natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In addition to the procedures carried out for the rest of the countries selected, in these three countries we re-performed the Commission’s verifications of the variable tranche disbursement requests and the related payments and compared our results with the results of the analysis done by the Commission. 
Utver de frfaranden som genomfrdes fr de resterande utvalda lnderna gjorde vi om kommissionens kontroller av anskningarna om utbetalning av rrliga delbetalningar och tillhrande betalningar i de hr tre lnderna, och jmfrde vra resultat med resultaten i kommissionens analys.
Furthermore, we cross-checked the performance data declared by the partner countries with other sources of evidence from external experts and other donors to assess its reliability. 13 
Dessutom dubbelkontrollerade vi de prestationsuppgifter som lmnats av partnerlnderna mot andra beviskllor frn externa experter och andra givare fr att bedma tillfrlitligheten. 13
Observations Relevance of variable tranche indicators weakened by their design 18 We examined whether: (i) the performance indicators are relevant for achieving the budget support contracts’ objectives and are aligned with country policies; and (ii) they provide a sound basis for monitoring meaningful results. 
Iakttagelser Indikatorerna fr de rrliga delbetalningarna var utformade p ett stt som minskade deras relevans 18 Vi underskte om i) prestationsindikatorerna r relevanta fr uppnendet av mlen i budgetstdkontrakten och verensstmmer med landets politik och ii) om de utgr en god grund fr att vervaka meningsfulla prestationer.
Indicators are consistent with country sector strategies, but mostly focus on short-term actions rather than longer-term results 19 Budget support is regarded by the Commission as a results-based means of delivering aid. 
Indikatorerna r frenliga med lndernas sektorstrategier, men fokus ligger frmst p kortsiktiga tgrder och inte lngsiktigare resultat 19 Kommissionen betraktar budgetstd som ett resultatbaserat stt att ge bistnd.
Whereas project-based aid is disbursed for eligible expenditure, budget support variable tranches are disbursed when partner countries meet the general conditions and achieve previously agreed results, measured by selected performance indicators. 
Projektbaserat bistnd betalas ut fr stdberttigande kostnader, men budgetstd i rrliga delbetalningar betalas ut nr partnerlnder uppfyller de allmnna villkoren och uppnr resultat som man tidigare kommit verens om, vilket mts med hjlp av utvalda prestationsindikatorer.
Therefore, the relevance of variable tranches depends on whether these performance indicators measure meaningful results. 
De rrliga delbetalningarnas relevans beror drfr p om prestationsindikatorerna mter meningsfulla resultat.
20 As presented in Box 1, there are five types of indicators. 
20 Ssom visas i ruta 1 finns det fem typer av indikatorer.
Input, process and output indicators are most relevant for the day-to-day management of public spending programmes. 
Inputindikatorer, processindikatorer och outputindikatorer r mest relevanta fr den dagliga frvaltningen av offentliga utgiftsprogram.
Outcome and impact indicators measure longer-term effects, such as the progress of reforms and programmes towards set objectives; for example, the SDGs. 
Utfalls-och effektindikatorer mter lngsiktigare effekter, exempelvis framsteg med reformer och program i frhllande till faststllda ml, bland annat mlen fr hllbar utveckling.
Figure 4 includes an example of different types of indicators used for one of the budget support programmes in Bolivia. 14 
I figur 4 finns ett exempel p olika typer av indikatorer som anvnds fr ett av budgetstdprogrammen i Bolivia. 14
Figure 4 – Result chain and different types of performance indicators 15 NEEDS Support the National Strategy of Integral Development including Coca in Bolivia OBJECTIVES • increase of agricultural production • reduction of coca surface INPUTS Indicator 7: Increase in allocation of resources from National Treasure to the sector PROCESSES Indicator 6: Framework for Performance Assessment for the sectoral policy made and monitored by a monitoring and evaluation system RESULTS IMPACTS Indicator 8: Reduction of coca crops area OUTCOMES Indicator 1: Increase in production for six strategic agricultural items indicated in the national strategy OUTPUTS Indicator 3: Enhancement of sustainable local economic development projects implemented in protected areas and buffer zones Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee result chain, used in EU external actions. 21 The budget support guidelines allow the use of any of the above type of indicator. 
