natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Article 2(1) of the Regulation grants any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, a right of access to documents of the institutions, ‘subject to the principles, conditions and limits defined in this Regulation’.
Člen 2(1) te uredbe priznava vsem državljanom Unije in vsem fizičnim ali pravnim osebam s prebivali�čem ali statutarnim sedežem v eni od držav članic pravico dostopa do dokumentov institucij „ob upo�tevanju načel, pogojev in omejitev, določenih s to uredbo“.
(6) Wider access should be granted to documents in cases where the institutions are acting in their legislative capacity, including under delegated powers, while at the same time preserving the effectiveness of the institutions’ decisionmaking process.
(6) Šir�i dostop do dokumentov se zagotovi, kadar institucije delujejo v svoji zakonodajni funkciji, vključno s prenesenimi pristojnostmi, sočasno pa se ohranja učinkovitost postopka odločanja institucij.
The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection of: the document would seriously undermine the institution’s decisionmaking process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.
Institucije zavrnejo dostop do dokumenta, kadar bi razkritje oslabilo varstvo: tudi po sprejetju odločitve, če bi razkritje resno oslabilo postopek odločanja institucije, razen če ne prevlada javni interes za razkritje.
— court proceedings and legal advice,
– sodnih postopkov in pravnih nasvetov [pravnih mnenj],
The exceptions may apply for a maximum period of 30 years. …’.
Izjeme lahko veljajo za največ 30 let. […]“ razen če ne prevlada javni interes za razkritje.
B — The facts
B – Dejansko stanje
Access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use or received by an institution, which relates to a matter where the decision has not been taken by the institution, shall be refused if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the institution’s decisionmaking process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.
Dostop do dokumenta, ki ga je institucija pripravila ali prejela za notranjo rabo in se nana�a na zadevo, o kateri institucija ni odločala, se zavrne, če bi razkritje resno oslabilo postopek odločanja institucije, razen če ne prevlada javni interes za razkritje.
Access to a document containing opinions for internal use as part of deliberations and preliminary consultations within the institution concerned shall be refused even after the decision has been taken if disclosure of
Dostop do dokumenta, ki vsebuje mnenja za notranjo rabo kot del razprav in predhodnih posvetovanj v zadevni instituciji, se zavrne
On 22 October 2002 Mr Turco submitted a request to the Council for access to the documents appearing on the agenda of the ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ Council meeting which took place in Luxembourg on 14 and 15 October 2002, including, under document number 9077/02, an opinion of the Council’s legal service on a proposal for a Council Directive laying down minimum standards for the reception of applicants for asylum in Member States.
Turco je 22. oktobra 2002 zaprosil Svet za dostop do dokumentov dnevnega reda sestanka Sveta „Pravosodje in notranje zadeve“ – ki je potekal 14. in 15. oktobra 2002 v Luxembourgu – med katerimi je bilo pod �tevilko 9077/02 navedeno mnenje pravne službe Sveta o predlogu direktive Sveta o minimalnih standardih za sprejem prosilcev za azil v državah članicah.
On 5 November 2002, on the basis of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, the Council refused Mr Turco access to the opinion in question on the ground that ‘given its content, the release of this document could undermine the protection of internal legal advice to the Council’ and that ‘in the absence of any specific reasons pointing to a particular overriding public interest in disclosure, the General Secretariat has concluded that, on balance, the interest in protecting internal legal advice outweighs the public interest’.
Svet mu je 5. novembra 2002 na podlagi člena 4(2) Uredbe �t. 1049/2001 zavrnil dostop do zadevnega mnenja, ker „[bi] glede na vsebino tega dokumenta […] lahko njegovo razkritje oslabilo varstvo notranjih pravnih mnenj Sveta“ in ker „[je v odsotnosti] posebnih razlogov, ki bi nakazovali, da obstaja odločilen javni interes za razkritje tega dokumenta, […] generalni sekretariat po pretehtanju interesov sklenil, da ima interes za�čite notranjih pravnih mnenj prednost pred javnim interesom“.
issue, and that, furthermore, disclosure of the legal service’s opinions could create uncertainty regarding the legality of legislative acts adopted further to those opinions, such as to undermine the presumption of legality which such acts enjoy and, therefore, to jeopardise the legal certainty and stability of the Community legal order.
razpravo o spornih pravnih vidikih; poleg tega bi njihovo razkritje ustvarilo negotovost glede zakonitosti zakonodajnih aktov, sprejetih na podlagi tega mnenja, s čimer bi oslabili domnevo zakonitosti, ki velja zanje, in bi zato ogrozili pravno varnost in stabilnost pravnega reda Skupnosti.
