natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Eurostat indicator guidance focuses on logic, relevance, the possibility of setting a target, frequency of data collection, appropriateness and possibility of estimating precision. 
I Eurostats riktlinjer fr indikatorer inriktar man sig p logik, relevans, mjligheten att faststlla ett ml, tthet i uppgiftsinsamlingen, lmplighet och mjlighet att uppskatta precision.
RACER indicators refer to indicators that are Relevant, Accepted, Credible, Easy, and Robust.’ 
Med RACER-indikatorer avses indikatorer som r relevanta, accepterade, trovrdiga, enkla och stabila (Relevant, Accepted, Credible, Easy, and Robust).
21 Regulation (EU) No 236/2014. 
21 Frordning (EU) nr 236/2014.
22 See, for example, the DCI (Development Cooperation Instrument) intervention logic in section 4.1.4 of EuropeAid’s management plan for 2014. 
22 Se exempelvis DCI (Development Cooperation Instrument) intervention logic (interventionslogiken fr instrument fr utvecklingssamarbete) i avsnitt 4.1.4 i frvaltningsplanen fr 2014 frn generaldirektoratet fr utveckling och samarbete Đ EuropeAid.
23 European Commission — Budget circular for 2014 — Standing instructions, 14.12.2012. 
23 Europeiska kommissionen: Budget circular for 2014 Đ Standing instructions (budgetskrivelse Đ stende instruktioner), 14.12.2012.
24 Budget Support Guidelines — Programming, Design and Management — A modern approach to Budget Support, September 2012. 
24 Budget Support Guidelines Đ Programming, Design and Management Đ A modern approach to Budget Support (vgledning fr budgetstd Đ programplanering, utformning och frvaltning Đ en modern strategi fr budgetstd), september 2012.
Document alignment and consistency 27 Objectives — together with their indi‐ cators — are easier to understand and more likely to be achieved when they are formulated in a clear and consist‐ ent way in all interrelated documents. 
Dokumentsamordning och konsekvens 27 Ml Đ och deras indikatorer Đ r lttare att frst och troligen att uppn om de r formulerade p ett tydligt och konsekvent stt i alla dokument som r relaterade till varandra.
4. Key risk areas 16 28 Objectives and indicators for EU devel‐ opment and cooperation are specified in a broad variety of documents. 
4. Centrala riskomrden 16 28 Ml och indikatorer fr EU:s utvecklings- och samarbetstgrder specificeras i ett stort antal olika dokument.
These include: (a) the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; (b) high‐level development goals (see section 2.1.1); (c) regulations on instruments for financing external action25; (d) the Commission’s regional and country strategies and multian‐ nual indicative programming documents; (e) annual action programmes an‐ nexed to the Commission’s financ‐ ing decisions; (f) financing agreements with partner countries, administration/contribu‐ tion agreements with international organisations, grant agreements and contracts with non‐govern‐ mental organisations and service providers; (g) activity statements (or programme statements) as part of the budget‐ ary procedure; (h) annual management plans and annual activity reports of the Commission directorates‐general concerned. 
Bland dessa terfinns fljande: a) Frdraget om Europeiska unionens funktionsstt. b) Utvecklingsml p hg niv (se avsnitt 2.1.1). c) Frordningar om instrument fr finansiering av yttre tgrder25. d) Kommissionens regionala och landsspecifika strategier och flerriga vgledande programdokument. e) rliga handlingsprogram som fogas till kommissionens finansieringsbeslut. f) Finansieringsverenskommelser med partnerlnder, frvaltnings-/ bidragsavtal med internationella organisationer, bistndsavtal och kontrakt med icke-statliga organisationer och tjnsteleverantrer. g) Verksamhetsfrklaringar (eller programfrklaringar) som en del av budgetfrfarandet. h) rliga frvaltningsplaner och rliga verksamhetsrapporter frn kommissionens berrda generaldirektorat.
