natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
TheMissiondidnothaveabudgetspecificallyallocatedfortheset-upphaseandreceivedonly little administrative and logistical support from Brussels. 
Uppdragethadeingenspecifikbudgetfrinrttandefasenochfickendastbegrnsat administrativt och logistiskt std frn Bryssel. Det kunde heller inte rekrytera skerhetspersonal.
In the first six months staff were accommodated in and worked from hotels. 
Under de frsta sex mnaderna var personalen inkvarterad p och arbetade frn hotell.
They had no computers, offices or mobile phones. 
De hade inga datorer, kontor eller mobiltelefoner.
In the first financial year, contracts covering accommodation and running costs were signed without proper procurement procedures for an estimated amount of Ű554 00027. 
Under det frsta budgetret undertecknades kontrakt fr inkvartering och lpande kostnader utan ordentliga upphandlingsfrfaranden till ett uppskattat belopp p 554 000 euro27.
In Niger, for example, this was not limited to the set-up phase (see Box 2), but continued in the subsequent years of the MissionŐs operation. 
I Niger, exempelvis, gllde detta inte bara under inrttandefasen (se ruta 2), utan det var ett bestende problem under de pfljande ren av uppdragets operativa verksamhet.
In the case of six projects audited equipment purchased arrived long after the training courses for which it had been intended had taken place. 
I sex projekt som vi granskade kom inkpt utrustning fram lngt efter att de utbildningskurser som utrustningen var avsedd fr hade genomfrts.
In five other cases, staff that had defined equipment needs or drawn up the specifications for a contract had left by the time the goods arrived. 
I fem andra fall hade den personal som faststllt behoven av utrustning eller utarbetat specifikationer fr ett kontrakt redan slutat nr varorna vl anlnde.
Newly recruited staff had to take over projects and procedures without having the necessary training, leading to delays in implementing the MissionŐs operations. 
Nyrekryterad personal fick ta ver projekt och frfaranden utan att ha den utbildning som krvdes, vilket ledde till frseningar i genomfrandet av uppdragets insatser.
In recognition of the weaknesses observed in setting up CSDP Missions, the EEAS and the Commission stated in their reply to our report on EUPOL Afghanistan that they would develop Ňa shared service centre for all CSDP MissionsÓ and optimise Ňthe use of the CSDP warehouse to manage the assets of ongoing MissionsÓ. 
Utrikestjnsten och kommissionen angav i sitt svar p vr rapport om Eupol Afghanistan att de var medvetna om de brister som noterats i frga om inrttandet av GSFP-uppdrag och avsg att utveckla Óett gemensamt servicecentrum fr alla GSFP-uppdragÓ och optimera Óanvndningen av GSFP-lagret fr att frvalta pgende uppdrags tillgngarÓ.
This was not in place at the time of our audit. 
Detta var inte klart nr vi genomfrde revisionen.
However, on 13 November 2017 the Council approved the set up of a reinforced Mission Support Platform that is to be completed by May 2018. 
Den 13 november 2017 stllde sig emellertid rdet positivt till inrttandet av en frstrkt plattform fr uppdragsstd som ska vara fullt operativ i maj 2018.
This Platform will make Ňrapidly deployable assets and planning elements from EU member states, as well as, where agreed, specialised teams and multinational formations such as the European Gendarmerie Force" available to new civilian CSDP Missions. 
Denna plattform kommer att innebra att Ósnabbt tillgngliga medel och planeringselement frn medlemsstaterna samt Đ efter verenskommelse Đ specialiserade arbetsgrupper och multinationella formationer, ssom den europeiska gendarmeristyrkanÓ blir tillgngliga fr nya civila GSFP-uppdrag.
The EEAS is also preparing to set up a central warehouse to hold a centralised stock of items for rapid distribution and so reduce the number of procurement procedures conducted by existing Missions. 
Utrikestjnsten frbereder ocks inrttandet av ett centralt lager med material fr snabb distribution fr att p s stt minska antalet upphandlingsfrfaranden som mste genomfras i befintliga uppdrag. 22
Commission rules and procedures not adapted to conditions in Niger and Mali 28. 
