natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In practice they are only carried out when there are HVO inspections (33) in Member States, or following complaints by third parties. 
I praktiken sker inte detta frrn i samband med OAV:s inspektioner (33) i medlemsstaterna eller efter klagoml frn tredje man.
The Commission has addressed to the Member States a large number of warnings for not transposing directives in time. 
Kommissionen har riktat ett stort antal formella underrttelser till medlemsstaterna om att direktiv inte har infrlivats i tid.
When the national measures adopted were communicated the Commission archived the files, without checking them for compliance. 
Efter att ha informerats om att de nationella bestmmelserna har antagits har kommissionen arkiverat rendena utan att kontrollera att de verenstmmer.
Consequently, no infringement file has ever been opened by the Commission as far as non-compliance is concerned. 
Kommissionen har fljaktligen heller aldrig inlett ett vertrdelserende fr bristande verensstmmelse.
As regards the directive on animal identification, and identification of sheep in particular, which Member States were to transpose by 1 January 1995, the Commission had sent warnings to Member States for not communicating national measures between 1993 and 1996. 
Nr det gller direktivet om identifiering av djur, och d srskilt fr, som skulle ha infrlivats av medlemsstaterna till den 1 januari 1995, utfrdade kommissionen mellan 1993 och 1996 formella underrttelser till medlemsstater fr att dessa inte meddelat de nationella bestmmelserna.
Between 1994 and 1997 it archived the files, following formal transposition of the Community law in the Member States, without making a compliance check. 
Mellan 1994 och 1997 arkiverades rendena efter det att gemenskapslagstiftningen formellt infrlivats i medlemsstaterna utan att det gjordes ngon kontroll av deras verensstmmelse.
During the 2001 crisis, however, the HVO pointed out that in all the Member States affected by FMD (apart from the Netherlands) there were significant omissions regarding the Directive and they had had a negative impact on the spread of the epidemic in 2001 (see paragraph 35). 
Men under krisen 2001 fann OAV stora brister i frhllande till direktivet i samtliga medlemsstater som drabbats av mul-och klvsjuka (med undantag fr Nederlnderna), brister som hade negativa konsekvenser fr epidemins spridning under 2001 (se punkt 35).
(33) During on-site visits the HVO also checks that the national transposing measures are effective and makes recommendations for the attention of the Commission if, amongst other things, it considers that the national measures are not in accordance with Community norms. 
(33) Vid inspektionerna p plats kontrollerar OAV bland annat att tgrderna fr det nationella infrlivandet r effektiva och utformar rekommendationer till kommissionen, bland annat om man bedmer att de nationella tgrderna inte fljer gemenskapens normer.
3.3.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 54/11 Health and veterinary checks at Union frontiers well supervised but certain risks not adequately covered by regulations 24. 
3.3.2005 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 54/11 God vervakning av veterinr-och hygienkontroller vid gemenskapens grnser men ett regelverk som inte tillrckligt vl tcker vissa risker 24.
The HVO carried out numerous health and veterinary checks at Member StatesŐ border inspection posts (BIPs) in order to check that only products that met the Community standards for animal health and food safety entered the Community territory through the BIPs. 
OAV hade fre krisen gjort mnga veterinr-och hygienkontroller av medlemsstaternas grnskontrollstationer fr att verifiera att endast produkter som fljer gemenskapsnormerna i frga om djurhlsa och livsmedelsskerhet kommer in p gemenskapens territorium via grnskontrollstationerna.
In cases where deficiencies were found the Commission temporarily suspended BIPsŐ approval, and in order to have the suspensions lifted Member States were fairly quick to take the corrective action required by the HVO, for example, providing additional personnel, stepping up veterinary controls, improving hygiene in installations and equipment, strengthening the systems for recording batches introduced, veterinary certificates and registers. 
De frbttringar OAV begrde, ssom mer personal och frbttrade veterinrkontroller, bttre hygien vid anlggningarna och i frga om utrustning, bttre system fr registrering av inkommande partier, av veterinrintyg och av register, genomfrde medlemsstaterna relativt snabbt fr att upphva den tillflliga indragningen av godknnandena av grnskontrollstationer, som kommissionen beslutade om nr det konstaterades brister.
Even though it is impossible to provide total protection against external sources of contamination, there were nevertheless a number of shortcomings in the Community regulations at the time of the crisis. They mainly concerned border-protection, especially as regards the carriage of foodstuffs by travellers and the possibility of storing in free zones products that did not comply with Community regulations (see paragraph 91(a)). 