C — The judgment under appeal
C – Izpodbijana sodba
By decision of 19 December 2002, the Council agreed to disclose the introductory paragraph of that opinion, in which it is stated that the opinion contains the advice of the Council’s legal service on the question of the powers of the Community regarding access to the labour market by third-country nationals.
Z odločbo z dne 19. decembra 2002 je Svet odločil razkriti prvi odstavek navedenega mnenja, v katerem je navedeno, da mnenje vsebuje nasvete pravne službe Sveta o vpra�anju pristojnosti Skupnosti na področju dostopa prebivalcev tretjih držav na trg dela.
As to the remainder, it refused to revise its position.
V preostalem delu je zavrnil spremembo svojega stali�ča.
It justified its confirmation of refusal of access on the grounds that the independent advice of its legal service deserves particular protection, because it is an important instrument which enables the Council to be sure of the compatibility of its acts with Community law and to move forward the discussion of the legal aspects at
Potrditev zavrnitve dostopa je upravičil s tem, da so neodvisna mnenja njegove pravne službe upravičena do posebnega varstva, ker predstavljajo pomemben instrument, ki mu omogoča, da se prepriča o skladnosti svojih aktov s pravom Skupnosti in da pospe�i
In support of his claim for annulment, the applicant raised a single plea in law
V utemeljitev svojih predlogov za razglasitev ničnosti je tožeča stranka navedla samo
Primarily, he submitted that there had been an error as to the legal basis, since legal opinions drawn up in the context of the examination of legislative proposals are covered by the exception laid down by Article 4(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001 and not by that referred to in Article 4(2) which covers only legal opinions drawn up in the context of court proceedings.
Primarno je zatrjevala napako v zvezi s pravno podlago, saj je za pravna mnenja, izdelana v zvezi s pregledi predlogov zakonodaje, veljala izjema iz člena 4(3) navedene uredbe in ne tista iz člena 4(2), ki je zajemala le pravna mnenja, izdelana v okviru sodnih postopkov.
That interpretation defended by the applicant did not convince the Court of First Instance which held that it was at variance with the wording of the provision, which does not include such a restriction, and that it would mean that the inclusion of legal advice among the exceptions under Regulation No 1049/2001 had no practical effect, since the Community legislature intended, in Article 4(2) of that regulation, to provide for an exception relating to legal advice distinct from that relating to court proceedings.
Ta razlaga, ki jo je zagovarjala tožeča stranka, ni prepričala Sodi�ča prve stopnje, ki je presodilo, da ni v skladu z besedilom določbe, ki ne dovoljuje take omejitve in bi povzročila, da bi bil omembi pravnih mnenj med izjemami, določenimi v Uredbi �t. 1049/2001, odvzet ves koristni učinek, saj je zakonodajalec Skupnosti v členu 4(2) navedene uredbe želel predvideti izjemo v zvezi s pravnimi mnenji, ki naj bi se razlikovala od izjeme v sodnih postopkih.
In fact legal advice drawn up by the Council’s legal service in the context of court proceedings is already included in the exception relating to the protection of court proceedings.
V bistvu so pravna mnenja, ki jih izdela pravna služba Sveta v okviru sodnih postopkov, že zajeta v izjemi, ki velja za varstvo sodnih postopkov.
Consequently, according to the Court of First Instance, the Council could legitimately rely on the exception relating to legal advice which is set out in the second indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, in order to decide whether it should give the applicant access to the relevant opinion of its legal service.
Po mnenju Sodi�ča prve stopnje se je Svet zato lahko upravičeno oprl na izjemo, ki se nana�a na pravna menja iz člena 4(2), druga alinea, Uredbe �t. 1049/2001, da je določil, ali mora tožeči stranki dovoliti dostop do spornega mnenja svoje pravne službe.
The applicant also disputed the relevance of the need to protect the legal opinion in question, which was identified by the Council in the contested decision.
Prav tako je spodbijala primernost potrebe po varstvu spornega pravnega mnenja, na katero se je skliceval Svet v izpodbijani odločbi.
In reply to the first point, the Court of First Instance acknowledged that the fact that the document in question is a legal opinion cannot, of itself, justify the refusal of access because the Council is bound to assess in each individual case whether the documents whose disclosure is sought actually fall within the exceptions set out in Regulation No 1049/2001.
