natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In spite of the lack of monitoring at Community and national level (3) as to how each reporting body interpreted the term ÔirregularityŐ, no Member State authority validated the nature of theinformationbeingreceived,butmerelypasseditonunchecked totheCommission. 
Trots bristen p vervakning p gemenskapsniv och nationell niv (3) av hur varje rapporterande organ tolkade termen ÓoegentlighetÓ var det ingen medlemsstats myndigheter som godknde karaktren p den information som erhlls utan den vidarebefordrades bara utan kontroll till kommissionen.
Furthermore, in most cases the national coordinating authorities did not have records providing a summary overview of all reported cases and their current situation, nor did they carry out any completeness checks or reasonableness tests by analysing which of the reporting bodies or regions submitted what volume of irregularities. 
I de flesta fall hade de nationella samordnande myndigheterna dessutom inga register med en sammanfattning av alla rapporterade fall och den aktuella situationen fr dessa, och utfrde inga fullstndighetskontroller eller rimlighetstest genom att analysera vilka av de rapporterande organen eller regionerna som lmnade en viss mngd oegentligheter.
In the case of the French Ministry of the Interior, no records were maintained of the irregularity communications received, and in the United Kingdom one ministry was unable to provide a listing of all cases in the period 1994 to 1999 owing to the fact that it deleted closed cases from its database. 
Nr det gller det franska inrikesministeriet frdes inga register ver erhllna meddelanden om oegentligheter, och i Frenade kungariket kunde ett ministerium inte tillhandahlla en lista ver alla fall under perioden 1994Đ1999 p grund av att det raderade avslutade fall frn sin databas.
The Court considers that such information should be retained for use in applying risk analysis in the context of Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 and other audits. 
Revisionsrtten anser att sdan information br bevaras fr att anvndas vid riskanalys i samband med frordning (EG) nr 2064/97 och vid andra granskningar.
The obligation on Member States, under Article 5 of the Regulation,tosubmitquarterlyupdatedinformationaboutjudi-cial or administrative action taken on irregularities previously notified, is not generally complied with, owing principally to the lengthy investigation periods. 
Medlemsstaterna skall enligt artikel 5 i frordningen varje kvartal lmna in aktuell information om rttsliga och administrativa tgrder som vidtagits angende tidigare anmlda oegentligheter, men denna skyldighet fullgrs i allmnhet inte, vilket framfr allt beror p de lnga utredningsperioderna.
Such delays impede the efficiency and transparency of follow-up procedures. 
Sdana frseningar frhindrar effektiviteten och insynen i uppfljningsfrfarandena.
Similarly, the requirement to confirm the non-detection of irregularities each quarter (nil returns) is often ignored. 
P samma stt nonchaleras ofta kravet p att man varje kvartal skall bekrfta att inga oegentligheter upptckts.
The audit revealed that the quality of the records maintained by the managing authorities on irregularities was poor, with many errors and inaccuracies uncovered in the records maintained by the authorities at each level. 
Granskningen avsljade att de register som de frvaltande myndigheterna frde ver oegentligheter var av dlig kvalitet; det frekom mnga fel och bristande noggrannhet i registren hos myndigheter p alla niver.
For example, OLAF rejected all French irregularity cases reported in the period 1997 to 1998, owing to incomplete information. 
Exempelvis frkastade OLAF alla franska fall av oegentligheter som rapporterats under perioden 1997Đ1998, p grund av ofullstndig information.
In many cases (4), the 3 () United Kingdom: DTI (Department of Trade and Industry); France: 4 CICC; Italy. () France: MI (Ministry of the Interior); United Kingdom: DTI, DETR (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions); Spain; Italy: Ministry for Industry. 
I mnga fall (4) innebar avsaknaden av viktiga detaljuppgifter i de formulr om 3 () Frenade kungariket: handels-och industriministeriet (Department of 4 Trade and Industry Đ DTI); Frankrike: CICC; Italien. () Frankrike: inrikesministeriet; Frenade kungariket: handels-och industriministeriet (DTI), ministeriet fr milj, transport och regionerna (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions Đ DETR); Spanien; Italien: industriministeriet.
