natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission proposed to harmonise these definitions in the PIF Directive but the Directive, as adopted by the EP and the Council, although providing for deeper harmonisation of the main PIF offences, does not feature definitions of all relevant offences. 50. 
Kommissionen freslog att dessa definitioner skulle harmoniseras i PIF-direktivet, men i den form som direktivet antogs av Europaparlamentet och rdet innehller det inte definitioner av alla relevanta brott ven om de viktigaste brotten mot EU:s ekonomiska intressen har harmoniserats.
The Commission considers that the ECA’s finding that managing authorities in Hungary do not properly report suspicions of fraud that are resolved prior to certification to the Commission, is mainly an issue of misinterpretation of the reporting provisions by the Member State. 
50 Kommissionen anser att revisionsrttens slutsats att de frvaltande myndigheterna i Ungern inte anmler misstankar om bedrgeri som har tgrdats innan de attesteras till kommissionen frmst beror p att medlemsstaten har feltolkat rapporteringsbestmmelserna.
Cases of "suspected fraud" once reported must not be withdrawn from IMS even if there is no longer expenditure submitted to the Commission, as this may have been the case in Hungary. 
Rapporterade fall av misstankar om bedrgeri fr inte dras tillbaka frn IMS ven om inga utgifter lmnas in till kommissionen lngre, vilket kan ha varit fallet i Ungern.
The Commission will call the attention of the Hungarian authorities to the correct application of the provision concerned. 
Kommissionen kommer att uppmrksamma de ungerska myndigheterna p hur de berrda bestmmelserna ska tillmpas.
The Commission is aware that the triggering moment of reporting may differ among Member States and even within Member States. 
51 Kommissionen r medveten om att den hndelse som utlser rapportering kan variera mellan medlemsstaterna och ven inom varje medlemsstat.
To this end, the "Handbook on the reporting of irregularities", prepared in cooperation with national experts, was finalised in 20179. 
Det r anledningen till att kommissionen i samarbete med nationella sakkunniga har tagit fram en Óhandbok om rapportering av oriktigheterÓ, som slutfrdes 20179.
It will not solve all situations, but it will surely ensure more consistency in this respect. 
Handboken kommer inte att lsa alla situationer, men kommer helt klart att bidra till mer konsekvens i det hr avseendet.
Its adoption is too recent to have produced its effects already on the data sampled by the ECA. 
Handboken antogs alltfr nyligen fr att den ska kunna pverka de uppgifter som granskats av revisionsrtten.
However, to overcome this issue, in its PIF Reports the Commission follows a multi-annual analysis, which, in relation to Cohesion Policy, encompasses whole programming periods, thus mitigating the impact of delayed reporting. 
Fr att lsa det hr problemet anvnder kommissionen dock en flerrig analys i PIF-rapporterna, som fr sammanhllningspolitiken omfattar hela programperioderna, vilket begrnsar effekterna av frsenad rapportering.
Common Commission reply to paragraphs 53 and 54: 6 See PIF Report 2014 - COM(2015) 386 final of 31/07/2015, recommendation 1, page 30. 
Kommissionens gemensamma svar p punkterna 53 och 54: Varje gng det hnder ngot i ett rende som har rapporterats i IMS bde kan och mste de rapporterande myndigheterna uppdatera den relaterade informationen.
7 Ares(2016)6943965 of 13/12/2016), developed in the framework of the COCOLAF subgroup on "Fraud Prevention" in cooperation with national experts. 
7 Ares(2016)6943965, 13.12/.2016), framtagen inom ramen fr Cocolafs undergrupp om ÓFrebyggande av bedrgerierÓ i samarbete med nationella sakkunniga.
8 See SWD(2016) 237 final, paragraph 2.4. 
8 Se SWD(2016) 237 final, punkt 2.4.
9 ARES(2017)5692256 of 21.11.2017. 
9 Ares(2017)5692256, 21.11.2017.
The assessment of the financial impact of fraudulent cases remains a controversial aspect in many respects. 
Bedmningen av de ekonomiska fljderna av fall med misstanke om bedrgeri r fortfarande en kontroversiell aspekt i mnga avseenden.
The Commission will continue to provide assistance to national authorities, but differences in interpretation are unlikely to disappear completely. 55. 
Kommissionen kommer att fortstta att hjlpa de nationella myndigheterna med detta, men de varierande tolkningarna kommer sannolikt inte att frsvinna helt och hllet.
The low number of fraudulent irregularities reported by some Member States can be due to many variables, such as the level of controls of EU funds or the proportion of EU funds as compared to the total public investment in that Member State. 
