natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It should also be more explicit in all cases on the level of compliance of an SCP with the requirements of the CoC. (c) The Commission should introduce a table presenting, separately for each pillar, assessment conclusions in its SWDs on the level of deviations. 
Kommissionen br ven vara tydligare i allmnhet nr det gller ett stabilitets-och konvergensprograms verensstmmelse med kraven i uppfrandekoden. c) Kommissionen br infra en tabell dr slutsatserna av bedmningarna i arbetsdokumenten nr det gller avvikelsenivn presenteras separat fr varje pelare.
It should also explain in detail the conclusion of the overall assessment, pointing to all the factors taken into consideration if the overall assessment conclusion is not in line with the criteria stipulated in the Regulation. (d) The Commission should also present data on cumulative deviations of at least the preceding five years. 
Den br ven i detalj nrmare frklara slutsatserna av den vergripande bedmningen, och hnvisa till samtliga faktorer som beaktats om den vergripande bedmningsslutsatsen inte verensstmmer med kriterierna som faststllts i frordningen. d) Kommissionen br ven lgga fram uppgifter om kumulativa avvikelser fr tminstone de fem fregende ren.
This recommendation should be implemented in time for application in Spring 2019. 
Denna rekommendation br genomfras i tid infr tillmpningen vren 2019.
Use of vintages and freezing should be reviewed 144. 
Anvndningen av datargngar och frysning br ses ver 144.
Certain technical approaches, such as the use of freezing or of the most favourable indicators from a mix of vintages, or the use of smoothing of investments in the expenditure benchmark do not stem from the Regulation and may lead to delays in detecting significant deviations (paragraphs 59 to 60, 108 to 109). 
Vissa tekniska metoder, exempelvis anvndning av frysning eller av de mest frdelaktiga indikatorerna frn olika r eller av utjmning av investeringar i riktmrket fr utgifter, hrrr inte frn frordningen och kan leda till frseningar i upptckten av betydande avvikelser (punkterna 59Đ60 och 108Đ109).
The practice of unfreezing adjustment requirements is asymmetrical. 
Den praxis som bestr i att hva frysningen av anpassningskrav r asymmetrisk.
It prevents a larger adjustment from being sought when assessing draft budgetary plans (DBP), when perhaps justified by updated information (paragraph 61). 
Den frhindrar att strre anpassningar efterstrvas nr utkasten till budgetplaner bedms, nr detta kanske motiveras av uppdaterade uppgifter (punkt 61).
Recommendation 5 (a) The Commission should base its requirements on the most up-to-date data rather than the most favourable data from a selection of past vintages. 
Rekommendation 5 a) Kommissionen br grunda sina krav p de mest aktuella uppgifterna snarare n p de mest frdelaktiga uppgifterna frn ett urval av tidigare rgngar.
72 (b) In the expenditure benchmark, it should apply the concept of aggregate expenditure as required by the Regulation, without “smoothing of investments”. (c) Where prospects improve substantially between the assessment of SCPs and DBPs, the Commission should be ready to request a larger adjustment effort. 
74 b) I utgiftsriktmrket br kommissionen tillmpa konceptet aggregerade utgifter, ssom krvs enligt frordningen, och inte Óutjmna investeringarÓ. c) I de fall d utsikterna frbttras vsentligt mellan bedmningen av stabilitets-och konvergensprogram och utkast till budgetplaner br kommissionen vara redo att begra en strre anpassningsinsats.
The clarity of explanations in country-specific recommendations should be improved 146. 
Frklaringarna i landsspecifika rekommendationer br frtydligas 146.
More could be done to explain the rationale behind recommended adjustments and the risks that would ensue if such requirements were not met (paragraphs 122 to 126). 
Mer kan gras fr att frklara den logiska grunden bakom rekommenderade anpassningar och de risker som skulle uppst om sdana krav inte uppfylls (punkterna 122Đ126).
Recommendation 6 (a) Recitals should explain in detail the rationale for the recommended adjustment and related risks. (b) The required adjustment should be specified in the enacting part of the CSRs to indicate their obligatory character and not in the recitals. 
