natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Fifteen countries’ average transmission times exceeded the time limit for entering the fingerprints in 2017 – see Figure 9. 
Den genomsnittliga verfringstiden fr 15 lnder verskred tidsfristen fr att mata in fingeravtryck 2017 Đ se figur 9.
While the regulation foresees derogations to the data entry deadlines, there is no mechanism in place to distinguish these from irregular delays. 
I frordningen anges undantag frn tidsfristerna fr uppgiftsinmatning, men det finns ingen mekanism som gr att man kan skilja dem frn irreguljra frseningar.
82 As Figure 9 shows, it took Spain, for example, 30 days on average to transmit fingerprints in Eurodac in 2017. 
82 Ssom figur 9 visar tog det exempelvis Spanien i genomsnitt 30 dagar att verfra fingeravtryck till Eurodac 2017.
This means that a person apprehended during an irregular border crossing into Spain had on average 30 days to reach another Member State and apply for asylum there. 
Det innebr att en person som greps i samband med att han eller hon passerade grnsen till Spanien irreguljrt i genomsnitt hade 30 dagar p sig att n en annan medlemsstat och ska asyl dr.
Authorities in that other country checking the fingerprints against the data in Eurodac would not have found any matches. 
Om myndigheterna i det andra landet hade kontrollerat fingeravtrycken mot uppgifterna i Eurodac skulle de inte ha ftt ngra trffar.
Consequently, the other country would have been obliged to process the person’s asylum application. 
Fljaktligen skulle det andra landet bli skyldigt att behandla personens asylanskan.
Conclusions and recommendations 83 We examined whether the EU information systems for internal security support border control efficiently. 
Slutsatser och rekommendationer 83 Vi underskte om EU:s informationssystem fr inre skerhet stder grnskontroller p ett effektivt stt.
We concluded that border guards are increasingly using and relying on these systems when performing border checks. 
Vi drog slutsatsen att grnskontrolltjnstemn i allt strre utstrckning anvnder och frlitar sig p dessa system nr de utfr grnskontroller.
However, some data is currently not included in the systems, while other data is not complete or not entered in a timely manner. 
Vissa uppgifter ingr dock fr nrvarande inte i systemen, medan andra uppgifter antingen inte r fullstndiga eller inte matas in i tid.
84 We found that the EU information systems were generally well designed to facilitate border checks. 
84 Vi konstaterade att EU:s informationssystem i allmnhet var vl utformade fr att underltta grnskontroller.
The countries we visited have set up their systems in line with the applicable legal framework. 
De lnder vi beskte hade upprttat sina system i linje med tillmplig lagstiftning.
Nevertheless, some national SIS II and VIS components facilitated more efficient border checks than others (see paragraphs 17-21). 
Vissa nationella SIS II-och VIS-komponenter mjliggjorde dock effektivare grnskontroller n andra (se punkterna 17Đ21).
85 While Member States are sharing more and more information via the systems, legal constraints (data protection and national security rules) prevent sharing of human resources. 
85 Medlemsstaterna delar alltmer information via systemen, men rttsliga begrnsningar (dataskydd och nationella skerhetsregler) frhindrar gemensam anvndning av personal.
Border guards visiting other Member States cannot access their host countries’ information systems to perform border checks. 
Grnskontrolltjnstemn som besker andra medlemsstater kan inte f tkomst till vrdlndernas informationssystem fr att utfra grnskontroller.
We also noted that the systems were set up without a training environment in which border guards could practise scenarios that they do not encounter frequently on the job (see paragraphs 22-23). 
Vi noterade ven att systemen hade upprttats utan ngon utbildningsmilj dr grnskontrolltjnstemn kunde va p scenarier som de inte stter p srskilt ofta p jobbet (se punkterna 22Đ23).
Recommendation 1 – Promote the use of SIS II and VIS training environments The Commission should promote the use by the Member States of the central SIS II and VIS training environments, which would allow border guards to experience real life situations during their training. 
Rekommendation 1 Đ Frmja anvndning av utbildningsmiljer fr SIS II och VIS Kommissionen br frmja medlemsstaternas anvndning av de centrala utbildningsmiljerna fr SIS II och VIS, s att grnskontrolltjnstemn fr uppleva verkliga situationer under sin utbildning.
Timeframe: end of 2020. 
Tidsram: Slutet av 2020.
86 The implementation of IT solutions was sometimes delayed, both at EU and national level. 
86 Genomfrandet av it-lsningar var ibland frsenat, bde p EU-niv och nationell niv.
Four years after the Eurosur regulation entered into force, only half of the Member States were sharing all obligatory and voluntary information on the Eurosur platform. 
