natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In other words, fast progress towards the MTO within the period of 3 years is crucial for highly indebted Member States to ensuring compliance with the debt rule. 
Med andra ord r snabba framsteg mot det medelfristiga budgetmlet inom tre r avgrande fr kraftigt skuldsatta medlemsstater fr att skerstlla att skuldkriteriet efterlevs.
Moreover, for countries exiting the EDP, the regulation envisages a transition period of 3 years until the 1/20 debt reduction requirement has been reached. 
Fr lnder som lmnar frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott freskrivs i frordningen en vergngsperiod p tre r till dess att kravet p en skuldminskning om 1/20 har uppntts.
However, taking into account the average significant deviation of 0.25 % of GDP over two consecutive years, a Member State could double its convergence time while still being considered compliant. 
Med beaktande av den genomsnittliga betydande avvikelsen p 0,25 % av BNP under tv p varandra fljande r skulle en medlemsstat dock kunna frdubbla sin konvergenstid och fortfarande anses efterleva kriteriet.
Flexibility clauses for investment and structural reforms have been limited to 0.75 pp of GDP. 
Flexibilitetsklausuler fr investeringar och strukturreformer har begrnsats till 0,75 procentenheter av BNP.
With an average fiscal effort of 0.25pp per year44, the convergence time would lengthen by another three years 45. 
Med en genomsnittlig budgetanstrngning p 0,25 procentenhet per r44 skulle konvergenstiden frlngas med ytterligare tre r45.
Flexibility clauses relating to unusual events are not limited; in the case of Italy, they have reached 0.5 pp of GDP. 
Flexibilitetsklausuler med anknytning till ovanliga hndelser r inte begrnsade; nr det gller Italien har de ntt 0,5 procentenhet av BNP.
This will lengthen the convergence time by another two years, assuming the same conditions as above. 
Detta kommer att frlnga konvergenstiden med ytterligare tv r, under frutsttning att villkoren r samma som ovan.
Finally, as experience has shown, any recession would set the clock back. 
Avslutningsvis har erfarenheten visat att en recession skulle vrida tillbaka klockan.
Within the long time frame for achieving the MTO permitted in the framework, a recession is quite likely. 
Det r tmligen sannolikt att en recession intrffar inom den lnga tidsram som medges fr uppnendet av det medelfristiga budgetmlet.
The relatively shallow recession in 2000-2002 (average growth rates in the euro area did not turn negative), for example, led to a decline in the euro area structural balance of about 1.2 % of GDP. 
Exempelvis ledde den relativt mttliga recessionen r 2000Đ2002 (den genomsnittliga tillvxttakten i euroomrdet blev inte negativ) till att det strukturella saldot i euroomrdet minskade med cirka 1,2 % av BNP.
Such recessions would further prolong the period for reaching the MTO. 
Sdana recessioner skulle ytterligare frlnga perioden fr att uppn det medelfristiga budgetmlet.
With the time for reaching the MTO extended, more than one recession might become possible. 
Med en frlngd tid fr att uppn det medelfristiga budgetmlet skulle fler n en recession kunna intrffa.
Chart 1 illustrates the cumulative effect of the matrix, significant deviation margin, all clauses (except the pension reform clause) and a possible recession on the time for achieving the MTO. 
Diagram 1 illustrerar matrisens kumulativa effekt, marginalen fr betydande avvikelser, alla klausuler (frutom klausulen om pensionsreform) och en mjlig recession p tiden fr att uppn det medelfristiga budgetmlet.
Except for the effects of recession, other effects shown in the Chart 1 broadly correspond to those already incurred in practice. 
Frutom effekterna av recessioner verensstmmer andra effekter i diagram 1 i stora drag med dem som redan intrffat i praktiken.
38 44 45 The benchmark of 0.5pp of GDP minus the significant deviation margin of 0.25pp of GDP. 
38 44 Riktmrket p 0,5 procentenhet av BNP minus marginalen fr betydande avvikelser p 0,25 procentenhet av BNP.
Italy received investment and reform allowances of close to that limit. 
