natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission has not monitored the relocation process in the countries receiving migrants since February 2018. 
Kommissionen har inte vervakat omplaceringsprocessen i de lnder som tar emot migranter sedan februari 2018.
The temporary relocation schemes expired in September 2017 and no consensus has yet been reached on the CommissionŐs proposal for a permanent relocation system. 
De tillflliga omplaceringsmekanismerna lpte ut i september 2017 och nnu har ingen samsyn ntts gllande kommissionens frslag om ett permanent omplaceringssystem.
In the absence of an agreed relocation mechanism at the EU level, voluntary relocation is taking place on an ad hoc basis, mainly for migrants who disembarked in Italy and Malta (paragraphs 48 to 53). 
D det saknas en verenskommen omplaceringsmekanism p EU-niv avgrs frivilliga omplaceringar frn fall till fall, huvudsakligen fr migranter som anlnt till Italien och Malta (punkterna 48Đ53).
Recommendation 1 Đ Use lessons learned to build on experience for any possible voluntary relocation mechanism in the future The Commission should use the lessons learned from the emergency relocation schemes (including from the situation in the receiving Member State after relocation) and build on this experience for any possible voluntary relocation mechanism in the future. 
Rekommendation 1 Đ Dra lrdom av erfarenheterna infr en eventuell framtida mekanism fr frivillig omplacering Kommissionen br dra lrdom av erfarenheterna frn omplaceringsmekanismen fr ndsituationer (ven frn situationen i mottagarmedlemsstaten efter omplacering) och anvnda dem fr en eventuell framtida mekanism fr frivillig omplacering.
Timeframe: 31 December 2020 153 AMIF EMAS was originally designed as a small-scale instrument to address urgent and specific emergency needs. The increase in EMAS funding helped to make the CommissionŐs crisis support more flexible and responsive. 
Tidsram: 31 december 2020 153 Amifs katastrofbistnd utformades ursprungligen som ett smskaligt instrument fr att tgrda brdskande och srskilda behov i ndsituationer. kningen av katastrofbistndet bidrog till att gra kommissionens krisstd mer flexibelt och lyhrt.
It has become the CommissionŐs key strategic instrument for rebalancing support towards the countries most affected by the migration crisis, particularly Greece, through complementing their national programme envelopes. 
Det har blivit kommissionens viktigaste strategiska instrument fr att balansera om stdet till de lnder som drabbats vrst av migrationskrisen, i synnerhet Grekland, genom att komplettera anslagen till deras nationella program.
This shift occurred without establishing a performance-monitoring framework. 
Detta skifte gde rum utan att ngon prestationsmtningsram upprttats.
The Commission has proposed including emergency assistance under shared management with Member States in the new financial framework 2021-2027 (paragraphs 54 to 64). 
Kommissionen har freslagit att katastrofbistnd ska inkluderas under delad frvaltning med medlemsstaterna inom den nya budgetramen 2021Đ2027 (punkterna 54Đ64).
154 Of the six EMAS projects examined, only two achieved their targets in full, three met their targets partially and one is still in the early stage of implementation. (paragraphs 65 to 66). 
154 Av de sex projekt inom katastrofbistndet som undersktes hade enbart tv uppntt sina mlvrden till fullo, tre ndde delvis sina mlvrden och ett befinner sig fortfarande i ett tidigt skede i genomfrandet (punkterna 65Đ66). 72
155 All ten examined projects under the AMIF NPs are relevant. 
155 Samtliga tio underskta projekt inom ramen fr Amifs nationella program r relevanta.
The AMIF NP is a multiannual funding instrument but robust multiannual strategic planning mechanisms are not yet in place in Greece and Italy to ensure that funds are allocated where needed the most (paragraphs 67 to 72). 
Amifs nationella program r ett flerrigt finansieringsinstrument, men gedigna flerriga och strategiska planeringsmekanismer har nnu inte upprttats i Grekland och Italien som ska skerstlla att medlen ansls dit de behvs mest (punkterna 67Đ72).