8.11.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 314/41 absence of important details on the irregularity forms submitted to OLAF, such as project name, irregularity amounts or a unique reference number and the use of non-standard forms, made any meaningful analysis of the information difficult. 113. 
8.11.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 314/41 oegentligheter som lmnats in till OLAF Đ ssom projektnamn, de belopp oegentligheterna rrde och ett enda referensnummer Đ samt anvndningen av icke standardiserade formulr att det var svrt att gra ngon meningsfull analys av informationen.
The communication in some cases of meaningless data, and their acceptance without follow-up action, demonstrates the need for a clearer and workable definition of what needs to be communicated. 
113. verlmnandet av uppgifter som i vissa fall var menings-lsa, och det faktum att de accepterades utan uppfljning, visar att det behvs en tydligare och fungerande definition av vad som skall meddelas.
Furthermore, proper records (on electronic media) should be maintained to ascertain quickly what irregularity communications have been received or are outstanding, the general content of the reports and the follow-up and correspondence on each case. 
Vidare br riktiga register (p elektroniska medium) finnas s att man snabbt kan kontrollera vilka meddelanden som har mottagits eller r utestende, och kontrollera det allmnna innehllet i rapporterna och uppfljningen samt korrespondens i samtliga fall.
These records should be periodically validated with the records of other authorities in the reporting system, so as to eliminate errors in the compilation of reports. 
Dessa register br kontrolleras regelbundet mot register hos andra myndigheter i rapporteringssystemet, fr att fel i sammanstllningen av rapporter skall kunna undviks.
Lastly, the reporting system in most Member States examined did not ensure that all irregularities detected were in fact finally and correctly communicated to OLAF (1). 
Slutligen gav systemen i de flesta medlemsstaterna ingen garanti fr att alla upptckta oegentligheter faktiskt till slut meddelades OLAF p ett korrekt stt (1).
In many instances the central managing authorityŐs records of open and closed irregularity cases did not fully correspond to that of the originating Structural Fund bodies and complete breaks in the reporting trail and inaccurate and delayed reporting were observed. 
I mnga fall motsvarade inte den centrala frvaltande myndighetens register ver pgende och avslutade fall av oegentligheter registret hos de organ som frvaltar strukturfonderna, och det konstaterades att det frekom totala brott i rapporteringskedjan samt felaktiga och frsenade rapporter.
In Italy (2), a number of parallel communication channels were used for reporting irregularities, which resulted in irregularities not being communicated to OLAF and intermediate authorities being bypassed and excluded from taking the necessary measures to safeguard Funds. instituted. 
I Italien (2) anvndes ett antal parallella kommunikationskanaler fr rapporteringen av oegentligheter, vilket resulterade i att oegentligheter inte anmldes till OLAF och att de frmedlande myndigheterna frbigicks och inte gavs mjlighet att vidta ndvndiga tgrder fr att skydda medlen.
For example, in 1999 some 75 recovery orders were issued under Article 24, amounting to 82 million euro (3). 
Under 1999 utfrdades exempelvis ungefr 75 betalningskrav i enlighet med artikel 24, p totalt 82 miljoner euro (3).
Very few of OLAFŐs investigations result from Member State communications.ThisisprimarilyduetothefactthattheCom-mission services expect Member States to follow-up irregularities they themselves have detected and to automatically correct, recover and/or re-programme the amounts concerned. 
Mycket f av OLAF:s utredningar r resultatet av meddelanden frn medlemsstaterna. Detta beror framfr allt p att kommissionens enheter frvntar sig att medlemsstaterna skall flja upp oegentligheter som de sjlva har upptckt, och automatiskt korrigera, terkrva och/eller omdisponera de aktuella beloppen.
