natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
EU funding was not adequately prioritised 50 We found a lack of adequate prioritisation: (a) The 2014 and 2015 CEF calls did not establish any specific priorities for funding beyond referring to the PCP. 
EU-finansieringen prioriterades inte p lmpligt stt 50 Vi konstaterade att det saknades lmpliga prioriteringar: a) Vid FSE-anskningsomgngarna 2014 och 2015 faststlldes inga specifika prioriteringar fr finansiering frutom en hnvisning till det gemensamma pilotprojektet.
In addition, the calls were launched without an approved deployment programme, which describes in detail what is needed for PCP implementation. 
Dessutom inleddes anskningsomgngarna utan att det fanns ett godknt infrandeprogram som i detalj beskrev vad som krvs fr att genomfra gemensamma pilotprojekt.
Despite this, these two calls awarded more than Ű1 billion (or 64 % of total EU funding to SESAR awarded between 2014 and 2017 Đ see Figure 4). 26 
Trots det delades det vid dessa tv anskningsomgngar ut ver 1 miljard euro (eller 64 % av EU:s totala finansiering till Sesar mellan 2014 och 2017 Đ se figur 4).
Figure 4 Đ Amounts awarded per CEF call (in million euro) TOTAL 600 500 400 300 200 100 682.8 364.4 318.6 45.8 296.9 269 27.9 301.2 27 Source: ECA based on data from the Innovation and Networks Executive Agency (INEA). 
Figur 4 Đ Tilldelade belopp per FSE-anskningsomgng (i miljoner euro) TOTALT 600 500 400 300 200 100 682,8 364,4 318,6 45,8 296,9 269 27,9 301,2 28 243,2 58 GEMENSAMMA PROJEKT VRIGA PROJEKT Klla: Revisionsrtten, p grundval av uppgifter frn genomfrandeorganet fr innovation och transportnt (Inea).
524.9 157.9 0 2014 2015 2016 2017 (b) In the absence of specific prioritisation, EU funding was de facto channelled to large ATM system renewal projects already in the investment pipeline and ready for implementation. 
524,9 157,9 0 2014 2015 2016 2017 b) Eftersom det inte gjordes en specifik prioritering gick EU-finansiering i praktiken till stora projekt fr frnyelse av ATM-system dr investeringsbesluten redan hade fattats och projekten var redo att genomfras.
53 % of the funding awarded in the 2014-2015 calls went to five large ANSPs. (c) From 2016 onwards, calls for proposals set specific priorities. 
Fem stora flygtrafiktjnstleverantrer tilldelades 53 % av finansieringen inom anskningsomgngarna 2014Đ2015. c) Frn och med 2016 angavs specifika prioriteringar fr anskningsomgngarna.
However, we noted that some priorities referred to elements which are outside the scope of the PCP33. 
Vi noterade dock att ngra prioriteringar hnvisade till element som inte ingr i det gemensamma pilotprojektet33.
Overall, between 2014 and the date of this report, the grants awarded to such projects amounted to Ű141 million. 
Mellan 2014 och datum fr denna rapport tilldelades sdana projekt sammantaget 141 miljoner euro i bidrag.
51 Moreover, all calls reserved approximately 20 % of the available funding to the so-called Ňother projectsÓ, identified as contributing to the implementation of the 33 As from 2016, the Deployment Programme defines core, complementary and facilitating families. 
51 I samtliga anskningsomgngar reserverades vidare omkring 20 % av den tillgngliga finansieringen till s kallade vriga projekt, vilket identifierades som projekt som bidrog till ett gemensamt europeiskt luftrum men lg utanfr det gemensamma pilotprojektet.
Some Ű290 million were awarded to projects under this category in the 2014-2017 calls. 
Cirka 290 miljoner euro tilldelades projekt i denna kategori inom anskningsomgngarna 2014Đ2017.
Because there is no requirement for coordinated action around a common project, EU support for this category of project has limited effectiveness in tackling fragmentation. 
Eftersom det inte stlls krav p en samordnad insats runt ett gemensamt projekt r EU-stdets ndamlsenlighet nr det gller att tgrda fragmentering begrnsad fr denna projektkategori.
52 The absence of specific priorities reduced the effectiveness of EU funding. 
52 Avsaknaden av specifika prioriteringar minskade EU-finansieringens ndamlsenlighet.
The fact that this was the case for the first two years is particularly serious, because this is the period during which the largest amounts of funding were awarded, meaning it was not used to target those investments most critical to PCP implementation. 
