natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Within the Commission there are only three officials dealing with these programmes, two officials supervising the execution of the contracts (about 23 contracts ongoing at the time of the audit) and one official for the financial management of the programmes. 
Inom kommissionen r det endast tre tjnstemn som arbetar med dessa program, tv tjnstemn vervakar genomfrandet av kontrakten (ungefr 23 kontrakt pgick nr granskningen genomfrdes) och en tjnsteman skter den ekonomiska frvaltningen av programmen.
This level of resources is insufficient as demonstrated by the lack of continuity between the latest campaigns. 
Dessa resurser r otillrckliga vilket framgr av den bristande kontinuiteten mellan de senaste kampanjerna.
The seventh campaign is not expected to start until autumn 1999, i.e., about 15 months after the completion of the sixth campaign, due to the lack of human resources. 
P grund av personalbrist frvntas den sjunde kampanjen inte inledas frrn under hsten 1999, det vill sga ungefr 15 mnader efter det att den sjtte kampanjen avslutats.
The Commission has not yet undertaken a general evaluation to assess whether, given the limited human and financial resources it can itself devote to these programmes, the extended use of external technical assistance and the reliance on outside evaluation of the programmes, the results obtained justify its commitment to these actions. 
Kommissionen har inte nnu genomfrt ngon allmn utvrdering fr att bedma om det uppndda resultatet berttigar dess tagande nr det gller dessa tgrder, mot bakgrund av de begrnsade personalresurser och ekonomiska resurser som den sjlv kan avstta fr dessa program, den utbredda anvndningen av externt tekniskt std och det faktum att man frlitar sig till externa utvrderingar av programmen.
Observations relating to the implementation of the scheme in the Member States 36. 
Iakttagelser rrande systemets tillmpning i medlemsstaterna 36.
The main parties involved in administering and controlling the production aid scheme at Member State level are the producers, the producer organisations (PO) and associations thereof, the national administrations and the control agencies (CA). 
De viktigaste parterna som deltar i frvaltningen och styrningen av produktionssystemet p medlemsstatsniv r producenterna, producentorganisationerna och sammanslutningar av sdana, de nationella frvaltningarna och kontrollorganen.
The producers have to submit cultivation declarations, indicating their production potential and any changes over time (total number of trees and those in production, area cultivated, varieties of trees, etc.). 
Producenterna skall lmna in skrdedeklarationer, som skall visa deras produktionspotential och varje frndring ver tiden (totalt antal olivtrd och olivtrd i produktion, olivodlingarnas areal, trdsorter och s vidare).
The POs and associations process these documents for their members. 
Producentorganisationerna och sammanslutningarna handlgger dessa dokument t sina medlemmar.
After some administrative checks they computerise the information contained in the applications and forward the files to the paying agencies or to their regional services for final administrative checking and for payments. 
Efter ngra administrativa kontroller fr de in de uppgifter som finns i anskningarna i ett dataregister och vidarebefordrar filerna till de utbetalande organen eller till deras regionala frvaltning fr slutlig administrativ kontroll och fr utbetalning.
The non-associated producers, who constitute a small percentage of the total, submit their applications directly to the services of the paying agencies for administrative control and payments. 38. control agencies are responsible for on-the-spot controls. 
Icke anslutna producenter, som utgr en liten andel av totalen, lmnar in sina anskningar direkt till det utbetalande organets frvaltning fr administrativ kontroll och utbetalning. 38. Kontrollorganen ansvarar fr kontroller p platsen.
Every year they select a sample of individual growers to be checked for the accuracy of their declarations and applications. They also select a sample of POs to be checked as to whether they continue to fulfil the conditions for their approval by the national authorities and whether they are performing their tasks effectively. 
Varje r vljer de ut ett antal enskilda odlare fr vilka man skall kontrol-leraomderasdeklarationerochanskningarrkorrekta.Devl- jer ven ut ett urval av producentorganisationer fr vilka man skall kontrollera om de fortfarande uppfyller villkoren fr att bli godknda av de nationella myndigheterna och om de fullgr sin uppgift p ndamlsenligt stt.
A sample of oil mills is also checked as to whether they are authorised to testify for their clients the quantities of oil olive produced and whether the quantities testified are correct. 
Ett urval av olivoljefabriker kontrolleras ocks med avseende p om de har tillstnd att fr sina kunders rkning uppge producerad oljekvantitet och om de uppgivna kvantiteterna r korrekta.
