natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Strengthening ECOWAS operational capacity to integrate gender in the ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture The action ŇDevis programme 4Ó is the last programme estimate of the program ŇProgramme dŐappui  la CEEAC en matire de Paix et de SecuritÓ (PAPS II) and is aiming at continuing the support to the ECCAS in order to sustain capacities in the area of peace and security 359795 ECCAS - Devis Programme nĄ4 de croisire et de clture Colour legend: In all significant respects, standards have been met Some standards are not met Significant deviation from the standards Too early to assess or sufficient information not available 
Frstrkning av Ecowas operativa kapacitet att integrera kn i sin freds-och skerhetsstruktur tgrden ÓKostnadsfrslag program 4Ó r det sista programkostnadsfrslaget fr stdprogrammet fr Eccas p omrdet fred och skerhet (PAPS II) och syftar till fortsatt std till Eccas fr att upprtthlla kapaciteten p freds-och skerhetsomrdet.
EU support to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) both in terms of capacities as well as of financial ownership, has been instrumental in contributing to the development of this architecture Đ although expected results have not systematically been reached. 
EU:s std till den afrikanska freds-och skerhetsstrukturen (Apsa) har p ett avgrande stt bidragit till utvecklingen av detta system svl nr det gller kapacitet som finansiellt egenansvar Đ ven om de frvntade resultaten inte systematiskt har uppntts.
Contributing to salaries or other operational costs is not an issue in itself as long as it is linked to achieving results and is part of a wider support strategy with a clear exit strategy. 
Att bidra till ln eller andra driftskostnader r inget problem i sig s lnge bidraget r kopplat till uppnendet av resultat och utgr en del av en bredare stdstrategi med en tydlig exitstrategi.
The EU did set specific priorities for its support to APSA. 
EU har faststllt srskilda prioriteringar fr sitt std till Apsa.
It is in the EU's specific interest to support African solutions to African peace and security problems in order to stabilise Africa. 
Det ligger i EU:s uttryckliga intresse att stdja afrikanska lsningar p afrikanska freds-och skerhetsproblem fr att stabilisera Afrika.
This is the core objective of the EU's support to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). 
Detta r det centrala mlet fr EU:s std till Apsa.
It is a long term endeavour, for which results cannot be measured immediately. 
Det r ett arbete p lng sikt, fr vilket resultaten inte kan mtas omedelbart.
Operationally, the EU objective is to be reached through a clearly formulated strategy: the 2016-2020 APSA Roadmap1. 
Operativt r syftet att EU:s ml ska ns genom en tydligt formulerad strategi: Frdplanen fr Apsa 2016Đ20201.
The implementation of this Roadmap is directly supported through a set of programmes, especially the ongoing third phase of the APSA Support Programme ('APSA III')2. 
Genomfrandet av denna frdplan stds direkt av ett antal program, srskilt den pgende tredje fasen i stdprogrammet fr Apsa (Apsa III)2.
The activities under APSA III are further detailed through annual work plans, which allow for a prioritisation of EU's support and for benchmarking of concrete results against concrete objectives. 
Verksamheten inom ramen fr Apsa III beskrivs mer ingende i rliga arbetsplaner som mjliggr en prioritering av EU:s std och riktmrkning av konkreta resultat mot konkreta ml.
In order to deliver on those results, the Commission covers a set of activities, the implementation of which requires supporting operational costs such as trainings, travels, and salaries of the African Union Commission (AUC) Peace and Security Department staff. 
Fr att uppn dessa resultat finansierar kommissionen ett antal tgrder, vilkas genomfrande krver std till driftskostnader fr bland annat utbildning, resor och lner fr anstllda vid freds-och skerhetsavdelningen inom Afrikanska unionens kommission (AU-kommissionen).
Financing these costs has been essential to achieve the main objective of the EU support. 
Finansieringen av dessa kostnader har varit avgrande fr att uppn huvudmlet fr EU:s std.
V. The lack of information on results does not mean that there is a lack of results. 
V. Avsaknaden av information om resultaten innebr inte att det saknas resultat.
Consequently, it cannot in itself be considered to be hampering the delivery of the EU's support. 
Detta kan sledes inte i sig anses hindra utdelandet av EU:s std.
The late signature of contracts and retroactive financing is very often due to belated requests and insufficient adequate information from the Organisations implementing EUŐs aid. 
Det sena undertecknandet av kontrakt och retroaktiv finansiering beror ofta p sena anskningar och brist p adekvata uppgifter frn de organisationer som genomfr EU:s std.
