natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
35 In 2012, common foreign and security policy funding for special representatives amounted to 27 897 500 euro which is equivalent to 5,7 % of the total EEAS expenditure for 2012. 
35 r 2012 uppgick den gemensamma utrikes-och skerhetspolitikens finansiering av srskilda representanter till 27 897 500 euro eller motsvarande 5,7 % av Europeiska utrikestjnstens totala utgifter 2012.
These amounts are funded by common foreign and security policy operational appropriations. 
Detta belopp finansieras genom driftsanslag inom ramen fr den gemensamma utrikes-och skerhetspolitiken.
36 In particular, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability which is in charge of operational planning and implementation of civilian common security and defence policy missions. 
36 Framfr allt den civilia planerings-och ledningskapaciteten som ansvarar fr den operativa planeringen och det operativa genomfrandet av icke-militra uppdrag inom ramen fr den gemensamma skerhets-och frsvarspolitiken.
Observations 17 42 In addition to climate change and energy security (see paragraph 18), the audit revealed several areas where a shortage of thematic expertise was particularly problematic: economic and financial issues, common security and defence policy expertise at delegation level, code of conduct in space, cyber-security, migration, sanctions and asset recovery. 
Iakttagelser 17 42 Frutom klimatfrndringar och energitrygghet (se punkt 18) visade revisionen p flera omrden dr bristen p tematisk expertis var srskilt pro-blematisk: ekonomiska och finansiella frgor, sakkunskap p delegationsniv om den gemensamma skerhets-och frsvarspolitiken, uppfrandekod avseende rymden, cyberskerhet, migration, sanktioner och tervinning av tillgngar.
Consequently, these gaps make it more difficult for the EEAS to ensure policy consistency regarding the external dimension of internal policies. 
Dessa brister gr det fljaktligen svrare fr Europeiska utrikestjnsten att se till att politiken r konsekvent nr det gller den yttre dimensionen av den inre politiken.
43 The GSC and the Commission foreign policy structures used different IT applications. 
43 Rdets generalsekretariat och kommissionens utrikespolitiska strukturer anvnde olika it-tillmpningar.
In addition, the establishment of the EEAS brought new requirements, for example in terms of secured communication networks to share information with delegations. 
Inrttandet av Europeiska utrikestjnsten tfljdes dessutom av nya krav, t.ex. i frga om skra kommunikationsnt fr att utbyta information med delegationerna.
However, the EEAS could not address its immediate needs, such as updating and integrating the applications inherited from the Commission and the GSC and improving communications with the delegations and Member States. 
Europeiska utrikestjnsten kunde dock inte tillgodose sina omedelbara behov, ssom att uppdatera och integrera de tillmpningar som rvts frn kommissionen och rdets generalsekretariat och att frbttra kommunikationen med delegationerna och medlemsstaterna.
44 The EEAS is largely dependent on seconded national experts that are not included in the establishment plan (366 at headquarters and delegations as of June 2013). 
44 Europeiska utrikestjnsten r till stor del beroende av utsnda nationella experter som inte finns med p tjnstefrteckningen (366 vid hgkvarteret och delegationerna i juni 2013).
This means that more than half of the EEAS’s administrator level staff are seconded from Member States for a limited period and can be recalled, which is a risk for the EEAS’s institutional memory and its business continuity. 
Det betyder att mer n hlften av Europeiska utrikestjnstens personal p handlggarniv r utsnd frn medlemsstaterna under en begrnsad period och kan kallas hem, vilket utgr en risk fr Europeiska utrikestjnstens institutionella minne och kontinuitet.
The recruitment procedures were lengthy, costly and did not fully correct pre-existing imbalances 45 The EEAS was required to renew its workforce by recruiting one third of its executive staff from the Member States in two and a half years, an unprecedented obligation for any EU institution. 
Rekryteringsfrfarandena var utdragna och kostnadskrvande och korrigerade inte befintliga snedfrdelningar 45 Europeiska utrikestjnsten var tvungen att byta ut sin personal genom att rekrytera en tredjedel av sina tjnstemn frn medlemsstaterna inom tv och ett halvt r, en aldrig frut skdad skyldighet fr en EU-institution.
46 Fulfilling the one third requirement through natural attrition was inherently difficult as most existing staff had permanent contracts. 
46 Att uppfylla kravet p en tredjedel tjnstemn frn medlemsstaterna genom naturlig avgng var svrt eftersom de flesta befintliga anstllda hade fasta anstllningar.
