natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Even if that is so, the fact remains that where individuals intended — as the complainants did in the main proceedings — to rely on the, albeit optional, jurisdiction which the national legislature, when transposing Directive 1999/70, conferred on those specialised courts to hear and determine disputes arising from the 2003 Act, the principle of effectiveness requires that those individuals should also be able to seek before the same courts the protection of the rights which they can derive directly from the directive itself, if it should emerge from the checks undertaken by the referring court that the obligation to divide their action into two separate claims and to bring the claim based directly on the directive before an ordinary court leads to procedural complications liable to render excessively difficult the exercise of those rights conferred on the parties by Community law.
Tudi če je ta trditev točna, načelo učinkovitosti zahteva, da lahko v primeru, ko so posamezniki hoteli, tako kot pritožniki iz postopka v glavni stvari, predložiti zadevo tem posebnim sodi�čem, ki jim je nacionalni zakonodajalec ob prenosu Direktive 1999/70 podelil pristojnost, čeprav fakultativno, za odločanje o sporih, ki temeljijo na zakonu iz leta 2003, posamezniki tudi pred temi sodi�či zahtevajo varstvo pravic, ki jih imajo neposredno na podlagi te direktive, če bi iz presoje predložitvenega sodi�ča izhajalo, da bi se z obveznostjo ločiti njihovo pravno sredstvo na ločeni zahtevi in vložiti tisto, ki temelji neposredno na navedeni direktivi, pri rednem sodi�ču povzročilo postopkovne zaplete, zaradi katerih bi bilo izvr�evanje pravic, ki jih imajo posamezniki na podlagi pravnega reda Skupnosti, pretežko.
If the referring court were to find such an infringement of the principle of effectiveness, it would be for that court to interpret the domestic jurisdictional rules in such a way that, wherever possible, they contribute to the attainment of the objective of ensuring effective judicial protection of an individual’s rights under Community law (see, to that effect, Unibet, paragraph 44).
Če bi predložitveno sodi�če ugotovilo tak�no kr�itev načela učinkovitosti, bi moralo razlagati nacionalna pravila o pristojnosti tako, da se bo z njimi čim bolj prispevalo k doseganju cilja, ki je zagotavljanje učinkovitega sodnega varstva pravic, ki jih imajo posamezniki na podlagi prava Skupnosti (glej v tem smislu zgoraj navedeno sodbo Unibet, točka 44).
Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question must be that Community law, in particular the principle of effectiveness, requires that a specialised court which is called upon, under the, albeit optional, jurisdiction conferred on it by the legislation transposing Directive 1999/70, to hear and determine a claim based on an infringement of that legislation, must also have jurisdiction to hear and determine an applicant’s claims arising directly from the directive itself
Ob upo�tevanju zgoraj navedenih ugotovitev je treba na prvo vpra�anje odgovoriti, da pravo Skupnosti, zlasti načelo učinkovitosti, zahteva, da se mora specializirano sodi�če, ki mu je bila zadeva predložena v okviru pristojnosti, čeprav fakultativne, podeljene z zakonodajo, s katero je bila prenesena Direktiva 1999/70, za odločanje o zahtevi zaradi kr�itve te zakonodaje, izreči za pristojno za odločanje tudi o zahtevah posameznika, ki temeljijo neposredno na tej direktivi za obdobje po poteku roka za njen prenos in pred začetkom veljavnosti navedene zakonodaje, če se izkaže, da bi
2008 — CASE C-268/06 in respect of the period between the deadline for transposing the directive and the date on which the transposing legislation entered into force if it is established that the obligation on that applicant to bring, at the same time, a separate claim based directly on the directive before an ordinary court would involve procedural disadvantages liable to render excessively difficult the exercise of the rights conferred on him by Community law.
