natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The first part of the procedure allowed the managing authority (or intermediate body) to establish whether or not a project met the OP eligibility criteria. 
Under frsta delen av frfarandet kunde frvaltningsmyndigheten (eller det frmedlande organet) faststlla om ett projekt uppfyllde stdvillkoren eller inte.
Successful project applications then OP Piedmont (Italy) Emilia-Romagna (Italy) Digital Convergence (Greece) Lowlands and Uplands of Scotland (United Kingdom) Innovative Economy (Poland) Support type Direct investment in SMEs Direct investment in SMEs Funding of intermediaries (project sponsors) Direct investment in SMEs Investment ceiling Up to 200 000 euro Depending on the scheme: up to 40 000 euro (tourism projects) or 200 000 euro (retail projects) Grants: up to 200 000 euro and/or No financial support: advice/consultancy services Up to 200 000 euro Selection procedure Ranking of applications based on an evaluation of substantive criteria (carried out by external experts) First come, first served Based on fulfilment of eligibility criteria Selection of SME projects by project sponsors: first come, first served basis based on fulfilment of eligibility criteria Up to 2010: First come, first served basis based on fulfilment of eligibility criteria From 2010: Ranking of applications based on evaluation of substantive criteria Source: ECA. 
De projekt-Operativt program Piemonte (Italien) Emilia-Romagna (Italien) Digital konvergens (Grekland) Lowlands och Uplands i Skottland (Frenade kungariket) Innovativ ekonomi (Polen) Typ av std Direktinvesteringar i sm och medelstora fretag Direktinvesteringar i sm och medelstora fretag Finansiering av mellanhnder (projektsponsorer) Direktinvesteringar i sm och medelstora fretag Investeringstak Hgst 200 000 euro Beroende p stdordning: hgst 40 000 euro (turistprojekt) eller 200 000 euro (detaljhandelsprojekt) Bidrag: hgst 200 000 euro och/eller inget finansiellt std: rdgivningstjnster Hgst 200 000 euro Urvalsfrfarande Rangordning av anskningar utifrn en utvrdering av materiella kriterier (som grs av externa experter) Frst till kvarn-principen utifrn uppfyllande av stdkriterier Projektansvariga vljer ut projekten: Frst till kvarn-principen utifrn uppfyllande av stdkriterier Fram till 2010: Frst till kvarn, utifrn uppfyllande av stdvillkor Frn 2010: Rangordning av anskningar utifrn en utvrdering av materiella kriterier Klla: Revisionsrtten.
Observations 18 35 Most of the selection procedures were conducted on a ‘first come, first served’ basis where only eligibility criteria were applied and they were easy to fulfil. 
Iakttagelser 18 35 De flesta urvalsfrfaranden genomfrdes enligt principen frst till kvarn dr endast stdkriterierna tillmpades och de var ltt att uppfylla.
Up until 2010, under only two of the five OPs in Italy (Piedmont, Emilia‐Romagna) had the managing authority used a qualitative selection procedure based on substantive criter‐ ia, ranking of applications and expert evaluation. In 2010, Poland decided to amend its selection procedures and introduced qualitative evaluation and ranking of proposals into the selection process. 
Fram till 2010 hade frvaltningsmyndigheterna fr endast tv av de fem operativa programmen i Italien (Piemonte och Emilia-Romagna) tillmpat ett kvalitativt urvalsfrfarande baserat p materiella kriterier, rangordning av anskningar och expertutvrdering. r 2010 beslutade Polen att ndra sina urvalsfrfaranden och infrde kvalitativ utvrdering och rangordning av frslag i urvalsprocessen.
36 The combination of a lack of demand‐ ing criteria and comparative selection of applications and the absence of comprehensive business information in project applications resulted, in over one‐third of the cases, in the co‐fund‐ ing of projects that offered low or no value for money: (a) In Greece, four projects — con‐ sisting in the development of a website with an online booking facility — were redundant. 
36 Kombinationen av brist p krvande kriterier och jmfrande urval av anskningar och brist p heltckande fretagsinformation i projektanskningar resulterade i att mer n en tredjedel av de projekt som medfinansierades gav lite eller ingen valuta fr pengarna: a) I Grekland var fyra projekt Đ med syftet att utveckla ett internetbaserat bokningsverktyg Đ verfldiga.
The enterprises had had a website and online booking facility before they carried out the project. 
Fretagen hade en webbplats och ett internetbaserat boknings-system innan de genomfrde projektet.
