natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Through further guidance10, the Commission specified that AFCOSs should have the mandate, within the Member State, to coordinate all legislative, administrative and investigative obligations and activities relating to the protection of the EU’s financial interests. 
I ytterligare vgledning10 specificerade kommissionen att Afcos ska ha befogenhet att inom medlemsstaten samordna alla rttsliga, administrativa och utredningsmssiga skyldigheter och tgrder relaterade till skyddet av EU:s finansiella intressen.
In shared management, Member State authorities report cases of suspected or established fraud (and other irregularities) to the Commission through the Irregularity Management System (IMS) hosted at OLAF’s anti-fraud information platform. 
Vid delad frvaltning rapporterar medlemsstaternas myndigheter fall av misstnkt eller konstaterat bedrgeri (och andra oriktigheter) till kommissionen via systemet fr hantering av oriktigheter (IMS), som r en del av Olafs informationssystem fr bedrgeribekmpning.
Significant incidence of reported fraud in EU cohesion policy compared to other spending areas 08 On 5 July 2017, the European Parliament and the Council adopted Directive (EU) 2017/1371 on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law (the ‘PIF Directive’11). 
Betydligt hgre frekomst av rapporterat bedrgeri inom EU:s sammanhllningspolitik n inom andra utgiftsomrden 08 Den 5 juli 2017 antog Europaparlamentet och rdet direktiv (EU) 2017/1371 om bekmpande genom straffrttsliga bestmmelser av bedrgeri som riktar sig mot unionens finansiella intressen (PIF-direktivet11).
The Directive establishes a common definition of fraud against the EU’s financial interests, in particular in the field of public procurement. 
I direktivet anges en gemensam definition av bedrgeri som riktar sig mot EU:s finansiella intressen, framfr allt inom omrdet offentlig upphandling.
Member States must enact the PIF Directive in national legislation by 6 July 201912. 
Medlemsstaterna mste infrliva PIF-direktivet i sin nationella lagstiftning senast den 6 juli 201912.
09 In September 2018, the Commission published its 29th annual report on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests13 (hereafter referred to as the 2017 PIF report). 
09 I september 2018 offentliggjorde kommissionen sin 29:e rsrapport om skyddet av Europeiska unionens finansiella intressen13 (nedan kallad 2017 rs PIF-rapport).
For shared management, the Commission prepares this report based on the information reported by Member States through the IMS (see paragraph 07). 
Vid delad frvaltning utarbetar kommissionen rapporten p grundval av den information som medlemsstaterna rapporterar via IMS (se punkt 07).
1). 10 Guidance note on main tasks and responsibilities of an Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS), 13 November 2013, Ares (2013) 3403880. 
10 Guidance note on main tasks and responsibilities of an Anti-Fraud Co-ordination Service (AFCOS) (riktlinjer om huvudsakliga uppgifter och ansvarsomrden fr en sambandscentral fr bedrgeribekmpning (Afcos)), 13 november 2013, Ares (2013) 3403880.
11 The abbreviation PIF comes from the French ‘protection des intérêts financiers’ and generally refers to the protection of the EU’s financial interests. 
11 Frkortningen PIF kommer frn franskans protection des intrts financiers och gller det generella skyddet av EU:s finansiella intressen.
12 Article 17(1) of Directive 2017/1371. 
12 Artikel 17.1 i direktiv 2017/1371.
13 COM(2018) 553 final of 3 September 2018. 10 9 
13 COM(2018) 553 final, 3.9.2018. 11
11 reported fraud cases and 72 % of the total financial amounts involved in these cases (see Figure 2). Figure 2 – Irregularities reported as fraudulent by policy area (2013-2017) Policy area Irregularities reported as fraudulent Financial amounts involved (number) (percentage) (million euro) (percentage) Common agricultural policy Cohesion and fisheries policies - Fisheries part - Agricultural part (pre-2007) - Cohesion part Pre-accession policy Direct management 2 081 64 24 1 645 133 206 50 % 2% 1% 39 % 3% 5% 350.9 20.1 3.4 1 063.6 28.8 21.5 24 % 1% 0% 72 % 2% 1% TOTAL (Expenditure part) 4 153 100 % 1 488.3 100 % Source: 2017 PIF report - Statistical Annex Part II (Expenditure) 10 According to the data supporting the 2017 PIF report, irregularities reported as fraudulent by Member States represent 0.44 % of the EU funds paid in the field of cohesion policy. 
