natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
At present only the European Commission can exercise the power to exempt arestrictive agreement under Article 81.
Zakonodaja Skupnosti dovoljuje, da se lahko izvzame posamični sporazum medpodjetji, vendar pa tudi sporazumi iste vrste, na primer distribucijski sporazumi.Danes je samo Evropska komisija pooblaščena, da za sporazum o omejitvikonkurence ne uveljavi 81. člena. Da bi dosegla posamično oprostitev, morajopodjetja Evropski komisiji prijaviti svoje sporazume.
In recent years, the Commission has received on average over 200 such notifications annually.
Zadnja leta je Komisija dobivalapovprečno več kot 200 takšnih prijav na leto.
In 1999, it suggested terminating this centralised notification of all agreementsbetween enterprises.
Leta 1999 je predlagala, da seodpravi ta centralizirani sistem prijavljanja vseh sporazumov med podjetji.
Member States more directly in the application of the Community competition rules.
Upa tudi,da bo v uveljavljanje predpisov Skupnosti o konkurenci bolj neposredno vključilatudi organe za konkurenco in sodišča držav članic.
Apart from proceeding on formal notifications by firms, the Commission can also carry out its own investigations following complaints from competitors or
Poleg nadzora na podlagi uradnih prijav s strani podjetij lahko Komisija opravljasvoje preiskave na podlagi pritožb tekmecev ali kupcev (leta 1999 jih je prejela149) ali kadar pridejo na dan dokazi o protikonkurenčnem ravnanju, ki jih Komisijarazišče na lastno pobudo (77 v letu 1999).
These restrictive agreements are automatically void, and the Commission haspower to prohibit them and impose fines on the offending firms.
Ti omejevalni sporazumi so sami po sebi neveljavni in Komisija je pristojna, da jihprepove in podjetjem naloži denarne kazni.
In certain conditions, it may also exempt some agreements that restrict competition.
Pod določenimi pogoji lahko tudiizvzame nekatere sporazume, ki omejujejo konkurenco.
In addition, it enjoys investigatory powers entitling it to inspect firms’ premises insearch of evidence of secret agreements.
Poleg tega ima Komisijapreiskovalna pooblastila, ki ji omogočajo, da preišče prostore podjetij, da bi odkriladokaze o skrivnih sporazumih.
Purchasers of pipes, mainly local authorities, were thus obliged to buyfrom the same supplier without any real choice between competing offers atcompetitive prices.
Kupci cevi, v glavnem lokalne oblasti, so bili takoprisiljeni kupovati od istega dobavitelja in so bili brez prave možnosti izbire medkonkurenčnimi ponudbami po konkurenčnih cenah.
The Commission imposed fines totalling approximately EUR92 million on the members of the cartel.
Komisija je člane kartelakaznovala z denarnimi kaznimi v skupnem znesku okoli 92 milijonov evrov.
In this case, the anti-competitive practice harmed firms outside the cartel, which were systematically excludedfrom calls for tenders, as well as local authorities and hence taxpayers.
V temprimeru je izigravanje konkurence škodilo podjetjem, ki niso bila v kartelu in sobila načrtno izključena iz razpisov, kot tudi lokalnim oblastem in s temdavkoplačevalcem.
Cartel prohibited in the sugar sector
Prepoved kartela v sladkornem sektorju
Two sugar producers and two sugar traders in the United Kingdom adopted aconcerted strategy for increasing prices on the sugar market.
Dva proizvajalca sladkorja in dva trgovca s sladkorjem so se dogovorili ostrategiji, kako bi zvišali cene na sladkornem trgu.
The result of thisagreement, for the final consumer, was purchase prices that were higher thanthey would have been with free competition.
Za končnega porabnika jepomenil ta dogovor višje nakupne cene, kot bi bile, če bi veljala svobodnakonkurenca.
In 1998, the Commission thereforeprohibited the agreement and imposed fines totalling more than EUR 50 millionon the firms.
Komisija je zato leta 1998 dogovor prepovedala in podjetjakaznovala z denarno kaznijo v skupnem znesku nad 50 milijonov evrov.
