natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Firstly, although the so-called ‘matrix’ approach remains the basis for the CSRs for 2018, the 2017 Commission proposals for recommendations brought a qualification regarding Member States for which the matrix implies a fiscal adjustment of, or above, 0.5% of GDP (the margin of discretion). 
Fr det frsta, och ven om den s kallade matrismetoden fortfarande utgr grunden fr de landsspecifika rekommendationerna fr 2018, kvalificerade kommissionen i sina frslag till rekommendationer 2017 de medlemsstater fr vilka matrisen innebr en finanspolitisk korrigering p 0,5% eller mer av BNP (bedmningsutrymmet).
The CSR was not deemed to be the right place to provide the details balancing the matrix requirements and the need to take into account the impact of consolidation on growth and employment through the margin of appreciation. 
De landsspecifika rekommendationerna bedmdes inte vara rtt plats fr nrmare frklaringar om hur matriskraven br balanseras, och behovet av att beakta konsolideringens inverkan p tillvxten och sysselsttningen genom uppskattningsmarginalen.
7 Secondly, the accompanying recitals are very explicit on what has to be done in 2018; in particular they mention (i) the quantified requirement, (ii) an assessment of compliance, and (iii) a conclusion as to whether additional measures are needed. 
Fr det andra beskrivs de tgrder som krvs fr 2018 mycket detaljerat i de tfljande sklen, srskilt i) det kvantifierade kravet, ii) efterlevnadsbedmning, och iii) en slutsats om huruvida ytterligare tgrder krvs. Fr det tredje r bde sklen och de landsspecifika rekommendationerna likvrdiga nr det gller rttsverkan.
The Commission therefore does not see evidence at this stage that the use of its margin of discretion has reduced the relevance or credibility of the fiscal requirement in the CSR. 
Kommissionen ser drfr inga belgg i detta skede fr att anvndningen av bedmningsutrymmet har lett till att det finanspolitiska kravet i de landsspecifika rekommendationerna har blivit mindre relevant eller trovrdigt.
In the phase of assessing compliance, the Commission has a margin of discretion when considering departures from the fiscal adjustments implied by the matrix. 
I sin efterlevnadsbedmning har kommissionen ett bedmningsutrymme nr den vervger avvikelser frn de finanspolitiska korrigeringar som matrisen medfr.
These margins of discretion result from the specific terms of Article 6(3) of Council Regulation no. 1466/97. 
Bedmningsutrymmet r fljden av den specifika ordalydelsen i artikel 6.3 i rdets frordning (EG) nr 1466/97.
According to Article 6(3), the establishment of a significant deviation from the MTO or the adjustment path towards it, is, on the one hand, linked to precise quantitative criteria, without being limited to those criteria, and, on the other hand, allows for other elements to be taken into account. 
Enligt artikel 6.3 r en avvikelse frn det medelfristiga budgetmlet eller frn den anpassningsbana som r lmplig fr att uppn detta  ena sidan kopplad till precisa kvantitativa kriterier, utan att vara begrnsad till sdana kriterier, vilket  andra sidan ger kommissionen mjlighet att beakta andra fakta.
In its assessments, the Commission recognises that there can be a tension between sustainability and stabilisation needs in individual Member States, though it also true that this may not necessarily be the case as demonstrated by the analysis published by the Commission in part IV of the Public Finances Report 2016. 
I sina bedmningar bekrftar kommissionen att det kan uppst en spnning mellan hllbarhets-och stabiliseringsbehoven i enskilda medlemsstater, men att detta inte ndvndigtvis r fallet, vilket framgr av den analys som kommissionen offentliggjorde i del IV av rapporten om de offentliga finanserna 2016.
Where a tension does exist, it is the Commission's role to analyse the competing demands and reach a balanced assessment, factoring in all relevant considerations. 
Om sdana spnningar finns r det kommissionens uppgift att analysera de konkurrerande behoven och gra en balanserad bedmning, dr den vger in alla relevanta hnsynstaganden.
Commission discretion consists of an intelligent reading of the set of available indicators, especially in light of the uncertainty surrounding the business cycle and the risks of strong fiscal retrenchment for the on-going recovery in specific Member States. 
Kommissionens bedmningsutrymme bestr av en intelligent tolkning av uppsttningen med tillgngliga indikatorer, med srskild hnsyn till oskerheten kring konjunkturen och riskerna fr kraftiga finanspolitiska tstramningar inom ramen fr den pgende terhmtningen i vissa medlemsstater.
