natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
24 More information on integrity pacts can be found on the Commission website at http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/how/improving-investment/integrity-pacts/. 
24 Mer information om integritetspakter finns p kommissionens webbplats http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/how/improving-investment/integrity-pacts/.
They rely instead on the internal controls and procedures that were already in place for 2007-2013 under a weaker control framework (see Figure 5). 
De frlitar sig i stllet p de interna kontroller och frfaranden som redan fanns fr 2007Đ2013 d kontrollramen var mycket svagare (se figur 5).
These are mainly on-the-spot checks (audits), internal fraud reporting mechanisms and, to a lesser extent, the identification of specific fraud indicators25 (red flags). 
Dessa bestr frmst av kontroller p plats (revisioner), interna mekanismer fr bedrgerirapportering och, i mindre utstrckning, identifiering av specifika bedrgeriindikatorer25 (rda flaggor).
Both through the survey and during our visits to Member States, we found very few additional ’proactive’ controls to detect fraud (e.g. specific checks for collusion in public procurement, such as the semantic analysis of bids received or the identification of abnormal bidding patterns). 
Bde genom vr enkt och vid vra besk i medlemsstater fann vi att det hade tillkommit mycket f nya proaktiva kontroller fr att upptcka bedrgeri (t.ex. specifika kontroller fr otillten samverkan vid offentlig upphandling, ssom semantisk analys av mottagna anbud eller identifiering av onormala anbudsmnster).
Practical problems limit the usefulness of fraud hotlines for whistleblowers 34 Our survey showed that managing authorities make little use of fraud hotlines for whistleblowers, even though they generally consider this tool to be an effective fraud detection method. 
Praktiska problem begrnsar nyttan med hjlplinjer fr visselblsare som slr larm om bedrgeri 34 Vr enkt visade att frvaltande myndigheter endast i liten utstrckning anvnder hjlplinjer fr visselblsare som slr larm om bedrgeri, ven om de i allmnhet anser att det r en effektiv metod fr att upptcka bedrgeri.
Fraud hotlines and other whistleblowing mechanisms allow managing authorities (and other relevant Member State authorities) to become aware of potential fraud that other controls have failed to detect26. 
Hjlplinjer och andra visselblsarmekanismer gr att frvaltande myndigheter (och andra berrda myndigheter i medlemsstaterna) kan f knnedom om potentiellt bedrgeri som andra kontroller inte har lyckats avslja26.
Various studies show that these methods are regarded as the most important source of fraud reports27. 
Olika studier visar att de hr metoderna ses som den viktigaste kllan till att bedrgeri rapporteras27.
During our visits, we assessed whistleblowing mechanisms and found a number of practical problems with their use. 
Under besken bedmde vi visselblsarmekanismer och fann ett antal praktiska problem med deras anvndning.
For example, they are not always anonymous and there is a risk of insufficient awareness of them among project beneficiaries and the general public. 
Till exempel r mekanismerna inte alltid anonyma och det finns risk fr att projektmottagare och allmnheten inte r tillrckligt medvetna om dem.
In the event of regulatory limitations on the use of anonymous denunciation channels, managing authorities and AFCOSs can always redirect anonymous whistleblowers to the fraud notification system put in place by OLAF28. 
Om det infrs lagstadgade begrnsningar fr anvndningen av anonyma angivelsekanaler kan frvaltande myndigheter och sambandscentraler alltid hnvisa anonyma visselblsare till det system fr att rapportera bedrgeri som Olaf har infrt28.
35 On 23 April 2018 the Commission proposed a Directive on the protection of whistleblowers. 
35 Den 23 april 2018 lade kommissionen fram ett frslag till direktiv om skydd av visselblsare.
This aimed to unify the different approaches currently applied by Member States and to increase the level of protection for people reporting on breaches of Union law, including all breaches affecting the EU`s financial interests. 
Syftet var att frena de olika synstt som fr nrvarande tillmpas av medlemsstaterna och att ka skyddet fr personer som rapporterar om brott mot unionslagstiftningen, dribland alla vertrdelser som pverkar EU:s finansiella intressen.
In our opinion on the proposal, issued on 15 October 2018, we stated our view that the introduction or expansion of whistleblowing arrangements in all Member States would help improve the management of EU policies through the actions of citizens and employees. 
I vrt yttrande ver frslaget, som lmnades den 15 oktober 2018, framfrde vi vr stndpunkt att infrandet eller utvidgningen av visselblsarsystem i alla medlemsstater skulle hjlpa till att frbttra frvaltningen av EU:s politik genom medborgares och anstlldas insatser.