45 Italien erhll undantag fr investeringar och reformer som lg nra denna grns.
Chart 1 - Cumulative impact on time to reach the MTO of the significant deviation margin, maximum investment and structural reforms, unusual event clauses and a mild recession Note: (1) We assume that all clauses are granted before the time of recession and when SB is above -1.5 %. 
Diagram 1 Đ Kumulativ inverkan p tiden fr att n det medelfristiga budgetmlet av marginalen fr betydande avvikelser, maximala investerings-och strukturreformer, klausuler fr ovanliga hndelser och en mttlig recession 39 3. Riktmrke fr anpassning minus marginal fr betydande avvikelser minus kumulativa investerings-och reformklausuler p 0,75 % av BNP 2.
This, however, does not affect the result. 
Detta pverkar dock inte resultatet.
(2) The average of Member States’ current MTO is -0.5 pp of GDP. 
2) Genomsnittet fr medlemsstaternas aktuella medelfristiga budgetml r -0,5 procentenhet av BNP.
The cumulative investment and reform clauses are a statutory maximum. 
De kumulativa investerings-och reformklausulerna r ett lagstadgat maximum.
The largest amount approved so far was 0.71 %. 
Det hgsta belopp som hittills godknts var 0,71 %.
The unusual event amount is the largest cumulative so far approved. 
Beloppet fr ovanliga hndelser r det hgsta kumulativa belopp som hittills godknts.
Finally, the latest introduction of the new “margin of discretion” has opened a new window to reduce requirements by halving the matrix requirement. 
Slutligen har det senaste infrandet av det nya ÓbedmningsutrymmetÓ ppnat ett nytt fnster mot att snka kraven genom att halvera kravet enligt matrisen.
A Member State with a debt exceeding 60 % of GDP in normal times would see its requirement in the matrix reduced from 0.6 % to 0.3 %. 
Fr en medlemsstat med en skuld som verstiger 60 % av BNP under normala frhllande skulle kravet enligt matrisen snkas frn 0,6 till 0,3 %.
Moreover, unless it had applied a significant deviation margin of more than 0.25 % of GDP in the previous year, the Member State would then be able to 39 further reduce this requirement by 0.24 % of GDP, practically avoiding any adjustment despite being in “normal times”. 
Medlemsstaten skulle dessutom, svida den inte tillmpat en marginal fr betydande avvikelser som verstiger 0,25 % av BNP under det fregende ret, kunna snka detta krav med ytterligare 0,24 % av BNP, och i praktiken undvika en anpassning trots att Ónormala frhllandenÓ rder.
When defining the matrix, introducing all these allowances and approving them for specific Member States, the Commission did not analyse the effects of the allowances on a Member State’s prospects for reaching the MTO in a reasonable time (see Box 1), which is the main objective of the Regulation. 
Nr kommissionen definierade matrisen, infrde alla dessa undantag och godknde dem fr specifika medlemsstater, analyserade den inte undantagens effekter fr en medlemsstats utsikter att uppn det medelfristiga budgetmlet inom rimlig tid (se ruta 1), vilket r frordningens huvudsyfte.
The Commission stated that it had intentionally focused on annual changes in the SB because of uncertainties in forecasting macroeconomic developments. 
Kommissionen angav att den avsiktligt hade fokuserat p rliga ndringar i det strukturella saldot p grund av oskerheter vid prognostisering av den makroekonomiska utvecklingen.
Simulations provided by the Commission and annexed in the Vade Mecum, are not realistic as they assume convergence at the benchmark rate of 0.5 % annually when in reality this changes in accordance to the Matrix and is further reduced by the allowed deviation margin. 
De simuleringar som kommissionen tillhandahll, och som ligger som bilagor till handledningen, r inte realistiska eftersom de utgr frn konvergens med riktmrkesvrdet p 0,5 % per r nr detta i realiteten ndras i enlighet med matrisen och ytterligare snks p grund av den tilltna marginalen fr avvikelser.
This short-sighted approach prevents proper assessment of the effects of allowances on achieving the main objective of the Regulation. 
