natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In some cases, the applicable procedures are not implemented because they are deemed too expensive by the responsible authorities, or are not applied for legal reasons, which prevents any convictions: (a) in the United Kingdom and more specifically in England and Wales, there is no system of administrative sanctions, and decisions to pursue a case are subject to a Ôpublic interestŐ assessment founded, in particular, on whether the ratio between the cost of proceeding and the applicable penalty is considered too high. 
I vissa fall anvnds inte tillmpliga frfaranden p grund av att de ansvariga myndigheterna anser att de r fr kostsamma eller p grund av juridiska vervganden, vilket frhindrar all form av bestraffning: a) I Frenade kungariket och nrmare bestmt England och Wales finns det inget system fr administrativa sanktioner, och beslut om laga tgrder blir freml fr en bedmning av om de r av Óallmnt intresseÓ som framfr allt grundas p frhllandet mellan rttegngskostnaderna och det tillmpliga straffet anses.
Hence, 90 % (3) of infringements identified in 2005 were not pursued through the Courts and led only to a warning from the inspectorate; (b) in France, for legal reasons, anomalies identified in the registration of catch data were not forwarded to the inspectors with a view to possible judicial proceedings (see paragraph 35). 
Drfr har 90 % (3) av de vertrdelser som upptcktes under 2005 inte blivit freml fr ngra strafftgrder utan endast lett till en varning frn inspektionskontoret. b) I Frankrike vidarebefordras inte de anomalier som identifieras vid insamlingen av fngstuppgifter till inspektrerna med hnsyn till risken fr ett eventuellt tal (se punkt 35).
(1) In fact, they are national inspectors designated by each Member State to take part in inspections in the context of operations coordinated by the Agency. 
(1) Egentligen handlar det om nationella inspektrer som utnmns av varje medlemsstat och som deltar i inspektioner inom ramen fr arbete som samordnas av kontrollorganet.
(2) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 25. 
(2) Artikel 25 i frordning (EG) nr 2371/2002.
(3) Out of 202 infringements found during landing inspections (including on-board controls) there were 167 oral warnings, 14 written warnings, 20 cases passed to the judicial authorities and one case pending. 
(3) Av de 202 vertrdelser som konstaterades vid inspektionen vid landningen och som kontrollerades ombord var 167 muntliga varningsmeddelanden, 14 skriftliga varningsmeddelanden, 20 verlmningar till domstol och ett fall har nnu inte lett till ngot beslut.
Incomplete information about sanctions and previous history 91. 
Ofullstndig knnedom om sanktioner och bakgrundsfakta 91.
In several Member States visited, there is no central computerised repository for all the information relating to fisheries offences and perpetrators of them. 
I flera av de medlemsstater som besktes finns det inget centraliserat dataregister fr all information om vertrdelser i frga om fiske och om dem som har begtt dem.
For this reason, prosecuting authorities are not able to base their decision on complete knowledge of the previous history. 
Drfr kan klagarmyndigheterna inte grunda sitt beslut p en fullstndig knnedom om bakgrundsfakta.
Moreover, due to the lack of information about the penalties awarded for each type of offence it is not possible to evaluate the effectiveness of inspection activities, and that same lack is therefore an impediment to good strategic planning and appropriate targeting of inspections (see paragraph 63). 
Vidare gr den bristflliga informationen om vilka sanktioner som utdms fr en viss typ av vertrdelse att det inte gr att bedma om inspektionsverksamheten r effektiv. Denna bristflliga information utgr drfr ett hinder fr en god strategisk programplanering och en lmplig inriktning p kontrollerna (se punkt 63).
In Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom there is no database that contains all sanctions imposed in the area of fisheries. 
I Spanien, Frankrike, Italien och Frenade kungariket finns det ingen databas som innehller alla sanktioner som utfrdats inom fiskerisektorn.
In Denmark, it has only existed since 2004. 
I Danmark har en sdan bara funnits sedan 2004.
Lack of integration and harmonisation at Community level 92. 
Bristfllig integrering och harmonisering p gemenskapsniv 92.
An initial difficulty is that of effectively applying the penalty imposed on a foreign national once he or she is beyond the jurisdiction of the State in which the offence was committed. 
Frst och frmst r det svrt att p ett effektivt stt tillmpa ett straff mot en utlndsk medborgare nr denne har lmnat jurisdiktionen i den stat dr vertrdelsen begicks.
