natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Such guidance communicated by the Commission may lead to a situation where the two objectives, of strengthening the on-going recovery on the one hand and ensuring the sustainability of public finances on the other hand, lead to very asymmetric conclusions: one prompting a Member State to spend more on growth-enhancing measures and the other restricting such increases in expenditure. 
Sdan vgledning frn kommissionen kan leda till en situation dr de tv mlen, det vill sga att strka den pgende terhmtningen  ena sidan och skerstlla de offentliga finansernas hllbarhet  den andra, leder till mycket asymmetriska slutsatser: en som uppmanar medlemsstaterna att spendera mer p tillvxtfrmjande tgrder och en annan som uppmanar till begrnsningar av sdana utgiftskningar.
It could also imply lower requirements than those determined by the SGP rules framework (the combination of matrix and clauses). 
Detta skulle ocks kunna innebra lgre krav n dem som faststlls genom stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens regelverk (kombinationen av matriser och klausuler).
To better convey the logic of the proposed recommendations, the Commission should provide a summary of the underlying assessment and explain the importance of implementing the recommendations, as well as point out risks if they are not implemented. 
Fr att frmedla logiken bakom de freslagna rekommendationerna p ett bttre stt br kommissionen tillhandahlla en sammanfattning av de underliggande bedmningarna och frklara vikten av att genomfra rekommendationerna samt framhlla de risker som freligger om de inte genomfrs.
However, after the latest changes, the recitals have ceased to explain the rationale behind the CSRs. 
Efter de senaste ndringarna frklaras inte lngre grunden till de landsspecifika rekommendationerna i sklen.
Commission sufficiently monitors the implementation of fiscal CSRs 126. 
Kommissionen vervakar tillrckligt genomfrandet av finanspolitiska landsspecifika rekommendationer 126.
The Commission monitors the implementation of the CSRs on the basis of a variety of inputs, with more focus on monitoring activity in the last quarter of the year. 
Kommissionen vervakar genomfrandet av de landsspecifika rekommendationerna p grundval av en mngd uppgifter, dr fokus p vervakningsverksamheten r strst under rets sista kvartal.
Given the extensive analysis, available data, and number of information visits and exchanges between Member States and the Commission, we consider this as sufficient monitoring and follow up of developments in Member States. 
Med tanke p den omfattande analysen, tillgngliga uppgifter och antalet informationsbesk och utbyten mellan medlemsstaterna och kommissionen anser vi att vervakningen och uppfljningen av utvecklingen i medlemsstaterna r tillrckliga.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The main objective of the preventive arm has not been delivered 127. 
SLUTSATSER OCH REKOMMENDATIONER Den frebyggande delens frmsta ml har inte frverkligats 127.
position and provide fiscal space in cases of recession. Moreover, by reaching their MTOs, Member States with high debt would ensure that their debt ratios started declining in line with the requirements under the debt-based corrective arm of the SGP. 
Genom att n de medelfristiga budgetmlen skulle medlemsstater med stora skulder dessutom skerstlla att deras skuldkvoter brjade minska i linje med kraven inom ramen fr den skuldbaserade korrigerande delen av stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten.
This is all crucial for avoiding a disruptive fiscal crisis in the EU and, even more importantly, in the monetary union (paragraphs 4 to 5). 
Detta r avgrande fr att frhindra en skadlig finanskris i EU och, n viktigare, i den monetra unionen (punkterna 4Đ5).
The Regulation set a reasonable benchmark for annual convergence towards the MTO of 0.5 pp of GDP per year; but it also introduced the concept of significant deviation which is interpreted as an allowed deviation margin. 
I frordningen faststlldes ett rimligt riktmrke fr rlig konvergens mot det medelfristiga budgetmlet p 0,5 procentenheter av BNP per r, men dr infrdes ven begreppet betydande avvikelser som tolkas som en tillten avvikelsemarginal.
Furthermore, it granted wide discretionary powers to the Commission to adjust the requirements (paragraphs 16 to 17, 32 to 37). 
Vidare gav den kommissionen ett omfattande utrymme fr sknsmssig bedmning fr att justera kraven (punkterna 16Đ17 och 32Đ37).
The Commission has exercised these discretionary powers very extensively with a view to reduce adjustment requirements, both in setting the implementation rules and in individual decisions. 
Kommissionen har utnyttjat detta utrymme fr sknsmssig bedmning i mycket stor utstrckning i syfte att snka anpassningskraven, bde nr det gller faststllandet av genomfrandereglerna och i enskilda beslut.