156 Of the five completed AMIF NP projects examined, none has achieved its targets fully: three achieved their targets partially, one did not achieve its objectives and, for the last, the data was not sufficient to assess progress. 
156 Av de fem avslutade projekten inom ramen fr Amifs nationella program har inget fullt ut ntt sina mlvrden: tre uppndde delvis sina mlvrden, ett uppndde inte sina ml och fr det sista fanns det inte tillrckliga uppgifter fr att vi skulle kunna bedma vilka framsteg som gjorts.
The remaining five projects were ongoing at the time of the audit (paragraphs 73 to 75). 
De terstende fem projekten pgick vid tidpunkten fr revisionen (punkterna 73Đ75).
157 The AMIF performance monitoring framework was set up late and without targets. 
157 Amifs prestationsmtningsram upprttades sent och utan mlvrden.
During the course of the audit, it became apparent that more performance data was needed to facilitate a robust policy evaluation at the EU level (paragraphs 76 to 82). 
Under revisionen blev det uppenbart att det behvdes mer prestationsuppgifter fr att underltta en grundlig politisk utvrdering p EU-niv (punkterna 76Đ82).
Recommendation 2 Đ Strengthen the management of AMIF emergency assistance and national programmes The Commission should: (a) define criteria for allocating EMAS funds under shared management with Member States in the next financial framework; (b) strengthen the performance-monitoring framework by: (i) ensuring that AMIF EMAS projects contain output and outcome indicators with clear targets and baselines where appropriate, and justifying when this is not the case; (ii) monitoring and reporting the outcomes achieved by EMAS-funded projects; (iii) for the new MFF 2021-2027, designing the AMIF CMEF indicators, including their baselines and targets before the 2021-2027 projects start; (c) implement measures to ensure complementarity and better coordination between AMIF and EASO/Frontex (e.g. in the area of forced returns or support to asylum authorities). 
Rekommendation 2 Đ Strk frvaltningen av Amifs program fr katastrofbistnd och nationella program Kommissionen br gra fljande: a) Faststlla kriterier fr frdelningen av medel fr katastrofbistnd under delad frvaltning med medlemsstaterna i nsta budgetram. b) Strka prestationsmtningsramen genom att i) se till att Amif-projekt fr katastrofbistnd har outputoch utfallsindikatorer med tydliga ml-och utgngsvrden nr s r lmpligt och motivera nr detta inte r fallet, ii) vervaka och rapportera om utfallet fr Emas-finansierade projekt, iii) fr den nya flerriga budgetramen fr 2021Đ2027 utforma indikatorer fr Amifs gemensamma vervaknings-och utvrderingsram som har utgngs-och mlvrden, innan projekten inleds fr perioden 2021Đ2027. c) Vidta tgrder fr att skerstlla komplementaritet och bttre samordning mellan Amif och Easo/Frontex (t.ex. nr det gller ofrivilliga tervndanden eller std till asylmyndigheter).
Timeframe: 30 June 2021 67 
Tidsram: 30 juni 2021 73
The situation is gradually improving in 2019 (paragraphs 83 to 89). 
Situationen frbttras gradvis under 2019 (punkterna 83Đ89).
159 While the shortage of Member State experts is compensated by interim service providers, the short duration of expertsŐ deployment remains an issue. 
159 Samtidigt som bristen p experter frn medlemsstaterna kompenseras genom tillfrordnade tjnsteleverantrer r experternas korta utstationeringstid fortsatt ett problem.
EASO operations in the Greek hotspots are affected by security issues, a lack of working space, disagreements on vulnerability assessments with GAS and the systematic overturning of non-admissibility decisions for non-Syrians by GAS (paragraphs 90 to 93). 
