natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In November 2015 the Commission stated that it was prepared to extend its recommendation to open accession negotiations with the country. However, this was made conditional upon the resolution of the current political crisis in the country and the implementation of a number of urgent reform priorities. 
I november 2015 uppgav kommissionen att den var beredd att frlnga sin rekommendation om att inleda anslutningsfrhandlingar med landet, frutsatt att den aktuella politiska krisen i landet fr en lsning och att ett antal brdskande reformprioriteringar genomfrs.
II During the 2007-2013 period the EU allocated 615 million euros under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA I) to help the country prepare for accession. 
II Under perioden 2007Đ2013 frdelade EU 615 miljoner euro via instrumentet fr std infr anslutningen (IPA I) fr att hjlpa landet att frbereda sig fr anslutning.
The country also received financial support under multilateral programmes covering the whole of the Western Balkans. 
Landet fick ocks ekonomiskt std inom multilaterala program som omfattade hela vstra Balkan.
III We audited projects financed from IPA I in three major sectors: public administration reform (12 % of the total allocation), transport (18 %) and environment (16 %). 
III Vi granskade projekt som finansierades frn IPA I i tre strre sektorer: reformen av den offentliga frvaltningen (12 % av de totala anslagen), transport (18 %) och miljn (16 %).
We found that, despite the priority assigned to capacity-building by the Commission, relatively limited progress was made in strengthening the country’s administrative capacity during the audited period. 
Vi konstaterade att trots att kommissionen har prioriterat kapacitetsuppbyggnad gjordes relativt begrnsade framsteg nr det gllde att strka landets administrativa kapacitet under den granskade perioden.
In some cases projects had limited impact and were not sustainable. 
I en del fall hade projekten begrnsad effekt och var inte hllbara.
IV All of the projects audited in the PAR sector included activities designed to strengthen administrative capacity but often did not effectively address many of the weaknesses. 
IV Alla de projekt som granskades i PAR-sektorn inbegrep verksamheter som skulle strka den administrativa kapaciteten men mnga av bristerna tgrdades ofta inte p ett ndamlsenligt stt.
For some key areas in which strong legislation already existed (internal control, the development of a professional, independent civil service) there was little assistance under IPA during the period audited and there was not sufficient progress on implementing that legislation. 
P vissa nyckelomrden dr det redan finns en stark lagstiftning (internkontroll och utveckling av en professionell och oberoende offentlig frvaltning) frekom endast litet std inom IPA under den granskade perioden och de framsteg som gjordes i tillmpningen av denna lagstiftning var inte tillrckliga.
In other key areas (such as the fight against corruption and public procurement) IPA projects had little impact in the absence of active support from the national authorities. 
P andra nyckelomrden (till exempel korruptionsbekmpning och offentlig upphandling) hade IPA-projekten liten effekt d det saknades aktivt std frn de nationella myndigheterna.
VIn the transport and environment sectors few of the audited projects addressed capacity-building to bring alignment with the EU acquis. 
VI transport-och miljsektorerna handlade f av de granskade projekten om uppbyggnad av kapacitet fr att f till stnd en anpassning till EU:s regelverk.
While others aimed to strengthen administrative capacity through ‘learning by doing’, further examination revealed that the investments in infrastructure did not include activities clearly designed to directly support this objective. 
Andra projekt syftade till att strka den administrativa kapaciteten genom praktiskt arbete (learning by doing), men kompletterande granskning visade att investeringarna i infrastruktur inte inbegrep verksamheter som tydligt syftade till att direkt bidra till det mlet.
Executive summary 07 VI The audited projects did not always fit into a coherent, cohesive and coordinated approach towards strengthening administrative capacity. 
Sammanfattning 07 VI De granskade projekten passade inte alltid in i en konsekvent, sammanhllen och samordnad strategi som skulle strka den administrativa kapaciteten.
Some projects did not follow on from previous assistance in the same sector or were not adequately followed up with further support. 
