natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ultimately, while the Commission is responsible for assessing Member States’ compliance with the preventive arm, the enforcement of the rules is a shared competence between the Commission and the Council, with the setting of Member States’ fiscal requirements and any subsequent procedural 1 The Commission replies reflect discussions with the ECA up to 22 May 2018 1 
1 Kommissionens svar terspeglar diskussionerna med revisionsrtten fram till den 22 maj 2018 1 Kommissionen ansvarar fr att bedma medlemsstaternas efterlevnad av den frebyggande delen, men genomfrandet av reglerna r en delad befogenhet mellan kommissionen och rdet.
Since the entry into force of the Six Pack, the Council has endorsed the Commission's recommendations under the preventive arm without substantive modifications. 
Sedan sexpacken trdde i kraft har rdet godknt kommissionens rekommendationer inom den frebyggande delen utan strre ndringar.
The Commission considers that the use of the flexibility built into the preventive arm has been proportionate, appropriate and economically justified in view of the unique nature of the crisis, which led to a deep deterioration of public finances across the board. 
Kommissionen anser att anvndningen av den flexibilitet som r inbyggd i stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens frebyggande del har varit proportionell, lmplig och ekonomiskt motiverad mot bakgrund av de unika dragen i den kris som ledde till en allvarlig frsmring av de offentliga finanserna generellt.
Indeed, while it is now widely recognised that the European economy is recovering strongly, it was only relatively recently that the unusual features of the recovery argued for caution in applying fiscal consolidation. 
Samtidigt rder det enighet om att den europeiska ekonomin har uppvisat en kraftfull terhmtning, men det r frst relativt nyligen som de ovanliga dragen i terhmtningen har anfrts som skl fr en varsam tillmpning av finanspolitisk konsolidering.
In particular, the Commission and others, including the President of the ECB, pointed to the lack of inflationary pressures, large current account surplus for the euro area and persistently high levels of unemployment in some Member States as evidence for the a continuing degree of slack in the economy. 
Kommissionen och andra, bland annat ECB:s ordfrande, har srskilt ppekat att bristen p inflationstryck, det stora bytesbalansverskottet i euroomrdet och den ihllande hga arbetslsheten i ngra medlemsstater visar p en fortsatt trghet i ekonomin.
These concerns, along with increased geo-political uncertainty, made the Commission believe that a prudent application of the fiscal rules would seek to ensure that overly large fiscal adjustments did not endanger what was a still fragile recovery in many Member States. 
Till fljd av dessa problem, tillsammans med den kade geopolitiska oskerheten, ansg kommissionen att en frsiktig tillmpning av de finanspolitiska reglerna var den lmpliga lsningen fr att se till att alltfr stora finanspolitiska justeringar inte ventyrade den fortfarande brckliga tillvxten i mnga medlemsstater.
To this end, the Commission’s 2015 Communication on Making the Best Use of the Flexibility in the Existing Rules of the Stability and Growth Pact provided further detail on how the Commission would conduct its assessment in three main areas; the modulation of fiscal requirements in light of cyclical conditions, making allowance for the implementation of structural reforms that improve long-term sustainability and making allowance for growth-enhancing public investment. 
I detta syfte frklarade kommissionen i sitt meddelande Att p bsta stt utnyttja flexibiliteten inom stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens befintliga regler frn 2015 hur den avsg att gra sina bedmningar inom tre huvudsakliga omrden: anpassning av de finanspolitiska kraven mot bakgrund av konjunkturlget, mjliggra genomfrandet av strukturreformer som bidrar till att frbttra den lngsiktiga hllbarheten och mjliggra tillvxtfrmjande investeringar.
The provisions of the Regulation under which the Commission applies this flexibility are long-standing, mainly dating back to the reform of the legislation in 2005. Again, the approach which the Commission has taken was extensively discussed with Member States, resulting in the publication in early 2016 of a Commonly Agreed Position on Flexibility in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
De bestmmelser i frordningen som styr kommissionens tillmpning av denna flexibilitet har funnits lnge, de hrrr frmst frn lagstiftningsreformen 2005. ven hr diskuterade kommissionen sin strategi grundligt med medlemsstaterna, vilket ledde till att en gemensamt verenskommen stndpunkt gllande flexibilitet inom stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten offentliggjordes tidigt 2016.
