natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The HFSF thus ended up contributing the remaining amount of 25.5 billion euros to these banks (not including 0.9 billion euros for a bridge bank), and provided warrants to private investors for its shares, as per the agreed recapitalisation framework. 
5
Given the time remaining until the end of April (second programme’s deadline) and the very high valuation of the shares to be issued, interest from private investors would be limited. 
3
As a result, in May 2013 the HFSF injected 5.8 billion euros into the bank, becoming the main shareholder (98.6 %) with full voting rights, unlike the other three systemic banks in which the HFSF had received shares with restricted voting rights. 
3 5 8
Bank recapitalisation of 2014 The protracted recession had a negative impact on Greek banks’ liquidity, balance sheets and financial results. 
4
Following a new capital needs assessment conducted by the Bank of Greece, in compliance with a condition under the second programme, the second recapitalisation of the four largest Greek banks was finalised until June 2014. 
4
In particular, 8.3 billion euros were raised entirely through the private sector (see Table 1). 
3 8
In the case of a bank, the share capital increase of 2.9 billion euros for the baseline scenario took place in accordance with revised Law 3864/2010, according to which the HFSF could act only as a backstop. 
3 4 8
In mid-April 2014, the HFSF received one binding offer at 0.30 euros per share for a total of 1.3 billion euros from a consortium of investors. 
3 4
The final offer price was set at 0.31 euros per share (at a discount of 23 % over the last closing price; see footnote 54), with the cornerstone investor raising its offer to match that price. 
3 4 5
As a result, the HFSF’s shareholding was reduced from 95.2 % to 35.4 %. 
5
Bank recapitalisation of 2015 In 2015 the protracted negotiations between the Greek authorities and the institutions, along with the substantial outflow of deposits and the constantly increasing NPLs against the backdrop of a worsening economic climate and capital controls necessitated a third bank recapitalisation. 
5
The capital needs assessment conducted by ECB found the four largest Greek banks to be short of 14.4 billion euros under the adverse scenario (see Table 1). 
4
Given the context of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), the state aid framework, and the Eurogroup’s guidance of 14 August 2015, the priority of key objectives for the 2015 recapitalisation was to address any capital shortfalls, avoid a depositor bail-in by completing recapitalisation in 2015, avoid nationalisation of the Greek banks, minimise state 32 aid by maximising private investment, and avoid undue dilution of the HFSF’s shareholdings. 
4 5
The two banks, which had the lowest capital needs, managed to cover the entire amount of the adverse scenario from private investors (3.2 billion euros) and by voluntarily converting all subordinated and senior bondholders into equity. 
3
The remaining amount of 5.4 billion euros was provided via HFSF from programme funds HFSF (i.e. 1.3 billion euros in new shares and 4.1 billion euros as CoCos). 
3 4 5
Annex X 33 FINANCIAL STABILITY The EBA’s risk indicators for the Greek and EU banking systems Weighted Averages 2013 2014 2015 2016 Greece Greece EU Greek banks' ranking in the EU-28 Solvency Total capital ratio Tier 1 capital ratio CET1 ratio CET1 ratio (fully loaded) 12.7 % 12.4 % ... ... 
3 4 5 7 8 12
14.1 % 13.9 % 13.9 % 5.6 % 16.4 % 16.3 % 16.3 % 15.0 % 17.1 % 17.0 % 17.0 % 15.9 % 18.5 % 22 15.5 % 14 14.2 % 12 13.6 % 13 Credit Risk and Asset Quality Ratio of non-performing loans and advances (NPL ratio) Coverage ratio of NPLs and advances Forbearance ratio for loans Ratio of non-performing exposures (NPE ratio) ... 
3 4 5 7 8 12
39.7 % ... 
3 7
43.8 % ... 
3 4 8
14.2 % ... 
4
33.9 % 46.2 % 48.5 % 19.8 % 37.3 % 45.9 % 48.2 % 23.2 % 38.5 % 5.1 % 28 44.6 % 12 3.2 % 27 4.4 % 27 Profitability Return on equity Return on assets Cost-to-income ratio Net interest income to total operating income Net fee income and commission income to total operating income Net trading income to total operating income Net interest income to interest bearing assets ... ... 
