natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The geographical desks, largely taken over from the former Commission Directorate for External Relations (DG RELEX), and the crisis management structures taken over from the GSC27 create two distinct parts of the organisation, the latter reporting directly to the HR/VP. 
De geografiska enheterna, som till stor del har tagits ver frn kommissionens fre detta generaldirektorat fr yttre frbindelser (GD Yttre frbindelser), och de strukturer fr krishantering som har tagits ver frn rdets gene-ralsekretariat27 bildar tv skilda delar av organisationen, dr den sistnmnda rapporterar direkt till den hga representanten/vice ordfranden.
30 The EEAS’s structure follows a pyramid organisational design which is more complex than the foreign policy structures it replaces: (a) geographical desks, the core function of the EEAS28, having additional levels of management than hitherto (see the Table); (b) there are more organisational units which are also of smaller size (managers have a narrower span of control, with approximately 20 % fewer staff reporting to them); and (c) the EEAS has twice the number of senior management staff as its predecessors29. 
30 Europeiska utrikestjnstens organisation har en pyramidformad struktur som r mer komplex n de utrikespolitiska strukturer som den erstter: a) Geografiska enheter, Europeiska utrikestjnstens krnfunktion28, med fler frvaltningsniver n tidigare (se tabellen). b) Det finns fler organisatoriska enheter som ocks r mindre till storleken (cheferna har ett mindre kontrollspann, med omkring 20 % frre anstllda som rapporterar till dem). c) Europeiska utrikestjnsten har dubbelt s mnga ledande befattningshavare som dess fregngare29.
26 The trio Presidency was established in 2007, following a decision by the European Council, according to which the Union’s Member States are divided in groups of three consecutive rotating Presidencies of the Council of the EU, which form the trio. 
26 Ordfrandeskapstrion inrttades 2007 efter ett beslut av Europeiska rdet, enligt vilket unionens medlemsstater r indelade i grupper av tre p varandra fljande roterande ordfrandeskap fr Europeiska unionens rd som bildar trion.
It aims to achieve continuity and consistency in the work of the Council. 
Syftet r att skapa kontinuitet och konsekvens i rdets arbete.
27 The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (created in 2009), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (2007), the Intelligence Analysis Centre (2002) and the Military Staff (2001). 
27 Direktoratet fr krishantering och planering (inrttat 2009), den civila lednings-och planeringskapaciteten (2007), underrttelseanalyscentrumet (2002) och den militra staben (2001).
They are essential to deploy civilian and military instruments decided by the Council in response to crises (e.g. the launch of a military training mission in Mali in February 2013 to support stability in the Sahel region). 
De r av grundlggande betydelse fr anvndningen av civila och militra instrument som rdet beslutat om som svar p kriser (t.ex. inledningen av ett militrt utbildningsuppdrag i Mali i februari 2013 fr att frmja stabilitet i Sahelregionen).
28 A geographical desk consists of one or more EEAS staff covering the same country. 
28 En geografisk enhet bestr av en flera anstllda vid Europeiska utrikestjnsten som arbetar med samma land.
They are grouped into geographical services. 
De r indelade i geografiska avdelningar.
29 DG RELEX had four senior managers (one director-general and three deputy directors-general) and the GSC two senior managers (a director-general and a deputy director-general). 
29 GD Yttre frbindelser hade fyra ledande befattningshavare (en generaldirektr och tre vice generaldirektrer) och rdets generalsekretariat tv ledande befattningshavare (en generaldirektr och en vice generaldirektr).
Observations 13 Overview of management levels at EEAS, DG RELEX and GSC New structure Previous structures EEAS DG RELEX GSC (six levels) (five levels) (five levels) 1. 
Iakttagelser 13 versikt ver frvaltningsniver vid Europeiska utrikestjnsten, GD Yttre frbindelser och rdets generalsekretariat Nya strukturen Tidigare strukturer Europeiska utrikestjnsten GD Yttre frbindelser Rdets generalsekretariat (sex niver) (fem niver) (fem niver) 1.
HR/VP 1. 
Den hga representanten/vice ordfranden 1.
Commissioner 2. 
Kommissionsledamot 2.
Executive Secretary-General/ Chief Operating Officer - 1. 
Den verkstllande generalsekreteraren/den operativa chefen Đ 1.
Secretary-General 3. 
Generalsekreterare 3.
Deputy Secretaries-General - - 4. 
Stllfretrdande generalsekreterare Đ Đ 4.
