natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It also proposes phasing out the correction mechanisms that currently apply to certain Member States. 
Den freslr ocks att de korrigeringsmekanismer som fr nrvarande tillmpas fr vissa medlemsstater ska fasas ut.
Doing this would lead to a more transparent and less complex system. 
Det skulle leda till ett mer transparent och mindre komplext system.
However, the Commission does not propose to complete the process until 2026. 
Kommissionen freslr dock att processen ska avslutas frst 2026.
Spending – what did we say? 
Utgifter Đ vad sa vi?
This section summarises our remarks on the Commission’s proposals for the following main expenditure areas: — Research and innovation; — C ohe s i on; — Agriculture and natural resources; — Neighbourhood, development and international cooperation; — Inves tEU. 
I detta avsnitt sammanfattar vi vra synpunkter p kommissionens frslag nr det gller fljande huvudsakliga utgiftsomrden: Ń Forskning och innovation. Ń Sammanhllning. Ń Jordbruk och naturresurser.
10 More details in our — Opinion No 5/2018 on own resources, published on 11 October 2018. 
10 Fler uppgifter finns i vrt Ń yttrande nr 5/2018 ver egna medel, som offentliggjordes den 11 oktober 2018.
Research and innovation On 7 June 2018 the Commission adopted its proposal for Horizon Europe, a €100 billion research and innovation programme that will succeed Horizon 2020. 
Forskning och innovation Den 7 juni 2018 antog kommissionen sitt frslag till Horisont Europa, ett program fr forskning och innovation med en budget p 100 miljarder euro som fljer p Horisont 2020.
11 We have not been asked to provide an opinion on this proposal. 
11 Vi har inte ombetts att yttra oss ver detta frslag.
However, in a recent briefing paper we made a number of proposals for simplifying participation in Horizon 2020. 
I ett nyligen offentliggjort informationsdokument lmnade vi dock ett antal frslag till hur deltagandet i Horisont 2020 skulle kunna frenklas.
For example, we suggested that the Commission further extend the use of simplified cost options to expand the number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and first-time entrants participating in EU research programmes. 
Till exempel freslog vi att kommissionen borde utvidga anvndningen av frenklade kostnadsalternativ ytterligare fr att ka antalet sm och medelstora fretag och frstagngsdeltagare i EU:s forskningsprogram.
In doing so, the Commission should be careful to mitigate any associated risk of simplified cost options (see section on Cohesion, p. 12). 
Kommissionen skulle i s fall behva vara noga med att minska eventuella risker som hnger samman med frenklade kostnadsalternativ (se avsnittet om sammanhllning, s. 12).
We also suggested that research proposals that have already been assessed as high quality by the Commission, but for which no EU research funding is available, could be financed through other European or national programmes without the need for another selection procedure. 
Vi freslog ven att forskningsfrslag som kommissionen redan har bedmt r av hg kvalitet men fr vilka det inte finns ngon EU-forskningsfinansiering tillgnglig skulle kunna finansieras genom andra europeiska eller nationella program utan krav p ett nytt urvalsfrfarande.
This could help to reduce the administrative burden for pa rti c i pa nts . 
Det skulle kunna bidra till en minskad administrativ brda fr deltagarna.
Cohesion On 29 May 2018, the Commission published its proposal for a common provisions regulation (CPR) for seven EU funds under shared management: the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund, the Asylum and Migration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Border Management and Visa Instrument. 
Sammanhllning Den 29 maj 2018 offentliggjorde kommissionen sitt frslag till frordning om gemensamma bestmmelser fr sju EU-fonder med delad frvaltning: Europeiska regionala utvecklingsfonden, Europeiska socialfonden+, Sammanhllningsfonden, Europeiska havs-och fiskerifonden, Asyl-och migrationsfonden, Fonden fr inre skerhet och instrumentet fr grnsfrvaltning och visering.
Taken together, these funds are worth around €360 billion, approximately 30 % of the total budget for 2021-2027. 
Tillsammans r dessa fonder vrda omkring 360 miljarder, vilket motsvarar cirka 30 % av den totala budgeten fr 2021Đ2027.
Funding conditions and performance orientation We consider that the Commission’s efforts to strengthen the link between the use of EU funding and the European semester, and the move from ex-ante conditions to simpler “enabling” conditions, mark a positive development. 
