natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Thus the Commission, in agreement with the Member States, used flexibility to modulate fiscal requirements in light of cyclical conditions. 
Kommissionen anvnde drfr flexibilitet fr att anpassa de finanspolitiska kraven mot bakgrund av konjunkturfrhllandena, vilket gjordes i samfrstnd med medlemsstaterna.
The Commission agrees that its latest assessment of forecast accuracy finds evidence of a bias in some cases while using a particular methodology. 
Kommissionen bekrftar att den i sin senaste bedmning av prognosernas exakthet fann bevis p bias i vissa fall med anvndning av en viss metod.
However, it stresses that the assessment also concludes that the Commission’s economic forecasts are more accurate than those of the market and comparable to those of other international institutions. 
Kommissionen betonar dock att bedmningen ven visar att kommissionens ekonomiska prognoser r mer exakta n marknadsprognoserna och jmfrbara med prognoser frn andra internationella institutioner.
In addition, the accuracy of the Commission’s debt projections will also depend on a number of other factors, such as the projection for the primary balance and stock-flow adjustments. 
Exaktheten i kommissionens skuldprognoser beror dessutom p ett antal andra faktorer, till exempel prognoser fr primra saldon och stock-/fldesjusteringar.
The purpose of the regular assessments of forecast accuracy is institutional learning, and the Commission constantly strives to improve the accuracy of its forecasts. 
Syftet med de regelbundna bedmningarna av prognosernas exakthet r institutionellt lrande, och kommissionen strvar stndigt efter att gra sina prognoser mer exakta.
Substantial effort in recent years has been invested in the development of additional quantitative forecasting tools. 
Under de senaste ren har avsevrda resurser lagts p att utveckla kompletterande kvantitativa prognosverktyg.
The recent external evaluation of the forecasting services (paper forthcoming) concludes that the forecasts are of a high quality and the forecast processes are efficient. 
En frsk extern utvrdering av prognostjnsterna (en rapport om detta kommer) visar att prognoserna hller hg kvalitet och att prognosprocesserna r effektiva.
First bullet point: The Commission considerations on this point are provided in replies to observations 58 and 59 regarding the need to respect the legitimate expectations of the Member States. 
Frsta punktsatsen: Kommissionen framfr sina sikter om denna punkt i svaren p iakttagelserna 58 och 59 angende behovet av att respektera medlemsstaternas berttigade frvntningar.
In the former case, when the adjustment requirement is derived from the matrix, this is based on the spring forecast of year t-1’s projection of the output gap in year t and this is only unfrozen if the economy moves into very bad or exceptionally bad economic times. 
I det frstnmnda fallet, dvs. nr ett anpassningskrav hrrrs frn matrisen, bygger det p uppskattningen av produktionsgapet r t, taget frn vrprognosen r t-1, och frysningen hvs endast om ekonomin gr in i mycket dliga eller dliga tider.
In the latter case, the reference rate for the expenditure benchmark in year t is based on the spring forecast projections of year t-1 and it is not updated for subsequent forecasts. 
I det sistnmnda fallet baseras riktmrket fr referensrntan r t p uppskattningarna i vrprognosen fr r t-1, och uppdateras inte fr pfljande prognoser.
See reply to paragraph 60 regarding the practical problems of setting the distance to MTO based on the current year forecast. 
Se svaret p punkt 60 angende de praktiska problemen med att faststlla avstndet till det medelfristiga budgetmlet baserat p prognosen fr innevarande r.
Second bullet point: The smoothing of investment over four years is not specified in the Regulation. 
Andra punktsatsen: Utjmningar av investeringar ver fyra r anges inte i frordningen.
Nevertheless, such smoothing has been fully discussed and agreed with Member States through the ECOFIN committees. 
Dessa utjmningar har dock till fullo diskuterats och verenskommits med medlemsstaterna via Ekofinkommitterna.
Therefore it is described in the Code of Conduct, where it states that "Due to the potentially very high variability of investment expenditure, especially in the case of small Member States, the government expenditure aggregate should be adjusted by averaging investment expenditure over 4 years." That is, the smoothing has been introduced in order to avoid that smaller countries with lower GDP per capita are not penalized for peaks in public investment. 