55 Det lga antal oriktigheter med misstanke som rapporteras av en del medlemsstater kan bero p mnga olika faktorer, exempelvis kontrollnivn nr det gller EU-medel eller andelen EU-medel jmfrt med den sammanlagda offentliga investeringen i den berrda medlemsstaten.
The under-reporting by France is known to the Commission and has already been pointed out in previous PIF Reports, which contained specific recommendations to this Member State (among others). 
Kommissionen knner till Frankrikes underrapportering och har redan ppekat detta i tidigare PIF-rapporter, som innehller srskilda rekommendationer till (bland annat) denna medlemsstat.
See also Commission replies to paragraphs 47-48 and 53-54 above. 
Se ven kommissionens svar p punkterna 47Đ48 och 53Đ54.
Common Commission reply to paragraphs 56 and 57: Fraud detection rate measures the financial impact of detected and reported fraudulent irregularities on the payments. 
Kommissionens gemensamma svar p punkterna 56 och 57: Andelen upptckta bedrgerier mter den ekonomiska inverkan av upptckta och rapporterade oriktigheter med misstanke om bedrgeri p betalningarna.
Despite mentioned shortcomings, of which the Commission is fully aware, IMS is the only tool that allows the analysis of fraud detected and reported by the Member States on EU scale. 
Trots de nmnda bristerna, som kommissionen r fullstndigt medveten om, r IMS det enda verktyget som mjliggr analyser av bedrgerier som upptckts och rapporterats av medlemsstaterna p EU-niv.
Based on these analyses and taking into account the known limitations of the system, the Commission draws specific conclusions as regards risks linked to specific policy areas and in relation to the detection efforts and the reporting behaviour of the Member States. 
Baserat p dessa analyser och med hnsyn till systemets knda begrnsningar drar kommissionen slutsatser om vilka risker det finns inom ett visst politikomrde och nr det gller medlemsstaternas insatser fr att upptcka och rapportera bedrgerier.
In the framework of its revised Anti-Fraud Strategy, while relying on an improved IMS, the Commission is also aiming at enhancing its analysis based on additional elements, in particular by developing country profiles to better understand differences in detection and reporting among Member States. 
Inom ramen fr sin reviderade strategi mot bedrgerier, dr IMS kommer att frbttras, frlitar sig kommissionen visserligen p IMS, men siktar ven p att frbttra sin analys med hjlp av kompletterande inslag, srskilt genom att utforma landsprofiler fr att f kade kunskaper om skillnaderna nr det gller upptckt och rapportering mellan medlemsstaterna.
As already indicated in relation to the ECA Special Report 01/2019, the absence of a strong correlation between reported fraud detection rates and perception of corruption should not be over-emphasised. 
Ssom kommissionen redan har ppekat i samband med revisionsrttens srskilda rapport 01/2019 br avsaknaden av en stark korrelation mellan andelen rapporterade bedrgerier och korruptionsrisken inte verbetonas.
Corruption is one of the many modi operandi through which fraud against the EU budget is perpetrated. 
Korruption r bara en av de mnga metoderna fr bedrgerier som riktar sig mot EU:s budget.
59. The Commission’s guidance note on fraud risk assessment states in section 4.3.3 that “Managing authorities should have clear reporting mechanisms ensuring sufficient coordination on anti-fraud matters with the audit authority and competent investigative authorities in the Member State”. 
59 Fljande anges i punkt 4.3.3 i kommissionens vgledning om bedmning av risken fr bedrgerier: ÓDe frvaltande myndigheterna br ha tydliga rapporteringsmekanismer fr att skerstlla tillrcklig samordning av bedrgeribekmpningsfrgor med revisionsmyndigheten och behriga utredningsmyndigheter i medlemsstatenÓ.
This is to be translated into the management and control instructions and specific set-up can usually be found under the management and control system description of each programme. 
Detta ska omvandlas till frvaltnings-och kontrollanvisningar och den specifika strukturen fr detta anges vanligen i beskrivningen av frvaltnings-och kontrollsystemet fr varje program.
In its 2014 PIF report the Commission carried out a mapping exercise of national obligations10. In 2014, only four Member States (UK, Ireland, Sweden and Denmark) specified in their replies to the questionnaire on the specific part of ‘Article 325 TFEU Report’, that they did not have an obligation for public officials to inform prosecution/law enforcement of potential cases of fraud11. 
