natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
We audited whether the European Commission had used the authority that it was granted by the Regulation to ensure an adequate implementation of the preventive arm. 
Vi granskade huruvida kommissionen anvnt den befogenhet den beviljats genom frordningen att skerstlla ett lmpligt genomfrande av den frebyggande delen.
We also addressed the issue of interaction between the preventive and corrective arm of the SGP to the extent that it is relevant for the former. 
Vi tog ven upp frgan om vxelverkan mellan stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens frebyggande respektive korrigerande del i den utstrckning det r relevant fr den frstnmnda delen.
The Commission was the auditee. 
Kommissionen var vrt granskningsobjekt.
What we found IV. 
Vra iakttagelser IV.
The Regulation has set a reasonable benchmark for annual convergence towards the MTO of 0.5 percentage points of GDP per year. 
Genom frordningen har man faststllt ett rimligt riktmrke fr den rliga konvergensen mot det medelfristiga budgetmlet p 0,5 procentenheter av BNP per r.
However, it has allowed deviations from that requirement, and authorised the Commission to grant various flexibility clauses. 
Emellertid har man tilltit avvikelser frn detta krav och gett kommissionen befogenhet att bevilja flera olika flexibilitetsklausuler.
The effectiveness of the preventive arm therefore depends very much on the way in which the Commission implements it (Part I). 
Den frebyggande delens ndamlsenlighet beror drfr i mycket hg utstrckning p det stt p vilket kommissionen genomfr den (del I).
V. The implementation rules decided by the Commission and its operational decisions do not ensure that the main objective of the Regulation is met - i.e. that Member States 11 converge toward MTOs in a reasonable period. 
V. De genomfrandebestmmelser som kommissionen har antagit och dess operativa beslut skerstller inte att frordningens huvudsakliga ml uppns Đ det vill sga att medlemsstaterna konvergerar mot medelfristiga budgetml inom en rimlig tidsperiod.
(Some of the main implementation rules after announced by the Commission were later endorsed by the Council.) 
(Vissa av de viktigaste genomfrandebestmmelserna godkndes i ett senare skede av rdet efter att ha tillknnagetts av kommissionen.)
Implementation rules on flexibility stem from 2005 reforms of the regulation but were not formally operationalised until 2015 when they reflected considerations prompted by the Great recession. 
Genomfrandebestmmelserna om flexibilitet hrstammar frn 2005 rs ndringar av frordningen men blev inte formellt operativa frrn 2015 nr de terspeglade vervganden som uppkommit p grund av den stora recessionen.
Some flexibility in crisis periods was appropriate in principle, but specific provisions were not time–bound and effectively went too far in practice particularly when implemented during more normal times. 
Viss flexibilitet var i princip lmplig i kristider, men specifika bestmmelser var inte tidsbundna och gick i praktiken fr lngt, i synnerhet nr de tillmpades under mer normala frhllanden.
Moreover, the rules set by the Commission do not distinguish enough between those Member States that do have a high level of debt and others. 
Dessutom grs det i de bestmmelser som faststllts av kommissionen inte tillrcklig tskillnad mellan de medlemsstater som har en hg skuldniv och andra medlemsstater.
Instead of tightening the framework as the recovery was progressing, the Commission further weakened it in 2017 by introducing the new “margin of discretion”. 
I stllet fr att skrpa ramen i takt med att terhmtningen gick framt frsvagade kommissionen den ytterligare 2017 genom att infra ett nytt Óutrymme fr sknsmssig bedmningÓ.
The structural reform allowance is no longer linked to the actual budget costs of the reform, but it is used as an “incentivizing instrument”. 
Undantaget fr strukturreformer r inte lngre kopplat till reformens faktiska budgetkostnader utan anvnds som ett ÓstimulansverktygÓ.
All allowances (except for the pension reform) increase spending not only in the particular year for which they are granted, but also in the following years. 
Alla undantag (utom fr pensionsreformer) innebr kade utgifter inte bara under det enskilda r fr vilka de beviljas, utan ven under de kommande ren.
The cumulative effect of all these allowances have resulted in multi-year delays in effective deadlines for reaching MTOs (Part II). 
Sammantagna har alla dessa undantag lett till att uppnendet av de medelfristiga budgetmlen har frsenats med flera r (del II).
The credibility of the preventive arm has been further eroded by the developments in the corrective arm. 
Den frebyggande delens trovrdighet har undergrvts ytterligare genom utvecklingen inom den korrigerande delen.
