natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
27.7.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities I (Information) COURT OF AUDITORS SPECIAL REPORT No 3/2001 concerningtheCommissionŐsmanagementoftheinternationalfisheriesagreements,togetherwith the CommissionŐs replies C 210/1 (pursuant to Article 248(4), second subparagraph, EC) (2001/C 210/01) CONTENTS SUMMARY ............................................................................ 
27.7.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning I (Meddelanden) REVISIONSRTTEN SRSKILD RAPPORT nr 3/2001 om kommissionens frvaltning av de internationella fiskeavtalen samt kommissionens svar C 210/1 (i enlighet med artikel 248.4 andra stycket i EG-frdraget) (2001/C 210/01) INNEHLLSF RTECKNING SAMMANFATTNING .................................................................... DENALLMNNARAMEN.....................................................
Aninstrumentformonitoringtheagreements ................................... 
Faktorersominverkarpfiskeavtalen ..........................................
Underutilisationoftheagreements ............................................ 
Granskningensmlochomfattning ...........................................
Indispensableinformation ................................................... THEINTENDEDPURPOSEOFTHEAGREEMENTS .................................. 
Budgetaspekter............................................................ FISKEAVTALENSKOSTNADSEFFEKTIVITET ....................................... Ettinstrumentfruppfljningavavtalen .......................................
Stabilityoffishingopportunities .............................................. 
AVTALENSSYFTE ...........................................................
Supplytothemarketandaidtoemployment .................................... Restructuringstrategy ...................................................... 
Frsrjningenavmarknadenochsysselsttningsstd .............................. Omstruktureringsstrategi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Managementshortcomings .................................................. 
Brister i kontrollen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Controlshortcomings ...................................................... 
BILAGAIĐIII................................................................
20 Paragraph Page 27.7.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities SUMMARY Aim of the audit The Court examined the CommissionŐs management of the international fisheries agreements, particularly the extent to which their objectives had been clearly defined and ultimately achieved. 
27.7.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning SAMMANFATTNING Granskningens ml Revisionsrtten har granskat kommissionens frvaltning av de internationella fiskeavtalen, bl.a. fr att faststlla i vilken grad mlen har definierats p ett tydligt stt och slutligen uppntts.
The CourtŐs audit focused on the five most important agreements in terms of the cost borne by the Community budget (92 % in 1999). 
Granskningen har omfattat de fem avtal som tilldelats strre delen av gemenskapens budget (92 % 1999).
The CourtŐs main observations are set out below. 
Revisionsrttens viktigaste iakttagelser behandlas nedan.
Cost-benefit ratio I. The Commission still needs to set up a system enabling an ongoing monitoring and a detailed cost-benefit analysis to be made of the international fisheries agreements. 
Kostnadseffektivitet I. Kommissionen br infra ett system som mjliggr en kontinuerlig uppfljning och en djupgende analys av de internationella fiskeavtalens kostnadseffektivitet.
These measures should enable it to evaluate the extent to which the objectives of these agreements (market supply, fishing opportunities, restructuring, jobs) have been achieved. 
Dessa tgrder br gra det mjligt fr kommissionen att avgra i vilken grad avtalens ml har uppntts (frsrjningen av marknaden, fngstmjligheter, omstrukturering, sysselsttning).
Ń It is up to the Commission to define criteria and performance indicators for these agreements in order to measure their effectiveness. 
Ń Det r kommissionens uppgift att definiera kriterier och resultatindikatorer fr avtalen, s att effektiviteten kan mtas.
Intended purposes III. 
Syfte III.
The Court has found a lack of consistency and poor coordination between these international agreements and the structural aspect of the common fisheries policy. 
Revisionsrtten konstaterade att de internationella avtalen och den strukturella delen av den gemensamma fiskeripolitiken inte var konsekventa, samt att det fanns brister i samordningen av dem.
Management and control V. Managementofthefisheriesagreementsisunderminedbythefaultyorunsuitableapplicationofcertain clauses and by the fact that they do not stipulate any compulsory exchange of information. 
Frvaltning och kontroll V. Frvaltningen av fiskeavtalen frsmras av att vissa bestmmelser tillmpas bristflligt eller felaktigt, samt av det faktum att avtalen inte innehller ngra bestmmelser om obligatoriskt utbyte av information.
C 210/4 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 27.7.2001 Ń It would be expedient if the Commission were to make them more legally binding and to improve their monitoring, for example, by inserting control clauses or by making payments dependent on progress; it should review certain unwarranted practices of systematically unloading and reloading frozen fish. 
