natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
9 African Peace Facility (APF), established by the EU in 200319, as well as through the Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs)20. 
9 resursen fr Afrika, som EU inrttade 200319, och de regionala vgledande programmen20.
In the 2014 to 2020 EDF period, there are three RIPs in Africa, covering the West Africa, Central Africa and Eastern/Southern Africa/Indian Ocean regions. 
Under EUF-perioden 2014Đ2020 finns det tre regionala vgledande program i Afrika som tcker regionerna Vstafrika, Centralafrika och stra/sdra Afrika/Indiska oceanen.
The amount allocated to peace and security under both the APF and under the RIPs has more or less doubled from the previous to the current period (Figure 2). 
Anslaget till fred och skerhet inom den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika och de regionala vgledande programmen har mer eller mindre frdubblats mellan den frra och den innevarande perioden (figur 2).
Most of the funds (around 80 %) were used to finance peace support operations, such as the African Union Mission to Somalia. 
Merparten av medlen (cirka 80 %) anvndes till att finansiera fredsfrmjande insatser, till exempel Afrikanska unionens uppdrag i Somalia.
The total financial resources of the EDF in the period from 2014 to 2020 amount to Ű30.5 billion. 
EUF:s totala ekonomiska resurser under perioden 2014Đ2020 uppgr till 30,5 miljarder euro.
Council Decision No 3/2003 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 11 December 2003 on the use of resources from the long-term development envelope on the ninth EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22003D0003(01)&from=EN). 
AVS-EG-Ministerrdets beslut nr 3/2003 av den 11 december 2003 om anvndning av medel ur nionde Europeiska utvecklingsfondens anslag fr lngsiktig utveckling till inrttandet av en fredsbevarande resurs fr Afrika (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/SV/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22003D0003(01)&from=SV).
The EU also supports peace and security in Africa out of the general budget using instruments such as the Pan-African Programme (PanAf); the Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability (IcPS); Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions; and the ŇEU Emergency Trust Fund for AfricaÓ. 
EU stder ocks fred och skerhet i Afrika via den allmnna budgeten genom instrument som det panafrikanska programmet (PanAf), instrumentet som bidrar till stabilitet och fred (IcPS), uppdrag inom ramen fr den gemensamma skerhets-och frsvarspolitiken (GSFP) och Europeiska unionens frvaltningsfond fr ndtgrder i Afrika.
10 Figure 2 - Amounts allocated to peace and security under Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) and the African Peace Facility (APF), 2008-2020* (million euros) Regional indicative programs (RIP) African Peace Facility (APF) 2046 849 Eastern / Southern Africa, Indian Ocean 1332 Central Africa West Africa 1150 645 2008-2013 597 64 160 250 2046 581 1172 119 478 900 150 43 307 849 350 165 15 2014-2020* Allocation to peace, security and stability/good governance (including Peace Support Operations for APF) Allocations to other sectors 2008-2013 2014-2020* 2008-2013 2014-2020* 2008-2013 2014-2020* *APF figures for 2019-2020 are provisional. 
10 Figur 2 Đ Anslag till fred och skerhet inom de regionala vgledande programmen och den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika (APF), 2008Đ2020* (miljoner euro) Regionala vgledande program (RIP) Den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika (APF) 2 046 Centralafrika 1 150 597 2014Đ2020* Frdelning till fred, skerhet och stabilitet/god samhllsstyrning (inbegripet fredsfrmjande insatser fr APF) Frdelning till andra sektorer stra/sdra Afrika, Indiska oceanen 1 332 Vstafrika 160 645 2008Đ2013 350 165 15 250 849 2046 64 581 1172 119 478 900 150 43 307 849 2008Đ2013 2014Đ2020* 2008Đ2013 2014Đ2020* 2008Đ2013 2014Đ2020* *APF-uppgifterna fr 2019Đ2020 r preliminra.