De beskrivs drfr i uppfrandekoden, dr fljande anges: ÓBeroende p de potentiellt mycket stora variationerna i investeringsutgifterna, i synnerhet nr det gller sm medlemsstater, br de statliga sammanlagda utgifterna justeras genom ett genomsnitt av investeringsutgifter ver fyra r.Ó Utjmningarna har allts infrts fr att undvika att mindre lnder med lgre BNP per capita bestraffas fr toppar i de offentliga investeringarna.
This is particularly an issue for some new European Member States for whom EU structural funds comprise a significant component of overall investment, as the drawdown of such funds can see large peaks and troughs in individual years. 
S r srskilt fallet fr ngra av de nyare EU-medlemsstaterna, dr EU:s strukturfonder utgr en betydande del av de totala investeringarna, eftersom utnyttjandet av sdana medel kan variera kraftigt mellan olika r.
The Commission considers that the transition between 2014 and 2015 was consistent. 
Kommissionen anser att vergngen mellan 2014 och 2015 var konsekvent.
The Commission, in full agreement with the Member States, has taken a practical policy decision to 14 ensure during the transition a consistency between the budgetary targets against which the Member States were being assessed. 
Kommissionen har i fullstndigt samfrstnd med medlemsstaterna fattat ett praktiskt politiskt beslut att under vergngsperioden skerstlla konsekvens mellan de budgetml som medlemsstaterna har bedmts mot.
Such an arrangement ensured that the introduction of the matrix published in the Flexibility Communication of January 2015 would not disadvantage particular Member States by changing the established budgetary requirement for 2015 during the transition. 
Genom detta arrangemang garanterades att infrandet av den matris som offentliggjordes i meddelandet frn januari 2015 om flexibilitetsmekanismen inte skulle missgynna vissa medlemsstater genom att ndra de faststllda budgetbehovet fr 2015 under vergngen.
The 2018 CSRs were intended to achieve the two objectives of strengthening the ongoing recovery and ensuring fiscal sustainability, while remaining short and simple and thus better understood by the public. 
Syftet med de landsspecifika rekommendationerna 2018 var att uppn de tv mlen att strka den pgende terhmtningen och skerstlla finanspolitisk hllbarhet, samtidigt som de r kort och enkelt hllna och drfr frsts bttre av allmnheten.
See reply to paragraph 33 for a detailed explanation. 
Se svaret p punkt 33 fr en detaljerad frklaring.
The Commission considers that guidance is clear and properly formulated for each individual Member State depending on its fiscal position. 
Kommissionen anser att vgledningen r klar och lmpligt utformad fr varje medlemsstat beroende p dess finanspolitiska stllning.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 127. 
SLUTSATSER OCH REKOMMENDATIONER 15
The role of the preventive arm is to achieve fiscal sustainability, while foreseeing the possibility for a modulation of fiscal policies in view of economic conditions. 
Syftet med stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens frebyggande del r att uppn finanspolitisk hllbarhet, samtidigt som den ger mjlighet att anpassa finanspolitiken till de ekonomiska frhllandena.
The MTO operationalises this need to balance prudent fiscal policy based on the medium to long-term while facilitating the operation of the automatic stabilisers. 
De medelfristiga budgetmlen utgr det praktiska verktyget fr att tillgodose behovet av att balansera en frsiktig finanspolitik p medellng sikt, samtidigt som de automatiska stabilisatorernas funktion underlttas.
The Commission exercises its discretionary powers fully in line with the legal framework, which has been agreed by the co-legislators, and in a transparent manner, in full consultation with the Member States through the relevant committees. 
Kommissionen utvar sitt bedmningsutrymme helt i linje med den rttsliga ram som medlagstiftarna har enats om, p ett ppet stt, och i fullstndigt samrd med medlemsstaterna via de relevanta kommitterna.
The Commission strongly disagrees with the ECA’s conclusion that the Commission used its discretion with a view to reducing adjustment requirements. 
Kommissionen instmmer inte alls i revisionsrttens slutsats att den har anvnt sitt utrymme fr sknsmssig bedmning i syfte att minska anpassningskraven.
The discretion was used in line with the Regulation, which recognises the wider context of sustainability in the medium-term, such as the need to avoid counter-productive fiscal adjustment, the role of structural reforms and investment in raising potential growth, and the need to allow for events outside the control of government. 
