natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
However, this protection does not extend to national public funding – i.e. Member States’ budgets are still affected if there is no recovery – which places limits on the deterrent effect of corrective action taken by managing authorities. 
Skyddet omfattar dock inte den nationella offentliga finansieringen Đ det vill sga att medlemsstaternas budgetar pverkas ven om medel inte tervinns Đ vilket begrnsar den avskrckande effekten av de korrigerande tgrder som frvaltande myndigheter vidtar.
Our special report 01/2019 provides additional information on the recovery of funds related to established fraud cases39. 
Vr srskilda rapport nr 1/2019 innehller ytterligare information om terkrav av medel i konstaterade bedrgerifall39.
However, even there, verification is not systematic. 37 Annex IV of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 480/2014 of 3 March 2014 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013. 
63 Frutom att tervinna alla EU-medel som berrs av bedrgeri frvntas frvaltande myndigheter bedma de vergripande konsekvenserna fr sina 37 Bilaga IV till kommissionens delegerade frordning (EU) nr 480/2014 av den 3 mars 2014 om komplettering av frordning (EU) nr 1303/2013.
38 The amount to be recovered in relation to these 84 fraud cases was €7 million. 
38 Det belopp som ska tervinnas i dessa 84 bedrgerifall var 7 miljoner euro.
39 Special report 01/2019: “Fighting fraud in EU spending: action needed”, paragraphs 112 to 115. 37 
39 Srskild rapport nr 1/2019 Kampen mot bedrgerier i samband med EU-utgifter: mer behver gras, punkterna 112Đ115. 39
38 Box 4 Example of good practice: checking for systematic fraud based on an initial case Most individual suspicions of fraud reported by Spain in relation to the 2007-2013 programming period can be traced to a single investigation triggered by an intermediate body. 
40 Ruta 4 Exempel p god praxis: kontroll av systematiskt bedrgeri efter ett frsta fall Merparten av de enskilda misstankar om bedrgeri som anmldes av Spanien fr programperioden 2007Đ2013 kan spras till en enda utredning som ett frmedlande organ tog initiativ till.
Based on the preliminary conclusions of an initial verification, the intermediate body made horizontal checks of all other grants awarded to the same final beneficiary. 
P grundval av de preliminra slutsatserna av en frsta kontroll gjorde det frmedlande organet vergripande kontroller av alla andra bidrag till samma slutmottagare.
It concluded that there was enough evidence to suspect systematic fraud involving false invoicing and collusion with external suppliers. 
Slutsatsen var att det fanns tillrckliga bevis fr att misstnka systematiskt bedrgeri i form av falska fakturor och otillten samverkan med externa leverantrer.
The intermediate body duly reported the results of its checks and its suspicions of fraud to the Spanish prosecutors and to the Commission. 
Det frmedlande organet rapporterade i vederbrlig ordning resultaten av sina kontroller och sina misstankar om bedrgeri till de spanska klagarna och till kommissionen.
The investigation currently covers 73 % of all the cases of suspected fraud reported in Spain for the 2007-2013 programming period and 56 % of their estimated potential impact on the EU contribution. 
Utredningen omfattar fr nrvarande 73 % av samtliga anmlda misstnkta bedrgerirenden i Spanien fr programperioden 2007Đ2013 och 56 % av deras uppskattade potentiella inverkan p EU:s bidrag.
the Commission), it takes around five months to initiate any administrative or criminal proceedings with a view to imposing sanctions. 
Efter den preliminra bedmningen (och parallellt med anmlan till kommissionen) tar det cirka fem mnader att inleda eventuella administrativa eller straffrttsliga frfaranden i syfte att tillmpa pfljder.
These proceedings take three years on average to come to term. 
Sdana frfaranden tar i genomsnitt tre r att slutfra.
Figure 9 – Average time taken for fraud to be detected, reported and closed by the competent Member State authorities 39 Fraud to suspicion Suspicion to detection Detection to reporting (Detection to sanctioning start) Reporting to case closure 26 months +5 months +8 months (5 months) (2 months) +34 months 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 (Time in months) Source: ECA, based on information extracted from IMS The functions of AFCOSs are insufficiently defined in the Regulation and vary considerably among Member States 66 Even though the main responsibility for fighting fraud in the use of Cohesion funding lies with the managing authorities, the AFCOSs play an essential role in coordinating the work of these authorities with other Member State bodies and with OLAF. 
