natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In that regard, it submits that the Court of First Instance, which considered as being insufficient the fact that the Cantine knew that they had suffered damage stemming from the application of that regulation, held that a wholly subjective element was required, namely that the Cantine should be aware that they
V zvezi s tem trdi, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje, ker je menilo, da ne zadostuje, da so vinske kleti vedele, da so zaradi uporabe te uredbe utrpele �kodo, presodilo, da je potreben popolnoma subjektiven element, in sicer to, da se morajo tožeče stranke zavedati, da bi lahko prejele
COMMISSION v CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA AND OTHERS could obtain redress only by way of an action for compensation brought against the Commission after the failure in this case of their attempts to obtain in the national courts payment of the Community aid by means of the attribution to them of the security provided by Assedile.
KOMISIJA PROTI CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA IN DRUGI od�kodnino le z od�kodninsko tožbo zoper Komisijo, po neuspelih poskusih, v obravnavanem primeru, da pri nacionalnih sodi�čih dosežejo izplačilo pomoči Skupnosti z dodelitvijo, v njihovo korist, var�čine, ki jo je izplačal Assedile.
The Commission also submits that the judgment under appeal does not even comply with the principles laid down in Case 145/83 Adams v Commission [1985] ECR 3539.
Komisija poleg tega trdi, da izpodbijana sodba tudi ni v skladu z načeli, navedenimi v sodbi Sodi�ča z dne 7. novembra 1985 v zadevi Adams proti Komisiji (145/83, Recueil, str. 3539).
As held in paragraphs 139 and 140 of the judgment under appeal, there is no doubt that the Cantine were aware of the procedure under Regulation No 2499/82.
Vendar, kot je ugotovljeno v točkah 139 in 140 izpodbijane sodbe, v zvezi s tem ni nobenega dvoma glede dejstva, da so vinske kleti poznale podrobnosti Uredbe �t. 2499/82.
The Commission also claims that the Court of First Instance failed to respect, in the judgment under appeal, the requirement of legal certainty necessary for the application of limitation periods.
Komisija poleg tega Sodi�ču prve stopnje očita, da je v izpodbijani sodbi kr�ilo zahtevo po pravni varnosti, ki se zahteva za uporabo zastaralnih rokov.
Linking the determination of the point at which the fiveyear limitation period laid down in Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice starts to run to the subjective perception that any interested party may have of the certainty of the harm suffered would amount to leaving it up to the injured party to decide when the action for compensation would be finally timebarred.
Če bi bila namreč določitev trenutka, ko začne teči petletni rok iz člena 46 Statuta Sodi�ča, odvisna od subjektivnega dojemanja nedvomne narave �kode zainteresirane stranke, bi se očitno o�kodovanec lahko odločil, kdaj je od�kodninska tožba končno zastarala.
The Commission adds, in that connection, that the appeal proceedings brought by the Cantine could not, moreover, have had any influence on their conviction as to the certainty of the damage.
Komisija v zvezi s tem dodaja, da pritožbeni postopek in postopek pred kasacijskim sodi�čem, ki so ju sprožile vinske kleti, sicer v ničemer ni omogočil, v obravnavanem primeru, vplivati na njihovo prepričanje glede nedvomne narave �kode.
The Commission also submits that the Court of First Instance vitiated its judgment by a contradiction in the grounds thereof.
Komisija sicer poudarja, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje v sodbi protislovno obrazložilo razloge.
First, it refused to consider the exhaustion of domestic remedies as a condition for admissibility of the action for compensation brought by the Cantine against the Commission and, second, it linked the point from which the limitation period applicable to that action started to run to the date of a definitive judgment delivered at national level, in this case the judgment of the Corte suprema di cassazione of 28 November 1994.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je namreč zavrnilo upo�tevanje izčrpanja nacionalnih pravnih sredstev kot pogoj za dopustnost tožbe zaradi nepogodbene odgovornosti, ki so jo vinske kleti vložile zoper Komisijo, in vezalo začetek zastaralnega roka za to tožbo na datum pravnomočne sodbe, izdane na nacionalni ravni, v obravnavanem primeru tiste, ki jo je dne 28. novembra 1994 izdalo Corte suprema di cassazione.