C 210/4 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 27.7.2001 Ń Kommissionen borde frstrka avtalens juridiskt bindande karaktr och frbttra uppfljningen av dem, till exempel genom att infoga bestmmelser om kontroll eller genom att gra utbetalningar i frhllande till vilka framsteg som gjorts.
VI. 
VI. sionens och medlemsstaternas kontroller.
Together with the Member States, it should also lay down guidelines on the detailed arrangements for their inspections. 
Tillsammans med medlemsstaterna borde kommissionen ocks faststlla riktlinjer fr hur kontrollerna skall utfras i detalj.
Fishery products are an important food resource for the Member States of the EU. 
Fiskeprodukter r en viktig livsmedelsresurs fr Europeiska unionens medlemsstater.
A common fisheries policy has been set up for conserving fish stocks, managing and adapting the development of the Member StatesŐ industrial structures, ensuring the common organisation of the market and concluding fisheries agreements with non-Community countries. 
En gemensam fiskeripolitik inrttades fr att bevara fiskbestndet, frvalta och anpassa utvecklingen av medlemsstaternas fiskeindustristrukturer, upprtta en gemensam organisation av marknaden och sluta fiskeavtal med icke-medlemsstater.
The principle of free access to the high seas gradually disappeared from the mid-1970s onwards and in the wake of the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. 
Principen om fri tillgng till det ppna havet har stegvis frsvunnit frn och med mitten av sjuttiotalet, och till fljd av Frenta nationernas tredje konferens om rtten till havet.
Around that time,moreandmorethirdcountriesdecidedtoextendtheir exclusive economic zone from 12 to 200 nautical miles and thus about 90 % of fish resources came under the control of coastal countries. 
Allt fler lnder utanfr Europeiska unionen har beslutat att utvidga sina egna ekonomiska zoner frn 12 till 200 sjmil och drmed har ungefr 90 % av det ppna havet kommit att kontrolleras av lnder vid kusten.
As a consequence, the fleets of the European Union Member States, which had previously fished these waters, no longer had access to them (representing 9 % (1) of Community consumption). 
Fljaktligen har EU-staternas flottor, som tidigare fiskadeidessavatten,intelngretillgngtilldem(dettafiskestod fr 9 % (1) av gemenskapens konsumtion).
As a result of this state of affairs, plus the need for sound management of fish stocks in short supply, the Community negotiated fisheries agreements with third countries, thus enabling the Member StatesŐ fleets to continue their previous activities. 
Denna situation och behovet av en sund frvaltning av de knappa fiskresurserna har lett till att gemenskapen slutit fiskeavtal med tredje land och drmed gjort det mjligt fr medlemsstaternas flottor att fortstta sin tidigare verksamhet.
By 1 January 2001, the Commission had signed fisheries agreements with 33 countries, 14 of which were still in force. 
Den frsta januari 2001 hade kommissionen undertecknat fiskeavtal med trettiotre lnder. Av dessa avtal var fjorton fortfarande i kraft.
Nature of the fisheries agreements 4. 
Fiskeavtalens utformning 4.
Theseagreementsdefinethelevel,thetermsofallocationand theuseoftherightsofaccesstofishresourcesintheexclusive (1) The CommissionŐs evaluation, carried out by Ifremer/CEP (Institut franais de recherche pour lŐexploitation de la mer/Centre dŐetudes de projets), p. 
Avtalen definierar nivn p, villkoren fr tilldelningen och anvndningen av nyttjandertten till fiskbestndet i de ekono-(1) Utvrdering ÓIfremer/CEPÓ (Franska forskningsinstitutet fr havsbruk/ Centrum fr projektstudier Đ Institut Franais de Recherche pour lŐExploitation de la Mer/Centre dŐtudes de Projets) p begran av kommissionen, s.
63, September 1999. economic zones of the third countries. 
63, september 1999. miska zonerna som tillhr tredje land.
The first-generation agreements are chiefly : (a) reciprocal agreements, involving an exchange of fishing possibilities between the fleets of the Member States and those of third countries; in general, the latter (for example Iceland, Norway, the Faeroe Islands) fully exploit their resources. 
Frsta generationens avtal utmrker sig bl.a. genom fljande: a) msesidiga avtal, vilket innebr ett utbyte av fiskerttigheter mellan medlemsstaternas och tredje lands flottor, som i allmnhet fullstndigt utnyttjar sina resurser (t.ex. Island, Norge, Frarna).