Bedmningsutrymmet har anvnts enligt frordningen, som beaktar hllbarhet p medellng sikt i ett bredare perspektiv, bland annat behovet av att undvika kontraproduktiva finanspolitiska justeringar, strukturreformernas roll, investeringar fr kad tillvxtpotential och behovet av att ge utrymme fr hndelser som str utanfr regeringarnas kontroll.
The matrix and the operationalisation of the flexibility clauses were set out in the Commission’s 2015 Communication. 
Matrisen och flexibilitetsklausulernas funktion anges i kommissionens meddelande frn 2015.
Regardless, the adjustment parameters in the matrix and flexibility clauses were set up and applied fully in line with the legal framework and in a transparent manner, as well as in full consultation with the Member States through the relevant committees. 
Oavsett detta faststlldes och tillmpades matrisens anpassningsparametrar och flexibilitetsklausulerna helt i linje med den rttsliga ramen, p ett ppet stt och i fullstndigt samrd med medlemsstaterna via de relevanta kommitterna.
The margin of discretion was introduced to establish the appropriate fiscal policy setting in cases where the aggregate growth rates do not necessarily capture the potentially fragile nature of the recovery in individual Member States, also taking into consideration the potentially counter-productive impact of an overly large fiscal consolidation upon such economies. 
Bedmningsutrymmet infrdes fr att faststlla lmpliga finanspolitiska ml i fall dr de aggregerade tillvxtsiffrorna inte ndvndigtvis avspeglar den potentiellt brckliga terhmtningen i enskilda medlemsstater, och beaktar dessutom de potentiellt kontraproduktiva effekterna av en alltfr kraftig finanspolitisk konsolidering p sdana ekonomier.
Progress towards achieving the MTO is continuing in current years, albeit at a less pronounced scale then in the initial recovery period. 
Framstegen mot att uppn de medelfristiga budgetmlen har fortsatt under de senaste ren, dock i en mindre uttalad grad n under den inledande terhmtningsperioden.
The Commission considers that the current SGP framework implementation rules, which are set up in common agreement with the Member States following extensive discussions, do not weaken the SGP framework, but make broad objectives of the Regulation operational. 
Kommissionen anser inte att de gllande genomfrandereglerna fr ramen fr stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten, som faststlls gemensamt tillsammans med medlemsstaterna efter omfattande diskussioner, frsvagar ramen fr stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten, utan att de snarare bidrar till att genomfra frordningens vergripande ml.
Firstly, the Commission notes that the corrective arm of the SGP is governed by a separate Regulation to the preventive arm. 
Fr det frsta ppekar kommissionen att stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens korrigerande del regleras av en annan frordning n frordningen om den frebyggande delen.
Secondly, the Commission believes that the corrective arm has 15 overall performed well in recent years, as evidenced by the fact that the number of Member States under an excessive deficit procedure fell from 24 in 2011 to just three in 2017. 
Fr det andra anser kommissionen att den korrigerande delen p det hela taget har fungerat vl p senare r, vilket styrks av att antalet medlemsstater som omfattas av frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott sjunkit frn 24 under 2011 till endast tre under 2017.
The Commission’s attempts to address this situation did not receive the support of the Member States. 
Kommissionens frsk att rtta till denna situation vann inte std bland medlemsstaterna.
See reply to paragraph 83 regarding the extension of EDP deadlines. 
Se svaret p punkt 83 nr det gller frlngningar av tidsfristerna fr frfarandet vid alltfr stora verskott.
The Commission and the Member States have engaged in extensive discussions in order to develop the common understanding necessary to establish the level of detail required to implement every aspect of the SGP framework. 
Kommissionen och medlemsstaterna har frt omfattande diskussioner fr att utveckla den gemensamma frstelse som krvs i syfte att faststlla den detaljniv som krvs fr att genomfra varje aspekt av ramen fr stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten.
The purpose of such rules is to make broad objectives of the Regulation operational and they do not preclude the Commission and the Member states agreeing on any needed further adjustment in the SGP framework. 
Syftet med dessa regler r att genomfra 16 frordningens vergripande ml, och de hindrar inte kommissionen och medlemsstaterna frn att enas om eventuella ytterligare justeringar av ramen fr stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten.
While the Commission is responsible for assessing Member States’ compliance with the preventive arm, the enforcement of the rules is a shared competence between the Commission and the Council. 
