natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The study suggests a probability factor of […] %, which it considers prudent.
De merkostnader som en marknadsekonomisk aktör som förvaltar flygplatsen i CCIPB:s ställe kunde förvänta för varje transaktion (som i förekommande fall innefattar ett avtal om flygplatstjänster och ett avtal om marknadsföringstjänster) omfattar följande tre kategorier:
However, this very theoretical study does not provide any serious evidence for this factor, neither quantitatively nor qualitatively.
Kostnader för inköp av marknadsföringstjänster.
It does not base itself on any facts relating to Ryanair’s activities, air transport markets or airport services to substantiate this rate of […] %.
Ytterligare investeringskostnader till följd av investeringar som görs på grund av transaktionen.
It does not establish any link between this rate and the factors that it mentions in passing (prominence, strong brand, network externalities and repeat passengers) and that are deemed to extend the benefits of the airport service and marketing services agreements after their expiry dates.
Ytterligare driftskostnader, det vill säga driftskostnader (personal, olika inköp) som kan uppstå till följd av att transaktionen genomförs.
Lastly, it does not in any way base itself on the specific content of the marketing services set out in the various agreements with AMS when analysing to what extent these services may influence the factors mentioned above.
När det gäller kostnaderna för avtalen om marknadsföringstjänster har kommissionen tagit hänsyn till de belopp som anges i de olika avtalen om marknadsföringstjänster.
Moreover, it does not prove that there is any likelihood that, on the expiry of an airport services agreement and marketing services agreement, the profits generated by these agreements for the airport operator in the final year of their application will continue in the future.
Där anges i allmänhet fasta belopp per år eller sammanlagt.
Likewise, it provides no evidence that the growth rate of the air transport market in Europe is a useful indicator for measuring the impact of an airport services agreement and a marketing services agreement for a given airport.
Detta är dock det högsta belopp som kommissionen har använt som kostnad för marknadsföringstjänster, i tillägg till den inledande betalning som föreskrivs i avtalet.
A ‘terminal value’ calculated using the method suggested by Ryanair would therefore be highly unlikely to be taken into account by a prudent MEO when assessing the value of entering into an agreement.
Precis som för trafikprognoserna motsvarar de preliminära betalningarna för marknadsföringstjänster inte nödvändigtvis de belopp som verkligen betalades ut, eftersom vissa händelser efter avtalets ingång skulle kunna leda till avvikelser från de belopp som angavs från början.
The study of 31 January 2014 therefore shows that the ‘cash flow’ approach would lead only to very imprecise and unreliable results, as would the ‘capitalisation’ method.
Det gäller framför allt när avtalet har avslutats i förväg.
Moreover, as stated above, the marketing services considered by the formal investigation procedure clearly target people likely to use the routes covered by the marketing services agreements.
Av den anledningen och eftersom det inte finns något i ärendet som visar att en marknadsekonomisk aktör skulle ha väntat sig att behöva göra vissa investeringar på grund av något eller flera avtal, däribland dem som omfattas av det formella granskningsförfarandet, har inga ytterligare investeringskostnader beaktats i den här analysen.
If these routes are not renewed on the expiry of the airport services agreement, it is unlikely that the marketing services will continue to have a positive effect on passenger traffic at the airport after the expiry date.
När det gäller de ytterligare driftskostnader gick att förutse när de olika avtalen slöts är de, i brist på affärsplaner för varje avtal, den kategori som är svårast att behandla.
It is very difficult for an airport operator to assess the likelihood of an airline continuing to operate a route on the expiry of the term to which it has committed itself in the airport services agreement.
En liknande metod som den som används för intäkterna från icke-luftfartsverksamhet, som utgick från flygplatsens sammanlagda intäkter för icke-luftfartsverksamhet för att härleda de ytterligare intäkterna per passagerare för icke-luftfartsverksamhet, går inte att använda för driftskostnaderna.
Low-fare airlines in particular have proven to be very dynamic in terms of launching and withdrawing routes.
Med en sådan metod skulle flygplatsens sammanlagda driftskostnader, sett till antalet passagerare, betraktas som merkostnader.
