natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
However, measuring the effectiveness of fraud prevention and detection methods is a highly complex and challenging task, as fraud is influenced by a great variety of exogenous factors, of which not all are policy domain -specific. 
Att mta metodernas ndamlsenlighet fr att frebygga och upptcka bedrgerier r dock en ytterst komplex och utmanande uppgift, eftersom bedrgeri pverkas av ett stort antal yttre faktorer som inte alla r specifika fr politikomrdet i frga.
Fifth indent: The Commission will continue encouraging the Member States to strengthen the coordination role of Anti-Fraud Coordination Services (AFCOS), in particular through expanding their network. 
Femte strecksatsen: Kommissionen kommer ven fortsttningsvis att uppmuntra medlemsstaterna att strka den samordnande rollen fr sambandscentralerna fr bedrgeribekmpning (Afcos), srskilt genom att utvidga deras ntverk.
The Commission will carefully assess any amendment of this kind put forward by the co-legislators. 
Kommissionen kommer noggrant att bedma eventuella ndringar av detta slag som lggs fram av medlagstiftarna.
The Commission agrees with the ECA on the importance of ensuring the effectiveness of AFCOSs and could support a clearer definition of their functions. 
Kommissionen hller med revisionsrtten om att det r viktigt att se till att sambandscentralerna r effektiva och skulle kunna stdja en tydligare definition av deras funktioner.
The Commission's proposal to amend the OLAF Regulation represents already a significant improvement over the current situation as the AFCOSs would need to ensure that the assistance to OLAF is provided regardless of the way it is provided (i.e. directly by the AFCOS, or by a different authority acting on the AFCOS’ request). INTRODUCTION 05. 
Kommissionens frslag om ndring av Olaf-frordningen utgr redan en betydlig frbttring jmfrt med den rdande situationen eftersom sambandscentralerna mste se till att Olaf fr den hjlp som byrn behver, oavsett hur hjlpen ges (t.ex. direkt via sambandscentralerna eller via en annan myndighet som agerar p sambandscentralernas begran).
The 2014-2020 Common Provisions Regulation introduced for the first time a requirement to have a risk-based approach and to put proportionate and effective anti-fraud measures in place at operational programme level. 
INLEDNING 05 Genom frordningen om gemensamma bestmmelser 2014Đ2020 infrdes fr frsta gngen ett krav p att det ska finnas en riskbaserad metod och proportionella och effektiva 2
This is an important step towards better financial management and the protection of the EU budget. 
Detta r ett viktigt steg mot frbttrad ekonomisk frvaltning och ett bttre skydd fr EU-budgeten.
07. The anti-fraud information platform referred to by the ECA is OLAF's Anti-Fraud Information System (AFIS). 
07 Den plattform fr information om bedrgeribekmpning som revisionsrtten hnvisar till r Olafs informationssystem fr bedrgeribekmpning (Afis).
Common Commission reply to paragraphs 08 and 09: The proportion of both fraud suspicion and non-fraudulent irregularities reported by Member States' authorities under Cohesion policy can be interpreted as the growing capacity of Member States to detect and report irregularities, including potential fraud cases, to the Commission. 
Kommissionens gemensamma svar p punkterna 08 och 09: Bde andelen oriktigheter med och utan misstanke om bedrgeri som rapporteras av medlemsstaternas myndigheter inom ramen fr sammanhllningspolitiken kan tolkas som att medlemsstaterna har frbttrat sin frmga att upptcka och rapportera oriktigheter till kommissionen, inklusive eventuella bedrgerifall.
The financial impact fluctuates greatly between Member States and between the years. 
Den finansiella inverkan varierar stort mellan medlemsstaterna och mellan olika r.
2 In the PIF Reports, the Commission has regularly and consistently observed that this may be due to the fact that projects funded in particular under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF) may involve very large sums compared to other policy areas. 
I PIF-rapporterna har kommissionen regelbundet och konsekvent ppekat att detta kan bero p att en del projekt, srskilt de som finansieras inom ramen fr Europeiska utvecklingsfonden (Eruf) och Sammanhllningsfonden, kan omfatta mycket stora belopp jmfrt med andra politikomrden.
10. Concerning Slovakia, the high fraud detection rate for 2007-2013 is, at least in part, due to a few cases (4) with exceptional financial amounts involved, which were reported in 2017. 
10 I Slovakiens fall beror den hga andelen upptckta bedrgerier fr 2007Đ2013 tminstone delvis p ett ftal renden (fyra) som omfattade exceptionellt hga belopp och som rapporterades 2017.