Detta r srskilt allvarligt eftersom det var s under de tv frsta ren nr de strsta stdbeloppen tilldelades, vilket innebr att stdet inte inriktades p att anvndas till de investeringar som r mest avgrande fr genomfrandet av det gemensamma pilotprojektet.
Clustering of applications for funding did not aid the effective synchronisation of projects and the appropriate evaluation of applications 53 EU funding is intended to support the efficient synchronisation and overall coordination of the implementation projects and the related investments in line with the Deployment Programme (see Box 5), developed by the Deployment Manager and approved by the Commission. 
Grupperingen av finansieringsanskningar gjorde det inte enklare att ndamlsenligt synkronisera projekt och att p ett adekvat stt utvrdera anskningar 53 Avsikten med EU-finansieringen r att stdja effektiv synkronisering och vergripande samordning av genomfrandeprojekt och de tillhrande investeringarna i enlighet med infrandeprogrammet (se ruta 5), som utarbetas av infrandefrvaltaren och godknns av kommissionen.
The evaluation of PCP-related projects should assess their need for synchronisation, their potential network performance improvements and their coverage of actual gaps relative to the Deployment Programme. 
29 relaterade projekt br deras behov av synkronisering, deras potentiella frbttringar av ntverkets prestanda och deras verbryggning av faktiska luckor bedmas i frhllande till infrandeprogrammet.
54 Each call for proposals launched by INEA specifically states that the Deployment Manager is to act as the coordinator for projects. 
54 I varje anskningsomgng som Inea bjuder in till anges srskilt att infrandefrvaltaren ska fungera som samordnare av projekt.
Common projectsŐ applicants must coordinate their applications with the Deployment Manager who is required to screen them to assess their relevance to the common project. 
Skande i gemensamma projekt mste samordna sina anskningar med infrandefrvaltaren som ska kontrollera dem fr att bedma deras relevans fr det gemensamma projektet.
In practice, the Deployment Manager receives individual project applications, groups them and submits clustered applications to INEA for funding. 
I praktiken fr infrandefrvaltaren anskningar om enskilda projekt, grupperar dem och lmnar in samlade anskningar till Inea fr finansiering.
55 Specifically, we found that, although the clustering could have been also used for technical coordination, it was not used for this purpose in the context of funding the common project: (a) Although project applications are organised in clusters by PCP functionality, individual projects were not coordinated and there was no cooperation between different stakeholders in their implementation. 
55 Mer specifikt fann vi att man inte anvnde samlade anskningar fr teknisk samordning vid finansiering av gemensamma projekt trots att man kunde ha gjort det: a) ven om projektanskningar organiseras i kluster i enlighet med PCP-funktionalitet samordnades inte enskilda projekt, och olika berrda parter samarbetade inte vid genomfrandet av dem.
Instead, aggregating individual projects into clusters was driven by administrative considerations: the timing (planned start and end dates) and the funding rates for cohesion and non-cohesion countries. (b) Despite being grouped in clusters, more than 70 % of the co-funded projects to date were implemented by single stakeholders. 
Aggregeringen av enskilda projekt i kluster drevs i stllet av administrativa hnsyn: tidpunkt (planerade start-och slutdatum) och finansieringsgrad fr lnder som omfattas av sammanhllningsstd eller inte.
This confirms that, to a large 29 Box 5 Synchronisation as described in the Deployment Programme The Deployment Programme is a crucial component of the governance framework established for the deployment of common projects. 
30 Ruta 5 Synkronisering enligt beskrivningen i infrandeprogrammet Infrandeprogrammet r en avgrande komponent i den styrningsram som faststllts fr infrandet av gemensamma projekt.
It is organized in four levels: the ATM functionalities (level 1) and sub-functionalities (level 2) as described in the PCP; the implementation clusters or families (level 3) which aggregate local implementation projects (level 4). 
Programmet r uppdelat i fyra niver: ATM-funktionaliteter (niv 1) och delfunktionaliteter (niv 2) enligt beskrivningen i det gemensamma pilotprojektet, infrandet av kluster eller familjer (niv 3) dr lokala genomfrandeprojekt aggregeras (niv 4).
The coordination work conducted by the Deployment Manager at level 3 is fundamental in light of the overarching principle behind a common project. 
Det samordningsarbete som infrandefrvaltaren utfr p niv 3 r avgrande mot bakgrund av den vergripande princip som ligger till grund fr ett gemensamt projekt.
Clusters are defined as ŇSampler/implementation initiatives under which local implementation projects are grouped that require coordination/ synchronisation at local or regional level and/or pursue the same (part of a) Sub-FunctionalityÓ34. 
