natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Issues with Commission guidance on data collection 127 In order to support Member States and ensure consistency in the reporting of the result indicators, the Commission issued guidance setting out the minimum requirements that each monitoring system must adhere to in order to be able to perform the tasks required by the Regulations27. 
Problem med kommissionens vgledning om uppgiftsinsamling 127. Fr att stdja medlemsstaterna och se till att rapporteringen av resultatindikatorerna var enhetlig lmnade kommissionen vgledning med minimikrav som alla vervakningssystem mste uppfylla fr att utfra de uppgifter som anges i frordningarna27.
Observations 58 128 According to the Commission’s guidance, YEI/ESF result indicators should capture whether participants complete the YEI intervention, whether they subsequently receive an offer or actually change their situation, irrespective of whether they complete the intervention or not, and whether or not the offer received is linked to their participation in the YEI/ESF supported measure. 
128. Enligt kommissionens vgledning ska resultatindikatorerna fr ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet/ESF visa om deltagarna slutfr insatsen inom ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet, om de drefter fr ett erbjudande eller verkligen ndrar sin situation Đ oavsett om de slutfrde insatsen eller inte Đ och om det mottagna erbjudandet r kopplat till deras deltagande i insatsen som fick std frn ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet/ESF.
A person that does not complete a YEI/ESF co-financed intervention or operation can therefore be counted as a positive result in terms of offers received and take-up, which implies that the YEI/ESF indicators are no longer assessing the added value of a YEI action. 
En person som inte slutfr en insats eller tgrd som medfinansieras av ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet/ESF kan drfr rknas som ett positivt resultat nr det handlar om det mottagna och antagna erbjudandet, vilket innebr att indikatorerna inte lngre bedmer insatsens/tgrdens mervrde.
This approach entails the risk of overstating the results (see Box 9). 
Med detta synstt finns det risk fr att resultaten verskattas (se ruta 9).
YEI results overstated As an example, let us take the case of a NEET flagged to participate in a one-year training programme aiming to provide a qualification designed to help him/her join the labour market, andlet us suppose that, after six months, and without completing the training and obtaining a certificate, the person in question leaves the measure, for instance, to accept a two-month job offer in a completely different field. 
52 Ruta 9 Đ Ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativets resultat verskattade Som ett exempel kan vi ta en NEET som valdes ut att delta i ett ettrigt utbildningsprogram som skulle ge honom/henne en kompetens fr att komma in p arbetsmarknaden. Lt oss anta att personen lmnar tgrden efter sex mnader, utan att avsluta utbildningen och utan intyg, fr att till exempel anta ett erbjudande om ett arbete under tv mnader inom ett helt annat omrde.
The Commission guidance suggests that this person should be counted as not having completed the YEI intervention, but as having received an offer upon leaving the intervention and as having taken up an offer within four weeks of completing the YEI measure. 
Enligt kommissionens vgledning ska den hr personen rknas som att inte ha slutfrt sysselsttningsinsatsen men som att ha ftt ett erbjudande nr han/hon lmnar insatsen och som att ha antagit ett erbjudande inom fyra veckor efter att ha slutfrt insatsen.
129 On the basis of this interpretation, it is difficult to measure whether the YEI interventions were contributing to the sustainable integration of NEETs in the labour market. 
Med den hr tolkningen r det svrt att mta om insatser inom ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet bidrog till NEET:s varaktiga integration p arbetsmarknaden.
130 In addition, the Commission’s guidance explicitly mentions that result indicators should take into consideration all offers, regardless of their quality, in order to clearly identify the situation of a person four weeks and then six months after his/her participation in the co-financed measure. 
Kommissionens vgledning anger ocks uttryckligen att resultatindikatorerna ska ta hnsyn till alla erbjudanden, oavsett kvalitet, fr att en persons situation fyra veckor respektive sex mnader efter det att han/hon deltog i den medfinansierade tgrden ska framg tydligt.
However, it is not very precise as to when an offer counts towards the result indicators, due to a rather flexible interpretation of the ‘upon leaving’ condition. 
Vgledningen r dock inte srskilt exakt i frga om nr ett erbjudande ska rknas fr resultatindikatorerna eftersom villkoret "vid uttrdet" tolkas ganska flexibelt.
Offers received during YEI support are counted as a result, as are those which are not linked to the YEI-subsidised offer and those resulting from the participant’s own initiative. Box 9 
Erbjudanden som tas emot under tiden med std frn ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet rknas som ett resultat, liksom de som inte r kopplade till ett erbjudande som subventioneras av ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet eller som uppkommer tack vare deltagarens egna initiativ.
