natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Figure 2 shows that, for the CEF-T call, once a project proposal had achieved the minimum score of 3 points, the probability of its being selected was virtually independent of the average score given by the external experts. 
Nr det gller anskningsomgngen fr FSE-T visar figur 2 att sannolikheten att ett projekt skulle vljas ut nr det hade ftt minimipongen tre var praktiskt taget oberoende av de externa experternas genomsnittliga pong.
We found no 22 At the time of the audit, INEA told us that 380 external experts had been involved in the evaluation of CEF project proposals, on which they had spent an estimated 5 050 days. 25 
Vi kunde inte konstatera ngon systematisk koppling mellan 22 Vid tidpunkten fr revisionen uppgav Inea att 380 externa experter hade deltagit i och gnat uppskattningsvis 5 050 dagar t utvrderingen av projektfrslag fr FSE. 25
systematic link between the scores of project proposals recommended by external experts and the Commission’s final list of selected projects. 
pongen fr projektfrslag som rekommenderats av externa expertpaneler och kommissionens slutliga lista ver utvalda projekt.
Figure 2 – Scores given by external experts and final selection of projects in one CEF-T call (MAP 2014 F01) Equal probability of being selected irrespective of scores given by external experts 26 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 S < 3 3.0≤ S < 3.5 Average scores (S) given by external experts S ≥ 4.5 3.5 ≤ S < 4 Not selected projects Selected projects 4 ≤ S < 4.5 Source: ECA based on data received by INEA. 
Figur 2 Đ Externa experters pongsttning och slutligt projekturval inom en anskningsomgng fr FSE-T (MAP 2014 F01) Sannolikheten att ett projekt vljs ut r oberoende av de externa experternas pong 26 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 S < 3 3,0 ˛ S < 3,5 Genomsnittliga pong (S) frn externa experter S ł 4.5 3,5 ˛ S < 4 Ej utvalda projekt Utvalda projekt 4 ˛ S < 4,5 Klla: Revisionsrtten, p grundval av uppgifter frn Inea.
50 By contrast, in CEF-E and CEF-ICT, there is a strong correlation between the scores given by external experts and the Commission’s final selection (see Figure 3 for CEF-E). 
50 Nr det gller FSE-E och FSE-IKT finns det dremot ett starkt samband mellan de pong som getts av de externa experterna och kommissionens slutliga urval (se figur 3 fr FSE-E).
Number of projetcs 
Antal projekt
Figure 3 – Expert scores and final selection of projects in one CEF-E call (2014) Higher probability of being selected depending on higher scores given by external experts Source: ECA based on data received by INEA. 
Figur 3 Đ Experternas pongsttning och slutligt projekturval inom en anskningsomgng fr FSE-E (2014) Sannolikheten att ett projekt vljs ut r strre om det ftt hgre pong av externa experter Klla: Revisionsrtten, p grundval av uppgifter frn Inea.
51 Furthermore, for CEF-T, the Commission does not record very clearly to what extent the external experts’ evaluation is taken into consideration for the final selection. 
51 Inom FSE-T dokumenterar dessutom inte kommissionen srskilt tydligt i vilken utstrckning de externa experternas utvrderingar beaktas i det slutliga urvalet.
The minutes of the selection committee do not provide details on award decisions. 
Urvalskommittns protokoll innehller inga nrmare uppgifter om tilldelningsbeslut.
The procedures that the Commission applies for the final selection of CEF-T projects are therefore not properly documented. 
De frfaranden som kommissionen tillmpar fr det slutliga urvalet av FSE-T-projekt r sledes inte ordentligt dokumenterade.
Some projects were selected although they did not receive the minimum score in the external assessment 52 We found that, in a number of cases, projects to which the external experts had not given even the minimum score were nevertheless selected by the Commission. 
Vissa projekt valdes ut trots att de inte fick minimipongen i den externa bedmningen 52 I ett antal fall konstaterade vi att projekt som inte ens hade ftt minimipongen av de externa experterna nd valdes ut av kommissionen.