Kluster definieras som frsks-och genomfrandeinitiativ dr man samlar lokala genomfrandeprojekt som behver samordnas/synkroniseras p lokal eller regional niv och/eller gller samma (del av en) delfunktionalitet34.
Further details about the Deployment Programme are provided in Annex I 34 Framework Partnership Agreement, Annex 1 Part B1. 
Nrmare information om infrandeprogrammet finns i bilaga I. 34 Ramavtalet om partnerskap, bilaga 1, del B1.
extent, EU funding is not being used to promote coordinated action where needed. (c) Some operational concepts within the PCP that would in principle benefit from a synchronised deployment were actually implemented separately by the relevant stakeholders. 
Detta bekrftar att EU-finansiering i stor utstrckning inte anvnds fr att frmja en samordnad insats dr en sdan krvs. c) Ngra operativa utformningar inom det gemensamma pilotprojektet som i princip skulle gynnas av ett synkroniserat infrande genomfrdes i praktiken var fr sig av de relevanta berrda parterna.
An example of this is the implementation of AF 3-Free Route Airspace, which in principle requires coordinated action from both ANSPs and airspace users. 
Ett exempel p detta r ATM-funktionalitet 3 Đ luftrum med fria flygvgar, som i princip krver en samordnad insats frn bde leverantrer av flygtrafiktjnster och luftrummets anvndare.
However, the audit revealed that these stakeholders are implementing this functionality in separate clusters, with different timeframes, leading to inefficiencies and protracted implementation periods. 
Revisionen visade dock att de hr berrda parterna genomfr funktionaliteten i separata kluster, med olika tidsramar, vilket leder till ineffektivitet och utdragna genomfrandeperioder.
56 In addition, we found that clustered applications comprise a large number of individual implementation projects (up to 104 in one case) and that they are wide in scope, covering the full range of functionalities and sub-functionalities described in the PCP. 
56 Vi fann dessutom att samlade anskningar bestr av ett stort antal enskilda genomfrandeprojekt (s mnga som 104 i ett fall), och att de r breda och omfattar samtliga funktionaliteter och delfunktionaliteter som beskrivs i det gemensamma pilotprojektet.
We found that, while complying with INEAŐs templates, they present crucial information in a condensed manner. 
De samlade anskningarna fljer visserligen Ineas mallar, men vi fann att de presenterade viktig information p ett mycket kortfattat stt.
This meant that INEA could not examine in a thorough manner the relevance and impact of applications: (a) All sampled ANSPs submitted projects that, while claiming to address a specific PCP functionality, actually cover the renewal of their entire ATM systems. 
Det innebar att Inea inte kunde gra en grundlig kontroll av anskningarnas relevans och effekter. a) Alla leverantrer av flygtrafiktjnster i urvalet lmnade in projekt som sades glla en specifik PCP-funktionalitet men som i praktiken handlade om att frnya hela deras ATM-system.
However, the information supplied to INEA does not allow an adequate identification of the cost corresponding to the specific PCP functionality being targeted. 
Den information som Inea fick gr det dock inte mjligt att p lmpligt stt identifiera kostnaden fr den specifika PCP-funktionalitet som projektet gller.
Overall, in the context of the 2014-2017 calls, close to Ű500 million of EU funding were awarded to ATM system upgrades, approximately 30 % of the total grants to date. (b) Cost effectiveness analyses (CEA), which are required by INEA calls, are presented in a grouped manner and not per individual project proposal, effectively preventing the INEA from assessing a projectŐs alignment with the PCP CBA. 
Vid anskningsomgngarna 2014Đ2017 gick nrmare 500 miljarder euro i EU-finansiering till uppgraderingar av ATM-system, vilket r omkring 30 % av de totala bidragen s hr lngt. b) Kostnadseffektivitetsanalyserna, som r obligatoriska fr Ineas anskningsomgngar, grupperas och r inte uppdelade per enskilt projektfrslag, vilket gr att Inea i praktiken inte kan bedma om ett projekt verensstmmer med kostnadsnyttoanalysen av det gemensamma pilotprojektet.
Moreover, our audit has identified pervasive low CEA scores, indicating that the cost-benefit ratio of the projects for which EU co-funding being requested was significantly worse than that included in the PCPŐs CBA. (c) We found several (8 out of 17) cases where the content of the projects was either partly or fully outside the scope of the PCP. 
