natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission divided the structural adjustment support amongtheeligiblecountriesfortwo-yearperiods.AstheCom-mission did not think it possible to obtain reliable budget deficit statisticsforthevariouscountries(2),thelinkbetweenthese Differences between actual and expected payments for budget years 1995 to 2000 for the 23 programmes examined Table 2 allocations and real financial needs is tenuous and is only one of the criteria for allocating resources. 
Frdelningen av stdet till strukturanpassning mellan stdberttigade lnder gjordes av kommissionen i tvrsperioder. Eftersom kommissionen ansg det omjligt (2) att erhlla tillfrlitliga Skillnader mellan gjorda och planerade betalningar under budgetren 1995 till 2000 fr de 23 granskade programmen Tabell 2 uppgifter om lndernas budgetunderskott, r sambandet mellan tilldelningen av medel och de verkliga finansieringsbehoven svagt och utgr endast ett av kriterierna fr frdelningen av medlen.
In the case of Senegal in 1998, whereas the Commission had provided the EDF Committee with justificationfortheCommunitysupportonthegroundsofimme-diate financial need, at the end of 2000, FCFA 7 000 Mio (10,7 million euro) remained unutilised in the counterpart funds account and the authorities appeared to be in no hurry to use it (3). 
I Senegal 1998 hade kommissionen infr EUF-kommittn rttfrdigat gemenskapens std, eftersom finansieringsbehovet sades vara omedelbart, men i slutet av 2000 fanns fortfarande 7 miljarder FCFA (motsvarande 10,7 miljarder euro) kvar p motpartsmedelskontot och myndigheterna visade ingen skyndsamhet vid anvndningen (3).
Table 2 shows that the calendar followed by the Commission in making support available to the beneficiary countries differed markedly from the intentions expressed in the financing proposals submitted to the EDF Committee. The time differences can be explained by the inherent delays of the EDF decisional procedures and the time required for ACP States to meet the disbursement conditions imposed by the Financing Agreements, with a total suspension of support if those conditions were not met. 
I tabell 2 redovisas stdet som kommissionen stllt till mottagarlndernas frfogande, enligt ett tidsschema som klart skiljer sig frn avsikterna i de finansieringsfrslag som lagts fram infr EUF-kommittn. Skillnaderna beror p den tid beslutsprocessen inom EUF krver och den tid som AVS-lnderna behver fr att uppfylla terbetalningsvillkoren i finansieringsverenskommelserna. Om dessa villkor inte uppfylls stlls hela stdet in.
50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 Source: Commission decisions and accounts. 
50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 Klla: Kommissionens beslut och rkenskaper.
Country Payments above forecast 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Payments below forecast 1 (2) COM(2000) 58 final, section 2.1.3.2. ( ) Information note to the EDF Committee dated 22 June 2000. 
Land Betalningar > berknat 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Betalningar < berknat (1) Se KOM(2000) 58 slutlig, punkt 2.1.3.2.
(3) Similarly, at the end of 2000, 29 million euro paid under Stabex, mainly from 1996 to 1998, remained unused in bank accounts in Europe. 
(3) I slutet av 2000 hade p liknande stt 29 miljoner euro, som betalats ut som Stabexmedel huvudsakligen mellan 1996 och 1998, frblivit outnyttjade p bankkonton i Europa.
Million euro Benin Burkina Faso Ghana Malawi Mozambique Senegal Tanzania Zambia 
Miljoner euro Benin Burkina Faso Ghana Malawi Moambique Senegal Tanzania Zambia
C 257/8 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 14.9.2001 19. 
C 257/8 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 14.9.2001 19.
After the foreign exchange had actually been disbursed by the Commission, in three of the eight countries examined (Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia), there were delays in the creation of the counterpart funds by the central bank. 
Efter kommissionens utbetalning i utlndska valutor upprttades motpartsmedlen av centralbanken i tre av de granskade lnderna (Malawi, Moambique och Zambia) med frsening.
