natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
DG II was not called on to participate in the additionality verification exercise for Objectives 3 and 4 for the 1994 to 1999 period because of the methodology adopted by DG V. This methodology was based on samples and takes into account the Objective 1 regions, for which the monitoring of additionality is carried out within the framework of the Objective 1 CSFs. 
P grund av de metoder som GD V antagit har GD II inte ombetts delta i kontrollen av additionaliteten fr ml 3 och 4 fr perioden 1994Đ1999. Dessa metoder grundade sig p stickprov och beaktar de ml 1-regioner fr vilka kontrollen av att additionalitetsprincipen efterlevs genomfrs i enlighet med ramarna fr gemenskapsstd fr nmnda ml.
Coordination 14. 
Samordning 14.
At DG VI (Agriculture), few arrangements were made for verifying additionality. 
Inom GD VI (Jordbruk) finns det f bestmmelser om kontroll av additionaliteten.
DG VI is of the opinion that the responsibility for verifying additionality lies with DG II, since it does not possess the necessary technical expertise to carry out this task. 
GD VI anser att ansvaret fr kontrollen av additionaliteten ankommer p GD II, eftersom GD VI inte besitter den tekniska sakkunskap som behvs fr denna uppgift.
For several Member States, DG VI was not able to provide any documents on the verification of additionality. 
Fr ett flertal medlemsstater kunde GD VI inte frete ngon dokumentation om kontrollen av additionaliteten.
At DG XVI (Regional policy and cohesion), a horizontal department is responsible for monitoring the principle of additionality which relies, as far as technical aspects are concerned, on the work carried out by DG II. 
Inom GD XVI (Regionalpolitik och sammanhllning), ansvarar en gemensam tjnst fr vervakningen av additionalitetsprincipen som, tekniskt sett, stder sig p det arbete som utfrs av GD II.
However, this department is not always informed of contacts between the geographical units and the Member States. 
Denna avdelning informeras emellertid inte alltid om kontakter mellan de geografiska enheterna och medlemsstaterna.
These deficiencies in coordination between the horizontal department, the geographical units and DG II result in documents being dispersed around several units and in several different people communicating with the Member States. 
Dessa brister i samordningen mellan den gemensamma tjnsten, de geografiska enheterna och GD II resulterar i att dokument sprids ut p flera enheter och att det finns flera personer som har i uppgift att upprtthlla kontakter med medlemsstaterna.
This situation makes partnership with the Member States difficult, and also makes it hard to obtain an overall view of the issue. 
Denna situation frsvrar partnerskapet med medlemsstaterna och gr det svrt att f en verblick ver situationen.
At DG V (Employment, industrial relations and social affairs), in spite of the checks concerning Objectives 3 and 4 of the European Social Fund (ESF) carried out in 1996 by the Court (7), the situation remains unsatisfactory. 
Inom GD V (Sysselsttning, arbetsmarknad och social politik) r situationen trots de kontroller betrffande Europeiska socialfondens (ESF) ml 3 och 4 som revisionsrtten genomfrde 1996 (7) fortfarande otillfredsstllande.
The results of the audit of the observance of additionality for Objectives 3 and 4 for the 1990 to 1993 period, carried out by the ÔAudit and inspectionŐ sector of the financial unit of DG V, were very disappointing: for seven Member States (B, EL, E, IRL, I, NL and UK) it was not possible to complete the exercise and nothing has been done to rectify this situation (see paragraph 28). 
Resultaten frn granskningen av att additionalitetsprincipen efterlevdes inom ml 3 och 4 fr perioden 1990Đ1993, som genomfrdes av sektorn ÓRevi-sion och inspektionÓ vid enheten fr finansiella frgor inom GD V gav ett mycket nedslende resultat: fr sju medlemsstater (B, EL, E, IRL, I, NL och UK) kunde arbetet inte slutfras och inga tgrder har vidtagits fr att rtta till detta (se punkt 28).
With regard to the 1994 to 1999 period, where the geographical units did receive information, it was not subjected to much examination. 
Vad gller perioden 1994Đ1999 hade, i de fall de geografiska enheterna verhuvudtaget hade ftt ngon information, denna inte granskats i ngon strre utstrckning.
The files are very incomplete and dispersed, making it very difficult for the Commission administrators to know what the situation is. 
Akterna r mycket ofullstndiga och spridda och det r sledes mycket svrt fr de ansvariga att f en bild av situationen.