On coherence, the Commission stresses that significant progress has been made with regards to making a more coherent use of financing instruments. 
Nr det gller samstmmighet betonar kommissionen att betydande framsteg har gjorts nr det gller en mer enhetlig anvndning av finansieringsinstrument.
In particular, the Commission has put in place an informal network of APSA focal points. 
Kommissionen har framfr allt upprttat ett informellt ntverk av kontaktpunkter fr Apsa.
The network facilitates consultations within the Commission during the identification and formulation of both APF (African Peace Facility) APSA support programmes and Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs). 
Ntverket underlttar samrd inom kommissionen nr det gller identifiering och formulering av stdprogram fr svl den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika (APF) som fr Apsa och regionala vgledande program.
In addition all relevant Commission Services /EEAS participate in internal Quality Support Groups during which peace and security programmes are discussed and complementarity between instruments is reviewed. 
Dessutom deltar alla berrda avdelningar inom kommissionen och Europeiska utrikestjnsten i interna kvalitetsstdgrupper dr freds-och skerhetsprogrammen diskuteras och komplementariteten mellan instrument ses ver.
VI. (i) The Commission and the EEAS accept the recommendation. 
VI. i) Kommissionen och Europeiska utrikestjnsten godtar rekommendationen.
However, ad hoc support to operational costs may still be appropriate under certain conditions. (ii) The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
Tillflliga std till driftskostnader kan emellertid fortfarande vara lmpligt p vissa villkor. ii) Kommissionen godtar rekommendationen.
INTRODUCTION Box 2: An example of intervention under the APSA This case is a good practice example of coherent use of the EU's tools to support the APSA's positive intervention in the Gambia through ECOWAS (Economic Community of the West African States): long-term capacity building of ECOWAS in the area of peace and security through the African Peace Facility and the Regional Indicative Programme combined with an African Peace Facility support to the ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG) itself (first through the Early Response Mechanism, then through the Peace Support Operation envelope3). 
INLEDNING Ruta 2: Exempel p en insats inom Apsa Detta r ett exempel p bsta praxis nr det gller konsekvent anvndning av EU:s verktyg till std fr Apsas positiva insatser i Gambia genom Vstafrikanska staters ekonomiska gemenskap (Ecowas): lngsiktig kapacitetsuppbyggnad av Ecowas nr det gller fred och skerhet genom den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika och det regionala vgledande programmet kombineras med std frn den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika till Ecowas uppdrag i Gambia (Ecomig) (frst genom mekanismen fr tidiga insatser, sedan via resursen fr fredsfrmjande insatser3).
The current status of AU member states financial contributions to the Peace Fund is USD 42.4 million. 
Det nuvarande lget fr AU-medlemsstaternas finansiella bidrag till fredsfonden uppgr till 42,4 miljoner US-dollar.
USD 39.9 million was collected for the year 2017 alone Đ the most important amount contributed by African Union member states since its establishment in 1993. 
39,9 miljoner US-dollar samlades in enbart fr r 2017 Đ det strsta beloppet frn Afrikanska unionens medlemsstater sedan AU inrttades 1993.
The development of APSA roadmaps has indeed been an African owned process, but one which has been supported by the EU through the provision of technical assistance and the facilitation of meetings and seminars as part of the APSA Support Programme II. 
Afrika har verkligen tagit ansvar fr processen fr utveckling av Apsas frdplaner, men processen har ftt std frn EU i form av tekniskt std och underlttande av mten och seminarier som en del av Apsas andra stdprogram (Apsa II).
On this issue of financial ownership and sustainability, the Commission and the EEAS acknowledge the importance for the African Union and the African SROs to gradually increase their share of the funds needed. This is why the EU is supporting the AU's initiatives on the matter through off-budget financing means (art. 41.2 TEU), in particular the Kaberuka process and the implementation of the 0.2% levy on imported goods. 
Nr det gller frgan om ekonomiskt egenansvar och hllbarhet inser kommissionen och Europeiska utrikestjnsten betydelsen av att Afrikanska unionen och de afrikanska subregionala organisationerna successivt kar sin andel av de medel som behvs. Det r av denna anledning som EU stder AU:s initiativ i frgan genom finansiering utanfr budgeten (artikel 41.2 FEU), framfr allt Kaberuka-processen och infrandet av en tullavgift p 0,2 % p importerade varor.
As a consequence, the financial ownership of the APSA by the AU is already increasing. 
Som en fljd av detta kar redan AU:s ekonomiska egenansvar fr Apsa.
