natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The areas covered in the pilot phase include Macroeconomic/ Fiscal indicators, PFM, public administration reform (including measures addressing the reintegration of non‐working Gaza civil servants), education, health and social protection. 
De omrden som berrs i pilotfasen r makroekonomiska/finanspolitiska indikatorer, frvaltning av de offentliga finanserna (PFM), reform av den offentliga frvaltningen (inbegripet tgrder fr att terintegrera icke-arbetande offentliganstllda i Gaza), utbildning, hlsa och socialt skydd.
An evaluation of the pilot phase will take place end 2015/early 2016 and additional sectors could be added for the next phase. 
En utvrdering av pilotfasen kommer att ske i slutet av 2015 eller i brjan av 2016 och ytterligare sektorer kan komma att lggas till i nsta fas.
The text above shows that indicators have been established, which is in line with the ENPI regulation. 
Texten ovan visar att indikatorer har faststllts, vilket uppfyller kraven i ENPI-frordningen.
Box 5 The Commission sees the case as an example where it ultimately had to adapt the understanding of the indicator to the conditions of specific local context and accordingly to accept the adaptation of the target value of the indicator. 
Ruta 5 Kommissionen ser fallet som ett exempel dr den till slut var tvungen att anpassa frstelsen fr indikatorn till frhllandena i den specifika lokala kontexten, och var drmed tvungen att acceptera en anpassning av indikatorns mlvrde.
The example demon‐ strates the importance of being continuously atten‐ tive to such situations but does not relate to a risk which the Commission can manage otherwise than in that way. 
Exemplet visar vikten av att hela tiden vara uppmrksam p sdana situationer, men det avser inte en risk som kommissionen kan hantera p ngot annat stt.
38 Institutional reforms are a long and difficult process where helping the government of a partner country to progress step by step can be more sustainable than a quick win of project. 
38 Institutionella reformer r en lng och svr process dr det kan vara mer hllbart att hjlpa en regering i ett partnerland att gra stegvisa framsteg n att uppvisa snabba projektresultat.
See reply to Box 6. 
Se svaret p ruta 6.
Box 6 The Commission notes that the quoted payments (referring to June 2008, December 2010, July 2011) largely precede the new policy on budget support which introduced a much more rigorous assess‐ ment of eligibility criteria, notably the PFM criterion. 
Ruta 6 Kommissionen noterar att de betalningar som det hnvisas till (juni 2008, december 2010, juli 2011) till vervgande del fregr de nya riktlinjerna om budgetstd, som infrde en mycket striktare bedmning av kriterierna fr stdberttigande, i synnerhet PFM-kriteriet.
The risk which is to be illustrated by this example is reduced through and since the application of the 2012 budget support guidelines. 
Den risk som illustreras av det hr exemplet minskas genom och efter infrandet av 2012 rs riktlinjer om budgetstd.
In its reply to the Court's findings the Commission also noted that ‘A distinction must be made, on the one hand, between the eligibility criteria for budget support, which require a holistic approach based on credibility and positive implementation and which are by nature general, and, on the other hand, the specific conditions, attached to variable tranches, which must indeed be clear and specific .... 
I sitt svar p revisionsrttens slutsatser noterade kommissionen ven fljande: ÓDet mste gras tskillnad mellan  ena sidan kriteriet fr berttigande till budgetstd, som krver en helhetssyn som bygger p trovrdighet och positivt genomfrande och till sin natur r vergripande, och  andra sidan de specifika villkor som stlls fr olika delar, som verkligen mste vara tydliga och specifika. [...]
Donors must acknowledge the complexity of reforms and define targets that are more reasonable and better sequenced. 
Givare mste acceptera att reformerna r komplexa och faststlla ml som r mer rimliga och har en bttre ordningsfljd.
Indeed PFM reform plans, initially largely prepared by external donors, were far too ambitious and underestimated the local capacities to implement them. 
PFM-reformplanerna, som inledningsvis till stor del utformades av externa givare, var alldeles fr ambitisa och underskattade den lokala kapaciteten att genomfra dem.
To remedy this, PFM reforms and action plans were revised to be more realistic and additional Technical Assistance was provided.’ As a result, the case is rather an example of overly ambitious objectives. 
Fr att avhjlpa detta reviderades PFM-reformerna och tgrdsplanerna s att de skulle bli mer realistiska och det beviljades ytterligare tekniskt bistnd.Ó Fallet r snarare ett exempel p fr ambitisa ml.