Recent Commission simulations confirm that an average requirement of close to the benchmark rate of 0.5% of GDP results from the application of the so-called matrix of requirements. 
Frska simuleringar som kommissionen har gjort bekrftar att ett genomsnittligt krav p nra riktmrket 0,5 % av BNP blir resultatet av den s kallade matrisen med krvda anpassningar.
The improvements to sustainability linked to the application of the structural reform and investment clauses will take longer to assess, as the very nature of these clauses recognises that there may be short-term costs to implementing policies that will have a long-term pay-off. 
Frbttringarna av hllbarheten till fljd av tillmpningen av bestmmelserna om strukturreformer och investeringar kommer att ta lngre tid att bedma, eftersom bestmmelserna i sig innebr att kortsiktiga kostnader uppstr i samband med genomfrandet av politiken som betalar sig frst p lng sikt.
In this regard, it is by design that the application of a temporary deviation from the adjustment path for Member States implementing major structural reforms or growth-enhancing investments may lead to a delay in MTO convergence. 
I detta sammanhang r det ven naturligt att tillflliga avvikelser frn anpassningsbanan fr medlemsstater som genomfr strre strukturreformer eller tillvxtfrmjande investeringar kan leda till frseningar i konvergensen fr de medelfristiga budgetmlen.
However, in order to ensure that this effect is temporary and ultimately leads to a long-term improvement in fiscal sustainability, a number of important safeguards have been put in place. 
Dock har ett antal skerhetstgrder infrts fr att se till att denna effekt blir kortvarig och i slutnden leder till en lngsiktig frbttring av den finanspolitiska hllbarheten.
In particular, there are stringent eligibility criteria which a Member State must meet in order for the clause to be granted, including remaining in the preventive arm, preserving a safety margin to the 3% of GDP threshold, being within 1.5% of GDP from the MTO when applying for the clause and a number of implementation requirements specific to each clause. 
Det finns strnga kriterier som medlemsstaterna mste uppfylla fr att klausulen ska tillmpas. De mste hlla sig inom den frebyggande delen, upprtthlla skerhetsmarginalen p 3 % av BNP och hlla sig inom 1,5 % av BNP frn det medelfristiga budgetmlet nr de ansker om tillmpning av klausulen samt ett antal genomfrandekrav fr varje klausul.
The Commission therefore rejects the ECA’s conclusion that the Commission has not ensured that the Regulation's main objective is met. 
Kommissionen avvisar drfr revisionsrttens slutsats att kommissionen inte har sett till att frordningens huvudsakliga ml uppfylls.
In all cases, the Commission applies the provisions of the Regulation in conjunction with the Council. The Commission has a degree of discretion in its implementation of the provisions of the preventive arm when making its assessments. 
Kommissionen tillmpar alltid frordningens bestmmelser tillsammans med rdet. Kommissionen har ett visst utrymme fr sknsmssig bedmning nr den genomfr bestmmelserna fr den frebyggande delen och i sina bedmningar.
In such circumstances, the Commission has considered that, in a very limited number of exceptional cases, it is more prudent to err on the side of caution when considering the impact of a large fiscal consolidation on economic growth. 
Under dessa omstndigheter anser kommissionen att det, i ett mycket begrnsat antal exceptionella fall, r klokare att ta det skra fre det oskra i bedmningen av hur en omfattande finanspolitisk konsolidering pverkar den ekonomiska tillvxten.
The Commission is of the view that a more mechanical application of the rules, which does not take account of the prevailing risks to economic recovery, may ultimately prove counter-productive. 
Kommissionen anser att en mer mekanisk tillmpning av reglerna, dr de rdande riskerna fr den ekonomiska terhmtningen inte beaktas, i slutnden kan visa sig vara kontraproduktiv.
In this regard, it is notable that the Commission’s approach was broadly endorsed by the European Fiscal Board in its 2017 Annual Report, which found that a rigid application of the rules could have undermined the continuation of a still fragile recovery. 2 
I detta sammanhang r det vrt att notera att kommissionens strategi fick brett std frn den europeiska finanspolitiska nmnden i dess 2
Overall, the fiscal position has steadily improved over recent years, with the number of Member States under the corrective arm significantly reduced and debt now on a downward path in both the EU and the euro area. 
Generellt sett har den finanspolitiska stllningen frbttrats stadigt under de senaste ren, eftersom antalet medlemsstater som omfattas av den korrigerande delen har minskat betydligt och skuldnivn nu visar en nedtgende tendens bde inom EU och i euroomrdet.
