natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This is particularly relevant in that only ten Member States have adopted a national anti-fraud strategy19 based on the Commission’s recommendation (see paragraph 18). 
Detta r srskilt relevant eftersom endast tio medlemsstater har antagit en nationell bedrgeribekmpningsstrategi19 som bygger p kommissionens rekommendation (se punkt 18).
Furthermore, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 480/2014 (complementing the CPR for 2014-2020) does not mention shortcomings 18 In this sense, the concept of a formal anti-fraud policy corresponds to the ’fraud risk management programme’ defined by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) in its ”Fraud examiners manual” or in the ”Fraud Risk Management Guide” it developed with the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), and to the “formal counter fraud and corruption strategies” defined by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) in its “Code of practice on managing the risk of fraud and corruption”. 
18 Konceptet med en formell bedrgeribekmpningspolicy motsvarar i det hr sammanhanget det program fr hantering av bedrgeririsk som utformats av Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) i handboken fr utredning av bedrgeri, eller i den guide om hantering av bedrgeririsk som utarbetats tillsammans med Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commissions (Coso).
19 National anti-fraud strategies exist in ten of the 28 Member States: Bulgaria, Czechia, Greece, France, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Hungary, Malta and Slovakia. 
19 Det finns nationella bedrgeribekmpningsstrategier i tio av de 28 medlemsstaterna: Bulgarien, Tjeckien, Grekland, Frankrike, Kroatien, Italien, Lettland, Ungern, Malta och Slovakien.
Romania also has a strategy, but it is now out-of-date (Source: 2017 PIF report, page 12). 
Rumnien har ocks en strategi, men den har blivit frldrad (klla: 2017 rs PIF-rapport, s. 12).
The Member States that have not adopted a national strategy are: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
Fljande medlemsstater har inte antaget en nationell strategi: Belgien, Danmark, Tyskland, Estland, Irland, Spanien, Cypern, Litauen, Luxemburg, Nederlnderna, sterrike, Polen, Portugal, Slovenien, Finland, Sverige och Frenade kungariket.
17 in the implementation of proportionate and effective anti-fraud measures in the context of determining ‘serious deficiencies’ that could lead on their own to the suspension of payments to or the financial correction of operational programmes20. 
I kommissionens delegerade frordning (EU) nr 480/2014 (som kompletterar frordningen om gemensamma bestmmelser fr 2014Đ2020) nmns inte brister i genomfrandet av proportionella och effektiva tgrder mot bedrgeri i samband med faststllandet av Óallvarliga bristerÓ som i sig kan leda till att betalningar hlls inne eller till finansiella korrigeringar av operativa program20.
As a result, the use of anti-fraud measures is given less weight than other areas in the assessment of management and control systems. 
Det leder till att anvndningen av tgrder mot bedrgeri tillmts mindre betydelse n andra omrden vid bedmningen av frvaltnings-och kontrollsystem.
The Commission’s proposal for the CPR for 2021-2027 does not consider anti-fraud measures as one of the enabling conditions21 which Member States must meet before they can obtain EU cohesion funding. 
I kommissionens frslag till frordning om gemensamma bestmmelser fr 2021Đ2027 nmns inte heller bestmmelser om bedrgeribekmpning som ett av de ndvndiga villkor21 som medlemsstater mste uppfylla innan de kan f sammanhllningsmedel frn EU.
Managing authorities systematically assess fraud risks, but this process could be further improved Managing authorities systematically identify fraud risks 22 The most significant change compared to the 2007-2013 programming period is that managing authorities now have to assess fraud risks in line with the requirements of the 2014-2020 control framework (see paragraph 05). 
Frvaltande myndigheter bedmer systematiskt bedrgeririsker, men processen skulle kunna frbttras ytterligare Frvaltande myndigheter identifierar systematiskt bedrgeririsker 22 Den viktigaste ndringen jmfrt med programperioden 2007Đ2013 r att de frvaltande myndigheterna nu mste bedma bedrgeririsker i enlighet med kraven i kontrollramen fr 2014Đ2020 (se punkt 05).
The purpose of this exercise is for managing authorities to determine the suitability of existing internal controls to address the risks associated with different fraud scenarios and identify areas where additional controls are necessary. 
Bedmningen grs fr att de frvaltande myndigheterna ska faststlla om de befintliga internkontrollerna r lmpliga fr att hantera de risker som hr samman med olika bedrgeriscenarier och identifiera omrden dr det krvs ytterligare kontroller.