However, as a result, the Commission has not ensured meeting of the Regulation’s main objective: convergence towards the MTOs in a reasonable period of time (paragraphs 63 to 71). 
Som en fljd av detta har kommissionen dock inte skerstllt att frordningens huvudml uppns, det vill sga konvergens i riktning mot de medelfristiga budgetmlen inom en rimlig tidsperiod (punkterna 63Đ71).
The adjustment requirements and parameters, as specified in the so-called matrix, and the numerous flexibility clauses were set when the main concern was the EU’s second recession in 2012. 
Kraven och parametrarna i frga om anpassning, vilka specificeras i den s kallade matrisen, och de mnga flexibilitetsklausulerna faststlldes nr det frmsta problemet var EU:s andra recession 2012.
Flexibility in such a situation was appropriate in principle, but has gone too far in practice (paragraphs 26 to 71). 
Flexibilitet i en sdan situation var lmpligt som princip, men har i praktiken gtt fr lngt (punkterna 26Đ71).
In particular, it did not distinguish enough between those Member States with debt problems and others (paragraphs 85 to 97, 100). 
Framfr allt gjordes inte tillrcklig tskillnad mellan medlemsstater med skuldproblem och vriga medlemsstater (punkterna 85Đ97 och 100).
Furthermore, the approved matrix parameters and the various flexibility clauses were not time-bound to these specific circumstances (paragraphs 77 to 82). 
De godknda matrisparametrarna och de olika flexibilitetsklausulerna var dessutom inte tidsbundna till dessa specifika omstndigheter (punkterna 77Đ82).
Instead of tightening the framework, the Commission has recently weakened it further for example by introducing the new margin of discretion in 2017 (paragraphs 32 to 37, 69 and 79). 
I stllet fr att skrpa ramen har kommissionen nyligen frsvagat den ytterligare, till exempel genom att 2017 infra det nya bedmningsutrymmet (punkterna 32Đ37, 69 och 79).
As a result, the current framework does not ensure convergence towards the MTOs at a reasonable pace during normal times. 
Av denna anledning skerstller inte den nuvarande ramen konvergens mot de medelfristiga budgetmlen i en rimlig takt under normala frhllanden.
On average, it has not facilitated progress towards the MTOs in the recent recovery period, despite the fact that growth has surpassed the potential growth rate and the output gap has been closing (paragraphs 79 to 82). 
Generellt sett har den inte underlttat framsteg mot de medelfristiga budgetmlen under den senaste terhmtningsperioden, trots att tillvxten har verstigit den potentiella tillvxttakten och att produktionsgapet har minskat (punkterna 79Đ82).
Of particular concern is the inability of the weakened SGP framework, as set in the Commission’s implementation rules, to ensure progress towards the MTO in several highly indebted Member States. 
Det r srskilt orovckande att den frsvagade ramen fr stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten, ssom den faststlls i kommissionens genomfranderegler, inte kan skerstlla framsteg mot det medelfristiga budgetmlet i flera kraftigt skuldsatta medlemsstater.
Their structural balances in 2014-2018 have either diverged from their MTOs, or are converging towards them at such a slow pace that substantial improvement ahead of the next recession is far from assured (paragraphs 85 to 97, 100). 
Deras strukturella saldon under 2014Đ2018 har antingen avvikit frn de medelfristiga budgetmlen eller konvergerar i riktning mot dem i s lngsam takt att det r lngt ifrn skert att det kommer att ske vsentliga frbttringar fre nsta recession (punkterna 85Đ97 och 100).
The Commission does not apply the preventive arm requirements to Member States under the corrective arm, and it has repeatedly proposed multi-year extensions of deadlines for exiting the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) meaning that Member States under an EDP do not have to fulfil the requirements they would otherwise have to observe if they were under the preventive arm (paragraph 84). 
Kommissionen tillmpar inte kraven enligt den frebyggande delen p medlemsstater som omfattas av den korrigerande delen, och den har upprepade gnger freslagit flerriga frlngningar av tidsfrister fr att lmna frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott. Detta innebr att medlemsstater som omfattas av ett sdant frfarande inte behver uppfylla de krav som de skulle ha behvt iaktta om de omfattades av den frebyggande delen (punkt 84).
Although not required by the Regulation, the Commission has sought and reached agreement with Member States through the ECOFIN Council of ministers on many implementation rules. 
