natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The external stocktaking study concluded that anti-fraud measures put in place are generally proportionate to the risks identified, even when taking into account that some authorities may underestimate the risks during their self-assessment. 
I den externa inventeringsstudien drogs slutsatsen att de bedrgeribekmpningstgrder som infrts generellt sett r proportionella till de identifierade riskerna, ven med hnsyn till att vissa myndigheter kan underskatta riskerna under sin sjlvbedmning.
The Commission recommends managing authorities to adopt a proactive, structured and targeted approach for managing the risk of fraud. 
29 Kommissionen rekommenderar de frvaltande myndigheterna att infra en proaktiv, strukturerad och mlinriktad metod fr att hantera bedrgeririsker.
Common Commission reply to paragraphs 30 to 32: According to the Commission Guidance on fraud risk assessment and effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures, prevention techniques most often revolve around implementing a robust system of internal controls, combined with a proactive, structured and targeted fraud risk assessment. 
Kommissionens gemensamma svar p punkterna 30 till 32: Enligt kommissionens vgledning Bedmning av risken fr bedrgerier samt effektiva och proportionella bestmmelser om bedrgeribekmpning handlar tekniker fr frebyggande oftast om att genomfra ett stabilt internt kontrollsystem kombinerat med en proaktiv, strukturerad och mlinriktad bedrgeririskbedmning.
Additionally, comprehensive training and awareness raising activities and the development of an ‘ethical’ culture (code of conduct, mission statements) and clear allocation of responsibilities (to set up a management and control system that effectively fights fraud) can also be very useful in fighting fraud and recusing the opportunities to commit fraud. 
Omfattande utbildning, informationsaktiviteter och utvecklingen av en ÓetiskÓ kultur (uppfrandekoder, verksamhetsml) och en tydlig ansvarsfrdelning (inrtta ett frvaltnings-och kontrollsystem som effektivt bekmpar bedrgeri) kan dessutom vara mycket anvndbara fr att bekmpa bedrgeri och begrnsa mjligheterna att beg bedrgeri.
Besides the above mentioned the Commission also proposes other mitigating measures, for specific areas (conflict of interest, public procurement, double funding), which according to the external study, almost all Member States authorities in the sample use in their fraud prevention mechanisms. 
Frutom de ovannmnda tgrderna freslr kommissionen ven andra begrnsande tgrder fr srskilda omrden (intressekonflikter, offentlig upphandling, dubbelfinansiering), vilka enligt den externa studien nstan alla de myndigheter i medlemsstaterna som ingick i urvalet anvnder i sina bedrgeribekmpningssystem.
Furthermore, the study concluded that some Member States, besides using what the Commission has proposed, also developed their own measures to prevent fraud. 
I studien konstateras ocks att vissa medlemsstater frutom att anvnda kommissionens freslagna tgrder ven tog fram egna tgrder fr att frebygga bedrgeri.
Additionally, the Commission is exploring new innovative ways of preventing corrupt practices in projects funded by EU funds and ensuring tax payers’ money is spent efficiently and transparently, such as Pilot Integrity Pacts as referred to by the Court in Box 1. 
Kommissionen undersker dessutom nya innovativa stt att frebygga korruption i projekt som finansieras med EU-medel och se till att skattebetalarnas pengar anvnds p ett effektivt och transparent stt, ssom det pilotprojekt om integritetspakter som revisionsrtten nmner i ruta 1.
Over the past years, the Commission has also issued specific documents to reinforce fraud prevention, most of them under the auspices of the Advisory Committee for Coordination of Fraud Prevention (COCOLAF). 
Under de senaste ren har kommissionen ven utfrdat srskilda dokument fr att frstrka frebyggandet av bedrgerier, de flesta under ledning av rdgivande samordningskommittn fr frebyggande av bedrgerier (Cocolaf).
For example: o Fraud in Public Procurement, A collection of Red Flags and Best Practices (2017); o Guidelines on National Anti-Fraud Strategies (2014 and 2016); o Identifying conflicts of interests in public procurement procedures for structural actions, A practical guide for managers (2013); o Compendium of anonymised cases – Structural Actions (2012). 33. Prevention and detection of fraud are interlinked. 
Exempelvis: o Fraud in Public Procurement, A collection of Red Flags and Best Practices (2017). o Guidelines on National Anti-Fraud Strategies (2014 och 2016). o Identifying conflicts of interests in public procurement procedures for structural actions, A practical guide for managers (2013). o Compendium of anonymised cases Đ Structural Actions (2012). 33 Frebyggande och upptckt av bedrgeri r sammanlnkade.