However, we also highlighted some areas of concern, such as the overly complex material scope of the proposal, which could reduce the legal certainty for potential whistleblowers and thus deter them from reporting. 
Men vi pekade ven p ngra problematiska omrden, ssom den alltfr stora komplexiteten hos frslagets materiella tillmpningsomrde, som skulle kunna minska potentiella visselblsares rttsliga skerhet och drmed avskrcka dem frn att rapportera.
Other issues we raised were the lack of clear obligations regarding awareness-raising and staff training, and our conviction that people who have reported anonymously should not be denied 26 It is in the very nature of fraud against EU cohesion policy funds that perpetrators identify the limitations of existing controls and attempt to exploit them in order to obtain direct or indirect unlawful gains. 
Vi ppekade ven att det saknas tydliga skyldigheter avseende kunskapshjande tgrder och utbildning av 26 Typiskt fr bedrgeri riktat mot EU:s sammanhllningspolitiska medel r att frvare identifierar de befintliga kontrollernas begrnsningar och frsker utnyttja dem fr att uppn direkt eller indirekt olovlig vinning.
27 In particular ‘Report to the Nations’, the 2018 global study on occupational fraud and abuse published by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE). 
27 I synnerhet den globala studien frn 2018 om yrkesrelaterat bedrgeri och missbruk Report to the Nations (rapport till nationerna) som offentliggjorts av Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE).
According to this study, fraud is mainly detected through tip-offs, whether from employees, customers, competitors or anonymous sources. 
Enligt studien upptcks bedrgeri framfr allt genom tips frn anstllda, kunder, konkurrenter eller anonyma kllor.
28 The “Report fraud” tool at https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/olaf-and-you/report-fraud_en. 25 
28 Verktyget fr att rapportera bedrgeri finns p https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/olaf-and-you/report-fraud_sv.
whistleblower protection if their identity is subsequently revealed29. 
personalen och framfrde vr bestmda sikt att personer som har rapporterat anonymt inte ska nekas skydd fr visselblsare om deras identitet senare avsljas29.
In relation to the adoption of this Directive, the European Parliament and the Member States reached on 12 March 2019 a provisional agreement on the new rules that would guarantee protection for whistleblowers who report breaches of EU law30. 
I samband med att direktivet antogs ndde Europaparlamentet och medlemsstaterna den 12 mars 2019 en provisorisk verenskommelse om nya regler som ska skydda visselblsare som avsljar vertrdelser av EU-lagstiftningen30.
Data analytics is under-used for fraud detection 36 The Commission encourages managing authorities to use data analytics proactively to detect potentially high-risk situations, identify red flags and refine the aim of measures to combat fraud. 
Dataanalys utnyttjas inte tillrckligt fr att upptcka bedrgeri 36 Kommissionen uppmanar frvaltande myndigheter att anvnda dataanalys proaktivt fr att upptcka potentiella hgrisksituationer, identifiera rda flaggor och finjustera bedrgeribekmpningstgrdernas ml.
Data analytics should be a systematic part of project selection, management verifications and audits31. 
Dataanalys br vara en systematisk del av projekturval, frvaltningskontroller och revisioner31.
In the framework of the fight against fraud, the Commission offers a specific data-mining tool (Arachne) to help managing authorities identify projects that might be subject to risks of fraud. 
Inom ramen fr bedrgeribekmpningen erbjuder kommissionen ett srskilt datautvinningsverktyg (Arachne) fr att hjlpa frvaltande myndigheter att identifiera projekt dr det skulle kunna freligga bedrgeririsker.
According to the information we received from the Commission, in December 2018 Arachne was being used by 21 Member States for 165 OPs representing 54 % of all EU cohesion funding for 2014-2020 (excluding ETC). 
Enligt den information som vi ftt frn kommissionen anvndes Arachne i december 2018 av 21 medlemsstater fr 165 operativa program med motsvarande 54 % av EU:s totala sammanhllningsmedel fr 2014Đ2020 (exklusive Europeiskt territoriellt samarbete).
In our special report 01/2019: “Fighting fraud in EU spending: action needed”, we highlighted the importance of Arachne as a fraud prevention tool. 
I vr srskilda rapport nr 1/2019 Kampen mot bedrgerier i samband med EU-utgifter: mer behver gras lyfte vi fram Arachnes betydelse som ett verktyg fr att frebygga bedrgerier.
We have now assessed Arachne’s role as a data analytics tool for fraud detection. 
Vi har nu analyserat Arachnes roll som datautvinningsverktyg fr att upptcka bedrgeri.
