natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
CLU000034EN02-04PP-FP5.ppt COCOBU, 19.04.2004 12 Overall conclusion Ľ FP5 was characterised by the complexity of rules applicable to its intervention mechanisms, often not fully understood by participants in indirect RTD actions Ľ joint management of FP5 by five Directorates-General and organisational structure within the Commission services was not conducive to the most efficient use of Community funds Ľ staff resources were insufficient to ensure adequate internal control, potential for centralised support functions was not fully exploited and support tools (i.e. manuals, IT systems, reporting) did not adequately address the needs of the Commission services CourtŐs findings and recommendations to be taken into account for the design of a future FP7 after 2006 
CLU000034SV02-04PP-FP5.ppt COCOBU, 19.04.2004 12 vergripande slutsats Ľ FP5 knnetecknades av komplexiteten hos de regler som gllde fr dess interventionsmekanismer och som deltagare i indirekta FoTU-tgrder ofta inte frstod fullt ut. Ľ De fem generaldirektoratens gemensamma frvaltning av FP5 och den organisatoriska strukturen inom kommissionen bidrog inte till att gemenskapsmedlen anvndes s effektivt som mjligt. Ľ Personalresurserna var otillrckliga fr att garantera en lmplig intern kontroll, mjligheterna till centraliserade stdfunktioner utnyttjades inte fullt ut och stdverktyg (dvs. handbcker, IT-system och rapportering) tillgodosg inte kommissionsenheternas behov i tillrcklig utstrckning.
18.8.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 202/1 I (Information) COURT OF AUDITORS SPECIAL REPORT No 1/2005 concerning the management of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), together with the CommissionŐs replies (pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 248(4) of the EC Treaty) (2005/C 202/01) CONTENTS LISTOFABBREVIATIONS ............................................................... 
18.8.2005 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 202/1 I (Meddelanden) REVISIONSRTTEN SRSKILD RAPPORT nr 1/2005 om frvaltningen av Europeiska byrn fr bedrgeribekmpning (OLAF), samt kommissionens svar (i enlighet med artikel 248.4 andra stycket i EG-frdraget) (2005/C 202/01) INNEHLLSF RTECKNING F RTECKNING VERF RKORTNINGAR........................................
ThemissionoftheAnti-FraudOffice(OLAF) .................................. 
SAMMANFATTNING ........................................................
OrganisationofOLAF.................................................... 
INLEDNING ...............................................................
Investigativeprocedures .................................................. SettingofprioritiesforOLAFŐsinvestigativefunction ........................... 
OLAF:sorganisation ..................................................... Revisionsrttensgranskning ...............................................
Theassessmentstage..................................................... 
Utvrderingsfasen .......................................................
Thefollow-upstage ..................................................... 
Utredningsfasen ........................................................
Qualitycontrolprocedures ................................................ 
Uppfljningsfasen .......................................................
TheOLAFmanual................................................... 
Internrevision ......................................................
C 202/2 EN Official Journal of the European Union 18.8.2005 UnitsreportingdirectlytotheDirectorofOLAF ............................... 
OLAF:sstyrelse .....................................................
Trainingandsupportforcandidatecountriesunit .......................... 
Verksamhetsrapporter................................................
HumanResourcesandBudgetUnit ..................................... Humanresources ....................................................... THESUPERVISORYCOMMITTEE .............................................. 
Enhetenfrbudgetochpersonal ....................................... Personalresurser ........................................................ VERVAKNINGSKOMMITTN ................................................ SLUTSATSEROCHREKOMMENDATIONER ......................................
RelationsbetweentheOfficeandtheSupervisoryCommittee ..................... 
FokuseringavOLAF:sverksamhetputredningsarbetet..........................
Paragraphs Page 56-61 12 57-58 12 59-60 13 61 13 62-65 13 66-72 14 73-94 15 74-88 15 89-92 17 93 17 94 18 ANNEXI:OLAForganisationchart ........................................................ 
Punkt Sida 56Đ61 12 57Đ58 12 59Đ60 13 61 13 62Đ65 13 66Đ72 14 73Đ94 15 74Đ88 15 89Đ92 17 93 17 94 18 BILAGAI:OrganisationsschemafrOLAF ................................................... 19 BILAGA II: De viktigaste brister som konstaterades vid granskningen av ett stickprov av utredningar . . . . .