Accordingly, OLAF prioritises its own investigations and high-risk areas for attention, while the managing DGs give priority to the recording and the follow-up of irregularity cases arising from the CommissionŐs own auditmissions,thoseoftheCourtofAuditorsandthosearising from OLAF investigations. 
Fljaktligen prioriterar OLAF sina egna utredningar och hgrisk-omrden, medan de frvaltande generaldirektoraten prioriterar att registrera och flja upp fall av oegentligheter som upptckts vid kommissionens egna och revisionsrttens granskningsbesk och OLAF:s utredningar.
Frequently, the incompleteness of Member StatesŐ communications (4) and their lack of significance from a risk viewpoint also lead to their low prioritisation. 
Ofullstndigheten i medlemsstaternas meddelanden (4) och det faktum att de haft liten betydelse i riskhnseende har ocks ofta lett till att de prioriterats lgt.
Thus, OLAF stated in its annualactivityreport1999to2000(5)thatitcouldnotÔbecon-tent with the information received from traditional sourcesŐ and that it had yet to carry out an analysis to determine whether Ôirregularities detected ... constituted the bulk of the irregularities actually committed or just a small partŐ. 
OLAF uttryckte drfr i sin verksamhetsrapport fr 1999Đ2000 (5) att man inte kunde vara njd med den information som kom frn traditionella kllor utan ven mste gra en analys fr att faststlla om de upptckta oegentligheterna utgjorde strre delen av de oegentligheter som faktiskt begtts eller endast en liten del.
According to data supplied by OLAF concerning (6), the period 30 June 1994 to 31 December 2000 a total of 3 244 communications of irregularities were reported by Member States under Regulation (EC) No 1681/94 in respect of the four Structural Funds (ERDF, ESF, EAGGF and FIFG), amounting to 433,9 million euro. 
Enligt uppgifter frn OLAF(6), om perioden 30 juni 1994Đ31 december 2000 inlmnade medlemsstaterna totalt 3 244 meddelanden om oriktigheter i enlighet med rdets frordning (EG) nr 1681/94 fr de fyra strukturfonderna (ERUF, ESF, EUGFJ och FFU), vilka uppgick till totalt 433,9 miljoner euro.
At the end of 2000, the total amount still to be recovered in respect of these cases was 317,3 million euro. 
I slutet av 2000 uppgick det totala belopp som nnu inte hade terbetalats vad gller dessa fall till 317,3 miljoner euro.
Thus the amount effectively recovered in respect of those same reports was 116,6 million euro, or just over one quarter of the amounts declared to be affected by irregularities. 
Det belopp som verkligen hade terbetalats avseende nmnda rapporter var 116,6 miljoner euro, eller lite drygt en fjrdedel av de belopp som frklarats vara behftade med oegentligheter.
The Table shows the number and value of irregularity cases communicated by Member States in 2000. 
Tabellen visar det antal fall och vrdet av oegentligheter som medlemsstaterna anmlt under 2000.
In 2000 the number of cases reported increased by over 74 % on the previous year. 
Under 2000 kade antalet rapporterade fall med mer n 74 % jmfrt med ret fre.
Under the Structural FundsŐ Regulations, if Member State authorities report a detected irregularity prior to the final date for financial commitments under the Operational Programme, they may substitute other project expenditure for the ineligible amounts. 
Enligt frordningarna om strukturfonderna fr medlemsstaternas myndigheter, om de rapporterar en upptckt oegentlighet fre slutdatum fr finansiella taganden inom ramen fr det operativa programmet, anvnda anslagen till andra projektutgifter i stllet fr de icke stdberttigande beloppen.
Intheabsenceofthis,andwhereOLAFandtheotherCommis-sion services subsequently become aware of the irregularity, a procedure under Article 24 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2082/93 to reduce, suspend or cancel Community aid may be 1 () For example, in the case of one region, six cases of irregularity recordedbytheregionalmanagingauthoritywerenotcommunicated 2 to either the national authorities or OLAF. () In Italy, despite an instruction that each managing body communicate a detected irregularity to the Department for Community Policy, some bodies communicated them directly to the Treasury Ministry, while others sent them directly to their lead ministries and the Commission DGs. 