These agreementsdonotrequireanyfinancialcontributiononthe part of the Community nor any fee (licence fee) to be paid by the shipowners. (b) agreements involving financial compensation, signed with third countrieswhichwanttoconcedepartoftheuseoftheir resources, without any reciprocity of access rights, in return for financial compensation borne by the Community budget and (licence) fees paid by the shipowners holding these access rights. (c) Thisfinancialcompensationtakestheformofcontributions: (i) to the State budget of the third country; (ii) to measures in support of development cooperation; (iii) to the public services of the fisheries sector (training programmes for fishermen and inspectors, scientific research programmes concerning fish stocks, administration, etc.). 
Dessa avtal innehller varken ngra bestmmelser om ekonomisk ersttning frn gemenskapen eller om ersttning (licensavgifter) frn de fartygsgare som utnyttjar rttigheterna. b) Avtal med avgifter, som undertecknats med tredje land som avstr frn att utnyttja en del av sina resurser, inte i utbyte mot msesidiga nyttjandertter utan mot ekonomisk ersttning frn gemenskapens budget och ersttning (licensavgifter) frn defartygsgare,somutnyttjarrttigheterna. Den ekonomiska ersttningen gr till i) statsbudgeten i tredje land, ii) verksamhet som ingr i utvecklingssamarbetet, iii) offentliga myndigheter inom fiskerisektorn (utbildningsprogram fr fiskare och inspektrer, vetenskapliga forskningsprogram som rr fiskreserverna, administration etc.).
The cost of some of the development measures provided for in these agreements, such as the presence of observers on board or the recruitment of local crews, is borne directly by the shipowners. 
Fartygsgarna r direkt ansvariga fr vissa av de utvecklingstgrder som omfattas av avtalen, som t.ex. observatrers nrvaro ombord eller rekrytering av lokala besttningar.
The agreements with the African and Indian Oceancountriescomeunderthiscategory;or agreements involving financial compensation and access to the Community market of fishery products coming from third countries (without any customs duties or quantitative restrictions), 
Avtalen med lnder i Afrika och Indiska Oceanen tillhr denna kategori. c) Avtal med ekonomisk ersttning och rtt att avstta fiskeprodukter frn tredje land p gemenskapsmarknaden (utan tullar eller kvantitativa begrnsningar).
27.7.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 210/5 enabling the Community, in return, to exploit certain fishing resources in the waters of those countries (for example Green-land), without the shipowners having to pay any fee. 
I gengld fr gemenskapen rtt att i 27.7.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 210/5 tredje land nyttja vissa fiskbestnd utan att fartygsgarna blir 5.
The second-generation agreements aim at the setting-up by private operators of joint ventures, which are responsible for the management of European vessels and which are allocated fishing quotas in the waters of third countries (the agreements may provide for financial compensation for the fishing quotas). 
Andra generationens avtal syftar till att stimulera privata aktrer att bilda samfretag (joint ventures) som skall ansvara fr frvaltningen av europeiska fartyg. Fretagen tilldelas fiskekvoter i tredje lands fiskevatten (avtalen kan innehlla bestmmelser om ekono-Fiskeavtalens viktigaste aktrer misk ersttning fr fiskekvoterna).
Furthermore, their objective is for vessels making up the fleets of Member States to be definitively or temporarily transferred to the fleets of third countries(forexampleArgentina,Estonia,Latvia,Lithuania). 
Mlsttningen r dessutom att varaktigt eller tillflligt frflytta vissa enheter av medlemsstaternas flottor till tredje land (t.ex. Argentina, Estland, Lettland och Litauen). 6.
From the outset, the purpose of the fisheries agreements has been to safeguard the continued activity of the Member StatesŐ fishing fleets, in return for financial contributions or fishing opportunities, thus confirming that these agreements are commercial in nature. The main parties involved in the fisheries agreements 6. The main responsibilities of the parties involved in the fisher-iesagreementsareasfollows: Main responsibilities Budgetary authority; gives the Commission a mandate to negotiate an agreement, including the level of fishing opportunities; adopts the agreement by means of a regulation and signs it Budgetary authority; consulted for an opinion Negotiates the agreements; takes care of the administrative, financial and technical management On a case-by-case basis, deconcentrated management by a fisheries unit in accordance with the provisions of the agreement Responsible for applying the control measures and other provisions of the fisheries agreements Negotiate the agreements; control and supervision in their ports and exclusive economic zones For the Őagreements involving financial compensationŐ mentioned in paragraph 4(b), payment of licence fees to the third country in return for access rights; compliance with any specific conditions (for example crews to consist of nationals of the third country) Council Parliament Commission: Brussels Commission: Delegations Member States Third countries Shipowners Objective and scope of the audit 7. 