Denna kortsiktiga strategi frhindrar en ordentlig bedmning av undantagens effekter p uppnendet av frordningens huvudsyfte.
Altogether the matrix, the significant deviation margin, the various flexibility clauses and the latest margin of discretion have led to a much weaker framework. 
Allt sammantaget har matrisen, marginalen fr betydande avvikelser, de olika flexibilitetsklausulerna och det senaste bedmningsutrymmet lett till en mycket svagare ram.
Specifically, convergence towards the MTOs for Member States that apply all the flexibility clauses could be extended to an extremely long period. 
I synnerhet skulle konvergens mot de medelfristiga budgetmlen fr medlemsstater som tillmpar alla flexibilitetsklausulerna kunna frlngas till en extremt lng period.
This would put Member States with high debt in a precarious position in the next recession, and would also postpone reduction in their debt ratio. 
Detta skulle frstta medlemsstater med stora skulder i en prekr situation vid nsta recession, och skulle ven frsena minskningen av deras skuldkvoter.
Information value of outer year projections in SCPs 71. 
Informationsvrde av slutrsprognoser inom stabilitets-och konvergensprogram 71.
Most of the Member States under the preventive arm show in their SCPs that they would reach the MTO by the fourth year, or at least make considerable progress towards it46. 
De flesta medlemsstater som omfattas den frebyggande delen visar i sina stabilitets-och konvergensprogram att de kommer att n det medelfristiga budgetmlet senast det fjrde ret, eller tminstone gra betydande framsteg mot att uppn det46.
This is in line with expectations expressed by the Commission in its document “The best use of 40 46 See, for example, Box 2.1 in “An Overview of the 2017 Stability and Convergence Programmes and an Assessment of the Euro Area Fiscal Stance for 2018”, Institutional paper 059, July 2017. 41 flexibility...”47. 
Detta Se t.ex. ruta 2.1 i An Overview of the 2017 Stability and Convergence Programmes and an Assessment of the Euro Area Fiscal Stance for 2018 (en versikt ver stabilitets-och 40 46 verensstmmer med de frvntningar som kommissionen uttryckte i dokumentet Att p bsta stt utnyttja flexibiliteten...47.
However, most progress is projected to be achieved in the last two years of the programme period (see Chart 2)48. 
Enligt prognosen kommer dock de strsta framstegen att uppns under programperiodens tv sista r (se diagram 2)48.
Chart 2 – Time profile of fiscal developments 2017-2020 as presented in the 2017 SCPs Source: Institutional Paper 059, July 2017, European Commission, referring to SCPs 2017, p. 
Klla: Stabilitets-och konvergensprogram 2017 Klla: Institutional paper nr 059, juli 2017, Europeiska kommissionen, med hnvisning till stabilitets-och konvergensprogrammen 2017, s.
Graph 2.1 in the same document. 
Diagram 2.1 i samma dokument.
Table 2 - Targeted SB for 2018 in the 2014-2017 SCPs for a sample of Member States, in percentage of GDP Source:SCPs2014-2017 forAT,BE,FI,IT,HU,NL,ES,FR,PT. 
Tabell 2 Đ Mlsttning fr strukturellt saldo 2018 i stabilitets-och konvergensprogrammen 2014Đ2017 fr ett urval av medlemsstater, uttryckt i procent av BNP 42 AT BE FI IT HU NL ES FR PT Stabilitets-och konvergensprogram 2014 -0,3 % 0,3 % 0,0 % -0,2 % Stabilitets-och konvergensprogram 2015 -0,5 % 0,0 % -2,6 % 0,1 % -1,6 % -0,5 % -0,2 % -0,1 % -0,4 % Stabilitets-och konvergensprogram 2016 -0,5 % 0,0 % -1,4 % -0,8 % -1,7 % -0,6 % -1,9 % -0,3 % -0,8 % Stabilitets-och konvergensprogram 2017 -0,8 % -0,4 % -1,1 % -0,7 % -2,4 % 0,3 % -2,0 % -0,5 % -1,1 % Klla: Stabilitets-och konvergensprogram 2014Đ2017 fr AT, BE, FI, IT, HU, NL, ES, FR och PT.
