natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
No robust comprehensive needs assessments in place for AMIF NPs 67 The AMIF NPs for 2014-2020 allocated Ű328.3 million to Greece and Ű394.2 million to Italy. 
Inga robusta, grundliga behovsbedmningar fr Amifs nationella program 67 Amifs nationella program fr 2014Đ2020 anslog 328,3 miljoner euro till Grekland och 394,2 miljoner euro till Italien.
68 Embedded in an overall strategic plan, a multiannual fund like AMIF calls for robust, comprehensive needs assessments, where all needs are costed, prioritised and 
68 Fr en flerrig fond som Amif, som ingr i en vergripande strategisk plan, mste det gras robusta och vergripande behovsbedmningar, dr alla behov prisstts, prioriteras och regelbundet uppdateras22.
The ever-changing situation left little time to establish such needs assessments in Greece and Italy. 
Den stndigt frnderliga situationen gjorde att det fanns vldigt lite tid till att genomfra sdana behovsbedmningar i Grekland och Italien.
69 We examined ten AMIF national projects: five in Greece and five in Italy (a detailed assessment of GR-1 to 5 and IT-1 to 5 can be found in Annex II). 
69 Vi underskte tio nationella Amif-projekt: fem i Grekland och fem i Italien (en utfrlig bedmning av GR-1 till 5 och IT-1 till 5 finns i bilaga II).
We found that all projects audited were relevant insofar as they had a demonstrable thematic link to national programme goals. 
Vi fann att alla granskade projekt var relevanta genom att de hade en pvisbar tematisk lnk till mlen inom de nationella programmen.
However, without all needs costed and prioritised, it is not possible to assess whether the AMIF funds were assigned where they were needed the most. 
Men alla behov mste prissttas och prioriteras om det ska g att bedma huruvida Amif-medlen anslogs till de strsta behoven.
70 We found weaknesses in the performance indicators of the audited projects. 
35 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden 70 Vi fann brister i prestationsindikatorerna fr de granskade projekten.
Some projects lacked specific output or outcome indicators (IT-1, GR-2). 
Vissa projekt saknade srskilda output-eller utfallsindikatorer (IT-1, GR-2).
Some indicators set targets which were too low (IT-2, 3, 4) or had already been achieved (GR-1). 
Fr vissa indikatorer faststlldes mlvrden som var fr lga (IT-2, 3 och 4) eller som redan uppntts (GR-1).
Some indicators were not updated after the scope of the project was amended (GR-3) or, finally, set a restrictive time frame for assisted voluntary returns and reintegration (GR-5). 
Vissa indikatorer uppdaterades inte efter att projektets omfattning ndrats (GR-3) eller, till sist, hade en restriktiv tidsram fr bistnd vid frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning (GR-5).
71 We found an overlap between the audited AVRR projects in Italy IT-2 and IT-3. 
71 Vi fann att de granskade projekten fr frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning i Italien IT-2 och IT-3 verlappade.
These projects were awarded under the same call for proposals, covered the same countries of origin and were carried out in the same regions of Italy. 
Projekten tilldelades inom ramen fr samma inbjudan att lmna frslag, omfattade samma ursprungslnder och genomfrdes i samma regioner i Italien.
With no mapping to ensure that the projects operated in complementary geographical areas, the projects competed to return the same migrants. 
Utan en kartlggning fr att skerstlla att projekten bedrevs i kompletterande geografiska omrden konkurrerade projekten om att terfra samma migranter.
72 Since FrontexŐs mandate was extended in 2016, there have been two EU-instruments (AMIF NP and Frontex return support) supporting the same type of forced return activities in parallel. 
72 Sedan Frontex mandat frlngdes 2016 har det funnits tv EU-instrument (Amifs nationella program och Frontex std vid tervndande) som parallellt stder samma typ av insatser vid ofrivilligt tervndande.
This also concerns the AMIF forced return projects GR-4 and IT-4. 
Detta berr ven Amif-projekten fr ofrivilligt tervndande GR-4 och IT-4.
Most of the audited AMIF NPs projects in Greece and Italy had not fully achieved their targets by the time of the audit 73 By the end of 2016, hardly any AMIF financial resources had been mobilised from Greece's NP to address the countryŐs needs arising from the migration crisis. 
Merparten av de granskade projekten inom ramen fr Amifs nationella program i Grekland och Italien hade inte till fullo uppntt sina mlvrden nr revisionen gjordes 73 I slutet av 2016 hade knappast ngra av Amifs finansiella resurser mobiliserats frn Greklands nationella program fr att tgrda landets behov till fljd av migrationskrisen.
