natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For the ERDF there were three Member States (Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia), for the ESF there were four (Czech Republic, Cyprus, Malta and Finland) and for the CF there were two (Cyprus and Malta) where no confirmed financial corrections were applied in the 2000‐2006 programme period. 
Fr Eruf fanns det tre medlemsstater (Cypern, Malta och Slovenien), fr ESF fyra (Tjeckien, Cypern, Malta och Finland) och fr Sammanhllningsfonden tv (Cypern och Malta) som inte pfrdes ngra bekrftade finansiella korrigeringar under programperioden 2000Đ2006.
The Commission’s assessment of weaknesses and financial corrections were in substance confirmed by the European Court of Justice 52. 
Kommissionens bedmning av brister och finansiella korrigeringar bekrftades i sak av Europeiska unionens domstol 52.
Where the Commission enforces suspensions or financial corrections by way of a Commission decision, the Member State is entitled to challenge this decision before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
Nr kommissionen hller inne betalningar eller gr finansiella korrigeringar genom ett kommissionsbeslut har medlemsstaten rtt att verklaga beslutet till Europeiska unionens domstol.
We therefore looked at whether the Commission decisions for previous programme periods were upheld in substance by the ECJ. 34 
Vi underskte drfr huruvida kommissionens beslut fr tidigare programperioder godkndes i sak av EU-domstolen. 35
2000‐2006 1994‐1999 Table 2 ‐ Commission decisions on financial corrections (1994‐1999 and 2000‐2006 programme periods) Programme period Member state Commission decision Belgium Germany 16 Ireland 5 Greece 7 Spain 14 France 4 Italy 7 Luxembourg Netherlands 3 Austria 3 Portugal 5 Finland 1 United Kingdom 7 Interreg1 4 Subtotal for 1994‐1999: 77 19 96 26 26 0 20 6 Lithuania 1 Portugal 4 Slovakia 1 United Kingdom 1 Interreg1 1 1 411 1 1 1 1 Subtotal for 2000‐2006: 38 3 41 15 11 4 8 3 TOTAL: 115 22 137 41 37 4 28 9 41 37 1 Interregional programmes are implemented by more than one Member State. Source: Information provided by the Commission. 
2000Đ2006 1994Đ1999 Tabell 2 Đ Kommissionsbeslut om finansiella korrigeringar (programperioderna 1994Đ1999 och 2000Đ2006) Programperiod Medlemsstat Antal renden till EU-domstolen Avslutade nde Kommissionens beslut Belgien Nederlnderna 3 sterrike 3 Portugal 5 Finland 1 Frenade kungariket 7 Interregionala1 4 4 4 1 1 2 2 4 1 1 1 Delsumma fr 1994Đ1999: 77 19 96 26 26 0 20 6 Belgien 1 Tyskland 1 Irland 1 Grekland 2 Spanien 21 1 1 1 2 Frankrike Italien Litauen 1 Portugal 4 Slovakien 1 Frenade kungariket 1 Interregionala program1 1 11 8 11 Delsumma fr 2000Đ2006: 38 3 41 15 11 4 8 3 TOTALT: 115 22 137 137 41 37 4 28 41 9 37 1 Interregionala program genomfrs av mer n en medlemsstat.
DG REGIO Total Financial correction decisions DG EMPL Number of cases challenged in front of ECJ Status Closed Open Judgement (for the closed cases) 134 1 17 11 11 10 1 4 137 1 6 7 2 2 2 5 1 2 16 5 4 8 7 4 5 5 4 4 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 9 Belgium 1 Germany 1 Ireland 1 Greece 2 Spain 21 France 1 2 3 1 1 1 Italy 3142111 3 1 3 5 2 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 21118362 confirmed annulled 35 
GD REGIO GD EMPL Totalt 134 Tyskland 16 1 17 Irland 516 11 11 10 1 4 Grekland 7 Spanien 14 Frankrike 4 Italien 7 Luxemburg 7 16 4 8 7 5 5 3 3 5 1 2 2 9 4 2 2 5 5 2 1 Beslut om finansiell korrigering Status som verklagats Pge Dom (fr avslutade renden) 2 21 123 314 36 1 2111 2 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 bekrftades upphvdes 36
Up to the end of 2015, from a total of 137 financial correction decisions, 41 cases were brought to the ECJ in relation to the 2000‐2006 and the 1994‐1999 periods (see Table 2). 