For their part, the Cantine submit that the appeal is unfounded and that the Court of First Instance correctly held in the judgment under appeal that the conditions
Vinske kleti v zvezi s tem trdijo, da je pritožba neutemeljena ter da je Sodi�če prve stopnje v izpodbijani sodbi pravilno ugotovilo, da pogoji v zvezi z vložitvijo tožbe
2008 — CASE C-51/05 P for bringing proceedings against the Commission on the ground of noncontractual liability were not satisfied until the action brought before the national courts was settled by the judgment of the Corte suprema di cassazione.
2008 – ZADEVA C-51/05 P za ugotovitev odgovornosti, vložene zoper Komisijo, niso bili izpolnjeni, dokler postopek, sprožen pred nacionalnimi sodi�či, ni bil razre�en s sodbo Corte suprema di cassazione.
The Cantine take the view that it was necessary for them to await the outcome of the litigation at national level before referring the matter to the Community authorities, taking account, in particular, of the absence in this case of any provision regulating the position of the insolvent distiller.
Vinske kleti menijo, da so morale počakati na konec postopkov v sporih na nacionalni ravni, preden so jih predložile organom Skupnosti, ob upo�tevanju zlasti neobstoja, v obravnavanem primeru, kakr�nega koli predpisa, ki bi urejal položaj plačilno nesposobnega destilaterja.
In that connection, they add that the Court of First Instance would undoubtedly have dismissed their action claiming liability on the ground that the domestic rights of action had not been exhausted.
V zvezi s tem dodajajo, da bi Sodi�če prve stopnje gotovo zavrnilo njihovo tožbo zaradi odgovornosti, ker �e niso bila izčrpana vsa nacionalna pravna sredstva.
The Cantine submit that the action is therefore not timebarred because the limitation period for proceedings against the Commission for noncontractual liability began to run only when the Corte suprema di cassazione dismissed their appeals, thereby rendering the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma res judicata.
Po mnenju vinskih kleti torej nikakor ni nastopilo zastaranje, saj je zastaralni rok za tožbo zaradi nepogodbene odgovornosti zoper Komisijo začel teči �ele potem, ko je Corte suprema di cassazione zavrnilo njihovo tožbo, s čimer je sodba Tribunale civile di Roma postala pravnomočna.
Furthermore, the Cantine reply to the Commission that its argument that the judgment under appeal contains a contradiction as regards the admissibility of the action against the Commission for noncontractual liability and the time from which the limitation period applicable to that action starts to run is, in any event, unfounded inasmuch as it is based on the juxtaposition of two parts of that judgment dealing with distinct legal concepts and events.
Vinske kleti Komisiji poleg tega očitajo, da je njena utemeljitev, v skladu s katero naj bi izpodbijana sodba vsebovala protislovje v zvezi z dopustnostjo tožbe zaradi nepogodbene odgovornosti zoper Komisijo, in da je začetek zastaralnega roka, ki se uporabi za to tožbo v vsakem primeru neutemeljen, saj temelji na vzporedni postavitvi dveh delov te sodbe, ki se nana�ata na različne pravne pojme in različno dejansko stanje.
If the Court accepts the Commission’s arguments that the proceedings against the Commission for noncontractual liability are timebarred, and if it were to set another point from which the limitation period for those proceedings began to run, the Cantine submit that such a limitation period cannot start to run against them before the unjust enrichment of the Community occurred by virtue of AIMA’s reassignment in 1991 to the EAGGF of the security provided by Assedile.
Če bi Sodi�če sprejelo trditve Komisije v zvezi z zastaranjem tožbe zaradi nepogodbene odgovornosti zoper Komisijo in če bi moralo določiti nov začetek zastaralnega roka za to tožbo, vinske kleti trdijo, da ta rok v zvezi z njimi ne bi mogel začeti teči pred nastankom neupravičene obogatitve Skupnosti s povračilom var�čine, ki jo je izplačal Assedile, leta 1991, ob prenosu var�čine iz AIMA na EKUJS.