29 The administration of all these docu‐ ments, which originate from different authorities and are subject to differ‐ ent adoption cycles and procedures, necessarily leads to adjustments to objectives and indicators and, in some cases, inconsistencies. 
29 Administrationen av alla dessa dokument, som kommer frn olika myndigheter och r freml fr varierande antagningscykler och frfaranden, leder av ndvndighet till att ml och indikatorer justeras och i vissa fall till att det uppstr inkonsekvenser.
In this connec‐ tion, a results reporting pilot exercise carried out by the Commission in 2014 in the preparation of the results framework found that, where logical frameworks existed at both decision and contract levels, ‘the degree of co‐ herence between them was mixed — at best’26. 
I ett pilotfrsk med resultatrapportering som kommissionen genomfrde 2014 fr att frbereda resultatramen fann man att i de fall det fanns logiska ramar p bde besluts-och kontraktsniv var graden av verensstmmelse mellan dem i bsta fall blandad26.
30 In previous audits, the Court also found inconsistencies between objec‐ tive and indicator‐setting documents (see Box 2). 
30 I tidigare granskningar har revisionsrtten ven konstaterat inkonsekvenser mellan ml-och indikatorfaststl-lande dokument (se ruta 2).
25 OJ L 77 2014, 15.3.2014. 
25 EUT L 77 2014, 15.3.2014.
26 A logical framework is a document that provides an overview of a project’s objectives, activities and resources. 
26 En logisk ram r ett dokument som ger en versikt ver ett projekts ml, verksamheter och resurser.
It also usually outlines critical assumptions on which the project rests and provides information on how the project will be monitored, including through the use of indicators. 
I regel beskrivs ven kritiska antaganden som projektet bygger p och information ges om hur projektet kommer att vervakas, bland annat genom anvndning av indikatorer.
Example of inconsistencies between documents ‘The annual activity reports contain seven indicators for Central Asia. Though of general relevance to the suc‐ cess of EU development assistance in Central Asia, these indicators are different from those set in the Regional Strategy Paper and Multi‐annual indicative programmes; nor are they directly linked to the intended results of the Council’s new partnership strategy for Central Asia.’27 27 Special Report No 13/2013 ‘EU development assistance to Central Asia’, paragraph 79 (http://eca.europa.eu). 
Exempel p inkonsekvenser mellan dokument ÓDe rliga verksamhetsrapporterna anger sju indikatorer fr Centralasien. ven om de generellt sett r relevanta fr bedmningen av hur EU:s utvecklingsbistnd i Centralasien har lyckats r dessa indikatorer inte samma som i det regionala strategidokumentet och i de vgledande programmen, och de r inte heller direkt kopplade till de planerade resultaten av rdets nya partnerskapsstrategi fr Centralasien.Ó27 27 Srskild rapport nr 13/2013: EU:s utvecklingsbistnd till Centralasien, punkt 79 (http://eca.europa.eu).
4. Key risk areas 17 31 Inconsistencies in the formulation of objectives and indicators can give rise to confusion about what should serve as a basis for assessing what has been achieved. 
4. Centrala riskomrden 17 31 Inkonsekvenser i formuleringen av ml och indikatorer kan leda till frvirring om vad som ska ligga till grund fr bedmningen av vad som har uppntts 4.1.3.
Setting SMART objectives and clear indicators 32 Setting specific, measurable, achiev‐ able, relevant and time bound (SMART) objectives is a legal requirement for all EU development and cooperation activities. 
Faststllande av SMART-ml och tydliga indikatorer 32 Faststllandet av specifika, mtbara, uppnbara, relevanta och tidsbundna (SMART) ml r ett rttsligt krav fr alla EU:s utvecklings-och samarbetstgrder.
Moreover, the results of EU external action — including EU devel‐ opment and cooperation — and the efficiency of a particular instrument should be monitored and assessed on the basis of predefined, clear, transpar‐ ent and — where appropriate — coun‐ try‐specific and measurable indicators (see paragraph 19)28. 
