natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
While the external constraints have affected considerably and adversely the effective implementation of the programme, matters for which the Commission has responsibility and over which it should exercise control are also important in explaining unsatisfactory performances. 
En sammanfattning av dessa grs i denna rapport. ven om olika yttre omstndigheter i hg grad har pverkat ett effektivt genomfrande av programmet i negativ riktning, r orsaker som kommissionen r ansvarig fr och som den borde ha kontroll ver ocks viktiga nr det gller att frklara otillfredsstllande resultat.
Budgetary execution 26. 
Budgetgenomfrande 26.
The Court has carried out an analysis of the budgetary execution of the projects and actions financed for the Palestinians under the three main budget headings B7-4 1 0 0, 4 2 0 0 and 4 2 1 0 from 1994 to 1999, on the basis of the data contained in the CommissionŐs accounting system (see Chart 1). 
Revisionsrtten har analyserat genomfrandet av budgeten fr de projekt och tgrder som finansieras fr palestinierna under de tre huvudsakliga budgetrubrikerna B7Đ4 1 0 0, 4 2 0 0 och 4 2 1 0 frn 1994 till 1999, p grundval av uppgifter frn kommissionens redovisningssystem (se diagram 1).
The trend in the volume of assistance provided has been influenced by the financing of the PA recurrent costs and by the Special Cash Facility. 
Utvecklingen av det lmnade bistndets storlek har pverkats av finansieringen av PA:s terkommande kostnader och av de srskilda kontantmedlen.
In 1995 and 1996 the financing of recurrent costs accounted for 30 % of the total commitments, but was gradually phased out in the following years. In 1997, the volume of assistance was influenced by the Special Cash Facility, which alone accounted for 20 % of commitments and 28 % of payments. 
Finansieringen av de terkommande kostnaderna utgjorde 1995 och 1996 30 % av de totala tagandena, men reducerades gradvis under fljande r. r 1997 pverkades bistndets storlek av de srskilda kontantmedlen, som ensamma stod fr 20 % av tagandena och fr 28 % av betalningarna.
In 1998 and 1999, in contrast, almost the total amount of funds was committed for projects of a more complex nature, for which disbursements are generally less rapid. 
Dremot gjordes 1998 och 1999 taganden fr nstan alla medel fr projekt som var av mer komplicerat slag och fr vilka utbetalningarna i allmnhet var lngsammare.
31.1.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 32/9 27. 
31.1.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 32/9 27.
Concerning budget heading B7-4 2 0 0, payment appropriations equal to 14 million euro were carried over to the financial year 1999. 
Nr det gller budgetrubrik B7Đ4 2 0 0, verfrdes betalningsbemyndiganden p motsvarande 14 miljoner euro till budgetret 1999.
Therefore, at the beginning of the financial year 1999, payment appropriations available for the budget heading totalled 64 million euro. 
Vid brjan av budgetret 1999 fanns drfr betalningsbemyndiganden p totalt 64 miljoner euro tillgngliga under budgetrubriken.
According to the Financial Regulation (1), payment appropriations may be carried over when the appropriations provided for the heading concerned in the budget for the followingfinancialyeardonotcoverrequirements.However,in 1999, only 16 million euro was paid from this budget heading. 
Enligt budgetfrordningen (1) kan betalningsbemyndiganden verfras nr anslag som gjorts fr den berrda budgetrubriken inte rcker till fr att tcka behoven under fljande budgetr. Emellertid utbetalades 1999 endast 16 miljoner euro frn denna budgetrubrik.
Due to this low rate of disbursements, payment appropriations totalling 40 million euro were transferred during 1999 from this budget heading to other chapters of the budget. 
P grund av den lga utbetalningsgraden verfrdes under 1999 betalningsbemyndiganden p totalt 40 miljoner euro frn denna budgetrubrik till andra kapitle i budgeten.
Structural weaknesses and failures in the CommissionŐs programming and management procedures and systems have contributed to slowing down the implementation of projects and therefore to reducing the rate of disbursements. 
Strukturella svagheter och misslyckanden i kommissionens frfaranden och system fr planering och frvaltning, har bidragit till att genomfrandet av projekt gtt lngsammare och drmed ven till att utbetalningsgraden blivit lgre.
In particular, by the end of 1999 there had been no payments on 10 important projects committed from 1996 to 1998 under budget heading B7-4 2 0 0 and totalling 49,5 million euro. 
Framfr allt gjordes vid slutet av 1999 inga utbetalningar till tio stora projekt fr vilka taganden gjorts mellan 1996 och 1998, under budgetrubriken B7Đ4 2 0 0, p totalt 49,5 miljoner euro.
