natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Whatever the reasons, proper monitoring and understanding followed up by enough support or corrective measures can normally compensate for shortcomings and should be appreciated as part of the efforts to rehabilitate the country. 
Oberoende av vilka orsakerna till tillkortakommanden r kan dessa vanligtvis kompenseras av ordentlig vervakning och insikt som fljs upp genom tillrckligt std eller avhjlpande tgrder och br anses utgra en del av anstrngningarna fr landets terhmtning.
Almost any local involvement should therefore be regarded as a positive factor under the condition that it is transparent and accountable. 
Lokalt deltagande i vilken form som helst br drfr anses vara en positiv faktor under frutsttning att det sker under iakttagande av ppenhet och ansvarstagande.
Sustainability 68. 
Varaktighet 68.
The involvement of the local authorities should include from the very beginning of a project an agreement that they will take over the structures and responsibility to secure operationality of schools, clinics etc. This responsibility should be stated in all FAs and contracts where applicable. 
De lokala myndigheternas deltagande br frn inledandet av ett projekt omfatta ett avtal om att dessa kommer att ta ver strukturerna och ansvaret fr skerstllande av verksamheten i skolor, kliniker osv. Detta ansvar br faststllas i alla tillmpliga finansieringsverenskommelser och avtal.
Too often handing-over certificates had not been issued and the continued financing of infrastructures was not clear at the time of finalising projects. 
Alltfr ofta hade intyg om verlmnande inte utfrdats och den fortsatta finansieringen av infrastrukturerna var fortfarande ofta oklar nr projekten avslutades.
In Mozambique, for example, the Ministry of Health did not accept the structures and responsibility for their operation since it had not been involved in the planning. 
Till exempel i Moambique godtog hlsovrdsministeriet inte strukturerna och ansvaret fr deras verksamhet, eftersom man inte deltagit i planeringen av den.
It was found that buildings did not meet Government standards and/or that they were not located where the ministry would have liked them to be. 
Det uppdagades att byggnader inte motsvarade nationella standarder och/eller att de inte var belgna dr ministeriet hade velat.
As a result, it is 1 ( ) Evaluation report on Hati, DRN, September 1997. stated in two evaluation reports (2) that several clinics and health posts were closed or, when they continued in existence, they were operating below standard. 
Till fljd av detta, konsta-1 ( ) Utvrderingsrapport betrffande Haiti, DRN, september 1997. teras det i tv bedmningsrapporter (2), lades flera kliniker och hlsovrdsstationer ned eller, om de fortsatte med sin verksamhet, motsvarade deras verksamhet inte standarderna.
It is particularly difficult to secure sustainability in innovative projects and in areas where NGOs and others have little or no experience. 
Det r srskilt svrt att skerstlla varaktighet fr innovativa projekt och omrden dr de enskilda organisationerna har liten eller ingen erfarenhet.
There has been a trend, for instance, to create credit schemes and revolving funds under so-called income generating projects, such as farming, livestock, handicrafts and other manufacturing of which the target groups have no previous experience. 
Det har till exempel frekommit en trend att skapa kreditsystem och rrelsekapital inom s kallade inkomstskapande projekt, ssom jordbruk, kreaturssktsel, hantverk och annan tillverkning, av vilken mlgrupperna inte har ngon tidigare erfarenhet.
Cost-sharing schemes for drugs, school equipment and teachersŐ salaries as well as water charges to make maintenance possible are other examples where beneficiaries are often not used to paying and have very few resources to do so. 
System med frdelning av kostnader fr medici-ner, skolmateriel och lrarlner samt ven vattenavgifter fr mj-liggrande av underhll r andra exempel dr stdmottagarna ofta inte r vana att betala och har mycket begrnsade resurser fr att gra det.
These projects have often more or less failed, or their successful implementation must be doubted. 
Dessa projekt har ofta misslyckats i strre eller mindre grad, eller ocks mste det framgngsrika genomfrandet av dem betvivlas.
Projects which always involved the beneficiaries themselves from the early stages of the project have a greater chance of being successful, as was the case in a microhydrological project in Madagascar. 
Projekt i vilka stdmottagarna sjlva deltagit frn det inledande skedet av projektet har en strre chans att lyckas, ssom var fallet i ett mikrohydrologiskt projekt i Madagaskar.
In this project, local enterprises were also successfully involved. 
I detta projekt deltog ven lokala fretag p ett framgngsrikt stt.
