. 
I de flesta fall hade lnderna svrigheter med att utarbeta projektformulr av acceptabel kvalitet fr programmen fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning och anlitade hjlp frn kommissionens delegationer och konsultfirmor.
Indeed, a significant portion of the projects which were approved were in fact often not fully prepared and/or suffered from shortcomings in their design, which delayed implementation and hence reduced their impact upon preparation before accession. Although Bulgaria was not due to join the European Union until after other Candidate Countries, the design of its ESC programmes was amongst the most complex of all the Phare ESC programmes, which increased implementation difficulties in that country. 
En betydande del av de projekt som godkndes var i sjlva verket ofta inte helt frberedda och/eller brast i utformningen, vilket frsenade genomfrandet och drfr begrnsade deras inverkan p frberedelserna infr anslutningen. ven om Bulgarien inte kommer att ansluta sig till Europeiska unionen frrn efter de andra kandidatlnderna var utformningen av dess program fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning bland de mest komplexa av alla Phare-program fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning, vilket ledde till kade svrigheter med genomfrandet i Bulgarien.
More straightforward implementation mechanisms should have been pursued in this country in the first years of ESC. 44. 
Man borde ha fljt enklare genomfrandemekanismer under de frsta ren med program fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning.
Although infrastructure projects financed under ESC were supposed to be business-related, in Poland in 2000 and 2001, in order to absorb funds, approximately 35 % of funding was allocated to road infrastructure projects with often only tenuous links to business development. 
44. ven om det var meningen att infrastrukturprojekt som finansierades genom program fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning skulle vara fretagsrelaterade, tilldelade man i Polen r 2000 och 2001, fr att f tillgng till medel, omkring 35 % av medlen till vginfrastrukturprojekt, ofta med endast otydliga kopplingar till fretagsutveckling.
In the Czech Republic and Romania, a number of industrial parks were financed without the countries having an overall strategy to prioritise locations and avoid an excess supply of such parks. 
I Tjeckien och Rumnien finansierades ett antal industriparker utan att lnderna hade ngon vergripande strategi fr att prioritera lokaliseringen och undvika ett verdrivet stort antal sdana parker.
Under the ESC 2000 programme, 12,7 % of PolandŐs allocation was foreseen for a 17,5 million euro access road to Katowice airport, even though all transport and environment infrastructure projects costing more than 5 million euro were to be financed by ISPA. 
Inom programmet fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning 2000 hade 12,7 % av Polens anslag planerats att anvndas till en tillfartsvg till Katowices flygplats fr 17,5 miljoner euro, trots att alla infrastrukturprojekt gllande transport och milj ver 5 miljoner euro skulle finansieras genom Ispa.
In addition, a further 10 road projects in the beneficiary regions were financed for 28,4 million euro which were not specifically focused on business promotion but most commonly formed part of wider city bypass/ring road projects. 
Dessutom finansierades ytterligare tio vgprojekt i de stdmottagande regionerna fr 28,4 miljoner euro som inte var specifikt inriktade p fretagsfrm-jande utan oftast var en del av strre projekt fr frbifartsleder/ringleder runt stder.
This was also the case for the 13 road projects financed under ESC 2001 for a total of 59,3 million euro (34,9 % of budget). 
Detta var ocks fallet med de 13 vgprojekt som finansierades genom programmet fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning 2001 fr totalt 59,3 miljoner euro (34,9 % av budgeten).
20.1.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 15/15 Table 3 Implementation of ESC programmes 2000 to 2002 (31.12.2003) 2000 ESC ESC payments commitments 17,5 13,3 2001 ESC ESC payments commitments (million euro) Total (2000 to 2002) 2002 ESC ESC payments commitments 6,3 1,7 3,7 0,6 4,5 Ń 1,6 Ń 41,5 0,4 197,6 Ń 5,8 1,0 16,5 1,3 14,0 Ń 106,6 0,6 398,1 5,6 51. delayed due to difficulties Candidate Countries had encountered in establishing the operational guidelines governing the implementation of grant schemes. 
20.1.2005 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 15/15 Tabell 3 Genomfrande av programmen fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning (ESC) 2000Đ2002 (31.12.2003) ESC taganden 17,5 ESC betalningar 13,3 9,7 8,8 13,0 18,5 103,7 4,5 6,1 5,3 53,9 236,8 ESC taganden 13,6 6,0 9,0 15,6 31,0 170,0 3,0 18,4 37,1 109,0 412,7 ESC betalningar 10,8 2,0 0,6 4,4 7,5 32,4 0,6 3,8 10,0 26,2 98,3 ESC betalningar 1,7 0,6 Ń Ń 0,4 Ń 1,0 1,3 Ń 0,6 5,6 ESC taganden 37,4 19,8 24,0 31,2 99,5 504,6 13,8 41,2 66,1 303,6 1 141,2 ESC betalningar 25,8 12,3 9,4 17,4 26,4 136,1 6,1 11,2 15,3 80,7 340,7 2000 2001 2002 (miljoner euro) Totalt (2000Đ2002) Land Tjeckien Estland Lettland Litauen Ungern Polen 137,0 Slovenien 5,0 Slovakien 6,3 Bulgarien 15,0 Rumnien 88,0 Totalt 330,4 Klla: Europeiska kommissionen.