Kommissionen har ansvaret fr att bedma medlemsstaternas efterlevnad av den frebyggande delen, men genomfrandet av reglerna r en gemensam befogenhet fr kommissionen och rdet.
The Commission does not believe that acting without consultation of Member States would be productive or beneficial to the long-term credibility of the framework. 
Kommissionen anser att det varken skulle vara konstruktivt eller gynnsamt fr ramens lngsiktiga trovrdighet att agera utan samrd med medlemsstaterna.
The design of the fiscal framework is inherently multilateral in nature and consultation with Member States is vital to ensuring ownership of the rules, which ultimately contributes to both compliance and enforcement. 
Den finanspolitiska ramen r multilateral i sig, och samrd med medlemsstaterna r avgrande fr att se till att de tar ansvar fr genomfrandet av reglerna, vilket i sin tur bidrar till bde efterlevnaden och verkstllandet.
Recommendation 1 (a) The Commission does not accept the recommendation as Regulation 1466/97 specifically provides for the 0.25% of GDP allowable margin of deviation and the Commission cannot impose restrictions, i.e. on the accumulation of non-significant deviations, that conflict with the Regulation. 
Rekommendation 1 (a) Kommissionen godtar inte rekommendationen, eftersom frordning (EG) nr 1466/97 srskilt freskriver 0,25 % av BNP som en tilltlig avvikelsemarginal, och kommissionen kan drfr inte infra begrnsningar, dvs. fr ackumulering av ej betydande avvikelser, d detta strider mot frordningen.
The Commission is concerned that a systematic re-design of the matrix in this manner could be seen as circumventing the margin provided for in the Regulation. 
Kommissionen oroar sig fr att systematiska ndringar av matrisen p det hr sttet kan uppfattas som ett kringgende av den marginal som faststlls i frordningen.
These factors can lead to a Member State deviating slightly from their target due to matters outside of the control of government. (b) The Commission does not accept the recommendation. 
Dessa faktorer kan leda till att en medlemsstat avviker ngot frn sitt ml p grund av frgor som str utanfr regeringens kontroll. (b) Kommissionen godtar inte rekommendationen.
Moreover, the legislation explicitly requires the Commission to assess relevant factors when assessing compliance with the debt reduction benchmark, which, therefore, cannot be thought of as an absolute rule. (c) The Commission partially accepts the recommendation, specifically, to the extent that it asks to examine the effectiveness of the matrix, as the Commission is currently conducting a wider review of the flexibility arrangements required under the Commonly Agreed Position with Member States. 
Lagstiftningen innehller dessutom ett uttryckligt krav p att kommissionen ska vga in relevanta faktorer i bedmningen av efterlevnaden av riktmrket fr skuldminskning, som drfr inte kan betraktas som en absolut regel. (c) Kommissionen godtar delvis rekommendationen, nrmare bestmt att matrisens ndamlsenlighet br underskas, eftersom kommissionen fr nrvarande genomfr en bredare versyn av flexibilitetsreglerna enligt den gemensamt verkomna stndpunkten med medlemsstaterna.
The Commission cannot prejudge the outcome of this process. 
Kommissionen kan inte fregripa resultatet av denna process.
The Commission strongly rejects the ECA’s conclusion that the use of the structural reform clause has gone beyond the objective of the Regulation. 
Kommissionen tillbakavisar med kraft revisionsrttens slutsats att strukturreformsklausulen har anvnts lngt utver dess syfte i frordningen.
Firstly, the provisions of the Regulation under which the Commission applies this flexibility are long-standing, mainly dating back to the reform of the legislation in 2005. 
Fr det frsta har de bestmmelser i frordningen som styr kommissionens tillmpning av denna flexibilitet funnits lnge, de hrrr frmst frn lagstiftningsreformen 2005.
Secondly, although the temporary deviation under the structural reform clause is not directly linked to the actual budgetary costs of the reform, the Regulation also does not foresee such a link, 16 particularly because those costs may be difficult to measure and/or have limited direct fiscal impact. 
Fr det andra, och ven om det tillflliga undantaget enligt strukturreformsklausulen inte r direkt kopplat till reformens faktiska budgetkostnader, freskrivs ingen sdan koppling i frordningen, i synnerhet eftersom dessa kostnader kan vara svra att mta och/eller ha en begrnsad direkt finanspolitisk pverkan.
