natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Moreover, regarding the limited number of third country nationals that can be detained, under the grounds allowed by asylum law, the maximum detention period is of six months. 
Fr det begrnsade antal tredjelandsmedborgare som kan hllas i frvar av de skl som anges i asyllagstiftningen r den maximala perioden sex mnader.
When the detention period ends, the migrants are released, and may abscond. 
Nr perioden fr frvar r slut slpps migranterna fria och kan avvika.
Finally, in both Italy and Greece, migrants often make last-minute asylum applications to delay the return procedure. 
Bde i Italien och Grekland ansker slutligen migranter om asyl i sista minuten fr att frhala tervndandeprocessen.
133 Good coordination between the asylum and return authorities is essential for optimising information-sharing and automating the issuance of a return decision following a negative asylum decision (Box 11). 
133 En god samordning mellan asylmyndigheterna och tervndandemyndigheterna r avgrande fr att informationsutbytet ska optimeras och det automatiskt ska utfrdas ett tervndandebeslut nr asylanskan avslagits (ruta 11).
60 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns Box 11 Link between asylum and return procedures in Greece and Italy In Greece, third-country nationals are registered as applicants for international protection in GASŐs database called ALKIONI. 
65 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden Ruta 11 Koppling mellan asyl-och tervndandefrfaranden i Grekland och Italien I Grekland registreras tredjelandsmedborgare som personer som ansker om internationellt skydd i den grekiska asylmyndighetens databas, ALKIONI.
On the mainland, even though the Police has been granted restricted access to certain modules of this database, it is not automatically alerted when a negative asylum decision is issued in the ALKIONI system. Return decisions are therefore issued only if a person happens to be apprehended. 
Trots att polisen har beviljats begrnsad tkomst till vissa moduler i databasen fr polisen p fastlandet inte ett automatiskt meddelande nr ett avslag p asylanskan utfrdas i ALKIONI-systemet. tervndandebeslut utfrdas drfr enbart om en person rkar bli gripen.
The exchange of information is better on the islands, but remains informal and depends on personal contacts. 
Informationsutbytet r bttre p arna, men fortstter att vara informellt och beroende av personliga kontakter.
Italy does not issue a return decision as soon as a negative asylum decision is handed down. 
Italien utfrdar inte ett tervndandebeslut s snart ett avslag p asylanskan meddelas.
These two types of decision are issued by two separate authorities: the questure and the asylum commissions. 
De tv beslutstyperna utfrdas av tv separata myndigheter: questure och asylkommissionerna.
The Police has access to the database in which asylum decisions are registered, but it is not automatically alerted when a negative asylum decision is issued. 
Polisen har tkomst till den databas dr asylbesluten registreras men fr inte ett automatiskt meddelande nr ett avslag p asylanskan utfrdas.
As in Greece, a return decision is also issued only if a person happens to be apprehended. 
Precis som i Grekland utfrdas ett tervndandebeslut enbart om en person rkar bli gripen.
As mentioned in paragraph 126, the lack of reliable and timely data on the negative decisions at the appeal stages also impedes the issuance of return decisions by the questure. 
Som nmnts i punkt 126 hindrar avsaknaden av tillfrlitliga och aktuella uppgifter om avslag i verklagandeetapperna ven questure vid utfrdandet av tervndandebeslut.
134 Greece has a centralised IT system (Greek Mapping System) for managing migration, but it is not yet mature in terms of information or functionality. 
134 Grekland har ett centraliserat it-system (det grekiska kartlggningssystemet) fr att hantera migration, men det r nnu inte fullt utvecklat vad gller information eller funktioner.
It is not an integrated system charting the entire return process. 
Det r inte ett integrerat system som kartlgger hela tervndandefrfarandet.
For example, there is no real-time data on detention. 
Det finns exempelvis inga realtidsdata om frvar.
Instead, each pre-removal centre uses its own Excel file and the coordinating unit at the police headquarters has to ask each pre-removal centre to provide regular updates to obtain an overview of the situation. 
Varje frvar infr avvisning anvnder i stllet sitt eget Excel-ark, och samordningsenheten vid polishgkvarteret mste be varje frvar att lmna regelbundna uppdateringar fr att f en verblick ver situationen.
Frontex is supporting Greece with the conversion of its returns process into a digital format. 
Frontex hjlper Grekland att omvandla tervndandefrfarandet till ett digitalt format.