A second is the difficulty, or even impossibility, of the authorities in one country taking into account infringements recorded by another Member State, whether for reasons of access to information or for legal reasons. 
Fr det andra r det svrt eller rentav omjligt fr myndigheterna i ett land att beakta vertrdelser som en annan medlemsstat har konstaterat, antingen av skl avseende tillgng till information eller av juridiska skl.
A catalogue of measures to be applied by Member States in relation to serious infringements (4) was to be drawn up by the Council, but has not yet been created. 
Rdet har nnu inte upprttat en katalog ver tgrder som medlemsstaterna ska vidta vid allvarliga vertrdelser (4).
To date, the Commission has still not presented the Council with a proposal to this end. 
Kommissionen har hittills inte lagt fram ngot frslag om detta fr rdet.
Penalties, on the whole, insufficient deterrent, according to the Commission 94. 
Enligt kommissionen har sanktionerna i allmnhet en fga avskrckande effekt 94.
Nevertheless, even without precise tools, the Commission was able to conclude that overall the penalties imposed were not a good deterrent. 
Trots att kommissionen inte hade ngot exakt instrument kunde den dra slutsatsen att de sanktioner som utfrdats i allmnhet inte hade ngon srskilt avskrckande effekt.
It stated it publicly in these terms, Ôthe amount paid by the fisheries industry as a consequence of sanctions imposed [...] is roughly equal to two thousandths of the [...] landing value. 
Detta framfrde den offentligt p fljande stt: Ódet belopp som fiskeindustrin har betalat med anledning av de pfljder som utfrdades (...) motsvarar ungefr 2 promille av vrdet p de fiskeprodukter som landades (...).
Such an amount entails the risk that the fishing industry may consider penalties imposed for infringements to the CFP rules just as an ordinary running cost for the enterprise and see no real incentive to be compliantŐ (5). 
Ett sdant belopp medfr risken att fiskeindustrin kan betrakta btesstraffen fr vertrdelser av den gemensamma fiskeripolitikens bestmmelser som en ordinarie driftskostnad fr fretaget, och inte se det som ngot verkligt incitament att flja reglernaÓ (5).
(4) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 25(4). 
(4) Artikel 25.4 i frordning (EG) nr 2371/2002.
(5) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Ń Reports from Member States on behaviours which seriously infringed the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy in 2004, COM(2006) 387, 14.7.2006. 
(5) Meddelande frn kommissionen till rdet och Europaparlamentet Đ Rapporter frn medlemsstaterna om beteenden som utgjorde allvarliga vertrdelser av den gemensamma fiskeripolitikens bestmmelser under r 2004, KOM(2006) 387, 14.7.2006.
See also third edition of the Common Fisheries Policy Compliance Scoreboard (page 40). 
Se ven tredje upplagan av den gemensamma fiskeripolitikens resultattabell ver efterlevnad (s. 40).
C 317/18 EN Official Journal of the European Union 28.12.2007 Means of applying pressure on Member States are effective only exceptionally 95. 
C 317/18 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 28.12.2007 Medlen fr att utva ptryckningar p medlemsstaterna r effektiva endast i undantagsfall 95.
In order to get Member States to respect their obligations, the Commission may either have recourse to the Court of Justice and the general procedure for failure to fulfil an obligation, or it may use one of the procedures specific to the CFP. 
Fr att f medlemsstaterna att uppfylla sina skyldigheter kan kommissionen antingen vnda sig till domstolen och det allmnna vertrdelsefrfarandet fr underltenhet att uppfylla en skyldighet eller anvnda sig av ett av GFP:s srskilda frfaranden.
Each of these procedures, however, has features that make it difficult to use and effective only exceptionally. 
Alla dessa frfaranden har dock egenskaper som gr dem svra att anvnda och endast effektiva i undantagsfall.
Proceedings for failure to fulfil an obligation are long, cumbersome and effective only exceptionally ... 
Ml om frdragsbrott r lngdragna, tungrodda och effektiva endast i undantagsfall ...
In fact, before they reach the Court of Justice the observed failure must be the subject of a formal notice, then of a reasoned opinion. 
Innan rendet anhngiggrs vid domstolen mste den frseelse som konstaterats bli freml fr en formell underrttelse och sedan ett motiverat yttrande.
Each of these stages not only requires extensive preparatory work and formal consultation between the relevant departments of DG Fish, but also involves the CommissionŐs legal service. 