Moreover, the websites developed had the same layout as other websites put in place by other hotels in the same chain, which had also been co‐funded (at the same or a very similar cost) by the ERDF under the same call for proposals. (b) Ten of the 30 co‐financed projects audited (all 10 of which were in either Italy (Emilia‐Romagna and Piedmont) or Greece19) would have been carried out even in the absence of public co‐financing, according to what was stated by the project owners. 
Dessutom hade de webbplatser som utvecklades samma layout som andra webbplatser som infrts av andra hotell i samma kedja, vilka ocks hade medfinansierats (till samma eller mycket liknande kostnader) genom Eruf inom samma anskningsomgng. b) Tio av de 30 medfinansierade projekt som granskades (alla tio fanns i antingen Italien (Emilia-Romagna och Piemonte) eller Grek-land19) skulle enligt projektgarna ha genomfrts ven utan offentlig medfinansiering.
Moreover, five of these 10 projects had started well before the grant had been notified. 
Dessutom hade fem av dessa tio startats lngt innan bidragbeslutet hade meddelats.
Three of them started before the enterprises had even submitted a co‐financing applica‐ tion. 
Tre av projekten startades till och med innan anskan om medfinansiering lmnades in.
All these projects represent deadweight. (c) In one Member State (United King‐ dom), project sponsors provided advice to enterprises, in addition to or instead of grants. 
Alla dessa projekt innebr ddviktseffekter. I en medlemsstat (Frenade kungariket) erbjd projektsponsorerna fretagen rdgivning utver eller i stllet fr bidrag.
In the case of the three SME projects that received advice, according to the project owners, the impact of the ERDF support was negligible, since all three enterprises had devel‐ oped their own e‐commerce strat‐ egy and online presence indepen‐ dently and at their own expense. 
Nr det gller de tre projekt vid sm och medelstora fretag som fick rdgivning var effekterna av Eruf-stdet enligt projektgarna frsumbart, eftersom alla tre fretagen hade utvecklat sin e-handelsstrategi och nrvaro p ntet p egen hand och p egen bekostnad.
In two of those cases, the advice did not help the enterprises in any way and was therefore considered useless by them. underwent the second part of the procedure, in which applications were evaluated on the basis of specific criteria and then weighted. 
I tv av dessa fall hjlpte inte rdgivningen fretagen alls, och de ansg drfr att den var meningsls. anskningar som klarade den bedmningen gick vidare till den andra delen av frfarandet dr anskningarna utvrderades utifrn specifika kriterier och sedan viktades.
The second stage of the overall selection procedure comprised the project sponsors that had been selected providing assistance to SMEs on a first come, first served basis. 
Det andra stadiet av det vergripande urvalsfrfarandet omfattade de projektsponsorer som hade valts ut fr att bist sm och medelstora fretag enligt frst till kvarn-principen.
19 Including the four projects mentioned in paragraph 36 (a). 
19 Inklusive de fyra projekt som nmns i punkt 36 a). c)
Observations 19 The selection procedures were sometimes too lengthy 37 The average time taken to approve the projects audited (timespan from the launch of the call for proposals to the grant award) lasted more than 6 months in the case of three of the five OPs audited (in Greece and Italy (Emilia‐Romagna and Piedmont)). 
Iakttagelser 19 Urvalsfrfarandena var ibland alltfr lngdragna 37 Nr det gller de projekt vi granskade tog projektgodknnandet (frn det att inbjudan att lmna frslag offentliggjordes till dess att bidraget beviljades) i genomsnitt mer n sex mnader inom tre av de fem operativa program som granskades (i Grekland och Italien (Emilia-Romagna och Piemonte)).
This potentially affected applicants who could not raise sufficient capital and were actually in greater need of public financial support, and could not carry out their projects as a result. 
Detta kan ha pverkat skande som inte kunde skaffa fram tillrckligt med kapital och i sjlva verket hade strre behov av offentligt finansiellt std och drmed inte kunde genomfra sina projekt.
38 Delays of several months were only partly explained by the fact that the selection process included an expert evaluation and comparison of ap‐ plications received, based on a set of substantive criteria. 
38 Handlggningstider p flera mnader kunde endast delvis frklaras av att det i urvalsprocessen ingick ett expertutltande och en jmfrelse av anskningarna utifrn en uppsttning materiella kriterier.
This was the case in Italy, where the average project approval took either 8 months (OP for Emilia‐Romagna) or 14 months (OP for Piedmont). 
S var det i Italien dr projektgodknnandet i genomsnitt tog antingen tta mnader (det operativa programmet fr Emilia-Romagna) eller 14 mnader (det operativa programmet fr Piemonte).
39 However, delays of 7 months were difficult to justify when the selection procedures were also ‘first come, first served’ with no substantive appraisal and comparison of applications, as was the case in Greece. (‘Digital Conver‐ gence’ OP). 