3 4 5 7 8 12
62.2 % 78.3 % 14.8 % ... ... 
3 4 7 8
(11.1 %) (1.0 %) 60.9 % 84.1 % 14.5 % (4.1 %) 2.8 % (25.5 %) (2.5 %) 59.8 % 86.4 % 10.9 % 2.1 % 2.5 % (7.7 %) (0.9 %) 51.9 % 82.0 % 12.4 % (2.9 %) 2.9 % 3.3 % 26 0.2 % 28 65.7 % 14 57.9 % 28 27.2 % 28 6.0 % 26 1.5 % 7 Balance Sheet Structure and Liquidity Loan-to-deposit ratio Leverage ratio (fully phased-in) Leverage ratio (transitional) Debt-to-equity ratio Asset encumbrance ratio Liquidity coverage ratio 100.7 % 109.2 % 129.7 % ......... ......... 
3 4 5 7 8 11 12
1132.0 % 999.0 % 837.8 % ... 
7 12
26.0 % 47.1 % ......... 
3 7
120.2 % 10.0 % 10.7 % 754.0 % 43.3 % 0% 118.4 % 21 5.2 % 22 5.5 % 27 1440.7 % 7 26.3 % 25 141.1 % 28 
4 8 11
Source: European Banking Authority, Risk Dashboard Data (from a sample of EU banks; 198 in 2016). 34 
8
2009 2010 -4.3 -5.5 -2.0 -4.0 SUSTAINABLE GROWTH GDP GROWTH (%) 2011 2012 2013 2014 -9.1 -7.3 -3.2 0.4 Target (MoU forecast, May 2010) -2.6 1.1 2.1 2.1 Target (MoU forecast, March 2012) -4.7 0.0 2.5 Target (MoU forecast, April 2014) 2015 2016 -0.2 0 2009 2010 1.3 4.7 2015 2016 2009 2010 9.6 12.70 -0.5 -0.3 0.1 Target (MoU forecast, April 2014) -0.8 0.3 UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (%) 2011 2012 2013 2014 17.9 24.5 27.5 26.5 24.9 -0.1 3.3 2011 2012 2013 2014 3.1 1.0 -0.9 -1.4 -1.1 Target (MoU forecast, May 2010) INFLATION – HICP (%) 1.9 -0.4 1.2 0.7 0.9 Target (MoU forecast, March 2012) Target (MoU forecast, May 2010) 12.0 14.7 15.2 14.8 2015 2016 Annex XI 35 
3 4 5 7 8 11 12
2009 2010 25.7 33.0 31.2 2009 2010 3.9 5.7 5.4 2009 2010 65.6 63.8 2009 2010 52.9 51.8 YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT (%) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 1 2 Adjusted MoU Adjusted MoU level. 
3 4 5 7 8 11 12
Target (MoU forecast, March 2012) 17.9 17.8 16.7 Target (MoU forecast, April 2014) 44,7 55.3 58.3 52.4 49.8 Target (ECA based on MoU forecast, May 2010) 1: 38.2 39.5 38.5 LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT (%) 2011 2012 2013 2014 8.8 14.5 18.5 19.5 18.2 Target (ECA based on MoU forecast, May 2010)2: 6.6 6.8 6.6 EMPLOYMENT RATE (%) 2011 2012 2013 2014 59.6 55.0 52.9 53.3 54.9 Target (Europe 2020) WOMEN EMPLOYMENT (%) 2011 2012 2013 2014 48.7 45.2 43.3 44.3 46.0 employment forecast, assuming stable ratio of youth/overall unemployment at 2010 level. employment forecast, assuming stable ratio of long-term/overall unemployment at 2010 24.5 22.5 2015 2016 2015 2016 70.0 2015 2016 36 
3 4 5 7 8 11 12
2009 2010 -20.2 10.8 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 5.8 3.7 0.6 5.2 -8.7 Target (MoU forecast, May 2010) 6.7 9.3 Target (MoU forecast, March 2012) 2.9 5.2 6.9 Target (MoU forecast, April 2014) 0.4 3.4 EXPORT SHARES (5-YEAR CHANGE, %) 2009 2010 -10.2 -14.0 2011 -15.5 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 -24.7 -25.2 -18.0 -20.6 Target (based on MIP threshold) -6.0 2009 0.8 -6.0 -6.0 -6.0 -6.0 -6.0 -6.0 FDI (% OF GDP – AVERAGE OF INFLOW AND OUTFLOW) 3 The overall Europe 2020 employment target (70 %), adjusted for the employment gender differential at EU average level in 2015 (i.e. 0.85, given female employment at 64.3 and male at 74.9). 
