natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In early 2005 the Directorate-General for Enlargement (DG ELARG) took over the responsibility for the full project cycle from policy formulation and programming to the implementation. 
I brjan av 2005 tog generaldirektoratet fr utvidgning (GD Utvidgning) ver ansvaret fr hela projektcykeln frn policyutformning och programplanering till genomfrande.
AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH 8. 
REVISIONENS OMFATTNING OCH INRIKTNING SAMT REVISIONSMETOD 8.
The purpose of the European Court of Auditors audit was to assess on the effectiveness of the CommissionŐs management of the CARDS programme. 
Syftet med Europeiska revisionsrttens revision var att bedma ndamlsenligheten i kommissionens frvaltning av Cardsprogrammet.
The main objectives of the audit were to conclude on the extent to which: (a) the strategic guidance directing the programme was appropriate and coherent; (b) the management approaches established and used by the Commission were appropriate and efficient; (4) By way of comparison the Tacis Regulation covering the same period as CARDS foresees an amount of less than 2 euro per capita per annum. 
Det frmsta mlet med revisionen var att komma till en slutsats om i vilken utstrckning a) den strategiska vgledning som programmet styrdes av var lmplig och konsekvent, b) de frvaltningsstt som kommissionen har infrt och anvnt var lmpliga och effektiva, (4) Som jmfrelse faststlls i Tacisfrordningen fr samma period som Cards ett belopp p mindre n 2 euro per capita per r.
In the European Commission the management of the 
Vid Europeiska kommissionen delades ansvaret fr frvalt-
C 285/6 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.11.2007 (c) (d) the projects financed by the programme encouraged recipient country ownership; monitoring and evaluation were effective in identifying weaknesses and disseminating their findings, and the subsequent action taken by the Commission was timely. 
C 285/6 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 27.11.2007 c) d) de projekt som finansierades av programmet frmjade mottagarlndernas egenansvar, vervakningen och utvrderingen var ndamlsenliga nr det gllde att identifiera brister och sprida resultat, och om kommissionens uppfljning gjordes i tid.
The Court assessed the extent to which the CARDS programme was governed by adequate strategic guidance and directed towards the specific need of the countries involved while being coherent with the regulatory-defined objectives of the programme and the SAp in its wider sense. 
Revisionsrtten bedmde i vilken utstrckning Cardsprogrammet styrdes av lmplig strategisk vgledning och inriktades p de berrda lndernas srskilda behov samtidigt som det stmde verens med de ml som faststlls i frordningen fr programmet och stabiliserings-och associeringsprocessen i en vidare bemrkelse.
In accordance with the CARDS regulation the Commission defined a strategy framework for the western Balkan countries, with country strategy papers (CSPs) for each individual country, and a regional strategy paper, drafted taking into account all the recipient countries. 
I enlighet med Cardsfrordningen faststllde kommissionen en strategisk ram fr lnderna p vstra Balkan med landstrategidokument fr varje enskilt land, och ett regionalt strategidokument som utarbetats med beaktande av samtliga mottagarlnder.
As required by the regulatory framework the Commission has produced two multi-annual indicative programmes (MIPs), one for each country and one for the regional inter-state programme for the periods 2002 to 2004 and 2005 to 2006. 
I enlighet med kraven i den rttsliga ramen har kommissionen tagit fram tv flerriga vgledande program, ett fr varje land och ett fr det regionala mellanstatliga programmet fr perioderna 2002Đ2004 och 2005Đ2006.
14. In 2004 Ń at the end of the first MIP period Ń European partnership documents were approved by the European Council covering Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo (3), with the aim of intensifying the stabilisation and association process (4). 
14. r 2004 Đ vid utgngen av den frsta perioden av de flerriga vgledande programmen Đ godknde Europeiska rdet dokumenten om europeiskt partnerskap fr Albanien, Bosnien och Hercegovina, f.d. jugoslaviska republiken Makedonien och Serbien och Montenegro inbegripet Kosovo (3) i syfte att intensifiera stabiliserings-och associeringsprocessen (4).
The partnerships were drawn up for each country in the region and identified areas for action and obligations to be fulfilled by the partner countries in order to move them closer to the European Union. 
Partnerskap upprttades fr varje land i regionen och i dessa dokument faststlldes utvalda insatsomrden och skyldigheter som partnerlnderna skulle uppfylla fr att nrma sig Europeiska unionen.
EU assistance was to be directed towards the priorities set out in the partnerships. 
