natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
From discussions with various stakeholders in the Member States it is clear that the following issues warranted consideration by the Commission: (a) theeconomiccostofthesurplusproductionandhighprices; (b) the effect on world prices and developing countriesŐ incomes of the subsidised exports; (c) the dependence of growers on the processors and the extent to which progress in beet production and processing techniques justified a review of the grower/processor share of rev-enues; (d) the barriers to entry for new beet growers; (e) the relative profitability of beet compared to other crops; (f) the justification for continuing the storage aid arrangements; (g) the environmental impact, in particular of the surplus production; (h) the effects of the fixed national quotas in limiting specialisation and competition. 
Efter diskussioner med olika intressenter i medlemsstaterna har det framkommit att fljande frgestllningar borde ha vervgts av kommissionen: a) Den ekonomiska kostnaden fr verskottsproduktionen och de hga priserna. b) Den bidragsstdda exportens effekt p vrldsmarknadspriserna och utvecklingslndernas inkomster. c) Odlarnas beroende av bearbetningsfretagen, samt i vilken grad framstegen inom sockerbetsproduktionen och bearbet-ningsteknikerna motiverade en versyn av odlarnas respektive bearbetningsfretagens andel av inkomsterna. d) Hindren fr nya sockerbetsodlare att komma in p marknaden. e) Sockerbetornas lnsamhet jmfrt med andra grdor. f) Huruvida en fortsttning av systemet med lagringsstd kan motiveras. g) Miljkonsekvenserna, framfr allt de som beror p verskottsproduktionen. h) De fasta nationella kvoternas begrnsande effekter vad gller specialisering och konkurrens.
Although these concerns were not addressed in the CommissionŐs 1994 proposals, an analysis of Commission working files showed that in 1992 its services prepared a thorough assessment of the operation of the sugar regime, its impact and the challenges it faced. 
Fastn dessa frgestllningar inte togs upp i kommissionens frslag 1994, visar en analys av kommissionens arbetsdokument att dess avdelningar 1992 frberedde en grundlig bedmning av sockersystemets funktion, dess effekter och de utmaningar den stod infr.
An internal working group considered a wide range of options for reform, some of them quite radical. 
En intern arbetsgrupp vervgde mnga olika reformalternativ, varav ngra var ganska radikala.
Most of the issues listed above were considered, to varying degrees. 
De flesta av ovanstende frgestllningar vervgdes, i olika hg grad.
They concluded that there should be a significant cut in prices over a seven-year period. 
Arbetsgruppen drog slutsatsen att en rejl prissnkning borde gras under en sjursperiod.
However, in the end, the Commission simply proposed that the existing regime be continued unchanged for one year while the effects of the 1992 reform of the CAP for the other main arable crops, and of the newly introduced single market, were assessed. 26. 
Slutligen freslog emellertid kommissionen endast att det nuvarande systemet skulle fortstta i ofrndrad form under ett r, medan en bedmning gjordes av effekterna av 1992 rs reform av GJP fr andra viktiga grdor och av den nyligen genomfrda inre marknaden.
Again in 1993 the Commission proposed a one-year extension, this time pending the results of the GATT negotiations. 
26. r 1993 frslog kommissionen terigen en ettrig frlngning, denna gng i vntan p resultaten frn GATT-frhandlingarna.
This proposal concentrated on the minimum adjustments to the regime necessary for compliance with the GATT and measures to ensure that the CommunityŐs refining industry had adequate supplies of raw sugar. 
Detta frslag koncentrerades p minsta mjliga anpassning av systemet som var ndvndig fr att flja GATT-avtalet och p tgrder som sg till att gemenskapens sockerraffinaderier hade tillrcklig tillgng till rsocker.
There were also some relatively minor proposals to tackle certain areas where the CMO was not functioning as intended, namely the payment of storage aid on sugar produced in excess of quotas (C sugar) carried forward, national aids in Italy, and the production refund for the chemical industry. 
Ngra relativt obetydliga frslag lades ocks fram fr att ta itu med vissa omrden dr den gemensamma organisationen av marknaden inte fungerade som det var tnkt. Det gllde utbetalningen av lagringsstd till socker som producerats utver verfrda kvoter (C-socker), nationellt std i Italien och produktionsstdet till den kemiska industrin.
For these issues that were included in the proposal, the explanatory memorandum gave a good description and well-reasoned arguments which were based on thorough studies and assessments of the alternatives and the implications. 
I en frklarande PM av dessa frgestllningar som ingick i frslaget, gavs en god beskrivning och vl underbyggda argument, som grundades p djupgende studier och bedmningar av olika alternativ och deras effekter.
