natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In another case the ECJ confirmed corrections concerning Greece (3) maintaining that Ô... the Greek Government does not challenge the CommissionŐs statements to the effect that the checks carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture were ineffective because of the insufficient number of qualified staff responsible for the checks and the absence of reports on the checks enabling them to be verifiedŐ. 
I ett annat fall bekrftade domstolen justeringarna fr Grekland (3) och hvdade att Ó...den grekiska regeringen inte bestritt kommissionens pstende att de kontroller som jordbruksministeriet har utfrt var ineffektiva p grund av att det saknades tillrckligt med kvalificerad personal med ansvar fr kontrollerna och p grund av att det inte fanns ngra rapporter ver kontrollerna som kunde mjliggra en granskningÓ.
Fines (4) 119. 
Bter (4) 119.
With effect from 1992, fines (5) were introduced for olive oil which laboratory tests showed not to meet the quality requirements necessary to qualify for consumption aid (6). 
Frn och med 1992 infrdes bter (5) fr olivolja som enligt laboratorietester inte uppfyllde de ndvndiga kvalitetskraven fr att berttiga till konsumtionsstd (6).
With effect from 1996, the rate was reduced to between 20 % and 80 % of the monthly average of the consumption aid applied for in the 12 months preceding that in which the samples were taken (7). 
Frn 1996 snktes satsen till mellan 20 % och 80 % av det mnatliga genomsnittet fr det konsumtionsstd man anskt om under de 12 mnader som fregick den mnad d stickproverna togs (7).
The fines collected were to be credited to the EAGGF. 
De inkasserade bterna skulle krediteras EUGFJ.
As of February 1999, neither Greece nor Italy had imposed the required fines. 
I februari 1999 hade varken Grekland eller Italien utdmt ndvndiga bter.
Italy has provided information on the value of fines which should have been imposed. 
Italien har lmnat information om beloppet fr de bter som skulle ha utdmts.
The information is, however, incomplete since it only covers the period from 1992 to 1995 for which period fines which should have been imposed total some ECU 7,8 million. 
Informationen r dock ofullstndig eftersom den endast omfattar perioden 1992Đ1995 under vilken de bter som skulle ha utdmts uppgick till totalt 7,8 miljoner ecu.
The Italian authorities were unable to provide the information for 1996 to 1998. 
De italienska myndigheterna kunde inte tillhandahlla information fr 1996Đ1998.
Greece has some 90 cases that were detected in the 1992 to 1998 period for which it has not notified the required fines. 
Grekland har ungefr 90 fall som upptcktesunderperioden1992Đ1998ochharfrdennaperiod inte informerat om ndvndiga bter.
The Greek authorities have yet to calculate the value of the fines involved. 
Det terstr fr de grekiska myndigheterna att berkna vrdet p bterna i frga.
In addition, during the period 1994 to 95, because of a dispute between the State Laboratory and the Olive Oil Control Agency, no samples were sent for analysis and those already in the possession of the Laboratory were not analysed. 
Under perioden 1994Đ1995 skickades dessutom p grund av en tvist mellan det statliga laboratoriet och olivoljekontrollorganet inga prover p analys och de prover som laboratoriet redan erhllit analyserades inte.
In Spain, of fines proposed by the control agency of some ECU 913 000, for the period 1992 to 1998, some ECU 394 000 has been collected. 
I Spanien inkasserades ungefr 394 000 ecu av de bter p ungefr 913 000 ecu som kontrollorganet freslagit fr perioden 1992Đ1998.
In Portugal for the period 1995 to 1997, fines of ECU 2 290 have been collected from a total of ECU 32 453 proposed. 
I Portugal inkasserades 2 290 ecu i bter av det freslagna beloppet p totalt 32 453 ecu fr perioden 1995Đ1997.
3 (4) Case C-61/95 of 29 January 1998. () Article 5(2) of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2677/85 (OJ L 254, 5 25.9.1985, p. 
