natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Negotiated procedure for building contracts: Building contracts (purchase, long lease, usufruct, leasing, rental or hire purchase, with or without option to buy, of land, existing buildings or other real estate) can be concluded by negotiated procedure without publication of a contract notice, after the local market has been prospected. 
Frhandlat frfarande fr upphandling av fastighetskontrakt: fastighetskontrakt (inkp, hyra under lngre period, nyttjandertt, hyra eller hyrkp, med eller utan kpoption, av mark, befintliga byggnader eller annan fast egendom) kan ske genom ett frhandlat frfarande utan offentliggrande av ett upphandlingsmeddelande efter det att den lokala marknaden har kartlagts.
The thresholds of the EU Procurement Directive are 5 225 000 euros for works and 135 000 euros for services or supplies. 
Trskelvrdena enligt EU:s upphandlingsdirektiv r 5 225 000 euro fr bygg-och anlggningsarbeten och 135 000 euro fr tjnster eller varor.
For amounts up to 1 000 euros no procurement procedure is required. 
Fr belopp upp till 1 000 euro krvs det inget upphandlingsfrfarande.
Publish award notice in the Official Journal or (mainly for middle-and low-value contracts) annual list of contractors on internet Figure 3 
Offentliggr meddelande om tilldelning i EUT eller (frmst vid kontrakt till medelhgt och lgt vrde) den rliga frteckningen ver kontraktsparter p internet Figur 3
Audit scope 15 and approach Audit scope 07 We examined to what extent the EU institutions facilitate access to their public procurement. 
Revisionens inriktning och 15 omfattning samt revisionsmetod Revisionens inriktning och omfattning 07 Vr underskning gllde i vilken utstrckning EU-institutionerna underlttar tilltrdet till sina offentliga upphandlingar.
See Figure 4 for the prerequisites for facilitating access to public procurement. 
I figur 4 presenteras frutsttningarna fr att underltta tilltrdet till offentliga upphandlingar.
Prerequisites for facilitating access to public procurement 2. 
Frutsttningar fr att underltta tilltrdet till offentliga upphandlingar 2.
Clear rules and choosing pro-competitive procedures 3. 
Tydliga regler och val av konkurrensfrmjande frfaranden Klla: Europeiska revisionsrtten.
No unnecessary hurdles for economic operators Facilitating ACCESS to public procurement 1. 
08 3. Inga ondiga hinder fr ekonomiska aktrer 1.
Few errors, robust systems, capable staff and monitoring of participation 4. Being transparent and learning from one another Source: European Court of Auditors. 08 We therefore considered the following four questions: (a) Do the EU institutions have robust systems that foster participation whilst protecting the Union’s financial interests? (b) Do the EU institutions make the right procedural choices to increase partici‐ pation in their procurement procedures? (c) Do the EU institutions to the greatest extent possible remove hurdles that make life difficult for potential tenderers? (d) Do the EU institutions ensure in a comprehensive and systematic manner that the outcomes of their procurement procedures are transparent and that they learn from one another? 
F fel, robusta system, kompetent personal och vervakning av deltagandet Underltta TILLTRDET till offentlig upphandling 4. ppenhet och msesidigt lrande Vid underskningen frskte vi f svar p fljande fyra frgor: a) Har EU-institutionerna robusta system som frmjar deltagande samtidigt som de skyddar unionens ekonomiska intressen? b) Vljer EU-institutionerna rtt frfarande fr att ka deltagandet i sina upphandlingar? c) Avlgsnar EU-institutionerna i strsta mjliga utstrckning hinder som gr det svrare fr potentiella anbudsgivare? d) Skerstller EU-institutionerna omfattande och systematiskt att resultaten av deras upphandlingar r ppna och att de lr sig av varandra?
Audit scope and approach 16 09 We covered the procurement activities of the four largest EU institutions: the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Un‐ ion and the European Central Bank (ECB). 
Revisionens inriktning och omfattning samt revisionsmetod 16 09 Vi granskade upphandlingsverksamheten vid de fyra strsta EU-institutionerna: Europeiska kommissionen, Europaparlamentet, Europeiska unionens rd och Europeiska centralbanken (ECB).
In 2014 the total value of all contracts above 15 000 euros (above 10 000 euros for the ECB) of these four institutions is presented in Table 1: Value of contracts in 2014 1 Council’s estimated value of procedures launched in 2014. 