47 The EEAS’s recruitment procedures are lengthy, especially for head of delegation positions, as the HR/VP decided to interview all short-listed candidates, no matter the size of the delegation. 
47 Europeiska utrikestjnstens rekryteringsfrfaranden r utdragna, srskilt fr tjnster som delegationschef, eftersom den hga representanten/ vice ordfranden har beslutat att intervjua alla de skande som tagits upp p slutlistan, oavsett delegationens storlek.
They are also costly, as many candidates are located outside the EU and interviews are held in person in Brus-sels38. 
De r ven kostnadskrvande eftersom mnga skande befinner sig utanfr EU och intervjuerna hlls p plats i Bryssel38.
Due to the HR/VP’s busy schedule, it is difficult to arrange interviews with early notice or avoid last minute changes, resulting in additional costs, time delays and media criticism. 
P grund av den hga representantens/vice ordfrandens fulltecknade schema r det svrt att anordna intervjuer lng tid i frvg eller undvika ndringar i sista minuten, vilket leder till kade kostnader, frseningar och kritik i medierna.
37 Overall, 35 % of the heads of delegation who returned to Brussels have not been given a management function. 
37 Totalt sett har 35 % av de delegationschefer som tervnde till Bryssel inte ftt en chefstjnst.
38 The full costs of EEAS recruitment procedures are unknown, as the EEAS Human Resources department only pays the costs for Member State diplomats, while EU institutions pay the related expenses for EU officials. 
38 De totala kostnaderna fr Europeiska utrikestjnstens rekryteringsfrfaranden r inte knda, eftersom Europeiska utrikestjnstens personalavdelning endast betalar kostnaderna fr medlemsstaternas diplomater, medan EU:s institutioner betalar de motsvarande kostnaderna fr EU-tjnstemn.
The requirement that the delegations must finance the expenses for their staff when they participate in recruitment procedures has also put pressure on their own budgets. 
Kravet att delegationerna mste finansiera kostnaderna fr sina anstllda nr de deltar i rekryteringsfrfaranden har ocks inneburit pfrestningar p deras egna budgetar.
Observations 18 48 Representatives of the Member States, the Commission and the GSC participate in the recruitment of sensitive posts, which facilitates an unbiased procedure in terms of origin of the candidates. 
Iakttagelser 18 48 Fretrdare fr medlemsstaterna, kommissionen och rdets generalsekretariat deltar i rekryteringen till knsliga befattningar, vilket frmjar ett objektivt frfarande vad betrffar de skandes ursprung.
However, the EEAS has not established a competency framework for managers as a basis for the evaluation of pre-selected candidates. 
Europeiska utrikestjnsten har dock inte faststllt en kompetensram fr chefer som utgngspunkt fr bedmningen av skande i frhandsurvalet.
In addition, the EEAS decided not to use assessment centres for managerial positions despite the possible advantages. 
Europeiska utrikestjnsten beslutade dessutom att inte anvnda utvrderingscentrum fr chefsbefattningar trots de eventuella frdelarna.
For example, assessment centres may reduce the need for interviews39, provide additional input on the candidate’s competences and identify training and development needs. 
Till exempel kan utvrderingscentrum minska behovet av inter-vjuer39, ge ytterligare underlag om den skandes kompetens och identifiera utbildnings-och utvecklingsbehov.
49 Significant gender and geographical imbalances, which already existed in the previous foreign policy structures40, still remained as of September 2013: (a) Too few women worked as administrators (34 %) and they were even more under-represented at delegations (26 % of administrators) or within the category of managers (21 %). (b) Only 14 % of managers came from the Member States which joined the Union in 2004 and 2007, below the 21 % that would represent their share of the EU population. 
49 nnu i september 2013 rdde en stor snedfrdelning mellan knen och en stor geografisk snedfrdelning, som redan fanns i de tidigare utrikespolitiska strukturerna40: a) Fr f kvinnor arbetade som handlggare (34 %) och kvinnor var nnu mer underrepresenterade vid delegationerna (26 % av handlg-garna) eller bland cheferna (21 %). b) Endast 14 % av cheferna kom frn de medlemsstater som anslt sig till EU 2004 och 2007, vilket r mindre n de 21 % som skulle motsvara deras andel av EU:s befolkning.
50 Induction training was insufficiently targeted to address the needs of new EEAS staff, as Member State diplomats are not familiar with Commission procedures and practices and EU officials are not well trained in their new diplomatic functions. 
