natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It then considers whether the Hauptzollamt is therefore obliged to review that decision, which in the meantime has become final, although the claimant did not plead misinterpretation of Community law, namely of Article 5(1) of Regulation No 3665/87, before either the Finanzgericht Hamburg or the Bundesfinanzhof.
Zatem se spra�uje, ali mora Hauptzollampt zato ponovno preučiti to odločbo, ki je medtem postala pravnomočna, glede na to, da tožeča stranka pred Finanzgericht Hamburg in Bundesfinanzhof ni zatrjevala napačne razlage prava Skupnosti, in sicer člena 5(1) Uredbe �t. 3665/87.
The referring court recalls that in Kühne & Heitz the Court of Justice ruled: ‘The principle of cooperation arising from Article 10 EC imposes on an administrative body an obligation to review a final administrative decision, where an application for such review is made to it, in order to take account of the interpretation of the relevant provision given in the meantime by the Court where:
Predložitveno sodi�če opozarja, da je Sodi�če v zgoraj navedeni sodbi Kühne & Heitz odločilo: „[N]ačelo sodelovanja, ki izhaja iz člena 10 ES, upravnemu organu, pri katerem je bil v ta namen vložen predlog, nalaga, da mora zaradi upo�tevanja zadevne določbe, kot jo je medtem razlagalo Sodi�če, pravnomočno upravno odločbo ponovno preučiti, kadar:
— the administrative decision in question has become final as a result of a judgment of a national court ruling at final instance;
– je zadevna odločba postala pravnomočna na podlagi sodbe nacionalnega sodi�ča, ki je odločalo na zadnji stopnji;
— that judgment is, in the light of a decision given by the Court subsequent to it, based on a misinterpretation of Community law which was adopted without a question being referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under [the third paragraph of Article 234] EC; and
– navedena sodba glede na poznej�o sodno prakso Sodi�ča temelji na napačni razlagi prava Skupnosti, ki je bila podana, ne da bi bilo Sodi�ču v skladu s členom 234, tretji odstavek, ES predloženo vpra�anje za predhodno odločanje, in
— the person concerned complained to the administrative body immediately after becoming aware of that decision of the Court.’
– se je stranka obrnila na upravni organ takoj po tem, ko se je seznanila z navedeno sodno prakso.“
The Finanzgericht Hamburg considers that the first two conditions set out in the preceding paragraph are met in the present case given the fact that, first, the Hauptzollamt has the power, under the first sentence of Paragraph 48(1) of the VwVfG, to withdraw its repayment decision of 10 August 1995 and, second, that decision did become final by reason of the order of 11 May 2000 of the Bundesfinanzhof which ruled at last instance.
Finanzgericht Hamburg meni, da sta v obravnavanem primeru izpolnjena prva dva pogoja, na�teta v prej�nji točki, ker je Hauptzollamt v skladu s členom 48(1), prvi stavek, VwVfG pristojen za odpravo svoje odločbe z dne 10. avgusta 1995 o povrnitvi nadomestil in ker je ta odločba postala pravnomočna na podlagi sklepa Bundesfi -nanzhof z dne 11. maja 2000, ki je odločalo na zadnji stopnji.
As regards the third condition referred to in Kühne & Heitz, the Finanzgericht is uncertain whether it must be interpreted as meaning that, first, the person concerned must have relied on Community law when he contested the administrative decision in court and, second, the national court must have dismissed the action without referring a question to the Court for a preliminary ruling. If that were the case, this condition I - 455
V zvezi s tretjim pogojem, omenjenim v zgoraj navedeni sodbi Kühne & Heitz, se Finanzgericht Hamburg spra�uje, ali ga je treba razlagati tako, da mora stranka pred sodi�čem izpodbijati upravni akt na podlagi prava Skupnosti in da mora nacionalno sodi�če zavreči tožbo, ne da bi Sodi�ču predlagalo sprejetje predhodne odločbe. V tem primeru ne bi mogli �teti, da je bil ta pogoj v obravnavanem primeru izpolnjen, I - 455
2008 — CASE C-2/06 could not be regarded as met here and, consequently, the action brought by Kempter would have to be dismissed, given that it pleaded misinterpretation of Community law before neither the Finanzgericht Hamburg nor the Bundesfinanzhof.
