natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The analysis focused on ÔflexibilityŐ from the perspective of the equitable treatment of applications. 
Analysen var inriktad p Óflexi-bilitetÓ ur perspektivet rttvis behandling av anskningar.
This means the fair assessment of the requests submitted by the applicants and the use of coherent and consistent criteria by the Commission for the approval or rejection of applications. 
Detta innebr att varje begran som lmnats in av en skande ska f en rttvis bedmning och att kommissionen ska anvnda enhetliga och konsekventa kriterier fr att bevilja eller avsl anskningar.
Of the 18 applications that were rejected (3), 15 (83 %) concerned regional disasters. 
Av de 18 anskningar som avslogs (3) gllde 15 (83 %) regionala katastrofer.
The reason for this very high level of rejection is that the definition of regional disaster is rather (2) Article 2(2) of Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002. 
Anledningen till denna mycket hga niv av avslag r att definitionen av regional katastrof r relativt vag och (2) Artikel 2.2 i frordning (EG) nr 2012/2002.
(3) Including two withdrawn applications. 
(3) Inklusive tv anskningar som drogs tillbaka.
C 153/10 EN Official Journal of the European Union 18.6.2008 vague and their eligibility for the Fund is more complex to assess. 
C 153/10 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 18.6.2008 berttigandet till std frn fonden r mer komplicerat att bedma.
Each rejection by the Commission is justified by a set of reasons. 
Varje avslag frn kommissionen motiveras genom en rad skl.
The main reasons that the Commission gave for rejection were: (a) applications were submitted late and/or were incomplete; (b) damage reported in the application did not affect a major part of the population and was not classified as regional disaster; (c) incorrect information about the date of the disaster given by Member States. 
De huvudsakliga sklen till att kommissionen gav avslag var fljande: a) Anskningarna lmnades in sent och/eller var ofullstndiga. b) De skador som rapporterades i anskan hade inte drabbat den strre delen av befolkningen och klassificerades inte som regional katastrof. c) Medlemsstaterna hade lmnat felaktig information om datumet fr katastrofen.
Whilst the Court does not claim that cases which have been rejected should have been accepted, it notes that there are two cases where there is a lack of clarity in the criteria applied or in the justification presented to the Member State (see Textbox 3). 
Revisionsrtten hvdar inte att de fall som har ftt avslag borde ha beviljats, men konstaterar att det finns tv fall med bristande tydlighet om vilka kriterier som tillmpas eller i den motivering som lmnas till medlemsstaten (se textruta 3).
In one case the eligibility conditions as regards the level of population affected has not been applied as in equivalent cases. 
I ett fall har kriterierna fr berttigande nr det gller hur stor del av befolkningen som drabbats inte tillmpats p samma stt som i likvrdiga fall.
Graph 2 ApplicantsŐ opinion of CommissionŐs reason for rejection Textbox 3 Some eligibility criteria applied for regional disasters For one forest fire rejected in 2005 Ń the Commission alleged, as one argument, that it did not affect a major part of the population (see conditions in paragraph 2). 
Diagram 2 De skandes sikt om kommissionens skl fr avslag Textruta 3 Kriterier fr berttigande som tillmpats vid regionala katastrofer Fr en anskning angende skogsbrnder som avslogs 2005 var ett av kommissionens argument att skogsbranden inte drabbade strre delen av befolkningen (se villkoren i punkt 2).
However, it did not use the same argument to reject another similar case in 2003. 
Kommissionen anvnde dock inte samma argument nr den avslog ett annat liknande fall 2003.
On the contrary, the Commission itself explained in its annual EUSF report 2002-2003 why that condition was not applicable for this particular case even though the condition makes little sense for either of the rejected forest fire applications. 
Tvrtom frklarade kommissionen sjlv i sin rsrapport fr EUSF fr 2002Đ2003 varfr det villkoret inte var tillmpbart i detta specifika fall ven om villkoret inte tycks srskilt relevant fr ngon av de anskningar gllande skogsbrand som avslogs.