For example, in 2018, 57% of the salaries of AUC short-term personnel working on peace and security programmes will be covered by AU Member States contributions, and only 15% by the EU (against 34% in the previous 16 months). 
Under 2018 kommer till exempel 57 % av lnerna fr AU-kommissionens korttidsanstllda som arbetar med freds-och skerhetsprogram att tckas av AU-medlemsstaternas bidrag, och endast 15 % kommer att komma frn EU (jmfrt med 34 % under de fregende 16 mnaderna).
Overall, these efforts have already resulted in the AU assuming a larger part of its 2018 budget: 41,3 % in 2018 (USD 318 million out of 770 million) instead of 26,2 % in 2017 (USD 205 million out of 783 million). 
Dessa insatser har redan lett till att AU tar ansvar fr en strre del av sin budget fr 2018: 41,3 % under 2018 (318 miljoner av 770 miljoner US-dollar) i stllet fr 26,2 % under 2017 (205 miljoner av 783 miljoner US-dollar).
Other donors that are active in supporting APSA are Norway, the UK, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. 
Andra givare som aktivt stder Apsa r Norge, Storbritannien, Danmark, Tyskland och Nederlnderna.
The part of the APSA operational costs being funded by the AU Member States is therefore progressively increasing. 
Den del av Apsas operativa kostnader som finansieras av AU:s medlemsstater kar drfr gradvis.
Rather than more dependency, the figures show a path towards less dependency on donor support. 
Snarare n kat beroende visar siffrorna p en vg mot ett minskat beroende av givarstd.
Donor support to EU African partners in the area of the APSA cannot reasonably be expected to fully come to an end in the near future. 
Givarnas std till EU:s afrikanska partner nr det gller Apsa kan inte rimligen frvntas upphra helt inom en snar framtid.
Moreover, the issue of financial ownership and sustainability is one of opportunity and political choice. 
Dessutom handlar frgan om ekonomiskt egenansvar och hllbarhet om mjligheter och politiska val.
Since, as explained above, it is in the EU's own interest to support the APSA, there is no direct justification to stop financing its basic operational costs as long as the Commission, the EEAS and the EU Member States continue to view this support as a relevant strategic tool to stabilise Africa. 
Eftersom det, som frklaras ovan, ligger i EU:s eget intresse att stdja Apsa, finns det inte ngot direkt skl fr att inte lngre finansiera dess grundlggande operativa kostnader s lnge som kommissionen, Europeiska utrikestjnsten och EU:s medlemsstater fortstter att betrakta detta std som ett relevant strategiskt verktyg fr att stabilisera Afrika.
3 Commission Decision C(2017) 8294 final OF 12.12.2017 2 
3 Kommissionens beslut C(2017) 8294 final av den 12 december 2017. 2
The Commission and the EEAS refer to the principle of partner ownership as set out in several international agreements, such as the agreement of Monterrey 20034. 
Kommissionen och Europeiska utrikestjnsten hnvisar till principen om partnerlndernas egenansvar som anges i flera internationella avtal, t.ex.
These principles mean that overall ownership of support should be in the hands of the partners (see also our reply under 28). 
Dessa principer innebr att egenansvaret fr std br ligga hos partnerna (se ven svaret i punkt 28).
The African Union has adopted a clear plan to achieve financial sustainability by 2020. 
Afrikanska unionen har antagit en tydlig plan fr att uppn ekonomisk hllbarhet senast 2020.
The EU, which financed technical experts hired by the AUC to assist developing the plan, has welcomed the measures included in it. 
EU, som finansierade tekniska experter som anlitades av AU-kommissionen fr att bist med utveckling av planen, vlkomnade tgrderna i planen.
EU's future support will be aligned with the plan. Measures to ensure sustainability included in the plan entail ensuring AU Member States contributions so that 100% of AUC operational costs and 25% of peace support operations costs are covered by them by 2020. 
EU:s framtida std kommer att anpassas till planen. tgrderna fr att skra hllbarheten som ingr i planen omfattar att skerstlla AU-medlemsstaternas bidrag s att de finansierar 100 % av AU-kommissionens driftskostnader och 25 % av kostnaderna fr fredsstdjande insatser senast 2020.
A specific 0.2% levy over eligible imports is being put in place by AU MS to this end (Kaberuka plan). 
En srskild avgift p 0,2 % fr stdberttigande import hller p att inrttas av AU:s medlemsstater i detta syfte (Kaberuka-planen).
In addition, the EU is supporting African Union Commission's reform of its financial and administrative management systems to become compliant with international standards. 