Dessutom ska resultaten av EU:s yttre tgrder Đ inbegripet EU:s utvecklings-och samarbetstgrder Đ och ett visst instruments effektivitet vervakas och bedmas utifrn i frvg faststllda, tydliga, ppna och Đ i frekommande fall Đ landspecifika och mtbara indikatorer (se punkt 19)28.
Need for SMART objectives and clear indicators 28 In April 2014, the European Parliament urged the adoption of specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timed benchmarks for all programmes in Heading 4 — Global Europe — of the multiannual financial framework 2014‐2020. 
Behov av SMART-ml och tydliga indikatorer 28 I april 2014 begrde Europaparlamentet att specifika, mtbara, relevanta och tidsbundna riktmrken skulle antas fr alla program inom rubrik 4 Đ Europa i vrlden Đ i den flerriga budgetramen fr 2014Đ2020.
See the European Parliament Decision of 3 April 2014 on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2012, Section III — Commission and executive agencies — ref. 
Se Europaparlamentets beslut av den 3 april 2014 om ansvarsfrihet fr genomfrandet av Europeiska unionens allmnna budget fr budgetret 2012, avsnitt III Đ kommissionen och genomfrandeorganen Đ ref.
P7_TA‐PROV(2014)0287. Activities SMART objectives Clear indicators Input Outputs Outcome Impact Results Figure 2 
P7_TA-PROV(2014)0287. tgrder SMART-ml Tydliga indikatorer Input Output Utfall Effekter Resultat Figur 2
4. Key risk areas 18 33 In previous audits, the Court often found that the objectives set were too vague or unrealistic (see Box 3). 
4. Centrala riskomrden 18 33 I tidigare granskningar har revisionsrtten ofta konstaterat att mlen varit fr vaga eller orealistiska (se ruta 3).
Similarly, the Court often found that indicators were missing or unclear (see Box 4). Even when indicators are well defined, their interpretation can be relative and their value can vary considerably according to the context in which they are used (see Box 5). 
Revisionsrtten har ocks ofta funnit att indikatorer saknats eller varit otydliga (se ruta 4). ven nr indikatorer r vldefinierade kan tolkningen av dem vara relativ och deras vrde kan variera betydligt beroende p det sammanhang som de anvnds i (se ruta 5).
34 The results reporting pilot exercise car‐ ried out by the Commission in 2014 in the preparation of the results frame‐ work also found that, in many cases, where the logical frameworks existed in decisions and contracts, they were not of good quality, i.e. objectives were not SMART and indicators were not well defined or were based on unclear data sources. 
34 I det pilotfrsk med resultatrapportering som kommissionen genomfrde 2014 fr att frbereda resultatramen fann man ocks att i den mn det fanns logiska ramar i beslut och kontrakt var de inte av bra kvalitet, dvs. mlen var inte SMART-ml och indikatorerna var antingen inte vldefinierade eller ocks var de grundade p oklara datakllor.
35 As well as contravening regulations, failing to set SMART objectives and clear indicators undermines perfor‐ mance monitoring and results assess‐ ment, which is detrimental to account‐ ability and public audit. 
35 Frutom att det strider mot frordningarna undergrver underltenheten att faststlla SMART-ml och tydliga indikatorer kontrollen av genomfrandet och resultatbedm-ningen, vilket inverkar negativt p ansvarsutkrvandet och den offentliga revisionen.
The results of an intervention also risk being limited if its objectives are not well defined from the beginning. 
Resultaten av en intervention riskerar ocks att begrnsas om dess ml inte r vldefinierade frn brjan.
Example of objectives that were too vague or unrealistic ‘The lack of clear definition of project objectives relates mainly to equipment planned, its level of operation (quantity and quality) and the target population expected to benefit from project results. 
Exempel p ml som var fr vaga eller orealistiska ÓBristen p tydligt faststllda projektml gller frmst den utrustning som planerades, dess driftsniv (kvantitet och kvalitet) och vilken mlgrupp som frvntades dra nytta av projektresultaten.
