natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Picture 1 Đ Makeshift tents outside the hotspot perimeter on Lesbos, Greece (February 2019) Source: ECA. See also FRA Opinion 3/2019: Update of the 2016 Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on fundamental rights in the ÔhotspotsŐ set up in Greece and Italy. 
5 Se ven FRA:s yttrande 3/2019: Update of the 2016 Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on fundamental rights in the ÓhotspotsŐ set up in Greece and Italy (uppdatering av Europeiska unionens byr fr grundlggande rttigheters yttrande frn 2016 om grundlggande rttigheter i hotspots som upprttats i Grekland och Italien).
16 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns Dire conditions for unaccompanied minors 26 Conditions for unaccompanied minors on the Greek islands are dire (Box 1). 
16 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden Bild 1 Đ Provisoriska tlt utanfr mottagningscentrumets omrde p Lesvos, Grekland (februari 2019) Klla: Revisionsrtten.
Box 1 Unaccompanied minors in the hotspot on Samos On Samos, we visited the minorsŐ section of the hotspot. 
Ruta 1 Ensamkommande barn i mottagningscentrumet p Samos P Samos beskte vi avdelningen fr minderriga i mottagningscentrumet.
It had seven containers, each housing one bathroom and two living rooms. 
Dr fanns sju containrar som var och en bestod av ett badrum och tv vardagsrum.
The official capacity of each container was 8-10 minors, but around 16 unaccompanied minors were staying in each, and even sleeping on the ground. 
Varje containers officiella kapacitet var 8Đ10 minderriga, men omkring 16 ensamkommande barn bodde i varje container, och de sov till och med p marken.
The minorsŐ section hosted only boys. 
Avdelningen fr minderriga hyste enbart pojkar.
Seventy-eight unaccompanied minors were in tents or abandoned derelict houses outside the hotspot, in unofficial extensions to the facility. 
78 ensamkommande barn fanns i tlt eller vergivna hus utanfr mottagningscentrumet, i inofficiella utbyggnader av anlggningen.
Nine unaccompanied girls were sleeping on the floor in a 10 m2 container next to the police office, with no bathroom or shower. 
Nio ensamkommande flickor sov p golvet i en container p 10 m2 bredvid poliskontoret, och dr fanns varken toalett eller dusch.
27 In Italy, focus has shifted to the situation at sea, as some rescue vessels have been prevented from docking since they had no authorised place of disembarkation. 
27 I Italien har fokus skiftats till situationen till havs, eftersom ngra rddningsfartyg frhindrats att angra hamnar eftersom de saknade en godknd landstigningsplats.
The disembarkation delays have also affected many children, including unaccompanied minors who have been stranded at sea for days and sometimes weeks6. 
De frsenade landstigningarna har ven drabbat mnga barn, dribland ensamkommande barn, som blivit kvar p havet i flera dagar och ibland i flera veckor6.
Deployment of EASO and Frontex experts not fully aligned with hotspot needs 28 We noted a constant shortage of national experts to work on EASO operations. 
Utstationeringen av experter frn Easo och Frontex r inte till fullo anpassad till behoven vid mottagningscentrumen 28 Vi noterade en konstant brist p nationella experter som skulle arbeta med Easos insatser.
By contrast, Frontex had sufficient staff from the Member States thanks to its annual deployment plans. 
Dremot hade Frontex tillrckligt med personal frn medlemsstaterna tack vare sina rliga utstationeringsplaner.
At the time of our visit to Italy, Frontex actually had more staff than needed on deployment to the hotspots, as it had not adjusted its plan in view of low sea arrivals and so was maintaining a permanent presence of hotspot staff (screeners, debriefers, fingerprinting experts), even if the hotspots were empty (Box 2). 
Nr vi beskte Italien hade Frontex faktiskt mer personal n ndvndigt utstationerade till mottagningscentrumen, eftersom man inte hade anpassat sin plan till det lga antalet personer som anlnde sjvgen och drfr upprtthll en permanent nrvaro av personal (preliminrunderskare, utfrgningsspecialister och fingeravtrycksspecialister), ven om mottagningscentrumen var tomma (ruta 2).
An assessment of the reception facilities, access to international protection and respect for human rights in Libya Đ where most migrants rescued at sea on the Central Mediterranean route are returned Đ falls outside the scope of this audit. 6 
6 En bedmning av mottagningsanlggningarna, tillgngen till internationellt skydd och respekten fr de mnskliga rttigheterna i Libyen Đ dit de flesta migranter som rddas till havs lngs den centrala Medelhavsrutten tersnds Đ ingr inte i denna revision.