Therefore, when entering into a transaction such as those being examined in this formal investigation procedure, a prudent MEO could not rely on an airline being willing to extend the operation of the route in question on the expiry of the agreement.
Men en stor del av driftskostnaderna för en flygplats är fasta, vilket innebär att de sammanlagda driftskostnaderna per passagerare i de allra flesta fall sannolikt är betydligt högre än merkostnaderna för ett nytt avtal som genererar ytterligare trafik.
Furthermore, it should be noted that a terminal value calculated using the method proposed by Ryanair in the study of 31 January 2014 will be positive (and therefore will have a positive effect on the projected return on the airport services agreement and marketing services agreement) only where the incremental profit expected from these agreements in the final year of application of the airport services agreement is positive.
För att beräkna de ytterligare driftskostnaderna måste kommissionen utgå från uppgifter i flygplatsförvaltarens analys, eftersom den inte själv kan bedöma hur ett visst avtal kan påverka de olika utgiftsposterna för flygplatsen.
This method involves taking the incremental profit expected in the final year of application of the airport services agreement and projecting it into the future by applying two factors.
Kommissionen konstaterar att CCIPB gjorde denna bedömning innan de undertecknade merparten av de avtal med Ryanair och AMS som omfattas av det formella granskningsförfarande och alltså var tillgänglig när dessa avtal ingicks.
The first factor is the overall growth in the European air transport market and reflects the expected growth in traffic.
Kommissionen konstaterar att Transavias verksamhetsplan har upprättats för ett annat flygbolag än Ryanair.
The second factor is a rate of […] % that basically represents the likelihood of agreements that are now expiring encouraging the signature of similar agreements in the future, resulting in similar financial flows.
Kommissionen anser dock att Transavia har en ekonomisk modell för ett ”lågprisbolag” som är jämförbar med Ryanairs modell och att de ytterligare driftskostnader som förväntas av en marknadsekonomisk aktör därför, sett till antalet passagerare, förmodligen är likartade för de båda flygbolagen.
The study of 31 January 2014 very briefly considers this scenario, by simply indicating in a footnote, without any comments or explanations, that ‘… no terminal value can be calculated if incremental profits net of AMS payments are negative in the last year of the period under consideration’.
Därför är beräkningen från december 2005 en acceptabel mall för den beräkning som en marknadsekonomisk aktör skulle ha gjort i juni 2005 för att bedöma intresset för att ingå dessa avtal med Ryanair och AMS.
However, as will be proven further on, all the agreements in this case involve projected incremental flows that have a negative net present value each year, and not just overall.
När det gäller avtalet från 2003 ingicks detta nästan tre år innan affärsplanen för Transavia utarbetades.
As a result, for these agreements, a ‘terminal value’ calculated using the method proposed by Ryanair would be zero, if not negative.
Trafikens struktur och flygplatsens verksamhet har dock inte förändrats avsevärt under denna period på tre år.
Taking this terminal value into account would not therefore call into question the conclusion that the various agreements involve an economic advantage.
Därför anser kommissionen i brist på bättre alternativ att den genomsnittliga merkostnaden på […] per passagerare, med en indexering på 2 % i förhållande till år 2009, också är lämplig för analysen av avtalet från 2003.
In conclusion, it is clear from the above that the only tangible benefit that a prudent MEO would expect from a marketing services agreement, and that it would take into account and quantify when assessing the value of entering into such an agreement, together with an airport services agreement, would be that the marketing services would have a possible positive effect on the number of passengers using the routes covered by the agreements in question for the operating period of those routes, as set out in the agreements.
Kommissionen konstaterar att den ytterligare driftskostnad som Frankrike föreslår ([…] euro per passagerare), beräknat som genomsnittet av driftkostnaderna per passagerare under perioden 2003–2011 är betydligt högre än den merkostnad per passagerare som kommissionen använder och som den anser är mer relevant av de skäl som beskrivs ovan.
Any other benefits would be deemed too uncertain to be taken into account and quantified, and there is nothing to suggest that they were taken into account by the CCIPB.