3 4 5 7 8 11 12
3.4 7.1 Target (ECA; based on Europe 2020) 3: EXPORT GROWTH 59.3 2010 2011 2012 2013 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.2 Target (ECA) EU-28 average in 2010 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2014 2015 2016 1.1 0.6 2.1 2.1 5.5 5.0 37 
3 4 5 7 8 11 12
Therein, the Commission acted within a new legal framework (Regulation 472/2013) which dramatically improved the transparency of its work and its democratic accountability, through a reinforced dialogue with the European Parliament and the national Parliaments. 
3 4 7
The Commission formally codified its own procedures in 2011. 
11
However, Greece tapped the markets in April and July 2014, following a period of a steady reform, successful conclusions of reviews, and improved growth prospects. 
4
At the end of June 2015, the Greek government decided unilaterally not to complete the 2nd EFSF programme and called a referendum. 
5
See Commission reply to paragraph V. of the Executive Summary (institutional setting). 
Se kommissionens svar på punkt V i sammanfattningen (institutionell struktur).
OBSERVATIONS PART I – MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES FOR GREECE 24. 
IAKTTAGELSER DEL I – FÖRVALTNINGEN AV DE EKONOMISKA ANPASSNINGSPROGRAMMEN FÖR GREKLAND 24.
Please see the Commission's reply to paragraph VIII. 
Se kommissionens svar på punkt VIII.
In the context of the first programme, the Commission and the Eurogroup relied upon the framework and methodologies of the IMF – the international organisation with the mandate and the experience to undertake such programmes. 
I samband med det första programmet förlitade sig kommissionen och Eurogruppen på det regelverk och de metoder som utarbetats av IMF – den internationella organisation som hade befogenhet och erfarenhet nog att genomföra sådana program.
The programme design was preceded by a considerable amount of research, covering the elements to be tackled by the reforms as well as introducing criteria for reform prioritisation. 
Utformningen av programmet föregicks av noggranna undersökningar av de delar som skulle bli föremål för reformerna, och kriterier för reformprioriteringar lades fram.
Moreover, the Commission was able to draw upon methodologies and analytical tools developed and applied under normal surveillance regimes in areas such as forecast, analysis of the fiscal stance and sustainability, pensions and the benchmarking of structural policies/reforms. 
Vidare kunde kommissionen bygga på metoder och analysredskap som hade utvecklats under normala övervakningsförfaranden på områden som prognoser, analys av finanspolitiken och hållbarhet, pensioner och jämförelser av strukturpolitik/strukturreformer.
The Commission produced analytical documents supporting the policy briefs and corroborating the design of conditions, including in the area of regulated professions. 
Kommissionen lade fram ett analytiskt underlag till stöd för policydokumenten och utformningen av villkor, däribland på området för reglerade yrken.
The first few conditions on regulated professions and the services directive, for example, were completed by the Greek government on time while reduced willingness on the Greek authorities' side ultimately induced delays. 3 
Den grekiska regeringen genomförde de första villkoren om bland annat reglerade yrken och tjänstedirektivet i tid, men förseningar uppstoid ändå i slutändan p.g.a. bristande vilja från de grekiska myndigheternas sida.
First bullet point: While some conditions were initially expressed in more general terms, setting out a clear end-objective, regular iterations with the authorities then produced more detailed guidance that laid out the means and steps by which such reforms would be implemented. 