Source: European Court of Auditors, based on information provided by the European Commission. 
Klla: Europeiska revisionsrtten, p grundval av information frn Europeiska kommissionen.
Around 14 % of overall funding for peace and security under the APF and the RIPs for 2014 to 2020, on average Ű50 million annually, has been allocated to the implementation of the APSA. 
Omkring 14 % av de totala medlen till fred och skerhet inom den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika och de regionala vgledande programmen 2014Đ2020, i genomsnitt 50 miljoner euro per r, har gtt till genomfrandet av Apsa.
This is an increase of 150 % compared to the previous programming period. 
Det r en kning med 150 % jmfrt med den fregende programperioden.
The EU estimates that supporting the APSA, notably by strengthening the AUŐs and the SROsŐ capacity to prevent and resolve conflicts on the continent, may reduce the need to finance expensive peace-support operations, costing up to Ű720 million21 per year. 
EU gr bedmningen att stdet till Apsa, srskilt strkandet av AU:s och de afrikanska subregionala organisationernas frmga att frebygga och lsa konflikter p kontinenten, kan minska behovet av att finansiera dyra fredsfrmjande insatser som kostar upp till 720 miljoner euro21 per r.
At the same time, the amount allocated to APSA under the RIPs increased six fold, reflecting the increased EU focus on conflict prevention and mediation at a sub-regional level (Figure 3). 
Samtidigt kade anslaget till Apsa inom de regionala vgledande programmen sexfaldigt, vilket speglar EU:s kade fokus p konfliktfrebyggande och medling p subregional niv (figur 3).
21 USD 900 million reported in APSA Assessment Study 2014, p. 
21 900 miljoner US-dollar rapporterades i Apsas bedmningsstudie 2014, s.
11 Figure 3 - EU funds allocated to implementing the APSA under the APF and RIPs, 2008-2020 (million euros) 22 116 348 138 138 210 2008-13* 2014-20* APF RIP *For future periods currently allocated amounts are still subject to discussion and changes. 
Figur 3 Đ EU-anslag till genomfrandet av Apsa inom den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika och de regionala vgledande programmen, 2008Đ2020 (miljoner euro) 11 22 116 2008Đ2013* 2014Đ2020* APF RIP 348 138 138 210 *Vad betrffar framtida perioder r de nuvarande anslagen fortfarande freml fr diskussioner och ndringar.
For past periods, and as far as available, contracted amounts are used instead of allocated amounts. 
Vad betrffar tidigare perioder anvnds i mjligaste mn kontraktsbelopp i stllet fr anslagna belopp.
AUDIT SCOPE AND APPROACH 11. In our audit, we examined whether the EU had provided effective support for the APSA. 
REVISIONENS INRIKTNING OCH OMFATTNING OCH SAMT REVISIONSMETOD 11. Vi granskade huruvida EU:s std till Apsa hade varit ndamlsenligt.
To do so, we set out to answer three sub-questions. (a) Has EU support for the APSA been designed and targeted well? (b) Has EU support for the APSA contributed to achieving sustainable results? (c) Has EU support for the APSA been implemented well? 
Fr det ndamlet frskte vi besvara fljande tre delfrgor: a) Har EU:s std till Apsa utformats och riktats vl? b) Har EU:s std till Apsa bidragit till bestende resultat? c) Har EU:s std till Apsa genomfrts vl?
The audit covered EDF expenditure made through the African Peace Facility (APF) and the Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs). 
Revisionen omfattade EUF:s utgifter genom den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika och de regionala vgledande programmen.
We examined EU support from 2014 onwards and refer to evaluations and assessments of previous activities where available and relevant. 
Vi granskade EU:s std frn 2014 och framt och hnvisar till utvrderingar och bedmningar av tidigare aktiviteter om sdana finns och r relevanta.
We audited all of the 14 contracts concluded by the Commission in the period from 2014 to 2016, with a total value of Ű102.5 million. 
