natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
A range of questions relating to job satisfaction, the workplace and their professional future now consistently score lower than before. 
En rad frgor med anknytning till arbetstillfredsstllelse, arbetsplatsen och deras yrkesmssiga framtid fr nu konsekvent lgre betyg n tidigare.
55 The surveys show a decline in the overall perception of the Commission as an organisation that cares about staff well-being, and this is linked to increasing concern about workload. 
55 Enkterna visar att den allmnna uppfattningen om kommissionen som en organisation som bryr sig om personalens vlmende har sjunkit, och att detta r kopplat till en kande oro ver arbetsbrdan.
Almost one third of Commission staff feel that they have an unacceptable workload (27 % in 2016 and 31 % in 2018), although a majority (59 % in 2016 and 56 % in 2018) still feel that the workload is acceptable. 
Nstan en tredjedel av kommissionspersonalen anser att de har en oacceptabel arbetsbrda (27 % r 2016 och 31 % r 2018), men majoriteten (59 % r 2016 och 56 % r 2018) anser fortfarande att arbetsbrdan r acceptabel.
56 Staff sickness rates are generally used as an indicator of staff commitment that could affect an organisationŐs efficiency. 
56 Personalens sjukfrnvaro brukar anvndas som en indikator p personalens engagemang som kan pverka organisationens effektivitet.
The Commission did not identify possible correlations of the sickness rate with workload, the staff cuts or other measures in the reforms package. 
tnkbara samband mellan sjukfrnvaron och arbetsbrdan, personalnedskrningarna eller andra tgrder i reformpaketet.
We conducted a limited review of the available figures. 
Vi gjorde en begrnsad genomgng av de tillgngliga uppgifterna.
57 The overall sickness rate at the Commission slightly increased between 2012 and 2017. 
57 Den samlade sjukfrnvaron vid kommissionen kade ngot mellan 2012 och 2017.
However, there was a marked deterioration in some DGs: the greatest increases in the number of sick leave days per head, including long-term absences, were in JUST (from 10.3 days on average in 2013-2015 to 17 days in 2016 and 18.9 in 2017) and HOME (from 9.4 to 14.9 and 15.1 respectively). 
Frsmringen var dock mycket tydlig fr ngra generaldirektorat: den strsta kningen av antalet sjukdagar per person, inklusive lngtidsfrnvaro, fanns vid GD Rttsliga frgor och konsumentfrgor (frn 10,3 dagar i genomsnitt 2013Đ2015 till 17 dagar 2016 och 18,9 dagar 2017) och GD Migration och inrikes frgor (frn 9,4 till 14,9 respektive 15,1 dagar).
58 The 2014 reforms package reduced the number of days of annual leave by 42 % (from 3.5 to 2 days per month) for staff in delegations and introduced changes to the calculation of the living conditions allowance. 
58 Genom 2014 rs reformpaket minskades den rliga ledigheten med 42 % (frn 3,5 till 2 dagar per mnad) fr personal vid delegationerna och berkningen av tillgget fr levnadsvillkor ndrades.
Overall, the staffŐs perception that working conditions have deteriorated is stronger in delegations than at the Commission as a whole. In 201622, fewer than 50 % of delegation staff considered the Commission to be an attractive workplace, with only 21 % considering that human resources matched the workload. 
Sammantaget r uppfattningen att arbetsvillkoren har frsmrats vanligare vid delegationerna n vid kommissionen som helhet. r 201622 var det mindre n 50 % av delegationspersonalen som ansg att kommissionen var en attraktiv arbetsplats och enbart 21 % ansg att personalen motsvarade arbetsbrdan.
59 One of the drivers for the changes in the SR revision affecting delegations was to generate cost savings23. 
59 De ndringar som gjordes vid versynen av tjnstefreskrifterna och som pverkat delegationerna syftade bland annat till att stadkomma kostnadsbesparingar23.
However, spending on delegation staff accounts for only 4.7 % of all expenditure from the administration budget24. 