The cultivation register and the average yields are two important tools for facilitating effective controls in the framework described above. 
Odlingsregistret och de genomsnittliga skrdarna r tv viktiga verktyg som underlttar verkningsfulla kontroller inom den ram som beskrivs ovan.
The yields as a control instrument 39. 
Skrdar som kontrollinstrument 39.
The quantities of oil declared in the aid applications are checked in the first instance by comparing average yields estimated every year by each Member State for homogeneous production zones with actual yields. 
De oljekvantiteter som anges i bidragsanskningarna kontrolleras frst genom att man jmfr genomsnittlig skrd som varje medlemsstat uppskattar rligen fr homogena produktionsomrden med faktiska skrdar.
The actual yield for each aid 
Den faktiska skrden fr varje
27.7.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 215/17 application is compared with the average calculated for the zone in which the applicantŐs parcel is located. 
27.7.2000 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 215/17 bidragsanskan jmfrs med det berknade genomsnittet fr det omrde dr skandens mark finns.
Abnormally high yields are taken as an indicator that the quantities declared may not be correct which usually leads to the farmer being checked on the spot. 
Onormalt stora skrdar ses som en indikator p att de angivna kvantiteterna kan vara felaktiga vilket vanligen leder till att odlaren kontrolleras p platsen.
Estimation of the average production yields 40. 
Uppskattning av genomsnittliga skrdar 40.
Apart from information on the area under olive trees and the trees per hectare, the estimation of any production yields requires estimates of the quantity of olives per tree, and the quantity of virgin olive oil per 100 kg of olives. 
Bortsett frn information om olivodlingarnas areal och antal trd per hektar frutstter en uppskattning av skrdar att det finns berkningar av mngden oliver per trd, och mngden jung-fruolivolja per 100 kg oliver.
Both of the latter indicators should be estimated for fairly homogeneous production zones in order to allow for valid comparisons between estimated and actual values. 
Bda de sistnmnda uppgifterna br berknas fr relativt homogena produktionsomrden fr att giltiga jmfrelser skall kunna gras mellan berknade och faktiska vrden.
The Court analysed the methods and procedures applied by the Member States for the collection, evaluation and communication to the Commission of the relevant data and the results are given in the following paragraphs. 
Revisionsrtten har granskat de metoder och frfaranden som medlemsstaterna tillmpar fr insamling, utvrdering och meddelande till kommissionen av relevanta uppgifter och resultatet beskrivs i nedanstende punkter.
Under Council Regulation (EEC) No 2262/84, Article 1(2), the control agencies are responsible for collecting, verifying and processing at national level the data for ascertaining the yields. 
Enligt artikel 1.2 i rdets frordning (EEG) nr 2262/84 skall kontrollorganen p nationell niv samla in, kontrollera och bearbeta de uppgifter som behvs fr att faststlla skrdarna.
To a certain extent, this provision is respected in all Member States visited. 
Denna bestmmelse efterlevs i viss utstrckning i alla de beskta medlemsstaterna.
However, the methods of data collection, the sources of the information and the processes of calculation differ not only between countries but also between regions of individual countries, resulting in non-comparable results. 
Metoderna fr insamling av uppgifter, informationskllor och berkningsmetoden varierar dock inte bara mellan lnder utan ven mellan regioner i de enskilda lnderna, vilket ger upphov till ojmfrbara resultat.
To assess the reliability of the data on olive and olive oil yields, the Court examined the data on the number of trees which is a basic element in the calculation of average yields and therefore has to be accurate. 
Fr att bedma tillfrlitligheten hos uppgifterna om skrdar av oliver och olivolja underskte revisionsrtten uppgifterna om antalet trd, som r en grundlggande faktor i berkningen av genomsnittliga skrdar och drfr mste vara korrekt.
However, from its audit work in Spain, Greece and Italy, the Court found that the recorded number of trees was rarely accurate. 
Revisionsrtten har dock utifrn granskningsarbetet i Spanien, Grekland och Italien funnit att det registrerade antalet trd sllan var korrekt.
Out of 35 parcels visited only in six did the number of trees found agree with that declared by the producers. 
Av 35 beskta skiften stmde det faktiska antalet trd endast i 6 fall med det antal producenterna hade deklarerat.
The usefulness of the average yields as a control instrument 43. 
Anvndningen av genomsnittliga skrdar som kontrollinstrument 43.
