natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Linking actions and results through a clear logical chain 39 In order to obtain the expected results, it is necessary to identify appropriate actions and thus to establish a clear logical link between activities, outputs, outcome and impact35,36. 
Sammankoppling av tgrder och resultat genom en tydlig logisk kedja 39 Fr att uppn de frvntade resultaten r det ndvndigt att identifiera lmpliga tgrder och drigenom skapa ett tydligt och logiskt samband mellan tgrder, output, utfall och effekter35,36.
Establishing such a logical chain is also essential to demonstrate how EU development and cooperation interventions contrib‐ ute to results37. 
Upprttandet av en sdan logisk kedja r ocks viktigt fr att visa hur EU:s utvecklings-och samarbetsinterven-tioner bidrar till resultat37.
40 Some previous Court special reports and Commission evaluation reports found that the link between action and results was not always clearly established (see Box 7). 
40 I en del av revisionsrttens tidigare srskilda rapporter och kommissionens utvrderingsrapporter har man funnit att sambandet mellan tgrder och resultat inte alltid var tydligt faststllt (se ruta 7).
41 For some actions, results‐based pay‐ ment conditions can be set in financ‐ ing agreements linking payment di‐ rectly to the achievement of results in order to create incentives for improved performance through full or partial payment for full or partial achieve‐ ment of results38,39. 
41 Fr vissa tgrder kan resultatbaserade betalningsvillkor vara faststllda i finansieringsavtal dr betalning direkt kopplas till uppnendet av resultat fr att skapa incitament till frbttrade prestationer genom full betalning eller delbetalning fr fullt eller partiellt uppnende av resultat38,39.
In previous audits, the Court sometimes found that such a link was not made or enforced (see Box 8). 
I tidigare granskningar har revisionsrtten ibland funnit att en koppling inte gjordes eller inte upprtthlls (se ruta 8).
42 In the absence of a clear link between actions — or conditions for pay‐ ment — and their intended results, the interventions’ objectives can be lost sight of, which is detrimental to aid effectiveness; the EU’s capacity to demonstrate and account for the re‐ sults of its actions is also undermined. 
42 Om det inte finns ett tydligt samband mellan tgrder Đ eller villkor fr betalning Đ och deras avsedda resultat kan man tappa interventionernas ml ur sikte, vilket inverkar negativt p bistndseffektiviteten. EU:s kapacitet att visa och redovisa resultaten av sina tgrder undergrvs ocks.
When designing an action in the context of a given policy, its possible results in terms of other policies may be given insufficient consideration; for example, a project could contribute to health‐re‐ lated objectives, such as combating malaria, while its stated objectives only concern improving access to safe drinking water. 
Till synes separata politikomrden kan dessutom i praktiken vara nra frknippade med varandra40. Nr en tgrd utformas inom ett visst politikomrde kanske dess tnkbara resultat fr annan politik inte beaktas tillrckligt. Exempelvis kan ett projekt bidra till hlsorelaterade ml, ssom att bekmpa malaria, medan dess angivna ml endast gller att frbttra tillgngen till skert dricksvatten.
35 Study on Legal Instruments and Lessons Learned from the Evaluations Managed by the Joint Evaluation Unit — Final Report Volume 1: Final Summary Report, July 2011, p. vi: ’Formulating clear logic chains in regulations is key. 
35 Study on Legal Instruments and Lessons Learned from the Evaluations Managed by the Joint Evaluation Unit Đ Final Report Volume 1: Final Summary Report (studie av rttsliga instrument och gjorda lrdomar frn utvrderingar som letts av den gemensamma utvrderingsenheten Đ slutrapport volym 1: sammanfattande slutrapport), juli 2011, s. vi: Det r viktigt att formulera tydliga logiska kedjor i bestmmelser.
This can be encouraged by avoiding unstructured lists of activities and unclear links between activities, outputs and their intended impacts. 
Detta kan frmjas genom att undvika ostrukturerade listor ver tgrder och oklara samband mellan tgrder, output och deras avsedda effekter.
The relationships between each step in the chain should be clear and logical so as to avoid gaps in the logic and ‘orphan’ outputs or impacts.‘ — ref. evaluation DEVCO 1292. 
Sambanden mellan varje steg i kedjan br vara tydliga och logiska fr att undvika luckor i logiken och output eller effekter utan samband med tgrder. Đ ref. evaluation DEVCO 1292.
36 A detailed explanation of a results chain is provided in United Nations Development Group’s results‐based management handbook, October 2011, p. 
36 En utfrlig frklaring av resultatkedjan finns i den resultatbaserade frvaltnings-handboken frn FN:s utvecklingsgrupp, oktober 2011, s.