2008 – ZADEVA C-268/06 obveznost za tega posameznika, da mora vzporedno pri rednem sodi�ču vložiti ločeno zahtevo, ki temelji neposredno na navedeni direktivi, povzročila tak�ne postopkovne težave, da bi bilo izvr�evanje pravic, ki jih ima na podlagi pravnega reda Skupnosti, pretežko.
In the event that, having regard to the answer given to its first question, the referring court must declare that it has jurisdiction to hear and determine the claims of the complainants in the main proceedings based directly on Directive 1999/70, it is necessary to answer the second question, by which the referring court asks, in essence, whether Clauses 4(1) and 5(1) of the framework agreement are capable of being relied upon by individuals before their national courts.
V primeru, da bi se glede na odgovor na prvo vpra�anje predložitveno sodi�če moralo izreči za pristojno za odločanje o zahtevah pritožnikov iz postopka v glavni stvari, ki temeljijo neposredno na Direktivi 1999/70, je treba odgovoriti na njegovo drugo vpra�anje, s katerim v bistvu spra�uje, ali se lahko posamezniki sklicujejo na določbi 4, točka 1, in 5, točka 1, okvirnega sporazuma pred nacionalnim sodi�čem.
As the Advocate General noted at point 87 of her Opinion, that caselaw can be applied to agreements which, like the framework agreement, are the product of a dialogue, based on Article 139(1) EC, between management and labour at Community level and which have been implemented in accordance with Article 139(2) EC by a directive of the Council of the European Union, of which they are thus an integral component.
Kot je poudarila generalna pravobranilka v točki 87 sklepnih predlogov, se lahko ta sodna praksa prenese na sporazume, ki kot okvirni sporazum izhajajo iz dialoga med socialnimi partnerji na ravni Skupnosti na podlagi člena 139(1) ES in ki se izvajajo, v skladu z odstavkom 2 tega člena, z direktivo Sveta Evropske unije, katere sestavni del torej so.
Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement
Določba 4, točka 1, okvirnega sporazuma
Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement prohibits, in respect of employment conditions, the treatment of fixedterm workers in a less favourable manner than com -parable permanent workers solely because they have a fixedterm contract or relation unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds.
Z določbo 4, točka 1, okvirnega sporazuma je glede pogojev zaposlitve delavce, zaposlene za določen čas, prepovedano obravnavati manj ugodno kakor primerljive delavce, zaposlene za nedoločen čas, zgolj zato, ker so zaposleni za določen čas, razen kjer je različno obravnavanje upravičljivo iz objektivnih razlogov.
That provision prohibits, in a general manner and in unequivocal terms, any difference in treatment of fixedterm workers in respect of employment conditions which is not objectively justified.
S to določbo je v zvezi s pogoji zaposlitve splo�no in nedvoumno prepovedano vsakr�no različno obravnavanje delavcev, zaposlenih za določen čas, ki ni objektivno utemeljeno.
As Impact maintained, its subjectmatter appears therefore to be sufficiently precise to be relied upon by an individual and to be applied by the national court (see, by analogy, Marshall, paragraph 52).
Kot je poudaril Impact, se zdi vsebina te določbe dovolj natančna, da se posameznik lahko nanjo sklicuje in da jo sodnik lahko uporabi (glej po analogiji zgoraj navedeno sodbo Marshall, točka 52).
Contrary to Ireland’s submission, the fact that there is no definition of ‘employment conditions’ in Clause 4(1) does not render that provision incapable of being applied by a national court to the facts of a dispute which it is to hear and determine and, consequently, is unlikely to render the subjectmatter of that provision insufficiently precise.
Nasprotno od tega, kar uveljavlja Irska, zaradi neobstoja opredelitve pojma pogojev zaposlitve v zadevni določbi ni onemogočeno, da bi sodnik uporabil navedeno določbo za dejstva spora, o katerem mora odločiti, in tako tudi ni vsebini te določbe odvzeta lastnost zadostne natančnosti.