135 In addition, there is no mutual recognition of return decisions among EU Member States. 
135 Dessutom finns inget msesidigt erknnande av tervndandebeslut mellan EU:s medlemsstater.
Until 2018, there was no exchange of information on return decisions within the EU. 
Fram till 2018 fanns inget informationsutbyte om tervndandebeslut inom EU.
Since December 2018, return decisions should be systematically entered in the Schengen Information System, making them visible to all Member States. 
Sedan december 2018 ska tervndandebeslut systematiskt fras in i Schengens informationssystem s att alla medlemsstater kan se dem.
The main cause for this is the absence of a standard system to verify whether a third-country national has crossed the external border of a Schengen country. 
Den frmsta orsaken till detta r avsaknaden av ett standardsystem fr kontroll av huruvida en tredjelandsmedborgare har passerat ett Schengenlands yttre grns.
It is therefore not possible to establish with certainty if a third-country national has actually left the EU, has gone into hiding in the Member State, or has moved to another Member State. 
Det r drfr inte mjligt att med skerhet faststlla huruvida en tredjelandsmedborgare verkligen har lmnat EU, gtt under jorden i medlemsstaten eller flyttat till en annan medlemsstat.
Detention is justified only when preparing the return or carrying out the removal process, or where less coercive measures would not suffice. 
Frvar r endast motiverat fr att frbereda tervndandet eller fr att genomfra avlgsnandeprocessen, eller om andra, mindre ingripande, tgrder r otillrckliga.
The initial period of detention is up to six months. 
Den inledande frvarsperioden r upp till sex mnader lng.
This can be extended by up to 18 months under certain conditions. 
Den kan under vissa omstndigheter frlngas till hgst 18 mnader.
In Greece, there are currently six pre-removal detention centres on the mainland and two on the islands of Lesbos and Kos. 
I Grekland finns fr nrvarande sex frvar infr avvisning p fastlandet och tv p arna Lesvos och Kos.
Another is planned on Samos. 
Ytterligare ett planeras p Samos.
Conditions in some of the pre-removal centres have been criticised (see project GR-3 in Annex IV). 
Frhllandena i vissa av frvaren infr avvisning har kritiserats (se projekt GR-3 i bilaga IV).
138 Despite ItalyŐs efforts, the countryŐs pre-removal detention centres still have insufficient capacity to accommodate the number of people to be returned (815 places compared to 27 070 return decisions issued in 2018). 
138 Trots Italiens insatser finns det fortfarande inte tillrcklig kapacitet vid landets slutna frvar infr tersndande fr att inkvartera antalet personer som ska skickas tillbaka (815 platser jmfrt med de 27 070 tervndandebeslut som utfrdades 2018).
There is no forthcoming AMIF project addressing this issue. 
Det finns inget kommande Amif-projekt som tar itu med detta problem.
139 Another reason for the low rate at which migrants who have been ordered to leave the EU are actually returned is the lack of cooperation from some third countries in identifying and readmitting their nationals (see also paragraph 100 (iv)). 
139 Ett annat skl till den lga andel migranter som faktiskt tervnder efter att ha beordrats lmna EU r den bristande samarbetsviljan hos vissa tredjelnder nr det gller att identifiera och terta sina medborgare (se ven punkt 100 iv)).
For example, the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries stipulates45 that these countries must readmit any of their nationals who are illegally present on the territory of an EU Member State without further formalities. 
Exempelvis freskrivs i AVSĐEU-partnerskapsavtalet45 att dessa lnder ska terta alla sina medborgare som olagligen befinner sig p en EU-medlemsstats territorium utan ytterligare formaliteter.
In practice, this legal provision is not respected. 
I praktiken respekteras inte denna lagbestmmelse.
44 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008. 
44 Europaparlamentets och rdets direktiv 2008/115/EG av den 16 december 2008.
45 Article 13.5c of the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States of the other part, signed in Cotonou in June 2000. 
45 Artikel 13.5 c i partnerskapsavtalet mellan medlemmarna i gruppen av stater i Afrika, Vstindien och Stillahavsomrdet,  ena sidan, och Europeiska gemenskapen och dess medlemsstater,  andra sidan, undertecknat i Cotonou i juni 2000.
62 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns 141 AVRR operations have so far represented only a fraction of total returns in Italy (15 % in 2018), as multiple issues have prevented the AVRR projects from contributing effectively to solving the returns problem (Box 12). 