Det sammanlagda vrdet fr dessa fyra institutioners samtliga kontrakt 2014 med ett vrde p ver 15 000 euro (ver 10 000 euro fr ECB) visas i tabell 1: Kontraktsvrden 2014 1 Rdets uppskattning av vrdet fr de upphandlingar som institutionen pbrjade under 2014.
Source: European Court of Auditors based on data provided by the audited institutions. 
Klla: Europeiska revisionsrtten, baserat p uppgifter frn de granskade institutionerna.
10 In addition, the following EU institutions and bodies were included in our audit to examine specific issues: the Court of Justice of the European Union for its juris‐ prudence in relation to public procurement by the EU institutions, the European Ombudsman who deals with maladministration in procurement procedures, the European Anti‐Fraud Office (OLAF) for its investigations in connection with irregularities in procurement procedures and the Publications Office which man‐ ages online services giving access to information on public procurement. 
10 Vi granskade dessutom fljande EU-institutioner och EU-organ fr att kontrollera srskilda aspekter: Europeiska unionens domstol fr dess rttspraxis med avseende p EU-institutionernas offentliga upphandlingar, Europeiska ombudsmannen som utreder administrativa missfrhllanden i upphandlingsfrfaranden, Europeiska byrn fr bedrgeribekmpning (Olaf) fr dess utredningar i samband med oriktigheter i upphandlingsfrfaranden samt Publikationsbyrn, som frvaltar onlinetjnster som ger tillgng till information om offentliga upphandlingar.
11 We did not look into public contracts concluded by the Commission on behalf of and on the account of beneficiaries in connection with external actions8, nor at procurements where the management of EU spending involves other organisa‐ tions or bodies (so‐called ‘indirect management’ by the Commission) or where the management is shared with Member States. 
11 Vi granskade inte offentliga kontrakt som slutits av kommissionen p uppdrag av och till frmn fr mottagare med anknytning till externa tgrder8, och inte heller upphandlingar dr frvaltningen av EU-medel inbegriper andra organisationer eller organ (s kallad indirekt frvaltning av kommissionen) eller dr frvaltningen delas med medlemsstaterna.
8 Specific rules apply which are laid down in Part Two, Title IV of the EU Financial Regulation. 
8 Fr detta gller srskilda regler som terfinns i del II avdelning IV i EU:s budgetfrordning.
Institution In million euro Commission 3 034 Parliament 497 ECB 515 Council1 171 Total 4 217 Table 1 
Institution miljoner euro Kommissionen 3 034 Parlamentet 497 ECB 515 Rdet1 171 Totalt 4 217 Tabell 1
Audit scope and approach 17 Audit approach 12 We based our observations on the following main sources of audit evidence: (a) We carried out preliminary research with representatives of business organi‐ sations, national procurement experts and experts from the academic world; (b) We reviewed documentation relating to procurement policies, procedures and tools; (c) We analysed samples of procurement files covering the years 2013–2015 from the European Parliament (DG INLO and DG COMM), from the General Sec‐ retariat of the Council, from the Commission (DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, Joint Research Centre (JRC)) and from the ECB; (d) We tested the EU institutions’ online tools which are meant to assist in the identification of procurement opportunities; (e) We interviewed EU staff; (f) We analysed the EU institutions’ replies to our questionnaires. 
Revisionens inriktning och omfattning samt revisionsmetod 17 Revisionsmetod 12 Vra iakttagelser bygger p fljande huvudsakliga kllor till revisionsbevis: a) Vi gjorde preliminra efterforskningar med hjlp av fretrdare fr fretags-organisationer, experter p nationell upphandling och experter frn den akademiska vrlden. b) Vi granskade dokumentation med anknytning till politik, frfaranden och verktyg fr upphandling. c) Vi analyserade slumpvis valda upphandlingsdokument frn ren 2013Đ2015 frn Europaparlamentet (GD INLO och GD COMM), rdets generalsekretariat, kommissionen (GD Inre marknaden, industri, entreprenrskap samt sm och medelstora fretag och det gemensamma forskningscentrumet) och ECB. d) Vi testade EU-institutionernas webbaserade verktyg som ska underltta identifieringen av upphandlingsmjligheter. e) Vi intervjuade personal vid EU:s institutioner. f) Vi analyserade EU-institutionernas svar p vra frgeformulr.
13 In addition, we surveyed 47 smaller EU bodies to obtain their opinions and views with regard to procurement policies and processes. 
13 Vi skickade ocks en enkt till 47 mindre EU-organ dr de ombads dela med sig av sina synpunkter p och sikter om politiken och frfarandena fr upphandling.
40 replies were received (response rate 85 %). 
Vi mottog 40 svar (85 % svarsfrekvens).