Figur 4 Đ Prestationskedja och olika typer av prestationsindikatorer 15 BEHOV Std till den nationella strategin fr vergripande utveckling inbegripet koka i Bolivia ML Ľ kad jordbruksproduktion Ľ Minskat kokaomrde INPUT Indikator 7: kat anslag av resurser frn statskassan till sektorn PROCESSER Indikator 6: Ram fr prestationsbedmning av sektorpolitik infrs och vervakas genom ett vervaknings-och utvrderingssystem RESULTAT EFFEKTER Indikator 8: Minskade omrden fr kokaodling UTFALL Indikator 1: kad produktion av sex strategiska jordbruksprodukter som anges i den nationella strategin OUTPUT Indikator 3: Frstrkning av projekt fr hllbar lokal ekonomisk utveckling som genomfrs i skyddade omrden och buffertzoner Klla: OECD:s bistndskommitts resultatkedja, som anvnds i samband med EU:s yttre tgrder.
According to the Commission, though, preference should be given to outcome indicators, because they encourage evidence-based policy making, protect political space for partner countries to choose their own policies and strategies for achieving them, and stimulate a demand for high-quality statistical information. 
Enligt kommissionen br dock fretrde ges t utfallsindikatorer, eftersom de uppmuntrar till evidensbaserat politiskt beslutsfattande, skyddar partnerlndernas politiska utrymme att vlja sina egna tgrder och strategier fr att uppfylla dem och stimulerar efterfrgan p statistisk information av hg kvalitet.
The greater the confidence in the partner government’s ability to produce reliable data, the more emphasis should be placed on outcome indicators. 
Ju strre frtroendet r fr partnerregeringens frmga att ta fram tillfrlitliga uppgifter, desto strre vikt br lggas vid utfallsindikatorer.
22 Our analysis of 248 indicators in the audited contracts shows that they are aligned with the sector strategies of the partner countries. 
22 Vr analys av 248 indikatorer i de granskade avtalen visar att de r anpassade till partnerlndernas sektorstrategier.
However, variable tranche disbursements are mainly based on input, process and output indicators, which together account for 87 % of the total number of indicators. 
Utbetalningar av rrliga delbetalningar grundas dock frmst p input-, process-och outputindikatorer, som tillsammans str fr 87 % av det totala antalet indikatorer.
Only 33 indicators (13 %) measured outcome and impact – see Figure 5. 
Enbart 33 indikatorer (13 %) mtte utfall och effekt Đ se figur 5.
Figure 5 – Type of indicator used for variable tranches in the audited programmes 16 Source: ECA. 
Figur 5 Đ Typ av indikator som anvndes fr rrliga delbetalningar i de granskade programmen 16 Klla: Revisionsrtten.
23 We found that most outcome and impact indicators were used in countries with lower and lower-middle income economies, while in upper-middle income countries, such as Jordan and Georgia, which had a better capacity to produce performance data, only four outcome indicators and no impact indicators were used. 
23 Vi konstaterade att de flesta utfalls-och effektindikatorerna anvndes i lnder med lginkomstekonomier och lg-medelinkomstekonomier. I hg-medelinkomstlnder, som Jordanien och Georgien, som hade bttre kapacitet att ta fram prestationsuppgifter, anvndes endast fyra utfallsindikatorer och inga effektindikatorer.
This shows that indicator selection is not necessarily linked to countries’ development status. 
Det visar att indikatorvalet inte ndvndigtvis r kopplat till lndernas utvecklingsstatus.
24 The input indicators used in the audited variable tranches related mainly to the procurement of goods (18 cases) and increases in budgetary allocations (9 cases). 
24 De inputindikatorer som anvndes fr de granskade rrliga delbetalningarna rrde frmst upphandling av varor (18 fall) och kade budgetanslag (nio fall).
Increases in budgets or the procurement of equipment might have the potential to trigger changes in a particular area of interest, but they do not automatically mean that meaningful progress will be achieved. 
Budgetkningar och upphandling av utrustning kan ha potential att leda till frndringar inom ett srskilt omrde av intresse, men de innebr inte automatiskt att meningsfulla framsteg kommer att gras.
25 The process indicators may play a useful role, in particular when the policy is aimed at achieving changes in the regulatory framework. 
25 Processindikatorer kan vara till nytta, i synnerhet nr politiken syftar till att f till stnd frndringar i den rttsliga ramen.
However, as indicated in the Guidelines, these should not focus only on processes, but should also measure qualitative aspects, e.g. what an entity to be set up is expected to cover, etc.4 However, this was not always the case. 
Ssom anges i riktlinjerna br de dock inte enbart vara inriktade p processer utan ven mta kvalitativa aspekter, exempelvis vad en enhet som ska inrttas frvntas omfatta och s vidare4. S var dock inte alltid fallet.