Bda dessa etapper krver inte enbart ett betydande frberedelsearbete och samrd mellan berrda avdelningar vid GD Fiske och havsfrgor utan inbegriper ven kommissionens rttsliga avdelning.
The delays inherent in each of these tasks are compounded by the fact that decisions on infringements are taken by the Commission only once in every quarter. 
Till de interna inbyggda tidsfristerna fr dessa uppgifter kommer det faktum att beslut avseende vertrdelser endast fattas en gng i kvartalet av kommissionen.
Furthermore, proceedings for failure in the implementation of control, inspection or sanctions procedures require a significant volume of inspection work on the part of the Commission. 
Dessutom krver ml om frdragsbrott fr underltenhet att infra frfaranden fr kontroll, inspektioner eller sanktioner ett betydande inspektionsarbete frn kommissionens sida.
Due to the absence of easily verifiable assessment criteria, the Commission has to increase the volume of evidence in order to demonstrate that the failure is both general and permanent. 
Eftersom det inte finns ngra bedmningskriterier som r ltta att kontrollera mste kommissionen ha fler bevis fr att visa att vertrdelsen r bde generell och bestende.
This requires numerous missions; especially as in practice Commission inspectors cannot officially record an infringement without national inspectors being present. 
Detta innebr ett flertal tjnsteresor, srskilt som kommissionens inspektrer i praktiken inte fr konstatera att en vertrdelse har begtts om inte nationella inspektrer r nrvarande.
All in all, the size of the task in fact makes it difficult to pursue more than one case of this type at a time (1). 
Vidare gr omfattningen av denna uppgift att det r svrt att g vidare med mer n ett fall av denna typ t gngen (1).
And lastly, a judgment of failure to fulfil an obligation (2) is not in itself effective, since the Member StateŐs obligation is confined to taking the measures required to execute the judgment. 
Slutligen r en dom avseende underltenhet att uppfylla en skyldighet enligt frdraget (2) inte effektiv i sig eftersom medlemsstatens skyldighet r begrnsad till att den mste vidta de tgrder som krvs fr att flja domen.
For that the Commission must bring evidence that the failure has continued without any interruption since the first judgment. 
Fr detta mste kommissionen bevisa att vertrdelsen har fortsatt utan avbrott sedan den frsta domen.
(1) The Commission estimated that in 2005 15 % of its inspection unitŐs resources had to be assigned to work linked to the legal action against France. 
(1) Kommissionen uppskattar att 15 % av inspektionsenhetens resurser mste tilldelas arbete som hade anknytning till tvister med Frankrike r 2005.
(2) Under Article 226 of the Treaty. 
(2) Enligt artikel 226 i frdraget.
(3) Under Article 228 of the Treaty. 
(3) Enligt artikel 228 i frdraget.
In practice, in the area of fisheries, there has only been one case in which a Member State was sentenced to pay a financial penalty (4). 
I praktiken finns det bara ett fall inom fiskerisektorn dr en medlemsstat har dmts till att betala en ekonomisk sanktion (4).
The judgment in question was delivered in 2005 for non-compliance with a 1991 judgment concerning a case in which the first infringements had been recorded in 1984, 21 years earlier. 
Domen i frga avkunnades 2005 fr underltenhet att uppfylla skyldigheten att flja en dom frn 1991 avseende ett ml dr de frsta vertrdelserna hade konstaterats redan 1984, det vill sga 21 r tidigare.
It allowed national authorities to impose within months the introduction and application of numerous procedures that had previously been absent or deficient, despite having been compulsory for many years, not only in the country fined but also in the other Member States against which similar proceedings were in progress. ... and limited specific procedures which are difficult to implement ... 
Detta enda beslut hade dock en mycket stor effekt. Det ledde till att de nationella myndigheterna kunde infra och till-lmpa ett flertal frfaranden p bara ngra mnader vilka tidigare hade varit obefintliga eller bristflliga, trots att de hade varit obligatoriska i mnga r.
One of the specific lines of action available to the Commission is the possibility of taking preventive measures (5) where there a risk that fishing activities pose a serious threat to conservation of resources. 
En av de tgrder som kommissionen frfogar ver r mjligheten att vidta frebyggande tgrder (5) om fiskeverksamhet i ett visst geografiskt omrde riskerar att leda till ett allvarligt hot mot bevarandet av resurserna.
But the difficulty of gathering the necessary evidence and observing the principle of proportionality have so far dissuaded the Commission from taking such action, especially as the effect of such a decision would be limited, with a maximum application period of six months. 