Observations 59 131 The Commission guidance also states that the result indicators should include ‘those who have gained a qualification as a result of the intervention’28. 
Kommissionens vgledning anger ocks att resultatindikatorerna ska ta med personer som har frvrvat en kompetens tack vare insatsen28.
However, this achievement is again automatically counted as a result in the reported indicators of the situation four weeks and six months later. 
prestationen rknas dock automatiskt som ett resultat i de indikatorer som visar situationen fyra veckor respektive sex mnader senare.
This situation was observed during the visit to Spain. 
Vi sg detta under besket i Spanien.
132 Another issue that raises questions in the Commission guidance concerns participants that receive an offer in a YEI operation but do not accept it. 
132. En annan problematisk frga i kommissionens vgledning handlar om deltagare som fr ett erbjudande inom en sysselsttningsinsats men inte antar det.
The guidance indicates that this offer should be counted as a positive result even if declined and not appropriate to the profile of the person. 
Enligt vgledningen ska erbjudandet rknas som ett positivt resultat ven om det inte accepteras och inte passar vederbrandes profil.
133 Similarly, there is the case where a YEI participant receives another offer (also subsidised by the YEI), either in the same or a different field. 
133. Samma sak gller nr en deltagare i en sysselsttningsinsats fr ett annat erbjudande (som ocks subventioneras av sysselsttningsinitiativet) inom samma eller ett annat omrde.
If the person accepts the second offer he/she is counted as not having completed the previous action and at the same time, he/she also counts as having received an offer due to the YEI. 
En person som accepterar det andra erbjudandet rknas som att inte ha slutfrt den fregende tgrden och samtidigt ocks som en person som har ftt ett erbjudande tack vare sysselsttningsinsatsen.
In reality, this person is being counted twice and the YEI resources are ‘com-peting’ for the same person in an inefficient way. 
Den hr personen rknas allts dubbelt, och ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativets medel "tvlar" om samma person p ett ineffektivt stt.
134 Based on the above, we conclude that the Commission’s interpretation in its guidance leads to situations where the data used for reporting the result indicators do not accurately reflect the impact of the YEI-co-financed measures and tend to overstate the results. 
Baserat p exemplen ovan drar vi slutsatsen att kommissionens tolkning i vgledningen leder till situationer dr de uppgifter som anvnds fr rapporteringen av resultatindikatorer inte korrekt terspeglar effekterna av de tgrder som medfinansieras av ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet och att resultaten tenderar att verskattas.
Observations 60 Member States only partially utilised the additional pre-financing for YEI/ESF OPs 135 In May 2015, the Commission proposed an increase in the initial pre-financing rate for the specific YEI/ESF allocation to 30 % (instead of the normal 1 %), with the aim of providing a quick response to youth unemployment29. 
Medlemsstaterna utnyttjade endast delvis det ytterligare frskottet till operativa program inom ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet/ESF 135. I maj 2015 freslog kommissionen att det inledande frskottet till det srskilda anslaget fr ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet/ESF skulle hjas till 30 % (i stllet fr som normalt 1 %) fr att ge ett snabbt svar p ungdomsarbetslsheten29.
The same regulation also requires that 50 % of the additional pre-financing amount, or 14.5 % of the total YEI funds allocated to the Member States, be substantiated through the submission of interim payment requests as of 23 May 2016. 
I samma frordning anges ocks att 50 % av det ytterligare frskottet, eller 14,5 % av det totala anslaget till sysselsttningsinitiativet fr unga som medlemsstaten har ftt, ska styrkas genom att medlemsstaten ansker om en mellanliggande betalning senast den 23 maj 2016.
Member States that do not fulfil this condition are required to reimburse the total additional initial pre-financing amount. 
Medlemsstater som inte uppfyller detta villkor ska terbetala hela det ytterligare inledande frskottet. 136.
136 Apart from Portugal, which managed to justify the total additional pre-financing received until 23 May 2016, the remaining Member States visited were only in a position to submit payment requests which correspond to a fraction of the additional pre-financing received, varying from the 58 % justified by France to 32 % in case of Spain (see Figure 13). 
Endast Portugal lyckades styrka hela det ytterligare inledande frskott som landet hade ftt fram till den 23 maj 2016, medan de terstende beskta medlemsstaterna bara kunde lmna in anskningar om mellanliggande betalningar som motsvarade en brkdel av de ytterligare frskott som lnderna hade ftt Đ den andel som lnderna kunde styrka varierade mellan 58 % i Frankrike och 32 % i Spanien (se figur 13).