30 The profiles of EASO experts are generally in line with requirements, although there is a shortage of experienced senior experts. 
30 Easo-experternas profiler uppfyller i allmnhet kraven, ven om det rder brist p erfarna, ledande experter.
The profiles of Frontex experts also matched the requirements, although a high share7 of Frontex experts for readmission operations to Turkey had only an escort profile; this is not fully aligned with hotspot needs. 
Frontex-experternas profiler matchade ocks kraven, ven om en stor andel7 av Frontex experter fr tertagandeinsatser till Turkiet enbart hade en ledsagarprofil. Detta r inte helt anpassat till behoven vid mottagningscentrumen.
With an average of just one return operation per week, lasting one working day, these single-profile escorts cannot be used for any other type of Frontex operation on the other six days of the week. 
Med i genomsnitt enbart en tervndandeinsats i veckan, som varar en arbetsdag, kan ledsagare med denna profil inte anvndas fr ngon annan typ av Frontex-insats under veckans vriga sex dagar.
Full registration, fingerprinting and debriefing of migrants in the hotspots and beyond 31 Registration and fingerprinting rates8 have improved significantly as the hotspot approach in Greece and Italy has established standard operating procedures and 2016: 81.8 %, 2017: 65.7 %, 2018: 54.0 %. 
Fullstndig registrering, fingeravtryckstagning och utfrgning av migranter i och utanfr hotspots 31 Andelen registreringar och fingeravtryckstagningar8 har kat betydligt eftersom hotspot-systemet i Grekland och Italien har lett till att det upprttats standardrutiner och tydligt uppdelade ansvarsomrden mellan de nationella myndigheterna och EU:s stdorgan. 7 8 2016: 81,8 %, 2017: 65,7 %, 2018: 54,0 %.
Greek Aegean Islands: from 8 % in September 2015 to 100 % in 2018; Italy: from 60 % in the first half of 2015 to 100 % in 2018. 
De grekiska Egeiska arna: frn 8 % i september 2015 till 100 % r 2018; Italien: frn 60 % under frsta halvan av 2015 till 100 % r 2018.
clearly divided responsibilities between the national authorities and the EU support agencies. 32 Nevertheless, looking outside the hotspots in Italy and Greece, a relatively high share of migrants apply for asylum in other EU Member States, without having their fingerprints stored in the EURODAC database in category 29 (Figure 4). 
19 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden 32 Utanfr hotspot-anlggningarna i Italien och Grekland ansker trots det en relativt stor andel migranter om asyl i andra EU-medlemsstater utan att deras fingeravtryck finns lagrade i Eurodac-databasen under kategori 29 (figur 4).
Excluding legal migrants applying for asylum who are exempt from category 2 fingerprinting in EURODAC, the absence of fingerprinting data in EURODAC could be explained by one of the following: (i) the asylum applicant entered the EU via an alternative route other than via the Greek East Aegean Islands or Italy, where, in the absence of the hotspot approach, EURODAC registration might in certain Member States not be as effective (Figure 4); (ii) the asylum applicant registered his/her application more than 18 months after the corresponding EURODAC entry was recorded and therefore the fingerprint data are no longer stored in the database; (iii) the asylum applicant arrived in the EU undetected and so went unregistered. 
Med undantag av reguljra migranter som ansker om asyl, och som r undantagna frn fingeravtryckstagning i kategori 2 i Eurodac, skulle avsaknaden av fingeravtrycksuppgifter i Eurodac kunna frklaras genom ngot av fljande: i) Den asylskande reste in i EU via en alternativ rutt till de grekiska arna i den stra delen av Egeiska havet eller Italien dr Eurodac-registreringen, p grund av att hotspot-systemet inte anvnds, kanske inte r lika effektiv i vissa medlemsstater (figur 4). ii) Den asylskande registrerade sin anskan mer n 18 mnader efter att tillhrande Eurodac-registrering gjordes, och fingeravtrycket r drfr inte lngre lagrat i databasen. iii) Den asylskande anlnde till EU oupptckt och registrerades drfr inte.
18 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns 9 EURODAC category 1 data are the fingerprint sets of every applicant for international protection, aged 14 or older, who lodges an asylum application in a Member State; category 2 data are the fingerprint sets of every third-country national or stateless person, aged 14 or older, who is apprehended by the authorities for irregularly crossing the external border of a Member State by land, sea or air, having come from a third country and not been turned back. 
