natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission has made a small and not consistent differentiation in the adjustment requirements for Member States with higher debt ratio (i.e. above the 60 % limit) and other Regardless of the rules and their interpretation, it is very difficult to prevent a worsening in the structural balance during recessions. 
Kommissionen har gjort en liten och inkonsekvent differentiering av kraven p anpassning fr medlemsstater med hgre skuldkvot (dvs. ver grnsen p 60 %) och andra medlemsstater. De krav som faststlls fr de fregende r en kvarts procentenhet hgre i Oaktat reglerna och tolkningen av dem r det vldigt svrt att frhindra en frsmring av det strukturella saldot under recessioner.
For example, during the relatively mild recession in 2000, the structural balances in euro area countries declined on average by 1.2 pp of GDP between 2000 and 2002. 
Till exempel: under den relativt mttliga recessionen r 2000 minskade det strukturella saldot i lnderna i euroomrdet med i genomsnitt 1,2 procentenheter av BNP mellan r2000 och 2002.
During the great recession, structural balances declined by 2.5 pp of GDP between 2007 and 2010 (Based on IMF data, World Economic Outlook, October 2017). 19 
Under den stora recessionen minskade det strukturella saldot med 2,5 procentenheter av BNP mellan 2007Đ2010 (baserat p uppgifter frn IMF, World Economic Outlook, oktober 2017). 19
The requirement for the former is set higher by a quarter of a percentage point in bad and good times, but surprisingly not in normal times. 
dliga och goda tider, men frvnansvrt nog inte under normala frhllanden.
For them, the Commission has simply specified that the requirement should be higher than 0.5 % of GDP. 
Fr dessa har kommissionen helt enkelt specificerat att kravet br vara hgre n 0,5 % av BNP.
The 2016 Vade Mecum explains that higher than 0.5 % of GDP is “conventionally understood to be 0.6 % of GDP at least"20. While an adjustment of 0.6 % of GDP has been required in normal times, there is no evidence that a requirement higher than this amount has been recommended in normal times for MS with higher debt levels. 
I 2016 rs Vade Mecum (handledning) frklaras att det med hgre n 0,5 % av BNP traditionellt menas tminstone 0,6 % av BNP20. ven om det har krvts en anpassning p 0,6 % av BNP under normala frhllanden finns det inga belgg fr att ett hgre krav n detta har rekommenderats vid normala frhllanden fr medlemsstater med hgre skuldniver.
However, this is done in an inconsistent manner as the requirements are higher by a quarter of a percentage point more in bad and good times if growth is above potential, but in normal times there is no such additional adjustment for low-debt countries, while it is unspecified for high-debt countries. 
I matrisen grs tskillnad beroende p huruvida tillvxten gr om potentialen eller ej. Det sker dock inte konsekvent eftersom kraven r en kvarts procentenhet hgre i dliga och goda tider om tillvxten r ver potentialen.
Although it should be easier to implement reforms when growth is fast, i.e. higher than the average or potential growth rate, the Commission argued that they had considered the feasibility of larger adjustments, including their political viability (see also paragraph 50). 
Vid normala frhllanden krvs dock ingen sdan ytterligare anpassning fr lnder med lga skulder, samtidigt som anpassningen inte specificeras fr lnder med hga skulder. ven om det vore enklare att genomfra reformer nr tillvxttakten r hg, det vill sga hgre n den genomsnittliga eller potentiella tillvxttakten, menade kommissionen att den vervgt genomfrbarheten hos strre anpassningar, inbegripet deras politiska genomfrbarhet (se ven punkt 50).
Before setting the matrix values, the Commission did not analyse how the set parameters, combined with the “significant deviation” defined in the Regulation, could ensure that the Member States reached their MTO in a reasonable time. 
Innan kommissionen faststllde matrisvrdena analyserade den inte hur de faststllda parametrarna, i kombination med den Óbetydande avvikelsenÓ som definieras i frordningen, skulle kunna skerstlla att medlemsstaterna ndde sina medelfristiga budgetml inom en rimlig tid.