One of the CommissionŐs reasons for rejecting a flooding case in 2004 was that the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection had not been activated, which implied that the flooding was of a limited nature. 
Ett av kommissionens skl fr att ge avslag p ett versvmningsfall 2004 var att gemenskapsmekanismen fr rddningstjnsten inte hade aktiverats, vilket skulle tyda p att versvmningen var av begrnsad art.
Activating this mechanism is, however, not a compulsory requirement under the Regulation. 
Att aktivera denna mekanism r dock inte ngot obligatoriskt krav i frordningen.
This case was compared to another rejected flooding case in 2005, where the Commission also referred to the mechanism for Civil Protection, but then in this case stated that this element was not relevant. 
Detta fall jmfrdes med ett annat versvmningsfall som fick avslag 2005, dr kommissionen ocks hnvisade till mekanismen fr rddningstjnsten men faststllde att den inte var relevant.
The Court examined whether the applicants for all categories of disaster whose applications were rejected agreed with the CommissionŐs reasons for rejection. 
Revisionsrtten granskade inom alla kategorier av katastrofer om de skande vilkas anskningar avslogs instmde i kommissionens skl fr avslaget.
This could be considered as measure of the extent to which the eligibility rules are coherent and clearly understood. 
Detta skulle kunna anses mta i vilken utstrckning reglerna fr stdberttigande r enhetliga och ltta att frst.
The survey data indicates that 45 % of the applicants agreed with the CommissionŐs arguments for rejecting their application as shown in Graph 2. 
Uppgifterna frn enkten visar att 45 % av de skande instmde i kommissionens argument fr att avsl deras anskan ssom framgr av diagram 2.
The rejected applicants did not agree with the CommissionŐs arguments for the following reasons: (a) the impossibility for the regions concerned to provide the data requested by the Commission to the level of accuracy requested and in a very short time period prescribed Ń in an emergency context in which priority is given to immediate needs; 
Dessa skande som fick avslag instmde inte i kommissionens argument av fljande anledningar: a) Det var omjligt fr de berrda regionerna att f fram de uppgifter som kommissionen begrde till den tillfrlitlighetsniv som krvdes och inom den korta tidsfrist som faststlldes Đ i en akutsituation dr prioritet ges till de omedelbara behoven.
18.6.2008 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 153/11 (b) (c) it is sometimes difficult to quantify exclusively in economic terms the impact of damage to populations; for instance in small rural communes there is damage not just to property but to a way of life and general living conditions. 
18.6.2008 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 153/11 b) c) Det r ibland svrt att kvantifiera uteslutande i ekonomiska termer hur stor inverkan skadan har haft p befolkningen, till exempel har i sm landsbygdskommuner inte bara egendom skadats utan ven sttet att leva och de allmnna livsvillko-ren.
At the same time it was claimed that all these small incidents can, if added together, create a big problem; in some cases the authorities believe that, in the past, the Commission accepted the application and financed the action in similar cases. 
De skande hvdade ocks att alla dessa sm hndelser sammantaget kan orsaka ett stort problem. I vissa fall ansg myndigheterna att kommissionen tidigare hade godknt anskningar och finansierat insatser i liknande fall.
The mobilisation of the Fund under the Ôexceptional cri-terionŐ (regional) is the rule and not the exception (58 % of disasters were regional disasters). 
Mobiliseringen av fonden enligt ÓundantagskriterietÓ (regional katastrof) r regel och inget undantag (58 % av katastroferna var regionala katastrofer).
Moreover, the conditions for a successful application under the extraordinary regional disaster criterion which are required to be examined with the utmost rigour are extremely difficult to meet. 
Villkoren fr att en anskan ska godknnas enligt kriteriet fr en ovanligt allvarlig regional katastrof, som ska behandlas med strsta mjliga terhllsamhet, r dessutom mycket svra att uppfylla.
So 83 % of applications for regional disasters were rejected after a longer assessment period. 
Drfr avslogs 83 % av de anskningar som gllde regionala katastrofer efter en lng bedm-ningsperiod.