Easos insatser vid de grekiska mottagningscentrumen pverkas av skerhetsproblem, brist p arbetsutrymme, meningsskiljaktigheter med den grekiska asylmyndigheten rrande srbarhetsanalyser samt den grekiska asylmyndighetens systematiska upphvande av beslut om nekad prvning fr icke-syrier (punkterna 90Đ 93).
Recommendation 3 Đ Enhance EASOŐs operational support to asylum procedures EASO should: (a) adjust its expert deployment model to make it more predictable given the permanent shortage of Member State experts; (b) complete its performance-monitoring frameworks for Greece and Italy by adding outcome indicators, baselines and targets, and collecting the relevant performance data on all indicators; (c) work with GAS on overcoming disagreements concerning the vulnerability assessments and admissibility of non-Syrians in the fast-track border procedure. 
Rekommendation 3 Đ Frbttra Easos operativa std till asylfrfaranden Easo br a) anpassa sin modell fr utstationering av experter s att den blir mer frutsgbar med tanke p den permanenta bristen p experter frn medlemsstaterna, b) komplettera sina prestationsmtningsramar fr Grekland och Italien genom att lgga till utfallsindikatorer, utgngs-och mlvrden, och samla in relevanta prestationsuppgifter fr alla indikatorer, c) samarbeta med den grekiska asylmyndigheten fr att finna samsyn rrande srbarhetsanalyserna och rtten till prvning fr icke-syrier i det pskyndade grnsfrfarandet.
Timeframe: 31 December 2020 160 Greece and Italy are among the Member States that have not taken full advantage of FrontexŐs return potential (extended mandate and increased budget). 
Tidsram: 31 december 2020 160 Grekland och Italien tillhr de medlemsstater som inte har dragit full nytta av Frontex tervndandepotential (frlngt mandat och kad budget).
Apart from the low number of returnees, the existence of two parallel EU-funding instruments supporting the same type of activities (forced returns funded under AMIF national programmes and Frontex operations) explains the situation (paragraphs 94 to 101). 68 
Frutom det lga antalet tervndande personer frklaras situationen av att det finns tv parallella EU-finansieringsinstrument som stder samma typ av insatser (ofrivilliga tervndanden som finansieras genom Amifs nationella program och Frontex insatser) (punkterna 94Đ 101). 74
Recommendation 4 Đ Adjust FrontexŐs return support and expertsŐ deployment in the hotspots Frontex should: (a) work with the Commission to ensure complementarity and better coordination between Frontex and AMIF-funded return support; (b) in the context of the low number of return operations in Greece, no longer deploy single-profile escorts who cannot be deployed for hotspot operations; (c) adjust the operating plan to make the hotspot staff deployment (including of fingerprinting experts) in Italy more responsive to sea arrival patterns. 
Rekommendation 4 Đ Anpassa Frontex tervndandestd och utstationeringen av experter till mottagningscentrum Frontex br gra fljande: a) Samarbeta med kommissionen fr att skerstlla komplementaritet och bttre samordning mellan det std vid tervndande som finansieras av Frontex och det std som finansieras av Amif, b) mot bakgrund av det lga antalet tervndandeinsatser i Grekland inte lngre utstationera ledsagare med en profil som gr att de inte kan utstationeras fr mottagningsarbete, c) anpassa verksamhetsplanen fr att gra utstationeringen av personal till mottagningscentrum (inbegripet fingeravtrycksspecialister) i Italien mer flexibel i frhllande till antalet personer som anlnder sjvgen.
Timeframe: 31 December 2020 161 Over the course of the crisis, most irregular migrants coming to Europe have arrived in either Italy or Greece. 
Tidsram: 31 december 2020 161 Under krisen har de flesta irreguljra migranter som kommit till Europa anlnt till antingen Italien eller Grekland.
The two Member States have evolved from countries of transit to countries where migrants apply for asylum (paragraph 103). 
De tv medlemsstaterna har utvecklats frn att vara transitlnder till att vara lnder dr migranter sker asyl (punkt 103).
