natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission, together with the relevant Agencies, should further support ItalyŐs efforts to increase the number of hotspots, as originally planned, and to take further measures to extend the hotspot approach in order to cover also disembarkations outside the fixed hotspot locations. 
Kommissionen br tillsammans med de berrda byrerna ytterligare stdja Italiens anstrngningar fr att ka antalet mottagningscentrum till det antal som ursprungligen planerades, och vidta ytterligare tgrder fr att ven tcka in landsttningar som sker utanfr de fasta mottagningscentrumen.
Implemented 2.1. 
Har genomfrts 2.1.
The Commission, together with the relevant Agencies and international organisations, should help the authorities in both Greece and Italy take all possible measures to ensure that unaccompanied minors arriving as migrants are treated in accordance with international standards, including adequate shelter, protection, access to and prioritisation of asylum procedures and possible consideration for relocation. 
Kommissionen br tillsammans med de berrda byrerna och internationella organisationerna hjlpa myndigheterna i bde Grekland och Italien att vidta alla tnkbara tgrder fr att se till att ensamkommande barn som anlnder som migranter behandlas i enlighet med internationella normer och bland annat fr tillgng till lmpliga boendefrhllanden, ges skydd, fr tilltrde till prioriterade asylfrfaranden och eventuellt vervgs fr omplacering.
Under implementation The Commission provided further support by funding new infrastructure projects to improve the situation of unaccompanied minors. 
Hller p att genomfras Kommissionen gav ytterligare std genom att finansiera nya infrastrukturprojekt fr att frbttra situationen fr ensamkommande barn.
EASO started a project in December 2018 to address the urgent situation on Samos. 
Easo pbrjade i december 2018 ett projekt fr att ta itu med den akuta situationen p Samos.
However, more support is still needed in Greece, as the situation on the ground remains critical. 
Mer std behvs dock fortfarande i Grekland, eftersom situationen p plats r fortsatt kritisk.
The Commission should insist on the appointment of a child protection officer for every hotspot/site. 
Kommissionen br insistera p att det utses en barnskyddsansvarig vid varje mottagningscentrum/mottagningsplats.
Implemented by the Commission The Commission insisted on the appointment, but the Italian authorities have not appointed child protection officers in the hotpots. 
Har genomfrts av kommissionen Kommissionen insisterade p att en barnskyddsansvarig ska utses, men de italienska myndigheterna har inte gjort det vid mottagningscentrumen.
The Commission and the relevant Agencies should further assist the responsible authorities through the provision of training and legal advice and continue to monitor the situation and report on action taken and progress achieved. Implemented 
Kommissionen och de berrda organen br ge de ansvariga myndigheterna mer hjlp i form av utbildning och juridisk rdgivning, och fortstta vervaka situationen och rapportera om vidtagna tgrder och gjorda framsteg. Har genomfrts
The Commission and the Agencies should continue to ask all Member States to provide more experts to cover current needs better. 
Kommissionen och byrerna br fortstta be alla medlemsstaterna att tillhandahlla fler experter s att de nuvarande behoven kan tillfredsstllas bttre.
Implemented by the Commission and the Agencies Constant shortage of experts provided by Member States for EASO operations in Greece and Italy. 
Har genomfrts av kommissionen och byrerna Konstant brist p experter frn medlemsstaterna fr Easo-insatser i Grekland och Italien.
Expert deployments by Member States should be long enough and in line with profiles requested to make the support provided by Frontex, EASO and Europol to Greece and Italy sufficiently efficient and effective. 
Medlemsstaterna br placera ut experter tillrckligt lnge och med de efterfrgade profilerna fr att stdet frn Frontex, Easo och Europol till Grekland och Italien ska bli tillrckligt effektivt och ndamlsenligt.
Not implemented Average deployment duration of EASO and Frontex experts continued to be below 2 months in 2018. 
Har inte genomfrts Den genomsnittliga utstationeringstiden fr Easos och Frontex experter fortsatte att vara kortare n tv mnader under 2018.
The Commission, together with the Agencies and the national authorities, should set out more clearly the role, structure and responsibilities of the EU Regional Task Force in the hotspot approach. 
Kommissionen br tillsammans med byrerna och de nationella myndigheterna tydligare ange roll, struktur och ansvarsomrden fr EU:s regionala insatsgrupp i systemet med mottagningscentrum.
Implemented 4.2. 
Har genomfrts 4.2.
The Commission and the Agencies should continue to insist on the appointment, by Italy and Greece, of a single person to be in charge of the overall management and functioning of each individual hotspot area on a more permanent basis and on the establishment of hotspot standard operating procedures in Greece. 