Detection is indeed part of the normal controls in place for all programmes, both at the level of the managing authority (management verifications), and of the audit authority (audits and controls). 
Upptckt av bedrgeri ingr mycket riktigt i de normala kontroller som finns fr alla program, bde hos de frvaltande myndigheterna (frvaltningskontroller) och revisionsmyndigheten (revisioner och kontroll).
The external study confirmed that additional controls have been developed by managing authorities to complement those recommended by the Commission for 2014-2020. 
Den externa studien bekrftade att de frvaltande myndigheterna har tagit fram ytterligare kontroller fr att komplettera de kontroller som kommissionen rekommenderade fr 2014-2020.
The opportunities of existing and available datamining tools such as Arachne are already used by some programme authorities in a more comprehensive way. 
En del programmyndigheter anvnder redan befintliga och tillgngliga datautvinningsverktyg som Arachne p ett mer vergripande stt.
For example, as a risk scoring and detection tool to check in the award and grant processes potential beneficiary companies, their beneficial owners and business partners, to assess potential conflicts of interest and risks of double funding, to identify red flags, and to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of management verifications. 
Exempel p det r verktyg fr bedmning och upptckt av risker fr att kontrollera fretag som eventuellt ska f std, deras verkliga huvudmn och affrspartner i tilldelnings-och bidragsprocesser, i syfte att bedma eventuella intressekonflikter och risker fr dubbelfinansiering, identifiera rda flaggor och ka frvaltningskontrollernas ndamlsenlighet och effektivitet.
Finally, in the 2017 PIF Report, the Commission recommended Member States to exploit the potential of risk analysis (understood as focusing controls on projects' risk profiles to be designed and tailored on the basis of in-depth assessments) in view of increasing their pro-active detection capabilities. 
I PIF-rapporten 2017 rekommenderar kommissionen medlemsstaterna att utnyttja mjligheterna med riskanalys (det vill sga att kontrollerna inriktas p projektens riskprofiler som utformas och skrddarsys baserat p djupgende kontroller) fr att ka deras frmga att proaktivt upptcka bedrgeri.
Common Commission reply to paragraphs 34 and 35: The absence of secure reporting channels for whistleblowing reporting, was a strong concern voiced in the responses to the Commission’s 2017 public consultation. 
Kommissionens gemensamma svar p punkterna 34 och 35: Bristen p skra rapporteringskanaler fr visselblsare var ett stort problem enligt svaren p kommissionens offentliga samrd 2017.
Current proposal of the Whistleblower Directive includes the internal and external reporting channels ensuring confidentiality in all entities in the private and public sector, across the EU. 
Det nuvarande frslaget till direktiv om skydd av visselblsare omfattar interna och externa rapporteringskanaler som skerstller konfidentialitet i alla enheter i den privata och den offentliga sektorn i hela EU.
The proposed Directive requires: i) legal entities in the private and public sector; ii) competent authorities and, iii) Member States to provide easily accessible information on the reporting channels, the protection, the conditions to benefit from the protection and remedies available, thereby increasing legal certainty for whistleblowers. 
Frslaget till direktiv innehller krav p att i) rttsliga enheter i den privata och den offentliga sektorn, ii) behriga myndigheter, och iii) medlemsstaterna p ett ltttkomligt stt offentliggra information om tillgngliga rapporteringskanaler, skydd, villkor fr att omfattas av skyddet och tillgngliga rttsmedel, vilket kar rttsskerheten fr visselblsare.
Moreover, the proposal provides that whistleblowers qualify for protection if, when reporting, they had reasonable grounds to believe that 6 the information reported falls within the scope of this Directive. 
Enligt frslaget omfattas visselblsare av skydd om de vid tidpunkten fr rapporteringen hade rimliga skl att tro att den information som rapporterades omfattas av direktivets tillmpningsomrde.
This safeguard ensures that whistleblowers do not lose protection if in the end it turns out that the report does not fall within the scope (if for instance the breach involved use of national and not EU funds). 
Denna garanti skerstller att visselblsare inte frlorar skyddet om det i slutndan visar sig att den rapporterade informationen inte omfattas av tillmpningsomrdet (till exempel om vertrdelsen rrde anvndning av nationella medel, inte EU-medel).
With regard to awareness raising, the amendments currently discussed with the co-legislators make it explicit that anonymous whistleblowers, are protected in case their identity is subsequently revealed and they meet the conditions for protection set out in the proposal. 
