natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Based on the data recorded in the IMS up to and including December 2018, we analysed the sources of information leading to the reporting of irregularities as fraudulent for the 2007-2013 programming period (see Figure 7). 
Baserat p de data som hade registrerats i IMS till och med december 2018 analyserade vi de informationskllor som hade lett till anmlningar av oriktigheter med misstanke om bedrgeri fr programperioden 2007Đ2013 (se figur 7).
We did not assess the data for 2014-2020 because it is still very incomplete and contains outliers (see paragraph 43). 
Vi bedmde inte uppgifterna fr 2014Đ2020 eftersom de nnu r mycket ofullstndiga och innehller avvikande vrden (se punkt 43).
45 By number, most irregularities were detected by means of on-the-spot checks by programme authorities (see paragraph 04), followed by reports from investigative or prosecution bodies. 
45 Sett till antalet upptcktes de flesta oriktigheterna genom programmyndigheternas kontroller p plats (se punkt 04), och drefter fljde anmlningar frn utrednings-eller lagfringsorgan.
This would suggest that these are the most effective means of detecting fraud in the use of Cohesion funding. 
Det tyder p att detta r de effektivaste stten att upptcka bedrgeri vid anvndningen av sammanhllningsmedel.
However, the statistics are influenced by the generalised use of audits as a fraud detection method (see paragraph 33 and Figure 5). 
Statistiken pverkas dock av den utbredda anvndningen av revisioner som en metod fr att upptcka bedrgeri (se punkt 33 och figur 5).
By value, the bulk of reports of fraudulent irregularities resulted from cases opened directly by investigative and prosecution bodies, or from revelations in the press and other media. 
Sett till vrdet var de flesta anmlningarna om oriktigheter med misstanke om bedrgeri ett resultat av renden som utrednings-och lagfringsorgan sjlva tagit initiativ till, eller av avsljanden i press och andra medier.
We consider that the statistics on the sources of information on fraud by value are strongly affected by uncertainty about the true amounts concerned, although less so when the information comes from an investigative or prosecution body. 31 
Vi anser att statistiken ver kllorna till information om bedrgeri sett till vrdet pverkas kraftigt av oskerhet om de verkliga belopp som berrs, ven om oskerheten r lgre nr informationen hrstammar frn ett utrednings-eller lagfringsorgan. 33
Figure 7 – Irregularities reported as fraudulent for 2007-2013 in the field of Cohesion by information source 32 Internal audit Press / Media Project monitoring OLAF / EC / ECA / EP / Council Data analytics / Extrapolation Whistleblowing / Complaint/ Self-admission Other Desk check (incl. public procurement) Investigative or prosecution bodies On-the-spot check 10 25 27 47 Distribution by number By number, on-the-spot checks and direct communication by investigators (police, prosecution) are the main sources of information on irregularities reported as fraudulent. 
Figur 7 Đ Oriktigheter med misstanke om bedrgeri som anmlts fr 2007Đ2013 inom sammanhllningsomrdet per informationsklla 34 Intern revision Press/medier Pro jektv ervak ning Olaf/ko mmissionen /rev ision srtten/Euro paparlamentet/rdet Dataanaly s/extr ap olering Visselblsning/Klagoml/Eget erknnande Ann an Skrivbordsgranskning (ven av offentlig upphandling) Utrednings-eller lagfringsorgan Kontroll p plats 10 25 27 47 Frdelning efter antal Sett till antalet r kontroller p plats och direkta rapporter frn utredare (polis och klagare) de frmsta kllorna till information om anmlda oriktigheter med misstankeom bedrgeri.
