natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
One result of this approach was to reduce the possibilities for some central ministries, particularly those that will be responsible for the European Social Fund, to gain experience in managing the ESC programmes and hence preparing for the Structural Funds. 
Ett resultat av detta var att det begrnsade mjligheterna fr vissa centrala ministerier, i synnerhet de som skall vara ansvariga fr Europeiska socialfonden, att f erfarenhet av att frvalta de ekonomiska och sociala sammanhllningsprogrammen och drmed frbereda fr strukturfonderna.
(23) In June 2000, the Director-General for Regional Policy wrote to the Directors-General for Enlargement, Employment, Fisheries and Agriculture that: ÔDans la mesure o ces pays sont potentiellement ligibles  lŐobjectif no 1 des Fonds structurels, il me parait ncessaire de mettre lŐaccent sur la prparation  cette objectif, qui mobilisera des ressources financires importantes ds leur adhsion et ncessitera des adaptations par rapport  lŐapproche actuelle de Phare.Ő (Letter of 6 June 2000, ref. 
(23) I juni 2000 skrev generaldirektren fr regionalpolitik till generaldirektrerna fr utvidgning, sysselsttning, fiske och jordbruk att han, eftersom dessa lnder kan komma att vara berttigade till strukturfondernas ml 1, ansg det vara ndvndigt att lgga tyngdpunkten p att frbereda detta ml, som kommer att ta betydande ekonomiska resurser i ansprk s snart lnderna har anslutit sig och som kommer att behva anpassas till det aktuella frfarandet fr Phare. (Brev av den 6 juni 2000, ref.
D(2000) JFD.A. 1 001 01111). 
D (2000) JFD.A.1 001 01111).
20.1.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 15/11 Constraints affecting strategy of using Phare to prepare for the ERDF and ESF 27. 
20.1.2005 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 15/11 Begrnsningar i strategin att anvnda Phare fr att frbereda fr ERUF och ESF 27.
The strategy of using the Phare programme to prepare for the ERDF and ESF suffered from the constraint that the Commission also sought to achieve a cohesion impact from the programmes which it believed could best be achieved by concentrating funds on a limited number of regions (see paragraph 19). 
Strategin att anvnda Phare-programmet fr att frbereda fr ERUF och ESF begrnsades av att kommissionen ocks ville uppn en sammanhllningseffekt genom programmen, vilket den trodde bst kunde uppns om medlen koncentrerades till ett begrnsat antal regioner (se punkt 19).
This cohesion objective made it difficult to give all the organisations which would be involved in managing the ERDF and ESF experience of the Phare ESC programmes in order to familiarise them with Structural Funds. 
Detta sammanhllningsml gjorde det svrt att ge alla de organisationer som skulle vara inblandade i frvaltningen av ERUF och ESF erfarenhet av Phare-programmen fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning fr att de skulle bli frtrogna med strukturfonderna.
More generally, the CommissionŐs use of the Phare programme to prepare Candidate Countries for managing the Structural Funds suffered from the lack of a wider strategy identifying both the requirements to be met by Candidate Countries in the field of regional policy prior to accession and the approach to be followed by these countries to Structural Fund management after accession. 
Nr kommissionen har anvnt Phare-programmet fr att frbereda kandidatlnderna fr frvaltningen av strukturfonderna har det saknats en bred strategi dr man identifierar bde de krav som kandidatlnderna skall uppfylla nr det gller regionalpolitik fre anslutningen och de frfaranden som dessa lnder skall anvnda fr strukturfonderna efter anslutningen.
Such a strategy should have been developed once the decision had been taken to open negotiations with Candidate Countries. On the other hand, the setting of a clear timeframe for such a strategy was rendered difficult because a clear timeframe for accession did not emerge until the end of 2000 (see paragraph 5). 