Trots att det inte krvs enligt frordningen har kommissionen nr det gller mnga genomfranderegler nskat komma verens med medlemsstaterna och gjort det genom Ekofinrdet.
Such precedents might now make necessary corrections in the framework more difficult (paragraphs 26, 38, 42 and 51). 
Sdana prejudikat kan nu gra det svrare att genomfra de ndvndiga korrigeringarna av ramen (punkterna 26, 38, 42 och 51).
Nevertheless, the current framework as set in the Commission’s implementation rules needs to be modified. 
Den nuvarande ramen, s som den faststlls i kommissionens genomfranderegler, mste dock ndras.
We recommend the following measures in the context of the review of the preventive arm framework scheduled for 2018. 
Vi rekommenderar fljande tgrder inom ramen fr den versyn av den frebyggande delen som planeras fr 2018.
The Commission should address the issue of cumulative deviations and parameters in the matrix of required adjustments 137. 
Kommissionen br ta itu med frgan om kumulativa avvikelser och parametrar i matrisen fr erforderliga anpassningar 137.
The current combination of the matrix specifying adjustment requirements depending on the business cycle, flexibility clauses and the permitted deviations do not ensure that MTOs are reached within a reasonable time under reasonable macroeconomic scenarios. 
Den nuvarande matriskombinationen som preciserar anpassningskrav utifrn konjunkturcykel, flexibilitetsklausulser och tilltna avvikelser skerstller inte att de medelfristiga budgetmlen ns inom rimlig tid och med rimliga makroekonomiska scenarier. 69
We consider that the issue of cumulative deviations can be addressed within the current regulation, given that its main objective should be given preponderance relative to the granted flexibility options. 
Vi anser att frgan om kumulativa avvikelser kan hanteras inom ramen fr den nuvarande lagstiftningen, med tanke p att dess frmsta ml br vga tyngre i frhllande till de beviljade flexibilitetsalternativen.
Given the interconnectedness of these issues the scale of necessary revision in the matrix will depend on whether and how the issues of the cumulative deviations and flexibility clauses are addressed and resolved. 
Mot bakgrund av att dessa frgor r nra frbundna kommer omfattningen av den ndvndiga revideringen av matrisen att bero p huruvida och hur frgan om kumulativa avvikelser och flexibilitetsklausuler hanteras och blir lsta.
Regardless of this, there is a strong case for tightening requirements for Member States with debt ratios above 67 68 90 % of GDP and, to a lesser extent, for those with debt above 60 % but less than 90 % of GDP (paragraphs 26 to 71, 85 to 97 and 100). 
Bortsett frn detta finns det starka skl till att skrpa kraven fr medlemsstater med skuldkvoter p ver 90 % av BNP och, i mindre utstrckning, fr medlemsstater med en skuld p ver 60 % men mindre n 90 % av BNP (punkterna 26Đ71, 85Đ97 och 100).
Recommendation 1 (a) To address the cumulative effects of the permitted deviations, the Commission should include in the revised matrix a provision increasing the adjustment requirement for the following year to compensate for the average deviation of the MS in the two preceding years and the expected deviation in the current year65. (b) The Commission should increase the adjustment requirements for Member States with debt ratio above 60 % of GDP, with a view to bringing the requirements in line with the provisions of the debt rule. 
70 Rekommendation 1 a) Fr att ta itu med de sammanlagda effekterna av de tilltna avvikelserna br kommissionen i den reviderade matrisen infra en bestmmelse som kar anpassningskravet det efterfljandet ret fr att kompensera fr medlemsstatens genomsnittliga avvikelse under de tv fregende ren och den frvntade avvikelsen under det innevarande ret65. b) Kommissionen br hja anpassningskraven fr medlemsstater med skuldkvoter p ver 60 % av BNP, i syfte att bringa kraven i verensstmmelse med bestmmelserna om skuldregeln.
The scale of the increase should depend on the distance from the 60 % threshold, either in steps (for example higher requirements for those with the debt ratio above 90 %), or gradually. (c) The Commission should review other provisions in the matrix of required adjustments and consider modifying them with a view of achieving convergence toward MTO in all MS in a reasonable time, taking the effects of revisions in all other provisions into account including those related to permitted deviations and allowances. 
Hjningens omfattning br grundas p avstndet frn trskeln p 60 %, antingen i steg (t.ex. hgre krav fr dem med en skuldkvot p ver 90 %) eller gradvis. c) Kommissionen br se ver andra bestmmelser i matrisen fr erforderliga anpassningar och vervga att ndra dem fr att uppn konvergens mot det medelfristiga budgetmlet i alla medlemsstater inom rimlig tid och samtidigt ta hnsyn till effekterna av ndringarna av alla vriga bestmmelser, dribland dem som gller tilltna avvikelser och undantag.
