natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The setting up of new structures (paragraph 69(b)) In response to a recommendation made by the Court of Auditors, a comprehensive file registration system, a Ôcase management sys-temŐ, which is constantly being improved, and a registry (greffe) have been in place since the first half of 2001. 
Att skapa nya strukturer (punkt 69 b) Som en fljd av en av revisionsrttens tidigare rekommendationer inrttades under frsta halvret 2001 ett rendehanteringssystem (Case Management System/CMS), som drefter har uppdaterats och frbttrats mnga gnger, samt en registerenhet (greffe).
Information on investigation not completed within nine months (paragraph 69(a)) Information from the Director of OLAF concerning investigations not completed within nine months, as required by Article 11(7) of the Regulation, has proved an extremely useful source of information for the Committee and a valuable monitoring tool. 
Information om underskningar som inte avslutats inom nio mnader (punkt 69 a) Den information om utredningar som inte avslutats inom nio mnader som OLAF:s direktr frelagt kommittn enligt artikel 11.7 i grundfrordningen har varit till mycket stor nytta och utgjort ett viktigt element i kontrollarbetet.
In practice, the provision of the information has given rise to exchanges of views regarding investigative activity and general matters with the Director responsible for investigations of the situation. 
I praktiken har dessa uppgifter ofta gett upphov till en fruktbar dialog mellan kommittn och den direktr som ansvarat fr de aktuella utredningarna, bde om arbetets frlopp och om allmnna frgor.
Prior notification of cases to be referred to a Member StateŐs judicial authorities (paragraph 69(c) and (d)) The final sentence of Article 11(7) of the Regulation states that Ô[t]he Director shall inform the committee of cases requiring information to be forwarded to the judicial authorities of a Member StateŐ. In Article 22(5) of its Rules of Procedure (published in OJ L 41 on 15 February 2000 and adopted on the basis of a text drafted by Mr Da Cunha Rodrigues, who was a member of the Committee at the time and was subsequently appointed as judge at the European Court of Justice) the Supervisory Committee interpreted the word ÔrequiringŐ as implying prior notification. 
Information i frhand om fall som skall lmnas ver till de rttsliga myndigheterna i medlemsstaterna (punkt 69 c och d) I den sista meningen i artikel 11.7 i frordningen anges fljande: ÓDirektren skall underrtta kommittn om de renden dr det r ndvndigt att verlmna information till de rttsliga myndigheterna i en medlemsstat.Ó I vervakningskommittns interna bestmmelser tolkades formuleringen p s stt att underrttelsen skulle ske i frhand (de interna bestmmelserna offentliggjordes i EGT L 41 av den 15 februari 2000 p grundval av en text utarbetad av den fredragande Jos Narciso da Cunha Rodrigues, som d var ledamot av kommittn och senare utsgs till domare i Europeiska gemenskapernas domstol).
This interpretation has been consistently employed and has never given rise to disputes or problems. 
Den allmnt tillmpade praxisen bygger p denna tolkning, och har inte lett till ngra ptagliga nackdelar eller invndningar.
In one sensitive case, without referring to the dossier concerned, the Director responsible for investigations asked the Supervisory Committee if OLAF could notify the Committee after the information had been forwarded to the national judicial authorities. The Committee gave its consent. 
I knsliga renden har den direktr som ansvarat fr den aktuella utredningen bett vervakningskommittn att f avvakta med meddelandet till kommittn till dess att informationen snts ver till de rttsliga myndigheterna i medlemsstaten, utan att i detta skede ge ngra uppgifter om vilket rende det rr sig om.
Internal and external investigations (paragraph 71) At the time of the events that led to the resignation of the Santer Commission the Institutions focused particularly on internal investigations. 
Interna och externa utredningar (punkt 71) I samband med de hndelser som ledde till Santer-kommissionens avgng riktade institutionerna mest uppmrksamhet mot interna underskningar.
Recitals 1 and 7 and Article 1(3) of the basic Regulation reflect this concern. 
Detta tar sig ocks uttryck svl i skl 1 och 7 som i artikel 1.3 i frordningen.
However, having examined all the files and the CMS, it is certainly not the case that in practice the Office or the Supervisory Committee, which bases its work on the investigations conducted by the Office, have given priority to the criminal aspect of internal investigations, to the detriment of external investigations. The fact that the Office, the Supervisory Committee (as can be seen from the minutes of its meetings) and even the press have often focused on internal investigations, which are by their very nature sensitive, in no way means that external investigations have been put on the backburner. 