Managing Directors 2. 
Verkstllande direktrer 2.
Director-General 2. 
Generaldirektr 2.
Director-General - 3. 
Generaldirektr Đ 3.
Deputy Directors-General 3. Deputy Director-General 5. 
Vice generaldirektrer 3.Vice generaldirektr 5.
Directors 4. 
Direktrer 4.
Directors 6. 
Direktrer 6.
Heads of Division 5. 
Avdelningschefer 5.
Heads of Unit 5. 
Enhetschefer 5.
Heads of Unit Source: EEAS staffing data and Official Directory of the European Union, 2010. 
Enhetschefer Klla: Europeiska utrikestjnstens personaluppgifter och Europeiska unionens officiella institutionskatalog, 2010.
31 The top-heavy nature of the EEAS is partly due to the Council decision, which envisaged the creation of directorates-general for geographical areas and required that one third of EEAS staff should come from the Member States. 
31 Europeiska utrikestjnstens topptunga struktur beror delvis p rdets beslut som frutsg att generaldirektorat fr geografiska omrden skulle inrttas och krvde att en tredjedel av Europeiska utrikestjnstens personal skulle komma frn medlemsstaterna.
As most of the management posts transferred to the EEAS were already occupied by permanent officials, the EEAS created a top-heavy structure, allowing a significant number of top posts to be occupied by Member State diplomats. 
Eftersom merparten av de chefstjnster som frdes ver till Europeiska utrikestjnsten redan innehades av fast anstllda tjnstemn, bildade Europeiska utrikestjnsten en topp-tung struktur som gjorde att ett stort antal hga befattningar kunde innehas av diplomater frn medlemsstaterna.
32 The common security and defence policy’s structures taken over from the GSC were created on a case-by-case basis over the years without an overarching framework and overlap with other crisis management de-partments30. 
32 De strukturer frn den gemensamma skerhets-och frsvarspolitiken som togs ver frn rdets generalsekretariat hade skapats frn fall till fall under ren utan en vergripande ram och verlappar med andra avdelningar fr krishantering30.
The EEAS has started to address these issues, but this is a complex process which requires the unanimous support of Member States to change several Council decisions. 
Europeiska utrikestjnsten har brjat ta itu med dessa frgor, men det r en komplex process som krver medlemsstaternas enhlliga std fr att flera av rdets beslut ska kunna ndras.
In the meantime, it has established new mechanisms to foster coordination, such as the crisis management board and the crisis platform (see Box 1). 
Under mellantiden har Europeiska utrikestjnsten infrt nya mekanismer som ska frmja samordning, t.ex. krishanteringsrdet och krisplattformen (se ruta 1).
30 In particular, with the crisis response and operational coordination department, the security policy and conflict prevention directorate and to certain extent with the global issues and counterterrorism division. 
30 Framfr allt med avdelningen fr krishantering och operativ samordning (crisis response and operational coordination department), direktoratet fr skerhetspolitik och konfliktfrebyggande (security policy and conflict prevention directorate) och i viss mn avdelningen fr globala frgor och terrorismbekmpning (global issues and counter-terrorism division).
For example, the audit revealed overlaps on crisis prevention, crisis response planning, space policy and security sector reform. Table 
Till exempel visade revisionen p verlappningar nr det gller krisfrebyggande, planering av krishantering, rymdpolitik och reform av skerhetssektorn. Tabell
Observations 14 The crisis platform The crisis platform is a new coordination mechanism to provide the EEAS and the Commission with clear political and strategic guidance for the management of a given crisis. 
Iakttagelser 14 Krisplattformen Krisplattformen r en ny samordningsmekanism som ska ge Europeiska utrikestjnsten och kommissionen tydlig politisk och strategisk vgledning i hanteringen av en kris.
Depending on the characteristics of a particular crisis, the crisis platform brings together crisis management structures, geographical and horizontal departments, and relevant Commission services. 
Beroende p vilka knnetecken en viss kris har, fr krisplattformen samman krishanteringsstrukturer, geografiska och vergripande avdelningar och behriga kommissionsavdelningar.
When a crisis platform is launched, the geographical managing director transfers the lead over the country to the Managing Director for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination, who coordinates the EU’s response. 
Nr en krisplattform sjstts lmnar den geografiska verkstllande direktren ver ledningen fr landet till den verkstllande direktren fr krishantering och operativ samordning, som samordnar EU:s svar.
