natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
(5) As a matter of fact, some studies claim that EU funding crowds out national investment such that the growth path of the economy without CSF funding would look better than the picture obtained from the HERMIN simulations. 
(5) I sjlva verket hvdas det i vissa studier att EU-medel trnger ut nationell investering s att ekonomins tillvxttakt utan medel frn gemenskapsstdramen skulle vara bttre n enligt den bild man fr fram genom Hermin-simulationerna.
C 302/14 EN Official Journal of the European Union 12.12.2006 51. 
C 302/14 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 12.12.2006 51.
The Court analysed the results of HERMIN simuilations concerning changes in the rate of unemployment, against a set of pre-established hypotheses(1). 
Revisionsrtten analyserade resultaten av Hermin-simulationer som gller frndringar i arbetslshetsgrad mot en uppsttning p frhand uppstllda hypoteser (1).
The outcome is shown in Annex IV. 
Resultatet redovisas i bilaga IV.
Finally, in many cases, the degree to which the intermediate objectives were attained was not evaluated. 
I mnga fall utvrderades inte i vilken grad de mellanliggande mlen uppnddes.
As regards the strategic objective of convergence, the only mention in the Synthesis Report is Ôthat the overall convergence between Member States is progressing but that this is not occurring to the same extent between regions across Europe. 
Nr det gller det strategiska konvergensmlet r det enda som nmns i den sammanfattande rapporten att den vergripande konvergensen mellan medlemsstaterna kar men att det sker i olika utstrckning i de olika regionerna i Europa.
Whether the convergence is due to the Structural Funds is a debatable pointŐ (2). 
Huruvida konvergensen beror p strukturfonderna r en frga som kan diskuteras (2).
Evaluation of the management systems 54. 
Utvrdering av frvaltningssystemen 54.
The management and implementation arrangements adopted for the Objective 1 programmes have a crucial role to play in contributing to the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of the Structural Funds. 
Systemen fr frvaltning och genomfrande som antogs fr ml 1-programmen spelar en viktig roll nr det gller att medverka till strukturfondernas ndamlsenlighet, effektivitet och effekt.
This aspect was addressed in both the ToR and the Methodology Guide and was taken up in the national evaluations (3). 
Denna aspekt har diskuterats bde i uppdragsbeskrivningen och i metodguiden och tagits upp i de nationella utvrderingarna (3).
The national evaluation reports described the impact on management systems but also identified situations where the effects on management systems could have been more pronounced. 
De nationella utvrderingsrapporterna beskriver effekten p frvaltningssystemen men identifierar ocks situationer dr effekterna p frvaltningssystemen kunde ha varit mer uttalade.
The importance of this topic is also recognised in the Synthesis Report and, in the recommendations section (4), no less than 13 out of 19 recommendations deal with management issues. 
Vikten av denna frga konstateras ocks i den sammanfattande rapporten och inte mindre n 13 av 19 rekommendationer i avsnittet med rekommendationer (4) gller frvaltningsfrgor.
The Synthesis Report provides a number of relevant insights into the management of EU Structural Funds and refers to several conclusions of the Thematic Evaluation of the Partnership Principle that was conducted in 1999. 
Den sammanfattande rapporten innehller ett antal relevanta uppgifter om frvaltningen av EU:s strukturfonder och refererar till flera slutsatser i den tematiska utvrderingen av partnerskapsprincipen som utfrdes 1999.
This provides for continuity in assessment, and some evidence in support or otherwise of observations made in the earlier study. 
Detta ger kontinuitet i bedmningen, och vissa bevis som stder eller bestrider iakttagelser som gjorts i den tidigare studien.
However, in a number of areas, the conclusions reached are in conflict with the thematic evaluation. 
P ett antal omrden skiljer sig dock slutsatserna i den sammanfattande rapporten frn dem i den tematiska utvrderingen.
The Synthesis Report provides a summary of the average size of membership of Monitoring Committees(MCs) by Member State. 
I den sammanfattande rapporten ges en sammanfattning av det genomsnittliga antalet ledamter i vervakningskommitter per medlemsstat.
The overall average was 44, but there was a wide variation from a low of 15 to a high of 85. 
Det totala genomsnittet var 44 men antalet varierar betydligt frn lgst 15 till hgst 85.
Indeed, the report concludes that the high membership level was regarded as a key constraint on the efficiency of the Monitoring Committees, and that this was (1) This sensitivity analysis was carried out for eastern Germany, Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. (2) Synthesis Report, p. 