23 Among other anti-fraud topics, the EGESIF guidelines for Member States and managing authorities (see paragraph 18) address the task of fraud risk assessment including a practical “ready-to-use” tool to perform the assessment22. 
23 Bland andra bedrgeribekmpningsrelaterade mnen handlar EGESIF-riktlinjerna fr medlemsstater och frvaltande myndigheter (se punkt 18) om uppgiften att bedma bedrgeririsk och innehller ven ett praktiskt verktyg fr riskbedmning22.
In most cases, the authorities 20 Article 30 and Annex IV. 
20 Artikel 30 och bilaga IV.
21 Article 11 and Annex III of Commission’s proposal for a CPR for 2021-2027, COM(2018) 375 of 29 May 2018. 
21 Artikel 11 i och bilaga III till kommissionens frslag till frordning om gemensamma bestmmelser fr 2021Đ2027, COM(2018) 375, 29.5.2018.
22 In the guidance document, the Commission developed a fraud risk assessment model based on 31 standard inherent risks, further subdivided into 40 risks and 128 recommended mitigating controls, all of them structured around four generic management processes (selection of applicants, implementation and verification of operations, certification and payments, and direct procurement by managing authorities). 
22 I vgledningen presenterade kommissionen en modell fr bedrgeririskbedmningar som bygger p 31 inbyggda standardrisker, som delades upp i ytterligare 40 risker och 128 rekommenderade begrnsningskontroller, som alla r strukturerade kring fyra allmnna frvaltningsprocesser (urval av skande, genomfrande och kontroll av insatser, attestering och betalning samt frvaltande myndigheters direkta upphandling).
However, the document does not cover financial instruments or risks in relation to state aid. 18 
I dokumentet behandlas dock inte finansieringsinstrument eller risker i anslutning till statligt std. 19
applied the model fraud risk assessment developed by the Commission or their own adaptation of that model. 
Myndigheterna anvnde oftast den modell fr bedmning av bedrgeririsk som kommissionen har tagit fram eller sin egen anpassning av den modellen.
24 On 28 November 2018, the Commission published the results of a study23 on the fraud and corruption prevention practices implemented by Member States in response to the specific provisions in place for the 2014-2020 programming period that it had outsourced in December 2016. 
24 Den 28 november 2018 offentliggjorde kommissionen resultatet av en studie23 om de rutiner fr att frebygga bedrgeri och korruption som medlemsstaterna har infrt som svar p de specifika bestmmelser som infrdes fr programperioden 2014Đ2020. Studien hade utkontrakterats i december 2016.
The study concluded that the new legislative requirements, in particular as regards the fraud risk assessment process, had helped to make Member States’ efforts to tackle fraud more formalised and systematic. 
Slutsatsen i studien var att de nya lagstadgade kraven, i synnerhet nr det gller processen fr bedrgeririskbedmning, hade hjlpt medlemsstaterna att hantera bedrgeri p ett mer formaliserat och systematiskt stt.
However, the study also concluded that some authorities may underestimate their self-assessed levels of risk (see Box 1). 
En annan slutsats i studien var emellertid att ngra myndigheter eventuellt underskattar sina sjlvbedmda riskniver (se ruta 1).
19 23 DG REGIO – Preventing fraud and corruption in the European Structural and Investment Funds – taking stock of practices in the EU Member States, October 2018, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/studies/2018/study-on-the-implementation-of-article-125-4-c-of-the-regulation-eu-no-1303-2013-laying-down- the-common-provisions-on-the-european-structural-and-investment-fund-in-member-states. 
20 23 GD Regional-och stadspolitik Preventing fraud and corruption in the European Structural and Investment Funds Đ taking stock of practices in the EU Member States (frebyggande av bedrgeri och korruption i de europeiska struktur-och investeringsfonderna Đ en inventering av praxis i EU:s medlemsstater), oktober 2018, finns p: https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/publications/studies/2018/study-on-the-implementation-of-article-125-4-c-of-the-regulation-eu-no-1303Đ2013-laying-down- the-common-provisions-on-the-european-structural-and-investment-fund-in-member-states.
20 Box 1 Stock taking study on preventing fraud and corruption in the ESIFs The study was based on a sample of 50 2014-2020 OPs (41 of which related to Cohesion, excluding ETC) selected by the Commission on a judgemental basis to cover all Member States and a range of sectors and funds. 