39 En handlggningstid p sju mnader var dock svr att motivera nr urvalsfrfarandet fljde frst till kvarn-principen utan ngon materiell bedmning eller jmfrelse mellan anskningarna, vilket var fallet i Grekland (det operativa programmet Digital konvergens).
Similar procedures in the United Kingdom (‘Lowlands and Up‐ lands of Scotland’ OP) or Poland (‘In‐ novative Economy’ OP) took between 2 and 4 months. 
Liknande frfaranden i Frenade kungariket (det operativa programmet Lowlands och Uplands i Skottland) och Polen (det operativa programmet Innovativ ekonomi) tog mellan tv och fyra mnader.
40 The duration of the selection proce‐ dure under the Greek OP may also be compared to that of the pilot project for the ‘ICT Innovation Voucher’ initia‐ tive, since they both funded similar types of off‐the‐shelf projects, spe‐ cifically defined at regional level, on a first come, first served basis. 
40 Tidstgngen fr urvalsfrfarandet i det grekiska operativa programmet kan ocks jmfras med tidstgngen fr pilotprojektet fr ÓIKT-innovationscheckarÓ eftersom bda finansierade liknande typer av redan utformade projekt som faststllts specifikt p regional niv enligt principen frst till kvarn.
Under the voucher pilot project very similar projects were selected in less than one third of the time needed in Greece (see Box 2). 
I pilotprojektet fr innova-tionscheckar valdes mycket likartade projekt ut p mindre n en tredjedel av den tid som krvdes i Grekland (se ruta 2).
In most of the Member States visited, the selection procedure did not take account of the cross‐border dimension 41 At the beginning of the programming period, the selection procedures under which the audited projects were se‐ lected in all the Member States visited, with the exception of Greece (where it was compulsory), did not take the matter of cross‐border online services into consideration, despite this being an important factor as regards achiev‐ ing a more integrated digital internal market (as stated in the i2010 strategy and emphasised in the DAE) (see also paragraph 5). 
I merparten av de beskta medlemsstaterna tog man i urvalsfrfarandet inte hnsyn till den grnsverskridande dimensionen 41 I brjan av programperioden behandlades inte frgan om grnsverskridande nttjnster i ngon av de beskta medlemsstaterna i de urvalsfrfaranden som de anvnde fr att vlja ut de granskade projekten, med undantag av Grekland (dr det var obligatoriskt), trots att detta r en viktig faktor fr att en mer integrerad digital inre marknad ska upprttas (i enlighet med vad som anges i i2010-strategin och betonas i den digitala agendan fr Europa) (se ven punkt 5).
In 2010, after reviewing its selection procedure and criter‐ ia, Poland introduced the selection criterion of ‘the international dimen‐ sion of a project’ (offer of cross‐border services) into the OP concerned. 
Polen infrde 2010, efter att ha sett ver sitt urvalsfrfarande och sina urvalskriterier, urvalskriteriet Óprojektets internationella dimensionÓ (utbud av grnsverskridande tjnster) i det aktuella operativa programmet.
Observations 20 42 Only seven of the 22 enterprises whose projects were examined and for which cross‐border transactions made sense actually carried out a project that enabled them to create a website or adapt their own for cross‐border transactions. 
Iakttagelser 20 42 Endast sju av de 22 fretag vars projekt undersktes och fr vilka det var lmpligt med grnsverskridande transaktioner genomfrde faktiskt ett projekt som gjorde det mjligt fr dem att skapa en webbplats eller anpassa sin webbplats fr grnsverskridande transaktioner.
Another four enterprises already had such a component avail‐ able to them within their company or the company group to which they be‐ longed. 
Fyra andra fretag hade redan en sdan komponent inom fretaget eller den koncern som de tillhrde.
Hence, half of the enterprises that by implementing their respective projects could have benefited from the opportunities brought by cross‐border e‐commerce had missed out on them. 
Hlften av de fretag som genom sina respektive projekt skulle ha kunnat dra nytta av de mjligheter som grnsverskridande e-handel ger har allts gtt miste om dem.
43 Ten of the 23 enterprises whose pro‐ jects were audited, and of which it was reasonable to expect a multilingual website, did have a website in two or more languages. 
43 Tio av de 23 fretag vars projekt granskades, och dr det var rimligt att frvnta sig en flersprkig webbplats, hade en webbplats p tv eller flera sprk.
Of those 10 enterpris‐ es, two had had a multilingual website before the project was implemented. 
Av dessa tio fretag hade tv haft en flersprkig webbplats innan projektet genomfrdes.