I rapporten dras slutsatsen att det stora antalet ledamter ansgs vara en allvarlig (1) Denna knslighetsanalys utfrdes i stra Tyskland, Spanien, Grekland, Irland och Portugal. (2) Sammanfattande rapport s. 183Đ184.
183. (3) These demonstrate the positive influence of the SFs on the development of multiannual programming, the application of the programme concept and of objective-based management, the establishment of management structures and procedures and in particular systems of monitoring and indicators, systems of quality assurance in public works, tendering procedures for government aid, the development of evaluation systems, capacity and culture, the project selection procedures and control systems. 
(3) Dessa utvrderingar visar p strukturfondernas positiva inflytande p utvecklingen av flerrig programplanering, p tillmpningen av pro-gramkonceptet och av mlbaserad frvaltning, p upprttandet av frvaltningsstrukturer och frvaltningsfrfaranden Đ i synnerhet system fr vervakning och indikatorer, system fr kvalitetsskring fr offentliga bygg-och anlggningsarbeten, upphandlingsfrfaranden fr offentligt std Đ, p utvecklingen av utvrderingssystem, kapacitet och kultur, samt p urvalsfrfaranden och kontrollsystem fr projekten.
SFs stimulate the development of more appropriate structures and capacities to handle development projects. common across all Member States (5). 
Strukturfonderna stimulerar utveckling av lmpligare strukturer och kapaciteter fr att hantera utvecklingsprojekt. begrnsning fr vervakningskommitternas effektivitet, och att detta var gemensamt fr alla medlemsstater (5).
In contrast, the thematic study concluded that there was no evidence to indicate a loss in efficiency through extending inclusiveness. 
I den tematiska studien dremot, drogs slutsatsen att det inte fanns ngot bevis fr att man hade tappat i effektivitet genom att ka antalet ledamter.
Given the significant difference in the conclusions of the different reports on this aspect, it would have been appropriate to analyse this aspect more thoroughly in the Synthesis Report, and to draw more concrete recommendations on the way forward. 
Med tanke p de stora skillnaderna i slutsatserna i de olika rapporterna p denna punkt borde denna frga ha analyserats mer ingende i den sammanfattande rapporten och mer konkreta rekommendationer borde ha utfrdats.
Another area which was linked to the thematic evaluation concerns the management of different funds. 
Ett annat omrde dr man gjorde en koppling till den tematiska utvrderingen gller frvaltningen av olika fonder.
Both evaluations concluded that the funds operated according to different principles and with different financial requirements and that this restricted synergy between the funds. 
Bda utvrderingarna drog slutsatsen att fonderna fungerade enligt olika principer och med olika finansiella krav och att detta frhindrade synergin mellan fonderna.
This important observation echoes the views already expressed by the Court (6) and underlines the need to strive for greater synergy between the funds. 
Denna viktiga iakttagelse r en upprepning av de synpunkter som revisionsrtten redan har uttryckt (6) och understryker behovet av att strva efter strre synergi mellan fonderna.
The Synthesis Report states that: ÔThe management systems were thought to be adequate by the national evaluations in just under half of the eligible member statesŐ. 
I den sammanfattande rapporten faststlls att frvaltningssystemen ansgs vara adekvata i de nationella utvrderingarna i endast knappt hlften av de berrda medlemsstaterna.
This is an important result and a detailed assessment of both the success cases and the inadequacies identified could have been expected. 
Detta r en viktig iakttagelse, och en detaljerad bedmning av bde framgngsrika fall och de ofullstndigheter som konstaterades kunde ha frvntats.
Although some points raised are developed, there is an overall lack of clarity in the Report about what was actually found. 
Vissa av de frgor som vcks utvecklas, men det finns en allmn brist p klarhet i rapporten om vad som faktiskt konstaterades.
The Thematic Evaluation of the Partnership Principle in relation to the Structural Funds (1999) found that this principle provided a number of positive advantages to Structural Funds implementation (7). 
I den tematiska utvrderingen av partnerskapsprincipen nr det gller strukturfonderna (1999) konstaterades att denna princip medfrde ett antal frdelar fr genomfrandet av strukturfonderna (7).
The Synthesis Report states that ÔBroadly, these advantages were also recognised by the Member States involved in the implementation of the 1994 to 1999 Objective 1 programme, and horizontal partnership working was welcomed as one of the Ňadded valueÓ aspects of European programmingŐ (8). 
I den sammanfattande rapporten sls fast att dessa frdelar i stora drag erkndes ocks av de medlemsstater som var inblandade i genomfrandet av ml 1-programmet fr 1994Đ1999, och sektorsvergripande partnerskap vlkomnades som ett mervrde med EU:s programplanering (8).