Observations 61 137 In 2016, due to the justified amount being less than 50 %, the Commission requested from Spain a reimbursement of 273.6 million euro. 
137. Eftersom Spanien kunde styrka mindre n 50 % av frskottet begrde kommissionen 2016 att landet skulle terbetala 273,6 miljoner euro.
However, this did not entail a loss of EU funding for the Member State, since the total EU contribution allocated remained unchanged. 
Det innebar dock inte att medlemsstaten gick miste om EU-finansiering eftersom EU:s totala bidrag inte ndrades.
138 The fact that Member States were only able to partially utilise the increased level of pre-financing indicates that, when proposing the increased additional pre-financing, the Commission underestimated the time required to put in place appropriate structures to spend and claim expenditure. 
Det faktum att medlemsstaterna bara delvis kunde utnyttja det hgre frskottet tyder p att kommissionen, nr den freslog att det ytterligare frskottet skulle hjas, underskattade hur lng tid det skulle ta att infra lmpliga strukturer fr att betala ut medel och begra ersttning.
140 For the five Member States visited, we reviewed the annual implementation reports to assess the progress made since 2013. 
Vi granskade de rliga genomfranderapporterna frn de fem beskta medlemsstaterna fr att bedma vilka framsteg som hade gjorts sedan 2013.
Our analysis does not cover Croatia since the agreement on the YEI grant was only signed in November 2015, and implementation only started in the second half of 2015. 
Kroatien ingr inte i vr analys eftersom verenskommelsen om bidraget frn sysselsttningsinitiativet fr unga inte undertecknades frrn i november 2015 och genomfrandet inte inleddes frrn andra halvret 2015.
141 By the end of 2015, the extent to which Member States had achieved the YEI output targets differs: in France (Nord-Pas-de-Calais), the initial output targets, i.e. the number of participants, had already been exceeded (111 %), whereas, in Italy, only around 23 % of the initial target had been attained (see Figure 14.1). 
141. I slutet av 2015 hade medlemsstaterna uppntt ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativets outputml i varierande grad: i Frankrike (Nord-Pas-de-Calais) hade de ursprungliga outputmlen, det vill sga antalet deltagare, redan vertrffats (111 %) medan endast omkring 23 % av det ursprungliga mlet hade uppntts i Italien (se figur 14.1).
30 Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1304/2013. 
30 31 32 Artikel 19 i frordning (EU) nr 1304/2013.
31 Articles 50(1) and 50(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013. 
Artikel 50.1 och 50.2 i frordning (EU) nr 1303/2013.
32 The 2015 annual implementation report for Spain did not provide any updates of the figures already provided as part of the first AIR, which had been estimations. 
Spaniens rliga genomfranderapport fr 2015 innehll inga uppdaterade siffror i frhllande till de uppgifter som redan hade lmnats i den frsta rliga genomfranderapporten, som var uppskattningar.
This was due to the national authorities’ decision not to report figures for operations which had not yet been formally selected or were only partially implemented. 
Det berodde p att de nationella myndigheterna beslutade att inte rapportera siffror fr insatser som nnu inte formellt hade valts ut eller som bara delvis hade genomfrts. 55
Observations 62 142 Also, the share of participants that completed the YEI/ESF funded Youth Guarantee scheme varies among Member States: we note, in particular, that less than one third of the participants finished the intervention in the case of the national French YEI/ESF OP and the YEI/ESF axis of the Portuguese ESF OP. This raises concerns regarding the effectiveness of the Youth Guarantee measures funded by the YEI/ESF (see Figure 14.2). Achieved with YEI/ESF funds as of the end of 20151 14.1 - % of total YEI output target reached 120 % 100 % 80 % 60 % 40 % 20 % 0% ES 111 % FRnational FR-NPDC 38 % HR IT PT 2% 41 % N/A 23 % 14.2 - % of participants that completed the intervention 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 69% 43% 47% 32% 25% N/A 0% ES FR national FR-NPDC HR IT PT 1 Data for Spain refer only to 2014. 