Of course, the fiscal rules are not perfect, with the increased complexity of the preventive arm being a legitimate concern. 
De finanspolitiska reglerna r naturligtvis inte perfekta, och den frebyggande delens kande komplexitet r en berttigad farhga.
The Commission is therefore committed to continuing to attempt to improve the functioning of the preventive arm and is open to considering any proposals that are warranted and take into account both the economic context and the appropriate medium-term perspective. 
Kommissionen r drfr fast besluten att fortstta frbttra den frebyggande delens funktion och r ppen fr att vervga alla berttigade frslag som beaktar bde den ekonomiska situationen och ett lmpligt medelfristigt perspektiv.
The Commission notes that the corrective arm of the SGP is governed by a separate Regulation to the preventive arm. 
Kommissionen ppekar att stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens korrigerande del regleras av en annan frordning n frordningen om den frebyggande delen.
In this regard, the Commission highlights that the ECA recently conducted a full separate audit of the corrective arm, with the report on the Excessive Deficit Procedure published in April 2016. 
I detta avseende betonar kommissionen att revisionsrtten nyligen genomfrde en fullstndig separat revision av den korrigerande delen, i och med rapporten om frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott som offentliggjordes i april 2016.
The Commission applies the legal framework which has been agreed by the co-legislators. 
Kommissionen tillmpar den rttsliga ram som medlagstiftarna har enats om.
The Regulation does not and cannot provide the level of detail necessary to implement every aspect of the framework and the Commission must decide how to operationalise the legislative provisions. 
Frordningen varken r eller kan vara tillrckligt detaljerad fr att genomfra alla aspekter av ramen, och kommissionen mste drfr bestmma hur de rttsliga bestmmelserna ska genomfras i praktiken.
In such instances where the Commission exercises its discretion, it endeavours to do so in a transparent and orderly manner, in full consultation with the Member States through the relevant committees, e.g. ECOFIN, EFC etc. 
Nr kommissionen utvar sitt bedmningsutrymme strvar den efter att gra detta p ett ppet och ordnat stt och samrder fullt ut med medlemsstaterna via de relevanta kommitterna, t.ex. Ekofin och ekonomiska och finansiella kommittn.
Indeed, the enforcement of the preventive arm is a shared competence between the Commission and the Council, which has endorsed all of the Commission’s country-specific recommendations, including those containing allowances granted under so-called flexibility clauses. 
Genomfrandet av den frebyggande delen r en delad befogenhet mellan kommissionen och rdet, och rdet har godknt samtliga landsspecifika rekommendationer frn kommissionen, ven de rekommendationer som innehller undantag som beviljats enligt de s kallade flexibilitetsklausulerna.
V. The Commission rejects the ECA’s conclusion that "the Commission and its operational decisions do not ensure that the main objective of the Regulation is met". 
V. Kommissionen avvisar revisionsrttens slutsats att Óde genomfrandebestmmelser som kommissionen beslutar om och dess operativa beslut skerstller inte att frordningens huvudsakliga ml uppnsÓ.
Firstly, the enforcement of the SGP is a shared competence between the Commission and the Council, which has endorsed all of the Commission’s country-specific recommendations. 
Fr det frsta r genomfrandet av stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten en delad befogenhet mellan kommissionen och rdet, och rdet har godknt samtliga landsspecifika rekommendationer frn kommissionen.
Secondly, the main objective of the Regulation is that Member States pursue prudent fiscal policies over the medium-term, which is operationalised through the achievement of or adjustment towards the MTO. 
Fr det andra gr frordningens frmsta ml ut p att medlemsstaterna ska fra en frsiktig finanspolitik p medellng sikt, vilket i praktiken handlar om att de ska uppn eller gra justeringar mot de medelfristiga budgetmlen.
However, the Regulation recognises the wider context of sustainability in the medium-term, including, for instance, the need to avoid counter-productive fiscal adjustment when the cyclical position of the economy is weak, the role of structural reforms and investment in raising potential growth and the need to allow for events outside the control of government. 
Frordningen beaktar dock hllbarhet p medellng sikt i ett bredare perspektiv, bland annat behovet av att undvika kontraproduktiva finanspolitiska justeringar nr konjunkturlget r svagt, strukturreformernas roll, investeringar fr kad tillvxtpotential och behovet av att ge utrymme fr hndelser som str utanfr regeringarnas kontroll.
