natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
After the original contracts with trainers expired, the national authorities did not facilitate new arrangements for providing the ITSF with trainers. 
Efter det att de ursprungliga kontrakten med utbildarna hade lpt ut gjorde de nationella myndigheterna ingenting fr att det skulle bli lttare fr ITSF att f tillgng till nya utbildare.
Neither the national authorities nor the Commission have provided financial support to meet the shortfall in trainers. 
Varken de nationella myndigheterna eller kommissionen har gett ekonomiskt std fr att tgrda bristen p utbildare.
Another reason was that the national authorities did not formally centralise training on IPA in the ITSF, so much training continues to take place at the individual line ministries (see photo). 
Ett annat skl var att de nationella myndigheterna inte formellt centraliserade IPA-utbildningen inom ITSF, vilket innebr att en stor del av utbildningen fortstter att ges vid de enskilda ansvariga ministerierna (se fotot).
Observations 22 Project 16 delivered training for staff measuring air quality but did not address the main obstacle to a fully operational air quality monitoring system, which is the lack of capacity in terms of functioning equipment. 
Iakttagelser 22 Projekt 16 gav utbildning till personal som mter luftkvaliteten men tgrdade inte det strsta hindret fr ett fullt fungerande system fr vervakning av luftkvaliteten, som r den bristande kapaciteten i frga om fungerande utrustning.
In addition, the calibration laboratory assisted under the project has not yet been accredited or staffed. 
Dessutom har det kalibreringslaboratorium som fick std inom projektet nnu inte ackrediterats eller bemannats.
Project 17 delivered a means of enforcing the ‘polluter pays’ principle and strengthening the capacity to do so, but this has not yet been implemented by the national authorities. 
Projekt 17 tillhandahll en metod fr att se till att principen att frorenaren betalar efterlevs och strka kapaciteten att gra det, men den har nnu inte satts i verket av de nationella myndigheterna.
The same project prepared for the introduction of tariffs to ensure the sustainability of waste treatment plants, but the country has still not set up a regulatory body to enforce tariffs. 
Samma projekt frberedde infrandet av avgifter fr att garantera avfallshanteringsanlggningarnas hllbarhet, men landet har nnu inte inrttat ett regleringsorgan som ser till att avgifterna betalas.
The project had not produced a sustainable impact by the time of the audit. 
Projektet hade inte ftt ngon hllbar effekt nr vi genomfrde revisionen.
40 Many of the audited projects did not achieve an impact because of obstacles that arose from inflexibilities in the structure and organisation of the public administration. 
40 Mnga av de granskade projekten fick ingen effekt p grund av de hinder som uppstod till fljd av stela strukturer och en stel organisation i den offentliga frvaltningen.
For example, in some of projects involving contracting authorities, we found that there was not enough flexibility between ministries to allow exchanges of staff and experience. 
I en del projekt dr till exempel upphandlande myndigheter deltog konstaterade vi att det inte gick att gra personal-och erfarenhetsutbyten mellan ministerierna p grund av bristande flexibilitet.
In addition, administrative staff trained by three of the audited projects to train other staff were frequently not released to run courses and the activity of training other staff was not compensated in any way. 
Dessutom hnde det ofta att den administrativa personal som ftt utbildning genom tre av de granskade projekten fr att utbilda annan personal inte fick ledigt fr att ge kurser, och verksamhet av det slaget kompenserades inte p ngot stt.
For over half of the audited projects we found that trained staff were not always encouraged or permitted to use the skills obtained and excessive rotation of staff and high turnover led to a lack of qualified staff. 
Nr det gller mer n hlften av de granskade projekten konstaterade vi att den personal som ftt utbildning inte alltid uppmuntrades eller tillts att anvnda de frdigheter som de hade frvrvat, och en verdriven rotation av personal och stor personalomsttning ledde till en brist p kvalificerad personal.
Observations 23 Obstacles to progress on strengthening administrative capacity 41 The Commission did not have an overall strategy of support for strengthening administrative capacity in the country, and the audited projects did not always fit together as part of a coherent, cohesive and coordinated approach. 
Iakttagelser 23 Hinder som gjorde att den administrativa kapaciteten inte kunde strkas 41 Kommissionen hade ingen vergripande strategi fr stdet till att strka den administrativa kapaciteten i landet, och de granskade projekten passade inte alltid ihop som en del av en enhetlig, sammanhllen och samordnad metod.