Men ven om det r omjligt att helt skydda sig mot externa smittkllor var gemenskapslagstiftningen vid tiden fr krisen ofullstndig nr det gllde grnsskydd, srskilt i frga om produkter som transporterades av resenrer och mjligheten att lagra produkter som inte verensstmde med gemenskapslagstiftningen i frilager (se punkt 91 a).
Before the crisis the Commission had proposed that introduction into the Community territory be limited to products of animal origin, which meet European animal health standards, but the proposal was only adopted in 2002 (34). 
Kommissionen hade fre krisen freslagit att infrseln till gemenskapens territorium skulle begrnsas till sdana animaliska produkter som uppfyller europeiska normer fr djurhlsa, men detta frslag antogs inte frrn 2002 (34).
Not until November 2002, after the crisis, did the Commission propose reinforcing controls on imports of products of animal origin intended for personal consumption. 
Inte frrn efter krisen, i november 2002, freslog kommissionen frstrkt kontroll av import av animaliska produkter fr privat bruk.
The Decision was adopted in December 2002 (35). 
Frslaget antogs i december 2002 (35).
Delays in imposing controls and banning the use of catering waste for animal feed 26. 
Sen kontroll av och frbud mot anvndning av matavfall som djurfoder 26.
The HVO inspections concerning animal feed were carried out late, partly after the crisis. 
OAV:s inspektioner av djurfoder gjordes sent, och delvis efter krisen.
The HVO highlighted the gaps (34) Council Directive 2002/99/EC of 16 December 2002 laying down the animal health rules governing the production, processing, distribution and introduction of products of animal origin for human consumption (OJ L 18, 23.1.2003, p. 
Hrigenom lyftes riskerna (34) Rdets direktiv 2002/99/EG av den 16 december 2002 om faststllande av djurhlsoregler fr produktion, bearbetning, distribution och infrsel av produkter av animaliskt ursprung avsedda att anvndas som livsmedel (EGT L 18, 23.1.2003, s.
(35) Commission Decision 2002/995/EC of 9 December 2002 laying down interim safeguard measures with regard to imports of products of animal origin for personal consumption (OJ L 353, 30.12.2002, p. 
(35) Kommissionens beslut 2002/995/EG av den 9 december 2002 om tillflliga skyddsbestmmelser fr import av animaliska produkter fr privat konsumtion (EGT L 353, 30.12.2002, s.
In so doing it brought to light the risks associated with this type of feedstuff, but partly only after the crisis. 
1). i samband med denna typ av foder fram, men detta skedde till viss del frst efter krisen.
The risks associated with this type of animal feed had already been illustrated however in 1997/1998, when there was an outbreak of swine fever in Germany as a consequence of using for pig food catering waste and swill that had been inadequately treated and thus infringed Community legislation. 
Emellertid hade redan 1997/1998 riskerna med denna typ av djurfoder visat sig nr det brt ut svinpest i Tyskland till fljd av att man anvnt otillrckligt behandlat matavfall som foder till grisar vilket allts stred mot gemenskapslagstiftningen.
For that reason some Member States had forbidden the use of catering waste on their territory before the 2001 FMD crisis, even if the waste had been treated (France and the Netherlands). Others (Germany and the United Kingdom) had not done so. 
Drfr hade vissa medlemsstater, fre mul-och klvsjukekrisen 2001, frbjudit anvndning av matavfall, ven behandlat sdant, p sitt territorium (Frankrike och Nederlnderna), medan andra inte hade gjort det (Tyskland och Frenade kungariket).
At the Community level, the use of processed catering waste in pig feed was still legal in February 2001 (36), despite the CommissionŐs proposals. 
P gemenskapsniv var i februari 2001 anvndningen av behandlat matavfall i svinfoder fortfarande laglig (36), trots kommissionens frslag.
In the United Kingdom the farm where the crisis originated was licensed to feed catering waste to pigs, provided that it had been treated. 
I Frenade kungariket hade den uppfdare, hos vilken krisen uppstod, tillstnd att anvnda matavfall i sitt grisfoder under frutsttning att det hade behandlats.
In practice the farmer collected catering waste from restaurants, hotels, schools and an armed forces establishment in the vicinity, and stored it outside the farm before sending it to two processing establishments close to the farm. 
I praktiken samlade uppfdaren ihop matavfall frn restauranger, hotell, skolor och militranlggningar i nrheten och lagrade det framfr sin grd innan det transporterades till ngon av de tv anlggningar fr behandling som lg nra hans grd.