During the 2014-2020 period, the Commission has selected 14 CEF-T projects, worth about €711 million in EU grants, which the external experts had not recommended for funding for reasons of maturity, quality or impact23. 
Under perioden 2014Đ2020 har kommissionen valt ut 14 projekt inom FSE-T, vrda omkring 711 miljoner euro i EU-bidrag, som de externa experterna inte hade rekommenderat fr finansiering p grund av mognadsgrad, kvalitet och effekt23.
Referring to the evaluation of external experts, INEA objected to the selection of six of these projects (total co-financing about €411 million). Nonetheless, the selection committee decided to select 27 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 S < 3 3.0 ≤ S < 3.5 3.5 ≤ S < 4 4 ≤ S < 4.5 S ≥ 4.5 Average scores (S) given by external experts Not selected projects Selected projects 23 In total, 711 projects were selected for €23 billion in CEF-T grants (see Table 2). 
Med hnvisning till de externa experternas utvrdering motsatte sig Inea urvalet av sex av dessa projekt (total medfinansiering p omkring 411 miljoner euro). nd beslutade urvalskommittn att vlja ut samtliga projekt under beropande av deras europeiska mervrde, bredare frdelar fr ntet, 27 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 S < 3 3,0 ˛ S < 3,5 Genomsnittliga pong (S) frn externa experter Ej utvalda projekt Utvalda projekt S ł 4,5 3,5 ˛ S < 4 4 ˛ S < 4,5 23 Sammanlagt valdes 711 projekt ut fr 23 miljarder euro i FSE-T-bidrag (se tabell 2).
Number of projects 
Antal projekt
them all, citing their “EU-added value”, “wider benefits for the network”, the “leverage effect of EU funds”, or a “political signal to another Member State”, although neither these criteria nor their weight in the evaluation are sufficiently explained. 
EU-medlens hvstngseffekt eller en politisk signal till en annan medlemsstat, trots att varken dessa kriterier eller deras viktning i utvrderingen frklaras tillrckligt.
An example of such a project is provided in Box 2. 
Ett exempel p ett sdant projekt finns i ruta 2.
In CEF-E, two projects not recommended for funding by the external experts were approved for grants worth a total of €41 million in EU co-financing. 
Inom FSE-E beviljades tv projekt som inte hade rekommenderats fr finansiering av de externa experterna bidrag p totalt p 41 miljoner euro i EU-medfinansiering.
28 Box 2 Example of a project rejected by the experts and INEA but selected by the CEF selection committee A project proposal concerning the electrification of a railway line in one Member State was rejected by the experts because it would not have any real impact unless the authorities in a neighbouring Member State pushed ahead with the electrification of the same line across the border. 
28 Ruta 2 Exempel p ett projekt som inte godtogs av experterna eller Inea men som valdes ut av FSE:s urvalskommitt Ett projektfrslag om elektrifiering av en jrnvgslinje i en medlemsstat godtogs inte av experterna eftersom det inte skulle ha ngon reell inverkan om inte myndigheterna i en angrnsande medlemsstat fortsatte med elektrifieringen av samma linje p andra sidan grnsen.
INEA also objected to this project, giving the same reason. 
Inea invnde ocks mot projektet av samma anledning.
The selection committee nevertheless chose the project, which was awarded a grant of €19 million. 
Trots det valde urvalskommittn projektet, som beviljades ett bidrag p 19 miljoner euro.
To date, the neighbouring Member State authorities have still not classified the project as a priority in their long-term planning for 2030, and therefore the impact of the project will remain low. 
Myndigheterna i den angrnsande medlemsstaten har fortfarande inte klassat projektet som prioriterat i sin lngsiktiga planering fram till 2030, varfr dess effekter kommer att vara sm.