In addition, it has to be underlined that the reform of the system of public finance management is a long‐term process. 
Det mste dessutom understrykas att en reform av frvaltningssystemet fr de offentliga finanserna r en lngsiktig process.
Within the timespan of one operation of 3 years, only very limited results can be detected. 
Inom tidsramen fr en tgrd med en varaktighet p tre r kan endast mycket begrnsade resultat visas upp.
The case of Egypt rather relates to an example where the issue is not about defining a partner country’s commitment to implement reforms as an objective (see title of section 4.1.4) but, in terms of the 2012 budget support guidelines, about the precondition for disbursement related to essential elements like human rights. 
Fallet med Egypten rr snarare ett exempel dr problemet inte handlar om att definiera ett partnerlands tagande att genomfra reformerna som ett ml (se rubriken fr avsnitt 4.1.4), utan Đ enligt riktlinjerna om budgetstd frn 2012 Đ om den ndvndiga frutsttningen fr utbetalning med koppling till grundlggande element som mnskliga rttigheter.
Following the Council conclusions of August 2013/ February 2014 and the recommendations of the Court, the Commission has focused its assistance on socioeconomic interventions and support to civil society. 
Efter rdets slutsatser i augusti 2013/februari 2014 och revisionsrttens rekommendationer har kommissionen inriktat sitt bistnd p socioekonomiska interventioner och std till civila samhllet.
There has been no new budget support operation in Egypt since 2011, and no budget support dis‐ bursement has been made on any of the five ongo‐ ing budget support operations since 2012. 
Det har inte inletts ngra nya budgetstdsinsatser i Egypten sedan 2011, och inga utbetalningar av budgetstd har gjorts i ngon av de fem pgende insatserna sedan 2012.
Reply of the Commission 45 46 EU contributions to country development results will be reported as country results supported, thus opting for a contribution approach (see Com‐ mission’s March 2015 Staff Working Document ‘Launching the EU International Cooperation and Development Results Framework’). 
Kommissionens svar 45 46 EU:s bidrag till nationella utvecklingsresultat kommer att rapporteras som stdda landspecifika resultat, vilket innebr en bidragsstrategi (se kommissionens arbetsdokument Launching the EU International Cooperation and Development Results Framework frn mars 2015).
To quantify such contribution, two methods which are currently being used by donors are possible: — the ‘overall method’, where the total (or overall) results the EU achieved jointly with others (such as the partner country government and other donors) would be reported, rather than results linked to the share of funding that has been provided by the EU; — the ‘proportional method, where results would be reported based on the EU’s proportion of total funding. 
Fr att kvantifiera sdana bidrag r tv metoder som fr nrvarande anvnds av givare mjliga: Đ Den Óvergripande metodenÓ, dr de totala (eller vergripande) resultat som EU uppnr tillsammans med andra (till exempel partnerlandets regering och andra givare) rapporteras, snarare n resultaten med koppling till den del av finansieringen som har tillhandahllits av EU. Đ Den Óproportionella metodenÓ, dr resultaten rapporteras med utgngspunkt i EU:s andel av den totala finansieringen.
Under this approach results of projects and programmes are calculated as a pro rata share equal to the level of financial inputs provided by the EU. 
Med denna metod berknas projekt-och programresultaten som en pro rata-andel som motsvarar nivn p den finansiella input som tillhandahllits av EU.
At an aggregate level, like in the case of report‐ ing on the basis of the new results framework, one method needs to be chosen. 
P aggregerad niv, som vid rapportering med utgngspunkt i den nya resultatramen, mste en metod vljas.
As detailed budget information on inputs by others, including part‐ ner governments, is not always easily available to allow proportional results to be calculated, the Commission has opted for reporting following the overall approach as being for the time being the only realistic option to report results achieved in an aggregated way. 
Eftersom detaljerad budgetinformation om input frn andra, dribland partner-regeringar, inte alltid finns lttillgnglig fr att mjliggra en utrkning av proportionella resultat har kommissionen valt att rapportera enligt den vergripande metoden. Den r fr nrvarande det enda realistiska alternativet fr rapportering av resultat som har uppntts p ett aggregerat stt.
As equally set out in the March 2015 Staff Working Document, the overall method would also be more appropriate from an aid effec‐ tiveness perspective, with the strong focus it places on country ownership. 
Den vergripande metoden r ocks lmpligare ur ett bistndseffektivt perspektiv, eftersom den lgger starkt fokus vid landets egenansvar, vilket ocks framgr av arbetsdokumentet frn mars 2015.