En sdan strategi borde ha utarbetats s snart beslutet att inleda frhandlingar med kandidatlnderna hade fattats.  andra sidan var det svrt att faststlla en tydlig tidsram fr en sdan strategi eftersom det inte fanns ngon tydlig tidsram fr anslutningen frrn i slutet av 2000 (se punkt 5).
PHARE PROCEDURES 29. 
F RFARANDEN F R PHARE 29.
While the Commission chose not to set up a new pre-accession instrument in relation to the ERDF and ESF (see paragraph 17), it aimed to move Phare procedures closer to those of the Structural Funds, in particular through making more use of ex post controls, introducing more Objective 1 type measures and launching multiannual programming (see paragraph 10). 
Kommissionen valde att inte inrtta ett nytt franslutningsinstrument fr ERUF och ESF (se punkt 17), men ville att frfarandena fr Phare skulle bli mer lika frfarandena fr strukturfonderna, framfr allt genom kat anvndande av efterhandskontroller, infrande av fler tgrder av ml 1-typ och infrande av flerrig programplanering (se punkt 10).
Delays in establishing Extended Decentralised Implementation System 30. 
Frseningar i upprttandet av systemet fr utvidgat decentraliserat genomfrande 30.
In terms of moving Phare implementation procedures closer to those of the Structural Funds, the largest single step which the Commission could have taken was to further decentralise the financial management of the Phare programme to Candidate Countries as foreseen in the Phare 2000 Review. 
Den strsta enskilda tgrden som kommissionen hade kunnat vidta fr att gra frfarandena fr genomfrande av Phare mer lika frfarandena fr strukturfonderna var att ytterligare decentralisera den finansiella frvaltningen av Phare-programmet till kandidatlnderna, vilket frutsgs i versynen av Phare 2000.
Therefore the Review took the view that ÔPrior to accession the applicant countries need to have several years experience of full responsibility for implementationŐ. 
Drfr ansg man i versynen att kandidatlnderna fre anslutningen skulle behva flera rs erfarenhet av att ha fullt ansvar fr genomfrandet.
The Commission therefore planned to give Candidate Countries operational experience in managing Objective 1 type measures in an ex post control environment by introducing what it termed the ÔExtended Decentralised Implementation SystemŐ (EDIS). 
Kommissionen ville drfr ge kandidatlnderna praktisk erfarenhet av att frvalta ml 1-tgrder i en efterhands-kontrollmilj genom att infra ett s kallat system fr utvidgat decentraliserat genomfrande (nedan ven kallat EDIS).
Under EDIS the ex ante controls carried out by the CommissionŐs Delegations on contracting procedures would be replaced with ex post controls. 
Inom EDIS skulle de frhandskontroller som utfrdes av kommissionens delegationer nr det gllde anbuds-och upphandlingsfrfaranden ersttas av efterhandskontroller.
The legal basis for this very significant shift in responsibilities was laid down in the June 1999 Coordinating Regulation (24) for Phare, ISPA and Sapard, which also defined the conditions to be met by Candidate Countries before the new procedures could be introduced. 
Den rttsliga grunden fr detta markanta skifte av ansvarsfrhllanden faststlldes i juni 1999 i frordningen (24) om samordning av Phare, Ispa och Sapard, dr man ocks definierade de villkor som kandidatlnderna skall uppfylla innan de nya frfarandena kan infras.
The Phare Review thus planned Ôto decentralise implementation responsibility to the Candidate Countries from 2002 where strict conditions are metŐ. 
I versynen av Phare planerades allts att ansvaret fr genomfrandet skulle decentraliseras till kandidatlnderna frn 2002 i de fall strikta villkor var uppfyllda.
Yet despite the fundamental importance of EDIS in preparing Candidate Countries for managing the Structural Funds, the Commission initially left it to the Candidate Countries to decide whether they wished to take the necessary steps to introduce EDIS or not (25). 
Trots EDIS stora betydelse nr det gller att frbereda kandidatlnderna fr frvaltningen av strukturfonderna, lt kommissionen inledningsvis kandidatlnderna sjlva besluta om de ville vidta ndvndiga tgrder fr att kunna infra EDIS eller inte (25).