The Commission considers that the requirements of the corrective arm can be fully met just by cyclical recovery, which is also facilitated by the Commission’s practice of proposing to Council granting multi-year extensions for exiting excessive deficit procedures (EDP). 
Kommissionen anser att den korrigerande delens krav bara kan uppfyllas fullt ut genom konjunkturterhmtning, vilket ven underlttas av kommissionens praxis att fresl rdet att bevilja flerriga frlngningar fr att lmna frfaranden vid alltfr stora underskott.
As a result, Member States under EDP do not have to fulfil the requirements for improving their structural balances they would otherwise have to observe if they were under the preventive arm. 
Som en fljd drav behver medlemsstater som omfattas av frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott inte uppfylla de krav p att frbttra sitt strukturella saldo som de skulle ha varit tvungna att iaktta om de omfattades av den frebyggande delen.
Of particular concern is that the weakened SGP framework is unable to ensure progress towards the MTOs in several highly indebted Member States. 
Det r srskilt bekymmersamt att stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens frsvagade ram inte kan skerstlla framsteg mot de medelfristiga budgetmlen i flera kraftigt skuldsatta medlemsstater.
Despite the fact that the weakened framework is not ensuring progress towards MTOs, the Commission has decided that compliance with it is essential for justifying a non-activation of the debt-based EDP (Part III). 12 
Trots det faktum att den frsvagade ramen inte skerstller framsteg mot de medelfristiga budgetmlen har kommissionen beslutat att efterlevnad av den r vsentlig fr att motivera att det skuldbaserade frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott inte ska aktiveras (del III).
X. At the technical level, we found weaknesses and information gaps in the Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCP) submitted by Member States that are not flagged in the Commission’s staff working documents (SWD). 
X. P teknisk niv fann vi svagheter och informationsbrister i stabilitets-och konvergensprogram som lmnats in av medlemsstaterna, som inte flaggas i kommissionens arbetsdokument.
In addition, the Commission does not explain clearly the differences between its own assumptions and those of Member States with respect to fiscal measures included in the respective forecasts. 
Dessutom ger kommissionen inte ngon tydlig frklaring av skillnaderna mellan sina egna antaganden och medlemsstaternas antaganden vad gller de finanspolitiska tgrder som ingr i respektive prognoser.
Moreover, the methodology used in its assessments is not always in line with the Regulation and may delay preventive warnings (Part IV). 
Drutver r den metod som anvnts i dess bedmningar inte alltid frenlig med frordningen, och kan leda till att frebyggande varningar frsenas (del IV).
Finally, we found that fiscal country-specific recommendations (CSRs) adopted by Council are based upon the Commission recommendations and reflect the conclusions of underlying technical assessments. 
Slutligen upptckte vi att finanspolitiska landsspecifika rekommendationer som antagits av rdet utgr frn kommissionens rekommendationer och speglar slutsatserna i underliggande tekniska bedmningar.
However, they do not explain sufficiently the rational for recommended adjustments nor the risks if Member States fail to meet the requirements (Part V). 
De ger dock varken ngon tillrcklig frklaring till den logiska grunden till de anpassningar som rekommenderas eller till de risker som det innebr om medlemsstater inte uppfyller kraven (del V).
What we recommend XII. 
Vra rekommendationer XII.
First the Commission should address the issue of persistent cumulative deviations from the required adjustment by introducing ex-poste corrections, i.e. additional requirements in the following years. 
Ramenbehverstramastisinavsentligadelarpettsamordnatstt.Frdetfrsta br kommissionen ta itu med frgan om kvardrjande kumulativa avvikelser frn den erforderliga anpassningen genom att infra efterhandskorrigeringar, det vill sga ytterligare krav under de fljande ren.
Second, it should review the parameters in the table that sets requirements for adjustment (the so-called “matrix”) so as to ensure that MTOs are reached within a reasonable period of time. 
Fr det andra br den se ver parametrarna i den tabell dr anpassningskraven anges (ÓmatrisenÓ) i syfte att skerstlla att de medelfristiga budgetmlen uppns inom en rimlig tidsperiod.
Higher requirements should be set for heavily indebted Member States. 
Hgre krav br faststllas fr kraftigt skuldsatta medlemsstater.
Third, flexibility clauses should cover only direct costs related to the reforms and unusual events in a particular year. 