Box 2 presents some examples of indicators, which did not specify any minimum quality requirements regarding the content or the structure of the information to be submitted. 
I ruta 2 ges ngra exempel p indikatorer som inte preciserar ngra lgsta kvalitetskrav nr det gller innehll i den information som ska lmnas eller hur informationen ska struktureras.
This makes it difficult to ensure that variable tranches reward good-quality processes. 
Det gr det svrt att skerstlla att rrliga delbetalningar gynnar processer av god kvalitet.
One third of indicators do not allow results to be measured objectively 26 The indicators used to measure progress in the implementation of a public policy need to be specific, have quantified and measurable targets, and when applicable, a reliable baseline. 
En tredjedel av indikatorerna gr det inte mjligt att objektivt mta resultat 26 De indikatorer som anvnds fr att mta framsteg med genomfrandet av offentlig politik mste vara specifika, ha kvantifierade och mtbara ml och, i tillmpliga fall, tillfrlitliga utgngsvrden.
Otherwise, it is not possible to objectively measure progress achieved. 
I annat fall r det omjligt att objektivt mta de framsteg som uppns.
Indicators, baselines and targets must be agreed when budget support contracts are formulated and specified in the financing agreement. 
Indikatorer, utgngsvrden och ml mste verenskommas nr budgetstdkontrakt utformas och specificeras i finansieringsverenskommelsen.
17 Box 2 Examples of process indicators with no qualitative specifications In the contract for the Moldova visa liberalisation action plan (contract 15), one indicator relates to a regulatory framework approved for the mandatory registration of reported offences, without any reference to the quality/content of this framework. 
Trots att det i riktlinjerna anges att man br undvika att gra ndringar i indikatorerna 17 Ruta 2 Exempel p processindikatorer utan kvalitativa specifikationer I kontraktet om Moldaviens handlingsplan fr viseringsliberalisering (kontrakt 15) rr en indikator antagandet av ett regelverk fr obligatorisk registrering av rapporterade vertrdelser, utan ngon hnvisning till regelverkets kvalitet eller innehll.
In the energy contract for Jordan (contract 4), the target for one indicator refers to “a multi-stakeholder policy dialogue structure led by Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources is operationalised and meets regularly” without any additional specification on how often the meetings should be held. 
I energikontraktet fr Jordanien (kontrakt 4) hnvisas det i mlet fr en indikator till inrttandet av en politisk flerpartsdialogstruktur under ledning av ministeriet fr energi och mineraltillgngar som ska vara operativ och sammantrda regelbundet, utan ngon nrmare information om hur ofta mten ska anordnas.
4 Budget Support guidelines 2017, p. 
4 Budget Support Guidelines 2017 (riktlinjer fr budgetstd 2017), s.
27 Our analysis shows that 72 indicators (i.e. 29 % of our sample) were not sufficiently specific. 
27 Vr analys visar att 72 indikatorer (dvs. 29 % av vrt urval) inte var tillrckligt specifika.
Non-specific indicators are especially problematic during the process of analysing disbursement requests: there is a risk of conflicting judgements as to whether targets have been achieved. 
Icke-specifika indikatorer r srskilt problematiska under processen d utbetalningsanskningar analyseras Đ det finns en risk fr motstridiga bedmningar av om mlen har uppntts.
This can in turn lead to a variety of different results being arrived at when calculating the variable tranche amount to be paid. 
Detta kan i sin tur leda till mycket varierande resultat nr beloppet fr den rrliga delbetalningen som ska betalas ut berknas.
28 29 % of the indicators were vaguely formulated with no quantified targets, using words such as ”improve”, ”increase the focus”, and ”provide evidence”. 
28 29 % av indikatorerna var vagt utformade och saknade kvantifierade ml. Ord som ÓfrbttraÓ, Óka fokusÓ och Ólmna bevisÓ anvndes.
We observed that contracts in the agriculture sector included the highest number of specific indicators (86.5 %), whereas in the Public Financial Management (PFM), only 60 % of indicators were specific. 
Vi konstaterade att kontrakt inom jordbrukssektorn innehll det strsta antalet specifika indikatorer (86,5 %), medan enbart 60 % av indikatorerna inom frvaltning av de offentliga finanserna var specifika.
Box 3 gives examples of non-specific indicators and the implications for the calculation of variable tranche disbursements. 
I ruta 3 ges exempel p icke-specifika indikatorer och vilken inverkan de har p berkningen av utbetalningar av rrliga delbetalningar.