The matrix was not based on a simulation of whether, under reasonable macroeconomic assumptions, its values would produce an average improvement in the SB of 0.5 pp of GDP over a reasonable period of time. 
Matrisen baserades inte p en simulering av huruvida dess vrden, vid normala makroekonomiska antaganden, skulle ge en genomsnittlig frbttring av det strukturella saldot p 0,5 procentenheter av BNP under en rimlig tidsperiod.
The only analysis done was on the distribution of output gaps, without looking at implications for reaching the MTO. 
Den enda analys som gjordes var av frdelningen av produktionsgap, och man tittade inte p konsekvenserna fr att n det medelfristiga budgetmlet.
The European Fiscal Board warned that, in the absence of restrictions on cumulative deviation in the Regulation, Member States had an incentive to systematically deviate from 26 20 Vade Mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact 2016, paragraph 5, Box 1.6, p. 
Den europeiska finanspolitiska nmnden varnade fr att medlemsstaterna, eftersom den kumulativa avvikelsen inte begrnsades i frordningen, hade ett incitament fr att systematiskt avvika frn den erforderliga anpassningen mot de medelfristiga budgetmlen, och att vissa eventuellt kan ha planerat att gra detta inom de tilltna marginalerna21. Vade Mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact 2016 (handledning om stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten), punkt 5, ruta 1.6, s.
Weakening the framework further, in May 2017 the Commission introduced a "margin of appreciation", also referred to as the "margin of discretion"22. 
I maj 2017 infrde kommissionen ett Óutrymme fr sknsmssig bedmningÓ, som ven benmns ÓbedmningsutrymmeÓ, vilket ytterligare frsvagar ramen22.
It announced that it intended to use this margin in cases where the impact of a large fiscal adjustment on growth and employment would be particularly significant23. 
Den meddelade att den avsg att anvnda denna marginal i de fall dr stora finanspolitiska anpassningar fr tillvxt och sysselsttning skulle vara srskilt betydelsefulla23.
In its proposed country-specific recommendations for Italy in May 2017, the Commission stated that the required adjustment would need to be “at least 0.6 % of GDP”, but then added: “As recalled in the Commission Communication accompanying these country-specific recommendations, the assessment of the 2018 Draft Budgetary Plan and subsequent assessment of 2018 budget outcomes will need to take due account of the goal to achieve a fiscal stance that contributes to both strengthening the ongoing recovery and ensuring the sustainability of Italy’s public finances. In that context, the Commission intends to make use of the applicable margin of appreciation in the light of the cyclical situation of Italy.”24 33. 
I sina freslagna landsspecifika rekommendationer fr Italien i maj 2017 fastslog kommissionen att den erforderliga anpassningen skulle behva vara minst 0,6 procentenheter av BNP, men tillade drefter: I det meddelande frn kommissionen som tfljde de landsspecifika rekommendationerna erinrade man om att bedmningen av 2018 rs utkast till budgetplan och pfljande bedmning av 2018 rs utfall av budgeten kommer att behva ta vederbrlig hnsyn till mlsttningen att n en finanspolitisk inriktning som bidrar bde till att strka den pgende terhmtningen och skerstlla hllbarheten i Italiens offentliga finanser.
In this way, the Commission announced ex ante that a significant deviation from the adjustment set in the CSRs might not trigger a non-compliance assessment. 
P detta stt meddelade kommissionen p frhand att en betydande avvikelse frn den anpassning som faststlls i de landsspecifika rekommendationerna kanske inte skulle franleda en bedmning av bristande verensstmmelse.
This has reduced the relevance and credibility of the set requirement. 
Detta har minskat det faststllda kravets relevans och trovrdighet.
Further explaining this new flexibility later in the year, the Commission stated that it could exercise a degree of discretion when assessing compliance with the SGP25. Therefore, even if a Member State was significantly deviating from its required adjustment, the See p. 55 of the European Fiscal Board 2017 Annual Report. 