Finansieringsvillkor och prestationsinriktning Vi anser att kommissionens anstrngningar fr att strka kopplingen mellan anvndningen av EU-medel och den europeiska planeringsterminen, och vergngen frn frhandsvillkor till enklare ÓndvndigaÓ villkor, r en positiv utveckling.
However, in the absence of an EU-wide strategy or set of targets which would provide a clear vision of what the EU wishes to achieve through its policies, it will be up to the Member States to define strategic goals for the funds concerned. 
Men s lnge det inte finns en EU-omfattande strategi eller uppsttning ml som ger en tydlig bild av vad EU vill uppn med sin politik r det upp till medlemsstaterna att definiera strategiska ml fr de berrda fonderna.
Care will be needed to ensure that these national/regional goals are sufficiently ambitious. 
Det r viktigt att se till att dessa nationella/regionala ml r tillrckligt ambitisa.
Flexibility Broadly, we welcome the various measures in the CPR proposal to increase the flexibility of the EU budget. 
Flexibilitet Generellt sett vlkomnar vi de olika tgrderna i frslaget till frordning om gemensamma bestmmelser fr att ka EU-budgetens flexibilitet.
However, some of them might increase the administrative burden for national or regional authorities (e.g. the planning of allocations in two stages) or require further clarification. 
Men vissa av dem kar eventuellt den administrativa brdan fr de nationella eller regionala myndigheterna (t.ex. planeringen av anslag i tv steg) eller krver ytterligare frtydliganden.
Simplification The proposal clearly reflects the Commission’s ambition to simplify, which we fully support. 
Frenkling Frslaget speglar tydligt kommissionens ambition att frenkla, vilket vi stder helhjrtat.
However, in some instances we consider that the potential benefits of simplification are outweighed by risks to compliance and sound financial management. 
I vissa fall anser vi dock att de potentiella frdelarna med en frenkling motverkas av risker avseende regelefterlevnaden och en sund ekonomisk frvaltning.
In particular: — simplification may come at the cost of clarity for beneficiaries and national or regional administrations; — the wide range of measures proposed (e.g. simplified cost options, financing not linked to costs) could mean reimbursements that are disproportionate to the costs incurred, which poses a value-for-money risk; and — the suppression of certain features, such as ex-ante programme assessments, appraisals of major projects, strategic reporting and the performance reserve, would weaken the mechanisms in place to deliver results. 
Framfr allt Ń kan frenklingen ske p bekostnad av tydligheten fr stdmottagare och nationella eller regionala myndigheter, Ń skulle den stora mngd olika tgrder som fresls (t.ex. frenklade kostnadsalternativ och finansiering som inte r kopplad till kostnader) kunna leda till ersttning som inte str i proportion till de kostnader som uppkommit, vilket medfr risker nr det gller att f valuta fr pengarna, Ń skulle avskaffandet av vissa frfaranden, till exempel frhandsbedmningar av program, bedmningar av strre projekt, strategisk rapportering och resultatreserven, frsvaga de befintliga resultatgivande mekanismerna.
Finally, annual funding in this policy area is allocated to each programme at the beginning of the programming period. 
Avslutningsvis frdelas den rliga finansieringen p detta politikomrde till varje program i brjan av programperioden.
Any share of annual funding which a Member State does not claim within a pre-determined period is automatically deducted from its allocation and returns to the EU budget. 
Eventuella delar av den rliga finansieringen som en medlemsstat inte begr ersttning fr inom en p frhand faststlld period dras automatisk av frn dess anslag och terfrs till EU-budgeten.
The Commission proposes to reduce the take-up period from 3 to 2 years, which we welcome as a step in the right direction. 
Kommissionen freslr att utnyttjandeperioden minskas frn tre till tv r, vilket vi anser r ett steg i rtt riktning.
Accountability The proposal would shift responsibility for implementation to the Member States, broaden the single audit arrangements and reduce the role of the Commission. 
Ansvarsskyldighet Nr det gller ansvarsskyldighet innebr frslaget att medlemsstaterna fr ansvaret fr genomfrandet, att frfarandena fr samordnad granskning utvidgas och att kommissionens roll minskar.
If applied correctly, these changes certainly have the potential to reduce administrative costs and increase efficiency. 
Om dessa frndringar genomfrs korrekt kan de skert minska de administrativa kostnaderna och ka effektiviteten.
However, they would also eliminate supervision, at the risk of greater levels of irregularities in spending, and could ultimately jeopardise the past 20 years’ progress in internal control. 