However, inspections carried out by the Ministry after the start of the outbreak revealed the presence of abnormal waste in the feeding troughs, clearly demonstrating that the waste had not been adequately treated (37). 
Men de kontroller som utfrdes av ministeriet efter krisutbrottet visade att frmmande avfall fanns kvar i utfordringskrlen vilket tydligt visar att behandlingen av matavfallet varit otillrcklig (37).
The exact provenance of the pan-Asiatic O type virus could not be established with certainty. 
Det exakta ursprunget till viruset av typen Ópan Asiatique OÓ har inte kunnat faststllas med skerhet.
The possibility of the virus having entered via BIPs was more or less ruled out and suspicion fell on illegal shipments of products presented as non-food imports for wholesale outlets or for sale to restaurants or canteens (38). 
Att viruset kommit in via grnskontrollstationer har mer eller mindre uteslutits och misstankarna (38) har riktats mot illegala sndningar av varor som redovisats som icke fdomnen och slts i parti till restauranger och storkk.
(36) The Commission presented a proposal to the Parliament and the Council concerning a ban on the use of catering waste and swill in animal feed (COM (2000) 574) in 2000, but it was not adopted until 2002 (Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002, OJ L 273, 10.10.2002, p. 
(36) r 2000 hade kommissionen lagt fram ett frslag fr Europaparlamentet och rdet (KOM(2000) 574) om att frbjuda anvndning av matavfall som foder till uppfdda djur men frslaget antogs inte frrn 2002 (frordning (EG) nr 1774/2002 (EGT L 273, 10.10.2002, s.
In January 2001, just before the crisis, it also presented a proposal for a ban on the use of catering waste as pig feed, but it was not adopted until 23 October 2001. 
I januari 2001, precis fre krisen, hade kommissionen ocks lagt fram ett frslag p frbud mot anvndning av matavfall i svin-foder, men det antogs inte frrn den 23 oktober 2001.
Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever (OJ L 316, 1.12.2001, p. 
Rdets direktiv 2001/89/EG av den 23 oktober 2001 om gemenskapstgrder fr bekmpning av klassisk svinpest (EGT L 316, 1.12.2001, s.
5). (37) Origin of the UK foot-and-mouth disease epidemic in 2001, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), June 2002. 
5). (37) Origin of the UK Foot and Mouth Disease Epidemic in 2001, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs; rapport om ursprunget till mul-och klvsjukeepidemin i Frenade kungariket frn ministeriet fr milj, mat och landsbygdsfrgor, juni 2002.
C 54/12 EN Official Journal of the European Union 3.3.2005 Insufficient checks and criteria for Member StatesŐ contingency plans 29. 
C 54/12 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 3.3.2005 Otillrckliga kriterier och kontroller i medlemsstaternas beredskapsplaner 29.
In 1990 the Council (39) called on the Member States to draw up contingency plans setting out the action to be taken if an outbreak of FMD occurred. 
Rdet (39) krvde 1990 att medlemsstaterna upprttade beredskapsplaner med detaljerade tgrder att vidta vid ett utbrott av mul-och klvsjuka.
The plans were to facilitate access to the plant, equipment, personnel and all other appropriate materials necessary for the rapid and efficient eradication of an outbreak. 
Genom planerna skulle det bli mjligt att f fram anlggningar, utrustning, personal och all annan lmplig materiel som krvs fr att snabbt och skert kunna hejda ett utbrott.
The Commission was to lay down the criteria to be applied in drawing up the plans, examine them in order to determine whether they provided a feasible means of achieving the desired objective, and suggest to the Member States where they could be amended. 
Kommissionen skulle faststlla kriterier fr utarbetandet av planerna, och drefter underska dem fr att se om man genom dem kunde n det uppsatta mlet samt ge frslag p eventuella ndringar till medlemsstaten.
30. In 1991 the Commission laid down the minimum criteria to be met by Member StatesŐ contingency plans (40). 
30. r 1991 faststllde kommissionen de minimikriterier som medlemsstaternas beredskapsplaner (40) skulle uppfylla.
(40) Commission Decision 91/42/EEC of 8 January 1991 laying down the criteria to be applied when drawing up contingency plans for the control of foot-and-mouth disease, in application of Article 5 of Council Directive 90/423/EEC (OJ L 23, 29.1.1991, p. 