Agreement concerning digital television exempted
Izvzem sporazuma glede digitalne televizije
The Commission exempted an agreement setting up a joint venture known as Open which had been concluded between four enterprises including BSkyB and British Telecom, both British companies involved in digital television andtelecommunications.
Komisija je izvzela sporazum štirih podjetij, vključno z britanskima družbama BSkyB in British Telecom, ki se ukvarjata z digitalno televizijo intelekomunikacijami, o ustanovitvi skupnega podjetja pod imenom Open.
BSkyB and British Telecom, which holdsignificant positions on the market in the areas where Open would be operating, would disappear as potentialcompetitors, and there was a risk of eliminating asubstantial part of competition on the British market in interactive digitaltelevision.
Storitve naj bi bile dostopne z dekoderjem.Kljub nespornim prednostim za porabnike, je Komisija ugovarjala, ker bi BskyB in British Telecom, ki sta imela pomemben položaj na trgu, nakaterem bi deloval Open, izginila kot možna tekmeca. Zatoje obstajala nevarnost, da bi izginil velik del konkurence zbritanskega trga interaktivne digitalne televizije.
For example,commitments given by Open’s shareholders will provide access to the market forthird parties.
Preden je Komisija sporazum odobrila, si je zagotovila, da bokonkurenca delovala tudi po ustanovitvi Opna.
Third parties will have access to Open decoders and to BSkyB’s cinema and sport channels.
Na primer,zagotovila, ki so jih dali delničarji Opna, naj bi omogočila, dabi na trg vstopili tudi tretji ponudniki.
Lastly, decoders in competition with Open decoderscan be sold on the market without hindrance.
Imeli naj bi zlastidostop do Opnovih dekoderjev in do BSkyB-jevih filmskih in športnih programov.Končno naj bi bili na trgu brez vsakih ovir v prodaji dekoderji, ki bi bilikonkurenčni Opnovim.
In this case, the Commissionsought to make it easier for new digital interactive television services to developwhile at the same time ensuring that there was competition on the market. The benefit to British consumers is therefore twofold.
Komisija si je torej v tej zadevi prizadevala, da bi olajšalarazvoj novih digitalnih interaktivnih televizijskih storitev in sočasno zagotovilatržno tekmovanje.Tako imajo britanski potrošniki dvakratno korist.
Abuse of adominant position
Zloraba prevladujočega položaja
Efficient businesses are run with a view to conquering markets, to the pointwhere they may establish very strong positions indeed.
Uspešna podjetja si prizadevajo osvojiti tržišča in si tako včasih tudi ustvarijozelo močan položaj.
But if the firm exploits its power to stifle competition, this is an anti-competitive practice which constitutes abuse.
Če pa podjetja izkoriščajo svojomoč za dušenje konkurence, gre za protikonkurenčno ravnanje, ki pomenizlorabo.
It is therefore the abuse of the dominantposition that is wrong.
Sporna je torej zloraba prevladujočega položaja.
A firm holds a dominant position if its economic power enables it to operate onthe market without taking account of the reaction of its competitors or ofintermediate or final consumers.
Podjetje ima prevladujoč položaj, če mu njegova gospodarska moč omogoča, dana trgu deluje, ne da bi upoštevalo odzive svojih tekmecev in vmesnih ali končnihporabnikov.
In those circumstances, an enterprise holding adominant position may be tempted to abuse that position to increase its incomeand consolidate its hold on the market by weakening or eliminating competitorsand denying access to the market for new entrants.
V takšnih okoliščinah se lahko podjetje znajde v skušnjavi, da bizlorabilo prevladujoč položaj, si tako povečalo prihodke in okrepilo svoj vpliv natrgu, tako da bi oslabilo ali izločilo svoje tekmece in novim ponudnikomonemogočilo dostop na trg.
It might take unfair actionagainst other operators on the market, for example, by charging exorbitantpurchase or selling prices or by conferring discriminatory benefits on certaincustomers in order to control their behaviour.