Senare samma r frklarade kommissionen denna nya flexibilitet ytterligare och angav att den skulle kunna tillmpa utrymmet fr sknsmssig bedmning nr efterlevnaden av stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten bedms25. ven om en medlemsstat avviker betydligt frn den anpassning som krvs kan det Ói slutnden leda till slutsatsenÓ att det inte r befogat med ett frfarande fr betydande avvikelser.
COM(2017) 500 final “2017 European Semester: Country-specific recommendations”. In its 2017 Annual Report, the European Fiscal Board stated in this context: ”While flexibility is desirable,thegrowingnumberofflexibilityprovisionsundertheSGPisincreasinglyperceivedas lacking transparency and, at times, to be determined in an ad hoc manner including in response to political considerations”. 
I detta sammanhang hnvisar kommissionen till artikel 6.3 i 1466/97, dr det freskrivs att ven om den samlade bedmningen var kopplad COM(2017) 500 final Europeiska planeringsterminen 2017: Landsspecifika rekommendationer. I detta sammanhang fastslog den europeiska finanspolitiska nmnden fljande i sin rsrapport fr 2017: ven om det r nskvrt med flexibilitet anses det vxande antalet flexibilitetsbestmmelser inom ramen fr stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten i allt hgre utstrckning sakna ppenhet och de anses, tidvis, faststllas frn fall till fall, inbegripet som gensvar p politiska vervganden.
COM(2017) 800 final “2018 Draft Budgetary Plans: Overall Assessment”. 
COM(2017) 800 final, Utkast till budgetplaner 2018: Samlad bedmning.
21 22 23 24 25 
27 22 23 24 25
Further explanations for using additional relaxation appeared in the Commission’s 2018 overall assessment report on the DBPs. 
Fler frklaringar fr anvndning av ytterligare lttnader fanns i kommissionens vergripande utvrderingsrapport frn 2018 om utkasten till budgetplaner.
The justification for relaxation is given on the grounds that the recovery still appears fragile or could be jeopardised by a too large fiscal tightening. 
Lttnader r motiverade om terhmtningen fortfarande verkar vara brcklig eller skulle kunna riskeras genom en alltfr stram finanspolitik.
It is stated that Member States with a debt-to-GDP ratio above 60 % should ensure effective delivery of a “reasonable fiscal adjustment”, which is described by the Commission as roughly half of the requirement from the matrix. 
Det fastsls att medlemsstater som har en skuldkvot som verstiger 60 % verkligen br genomfra en Órimlig finanspolitisk anpassningÓ, som enligt kommissionen i grova drag kan berknas till uppfyllandet av minst hlften av kraven enligt matrisen.
The same document sets this reasonable adjustment as the essential criterion for avoiding the debt-based EDP. 
I samma dokument faststlls denna rimliga anpassning som ett viktigt kriterium fr att undvika ett skuldbaserat frfarande vid alltfr stora underskott.
It should be noted that the latest weakening of requirements has been introduced at a time when the EU and euro area economy has been continuously growing for four years, with growth rates higher than those of potential output. 
Det br noteras att den senaste frsvagningen av kraven har infrts vid en tidpunkt nr EU:s och euroomrdets ekonomi har vuxit kontinuerligt i fyra r med en tillvxttakt som verstiger den potentiella produktionen.
In one case the Commission has justified reducing the adjustment required based on its assessment that recovery is insufficiently robust, but it did not take into account that growth over the past four years (2015-2018), which might appear low, is estimated to have been 1 pp higher than the potential growth rate. 
I ett fall motiverade kommissionen en minskning av den erforderliga anpassningen p grundval av sin bedmning att terhmtningen inte r tillrckligt stabil, men den beaktade inte att tillvxten under de senaste fyra ren (2015Đ 2018), som skulle kunna uppfattas som lg, berknades ha varit 1 procentenhet hgre n den potentiella tillvxttakten.