Six of these projects, corresponding, with one exception, to the oldest commitments, were examined in the context of the audit (2) (see paragraphs 38, 51, 57-59, 66-68, 76-79). 
Sex av dessa projekt, som med ett undantag motsvarar de ldsta tagandena, granskades (2) (se punkterna 38, 51, 57Đ59, 66Đ68, 76Đ79).
Human resources Number of staff The CommissionŐs central services 29. 
Personal Antal anstllda Kommissionens centrala avdelningar 29.
At the CommissionŐs central services in Brussels, the responsibility for the management of the projects and actions financed under the B7-4 1 0 0, 4 2 0 0 and 4 2 1 0 budget headings is mainly shared between the geographical unit of the External Relations Directorate-General (formerly DG I. B) and the technical unitoftheJointExternalRelationsService(SCR).Inneitherser-vice, however, does the allocation of Commission staff reflect the priority given by the EU, financially and politically, to the programme. 
Vid kommissionens centrala avdelningar i Bryssel har ansvaret fr frvaltningen av projekten och tgrderna, som finansieras under budgetrubrikerna B7Đ4 1 0 0, 4 2 0 0 och 4 2 1 0, i huvudsak delats upp mellan den geografiska enheten vid Generaldirektoratet fr yttre frbindelser (tidigare GD I B) och den tekniska enheten vid Gemensamma tjnsten fr yttre frbindelser (SCR).
The Court was not able to find analyses and assessments, carried out as part of the normal management processes, ofhowmany,andwhattypeofstaff,theresponsibleservicesof the Commission considered necessary at the central level for the implementation of the programme itself and all the other respon-sibilitiesoftheWestBankandGazaStripdesk(3).AttheRELEX DG, the programme is handled on a full-time basis by two people: the desk officer and an assistant. 
Emellertid avspeglar personalstyrkan inte vid ngon av avdelningarna EU:s ekonomiska och politiska prioritering av programmet. Revisionsrtten kunde inte finna ngra analyser eller bedmningar, som gjorts inom ramen fr det vanliga frvaltningsarbetet, av hur mnga och vilket slags anstllda, som kommissionens ansvariga avdelningar bedmde vara ndvndigt p central niv, fr att genomfra sjlva programmet och alla andra ansvarsomrden som vilar p kontoret fr Vstbanken och Gazaremsan (3).
In the technical unit of the SCR, most of the projects are the responsibility of one official, who is also responsible for other non-Palestine projects. 
Vid SCR:s tekniska enhet ansvarar en tjnsteman fr de flesta projekten och denne r ven ansvarig fr andra projekt som inte rr Palestina.
Notwithstanding the recent reinforcement of the geographical desk, and the fact that staff of other services also participate (4), the total number of staff available is insufficient to manage a programme of this size and scope effectively. 
Trots att det geografiska kontoret nyligen frstrkts och trots att personal frn andra avdelningar ocks deltar (4), r det totala antalet anstllda inte tillrckligt fr att mjliggra en effektiv frvaltning av ett program av denna storlek och omfattning.
The field office 31. 
Kontoret p platsen 31.
Following a request from the Dublin European Council in 1990, the Commission, in 1991, appointed a Representative to the Occupied Territories, who initially worked in Brussels. 
Efter en anmodan som framkom vid Europeiska rdets mte iDublin1990,utsgkommissionenenrepresentanttilldeocku-perade omrdena, som frst arbetade i Bryssel.
In February 1994, the Representative moved to Jerusalem with three technical assistants. 
I februari 1994 flyttade representanten till Jerusalem med tre tekniska assistenter.
The Israeli authorities did not allow the Commission Representative to open and operate an office in that capacity. 
De israeliska myndigheterna tillt inte att en representant frn kommissionen ppnade och drev ett kontor.
The conditions for the work of the ECTAO were defined in 1994, on the basis of an exchange of letters between the Commission and the Israeli authorities. 
Villkoren fr ECTAO:s arbete definierades 1994 p grundval av en brevvxling mellan kommissionen och de israeliska myndigheterna.
According to this agreement, the office would be staffed by a maximum of six people who would be granted privileges and immunities identical to those enjoyed by United Nations (UN) officials (5) in Israel and in the territories under Israeli administration, plus some local personnel. The agreement, which places an external constraint on the number of staff, is still in force. 
Enligt denna verenskommelse skulle byrn bemannas med hgst sex personer, som skulle tnjuta samma privilegier och immunitet som dem som tillkommer tjnstemn vid Frenta nationerna (FN) (5) i Israel och i de territorier som frvaltas av Israel, samt viss lokal personal. verenskommel-sen, som innebr en extern begrnsning av antalet anstllda, gller fortfarande.