Utgifterna fr delegationspersonal str dock fr endast 4,7 % av alla utgifter i den administrativa budgeten24.
We found that the small budgetary savings were accompanied by a significant negative impact on staff. Increased contract and pay diversity 60 Staff recruited after 2004 and 2014 are employed under less favourable conditions than applied previously. 
Vi konstaterade att de sm budgetbesparingarna medfrde stora negativa konsekvenser fr personalen. kade skillnader nr det gller kontrakt och lner 60 Personal som rekryterats efter 2004 och 2014 har mindre gynnsamma arbetsvillkor n de som tillmpades tidigare.
23 See Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 1023/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013, recital (27) "It is appropriate to modernise working conditions for staff employed in third countries and to render them more cost-effective whilst generating cost savings". 
23 Se Europaparlamentets och rdets frordning (EU, Euratom) nr 1023/2013 av den 22 oktober 2013, skl 27: ÓArbetsvillkoren br moderniseras fr personal i tredjeland och gras mer kostnadseffektiva, samtidigt som kostnadsbesparingar br uppnsÓ.
24 Share of spending on delegation staff compared to overall expenditure under Heading 5 (excl. Pensions and European Schools). 34 
24 Andel av utgifterna fr delegationspersonal jmfrt med de totala utgifterna under rubrik 5 (exkl. pensioner och Europaskolor). 34
than the latter. Currently around 6 % of staff, all of them GFI and GFII contract staff, earn less than the lowest paid official (AST/SC1, with a basic yearly salary around Ű32 400). 
Fr nrvarande tjnar omkring 6 % av personalen, varav samtliga r kontraktsanstllda i tjnstegrupperna GFI och GFII, mindre n tjnstemnnen med lgst ln (AST/SC 1, med en rlig grundln p omkring 32 400 euro).
Another third of staff (across all categories) earn up to twice that amount. 
En annan tredjedel av personalen (i alla kategorier) tjnar upp till tv gnger s mycket.
Experienced professionals in junior grades (AD6 to AD8) may be assigned greater responsibility than higher graded staff recruited before them. 
Erfarna tjnstemn med lgre lnegrader (AD6 till AD8) kan tilldelas mer ansvar n kollegor med hgre lnegrader som rekryterades fre dem.
Ń Only 22.4 % of recruitment was at AD7 level between 2012 and 2017, many experienced candidates wishing to work for the Commission applied through entry-grade (AD5/AD6) competitions. 
Ń Enbart 22,4 % av rekryteringen gjordes till AD7 mellan 2012 och 2017 och kandidater med mnga rs erfarenhet som ville arbeta fr kommissionen anskte via uttagningsprov fr ingngsgrader (AD5/AD6).
Because of their professional background, and performance, these new recruits were often quickly given responsibilities (e.g. head of cooperation in a delegation, team leader in other activities). 
P grund av sin yrkesbakgrund, och sina prestationer, fick dessa nyanstllda ofta snabbt ansvar (t.ex. samarbetschef i en delegation, gruppledare i andra verksamheter etc.).
Pay package less attractive over the years 63 The 2014 revision of the SR aimed at maintaining attractive recruitment conditions. 
Lnepaketet har med ren blivit mindre attraktivt 63 Syftet med 2014 rs versyn av tjnstefreskrifterna var att upprtthlla attraktiva rekryteringsvillkor.
Even though overall working conditions (including entry-grade salaries) remain attractive for most EU graduates, the Commission faces difficulties in attracting qualified applicants from certain nationalities and with certain profiles. 
Trots att de allmnna arbetsvillkoren (inklusive ingngslnerna) fortfarande r attraktiva fr de flesta hgskoleutbildade i EU har kommissionen svrt att locka till sig kvalificerade skande frn vissa nationaliteter och med srskilda profiler.
The attractiveness of salaries partly depends on the purchasing power of EU officials in the different locations where they work. 
Lnernas attraktivitet beror delvis p EU-tjnstemnnens kpkraft p de olika platser dr de arbetar.