107 198 281 298 462 470 Distribution by value (euro) Internal audit Data analytics / Extrapolation Project monitoring Desk check (incl. public procurement) Whistleblowing / Complaint/ Self-admission OLAF / EC / ECA / EP / Council Press / Media On-the-spot check Other Investigative or prosecution bodies 608 915 10 808 632 15 985 229 72 294 461 89 723 827 99 208 426 By value, however, direct communication by investigators is b far the most effective means of detecting fraud. 215 255 628 220 028 063 290 987 423 y 549 405 506 Source: ECA, based on IMS data 
107 198 281 298 462 470 Frdelning efter vrde (euro) Intern revision Dataanalys/extrapolering Projektvervakning Skrivbordsgranskning (ven av offentlig upphandling) Visselblsning/Klagoml/Eget erknnande Olaf/kommissionen/revisionsrtten/Europaparlamentet/rdet Press/medier Kontroll p plats Annan Utrednings-eller lagfringsorgan 608 915 10 808 632 15 985 229 72 294 461 89 723 827 99 208 426 215 255 628 220 028 063 290 987 423 Sett tillvrdetrdockdirekta rapporter frn utredare det absolut effektivaste sttet att upptcka bedrgerier 549 405 506 Klla: Revisionsrtten p grundval av data frn IMS.
Fraud response, investigation and coordination among the relevant bodies 46 The Commission requires managing authorities to develop effective fraud response measures. 
Mottgrder, utredning och samordning mellan berrda organ 46 Kommissionen krver att frvaltande myndigheter ska ta fram effektiva tgrder mot bedrgeri.
These should include clear mechanisms for reporting suspected fraud and clear procedures for referring cases to the competent investigation and prosecution authorities. 
Det ska bland annat finnas tydliga mekanismer fr rapportering av misstnkt bedrgeri och tydliga frfaranden fr verlmnande av renden till de behriga utrednings-och lagfringsorganen.
Managing authorities should work with their AFCOSs, and there is a need for adequate coordination among all administrative and law enforcement bodies. 
Frvaltande myndigheter ska arbeta tillsammans med sina sambandscentraler, och alla administrativa och brottsbekmpande organ mste vara samordnade p lmpligt stt.
Managing authorities’ under-reporting has affected the reliability of the fraud detection rates published in PIF reports 47 Member States must use the IMS to notify the Commission of irregularities exceeding €10 000 that cause them to suspect or establish fraud34. 
Frvaltande myndigheters underrapportering har pverkat tillfrlitligheten hos den andel upptckta bedrgerier som offentliggrs i PIF-rapporter 47 Medlemsstaterna r skyldiga att anvnda IMS fr att meddela kommissionen om oriktigheter som verstiger 10 000 euro och ger dem anledning att misstnka eller faststlla bedrgeri34.
Member States must report suspected or established fraud cases even if they have been resolved before certification of the related expenditure to the Commission. 
Medlemsstaterna ska rapportera misstnkta eller konstaterade bedrgerirenden ven om de har tgrdats innan den aktuella kostnaden attesteras till kommissionen.
Not all potential fraud is reported as such in the IMS 48 Figure 3 above presents the fraud detection rates for 2007-2013 in EU cohesion policy. 
Allt potentiellt bedrgeri anmls inte som sdant i IMS 48 I figur 3 ovan presenteras andelen upptckta bedrgerier inom EU:s sammanhllningspolitik fr 2007Đ2013.
In special report 01/2019, we stated that the PIF report data on detected fraud was incomplete35. 
I srskild rapport nr 1/2019 fastslog vi att uppgifterna i PIF-rapporten om upptcka bedrgerier var ofullstndiga35.
We also detected several cases that raised questions about the completeness and reliability of the fraud data in the IMS and therefore limit the use that the Commission and Member States can make of the system. 
Vi upptckte ocks flera fall dr det kunde ifrgasttas om uppgifterna om bedrgeri i IMS r fullstndiga och tillfrlitliga, vilket begrnsar den nytta som kommissionen och medlemsstaterna kan ha av systemet.
For instance, cartel offences (bid rigging) are not always 34 Article 122(2) of the CPR; Articles 3 and 4 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/1970 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with specific provisions on the reporting of irregularities (OJ L 293, 10.11.2015, p. 