After that the transfer of funds to the general treasury accounts took place at varying rates. 
Sedan gjordes verfringen av medel till statskassans allmnna konton mer eller mindre snabbt.
Due to these variations in the timetabling, the already tenuous relationship between the support granted and the treasury needs for particular budget years was stretched still further. 
P grund av dessa olika drjsml frsvagades ytterligare det redan brckliga sambandet mellan beviljat std och likviditetsbehoven fr enskilda budgetr.
This situationdoesnotmakeitanyeasierforbeneficiarycountriesto meet their foreign and domestic payment deadlines, nor does it help them avoid a build-up of payment arrears (see Box 2). 
Detta hjlper inte mottagarlnderna att skta sina externa och interna betalningar i rtt tid, eller att undvika att betalningsefterslpningar uppstr (se ruta 2).
Box 2 Shifts in the support timetable 1. 
Ruta 2 Drjsml i tidsschemat fr bistndet 1.
In Malawi, a payment of 16 million euro scheduled for July 2000 was disbursed by the Commission at the end of December 2000, after several reminders from the Delegation to Commission headquarters. 
Kommissionen gjorde i december 2000 en utbetalning till Malawi p 16 miljoner euro, som var planerad till juli 2000, sedan delegationen flera gnger pmint de centrala avdelningarna.
The World Bank has estimated that the financial cost to Malawi of payment delays by all fund providers is around 11 million US dollars per year (1). 2. 
Vrldsbanken uppskattade att Malawis finansiella kostnader fr samt-liga1 bidragsgivares frsenade betalningar uppgick till 11 miljoner USD per r ( ). 2.
In Zambia, the counterpart funds were paid into the joint-signature account six months after a payment of 20,6 million euro under the fourth structural adjustment programme. 3. 
I Zambia betalades motpartsmedlen in p kontot som tecknas av tv fretrdare frst sex mnader efter en utbetalning p 20,6 miljoner euro frn fjrde strukturanpassningsprogrammet. 3.
In Ghana, it was not possible to establish a correlation between the annual volume of counterpart funds released from the joint-signature account and the amounts in foreign exchange decided by the Commission as support for the budget years in question. 
I Ghana kan inget samband hittas mellan de rliga beloppen frn motpartsmedlen som frigjorts frn kontot som tecknas av tv fretrdare och beloppen i utlndsk valuta som kommissionen beslutar om som std till de berrda budgetren.
Depending on the country or period, the support is (or is not) included in the calculation of the governmentŐs net position with its central bank. 
Om stdet ingr eller inte i berkningen av regeringens nettoposition hos centralbanken, beror p vilket land och vilken tidsperiod det r frga om.
Such accounting procedures and delays do not make it easier to incorporate the support in the estimated budget revenue (2), nor do they facilitate compliance with public accounting standards (3) and the coordination of assistance, that the Commission wishes. 
Dessa rkenskapsmetoder och frseningar underlttar inte integrationen av stdet i de berknade budgetinkomsterna (2) och inte heller respekten fr normerna fr offentliga rkenskaper (3) eller samordningen av stdet, vilket kommissionen nskar.
Controls on the constitution of counterpart funds 21. 
Granskning av faststllandet av motpartsmedel 21.
In several of the Commission Delegations checks on bank statements and the conversion rates applied were insufficient. 
Granskningen av de vxelkurser som anvnts och kontout-dragen frn bankerna, har varit otillrcklig vid flera av kommissionens delegationer.
None of the 23 Financing Agreements examined contained detailed information about determining the exchange rates to be used to calculate the national currency equivalents of payments made in EuropeancurrencybytheCommission.TheProtocolsofAgree-ment subsequently dealt with this point, but did not apply uniform rules (see Box 3). 
