natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
If it is issued by a court of another Member State, it will be recognised in the Member State where the child is actually present, pursuant to Article 21(1) of the Regulation, without any special procedure being required (subject to a possible application under Article 21(3) that it should not be recognised on one of the grounds exhaustively listed in Article 23), but its enforcement will require a declaration of enforceability pursuant to an application made in accordance with Chapter III, Section 2, of the Regulation (Articles 28 to 36).
Če jo izda sodi�če druge države članice, bo priznana v državi članici, v kateri je otrok, na podlagi člena 21(1) Uredbe, ne da bi bilo treba izvesti kakr�enkoli postopek (ob upo�tevanju možnosti vložitve predloga za nepriznanje na podlagi člena 21(3) iz enega od razlogov, taksativno na�tetih v členu 23), vendar bo za njeno izvršitev potrebna razglasitev izvr�ljivosti, ki se zahteva v skladu s postopki iz poglavja III, oddelek 2, Uredbe (in sicer iz členov od 28 do 36).
That is so because the only decisions which are enforceable in other Member States without such a declaration are those issued pursuant to Article 11(8) (that is to say, after an initial decision of nonreturn issued pursuant to Article 13 of the Convention) and certified in accordance with Article 42(2) of the Regulation.
Tako velja, ker so samo odločbe, ki so bile sprejete na podlagi člena 11(8) Uredbe (torej po prvi odločbi, da se otrok ne vrne, izdani na podlagi člena 13 Konvencije) in v zvezi s katerimi je bilo izdano potrdilo v skladu s členom 42(2) Uredbe, izvr�ljive v drugi državi članici brez take razglasitve.
18 — It is clear from the words ‘connected with that application’ that the application must actually have been made; it is not enough for the court to have theoretical jurisdiction to decide on such an application.
18 – Zaradi uporabe izraza „povezan s tem predlogom“ je očitno, da je moral biti predlog v resnici vložen; ni dovolj, da ima lahko sodi�če hipotetično pristojnost odločati o takem predlogu.
Thus, the competent court of the Member State of habitual residence may, under the jurisdiction which it already enjoys from Articles 8, 10 and, where applicable, 12, order the child’s return in the context of Article 11(8) if a nonreturn decision has been issued pursuant to Article 13 of the Convention.
Tako lahko pristojno sodi�če države članice običajnega prebivali�ča otroka na podlagi pristojnosti, ki jo ima že na podlagi členov 8, 10 in morebiti 12 Uredbe, odredi vrnitev otroka na podlagi člena 11(8), če je bila odločba, da se otrok ne vrne, izdana na podlagi člena 13 Konvencije.
In that event, its order will not require a declaration of enforceability in accordance with the procedure in Chap -ter III, Section 2.
V tem primeru za njegovo odločbo ne bo potrebna razglasitev izvr�ljivosti po postopku iz poglavja III, oddelek 2.
I shall endeavour none the less to find a solution to that situation too in the provisions of the Regulation, interpreted in accordance with its fundamental aims.
Vseeno bom poskusila v določbah Uredbe, razloženih v skladu z njenimi temeljnimi cilji, najti re�itev za ta položaj.
But the referring court’s question supposes not a pre-existing nonreturn decision pursuant to Article 13 of the Convention but a pre-existing order for the child’s return issued under Article 12 of the Convention, by a competent court of the Member State where the child is actually present.
Vendar se v vpra�anju, ki ga je postavilo predložitveno sodi�če, predpostavlja, da predhodno ne obstaja odločba, da se otrok ne vrne, na podlagi člena 13 Konvencije, temveč odločba o vrnitvi otroka na podlagi člena 12 Konvencije, ki jo je izdalo pristojno sodi�če države članice, v kateri je otrok.
In such a situation, can the competent court of the Member State of habitual residence also order the child’s return?
Ali lahko v takem primeru tudi pristojno sodi�če države članice običajnega prebivali�ča odredi vrnitev otroka?
First, we may look at Article 19 of the Regulation, which concerns lis pendens.