The rejections were not due to the non-availability of funds since from its creation in October 2002 up to the end of 2006 the Fund has granted aid for not much more than its budget for one year. Are applicants satisfied with the Fund? 
Avslagen berodde inte p att det saknades tillgngliga medel eftersom fonden sedan den inrttades i oktober 2002 till slutet av 2006 endast har beviljat std motsvarande drygt ett rs budget. r de skande njda med fonden?
All applicants that have replied to the survey were satisfied with the Fund. 
Alla skande har i enkten svarat att de var njda med fonden.
The Fund is perceived as a sign of solidarity, with a positive impact on public opinion, especially in the new Member States. 
Fonden uppfattas som ett tecken p solidaritet, och har en positiv inverkan p den allmnna opinionen, srskilt i de nya medlemsstaterna.
Based on the survey replies (see Graph 3), the main reasons given for this satisfaction are: (a) the FundŐs contribution was a signal of the EU solidarity with the population of the regions affected, in view of the scale of the disasters; (b) the grant helped to alleviate the enormous expenses linked to the disasters (extending secondary emergency operations, speeding up the process and so on); (c) the aid represented a reduction of the burden on public budgets, albeit sometimes limited compared to the degree of the disaster; (d) the contribution had a positive impact on public opinion with regard to the accession to the EU for candidate countries. 
Baserat p svaren p enkten (se diagram 3) r de frmsta sklen fr denna tillfredsstllelse fljande: a) Fondens bidrag var ett tecken p EU:s solidaritet med befolkningen i de drabbade regionerna, mot bakgrund av katastrofernas omfattning. b) Bidraget hjlpte till att mildra de enorma utgifterna till fljd av katastrofen (utkade extra katastrofinsatser, pskyndande av processen och s vidare). c) Stdet innebar en minskad belastning p den offentliga budgeten, ven om minskningen ibland var begrnsad i frhllande till katastrofens omfattning. d) Bidraget hade en positiv inverkan p den allmnna opinionen i kandidatlnderna nr det gller anslutningen till EU.
38. with the time allocated to them to prepare an application, the assessment of the damage in terms of components of damage which are difficult to quantify as well as with the criteria used by the Commission to assess the application. 
38. blem med den tid de har till sitt frfogande fr att frbereda anskan, med att bedma skadan i skadekomponenter som r svra att kvantifiera och med de kriterier som kommissionen anvnde fr att bedma anskan.
This last critical element could imply that the applicants have concerns about the fairness of treatment in some cases. 
Denna sista viktiga punkt skulle kunna innebra att de skande hyser farhgor om rttvisan i behandlingen av vissa fall.
Does the grant calculation principle compromise the fair treatment of grants allocated to regional disasters? 
Utgr principen fr berkning av bidrag ett hinder fr en rttvis behandling av anskningar om bidrag vid regionala katastrofer?
According to the method used by the Commission (1), all regional disasters receive the same percentage of total direct damage, namely a flat rate of 2,5 % of the total direct damage, without taking into account the ÔprosperityŐ of the applicant state or region. 
Enligt den metod som kommissionen anvnder (1) beviljas ersttning med samma procentandel av kostnaden fr total direkt skada vid alla regionala katastrofer, nmligen en schablonsats p 2,5 % av den totala direkta skadan, utan att man tar hnsyn till den skande statens eller regionens ÓvlstndÓ.
In contrast, in major disasters the grant calculation is based on the Gross National Income of the applicant giving a more equitable treatment between countries in relation to their prosperity. The views noted indicate that applicants have problems Graph 3 Global satisfaction from EUSF (1) The CommissionŐs annual European Union Solidarity Fund Report 2002-2003, p. 
Vid strre katastrofer baseras istllet bidragsberkningen p anskarlandets bruttonationalinkomst, vilket ger en mer rttvis behandling mellan olika lnder i frhllande till deras vlstnd. sikterna som kom fram visar att de skande har pro-Diagram 3 Allmn tillfredsstllelse med EUSF (1) Kommissionens rsrapport om Europeiska unionens solidaritetsfond 2002Đ2003, s.