Within the various zones comparisons between the average yields fixed by the Commission and the yields declared by each producer-applicant showed variations up to three times of the average yield. 
Inom de olika omrdena uppvisar jmfrelserna mellan den genomsnittliga skrd som kommissionen fastslagit och den skrd som varje anskande producent deklarerat avvikelser p upp till tre gnger den genomsnittliga skrden.
This situation calls into question the concept of homogeneous production zones and the usefulness of average yields as a control instrument. 
Denna situation innebr att man mste ifrgastta begreppet homogena produktionsomrden och skrdarnas lmplighet som kontrollinstrument.
The use of the average yields for identifying potential inaccurate aid applications gives rise to the following further comments: (a) each producer Member State used to set its own limits margin above and below which the declared quantities had to be considered abnormal requiring an on-the-spot check; the Court found that this margin was set too high in some production zones; for example, cases were found where margins of 49 times the average yield were tolerated; such high tolerance levels adopted by the Member States are indicative of the inadequacy of the estimation of average yields and reduce the effectiveness of yields as a control tool; (b) since the last marketing year two countries apply a single margin of tolerance over all zones; the maximum tolerance in these cases is 3,5 times the average yield, which is fixed for several years; the risk of this is that the applicants become aware of the limits and adjust the declared quantities to just below the upper limit thus evading any check. 
Anvndningen av genomsnittliga skrdar fr att faststlla eventuellt felaktiga bidragsanskningar ger anledning till fljande ytterligare kommentarer: a) Varje medlemsstat satte sina egna grnser ver och under vilka den deklarerade kvantiteten mste anses onormal och krver en kontroll p platsen. Revisionsrtten fann att denna marginal sattes fr hgt i vissa omrden; till exempel pvisades fall dr marginaler p 49 gnger skrden accepterades.
Reliability of the control mechanism 45. 
Kontrollmekanismens tillfrlitlighet 45.
Producers are not always well informed about their obligations in respect of the cultivation declarations, aid applications and the notification of any change concerning the number of trees, the area, etc. 
Producenterna r inte alltid vlinformerade om sina skyldigheter nr det gller skrdedeklarationer, bidragsanskningar och meddelande av frndringar av antalet trd, arealen och s vidare.
What is more important is that they do not seem to be aware of the consequences of failing to declare their olive groves correctly and to notify any amendment without delay. 
Vad som r viktigare r att de inte tycks vara medvetna om konsekvenserna av att inte deklarera sina olivodlingar korrekt och omedelbart meddela varje frndring.
The low quality of the information provided by the producers is the main source of the large discrepancies concerning the number of trees and makes the control ineffective. 
Den lga kvaliteten p den information som producenterna lmnar r den frmsta orsaken till de stora avvikelserna vad gller antalet trd och gr kontrollen verkningsls.
The tasks of the POs and their associations are confined mostly to administrative checks, i.e. identification of the applicant, completeness of declaration and application and checking for dual applications. This latter check merits special attention from an audit point of view. 
Producentorganisationernas och sammanslutningarnas uppgifter innebr frmst administrativa kontroller, det vill sga att identifiera skande, kontrollera deklarationens och anskans fullstndighet och kontrollera om det finns dubbla anskningar. Den sistnmnda kontrollen frtjnar srskild uppmrksamhet i samband med granskningen.
Within one PO it is possible to identify duplicate applications made by the same applicant but it is not possible to detect whether the same parcel of trees appears on applications of two different applicants. 
Inom en producentorganisation kan man pvisa dubbla anskningar som gjorts av samma skande men det r inte mjligt att avslja om samma skifte med trdplantering frekommer i anskningar frn tv olika skande.
Moreover, the administrative checks are not always extended to cover the ownership and the basis on which the producers manage their olive groves. 
Dessutom utstrcks inte alltid de administrativa kontrollerna till att omfatta gandertten och frgan om utifrn vilken grund producenterna frvaltar sina olivodlingar.
Such controls are however foreseen in the 1998 regulations. 
Sdana kontroller freskrivs dock i 1998 rs bestmmelser.
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3061/84 of 31 October 1984 (1) further requires producer organisations to collect copies of contracts for land use or titles of ownership. 
Enligt kommissionens frordning (EEG) nr 3061/84 av den 31 oktober 1984 (1) skall producentorganisationerna ven samla in kopior av kontrakt om rtten att utnyttja marken eller bevis p gandertten.