En del projekt byggde inte vidare p tidigare std i samma sektor eller fljdes inte upp tillrckligt med ytterligare std.
There was often a gap of 4 years or more between establishing the need for assistance and the delivery of project results. 
Det frekom ofta ett glapp p fyra r eller mer frn det att behovet av std faststlldes till dess att projektresultat levererades.
VII The Commission decentralised the management of 76 % of the IPA I allocation of funds to the national administration and supported the setting up and operation of structures to manage these funds. 
VII Kommissionen decentraliserade frvaltningen av 76 % av IPA I:s anslagna medel till den nationella frvaltningen och bistod med inrttandet och driften av strukturer fr frvaltningen av medlen.
This resulted in improved capacity in the parts of the public administration concerned. 
Det ledde till en frbttrad kapacitet i delar av den aktuella offentliga frvaltningen.
However, we found that the experience of decentralising management presented an opportunity for capacity-building in the rest of the public administration which the Commission did not take up during the audited period. 
Men vi konstaterade att erfarenheten av att decentralisera frvaltningen erbjd ett tillflle fr kapacitetsuppbyggnad i resten av den offentliga frvaltningen som kommissionen inte utnyttjade under den granskade perioden.
VIII The mechanisms for political dialogue were well-suited to supporting reform in the country. 
VIII Mekanismerna fr en politisk dialog var vl lmpade fr att stdja en reform i landet.
The fact that overall administrative capacity did not improve significantly during the period audited was largely due to the insufficient political will of the national authorities to tackle some of the obstacles to strengthening administrative capacity. 
Att den vergripande administrativa kapaciteten inte blev mycket bttre under den granskade perioden berodde till stor del p de nationella myndigheternas brist p politisk vilja att vervinna en del av hindren fr att strka den administrativa kapaciteten.
In addition, the leverage for the Commission to encourage reform, especially in sensitive areas, was greatly reduced during this period in the absence of the framework provided by accession negotiations. 
Dessutom minskade kommissionens mjlighet att uppmuntra reformer, srskilt p knsliga omrden, markant under den hr perioden eftersom det inte fanns ngon ram fr anslutningsfrhandlingar.
IX We make a number of recommendations in support of strengthening administrative capacity. 
IX Vi lmnar ett antal rekommendationer som ska bidra till att strka den administrativa kapaciteten.
Introduction 08 The road to accession 01 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the EU signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2001, the first in the Western Balkans. 
Inledning 08 Vgen till anslutning 01 F.d. jugoslaviska republiken Makedonien och EU undertecknade ett stabiliserings-och associeringsavtal (SAA) 2001, det frsta p vstra Balkan.
At the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, the European Union (EU) granted all countries of the Western Balkans1 a clear prospect of EU membership, subject to their meeting the Copenhagen criteria2 and the conditions of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP)3. In 2005 the country formally became a full candidate for EU membership. 
Vid toppmtet i Thessaloniki 2003 gav Europeiska unionen (EU) alla lnder p vstra Balkan1 klara utsikter till EU-medlemskap, frutsatt att de uppfyller Kpenhamnskriterierna2 och villkoren inom ramen fr stabiliserings-och associeringsprocessen3. r 2005 blev landet formellt fullvrdig kandidat fr EU-medlemskap.
02 By 2009 the country had successfully aligned many important parts of its national legislation with EU legislation. 
02 r 2009 hade landet lyckats anpassa mnga viktiga delar av sin nationella lagstiftning till EU:s lagstiftning.
The Commission acknowledged this progress and recommended opening formal accession negotiations. 
Kommissionen noterade det och rekommenderade drfr att formella utvidgningsfrhandlingar skulle inledas.
However, membership negotiations cannot start until the governments of all EU Member States agree in the form of a unanimous decision by the EU Council. 
Men medlemskaps-frhandlingar kan inte inledas frrn regeringarna i alla EU-medlemsstater fattar ett enhlligt beslut i rdet.
Despite agreeing that the country had met the political criteria for opening accession negotiations, the Council did not take such a decision following the Commission’s 2009 recommendation. 