34 Artikel 122.2 i frordningen om gemensamma bestmmelser, artiklarna 3 och 4 i kommissionens delegerade frordning (EU) 2015/1970 om komplettering av Europaparlamentets och rdets frordning (EU) nr 1303/2013 med srskilda bestmmelser om rapportering av oriktigheter (EUT L 293, 10.11.2015, s.
1); Article 28(2) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1828/2006 (rules for implementation). 
1) och artikel 28.2 i kommissionens frordning (EG) nr 1828/2006 (tillmpningsfreskrifter).
35 ECA special report 01/2019: “Fighting fraud in EU spending: action needed”, paragraphs 21 to 32. 33 
35 Revisionsrttens srskilda rapport nr 1/2019 Kampen mot bedrgerier i samband med EU-utgifter: mer behver gras, punkterna 21Đ32. 35
reported as fraudulent in Spain but other Member States, such as Latvia, systematically report them. 
Till exempel anmls inte alltid konkurrensbegrnsande samverkan (uppgjorda anbud) som bedrgeri i Spanien, medan andra medlemsstater, ssom Lettland, systematiskt anmler sdana fall.
50 We came across cases where irregularities giving clear indications of fraud were not properly reported to the Commission because they had been detected and corrected before certification of the related expenditure to the Commission. 
50 Vi ptrffade renden dr oriktigheter med tydliga indikationer p bedrgeri inte hade anmlts korrekt till kommissionen eftersom de hade upptckts och korrigerats innan den aktuella kostnaden hade attesterats till kommissionen.
However, Member States are supposed to report suspicions of fraud (as ‘attempted fraud’) even if there is ultimately no EU co-financing. 
Medlemsstaterna r dock skyldiga att rapportera misstankar om bedrgeri (som Ófrsk till bedrgeriÓ) ven om EU i slutndan inte bidrar med medfinansiering.
In Hungary, the managing authorities do not report suspicions of fraud that are resolved prior to certification to the Commission. 
I Ungern anmler inte de frvaltande myndigheterna misstankar om bedrgeri som har tgrdats innan de aktuella kostnaderna attesteras till kommissionen.
In Spain, the managing authority responsible for the ESF withheld payments as a precautionary measure, but without reporting to the Commission on the expenditure affected by cases of alleged fraud that had appeared in the press. 
I Spanien hll den frvaltande myndigheten med ansvar fr ESF inne betalningar som en frebyggande tgrd men anmlde inte till kommissionen de utgifter som berrdes av misstnkt bedrgeri och hade rapporterats i pressen.
51 We found inconsistencies in the Member States’ use of administrative or legal acts to trigger reporting to the Commission. 
51 Vi fann att medlemsstaterna inte r konsekventa i sitt stt att anvnda frvaltningstgrder eller rttsliga tgrder fr att utlsa en anmlan till kommissionen.
For instance, Romania does not systematically report ongoing investigations or decisions to prosecute in the IMS. 
Till exempel rapporterar Rumnien inte systematiskt pgende utredningar eller beslut om tal i IMS.
As required by Romanian law, suspicions of fraud are only encoded when a managing authority, the audit authority, the AFCOS or OLAF issues an additional separate control/investigation report, even if an investigation is already ongoing or has been concluded. 
I enlighet med rumnsk lag registreras inte misstankar om bedrgeri i systemet frrn en frvaltande myndighet, revisionsmyndigheten, sambandscentralen eller Olaf upprttar en extra separat kontroll-/utredningsrapport Đ inte ens om utredningen redan pgr eller har avslutats.
As a result, reporting in IMS is unduly delayed and some cases in the courts might be totally excluded from the system. 
Rapporteringen i IMS blir drfr ondigt frsenad, och ngra domstolsrenden kan komma att helt uteslutas frn systemet.
52 Finally, we also found that the Hungarian AFCOS has a large backlog of cases to be analysed prior to reporting in the IMS. 