3 (4) Dom av den 29 januari 1998 i ml C-61/95. () Artikel 5.2 i kommissionens frordning (EEG) nr 2677/85, EGT 5 L 254, 25.9.1985, s.
5). () Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1008/92 (OJ L 106, 24.4.1992, 6 p. 12). () Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2568/91 (OJ L 248, 5.9.1991, 7 p. 1). () Commission Regulation (EC) No 887/96 (OJ L 119, 16.5.1996, p. 
5. () Kommissionens frordning (EEG) nr 1008/92, EGT L 106, 24.4.1992, 6 s. 12. () Kommissionens frordning (EEG) nr 2568/91, EGT L 248, 5.9.1991, 7 s.1. () Kommissionens frordning (EG) nr 887/96, EGT L 119, 16.5.1996, s.16.
16). (million ECU) 1995 Total 9,4 9,4 37,6 43,8 0,2 8,2 1,0 17,9 1,1 4,7 49,2 84,0 117. 
1992 1993 Grekland 0,0 0,0 Spanien 5,6 0,6 Frankrike 7,8 0,0 Italien 5,2 11,7 Portugal 0,1 3,5 Totalt 18,7 15,9 (miljoner ecu) 1994 1995 Totalt 0,0 9,4 0,0 37,6 43,8 0,2 0,2 8,2 9,4 0,0 1,0 0,0 1,1 4,7 17,9 0,2 49,2 84,0 Klla: Kommissionens sammanfattande rapporter 1992Đ1995. 117.
Corrections made regarding the two problems mentioned in the previous paragraph were upheld by the Court of Justice. One relevant case (1) concerned Italy. 
De justeringar som avsg de tv problem som nmndes i punktenovanvidmakthllsavdomstolen.Ettrelevantfall(1) rrde Italien.
The responsible authority, the Ministry of Industry, did not withdraw approvals until the Ispettorato Centrale Repressione Frodi (ICRF) had imposed the administrative fine (see also paragraphs 119-123 below). 
Den ansvariga myndigheten, industriministeriet, ter-tog inte godknnandena frrn myndigheten fr bedrgeribekmpning (Ispettorato Centrale Repressione Frodi Đ ICRF) hade lagt fretaget administrativa bter (se ven punkterna 119Đ123 nedan).
In its judgment the ECJ refers to the opinion of the ÔConciliation Body (2)Ő which Ôformed the view that the more recent improvements in the management of securities, and ... the introduction of a fairly rigorous system of penalties should also be taken into considerationŐ. 
I sin dom hnvisar domstolen till yttrandet frn frlikningsorganet (2) som Óansg att hnsyn borde tas till de frbttringar som under tiden gjorts p omrdet fr frvaltning av garantierna [...] att det infrts ett relativt strikt pfljdssystemÓ.
(1) Case C-253/97 of 28 October 1999. 
(1) Dom av den 28 oktober 1999 i ml C-253/97.
(2) Commission Decision No 442/94 of 1.7.1994 (OJ L 182, 16.7.1994) setting up a conciliation procedure states that the Conciliation BodyŐs purpose is Ňto try to reconcile the divergent positions of the Commission and the Member State concernedÓ with regard to corrections proposed by the Commission in the context of the clearance of accounts procedure. The Body forms an integral part of the clearance procedure. 
(2) Enligt kommissionens beslut 94/442/EG av den 1 juli 1994 (EGT L 182, 16.7.1994) om ett frlikningsfrfarande i samband med rkenskapsavslutet har frlikningsorganet till uppgift Óatt frska stadkomma en frlikning mellan kommissionen och den berrda medlemsstaten vad gller de skiljaktiga stndpunkternaÓ nr det gller de justeringar som kommissionen freslagit i samband med frfarandet fr avslutning av rkenskaperna.
Member States may choose to make use of the conciliation procedure, subject to certain minimum values, without prejudice to their right to refer the matter to the European Court of Justice. 
Medlemsstaterna fr under vissa frutsttningar vlja att inleda frlikningsfrfarandet, utan att det pverkar deras rtt att hnvisa rendet till EG-domstolen.