Dessutom stder EU AU-kommissionens reform av sina finansiella och administrativa frvaltningssystem fr att de ska bli frenliga med internationella standarder.
The Commission has supported such reforms by technical assistance to strengthen accountancy, internal audit, procurement and asset management and progress is acknowledged in a review of AUC's systems of April 20185. 
Kommissionen har sttt dessa reformer genom tekniskt bistnd fr att strka redovisning, internrevision, upphandling och kapitalfrvaltning. Framsteg p dessa omrden konstaterades i en versyn av AU-kommissionens system i april 20185.
The Commission intends to further assess the AUC systems in depth by the end of 2018. 
Kommissionen har fr avsikt att gra en ytterligare, grundlig utvrdering av AU-kommissionens system i slutet av 2018.
Box 3 - The ups and downs of a regional early warning system Second alinea: Through EU support (mainly PAPS IIĐ Political Affairs, Peace and Security - under the 10th EDF RIP), the capabilities of MARAC (Mcanisme d'Alerte Rapide d'Afrique Centrale) have been developed. 
Ruta 3 Đ Svngningar i ett regionalt system fr tidig varning Andra satsen: Genom stdet frn EU (huvudsakligen Paps II Đ politiska frgor, fred och skerhet Đ inom ramen fr EUF:s 10:e regionala vgledande program) har kapaciteten hos Marac (Mcanisme dŐAlerte Rapide dŐAfrique Centrale) utvecklats.
However, following the end of PAPS II, ECCAS failed to build upon this progress, notably because a significant part of the technical staff was laid off. 
Efter utgngen av Paps II lyckades Eccas emellertid inte bygga vidare p dessa framsteg, framfr allt p grund av att en betydande del av den tekniska personalen avskedades.
Acknowledging this issue, the EU and ECCAS agreed that a minimum standard of business continuity ought to be supported through the APF-funded APSA Support Programme III. 
EU och Eccas insg problemet och kom verens om att en minimistandard fr driftskontinuitet borde stdjas genom det APF-finansierade tredje stdprogrammet fr Apsa.
This is the reason why this programme contains specific provisions to support some MARAC capacity building activities in the 2017 and 2018 ECCAS work plans. 
Detta r sklet till att det programmet innehller srskilda bestmmelser om std fr vissa aktiviteter fr att ka kapaciteten inom Marac i Eccas arbetsplaner fr 2017 och 2018.
This is understood as a gap-filling measure while the preparations for the contractualisation of the Central Africa 11th EDF RIP peace and security programme are being finalised. 
Detta r tnkt som en verbryggande tgrd medan frberedelserna fr en kontraktualisering av det centralafrikanska freds-och skerhetsprogrammet i EUF:s 11:e regionala vgledande program slutfrs.
One of the expected results of this upcoming programme is to keep on strengthening MARAC's capacities, while using the lessons learnt from PAPS II in terms of sustainability. 
Ett av de frvntade resultaten av detta kommande program r en fortsatt frstrkning av Maracs kapacitet, samtidigt som man utnyttjar erfarenheterna frn Paps II i frga om hllbarhet.
The Commission and the EEAS consider that steps are already being taken in this direction. 
Kommissionen och Europeiska utrikestjnsten anser att EU redan vidtar tgrder i denna riktning.
Taking the example of the JFA (Joint Financing Arrangement) Salaries programme, the following progress has been made for 2018: * As compared to the previous phase of this EU support (JFA Salaries IV), the EU's share of the total budget is reduced from 34 % to 15%. 
Nr det gller till exempel lneprogrammet inom ramen fr medfinansieringsverenskommelsen (JFA) har fljande framsteg gjorts fr 2018: * Jmfrt med den fregende fasen av detta EU-std (JFA Lner IV) har EU:s andel av den totala budgeten minskat frn 34 % till 15 %.
Moreover, AU Member States' pledges share for 2018 represents the majority of the total budget as a result of the efforts of the AUC to reduce the number of positions to be financed by partners. 
Dessutom utgr AU-medlemsstaternas utfstelser fr 2018 den strsta delen av den totala budgeten som ett resultat av de insatser som gjorts av AU-kommissionen fr att minska antalet tjnster som ska finansieras av partnerna.
4 5 http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf The assessment was carried out by Ernst & Young and the report was issued on 16/04/2018 (Ares(2018)2249815) 3 
4 5 http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf Vrderingen utfrdes av Ernst & Young och rapporten offentliggjordes den 16 april 2018 (Ares(2018)2249815). 3
* Positions financed by partners are limited to P3 and P4 (i.e. specialized staff) while all general staff positions have been taken over by the AUC. 