Prvič, uporabimo lahko člen 19 Uredbe, ki se nana�a na litispendenco.
According to paragraphs 2 and 3 of that article, where proceedings relating to parental responsibility for the same child and involving the same cause of action are brought before courts of different Member States, the court second seised must of its own motion stay its proceedings until the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established.
V odstavkih 2 in 3 tega člena je določeno, da če pred sodi�či različnih držav članic tečejo postopki z istim zahtevkom v zvezi s star�evsko odgovornostjo, sodi�če, ki je drugo začelo postopek, po uradni dolžnosti prekine svoj postopek, vse dokler se ne ugotovi pristojnost sodi�ča, ki je prvo začelo postopek.
Where that jurisdiction is established, the court second seised must decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.
Ko se ugotovi ta pristojnost, se sodi�če, ki je drugo začelo postopek, izreče za nepristojno v korist prvega sodi�ča.
I conclude that, in the normal event, as long as proceedings for a return order are pending in the Member State where the child is actually present, the court of the Member State of habitual residence must not examine the same question.
Iz tega sklepam, da v običajnem primeru, dokler postopek za izdajo odločbe o vrnitvi otroka teče v državi članici, v kateri je otrok, sodi�če države članice običajnega prebivali�ča ne sme preučiti istega vpra�anja.
In so far as the sixweek timelimit imposed by Article 11(3) applies, that result in no way delays the return procedure, whereas the simultaneous conduct of two sets of proceedings concerning the same child could give rise to complications.
Ker velja �esttedenski rok iz člena 11(3), tak rezultat nikakor ne odloži postopka vrnitve, medtem ko bi hkratno nadaljevanje dveh postopkov z enakim ciljem lahko povzročilo zaplete.
Quite obviously, such a question can arise only in extraordinary circumstances such as those of the present case.
Seveda se tako vpra�anje lahko postavi samo v izjemnih okoli�činah, kakr�ne so v tej zadevi.
It is selfevident that in any normally conceivable situation, the child will be returned to the Member State of habitual residence following the first order for his or her return, particularly since the very strict timelimit for taking the decision is not conducive to appeal proceedings.
Jasno je, da bo v vsakem normalno predstavljivem primeru otrok vrnjen v državo članico običajnega prebivali�ča po prvi odločbi o vrnitvi otroka, zlasti ker zelo kratek rok za izdajo odločbe ni naklonjen vložitvi pritožbe 19.
19It is therefore quite understandable, as the Netherlands Government pointed out at the hearing, that the legislature did not explicitly envisage the rather implausible situation now facing us.
Torej je povsem razumljivo, kot je na obravnavi opozorila nizozemska vlada, da zakonodajalec v Uredbi ni izrecno predvidel malo verjetnega položaja, kakr�nega obravnavamo zdaj.
19 — The Commission’s Practice Guide considers, at point VII.2.4, that in order to ensure observance of the sixweek timelimit imposed by Article 11(3) national law may (a) preclude the possibility of an appeal against a decision entailing the return of the child, or (b) allow for the possibility for appeal, but provide that a decision entailing the return of the child is enforceable pending any appeal, or (c) ensure an accelerated hearing of the appeal.
19 – V Praktičnem vodniku Komisije je v točki VII.2.4 navedeno, da bi morala nacionalna zakonodaja držav članic za zagotavljanje upo�tevanja �esttedenskega roka, določenega v členu 11(3), (a) izključiti možnost pravnega sredstva proti odločbi, ki določa vrnitev otroka, ali (b) dovoliti možnost pravnega sredstva, vendar zagotoviti, da je odločba izvr -�ljiva do kakr�negakoli pravnega sredstva, ali (c) zagotoviti pospe�eni pritožbeni postopek.
It may also be noted that, in the same spirit, Lithuanian law appears to rule out any further appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal of 15 March 2007 ordering the child’s return in the present case (even if other steps to reopen the proceedings do not seem to be impossible in reality).