21 Ruta 1 Inventeringsstudie om frebyggande av bedrgeri och korruption i ESI-fonderna Studien byggde p ett urval med 50 operativa program fr programperioden 2014Đ 2020 (varav 41 gllde sammanhllning, exklusive europeiskt territoriellt samarbete) som kommissionen hade valt ut p grundval av en subjektiv bedmning fr att f med alla medlemsstater och ett antal olika sektorer och fonder.
The study team reviewed information from Member States (in particular the outcome of their fraud risk assessments) and conducted interviews with programme authorities and AFCOSs. 
Studieteamet gick igenom information frn medlemsstaterna (i synnerhet utfallet av deras bedrgeririskbedmningar) och intervjuade programmyndigheter och sambandscentraler.
The study focused on the design of fraud prevention measures and (to a lesser extent) fraud detection methods and assessed how proportionated the measures were to the identified risks. 
Studien var inriktad p utformningen av bedrgerifrebyggande tgrder och (i mindre utstrckning) metoder fr att upptcka bedrgeri. Dessutom bedmdes hur proportionella tgrderna var i frhllande till de identifierade riskerna.
The study did not conclude on the effectiveness of the measures put in place, either. 
Inte heller bedmdes de vidtagna tgrdernas ndamlsenlighet.
The key lessons drawn from the study can be summarized as follows: Positive remarks Areas for improvement Anti-fraud and anti-corruption efforts are more formalised and systematic in the 2014-2020 programming period. 
De viktigaste lrdomar som kan dras frn studien kan sammanfattas p fljande stt: Positiva kommentarer Omrden som kan frbttras Insatserna fr att bekmpa bedrgeri och korruption r mer formaliserade och systematiska fr programperioden 2014Đ2020.
Proportionateness of mitigating measures is lowest for the risks of collusive bidding and double funding. 
De riskreducerande tgrderna r minst proportionella nr det gller risken fr samordnad anbudsgivning och dubbelfinansiering.
Mitigating measures are generally proportionate to the self-assessed risks. 
De riskreducerande tgrderna r i allmnhet proportionella i frhllande till de sjlvbedmda riskerna.
Most authorities are using the Commission`s fraud risk assessment template. 
De flesta myndigheterna anvnder kommissionens mall fr bedrgeririskbedmning.
A more inclusive fraud risk assessment process is better suited to reducing fraud risks. 
En mer inkluderande process fr bedrgeririskbedmning r lmpligare fr att minska riskerna fr bedrgeri.
In its current form, the managing authorities in the sample perceive Arachne as not entirely meeting their needs. 
De frvaltande myndigheterna i urvalet anser att Arachne i sin nuvarande form inte helt uppfyller deras behov.
There are some areas for further improvement 25 However, we note that some of the managing authorities we visited take a mechanical approach to the assessment of fraud risks, suggesting that they favour form over substance. 
Ngra omrden kan frbttras ytterligare 25 Vi noterar dock att ngra av de frvaltande myndigheter som vi beskte hanterar bedmningen av bedrgeririsker p ett mekaniskt stt, vilket tyder p att de lgger mer vikt vid formen n innehllet.
26 In addition, they generally base the identification of fraud risks on their own experience, without any additional input from other knowledgeable actors (anti-fraud coordination services, investigative and prosecution bodies or other specialised expert agencies). 
26 Dessutom baserar de i allmnhet identifieringen av bedrgeririsker p sina egna erfarenheter utan kompletterande synpunkter frn andra kunniga aktrer (avdelningar som samordnar bedrgeribekmpningstgrder, utrednings-och lagfringsorgan eller andra specialiserade expertorgan).
27 During our Member State visits, we found indications that several managing authorities and intermediate bodies might have inadequately evaluated fraud risks: o In Bulgaria, the audit authority had already detected that some managing authorities had incorrectly classified specific fraud risks as low and therefore failed to address them through additional control procedures. o In France, the managing authorities we visited had not assessed the impact of additional controls on the residual risk of fraud. o In Spain, where the responsibility for fraud risk assessment is partly delegated to intermediate bodies, an independent evaluation mandated by the managing authority detected coherence problems between identified risks and planned controls (e.g. certain risks not covered by an action plan or controls set up in areas marked as not applicable). o In one of the OPs audited in Romania, intermediate bodies dealing with similar delegated functions and funding provided different fraud risk assessments. o In Hungary, we found that the fraud risk assessment was insufficiently comprehensive (it excluded previous audit results) and did not identify risks specifically associated with the types of operations and beneficiaries covered by the OPs. 