Vad gller kunskapshjande tgrder klargrs det uttryckligen i de ndringsfrslag som fr nrvarande diskuteras med medlagstiftarna att anonyma visselblsare skyddas om deras identitet rjs i ett senare skede och de uppfyller de villkor fr skydd som anges i frslaget.
Common Commission reply to paragraphs 36 and 37: Arachne as a risk-scoring tool can increase the efficiency of projects' selection, management verifications and audit, and further strengthen fraud identification, prevention and detection. 
Kommissionens gemensamma svar p punkterna 36 och 37: Som ett riskbedmningsverktyg kan Arachne effektivisera projekturval och frvaltningskontroller och gra det lttare att kartlgga, frebygga och upptcka bedrgerier.
The effective use of Arachne is a good practice in order to identify red flags and target fraud combatting measures, and should be taken into account when assessing the adequacy of current preventive and detective controls in place. 
Effektiv anvndning av Arachne r god praxis nr det gller att identifiera rda flaggor och justera bedrgeribekmpningstgrder och br drfr beaktas i bedmningen av hur lmpliga de befintliga kontrollerna fr frebyggande och upptckt r.
In the 2015 and following PIF Reports the Commission explicitly recommended Member States to increase their use of IT risk scoring tools (namely Arachne) and risk analysis and stressed their importance in the fight against fraud. 
Under 2015 och enligt PIF-rapporterna rekommenderade kommissionen uttryckligen medlemsstaterna att ka sin anvndning av it-riskbedmningsverktyg (dvs. Arachne) och riskanalyser, och framhll deras betydelse i kampen mot bedrgeri.
The opportunities of existing and available datamining tools such as Arachne are already used by some programme authorities in a more comprehensive way. 
En del programmyndigheter anvnder redan befintliga och tillgngliga verktyg som Arachne p ett mer vergripande stt.
See also the Commission reply to paragraph 33. 
Se ven kommissionens svar p punkt 33.
First bullet: The Commission services organised a meeting in February 2019 with the Greek authorities to clarify their position on the integration of the use of Arachne in the management and control system for Greek programmes. 
37 Frsta punktsatsen: I februari 2019 anordnade kommissionens avdelningar ett mte med de grekiska myndigheterna fr att klargra deras stndpunkt om integrationen av Arachne i frvaltnings-och kontrollsystemet fr de grekiska programmen.
The conclusion of this meeting is that Arachne could be complementary to the tools developed internally by the Greek programme authorities and therefore further work, jointly with the Commission, is needed to integrate Arachne into the management and control system. 
Resultatet av mtet r att Arachne kan komplettera de verktyg som tagits fram internt av de grekiska programmyndigheterna. Hr krvs ytterligare arbete, tillsammans med kommissionen, fr att integrera Arachne i frvaltnings-och kontrollsystemet.
Second bullet: The Commission is continuously encouraging Member States to regularly update operational data in order to exploit the full capacity of the Arachne datamining tool. 
Andra punktsatsen: Kommissionen uppmanar stndigt medlemsstaterna att regelbundet uppdatera sina operativa data fr att utnyttja hela kapaciteten hos datautvinningsverktyget Arachne.
For the four Member States audited by the ECA, the Commission notes an increase in the number of active users or in the number of OPs covered by Arachne. 
Vad betrffar de fyra medlemsstater som granskats av revisionsrtten noterar kommissionen en kning av antalet aktiva anvndare eller antalet operativa program som omfattas av Arachne.
Third bullet: Arachne can be used by the investigative bodies on a case-by-case basis with due regard to data protection regulations. 
Tredje punktsatsen: Arachne kan anvndas av utredningsorgan frn fall till fall, med vederbrlig hnsyn till dataskyddsbestmmelserna.
38. The Commission continues to visit programme authorities to promote the benefits and functionalities of the Arachne datamining tool. 
38 Kommissionen fortstter med sina besk hos programmyndigheterna fr att informera om frdelarna med och funktionerna hos datautvinningsverktyget Arachne.
In parallel, the Commission is also exploring the possibility of further targeting risk areas by either eliminating (obsolete) indicators or by creating new indicators, e.g. an indicator to confirm the SME status of a company. 
Parallellt med detta undersker kommissionen ven mjligheten att ytterligare ka inriktningen p riskomrden genom att antingen ta bort (inaktuella) indikatorer eller skapa nya indikatorer, exempelvis en indikator fr att bekrfta fretags status som litet eller medelstort fretag.