* Tjnsterna som finansieras av partnerna r begrnsade till P3 och P4 (dvs. specialiserad personal) medan alla allmnna tjnster har tagits ver av AU-kommissionen.
At present, they represent 12.6% of the positions financed under the present JFA, which is a major improvement as compared to the previous years. * Partners and the AUC have agreed that the AUC will continue to progressively cover the staff costs of its personnel implementing peace and security programmes to enable partners to shift their support from operational to programmatic costs. 
Fr nrvarande utgr de 12,6 % av de tjnster som finansieras inom ramen fr det nuvarande JFA, vilket r en stor frbttring jmfrt med fregende r. * Partnerna och AU-kommissionen har enats om att kommissionen ska fortstta att successivt tcka personalkostnaderna fr den personal som genomfr program fr fred och skerhet fr att gra det mjligt fr partnerna att flytta sitt std frn operativa till programmatiska kostnader.
This agreement is part of the JFA exit strategy. 
Detta avtal r en del av medfinansieringsverenskommelsens exitstrategi.
The Commission and the EEAS refer to the principle of partners' ownership, and consider that they did set specific priorities for their support to APSA. 
Kommissionen och Europeiska utrikestjnsten hnvisar till principen om partnernas egenansvar och anser att de har faststllt srskilda prioriteringar fr sitt std till Apsa.
These were discussed and agreed with the African Union Commission and African Regional Economic Communities during the formulation of the APSA Roadmap 2016-20206. 
Dessa diskuterades och godkndes med Afrikanska unionens kommission och Afrikanska regionala ekonomiska gemenskaperna under utformningen av frdplanen fr Apsa 2016Đ20206.
The Roadmap has a clear objective to support African solutions to African peace and security problems. 
Ett tydligt ml fr frdplanen r att stdja afrikanska lsningar p afrikanska freds-och skerhetsproblem.
The implementation of this Roadmap is supported through a set of programmes, in particular the ongoing third phase of the APSA Support Programme ('APSA III'). 
Genomfrandet av denna frdplan stds genom en rad program, i synnerhet den pgende tredje fasen av Apsas stdprogram (Apsa III).
The activities under APSA III are further detailed through annual work plans7, which allow for a prioritisation of EU's support and for benchmarking of concrete results against concrete objectives. 
Verksamheten inom ramen fr Apsa III beskrivs mer ingende i rliga arbetsplaner7, som mjliggr en prioritering av EU:s std och riktmrkning av konkreta resultat mot konkreta ml.
In order to deliver on those results, the Commission therefore covers a set of activities, the implementation of which requires supporting operational costs such as trainings, travels, and salaries. 
Fr att n dessa resultat finansierar kommissionen drfr ett antal tgrder, vilkas genomfrande krver std till driftskostnader ssom utbildning, resor och lner.
Financing these costs has been essential to achieve the objective of the EU support. 
Finansieringen av dessa kostnader har varit avgrande fr att uppn mlet fr EU:s std.
30. (c) The EU decided to transfer the entire IGAD RIP allocation to the Trust Fund for purposes of coherence, among other things. 
30. c) EU beslutade att verfra hela anslaget till den mellanstatliga utvecklingsmyndighetens regionala vgledande program till frvaltningsfonden fr att bland annat kunna garantera enhetlighet.
Most of the allocation is being directed to activities related to peace and security, resilience and migration. 
Merparten av anslagen gr till tgrder med anknytning till fred och skerhet, motstndskraft och migration.
Using the Trust Fund provided greater coherence Đ for example, where the actions envisaged under the RIP were more appropriate for or contributed substantially to the emergency migration-related objectives of the Trust Fund. (d) The concern with this risk is one of the reasons why the EU remains committed to continue working with the AU. (e) Military expertise is available in the EU delegation to the AU where the programme is managed. 
Utnyttjandet av frvaltningsfonden gav strre enhetlighet, till exempel om huruvida de tgrder som planerades enligt det regionala vgledande programmet var lmpligare fr eller i hg grad bidrog till frvaltningsfondens migrationsrelaterade katastrofml. d) Oron fr detta r ett av sklen till att EU str fast vid sitt tagande att fortstta samarbeta med Afrikanska unionen. e) Militr expertis finns tillgnglig i EU:s delegation till AU dr programmet frvaltas.
This military expertise can rely, when necessary, on expertise available at EU regional delegations. 
Denna militra expertis kan vid behov frlita sig p sakkunskap som finns tillgnglig vid EU:s regionala delegationer.