141 Insatserna fr frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning har hittills enbart utgjort en brkdel av det totala antalet tervndanden i Italien (15 % r 2018), eftersom ett flertal problem har frhindrat projekten fr frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning att effektivt bidra till att lsa problemet med tervndanden (ruta 12).
Box 12 Examples of issues hindering the effectiveness of AVRR projects in Italy In 2015/2016, there was a 1-year gap with no AVRR programme running, due to the transition to the delayed AMIF Fund. 
68 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden Ruta 12 Exempel p problem som hindrar effektiviteten hos projekten fr frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning i Italien Under 2015/2016 pgick inget program fr frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning under ett r p grund av vergngen till den frsenade Amif-fonden.
No national awareness campaign accompanied the AMIF-funded AVRR projects launched in 2016, and each project carried out its information activities individually (see paragraph 71 on overlap). 
Ingen nationell upplysningskampanj tfljde de Amif-finansierade projekten fr frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning som inleddes 2016, och varje projekt genomfrde sina egna upplysningsinsatser (se punkt 71 om verlappning).
Moreover, the projects lacked effective outreach activities when they started. 
Vidare saknade projekten effektiv uttriktad verksamhet nr de inleddes.
The situation was later addressed by introducing dedicated outreach staff: regional counsellors. 
Situationen tgrdades senare genom infrandet av personal som srskilt gnar sig t uttriktad verksamhet: regionala rdgivare.
The targets set for the projectsŐ indicators were unambitious considering the needs. 
De mlvrden som sattes upp fr projektens indikatorer var oambitisa med tanke p behoven.
A large group of migrants staying illegally in Italy were excluded from the AVRR programme, since, to be eligible, a migrant has to apply in the narrow window of 7-30 days after the issue of a return decision. 
En stor grupp migranter som vistades olagligt i Italien utestngdes frn programmet fr frivilligt tervndande eftersom en migrant, fr att vara behrig, mste anska om frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning under den korta perioden p 7Đ30 dagar efter att ett tervndandebeslut har utfrdats.
The time elapsing from application until approval by the questura or prefecture was long, averaging 37 days (in IT-3 project) and 40 days (in IT-2 project). 
Tiden frn anskan till godknnande av questura eller prefekturen var lng, i genomsnitt 37 dagar (i projektet IT-3) och 40 dagar (i projektet IT-2).
Since Italy has no accommodation for AVRR applicants, these long waiting times contributed to a high dropout rate of 27 %46. 
Eftersom Italien saknar inkvartering fr personer som ansker om frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning bidrog de lnga vntetiderna till att s mnga som 27 %46 hoppade av.
Finally, there was a gap in the AVRR programme as, after the projects ended in June 2018, a new call was not published until October 2018. 
Avslutningsvis uppstod ett avbrott i programmet fr frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning eftersom en ny inbjudan att lmna frslag inte offentliggjordes frrn i oktober 2018 och projekten avslutades i juni 2018.
This call was under evaluation at the time of our audit visit in February 2019. 
Denna inbjudan hll p att utvrderas vid tidpunkten fr vrt revisionsbesk i februari 2019.
The IOM informed us that they had not participated owing to the overly stringent cost-eligibility rules47. 
IOM informerade oss om att de inte deltagit p grund av de verdrivet strnga reglerna fr kostnaders stdberttigande47.
46 Statistics received from the IOM reveal the following: of the 1 606 AVRR applications received by the agency between January and September 2018, 67 (4 %) were not approved, 169 (10 %) never received a reply from the authorities, 118 (7 %) cancelled their application before approval and 319 (20 %) cancelled the application after approval. 
46 Statistik frn IOM visar fljande: av de 1 606 anskningar om frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning som mottogs mellan januari och september 2018 fick 67 (4 %) avslag, 169 (10 %) fick aldrig ngot svar av myndigheterna, 118 (7 %) drog tillbaka sin anskan fre godknnandet och 319 (20 %) drog tillbaka sin anskan efter godknnande.
47 According to the rules in the last call for proposals, the costs would be eligible only if a migrant was actually returned. 
47 Enligt reglerna i den senaste inbjudan att lmna frslag skulle kostnader enbart vara stdberttigande om en migrant faktiskt tervnde.