In practice, the Candidate Countries did not initiate preparations for EDIS, often owing to competing priorities in preparing for accession and because they were content to have the safeguard of the ex ante system of checks provided by the Commission Delegations. 
I praktiken gjorde kandidatlnderna inga frberedelser fr EDIS, ofta p grund av att det fanns konkurrerande prioriteringar under frberedelserna fr anslutningen och fr att de var njda med den trygghet som systemet med frhandskontroller utfrda av kommissionens delegationer innebar.
It was only towards the end of 2001 that the Commission began to apply the necessary pressure on Candidate Countries to set up EDIS before the accession, in particular by establishing in 2002 what were termed ÔHigh-level Working GroupsŐ made up of Commission and national representatives in each beneficiary country to oversee its introduction. 
Inte frrn mot slutet av 2001 brjade kommissionen stta ndvndig press p kandidatlnderna fr att de skulle infra EDIS fre anslutningen, framfr allt genom att 2002 upprtta vad man kallade Óarbets-grupper p hg nivÓ, med fretrdare fr kommissionen och nationella fretrdare i varje mottagarland, fr att vervaka infrandet.
The CommissionŐs efforts to introduce EDIS in the framework of Phare were initiated later than for ISPA, while Sapard from the outset was set up on an ex post control basis which gave the beneficiary institutions more experience for meeting their responsibilities after the accession. 
Kommissionens satsning p att infra EDIS inom ramen fr Phare inleddes senare n fr Ispa, medan Sapard redan frn brjan inrttades med efterhandskontroller, vilket gav mottagarinstitutionerna mer erfarenhet infr axlandet av ansvaret efter anslutningen.
32. While the 2003 Annual Management Plan for Directorate-General Enlargement still foresaw Commission decisions on the accreditation of countries for the introduction of EDIS in the second half of 2003, EDIS was not introduced for the management of Phare funds into any of the Candidate Countries before the accession on 1 May 2004 (26). 
32. ven om det nnu i den rliga frvaltningsplanen 2003 fr Generaldirektoratet fr utvidgning planerades att kommissionen skulle fatta beslut om att godknna lndernas infrande av EDIS under andra halvret 2003, infrdes inte EDIS fr frvaltningen av Phare-medlen i ngot av kandidatlnderna fre anslutningen den 1 maj 2004 (26).
It meant that Candidate Countries would become Member States less well prepared for the financial management of the ERDF and the ESF than the Commission had intended in the Phare Review 2000. 
Detta betydde att kandidatlnderna skulle vara smre frberedda fr den finansiella frvaltningen av ERUF och ESF nr de blev medlemsstater n vad kommissionen hade avsett i versynen av Phare 2000.
(24) Council Regulation (EC) No 1266/1999 of 21 June 1999 on coordinating aid to the Applicant Countries in the framework of the pre-accession strategy (OJ L 161, 26.6.1999, p. 
(24) Rdets frordning (EG) nr 1266/1999 av den 21 juni om samordning av stdet till kandidatlnderna inom ramen fr franslutningsstrategin (EGT L 161, 26.6.1999, s.
(25) A circular letter sent by the Directors-General for Enlargement and Regional Policy to National Aid Coordinators in December 2000 stated that Őnational preparatory efforts should start as soon as possible in those countries interested in moving to EDISŐ. 
(25) I ett cirkulr som generaldirektrerna fr utvidgning och regionalpolitik skickade till de nationella stdsamordnarna i december 2000 fastslogs det att nationella frberedande insatser skulle inledas s snart som mjligt i de lnder som var intresserade av att g ver till EDIS.
(26) The only exception was Hungary where EDIS was symbolically introduced on 30 April 2004. 
(26) Det enda undantaget var Ungern dr EDIS symboliskt infrdes den 30 april 2004.
C 15/12 EN Official Journal of the European Union 20.1.2005 33. 