Men svrigheterna med att samla in de bevis som krvs och iaktta proportionalitetsprincipen har hittills avskrckt kommissionen frn att anvnda sig av den, srskilt som effekten av ett sdant beslut skulle vara begrnsad med en tillmpningsperiod p hgst sex mnader.
On the other hand, where it is found that previous quotas were exceeded (6), the Commission has the power to reduce the future fishing opportunities of the offending Member State (7). 
Om det dremot konstateras att tidigare kvoter har verskridits (6) fr kommissionen minska den skyldiga medlemsstatens framtida fiskemjligheter (7).
This possibility requires the Commission to obtain sufficient evidence that the final catch figures submitted by the Member States are erroneous. 
Fr att f utnyttja denna mjlighet mste kommissionen hmta in tillrckliga bevis p att de slutliga fngstuppgifter som lmnats in av medlemsstaterna innehller fel.
In practice it has been possible to implement this provision only once (8), on the basis of information obtained in national inspections of one of the Member States sanctioned. 
I praktiken har denna bestmmelse endast kunnat utnyttjas en enda gng (8) p grundval av uppgifter som inhmtats i samband med nationella inspektioner av en av de medlemsstater mot vilka sanktionstgrder hade vidtagits.
The Commission does not have the possibility of suspending aid allocated to a Member State under the CFP in case of failure to apply the control rules. 
Kommissionen har inte mjlighet att dra in std som tilldelats medlemsstaten inom ramen fr GFP om denna underlter att tillmpa kontrollbestmmelserna.
(4) Case C-304/02 Commission/France; action for failure to fulfil obligations under Article 228 EC; sentenced to pay a lump sum of 20 million euro and a penalty payment of 57,8 million euro for each period of six months (judgment given on 12 July 2005); in fact France paid the lump sum and one penalty payment. 
(4) Ml C-304/02, kommissionen mot Frankrike angende en talan om frdragsbrott enligt artikel 228 EG; frelggande om att betala ett engngsbelopp p 20 miljoner euro och ett lpande vite p 57,8 miljoner euro var sjtte mnad (dom avkunnad den 12 juli 2005); Frankrike betalade engngsbeloppet och det lpande vitet.
(5) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 26(3). 
(5) Artikel 26.3 i frordning (EG) nr 2371/2002.
(6) That is to say, other than those relating to the last complete fisheries year for which an administrative mechanism exists, allowing the reat-tribution, under certain conditions, of excess amounts from one year against the relevant quotas for the following year. 
(6) Det vill sga de kvoter som gller det senast avslutade budgetret fr vilket det finns en frvaltningsmekanism som gr det mjligt att under vissa omstndigheter lgga p verskottet frn ett r till motsvarande kvoter fr det pfljande budgetret.
(7) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 23(4). 
(7) Artikel 23.4 i frordning (EG) nr 2371/2002.
(8) Commission Regulation (EC) No 147/2007 of 15 February 2007 adapting certain fish quotas from 2007 to 2012 pursuant to Article 23(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy. 
(8) Kommissionens frordning (EG) nr 147/2007 av den 15 februari 2007 om anpassning av vissa fiskekvoter frn och med 2007 till och med 2012 enligt artikel 23.4 i frordning (EG) nr 2371/2002 om bevarande och hllbart utnyttjande av fiskeresurserna inom ramen fr den gemensamma fiskeripolitiken.
28.12.2007 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 317/19 104. 
28.12.2007 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 317/19 104.
Furthermore, it has never assessed the extent to which Member States have implemented the obligation imposed upon them to recover aid granted under the fisheries structural funds from beneficiaries who do not comply with CFP rules (1). ... allowing serious shortcomings to persist in the Member States 105. 
Kommissionen har fr vrigt aldrig bedmt i vilken utstrckning medlemsstaterna har uppfyllt sin skyldighet att terkrva std som beviljats inom ramen fr strukturfonderna fr fiske frn stdmottagare som inte iakttar bestmmelserna fr GFP (1). ... vilket gr att allvarliga brister kvarstr i medlemsstaterna 105.
Finally, in view of the weaknesses just described in the system of sanctions, it is not surprising that the Court was able to find serious inadequacies in Member StatesŐ application of measures aimed at sustainable management of fisheries resources, even though the Commission has been aware of this situation for several years. 