Firstly, the aggregate growth rates do not necessarily capture the potentially fragile nature of the recovery in individual Member States, nor do they take consideration of the potentially counter-productive impact of an overly large fiscal consolidation upon such an economy. 
Fr det frsta avspeglar de aggregerade tillvxtsiffrorna inte ndvndigtvis den potentiellt brckliga terhmtningen i enskilda medlemsstater, och beaktar inte heller de potentiellt 8 kontraproduktiva effekterna av en alltfr kraftig finanspolitisk konsolidering p sdana ekonomier.
Secondly, the fact that actual growth is higher than potential growth does not say much regarding the strength of the recovery. 
Fr det andra sger det faktum att den faktiska tillvxttakten verstiger den potentiella tillvxttakten inte mycket om hur stark terhmtningen r.
For instance, Italy's potential growth was estimated at around 0 in those years. 
Italiens potentiella tillvxt uppskattades exempelvis till omkring 0 under dessa r.
The limits on the structural reform and investment clauses were agreed in discussions between the Commission and Member States. 
Grnserna fr strukturreforms-och investeringsklausulerna verenskoms under diskussioner mellan kommissionen och medlemsstaterna.
To complete the picture, the Commission wishes to add an explanation for the rationale underlying the conditions of the investment clause. 
Fr att komplettera bilden vill kommissionen lgga till en frklaring av den logiska grunden fr investeringsklausulens villkor.
The clause is intended to cater for public investments which can be considered economically equivalent to structural reforms in having a positive impact on potential growth and the sustainability of public finances and is therefore linked to certain projects co-funded by the EU. 
Syftet med klausulen r att srja fr offentliga investeringar som ekonomiskt sett kan anses motsvara strukturreformer eftersom de har en positiv effekt p potentiell tillvxt och de offentliga finansernas hllbarhet och drfr r kopplade till vissa projekt som samfinansieras av EU.
The eligibility condition that public investment should not decline is intended to ensure that EU funded investments are not used to substitute for nationally funded investment. 
Syftet med villkoret att de offentliga investeringarna inte br minska r att se till att EU-finansierade investeringar inte anvnds som ersttning fr nationellt finansierade investeringar.
A key eligibility criterion in order to qualify for use of the investment clause is that the Member State’s output gap must be more negative than -1.5% of GDP. 
Ett viktigt kriterium fr att en medlemsstat ska vara berttigad att anvnda investeringsklausulen r att medlemsstatens produktionsgap r mer negativt n Đ 1,5 % av BNP.
In other words, the Member State must be in bad economic times. 
Det mste med andra ord rda dliga ekonomiska tider i medlemsstaten.
Research shows that when countries face sustainability challenges in such circumstances, public investment is very often cut, with a detrimental impact on potential growth. 
Forskning visar att nr lnder har hllbarhetsproblem under sdana omstndigheter skrs ofta de offentliga investeringarna ned, vilket har en negativ inverkan p den potentiella tillvxten.
The investment clause seeks to ensure this does not happen, by requiring that the level of public investment does not decrease in the reference year for the application of the clause. 
Syftet med investeringsklausulen r att se till att detta inte intrffar, genom kravet att de offentliga investeringarna inte fr minska under referensret fr tillmpningen av klausulen.
A decrease in the nominal level of investment could still lead to an increase in the investment-to-GDP 8 ratio if the decrease in GDP growth (outside the control of the government) is starker than that in investment. 
En minskning av den nominella investeringsnivn kan fortfarande leda till en kning av investeringskvoten jmfrt med BNP om BNP-tillvxten minskar (utanfr regeringens kontroll) mer n investeringarna.
The intention of the investment clause is to lead to sustained levels of increased investment. 
Syftet med investeringsklausulen r att den ska leda till hllbara niver av kade investeringar.
In such cases, requiring a Member State to return to their original path a year after the granting of the clause would not be warranted. 
I sdana fall skulle det inte vara motiverat att krva att en medlemsstat ska terg till sin ursprungliga bana ett r efter beviljandet av klausulen.
See reply to paragraphs VII and 43. 
Se svaren p punkterna VII och 43.
Since the introduction of the matrix, it is not possible to assess in advance whether a Member State will achieve their MTO within the four-year timeframe (as this will be a function of, amongst other things, the requirements of the matrix for individual years). 
Sedan matrisen infrdes r det inte mjligt att p frhand bedma om en medlemsstat kommer att uppn sitt medelfristiga budgetml inom den fyrariga ramen (eftersom detta bland annat beror p matrisens krav fr individuella r).