EU-stdet skulle riktas direkt till de prioriteringar som faststllts i partnerskapsavtalen.
The audit revealed weaknesses in the strategic guidance of CARDS programming mechanisms. 
Vid revisionen konstaterades brister i den strategiska vgledningen fr Cards programplaneringsmekanismer.
Strategies as described in Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), although formally compliant with the Commission CSP guidelines, were too broadly formulated to be useful for the programming exercise. 
De strategier som beskrevs i landstrategidokumenten var, trots att de formellt stmde verens med kommissionens riktlinjer fr landstrategidokumenten, alltfr allmnt hllna fr att vara anvndbara fr programplaneringen.
The MIPs did not prioritise between and within sectors as required by Commission guidelines (5) nor indicated timing for the foreseen actions. 
I de flerriga vgledande programmen faststlldes inte vilka sektorer eller vilka delar av sektorerna som skulle prioriteras, vilket krvdes enligt kommissionens riktlinjer (5) och det angavs inte heller ngon tidsram fr de planerade insatserna.
The first European partnership in 2004 offered an opportunity for the Commission to focus its actions more precisely in the MIP covering 2005 to 2006 (6). 
Det frsta europeiska partnerskapet 2004 var ett tillflle fr kommissionen att tydligare skrpa fokus fr sina insatser inom de flerriga vgledande programmen fr 2005Đ2006 (6).
Even though the MIPs for 2005 to 2006 contained references to the European Partnership priorities, they still gave insufficient guidance for the selection of actions to be financed. 
I de flerriga vgledande programmen fr 2005Đ2006 fanns det visserligen hnvisningar till prioriteringarna inom det europeiska partnerskapet, men de gav nd otillrcklig vgledning i frga om vilka insatser som skulle vljas ut till finansiering.
(3) On the basis of Council Regulation (EC) No 533/2004(OJ L 86, 24.3.2004, p. 
(3) P grundval av rdets frordning (EG) nr 533/2004 (EUT L 86, 24.3.2004, s.
(4) The European Partnership for Croatia was approved by Council Decision 2004/648/EC (OJ L 297, 22.9.2004, p. 
(4) Det europeiska partnerskapet fr Kroatien godkndes genom rdets beslut 2004/648/EG (EUT L 297, 22.9.2004, s.
(5) Reference made to point 3.1.4 of the guidelines for implementation of the common framework for country strategy papers. 
(5) Hnvisning till punkt 3.1.4 i riktlinjerna fr genomfrande av den gemensamma ramen fr landstrategidokument.
(6) Since becoming a candidate country in 2004, Croatia has benefited from the pre-accession instruments. 
(6) Eftersom Kroatien blev kandidatland 2004 har landet ftt tillgng till franslutningsstd.
9. documents, guidelines and reports. 
9. ringsdokument, riktlinjer och rapporter.
In addition a judgemental sample of CARDS projects (Annex) over the period 2002 to 2005 was examined. 
Drutver granskades ett subjektivt urval av Cardsprojekt (bilaga) fr perioden 2002Đ2005.
The audit also examined the relevant evaluation reports, prepared on behalf of the Commission Ń including the mid-term evaluation of the CARDS programme (1), which was completed in June 2004 Ń as well as the follow-up actions taken by the Commission. 
Vid revisionen granskades ocks de relevanta utvrderingsrapporter som utarbetats fr kommissionens rkning Đ inklusive halvtidsutvrderingen av Cardsprogrammet (1) som avslutades i juni 2004 Đ liksom den uppfljning som kommissionen gjort.
The Court concluded that they provided a sufficient basis to use the results as corroborative evidence for its own audit findings (2). 
Revisionsrtten drog slutsatsen att de gav tillrcklig grund fr att resultaten skulle kunna anvndas som bekrftande underlag fr revisionsrttens egna granskningsresultat (2).
OBSERVATIONS Weaknesses in strategic guidance in the programming process CSPs too broadly formulated, MIPs without clear priorities, lack of effective guidance of aid 11. 
IAKTTAGELSER Brister i den strategiska vgledningen under programplaneringsprocessen Alltfr allmnt hllna landstrategidokument, flerriga vgledande program utan tydliga prioriteringar, avsaknad av ndamlsenlig vgledning fr stdet 11.