Greece was making up for its delay in implementing commitments, but payments made under the AMIF NP remained low. 
Grekland kompenserade fr landets drjsml med att uppfylla tagandena, men utbetalningarna inom ramen fr Amifs nationella program frblev sm.
Italy caught up on delays in implementing commitments under special objectives 1 and 2, but commitments under specific objective 3 were lagging behind at the time of the audit visit (see Annex I). 
Italien minskade sina drjsml med att uppfylla tagandena fr de srskilda mlen 1 och 2, men tagandena fr det srskilda mlet 3 slpade efter nr revisionsbesket gjordes (se bilaga I).
74 In Greece, one of the five projects examined (GR-1) had ended by the time of the audit, four were still ongoing. 
36 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden 74 I Grekland hade ett av de fem granskade projekten (GR-1) avslutats nr revisionen gjordes, och fyra pgick fortfarande.
Four of the five projects had either not achieved or were unlikely to achieve (in case of ongoing projects) their intended results (Annex IV). 
Fyra av de fem projekten hade antingen inte uppntt, eller skulle sannolikt inte uppn (nr det gllde pgende projekt), sina avsedda resultat (bilaga IV).
In all projects examined, we found evidence of regular reporting and monitoring. 
Vi fann bevis fr regelbunden rapportering och vervakning i samtliga underskta projekt.
In three of the five projects, the high number of amendments made monitoring project performance and ultimately assessing their success more difficult23. 
I tre av de fem projekten frsvrades vervakningen av projektens resultat av det stora antalet ndringar som i slutndan ven pverkade bedmningen av huruvida de varit framgngsrika23.
75 In Italy, four of the five projects examined had ended by the time of the audit. 
75 I Italien hade fyra av de fem granskade projekten avslutats nr revisionen gjordes.
Of these, two partially met their objectives. 
Tv av dem ndde delvis sina ml.
One project was suspended and, for another, final data was not available (Annex IV). 
Ett projekt stoppades tillflligt och fr ett annat fanns inga slutliga uppgifter tillgngliga (bilaga IV).
In two of the five projects, reporting and monitoring were inadequate. 
I tv av de fem projekten var rapporteringen och vervakningen bristfllig.
Performance monitoring framework set up late and without targets 76 The Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework is the CommissionŐs main tool for monitoring and evaluating the performance of the AMIF NPs. 
Prestationsmtningsramen upprttades sent och saknade mlvrden 76 Den gemensamma vervaknings-och utvrderingsramen r kommissionens frmsta verktyg fr att vervaka och utvrdera resultaten av Amifs nationella program.
Owing to lengthy discussions with the Member States to agree on a harmonised set of result and impact indicators, the framework was not finalised until February 201724. 
P grund av de utdragna diskussionerna med medlemsstaterna fr att komma verens om en harmoniserad uppsttning resultat-och effektindikatorer var ramen inte klar frrn i februari 201724.
By this time, many AMIF projects had already started. 
Vid den tidpunkten hade mnga Amif-projekt redan pbrjats.
23 For example, project GR-3 has been subject to 12 amendments, changing its scope, duration and budget, GR-2 to 8 amendments altering its duration and budget, and GR-4 to 6 amendments modifying its scope, duration and budget. 
23 Exempelvis var projekt GR-3 freml fr tolv ndringar som ndrat dess omfattning, varaktighet och budget, GR-2 fr tta ndringar som ndrat dess varaktighet och budget, och GR-4 fr sex ndringar som ndrat dess omfattning, varaktighet och budget.
24 Based on the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 207/2017 of October 2016. 
24 Baserat p kommissionens delegerade frordning (EU) 207/2017 frn oktober 2016.
Insufficient performance data to facilitate a robust policy evaluation at the EU level 79 In May 2018 the Commission proposed25 revising EUROSTATŐs migration and asylum statistics to, among other things: (i) increase the frequency and content of return statistics; (ii) provide disaggregated asylum data on unaccompanied minors; and (iii) introduce new statistics on Dublin re-examination requests. 
37 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden Otillrckliga resultatuppgifter underlttar inte en grundlig politisk utvrdering p EU-niv 79 I maj 2018 freslog25 kommissionen en ndring av Eurostats statistik om migration och asyl fr att bland annat i) lmna statistik om tervndande mer regelbundet och att ka innehllet i denna, ii) tillhandahlla uppdelade asyldata om ensamkommande barn och iii) infra ny statistik om anskningar om frnyad prvning enligt Dublinfrordningen.