Lahko nepošteno ravna z drugimi akterji na trgu, naprimer, s privijanjem nabavnih ali prodajnih cen ali z odobravanjem večjihugodnosti nekaterim strankam, zato da bi obvladovalo njihovo obnašanje.
Those practices interfere withcompetition.
Takšnoravnanje moti konkurenčni boj.
The Commission can act against them and punish their perpetratorsseverely.
Komisija lahko ukrepa zoper takšno ravnanje inkrivce strogo kaznuje.
Citizens have good reason to be apprehensive of abuses of this kind, whichresult in higher prices, restrictions on the availability of products and services and unfair trading conditions.
Državljani se upravičeno bojijo takšnih zlorab, katerih posledica so višje cene,omejena izbira izdelkov in storitev ter nepošteni kupoprodajni pogoji.
(Article 82)
(82.člen)
Article 82 of the EC Treaty prohibits the abuse of a dominant position.
82. člen Pogodbe ES prepoveduje zlorabo prevladujočega položaja.
For the article to apply, the following conditions must be fulfilled.
Za veljavnostčlena morajo biti izpolnjeni naslednji pogoji:
• The firm holds a dominant position.
• Podjetje ima prevladujoč položaj.
In appraising the firm’s economic power, the Commission takes account of its market share and also of other factors suchas whether there are credible competitors, whether the firm has its owndistribution network, whether it has favourable access to raw materials, etc. These are all factors which allow the firm to evade normal competition.
Pri presoji gospodarske moči podjetja Komisija upošteva njegov tržni delež, pa tudi druge dejavnike, kot so obstoj resnihtekmecev, razpolaganje s svojo distribucijsko mrežo, prednostni dostop dosurovin itd., to je vse, kar podjetju omogoča, da se izogne normalni konkurenci.
• The firm abuses its position: it may overcharge consumers, or charge prices that are excessively low so as to exclude weaker competitors or new entrants from the market for example, or it may grant some customers discriminatory advantages such as fidelity rebates provided they agree to comply with its sales policy.
• Podjetje obvladuje skupni trg ali “velik del” skupnega trga. • Podjetje zlorablja svoj položaj, kadar privija cene v škodo porabnikov ali kadar se zateka k prenizkim cenam, zato da bi iz trga izločilo šibkejše tekmece ali noveponudnike; kadar nekaterim strankam odobrava boljše pogoje, kot popust za zvestobo, če pristanejo, na poslovanje v skladu z njegovo prodajno politiko.
There is no exemption available for abuse of a dominant position.
Za zlorabo prevladujočega položaja ni nobene izjeme.
The Commission can adopt a decision prohibiting an abuse and fining theoffending firm.
Komisija lahko sprejme sklep o prepovedi zlorabe in kaznovanju podjetja, ki je zlorabo zakrivilo.
In 1998 and 1999, the Commission adopted around a dozendecisions prohibiting abuses.
V letih 1998 in 1999 je Komisija sprejela kakih deset sklepov o
Some examples of action taken by the Commission
Primeri ukrepov,ki jih je sprejela Komisija
Abuse of a dominant position on the ice-cream distribution market
Zloraba prevladujočega položaja v distribucijisladoleda
As a result of a complaint submitted by Mars, the Commission found that Unilever had abused its dominant position.
Na podlagi pritožbe Marsa je Komisija ugotovila, da je Unilever zlorabil svojprevladujoči položaj.
Unilever provided freezer cabinets toits Irish distributors free of any direct charge on condition that they stocked only Unilever products there.
Unilever je svoje irske distributerje opremil z zamrzovalnimiomarami, in sicer pod pogojem, da v njih hranijo samo Unileverjeve izdelke.
Irish consumers therefore had a very restricted choice ofice-creams.
Irskiporabniki so imeli zato na voljo le zelo omejeno izbiro sladoledov.
The Commission considered that having regard to Unilever’sdominant position on the market the requirement of exclusive use constitutedan abuse.