The CARDS regulation provides the legal basis for the main strategy papers used for CARDS assistance: ÔThe Community assistance should be governed by a strategy framework and by annual and multi-annual programming, which will be put to the management committee set up by this regulation for an opinionŐ. (1) Article 13 of the CARDS Regulation established that Ônot later than 30 June 2004, the Commission shall submit to the Council an evaluation report, together with proposals for the future of this Regulation and for any amendments to be made to it.Ő (2) The main conclusions of the evaluation of the assistance to Balkan countries under CARDS Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000 (contract No B7-6510/2002/005) were: (a) the CARDS programme was highly relevant for ensuring financial and technical support to the Stabilisation and Association process; (b) the centralised nature and approach might become an obstacle to the programme ownership and effectiveness; (c) balancing support for institution building and development investment was a key challenge; (d) the regional dimension of the programme was weak. 
Den frvaltningskommitt som inrttas genom denna frordning kommer att yttra sig om strategidokumentet och programplaneringen.Ó (1) I artikel 13 i Cardsfrordningen faststlls det att Ósenast den 30 juni 2004 skall kommissionen verlmna en utvrderingsrapport till rdet, tillsammans med frslag om denna frordnings framtid och, vid behov, med de ndringar som skall fretas i densammaÓ. (2) DefrmstaslutsatsernaavutvrderingenavstdettilllndernapBal-kan enligt Cardsfrordningen (EG) nr 2666/2000 (kontrakt nr B7Đ6510/2002/005) var: a) Cardsprogrammet var mycket relevant nr det gller att skerstlla ekonomiskt och tekniskt std till stabiliserings-och associeringsprocessen. b) Programmets centraliserade art och arbetsstt kan vara ett hinder fr egenansvaret och ndamlsenligheten. c) Att f en jmvikt mellan std till institutionsuppbyggnad och utvecklingsinvesteringar var den frmsta utmaningen. d) Programmets regionala dimension var bristfllig.
27.11.2007 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 285/7 17. 
27.11.2007 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 285/7 17.
As provided in the CARDS Regulation the CARDS Management Committee (1) was required to give its opinion on the CARDS programming guidelines, the Multi-annual Indicative Programmes and the Annual Programmes, with the intention of enhancing strategic guidance in the programming process. 
I enlighet med Cardsfrordningen skulle Cards frvaltningskommitt (1) yttra sig om Cards riktlinjer fr programplanering, de flerriga vgledande programmen och de rliga programmen fr att frbttra den strategiska vgledningen i programplaneringsprocessen.
In reality no evidence was found that the CommitteeŐs work contributed to improving the quality of the proposed documents. 
I verkligheten tydde dock ingenting p att kommittns arbete hade bidragit till att frbttra kvaliteten p de freslagna dokumenten.
Detailed sectoral analyses by the Commission and/or recipient country national strategies mostly did not exist or were produced too late to enhance the strategic guidance. 
Fr det mesta hade inga detaljerade sektorspecifika analyser gjorts av kommissionen och/eller nationella strategier fr mottagarlandet eller s hade de gjorts fr sent fr att kunna frbttra den strategiska vgledningen.
As a result, projects were not selected on the basis of objective criteria and, in certain cases, they were selected in response to the beneficiariesŐ ad hoc request. 
Drfr valdes inte projekten ut p grundval av objektiva kriterier, och i vissa fall valdes de ut som ett svar p en enskild begran frn mottagarlnderna.
Although the identification process was complex, it did not involve a clear methodology for optimising project selection. 
Identifieringsprocessen var visserligen komplex, men inbegrep ingen tydlig metod fr att optimera projekturvalet.
For instance, there was no cost-benefit analysis (2) or other comparative analysis of possible alternative projects before selecting the projects. 
Till exempel gjordes ingen lnsamhetsanalys (2) eller ngon annan jmfrbar analys av mjliga alternativa projekt innan projekten valdes ut.
Some projects were simply continuations of earlier support. 
Vissa projekt var endast fortsttningar p tidigare std.
There were no guidelines to help decide which intervention would best support the stabilisation and association process. 
Det fanns inga riktlinjer som std fr beslut om vilken intervention som bst skulle stdja stabiliserings-och associeringsprocessen.
Weaknesses in strategic guidance lead to implementation problems 20. 
Brister i den strategiska vgledningen ledde till problem med genomfrandet 20.
The audit identified differences between the planned and implemented projects. 
Vid revisionen konstaterades skillnader mellan de planerade och de genomfrda projekten.
There were essential projects not implemented due to the resistance of the recipient country or projects for which the initial plans were disregarded (Box 1). 