V odgovoru na prvo navedbo je Sodi�če prve stopnje priznalo, da dejstvo, da je sporni dokument pravno mnenje, samo po sebi ne upravičuje zavrnitve dostopa, saj mora Svet za vsak posamezen primer preveriti, ali dokumenti, katerih razkritje se zaprosi, dejansko spadajo med izjeme, na�tete v Uredbi �t. 1049/2001.
Furthermore, according to the Court of First Instance, the reasoning given by the Council for its refusal to disclose the entirety of the legal opinion in question seems to relate to all of its legal service’s advice on legislative acts and not specifically to the legal opinion in question.
Poleg tega se po mnenju Sodi�ča prve stopnje zdi, da obrazložitev, ki jo je Svet dal za zavrnitev razkritja spornega pravnega mnenja v celoti, zadeva vsa mnenja njegove pravne službe, ki se nana�ajo na zakonodajne akte in ne posebej na sporno pravno mnenje.
The applicant’s arguments were, however, rejected for two reasons: the generality of the reasoning was justified by the fact that giving additional information, making particular reference to the contents of the legal opinion in question, would deprive the exception of its purpose, and the fact that the Council finally agreed to disclose the introductory paragraph of the opinion indicates that it considered its content before giving a decision on the request for access.
Utemeljitev tožeče stranke je bila kljub temu zavrnjena iz dveh razlogov: splo�nost obrazložitve Sveta je upravičena z dejstvom, da bi predložitev dodatnih informacij, na katere se vsebina spornega pravnega mnenja �e posebej sklicuje, izjemi odvzela namen; dejstvo, da je Svet na koncu le odobril razkritje uvodnega odstavka tega mnenja, kaže na to, da je preučil vsebino spornega pravnega mnenja, preden je odločil o pro�nji za dostop.
As regards the challenge to the existence of an interest in the protection of the legal opinion in question, which was relied on by the Council, the Court of First Instance discounted any error of assessment, on the grounds that the disclosure of that opinion, firstly, would make public the Council’s internal discussions on the question of the legality of the legislative act to which it related and therefore, ‘given the particular nature of such documents’,
Sodi�če prve stopnje v zvezi s sporom o obstoju interesa za varstvo spornega pravnega mnenja, na katerega se sklicuje Svet, zavrača vsako napako pri presoji, ker bi se z razkritjem takega mnenja po eni strani javno razkrile notranje razprave Sveta v zvezi z vpra�anjem zakonitosti zakonodajnega akta, na katerega se nana�a, in bi zato „s stali�ča posebnih značilnosti teh dokumentov“ lahko povzročilo dvom glede omenjene zakonitosti ter bi
II — Analysis of the appeals give rise to lingering doubts as to that legality and, secondly, could compromise the independence of the opinions of the Council’s legal service.
II – Analiza pritožb po drugi strani lahko ogrozilo neodvisnost mnenj pravne službe Sveta.
In support of their appeals, the appellants raise pleas in law which, in essence, call in question the reasoning followed by the Court of First Instance in rejecting the arguments which had been put forward at first instance.
Pritožnika v podporo svojima pritožbama navajata pritožbene razloge, ki v bistvu in predvsem izpodbijajo sklepanje Sodi�ča prve stopnje, na podlagi katerega je zavrnilo trditve, navedene na prvi stopnji. Prvič, M.
Mr Turco claims, first, that there was a misinterpretation of the second indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, as the Court of First Instance wrongly held that legal opinions relating to draft legislation could fall within the scope of that provision although only Article 4(3) of the Regulation can apply to such opinions.
Drugič, M. Turco in �vedska vlada navajata, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno uporabilo člen 4(2), druga alinea, Uredbe �t.
Secondly, Mr Turco and the Swedish Government submit that the Court of First Instance misapplied the second indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 in holding that legal opinions of the Council’s legal service relating to draft legislation are by definition covered by the exception laid down by that provision in favour of legal advice.
1049/2001, ko je presodilo, da izjema iz te določbe, ki se nana�a na pravna mnenja, po naravi stvari velja za pravno mnenje pravne službe Sveta v zvezi s predlogi zakonodaje.
Thirdly, the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance misinterpreted and misapplied the concept of an overriding public interest capable of justifying the disclosure of a document which is in principle covered by the exception on the ground of confidentiality provided for in respect of legal advice.
Tretjič, pritožnika očitata Sodi�ču prve stopnje nepravilno razlago in uporabo prevladujočega javnega interesa, ki bi lahko upravičil razkritje dokumenta, za katerega načeloma velja izjema zaupnosti pravnih mnenj.
Lastly, the applicant complained that the Council did not examine whether there was an overriding public interest, in particu- lar that related to the transparency of the decisionmaking process and to the principles of openness and democracy, which would justify public access to legal opinions relating to legislative initiatives.