Some projects did not follow on from previous assistance in the same sector and were not adequately followed up with further support. 
En del projekt byggde inte vidare p tidigare std inom samma sektor och fljdes inte upp tillrckligt med ytterligare std.
Often the reason for this was the fact that the Commission has to make choices about the limited resources available for a wide range of EU policies in the country. 
Ofta berodde det p att kommissionen tvingades gra vissa val p grund av de begrnsade resurser som fanns tillgngliga fr en mngd olika EU-politikomrden i landet.
In addition, individual projects were often very ambitious and had numerous objectives. 
Dessutom var enskilda projekt ofta mycket ambitisa och hade tskilliga ml.
42 The objectives of IPA assistance were also hampered by the fact that the assistance was not sufficiently responsive, flexible and targeted. 
42 IPA-stdets ml hindrades ocks av att stdet inte var tillrckligt tillgngligt, flexibelt och mlinriktat.
For example, the impact of the audited projects was often weakened because the time taken between establishing the need for assistance and the delivery of results was 4 years or more. 
Till exempel frsvagades ofta de granskade projektens effekter av att det tog minst fyra r frn det att behovet av std faststlldes tills resultat levererades.
In some cases needs had changed before results were delivered. 
I vissa fall hade behoven ndrats innan resultaten levererades.
This was partly due to the lengthy process of mobilising IPA funds. 
Det berodde delvis p den lngdragna processen fr att mobilisera IPA-medel.
It was also because when projects were selected they were not always sufficiently mature, which lowered the efficiency of implementation. 
Det berodde ocks p att projekten inte alltid var tillrckligt mogna nr de valdes ut, vilket gjorde genomfrandet mindre effektivt.
43 Under IPA I the Commission did not have at its disposal funds which it could mobilise quickly to address issues as they arose. 
43 Inom IPA I hade kommissionen inte tillgng till medel som den kunde mobilisera snabbt fr att tgrda problem allteftersom de uppkom.
An example of how funds can be used in this way emerged during the recent political crisis. 
Ett exempel p hur medel kan anvndas p detta stt kom under den politiska krisen p senare tid.
The Commission successfully employed funds at short notice and in exceptional circumstances to provide flexible, targeted, fast-track expert input to support urgent and sensitive policy priorities. 
Kommissionen lyckades f fram medel med kort varsel och under exceptionella omstndigheter och kunde ge ett flexibelt, mlinriktat och omedelbart expert-std till brdskande och knsliga politiska prioriteringar.
Observations 24 44 The continued existence of obstacles to improving administrative capacity in the country meant that the objectives of pre-accession assistance were not always achieved. 
Iakttagelser 24 44 De fortsatta hindren fr att strka den administrativa kapaciteten i landet innebar att franslutningsstdets ml inte alltid uppnddes.
A major issue has been the lack of high-level political will and commitment by the national authorities to support for IPA projects. 
Ett stort problem har varit att det saknas politisk vilja p hg niv och ett politiskt tagande att stdja IPA-projekt frn de nationella myndigheternas sida.
For example, at a political level, there is continued resistance to moves to develop a public administration that is independent, strong and representative (see Box 4). 
P politisk niv r man till exempel fortfarande ovillig att utveckla en offentlig frvaltning som r oberoende, stark och representativ (se ruta 4).
Resistance to developing a public administration that is independent, strong and representative With the support of the Commission, in February 2015 the country put in place a new legal framework for a professional public service. 
Ovilja att utveckla en offentlig frvaltning som r oberoende, stark och representativ Med kommissionens std infrde landet i februari 2015 en ny rttslig ram fr en professionell offentlig frvaltning.
The main thrust of the legislation was to ensure that recruitment of public employees is based on merit and equal treatment. 
Den frmsta drivkraften bakom lagstiftningen var att garantera att rekryteringen av offentliganstllda grundas p meriter och likabehandling.
While it still suffers from some gaps, the legislation represents a major step towards developing a strong, independent, professional civil service. 
Lagstiftningen har fortfarande vissa luckor men innebr ett stort steg framt fr utvecklingen av en stark, oberoende och professionell offentlig frvaltning.
Two days before the law entered into force, the parliament adopted a new law on transformation of temporary positions into permanent contracts. 
Tv dagar innan lagen trdde i kraft antog parlamentet en ny lag som omvandlade tillflliga tjnster till fasta tjnster.