Salaries are updated annually to ensure 'parallelism' with the changes in pay for national civil servants and to reflect the evolution in the cost of living for EU officials in Belgium and Luxembourg. 
Lnerna uppdateras rligen fr att skerstlla att de utvecklas parallellt med hur lnerna fr nationella offentliganstllda frndras och fr att terspegla hur levnadskostnaderna fr EU-tjnstemn i Belgien och Luxemburg utvecklas.
64 The annual method for updating the pay and pensions of EU officials was modified in 2004 and again amended in 2014. 
64 Metoden fr att rligen uppdatera EU-tjnstemnnens lner och pensioner anpassades 2004 och ndrades terigen 2014.
It now includes two key elements: Ń a global specific indicator (GSI): based on changes in the purchasing power of national civil servants in central government in 11 Member States (previously just eight were used); Ń the joint Belgium-Luxembourg index25 (JBLI) of changes in the cost of living in Belgium and Luxembourg, also taking account of inflation in the two countries. 
Den inbegriper nu tv centrala faktorer: Ń En vergripande srskild indikator (GSI) som grundas p frndringar i kpkraft fr nationella offentliganstllda vid den centrala statsfrvaltningen i elva medlemsstater (tidigare anvndes bara tta).
65 Outside Belgium and Luxembourg, the pay and pensions of EU staff are corrected to maintain purchasing power parity with reference to Brussels. 
65 Utanfr Belgien och Luxemburg korrigeras lner och pensioner fr EU:s personal fr att upprtthlla kpkraftsparitet i frhllande till Bryssel.
For this purpose, Eurostat calculates annual correction coefficients for certain locations. 
Fr detta ndaml berknar Eurostat rliga korrigeringskoefficienter fr vissa platser.
66 Use of the method has led to regular nominal salary increases, except when pay was frozen in 2011, 2013 and 2014. 
66 Anvndningen av metoden har lett till regelbundna nominella lnekningar, frutom nr lnerna frystes 2011, 2013 och 2014.
In 2011Đ2018 the salaries of EU officials were adjusted as shown in Table 2. 
Under 2011Đ2018 anpassades lnerna fr EU-tjnstemn p det stt som visas i tabell 2.
Table 2 Đ Annual adjustments to the salaries of EU officials 2011-2018 Source: Eurostat reports on annual updates of remuneration and pensions of EU officials. 
Tabell 2 Đ rliga justeringar av lner fr EU-tjnstemn 2011Đ2018 Klla: Eurostats rapporter om rliga uppdateringar av lner och pensioner fr EU-tjnstemn.
67 The purchasing power of central government civil servants across the EU has declined since 2003. 
67 Kpkraften fr offentliganstllda inom centrala statsfrvaltningar i hela EU har minskat sedan 2003.
Consequently, in line with the parallelism principle, the purchasing power of EU officials has followed a similar path. 
I linje med principen om parallell utveckling har kpkraften fr EU-tjnstemn fljaktligen utvecklats p liknande stt.
However, the 2011, 2013 and 2014 freezes made the decline more pronounced for EU staff (see Figure 18). 
Frysningarna 2011, 2013 och 2014 har dock gjort denna minskning mer markant fr EU-personal (se figur 18).
36 Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Annual update coefficient based on GSI and JBLI 0% (freeze) 0.8 % 0% (freeze) 0% (freeze) 2.4 % 3.3 % 1.5 % 1.7 % 
36 r 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 rlig uppdateringskoefficient baserad p GSI och JBLI 0% (frysning) 0,8 % 0% (frysning) 0% (frysning) 2,4 % 3,3 % 1,5 % 1,7 %
Figure 18 Đ Evolution of the purchasing power of EU officials in Brussels and central governments staff in Member States 37 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2% 0% -2% -4% -6% -8% -10 % -12 % -14 % Central Governments staff in Member States (GSI) EU staff in Brussels Source: ECA, based on Eurostat data. 
