natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For the purposes of ensuring more effective preparation, it would have been desirable for the Commission at an earlier stage to have required Candidate Countries to designate these authorities. 
Fr att garantera en mer ndamlsenlig frberedelse borde kommissionen i ett tidigare skede ha begrt att kandidatlnderna skulle utse dessa myndigheter.
59. Even after the managing and paying authorities were designated, the identification of effective institution-building projects was hindered by uncertainty over which departments within ministries would play what role and the fact that the identity and role of intermediate bodies was also not yet clear. 
59. ven efter det att frvaltningsmyndigheter och utbetalande myndigheter hade utsetts hindrades identifieringen av ndamlsenliga institutionsuppbyggnadsprojekt av oskerhet kring vilka roller de olika avdelningarna inom ministerierna skulle ha, och det var heller inte klart vilka de frmedlande organen var och vilken roll de hade.
The task of Phare concerning institution-building at regional level was particularly difficult. 
Phares uppgift nr det gller institutionsuppbyggnad var srskilt svr p regional niv.
Most countries only started to establish administrative structures at regional level (32) for the purpose of managing the Structural Funds. 
De flesta lnderna brjade inrtta administrativa strukturer p regional niv (32) endast i syfte att frvalta strukturfonderna.
Often the boundaries of the newly created regions did not reflect natural historical or geographical boundaries and did not have political bodies as these tended to reside at county level (33). 
Ofta hade de nyligen inrttade regionernas grnser inga naturliga historiska eller geografiska grunder och det fanns inga regionala politiska organ, d dessa oftare fanns p subregional niv (33).
In several countries, for example Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, regional structures for managing the Structural Funds were only put in place at the end of 2001. 
I flera lnder, till exempel Bulgarien, Tjeckien och Slovakien inrttades inte regionala strukturer fr frvaltning av strukturfonderna frrn i slutet av 2001.
This meant Twinning projects could not be set up at regional level in these countries before this time. 
Detta betydde att partnersamverkansprojekt inte kunde inledas p regional niv i dessa lnder fre detta datum.
In the Czech Republic Twinning assistance to the regions carried out under the SPP was significantly less than had been foreseen. 
I Tjeckien var det partnersamverkansbistnd som genomfrdes genom det srskilda frberedande programmet till regionerna betydligt lgre n planerat.
This was in part due to the setting up of new regional structures in the first half of 2001. 
Detta berodde delvis p att nya regionala strukturer inrttades under frsta halvret 2001.
Under the Twinning covenant financed from the ESC 2000 programme, it was intended during the course of 2001 and 2002 to make up for the limited inputs at regional level made during the 1998 project. 
Det var meningen att den begrnsade insatsen p regional niv som gjordes under projektet 1998 skulle kompenseras under loppet av 2001 och 2002 genom avtalet om partnersamverkan som finansierades genom programmet fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning 2000.
However, continuing uncertainty, in particular, over the role of Regional Executive Units and Regional Secretariats (32) in the implementation of the Structural Funds meant that in this case too the twinners reduced the amount of time they spent working at regional level. 
Fortsatt oskerhet om de regionala verkstllande enheternas och de regionala sekretariatens (32) roll i genomfrandet av strukturfonderna betydde att samverkanspartnerna ven i detta fall begrnsade den tid de lade ner p arbete p regional niv.
In certain other countries, where regional structures had been established earlier, large Twinning projects were carried out in most or all regions of the country under the ESC 2000 programme. 
I vissa andra lnder dr regionala strukturer hade inrttats tidigare genomfrdes stora partnersamverkansprojekt i de flesta eller alla regioner i landet inom programmet fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning 2000.
However, in half of the regions in Hungary and Romania, and all the regions supported in Poland, no ESC funding was allocated to ESC investment projects. 
I hlften av regionerna i Ungern och Rumnien och i alla understdda regioner i Polen gavs emellertid inga medel fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning till investeringsprojekt fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning.
Moreover, in Romania, none of the eight Regional Development Agencies (32) where the twinners were located had a budget from central government to cover their running costs, which also made the work of the twinners more difficult. 
I Rumnien hade dessutom ingen av de tta regionala utvecklings-byrer (32) dr samverkanspartnerna fanns en budget frn den centrala regeringen fr att tcka de lpande kostnaderna, vilket ocks frsvrade samverkanspartnernas arbete.
Under the 2000 Twinning covenants, one of the main tasks both at regional and national level was to assist in drawing up regional operational programmes for each region (32). 
