natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Observations 21 The new set-up of EU delegations demands more coordination work and its administrative management is less efficient 57 At delegation level the strict distinction between the administrative budgets of the EEAS and Commission has added complexity to the budget preparation and implementation stages. 
Iakttagelser 21 Den nya organisationen fr EU-delegationer krver mer samordningsarbete och dess administrativa frvaltning r mindre effektiv 57 P delegationsniv har den strikta tskillnaden mellan Europeiska utrikestjnstens och kommissionens administrativa budgetar gjort budgetprocessen och de olika etapperna i budgetgenomfrandet mer komplexa.
For example, during 2012, the Commission funded administrative costs in delegations through eight different directorates-general and three instruments. 
Till exempel finansierade kommissionen under 2012 administrativa kostnader vid delegationerna genom tta olika generaldirektorat och tre instrument.
Having separated budgets has a negative impact on the efficiency of the delegations, as the current set-up requires more resources to manage the administrative budget and it is a source of risk in a framework of limited resources and decentralised budget implementation (see Box 3). 
Separata budgetar har negativ effekt p delegationernas effektivitet, eftersom den nuvarande organisationen krver strre resurser fr att frvalta den administrativa budgeten, och det r en klla till risk nr resurserna r begrnsade och budgetgenomfrandet decentraliserat (se ruta 3).
In November 2013, the EEAS made a proposal to the Commission for simplification which if implemented will reduce the number of funding sources to a maximum of two. 
I november 2013 freslog Europeiska utrikestjnsten en frenkling fr kommissionen som om den genomfrs kommer att minska antalet finansieringskllor till hgst tv.
58 Heads of delegation also face significant difficulties in allocating staff to priorities, as they can only allocate Commission staff to EEAS duties within a limit of 20 % of their working time. 
58 Delegationscheferna stlls ocks infr stora svrigheter nr de ska frdela personal till prioriteringar, eftersom de endast kan frdela kommissionspersonal till Europeiska utrikestjnstens uppgifter motsvarande hgst 20 % av personalens arbetstid.
In addition, Commission staff cannot authorise EEAS expenditure. 
Dessutom kan kommissionspersonal inte godknna Europeiska utrikestjnstens utgifter.
As a result, heads of delegation spend a significant part of their time on administrative rather than political issues, which hampers their effectiveness45. 
Det leder till att delegationschefer gnar en stor del av sin tid t administrativa i stllet fr politiska renden, vilket begrnsar deras ndamlsenlighet45.
59 Heads of Delegation and desk officers at headquarters are not always informed about the instructions and reports sent between the Commission headquarters and Commission staff in delegations. 
59 Delegationschefer och handlggare p hgkvarteret informeras inte alltid om de anvisningar och rapporter som skickas mellan kommissionens hgkvarter och kommissionspersonal vid delegationerna.
This puts at risk the consistency of EU actions. 
Detta innebr en risk fr att EU:s tgrder inte blir samstmmiga.
45 According to the replies received from the heads of delegation to the Court’s survey, 46 % spend 50 % or more of their time on management/administrative tasks. 
45 Enligt delegationschefernas svar i revisionsrttens enkt gnar46%avdem50%eller mer av sin tid t frvaltning/ administrativa uppgifter.
Financial authorisation restrictions There are strict restrictions on which delegation staff can authorise EEAS administrative expenditure and Commission operational expenditure. 
Restriktioner nr det gller finansiellt godknnande Restriktionerna r strnga nr det gller vilken delegationspersonal som kan godknna Europeiska utrikestjnstens administrativa utgifter och kommissionens driftsutgifter.
The sole exception is the Head of Delegation, who works for the EEAS but is sub-delegated by the Commission to authorise Commission operational expenditure. 
Det enda undantaget r delegationschefen som arbetar fr Europeiska utrikestjnsten men som genom vidaredelegering av kommissionen kan godknna kommissionens driftsutgifter.
This has led to situations where nobody is authorised to implement some of the fundamental steps of financial transactions, notably in delegations where the only EEAS administrator is the Head of Delegation: in his/her absence no one else can authorise EEAS administrative expenditure. 
Detta har lett till situationer dr ingen r bemyndigad att genomfra vissa av de grundlggande stegen i de finansiella transaktionerna, srskilt vid delegationer dr Europeiska utrikestjnstens enda handlggare r delegationschefen: i hans eller hennes frnvaro kan ingen annan godknna Europeiska utrikestjnstens administrativa utgifter.