Kommissionen och byrerna br fortstta insistera p att Italien och Grekland utser en person som fr permanent ansvar fr den vergripande frvaltningen och driften av varje enskilt mottagningscentrumsomrde och p att det faststlls standardrutiner fr mottagningscentrum i Grekland.
Implemented 5.1. 
Har genomfrts 5.1.
The Commission and the agencies should evaluate, by the end of 2017, the set-up and implementation of the hotspot approach to date and put forward suggestions for further development. 
I slutet av 2017 br kommissionen och byrerna utvrdera hur systemet med mottagningscentrum har satts upp och genomfrts s hr lngt och lgga fram frslag p hur det kan utvecklas ytterligare.
These should include a standard model of support to be applied to future large-scale migratory movements, the definition of different roles and responsibilities, minimum infrastructure and human resource requirements, types of support to be provided, and standard operating procedures. Implemented 
Frslagen br bland annat ange en standardmodell fr std som kan tillmpas vid framtida storskalig migration, definitioner av olika roller och ansvarsomrden, minimikrav p infrastruktur och personalresurser, typer av std som ska tillhandahllas och standardrutiner. Har genomfrts
This analysis should also assess the need for further clarifications of the legal framework for the hotspot approach as part of the EUŐs external border management. 
Analysen br ven omfatta en bedmning av behovet av att ytterligare frtydliga den rttsliga ramen fr systemet med mottagningscentrum som en del av EU:s frvaltning av de yttre grnserna.
Implemented The Commission recommended the Hotspot Standard Operating Procedures should take the form of a legal act, governmental or ministerial decision or circular, depending on the host Member State's constitutional requirements. 
Har genomfrts Kommissionen rekommenderade att mottagningscentrumens standardrutiner br utgras av en rttsakt, ett regeringsbeslut eller ministerbeslut eller ett cirkulr, beroende p vrdmedlemsstatens konstitutionella krav.
In Italy, the Hotspot Standard Operating Procedures were transmitted to the concerned national authorities in a circular in December 2016. 
I Italien verlmnades standardrutinerna fr mottagningscentrumen till de berrda nationella myndigheterna genom ett cirkulr i december 2016.
In Greece, the Standard Operating Procedures were published and distributed through an administrative circular in 2017. 
I Grekland offentliggjordes och distribuerades standardrutinerna genom ett administrativt cirkulr 2017.
Annex IV - Implementation of AMIF NP projects Greece The only completed project in the sample for Greece, GR-1, did not fully achieve its main objective to clear the backlog of second-instance asylum cases (14 % of second-instance cases had been left uncleared). 
Bilaga IV Đ Genomfrande av projekten inom ramen fr Amifs nationella program Grekland Det enda avslutade projektet i urvalet fr Grekland, GR-1, ndde inte fullt ut sitt frmsta ml att komma ifatt med asylrendena i andra instans (14 % av rendena i andra instans hade nnu inte behandlats).
The project could have benefited from an extension, but this was requested too late and thwarted by legal disputes concerning the remuneration of the Backlog Committee members. 
Projektet skulle ha kunnat gynnas av en frlngning, men denna begrdes fr sent och omintetgjordes av rttsliga tvister rrande ersttningen till medlemmarna i efterslpningskommittn.
When the project ended, 20 % of the budget for the project remained unused. 
Nr projektet avslutades hade 20 % av projektbudgeten nnu inte utnyttjats.
Despite the ever-growing backlog (see also paragraphs 106 and 107) that still hampers the asylum procedure, we also noted that no new project was planned to tackle the post-2013 backlog. 
Trots den alltjmt vxande efterslpningen (se ven punkterna 106 och 107), som fortfarande hindrar asylfrfarandet, noterade vi ven att inget nytt projekt planerades fr att ta itu med efterslpningen efter 2013.
Among the ongoing projects audited, GR-2 on reinforcing the asylum process is achieving its targets in terms of recruiting personnel to strengthen GAS. 
Bland de pgende projekt som granskades uppnr GR-2, om frstrkning av asylfrfarandet, sina mlvrden vad gller att rekrytera personal som ska frstrka den grekiska asylmyndigheten.
However, the targets set could prove insufficient in the face of the continuous pressure from the steady inflows of migrants to Greece. 
De mlvrden som satts upp kan dock visa sig vara otillrckliga mot bakgrund av det fortsatta trycket frn det stadiga infldet av migranter till Grekland.
In the context of project GR-3 supporting the pre-removal detention centres, we visited the centre in Amygdaleza and found the conditions acceptable. 