37 Study on the uptake of learning from EuropeAid’s strategic evaluations into development policy and practice, Final report, June 2014, p. vii. 
37 Study on the uptake of learning from EuropeAidŐs strategic evaluations into development policy and practice, Final report (studie av hur lrdomar frn de strategiska utvrderingar som utfrts av generaldirektoratet fr utveckling och samarbete Đ EuropeAid utnyttjas i utvecklingspolitik och praxis, slutrapport), juni 2014, s. vii.
38 Commission Budget Support Guidelines — Executive Guide — A modern approach to Budget support, September 2012. 
38 Commission Budget Support Guidelines Đ Executive Guide Đ A modern approach to Budget support (kommissionens riktlinjer fr budgetstd Đ sammanfattande vgledning Đ en modern metod fr budgetstd), september 2012.
39 See EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, 29 November — 1 December 2011) — Council conclusions — 3124th Foreign Affairs Development Council meeting, Brussels, 14 November 2011: ‘The EU calls on partner countries and development partners to increase the emphasis on harmonised and results‐based conditionality’. 
39 Se EU:s gemensamma stndpunkt vid det fjrde hgnivforumet om bistndseffektivitet (Busan, 29 novemberĐ1 december 2011) Đ rdets slutsatser Đ 3124:e mtet i rdet (utrikes frgor/utveckling), Bryssel, den 14 november 2011: ÓEU uppmanar partnerlnder och utvecklingslnder att ka betoningen av harmoniserad och resultatbaserad villkorlighetÓ.
40 Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to the health sector — Final report — Volume 1, August 2012, p. xiv. 4. 
40 Thematic evaluation of the European Commission support to the health sector Đ Final report Đ Volume 1 (tematisk utvrdering av kommissionens std till hlsosektorn Đ slutrapport Đ volym 1), augusti 2012, s. xiv. 4.
Key risk areas 22 Examples of an unclear link between action and results ‘In the 24 interventions examined, the ENP strategy is clearly referenced as the umbrella under which the cooperation takes place. 
Centrala riskomrden 22 Exempel p ett otydligt samband mellan tgrd och resultat I de 24 interventioner som granskats hnvisas tydligt till strategin fr den europeiska grannskapspolitiken som den vergripande politik under vilken samarbetet ger rum.
Reference to one or several ENP objectives is clearly made in the programming docu‐ ments and the interventions are in line with the strategy documents. 
Hnvisning till ett eller flera ml fr den europeiska grannskapspolitiken grs tydligt i programplaneringsdokumenten och interventionerna verensstmmer med strategidokumenten.
However, the documentation reviewed does not show nor explain in an explicit manner how the objectives will be achieved through the specific interventions, and how the interventions programmed will contribute to achieve the results.’41 ‘Budget support programmes in Malawi and Rwanda make reference to the objectives of the national poverty reduction strategies and sector policies and programmes. 
I den granskade dokumentationen visas eller frklaras dock inte p ett uttryckligt stt hur mlen ska uppns genom de specifika interventionerna och hur de planerade interventionerna kommer att bidra till resultaten.41 ÓBudgetstdprogrammen i Malawi och Rwanda hnvisar till mlen i de nationella strategierna fr fattigdomsminskning och sektorsstrategierna och sektorsprogrammen.
They do not state how they aim to contribute to the governments’ objectives.’42 41 Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to two European Neighbourhood Policy Regions (East and South) — Final report — Volume 1, June 2013, p. 
De beskriver inte hur de avser att bidra till regeringens ml.Ó42 41 Evaluation of the European UnionŐs Support to two European Neighbourhood Policy Regions (East and South) Đ Final report Đ Volume 1 (utvrdering av EU:s std till tv regioner fr den europiska grannskapspolitiken (st och sder) Đ slutrapport Đ volym 1), juni 2013, s.
42 Special Report No 1/2012, paragraph 53. 
42 Srskild rapport nr 1/2012, punkt 53.
Examples of financial interventions with ineffective payment conditions ‘One objective of the two targeted budget support programmes was to contribute to improving public finan‐ cial management (PFM). 
Exempel p finansiella interventioner med ineffektiva betalningsvillkor ÓEtt ml med de tv riktade budgetstdprogrammen var att frbttra frvaltningen av de offentliga finanserna.
However, the programmes did not establish any links with the government’s PFM re‐ form plan, nor did they identify which priorities they were intended to support. 
I programmen gjorde man dock inga kopplingar till regeringens plan fr reform av frvaltningen av de offentliga finanserna och identifierade inte heller vilka prioriteringar programmen skulle stdja.