Om s inte sker, och om OLAF och kommissionens enheter senare fr knnedom om oegentligheten, kan ett frfarande enligt artikel 24 i rdets frordning (EEG) nr 2082/93 inledas fr att reducera, suspendera 1 () I en region anmldes exempelvis inte sex fall av oegentligheter som registrerats av den regionala frvaltande myndigheten till vare sig de 2 nationella myndigheterna eller OLAF. () Trots att det i Italien fanns instruktioner om att varje frvaltande organ skulle anmla upptckta oegentligheter till avdelningen fr gemenskapspolitik, anmlde vissa oegentligheterna direkt till finansministeriet, medan andra snde dem direkt till de ministerier de lyder under och till kommissionens generaldirektorat.
(3) (4) 5 () 6 () Structural Fund No of recovery orders Amount issued ERDF EAGGF ESF 12 1557709 FIFG 8 5 172 100 Total 75 82 258 047 Source: Commission. 
(3) Strukturfonderna ERUF EUGFJ ESF FFU Summa Klla: Kommissionen. Betalningskravets nr 22 33 12 8 75 Belopp 63 303 281 12 224 957 1 557 709 5 172 100 82 258 047 (4) Medlemsstaternas meddelanden lmnades ocks in i mycket olika format, eftersom frordningarna inte innehller ngra freskrifter p detta omrde.
This situation created additional difficulties ininputtingandanalysingtheinformation. OLAF Activity Report of 23 May 2000 (1 June 1999 to 31 May 2000) paragraph 5.1.2. It should be noted that this information varies from that in ÔProtecting the CommunityŐs financial interests and the fight against fraudŐ Annual Report 1999 (COM(2000) 718 final of 8 November 2000 due toupdatingoftheinformation. 
Denna situation skapade ytterligare svrigheter vid 5 inmatning och analys av informationen. () OLAF:s verksamhetsrapport av den 23 maj 2000 (1 juni 6 1999Đ31 maj 2000), punkt 5.1.2. () Observera att denna information avviker frn den i ÓSkydd av gemenskapens finansiella intressen Kampen mot bedrgerier Đ rsrapport 1999Ó (KOM(2000) 718 slutlig av den 8 november 2000, p grund av att informationen har uppdaterats.
C 314/42 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 8.11.2001 largest proportion of cases reported (in terms of both number of cases, 55 % and the amount involved, 51 %) concerned the Social Fund. 
C 314/42 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 8.11.2001 och belopp, 51 %).
While the significant increase in the number of reported Fraud and irregularities communicated by Member States under Regulation (EC) No 1681/94 (year 2000) cases reflects the greater effort on the part of Member States to report irregularities, the figures still mask the enormous variations between Member States and between regions. (1 000 EUR) ERDFEAGGF-GuidanceFIFGESFGrandtotal Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount Number Amount Belgium 0000000000 Member State Denmark 8 123 4 173 0 0 0 0 20 0 9 207 141 445 207 0 5 2 824 29 00 223 0 12 296 Germany 40 Greece 2 Spain 11 France 69 Ireland 75 Italy 21 Luxembourg 0 Netherlands 0 Austria 0 Portugal 10 12 034 2 359 985 2 387 8170 8 895 83 3070 0 3 165 0 27 799 4 9 113 1 8 82 0 4 902 16 00 0 0 1 363 0 576 2 32 0 25 1 0 0 11300 24 Finland Sweden United Kingdom Total 2 3 51 292 51 00 00 0 44 786 23 271 5 87 2 4 461 0 0 296 0 0 0 3 772 23 736 0 0 15 1 835 6 56 13 1152 28 6196 17 277 2 654 11 273 9 963 8757 22 926 0 23 736 1 363 3 493 359 1264 10 657 114 018 120. 