2008 – ZADEVA C-2/06 in bi zato morala biti tožba tožeče stranke v postopku v glavni stvari zavrnjena, ker se Kempter pred Finanzgericht Hamburg in Bundesfinanzhof ni sklicevala na napačno razlago prava Skupnosti.
The Finanzgericht Hamburg nevertheless considers that it can be seen from the judgment in Kühne & Heitz that in the case which gave rise to that judgment the claimant likewise did not request that a question be referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling. 23
Finanzgericht Hamburg kljub temu meni, da je iz zgoraj navedene sodbe Kühne & Heitz mogoče sklepati, da v zadevi, v kateri je bila izrečena ta sodba, tožeča stranka ni predlagala niti tega, naj se Sodi�ču zastavi vpra�anje za predhodno odločanje. 23
In the grounds of its order for reference, the Finanzgericht Hamburg suggests, moreover, that the fact that national courts have themselves not understood the significance of a question of interpretation of Community law should not be held against the individual affected.
Finanzgericht Hamburg v obrazložitvi predložitvene odločbe sicer meni, da kadar nacionalna sodi�ča niso upo�tevala pomena vpra�anja razlage prava Skupnosti, tega ne bi smela očitati o�kodovancu.
The Finanzgericht Hamburg considers that the fourth condition referred to in Kühne & Heitz is met if the individual affected by the administrative decision inconsistent with Community law requests the administrative authority ‘without delay’ or ‘without culpable delay’ to review that decision, once it has ‘positive awareness’ of the relevant decision of the Court. 25
Finanzgericht Hamburg v zvezi s četrtim pogojem iz zgoraj navedene sodbe Kühne & Heitz meni, da je izpolnjen, če o�kodovanec, ki ga zadeva upravna odločba, ki ni skladna s pravom Skupnosti, „nemudoma“ ali „brez nepotrebnega odla�anja“ zaprosi upravni organ za ponovno preučitev te odločbe, kakor hitro je bil „dejansko seznanjen“ z ustrezno sodno prakso Sodi�ča. 25
In the circumstances of the main proceedings, although Kempter’s application for review to the Hauptzollamt was made 21 months after delivery of the judgment in Emsland-Stärke, it cannot be regarded as too late, considering that it was made on 16 September 2002, that is to say less than three months from when Kempter has claimed to have become aware of the judgment in which the Bundesfinanzhof applied Emsland-Stärke.
Čeprav je družba Kempter predlog za ponovno preučitev v sporu o glavni stvari vložila pri Hauptzollamt 21 mesecev po razglasitvi zgoraj navedene sodbe Emsland-Stärke, ga ni mogoče �teti za prepoznega, če se upo�teva, da je bil vložen 16. septembra 2002, kar je manj kot tri mesece od dneva, ki ga je družba Kempter navedla kot dan, ko se je seznanila s sodbo, s katero je Bundesfinanzhof uporabilo zgoraj navedeno sodbo Emsland-Stärke.
Inasmuch as administrative authorities must apply the interpretation of a provision of Community law supplied by the Court in a preliminary ruling to legal relationships which have arisen before the Court’s judgment, the referring court is unsure whether the possibility of applying for review and withdrawal of an administrative decision that is final and infringes Community law might be temporally unrestricted or whether, on the other hand, it must be subject to a timelimit justified by reasons of legal certainty.
Če mora upravni organ uporabiti razlago določbe prava Skupnosti, ki jo poda Sodi�če v sodbi v zvezi z vpra�anjem za predhodno odločanje, za pravna razmerja, ki so nastala pred to sodbo, predložitveno sodi�če spra�uje, ali se lahko časovno omeji možnost predlagati ponovno preučitev in odpravo pravnomočne upravne odločbe, s katero je kr�eno pravo Skupnosti, ali pa mora imeti časovno omejitev, ki je utemeljena z razlogi pravne varnosti.