Figur 2 Đ Anmlda oriktigheter med misstanke om bedrgeri per politikomrde (2013Đ2017) 12 Politikomrde Anmlda oriktigheter med misstanke om bedrgeri Belopp som berrs (antal) (i procent) (miljoner euro) (i procent) Gemensamma jordbrukspolitiken Sammanhllnings-och fiskeripolitiken - Fiske - Jordbruk (fre 2007) - Sammanhllning Franslutningspolitiken Direkt frvaltning 2 081 64 24 1 645 133 206 50% 2% 1% 39% 3% 5% 350,9 20,1 3,4 1 063,6 28,8 21,5 24% 1% 0% 72% 2% 1% TOTALT (kostnader) 4 153 100% 1 488,3 100% Klla: 2017 rs PIF-rapport Đ Statistikbilagan del II (Kostnader).
This indicator is known as the fraud detection rate14 and varies widely by Member State (see Figure 3), ranging from 0 % to 2.1 % in relation to EU cohesion funding for the whole 2007-2013 programming period. 
Den hr indikatorn brukar kallas fr andelen upptckta bedrgerier14 och varierar mycket mellan medlemsstaterna (se figur 3), dr den ligger mellan 0 och 2,1 % nr det gller EU:s sammanhllningsmedel fr hela programperioden 2007Đ2013.
The 2017 PIF report does not provide any specific explanation regarding the significantly higher fraud detection rate reported for Slovakia. 
I 2017 rs PIF-rapport ges ingen srskild frklaring till den betydligt hgre andelen upptckta bedrgerier som anmlts fr Slovakien.
The average individual value of the irregularities as fraudulent amounts to €0.8 million. 
Det genomsnittliga enskilda vrdet av anmlda oriktigheter med misstanke om bedrgeri r 0,8 miljoner euro.
14 Statistical annex to the 2017 PIF report, page 93. The FDR is the ratio between the amounts involved in cases reported as fraudulent and the payments made in the 2007-2013 programming period (page 91). 
14 Statistikbilagan till 2017 rs PIF-rapport, s. 93. Andelen upptckta bedrgerier visar frhllandet mellan de aktuella beloppen i anmlda renden med misstanke om bedrgeri och de utbetalningar som gjordes under programperioden 2007Đ2013 (s.
This indicator does not include undetected or unreported fraud. Figure 3 – Fraud detected and reported as a percentage of cohesion policy funds received by EU Member States in the 2007-2013 programming period 12 Luxembourg Finland Ireland Sweden Belgium France 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.00 % 0.02 % 0.02 % Lithuania 0.03 % Hungary Malta Denmark Spain 0.04 % 0.04 % 0.05 % 0.05 % Greece 0.07 % Bulgaria United Kingdom Germany Austria Cyprus Netherlands Croatia Estonia Italy EUTotal Portugal Poland Slovenia Latvia Czechia Romania Slovakia 0.12 % 0.12 % 0.14 % 0.14 % 0.15 % 0.26 % 0.31 % 0.34 % 0.37 % 0 4% 0.57 % 0.61 % 0.74 % 0.86 % 0.88 % 1.10 % .4 2.13 % N.B. The calculation of the fraud detection rate represented in this figure excludes irregularities concerning fisheries policy (which are included in the statistics published by the Commission under cohesion and fisheries policies and which do not increase the fraud detection rate for the EU Total. 
