natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
184 — See above, points 212 to 218.
184 – Glej zgoraj točke od 212 do 218 teh sklepnih predlogov.
(c) Interim conclusion allow it to be ruled out that there is a risk that a collective dominant position will be created or strengthened, provided that the facts on which each finding is based are correct, complete, and capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from them.
KOKOTT – ZADEVA C-413/06 P c) Vmesni sklep utemeljujeta izključitev nevarnosti, da bo nastal ali da se bo krepil kolektivni prevladujoči položaj, pod pogojem, da so vsakokratna dejstva, na katerih temeljita, točna, popolna in da lahko utemeljijo iz njih izvedene sklepe.
Thus, the second part of the third ground of appeal is unfounded.
Drugi del tretjega pritožbenega razloga je tako neutemeljen.
The same applies for the submissions in paragraphs 98 to 100 and 102 of the appeal, the substance of which overlaps with the second part of the third ground of appeal.
Isto velja za navedbe v točkah od 98 do 100 in v točki 102 pritožbe, ki se vsebinsko prekrivajo z drugim delom tretjega pritožbenega razloga.
B — Limitations on the Court of First Instance’s power to analyse the facts and the evidence (fourth ground of appeal)
B – Meje proste presoje dejstev in dokazov Sodišča prve stopnje (četrti pritožbeni razlog)
Second, the appellants’ criticism of the standard of proof applied by the Court of First Instance appears to me to be based on a misinterpretation of the judgment under appeal.
Po drugi strani se mi zdi, da očitek pritožnikov glede zahtevanega dokaznega standarda Sodi�ča prve stopnje temelji na napačni razlagi izpodbijane sodbe.
On closer consideration, the Court of First Instance does not accuse the Commission of having failed to satisfy the standard of proof in its assessment of the concentration’s effect on competition.
Če natančneje pogledamo, Sodi�če prve stopnje Komisiji sploh ne očita, da pri presoji koncentracije z vidika konkurence ni zadostila zahtevanemu dokaznemu standardu.
Instead, in reviewing the first clearance decision the Court of First Instance orientates itself on the Commission’s finding that the market ‘is not sufficiently transparent to permit a collective dominant position.’ 185Thus, as the appellants demanded, the Court of First Instance even went so far as to review whether there was in fact the alleged insufficiency of evidence that the market was transparent.
Sodi�če prve stopnje se namreč pri svoji presoji prve odločbe o odobritvi ravna po ugotovitvi Komisije, da trg „ni tako pregleden, da bi omogočal kolektivni prevladujoči položaj“. 185Sodi�če prve stopnje je torej celo preučilo, kot sta zahtevala pritožnika, ali je dejansko obstajalo zatrjevano pomanjkanje zadostnih dokazov za obstoj preglednosti trga.
By their fourth ground of appeal the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance exceeded the scope of judicial review by failing to respect the Commission’s margin of discretion and, on a number of points, by substituting its own assessment of the facts and of the evidence for that of the Commission; in doing so, the Court itself committed manifest errors and fundamentally misconstrued the evidence. 187
Pritožnika s četrtim pritožbenim razlogom Sodi�ču prve stopnje očitata, da je prekoračilo obseg sodnega preizkusa odločbe Komisije, s tem da ni upo�tevalo diskrecijske pravice Komisije in da je njeno presojo dejstev in dokazov večkrat nadomestilo s svojo, pri čemer je storilo očitne napake in izkrivilo dokaze. 187
The manifest error of assessment found by the Court of First Instance consisted not in a failure positively to prove a lack of market transparency but instead in a failure to take all the relevant facts into account in the first clearance decision and in the fact that the facts taken into account were not capable of substantiating the conclusion that the Commission drew. 186
Za očitno napako pri presoji, ki jo je ugotovilo Sodi�če prve stopnje, ni �lo zato, ker ni bil predložen pozitivni dokaz za neobstoj preglednosti trga, ampak nasprotno zato, ker v prvi odločbi o odobritvi niso bili upo�tevani vsi relevantni podatki in ker tudi upo�tevana dejstva niso mogla utemeljiti sklepa, ki ga je izvedla Komisija sama. 186
Whereas the Commission supports this ground of appeal, Impala defends the judgment under appeal.