The Associations of POs are required under Council Regulation (EEC) No 2261/84 of 17 July 1984 (2) to check that POs comply with their obligations. 
Sammanslutningar av producentorganisationer skall enligt rdets frordning (EEG) nr 2261/84 av den 17 juli 1984 (2) kontrollera att producentorganisationerna fullgr sina skyldigheter.
The Court examined eight cases of 49 irregularities declared by Spain in 1996 to 1997 and found that had these provisions been correctly applied, no irregularities would have occurred. 
Revisionsrtten underskte tta av 49 fall av oegentligheter som Spanien anmlt 1996Đ1997, och konstaterade att om dessa bestmmelser hade tillmpats korrekt skulle inga oegentligheter ha uppsttt.
(1) OJ L 288, 1.11.1984. 
(1) EGT L 288, 1.11.1984.
(2) OJ L 208, 3.8.1984. 
(2) EGT L 208, 3.8.1984.
C 215/18 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 27.7.2000 48. 
C 215/18 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 27.7.2000 51.
The paying agencies in all producer Member States except Greece are equipped with computerised systems and therefore are capable of performing effective administrative checks on all individual declarations and aid applications. 
De utbetalande organen r i alla lnder utom Grekland utrustade med datorsystem och kan drfr utfra verkningsfulla administrativa kontroller av alla enskilda deklarationer och stdanskningar.
In Greece the paying agency relies heavily for these checks on the work of the POs, i.e. on the beneficiaries themselves. 
I Grekland r det utbetalande organet nr det gller dessa kontroller mycket beroende av producentorganisationerna, det vill sga av mottagarna sjlva.
However, checking for multiple declarations in respect of the same parcel can only be done effectively when each parcel is identified by a unique code. 
En kontroll av om det finns flera deklarationer fr samma skifte kan endast ske p ett effektivt stt om varje skifte identifieras med en unik kod.
At present, this is only possible in Italy. 
Fr nrvarande r detta endast mjligt i Italien.
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2262/84 required the producer Member States to set up an agency to play a key role in ensuring thatCommunityrulesinrespectofoliveoilarecorrectlyapplied by all operators. For the first three years (until 1986/87 for Italy, 1988/89 for Greece and 1989/90 for Spain and Portugal) the operational expenditure of these agencies was fully covered by the Community budget. 
Enligt rdet frordning (EEG) nr 2262/84 skall de producerande medlemsstaterna upprtta ett organ som skall spela en nyckelroll i att skerstlla att gemenskapens bestmmelser fr olivoljatillmpaskorrektavallaaktrer.Underdefrstatreren (fram till 1986/87 fr Italien, 1988/89 fr Grekland och 1989/90 fr Spanien och Portugal) tcktes dessa organs driftsutgifter helt och hllet av gemenskapens budget.
Since then and until 2002 the Community contribution has been reduced to 50 %. 
Sedan dess och fram till 2002 har gemenskapens bidrag minskats till 50 %.
The operational expenditure declared by the control agencies for 1996/97 was ECU 24,1 million, 50 % of which was covered by the Community. 
De driftsutgifter kontrollorganen deklarerade fr 1996/97 var 24,1 miljoner ecu, varav 50 % tcktes av gemenskapen.
This amount represents about 1 % of the total budgetary expenditure on the olive oil sector. 
Detta belopp motsvarar ungefr 1 % av totala budgetutgifter inom olivoljesektorn.
The Community contributes to control activities which are the responsibility of the Member States. 
Gemenskapen bidrar till kontrollverksamhet som r medlemsstaternas ansvar.
The Commission has not yet carried out an evaluation of the cost effectiveness of the activities of the agencies. 
Kommissionen har inte nnu gjort ngon utvrdering av kostnadseffektiviteten i organens verksamhet.
Furthermore, the CommissionŐs decisions concerning the eligibility of the agenciesŐ expenditure are taken after long delays, putting the proper functioning of the agencies at risk. 
Dessutom blir kommissionens beslut om huruvida organens utgifter berttigar till std mycket frsenade, vilket stter organens funktion p spel.
Financial information on the CAs operating in the four main producer Member States for the marketing year 1996/97 is to be found in Table 8. 51. 
Ekonomisk information om de kontrollorgan som r verksamma i de fyra viktigaste producerande medlemsstaterna fr regleringsret 1996/97 finns i tabell 8.