C 15/12 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 20.1.2005 33.
The delays in the introduction of EDIS also made it more difficult for the Commission to use grant schemes to implement Phare ESC programmes. While the setting up of grant schemes under Phare ESC programmes was an important step towards moving to a more Structural Funds approach to implementation, in an ex ante control context there was a limit to the CommissionŐs capacity to supervise them. 
Frseningarna i infrandet av EDIS gjorde det ocks svrare fr kommissionen att anvnda bidragssystem fr att genomfra Phare-programmen fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning. ven om infrandet av bidragssystem fr Phare-programmen fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning var ett viktigt steg mot att gra genomfrandet mer likt arbetssttet fr strukturfonderna, begrnsades kommissionens mjlighet att vervaka dem med hjlp av efterhandskontroller.
This was because grant schemes were considered to be a high-risk area involving a large number of small projects. 
Detta berodde p att bidragssystemen ansgs vara ett hgriskomrde med ett stort antal sm projekt.
The Commission Delegations therefore had to carry out very time-consuming checks, both on the mechanisms proposed by the beneficiary authorities for implementing each grant scheme and on the evaluation of the project applications submitted for funding. 
Kommissionens delegationer fick drfr gra mycket tidskrvande kontroller, bde av de mekanismer som freslogs av mottagarmyndigheterna fr att genomfra varje bidragssystem och av utvrderingen av de inlmnade anskningarna om std till projekt.
This implied significantly more work for Commission Delegations compared with more traditional Phare implementation mechanisms (essentially works, service and supply contracts). 
Detta innebar vsentligt kat arbete fr kommissionens delegationer jmfrt med mer traditionella mekanismer fr genomfrande av Phare (frmst kontrakt om arbeten, tjnster och leveranser).
Multiannual programming not introduced 34. 
Flerrig programplanering har inte infrts 34.
To serve as a basis for introducing multiannual programming along the lines of that used for the Structural Funds, the Commission announced in early 1999 that a preliminary National Development Plan (PNDP) was to be drawn up in draft form by each country for September 1999. 
Tidigt 1999 meddelade kommissionen att varje land skulle upprtta en preliminr nationell utvecklingsplan till september 1999. Den skulle ligga till grund fr infrandet av flerrig programplanering, vilket anvndes fr strukturfonderna.
Most countries were unfamiliar with this form of planning and were often sceptical of the benefits of planning in view of their experience of planned economies prior to 1989. 
Denna form av planering var frmmande fr de flesta lnder och de var ofta skeptiska till frdelarna med planering p grund av sin erfarenhet av planekonomi fre 1989.
In any case, countries generally directed their limited human resources in ministries to identifying ESC projects for the annual funding round rather than to longer-term planning. 
Hur som helst riktade lnderna i allmnhet in sin begrnsade personalstyrka inom ministerierna p att identifiera projekt fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning fr den rliga finansieringsrundan hellre n p lngsiktig planering.
In cases where single ministries were given the overall responsibility for drawing up the plan, they often did not coordinate effectively with other ministries that needed to be consulted. 
I de fall dr enstaka ministerier gavs det vergripande ansvaret fr att utforma planen, frekom ofta ingen effektiv samordning med andra ministerier som skulle tillfrgas.
The short time period granted by the Commission for submitting the PNDP also made it very difficult to draw up adequate documentation and made it impossible to establish a proper partnership approach to planning, involving consultation with regional and local authorities and NGOs. 35. 
P grund av den korta tid som kommissionen gav fr inlmnandet av de preliminra nationella utvecklingsplanerna var det ocks mycket svrt att utforma lmplig dokumentation och omjligt att arbeta med partnerskap vid planeringen, vilket skulle inbegripa rdfrg-grnsverskridande samarbete, som bygger p samma modell som strukturfondsinitiativet ÓInterregÓ, trots att det inte fanns ngon allmn utvecklingsplan.