Box 7 — Second indent The budget support operations in Malawi and Rwanda are dating before 2010 and largely precede the new policy on budget support which intro‐ duced a much more rigorous approach to clarifying the link between the operation financed by the EU and the national policies. 
Ruta 7 Đ Andra strecksatsen Budgetstdsinsatserna i Malawi och Rwanda dateras till fre 2010 och fregr till stor del de nya riktlinjerna om budgetstd, som infrde en mycket striktare strategi fr att klargra sambandet mellan den tgrd som finansieras av EU och de nationella strategierna.
The risk which is to be illustrated by this example is reduced through and since the application of the 2012 guidelines. 
Den risk som illustreras av det hr exemplet minskas genom och efter infrandet av riktlinjerna frn 2012.
Box 8 The operations targeted emergency budget sup‐ port measures to allow macro‐economic stabilisa‐ tion of the country with the global objective of sustaining the Democratic Republic of Congo in the economic and food crisis, and consequently, the results analysis has to be seen in this context. 
Ruta 8 Insatserna var riktade akuta budgetstdstgrder fr att mjliggra makroekonomisk stabilisering av landet med det vergripande mlet att bist Demokratiska republiken Kongo i den ekonomiska krisen och livsmedelskrisen, och resultatanalysen mste fljaktligen ses i detta sammanhang.
The PFM reform plan the Court refers to was indeed mentioned in the Financing Agreement and its establishment was one of the milestones to meas‐ ure progress. 
PFM-reformplanen, som revisionsrtten hnvisar till, omnmndes faktiskt i finansieringsavtalet och dess infrande var en av milstolparna fr att mta framstegen.
Fixed tranches are also subject to eligibility, i.e. performance related. 
Fasta delutbetalningar omfattas ocks av stdberttigande, dvs. r resultatinriktade.
Therefore the payment conditions were linked to objectives including PFM improvements. 
Betalningsvillkoren var drfr kopplade till ml som inbegrep PFM-frbttringar.
Reply of the Commission 46 Box 9 Whereas it is possible to assess in general whether a national policy to which a budget support pro‐ gramme provided support, has contributed to cer‐ tain well defined results achieved at country level, it is not possible to attribute a particular proportion of the result to the EU funding. 
Kommissionens svar 46 Ruta 9 Det r mjligt att gra en allmn bedmning av huruvida en nationell tgrd som erhllit budgetstd har bidragit till vissa vldefinierade resultat som uppntts p nationell niv, men det r inte mjligt att tillskriva EU:s finansiering en srskild andel av detta resultat.
Box 11 The example set out in Box 11 rather focuses on the insufficiency of integrating the human rights perspective in programmes than on the increased complexity due to the integration of cross‐cutting issues or on the additional resulting risks for appro‐ priate definition of objectives and indicators and related results measurement. 
Ruta 11 Exemplet i ruta 11 fokuserar snarare p att det inte r tillrckligt att integrera mnniskorttsperspekti-vet i programmen n p den kade komplexiteten p grund av integreringen av vergripande frgor, eller p de ytterligare risker som uppstr i samband med en lmplig definition av ml och indikatorer och dithrande mtning av resultaten.
Box 14 — Second indent In 2015, the Commission has introduced specific provisions on results reporting by EU implementing partners in the general conditions of the Admin‐ istration Agreement (covering the World Bank as implementing partner) and of the ‘PAGODA’ Agree‐ ment covering all pillar assessed organisations — including UN Agencies. 
Ruta 14 Đ Andra strecksatsen Kommissionen har under 2015 infrt srskilda bestmmelser om resultatrapportering fr EU:s genomfrandepartner inom ramen fr de allmnna villkoren i det administrativa avtalet (omfattar Vrldsbanken som genomfrandepartner) och i Pagoda-avtalet, som omfattar alla pelarbedmda organisationer, dribland FN-organen.
This should ensure greater availability of results data in progress and final reports transmitted by EU implementing partners. 
Detta borde skerstlla bttre tillgng till information om resultat i lges-och slutrapporterna frn EU:s genomfrandepartner.
59 The fact that in certain cases, by the nature of the project or programme, the results can only be identified and reported at the end of the project or programme, and therefore do not allow for periodic assessment of their achievement, does not inevita‐ bly lead to weak reporting on results. 
59 Det faktum att resultaten i vissa fall Đ p grund av typen av projekt eller program Đ inte kan identifieras eller rapporteras frrn projektet eller programmet har avslutats, vilket inte mjliggr regelbunden utvrdering av framstegen, innebr inte ndvndigtvis att resultatrapporteringen brister.