OBSERVATIONS Common Commission reply to paragraphs 18 and 19: The Commission fully supports the adoption of national anti-fraud strategies by Member States through which the Member States indicate to beneficiaries and the public how they intend to fight fraud. 
IAKTTAGELSER Kommissionens gemensamma svar p punkterna 18 och 19: Kommissionen ger sitt fulla std till att medlemsstaterna antar nationella strategier mot bedrgerier, dr de gr klart fr stdmottagare och allmnhet hur de tnker g till vga fr att bekmpa bedrgeri.
It should be noted that there is no legal obligation for Member States to adopt a national anti-fraud strategy. 
Det br dock ppekas att medlemsstaterna inte har ngon rttslig skyldighet att anta nationella strategier mot bedrgerier.
Despite this, ten Member States have adopted a national anti-fraud strategy and one Member State is updating its existing one (see the 2017 PIF report). 
Trots detta har tio medlemsstater antagit en nationell strategi mot bedrgerier och en medlemsstat arbetar med att uppdatera sin befintliga strategi (se PIF-rapporten 2017).
The Commission guidance note for Member States and programme authorities on fraud risk assessment and effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures (EGESIF 14-0021 of 16 June 2014) includes a voluntary template for an anti-fraud policy statement at programme level. 
Kommissionens vgledning Bedmning av risken fr bedrgerier samt effektiva och proportionella bestmmelser om bedrgeribekmpning som riktas till medlemsstaterna och programmyndigheterna (EGESIF 14-0021 av den 16 juni 2014) innehller en mall fr en frivillig frklaring om bedrgeribekmpningspolicy p nationell niv.
The purpose of this statement is to indicate to beneficiaries and the public the zero tolerance for fraud and how managing authorities intend to fight fraud. 
Syftet med sdana frklaringar r att klargra fr stdmottagarna och allmnheten att det r nolltolerans mot bedrgerier som gller och hur de frvaltande myndigheterna har fr avsikt att bekmpa bedrgerier.
In addition, in order to increase awareness of fraud and corruption and assist managing authorities in the fight against fraud, the Commission organised several anti-fraud and anti-corruption seminars in Member States in 2014-2015 in collaboration with Transparency International. 
Fr att ka medvetenheten om bedrgeri och korruption och hjlpa de frvaltande myndigheterna i kampen mot bedrgerier anordnade kommissionen ocks flera seminarier om bekmpning av bedrgeri och korruption i medlemsstaterna 2014Đ2015 i samarbete med Transparency International.
The Commission further refers to its guidance on how to assess management and control systems’ key requirements (KR), and in particular assessment criterion 7.3 in relation to KR7 on "proportionate and effective antifraud measures". Even though this KR does not refer to an anti-fraud policy per se but to the need to conduct a self-assessment leading to targeted controls, it adds also other aspects than the assessment of fraud risks identified, and makes clear what the position of the programme authorities against fraud should be. 
Kommissionen hnvisar dessutom till sin vgledning om bedmningen av centrala krav i frvaltnings-och kontrollsystemen, srskilt bedmningskriterium 7.3 i samband med centralt krav 7 om Óproportionella och effektiva bedrgeribekmpningstgrderÓ. ven om detta centrala krav inte avser bedrgeribekmpningspolicyer i sig, utan behovet av att genomfra sjlvbedmningar som leder till riktade kontroller, omfattar det dock andra aspekter n bedmning av identifierade bedrgeririsker och klargr hur programmyndigheterna br frhlla sig till bedrgerier.
Common Commission reply to paragraphs 20 and 21: First, the Commission considers that the Member States have taken a number of measures to implement the guidance and their obligations under the Regulation. 
Kommissionens gemensamma svar p punkterna 20 och 21: Fr det frsta anser kommissionen att medlemsstaterna har vidtagit ett flertal tgrder fr att genomfra vgledningen och uppfylla sina skyldigheter enligt frordningen.
One of the conclusions of the external study on anti-fraud measures in Member States commissioned by the Commission is that the Commission efforts to address fraud and corruption have catalysed a number of changes at Member State level and have resulted in a more structured and systematic approach. 
En av slutsatserna i den externa studie om medlemsstaternas bedrgeribekmpningstgrder som bestllts av kommissionen r att kommissionens insatser fr att hantera bedrgeri och korruption har gett 3 upphov till flera frndringar p medlemsstatsniv och har lett till en mer strukturerad och systematisk metod.
In particular, conducting the fraud risk assessment in accordance with the criteria set out in the template helped to put more focus on fraud and corruption risks, and created clear links between identified risks and specific mitigating measures (Quoted external Study, p.49). 
