natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
A Commission working paper (Working Paper No 8: The Mid-Term Evaluation of Structural Fund Intervention, 5.12.2000) provided more extensive guidance and more ambitious goals to Member States for the mid-term evaluation. 
I ett arbetsdokument frn kommissionen (arbetsdokument nr 8 Đ Utvrdering efter halva tiden av strukturtgrder, 5.12.2000) gavs utfrligare riktlinjer och uppstlldes ambitisare ml fr medlemsstaternas halvtidsutvrdering.
The working paper set out the evaluation questions and the content of an evaluation report (See box 3). 
I arbetsdokumentet framgick vilka frgor som skulle studeras vid en utvrdering och vad utvrderingsrapporten skulle innehlla (se ruta 3).
Box 3 Role of the MTE according to Working Paper No 8 Ń To assess whether the overall form of assistance remains the appropriate means to address the issues confronting the region or sector. 
Ruta 3 Halvtidsutvrderingens roll enligt kommissionens arbetsdokument nr 8 Ń Att bedma om den vergripande stdformen fortfarande r ett lmpligt instrument fr att hantera regionens eller sektorns problem.
Ń To review whether the strategic axes, priorities and objectives are coherent and still relevant, how far progress has been made towards the achievement of these objectives and the extent to which they can actually be achieved. 
Ń Att granska om strategierna, prioriteringarna och mlen r sammanhngande och fortfarande relevanta, vilka framsteg som har gjorts fr att n dessa ml och i vilken utstrckning de faktiskt kan uppns.
Ń To assess the quantification of objectives, specifically the extent to which they have facilitated monitoring and evaluation. 
Ń Att bedma kvantifieringen av mlen, srskilt i vilken utstrckning de har mjliggjort vervakning och utvrdering.
Ń To assess the extent to which horizontal priorities Ń equal opportunities and the environment in particular Ń have been integrated into the forms of assistance. Ń To analyse the adequacy of the implementation and monitoring arrangements. 
Ń Att bedma i vilken utstrckning de vergripande prioriteringarna Đ srskilt jmstlldhet mellan kvinnor och mn, samt miljn Đ har integrerats i stdformerna.
Ń To present the results against the indicators agreed for the performance reserve. 
Ń Att redogra fr resultaten i frhllande till de indikatorer som valts fr resultatreserven.
Source: Commission Working Document No 8 (pages 4 and 5). 
Klla: Kommissionens arbetsdokument nr 8 (sidorna 4 och 5).
The same Commission Working Paper indicated that the scale of the evaluation (and therefore its cost) should be proportional to the scale of the programme Ń giving the example that macro-economic modelling would be appropriate for large Objective 1 CSFs, but not for small Objectives 2 or 3 programmes. 
I samma arbetsdokument anges att utvrderingens omfattning (och drmed kostnaderna fr den) skall st i proportion till interventionsnivn, och detta belyses genom exemplet att makroekonomiska modeller lmpar sig fr stora ml-1 program som omfattar en gemenskapsstdram, men inte fr sm ml 2-och ml 3-program.
The fees for the evaluation were financed partly from At the end of 2002, almost the entire Berlin totals had Source: Commission Report: ÔThe Mid-Term Evaluation in Objective 1 and 2 Regions Ń Growing Evaluation CapacityŐ Ń November 2004 (page 19). 
Kostnaderna fr utvrderingarna finansierades delvis genom EU-medel. Den slutliga kostnaden I slutet av 2002 hade nstan hela de totalbelopp som Klla: Kommissionens rapport ÓThe Mid-Term Evaluation in objective 1 and 2 Regions Đ Growing Evaluation CapacityÓ, november 2004 (sid 19).
Commission assessment of evaluations 21. 
Kommissionens bedmning av utvrderingarna 21.
Member States, monitoring committees and the Commission all played a role in evaluating the quality of evaluations. 
Medlemsstaterna, vervakningskommitterna och kommissionen var alla delaktiga i utvrderingen av kvaliteten p utvrderingarna.
The Commission had to operate within the ambitious deadlines set by the Regulation and assess the evaluation reports on about 400 programmes simultaneously from January to March 2004. 
Kommissionen var tvungen att hlla sig inom de ambitisa tidsfrister som faststllts i frordningen och bedma utvrderingsrapporterna avseende omkring 400 program samtidigt frn januari till mars 2004.
The Commission hired outside evaluators in addition to its own staff in order to finish the task on time. 
Kommissionen anlitade externa utvrderare utver sin egen personal fr att avsluta arbetet i tid.