This limits the number of crises which the EU can deal with at the same time, as the crisis response managing director does not have sufficient resources to manage more than two crises simultaneously. 
Detta begrnsar antalet kriser som EU kan hantera samtidigt, eftersom den verkstllande direktren fr krishantering inte har tillrckligt med resurser fr att kunna hantera fler n tv kriser samtidigt.
As a result, a crisis platform for a given country may be called off when the crisis is still ongoing and the EU’s response has not yet taken shape (e.g. Libya). 
En krisplattform fr ett visst land kan drfr avbrytas nr krisen fortfarande pgr och EU:s svar nnu inte har tagit form (t.ex. i fallet med Libyen).
33 The EEAS has a Corporate Board, composed of its four most senior of-ficials31. 
33 Europeiska utrikestjnsten har en styrelse som bestr av dess hgsta tjnstemn31.
It aims to ensure that activities carried out by the EEAS are consistent and contribute towards achieving the political objectives established by the HR/VP. 
Den ska se till att den verksamhet som Europeiska utrikestjnsten bedriver r konsekvent och bidrar till att de politiska ml som faststllts av den hga representanten/vice ordfranden uppfylls.
The EEAS internal procedures do not consider it as a collective entity with a distinctive role and functions. Although the Corporate Board has facilitated coordination among the top managers, it could not reduce as expected the workload of the HR/VP, who still has 23 direct reporting lines. 
Enligt Europeiska utrikestjnstens interna frfaranden betraktas den inte som en kollektiv enhet med en srskild roll och srskilda ligganden. ven om styrelsen har bidragit till samordningen mellan de hgsta cheferna kunde den inte som frvntat minska arbetsbrdan fr den hga representanten/vice ordfranden, som fortfarande har 23 direkta rapporteringsvgar.
34 As in any diplomatic service, having timely access to information is of key importance. 
34 P samma stt som inom alla diplomattjnster r tillgng till information i rtt tid av avgrande betydelse.
The audit assessed the effectiveness of the existing procedures for the production and distribution of two main types of information products: (a) The EEAS provides support for the preparation of meetings held by the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, the HR/VP and Commissioners by responding to briefing requests in due time. 
Revisionsrtten bedmde ndamlsenligheten i de befintliga frfarandena fr produktion och spridning av tv huvudtyper av informationsprodukter: a) Europeiska utrikestjnsten ger std till frberedelserna av mten som hlls av Europeiska rdets ordfrande, kommissionens ordfrande, den hga representanten/vice ordfranden och kommissionsledamter genom att svara p begranden om underlag i rtt tid.
However, answers can take a relatively long time to be prepared, notably due to the validation process, which is the result of the EEAS’s structure32. 
Det kan dock ta relativt lng tid att formulera svar, srskilt p grund av den valideringsprocess som r en fljd av Europeiska utrikestjnstens struktur32.
Moreover, departments rarely receive feedback regarding either the text or the final outcome of the meeting for which a given briefing note was prepared, making it more difficult for them to improve. 
Dessutom fr avdelningar sllan feedback p vare sig texten till eller slutresultatet av det mte till vilket ett visst pm frbe-retts, vilket gr det svrare fr dem att utvecklas och bli bttre.
31 The Executive Secretary-General, Chief Operating Officer and two Deputy Secretaries-General. 
31 Den verkstllande generalsekreteraren, den operativa chefen och de tv stllfretrdande general-sekreterarna.
32 In the sample, the validation process took an average of four days and included up to five validators (Deputy Head of Division, Head of Division, Director, Managing Director, Member of the Corporate Board) before reaching the Cabinet, where there is a possibility that the text may be redrafted. 
32 I urvalet tog valideringsprocessen i genomsnitt fyra dagar och involverade upp till fem validerare (bitrdande avdelningschef, avdelningschef, direktr, verkstllande direktr och styrelseledamot) innan det ndde kansliet, dr texten kan omarbetas.
Observations 15 33 This is a heritage from GSC systems, which were built to avoid mixing civilian and military information. 
Iakttagelser 15 33 Detta r ett arv frn rdets generalsekretariats system, som konstruerades s att man skulle undvika att blanda civil och militr information.
34 Special representatives had been at the disposal of the Council since 1996. 
34 Srskilda representanter har sttt till rdets frfogande sedan 1996.
Initially the Council could appoint a special representative whenever it deemed necessary, but, after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, only the HR/VP can propose this. (b) With the establishment of the EEAS, intelligence services and delegations were for the first time part of the same organisation, increasing the potential for combining political reporting and intelligence to assist decision-makers. 