However, the preparatory work by the Commission services on analysing issues such as growersŐ incomes, processing industry margins and concentration, alternative uses of sugar and quota transferability was again not presented to the decision-makers (1). 
Kommissionens frberedande arbete med att analysera olika frgor som odlarnas inkomster, bearbetningsindustrins marginaler och koncentration, alternativ anvndning av socker och verfringar av kvoter, lades emellertid inte heller denna gng fram fr beslutsfattarna (1).
There was no information given on the desirability of reform in the light of the CAP reforms and the single market. 
Ingen information lmnades om huruvida det vore nskvrt med en reform, med tanke p GJP-reformerna och den inre marknaden.
The concerns of consumers and industrial users were not addressed. 
Konsumenternas och industrianvndarnas intressen behandlades inte.
It is clear from the above that the Commission did not present all the appropriate information to justify the continuation of the quota arrangements for 1995 to 2001, nor did it give a comprehensive analysis of the state of achievement of the CMOŐs objectives. 
Av ovanstende framgr tydligt att kommissionen inte lade fram all relevant information fr att motivera att kvotsystemet skulle fortstta under perioden 1995Đ2001. Den lmnade inte heller ngon fullstndig analys av i vilken grad mlen fr den gemensamma organisationen av marknaden hade uppntts.
At the same time it was noted that extensive, although not complete, information was available to the Commission services. 
Samtidigt noterades att kommissionens avdelningar hade tillgng till omfattande, om n inte fullstndig, information.
Furthermore, the Commission did not present the likely impact of their proposals compared with other options and there was no assessment of the consequences of the regime for the consumer, nor of the impact on the environment. Annual proposals for institutional prices Data used in preparing the price proposals 32. 
Dessutom lade kommissionen inte fram de sannolika effekterna av sina frslag jmfrt med andra alternativ och ingen bedmning gjordes heller av systemets konsekvenser fr konsumenterna eller av effekterna p miljn. rliga frslag till institutionella priser Uppgifter som anvnds fr att frbereda prisfrslagen 32.
Regulation (EC) No 2038/1999 requires the Commission to propose an intervention price for white sugar and a basic price for beet. 
I frordning nr 2038/1999 faststlls att kommissionen skall fresl ett interventionspris fr vitsocker och ett baspris fr sockerbetor.
The Regulation is specific only about the calculation of the basic beet price: it is to be based on the intervention price less the costs of processing and transport plus receipts from molasses (2). 
Endast berkningen av baspriset p sockerbetor specificeras i frordningen. Det skall baseras p interventionspriset minus kostnader fr bearbetning och transport plus inkomster frn melass (2).
(1) The Council, after consultation with the European Parliament and the 2 Economic and Social Committee. () Molasses is a by-product of refining sugar (whether from beet or cane) and is used in the EU primarily in animal feeds. 
(1) Rdet, efter samrd med Europaparlamentet och Ekonomiska och 2 sociala kommittn. () Melass r en biprodukt som uppkommer nr sockret raffineras (bde socker frn sockerbetor och sockerrr) och det anvnds inom EU frmst till djurfoder.
C 50/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.2.2001 33. 
C 50/10 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 15.2.2001 33.
In practice, the Commission has not reviewed the elements of this calculation for many years and analysis of the basic documentation for 1999/2000 showed that it disposes of insufficient information. 
I praktiken har kommissionen inte reviderat faktorerna i denna berkning p mnga r och analysen av grunddokumen-tationen fr 1999/2000 visade att den har tillgng till otillrcklig information.
For the main part, concerning the cost of processing the beet into white sugar, the Commission only has data provided by the body that defends the interests of the processing industry (1). 
Nr det gller den viktigaste faktorn, nmligen kostnaderna fr bearbetning av sockerbetor till vitsocker, har kommissionen endast tillgng till uppgifter som lmnas frn det organ som representerar bearbetningsindustrins intressen (1).
These data are not in sufficient detail to enable the processing costs to be verified. 
Dessa uppgifter r inte tillrckligt detaljerade fr att man skall kunna verifiera bearbetningskostnaderna.
For example, depreciation figures, which are by far the largest single element in the processing costs given, are based on replacement value rather than actual costs. 
Avskrivningsbeloppen, som med god marginal r den viktigaste enskilda faktorn av de angivna bearbetningskostnaderna, baseras till exempel p teranskaffningsvrdet i stllet fr p de faktiska kostnaderna.
