natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
12 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Hungary, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden and United Kingdom. (a) Was the establishment of the EEAS adequately prepared? (b) Were the resources of the EEAS prioritised, organised and allocated efficiently? (d) a sample of 14 EEAS staff training courses organised since 2011; (e) a quantitative analysis of EEAS staffing data as of 15 April 2013, 10 January 2012 and 25 January 2011; (c) Has the EEAS coordinated effec-(f) tively with the Commission and a survey of a sample of 35 EU delegations (all 35 replied); the Member States? (g) a survey of Member States which was completed by 15 of them12; 11 (h) The audit covered the preparatory work conducted by EU institutions and the Member States and the activities interviews with representatives of the GSC and nine Commission directorates-general to obtain their views on cooperation with the EEAS; carried out by the EEAS from its launch on 1 January 2011 to December 2013. 
12 Bulgarien, Tjeckien, Estland, Spanien, Italien, Cypern, Lettland, Ungern, Nederlnderna, sterrike, Polen, Portugal, Slovakien, Sverige och Storbritannien.
As a result, when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009, the characteristics of the future service were still under discussion by the Member States, the Commission and the Council. 15 An important factor during this discussion was that the EU’s objectives were not set out in an overarching EU foreign policy strategy, which could have guided this preparatory work14. 
Iakttagelser 08 Inrttandet av Europeiska utrikestjnsten forcerades, frbereddes inte tillrckligt och tfljdes av alltfr mnga restriktioner och vagt formulerade uppgifter 15 En viktig faktor under denna diskussion var att EU:s ml inte hade faststllts i en vergripande utrikespolitisk strategi som kunde ha vglett detta frberedelsearbete14.
16 Consequently, the Council decision does not state any objectives for the EEAS. Instead, it merely states its tasks15: (a) supporting the HR/VP to fulfil her triple-hatted mandate: conducting the common foreign and security policy, presiding over the Foreign Affairs Council and being Vice-President (VP) of the Commission; (b) assisting the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the Commission itself in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of external relations; (c) supporting the diplomatic services of the Member States, the GSC and the Commission, and other institutions and bodies of the Union, in particular the European Parliament and cooperating with them. 
16 I rdets beslut anges fljaktligen inte ngra ml fr Europeiska utrikestjnsten utan endast dess uppgifter15, nmligen fljande: a) Stdja den hga representanten/ vice ordfranden i hans eller hennes tre uppgifter: leda den gemensamma utrikes-och skerhetspolitiken, vara ordfrande i rdet (utrikes frgor) och vara vice ordfrande fr kommissionen. b) Bist ordfranden i Europeiska rdet, kommissionens ordfrande och kommissionen d de fullgr sina olika uppgifter p omrdet yttre frbindelser. c) Stdja, och samarbeta med, medlemsstaternas diplomat-tjnster, rdets generalsekretariat och kommissionen samt andra EU-institutioner och EU-organ, srskilt Europaparlamentet.
13 The Irish electorate rejected the Lisbon Treaty in June 2008 before approving it in a second referendum on 2.10.2009. 
13 De irlndska vljarna rstade nej till Lissabonfrdraget i juni 2008 innan de godknde det i en andra folkomrstning den 2 oktober 2009.
14 The latest overarching EU strategic document is still the 2003 European Security Strategy which, although updated in 2008, does not reflect the evolving geopolitical events which have transformed the world. 
14 Det senaste vergripande EU-strategidokumentet r fortfarande den europeiska skerhetsstrategin frn 2003 som visserligen uppdaterades 2008 men som inte terspeglar de geopolitiska hndelser som har frndrat vrlden.
However, Member States disagree on the case for a new strategy as some consider that the principles stated in 2003 are still valid. 
Medlemsstaterna r dock oense om huruvida en ny strategi behvs eftersom en del av dem anser att principerna frn 2003 fortfarande gller.
15 Article 2 and Article 3 of Council Decision 2010/427/EU. 
15 Artiklarna 2 och 3 i rdets beslut 2012/427/EU.
Observations 09 17 The Council decision reflects the agreement among the Member States, the European Parliament and the Commission at the moment of drawing up the text. 
Iakttagelser 09 17 Rdets beslut speglar samfrstndet mellan medlemsstaterna, Europaparlamentet och kommissionen vid den tidpunkt d texten utformades.
It does not further define these wide-ranging tasks and says little about their substance. 
Det preciserar inte dessa vittomfattande uppgifter ytterligare och sger inte mycket om deras innehll.