Figur 18 Đ Kpkraftsutvecklingen fr EU-tjnstemn i Bryssel och personal vid central statsfrvaltning i medlemsstater 37 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2% 0% -2% -4% -6% -8% -10 % -12 % -14 % Personal vid medlemsstaternas centralfrvaltningar EU-personal i Bryssel Klla: Revisionsrtten, p grundval av uppgifter frn Eurostat.
68 Eurostat reports26 provide indicative information on the difference in the purchasing power of EU staff working and living in, respectively, Luxembourg and Brussels. 
68 Eurostats rapporter26 innehller vgledande information om skillnaden i kpkraft fr EU:s personal som arbetar och bor i Luxemburg respektive Bryssel.
This difference mainly results from the faster growth of rental prices in Luxembourg. 
Skillnaden beror frmst p att hyrorna kar snabbare i Luxemburg.
Once the cost of rentals is excluded, the purchasing power of Luxembourg-based staff was higher in 2017 and lower in 2018. 
Om hyreskostnaden utesluts var kpkraften i Luxemburg hgre 2017 och lgre 2018.
Given the scale of the difference, the Commission is carrying out a study of its attractiveness as an institution and the cost of living in Luxembourg. 
Med anledning av den stora skillnaden genomfr kommissionen nu en underskning av institutionens attraktivitet och levnadskostnaderna i Luxemburg.
The study should be completed in the third quarter of 2019. 
Underskningen berknas vara klar under tredje kvartalet 2019.
69 The distribution of Commission staff by country of origin reflects the relative attractiveness of the working conditions on offer. 
69 Frdelningen av kommissionens personal per ursprungsland terspeglar hur attraktiva de arbetsvillkor som erbjuds r.
Similarly, imbalances are visible in 26 Analytical category reports supplementing the reports on annual updates of remuneration and pensions of the EU officials https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/civil-servants-remuneration/publications. 38 the nationalities of candidates in EPSO competitions, with certain countries (e.g. France, Germany and the Netherlands) under-represented27. 
26 Analytiska kategorirapporter som kompletterar rapporterna om rliga uppdateringar av ersttningar och pensioner fr EU-tjnstemn https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/civil-servants-remuneration/publications 27 Rapport frn kommissionen till Europaparlamentet och rdet i enlighet med artikel 27 i tjnstefreskrifterna fr tjnstemn i Europeiska unionen och artikel 12 i
70 We conducted a detailed analysis of the CommissionŐs staff nationality statistics to see what imbalances not justified by objective criteria could be observed. 
70 Vi gjorde en detaljerad analys av kommissionens statistik ver personalens nationaliteter fr att se vilka obalanser som kunde konstateras (och inte kan frklaras av objektiva kriterier).
We compared the share of CommissionŐs staff of each nationality with the corresponding country share of the EUŐs active population (the source of potential recruits), computing how many staff each Member State "should" supply by grade range. 
Vi jmfrde personalandelen fr varje nationalitet vid kommissionen med motsvarande andel av EU:s befolkning i arbetsfr lder i landet (potentiellt rekryteringsunderlag) fr att uppskatta hur mnga anstllda varje medlemsstat ÓbordeÓ ha per lnegradsintervall.
Figure 19 presents the results of this analysis. 
I figur 19 presenteras resultaten av vr analys.
27 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council pursuant to Article 27 of the Staff Regulations of Officials and to Article 12 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (Geographical balance), COM(2018) 377 final. 
38 anstllningsvillkoren fr vriga anstllda i Europeiska unionen (geografisk balans), COM(2018) 377 final.
71 The distribution of Commission staff by country of origin reveals significant differences between nationalities, with Belgian nationals the most represented28, and UK and German nationals the least represented, at all grades. 
71 Frdelningen av kommissionens personal per ursprungsland visar p betydande skillnader mellan nationaliteter Đ belgiska medborgare r mest representerade28 och brittiska och tyska medborgare allra minst representerade, i alla lnegrader.