Inte i ngon av de 23 granskade finansieringsverenskommelserna preciserades hur man skulle faststlla vxelkursen fr att berkna motvrdet i nationell valuta av de betalningar kommissionen gjort i europeisk valuta. I avtalsprotokollen har denna frga sedan tagits upp, utan att enhetliga regler fljts (se ruta 3).
Box 3 Controls on the constitution of counterpart funds 1. tral banks used unfavourable rates, thereby reducing the amount transferred to the exchequer. 
Ruta 3 Granskning av faststllandet av motpartsmedel 1.
In four countries (Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia), the cen-2. 
I fyra lnder (Malawi, Moambique, Tanzania och Zambia) anvnde centralbankerna en ogynnsam vxelkurs, vilket minskade beloppen som verfrdes till statskassan.
In Mozambique, the exchange rate applied by the central bank in order to constitute the counterpart funds was 3 % below the most favourable rate. 
2. I Moambique var den vxelkurs centralbanken anvnde fr berkning av motpartsmedelsbeloppet 3 % lgre n den mest gynnsamma vxelkursen.
Furthermore an additional 1 % was levied by way of handling charges. 
Dessutom rknades ytterligare 1 % bort fr administrativa kostnader.
According to the CourtŐs estimates, the margin thus obtained by the central bank was four million euro. 3. 
Revisionsrtten uppskattar att centralbankens marginal drmed uppgick till 4 miljoner euro. 3.
In Mozambique and Senegal, the Delegations did not have any bank statements that could be used to check that the counterpart funds had been set up correctly. 
I Moambique och Senegal, hade delegationen inte tillgng till kontoutdrag frn banken fr att kontrollera att berkningen av motpartsmedlen var korrekt.
In Mozambique, in addition, the counterpart funds were not set up as a joint-signature account and the constitution of the counterpart funds corresponding to the 8 million euro paid under the first import programme (1992) could not be confirmed (4). 
I Moambique hade dessutom motpartsmedlen inte satts in p ett konto som tecknas av tv fretrdare. Det har inte gtt att bekrfta upprttandet av motpartsmedel motsvarande 8 miljoner euro, som betalats ut fr det frsta importprogrammet (1992) (4).
Use of technical assistance 22. 
Anvndning av tekniskt bistnd 22.
Technical assistance is one of the three forms of structural adjustment support provided for in Article 247 of the Fourth Lom Convention. 
Tekniskt bistnd r en av tre former fr std till strukturanpassning som faststlls i fjrde Lomkonventionen, artikel 247.
Article 20(e) of the Internal Agreement for the seventh and eighth EDFs defined its role only in relation to the monitoring of import programmes. 
I sjunde och ttonde EUF:s interna avtal, artikel 20 e, preciseras endast dess roll vad gller vervakning av importprogrammen.
This was the CommissionŐs main concern in 1990, but it should have been adapted for the eighth EDF in 1995, in view of the emphasis placed on budget support. 
Detta var kommissionens huvudsakliga problem 1990, men en anpassning borde ha gjorts 1995 fr ttonde EUF fr att ta hnsyn till den vikt man fste vid budgetstdet.
The CommissionŐs operations manual, which was updated in July 1998, states that technical assistance may be employed to supervise and direct the operational side of programme implementation and to monitor budget implementation (programming, execution, control), but it does not contain any details about the timetabling or substance of these activities. 
I handboken fr verksamheten fr kommissionens avdelningar, uppdaterad i juli 1998, uppges att man genom tekniskt bistnd kan kontrollera och styra genomfrandet av programmet och flja genomfrandet av budgeten (planering, genomfrande, kontroll). Emellertid preciseras varken ngot tidsschema fr tgrderna eller deras innehll.
4 ( ) As regards the difficulties experienced in connection with the central bank in Mozambique, see also paragraph 4.52 of Special Report No 2/94 on the import programmes carried out under the sixth EDF (OJ C 97, 6.4.1994). 