20 TheCommissionŐsreplies .............................................................. 
20 Kommissionenssvar...................................................................
21 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AFIS Anti-fraud information system CMS Case management system DG Directorate-General ECR Electronic case register EIB European Investment Bank END Seconded national experts EU European Union IDOC Investigation and Discipline Office of the Commission OLAF European Anti-Fraud Office UCLAF Unit for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention 
21 F RTECKNING VER F RKORTNINGAR AFIS Anti Fraud Information System, informationssystem fr bedrgeribekmpning CMS rendehanteringssystemet (case management system) ECR Electronic Communications Registry, informationssystem fr bedrgeribekmpning EIB Europeiska investeringsbanken END Utstationerade nationella experter EU Europeiska unionen GD Generaldirektorat IDOC Kommissionens byr fr utredningar och disciplinrenden OLAF Europeiska byrn fr bedrgeribekmpning UCLAF Enheten fr samordning av bedrgeribekmpning
18.8.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 202/3 SUMMARY I. The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) succeeded the Unit for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention (UCLAF) in April 1999 with enhanced status and a mandate extended to cover all the institutions and bodies of the European Union. 
18.8.2005 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 202/3 SAMMANFATTNING I. Europeiska byrn fr bedrgeribekmpning (OLAF) eftertrdde i april 1999 enheten fr samordning av bedrgeribekmpning (UCLAF) och fick en frstrkt stllning och ett frstrkt mandat som utvidgats till att omfatta Europeiska unionens samtliga institutioner och organ.
Setting up the Office was a laborious process, in particular because of the disorganised nature of the files that it inherited. 
Starten blev besvrlig, srskilt p grund av den oordning som knnetecknade de renden den fick ta ver.
It was only towards the end of 2003 that the effects of its restructuring began to make themselves felt. 
Inte frrn i slutet av 2003 brjade man se effekterna av omstruktureringen.
As at mid-2004, however, improvements were still necessary in many areas of the management of investigations. 
I mitten av 2004 behvde dock frvaltningen av utredningarna i mnga avseenden frbttras ytterligare.
The hybrid status of the Office, which has investigative autonomy but reports to the Commission for its other duties, has not adversely affected the independence of its investigative function. 
Byrns blandade stllning, som innebr att den r oberoende nr det gller utredningar men understlld kommissionen i frga om vriga funktioner, har inte inkrktat p utredningsfunktionens oberoende.
Being part of the Commission, the Office has been able not only to benefit from substantial administrative and logistical support, but also to take advantage of the anti-fraud legislation that is available to Commission departments. 
Byrns koppling till kommissionen har gjort det mjligt fr den att inte endast f stort administrativt och logistiskt std utan ocks att kunna utnyttja den lagstiftning mot bedrgerier som anvnds av kommissionens avdelningar.
Consequently, it does not appear appropriate to consider amending the OfficeŐs status (1). 
Det frefaller drfr inte ndvndigt att vervga en ndring av byrns stllning (1).
The Office has sufficient resources to deal with all justified denunciations that it receives. 
Byrns resurser gr att den kan flja upp alla serisa angivelser som den tar emot.
This being so, the priorities that it establishes as part of its investigation policy continue to be theoretical ones. 
Med sdana frutsttningar blir de prioriteringar som den faststller fr sin utredningspolicy enbart teoretiska.
OLAF makes too little distinction between investigations (internal or external) on the one hand, and assistance and coordination operations on the other. 
Byrn gr inte tillrckligt stor tskillnad mellan utredningar (interna eller externa) och std-och sam-ordningsoperationer.
V. While the introduction of a registry and a computerised system for managing investigation files have improved record keeping for operations and clarified responsibilities, managerial supervision has remained inadequate and results in serious delays in the processing of files, the lodging of inconclusive reports and results that are difficult to identify. 
V. ven om infrandet av ett register och ett datasystem fr handlggning av renden har frbttrat registreringen av operationer och frtydligat ansvaret, har ledningens vervakning varit otillrcklig vilket lett till allvarliga frseningar i handlggningen av renden, fga beviskraftiga rapporter och vaga resultat.
In order to eliminate unnecessary delays, imperative deadlines should be set when investigations are opened. 
Fr att motverka ondiga frseningar br man faststlla ett slutdatum redan nr utredningar inleds.
The customs sector apart, there is a need for more effective cooperation with the Member States, both in areas of direct management and in areas where management is shared with Member States. VII. 
Med undantag fr tullsektorn krvs det strre anstrngningar nr det gller samarbetet med medlemsstaterna, bde p omrden med direkt frvaltning och nr frvaltningen delas med medlemsstaterna.
The system for assessing results, which is based on relevant indicators, needs to be further strengthened. 