Vi granskade alla de 14 kontrakt som kommissionen ingick mellan 2014 och 2016, vilkas totala vrde var 102,5 miljoner euro.
Nine of them were financed out of the African 
Nio av dem finansierades genom den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika, fyra inom det regionala vgledande programmet fr
12 Peace Facility, four under the RIP for West Africa and one under the RIP for Central Africa22. 
12 Vstafrika och ett inom det regionala vgledande programmet fr Centralafrika22.
The largest contracts were signed with the AU, for example, joint financing arrangements to fund salaries in the Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission and the AU Liaison Offices. 
De strsta kontrakten ingicks med AU, till exempel gemensamma finansieringsarrangemang fr att finansiera lner p freds-och skerhetsavdelningen vid AU-kommissionen och AU:s kontaktkontor.
Other contracts were signed with regional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). 
Andra kontrakt ingicks med regionala organisationer, ssom Vstafrikanska staters ekonomiska gemenskap (Ecowas) och Centralafrikanska staternas ekonomiska gemenskap (Eccas).
Annex I provides a breakdown of the funding provided to each organisation supported. 
Bilaga I visar frdelningen av medel mellan de olika organisationerna.
We excluded peace-support operations from our audit because this expenditure mainly relates to reimbursements of allowances paid to troops and not to support for the APSA. 
Vi granskade inte fredsfrmjande insatser eftersom utgifterna fr dem mest handlar om ersttningar av traktamenten som betalas till soldater och inte om std till Apsa.
We did not audit the other EU instruments financing peace and security in Africa because during the period audited none of the activities related directly to the APSA. 
Vi granskade inte EU:s vriga finansieringsinstrument som finansierar fred och skerhet i Afrika eftersom inga av aktiviteterna var direkt relaterade till Apsa under den granskade perioden.
We carried out our audit work between January and November 2017. 
Revisionen utfrdes mellan januari och november 2017.
We gathered evidence by reviewing documentation and by conducting interviews with the European External Action Service, the Commission, and relevant stakeholders, such as other donors and the beneficiaries of EU support (the AU and the SROs). 
Vi samlade bevis genom att g igenom dokumentation och intervjua Europeiska utrikestjnsten, kommissionen och berrda intressenter, till exempel andra givare och mottagarna av EU:s std (AU och de afrikanska subregionala organisationerna).
We visited the African Union Commission, the ECOWAS and the ECCAS. 
Vi beskte Afrikanska unionens kommission, Ecowas och Eccas.
OBSERVATIONS EU support remained focused on operational costs 15. 
IAKTTAGELSER EU:s std fortsatte att vara inriktat p driftskostnader 15.
In this section, we examine whether there was a clear strategy covering the present and future provision of EU support to the APSA. 
I detta avsnitt granskar vi huruvida det fanns en tydlig strategi fr EU:s nuvarande och framtida std till Apsa.
We assess whether EU support addressed the APSAŐs needs, and how it evolved to target ongoing and future issues facing the APSA. 
Vi bedmde huruvida EU:s std tillgodosg Apsas behov och hur det utvecklades fr att riktas in p aktuella och framtida problem som Apsa stlls infr.
The EUŐs support for APSA was conceived on the basis of a strategic framework 16. 
EU:s std till Apsa utformades p grundval av en strategisk ram 16.
The EU assessed the peace and security situation on the African continent and developed an approach which formed the basis for EU support. 
EU bedmde freds-och skerhetssituationen p den afrikanska kontinenten och utvecklade ett tillvgagngsstt som bildade grunden fr EU:s std.
Recognising the important role in the area of peace and security of both the African Union (AU) and the African Sub-regional No contracts in support of the APSA were concluded during the audited period under the other RIPs. 22 
EU insg att bde Afrikanska unionen (AU) och de afrikanska subregionala organisationerna spelar en viktig roll nr det gller fred och skerhet och beslutade sig fr att samarbeta med bda niverna. I Inom de vriga regionala vgledande programmen ingicks inga kontrakt till std fr Apsa under den granskade perioden. 22
As new threats to peace and security emerged, the EU revised and updated its strategies (paragraph 8). 