The award criteria applied need further clarity 53 Article 199 of the Financial Regulation requires the Commission to define clear award criteria for the selection of projects so that the quality of proposals can be assessed in the light of the objectives. 
De tilldelningskriterier som anvnds behver frtydligas 53 Enligt artikel 199 i budgetfrordningen ska kommissionen faststlla tydliga tilldelningskriterier fr urval av projekt, s att kvaliteten p frslag kan bedmas i frhllande till mlen.
INEA organises briefing sessions for external experts and provides briefing material to help them understand the criteria. 
Inea anordnar informationsmten fr externa experter och tillhandahller informationsmaterial fr att hjlpa dem att frst kriterierna.
54 Our analysis of the scoring of individual external evaluations shows discrepancies and inconsistencies in the scoring of award criteria. 
54 Vr analys av pongen i enskilda externa utvrderingar visar p diskrepanser och inkonsekvenser nr det gller pongsttningen fr tilldelningskriterierna.
This view is corroborated by the external observers, who note that, although the award criteria are generally well understood, individual experts had a different understanding of the evaluation criteria in a number of cases. 
Denna stndpunkt bekrftas av de externa observatrerna som noterar att tilldelningskriterierna i allmnhet frsts vl, men att enskilda experter gjorde en annan tolkning av kriterierna i ett antal fall.
These discrepancies among evaluations (see examples in Box 3) were discussed and a common position was found in consensus meetings. 
Dessa diskrepanser bland utvrderingarna (se exempel i ruta 3) diskuterades och en gemensam stndpunkt nddes under samfrstndsmten.
Detailed written guidance for experts on the interpretation of award criteria is available in CEF-E and, since 2018, in CEF-T. 
Detaljerad skriftlig vgledning fr experter om tolkningen av tilldelningskriterier finns inom FSE-E och, sedan 2018, inom FSE-T.
29 Box 3 Examples of issues with the interpretation of award criteria The external observers’ reports highlight issues with the clarity of criteria: “Ensure that the detailed descriptions of the award criteria and sub-criteria are consistent throughout the evaluation: e.g. in some consensus meetings, the experts had used slightly different descriptions of the criteria that were not listed in the call preparation material.” 
29 Ruta 3 Exempel p problem med tolkningen av tilldelningskriterier I de externa observatrernas rapporter framhlls problem med kriteriernas tydlighet: Skerstll att de detaljerade beskrivningarna av tilldelningskriterierna och underkriterierna r enhetliga under hela utvrderingen: under vissa samfrstndsmten hade exempelvis experterna anvnt ngot olika beskrivningar av de kriterier som inte angavs i underlaget fr anskningsomgngen.
(CEF ICT, 2017 calls) “There are always some problems with the interpretation and application of the award criteria. (...) 
(FSE-IKT, anskningsomgngar 2017) Det finns alltid vissa problem med tolkning och tillmpning av tilldelningskriterierna.
During this phase it was important, as regularly observed, to occasionally remind evaluators what specific evaluation criteria mean in specific contexts (for instance, how to interpret maturity in the case of works, studies and for mixed projects) and that marks must be consistent with comments and remarks. 
Under denna fas var det viktigt, vilket regelbundet konstaterades, att d och d pminna utvrderarna om vad specifika utvrderingskriterier innebr i specifika sammanhang (t.ex. hur man ska tolka mognadsgrad nr det gller bygg-och anlggningsarbeten, studier och blandade projekt) och att pongen mste verensstmma med kommentarer och synpunkter.
In some consensus meetings it was observed that experts took different views on what was explicit in the proposal and what could be inferred from the description of the proposal.” 
Under vissa samfrstndsmten konstaterades det att experter intog olika stndpunkter om vad som var tydligt i frslaget och vilka slutsatser som kunde dras av beskrivningen av frslaget.
(CEF-T, annual and multi-annual work programme calls, 2014) 55 The thorough assessment of the criteria “maturity” and “quality” is key for anticipating issues that may affect the timely implementation of projects. 