Interdepartmental discussions and discussions with the Member States were often informal, so that the results were not recorded in the files. 
Diskussionerna mellan avdelningar och med medlemsstaterna har ofta varit informella och resultaten frn dem har drfr inte lmnat ngra skriftliga spr.
Some Commission departments asked Member States for information which had already been provided to other Commission departments and which had obviously not been circulated. 
Vissa av kommissionens avdelningar hade bett medlemsstaterna om information som dessa redan snt till andra avdelningar vid kommissionen och som uppenbarligen inte cirkulerat.
In order to obviate these problems, one Member State decided to send information to all the officials who might possibly be responsible for the file by post and by e-mail. 
Fr att undvika dylika problem beslutade en medlemsstat att snda information till alla tjnstemn som mjligen kunde tnkas vara ansvariga fr rendet i frga per post och per e-post.
Suspensive clauses 18. 
Frbehll 18.
The use of suspensive clauses gives a clear illustration of the consequences of this lack of coordination. 
Frvaltningen av frbehll visar tydligt fljderna av denna brist p samordning.
This kind of clause provides for the automatic suspension of payments after the first advance if the relevant information needed for ex ante verification of additionality has not been provided by the Member State. 
Detta slags bestmmelser bestr av innehllande av betalningar efter det frsta automatiska frskottet om medlemsstaten inte lmnar den information som r ndvndig fr att en frhandskontroll av additionaliteten skall kunna genomfras.
The Commission inserted them in decisions granting assistance as a means of exerting pressure. 
Kommissionen har infrt frbehllen i besluten om beviljande av std som ett ptryckningsmedel.
This is not a case of the application of Article 24 of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88, which is supposed to govern the suspension of payments, but of a procedure 
Det r inte frga om till-lmpning av artikel 24 i frordning (EEG) nr 4253/88, som skall reglera innehllandet av betalningar, utan om ett frfarande som
C 68/6 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 9.3.2000 lacking any procedures or fixed criteria stating when these clauses are to be inserted and applied. 
C 68/6 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 9.3.2000 varken tfljs av bestmmelser eller villkor fr nr de skall infras eller tillmpas.
Thus, clauses of this kind have been employed for Objectives 2 and 5b, but not for the other Objectives, although there are factors which might also, in some circumstances, have justified their insertion. 
Sledes har de anvnts fr ml 2 och 5b, men inte fr vriga ml, trots att omstndigheterna i vissa fall kunde ha motiverat att de hade tagits i bruk.
In the case of some Member States, these clauses were inserted in some regional SPDs, although additionality must be measured at the level of the entire group of regions to which an Objective applies. 
Fr vissa medlemsstater infrdes dessa frbehll fr en del regionala samlade programplaneringsdokument trots att additionaliteten skall mtas med avseende p hela den grupp av regioner som hnfr sig till ett visst ml.
The Commission justified this practice as necessary to avoid penalising regions which had provided the information required, but it resulted in unequal treatment between Member States. 
Kommissionen har motiverat denna praxis med att den varit ndvndig fr att inte regioner som gett den information som erfordrades skulle straffas, men detta har lett till att medlemsstater behandlats olika.
In many Member States the verification of additionality for Objectives 2 and 5b was carried out by the same departments, using identical approaches and sources. 
I ett flertal medlemsstater har kontrollen av additionaliteten fr ml 2 och 5b genomfrts av samma instanser, med hjlp av identiska tillvgagngsstt och kllor.
The only explanation to be found for this lies in purely formal aspects and in the fact that the DGs in charge and their counterparts in the Member States differ. 
Den enda frklaringen till detta frhllande str att finna i rent formella aspekter och i det faktum att de ansvariga inom generaldirektoraten och deras motparter i medlemsstaterna r olika fr olika ml.
The lifting of these clauses has not always been the subject of formal procedures. 
Hvandet av dessa frbehll har inte alltid skett p ett formellt korrekt stt.
This decision was communicated, on only one occasion, to the relevant Member State by means of a letter from the Commissioner responsible, which was accompanied by the amended verification procedures and the corresponding tables. 
I ett enda fall har den berrda medlemsstaten underrttats om detta beslut genom en skrivelse frn den ansvarige ledamoten av kommissionen, tfljt av de ndrade kontrollfrfarandena och motsvarande tabeller.
On other occasions, the lifting of the clause was communicated by means of a letter from the Director-General. 
I andra fall har hvandet av frbehllet meddelats genom en skrivelse frn generaldirektren.