C 153/12 EN Official Journal of the European Union 18.6.2008 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 42. 
C 153/12 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 18.6.2008 SLUTSATSER OCH REKOMMENDATIONER 42.
The CourtŐs examination of the operation of the Fund in 2002-2006 shows that the Fund does not provide a rapid response. 
Revisionsrttens revision av fondens verksamhet under 2002Đ2006 visar att fonden inte ger std snabbt.
On average, the applicants had to wait for 12 months after the disaster to receive payment of the assistance. 
I genomsnitt fick de skande vnta i 12 mnader efter katastrofen fr att f stdet utbetalt.
The delays are not related to the category or the nature of the disaster, or to the origin of the application. 
Frseningarna har inte att gra med katastrofens kategori eller art, och inte heller med anskningarnas ursprung.
The time necessary to mobilise funds depends mainly on the extent of the administrative rules applied, on the rapidity of the Commission, on the promptness of the national authoritiesŐ replies and on the quality of the information provided in each case by the applicants (see paragraphs 10 to 26). 
Den tid det tar att mobilisera resurserna beror huvudsakligen p omfattningen av de administrativa regler som tillmpas, p kommissionens snabbhet, p de nationella myndigheternas skyndsamhet att svara och p kvaliteten p den information som lmnas i varje enskilt fall av de skande (se punkterna 10Đ26).
The existing number of staff managing the Fund at the level of the Commission has proved to be efficient. 
Antalet anstllda som fr nrvarande frvaltar fonden p kommissionens niv har visat sig vara effektivt.
In addition, the total costs of managing the Fund were found to be very low in relation to the aid granted (see paragraphs 27 to 31). 
Dessutom konstaterades att den totala kostnaden fr frvaltningen av fonden var mycket lg i frhllande till det beviljade stdet (se punkterna 27Đ31).
Without questioning the rejection of applications there are a few cases which illustrate a lack of clarity in the justification of the rejection of applications for regional disasters. 
Utan att avslagen p anskningarna ifrgastts har det i ett ftal fall funnits bristande tydlighet i motiveringen av avslag p anskningar om std fr regionala katastrofer.
The method used for the calculation of the grant amount for approved regional disasters does not take into account the prosperity of the state, so it may not respect the principle of fairness (see paragraphs 32 to 40). 
Den metod som anvnds fr att berkna bidragsbeloppet fr beviljade anskningar angende regionala katastrofer tar inte hnsyn till landets vlstnd, vilket kan innebra att den inte respekterar principen om rttvisa (se punkterna 32Đ40).
Finally it should be noted that, despite the issues raised above, all applicants that have replied to the survey are satisfied with the Fund. 
Slutligen ska det noteras att alla skande som svarat har varit njda med fonden, trots de problem som nmns ovan.
In this way the Fund has achieved its underlying objective which is to demonstrate solidarity with Member States in disaster situations (see paragraph 41). 
Drmed har fonden uppntt sitt grundsyfte, vilket r att visa solidaritet med medlemsstater i katastrofsituationer (se punkt 41).
In order to speed up the payment of the assistance, the Commission should have procedures in place, before the end of 2008, to ensure that an applicant state receives detailed guidance on the requirements of the application as soon as possible, preferably within one week of a state or region advising the Commission that they will be seeking aid from the Fund. 
Fr att skynda p utbetalningen av stdet br kommissionen innan utgngen av 2008 ha inrttat frfaranden som garanterar att de skande lnderna fr detaljerad vgledning om kraven fr anskningen s snart som mjligt, helst inom en vecka frn det att ett land eller en region har underrttat kommissionen om att de kommer att anska om std frn fonden.
In addition the Commission should establish direct contact with the body in the Member or Accession State responsible for preparing the application to warn them of the common weaknesses in applications received and stress the importance of sending back the application and any other document requested by the Commission, including the final agreement, rapidly. 