Komisija jemenila, da pomeni zahteva po izključni uporabi glede na Unileverjev prevladujočipoložaj na trgu zlorabo.
Abuse of a dominant position on the market in air transport services offered by travel agencies
Zloraba prevladujočega položaja na trguletalskih prevozov, ki jih ponujajo potovalneagencije
Acting on a complaint by Virgin Airways, the Commission found in July 1999that British Airways had abused a dominant position.
Na podlagi pritožbe Virgin Airways je Komisija julija 1999 ugotovila, da je British Airways zlorabil prevladujoči položaj.
The abuse consisted ofestablishing a system of brand loyalty, which meant that the market in airtransport services provided by travel agencies was closed to British Airways’competitors.
Do zlorabe je prišlo z uvedbo sistemazvestobe znamki, kar je pomenilo, da je bil trg letalskih prevozov prek potovalnihagencij zaprt za tekmece British Airwaysa.
British Airways offered some British travel agencies extracommission if they equalled or exceeded their previous year’s sales of British Airways’ tickets.
British Airways je nekaterimpotovalnim agencijam ponudil dodatno provizijo, če bi dosegle ali presegleprodajo letalskih vozovnic British Airwaysa iz predhodnega leta.
The effect of the system was toreinforce agencies’ brand loyalty to British Airwaysand to discourage them from offering the services of
Učinek sistemaje bil, da so bile agencije še bolj zveste znamki British Airways in še manjpripravljene ponuditi storitve drugih letalskih družb.British Airways je obvladoval trg, zato je pomenil tasistem za konkurenčne letalske družbe resnično oviro
/ other airlines.
/ za dostop na trg.
Since theagencies favoured the airline paying the highest commission, consumers werealmost always offered British Airways’ tickets even if competitors’ services weremore advantageous.
Ker so dajale agencije prednost letalski družbi, ki je plačevalanajvišjo provizijo, so porabnikom skoraj vedno ponujale vozovnice British Airwaysa, četudi so bile storitve tekmecev cenejše.
The Commission therefore considered that this practice,which affected the market in air transport services offered by travel agencies,constituted an abuse of a dominant position.
Komisija je zato presodila,da pomeni to ravnanje, ki je prizadelo trg letalskih prevozov, ki jih prodajajopotovalne agencije, zlorabo prevladujočega položaja.
Abuse of a dominant position in the organisation of the Football World Cup
Zloraba prevladujočega položaja pri organizaciji svetovnega prvenstva v nogometu
On 20 July 1999, the Commission adopted a formal decision against the Frenchcommittee organising the Football World Cup which was held in France in 1998.The committee, the CFO, held a monopoly in the organisation of the event thatincluded ticket sales.
Dne 20. julija 1999 je Komisija sprejela uradni sklep proti francoskemu odboru,ki je leta 1998 v Franciji organiziral svetovno prvenstvo v nogometu.
The Commission found that the arrangements for ticketsales for the final matches were discriminatory and constituted an abuse of adominant position.
Odbor jeimel v svojih rokah izključno organizacijo prireditve, vključno s prodajo vstopnic.Komisija je ugotovila, da način prodaje vstopnic za finalne tekme ni bil enak zavse in da je pomenil zlorabo prevladujočega položaja.
The arrangements made for ticket sales favoured consumerswho could provide an address in France, at the expense of consumers residentin other countries.
Sistem prodaje vstopnicje dajal prednost kupcem, ki so lahko navedli naslov v Franciji, na škodoporabnikov z bivališčem v drugih državah.
Persons not resident in France who wished to see the finalswere thus at a severedisadvantage compared withpersons resident in France.The Commission thereforeruled against the CFO.
Ljubitelji nogometa, ki niso prebivali v Franciji, so bili zato v bistveno slabšem položaju v primerjavi z osebami, ki soprebivale v Franciji. Komisija je zato obsodila organizacijski odbor.
Merger control
Nadzorovanje združitev podjetij
When companies combine via a merger, an acquisition or the creation of a jointventure, this generally has a positive impact on markets.