80 During the course of this audit, it became apparent that more performance data was needed to facilitate a robust policy evaluation at the EU level. This is not covered by the CommissionŐs proposal. 
80 Under revisionen blev det uppenbart att det behvs mer prestationsuppgifter fr att underltta en grundlig politisk utvrdering p EU-niv. Detta behandlas inte i kommissionens frslag.
81 For example, as regards asylum procedures, EUROSTAT and EASO do not collect performance data on asylum application processing times between the key milestones26 in the procedure, despite the numerous time limits set in the EU and national asylum legislation. 
81 Fr asylfrfaranden, till exempel, samlar Eurostat och Easo inte in prestationsuppgifter om handlggningstiderna fr asylanskningar mellan de viktigaste milstolparna26 i frfarandet, trots de mnga tidsfrister som faststlls i EU:s och medlemsstaternas asyllagstiftning.
EASO collects basic backlog data concerning only the ageing of pending asylum applications at the first-instance stage. 
Easo samlar in grundlggande uppgifter om efterslpningen som endast rr hur lnge pgende asylanskningar handlggs i frsta instans.
EUROSTAT collects only limited data27 on the judicial/appeal stage, but no data on pending appeals at the different instances. 
Eurostat samlar endast in begrnsade uppgifter27 om domstolsetappen/verklagandeskedet, men inga uppgifter om pgende verklaganderenden i de olika instanserna.
82 No data is collected on the swiftness of return procedures. 
82 Inga uppgifter samlas in om hur snabbt tervndandefrfaranden genomfrs.
Moreover, there are no indicators measuring the sustainability of returns, such as the number of returned migrants who attempt to come back to the EU or the success of the AVRR reintegration packages. 
Vidare finns inga indikatorer som mter tervndandenas varaktighet, till exempel antalet tervnda migranter som frsker komma tillbaka till EU eller framgngen hos paketen fr std vid frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning.
25 COM(2018) 307 final. 
25 KOM(2018) 307 slutlig.
26 Making, registering and lodging an asylum application, first-instance decision, second-instance decision, final-instance decision. 
26 Att gra, registrera och lmna in en asylanskan, beslut i frsta instans, beslut i andra instans och beslut i sista instans.
27 Only final instance decisions, database: migr_asydcfina. 
27 Endast beslut i sista instans, databas: migr_asydcfina.
35 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns EU agenciesŐ operational support not used to its full extent Efforts made by EASO to develop a more strategic approach to its support of asylum procedures 83 We assessed EASOŐs operations as relevant to the plethora of needs emerging from the large inflows of migrants to Greece and Italy. 
38 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden EU-byrernas operativa std anvndes inte i hela sin omfattning Easos frsk att utarbeta ett mer strategiskt tillvgagngsstt fr stdet till asylfrfaranden 83 Vi bedmde att Easos insatser var relevanta fr den uppsj av behov som uppstod genom det stora infldet av migranter till Grekland och Italien.
84 When supporting these Member States during the migration crisis, particularly with the peak migrant arrivals in 2015 and 2016, and taking into account the continuous and frequent developments, EASO had no time to conduct comprehensive needs assessments prioritising and costing needs, or to establish either multiannual plans or exit strategies. 
84 Nr Easo bistod dessa medlemsstater under migrationskrisen, i synnerhet nr antalet anlndande migranter ndde sin kulmen 2015 och 2016, och med hnsyn till den stndiga och ofta ndrade utvecklingen, hade byrn inte tid att genomfra vergripande behovsbedmningar, prisstta och vrdera behov eller upprtta vare sig flerriga planer eller exitstrategier.
However, no such structured assessment was prepared for the 2017 and 2018 operating plans either. 
Ngon sdan strukturerad bedmning gjordes dock inte heller infr verksamhetsplanerna fr 2017 och 2018.
The plans were agreed by EASO and the hosting Member States. 
Easo och vrdmedlemsstaterna kom verens om planerna.
However, in the absence of clearly prioritised and costed needs, it could not be demonstrated that EASO had targeted its support where needed the most. 
Men i brist p tydligt prioriterade och prissatta behov kunde det inte styrkas att Easo hade riktat sitt std dit det behvdes mest.
85 When preparing its 2019 operating plans, EASO made a substantial effort to put the key elements of strategic planning in place28. 
85 Vid utarbetandet av sina verksamhetsplaner fr 2019 gjorde Easo en betydande insats fr att faststlla de viktigaste delarna av den strategiska planeringen28.