Ugotovimo lahko tudi, da litovska zakonodaja v istem duhu očitno izključuje vsakr�no pritožbo zoper odločbo, ki jo je v tej zadevi izreklo Lietuvos apeliacinis teismas 15. marca 2007 in v kateri je odredilo vrnitev otroka (čeprav drugi postopki zaradi predloga za obnovo postopka v tem sporu v teh okoli�činah očitno niso izključeni).
However, once the court of the Member State where the child is actually present has issued its decision, lis pendens no longer applies and there is thus no longer any barrier to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court of the Member State of habitual residence.
Vendar ko sodi�če države članice, v kateri je dejansko otrok, izda odločbo, ni več litispendence in torej ovire za obstoj pristojnosti sodi�ča države članice običajnega prebivali�ča.
Article 11(8) of the Regulation specifically confirms jurisdiction in the event of an initial
Taka pristojnost je izrecno potrjena v členu 11(8) Uredbe ob prvi odločbi, da se otrok ne vrne, in ni nobenega razloga za njeno
Certification of the decision nonreturn decision, and there is no reason to rule out that jurisdiction (as conferred by Articles 8 and 10) if the initial decision orders the child’s return.
Potrdilo o odločbi izključitev (ki izhaja iz členov 8 in 10) ob prvi odločbi o vrnitvi otroka.
The only difference is that, in that event, the specific provisions of Article 11(8) will not apply and, in practice, a second return order will normally be redundant.
Edina razlika v tem primeru je, da se posebne določbe člena 11(8) ne bodo uporabile in da bo v praksi druga odločba o vrnitvi otroka navadno odveč.
The referring court asks also whether, once that decision has been adopted, the issue of a certificate under Article 42 of the Regulation complies with those aims and procedures.
Predložitveno sodi�če spra�uje tudi, ali je po izdaji te odločbe izdaja potrdila iz člena 42 Uredbe v skladu z istimi cilji in postopki.
I would add that, without necessarily following the Commission in its suggestion that, if the court of the Member State where the child is actually present has not taken a decision within a certain period, there is a de facto nonreturn order capable of triggering the application of Article 11(8), I consider that the lis pendens rule in Article 19 must be read subject to the sixweek timelimit imposed by Article 11(3) and that any failure to comply with that timelimit may also set aside the barrier to the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court of the Member State of habitual residence under Articles 8 and 10.
Dodala bi – ne da bi bilo nujno treba sprejeti predlog Komisije, da če sodi�če države članice, v kateri je otrok, ne sprejme odločbe v določenem roku, de facto obstaja odločba, da se otrok ne vrne, zaradi katere je mogoče uporabiti člen 11(8) – da menim, da je treba pravilo o litispendenci v členu 19 brati ob upo�tevanju �esttedenskega roka iz člena 11(3) in da vsaka prekoračitev tega roka lahko tudi odpravi oviro za izvajanje pristojnosti sodi�ča države članice običajnega prebivali�ča na podlagi členov 8 in 10.
The reply to this part of the question is simpler, at least in the abstract.
Odgovor na to vpra�anje je preprostej�i, vsaj z abstraktnega vidika.
The certificate in question can never be issued unless the decision was adopted in the circumstances set out in Article 11(8) of the Regulation (Article 42 refers to Article 40(1)(b), which refers in turn to Article 11(8)).
Zadevno potrdilo se vsekakor lahko izda samo, če je bila odločba izdana v okoli�činah, navedenih v členu 11(8) Uredbe (člen 42 se sklicuje na člen 40(1)(b), ta pa na člen 11(8)).
The adoption of a return order in such circumstances presupposes that a nonreturn decision has been issued previously pursuant to Article 13 of the Convention.
Izdaja odločbe o vrnitvi otroka v takih okoli�činah predpostavlja, da je bila pred tem na podlagi člena 13 Konvencije izdana odločba, da se otrok ne vrne.
Admittedly, taken in isolation, the wording ‘notwithstanding a judgment of nonreturn pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention’ (emphasis added) could be taken to mean ‘whether such a judgment has been issued or not’.