In such cases milestones or benchmarks can be identified which assist in tracking whether the project or programme is well under way to the effective achievement of results. 
I sdana fall kan milstolpar eller riktmrken identifieras som hjlper till att bedma om projektet eller programmet r p god vg att p ett effektivt stt uppn resultaten.
60 The Commission has already taken steps to improve evaluations by: — drafting and issuing an ‘Evaluation Policy for the European Union development cooperation’ (2014); — improving the quality of the planning, imple‐ mentation, monitoring of evaluations of pro‐ jects and programmes (ongoing); — increasing the involvement of the management in strategic evaluations already at the Inception phase (ongoing); and — applying the ‘Evaluation first principle’ in ac‐ cordance with the Communication COM(2013) 686 final. 
60 Kommissionen har redan vidtagit tgrder fr att frbttra utvrderingarna genom att Đ utarbeta och utfrda en utvrderingspolicy fr Europeiska unionens utvecklingssamarbete (2014), Đ frbttra kvaliteten p planeringen, genomfrandet och vervakningen av utvrderingarna av projekt och program (pgende), Đ ka ledningens deltagande i strategiska utvrderingar som redan r i inledningsfasen (pgende), och Đ tillmpa Óutvrdera frstÓ-principen i enlighet med meddelandet COM(2013) 686 final.
Box 15 The Commission does not consider the example as a case of weakness in results reporting or evaluation with respect to the action as a whole, the effective‐ ness of which can per definition only be assessed towards the end of or after the implementation of all its components or sub‐projects. 
Ruta 15 Kommissionen anser inte att exemplet r ett fall av bristande resultatrapportering eller utvrdering nr det gller tgrden i sin helhet. Dess effektivitet kan per definition inte bedmas frrn i slutet av eller efter genomfrandet av alla dess delar eller delprojekt.
65 In 2015, the Commission will issue its first consoli‐ dated results report in relation to the assistance provided within the context of the EU international cooperation and development policies. 
65 Kommissionen kommer under 2015 att utfrda sin frsta konsoliderade resultatrapport nr det gller det bistnd som tillhandahlls inom ramen fr EU:s internationella samarbets-och utvecklingspolitik.
This will take the form of a complementary report to the Annual report. 
Den kommer att ta formen av en kompletterande rapport till rsrapporten.
Box 16 — Third indent Improved monitoring and reporting systems and the implementation of an operational informa‐ tion management system (replacing also CRIS) will significantly step up EuropeAid’s use of informa‐ tion systems for reporting, in particular results reporting. 
Ruta 16 Đ Tredje strecksatsen Frbttrade vervaknings-och rapporteringssystem och infrandet av ett operativt frvaltningssystem fr information (erstter ven Cris) kommer att ka EuropeAids anvndning av informationssystemen fr rapportering betydligt, srskilt vad gller resultatrapportering.
Reply of the Commission 47 Box 17 The weaknesses of national data collection and information management systems in the countries to which the EU provides assistance is a factor which is inherent to the developing status of the countries concerned and a permanent point of con‐ cern on all donors’ side. 
Kommissionens svar 47 Ruta 17 Bristerna i den nationella uppgiftsinsamlingen och frvaltningssystemen fr information i de lnder som erhller bistnd frn EU r en inneboende faktor i de berrda lndernas utvecklingsstatus och ett permanent bekymmer fr alla givare.
This can only be sustainably addressed by building up appropriate national sta‐ tistical systems. 
Detta kan endast tgrdas p ett hllbart stt om lmpliga nationella statistiksystem byggs upp.
This risk factor is mitigated on the EU side as part of the sector and other support the EU is providing. 
Den hr riskfaktorn minskar fr EU:s del som del av bland annat det sektorstd som EU tillhandahller.
72 The MFF 2014‐2020 introduces a number of new features particularly to stimulate spending pro‐ grammes' performance. 
72 Genom den flerriga budgetramen fr 2014Đ2020 infrs ett antal nya funktioner, i synnerhet fr att stimulera utgiftsprogrammens resultat.
Building on this, a Com‐ mission initiative lead by Vice‐President Kristalina Georgieva, Budget and Human Resources aims at a shift from spending to an EU Budget Focused on Results. 
Kommissionen bygger vidare p detta genom ett initiativ lett av vice ordfrande Kristalina Georgieva, budget och personal, som syftar till en vergng frn utgifter till en EU-budget fokuserad p resultat.