Medtem ko Komisija podpira ta pritožbeni razlog, Impala brani izpodbijano sodbo.
185 — Paragraphs 289 and 459 of the judgment under appeal; see also paragraphs 287, 366 and 371 of that judgment.
185 – Točki 289 in 459 izpodbijane sodbe; glej tudi točke 287, 366 in 371 te sodbe.
187 — The following discussion applies also in relation to the part of the sixth ground of appeal contained in paragraphs 101 and 102 of the appeal.
187 – Naslednje ugotovitve veljajo tudi za tisti del �estega pritožbenega razloga, ki ga vsebujeta točki 101 in 102 pritožbe.
186 — See in particular paragraphs 377, 390, 459 and 542 of the judgment under appeal.
186 – Glej zlasti točke 377, 390, 459 in 542 izpodbijane sodbe.
The Commission’s discretion and judicial review thereof
Diskrecijska pravica Komisije in njen sodni nadzor
— The Court of First Instance regarded campaign discounts as having ‘only a limited impact on prices’. 190
Reklamnim popustom naj bi Sodi�če prve stopnje pripisalo „le omejen vpliv na cene“.
— The Court of First Instance referred to a ‘high level of transparency of prices’ and a ‘high degree of transparency on the market’, 191 and regarded the weekly reports by parties to the concentration as ‘an additional factor of the transparency of the market’; 192the Court of First Instance regarded campaign discounts as ‘destined to become public knowledge’ 193and ‘rather public and transparent’. 194
Sodi�če prve stopnje naj bi govorilo o „veliki preglednosti cen“ oziroma o „veliki preglednosti trga“ 191in naj bi v tedenskih poročilih trgovskih zastopnikov videlo „dodatni dokaz za preglednost trga“; 192za reklamne popuste naj bi Sodi�če prve stopnje menilo, da so „namenjeni temu, da za njih izve javnost“ 193in da so „splo�no znani in pregledni“. 194
As support for its complaint that the Court of First Instance did not respect the Commission’s margin of discretion and instead substituted its own assessment of the facts and evidence on a number of points, the appellants give the following examples from the judgment under appeal:
Pritožnika kot dokaz za očitek, da Sodi�če prve stopnje ni upo�tevalo diskrecijske pravice Komisije in je njeno presojo dejstev in dokazov večkrat nadomestilo s svojo, opozarjata na naslednje primere iz izpodbijane sodbe:
— According to the Court of First Instance, the differences in the ranges of discounts could be ‘the result of differences in performance’ and did not preclude ‘the discounts being based on a known set of rules’. 195
Razlike v razponih popustov bi lahko bile po mnenju Sodi�ča prve stopnje „posledica različnih storitev“ in naj ne bi bilo mogoče izključiti, „da popusti temeljijo na znani vrsti pravil“. 195
— The Court of First Instance described the alignment of list prices as ‘very marked’, whereas the Commission referred simply to list prices as being ‘rather aligned’. 188
Sodi�če prve stopnje naj bi prilagajanje cen po ceniku označilo za „dejansko zelo jasno“, medtem ko naj bi Komisija govorila le o „bolj ali manj enakih“ cenah po ceniku. 188
— The Court of First Instance wrongly regarded the economic data produced as irrelevant to the question whether
Sodi�če prve stopnje naj bi predloženim gospodarskim podatkom neupravičeno odrekalo pomembnost v zvezi z vpra�a-
190 — Paragraph 317 of the judgment under appeal.191 — Paragraphs 347 and 361 of the judgment under appeal.192 — Paragraph 354 of the judgment under appeal.
190 – Točka 317 izpodbijane sodbe.191 – Točki 347 in 361 izpodbijane sodbe.192 – Točka 354 izpodbijane sodbe.
variation in the general levels of invoice discounts applied by the parties to the concentration as being ‘very low’. 189
Sodi�če prve stopnje naj bi nihanje splo�ne vi�ine popustov, ki so jih priznavale stranke koncentracije, označilo kot „le zelo neznatno“. 189
188 — Paragraph 299 of the judgment under appeal.