Rekommendation 6 a) Sklen br i detalj frklara den logiska grunden till de rekommenderade anpassningarna och tillhrande risker. b) Den erforderliga anpassningen br preciseras i artikeldelen av de landsspecifika rekommendationerna, fr att klargra att den r obligatorisk, och inte i sklen.
This Report was adopted by Chamber IV, headed by Mr Neven MATES, Member of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 13 June 2018. 
Denna rapport antogs av revisionsrttens avdelning IV, med ledamoten Neven Mates som ordfrande, vid dess sammantrde i Luxemburg den 13 juni 2018.
The audit of the preventive arm procedures focused on six Member States (5 from euro area and 1 from non-euro area). 
Revisionen av frfarandena inom ramen fr den frebyggande delen var inriktad p sex medlemsstater (fem i euroomrdet och en utanfr euroomrdet).
Member States that were under an EDP or an adjustment programme throughout, or covered already under EDP, Greece, or Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) audits, were excluded (with the exception of Italy66). 
Medlemsstater som omfattades av ett frfarande vid alltfr stora underskott eller ett anpassningsprogram, eller som redan omfattades av frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott (Grekland) eller frfarandet vid makroekonomiska obalanser, uteslts (med undantag fr Italien66).
From the remaining Member States, we selected those that had been longer under the corrective arm, showed recent worsening in the structural balance, or had and the highest distance from MTO (see Table 1). 
Bland kvarvarande medlemsstater valde vi ut dem som lngst hade omfattats av den frebyggande delen, vilkas strukturella saldo nyligen hade frsmrats eller som hade strst avstnd till det medelfristiga budgetmlet (se tabell 1).
ANNEX I 73 SELECTION OF MEMBER STATES FOR THE AUDIT SAMPLE 66 Italy exited EDP in June 2013, and the period before was partially covered under Court’s EDP audit. 
BILAGA I 75 URVALET AV MEDLEMSSTATER F R GRANSKNING 66 Italien lmnade frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott i juni 2013 och omfattades delvis under perioden innan dess av revisionsrttens revision av frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott.
It was included in the sample given the extensive application of flexibility clauses under the preventive arm and its overall importance for macroeconomic developments in the EU. 
Italien togs med i urvalet med tanke p den omfattande tillmpningen av flexibilitetsklausuler inom ramen fr den frebyggande delen och landets vergripande betydelse fr den makroekonomiska utvecklingen i EU.
1. 
BILAGA II 1.
We audited a sample of six Member States, reviewing the Commission’s assessment of the SCPs, the Commission’s SWDs, the CSRs, and various related working papers. 
Vi granskade ett urval av sex medlemsstater, och underskte kommissionens bedmning av stabilitets-och konvergensprogrammen, arbetsdokumenten frn kommissionens avdelningar, de landsspecifika rekommendationerna och olika tillhrande arbetsdokument.
We also carried out information visits to the Member States in the sample to gather feedback on the process, the framework of rules, and the coordinated EU surveillance of fiscal policies. 
Vi genomfrde ven informationsbesk i de medlemsstater som ingick i urvalet fr att samla in terkoppling om frfarandet, regelverket och den samordnade EU-vervakningen av finanspolitik.
Member States’ submissions (SCPs) 2. 
Medlemsstaternas framlgganden (stabilitets-och konvergensprogram) 2.
We found that, overall, the SCPs address most of the requirements of the Regulation and CoC in terms of the information provided. 
Vi konstaterade att stabilitets-och konvergensprogrammen p det hela taget behandlar de flesta kraven i frordningen och uppfrandekoden med avseende p de uppgifter som lmnats.
They included information on the budgetary objectives and the measures to achieve them, as well as information on measures to enhance the quality of public finances and achieve long-term sustainability. 
De innehll information om budgetmlen och tgrder fr att uppn dem samt information om tgrder fr att frbttra kvaliteten p de offentliga finanserna och uppn lngsiktig hllbarhet.
