natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
4. Key risk areas 26 Examples of difficulties in addressing cross‐cutting issues — the case of human rights ‘The EU has sought to further translate its commitment and mainstream human rights at programming level, including regional strategy papers, bilateral action plans, and thematic programmes. 
4. Centrala riskomrden 26 Exempel p svrigheter att ta itu med vergripande frgor Đ fallet mnskliga rttigheter EU har frskt att ytterligare omstta sitt tagande och integrera mnskliga rttigheter p programniv, inklusive i regionala strategirapporter, bilaterala handlingsplaner och tematiska program.
Nevertheless, one can observe a phe‐ nomenon of ‘dilution’ of the democracy and human rights component as the cycle moves ‘downstream’, i.e. from broad political pledges to policy frameworks down to programming, choice of instruments, allocation of funding and selection of projects. 
Trots detta kan man observera att demokrati och mnskliga rttigheter Óspds utÓ nr cykeln fortstter ÓnedtÓ, dvs. frn breda politiska utfstelser till politiska ramar ned till programplanering, val av instrument, tilldelning av medel och val av projekt.
This ‘dilution’ appears under various forms including: (i) the lack of coherent strategy to address problems through concrete interventions; (ii) the limited funding for related democratic and human rights aspects in other thematic important sectors; (iii) the tendency to confine human rights work to thematic instruments.’49 ‘The desk analysis of six concrete areas where European Commission (EC) sought to mainstream human rights shows the phenomenon of ‘dilution’ of the human rights component as the cycle moves downstream (...). 
Denna ÓutspdningÓ tar sig flera uttryck, bland annat i) avsaknaden av en sammanhngande strategi fr att lsa problem genom konkreta interventioner, ii) den begrnsade finansieringen av relaterade demokratiska aspekter och aspekter som gller mnskliga rttigheter i andra viktiga tematiska sektorer, och iii) tendensen att begrnsa arbetet med mnskliga rttigheter till tematiska instrument.49 Skrivbordsanalysen av sex konkreta omrden dr Europeiska kommissionen efterstrvat att integrera mnskliga rttigheter visar att komponenten mnskliga rttigheter spds ut nr cykeln fortstter nedt.
All this is compounded by a lack of even basic systems to monitor and evaluate progress in relation to main‐ streaming. 
Allt detta frvrras av en avsaknad av ven de mest grundlggande system fr att vervaka och utvrdera framsteg nr det gller integrering.
This dilution is related to political resistance of partner countries but also to major internal weak‐ nesses at EU level, such as limited political leverage and inconsistent decision‐making with regard to the place and weight of human rights in EU external action. 
Utspdningen r relaterad till partnerlndernas politiska motstnd men ocks till stora inre svagheter p EU-niv, ssom begrnsad politisk genomslagskraft och inkonsekvent beslutsfattande i frga om platsen fr och vikten av mnskliga rttigheter i EU:s yttre tgrder.
The EU’s difficulties to reconcile values and interests have been widely documented and criticised by media and civil society. 
EU:s svrigheter att frena vrden och intressen har dokumenterats vitt och brett och kritiserats av medierna och det civila samhllet.
The Arab Spring was an eye‐opener on the limits of the ‘stability versus human rights approach’ and may open perspectives for a more serious approach to mainstreaming human rights.’ 50 49 ‘Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to two European Neighbourhood Policy Regions (East and South) — Final report — Volume 1, June 2013’, p. 
Arabiska vren var en gonppnare om grnserna fr strategin Óstabilitet kontra mnskliga rttigheterÓ och kan ppna mjligheter fr en mer allvarligt menad strategi fr att integrera mnskliga rttigheter.50 49 Evaluation of the European UnionŐs Support to two European Neighbourhood Policy Regions (East and South) Đ Final report Đ Volume 1, juni 2013, s.
50 ‘Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to respect of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (including solidarity with victims of repression)’ — Final Report — Volume 1, December 2011, p. 
50 Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to respect of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (including solidarity with victims of repression) Đ Final Report Đ Volume 1 (tematisk utvrdering av kommissionens std till mnskliga rttigheter och grundlggande friheter (inklusive solidaritet med offren fr frtryck) Đ slutrapport Đ volym 1), december 2011, s.
4. Key risk areas 27 4.4. 
4. Centrala riskomrden 27 4.4.
Harmonisation between development partners’ instruments and frameworks 4.4.1. 
Harmonisering mellan utvecklingspartners instrument och regelverk 4.4.1.