This recommendation should be implemented in the review of the matrix and flexibility clauses as foreseen for 2018 in the commonly agreed position, or at the latest for the application in Spring 2019. 
Denna rekommendation br genomfras inom ramen fr versynen av matrisen och flexibilitetsklausulerna som planeras till 2018 i den gemensamt verenskomna stndpunkten, eller som senast infr tillmpningen vren 2019.
Flexibility clauses should be reformed to reflect the original role envisaged in the Regulation 138. 
Flexibilitetsklausuler br reformeras fr att terspegla den ursprungliga funktion som avsgs i frordningen 138.
The Commission is using the structural reform clause far beyond its objective in the Regulation of ensuring that budget constraints do not hamper the implementation of important reforms. 
Kommissionen anvnder klausulen om strukturreformer lngt utver dess syfte i frordningen, som bestr i att skerstlla att budgetrestriktioner inte hmmar genomfrandet av viktiga reformer.
The Regulation does not speak about flexibility clauses serving as an 65 See a similar recommendation in the 2017 report from the European Fiscal Board. 69 incentive for reforms. 
I frordningen talas inte om flexibilitetsklausuler som incitament fr reformer. Undantag inom ramen fr stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten br anvndas till det de r avsedda fr.
Allowances under SGP should be used for the intended purpose, while other instruments can be used to promote reforms (paragraphs 50 to 52). 
Andra instrument kan anvndas fr att frmja reformer (punkterna 50Đ52).
The Commission allows increased spending under various clauses to continue beyond the years for which they had been approved. 
Kommissionen tillter att kade utgifter enligt olika klausuler fortstter efter de r fr vilka de godknts.
The overall spending is permanently increased until the MTO is finally reached. This leads to prolongations in the convergence period that adversely affects the achievement of the basic objective of the Regulation (paragraphs 44 to 48, 54). 
De sammanlagda utgifterna kas stndigt tills det medelfristiga budgetmlet slutligen ns. Detta leder till frlngningar av konvergensperioden, vilket pverkar uppnendet av det grundlggande mlet i frordningen p ett negativt stt (punkterna 44Đ48 och 54).
The investment clause does not ensure an increase in the public investment-to-GDP ratio and allows non-investment-related spending to continue in the years ahead (paragraph 43). 
Investeringsklausulen skerstller inte en kning av offentliga investeringar i frhllande till BNP och tillter att icke-investeringsrelaterade utgifter fortgr under de efterfljande ren (punkt 43).
The unusual event clause also leads to increase in non-related expenditure in the years following the granting of the clause, and applies broad interpretation of eligible expenditures (paragraph 57). 
Klausulen om ovanliga hndelser leder likas till kningar av icke-relaterade utgifter under de r som fljer p att klausulen beviljats, och tillmpar en bred tolkning av berttigade utgifter (punkt 57).
Recommendation 2 (a) The Commission should amend the implementation rules for the structural reform clause and limit the clause to directly identified budget costs in the first few years of implementation. 
71 Rekommendation 2 a) Kommissionen br ndra genomfrandereglerna fr klausulen om strukturreformer och begrnsa klausulen till direkt identifierade budgetkostnader under de frsta genomfranderen.
The approved increase in spending should be treated as a one-time event, and not lead to an increase in unrelated expenditure in the following years. (b) The Commission should discontinue the use of the investment clause in its current form. 
Den godknda utgiftskningen br behandlas som en engngshndelse, och inte leda till en kning av icke-relaterade utgifter de efterfljande ren. b) Kommissionen br sluta att anvnda investeringsklausulen i dess nuvarande form.
Any possible successor clause should ensure an increase in public investment relative to GDP. (c) The Commission should approve the unusual event clause only for expenditure directly linked to the events that have occurred. This recommendation should be implemented in time for application in Spring 2019. 
Eventuella nya klausuler br skerstlla en kning av offentliga investeringar i frhllande till BNP. c) Kommissionen br enbart godknna klausulen om ovanliga hndelser fr utgifter med direkt anknytning till de hndelser som gt rum. Denna rekommendation br genomfras i tid infr tillmpningen vren 2019.
The adjustment requirements under the corrective and preventive arm should be synchronised and the step-up procedures used more effectively 142. Inconsistencies exist between the deficit-based corrective arm and the preventive arm. 