Figur 3 Đ Upptckt och anmlt bedrgeri i procent av de sammanhllningspolitiska medel som EU-medlemsstaterna tog emot under programperioden 2007Đ2013 13 Luxemburg Finland Irland Sverige Belgien Frankrike Litauen Ungern Malta Danmark Spanien Grekland Bulgarien Frenade kungariket Tyskland sterrike Cypern Nederlnderna Kroatien Estland Italien EUtotalt Portugal Polen Slovenien Lettland Tjeckien Rumnien Slovakien 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,02 % 0,02 % 0,03 % 0,04 % 0,04 % 0,05 % 0,05 % 0,07 % 0,12 % 0,12 % 0,14 % 0,14 % 0,15 % 0,26 % 0,31 % 0,34 % 0,37 % 0 4% 0,57 % 0,61 % 0,74 % 0,86 % 0,88 % 1,10 % ,4 2,13 % Anm.: I berkningen av andelen upptckta bedrgerier i figuren ingr inte oriktigheter inom fiskeripolitiken (eftersom de ingr i den statistik som kommissionen offentliggr fr sammanhllnings-och fiskeripolitiken, och som inte kar andelen upptcka bedrgerier fr EU totalt).
However, these programmes are considered for the calculation of the EU average in the figure. 
De programmen ingr dock i berkningen av EU-genomsnittet i figuren.
As regards the Member States presenting a zero FDR, Finland and Luxembourg reported no fraudulent irregularities, while Ireland and Sweden reported some irregularities with a low financial value. 
Nr det gller de medlemsstater som presenterar noll upptckta bedrgerier hade Finland och Luxemburg inte anmlt ngra oriktigheter med misstanke om bedrgeri, och Irland och Sverige hade anmlt ngra oriktigheter med lgt ekonomiskt vrde.
11 We considered it necessary to assess the work carried out by managing authorities, as they are in the front line of the fight against fraud in EU cohesion policy. 
11 Vi ansg att det var ndvndigt att bedma det arbete som utfrs av frvaltande myndigheter eftersom de str i frmsta ledet i kampen mot bedrgeri inom EU:s sammanhllningspolitik.
According to the Commission15, the combination of a thorough risk assessment leading to adequate preventive and detective measures by managing authorities, on the one hand, and coordinated and timely investigations by competent bodies (usually the police or prosecutors), on the other hand, could significantly reduce fraud risk in the field of cohesion policy and provide suitable deterrence against fraud. 
Enligt kommissionen15 skulle kombinationen av dels en grundlig riskbedmning som leder till att frvaltande myndigheter vidtar frebyggande och korrigerande tgrder, dels samordnade utredningar som behriga organ (vanligen polis eller klagare) gr vid rtt tidpunkt kunna minska bedrgeririsken inom sammanhllningspolitiken betydligt och p lmpligt stt avskrcka frn bedrgeri.
This audit was structured around these two broad areas. 
Revisionen strukturerades runt dessa tv breda omrden.
13 15 Commission’s guidance for Member States and programme authorities on fraud risk assessment and effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures, page 11 (EGESIF 14-0021 of 16 June 2014). 
14 15 Kommissionens vgledning fr medlemsstater och programmyndigheter om bedmning av risken fr bedrgerier samt effektiva och proportionella tgrder mot bedrgeri, s. 11 (EGESIF 14-0021, 16.6.2014).
Audit scope and approach 12 We decided to audit the work of managing authorities in fighting fraud in cohesion policy because of the key role they play, and will continue to play in the 2021-2027 programming period. 
Revisionens inriktning och omfattning samt revisionsmetod 12 Anledningen till att vi beslutade att granska de frvaltande myndigheternas arbete fr att bekmpa bedrgeri inom sammanhllningspolitiken r den centrala roll de spelar och kommer att fortstta att spela under programperioden 2021Đ2027.
We assessed whether managing authorities have properly fulfilled their responsibilities at each stage of the anti-fraud management process: fraud prevention, fraud detection and fraud response (including reporting on fraud and recovery of funds unduly paid). 
Vi bedmde om de frvaltande myndigheterna p lmpligt stt har uppfyllt sina skyldigheter i varje led av bedrgeribekmpningsprocessen, vilket innebr att de ska frebygga och upptcka bedrgerier och vidta mottgrder (bland annat anmla bedrgeri och tervinna felaktigt utbetalda belopp).