(FSE-T, anskningsomgngar inom ramen fr rliga och flerriga arbetsprogram 2014) 55 En noggrann bedmning av kriterierna mognadsgrad och kvalitet r av central betydelse fr att frutse problem som kan pverka om projekten genomfrs i tid.
Insufficiently realistic planning was cited by INEA as one of the main reasons why implementation lags behind schedule. 
Inea uppgav att orealistisk planering var ett av de frmsta sklen till att genomfrandet slpar efter tidsplanen.
The main issues identified by external experts with regard to the maturity of projects concern land acquisition, environmental impact assessments and financial or technical readiness. 
De strsta problem som identifierades av de externa experterna nr det gller projektens mognadsgrad rr markfrvrv, miljkonsekvensbedmningar och finansiell eller teknisk beredskap.
56 We found that experts cannot always properly assess the maturity of projects based on the documents submitted in an application. 
56 Vi konstaterade att experter inte alltid kan bedma projektens mognadsgrad korrekt med hjlp av de handlingar som lmnas in med anskan.
Works can start up to 18 months after the submission of a proposal. 
Bygg-och anlggningsarbeten kan inledas upp till 18 mnader efter det att ett frslag har lmnats in.
Also, projects may include both studies and works, or works may be carried out in parallel with studies in a separate project. 
Dessutom kan projekten inbegripa bde studier och bygg-och anlggningsarbeten, eller s kan bygg-och anlggningsarbeten utfras parallellt med studier i ett separat projekt.
This means that a project may be submitted although the works component is still at an early stage of maturity. 
Det innebr att ett projekt kan lmnas in trots att mognadsgraden fr delen avseende bygg-och anlggningsarbeten fortfarande r lg.
The assessment of maturity for such projects is challenging, because much relevant information will not be known until the study is completed. 
Att bedma mognadsgraden fr sdana projekt r en utmaning, eftersom en hel del relevant information inte blir knd frrn studien har slutfrts.
There is a risk that the CEF will not be fully implemented 57 We examined the state of play regarding the implementation of the CEF budget and the action INEA has taken to ensure it is being used. 
Det finns risk fr att FSE inte kommer att genomfras fullt ut 57 Vi granskade lget nr det gller genomfrandet av FSE-budgeten och de tgrder som Inea har vidtagit fr att skerstlla att den anvnds.
To achieve concrete benefits in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors, the budget needs to be managed soundly and spent on relevant and suitable investment projects which are then implemented on a timely basis. 
Om konkreta frdelar inom transport-, energi-och telekommunikationssektorerna ska uppns mste budgeten anvndas p ett sunt stt och medlen g till relevanta och lmpliga investeringsprojekt som sedan genomfrs i tid.
There is a risk of under-execution of the CEF 58 The CEF Regulation itself estimated funding needs for transport, telecommunications and energy that were substantially higher than the €33 billion available in the 2014-2020 budget24. 
Det finns risk fr underutnyttjande av FSE 58 Enligt de finansiella bedmningarna i FSE-frordningen r finansieringsbehoven inom transport-, telekommunikations-och energisektorerna mycket strre n de 33 miljarder euro som finns tillgngliga i budgeten fr 2014Đ202024.
The regulation for the predecessor 2007-2013 TEN-T programme gave a similar assessment. 
I frordningen om det fregende TEN-T-programmet 2007Đ2013 gjordes en liknande bedmning.
59 Despite these stated needs, the 2007-2013 TEN-T budget was not entirely used. 
59 Trots dessa ptalade behov anvndes inte TEN-T-budgeten 2007Đ2013 fullt ut.
The absorption rate, at closure, was 74 % of the budget, with €5.5 billion actually used out of a total of €7.4 billion25. 
Vid avslutandet lg utnyttjandegraden p 74 % av budgeten: av totalt 7,4 miljarder euro hade 5,5 miljarder euro faktiskt anvnts25.