Observations 22 60 The EEAS and the Commission coordinate the management of delegations though EUDEL, a body that meets at both senior and operative levels. 
Iakttagelser 22 60 Europeiska utrikestjnsten och kommissionen samordnar frvaltningen av delegationerna genom Eudel, ett organ som sammantrder p svl ledningsniv som operativ niv.
At the same time, however, the Commission also has a separate forum, ‘COM-DEL’, to deal with Commission-specific matters. 
Samtidigt har dock kommissionen ocks ett separat forum, Comdel, som behandlar kommissionsspecifika frgor.
The EEAS does not receive the minutes of COMDEL meetings and is not consulted on relevant initiatives. 
Europeiska utrikestjnsten fr inte protokollen frn Comdels mten och rdfrgas inte om relevanta initiativ.
As an example, the Commission carried out a major workload assessment for Commission posts in delegations in 2011, which did not cover the relative workload of all delegation staff (including EEAS staff) and the EU’s overall priorities. 
Till exempel gjorde kommissionen en strre bedmning av arbetsbelastningen nr det gllde kommissionstjnster vid delegationer 2011 som inte omfattade den relativa arbetsbrdan fr all delegationspersonal (inbegripet Europeiska utrikestjnstens personal) och EU:s vergripande prioriteringar.
The existence of two separate bodies to deal with delega-tion-related matters complicates the working arrangements. 
Att det finns tv separata organ som behandlar delegationsrelaterade renden komplicerar arbetsformerna.
61 Despite these issues, the Member States judge that the transformation of the former Commission delegations into EU delegations has been a considerable success for the EEAS. 
61 Trots dessa problem anser medlemsstaterna att omvandlingen av de fre detta kommissionsdelegationerna till EU-delegationer har varit en stor framgng fr Europeiska utrikestjnsten.
Member States and the EEAS have not yet fully exploited the potential for synergies between their networks of diplomatic representations 62 The EEAS has established regular meetings with the diplomatic services of the Member States to discuss issues of common interest. 
Medlemsstaterna och Europeiska utrikestjnsten har nnu inte fullt ut utnyttjat potentialen fr synergier mellan sina nt av diplomatiska representationer 62 Europeiska utrikestjnsten har infrt regelbundna mten med medlemsstaternas diplomattjnster fr att diskutera frgor av gemensamt intresse.
These meetings were organised at different levels and allowed the EEAS to coordinate a wide range of topics, from political issues to administrative matters such as training or security. 
Dessa mten har anordnats p olika niver och gjort det mjligt fr Europeiska utrikestjnsten att samordna ett brett spektrum av frgor, frn politiska frgor till administrativa renden, ssom utbildning eller skerhet.
63 However, the new role for EU delegations has not been followed by a significant exploitation of synergies with the diplomatic services of the Member States, which is largely attributable to the short time passed and a lack of commitment from the Member States themselves. 
63 EU-delegationernas nya roll har dock inte fljts av ngot stort utnyttjande av synergier med medlemsstaternas dip-lomattjnster, vilket till stor del beror p den korta tid som har frflutit och p bristande engagemang hos medlemsstaterna sjlva.
The co-location of EU delegations and Member State diplomatic representations is still very limited and common political reporting is exceptional. 
Samlokaliseringen av EU-delegationer och medlemsstaternas diplomatiska representationer r alltjmt mycket begrnsad, och gemensam politisk rapportering hr till undantagen.
In practice, the information flow between the delegations and Member State embassies remains one-way with delegations receiving little information. 
I praktiken r informationsfldet mellan delegationerna och medlemsstaternas ambassader fortfarande enkelriktat, dr delegationerna endast fr lite information.
Co-location and common political reporting are areas which provide good opportunities for the EEAS to provide added value46. 
Samlokalisering och gemensam politisk rapportering r omrden dr Europeiska utrikestjnsten har goda mjligheter att ge ett mervrde46.
46 In this regard, the Council has given its full support to further enhancing co-location and sharing reports and information in the Council conclusions on the EEAS review. 
46 I detta avseende gav rdet sitt fulla std till en ytterligare kning av samlokaliseringen och till utbyte av rapporter och information i sina slutsatser om versynen av Europeiska utrikestjnsten.
Observations 23 64 The Lisbon Treaty, which set up EU delegations, increased expectations that these ‘houses of Europe’ would provide consular services, including consular protection of EU citizens. 