Kommissionens regler och frfaranden r inte anpassade till frhllandena i Niger och Mali 28.
The Commission allowed Mission staff in Niger and Mali to apply flexible procurement procedures29 because of the difficult context in which they had to operate30. 
Kommissionen tillt uppdragspersonalen i Niger och Mali att tillmpa flexibla upphandlingsfrfaranden29 p grund av den svra kontext dr de mste utfra sin verksamhet30.
Although these procedures were used, staff carrying out procurement in the Missions considered that FPI When Missions are allowed to use flexible procedures (i.e. negotiated procedures without prior publication pursuant to Articles 266(2) and 134(1) point (c) RAP), it also relieves them pursuant to Article 128(3) point (b) RAP of the necessity to negotiate with several potential contracting parties, as required by usual European Commission rules (see Article 128 RAP). 
Nr uppdragen tillts anvnda flexibla frfaranden (dvs. frhandlade frfaranden utan fregende offentliggrande i enlighet med artiklarna 266.2 och 134.1 c i tillmpningsfreskrifterna), befrias de ven enligt artikel 128.3 i tillmpningsfreskrifterna frn kravet p att frhandla med flera potentiella avtalsslutande parter, s som krvs enligt Europeiska kommissionens vanliga regler (se artikel 128 i tillmpningsfreskrifterna).
Applying flexible procedures makes purchasing simpler and quicker. 
Tillmpningen av flexibla frfaranden gr upphandlingen enklare och snabbare.
The Commission allows this in crisis situations (see for a definition Article 190(2) RAP) after adopting a crisis declaration. 
Kommissionen tillter detta i krissituationer (en definition finns i artikel 190.2 i tillmpningsfreskrifterna) efter att ha antagit en frklaring om rdande krissituation.
Following ECAŐs Special Report on Kosovo, the EEAS and the Commission undertook to Ňreview Commission programming and procurement procedures to ensure they are responsive to EULEXŐs operational needsÓ. 
I enlighet med revisionsrttens srskilda rapport om Kosovo har utrikestjnsten och kommissionen tagit sig att Óse[...] ver kommissionens frfaranden fr programplanering och upphandling [och se till] att de svarar mot Eulex operativa behovÓ.
In one case, EUCAP Sahel Niger ordered equipment but the purchase ceiling of the framework contract had been reached. 
I ett fall bestllde Eucap Sahel Niger utrustning men ramavtalets inkpstak hade redan ntts.
As a result, the Mission had to launch procurement procedures for these items locally. 
Drfr tvingades uppdraget genomfra upphandlingsfrfaranden fr dessa artiklar lokalt.
In other cases, supplies for equipment purchased under the framework contract could not be procured locally. 
I andra fall kunde inte leveransen av utrustning som kpts in genom ramavtalet tillhandahllas lokalt.
The EUCAP Sahel Missions require the CommissionŐs prior authorisation for purchases over Ű20 000. 
Eucap Sahel-uppdragen behver kommissionens frhandsgodknnande fr inkp ver 20 000 euro.
The Commission accepted the recommendation in the ECAŐs 2013 Annual Report that the FPI should accredit all civilian CSDP Missions in accordance with the Ôsix-pillar assessmentŐ31. 
Kommissionen godtog rekommendationen i revisionsrttens rsrapport fr 2013 om att tjnsten fr utrikespolitiska instrument br godknna alla civila GSFP-uppdrag i enlighet med bedmningar grundade p de sex pelarna31.
This means that once the Missions have strengthened their systems to meet the requirements of the assessors, Heads of Mission receive delegated powers to authorise An assessment of key processes by an independent auditor (internal control; accounting; external audit; grants; procurement; financial instruments). 
Det innebr att s snart uppdragen har frstrkt sina system s att de uppfyller bedmarnas krav ges uppdragscheferna delegerade befogenheter att godknna inkp, medan kommissionen fortstter att utfra kontroller i efterhand.