However, fiscal measures are not always presented in a sufficiently well-structured way to allow for a clear understanding of their details (e.g. estimated budgetary impact, typology, status, etc.). 
Finanspolitiska tgrder presenteras dock inte alltid p ett tillrckligt vlstrukturerat stt, vilket gr det svrare att frst detaljerna i dem tillrckligt vl (t.ex. uppskattad budgetinverkan, typ och status).
This has been remarked repeatedly in the recitals of the Council recommendations (see Table 1). 
Detta har ppekats tskilliga gnger i sklen i rdets rekommendationer (se tabell 1).
Table 1 – Recitals in Council recommendations on the quality and level of information on measures contained in SCPs submitted by Member States in sample ANNEX II 75 RESULTS ON MEMBER STATES IN AUDIT SAMPLE Recitals in the Council Recommendations 2015 2016 2017 AT (8) ... measures to support the planneddeficittargets from 2016 onwards have not been sufficiently specified ... 
Tabell 1 Đ Skl i rdets rekommendationer om kvaliteten och nivn p information om tgrder i stabilitets-och konvergensprogram som lagts fram av medlemsstaterna i urvalet RESULTATEN F R MEDLEMSSTATERNA I URVALET F R GRANSKNING 77 Skl i rdets rekommendationer 2015 2016 2017 AT (8) tgrderna som ska stdja de planerade underskottsmlen frn 2016 och framt har dock nnu inte beskrivits tillrckligt ...
(6) ... the measures needed to supportthe planneddeficit targets from 2017 onwards have not been sufficiently specified ... 
(6) ... de tgrder som ska stdja de planerade underskottsmlen frn 2017 och framt har inte beskrivits tillrckligt ...
COM assessments of Member States’ submissions 3. 
Kommissionens bedmningar av medlemsstaternas framlgganden 3.
We found that Member States generally submit their SCPs within the stipulated timeframes, and that country desks in DG ECFIN have a relatively short period of time to review the SCPs received in depth (see Table 2). 
Vi konstaterade att medlemsstaterna generellt sett lgger fram sina stabilitets-och konvergensprogram inom de faststllda tidsramarna, och att de landsansvariga enheterna inom GD Ekonomi och finans har relativt lite tid fr att ingende bedma de stabilitets-och konvergensprogram som mottagits (se tabell 2).
76 sufficiently specified, in particularbeyond2016... not been sufficiently specified, in particularfor after 2017 FI (6) ... The measures needed to reach the medium-term budgetary objectiveby 2019 have not been sufficiently specified. 
(6) De tgrder som ska stdja de planerade underskottsmlen frn 2017 och framt har inte beskrivits tillrckligt noga, srskilt inte fr perioden efter 2017 ... FI (6) De tgrder som krvs fr att det medelfristiga budgetmlet ska ns senast 2019 har inte beskrivits tillrckligt ...
IT (12)...The government has yet to specify the additional expenditure cuts that will allow it to avoid implementing the legislatedVAT increasein2016. 
IT (12) Det terstr dock fr regeringen att specificera de ytterligare nedskrningarna i utgifterna som ska gra det mjligt att undvika den lagstadgade momshjningen under 2016.
Table 2 - SCP submissions and SWD publication dates (2015-2017) for Member States in sample 77 2015 2016 2017 SCP submission date COM assessment document date Time elapsed (calendar days) SCP submission date COM assessment document date Time elapsed (calendar days) SCP submission date COM assessment document date Time elapsed (calendar days) AT 21/04 27/05 36 27/04 26/05 29 02/05 23/05 21 BE 30/04 27 29/04 27 28/04 25 FI 02/04 55 14/04 42 28/04 25 HU 30/04 27 29/04 27 02/05 21 IT 28/04 29 28/04 28 27/04 26 NL 30/04 27 28/04 28 26/04 27 Source: ECA review of SCPs and SWDs. 