Dessutom br kommissionen upprtta direkt kontakt med det organ i medlemsstaten eller anslutningslandet som ansvarar fr att utarbeta anskningen och frvarna dem om de vanligaste bristerna i inkomna anskningar och betona vikten av att snabbt snda in anskan och eventuella andra handlingar som kommissionen begr, ven den slutliga verenskommelsen.
This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its meeting of 13 March 2008. 
Denna rapport har antagits av revisionsrtten vid dess sammantrde i Luxemburg den 13 mars 2008.
For the Court of Auditors Vtor Manuel DA SILVA CALDEIRA President 
Fr revisionsrtten Vtor Manuel DA SILVA CALDEIRA Ordfrande
18.6.2008 EN Official Journal of the European Union ANNEX EU SOLIDARITY FUND APPLICATIONS SINCE 2002 (LAST UPDATE 31 DECEMBER 2007/REGIONAL POLICY DG) C 153/13 Damage Year Country Nature of the disaster (million EUR) Category Aid granted (million EUR) Receipt of EUSF aid at national level (1) 1 AT 2 CZ 3 FR 4 DE 1 ES 2 IT 3 IT 4 IT 5 EL 6 PT 7 FR 8 ES 9 MT 10 IT 1 FR 2 ES 3-9 ES 10 SK 11 SI flooding flooding flooding (Le Gard) flooding oilspill (Prestige) earthquake (Molise/Apulia) volcanic eruption (Etna) flooding (northern Italy) adverse winter weather forest fires forest fires (southern France) forest fires (Portuguese border) flooding flooding (Friuli Venezia-Giulia) 2 900,0 2 300,0 835,0 9 100,0 436,0 1 558,0 849,0 1 900,0 n/a major major regional major regional regional regional regional major major regional neighbouring country major regional regional regional regional regional regional Total aid 2004 134,0 129,0 21,0 444,0 8,6 30,8 16,8 rejected rejected 48,5 rejected 1,3 1,0 rejected 19,6 rejected all 7 rejected rejected withdrawn 19,6 27.12.2002 13.1.2003 27.12.2002 29.12.2002 29.3.2004 11.3.2004 11.3.2004 n/a n/a 2.12.2003 n/a 6.9.2004 (payment date) 12.11.2004 (payment date) n/a 7.7.2004 n/a n/a n/a n/a Total aid 2002 728,0 1 227,9 531,1 53,2 30,2 525,1 Total aid 2003 107,0 flooding (Rhone delta) flooding (Malaga) forest fires (7 applications) flooding 29,1 earthquake 12,5 785,0 72,9 479,8 2004 2003 2002 
18.6.2008 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning BILAGA ANS KNINGAR TILL EU:S SOLIDARITETSFOND SEDAN 2002 (SENAST UPPDATERAD 31.12.2007/GD REGIONALPOLITIK) C 153/13 Skada r Land Katastrofens art (miljoner euro) Kategori Beviljat std (miljoner euro) EUSF-std mottaget p nationell niv (1) 1 AT 2 CZ 3 FR 4 DE 1 ES 2 IT 3 IT 4 IT 5 EL 6 PT 7 FR 8 ES 9 MT 10 IT 1 FR 2 ES 3Đ9 ES 10 SK 11 SI versvmning versvmning versvmning (Le Gard) versvmning oljeutslpp (Prestige) jordbvning (Molise/Apulien) vulkanutbrott (Etna) versvmning (norra Italien) ogynnsamt vintervder skogsbrand skogsbrand (sdra Frankrike) skogsbrand (portugisiska grnsen) versvmning versvmning zia Giulia) versvmning versvmning skogsbrand (7 versvmning jordbvning 12,5 2 2 9 1 1 1 900,0 300,0 835,0 100,0 436,0 558,0 849,0 900,0 Ń 227,9 531,1 53,2 30,2 525,1 785,0 72,9 strre strre regional strre regional regional regional regional strre strre regional angrnsande land strre regional regional regional regional regional regional 134,0 129,0 21,0 444,0 8,6 30,8 16,8 avslag avslag 48,5 avslag 1,3 1,0 avslag 19,6 avslag avslag fr alla 7 avslag dragits tillbaka 27.12.2002 13.1.2003 27.12.2002 29.12.2002 29.3.2004 11.3.2004 11.3.2004 Ń Ń 2.12.2003 Ń 6.9.2004 (betalnings-datum) 12.11.2004 (betalnings-datum) Ń 7.7.2004 Ń Ń Ń Ń Totalt std 2002 728 (Friuli-Vene-(Rhne-deltat) (Mlaga) Totalt std 2003 107,0 anskningar) 479,8 29,1 Totalt std 2004 19,6 2004 2003 2002