The perception by some Member States that the usefulness of the tool depends on the number of OPs that regularly upload and update data is incorrect. 
Vissa medlemsstaters uppfattning att verktygets anvndbarhet beror p hur mnga operativa program som regelbundet lgger in och uppdaterar data i verktyget r felaktig.
This OP’s internal data is then crosschecked and processed by Arachne with data on companies across Europe and the world, which come from external databases. 
De interna uppgifterna om varje operativt program dubbelkontrolleras och behandlas drefter av Arachne mot data om fretag i Europa och vrlden, som kommer frn externa databaser.
Common Commission reply to paragraphs 40 and 41: 7 Fighting fraud is a continuous process which starts with putting in place a fraud risk assessment and mitigating measures.. 
Kommissionens gemensamma svar p punkterna 40 och 41: Bedrgeribekmpning r en kontinuerlig process som inleds med infrandet av en bedmning av bedrgeririsker och begrnsande tgrder.
Member States’ audit authorities must systematically review the implementation of effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures at the level of intermediate bodies as part of their system audits (KR7 assesses the adequacy of such measures).2 Additionally, the implementation of anti-fraud measures is audited by the Commission. 
Medlemsstaternas revisionsmyndigheter ska systematiskt se ver de frmedlande organens genomfrande av effektiva och proportionella bedrgeribekmpningstgrder som ett led av sina systemrevisioner (sdana tgrders lmplighet bedms med hjlp av centralt ml 7)2. Genomfrandet av bedrgeribekmpningstgrder granskas dessutom av kommissionen.
Fraud detection can be tracked, but measuring its effectiveness would necessitate a comparison with the unknown total extent of fraud, including undetected fraud. 
Omfattningen av upptckta bedrgerier kan spras, men fr att mta effektiviteten krvs en jmfrelse med den oknda sammanlagda omfattningen av bedrgerier, inklusive oupptckta bedrgerier.
However, as already indicated in the Commission's reply to Special Report 1/2019, there is no cost-effective method to estimate undetected fraud reliably and defendably enough for evidence-based policy. 
Ssom kommissionen redan anger i sitt svar p srskild rapport 1/2019 finns det ingen kostnadseffektiv metod fr att uppskatta oupptckta bedrgerier p ett stt som r tillrckligt tillfrlitligt och kan motiveras fr en evidensbaserad policy.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of fraud detection also depends on exogenous factors. 
Effektiviteten hos tgrder fr att upptcka bedrgerier r dessutom ven beroende av yttre faktorer.
The Commission encourages Member States to use the findings of the audit authorities to develop action plans to handle errors and risks found. 
Kommissionen uppmuntrar medlemsstaterna att anvnda revisionsmyndigheternas slutsatser som underlag fr utformningen av handlingsplaner fr att hantera upptckta fel och brister.
Furthermore, every time an error/risk is detected in the OP’s management and control system, the managing authorities and the central bodies intervene and review the rules of procedure applicable to the given control activities. 
Varje gng fel/risker upptcks i det operativa programmets frvaltnings-och kontrollsystem ingriper de frvaltande myndigheterna och centrala organen och ser ver de frfaranderegler som gller fr de aktuella kontrollaktiviteterna.
Thus, the annual fraud risk analysis does not show the errors found during the year. 
Den rliga bedrgeririskanalysen visar fljaktligen inte de fel som ptrffats under ret.
43. It should be noted that the 2014-2020 assurance model has been strongly reinforced on Member State’s accountability which together with the new requirement on the anti-fraud measures in Article 125(4) of the Regulation (EU) N° 1303/2013 (the CPR) can explain the trend depicted by the ECA. 
43 Det br noteras att skerhetsmodellen fr 2014Đ2020 har frstrkts kraftigt nr det gller medlemsstaternas redovisningsskyldighet, tillsammans med det nya kravet p bedrgeribekmpningstgrder i artikel 125.4 i frordning (EU) nr 1303/2013 (frordningen om gemensamma bestmmelser), vilket kan frklara den trend som revisionsrtten beskriver.
Common Commission reply to paragraphs 44 and 45: In the PIF Report 2017, the Commission published its own analysis of the “reasons for performing the control” (a structured field) which led to detection in the programming period 2007-2013. 
Kommissionens gemensamma svar p punkterna 44 och 45: I PIF-rapporten 2017 offentliggr kommissionen sin egen analys av Óorsaker till kontrollerÓ (ett strukturerat flt) som ledde till upptckt under programperioden 2007Đ2013.