To this end, we assessed whether managing authorities have: (a) developed anti-fraud policies, performed a thorough risk assessment and implemented adequate preventive and detective measures; and (b) properly responded to detected fraud in coordination with the investigation and prosecution bodies and with AFCOSs, considering the design of these services in the Member States we visited. 
Vi bedmde drfr om de frvaltande myndigheterna hade a) utarbetat en bedrgeribekmpningspolicy, gjort en grundlig riskbedmning och genomfrt lmpliga tgrder fr att frebygga och upptcka bedrgeri, b) reagerat p upptckt bedrgeri p lmpligt stt och i samarbete med utrednings-och lagfringsorganen och sambandscentralerna, beroende p hur dessa avdelningar var utformade i de medlemsstater som vi beskte.
13 We looked at the role played by managing authorities and AFCOSs in the Member States in cohesion policy. 
13 Vi tittade p den roll som frvaltande myndigheter och sambandscentraler i medlemsstaterna spelar inom sammanhllningspolitiken.
We audited the managing authorities for the operational programmes funded by the three main European Structural and Investment Funds concerning EU cohesion policy: the CF, the ESF and the ERDF. 
Vi granskade de myndigheter som frvaltar de operativa program som finansieras av de tre strsta europeiska struktur-och investeringsfonderna inom EU:s sammanhllningspolitik: Sammanhllningsfonden, ESF och Eruf.
We decided to exclude the European Territorial Cooperation objective (ETC) of the ERDF, as the projects financed by the corresponding OPs involve partners from different countries under the supervision of authorities in different Member States. 
Vi beslutade att utesluta mlet Europeiskt territoriellt samarbete inom Eruf eftersom de projekt som finansieras av motsvarande operativa program involverar partner frn olika lnder som vervakas av myndigheter i olika medlemsstater.
14 We reviewed how managing authorities had considered the Member States’ legal and strategic anti-fraud framework for the management of the anti-fraud process, in particular when a national anti-fraud strategy was available. 
14 Vi kontrollerade hur frvaltande myndigheter hade beaktat medlemsstaternas rttsliga och strategiska bedrgeribekmpningsramar vid sin frvaltning av bedrgeribekmpningsprocessen, srskilt nr det fanns en nationell strategi fr bedrgeribekmpning.
We invited all managing authorities to participate in a survey on fraud prevention and detection measures and obtained replies from authorities in 23 Member States. 
Vi bad alla frvaltande myndigheter att delta i en enkt om tgrder fr att frebygga och upptcka bedrgeri och fick svar frn myndigheter i 23 medlemsstater.
15 We visited seven Member States: Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Greece, Latvia, Romania and Spain. 
15 Vi beskte fljande sju medlemsstater: Bulgarien, Frankrike, Ungern, Grekland, Lettland, Rumnien och Spanien.
For the selection of these Member States, we considered the fraud detection rates and the number of fraud cases presented in the 2016 PIF report, as well as their correlation with other available fraud risk indicators. 
Fr att vlja ut dem tittade vi p andelen upptckta bedrgerier och antalet bedrgerirenden i 2016 rs PIF-rapport, samt p deras korrelation med andra tillgngliga bedrgeririskindikatorer.
During our visits, we met with representatives of the authorities responsible for implementing a total of 43 OPs (22 OPs for 2007-2013 and 21 OPs for 2014-2020) and with key actors in the fight against fraud (prosecution and judicial bodies, investigative bodies, anti-fraud agencies, competition authorities). 
fretrdare fr de myndigheter som ansvarade fr genomfrandet av totalt 43 operativa program (22 fr 2007Đ2013 och 21 fr 2014Đ2020) och centrala aktrer i kampen mot bedrgeri (klagarmyndigheter och lagfringsorgan, utredningsorgan, byrer fr bedrgeribekmpning och konkurrensmyndigheter).