Koncentracije podjetij z združevanjem, prevzemom ali ustanovitvijo skupnegapodjetja imajo na splošno ugodne tržne učinke.
The linking-up of thefirms’ activities enables them to achieve synergy in numerous areas, such asresearch and the development of new products, or sometimes to implementrestructuring measures that will reduce production or distribution costs for thenew company.
S povezovanjem podjetjadosežejo sinergijo na številnih področjih, kot so raziskave, razvoj novih izdelkovali izvedbo prestrukturiranja, s katerim se zmanjšajo proizvodni ali distribucijskistroški novega podjetja.
They thus become more efficient on the market.
Podjetja so zato na trgu uspešnejša.
Competitionintensifies and the final consumer will benefit from higher-quality goods at fairerprices.
Konkurenčni boj sezaostri in končni porabnik dobi boljše izdelke po primernejših cenah.
In the context of the globalisation of trade coupled with the further developmentof the single market in the Community, firms are being driven to combine inorder to reach a size which will allow them to remain competitive and presenton markets that are extending all the time.
V dobi globalizacije trgovine in razvoja enotnega trga Skupnosti so se podjetjaprisiljena združevati, da bi dosegla velikost, ki bi jim omogočila ostatikonkurenčna in prisotna na vse širših trgih.
In recent years, the merger trend inthe European Union has gained pace.
Trend združevanja je v Evropski unijije vedno bolj izrazit.
Mergers which create orstrengthen a dominantposition, however, areprohibited by the Treatyin order to preventensuing abuses.
Zato da bi preprečili zlorabe,Pogodba prepoveduje združitvepodjetij,ki ustvarjajo alikrepijo prevladujoč položaj.
Mergers which create or strengthen a dominantposition, however, are prohibited by the Treaty inorder to prevent ensuing abuses.
Zato da bi preprečili zlorabe, Pogodbaprepoveduje združitve, ki ustvarjajo ali krepijoprevladujoč položaj.
A firm is in adominant position when it is able to act on themarket without having to take account of thereaction of its competitors, suppliers orcustomers.
Podjetje ima prevladujočpoložaj, kadar lahko na trgu deluje, ne da biupoštevalo odziv svojih tekmecev, dobaviteljev alikupcev.
For example, such a firm can increaseits prices above those of its competitors withoutfearing any loss of profit.
Takšno podjetje denimo lahko zviša svojecene nad cene svojih tekmecev, brez strahu predizgubo dobička.
All market players andespecially consumers stand to lose from theemergence of this kind of dominant structure, which is likely to result in higher prices, a narrower choice of goods or scarcityof innovation.
Vsi tržni subjekti, zlastipotrošniki, so v nevarnosti, da bodo zaradi takoorganizirane prevlade imeli izgubo, višje cene,ožjo izbiro blaga ali manj inovacij. Zato je
That is why the European Union has set up an advance vettingsystem for mergers with a Community dimension that enables it to prohibit aplanned merger if necessary.
Evropska unija vzpostavila preventivni sistem za združitve podjetij, ki deluje naravni Skupnosti in ki le-tej omogoča, da po potrebi prepove načrtovanozdruževanje.
Identical systems have been set up in the Member States for investigating mergers of national dimension.
Podobni sistemi so bili vzpostavljeni v državah članicah, in sicer zanadzor nad združitvami podjetij na ravni države.
Public opinion does not always understand why the Commission approvesmergers and acquisitions when they involve loss of jobs.
Očem javnosti ni vedno razumljivo, zakaj Komisija odobri združitve inprevzeme, kadar privedejo do izgube delovnih mest.
It must be borne inmind that the Commission’s objective in the merger control field is to preserve asituation of effective competition on the markets, which it considers to be aguarantee of growth and thus of viable jobs.
Potrebno se je zavedati, daje cilj Komisije na področju nadzorovanja združitev ohraniti dejansko konkurencona trgih, ki zagotavlja rast in stabilnost delovnih mest.
It may be that, in the short term,efforts to improve the competitiveness of firms by means of mergers oracquisitions involve restructuring and thus loss of jobs.
