natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
When the EU IRU examines propaganda in non-EU languages (e.g. Arabic, Russian or Turkish) which national Internet Referral Units examine less, the risk is lower. 
Nr EU IRU granskar propaganda p andra sprk n EU-sprken (t.ex. arabiska, ryska eller turkiska), som nationella enheter fr anmlan av innehll p internet granskar i mindre utstrckning, r risken mindre.
The EU IRU does not have information on how much terrorist content has been removed by internet companies at its request alone, without also having been flagged by national IRUs, civil society or the internet companies themselves. 
EU IRU har ingen information om hur mycket terroristinnehll som internetfretag har tagit bort enbart p dess begran, det vill sga utan att det ocks har rapporterats av nationella enheter fr anmlan av innehll p internet, civilsamhllet eller internetfretagen sjlva.
Internet companies do not provide feedback on why content has been removed. 
Internetfretag ger ingen feedback om varfr innehll har tagits bort.
They do not demonstrate effectiveness in terms of the amount of terrorist propaganda that remains on the internet. 
Den visar inte effektivitet uttryckt i den mngd terroristpropaganda som finns kvar p internet.
The 10 survey respondents who expressed an opinion felt that one challenge faced by the EU IRU is that the removed propaganda is simply re-uploaded or moved to other platforms (known as the Ňwhack-a-moleÓ effect). 
De tio enktsvarande som uttryckte en sikt ansg att ett problem som EU IRU stlls infr r att den propaganda som tagits bort helt enkelt laddas upp p nytt eller flyttas till andra plattformar (en effekt som kallas whack-a-mole, efter spelet med samma namn, ungefr Óklubba mullvadÓ p svenska).
At the December 2016 EU Internet Forum (see Box 2), key internet companies presented an initiative to help prevent propaganda being re-uploaded. 
P EU:s internetforum (se ruta 2) i Beskrivande och finansiell rapport om projektverksamhet och projektresultat, som upprttas i slutet av ett projekt av mottagaren av EU-finansiering.
The French authorities we met stressed the need to demonstrate the effectiveness of this mechanism. 
De franska myndigheter som vi trffade betonade behovet av att visa att denna mekanism r ndamlsenlig.
They also highlighted the challenge of finding the right balance between making terrorist propaganda less accessible on the internet and pushing terrorists to use more complex and clandestine messaging systems, which could make investigations more difficult. 
De pekade ocks p utmaningen att hitta rtt balans mellan att gra terroristpropaganda mindre tillgnglig p internet och tvinga terrorister att anvnda komplexare och hemliga meddelandesystem, vilket skulle kunna frsvra utredningar.
They do not measure response speed, e.g. the time the EU IRU takes to identify suspicious content once it has been uploaded and the time internet companies take to remove such content once they have been notified of it. 
Den mter inte reaktionstid, till exempel den tid det tar fr EU IRU att identifiera misstnkt innehll som har laddats upp, och den tid det tar fr internetfretag att ta bort sdant innehll nr de vl har underrrttats om det.
Figure 5 - EU IRU statistics 29 1 July 2015 to 1 July 2016 1 July 2016 to 1 June 2017 Proposals for referral 9 787 20 174 Content removed by service providers 8 949 16 143 Success rate 91.4 % 80.0 % Source: Europol - EU IRU Year One Report and Europol data. 
Figur 5 Đ Statistik frn EU IRU 30 1 juli 2015 till 1 juli 2016 1 juli 2016 till 1 juni 2017 Frslag till anmlan 9 787 20 174 Innehll som tagits bort av internetleverantrer 8 949 16 143 Resultat 91,4 % 80,0 % Klla: Europol Đ ettrsrapport frn EU IRU och uppgifter frn Europol.
DG Migration and Home Affairs sets detailed quantified targets for the RAN in the annual activity plan, and reviews progress in quarterly and annual progress reports. 
GD Migration och inrikes frgor faststller detaljerade, kvantifierade delml fr RAN i den rliga verksamhetsplanen och granskar framstegen i kvartalsvisa och rliga lgesrapporter.
However, these plans and reports only list activities, e.g. numbers of meetings, participants, ex-ante papers, study visits, seminars, conferences, newsletters, training courses, workshops, policy papers and issue papers. 
I dessa planer och rapporter listas dock endast verksamheter, till exempel antal mten, deltagare, frhandsdokument, studiebesk, seminarier, konferenser, nyhetsbrev, utbildningskurser, workshoppar, strategidokument och informationsdokument.