Tabell 2 Đ Framlggande av stabilitets-och konvergensprogram och datum fr offentliggrande av arbetsdokument frn kommissionens avdelningar (2015Đ2017) fr medlemsstater i urvalet 79 2015 2016 2017 AT 21.4 27.5 36 27.4 26.5 29 2.5 23.5 21 BE 30.4 27 29.4 27 28.4 25 FI 2.4 55 14.4 42 28.4 25 HU 30.4 27 29.4 27 2.5 21 IT 28.4 29 28.4 28 27.4 26 NL 30.4 27 28.4 28 26.4 27 Klla: Revisionsrttens granskning av stabilitets-och konvergensprogram och arbetsdokument frn kommissionens avdelningar.
The preparation of the Commission’s assessment depends, however, on a process of exchange of information, which starts earlier in the annual cycle, including information exchanges in bilateral meetings held well in advance of the submission of SCPs. 
Utarbetandet av kommissionens bedmningar bygger dock p ett informationsutbyte som inleds tidigare p ret, bland annat vid bilaterala mten som hlls i god tid infr framlggandet av stabilitets-och konvergensprogram.
The work of country desks is complemented by European Semester Officers working in EU representations in Member States. 
De landsansvariga enheternas arbete kompletteras av tjnstemn med ansvar fr den europeiska planeringsterminen som arbetar vid EU:s representationer i medlemsstaterna.
These Officers liaise with the representatives of the relevant national authorities and monitor closely the main fiscal and budgetary developments in each Member State. 
Dessa tjnstemn str i kontakt med fretrdare fr relevanta nationella myndigheter och vervakar noga den viktigaste finanspolitiska och budgetmssiga utvecklingen i varje medlemsstat.
Relevance of country-specific recommendations 5. 
De landsspecifika rekommendationernas relevans 5.
Overall, the fiscal CSRs are in line with the results of the Commission’s assessment (see Table 3). 
80 finanspolitiska landsspecifika rekommendationerna med resultaten av kommissionens bedmningar (se tabell 3).
Table 3 – Consistency check between CSRs and underlying Commission assessments for sample Member States (2015-2017) 78 Year t COM assessment Required adjustment corrected (years t / t+1) Recital / Recommendation AT 2015 0.3 % Recital (8) ... 
Tabell 3 Đ Kontroll av verensstmmelse mellan de landsspecifika rekommendationerna och underliggande kommissionsbedmningar fr medlemsstater i urvalet (2015Đ2017) r t Kommissionens bedmning Erforderlig anpassning korrigerad (r t/t+1) Skl/ Rekommendation AT 2015 0,3 % Skl (8) ... den strukturella anpassning p 0,3 % av BNP som krvs fr att n det medelfristiga budgetmlet ...
0.3 % of GDP structural adjustment required in order to reach the medium-term objective 2016 0.3 % Recommendation (1) ... achieve an annual fiscal adjustment of 0.3 % of GDP in 2017 2017 0.3 % Recital (8) ...achievean annual fiscal adjustment of 0.3 % of GDP in 2017 BE 2015 2015: 0.6 % 2016: 0.6 % Recommendation (1) Achieve a fiscal adjustment of at least0.6 % of GDP towards the medium-term budgetary objective in 2015 and in 2016 2016 0.6 % Recommendation (1)...to achieveanannualfiscal adjustment of at least0.6 % of GDP 2017 0.6 % Recital (10) ...that adjustment ... would correspond to an annual structural adjustment of at least0.6 % of GDP FI 2015 2015: 0.1 % 2016: 0.5 % Recommendation (1) Achieve a fiscal adjustment of at least0.1 % of GDP towards the medium-term budgetary objective in 2015 and of 0.5 % of GDP in 2016 2016 2016: 0.5 % Recommendation (1) Achieve an annual fiscal adjustment of at least0.5 % of GDP Member State 
2016 0,3 % Rekommendation (1) ... uppn en rlig finanspolitisk korrigering om 0,3 % av BNP 2017 ... 2017 0,3 % Skl (8) ... uppn en rlig finanspolitisk korrigering om 0,3 % av BNP 2017 ... BE 2015 2015: 0,6 % 2016: 0,6 % Rekommendation (1) Uppn en finanspolitisk korrigering p minst 0,6 % av BNP p vg mot det medelfristiga budgetmlet 2015 och 2016 2016 0,6 % Rekommendation (1) stadkomma en rlig finanspolitisk korrigering p minst 0,6 % av BNP ...