In its 2015 communication on flexibility, the Commission stated that “the Member State must compensate for any temporary deviations and the MTO must be reached within the four-year horizon of its current Stability or Convergence Programme”49. 
I meddelandet frn 2015 om flexibilitet angav kommissionen att Ó[m]edlemsstaten ska kompensera eventuella tillflliga avvikelser och det medelfristiga budgetmlet ska uppns inom de fyra r som medlemsstatens nuvarande stabilitets-eller konvergensprogram vararÓ49.
This sentence appears in the section dealing with the effects of the flexibility clauses, but seems to suggest that all Member States have to reach the MTO by the end of the SCP programme period. 
Den hr meningen r hmtad frn avsnittet som handlar om effekterna av flexibilitetsklausuler, men tycks innebra att samtliga medlemsstater mste uppn det COM(2015) 12 final, avsnitt 2.2, Strasbourg, 13.1.2015.
A similar sentence appears in the same context in Article 5(1), which says that “the budgetary position is expected to return to the medium-term budgetary objective within the programme period”. 
Det finns en liknande mening i samma sammanhang i artikel 5.1, dr det anges att Óde offentliga finanserna frvntas terg till det medelfristiga budgetmlet inom programperiodenÓ.
However, the Commission does not hold Member States accountable for such revisions, nor does it try to enforce the original target. 
Kommissionen hller dock inte medlemsstaterna ansvariga fr sdana revideringar och frsker heller inte driva igenom det ursprungliga mlet.
It has also not designed the matrix in such a way that all Member States, regardless of where they are relative to the MTO, would reach it in the fourth year of the programme period. 
Kommissionen har inte heller utformat matrisen p ett stt som gr att alla medlemsstater, oavsett var de befinner sig i frhllande till det medelfristiga budgetmlet, skulle uppn det under det fjrde ret av programperioden.
The persistent overestimates of the structural balances 2-3 years ahead show that the outer year projections in the SCPs have limited information value (see Table 2). 
De stndiga verskattningarna av de strukturella saldona fr de 2Đ3 kommande ren visar att slutrsprognoserna inom stabilitets-och konvergensprogrammen har begrnsat informationsvrde (se tabell 2).
Part III — progress towards the MTOs came to a halt as soon as market pressure subsided and several indebted countries are not on the path to achieve the MTO in a reasonable time No progress towards the MTOs on average in recent years 76. 
Del III Đ Framstegen mot de medelfristiga budgetmlen stannade av nr marknadstrycket avtog, och flera skuldsatta lnder kommer sannolikt inte att uppn det medelfristiga budgetmlet inom rimlig tid P det stora hela har inga framsteg mot de medelfristiga budgetmlen skett de senaste ren 76.
Between 2011 and 2014 fiscal consolidation in Member States was driven by market pressures. 
Mellan 2011 och 2014 drevs budgetkonsolideringen i medlemsstaterna p av marknadstrycket.
In the Eurozone, after 2014 structural balance remained basically unchanged, while the structural primary balance on average worsened by about 1pp of GDP. 
I euroomrdet var det strukturella saldot fortsatt i princip ofrndrat efter 2014, samtidigt som det strukturella primrsaldot i genomsnitt minskade med omkring 1 procentenhet av BNP.
Member States spent all the savings coming from lower interest rates (see Chart 3). 
Medlemsstaterna spenderade alla besparingar som gjorts tack vare lgre rntesatser (se diagram 3).
In several large euro zone countries (Spain, Italy and France), which are far from their MTOs, the structural balance and even more the structural primary balance worsened substantially (see Chart 4). 
I flera stora lnder i euroomrdet (Spanien, Italien och Frankrike), som r lngt frn att uppn sina medelfristiga budgetml, har det strukturella saldot och i synnerhet det strukturella primrsaldot frsmrats kraftigt (se diagram 4). % av potentiell BNP
Chart 4 – Fiscal developments in selected EU Member States (average, percentage of potential GDP for 2011 – 2018) 44 2 1 0 ‐1 ‐2 ‐3 ‐4 ‐5 ‐6 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Structural balance for Spain, France and Italy (% of potential GDP) Primary structural balance for Spain, France and Italy (% of potential GDP) MTO for Spain, France and Italy Note: The structural balance for Spain, Italy and France is based on a weighted average of their respective nominal GDP; MTOs based on 2017 Stability Programmes. 