Thus, the provisions of a directive have already been deemed to be sufficiently precise notwithstanding the absence of a Community definition of the sociallaw terms included in those provisions (see, in that respect, Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others [1991] ECR I-5357, paragraphs 13 and 14).
Tako se je že obravnavalo določbe direktive kot dovolj natančne kljub neobstoju opredelitve pojmov socialnega prava iz teh določb na ravni Skupnosti (glej v zvezi s tem sodbo z dne 19. novembra 1991 v združenih zadevah Francovich in drugi, C-6/90 in C-9/90, Recueil, str. I-5357, točki 13 in 14).
Furthermore, the precise prohibition laid down by Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement does not require the adoption of any further measure of the Community institutions (see, by analogy, Case 41/74 van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337, paragraph 6).
Poleg tega natančna prepoved iz določbe 4, točka 1, okvirnega sporazuma ne zahteva sprejetja nobenega akta institucij Skupnosti (glej po analogiji sodbo z dne 4. decembra 1974 v zadevi Van Duyn, 41/74, Recueil, str. 1337, točka 6).
Besides, the provision under consideration does not in any way confer on
Obravnavana določba tudi ne daje državam članicam možnosti, da bi ob njenem prenosu v
Member States the right, when transposing it into domestic law, to limit the scope of the prohibition laid down in respect of employment conditions (see, by analogy, Marshall, paragraph 55).
2008 – ZADEVA C-268/06 nacionalno pravo pogojevale ali omejile obseg prepovedi iz te določbe na področju pogojev zaposlitve (glej po analogiji zgoraj navedeno sodbo Marshall, točka 55).
Admittedly, as Ireland submitted, that provision includes, in relation to the principle of nondiscrimination there laid down, a qualification concerning justification on objective grounds.
Kot je uveljavljala Irska, ta določba res vsebuje v zvezi z načelom prepovedi diskriminacije izjemo v zvezi z utemeljitvami na podlagi objektivnih razlogov.
The precision and unconditionality of Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement are not affected by Clause 4(2) either.
Določba 4, točka 2, okvirnega sporazuma ne vpliva na natančnost in brezpogojnost točke 1 te določbe.
As the Advocate General noted at point 101 of her Opinion, Clause 4(2) simply articulates one of the consequences which may be associated, where appropriate, subject to judicial control, with the application of the principle of nondiscrimination in favour of fixedterm workers, without in any way undermining the substance of that principle.
Kot je poudarila generalna pravobranilka v točki 101 sklepnih predlogov, je namreč s točko 2 le poudarjena ena izmed posledic, ki so lahko, če je to primerno, povezane, pod morebitnim nadzorom sodi�ča, z uporabo načela prepovedi diskriminacije v korist delavcev, zaposlenih za določen čas, brez vpliva na vsebino tega načela.
As regards Clause 4(3) of the framework agreement, upon which Ireland also relied in order to deny Clause 4(1) direct effect, it must be observed that Clause 4(3) entrusts the Member States and/or the social partners with the definition of the arrangements for facilitating the ‘application’ of the principle of nondiscrimination laid down by that clause.
Glede določbe 4, točka 3, okvirnega sporazuma, ki jo je Irska prav tako navedla, da ne bi priznala neposrednega učinka točki 1 te določbe, je treba ugotoviti, da pu�ča državam članicam in/ali socialnim partnerjem določitev načina, ki bo olaj�al „uporabo“ načela prepovedi diskriminacije iz te določbe.
Such arrangements cannot therefore in any way relate to the actual substance of that principle (see, by analogy, Case 8/81 Becker [1982] ECR 53, paragraphs 32 and 33).
Ta način se torej nikakor ne more nana�ati na določitev same vsebine tega načela (glej po analogiji sodbo z dne 19. januarja 1982 v zadevi Becker, 8/81, Recueil, str. 53, točki 32 in 33).
It follows that Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement appears, so far as its subjectmatter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise for individuals to be able to rely upon it before a national court.