This law circumvents the principles of merit-based recruitment and has allowed thousands of temporary staff to become permanent civil servants or public employees without open competition. 
Lagen kringgr principerna om en meritgrundad rekrytering och har gjort att tusentals tillflligt anstllda har blivit fasta tjnstemn eller offentliganstllda utan ngot allmnt uttagningsprov.
Project 7 trained 600 administrative officers who were among 2 400 staff recruited by the national authorities from the non-majority communities32 following the Ohrid Framework Agreement33 on equitable representation. 
Projekt 7 utbildade 600 administrativa tjnstemn som tillhrde de 2 400 anstllda som rekryterades av de nationella myndigheterna frn minoritetsgrupper32 enligt Ohrid-ramavtalet33 om en rttvis representation.
The aim of providing this training was to increase the likelihood that the participants would be offered posts. 
Syftet med utbildningen var att ka sannolikheten fr att deltagarna skulle erbjudas en tjnst.
At the time of the audit, the majority of the staff trained under the project were still being paid but not actively employed. 
Nr vi genomfrde revisionen fick de flesta anstllda som hade ftt utbildning inom projektet fortfarande ln men de var inte i aktiv tjnst.
The objective of achieving equitable representation in the public administration had not been met. 
Mlet att uppn en rttvis representation inom den offentliga frvaltningen uppnddes inte.
32 Ethnic Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Roma, etc. 
32 Etniska albaner, serber, turkar, romer m.fl.
33 The Ohrid Framework Agreement was a peace deal signed by the government and representatives of the ethnic Albanian community on 13 August 2001. 
33 Ohrid-ramavtalet var ett fredsavtal som regeringen och fretrdare fr den etniska albanska gruppen undertecknade den 13 augusti 2001.
The agreement ended the armed conflict between the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army and the national security forces and set the groundwork for improving the rights of ethnic Albanians. 
I och med avtalet upphrde den vpnade konflikten mellan den etniska albanska nationella befrielsearmn och de nationella skerhetsstyrkorna och lades grunden fr strkta rttigheter fr de etniska albanerna.
Observations 25 Part II — The use of decentralised management as 45 We examined the introduction of decentralised management under IPA I and how the Commission resolved the issues which arose using this management mode. 
Iakttagelser 25 Del II Đ Att anvnda decentraliserad frvaltning till 45 Vi granskade hur den decentraliserade frvaltningen infrdes inom IPA I och hur kommissionen lste de problem som uppkom nr denna frvaltningsmetod anvndes.
We also examined whether the Commission’s use of decentralised management strengthened administrative capacity. 
Vi granskade ocks om kommissionens anvndning av decentraliserad frvaltning strkte den administrativa kapaciteten.
The country was not ready for the volume and complexity of IPA funds for which management was decentralised 46 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia asked the Commission to decentralise the management of IPA funds to the national authorities in 200834. By 2010, the country was responsible for contracting and implementing 470 million euros (76 %) of its total IPA I financial envelope, subject to either ex ante or ex post checks by the Commission. 
Landet var inte redo att hantera den mngd komplexa i IPA-medel med decentraliserad frvaltning 46 F.d. jugoslaviska republiken Makedonien bad kommissionen att decentralisera frvaltningen av IPA-medel till de nationella myndigheterna 200834. r 2010 ansvarade landet fr att upphandla och genomfra 470 miljoner euro (76 %) av den totala finansieringsramen fr IPA I, om inte annat fljde av kommissionens frhands-eller efterhandskontroller.
The national authorities were required to set up operating structures to manage the decentralised IPA funds. 
De nationella myndigheterna var skyldiga att inrtta verksamhetsstrukturer fr frvaltningen av de decentraliserade IPA-medlen.
47 The process of decentralisation was carried out in accordance with the regulations. 
47 Decentraliseringen gjordes i enlighet med de lagstadgade kraven.
However, the Commission was not required to assess whether the national authorities were ready to manage the volume and complexity of IPA funds to be decentralised. 
Men kommissionen var inte skyldig att bedma om de nationella myndigheterna var redo att frvalta den volym komplexa IPA-medel som skulle decentraliseras.
For the decentralised management mode to work effectively it is necessary for there to be sufficient capacity in the operating structures. 
Om metoden fr decentraliserad frvaltning ska fungera ndamlsenligt krvs det att verksamhetsstrukturerna har tillrcklig kapacitet.