Fram till slutet av 2015 vcktes talan vid EU-domstolen i 41 renden rrande perioderna 2000Đ2006 och 1994Đ1999 av totalt 137 beslut om finansiella korrigeringar (se tabell 2).
Of the 41 cases, 37 were closed by the end of 2016. 
Av dessa 41 renden hade 37 avslutats i slutet av 2016.
Around half of the ECJ cases covered by our analysis concern issues linked to non‐ compliance with public procurement rules. 
Omkring hlften av de renden i EU-domstolen som omfattas av vr analys rr frgor som har att gra med bristande efterlevnad av bestmmelserna om offentlig upphandling.
Some other issues include submission of costs incurred outside the eligibility period, switching of funds between operational programmes and identification of weaknesses in management and control procedures. 
Exempel p andra frgor r begran om ersttning fr kostnader som uppkommit utanfr den stdberttigande perioden, flyttning av anslag mellan operativa program och identifiering av brister i frvaltnings-och kontrollfrfarandena.
In nine of the 37 closed cases, the ECJ annulled the Commission’s financial correction decision. 
I nio av de 37 avslutande rendena upphvde EU-domstolen kommissionens beslut om finansiella korrigeringar.
In all nine cases the annulment was due to procedural issues without any conclusions on the substance of the case. 
I alla nio rendena berodde upphvandet p frfarandemssiga problem utan att ngra slutsatser drogs rrande sakfrgan.
Three of the four open cases with the same issues are under appeal. 
Tre av de fyra pgende rendena om samma frgor har verklagats.
In all other cases, the Commission decision was confirmed by the ECJ both on form and on substance. 
I alla andra renden godknde EU-domstolen kommissionens beslut i bde form och sak.
This suggests that the Commission has generally made robust interpretations of the articles governing the application of financial corrections and had applied proportionate financial corrections during the 1994‐1999 and 2000‐2006 periods. 
Detta tyder p att kommissionen i allmnhet har gjort vlgrundade tolkningar av de artiklar som styr tillmpningen av finansiella korrigeringar och att den har tillmpat proportionerliga finansiella korrigeringar under perioderna 1994Đ1999 och 2000Đ2006.
There was only one case where a Member State challenged a Commission decision in relation to a payment suspension for the 2007‐2013 period, but this case is still on‐going and thus not covered by our analysis. 
Endast i ett rende verklagade en medlemsstat ett kommissionsbeslut avseende ett instllande av utbetalningar fr perioden 2007Đ2013, men detta rende pgr fortfarande och omfattas drfr inte av vr analys.
The Commission makes increasing use of preventive measures and financial corrections during the 2007‐2013 period 58. 
Kommissionen anvnde sig i allt strre utstrckning av frebyggande tgrder och finansiella korrigeringar under perioden 2007Đ2013 58.
For the 2007‐2013 period no final assessment is possible at this stage since the closure process for ERDF/CF and ESF OPs will be initiated only in 2017. 
Fr perioden 2007Đ2013 r det i detta lge omjligt att gra en slutlig bedmning eftersom avslutandefrfarandet fr de operativa programmen inom ramen fr Eruf/SF och ESF inte kommer att inledas frrn under 2017.
We therefore looked at the way in which the Commission has made use of the regulatory provisions which were available during this period to protect the EU budget from irregular spending. 
Vi tittade drfr p hur kommissionen har anvnt sig av de rttsliga bestmmelser som fanns att tillg under denna period fr att skydda EU:s budget mot oriktiga utgifter.