37 One of the most significant observations arising from our audit work is that managing authorities do not sufficiently use data analytics for fraud detection. 
37 En av de viktigaste iakttagelserna frn vrt revisionsarbete r att frvaltande myndigheter inte tillrckligt utnyttjar dataanalys fr att upptcka bedrgeri.
Our survey showed that only one in every two managing authorities uses data analytics tools in this way (see Figure 5). 
Vr enkt visade att endast en av tv frvaltande myndigheter anvnder dataanalysverktyg p detta stt (se figur 5).
Arachne in particular is under-used. In the Member States we visited we found that: o One Member State (Greece) has not provided any information as to whether or not Arachne will be introduced in the near future. 
I de medlemsstater som vi beskte fann vi fljande: o En medlemsstat (Grekland) har inte lmnat ngon information om huruvida Arachne kommer att infras inom en snar framtid eller inte.
29 Paragraphs 3, 12, 21, 23 and 32 of ECA Opinion No 4/2018 concerning the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law. 
De frvaltande 29 Punkterna 3, 12, 21, 23 och 32 i revisionsrttens yttrande nr 4/2018 ver frslaget till Europaparlamentets och rdets direktiv om skydd fr personer som rapporterar om vertrdelser av unionsrtten.
30 See Commission’s press release IP/19/1604 “European Commission welcomes provisional agreement to better protect whistleblowers across the EU” (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1604_en.htm). 31 Commission’s guidance for Member States and programme authorities on fraud risk assessment and effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures (EGESIF 14-0021). 
30 Se kommissionens pressmeddelande IP/19/1604 EU-kommissionen vlkomnar den provisoriska verenskommelsen fr bttre skydd av visselblsare i EU (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1604_sv.htm) 31 Kommissionens vgledning fr medlemsstater och programmyndigheter om bedmning av risken fr bedrgerier samt effektiva och proportionella bestmmelser om bedrgeribekmpning (EGESIF 14-0021).
26 o In four of the remaining six Member States, even where they have decided to use Arachne the managing authorities have made little progress on uploading the necessary operational data or using the tool for their internal controls. o The Arachne Charter allows access only to managing authorities, certifying authorities and audit authorities. 
29 dataanalysverktyg som skulle kunna anvndas fr alla operativa program i landet. o Ocks i de fall d man beslutat att anvnda Arachne har de frvaltande myndigheterna i fyra av de sex resterande medlemsstaterna gjort sm framsteg nr det gller att ladda upp ndvndiga operativa data eller anvnda verktyget fr sina interna kontroller. o Enligt stadgan om Arachne har endast frvaltande myndigheter, attesterande myndigheter och revisionsmyndigheter tillgng till verktyget.
Thus, Arachne cannot be automatically used by investigative bodies. 
Arachne kan allts inte automatiskt anvndas av utredningsorgan.
We also found that, in two of the Member States we visited, managing authorities which have fully incorporated Arachne into their management procedures have used the tool to help them to adapt their specific anti-fraud measures to high-risk beneficiaries. 
I tv av de medlemsstater som vi beskte fann vi ocks att de frvaltande myndigheterna fullt ut hade infrt Arachne i sina frvaltningsfrfaranden och anvnt verktyget som en hjlp fr att anpassa sina specifika bestmmelser om bedrgeribekmpning till stdmottagare med hg risk.
38 We did not obtain any convincing explanation as to why managing authorities were not making full use of the tool, which the Commission makes available free of charge. 
38 Vi fick ingen vertygande frklaring till varfr frvaltande myndigheter inte fullt ut utnyttjade verktyget, som kommissionen tillhandahller utan kostnad.
However, the Commission’s own November 2018 study (see paragraph 24 and Box 1) concluded that managing authorities consider that, its current form, Arachne does not entirely meet their needs. 
I kommissionens egen studie frn november 2018 (se punkt 24 och ruta 1) var dock slutsatsen att frvaltande myndigheter anser att Arachne i sin nuvarande form inte helt uppfyller deras behov.
The authors of the study found this particularly worrying, as the usefulness of Arachne is largely perceived to depend on the number of OPs feeding information into the tool32. 
Frfattarna till studien ansg att detta var srskilt bekymmersamt eftersom nyttan med Arachne i stor utstrckning anses avgras av antalet operativa program som lgger in information i verktyget32.
39 Nevertheless, during our visits we were able to identify some examples of good practice where Member State authorities had developed data analytics tools to help with the identification of potential fraud risks (see Box 3). 27 32 Page 51 of DG REGIO’s study “Preventing fraud and corruption in the European Structural and Investment Funds – taking stock of practices in the EU Member States”. 