Första punkten: Även om vissa villkor inledningsvis uttrycktes i mer allmänna ordalag, men med ett tydligt slutmål, ledde regelbundna kontakter med myndigheterna med tiden till en mer detaljerad vägledning, som beskrev hur sådana reformer skulle genomföras.
This approach did not lead to proper implementation in some cases. 
Detta tillvägagångssätt innebar att genomförandet i vissa fall blev mindre effektivt.
Interpretational issues, however, were not necessarily the main cause for delayed implementation. 
Men tolkningsproblem var inte nödvändigtvis huvudorsaken till att genomförandet försenades .
Second bullet point: Before the Greek authorities commit to any conditions and sign the Memorandum of Understanding, every condition is always discussed and agreed with the authorities, both at technical and political level to ensure a thorough and common understanding and ownership of the reform process to be undertaken. 
Andra punkten: Innan de grekiska myndigheterna förbinder sig till några villkor och undertecknar samförståndsavtalet diskuteras alltid varje enskilt villkor, och godkänns av myndigheterna, på både teknisk och politisk nivå, för att garantera en ingående och gemensam förståelse och ett gemensamt ansvar för den reformprocess som ska företas.
The high level of detail was motivated by a need to identify clearly how the reforms were to be undertaken and address implementation challenges. 
Den stora etaljrikedomen motiverades av att det tydligt måste framgå hur reformerna skulle genomföras och hur utmaningar i det avseendet skulle mötas.
Moreover, the authorities' administrative capacity was challenged by the number of measures necessary to truly improve efficiency of the tax administration rather than by their level of detail. 
Vidare var det snarare det stora antal åtgärder som krävdes för att verkligen öka skatteförvaltningens effektivitet som innebar en utmaning för myndigheternas administrativa kapacitet – inte den höga detaljnivån.
Limited ownership of the reforms during the second programme was often an issue, notably regarding the staff of the tax administration. 
Begränsat ansvar för reformerna under det andra programmet var ofta ett problem, särskilt i fråga om skatteförvaltningspersonalen.
See Commission reply to paragraph IV. of the Executive Summary on the objectives of the programme and the general context. 
Se kommissionens svar på punkt IV i sammanfattningen om programmets målsättningar och den allmänna kontexten.
The comprehensive set of reforms under the ESM programme has been, moreover, flanked by a set of extraordinary measures to help Greece make best use of available EU funds and technical support under the Commission's initiative set out in the Communication of 15 July 2015 on "A New Start for Jobs and Growth in Greece". 
Den omfattande uppsättningen reformer inom ramen för ESM-programmet har dessutom omgetts av en rad kompletterande åtgärder för att hjälpa Grekland att till fullo utnyttja tillgängliga EU-medel och tekniskt bistånd inom kommissionens initiativ i meddelandet ”Nystart för sysselsättning och tillväxt i Grekland” av den 15 juli 2015.
The first programme had more elements of horizontal policies, while the number of conditions targeting specific sectors increased in the second programme with conditionality on screening of business restricting regulations and targeting sectors such as building materials and manufacturing in addition to tourism and retail. 
Det första programmet innehöll fler delar som rörde övergripande politiska områden, medan antalet villkor inriktade på specifika sektorer ökade i det andra programmet, med krav på granskning av verksamhetsbegränsande regler och, utöver turism och detaljhandel, inriktning på områden som byggmaterial och tillverkning.
This conditionality was carried out with the assistance of the OECD competition toolkit. 
Detta krav genomfördes med hjälp av OECD:s verktyg för genomdrivande av konkurrensreglerna.
Box 2 – Product market reforms versus labour and tax reforms The Commission was fully aware of the effect of higher indirect taxes on price developments. However, there has been an underlying price adjustment process ongoing in the Greek economy, which has contributed to regaining price competitiveness. 
Ruta 2 – Produktmarknadsreformer kontra arbetsmarknads-och skattereformer Kommissionen var väl medveten om hur högre indirekta skatter skulle påverka prisutvecklingen. inom I den grekiska ekonomin har det dock funnits en underliggande prisjusteringsprocess, som har bidragit till att den kostnadsrelaterade konkurrenskraften återkommit.