P grund av motstnd i mottagarlandet hade ngra mycket viktiga projekt inte genomfrts och inom ngra projekt avvek man frn de ursprungliga planerna (ruta 1).
Box 1 Examples of non-implemented projects Case 1: No political support to the Serbian Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) As early as 2001 the EAR had identified the necessary building blocks for significant government institutional reform in Serbia, including support to the treasury, the internal audit function as well as a project concerning the creation of a Supreme Audit Institution. 
Ruta 1 Exempel p projekt som inte genomfrts Fall 1: Inget politiskt std till det serbiska hgre revisionsorganet S tidigt som 2001 identifierade Europeiska byrn fr teruppbyggnad de ndvndiga byggstenarna fr en genomgripande reform av statliga institutioner i Serbien, bland annat std till finansministeriet, internrevisionsfunktionen samt ett projekt som gllde inrttandet av ett hgre revisionsorgan.
However, the necessary backing of the Serbian Parliament did not materialise for the SAI and the project was not taken forward until the 2006 programme. 
Detta revisionsorgan fick dock inte den uppbackning som krvdes frn det serbiska parlamentet och projektet frdes inte vidare frrn i programmet 2006.
(1) The CARDS Management Committee is composed of the representations of the Member States and chaired by the Commission. 
(1) Cards frvaltningskommitt bestr av medlemsstaternas representationer och kommissionen r ordfrande.
(2) Cost-benefit analysis allows a measure of the economic efficiency of the programme or project, as well as providing a basis for comparison with alternatives. 
(2) Med en lnsamhetsanalys kan man mta programmets eller projektets ekonomiska effektivitet, och den kan tjna som grund fr jmfrelser med andra alternativ.
Case 2: The European Commission Police Assistance mission in Albania The project fiche of the Justice and Home Affairs sector in Albania for the programming year 2002 envisaged for the Police and Public Order component Ôto contribute to the establishment of rule of law and to the establishment of a functioning police force able to contribute to democratic stabilityŐ. 
Fall 2: Europeiska kommissionens uppdrag fr std till polisvsendet i Albanien I projektunderlaget fr sektorn rttsliga och inrikes frgor i Albanien fr programret 2002 stod det att polis-och rttsordningskompo-nenten skulle bidra till upprttandet av rttsskerhet och en fungerande poliskr som kan medverka till demokratisk stabilitet.
It established the following: ÔThe project will be executed through supporting the EC Police Assistance Mission (ECPA), training and related investment supportŐ. 
Det faststlldes att projektet skulle genomfras genom std till EG:s uppdrag fr polisstd, samt fortbildning och tillhrande investeringsstd.
Out of the 8 million euro allocated to the Police and Public order component, 4 million euro were planned for institution building support (financing ECPA mission), 2,5 million euro for training and support component and 1,5 million euro for the investment component. 
Av de 8 miljoner euro som tilldelades polis-och rttsordningskom-ponenten skulle 4 miljoner euro vikas fr std till institutionsuppbyggnad (finansiering av polisuppdraget), 2,5 miljoner euro fr fortbildnings-och stdkomponenten och 1,5 miljoner euro fr inves-teringskomponenten.
Not one euro was spent in order to finance the ECPA mission. 
Inte en euro lades p finansiering av polisuppdraget.
4,7 million euro were spent on a Data Communication Network, 1,9 million euro were spent on the power supply equipment and 1 million euro were spent on a grant to the United Nations in order to support the Security Sector Reform programme. 
4,7 miljoner euro anvndes till ett datakommunikationsntverk, 1,9 miljoner euro till utrustning fr strmfrsrjning och 1 miljon euro till ett bidrag till Frenta nationerna fr att stdja programmet fr reform av skerhetssektorn.
Redirecting assistance from investment support to institution building 21. 
Omorientering av std frn investeringsstd till institutionsuppbyggnad 21.
Because the recipient countries were recovering from war the early years of the CARDS programme focused more on reconstruction (through investment projects) than institution building. 
Eftersom mottagarlnderna hll p att terhmta sig efter kriget var Cardsprogrammet under de frsta ren mer inriktat p teruppbyggnad (genom investeringsprojekt) n p institutionsuppbyggnad.
The redirection of assistance was of interest to the discharge authority. 
Omorienteringen av stdet var av intresse fr den myndighet som beviljar ansvarsfrihet.
In its report on the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) published in May 2002, the European Parliament considered that the EAR should significantly increase EU assistance in the two countries (i.e. the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) in favour of institution building. 