De viktigaste ansvarsomrdena fr de aktrer som deltar i arbetet med fiskeavtalen r fljande: Viktigaste ansvarsomrden Budgetmyndighet, ger kommissionen frhandlingsmandat fr ett avtal, inklusive nivn fr fiskerttigheterna, antar avtalet genom en frordning och undertecknar Budgetmyndighet, lmnar ett yttrande Frhandlar fram avtalet, skter den administrativa, ekonomiska och tekniska frvaltningen En fiskerienhet skter frvaltningen decentraliserat frn fall till fall, enligt avtalets bestmmelser Ansvarar fr att kontrolltgrderna och andra bestmmelser i fiskeavtalen tillmpas Frhandlar fram avtalen: kontrollerar och vervakar sina hamnar och exklusiva ekonomiska zoner Betalar licensavgifter till tredje land i utbyte mot fiskerttigheter vad gller aÓvtal med ekonomisk ersttningÓ som nmns i punkt 4 b ovan; fljer eventuella srskilda avtalsvillkor (t.ex. att en viss andel av besttningen skall komma frn det berrda tredje landet) Rdet Parlamentet Kommissionen i Bryssel Kommissionens delegationer Medlemsstaterna Tredje land Fartygsgare Granskningens ml och omfattning 7.
The objective of the audit was to examine whether the Commission had clearly defined the objectives of the international fisheries agreements and whether it had set up adequate performance monitoring systems to measure their achievement. 
Granskningens ml var att kontrollera i vilken utstrckning kommissionen p ett tydligt stt hade definierat mlen fr de internationella fiskeavtalen, samt vilka lmpliga system kommissionen inrttat fr att vervaka avtalens effektivitet.
The audit examined the management, during the period 1993 to 1999, of the agreements made with Morocco, Mauritania, Greenland, Senegal and Argentina, which together accounted for 92%ofthepaymentschargedtothefinancialyear1999.These are agreements involving financing by the Community budget. 
Granskningen omfattade frvaltningen under perioden 1993Đ1999 av avtalen med Marocko, Mauretanien, Grnland, Senegal och Argentina, som tillsammans erhllit 92 % av utbetalningarna fr fiske under budgetret 1999.
Through documentary analysis of the management systems, the key activities were identified and then underwent audit tests. 
En analys av dokumentationen om frvaltningssystemen gjorde det mjligt att identifiera de viktigaste verksamheterna, som sedan utsattes fr granskningstgrder.
Audit visits were conducted at the Commission, in the Member States (Spain, France and Portugal) and in the CommissionŐs delegations in Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal. 
Revisionsbesk har gjorts vid kommissionen, i medlemsstaterna (Spanien, Frankrike och Portugal) och vid kommissionens delegationer i Marocko, Mauretanien och Senegal.
Audit evidence was obtained by checks on documents and registers, the observation of port activities, requests for and confirmation of information, supplemented by interviews with representatives of third countries and selected organisations. 
Verifierande underlag har erhllits genom kontroller av dokument och register, vervakning av hamn-verksamhet, begran om och styrkande av information som kompletterats genom samtal med representanter fr tredje land och utvalda organ.
10.InitsAnnualReportconcerningfinancialyear1999,the Court stated that, for budget headings relating to international fisheries agreements, the Commission had entered into legal obligations which exceeded available appropriations by 129 million euro and that, as a consequence, the commitments for the finan-cialyearhadbeenunderstated(1).Thisquestionhasthereforenot beendealtwithinthisReport. 
10. Revisionsrtten ppekade redan i sin rsrapport fr budgetret 1999 att kommissionen gjort rttsliga taganden inom ramen fr de internationella fiskeavtalen till ett belopp som verskred tillgngliga anslag med 129 miljoner euro, och att tagandena fr nmnda budgetr fljaktligen hade underskattats (1).
Budgetaryaspects 11. 
Budgetaspekter 11.
Annex I shows the budgetary expenditure for the interna-tionalfisheriesagreementsfortheperiod1993to2000,andits relationship with the total expenditure borne by the common fisheries policy. 
I bilaga I redogrs fr budgetutgifterna fr de internationella fiskeavtalen frn 1993 till 2000, samt deras relation till de totala utgifterna fr gemenskapens fiskeripolitik.
Between 1993 and 1997 there was an upward trend in the amounts paid to the partner countries in return for fishing rights, but since 1998 the level of these amounts has stabilised (see the Graph). 