In those circumstances, the Finanzgericht Hamburg decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
V teh okoli�činah je Finanzgericht Hamburg prekinilo odločanje in Sodi�ču v predhodno odločanje predložilo ti vpra�anji:
(2) Is an application for the review and amendment of a final administrative decision which is contrary to Community law subject to a limit in time for overriding reasons of Community law, apart from the conditions set out in [Kühne & Heitz]?’ Consideration of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
Ali je ne glede na pogoje, določene v sodbi [v zgoraj navedeni zadevi Kühne & Heitz], možnost, da se vloži predlog za ponovno preučitev in odpravo pravnomočne upravne odločbe, ki je v nasprotju s pravom Skupnosti, časovno omejena zaradi nujnih razlogov prava Skupnosti časovno omejena?“ Vprašanji za predhodno odločanje
By its first question, the referring court essentially asks whether Kühne & Heitz requires an administrative decision that has become final by virtue of a judgment of I - 457
Predložitveno sodi�če s prvim vpra�anjem v bistvu spra�uje, ali zgoraj navedena sodba Kühne & Heitz nalaga ponovno preučitev ali odpravo (rectius: popravo) upravne odločbe, ki je postala pravnomočna na podlagi sodbe sodi�ča, ki je odločalo na zadnji stopnji, le če se je tožeča stranka v postopku v glavni stvari sklicevala na I - 457
2008 — CASE C-2/06 a court of final instance to be reviewed and amended only if the claimant relied on Community law in the legal action under domestic law which he brought against that decision.
2008 – ZADEVA C-2/06 pravo Skupnosti v okviru pravnega sredstva nacionalnega prava, ki ga je vložila zoper to odločbo.
Kempter, the Finnish Government and the Commission of the European Communities submit that the first question should be answered in the negative.
Družba Kempter, finska vlada in Komisija Evropskih skupnosti menijo, da je treba na prvo vpra�anje odgovoriti nikalno.
First of all, Kempter states that it does not follow from the third paragraph of Article 234 EC that the parties to the main proceedings must have pleaded misinterpretation of Community law before the national court in order for it to be obliged to make a reference for a preliminary ruling.
Družba Kempter najprej navaja, da iz člena 234, tretji odstavek, ES ne izhaja, da se morajo stranke v postopku v glavni stvari pred nacionalnim sodi�čem sklicevati na napačno razlago prava Skupnosti, saj mora to sodi�če uporabiti postopek predhodnega odločanja.
Nor, the Commission adds, does such a condition follow from the grounds or operative part of the judgment in Kühne & Heitz. 31
Komisija dodaja, da ta pogoj ne izhaja iz obrazložitve in izreka zgoraj navedene sodbe Kühne & Heitz. 31
Second, Kempter and the Commission observe that the obligation, under the third paragraph of Article 234 EC, on national courts ruling at final instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling cannot depend either on the parties requesting them to make such a reference.
Družba Kempter in Komisija nato opozarjata, da obveznost vložitve predloga za sprejetje predhodne odločbe, ki jo imajo v skladu s členom 234, tretji odstavek, ES nacionalna sodi�ča, ki odločajo na zadnji stopnji, ne sme biti pogojena s tem, da stranke od navedenih sodi�č zahtevajo, naj vložijo tak predlog.
Finally, the Finnish Government submits that a need for the parties to the main proceedings to have pleaded misinterpretation of Community law before the national court could render the exercise of rights conferred by Community law impossible in practice and thus run counter to the principle of effectiveness.
Finska vlada nazadnje meni, da bi nujnost, da se stranke v postopku v glavni stvari pred nacionalnim sodi�čem sklicujejo na napačno razlago prava Skupnosti, lahko v praksi onemogočila izvajanje pravic, ki jih priznava pravni red Skupnosti, kar je v nasprotju z načelom učinkovitosti.
Nor should the fact that a national court has not recognised the significance of a question of Community be held against the citizen affected.
Poleg tega se o�kodovancu ne bi smelo očitati dejstva, da nacionalno sodi�če ni upo�tevalo pomembnosti vpra�anja prava Skupnosti.