Alignment with partner countries’ results frameworks 51 In line with the principles agreed at high‐level international forums, donors, including the EU, should rely as far as possible on partner coun‐ tries’ frameworks for results‐oriented reporting and monitoring (see sec‐ tion 2.1.2). 
Anpassning till partnerlndernas resultatramar 51 Enligt de principer som verenskommits i internationella forum p hg niv ska givare, inklusive EU, s lngt som mjligt anvnda partnerlndernas ramar fr resultatinriktad rapportering och vervakning (se avsnitt 2.1.2).
In particular, donors should minimise their use of additional frame‐ works, refraining from requesting the introduction of performance indicators that are not consistent with countries’ national development strategies51. 
Givarna br i synnerhet minimera anvndningen av ytterligare ramar och avst frn att begra infrandet av resultatindikatorer som inte r frenliga med lndernas nationella utvecklingsstrategier51.
52 However, previous Commission evalu‐ ation reports found issues related to non‐alignment between donors and partner countries’ frameworks (see Box 12). 
52 I tidigare utvrderingsrapporter frn kommissionen har man dock funnit problem nr det gller bristande anpassning mellan givares och partnerlnders ramar (se ruta 12).
53 When partner countries face many different types and levels of reporting obligations and payment conditions from various donors, these can present an unmanageable burden, which is detrimental to both aid efficiency and effectiveness. 
53 Nr partnerlnderna mts av mnga olika typer och niver av rapporteringsskyldigheter och betalningsvillkor frn olika givare, kan dessa utgra en ohanterlig brda, vilket inverkar negativt p bde bistndets ndamlsenlighet och effektivitet.
51 Busan Partnership for effective development cooperation. 
51 Partnerskapet frn Busan fr effektivt utvecklingssamarbete.
Example of the lack of alignment with the partner country’s results framework ‘(...) far from being a Government‐led, genuinely harmonised framework, the Performance Assessment Frame‐ work (PAF) had developed into ‘the sum total of all Development Partners’ individual preferences and require‐ ments’. (...) 
Exempel p bristande anpassning till partnerlndernas resultatram Ramen fr resultatbedmning (PAF) var allt annat n en regeringsledd och verkligt harmoniserad ram. Den hade utvecklats tillÓ summan av alla utvecklingspartners enskilda nskeml och kravÓ.
The effective ownership of Government was lost and the PAF assessment process became little more than a compulsory process, which needed to be respected in order for Budget Support disbursements to continue (...). 
Regeringens faktiska ansvar hade frlorats och PAF-bedmningsprocessen var fga mer n en obligatorisk process, som man var tvungen att respektera fr att utbetalningarna av budgetstdet skulle fortstta.
Simultaneous with this loss of ownership and engagement, there has been a significant in‐ crease in the transaction costs associated with the annual assessment process and the related policy dialogue. 
Samtidigt som ansvaret och engagemanget gtt frlorade har det skett en betydande kning av transaktionskostnaderna fr den rliga bedmningsprocessen och den tillhrande politiska dialogen.
This is a perception reported unanimously by all relevant stakeholders interviewed. It is manifested most obvi‐ ously in the steady growth in the number of indicators incorporated within the PAF.’52 52 Joint Evaluation of Budget Support to Tanzania: lessons learned and recommendations for the future Final Report: Volume 1, 2013, paragraphs 74‐75. 
Denna iakttagelse rapporterades enhlligt av alla berrda intressenter som intervjuats och framgr allra tydligast av den stadiga kningen av antalet indikatorer som ingr i PAF.52 52 Joint Evaluation of Budget Support to Tanzania: lessons learned and recommendations for the future Đ Final Report: Volume 1 (gemensam utvrdering av budgetstd till Tanzania: lrdomar och rekommendationer fr framtiden Đ slutrapport Đ volym 1), 2013, punkterna 74Đ75.
4. Key risk areas 28 4.4.2. 
4. Centrala riskomrden 28 4.4.2.
Harmonising the instruments used by development stakeholders 54 In previous Court special reports, is‐ sues were found related to the lack of harmonisation of instruments used by development partners (see Box 13). 
Harmonisering av instrument som anvnds av utvecklingspartner 54 I revisionsrttens tidigare srskilda rapporter konstaterades problem p grund av bristande harmonisering av instrument som anvnds av utvecklingspartner (se ruta 13).
55 The failure to harmonise instruments used by development partners can be detrimental to results monitoring and reporting effectiveness and efficiency. 
55 Underltenheten att harmonisera de instrument som anvnds av utvecklingspartnerna kan vara till nackdel fr en effektiv och ndamlsenlig resultat-vervakning och rapportering.