Inom ramen fr projekt GR-3 fr std till slutna frvar infr avvisning beskte vi frvaret i Amygdaleza och fann att frhllandena var acceptabla.
However, according to a report by the Council of EuropeŐs Committee for the Prevention of Torture51, conditions in the pre-removal centres vary largely. 
Enligt en rapport av Europardets kommitt fr frhindrande av tortyr51 varierar dock frhllandena kraftigt mellan de olika frvaren.
In some, detention conditions were very poor to unacceptable, with overcrowding and unhygienic cells. 
I ngra frvar var frhllandena mycket dliga och oacceptabla, med verfulla och ohygieniska celler.
Project GR-4 supports the enforcement of forced returns of third-country nationals. 
Projekt GR-4 stder verkstllandet av tredjelandsmedborgares ofrivilliga tervndande.
Owing to the very low rate of forced returns, the project is unlikely to achieve its targets (see also paragraphs 130 to 139). 
P grund av det mycket lga antalet ofrivilliga tervndanden kommer projektet sannolikt inte att n sina mlvrden (se ven punkterna 130Đ139).
Project GR-5 on assisted voluntary returns has so far met its targets. 
Projekt GR-5 fr bistnd vid frivilligt tervndande har hittills ntt sina mlvrden.
However, the reintegration package is currently offered to only 26 % of AVRR candidates. 
Fr nrvarande erbjuds dock endast 26 % av kandidaterna till frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning ett teranpassningspaket.
Meeting the rigid annual targets with +/-10 % deviation is a challenge as multiple factors influence migrantsŐ decisions to benefit from the AVRR (situation in the country of origin, family status, health issues, etc.). 
migranternas beslut att dra nytta av frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning (situationen i ursprungslandet, familjestatus, hlsoproblem etc.).
Italy: IT-1 met its targets, but the few indicators set were insufficient to demonstrate achievement of the planned objectives. 
Italien: IT-1 uppndde sina mlvrden, men de f indikatorer som faststllts rckte inte fr att styrka att de planerade mlen ntts.
For instance, there was no target set to monitor the achievement of the objective of identifying and referring vulnerable cases. 
Det hade exempelvis inte faststllts ngot mlvrde fr att vervaka om mlet att identifiera och verlmna renden med srbara personer hade uppntts.
The project spent 84 % of its budget. 
Projektet anvnde 84 % av budgeten.
Both AVRR projects, IT-2 and IT-3, underperformed. 
Bda projekten fr frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning, IT-2 och IT-3, gav bristflliga resultat.
Box 12 gives more information on the AVRR issues in Italy. 
I ruta 12 finns mer information om problemen rrande frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning i Italien.
IT-2, implemented by the Consiglio Italiano per i Rifugiati, managed to return only 49 % of the migrants initially planned, despite the project being extended by three months. 
IT-2, som genomfrdes av Consiglio Italiano per i Rifugiati, lyckades enbart skicka tillbaka 49 % av de migranter som ursprungligen planerades att skickas tillbaka, trots att projektet frlngdes med tre mnader.
Its budget was also underspent by 35 %. 
Budgeten underutnyttjades dessutom med 35 %.
IT-3, implemented by the IOM, met only 12 % to 28 % of its targets and spent only 15 % of its budget. 
IT-3, som genomfrdes av IOM, ndde enbart 12Đ28 % av sina mlvrden och anvnde endast 15 % av sin budget.
The Italian authorities suspended this AMIF project and decided instead to fund the IOMŐs AVRR activities using only national budget resources (with no EU support). 
De italienska myndigheterna stoppade tillflligt detta Amif-projekt och beslutade i stllet att finansiera IOM:s verksamhet rrande frivilligt tervndande och teranpassning med enbart nationella budgetresurser (utan EU-std).
IT-4 was a project developed by the Ministry of Interior on forced returns. 
IT-4 var ett projekt fr ofrivilliga tervndanden som utarbetades av inrikesministeriet.
The grant agreement was signed in September 2017 to cover the period 2014-2018. 
Bidragsavtalet undertecknades i september 2017 fr att omfatta perioden 2014Đ2018.
The activities implemented in the first two years (2014 and 2015) represented about 70 % of the overall targets and 67 % of the budget. 
De verksamheter som genomfrdes under de tv frsta ren (2014 och 2015) utgjorde ungefr 70 % av de vergripande mlvrdena och 67 % av budgeten.
At the time of the audit, the Italian authorities had not yet collected data on indicators and expenses for 2016, 2017 and 2018. 
Nr revisionen gjordes hade de italienska myndigheterna nnu inte samlat in uppgifter om indikatorer och utgifter fr ren 2016, 2017 och 2018.