4 ( ) Se ven punkt 4.52 i den srskilda rapporten nr 2/94 om importprogrammen under sjtte EUF (EGT C 97, 6.4.1994) om de svrigheter som ptrffades i samband med Centralbanken i Moambique.
14.9.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 257/9 the limited use of technical assistance and an objective reason for dispensing with it. 
14.9.2001 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 257/9 lokala frhllanden objektivt sett gjort det mjligt att avvara det.
The cumbersome nature of the CommissionŐs centralised procedures for recruiting technical assistance and, in some cases, the reluctance of the national authorities, slowed down the release of the resources earmarked for these essential support functions. 
De tungrodda frfaranden som kommissionens centrala avdelningar anvnder vid rekrytering av personal som skall arbeta med tekniskt bistnd, samt i vissa fall de nationella myndigheternas tveksamhet, har bromsat upp anvndningen av medel som avsatts till dessa mycket viktiga kompletterande uppgifter.
Implementation of the technical assistance provided for in the financing agreements examined 23. 
Genomfrandet av tekniskt bistnd som omfattas av de finansieringsverenskommelser som granskats 23.
Table 3 gives an overview of the budgets allocated for technical assistance and their implementation for the programmes examined. 
I tabell 3 sammanfattas budgeten som det tekniska bistndet tilldelats samt dess genomfrande fr de granskade programmen.
These budgets were underutilised and often late in terms of the timetable for releasing the counterpart funds, to such an extent that only 31 % of the total finance provided had been subject to payments as of the end of 2000. 
Budgetmedlen har inte anvnts fullt ut och ofta med frseningar jmfrt med tidsschemat fr anvndningen av motpartsmedlen, vilket lett till att i slutet av 2000 endast 31 % hade betalats ut av totalt avsatta medel.
With the exception of Benin, it was not possible to cite local conditions as the explanation for 3,5 Table 3 Technical 3,0 assistance 2,5 2,0 1,5 1,0 0,5 0,0 budget forecast Contracts accounted for Payments accounted for Source: Financing agreements and EDF accounts at 31 December 2000, according to the breakdown in Annex III. 
Med undantag fr Benin, har det begrnsade utnyttjandet av det tekniska bistndet inte kunnat frklaras av att 3,5 3,0 2,5 2,0 1,5 1,0 0,5 0,0 Planerad budget fr tekniskt bistnd Bokfrda kontrakt Bokfrda betalningar Tabell 3 Klla: Finansieringsverenskommelser och EUF:s rkenskaper per den 31 december 2000, se bilaga 3.
This indirect monitoring did little for the transparency of the objectives pursued or the work carried out, which focused more on quantitative analysis of budgets than on the regularity and impact of the expenditure. 
Denna indirekta vervakning har inte bidragit till att tydliggra uppsatta ml och utfrda arbeten, som mer avsett kvantitativa analyser av budgeten n utgifternas korrekthet och deras effekter.
Some technical assistance did make it possible for the Commission to monitor programme execution, but it was only indirectly that it had any operational advantages for the beneficiary administrations (Senegal). 
Visst tekniskt bistnd ger kommissionen mjlighet att flja upp genomfrandet av programmen, men det har endast indirekt operativt intresse fr de stdmottagande myndigheterna (Senegal).
Amidst all this diversity some measures did have an impact (Burkina Faso, Tanzania), but the cases where tasks were badly defined and resources inappropriately mobilised were not always resolved and, on balance, there were very marked variations in the use of technical assistance. 
Frdelningen mellan bistnd frn utlandet och lokalt bistnd fljer ingen generell politik. ven om vissa tgrder i denna mngfald ftt effekt (Burkina Faso, Tanzania), s har de fall dr uppgiften definierats dligt och anvnda medel varit otillrckliga inte alltid kunnat tgrdas.
InBenin,GhanaandMalawi,thefinancefortechnicalassis-tance was taken from the counterpart funds up until 1999 (1), especially as regards the audits and evaluations provided for in the programmes. 