Den betydande kningen av antalet rapporterade fall speglar medlemsstaternas kade anstrngningar att rap-Bedrgerier och andra oegentligheter som meddelats av medlemsstaterna i enlighet med frordning (EG) nr 1681/94 (r 2000) Antal Tyskland 40 Grekland 2 Spanien 11 Frankrike 69 Irland 75 Italien 21 Luxemburg 0 Nederlnderna 0 sterrike 0 Portugal 10 Belopp Antal ERUF EUGFJ Đ Utveckling FFU Belopp Antal Belopp Antal Medlemsstat Danmark 8 123 4 173 0 Tabell portera oegentligheter, men siffrorna dljer fortfarande enorma variationer mellan olika medlemsstater och mellan olika regioner.
(1) DG REGIO Ń In 35 cases (33 % of 107 cases) the final situation was thatitwasnotpossiblefortheDGtoidentifythebeneficiary/action/ OP, etc. In many instances, the flow of information and enquiries 40 558 259 696 58 388 Table 2 173 143 130 14 9 282 183 7 018 286 505 88 6 305 117 00 223 44 50 13 19 79 1 271 122. between OLAF and the other Commission services proved most tortuous. 
(1 000 euro) ESF Totalsumma Belopp Antal Belopp Belgien 0000000000 Finland Sverige Frenade kungariket Totalt 2 3 51 292 51 00 00 0 44 786 23 271 5 87 2 4 461 0 0 296 0 0 0 3 772 23 736 0 0 15 1 835 6 56 13 1152 28 6 196 12 034 2 359 985 2 387 8170 8 895 2 173 143 130 14 9 282 183 7 018 286 505 88 6 305 117 00 223 44 50 13 19 79 1 271 122. ningar mellan OLAF och vriga enheter inom kommissionen vara mycket tillkrnglat.
DG REGIO sent queries through OLAF to Member States for reply, although direct communication with Member State authorities would have obtained immediate results. 
GD Regionalpolitik snde frfrgningar via OLAF till medlemsstaterna fr att f svar, trots att en direkt kommunikation med medlemsstaterna skulle ha gett omedelbara resultat.
Instead, voluminous and at times needless correspondence was generated, resulting in inefficiencies. 
I stllet skapades stora mngder ibland meningsls korre-spondens, vilket ledde till ineffektivitet.
The veracity and accuracy of all significant expenditure items submitted for grant aid should be independently or directly verified by reference to the original underlying documents. 
Sanningshalten och korrektheten fr alla betydande utgiftsposter som ligger till grund fr en bidragsbegran br kontrolleras separat eller i frhllande till bakomliggande originaldoku-ment.
Furthermore, a horizontal analysis of Ôover-claimedŐ grants (i.e. grants requested compared with final approved amount) should be considered by managing authorities, to identify ineligible expenditure and irregularities in excess of 4 000 euro and to be included in risk profiles. 
En vergripande analys av anskningar om alltfr stora bidrag (det vill sga begrda bidrag i jmfrelse med slutligen godknda belopp) br vervgas av de frvaltande myndigheterna, fr att icke stdberttigande utgifter och oegentligheter som verskrider 4 000 euro skall kunna identifieras och resultatet av analysen inkluderas i riskprofiler.
While some Member States had reported large numbers of irregularities each quarter, many of these cases remained unresolved for long periods. 
Vissa medlemsstater rapporterade ett stort antal oegentligheter varje kvartal, men mnga av dessa fall frblev ouppklarade under lnga perioder.
For example, in one instance (2), following a 16-month delay in taking initial action, a further five years 2 ( ) Germany: Brandenburg: ILB (Investition Landesbank). 
I ett fall (2) tog det exempelvis frst 16 mnader innan inledande tgrder vidtogs, och sedan frflt 2 ( ) Tyskland: Brandenburg: ILB (Investition Landesbank).