C 153/14 EN Official Journal of the European Union 18.6.2008 1 SK storm (Tatras) 2 IT flooding (Sardinia) 3 EE storm 4 LV storm 5 SE storm 2 202,7 223,0 47,9 192,6 297,3 15,2 135,0 489,5 222,3 237,4 049,7 591,9 730,0 372,3 519,1 91,0 major 5,7 7.11.2005 regional rejected n/a major 1,3 major 9,5 major 81,7 neighbouring 0,4 country not available not available 18.4.2006 6 LT storm 7 EL Evros flooding 8 RO spring flooding 9 BG spring flooding 10 BG summer flooding 11 RO summer flooding 12 AT flooding (Tyrol/Vorarlberg) 1UK explosion 2EL flooding 3HU flooding 4ES forest fires 12.4.2006 regional rejected n/a major major major major regional (regional) regional 9,3 17.12.2007 major 15,1 19.10.2007 regional rejected n/a 18,8 9,7 17.8.2006 7.7.2006 7.7.2006 17.8.2006 1 10,6 52,4 14,8 24.10.2006 withdrawn n/a Total aid 2006 24,4 Grand total of aid granted since 2002 EUR 1 083,9 million (2) (1) TheEUSFgranthastobeusedwithinoneyearofthedateofreceiptofthegrantinthebeneficiarycountry.Nolaterthansixmonthsafter the expiry of the one-year period the beneficiary country has to present an implementation report with a statement of validity. 
C 153/14 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 18.6.2008 1 SK storm (Tatras) 2 IT versvmning (Sardinien) 3 EE storm 4 LV storm 5 SE storm 2 6 LT storm 7 EL versvmning, Evros 8 RO versvmning vr 9 BG versvmning vr 10 BG versvmning sommar 11 RO versvmning sommar 1 12 AT versvmning (Tyrolen/Vorarlberg) 1UK explosion 2GR versvmning 3HU versvmning 4ES skogsbrand 91,0 202,7 223,0 47,9 192,6 297,3 15,2 135,0 489,5 222,3 237,4 049,7 591,9 730,0 strre 5,7 7.11.2005 regional avslag Ń strre 1,3 strre 9,5 strre 81,7 angrnsande 0,4 land ej tillgngligt ej tillgngligt 18.4.2006 12.4.2006 regional avslag Ń strre strre strre strre regional Totalt std 2005 18,8 9,7 10,6 52,4 17.8.2006 7.7.2006 7.7.2006 17.8.2006 14,8 24.10.2006 204,9 dragits till-Ń baka 372,3 519,1 (regional) regional 9,3 17.12.2007 strre 15,1 19.10.2007 regional avslag Ń Totalt std 2006 24,4 Totalsumma fr std beviljat sedan 2002 1 083,9 miljoner euro (2) (1) EttEUSF-bidragskaanvndasinomettrfrndetdatumdmottagarlandettogemotbidraget.Senastsexmnaderefterutgngenavett-rsperioden ska mottagarstaten verlmna en rapport om anvndningen med en redovisning av utgifterna.
(2) Including amounts waiting to be paid out in 2006 for applications from 2005. 
(2) Inkluderar belopp som nnu inte betalats ut under 2006 fr anskningar frn 2005.
18.6.2008 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 153/15 THE COMMISSIONŐS REPLIES EXECUTIVE SUMMARY III. 
18.6.2008 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 153/15 KOMMISSIONENS SVAR SAMMANFATTNING III.