Consequently, the Commission proposed to Member States a simplifying assumption to meet the MTO convergence criterion, instead assessing whether a Member State applying for use of the clause is within a maximum initial distance of 1.5% of GDP from the MTO. 
Kommissionen freslog drfr ett frenklat antagande fr att uppn konvergenskriteriet fr det medelfristiga budgetmlet fr medlemsstaterna, genom att i stllet bedma huruvida en medlemsstat som ansker om att f tillmpa klausulen befinner sig inom ett maximalt inledande avstnd p 1,5 % av BNP frn det medelfristiga budgetmlet.
Based on the benchmark adjustment of 0.5% of GDP per year and a maximum temporary deviation of this amount, this distance would deliver a return to the MTO within four years. 
Baserat p riktmrket p 0,5 % anpassning av BNP per r och en hgsta tillfllig avvikelse av den storleken, skulle detta avstnd innebra en tergng till det medelfristiga budgetmlet inom fyra r.
The non-significant deviation margin is contained in the Regulation and the Commission does not have a choice regarding its implementation. 
Marginalen fr ej betydande avvikelser freskrivs i frordningen, och kommissionen har inget val rrande dess tillmpning.
However, it is not necessarily the case that the significant deviation margin will unavoidably be exhausted in every year, i.e. "the extension in the convergence time will therefore be much longer." 
Marginalen fr betydande avvikelser behver dock inte ndvndigtvis uttmmas varje r, dvs. att Ófrlngningen av konvergenstiden kommer drfr att bli mycket lngreÓ.
For instance, according to the Commission’s Spring Forecast 2018, Finland is not projected to do so. 
Till exempel visar kommissionens vrprognos 2018 att Finland inte frvntas utnyttja denna mjlighet.
The application of the investment clause will, other things being equal, lead to an increase in overall spending compared to if the clause had not been applied. 
Tillmpningen av investeringsklausulen kommer, i vrigt lika frhllanden, att leda till en kning av de totala utgifterna jmfrt med om klausulen inte tillmpas.
However, the increase in spending is not regardless of what happens to the level of investment spending as a qualifying condition is that the level of public investment should not decline in the reference year for the application of the clause. 
Utgifterna kar dock inte oavsett vad som hnder med nivn p investeringsutgifterna, eftersom ett villkor fr tillmpningen av klausulen r att de offentliga investeringarna inte fr minska under referensret.
See replies to observation 43, 45 and 47. 
Se svaren p punkterna 43, 45 och 47.
While a cost-benefit analysis of major structural reforms is requested in the Stability and Convergence Programme under article 3, this does not mean that the temporary deviation has to be based on the costs. 
En kostnads-nyttoanalys av stora strukturreformer r visserligen ett krav fr stabilitets-och konvergensprogrammet enligt artikel 3, men detta innebr inte att tillflliga avvikelser mste baseras p kostnaderna.
Indeed, the relevant provisions of the so-called structural reform clause in Article 5 make no reference to costs. 
De relevanta bestmmelserna i artikel 5 i den s kallade strukturreformsklausulen innehller faktiskt ingen hnvisning till kostnader.
In addition, the fact that the temporary deviation is not directly based on costs, does not mean that costs are not measured. 
Det faktum att den tillflliga avvikelsen inte direkt baseras p kostnader innebr inte heller att kostnaderna inte mts.
In assessing whether the reforms have positive budgetary impacts, as required by the Regulation, the Commission considers the direct budgetary costs as well as the long-term impact on growth. 
Nr kommissionen bedmer om reformer har positiva budgetkonsekvenser, vilket r ett krav enligt frordningen, vervger den bde de direkta budgetkostnaderna och den lngsiktiga inverkan p tillvxten.
The Commission has consistently assessed the impact of all structural reforms in Italy, including those for which flexibility under the structural reforms clause had been asked, as indicated in the assessment of Italy's eligibility for the structural reforms clause (Staff working document on Italy's 2016 Stability Programme – page 18). 
Kommissionen har konsekvent bedmt effekten av alla strukturreformer i Italien, ven de reformer som landet hade begrt flexibilitet fr enligt strukturreformsklausulen, vilket anges i bedmningen av Italiens berttigande till strukturreformsklausulen (arbetsdokument frn kommissionens avdelningar om Italiens stabilitetsprogram 2016, s. 18).