The Commission has not asked the RAN Centre of Excellence for information to monitor its effectiveness, e.g. participant satisfaction, the knowledge and contacts acquired, how these were used and disseminated within Member States, and their impact on the job or on the organisationŐs results (e.g. whether training actually helped the police to recognise radicalised individuals and mitigate the risk they posed). 
Kommissionen har inte begrt information frn RAN:s kompetenscentrum fr att vervaka dess ndamlsenlighet, till exempel deltagarnas beltenhet, kunskap som frvrvats och kontakter som knutits samt hur de har anvnts och spridits inom medlemsstater och deras effekt p jobbet eller p organisationens resultat (t.ex. huruvida utbildning faktiskt hjlpte polisen att identifiera radikaliserade personer och minska den risk som de utgjorde).
On its own initiative, the RAN Centre of Excellence has, however, carried out surveys which provide some indication of how useful its products are. 
P eget initiativ har RAN:s kompetenscentrum emellertid genomfrt enkter som ger en indikation p hur anvndbara dess produkter r.
For example, one survey in August 2016 found that nearly 90 % of participants at RAN events felt that their attendance would have a positive impact on their daily work. 
I exempelvis en enkt frn augusti 2016 konstaterades att nstan 90 % av deltagarna i RAN:s evenemang ansg att deras deltagande skulle inverka positivt p deras dagliga arbete.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 37. 
SLUTSATSER OCH REKOMMENDATIONER 37.
Member States are responsible for their national security, including fighting terrorism. 
Medlemsstaterna ansvarar fr sin nationella skerhet, inbegripet kampen mot terrorism.
The EU also has a role in ensuring a high level of security by facilitating exchanges of information, operational cooperation and sharing of knowledge and experiences. In 2005, the EU set out its counter-terrorism strategy, organised around four pillars. The first pillar 
EU:s roll r att verka fr att skerstlla en hg skerhetsniv genom att frmja utbyte av information, operativt samarbete och utbyte av kunskaper och erfarenheter. r 2005 faststllde EU sin strategi fr kampen mot terrorism som bygger p fyra pelare.
aims to prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the causes of radicalisation and recruitment. 
Den frsta pelaren syftar till att frebygga att mnniskor dras till terrorism genom att ta angripa orsakerna till radikalisering och rekrytering.
As radicalisation is caused by several factors, a wide range of actions are deployed to address the problem. 
Eftersom radikalisering orsakas av flera faktorer vidtas en mngd olika tgrder fr att frska komma till rtta med problemet.
The Commission therefore draws on an increasingly wide range of existing EU funds to support Member States. 
Kommissionen anvnder drfr en allt strre mngfald av befintliga EU-medel fr att stdja medlemsstaterna.
Our audit examined whether the Commission appropriately managed its support for Member States in addressing radicalisation leading to terrorism. 
Vi granskade huruvida kommissionen p ett lmpligt stt frvaltade sitt std till medlemsstaterna fr att bekmpa radikalisering som leder till terrorism.
Overall, we found that the Commission addressed the needs of Member States, but there were some shortfalls in coordination and evaluation. 
Generellt konstaterade vi att kommissionen har tillgodosett medlemsstaternas behov men att det fanns vissa brister i samordningen och utvrderingen.
The Commission promoted cooperation between Member States through relevant initiatives such as the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), the EU Internet Forum and the European Strategic Communications Network (see paragraphs 15 to 21). 
Kommissionen frmjade samarbete mellan medlemsstaterna genom relevanta initiativ som ntverket fr kunskapsspridning om radikalisering (RAN), EU:s internetforum och det europeiska ntverket fr strategisk kommunikation (se punkterna 15Đ21).
The Commission coordinated its cross-cutting support, for example, by means of consultation between directorates-general when approving work programmes. 
Kommissionen samordnade sitt vergripande std, till exempel genom samrd mellan generaldirektorat, nr den skulle godknna arbetsprogram.
For example, the CommissionŐs overview of EU-funded actions in this area does not include those managed by Member States, which would be useful to make the most of potential synergies. 
I till exempel kommissionens versikt ver EU-finansierade tgrder p omrdet ingr inte de tgrder som frvaltas av medlemsstaterna, vilket vore lmpligt om potentiella synergieffekter ska kunna utnyttjas p bsta stt.
We also found that the RAN, one of the CommissionŐs main initiatives, was not used to its full potential to disseminate the results of successful EU-funded projects (see paragraphs 22 to 28). 