Iakttagelser 23 64 Lissabonfrdraget, som inrttade EU-delegationerna, kade frvntningarna p att dessa ÓEuropahusÓ skulle tillhandahlla konsulra tjnster, inbegripet konsulrt skydd till unionsmedborgare.
However, much still remains to be done, and the EEAS has not yet prepared a detailed analysis of the financial implications of addressing these issues, especially of meeting the expectations of some medium-sized and small Member States. 
Mycket terstr dock att gra, och Europeiska utrikestjnsten har nnu inte ingende analyserat de finansiella konsekvenserna av att frska lsa dessa frgor, srskilt av att uppfylla en del medelstora och sm medlemsstaters frvntningar.
The Member States have neither reached a common position on this issue nor agreed on the harmonisation of rules and legislation applicable in crisis and emergency situations, staff training and the distribution of costs. 
Medlemsstaterna har varken ntt en gemensam stndpunkt i denna frga eller enats om harmonisering av regler och lagstiftning som skulle vara tillmpliga nr det gller kris-och ndsituationer, personalutbildning och kostnadsfrdelning.
The potential benefits from having the EEAS as permanent chair of Council preparatory bodies have not been fully realised 65 The HR/VP chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, one of the configurations of the Council of the European Union, and appoints the permanent chairs of some of its preparatory bodies, including the Political and Security Committee. Although this facilitates coordination and gives the EEAS significant influence on the whole foreign policy cycle, there are some shortcomings such as the absence of a preparatory body to deal with the external dimension of internal policies. 
De potentiella frdelarna med att ha Europeiska utrikestjnsten som permanent ordfrande i rdets frberedande organ har nnu inte frverkligats fullt ut 65 Den hga representanten/vice ordfranden r ordfrande fr mtena i rdet (utrikes frgor), som r en av rdets konstellationer, och utser de stndiga ordfrandena i vissa av dess frberedande organ, bland annat kommittn fr utrikes-och skerhetspolitik. ven om detta underlttar samordning och ger Europeiska utrikestjnsten stort inflytande ver hela den utrikespolitiska cykeln, finns det en del brister, t.ex. att det saknas ett frberedande organ som kan behandla den yttre dimensionen av den inre politiken.
66 Having permanent chairs was considered to represent an advantage over the previous rotating chair model due to the opportunity for long-term planning and more strategic thinking. 
66 Stndiga ordfrande ansgs vara en frdel jmfrt med den tidigare modellen med roterande ordfrandeskap genom mjligheten till lngsiktig planering och mer strategiskt tnkan-de.
67 Overall, the current set-up still requires close cooperation with the rotating Presidency, which chairs the General Affairs Council responsible for key topics, like accession negotiations, the Committee of permanent representatives, and some relevant Council working groups such as the one on development. 
67 Sammantaget krver den nuvarande organisationen fortfarande nra samarbete med det roterande ordfrandeskapet, som r ordfrande i rdet (allmnna frgor) med ansvar fr nyckelfrgor, t.ex. anslutningsfr-handlingar, och vissa berrda rdsar-betsgrupper, t.ex. den om utveckling.
This coordination has so far worked in practice although its efficiency has suffered from weaknesses in the EEAS’s planning and agenda-set-ting, which has led to the late submission of documents and short notice before international summits. 
Denna samordning har hittills fungerat i praktiken ven om effektiviteten har pverkats negativt av brister i Europeiska utrikestjnstens planering och faststllande av dagordning, vilket har lett till att dokument lmnats in sent och att internationella toppmten hllits med kort varsel.
Conclusions and 24 recommendations 68 This report is the result of an independent assessment of the establishment of the EEAS. 
Slutsatser och 24 rekommendationer 68 Denna rapport r resultatet av en oberoende bedmning av inrttandet av Europeiska utrikestjnsten.
69 With the establishment of the EEAS the EU has an operational foreign policy service, equipped with policy desks and crisis management structures, a wide network of diplomatic posts and with a balanced presence of different sources of staff. 
69 Genom inrttandet av Europeiska utrikestjnsten har EU nu en operativ utrikespolitisk avdelning, med policyenheter och strukturer fr krishantering, ett omfattande nt av diplomatiska representationer och med en jmn frdelning av personal frn olika kllor.
70 The establishment of the EEAS took place during a time of financial constraints and of increasing turmoil close to the EU’s borders. 
70 Inrttandet av Europeiska utrikestjnsten skedde i en tid av finansiella begrnsningar och kande oro nra EU:s grnser.
It was also rushed and inadequately prepared and, at the same time, was beset by too many constraints and vaguely defined tasks. 