5.6.2007 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124/7 22. 
5.6.2007 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 124/7 22.
The Commission review of the findings of evaluators (1), is set out in ÔGrowing Evaluation CapacityŐ. 
Kommissionens granskning av utvrderarnas granskningsresultat (1), beskrivs i ÓGrowing Evaluation CapacityÓ.
This led to recommendations which were purely finance-driven, rather than reviewing the strategic implications of such reallocations (2). 
Detta ledde till rekommendationer som var rent ekonomiskt inriktade snarare n att vara inriktade p de strategiska implikationerna av sdana omfrdelningar (2).
Assessment by the Court 23. 
Revisionsrttens bedmning 23.
In its audit, the Court identified a number of problems faced by, and difficulties identified by, evaluators in giving a clear answer as to whether the overall form of assistance remained appropriate to address the issues confronting the region or sector, and whether objectives could be achieved. 
Vid granskningen identifierade revisionsrtten ett antal problem som utvrderarna stlldes infr och svrigheter de konstaterade nr det gllde att ge ett tydligt svar p om den vergripande stdformen fortfarande r ett lmpligt stt att hantera problemen i en region eller sektor, och om mlen kunde uppfyllas.
Ń All evaluators had to cope with the problem that only limited spending had been made at the time of evaluation. 
Ń Alla utvrderare var tvungna att hantera problemet med att medlen endast utnyttjats i begrnsad utstrckning vid tiden fr utvrderingen.
(1) At the draft stage, the Commission assessed one third of the reports as good or excellent. 
(1) Pfrslagsstadietbedmdekommissionenentredjedelavrapporterna som bra eller utmrkta. Bedmningen av slutrapporten var mycket mer positiv.
The assessment of the final report was much more positive: two-thirds of the reports were assessed as good or excellent. 
Tv tredjedelar av rapporterna bedmdes vara bra eller utmrkta.
Where weaknesses were identified, the main cause was that evaluators were stretched by: Ń the number of evaluation questions; Ń the number of projects involved; Ń the complexity of some large programmes, and the limited resources of some evaluators. 
Om brister ptrffades var den frmsta orsaken att utvrderarna var pressade av Ń antalet utvrderingsfrgor, Ń antalet projekt, Ń komplexiteten i vissa stora program, och vissa utvrderares begrnsade resurser.
(2) Growing Evaluation Capacity, European Commission, November 2004 (page 35). 
(2) Growing Evaluation Capacity, Europeiska kommissionen, november 2004 (s. 35).
Ń Almost half of the evaluators of the programmes which the Court examined identified important issues of concern linked to concrete development needs and proposed stronger emphasis on certain policy fields, especially linked to the Lisbon and Gothenburg strategies. 
Ń Nstan hlften av utvrderarna av de program som revisionsrtten granskade pvisade viktiga frgor som hade att gra med konkreta utvecklingsbehov, och freslog tydligare betoning p vissa politikomrden, srskilt dem som hnger samman med strategierna frn Lissabon och Gteborg.
Ń Other evaluators drew attention to the intrinsic difficulty of evaluation, such as the difficulty of determining the impact of additional investment in road construction or of establishing the impact of ESF intervention on net employment levels. 
Ń Andra utvrderare uppmrksammade utvrderingens inneboende svrigheter, till exempel att det var svrt att avgra effekten av stdfinansierade investeringar i vgbyggen eller att faststlla ESF-tgrdens effekt p nettoniverna av sysselsttning.
For example commenting on investment in roads, the German evaluator suggested that further investment in economies with good existing infrastructure provision could even lead to slower growth than without it (3). 
Till exempel menade den tyska utvrderaren i sin kommentar till vginvesteringarna att stdfinansierade investeringar i ekonomier med god befintlig infrastrukturfrsrj-ning till och med kunde leda till lngsammare tillvxt n om detta std inte gavs (3).
The evaluators for the UK and Gibraltar programmes commented that, when considering the employment impact of the ESF, only gross job creation could be monitored. 
Utvrderarna av programmen i Frenade kungariket och Gibraltar kommenterade att endast bruttoantalet skapade arbetstillfllen kunde vervakas vid bedmningen av ESF:s effekt p sysselsttningen.
The CommissionŐs summary report ÔGrowing Evaluation CapacityŐ gave less attention to these problems and difficulties, than to more positive evaluation outcomes. 
Kommissionens sammanfattande rapport ÓGrowing Evaluation CapacityÓ tog inte upp dessa problem och svrigheter i lika stor utstrckning som positivare utvrderingsresultat.