In particular, Italy's 2017 and 2018 Country Reports provide an in-depth assessment of the state of play in terms of implementation of Italy's structural reforms. 
Landrapporterna fr Italien 2017 och 2018 innehller en djupgende bedmning av genomfrandelget fr Italiens strukturreformer.
In addition, a constant reference to the state of play in terms of implementation, both ex ante and ex post, was included in the Staff working documents on Italy's 2016 Draft Budgetary Plan (pages 22-23), on 2016 Stability Programme (pages 4 and following), and 2017 Draft Budgetary Plan (page 19), as well as in the 126(3) Report of February 2017 (pages 13-14). 
En konstant hnvisning till genomfrandelget, bde i frhand och i efterhand, finns dessutom med i arbetsdokumentet frn kommissionens avdelningar om Italiens utkast till budgetplan 2016 (s.22Đ23), om stabilitetsprogrammet 2016 (sidan4 och fljande sidor) och utkastet till budgetplan 2017 (s. 19) samt artikel 126.3-rapporten frn februari 2017 (s. 13Đ14).
As stated in reply to observation 49, the temporary deviation is not based upon the direct budgetary costs of the reforms. 
Ssom anges i svaret p iakttagelse 49 baseras den tillflliga avvikelsen inte p de direkta budgetkostnaderna fr reformerna.
Extensive details on the Commission's assessment of the long-term growth impact of the reforms are provided in reply to observation 54. 
Detaljerade uppgifter om kommissionens bedmning av reformernas lngsiktiga inverkan p tillvxten ges i svaret p iakttagelse 54.
The Commission considers that it estimated the economic impact related to the clause properly.. 
Kommissionen anser att den har uppskattat den ekonomiska inverkan med anknytning till klausulerna p ett tillrckligt stt.
At the time of Italy's application for the structural reform clause for 2016 (in the 2016 Draft Budgetary Plan and the 2016 Stability Programme) the Commission analysed the impact of Italy's structural reforms through its QUEST model in a note presented to the Economic Policy Committee of December 2015 (later published as "The Economic Impact of Selected Structural Reform Measures in Italy, France, Spain and Portugal" in April 2016). 
Vid tidpunkten fr Italiens anskan om strukturreformsklausulen fr 2016 (i utkastet till budgetplan 2016 och stabilitetsprogrammet 2016) analyserade kommissionen inverkan av Italiens strukturreformer med hjlp av sin Quest-modell i en skrivelse som lades fram fr kommittn fr ekonomisk politik i december 2015 (skrivelsen offentliggjordes senare som The Economic Impact of Selected Structural Reform Measures in Italy, France, Spain and Portugal i april 2016).
Hence, by the time of the 2016 Stability Programme, the Commission's estimates had been amply discussed with the Italian authorities. 
Vid tidpunkten fr stabilitetsprogrammet 2016 hade kommissionens uppskattningar drfr diskuterats utfrligt med de italienska myndigheterna.
Moreover, the Commission had openly challenged the initial estimation of the impact of reforms as proposed by the Italian authorities in its 126(3) Report of February 2015. 
Kommissionen hade dessutom ppet invnt mot den ursprungliga uppskattningen av reformernas inverkan som de italienska myndigheterna freslagit i sin artikel 126.3-rapport frn februari 2015.
As a result of those exchanges, the 2016 Stability Programme revised downwards the estimated impact of structural reforms for which flexibility had been asked (compared to the 2016 Draft Budgetary Plan), as acknowledged in footnote 26. 
Till fljd av dessa utbyten reviderades de uppskattade effekterna av de strukturreformer fr vilka flexibilitet hade begrts nedt i 2016 rs stabilitetsprogram (jmfrt med utkastet till budgetplan 2016), vilket bekrftas i fotnot 26.
This shows the relevance of the Commission's work to analyse the impact of reforms and verify the estimates presented by the authorities. 
Detta visar p relevansen av kommissionens arbete med att analysera reformernas inverkan och kontrollera de uppskattningar som lggs fram av myndigheterna.
As regards, the reportedly indicative nature of the estimates of the impact of structural reforms upon growth, this reflects the intrinsic limits of macroeconomic modelling. 
Nr det gller pstendet om att uppskattningarna av strukturreformernas inverkan p tillvxten endast r fingervisningar, avspeglar detta de makroekonomiska modellernas inneboende begrnsningar.
The Regulation requires the Commission to take account of the improvement to sustainability from structural reforms’ impact upon potential growth, but this is an inherently uncertain modelling exercise. 