162 In Greece, GASŐ processing capacity has increased since 2015, but it is still not sufficient to tackle the increasing backlog of pending asylum applications. 
162 I Grekland har den grekiska asylmyndighetens handlggningskapacitet kat sedan 2015, men den r fortfarande inte tillrcklig fr att hantera den allt strre efterslpningen av pgende asylanskningar.
The EU-Turkey statement has had a major impact on arrivals but its cornerstone, the fast-track border procedure, is not swift enough. 
Uttalandet frn EU och Turkiet har haft stor inverkan p antalet nyanlnda, men dess hrnsten, det pskyndade grnsfrfarandet, r inte tillrckligt snabbt.
For the regular and accelerated procedures, the situation is even more problematic with interview dates set for as late as 2023 and 2021 respectively. 
Fr de reguljra och pskyndade frfarandena r situationen n mer problematisk, och intervjudatum har satts till s sent som 2023 respektive 2021.
A large caseload of negative first-instance decisions is moving to the appeals stage, which is lacking support and is already overloaded (paragraphs 104 to 118). 
Mnga renden med avslagsbeslut i frsta instans gr vidare till verklagandeetappen, som saknar std och redan r verbelastad (punkterna 104Đ118).
163 In the context of the sharp decrease in arrivals and asylum applications, ItalyŐs current processing capacity at first instance is sufficient. 
163 Mot bakgrund av den kraftiga minskningen av nyanlnda och asylanskningar r Italiens nuvarande handlggningskapacitet i frsta instans tillrcklig.
The existing substantial backlog is expected to be cleared by the end of 2019. 
De mnga renden som fr nrvarande slpar efter frvntas vara behandlade i slutet av 2019.
However, this is expected to result in heavy pressure on the appeal authorities. 
Detta frvntas dock leda till stora pfrestningar fr verklagandemyndigheterna.
It took over 4 years for an asylum application lodged in 2015 to reach the final appeal stage. 
Det tog mer n fyra r fr en asylanskan som lmnades in 2015 att n sista verklagandeinstans.
Without adequate support, this lengthy time frame could further increase in the future (paragraphs 119 to 129). 69 
Utan tillrckligt std skulle denna utdragna period kunna bli nnu lngre i framtiden (punkterna 119Đ129). 75
Recommendation 5 Đ Reinforce the management of the national asylum systems The Commission and EASO, in cooperation with the national authorities, should: (a) further increase their support to GAS in clearing the rising backlog at first instance; (b) provide support to the overloaded appeal authorities in Greece and Italy, while avoiding potential conflicts of interest for EASO in Greece; (c) propose measures allowing for the systematic collection of performance data on processing times (disaggregated by the type of procedure and key milestones) and on backlogs (disaggregated by key milestones, including different stages of appeal) to facilitate policymaking and performance evaluation, as well as to monitor compliance with EU legislation. 
Rekommendation 5 Đ Frstrk frvaltningen av de nationella asylsystemen Kommissionen och Easo br i samarbete med de nationella myndigheterna a) ytterligare ka sitt std till den grekiska asylmyndigheten fr att behandla de mnga renden som slpar efter i frsta instans, b) tillhandahlla std till de verbelastade verklagandemyndigheterna i Grekland och Italien och samtidigt undvika potentiella intressekonflikter fr Easo i Grekland, c) fresl tgrder som gr det mjligt att systematiskt samla in prestationsuppgifter om handlggningstider (uppdelade efter typ av frfarande och viktiga milstolpar) och om renden som slpar efter (uppdelade efter viktiga milstolpar, inbegripet olika verklagandeetapper) fr att underltta beslutsfattande och prestationsutvrdering, samt fr att vervaka efterlevnaden av EU:s lagstiftning.
Timeframe: 31 December 2020 164 There were far fewer actual returns than return decisions from both countries and the EU overall. 
