natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In January 2000, the Russian Government had still not presented any plan for using the 20 % of the counterpart funds earmarked for specific social purposes or for projects acceptable to theCommission.TheCommissionitselfstillhadnopreciseidea, at that time, of the use to which this 20 % should be put, even though it had frozen, for social projects, the equivalent of 35,7 million euro in roubles that were steadily depreciating (see paragraph 44). 
I januari 2000 hade den ryska regeringen fortfarande varken lagt fram ngon plan fr anvndningen av de 20 % av motparts-medlensomvaravseddafrsrskildasocialandamlellerfr projektsomvargodtagbarafrkommissionen.Densenarehade vid denna tidpunkt nnu ingen tydlig uppfattning om frdelningen av dessa 20 %, trots att man hade reserverat motsvarande 35,7miljonerieuro(somstndigtminskadeivrde)frsociala projekt (se punkt 44).
However, in January 2000, the equivalent of 20,5 millioneuro was transferred to the Ministries of Health and Employment without authorisation from the Commission and 11,6 million euro of that had already been spent without any project having been proposed to the Commission. 
I januari 2000 verfrdes ett belopp p motsvarande 20,5 miljoner euro till ministerierna fr hlsa och sysselsttning utan ngot tillstnd frn kommissionen och av dessa medel hade 11,6 miljoner euro redan anvnts utan att ngot projektfrslag lagts fram fr kommissionen.
In April 2000, in view of the difficulty of reaching agreement with the Russian side regarding individual projects, the Commission finally agreed to finance some budget items proposed by the Health and Employment Ministries. 
I april 2000 accepterade kommissionen p grund av svrigheten att n fram till ett avtal om enskilda projekt med den ryska sidan slutligen att finansiera vissa budgetrubriker som freslagits av ministerierna fr hlsa och sysselsttning.
IMPACT OF THE PROGRAMME On the price of foodstuffs 48. 
PROGRAMMETS EFFEKTER Livsmedelspriserna 48.
The programme was supposed to help regularise agricultural markets in Russia. 
Programmet var avsett att stabilisera jordbruksmarknaderna i Ryssland.
The price of the wheat bought by the flour mills rose from 33 to 101,2 EUR/t between January and September 1999 (4). 
Priset p det vete som kptes av kvarnindustrierna kade frn 33 till 101,2 euro/ton mellan januari och september 1999 (4).
In some regions the weight of a loaf of bread was quite simply reduced from 500 grams to 400 grams while the price remained approximately the same. 
I vissa regioner minskades helt enkelt brdets vikt frn 500 till 400 gram samtidigt som dess pris frblev ungefr det samma.
Nevertheless, it may be considered that by increasing the supply of cereals for breadmaking by 5 % (5), the Community programme prevented an even bigger price rise. 
Icke desto mindre kan man sluta sig till att gemenskapsprogrammet genom att ka utbudet av spannml fr bakning med 5 % (5) hindrade priserna frn att ka nnu mer.
Consumer prices in the meat sector more than doubled betweenAugust1998andSeptember1999,bringingabouta widespreadfallinconsumption(6).Ifitwaspossibletolimitthe increase in meat prices, it was due more to the export refunds which enabled local operators to contain prices than to the (4) Russian Ministry of Food and Agriculture (5) Even if half the deliveries did not reach their destinations until after 6 theharvest. () ÔEuropean Union Heads of Mission assessment on the situation of Russian agriculture, harvest and food aidŐ, September 1999. 
Inom kttsektorn kade priserna till mer n det dubbla mellan augusti 1998 och september 1999, vilket medfrde en allmn minskning av konsumtionen (6).
25.1.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 25/11 Community aid programme which, as of September 1999, had recorded the sale of only limited quantities of meat. The increase in the level of refunds for pigmeat from 40 to 70 EUR/100 kg between November 1998 and July 1999 proved to be a more economic and effective instrument for securing the continuity of CommunityexportsofpigmeattoRussia(seeTable2).TheCom-mission actually estimated that in May 2000 the total cost of the export refunds on 450 000 tonnes of pigmeat exported to Russia in 1999 amounted to between 270 and 290 million euro (1), whereas the supply of only 58 500 tonnes of the same product under the programme amounted to some 101 million euro, includ-ingthecostsofmonitoringandtechnicalassistanceforimple- menting the programme. 