Inledningsvis kunde rdet utse en srskild representant nr den ansg att det var ndvndigt, men efter Lissabonfrdragets ikrafttrdande kan endast den hga representanten/vice ordfranden fresl detta. b) Genom inrttandet av Europeiska utrikestjnsten blev underrttelse-avdelningar och delegationer fr frsta gngen delar av samma organisation, vilket kade potentialen fr att kombinera politisk rapportering och underrttelser i syfte att bist beslutsfattare.
However, the distribution of intelligence products is still limited because of the practical difficulties of sharing classified information with some recipients. 
Spridningen av underrttelse-resultat r dock nnu begrnsad p grund av de praktiska svrigheterna med att utbyta skerhetsskyddsklassificerad information med vissa mottagare.
In this regard, most EU delegations are not prepared to deal with classified documents, many heads of delegation do not yet have the appropriate security clearance and the systems used for political reporting and intelligence reporting are still incompatible33. 
I detta avseende r merparten av EU-delegationerna inte redo att hantera skerhetsskyddsklassificerade dokument, mnga delegationschefer har nnu inte ftt ett relevant skerhetsgodknnande och de system som anvnds till politisk rapportering och under-rttelserapportering r fortfarande inkompatibla33.
As a result, access to and the use of classified information within the EEAS, notably by the delegations, is seriously constrained. 
Detta har ftt till fljd att tillgngen till och anvndningen av skerhetsskyddsklassificerad information inom Europeiska utrikestjnsten, srskilt av delegationerna, allvarligt begrnsas.
EU special representatives are not sufficiently integrated in the EEAS 35 One of the oldest instruments of the common foreign and security policy is the deployment of EU special representatives to deal with crises or specific tasks on behalf of the EU34. 
EU:s srskilda representanter r inte tillrckligt integrerade i Europeiska utrikestjnsten 35 Ett av de ldsta instrumenten inom den gemensamma utrikes-och skerhetspolitiken r anvndningen av EU:s srskilda representanter fr att hantera kriser eller specifika uppgifter fr EU:s rkning34.
Special representatives are appointed by the Foreign Affairs Council on recommendation of the HR/VP and benefit from strong support from Member States. 
Srskilda representanter utses av rdet (utrikes frgor) p rekommendation av den hga representanten/vice ordfranden och har ett starkt std av medlemsstaterna.
36 Initially, the special representatives had an important role in helping coordinate foreign policy between the Council and the Commission, which, however, became redundant after the establishment of the EEAS. 
36 Ursprungligen hade de srskilda representanterna en viktig roll nr det gllde att hjlpa till att samordna utrikespolitiken mellan rdet och kommissionen, vilket dock inte lngre var ndvndigt efter inrttandet av Europeiska utrikestjnsten.
Still, taking into account their special tasks dealing with regional problems and ad hoc crises, the EEAS continues to consider them as a useful instrument and the Council appreciates them as a valuable foreign policy tool. 
Men med hnsyn till deras speciella uppgifter i hanteringen av regionala problem och ad hoc-kriser fortstter Europeiska utrikestjnsten att betrakta dem som ett anvndbart instrument, medan rdet anser att de r ett vrdefullt utrikespolitiskt instrument.
That is why after a temporary decrease in their number (from 12 in 2010 to 9 in 2011), there were 11 special representatives at the end of 2013. 
Det r sklet till att det efter en tillfllig minskning av deras antal (frn tolv r 2010 till nio r 2011) fanns elva srskilda representanter i slutet av 2013.
37 The special representatives have broad mandates. 
37 De srskilda representanterna har breda mandat.
This allows for a high degree of flexibility during implementation, but also makes it more difficult to evaluate their performance. 
Det medger en hg grad av flexibilitet under genomfrandet men gr det ocks svrare att utvrdera deras insats.
Despite being considered as ad hoc crisis-response instrument, special representatives are in place for an average of 8 years, which risks leading to their proliferation and an undermining of the role of the normal EEAS structures. 
Trots att de srskilda representanterna anses vara ett ad hoc-krisinstrument r de i genomsnitt verksamma i tta r, vilket riskerar att leda till att deras antal snabbt kar och till att den roll som Europeiska utrikestjnstens normala strukturer spelar frsvagas.
Observations 16 38 In December 2013, 7 of the 11 special representatives were based in Brussels and co-located in the premises of the EEAS. 