Systemet fr att mta resultat som baseras p relevanta indikatorer mste frstrkas ytterligare.
The large number of staff on contracts that cannot be renewed beyond a certain duration (between six and eight years) is now hindering any further consolidation of expertise. 
Den hga andelen anstllda vars kontrakt inte kan frnyas utver en viss tidsgrns (som varierar mellan sex och tta r) r nu till nackdel fr konsolideringen av erfarenheter och kunskap.
For want of a clear codification of investigative procedures, the situation is prone to litigation. 
Att utredningstgrderna saknar tydlig kodifiering visar sig ge upphov till tvister.
The relevant regulatory provisions have proved unsatisfactory. 
Bestmmelserna fr detta har visat sig vara otillrckliga.
(1) See the evaluation report on OLAFŐs activities (Article 15), COM(2003) 154 final of 2 April 2003. 
(1) Se utvrderingsrapporten om verksamheten vid OLAF (artikel 15), KOM(2003) 154 slutlig av den 2 april 2003.
C 202/4 EN Official Journal of the European Union 18.8.2005 X. Relations between the Office and its Supervisory Committee are difficult. 
C 202/4 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 18.8.2005 X. Relationerna mellan byrn och dess vervakningskommitt r besvrliga.
To avoid dissipating the OfficeŐs work on activities which, although related to fraud prevention, are not directly concerned with investigations, and in order to guarantee that all resources are directed towards effectively combating fraud detrimental to the European UnionŐs financial interests, the tasks assigned to the Office ought to be re-examined in detail. 
Fr att undvika att byrns verksamhet splittras mellan tgrder som, ven om de har anknytning till bedrgeribekmpning, inte direkt gller utredningarna, och fr att garantera att alla resurser gnas t effektiv bekmpning av bedrgeri riktat mot Europeiska unionens ekonomiska intressen br man grundligt se ver byrns arbetsuppgifter.
INTRODUCTION The mission of the Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 1. 
Uppdraget fr Europeiska byrn fr bedrgeribekmpning (OLAF) 1.
By setting up the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (1), the European institutions aimed to increase the effectiveness of the fight against illegal activities detrimental to the UnionŐs financial interests. 
Genom att inrtta Europeiska byrn fr bedrgeribekmpning (OLAF) (1) ville gemenskapens institutioner effektivisera kampen mot olaglig verksamhet som kan skada gemenskapernas ekonomiska intressen.
The Office was thus given new powers as compared with those of its predecessors (2). 
Byrn fick drfr nya befogenheter jmfrt med sin fregngare (2).
In particular, it was given the task of carrying out administrative investigations within all the institutions and bodies of the European Union. 
Den fick srskilt i uppdrag att utfra interna administrativa underskningar vid samtliga Europeiska unionens institutioner och organ.
The Director of the Office, who took up his post in March 2000, was invested with the power to appoint OLAF staff, which should enable him to respond more effectively to the OfficeŐs specific investigative needs. 
Byrns direktr, som tilltrdde sin tjnst i mars 2000, fick befogenhet att utse OLAF:s personal vilket br gra det mjligt fr honom att fylla byrns srskilda behov i frga om utredningar.
While emphasising the importance of OLAFŐs investigative function (see paragraph 12), the Commission also entrusted the Office with a wide range of activities related to the protection of the European UnionŐs financial interests (3). 
Samtidigt som man understrk utredningsarbetets betydelse (se punkt 12) gav kommissionen OLAF ansvaret fr en mngd verksamheter av varierande slag som hr samman med skyddet av Europeiska unionens ekonomiska intressen (3).
These activities, which are partly grouped into what the Office calls a Ôservice plat-formŐ, cover: (a) the assistance that the Commission gives the Member States in the fight against fraud; (b) the development of a strategy for fighting fraud within the framework of its policy on the protection of financial interests (Article 280 of the Treaty); (1) Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 28 April 1999 (OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 
Dessa verksamheter, samlade i vad byrn kallar en serviceplattform, omfattar: a) Hjlp frn kommissionen till medlemsstaterna p omrdet fr bedrgeribekmpning. b) Utveckling av en strategi fr bedrgeribekmpning inom ramen fr policyn om skydd av ekonomiska intressen (artikel 280 i frdraget). (1) Kommissionens beslut 1999/352/EG, EKSG, Euratom av den 28 april 1999 (EGT L 136, 31.5.1999, s.
20); Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 (OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 
20), Europaparlamentets och rdets frordning (EG) nr 1073/1999 av den 25 maj 1999 (EGT L 136, 31.5.1999, s.