I Benin, Ghana och Malawi finansierades det tekniska bistndet, som bl.a. omfattade granskningar och utvrderingar enligt programmen, med motpartsmedel fram till 1999 (1).
In such cases the activities are not recorded in the (1) The Financing Agreements concluded in 1999 broke with this practice and provided for an audit and evaluation budget separate from that for budget aid. 
Drmed omfattas inte dessa tgrder av kommissionens frvaltningssys-(1) I finansieringsverenskommelserna som slts 1999 brt man med denna praxis och planerade en budget fr granskning och utvrdering som var skild frn budgeten fr budgetstd.
CommissionŐs management systems, which have no provision for analytically monitoring the technical assistance employed. As with EDF direct-financing, mission statements and contracts are negotiated on the beneficiary countryŐs initiative. 
I de tta lnder som granskats arbetade ibland de tekniska tem, eftersom man med detta system inte kan gra ngon analytisk granskning av det tekniska bistnd som anvnts. Liksom fr direkt finansiering frn EUF frhandlas befogenheter och kontrakt p mottagarlandets initiativ.
Commission control over these activities is much weaker than for the contracts concluded at central services level from other resources, especially as regards the actual content of the works, the harmonisation of methods and the time required to put them in place. 
Kommissionens kontroll ver verksamheten r svagare n fr sdana kontrakt som sluts p central avdelningsniv fr andra resurser, framfr allt vad gller tgrdernas innehll, harmonisering av metoder och tidsschemat fr genomfrandet.
Auditing 26. 
Anvndningen av revisioner 26.
The Financing Agreements make provision for financial audits to be carried out at the instigation of the Commission or the national authorities. 
Mjligheten att utfra redovisningsrevisioner p initiativ av kommissionen eller nationella myndigheter, faststlls i finansieringsverenskommelserna.
Table 4 provides an overview, for the programmes under consideration, of the audits carried out and the follow-up to them. 
I tabell 4 sammanfattas de revisioner som gjorts av de granskade programmen, samt de konsekvenser de lett till.
In Zambia there were no audits, but the reasons for this exception were not clear. 
I Zambia gjordes ingen revision, men sklen till att undantag gjordes r otydliga.
In only two countries (Benin and Burkina Faso) were the audits annual audits that covered all the support for one budget year, rather than a number of financial years receiving support from one, or even several, programmes. 
Endast i tv lnder (Benin och Burkina Faso) gjordes revisionerna rligen och de omfattade samtliga stdformer under ett visst budgetr, och inte revisioner fr flera budgetr av ett eller flera program.
They intermesh with the budgetary arrangements and reinforce the national public finance control systems. 
De ingr i budgetbestmmelserna och frstrker de nationella kontrollbestmmelserna avseende offentliga finanser.
Country Million euro Benin Burkina Faso Ghana Malawi Mozambique Senegal Tanzania Zambia 
Land Miljoner euro Benin Burkina Faso Ghana Malawi Moambique Senegal Tanzania Zambia
C 257/10 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 14.9.2001 Table 4 Position at 31 December 2000 as regards audits of use of counterpart funds for the programmes examined Benin Yes Yes Yes From 1999 Burkina Faso Yes Yes Yes From 1999 Yes Yes 3,7 Yes No Ghana No (4) Yes Yes From 2000 (2) Yes Yes 10,2 Yes No Malawi Mozam-Senegal bique No No No No Yes Yes No From 2000 No (1) No (1) 1 No (1) No (1) No () Box 4 Tanzania Zambia Audit periodicity and coverage Annual audits Audit of all counterpart funds Examine level of expenditure Examine ŐqualityŐ of expenditure Follow-up of established irregularities No (3) Yes (3) (3) (3) 3 (3) (3) () From No None Yes None Yes None 2000 (2) None Yes None Yes None 1 None Yes None No None Specific corrective action Signature of protocol of agreement Agreement on total ineligible expenditure (Mio EUR) Reconstitution of counterpart funds Repaid to EDF treasury (1) Negotiations in progress. 