Rdet hll visserligen med om att landet uppfyllde de politiska kriterierna fr att utvidgningsfrhandlingar skulle inledas men fattade inte ngot beslut om att gra det efter kommissionens rekommendation 2009.
03 The Council continued to take no action despite positive recommendations delivered by the Commission in each of the next 5 years. 
03 Under de fem fljande ren agerade rdet fortfarande inte trots kommissionens upprepade rekommendationer.
Issues regarding the country’s official name4 and, more recently, relations with neighbours, have proven to be an impediment to reaching a decision. 
Problem med landets officiella namn4 och, mer nyligen, frbindelserna med grannlnderna har visat sig vara ett hinder fr ett beslut.
The country’s formal road towards accession has been blocked for more than 6 years. 
Landets formella vg mot anslutning har varit blockerad i mer n sex r.
In the meantime, it has seen many of the other Western Balkan nations catch up and even overtake it5. 
Under tiden har mnga andra nationer p vstra Balkan hunnit ikapp och till och med gtt om landet5.
04 In 2013 the country entered a period of political crisis and there was a breakdown of domestic political dialogue6 which exposed serious shortcomings in democratic governance. 
04 r 2013 hamnade landet i en politisk kris d den inhemska politiska dialogen brt samman6 och blottstllde allvarliga brister i den demokratiska styrningen. r 2015 offentliggjordes avlyssningar som tydde p att det hade frekommit vertrdelser av grundlggande rttigheter, politisering och korruption7.
The Commission and some Members of the European Parliament have been closely involved in facilitating a political agreement to overcome this crisis. 
Kommissionen och en del ledamter av Europaparlamentet har varit djupt involverade i att frska bidra till en politisk verenskommelse fr att f en lsning p krisen.
1 The countries at that time were Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro. 
1 Kandidatlnder vid den tiden var Albanien, Bosnien och Hercegovina, Kroatien, f.d. jugoslaviska republiken Makedonien och Serbien och Montenegro.
2 The Copenhagen criteria set by the European Council in June 1993 consist of: (a) politicalcriteria; (b) economic criteria; (c) theabilitytoassume the obligations of membership. 
2 De Kpenhamnskriterier som sattes upp av Europeiska rdet i juni 1993 r a) politiska kriterier, b) ekonomiska kriterier, c) frmga att fullgra de skyldigheter som fljer av ett medlemskap.
3 The SAP, the EU’s policy on the Western Balkans, was established with the aim of eventual EU membership. 
3 Stabiliserings-och associeringsprocessen, EU:s politik p vstra Balkan, faststlldes med syfte p ett senare EU-medlemskap.
The western Balkan countries are involved in a progressive partnership with a view to stabilising the region and establishing a free-trade area. 
Lnderna p vstra Balkan deltar i ett progressivt partnerskap fr att stabilisera regionen och etablera ett frihandelsomrde.
4 This has been addressed through United Nations mediation since 1994. 
4 Frenta nationerna har medlat i frgan sedan 1994.
5 Croatia is now an EU Member State. 
5 Kroatien r nu medlem i EU.
Montenegro, Serbia and Albania have become candidate countries for EU membership, and Montenegro and Serbia have opened accession negotiations. 
Montenegro, Serbien och Albanien har blivit kandidatlnder, och Montenegro och Serbien har inlett anslutningsfrhandlingar.
6 The main opposition party boycotted parliament. 
6 Det frmsta oppositionspartiet bojkottade parlamentet.
7 See the introduction to the 2015 Progress Report (SWD(2015) 212 final of 10 November 2015). 
7 Se inledningen till framstegsrapporten 2015, SWD(2015) 212 final, 10.11.2015.
Introduction 09 05 In 2014 the Commission announced that there would be no new EU Member States before 20208. 
Inledning 09 05 r 2014 meddelade kommissionen att det inte skulle bli ngra nya EU-medlemsstater fre 20208.