Nazadnje je tožeča stranka Svetu očitala, da ni preveril obstoja prevladujočega javnega interesa, predvsem tistega, vezanega na preglednost postopka odločanja in na načeli odprtosti in demokracije, kar bi upravičilo dostop javnosti do pravnih mnenj v zvezi s predlogi zakonodaje.
There too, the Court of First Instance discounted any error of assessment and made two findings.
Tu je Sodi�če prve stopnje ponovno zavrnilo očitek napake pri presoji, za kar je navedlo dva razloga.
The principles of transparency, openness and democracy underlie all the provisions of Regulation No 1049/2001, with the result that the overriding public interest mentioned in Article 4(2) of that regulation must, as a rule, be distinct from those principles or, at the very least, the applicant must show, which he failed to do in the present case, that, having regard to the specific facts of the case, the invocation of those same principles is so pressing that it overrides the need to protect the document requested.
Načela preglednosti, odprtosti in demokracije so podlaga za določbe Uredbe �t. 1049/2001, tako da se mora prevladujoči javni interes iz člena 4(2) navedene uredbe od njih načeloma razlikovati ali pa mora prosilec vsaj dokazati, da je glede na posebne okoli�čine primera sklicevanje na ta načela tak�no, da preseže potrebo po varstvu zapro�enega dokumenta, česar pa v obravnavanem primeru ni storil.
Furthermore, it is for the applicant who intends to rely on an overriding public interest capable of justifying the disclosure of a legal opinion to invoke it in his application so as to invite the institution to give a decision on that point, although the institution may itself identify an overriding public interest of that kind.
Poleg tega mora prosilec, ki želi določeno korist na podlagi prevladujočega javnega interesa, ki lahko upraviči razkrijte pravnega mnenja, ta interes uveljavljati v okviru svoje pro�nje, s katero institucijo povabi, da se o tej točki izjasni, čeprav bi lahko sama ugotovila tak prevladujoč pravni interes.
Before dealing in detail with those pleas, I must quickly refute the final two pleas in law raised by Mr Turco.
Preden podrobno obravnavam te pritožbene razloge, moram zavrniti zadnja, ki ju navaja M. Turco.
Since none of the arguments put forward by the applicant found favour with the Court of First Instance, it dismissed the action for annulment of the refusal of access to the opinion of the Council’s legal service, by judgment of 23 November 2004.
Sodi�če prve stopnje ni sprejelo nobene trditve tožeče stranke in je s sodbo z dne 23. novembra 2004 zavrnilo ničnostno tožbo, vloženo zoper zavrnitev dostopa do mnenja pravne službe Sveta.
The Court of First Instance ruled on that point by finding that the ‘independence of the opinions of [the] legal service’ can justify a refusal to disclose.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je to storilo, s tem da je odločilo, da „neodvisnost mnenj pravne službe“ lahko upraviči zavrnitev razkritja.
5Furthermore, the Court of First Instance cannot properly be criticised for failing to discuss, for the purposes of that assessment, the applicant’s assertion that the disclosure of the opinions of the Council’s legal service would help to protect that service from improper external influences since, as the Court of First Instance rightly pointed out, the applicant had put forward no explanation in support of it.
5Ne moremo mu utemeljeno očitati, da pri tem ocenjevanju ni preučilo trditve pritožnika, da bi razkritje pravnih mnenj pravne službe prispevalo k varovanju pravne službe Sveta pred nezakonitimi zunanjimi vplivi, saj, kot je Sodi�če prve stopnje pravilno poudarilo, pritožnik tega ni razložil.
6 In that regard it should be borne in mind that ‘although the Court of First Instance is required to give reasons for its decisions, it is not obliged to respond in detail to every single argument advanced by a party, par -ticularly if the argument is not sufficiently clear and precise’.
6 V zvezi s tem je treba spomniti, da „se obveznosti Sodi�ča prve stopnje, da obrazloži svoje odločitve, ne sme razlagati tako, da zahteva, da to podrobno odgovori na vsako trditev tožeče stranke, predvsem če ta ni dovolj jasna in natančna“.
7 that access to a legal opinion may be refused on the ground that its disclosure could give rise to lingering doubts as to the lawfulness of the legislative act to which it relates, 4 the Court of First Instance favoured the view of a stable legal order based on unlawful acts.
7 s tem, da je priznalo, da se lahko zavrne dostop do pravnega mnenja, ker bi njegovo razkritje lahko povzročilo dvom o zakonitosti zakonskega akta, na katerega se nana�a, 4v bistvu dalo prednost stabilnemu pravnemu redu pred nezakonitimi akti.