Figur 9 Đ Genomsnittlig tidstgng fr att bedrgerifall ska upptckas, anmlas och avslutas av medlemsstatens behriga myndigheter 41 Bedrgeri till misstanke Misstanke till upptckt Upptckt till anmlan (Upptckt till dess att sanktionerna inleds) Anmlan till avslutat rende 26 mnader +5 mnader +8 mnader (5 mnader) (2 mnader +34 mnader 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 (mnader) Klla: Revisionsrtten, p grundval av information frn IMS.
The EU legislation establishing the AFCOSs42 does not provide guidance regarding their terms of reference, organisational framework or tasks. 
sambandscentralerna42 ges ingen vgledning om deras mandat, organisatoriska struktur eller uppgifter.
The Commission has provided specific recommendations in this respect through further guidance43 (see paragraph 07). 
Kommissionen har lmnat specifika rekommendationer om detta genom ytterligare vgledning43 (se punkt 06).
However, it is up to each Member State to make specific arrangements for its AFCOS. 
Varje medlemsstat avgr dock hur dess sambandscentral ska utformas.
42 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 
42 Europaparlamentets och rdets frordning (EU, Euratom) nr 883/2013 av den 11 september 2013 om utredningar som utfrs av Europeiska byrn fr bedrgeribekmpning (Olaf) (EUT L 248, 18.9.2013, s.
1), as amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2016/2030 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2016 (OJ L 317, 23.11.2016, p. 
1), ndrad genom Europaparlamentets och rdets frordning (EU, Euratom) 2016/2030 av den 26 oktober 2016 (EUT L 317, 23.11.2016, s.
1). 43 Guidance note on main tasks and responsibilities of an Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS), 13 November 2013, Ares (2013) 3403880. 
43 Guidance note on main tasks and responsibilities of an Anti-Fraud Co-ordination Service (AFCOS) (riktlinjer om huvudsakliga uppgifter och ansvarsomrden fr en sambandscentral fr bedrgeribekmpning (Afcos)), 13 november 2013, Ares (2013) 3403880.
This AFCOS does not make public any reports on those activities or on potential fraud in EU Cohesion spending (see Figure 10). 
Sambandscentralen offentliggr inga rapporter om sdana tgrder eller om potentiella bedrgerier i samband med EU:s sammanhllningsutgifter (se figur 10).
69 On 23 May 2018, the Commission issued a proposal for amendments to the OLAF Regulation44. 
69 Den 23 maj 2018 offentliggjorde kommissionen ett frslag till ndring av Olaf-frordningen44.
Before putting forward the proposal, in 2017 the Commission had conducted an evaluation45 of the way the OLAF Regulation was being applied. 
Innan frslaget lades fram hade kommissionen 2017 utvrderat45 tillmpningen av Olaf-frordningen.
70 On 22 November 2018, the Court gave its opinion on the proposal46. 
70 Den 22 november 2018 avgav revisionsrtten ett yttrande ver frslaget46.
Our view was that the proposal does not sufficiently contribute to the more harmonised and effective implementation of AFCOSs in all Member States, as it only addresses the services’ cooperation with OLAF and fails to provide clarity as to their minimum functions. 
Vi ansg att frslaget inte tillrckligt bidrar till ett mer harmoniserat och effektivt genomfrande av sambandscentraler i alla medlemsstater eftersom det endast behandlar sambandscentralernas samarbete med Olaf och inte klargr vilka funktioner de minst ska fullgra.
The status of fraud cases is inadequately reported and followed up 71 In order to follow up the status of a case, it may be necessary to consult parties involved in the fight against fraud that are outside the OP management and control structures. 
Rapporteringen och uppfljningen av bedrgerirendens status r otillrcklig 71 Fr att flja upp ett rendes status kan man behva konsultera parter som deltar i kampen mot bedrgeri men inte ingr i det operativa programmets frvaltnings-och kontrollsystem.
We consider that, as the central structures liaising with OLAF in the fight against fraud, AFCOSs should have an overview at all times of cases of fraud involving EU funding. 
Eftersom sambandscentralerna r den centrala strukturen fr kontakter med Olaf i kampen mot bedrgeri anser vi att de alltid br ha verblick ver bedrgerirenden som rr EU-medel.
To do this, they should be able to obtain information on the status of cases investigated by the competent authorities in their Member States. 
De br drfr f tillgng till information om statusen fr renden som utreds av de behriga myndigheterna i deras medlemsstat.
72 In five of the Member States we visited, the AFCOSs were insufficiently aware of the investigative status of cases reported to the Commission. 