52 Slutligen konstaterade vi ocks att sambandscentralen i Ungern ligger lngt efter med renden som ska analyseras innan de rapporteras i IMS.
The IMS contains some inaccuracies and obsolete data 53 We found examples of inaccurate or obsolete data in the IMS, particularly in relation to the status of a case and the key dates in the sanctioning procedure. 
IMS innehller ngra felaktiga och frldrade data 53 Vi fann exempel p felaktiga eller frldrade data i IMS, srskilt betrffande ett rendes status och viktiga datum i sanktionsfrfarandet.
This could indicate that a managing authority, the data validator or AFCOS has not carefully checked data quality. While this situation is not satisfactory, it does not usually affect the number of fraud cases reported in IMS. 
Det skulle kunna tyda p att en frvaltande myndighet, den som har validerat uppgifterna eller sambandscentralen inte noggrant har kontrollerat uppgifternas kvalitet. ven om detta inte r tillfredsstllande brukar det inte pverka det antal bedrgerirenden som rapporteras i IMS.
54 We identified inconsistencies in the approach taken by managing authorities to assess the financial impact of potential fraud. 
54 Vi konstaterade att frvaltande myndigheter inte bedmde de finansiella effekterna av potentiellt bedrgeri p samma stt.
As a result, similar legal offences may be quantified differently in the IMS by different Member States. 
drfr kvantifieras olika i IMS av olika medlemsstater.
Most concerned are cases where it is difficult to state accurately how much expenditure is affected (e.g. conflicts of interest in project selection or public procurement infringements). 
Det gller frmst renden dr det r svrt att korrekt ange hur stora utgifter som berrs (t.ex. intressekonflikter vid projekturval eller vertrdelser vid offentlig upphandling).
Under-reporting has affected the reliability of fraud detection rates 55 The 2017 PIF report gives fraud detection rates for each Member State and for the EU as a whole, based on the data reported in the IMS by Member States’ authorities and AFCOSs (see paragraph 07). 
Underrapportering har pverkat tillfrlitligheten hos andelen upptckta bedrgerier 55 I 2017 rs PIF-rapport redovisas andelen upptckta bedrgerier fr varje medlemsstat och fr hela EU. Redovisningen bygger p de data som myndigheter i medlemsstaterna och sambandscentralerna har rapporterat i IMS (se punkt 07).
It does not provide a similar comparative indicator regarding the number of irregularities across the EU in the field of cohesion policy. 
Rapporten innehller ingen liknande jmfrbar indikator fr antalet oriktigheter i hela EU inom sammanhllningspolitiken.
To compute this figure, we compared the number of fraudulent irregularities reported by each Member State with the amount they had received in EU funds (see Figure 8). 
Fr att berkna den siffran jmfrde vi det antal oriktigheter med misstanke om bedrgeri som varje medlemsstat hade anmlt med det EU-std som de hade ftt (se figur 8).
We found that France reports the fewest fraudulent irregularities for each euro it receives from the EU. 
Vi fann att Frankrike rapporterar det lgsta antalet oriktigheter med misstanke om bedrgeri fr varje euro som landet fr frn EU.
In our view, France does not adequately report irregularities, including suspicions of fraud. 
Vi anser att Frankrike inte rapporterar oriktigheter, inklusive misstnkt bedrgeri, p ett tillfredsstllande stt.
Figure 8 – Cohesion policy funds – EU funds received per irregularity reported as fraudulent - 2007-2013 programming period 35 France Lithuania Sweden Ireland Portugal Greece Belgium Italy Hungary Denmark Spain Croatia Poland United Kingdom Bulgaria EU Total Estonia Czechia Austria Slovenia Netherlands Germany Latvia Cyprus Romania Slova kia Malta 0 500 1 000 1 500 2 000 2 500 Source: ECA, based on 2017 PIF report. 