Iakttagelser 16 38 I december 2013 var sju av de elva srskilda representanterna baserade i Bryssel i Europeiska utrikestjnstens lokaler.
The EU special representatives are only integrated into the EEAS structure when double-hatted as heads of delegation (4 out of the 11, all located outside the EU). 
EU:s srskilda representanter r endast integrerade i Europeiska utrikestjnstens struktur nr de ven fyller funktionen som delegationschefer (fyra av de elva, samtliga lokaliserade utanfr EU).
In the absence of clear procedures, it is left to the discretion of the individual special representatives to decide how to manage coordination with the relevant EEAS departments, thus increasing the risk that their actions are inconsistent with other EU actions. 
Eftersom det inte finns ngra tydliga frfaranden fr de enskilda srskilda representanterna sjlva bestmma hur de ska skta samordningen med de berrda avdelningarna vid Europeiska utrikestjnsten, vilket kar risken fr att deras tgrder inte r frenliga med andra EU-tgrder.
Only half of the surveyed heads of delegation considered that they were adequately informed about the activities of special representatives. 
Endast hlften av de delegationschefer som besvarade enkten ansg att de fick tillfredsstllande information om de srskilda representanternas aktiviteter.
39 The special representatives are funded by the ‘operations’ EU budget managed by the Commission which, at times of budgetary constraint, gives the EEAS significant additional resources outside the EEAS administrative budget35. 
39 De srskilda representanterna finansieras genom EU:s driftsbudget som frvaltas av kommissionen, vilket i tider av budgetbegrnsningar ger Europeiska utrikestjnsten betydande extra resurser utanfr Europeiska utrikestjnstens administrativa budget35.
However, this also leaves them outside the administrative and management framework established for the EEAS, notably in terms of staffing, salaries, and reporting, and obliges them to comply with extra administrative and financial obligations reducing their availability for policymaking. 
Detta gr dock ocks att de hamnar utanfr den administrativa ram och frvaltningsram som faststllts fr Europeiska utrikestjnsten, srskilt vad betrffar personal, lner och rapportering, och tvingar dem att uppfylla extra administrativa och finansiella skyldigheter vilket ger dem mindre tid fr de politiska frgorna.
The EEAS faced difficulties in staffing critical functions with the resources transferred 40 The EEAS started operations with given resources and services, with staff being transferred on the basis of their status as of 31 December 2010. In 2011, the EEAS performed an initial screening exercise focusing on the rationalisation of the geographical desks. In 2012, a second screening procedure was launched with more ambitious goals in terms of assessing needs and aligning resources with EU foreign policy priorities. 
Europeiska utrikestjnsten hade svrt att tillstta personal p nyckelbefattningar med de verfrda resurserna 40 Europeiska utrikestjnsten inledde verksamheten med givna resurser och avdelningar och med personal som verfrdes beroende p vilken stllning de hade den 31 december 2010. r 2011 gjorde Europeiska utrikestjnsten en frsta underskning med inriktning p rationalisering av de geografiska enheterna. r 2012 inleddes en andra underskning med ambitisare ml nr det gllde att bedma behov och anpassa resurserna till EU:s utrikespolitiska prioriteringar.
These two screening procedures allowed the EEAS to strengthen its administrative and support functions which were not sufficiently staffed when it was set up. 
Dessa bda underskningar gjorde att Europeiska utrikestjnsten kunde frstrka sina administrativa funktioner och stdfunktioner som inte fick tillrckligt med personal vid inrttandet.
41 Despite 18 redeployments, the staffing of the delegations’ political sections is still not completed and no new resources had been provided to take over responsibilities relating to the rotating Presidency. 
41 Trots 18 omplaceringar hade tillsttningen av personal vid delegationernas politiska avdelningar nnu inte avslutats, och ngra nya resurser hade inte tillhandahllits fr vertagandet av uppgifter avseende det roterande ordfrandeskapet.
Similarly, the relevant departments36 had not received corresponding new staff resources for the operational planning and implementation of the wave of common security and defence policy missions launched in 2012 and 2013 to respond, in particular, to the crises in Libya, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. 
P samma stt hade de berrda avdelningarna36 inte ftt motsvarande nya personalresurser fr den operativa planeringen och genomfrandet av den vg av uppdrag inom den gemensamma skerhets-och frsvarspolitiken som inleddes 2012 och 2013 som svar framfr allt p kriserna i Libyen, p Afrikas horn och i Sahel.