The Czech Government submits that review and withdrawal of a final decision by an administrative authority can be limited so as to require the person concerned to have relied on Community law when contesting that decision before the national courts only where those courts do not have, under domestic law, the power or the obligation to apply Community law of their own motion and that does not impede observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
Če�ka vlada zatrjuje, da sta ponovna preučitev in odprava pravnomočne odločbe upravnega organa lahko odvisni od tega, da je stranka izpodbijala to odločbo pred nacionalnimi sodi�či in se je pri tem sklicevala na pravo Skupnosti, le kadar ta sodi�ča v skladu z nacionalnim pravom nimajo pristojnosti in dolžnosti, da po uradni dolžnosti uporabijo pravo Skupnosti, in da ta okoli�čina ne ovira spo�tovanja načel enakovrednosti in učinkovitosti.
In answering the first question, it should be remembered first of all that, in accordance with settled case-law, all the authorities of the Member States have the task of ensuring observance of the rules of Community law within the sphere of their competence (see Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission [1990] ECR I-2321, paragraph 13, and Kühne & Heitz, paragraph 20). 35
Da bi lahko odgovorili na prvo vpra�anje, je treba najprej opozoriti, da morajo v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso Sodi�ča vsi organi držav članic v skladu s svojimi pristojnostmi zagotavljati spo�tovanje pravil prava Skupnosti (glej sodbo z dne 12. junija 1990 v zadevi Nemčija proti Komisiji, C-8/88, Recueil, str.
It should also be remembered that the interpretation which, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article 234 EC, the Court gives to a rule of Community law clarifies and defines, where necessary, the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be, or ought to have been, understood and applied from the time of its
Prav tako je treba opozoriti, da razlaga posameznega pravila prava Skupnosti, ki jo Sodi�če poda pri izvr�evanju pristojnosti na podlagi člena 234 ES, po potrebi pojasnjuje in natančneje določa pomen in obseg tega pravila, kot ga je treba ali bi ga bilo treba razumeti in uporabljati od začetka njegove veljave (glej zlasti sodbi z dne
2008 — CASE C-2/06 coming into force (see, inter alia, Case 61/79 Denkavit italiana [1980] ECR 1205, paragraph 16; Case C-50/96 DeutscheTelekom [2000] ECR I-743, paragraph 43; and Kühne & Heitz, paragraph 21). In other words, a preliminary ruling does not create or alter the law, but is purely declaratory, with the consequence that in principle it takes effect from the date on which the rule interpreted entered into force (see, to this effect, Case C-137/94 Richardson [1995] ECR I-3407, paragraph 33). 36
I-743, točka 43, ter zgoraj navedeno sodbo Kühne & Heitz, točka 21). Z drugimi besedami, sodba v zvezi z vpra�anjem za predhodno odločanje ni oblikovalna, temveč izključno ugotovitvena, kar pomeni, da njene posledice načeloma nastanejo na dan, ko je začela veljati razlagana določba (glej v tem smislu sodbo z dne 19. oktobra 1995 v zadevi Richardson, C-137/94, Recueil, str. I-3407, točka 33). 36
It follows that, in a case such as the main proceedings, a rule of Community law as thus interpreted must be applied by an administrative body within the sphere of its competence even to legal relationships which arose and were formed before the Court gave its ruling on the request for interpretation (see Kühne & Heitz, paragraph 22, and, to this effect, Case C-347/00 Barreira Pérez [2002] ECR I-8191, paragraph 44; Joined Cases C-453/02 and C-462/02 Linneweber and Akritidis [2005] ECR I-1131, paragraph 41; and Case C-292/04 Meilicke and Others [2007] ECR I-1835, paragraph 34). 37
Iz tega sledi, da mora upravni organ v zadevi, kot je ta v postopku v glavni stvari, tako razlagano pravilo prava Skupnosti uporabiti v skladu s svojimi pristojnostmi, in to tudi za pravna razmerja, ki so nastala in so bila oblikovana, preden je Sodi�če izdalo sodbo v zvezi s predlogom za razlago (glej zgoraj navedeno sodbo Kühne & Heitz, točka 22, in v tem smislu sodbe z dne 3. oktobra 2002 v zadevi Barreira Pérez, C-347/00, Recueil, str. I-8191, točka 44; z dne 17. februarja 2005 v združenih zadevah Linneweber in Akritidis, C-453/02 in C-462/02, ZOdl., str. I-1131, točka 41, in z dne 6. marca 2007 v zadevi Meilicke in drugi, C-292/04, ZOdl., str. I-1835, točka 34). 37
However, as the Court has pointed out, this caselaw must be read in the light of the principle of legal certainty, which is one of the general principles recognised by Community law.