Iz tega izhaja, da se zdi določba 4, točka 1, okvirnega sporazuma z vidika njene vsebine brezpogojna in dovolj natančna, da se posameznik lahko sklicuje nanjo pred nacionalnim sodi�čem.
Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement
Določba 5, točka 1, okvirnega sporazuma
Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement requires Member States to adopt one or more of the measures listed where domestic law does not include equivalent legal measures, in order to prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixedterm employment contracts or relationships.
Določba 5, točka 1, okvirnega sporazuma nalaga državam članicam z namenom preprečevanja zlorab, ki izhajajo iz veriženja pogodb o zaposlitvi ali delovnih razmerij za določen čas, da sprejmejo enega ali več ukrepov, ki so na�teti, kadar ni ustreznih pravnih ukrepov v njihovem nacionalnem pravu.
The measures listed, of which there are three, relate, respectively, to objective reasons justifying the renewal of such contracts or relationships, the maximum total duration of successive fixedterm employment contracts or relationships, and the number of renewals of such contracts or relationships.
Trije ukrepi, ki so tako na�teti, se nana�ajo na objektivne razloge, ki upravičujejo obnovitev tak�nih pogodb ali delovnih razmerij, na najdalj�e skupno trajanje tak�nih zaporednih pogodb ali delovnih razmerij oziroma na �tevilo njihovih obnovitev.
Under Clause 5(1), it is effectively left to the discretion of the Member States to rely to that end on one or more of the measures listed in that clause, or even on existing equivalent legal measures, while taking account of the needs of specific sectors and/or categories of workers.
Na podlagi te določbe imajo namreč države članice diskrecijsko pravico, da v ta namen uporabijo enega ali več ukrepov, na�tetih v tej določbi, ali že obstoječe ustrezne pravne ukrepe ob upo�tevanju potreb posameznih sektorjev in/ali kategorij delavcev.
Admittedly, as the Commission contended when referring to the judgment in Francovich and Others (paragraph 17), the right of the Member States to choose among several possible means of achieving the result required by a directive does not preclude the possibility for individuals of enforcing before the national courts rights the content of which can be determined sufficiently precisely on the basis of the provisions of that directive alone (see also, to that effect, Case C-271/91 Marshall [1993] ECR I-4367, paragraph 37, and Pfeiffer and Others, paragraph 105).
Kot je zatrjevala Komisija ob sklicevanju na zgoraj navedeno sodbo Francovich in drugi (točka 17), možnost držav članic, da izbirajo med več mogočimi načini za izpolnitev v direktivi predpisanih ciljev, res ne izključuje možnosti, da posamezniki pred nacionalnimi sodi�či uveljavljajo pravice, ki jih je mogoče dovolj natančno določiti na podlagi določb te direktive (glej v tem smislu tudi sodbo z dne 2. avgusta 1993 v zadevi Marshall, C-271/91, Recueil, str. I-4367, točka 37, in zgoraj navedeno sodbo Pfeiffer in drugi, točka 105).
However, it must be held that, unlike the provisions at issue in the case giving rise to the judgment in Francovich and Others, Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement does not contain any unconditional and sufficiently precise obligation capable of being relied upon, in the absence of transposing measures taken within the requisite period, by an individual before a national court.
Vendar je treba ugotoviti, da v nasprotju s spornimi določbami v zadevi, v kateri je bila izrečena zgoraj navedena sodba Francovich in drugi, določba 5, točka 1, okvirnega sporazuma ne vsebuje nobene brezpogojne in dovolj natančne obveznosti, da bi se posameznik nanjo lahko skliceval pred nacionalnim sodi�čem v primeru, da ukrepi za prenos niso bili pravočasno sprejeti.