9 Eurodac-uppgifter i kategori 1 r fingeravtryck frn varje person som ansker om internationellt skydd, frn 14 rs lder och uppt, och lmnar in en asylanskan i en medlemsstat; kategori 2-uppgifter r fingeravtryck frn varje tredjelandsmedborgare eller statsls person, frn 14 rs lder och uppt, som grips av myndigheterna fr att irreguljrt ha tagit sig ver en medlemsstats yttre grns landvgen, sjvgen eller luftvgen, och som kommer frn ett tredjeland och inte avvisats.
33 The fact that there were many EURODAC foreign fingerprint hits10 between 2015 and 2018 shows that a high volume of asylum applicants moved from Greece and Italy to other Member States11. 
33 Det faktum att det finns s mnga utlndska fingeravtryck i Eurodac10 frn perioden 2015Đ2018 visar att ett stort antal asylskande frflyttade sig frn Grekland och Italien till andra medlemsstater11.
The high volume of secondary movements in the EU further exacerbates the difficulty in implementing the Dublin mechanism. 
Den stora volymen sekundrfrflyttningar i EU frsvrar ytterligare genomfrandet av Dublinsystemet.
10 A foreign EURODAC hit is generated when an identical fingerprint is found in another Member State. 
10 En utlndsk trff i Eurodac skapas nr ett identiskt fingeravtryck hittas i en annan medlemsstat.
Hits do not correspond to the number of persons but to numbers of datasets, as one person can apply for asylum more than once. 
Trffar motsvarar inte antalet personer utan antalet fingeravtryck, eftersom en person kan anska om asyl mer n en gng.
11 Foreign hits outside Italy and Greece - 2015: 236 422; 2016: 317 455; 2017: 164 639; 2018: 112 817. 
11 Utlndska trffar utanfr Italien och Grekland Đ 2015: 236 422, 2016: 317 455, 2017: 164 639 och 2018: 112 817.
Temporary emergency relocation schemes did not reach their targets and main objective The main objective of relocation was only partially achieved 35 The hotspot approach was part of a package of immediate measures established by the Council to counter the crisis unfolding in 2015. 
Tillflliga omplaceringsmekanismer uppndde inte sina mlvrden och det frmsta mlet Det frmsta mlet Đ omplacering Đ uppnddes endast delvis 35 Hotspot-systemet var en del av ett paket med omedelbara tgrder som rdet faststllde fr att motverka den kris som inleddes 2015.
Another part of this package was a temporary and exceptional relocation mechanism for applicants in clear need of international protection from Greece or Italy to other countries in the EU, in order to relieve the burden on these two frontline Member States. 
En annan del av paketet var en tillfllig och extraordinr mekanism fr omplacering av skande i tydligt behov av internationellt skydd frn Grekland och Italien till andra EU-lnder fr att ltta p brdan fr de tv medlemsstaterna i frontlinjen.
36 The Council set two initial relocation targets of 40 000 and 120 000 respectively (160 000 in total). 
36 Rdet faststllde tv initiala omplaceringsmlvrden p 40 000 respektive 120 000 personer (totalt 160 000).
Since this was done at the peak of the migration crisis, the targets were the result of political negotiation rather than a robust analysis of forecast migratory flows. 
Eftersom detta skedde nr migrationskrisen ndde sin kulmen var mlvrdena snarare ett resultat av politiska frhandlingar n av en gedigen analys av prognostiserade migrationsstrmmar.
As 7 744 places (of the 40 000) were never allocated13, and 54 000 (of the 120 000) were made available for resettling Syrians from Turkey after the EU-Turkey statement, the Member States legally committed to relocate 98 256 out of 160 000 migrants. 
Eftersom 7 744 platser (av de 40 000) aldrig frdelades13 och 54 000 (av de 120 000) gjordes tillgngliga fr vidarebosttning av syrier frn Turkiet efter uttalandet frn EU och Turkiet, gjorde medlemsstaterna rttsliga taganden om att omplacera 98 256 av 160 000 migranter.
37 Under the Relocation Decisions, only nationalities with an average EU asylum recognition rate of 75 % or higher Đ which therefore stood a high chance of being granted international protection in the Member States of relocation Đ were eligible for relocation. 
22 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden 37 Enligt omplaceringsbesluten hade enbart nationaliteter med en genomsnittlig andel godknda asylanskningar i EU p 75 % eller hgre Đ och som drfr hade strre chans att beviljas internationellt skydd i omplaceringsmedlemsstaten Đ rtt till omplacering.
Use of this EU-wide average assumed coherent asylum approaches across the Member States in the Common European Asylum System. 
Anvndningen av EU-genomsnittet frutsatte att medlemsstaterna i det gemensamma europeiska asylsystemet tillmpade samstmmiga asylmetoder.