As migrants may change their mind up to the last minute, all costs until that moment would need to be borne by the agency. 
Eftersom migranter kan ndra sig i sista minuten skulle IOM vara tvungen att st fr alla kostnader fram till dess.
This gap in providing reintegration assistance could have been partially filled by the European Reintegration Network (ERIN) Specific Action Programme49, but Greece has not yet made use of it. 
Detta avbrott i tillhandahllandet av teranpassningsstd kunde delvis ha tgrdats med det srskilda handlingsprogrammet inom ramen fr det europeiska ntverket fr teranpassningsinstrument (Erin-programmet)49, men Grekland har nnu inte utnyttjat det.
143 Additionally, while the eligibility period for the programme on the mainland is unlimited, migrants on the islands have to apply for AVRR within a very short time (15 days following a negative first-instance decision from GAS). 
143 Vidare r behrighetsperioden fr programmet obegrnsad p fastlandet, men migranter p arna mste anska om frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning inom en vldigt kort tidsperiod (15 dagar efter ett avslagsbeslut i frsta instans frn den grekiska asylmyndigheten).
144 Notwithstanding the above, an example of good practice has been noted at the Attiko Alsos Open Centre for migrants registered for assisted voluntary return and reintegration, which offers a safe environment and support to third-country nationals who volunteer to return to their country of origin (see Box 13). 
144 Trots ovanstende noterade vi ett exempel p god praxis vid Attiko Alsos ppna mottagningscentrum fr migranter som registrerats fr bistnd till frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning, som erbjuder en trygg milj och bistnd till tredjelandsmedborgare som r villiga att frivilligt tervnda till sitt ursprungsland (se ruta 13).
Box 13 Example of good practice in AVRR The Attiko Alsos Open Centre for migrants registered for assisted voluntary return and reintegration, funded under AMIF EMAS, has been set up near the centre of Athens in order to provide shelter to migrants in Greece who have registered for the AVRR programme and who have nowhere to stay until their departure. 
70 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden Ruta 13 Exempel p god praxis vid frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning Attiko Alsos ppna mottagningscentrum fr migranter som registrerats fr bistnd till frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning och finansieras med Amifs katastrofbistnd har upprttats nra Atens centrum fr att ge skydd t migranter i Grekland som registrerat sig fr programmet fr frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning och inte har ngonstans att bo fram till sin avresa.
The beneficiaries are vulnerable migrants, defined for the purpose of the project as pregnant women, single parent families, migrants with medical needs, elderly migrants and destitute migrants. 
Mottagarna r srbara migranter, som fr projektets syften definieras som gravida kvinnor, ensamfrlderfamiljer, migranter med medicinska behov, ldre migranter och utblottade migranter.
The Open Centre has good transport links and is close to hospitals and consular services. 
Det ppna mottagningscentrumet har goda transportfrbindelser och nra till sjukhus och konsulra tjnster.
It provides vital services to vulnerable migrants until they return to their country of origin. 
Det tillhandahller ndvndiga tjnster till utsatta migranter till dess att de tervnder till sitt ursprungsland.
No data on swiftness of return operations 145 Neither the Greek nor the Italian IT systems are able to generate statistics on the swiftness of the return procedures50. 
Inga uppgifter om hur snabbt tervndandeinsatserna genomfrs 145 Varken de grekiska eller italienska it-systemen kan skapa statistik om hur snabbt tervndandefrfarandena genomfrs50.
As a result, we were not able to assess this aspect. 
Vi kunde drfr inte bedma denna aspekt.
Conclusions and recommendations 146 Our audit examined whether the EU support to migration management (including the hotspot approach) had contributed to effective and swift asylum and return procedures in Greece and Italy. 
Slutsatser och rekommendationer 146 Vid revisionen underskte vi huruvida EU:s std till migrationshantering (bland annat systemet med mottagningscentrum (hotspots)) har bidragit till effektiva och snabba asyl-och tervndandefrfaranden i Grekland och Italien.
As in the rest of the EU, returns of irregular third-country nationals from Greece and Italy are low. 
Precis som i vriga EU r antalet tervndanden av irreguljra tredjelandsmedborgare frn Grekland och Italien lgt.
147 Of the 11 recommendations we made in 2017 on the hotspot approach in Greece and Italy, six have been fully implemented, two have been implemented as far as the Commission and the Agencies are concerned, and one has not been implemented by Member States (Annex III). 