The lack of clear and quantified measures significantly hampered the Commission’s ability to monitor progress during implementa‐ tion and later to measure and check whether the results achieved were sustained over time or not (...).’29 ‘The objectives are also sometimes overly ambitious, in particular in the case of NGO projects which have modest budgets and a relatively short implementation period. 
Bristen p tydliga och kvantifierade tgrder utgjorde ett stort hinder fr kommissionens frmga att vervaka framsteg under genomfrandet och senare att mta och kontrollera om de uppndda resultaten var hllbara i ett lngre perspektiv (...).Ó29 ÓIbland r mlen alltfr ambitisa, srskilt nr det gller frivilligorganisationers projekt som har ansprkslsa budgetar och en relativt kort genomfrandeperiod.
This was particularly true of NGO projects funded under the Food Facility: they had approximately 20 months for implementation, which in practice was reduced to more like 15 months as the first months were given over to procurement and other preparatory activities. 
Detta gllde srskilt frivilligorganisationers projekt som finansierades inom livsmedelsmekanismen: de hade ungefr 20 mnader p sig fr genomfrandet, som i praktiken minskades till cirka 15 mnader eftersom de frsta mnaderna gnades t upphandling och annan frberedande verksamhet.
In some cases, the interventions are based on unreasonable assumptions concerning the conditions necessary for successful implementation, e.g. the institutional and management capacities of the national or local authorities, the quality of rural infrastructure or the availability of suitable staff (e.g. nutritionists and extension workers).’30 29 Special Report No 13/2012 ‘European Union development assistance for drinking water supply and basic sanitation in sub‐Saharan countries’, paragraph 50 (http://eca.europa.eu). 
Ibland bygger insatserna p orimliga antaganden om vilka villkor som krvs fr ett framgngsrikt genomfrande, t.ex. nationella eller lokala myndigheters institutions-och frvaltningskapacitet, kvaliteten p infrastrukturen i landsbygdsomrdet eller tillgng till lmplig personal (t.ex. dietister och jordbruksrdgivare).Ó30 29 Srskild rapport nr 13/2012: Europeiska unionens utvecklingsbistnd till dricksvattenfrsrjning och grundlggande sanitetstjnster i lnder sder om Sahara, punkt 50 (http://eca.europa.eu).
30 Special Report No 1/2012 ‘Effectiveness of European Union development aid for food security in sub‐Saharan Africa’, paragraph 52 (http://eca. europa.eu). 
30 Srskild rapport nr 1/2012: ndamlsenligheten i Europeiska unionens utvecklingsbistnd till en tryggad livsmedelsfrsrjning i Afrika sder om Sahara, punkt 52 (http://eca.europa.eu).
4. Key risk areas 19 Examples of indicators that were missing or unclear ‘No performance indicators were included in the financing agreements for Pegase Direct Financial Sup‐ port (Pegase DFS), which makes it harder for the EEAS, the Commission and the Member States to assess the concrete results of the support (...). 
4. Centrala riskomrden 19 Exempel p indikatorer som saknades eller var otydliga ÓInga resultatindikatorer fanns med i finansieringsverenskommelserna fr Pegases direkta ekonomiska std, vilket gr det svrare fr Europeiska utrikestjnsten, kommissionen och medlemsstaterna att bedma de konkreta resultaten av stdet (...).
Moreover, this does not comply with the ENPI regulation’s explicit requirement that performance indicators be established for monitoring purposes for all forms of ENPI assistance.’31 ‘(...) in Kyrgyzstan the food security information programme contained vague indicators, such as ‘food secu‐ rity information is generally accepted to be accurate and timely’, ‘adequate numbers of staff are trained’ and ‘usefulness of crop forecast’.’32 31 Special Report No 14/2013 ‘European Union direct financial support to the Palestinian Authority’, paragraph 31 (http://eca.europa.eu). 