(40) Kommissionens beslut 91/42/EEG av den 8 januari 1991 om faststllande av de kriterier som skall tillmpas vid upprttandet av katastrofplaner fr bekmpning av mul-och klvsjuka, med tillmpning av rdets direktiv 90/423/EEG (EGT L 23, 29.1.1991, s.
29). (e) the system for recruiting valuers in an emergency and the general principles for remunerating them; (f) the farmer compensation system and its use before or after culling. 
29). e) systemet fr snabbrekrytering av vrderingsmn och allmnna principer fr ersttningen till dem, f) systemet fr kompensation till uppfdare och om det trder i kraft fre eller efter slakt.
The Commission has not revised these criteria since 1991. 
Kommissionen har inte reviderat dessa kriterier sedan 1991.
It adopted Member StatesŐ plans between 1993 and 1995. 
Mellan 1993 och 1995 antog kommissionen medlemsstaternas beredskapsplaner.
During that process, however, the Commission confined itself to making documentary checks, with no on-the-spot checks of the effectiveness of the described measures. 
Under denna process begrnsade kommissionen sig emellertid till en underskning p papper utan att kontrollera de uppgivna tgrderna p plats.
Contrary to the CommissionŐs reply to paragraph 33, its 1995 Guidelines for the preparation of contingency plans (41) only required the Member States to have sufficient veterinary staff to deal with up to 10 outbreaks of disease at any one time, and did not ask them to provide for the number of staff to be increased as a function of the epidemi-ogical situation. 
Tvrtemot vad man sger i sitt svar p punkt 33 var kommissionens riktlinjer fr utarbetandet av beredskapsplaner frn 1995 (41) begrnsade till att begra av medlemsstaterna att deras veterinrvsende skulle ha tillrcklig kapacitet fr att, nr som helst, kunna behandla upp till tio utbrott, och man begrde inte att de skulle planera fr att kunna utka sina tjnster beroende p den epidemiologiska situationen.
Moreover, the first on-the-spot inspections of these plans by the Commission (HVO) in the Member States affected by FMD only took place at the end of 2001 and during the 2002 year, after the crisis. 
Dessutom utfrdes inte kommissionens (OAV:s) frsta inspektioner p plats av dessa beredskapsplaner i de medlemsstater som drabbades av mul-och klvsjuka frrn i slutet av 2001 och under budgetret 2002, efter krisen.
The Parliament also pointed out that, before the crisis, the Commission did not Ôreview the Member StatesŐ contingency plans within an appropriate periodŐ. 
Europaparlamentet har ocks visat att kommissionen inte fre krisen med nskvrd skyndsamhet hade kontrollerat medlemsstaternas beredskapsplaner.
It went on to say, ÔAt the time of the 2001 crisis Đ apart from the assessments in connection with the approval of the contingency plans Đ [the Commission] had still not reviewed the implementation either of the UKŐs contingency plan or of those of the Netherlands or FranceŐ (42). 
Vidare konstateras att bortsett frn kontrollerna i anslutning till godknnandet av beredskapsplaner, hade infrandet av beredskapsplanerna i Frenade kungariket, Nederlnderna och Frankrike inte kontrollerats innan epidemin brt ut 2001 (42).
As a consequence the Member StatesŐ plans, although adopted by the Commission, could not be adapted to a crisis that was unprecedented and on a scale that was difficult to imagine. 
Fljaktligen var medlemsstaternas planer, ven om de hade antagits av kommissionen, inte anpassade till en kris av stor omfattning som saknade motstycke och var svr att frutsga.
(41) Guidelines for the preparation of contingency plans for epidemic diseases, paragraph 6.12: ÔEach Member State should ensure that it has immediately available sufficient trained staff to deal with, at any time, up to 10 outbreaks of disease and to properly maintain surveillance in the 3 km radius protection zone associated with each. 
(41) I riktlinjerna fr utarbetandet av beredskapsplaner vid epidemiologiska sjukdomar, punkt 6.12, sgs att varje medlemsstat skall se till att den omedelbart har tillgng till tillrckligt mycket utbildad personal fr att nr som helst kunna behandla upp till tio sjukdomsutbrott och p ett godtagbart stt vervaka den 3 kilometer breda skyddszonen runt vart och ett av utbrotten.
It has been estimated that a trained veterinarian can visit and examine stock at no more than five holdings on one day if he/she properly undertakes the required disinfection procedures at each place.Ő (42) European Parliament, Resolution adopted on 17 December 2002, paragraph 54. 