Fr det tredje br flexibilitetsklausulerna enbart omfatta direkta kostnader med anknytning till reformer och ovanliga hndelser under ett enskilt r.
We consider that these changes can be achieved with the existing legal framework. 
Vi anser att dessa frndringar kan uppns med den befintliga rttsliga ramen.
Commission should explore ways within the legal framework to ensure that the level of structural adjustment required under the preventive arm is also delivered by Member States under the corrective arm. 
Kommissionen br underska stt att inom den rttsliga ramen se till att den niv av strukturanpassning som krvs enligt den frebyggande delen ven uppns av medlemsstater som omfattas av den korrigerande delen.
The Code of Conduct (CoC) should be updated to improve the quality of information required in SCPs on planned fiscal measures. 
Uppfrandekoden br uppdateras i syfte att frbttra kvaliteten p den information som erfordras i stabilitets-och konvergensprogrammen om planerade finanspolitiska tgrder.
The Commission’s documents should report all differences between forecasts and present assessment conclusions in line with the criteria 13 set in the Regulation. 
Kommissionens dokument ska innehlla redogrelser om alla skillnader i frhllande till prognoser och om slutsatserna av bedmningar, i enlighet med de kriterier som anges i frordningen.
CSRs should contain clear and explicit adjustment requirements in the enacting part of the recommendations and recitals should provide a clearer explanation of the rationale for such adjustments and the risks if these are not implemented. 14 
De landsspecifika rekommendationerna br innehlla tydliga och uttryckliga anpassningskrav i den freskrivande delen av rekommendationerna och sklen br ge en tydligare frklaring till den logiska grunden till sdana anpassningar och riskerna i hndelse av att de inte genomfrs. 14
INTRODUCTION The preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact 1. 
INLEDNING Stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens frebyggande del 1.
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has established a system of multilateral surveillance over fiscal policies in Member States. 
Genom stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten har det infrts ett system fr multilateral vervakning av finanspolitiken i medlemsstaterna.
It is implemented by the European Commission and Council of the European Union with the objective of ensuring fiscal discipline in Member States. 
Pakten genomfrs av Europeiska kommissionen och Europeiska unionens rd i syfte att skerstlla budgetdisciplin i medlemsstaterna.
The rationale for the surveillance is that one country’s fiscal policies can adversely affect others. 
Den logiska grunden till vervakningen r att ett lands finanspolitik kan f skadliga effekter fr andra lnder.
The SGP has a preventive and a corrective arm1. 2. 
Stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten har en frebyggande och en korrigerande del1.
The surveillance is co-ordinated within the European Semester process, which requires Member States to submit their Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCPs) in spring. 
2. vervakningen samordnas inom processen med den europeiska planeringsterminen, i enlighet med vilken medlemsstaterna ska lmna in sina stabilitets-och konvergensprogram under vren.
SCPs are then assessed by the Commission, and the results of these assessments are published in Commission Staff Working Documents (SWDs). 
Stabilitets-och konvergensprogrammen bedms drefter av kommissionen och resultaten av dessa bedmningar offentliggrs i kommissionens arbetsdokument.
The Council on the basis of Commission’s recommendations issues country specific recommendations (CSRs) in June every year. 
P grundval av kommissionens rekommendationer utfrdar rdet landsspecifika rekommendationer i juni varje r.
Member states in the euro area are also required to present Draft Budgetary Plans (DBP) in October which are assessed by the Commission in November (see Figure 1). 
Dessutom ligger det medlemsstater i euroomrdet att inkomma med utkast till budgetplaner i oktober, som bedms av kommissionen i november (se figur 1).
15 1 The SGP is based on Articles 121 and 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the “Treaty”) and Protocol No 12 annexed to it, while Article 136 is the basis for measures specific to euro area Member States. 
15 1 Grundvalen fr stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten utgrs av artiklarna 121 och 126 i frdraget om Europeiska unionens funktionsstt (nedan kallat frdraget) och protokoll nr 12 i dess bilagor, medan artikel 136 ligger till grund fr de tgrder som specifikt rr euroomrdets medlemsstater.
The preventive arm was established by Council Regulation No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 (further amended in 2005 and 2011). 
Den frebyggande delen inrttades genom rdets frordning nr 1466/97 av den 7 juli 1997 (senare ndrad 2005 och 2011).
3. 
Maj Oktober 3.