Some evaluators were also able to identify significant problems in the way programmes were operating. 
Vissa utvrderare kunde ocks identifiera vsentliga problem nr det gller hur programmen fungerade.
For example: Ń the evaluator of the Italian OP PONSIL (financial aid for enterprises) estimated a deadweight (4) effect of 50 %; Ń in the UK, evaluators commented that the programme had had only very modest success in securing sizeable net movements of individuals into the labour market who were previously outside it, and noted that ESF support tended to reinforce existing patterns of training within companies, in which well-qualified individuals generally received more training; However the report also stated that the programme had been ÔdisproportionatelyŐ successful in helping the most disadvantaged beneficiaries find work; Ń the evaluators of the Austrian Burgenland operational programme observed that the N + 2 rule encouraged higher spending rather than effective allocation; Ń where evaluators used a macroeconomic model (Germany, Spain, Portugal and Italy) estimates of the impact of the funds (in particular on GDP growth) were often significantly reduced as compared with the ex ante appraisal, suggesting that programmes were unlikely to meet their objectives; (3) There are a number of empirical studies and evaluations showing these effects. 
Till exempel konstaterades fljande: Ń Utvrderaren av det italienska operativa programmet Ponsil (ekonomiskt std till fretag) uppskattade en ddviktseffekt (4) p 50 %. Ń I Frenade kungariket kommenterade utvrderarna att programmet endast hade haft mycket blygsam framgng nr det gller att skerstlla betydande nettorrelser till arbetsmarknaden av personer som tidigare stod utanfr arbetsmarknaden, och noterade att ESF-stdet tenderade att frstrka fort-bildningsmnster inom fretag som innebar att vlkvalificerade personer ver lag fick mer fortbildning.
In general, there is insufficient data with regard to the real needs, including the kind of infrastructure in order to optimise the effects of the Structural funds. 
I allmnhet finns det otillrckliga uppgifter om de verkliga behoven, inklusive vilken typ av infrastruktur som behvs fr att det skall g att optimera strukturfondernas effekt.
(4) A ÔdeadweightŐ effect exists where an activity or investment would have been undertaken in the absence of financing. 
(4) En ÓddviktseffektÓ uppstr nr en verksamhet eller investering skulle ha genomfrts ven utan stdfinansiering.
C 124/8 EN Official Journal of the European Union 5.6.2007 Ń out of the 25 selected CSFs, OPs and SPDs more than half of the MTEs noted weaknesses with regard to project selection and the integration of horizontal principles such as the environment, equal opportunities and the information society. 
C 124/8 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 5.6.2007 Ń I ver hlften av halvtidsutvrderingarna av de 25 utvalda stdramarna, operativa programmen och samlade programdokumenten konstaterades brister nr det gller urvalet av projekt och integreringen av vergripande principer som milj, lika mjligheter och informationssamhllet.
In many cases the evaluations however only described weaknesses without proposing operational recommendations. performance reserve: effectiveness, the quality of management and financial implementation. Performance assessment was to be based on monitoring indicators measuring the mid-term results in relation to their specific initial targets. 
I mnga fall beskrev dock utvrderingarna endast brister utan att fresl ngra konkreta rekommendationer. bedmas mot kriterierna fr frdelning av resultatreserven: ndamlsenlighet (ÓmluppfyllelseÓ i arbetsdokument 4, vers. anm.), frvaltning och finansiellt genomfrande.
The CommissionŐs working paper included examples of indicators (2) to be taken into account in carrying out the review of performance. 
I kommissionens arbetsdokument gavs exempel p indikatorer (2) som skulle beaktas vid versynen av resultatet.
For effectiveness: Ń a basket of some outputs covering at least half the value of the programme; Ń comparison of actual and planned results for employment (temporary/permanent jobs created or maintained) or employability of target groups. 
Nr det gller ndamlsenlighet (mluppfyllelse): Ń Ett urval faktiska aktiviteter som omfattar minst halva programmets vrde. Ń Jmfrelse av faktiska sysselsttningseffekter med dem som planerats (tillflliga/fasta jobb som skapats eller bevarats) eller mlgruppernas anstllbarhet.
For management: Ń four types of indicators, measuring monitoring, financial control, project selection and evaluation systems. 
Nr det gller frvaltning: Ń Fyra sorters indikatorer som mter vervakning, finansiell kontroll, projekturval och utvrderingssystem.
Assessments by Member States and allocation of the performance reserve 30. 
F RDELNING AV RESULTATRESERVEN 28.
Member States were required to evaluate performance for a period when on average only 20 % of expenditure had been undertaken. 