188 – Točka 299 izpodbijane sodbe.
193 — Paragraph 402 of the judgment under appeal.
193 – Točka 402 izpodbijane sodbe.
It should be observed that this claim is based on the — authoritative — English language version of the judgment (‘destined to become public knowledge’), whereas the French language version states that a campaign discount, ‘semble, par essence, avoir vocation à revêtir un caractère de publicité’, which seems not to be very similar to the English term, ‘public knowledge’ (emphasis added).
Opozoriti je treba na to, da ta očitek temelji na – zavezujoči – angle�ki jezikovni različici sodbe („destined to become public knowledge“), medtem ko je v francoski jezikovni različici zapisano, da reklamni popust „semble, par essence, avoir vocation à revêtir un caractère de publicité“, kar ima bolj malo zveze z angle�kim izrazom „public knowledge“; moji poudarki.
189 — Paragraph 307 of the judgment under appeal; the appellants refer in addition to paragraphs 421, 419, 424, 444 and 457 of the judgment under appeal, in which they identify similar statements by the Court of First Instance.
189 – Točka 307 izpodbijane sodbe; pritožnika poleg tega napotujeta na točke 421, 419, 424, 444 in 457 izpodbijane sodbe, kjer sta na�la podobne izjave Sodi�ča prve stopnje.
195 — Paragraph 420 of the judgment under appeal.
194 – Točke 403, 405, 406 in 436 izpodbijane sodbe.195 – Točka 420 izpodbijane sodbe.
196 of merger control, with regard to manifest errors of assessment. 199
196 njenih odločb s področja nadzora koncentracij glede očitnih napak pri presoji. 199
On this point the Court expressed itself most recently in Tetra Laval as follows:
Glede tega je Sodi�če ravno pred kratkim v sodbi Komisija proti Tetra Laval ugotovilo: b) Presoja
As already mentioned elsewhere, 197in the context of merger control the Commission has a not insignificant margin of discretion in assessing complex economic situations.
„Čeprav je Sodi�če Komisiji priznalo območje proste presoje glede ekonomskih zadev, to ne pomeni, da se morajo sodi�ča Skupnosti vzdržati nadzora nad razlago podatkov ekonomske narave, ki jo opravi Komisija.
According to consistent caselaw, review by the Community Courts in this regard must be limited to verifying whether the rules governing procedure and the statement of reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of assessment or misuse of powers. 198
Sodi�ča Skupnosti morajo zlasti preveriti ne samo vsebinsko točnost navedenih dokazov, njihovo zanesljivost in doslednost, ampak tudi, ali ti dokazi vsebujejo vse upo�tevne podatke, ki jih je treba upo�tevati pri presoji kompleksnega položaja, in ali lahko utemeljijo iz njih izvedene sklepe.“ 200 tracij na voljo �iroko diskrecijsko pravico za presojo zapletenih gospodarskih povezav.
Having regard to this standard of review, it would be an error to assume that
Spričo tega merila pri presoji bi bilo napačno domnevati, da diskrecijska pravica
By their criticism of the passages in the judgment under appeal quoted at paragraph 235 above, the appellants ultimately raise the question of the limits which the Commission’s discretion imposes on the judicial review of its decisions, in the context
Pritožnika na koncu s kritiko delov besedila iz točke 235 izpodbijane sodbe odpirata vpra�anje, kak�ne meje diskrecijska pravica Komisije določa sodnemu preizkusu
196 — Paragraph 456 of the judgment under appeal.
196 – Točka 456 izpodbijane sodbe.
199 — In passing it may be mentioned that the context in which the appellants’ criticism of some of the findings appears, namely those in paragraphs 299, 307 and 317 of the judgment under appeal, indicates that they belong to the formal review of the first clearance decision for failure to state reasons.