After taking over completed projects, such as schools and health clinics, the staff will normally be paid salaries according to the established schemes for public servants in the respective country. 
Efter att slutfrda projekt, ssom skolor och hlsovrdskli-niker, vertas fr personalen vanligtvis ln i enlighet med de befintliga systemen fr statsanstllda i vederbrande land.
NGOs and other implementing partners always pay salaries to local staff which are higher than those offered by governmental authorities. 
Enskilda organisationer och vriga verkstllande parter betalar alltid lner till lokalanstllda som r hgre n de som erbjuds av de nationella myndigheterna.
This makes it difficult to retain the staff after local take-over. 
Detta gr det svrt att hlla kvar personalen efter att de lokala myndigheterna vertar projektet.
Either the staff manage to find a new job, e.g. with an international agency or the private sector, or they might stay, but become demotivated. 
Antingen hittar personalen ett nytt jobb, t.ex. inom en internationell organisation eller den privata sektorn, eller ocks stannar de kvar men tappar motivationen.
In Angola monthly salaries were USD 1 000 for a secretary working for a NGO and USD 300 for a driver. 
I Angola var mnadslnen 1 000 US-dollar fr en sekreterare som arbetade fr en enskild organisation och 300 US-dollar fr en chauffr.
At the same time a doctor working for the Ministry of Health earned USD 10 to 20. 
Samtidigt tjnade en lkare som arbetade fr hlsovrdsministeriet 10Đ20 US-dollar.
The salaries offered under contracts financed under SIA were completely out of line with local conditions and not sustainable once Government took over the projects. 
De lner som erbjds i kontrakt som finansierades inom SIA var fullstndigt ofrenliga med de lokala frhllandena och kunde inte upprtthllas nr regeringen tog ver projekten.
Such situations can partly be explained by the lack or scarcity of human resources. 
Sdana situationer kan delvis frklaras genom avsaknad av eller brist p personal.
Not only did it make the recruitment of experts by NGOs a lengthy process but as a result of competition between NGOs high salaries had to be offered (more or less the same as those offered to ÔcommercialŐ TAs) and even then people with enough experience and qualifications for the tasks were not always available. 
Detta ledde inte bara till att anstllningen av experter till enskilda organisationer blev en utdragen process, till fljd av konkurrens mellan enskilda organisationer blev man dessutom tvungen att erbjuda hga lner (mer eller mindre samma som de som erbjds ÓkommersiellaÓ tekniska experter) och inte ens d fanns det alltid personer med tillrcklig erfarenhet och kvalifikationer tillgngliga fr uppgifterna.
Sometimes people who had been recruited left the country before the contract had expired or did not extend their contract due to difficulties in coping with the local working conditions. 
Ibland lmnade anstllda landet innan kontraktet hade gtt ut eller frlngde inte sina kontrakt p grund av svrigheter att klara av de lokala arbetsfrhllandena.
(2) Evaluation, Article 255 Mozambique, COWI, July 1997; Phase II Country Report Mozambique, APT Consult, September 1998. 
(2) Utvrdering, artikel 255 Moambique, Cowi, juli 1997, Phase II Country Report Mozambique, APT Consult, september 1998.
C 113/14 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 19.4.2000 73. 
C 113/14 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 19.4.2000 73.
In Haiti neither the Government nor the parents have the funds required for the maintenance of schools. 
I Haiti har varken staten eller frldrarna de medel som krvs fr att upprtthlla skolor.
Equally there is no system which ensures the payment of charges for drinking water (1). 
Inte heller finns det ngot system som garanterar betalningen av avgifter fr dricksvatten (1).
Under such circumstances, the sustainability of the investment depends entirely on continuous outside funding. 
Under sdana omstndigheter r investeringens varaktighet fullstndigt beroende av kontinuerlig utomstende finansiering.
Execution and results of programmes 74. 
Genomfrande av program och resultat 74.
The Court acknowledges achievements under the programmes in the various countries in the form of provision/ restoring of schools, health facilities, water points, irrigation schemes, etc. which were operational and well used by the target groups. 
Revisionsrtten medger att det gjorts framsteg inom programmen i de enskilda lnderna i form av inrttande/upprustning av skolor, hlsovrdsinrttningar, vattenposter, bevattningssystem osv. som var funktionsdugliga och utnyttjades vl av mlgrupperna.
Examples of successful actions are also given in various evaluation reports. 
Exempel p lyckade insatser ges ven i olika bedmningsrapporter.