Fyra r efter det att Eurosur-frordningen trdde i kraft var det endast hlften av medlemsstaterna som delade all obligatorisk och frivillig information p Eurosur-plattformen.
Fourteen countries failed to implement the rules on Passenger Name Record data on time. 
14 lnder underlt att genomfra reglerna om passageraruppgifter i tid.
This prevented border authorities from having a full picture of the situation at the external borders of the Schengen area as well as advance information about high-risk individuals crossing them (see paragraphs 24-32). 36 
Detta ledde till att grnsmyndigheterna inte hade en fullstndig bild av situationen vid de yttre grnserna i Schengenomrdet och ocks saknade frhandsinformation om hgriskindivider som tog sig ver dem (se punkterna 24Đ32). 37
87 The Schengen evaluation mechanism plays an important role in monitoring the Schengen States’ compliance with Schengen rules. 
87 Utvrderingsmekanismen fr Schengen spelar en viktig roll i vervakningen av Schengenstaternas efterlevnad av Schengenreglerna.
We found that these evaluations were generally thorough and methodical, and addressed key aspects of the systems. 
Vi konstaterade att utvrderingarna generellt sett var grundliga och metodiska och behandlade centrala aspekter av systemen.
However, it takes a long time for the Schengen States to remedy weaknesses identified during the evaluations. 
Det tar dock lng tid fr Schengenstaterna att avhjlpa de brister som identifieras i utvrderingarna.
This is due to a lack of deadlines for the adoption of evaluation reports and the implementation of corrective action plans (see paragraphs 33-41). 
Det beror p att det inte finns ngra tidsfrister fr att anta utvrderingsrapporter och genomfra korrigerande handlingsplaner (se punkterna 33Đ41).
88 The Commission has not met its obligation to report annually to the Parliament and the Council on the evaluations carried out. 
88 Kommissionen har inte fullgjort skyldigheten att rligen rapportera till parlamentet och rdet om de utvrderingar som har genomfrts.
We found that up to four years after their evaluations, none of the Schengen States covered by the audit had fully implemented their action plans. 
Vi konstaterade att inga av de Schengenstater som omfattas av revisionen hade genomfrt sina handlingsplaner till fullo upp till fyra r efter utvrderingarna.
This shows that the evaluation process does not swiftly remedy identified weaknesses (see paragraphs 42-43). 
Det visar att utvrderingsfrfarandet inte avhjlper identifierade brister p ett skyndsamt stt (se punkterna 42Đ43).
Recommendation 2 – Speed up the correction of weaknesses detected during Schengen evaluations The Commission should: (a) when presenting the evaluation report provided for under Article 22 of Regulation 1053/2013 to the Parliament and the Council, include information on the delays encountered by the evaluated Schengen States’ implementation of their action plans to address the Council recommendations. (b) propose appropriate legislative and procedural measures in order to shorten the timeframe of the Schengen evaluation cycle. 
Rekommendation 2 Đ Pskynda korrigeringen av brister som upptcks under Schengenutvrderingarna Kommissionen br a) informera om frseningar av de utvrderade Schengenstaternas genomfrande av handlingsplanerna fr att flja rdets rekommendationer nr den lgger fram utvrderingsrapporten enligt artikel 22 i frordning 1053/2013 fr parlamentet och rdet, b) fresl lmpliga rttsliga och frfarandemssiga tgrder fr att frkorta tidsramen fr Schengens utvrderingscykel.
89 The EU provides Member States with funding from the Internal Security Fund for the development and maintenance of the information systems covered by our audit. 
89 EU tillhandahller medlemsstaterna finansiering frn Fonden fr inre skerhet fr utveckling och underhll av de informationssystem som omfattas av vr revision.
On average, the countries we visited dedicated 15 % of their Internal Security Fund allocations to these five systems. 
I genomsnitt avsatte de lnder vi beskte 15 % av sina anslag frn Fonden fr inre skerhet till dessa fem system.
They mostly used this EU money for maintenance of SIS II and VIS and extensions of Eurosur and PNR (see paragraphs 44-46). 
De anvnde frmst dessa medel till att underhlla SIS II och VIS och bygga ut Eurosur och PNR (se punkterna 44Đ46).