18 As a result, departments were transferred to the EEAS not on the basis of their expected contribution to the fulfilment of EEAS objectives, but on the basis of their activities and their administrative position within the Commission or the GSC. 
18 Det ledde till att avdelningar inte frdes ver till Europeiska utrikestjnsten utifrn sina frvntade bidrag till uppfyllandet av Europeiska utrikestjnstens ml utan p grundval av sin verksamhet och administrativa stllning inom kommissionen eller rdets generalsekretariat.
This is particularly evident with regard to the external dimension of internal EU policies, for which the EEAS received no resources from the Commission16. 
Detta r srskilt uppenbart i frga om den yttre dimensionen av EU:s inre politik, fr vilken Europeiska utrikestjnsten inte fick ngra resurser av kommissionen16.
In particular, the EEAS was created with no departments to deal with global issues of relevance to the EU such as climate change or energy security, as the resources dealing with these issues were transferred from the former Commission Directorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX) to other Commission departments before the establishment of the EEAS. 
Framfr allt inrttades Europeiska utrikestjnsten utan avdelningar som skulle hantera globala frgor av betydelse fr EU, ssom klimatfrndringar eller energitrygghet, eftersom resurserna avseende dessa frgor frdes ver frn kommissionens fre detta generaldirektorat fr yttre frbindelser (GD Yttre frbindelser) till andra kommissionsavdelningar innan Europeiska utrikestjnsten inrttades.
This has contributed to the de facto outcome whereby the EEAS has had practical difficulties to coordinate some actions of the Commission with impact over EU foreign policy. 
Detta har de facto bidragit till att Europeiska utrikestjnsten har haft praktiska svrigheter att samordna en del av kommissionens tgrder med inverkan p EU:s utrikespolitik.
The EEAS has faced a number of political and financial challenges 19 The establishment of the EEAS took place during a time of increasing turmoil in the southern Mediterra-nean17. 
Europeiska utrikestjnsten har stllts infr ett antal politiska och ekonomiska utmaningar 19 Inrttandet av Europeiska utrikestjnsten skedde i en tid av kande oro i sdra Medelhavsomrdet17.
The EEAS focused its attention on leading the EU’s response18 which took priority over the development of foreign policy initiatives, long awaited by Member States and EU institutions alike, such as the reform of the common security and defence policy procedures and structures and the development of the EU’s comprehensive approach19. 
Europeiska utrikestjnsten riktade in sin uppmrksamhet p att leda EU:s svar18, vilket prioriterades framfr att g vidare med utrikespolitiska initiativ, som bde medlemsstaterna och EU-institu-tionerna vntat p lnge, t.ex. en reform av frfarandena och strukturerna inom den gemensamma skerhets-och frsvarspolitiken och en utveckling av EU:s vergripande strategi19.
16 EU internal policies and actions can have significant impacts beyond the EU’s borders, likewise external events can also impact on EU internal dynamics. 
16 EU:s inre politik och tgrder kan f betydande effekter utanfr EU:s grnser, och p samma stt kan yttre hndelser pverka EU:s inre dynamik.
The ‘external dimension of internal policies’ generally refers to the situations where the external aspects of internal EU policies have a growing foreign and security policy dimension. 
Den yttre dimensionen av den inre politiken avser vanligtvis de situationer dr de yttre aspekterna av EU:s inre politik fr en allt strre utrikes-och skerhetspolitisk dimension.
As an example of the impact of EU internal policies over EU foreign policy, bilateral relationships with Canada have been dominated for a long time by the discussion on the impact of the EU’s policies on climate change over the access to European markets of oil produced from tar sands. 
Ett exempel p hur EU:s inre politik har pverkat EU:s utrikespolitik r att de bilaterala frbindelserna med Kanada lnge har dominerats av diskussionen om effekterna av EU:s klimatpolitik p tilltrdet till europeiska marknader fr olja framstlld av oljesand.
17 The EEAS started operations during the Arab Spring, specifically on the eve of the international intervention in Libya. 
17 Europeiska utrikestjnsten inledde verksamheten under den arabiska vren, kort fre den internationella insatsen i Libyen.
18 This response included numerous initiatives such as the development of a new neighbourhood policy adopted in May 2011, the opening of the EU office in Benghazi in May 2011 and the appointment of a European Union Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean in July 2011. 
18 I detta svar ingick tskilliga initiativ, t.ex. utarbetades en ny grannskapspolitik som antogs i maj 2011, ppnades ett EU-kontor i Benghazi i maj 2011 och utnmndes Europeiska unionens srskilda representant i sdra Medelhavsomrdet i juli 2011.