I frordningen krvs att kommissionen beaktar frbttringar av hllbarheten till fljd av strukturreformers inverkan p den potentiella tillvxten, men sdana modeller r i sig oskra.
See replies to paragraphs 45, 47 and 48. 
Se svaren p punkterna 45, 47 och 48.
The preventive expenditure related to earthquakes in Italy was eligible, due to the reoccurrence of intense earthquakes as well as the integrated nature of emergency management and preventive expenditures. 
De frebyggande utgifterna i samband med jordbvningarna i Italien var berttigade p grund av de upprepade kraftiga jordbvningarna samt den integrerade karaktren hos krishanteringen och 10
As a result, around EUR 3 billion or 0.18% of GDP earmarked by the Italian government for this purpose in 2017 were considered eligible for the "unusual event clause". 
Till fljd av detta ansgs beloppet 3 miljoner euro eller 0,18 % av BNP, som ronmrkts av den italienska regeringen fr detta ndaml 2017, vara berttigat fr klausulen om ovanliga hndelser.
The budgetary impact of the investment plan has to be confirmed ex post, based on the relevant ex-ante and ex-post data provided to the Commission by the Italian authorities. 
Investeringsplanens budgetkonsekvenser mste bekrftas i efterhand, baserat p relevanta frhands-och efterhandsuppgifter som de italienska myndigheterna lmnat till kommissionen.
The Commission does not consider this to be a relaxation of the framework but rather a practical recognition of the realities of budgetary policy-making and setting at the Member State level. 
Kommissionen anser inte att detta r en lttnad avseende ramen, utan att det snarare avspeglar den praktiska realiteten i budgetpolitiken och faststllandet av budgetml ute i medlemsstaterna.
Member States need to be told in advance how large the required fiscal adjustment is in order to be able to factor it into their budgetary planning. 
Medlemsstaterna mste i frvg f reda p hur stora finanspolitiska korrigeringar som krvs fr att kunna vga in detta i sin budgetplanering.
This ex ante medium-term budgetary planning and coordination is in fact the raison d'être of the Stability and Convergence Programme process in the European Semester. 
Denna medelfristiga frhandsplanering och samordning av budgeten r i sjlva verket det huvudsakliga syftet med stabilitets-och konvergensprogrammen inom den europeiska planeringsterminen.
If the structural balance is revised so that the distance to the MTO is reduced to such an extent that the original requirement implies an over-achievement of the MTO, then the requirement is unfrozen and revised. 
Om de strukturella saldona revideras s att avstndet till det medelfristiga budgetmlet minskas i en sdan utstrckning att det ursprungliga kravet leder till att budgetmlet veruppfylls hvs frysningen av kravet och det granskas p nytt.
It is true that there is an asymmetry in this approach, as if the structural balance is revised downwards, i.e. to a distance further from the MTO than originally projected, then the Member State's requirement is not increased. 
Det r sant att det finns en asymmetri i metoden, eftersom medlemsstatens krav inte hjs om det strukturella saldot revideras nedt, dvs. till ett lngre avstnd frn det medelfristiga budgetmlet n den ursprungliga prognosen.
This is because it would violate the legitimate expectations that the Member State had regarding the required level of budgetary adjustment which has been requested by the Commission when the Member State was planning and agreeing its budgetary strategy. 
Detta beror p att principen om medlemsstatens berttigade frvntningar skulle sidosttas nr det gller den ndvndiga budgetanpassning som kommissionen krvde nr medlemsstaten planerade och enades om sin budgetstrategi.
Calculating the requirement based on the in-year distance to MTO is not only politically unrealistic but practically unworkable. 
Att berkna kravet baserat p det rliga avstndet till det medelfristiga budgetmlet r inte bara politiskt orealistiskt, utan ven praktiskt omjligt.
If in spring of t-1, a Member State is estimated to be at its MTO in t-1, then no further adjustment is necessary in year t, and the requirement for t will be frozen at zero. 
Om medlemsstaten under vren t-1 uppskattas att uppn sitt medelfristiga budgetml t-1, krvs inga ytterligare anpassningar under r t, och kravet fr t fryses till 0.
This provides the Member States with the necessary degree of certainty regarding the required level of adjustment to begin the 10 very extensive national procedures normally involved in building a budget. 
Detta ger medlemsstaten den ndvndiga graden av skerhet i frga om den ndvndiga anpassningsnivn, s att den kan inleda de mycket omfattande nationella frfaranden som vanligen krvs fr att ta fram en budget.