1). (2) TaskforcefortheCoordinationofFraudPrevention(until1987),Unit for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention (UCLAF Ń 1987-1999). 
1). (2) Den srskilda arbetsgruppen (ÓTask-forceÓ) fr samordning av bedrgeribekmpning (fram till 1987), Enheten fr samordning av bedrgeribekmpning (UCLAF: 1987Đ1999).
In this connection, see the CourtŐs Special Report No 8/98 (OJ C 230, 22.7.1998) the conclusions of which contributed to the debate that led to the creation of OLAF. 
Se i detta sammanhang revisionsrttens srskilda rapport nr 8/98 (EGT C 230, 22.7.1998) vars slutsatser bidrog till diskussionen som lg till grund fr inrttandet av Europeiska byrn fr bedrgeribekmpning.
18.8.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 202/5 4. 
18.8.2005 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 202/5 4.
As the Member States are responsible for managing around 80 % of European Union expenditure, it is necessary, for obvious reasons of effectiveness, for the Office to work closely with national authorities (police, customs, the courts, etc.). 
Eftersom medlemsstaterna ansvarar fr frvaltningen av omkring 80 % av Europeiska unionens utgifter r det av uppenbara effektivitetsskl ndvndigt att byrn har ett nra samarbete med medlemsstaternas myndigheter (polis, tullvsende, rttsliga myndigheter etc.).
This requirement adds to the complexity of its task. 
Detta krav frstrker komplexiteten i byrns uppgift.
Although OLAF is a new body, it has been obliged to continue the operations begun by its predecessor, UCLAF. 
Trots att OLAF r ett nytt organ fick det fortstta de operationer som hade inletts av dess fretrdare, UCLAF.
It thus took on around 1 400 active files (1), a very burdensome legacy owing to the disorganised way in which many of these investigations had been managed (2). 
Byrn fick p detta stt ta ver omkring 1 400 pgende renden (1) vilket var ett mycket tungt arv eftersom handlggningen av mnga av dessa utredningar varit oorganiserad (2).
At the same time, UCLAFŐs staff were reassigned en bloc to the Office, which, until the 2001 overhaul of the establishment plan, limited the new DirectorŐs room for manoeuvre (3). 
Samtidigt verfrdes hela UCLAF:s personal till byrn vilket, fram till ndringen av tjnstefrteckningen 2001, begrnsade den nye direktrens handlingsutrymme (3).
Organisation of OLAF 6. 
OLAF:s organisation 6.
The Office enjoys an ambivalent status, according to which it has investigative autonomy but is answerable to the Commission as regards its other duties. This hybrid structure has not adversely affected the independence of its investigative function and brings certain advantages. 
Byrn har en ambivalent stllning: den r oberoende i frga om sina utredningar, men understlld kommissionen nr det gller den vriga verksamheten. Denna blandade stllning, som inte har inkrktat p utredningsarbetets oberoende, innebr vissa frdelar.
From the legal point of view, for example, as a part of the Commission the Office has been able to make use of powers conferred on that institution, in particular the power to carry out on-the-spot checks in the Member States pursuant to a variety of general and sectoral regulations (4). 
Ur juridisk synvinkel har byrn, som ingr i kommissionen, slunda kunnat anvnda denna institutions befogenheter, srskilt fr att utfra kontroller p platsen i medlemsstaterna i enlighet med olika allmnna och sektorsfrordningar (4).
The OfficeŐs organisation chart as at May 2004 is presented in Annex I. Since 2001, the OfficeŐs establishment plan has been made up of around 300 posts, twice as many as were available to UCLAF (5). 
Byrns organisationsschema frn maj 2004 visas i bilaga I. Sedan 2001 innehller byrns tjnstefrteckning omkring 300 tjnster vilket r dubbelt s mnga som UCLAF hade (5).
In 2004, the Investigations Directorate (Directorate B) comprised 126 investigators (6) and 13 administrative staff. 
Direktoratet fr utredningar (direktorat B) hade 126 utredare (6) och 13 administratrer 2004.
The remaining 193 posts were divided among the OfficeŐs other departments (Directorate A ÔPolicy, legislation and legal affairsŐ and Directorate C ÔIntelligence, operational strategy and information servicesŐ). 
De terstende 193 tjnsterna frdelades mellan byrns vriga avdelningar som bestr av direktoratet fr policy-och lagstiftningsfrgor samt rttsliga frgor (direktorat A) och direktoratet fr underrttelseverksamhet, operativ strategi och informationsservice (direktorat C).