Kommissionen kartlade de nationella skyldigheterna i sin PIF-rapport fr 201410. r 2014 angav endast fyra medlemsstater (Frenade kungariket, Irland, Sverige och Danmark) i sina svar p frgeformulret om den specifika delen av Órapporten enligt artikel 325 i EUF-frdragetÓ att statstjnstemn inte var skyldiga att informera lagfringsorgan/brottsbekmpande organ om potentiella bedrgerifall.11.
10 (SWD(2015) 154 final, paragraph 3.2, pages 57-61). 
I Grekland r varje frvaltande myndighet skyldig att informera sambandscentralen om alla misstnkta 10 (SWD(2015) 154 final, punkt 3.2, s.
11 See SWD(2015) 154 final, paragraph 3.2, pages 57-61. 
11 Se SWD(2015) 154 final, punkt 3.2, s.
In Greece, each managing authority is obliged to inform the AFCOS of each case of suspected fraud and, in this context, an AFCOS liaison person has been appointed within each managing authority. 
11 bedrgerifall, och fr detta ndaml har en kontaktperson fr sambandscentralen utsetts inom varje frvaltande myndighet.
At the same time, a prosecutor has been seconded to the Greek AFCOS office. 
Dessutom har en klagare avdelats till den grekiska sambandscentralen.
The Commission will monitor whether this set-up ensures effective communication between the managing authorities and the AFCOS. 
Kommissionen kommer att vervaka om denna struktur skerstller effektiv kommunikation mellan de frvaltande myndigheterna och sambandscentralen.
In Spain, officials working in public administrations are obliged by national law to report all suspected cases of fraud. 
I Spanien r tjnstemn som arbetar vid offentliga frvaltningar skyldiga enligt nationell lag att rapportera alla misstnkta bedrgerifall.
The Commission is of the opinion that the analysis of the reasons for rejection of a potential fraudulent case by the competent authority is a shared responsibility. 
60 Kommissionen anser att analysen av sklen till varfr en behrig myndighet avvisar misstnkta bedrgerifall r ett gemensamt ansvar.
Services analysing and investigating these cases should offer feedback to managing authorities on the research carried out and the reasons not to open an investigation. 
De instanser som analyserar och utreder dessa renden br ge terkoppling till de frvaltande myndigheterna om de efterforskningar som gjorts och om sklen till varfr en utredning inte inleds.
AFCOS could play a larger role in this context to ensure a better coordination between the managing authorities and the prosecutor. 
Sambandscentralerna kan spela en strre roll i detta sammanhang genom att frbttra samordningen mellan de frvaltande myndigheterna och klagarmyndigheten.
For example, arrangements of this kind exist in Bulgaria (see the latest annual action plan, adopted on 24 January 2019 - http://www.afcos.bg/bg/node/227) and in Greece (where the complaints management system involves the AFCOS). 62. 
Arrangemang av den hr typen finns redan, exempelvis i Bulgarien (se den senaste rliga handlingsplanen som antogs den 24 januari 2019 Đ http://www.afcos.bg/bg/node/227), och i Grekland (dr sambandscentralen deltar i klagomlshanteringssystemet).
The Commission and Member States have to in the first instance protect the EU budget. 
62 Kommissionen och medlemsstaterna mste i frsta hand skydda EU-budgeten.
This is effective through for example, withdrawal of affected expenditure from the EU co-funded programme by the programme authorities. 
Detta grs till exempel genom att programmyndigheterna drar tillbaka de berrda utgifterna frn det EU-medfinansierade programmet.
However, the judicial proceeding may continue at national level and the recovery from perpetrators will take time, depending on the outcome of this judicial proceeding, which can take several years to be finalised. 
Det rttsliga frfarandet kan dock fortstta p nationell niv. Det tar emellertid tid att tervinna medlen frn de personer som gjort sig skyldiga till bedrgeri beroende p resultatet av det rttsliga frfarandet som kan pg flera r innan det avslutas.
It is therefore, from a point of view of administrative efficiency and legal security of the EU budget, preferable to have the concerned amounts withdrawn immediately from the co-funded operational programme, while the Member State will follow up at national level the required judicial proceedings. 
Fr att skapa administrativ effektivitet och rttsskerhet fr EU-budgeten r det drfr att fredra att omedelbart dra tillbaka de berrda beloppen frn det medfinansierade operativa programmet, samtidigt som medlemsstaten inleder de tillmpliga rttsliga frfarandena p nationell niv.
Moreover, the Commission has no legal means to force Member States to enter into such judicial proceedings or to recover funds from the perpetrator once expenditure has been withdrawn and, consequently, no longer forms part of the EU co-funded programme. 