18 Box 3 Examples of non-specific indicators/targets o In the contract on “Support to the second phase of education reform in Jordan” (contract 1), the target for indicator 5 was: ”6 new schools equipped and operational with adequate means/learning environment and adequate human resources”. 
18 Ruta 3 Exempel p icke-specifika indikatorer och ml o I kontraktet Support to the second phase of education reform in Jordan (std till den andra etappen av utbildningsreformen i Jordanien) (kontrakt 1) var mlet fr indikator 5 sex nya skolor som r i drift och utrustade med lmpliga resurser, lmplig inlrningsmilj och adekvata personalresurser.
The compliance with the term “adequate” and how this should be quantified for the calculation of the payment was not sufficiently specified in the Financing Agreement and therefore was open to different interpretations. 
Efterlevnaden av begreppet ÓadekvatÓ och hur den skulle kvantifieras fr berkningen av betalning var inte tillrckligt specificerad i finansieringsverenskommelsen och kunde drfr tolkas p olika stt.
This means that these criteria had not been set out in advance in the financing agreement, and had thus not been agreed with the partner country. o Indicator 2.1 of the contract on “Support to public finance policy reform” in Georgia (contract 8) reads as follows: ”The Ministry of Finance organises a series of public discussions on fiscal governance [...].“This indicator does not specify the number and character of meetings. 
Det innebr att kriterierna inte hade angetts i frvg i finansieringsverenskommelsen och att man sledes inte hade enats om dem med partnerlandet. o Indikator 2.1 i kontraktet Support to public finance policy reform (std till reform av finanspolitiken) i Georgien (kontrakt 8) anger att finansministeriet ska anordna en serie offentliga diskussioner om finanspolitisk styrning.
29 We have also found good examples of where the Commission had made efforts to measure progress for indicators which were not easy to analyse. 
29 Vi fann ven goda exempel p att kommissionen hade anstrngt sig fr att mta framsteg nr indikatorerna var svra att analysera.
In the case illustrated in Box 4, the Commission had led the way for the entire donor community in the area of education. 
I det fall som illustreras i ruta 4 hade kommissionen visat vgen fr hela givarsamfundet p utbildningsomrdet.
19 Box 4 Measuring the quality of education – a good example In the contract “Budget support to the Jordanian Ministry of Education to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis” the Commission used the indicator ”Quality education provided to Syrian pupils in single-and double-shift schools in host communities and camps comparable to Jordanian standards and advocated in the country”. 
19 Ruta 4 Mtning av utbildningskvalitet Đ ett bra exempel I kontraktet Budget support to the Jordanian Ministry of Education to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis (budgetstd till Jordaniens utbildningsministerium fr att hantera den syriska flyktingkrisen) anvnde kommissionen fljande indikator: utbildning av god kvalitet erbjuds syriska elever i skolor med ett eller tv skift i vrdsamhllen och lger; utbildningen r jmfrbar med jordanska normer och frmjas i landet.
This was an outcome indicator measuring the quality of education provided to Syrian students. 
Detta var en utfallsindikator som syftade till att mta kvaliteten p den utbildning som tillhandahlls syriska studenter.
The value of the indicator was obtained through a survey carried out in a sample of schools. 
Indikatorns vrde erhlls genom en underskning som genomfrdes i ett urval av skolor.
In each school, the quality of education was measured by assessing ten different factors (such as lesson observations, involvement of parents and students, equal representation between boys, girls, refugees and Jordanians) on a four-point scale. 
I varje skola mttes kvaliteten p utbildningen genom att tio olika faktorer bedmdes (t.ex. iakttagelser under lektioner, frldrars och studenters delaktighet, jmn frdelning av pojkar, flickor, flyktingar och jordanier) p en fyrgradig skala.
The scores obtained (quality performance scores) were used to issue the schools with grades from A+ (good) to C-(in need of improvement). 
Pongen (pong fr kvalitetsprestationer) anvndes fr att ge skolorna betyg frn A+ (bra) till C-(frbttringar krvs).
This indicator was the first to measure the quality of education in Jordan; it has subsequently been used by other donors and introduced into the Common Results Framework in Jordan. 
Denna indikator var den frsta som mtte kvaliteten p utbildningen i Jordanien. Den har senare anvnts av andra givare och infrlivats i den gemensamma resultatramen i Jordanien.
However, when it came to checking the fulfilment of the indicators, we identified weaknesses (see Box 10). 