The remaining eight had this capabil‐ ity for the first time as a result of their projects being implemented. 
De vriga tta fick fr frsta gngen denna kapacitet som ett resultat av att deras projekt genomfrdes.
45 The competent managing authori‐ ties (in Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom) did not ask for any result‐ori‐ ented targets for any of the 16 projects concerned. 
45 De behriga frvaltningsmyndigheterna (i Grekland, Italien och Frenade kungariket) stllde inga krav p resultatml fr ngot av de 16 aktuella projekten.
The only information re‐ quested, and provided by the benefi‐ ciaries, concerned the actual cost of the project and the outputs achieved. 
Den enda information de begrde, och som de berrda stdmottagare lmnade, gllde de faktiska projektkostnaderna och de resultat som uppntts.
Managing authorities were, in most cases, unable to assess the impact of a project on an SME’s development Over half of the projects examined were not asked to report on any result‐oriented targets 44 All the managing authorities asked beneficiary enterprises to submit re‐ ports on the progress of their project’s implementation and, depending on the duration, reports were submitted either following or both during and after project implementation. 
Frvaltningsmyndigheterna kunde i de flesta fall inte bedma ett projekts effekt p ett litet eller medelstort fretags utveckling Fr ver hlften av de granskade projekten fanns inga krav p rapportering om resultatml 44 Alla frvaltningsmyndigheter bad stdmottagande fretag att lgga fram lgesrapporter om projektgenomfrandet och, beroende p hur lnge projekten pgick, lmnades rapporterna antingen efter eller bde under och efter projektets genomfrande.
How‐ ever, in 16 of the 30 cases examined this information concerned only the physical completion of the project, i.e. purchase and/or development of the necessary IT solutions. 
I 16 av de 30 fall som undersktes avsg uppgifterna endast det fysiska slutfrandet av projektet, dvs. inkp och/eller utveckling av ndvndiga it-lsningar.
Moreover, the reports did not contain information on the duration of one third of the projects audited. 
Fr en tredjedel av de granskade projekten innehll rapporterna dessutom inga uppgifter om hur lnge de pgick.
Observations 21 46 For the other 14 projects, detailed monitoring of business data was sought so as to allow the managing authority to assess the immediate impact of the project’s implementa‐ tion on the enterprise’s development. 
Iakttagelser 21 46 Fr de vriga 14 projekten begrde frvaltningsmyndigheten detaljerad vervakning av uppgifter om fretaget fr att kunna bedma projektgenomfrandets omedelbara effekter p fretagets utveckling.
In the case of one managing author‐ ity, payments were linked to project performance (see Box 5). 
Vid en frvaltningsmyndighet var utbetalningarna kopplade till projektets resultat (se ruta 5).
47 No further systematic monitoring was carried out once a project had been fully implemented other than by one managing authority (Poland) and one project sponsor (United Kingdom), which had specified an obligation to this effect in the grant agreement. Other managing authorities were therefore left with information that was insufficient to judge how effec‐ tively the support given had con‐ tributed to the development of the co‐financed enterprises and/or the strategic objectives set. 
47 Ingen ytterligare systematisk vervakning skedde efter det att ett projekt var helt genomfrt utom av en frvaltningsmyndighet (Polen) och en projektsponsor (Frenade kungariket) som hade angett det som ett krav i bidragsverenskommelsen. vriga frvaltningsmyndigheter hade drfr inte tillrcklig information fr att bedma hur ndamlsenligt stdet hade bidragit till utvecklingen av de medfinansierade fretagen och/eller de strategiska ml som faststllts.
Example of result‐oriented management: linking payments to performance In Poland, payments were linked to the achievement of business‐result targets. 
Exempel p resultatinriktad frvaltning: att koppla utbetalningar till resultat I Polen var utbetalningar kopplade till uppnendet av fretagens resultatml.
This was the case with one of the projects assessed, where underperformance (the expected revenue target was not achieved) was reflected in decreased public‐funding support of 5 % for the project in question. 
Det var fallet med ett av de projekt som bedmdes, dr otillfredsstllande resultat (den frvntade mlvrdet fr inkomster hade inte uppntts) terspeglades i en minskning av den offentliga finansieringen med 5 % fr projektet i frga.
In some cases, monitoring systems did not record project performance in a reliable manner 48 In the case of all but one of the manag‐ ing authorities examined, performance information was provided by SMEs in the form of a standardised report. 
I vissa fall registrerades inte projektresultatet p ett tillfrlitligt stt i vervakningssystemen 48 Alla utom en av de frvaltningsmyndigheter som granskades fick resultatuppgifter i form av en standardiserad rapport frn de sm och medelstora fretagen.