79 Year t COM assessment Required adjustment corrected (years t / t+1) Recital / Recommendation 2017: 0.6 % towards the medium-term budgetary objective in 2016 and 0.6 % in 2017 2017 0.1 % Recital (12) ... corresponding to an annual structural adjustment of 0.1 % of GDP HU 2015 2015: 0.5 % 2016: 0.6 % Recommendation (1) Achieve a fiscal adjustment of 0..5 % of GDP towards the medium-term budgetary objective in 2015 and of 0.6 % of GDP in 2016 2016 2016: 0.3 % 2017: 0.6 % Recommendation (1) ... achieve an annual fiscal adjustment of 0.3 % of GDP towards the medium-term budgetary objective in 2016 and of 0.6 % of GDP in 2017 2017 1.0 % Recital (8) ...that adjustment ... would correspond to a structural adjustment of 1.0 % of GDP IT 2015 2015: 0.3 % 2016: 0.1 % Recommendation (1) Achieve a fiscal adjustment of at least0.25 % of GDP towards the medium-term budgetary objective in 2015 and of 0..1 % of GDP in 2016 2016 2016: 0.25 % 2017: 0.6 % Recommendation (1)...to achieveanannualfiscal adjustment of 0.6 % or more of GDP 2017 0.6 % Recital (10) ...that adjustment ... would correspond to an annual structural adjustment of at least0.6 % of GDP Member State 
81 r t Kommissionens bedmning Erforderlig anpassning korrigerad (r t/t+1) Skl/ Rekommendation 2016: 0,5 % medelfristiga budgetmlet under 2015 och p 0,5 % av BNP under 2016 2016 2016: 0,5 % 2017: 0,6 % Rekommendation (1) Uppn en rlig finanspolitisk korrigering p minst 0,5 % av BNP mot det medelfristiga budgetmlet under 2016 och p 0,6 % av BNP under 2017 2017 0,1 % Skl (12) ... vilket motsvarar en rlig strukturell anpassning p 0,1 % av BNP ...
80 Year t COM assessment Required adjustment corrected (years t / t+1) Recital / Recommendation NL 2015 2015: -0.3 % 2016: -0.2 % Nil 2016 0.6 % Recommendation (1) ... achieve an annual fiscal adjustment of 0.6 % of GDP in 2017 2017 Compliant Nil Source: SWDs and CSRs for sample Member States (2015-2017). 
2017 0,6 % Skl (10) Det skulle motsvara en rlig strukturell anpassning p 0,6 % av BNP NL 2015 2015: -0,3 % 2016: -0,2 % Inget 2016 0,6 % Rekommendation (1) ... uppn en rlig finanspolitisk korrigering om 0,6 % av BNP 2017 ...
At the heart of the preventive arm, the Medium-term Budgetary Objective (MTO) operationalises this need to balance prudent fiscal policy based on the medium to long-term while facilitating the operation of the automatic stabilisers. 
De medelfristiga budgetmlen str i centrum fr den frebyggande delen och utgr det praktiska verktyget fr att tillgodose behovet av att balansera en frsiktig finanspolitik p medellng sikt, samtidigt som de automatiska stabilisatorernas funktion underlttas.
As the MTO is set in structural terms, it allows for the regular movements in the fiscal balance caused by the economic cycle. 
Eftersom de medelfristiga budgetmlen faststlls i strukturella termer, ger de utrymme fr de regelbundna rrelserna i de offentliga finanserna som orsakas av konjunkturcykeln.
Ensuring that Member States continue to make steady progress towards their MTO is therefore a critical function of the Commission and the Council in delivering the necessary improvements in debt sustainability and macro-stabilisation. 