För varje transaktion multipliceras den ytterligare driftskostnaden per passagerare med den förväntade ytterligare trafiken för att år för år fastställa den sammanlagda ytterligare driftskostnaden för avtalet.
Relevance of comparing the terms of the airport services agreements covered by the formal investigation procedure with the airport charges invoiced at other airports
Presentation av resultatet i fråga om avtalen med Ryanair och AMS
According to the new Guidelines, when applying the MEO test, aid to an airline using an airport can, in principle, be excluded where:
Efter att ha fastställt samtliga ytterligare intäkter och samtliga merkostnader som en aktör i en marknadsekonomi skulle ha förväntat sig för varje avtal, kan kommissionen för varje avtal, och år för år under hela den fastställda avtalsperioden fastställa de beräknade ytterligare flödena (intäkter minus kostnader).
the price charged for the airport services corresponds to the market price;
Dessa resultat återges i tabellerna 6–11.
it can be demonstrated through an ex ante analysis, i.e. based on available information and foreseeable developments at the time when the measure was granted, that the airport/airline arrangement will lead to a positive incremental profit contribution for the airport.
Kommissionen konstaterar att samtliga ytterligare flöden är negativa för alla avtal och för tillägget av den 16 juni 2009 till avtalet från 2005 för flyglinjen Pau–London, vilket framgår av tabellen nedan.
Furthermore, according to the new Guidelines, ‘When assessing airport/airline arrangements, the Commission will also take into account the extent to which the arrangements under assessment can be considered part of the implementation of an overall strategy of the airport expected to lead to profitability at least in the long term’.
Detta blir fallet trots att kommissionen gör fördelaktiga antaganden för Ryanair, bland annat i fråga om ytterligare trafik och merkostnader.
However, with regard to the first approach (comparison with a ‘market price’), the Commission has strong doubts that, at the present time, an appropriate benchmark can be identified to establish a true market price for the services provided by airports.
Kommissionen konstaterar att denna slutsats även gäller för avtalen från 2007, 2008, 2009 och 2010, till och med när de ytterligare driftskostnaderna utesluts helt, och endast kostnaderna för inköp av marknadsföringstjänster räknas med som merkostnader.
The Commission considers ex ante incremental profitability analysis to be the most relevant criterion for the assessment of arrangements concluded by airports with individual airlines.
Av detta framgår tydligt att avtalen och tillägget av den 16 juni 2009 till avtalet från 2005 för London som CCIPB har ingått med Ryanair och AMS och som omfattas av denna granskning vart och ett ger Ryanair och/eller AMS en ekonomisk fördel.
It should be noted in this regard that, in general, the application of the MEO test based on an average price observed in other similar markets may prove helpful where a market price can be reasonably identified or deduced from other market indicators.
Eftersom denna fördel är en följd av särskilda bestämmelser i avtalen med Ryanair och AMS är den selektiv.
However, this method may not be as relevant in the case of airport services.
Tillägget av den 16 juni 2009 till avtalet från 2007 om flyglinjen Pau–Charleroi, där marknadsföringsinsatsen höjs från […] till […] euro per år från och med den 1 januari 2009 utan ändring av tjänsterna, innebär också en selektiv fördel för Ryanair och AMS, eftersom CCIPB inte fick något i utbyte mot den ytterligare betalningen på […] euro per år och framför allt inte kunde förvänta sig någon ytterligare trafik.
The revenue and cost structure tends to differ significantly from airport to airport.
Tabell 6
These costs and revenues depend on the airport’s state of development, number of airlines operating from/to the airport, available capacity in terms of passenger traffic, state of the infrastructure, the regulatory burden, which may vary from Member State to Member State, and historical debts and obligations of the airport.
Passagerare. ((s) = säsongsberoende).
Moreover, the liberalisation of the air transport market complicates any purely comparative analysis.