In such cases, directly linking the temporary deviation to the budgetary costs would effectively nullify the incentivizing intent of the clause. 
Att i sdana fall direkt koppla den tillflliga avvikelsen till budgetkostnaderna skulle omintetgra klausulens uppmuntrande syfte.
It is important to point out that the approach which the Commission has taken was extensively discussed with Member States, resulting in the publication in early 2016 of a Commonly Agreed Position on Flexibility in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Det r viktigt att ppeka att kommissionen diskuterade sin strategi grundligt med medlemsstaterna, vilket ledde till att en gemensamt verenskommen stndpunkt gllande flexibilitet inom stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten offentliggjordes tidigt 2016.
The technical design of the temporary deviation from the MTO or adjustment path means that spending is increased relative to the baseline (i.e. the path of expenditure in the absence of the temporary deviation) in each year until the MTO is reached. 
Den tekniska utformningen av tillflliga avvikelser frn de medelfristiga budgetmlen eller anpassningsbanan innebr att utgifterna kar jmfrt med baslinjen (dvs. utgiftsbanan utan den 17 tillflliga avvikelsen) under varje r till dess att de medelfristiga budgetmlen uppns.
Unless the clause is linked to direct costs related to the reform, the necessary compensation to return spending to the original trajectory in the year after application of the clause would imply an additional fiscal adjustment on top of the Member State’s standard requirement in that year. 
Om klausulen inte r kopplad till direkta kostnader i samband med reformer skulle den ndvndiga kompensationen fr att utgifterna ska terg till den ursprungliga banan ret efter det att klausulen tillmpats krva en ytterligare finanspolitisk korrigering utver medlemsstaternas standardkrav under det ret.
This would significantly reduce the incentive for structural reforms which do not carry substantial fiscal costs but nevertheless require an incentive which the use of the clause can provide. 
Detta skulle i sin tur avsevrt minska incitamenten till strukturreformer som visserligen inte medfr betydande finanspolitiska kostnader men nd krver incitament, vilket anvndningen av klausulen kan ge.
There is a strong rationale for the approach agreed by the Commission and the Council and set out in the Commonly Agreed Position on Flexibility. 
Det finns en stark logisk grund till det tillvgagngsstt som kommissionen och rdet har enats om och som anges i den gemensamt verenskomna stndpunkten om flexibilitet.
The eligibility condition that nominal investment should not decline is intended to ensure that EU funded investments are not used to substitute for nationally funded investment. 
Syftet med villkoret att de nominella investeringarna inte br minska r att se till att EU-finansierade investeringar inte anvnds som ersttning fr nationellt finansierade investeringar.
The Commission considers that it does ensure that only expenditures directly related to the unusual events clause are eligible. 
Kommissionen anser att den skerstller att endast utgifter som r direkt relaterade till klausulen om ovanliga hndelser r berttigade.
An extensive example from a particular case is provided in the Commission’s reply to paragraph 57. 
Kommissionen ger ett utfrligt exempel frn ett visst fall i sitt svar p punkt 57.
Recommendation 2 (a) The Commission does not accept the recommendation as it considers that the required adjustment would weaken the effectiveness of the structural reform clause. 
Rekommendation 2 (a) Kommissionen godtar inte rekommendationen eftersom den anser att den krvda anpassningen skulle frsvaga strukturreformsklausulens ndamlsenlighet.
The temporary deviation under the structural reform clause is not directly linked to the actual budgetary costs of the reform, because some very beneficial structural reforms do not always create significant direct budgetary costs, while such reforms carry substantial economic or political costs. 
Tillflliga avvikelser enligt strukturreformsklausulen r inte direkt kopplade till de faktiska budgetkostnaderna fr reformer, eftersom vissa mycket gynnsamma strukturreformer inte skapar ngra strre direkta budgetkostnader, men dremot medfr betydande ekonomiska eller politiska kostnader.
In addition, as the allowance is not based on once-off costs, the recommended requirement to return spending to the original trajectory in the year after application of the clause would imply an additional fiscal adjustment on top of the Member State’s standard requirement in that year. 
Eftersom undantaget inte baseras p engngskostnader skulle det rekommenderade kravet att utgifterna ska terg till den ursprungliga banan ret efter det att klausulen tillmpats krva en ytterligare finanspolitisk korrigering utver medlemsstaternas standardkrav under det ret.