(1) See Table 3 in the Complementary Evaluation Report on the Activities of OLAF, SEC(2004) 1370 of 26 October 2004. 
(1) Se tabell 3 i den kompletterade utvrderingen av OLAF:s verksamheter, SEK(2004) 1370, 26 oktober 2004.
Nine cases were still open on 30 June 2004 and 280 cases were in the follow-up phase. 
Enligt tabellen pgick fortfarande nio fall per den 30 juni 2004, och 280 fall var under uppfljning.
(2) See Special Report No 8/98, paragraph 1.6 (OJ C 230, 22.7.1998). 
(2) Se punkt 1.6 i srskild rapport nr 8/98 (EGT C 230, 22.7.1998).
(3) See paragraph 7.42 of the CourtŐs Annual Report concerning the financial year 2000 (OJ C 359, 15.12.2001). 
(3) Se punkt 7.42 i revisionsrttens rsrapport fr budgetret 2000 (EGT C 359, 15.12.2001).
(4) Forexample,CouncilRegulation(EC,Euratom)No2988/95concern-ing administrative penalties in the case of irregularities (OJ L 312, 23.12.1995, p. 
(4) Till exempel rdets frordning (EG, Euratom) nr 2988/95 (EGT L 312, 23.12.1995, s.
1), Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 
1) som gller administrativa sanktioner som har samband med oegentligheter, rdets frordning (Euratom, EG) nr 2185/96 (EGT L 292, 15.11.1996, s.
2), or specific regulations on own resources, the Structural Funds, the European Development Fund, etc. 
2) om kontroller och inspektioner p platsen, eller specifika frordningar som gller egna medel, strukturfonder, Europeiska utvecklingsfonden etc.
(5) At the beginning of 1999, the UCLAF establishment plan contained 149 posts. 
(5) I brjan av 1999 hade UCLAF 149 tjnster i sin tjnstefrteckning.
(6) Including 13 seconded national experts (END). 
(6) Varav 13 utstationerade nationella experter.
The CourtŐs audit 8. 
Revisionsrttens granskning 8.
The aim of the audit was to appraise the quality of OLAFŐs investigations management. This was done by assessing: (a) how the Office had discharged its investigative duties; (b) the contribution made by each OLAF department to the investigative function. 
Syftet med granskningen var att bedma kvaliteten p OLAF:s handlggning av utredningar genom att utvrdera a) hur byrn har utfrt sitt utredningsuppdrag, b) hur OLAF:s olika avdelningar har bidragit till utredningsarbetet.
The final effectiveness of the OfficeŐs work could not be evaluated due to the insufficient reliability of the data on the follow-up of investigations. 
P grund av bristande tillfrlitlighet i de uppgifter om konkreta fljder som utredningarna har lett till har den slutliga effektiviteten av byrns arbete inte kunnat bedmas.
The CourtŐs report complements the evaluation produced by the Commission in April 2003, which essentially focused on the legal framework of the OfficeŐs activities (7), as well as a second more quantitative evaluation submitted by the Commission in October 2004 (8). 
Revisionsrttens rapport kompletterar den utvrdering som lades fram av kommissionen i april 2003 dr framfr allt den rttsliga ramen fr byrns verksamhet analyserades (7). Den kompletterar ven en andra, mer kvantitativ, utvrdering som lades fram av kommissionen i oktober 2004 (8).
As far as investigations are concerned, the audit carried out between April and October 2004 had as its starting point previous observations made by the Court (9). 
Nr det gller utredningarna utgick granskningen som genomfrdes mellan april och oktober 2004 frn de iakttagelser som tidigare har lagts fram av revisionsrtten (9).
It focused on systems, structures and staff measures. There was also a review of the activity of the OLAF departments that are not directly responsible for investigations. Although the OfficeŐs recent organisation was analysed, along with a sample of 117 operations conducted or closed towards the end of 2003, it became clear that, at that time, the Office was still engaged on clearing numerous operations begun by its predecessor, and that the reorganisation measures introduced during the 2002-2003 period were just starting to have an effect. 
Granskningen gllde system, strukturer och bestmmelser fr personalen. ven verksamheten vid de avdelningar inom OLAF som inte r direkt inblandade i utredningsarbetet gicks igenom. ven om analysen vid denna granskning gllde byrns nya organisation och ett urval p 117 operationer som hade genomfrts eller avslutats i slutet av 2003, framkom det att byrn vid denna tid fortfarande hll p att avsluta flera operationer som hade pbrjats av dess fregngare och att de omorganisationstgrder som vidtogs under perioden 2002Đ2003 just hade brjat f effekt.