50 Introduktionsutbildningen var inte tillrckligt inriktad p de behov som de nyanstllda vid Europeiska utrikestjnsten hade, eftersom diplomater frn medlemsstaterna inte knner till kommissionens frfaranden och metoder och EU-tjnstemn inte fr ngon bra utbildning nr det gller de nya diplomatiska uppgifter som de ska fullgra.
However, changes to the induction training were implemented in September 2013. 
I september 2013 ndrades dock introduktionsutbildningen.
39 75 and 39 candidates were invited more than once for interviews in 2012 and 2013 respectively. In 2013 the 10 candidates with the greatest number of invitations combined 37 interviews in Brussels. 
39 Under 2012 och 2013 kallades 75 respektive 39 skande till intervju mer n en gng. r 2013 stod de tio skande som hade ftt flest antal kallelser sammanlagt fr 37 intervjuer i Bryssel.
40 In January 2011, 28 % and 13 % of the administrators were women and nationals of the Member States which joined the Union in 2004 and 2007 respectively. 
40 I januari 2011 var 28 respektive 13 % av handlggarna kvinnor och medborgare i de medlemsstater som anslt sig till EU 2004 och 2007.
Observations 19 Coordination with the Commission and Member States is improving, but is still insufficient for the EEAS to fulfil its potential 51 This section (paragraphs 51 to 67) answers the third question: Has the EEAS coordinated effectively with the Commission and the Member States? 
Iakttagelser 19 Samordningen med kommissionen och medlemsstaterna blir allt bttre men r nnu inte tillrcklig fr att Europeiska utrikestjnsten ska kunna utnyttja sin potential 51 I detta avsnitt (punkterna 51Đ67) besvaras den tredje frgan: Hade Europeiska utrikestjnsten samordnat verksamheten p ett ndamlsenligt stt med kommissionen och medlemsstaterna?
The Court used criteria related to the effectiveness of the EEAS coordination mechanisms with the Commission and the Member States, both at headquarters and at delegation levels. 
Revisionsrtten anvnde kriterier avseende ndamlsenligheten i Europeiska utrikestjnstens mekanismer fr samordning med kommissionen och medlemsstaterna, bde p huvudkontoret och vid delegationerna.
Coordination with the Commission was partly effective 52 The EEAS is meant to contribute towards greater foreign policy consistency. 
Samordningen med kommissionen var delvis ndamlsenlig 52 Europeiska utrikestjnsten ska bidra till strre samstmmighet i utrikes-politiken.
This mandate requires close cooperation with the Commission which under the Lisbon Treaty retains responsibility for some external relations areas (such as development, trade, enlargement, humanitarian assistance and the external aspects of internal policies). 
Denna uppgift krver nra samarbete med kommissionen som enligt Lissabonfrdraget behller ansvaret fr vissa omrden fr yttre frbindelser (ssom utveckling, handel, utvidgning, humanitrt bistnd och yttre aspekter av den inre politiken).
53 As Vice-President of the Commission, the HR/VP plays a full part in the Commission’s decision-making, but, given the nature of her job, she was not able to attend two thirds of the Commission meetings in 2012, including those with direct or indirect impact over EU foreign policy. 
53 Ssom vice ordfrande fr kommissionen deltar den hga representanten/ vice ordfranden fullt ut i kommissionens beslutsfattande, men med hnsyn till arbetets karaktr kunde hon inte delta i tv tredjedelar av kommissionens mten 2012, bland annat mten med direkt eller indirekt inverkan p EU:s utrikespolitik.
In addition, it proved to be difficult to organise formal meetings of External Relations Commissioners, with only five held in 29 months, all chaired by the President of the Commission41. 
Dessutom visade det sig vara svrt att anordna formella mten fr kommissionsledamter med ansvar fr yttre frbindelser. Under 29 mnader hlls endast fem sdana mten, alla med kommissionens ordfrande som ordfrande41.
In this respect, there has been limited progress clarifying what are the concrete functions/powers of her VP role, notably when coordinating other Commissioners. 
I det avseendet har framstegen varit begrnsade nr det gller att frtydliga vilka konkreta uppgifter/befogenheter hon har i sin roll som vice ordfrande, srskilt nr andra kommissionsledamter samordnas.
This is in contrast with the progress defining the powers of the VP role of the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Euro which was established in October 2011 as a response to the gravity of the financial crisis42. 
Det avviker frn de framsteg med att definiera vilka befogenheter kommissionsledamoten med ansvar fr ekonomiska och monetra frgor samt euron har som vice ordfrande som gjordes i oktober 2011 som svar p den allvarliga finansiella krisen42.