Results are summarised in Annex II. 
Resultaten sammanfattas i bilaga II.
Observations 18 Section I — The EU institutions manage to keep the number of serious errors low in their procurement procedures but participation therein is not systematically monitored 14 The EU institutions should be able to demonstrate that they ensure accessibility in their procurement activities. 
Iakttagelser 18 Avdelning I Đ EU-institutionerna lyckas hlla antalet allvarliga fel i sina upphandlingsfrfaranden nere, men deltagandet i dem vervakas inte systematiskt 14 EU-institutionerna br kunna visa att deras upphandlingsverksamhet r tillgnglig fr mnga aktrer.
To that end, they need information on the level of participation of economic operators in their procurement procedures. 
Fr att kunna gra detta krvs information om hur mnga ekonomiska aktrer som deltar i upphandlingarna.
They must also prevent serious errors and irregularities whose occurrence could adversely affect the possibility for economic operators to participate and undermine their confidence and hence their interest in the EU institutions’ procurement. 
Institutionerna ska ven frhindra allvarliga fel och oriktigheter som skulle kunna hindra ekonomiska aktrer frn att delta och undergrva deras frtroende och fljaktligen deras intresse fr EU-institutionernas upphandlingar.
We ex‐ amined the information available on serious errors and irregularities, the systems to prevent them and the participation by economic operators in the EU institu‐ tions’ procurement procedures. 
Vi granskade den tillgngliga informationen om allvarliga fel och oriktigheter, systemen som ska frhindra fel och oriktigheter samt ekonomiska aktrers deltagande i EU-institutionernas upphandlingar.
In contrast to the situation in shared management with Member States, few serious errors or irregularities are reported in connection with the EU institutions’ procurement 15 In our annual Statement of Assurance9 we detect few serious public procurement errors in the transactions directly managed by the EU institutions10. 
F allvarliga fel eller oriktigheter rapporteras i samband med EU-institutionernas upphandlingar Đ till skillnad frn de omrden dr frvaltningen delas med medlemsstater 15 I vr rliga revisionsfrklaring9 upptcker vi f allvarliga fel i samband med offentliga upphandlingar i de transaktioner som frvaltas direkt av EU-institutio-nerna10.
16 At our request OLAF analysed its information on alleged irregularities received between 1 January and 30 April 2015 to identify cases related to public procure‐ ment. 
16 P vr begran analyserade Olaf den information om pstdda oriktigheter som byrn mottog mellan den 1 januari och den 30 april 2015 i syfte att hitta de fall som hade anknytning till offentliga upphandlingar.
In total, OLAF counted 503 different incoming information items. 
Totalt sett mottog Olaf information om 503 olika renden.
Only 20 out of 503 notifications concerned procurement by the EU institutions, 16 of these were dismissed at the initial case selection phase and four led to the open‐ ing of an investigation. 
Endast 20 av 503 anmlningar gllde EU-institutioners upphandlingar, 16 av dem avvisades vid det inledande urvalet av renden och fyra ledde till en utredning.
These figures imply that, compared to the total number of procurement procedures launched by EU institutions, the share of cases with potentially serious irregularities is in the order of 1 %, if one takes into account the approximately 2 000 procedures per year where a contract award notice is published in the Official Journal by the EU institutions. 
Detta tyder p att potentiellt allvarliga oriktigheter frekommer i omkring 1 % av de cirka 2 000 upphandlingsfrfaranden per r fr vilka ett meddelande om tilldelning av kontrakt offentliggrs av EU-institutionerna i Europeiska unionens officiella tidning.
9 See for example the most recent annual report of the Court of Auditors on the implementation of the budget concerning the financial year 2014, together with the institutions’ replies (OJ C 373, 10.11.2015), paragraph 1.29. 
9 Se till exempel Revisionsrttens rsrapport om budgetgenomfrandet fr budgetret 2014 med institutionernas svar (EUT C 373, 10.11.2015, s. 1), punkt 1.29.
10 Errors in direct management mostly occurred with grants financed from the EU budget. 
10 Fel vid direkt frvaltning skedde frmst i samband med bidrag som finansierades genom EU:s budget.
11 See our Special Report 10/2015 ‘Efforts to address problems with public procurement in EU cohesion expenditure should by intensified’, in particular paragraphs 19 to 24 and Table 1 which provide a typology of errors. 
11 Se vr srskilda rapport nr 10/2015 Mer behver gras fr att tgrda problemen vid offentlig upphandling inom EU:s sammanhllningsutgifter, srskilt punkterna 19Đ24 och tabell 1 som innehller exempel p olika typer av fel.