Vid en genomgng av alla renden och av informationen i rendehanteringssystemet finns det dremot ingenting som skulle peka p att OLAF eller kommittn (som baserar sitt arbete p de utredningar som genomfrs av OLAF) prioriterat de interna utredningarna och deras straffrttsliga aspekter p bekostnad av de externa. Det faktum att de interna underskningarna Đ som till sin natur r knsliga Đ ofta har gnats en srskilt stor uppmrksamhet inom OLAF, i kommittn (se mtesprotokoll) och ibland ven i pressen, innebr inte p ngot stt att de externa utredningarna getts en Ólgre rangÓ.
It should indeed be noted that, apart from the external investigations, the Office has provided important assistance to the Member States, support much appreciated by the Committee (see Chapter II of the annual report). 
Det br ocks uppmrksammas att OLAF, frutom de externa utredningarna, ocks ger mycket std i olika former t myndigheter i medlemsstaterna, vilket kommittn ocks utvrderat (se kapitel 2 i rsrapporten).
The examination of closed files and evaluation records (paragraph 72) The Supervisory Committee devoted particular attention to the question of closed files, instructing its secretariat to examine as many files as possible and, in significant cases, to prepare evaluation records. 
Granskning av avslutade underskningar Đ utvrderingsrapporter (punkt 72) Kommittn har lagt ner ett omfattande arbete p att granska avslutade utredningar, och dess sekretariat har getts i uppdrag att g igenom s mnga renden som mjligt, varvid bara de mest signifikanta blir freml fr en utvrderingsrapport.
As the records drawn up by the Committee secretariat are purely for internal use, it was possible to use them to point up any problems encountered and they were studied at length by the Committee. 
I de rapporter som upprttas av kommittns sekretariat har man Đ just drfr att det r ett dokument fr uteslutande internt bruk Đ kunnat ta upp samtliga de eventuella problem som kommittn gnat en mer ingende analys.
The Supervisory Committee and the Director of the Office or the director responsible for investigations held very fruitful discussions on any underlying problems detected, such as procedural problems and problems relating to the examination of the outcomes of criminal proceedings in the Member States. 
I de fall principiella problem har upptckts (t.ex. brister i tillvgagngssttet vid utredningen eller vid genomgngen av resultat av straffrttsliga frfaranden i medlemsstaterna) har dessa tagits upp med OLAF:s direktr eller med den direktr som ansvarat fr de aktuella utredningarna, vilket ofta har lett till konstruktiva diskussioner.
The Supervisory Committee minutes do not always reflect the full range of observations made during the CommitteeŐs meetings, as some cases closed by OLAF were under investigation in the Member States. 
Protokollen frn kommittns mten innehller inte alla detaljerade synpunkter som tagits upp, eftersom mnga renden fortfarande kan vara under utredning i medlemsstaterna ven om OLAF avslutat sitt arbete med dem.
C 202/32 EN Official Journal of the European Union 18.8.2005 D. Conclusions (paragraph 93) It can be concluded the Supervisory Committee has adopted a totally supportive attitude towards the Office, encouraging where necessary the introduction of new structures or methods. 
C 202/32 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 18.8.2005 D. Slutsatser (punkt 93) vervakningskommittns attityd gentemot OLAF har varit positiv, och kommittn har i ndvndiga fall stimulerat utvecklingen av nya strukturer eller metoder.
7.10.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 249/1 I (Information) COURT OF AUDITORS SPECIAL REPORT No 2/2005 concerning EDF budget aid to ACP countries: the CommissionŐs management of the public finance reform aspect, together with the CommissionŐs replies (presented pursuant to Article 248(4) second subparagraph of the EC Treaty) (2005/C 249/01) CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONSANDTERMINOLOGY .................................................... 
7.10.2005 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 249/1 I (Meddelanden) REVISIONSRTTEN SRSKILD RAPPORT nr 2/2005 om EUF:s budgetstd till AVS-lnderna: kommissionens frvaltning av omrdet Óreformen av de offentliga finansernaÓ samt kommissionens svar (i enlighet med artikel 248.4 andra stycket i EG-frdraget) (2005/C 249/01) INNEHLLSF RTECKNING F RKORTNINGAR .....................................................................
THECOURTŐSAUDIT ....................................................... 
SAMMANFATTNING ........................................................
Assessmentoftheinitialpublicfinancemanagementsituation .................... 
Beskrivningavmekanismen ...............................................