Spanish, French, Polish and Dutch nationals are particularly under-represented in the following grades: Ń in the intermediate AD grades (5-8) for Spain, France and the Netherlands, and Ń in the intermediate AST (5-9) and higher AD (9-12) grades for Poland. 
Spanska, franska, polska och nederlndska medborgare r srskilt underrepresenterade i fljande lnegrader: Ń Inom de mellanliggande AD-lnegraderna (5Đ8) fr Spanien, Frankrike och Nederlnderna. Ń Inom de mellanliggande AST-lnegraderna (5Đ9) och hgre AD-lnegraderna (9Đ 12) fr Polen.
72 We found that the pattern of under-and over-representation is not consistent among grades. 
72 Vi konstaterade att mnstret nr det gller under-och verrepresentation inte r enhetligt bland de olika lnegraderna.
Some countries are over-represented in the lower AST grades (Romania and Bulgaria), while other are over-represented in the higher AD grades (most noticeably Sweden, Finland, Greece and Italy). 
Vissa lnder r verrepresenterade i de lgre AST-lnegraderna (Rumnien och Bulgarien), medan andra r verrepresenterade inom de hgre AD-lnegraderna (i synnerhet Sverige, Finland, Grekland och Italien).
73 Overall, changes in the conditions of employment have reduced the relative attractiveness of working for the EU to some nationalities that are already under-represented. 
73 Sammantaget har ndringar av anstllningsvillkoren minskat den relativa attraktionskraften i frga om att arbeta fr EU fr ngra nationaliteter som redan r underrepresenterade.
The evidence we collected shows disparity in the attractiveness of the Commission for graduates. 
Det underlag som vi samlade in visar p skillnaden i hur attraktiv kommissionen r fr hgskoleutbildade.
The Trendence Institute's graduate barometer listed 'Commission and EU careers' as the 15th most popular potential employer in the EU in 201629. 
Institutet Trendence Ógraduate barometerÓ (en utbildnings-och karrirunderskning) listade kommissionen och EU-karrirer som den 15:e mest populra potentiella arbetsgivaren i EU 201629.
The results by country reveal significant disparities in the Commission's perceived attractiveness. In 2017 the Commission was ranked 6th (7.4 %) in Austria, and in 2016 it was ranked 7th (4.8 %) in France and 15th in Spain (3.5 %), but only 31st (2.2 %) in Germany and 48th (1.5 %) in Poland. 
Resultaten per land visar p betydande skillnader i hur attraktiv kommissionen anses vara. r 2017 rankades kommissionen p sjtte plats (7,4 %) i sterrike. r 2016 rankades den p sjunde plats (4,8 %) i Frankrike och p 15:e plats i Spanien (3,5 %), men bara p 31:a plats (2,2 %) i Tyskland och 48:e plats (1,5 %) i Polen.
Better preparation of the 2014 package could have helped mitigate its negative consequences 74 Given the size and nature of the potential financial and non-financial impacts of the 2014 reforms package, we would have expected the Commission to have carried out an assessment similar to those made for other major legislative proposals with budgetary implications. 28 Belgium is a host country which has an impact on the number of staff working for the Commission. 
Om 2014 rs paket hade frberetts bttre skulle dess negativa konsekvenser ha kunnat motverkas 74 Med tanke p typen av potentiella finansiella och icke-finansiella konsekvenser av 2014 rs reformpaket och deras omfattning, frvntade vi oss att kommissionen skulle 28 Belgien r ett vrdland, vilket inverkar p antalet personer som arbetar fr kommissionen.
29 In a survey of 300 000 graduates from 24 European countries, the Commission obtained 2.94 % of positive answers, compared to 11.54 % for the first employer cited. 40 
29 I en enkt bland 300 000 hgskoleutbildade i 24 lnder i Europa fick kommissionen 2,94 % av de positiva svaren, jmfrt med 11,54 % fr den frst angivna arbetsgivaren. 40
Low focus on non-financial aspects 75 The Commission considered that there was no legal requirement to carry out an in-depth analysis of potential consequences of the proposed changes. 