The primary objective of the first programme was to restore Greece’s access to market financing, which necessitated a clear focus on fiscal consolidation. 
Det första programmets huvudmål var att Grekland åter skulle få tillgång till marknadsfinansiering, vilket krävde tydligt fokus på konsolidering av de offentliga finanserna.
Nonetheless, the overall design of the Greek financial assistance programmes was underpinned by an explicit strategy. 
Men den övergripande utformningen av programmen för ekonomiskt bistånd till Grekland underbyggdes ändå av en uttrycklig strategi.
Structural reforms formed a key part of the programme and were aimed precisely at producing positive impact beyond the programme horizon. 
Strukturreformer utgjorde en central del av programmet och syftade just till att skapa positiva effekter bortom programmets ram.
In order to benchmark Greece's performance and evolution over time, the Commission relied on indicators that were available from international sources, but were not always fully comprehensive and were only available with a time-lag. 
Som måttstock för Greklands resultat och utveckling över tiden förlitade sig kommissionen på indikatorer från internationella källor, som inte alltid var tillräckligt övergripande och som alltid innebar en viss tidsfördröjning.
This includes OECD product market indicators to measure progress made in reforming regulated professions as well as the World Bank's Doing Business indicators. 
Till dessa hör OECD:s indikatorer för reglering av produktmarknaden, som ska mäta vilka framsteg som gjorts när det gäller reformer av reglerade yrken samt indikatorerna i Världsbankens rapport Doing business.
Moreover, the MoUs included specific conditionality to assess the impact of the reform of regulated professions – including a survey of the 20 largest professions examining the degree of liberalisation, results with respect to new entrants, price changes, etc. 
Dessutom omfattade samförståndsavtalet specifika krav om att bedöma effekterna av reformen av reglerade yrken – inklusive en undersökning av de 20 största yrkena, där graden av liberalisering, resultat i fråga om nya aktörer, prisförändringar osv. skulle granskas.
During a crisis, it is imperative to prioritise actions, particularly when there is limited institutional capacity to address all actual and potential issues immediately. 
Under en kris är det centralt att prioritera vissa åtgärder, särskilt när det inte finns institutionell kapacitet att omedelbart hantera alla faktiska och potentiella problem.
In the Greek financial assistance programmes, priority was given to recapitalisations that were urgently requested by the supervisors for financial stability purposes. 
Inom programmen för ekonomiskt bistånd till Grekland prioriterades rekapitaliseringar, eftersom det genast efterfrågades av tillsynsansvariga i syfte att åstadkomma finansiell stabilitet.
The issue of NPL resolution was addressed as a critical next step, given the increase in NPLs as a result of a protracted crisis period. 
Problemet med nödlidande lån angreps som ett avgörande nästa steg, med tanke på det ökade antalet nödlidande lån till följd av den utdragna krisperioden.
The process of addressing NPLs is longer and more complex, and requires reforms on several fronts (legal, supervisory, governance, regulatory, etc.) and in different contexts, each presenting its own peculiarities (household debt, SME and bigger corporate business debt). 
Förfarandet för att hantera nödlidande lån är mer långdraget och komplicerat och kräver reformer på flera områden (inom lagstiftningen, tillsynen, styrningen, regleringen osv.) och i olika sammanhang, vart och ett med sina egna särdrag (hushållens skuldsättning samt skuldsättning för SMF och större företag).
It is recalled that the Asset Quality Review in 2013 included a Troubled Asset Review, which measured banks’ preparedness and capacity to manage NPLs. 
Det ska påpekas att den översyn av tillgångarnas kvalitet som gjordes 2013 omfattade en granskning av osäkra tillgångar, där bankernas beredskap för och förmåga att hantera nödlidande lån mättes.
As regards the HFSF, the Commission has only an observer role. 
Vad gäller Greklands finansiella stabilitetsfond (nedan kallad HFSF) har kommissionen bara en observatörsroll.
There is no single macroeconomic model that can be readily used for economic forecasts. 