C 257/10 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 14.9.2001 Tabell 4 Situationen den 31 december 2001 fr revisioner av anvndningen av motpartsmedel i de granskade programmen Benin Burkina Faso Ghana Ja Ja Nej (4) Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja Ja fr.o.m. fr.o.m. fr.o.m. 1999 1999 2000 (2) Punktvisa korrigerande tgrder Slutande av avtalsprotokoll Avtal om samtliga icke-stdberttigade utgifter (miljoner euro) Ombildning av motpartsmedel terbetalning till EUF:s kassa (1) Under frhandling.
(2) Financial audit by SCR in 2000. 
(2) Redovisningsrevision utfrd av Gemensamma tjnsten fr yttre frbindelser r 2000.
(3) Audit performed end 2000 Ń Final report in preparation. 
(3) Granskning utfrd i slutet av 2000 Đ Slutrapport under utarbetande.
(4) In some cases the follow-up reports cover several years. 
(4) Uppfljningsrapporterna avser i vissa fall flera budgetr.
Source: Commission files. 
Klla: kommissionens handlingar.
Yes No No No No 27. Even where the controls on which the audits focused were similar, their terms of reference and the resources devoted to them varied significantly from one country to another. 
27. ven nr revisionerna innehllit liknande granskningsmo-ment, har de befogenheter och resurser som tilldelats dem varit mycket olika i olika lnder.
The disparity of the situations is not mirrored by any pragmatic policy of performing audits according to a reasoned evaluation of the conditions prevailing in each of the countries concerned. 
De skilda situationer som rder speglar inte ngon pragmatisk politik, dr revisioner grs efter en utvrdering av frhllandena i lnderna i frga.
As in the case of technical assistance, a general framework outlining the objectives, defining the checks to be carried out and the scope of them and describing the auditing strategy would have facilitated the programming of resources by serving as a benchmark for all the countries. 
Liksom fr det tekniska bistndet hade planeringen av resurser underlttats om det hade funnits en allmn referensram fr samtliga lnder som definierar mlen, vilka granskningar som skall gras och deras omfattning, samt strategin fr anvndning av revisioner.
In some cases, however, the auditors devoted most of their work to understanding ill-defined expenditure systems, reconstructing accounts and producing quantitative overviews, without being able subsequently to examine the reliability of the accounts ortheexecutionandregularityofthetransactions,sothatthe reports proved to be inconclusive. 
Fram till 1998 omfattade de programfinansierade redovisningsrevisionerna i huvudsak bildandet av motpartsmedel, utgifternas stdberttigande och nivn p budgetgenomfrandet. I vissa fall gnade emellertid revisorerna sig frmst t att komma till rtta med dligt avgrnsade utgiftssystem, rekonstruera rkenskaperna och lgga fram rapporter med tonvikten p kvantitet.
Following the irregularities established in Cte dŐIvoire in 1998 (1), the Commission had a better idea of the risks associated with its approach. 
Efter de oegentligheter som konstaterades i Elfenbenskusten 1998 (1) gjorde kommissionen en bttre bedmning av riskerna med sina metoder.
As of 1999, the financial audits in several countries were reinforced with checks that focused more on the nature of expenditure, the reliability of the accounts and the soundness of the management and control systems (see Box 4). 
Frn och med 1999 frstrktes redovisningsrevisionerna i flera lnder genom en granskning som var mer inriktad p utgifternas kvalitet, rkenskapernas tillfrlitlighet och frvaltnings-och kontrollsystemens vederhftighet (se ruta 4).
2. In Burkina Faso, the auditors noted a number of irregularities in 1998 then, in 1999, stated that the accounts did not give a true view of the level of expenditure. 
2. I Burkina Faso upptckte revisorerna vissa oegentligheter 1998, och 1999 visade de att rkenskaperna inte terspeglade utgifternas verkliga niv.