On some occasions, there was no written communication. 
Ibland har inget skriftligt frfarande gt rum.
Since in the case of multifund assistance there is a single decision to grant assistance covering all the Funds, the suspensive clauses obviously apply to all of them. 
Eftersom det endast fattas ett beslut att bevilja flerfondsstd som tcker samtliga fonder sger det sig sjlvt att frbehllen gller fr alla dessa.
However, the lack of coordination and the absence of appropriate monitoring and financial control in respect of the files resulted in the payment of approximately ECU 140 million before the lifting of the suspensive clauses. 
Bristen p samordning samt avsaknaden av lmplig vervakning och finansiell kontroll av rendena resulterade emellertid i att cirka 140 miljoner ecu utbetalades innan frbehllen hvdes.
The payments in question concern the ERDF (ECU 4,3 million), the EAGGF Guidance (ECU 2,7 million) and the ESF (ECU 133,5 million) for Objective 2 (ECU 42,4 million for the 1994 to 1996 period and ECU 87,8 million for the 1997 to 1999 period) and Objective 5b (ECU 10,3 million). 
Utbetalningarna i frga gller ERUF (4,3 miljoner ecu), EUGFJ:s utvecklingssektion (2,7 miljoner ecu) och ESF (133,5 miljonerecu)frml2(42,4miljonerecufrperioden1994Đ1996 och 87,8 miljoner ecu fr perioden 1997Đ1999) och ml 5b (10,3 miljoner ecu).
The majority of the files involved are the responsibility of DG V, which ought to have monitored the suspensive clauses even though it is not in charge of these Objectives. 
Det handlar i huvudsak om fall som hnfr sig till GD V, som borde ha vervakat frbehllen, ven om det inte ansvarar fr dessa ml.
Despite the existence of suspensive clauses, all the eligible requests for payments from the ESF submitted by the Member States concerned were granted, revealing the weaknesses of the control procedures used. 
Trots frbehllen beviljades varje godtagbar begran frn medlemsstaterna om betalning frn ESF, vilket visar hur bristflliga de kontrollfrfaranden som tillmpades var.
Procedures 22. 
Frfaranden 22.
As a general rule, the Commission does not send the national authorities involved the results of its analyses of the documents sent by the Member States. 
I allmnhet frmedlar kommissionen inte resultaten frn sina analyser av de dokument som medlemsstaterna inlmnat till de nationella myndigheterna.
There is no procedure laid down to cover this point. 
Det finns inget frfarande fr detta.
If the information is judged to be insufficient, the Commission sometimes asks the Member State for additional information. 
Om informationen inte anses vara tillrcklig ber kommissionen ibland medlemsstaten om kompletterande information.
If the information is judged to be satisfactory, the Member State is not always informed of the fact. 
Om informationen anses vara tillfredsstllande underrttas medlemsstaten inte alltid om detta.
The national authorities are very often unaware of the status of a file on which they have had to do a lot of work (8). On the other hand, the absence of a reaction from the Commission does not necessarily mean that it considers the information to be correct. 
Mycket ofta knner de nationella myndigheterna inte till den fortsatta utvecklingen av ett rende som de varit tvungna att lgga ner mycket arbete p (8).  andra sidan innebr avsaknaden av en reaktion frn kommissionens sida ndvndigtvis inte att den anser informationen vara korrekt.
It may happen that this lack of reaction is simply because of the lack of any analysis by the Commission. 
Det frekommer att denna avsaknad av reaktion endast beror p att kommissionen inte gjort ngon analys.
In cases where the SFs are managed by the regional SPDs and not by a CSF, the absence of a Monitoring Committee at national level has made contact between the Commission and the Member States more difficult. 
Avsaknaden av en vervakningskommitt p nationell niv i de fall dr strukturfonderna styrs av regionala samlade programplaneringsdokument och inte av ramar fr gemenskapsstd har frsvrat kontakterna mellan kommissionen och medlemsstaterna.
For Objective 1, this concerns France and the United Kingdom, for Objective 2, all of the Member States except Spain are concerned and for Objective 5b, all of the Member States are concerned. 
Det r frga om Frankrike och Frenade kungariket fr ml 1, alla medlemsstater utom Spanien fr ml 2 och alla medlemsstater fr ml 5b.
THE STATE OF PROGRESS OF WORK ON THE VERIFICATION OF ADDITIONALITY Introduction 23. 