I partnersamverkansavtalen fr 2000 var en av huvuduppgifterna bde p regional och nationell niv att hjlpa till med utarbetandet av regionala operativa program fr varje region (32).
The decision in 2001 by Directorate-General Regional Policy to only allow one Regional Operational Programme per country meant that covenants had to be subsequently modified. 
Det beslut som fattades 2001 av Generaldirektoratet fr regionalpolitik att endast tillta ett regionalt operativt program per land betydde att avtalen behvde frndras.
(32) NUTS II level. 
(32) NUTS II-niv.
(33) NUTS III level. 
(33) NUTS III-niv.
C 15/18 EN Official Journal of the European Union 20.1.2005 CONCLUSIONS Difficulties in the overall approach of using the Phare programme to prepare Candidate Countries for managing the Structural Funds 63. 
C 15/18 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 20.1.2005 SLUTSATSER Svrigheter med den vergripande strategin att anvnda Phare-programmet fr att frbereda kandidatlnderna fr frvaltningen av strukturfonderna 63.
There were several difficulties concerning the CommissionŐs overall approach to using the Phare programme for managing the Structural Funds. 
Det fanns flera svrigheter med kommissionens vergripande strategi att anvnda Phare-programmet fr att frvalta strukturfonderna.
It was the instrument used in the context of preparing for the ERDF and ESF although it was clear in advance that there were limitations on how far Structural Fund procedures could be replicated under Phare. 
Phare var det instrument som anvndes nr det gllde att frbereda fr ERUF och ESF ven om det stod klart redan i frvg att det fanns grnser fr hur lngt strukturfonds-frfarandena kunde kopieras inom Phare.
In the absence of arrangements similar to those under Sapard and ISPA, it was more difficult to gain practical experience in managing and controlling ESF and ERDF type expenditure (see paragraphs 16 and 17). 
Eftersom det inte fanns arrangemang liknande dem som fanns fr Sapard och Ispa, var det svrare att f praktisk erfarenhet av att frvalta och kontrollera utgifterna av typerna ESF och ERUF (se punkterna 16 och 17).
The approach to programming initially followed by Phare did not reflect actual practice in the Structural Funds (see paragraphs 18 to 24). 
Det frfarande fr programplanering som ursprungligen anvndes inom Phare speglade inte det verkliga arbetssttet fr strukturfonderna (se punkterna 18Đ24).
This situation arose in part because of the tension between the two objectives of the Phare ESC programmes: on the one hand to use them to prepare for Structural Funds, and on the other hand to already achieve a cohesion impact through these programmes (see paragraph 27). 
Denna situation uppstod delvis p grund av spnningarna mellan de tv mlen fr Phares program fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning.  ena sidan skulle de anvndas fr frberedelsen fr strukturfonderna,  andra sidan fr att n en sammanhllningseffekt redan genom dessa program (se punkt 27).
More generally, the use of the Phare programme was not linked to an overall strategy defining the pre-accession and post-accession needs of the Candidate Countries in terms of preparing for and then utilising the Structural Funds (see paragraph 28). 
Mer allmnt var anvndandet av Phare-programmet inte kopplat till en vergripande strategi som definierade kandidatlndernas behov fre och efter anslutningen nr det gller frberedelser fr och anvndandet av strukturfonderna (se punkt 28).
Limited progress in moving Phare closer to Structural Funds 64. Although an important part of the CommissionŐs strategy for using Phare to prepare Candidate Countries for managing ERDF and ESF was to modify Phare procedures to make them more akin to those of the Structural Funds, only limited progress was made in this respect. 
Begrnsade framsteg med att gra Phare-programmet mer likt strukturfonderna 64. ven om en viktig del i kommissionens strategi att anvnda Phare fr att frbereda kandidatlnderna fr frvaltningen av ERUF och ESF var att frndra frfarandena fr Phare s att de skulle bli mer lika frfarandena fr strukturfonderna, gjordes endast begrnsade framsteg p detta omrde. ven om infrandet av systemet fr decentraliserat genomfrande (EDIS) inom Phare skulle innebra ett stort steg mot att gra Phare mer likt strukturfonderna, infrdes EDIS inte fre anslutningen.
As a result Candidate Countries will not have gained the experience of managing programmes similar to ERDF and ESF in an ex post control environment prior to accession, which is what the Commission originally planned (see paragraphs 30 to 32). 