From a conceptual point of view, we consider this approach good practice, although its effective implementation can only be assessed when examining the 2019 operating plans, which fall outside our audit scope. 
I begreppsmssigt hnseende anser vi att tillvgagngssttet r god praxis, ven om genomfrandets ndamlsenlighet endast kan bedmas vid granskning av verksamhetsplanerna fr 2019, vilket inte omfattas av vr revision.
28 A series of analytical documents (a comprehensive needs assessment, a prioritised needs assessment report and a high-level results matrix) were used to produce a three-year roadmap for both Italy and Greece. 
28 En serie analysdokument (en omfattande behovsbedmning, en bedmningsrapport om prioriterade behov samt en hgnivresultatmatris) anvndes fr att ta fram en trerig frdplan fr bde Italien och Grekland.
The roadmaps include the needs identified, their hierarchy and the solutions, accompanied by their estimated costs. 
Frdplanerna inbegriper de konstaterade behoven, deras rangordning och lsningar, tillsammans med de uppskattade kostnaderna fr dem.
36 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns 
39 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden 86 Fram till 2018 var verksamhetsplanerna inputdrivna.
87 Although we have found no concrete examples of an overlap, the Commission and EASO have no procedure in place to systematically involve EASO in planning AMIF projects, in particular for projects (whether under AMIF NPs or EMAS) funding similar activities (e.g. funding GAS staff or supporting the questure in Italy). 
87 ven om vi inte hittade ngra konkreta exempel p verlappning har varken kommissionen eller Easo inrttat ngot frfarande fr att systematiskt involvera Easo i planeringen av Amif-projekt, i synnerhet projekt (oavsett om projekten genomfrs inom Amifs nationella program eller via katastrofbistndet) som finansierar liknande verksamheter (t.ex. finansiering av personal vid den grekiska asylmyndigheten eller std till questure i Italien).
88 In Italy, EASO adjusted its support as migratory flows decreased significantly. 
88 I Italien anpassade Easo sitt std nr migrationsstrmmarna minskade markant.
It stopped supporting information provision at the end of 2018. 
Byrn slutade stdja tillhandahllandet av information i slutet av 2018.
Less registration support was provided than planned and is scheduled to be phased out by the end of 2019. 
Det gavs mindre std till registreringar n planerat och det ska enligt planen fasas ut i slutet av 2019.
EASO also intends to stop its support to the territorial asylum commissions30 by the end of 2019. 
Easo avser ven att upphra med sitt std till de territoriella asylkommissionerna30 i slutet av 2019.
89 Although certain elements of EASOŐs support could be performed by the national authorities and funded under AMIF (e.g. interims Đ registration experts and asylum caseworkers already seconded to GAS, or interpretation services), EASO has no such exit strategy in place for Greece. 
89 Trots att vissa delar av Easos std skulle kunna utfras av de nationella myndigheterna och finansieras inom ramen fr Amif (t.ex. tillfrordnade personer Đ registreringsexperter och asylhandlggare som redan utstationerats till den grekiska asylmyndigheten eller fr tolkning) hade Easo inte upprttat ngon sdan exitstrategi fr Grekland.
EASOŐs support hampered by a permanent shortage of Member State experts, the short duration of their deployment and other operational issues 90 As for the inputs (number of experts, interim consultants, etc.), EASOŐs deployment in Greece and Italy is broadly in line with the operating plans. 
40 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden Easo std hindrades av en konstant brist p experter frn medlemsstaterna, deras kortvariga utstationering och andra operativa problem 90 Nr det gller input (antalet experter, tillfrordnade konsulter etc.) sker Easos utstationering i Grekland och Italien i stora drag i enlighet med verksamhetsplanerna.
Annex I shows that spending was higher than the initial budget every year. 
I bilaga I visas att utgifterna verskred den ursprungliga budgeten varje r.
Nevertheless, the Greek and Italian asylum authorities we interviewed considered EASOŐs support useful in both supporting asylum procedures and strengthening national capacity. 
Trots detta ansg de grekiska och italienska asylmyndigheter som vi intervjuade att Easos std var anvndbart bde nr det gllde std till asylfrfaranden och fr att strka den nationella kapaciteten.
92 EASO operations continue to suffer from a permanent shortage of Member State experts and their average deployment duration has proven too short (on average, 50 days in Greece and 46 in Italy in 2018). 
92 Easo insatser fortstter att lida permanent brist p experter frn medlemsstaterna, och deras genomsnittliga utstationeringstid har visat sig vara alltfr kort (i genomsnitt 50 dagar i Grekland och 46 dagar i Italien 2018).