Kommissionen har inte heller ngra rttsliga medel fr att tvinga medlemsstaterna att inleda sdana rttsliga frfaranden eller tervinna medel frn den som gjort sig skyldig till bedrgeri nr utgiften vl har dragits tillbaka och fljaktligen inte lngre ingr i det EU-medfinansierade programmet.
Common Commission reply to paragraphs 63, 64 and Box 3: The Commission regularly reminds the Member States of their obligations regarding the possible horizontal implications of a single fraud case identified, based on the guidance note on fraud risk assessment, section 4.4. 
Kommissionens gemensamma svar p punkterna 63 och 64 samt ruta 3: Kommissionen pminner regelbundet medlemsstaterna om deras skyldigheter i samband med eventuella vergripande konsekvenser av identifierade bedrgerifall, baserat p avsnitt 4.4 i vgledningen om bedmning av risken fr bedrgerier.
Some Member States indeed assess the implications of potential fraud cases on their systems and apply corrective measures. 
En del medlemsstater bedmer ocks hur misstnkta bedrgerifall pverkar deras system och vidtar korrigerande tgrder.
Common Commission reply to paragraphs 66 and 67: According to the current provisions of Regulation 883/2013, the role of AFCOSs is to facilitate effective cooperation and exchange of information with OLAF. 
Kommissionens gemensamma svar p punkterna 66 och 67: Enligt de gllande bestmmelserna i frordning (EU) nr 883/2013 har sambandscentralerna till uppgift att underltta ett effektivt samarbete och informationsutbyte med Olaf.
Since Regulation 883/2013 relates to OLAF's investigations, the role of AFCOSs, as defined in Article 3(4) is limited to investigative cooperation and does not require including tasks such as monitoring of fraud reporting or coordinating the work of all the parties involved at the national level. 
Eftersom frordning (EU) nr883/2013 rr Olafs utredningar begrnsas sambandscentralernas roll enligt definitionen i artikel 3.4 till utredningssamarbete och det krvs inte att de ska utfra uppgifter som att vervaka rapportering av bedrgerier eller samordna arbetet fr alla parter som r involverade p nationell niv.
The Commission issued a Guidance Note in 2013, shortly after the entry into force of Regulation 883/2013, encouraging Member States to consider a possible broader role for the AFCOS, by entrusting them also with other anti-fraud tasks. 
Under 2013, kort efter det att frordning (EU) nr 883/2013 trdde i kraft, utfrdade kommissionen en vgledning dr den uppmuntrar medlemsstaterna att vervga en eventuellt bredare roll fr sambandscentralerna genom att ven anfrtro dem andra uppgifter p bedrgeribekmpningsomrdet.
It was intended to support the Member States in the setting up of their AFCOS in the period 2013-2014 and was not binding upon the Member States. 11 
Syftet med vgledningen var att hjlpa medlemsstaterna att inrtta sina sambandscentraler under perioden 2013Đ2014 och den var inte bindande fr medlemsstaterna. 12
The evaluation of the OLAF Regulation showed that the creation of the AFCOSs had brought about a clear improvement in the cooperation and exchange of information between OLAF and the Member States, but it has also identified room for further improvement. 
69 Utvrderingen av Olaf-frordningen visade att inrttandet av sambandscentralerna hade lett till en klar frbttring av samarbetet och informationsutbytet mellan Olaf och medlemsstaterna, men ven att det finns utrymme fr ytterligare frbttringar.
While the diversity of AFCOSs was acknowledged, there were diverging views (notably among the AFCOSs themselves) on the need to further align their role and powers. 70. 
Utvrderingen bekrftade visserligen att det finns stora skillnader mellan sambandscentralerna, men det rdde delade sikter (srskilt bland sambandscentralerna sjlva) om huruvida det r ndvndigt att ytterligare anpassa deras roller och befogenheter.
While the Commission agrees that more coherence among the AFCOSs in various Member States would be desirable, at this point it is up to the co-legislators to decide on any changes. 
70 Kommissionen instmmer i att det skulle vara nskvrt med kad samstmmighet mellan flera medlemsstaters sambandscentraler, men ppekar att det r upp till medlagstiftarna att besluta om eventuella ndringar.
The Commission proposal to amend the OLAF Regulation, which is now in the legislative process, represents already a significant improvement over the current situation, from several perspectives. 
Kommissionens frslag om ndring av Olaf-frordningen, som nu befinner sig i lagstiftningsprocessen, utgr redan en betydande frbttring jmfrt med den nuvarande situationen, i flera hnseenden.
Firstly, it proposes (Article 12a) to further specify the role of the AFCOSs in the Member States in support of OLAF in particular by creating an obligation of result to ensure that OLAF is provided with the assistance it needs for its investigations, either directly by AFCOS or by a different authority. 