Men de skulle ocks leda till att vervakningen frsvann, med en risk fr fler oriktigheter i utgifterna, vilket p sikt skulle kunna ventyra de senaste 20 rens framsteg nr det gller den interna kontrollen.
Agriculture and natural resources On 1 June 2018, the Commission published its proposal for the post-2020 common agricultural policy (CAP), which will have funding of around €330 billion. 
Jordbruk och naturresurser Den 1 juni 2018 offentliggjorde kommissionen sitt frslag till gemensam jordbrukspolitik (GJP) efter 2020, som kommer att ha en finansiering p omkring 330 miljarder euro.
The key changes compared to the current programming period can be summarised as follows: — one CAP strategic plan per Member State for all CAP expenditure (direct payments, rural development and market measures); — efforts to move towards a performance-based system; — a redefinition of eligible spending (based on reported outputs and a new concept of legality and regularity). — changes in control systems, in particular for certification bodies. 
De viktigaste frndringarna jmfrt med den innevarande programperioden kan sammanfattas p fljande stt: Ń En strategisk plan inom den gemensamma jordbrukspolitiken per medlemsstat fr samtliga GJP-utgifter (direktstd, landsbygdsutveckling och marknadstgrder). Ń Frsk att g ver till ett prestationsbaserat system. Ń En omdefiniering av stdberttigande fr utgifter (baserat p rapporterad output och en ny syn p laglighet och korrekthet).
Funding conditions and performance orientation We welcome the Commission’s intention to shift to a performance-based model for the CAP. 
Finansieringsvillkor och prestationsinriktning Vi vlkomnar kommissionens ambition att g ver till en prestationsbaserad modell fr GJP.
However, the absence of clear, specific and quantified EU objectives creates uncertainty about how the Commission would assess Member States’ CAP strategic plans. 
Avsaknaden av tydliga, specifika och kvantifierade EU-ml skapar dock oskerhet kring hur kommissionen ska bedma medlemsstaternas strategiska planer inom den 14 Fler uppgifter finns i vrt Ń briefingdokument Frenkling av genomfrandet av sammanhllningspolitiken efter 2020, som offentliggjordes den 28 maj 2018, Ń yttrande nr 6/2018 ver frordningen om gemensamma bestmmelser, som offentliggjordes den 31 oktober 2018.
We also regret the fact that the proposed performance framework provides only weak incentives: targets could be missed by a considerable margin with little impact on EU funding, and successful performance could trigger at best a marginal ‘performance bonus ’. 
Vi beklagar ocks det faktum att den freslagna prestationsramen endast ger svaga incitament: resultaten kan hamna lngt under mlen utan att detta har ngon strre inverkan p EU:s finansiering, och god prestation leder i bsta fall till en marginell ÓprestationsbaseradÓ bonus.
We have our doubts as regards the Commission’s view that the proposal will reinforce the CAP’s links with environmental and climate objectives. 
Vi r tveksamma till kommissionens stndpunkt att frslaget kommer att strka GJP:s kopplingar till milj-och klimatml.
And we also question how the Commission intends to assess or measure the environmental impact of the proposed changes. 
Och vi undrar ocks hur kommissionen ska bedma eller mta miljeffekterna av de freslagna frndringarna.
Finally, we note that the largest share of CAP spending would continue to consist of direct payments to farmers. 
Slutligen konstaterar vi att den strsta andelen av utgifterna inom GJP skulle fortstta att utgras av direktstd till jordbrukare.
The proposal contains insufficient evidence that farmers really need this form of income support. 
Frslaget innehller otillrckliga bevis fr att jordbrukarna verkligen behver denna form av inkomststd.
Simplification The Commission proposes to reduce the legislative framework from five to three regulations. 
Frenkling Kommissionen freslr att den rttsliga ramen minskas frn fem till tre frordningar.
Certainly, the combined programming of measures currently divided between the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) through a single national CAP strategic plan could help to ensure consistency. 
En gemensam programplanering av tgrder, som fr nrvarande delas mellan Europeiska garantifonden fr jordbruket (EGFJ) och Europeiska jordbruksfonden fr landsbygdsutveckling (Ejflu), i en enda nationell strategisk plan inom den gemensamma jordbrukspolitiken skulle skert kunna bidra till samstmmighet.
However, it is not clear that the CAP would be simpler overall, as in other respects complexity would increase (for example the proposal introduces an eco-scheme with similar objectives to two other environmental instruments). 