Figur 8 Đ Sammanhllningspolitiska medel Đ mottaget EU-std per oriktighet som anmlts som bedrgeri Đ programperioden 2007Đ2013 37 Frankrike Litauen Sverige Irland Portugal Grekland Belgien Italien Ungern Danmark Spanien Kroatien Polen Frenade... Bulgarien EU totalt Estland Tjeckien sterrike Slovenien Nederlnderna Tyskland Lettland Cypern Rumnien Slovakien Malta 0 500 1 000 1 500 2 000 2 500 miljoner euro Klla: Revisionsrtten, baserat p 2017 rs PIF-rapport.
This chart does not include Finland or Luxembourg, which reported no fraudulent irregularities for the period. 
Varken Finland eller Luxemburg finns med i diagrammet eftersom de inte anmlde ngra oriktigheter med misstanke om bedrgeri under perioden.
56 In our view, the fraud detection rates published by the Commission are actually fraud reporting rates: they do not necessarily reflect the effectiveness of Member States’ detection mechanisms or even indicate how much fraud is actually detected, but rather show how many cases Member States have decided to report to the Commission (see paragraphs 48 to 52). 
56 Vi anser att de andelar upptckta bedrgerier som kommissionen offentliggr i realiteten visar andelen anmlda bedrgerier Đ de terspeglar inte ndvndigtvis effektiviteten hos medlemsstaternas upptcktsmekanismer och visar inte heller hur mycket bedrgeri som verkligen upptcks utan snarare hur mnga renden som medlemsstaterna har bestmt sig fr att anmla till kommissionen (se punkterna 48 till 52).
In our special report 01/2019, we concluded that the correlation between fraud detection rates and other corruption risk indicators is weak36. 
I vr srskilda rapport nr 1/2019 drog vi slutsatsen att korrelationen mellan andelen upptckta bedrgerier och andra korruptionsriskindikatorer r svag36.
57 In the light of the problems we identified, we consider that the fraud detection rate published in the 2017 PIF report for cohesion policy does not give a true representation of the incidence of fraud in the Member States we visited. 
57 Med tanke p de problem som vi identifierade anser vi att den andel upptckta bedrgerier som offentliggjordes i 2017 rs PIF-rapport om sammanhllningspolitiken inte ger en rttvisande bild av frekomsten av bedrgeri i de medlemsstater som vi beskte.
Several managing authorities fail to systematically communicate suspicions of fraud to investigation or prosecution bodies 58 A key part of reducing fraud risk and heightening fraud deterrence is for competent judicial bodies (police, prosecutors and others) to investigate reports of fraud in a coordinated and timely manner. Although this audit did not cover the work of investigation and prosecution bodies, we did assess the way managing authorities communicate and coordinate with them. 
Flera frvaltande myndigheter rapporterar inte systematiskt misstnkt bedrgeri till utrednings-eller lagfringsorgan 58 En viktig faktor fr att minska riskerna fr bedrgeri och i strre utstrckning avskrcka frn bedrgeri r att behriga lagfringsorgan (polis, klagare och andra) snabbt och samordnat utreder rapporterat bedrgeri. ven om utrednings-och lagfringsorganens arbete inte ingick i den hr revisionen bedmde vi hur de frvaltande myndigheterna kommunicerar och samordnar med dem.
59 Putting the principle of fraud deterrence into practice requires managing authorities (or any other authority detecting potential irregularities) promptly and systematically to communicate suspicions of fraud to the relevant investigative or prosecution bodies, which are the only ones capable of determining intent. 
59 Fr att principen om att avskrcka frn bedrgeri ska kunna tillmpas i praktiken mste frvaltande myndigheter (eller andra myndigheter som upptcker potentiellt bedrgeri) snabbt och systematiskt underrtta de berrda utrednings-eller lagfringsorganen om bedrgerimisstankarna, eftersom endast de kan faststlla om uppst freligger.