In Francovich and Others, notwithstanding the freedom of choice given to the Member States by the directive in question to achieve the result required by that directive, the Court of Justice was able to identify in the directive provisions defining, unconditionally and sufficiently precisely, content comprising minimum protection in favour of individuals: in that case, a minimum guarantee for the payment of wage claims in the event of the employer’s insolvency (for other cases of identificat- ion of minimum protection, see also Case C-303/98 Simap [2000] ECR I-7963, paragraphs 68 and 69, and Pfeiffer and Others, paragraph 105).
V zgoraj navedeni sodbi Francovich in drugi je lahko Sodi�če kljub svobodi izbire, ki jo zadevna direktiva pu�ča državam članicam za izpolnitev v tej direktivi predpisanega rezultata, v njej odkrilo določbe, ki brezpogojno in dovolj natančno določajo vsebino minimalne za�čite posameznikov, v tem primeru minimalno jamstvo za plačilo terjatev iz delovnega razmerja v primeru plačilne nesposobnosti delodajalca (za druge primere, ko je bila ugotovljena tak�na minimalna za�čita, glej tudi sodbo z dne 3. oktobra 2000 v zadevi Simap, C-303/98, Recueil, str. I-7963, točki 68 in 69, ter zgoraj navedeno sodbo Pfeiffer in drugi, točka 105).
In the present case, however, the Court cannot accept the Commission’s suggestion that Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement also establishes such minimum material protection in that, in the absence of any other measure intended to combat abuse or at least of any sufficiently effective, objective and transparent measure to that end, it requires objective reasons to justify the renewal of successive fixedterm employment contracts or relationships.
Vendar v obravnavanem primeru ni mogoče sprejeti predloga Komisije, da določba 5, točka 1, okvirnega sporazuma prav tako določa tak�no minimalno dejansko za�čito s tem, da se zahteva, kadar ni drugih ukrepov, ki bi preprečevali zlorabo, ali vsaj dovolj učinkovitega, nepristranskega in preglednega ukrepa v ta namen, obstoj objektivnih razlogov, ki upravičujejo obnovitev zaporednih pogodb o zaposlitvi ali delovnih razmerij za določen čas.
First, while it is true, as the Court stated in paragraph 67 of the judgment in Adeneler and Others, that, according to paragraph 7 of the general considerations in the framework agreement, the signatory parties to that agreement took the view that ‘the use of fixedterm employment contracts founded on objective reasons is a way to prevent abuse’, the fact remains that the construction advocated by the Commission effectively introduces a hierarchy between the various measures referred to in Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement, whereas the terms of that provision themselves unequivocally show that the various measures envisaged are intended to be ‘equivalent’.
Na eni strani, tudi če je namreč res – kot je poudarilo Sodi�če v točki 67 zgoraj navedene sodbe Adeneler in drugi –, da izhaja iz točke 7 splo�nih ugotovitev okvirnega sporazuma, da so stranke podpisnice tega sporazuma menile, da „je uporaba pogodb o zaposlitvi za določen čas, ki temeljijo na objektivnih razlogih, način preprečevanja zlorab“, pa bi se z razlago Komisije vzpostavilo hierarhijo med različnimi ukrepi iz določbe 5, točka 1, navedenega okvirnega sporazuma, čeprav iz besedila te določbe nedvoumno izhaja, da so vsi različni ukrepi „ustrezni“.
Second, as the Advocate General also noted at point 116 of her Opinion, the interpretation proposed by the Commission would have the effect of rendering meaningless the choice of means allowed by Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement, since
Na drugi strani, kot je poudarila tudi generalna pravobranilka v točki 116 sklepnih predlogov, bi se z razlago Komisije povzročilo, da bi izbira sredstev iz določbe 5, točka 1, okvirnega sporazuma postala brezsmiselna, ker bi se tako lahko posameznik
2008 — CASE C-268/06 it would permit an individual to plead the absence of objective reasons in order to challenge the renewal of his fixedterm contract, even where that renewal did not infringe the rules relating to maximum total duration or number of renewals adopted by the Member State concerned in accordance with the options available under Clause 5(1)(b) and (c).