Medlemsstaterna skulle utvrdera resultaten fr en period nr i genomsnitt endast 20 % av stdet hade utnyttjats.
Some evaluators drew attention to this problem. 
Vissa utvrderare framfrde detta problem.
For example, the Italian evaluator pointed out that it was too early to carry out a general analysis of effectiveness. 
Till exempel pekade den italienska utvrderaren p att det var fr tidigt att gra en vergripande analys av ndamlsenligheten.
There were however significant differences in the speed with which programme priorities could be implemented. 
Det fanns dock betydande skillnader nr det gller hur snabbt programprioriteringarna kunde genomfras.
Overall, the programmes examined by the Court showed faster spending at mid-term for physical infrastructure than for some priorities and measures related to the Lisbon and Gothenburg objectives. 
I de program som revisionsrtten granskade var ver lag utnyttjandet efter halva tiden snabbare nr det gller fysisk infrastruktur n nr det gller vissa prioriteringar och tgrder som hnger samman med Lissabon-och Gteborgmlen.
Member States tried to assess performance against indicators, though the process was handicapped by the limitations of some of the indicators developed in the ex ante assessment of 2000-2006 programmes. 
Medlemsstaterna frskte bedma resultat mot indikatorer, men processen frsvrades genom begrnsningarna hos vissa av de indikatorer som tagits fram under frhandsbedmningen av programmen 2000Đ2006.
For example, for the German and Italian programmes, effectiveness was only monitored through output indicators (3). 
I till exempel de tyska och italienska programmen vervakades ndamlsenligheten endast genom indikatorer fr aktiviteter (3).
(2) These indicators are related: financial absorption and output are strongly correlated. 
(2) Indikatorernarinbrdesberoende:Detfinnsettstarktsambandmel-lan aktiviteterna och frmgan att utnyttja medlen.
(3) TheCourtŐsSpecialReportNo7/2003pointedoutthatinpractice,the performance reserve entailed a complex procedure for reallocating funds, and could lead to inconsistencies and ineffectiveness in the use of the reserve. 
(3) I revisionsrttens srskilda rapport nr 7/2003 ppekas att resultatreserven i praktiken medfrde ett komplext frfarande fr omfrdelning av medel och kunde leda till inkonsekvent och ineffektivt anvndande av reserven.
5.6.2007 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 124/9 32. 
5.6.2007 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 124/9 32.
Member StatesŐ proposals for allocation of the performance reserve were based on the criteria listed in paragraph 29 above. 
Medlemsstaternas frslag till frdelning av resultatreserven grundades p de kriterier som rknas upp i punkt 29.
In the case of the Spanish, Portuguese and Irish Community Support Frameworks, Member States went further and assessed performance by reference to a wider set of indicators than recommended by the Commission. 
Nr det gller de spanska, portugisiska och irlndska gemenskapsstdramarna gick medlemsstaterna nnu lngre och bedmde resultat i frhllande till en strre uppsttning indikatorer n dem som rekommenderats av kommissionen.
Nevertheless, Member StatesŐ proposals for the allocation of the performance reserve were significantly constrained by a perceived need to maximise absorption of EU funds. 
Medlemsstaternas frslag till frdelning av resultatreserven begrnsades dock betydligt genom att de uppfattade det som att utnyttjandet av EU-medlen mste maximeras.
The Commission itself emphasised the importance of absorption. 
Kommissionen betonade sjlv vikten av utnyttjande.
For example, in a Commission note of 16 October 2003 to the members of the CDCR Ôpreparation for the allocation of the performance reserveŐ, communicated also to the Member States, it was stressed that Ôthe Commission will pay particular attention to the absorption of funds in the case of significant losses under the N + 2 mechanism and the quality of the mid-term evaluation (1).Ő Examples include the following: Ń the German transport OP aimed to spend approximately equal amounts on road and rail. 
I kommissionens meddelande till ledamterna av kommittn fr utveckling och omstllning av regioner av den 16 oktober 2003 om frberedelsen fr frdelningen av resultatreserven, som ven sndes till medlemsstaterna, betonades till exempel att kommissionen kommer att gna srskild uppmrksamhet t utnyttjandet av medlen (i fall av vsentliga frluster i samband med N + 2-mekanismen) och t kvaliteten p halvtidsutvrderingen (1).
When submitting the proposal to the Commission, the managing authority stated that the performance reserve was not employed in line with environmental or transport policy objectives, but according to progress in spending; Ń SPD Runion: Some environmental and equal opportunities measures did not receive any allocation of the performance reserve. 