90 We found that the Member States are making increasing use of the systems. 
90 Vi konstaterade att medlemsstaterna anvnder systemen i allt strre utstrckning.
Between 2013 and 2017, the number of hits in SIS II relating to wanted persons and objects based on alerts originating in other countries almost tripled (see paragraphs 47-58). 37 
Antalet trffar i SIS II som rrde efterlysta personer eller freml p grundval av registreringar som gjorts i andra lnder nstan tredubblades mellan 2013 och 2017 (se punkterna 47Đ58). 38
91 However, this use could be more systematic. 
91 Anvndningen skulle dock kunna vara mer systematisk.
Our survey reveals that more than half of the border guards had been in a situation where they had to decide whether to let someone through without consulting the systems. 
Vr underskning visar att mer n hlften av grnskontrolltjnstemnnen hade befunnit sig i situationer dr de var tvungna att fatta beslut om de skulle lta ngon resa in utan att anvnda systemen.
In particular, we noted a discrepancy between the number of visas issued and the number of visas checked. 
Vi konstaterade i synnerhet en skillnad mellan det antal viseringar som hade utfrdats och det antal viseringar som hade kontrollerats.
Moreover, VIS can only handle short-term Schengen visas – it is not currently designed to accommodate data on national visas, which also allow holders to enter any Schengen State. 
Dessutom kan VIS enbart hantera Schengenviseringar fr kortare vistelser Đ systemet r fr nrvarande inte utformat fr att hantera uppgifter om nationella viseringar, som ocks tillter innehavare att resa in i alla Schengenstater.
In 2017 alone, almost 2.6 million such visas were issued (see paragraphs 59-62).The Commission has identified this information gap and has tabled a proposal to revise the VIS legal framework. 
Enbart 2017 utfrdades nstan 2,6 miljoner sdana viseringar (se punkterna 59Đ62). Kommissionen har identifierat denna informationslucka och har lagt fram ett frslag till versyn av den rttsliga ramen fr VIS.
Recommendation 3 – Analyse discrepancies in visa checks The Commission should analyse the reasons for discrepancies between the number of Schengen visas issued and the number checked, and propose corrective measures. 
Rekommendation 3 Đ Analysera skillnaderna i viseringskontroller Kommissionen br analysera anledningarna till skillnaderna mellan det antal Schengenviseringar som utfrdas och det antal som kontrolleras och fresl korrigerande tgrder.
92 Border guards use the data in the systems as their basis for making decisions that affect the safety of European citizens. 
92 Grnskontrolltjnstemn anvnder uppgifterna i systemen som grund fr att fatta beslut som pverkar de europeiska medborgarnas skerhet.
We found little reference to the issue of data quality in the legal acts governing the European information systems. 
Vi fann f hnvisningar till problemet med uppgiftskvalitet i de rttsakter som reglerar EU:s informationssystem.
The SIS II regulation gave Member States the responsibility for data quality and did not involve the Commission or eu-LISA (see paragraphs 63-65). 
I SIS II-frordningen gavs medlemsstaterna ansvaret fr uppgiftskvaliteten utan inblandning av kommissionen eller eu-Lisa (se punkterna 63Đ65).
93 Although eu-LISA performs automated monthly quality checks on the data in SIS II and transmit the results to the countries concerned, the agency can only see the aggregate numbers of quality issues for each type of alert and each country. 
93 ven om eu-LISA gr automatiska kvalitetskontroller av uppgifterna i SIS II varje mnad och versnder resultaten till de berrda lnderna, kan byrn enbart se det sammanlagda antalet kvalitetsproblem fr varje typ av registrering och fr varje land.
This report is not sufficiently detailed to see the progress made in addressing data quality issues. 
Rapporten r inte tillrckligt detaljerad fr att det ska g att se vilka framsteg som gjorts i frga om att ta itu med problem som rr uppgiftskvaliteten.
Furthermore, neither eu-LISA nor the Commission have any enforcement powers to ensure that Schengen countries correct data quality issues in a timely manner (see paragraphs 67-70). 
Vidare har varken eu-Lisa eller kommissionen befogenhet att se till att Schengenlnderna korrigerar problem med uppgifters kvalitet inom rimlig tid (se punkterna 67Đ70).
94 We found that border guards do not always get timely and complete data from the information systems, which undermines the efficiency of border checks. 
94 Vi konstaterade att grnskontrolltjnstemn inte alltid fr aktuella och fullstndiga uppgifter frn informationssystemen, vilket undergrver grnskontrollernas effektivitet.
For example, when border guards check a name in SIS II, they may receive hundreds of results (mostly false positives), which they have to check manually. 
ett namn i SIS II kan de f hundratals resultat (mest falska positiva resultat) som de mste g igenom manuellt.
This not only makes border checks less efficient, but also increases the risk of real hits being overlooked (see paragraphs 71-76). 