32. In 1998, the activities of ECTAO were taken over by the European Commission Representative Office (ECRO) which, at the end of 1999, was staffed, in addition to the CommissionŐs Representative, by three officials and two European experts on two-year contracts. 
32. r 1998 vertogs ECTAO:s verksamhet av Europeiska unionens representationskontor (European Commission Representative Office, ECRO).
The Representative has had diplomatic status since 1992, whereas the three officials and two European experts are covered by the agreement with the Israeli authorities. 
Representanten har haft diplomatstatus sedan 1992 medan de tre tjnstemnnen och de tv europeiska experterna omfattas av verenskommelsen med de israeliska myndigheterna.
Additionally, the staff of the office was completed by nine local agents. 
Dessutom kompletterades kontorets personal med nio lokalanstllda.
Technical expertise was provided by a new TAO, the MEDA team, consisting of six professionals, plus administrative support (see also paragraphs 35-36). 
Teknisk expertis tillhandahlls av en ny byr fr tekniskt bistnd, Meda-teamet, som bestod av sex experter samt administrativa stdfunktioner (se ven punkterna 35Đ36).
At the end of 1999, therefore, the number of ECROŐs officials and experts was below the ceiling fixed by the agreement with the Israeli authorities. 
Vid slutet av 1999 var sledes antalet tjnstemn och experter vid ECRO mindre n det maximala antal som faststllts i verenskommelsen med de israeliska myndigheterna.
Following an inspection in 1996, the Inspection des Dlgations recommended reinforcing ECRO by two A posts and one C post. The Commission, because of a lack of budgetary funds, did not allocate the second senior permanent post, which was allowed for under the abovementioned agreement. This post could have been entirely devoted to the manage-mentofdevelopmentissues. 
Efter en inspektion 1996 rekommenderade tjnsten fr inspektion av delegationerna att ECRO skulle frstrkas med tv tjnster i kategori A och en tjnst i kategori C. P grund av att det saknades budgetmedel, tilldelade inte kommissionen ECRO den andra fasta chefstjnsten som medgavs i den ovan nmnda verenskommelsen. Denna tjnst skulle helt ha kunnat gnats t ledning av utvecklingsfrgor.
(1) 2 ( ) 3 () Article 7 of the Financial Regulation of 21 December 1977 applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (OJ L 356, 31.12.1977, p.1), as last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 2673/1999 of 13 December 1999 (OJ L 326, 18.12.1999, p. 
1 () 2 ( ) 3 ( ) Artikel 7 i budgetfrordningen av den 21 december 1977 fr Europeiska gemenskapernas allmnna budget (EGT L 356, 31.12.1977, s. 1), senast ndrad genom rdets frordning (EG) nr 2673/1999 av den 13 december 1999 (EGT L 326, 18.12.1999, s.
1). Technical assistance and temporary seat building for the PLC; final equipment for the European Gaza Hospital; Ramallah Radio Station; MSP III ; PDF (PLE/98/06). 
1). Tekniskt bistnd och tillflligt ste fr PLC, Slutlig utrustning fr Europeiska sjukhuset i Gaza, radiostationen Ramallah, MSP III ; PDF (PLE/98/06).
There have been assessments made of a global nature of requirements as part of the Decode exercise, but this was a special exercise to prepare for the ÔCommission of tomorrowŐ. 
Bedmningar av allmnt slag har gjorts inom ramen fr DECODE, men det var en srskild tgrd fr att frbereda fr Framtidens kommission (ÓCommission of TomorrowÓ).
This is not the same as the responsible services making, on a regular basis, assessments of need in order to support bids for additional staff as part of the normal budgetary process. 
Det r inte detsamma som att de ansvariga avdelningarna regelbundet gr behovsbedmningar som kan ligga till grund fr en begran om ytterligare personal som en del av den normala budgetprocessen.
4 (5) ( ) For instance, the financial, tendering and contract units of the SCR. 
4 (5) ( ) T.ex. SCR:s avdelningar fr finansiering, anbud och avtal.
The Commission Representative had already been granted diplomatic status in 1992. 
Kommissionens representant fick diplomatstatus redan 1992.
C 32/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 31.1.2001 34. 
C 32/10 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 31.1.2001 34.
In 1999-2000, it took the Commission five months to appoint a new Representative. 
Det tog kommissionen fem mnader att 1999Đ2000 utse en ny representant.
During this time, and pending the accreditation procedure which has followed, there was only one official to manage all the activities. 