Vid revisionen fann vi dessutom att kostnadseffektivitetsanalyserna genomgende hade lga vrden, vilket tyder p att kostnads-nyttofrhllandet fr de projekt som skte EU-medfinansiering var betydligt smre n vrdet i kostnadsnyttoanalysen av det gemensamma pilotprojektet. c) Vi hittade flera fall (tta av 17) dr projektens innehll lg antingen delvis eller helt utanfr det gemensamma pilotprojektet.
In two cases, the funded projects claimed to support the deployment of flight information exchange, a functionality which was not ready for implementation. 
I tv fall hvdades att de finansierade projekten skulle stdja infrandet av utbyte av flyginformation, en funktionalitet som inte var redo att genomfras.
Projects have been grouped for administrative reasons, rather than in multi-stakeholder groupings aiming at delivering 30 
Projekt har grupperats av administrativa skl snarare n i grupper med flera berrda aktrer i syfte att leverera operativ synkronisering.
operational synchronisation. Additionally, adequate evaluation of the proposals is hindered by the size, heterogeneity and lack of transparency within the clusters. 
Dessutom gr storleken p, variationerna inom och bristen p insyn i klustren att det blir svrare att utvrdera frslagen p lmpligt stt.
The risk of conflict of interest is not sufficiently mitigated 58 The EU financial regulation requires that financial actors and other persons involved in budget implementation and management, audit or control shall not take any action which may bring their own interests into conflict with those of the Union35. 
Risken fr intressekonflikter motverkas inte tillrckligt 58 Enligt EU:s budgetfrordning fr finansiella aktrer och andra personer som medverkar vid genomfrande och frvaltning av budgeten och vid revision eller kontroll av budgetmedel inte utfra handlingar som kan leda till en konflikt mellan ett egenintresse och unionens intresse35.
In addition, the regulation on defining common projects gives responsibility for ensuring effective management of risks and conflict of interest to the Deployment Manager36. 
Enligt frordningen om definition av gemensamma projekt har dessutom infrandefrvaltaren ansvaret fr att skerstlla en effektiv hantering av risker och intressekonflikter36.
59 As described in paragraph 54, the rules established by INEA state that applicants for funding of projects implementing the PCP must coordinate their proposals with the Deployment Manager who will then screen these individual project applications. 
59 Ssom beskrivs i punkt 54 anges i Ineas regler att de som ansker om finansiering av projekt om genomfrande av det gemensamma pilotprojektet mste samordna sina frslag med infrandefrvaltaren, som drefter kontrollerar de enskilda projektanskningarna.
In practice, the DM has also supported the preparation of applications, and clustered and submitted them to INEA for funding. 
I praktiken har infrandefrvaltaren ven hjlpt till vid utarbetandet av anskningar, samlat dem och verlmnat dem till Inea fr finansiering.
60 The SESAR Deployment Alliance, acting as Deployment Manager, is a consortium composed of some but not all ATM stakeholders. 
60 Alliansen fr Sesarinfrandet, som fungerar som infrandefrvaltare, r ett konsortium bestende av ngra, men inte alla ATM-aktrer.
Its members are themselves beneficiaries of funding and they second staff to the DM for the execution of its tasks Đ notably the screening of the memberŐs own projects for PCP relevance. 
Alliansens medlemmar tar sjlva emot std, och de lnar ut personal till infrandefrvaltaren s att dess uppgifter kan utfras Đ srskilt kontrollen av om medlemmarnas egna projekt r relevanta fr det gemensamma pilotprojektet.
We consider that this framework generates a potential conflict of interest as regards the EU funding allocation. 
Vi anser att denna ram leder till en potentiell intressekonflikt nr det gller frdelningen av EU-finansiering.
This limits 35 Article 61 of Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union. 
35 Artikel 61 i Europaparlamentets och rdets frordning (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 om finansiella regler fr unionens allmnna budget.
36 Article 9.2.d) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 409/2013. 
36 Artikel 9.2 d i kommissionens genomfrandefrordning (EU) nr 409/2013.
32 the possibility of tracing the process from the initial project proposals to the final composition of the clustered applications (see Box 6). (c) In order to optimise the allocation of funds in a context of oversubscribed calls, the Deployment Manager advised applicants of large investment projects to split them into phases spread over several calls. 
Det begrnsar mjligheterna att flja processen frn de ursprungliga projektfrslagen till den slutliga sammansttningen av de samlade anskningarna (se ruta 6). c) Fr att optimera tilldelningen av medel vid vertecknade anskningsomgngar rdde infrandefrvaltaren skande med stora investeringsprojekt att dela upp dem i faser ver flera anskningsomgngar.
Depending on the scope of the projects and their phases, such splitting effectively modifies the final allocation of funding to each of them. (d) In the 2015 call, the withdrawal of some applicants after the award of the funding and before the signing of the grant agreements led INEA to redistribute the funds made available by such withdrawal. 