Minskningen av pensionrernas kpkraft berknas till 45 % i frhllande till 1998. 25.1.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 25/11 gemenskapens stdprogram, som frn och med september 1999 endast registrerat frsljning av begrnsade mngder ktt. kningen av exportbidragsnivn fr grisktt frn 40 till 70 euro/ 100 kg frn november 1998 till juli 1999 visade sig vara ett mer ekonomiskt och ndamlsenligt instrument fr att skerstlla kontinuiteten fr gemenskapens export av grisktt till Ryssland (se tabell 2).
This measure made it possible to partly cover the deficit on the Russian market and also had a positive impact on pigmeat prices by reducing stocks in the Community market while allowing the EU to keep its export market (see paragraph 35). 
Denna tgrd gjorde det mjligt att bidra till att tcka underskottet p den ryska marknaden och ledde till gynnsamma effekter p priset p grisktt genom att lagren p gemenskapens marknad minskade samtidigt som EU kunde behlla sin exportmarknad (se punkt 35).
On the private sector 51. The operation was criticised by the large private Russian operators set up in the 1990s, which considered that the programme strengthened operators from the old regime to their detriment (2). 
Den privata sektorn 51. tgrden har kritiserats av de stora ryska privata fretagen som grundades under 1990-talet, som anser att programmet gynnat den tidigare regimens fretag p deras bekostnad (2).
The fact that, in some regions, the cold stores were filled to capacity for many months as the meat could not be sold for the price demanded by the Russian authorities, prevented some local producers from selling their products when they wished although they were often already in a difficult financial position (see paragraph 35). 
Det fak-tumattfrysanlggningarnaivissaregionervaritfullaunderflera mnader, eftersom kttet inte kunnat sljas till det pris som krvts av de ryska myndigheterna har hindrat vissa lokala producenter frn att avstta sin produktion nr de s nskat, trots att de ofta redan befann sig i en svr ekonomisk situation (se punkt 35).
While the Tacis programme was trying to develop local agriculture, food aid prevented it from taking full advantage of the rouble devaluation that had made imported foodstuffs less competitive (3) and allowed the local authorities to postpone until later indispensable agricultural reforms (4). 
Trots att programmet Tacis syftar till att utveckla det lokala jordbruket har livsmedelsstdet hindrat detta frn att dra s stor frdel som mjligt av devalveringen av rubeln, vilket lett till lgre konkurrenskraft fr de importerade livsmedlen (3) och gjort det mjligt fr de lokala myndigheterna att skjuta upp de ndvndiga reformerna av jordbrukssektorn till ett senare tillflle (4).
At the same time the CIS countries were receiving exceptional Tacis aid (20 million euro) to alleviate the effects of the financial crisis in Russia. 
OSS-staterna erhll samtidigt ett exceptionellt std frn Tacis (20miljonereuro)frattmildraeffekternaavdenfinansiellakri-sen i Ryssland. Livsmedelsstdet ledde emellertid till att exportmarknaden fr dessa lnder frsvann.
During the first six months of 1999, while imports of pigmeat into Russia increased by 32 % compared with the corresponding period of 1998, imports of this product from other CIS countries fell by more than two thirds (5). 
Under frsta halvret 1999, d importen av grisktt till Ryssland kade med 32 % i frhllande till motsvarande period under 1998, minskade importen av denna produkt frn vriga OSS-lnder med ver tv tredjede-lar(5).
On supplies to the regions and on the neediest groups 53. 
Regionernas livsmedelsfrsrjning och de hrdast drabbade grupperna 53.
Because the Commission agreed to the Russian authoritiesŐ requiring a financial guarantee from regions which requested supplies of food products, the poorest regions, which the programme was supposed to help but which could not provide such guarantees, forwent certain products which they had, however, considered that they needed. 
Eftersom kommissionen godtog de ryska myndigheternas krav p en finansiell garanti frn de regioner som anskte om leveranser av livsmedelsprodukter avstod de fattigaste regionerna, som programmet var avsett att hjlpa men som inte kunnat ge sdana garantier, frn att frvrva vissa produkter som de likvl ansett sig vara i behov av.
Furthermore, the poorest regions refused to buy the meat supplied by the EU, because they found the selling price too high, and the meat went instead to more favoured regions. 
De fattigaste regionerna avstod vidare frn att kpa ktt som levererats av EU eftersom de ansg att frsljningspriset var fr hgt, vilket ledde till att kttet gick till de mera gynnade regionerna.
Thus regions such as Belgorod and the republic of Komi, which are among the least poor regions in Russia, received more aid than Ingushetia and Daghestan, which are severely affected by poverty (see Annex). 
Regioner som Belgorod eller republi-kenKomi,somrblanddeminstfattigaiRyssland,erhllsledes merstdnIngusjienochDagestansomrsrskiltdrabbadeav fattigdom (se bilaga 1).