Slutligen r det inte frvnande att revisionsrtten, mot bakgrund av de brister i sanktionssystemet som just har ptalats, kunde konstatera allvarliga brister i medlemsstaternas tillmpning av tgrder som ska bidra till en hllbar frvaltning av fiskeresurserna, trots att kommissionen har varit medveten om denna situation i mnga r.
This situation is also linked to the fact that, following its inspection reports, the Commission does not formally ask national authorities to comment on the failings found and, where appropriate, present an action plan to rectify them. 
Denna situation beror ocks p det faktum att kommissionen, som en fljd av sina inspektionsrapporter, inte formellt ber de nationella myndigheterna att kommentera de frseelser som upptckts och i freliggande fall lgga fram en handlingsplan fr att komma till rtta med dem.
The control context: fishing overcapacity jeopardises compliance with rules and effectiveness of controls 107. 
Kontrollsammanhang: fiskeverkapacitet ventyrar regelefterlevnaden och kontrollernas effektivitet 107.
In addition to the weaknesses described above, the effectiveness of inspection and control systems is impeded by the existence of a very high inherent risk associated with the existence of significant fishing overcapacity. This situation is, in fact, a strong incitement for the fishing industry not to observe the regulations, and, everything else being equal, the only way to achieve effective controls is to step up inspection resources and pressure of controls. 
Utver de brister som har beskrivits ovan hmmas kontroll-och inspektionssystemen av att det finns en mycket hg inneboende risk som har att gra med mnga fiskeflottors verkapacitet. Denna situation utgr ett starkt incitament fr fiskarna att inte iaktta bestmmelserna. Det enda sttet som man kan gra kontrollerna effektivare p r att ka inspektionsresurserna och kontrollnivn.
Despite the difficulties in measuring it, the finding of overcapacity in the Community fleet is highlighted in the Green Paper (2). 
Trots svrigheterna med att mta detta har konstaterandet av gemenskapsflottans verkapacitet lyfts fram i grnboken (2).
According to the Commission, ÔWhat is clear, in any event, is that the fleet is currently much too largeŐ and Ôthat the necessary reductions of fishing mortality for the prudent management of stocks should be about 40 % and in many cases much higherŐ. Overcapacity encourages over-fishing 109. Overcapacity is a factor in over-fishing. 
Enligt kommissionen r gemenskapsflottan Ófr nrvarande mycket fr stor (...)Ó och Óden ndvndiga minskningen av fiskeddligheten fr en varsam frvaltning av bestnden skulle vara omkring 40 %Ó. verkapacitet uppmuntrar till verfiske 109. verkapaciteten r en faktor i verfisket.
It influences the behaviour of the industry and the legislator, by reducing the profitability of enterprises in the sector, which have to bear the costs associated with the overcapacity of their means of production. 
Den pverkar de yrkesverksammas och lagstiftarens beteende genom att den minskar vinstmarginalen fr fretag inom sektorn som mste st fr de kostnader som hnger samman med verkapaciteten i deras produktionsmedel.
The fishing industry is exposed to the temptation of exploiting its over-sized vessels to the full and to fish beyond the authorised limits. 
Fiskarna frestas att utnyttja sina verdimensionerade fartyg maximalt och fiska ver de tilltna grnserna.
There is a risk of their underdeclaring their catches or throwing the less profitable part overboard (see paragraph 25). 
Det finns en risk fr att de deklarerar sina fngster fr lgt eller kastar de minst vinstgivande av dem verbord (se punkt 25).
When the Council of Ministers adopts the TAC and quotas it acts as an arbiter between divergent short-term interests, environmental on the one hand, and socio-economic on the other. 
Nr ministerrdet antar TAC och kvoter agerar det som en skiljedomare mellan olika kortsiktiga intressen, miljmssiga  ena sidan och socioekonomiska  andra sidan.
In doing so it may authorise catch quantities that are higher than those recommended by the scientists (see Table 3), in order to protect the immediate social and economic interests of those employed in the industry. 
Detta kan leda till att det tillter fngstmngder som ligger ver forskarnas rekommendationer (se tabell 3) fr att skydda de omedelbara intressen som de yrkesverksamma p omrdet har.
Furthermore, the CouncilŐs choices are made without any means of evaluating objectively how the catch levels will impact on any of those interests. 
Dessutom grs dessa val utan ngot instrument som gr det mjligt att objektivt bedma hur fngstmngderna kommer att pverka intressegrupperna.