The higher value of detections originating from investigative and prosecution bodies has been highlighted since the 2014 PIF Report4 and, according to the Commission's analysis, is linked to the effectiveness of the investigations and the strong investigative capabilities of the authorities concerned. 
Det hgre vrdet fr fall som upptckts av utrednings-och lagfringsorgan har betonats sedan 2014 rs PIF-rapport4 och r enligt kommissionens analys kopplat till utredningarnas effektivitet och de berrda myndigheternas starka utredningskapacitet.
The Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 establishing the EPPO (European Public Prosecutor's Office) under enhanced cooperation provides for the obligation of all competent authorities to report cases of fraud affecting the EU financial interests to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office5. This includes managing authorities. 
46 Enligt rdets frordning (EU) 2017/1939 om genomfrande av frdjupat samarbete om inrttande av Europeiska klagarmyndigheten r alla behriga myndigheter skyldiga att rapportera bedrgeri som riktar sig mot EU:s ekonomiska intressen till Europeiska klagarmyndigheten.5. Detta gller ven de frvaltande myndigheterna.
Moreover, OLAF, as provided for in Regulation 883/2013, will continue to play its key role in the fight against fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union in all Member States. 
Enligt frordning (EU) nr 883/2013 kommer dessutom Olaf att fortstta att spela en central roll i kampen mot bedrgerier, korruption och all annan olaglig verksamhet som riktar sig mot unionens ekonomiska intressen i alla medlemsstater.
A targeted and proportionate approach is recommended. 3 See SWD(2018) 386 final 2/2, paragraph 4.3, pages 86-88. 
Denna rekommendation fljs upp i kommissionens allmnna riktlinjer om nationella strategier mot bedrgerier (General guidelines on National Anti-3 Se SWD(2018) 386 final 2/2, punkt 4.3, s.
4 See COM(2015) 386 final, paragraph 4.2.2, page 23. 
86Đ88. 4 Se COM(2015) 386 final, punkt 4.2.2, s.
5 O.J. L 283, 31.10.2017, p.1. 
23. 5 EUT L 283, 31.10.2017, s.
National anti-fraud strategies promote cooperation and coordination as key elements for the protection of the EU financial interests. 
Nationella strategier mot bedrgerier frmjar samarbete och samordning som centrala aspekter fr skyddet av EU:s ekonomiska intressen.
Common Commission reply to paragraphs 47 to 48: Any use made by the Commission of the data reported in IMS is based on the awareness that reporting may be incomplete. 
Kommissionens gemensamma svar p punkterna 47 till 48: Kommissionens anvndning av de uppgifter som rapporteras i IMS baseras alltid p frutsttningen att rapporteringen kan vara ofullstndig.
This is also clearly stated in several PIF Reports and in the accompanying "Methodology for the evaluation of reported irregularities".8 Reporting of detected fraudulent irregularities is linked to the efficiency of the system, as it implies that different bodies and authorities cooperate in this domain. 
Detta anges ocks tydligt i flera PIF-rapporter och den tfljande Ómetoden fr utvrdering av rapporterade oriktigheterÓ8. Rapportering av upptckta oriktigheter med misstanke om bedrgeri r kopplad till hela systemets effektivitet, eftersom olika organ och myndigheter samarbetar p detta omrde.
On the basis of these assumptions, the Commission has repeatedly expressed its doubts about the reliability of data received by Member States which report a very low number of fraudulent irregularities. 49. 
P grundval av dessa antaganden har kommissionen vid upprepade tillfllen frklarat att den tvivlar p tillfrlitligheten hos de uppgifter som lmnas av medlemsstaterna, eftersom de rapporterar ett mycket lgt antal oriktigheter med misstanke om bedrgeri.
The issue of differing interpretations of the EU definition of fraud has also been acknowledged in the PIF Reports. 
49 Problemen med olika tolkningar av EU:s definition av bedrgeri har ven bekrftats i PIF-rapporterna.
Sometimes these differences of interpretations are inherent in the different legal systems and the way in which certain behaviours are considered (e.g. conflict of interests is regarded as criminal behaviour in certain countries and not in others and reported accordingly). 
Ibland hnger sdana skillnader i tolkningen samman med de olika rttssystemen och synen p vissa beteenden (intressekonflikter anses t.ex. vara ett brott i vissa lnder men inte i andra och rapporteras drefter).