Unlike the American aid which, from the outset, provided for 191 000 tonnes of products to be distributed free by NGOs to themostvulnerablegroupsinthepopulation,theEUaidben-efited the neediest groups only to a limited extent, although the basic Regulation laid down that exceptionally Ôthe products supplied may be distributed free to the neediest people of the regions concernedŐ (6). 
I motsats till det amerikanska stdet som frn brjan freskrev att icke-statliga organisationer skulle dela ut 191 000 ton produktergratistillfrmnfrdemestutsattabefolkningsgrup-perna kom stdet frn EU endast i liten utstrckning de mest behvande grupperna till godo, trots att det i grundfrordningen freskrevs att Óprodukterna kan ven undantagsvis delas ut gratis till frmn till de mest behvande i de berrda regionernaÓ (6).
It was only in March 2000 that the Commission allocated a small quantity of products (3 000 tonnes of beef and 1 000 tonnes of rice) for free distribution to refugees and their hosts via NGOs in Ingushetia. 
Inte frrn i mars 2000 avsatte kommissionen en mindre mngd produkter(3000tonntkttoch1000tonris)frgratisutdel-ning via icke-statliga organisationer till flyktingar och deras vrdar i Ingusjien.
It is clear that the products supplied by the EU did little to improve the living conditions of the poorest groups (7). 
Det str klart att de produkter som levererats av EU knappast frbttrat de fattigaste gruppernas levnadsfrhllan-den (7).
It is especially true of an expensive product such as meat. 
Detta gller i synnerhet fr en s dyr produkt som ktt.
The counterpart funds nevertheless helped to improve the pensionersŐ lot and made it possible for the Health and Employment Ministries to finance projects of a social nature. CONCLUSION 55. 
Icke desto mindre har motpartsmedlen bidragit till att frbttra pensionrernas situation och har slutligen gjort det mjligt fr ministerierna fr hlsa och sysselsttning att finansiera projekt av social karaktr.
The need for the programme in the form it took is arguable; the country exported cereals in 1999 (see paragraph 9) and the hardships facing a large part of the population were attributable moretoalackoffinancialresourcesthantothefailureofsupply (see paragraphs 6 to 8). 
Ndvndigheten av programmet ssom det utformats r diskutabel eftersom landets exporterade spannml 1999 (se punkt 9) och den svra situation som en stor del av befolkningen befann sig i snarare berodde p avsaknad av ekonomiska medel n p bristande livsmedelsfrsrjning (se punkterna 6Đ8).
Supplying meat proved to be particularly complicated and expensive (see paragraphs 17, 36, 40 and 41) and, with no guarantee as to its final destination (see paragraph 30), appeared to be particularly unjustified. 
Det r speciellt svrt att motivera kttleveranserna, som visat sig vara srskilt svra och kostsamma att genomfra (se punkterna 17, 36 och40Đ41),ochdringengarantifrdenslutligadestinationen finns (se punkt 30).
56. The desire to maximise the revenue from sales of the products, and thus the counterpart funds, ran counter to the programmeŐs principal declared objective of helping the neediest regions (see paragraphs 42 to 47). 
56. nskan att maximera inkomsterna frn frsljningen av produkterna och drmed motpartsmedlen, stred mot programmets huvudsakliga ml att stdja de mest behvande regionerna (se punkterna 42Đ47).
6 () Council Regulation (EC) No 2802/98 of 17 December 1998, 7 Article1(4). () Around 52 million Russians (35,3 %) live below the poverty line, according to the Russian Ministry of Social Development. 
6 () Artikel 1.4 i rdets frordning (EG) nr 2802/98 av den 17 december 7 1998. () Ca52miljonerryssar(35,3%)leverunderfattigdomstrskelnenligt det ryska ministeriet fr social utveckling.
In 1999 the most needy consumed 8,2 times less meat and 2,9 times less bread thantheaverageforthebetteroff. 
1999 frbrukade de mest behvande 8,2 gnger mindre ktt och 2,9 gnger mindre brd n genomsnittet i de vre samhllsklasserna.
C 25/12 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 25.1.2001 57. 
C 25/12 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 25.1.2001 57.
Such an operation could have been carried out specifically for the benefit of the poorest regions by dealing with the regional authorities and traders direct. 
En sdan tgrd hade kunnat genomfras srskilt till frmn fr de fattigaste regionerna genom direkta frhandlingar med de regionala myndigheterna och handelsidkarna.
Such an approach would have made itpossibletoassistthedevelopmentoftheprivateoperatorsand to avoid strengthening the old, centralist State structures (see paragraphs 28 and 51). 