Under denna tidsperiod och i vntan p det fljande ackrediteringsfrfarandet fanns endast en tjnsteman som kunde handlgga alla renden.
In view of the size and the high profile of this politically sensitive programme, this was insufficienttocarryoutthetask. 
Med tanke p det politiskt knsliga programmets storlek och dess framtrdande profil, var detta otillrckligt fr att genomfra uppgiften.
The MEDA team 35. 
Meda-teamet 35.
From its establishment, ECRO depended for the manage-mentofassistanceactionsonthesupportoftechnicalassistants. 
ECRO var redan d den upprttades beroende av tekniskt std fr att frvalta bistndstgrder.
From 1998 onwards, this support was provided by TAOs, called MEDA teams. 
Frn 1998 och framt gavs detta std av byrer fr tekniskt bistnd, som kallades Meda-team.
The MEDA teams provide an important technical input, but the limited duration of the contracts makes them only a short-term solution. 
Meda-teamen lmnar viktiga tekniska bidrag, men eftersom kontrakten lper p en viss tid, r de endast lsningar p kort sikt.
The scope of their action is also limited, since they cannot carry out public authority tasks. 
Deras verksamhetsomrde r ocks begrnsat, eftersom de inte kan utfra offentliga myndigheters uppgifter.
A further limitation to the effectiveness of the MEDA team based in Palestine has stemmed from the high rate of replacement: at the end of 1999, about one and a half years after the signature of the contract, only one member of the original team of six was still in post. 
Effektiviteten vid de Meda-team som r baserade i Palestina begrnsas ytterligare av den hga personalomsttningen. Vid slutet av 1999, dvs. cirka ett och ett halvt r efter det att kontraktet undertecknats, var endast en person frn det ursprungliga teamet p sex personer fortfarande i tjnst.
One reason for this high turnover is the fact that the contract has to be renewed every year, which leads many experts to lookforlonger-termassignments. 
En orsak till denna hga personalomsttning r att kontraktet mste frnyas varje r, vilket fr mnga experter att se sig om efter mer lngsiktiga uppdrag.
Since the beginning of 1999, the Commission had been unable, for more than one year, to decide on the replacement of the Palestine MEDA team private sector expert. 
Sedan brjan av 1999 har kommissionen, i ver ett r, inte kunnat fatta beslut om vem som skall erstta det palestinska Meda-teamets expert p den privata sektorn.
Initially this was for procedural reasons, then it was because the responsible services could not agree on the choice of the candidate. 
Ursprungligen berodde detta p procedurfrgor, men sedan var anledningen att man vid de ansvariga avdelningarna inte kunde enas om vilken kandidat som skulle utses.
In the absence of the expert, adequate planning and monitoring has not been carried out in this essential component of the programme. 
Utan ngon sdan expert har ndvndig planering och vervakning inte kunnat genomfras i denna mycket viktiga programdel.
Skills of staff 37. 
Personalens kompetens 37.
A large and complex programme such as that in favour of Palestinian society should preferably be managed by staff with experience of comparable programmes. 
Ett stort och komplicerat program, som programmet till frmn fr Palestina, borde helst frvaltas av personal med erfarenhet av liknande program.
This has not, however, been the case. 
S har emellertid inte varit fallet.
In addition to the insufficient number of staff in ECRO and at the central services, the educational and experience profiles of those who are there do not always correspond to the tasks to be performed. 
Frutom att antalet anstllda vid ECRO och vid de centrala avdelningarna varit otillrckligt, verensstmmer den tillgngliga personalens bakgrund vad gller utbildning och erfarenhet inte alltid med de arbetsuppgifter som skall utfras.
Also, because of the stretched resources and heavy workload, staff can devote only limited time to professional training. 
Dessutom kan personalen, p grund av knappa resurser och hg arbetsbelastning, endast gna begrnsad tid t vidareutbildning.
This should not in any way detract from the commitment and hard work demonstrated by the staff on the programme. 
Detta br inte p ngot stt fr-ringa det engagemang och den gedigna arbetsinsats som programmets personal visat prov p.
Their contribution is highly regarded by the Palestinian authorities and by their interlocutors in other agencies. 
Deras insatser uppskattas mycket av de palestinska myndigheterna och av deras kontaktpersoner vid andra organ.
Organisation 38. 
Organisation 38.
In addition to the geographical unit in the RELEX DG, and the technical unit in the SCR, several other services in the SCR, such as the legal affairs, public procurement, financial and audit units, and the Financial Controller, are involved in the management and control of the programme. 