However, because of inadequate reporting (see paragraphs 88 to 99), insufficient information is available on the overall results of the actions and on the extent to which the objectives have been met. 
P grund av otillrcklig rapportering (se punkterna 88Đ99) r den information som finns att tillg om de vergripande resultaten av tgrderna och informationen om i vilken utstrckning mlsttningarna uppntts inte tillrcklig.
Nevertheless, it was found in a number of cases that projects had been poorly executed and that some were not at all cost-effective. 
Det uppdagades emellertid i ett flertal fall att projekt genomfrts dligt och att vissa av dem inte alls var kostnadseffektiva.
As stated in the Commission proposal and the Council conclusions the immediate goals for the SIA initiative were to rehabilitate the social sectors and to (re)activate food and income generating activities as quickly as possible while at the same time paving the way for sustainable long-term development. 
Ssom konstateras i kommissionens frslag och rdets slutsatser var SIA-initiativets omedelbara syften att teranpassa de sociala sektorerna och att (ter)inleda livsmedels-och inkomstgenererande verksamhet s snabbt som mjligt medan man jm-nade vgen fr varaktig lngsiktig utveckling.
The start of many projects was severely delayed as it took a long time to disburse the initial funds. 
Inledningen av flera projekt frsenades kraftigt eftersom det tog lng tid att distribuera de medel som ursprungligen stllts till frfogande.
The lengthy procedures within the Commission services to transfer the funds to the implementing agents forced them to delay implementation for several months after contracts had been signed. Successive payments were also frequently delayed. 
De lngdragna frfarandena inom kommissionen fr att verfra medlen till de verkstllande organen tvingade dem att skjuta upp genomfrandet med flera mnader efter att avtalen hade undertecknats. ven senare utbetalningar var ofta frsenade.
In a few cases NGOs advanced their own funds to start or continue the actions. 
I ett ftal fall utnyttjade de enskilda organisationerna sina egna medel fr att inleda eller fortstta tgrderna.
There were also long delays because the local authorities had to approve financial reports from the NGOs and other agents, which were often unclear and of poor quality. 
Lnga frseningar orsakades ven av att de lokala myndigheterna var tvungna att godknna ofta oklara och kvalitetsmssigt bristflliga ekonomiska rapporter frn enskilda organisationer och andra organ.
In Somalia, the cost of technical assistance under the first rehabilitation programme was very high. 
I Somalia var kostnaderna fr det tekniska bistndet inom det frsta terhmtningsprogrammet mycket hgt.
Around ECU 9 million of the total amount of ECU 38 million was used for technical assistance and consultancies (studies). 
Omkring 9 miljoner ecu av det totala beloppet p 38 miljoner ecu anvndes till tekniskt bistnd och rdgivning (underskningar).
If transport (cost of flights: ECU 1,1 million), administrative costs and other overheads in all projects are added to the technical assistance, not more than half (1) OJ C 349, 17.11.1998, paragraphs 5.28 to 5.31. of the total budget was spent on services or works directly for the beneficiaries. 
Om transportkostnader (flygkostnader: 1,1 miljoner ecu), administrationskostnader och andra allmnna omkostnader i alla projekt lggs till (1) EGT C 349, 17.11.1998, punkt 5.28Đ5.31. det tekniska bistndet har inte mer n hlften av den totala budgeten anvnts fr tjnster eller bygg-och anlggningsarbeten som direkt gagnar stdmottagarna.
Administrative costs could be included if justified, but not on a flat-rate basis that in many cases the Commission actually accepted. 
Administrationskostnader kan tas med om detta r motiverat, men inte till schablonbelopp, vilket kommissionen i sjlva verket i mnga fall godtog.
In Mozambique it was a rule rather than an exception that a 6 % flat rate of administration cost was added to all other budget items. 
I Moambique var det snarare regel n undantag att ett schablonbelopp p 6 % i administrationskostnader lades till alla andra budgetposter.
Although the treatment of administrative costs was clearly stated in the guidelines (see paragraph 31), this was completely overlooked by its Delegation. 
Trots att det tydligt angavs i riktlinjerna hur administrationskostnader skulle behandlas (se punkt 31), ignorerades detta totalt av dess delegation.
Initially it was stipulated that only existing structures should be rehabilitated and no new investments should be made. 
Ursprungligen faststlldes att endast befintliga strukturer br teranpassas och att inga nya investeringar br gras.
As it was felt that the restriction, imposed to promote a speedy implementation, was counterproductive, nevertheless such investments were made in the form of new water installations, schools and health facilities in most of the countries. 