199 – Le obrobno je treba omeniti, da nekatere ugotovitve, ki jih kritizirata pritožnika, natančneje tiste v točkah 299, 307 in 317 izpodbijane sodbe, zaradi svojega sistematičnega položaja spadajo k formalnemu preizkusu prve odločbe o odobritvi glede pomanjkljivosti v obrazložitvi.
That criticism is principally addressed by what has been said above as regards the third part of the sixth ground of appeal (see in particular paragraphs 114 to 131).
Zanje v prvi vrsti velja tisto, kar je bilo navedeno zgoraj k tretjemu delu �estega pritožbenega razloga (glej zlasti točke od 114 do 131 teh sklepnih predlogov).
However, given that the appellants appear to assume that paragraphs 299, 307 and 317 of the judgment under appeal contain also elements of the review of the substance of the first clearance decision for manifest errors of assessment, in the following I consider them also on this footing.
Ker pa pritožnika očitno menita, da točke 299, 307 in 317 izpodbijane sodbe poleg tega vsebujejo elemente vsebinskega preizkusa prve odločbe o odobritvi glede očitnih napak pri presoji, jih bom v nadaljevanju preučila �e s tega vidika.
197 — See in particular the discussion concerning the first and sixth grounds of appeal in paragraphs 126 and 173 above.
198 – Sodbe z dne 3. aprila 2003 v zadevi Petrolessence in SG2R proti Komisiji (T-342/00, Recueil, str. II-1161, točka 101); EDP proti Komisiji (navedena v opombi 177, točka 151) in z dne 4. julija 2006 v zadevi easyJet proti Komisiji (T-177/04, ZOdl., str.
200 — Tetra Laval (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 39; likewise Spain v Lenzing (cited above, footnote 97), paragraphs 56 and 57, and General Electric (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 63.
200 – Sodba Komisija proti Tetra Laval (navedena v opombi 96, točka 39); poslej glej tudi sodbi Španija proti Lenzing (navedena v opombi 97, točki 56 in 57) in General Electric proti Komisiji (navedena v opombi 96, točka 63).
First, one cannot complain of an error of law in so far as the Court of First Instance reviewed the facts established by the Commission as to whether and to what extent it was evidence for or against market transparency.
Po eni strani s pravnega vidika ni mogoče očitati, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje dejstva, ki jih je ugotovila Komisija, preučilo glede tega, ali in v kolik�nem obsegu vsebujejo znake za oziroma proti preglednosti trga.
Thus, findings such as those in paragraphs 299, 307, 317, 347, 354 and 361 of the judgment under appeal which are criticised by the appellants were lawful, for example the statement ‘that three factors referred to in the Decision … are capable of giving rise to a high level of transparency of prices’ (paragraph 347).
Ugotovitve, kot so tiste v točkah 299, 307, 317, 347, 354 in 361 izpodbijane sodbe, ki sta jih kritizirala pritožnika, so bile torej zakonite, tudi na primer izjava, „da lahko trije dejavniki, navedeni v odločbi[,…] utemeljijo veliko preglednost cen“ (točka 347).
the Commission’s margin of discretion precludes the Community Courts in any event from giving their own analysis of the facts and the evidence.
Komisije sodi�ču Skupnosti že vnaprej onemogoča vsako lastno presojo dejstev in dokazov.
On the contrary, it is essential for the Community Courts to undertake such an assessment of their own where they are assessing whether the factual material on which the Commission’s decision was based was accurate, reliable, consistent and complete, and whether this factual material was capable of substantiating the conclusions the Commission drew from it.
Taka lastna presoja sodi�ča Skupnosti je ravno nasprotno neobhodno potrebna, kadar je treba raziskati, ali so bila dejstva, na katerih temelji odločba Komisije, točna, zanesljiva, dosledna in popolna in ali so lahko ta dejstva utemeljila sklepe Komisije.