Det r dock oklart om GJP blir enklare generellt sett, eftersom komplexiteten i andra avseenden kar (till exempel infrs enligt frslaget ett miljsystem med ml som liknar mlen fr tv andra miljinstrument).
Accountability The Commission’s assessment of eligibility would be based on outputs and an operational governance system, but would exclude rules contained in the CAP strategic plans in respect of individual beneficiaries. 
Ansvarsskyldighet Kommissionens bedmning av stdberttigande ska enligt frslaget baseras p output och ett operativt styrningssystem men utesluta regler fr enskilda stdmottagare i de strategiska planerna.
The proposal gives no definition of ‘output’. 
Frslaget innehller ingen definition av ÓoutputÓ.
In our view, however, for certain measures output depends upon beneficiaries’ compliance with commitments set out in the strategic plans. 
Vi anser att det finns vissa tgrder dr outputen r beroende av stdmottagarnas fullgrande av taganden som anges i de strategiska planerna.
It is thus not clear how the eligibility of some expenditure would be assessed. 
Det r drfr oklart hur stdberttigandet fr vissa utgifter ska bedmas.
In addition, the proposal weakens the supervisory role of both Member States and the Commission in the following ways: — as in the past, paying agencies would be tasked with ensuring the legality and regularity of operations financed by the CAP, while certification bodies would check the functioning of governance systems. 
Frslaget frsvagar vidare bde medlemsstaternas och kommissionens vervakningsroll p fljande stt: Ń Liksom i det frgngna ska de utbetalande organen ha i uppgift att skerstlla lagligheten och korrektheten i insatser som finansieras av GJP, medan de attesterande organen ska kontrollera hur styrningssystemen fungerar.
However, it is unclear whether those checks would also cover definitions and any specific eligibility criteria in strategic plans. 
Det r emellertid oklart om dessa kontroller ocks omfattar definitioner och srskilda stdvillkor som anges i de strategiska planerna.
Moreover, it would no longer be mandatory for certification bodies to verify legality and regularity; — the Commission, although ultimately responsible for implementing the budget, would no longer receive control statistics from paying agencies and would therefore be unable to quantify ineligible expenditure. 
15 Ń Trots att kommissionen r ytterst ansvarig fr genomfrandet av budgeten ska den inte lngre f kontrollstatistik frn de utbetalande organen, vilket leder till att den inte kan kvantifiera icke stdberttigande utgifter.
The current practice of certification bodies giving assurance with regard to payments to individual farmers would also cease. 15 
Nuvarande praxis som innebr att de attesterande organen ger skerhet om stdet till enskilda lantbrukare ska ocks upphra.
Neighbourhood, development and international cooperation On 14 June 2018 the Commission presented its proposal for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), formed by merging several existing external action instruments. €89.2 billion is proposed in funding to implement the NDICI for the 2021-2027 period. 
Grannskapspolitik, utvecklingssamarbete och internationellt samarbete Den 14 juni 2018 presenterade kommissionen sitt frslag till instrument fr grannskapspolitik, utvecklingssamarbete och internationellt samarbete, som skapats genom att flera befintliga instrument fr yttre tgrder slagits samman. Fr genomfrandet av instrumentet under perioden 2021Đ2027 fresls en budget p 89,2 miljarder euro.
In particular, we welcome the fact that incorporating the EDF into the NDICI would bring it under the EU budget. 
Framfr allt vlkomnar vi det faktum att en integrering av EUF i instrumentet fr
The result would be more consistency between the various EU funds providing financial support, and stronger democratic oversight for the European Parliament. 
Resultatet skulle bli strre samstmmighet mellan de olika EU-fonder som tillhandahller finansiellt std och starkare demokratisk kontroll fr Europaparlamentet.
It remains to be seen whether the merging of funds would be enough on its own to allow more flexible responses to unforeseen challenges and crises. 
Det terstr att se om en sammanslagning av fonder i sig r tillrckligt fr att mjliggra flexiblare svar p ofrutsedda utmaningar och kriser.
The Commission also proposes to increase the thresholds above which action plans and measures must be adopted by means of implementing acts. 
Kommissionen freslr ocks en hjning av de tak ver vilka handlingsplaner och tgrder mste antas genom genomfrandeakter.
The proposed thresholds are twice as high as for the EDF. 
De freslagna taken r dubbelt s hga som fr EUF.
This could weaken the oversight a rra ng e me nts . 