13 takt med att nya hot mot fred och skerhet uppstod sg EU ver och uppdaterade sina strategier (punkt 8).
In line with this strategic framework, the EU provided political and financial support to the AU, and to the SROs, including for the development of the APSA. 
I enlighet med denna strategiska ram gav EU politiskt och ekonomiskt std till AU, och till de afrikanska subregionala organisationerna, inbegripet till utvecklingen av Apsa.
The European Union also supported regular assessments of the APSA. 
EU gav ocks std till regelbundna bedmningar av Apsa.
This meant that the APSA benefited from regular feedback (in the form of the APSA assessments) and guidance for further development (in form of the APSA roadmaps). 
Detta betydde att Apsa fick regelbunden feedback (i form av bedmningar av Apsa) och vgledning om fortsatt utveckling (i form av frdplaner fr Apsa).
The roadmaps also provided a framework for donor coordination. 
Frdplanerna bildade ocks en ram fr givarsamordning.
However, a 2017 assessment of the APF pointed to weaknesses with the latest APSA roadmap. 
I en bedmning av den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika frn 2017 pekades dock p brister i den senaste frdplanen fr Apsa.
The roadmap is considered to be too complex to work with, lacks an overarching perspective and the AU Commission has not yet taken real ownership of it24. 
Frdplanen ansgs vara alltfr komplex att arbeta med och sakna ett vergripande perspektiv, och AU-kommissionen ansgs nnu inte ha tagit ett reellt egenansvar fr den24.
The EU set up mechanisms for political dialogue at both AU and regional levels. 
EU har inrttat mekanismer fr politisk dialog p bde AU-niv och regional niv.
Political and policy dialogue on peace and security issues, including on the implementation of the APSA, took place during regular meetings with the AU within the framework of the JAES, established in 2007. 
Politiska och strategiska dialoger om freds-och skerhetsfrgor, ocks om genomfrandet av Apsa, gde rum under regelbundna mten med AU inom ramen fr den gemensamma strategin EUĐAfrika, som faststlldes 2007.
There was, however, lack of clarity between the AU and the different SROs regarding the strategy for dividing up responsibilities between them, notably on the question of subsidiarity (paragraph 34). 
Det rdde dock oklarhet om ansvarsfrdelningen mellan AU och de olika afrikanska subregionala organisationerna, srskilt nr det gllde frgan om subsidiaritet (punkt 34).
The mechanisms which the EU set up for dialogue with the regional organisations ran less smoothly. 
De mekanismer som EU inrttade fr dialog med de regionala organisationerna fungerade inte srskilt smidigt.
In the case of the ECOWAS, for example, ministerial-level meetings were irregular (they took place in 2017 but, despite efforts, not in 2016). 
Nr det till exempel gllde Ecowas var mtena p ministerniv sporadiska (de hlls 2017 men inte 2016, trots anstrngningar).
The work plan for the 2011-2013 roadmap also covered some activities to be implemented in 2014 and 2015. 
Arbetsplanen fr frdplanen 2011Đ2013 behandlade ven vissa aktiviteter som skulle genomfras 2014 och 2015.
During 2015 (before the second roadmap was drawn up), the EU did not sign with the AU any new major contracts for the development of the APSA, with the exception of the ŇInterim APSA Support ProgrammeÓ, whose main objectives included drawing up the second APSA roadmap. 
Under 2015 (innan den andra frdplanen utarbetades) ingick inte EU ngra nya strre kontrakt om utveckling av Apsa med AU, med undantag av det tillflliga Apsa-stdprogrammet, vars huvudml bland annat var att upprtta den andra frdplanen fr Apsa.