Diagram 4 Đ De offentliga finansernas utveckling i utvalda EU-medlemsstater (i genomsnitt, procent av potentiell BNP 2011Đ2018) 45 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Strukturellt saldo fr Spanien, Frankrike och Italien (% av potentiell BNP) Strukturellt primrsaldo fr Spanien, Frankrike och Italien (% av potentiell BNP) Medelfristigt budgetml fr Spanien, Frankrike och Italien Anmrkning: Det strukturella saldot fr Spanien, Italien och Frankrike r baserat p ett viktat genomsnitt av deras respektive nominella BNP.
Source: AMECO, March 2018. 
Klla: Ameco, mars 2018.
The number of Member States that have achieved their MTO, increased from 3 in 2011 to 12 in 2014 under market pressures despite the adverse economic conditions at that time. 
Antalet medlemsstater som har uppntt sina medelfristiga budgetml kade frn tre r 2011 till tolv r 2014 under marknadstrycket, trots de svra ekonomiska frhllanden som rdde d.
After that, progress in that respect also came to a halt, despite the fact that growth returned (see Chart 5). 
Efter detta stannade framstegen av ven i detta avseende, trots att tillvxten hade kommit tillbaka (se diagram 5).
Only about half of Member States are currently at their MTO. % of potential GDP 
Det r enbart omkring hlften av medlemsstaterna som fr nrvarande befinner sig vid sina medelfristiga budgetml. % av potentiell BNP
Figure 5 presents the rate of progress in structural balance for Members States not at their MTO based on the Autumn forecast data 2017. 
I figur 5 visas de framsteg som gjorts i frga om strukturellt saldo fr de medlemsstater som inte befann sig vid sitt medelfristiga budgetml, p grundval av hstprognosuppgifterna 2017.
On average, these 13 countries do not show progress over the four years between 2014 and their latest forecast for 2018. 
Generellt sett har dessa 13 lnder inte gjort ngra framsteg under de fyra ren mellan 2014 och den senaste prognosen fr 2018.
Seven in fact reported a deterioration in their structural balance and only six member states registered improvement. 
Sju av dem har i sjlva verket rapporterat om frsmringar av sitt strukturella saldo, och enbart sex medlemsstater noterade frbttringar.
The average worsening was somewhat higher than the average improvement. 
Den genomsnittliga frsmringen var ngot mer betydande n den genomsnittliga frbttringen.
54% 46% Source: Commission Autumn Forecast 2017, SCPs 2017, Assessment of the DBPs for 2018. 
54 % 46 % Klla: Kommissionens hstprognos 2017, stabilitets-och konvergensprogram 2017 och bedmning av utkast till budgetplaner fr 2018.
Moreover, in 2016 the Commission’s position papers on the euro area fiscal stance began recommending fiscal expansion50, despite the fact that the output gap started to close rapidly after 2013 and will turn positive in 2018 (see Chart 6)51. 
Vidare brjade kommissionen under 2016, i sina policydokument om euroomrdets finanspolitiska inriktning, rekommendera finanspolitisk expansion50, trots att produktionsgapet brjade minska snabbt efter 2013 och kommer att bli positivt under 2018 (se diagram 6)51.
Such recommendations could have weakened the case for fiscal consolidation in Member States not at MTO. 
Sdana rekommendationer hade kunnat frsvaga acceptansen fr budgetkonsolidering i de medlemsstaterna som inte uppntt det medelfristiga budgetmlet.
50 51 Commission communication “Towards a positive fiscal stance for the euro area”, p. 
50 51 Meddelande frn kommissionen Mot en positiv finanspolitisk inriktning i euroomrdet, s.
A classical critique of discretionary fiscal policy is that its effects always come too late and then act pro-cyclically. 