However, recognition rates vary significantly among the Member States, particularly for certain nationalities14. 
Andelen godknda anskningar varierar dock betydligt mellan medlemsstaterna, i synnerhet fr vissa nationaliteter14.
The EU-wide average was therefore not an optimal indicator of the chances of being granted international protection in a particular Member State. 
Det EU-omfattande genomsnittet var drfr ingen optimal indikator fr chanserna att beviljas internationellt skydd i en viss medlemsstat.
Nevertheless, we acknowledge the fact that it was a clear criterion allowing for a quick eligibility assessment for relocation. 
Trots det konstaterar vi att det var ett tydligt kriterium som mjliggjorde en snabb bedmning av rtten till omplacering.
38 Figure 5 shows that 34 705 eligible migrants (12 706 from Italy and 21 999 from Greece) were relocated to 22 Member States and 3 associated countries (Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). 
38 Figur 5 visar att 34 705 behriga migranter (12 706 frn Italien och 21 999 frn Grekland) omplacerades till 22 medlemsstater och tre associerade lnder (Liechtenstein, Norge och Schweiz).
The United Kingdom and Denmark exercised their opt-out rights under the Treaties. 
Frenade kungariket och Danmark utnyttjade sina undantagsrttigheter i enlighet med frdragen.
Hungary and Poland did not relocate any migrants15. 
Ungern och Polen omplacerade inga migranter15.
21 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns 15 In June 2017, the Commission launched infringement proceedings for non-compliance with the Relocation Decisions against Hungary, Poland and Czechia. 
Klla: Easo. 15 I juni 2017 inledde kommissionen vertrdelsefrfaranden mot Ungern, Polen och Tjeckien fr bristande efterlevnad av omplaceringsbesluten.
Hungary neither pledged any relocation places nor relocated any migrants. 
Ungern varken utlovade ngra omplaceringsplatser eller omplacerade ngra migranter.
Poland pledged some places in December 2015, but none after that, and relocated no-one. 
Polen utlovade ngra platser i december 2015, men inga efter det, och omplacerade ingen.
Czechia made some pledges and relocated 12 migrants, but ceased making pledges later in the process. 
Tjeckien gjorde vissa utfstelser och omplacerade tolv migranter, men slutade gra utfstelser senare i processen.
Figure 5 Đ Relocation of migrants from Greece and Italy under the temporary emergency relocation scheme (2015-2017) Migrants potentially eligible for relocation approx. 445 000 approx. 
Figur 5 Đ Omplacering av migranter frn Grekland och Italien inom ramen fr de tillflliga omplaceringsmekanismerna fr ndsituationer (2015Đ2017) Klla: Revisionsrtten, p grundval av uppgifter som samlats in frn medlemsstaterna.
5 000 people 39 For each relocated migrant, the Commission disbursed from AMIF Ű500 to Greece or Italy to cover travel costs and Ű6 000 to the receiving Member State for reception costs. 
24 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden 39 Fr varje omplacerad migrant betalade kommissionen ut 500 euro frn Amif till Grekland eller Italien fr att tcka reskostnader och 6 000 euro till den mottagande medlemsstaten fr mottagningskostnader.
This amounts to a total of Ű225.6 million for all relocated migrants. 
Detta blir totalt 225,6 miljoner euro fr alla omplacerade migranter.
40 The mandatory relocation schemes were the first solidarity initiative in the history of European migration policy aimed at the large-scale redistribution of asylum applicants among Member States. 
40 De obligatoriska omplaceringsmekanismerna var det frsta solidaritetsinitiativet i den europeiska migrationspolitikens historia som syftade till en storskalig omfrdelning av asylskande bland medlemsstaterna.
The Relocation Decisions also provided protection to a significant number of applicants who would have otherwise stayed in Italy or Greece, or who might have moved to other countries irregularly. 
Omplaceringsbesluten gav ven skydd t ett betydande antal skande som annars skulle ha blivit kvar i Italien eller Grekland, eller som eventuellt hade frflyttat sig irreguljrt till andra lnder.
41 However, the number of relocated asylum seekers was not sufficient to alleviate effectively the pressure on the asylum systems in Greece and Italy. 
41 Antalet omplacerade asylskande var dock inte tillrckligt fr att effektivt minska trycket p asylsystemen i Grekland och Italien.
Migrants relocated during the eligibility period represented around 4 % of all asylum seekers in Italy and around 22 % of those in Greece. 
De migranter som omplacerades under behrighetsperioden motsvarade cirka 4 % av alla asylskande i Italien och cirka 22 % av dem i Grekland.