Dessutom verensstmmer detta inte med det uttryckliga kravet i EGPI-fr-ordningen att resultatindikatorer ska faststllas i vervakningssyfte fr alla former av EGPI-std.Ó31 Ó(...) I Kirgizistan var indikatorerna fr informationsprogrammet om tryggad livsmedelsfrsrjning vaga, till exempel att Őinformationen om tryggad livsmedelsfrsrjning anses allmnt vara korrekt och lmnas i rtt tidŐ, Őett lmpligt antal anstllda utbildasŐ och Őnyttan med skrdeprognoserŐ.Ó32 31 Srskild rapport nr 14/2013: Europeiska unionens direkta ekonomiska std till den palestinska myndigheten, punkt 31 (http://eca.europa.eu).
32 Special Report No 13/2013, paragraph 52. 
32 Srskild rapport nr 13/2013, punkt 52.
Example of the changing relevance of indicators The EU provides budget support to Cambodia for the development of its education sector. 
Exempel p att indikatorers relevans frndras EU tillhandahller budgetstd till Kambodja fr utveckling av utbildningssektorn.
In recent years, grade 12 school exams in Cambodia were undermined by cheating and corruption. 
P senare r har skolexamen i rskurs 12 i Kambodja undergrvts av fusk och korruption.
The pass rates were then around 80 %. In 2014, the Cambodian authorities undertook to prevent and eventually eliminate irregulari‐ ties in these exams, in particular by introducing measures at testing centres to prevent cheating. 
Andelen godknda elever var ungefr 80 %. r 2014 brjade de kambodjanska myndigheterna att frska frhindra och till sist undanrja oegentligheter i dessa examina, framfr allt genom att vidta tgrder vid provcentralerna fr att frhindra fusk.
A first exam organised in August 2014 led to a 25 % pass rate; a second‐chance exam organised in October brought the total pass rate for 2014 up to 41 % of candidates, roughly half the 2013 pass rate. 
En frsta examen som organiserades i augusti 2014 ledde till att 25 % godkndes. Genom en andra chans till examen som arrangerades i oktober blev det totala antalet godknda elever 41 %, vilket var ungefr hlften av andelen godknda 2013.
At first sight, the change in this indicator could be interpreted as a deterioration; however, it can alternatively be regarded as reflecting an improvement in the reliability and credibility of the exams. 
Vid frsta pseende kan frndringen av denna indikator tolkas som en frsmring. Den kan dock ocks ses som en fljd av en frbttring av examinationernas tillfrlitlighet och trovrdighet.
Defining a partner country’s commitment to implement reforms as an objective 36 For an action’s objectives to be sig‐ nificant in terms of development, they should correspond to the achievement of a result, i.e. a measurable change resulting from the action concerned. 
Faststllande av ett partnerlands tagande att genomfra reformer som ett ml 36 Om mlen fr en tgrd ska vara betydande fr utvecklingen mste de motsvara uppnendet av ett resultat, dvs. en mtbar frndring till fljd av den berrda tgrden.
Box 5 Box 4 
Ruta 5 Ruta 4
4. Key risk areas 20 37 In previous audits, the Court found that the objectives of EU actions are sometimes formulated in the form of a commitment to be taken by a part‐ ner country at a given moment. How‐ ever, in some of these cases, even if the stated objective had been met, i.e. even if the partner country appeared to have made the expected commit‐ ment, the action had then no or little significant effect over time; in other words, it did not produce any signifi‐ cant result in terms of development (see Box 6). 
4. Centrala riskomrden 20 37 I tidigare revisioner har revisionsrtten funnit att mlen fr EU:s tgrder ibland formuleras som ett tagande som ska gras av ett partnerland vid en viss tidpunkt. ven om det angivna mlet har uppfyllts, dvs. ven om partnerlandet tycks ha gjort det frvntade tagandet, har tgrden dock i vissa fall haft ingen eller liten betydande effekt ver tiden.
