natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This exercise was all the more difficult as, unlike the practice at DG Competition and DG Trade (2), the Office provides only limited initial training to the investigators it recruits; (b) most of the temporary contracts now in progress will come to the end of their second and final three-year term between 2007 and 2009 (3). 
Detta var desto svrare eftersom byrn inte arbetar som Generaldirektoraten fr handel och konkurrens (2), utan endast ger en begrnsad inledande utbildning till de utredare man rekryterar. Fr flertalet av de nu gllande kontrakten p tillflliga tjnster avslutas den andra och sista trersperioden mellan 2007 och 2009 (3).
Since the staff members concerned will then have to leave the Office, there is a high risk that all this accumulated knowledge and experience will disappear within a short period. 64. Because of the complexity of the Community context, investigators are required to show versatility and adaptability. 
Eftersom de anstllda som berrs d mste lmna byrn r risken stor fr att man under en kort tidsperiod frlorar all samlad erfarenhet och inhmtat kunnande. b) 64. mste utredarna visa prov p mngsidighet och god anpassningsfrmga.
Since it is not easy to find this combination of qualities, this is a serious reason for giving greater priority to stability in recruitment and training programmes. 
Denna kombination av egenskaper r inte enkel att finna vilket r ett tungt skl fr att i framtiden ge hgre prioritet t stabilitet i rekryteringen och t utbildningsprogram.
That can be achieved gradually by converting some posts as future budgetary procedures permit. 
Detta kan genomfras successivt genom att tjnster omvandlas i kommande budgetfrfaranden.
At the same time, the administrations most exposed to the problems of fraud and the protection of the European UnionŐs financial interests should be encouraged to make available to the OfficeŐs analytical (intelligence) services a greater number of seconded national experts. 
Samtidigt br de frvaltningar som r mest utsatta fr problematiken med bedrgeri och skydd av gemenskapens ekonomiska intressen uppmanas att stlla fler utstationerade nationella experter till frfogande fr byrns analysenhet (underrttel-severksamhet).
A particular effort in this direction may be made as regards the services of Member States called on to collaborate with the Office. 
Srskilda insatser i denna riktning kan gras gentemot de avdelningar i medlemsstaterna som skall samarbeta med byrn.
(1) The number of permanent posts in categories A and B moreover increased from 107 in 1999 to 143 in 2000 and then was cut back to 109 in 2001. 
(1) Antalet fasta tjnster i kategorierna A och B kade fr vrigt frn 107 tjnster 1999 till 143 tjnster 2000 fr att sedan minska till 109 tjnster 2001.
(2) These Commission Directorates-General make considerable use of high-level investigative teams. 
(2) Dessa generaldirektorat vid kommissionen anlitar i stor utstrckning mycket hgt kvalificerade utredningsteam.
(3) In Special Report No 8/98 the Court had already indicated that the high proportion of temporary staff was leading to a lack of continuity in the organisation. 
(3) Redan i den srskilda rapporten nr 8/98 ppekade revisionsrtten att den hga andelen tillflligt anstllda ledde till brist p kontinuitet i organisationen.
C 202/14 EN Official Journal of the European Union 18.8.2005 THE SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE 66. The Supervisory Committee was established by OLAFŐs founding acts (1). ÔThrough its regular control of the implementation of investigations it strengthens the OfficeŐs independenceŐ (2). 
C 202/14 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 18.8.2005 VERVAKNINGSKOMMITTN 66. vervakningskommittn inrttades genom OLAF:s grundrttsakter (1). Ó[Kommittn] skall genom regelbunden kontroll av utredningsarbetet stdja byrns oberoendeÓ (2).
It was also supposed, in response to requests from the Director or on its own initiative, Ôto deliver opinions to the Director concerning the activities of the Office without, however, interfering with the conduct of investigations in progressŐ (2). 
Den skall ocks p begran av byrns direktr eller p eget initiativ Óavge yttranden om byrns verksamhet till direktren, dock utan att stra pgende utredningarÓ (2).
In practice, using recital 10 of Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 as a basis, the Committee has concentrated its attention on one of its own rules of procedure, under which it states that it will ensure that the Office respects the principles of individual rights and fundamental freedoms, particularly with regard to internal investigations (3). 
I praktiken har kommittn med hnvisning till skl 10 i frordning (EG) nr 1073/1999 i stor utstrckning koncentrerat sig p en bestmmelse i den egna arbetsordningen p grundval av vilken den preciserar att den skall se till att byrn respekterar de mnskliga rttigheterna och de grundlggande friheterna, srskilt nr det gller interna utredningar (3).