Andelen deltagare som slutfrde ungdomsgarantisystemet som finansierades av ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet/ESF varierar ocks mellan medlemsstaterna: vi noterar i synnerhet att mindre n en tredjedel av deltagarna slutfrde insatsen inom Frankrikes nationella operativa program inom ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet/ESF och inom insatsomrdet fr ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet/EFS i Portugals operativa program inom ESF. Detta gr att ndamlsenligheten hos de ungdomsgarantitgrder som finansieras av ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet/ESF kan ifrgasttas (se figur 14.2) 56 120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 41% 111% FR-NPDC 38% 23% HR IT PT 14.1 Đ Procent av ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativets totala outputml som uppnddes 2% e.t. ES FR nationellt 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 43% 25% ES FR nationellt 69% e.t.
Source: 2015 Annual Implementation Report. Figure 14 
Klla: rlig genomfranderapport fr 2015. 143.
Observations 63 143 The information reported by Member States also shows that the inactive NEET group benefitted least. 
Den information som medlemsstaterna rapporterade visar ocks att gruppen inaktiva NEET gagnades minst.
For example, in Portugal, none of the participants were from the inactive group. 
I Portugal till exempel var ingen av deltagarna frn den inaktiva gruppen.
Moreover, just 1 % of the participants in the five Member States visited had a disability, 8 % were immigrants (95 % of whom were in France) and 22 % came from an unemployed household (Portugal accounted for 50 % of these). 
Dessutom hade ngot fler n 1 % av deltagarna i de fem beskta medlemsstaterna ett funktionshinder, 8 % var invandrare (varav 95 % fanns i Frankrike) och 22 % kom frn arbetslsa hushll (varav 50 % fanns i Portugal).
Limited use made of YEI/ESF funding by the end of 2015 144 The spending levels reported in the 2015 annual implementation reports show that only Portugal submitted a payment request equivalent to 47 % of the total YEI/ESF budget during the year. 
Begrnsad anvndning av anslagen frn ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet/ESF fram till slutet av 2015 144. De utbetalningsniver som rapporterades i de rliga genomfranderapporterna fr 2015 visar att endast Portugal lmnade in en utbetalningsanskan som motsvarade 47 % av den totala budgeten fr ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet/ESF fr det ret.
Apart from Spain, which did not declare any amount for committed expenditure, the remaining Member States committed between 24 % (Italy) and 85 % (France – Nord-Pas-de-Calais) of the overall budget (see Figure 15). 
Frutom Spanien, som inte redovisade ngra gjorda taganden, hade de terstende medlemsstaterna gjort taganden fr mellan 24 % (Italien) och 85 % (Frankrike Đ Nord-Pas-de-Calais) av den totala budgeten (se figur 15).
Percentage of expenditure committed at the end of 2015 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% 85 % 76 % 69 % 73 % 0% 24 % ES FRnational FR-NPDC HR IT PT Source: 2015 Annual Implementation Report. 
Mot denna bakgrund angav flera 57 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 85% 76% 69% 73% 24% 0% 0% ES FR nationellt FR-NPDC HR IT PT
In view of this, many of the Member States mentioned that they had not yet made the relevant administrative arrangements to certify the expenditure incurred (i.e. they had not yet designated the managing and certifying authorities). 
medlemsstater att de nnu inte hade vidtagit de administrativa arrangemang som krvs fr att intyga uppkomna utgifter (dvs. de hade nnu inte utsett frvaltningsmyndigheter och attesterande myndigheter).
A common problem in this regard was the setting up of an IT system capable of ensuring that the expenditure was traceable. 
Ett vanligt problem i anslutning till detta var infrandet av ett it-system som garanterade att utgifter kunde spras.
Implementation delays limited the value of the first evaluations of YEI/ESF support measures 146 Member States should carry out an evaluation to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of ESF/YEI support at least twice during the programme period. 
Frseningar i genomfrandet begrnsade vrdet av de frsta utvrderingarna av stdtgrder inom ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet/ESF 146. Medlemsstaterna ska minst tv gnger under programperioden gra en utvrdering fr att bedma hur verkningsfullt, effektivt och genomslagskraftigt stdet frn ESF/ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet har varit.
The first evaluation had to be completed by 31 December 201533 with a second by 31 December 2018. 
Den frsta utvrderingen skulle var klar senast den 31 december 201533 och den andra den 31 december 2018.
147 Our analysis showed that since the programmes were still in their early stages none of the evaluation reports submitted by Member States assessed the efficiency of the YEI funded measures, their cost-effectiveness or their impact. 
147. Vr analys visar att ingen av medlemsstaternas utvrderingsrapporter innehll information om hur effektiva, kostnadseffektiva och genomslagskraftiga de tgrder som finansierades av ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet hade varit eftersom programmen precis hade inletts.