Avtal
As the present case amply demonstrates, commercial arrangements between airports and airlines are not necessarily based on a list of public prices for individual services.
flygningar/vecka
These commercial relationships vary widely.
flygningar/år
They include the sharing of risks in terms of traffic and of correlative commercial and financial responsibilities, the generalised use of incentive mechanisms (for example, in the form of discounts connected with the number of links or passengers carried), and variations in the distribution of risk over the term of contracts.
Datum för undertecknande av avtal
As a result, it is difficult to compare transactions based on a price per rotation or per passenger.
Verkligt startdatum
In its study of 9 April 2013, Ryanair essentially argues that the MEO test can be applied based on a comparison with the commercial arrangements of other European airports.
Ursprungligt slutdatum
It should firstly be noted that, during the procedure, neither France nor any interested third party has suggested to the Commission a sample of comparison airports that may be used in this case and that are sufficiently comparable to Pau airport in terms of traffic volume, type of traffic, type and level of airport services provided, proximity of the airport to a large city, number of inhabitants in the catchment area, prosperity of the surrounding area, and different geographical areas from which passengers could be attracted.
Tillägg 2009 till avtalet från 2005 för London
Even if such a sample of airports had been available, a comparative method would have been totally unworkable in this case.
London, Charleroi (s) och Beauvais (s) 2010
As proven above, the transactions to be analysed are complex packages consisting of an airport services agreement and a marketing services agreement (sometimes combined within the same legal medium).
Tabell 7
These transactions involve several ‘prices’, namely the various airport charges, price of the groundhandling services and price of the marketing services, some of which depend on the number of passengers and others on the number of aircraft movements, with others involving fixed amounts.
Avtal från 2003 om flyglinjen Pau-London
Each of these transactions therefore leads to a complex set of financial flows between the airport operator and the airline and its subsidiaries, consisting of the revenue from the airport charges, revenue linked to the groundhandling services and revenue linked to the marketing services.
(euro)
Accordingly, a comparison between just the airport charges invoiced by the CCIPB to the airlines concerned and the airport charges invoiced at the comparison airports would not provide any useful indication as to whether the MEO test was satisfied.
sammanlagt antal passagerare, ankomst och avgång
At the very least, in order to validly compare the transactions covered by this assessment, it would be necessary to identify, for the airports in the comparison sample, a set of comparable transactions, which must particularly include equivalent marketing services and equivalent groundhandling services.
antal turer per år
Identifying such a sample of comparable transactions would prove impossible, given that the transactions covered by this assessment are so complex and specific, and all the more so as the prices of groundhandling services and marketing services are rarely made public and would be difficult to obtain in order to form a basis for comparison.
landningsavgifter
Lastly, assuming that it could be established, based on a valid comparative analysis, that the ‘prices’ applied in the various transactions covered by this assessment were equivalent to or higher than the ‘market prices’ established using the sample of comparison transactions, the Commission could not, however, conclude that those transactions corresponded to the market price if it proved that, on their conclusion, the airport operator may have expected them to lead to incremental costs higher than the incremental revenues.
passageraravgifter
An MEO would not in fact be interested in offering goods or services at the ‘market price’ if this led to an incremental loss.
behållning från marktjänster
The Commission considers it appropriate to reiterate in the context of this analysis that, following the adoption of the new Guidelines, both France and the interested parties were invited to submit comments on the application of those guidelines to the present case (see recitals 22 and 23).
[0–99 999]
In the event, neither France nor the interested parties disputed in substance the Commission’s approach according to which, where an appropriate benchmark cannot be identified to establish a true market price for the services provided by airports to airlines, the most relevant criterion for assessing the arrangements concluded between these two parties is an ex ante incremental profitability analysis.
totala intäkter från luftfartsverksamhet
This approach is justified by the fact that an airport operator may have an objective interest in concluding a transaction with an airline where it may reasonably expect this transaction to improve its profits (or reduce its losses) compared to a counterfactual situation in which this transaction is not concluded, regardless of any comparison with the conditions offered to airlines by other airport operators, or even with the conditions offered by the same airport operator to other airlines.