27 Vid vra besk i medlemsstaterna fann vi indikationer p att de utvrderingar av bedrgeririsken som hade gjorts av flera frvaltande myndigheter och frmedlande organ kan ha varit otillrckliga: o I Bulgarien hade revisionsmyndigheten redan upptckt att ngra frvaltande myndigheter felaktigt hade klassificerat specifika bedrgeririsker som lga och drfr inte kontrollerat dem ytterligare. o I Frankrike hade de frvaltande myndigheter som vi beskte inte bedmt effekten av ytterligare kontroller p den kvarstende bedrgeririsken. o I Spanien, dr ansvaret fr bedrgeririskbedmningar delvis har delegerats till frmedlande organ, upptcktes vid en oberoende utvrdering som gjordes p uppdrag av den frvaltande myndigheten att det fanns problem med verensstmmelsen mellan identifierade risker och planerade kontroller (t.ex. fanns det ingen handlingsplan fr vissa risker eller s hade kontroller gjorts inom omrden som markerats som inte tillmpliga). o I ett av de operativa program som granskades i Rumnien hade frmedlande organ som hanterade liknande delegerade funktioner och finansiering gjort olika bedrgeririskbedmningar. o I Ungern konstaterade vi att bedmningen av bedrgeririsk inte var tillrckligt omfattande (resultaten av tidigare revisioner fanns inte med) och att specifika risker i samband med de typer av insatser och stdmottagare som ingick i det operativa programmet inte hade identifierats.
28 In nearly all cases the managing authorities concluded that existing anti-fraud measures address the identified fraud risks. 
28 I s gott som samtliga fall drog de frvaltande myndigheterna slutsatsen att de befintliga tgrderna mot bedrgeri kom till rtta med de identifierade bedrgeririskerna.
Given the shortcomings identified, we consider that this conclusion may be too optimistic. 21 
Med tanke p de brister som identifierades anser vi att den slutsatsen kan vara veroptimistisk. 22
Managing authorities have improved their fraud prevention measures but made no significant progress towards proactive fraud detection 29 Managing authorities are expected to develop effective and proportionate fraud prevention and detection measures in response to identified risks, in such a way that the opportunity to commit fraud is substantially reduced. 
Frvaltande myndigheter har frbttrat sina bedrgerifrebyggande tgrder men inte gjort ngra strre framsteg mot att proaktivt upptcka bedrgeri 29 Nr risker identifieras frvntas frvaltande myndigheter ta fram effektiva och proportionella tgrder fr att frebygga och upptcka bedrgeri, s att mjligheten att beg bedrgeri vsentligt inskrnks.
Managing authorities have developed specific fraud prevention measures for 2014-2020 30 We found that the additional anti-fraud measures developed for the 2014-2020 period largely focus on preventive actions, which are more comprehensive than those set up for 2007-2013. 
Frvaltande myndigheter har tagit fram specifika bedrgerifrebyggande tgrder fr 2014Đ2020 30 Vi fann att de ytterligare bestmmelser om bedrgeribekmpning som togs fram fr perioden 2014Đ2020 till stor del r inriktade p frebyggande insatser, som r mer omfattande n de som infrdes fr 2007Đ2013.
Our survey showed that such additional preventive measures mainly comprise fraud-awareness training for staff, policies on conflicts of interest and ethical guidance for employees and beneficiaries, and the publication of high-level institutional anti-fraud statements or declarations. 
Vr enkt visade att de nytillkomna frebyggande tgrderna oftast bestr av utbildning fr att hja personalens kunskaper om bedrgeri, strategier fr intressekonflikter och etisk vgledning fr anstllda och stdmottagare. Institutionerna har ven offentliggjort uttalanden eller deklarationer p hg niv om bedrgeribekmpning.
31 Our survey also showed that managing authorities consider fraud-awareness measures (both staff training and measures targeting intermediate bodies and project beneficiaries), policies on conflicts of interest and codes of conduct to be the most effective way of preventing fraud in the use of EU Cohesion funding (see Figure 4). 
31 Vr enkt visade ocks att frvaltande myndigheter anser att tgrder fr att hja kunskaperna om bedrgeri (bde utbildning av personalen och tgrder riktade till frmedlande organ och mottagare av projektstd), strategier fr intressekonflikter och uppfrandekoder r det effektivaste sttet att frebygga bedrgeri vid anvndningen av EU:s sammanhllningsmedel (se figur 4).