Commission implementation of flexibility, on which it later reached agreement with Member States, leads to long delays in reaching the MTOs and allows for an increase in unrelated expenditure 37. In 2015 the Commission took the position to limit the structural reform clause to 0.5 % of GDP and not to set a limit on the investment clause26. 
Kommissionens genomfrande av flexibilitet, som den senare kom verens om med medlemsstaterna, leder till stora frseningar i uppnendet av de medelfristiga budgetmlen och innebr att orelaterade utgifter fr ka 37. r 2015 intog kommissionen stndpunkten att begrnsa strukturreformsklausulen till 0,5 % av BNP och att inte faststlla ngon grns fr investeringsklausulen26.
Subsequently ECOFIN27, in agreement Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank on “Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact”; Strasbourg, 13.1.2015; COM(2015) 12 final. 
Rdet (ekonomiska och finansiella frgor)27 faststllde senare, efter verenskommelse med kommissionen, en total grns fr kombinerade strukturreformer och investeringsbidrag p Meddelande frn kommissionen till Europaparlamentet, rdet, Europeiska centralbanken, Europeiska ekonomiska sociala kommittn, Regionkommittn och Europeiska investeringsbanken, Att p bsta stt utnyttja flexibiliteten inom stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens befintliga regler, Strasbourg, 13.1.2015, COM(2015) 12 final.
Commonly Agreed position on Flexibility in the Stability and Growth Pact; ECOFIN Council of the EU;14345/15; Brussels,30November2015,p.8. 
Gemensamt verenskommen stndpunkt om flexibilitet inom stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten, EU:s Ekofinrd, 14345/15, Bryssel, den 30 november 2015, s.
28 26 27 
8 28 26 27
with the Commission, set a cumulative limit on combined structural reform and investment allowances at 0.75 % of GDP until a Member State has reached its MTO. 
0,75 % av BNP till dess att en medlemsstat har uppntt sitt medelfristiga budgetml.
No cap has been imposed on the pension reform clause (which is, however, limited to actual costs). 
Inget vre tak har faststllts fr klausulen om pensionsreform (som dock r begrnsad till faktiska kostnader).
The investment clause can only be used in a budget year when GDP growth is negative or the negative output gap is greater than 1.5 % of GDP. 
Investeringsklausulen kan endast anvndas under ett budgetr dr BNP har en negativ tillvxt eller dr det negativa produktionsgapet r strre n 1,5 % av BNP.
The investment and structural reform allowance can only be granted if a Member State’s structural balance is at a distance to the MTO of at most 1.5 pp of GDP. 
Undantagen fr investeringar och strukturreformer kan endast beviljas om en medlemsstats strukturella saldo befinner sig p ett avstnd till det medelfristiga budgetmlet p hgst 1,5 procentenheter av BNP.
It also does not apply to the unusual event clauses. 
Den gller inte heller klausulerna om ovanliga hndelser.
Table 1 provides an overview of all the approved flexibility clauses in 2013-2017. 
Tabell 1 innehller en versikt ver alla godknda flexibilitetsklausuler under 2013Đ 2017.
Table 1 – List of flexibility clauses granted in 2013-2017, in percentage of GDP 29 Sum of allowed deviation 2013-2017 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 MS Pension Investment Pension Investment Pension Refugee Structural reform Pension Investment Refugee Security Structural reform Pension Investment Refugee Security Earthquake LV 1,20 ||||||||||||||||||| 0,50 0,30 0,30 0,10 IT 1,20 ||||||||||||||||||| 0,03 0,50 0,21 0,06 0,06 0,16 0,18 BG 0,70 ||||||||||| 0,60 0,10 FI 0,67 |||||||||| 0,05 0,17 0,50 0,10 -0,15 SK 0,40 |||||| 0,40 AT 0,39 |||||| 0,09 0,25 0,04 0,01 HU 0,22 ||| 0,04 0,04 0,14 BE 0,17 || 0,03 0,08 0,05 0,01 LT 0,10 | 0,10 0.4* SL 0,08 | 0,07 0,01 Sources: 2013 - 2017 Commission. 