C 249/2 EN Official Journal of the European Union 7.10.2005 Implementationofthemethodologicalframework ......................... 
Granskningsresultat......................................................
Initial assessments generally comprehensive and linked to the national reform programme.................................................... 
Definition .............................................................
Fightingcorruption:anissuethatneedstobedeveloped ................. 
Frdelar:egenansvarochfrenklingfrmottagarlandet..........................
Informationreflectsthetruepicture ..................................... 
Genomfrande:ettvillkorligtstd ..........................................
Methodologicalframeworkunderdevelopment ............................ 
REVISIONSRTTENSGRANSKNING............................................
Performanceindicatorsarebeingimproved ........................... 
Granskningsml ........................................................
Implementationofthemethodologicalframework ......................... DelegationsŐmonitoringreportsincomplete........................... Performance indicators sometimes offer too little incentive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Det institutionella stdet r samordnat men ingr inte alltid i en vergripande ram.......................................................... Ingarekommendationerfrndelegationscheferna ...................... Uppgifternaspeglardefaktiskafrhllandena .............................
Relations with parliaments and Supreme Audit Institutions to be strengthened HumanresourcesshortfallattheCommission ......................... 
Kommissionensbeslutrintetillrckligtvlunderbyggda .................... vervakningavhurreformernaframskrider ..................................
24 ANNEX3ŃTheperformanceindicatorsusedbytheCommission ............................... 
Metodiskramunderutveckling ........................................
28 ANNEX4ŃMozambique:anexampleofgoodpracticeininter-donorcoordination ................. 
Genomfrandeavdenmetodiskaramen .................................
30 TheCommissionŐsreplies .............................................................. 
Slutsatser..............................................................
31 7.10.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 249/3 ACP ADB AFD BWIs CFAA CPAR DFID EDF EMCP FRA GBOFT HIPC HOAP IFAC IMF ISA MoU NIP OECD PAF PARPA PEFA PEMFA PER PETS PF PFMA PPARP PRGF PRSP PSCAP ROSC SAI SISTAFE WB ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY Ń African, Caribbean and Pacific States signatory to the Cotonou Agreement Ń African Development Bank Ń French Development Agency Ń Bretton Woods Institutions (WB and IMF) Ń Country Financial Accountability Assessment Ń Country Procurement Analytical Review Ń UK Department for International Development Ń European Development Fund Ń Expenditure Management and Control Programme Ń Fiduciary Risk Assessment Ń Government budgetary operations and financing table Ń Highly indebted poor country Ń Harmonisation of overseas audit practice Ń International Federation of Accountants Ń International Monetary Fund Ń International Standards on Auditing Ń Memorandum of Understanding Ń National Indicative Programme Ń Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Ń Performance Assessment Framework Ń Plano de Aco para a Reduo da Pobreza Absoluta (action plan to reduce absolute poverty) Ń Public expenditure financial accountability Ń Public expenditure management and financial accountability Ń Public expenditure review Ń Public expenditure tracking survey Ń Public finances Ń Public finance management assessment Ń Multiannual support programme for poverty reduction Ń Poverty reduction and growth facility Ń Poverty reduction strategy paper Ń Public service capacity building programme Ń Report on the observance of standards and codes Ń Supreme audit institution Ń Sistema de Administrao Financeira do Estado (government financial administration system) Ń World Bank 
31 7.10.2005 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 249/3 F RKORTNINGAR AfDB Ń Afrikanska utvecklingsbanken AVS Ń Lnder i Afrika, Vstindien och Stillahavsomrdet som skrivit under Cotonou-avtalet DSRP Ń Strategidokument fr fattigdomsminskning EUF Ń Europeiska utvecklingsfonden HIPC Ń Kraftigt skuldtyngda fattiga lnder IFAC Ń Internationella revisorsfrbundet (International Federation of Accountants) IMF Ń Internationella valutafonden (International Monetary Fund) ISA Ń Internationell revisionsstandard (International Standards on Auditing) OECD Ń Organisationen fr ekonomiskt samarbete och utveckling
C 249/4 EN Official Journal of the European Union SUMMARY Description of the mechanism I. The volume of direct non-targeted budget aid has increased substantially in recent years and now accounts for around one fifth of EDF aid. 
C 249/4 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning SAMMANFATTNING Beskrivning av mekanismen I. Det direkta och icke ronmrkta budgetstdet har kat betydligt under senare r och motsvarar nu cirka en femtedel av EUF-stden.