The opinions of the Body are not binding on the CommissionŐs final decision on the clearance of accounts. 
Organets yttranden r inte bindande fr kommissionens slutliga beslut om rkenskapsavslutet.
C 215/30 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 27.7.2000 121. 
C 215/30 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 27.7.2000 121.
The delays in notification of fines in Italy were attributed to staff shortages (1). 
Frseningen av anmlan av bter i Italien tillskrevs personalbrist (1).
In its defence, the Ispettorato Centrale Repressione Frodi (ICRF), responsible for the imposition of these fines, maintains that all fines will be notified within the five years laid down by the statute of limitations. 
I sitt frsvar vidhller Ispettorato Centrale Repressione Frodi (ICRF), som ansvarar fr att utdma dessa bter att alla bter kommer att anmlas inom de fem r som faststllts i bestmmelserna.
Whilst such delays are permissible under the law, the systematic failure to notify these fines promptly and pursue recovery action is damaging to the financial interests of the Community (see also paragraph 88). 
Sdana frseningar kan visserligen tilltas enligt lag men nr man systematiskt underlter att omedelbart anmla dessa bter och fullflja terkravstgrder skadar det gemenskapens ekonomiska intressen (se ven punkt 88).
As of 1993, fines (2) were introduced in respect of applications for quantities of consumption aid that were greater than those for which entitlement was recognised. 
Frn 1993 infrdes bter (2) fr anskningar om konsumtionsstd som gller en kvantitet som verskrider den fr vilken rtten till std har erknts.
The fines should be between three and eight times the unduly claimed aid. 
Bterna skall motsvara mellan tre och tta gnger det std som oberttigat har anskts om.
The Regulation is silent as to whether or not these fines should be credited to the EAGGF. 
Frordningen sger ingenting om huruvida dessa bter skall krediteras EUGFJ.
However, a letter from the Commission to the Italian authorities in 1998 (3) indicated that they were to be credited to the national budgets. 
I ett brev frn kommissionen till de italienska myndigheterna 1998 (3) stod det att de skulle krediteras de nationella budgetarna.
Amongst the arguments given for this interpretation was that Member States would be more inclined to impose the highest rate of penalty and thereby obtain the greatest deterrent effect. 
Ett av argumenten fr denna tolkning var att medlemsstaterna d skulle vara mer bengna att lgga hgsta pfljdssatsen och att det drmed skulle f den mest avskrckande effekten.
The Court considers that the Regulation should have required the fines to be credited to the EU budget as for fines in respect of quality infringements. 
Revisionsrtten anser att frordningen borde ha innehllit krav p att bterna krediteras EU:s budget, nr det gller bter fr vertrdelse avseende kvalitet.
In contrast with the CommissionŐs idea that crediting these fines to the national budget should increase their efficacy, their deterrent effect was seriously undermined by delays in notification (and, consequently, collection) for example, in Italy, where the majority of fines are notified in the last year of the five provided for by the statute of limitations. 
I strid med kommissionen uppfattning att dessa bter skulle bli effektivare om de krediteras de nationella budgetarna, frsmrades den avskrckande effekten vsentligt genom exempelvis frseningar i anmlningar (och fljaktligen i terkraven) i Italien dr de flesta bter anmls under det sista ret av de fem som faststlls i bestmmelserna.
In Greece, of a possible 468 cases where fines have been recommended by the Control Agency since 1993, decisions to apply fines have only been taken in 121 cases. 
I Grekland har beslut om att lgga bter fattats i endast 121 fall av 468 mjliga fall dr kontrollorganet sedan 1993 rekommenderat bter.
In 60 % of these cases the delay between the date of the report and the date of the decision was more than four years. 
I 60 % av dessa fall var tidsperioden mellan rapportens datum och beslutsdatumet mer n fyra r.
Exchange of information on laboratory tests 124. 
Utbyte av information om laboratorietest 124.
Exports of olive oil could and did attract both consumption aid and export refunds. 
Export av olivolja kunde ge och har givit bde konsumtionsstd och exportbidrag.