Beroende p projektens omfattning och deras faser ndrar uppdelningen i praktiken den slutliga medelstilldelningen till vart och ett av dem. d) I anskningsomgngen 2015 drog sig ngra skande tillbaka efter det att anslagen hade frdelats men fre undertecknandet av bidragsverenskommelserna, vilket gjorde att Inea frdelade om de anslag som drmed blev tillgngliga.
However, the redistribution followed a specific proposal provided by the Deployment Manager. Although ultimately agreed by the Commission, this process lacked transparent criteria and benefited a limited number of projects. 
Omfrdelningen skedde emellertid i enlighet med ett specifikt frslag frn infrandefrvaltaren. ven om kommissionen slutligen godknde processen saknade den transparenta kriterier och gagnade ett begrnsat antal projekt.
Box 6 Example of insufficient transparency In the 2015 call, 318 individual proposals were received by the Deployment Manager but 108 of those were not retained in the clusters finally submitted to INEA. 
34 Ruta 6 Exempel p bristande insyn Vid anskningsomgngen 2015 tog infrandefrvaltaren emot 318 enskilda frslag, men 108 av dem togs inte med i de kluster som slutligen verlmnades till Inea.
The Deployment Manager does not keep a systematic record of the underlying reasons for their removal and could not provide a reconciliation between proposals received and retained. 
Infrandefrvaltaren dokumenterar inte systematiskt de underliggande sklen till att frslag tas bort och kunde inte ge oss en avstmning mellan de frslag som tagits emot och de som behllits.
In the same call, the Deployment Manager also created priority groups among the retained proposals, according to criteria devised by the Deployment Manager itself and not by INEA in its call for proposals. 
Vid samma anskningsomgng skapade infrandefrvaltaren ven prioriterade grupper bland de frslag som behllits, i enlighet med kriterier som infrandefrvaltaren sjlv hade utarbetat och som inte fanns med i Ineas anskningsomgng.
Improvements in European ATM still not demonstrated 61 In this section, we assessed whether EU intervention actually contributes to improving the performance of European ATM. 
Det finns nnu inga bevis fr att den europeiska flygledningstjnsten har frbttrats 61 I det hr avsnittet bedmer vi om EU:s insats verkligen bidrar till att frbttra den europeiska flygledningstjnstens prestanda.
We analysed the progress achieved so far with the deployment of the PCP, both in terms of the outputs actually deployed in a real operational environment and in terms of the performance benefits delivered to the ATM system. 
Vi analyserar vilka framsteg som hittills har gjorts nr det gller infrandet av det gemensamma pilotprojektet, bde i form av output som infrts i en verklig operativ milj och i form av prestationsfrdelar fr ATM-systemet.
To this end, we assessed whether the PCPŐs implementation is on track as per the regulatory deadlines and whether there are actual performance gains being detected by the monitoring system. 
Vi bedmde drfr om genomfrandet av det gemensamma pilotprojektet gr som planerat i frhllande till de lagstadgade tidsfristerna och om det finns verkliga prestationsvinster som upptcks av vervakningssystemet.
Deployment is ongoing, but the risk of delays is increasing 62 The PCP establishes deadlines varying between 2018 and 2026 for the full deployment of its 6 functionalities (see Table 2 above). 
Infrandet pgr, men risken fr frseningar kar 62 I det gemensamma pilotprojektet anges tidsfrister mellan 2018 och 2026 fr det fulla infrandet av projektets sex funktionaliteter (se tabell 2 ovan).
63 30 % of PCP components have not yet been planned or are being planned (see Box 7). 
63 30 % av PCP-komponenterna har nnu inte planerats eller hller p att planeras (se ruta 7).
These are mainly related to ATM functionalities 4, 5 and 6, where some of the technology required for implementation is not yet ready for deployment. 
Det handlar frmst om ATM-funktionaliteterna 4, 5 och 6, dr en del av den teknik som krvs fr genomfrandet nnu inte r klar att infras.
The Risk Management Plan of the Deployment Programme repeatedly identifies these risks. 
I infrandeprogrammets riskhanteringsplan identifieras dessa risker flera gnger.
This is partly the consequence of the lack of maturity of the necessary technology and concepts described in paragraph 28 and can impact negatively on the achievement of the PCP deadlines. 
som beskrivs i punkt 28 inte r tillrckligt mogna, vilket kan inverka negativt p uppnendet av tidsfristerna fr det gemensamma pilotprojektet.