This is a relevant result, and although some highlights of various cases are presented, including brief comments on negative experiences or difficulties encountered, the discussion could have been more directed at highlighting improvements that could be made, on the basis of the experiences mentioned, so as to make the partnership principle more effective. (5) Synthesis Report, p. 
Detta r ett relevant resultat och visserligen lyfter rapporten fram flera fall, bland annat korta kommentarer om negativa erfarenheter eller problem man har sttt p, men diskussionen kunde ha varit mer inriktad p att peka p frbttringar som skulle kunna gras, utifrn de erfarenheter som nmnts, fr att partnerskapsprincipen skall bli mer ndamlsenlig. (5) Sammanfattande rapport s.
(6) Opinion No 2/2005 on the proposal for a Council Regulation laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund (COM(2004) 492 final of 14 July 2004) (OJ C 121, 20.5.2005, p. 
(6) Yttrande nr 2/2005 om frslaget till rdets frordning om allmnna bestmmelser fr Europeiska regionala utvecklingsfonden, Europeiska socialfonden och Sammanhllningsfonden (KOM(2004) 492 slutlig av den 14.7.2004) (EUT C 121, 20.5.2005, s.
18); Special Report No 7/2003 on the implementation of assistance programming for the period 2000 to 2006 within the framework of the Structural Funds, paragraph 90 (OJ C 174, 23.7.2003, p. 
18), Srskild rapport nr 7/2003 om genomfrandet av programplaneringen fr strukturfondstgrder fr perioden 2000Đ2006, punkt 90 (EUT C 174, 23.7.2003, s.
(7) These included: greater effectiveness in programme development and monitoring, more effective project selection, greater legitimacy and transparency in decisions and decision-making processes, greater commitment and ownership of programme outputs, etc. See Thematic Evaluation of the Partnership Principle, p. 
(7) Frdelarna r fljande: ndamlsenligare utveckling och vervakning av program, ndamlsenligare projekturval, strre legitimitet och insyn i beslut och beslutsfattandeprocesser, starkare upplevelse av tagande och egenansvar fr programmens output osv. Se den tematiska utvrderingen av partnerskapsprincipen, s.
(8) Synthesis Report, p. 
(8) Sammanfattande rapport s.
(4) Synthesis Report, section 9.1. 
(4) Sammanfattande rapport, avsnitt 9.1.
12.12.2006 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 302/15 61. 
12.12.2006 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 302/15 61.
The project application/selection process is identified as one of the two most frequently cited processes that caused administrative problems. 
Ansknings-och urvalsprocessen fr projekten har utpe-kats som en av de tv processer som oftast sgs orsaka administrativa problem.
A number of examples are given, indicating a lack of clarity in the procedures and an urgent need for the Commission to issue a best-practice benchmark. 
Ett flertal exempel ges, vilka tyder p en brist p klarhet i frfarandena och ett brdskande behov av att kommissionen utfrdar ett riktmrke fr bsta praxis.
A table is provided giving the duration of the project selection process by country, although no data is provided for three Member States. 
I en tabell visas tidstgngen fr projekturvalsprocessen per land, men inga uppgifter ges fr tre medlemsstater.
The duration of the process for the remaining Member States ranges from two to nine months with an average of five months. 
Tidstgngen fr processen fr de vriga medlemsstaterna varierar frn tv till nio mnader med ett genomsnitt p fem mnader.
The evidence provided implies that there is still work to be done in order to streamline the application process. 
De bevis som tillhandahlls visar p att det nnu finns frbttringar att gra fr att rationalisera anskningsprocessen.
In this context, no thorough analysis has been conducted concerning the respective merits and/or effectiveness in the choice between the competitive process and the queuing process. 
Mot denna bakgrund har ingen djupgende analys gjorts nr det gller de respektive frdelarna och/eller ndamlsenligheten i valet mellan konkurrenssystemet och ksystemet.
It is claimed, in the Synthesis Report, that the ÔFinancial control systems appear to have functioned relatively well within the Member States under the Objective 1 1994 to 1999 although some adjustments needed to be made to accommodate the new Financial Regulations in 1997. 
Det hvdas i den sammanfattande rapporten att systemen fr finansiell kontroll verkar ha fungerat relativt vl inom medlemsstaterna under ml 1 under 1994Đ1999 ven om ngra justeringar behvde gras fr att anpassa systemet till de nya budgetbestmmelserna 1997.