38 The effectiveness of EU development aid and coordination actions can be undermined when the partner coun‐ try’s apparent commitment to achiev‐ ing results, without further evidence that significant reforms are actually being implemented, is considered as a sufficient condition for payment. 
38 ndamlsenligheten i EU:s utvecklingsbistnd och samordningstgrder kan undergrvas nr partnerlandets uppenbara tagande om att uppn resultat anses vara ett tillrckligt villkor fr betalning, utan ytterligare bevis fr att betydande reformer faktiskt genomfrs.
Example of intervention where the partner country’s commitment to implement reforms did not translate into development results ‘The Commission disbursed its budget support in Kyrgyzstan in three tranches, each of which was preceded by an assessment of progress towards public financial management (PFM) objectives. 
Exempel p en intervention dr partnerlandets tagande att genomfra reformer inte lett till utvecklingsresultat ÓKommissionen betalade ut sitt budgetstd i Kirgizistan i tre delar, som var och en fregicks av en bedmning av framstegen i uppfyllandet av PFM-mlen (mlen fr frvaltning av offentliga finanser).
The Commission as‐ sessed that progress had been slow, but justified the disbursement of each of the three tranches mainly because it considered that the Kyrgyz government remained committed to further reforms. 
Kommissionen bedmde att framstegen hade gtt lngsamt men motiverade utbetalningen av var och en av de tre delarna frmst med att den kirgizistanska regeringen var fast besluten att genomfra ytterligare reformer.
There was no clear evidence for this opinion. 
Det fanns inga klara bevis fr detta.
A core part of the Commission’s reasoning for its disbursement decisions is based on its assessment of the partner countries’ commitment to reform rather than on the actual progress achieved’.33 ‘The Commission did not succeed in ensuring that the issues it brought up in the subcommittee dialogue were subsequently followed up by the Egyptian authorities with concrete actions. Even when issues raised were included as action items at the end of the meeting, they were not generally implemented. 
En central del av kommissionens motivering till utbetalningsbesluten bygger p dess bedmning av partnerlndernas taganden om att genomfra reformer snarare n p vilka framsteg som faktiskt har skett.Ó33 ÓKommissionen lyckades inte garantera att de frgor som den tog upp i dialogen i underkommittn sedan fljdes upp av de egyptiska myndigheterna i form av konkreta tgrder. ven nr frgor som hade tagits upp frdes upp som tgrdsposter i slutet av mtet genomfrdes de i regel inte.
For example, the 2009 subcommittee included as an action point ‘exploring the possibility to use EU technical assistance to advise Egypt on NGO legislation in Member States’. 
Till exempel tog underkommittn 2009 med tgrdspunkten Őutforska mjligheterna att anvnda EU:s tekniska std fr att ge rd till Egypten om lagstiftning fr frivilligorganisationer i medlemsstaternaÓ.
This was not followed up. (...) 
Detta fljdes inte upp. (...)
The Commission made no link between its criticisms of human rights violations made in the progress reports and the option of reducing or suspending EU assistance.’ 34 33 Special Report No 13/2013, paragraph 57. 
Kommissionen gjorde ingen koppling mellan sin kritik av krnkningar av de mnskliga rttigheterna som framfrdes i lgesrapporterna och alternativet att minska eller avbryta EU-stdet.Ó34 33 Srskild rapport nr 13/2013, punkt 57.
34 Special Report No 4/2013‘ EU Cooperation with Egypt in the Field of Governance’, paragraphs 39 and 41 (http://eca.europa.eu). 
34 Srskild rapport nr 4/2013: EU:s samarbete med Egypten p omrdet samhllsstyrning, punkterna 39 och 41 (http://eca.europa.eu).
4. Key risk areas 21 4.2. 
4. Centrala riskomrden 21 4.2.
Establishment of the results chain 4.2.1. 
Upprttande av resultatkedjan 4.2.1.