The results of the ECA's analysis need to be assessed against the specific economic conditions that existed over recent years, including important legacies from the crisis. 
Resultaten av revisionsrttens analys mste bedmas mot de senaste rens specifika ekonomiska frhllandena, inklusive viktiga terverkningar frn krisen.
The Commission considers that the use of the flexibility built into the preventive arm has been proportionate, appropriate and economically justified. 
Kommissionen anser att den flexibilitet som har byggts in i den frebyggande delen har anvnts p ett proportionellt, lmpligt och ekonomiskt motiverat stt.
While it is now widely recognised that the European economy is recovering strongly, it was only relatively recently that the unusual features of the recovery argued for caution in applying fiscal consolidation due to the evidence of continuing slack in the economy. 
Det r nu allmnt erknt att den europeiska ekonomin terhmtar sig starkt, men samtidigt krvde vissa ovanliga inslag i terhmtningen frsiktighet i budgetkonsolideringen fram till helt nyligen p grund av den bevisat fortsatta trgheten i ekonomin.
These concerns made the Commission believe that a prudent application of the fiscal rules would seek to ensure that overly large fiscal adjustments did not endanger what was a still fragile recovery in many Member States. 
Till fljd av dessa problem ansg kommissionen att en frsiktig tillmpning av de finanspolitiska reglerna var den lmpliga lsningen fr att se till att alltfr stora finanspolitiska justeringar inte ventyrade den fortfarande brckliga tillvxten i mnga medlemsstater.
At the same time, the Commission has consistently stressed the need for high-debt Member States to take measures to improve their sustainability, and a number of the flexibility provisions operationalised by the Commission in its January 2015 Communication are designed to do just that. 
Samtidigt har kommissionen stndigt betonat behovet av att hgt skuldsatta medlemsstater vidtar tgrder fr att frbttra sin hllbarhet, och ett antal av de flexibilitetsklausuler som kommissionen lgger fram i sitt meddelande frn januari 2015 r avsedda att gra just detta.
The Commission therefore rejects the ECA’s conclusion that it further weakened the framework though the application of its discretion. 
Kommissionen avvisar drfr revisionsrttens slutsats att kommissionen frsvagade ramen ytterligare genom att tillmpa sitt utrymme fr sknsmssig bedmning.
In a very limited number of exceptional cases, the Commission has considered that it is more prudent to err on the side of caution when considering the impact of a large fiscal consolidation on economic growth. 
Kommissionen har i ett 3 mycket begrnsat antal exceptionella fall ansett att det r klokare att ta det skra fre det oskra i bedmningen av hur en omfattande finanspolitisk konsolidering pverkar den ekonomiska tillvxten.
more mechanical application of the rules, which does not take account of the prevailing risks to economic recovery, may have proven counter-productive. 
Kommissionen anser att en mer mekanisk tillmpning av reglerna, dr de rdande riskerna fr den ekonomiska terhmtningen inte beaktas, i slutnden kan ha visat sig vara kontraproduktiv.
The temporary deviation under the structural reform clause was never linked to the actual budgetary costs of the reform and the Regulation also does not foresee such a link, particularly because those costs may be difficult to measure and/or have limited direct fiscal impact. 
Det tillflliga undantaget enligt strukturreformsklausulen var aldrig kopplat till reformens faktiska budgetkostnader, och frordningen freskriver inte heller en sdan koppling, i synnerhet eftersom dessa kostnader kan vara svra att mta och/eller ha en begrnsad direkt finanspolitisk pverkan.
Indeed, there may be very beneficial structural reforms that do not create significant direct budgetary costs but nonetheless carry substantial economic or political costs, for example labour market or judicial reforms. 
Det kan faktiskt vara s att mycket gynnsamma strukturreformer inte skapar ngra strre direkta budgetkostnader, men dremot medfr betydande ekonomiska eller politiska kostnader, till exempel reformer av arbetsmarknaden eller rttsvsendet.
The technical design of the temporary deviation from the MTO or adjustment path means that spending is increased relative to the baseline (i.e. the path of expenditure in the absence of the temporary deviation) in each year until the MTO is reached. 