The data provided imply that the processing costs in 1996/1997 and 1997/1998 were 25 % higher than the amount allowed for in the beet price calculation yet most processing companies continue to be highly profitable. 
De uppgifter som lmnats tyder p att bearbetningskostnaderna fr ren 1996/1997 och 1997/1998 var 25 % hgre n det belopp som anvndes vid berkningen av priset p sockerbetor, och nd r de flesta bearbetningsfretagen fortfarande mycket lnsamma.
Although the Commission does not actually use the information to calculate the beet price each year, its unreliability means that it is not in a position to demonstrate that the prices are reasonable. 
Fastn kommissionen inte anvnder sig av denna information varje r fr att berkna priset p sockerbetor, betyder den bristande tillfrlitligheten att kommissionen inte kan visa att priserna r rimliga.
Some elements of production costs have undergone considerable changes over the years. 
Vissa delar av produktionskostnaderna har genomgtt betydande frndringar under rens lopp.
For example, improvements in cultivation techniques have allowed production periods to be prolonged in some countries, thereby optimising the use of capital investment; interest rates have fallen and there has been extensive rationalisation with the closure of smaller inefficient factories. These changes have not been reported on by the Commission in the price proposals. 
Frbttrade odlingstekniker har till exempel inneburit att man i vissa lnder kunnat frlnga produktionsssongen och drmed har anvndningen av kapital-investeringen optimerats, rntesatserna har fallit och i samband med omfattande rationaliseringar har sm och ineffektiva fabriker stngts. Dessa frndringar har kommissionen inte redogjort fr i prisfrslagen.
This lack of information, which makes it difficult for the decision-makers and other interested parties to judge the basis for the CommissionŐs price proposals, has been strongly criticised by the CommissionŐs Consumers Committee (2) and by the industrial users of sugar. 
Denna brist p information, som gr det svrt fr beslutsfattarna och andra intressenter att bedma grunderna fr kommissionens prisfrslag, har starkt kritiserats av kommissionens kon-sumentkommitt(2) och av dem som anvnder socker vid industriell tillverkning.
The industrial users have made their own estimates of processing costs and concluded that the existing margin allowed in the intervention price is too high (3). 
De industriella anvndarna har gjort egna uppskattningar av bearbetningskostnaderna och kommit fram till att marginalen i interventionspriset r fr stor (3).
Taking account of the CAP objectives 37. While the Regulation gives no guidance on how white sugar prices are to be set, it is stated in the preamble to the CommissionŐs price proposals that when sugar prices are fixed, account should be taken of the objectives of the CAP and in particular of (1) CEFS: European Committee of Sugar Manufacturers. 
Beaktande av den gemensamma jordbrukspolitikens ml 37. ven om det i frordningen inte ges ngon vgledning om hur priset p vitsocker skall faststllas, str det i inledningen till kommissionens prisfrslag att hnsyn skall tas till den gemensamma jordbrukspolitikens ml nr priset p socker bestms.
(2) Opinion by the Consumer Committee on the reform of the CAP, 3 Brussels,14June1999. () CIUS, proposal on the reassessment of the institutional manufactur-the need to guarantee a fair standard of living for the farming community and ensure that supplies are available and that prices to the consumer are reasonable. 
(1) CEFS: European Committee of Sugar Manufacturers. (2) Yttrande frn konsumentkommittn om GJP-reformen, Bryssel den 3 14 juni 1999. () CIUS, Frslag till ny bedmning av den institutionella tillverkningsmarginalen, den 22 december 1998.
It adds that the balance between the prices of the principal agricultural products should be maintained. 
Dessutom skall balansen mellan priserna p de viktigaste jordbruksprodukterna bibehllas.
However, the Commission presented no information on these elements in its proposal. 
Kommissionen lade emellertid inte fram ngon information om dessa aspekter i sitt frslag.
Furthermore, there was no analysis of growersŐ incomes and employment or the impact on consumers in the CommissionŐs preparatory files. 
Ngon analys av odlarnas inkomster och sysselsttning eller effekter fr konsumenterna gjordes inte heller i kommissionens frberedande dokument.
Nevertheless, growersŐ incomes in this period have been affected by increasing yields, resulting from mechanisation and concentration, use of more effective herbicides, pesticides, etc. In addition, prices for other crops have been reduced substantially since 1992. 
Odlarnas inkomster har under denna period trots allt pverkats av en allt strre avkastning, som beror p mekanisering och koncentrering, samt anvndning av effektivare vxtgifter och bekmpningsmedel etc. Dessutom har priserna p andra grdor minskat betydligt sedan 1992.