Examples of issues due to the lack of harmonisation of instruments used by development partners ‘The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has estimated that there are more than 50 international public funds, 45 carbon markets and 6 000 private equity funds providing climate change finance, each with its own governance structure. 
Exempel p problem p grund av bristande harmonisering av instrument som anvnds av utvecklingspartner ÓFrenta nationernas utvecklingsprogram (UNDP) har uppskattat att det redan finns mer n 50 internationella offentliga fonder, 45 koldioxidmarknader och 6 000 riskkapitalfonder som tillhandahller klimatfinansiering, var och en med en egen styrningsstruktur.
As the World Bank notes, fragmentation of this sort threatens to reduce the overall effectiveness of climate finance (...). 
Som Vrldsbanken noterar innebr denna typ av splittring ett hot som kan gra att klimatfinansieringens vergripande ndamlsenlighet minskar (...).
The Commission and Member States use both bilateral and multi‐ lateral channels to disburse climate finance. In 2010 they used no less than 22 multilateral channels. (...) 
Kommissionen och medlemsstaterna anvnder bde bilaterala och multilaterala kanaler fr att betala ut klimatfinansiering. r 2010 anvnde EU s mnga som 22 multilaterala kanaler. (...)
No attempt has been made to reduce the proliferation of climate funds, which involves serious risks of inefficiencies, inadequate accountability and fragmentation of aid (...)’53 53 Special Report No 17/2013 ‘EU climate finance in the context of external aid’, paragraphs 57 to 58 and paragraph 68 (http://eca.europa.eu). 
Inga frsk har gjorts fr att minska det stora antalet klimatfonder, vilket medfr allvarliga risker fr ineffektivitet, otillrcklig ansvarsskyldighet och ett splittrat bistnd (...)Ó53 53 Srskild rapport nr 17/2013: EU:s klimatfinansiering inom ramen fr bistnd till tredjeland, punkterna 57Đ58 och punkt 68 (http://eca.europa.eu).
Coping with the juxtaposition of different accountability structures 56 As part of the EU’s development and cooperation action, the European Commission entrusts some budget implementation tasks under indirect management to international organi‐ sations54. 
Hantering av en kombination av olika ansvarsstrukturer 56 Som en del av EU:s utvecklings-och samarbetstgrd anfrtror kommissionen vissa budgetgenomfrandeuppgifter under indirekt frvaltning till internationella organisationer54.
For these tasks, accountabil‐ ity relies on the accountability struc‐ tures of the international organisation concerned, including governance, results frameworks55 and external audit, as well as on the EU’s own audit and accountability provisions. 
Fr dessa uppgifter r ansvarsutkrvandet beroende av den berrda internationella organisationens ansvarsstrukturer, inklusive styrning, resultatramar55 och extern revision samt EU:s egna revisions-och ansvarsbestmmelser.
57 In previous audits, the Court found that the juxtaposition of different ac‐ countability structures for tasks under indirect management with internation‐ al organisations sometimes created accountability gaps (see Box 14). 
57 I tidigare revisioner har revisionsrtten funnit att en kombination av olika ansvarsstrukturer fr uppgifter under indirekt frvaltning tillsammans med internationella organisationer ibland ger upphov till luckor i ansvarsutkrvandet (se ruta 14).
54 Financial Regulation, Article 58 — methods of implementation of the budget. 
54 Budgetfrordningen, artikel 58 Đ metoder fr genomfrande av budgeten.
55 See, for example, United Nations Development Group’s results‐based management handbook, United Nations Population Fund’s integrated results framework, or United Nations Development Programme’s handbook on planning, monitoring and evaluating for development results. 
55 Se till exempel handboken fr resultatbaserad frvaltning frn FN:s utvecklingsgrupp, FN:s befolkningsfonds integrerade resultatram eller handboken om planering, vervakning och utvrdering av utvecklingsresultat frn FN:s utvecklingsprogram.
4. Key risk areas 29 Example of distinct accountability architecture — United Nations ‘Although the Commission verifies the financial management systems of its UN partners (using a four‐pillar analysis), the Commission depends on UN reports for confirming the practical operation of control systems and the achievement of results. 
4. Centrala riskomrden 29 Exempel p skilda ansvarsstrukturer Đ FN Óven om kommissionen kontrollerar sina FN-partners system fr ekonomisk frvaltning (genom analys av de fyra pelarna) r kommissionen beroende av FN-rapporter fr att bekrfta att kontrollsystemen fungerar i praktiken och att resultat uppns.