Vi konstaterade ocks att RAN, som r ett av kommissionens viktigaste initiativ, inte anvndes till sin fulla potential fr att sprida resultaten av framgngsrika EU-finansierade projekt (se punkterna 22Đ28).
In particular the Commission should: include the major EU-funded actions managed by Member States in the list of EU-funded radicalisation actions. 
Framfr allt br kommissionen gra fljande: Ta med de viktigaste EU-finansierade tgrder som frvaltas av medlemsstaterna p listan ver EU-finansierade tgrder mot radikalisering.
view to maximising synergies especially where different funds and tools intersect. 
Kommissionen br regelbundet uppdatera denna lista fr att maximera synergieffekterna, srskilt i skrningspunkten mellan olika medel och verktyg.
The list should be available to project applicants; make the most of potential synergies between Commission actions by formalising the requirement to use the RAN to disseminate the results of successful EU-funded projects. 
P bsta stt utnyttja potentiella synergieffekter mellan kommissionens tgrder genom att infra ett formellt krav p att RAN anvnds fr att sprida resultaten av framgngsrika EU-finansierade projekt.
Timeframe: June 2019. 
Tidsram: juni 2019.
31 Recommendation 2 - Increase practical support to practitioners and policymakers in Member States The Commission should: improve communication from practitioners to policymakers through a regular and structured exchange of approaches and ideas; analyse participation by Member StatesŐ practitioners in the RAN, with a particular focus on whether less active countries should be more involved; analyse the involvement of practitioners within the RAN ensuring that different types of stakeholders are adequately represented, including networks of organisations on the ground, without links with government, in order to enhance the bottom-up approach; support managers of counter-radicalisation projects in assessing the effectiveness and transferability of practices, and increase the relevance of the RAN Collection by including more information on the effectiveness of practices and the context in which they can be transferred; include in the RAN Collection a clear explanation of how actions are financed with EU funds. Timeframe: June 2019. 
Rekommendation 2 Đ ka det konkreta stdet till yrkesverksamma och beslutsfattare i medlemsstaterna Kommissionen br frbttra kommunikationen frn yrkesverksamma till beslutsfattare genom ett regelbundet och strukturerat utbyte av tillvgagngsstt och ider, analysera hur yrkesverksamma i medlemsstaterna deltar i RAN, med srskilt fokus p huruvida mindre aktiva lnder borde vara mer delaktiga, analysera yrkesverksammas deltagande i RAN och se till att olika typer av berrda parter r vederbrligt representerade, inbegripet ntverk av organisationer p fltet, utan kopplingar till regeringen, fr att frstrka bottom-up-strategin,
The Commission has not sufficiently developed its framework for assessing whether its support is effective and offers value for money. 
Kommissionen har inte p ett tillrckligt stt utvecklat sin ram fr att bedma om dess std r ndamlsenligt och effektivt.
For example, it has not broken down the overall policy objectives into more specific and measurable objectives, and the funds that the Commission has used to address radicalisation are not accompanied by indicators and targets designed to measure success in pursuit of this goal (see paragraphs 29 to 31). 
Till exempel har den inte delat upp de vergripande politiska mlen i mer specifika och mtbara ml, och de medel som den har anvnt fr att bekmpa radikalisering tfljs inte av indikatorer och delml fr mtning av hur framgngsrikt arbetet fr att uppn mlet r (se punkterna 29Đ31).
Moreover, the achievements of specific actions are often measured in terms of amount of activity rather than effectiveness. 
Genomfrandet av specifika tgrder mts dessutom ofta i verksamhetsmngd och inte i ndamlsenlighet.
As a result, there is a risk that useful lessons might not be disseminated or taken into account when the Commission designs actions or develops its policy further (see paragraphs 32 to 36). 
Det leder till att nyttiga lrdomar eventuellt inte sprids eller beaktas nr kommissionen planerar tgrder eller vidareutvecklar sin politik (se punkterna 32Đ36) Rekommendation 3 Đ Frbttra ramen fr resultatbedmning Kommissionen br utvrdera om den uppfyller sina politiska ml och se till att det gr att bevisa hur ndamlsenliga EU-finansierade tgrder i sjlva verket r.