These had to be approved by the Commission before calls for project proposals could be launched and frequently required several drafts before they were of a satisfactory standard. 
Dessa mste godknnas av kommissionen innan man kunde gra en anbudsinfordran och krvde ofta flera omarbetningar innan de var i godtagbart skick.
In most countries the great majority of funds were only contracted in the last two months before the contracting deadline, approximately 6 to 12 months later than the implementation timetables set out in the project fiches. 
I de flesta lnder tecknades kontrakt fr strre delen av medlen inte frrn tv mnader fre sista dagen fr att teckna kontrakt, omkring 6Đ12 mnader senare n den tidsplan fr genomfrande som angavs i projektformulret.
In fact the deadline for the beneficiary countries to complete the contracting of the programme had to be extended in Bulgaria and Estonia, as did the disbursement period in Hungary and Poland. 
I sjlva verket fick man i Bulgarien och Estland frlnga tiden som mottagarlnderna hade p sig att teckna kontrakt fr resterande anslag inom programmet, och i Ungern och Polen fick man frlnga utbetalningsperioden.
In the case of the SPP pilot investment projects, implementation was particularly slow because it was only after the SPP had begun that the Commission sought to clarify how far existing Phare procedures for the implementation of these projects could be modified in order to make them more akin to Structural Fund procedures. 
Vad gller investeringar i pilotprojekt inom det srskilda frberedande programmet var genomfrandet srskilt lngsamt eftersom det var frst nr det frberedande programmet hade inletts som kommissionen frskte klargra hur de befintliga Phare-frfarandena fr genomfrande av dessa projekt kunde anpassas s att de blev mer lika frfarandena fr strukturfonderna.
Most countries only contracted the 1999 Project Preparation Facility shortly before the December 2001 deadline, even though most of the contracts to be funded under the PPF concerned relatively small service and study inputs. 
De flesta lnderna tecknade inga kontrakt fr 1999 rs projektberedningsfond frrn kort tid fre slutdatum i december 2001, ven om de flesta av de kontrakt som skulle finansieras genom projektberedningsfonden gllde relativt sm tjnste-och underskningsuppdrag.
Because of delays, in only a few cases was the Facility used for preparing projects under the ESC 2000 programme, it being mainly used for the 2001 and 2002 ESC programmes. 
P grund av frseningar anvndes projektberedningsfonden endast i f fall fr frberedelse av projekt inom programmet fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning 2000, och anvndes istllet mestadels fr programmen fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning 2001 och 2002.
Several countries were unable to fully use their allocation before the contracting deadline. 
Flera lnder kunde inte till fullo anvnda sina anslag fre sista datum fr att teckna kontrakt.
In Latvia, the Commission made a significant derogation from tendering procedures to enable funds to be contracted before the deadline. 
I Lettland avvek kommissionen tydligt frn upphandlingsfrfarandena fr att man fre slutdatum skulle kunna teckna kontrakt fr anslagen.
Thus the time for tendering a contract of 2 million euro to provide a number of studies was reduced from the minimum of 50 days to just 28 days. 
Minimitidsfristen p 50 dagar fr upphandling av ett kontrakt om 2,0 miljoner euro fr ett antal underskningar minskades till endast 28 dagar.
This had a negative effect on the number and quality of the bids received, which also affected subsequent implementation. 
Detta hade en negativ effekt p antalet mottagna bud och kvaliteten p dem, vilket ocks senare pverkade genomfrandet.
Notwithstanding the fact that Twinning procedures were not being used for the first time, Twinning projects in the framework of the 2000 and 2001 ESC were subject to considerable delays in both selecting the Member State which would provide the twinners and then drafting the Twinning covenant. 
Trots att det inte var frsta gngen frfarandena fr partnersamverkan anvndes blev partnersamverkansprojekten inom ramen fr programmet fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning 2000 och 2001 kraftigt frsenade bde vad gller val av medlemsstat som skulle st fr samverkanspartner och vad gller utarbetandet av partnersamverkansavtalet.
C 15/16 EN Official Journal of the European Union 20.1.2005 53. 
C 15/16 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 20.1.2005 53.