Otherwise, the Community Courts could not sensibly assess whether the Commission had stayed within the limits of the margin of discretion allowed to it or had committed a manifest error of assessment. 201
Drugače sodi�če Skupnosti sploh ne bi moglo smiselno presoditi, ali je Komisija ostala v mejah diskrecijskega odločanja, ki ji je priznano, ali pa je naredila očitno napako pri presoji. 201
The Court of First Instance exceeds the limits of judicial review of a Commission decision in the context of merger control only where the factual and evidential position reasonably allows different assessments, the Commission adopts one of them, and the Court of First Instance none the less substitutes its own different assessment for that of the Commission.
Sodi�če prve stopnje meje sodnega preizkusa odločbe Komisije pri nadzoru koncentracij prestopi �ele takrat, če se zdi, da dejstva in dokazi dopu�čajo različne presoje, Komisija se je odločila za eno od njih, Sodi�če prve stopnje pa kljub temu to presojo Komisije nadomesti s svojo, drugačno presojo.
Second, the Court of First Instance was entitled also to form its own view as to whether and to what extent the factual material established by the Commission as regards price discounts, and in particular campaign discounts, was sufficient to exclude there being enough transparency in the market to allow a finding of a collective dominant position.
Po drugi strani si je Sodi�če prve stopnje lahko ustvarilo tudi svoje mnenje glede vpra�anja, ali in v kolik�nem obsegu so dejstva glede popustov, zlasti glede reklamnih popustov, ki jih je ugotovila Komisija, zado�čala za to, da se je lahko izključila zadostna preglednost trga za možnost domneve kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja.
Thus, the findings of the Court of First Instance such as those in paragraphs 402, 403, 405, 406, 419, 420, 421, 424, 436, 444, 456 and 457 of the judgment under appeal which are criticised by the appellants were likewise lawful, for example the statement that campaign discounts represent only a very small part of the gross selling price of albums (paragraph 457).
Ugotovitve Sodi�ča prve stopnje, kot so tiste v točkah 402, 403, 405, 406, 419, 420, 421, 424, 436, 444, 456 in 457 izpodbijane sodbe, ki sta jih kritizirala pritožnika, so bile torej prav tako zakonite, tudi na primer izjava, da so reklamni popusti pomenili le zelo majhen del bruto prodajne cene albumov (točka 457).
In essence, in the disputed paragraphs of the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance applied the criteria developed by the Court of Justice itself 202and reviewed in particular whether the factual
Sodi�če prve stopnje je namreč v bistvu v spornih točkah izpodbijane sodbe uporabilo merila, ki jih je samo razvilo Sodi�če, 202 in zlasti preverilo, ali so lahko dejstva, na katerih je temeljila prva odločba o odobritvi,
If one considers the examples from the judgment under appeal relied upon by the appellants from this point of view, it is clear that although the Court of First Instance in each case undertook its own assessment of the factual and evidential position it clearly remained within the proper limits of judicial review of a Commission decision in the context of merger control.
Če s tega zornega kota pogledamo primere iz izpodbijane sodbe, ki sta jih navedla pritožnika, se pokaže, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje sicer v vseh primerih opravilo lastno presojo dejstev in dokazov, da pa je vsekakor ostalo v mejah sodnega nadzora nad odločbo Komisije pri nadzoru koncentracij.
202 — Again, see Tetra Laval (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 39, most recently confirmed in Spain v Lenzing (cited above, footnote 97), paragraph 57.
202 – Glej �e enkrat sodbo Komisija proti Tetra Laval (navedena v opombi 96, točka 39), pred kratkim potrjeno s sodbo Španija proti Lenzing (navedena v opombi 97, točka 57).
201 — See already above, paragraph 179, albeit in a different context.
201 – K temu glej že – v drugi zvezi – točko 179 teh sklepnih predlogov.
The alleged distortion of evidence basis underlying the first clearance decision was capable of substantiating the Commission’s conclusion that the market was not sufficiently transparent as to allow a collective dominant position.
Očitek izkrivljanja dokazov utemeljila sklep Komisije, da trg ni dovolj pregleden, da bi omogočal kolektivni prevladujoči položaj.
The appellants further complain that in paragraphs 425, 427 and 434 of the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance distorted the evidence.