It should then report regularly on the overall progress made towards achieving the objectives of its counter-radicalisation policy, including the EU funds involved; request the RAN Centre of Excellence to provide more detailed reports on its effectiveness, e.g. participant satisfaction, the knowledge and contacts acquired, how these were used, and their impact on the job or on the organisationŐs results; oversee through the EU Internet Forum: Ľ cooperation between the EU IRU and national IRUs in ensuring complementarity and avoiding unnecessary duplication in referring terrorist content to IT companies; Ľ the extent to which removing terrorist propaganda has an impact on its prevalence on the internet; 
kontakter som knutits samt hur denna kunskap och dessa kontakter har anvnts och deras effekt p jobbet eller p organisationens resultat, genom EU:s internetforum vervaka Ľ samarbetet mellan EU IRU och nationella enheter fr anmlan av innehll p internet fr att skerstlla komplementaritet och undvika att terroristinnehll anmls flera gnger till it-fretag, Ľ i vilken utstrckning avlgsnande av terroristpropaganda pverkar dess frekomst p internet, Ľ hur snabbt innehll som anmlts av EU IRU tas bort, se till att projektskande visar hur de kommer att mta sina projekts ndamlsenlighet.
This Report was adopted by Chamber V, headed by Mr Lazaros S. LAZAROU, Member of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 20 March 2018. 
Denna rapport antogs av revisionsrttens avdelning V, med ledamoten Lazaros S. Lazarou som ordfrande, vid dess sammantrde i Luxemburg den 20 mars 2018.
REPLIES OF THE COMMISSION TO THE SPECIAL REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS "TACKLING RADICALISATION THAT LEADS TO TERRORISM: THE COMMISSION ADDRESSED THE NEEDS OF MEMBER STATES, BUT WITH SOME SHORTFALLS IN COORDINATION AND EVALUATION" EXECUTIVE SUMMARY V. Since 2017, the Commission has improved its overview of EU funded actions and is able to identify synergies between different funds and actions in particular within the framework of the Security Union Task Force and its dedicated subgroup on radicalisation. 
KOMMISSIONENS SVAR P EUROPEISKA REVISIONSRTTENS SRSKILDA RAPPORT ÓBEKMPNING AV RADIKALISERING SOM LEDER TILL TERRORISM: KOMMISSIONEN HAR TILLGODOSETT MEDLEMSSTATERNAS BEHOV, MEN DET FINNS BRISTER I SAMORDNINGEN OCH UTVRDERINGENÓ SAMMANFATTNING V. Kommissionen har sedan 2017 frbttrat sin bild av EU-finansierade tgrder och kan identifiera synergieffekter mellan olika medel och tgrder, srskilt inom ramen fr arbetsgruppen fr skerhetsunionen och dess srskilda undergrupp om radikalisering.
The objectives of the Commission's policy on preventing and countering radicalisation are set out in the relevant policy documents. 
Mlen fr kommissionens politik fr frebyggande och bekmpande av radikalisering anges i de relevanta policydokumenten.
These are necessarily of a more general nature with more concrete objectives being set out under the relevant initiatives. 
Dessa dokument r ndvndigtvis av en mer allmn karaktr, och de mer konkreta mlen anges i de relevanta initiativen.
The Commission underlines that individual projects and initiatives are evaluated and their achievements are recorded. 
Kommissionen betonar att individuella projekt och initiativ utvrderas och deras resultat registreras.
This feeds into the general evaluation of funds and programmes. However, the Commission recognises that the longer term impact of these actions is not measured in a systematic way. 
Detta ingr i de allmnna utvrderingarna av medel och program. Kommissionen r dock medveten om att tgrdernas mer lngsiktiga verkan inte mts p ett systematiskt stt.
The development of knowledge on radicalisation is not only done through projects funded under Horizon 2020, but also done through other EU funds and in particular the Internal Security Fund Police (ISF-P) including the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) which is also tasked to share and establish good practices. 
Kunskapen om radikalisering utvecklas inte bara genom projekt som finansieras via Horisont 2020, utan ven via andra EU-fonder, srskilt fonden fr inre skerhet Đ polisdelen (ISF-P), inklusive ntverket fr kunskapsspridning om radikalisering (RAN), som ocks har till uppgift att utbyta och faststlla god praxis.
Projects funded under the European Social Fund aim inter alia to strengthen resilience more broadly but can also specifically address radicalisation (e.g. the project BAANA). 
Projekt som finansieras av Europeiska socialfonden syftar bland annat till att mer allmnt strka motstndskraften, men kan ven inriktas specifikt p radikalisering (t.ex. projektet Baana).
Exit strategies in the broader sense as well as rehabilitation and de-radicalisation projects are not only funded under the Justice programme but can be also funded by ISF-P as it is currently the case with the general call on radicalisation launched in November 2017. 