ECDPM, ŇEvaluation of the implementation of the African Peace Facility as an instrument supporting African efforts to manage conflicts on the continentÓ, December 2017, p. 
ECDPM, Evaluation of the implementation of the African Peace Facility as an instrument supporting African efforts to manage conflicts on the continent (utvrdering av genomfrandet av den fredsbevarande resursen fr Afrika som ett instrument fr att stdja afrikanska anstrngningar att hantera konlikter p kontinenten), december 2017, s.
24 and 30. 
24 och 30.
The dialogue needed to be improved, intensified and consolidated, for example in respect of the sub-regional EU Sahel and Gulf of Guinea strategies. 
Dialogen behvde frbttras, intensifieras och konsolideras, till exempel med avseende p EU:s subregionala strategier fr Sahel och Guineabukten.
Sometimes dialogue was difficult because organisations lacked administrative capacity, for example ECCAS. 
Ibland var det svrt med dialog eftersom organisationer saknade administrativ kapacitet, till exempel Eccas.
APSAŐs funding depends on donorsŐ contributions 20. 
Apsas finansiering r beroende av givarnas bidrag 20.
The shortfall in contributions by the AU member states to the AU budget (paragraph 5) and the Peace Fund (paragraph 6) left the APSA underfunded. 
Underskottet i AU-medlemsstaternas bidrag till AU:s budget (punkt 5) och fredsfonden (punkt 6) har gjort att Apsa r underfinansierat.
This issue was highlighted in the last APSA Roadmap: ŇDespite several decisions by the AU Assembly of heads of State and Government and/or provisions made in the establishment of the PSC, APSA still suffers from the absence of financial ownership by the AUC and RECs/RMs, and from a high dependency on donors25. 
Problemet uppmrksammades i den senaste frdplanen fr Apsa dr det sgs att Apsa fortfarande pverkas negativt av att AU-kommissionen och regionala ekonomiska gemenskaper/regionala mekanismer fr frebyggande, hantering och lsning av konflikter inte har ngot ekonomiskt egenansvar och r kraftigt beroende av givare, trots flera beslut av AU:s frsamling av stats-och regeringschefer och/eller de tgrder som vidtogs nr freds-och skerhetsrdet inrttades25.
Also experts have emphasized that African ownership of the continentŐs peace and security agenda could not be expected until that agenda became financially autonomous26. 
Experter har ven betonat att man inte kan rkna med afrikanskt egenansvar fr kontinentens agenda fr fred och skerhet frrn det finns ett ekonomiskt sjlvbestmmande ver den26.
Acknowledging the problems associated with relying on donors, the AU member states decided in July 2016 on a new mechanism for financing the AUŐs operational budget and the Peace Fund27. 
Medvetna om problemen med givarberoende beslutade AU-medlemsstaterna i juli 2016 om en ny mekanism fr att finansiera AU:s driftsbudget och fredsfonden27.
The EU has supported this initiative, which consists of imposing a 0.2 % levy on all eligible goods imported into Africa, starting in 2017. 
EU har sttt detta initiativ, som innebr att en avgift p 0,2 % infrs p alla berrda varor som importeras till Afrika, med brjan 2017.
By January 2018, 14 member states had started collecting the levy28, the Peace Fund was beginning to operate, and it had a governance structure. 
I januari 2018 hade 14 medlemsstater brjat ta ut avgiften28, Frdplan fr Apsa 2016Đ2020, s.
World Peace Foundation, ŇAfrican Politics, African PeaceÓ, 2016, p. 
World Peace Foundation, African Politics, African Peace (afrikansk politik, afrikansk fred), 2016, s.
In addition to this, some African states may find they have to take decisions regarding whether to use scarce funds to finance the AU or the SROs30. 
Utver detta mste vissa afrikanska stater eventuellt besluta huruvida de ska anvnda sina knappa resurser till att finansera AU eller de afrikanska subregionala organisationerna30.