72 I fem av de medlemsstater som vi beskte var sambandscentralerna inte tillrckligt informerade om lget i utredningar av renden som hade anmlts till kommissionen.
In Romania and Hungary we found no formal mechanism for systematic cooperation between the managing authorities, the AFCOS and the investigative and prosecution bodies; thus the AFCOS had no full overview of ongoing investigations involving EU-funded projects. 
I Rumnien och Ungern fann vi ingen formell mekanism fr systematiskt samarbete mellan de frvaltande myndigheterna, sambandscentralerna och utrednings-och lagfringsorganen, vilket innebar att sambandscentralerna inte hade fullstndig verblick ver pgende utredningar av EU-finansierade projekt.
That said, the Romanian AFCOS periodically approaches the prosecution bodies for information on the status of ongoing investigations about which it is aware. In Spain, the AFCOS also takes a proactive approach by requesting data on ongoing investigations. 
Sambandscentralen i Rumnien kontaktar dock regelbundet lagfringsorganen fr att f information om statusen p pgende utredningar som den knner till. ven i Spanien agerar sambandscentralen proaktivt och begr att f uppgifter om pgende utredningar.
In spite of this, it is unable to ensure that updated information is forwarded to the Commission. 
Trots det kan den inte garantera att uppdaterad information verlmnas till kommissionen.
73 We found coordination and information exchange issues in six of the seven Member States. 
73 Vi konstaterade problem som gllde samordningen och informationsutbytet i sex av de sju medlemsstaterna.
We were also unable to reconcile the information recorded in the IMS regarding cases of suspected and confirmed fraud involving EU funding with that held by the various authorities. 
Vi lyckades inte heller stmma av den information som registrerats i IMS om fall av misstnkt och bekrftat bedrgeri som rrde EU-medel med den information som de olika myndigheterna hade.
42 central database or other form of centralised statistical records that might provide an overview of the nature and status of fraud cases (see paragraph 48). 
De aktuella medlemsstaterna har ingen central databas eller ngon annan form av centraliserad statistik som skulle kunna ge en versikt ver bedrgerifallens typ och status (se punkt 48).
Coordination mechanisms are often lacking 74 Protection for the EU’s financial interests at the level of the Member States does not exclusively concern the authorities responsible for the implementation of Cohesion funding or the AFCOSs. 
Ofta saknas samordningsmekanismer 74 Skyddet av EU:s finansiella intressen i medlemsstaterna r inte enbart en frga fr myndigheterna som ansvarar fr genomfrandet av sammanhllningsmedel eller fr sambandscentralerna.
Other interested parties include investigation and prosecution bodies, competition authorities, procurement agencies and, depending on the country, certain other institutions. 
Andra aktrer som berrs r utrednings-och lagfringsorgan, konkurrensmyndigheter, upphandlingsorgan och, beroende p land, vissa andra institutioner.
Member States should put in place adequate coordination mechanisms so that the various actors can exchange information about measures taken and planned, as well as recommendations for improvement. 
Medlemsstaterna br infra lmpliga samordningsmekanismer s att de olika aktrerna kan utbyta information om vidtagna och planerade tgrder, och ven f rekommendationer om frbttringar.
75 However, most of the Member States we visited do not have proper coordination mechanisms involving all the relevant parties in the fight against fraud involving EU Cohesion funding. 
75 Men de flesta medlemsstater som vi beskte har inga riktiga samordningsmekanismer dr alla aktrer som r involverade i kampen mot bedrgeri som rr EU-medel deltar.
76 In Bulgaria, where 60 % of the cases we examined had been rejected or terminated by the prosecutor`s office, neither the AFCOS nor the managing authorities systematically analyse the reasons for rejection. 
76 I Bulgarien, dr 60 % av de renden som vi underskte hade avvisats eller avslutats av klagaren, gjorde varken sambandscentralen eller de frvaltande 44
In Hungary, the AFCOS does not have an overview of measures actually implemented as part of the anti-fraud management process or of the status of reported cases. 
I Ungern har sambandscentralen ingen verblick ver vilka tgrder som verkligen genomfrs som en del av bedrgeribekmpningsprocessen eller ver statusen fr anmlda renden.
The Romanian AFCOS carries out coordination work solely on the basis of bilateral agreements with each of the programme authorities, but there is no national multilateral coordination mechanism involving all stakeholders. 