This overall slow-down in the enlargement process was due both to the need for consolidation within the EU following the recent rounds of enlargement and to the challenges faced in integrating a region still emerging from violent conflict in the 1990s. 
Att takten i utvidgningsprocessen rent generellt minskade berodde bde p behovet av konsolidering inom EU efter de senaste utvidg-ningsomgngarna och p de utmaningar det innebr att integrera en region som fortfarande frsker komma p ftter efter en svr konflikt p 1990-talet.
See key dates shown at Annex I. The national context of reform 06 The Commission assists the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to enact reforms and prepare for membership of the EU. 
Viktiga datum visas i bilaga I. Den nationella reformkontexten 06 Kommissionen hjlper f.d. jugoslaviska republiken Makedonien att anta reformer och frbereda sig fr ett EU-medlemskap.
The reform process consists of introducing and implementing national legislation which is aligned with EU legislation. 
Reformprocessen bestr i att infra och tillmpa nationell lagstiftning som r anpassad till EU-lagstiftningen.
The Commission helps to draft new legislation and to strengthen the administrative capacity to implement it. 
Kommissionen hjlper landet att utarbeta ny lagstiftning och strka den administrativa kapaciteten att tillmpa den.
07 The Commission and other stakeholders have reported that, although the public administration of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is continuing to work towards integration with the EU, there is reduced commitment to reform from the national authorities at a higher level9. 
07 Kommissionen och andra intressenter har rapporterat att trots att den offentliga frvaltningen i f.d. jugoslaviska republiken Makedonien fortstter att arbeta fr integrering i EU har reformviljan hos de nationella myndigheterna p en hgre niv minskat9.
There is often a lack of will to engage in some of the significant financial investment which is necessary to make progress on reform, for example on environmental measures. 
Det saknas ofta vilja att ta sig en del av de betydande finansiella investeringar som krvs om man ska komma ngon vart med reformarbetet, till exempel nr det gller miljtgrder.
08 In the absence of formal accession negotiations, the Commission has used the chapters on which negotiations are usually based as a guide10 for assessing annual progress in the country11. 
08 Eftersom formella utvidgningsfrhandlingar har uteblivit har kommissionen anvnt de kapitel som frhandlingarna vanligtvis bygger p som vgledning10 fr att bedma landets rliga framsteg11.
Although pointing to weaknesses in administrative capacity, up to 2012 the Commission concluded that the overall reform process was generally proceeding well in the country. 
Kommissionen har visserligen ptalat brister i den administrativa kapaciteten, men fram till 2012 konstaterade den att den vergripande reformprocessen i allmnhet gick framt i landet.
The 2014 report made a more negative assessment and issued the following warning: ‘...The Commission urges the authorities to take decisive action to address concerns about increased politicisation and growing shortcomings with regard to the independence of the judiciary and freedom of expression so that its recommendation can be sustained in future years’12. 
I rapporten 2014 gjorde kommissionen en negativare bedmning och utfrdade fljande varning: Kommissionen uppmanar myndigheterna att vidta beslutsamma tgrder fr att dmpa farhgor om kad politisering och kande brister i frga om rttsvsendets oberoende och yttrandefriheten s att rekommendationen fortstter att glla de kommande ren12.
8 Opening Statement by the President of the European Commission to the European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg, 15 July 2014. 
8 Opening Statement by the President of the European Commission in the European Parliament Plenary Session (ppningsanfrande av Europeiska kommissionens ordfrande vid Europaparlamentets plenar-sammantrde), Strasbourg, 15 juli 2014.
9 See 2015 Progress Report: ‘Strong political will is necessary to guarantee the independence of administration.’ (section 2.2), The capacity to effectively address [the fight against corruption] is currently being undermined by a lack of political will and political interference in the work of the relevant bodies, which is hampering their ability to act proactively and non-selectively, especially in high-level cases (section 2.3) and on Chapter 23: ‘The current lack of political will to tackle the remaining challenges at the highest level is holding back the capable administration from reaching its full effectiveness’. 