Det finns ingen makroekonomisk modell som snabbt och enkelt kan användas för ekonomiska prognoser.
Moreover, it is crucial to systematically take into account the fast-changing economic and political context in Greece when assessing the timeliness, quality and impact of policies adopted under the programmes. 
Vidare är det centralt att hänsyn tas till de snabba förändringarna inom den grekiska ekonomin och politiken när man bedömer tidsanpassning, kvalitet och effekten av politiska beslut som fattas inom ramen för programmen.
Box 4 – Coordination of projections Throughout the programmes, the mutual impact of both macroeconomic and fiscal projections was estimated through an iterative process in which the impact of new fiscal measures was included in the macroeconomic baseline scenario and the latter was used to estimate the fiscal projections. 
Ruta 4 – Sammanvägning av prognoserna Under programmen uppskattades den ömsesidiga effekten av både de makroekonomiska och de finanspolitiska prognoserna genom en iterativ process, där effekterna av de nya finanspolitiska åtgärderna ingick i det makroekonomiska utgångsscenariot, och det sistnämnda användes för att uppskatta de finanspolitiska prognoserna.
In view of the high pressure and very short deadlines, minor errors or omissions may have occurred on occasion. 
Med tanke på den pressande situationen och de mycket korta tidsfristerna kan smärre fel eller förbiseenden ibland ha inträffat.
Throughout the programmes there was strong and systematic interinstitutional quality and peer review of data and calculations. 
Programperioden präglades av en stabil och systematisk interinstitutionell kvalitet och expertgranskning av data och uträkningar.
The amount of EUR 8 billion was considered a roughly acceptable target, taking into account the financing needs after the end of the programme which in turn depends on possible debt measures to be implemented. 
Beloppet 8 miljarder euro ansågs, grovt räknat, vara ett godtagbart mål med hänsyn till finansieringsbehoven efter att programmet hade avslutats, som i sin tur beror på eventuella skuldåtgärder.
Moreover, the complexity of the institutional and legal framework, with its multiplicity of actors and decision makers, should be kept in mind. 
Dessutom bör komplexiteten hos de institutionella och rättsliga ramarna hållas i åtanke, med de många olika aktörerna och beslutsfattarna.
Given the lack of consensus in the economic literature, projections must rely on a few studies that can give guidance to the scale of the impact. 
Med hänsyn till bristen på samsyn i den ekonomiska litteraturen måste prognoserna baseras på ett fåtal studier, som kan ge en fingervisning om effekternas omfattning.
Furthermore, macro-fiscal projections have been integrated and this concerned not only the Commission's forecast and not only for Greece. 
Vidare har makrofinansiella prognoser integrerats, inte bara i samband med kommissionens prognoser och inte bara för Grekland.
PART II - DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORMS 56. 
DEL II – UTFORMNINGEN OCH GENOMFÖRANDET AV REFORMERNA 56.
The Commission stresses that the responsibility for not only policy choices but also implementation lies with the national authorities in every financial assistance programme. 
Kommissionen betonar att ansvaret i samband med varje program för ekonomiskt bistånd ligger hos de nationella myndigheterna, inte bara för politiska val, utan också för genomförandet.
See Commission reply to paragraph IV of the Executive Summary (programme objectives). 
Se kommissionens svar på punkt IV i sammanfattningen (målen i programmen).
Tackling tax evasion and improving tax compliance is clearly an important avenue for reforms in Greece. 
Att hantera skatteflykt och förbättra skatteuppbörden är utan tvekan en betydelsefull reformmöjlighet i Grekland.
Nevertheless, it is not one that can be solved quickly. 
Men det är inte någon snabb lösning.
The ESM programme has laid great emphasis on such measures, building on the experience of the prior programmes. 
I ESM-programmet läggs stor vikt vid sådana åtgärder och erfarenheter från de tidigare programmen utnyttjas.
Box 6 – Scope of measures A split-payment mechanism for VAT transactions with public institutions has been contested by experts. 
Ruta 6 – Åtgärdernas omfattning Uppdelade momsbetalningar vid transaktioner med offentlig sektor har ifrågasatts av sakkunniga.