The ongoing project IT-5 includes activities relating to training, the identification of migrants with special needs and the provision of information and assistance. 
Det pgende projektet, IT-5, innehller insatser som gller utbildning, identifiering av migranter med srskilda behov och tillhandahllande av information och assistans.
While the training objective has already been exceeded, the other two objectives have not yet been met for the following reasons: a) difficulties in identifying or involving the final beneficiaries; b) a lack of communication on migrant arrivals from local counterparts; c) the significant decrease in arrivals in 2018. 
Samtidigt som utbildningsmlet redan vertrffats har de tv vriga mlen nnu inte uppfyllts av fljande skl: a) svrigheter att identifiera eller involvera slutmottagarna, b) bristfllig kommunikation frn lokala motparters sida rrande nyanlnda, c) den stora minskningen av antalet nyanlnda under 2018.
The project is scheduled to continue until the end of 2019. 
Projektet r planerat att fortstta fram till slutet av 2019.
At the time of the audit, the authorities were considering adjusting the targets. 79 
Nr revisionen gjordes vervgde myndigheterna att justera mlvrdena. 85
Replies of the Commission and the Agencies Commission: EASO: Frontex: https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=52087 https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=52146 https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=52147 Timeline https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=52089 
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The audit was led by ECA Member Leo Brincat, supported by Romuald Kayibanda, Head of Private Office and Annette Farrugia, Private Office Attach; Sabine Hiernaux-Fritsch, Principal Manager; Andrej Minarovic, Head of Task; Emmanuel-Douglas Hellinakis and Florin-Alexandru Farcas, Auditors. 
Revisionsarbetet leddes av revisionsrttens ledamot Leo Brincat med std av Romuald Kayibanda (kanslichef), Annette Farrugia (attach), Sabine Hiernaux-Fritsch (frstechef), Andrej Minarovic (uppgiftsansvarig), Emmanuel-Douglas Hellinakis och Florin-Alexandru Farcas (revisorer).
Hannah Critoph provided linguistic support. 
Hannah Critoph gav sprkligt std.
From left to right: Andrej MINAROVIC, Hannah CRITOPH, Annette FARRUGIA, Leo BRINCAT, Mirko IACONISI, Romuald KAYIBANDA, Emmanuel-Douglas HELLINAKIS, Florin-Alexandru FARCAS. 
Frn vnster till hger: Andrej Minarovic, Hannah Critoph, Annette Farrugia, Leo Brincat, Mirko Iaconisi, Romuald Kayibanda, Emmanuel-Douglas Hellinakis och Florin-Alexandru Farcas.
EN PDF ISBN 978-92-847-3979-0 doi:10.2865/48906 QJ-AB-19-021-EN-N EN HTML ISBN 978-92-847-3981-3 doi:10.2865/877951 QJ-AB-19-021-EN-Q 
SV PDF ISBN 978-92-847-3968-4 doi:10.2865/265517 QJ-AB-19-021-SV-N SV HTML ISBN 978-92-847-3980-6 doi:10.2865/30291 QJ-AB-19-021-SV-Q
In this audit, we assessed whether the EU-funded support action for Greece and Italy had achieved its objectives and whether the asylum and return procedures were effective and swift. 
Vid denna granskning bedmde vi om den EU-finansierade stdtgrden fr Grekland och Italien hade uppntt sina ml och om asyl-och tervndandefrfarandena var effektiva och snabba.
We conclude that there are disparities between the objectives of the EU support and the results achieved. 
Vr slutsats r att det frekommer skillnader mellan mlen fr EU:s std och de uppndda resultaten.
The emergency relocation schemes did not reach their targets. Even though the capacity of the Greek and Italian authorities has increased, the implementation of the asylum procedures continues to be affected by long processing times and bottlenecks. 
De tillflliga omplaceringsmekanismerna uppndde inte sina mlvrden. ven om de grekiska och italienska myndigheternas kapacitet har kat fortstter genomfrandet av asylfrfarandena att pverkas av lnga handlggningstider och flaskhalsar.
As in the rest of the EU, returns from Greece and Italy are low for the reasons identified in this report. 
Precis som i vriga EU r antalet tervndanden frn Grekland och Italien lgt av de anledningar som redovisas i denna rapport.