Pritožnika dalje očitata, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje v točkah 425, 427 in 434 izpodbijane sodbe izkrivljalo dokaze.
In the disputed passages of the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance considered the Commission’s view that campaign discounts were not transparent.
V sporni delih besedila izpodbijane sodbe se Sodi�če prve stopnje ukvarja s stali�čem Komisije, da naj bi bili reklamni popusti nepregledni.
The Court of First Instance by no means substituted its own assessment of market transparency for an equally reasonable assessment of the Commission and it by no means took upon itself to decide whether the disputed concentration was compatible or incompatible with the common market.
Sodi�če prve stopnje ni na primer lastne presoje preglednosti trga postavilo na mesto prav tako sprejemljive presoje Komisije, in tudi si ni nikakor vzelo pravice, da bi samo sodilo o združljivosti ali nezdružljivosti sporne koncentracije s skupnim trgom.
203It merely concluded that the conclusions drawn by the Commission in the present case were not supported by the factual basis of its first clearance decision.
203Presodilo je zgolj, da sklepi Komisije v obravnavanem primeru niso temeljili na dejstvih iz njene prve odločbe o odobritvi.
204 This assessment by the Court of First Instance is part of its analysis of the facts and the evidence in first instance proceedings and as such is not susceptible to review in appeal proceedings, subject, however, to the question of distortion of facts and evidence, to which I will turn in a moment.
204 Zadnja presoja Sodi�ča prve stopnje je del njegove presoje dejstev in dokazov v prvostopenjskem postopku in je kot take v pritožbenem postopku – s pridržkom vpra�anja izkrivljanja dejstev in dokazov, ki ga obravnavam v nadaljevanju – ni več mogoče preizkusiti.
Before I turn to consider those paragraphs of the judgment under appeal, I recall the strict criteria which the Court has laid down in its consistent caselaw for the review of an allegation that evidence has been distorted.
Preden se posvetim posameznim omenjenim točkam izpodbijane sodbe, bom spomnila na stroga merila, ki jih je Sodi�če v ustaljeni sodni praksi določilo za preizkus očitka izkrivljanja dokazov.
According to it, evidence may be found to have been distorted where, without recourse to new evidence, the assessment of the existing evidence appears to be clearly incorrect.
V skladu z njimi je izkrivljanje dokazov podano, če se zdi presoja obstoječih dokazov, ne da bi bilo treba poseči po novih dokazih, očitno napačna.
205 Thus, the issue is not to review whether the Court of First Instance’s ana -lysis of the evidence is convincing from the point of view of the Court of Justice.
205 Ne gre torej za to, da se preveri, ali je presoja dokazov, ki jo opravi Sodi�če prve stopnje, z vidika Sodi�ča prepričljiva; drugače bi namreč Sodi�če na mesto presoje dokazov Sodi�ča prve stopnje postavilo lastno presojo, kar v pritožbenem postopku ni njegova naloga.
Otherwise, the Court would simply be substituting its own analysis of the evidence for that of the Court of First Instance, and this is not its task in appeal proceedings.
Dokler je presoja dokazov Sodi�ča prve stopnje vsaj sprejemljiva, ni podano izkrivljanje dokazov.
203 — See paragraph 479 of the judgment under appeal: ‘It is not for the Court to rule on the compatibility of the concentration with the common market, but to review the lawfulness of the findings made in the Decision.’
203 – Glej točko 479 izpodbijane sodbe: „Naloga Sodi�ča prve stopnje namreč ni, da odloča o združljivosti koncentracije s skupnim trgom, ampak je, da preveri zakonitost ugotovitev, sprejetih v odločbi.“
204 — Paragraph 452 of the judgment under appeal.
204 – Točka 452 izpodbijane sodbe.
The Court of Justice undertakes its review exclusively by reference to the case file.
Sodi�če presojo opravi izključno na podlagi podatkov iz spisa.
206 amount which a party to the concentration had given to one and the same customer for each of its top 20 albums.
206 kupcu za vsakega od svojih 20 najbolje prodajanih albumov.