The Committee is required to be the guarantor of both the OfficeŐs independence and the rights of persons under investigation. 
Kommittn skall garantera bde byrns oberoende och rttigheterna fr dem som r freml fr utredning.
The legislation gives it no decision-taking power to do this. 
Lagstiftningen ger den ingen beslutsmakt fr att kunna gra detta.
By restricting its pronouncements to issues of principle, it is laying down a doctrine which has no real effects on investigations. 
Genom att endast uttala sig om principiella frgor utformar den en doktrin som inte har ngon direkt inverkan p utredningarna.
Finally, as the Committee cannot intervene during the course of investigations, it in no way constitutes a mechanism to monitor the legality of investigations while they are in progress. 
Eftersom den slutligen inte kan ingripa direkt under en utredning kan den inte p ngot stt vervaka att utredningstgrderna r lagliga medan de genomfrs.
With regard to monitoring the procedure followed in investigations, several recent cases demonstrate the existence of overlaps between the roles of the Supervisory Committee and the European Ombudsman. 
Nr det gller kontrollen av frfarandet fr utredningar visar flera nyligen intrffade fall att det frekommer verlappningar mellan vervakningskommittns och Europeiska ombudsmannens ingripanden.
For example, between September 2003 and May 2004, the Committee debated the OmbudsmanŐs interventions in connection with individual investigations by the Office during seven of its meetings. 
Slunda diskuterade kommittn mellan september 2003 och maj 2004 vid sju av sina sammantrden ombudsmannens ingripanden i samband med byrns enskilda utredningar.
Moreover, the Committee does not deal with complaints which persons under investigation address to the Director of the Office, who remains free to deal with them as he sees fit. 
Vidare behandlar inte kommittn klagoml som personer som utreds lmnar till byrns direktr, som fortfarande sjlv avgr vilken uppfljning han bedmer vara lmplig.
Whilst the Committee may not interfere in the management of the Office, that is, it may intervene neither in the OfficeŐs non-investigative activities nor in the conduct of investigations: (a) it must be informed of any investigations not completed within nine months of their start; in practice, when such information is communicated to the Committee it usually has no practical consequences; (1) Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom, Article 4. 
Samtidigt som kommittn inte skall lgga sig i byrns frvaltning, det vill sga den skall inte ingripa vare sig i de delar av byrns verksamhet som ligger utanfr utredningarna eller i hur utredningarna genomfrs, skall den dock a) underrttas om ej avslutade utredningar inom nio mnader frn det att de pbrjades; i praktiken leder denna information till kommittn oftast inte till ngra konkreta effekter, (1) Artikel 4 i rdets beslut 1999/352/EG, EKGS, Euratom.
(2) Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999, Article 11(1). 
(2) Artikel 11.1 i frordning (EG) nr 1073/1999.
Since the Director of the Office was appointed, his independence has never been under any real threat (12). 
Sedan byrns direktr utsgs har hans oberoende aldrig varit utsatt fr ngot egentligt hot (12).
In practice, the Committee has largely focused its attention on questions relating to the OfficeŐs observance of individual rights in internal investigations and has deplored the absence of a code of procedure to give a firm framework for investigative actions. 
Kommittn har i praktiken koncentrerat sin uppmrksamhet p frgor som rr byrns respekt fr de mnskliga rttigheterna i samband med interna utredningar och har beklagat att det saknas en frfarandekod som skulle ge en fast ram fr utredningstgrderna.
Following the policy adopted by the Office, the Supervisory Committee has given priority to the criminal destination of internal investigations, to the detriment of external investigations, in spite of the fact that fighting fraud against the CommunitiesŐ financial interests goes well beyond the confines of the institutions, and that numerous frauds are committed without any (4) Consultation of the Committee by the Director under Article 6(2) of Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom, which does not require a formal opinion. 
Enligt den policy byrn antagit har vervakningskommittn prioriterat det straffrttsliga mlet i interna utredningar p bekostnad av externa utredningar trots att bedrgeribekmpning som gller gemenskapens ekonomiska intressen strcker sig lngt utanfr institutionerna och att mnga bedrgerier begs utan (4) I enlighet med artikel 6.2 i kommissionens beslut 1999/352/EG, EKSG, Euratom skall direktren samrda med kommittn, det krvs inget formellt yttrande.