EN 2019 Special Report NO 25 Data quality in budget support: weaknesses in some indicators and in the verification of the payment for variable tranches 
SV 2019 Srskild rapport nr 25 Uppgiftskvalitet vid budgetstd: brister i ngra indikatorer och i kontrollen infr utbetalning av rrliga delbetalningar
Annexes Annex I Share of budget support in bilateral ODA commitments Annex II Audited contracts Annex III Disbursements of variable tranches in 2017 for sector reform performance contracts Annex IV Summary assessment Replies of the Commission Audit team Timeline 3 
Bilagor Bilaga I Đ Andel budgetstd inom bilaterala taganden om offentligt utvecklingsbistnd Bilaga II Đ Granskade kontrakt Bilaga III Đ Utbetalningar av rrliga delbetalningar 2017 fr prestationsavtal om sektorreformer Bilaga IV Đ Sammanfattande bedmning Kommissionens svar Granskningsteam Tidslinje 3
Executive summary I Budget support is a form of EU aid which involves transferring money to the national treasury of a partner country, subject to that country’s compliance with agreed conditions for payment. 
Sammanfattning I Budgetstd r en form av EU-bistnd som innebr att pengar frs ver till ett partnerlands statskassa, frutsatt att landet respekterar de utbetalningsvillkor som man har kommit verens om.
With an average of €1.69 billion in annual payments, the EU is the largest provider of budget support. 
EU betalar rligen ut i genomsnitt 1,69 miljarder euro och r den strsta givaren av budgetstd.
Budget support payments are made in the form of either fixed or variable tranches. 
Budgetstd betalas ut i form av antingen fasta eller rrliga delbetalningar.
Approximately 44 % of EU budget support payments relate to variable tranches. 
Omkring 44 % av EU:s utbetalningar av budgetstd sker i form av rrliga delbetalningar.
This proportion is as high as 90 % in some EU neighbourhood countries. 
Denna andel uppgr till s mycket som 90 % i vissa av EU:s grannlnder.
The amounts paid from variable tranches depend on the performance achieved by partner countries, which is measured by pre-defined performance indicators. 
Beloppen som betalas ut som rrliga delutbetalningar beror p partnerlndernas prestationer, vilka mts med frdefinierade prestationsindikatorer.
II We examined whether the Commission used relevant and reliable performance data for disbursing budget support variable tranches. 
II Vi granskade om kommissionen anvnde relevanta och tillfrlitliga prestationsuppgifter fr utbetalningar av budgetstd i rrliga delbetalningar.
We conclude that for one third of the performance indicators reviewed their relevance was weakened by their design, and they do not allow results to be measured objectively, thereby undermining their relevance. 
Vi konstaterar att en tredjedel av de prestationsindikatorer som vi granskade var utformade p ett stt som gr dem mindre relevanta, och att de inte gr det mjligt att mta prestationer p ett objektivt stt Đ vilket undergrver deras relevans.
Furthermore, the Commission’s assessment of whether variable tranche indicators had been met was not always reliable, leading to some insufficiently justified payments. 
Vidare var kommissionens bedmning av om indikatorerna fr rrliga delbetalningar hade uppfyllts inte alltid tillfrlitliga, och detta ledde till att vissa utbetalningar inte var tillrckligt styrkta.
III While the variable tranche performance indicators were aligned to the partner countries’ sector development strategies, most of them were focused on short-term actions rather than longer-term results, including progress over time towards the sustainable development goals. 
III Prestationsindikatorerna fr rrliga delbetalningar var anpassade till partnerlndernas strategier fr sektorutveckling, men merparten av dem var inriktade p kortsiktiga tgrder snarare n lngsiktigare resultat, bland annat framstegen ver tid mot mlen fr hllbar utveckling.
Furthermore, more than one third of the indicators were vaguely defined or had incorrect baselines, or none at all. 
Vidare hade ver en tredjedel av indikatorerna inte definierats p ett tydligt stt eller hade felaktiga utgngsvrden eller inga utgngsvrden alls.
This allowed for different interpretations as to whether targets had been achieved, making the analysis of the disbursement requests more complex and less objective. 
Detta mjliggjorde olika tolkningar av huruvida ml hade uppntts, vilket ledde till att analysen av utbetalningsanskningar blev mer komplex och mindre objektiv.
IV Most variable tranches reviewed provided the intended effect of incentivising partner countries to advance in their reform agendas by having sufficiently ambitious targets. 
IV De flesta av de rrliga delbetalningar som vi granskade frde med sig avsedd effekt, det vill sga gav partnerlnderna incitament att gra framsteg med sina reformagendor med hjlp av tillrckligt ambitisa ml.
The few exceptions we found concerned indicators with targets which were easily achievable, or which had been achieved via the work carried out by other donors or by external experts paid by the EU. 
De f undantag vi fann rrde indikatorer med ml som var enkla att n eller som hade ntts via det arbete som utfrdes av andra givare eller externa experter som betalades av EU.