Tabell 1 Đ Frteckning ver beviljade flexibilitetsklausuler under 2013Đ2017, uttryckt i procent av BNP 29 Medlemsstat Summa av tillten avvikelse 2013Đ2017 2 Pensioner 013 Investeringar 2 Pensioner 014 Investeringar 20 Pensioner 15 Flyktinga r Strukturreforme r Pensioner 2016 Investeringar Flyktinga r Skerhet Strukturreformer Pensioner 2017 Investeringar Flyktinga r Skerhet Jordbvning LV 1,20 ||||||||||||||||||| 0,50 0,30 0,30 0,10 IT 1,20 ||||||||||||||||||| 0,03 0,50 0,21 0,06 0,06 0,16 0,18 BG 0,70 ||||||||||| 0,60 0,10 FI 0,67 |||||||||| 0,05 0,17 0,50 0,10 -0,15 SK 0,40 |||||| 0,40 AT 0,39 |||||| 0,09 0,25 0,04 0,01 HU 0,22 ||| 0,04 0,04 0,14 BE 0,17 || 0,03 0,08 0,05 0,01 LT 0,10 | 0,10 0,4* SL 0,08 | 0,07 0,01 Kllor: 2013Đ2017 Kommissionen.
This meant the allowed deviation for LT was of 0.1 in 2017. 
Detta innebar att den tilltna avvikelsen fr Litauen var 0,1 r 2017.
Implementation of the investment clause 41. 
Genomfrandet av investeringsklausulen 41.
In January 2015 the Commission28 took the position that the allowance under the investment clause could be granted when Member States intend to incur national spending Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the 28 
I januari 2015 intog kommissionen28 stndpunkten att undantaget inom ramen fr investeringsklausulen skulle kunna beviljas nr medlemsstaterna avser dra sig nationella Meddelande frn kommissionen till Europaparlamentet, rdet, Europeiska centralbanken, Europeiska ekonomiska sociala kommittn, Regionkommittn och Europeiska 28
Nominal expenditure is then calculated as a percentage of GDP, and the adjustment requirement is reduced by the same percentage of GDP. 
De nominella utgifterna berknas sedan som en procentsats av BNP, och kravet p anpassning minskas med samma procentandel av BNP.
A condition was imposed that euro value of spending on gross fixed capital formation in the corresponding year should not decline. 
Ett villkor infrdes om att vrdet i euro av utgifter fr fasta bruttoinvesteringar fr motsvarande r inte ska minska.
This was subsequently confirmed by ECOFIN in a “Commonly agreed position on Flexibility the Stability and Growth Pact”30. 
Detta bekrftades drefter av Ekofinrdet i en gemensamt verenskommen stndpunkt om flexibilitet inom stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten30.
The current design of the investment clause makes it neither a condition nor an explicit objective for the investment ratio as a share of GDP to increase. 
Ssom investeringsklausulen fr nrvarande r utformad r den varken en frutsttning, eller en uttrycklig mlsttning, fr att investeringskvoten som en andel av BNP ska ka.
In the case of Italy, the Commission reported that, even with the granted investment allowance, the country’s budget spending on gross fixed capital formation would, in fact, remain broadly stable relative to GDP31. 
Nr det gller Italien rapporterade kommissionen att landets budgetutgifter fr fasta bruttoinvesteringar, ven med det beviljade undantaget fr investeringar, i praktiken skulle frbli i stort sett stabila i frhllande till BNP31.
As the expenditure relating to the approved investment clause will reduce the SB in the year for which the allowance has been approved, this will affect the path of structural balances in the following years, and the time for converging to the MTO will therefore be extended, all else being equal. 
Eftersom utgifterna med anknytning till den godknda investeringsklausulen kommer att minska det strukturella saldot fr det r fr vilket undantaget har godknts kommer detta att pverka de strukturella saldonas anpassningsbanor under de fljande ren, och tiden fr konvergens mot det medelfristiga budgetmlet kommer drfr att frlngas, om inget annat ndras.