The problems encountered by Candidate Countries in programming ESC allocations raise doubts about their capacity to absorb the much greater allocations planned under the Structural Funds (see Table 4), particularly in view of the new tighter timeframe for the ESC commitments 2000 to 2002 compared with Structural Fund allocations 2004 to 2006 disbursement of Structural Funds introduced for the period 2000 to 2006 (the so-called Ôn+2Ő rule) (30). 
De problem som kandidatlnderna hade med programplaneringen av anslag till ekonomisk och social sammanhllning vcker tvivel om deras frmga att utnyttja de mycket strre anslag som planeras under strukturfonderna (se tabell 4), i synnerhet med tanke p den nya snvare tidsram fr struktur-fondsutbetalningar som infrdes fr perioden 2000Đ2006 (den s kallade Ón+2Ó-regeln) (3 0 ).
In fact ESC funding for 2000 to 2002 represented only approximately 6 % of Structural Fund allocations for 2004 to 2006 for Objective 1 (31). 
Medlen fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning fr 2000Đ2002 utgjorde i sjlva verket endast omkring 6 % av strukturfondsanslagen fr 2004Đ2006 fr ml 1 (31).
Country Czech Republic Estonia Latvia Lithuania Hungary Poland 504,6 Slovenia 13,8 Slovakia 41,2 Total 771,5 Source: European Court of Auditors. 
Tabell 4 taganden inom ekonomisk och social sammanhllning (ESC) 2000Đ2002 jmfrt med strukturfondsanslag (SF) 2004Đ2006 Land Tjeckien Estland Lettland Litauen Ungern Polen 504,6 Slovenien 13,8 Slovakien 41,2 Totalt 771,5 Klla: Europeiska revisionsrtten.
A fundamental cause of the delays for all programmes has been administrative weaknesses in the Candidate Countries. 
En kraftigt bidragande orsak till frseningarna i alla programmen var administrativa brister i kandidatlnderna.
In each country regional policy represents a new field of action and most countries struggled to establish stable structures which were capable of managing even the relatively small amount of funding allocated to the ESC. 
I samtliga lnder r regionalpolitik ett nytt verksamhetsflt och de flesta lnder kmpade fr att upprtta stabila strukturer som skulle klara av att frvalta ven den relativt lilla summa som anslogs till ekonomisk och social sammanhllning.
Moreover, the newness and weakness of the ministries concerned reduced their ability to establish the necessary coordination with other ministries to ensure effective programming and implementation. 
P grund av att ministerierna var s nyinrttade och svaga begrnsades deras frmga att upprtta den ndvndiga samordningen med andra ministerier fr att garantera att programmen planerades och genomfrdes ndamlsenligt.
In addition, the channelling of all funding through a single implementing authority also created bottlenecks which slowed down the overall implementation and, therefore, impact of the programmes (see paragraph 26). (million euro) ESC as % of SF 2,9 % 6,0 % 4,3 % 3,9 % 5,6 % 6,9 % 6,6 % 4,5 % 5,9 % ESC 2000 to 2002 37,4 SF 2004-2006: Objective 1 1 286 329 554 792 1 765 7 321 210 921 13 178 19,8 24,0 31,2 99,5 Table 4 down in January 2001 and its functions transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. 
I Litauen lades ministeriet fr reform av offentlig frvaltning och fr lokala myndigheter ner i januari 2001 och (miljoner euro) ESC i % av SF 2,9 6,0 4,3 3,9 5,6 6,9 6,6 4,5 5,9 ESC 2000Đ2002 37,4 SF 2004Đ2006: ml 1 1 286 329 554 792 1 765 7 321 210 921 13 178 19,8 24,0 31,2 99,5 dess verksamhet verfrdes till inrikesministeriet.
Inadequate performance by the Latvian authorities originally managing the ESC programme also led to these responsibilities being moved to the Ministry of Finance in 2002. 
De lettiska myndigheter som ursprungligen frvaltade programmet fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning fullgjorde inte sin uppgift tillfredsstllande, vilket ledde till att dessa ansvarsomrden flyttades ver till finansministeriet 2002.
In Slovakia and Romania, the ministries responsible for regional development only became operational in 2000 and lacked experienced staff. 
I Slovakien och Rumnien brjade ministerierna som var ansvariga fr regional utveckling och offentliga arbeten inte fungera frrn r 2000 och de saknade erfaren personal.
In Bulgaria, the Ministry for Regional Development and Public Works underwent reorganisations and a particularly high level of staff turnover followed changes in political responsibilities. 
I Bulgarien omorganiserades ministeriet fr regional utveckling, och efter frndringar i det politiska ansvaret fljde en synnerligen hg personalomsttning.
The Ministries of Regional Development in the Czech Republic and Hungary also suffered a loss of key personnel in 2000 for similar reasons. 
Ministerierna fr regional utveckling i Tjeckien och Ungern frlorade ocks nyckelpersoner i personalen r 2000 av liknande skl.