The main objective of the preventive arm, as set in Council Regulation No 1466/97 was to ensure that Member States rapidly converged towards a close-to-balance or surplus budget position, which would then allow them to deal with normal cyclical fluctuations without breaching the 3 % limit on headline deficit2. In 2005, the target position for each Member State was recast in terms of a structural balance (SB)3 which has to converge towards their country-specific medium-term objective (MTO). 
Det huvudsakliga mlet med den frebyggande delen var, enligt vad som faststlls i rdets frordning nr 1466/97, att skerstlla att medlemsstaterna snabbt konvergerade mot offentliga finanser som r nra balans eller i verskott, varefter de skulle kunna hantera normala konjunktursvngningar utan att verskrida grnsen p 3 % fr det nominella underskottet2. r 2005 omarbetades det ml som faststllts fr var och en av medlemsstaterna vad gller strukturellt saldo3, som mste konvergera mot deras landsspecifika medelfristiga budgetml.
According to the Regulation, the MTO cannot be below -1 % of the gross domestic product (GDP) for euro area and European Exchange Rate Mechanism 2 Member States. 
Enligt frordningen fr det medelfristiga budgetmlet inte understiga -1 % av bruttonationalprodukten (BNP) fr euroomrdet och Europeiska vxelkursmekanismens tv medlemsstater.
Signatories of the Treaty for Stability Co-ordination and Governance (TSCG) have committed to MTOs of at least -0.5 % of GDP – unless their debt is below 60 % of GDP, in which case the limit remains -1 %4. 
Undertecknarna av frdraget om stabilitet, samordning och styrning har frbundit sig till medelfristiga budgetml p minst - 0,5 % av BNP, svida deras skuld inte understiger 60 % av BNP, varvid grnsen ligger kvar p-1 %4.
Figure 2 outlines the key steps under the current preventive arm framework. 
I figur 2 anges de vsentliga stegen enligt den befintliga ramen fr den frebyggande delen.
A breach of this limit would trigger an excessive deficit procedure (the SGP corrective arm). 
En vertrdelse av denna grns skulle leda till ett frfarande vid alltfr stora underskott (stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens korrigerande del).
Budget balance and the deficit are equal in absolute value, but have opposite sign. 
Budgetsaldo och budgetunderskott r lika i absolut vrde, men har motsatt tecken.
The deficit of 3 % equals balance of - 3 %. 
Ett underskott p 3 % r likvrdigt med ett saldo p -3 %.
Twenty-two out of the 25 signatories of the TSCG are formally bound by the Fiscal Compact (the 19 euro area Member States plus Bulgaria, Denmark and Romania). 
Tjugotv av de 25 stater som undertecknat frdraget om stabilitet, samordning och styrning r formellt bundna av finanspakten (de 19 medlemsstaterna i euroomrdet plus Bulgarien, Danmark och Rumnien).
Figure 2 – Preventive arm rules 17 Preventive arm assessment process Isthe Structural Balance (SB) at or above the Medium term objective (MTO)? No Yes Compliant with Preventive Arm Assessment based on two pillars Pillar1 Change in SB =< Requirement Pillar2 Expenditure growth > = Expenditure Benchmark (EB) Does MS havedeviations No Compliant with r eq ui re me nt s from requirements or EB? 
Figur 2 Đ Den frebyggande delens bestmmelser 17 Den frebyggande delens bedmningsprocess Ligger det strukturella saldot i niv med eller ver det medelfristiga mlet? Ja Frenligt med den frebyggande delen Nej Bedmning p grundval av tv pelare Frsta pelaren Frndring av det strukturella saldot =< kravet Andra pelaren Utgiftskning >= utgiftsriktmrket Avviker medlemsstaten frn kraven eller utgiftsriktmrket?
Yes Overall assessment Isdeviation significant? 
Nej Nej Uppfyller kraven Ja r avvikelsen betydande?
Yes No COM concludes that MS is in deviation COM concludes MS is in significant deviation CSR recommends n ece ssar y adjustments Significant Deviation Proceduremaybe triggered ex-post Source: European Court of Auditors (ECA). 
Ja Samlad bedmning Kommissionen drar slutsatsen att medlemsstaten uppvisar en avvikelse Kommissionen drar slutsatsen att medlemsstaten uppvisar en betydande avvikelse I de landsspecifika rekommendationerna rekommenderas ndvndi ga anpa ssning ar Frfarandet vid betydande avvikelser kan komma att aktiveras i efterhand Klla: Europeiska revisionsrtten.