EU financed operational costs with no plan for refocusing support 23. 
EU finansierade driftskostnader utan ngon plan fr att rikta om stdet 23.
During the audited period, most of the EUŐs funding of the APSA was used to meet operational costs such as staff-related expenses (Figure 4). 
Under den granskade perioden anvndes merparten av EU:s finansiering av Apsa till att tcka driftskostnader, ssom personalkostnader (figur 4).
In the early years of its support (since 2010), the EU justified the funding of the operational costs by pointing out the importance of making the new structure operational. 
Under de frsta stdren (sedan 2010) motiverade EU finansieringen av driftskostnaderna med att peka p vikten av att gra den nya strukturen operativ.
However, after nearly seven years, the focus of EU support remained to provide support for basic operational costs. 
Men efter nstan sju r var EU:s std fortfarande inriktat p grundlggande driftskostnader.
This may lead to a risk of the APSA becoming dependant on donor support, since the longer the period over which aid is provided, and the greater the proportion of financing provided by donors, the greater a projectŐs dependency on such aid becomes31. 
Detta kan leda till en risk fr att Apsa blir beroende av givarstd eftersom ett projekts beroende av sdant std blir strre ju lngre tid som det ges och ju strre givarnas andel av finansieringen r31.
Source: ECCAS, via the European Commission. 
Klla: Eccas, via Europeiska kommissionen.
Institute for Security Studies, PSC Report 89, "The new funding model tests the commitment of AU member states", March 2017. 
Institutet fr skerhetsstudier, freds-och skerhetsrdets rapport 89, The new funding model tests the commitment of AU member states (den nya finansieringsmodellen stter AU-medlemsstaternas engagemang p prov), mars 2017.
31 Victoria Stanford, ŇAid Dependency: The Damage of DonationÓ, University of Edinburgh, 2015. 
Victoria Stanford, Aid Dependency: The Damage of Donation (stdberoende: skada som givarstd kan orsaka), Edinburghs universitet, 2015.
We expected the EU to have prepared a long-term plan to show how its provision of support would evolve over time and eventually be phased out. 
Vi rknade med att EU hade upprttat en lngsiktig plan fr att visa hur stdet skulle utvecklas med tiden och slutligen gradvis avvecklas.
We found no evidence that it had done this. 
Vi fann inga bevis fr att detta hade skett.
The EU had also not agreed with the AU and the SROs how it would gradually adapt the amount of support it was providing and reallocate funds towards more capacity building (for example for conflict prevention, effective response and post-conflict reconstruction) and strategic support measures (such as organisational and operational reforms, improvements of systems, provision of specific know-how and training, etc.), in order to develop long-term capacities. 
EU hade inte heller kommit verens med AU och de afrikanska subregionala organisationerna hur man successivt skulle anpassa stdbeloppet och omfrdela medel till mer kapacitetsuppbyggnad (t.ex. fr konfliktfrebyggande, ndamlsenliga reaktioner och teruppbyggnad efter konflikter) och strategiska stdtgrder (organisatoriska och operativa reformer, systemfrbttringar, tillhandahllande av srskild know-how och utbildning etc.) fr att utveckla lngsiktig kapacitet.
The EU had not made provision of its support contingent upon conditions being met, such as the requirement for the AU or the SROs to continue financing initiatives previously supported by the EU. 
EU hade inte villkorat sitt std, till exempel att AU eller de afrikanska subregionala organisationerna skulle fortstta finansiera initiativ som tidigare ftt std av EU.
In one contract where such a provision was included in the financing agreement the SRO concerned did not respect the agreement and did not go on to fund the posts previously funded under the EDF (Box 3). 
I ett kontrakt dr en sdan bestmmelse fanns med i finansieringsverenskommelsen respekterade inte den berrda subregionala organisationen verenskommelsen och fortsatte inte att finansiera de tjnster som tidigare finansierats inom EUF (ruta 3).