Lack of guidance from EEAS headquarters resulted in weak procedures 30. 
Brist p vgledning frn utrikestjnstens huvudkontor resulterade i svaga frfaranden 30.
We looked at the guidance available to the Missions and found it to be inadequate since it related mainly to administrative procedures33. 
Vi tittade p den vgledning som var tillgnglig fr uppdragen och konstaterade att den var bristfllig eftersom den frmst rrde administrativa frfaranden33.
There was little operational guidance, with examples of good practice, or standard templates from the previous civilian CSDP Missions, that could be used to train newly recruited staff. 
Det fanns inte mycket vgledning fr den operativa verksamheten, exempel p god praxis eller standardmallar frn tidigare civila GSFP-uppdrag som kunde anvndas fr att utbilda nyrekryterad personal.
Each EUCAP Sahel Mission spent considerable time and resources on defining and setting up its own procedures, which were not always operationally efficient. 
Varje Eucap Sahel-uppdrag gnade avsevrd tid och resurser t att faststlla och inrtta sina egna frfaranden, som inte alltid var effektiva frn operativ synpunkt.
The EU member states did not provide enough staff to fill the posts available 31. 
EU:s medlemsstater tillhandahll inte tillrckligt med personal fr att tillstta alla tillgngliga tjnster 31.
The most important resource of the EUCAP Sahel Missions is their staff, both those seconded and paid for by the EU member states and those contracted locally by the Missions and funded out of the EU budget. 
Eucap Sahel-uppdragens viktigaste resurs r deras personal, bde den som utstationeras och betalas av EU:s medlemsstater och den som kontraktanstlls lokalt av uppdraget och finansieras ur EU-budgeten.
The Missions consistently experienced problems filling vacancies for seconded staff. 
Uppdragen hade stndiga problem med tillsttandet av lediga tjnster fr utstationerad personal.
The EEAS invites the EU member states to provide candidates for secondment through calls for contributions, which are time-consuming and expensive to organise. 
Utrikestjnsten uppmanar EU:s medlemsstater att tillhandahlla kandidater fr utstationering genom bidragsinfordringar, som r tidskrvande och kostsamma att anordna.
24 calls for contributions were made for EUCAP Sahel Niger between 2012 and 2016 and 14 for EUCAP Sahel Mali between 2014 and 2016. 
24 bidragsinfordringar gjordes fr Eucap Sahel Niger mellan 2012 och 2016 och 14 fr Eucap Sahel Mali mellan 2014 och 2016.
These calls for contributions only resulted in filling half of the vacant posts published for Niger, and only two-thirds for Mali (see Tables 2 and 3). 
Dessa bidragsinfordringar resulterade endast i att hlften av de lediga tjnster som offentliggjorts kunde tillsttas i Niger och tv tredjedelar i Mali (se tabellerna 2 och 3).
The CIVCOM decides which posts are published exclusively for seconded staff and which are also open to contracted staff. 
Civcom beslutar om vilka tjnster som offentliggrs uteslutande fr utstationerad personal och vilka som ven r ppna fr kontraktsanstlld personal.
Table 2 Đ EUCAP Sahel Niger: results of calls for contributions (2012-2016) 24 EUCAP Sahel Niger Ordinary Calls for Contributions Extraordinary Calls for Contributions Total number of posts published 276 59 Published as 'Seconded' 132 48% 20 34% Published as 'Seconded/Contracted' 144 52% 39 66% Posts Filled 163 59% 29 49% Posts Not filled 113 41% 30 51% Posts for which no applications were received 33 12% 9 15% Posts for which only one application was received 71 26% 9 15% Source: EUCAP Sahel Niger. 
Tabell 2 Đ Eucap Sahel Niger: resultat av bidragsinfordringar (2012Đ2016) 25 Eucap Sahel Niger Ordinra bidragsinfordringar Extraordinra bidragsinfordringar Totalt antal tjnster som offentliggjorts 276 59 Offentliggjorda som ÓutstationeradeÓ 132 48% 20 34% Offentliggjorda som Óutstationerade/kontraktsanstlldaÓ 144 52% 39 66% Tillsatta tjnster 163 59% 29 49% Ej tillsatta tjnster 113 41% 30 51% Tjnster fr vilka inga anskningar inkommit 33 12% 9 15% Tjnster fr vilka endast en anskan inkommit 71 26% 9 15% Klla: Eucap Sahel Niger.