Anpassningskraven inom ramen fr den korrigerande och frebyggande delen br samordnas och frfarandena fr skrpning br anvndas mer ndamlsenligt 142. verensstmmelsen mellan den underskottsbaserade korrigerande delen och den frebyggande delen r bristande.
Discontinuing the practice of excessive and multiyear prolongations in the deadlines for exiting EDP would be an important step in that direction. 
Att sluta med de orimliga flerriga frlngningarna av tidsfristerna fr att lmna frfaranden vid alltfr stora underskott skulle vara ett viktigt steg i den riktningen.
Moreover, requirements under the preventive arm should be the minimum under the corrective arm. We do not see legal grounds to exempt Member States under the corrective arm from meeting the requirements of the preventive arm and be subject to the preventive arm step-up procedures (paragraph 84 to 94). 
Vi kan inte se ngra rttsliga grunder till att undanta medlemsstater som omfattas av den korrigerande delen frn att uppfylla kraven enligt den frebyggande delen och vara freml fr frfarandena fr intensifiering enligt den frebyggande delen (punkterna 84Đ94).
70 Recommendation 3 The Commission should explore ways within the legal framework to ensure that the level of structural adjustment required under the preventive arm is also delivered by Member States under the corrective arm. 
72 Rekommendation 3 Kommissionen br underska stt att inom den rttsliga ramen se till att den niv av strukturanpassning som krvs enligt den frebyggande delen ven uppns av medlemsstater som omfattas av den korrigerande delen.
The Commission should submit a note to the EFC explaining how it plans to achieve this. 
Kommissionen br verlmna en not till ekonomiska och finansiella kommittn som frklarar hur den planerar att frverkliga detta.
This recommendation should be implemented in time for application in Spring 2019, and by that time the Commission should submit such a note to the EFC. 
Rekommendationen br genomfras i tid fr att kunna tillmpas vren 2019, och kommissionen br d ha utfrdat en sdan not till ekonomiska och finansiella kommittn.
Improve the quality of information required in Stability and Convergence Programmes and in the Commission’s assessment reports 143. 
Frbttra kvaliteten p den information som krvs i stabilitets-och konvergensprogram och i kommissionens bedmningsrapporter 143.
There is a need to improve the quality of information presented in Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCP). 
Kvaliteten p den information som lggs fram i stabilitets-och konvergensprogrammen mste frbttras.
Furthermore, given that the Commission’s assessment is underpinned by a comparison of its own forecasts with those of Member States, more transparency on the different measures included in the Commission’s forecasts is necessary to determine the credibility of the plans and the corresponding assessment. 
Med tanke p att kommissionens bedmning bygger p en jmfrelse mellan de egna prognoserna och medlemsstaternas prognoser krvs dessutom mer transparens nr det gller de olika tgrder som ingr i kommissionens prognoser fr att planernas och tillhrande bedmnings trovrdighet ska kunna faststllas.
A clearer presentation of compliance results, based on criteria set in the recommendations, and an explanation of factors taken into account in the overall assessment, are also necessary in the Commission’s staff working documents (SWD) (paragraphs 104 to 106, 111 to 112). 
En tydligare presentation av resultaten i frga om efterlevnad, p grundval av kriterier som anges i rekommendationerna, och en frklaring av faktorer som tagits i beaktande i den vergripande bedmningen, r likas ndvndigt i arbetsdokumenten frn kommissionens avdelningar (punkterna 104Đ106 och 111Đ112).
71 Recommendation 4 (a) The Commission should propose and seek agreement with Member States for revisions in the Code of Conduct (CoC) to ensure that Member States’ SCPs include a summary table including the revenue and expenditure estimates along with the main revenue and expenditure measures and their timing. (b) The Commission should, in its SWDs, better explain the differences between its own estimates of fiscal measures and those in Member States forecasts. 
73 Rekommendation 4 a) Kommissionen br fresl och komma verens med medlemsstaterna om ndringar av uppfrandekoden fr att skerstlla att medlemsstaternas stabilitets-och konvergensprogram innehller en sammanfattande tabell ver uppskattningar av intkter och utgifter, tillsammans med de viktigaste intkts-och utgiftstgrderna och en tidsplan fr dem. b) Kommissionen br i arbetsdokumenten bttre frklara skillnaderna mellan de egna uppskattningarna av finanspolitiska tgrder och uppskattningarna i medlemsstaternas prognoser.