Dessutom forcerades det och var det inte tillrckligt frberett, och samtidigt tfljdes det av alltfr mnga restriktioner och vagt formulerade uppgifter.
Overall, all these factors contributed towards a difficult start-up environment. 
Sammantaget bidrog alla dessa faktorer till en problematisk startmilj.
(See paragraphs 13 to 22) 71 Weaknesses in the objective setting and planning, organisation and allocation of resources have also reduced the EEAS’s efficiency. 
(Se punkterna 13Đ22) 71 Brister i mlformuleringen och planeringen, organisationen och frdelningen av resurser har ocks minskat Europeiska utrikestjnstens effektivitet.
The integration of the EU special representatives within the work of the EEAS is not yet sufficient. 
EU:s srskilda representanter har nnu inte integrerats tillrckligt i Europeiska utrikestjnstens arbete.
As regards recruitment, the Court found that significant gender and geographical imbalances have not yet been fully corrected and that the recruitment procedures are costly and lengthy. 
Vad betrffar rekrytering konstaterade revisionsrtten att stor snedfrdelning mellan knen och stora geografiska snedfrdelningar nnu inte har korrigerats helt och hllet och att rekryteringsfrfarandena r kostnadskrvande och utdragna.
(See paragraphs 23 to 50) 72 Overall, coordination between the EEAS and the Commission was only partly effective, mainly due to the absence of effective coordination mechanisms at top level and a rigid financial and administrative framework at delegations, which takes resources away from political tasks. 
(Se punkterna 23Đ50) 72 Sammantaget var samordningen mellan Europeiska utrikestjnsten och kommissionen endast delvis ndamlsenlig, frmst p grund av att det saknades ndamlsenliga samordningsmekanismer p hgsta niv och att den finansiella och administrativa ramen vid delegationerna var of-lexibel, vilket tar resurser frn politiska uppgifter.
The coordination with Member States improved although it can be further developed to exploit synergies such as information sharing or co-location, to improve consular services, including consular protection of EU citizens, and to facilitate a more strategic role for the Council and its preparatory bodies. 
Samordningen med medlemsstaterna frbttrades men kan utvecklas ytterligare s att man utnyttjar synergier som informationsutbyte eller samlokalisering, frbttrar de konsulra tjnsterna, inbegripet konsulrt skydd till unionsmedborgare, och frmjar en mer strategisk roll fr rdet och dess frberedande organ.
(See paragraphs 51 to 67) 73 Based on the above conclusions, the Court recommends that: (a) the EEAS should clarify its objectives, tasks and competencies, streamline its organisational design and simplify the administrative framework in which it operates; (b) the EEAS should examine with the Member States and the Commission the necessity and feasibility of preparing a new overarching strategic framework for EU foreign affairs and security policy, to be submitted to the European Council for approval; (c) the EEAS should develop its comprehensive planning to strengthen the internal coherency of its activities and to better connect them with the Commission’s annual work programme and the trio programme of the rotating presidencies; 
(Se punkterna 51Đ67) 73 P grundval av slutsatserna ovan rekommenderar revisionsrtten fljande: a) Europeiska utrikestjnsten br frtydliga sina ml, uppgifter och befogenheter, effektivisera sin organisation och frenkla den administrativa ram som den arbetar inom. b) Europeiska utrikestjnsten br tillsammans med medlemsstaterna och kommissionen underska om det r ndvndigt och genomfrbart att utforma en ny vergripande strategisk ram fr EU:s utrikes-och skerhetspolitik, som ska lggas fram fr Europeiska rdet fr godknnande. c) Europeiska utrikestjnsten br utveckla sin vergripande planering fr att strka samstmmigheten i sina aktiviteter och bttre koppla samman dem med kommissionens rliga arbetsprogram och de roterande ordfrandeskapens trioprogram.
This report was adopted by Chamber III, headed by Mr Karel PINXTEN, Member of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 20 May 2014. 
Denna rapport antogs av revisionsrttens avdelning III, med ledamoten Karel Pinxten som ordfrande, vid dess sammantrde i Luxemburg den 20 maj 2014.
For the Court of Auditors Vítor Manuel da SILVA CALDEIRA President 
Fr revisionsrtten Vtor Manuel da SILVA CALDEIRA Ordfrande
Reply of 26 the EEAS Observations The role of the EEAS was decided late and defined in vague terms 15 The task that has been assigned to the EEAS consists in assisting the HR in fulfilling his/her mandate, which in turn is to conduct the Union’s CFSP and CSDP as mandated by the Council, as well as to ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action. 