I en rapport om Europeiska byrn fr teruppbyggnad som offentliggjordes i maj 2002 ansg Europaparlamentet att Europeiska byrn fr teruppbyggnad kraftigt borde ka EU-stdet i de tv lnderna (dvs. Frbundsrepubliken Jugoslavien och f.d. jugoslaviska republiken Makedonien) till frmn fr institutionsuppbyggnad.
The Court analysed the CARDS projects in order to determine and assess the proportion of institution building projects compared with investment projects (see Graph 1). 
Revisionsrtten analyserade Cardsprojekten fr att avgra och bedma institutionsuppbyggnadsprojektens proportion i frhllande till investeringsprojekten (se diagram 1).
C 285/8 EN Official Journal of the European Union Graph 1 Proportion of institution building projects in Delegations and in the EAR by programming year (1) 27.11.2007 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 YEAR (1) Projects of each programming year n are implemented in the year n and the following years. 
C 285/8 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 27.11.2007 Diagram 1 Andel institutionsuppbyggnadsprojekt vid delegationerna och Europeiska byrn fr teruppbyggnad per programr (1) 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 R DELEG. BYRN (1) Projekten fr varje programr n genomfrs under r n och de fljande ren.
From the very beginning the focus on institution building was more pronounced in countries where assistance was managed by the Delegations (1) than in countries where it was managed by the EAR (2). 
Frn frsta brjan var inriktningen p institutionsuppbyggnad mer uttalad i lnder dr stdet frvaltades av delegationerna (1) n i lnder dr det frvaltades av Europeiska byrn fr teruppbyggnad (2).
When strengthening the administrative capacity of a country, twinning is recognised as an important instrument (3). 
Nr det gller att strka den administrativa kapaciteten i ett land r partnersamverkan ett erknt viktigt instrument (3).
However, twinning had a slow start in the western Balkans particularly in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia where the EAR only started to use twinning in 2005. 
Partnersamverkan fick dock en trg start i lnderna p vstra Balkan, srskilt i f.d. jugoslaviska republiken Makedonien, dr Europeiska byrn fr teruppbyggnad inte brjade anvnda sig av partnersamverkan frrn 2005.
An EAR evaluation of twinning (4) concluded that there was sometimes only limited support from the AgencyŐs Programme Managers for twinning and that EAR staff were not always trained sufficiently in the use of that instrument. 
I en utvrdering av partnersamverkan (4) som Europeiska byrn fr teruppbyggnad gjorde drogs slutsatsen att partnersamverkan ibland endast hade begrnsat std frn byrns programansvariga och att personalen vid Europeiska byrn fr teruppbyggnad inte alltid hade ftt tillrckligt med utbildning fr att anvnda detta instrument.
(1) The EC Delegations are implementing CARDS programmes in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia. 
(1) Kommissionens delegationer genomfr Cardsprogram i Albanien, i Bosnien och Hercegovina och i Kroatien.
(2) The EAR has operational centres in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia. 
(2) Europeiska byrn fr teruppbyggnad har operativa centrum i f.d. jugoslaviska republiken Makedonien, Kosovo, Montenegro och Serbien.
(3) The Commission launched twinning as the principal tool of pre-accession assistance for institution building already in May 1998. 
(3) Kommissionen lanserade partnersamverkan som det frmsta verktyget fr franslutningsstd fr institutionsuppbyggnad redan i maj 1998.
The Thessaloniki Summit, in June 2003 underlined the significance of twinning in the western Balkans. 
Vid toppmtet i Thessaloniki i juni 2003 betonades vikten av partnersamverkan i lnderna p vstra Balkan.
(4) Reference made to EAR evaluation EU/13/040/05 of November 2005. 26. 
(4) Hnvisning till Europeiska byrn fr teruppbyggnads utvrdering EU/13/040/05 frn november 2005.
As the countries of western Balkans recovered from the war, the draft programmes and the related Project Fiches (5) as well as the projects under implementation took into account the ParliamentŐs request to increase the EU assistance from investment support to institution building. 
26. efter kriget tog man i programutkasten och de tillhrande projektunderlagen (5) liksom de projekt som hll p att genomfras, hnsyn till parlamentets begran om ett kat EU-std till institutionsuppbyggnad p bekostnad av investeringsstdet.
However, in some cases the changes to the planned projects led to decreased emphasis on institution building (see Box 2). 
I vissa fall ledde dock ndringarna av de planerade projekten till att man lade mindre vikt vid institutionsuppbyggnad (se ruta 2).