Genomfrandet av bedmningar av bedrgeririsker enligt de kriterier som anges i mallen bidrog i synnerhet till en starkare inriktning p risker fr bedrgeri och korruption och skapade tydliga kopplingar mellan identifierade risker och motsvarande begrnsande tgrder (citat frn den externa studien, s. 49).
Second, it is the combination of deficiencies in Key Requirement 7 with other non-essential key requirements which can be defined as “serious deficiencies at the level of the overall management and control system”, and therefore lead to interruptions in the payment deadline or financial correction. 
Fr det andra r det en kombination av bristerna i centralt krav 7 och andra icke vsentliga viktiga krav som kan definieras som Óallvarliga brister i det vergripande frvaltnings-och kontrollsystemetÓ, vilka leder till avbrott i betalningsfristerna eller till finansiella korrigeringar.
In this context, Key Requirement 4 “Adequate management verifications” and 16 “Adequate audits of operations” act as mitigating controls, as they allow the detection of potential fraud. 
I detta sammanhang fungerar centralt krav 4 ÓLmpliga frvaltningskontrollerÓ och centralt krav 16 ÓLmpliga revisioner av insatserÓ som begrnsande kontroller, eftersom de mjliggr upptckt av eventuellt bedrgeri.
The non-compliance of one aspect of the management and control system associated with financial impact on the legality and regularity of the underlying transaction(s) leads to the interruption of payment or to financial corrections by the Commission. 
Bristande efterlevnad av en aspekt av frvaltnings-och kontrollsystemet som fr ekonomiska konsekvenser fr de underliggande transaktionernas laglighet och korrekthet leder till avbrott i betalningen eller till finansiella korrigeringar frn kommissionens sida.
The Commission therefore considers that the 2014-2020 legal framework has been clearly reinforced by introduction of the obligation to put in place effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures, even though no legal requirement for formal anti-fraud policies is imposed. 
Kommissionen anser drfr att den rttsliga ramen fr 2014Đ2020 helt klart har frstrkts i och med infrandet av skyldigheten att infra effektiva och proportionella bedrgeribekmpningstgrder, ven om det inte stlls ett rttsligt krav p formella bedrgeribekmpningspolicyer.
Enabling conditions are fewer and more focused on the specific goals of the Fund concerned. 
De ndvndiga villkoren r drfr frre och mer inriktade p de specifika mlen fr den berrda fonden.
Once met, they are meant to ‘enable’ Member States’ authorities to start the implementation of the Funds. 
Nr villkoren har uppfyllts r de avsedda att gra det mjligt fr medlemsstaternas myndigheter att brja genomfra fonderna.
Anti-fraud measures are aimed at minimizing risks and need to be periodically reviewed. 
Syftet med bedrgeribekmpningstgrder r att minimera riskerna och dessa tgrder mste ses ver regelbundet.
Therefore, anti-fraud measures are not suitable for inclusion into the enabling conditions. 
Det r drfr inte lmpligt att ta med bedrgeribekmpningstgrder i de ndvndiga villkoren.
Common Commission reply to paragraphs 22 to 23bis: The Commission’s practical ready-to-use fraud risk assessment tool mentioned by the ECA allows a consistent approach to risk assessments across Member States for all programmes. 
Kommissionens gemensamma svar p punkterna 22Đ23: Kommissionens praktiska och lttanvnda verktyg fr bedmning av bedrgeririsk som revisionsrtten nmner bidrar till att i medlemsstaterna skapa en enhetlig metod fr riskbedmningar fr alla program.
The external study on anti-fraud measures mentioned by the ECA confirmed the fact that managing authorities now assess fraud risks in line with the requirements of the 2014-2020 control framework, determine the readiness of existing internal controls to address the risks associated with different fraud scenarios and identify areas where additional controls are necessary. 
I den externa studie om bedrgeribekmpningstgrder som revisionsrtten nmner bekrftas att de frvaltande myndigheterna nu bedmer bedrgeririsker i enlighet med kraven i kontrollramen fr 2014Đ2020, att de faststller om de befintliga internkontrollerna klarar att hantera de risker som hr samman med olika bedrgeriscenarier och att de identifierar omrden dr det krvs ytterligare kontroller.
New requirements have led to a more structured approach to fraud risk assessment. 
Nya krav har lett till en mer strukturerad metod fr bedrgeririskbedmning.
The Commission has also made practical presentations on the use of its recommended risk assessment tool during anti-fraud/anti-corruption awareness seminars in 2014-2015, covering 15 Member States (BG, RO, IT, SK, CZ, HR, LV, HU, MT, SI, LT, ES, PL, PT, EE). 