Detta innebr att kandidatlnderna inte kommer att ha ftt erfarenhet av att frvalta program liknande ERUF och ESF med efterhandskontroller fre anslutningen, vilket var vad kommissionen ursprungligen hade planerat (se punkterna 30Đ32).
Furthermore, delays in introducing EDIS have made it more difficult to channel funding through grant schemes, although these are the main instruments for implementing the Structural Funds (see paragraph 33). 
Dessutom har frseningar i infrandet av systemet fr decentraliserat genomfrande gjort det svrare att kanalisera medlen genom bidragssystem, trots att dessa r det huvudsakliga instrumentet fr genomfrandet av strukturfonderna (se punkt 33).
In addition, the Commission did not introduce multi-annual programming as foreseen (see paragraphs 34 to 35). 
Kommissionen har heller inte genomfrt flerrig programplanering ssom planerat (se punkterna 34 och 35).
Variable allocations for and delayed implementation of ESC programmes 65. Although for Phare national programmes taken as a whole, the Commission achieved its target of allocating approximately 35 % of funds to the ESC, in most countries the amount of the national programme allocated to this purpose was somewhat less, thus reducing the impact of the Phare programme on contributing to their preparation for the Structural Funds (see paragraphs 38 to 44). 
Varierande anslag till och frsenat genomfrande av programmen fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning 65. ven om kommissionen sammantaget fr de nationella Phare-programmen ndde sitt ml att ansl omkring 35 % av medlen till ekonomisk och social sammanhllning anslog de flesta lnder ett ngot lgre belopp i det nationella programmet fr detta syfte, vilket begrnsade effekten av Phare-programmets bidrag till lndernas frberedelser fr strukturfonderna (se punkterna 38Đ44).
Moreover, within the total allocations available insufficient funding has been allocated to preparing future Structural Fund measures (see paragraph 45). 
Inom de totala tillgngliga anslagen har dessutom otillrckliga medel anslagits till frberedelser av framtida strukturfondstgrder (se punkt 45).
Actual programme implementation has been subject to serious delays (see paragraphs 46 to 52). 
Det faktiska programgenomfrandet har blivit kraftigt frsenat (se punkterna 46Đ52).
The difficulties encountered largely reflect the administrative weaknesses in the ministries responsible for regional development in the Candidate Countries (see paragraphs 54 and 55). 
De ptrffade svrigheterna speglar i stor utstrckning de administrativa bristerna i de ministerier som r ansvariga fr regional utveckling i kandidatlnderna (se punkterna 54 och 55).
Only partial achievement of results of institution-building projects to prepare Candidate Countries for managing the Structural Funds 66. 
Institutionsuppbyggnadsprojekten kandidatlnderna fr frvaltningen av strukturfonderna har endast delvis gett resultat 66.
The impact of institution-building projects has particularly suffered from the changes in responsibilities for regional development among ministries in beneficiary countries. 
Effekten av institutionsuppbyggnadsprojekten har delvis frsvagats p grund av att ansvaret fr regional utveckling har flyttats mellan ministerierna i de stdmottagande lnderna.
Delays in designating managing authorities and paying authorities and defining specific roles and responsibilities within them has further hindered institution-building efforts (see paragraphs 58 and 59). 
Arbetet med att utse frvaltningsmyndigheter och utbetalande myndigheter och att definiera roller och ansvarsomrden inom dessa myndigheter har ytterligare hindrat satsningar p institutionsuppbyggnad (se punkterna 58 och 59).
Slowness in setting up regional structures has restricted the scope for support to institution-building at this level in some countries (see paragraph 60). 
Det lngsamma inrttandet av regionala strukturer har lett till att mjligheten att stdja institutionsuppbyggnad p denna niv har begrnsats i vissa lnder (se punkt 60).
Overall conclusion 67. 
Allmn slutsats 67.
The Commission should be commended for starting as early as 1998 to use the Phare programme to help prepare Candidate Countries for managing the Structural Funds. However, while Phare continued to provide important support in this area over the period 1998 to 2002, at the time of accession the Phare programme had a more limited impact than expected in preparing the Candidate Countries for the ERDF and ESF to the extent the Commission had planned in its policy documents, notably the Phare Review 2000. 
Kommissionen br f berm fr att man brjade s tidigt som 1998 med att anvnda Phare-programmet fr att hjlpa kandidatlnderna att frbereda sig fr frvaltningen av strukturfonderna. ven om detta arbete gavs fortsatt std frn Phare under perioden 1998Đ2002 hade Phare-programmet vid tidpunkten fr anslutningen mindre inverkan n frvntat nr det gllde att frbereda kandidatlnderna fr ERUF och ESF i den utstrckning som kommissionen hade planerat i sina policydokument, srskilt i versynen av Phare 2000.