Sambandscentralen i Rumnien utfr samordningsarbete som enbart bygger p bilaterala verenskommelser med varje enskild programmyndighet, men det finns ingen nationell, multilateral samordningsmekanism som alla berrda parter deltar i.
In Spain, the establishment of a body meant to assist the AFCOS by coordinating all parties to the fight against fraud has been pending since the AFCOS was set up in 201647. 
I Spanien inrttades sambandscentralen 2016, men inrttandet av det organ som ska bist den genom att samordna alla aktrer i kampen mot bedrgeri har frdrjts47.
47 The Royal Decree regulating the composition and the functioning of this body was finally adopted on 1 March 2019 and published on 19 March 2019. 
45 47 Det kungliga dekret som reglerar organets sammansttning och uppgifter antogs slutligen den 1 mars 2019 och offentliggjordes den 19 mars 2019.
43 77 We found an example of good coordination practice in Latvia (see Box 5). 
77 Vi fann ett exempel p goda samordningsrutiner i Lettland (se ruta 5).
Box 5 Coordination between managing authorities and investigation and prosecution bodies In Latvia, the investigative authorities refused to start criminal proceedings in a number of cases identified by the managing authority and its delegated intermediate bodies. 
46 Ruta 5 Samordning mellan frvaltande myndigheter och utrednings-och lagfringsorgan I Lettland vgrade utredningsmyndigheterna att inleda brottsutredningar i ett antal fall som den frvaltande myndigheten och dess delegerade frmedlande organ hade identifierat.
To analyse the reasons for these refusals and determine whether changes were required to working practices, the AFCOS set up an interinstitutional working group involving the authorities, the Ministry of Justice, the police and the State prosecution service. 
Fr att analysera orsakerna till detta och fastsl om arbetsrutinerna behvde ndras tillsatte sambandscentralen en interinstitutionell arbetsgrupp med fretrdare fr myndigheterna, justitieministeriet, polisen och statsklarmyndigheten.
The working group now meets regularly to examine cases of suspected fraud in the implementation of Cohesion funding. 
Arbetsgruppen trffas nu regelbundet fr att underska fall av misstnkt bedrgeri vid genomfrandet av sammanhllningsmedel.
Conclusions and recommendations 78 Through this audit, we assessed whether managing authorities have properly met their responsibilities at each stage of the anti-fraud management process: fraud prevention, fraud detection and fraud response (including reporting on fraud and recovery of funds unduly paid). 
Slutsatser och rekommendationer 78 Vid revisionen bedmde vi om de frvaltande myndigheterna har uppfyllt sina skyldigheter i varje led av bedrgeribekmpningsprocessen p lmpligt stt, vilket innebr att de ska frebygga och upptcka bedrgerier och vidta mottgrder (bland annat anmla bedrgeri och tervinna felaktigt utbetalda belopp).
To this end, we assessed whether managing authorities have: (a) developed anti-fraud policies, performed a thorough risk assessment and implemented adequate preventive and detective measures; and (b) properly responded to detected fraud in coordination with AFCOSs and other competent anti-fraud bodies. 
Vi bedmde drfr om de frvaltande myndigheterna hade a) utarbetat en bedrgeribekmpningspolicy, gjort en grundlig riskbedmning och genomfrt lmpliga tgrder fr att frebygga och upptcka bedrgeri, b) reagerat p upptckt bedrgeri p lmpligt stt och i samarbete med sambandscentraler och andra behriga bedrgeribekmpningsorgan.
Managing authorities generally have no specific anti-fraud policy 80 Managing authorities seldom prepare a formal anti-fraud policy or a similar single document specifying the fraud prevention, detection and response (correction and prosecution) measures which they have designed following a risk assessment. 
Frvaltande myndigheter har i allmnhet ingen specifik bedrgeribekmpningspolicy 80 Frvaltande myndigheter utarbetar sllan en formell bedrgeribekmpningspolicy eller ett liknande fristende dokument dr de specificerar de tgrder fr att frebygga, upptcka och komma till rtta med bedrgeri (korrigering och lagfring) som de har utformat efter en riskbedmning.
We consider that the preparation and publication of a formal anti-fraud policy in the form of a single, stand-alone document is essential in order to communicate a managing authority’s determination to actively combat fraud. 
Vi anser att en formell bedrgeribekmpningspolicy i form av ett fristende dokument mste utarbetas och offentliggras fr att frmedla en frvaltande myndighets fasta fresats att aktivt bekmpa bedrgeri.