Vendar je treba, kot je Sodi�če opozorilo, to sodno prakso razumeti v smislu načela pravne varnosti, ki spada med splo�na načela prava Skupnosti.
Finality of an administrative decision, which is acquired upon expiry of reasonable timelimits for legal remedies or, as in the main proceedings, by exhaustion of those remedies, contributes to such legal certainty, with the consequence that Community law does not require that administrative bodies be placed under an obligation, in principle, to reopen an administrative decision which has become final in that way (Kühne & Heitz, paragraph 24). 38
V zvezi s tem je treba ugotoviti, da pravnomočnost neke upravne odločbe po preteku razumnih rokov za vložitev tožbe ali, kot je to v postopku v glavni stvari, z izčrpanjem pravnih sredstev pripomore k pravni varnosti, kar pomeni, da pravo Skupnosti ne zahteva, da mora upravni organ načeloma odpraviti upravno odločbo, ki je postala pravnomočna (zgoraj navedena sodba Kühne & Heitz, točka 24). 38
The Court has none the less held that specific circumstances may be capable, by virtue of the principle of cooperation arising from Article 10 EC, of requiring a national administrative body to review an administrative decision that has become final following the exhaustion of domestic remedies, in order to take account of the
Sodi�če je kljub temu razsodilo, da je lahko zaradi posebnih okoli�čin nacionalnemu upravnemu organu na podlagi načela sodelovanja iz člena 10 ES naloženo, da mora po izčrpanju notranjih pravnih sredstev ponovno preučiti pravnomočno upravno odločbo, da bi se upo�tevala razlaga ustrezne določbe prava Skupnosti, ki jo je
KEMPTER interpretation of a relevant provision of Community law given subsequently by the Court (see, to this effect, Kühne & Heitz, paragraph 27, and Joined Cases C-392/04 and C-422/04 i-21 Germany and Arcor [2006] ECR I-8559, paragraph 52). 39
KEMPTER pozneje sprejelo Sodi�če (glej v tem smislu zgoraj navedeno sodbo Kühne & Heitz, točka 27, in sodbo z dne 19. septembra 2006 v združenih zadevah i-21 Germany in Arcor, C-392/04 in C-422/04, ZOdl., str. I-8559, točka 52). 39
As the referring court points out, in light of paragraphs 26 and 28 of Kühne & Heitz, the conditions capable of providing the basis for such an obligation of review that have been taken into account by the Court include the fact that the judgment of the court of final instance, by virtue of which the contested administrative decision became final, was, in the light of a decision given by the Court subsequent to it, based on a misinterpretation of Community law which was adopted without a question being referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under the third paragraph of Article 234 EC. 40
Kot opozarja predložitveno sodi�če v smislu točk 26 in 28 zgoraj navedene sodbe Kühne & Heitz, je Sodi�če med pogoji za nastanek obveznosti ponovne preučitve upo�tevalo predvsem dejstvo, da je sodba sodi�ča, ki je odločalo na zadnji stopnji, s katero je izpodbijana upravna odločba postala pravnomočna, v smislu poznej�e sodne prakse Sodi�ča temeljila na napačni razlagi prava Skupnosti, ki je bila sprejeta, ne da bi bilo Sodi�če v skladu s členom 234, tretji odstavek, ES zapro�eno za sprejetje predhodne odločbe. 40
The present question referred for a preliminary ruling is designed to ascertain solely whether such a condition is met only if the claimant relied on Community law in the legal action brought by him against the administrative decision in question.