LGESRAPPORT ANGENDE KONTROLLEN AV ADDITIONALITETEN Inledning 23.
The Commission has issued very little information on the state of progress of the work that has been carried out with the aim of verifying the observance of the principle of additionality. 
Kommissionens information om vad som gjorts fr att kontrollera att additionalitetsprincipen efterlevs har varit mycket knapphndig.
All that is available is a communication to the Consultative Committee on the development and conversion of regions (9), a single annual report on additionality from 1990 to 1993, concerning Objectives 3 and 4 (10) and a few paragraphs in the annual reports on the SFs. 
Den enda information som finns att tillg r ett meddelande till rdgivande kommittn fr utveckling och omvandling av regioner (9), en enda rsrapport om additionalitetsprincipen 1990Đ1993 betrffande ml 3 och 4 (10) och ngra punkter i rsrapporterna om strukturfonderna.
For example, the 1995 annual report (11) states that ÔObjective 5b was the only Objective for which it was possible to confirm in 1995 that additionality had been observed in all Member StatesŐ. 
Till exempel i rsrapporten fr 1995 (11) anges att Óml 5b r det enda fr vilket det frn och med 1995 kan bekrftas att additionalitetsprincipen efterlevs i samtliga medlemsstaterÓ.
However, most Member States have not carried out any ex post verification operation concerning this Objective, and, moreover, have not been asked to do so by the Commission (12). 
De flesta medlemsstater har emellertid inte vidtagit ngra tgrder fr efterhandskontroll av detta ml, vilket inte heller krvts av kommissionen (12).
The 1989 to 1993 period 24. 
Perioden 1989Đ1993 24.
Work on the ex post verification of the observance of the principle of additionality for the 1989 to 1993 period is still unfinished for certain Member States. 
Arbetet fr efterhandskontroll av additionaliteten under perioden 1989Đ1993 har frblivit oavslutat fr vissa medlemsstater.
The extremely long periods over which data collection, processing and forwarding, and the CommissionŐs examination, the discussions and exchanges of letters were spread have led to a gradual loss of interest on the part of the Member States and the Commission in this exercise, which is required by the regulations. 
Den mycket lnga tid som insamling, bearbetning och versndande av information, analys av denna information vid kommissionen, diskussioner och skriftvxling tagit i ansprk har lett till att medlemsstaterna och kommissionen gradvis mist intresset fr detta i frordningarnas freskrivna frfarande.
In addition, the fact that the results have not been formally stated or published makes knowledge of the state of progress in each Member State and on each Objective impossible. 
Att resultaten inte formellt faststllts eller spridits har dessutom resulterat i att det blivit omjligt att f knnedom om situationen i frga om enskilda medlemsstater och ml.
For Objective 1, two of the Member States (F and UK) out of the seven involved (EL, E, F, IRL, I, P and UK) have not even begun ex post verification. 
Fr ml 1 har tv medlemsstater (F och UK) av de sju som berrs (EL, E, F, IRL, I, P och UK) inte ens inlett ngon efterhandskontroll.
In the case of the others, the Commission has accepted, although not without difficulty and occasionally with reservations (EL), the data and results submitted by the Member States (in some cases extremely late Ń Italy in 1997). 
Fr de vriga har kommissionen godknt den information och de resultat som medlemsstaterna lagt fram (i vissa fall mycket sent Đ Italien r 1997), dock inte utan problem och ibland med reservation (EL).
In Germany, no verification was carried out for the 1991 to 1993 period on account of the special circumstances of the new Lnder. 
I Tyskland har ingen kontroll genomfrts fr perioden 1991Đ1993 p grund av de srskilda omstndigheter som franleds av de nya delstaterna.
9.3.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 68/7 26. 
9.3.2000 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 68/7 26.
For Objective 2 (B, DK, D, E, F, I, L, NL and UK), the situation is less certain. 
Fr ml 2 (B, DK, D, E, F, I, L, NL och UK), r situationen oskrare.
Three Member States have not sent in the data (F, L and UK), and for three others the data sent were inadequate. 
Tre medlemsstater har inte snt in ngon information (F, L och UK), och fr tre andra var informationen otillrcklig (B, DK och D).
The Italian authorities did not send in information on the year 1988 until May 1999. 
De italienska myndigheterna snde frst i maj 1999 in uppgifterna fr 1988.
The Commission has not taken any concrete steps to carry out an ex post verification of the observance of additionality for Objective 5b. 