Other Average cost by inspector (man/day in ECU) Average cost of a control (1995/96, Spain 1994/95 in ECU) Mills Producer organisations Producers Italy 197 122 30 13 32 13,211 9,734 2,086 1,391 574 2 756 6 474 2 271 Greece 119 70 30 5 14 4,088 3,096 0,775 0,217 317 1 376 3 556 254 Spain 97 48 21 9 19 5,300 3,409 1,700 0,191 605 658 2 466 666 Portugal 44 29 10 3 2 1,524 1,064 0,216 0,244 282 1 221 2 380 792 Total 457 269 91 30 67 24,123 17,303 4,777 2,043 445 1 503 3 719 996 Source: Commission, DGVI. 
Tabell 8 Totalt personal Styrekonomer Administration Datorer vrigt Totala utgifter (i miljoner ecu) Personal Administrativa utgifter vrigt Genomsnittlig kostnad per inspektr (mandagar i ecu) Genomsnittlig kostnad fr en kontroll (1995/96, Spanien 1994/95, i ecu) Fabriker Producentorganisationer Producenter Italien Grekland 197 119 122 70 30 30 13 5 32 14 13,211 4,088 9,734 3,096 2,086 0,775 1,391 0,217 574 317 2 756 1 376 6 474 3 556 2 271 254 2 Spanien Portugal Totalt 97 44 457 48 29 269 21 10 91 9 3 30 19 2 67 5,300 1,524 24,123 3,409 1,064 17,303 1,700 0,216 4,777 0,191 0,244 2,043 605 282 445 658 1221 1503 466 2 380 3 719 666 792 996 Klla: Kommissionen DGVI.
27.7.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 215/19 for Spain and 20 % for Portugal), these checks are plausibility checks and they do not constitute a reliable proof of the quantity of oil actually produced; for example husk, water and electricity consumption can easily be manipulated in order to overestimate production, from which both the miller and the producer would benefit; in addition checks at producer level of the number of trees declared only indicate the theoretical production capacity rather than being a reliable proof of the quantity of oil actually produced; it should also be noted that checksarenotmadeonpossiblesourcesofevidencesuchas weighing scales, the quality of oil in stock, the existence of proper stock records of the mills, nor are there checks to ensure that all the contents of barrels and tanks declared as olive oil stocks is really olive oil. irregularities to the competent authorities and the final decision taken by the latter. 
27.7.2000 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 215/19 p 16 % fr Italien, 34 % fr Grekland, 38 % fr Spanien och 20 % fr Portugal), r dessa kontroller rimlighetskontroller snarare n ett tillfrlitligt bevis p hur stor mngd olja som faktiskt producerats.
The new Community rules which came into force as from 1 November 1998 do not alleviate the problem. 
De nya gemenskapsbestmmelser som trdde i kraft den 1 november 1998 lser inte detta problem.
They only stipulate that Member States shall decide on action to be taken within 12 months of the report and the sanctions to be applied in case of discrepancies in quantities of olive oil and in number of trees. 
De freskriver bara att medlemsstater skall besluta om vilka tgrder som skall vidtas inom 12 mnader efter rapporten och vilka sanktioner som skall tillmpas vid avvikelser betrffande mngden olivolja och antal trd.
They do not solve the problem of long legal and administrative procedures between this first decision and the final one after which amounts unduly paid can actually be recovered. 
De lser inte problemet med lnga rttsliga och administrativa frfaranden mellan detta frsta beslut och det slutliga, efter vilket felaktigt utbetalda belopp faktiskt kan terkrvas.
The Court examined the extent to which irregularities that were reported by the CAs led to the imposition of sanctions. 
Revisionsrtten har ven underskt i vilken utstrckning de oriktigheter som kontrollorganen rapporterade ledde till sanktioner.
Most of the sanctions on producers proposed by the CAs are based on variations from average yields or the technical standards applied by the CAs. Although this methodology has steadily been improving, individual deviations from averages cannot be considered as irrevocable proof of the inaccuracy of aid applications. 
De flesta sanktioner fr producenterna som kontrollorganen freslagit baseras p skillnader jmfrt med genomsnittlig skrd eller de tekniska normer som kontrollorganen tillmpar. ven om denna metod stndigt har frbttrats, kan inte enskilda avvikelser frn genomsnittet betraktas som oterkalleligt bevis p att stdanskningarna varit felaktiga.