Table 3 Đ EUCAP Sahel Mali: results of calls for contributions (2014-2016) EUCAP Sahel Mali Ordinary Calls for Contributions Extraordinary Calls for Contributions Total number of posts published 198 21 Published as 'Seconded' 127 64% 5 24% Published as 'Seconded/Contracted' 71 36% 16 76% Posts Filled 139 70% 14 67% Posts Not filled 59 30% 7 33% Posts for which no applications were received 7 4% 0 0% Posts for which only one application was received 26 13% 1 5% Source: EUCAP Sahel Mali. 
Tabell 3 Đ Eucap Sahel Mali: resultat av bidragsinfordringar (2014Đ2016) 26 Eucap Sahel Mali Ordinra bidragsinfordringar Extraordinra bidragsinfordringar Totalt antal tjnster som offentliggjorts 198 21 Offentliggjorda som ÓutstationeradeÓ 127 64% 5 24% Offentliggjorda som Óutstationerade/kontraktsanstlldaÓ 71 36% 16 76% Tillsatta tjnster 139 70% 14 67% Ej tillsatta tjnster 59 30% 7 33% Tjnster fr vilka inga anskningar inkommit 7 4% 0 0% Tjnster fr vilka endast en anskan inkommit 26 13% 1 5% Klla: Eucap Sahel Mali.
The difficulties faced by the Missions in Niger and Mali in obtaining seconded staff from EU member states are similar to those faced by previous civilian CSDP Missions34. 
De svrigheter som uppdragen i Niger och Mali har att f utstationerad personal frn EU:s medlemsstater liknar de svrigheter som tidigare civila GSFP-uppdrag har haft34.
The reasons include the fact that the qualifications and level of expertise required of such staff are high, and they need to be able to work in French35. 
Anledningarna r bland annat att det stlls hga krav p kvalifikationer och expertkunskaper och att personalen mste kunna arbeta p franska35.
Lastly, staffing civilian CSDP Missions is not always a high priority for EU member states. 
Slutligen prioriteras inte alltid utstationering av personal till civila GSFP-uppdrag srskilt hgt av EU:s medlemsstater.
posts in the EUCAP Sahel Missions in Niger and Mali averaged 72 % and 77 % respectively in the relevant periods. 
Som ett resultat lg andelen tillsatta tjnster i Eucap Sahel-uppdragen i Niger och Mali p 72 % respektive 77 % under de berrda perioderna.
The length of secondment of staff from EU member states is two years on average or just one year for some EU member states. 
Lngden p utstationeringen av personal frn EU:s medlemsstater r i allmnhet tv r eller bara ett r frn vissa medlemsstater.
This is not enough time for individuals to build up sufficient knowledge of the various procedures and working conditions. 
Det r inte tillrckligt lng tid fr att enskilda personer ska kunna bygga upp ndvndig kunskap om olika frfaranden och arbetsvillkor.
We found that in addition to the shortness of the secondments, the high vacancy rate had a negative impact on the extent to which the Missions carried out their activities (see Box 3). 
Vi konstaterade att den korta utstationeringstiden tillsammans med den hga andelen otillsatta tjnster inverkade negativt p genomfrandet av uppdragens verksamheter (se ruta 3).
25 Box 3-Vacancies at the beginning of 2017 Ľ EUCAP Sahel Niger: at the beginning of 2017, the Mission had 39 vacancies (35 %36) in key posts in the operational units as well as in the monitoring, evaluation and procurement departments. 
27 Ruta 3 Đ Otillsatta tjnster i brjan av 2017 Ľ Eucap Sahel Niger: i brjan av 2017 hade uppdraget 39 otillsatta tjnster (35 %36) p nyckelpositioner i de operativa enheterna och inom vervaknings-, utvrderings-och inkpsavdelningarna.