Making effective use of the Structural Funds will represent a major challenge for new Member States, particularly given the shortened programming and implementation period of 2004 to 2006. 
Att anvnda strukturfonderna effektivt kommer att vara en stor utmaning fr de nya medlemsstaterna, srskilt med tanke p att perioden fr programplanering och genomfrande (2004Đ2006) har frkortats.
RECOMMENDATIONS 68. 
REKOMMENDATIONER 68.
There is a significant need for more institution-building support in the area of managing the Structural Funds after the accession. 
Det finns ett stort behov av ytterligare std till uppbyggnad av institutioner fr frvaltningen av strukturfonderna efter anslutningen. fr att frbereda
20.1.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 15/19 69. 
20.1.2005 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 15/19 69.
Considerable resources should be devoted to the ex post control of Structural Fund operations in the new Member States. 
Ansenliga resurser br avsttas till efterhandskontroller av strukturfondsverksamhet i de nya medlemsstaterna.
A clear strategy should be put in place identifying the different steps that still need to be taken for preparing the current and future Candidate Countries for managing the Structural Funds. 
Det br finnas en tydlig strategi som definierar vilka ytterligare steg som behvs fr att frbereda de nuvarande och framtida kandidatlnderna fr frvaltningen av strukturfonderna.
The Commission should increase its efforts to bring Phare closer to the Structural Funds by: This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its meeting of 7 and 8 July 2004. 
Denna rapport har antagits av revisionsrtten vid dess sammantrde i Luxemburg den 7 och 8 juli 2004. Fr revisionsrtten Juan Manuel FABRA VALLS Ordfrande
C 15/20 EN Official Journal of the European Union 20.1.2005 SUMMARY I. Phare was established in 1989 and assisting Candidate Countries to prepare for Structural Funds was not part of its remit at that time. 
C 15/20 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 20.1.2005 SAMMANFATTNING I. Phare inrttades 1989 och att frbereda kandidatlnderna fr frvaltningen av strukturfonderna ingick vid dvarande tidpunkt inte i dess ansvarsomrde.
In 1997 Phare became accession-driven with the objective of preparing Candidate Countries for membership across all 31 chapters of the acquis communautaire. 
Under 1997 blev Phare anslutningsorienterat med mlsttning att frbereda kandidatlnderna fr medlemskap ver alla 31 kapitlen i Ógemenskapens regelverkÓ.
The first preparatory projects for Structural Funds and related negotiation chapters were institution building in nature and began in 1998. 
De frsta projekten fr frberedande infr strukturfonderna och drtill kopplade frhandlingskapitel inleddes 1998 och hade en institutionsuppbyggande karaktr.
Only in 2000 did Phare begin with investment projects under the title of Economic and Social Cohesion (ESC) that had a twofold provision: assistance for preparing for Structural Funds and an initial impact on development disparities. 
Det var frst under r 2000 som Phares investeringsprojekt inleddes under rubriken ekonomisk och social sammanhllning (ESS), med dubbla mlsttningar: std fr frberedelser infr strukturfonderna och en begynnande pverkan p utvecklingsskillnaderna.
The indicative target for Economic and Social Cohesion was 35 % of annual national programmes as of 2001. 
Det vgledande mlet fr den ekonomiska och sociala sammanhllningen var 35 % av de rliga nationella programmen frn 2001.
The timeframe for enlargement and hence the related timeframe for preparation was estimated to be around five to six years. 
Tidsramen fr utvidgningen och fljaktligen ocks tidsramen fr frberedelserna berknades till ungefr femĐsex r.
Through Phare, prerequisite planning processes were stimulated and overall planning capacity established and these countries were able to submit draft Structural Funds Development Plans already at the beginning of 2003, thereby ensuring early approval and launch in 2004 of Structural Funds Programming Documents for the 2004 to 2006 period. 
Genom Phare stimulerades ndvndiga planeringsprocesser och man infrde vergripande planeringskapacitet. Dessa lnder kunde redan i brjan p 2003 lmna utkast till strukturfondsutvecklingsplaner, och drigenom skerstlla ett snabbt godknnande under 2004 av strukturfondernas programdokument fr perioden 2004Đ2006.