S tem vpra�anjem za predhodno odločanje se spra�uje le, ali je tak pogoj izpolnjen, le če se je tožeča stranka v postopku v glavni stvari sklicevala na pravo Skupnosti v okviru pravnega sredstva, ki ga je vložila zoper zadevno upravno odločbo.
As the Advocate General explains in points 100 to 104 of his Opinion, the system of references for a preliminary ruling is based on a dialogue between one court and
Kot poudarja generalni pravobranilec v točkah od 100 do 104 sklepnih predlogov, predlog za sprejetje predhodne odločbe temelji na izmenjavi mnenj med sodi�či,
2008 — CASE C-2/06 another, the initiation of which depends entirely on the national court’s assessment as to whether a reference is appropriate and necessary (see, to this effect, Case 126/80 Salonia [1981] ECR 1563, paragraph 7).
2008 – ZADEVA C-2/06 njegova vložitev pa je v celoti odvisna od tega, kako navedeno sodi�če presodi pomembnost in potrebnost tega predloga (glej v tem smislu sodbo z dne 16. junija 1981 v zadevi Salonia, 126/80, Recueil, str. 1563, točka 7).
Moreover, as observed by the Commission and by the Advocate General in points 93 to 95 of his Opinion, the wording of Kühne & Heitz does not in any way indicate that the claimant is required to have raised, in his legal action under domestic law, the point of Community law that was subsequently the subject of the Court’s preliminary ruling. 44
Sicer pa, kot navajata Komisija in generalni pravobranilec v točkah od 93 do 95 sklepnih predlogov, besedilo zgoraj navedene sodbe Kühne & Heitz nikakor ne določa, da se je tožeča stranka dolžna v okviru pravnega sredstva nacionalnega prava sklicevati se na vpra�anje prava Skupnosti, ki je bilo kasneje predmet sodbe v zvezi z vpra�anjem za predhodno odločanje. 44
It cannot therefore be inferred from Kühne & Heitz that, for the purposes of the third condition established by that judgment, the parties must have raised before the national court the point of Community law in question. In order for that condition to be satisfied, it is sufficient if either the point of Community law the interpretation of which proved to be incorrect in light of a subsequent judgment of the Court was considered by the national court ruling at final instance or it could have been raised by the latter of its own motion. 45
Iz zgoraj navedene sodbe Kühne & Heitz torej ni mogoče sklepati, da se morajo stranke zaradi tretjega pogoja, določenega v tej sodbi, pred nacionalnim sodi�čem sklicevati na zadevno vpra�anje prava Skupnosti. Za izpolnitev tega pogoja je dovolj, da je nacionalno sodi�če, ki je odločalo na zadnji stopnji, preučilo navedeno vpra�anje prava Skupnosti, katerega razlaga se je ob upo�tevanju poznej�e sodbe Sodi�ča izkazala za napačno, ali da bi ga lahko zastavilo po uradni dolžnosti. 45
Accordingly, the answer to the first question referred must be that, in the context of a procedure before an administrative body for review of an administrative decision that became final by virtue of a judgment, delivered by a court of final instance, which, in the light of a decision given by the Court subsequent to it, was based on a misinterpretation of Community law, Community law does not require the claimant to have relied on Community law in the legal action under domestic law which he brought against the administrative decision.
Torej je treba na prvo zastavljeno vpra�anje odgovoriti tako, da v postopku pred upravnim organom v zvezi s ponovno preučitvijo upravne odločbe, ki je postala pravnomočna na podlagi sodbe sodi�ča, ki je odločalo na zadnji stopnji, pri čemer je ta sodba glede na poznej�o sodno prakso Sodi�ča temeljila na napačni razlagi prava Skupnosti, pravo Skupnosti ne zahteva, da se je tožeča stranka v postopku v glavni stvari sklicevala na pravo Skupnosti v okviru pravnega sredstva nacionalnega prava, ki ga je vložila zoper to odločbo.