(Avsnitt 2.2), The capacity to effectively address [the fight against corruption] is currently being undermined by a lack of political will and political interference in the work of the relevant bodies, which is hampering their ability to act proactively and non-selectively, especially in high-level cases (kapaciteten att p ett ndamlsenligt stt [bekmpa korruptionen] undergrvs fr nrvarande av bristande politisk vilja och politisk inblandning i berrda organs arbete, vilket hindrar deras frmga att agera proaktivt och utan tskillnad, srskilt i hgnivfall (avsnitt 2.3) och i kapitel 23: The current lack of political will to tackle the remaining challenges at the highest level is holding back the capable administration from reaching its full effectiveness (den aktuella bristen p politisk vilja att hantera de kvarstende utmaningarna p hgsta niv hindrar en kapabel frvaltning att vara s ndamlsenlig som den skulle kunna vara).
10 The chapters of the acquis (currently 35) form the basis of the accession negotiations. 
10 Kapitlen om EU:s regelverk (fr nrvarande 35) bildar grunden fr utvidgningsfrhandling-arna fr varje kandidatland.
They correspond to the different areas of the acquis in which reforms are needed in order to meet accession conditions. 
De motsvarar olika omrden i regelverket dr reformer krvs om landet ska uppfylla an-slutningsvillkoren.
11 Without opening and closing them as it would if the accession process had already started. 
11 Utan att ppna och stnga dem som den skulle gra om anslutningsprocessen fungerade normalt.
12 2014 Progress Report on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, p. 
12 2014 rs framstegsrapport om f.d. jugoslaviska republiken Makedonien, s.
Introduction 10 09 In its 2015 Progress Report, published in November 2015, the Commission repeated its recommendation to open accession negotiations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
Inledning 10 09 I sin framstegsrapport 2015, som offentliggjordes i november 2015, upprepade kommissionen sin rekommendation om att inleda anslutningsfrhandlingar med f.d. jugoslaviska republiken Makedonien.
However, this positive recommendation was conditional on the successful implementation of the Przino Agreement13 and substantial progress in the implementation of the urgent reform priorities14. 
Denna positiva rekommendation gller dock p villkor att Przinoavtalet13 genomfrs och att betydande framsteg grs i genomfrandet av brdskande reformprioriteringar14.
10 Table 1 shows our summary of weaknesses in administrative capacity in some key areas of reform which were highlighted in the Commission’s 2011-2015 progress reports. 
10 I tabell I har vi sammanfattat bristerna i den administrativa kapaciteten p vissa nyckelomrden av reformen som betonades i kommissionens framstegsrapporter 2011Đ2015.
13 The main four political parties signed the Przino Agreement in June 2015. 
13 De fyra strsta politiska partierna undertecknade Przinoavtalet i juni 2015.
This agreement consisted of conditions to be met including free and fair elections and the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate the issues surrounding or arising from the interception of communications. 
Avtalet bestod av de villkor som skulle uppfyllas och inbegrep fria och rttvisa val och utnmningen av en srskild klagare som skulle utreda de problem som omgav eller uppstod till fljd av avlyssningarna.
See also paragraph 65 and Annex I. 14 In June 2015 the Commission issued ‘Urgent reform priorities for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ drawn up on the basis of the findings of the Senior Experts’ Group. 
Se ven punkt 65 och bilaga I. 14 I juni 2015 utfrdade kommissionen Urgent reform priorities for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (brdskande reformprioriteringar fr f.d. jugoslaviska republiken Makedonien) som byggde p iakttagelserna frn gruppen av ledande experter.
It contains a list of urgent reform priorities to be fulfilled by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the fields of rule of law and fundamental rights, de-politicisation of the public administration, freedom of expression and electoral reform. 
Dokumentet bestr av en lista ver brdskande reformprioriteringar som ska genomfras av f.d. jugoslaviska republiken Makedonien vad gller rttsstatsprincipen och grundlggande rttigheter, avpolitisering av den offentliga frvaltningen, yttrandefrihet och valreformen.