54 At working level, there are different fora where the EEAS and the Commission coordinate their activities. 
54 P arbetsniv samordnar Europeiska utrikestjnsten och kommissionen sin verksamhet i olika forum.
The audit found that country teams, the intelligence steering board and the crisis management board meet less frequently than envisaged and that participation does not include all relevant parties43. 
Revisionsrtten konstaterade att landsgrupper, styrelsen fr underrttelseverksamhet och krishanteringsrdet inte sammantrder lika ofta som planerat och att alla berrda parter inte deltar43.
More systematic coordination took place through the weekly coordination meetings between the Commission’s Secretariat-General and the Policy Coordination Division, and in the meetings held between the EEAS and the Commission directorates-general in the context of the Council Working Groups’ preparatory work. 
Mer systematisk samordning gde rum genom de samordningsmten som kommissionens generalsekretariat och avdelningen fr politisk samordning hll varje vecka och vid de mten som hlls av Europeiska utrikestjnsten och kommissionens generaldirektorat i samband med rdsarbetsgruppernas frberedelsearbete.
41 The EEAS review states that ‘Unfortunately these meetings have not been held frequently enough. 
41 I Europeiska utrikestjnstens versyn sgs fljande: ÓTyvrr har de mtena inte hllits tillrckligt ofta.
The President of the Commission and the High Representative have recently agreed that the Relex Group of Commissioners should meet more regularly, with the High Representative in the Chair’. 42 The Commission reinforced the role of the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs by elevating the post to that of Vice-President, and giving the post-holder additional working instruments. 
Kommissionens ordfrande och den hga representanten har nyligen kommit verens om att kommissionrernas grupp fr yttre frbindelser ska trffas mer regelbundet under ledning av den hga representanten.Ó 42 Kommissionen strkte den roll som kommissionsledamoten med ansvar fr ekonomiska och monetra frgor har genom att upphja den befattningen till vice ordfrande och ge innehavaren av den ytterligare arbets-instrument.
43 Country team meetings are organised by each geographical service on average twice to three times per year; they often do not include all relevant participants such as thematic desks, common security and defence policy structures or EU special representatives. 
43 Landsgruppmten anordnas av varje geografisk avdelning i genomsnitt tv till tre gnger per r; ofta inbegriper de inte alla berrda deltagare, ssom enheter fr srskilda mnesomrden, den gemensamma skerhets-och frsvarspolitikens struktur eller EU:s srskilda representanter.
The EEAS managing directorate responsible for counter-terrorism and development issues, DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, DG Development and Cooperation — EuropeAid and the special representatives are not represented in the Crisis Management Board. 
Europeiska utrikestjnstens verkstllande direktorat med ansvar fr terrorismbekmpning och utvecklingsfrgor, GD Humanitrt bistnd och civilskydd (Echo), GD Utveckling och samarbete Đ EuropeAid och de srskilda representanterna r inte fretrdda i krishanterings-rdet.
DG Home Affairs is the only Commission directorate-general represented in the intelligence steering board. 
GD Inrikes frgor r det enda generaldirektorat vid kommissionen som r fretrtt i styrelsen fr underrttelser.
Observations 20 55 The EEAS participates in the Commission’s inter-service consultations, although its limited resources affect its impact on the external dimension of internal policies. 
Iakttagelser 20 55 Europeiska utrikestjnsten deltar i samrden mellan kommissionens tjnsteavdelningar, men de begrnsade resurser som den har pverkar vilken inverkan den kan f p den yttre dimensionen av den inre politiken.
In the common foreign and security policy, a field of intergovernmental competence, the HR/VP assesses whether a topic falls predominantly, or exclusively, under this category when deciding whether to consult the Commission. 
I den gemensamma utrikes- och skerhetspolitiken, som r ett mellanstatligt samarbetsomrde, bedmer den hga representanten/ vice ordfranden huruvida ett mne huvudsakligen eller uteslutande faller under denna kategori nr beslutet om man ska samrda med kommissionen ska fattas.
Sometimes, this is a matter of opinion and the proposal may nevertheless have implications for the Commission’s areas of competence. 
Ibland r detta en frga om tyckande och frslaget kan trots det f konsekvenser fr kommissionens behrighetsomrden.