En sdan metod hade gjort det mjligt att bidra till de privata fretagens utveckling och till att undvika ett frstrkande av de gamla centralistiska statsstrukturerna (se punkterna 28 och 51).
When the Commission proposed this operation to the Council, it underestimated the length of time for which the financial crisis in Russia would last and underestimated the impact of export refunds, which also contributed supplies to the Russian market, but at less cost, and, at the same time allowed Community exporters to retain their market (see paragraph 10). 
Nr kommissionen freslog denna tgrd fr rdet verskattade man varaktigheten hos den finansiella krisen i Ryssland, samtidigt som man underskattade effekten av exportbidragen, som till lgre kostnad hade kunnat bidra till frsrjningen p den ryska marknaden, samtidigt som gemenskapens exportrer kunnat behlla sin marknad (se punkt 10).
The Commissionshouldalsohavemadeitsaidmoreconditionalon the adoption of reforms that would promote a recovery in agri-culturaloutputandshouldhavecalledforthesetting-upofasys- tem to encourage trade between producer regions and deficit regions (see paragraph 7). 
Kommissionen borde ven ha angett infrandet av reformer fr jordbruksproduktionens terhmtning som villkor fr stdet samt krvt att ett system fr frmjande av handelsutbyte mellan producerande regioner och regioner med underskott infrdes (se punkt 7).
The deadlines for the implementation of the programme were greatly overstepped (see paragraphs 18 to 20) and the Commission was unable to deliver all the products initially planned before the carryovers of appropriations lapsed (see paragraph 21). 
Tidsfristerna fr genomfrandet av programmet verskreds kraftigt (se punkterna 18Đ20) och kommissionen kunde inte leverera alla produkter som ursprungligen planerats innan de verfrda anslagen frfll (se punkt 21).
Nevertheless, it managed to minimise the losses incurred during transport of the products to the beneficiary regions (see paragraph 30). 
Icke desto mindre lyckades kommissionen begrnsa de frluster som skedde i samband med transporten av produkterna till de stdmottagande regionerna (se punkt 30).
Not having assigned or redeployed the necessary human resources to the Delegation on the spot (see paragraph 16), the Commission was unable to effect adequate monitoring, particularly as regards the adaptation of the selling prices of the products in the various regions (see paragraph 37). 
Eftersom kommissionen inte anslagit eller omfrdelat de ndvndiga mnskliga resurserna till sin delegation p platsen (se punkt 16) kunde man inte skerstlla en tillrcklig uppfljning, srskilt betrffande anpassningen av produkternas frsljningspris i de olika regionerna (se punkt 37).
Moreover, the need to constantlyreferthembacktoheadquartersinBrusselsbeforeany decision could be taken on changes to the prices and quantities allocated to the beneficiary regions led to delays in the implementation of the programme. 
Vidare har frseningar vid genomfrandet av programmet frorsakats av tvnget att stndigt rapportera till huvudkontoret i Bryssel fre alla beslut rrande ndring av priser och mngder som beviljats de stdmottagande regionerna.
The principal declared objective, of improving the precar-ioussituationoftheRussianpeopleandregularisingagricultural markets by delivering to the neediest regions agricultural products that were to reach their destination as soon as possible, was only very partially achieved. 
Det huvudsakliga mlet, som frklarats vara att frbttra den prekra situation som det ryska folket befinner sig i och att stabilisera jordbruksmarknaderna genom att s snabbt som mjligt leverera jordbruksprodukter till de mest behvande regionerna, har endast uppntts till en liten del.
The counterpart funds, on the other hand, helped to improve the situation as regards health care and pensioners (see paragraphs 46, 47 and 54). 
Motpartsmedlen har dremot bidragit till att frbttra pensionrernas situation samt hlsovrden (se punkterna 46Đ47 och 54).
As regards regularising markets, the impact of consignments of cereals was limited, especially as less than half the consignments reached their destination before theharvest(seeparagraphs48and49).Asfortheconsignments of meat, they had no impact on the market in 1999, and a large proportion of the meat was still unsold in March 2000 (see paragraph 50). 
Vad gller stabilisering av marknaderna har spannmlsleveransernas effekt varit begrnsad, srskilt som mindre n hlften av leveranserna kom fram fre skrden (se punkterna 48Đ49). Vad gller kttleveranserna fick de ingen effekt p marknaden 1999 och en stor del av kttet hade fortfarande inte slts i mars 2000 (se punkt 50).
Furthermore, some of the most favoured regions benefited as much from the programme as the regions with the highest poverty rates, if not more (see paragraph 53). 