8.11.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 314/43 passed in which numerous requests to the beneficiary for repayment of the grant aid went ignored. 
8.11.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 314/43 ytterligare fem r under vilka mnga uppmaningar till mottagaren om terbetalning av stdet nonchalerades.
Although the case was identified as outstanding in quarterly reports to the coordinating body, no follow-up action was taken by this body, OLAF or the other Commission services. 
Trots att fallet identifierades som utestende i kvartalsrapporter till det samordnande organet vidtog varken detta organ, OLAF eller vriga enheter vid kommissionen ngra uppfljningstgrder.
The nature, trend or frequency of the reported irregularities were not systematically analysed by OLAF nor by the other Commission services for risk analysis purposes (e.g. the identification of high-risk areas for specific audit attention), or as a source of information for improving or targeting financial checks. 
De rapporterade oegentligheternas karaktr, tendens och frekvens analyserades inte systematiskt av vare sig OLAF eller vriga enheter vid kommissionen i riskanalyssyfte (till exempel faststllande av hgriskomrden fr srskild uppmrksamhet vid revision), eller som klla till information fr att kunna frbttra eller mlinrikta ekonomiska kontroller.
Furthermore, OLAFŐs computer database IRENE, owing to its configuration and design, did not allow for the production of analytical reports on irregularities across geographic areas or sectors, nor was it generally used as a tool for risk analysis. 
Vidare medgav inte OLAF:s databas IRENE, p grund av sin konfiguration och utformning, framstllning av analytiska rapporter om oegentligheter ver olika geografiska omrden eller sektorer, och den anvndes i allmnhet inte heller som ett verktyg fr riskanalys.
Indeed, for the period September 1997 to late 2000 it was non-operational. 
Under perioden september 1997 till slutet av 2000 var det ur funktion.
The non-systematic follow-up and the lack of analysis of irregularities across Operational Programmes and Member States reduce the effectiveness of financial management and seriously call into question the usefulness of this reporting mechanism. 
Den icke-systematiska uppfljningen och avsaknaden av analys av oegentligheter fr olika operativa program och medlemsstater minskar effektiviteten i den ekonomiska frvaltningen och innebr att man p allvar mste ifrgastta nyttan av detta rapporteringssystem.
In general, in the Member States, the information was not being fully utilised, with no statistical analysis being carried out to compare the irregularity history of the different sectors. 
I allmnhet anvndes inte informationen fullt ut i medlemsstaterna, d ingen statistisk analys utfrdes fr att olika sektorers historia vad gller oegentligheter skulle kunna jmfras.
Nor weretheCourtandCommissionauditfindingsfoundtobe included in the irregularity reporting system examined. 
Inte heller har man kunnat se att revisionsrttens och kommissionens granskningsresultat inkluderats i det underskta systemet fr rapportering av oegentligheter.
If the irregularities reporting exercise is to be worthwhile, prompt follow-up action is needed to protect EU funding in individual cases and an analysis must be carried out of audit results from all relevant sources, so as to draw conclusions for control systems and risk in general. 
Om rapporteringen om oegentligheter skall vara vrd besvret krvs omedelbar uppfljning fr att EU:s medel skall skyddas i enskilda fall, och en analys mste gras av granskningsresultat frn alla relevanta kllor s att man kan dra allmnna slutsatser angende kontrollsystem och risker.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 128. 
SLUTSATSER OCH REKOMMENDATIONER 127.
The CourtŐs audit revealed that much good audit work is being carried out in the Member States but the quality is variable, even within regions (paragraphs 42 to 84). 
128. Revisionsrttens granskning har visat att stora revisionsinsatser grs i medlemsstaterna men att kvaliteten varierar, ven inom regioner (punkterna 42Đ84).
It is essential that the Commission ensures that there are satisfactory levels of control across the Union. 
Det r mycket viktigt att kommissionen ser till att kontrollniverna r tillfredsstllande i hela EU.