Tidsram: 31 december 2020 164 Antalet faktiska tervndanden var mycket lgre n antalet tervndandebeslut frn bda lnderna och EU som helhet.
We identified a number of reasons for this (paragraphs 130 to 139). 
Vi identifierade ett antal anledningar till detta (punkterna 130Đ139).
165 Assisted voluntary return and reintegration is affected by the lack of a harmonised approach within the EU. 
165 Bistndet till frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning pverkas av att det saknas en harmoniserad strategi inom EU.
We found structural weaknesses with the AVRR in Italy. 
Vi fann strukturella svagheter inom bistndet till frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning i Italien.
The AVRR programme in Greece is achieving its objectives, but the reintegration package is offered to only 26 % of applicants. 
Programmet fr frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning i Grekland nr sina ml, men teranpassningspaketet erbjuds endast till 26 % av de skande.
A dedicated AVRR accommodation facility is an example of good practice increasing the attractiveness of the scheme (paragraphs 140 to 144). 
En srskild inkvarteringsanlggning fr frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning r ett exempel p god praxis som gr systemet mer attraktivt (punkterna 140Đ144).
166 No data is collected on the swiftness of return procedures. 
166 Inga uppgifter samlas in om hur snabbt tervndandefrfaranden genomfrs.
Moreover, there are no indicators measuring the sustainability of returns, such as the number of returned migrants who attempt to come back to the EU or the success of AVRR reintegration packages (paragraphs 145). 70 
Vidare finns inga indikatorer som mter tervndandenas varaktighet, till exempel antalet migranter som har tervnt men frsker komma tillbaka till EU eller hur framgngsrika stdpaketen vid frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning r (punkt 145). 76
Recommendation 6 Đ Support further national return procedures The Commission, in cooperation with national authorities, should: (a) provide, together with Frontex, further support to address the causes for low returns in Greece and Italy identified in this report, focusing on low returns from the Greek islands and the AVRR in Italy; (b) take measures to ensure that the existing agreements with third countries to return third country nationals such as the Cotonou agreement and EU readmission agreements, are enforced by third countries and fully used by the Member States; (c) foster a coordinated approach in the EU for reintegration assistance in third countries of return; (d) propose measures to allow for the systematic collection of performance data on the swiftness and sustainability of return procedures to facilitate policymaking, performance evaluation and research. 
Rekommendation 6 Đ Ge mer std till nationella tervndandefrfaranden Kommissionen br i samarbete med de nationella myndigheterna gra fljande: a) Tillsammans med Frontex tillhandahlla mer std till hantering av orsakerna till det lga antal tervndanden i Grekland och Italien som identifierats i denna rapport och fokusera p det lga antalet tervndanden frn de grekiska arna och p bistndet till frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning i Italien. b) Vidta tgrder fr att skerstlla att de befintliga avtalen med tredjelnder fr tervndande av tredjelandsmedborgare, ssom Cotonouavtalet och EU:s tertagandeavtal, tillmpas av tredjelnder och anvnds fullt ut av medlemsstaterna. c) Frmja en samordnad strategi inom EU fr teranpassningsstd i tredjelnder. d) Fresl tgrder fr att systematiskt samla in prestationsuppgifter om tervndandefrfarandenas snabbhet och varaktighet i syfte att underltta beslutsfattande, prestationsutvrdering och forskning.
Timeframe: 31 December 2020 This Report was adopted by Chamber III, headed by Mrs Bettina Jakobsen, Member of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 22 October 2019. 
Tidsram: 31 december 2020 Denna rapport antogs av revisionsrttens avdelning III, med ledamoten Bettina Jakobsen som ordfrande, vid dess sammantrde i Luxemburg den 22 oktober 2019.
For the Court of Auditors Klaus-Heiner Lehne President 71 
Fr revisionsrtten Klaus-Heiner Lehne ordfrande 77
Annexes Annex I - Financial implementation (in million euros) AMIF EMAS: Source: EU Commission based on published Annual Work Programmes. 