This is particularly relevant, as only ten Member States have adopted a national anti-fraud strategy based on the Commission’s recommendation. 
Detta r srskilt relevant eftersom endast tio medlemsstater har antagit en nationell bedrgeribekmpningsstrategi som bygger p kommissionens rekommendation.
We consider the absence of provisions requiring managing authorities to adopt formal anti-fraud policies to be a shortcoming in the design of the anti-fraud framework for 2014-2020 (paragraphs 18 to 21). 44 
Vi anser att avsaknaden av bestmmelser om att frvaltande myndigheter ska anta en formell bedrgeribekmpningspolicy r en brist i utformningen av bedrgeribekmpningsramen fr 2014Đ2020 punkterna (18 till 21). 47
Recommendation 1 – Develop formal strategies and policies to combat fraud against EU funds (a) Member States that do not have a national anti-fraud strategy (see paragraph 20 and footnote 19) should formulate one. 
Rekommendation 1 Đ Utarbeta en formell strategi och politik fr bekmpning av bedrgeri med EU-medel a) Medlemsstater som inte har en nationell bedrgeribekmpningsstrategi (se punkt 20 och fotnot 19) br utarbeta en sdan.
The strategy should at least: — be based on the assessment of existing risks and involve knowledgeable actors from different areas (managers of EU funds, competent fraud investigation and prosecution bodies, etc.) in its preparation; — outline concrete measures for fraud prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution, and recovery and sanctions; — contain specific arrangements for monitoring the implementation of anti-fraud measures and measuring results; and — explicitly assign responsibilities for the implementation, monitoring, coordination and comparative evaluation of anti-fraud measures. 
Strategin br tminstone bygga p en bedmning av befintliga risker och involvera kunniga aktrer frn olika omrden (frvaltare av EU-medel, behriga utrednings-och lagfringsorgan etc.) i utarbetandet av den, ange huvuddragen i konkreta tgrder fr att frebygga, upptcka, utreda och lagfra bedrgeri, och fr tervinning och pfljder, innehlla specifika arrangemang fr vervakning av genomfrandet av bedrgeribekmpningstgrder och resultatmtning, tydligt tilldela ansvaret fr genomfrande, vervakning, samordning och jmfrande utvrdering av bedrgeribekmpningstgrder.
Unless a sufficiently detailed strategy exists at national level, the Commission should require managing authorities to adopt a formal anti-fraud policy or statement covering the OPs under their responsibility. 
Om det inte finns en tillrckligt detaljerad strategi p nationell niv br kommissionen krva att frvaltande myndigheter antar en formell bedrgeribekmpningspolicy eller ett uttalande om bedrgeribekmpning som ska glla fr de operativa program som de ansvarar fr.
This policy should serve as a single reference source specifying the strategies for the development of an anti-fraud culture, the allocation of responsibilities for tackling fraud, the reporting mechanisms for suspicious of fraud and the way different actors need to cooperate in line with Key Requirement 7 and the Commission ́s guidance. (b) Timeframe: by the end of 2019 81 In line with the zero-tolerance approach to fraud, and during negotiations and approval process for the CPR for the period 2021-2027, the co-legislators could consider making compulsory the adoption of national strategies or anti-fraud policies. 
Policyn ska fungera som enda referensklla och ange strategier fr hur en bedrgeribekmpningskultur ska vxa fram, hur ansvaret fr bedrgeribekmpning ska frdelas, hur misstankar om bedrgeri ska anmlas och hur olika aktrer ska samarbeta i enlighet med centralt krav 7 och kommissionens vgledning. b) Tidsram: Fre slutet av 2019.
Managing authorities systematically assess fraud risks, but this process could be further improved 82 In line with the provisions of the 2014-2020 control framework, managing authorities now systematically assess fraud risks (largely based on the guidance provided by the Commission), which is an improvement in the fight against fraud (paragraphs 22 and 23). 
Frvaltande myndigheter bedmer systematiskt bedrgeririsker, men processen skulle kunna frbttras ytterligare 82 I linje med bestmmelserna fr kontrollramen fr 2014Đ2020 bedmer de frvaltande myndigheterna nu systematiskt bedrgeririsker (i stor utstrckning baserat p kommissionens vgledning), vilket r en frbttring av kampen mot bedrgeri (punkterna 22 och 23).
We consider that this conclusion may be too optimistic (paragraphs 24 to 28). 
Vi anser att den slutsatsen kan vara veroptimistisk (punkterna 24 till 28).