The chemical parameters which had to be met for consumption aid and export refunds were mostly identical. 
De kemiska parametrar som krvdes fr bde konsumtionsstd och exportbidrag var till stora delar identiska.
Despite this, there was no systematic exchange of information in any of the Member States between the bodies responsible for export refunds and those responsible for consumption aid in respect of irregularities detected in laboratory tests. 
Trots detta skedde inget systematiskt informationsutbyte i ngon av medlemsstaterna mellan de organ som ansvarade fr exportbidrag och de som ansvarade fr konsumtionsstd med avseende p oriktigheter som upptckts vid laboratorietest.
Italy and Spain were requested to check whether or not consumption aid had been claimed for a selection of export refund transactions where irregularities had been detected in laboratory tests. 
Italien och Spanien uppmanades att kontrollera huruvida ngon hade anskt om konsumtionsstd fr ett urval av exportbidragstransaktioner fr vilka oriktigheter hade avsljats vid laboratorietest.
Spain has reported one case, involving penalties of some ECU 83 000 which should have been applied. 
Spanien har rapporterat ett fall dr bter p ungefr 83 000 ecu borde ha lagts.
Enquiries involving 12 cases are still under way in Italy. 
Underskningar av tolv fall pgr fortfarande i Italien.
There were no cases to be followed up in Greece and Portugal. 
Det fanns inga fall som behvde fljas upp i Grekland och Portugal.
Export refunds 126. 
Exportbidrag 126.
Irregularities in payments of export refunds for olive oil, as reported to the Commission, are considerably less than consumption aid irregularities, some ECU 12,5 million for export refunds in comparison with ECU 456 million for consumption aid. 
De oegentligheter nr det gller utbetalningar av exportbidrag fr olivolja som rapporterats till kommissionen r avsevrt mindre n oegentligheterna rrande konsumtionsstd, ungefr 12,5 miljoner ecu fr exportbidrag jmfrt med 456 miljoner fr konsumtionsstd.
The rate of recovery is only marginally higher, 13 % for export refunds as compared with 6 % for consumption aid but the delays in recovery are considerably shorter. 
Den andel som terbetalas r endast marginellt hgre, 13 % fr exportbidrag jmfrt med 6 % fr konsumtionsstd, men frseningarna av terbetalningarna r betydligt mindre.
Some 43 % of amounts to be recovered for consumption aid irregularities relates to years prior to 1993, whereas almost 100 % of unrecovered amounts for export refund irregularities relates to 1993 and subsequent years. 
Ungefr 43 % av de belopp avseende oriktigt konsumtionsstd som skall terbetalas hrrr frn r fre 1993, medan nstan 100 % av icke terbetalda oriktiga exportbidrag avser 1993 och senare r.
This does not imply that the rate of recovery for export refund irregularities is acceptable. 
Detta betyder inte att terbetalningsgraden fr oriktiga exportbidrag r godtagbar.
Some 87 % (ECU 10,9 million) is outstanding for the years 1993 to 1996. 
Ungefr 87 % (10,9 miljoner ecu) r utestende fr ren 1993Đ1996.
The reasons for the delays, administrative and judicial, are similar to those for consumption aid. Member States should therefore take urgent steps to improve their recovery procedures. 
Orsakerna till frseningarna Đ administrativa och rttsliga Đ liknar dem fr konsumtionsstd. Medlemsstaterna br drfr vidta omedelbara tgrder fr att frbttra sina terkravsfrfaranden.
Conclusions 128. 
Slutsatser 128.
According to information on debtors supplied to the Commission by the Member States (Table 105), Italy accounts for about 60 % of debts two thirds of which relate to consumption aid. 
Enligt den information om fordringar som medlemsstaterna verlmnat till kommissionen (tabell 105), str Italien fr ungefr 60 % av fordringarna av vilka tv tredjedelar avser konsumtionsstd.
These figures are known to be inaccurate since most of the Member StatesŐ paying agencies do not have accurate and complete debtor accounts. 