Detta leder inte bara till att grnskontrollerna blir mindre effektiva utan kar ven risken fr att verkliga trffar frbises (se punkterna 71Đ76).
Recommendation 4 – Improve data quality control procedures The Commission should: (a) ask eu-LISA to include, in its monthly monitoring, statistics on corrections made by the Schengen States. (b) if data quality monitoring does not indicate improvement take the necessary steps, e.g. via guidance or existing advisory groups, to encourage Schengen states to step up their corrective actions. Timeframe: by the end of 2020. 
Rekommendation 4 Đ Frbttra frfarandena fr att kontrollera uppgifters kvalitet Kommissionen br a) begra att eu-Lisa i den mnatliga vervakningen inbegriper statistik om de korrigeringar som Schengenstaterna gjort, b) vidta ndvndiga tgrder fr att uppmana Schengenstaterna att intensifiera sina korrigerande tgrder, exempelvis genom vgledning eller befintliga rdgivande grupper, om vervakningen av uppgiftskvaliteten inte visar p frbttringar. Tidsram: Fre slutet av 2020.
95 Except in the case of Eurodac, there are generally no compulsory deadlines on entering data. 
95 Frutom nr det gller Eurodac finns det generellt sett inga obligatoriska tidsfrister fr inmatning av uppgifter.
For example, Eurosur is meant to provide real-time information on the situation at the external borders. 
Syftet med Eurosur r till exempel att ge realtidsinformation om situationen vid de yttre grnserna.
However, while some of the countries covered by our audit do indeed enter information in Eurosur on a real-time basis, others do so only once a week. 
Vissa av de lnder som omfattas av vr revision matar in uppgifter i Eurosur i realtid, men andra gr det enbart en gng i veckan.
Since Eurodac started operating in 2003, there has not been a single year in which all Member States have transmitted the required information on time. 
Sedan Eurodac brjade anvndas 2003 har inte alla medlemsstater verfrt den information som krvs i tid ngot enda r.
Delayed transmission can lead to the wrong country being designated responsible for processing an asylum application (see paragraphs 77-82). 
Frsenade verfringar kan leda till att fel land anges som ansvarigt fr att behandla en asylanskan (se punkterna 77Đ82).
Recommendation 5 – Reduce delays in data entry The Commission should: (a) analyse the causes of irregular delays in Eurodac data entries and take appropriate action towards the Member States concerned. (b) propose during the next revision of the applicable legislation for Eurosur that binding deadlines on data entry are introduced. 
Rekommendation 5 Đ Minska frseningarna i uppgiftsinmatningen Kommissionen br a) analysera sklen till irreguljra frseningar i inmatningen av uppgifter i Eurodac och vidta lmpliga tgrder mot de berrda medlemsstaterna, b) inom ramen fr nsta versyn av den tillmpliga lagstiftningen fr Eurosur fresl att bindande tidsfrister fr uppgiftsinmatning infrs.
Timeframe: end 2021. 
Tidsram: Slutet av 2021.
This Report was adopted by Chamber III, headed by Ms Bettina JAKOBSEN, Member of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 8 October 2019. 
Denna rapport antogs av revisionsrttens avdelning III, med ledamoten Bettina Jakobsen som ordfrande, vid dess sammantrde i Luxemburg den 8 oktober 2019.
Annex Brief description of the information systems selected SIS II The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the most widely used and largest information sharing system for security and border management in Europe. 
Bilaga Kort beskrivning av de utvalda informationssystemen SIS II Schengens informationssystem (SIS) r det mest anvnda och strsta informationsdelningssystemet fr skerhet och grnsfrvaltning i Europa.
SIS II enables competent national authorities, such as the police and border guards, to enter and consult alerts on persons or objects. 
SIS II gr det mjligt fr berrda nationella myndigheter, till exempel polis och grnsbevakning, att mata in och ska p registreringar om personer och freml.
A SIS alert does not only contain information about a particular person or object but also instructions for the authorities on what to do when the person or object has been found. 
En SIS-registrering innehller inte bara information om en viss person eller ett visst freml, utan ven anvisningar om vad myndigheterna ska gra om de hittar den personen eller det fremlet.
SIS II consists of three major components: a central system, the national systems and a communication infrastructure (network) between the systems. 
SIS II bestr av tre stora delar: ett centralt system, de nationella systemen och en kommunikationsinfrastruktur (ntverk) mellan systemen.
An alert entered in SIS II in one Schengen State is transferred in real time to the central system. 
En registrering som frs in i SIS II i en Schengenstat verfrs i realtid till det centrala systemet.