This has never been achieved before. While not all early ambitions were realised in a timeframe compressed by rapid acceleration in the negotiations, the ESC initiative, among others, had a very significant impact on the negotiations themselves and on institutional developments. 
Ett sdant resultat har aldrig tidigare uppntts. ven om alla tidiga ambitioner inte frverkligades inom den tidsram som frkortades genom pskyndade frhandlingar fick bland annat initiativet om ekonomisk och social sammanhllning ett mycket stort inflytande p sjlva frhandlingarna och p den institutionella utvecklingen.
As a result the Council was able to close negotiations on the main Structural Funds related chapter (21) in 2002 on the basis of legislative alignment and designation of structures. 
Drmed kunde rdet under 2002 avsluta frhandlingarna om det viktigaste strukturfondsrelaterade kapitlet (21) p grundval av en anpassning av lagstiftningen och val av strukturer.
The second objective of ESC was Ôto begin to make an impact on development disparitiesŐ through focus and concentration. 
Den andra mlsttningen fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning var att genom inriktning och koncentration Óbrja pverka utvecklings-skillnadernaÓ.
Any intentionally diffused approach would have been a very poor learning model and this was clearly stated at the outset: ÔIt is neither feasible nor wise to pilot test all structures and instruments that will be developed...Ő (Phare 2000 Review). 
Varje strategi som avsiktligt spreds skulle ha varit en dlig inlrningsmodell och det angavs klart att det varken var genomfrbart eller klokt att pilottesta alla strukturer och instrument som skulle utvecklas... (versyn av Phareprogrammet r 2000).
It was foreseen from the outset that extending decentralised management (EDIS) and multiannual programming Ôcould not start until 2002 at the earliestŐ (Phare 2000 Review). 
Redan frn brjan frvntades utvidgningen av decentraliseringen (EDIS) och den flerriga programplaneringen Óinte kunna inledas frrn tidigast 2002Ó (versynen av Phareprogrammet r 2000).
It transpired that 2002 was the year that negotiation closed and consequently there has been a compression of the timeframe. 
2002 blev det r d frhandlingarna avslutades och fljaktligen har en frkortning av tidsramen genomfrts.
EDIS is a complex and lengthy process, not a punctual event, and the countries have been working on this process for several years. 
EDIS r en komplicerad och lngsiktig process, inte ngon enstaka hndelse, och lnderna har arbetat med denna process i ratal.
The determining factor for moving to ex post controls is overwhelmingly the acceding countries ÔownershipŐ of the process to establish their own safe management and control systems. 
Den avgrande faktorn bakom vergngen till kontroller i efterhand r i vervgande grad de anslutande lndernas Ógan-derttÓ ver processen att infra egna skra frvaltnings-och kontrollsystem.
Hence, they were not related to the type of Commission control (ex ante or ex post). 
De var inte kopplade till kommissionens kontroller (p frhand eller i efterhand).
IV. Although the objective of allocating approximately 35 % of Phare national programmes to ESC was indicative only Ôto be applied with flexibility on a country by country basisŐ, (Phare Guidelines Decision 1999), the 2001 to 2003 figures indicate that the average of around 35 % has been maintained. 
IV. ven om mlsttningen med att tilldela ungefr 35 % av de nationella Phareprogrammen till ekonomisk och social sammanhllning bara var vgledande och man kunde visa Óflexibilitet vid anvndningen.... fr varje landÓ (1999 rs beslut om riktlinjer fr Phare) visar siffrorna fr 2001Đ2003 att genomsnittet p ungefr 35 % har upprtthllits.
The insignificant dip in percentage terms in 2002 due to the Action Plans on Administrative and Judicial Capacity was fully compensated in 2003 allocations. 
Den obetydliga nedgngen i procentenheter under 2002 till fljd av handlingsplanerna fr den offentliga frvaltningens och rttsvsendets frmga kompenserades helt genom 2003 rs anslag.
In addition there were both investment and institution-building allocations in other horizontal chapters that had an indirect bearing on preparing for managing Structural Funds. 
Dessutom fanns anslag fr bde investeringar och institutionsuppbyggnad i andra vergripande kapitel som indirekt pverkade frberedelserna infr frvaltningen av strukturfonderna.
Several countries devoted well over 35 % of their 2003 funds to investment in ESC. 
Flera lnder anvnde ver 35 % av 2003 rs anslag till investeringar i ekonomisk och social sammanhllning.
The average was 39 %. 
Genomsnittet lg p 39 %.