Seveda je izraz „[n]e glede na sodno odločbo, da se otrok ne vrne, na podlagi člena 13 [K]onvencije“ (moj poudarek), če ga obravnavamo ločeno, mogoče razlagati tako, da pomeni, „da je bila taka sodna odločba izdana ali ne“ 20.
20 However, on a systematic reading, Article 11(6) to (8) rules out such an interpretation.
Vendar sistematično branje odstavkov od 6 do 8 člena 11 izključuje tako razlago.
Moreover, a certificate cannot be issued under Article 42 unless, in particular, the court has taken into account in issuing its judgment the reasons for and evidence under-
Poleg tega je potrdilo iz člena 42 mogoče izdati le, če je sodi�če med drugim pri izdaji sodne odločbe upo�tevalo razloge in dokaze,
Consequently, to sum up on my analysis of this part of the fifth question, the adoption of a decision ordering the return of the child by the court of the Member State of habitual residence after the court of the Member State where the child is actually present has ordered his or her return is in no way incompatible with the aims or procedural rules of the Regulation.
Zato – če povzamem svojo analizo tega dela petega vpra�anja – dejstvo, da sodi�če države članice običajnega prebivali�ča sprejme odločbo o vrnitvi otroka, potem ko je sodi�če države članice, v kateri je otrok, sprejelo odločbo o vrnitvi otroka, nikakor ni nezdružljivo s cilji in postopki Uredbe.
RINAU lying the order issued pursuant to Article 13 of the Convention (Article 42(2)(c)).
RINAU na podlagi katerih se izda odredba v skladu s členom 13 Konvencije (člen 42(2)(c)).
which was well and truly a ‘judgment of nonreturn pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention’ within the meaning of Article 11(8) of the Regulation.
22. decembra 2006 izdalo odločbo, ki je bila „sodna odločba, da se otrok ne vrne, na podlagi člena 13 [K]onvencije“ v smislu člena 11(8) Uredbe.
I conclude that, in principle, the issue of a certificate under Article 42 of the Regulation by the court of the Member State of habitual residence, in respect of a return order which it has made after the court of the Member State where the child is actually present has ordered his or her return does not comply with the procedural rules of the Regulation.
Iz tega sklepam, da načeloma izdaja potrdila iz člena 42 Uredbe s strani sodi�ča države članice običajnega prebivali�ča otroka za odločbo o vrnitvi otroka, ki jo je to sodi�če izdalo po tem, ko je sodi�če države članice, v kateri je otrok, sámo sprejelo odločbo o vrnitvi otroka, ni v skladu s postopki iz Uredbe.
Can that circumstance affect the compatibility with the Regulation of the certificate which the Oranienburg court issued in respect of its order?
Ali lahko ta okoli�čina vpliva na združljivost potrdila, ki ga je Amtsgericht Oranienburg izdalo za to odločbo, z Uredbo?
In other words, was the Oranienburg court entitled to consider that the requirements for the application of Article 11(6) to (8) were satisfied?
Povedano drugače, ali je Amtsgericht Oranienburg lahko upravičeno menilo, da so pogoji za uporabo člena 11, od (6) do (8), izpolnjeni?
Competence to deliver a certificate under Article 42 in the present case
Pristojnost za izdajo potrdila iz člena 42 v obravnavani zadevi
The formulation of the national court’s fifth question omits however any mention of a factor in the present case which cannot be ignored if we are to give that court a helpful answer.
V besedilu petega vpra�anja za predhodno odločanje je vseeno izpu�čena vsakr�na navedba elementov zadeve, ki je ne smemo spregledati, če želimo dati predložitvenemu sodi�ču uporaben odgovor.
It transpired at the hearing that most of the Member States submitting observations thought that the answer should be ‘no’ — only a final, enforceable judgment having the force of res judicata could trigger the application of those provisions.