Nr frslaget lmnades in till kommissionen konstaterade frvaltningsmyndigheten att resultatreserven inte hade anvnts i enlighet med de miljpolitiska och transportpolitiska mlen utan i frhllande till utnyttjande.
The managing authority underlined that it was in some cases difficult to reconcile certain Community objectives with the need to spend funds; Ń the proposal of Brandenburg, Germany, made mainly in the light of the analysis of absorption, excluded environmental investment measures from the allocation. 
Frvaltningsmyndigheten understrk att det i vissa fall var svrt att frena vissa gemenskapsml med behovet av att utnyttja medlen.
The evaluators of the programme also concluded that the CommissionŐs indicators were rather based on absorption than on effectiveness. 
Utvrderarna av programmet drog ocks slutsatsen att kommissionens indikatorer snarare var baserade p utnyttjandefrmga n p ndamlsenlighet.
In addition there were several allocations of the performance reserve exclusively to the ERDF, mainly on the grounds of absorption, for example in Germany (OP Saxony), Ireland (the performance reserve of all Irish OPs was entirely allocated to one ERDF financed programme), Italy (OP Sviluppo Imprenditoriale Locale) and some Objective 2 Austrian, German, French, and Spanish and UK OPs. 
Dessutom gjordes flera av frdelningarna av resultatreserven endast till ERUF, frmst p grundval av utnyttjandefr-mga, till exempel i Tyskland (operativt program Sachsen), Irland (hela resultatreserven fr alla de irlndska operativa programmen frdelades till ett ERUF-finansierat program), Italien (operativt program ÓSviluppo Imprenditoriale LocaleÓ) och vissa operativa program inom ml 2 i sterrike, Tyskland, Frankrike, Spanien och Frenade kungariket.
The time-table for allocation of the performance reserve was tight. 
Tidsramen fr frdelning av resultatreserven var snv.
The proposals were received in January 2004 and agreement in principle had to be concluded by early February. 
Frslagen togs emot i januari 2004 och verenskommelserna skulle i princip vara slutna i brjan av februari.
(1) In one case, the Dutch Objective 3 programme, the Commission had no option other than to allocate the performance reserve despite the fact that significant decommitments had already taken place because funds had not been spent. 
(1) I ett fall Đ det nederlndska ml 3-programmet Đ hade kommissionen inget annat val n att frdela resultatreserven trots att omfattande tertaganden redan hade gjorts eftersom medlen inte hade utnyttjats.
Some use was made of the performance reserve to allocate money to programmes on the basis of effectiveness and quality of management. 
Ibland anvndes resultatreserven fr att frdela pengar till program p grundval av frvaltningens ndamlsenlighet och kvalitet.
Overall, however, the performance reserve was primarily used to maximise spending rather than to concentrate spending on activities which were assessed as particularly effective. 
Resultatreserven anvndes generellt sett frmst till att maximera stdet snarare n till att fokusera stdet p verksamheter som bedmdes som srskilt ndamlsenliga.
IMPACT OF MID-TERM REVISION 37. 
HALVTIDS VERSYNENS EFFEKT 37.
The 2000-2006 reform of the Structural Funds modified and strengthened the FundsŐ objectives. 
Genom reformen av strukturfonderna 2000Đ2006 ndrades och strktes fondernas ml.
The intention was to promote growth and employment in a way which took account of and combined interrelated economic, social and environmental policy objectives (2). 
Avsikten var att frmja tillvxt och sysselsttning och samtidigt ta hnsyn till och kombinera sammanlnkade ekonomiska, sociala och miljpolitiska ml (2).
In particular, expenditure from the funds was to take account of new technologies and innovation, research, the information society, clean and efficient use of energy (including renewable energy), better protection of the environment, social inclusion and life-long learning. 
I synnerhet skulle stdet frn fonderna ta hnsyn till ny teknik och innovation, forskning, informationssamhllet, ren och effektiv energianvndning (inklusive frnybar energi), miljskydd, social integration och livslngt lrande.
Allocation of the performance reserve and shifts of funds following the mid-term revision had to take account of the programming principles set out in the CommissionŐs programming guidelines (3). 
Vid frdelningen av resultatreserven och verfringen av medel efter halvtidsversynen var man tvungen att ta hnsyn till de principer fr programplanering som faststlldes i kommissionens riktlinjer fr programplaneringen (3).
The Commission however issued its revised programming guidelines only in August 2003. 
Kommissionen presenterade dock inte sina reviderade riktlinjer fr programplanering frrn i augusti 2003.