The EU delegation to Libya was finally opened in November 2011. 
EU:s delegation i Libyen ppnades slutligen i november 2011.
19 The EU’s comprehensive approach is an integrated approach towards a country or a region which combines the use of traditional instruments (e.g. development assistance) and common foreign and security policy actions (e.g. sanctions) in support of a high level objective. 
19 EU:s vergripande strategi r en integrerad strategi fr ett land eller en region som kombinerar anvndning av traditionella instrument (t.ex. utvecklingsbistnd) med tgrder inom ramen fr den gemensamma utrikes-och skerhetspolitiken (t.ex. sanktioner) fr att ett vergripande ml ska uppns.
The value added of such combination was recognised before (e.g. after the Balkan wars) but its implementation was affected by the multiplicity of EU foreign policy actors at that time. 
Mervrdet av en sdan kombination hade man insett tidigare (t.ex. efter Balkankrigen) men genomfrandet av den pverkades av att det vid tidpunkten fanns s mnga olika utrikespolitiska aktrer i EU.
A joint communication from the HR/VP and the Commission on this subject was published on 11.12.2013. 
Ett gemensamt meddelande frn den hga representanten/vice ordfranden och kommissionen i denna frga offentliggjordes den 11 december 2013.
Observations 10 20 In a time of austere EU and national budgets, the Council decided that the establishment of the EEAS should follow the principle of budgetary neutrality20. 
Iakttagelser 10 20 I en tid av budgettstramningar p bde EU-niv och medlemsstatsniv beslutade rdet att inrttandet av Europeiska utrikestjnsten skulle flja principen om budgetneutralitet20.
However, establishing a new institution is inherently costly, even more so when the resulting body has to carry out new tasks. 
Att inrtta en ny institution r dock frenat med stora kostnader, och det gller i nnu hgre grad om det nya organet ska utfra nya uppgifter.
Indeed, the Council decided it without a resource assessment that should have taken into account both the new demands21 and the potential for synergies resulting from the merging of Commission and GSC structures. 
I sjlva verket beslutade rdet om inrttandet utan en resursbedmning som skulle ha beaktat bde de nya kraven21 och potentialen fr synergier till fljd av att strukturer vid kommissionen och rdets generalsekretariat slogs samman.
21 The budgetary-neutral condition was applied strictly and only foreign policy structures were transferred into the new service. 
21 Villkoret om budgetneutralitet tillmpades strikt, och endast utrikespolitiska strukturer frdes ver till den nya tjnsten.
This meant that the EEAS did not receive resources for support functions. 
Detta innebar att Europeiska utrikestjnsten inte fick resurser till stdfunktioner.
Instead, the Commission and the GSC continued to provide services ranging from staff management (such as recruitment, medical examinations or payment of salaries) to administrative support (such as IT, buildings or meeting room facilities). 
I stllet fortsatte kommissionen och rdets generalsekretariat att tillhandahlla tjnster, frn personalfrvaltning (ssom rekrytering, lkarunderskningar och lneutbetal-ning) till administrativt std (ssom it, byggnader och mteslokaler).
To this end, the EEAS signed service level agreements with the Commission and the GSC. 
Fr det ndamlet ingick Europeiska utrikestjnsten servicenivavtal med kommissionen och rdets generalsekretariat.
This was a pragmatic solution in the short term but, overall, the services provided did not fully address the EEAS’s needs: (a) The EEAS had no opportunity to assess or alter the scope and benefits of these service level agreements which were drafted in accordance with the support given before its establishment. (b) The duration of the agreements did not take into account the EEAS’s needs. 
Detta var en pragmatisk lsning p kort sikt men generellt sett tillgodosg inte de levererade tjnsterna Europeiska utrikestjnstens behov fullt ut: a) Europeiska utrikestjnsten hade inte mjlighet att bedma eller ndra omfattningen hos eller frdelarna med dessa servicenivavtal som upprttades i enlighet med det std som getts innan utrikestjnsten inrttades. b) Avtalens lngd beaktade inte Europeiska utrikestjnstens behov.
For instance, the GSC’s support for the maintenance of the secured systems used for distributing classified information ended before an alternative and effective solution was established (in line with the budget neutral principle). 
Till exempel upphrde rdets generalsekretariats std till underhll av de skra system som anvndes fr att sprida skerhetsskyddsklassificerad information innan man hade hittat en alternativ och ndamlsenlig lsning (i linje med principen om budgetneutralitet).