Other vacancies included those for armed protection officers, and a press and public information officer. 
Andra otillsatta tjnster rrde tjnstemn med ansvar fr vpnat skydd och en protokoll-och pressinformationstjnsteman.
As a result: - fewer tender procedures were launched than planned meaning the equipment to carry out activities was not available; - there was no evaluation of training or projects; - the Mission was unable to start implementing activities related to arms and drugs trafficking and did not succeed in making activities sustainable. 
Det fick fljande konsekvenser: - Frre anbudsfrfaranden n planerat inleddes, vilket ledde till att det saknades utrustning fr att kunna utfra verksamheterna. - Det gjordes ingen utvrdering av utbildning eller projekt. - Uppdraget kunde inte pbrja genomfrandet av verksamheter som rrde vapen-och narkotikahandel och lyckades inte uppn hllbarhet i verksamheterna.
Ľ EUCAP Sahel Mali: at the beginning of 2017, the Mission had 50 vacancies (37 %37), mainly for advisors and trainers in key areas. 
Ľ Eucap Sahel Mali: i brjan av 2017 hade uppdraget 50 otillsatta tjnster (37 %37) som frmst avsg rdgivare och utbildare inom nyckelomrden.
Implementation of some activities was delayed, but the Mission redistributed the workload between existing staff. 
Genomfrandet av vissa verksamheter frsenades, men uppdraget omfrdelade arbetet inom den befintliga personalen.
Uncertain lifetime for the Missions made it difficult to plan an exit strategy 34. 
Oskerhet kring uppdragens livstid gjorde det svrt att planera en strategi fr tillbakadragandet 34.
Based on the proposal of the EEAS (see paragraph 7), the Council set up the two Missions in the Sahel region to strengthen the capacities of the forces responsible for internal security. 
Baserat p utrikestjnstens frslag (se punkt 7) inrttade rdet de tv uppdragen i Sahelregionen fr att strka kapaciteten hos de styrkor som ansvarar fr den inre skerheten.
The Council decisions defined the objectives of the MissionsŐ work, but gave no indication of how long the Missions might exist. 
I rdets beslut faststlldes mlen fr uppdragens arbete, men det angavs inte hur lnge uppdragen skulle kunna pg.
The Missions currently operate within two-year mandates, which are renewable. 
Uppdragen arbetar fr nrvarande enligt tvriga mandat, som kan frnyas.
The EEAS is required to prepare an exit strategy for when the EU member states decide to end the Missions. 
Utrikestjnsten behver frbereda en strategi fr hur tillbakadragandet ska g till nr EU:s medlemsstater beslutar att avsluta uppdragen.
However, they did not set out a detailed plan towards reaching a transition or exit strategy. 
detaljerad plan fr hur man ska n fram till en vergngsstrategi eller en strategi fr tillbakadragandet.
Stakeholders38 we interviewed were of the opinion that the Missions would exist in at least the medium-term in order to achieve the objectives set for them. 
Berrda parter38 som vi intervjuade ansg att uppdragen borde vara kvar tminstone p medellng sikt fr att kunna uppn de ml som satts upp fr dem.
It would also make it easier to draw up a meaningful exit strategy. 
Det skulle ocks gra det lttare att utarbeta en genomtnkt strategi fr tillbakadragandet.
The EUCAP Sahel Missions strengthened the capacity of the security forces, but results were not sustainable 36. 
Eucap Sahel-uppdragen strkte skerhetsstyrkornas kapacitet, men resultaten var inte hllbara 36.
We examined how the EUCAP Sahel Missions in Niger and Mali carried out the activities planned, how they delivered, monitored and evaluated results, and whether the results were sustainable. 
Vi underskte hur Eucap Sahel-uppdragen i Niger och Mali utfrde de planerade verksamheterna, hur de levererade, vervakade och utvrderade resultat och om resultaten var hllbara.