Vidare har regio-nersomhrtilldemestgynnadedragitlikastor,omintestrre frdel av programmet som regionerna med de hgsta fattighets-talen (se punkt 53).
This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at the Court meeting of 5 October 2000. 
Denna rapport har antagits av revisionsrtten vid dess sammantrde i Luxemburg den 5 oktober 2000.
C 25/14 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 25.1.2001 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The programme, the largest ever food delivery programme undertaken by the EU, has achieved some very positive results. 
C 25/14 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 25.1.2001 SAMMANFATTNING Programmet Đ det strsta program fr livsmedelsleverans som ngonsin genomfrts av EU Đ har gett en del mycket positiva resultat.
The combined effect of both the EU and American programmes made a significant contribution to the stabilisation of market prices and to the issue of affordability by the use of counterpart funds to clear pension arrears and to enable significant pension increases to be made (Article 4, Council Regulation (EC) No 2802/98). 
Den kombinerade effekten av EU:s program och Frenta staternas program utgjorde ett betydande bidrag till stabiliseringen av marknadspriserna och till konsumenters betalningsfrmga genom anvndning av motpartsmedel fr att betala utestende pensionsskulder och fr att mjliggra en betydande pensionskning(artikel4irdetsfrordning(EG)nr2802/98).
The Commission services faced numerous difficulties in implementing the programme undertaken by the EU. 
Kommissionen sttte p mnga svrigheter i genomfrandet av det program som EU tagit sig.
The primary task of delivering the food supplies to the agreed destinations was achieved with relative speed, despite a lack of human resources withintheCommissionitself. 
Den primra uppgiften, som bestod i att leverera livsmedel till de verenskomna destinatio-nerna, genomfrdes relativt snabbt trots brist p mnskliga resurser inom sjlva kommissionen.
In the view of the EU, the need was evident and was supported, interalia,bythefollowingfacts: Ń according to official Russian statistics, the 1998 cereals harvest was one third below the average harvest of the preceding years, Ń the marked fall in the importation of meat products brought aboutbythefinancialcrisisinautumn1998, Ń an analysis carried out by the other donor. 
EnligtEU:smeningvarbehovetuppenbartmedhnsyntillbl.a. Ń 1998rsspannmlsskrdsomenligtofficiellryskstatistiklg en tredjedel under de fregende rens genomsnittliga skrd, Ń den markanta nedgng i importen av kttprodukter som frorsakades av den finansiella krisen under hsten 1998, Ń den analys som genomfrts av den andra givaren.
Furthermore, even if money existed inside Russia on a macro level, it was impossible for private operators to execute commercial imports as they could not bear the risks linked to the erratic dollar-rouble conversion rate. 
Dessutom var det, ven om det fanns medel p makroniv i Ryss-land,omjligtfrprivataaktrerattgenomfrakommersiell import eftersom de inte kunde pta sig de risker som var frenade med den vxlande valutakursen mellan US-dollarn och rubeln.
It is not the case that meat prices were primarily set at levels that safeguarded commercial imports from the EU. 
Det var inte s att kttpriserna ursprungligen sattes till niver som skyddade kommersiell import frn EU.
The first price protocol for the programme (adopted on 14 May 1999) agreed price estimates which corresponded to prices set by the Russian administration in its decision of 5 February 1999. 
I det frsta prisprotokollet fr programmet (antaget den 14 maj 1999) verenskoms uppskattade priser som motsvarade de priser som faststllts av den ryska frvaltningen i dess beslut av den 5 februari 1999.
The Court considers that a targeted humanitarian programme would have been more appropriate, but the NGOs which would have been charged with the execution of such a programme did not have sufficient resources to execute a programme of this magnitude throughout the Russian Federation. 
Revisionsrtten anser att ett riktat humanitrt program skulle ha varit lmpligare, men de icke-statliga organisationer som skulle ha fttuppdragetattgenomfraettsdantprogramhadeintehaft tillrckliga resurser att genomfra ett s omfattande program i Ryssland.
Furthermore, such a programme would not have produced the considerable benefits produced by the generation of counterpart funds which were used to wipe out pension arrears and contributed to the increase in basic pensions. 
Vidare skulle ett sdant program inte ha givit de avsevrda frdelar som stadkoms genom skapandet av motpartsmedel, vilka anvndes till att betala utestende pensionsskulder och bidrog till att ka folkpensionerna.
The CourtŐs observations relate to a programme that is still under way. 
Revisionsrttens iakttagelser hnfr sig till ett program som fortfarande pgr.