At the time of the audit the Commission had not yet succeeded in obtaining adequate information from the UN in this regard.’56 ‘The Commission does not receive sufficient timely information from UN reports. 
Vid tidpunkten fr revisionen hade kommissionen inte nnu kunnat f tillrcklig information frn FN i detta avseende.Ó56 Kommissionen fr inte Ótillrckligt mycket information i tid frn FN-rapporter.
A large proportion of reports are still delayed, not detailed enough and focus on activities rather than results.’57 56 Landscape review 2014 ‘Gaps, overlaps and challenges: a landscape review of accountability and public audit arrangements’, Box 1 (http://eca. europa.eu). 
Mnga rapporter r fortfarande frsenade, inte tillrckligt detaljerade och mer inriktade p tgrder n p resultat.Ó57 56 versiktlig analys 2014: Luckor, verlappningar och utmaningar: En versiktlig analys av EU:s frfaranden fr ansvarsutkrvande och offentlig revision, ruta 15 (http://eca.europa.eu).
57 Special Report No 3/2011 ‘The efficiency and effectiveness of EU contributions channelled through United Nations organisations in conflict‐affected countries’, paragraph IV (http://eca.europa.eu). 
57 Srskild rapport nr 3/2011: Effektiviteten och ndamlsenligheten i EU-bidrag som kanaliseras genom FN-organisationer i konfliktdrabbade lnder, punkt IV (http://eca.europa.eu).
Weaknesses in evaluation and results reporting 58 Legal provisions for results monitoring, evaluation and audit provide for two different types of timing: (a) periodic timing: for example, Article 318 TFEU lays down that the Commission must submit annu‐ ally (...) an evaluation report on the Union’s finances based on the results achieved, in particular in relation to the indications given by the European Parliament and the Council in the context of the annual discharge procedure; (b) action‐based timing: for example, Article 18.3 of the rules of applica‐ tion of the Financial Regulation provides that results of multian‐ nual programmes where the resources exceed 5 000 000 euros must be periodically evaluated in accordance with a timetable which enables the findings of that evalu‐ ation to be taken into account for any decision on the renewal, modification or suspension of the programme. 
Svagheter i utvrdering och resultatrapportering 58 I de rttsliga bestmmelserna om re-sultatvervakning, utvrdering och revision freskrivs tv olika tidsintervall: a) regelbundet tidsintervall: I exempelvis artikel 318 i EUF-frdraget freskrivs att kommissionen rligen ska verlmna (...) en rapport med utvrdering av unionens finanser p grundval av de resultat som uppntts, srskilt i frhllande till de uppgifter som Europaparlamentet och rdet lmnat i samband med det rliga frfarandet fr beviljande av ansvarsfrihet. b) tgrdsbaserat tidsintervall: I exempelvis artikel 18.3 i tillmpningsfreskrifterna fr budgetfrordningen freskrivs att resultaten av flerriga program vars resurser verskrider 5 000 000 euro ska utvrderas lpande med bestmda intervall och enligt ett tidsschema som gr det mjligt att ta hnsyn till resultaten av utvrderingen nr beslut ska fattas om huruvida programmet ska frlngas, lggas om eller avbrytas.
59 In previous audit reports, the Court found that, in some cases, the achieve‐ ment of projects or programme objec‐ tives could not be assessed before they finished, which undermined peri‐ odic assessment of the achievement of results (see Box 15). 
59 I tidigare revisionsrapporter fann revisionsrtten att uppnendet av projekt-eller programml inte kunde bedmas innan de avslutades, vilket undergrver de periodiskt terkommande utvrderingarna av resultat (se ruta 15).
4. Key risk areas 30 60 The Court also found weaknesses in the timely delivery of evaluations, i.e. strategic evaluations often took much longer than planned and programme evaluations were sometimes post‐ poned or cancelled58. 
4. Centrala riskomrden 30 60 Revisionsrtten fann ocks svagheter nr det gllde att leverera utvrderingar i tid, dvs. strategiska utvrderingar tog ofta mycket lngre tid n planerat och programutvrderingar skts ibland upp eller stlldes in58.
A recent study requested by the Commission also found ‘important disconnects’ be‐ tween evaluations and policy for‐ mulation, programming, monitoring and result‐oriented management. 
I en underskning nyligen som kommissionen begrt fann man ocks Óbetydande glappÓ mellan utvrderingar och politikutformning, programplanering, vervakning och resultatinriktad frvaltning.