We assessed: (a) whether the Missions had strengthened the capacity of the internal security forces; (b) whether the MissionsŐ results were sustainable; (c) whether indicators for monitoring the MissionsŐ results were appropriate; E.g. national ministries in Niger and Mali, embassies of some EU member states and donor organisations, such as GIZ, Civipol and Expertise France. 26 38 
Vi bedmde a) om uppdragen hade strkt de interna skerhetsstyrkornas kapacitet, b) om uppdragens resultat var hllbara, c) om man hade lmpliga indikatorer fr vervakning av uppdragens resultat, d) om frfarandena fr vervakning och utvrdering inom uppdragen var inriktade p effekter, e) vilken uppfattning vriga berrda parter i de bda lnderna hade om uppdragens resultat.
Working in a challenging context, the Missions strengthened the capacity of the security forces, albeit slowly 37. 
Det arbete som uppdragen bedriver i en svr kontext har strkt skerhetsstyrkornas kapacitet, ven om det gr lngsamt 37.
The capacity-building needs of the forces responsible for internal security in both Niger and Mali are high. 
Behoven av kapacitetsuppbyggnad inom de styrkor som ansvarar fr den inre skerheten i bde Niger och Mali r stora.
The EUCAP Sahel Missions deliver training, equipment, advice and exercise a coordination function over the internal security forces through a range of tasks and activities. 
28 38 och rdgivning och har en samordnande funktion ver de interna skerhetsstyrkorna genom en rad uppgifter och verksamheter.
The EU also provides support to the internal security sector through instruments such as the European Development Fund and the EU Trust Fund for Africa. 
EU tillhandahller ocks std till sektorn fr inre skerhet genom instrument som Europeiska utvecklingsfonden och EU:s frvaltningsfond fr ndtgrder i Afrika.
Living and working in countries on the edge of the Sahara desert with poor infrastructure and weak public administrations presents EUCAP staff with considerable challenges. 
Att bo och arbeta i lnder vid randen till Saharaknen med bristfllig infrastruktur och svaga offentliga frvaltningar stller Eucap-personalen infr stora utmaningar.
Travel is complicated and staff must constantly be vigilant against the threat of terrorist attacks. In Niger some of the border regions are too insecure to visit, and the centre and the north of Mali are entirely out of bounds. 
Det r komplicerat att resa och personalen mste hela tiden vara vaksam p hotet om terrorattentat. I Niger r vissa grnsomrden alltfr oskra att beska och de centrala och norra delarna av Mali har man inte alls tilltrde till.
To meet their objectives, the Missions carry out activities, which are mostly ongoing and rolled over from one Council mandate to another and from one budgetary year to the next. 
Fr att n sina ml utfr uppdragen verksamheter som i de flesta fall pgr och verfrs frn ett rdsmandat till ett annat och frn ett budgetr till nsta.
We compared how the Missions carried out the activities planned with results reported and confirmed in interviews we held in Niger and Mali. 
Vi jmfrde hur uppdragen utfrde de planerade verksamheterna med de resultat som rapporterades och bekrftades vid vra intervjuer i Niger and Mali.
See Annexes III and IV for details of our findings. 
Se bilagorna III och IV fr nrmare uppgifter om vra iakttagelser.
In some cases, the Missions made good progress, such as on providing training to fight terrorism and organised crime in Niger. 
I vissa fall gjorde uppdragen goda framsteg, exempelvis nr det gller att ge utbildning i att bekmpa terrorism och organiserad brottslighet i Niger.
In other cases, there was little or no progress, such as on setting up internal control and audit services in the ISFs in Mali. 
I andra fall gjordes sm eller inga framsteg, exempelvis i frga om att inrtta tjnster fr intern kontroll och revision inom de interna skerhetsstyrkorna i Mali.
Training courses 40. 
Utbildningskurser 40.
We examined a sample of training courses for each of the Missions. 
Vi underskte ett urval av utbildningskurser fr vart och ett av uppdragen.
The principal beneficiaries of the courses were the police, the gendarmerie and the national guard. 
De huvudsakliga deltagarna i kurserna var polisen, gendarmeriet och nationalgardet.