As a result, the investment allowance in one year will increase overall permitted spending in the following years, independently of the level of investment spending in those years. 
Till fljd av detta kommer undantaget fr investeringar under ett r att ka de totala tilltna utgifterna fr de kommande ren, oberoende av investeringsniverna under dessa r.
There is no condition requiring that levels of increased investment are sustained in subsequent years. 
Det finns inget villkor som anger att niverna p kade investeringar ska upprtthllas under de fljande ren.
This can also be seen in the Commission’s description of the effects of the investment clause32 (see Figure 4). European Investment Bank on “Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact”; Strasbourg, 13.1.2015; COM(2015) 12 final. 
Detta framgr ven i kommissionens beskrivning av investeringsklausulens effekter32 (se figur 4). investeringsbanken, Att p bsta stt utnyttja flexibiliteten inom stabilitets-och tillvxtpaktens befintliga regler, Strasbourg, 13.1.2015, COM(2015) 12 final.
The Commission occasionally refers to the investment allowance as a sub-category of the reform clause. 
Kommissionen hnvisar emellant till undantaget fr investeringar som en underkategori i reformklausulen.
ECOFIN 888, UEM 422, 14345/15. 
Ekofin 888, UEM 422, 14345/15.
Assessment of the 2016 Stability Programme for Italy (May 2016): “Italy’s government gross fixed capital formation is forecast by the Commission to increase further in nominal terms in 2016 and 2017 (by 0.9 % and 0.6 %, respectively). 
Bedmning av stabilitetsprogrammet 2016 fr Italien (maj 2016): Enligt kommissionens prognos kommer den italienska regeringens utgifter fr fasta bruttoinvesteringar att ka ytterligare i nominellt vrde under 2016 och 2017 (med 0,9 respektive 0,6 %).
As a result, public investment is expected to remain broadly stable as a share of GDP (at around 2.3 %)”. 
Till fljd av detta frvntas de offentliga investeringarna frbli i stort sett stabila som en andel av BNP (ungefr 2,3 %).
2017 Vade Mecum, Annex 14, simulation 2, p. 
30 29 30 31 32 2017 rs Vade Mecum, bilaga 14, simulering 2, s.
30 29 30 31 32 Figure 4 – Simulation of investment clause by Commission 31 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 -2.0 -2.5 t-1 t+0 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 Years Safety Margin = Minimum Benchmark t+5 t+6 t+7 Maximum initial distance to the MTO set at -1.5% in year t+0 Temporary deviation is allowed over three years temp. dev t+1 temp. dev t+2 temp. dev t+3 MB is not binding temporary deviation is possible Pre clause - IC Post clause - IC Source: Commission SGP Vade Mecum 2017, Annex 14, Simulation 2, p. 
Figur 4 Đ Kommissionens simulering av investeringsklausulen 31 0,0 -0,5 -1,0 -1,5 -2,0 -2,5 t-1 t+0 t+1 t+2 Innan klausulen t+3 t+4 r Efter klausulen Skerhetsmarginal = lgsta riktmrke t+5 t+6 t+7 Maximalt inledande avstnd till det medelfristiga budgetmlet som faststllts till -1,5 % r t+0 tillf. avv t+1 tillf. avv t+2 tillf. avv t+3 Tillfllig avvikelse tillts under tre r Lgsta riktmrke r inte bindande tillfllig avvikelse r mjlig Klla: Kommissionens SGP Vade Mecum (handledning om stabilitets-och tillvxtpakten) 2017, bilaga 14, simulering 2, s.
To avoid lengthening the convergence time, in the years that follow the Commission would need to increase the adjustment from the matrix by a full or pro-rated amount of the approved investment allowance (and the same applies to structural reform and unusual event allowances, see below). 
Fr att undvika en frlngning av konvergenstiden behver kommissionen under de fljande ren ka anpassningen enligt matrisen med ett fullstndigt belopp eller ett belopp som berknas p proportionell basis av det godknda undantaget fr investeringar (och samma gller undantag fr strukturreformer och ovanliga hndelser, se nedan).