Kommissionen har inte vidtagit ngra konkreta tgrder fr att kontrollera additionaliteten fr ml 5b.
The only analyses carried out concern the calculations of the baseline for the 1994 to 1999 period. 
De enda analyser som genomfrts gller berkningarna fr referensbaserna fr perioden 1994Đ1999.
Only one Member State (E) has sent, of its own initiative, final data to the Commission, but has received no reply. 
Endast en medlemsstat (E) har p eget initiativ snt slutlig information till kommissionen, men inte ftt ngot svar.
For Objectives 3 and 4, the Commission published a report (13) in 1995 setting out the results of an audit it had carried out on the data provided by the Member States, which was, in the majority of cases, insufficient (14). 
Vad gller ml 3 och 4 har kommissionen r 1995 offentliggjort en rapport (13). I den framlggs resultaten av en granskning som genomfrts av kommissionen med utgngspunkt i information, fr det mesta otillrcklig, som snts in av medlemsstaterna (14).
The 12 Member States were examined, even though for the three to whom Objective 1 applied additionality was verified within the framework of the CSF for this Objective. 
De 12 medlemsstaterna granskades, ven om additionalitetsprincipen fr de tre stater som berrs av ml 1 kontrolleras inom ramarna fr gemenskapsstd fr detta ml.
The Commission concluded that the principle of additionality was being observed in four countries (D, F, L and P), was less sure in three other countries (DK, I and NL) and stated that the principle had not been observed at all in the five remaining countries (B, EL, E, IRL and the UK). 
Fr fyra medlemsstater (D, F, L och P) drog kommissionen slutsatsen att additionalitetsprincipen hade efterlevts, fr tre andra (DK, I och NL) att detta var mindre skert, och fr de vriga medlemsstaterna (B, EL, E, IRL och UK) att detta verhuvudtaget inte hade kunnat visas.
This situation has still not been monitored and the process of verifying additionality has therefore not been completed. 
Denna situation har nnu inte granskats och kontrollen av att additionalitetsprincipen efterlevts har allts inte avslutats.
The 1994 to 1999 period 29. 
Perioden 1994Đ1999 29.
At the beginning of the 1994 to 1999 period, the initial results of the ex ante verifications were set out in the majority of the CSFs/SPDs, in varying degrees of detail. 
I brjan av perioden 1994Đ1999 framlades de frsta resultaten av frhandskontrollerna i strsta delen av ramarna fr gemenskapsstd/de samlade programplaneringsdokumenten, i olika grad av detalj.
For example, the ex ante verification of Objective 2 for 1994 to 1996 for Luxembourg was only carried out during the summer of 1998. 
Frhandskontrollen fr ml 2 1994Đ1996 genomfrdes till exempel fr Luxemburgs del inte frrn under sommaren 1998.
The Commission carried out the ex ante analyses on the basis of the tables sent in by the Member States. 
Kommissionen har genomfrt frhandsanalyser med utgngspunkt i tabeller som versnts av medlemsstaterna.
Usually these tables had been created by putting together many items of data relating to regions, sectors and other units. 
Dessa tabeller r i allmnhet resultatet av en sammanstllning av flera olika regionala, sektorsvisa och vriga uppgifter.
Their reliability can only be properly evaluated if their sources and the methods used to draw them up are known, which is not often the case. 
Deras tillfrlitlighet kan bedmas endast om man knner till kllorna till dem och tillvgagngsstten vid framtagandet av dem, vilket sllan r fallet.
The lack of the methodology and tools needed to examine the validity of the results obtained by the Member States leaves the Commission no alternative but to accept the conclusions reached by the national authorities. 
Avsaknaden av en metodologi och instrument som skulle tillta en analys av tillfrlitligheten hos de resultat som medlemsstaterna kommit fram till gr att kommissionen inte har ngot annat alternativ n att godta de nationella myndigheternas slutsatser.
Tables 1 and 2 show the annual average expenditure on development in the Objective 1 regions as given in the CSFs/SPDs. 
Tabellerna 1 och 2 visar de rliga genomsnittliga utgifterna fr utveckling i ml 1-regionerna, ssom dessa framlggs i ramarna fr gemenskapsstd/de samlade programplaneringsdokumenten.
The extreme variations that can be seen in these tables could, in some cases, be the result of the quality and the quantity of the information transmitted by the Member States. 
De extrema skillnader som frekommer kan i vissa fall bero p kvaliteten hos och kvantiteten av de uppgifter som medlemsstaterna snt in.