Svar frn europeiska 26 utrikestjnsten Iakttagelser Europeiska utrikestjnstens roll faststlldes sent och var vagt formulerad 15 Den uppgift som tilldelats Europeiska utrikestjnsten r att bist EU:s hga representant i hans eller hennes arbete med att genomfra unionens gemensamma utrikes-och skerhetspolitik och gemensamma skerhets-och frsvarspolitik enligt rdets uppdrag, samt att skerstlla konsekvens i unionens yttre tgrder.
Decisions on CFSP are subject to unanimity among EU Member States, the EEAS could have outlined an overarching foreign policy strategy only if EU MS would have given a clear mandate to the HR to proceed in that direction, which has not been the case. 
Besluten om den gemensamma utrikes-och skerhetspolitiken (Gusp) ska fattas enhlligt av EU:s medlemsstater, och utrikestjnsten kunde bara ha utarbetat en vergripande utrikespolitisk strategi om EU-medlemsstaterna hade gett den hga representanten tydligt mandat att fortstta i den riktningen, vilket inte har varit fallet.
Instead, there have been some initiatives by a limited number of MS — such as the project for a ‘European Global Strategy’, promoted by Spain, Italy, Poland, Sweden — but not supported by others, to which the EEAS has been closely associated. 
I stllet har ett begrnsat antal medlemsstater tagit vissa initiativ Đ exempelvis projektet om en Óeuropeisk global strategiÓ, som stds av Spanien, Italien, Polen och Sverige, men som inte ftt std av andra lnder Đ som utrikestjnsten har varit nra anknuten till.
The EU strategic approach continues to be based on the European Security Strategy adopted in 2003 and its implementation report issued in 2008, whose findings are in many respects still valid and pertinent to date (see also our comments to paragraph 25). 
EU:s strategiska tillvgagngsstt r fortsatt baserat p den europeiska skerhetsstrategi som antogs 2003 och rapporten om genomfrandet av denna som kom 2008, vars rn i mnga avseenden r giltiga och relevanta n idag (se ven kommentaren till punkt 25).
The EEAS has faced a number of political and financial challenges 21 Concerning the General Secretariat of the Council, the pattern was one of the progressive and rapid phasing out. 
Europeiska utrikestjnsten har stllts infr ett antal politiska och ekonomiska utmaningar 21 Nr det gller rdets generalsekretariat har mnstret varit en progressiv och snabb utfasning.
The EEAS did not treat as a priority the development of an overarching strategic framework for EU foreign policy, and did not adopt an internal strategy 25 Since the inception of her mandate, the HR/VP has repeatedly indicated that relations with strategic partners were among the priorities of EU foreign policy. 
Europeiska utrikestjnsten prioriterade inte att utveckla en vergripande strategisk ram fr EU:s utrikespolitik och infrde inte en intern strategi 25 Sedan den hga representanten/vice ordfranden tilltrdde sin post har hon upprepade gnger framhllit att relationerna med strategiska partner r en av prioriteringarna i EU:s utrikespolitik.
How to make sure that the EU would improve its approach to these crucial relationships has been the subject of intense discussions, also at the highest political level, including at the European Council (September 2010) and at ministerial levels (Foreign Affairs Council of December 2010), and especially in the Gymnich format in September 2011 and on a number of other occasions. 
Hur man ska kunna se till att EU frbttrar sina strategier avseende dessa mycket viktiga relationer har diskuterats intensivt, ven p hgsta politiska niv, bland annat i Europeiska rdet (september 2010) och p ministerniv (ministerrdet (utrikes frgor) i december 2010), och srskilt vid mtet i Gymnich i september 2011, samt vid ett flertal andra tillfllen.
Due to the heterogeneous nature of the group of the strategic partner countries and of their respective relations with the EU, it has always been recognised that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to these partnerships might have been not the most beneficial one. 
Med tanke p att de strategiska partnerlnderna sinsemellan r mycket olika och har olika frhllanden till EU, har man hela tiden varit medveten om att ett gemensamt frhllningsstt som ska passa alla partnerskap inte varit det optimala.
Initially, the main focus of discussions was on strategic partnerships with the US, Russia, and China. 
Frn brjan fokuserade diskussionerna frmst p de strategiska partnerskapen med USA, Ryssland och Kina.