Where appropriate, we also made a comparison with the 2000‐2006 period. 36 
Dr s var lmpligt gjorde vi ven jmfrelser med perioden 2000Đ2006. 37
During the 2007‐2013 period the Commission used the measures at its disposal to protect the EU budget more extensively than in the past 59. 
Under perioden 2007Đ2013 anvnde kommissionen sig i strre utstrckning n tidigare av de tgrder den har till sitt frfogande fr att skydda EU:s budget 59.
The Commission should make use of the measures to protect the EU budget set out in the regulations as soon as significant weaknesses are detected in the management and control system and these may result in irregular expenditure being claimed by Member States. 
Kommissionen br anvnda sig av de tgrder till skydd fr EU:s budget som faststlls i frordningarna s snart som betydande brister upptcks i frvaltnings-och kontrollsystemet som kan leda till att medlemsstaterna begr ersttning fr oriktiga utgifter.
This is necessary so that Member States can improve their systems and avoid claiming additional irregular expenditure from the EU budget. 
Detta r ndvndigt fr att medlemsstaterna ska kunna frbttra sina system och undvika att begra ersttning frn EU:s budget fr fler oriktiga utgifter.
We have therefore compared the use made by the Commission of preventive measures and financial corrections for the 2007‐2013 period with that for the previous period. 
Vi har drfr jmfrt kommissionens anvndning av frebyggande tgrder och finansiella korrigeringar fr perioden 2007Đ2013 med anvndningen under fregende period.
For the 2007‐2013 period, financial corrections of around 3 326 million euro had been imposed by the end of 2015 (see Table 1). 
Fr perioden 2007Đ2013 hade kommissionen beslutat om finansiella korrigeringar till ett vrde av omkring 3 326 miljoner euro i slutet av 2015 (se tabell 1).
This corresponds to 1.0 % of the total budget envelope. 
Detta motsvarar 1,0 % av det totala budgetanslaget.
In addition, payments for around 28 446 million euro had been interrupted (8 % of the total allocated envelope). 
Dessutom hade utbetalningar p 28 446 miljoner euro avbrutits (8 % av det totala tilldelade anslaget).
Preventive measures were applied earlier and more extensively in the 2007‐2013 programme period than in the previous period 61. 
Frebyggande tgrder tillmpades tidigare och i strre omfattning under programperioden 2007Đ2013 n under fregende period 61.
Our analysis shows that the Commission started to use preventive measures in 2010, i.e. the 4th year of the 2007‐2013 programme period. 
Vr analys visar att kommissionen brjade anvnda frebyggande tgrder 2010, det vill sga det fjrde ret av programperioden 2007Đ2013.
This was two years earlier than for the 2000‐2006 programme period and five years before the eligibility period finished (see Figure 7 and Table 1). 
Detta var tv r tidigare n fr programperioden 2000Đ2006 och fem r fre utgngen av den stdberttigande perioden (se figur 7 och tabell 1).
Moreover, the preventive measures covered a larger share of the OPs earlier and the Commission also imposed more serious measures earlier. 
Vidare omfattade de frebyggande tgrderna en strre andel av de operativa programmen i ett tidigare skede och kommissionen infrde ven mer kraftfulla tgrder tidigare.
For example, for the 2000‐2006 period, payment suspensions were applied to the first OPs in 2007 (the 8th year of the 2000‐ 2006 period). 
Under perioden 2000Đ2006 stlldes till exempel utbetalningar in fr de frsta operativa programmen under 2007 (det ttonde ret av perioden 2000Đ2006).
For the 2007‐2013 period, this was already the case in 2010 (the 4th year of the 2007‐2013 period. 
Fr perioden 2007Đ2013 skedde detta redan under 2010 (det fjrde ret av perioden 2007Đ2013).
In addition, while for the previous programme period around 20 % of all OPs with a payment suspension had been suspended in year 2007 (the 8th year of the period), for the 2007‐2013 period this was the case for 68 % of such OPs. 