In the Member States we visited we audited a 14 judgemental sample of OPs selected to be representative of all funds (ERDF, ESF and, where applicable, CF) and a range of intervention types. 
I de beskta medlemsstaterna granskade vi ett subjektivt urval av operativa program som hade valts ut fr att vara representativa fr alla fonder (Eruf, ESF och, i tillmpliga fall, Sammanhllningsfonden) och ett antal olika insatstyper.
16 We reviewed the case files of a sample of 138 irregularities reported to the Commission as fraudulent from the 22 OPs we tested for 2007-2013. 
16 Vi gick igenom akterna frn ett urval av 138 oriktigheter med misstanke om bedrgeri som anmlts till kommissionen frn de 22 operativa program som vi granskade fr 2007Đ2013.
Wherever the size of the population allowed, we applied the random method known as monetary unit sampling to select the irregularities to be reviewed. 
Nr populationsstorleken tillt anvnde vi den slumpmssiga metoden monetary unit sampling (urvalsmetod med beloppsenheter) fr att vlja ut de oriktigheter som skulle granskas.
We did not assess the work of investigation, prosecution and judicial bodies – although we did look at the managing authorities’ coordination and communication with those bodies. 
Vi bedmde inte det arbete som utfrts av utredningsorgan, klagarmyndigheter och lagfringsorgan, men vi tittade p de frvaltande myndigheternas samordning och kommunikation med dem.
17 The findings in this report complement those in special report 01/2019: “Fighting fraud in EU spending: action needed”, published on 10 January 2019, which covered the design and implementation of the Commission’s Anti-Fraud Strategy. 
17 Iakttagelserna i den hr rapporten kompletterar iakttagelserna i srskild rapport nr 1/2019 Kampen mot bedrgerier i samband med EU-utgifter: mer behver gras som offentliggjordes den 10 januari 2019 och handlar om utformningen och genomfrandet av kommissionens bedrgeribekmpningsstrategi.
In that report, we mainly focused on the role of OLAF, but also looked at the work done on anti-fraud policies by the Commission DGs responsible for the implementation of EU cohesion policy (see paragraph 04). 15 
I den rapporten inriktade vi oss frmst p Olafs roll, men tittade ven p det arbete avseende bedrgeribekmpningspolicyer som utfrts av kommissionens generaldirektorat med ansvar fr genomfrandet av EU:s sammanhllningspolitik (se punkt 04). 16
Observations Anti-fraud policy, fraud prevention and detection measures Managing authorities generally have no specific anti-fraud policy 18 The Commission has provided guidelines for Member States and managing authorities to help them comply with their legal obligation to put in place anti-fraud measures that are proportionate and effective. — At the level of the Member States, the Commission recommends the adoption of national anti-fraud strategies for the protection of the ESI Funds, with the objective of ensuring homogenous and effective implementation of anti-fraud measures, especially where Member States’ organisational structures are decentralised. — At the level of operational programmes, the Commission recommends that managing authorities develop a structured approach to tackling fraud, organised around the four key elements in the anti-fraud management process: prevention, detection, correction and prosecution16. — The Commission has further defined concrete criteria for evaluating the way managing authorities have complied with their legal obligations for setting up proportionate and effective anti-fraud measures17. 
Iakttagelser Bedrgeribekmpningspolicy och tgrder fr att frebygga och upptcka bedrgeri Frvaltande myndigheter har i allmnhet ingen specifik bedrgeribekmpningspolicy 18 Kommissionen har tagit fram riktlinjer fr medlemsstater och frvaltande myndigheter som ska hjlpa dem att uppfylla sin lagstadgade skyldighet att vidta tgrder mot bedrgeri som r proportionella och effektiva. Ń Nr det gller medlemsstaterna rekommenderar kommissionen att de antar nationella bedrgeribekmpningsstrategier fr att skydda ESI-fonderna, i syfte att skerstlla ett enhetligt och effektivt genomfrande av tgrder mot bedrgeri, i synnerhet nr medlemsstaternas organisatoriska struktur r decentraliserad.