En klassisk kritik mot diskretionr finanspolitik r att dess effekter alltid kommer fr sent och d fungerar konjunkturfrstrkande.
Chart 6 - Output gap (OG) in the euro area (2011-2019) 47 1 0.5 0 -0.5 -1 -1.5 -2 -2.5 -3 -3.5 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Source: AMECO, March 2018. 
Diagram 6 Đ Produktionsgap i euroomrdet (2011Đ2019) 48 1 0,5 0 -0,5 -1 -1,5 -2 -2,5 -3 -3,5 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Klla: Ameco, mars 2018.
The poor adjustment effort made by Member States under the preventive arm and not yet at MTO can also be seen by comparing the requirements for the adjustment in SB set in the matrix with the actual adjustment. 
De bristflliga anpassningsinsatser som gjorts av medlemsstater som omfattas av den frbyggande delen och som nnu inte uppntt det medelfristiga budgetmlet kan ven konstateras genom att man jmfr anpassningskraven fr det strukturella saldot som faststlls i matrisen med den faktiska anpassningen.
Chart 7 shows the rate of progress in the structural balance for those Member States which are not at their MTO. 
I diagram 7 visas framstegen nr det gller det strukturella saldot fr de medlemsstater som inte befinner sig vid sitt medelfristiga budgetml.
Very few countries meet the requirements from the matrix, and the majority does not. 
Det r enbart ett ftal lnder som uppfyller kraven i matrisen Đ de allra flesta gr det inte.
On the basis of preliminary data, in 2017 only two Member States seem to have been compliant with the matrix, whereas after taking into consideration the most recent updates of structural balance indicators from the Spring 2018 forecast, it seems that in view of the growth registered in a number of Member States during 2017, more than half of the same Member States will be compliant to their MTO ex post. % of potential GDP 
Baserat p preliminra uppgifter frefaller endast tv medlemsstater ha uppfyllt matrisen 2017. Till fljd av den tillvxt som registrerades i ett antal medlemsstater under 2017, och med beaktande av de senaste uppdateringarna av indikatorerna fr strukturellt saldo frn vrprognosen 2018, frefaller dock ver hlften av medlemsstaterna med tillvxt ha uppfyllt sitt medelfristiga budgetml i efterhand. % av potentiell BNP
Chart 7 – Number of Member States under the preventive arm and below the MTO which are or are not making adjustments in accordance with the SGP matrix requirements 48 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 - 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2017* Not compliant with matrix even after allowance - - 3 4 3 1 Not compliant with matrix and with no allowance 1 1 3 3 2 7 3 Not compliant with matrix but compliant after allowance - 1 1 - - Compliance with requirement from Matrix 1 2 1 2 - 4 2 8 *Note: Based on Spring forecast 2018 updates of structural balance for the same Member State. 
Diagram 7 Đ Antal medlemsstater som omfattas av den frebyggande delen, ligger under det medelfristiga budgetmlet och som gr eller inte gr anpassningar i enlighet med stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens matriskrav 49 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2017* Uppfyller inte matriskraven, inte ens efter undantag - - 3 4 3 1 Uppfyller inte matriskraven och har inget undantag 1 3 3 7 3 Uppfyller inte matriskraven, men uppfyller dem efter undantag 1 - 1 2 1 - - - Uppfyller matriskraven 1 2 1 2 4 2 8 *Anmrkning: Baserat p uppdateringar av det strukturella saldot fr samma medlemsstat i vrprognosen 2018.
The effectiveness of the preventive arm has also been undermined by developments in the corrective arm since 2014. 
Den frebyggande delens ndamlsenlighet har ven undergrvts av utvecklingen i den korrigerande delen sedan 2014.
Spain under the corrective arm experienced a large deterioration in its structural balance in period after 2014, while France and Portugal achieved only very slow progress (see Table 3)52. 
Spanien drabbades inom ramen fr den korrigerande delen av en betydande frsmring av det strukturella saldot under perioden efter 2014, samtidigt som utvecklingen i Frankrike och Portugal gick mycket lngsamt (se tabell 3)52.