(5) Whilst Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 says that the Committee must be informed of cases which the Director of the Office transfers to the judicial authorities but does not specify when this information is to be given, the CommitteeŐs Rules of Procedure (Article 22(5)) establish the principle of information in advance. 
(5) I frordning (EG) nr 1073/1999 anges att byrns direktr skall informera om fall som verfrs till rttsliga myndigheter utan att det preciseras nr detta skall ske, medan kommittns interna bestmmelser (artikel 22.5) anger principen om frhandsunderrttelse.
(6) Article 22(6). 
(6) Artikel 22.6.
(7) Article 22(7). 
(7) Artikel 22.7.
(8) Article 3(b). 
(8) Artikel 3 b.
(9) Articles 4(5), 19(7) and 25. 
(9) Artikel 4.5, artikel 19.7 och artikel 25.
(10) Articles 19(1) and 19(2). 
(10) Artikel 19.1 och 19.2.
(11) Article 19(4). 
(11) Artikel 19.4.
(12) Even at the height of the Eurostat crisis in 2003, the Commission was careful not to interfere in the conduct of investigations. 
(12) Till och med nr Eurostataffren var som besvrligast 2003 sg kommissionen till att inte blanda sig i hur utredningarna genomfrdes.
18.8.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 202/15 collusion with staff from the institutions or its related bodies. 
18.8.2005 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 202/15 ngon som helst medhjlp frn anstllda vid institutionerna eller organ som r knutna till dem.
Though Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 require that Ôthe institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall forward to the Office without delay any information relating to possible cases of fraud or corruptionŐ and that ÔMember States shall also send ... any other document or information considered pertinent ... relating to the fight against fraud ... and any other illegal activity affecting the CommunitiesŐ financial interestsŐ, the Supervisory Committee has never studied the conditions in which the agencies or Member States have discharged this duty, although it is essential to the OfficeŐs investigative activities (1). 
I artikel 7.1 och 7.3 i frordning (EG) nr 1073/1999 sgs att Óinstitutioner, organ och byrer skall utan drjsml till byrn verlmna alla uppgifter som kan ha samband med eventuella fall av bedrgeri [eller] korruptionÓ och att Ó[medlemsstaterna,] i den mn den nationella lagstiftningen tillter detta, (...) till byrn [skall] verlmna alla (...) relevanta handlingar och uppgifter (...) som rr bekmpningen av bedrgerier (...) och annan olaglig verksamhet som riktar sig mot gemenskapernas ekonomiska intressenÓ. vervakningskommittn har dock aldrig underskt hur organen eller medlemsstaterna fullgr detta tagande trots att det r grundlggande fr byrns utredningsverksamhet (1).
The number of files examined recently was 17 (2) in 2003 and seven in the first six months of 2004. 
Antalet nyligen underskta renden var 17 (2) under 2003 och 7 under det frsta halvret 2004.
These examinations are the subject of detailed evaluation records which often include pertinent recommendations or important matters of principle. 
Underskningarna dokumenteras i utfrliga utvrderingsrapporter som ofta ger relevanta rekommendationer eller behandlar viktiga principiella frgor.
These records are not communicated to the Office. 
Dessa rapporter verlmnas inte till byrn.
An attitude of greater openness would not only benefit relations between services but would also allow all parties to benefit from best practice, which would thus contribute to strengthening the investigative function. 
En mer ppen attityd skulle inte endast vara till nytta fr relationerna mellan avdelningarna utan ven gra det mjligt att ta tillvara de bsta arbetsmetoderna vilket skulle frstrka utredningsarbetet.
The Office undertook substantial reorganisation measures in November 2003. 
Byrn genomfrde i november 2003 en omfattande omorganisation.
At the time of the audit, it was evident that at the beginning of 2004 it was still engaged in clearing the burden of the past inherited from UCLAF, its predecessor, and that the new measures were just beginning to have an effect (see paragraph 10). 
Vid granskningen framkom att man i brjan av 2004 fortfarande var upptagen med att reda ut det tunga arv som lmnats av fretrdaren UCLAF och att de nya tgrderna just brjade ge effekt (se punkt 10).
Efficiency and effectiveness of investigations 74. 
Utredningarnas effektivitet och ndamlsenlighet 74.
The OfficeŐs investigations policy is still uncertain, whether with regard to the question of acting on its own initiative, the management of priorities, procedures for collaboration with the authorities of Member States or checking deadlines. 