16 Commission’s Guidance for Member States and programme authorities on fraud risk assessment and effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures (EGESIF 14-0021 of 16 June 2014), OLAF’s Handbook on the role of Member State auditors in fraud prevention and detection (October 2014) and Guidance on a common methodology for the assessment of management and control systems in the Member States (EGESIF 14-0010-final of 18 December 2014). 
16 Kommissionens vgledning fr medlemsstater och programmyndigheter om bedmning av risken fr bedrgerier samt effektiva och proportionella tgrder mot bedrgeri (EGESIF 14-0021, 16.6.2014), Olafs handbok om den roll som revisorer i medlemsstaterna spelar fr att frebygga och upptcka bedrgeri (oktober 2014) och vgledningen avseende en gemensam metod fr utvrdering av frvaltnings-och kontrollsystem i medlemsstaterna (EGESIF 14-0010-final, 18.12.2014).
17 Article 30 and Annex IV of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 480/2014 of 3 March 2014 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 138, 13.5.2014, p. 
17 Artikel 30 och bilaga IV till kommissionens delegerade frordning (EU) nr 480/2014 av den 3 mars 2014 om komplettering av Europaparlamentets och rdets frordning (EU) nr 1303/2013 (EUT L 138, 13.5.2014, s.
5) and defining key requirements of management and control systems and their classification with regard to their effective functioning - specifically key requirement 7 (effective implementation of proportionate anti-fraud measures). 16 
5) och faststllande av centrala krav p frvaltnings-och kontrollsystem och klassificering av dessa system efter hur vl de fungerar Đ i synnerhet centralt krav 7 (effektiva och proportionella tgrder mot bedrgeri). 17
19 The Commission recommends that managing authorities use a formal anti-fraud policy18 to communicate their determination to combat and address fraud. 
19 Kommissionen rekommenderar att frvaltande myndigheter anvnder en formell bedrgeribekmpningspolicy18 fr att frmedla sin fasta fresats att bekmpa och tgrda bedrgeri.
We consider that managing authorities should have prepared a formal anti-fraud policy or a similar single, stand-alone document specifying their fraud prevention, detection and response measures and making clear to their own staff, the beneficiaries of EU funding and other authorities that measures to tackle fraud are in place and being implemented. 
Vi anser att de frvaltande myndigheterna borde ha utarbetat en formell bedrgeribekmpningspolicy eller ett liknande fristende dokument dr de anger sina tgrder fr att frebygga, upptcka och komma till rtta med bedrgeri och gr klart fr den egna personalen, mottagare av EU-medel och andra myndigheter att myndigheten har infrt och tillmpar tgrder fr att bekmpa bedrgeri.
20 We found during our visits that very few of these policies actually constitute formal reference documents summarising the measures to be implemented at each stage of the anti-fraud management process in response to identified fraud risks. 
20 Vid besken konstaterade vi att mycket f policyer verkligen r formella referensdokument som sammanfattar de tgrder som ska genomfras i varje led av bedrgeribekmpningsprocessen som svar p upptckta bedrgeririsker.
We only found examples of formalised anti-fraud policies in Latvia, at specific intermediate bodies in Spain, and in France (where the policy has not been made public). 
De enda exemplen p en formaliserad bedrgeribekmpningspolicy fann vi i Lettland, vid specifika frmedlande organ i Spanien och i Frankrike (dr policyn inte har offentliggjorts).
In all other cases, to obtain a full description of anti-fraud measures we needed to consult multiple management documents and manuals of procedures. 
I alla vriga fall var vi tvungna att stta oss in i flera olika frvaltningsdokument och handbcker fr att f en fullstndig beskrivning av tgrderna mot bedrgeri.
We consider that the absence of formalised anti-fraud policies limits Member States’ ability to supervise and coordinate anti-fraud measures and evaluate their effectiveness. 
Vi anser att avsaknaden av formaliserade bedrgeribekmpningspolicyer begrnsar medlemsstaternas frmga att vervaka och samordna tgrder mot bedrgeri och utvrdera deras effektivitet.