It is unclear how programmes of this sort can achieve such an objective, given that funds were disbursed in a single fixed tranche, with no performance‐related conditions or policy dialogue requirements.’43 ‘For road infrastructure investment projects, the Commission uses conditions in a way that gives partner coun‐ tries little incentive to comply with them. 
Det r oklart hur program av denna typ kan uppn ett sdant ml med tanke p att medlen betalades ut i en enda fast utbetalning utan ngra resultatrelaterade villkor eller krav p politisk dialog.Ó43 ÓNr det gller projekt fr investeringar i vginfrastruktur utnyttjar kommissionen inte villkoren p ett stt som ger partnerlnderna tillrckliga incitament till att uppfylla dem.
The conditions set are not legally binding but presented in the fi‐ nancing agreements as ‘accompanying measures’ to be taken up by the partner country. 
De faststllda villkoren r inte rttsligt bindande utan framstlls i finansieringsverenskommelserna som Őkompletterande tgrderŐ som partnerlandet ska ta sig att utfra.
In practice, the Com‐ mission generally endorses works contracts between partner countries and contractors regardless of whether these accompanying measures have been taken. 
I praktiken godknner kommissionen i allmnhet kontrakt om bygg-och anlggningsarbeten mellan partnerlnder och entreprenrer oavsett om dessa kompletterande tgrder har vidtagits eller inte.
It is then under an obligation to pay EDF money under these contracts, and it has little leverage to compel the partner country to comply with the conditions.’44 43 Special Report No 9/2013 ‘EU support for governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, paragraph 65 (http://eca.europa.eu). 
Kommissionen r d frpliktigad att betala ut EUF-medel i enlighet med dessa kontrakt och har liten mjlighet att frm partnerlandet att uppfylla villkoren.Ó44 43 Srskild rapport nr 9/2013: EU:s std till en god samhllsstyrning i Demokratiska republiken Kongo, punkt 65 (http://eca.europa.eu).
44 Special Report No 17/2012 ‘The European Development Fund (EDF) contribution to a sustainable road network in sub‐Saharan Africa’, paragraph 27 (http://eca.europa.eu). 
44 Srskild rapport nr 17/2012: Europeiska utvecklingsfondens (EUF) bidrag till ett hllbart vgnt i Afrika sder om Sahara, punkt 27 (http://eca.europa.eu).
4. Key risk areas 23 4.2.2. 
4. Centrala riskomrden 23 4.2.2.
Contribution versus attribution 43 EU development and cooperation interventions take place in a complex realm, where many other donors and many exogenous factors, besides EU intervention, contribute — positively or negatively — to the achievement of results. 
Bidrag jmfrt med tillskrivning 43 EU:s utvecklings-och samarbetsinter-ventioner ger rum i ett komplicerat sammanhang, dr mnga andra givare och mnga yttre faktorer, frutom EU:s intervention, bidrar positivt eller negativt till uppnendet av resultat.
For this reason, as well as es‐ tablishing a causal link between EU de‐ velopment and cooperation action and its results (see section 4.2.1.), it could be desirable to assess the strength of this link, i.e. which part of the results can be attributed to EU action. 
Av denna anledning, och ven fr att faststlla ett orsakssamband mellan EU:s utvecklings-och samarbetstgrder och resultaten av dem (se avsnitt 4.2.1.), kan det vara nskvrt att bedma styrkan i sambandet, det vill sga vilken del av resultaten som kan tillskrivas EU:s tgrd.
44 However, as the Commission pointed out in its Staff Working Document on ‘Paving the way for an EU develop‐ ment and Cooperation Results Frame‐ work’ (see paragraph 7), ‘it is difficult to measure contribution of one level of the results hierarchy to the next’, i.e. from output to outcome, and from outcome to impact. 
44 I sitt arbetsdokument Paving the way for an EU development and Cooperation Results Framework (se punkt 7) ppekade dock kommissionen att det r svrt att mta bidraget frn en niv i resul-tathierarkin till nsta, dvs. frn output till utfall, och frn utfall till effekter.
Indeed, while an intervention’s outputs can usually be largely attributed to the intervention, this will often not be the case for its outcome, and even less for its impact, as the Court found in some of its au‐ dits (see Box 9). 
En interventions output kan i regel i stor utstrckning tillskrivas interventionen, men detta r ofta inte fallet med dess utfall, och nnu mindre nr det gller interventionens effekter, vilket revisionsrtten konstaterat i vissa av sina revisioner (se ruta 9).
45 In the particular case of budget sup‐ port interventions, it is not normally possible to identify the outputs, due to the fungibility of EU financial support within the partner country’s budget. 