The objective is to create the conditions for further strengthening the budget’s performance in terms of both programme results and sound financial management of funds in a balanced, com‐ prehensive approach. 
Mlet r att, p ett balanserat och vergripande stt, skapa frutsttningar fr att ytterligare frstrka budget-resultatet, bde med avseende p programresultat och en sund ekonomisk frvaltning av medel.
This aims at reducing the risk of focusing on budgetary implementation to the detriment of programme results, including spend‐ ing areas and methods by which the EU budget can maximise results and rigorous application of cost‐ effective controls for enhanced compliance. 
Detta syftar till att minska risken fr att fokusera p budgetens genomfrande i stllet fr p programresultaten, inbegripet utgiftsomrden och metoder genom vilka EU-budgeten kan maximera resultaten, samt en rigors tillmpning av kostnadseffektiva kontroller fr kad efterlevnad.
73 The Commission addresses the risk by multian‐ nual programming, by 24 months planning of the implementing individual actions and by the internal quality support group process. 
73 Kommissionen hanterar risken genom flerrig programplanering, 24-mnadersplanering av genomfrandet av enskilda tgrder och genom processen med den interna kvalitetsstdsgruppen.
These actions are complemented by further measures such as the upcoming EU Results Framework. 
De hr tgrderna kompletteras av ytterligare insatser, till exempel EU:s kommande resultatram.
See also reply to paragraph 29. 
Se ven svaret p punkt 29.
75 For budget support programmes, the Commission has developed a risk management framework (RMF) to identify major risks and mitigate them. 
75 Nr det gller programmen fr budgetstd har kommissionen utvecklat en riskhanteringsram fr att identifiera strre risker och minska dem.
The RMF is taken into account in the decision‐making pro‐ cess notably in the enhanced governance through the internal Budget Support Steering Committee. 
Man tar hnsyn till riskhanteringsramen i beslutsprocessen, srskilt vid den frbttrade styrningen genom den interna styrkommittn fr budgetstd.
The RMF informs systematically the policy dialogue with partner countries on the strategic level, as well as by focussing on key issues. 
Ramen fr riskhantering informerar systematiskt den politiska dialogen med partnerlnderna p en strategisk niv, liksom genom att fokusera p viktiga frgor.
The RMF is used to balance expected benefits, as defined in the action document, with identified risks and proposes miti‐ gating measures. 
Ramen anvnds fr att balansera frvntade frdelar, enligt vad som definieras i tgrdsdokumentet, med identifierade risker och freslr mildrande tgrder.
Internal analysis (budget support report 2013 and 2014) shows that EU budget support countries clearly show better and improving PFM performance compared with non‐budget support aid recipients. 
Interna analyser (budgetstdsrapporterna frn 2013 och 2014) visar att de lnder som fr budgetstd frn EU uppvisar bttre PFM-resultat och frbttrar dessa jmfrt med bistndsmottagare som inte fr budgetstd.
Box 19 In 2015, the Commission has decided to step up on a case‐by‐case basis the underlying assess‐ ment whether or not to work with an international organisation as an implementing partner. 
Ruta 19 Kommissionen har under 2015 bestmt sig fr att frn fall till fall utka den underliggande bedmningen av huruvida man ska arbeta med en internationell organisation som genomfrandepartner eller inte.
Box 20 The Commission recognises that changes in the political and economic context represent risks in terms of results to be attained. 
Ruta 20 Kommissionen medger att frndringar i den politiska och ekonomiska bakgrunden utgr risker med avseende p de resultat som ska uppns.
This type of risks are the reason why the context analysis is an important feature of the standard identification and formula‐ tion process applied by the Commission’s services and EU Delegations in the preparation of projects and programmes. 
Den hr typen av risker r anledningen till varfr bakgrundanalysen r en viktig del i den standardiserade identifierings-och utformningsprocess som anvnds av kommissionens avdelningar och EU:s delegationer i samband med frberedandet av projekt och program.
Reply of the Commission 48 In order to adapt to unforeseen changes of the aid context a certain degree of flexibility is needed during the implementation phase. 
Kommissionens svar 48 Fr att kunna anpassa sig till ofrutsedda frndringar som rr bistndet r det ndvndigt med en viss grad av flexibilitet under genomfrandefasen.
This has been ensured by simplifying relating rules and proce‐ dures as of July 2014. 
Detta har skerstllts genom en frenkling av reglerna och frfarandena frn och med juli 2014.