The CommissionŐs Consumer Committee (4) declared that sugar prices were Ôincreasingly out of line with other arable cropsŐ and that Ôan effort should be made to reduce the very high consumer burden and trade distortion effects of the sectorŐ. These issues have not been addressed in the CommissionŐs proposals. 
Kommissionens konsumentkom-mitt (4) deklarerade att sockerpriserna alltmer avvek frn priserna p andra jordbruksgrdor och att anstrngningar borde gras fr att minska den mycket stora brdan som konsumenterna fr bra, samt snedvridningseffekterna p handeln inom sektorn. Dessa frgor har kommissionen inte tagit upp i sina frslag.
The level of prices 39. 
Prisnivn 39.
The Commission has not proposed any changes to the white sugar and beet prices since 1991. 
Kommissionen har inte freslagit ngra frndringar av priserna p vitsocker och sockerbetor sedan 1991.
It has not presented its proposals in terms of the likely impact on growersŐ incomes and consumer prices. 
Den har inte lagt fram sina frslag med hnsyn till de troliga effekterna p odlarnas inkomster och konsumentpriserna.
However, when examining the Commission files, it was noted that price cuts had been seriously considered in previous years and notably in 1992, when the Directorate-General (DG) for Agriculture prepared a proposal for a 15 % cut over seven years analogous with the cuts decided for the cereals sector. 
Vid en genomgng av kommissionens dokumentation noterades emellertid att prisminskningar allvarligt hade vervgts under tidigare r, framfr allt under 1992. D frberedde generaldirektoratet fr jordbruk ett frslag om en prisminskning med 15 % under 7 r, i likhet med de prisminskningar som faststlldes fr spannmlssektorn.
This followed an internal Commission working group analysis of the impact of various options. 
Detta verensstmde med en analys som gjorts av kommissionens interna arbetsgrupp, av olika handlings-alternativs effekter.
They concluded that an uncompensated reduction of 15 % to 20 % would not lead to major problems for the sector and could reduce EU surplus sugar production by between 2 and 3 million tonnes and produce a gain for consumers of up to 650 million euro. 
Den drog slutsatsen att en minskning med 15Đ20 %, som inte kompenserades, inte skulle leda till ngra strre problem fr sektorn och att EU:s produktionsverskott av socker skulle kunna minskas med mellan 2 och 3 miljoner ton, samt att konsumenterna skulle tjna upp till 650 miljoner euro.
As described above, neither this information nor the price reduction proposals was put by the Commission to the decision-makers. 
Som redan ppekats ovan, lade kommissionen varken fram denna information eller prisminskningsfrslagen fr beslutsfattarna.
The Commission services therefore did not present an assessment of the likely consequences of their proposals, nor justify them in relation to alternatives, despite having the information necessary to do so. 
Kommissionen lade drfr inte fram ngon bedmning av de troliga konsekvenserna av sina frslag och motiverade inte heller dem i frhllande till alternativ, trots att de hade tillgng till den fr ndamlet ndvndiga informationen.
4 ( ) Consumer Committee, opinion on the reform of the common agri-ingmargin,22December1998. culturalpolicy,Brussels,14June1999. 
4 ( ) Konsumentkommittns yttrande om GJP-reformen, Bryssel den 14 juni 1999.
15.2.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 50/11 The price for ACP raw cane sugar 42. 
15.2.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 50/11 Priset p rrrsocker frn AVS-lnderna 42.
The guaranteed price for ACP raw cane sugar is not part of the EU price proposals but is negotiated separately under the Sugar Protocol (1). 
Det garanterade priset p rrrsocker frn AVS-lnderna ingr inte i EU:s prisfrslag utan frhandlas separat under sockerprotokollet (1).
This allows considerable room for manoeuvre in the setting of prices, requiring simply that the price to be paid to the ACP countries be negotiated within the range of prices obtaining in the EU, taking into account all relevant economic factors. 
Detta lmnar stort manverutrymme vid faststllandet av priserna, eftersom det enda kravet r att priset som skall betalas till AVS-lnderna skall ligga i nrheten av de priser som erhlls inom EU, med hnsyn tagen till alla relevanta ekonomiska faktorer.
To this end, the ACP sugar-producing countries cooperate each year to produce a memorandum on economic factors. 
I detta syfte tar de sockerproducerande AVS-lnderna varje r gemensamt fram ett memorandum om ekonomiska faktorer.
The country benefiting most from the special conditions under the abovementioned arrangements is Mauritius. 