Den fregende programperioden hade utbetalningarna stllts in under 2007 (det ttonde ret av perioden) fr de cirka 20 % av operativa program dr utbetalningar stlldes in, medan det fr perioden 2007Đ2013 hade skett fr 68 % av sdana operativa program.
Our analysis also shows that in the 2007‐2013 period the level of financial corrections and the implementation rate of the imposed financial corrections were similar to those observed during the previous 2000‐2006 period (see Figure 8). 
Vr analys visar ocks att de finansiella korrigeringarna och genomfrandegraden fr gjorda finansiella korrigeringar lg p ungefr samma niv under perioden 2007Đ2013 som under perioden 2000Đ2006 (se figur 8).
The levels of financial corrections in the two periods need, however, to be put into perspective and must be compared with the underlying level of irregular expenditure. 
Niverna p de finansiella korrigeringarna under bda perioderna mste dock sttas in i sitt sammanhang och jmfras med den underliggande nivn p oriktiga utgifter.
Our audits since 2009 have shown that the level of error for the 2007‐2013 period is significantly lower than for the 2000‐2006 programme period29. 
Vra revisioner har sedan 2009 visat att felfrekvensen fr perioden 2007Đ2013 r betydligt lgre n fr programperioden 2000Đ 200629.
This means that there was significantly more irregular expenditure during the 2000‐2006 than during the 2007‐2013 period. 
Det betyder att det frekom mnga fler oriktiga utgifter under perioden 2000Đ2006 n under perioden 2007Đ2013.
In turn, this implies that the level of financial corrections has increased in relative terms. 
Detta tyder i sin tur p att nivn p finansiella korrigeringar har kat relativt sett.
38 29 Annual Report concerning financial year 2015, paragraph 6.74 (OJ C 375, 13.10.2016). 
39 29 Punkt 6.74 i rsrapporten fr budgetret 2015 (EUT C 375, 13.10.2016).
Source: European Court of Auditors based on information provided by the Commission. 
Klla: Europeiska revisionsrtten p grundval av information frn kommissionen.
Final impact of financial corrections for the 2007‐2013 period can be determined only at closure 65. 
Den slutliga inverkan av finansiella korrigeringar under perioden 2007Đ2013 kan endast faststllas vid avslutandet 65.
The final impact of the confirmed financial corrections on the 2007‐2013 OPs (i.e. whether the financial corrections lead to loss of funds) can however be assessed only once the final payment claim has been submitted by the Member State and assessed by the Commission. As for the 2007‐2013 programme period, submission of final payment claims 40 
Den slutliga inverkan av de bekrftade finansiella korrigeringarna p 2007Đ2013 rs operativa program (dvs. huruvida de finansiella korrigeringarna ledde till frlust av medel) 2007Đ2013 2000Đ2006 kan dock endast bedmas nr den sista betalningsanskan har lmnats in av medlemsstaten och bedmts av kommissionen.
must be done by 31 March 201730, so it is too early to assess at the time of drafting this report the impact on Member States of financial corrections for the 2007‐2013 programme period. 
Med avseende p programperioden 2007Đ2013 mste de slutliga betalningsanskningarna lmnas in senast den 31 mars 201730, s nr vi utarbetade denna rapport var det fr tidigt att bedma de finansiella korrigeringarnas inverkan p medlemsstaterna under programperioden 2007Đ2013.
Annex IV provides more detailed information per Member State related to the implementation by the end of 2015 of the Commission’s measures for the 2007‐2013 period. 
I bilaga IV tillhandahlls mer detaljerad information fr varje medlemsstat med avseende p genomfrandet i slutet av 2015 av kommissionens tgrder fr perioden 2007Đ 2013.
The Commission applied its preventive measures and financial corrections in a proportionate manner in the 2007‐2013 period The Commission’s measures in the 2007‐2013 period focussed on the Member States with the riskiest programmes 67. 
Kommissionen tillmpade sina frebyggande tgrder och finansiella korrigeringar p ett proportionerligt stt under perioden 2007Đ2013 Kommissionens tgrder fr perioden 2007Đ2013 var inriktade p de medlemsstater som hade de mest riskfyllda programmen. 67.