48 Soon after decentralisation began, the national authorities were unable to respect the deadlines for presenting contract dossiers for ex ante checks by the Commission. 
48 Kort efter det att decentraliseringen brjade kunde de nationella myndigheterna inte hlla tidsfristerna fr att lmna kontraktshandlingarna fr frhandskontroller av kommissionen.
This was often because they submitted documents of insufficient quality which had to be returned. 
Det berodde ofta p att de lmnade in dokument av otillrcklig kvalitet som d mste skickas tillbaka.
This was the case for one third of these documents in 2014. 
S var det med en tredjedel av dokumenten 2014.
The rate of contracting slowed. 
Upphandlingstakten minskade.
By the end of 2014, the delays had led to the de-commitment35 of 70 million euros of funds under IPA I (11 % of the IPA funds allocated to the country), and 244 million euros remained to be committed (about 40 % of the total). 
Vid utgngen av 2014 hade frseningarna lett till att 70 miljoner euro inom IPA I (11 % av de IPA-medel som anslogs till landet) tertogs35 och att det fanns 244 miljoner euro att ing taganden fr (cirka 40 % av det totala beloppet).
In many cases the de-commitments resulted in the loss of projects designed to fund key reforms. 
I mnga fall ledde tertagandena till att projekt som skulle finansiera nyckelreformer inte blev av.
For example, 33 million euros was allocated for 2010, but the cancellation of 12 out of 31 projects presented for funding meant that 10 million euros (33 %) was effectively lost for funding reform in the country. 
Till exempel frdelades 33 miljoner euro fr 2010 men eftersom tolv av de 31 projekt som presenterats fr finansiering inte blev av gick 10 miljoner euro (33 %) i praktiken frlorade och kunde inte anvndas till att finansiera landets reform.
34 See articles 11 and 14 of Regulation (EC) No 718/2007. 
34 Se artiklarna 11 och 14 i frordning (EG) nr 718/2007.
35 The Commission de-commits funds committed for a project when they are not used by the deadline set. 
35 Kommissionen tertar medel som anslagits till ett projekt om de inte har anvnts fre den faststllda tidsfristen.
These funds are lost for the project concerned. a means of building capacity 
Medlen gr d frlorade fr det aktuella projektet. kapacitetsuppbyggnad
Observations 26 49 The Commission attributed the delays to a highly centralised decision-making process, which prevents timely decisions, as well as a lack of material resources and sufficient and sufficiently qualified staff, allegations of political interference in procurement and poor interinstitutional cooperation. 
Iakttagelser 26 49 Kommissionen ansg att frseningarna berodde p den hgst centraliserade beslutsprocessen, som frhindrar snabba beslut, och ven en brist p materiella resurser, personal och p tillrckligt kvalificerad personal, samt misstankar om politisk inblandning i upphandlingen och dligt interinstitutionellt samarbete.
Weaknesses of this type had already been highlighted by the Commission in the rest of the public administration before management had been decentralised. 
Brister av den hr typen hade kommissionen redan ptalat i frga om resten av den offentliga frvaltningen innan frvaltningen decentraliserades.
If the Commission had taken more account of weaknesses already identified in the public administration, it might have concluded that the decision to decentralise management should be delayed or that a smaller proportion of IPA funds should be decentralised within the constraints of the applicable regulations. 
Om kommissionen hade beaktat de brister som redan konstaterats i den offentliga frvaltningen bttre skulle den kanske ha kommit fram till att beslutet att decentralisera frvaltningen borde skjutas upp eller till att en mindre andel IPA-medel borde decentraliseras inom de begrnsningar som faststlls i gllande frordningar.
The Commission has taken action but further de-commitment is probable 50 Drawing on previous experience with other enlargement countries, the Commission expected the early years of decentralised management to be a period of learning and transfer of knowledge. 
Kommissionen har vidtagit tgrder men ytterligare medel kommer troligen att tertas 50 Utifrn erfarenheterna frn arbetet med andra utvidgningslnder utgick kommissionen frn att de frsta ren med decentraliserad frvaltning skulle bli en period av lrande och kunskapsverfring.
It worked with the country to address the reasons for the delays in contracting and implementing IPA funds. However, significant further de-commitment of IPA I funds was expected in 2015, 2016 and 2017. 