Byrns utredningspolicy r fortfarande oklar nr det gller frgan om att agera p eget initiativ, hur man prioriterar, formerna fr samarbete med myndigheter i medlemsstaterna och kontrollen av tidsfrister.
Similarly, guidelines on the results to be achieved are still vague because the disciplinary or financial aspects may be overlooked in favour of judicial processes, the outcome of which is often remote and uncertain (see paragraphs 19, 20 and 25). 
P samma stt r riktlinjerna fr vilka resultat som skall uppns fortfarande vaga eftersom det kan intrffa att ekonomiska eller disciplinra aspekter frsummas till frmn fr rttsliga frfaranden vars utgng ofta r osker och ligger lngt fram i tiden (se punkterna 19, 20 och 25).
(1) See also the provisions of Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 which obliges Member States to give the Commission every assistance necessary, as part of the protection of financial interests. 
(1) Se ven bestmmelserna i artikel 9 i frordning (EG, Euratom) nr 2988/95 som lgger medlemsstaterna att inom ramen fr skyddet av ekonomiska intressen ge kommissionen allt ndvndigt bistnd.
(2) Including 14 internal investigations. 
(2) Varav 14 interna utredningar.
Once the guiding principles of its investigations have been specified in terms of results to be achieved instead of simply the areas on which it wishes to concentrate its activities, the introduction of performance indicators (rather than mere activity indicators) should make it possible to assess the extent to which the OfficeŐs choices are justified. 
Nr riktlinjerna fr byrns utredningar har faststllts med avseende p vilka resultat som skall uppns i stllet fr enbart vilka omrden tgrderna skall koncentreras p, skulle infrandet av resultatindikatorer (i stllet fr endast verksamhetsindikatorer) gra det mjligt att bedma hur vlgrundade byrns val r.
The decision-making system governing the various stages of the investigations has become more transparent (see paragraph 16). 
De bestmmelser fr beslutsfattande som reglerar de olika faserna av utredningarna har blivit ppnare (se punkt 16).
This is largely due to the intervention of the Executive Board and the introduction of standardised reports (see paragraph 41). 
Detta beror till stor del p verkstllande kommittns ingripande och infrandet av standardiserade rapporter (se punkt 41).
The fact that coordination and assistance operations are treated as equivalent to investigations makes control of resources difficult and results in time-consuming use of the CMS system, even though the Office has no obligation, in coordination and assistance cases, to collect and produce evidence itself (see paragraphs 13 and 14). 
Att std-och samordningsverksamhet likstlls med utredningsarbetet gr det svrt att ha kontroll ver resurserna och leder till tidskrvande anvndning av rendehanteringssystemet (CMS) trots att byrn, nr det gller samordning och std, inte r skyldig att sjlv samla in och ta fram bevisning (se punkterna 13 och 14).
With regard to preliminary work (assessments), analyses are still rudimentary. 
Nr det gller frberedelsearbetet (utvrderingar) r analyserna fortfarande rudimentra.
The Executive Board has not insisted strongly enough on the need for clear formulation of the objectives and expected results of investigations (see paragraphs 20 and 22). 
Styrelsen har inte tillrckligt insisterat p behovet av att tydligt formulera ml fr utredningarna och ange frvntade resultat (se punkterna 20 och 22).
Some investigation acts still need to be justified more convincingly, the objectives set for the investigators in each case need to be clarified and there must be more insistence on work programmes to support proposed decisions. 
Fortfarande terstr att bttre motivera vissa utredningstgrder, frtydliga de ml utredarna skall arbeta mot i varje rende och insistera p arbetsplaner till std fr de beslut som fresls.
Regarding the Executive Board, it would be worth considering smaller groupings each of which would bring together managers working on files that have common features (3) . 
Nr det gller styrelsen br man vervga att samla de tjnstemn som arbetar med liknande renden i mindre grupper (3) .
This kind of approach would reduce the participantsŐ burden of work on examining files and would encourage more rational and more thorough analysis of draft decisions. 
Genom att underltta deltagarnas arbete fr att stta sig in i rendena skulle ett sdant arbetsstt underltta en mer djupgende analys av frslag till beslut.
It would also allow coordinated follow-up of the portfolio of current cases and the introduction of a system of prioritisation. 
Det skulle ocks gra det mjligt att infra en samlad uppfljning av alla pgende renden och ett system fr prioritering.
(3) For example revenue and shared-management expenditure, direct-management expenditure, internal investigations, etc. 