Inriktningen p icke-finansiella aspekter var lg 75 Kommissionen ansg att det inte fanns ngon rttslig skyldighet att gra en ingende analys av de freslagna ndringarnas potentiella konsekvenser.
As a result, implementation of the 2014 package was not preceded by an overall analysis of either the problems to be addressed or the likely short and long-term consequences of the chosen measures on HR management. 
Drfr fregicks inte genomfrandet av 2014 rs paket av en vergripande analys av vare sig de problem som skulle lsas eller de valda tgrdernas sannolika konsekvenser fr personalfrvaltningen p kort och lng sikt.
76 The CommissionŐs preparatory analysis focused largely on estimating the likely financial effects of the proposed cost-saving measures. 
76 Kommissionens frberedande analys var frmst inriktad p uppskattningen av de sannolika finansiella effekterna av de freslagna kostnadsbesparingstgrderna.
We found that the analysis of budgetary savings was based on a sound methodology which explained the key assumptions made. 
Vi konstaterade att analysen av budgetbesparingar byggde p en sund metod som frklarade de centrala antagandena.
77 Regarding the HR situation, the Commission focused mostly on developing measures to remedy specific consequences of the 2004 reform. These measures were motivated by analyses done during 2009-2011, in particular: Ń a Eurostat study on the long-term budgetary implications of pension costs, which addressed the major trends forecast in this area from 2010 to 2059; Ń a report on equivalence between the old (pre-2004) and new career structures, which concluded that equivalence was not maintained for all function groups and there was a need for a clearer correlation between levels of responsibility and levels of pay. 
77 Nr det gller personalsituationen fokuserade kommissionen frmst p att ta fram tgrder fr att avhjlpa specifika konsekvenser av 2014 rs reform. tgrderna motiverades av analyser som gjordes under 2009Đ2011, i synnerhet fljande: Ń En Eurostat-studie om pensionskostnadernas lngsiktiga budgetkonsekvenser, med de frmsta trenderna som frutsetts p detta omrde frn 2010 till 2059. Ń En rapport om likvrdighet mellan det gamla (fre 2004) och det nya befordringssystemet, dr man drog slutsatsen att likvrdighet inte hade upprtthllits fr alla tjnstegrupper och att det behvdes tydligare samband mellan ansvarsniver och lneniver.
78 However, the HR implications of the cost-saving measures were not all assessed in the same degree of detail. 
78 Kostnadsbesparingstgrdernas konsekvenser fr personalen bedmdes dock inte lika ingende.
79 As a result, some of the proposed changes to the conditions of employment listed above were not based on an analysis of expected or identified problems. Some of 41 
79 Detta innebar att ngra av de freslagna ndringar av anstllningsvillkoren som rknas upp ovan inte baserades p en analys av frvntade eller identifierade problem.
Insufficient monitoring and reporting on HR consequences 80 We found weaknesses in the CommissionŐs monitoring of the main HR effects of the measures in the 2014 package, such as the increased working week and the 5 % reduction in posts. 
Otillrcklig vervakning av och rapportering om personalkonsekvenser 80 Vi fann brister i kommissionens vervakning av de viktigaste konsekvenserna fr personalen av 2014 rs paket, bland annat den lngre arbetsveckan och minskningen av antalet tjnster med 5 %.
81 To assign staff to priorities, it is necessary to have a system with sufficiently reliable data for assessing workload across the Commission as a whole. 
81 Fr att personal ska kunna ansls till prioriteringar mste det finnas ett system med tillrckligt tillfrlitliga uppgifter fr att kommissionens vergripande arbetsbrda ska kunna bedmas.
Information about the resources used for specific tasks (objectives) is a requirement for managerial accountability, which supports the annual declaration of assurance. 
Information om vilka resurser som anvnds till specifika uppgifter (ml) r ett krav fr ledningens ansvarsskyldighet, som ligger till grund fr den rliga revisionsfrklaringen.