Similarly, in Lithuania, the Ministry of Public Administration Reform and Local Authorities was closed (30) The Structural Fund Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 Article 31.2 foresees that Ôthe Commission shall automatically decommit any part of a commitment which has not been settled by the payment on account or for which it has not received an acceptable payment appli-cation... by the end of the second year following the year of com-mitmentŐ. 
(30) I artikel 31.2 i strukturfondsfrordningen (EG) nr 1260/1999 faststlls det att Ókommissionen skall automatiskt terta den del av ett tagande som inte har omfattats av frskottsbetalningen eller fr vilken det inte har kommit in ngon (...) godtagbar anskan om utbetalning till kommissionen senast vid utgngen av andra ret efter det r d tagandet ingicksÓ.
(31) Notwithstanding the closeness of accession, the CommissionŐs November 2003 ÔComprehensive Monitoring ReportŐ pointed to continuing weaknesses in Candidate CountriesŐ capacity for managing the Structural Funds. 
(31) Trots att anslutningen nrmade sig pekade kommissionens Óheltckande vervakningsrapportÓ i november 2003 p bestende brister i kandidatlndernas frmga att frvalta strukturfonderna.
The countries needed to make what the Commission termed Ôenhanced effortsŐ in their preparations for accession. 
Kommissionen ansg att lnderna behvde gra Ókade anstrngningarÓ fr att frbereda sig infr anslutningen.
20.1.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 15/17 RESULTS OF INSTITUTION-BUILDING PROJECTS TO PREPARE CANDIDATE COUNTRIES FOR MANAGING THE STRUCTURAL FUNDS 56. 
20.1.2005 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 15/17 RESULTAT AV INSTITUTIONSUPPBYGGNADSPROJEKT F R ATT F RBEREDA KANDIDATLNDERNA F R F RVALTNINGEN AV STRUKTURFONDERNA 56.
The 1998 SPP Twinning projects generally allowed some initial progress to be made by mid-2001 in preparing for the Structural Funds. 
Tack vare samverkansprojekten inom det srskilda frberedande programmet 1998 gjordes vissa inledande framsteg fram till mitten av 2001 nr det gller frberedelserna fr strukturfonderna.
However, the project achievements were very largely not as far-reaching as had been intended at the start of the projects. 
Resultaten av projekten var dock ofta inte s genomgripande som man hade avsett nr projekten inleddes.
In the most problematic case, in Bulgaria, the project was abandoned with only approximately 30 % of the funds spent because of the difficult relations between the twinners and their counterparts. 
I det mest problematiska fallet, i Bulgarien, vergav man projektet nr endast 30 % av medlen hade anvnts p grund av svrigheter i relationerna mellan samverkanspartnerna och deras motparter.
Generally SPP Projects achieved least progress in contributing to drawing up National Development Plans and the setting up of monitoring systems for Structural Funds, mainly because of the complexity of these tasks and the relatively short timeframe of Twinning covenants. 
I allmnhet nddes minst framgngar i projekten inom det srskilda frberedande programmet nr det gllde att medverka till att utarbeta nationella utvecklingsplaner och inrtta vervakningssystem fr strukturfonderna, frmst p grund av att dessa uppgifter r s komplexa och att tidsramen i avtalen om partnersamverkan r relativt kort.
However, the respective roles of twinners and consultants were not always clearly defined which led to a degree of overlap, for example, in contributing to the National Development Plans. 
Samverkanspart-nernas och konsulternas olika roller var dock inte alltid tydligt definierade, vilket ledde till en viss verlappning till exempel nr det gllde medverkande till de nationella utvecklingsplanerna.
Of particular concern is the way the changes in responsibilities between ministries and the internal restructuring of ministries (see paragraph 55), as well as the high turnover of individual staff, reduced the lasting impact of the SPP. Even for ESC programmes in 2000 and 2001 there still existed a similar risk of funds being allocated to ministries which in the end would not be designated to manage the Structural Funds. 
Srskilt oroande r det att frndringar i ansvarsfrhl-landena mellan ministerier och den interna omstruktureringen av ministerierna (se punkt 55) liksom den hga personalomsttningen minskade den varaktiga effekten av det srskilda frberedande programmet. ven fr programmen fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning 2000 och 2001 fanns det en liknande risk fr att medlen tilldelades ministerier som i slutndan inte skulle utses att frvalta strukturfonderna.
This problem was only finally resolved in 2002 when Candidate Countries, in the context of their negotiation of Chapter 21 of the Accession Treaty, were obliged to decide on their managing and paying authorities. 
Detta problem lstes slutgiltigt frst 2002 nr kandidatlnderna under frhandlingarna om kapitel 21 i anslutningsfrdraget var tvungna att fatta beslut om sina frvaltningsmyndigheter och utbetalande myndigheter.