Att se till att medlemsstaterna fortstter att gra stadiga framsteg mot sina medelfristiga budgetml r drfr en mycket viktig del av kommissionens och rdets arbete fr att skapa de ndvndiga frbttringarna av skuldnivn och makrostabiliseringen.
Article 6(3) of the Regulation rightly recognises that a wider range of elements determine the sustainability of public finances in the medium-term, including, for instance, the need to avoid counter-productive fiscal adjustment when the cyclical position of the economy is weak, the role of structural reforms and investment in raising potential growth and the need to allow for events outside the control of government. 
I artikel 6.3 i frordningen medges med rtta att ett bredare spektrum av faktorer avgr de offentliga finansernas hllbarhet p medellng sikt, t.ex. behovet av att undvika kontraproduktiv finanspolitisk anpassning nr konjunkturlget r svagt, den roll som strukturreformer och investeringar spelar fr att ka den potentiella tillvxten och behovet av ta hnsyn till hndelser utanfr regeringens kontroll.
All of these factors are specifically provided for in the Regulation. 
Alla dessa faktorer beaktas uttryckligen i frordningen.
The regulation also foresees for an allowable level of deviation from the annual requirements, which recognises the inherent uncertainty in budgetary policy planning and implementation that may lead to a Member State missing their target due to matters outside of the control of government. 
Syftet med det r att ta hnsyn till den inneboende oskerheten i planeringen och genomfrandet av budgeten, som kan leda till att medlemsstaterna inte uppnr sina ml till fljd av faktorer som regeringarna inte kan kontrollera.
While the ECA appears to have concerns that this margin is being persistently exploited by some Member States, see paragraph XII and Recommendation 1(a), its stipulation in the Regulation nevertheless requires the Commission to allow such deviation. 
Revisionsrtten verkar vara orolig fr att denna marginal stndigt utnyttjas av vissa medlemsstater, se punkt XII och rekommendation 1 a. Enligt frordningen r kommissionen dock skyldig att tillta sdana avvikelser.
While the SGP frames the conduct of fiscal policy for Member States under the preventive arm, it is important to reiterate that budgetary policy is ultimately within the competence of Member States. 
Stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten utgr visserligen ramen fr medlemsstaternas finanspolitik enligt den frebyggande delen, men det r viktigt att upprepa att budgetpolitiken i sista hand r medlemsstaternas behrighet.
The Commission obviously plays a key role in the enforcement of the SGP, in particular through its assessment of whether Member States’ policies are being conducted in compliance with their obligations under the Regulation. 
Kommissionen spelar sjlvklart en central roll i genomfrandet av stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten, srskilt genom att bedma huruvida medlemsstaterna fr sin politik enligt de skyldigheter som faststlls i frordningen.
The legislation cannot realistically codify every possible aspect of macroeconomic and budgetary policy-making which may be relevant to the application of the fiscal rules and therefore leaves room for the Commission and the Council to deal with specific situations. 
Det r inte realistiskt att frvnta sig att lagstiftningen kan kodifiera varje mjlig aspekt av den makroekonomiska politiken och budgetpolitiken som kan vara relevant fr tillmpningen av de finanspolitiska reglerna.
In order to facilitate its assessments, the Commission has developed a large body of procedures and methodologies. 
Kommissionen har utvecklat ett stort antal frfaranden och metoder fr att underltta sina bedmningar.
These are necessary both to provide predictability to Member States as to how the Commission will assess compliance and to ensure horizontal consistency in these assessments. 
Dessa r ndvndiga bde fr att medlemsstaterna ska veta hur kommissionen kommer att bedma efterlevnaden och fr att garantera vergripande konsekvens i bedmningarna.
In such instances where the Commission exercises its discretion in making its assessments, it endeavours to do so in a transparent and orderly manner, in full consultation with the Member States (through the relevant committees, e.g. ECOFIN, EFC). 
Nr kommissionen utvar sitt bedmningsutrymme strvar den efter att gra detta p ett ppet och ordnat stt och samrder fullt ut med medlemsstaterna (via de relevanta kommitterna, t.ex. Ekofin och ekonomiska och finansiella kommittn).