Since the 2007‐2013 programme period the Commission has calculated the “amount at risk” for each programme. 
Sedan programperioden 2007Đ2013 har kommissionen berknat Ódet riskutsatta beloppetÓ fr varje program.
These indicators present the programmes’ risk for the given year and they show the potential amount of ineligible expenditure co‐financed for each programme or Member State on the basis of the information available to the Commission. 
Indikatorerna visar p programmens risk fr ret i frga och p det potentiella oberttigade utgiftsbelopp som medfinansieras fr varje program eller medlemsstat p grundval av den information som kommissionen har att tillg.
As the Commission’s measures should mostly affect the riskiest programmes, there is likely to be a correlation between the distribution of the amount at risk and the distribution of financial corrections imposed by the Commission. 
Eftersom kommissionens tgrder frmst ska pverka de mest riskfyllda programmen br det finnas en korrelation mellan frdelningen av det riskutsatta beloppet och frdelningen av de finansiella korrigeringar som kommissionen har beslutat.
We therefore analysed whether such a correlation exists. 
Vi underskte drfr om det finns en sdan korrelation.
Programme risk indicator by Member State correlated with confirmed/decided financial corrections 69. 
Programriskindikator per medlemsstat i frhllande till bekrftade/beslutade finansiella korrigeringar 69.
The difference between the “amount at risk” and the Commission’s and Member State’s financial corrections is the cumulative residual risk (CRR) (see paragraphs 32 to 33). 
Skillnaden mellan det "riskutsatta beloppet" och kommissionens och medlemsstaternas finansiella korrigeringar r den ackumulerade kvarstende risken (se punkterna 32 och 33).
When assessing the OPs, the Commission requires that financial corrections imposed by Member 41 30 Article 89.1a of Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. States and by the Commission are high enough to ensure that this indicator is below a 2 % materiality threshold31. 
42 30 Artikel 89.1 a i frordning (EG) nr 1083/2006. Vid bedmningen av de operativa programmen krver kommissionen att finansiella korrigeringar som grs av medlemsstater och av kommissionen r tillrckligt hga fr att skerstlla att denna indikator ligger under vsentlighetsgrnsen p 2 %31.
Figure 9 shows the programme risk level by Member State as indicated by the Commission’s amount at risk and the level of Commission’s financial corrections per Member State for the 2007‐2013 period. 
Figur 9 visar programrisknivn per medlemsstat enligt vad som utvisas av kommissionens riskutsatta belopp och nivn p kommissionens finansiella korrigeringar per medlemsstat fr perioden 2007Đ2013.
The correlation analysis also displays the trend line (the overall relation for the Member States between the programme risk and the financial corrections imposed by the Commission) as well as the 45 line (points where financial corrections would equal the programme risk level). 
Korrelationsanalysen visar ocks trendkurvan (medlemsstaternas vergripande samband mellan programrisken och de finansiella korrigeringar som kommissionen beslutat) liksom 45-graderslinjen (de punkter dr finansiella korrigeringar motsvarar programrisknivn).
Our correlation analysis shows that the trend line is below the 45 line (see Figure 9). 
Vr korrelationsanalys visar att trendkurvan ligger under 45-graderskurvan (se figur 9).
This indicates that financial corrections imposed by the Commission are generally at a lower level than the amount at risk. 
Det tyder p att de finansiella korrigeringar som kommissionen faststller i allmnhet ligger p en lgre niv n det riskutsatta beloppet.
This can be explained by two factors: - the risk of co‐financing ineligible expenditure (amount at risk) is partly addressed by the financial corrections already imposed as a result of Member State controls without the issue reaching the Commission; and - the Commission requires that financial corrections bring the CRR below the 2 % materiality threshold (and not to zero). 