56 The EEAS and the Commission have established formal working agreements to coordinate their activities. 
56 Europeiska utrikestjnsten och kommissionen har ingtt formella samarbetsavtal fr att samordna sina aktiviteter.
Overall, the new procedures are less flexible and more demanding than the ones that existed when DG RELEX was in charge of external relations as the EEAS is separated from the Commission. Although many ex-Commission EEAS staff still had good networks of contacts, which facilitated coordination, these networks are likely to weaken over time. 
Generellt sett r de nya frfarandena mindre flexibla och mer krvande n de som fanns nr GD Yttre frbindelser ansvarade fr yttre frbindelser eftersom Europeiska utrikestjnsten r skild frn kommissionen. ven om mnga fre detta kommissionsanstllda vid Europeiska utrikestjnsten nnu hade goda kontaktnt som underlttade samordning kommer dessa nt sannolikt att frsvagas med tiden.
In addition, the establishment of the EEAS as a separate entity increased the number of EU institutions dealing with the same matters and this can make it more difficult to agree on an efficient division of labour, as is shown by the current set-up of crisis rooms within the EU (see Box 2). 
Inrttandet av Europeiska utrikestjnsten som en separat enhet kade dessutom antalet EU-institutioner som arbetar med samma frgor och det kan gra det svrare att komma verens om en effektiv arbetsfrdelning, ssom visas av den nuvarande organisationen av kriscentraler inom EU (se ruta 2).
Crisis rooms Situation monitoring is the continuous review and analysis of events occurring worldwide using all available resources, including reports from EU delegations, intelligence sources, and public media. 
Kriscentraler Lgesbevakning r en kontinuerlig granskning och analys av hndelser som intrffar runtom i vrlden med hjlp av alla tillgngliga resurser, t.ex. rapporter frn EU-delegationerna, underrttelsekllor och offentliga medier.
The EEAS created the EU Situation Room in 2012 using existing resources which had previously been split over three separate departments. 
Europeiska utrikestjnsten inrttade EU:s lgescentral 2012 med hjlp av befintliga resurser som tidigare hade varit frdelade p tre separata avdelningar.
Although this was a positive step in the reduction of crisis rooms with similar roles, much remains to be done at EU level. 
Detta var visserligen ett positivt steg fr att minska antalet kriscentraler med likartade uppgifter, men mycket terstr att gra p EU-niv.
In May 2013, the Commission established its own Emergency Response Centre, to provide ‘a better coordinated, faster and more efficient response when disaster strikes in Europe and the rest of the world’. 
I maj 2013 inrttade kommissionen sitt eget centrum fr krisberedskap fr att kunna reagera mer samordnat, snabbare och effektivare nr en katastrof drabbar Europa eller vriga vrlden.
In addition, the GSC supports the implementation of the EU emergency and crisis coordination arrangements (EU-CCA), which were designed to ‘ensure rapid and coordinated EU cross-sector policy responses in serious crises under the leadership of the rotating Presidency’. 
Rdets generalsekretariat stder dessutom genomfrandet av EU:s arrangemang fr samordning vid katastrofer och kriser (EU-CCA) som syftar till att skerstlla snabba och samordnade sektorsvergripande svar frn EU:s sida vid allvarliga kriser under ledning av det roterande ordfrandeskapet.
Currently there is no clear division of responsibilities between the EU Situation Room, the Emergency Response Centre and EU-CCA structures to mitigate the evident risk of overlaps. 
Fr nrvarande finns det ingen tydlig ansvarsfrdelning mellan EU:s lgescentral, centrumet fr krisberedskap och EU-CCA-strukturerna fr att minska den uppenbara risken fr verlappningar.
Other specific centres also continue to play a relevant role in crisis response44. 
Andra specifika centrum fortstter ocks att spela en viktig roll inom krishantering44.
The current architecture raises questions in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, as information and responsibilities are scattered over different players and, for example, the EU will only have a joint integrated threat and risk assessment report as of 2015. 
Den nuvarande organisationen vcker frgor om effektivitet och ndamlsenlighet, eftersom information och ansvar r frdelade p olika aktrer, och t.ex. kommer EU inte att f en gemensam integrerad hot-och riskbedmningsrapport frrn 2015.
44 The strategic analysis and response capability (DG Home Affairs), the health emergency operations facility (DG Health and Consumers), the emergency operations centre within the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, and the Frontex Situation Centre. 
44 Centrum fr strategisk analys och insatskapacitet (GD Inrikes frgor), centrum fr hantering av hlsokrislgen (GD Hlso-och konsumentfrgor), ndlgescentralen inom Europeiskt centrum fr frebyggande och kontroll av sjukdomar och Frontex kriscentrum.