Den arbetade med landet fr att frska komma till rtta med orsakerna till frseningarna i upphandlingen och genomfrandet av IPA-medel. nd tror man att betydande IPA I-medel kommer att tertas 2015, 2016 och 2017.
51 In 2015 the Commission took measures to improve the situation for IPA I funds, for example by re-centralising the management of some IPA projects and speeding up contracting procedures by reducing the number of ex ante checks. 
51 r 2015 vidtog kommissionen tgrder fr att frbttra situationen nr det gllde IPA I-medel, till exempel genom att ter centralisera frvaltningen av en del IPA-projekt och pskynda upphandlingsfrfarandena genom att minska antalet frhandskontroller.
For IPA II, the Commission is currently assessing the optimum level of decentralisation and plans to be more selective regarding the kinds of project it will decentralise for management by the national authorities. 
Nr det gller IPA II hller kommissionen fr nrvarande p att bedma vad som r en optimal niv fr decentralisering och planerar att bli selektivare nr den vljer vilka typer av projekt som ska decentraliseras och frvaltas av de nationella myndigheterna.
Decentralising management could have been used more widely as a capacity-building tool for the public administration 52 When management was decentralised in 2010, the main objective was to prepare the country for the future management of the EU’s structural and agricultural funds. 
Decentralisering av frvaltningen kunde ha anvnts i strre omfattning som ett kapacitetsuppbyggnadsverktyg fr den offentliga frvaltningen 52 Nr frvaltningen decentraliserades 2010 var det frmsta mlet att frbereda landet fr den kommande frvaltningen av EU:s struktur-och jordbruksmedel.
The focus was therefore on setting up structures to operate decentralised management and strengthening the capacity of administrative staff to operate these structures. 
Man inriktade sig drfr p att inrtta strukturer fr en decentraliserad frvaltning och strka den administrativa personalens kapacitet att arbeta med dessa strukturer.
Observations 27 53 Decentralising management required significant investment of resources by the country as well as the Commission. 
Iakttagelser 27 53 Decentraliseringen av frvaltningen krvde stora investeringar i resurser av svl landet som av kommissionen.
For example, the country assigned 436 administrative staff to work in the operating structures, at an annual salary cost of 4.7 million euros (2014 figures). 
Landet avdelade till exempel 436 administrativt anstllda som skulle arbeta i verksamhetsstrukturerna till en rlig lnekostnad p 4,7 miljoner euro (uppgifter fr 2014).
Both the Commission and the country provided training in setting up operating structures and in programming, contracting and implementing IPA projects. 
Bde kommissionen och landet erbjd utbildning i hur man inrttar verksamhetsstrukturer och planerar, upphandlar och genomfr IPA-projekt.
54 Decentralised management has strengthened capacity in the operating structures. 
54 Den decentraliserade frvaltningen har strkt kapaciteten i verksamhetsstrukturerna.
Internal control is stronger and operational decisions are mostly taken at an appropriate level, with less political interference than in other parts of the public administration. 
Internkontrollen r starkare och de operativa besluten fattas fr det mesta p lmplig niv med mindre politisk inblandning n i andra delar av den offentliga frvaltningen.
Rigorous ex ante controls by the EU Delegation have provided further opportunity for ‘learning by doing’36. 
EU-delegationens strnga frhandskontroller har gett ytterligare mjlighet till lrande genom praktiskt arbete (learning by doing)36.
The operating structures have become ‘centres of excellence’ in terms of administrative capacity. 
Verksamhetsstrukturerna har blivit ÓkompetenscentrumÓ nr det handlar om administrativ kapacitet.
55 While strengthening administrative capacity was not included as an objective of decentralising management, the Commission could have made more use of the experience gained to encourage the national authorities to transfer knowledge to the rest of the public administration, for example through ‘learning by doing’. 
55 Strkandet av den administrativa kapaciteten var visserligen inte ett ml fr den decentraliserade frvaltningen, men kommissionen kunde ha utnyttjat sina erfarenheter och uppmuntrat de nationella myndigheterna att verfra kunskap till resten av den offentliga frvaltningen, till exempel genom lrande genom praktiskt arbete (learning by doing).
The operating structures for decentralised management were seen as organisations that were parallel to and even separate from the rest of the public administration. 
Verksamhetsstrukturerna fr decentraliserad frvaltning betraktades som parallella organisationer och ven skilda frn resten av den offentliga frvaltningen.