De seminarier p temat medvetenhet om bekmpning av bedrgerier/korruption som kommissionen anordnade 2014Đ2015 i 15 medlemsstater (BG, RO, IT, SK, CZ, HR, LV, HU, MT, SI, LT, ES, PL, PT, EE), omfattade ven praktiska presentationer om hur kommissionens rekommenderade riskbedmningsverktyg br anvndas.
In addition, in 2015, the tool was presented to all Member States as part of the Irregularity Management System (IMS) training. 
Under 2015 presenterades verktyget ven fr samtliga medlemsstater som ett led i utbildningen om systemet fr hantering av oriktigheter (IMS).
The Commission shares the ECA's conclusion that Member States have used the model designed by the Commission. 
Kommissionen instmmer i revisionsrttens slutsats att medlemsstaterna har anvnt den modell som tagits fram av kommissionen.
The Commission will continue to support the Member State authorities in improving their administrative capacity when fighting fraud. 
Kommissionen kommer att fortstta att hjlpa medlemsstaternas myndigheter att frbttra sin administrativa kapacitet fr att bekmpa bedrgeri.
For now, the new training module for experts (in cooperation with EIPA) on Identifying and preventing fraud and corruption in ESI funds 2014-2020, and a follow up study, which will build on the outputs from the stocktaking study, are planned. 
Fr tillfllet planeras en ny utbildningsmodul fr sakkunniga (i samarbete med Europeiska institutet fr offentlig frvaltning) p temat ÓIdentifiera och frebygga bedrgeri och korruption i ESI-fonderna 2024Đ2020Ó samt en uppfljningsstudie som kommer att bygga p resultaten av inventeringsstudien.
Common Commission reply to paragraphs 24 and 25: The Commission is of the view that managing authorities generally take a more proactive approach towards the assessment of fraud risks. 
Kommissionens gemensamma svar p punkterna 24 och 25: Kommissionen anser att de frvaltande myndigheterna generellt hanterar bedmningen av bedrgeririsker p ett mer proaktivt stt.
The Commission’s view is confirmed by the external study, which found that “in most OPs (40) authorities took an active approach to developing their fraud risk assessments’, ‘a large majority of the fraud risk assessments based on the Commission’s template (76%) were filled in comprehensively, 14% only partially, and 8% contained only basic information. 
Kommissionens sikt bekrftas av den externa studien, dr man fann att i de flesta operativa program (40) agerade myndigheterna aktivt fr att utveckla sina bedrgeririskbedmningar och att 4 de flesta bedmningar som baserades p kommissionens mall (76 %) fylldes i med utfrliga uppgifter, 14 % fylldes i endast delvis och 8 % innehll endast grundlggande information.
The two fraud risk assessments (FRA) that had the least information were from those OPs where the passive approach was taken’. 
De tv bedrgeririskbedmningar som innehll minst information var frn operativa program dr ett passivt frhllningsstt hade valts.
The study also concludes that ‘...furthermore some authorities expanded the scope of FRAs self assessments to other forms of risks ... while other MAs provided more granularity to their assessment’. 
I underskningen konstateras ven att en del myndigheter dessutom utvidgade sjlvbedmningarna av bedrgeririsker till att omfatta andra former av risker, medan andra frvaltande myndigheter gjorde sina bedmningar mer detaljerade.
Additionally, managing authorities notice an increase in awareness of their staff with respect to the importance of anti-fraud risk assessment and improvement of IT systems used to prevent and detect fraud. 
De frvaltande myndigheterna mrker ven en kad medvetenhet hos sin personal nr det gller vikten av bedrgeririskbedmningar och av att frbttra de it-system som anvnds fr att frebygga och upptcka bedrgeri.
According to the Commission’s guidance, the anti-fraud process starts with a self-assessment based on the managing authorities’ knowledge of the environment and its specific fraud risks as well as on commonly recognised and recurring fraud schemes. 
Enligt kommissionens vgledning inleds bedrgerikmpningsprocessen med en sjlvbedmning som baseras p de frvaltande myndigheternas kunskap om frhllandena och sina specifika bedrgeririsker samt allmnt knda och terkommande bedrgerisystem.
The Commission recommends for the self-assessment team that the most relevant actors take part in the process, which could mean different departments of the managing authority (MA) as well as certifying authority (CA) and implementing bodies (IB). 
Nr det gller sjlvbedmningsgrupperna rekommenderar kommissionen att de mest relevanta aktrerna deltar i processen, vilket kan innebra personal frn olika avdelningar hos den frvaltande myndigheten, den attesterande myndigheten och genomfrandeorganen.