It has several major advantages, chief of which are ownership and greater simplicity (see paragraphs 9 to 11), but it also brings an element of risk. 
Det finns flera viktiga frdelar med stdet Đ bland annat egenansvar och frenkling (se punkterna 9Đ11) Đ men det innebr ocks en risk.
This risk differs from that affecting other types of aid (see paragraphs 12 and 13): the objectives are more ambitious and the funds disbursed are merged with the revenue of the beneficiary countries, which then spend them in accordance with their own management systems, which are usually weak. 
Denna risk r annorlunda jmfrt med andra typer av std (se punkterna 12Đ13) med tanke p de ambitisare mlen och eftersom de pengar som betalas ut uppgr i mottagarlndernas inkomster och sedan anvnds enligt deras egna frvaltningssystem som i regel r svaga.
The philosophy behind budget aid is to help beneficiary countries to reduce this risk while at the same time allowing them to manage their own development through growth and poverty reduction. 
Filosofin bakom budgetstdet r att hjlpa mottagarlnderna att minska denna risk men samtidigt gra det mjligt fr dem att sjlva styra utvecklingen i riktning mot tillvxt och fattigdomsbekmpning.
Most donors are showing an increased interest in this form of aid, which is fundamentally different from the traditional method of project support (see paragraph 11). 
Merparten av bidragsgivarna intresserar sig alltmer fr denna stdform som helt skiljer sig frn de traditionella projektst-den (se punkt 11).
The Commission is prepared to transfer budget aid to countries with weak management systems, provided that reforms are put in place to improve them (see paragraphs 28 and 29). This is a long-term process. 
Kommissionen betalar ut budgetstd till lnder med svaga frvaltningssystem p villkor att de genomfr reformer fr att frbttra dem (se punkterna 28Đ29), vilket r en lngsiktig process.
The CourtŐs audit III. 
Revisionsrttens granskning III.
The objective of this audit was to examine, for 2003 and 2004, how the Commission had managed the risk linked to public finance within the framework of budget aid (see paragraph 12), i.e. how it had verified the quality of public finance management and the effectiveness of the reforms introduced by the beneficiary State (see paragraphs 19 and 20). 
Mlet med granskningen var att underska hur kommissionen under 2003Đ2004 hanterade den risk som r frenad med offentliga finanser inom ramen fr budgetstdet (se punkt 12), och frskrade sig om att frvaltningen av de offentliga finanserna hll god kvalitet och om att de reformer som mottagarlandet infrde var effektiva (se punkterna 19Đ20).
The audit focused in particular on the programmes of direct non-targeted budget aid granted from the EDF within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement. It was based on checks performed at Commission headquarters and in five countries (see paragraphs 21 and 22). 
Granskningen gllde frmst EUF:s program fr direkt och icke ronmrkt budgetstd som beviljats enligt Cotonou-avtalet, och den grundar sig p kontroller som utfrdes vid huvudkontoret och i fem lnder (se punkterna 21Đ22).
Audit results IV. 
Granskningsresultat IV.
The analytical and follow-up tools, which the Commission applies in coordination with the other donors, and the World Bank and IMF in particular, provide relatively comprehensive information that enables it to take appropriate action. 
De analys-och vervakningsverktyg som kommissionen anvnder i samarbete med de andra bidragsgivarna, frmst Vrldsbanken och Internationella valutafonden, ger relativt heltckande information som gr att den kan vidta lmpliga tgrder.
However, the design (see paragraphs 23 to 27 and 42 to 46) and implementation (see paragraphs 31 to 37 and 47 to 68) of these tools need to be improved. 
De behver dock frbttras, bde nr det gller utformning (se punkterna 23Đ27 och 42Đ46) och genomfrande (se punkterna 31Đ37 och 47Đ68).
There are some design weaknesses at the diagnostic level and in the monitoring reports, which are not sufficiently complete and informative. 
Utformningen har vissa brister nr det gller diagnoserna och vervakningsrapporterna som inte r tillrckligt omfattande och informativa.
Furthermore, there is insufficient coordination with other donors at local level as regards the use of these instruments and their implementation does not rely sufficiently on the parliaments and supreme audit institutions of the beneficiary countries concerned. V. The Court recommends that the Commission: (a) update and complete its Methodological Guide, including the parts relating to monitoring reports (see paragraph 84); (b) give clearer evidence for the eligibility of beneficiary countries (see paragraph 85); (c) employ enhanced-incentive public finance performance indicators (see paragraph 86); (d) finalise the new public finance management performance measurement tool and do its utmost to have it adopted by the various donors (see paragraph 87); (e) strengthen local cooperation between donors (see paragraph 88); (f) strengthen its relations with the parliaments and supreme audit institutions of beneficiary countries (see paragraph 89). 