Napori za izboljšanje konkurenčnosti podjetij z združitvami in prevzemi pa lahko kratkoročnovključujejo tudi prestrukturiranje in s tem izgubo delovnih mest.
However, this does notchange the fact that improving firms’ competitiveness is the only effective wayto ensure the growth needed to create business and stable and lasting jobs.
Vendar to vničemer ne spremeni dejstva, da je izboljšanje konkurenčnosti podjetij ediniučinkovit način za zagotovitev rasti, ki prinaša posle ter stabilna in trajnadelovna mesta.
(Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89)
(Uredba (EGS) št.4064/89)
The Community’s system for monitoring this type of transaction has beengoverned by the merger regulation since 1990.
Sistem Skupnosti za nadzorovanje združitev podjetij od leta 1990 ureja Uredba ozdružitvah.
The regulation is based on thefollowing principles.
Uredba temelji na naslednjih načelih:
• The European Commission has exclusive power to investigate mergers with a
• Evropska komisija ima izključno pristojnost za preverjanje združitev evropskih razsežnosti.
The Community dimension of a merger or acquisition isassessed using thresholds based on the turnover of the companies involved.The most important are the worldwide threshold (EUR 5 000 million) and the Community-wide threshold (EUR 250 million).
Evropska razsežnost združitve ali prevzema podjetijse ocenjuje na podlagi pragov, ki temeljijo na prometu vključenih podjetij.Najpomembnejša sta svetovni prag (5 milijard evrov) in prag Skupnosti (250milijonov evrov).
Below these thresholds, mergercontrol is carried out by the authorities in the Member States under their ownlegislation.
Nadzor združitev pod obemi pragovi izvajajo vlade držav članic vskladu s svojo zakonodajo.
• Mergers and acquisitions with a Community dimension have to be notified to the Commission for its agreement before they are put into effect.
• Združitve in prevzeme, ki dosegajo prag Skupnosti, je treba predhodno prijaviti
Since theentry into force of the merger regulation, the Commission has seen thenumber of notifications grow very rapidly, especially in recent years, when the annual rate of growth has been around 30 %.
Komisiji v odobritev. Odkar je začela veljati uredba o združitvah, je število prijav Komisiji zelo hitro naraslo, predvsem zadnja leta, ko se je letna rast gibala okoli30 odstotkov.
The Commission currently receives close on 300 notifications every year.
Trenutno prejme Komisija okoli 300 prijav letno.
• After an initial scrutiny period of one month, the Commission decides either to
• Po uvodnem enomesečnem skrbnem pregledu Komisija posel odobri ali, če meni, da se lahko ustvari ali okrepi prevladujoči položaj, začne štirimesečnipreiskovalni postopek.
Regulation authorise the transaction or, if it thinks that a dominant position might be created or strengthened, to initiate a four-month investigation procedure.
• Po končanem postopku lahko Komisija pogojno ali brezpogojno odobri združitev ali pa jo prepove, na primer, kadar podjetja niso mogla predlagati primernih rešitev za vprašanja, ki jih je odprla Komisija.
• At the end of this procedure, the Commission may authorise the merger
“Pogoji”, ki spremljajo odobritev,
‘Conditions’ attached to the authorisationfrequently entail the sale to competitors of assets, shares in other companies,patents, etc.
Uredba pogosto nalagajo prodajo aktive, deležev v drugih podjetjih, patentov itd.
• The vast majority of notified cases are approved after the first month’s scrutiny
• Veliko večino prijavljenih primerov odobrijo po prvem enomesečnem pregledu
(more than 90 %).
(več kot 90 %).
In a market in the process of integration, mergers whichcreate or strengthen a dominant position are, in fact, quite rare.
Na trgu, ki se združuje, so združitve, ki ustvarjajo ali krepijoprevladujoč položaj, sorazmerno redke.
• Most cases going through the four-month investigation procedure are resolved by a conditional authorisation.
• Večina primerov, ki gredo skozi štirimesečni preiskovalni postopek, se konča s pogojno odobritvijo.