Eftersom man ansg att denna begrnsning, som infrts fr att frmja ett snabbt genomfrande, motverkade sitt eget syfte, gjordes dylika investeringar det oaktat i form av nya vatteninstallationer, skolor och hlsovrdsinrttningar i de flesta av de berrda lnderna.
The stipulation against new investments was therefore not included (except for the purchase of buildings) in Regulation (EC) No 2258/96. 
Frbudet mot nya investeringar (frutom fr anskaffning av byggnader) togs drfr inte med i frordning (EG) nr 2258/96.
The standard of equipment and constructions should not be excessive compared to the normal standard of the country to avoid higher construction and maintenance costs. 
Fr att undvika hgre byggnads-och underhllskostnader br utrustningens och byggnadernas standard inte vara verdrivet hg jmfrt med normal standard i landet.
In Mozambique the government complained of excessively high construction costs for clinics and water pumps in a project evaluated by independent consultants. 
I Moambique klagade regeringen ver alltfr hga byggnadskostnader fr kliniker och vattenpumpar i ett projekt som bedmts av oberoende konsulter.
They said they cost so much that they would be difficult to maintain and replace when worn out. 
De sade att dessa kostade s mycket att de skulle bli svra att underhlla och erstta nr de hade slitits ut.
In Haiti, on the other hand, for all road contracts local firms were chosen and they performed adequately. 
I Haiti,  andra sidan, utnyttjade man lokala fretag fr alla avtal om vgbyggen, vilket ledde till ett gott resultat.
In Somalia, support was given to new structures that would generate revenue (e.g. import duties), the most important being the port in Berbera. 
I Somalia stddes nya strukturer som skulle skapa inkomster (t.ex. importavgifter). Den viktigaste av dessa var hamnen i Ber-bera.
Although the Commission supported the introduction of financial control systems, there are still doubts about transparency and accountability. 
Trots att kommissionen stdde infrandet av system fr finansiell kontroll terstr fortfarande tvivel angende insyn och ansvarsskyldighet.
The Commission should have been more cautious before committing itself to revenue-generating projects under the present conditions as Somaliland, where the port is located, has not been internationally recognised as an autonomous State. 
Kommissionen borde ha varit frsiktigare innan man tog sig inkomstskapande projekt under de rdande frhllandena eftersom Somaliland, dr hamnen r belgen, inte erknts internationellt som en oberoende stat.
Simplified procedures 84. 
Frenklade frfaranden 84.
As a result direct contracting was often used although this was not enough to ensure the required rapid execution. 
Till fljd av detta anvndes ofta avtal genom privat verenskommelse, trots att detta inte var tillrckligt fr att skerstlla det snabba genomfrande som krvdes.
Instead, both implementing agencies and local authorities frequently complained about what they considered were excessively lengthy and bureaucratic Commission procedures. 
Istllet klagade bde verkstllande organ och lokala myndigheter ofta ver vad de ansg vara utdragna och byrkratiska kommissions-frfaranden.
This related in particular to tender and procurement procedures, for which it took a long time to obtain the approval of Brussels. 
Detta gllde i synnerhet anbuds-och upphandlingsfrfaranden, fr vilka det tog lng tid att f godknnande frn Bryssel.
19.4.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 113/15 85. 
19.4.2000 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 113/15 85.
A project in Mozambique covered the rehabilitation of roads, for an amount of ECU 30 million, which was part of a larger road rehabilitation programme funded by several donors. 
Ett projekt i Moambique gllde upprustning av vgar till ett belopp p 30 miljoner ecu och utgjorde en del av ett strre program fr upprustning av vgar som finansierades av flera bistndsgivare.
At the time of the audit visit in October 1996, almost three years had elapsed since the signing of the Financial Agreement and most other donor-funded roads were already finalised. 
Vid tidpunkten fr granskningsbesket i oktober 1996 hade nstan tre r frflutit sedan finansieringsverenskommelsen undertecknades och de flesta andra vgar som finansierats med bistndsmedel hade redan frdigstllts.
These problems led to disqualification of tenders for administrative reasons. 
Dessa problem ledde till att anbud dis-kvalificerades av administrativa skl.
Eventually tender evaluation took place in Brussels, which did not help to increase the speed. 
Slutligen utvrderades anbuden i Bryssel, vilket inte bidrog till att ka hastigheten.