Bilagor Bilaga I Đ Finansiellt genomfrande (i miljoner euro) Amifs katastrofbistnd (EMAS): Klla: Kommissionen, p grundval av offentliggjorda rliga arbetsprogram.
AMIF NP Greece: (*) Total AMIF NP allocation for Greece is Ű328,3 million (including solidarity and technical assistance). (**) Calculated based on multi annual planning of commitments in the National programme. 
Greklands nationella program som finansieras via Amif: * Det totala anslaget till Grekland inom ramen fr Amifs nationella program r 328,3 miljoner euro (inbegripet solidaritet och tekniskt bistnd). ** Berknat p den flerriga planeringen av taganden i det nationella programmet.
Source: AMIF Responsible Authority, Greece. 
Klla: AnsvarigmyndighetfrAmif,Grekland.
Source: AMIF Responsible Authority, Italy. 
Klla: AnsvarigmyndighetfrAmif,Italien.
The 2016 initial and amended budget figures cover the entire operational support including other countries and horizontal costs. 
De ursprungliga och ndrade budgetsiffrorna fr 2016 omfattar hela det operativa stdet, inbegripet andra lnder och vergripande kostnader.
Source: EASO. 
Klla: Easo.
73 Budget line 18 02 03, Return support 2015 2016 2017 2018 Initial budget 9.5 66.6 66.6 53.8 Latest amended budget 13.2 38.5 53.1 49.4 Executed regular budget commitments 13.2 38.5 53.1 49.4 Unused initial budget 0.0 28.1 13.5 4.4 
Budgetrubrik 18 02 03, std vid tervndande 2015 2016 2017 2018 Ursprunglig budget 9,5 66,6 66,6 53,8 Senast ndrade budget 13,2 38,5 53,1 49,4 Genomfrda ordinarie budgettaganden 13,2 38,5 53,1 49,4 Outnyttjad ursprunglig budget 0,0 28,1 13,5 4,4
Annex III - Follow up of the recommendations on hotspot approach 75 Recommendation Status Comments 1.1. 
Bilaga III Đ Uppfljning av rekommendationerna om systemet med mottagningscentrum (hotspots) 81 Rekommendation Status Kommentar 1.1.
The Commission, together with the relevant Agencies, should provide further support to Greece in addressing the lack of capacity at the hotspots through: - upgrading the accommodation facilities on the islands where hotspots are located; - further speeding up the processing of asylum applications (with support from EASO), while providing clear information to migrants as to how and when their applications will be processed; - enforcing existing return procedures, where appropriate (with support from Frontex). 
Kommissionen br tillsammans med de berrda byrerna ge Grekland ytterligare std fr att tgrda mottagningscentrumens brist p kapacitet genom att Đ uppgradera inkvarteringsanlggningarna p de ar dr mottagningscentrumen ligger, Đ ytterligare pskynda handlggningen av asylanskningar (med std frn Easo) och ge migranterna tydlig information om hur och nr deras anskningar kommer att handlggas, Đ verkstlla befintliga tervndandefrfaranden, i frekommande fall (med std frn Frontex).
Under implementation The Commission, EASO and Frontex provided further support to increase the capacity of Greek hotspots by funding new infrastructure projects, supporting all GAS contractual staff and carrying out all readmission operations to Turkey. 
Hller p att genomfras Kommissionen, Easo och Frontex gav ytterligare std fr att ka kapaciteten vid de grekiska mottagningscentrumen genom att finansiera nya infrastrukturprojekt, bist alla kontraktsanstllda vid den grekiska asylmyndigheten och genomfra alla tertagandeinsatser till Turkiet.
However, more support is still needed, as the situation on the ground remains critical. 
Mer std behvs dock fortfarande, eftersom situationen p plats r fortsatt kritisk.