Other fraud prevention measures, such as employee support programmes (aimed at reducing pressure on employees exposed to fraud) and bounty schemes (whereby managing authorities make public their intention to reward whistleblowers of fraud), remain infrequent, although they are considered reasonably effective. 
Andra bedrgerifrebyggande tgrder, ssom stdprogram fr anstllda (som syftar till att minska trycket p anstllda som konfronteras med bedrgeri) eller bonussystem (nr frvaltande myndigheter tillknnager att de har fr avsikt att belna personer som slr larm om bedrgeri), r fortfarande ovanliga, ven om de anses vara ganska ndamlsenliga.
32 Several Member States have taken a more innovative approach to preventing fraud against the EU’s financial interests, such as by involving civil society organisations in monitoring the execution of public contracts or running campaigns questioning the social acceptability of certain fraudulent practices (see Box 2). 
32 Flera medlemsstater har vidtagit mer innovativa tgrder fr att skydda EU:s finansiella intressen mot bedrgeri, ssom att involvera organisationer i det civila samhllet i vervakningen av verkstllandet av offentliga kontrakt eller genomfra kampanjer dr den sociala acceptansen fr vissa bedrgliga beteenden ifrgastts (se ruta 2).
23 Box 2 Innovative fraud prevention measures Integrity pacts In 2015 the European Commission and Transparency International, a global non-governmental organisation actively fighting corruption and particularly known for its publication of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), launched a pilot project on ‘integrity pacts’ as an innovative way of preventing fraud in EU cohesion policy projects. 
25 Ruta 2 Innovativa tgrder fr att frebygga bedrgeri Integritetspakter r 2015 inledde Europeiska kommissionen och Transparency International, en global icke-statlig organisation som aktivt bekmpar korruption och framfr allt r knd fr sitt korruptionsindex, ett pilotprojekt om s kallade integritetspakter som ett innovativt stt att frebygga bedrgeri i EU:s sammanhllningspolitiska projekt.
An integrity pact is an agreement in which the authority responsible for awarding a public contract and the economic operators bidding for the contract undertake to abstain from corrupt practices and ensure transparency in the procurement process. 
En integritetspakt r en verenskommelse dr den myndighet som ansvarar fr tilldelningen av ett offentligt kontrakt och de ekonomiska aktrer som lmnar anbud p kontraktet frbinder sig att avst frn korrupt beteende och skerstlla insyn i upphandlingsprocessen.
Pacts also include a separate agreement engaging a civil society organisation (such as an NGO, a foundation or a local community-based organisation) to monitor all parties’ compliance with their commitments. 
I pakterna ingr ven en separat verenskommelse dr en organisation i civilsamhllet (ssom en icke-statlig organisation, en stiftelse eller en lokal sammanslutning) tar sig att vervaka att alla parter uppfyller sina taganden.
The purpose of integrity pacts is to increase transparency, accountability and good governance in public contracting, enhance trust in public authorities and promote cost efficiency and savings through better procurement. 
Syftet med integritetspakter r att frbttra insynen, ansvarsutkrvandet och den goda frvaltningen vid tilldelning av offentliga kontrakt, ka frtroendet fr offentliga myndigheter och frmja kostnadseffektivitet och besparingar genom bttre upphandling.
The second phase of the project began in 2016 and will run for four years24. 
Den andra fasen av projektet inleddes 2016 och kommer att pg i fyra r24.
We discussed the use of integrity pacts with civil society organisations in Latvia, Romania and Hungary, which were generally positive about the initiative. 
Vi diskuterade anvndningen av integritetspakter med organisationer i civilsamhllet i Lettland, Rumnien och Ungern, som i allmnhet var positiva till initiativet.
“FRAUD OFF!” campaign In March 2017, the Latvian AFCOS launched an awareness-raising campaign called “FRAUD OFF!” questioning the social acceptability of certain types of fraudulent behaviour. 
FRAUD OFF!-kampanjen I mars 2017 inledde sambandscentralen i Lettland en medvetandehjande kampanj kallad FRAUD OFF!, dr den sociala acceptansen fr vissa bedrgliga beteenden ifrgasattes.
National TV channels ran campaign advertisements featuring national celebrities, and publicity material was distributed to institutions, businesses, shops and the population in general. 
Nationella tv-kanaler gjorde reklam fr kampanjen dr nationella kndisar deltog, och reklammaterial delades ut till institutioner, fretag, butiker och allmnheten.
The campaign reached a significant audience and trended heavily for a while. 
Kampanjen ndde en stor publik och var ett tag mycket omtalad.