The works, supplies and services procured in connection with cohesion expenditure in Member States include items such as road construction or waste water treatment plants which are normally not to be found in the procurement portfolio of the EU institutions (http://eca. europa.eu). 
De bygg-och anlggningsarbeten, varor och tjnster som upphandlas inom ramen fr sammanhllningspolitiken i medlemsstaterna utgrs bland annat av anlggning av vgar eller vattenreningsverk, som normalt inte ingr i EU-institutionernas upphandlings-portflj (http://eca.europa.eu).
Observations 19 17 OLAF only produced these statistics at our specific request and they only repre‐ sent a snapshot at a given point in time in order to have an idea of the number of potential cases brought to OLAF’s attention. 
Iakttagelser 19 17 Olaf tog fram denna statistik p srskild begran av revisionsrtten. Den ska bara ses som en beskrivning av situationen vid en given tidpunkt och r endast en uppskattning av antalet potentiella fall som Olaf uppmrksammats p.
It would have been more useful if OLAF had been able to provide statistics which allow trends to be identified and the outcome of its investigations to be assessed. 
Det hade varit bttre om Olaf hade kunnat tillhandahlla statistik som gr det mjligt att identifiera tendenser och kunna bedma resultaten av byrns utredningar.
The EU institutions have robust systems and capable staff to keep the risk of errors and irregularities under control Procedural expertise and assistance is available to the operational services 18 Successful procurement requires a combination of technical expertise concerning the specific works, supplies and services being procured and sound knowledge of the rules and procedures to be applied. 
EU-institutionerna har robusta system och kompetent personal som hller risken fr fel och oriktigheter nere De operativa avdelningarna har tillgng till expertis och std avseende frfaranden 18 Fr att en upphandling ska kunna genomfras med lyckat resultat krvs bde teknisk expertis avseende de specifika bygg-och anlggningsarbeten, varor och tjnster som upphandlas och gedigna kunskaper om de regler och frfaranden som ska tillmpas.
19 All entities whose procurement procedures we examined12 have dedicated units of procurement experts who advise and assist the operational services on their procurement activities. 
19 Alla enheter vars upphandlingsfrfaranden vi underskte12 har srskilda enheter med upphandlingsexperter som ger de operativa avdelningarna rd och std i samband med upphandlingsverksamheten.
We found that the procedural expertise of the procure‐ ment experts complements the technical expertise of the operational services and that the staff resources dedicated to procurement activities are appropriate. 
Vi kunde konstatera att upphand-lingsexperternas kunskaper om frfaranden kompletterar de operativa avdelningarnas tekniska expertis och att det finns tillrckliga personalresurser fr upphandlingsverksamheten.
Furthermore, procedural advice and expertise is available from the EU institu‐ tions’ legal services and/or central financial units. 
Vidare erbjuder EU-institutionernas rttstjnster och/eller centrala ekonomienheter rdgivning och expertis.
20 Most of the audited entities have internal committees in place that aim to strengthen governance and control over procurement procedures. 
20 De flesta av de granskade enheterna har interna kommitter som har i uppgift att frbttra styrningen av och kontrollen ver upphandlingsfrfaranden.
Typically these committees are composed of staff from other parts of the organisation. 
Kommitterna bestr normalt sett av personal frn andra delar av organisationen.
Such committees have decision‐making powers or can issue recommendations and they tend to deal with the larger procurements and/or with procurements with a more limited form of competition. 
De har befogenhet att fatta beslut och kan utfrda rekommendationer. Ofta hanterar de strre upphandlingar och/eller upphandlingar med mer begrnsad konkurrens.
Prior to the signature of a contract, these committees provide additional assurance that applicable rules have been followed. 
Innan ett kontrakt undertecknas lmnar kommitterna ytterligare frskringar om att tillmpliga regler har fljts.
Furthermore, their interdisciplinary composition makes them a plat‐ form for the exchange of views in the larger institutions where procurement is decentralised. 
Eftersom medlemmarna kommer frn olika avdelningar r de en lmplig plattform fr utbyte av sikter inom de strre institutionerna dr upphandlingen r decentraliserad.
12 See paragraph 9. 
12 Se punkt 9.
Observations 20 Advice from internal audit services played an important role 21 The current organisational set‐up and procedures for procurement activities are to a considerable extent the result of recommendations made by the internal audit services some years ago. 