Detta kan frklaras av tv faktorer: - Risken fr att icke stdberttigande utgifter (riskutsatta belopp) medfinansieras hanteras delvis genom de finansiella korrigeringar som redan har gjorts som ett resultat av medlemsstaternas kontroller utan att rendet nr kommissionen. - Kommissionen krver att finansiella korrigeringar ska snka den ackumulerade kvarstende risken till under vsentlighetsgrnsen p 2 % (och inte till noll).
Most of the Member States are close to the trend line. 
De flesta medlemsstaterna ligger nra trendkurvan.
This indicates that the level of financial corrections imposed by the Commission overall correlates with the Commission’s assessment of the amount at risk32. 
Det tyder p att nivn p de finansiella korrigeringar som faststllts av kommissionen generellt motsvarar kommissionens bedmning av det riskutsatta beloppet32.
31 32 42 See AAR 2015 of DG Regional and Urban Policy, p. 
31 32 43 Se s.
75 and AAR of DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, p. 
75 i den rliga verksamhetsrapporten fr 2015 frn GD regional-och stadspolitik och s.
The correlation coefficient is an indicator, which shows the degree to which the movement in two variables are associated. 
Korrelationskoefficienten r en indikator som visar i vilken omfattning rrelserna i tv variabler r frbundna med varandra.
Its possible values range between ‐1 and 1, the two extreme points indicating a perfect negative or positive link and zero indicating no link, i.e. the two variables move independently of each other. 
Dess mjliga vrden ligger mellan -1 och 1, dr extremvrdena visar p en fullstndig negativ eller positiv koppling och noll visar p ingen koppling, dvs. att de tv variablerna rr sig oberoende av varandra.
Where Member States are significantly above the trend line, the level of financial corrections is higher than the potential amount at risk indicated for the Member State’s programmes. 
Om en medlemsstat befinner sig betydligt ver trendkurvan r nivn p de finansiella korrigeringarna hgre n det potentiella riskutsatta belopp som anges fr medlemsstatens program.
This is, for example, the case for Slovakia, Romania and Ireland. 
S r det till exempel fr Slovakien, Rumnien och Irland.
Where Member States are significantly below the trend line, the level of financial corrections imposed by the Commission is lower than the potential amount at risk indicated for the Member State’s programmes. 
Nr en medlemsstat ligger betydligt under trendkurvan r nivn p de finansiella korrigeringar som faststllts av kommissionen lgre n det potentiella riskutsatta belopp som anges fr medlemsstatens program.
This is, for example, the case for France and Spain, which both applied financial corrections on their own initiative. 
S r det till exempel fr Frankrike och Spanien, som bda tillmpade finansiella korrigeringar p eget initiativ.
By doing this, they avoided additional financial corrections being imposed by the Commission. 43 
Genom att de gjorde detta undvek de att kommissionen faststllde ytterligare finansiella korrigeringar. 44
European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) programmes are implemented by more than one Member State. 
Europeiska territoriala samarbetsprogram (ETC) genomfrs av mer n en medlemsstat.
This is particularly the case for Spain where 20 operational programmes were under suspension and for a further seven programmes, payment claims were interrupted as of the end of 2015 (representing 70 % of all on‐going preventive measures). 
Detta gller i synnerhet Spanien dr utbetalningarna fr 20 operativa program hade hllits inne, och dr ersttningsansprken fr ytterligare sju program avbrts i slutet av 2015 (motsvarande 70 % av alla pgende frebyggande tgrder).
The Commission’s internal procedures for the 2007‐2013 period aim to ensure harmonised treatment of cases across programmes and Member States 76. 
Kommissionens interna frfaranden fr perioden 2007Đ2013 syftar till att garantera en harmoniserad behandling av renden i alla program och medlemsstater 76.
The Commission should ensure harmonised treatment of cases across programmes and Member States and that preventive measures and financial corrections are implemented before payments are resumed. 
Kommissionen br garantera att renden behandlas p ett harmoniserat stt inom olika program och i medlemsstaterna och att frebyggande tgrder och finansiella korrigeringar genomfrs innan utbetalningar terupptas.