Involving AFCOS or other specialised bodies is left at the discretion of managing authorities (section 3.2). 
De frvaltande myndigheterna bestmmer sjlva om de vill lta sambandscentraler eller andra specialiserade organ ing (avsnitt 3.2).
The audit authority (AA) will audit the process without taking any direct role. 
Revisionsmyndigheten granskar processen utan att ha en direkt roll.
As regards the fraud risk assessment, the external study also confirms that the ‘involvement of variety of authorities in the antifraud activities (MA, IBs, AA, CA, AFCOS and law enforcement authorities) leads to enhanced coordination of antifraud activities and reduces fraud risks’. 
Nr det gller bedrgeririskbedmningar bekrftar den externa studien ven att olika myndigheters deltagande i bedrgeribekmpningstgrderna (frvaltande myndigheter, genomfrandeorgan, revisionsmyndigheter, attesterande myndigheter, sambandscentraler och brottsbekmpande myndigheter) bidrar till frbttrad samordning av bedrgeribekmpningstgrderna och minskar bedrgeririskerna.
4 
Frsta punktsatsen: Skerhetsmodellen fr 2014Đ2020 r utformad s att revisionsmyndigheten utvar tillsyn ver de frvaltande myndigheterna genom systemrevisioner och granskningar av insatser, vilket leder till en bedmning av varje centralt krav fr frvaltnings-och kontrollsystemen, inklusive centralt krav 7 som speciellt avser bedrgeribekmpningstgrder.
In the Bulgarian case, the audit authority has detected some fraud risks and the responsible managing authority took adequate action to correct the situation. 
I Bulgariens fall hade revisionsmyndigheten upptckt vissa bedrgeririsker och den ansvariga frvaltande myndigheten vidtog lmpliga tgrder fr att rtta till situationen.
The overall system therefore functioned to ensure more robust anti-fraud measures. 
Det vergripande systemet bidrog drfr till att skerstlla mer robusta bedrgeribekmpningstgrder.
Second bullet: The Commission will explore any possible action to raise awareness with the French authorities and improve the assessment with the concerned managing authorities and audit authorities in the context of respective annual meetings. 
Andra punktsatsen: Inom ramen fr de respektive rsmtena kommer kommissionen att vervga eventuella tgrder fr att ka medvetenheten tillsammans med de franska myndigheterna och att frbttra bedmningarna tillsammans med de berrda frvaltande myndigheterna och revisionsmyndigheterna.
Third bullet: The Spanish example shows that the managing authority takes its responsibilities in relation to antifraud measures and the supervision of intermediate bodies seriously. 
Tredje punktsatsen: Det spanska exemplet visar att den frvaltande myndigheten tar sitt ansvar i frga om bedrgeribekmpningstgrder och tillsyn av frmedlande organ p allvar.
Through the mandated evaluation, the managing authority could recommend actions to adjust the identified weaknesses, followed up by the internal audit section of the managing authority. 
Som ett led i den obligatoriska utvrderingen kan den frvaltande myndigheten rekommendera tgrder fr att korrigera de identifierade bristerna, som fljs upp av den frvaltande myndighetens avdelning fr internrevision.
Fifth bullet: The Commission services have made audit recommendations to Hungary to improve further their anti-fraud measures. 
Femte punktsatsen: Kommissionens avdelningar har lmnat revisionsrekommendationer till Ungern s att landet kan frbttra sina bedrgeribekmpningstgrder ytterligare.
For example, the Hungarian managing authorities should ensure that the verification procedures at the selection and management verification stages include proportionate anti-fraud measures including the tailoring of the IT subsystem. 
De ungerska frvaltande myndigheterna br till exempel frskra sig om att granskningsfrfarandena vid projekturval och frvaltningskontroller inbegriper proportionella bedrgeribekmpningstgrder, inklusive skrddarsydda it-undersystem.
Hence, the Commission expects the fraud risk assessment in Hungary to improve. 27. 
Kommissionen frvntar sig drfr att bedmningarna av bedrgeririsk i Ungern kommer att frbttras.
It should be noted that Member States are expected to put in place anti-fraud measures taking account of the principle of proportionality. 
27 Kommissionen ppekar att medlemsstaterna frvntas infra bedrgeribekmpningstgrder med hnsyn till proportionalitetsprincipen.
These measures can always be improved based on fraud detection cases and newly identified risks, however they should remain proportionate to the risk identified. 
Dessa tgrder kan alltid frbttras baserat p upptckta bedrgerifall och nya identifierade risker, men ska samtidigt vara proportionella till den identifierade risken.