Iakttagelser 20 Rdgivning frn tjnsterna fr internrevision spelade en viktig roll 21 Den nuvarande organisationsstrukturen och de nuvarande frfarandena fr upphandlingsverksamhet r till stor del ett resultat av de rekommendationer som tjnsterna fr internrevision utfrdade fr ett antal r sedan.
In the meantime, most internal audit services have focussed their attention on other areas of their institutions’ activities and allo‐ cated limited resources to public procurement. 
Sedan dess har de flesta tjnsterna fr internrevision inriktat sig p andra delar av institutionernas verksamhet och lagt begrnsade resurser p offentlig upphandling.
However, the internal audit ser‐ vices will have to revisit procurement to assess the implementation of the recent revision of the procurement rules and, based on the results of this reassessment, adjust their work programmes accordingly. 
De kommer emellertid att behva se ver upphandlingen igen fr att bedma genomfrandet av den senaste versynen av upphandlingsreglerna och, baserat p resultatet av bedmningen, justera sina arbetsprogram.
The ECB obtained external certification of its procurement activities 22 In addition to internal advice, external certification can help to bring in outside knowledge and perspective and can be a driver for improvement. 
ECB erhll extern certifiering av sin upphandlingsverksamhet 22 Utver intern rdgivning kan extern certifiering vara ett bra stt att erhlla kunskaper och synpunkter frn en utomstende aktr, som kan anvndas fr att frbttra frfarandena.
The Central Procurement Office (CPO) of the ECB applied for and obtained an external certifi‐ cation of its activities. 
ECB:s centrala upphandlingsavdelning anskte om, och erhll, extern certifiering av sin verksamhet.
The ECB’s certification, called the ‘PPP Award’ (Processes, Policies and Procedures) for achieving the standard of excellence in these fields, expired at the end of 2015 and the CPO has planned to undergo a full recertification process in the first quarter of 2016. 
ECB:s certifiering, som kallas PPP Award (dr PPP str fr Processes, Policies and Procedures, processer, policy och frfaranden) och utfrdas till aktrer som uppfyllt den hgsta standarden p dessa omrden, lpte ut i slutet av 2015.
Most EU institutions do not systematically measure the level of participation in their procurement procedures Simply counting the number of offers received is not enough to reliably monitor the level of participation 23 When they publish a contract award notice in the Official Journal, the EU institu‐ tions have to indicate the number of offers received for the contract in question. 
De flesta EU-institutioner mter inte systematiskt deltagandet i sina upphandlingsfrfaranden Att bara rkna antalet mottagna anbud rcker inte fr att p ett tillfrlitligt stt vervaka nivn p deltagandet 23 Nr en EU-institution offentliggr ett meddelande om tilldelning av kontrakt i Europeiska unionens officiella tidning ska den ange hur mnga anbud som har mottagits fr kontraktet i frga.
However, this information alone is not a sufficient basis to reliably assess the level of competition in a procedure. 
Denna information rcker dock inte fr att man ska kunna gra en tillfrlitlig bedmning av graden av konkurrens vid en viss upphandling.
Competition might be weak even in cases where several offers have been received. 
Konkurrensen kan i sjlva verket vara liten ven i fall dr flera anbud har lmnats.
This is in particular the case when only one of‐ fer can be taken into account for an assessment against the award criteria and the others have been eliminated before they reach the final stage of the evaluation. 
Det gller i synnerhet nr endast ett anbud uppfyller tilldelningskriterierna och de vriga anbuden redan har frkastats fre den slutliga utvrderingen.
Offers can be eliminated from the final evaluation for various reasons, notably when they are incomplete or do not comply with the exclusion or selection criteria. 
Anbud kan uteslutas frn den slutliga utvrderingen av olika anledningar, i synnerhet nr de r ofullstndiga eller inte uppfyller uteslutnings-eller urvalskriterierna.
Observations 21 JRC data show that in half of the procedures only one offer could be taken into account for the final award decision 24 Only the Commission’s JRC compiles data, collected procedure by procedure and for each type of procedure, on the number of offers received, the number of of‐ fers in order, the number offers admissible, the number of offers found compliant and the number of offers ranked. 
Iakttagelser 21 Uppgifter frn det gemensamma forskningscentrumet visar att i hlften av frfarandena kunde endast ett anbud beaktas fr det slutliga tilldelningsbeslutet 24 Endast kommissionens gemensamma forskningscentrum samlar in uppgifter om varje enskilt frfarande och varje typ av frfarande, om antalet mottagna anbud, antalet anbud som fljer reglerna, antalet godtagbara anbud, antalet anbud som uppfyller urvalskriterierna och antalet rangordnade anbud.