Man vet att dessa belopp r felaktiga eftersom de flesta av medlemsstaternas utbetalande organ inte har riktiga och fullstndiga rkenskaper fr fordringar.
For example, this audit showed that Italy alone had understated debts by ECU 208 million in Table 105. 
Exempelvis visade denna granskning att Italien ensamt hade undervrderat skulderna med 208 miljoner ecu i tabell 105.
The information provided, though incomplete, points to a disturbing scenario of fraud and irregularities at the expense of the EU budget, coupled with inadequate recovery and sanction procedures in the Member States (see paragraphs 83, 93-111, 117-123). 
Den inlmnade informationen pvisar ven om den r ofullstndig ett oroande scenario med bedrgerier och oegentligheter p bekostnad av EU:s budget, i kombination med otillrckliga terkravs-och pfljdsfrfaranden i medlemsstaterna (se punkterna 83, 93Đ111, 117Đ123).
The Commission bears responsibility for not having introduced regulatory requirements for effective checks and fines from the outset and for failing to ensure that Member States kept debtor accounts, set up effective recovery procedures and applied the fines once they had at last been introduced (see paragraphs 89-92, 93, 117-123). 
Kommissionen har ansvaret fr att den inte infrde lagstadgade krav p verkningsfulla kontroller och bter frn brjan, och fr att den inte lyckades se till att medlemsstaterna bokfrde fordringar, utarbetade ndamlsenliga terkravsfrfaranden och lade bter nr dessa krav till slut hade infrts (se punkterna 89Đ92, 93, 117Đ123).
27.7.2000 EN Official Journal of the European Communities C 215/31 130. 
27.7.2000 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning C 215/31 130.
The lengthy administrative and/or judicial procedures in Member States are the principal causes of the delay in the recovery of sums unduly paid. 
De lngdragna administrativa och/eller rttsliga frfarandena i medlemsstaterna r den frmsta orsaken till frseningar av terkraven av felaktigt utbetalda belopp.
There are several factors contributing to the length of these procedures in Member States, principally the shortages of staff in administrations, Courts and district attorney offices, but also the lack of a deterrent for appeals which may subsequently prove to be either a delaying tactic or otherwise without serious justification, (see paragraph 101) and the failure to monitor systematically the progress of criminal cases. 
Det finns flera faktorer som bidrar till att dessa frfaranden tar s lng tid, huvudsakligen personalbristen inom frvaltningar, domstolar och distriktskla-garkontor, men ven avsaknaden av tgrder fr att avskrcka frn verklaganden som senare kan visa sig vara antingen frseningstaktik eller p annat stt sakna seris motivering (se punkt 101) och misslyckandet att systematiskt vervaka brottm-lens utveckling.
However, in that their actions to recover unduly paid sums of some ECU 429 million relating to the period 1983 to 1998 were inadequate and in that they failed to collect fines, Greece and Italy have not acted with the necessary diligence referred to by the ECJ (see paragraph 87). 
Eftersom Greklands och Italiens tgrder fr att inkassera felaktigt utbetalda belopp p ungefr 429 miljoner ecu som avsg perioden 1983 till 1998 var otillrckliga, och de inte lyckades driva in bter, har dessa lnder inte iakttagit den noggrannhet som EG-domstolen hnvisar till (se punkt 87).
The Commission should therefore take urgent action within the context of the clearance of accounts to protect the CommunitiesŐ financial interests. 
Kommissionen br drfr vidta omedelbara tgrder i samband med frfarandet fr avslutning av rkenskaperna fr att skydda gemenskapens ekonomiska intressen.
The Commission should also consider introducing a time limit for Member States to recover sums unduly paid. 
Kommissionen br ven vervga att infra en tidsgrns fr medlemsstaterna att inkassera felaktigt utbetalda belopp.
Any sums not recovered within such a time limit should be credited to the EAGGF budget within the clearance of accounts procedures pending a definitive court judgment (see paragraph 88). 