In several cases we found that managing authorities failed to systematically report suspected fraud to the bodies charged with investigation. 
I flera fall fann vi att frvaltande myndigheter inte systematiskt rapporterade misstnkt bedrgeri till de organ som ansvarar fr utredningar.
In Greece, for instance, the managing authorities had not referred any of the suspicions of fraud sampled for our audit to the prosecution services. 
I Grekland, till exempel, hade de frvaltande myndigheterna inte verlmnat ngot av de misstnkta bedrgerifallen i urvalet fr vr revision till lagfringsorganen.
In Spain we found no specific instructions or procedures requiring managing authorities to report all suspected fraud in this way. 
I Spanien fann vi inga specifika instruktioner eller frfaranden som anger att frvaltande myndigheter r skyldiga att rapportera alla misstankar om bedrgeri p detta stt.
Failure to communicate suspicions of fraud severely limits the deterrent effect of possible investigation and prosecution. 
Om misstnkta bedrgerifall inte rapporteras begrnsas den avskrckande effekten av eventuell utredning och lagfring allvarligt.
60 Investigators and prosecutors regularly turn down requests to open criminal investigation of cases referred to them by managing authorities. 
60 Utredare och klagare avslr regelbundet begranden om att inleda en brottsutredning av renden som frvaltande myndigheter har verlmnat till dem.
This is quite normal, as only these specialised services have the legal capacity and investigative resources to establish whether a criminal act may have taken place. 
Detta r helt normalt eftersom endast dessa specialiserade enheter har juridisk kapacitet och utredningsresurser fr att faststlla om en brottslig handling kan ha gt rum.
should always analyse the reasons for a rejection and, where possible and appropriate, amend their operational procedures. 
De frvaltande myndigheterna ska dock alltid analysera sklen till avslaget och, nr det r mjligt och lmpligt, ndra sina operativa frfaranden.
We found that only Latvia has made arrangements to analyse why referred cases are rejected and take the necessary action. 
Vi konstaterade att endast Lettland hade rutiner fr att analysera varfr verlmnade renden avsls och vidta ndvndiga tgrder.
Corrective measures have a limited deterrent effect 61 Managing authorities are expected to recover EU funds that are spent fraudulently37. 
Korrigerande tgrder har en begrnsad avskrckande effekt 61 Frvaltande myndigheter frvntas terkrva EU-medel som anvnts p ett bedrgligt stt37.
They are also charged with making a thorough and critical review of any internal control systems that may have exposed them to potential or proven fraud. 
De ska ven gra en grundlig och kritisk genomgng av interna kontrollsystem som kan ha exponerat dem fr potentiellt eller bevisat bedrgeri.
62 The most common corrective measure is to withdraw affected expenditure from the declarations made to the Commission, but without recovering funds from the perpetrator of fraud or imposing any type of additional deterrent action such as a sanction or penalty. 
62 Den vanligaste korrigerande tgrden r att felaktiga utgifter dras av frn deklarationerna till kommissionen, men utan att medlen terkrvs frn den som gjort sig skyldig till bedrgeri eller att det vidtas ngon annan avskrckande tgrd, ssom en sanktion eller en pfljd.
There is nothing unusual about this procedure, as in most of the cases we reviewed the actual occurrence of fraud had not yet been established. 
Det r inget ovanligt med detta frfarande eftersom det i de flesta renden som vi granskade nnu inte hade faststllts att bedrgeri hade gt rum.
According to the IMS, however, Member State authorities had initiated the recovery of EU funds in only 84 out of 159 cases of established fraud38. 
Men enligt IMS hade medlemsstaternas myndigheter brjat terkrva EU-medel i endast 84 av de 159 renden dr bedrgeri hade konstaterats38.
Withdrawing expenditure from declarations to the Commission is an effective way of protecting the EU’s financial interests. 
Att kostnader dras tillbaka frn deklarationer till kommissionen r ett effektivt stt att skydda EU:s finansiella intressen.