Limitations in the monitoring systems and the lack of reliable data also impacted the quality of these evaluations. 
Begrnsningar i vervakningssystemen och bristen p tillfrlitliga uppgifter pverkade ocks utvrderingarnas kvalitet.
In particular, Spain, Croatia and Portugal reported having experienced difficulties in implementing the IT system used to manage the information database. 
Srskilt Spanien, Kroatien och Portugal rapporterade att de hade haft problem med att infra det it-system som anvnds fr att frvalta informationsdatasen.
148 Based on the above, we consider that, although the regulation provided for the first evaluations by 31 December 2015, delays in implementation limited their usefulness. 
148. Frordningen angav att de frsta utvrderingarna skulle gras senast den 31 december 2015 men vi anser utifrn exemplen ovan att frseningarna i genomfrandet begrnsade deras anvndbarhet.
Observations 65 Implementation difficulties confirmed by the directly sampled individual cases 149 We also examined the individual cases for a sample of 175 participants in Youth Guarantee measures that had been co-financed by YEI/ESF. 
Svrigheterna med genomfrandet bekrftades av enskilda fall i det direkta urvalet 149. Vi granskade ocks enskilda fall i ett urval bestende av 175 deltagare i ungdomsgarantitgrder som hade medfinansierats av ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet/ESF.
In each Member State 35 people were randomly selected, except for France, where 20 participants were selected from the national OP and another 15 from the Nord-Pas-de-Calais OP. 
utom Frankrike, dr 20 deltagare valdes ut frn det nationella operativa programmet och ytterligare 15 frn det operativa programmet fr Nord-Pas-de-Calais.
150 When entering the Youth Guarantee scheme, 78 % of all selected participants were unemployed, 14 % were inactive and 8 % did not fulfil the criteria for being considered NEETs (see Figure 16.1). 
150. Nr de utvalda deltagarna gick med i ungdomsgarantisystemet var 78 % av dem arbetslsa, 14 % var inaktiva och 8 % uppfyllde inte kriterierna fr NEET (se figur 16.1).
Additionally, 11 % of the participants had started the measure before the Youth Guarantee was launched or were outside the age bracket set out in the OP34, making them ineligible for co-financing. 
Vidare hade 11 % av deltagarna pbrjat tgrden innan ungdomsgarantin lanserades eller s ingick de inte i den ldersgrupp som det operativa programmet riktades till34, vilket gjorde att de inte berttigade till medfinansiering.
Characteristics of the YEI participants in the sample 34 The Spanish eligibility rules required prior registration in the YG database - Sistema nacional de Garantía Juvenil. 
59 34 Enligt Spaniens stdberttiganderegler mste personen frst registreras i ungdomsgarantins databas Đ Sistema nacional de Garanta Juvenil.
Furthermore, although Spain asked the Commission if it could increase the age for YEI OP beneficiaries on 3.12.2015, it was found that some participants were more than 25 years of age before that date. 
Trots att Spanien den 3 december 2015 frgade kommissionen om man fick hja ldergrnsen fr deltagare i ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativets operativa program fann vi att ngra deltagare var ldre n 25 r fre det datumet.
Observations 67 151 Of the participants 54 % were concentrated in the 22-25 age range (see Figure 16.2). 
151. 54 % av deltagarna var koncentrerade till ldersgruppen 22Đ25 r (se figur 16.2).
Furthermore, 80 % had secondary education or above, with more than 30 % having tertiary education (see Figure 16.3). 
Vidare hade 80 % minst gymnasieutbildning, varav ver 30 % hade hgskoleutbildning (se figur 16.3).
These numbers confirm that the people benefiting most from the YEI were the ones who were most qualified and better educated. 
Siffrorna bekrftar att de som gagnades mest av ungdomssysselsttningsinitiativet var de mest kvalificerade och bst utbildade. 152.
152 Of the 175 people covered by this review 25 had left the Youth Guarantee without receiving an offer of employment, a traineeship, education or an apprenticeship. 
Av de 175 personerna i urvalet hade 25 lmnat ungdomsgarantin utan att ha ftt ett erbjudande om anstllning, praktikplats, utbildning eller lrlingsutbildning.
The remaining 150 did receive one, with traineeships alone accounting for 45 % of the offers (see Figure 17). 
De terstende 150 personerna hade ftt ett erbjudande, och 45 % av erbjudandena var en praktikplats (se figur 17).