147 Av de elva rekommendationer som vi lmnade 2017 om hotspot-systemet i Grekland och Italien har sex genomfrts till fullo, tv har genomfrts i de delar som gller kommissionen och byrerna och en har inte genomfrts av medlemsstater (bilaga III).
Two key recommendations are still under implementation (on the hotspot capacity and the situation of unaccompanied minors in the Greek hotspots), as the situation in the Greek hotspots remains highly critical (paragraphs 23 to 27). 
Tv viktiga rekommendationer hller fortfarande p att genomfras (om kapaciteten vid mottagningscentrumen och situationen fr ensamkommande barn vid mottagningscentrumen i Grekland), eftersom situationen vid de grekiska mottagningscentrumen fortfarande r mycket besvrlig (punkterna 23Đ27).
148 Our recommendation that the deployment of Member States experts be sufficiently long has not yet been implemented. 
148 Vr rekommendation att utstationeringen av experter frn medlemsstaterna ska pg tillrckligt lnge har nnu inte genomfrts.
Although the Commission and the Agencies have repeatedly called on Member States to deploy more national experts, the shortage of national experts on EASO operations persists. 
Trots att kommissionen och byrerna vid upprepade tillfllen har uppmanat medlemsstaterna att utstationera fler nationella experter r det fortfarande brist p nationella experter inom Easos insatser.
By contrast, Frontex had actually deployed more staff than needed to the Italian hotspots, as it had not adjusted its plans in view of the few sea arrivals. 
Dremot hade Frontex faktiskt utstationerat mer personal n vad som krvdes till mottagningscentrumen i Italien, eftersom byrn inte anpassat sina planer till det lga antalet personer som anlnde sjvgen.
Despite the few return operations, we also noted that a high share of Frontex escort experts for readmission operations to Turkey had only an escort profile and therefore could not be used for any other type of operation (paragraphs 28 to 30). 
Trots det lga antalet tervndandeinsatser noterade vi ven att en stor andel av Frontex expertledsagare fr tertagandeinsatser till Turkiet enbart hade en ledsagarprofil och drfr inte kunde anvndas fr ngon annan typ av insats (punkterna 28Đ30).
149 We found that registration and fingerprinting rates at the hotspots had improved significantly, as standard operating procedures had been established and responsibilities clearly divided between the national authorities and the EU support agencies. 
149 Vi fann att den andel som registreras och fr lmna fingeravtryck vid mottagningscentrumen hade kat markant i takt med att standardrutiner upprttats och ansvarsomrden tydligt frdelats mellan de nationella myndigheterna och EU:s stdorgan.
Nevertheless, a high share of migrants continues to move on to and apply for asylum in other EU Member States, without having their fingerprints stored in the EURODAC database (paragraphs 31 to 34). 
Trots det flyttar fortfarande en stor andel migranter till och sker asyl i andra EU-medlemsstater utan att deras fingeravtryck finns lagrade i Eurodac-databasen (punkterna 31Đ34).
150 The emergency relocation schemes, temporary by design, were the first solidarity initiative in the history of European migration policy aimed at the large-scale redistribution of asylum applicants among Member States. However, they did not 65 
150 Omplaceringsmekanismerna fr ndsituationer, som utformades fr att vara tillflliga, var det frsta solidaritetsinitiativet i den europeiska migrationspolitikens 71 historia och syftade till att i stor skala omfrdela asylskande mellan medlemsstaterna.
66 reach their targets and so did not effectively alleviate the pressure on the Greek and Italian asylum systems (paragraphs 35 to 41). 
De uppndde dock inte sina mlvrden och minskade drfr i sjlva verket inte trycket p de grekiska och italienska asylsystemen (punkterna 35Đ41).
151 Indeed, a very low share of potentially eligible migrants were identified and successfully channelled towards applying for relocation (paragraphs 42 to 47). 
151 Man lyckades endast identifiera en mycket lg andel potentiellt behriga migranter och leda dem mot en omplaceringsanskan (punkterna 42Đ47).
152 A high share of candidates who applied were actually relocated (80 % in Greece and 89 % in Italy). 
152 En stor andel av de kandidater som anskte omplacerades faktiskt (80 % i Grekland och 89 % i Italien).
Nevertheless, we found a number of operational weaknesses in the relocation process. 
Trots det hittade vi ett antal operativa brister i omplaceringsprocessen.