Mellan 1993 och 1997 kan man konstatera en tendens till kning av de belopp som betalades ut till avtalsparterna i utbyte mot fiskerttigheter. Sedan 1998 har beloppen stabiliserats (se diagram).
(1) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999 (OJ C 342, 1.12.2000, p. 
(1) Revisionsrttens rsrapport fr budgetret 1999 (EGT C 342, 1.12.2000, s.
C 210/6 EN Official Journal of the European Communities Graph InternationalfisheriesagreementsŃCommitmentsandpayments(implementation),valueofcatches 27.7.2001 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 Commitments Payments Value of catches 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Year NB: Figures for catches not available at the Commission for 1998 and 1999. 
C 210/6 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 27.7.2001 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 Diagram Internationella fiskeavtal Đ taganden och betalningar (genomfrande), fngsternas vrde taganden Betalningar Fngsternas vrde 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 r Anm.: Uppgifter om fngsterna fr 1998 och 1999 finns inte tillgngliga vid kommissionen.
See Annex II: Morocco, providing 74 % of thecatchesundertheÔSouthernŐAgreements(1)fortheperiod 1993 to 1997, was the most important partner, whereas Spain, with more than 87 % of the catches, was the prime beneficiary of these agreements (2). 
Av bilaga II framgr att Marocko, med 74 % av uttaget under de Ósydliga avtalenÓ (1), mellan 1993 och 1997 var den strsta avtalspartnern, medan Spanien med ver 87 % av uttaget var den som drog strst nytta av avtalen ifrga (2).
THE COST-BENEFIT RATIO OF THE FISHERIES AGREEMENTS An instrument for monitoring the agreements 13. 
FISKEAVTALENS KOSTNADSEFFEKTIVITET Ett instrument fr uppfljning av avtalen 13.
In its Annual Report for financial year 1992 (3), the Court stressed the importance of cost-benefit analyses, as part of the (1) International Fisheries Agreements signed with certain countries situ-2 ated to the south of the Strait of Gibraltar. () Spain is also the second largest market in Europe in terms of both the 3 supply available and the per capita consumption. () Annual Report concerning the financial year 1992, Chapter 5 (OJ C 309, 16.11.1993). monitoring of these agreements by the Commission. These analy-sesrequirethedefinitionofcriteriaandindicatorsmakingitpos- sible to evaluate the extent to which the agreementsŐ objectives havebeenachieved.IntheFisheriesCouncilŐsconclusionsof 30 October 1997, the Commission was requested to draw up cost-benefit analyses for each agreement (or renegotiation of an agreement) well before they were signed. 
I (1) Internationella fiskeavtal som undertecknats med vissa lnder sder 2 om Gibraltarsundet. () Den spanska marknaden ligger ven p andra plats i Europa bde vad 3 gller tillgngligt utbud och konsumtion per capita. () Revisionsrttens rsrapport fr budgetret 1992 (kapitel 5, EGT C 309, 16.11.1993). rdets (fiske) slutsatser av den 30 oktober 1997 uppmanades kommissionen att analysera sambandet mellan kostnader och effektivitet i varje avtal (eller omfrhandlat avtal) i god tid innan dessa undertecknades. Kommissionen har hrsammat rdets begran framfr allt p tv stt, dels har den gjort en extern utvrdering och dels har den tagit fram tekniska specifikationsmallar fr varje avtal.
Theevaluationoftheinternationalfisheriesagreementsfor the period 1993 to 1997, for which the Commission used the services of an external consultant (4), consists of an examination of variousaspectsoftheagreements,butdoesnotconstituteafull cost-benefit analysis. 
Utvrderingen av de internationella fiskeavtalen fr perioden 1993Đ1997, som kommissionen lt en extern konsult gra (4), bestod av en granskning av avtalens olika aspekter, vilket inte r det samma som en fullstndig analys av kostnadseffektiviteten.
This evaluation contains reservations concerning the quality, completeness, relevance and reliability of the information available. 
I denna utvrdering grs reservationer fr den tillgngliga informationens kvalitet, fullstndighet, vikt och tillfrlitlighet.
These reservations undermine the conclusions of the evaluation and indicate that the Commission needs to improve its collection of data from the Member States. 
Reservationerna gr slutsatserna mindre betydelsefulla och visar att det r ndvndigt att frbttra kommissionens insamling av uppgifter frn medlemsstaterna.
Mio EUR 
Miljoner euro
27.7.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 210/7 15. 
27.7.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 210/7 15.