In the majority of Member States financial control systems were felt to be fit for the purpose and operated relatively efficiently. 
I de flesta medlemsstater upplevdes systemen fr finansiell kontroll vara vl utformade fr syftet och fungerade relativt effektivt.
Financial control appears to have been generally reliable and respected the 5 % ruleŐ (1). 
Den finansiella kontrollen verkar i allmnhet ha varit tillfrlitlig och ha respekterat 5-procentsregeln (1).
This finding does not coincide with the various reports of the Court (2) which indicate that the 1994 to1999 Structural Funds programme suffered from significant financial control deficiencies. 
Denna iakttagelse stmmer inte verens med flera rapporter frn revisionsrtten (2) dr det konstateras att strukturfondsprogrammet 1994Đ1999 hade vsentliga brister i den finansiella kontrollen.
The other element of the monitoring process that gives rise to administrative problems relates to the non-financial monitoring and evaluation systems. Monitoring comes in for heavy criticism. 
Den andra bestndsdelen i vervakningsprocessen som ger upphov till administrativa problem gller de icke-finansiella vervaknings-och utvrderingssystemen. vervakningen fr kraftig kritik.
The Synthesis Report concludes that Ômonitoring remained a major weakness despite the emphasis on developing its role since the first programming period. 
I den sammanfattande rapporten dras slutsatsen att vervakningen var mycket bristfllig trots den vikt som hade lagts vid att utveckla dess roll sedan den frsta programperioden.
The available data is fragmented, inconsistent, overly focused on physical outputs and often of doubtful reliabilityŐ (3). 
De tillgngliga uppgifterna r splittrade, osammanhngande, verdrivet fokuserade p fysisk output och ofta av tveksam tillfrlitlighet (3).
It also states: ÔAcross all of the Member States there was a lack of quantification to the objectives defined at the start of the programmeŐ (4). 
Det sls ocks fast att det i alla medlemsstaterna fanns en brist p kvantifiering av de ml som faststlldes vid programmets inledande (4).
Of the 10 Member States listed, seven are classified as having a poor level of quantification, one as variable and two as adequate only at the start of the programme. 
Av de tio medlemsstaterna i frteckningen klassificeras sju som att de har en bristande niv av kvantifiering, en som varierande och tv som tillrckliga men endast vid programmets inledande.
Brief summaries are given for each Member State. 
Korta sammanfattningar ges fr varje medlemsstat.
It is also stated that the computerised systems set up for monitoring the 1994 to 1999 programme Ôwere frequently criticised due to their lack of integration across programmes and between funds. This had an impact on the ongoing ability of (1) Synthesis Report, p. 
Det faststlls ocks att de datasystem som inrttats fr vervakningen av programmet 1994Đ1999 ofta var kritiserade p grund av den bristande integreringen mellan program och mellan fonder. Detta inverkade negativt p frvaltningsmyndigheternas mjlighet att vervaka framstegen inom programmen, (1) Sammanfattande rapport. s.
(2) Annual Report concerning the financial year 2003, paragraphs 5.22, 5.32(d), 5.33 and 5.34 (OJ C 293, 30.11.2004, p. 
(2) rsrapport fr budgetret 2003, punkterna 5.22, 5.32 d, 5.33 och 5.34 (EUT C 293, 30.11.2004, s.
162). Annual Report concerning the financial year 2004, paragraph 5.30 (OJ C 301, 30.11.2005, p. 
162). rsrapport fr budgetret 2004, punkt 5.30 (EUT C 301, 30.11.2005, s.
(4) Synthesis Report, p. 219. managing authorities to achieve an oversight on progress within the programmes, as well as posing a problem for later evaluationsŐ (5). 
(4) Sammanfattande rapport s. 219. och innebar ocks ett problem fr senare utvrderingar (5).
These findings must also cast doubt on the validity of the earlier conclusion in the report that the financial management of the programme performed well if monitoring information, which is such an important input into the management process, was deemed to have been Ôfragmented, inconsistent and of doubtful reliabilityŐ (3). 
Med dessa resultat mste man ocks betvivla giltigheten i rapportens tidigare slutsats om att den finansiella frvaltningen av programmet utfrdes vl, nr informationen om vervakningen, som r en s viktig del i frvaltningsprocessen, bedmdes vara splittrad, osammanhngande och av tvivelaktig tillfrlitlighet (3).
The Synthesis Report also provides some brief comments on so-called Ôinternal evaluationsŐ (6). 