However, the entire budget had been awarded to projects. 
Hela budgeten hade dock anslagits till projekt.
Delayed and under-executed infrastructure projects were the main reason for the slow use of funding, which eventually adversely impacted overall programme implementation. 
Frsenade och underutnyttjade infrastrukturprojekt var den frmsta anledningen till att finansieringen anvndes lngsamt, vilket i slutndan pverkade det vergripande programgenomfrandet negativt.
60 INEA monitors the progress of the implementation, but does not compare it, mutatis mutandis, to the implementation rate for the predecessor programme. Nevertheless, several elements indicate that the use of EU funding is still slow for the current programme. 
60 Inea vervakar framstegen med genomfrandet men jmfr det inte i tillmpliga delar med genomfrandegraden fr det fregende TEN-T-programmet. nd tyder flera faktorer p att anvndningen av EU-finansieringen fortfarande r lngsam i det nuvarande programmet.
INEA had planned for the cumulative amount of budgetary commitments to be €19 billion in 2018, but the actual level stood at €14 billion, i.e. 26 % lower than expected26. 
Inea hade planerat att det ackumulerade beloppet fr budgettaganden skulle uppg till 19 miljarder euro 2018, men det faktiska beloppet var 14 miljarder euro, det vill sga 26 % lgre n frvntat26.
Table 4 – Implementation of the 2014-2020 CEF, € million 30 Grants awarded to projects Budgetary commitments Payments % payments / grants Transport 22 870 11 868 5 416 24 % Energy 2 400 1 836 416 17 % 24 Recital 3 to Regulation No 1316/2013 estimated that the investment requirement for trans-European networks in the transport, telecommunications and energy sectors for the period to 2020 was €970 billion. 
I januari 2019, fem r in i 24 I skl 3 i frordning nr 1316/2013 uppskattas investeringsbehoven fr de transeuropeiska nten inom transport-, telekommunikations-och energisektorerna till 970 miljarder euro fram till 2020.
25 The absorption rate for TEN-T would have been even lower if TEN-T EA had not managed to commit about one third of the budget twice, by reinjecting funds from non-performing projects into new grants through “reflow calls” worth €2.3 billion. 
25 Utnyttjandegraden fr TEN-T skulle ha varit nnu lgre om genomfrandeorganet fr det transeuropeiska transportntet (TEN-T EA) inte hade lyckats ansl omkring en tredjedel av budgeten tv gnger, genom att terfra medel frn lgpresterande projekt till nya bidrag genom anskningsomgngar grundade p terflden (Óreflow callsÓ) till ett vrde av 2,3 miljarder euro.
26 After signing grant agreements, INEA commits funds in line with planned payments for the relevant year. 
26 Efter att ha undertecknat bidragsavtal anslr Inea medel i enlighet med planerade utbetalningar fr det aktuella ret.
Thus, budgetary commitments only reflect part of the budget granted to projects. 
Budgettagandena terspeglar allts enbart en del av den budget som beviljas projekt. 30
31 Telecom 228 208 100 44 % Synergy 21 21 8 40 % Grand total 25 519 13 933 5 940 23 % Source: Information provided by INEA, January 2019. 
Tabell 4 Đ Genomfrande av FSE 2014Đ2020 (miljoner euro) Bidrag till projekt Budgettaganden Betalningar % betalningar/-bidrag Transport 22 870 11 868 5 416 24 % Energi 2 400 1 836 416 17 % Telekommunikation 228 208 100 44 % Synergier 21 21 8 40 % Totalsumma 25 519 13 933 5 940 23 % Klla: Uppgifter frn Inea, januari 2019.
61 The payment rate is particularly low for CEF-E and CEF-T at 17 % and 24 % respectively of the initial budget. 
61 Utbetalningsgraden r srskilt lg fr FSE-E och FSE-T och uppgr till 17 % respektive 24 % av den ursprungliga budgeten.
By January 2019, the grant agreements for 76 projects (total EU grants of €4 billion) were modified to postpone the implementation deadline by at least one year. 