One managing authority (Italy (Emilia‐Ro‐ magna)) had no such standardised format, however, which meant that the reports it received varied greatly in terms of quality, since each enterprise chose what and how to report. 
En frvaltningsmyndighet (Italien (Emilia-Romagna)) hade dock inget sdant standardiserat format, vilket innebar att den fick rapporter av mycket varierande kvalitet, eftersom varje fretag fick vlja vad och hur de skulle rapportera.
This, in turn, meant that the managing author‐ ity was unable to assess whether or not a project had been completed suc‐ cessfully. 
Det medfrde i sin tur att frvaltningsmyndigheten inte kunde bedma huruvida ett projekt hade genomfrts p ett framgngsrikt stt.
For example, one beneficiary failed to declare that one of the com‐ ponents of the project (online shop‐ ping basket) had not been developed, and the managing authority did not address the matter, despite it being part of the co‐financed project. 
En stdmottagare rapporterade exempelvis inte att en del av projektet (en webbvarukorg) inte hade utvecklats, och frvaltningsmyndigheten vidtog inga tgrder trots att webbvarukorgen ingick i det medfinansierade projektet.
Observations 22 49 In the case of two other managing authorities (Italy and the United King‐ dom), the data entered in the monitor‐ ing systems was not fully reliable and/ or comprehensive: (a) In Italy (Piedmont), the managing authority did not check the ac‐ curacy of the information pro‐ vided. 
Iakttagelser 22 49 Vid tv andra frvaltningsmyndigheter (Italien och Frenade kungariket) var inte de uppgifter som registrerades i vervakningssystemen helt tillfrlitliga och/eller heltckande: a) I Italien (Piemonte) kontrollerade inte frvaltningsmyndigheten riktigheten i den information som lmnades in.
In two of the four projects assessed, the information fed into the system was erroneous (in one case it concerned the output indi‐ cator and in the other, the number of employees at one of the enter‐ prises co‐financed). (b) In the United Kingdom (Lowlands and Uplands of Scotland), the poorly‐defined indicators set by the managing authority resulted in each project sponsor interpret‐ ing them differently and hence not reporting progress in a consistent manner. 
I tv av de fyra projekt som bedmdes var de uppgifter som matades in i systemet felaktiga (i ett fall gllde det outputindikatorn och i det andra fallet antalet anstllda vid ett av de fretag som medfinansierades). b) I Frenade kungariket (Lowlands och Uplands i Skottland) ledde de bristflliga indikatorer som faststllts av frvaltningsmyndigheten till att projektsponsorerna tolkade dem p olika stt, och drfr rapporterade de inte p ett konsekvent stt om framstegen.
Lack of data sometimes hampered monitoring of the economic use of EU funding 50 In the United Kingdom (Lowlands and Uplands of Scotland), enterprises were supported via intermediaries (i.e. project sponsors). 
Brist p uppgifter har ibland frsvrat vervakningen av den ekonomiska nyttan med EU-finansiering 50 I Frenade kungariket (Lowlands och Uplands i Skottland) fick fretag std via mellanhnder (s kallade projekt-sponsorer).
In some cases, intermediaries provided non‐financial assistance, i.e. provision of advice or consulting services (see also paragraph 36(c)). 
I vissa fall gav mellanhnderna icke-finansiellt std i form av rdgivning eller konsulttjnster (se ven punkt 36 c).
51 In two cases the intermediaries’ ad‐ ministrative costs were considerable, especially when compared to those of the pilot project for the ‘ICT Innovation Voucher’ initiative (see Box 2). 
51 I tv fall var mellanhndernas administrativa kostnader betydande, srskilt jmfrt med kostnaderna i pilotprojekten fr ÓIKT-innovationscheckarÓ (se ruta 2).
In the other Member States it was possible to establish the exact amount paid to SMEs for ICT‐uptake, whereas in this case it was unclear how much ERDF funding was actually devoted to sup‐ porting beneficiaries (see Box 6). 
I de andra medlemsstaterna var det mjligt att faststlla exakt vilket belopp som hade betalats till sm och medelstora fretag fr IKT-an-vndning, men i det hr fallet var det oklart hur mycket Eruf-medel som faktiskt hade anvnts till att stdja stdmottagare (se ruta 6).
Lack of information on the economy of the administrative costs incurred by intermediaries In Scotland, the managing authority implemented projects via intermediaries, i.e. project sponsors. 
Bristfllig information om mellanhndernas administrativa kostnader i frhllande till principen om sparsamhet I Skottland genomfrde frvaltningsmyndigheten projekten via mellanhnder, s kallade projektsponsorer.