Frutom den geografiska enheten vid Generaldirektoratet fr yttre frbindelser och den tekniska enheten vid SCR deltar flera andra avdelningar vid SCR i frvaltningen och kontrollen av programmet, som t.ex. den juridiska avdelningen, avdelningen fr offentlig upphandling, avdelningarna fr ekonomi och revision samt controllern.
This caused implementation delays to and blockages of projects examined during the audit (1). 
Detta orsakade frseningar i genomfrandet och blockeringar av granskade projekt (1).
Moreover, responsibilities are fragmented and coordination between units needs to be improved. 
Dessutom r ansvarsomrdena uppsplittrade och samordningen mellan enheterna behver frbttras.
Currently, despite the creation of the SCR, the respective tasks of the units are not clearly defined. 
Fr nrvarande r enheternas respektive arbetsuppgifter inte tydligt definierade, trots att SCR inrttats.
Some project files have been transferred from the geographical unit to the SCR; others have stayed in the geographical unit. 
Vissa prmar med projektdokumentation har flyttats frn den geografiska enheten till SCR, medan andra lmnats kvar vid den geografiska enheten.
Also, the technical unit in the SCR is not responsible for the implementation of all new projects. 
Den tekniska enheten vid SCR r dessutom inte ansvarig fr genomfrandet av alla nya projekt.
In some cases, the allocation of responsibilities for project implementation and monitoring is unclear, with the result that ultimately no action is taken (2). 
I vissa fall r ansvarsfrdelningen otydlig vad gller genomfrandet av projekt och dess vervakning, vilket till sist leder till att inga tgrder vidtas (2).
Within units, comprehensive job descriptions, including tasks to be performed, are lacking at the central services; for ECRO, they were prepared only at the end of 1999. 
Inom enheterna saknas utfrliga arbetsbeskrivningar, inklusive uppgifter om vilket arbete som skall utfras, vid de centrala avdelningarna. Fr ECRO utarbetades de frst vid slutet av 1999.
At the moment, procedures are heavily centralised: in practice ECRO must refer to the central services for all important deci-sions.Thisnotonlycreatesimplementationdelays,butalsounder- mines ECROŐs profile when dealing with other major donors on the spot. 
Fr tillfllet r frfarandena i hg grad centraliserade och i praktiken mste ECRO vnda sig till de centrala avdelningarna vid alla viktiga beslut. Detta leder inte bara till frseningar i genomfrandet, utan frsvagar ocks ECRO:s stllning vid kontakterna med andra stora bistndsgivare p platsen.
Interlocutors, beneficiaries, other donors, commented that it was very frustrating for them that people on the spot in ECRO, who were clearly in a position to take a decision, were unable to do so because they lacked the appropriate authority. 
Motparter som stdmottagare och andra bistndsgivare uppgav att det var mycket frustrerande fr dem, att personer som arbetade fr ECRO p platsen och som uppenbart hade en beslutsfattande stllning, inte kunde fatta ngra beslut eftersom de saknade det rtta tillstndet.
This contrasts with the example of the World BankŐs local office. 
Detta str i kontrast till det exempel som Vrldsbankens lokala kontor utgr.
Because of the special situation in Palestine, the Country Director, based on the spot, is the head of the World Bank programme, with full authority. 
P grund av den speciella situationen i Palestina, r landsdirektren, som r stationerad p platsen, chef fr Vrldsbankens program med fulla befogenheter.
In order to be able to take action quickly and effectively in the complex and rapidly evolving Palestinian scenario, the Commission needs to devolve substantial authority, including financial authority, from the central services to ECRO. The devolution can, however, only take place by reinforcing ECRO, through the provision of adequate human resources and management tools, such as access to Sincom and databases. 
Fr att kunna agera snabbt och effektivt i det komplicerade och snabbt skiftande palestinska scenariot, mste kommissionen verlta lngtgende befogenheter, inklusive ekonomiska befogenheter, frn de centrala avdelningarna till ECRO. verltandet kan emellertid endast gras nr ECRO har frstrkts och frsetts med lmplig personal och lmpliga frvaltningssystem, som t.ex. tillgng till Sincom och databaser.
In this respect, the CommissionŐs pilot exercise in devolving responsibility to field offices, first of all in the special case of Sarajevo, and more recently to South Africa, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and in the context of the post-hurricane Mitch reconstruction programme in Central America, is to be welcomed. 
I detta sammanhang vlkomnas kommissionens pilotprogram fr att verlta ansvar till flt-kontoren, allra frst till det i Sarajevo, som r ett srfall, och p senare tid till kontoren i Sydafrika, Marocko, Egypten, Jordanien och till kontoret i Centralamerika inom ramen fr teruppbyggnadsprogrammet efter orkanen Mitch.