45 Nr det gller interventioner i form av budgetstd r det normalt inte mjligt att identifiera outputen p grund av det stt p vilket EU:s finansiella std fungerar inom partnerlandets budget.
This is well illustrated in the OECD’s comprehen‐ sive evaluation framework for budget support evaluations (see Annex). 
Detta illustreras vl i OECD:s vergripande ram fr utvrdering av budgetstd (se bilagan).
46 Consequently, even where a clear logi‐ cal link between action and results can be established, it can be difficult — if not impossible — to assess which part of the results is attributable to EU in‐ terventions and which is due to other donors’ interventions or other factors. 
46 ven om ett tydligt logiskt samband mellan tgrd och resultat kan faststllas kan det fljaktligen vara svrt Đ fr att inte sga omjligt Đ att bedma vilken del av resultaten som kan tillskrivas EU:s interventioner och vilka som beror p andra givares interventioner eller p andra faktorer.
For this reason, it is more relevant to speak in terms of contribution rather than attribution. 
Drfr r det mer relevant att tala om bidrag n tillskrivning.
Besides its techni‐ cal aspects, this issue also relates to the more political question of results ownership. 
Frutom dess tekniska aspekter r denna frga ocks relaterad till den mer politiska frgan om vem som ger resultaten.
Indeed, when many stake‐ holders are involved, including the EU, partner countries and other donors, there can be several claims for the same positive results, or no acknowl‐ edgement of responsibility for nega‐ tive results. 
Nr mnga intressenter medverkar, dribland EU, partnerlnder och andra givare, kan det faktiskt finnas flera som gr ansprk p samma positiva resultat, eller ingen som erknner sitt ansvar fr negativa resultat.
45 OECD — DAC Network on Development Evaluation — Evaluating Budget Support Methodological Approach, page 11. See also page 12, on budget support outcomes: ‘Outcomes are the result of the entire set of policies, strategies and spending actions of the government (...), of the reactions/responses of the relevant stakeholders to changes in public policy making and resource allocation decisions, and of the influence of other external factors. 
45 OECD Đ DAC Network on Development Evaluation Đ Evaluating Budget Support Methodological Approach (DAC-ntverket om utvrdering av utvecklingsinsatser Đ en metod fr att utvrdera budgetstd), s. 11. Se ven sidan 12 om utfallet av budgetstd: Utfallet r resultaten av hela uppsttningen av regeringens politiska tgrder, strategier och utgiftstgrder, av de berrda intressenternas reaktioner/gensvar p frndringar i den offentliga politiken och besluten om resurstilldelning samt inverkan av andra yttre faktorer.
These outcomes are thus only partly influenced by the BS provided. 
Dessa utfall pverkas sledes endast delvis av det tillhandahllna budgetstdet.
The causal relationship between the provided budget support and the outcomes will therefore be (strongly) diluted with other influencing factors.’ 4. 
Orsakssambandet mellan det tillhandahllna budgetstdet och utfallet blir drfr (kraftigt) utsptt av pverkan frn andra faktorer. 4.
Key risk areas 24 Example of difficulties in attributing results to EU intervention ‘The Court cannot assess the extent to which the EU budget support programmes in Malawi and Rwanda have contributed to the results of the governments’ programmes since there are multiple and complex intervening factors (...).’46 46 Special Report No 1/2012, paragraph 57. 
Centrala riskomrden 24 Exempel p svrigheter att tillskriva resultat till EU:s intervention ÓRevisionsrtten kan inte bedma i vilken omfattning EU:s budgetstdprogram i Malawi och Rwanda har bidragit till de statliga programmens resultat eftersom det finns mnga olika och komplexa faktorer (...).Ó46 46 Srskild rapport nr 1/2012, punkt 57.
4.3. Increased complexity due to the integration of cross‐cutting issues 47 In its communication on ‘Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change’ (see para‐ graph 18), the Commission proposed that EU activities in each partner country should be concentrated on a maximum of three sectors. 
4.3. kad komplexitet p grund av integrering av vergripande frgor 47 I sitt meddelande Att gra EU:s utvecklingspolitik mer effektiv: en agenda fr frndring (se punkt 18) freslog kommissionen att EU:s tgrder i varje partnerland skulle koncentreras till hgst tre sektorer.
Focusing EU interventions on a small number of sectors can increase their impact and leverage and help to keep EU assis‐ tance manageable not only for partner countries, but also for the Commission and EU Delegations47. 