Man har berknat att en utbildad veterinr kan beska och underska besttningen p hgst fem grdar varje dag om han/hon p varje stlle genomfr den obligatoriska desinfektionsproceduren p ett korrekt stt. (42) Europaparlamentets resolution av den 17 december 2002, punkt 54.
3.3.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 54/13 33. 
3.3.2005 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 54/13 33.
For example, the plan submitted to the Commission by the United Kingdom had not been substantially reviewed since its adoption in 1991. 
Som exempel hade inte den plan som Frenade kungariket verlmnade till kommissionen genomgtt ngon grundlig versyn sedan den antogs 1991.
In line with the CommissionŐs guidelines it did not make provision for a pessimistic scenario (43) and even in the national plan, the basis for plans at local level, the scenario only covered up to ten outbreaks at any one time (44), without establishing any procedures for rapidly increasing the resources needed to handle culling and destruction. 
I enlighet med kommissionens riktlinjer innehll den inget pessimistiskt scenario (43) och ven i den nationella planen, p lokal niv, omfattade inte scenariot fler n tio utbrott samtidigt (44) och det fanns inga frfaranden fr att snabbt ka ndvndiga resurser fr hantering av slakt och destru-ering.
The plan had not been issued to farmers or farmersŐ representatives. 
Planen hade inte distribuerats till uppfdarna eller deras representanter.
In France the plan made it possible to deal successfully with the two outbreaks that occurred simultaneously, but there was no provision for the increased resources needed to deal with a more pessimistic scenario. 
Nr det gller Frankrike kunde man genom planen framgngsrikt behandla de tv utbrott som gde rum samtidigt men det saknades beredskap fr det kade behovet av resurser som ett mer pessimistiskt scenario skulle medfra.
The Irish contingency plan envisaged dealing with ten outbreaks at any one time. 
I den irlndska planen frutsgs behandling av tio utbrott samtidigt.
The CommissionŐs internal audit showed that the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection, which is constantly being confronted with crises in the animal sector, had introduced standardised routines, which were judged effective, but these working procedures had not been documented. 
Kommissionens internrevision har visat att Generaldirektoratet fr hlsa och konsumentskydd, som stndigt r utsatt fr kriser p djuromrdet, hade infrt standardiserade rutiner som bedmdes vara effektiva, men dessa arbetsmetoder hade inte dokumenterats i skrift.
Moreover, crisis management materials and manuals were not available. Although the Commission responded rapidly during the crisis (see paragraph 44), the Court considers that good groundwork by the Commission, especially from the point of view of the financial arrangements for the reimbursement to be granted to Member States (see paragraphs 74 to 81), would have made it possible to avoid some of the problems encountered during the 2001 crisis. 
Det fanns inte heller utrustning eller handbcker fr krishantering. ven om kommissionen agerade snabbt i anslutning till krisen (se punkt 44) anser revisionsrtten att om kommissionen hade varit vl frberedd, srskilt i frga om finansiella bestmmelser fr ersttning till medlemsstaterna (se punkterna 74Đ81), skulle vissa av de problem som uppstod under krisen 2001 ha kunnat undvikas.
Incomplete identification and inadequate tracing of animals of FMD-sensitive species 35. 
Ofullstndig identifiering och otillrcklig sprning av djur av raser som r mottagliga fr mul-och klvsjuka 35.
At Community level there is a compulsory system for identifying and registering cattle individually (45). 
P gemenskapsniv r systemet fr att identifiera och registrera enskilda ntkreatur obligatoriskt (45).
However, the (43) The 2001 Outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, 21 June 2002, The Stationery Office, London, p. 4, section 2, third paragraph: ÔThe plans were based on the most likely scenario and other scenarios were not considered. 
Trots detta kan (43) The 2001 Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, 21 juni 2002, The Stationery Office, London; rapport av controllern och riksrevisorn om 2001 rs utbrott av mul-och klvsjuka, punkt 2 tredje stycket: Planerna baserades p det mest troliga scenariot och man hade inte vervgt andra scenarier.
In line with European Commission guidance, the DepartmentŐs plans were based on the supposition that there would not be more than 10 infected premises at any one timeŐ. 
I enlighet med gemenskapens riktlinjer utgick avdelningens planer frn antagandet att det inte skulle finnas fler n tio smittade grdar samtidigt.
(44) The 2001 Outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, 21 June 2002, The Stationery Office, London, paragraph 2.30. 
(44) The 2001 Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, 21 juni 2002, The Stationery Office, London; punkt 2.30; rapport av controllern och riksrevisorn om 2001 rs utbrott av mul-och klvsjuka.