EASO does not draw up an annual deployment plan, as Frontex does. Instead, it requests expert nominations from the Member States, but often does not receive a sufficient response. 
Easo tar, till skillnad frn Frontex, inte fram ngon rlig utstationeringsplan. I stllet begr Easo att experter nomineras av medlemsstaterna, men detta leder ofta inte till ngot tillrckligt gensvar.
EASO is then obliged to use more interims to cover this shortfall. 
Easo mste drfr anvnda fler tillfrordnade personer fr att tcka upp fr denna brist.
38 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns 93 EASO support on the Greek Islands has been hampered by additional operational issues (Box 7). 
93 Easos std p de grekiska arna har hindrats av ytterligare operativa problem (ruta 7).
Box 7 Operational issues affecting EASO support to asylum procedures on the Greek islands EASO support has been hampered by a lack of working space and security concerns (riots, blocked evacuation roads). 
41 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden Ruta 7 Operativa problem som pverkar Easos std till asylfrfaranden p de grekiska arna Easos std har hindrats av en brist p arbetsutrymme samt av skerhetsproblem (upplopp och sprrade evakueringsvgar).
For example, in the highly overpopulated hotspot on Samos, EASO conducted only four interviews per shift as it only has four workstations at its disposal. 
I det mycket verfulla mottagningscentrumet p Samos, till exempel, genomfrde Easo enbart fyra intervjuer per skift eftersom det enbart har fyra arbetsstationer till sitt frfogande.
No afternoon shift was held in the winter owing to security concerns for EASO staff after dark. 
Det fanns inget eftermiddagsskift under vintern p grund av hnsyn till skerheten fr Easos personal efter mrkrets inbrott.
Admissibility interviews, lasting 2-3 hours, are conducted for all nationalities with a recognition rate higher than 25 %. 
Intervjuer fr att avgra om en anskan ska tas upp till prvning, som varar i 2Đ 3 timmar, genomfrs fr alla nationaliteter med en andel godknda asylanskningar som verstiger 25 %.
GAS systematically overturns EASOŐs legal opinions (concluding remarks) on inadmissibility for all except Syrians subject to temporary protection in Turkey, as GAS (unlike EASO and the Commission) does not generally consider Turkey to be a Ňsafe third countryÓ for international protection. 
Den grekiska asylmyndigheten upphver systematiskt Easos rttsliga yttranden (avslutande anmrkningar) om nekad prvning fr alla utom syrier som tnjuter tillflligt skydd i Turkiet, eftersom den grekiska asylmyndigheten (till skillnad frn Easo och kommissionen) generellt inte anser att Turkiet r ett Óskert tredjelandÓ fr internationellt skydd.
The resulting inefficiency was partially addressed by merging the admissibility and eligibility interviews into one step in 2017. 
Den ineffektivitet detta ledde till tgrdades delvis genom att man 2017 slog ihop intervjuerna fr att avgra om en anskan kan tas upp till prvning och intervjun fr sjlva prvningen i samma steg.
Since September 2018, EASO has issued concluding remarks on admissibility and eligibility to GAS simultaneously, to avoid unnecessary back-and-forth referrals. 
Sedan september 2018 har Easo samtidigt gett den grekiska asylmyndigheten avslutande anmrkningar om huruvida en anskan kan tas upp till prvning och om sjlva prvningen fr att undvika att renden i ondan skickas fram och tillbaka.
According to the statistics, in 2018 EASOŐs opinions considered 70 % of interviewed applicants and family members to be vulnerable (or requiring further medical assessment), according to the categories defined by Greek law, resulting in the referral by GAS to the regular procedure. 
Enligt statistiken ansg Easo 2018 att 70 % av de utfrgade skande och familjemedlemmarna var srbara (eller behvde ytterligare medicinsk bedmning), enligt den grekiska lagstiftningens kategorier, vilket ledde till att den grekiska asylmyndigheten placerade dem i det reguljra frfarandet.
We noted disagreements between EASO and GAS on the outcome of these vulnerability assessments. 
Vi noterade att Easo och den grekiska asylmyndigheten kunde ha olika sikter om srbarhetsanalysernas resultat.
Neither GAS nor EASO collects statistics on the overturn rate of vulnerability assessments that would allow us to assess the magnitude of this issue. 
Varken den grekiska asylmyndigheten eller Easo samlar in statistik ver upphvandefrekvensen nr det gller srbarhetsanalyser, vilket skulle gra det mjligt fr oss att bedma problemets omfattning.