En koncentration av EU:s interventioner till ett litet antal sektorer kan ka deras effekt och hvstngskraft och bidra till att hlla EU:s bistnd hanterligt inte bara fr partnerlnderna utan ven fr kommissionen och EU:s delegationer47.
48 Meanwhile, according to EU instruc‐ tions for establishing multiannual programming documents for the 2014‐2020 programming period, sector policy commitments must also take into account nine cross‐cutting issues, including the promotion of human rights, gender equality, democracy, good governance, children’s rights, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples, environmental sustainabil‐ ity and combating HIV/AIDS48 (see Box 10). 
48 Enligt EU:s instruktioner fr att upprtta flerriga programdokument fr programperioden 2014Đ2020 ska man vid sektorpolitiska taganden ven ta hnsyn till nio vergripande frgor, bland annat frmjandet av mnskliga rttigheter, jmstlldhet mellan kvinnor och mn, demokrati, god samhllsstyrning, barns rttigheter, personer med funktionsnedsttningar, urbe-folkningar, miljmssig hllbarhet och bekmpning av hiv/aids48 (se ruta 10).
47 EEAS and Commission joint ‘Instructions for the programming of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) — 2014‐2020’. 
47 Europeiska utrikestjnstens och kommissionens gemensamma dokument: Instructions for the programming of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) Đ 2014-20 (instruktioner fr planering av elfte Europeiska utvecklingsfonden och finansieringsinstrumentet fr utvecklingssamarbete).
48 See also, for example, the Development and Cooperation Instrument (DCI) Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 which lays down that: ‘Throughout all programmes, cross‐cutting issues as defined in the European Consensus shall be mainstreamed. 
48 Se ven till exempel frordning (EU) nr 233/2014 om finansieringsinstrumentet fr utvecklingssamarbete dr det freskrivs att: ÓFrgor av vergripande karaktr som har faststllts i det europeiska samfrstndet ska integreras i alla program.
In addition, conflict prevention, decent work and climate change shall be mainstreamed, where relevant’ (Article 3). 
Dessutom ska konfliktfrebyggande, anstndigt arbete och klimatfrndringar integreras, dr s r lmpligtÓ (artikel 3).
4. Key risk areas 25 Focal sectors and cross‐cutting issues Cross-cutting issue 1 Cross-cutting issue 3 Focal sector 1 Focal sector 2 Focal sector 3 Cross-cutting issue 2 Cross-cutting issue 4 Cross-cutting issue 5 Cross-cutting issue 6 Cross-cutting issue 7 Cross-cutting issue 8 Cross-cutting issue 9 49 Previous Commission evaluation reports pointed out difficulties in mainstreaming human rights through EU development actions (see Box 11). 
4. Centrala riskomrden 25 Huvudsektorer och frgor av vergripande karaktr vergripande frga 1 vergripande frga 3 Huvudsektor 1 Huvudsektor 2 Huvudsektor 3 vergripande frga 2 vergripande frga 4 vergripande frga 5 vergripande frga 6 vergripande frga 7 vergripande frga 8 vergripande frga 9 49 I tidigare utvrderingsrapporter har kommissionen pekat p svrigheterna att integrera mnskliga rttigheter i EU:s utvecklingstgrder (se ruta 11).
50 The mainstreaming of cross‐cutting issues in EU interventions can make the prioritisation of these interven‐ tions’ objectives more complex. 
50 Integreringen av vergripande frgor i EU:s interventioner kan gra prioriteringen av dessa interventionsml mer komplex.
The increased complexity due to the integration of cross‐cutting issues in EU programmes represents a supple‐ mentary risk to the achievement and reporting of results. 
Den kade komplexiteten p grund av integreringen av vergripande frgor i EU:s program utgr en ytterligare risk fr uppnendet och rapporteringen av resultat.
Integration of cross‐cutting issues in a programme — the example of Cambodia The Commission’s Multiannual Indicative Programme for Cambodia for the 2014‐2020 period provides for three focal sectors: Agriculture/Natural Resource Management, Education/Skills and Good Governance. 
Integrering av vergripande frgor i program Đ exemplet Kambodja I kommissionens flerriga vgledande program fr Kambodja fr perioden 2014Đ2020 freskrivs tre huvudsek-torer: jordbruk/frvaltning av naturresurser, utbildning/frdigheter och god samhllsstyrning.
It also provides for the mainstreaming of several cross‐cutting issues: gender equality and empowerment of women, nutrition, the environment, and information and communication technologies. 
Dr freskrivs ocks att flera vergripande frgor ska integreras: jmstlldhet och kvinnors egenmakt, nutrition, milj samt informations-och kommunikationsteknik.
Box 10 Figure 3 
Ruta 10 Figur 3