Na obravnavi se je izkazalo, da večina držav članic, ki so predložile stali�ča, meni, da je treba odgovoriti nikalno – te določbe se lahko uporabljajo samo za dokončno, izvr�ljivo in pravnomočno sodno odločbo, da se otrok ne vrne.
In the present case, the Klaipėda court’s decision of 22 December 2006 had been not only appealed against but quashed before the Oranienburg court took its decision of 20 June 2007.
Vendar v tej zadevi ni bila samo vložena pritožba zoper odločbo Klaipėdos apygardos teismas z dne 22. decembra 2006, temveč je bila ta odločba celo razveljavljena pred sprejetjem odločbe Amtsgericht Oranienburg z dne 20. junija 2007.
In addition, we were told, the decision of 22 December 2006 had never been enforceable at any time.
Poleg tega so potrdili, da odločba z dne 22. decembra 2006 nikoli ni bila izvr�ljiva.
It is true that the Oranienburg court’s decision of 20 June 2007, which is the decision under challenge in the proceedings with which we are concerned, was preceded by that of the Lithuanian Court of Appeal of 15 March 2007 also ordering the child’s return, but it was preceded, too, by that of the Klaipėda court of 22 December 2006,
Pred odločbo Amtsgericht Oranienburg z dne 20. junija 2007, ki se izpodbija v upo�tevnem postopku, je sicer Lietuvos apeliacinis teismas izdalo odločbo z dne 15. marca 2007, v kateri je tudi odredilo vrnitev otroka, vendar je �e pred to odločbo Klaipėdos apygardos teismas
VIEW OF MS SHARPSTON — CASE C-195/08 PPU of which it may order the child’s return as envisaged in paragraph 8, which will be fully enforceable as provided for in Article 42 if it is certified.
�anje dodelitve varstva in vzgoje, zaradi česar lahko odredi vrnitev otroka, kot je določeno v odstavku 8, z vsemi učinki izvr�ljivosti, ki izhajajo iz člena 42, če se izda potrdilo.
Article 11 uses the words ‘the court shall … issue its judgment’ (paragraph 3, second sentence), ‘[i]f a court has issued an order on non-return’ (paragraph 6) and ‘[n]otwithstanding a judgment of nonreturn pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention’ (paragraph 8).
V členu 11 so uporabljeni izrazi „izda sodi�če sodno odločbo“ (odstavek 3, drugi stavek), „[č]e je sodi�če […] izdalo sodno odločbo, da se otrok ne vrne“ (odstavek 6) in „[n]e glede na sodno odločbo, da se otrok ne vrne, [izdano] na podlagi člena 13 [K]onvencije“ (odstavek 8) 21.
21In other provisions, when the Regulation wishes to specify that a decision is enforceable, it does so expli -citly (see, in particular, Articles 28, 36 and 44).
Kadar želi Uredba natančneje določiti izvr�ljivost odločbe, je to v drugih določbah izrecno navedeno (glej predvsem člene 28, 36 in 44).
But nothing in the wording of Article 11 indicates that the nonreturn decision must be enforceable, or even still in force, at the moment when the court of the Member State of habitual residence gives its judgment in the context of Article 11(8). 22
Toda v besedilu člena 11 ni nikjer navedeno, da mora biti sodna odločba, da se otrok ne vrne, izvr�ljiva ali celo �e vedno veljavna, ko sodi�če države članice običajnega prebivali�ča odloča v okviru člena 11(8) 22.
That chain of obligations and procedures forms a whole, and is set in motion automatically as soon as the nonreturn order is issued.
Te obveznosti in ukrepi sestavljajo celoto ter se začnejo izvajati samodejno, ko se izda odločba, da se otrok ne vrne.
The only factor envisaged as interrupting it is the non-receipt of submissions from the parties by the court of the Member State of habitual residence (paragraph 7, second indent) — which would amount, in effect, to a discontinuance of the proceedings by the parent left behind.
Edini predvideni dejavnik, ki bi lahko ustavil to izvajanje, je, če sodi�če države članice običajnega prebivali�ča ne prejme predlogov strank (odstavek 7, drugi pododstavek), kar pomeni, da je tisti od star�ev, ki ga je otrok moral zapustiti, odstopil od zahteve.