Alla belopp som inte inkasserats inom denna tidsgrns skulle krediteras EUGFJ:s budget i samband med frfarandet fr avslutning av rkenskaperna i avvaktan p en slutlig domstolsdom (se punkt 88).
This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its meeting of 4 May 2000. 
Denna rapport har antagits av revisionsrtten i Luxemburg vid dess sammantrde den 4 maj 2000.
C 215/32 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 27.7.2000 ANNEX REVIEW OF THE WORLD OLIVE OIL MARKET 1. 
C 215/32 SV Europeiska gemenskapernas officiella tidning 27.7.2000 BILAGA GENOMGNG AV VRLDSMARKNADEN F R OLIVOLJA 1.
Olive oil represents about 3 % of the edible oils on the world market. 
Olivolja utgr ungefr 3 % av de tliga oljorna p vrldsmarknaden.
According to the statistics of the International Olive Oil Council (IOOC), in the course of the last 12 years the average world production of olive oil, including olive residue oil, is situated at 2, 018 million tonnes, varying from 1, 532 million tonnes in 1988/89 to 2,628 million tonnes estimated production for 1997/98. 
Enligt statistik frn internationella olivoljerdet (IOOC) ligger den genomsnittliga vrldsproduktionen under de senaste 12 ren, inberknat olivolja av pressrester, p 2,018 miljoner ton, och har varierat mellan 1,532 miljoner ton under 1988/89 och 2,628 miljoner ton uppskattad produktion under 1997/98.
The corresponding consumption is estimated on average to be 2,050 million tonnes (from 1,836 million tonnes in 1990/91 to 2,402 million tonnes in 1997/98). 
Motsvarande konsumtion uppskattas till i genomsnitt 2,050 miljoner ton (frn 1,836 miljoner ton 1990/91 till 2,402 miljoner ton 1997/98).
Comparing consumption with production, it could be said that, on average, there is an equilibrium in the world market for the period of reference, but the situation changes considerably from one year to the next, especially with regard to production, which varies compared with a relatively stable level of consumption. 
Om man jmfr konsumtion med produktion kan man sga att det i genomsnitt r balans p vrldsmarknaden fr referensperioden, men situationen frndras betydligt frn ett r till ett annat, srskilt nr det gller produktionen, som varierar i frhllande till en relativt stabil konsumtionsniv.
Table 14 shows the olive oil supply balance at world and EU level for the period 1986/87 to 1997/98. 
Tabell 14 visar frsrjningsbalansen fr olivolja i vrlden och inom EU fr perioden 1986/87 till 1997/98.
Community production and consumption 2. 
Gemenskapens produktion och konsumtion 2.
The world market situation is strongly influenced by the trend in the Community market, since the European Union counts on average for 78 % of production and 73 % of consumption for the same period. 
Situationen p vrldsmarknaden pverkas starkt av utvecklingen p EU-marknaden, eftersom Europeiska unionen str fr ungefr 78 % av produktionen och 73 % av konsumtionen under samma period.
Based on the same statistics, the European market shows average production of 1,579 million tonnes compared with 1,487 million tonnes of consumption. 
Enligt samma statistik fr den europeiska marknaden uppgick produktionen till i genomsnitt 1,579 miljoner ton jmfrt med konsumtionen p 1,487 miljoner ton.
Since 1993/94 an increasing tendency has been registered concerning production, which reached its highest level at 2,294 million tonnes in 1997/98. 
Sedan 1993/94 har det skett en kning av produktionen, som ndde sin hgsta niv p 2,294 miljoner ton 1997/98.
Consumption, after having been relatively stable for a number of years, has been increased in the last two marketing years, reaching 1,841 million tonnes in 1997/98. 
Efter att ha varit relativt stabil under ett antal r har konsumtionen kat under de tv senaste regleringsren och uppndde 1,841 miljoner ton 1997/98.
The information for the 1996/97 and 1997/98 marketing years gives an indication of the current situation in the olive oil market. 
Informationen fr regleringsren 1996/97 och 1997/98 ger en indikation p den nuvarande situationen p olivoljemarknaden.