Det land som drar strst nytta av de srskilda villkoren under ovannmnda avtal r Mauritius.
Almost all of the Mauritius sugar crop (630 000 tonnes in 1998) is sold under preferential arrangements; over 95 % of 1998 sales went to the EU under the Sugar Protocol and special preferential sugar (SPS) (2) arrangements and a further 3 % to the USA under the import quota. 
Av 1998 rs frsljning gick ver 95 % till EU enligt villkoren i sockerprotokollet och systemet fr srskilda frmner fr socker (Special Preferential Sugar, SPS) (2) och ytterligare 3 % exporterades till USA inom ramen fr importkvoten.
Just 0,7 % of sales were on the world market, these being entirely sales of bagged speciality sugars. 
Endast 0,7 % av frsljningen skedde p vrldsmarknaden och den bestod enbart av frpackade, speciella sockerprodukter.
The cost of production of Mauritius sugar exceeds the prices that can be obtained for raw or white sugar on the world market (although speciality sugars can be sold profitably). 
Produktionskostnaden fr socker p Mauritius verstiger vrldsmarknadspriserna p rsocker och vitsocker (srskilda sock-erprodukter kan dock sljas med vinst).
The Mauritius sugar industry therefore depends heavily on its access to the EU market at guaranteed EU prices. 
Sockerindustrin p Mauritius r drfr i hg grad beroende av att ha tillgng till EU-marknaden till garanterade EU-priser.
Production costs in Mauritius are more than double those of the more efficient ACP countries (Malawi, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, etc.) because of the high labour costs and the hilly and rocky terrain, which reduces possibilities for irrigation and mechanisation. 
Produktionskostnaderna p Mauritius r mer n dubbelt s hga som i de mer effektiva AVS-lnderna (Malawi, Zimbabwe, Swaziland etc.) p.g.a. de hga kostnaderna fr arbetskraft samt den bergiga och steniga ter-rngen, som minskar mjligheterna till bevattning och mekani-sering.
Mauritius imports white sugar (36 000 tonnes from South Africa in 1998) for local consumption in order to maximise the exports of its own raw sugar under preferential arrangements. 
Mauritius importerar vitsocker (36 000 ton frn Sydafrika 1998) fr lokal konsumtion i syfte att maximera exporten av det egna rsockret under frmnssystemet.
The economic importance of access to the EU market at special conditions has created a strong dependence for Mauritius and other ACP countries on the continuation of these arrangements and the prices obtained. 
Tilltrdet till EU-marknaden p srskilda villkor r av stor ekonomisk betydelse och har gjort Mauritius och andra AVS-lnder starkt beroende av att dessa avtal och priser fortstter att glla.
However, the Commission has always proposed that the guaranteed price (3) for Protocol sugar be simply equal to the raw beet sugar intervention price and this has remained unchanged for many years. 
Kommissionen har emellertid alltid freslagit att det garanterade priset (3) fr protokollsocker helt enkelt skall vara detsamma som interventionspriset fr rbetsocker och s har det varit under mnga r.
In practice, there is no negotiation or consideration of the economic factors by the Commission. 
I praktiken frhandlar kommissionen inte och den tar heller inte hnsyn till ngra ekonomiska faktorer.
Management of the export programme 46. 
Frvaltningen av exportprogrammet 46.
The annual cost to the EU budget of exports of surplus sugar is some 1 500 million euro, of which 800 million euro is recovered through the production levy. 
Den rliga exporten av sockerverskottet kostar EU:s budget cirka 1 500 miljoner euro. Av dessa terfs 800 miljoner euro genom produktionsavgifter.
(1) Protocol 3 on ACP sugar of the Lom Convention, 28 February 1975. 
(1) Protokoll nr 3 om AVS-socker i Lomkonventionen, den 28 februari 1975.
(2) Arrangements for the import of preferential sugar in addition to the Sugar Protocol to ensure that the CommunityŐs refining industry has adequate supplies of raw sugar. 
(2) System fr import av frmnssocker som lagts till sockerprotokollet fr att skerstlla att gemenskapens raffineringsindustri har tillrcklig tillgng till rsocker.
(3) CIF: cost, insurance and freight. 
(3) CIF: fraktfritt och assuransfritt.
The Commission calculates each week the Ôtheoretical export refundŐ. 
Kommissionen berknar varje vecka det Óteoretiska export-bidragetÓ.
From this it used to deduct an arbitrary amount of 0,2 euro per tonne. 
Frn detta brukade den dra av ett godtyckligt belopp p 0,2 euro per ton.