With growth of the EU economies having slowed since 2007 and public debt ratios having increased sharply in many Member States, the preventive arm has gained importance beyond the need to create fiscal space for operation of automatic stabilizers and for discretionary anticyclical fiscal policy5. 
D tillvxttakten fr EU:s ekonomier sjunkit sedan 2007 och de offentliga skuldkvoterna kat drastiskt i mnga medlemsstater har den frebyggande delen ftt en betydelse som strcker sig lngre n till behovet av att skapa finanspolitiskt utrymme fr automatiska stabilisatorer att verka och fr en diskretionr konjunkturutjmnande finanspolitik5.
Fast convergence towards the MTOs has become crucial to reduce excessive debt ratios. 
Snabb konvergens mot de medelfristiga budgetmlen har blivit avgrande fr att minska alltfr stora skuldkvoter.
Even the most indebted Member States would quickly put their debt ratios on a declining path as soon as they reached their MTOs. 
Till och med de mest skuldsatta medlemsstaterna skulle snabbt f till stnd en minskning av sina skuldkvoter s fort de uppndde sina medelfristiga budgetml.
This prompted the Commission to acknowledge that compliance with the preventive arm is an essential condition for not triggering the debt-based excessive deficit procedure (EDP)6. 
Detta fick kommissionen att erknna att efterlevnad av den frebyggande delen utgr en vsentlig frutsttning fr att det skuldbaserade frfarandet vid alltfr stora underskott inte ska utlsas6.
Audit scope and approach 5. 
Revisionens inriktning och omfattning samt revisionsmetod 5.
The main audit question was whether the Commission had effectively coordinated the Member State fiscal policies needed for achieving the objectives of the preventive arm of the SGP under its assigned responsibilities for the European Semester. 
Den vergripande revisionsfrgan gllde huruvida kommissionen p ett ndamlsenligt stt hade samordnat medlemsstaternas finanspolitik fr att uppn mlen fr den frebyggande delen inom stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten i enlighet med sitt ansvar fr den europeiska planeringsterminen.
More specifically, we examined: (a) the clarity of the objectives and conditions set in Regulation No 1466/97 to ensure that the Member States with deficits and/or high debt levels (above 60 % of GDP) progressed rapidly towards their MTOs (Part I); (b) the Commission’s implementation of the Regulation, whether it is compliant with the rules and whether operational decisions are effective in relation to preventive arm rules (Part II); Fiscal policy acts as an automatic stabilizer when it lets the headline deficit increase in a time of recession, but does not implement additional measures that would worsen the structural deficit. 
Nrmare bestmt granskade vi fljande: a) tydligheten avseende de ml och villkor som faststlls i frordning nr 1466/97 fr att skerstlla att de medlemsstater som har underskott och/eller hga skuldniver (ver Finanspolitiken fungerar som en automatisk stabilisator nr den lter det nominella underskottet ka under en recession, men inte innebr att man genomfr ytterligare tgrder som skulle frvrra det strukturella underskottet.
In a boom period, it allows the headline deficit to decline in a similar way. 
Under en period av stark tillvxt lter den det nominella underskottet minska p ett liknande stt.
Discretionary anticyclical fiscal policy is the one that takes additional measures to stimulate the economy at the time of a recession. 
En diskretionr konjunkturutjmnande finanspolitik r en finanspolitik dr man vidtar ytterligare tgrder fr att stimulera ekonomin vid en recession.
This leads to an increase in the structural deficit (i.e. decline in the structural balance). 
Detta leder till en kning av det strukturella underskottet (dvs. en minskning av det strukturella saldot).
At the time of a boom, anticyclical fiscal policy would try to cool the economy, and reduce the structural deficit (i.e. improve the structural balance). 
Nr det rder stark tillvxt skulle den konjunkturutjmnande finanspolitiken innebra att man frsker svalka ned ekonomin och minska det strukturella underskottet (dvs. frbttra det strukturella saldot).
The opposite is a pro-cyclical policy. 
Motsatsen bestr i en konjunkturfrstrkande politik.
For example see Report prepared in accordance with Article 126(3) of the Treaty on Italy, Commission 2016, Brussels, 22.2.2017 COM(2017) 106 final. 
Se till exempel Report prepared in accordance with Article 126(3) of the Treaty on Italy (rapport utarbetad i enlighet med artikel 126.3 i frdraget om Italien), kommissionen 2016, Bryssel, 22.2.2017 COM(2017) 106 final.