2008 – ZADEVA C-268/06 skliceval na neobstoj objektivnih razlogov, da bi izpodbijal obnovitev svoje pogodbe o zaposlitvi za določen čas, čeprav ta obnovitev ne bi kr�ila pravil v zvezi z najdalj�im skupnim trajanjem ali s �tevilom obnovitev, ki bi jih zadevna država članica lahko sprejela v skladu z možnostmi, ki so ponujene v navedeni določbi 5, točka 1(b) in (c).
Contrary to what was accepted in the cases giving rise to the judgments cited in paragraph 72 of the present judgment, it is therefore not possible, in the present case, to determine sufficiently the minimum protection which should, on any view, be implemented pursuant to Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement.
V nasprotju s tem, kar je bilo priznano v zadevah, v katerih so bile izrečene v točki 72 te sodbe navedene sodbe, v tej zadevi torej ni mogoče na zadosten način ugotoviti, da obstaja minimalna za�čita, ki jo je v vsakem primeru treba izvajati na podlagi določbe 5, točka 1, okvirnega sporazuma.
It follows that that provision does not appear, so far as its subjectmatter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise for individuals to be able to rely upon it before a national court.
Iz tega izhaja, da se z vidika njene vsebine ta določba ne zdi brezpogojna in dovolj natančna, da bi se posameznik lahko skliceval nanjo pred nacionalnim sodi�čem.
In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the second question must be that Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement is unconditional and sufficiently precise for individuals to be able to rely upon it before a national court; that is not the case, however, as regards Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement.
Ob upo�tevanju navedenega je treba na drugo vpra�anje odgovoriti, da je določba 4, točka 1, okvirnega sporazuma brezpogojna in dovolj natančna, da se posameznik lahko sklicuje nanjo pred nacionalnim sodi�čem, in da nasprotno to ne velja za določbo 5, točka 1, navedenega okvirnega sporazuma.
By its third question the referring court asks, in essence, having regard to the answers to the first question and to the second question in so far as it relates to Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement, whether Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement precludes a Member State, acting in its capacity as an employer, from renewing a
S tretjim vpra�anjem predložitveno sodi�če glede na odgovore na prvo in drugo vpra�anje, v zvezi s slednjim glede določbe 5, točka 1, okvirnega sporazuma, v bistvu spra�uje, ali ta določba okvirnega sporazuma prepoveduje državi članici, ki nastopa
IMPACT fixedterm employment contract for up to eight years in the period between the deadline for transposing Directive 1999/70 and the date on which the legislation transposing that directive enters into force.
IMPACT kot delodajalec, da v obdobju po poteku roka za prenos Direktive 1999/70 in pred začetkom veljavnosti zakona, s katerim je bila prenesena ta direktiva, obnovi pogodbo o zaposlitvi za določen čas za obdobje do osmih let.
In relation to that third question the referring court explains that, on previous occasions, the contract in question had always been renewed for shorter periods; that the employer requires the services of the employee for a period exceeding the usual term on renewal; that the renewal for an extended period has the effect of circumventing the application to an employee of Clause 5 of the framework agreement when transposed into domestic law; and that there are no objective reasons unrelated to the employee’s status as a fixedterm worker for such a renewal.
V okviru tega vpra�anja predložitveno sodi�če pojasnjuje, da je bila do tedaj ta pogodba vedno obnovljena za kraj�a obdobja, da delodajalec potrebuje storitve delavca za obdobje, ki je dalj�e od obdobja običajnega podalj�anja, da se s podalj�anjem pogodbe za dalj�e obdobje prepreči delavcu, da bi bil v celoti deležen ugodnosti uporabe določbe 5 okvirnega sporazuma po njenem prenosu v nacionalno pravo, in da ni objektivnih razlogov, ki niso povezani s statusom zadevne osebe kot delavca, zaposlenega za določen čas, ki bi upravičili tako obnovitev.