[300 000–599 999]
On this last point, as the Commission noted in the new Guidelines, ‘price differentiation is a standard business practice, as long as it complies with all relevant competition and sectoral legislation.
intäkter från icke-luftfartsverksamhet
Nevertheless, such differentiated pricing policies should be commercially justified to satisfy the MEO test’ (footnotes omitted).
totala inkomster
In this regard, it should be noted that the comments of certain third parties that basically criticise the CCIPB for not having applied its general pricing system uniformly to all airlines are not relevant with regard to the application of the MEO test.
driftskostnader (personal, diverse inköp...)
For example, Air France’s comment, summarised in recital 169, that the CCIPB should have invoiced Ryanair for the ‘lighting charge’ under certain circumstances is without merit.
marknadsföringskostnader
An airport operator does not necessarily confer an economic advantage on an airline by negotiating conditions with that airline that fall outside its general pricing system, or even by negotiating a different pricing system from this general system.
totala kostnader
Joint assessment of the conduct of the airport operator and the CCIPB as a whole
[600 000–999 999]
In the opening decision, the Commission considered, as a preliminary observation, that the conduct of the CCIPB as a whole should be assessed together with that of the airport operator and, where applicable, with that of the State or other public authorities supervising the airport operator or involved in its financing.
ytterligare flöden (intäkter minus kostnader)
France indicated its agreement to the joint assessment of the conduct of the service operating the airport, the CCIPB as a whole and other public authorities.
[- 100 000 till - 299 999]
In applying the MEO test, the conduct of the CCIPB as a whole, and not just that of its service operating the airport, should be taken into account.
[- 1 till - 99 999]
The service operating the airport within the CCIPB does not in fact have its own legal personality distinct from that of the CCIPB.
Tabell 8
Furthermore, although the airport services agreements were signed with the airport, which received the airport charges paid by Ryanair and other airlines, the costs of the marketing services agreements were mainly charged to the CCIPB’s general budget and were not necessarily reflected in the airport’s accounts.
Avtal från 2005 om flyglinjen Pau-London
France also indicates in this respect that the CCIPB directly covered these costs.
Tabell 9
The Commission therefore takes the view that the conduct of the airport operator and the CCIPB as a whole must be assessed together, in terms of their relations with the airlines and their subsidiaries, in order to apply the private operator in a market economy test.
Tillägg av den 16 juni 2009 till avtalet om marknadsföringstjänster av den 30 juni 2005
Conclusion on the terms for applying the market economy operator test
Tabell 10
It is clear from all the above that, in order to apply the MEO test to the agreements in question, the Commission must analyse each marketing services agreement together with the corresponding airport services agreement, and must assess whether a hypothetical MEO, motivated by the prospect of profits and operating Pau airport in place of the CCIPB, would have entered into these transactions.
Avtal från 2007 om flyglinjen Pau-Charleroi
To this end, the Commission must determine the incremental profitability of the agreements as it would have been assessed by the MEO at the time of their conclusion, by estimating, for the entire period of application of the agreements:
Tabell 11
the future incremental traffic expected from the implementation of these agreements, possibly taking into account the effects of the marketing services on the load factors of the routes covered by the agreements;
Avtal från 2008 och 2009 om flyglinjerna Pau–Bristol och avtal från 2010 om flyglinjerna Pau–London, Pau–Charleroi och Pau–Beauvais
the future incremental revenues expected from the implementation of these agreements, including revenue from airport charges and groundhandling services, generated by the routes covered by these agreements, as well as non-aeronautical revenue from the additional traffic generated by the implementation of these agreements;
Avtal om Bristol 2008
the future incremental costs expected from the implementation of these agreements, including operating costs and any incremental investment costs generated by the routes covered by these agreements, as well as marketing service costs.
Avtal om Bristol 2009
These calculations will provide the future annual flows corresponding to the difference between incremental revenues and costs, which are to be discounted, if necessary, by a rate reflecting the cost of capital for the airport operator.
Avtal om London, Charleroi, Beauvais 2010
A positive net present value indicates in principle that the agreements in question do not confer an economic advantage, whereas a negative net present value reveals the presence of such an advantage.
[1 000 000–1 499 999]