Vi identifierade dock brister nr det gller kontroll av om indikatorerna hade uppfyllts (se ruta 10). 5
Amongst the 85 indicators analysed for which baselines were necessary (i.e. for those indicators which analysed progress5), we found problems in 35 of them related to: (i) a lack of necessary baseline values (15), and (ii) incorrect or outdated baselines (20). 
35 av dem med anknytning till i) brist p ndvndiga utgngsvrden (15) och ii) felaktiga eller inaktuella utgngsvrden (20).
31 There were 15 indicators with no identified baselines. 
31 Det fanns 15 indikatorer som saknade utgngsvrden.
These were spread across four (contracts 6, 7, 8 and 17) of the 24 selected budget support contracts. 
De var utspridda bland fyra (kontrakten 6, 7, 8 och 17) av de 24 utvalda budgetstdkontrakten.
The main reason for the lack of baselines was that the partner countries had not monitored the situation before the start of the budget support contract. 
Den frmsta anledningen till att det saknades utgngsvrden var att partnerlnderna inte hade vervakat situationen innan budgetstdkontraktet inleddes.
However, we found examples where, in a similar situation, the Commission had used the first variable tranche of the budget support contract to ask the partner country to calculate the baseline. 
Vi fann dock exempel p att kommissionen, i en liknande situation, hade anvnt den frsta rrliga delbetalningen i budgetstdkontraktet fr att be partnerlandet att berkna utgngsvrdet.
In other cases, the Commission had carried out the necessary work (i.e. surveys) to calculate the missing baselines. 
I andra fall hade kommissionen genomfrt det arbete som krvdes (t.ex. underskningar) fr att berkna de saknade utgngsvrdena.
We consider these to be good practices. 
Vi anser att detta r god praxis.
The example of necessary work carried out by the Commission to accurately assess the progress achieved for the relevant indicator in subsequent tranches is described in Box 5. 
Exempel p det ndvndiga arbete som utfrts av kommissionen fr att korrekt bedma gjorda framsteg nr det gller den relevanta indikatorn fr efterfljande delbetalningar beskrivs i ruta 5.
20 Box 5 Setting baselines An example of good practice in setting baselines by substituting missing data with other sources of information is indicator 3 of the sector reform contract to increase the performance of Rwanda’s energy sector (contract 19). 
20 Ruta 5 Faststlla utgngsvrden Indikator 3 i prestationsavtalet om sektorreformer fr att ka prestandan hos Rwandas energisektor (kontrakt 19) r ett exempel p god praxis i frga om att faststlla utgngsvrden genom att erstta uppgifter som saknas med andra informationskllor.
This indicator is measured throughout the contract with an annual survey. 
Denna indikator bedms under hela kontraktsperioden med hjlp av en rlig underskning.
In order to set the baseline value, the EU Delegation carried out a comprehensive analysis and cross-checked alternative sources of data such as the Biomass Energy Strategy from 2009, the Global Alliance for Cooking Stove assessment from 2012, and the Wood fuel Integrated Supply/Demand Overview Mapping report. 
I syfte att faststlla utgngsvrdet genomfrde EU:s delegation en omfattande analys och dubbelkontrollerade alternativa uppgiftskllor, exempelvis strategin fr biomassaenergi frn 2009, bedmningen frn den globala alliansen fr matlagningsspisar frn 2012 och kartlggningsrapporten om en versikt ver integrerad tillgng och efterfrgan p brnnved.
32 In addition, 20 indicators had incorrect or outdated baselines. 
32 Drutver innehll 20 indikatorer felaktiga eller inaktuella utgngsvrden.
In 11 of these cases, new data relevant for the correct calculation of the baseline became available after the budget support contract had been signed. 
I elva av dessa fall blev nya uppgifter som var relevanta fr att korrekt berkna utgngsvrdet tillgngliga efter det att budgetstdkontraktet hade undertecknats.
Although it is possible to amend the related financing agreement in order to reflect the correct baseline, the Commission had not done so in these cases. 
Trots att det r mjligt att ndra tillhrande finansieringsverenskommelse fr att den ska terspegla korrekt utgngsvrde hade kommissionen inte gjort det i dessa fall.
The use of incorrect or outdated baselines also resulted in indicators having lower targets than the actual baselines. 
Anvndningen av felaktiga eller inaktuella utgngsvrden ledde ven till att indikatorer hade ml som var lgre n de faktiska utgngsvrdena.
Box 6 contains some examples. 
I ruta 6 finns ngra exempel.