It is evident that that argument cannot succeed.
Tako razlogovanje naj bi bilo očitno napačno.
By the grounds which the appellant has called in question, the Court of First Instance highlighted the risk that the subjective opinion of the Council’s legal service on the lawfulness of a legislative act might, if disclosed, fuel challenges before the courts which may prove to be misplaced.
V skladu s pritožbenimi razlogi, ki jih je navedel pritožnik, je Sodi�če prve stopnje poudarilo nevarnost, da bi subjektivno mnenje pravne službe Sveta o zakonitosti zakonskega akta vzpodbudilo spore, za katere bi se lahko izkazalo, da so neumestni.
On the other hand, that opinion in no way prejudges the lawfulness of the legislative act to which it refers.
Omenjeno mnenje v ničemer vnaprej ne odloča o zakonitosti zakonskega akta, na katerega se nana�a.
The role of the legal service is limited to providing the Council with assistance in its assessment ex ante of the lawfulness of an act, but it is not the arbiter of the legality of the acts which that institution adopts, since only the Court of Justice has the power to give a legally binding ruling on that point.
Vloga pravne službe je, da nudi Svetu pomoč pri njegovi vnaprej�nji presoji zakonitosti akta, vendar ne sodi o zakonitosti aktov, ki jih ta institucija sprejme, saj ima le Sodi�če pristojnost, da zakonito odloča o tem.
Moreover, that is the reason why the Council is perfectly entitled to disregard an unfavourable opinion from its legal service, even though, politically, it would have more difficulty in doing so if the opinion were published.
Poleg tega gre za razlog, da ima Svet vso pravico, da se ne zmeni za neugodno mnenje njegove pravne službe, čeprav bi bilo to zanj politično gledano slab�e, če bi bilo mnenje objavljeno.
Paradoxically, however, as the Council correctly points out, making its opinions public would be likely to prejudice the independence and the candour with which its legal service issues them and, therefore, the benefit which the institution may derive from them in its a priori assessment of the lawfulness of an act.
Kljub temu pa bi paradoksalno, kot je Svet pravilno navedel, objava njenih mnenj lahko �kodovala neodvisnosti in odkritosti, s katero jih njegova pravna služba izdela, s tem pa tudi uporabnosti mnenj za Svet v postopku predhodne presoje o zakonitosti akta.
Let us come back now to the main points of the appellants’ arguments.
Sedaj se vrnimo k bistvu trditev pritožnikov.
For the purposes of clarity in the examination of the substance of the appeal, rather than set out each plea in turn, I will divide my analysis into two stages.
Zaradi jasnosti preučitve utemeljenosti pritožbe bom naredil analizo v dveh delih, namesto da bi obravnaval vsak pritožbeni razlog posebej.
First I will examine whether the legal opinions of the Council’s legal service relating to draft legislation are covered by the exception set out in the second indent of
Najprej bom obravnaval vpra�anje, ali za pravna mnenja pravne službe Sveta v zvezi s predlogi zakonodaje velja izjema iz člena 4(2), druga alinea, Uredbe �t. 1049/2001ali izjema iz člena 4(3)
However, for the purpose of ruling on the application of
Vendar Sodi�ču prve stopnje, da bi odločilo o veljavnosti izjeme, ki se nana�a na pravna
5 — Judgment under appeal, paragraph 79.6 — Ibidem.
5 – Izpodbijana sodba, točka 79.6 – Prav tam.
4 — See paragraph 78 of the judgment under appeal.
4 – Glej točko 78 izpodbijane sodbe.
SWEDEN AND TURCO v COUNCIL
ŠVEDSKA IN TURCO PROTI SVETU IN DRUGIM izjema ne nana�a (samo) na pravna mnenja, izdelana v okviru sodnih postopkov.
Then I will consider the way in which the second indent of Article 4(2) is to be applied.
Nato bom opisal način, na katerega bi moral biti uporabljen člen 4(2), druga alinea.
A — The scope of the second indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001
A – Področje uporabe člena 4(2), druga alinea, Uredbe št. 1049/2001
Does the exception to the right of access to documents, laid down in the second indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 in favour of legal advice, cover only legal advice issued in the context of court proceedings?
Ali izjema od pravice dostopa do dokumentov, določena v členu 4(2), druga alinea, Uredbe �t. 1049/2001, v korist pravnih mnenj ne zajema le pravnih mnenj, izdanih v okviru sodnih postopkov?