Den sammanfattande rapporten ger ocks ngra kortfattade kommentarer om s kallade Óinterna utvrderingarÓ (6).
The following observation is made: ÔThese internal evaluations were carried out by the ministries or regional authorities, with assistance from universities and external agencies. 
Man konstaterar att dessa interna utvrderingar utfrdes av ministerier eller regionala myndigheter med hjlp av universitet och externa organ.
The degree to which evaluation was carried out may, perhaps, be surprising in the light of the weakness of the monitoring systems. 
Den utstrckning i vilken utvrderingar utfrdes kan kanske verka frvnande med tanke p bristerna i vervak-ningsysstemen.
This perhaps is a reflection of the perceived requirement to undertake evaluation activity, although the results did often feed through into programme managementŐ (7). 
Detta r kanske en spegling av det som man uppfattade vara ett krav p att utfra utvrderingar, ven om resultaten ofta gav nring t programfrvaltningen (7).
In view of this statement, it would seem that it would have been useful to focus more on these internal evaluations, and to build on the results achieved by the relevant ministries or regional authorities. 
Med tanke p detta uttalande kan det tyckas att man borde ha fokuserat mer p dessa interna utvrderingar och dragit nytta av de resultat som uppntts av respektive ministerier eller regionala myndigheter.
With regard to the 2000 to 2006 programming period, the Synthesis Report notes that attempts have been made to address the monitoring problem experienced in the 1994 to 1999 period (8). 
Nr det gller programperioden 2000Đ2006 grs iakttagelsen i den sammanfattande rapporten att frsk har gjorts att ta itu med det vervakningsproblem som man upplevde under perioden 1994Đ1999 (8).
Adequacy of the framework for evaluation The terms of reference 67. 
Utvrderingsramens lmplighet Uppdragsbeskrivningen 67.
In the light of the various problems identified in the analysis of the Synthesis Report it is necessary to focus specifically on the original terms of reference. 
I ljuset av de olika problem som konstaterats vid analysen av den sammanfattande rapporten r det ndvndigt att fokusera srskilt p den ursprungliga uppdragsbeskrivningen.
In particular: (a) They did not address the issue of the lack of quantified objectives. 
Det gller i synnerhet fljande: a) Bristen p kvantifierade ml nmndes inte i uppdragsbeskrivningen.
(8) For example: ÔThere is clear evidence that the partnership arrangements have deepened and widened and that there has been increasing delegation of responsibility for decision making to the programme partnershipŐ (Synthesis Report, p. 246). 
(8) Till exempel finns det tydliga bevis p att partnerskapsarrangemangen har frdjupats och vidgats och det mrks en kad delegering av ansvaret fr beslutsfattande till programpartnerskapet. Sammanfattande rapport, s. 246.
C 302/16 EN Official Journal of the European Union 12.12.2006 (b) Similarly, they did not require the evaluator to collect additional data on performance indicators. 
C 302/16 SV Europeiska unionens officiella tidning 12.12.2006 b) De innehll heller inga krav p att utvrderaren skulle samla ytterligare uppgifter om resultatindikatorer.
The ToR (1) did foresee the carrying out of field review Ôas necessary, if data is not available in the Member StatesŐ. However, this point was not further specified in the Methodology Guide (2). (c) Insufficient emphasis was put on the need to assess net effects (3), with the exception of some economic impacts. (d) The ToRs under-emphasised the question of effectiveness and deadweight effects in particular. 
Enligt uppdragsbeskrivningen (1) skulle en granskning p fltet utfras om uppgifterna inte fanns tillgngliga i medlemsstaten men detta specificerades inte ytterligare i metodguiden (2). c) Otillrcklig vikt lades vid behovet att bedma nettoeffekterna (3), med undantag av ngra ekonomiska effekter. d) I uppdragsbeskrivningen lade man fr liten vikt vid frgan om ndamlsenlighet och i synnerhet frgan om ddviktseffekter.
This is regrettable given that deadweight is often considered to be a relevant factor in important areas such as business investment grants, direct aid for employment and vocational training facilitating access to employment. (e) Insufficient attention was paid to the analysis of the potential links between strategy appropriateness, effectiveness and impact (4). 
Detta r beklagligt eftersom ddviktseffekter ofta anses vara en relevant faktor p viktiga omrden ssom investeringsstd fr fretag, direktstd till sysselsttning och yrkesutbildning fr att underltta vgen till anstllning. e) Otillrcklig vikt lades vid analysen av de potentiella kopplingarna mellan strategins lmplighet, ndamlsenlighet och effekt (4).