In particular, it found missed opportuni‐ ties — in terms of uptake — where previously learned lessons were ignored because evaluation findings did not synchronise with the manage‐ ment decision‐making process, (...) or because the context had changed by the time the findings were made available59. 
Framfr allt konstaterades att man missade mjligheter att ta tillvara tidigare lrdomar eftersom utvrderingsresultaten inte synkroniserades med den frvaltningsmssiga beslutsprocessen, eller drfr att sammanhanget hade frndrats vid den tid d resultaten var tillgngliga59.
58 Special Report No 18/2014 ‘EuropeAid’s evaluation and results‐oriented monitoring systems’, paragraphs 27 to 29 (http://eca.europa.eu). 
58 Srskild rapport nr 18/2014: EuropeAids system fr utvrdering och resultatinriktad vervakning, punkterna 27Đ29 (http://eca.europa.eu).
59 Study on the uptake of learning from EuropeAid’s strategic evaluations into development policy and practice — Final report, June 2014, p. vii. 
59 Study on the uptake of learning from EuropeAidŐs strategic evaluations into development policy and practice (studie om tillvaratagandet av lrdomar frn EuropeAids strategiska utvrderingar fr utvecklingspolitik och utvecklingspraxis), slutrapport, juni 2014, s. vii.
Legislative process Follow-up (including evaluation) Programming Identification Implementation (including monitoring and mid-term evaluation) Formulation Figure 4 4. 
Lagstiftnings-process Uppfljning (inklusive utvrdering) Programplanering Identifiering Genomfrande (inklusive vervakning och halvtidsutvrdering) Formulering Figur 4 4.
Key risk areas 31 Example of results which could only be assessed at the end of the action concerned ‘The Court assessed the effectiveness of a sample of 19 projects by comparing the intended objectives in the contribution agreement with the actual achievements. (...) 
Centrala riskomrden 31 Exempel p resultat som endast kan bedmas i slutet av den berrda tgrden ÓRevisionsrtten bedmde ndamlsenligheten i ett urval av 19 projekt och jmfrde de frvntade mlen i bidragsverenskommelsen med det faktiska resultatet. (...)
Due to insufficient information, the results could not be assessed in the following cases: (...) 
Resultaten kunde inte bedmas p grund av otillrcklig information i fljande fall: (...)
One major project was a trust fund for which the objectives stated in the contribution agreement concerned the fund as a whole and were therefore of a more general nature. 
Ett strre projekt var en frvaltningsfond fr vilken de ml som angavs i bidragsverenskommelsen gllde fonden som helhet och drfr var mer allmnt hllna.
Although more specific objectives were defined for the underlying projects, there can be no clear link be‐ tween the achievement of the project objectives and the general objectives in the contribution agreement. 
Trots att mer specifika ml hade faststllts fr de underliggande projekten kan det inte finnas ngon tydlig koppling mellan uppfyllelsen av projektmlen och de allmnna mlen i bidragsverenskommelsen.
Consequently the effectiveness can only be assessed when the fund itself will be closed, which was not yet the case at the time of the audit.’60 60 Special Report No 3/2011, paragraphs 25 and 27 (b). 
Drfr kan ndamlsenligheten bedmas frst nr sjlva fonden avslutas, vilket nnu inte var fallet nr granskningen genomfrdes.Ó60 60 Srskild rapport nr 3/2011, punkterna 25 och 27 b. 4.6.
Data consolidation and reporting 62 In order to demonstrate the results achieved by EU development poli‐ cies, data on results achieved by EU development and cooperation actions needs to be collected and consolidat‐ ed through information systems and presented and disseminated through appropriate reporting channels. 
Konsolidering av uppgifter och rapportering 62 Fr att visa de resultat som uppntts genom EU:s utvecklingspolitik mste uppgifter om de resultat som uppntts genom EU:s utvecklings-och samarbetstgrder samlas in och konsolideras genom informationssystem samt presenteras och spridas genom lmpliga rapporteringskanaler.
63 However, in previous audit reports, the Court found issues with the capacity of EuropeAid’s information systems to collect results‐related data (see Box 16). 
63 I tidigare revisionsrapporter fann revisionsrtten problem med kapaciteten hos det informationssystem som generaldirektoratet fr utveckling och samarbete Đ EuropeAid anvnder fr att samla in resultatrelaterade uppgifter (se ruta 16).
In 2014, the Commission also pointed out that, for the EU to be able to report results, data collection systems and tools would need to be further rationalised and developed61. 
Under 2014 ppekade kommissionen ocks att om EU ska kunna rapportera resultat mste system och verktyg rationaliseras och utvecklas vidare61.