Indeed, from 2000 such programmes took an increasingly sophisticated form as Phare CBC aligned itself more closely with Interreg practices. 
Frn och med 2000 blev den sortens program alltmer komplicerade allteftersom Phare-programmet fr grnsverskridande samarbete nrmade sig Interreg-frfarandena.
In the absence of these programmes this key issue of co-financing to accompany European Union funding, which would become all the more important under Structural Funds, was not properly addressed (27). 
D dessa program inte fanns tog man inte p allvar itu med den viktiga frgan om medfinansiering till Europeiska unionens finansiering, en frga som skulle bli nnu viktigare inom strukturfonderna (27).
FUNDING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PHARE PROGRAMMES TO PREPARE CANDIDATE COUNTRIES FOR MANAGING THE STRUCTURAL FUNDS Allocation of funding to most countries was less than foreseen 37. 
FINANSIERING OCH GENOMF RANDE AV PHARE-PROGRAM F R ATT F RBEREDA KANDIDATLNDERNA F R F RVALTNINGEN AV STRUKTURFONDERNA Tilldelningen av anslag till de flesta lnder var lgre n vad som frutsetts 37.
The 1998 Special Preparatory Programme (SPP) was the first programme financed throughout the Phare Candidate Countries to specifically prepare for the management of the Structural Funds. 
Det srskilda frberedande programmet 1998 var det frsta program som finansierades i alla de kandidatlnder som var berttigade till Phare-std i det srskilda syftet att frbereda lnderna fr frvaltningen av strukturfonderna.
However, no similar programmes were financed by the Commission in 1999 to build on these initial programmes. 
Kommissionen finansierade dock inga liknande program 1999 fr att bygga vidare p dessa frsta program.
The Phare 2000 Review stated that about 35 % of the funds for Phare national programmes should be devoted to ESC programmes. 
I versynen av Phare 2000 konstaterades att omkring 35 % av medlen i Phares nationella program skulle gnas t program fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning.
In global terms the Commission succeeded in meeting this objective, as Table 2 shows. 
P det stora hela lyckades kommissionen n detta ml, vilket framgr av tabell 2.
Thus for the period 2000 to 2002, the average percentage of national programmes committed to these activities was 36,8 %. 
Fr perioden 2000Đ2002 hade i genomsnitt 36,8 % av anslagen till nationella program anvnts till taganden fr denna typ av tgrder.
(27) On the subject of co-financing see also the CourtŐs observations in its Annual Report 2002, paragraphs 8.10 and 8.11 (OJ C 286, 28.11.2003). 
(27) Nr det gller medfinansiering se ven revisionsrttens iakttagelser i rsrapporten fr 2002, punkterna 8.10 och 8.11 (EUT C 286, 28.11.2003). ning av regionala och lokala frivilligorganisationer. myndigheter och 35.
20.1.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 15/13 Table 2 ESC commitments as a percentage of Phare National Programmes 2000 to 2002 2000 2001 2002 (million euro) Total (2000 to 2002) ESC commitments 17,5 Estonia Latvia Lithuania Hungary Poland 137,0 Slovenia 5,0 Slovakia 6,3 Bulgaria 15,0 Romania 88,0 ESC as % of national programme 29,7 42,6 42,4 36,6 41,5 43,8 31,8 22,5 22,8 40,9 39,0 ESC commitments 13,6 6,0 9,0 15,6 31,0 170,0 3,0 18,4 37,1 109,0 412,7 ESC as % of national programme 20,8 22,8 28,7 34,3 34,5 41,4 14,1 42,3 44,8 39,8 37,8 ESC commitments 6,3 3,7 4,5 1,6 41,5 197,6 5,8 16,5 14,0 106,6 398,1 ESC as % of ESC national commitments programmes 7,4 37,4 12,2 19,8 14,0 24,0 2,6 31,2 37,2 99,5 50,2 504,6 18,5 13,8 28,9 41,2 14,8 66,1 40,2 303,6 34,2 1 141,2 ESC as % of national programme 17,9 24,6 27,2 21,4 37,3 45,1 20,2 32,0 27,2 40,3 36,8 Country Czech Republic 10,1 10,5 14,0 27,0 Total 330,4 Source: European Court of Auditors. 