The project continued to exhibit problems after it had started and, as at the end of December 1998, five years after the project had been decided, it had still not been finalised (only ECU 20,4 million of the contracted ECU 25,7 million had been paid). 
Projektet fortsatte att uppvisa problem ven efter att det inletts och i slutet av december 1998, fem r efter att man fattat beslut om projektet, hade det fortfarande inte avslutats (endast 20,4 miljoner ecu av de 25,7 miljoner ecu fr vilka avtal hade ingtts hade utbe-talats).
In the meantime urgent repairs to the same roads had to be made. 
Under tiden var man tvungen att genomfra brdskande reparationer av samma vgar.
In Angola technical assistance was contracted in March 1995 for the supervision of a health rehabilitation programme of ECU 15 million which had been decided already in 1993. 
I Angola ingick man avtal om tekniskt bistnd i mars 1995. Avtalet gllde vervakning av ett program fr terhmtning inom hlsovrden till ett belopp p 15 miljoner ecu som man hade fattat beslut om redan 1993.
No real activities started until after June 1995. 
Ingen egentlig verksamhet inleddes frrn efter juni 1995.
The programme has been extremely slow in implementation (50 % of allocation committed at the end of 1998 and 25 % disbursed after about four years). 
Programmet har genomfrts extremt lngsamt (taganden hade ingtts fr 50 procent av anslagen i slutet av 1998 och 25 procent hade utbetalats efter cirka fyra r).
The Commission has blamed the national authorising officer (NAO) as one of the reasons for slow progress, i.e. a long time taken for processing project proposals and obtaining approval of reports/payments in respect of the NGOs. 
Kommissionen skyllde p den nationella utanordnaren som angavs som en av orsakerna till de lngsamma framstegen, dvs. att det tagit lng tid att behandla frslag till projekt och erhlla godknnande fr rapporter/utbetalningar betrffande de enskilda organisationerna.
At the same time, the Court observed that about ECU 1 million had been spent under a separate programme in the form of technical assistance to the NAO. 
Samtidigt iakttog revisionsrtten att cirka 1 miljon ecu hade anvnts inom ett srskilt program i form av tekniskt bistnd till den nationella utanordnaren.
It seems that the outcome of these efforts was poor and not based on sound appraisal of the feasibility of the support. 
Det ser ut som om resultatet av dessa anstrngningar var dligt och inte baserat p en sund bedmning av stdets genomfrbarhet.
Separate bank accounts 87. 
Srskilda bankkonton 87.
The contracts usually required that funds from the Commission had to be kept in a separate bank account and that interest should be accounted for separately. 
I avtalen krvdes vanligtvis att medel frn kommissionen skulle deponeras p ett srskilt bankkonto och att rntorna skulle redovisas skilt fr sig.
The contracts required NGOs to seek agreement on how the interest should be used: either on the same project or to pay it back to the Commission. 
I avtalen krvdes ven att de enskilda organisationerna skulle komma verens om hur rntorna skulle anvn-das; antingen till samma projekt eller terbetalas till kommissionen.
These stipulations were mostly not respected and it is not known how much interest has been earned as the Commission has not closely monitored this aspect although substantial amounts may have been earned. 
I de flesta fall iakttogs dessa bestmmelser inte och det r inte knt hur stora rntebeloppen varit, eftersom kommissionen inte vervakat detta i detalj. Det kan emellertid vara frga om betydande belopp.
For example, under a ECU 12 million project in Mozambique about 20 contracts were signed with NGOs. 
Till exempel inom ett projekt p 12 miljoner ecu i Moambique undertecknades cirka 20 avtal med enskilda organisationer.
Interest was not separately accounted for in any of the related financial reports, which remained unnoticed by the Delegation. 
Rntorna redovisades inte separat i ngon av de berrda ekonomiska rapporterna, vilket delegationen frsummade att lgga mrke till.
Reporting Requirements 88. 
Rapportering Krav 88.
In general, the reporting requirements for implementing agents were not specified and laid down before or at the start-up of the initiative. 
I allmnhet specificerades eller faststlldes inte kraven p verkstllande organs rapportering p frhand eller vid inledandet av initiativet.
That was despite the specific requirement for reporting at all levels, mentioned in the Commission proposals and Council conclusions of May 1993. 
Detta trots de srskilda kraven p rapportering p alla niver som nmndes i kommissionens frslag och rdets slutsatser frn maj 1993.
This slippage caused many problems during the process. 
Detta misstag orsakade mnga problem under frfarandet.