39 Trots det kunde vi vid besken identifiera ngra exempel p god praxis dr medlemsstaternas myndigheter hade utarbetat dataanalysverktyg som hjlper till att identifiera potentiella bedrgeririsker (se ruta 3). myndigheterna i Grekland har dock inte infrt ngot motsvarande 32 GD Regional-och stadspolitiks studie Preventing fraud and corruption in the European Structural and Investment Funds Đ taking stock of practices in the EU Member States (frebyggande av bedrgeri och korruption i de europeiska struktur-och investeringsfonderna Đ en inventering av praxis i EU:s medlemsstater), s. 51.
28 Box 3 Good practices in data analytics by Member States We identified the following data analytics tools that are used directly to detect potential fraud in the use of EU Cohesion funding: o In Romania, the National Integrity Agency has developed an IT system (’PREVENT’) that compares the public procurement information provided by contracting authorities and bidders with information from other national databases (e.g. the trade register). 
30 Ruta 3 God praxis fr dataanalys i medlemsstater Vi identifierade fljande dataanalysverktyg som anvnds just fr att upptcka potentiellt bedrgeri vid anvndning av EU:s sammanhllningsmedel: o I Rumnien har den nationella integritetsbyrn utarbetat ett it-system (PREVENT) dr informationen om offentlig upphandling frn upphandlande myndigheter och anbudsgivare jmfrs med information frn andra nationella databaser (t.ex. handelsregistret).
Use of the system in connection with 839 public procurement procedures financed by the EU enabled the Agency to issue 42 integrity warnings for correction or investigation. o In Spain, the intermediate body responsible for implementing a large part of the OP ’Comunidad Valenciana’, in cooperation with higher education institutions, has developed a rapid alert IT system (‘SALER’) combining four separate national and regional databases in order to identify fraud risks. 
Genom att systemet anvndes vid 839 frfaranden fr offentlig upphandling som finansierades av EU kunde byrn utfrda 42 integritetsvarningar om korrigering eller utredning. o I Spanien har det frmedlande organ som ansvarar fr genomfrandet av en stor del av det operativa programmet Comunidad Valenciana, tillsammans med institutioner fr hgre utbildning, utarbetat ett it-system fr snabb varning (SALER) dr fyra separata nationella och regionala databaser kombineras fr att identifiera bedrgeririsker.
These should include specific arrangements for reporting what anti-fraud measures have been set up and how they are applied. 
Frfarandena ska omfatta specifika arrangemang fr rapportering av vilka bedrgeribekmpningstgrder som har infrts och hur de tillmpas.
Member States and managing authorities should use the results of monitoring to evaluate the measures’ effectiveness and rework their anti-fraud strategies and policies as necessary. 
Medlemsstater och frvaltande myndigheter br anvnda vervakningsresultaten fr att utvrdera tgrdernas effektivitet och vid behov omarbeta sin strategi och policy fr bedrgeribekmpning.
41 Except in Latvia, we found that none of the managing authorities we visited examines the effectiveness of fraud prevention and detection measures. 
41 Med undantag fr Lettland fann vi att ingen av de frvaltande myndigheter som vi beskte undersker om tgrderna fr att frebygga och upptcka bedrgeri r effektiva.
They keep limited records of which measures are used and seldom link them to specific results. 
Deras register ver vilka tgrder som anvnds r begrnsade, och tgrderna r sllan kopplade till specifika resultat.
Consequently, anti-fraud systems are not evaluated in terms of their actual results – either by managing authorities or by any other programme authority (e.g. the audit authority) or the AFCOS. 
Fljaktligen utvrderas bedrgeribekmpningssystem inte i frhllande till sina faktiska resultat Đ varken av frvaltande myndigheter eller ngon annan programmyndighet (t.ex. revisionsmyndigheten) eller sambandscentralerna.
Similar levels of fraud reported for the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 programming periods 42 Managing authorities and other Member State bodies report fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities to the Commission through the IMS. 
Liknande bedrgeriniver har anmlts fr programperioderna 2007Đ2013 och 2014Đ 2020 42 Frvaltande myndigheter och andra organ i medlemsstaterna anmler oriktigheter med och utan misstanke om bedrgeri till kommissionen via IMS.
As of December 2018, Member States (mainly managing and audit authorities) had reported a total of 1 925 and 155 irregularities as fraudulent, respectively, for the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 programming periods. 