I januari 2019 hade bidragsavtalen fr 76 projekt (totala EU-bidrag p 4 miljarder euro) ndrats i syfte att skjuta upp tidsfristen fr genomfrandet med minst ett r.
However, we found that these changes only reflect a small number of delays. 
Vi konstaterade dock att ndringarna endast terspeglar ett litet antal frseningar.
In reality, far more projects are delayed, as demonstrated by INEA’s internal analysis: o For CEF-T, a mid-term review (MTR) took stock of the implementation of a sample of 356 projects. 
Faktum r att ett mycket strre antal projekt r frsenade, ssom framgr av Ineas interna analys: o Nr det gller FSE-T bedmdes genomfrandet fr ett urval av 356 projekt i en halvtidsversyn.
More than half of the projects were delayed: 156 by a year or more and 50 by less than a year. 
Mer n hlften av projekten var frsenade: 156 projekt var frsenade med minst ett r och 50 projekt med mindre n ett r.
On average, the delay at completion was 10.7 months. o For CEF-E, at the end of 2017, around two thirds of 39 ongoing projects reviewed by INEA were not fully on track: average delay 6.5 months. 
I genomsnitt var frseningen vid slutfrandet 10,7 mnader. o Nr det gller FSE-E var omkring tv tredjedelar av 39 pgende projekt, som granskades av Inea, i slutet av 2017 inte helt i fas: den genomsnittliga frseningen var 6,5 mnader.
Projects incurring delays often lacked maturity when submitted 62 The parent DGs plan calls for proposals, and thus decide on the distribution of the budget (paragraphs 39 to 40 ). 
Projekt som frsenades hade ofta otillrcklig mognadsgrad nr de lmnades in 62 De ansvariga generaldirektoraten planerar anskningsomgngar och beslutar sledes om frdelningen av budgeten (punkterna 39Đ40).
For this reason, INEA granted much of the CEF budget early in the programming period, with 85 % of CEF-T awarded through the 2014 and 2015 calls. 
Av den anledningen anslog Inea stora delar av FSE-budgeten tidigt under programperioden: 85 % av budgeten fr FSE-T anslogs under anskningsomgngarna 2014 och 2015.
The CEF-T budget for 2014 alone was €12 billion - or 52 % of the total of €23 billion for the period. 
FSE-T-budgeten fr enbart 2014 uppgick till 12 miljarder euro eller 52 % av den totala budgeten p 23 miljarder euro fr perioden.
63 Because so much of the budget was allocated to the first calls, and it was difficult for applicants to predict future calls, some projects selected were not mature enough. 
63 Eftersom en s stor del av budgeten anslogs till de frsta anskningsomgngarna, och det var svrt fr de skande att frutsp framtida anskningsomgngar, var mognadsgraden hos vissa av de utvalda projekten otillrcklig.
64 In the absence of multiannual call planning, beneficiaries submitted applications despite the fact that the maturity of some projects could have benefitted from submission at a later stage. 
64 Eftersom det inte fanns ngon flerrig planering fr anskningsomgngar lmnade stdmottagare in anskningar trots att mognadsgraden hos vissa projekt kunde ha gynnats av en senare inlmning.
INEA’s internal analysis revealed that the low maturity of initial proposals was a common cause of delayed projects. 
Ineas interna analys visade att otillrcklig mognadsgrad hos de ursprungliga frslagen var ett vanligt skl till att projekt frsenades.
Box 4 presents an example of an immature project. 
I ruta 4 ges ett exempel p ett projekt med otillrcklig mognadsgrad.
For eight of the 12 projects27 that have so far been terminated prematurely, the reason was the immaturity of the projects. 
Nr det gller tta av de tolv projekt27 som hittills har avbrutits i frtid var anledningen att projekten inte hade en tillrcklig mognadsgrad.