Exitstrategier i en vidare bemrkelse samt projekt fr teranpassning och avradikalisering finansieras inte enbart via programmet Rttsliga frgor, utan kan ven finansieras via ISF-P, vilket fr nrvarande r fallet med den allmnna frslagsinfordran om radikalisering som inleddes i november 2017.
OBSERVATIONS Box 5 While the Commission indeed adapts its policy response to an evolving threat picture, the Commission's work in the area of prevention of radicalisation is following long term as well as short term objectives. 
IAKTTAGELSER Ruta 5 Kommissionen anpassar mycket riktigt sina politiska lsningar till den skiftande hotbilden, men arbetar samtidigt efter bde lng-och kortsiktiga ml inom omrdet frebyggande av radikalisering.
In this sense, many of the work streams address all forms of radicalisation. 
I detta avseende omfattar mnga av arbetsfldena alla former av radikalisering.
19. (a) The topic of media and communication has been addressed in different ways: it was included in the 2005 Commission Communication (chapter 2.1 Broadcast Media); this topic (including in particular the issue of polarisation) was also discussed in the framework of the RAN as well as ESCN (European Strategic Communications Network), and the Commission has given priority to this topic in the recent 2017 call for proposals (ISF-2017-AG-RAD). 
19. a) Frgan om medier och kommunikation har hanterats p olika stt. Den ingick i kommissionens meddelande frn 2005 (kapitel 2.1 Đ Radio och tv). Frgan (srskilt problemet med polarisering) diskuterades ven inom ramen fr RAN-ntverket och det europeiska ntverket fr strategisk kommunikation ESCN, och kommissionen prioriterade nyligen denna frga i sin frslagsinfordran 2017 (ISF-2017-AG-RAD).
Furthermore, the matter was raised in the High Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCEG-R) recommending in its December 2017 interim report for Member States (with the support of the Commission) to examine whether existing tools are sufficient to effectively prevent the spread of violent extremist propaganda via traditional media. (b) The Commission has put in place the necessary measures to address the needs to develop exit strategies. 
Denna frga togs dessutom upp i kommissionens hgnivgrupp av experter p radikalisering (HLCEG-R), som i sin interimsrapport frn december 2017 rekommenderade medlemsstaterna att (med std frn kommissionen) underska huruvida de befintliga verktygen r tillrckliga fr att p ett verkningsfullt stt frebygga spridningen av vldsam extremistpropaganda via traditionella medier. b) Kommissionen har vidtagit ndvndiga tgrder fr att hantera behovet av att ta fram exitstrategier.
Already in the past, the Commission has funded major exit programs under ISEC (Programme Prevention and Fight against Crime), the funding of the European Network of De-radicalisation (ENoD) in 2012-2013 being the most important example. In addition, following the 1 
Kommissionen har redan tidigare finansierat omfattande exitprogram inom programmet Frebyggande och bekmpande av brott, dr finansieringen av ENoD (European 1 Network of De-radicalisation) 2012Đ2013 r det viktigaste exemplet.
adoption of the 2014 Communication on Radicalisation, the Commission invited Member States to include the development of exit strategies as funding priority under their National Programmes. 
Efter antagandet av meddelandet om radikalisering frn 2014 uppmanade kommissionen dessutom medlemsstaterna att inbegripa framtagandet av exitstrategier som en finansieringsprioritet i sina nationella program.
Exit programmes remain a priority and have been included in a call for proposals opened in November 20171. 
Exitprogram r fortfarande en prioritering och ingr i en frslagsinfordran som inleddes i november 20171.
Box 6 In addition to the procedures and mechanisms to facilitate coordination between different funds and initiatives mentioned by the Court of Auditors, coordination also takes place at the broader policy level in particular since 2017 through the Security Union Task Force as well as more specifically the subgroup on radicalisation. 
Ruta 6 Frutom de frfaranden och mekanismer fr att underltta samordning mellan olika medel och initiativ som revisionsrtten nmner, samordnas arbetet ven p en bredare politisk niv, frn 2017 srskilt via arbetsgruppen fr skerhetsunionen, och mer specifikt via dess undergrupp om radikalisering.
The Commission considers that, while a single document increases transparency, even without a consolidated list of EU funded counter radicalisation actions the relevant Commission's services coordinated actions through existing procedures. 
Kommissionen anser att ven om ett gemensamt dokument kar ppenheten, s samordnade kommissionens berrda avdelningar tgrder mot radikalisering via de befintliga frfarandena, ven utan en konsoliderad lista ver tgrder mot radikalisering.