Fram till december 2018 hade medlemsstaterna (frmst frvaltande myndigheter och revisionsmyndigheter) anmlt totalt 1 925 respektive 155 oriktigheter med misstanke om bedrgeri fr programperioderna 2007Đ2013 och 2014Đ2020.
These concerned suspected and established fraud cases potentially affecting €1.6 billion (2007-2013) and €0.7 billion (2014-2020) in EU funds. 
Oriktigheterna gllde misstnkta och konstaterade bedrgerifall som skulle kunna pverka 1,6 miljarder euro (2007Đ2013) respektive 0,7 miljarder euro (2014Đ2020) av EU:s medel.
43 Figure 6 charts the evolution in the number and value of irregularities reported in the IMS for the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 programming periods. 
43 I figur 6 visas hur antalet och vrdet av de oriktigheter som anmlts i IMS utvecklades under programperioderna 2007Đ2013 och 2014Đ2020.
So far, 155 irregularities have been reported as fraudulent for 2014-2020 – 10 % fewer than at the same stage in the 2007-2013 period (174). 
Hittills har 155 oriktigheter med misstanke om bedrgeri anmlts fr 2014Đ2020, vilket r 10 % frre n vid motsvarande tidpunkt under programperioden 2007Đ2013 (174).
In financial terms the situation is rather different: the potential impact of reported fraud on EU cohesion policy funds in the 2014-2020 programming period (€0.7 billion) is more than three times higher than at the same stage of the previous period (€0.2 billion). 
I ekonomiska termer ser situationen annorlunda ut: den potentiella effekten av anmlt bedrgeri p EU:s sammanhllningspolitiska medel under programperioden 2014Đ2020 (0,7 miljarder euro) r mer n tre gnger s hg som vid samma tidpunkt fregende period (0,2 miljarder euro).
However, this significant increase is the result of two separate cases of suspected fraud that we consider to be data outliers33. 
Den stora kningen beror emellertid p tv separata fall av misstnkt bedrgeri som vi anser vara avvikande vrden33.
29 33 The two irregularities were reported by Slovakia and are worth close to €0.6 billion. 
31 33 De tv oriktigheterna anmldes av Slovakien och r vrda nrmare 0,6 miljarder euro.
By definition, they are at an early stage in the fraud management process and may yet evolve significantly. 
Per definition befinner de sig i ett tidigt skede av bedrgerifrvaltningsprocessen och kan komma att utvecklas betydligt.
Figure 6 – Evolution of irregularities reported as fraudulent 30 2 500 2 000 1 500 1 000 500 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 2007-2013 Year 5 Year 6 2014-2020 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 At the same stage of implementation, almost the same number of irregularities have been reported as fraudulent for 2014-2020 and for 2007-20 13 1 800 1 600 1 400 1 200 1 000 800 600 400 200 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 2007-2013 Year 5 Year 6 2014-2020 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 The value of EU funds involved is far higher for 2014-2020 than at the same stage during 2007-2013 Source: ECA, based on IMS data EU funds affected by irregularities (millioneuro) Irregularities reported as fraudulent (number) 
Figur 6 Đ Utveckling av anmlda oriktigheter med misstanke om bedrgeri 32 2 500 2 000 1 500 1 000 500 0 r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4 2007Đ2013 r 5 r 6 2014Đ2020 r 7 r 8 r 9 I samma skede av genomfrandet har nstan samma antal oriktigheter med misstanke om bedrgeri anmlts fr 2014Đ2020 som fr 2007Đ2013 1 800 1 600 1 400 1 200 1 000 800 600 400 200 0 r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4 2007Đ2013 r 5 r 6 2014Đ2020 r 7 r 8 r 9 Vrdet av de EU-medel som berrs r mycket hgre fr 2014Đ2020 n i samma skede under 2007Đ2013 Klla: Revisionsrtten p grundval av data frn IMS.
Most fraud cases reported to the Commission are detected through on-the-spot checks or revealed by investigative and prosecution bodies or the media 44 The IMS contains a number of data fields that are to be used to characterise irregularities and indicate the status of any proceedings. 
De flesta bedrgerirenden som anmls till kommissionen upptcks vid kontroller p plats eller avsljas av utrednings-och lagfringsorgan eller medier 44 IMS innehller ett antal dataflt som ska anvndas fr att karaktrisera oriktigheter och ange status p pgende frfaranden.
One of these fields is headed ‘source of the information leading to a suspicion of an irregularity’, which represents the method of detection. 
Ett av flten har rubriken Óinformationsklla som lett till misstanken om oriktighetÓ, dr upptcktsmetoden ska anges.