V. Revisionsrtten rekommenderar att kommissionen a) uppdaterar och frdigstller sin metodiska handledning, inbegripet den del som gller vervakningsrapporterna (se punkt 84), b) mer uttryckligt pvisar mottagarlndernas rtt till std (se punkt 85), c) anvnder resultatindikatorer fr offentliga finanser som ger mer incitament (se punkt 86), d) frdigstller det nya verktyget fr utvrdering av kvaliteten p frvaltningen av de offentliga finanserna och gr sitt yttersta fr att det skall antas av de olika bidragsgivarna (se punkt 87), e) strker det lokala samarbetet mellan bidragsgivarna (se punkt 88), f) strker sina frbindelser med mottagarlndernas parlament och hgre revisionsorgan (se punkt 89).
7.10.2005 In 2000, the Court examined the CommissionŐs follow-up of the use of counterpart funds from structural adjustment support earmarked for budget aid in the ACP countries (1). The Commission has since replaced this form of assistance by budget aid, which now represents more than one quarter of total aid under the ninth EDF (see table A in Annex 1). 
7.10.2005 Kommissionen har ersatt denna stdform med budgetstd, vilket nu utgr mer n en fjrdedel av det totala stdet frn nionde EUF (se tabell A i bilaga 1).
2. The Parliament (2) and the Council (3) have recognised the advantages of budget aid. 
2. Europaparlamentet (2) och rdet (3) medger att det finns frdelar med budgetstdet.
They are concerned about the control arrangements for it and have urged the Commission to be vigilant in its observance of Article 61(2) of the Cotonou Agreement (see paragraph 18) and, in coordination with the other donors, to carry out more thorough appraisal of the direction taken by public finance management in the beneficiary countries as well as monitoring the progress of the reforms that are intended to improve it. 
De r bekymrade ver hur kontrollen av det r organiserad och uppmanar kommissionen att vara vaksam nr det gller artikel 61.2 i Cotonou-avtalet (se punkt 18) och att, i samordning med de andra bidragsgivarna, strikt vervaka hur mottagarlndernas frvaltning av de offentliga finanserna utvecklas och hur de reformer som skall frbttra den framskrider.
AUDIT FIELD: DIRECT NON-TARGETED BUDGET AID Definition 3. 
GRANSKNINGSOMRDE: DIREKT OCH ICKE RONMRKT BUDGETST D Definition 3.
It provides de facto support for their balance of payments and public finances. 
Det r ett std till lndernas betalningsbalans och offentliga finanser.
The importance of this aid relative to total EDF assistance is shown in table B in Annex 1. 
I tabell B i bilaga 1 visas storleken p detta std i frhllande till EUF:s sammanlagda std.
The amount of budget aid by country is shown in table C in Annex 1. 4. 
I tabell C i bilaga 1 visas frdelningen per land. 4.
The aid is ÔdirectŐ in that it enters budgets directly without the need for a counterpart allocation of currency for countriesŐ essential imports. 
Stdet r ÓdirektÓ eftersom det gr direkt in i budgetarna utan att motsvaras av en tilldelning av valuta avsedd fr lndernas vsentliga import.
In general, this mechanism is no longer necessary because the currency of the beneficiary countries is nearly always convertible and freely transferable. 5. 
I allmnhet r denna mekanism inte lngre ndvndig eftersom mottagarlndernas valuta nstan alltid r konvertibel och fritt kan verltas. 5.
The aid is Ônon-targetedŐ in that it is merged indistinguish-ably with other budgetary revenue and cannot be associated with specific expenditure, in contrast to targeted budget aid, where the EDF funds are paid into special accounts whose use requires the signature of the Heads of Delegation. 
Stdet r Óicke ronmrktÓ eftersom det sammanblandas med andra budgetinkomster och inte kan knytas till specifika utgifter i motsats till riktade budgetstd dr EUF-pengarna stts in p srskilda konton som bara kan anvndas med delegationschefernas underskrift fr att det skall synas vad stdet anvnds till.
Targeted budget aid is lim-ited(4) to cases of countries experiencing serious liquidity problems. 
De riktade budgetstden r begrnsade (4) till de fall dr lnderna har allvarliga likviditetsproblem.