Den tekniska utformningen av tillflliga avvikelser frn de medelfristiga budgetmlen eller anpassningsbanan innebr att utgifterna kar jmfrt med baslinjen (dvs. utgiftsbanan utan den tillflliga avvikelsen) under varje r till dess att de medelfristiga budgetmlen uppns.
This design of the deviation was agreed with the Council, in order to avoid creating a stop-start pattern of fiscal adjustment and to ensure equality of treatment across Member States depending on their distance to MTO. 
Denna utformning av avvikelsen verenskoms med rdet i syfte att undvika att skapa ett Óstopp-startÓ-mnster fr den finanspolitiska korrigeringen och garantera lika behandling av medlemsstaterna beroende p deras avstnd till de medelfristiga budgetmlen.
Unless the associated costs are of a one-off nature, the necessary compensation to return spending to the original trajectory in the year after application of the clause would imply an additional fiscal adjustment on top of the Member State’s standard requirement in that year which would significantly reduce the incentive for structural reforms that the clause is meant to provide. 
Om inte kostnaderna i samband med detta r tillflliga, skulle den ndvndiga kompensationen fr att utgifterna ska terg till den ursprungliga banan ret efter det att klausulen tillmpats krva en ytterligare finanspolitisk korrigering utver medlemsstaternas standardkrav under det ret, vilket i sin tur avsevrt skulle minska deras incitament att genomfra de strukturreformer som klausulen syftar till.
The ECA’s conclusion that the cumulative impact of all the potential allowances is long delays in reaching the MTO represents a generalisation that relates only to an isolated specific Member State example. 
Revisionsrttens slutsats att den samlade effekten av samtliga mjliga undantag blir lnga frseningar i uppnendet av de medelfristiga budgetmlen r en generalisering som endast rr ett isolerat fall och en viss medlemsstat.
In the benchmark case, where a Member State is on the adjustment path to MTO, the ultimate impact is simply to delay achievement of the MTO by one year. 
I referensfallet, dr en medlemsstat befinner sig p anpassningsbanan mot sitt medelfristiga budgetml, blir resultatet i slutnden helt enkelt att uppnendet av mlen frsenas med ett r.
The Commission believes that the corrective arm has overall performed well in recent years, as evidenced by the fact that the number of Member States under an excessive deficit procedure fell from 24 in 2011 to just three in 2017. 
Kommissionen anser att den korrigerande delen p det hela taget har fungerat vl p senare r, vilket styrks av det faktum att antalet medlemsstater som omfattas av frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott sjunkit frn 24 under 2011 till endast tre under 2017.
Nevertheless, it is correct that Member States who meet their headline deficit targets under the corrective arm will not face procedural consequences if they miss their structural targets. 
Det stmmer dock att de medlemsstater som uppfyller sina ml fr totalt underskott enligt den korrigerande delen inte stlls infr frfarandemssiga konsekvenser om de inte uppfyller sina ml fr strukturella saldon.
This reflects the inherently nominal nature of the corrective arm, where an EDP is ultimately abrogated based on bringing the headline deficit below 3% of GDP, notwithstanding the structural position. 
Detta avspeglar den korrigerande delens inneboende nominella karaktr, dr frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott upphvs om det totala underskottet minskar till under 3 % av BNP, oavsett den strukturella positionen.
The Commission put forward options to rectify this anomaly through allowing for a shortening of EDP deadlines when cyclical conditions improve, but this suggestion was not supported by Member States. 
Kommissionen freslog alternativ fr att korrigera sdana avvikelser genom att tidsfristerna fr frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott frkortas nr konjunkturlget frbttras, men detta frslag vann inte std bland medlemsstaterna.
The Commission is open to the possibility to revisit this issue and build support for proposals among the Member States. 
Kommissionen r beredd att terkomma till denna frga och skapa std fr frslagen bland medlemsstaterna.
The Commission does not share the ECA’s concern "that the weakened SGP framework is unable to ensure progress towards the MTOs in several highly indebted Member States." as a number of the Member States which the ECA is referring to have been under the corrective arm during the period in question. 
Kommissionen instmmer inte i revisionsrttens sikt att det r bekymmersamt att Óstabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens frsvagade ram inte kan skerstlla framsteg mot de medelfristiga budgetmlen i flera hgt skuldsatta medlemsstaterÓ, eftersom ett antal av de medlemsstater som revisionsrtten hnvisar till omfattades av den korrigerande delen under den ifrgavarande perioden.