A very low share of potentially eligible migrants were relocated 42 The Relocation Decisions applied to migrants who had arrived in either Greece or Italy between 24 March 2015 and 26 September 2017. 
En mycket lg andel av potentiellt behriga migranter omplacerades 42 Omplaceringsbesluten gllde migranter som anlnt till antingen Grekland eller Italien mellan den 24 mars 2015 och den 26 september 2017.
Syrians and Eritreans were the two main nationalities that remained eligible throughout the whole period. 
Syrier och eritreaner var de tv strsta nationaliteterna som frblev behriga under hela perioden.
Iraqis were eligible until 15 June 201616. 
Irakier var behriga fram till den 15 juni 201616.
43 However, receiving Member States only accepted relocation candidates from Greece who had arrived in the country before 20 March 2016 (date of entry into force of the EU-Turkey statement). 
43 Mottagarmedlemsstaterna accepterade dock enbart omplaceringskandidater frn Grekland som anlnt till landet fre den 20 mars 2016 (det datum d uttalandet frn EU och Turkiet trdde i kraft).
44 The Decisions came into effect at the peak of the migration crisis, when most migrants who would have been potentially eligible were transiting through Greece or Italy in a process of secondary migration to other Member States. 
44 Besluten trdde i kraft nr migrationskrisen ndde sin kulmen och de flesta migranter som hade kunnat vara behriga transiterade genom Grekland eller Italien i en sekundr migrationsprocess till andra medlemsstater.
In late 2015 to early 2016, both the Greek and Italian authorities lacked sufficient capacity to identify and reach out to all potentially eligible candidates on their territory. 
I slutet av 2015 till brjan av 2016 hade varken de grekiska eller italienska myndigheterna tillrcklig kapacitet att identifiera och n ut till alla potentiellt behriga kandidater p sina territorier.
The schemes underperformed mainly owing to the very low number of potentially eligible candidates registered (see Figure 5). 
Mekanismerna fungerade smre n frvntat frmst p grund av det mycket lga antalet potentiellt behriga skande som hade registrerats (se figur 5).
45 The closure of the Balkan route in March 2016 significantly curbed uncontrolled transit through Greece, leaving many potentially eligible relocation candidates in 23 Hotspots Relocation AMIF funding EU agencies Asylum in Greece Asylum in Italy Returns 16 Table 6 of the Eurostat asylum quarterly report of 15 June 2016. 
16 Tabell 6 i Eurostats kvartalsrapport om asyl av den 15 juni 2016. 25 Hotspots Omplacering AMIF-finansiering EU-byrer Asyl i Grekland Asyl i Italien tervndanden 45 Nr Balkanrutten stngdes i mars 2016 begrnsades den okontrollerade transiteringen genom Grekland markant, och mnga potentiellt behriga omplaceringskandidater blev kvar i Grekland.
In March 2016, the Commission estimated that between 50 000 to 56 000 people had to remain in Greece, including 35 000 to 40 000 potentially eligible candidates for relocation. 
I mars 2016 uppskattade kommissionen att mellan 50 000 och 56 000 personer var tvungna att stanna i Grekland, varav 35 000 till 40 000 potentiellt behriga omplaceringskandidater.
A mass pre-registration exercise, financed through EMAS and supported by the UNHCR and EASO, helped to identify and register those still in Greece in summer 2016. 
Frhandsregistrering i stor skala, som finansierades med katastrofbistnd och stddes av UNHCR och Easo, hjlpte till att identifiera och registrera dem som fortfarande befann sig i Grekland sommaren 2016.
Without this exercise, the number of relocations would have been even lower. 
Utan detta projekt skulle antalet omplaceringar ha varit nnu lgre.
46 The information provided to the identified migrants on the countries of relocation and the benefits of orderly relocation (as opposed to irregular Ňself-relocationÓ) was not effective enough to gain their trust and convince them that the schemes were attractive. 
46 Den information som lmnades till de identifierade migranterna om omplaceringslnder och frdelarna med ordnad omplacering (till skillnad frn irreguljr ÓegenomplaceringÓ) var inte tillrckligt effektiv fr att vinna deras frtroende och vertyga dem om att mekanismerna var attraktiva.
47 The low number of relocation pledges and the slow pace at which Member States processed pledges and transfers would have also dissuaded some migrants from applying for relocation, although the situation improved with time. 
47 Det lga antalet utfstelser om omplacering och det lngsamma tempo i vilket medlemsstaterna behandlade utfstelser och verfringar avskrckte sannolikt ocks vissa migranter frn att anska om omplacering, ven om situationen frbttrades ver tid.