22 No overall assessment was made to compare the operational costs of the EEAS with the costs of the previous structures, including Member States. 
22 Det gjordes ingen samlad bedmning fr att jmfra Europeiska utrikestjnstens driftskostnader med kostnaderna fr de tidigare strukturerna, inbegripet medlemsstater.
In this respect, the establishment of the EEAS is likely to have brought Member States considerable savings. 
I det avseendet torde inrttandet av Europeiska utrikestjnsten ha lett till betydande besparingar fr medlemsstaterna.
For example, Member States can rely on EEAS political reporting instead of producing their own reports, the rotating Presidency has a smaller workload in preparing and chairing Council working groups and the salaries of the seconded diplomats are now paid by the EEAS. 
Till exempel kan medlemsstaterna frlita sig p Europeiska utrikestjnstens politiska rapportering i stllet fr att upprtta egna rapporter, har det roterande ordfrandeskapets arbetsbelastning minskat nr det gller att frbereda arbetet och vara ordfrande i rdets arbetsgrupper och betalas nu de utsnda diplomaternas lner av Europeiska utrikestjnsten.
20 Recital 15 in the preamble to the Council decision states that: ‘the establishment ... should be guided by the principle of cost-efficiency aiming towards budget neutrality’. 
20 I skl 15 i ingressen till rdets beslut sgs fljande: ÓUpprttandet av Europeiska utrikestjnsten br vgledas av principen om kostnadseffektivitet syftande till budgetneutralitetÓ.
21 The administrative tasks associated with the EEAS’s autonomy, tasks previously carried out by the rotating Presidency (e.g. chairing some Council working groups) and the new political duties of EU delegations (e.g. coordinating all EU embassies on the ground). 
21 De administrativa uppgifter som hngde samman med Europeiska utrikestjnstens sjlvbestmmande, uppgifter som tidigare hade utfrts av det roterande ordfrandeskapet (t.ex. att vara ordfrande i vissa av rdets arbetsgrupper) och EU-delegationernas nya politiska uppgifter (t.ex. att samordna alla EU-ambassader p fltet).
Observations 11 Weaknesses in the prioritisation, organisation and allocation of resources reduce the EEAS’s efficiency 23 This section (paragraphs 23 to 50) answers the second question: Were the resources of the EEAS prioritised, organised and allocated efficiently? 
Iakttagelser 11 Brister i prioriteringen, organisationen och frdelningen av resurser minskar Europeiska utrikestjnstens effektivitet 23 I detta avsnitt (punkterna 23Đ50) besvaras den andra frgan: Hade Europeiska utrikestjnstens resurser prioriterats, organiserats och frdelats effektivt?
The Court audited samples of recruitment procedures, briefings and training courses, and made a quantitative analysis of staffing data. 
Revisionsrtten granskade urval av rekryteringsfrfaranden, briefingar och utbildningskurser samt gjorde en kvantitativ analys av personaluppgifter.
24 Based on that, the Court assesses the management strategy, the objective setting and planning, the organisational structure of the EEAS, the role of EU special representatives and the management of human resources, focussing on recruitment, staff allocation and training. 
24 Med utgngspunkt frn detta arbete bedmde revisionsrtten frvaltnings-strategin, faststllandet och planeringen av ml, Europeiska utrikestjnstens organisatoriska struktur, EU:s srskilda representanters roll och frvaltningen av personalresurser med fokus p rekrytering, personalfrdelning och utbildning.
26 Whenever strategic guidance is missing, the EEAS consults with the EU institutions and the Member States to prepare the EU’s responses. 
26 Nr strategisk vgledning saknas samrder Europeiska utrikestjnsten med EU-institutionerna och medlemsstaterna fr att formulera EU:s svar.
The resulting ad hoc strategies are the outcome of intense debates before being formally adopted by the Commission and endorsed by the Council. 
De ad hoc-strategier som detta leder till r resultatet av intensiva diskussioner innan de antas formellt av kommissionen och godknns av rdet.
This process does not facilitate timely action. 
Denna process bidrar inte till tgrder i rtt tid.
The EEAS did not treat as a priority the development of an overarching strategic framework for EU foreign policy, and did not adopt an internal strategy 25 In view of a rapidly evolving international situation, the EEAS has favoured ad hoc approaches instead of proposing an overarching foreign policy strategy. 