Detta skulle kunna frsvaga kontrollarrangemangen.
Performance We consider that the proposed performance-based approach should apply in all cases, not only to ‘Neighbourhood’ countries. 
Prestation Vi anser att den freslagna prestationsbaserade metoden ska glla i samtliga fall och inte bara grannskapslnder.
Similarly, the use of results-based programming should also extend to thematic programmes. 
P samma stt br anvndningen av resultatbaserad programmering ocks glla tematiska program.
We recommend that, in its evaluation of the NDICI, the Commission distinguish more clearly between the regulation itself and the resulting measures. 
Vi rekommenderar att kommissionen i sin utvrdering av instrumentet fr grannskapspolitik, utvecklingssamarbete och internationellt samarbete tydligare skiljer mellan sjlva frordningen och de pfljande tgrderna.
Given that the EDF would be brought into the EU budget, we consider that the rules on budget support in the EDF financial regulation should also be aligned with those applicable to the EU’s general budget. 
Med hnsyn till att EUF frs in i EU-budgeten anser vi att reglerna om budgetstd i budgetfrordningen fr EUF br harmoniseras med de regler som gller fr EU:s allmnna budget.
In addition, the scope of the Commission’s discretionary power over budget support to overseas countries and territories (OCTs) remains to be clarified. 
Dessutom behver omfattningen av kommissionens bedmningsutrymme nr det gller tillhandahllande av budgetstd till utomeuropeiska lnder och territorier (ULT) frtydligas.
17 More details in our — Opinion No 3/2018 on the proposal for a Council Regulation on the financial regulation applicable to the 11th European Development Fund, published on 1 October 2018; — Opinion No 10/2018 on the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, published on 17 December 2018. 
17 Fler uppgifter finns i vrt Ń yttrande nr 3/2018 ver frslaget till rdets frordning med budgetfrordning fr elfte Europeiska utvecklingsfonden, som offentliggjordes den 1 oktober 2018, Ń yttrande nr 10/2018 ver instrumentet fr grannskapspolitik, utvecklingssamarbete och internationellt samarbete, som offentliggjordes den 17 december 2018.
InvestEU On 6 June 2018, the Commission proposed the ‘InvestEU’ Programme to support investments in the EU. 
InvestEU Den 6 juni 2018 lade kommissionen fram ett frslag till frordning om inrttande av InvestEU-programmet fr att stdja investeringar i EU.
The Commission estimates that the new fund will mobilise additional investment of around €650 billion. 
Kommissionen uppskattar att den nya fonden kommer att mobilisera ytterligare investeringar p omkring 650 miljarder euro.
This will be achieved by making available a €38 billion guarantee from the EU budget, following the example of the demand-driven European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) established during the 2014-2020 period. 
Det ska uppns genom att en garanti p 38 miljarder euro tillhandahlls frn EU-budgeten, vilket fljer exemplet med den efterfrgetyrda Europeiska fonden fr strategiska investeringar (Efsi) som inrttades under perioden 2014Đ2020.
We have not been asked to provide an opinion on this proposal. 
Vi har inte ombetts att yttra oss ver detta frslag.
However, in recent reports and an opinion we made a number of remarks on the complementarity of the EFSI with other financial instruments and budgetary guarantees, the methods used to estimate the level of additional investment mobilised and the geographical distribution of projects and, more generally, the use of financial instruments to fund EU policies. 
Men i rapporter och ett yttrande som nyligen offentliggjordes framfrde vi ett antal synpunkter p Efsis komplementaritet med andra finansieringsinstrument och budgetgarantier, de metoder som anvnds fr att berkna storleken p de ytterligare investeringar som mobiliseras och den geografiska frdelningen av projekt och, mer generellt, anvndningen av finansieringsinstrument fr att finansiera EU-politik.
Moreover, we have previously noted accountability gaps in the management and reporting of spending from the EU budget. 
Vi har tidigare ven konstaterat brister i ansvarsskyldigheten nr det gller frvaltningen av och rapporteringen om utgifter frn EU-budgeten.
Bringing all centrally managed financial instruments together in a single programme is a positive step towards mitigating that risk. 
Att fra samman alla centralt frvaltade finansieringsinstrument i ett enda program r ett positivt steg fr att minska den risken.
We consider that this assessment applies equally well to the Commission’s propos a l . 
Vi anser att denna bedmning i lika hg r tillmplig p kommissionens frslag.