It then becomes available in all the other Schengen States. 
Den blir sedan tillgnglig i alla andra Schengenstater.
Each Schengen State using SIS II is responsible for setting up, operating and maintaining its national system and its national SIRENE Bureau, which serves as a single point of contact for the exchange of supplementary information and coordination of activities related to SIS II alerts. 
Varje Schengenstat som anvnder SIS II br ansvaret fr inrttande, drift och underhll av sitt nationella system och sitt nationella Sirenekontor, som fungerar som gemensam kontaktpunkt fr att utbyta ytterligare information och samordna verksamheter med anknytning till SIS II-registreringar.
The EU Agency for large-scale Information systems (eu-LISA) is responsible for the operational management of the central system and the communication infrastructure. 
Europeiska unionens byr fr den operativa frvaltningen av stora it-system inom omrdet frihet, skerhet och rttvisa (eu-Lisa) br ansvaret fr den operativa frvaltningen av det centrala systemet och kommunikationsinfrastrukturen.
The European Commission is responsible for the general supervision and evaluation of the system and for the adoption of implementing measures. 
Europeiska kommissionen br ansvaret fr den allmnna vervakningen och utvrderingen av systemet och fr att vidta genomfrandetgrder.
SIS II is in operation in 30 European countries, including 26 EU Member States (only Ireland and Cyprus are not yet connected to SIS II) and 4 Schengen Associated Countries (Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland). 
SIS II r i drift i 30 europeiska lnder, inbegripet 26 EU-medlemsstater (enbart Irland och Cypern r nnu inte anslutna till SIS II) och fyra Schengenassocierade lnder (Schweiz, Norge, Liechtenstein och Island).
VIS The Visa Information System (VIS) supports the implementation of the common EU visa policy. 
VIS Informationssystemet fr viseringar (VIS) stder genomfrandet av EU:s gemensamma viseringspolitik.
It allows Schengen States to exchange visa data. 
Det gr det mjligt fr Schengenstaterna att utbyta viseringsuppgifter.
The system can perform biometric matching, primarily of fingerprints, for identification and verification purposes. 
Systemet mjliggr biometrisk matchning, framfr allt av fingeravtryck, i identifierings-och kontrollsyfte.
VIS enables border guards to verify that the person presenting a visa is its rightful holder, that the visa is authentic and that the person still meets the visa requirements. 
VIS gr det mjligt fr grnskontrolltjnstemn att kontrollera att den person som uppvisar en visering r den faktiska innehavaren, att viseringen r kta och att personen fortfarande uppfyller viseringskraven.
A digital photograph and 10 fingerprints are collected from persons applying for a visa. 
Ett digitalt fotografi och tio fingeravtryck samlas in frn personer som ansker om visering.
These biometric data, along with data provided in the visa application form, are recorded in a secure central database. 
Dessa biometriska uppgifter registreras tillsammans med de uppgifter som lmnas i formulret fr viseringsanskan i en sker central databas.
Using biometric data to confirm a visa holder's identity allows for faster, more accurate and more secure checks. 
Nr biometriska uppgifter anvnds fr att bekrfta en viseringsinnehavares identitet mjliggrs snabbare, exaktare och skrare kontroller.
VIS consists of a central IT system and of a communication infrastructure that links the central system to national systems. 
VIS bestr av ett centralt it-system och av en kommunikationsinfrastruktur som sammankopplar det centrala systemet och nationella system.
VIS connects consulates in non-EU countries and all external border checkpoints of Schengen States. 
VIS sammankopplar konsulat i tredjelnder och alla yttre grnsvergngar i Schengenstaterna.
It processes and stores data and decisions relating to applications for short-stay visas. 
Systemet behandlar och lagrar uppgifter och beslut som rr anskningar om viseringar fr kortare vistelse.
As a Schengen instrument, VIS applies to all Schengen Area countries. 
I egenskap av Schengeninstrument omfattar VIS alla lnder i Schengenomrdet.
The EU Agency for large-scale Information systems, eu-LISA, is responsible for the operational management of VIS. Eurodac EURODAC is an EU asylum fingerprint database. 
Europeiska unionens byr fr den operativa frvaltningen av stora it-system inom omrdet frihet, skerhet och rttvisa (eu-Lisa) br ansvaret fr den operativa frvaltningen av VIS. Eurodac Eurodac r en EU-databas ver asylskandes fingeravtryck.
Its primary objective is to serve the implementation of Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 ('the Dublin regulation'). 
Det frmsta mlet med systemet r att frmja genomfrandet av frordning (EU) nr 604/2013 (Dublinfrordningen).