If a nonreturn order issued by the court of the Member State where the child is actually present is subsequently overturned by a higher court, that does not in any way change the essential factors, namely that: (a) a nonreturn order was made; (b) the child has still not been returned; (c) time is passing; and (d) the court of the Member State of habitual residence still has sole jurisdiction to decide on custody, which necessarily implies the power to ensure, by interim order where appropriate, the child’s presence with the person to whom it awards custody.
Če vi�je sodi�če nato razveljavi odločbo, da se otrok ne vrne, ki jo je izdalo sodi�če države članice, v kateri je otrok, to ne spremeni bistvenih dejavnikov, in sicer: (a) da je bila taka odločba izdana, (b) da otrok �e vedno ni bil vrnjen, (c) da čas mineva in (d) da je sodi�če države članice običajnega prebivali�ča �e vedno edino pristojno za odločanje o varstvu in vzgoji otroka, kar nujno vključuje pristojnost za zagotavljanje njegove dejanske navzočnosti pri osebi, ki ji je bil dodeljen v varstvo in vzgojo, tudi z začasno odredbo.
On the contrary, the text even seems indifferent to the subsequent fate of that decision.
Nasprotno, zdi se, da v tem besedilu ni zanimanja za poznej�o usodo te odločbe.
It does not envisage, explicitly or by implication, any appeal procedure in the Member State where the child is actually present.
V njem ni niti izrecno niti implicitno predviden pritožbeni postopek v državi članici, v kateri je otrok.
Paragraph 6 requires the court which issued the decision to transmit it immediately, together with all other relevant documents, to the authorities of the Member State of habitual residence, to be received by the competent court of that State within a mandatory timelimit of one month from the date of the nonreturn order.
V odstavku 6 je sodi�ču, ki je izdalo sodno odločbo, naloženo, da takoj po�lje odločbo in ustrezne dokumente organom države članice običajnega prebivali�ča otroka, tako da jih pristojno sodi�če te države prejme v zavezujočem roku enega meseca od dne izdaje odločbe o tem, da se otrok ne vrne.
That notification triggers, under paragraph 7, a new timelimit of three months for the parties to make their submissions so that the court of the Member State of habitual residence can examine the question of custody, as a result
S tem obvestilom v skladu z odstavkom 7 začne teči nov trimesečni rok, v katerem stranke predložijo predloge, da sodi�če države članice običajnega prebivali�ča preuči vpra-
21 — Emphasis added in each quotation.
21 – Moj poudarek v vseh primerih.
In paragraph 8, the majority of language versions speak of a judgment issued pursuant to Article 13.
V nekaterih jezikovnih različicah je v odstavku 8 izpu�čen enakovreden izraz besede „rendue“, saj slovnično ni potreben.
22 — It is however clear that there was indeed an order on nonreturn — see the considerations set out at point 64 above.
22 – Vendar je jasno, da je res morala obstajati sodna odločba, da se otrok ne vrne – glej preudarke v točki 64 zgoraj.
It is entirely coherent with the aims and scheme of the Regulation with regard to child abduction to interpret Article 11(6) to (8) as applying notwithstanding any appeal which may be brought against the initial nonreturn
Razlagati odstavke od 6 do 8 člena 11 tako, da se uporabljajo ne glede na kakr�nokoli pravno sredstvo, ki se lahko vloži zoper prvotno odločbo, da se otrok ne vrne, v državi članici, v kateri je bila izdana, je povsem
In my view, the wording does not require us to read the Regulation in that way, and such a reading would run counter to one of its principal aims.
Po mojem mnenju nas besedilo ne zavezuje, da Uredbo razumemo v tem smislu, saj bi bilo tako razumevanje v nasprotju z enim od njenih glavnih ciljev.
order in the Member State in which it was made.
v skladu s cilji in sistematiko Uredbe, kar zadeva ugrabitev otroka.