Fr det frsta fresls (artikel 12a) att den roll som sambandscentralerna har i medlemsstaterna ska preciseras nrmare fr att stdja Olaf, srskilt genom att infra en skyldighet att skerstlla att Olaf ges det bistnd som den behver fr sina utredningar, antingen direkt av sambandscentralerna eller av en annan myndighet.
While abstaining from harmonisation of the organisation and powers of AFCOS, the proposal stipulates that AFCOS should “provide”, “obtain” or "coordinate" the assistance required by OLAF. 
I frslaget avstr kommissionen frn att harmonisera sambandscentralernas organisation och befogenheter, utan det anges i stllet att sambandscentralerna ska ÓgeÓ, ÓfÓ eller ÓsamordnaÓ det bistnd som Olaf behver.
Secondly, the proposal also introduces a legal basis for AFCOS to cooperate among themselves, horizontally, which is currently lacking from the legal setting of operation of AFCOS. 
Fr det andra infrs genom frslaget en rttslig grund fr sambandscentralernas vergripande samarbete sinsemellan, vilket fr nrvarande saknas i den rttsliga grunden fr deras uppgifter.
71. While the Commission agrees that information on case status and statistics would be useful for effective anti-fraud coordination, the current legal mandate of the AFCOS, as defined in Article 3(4) of Regulation 883/2013, does not require such access to statistics on the number and progress of cases under investigation by competent national authorities. 
71 Kommissionen hller visserligen med om att information om och statistik ver rendens status skulle vara anvndbart fr en effektiv samordning av bedrgeribekmpningstgrderna, men det gllande rttsliga mandatet fr Afcos, som faststlls i artikel 3.4 i frordning (EU) nr 883/2013, freskriver inte tillgng till statistik ver antalet renden som utreds och hur utredningarna framskrider hos de behriga nationella myndigheterna.
72. The current OLAF Regulation 883/2013 does not oblige the AFCOS to have a full overview of investigations by competent national authorities involving EU funding in the respective Member State. 
72 Enligt den gllande Olaf-frordningen, frordning (EU) nr 883/2013, r sambandscentralerna inte skyldiga att ha en fullstndig verblick ver behriga nationella myndigheters utredningar av EU-finansierade projekt i respektive medlemsstat.
See common Commission reply to paragraphs 47 and 48. 
73 Se kommissionens gemensamma svar p punkterna 47 och 48.
The Commission agrees that for the protection of the EU’s financial interests Member States should put in place adequate coordination mechanisms where different actors can exchange information on the steps taken and planned and recommendations for improvement. 
74 Kommissionen instmmer i att medlemsstaterna fr att skydda EU:s ekonomiska intressen br infra lmpliga samordningsmekanismer dr olika aktrer kan utbyta information om vilka steg som har vidtagits och planeras och f rekommendationer om frbttringar.
75. OLAF encourages the Member States to set up AFCOS networks to improve national coordination of fight against fraud. 
75 Olaf uppmuntrar medlemsstaterna att inrtta ntverk fr sambandscentralerna i syfte att frbttra den nationella samordningen av bedrgeribekmpningstgrder.
Intervening at the level of the operations of the National Prosecutor is not within the competences of the Commission; however, the Commission is adamant about the need for cooperation between the bodies responsible for the management of EU funds, audit and fraud prevention and other relevant national bodies such as the prosecutor's office. 
76 Kommissionen r inte behrig att ingripa i de nationella klagarmyndigheternas arbete. Kommissionen r dock av den bestmda sikten att det krvs samarbete mellan de organ som ansvarar fr frvaltningen av EU-medel, revision och frebyggande av bedrgerier och andra relevanta nationella organ, ssom klagarmyndigheten.
In this context, when appropriate, the Commission requests information on measures taken or intended to be taken in order to ensure that ESIF co-financed interventions are implemented in a regular, efficient and effective manner. 
I detta sammanhang och vid behov begr kommissionen information om tgrder som vidtagits eller ska vidtas fr att se till att insatser som medfinansieras av ESI-fonderna genomfrs p ett regelbundet, effektivt och ndamlsenligt stt.
See Commission replies to paragraphs 46 and 75. 
Se kommissionens svar p punkterna 46 och 75.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 80. 
SLUTSATSER OCH REKOMMENDATIONER 13
The Commission fully supports the adoption of national anti-fraud strategies by Member States in their fight against fraud. 
80 Kommissionen ger sitt fulla std till att medlemsstaterna antar nationella strategier mot bedrgerier i sin kamp mot bedrgerier.