Till exempel infrde kommissionen s tidigt som 1994 ett flerrigt frfarande fr perioden fram till 1998 inom Phare-programmet fr 20.1.2005 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 15/13 Tabell 2 tagande fr program fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning (ESC) i procent av Phares nationella program 2000Đ2002 2000 ESC taganden Tjeckien Estland Lettland Litauen Ungern Polen 137,0 Slovenien 5,0 Slovakien 6,3 Bulgarien 15,0 Rumnien 88,0 Totalt 330,4 Klla: Europeiska revisionsrtten.
39. However, this overall average figure was largely attained because of the significantly higher than average percentage of their national programmes committed to ESC by the two largest Phare beneficiary countries, Poland (45,1%) and Romania (40,3 %) over the period 2000 to 2002 (28). 
Detta medeltal uppnddes dock till stor del p grund av att i tv av de strsta mottagarlnderna av Phare-std, Polen (45,1 %) och Rumnien (40,3 %), var procentandelen av de nationella program som anvnts fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning under perioden 2000Đ2002 betydligt hgre n genom-snittet(28).
All the other countries, with the exception of Hungary, experienced difficulties in committing the required 35 % of their national programme to this objective. 40. 
Alla de andra lnderna, frutom Ungern, hade svrigheter med att uppfylla kravet p att anvnda 35 % av sitt nationella program fr detta ml.
While it would be expected that the percentage of funds committed to ESC would increase from year to year as absorption capacity increased as accession drew nearer, this has not been the case. 
40. ven om man kunde frvnta sig att den procentuella andel av medlen som anvnts fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning skulle ka frn r till r eftersom frmgan att utnyttja stdet kade och allteftersom anslutningen nrmade sig, var s inte fallet.
In four countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) the percentage of the programme allocated to ESC programmes was progressively reduced from 2000 to 2002. 
I fyra lnder (Estland, Lettland, Litauen och Tjeckien) minskade den procentuella andel av programmet som anslogs till program fr ekonomisk och social sammanhllning alltmer frn 2000 till 2002.
The main reason for this was difficulties in absorbing funds committed in 2000. 
Den frmsta orsaken till detta var svrigheter med att utnyttja medel fr vilka taganden gjorts under 2000.
In Bulgaria, a large commitment was made in 2001 despite the significant implementation difficulties with the relatively low commitment made in 2000 programme, but the commitment in 2002 was then reduced to less than that of 2000. 
I Bulgarien gjordes ett stort tagande 2001 trots att man hade stora svrigheter med att genomfra det relativt lga tagande som gjordes i 2000 rs program, men tagandet 2002 minskades s att det blev mindre n det som gjordes r 2000.
(28) The average annual allocation for the Phare national programme over the period 2000 to 2002 for Poland was 373 million euro and Romania 251 million euro. 
(28) Den rliga genomsnittliga tilldelningen till det nationella Phare-programmet under perioden 2000Đ2002 i Polen var 373 miljoner euro och i Rumnien 251 miljoner euro.
For the eight other countries average annual allocation over the same period was 51 million euro. 
Fr de vriga tta lnderna var den genomsnittliga rliga tilldelningen under samma period 51 miljoner euro.
C 15/14 EN Official Journal of the European Union 20.1.2005 which were made on a more sectoral basis starting from 2001. 
De begrnsade tagandena fr investeringsprojekt 2002 C 15/14 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 20.1.2005 program med brjan 2001.
This was followed by a strong emphasis on institution-building projects rather than investment projects in 2002. 
Efter detta fljde en tydlig betoning p institutionsuppbyggnadsprojekt snarare n p investeringsprojekt 2002.