Europeiska utrikestjnsten prioriterade inte att utveckla en vergripande strategisk ram fr EU:s utrikespolitik och infrde inte en intern strategi 25 Med anledning av den snabba internationella hndelseutvecklingen har Europeiska utrikestjnsten fredragit ad hoc-insatser i stllet fr att fresl en vergripande utrikespolitisk strategi.
The EEAS has also opted not to propose an overarching approach to deal with the EU’s strategic partnerships, although the existing ones22 had been established long before the Lisbon Treaty in an ad hoc way and may have no clear link with current EU foreign policy priorities. 
Den har ven valt att inte fresl en vergripande strategi fr hanteringen av EU:s strategiska partnerskap, trots att de befintliga partnerskapen22 etablerades lngt fre Lissabonfrdraget p ad hoc-vis och eventuellt saknar en tydlig koppling till EU:s nuvarande utrikespolitiska prioriteringar.
The absence of an overarching strategic framework has been criticised by some Member States23 and the European Parliament24, which expected a more proactive role for the EEAS in developing the EU’s foreign policy25. 
Avsaknaden av en vergripande strategisk ram har kritiserats av en del medlemsstater23 och Europaparlamentet24, som frvntade sig att Europeiska utrikestjnsten skulle ha en proaktivare roll i utformningen av EU:s utrikespolitik25.
22 The EU currently has strategic partnerships with 10 countries: Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and USA. 
22 EU har fr nrvarande strategiska partnerskap med tio lnder: Brasilien, Kanada, Kina, Indien, Japan, Mexiko, Ryssland, Sydafrika, Sydkorea och USA.
These partnerships were entered into by the Council long before the EEAS was set up. 
Dessa partnerskap ingicks av rdet lngt innan Europeiska utrikestjnsten inrttades.
23 Spain, Italy, Poland and Sweden considered that a broad strategic approach for EU external relations was needed and decided to fund the ‘Think-tank process for a European Global Strategy’ initiative to prepare it. 
23 Spanien, Italien, Polen och Sverige ansg att en bred strategi fr EU:s yttre frbindelser behvdes och beslutade att finansiera initiativet fr en id-genererande tanke-smedjeprocess fr en europeisk global strategi som ett stt att utarbeta den.
24 European Parliament Report on the Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (A7-0357/2012), 31.10.2012. 
24 Europaparlamentets betnkande om genomfrandet av den gemensamma skerhets-och frsvarspolitiken (A7-0357/2012), 31.10.2012.
25 Half of the Member States that replied to the survey thought that the EEAS should contribute more towards the development of EU foreign policies, such as regional strategies. 
25 Hlften av de medlemsstater som besvarade enkten ansg att Europeiska utrikestjnsten borde bidra mer till utvecklingen av EU:s utrikespolitik, t.ex. regionala strategier.
Observations 12 27 The EEAS has not yet adopted an internal strategy or management plan. In 2011 the HR/VP did, however, set three initial priorities: (a) setting up the EEAS as a working institution; (b) developing the 10 existing EU Strategic Partnerships; (c) strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy in response to the Arab Spring. 
Iakttagelser 12 27 Europeiska utrikestjnsten har nnu inte infrt en intern strategi eller frvaltningsplan. r 2011 faststllde dock den hga representanten/vice ordfranden fljande tre inledande prioriteringar: a) Inrttande av Europeiska utrikestjnsten som en fungerande institution. b) Utveckling av EU:s tio befintliga strategiska partnerskap. c) Frstrkning av den europeiska grannskapspolitiken som svar p den arabiska vren.
Besides this limited number of priorities, the EEAS was flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances and played key facilitator roles on the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue and the Iran nuclear programme talks. 
Utver detta begrnsade antal prioriteringar var Europeiska utrikestjnsten tillrckligt flexibel fr att kunna anpassa sig till frndrade omstndigheter och hade en vsentlig stdjande roll i dialogen mellan Kosovo och Serbien och i samtalen om Irans krntekniska program.
The complex organisation of the EEAS does not facilitate timely cooperation between departments 29 The overall structure of the EEAS is complex, partly due to the fact that, unlike a typical ministry of foreign affairs, it has additional functions which are characteristic of defence ministries, interior ministries and intelligence services. 
Europeiska utrikestjnstens komplexa organisation underlttar inte samarbetet i rtt tid mellan avdelningar 29 Europeiska utrikestjnstens allmnna struktur r komplex, delvis p grund av det faktum att den till skillnad frn ett typiskt utrikesministerium har ytterligare funktioner som r utmrkande fr frsvarsministerier, inrikesminis-terier och underrttelsetjnster.