(3) Till exempel inkomster och utgifter med delad frvaltning, utgifter med direkt frvaltning, interna utredningar etc.
C 202/16 EN Official Journal of the European Union 18.8.2005 78. 
C 202/16 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 18.8.2005 78.
Supervision of investigations by the OfficeŐs management has generally proved inadequate (see paragraphs 28, 35 and 36). 
Den vervakning byrns ledning har haft av utredningarna har i allmnhet visat sig vara otillrcklig (se punkterna 28, 35 och 36).
The duration of investigations has not been brought under control (see paragraph 24). 
Man har inte haft kontroll ver utredningarnas lngd (se punkt 24).
Heads of unit must ensure that priorities are as far as possible respected and must both be aware of and control investigatorsŐ actual workload. 
Enhetscheferna mste se till att prioriteringar respekteras och att utredarnas faktiska arbetsbrda bde r knd och kontrolleras.
In the course of an investigation, the search for evidence must take precedence over mere collation of information already available. 
Under utredningen mste skandet efter bevis g fre en ren insamling av redan tillgnglig information.
From this point of view, the Office must make better use of the means it has available (witness hearings, on-the-spot visits to collect documents, operational analyses, etc.). 
Byrn mste i detta avseende bttre anvnda de medel den har till sitt frfogande (hrande av vitt-nen, besk p platsen fr att samla in bevis, operativa analyser etc.).
There is no system in place to measure investigatorsŐ actual workload or the time they spend on investigations (see paragraph 26). 
Det saknas system bde fr att mta utredarnas faktiska arbetsbrda och den tid de lgger ned p utredningarna (se punkt 26).
A time-recording system, linked to work plans which include estimates of time to be spent on investigations, would supply a basis for better alignment of the workload with the resources available in the various units of the Investigations Directorate, and would allow delays to be avoided. 
Tillsammans med en arbetsplan med berkningar av tidstgngen fr utredningarna skulle ett system fr tidsregistrering kunna bli en av hrnstenarna fr att bttre anpassa arbetsbrdan till de resurser som finns tillgngliga vid de olika avdelningarna inom direktoratet fr utredningar och gra det mjligt att undvika frseningar.
The obligation to report investigations that are more than nine months old to the Supervisory Committee has had no notable effect (see paragraph 24). 
Att de utredningar som pgtt lngre n nio mnader automatiskt skall tas upp av vervakningskommittn har inte haft ngra ptagliga effekter (se punkt 24).
Taking into account the time-barring periods laid down in national (criminal) and Community legislation (e.g. Article 3 of Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95), establishing a maximum duration for enquiries would be likely to increase their effectiveness. 
Med hnsyn till de preskriptionstider som anges i nationell lagstiftning (straffrttslig) och gemenskapslagstiftning (till exempel artikel 3 i frordning (EG, Euratom) nr 2988/95) frefaller infrandet av en maximitid fr hur lnge utredningarna kan pg leda till kad effektivitet.
Judicial and legal routes have in the main proved ineffective (see paragraph 37). 
Rttsliga och disciplinra vgar har p det hela taget visat sig vara ineffektiva (se punkt 37).
The OfficeŐs financial follow-up operations use up a lot of its resources (see paragraphs 31 and 54). 
Byrns ekonomiska uppfljning tar resurser i ansprk (se punkterna 31 och 54).
Judicial follow-up adds little value to the conclusions submitted (see paragraph 43). 
Den rttsliga uppfljningen tillfr fga reellt vrde till de inlmnade slutsatserna (se punkt 43).
It is up to authorising departments in the Commission and Member States to organise the recovery of amounts identified as a result of investigations. 
Det r utanordnare vid kommissionen och i medlemsstaterna som skall organisera terbetalningen av belopp som faststllts efter avslutad utredning.
Authorising officers and Member States should notify OLAF promptly of any sums recovered or amounts written off. 
Utanordnare och medlemsstater br utan drjsml informera OLAF nr terbetalningar grs eller nr konstaterade fordringar skrivs av.
Legislative follow-up ought to remain the responsibility of the operational Directorates-General on the basis of summaries addressed to them by the Office. 
Ansvaret fr uppfljning i lagstiftningshnseende br fortfarande ligga hos de operativa generaldirektoraten och baseras p sammanfattningar som byrn gr fr deras rkning.
There is no independent control of the legality of investigative actions (1). 
Kontrollen av pgende utredningstgrder r inte skerstlld p ett oberoende stt (1).