The Cantine submit that they learned of that reassignment to the EAGGF, and therefore of the unjust enrichment of the Community, only after receiving the Commission’s letter of 8 December 1997.
Vinske kleti trdijo, da so za ta prenos na EKUJS in torej neupravičeno obogatitev Skupnosti izvedele �ele po prejetju dopisa Komisije z dne 8. decembra 1997.
The limitation period for those proceedings should therefore start to run from that date.
Zastaralni rok za navedeno tožbo bi torej moral začeti teči s tem dnem.
The Cantine rely, in that connection, on the settled caselaw of the Court of Justice and, in particular, Adams v Commission, according to which the expiry of a limitation period cannot constitute a valid defence to a claim by a person who has suffered damage where that person only belatedly became aware of the event giving rise to that damage and thus could not have had a reasonable time in which to bring an action.
Vinske kleti se v zvezi s tem sklicujejo na ustaljeno sodno prakso Sodi�ča in zlasti na zgoraj navedeno sodbo v zadevi Adams proti Komisiji, v skladu s katero nastop zastaranja ni veljavna obramba zoper zahtevek osebe, ki je utrpela �kodo, ker je bila ta oseba pozno seznanjena z dejstvom, zaradi katerega je nastala �koda, in tako ni mogla v razumnem času vložiti tožbe.
The Cantine also state that they did not cease to safeguard their rights by applying to AIMA to obtain payment of the debts owed to them by DAI by way of the security provided by Assedile, and subsequently to the Commission in order to make a complaint concerning the irregularity committed by AIMA.
Vinske kleti prav tako poudarjajo, da so za�čitile svoje pravice s tem, da so od AIMA zahtevale plačilo terjatev, ki so jih imele do DAI iz var�čine, ki jo zagotavlja Assedile, in pozneje od Komisije, da ugotovi nepravilnosti, ki jih je napravil AIMA.
No culpable delay can therefore be attributed to them in this case.
V obravnavanem primeru jim torej ni mogoče očitati, da so po svoji krivdi zamudile rok.
It must be recalled, as a preliminary point, that the right to bring an action before the Community Courts can be exercised only under the conditions laid down in that regard by the provisions governing each specific action, in this case, an action for damages under Article 235 EC.
Uvodoma je treba opozoriti, da se pravica do začetka postopka pred sodi�čem Skupnosti lahko izvr�uje le v skladu s pogoji, ki so v zvezi s tem določeni z določbami, ki urejajo posamezne postopke, zlasti, v obravnavanem primeru, od�kodninsko tožbo, določeno v členu 235 ES.
As a consequence, that right will have been properly exercised before the Court of First Instance only if the latter correctly applied, in particular, the provisions governing the limitation rules specific to that action (see, to that effect, order in Case C-136/01 P Autosalone Ispra dei Fratelli Rossi v Commission [2002] ECR I-6565, paragraph 26).
Zato se je ta pravica pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje veljavno izvajala le, če je to pravilno uporabilo zlasti določbe, ki urejajo pravila v zvezi z zastarajem glede navedenih postopkov (glej v tem smislu sklep z dne 18. julija 2002 v zadevi Autosalone Ispra dei Fratelli Rossi proti Komisiji, C-136/01 P, Recueil, str. I-6565, točka 26).
In accordance with Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, proceedings against the Community in matters relating to noncontractual liability are barred after a period of five years from the occurrence of the event giving rise thereto.
V skladu s členom 46 Statuta Sodi�ča tožbe zaradi nepogodbene odgovornosti Skupnosti zastarajo v petih letih od nastanka kr�itve.
The fiveyear limitation period referred to in that provision cannot begin to run until all the requirements governing the obligation to provide compensation for damage are satisfied and, in particular, until the damage to be made good has materialised.
Petletni zastaralni rok, določen v navedeni določbi, začne teči, ko so izpolnjeni vsi pogoji, od katerih je odvisna obveznost povračila, in zlasti ko je �koda, ki jo je treba povrniti, konkretizirana.
Therefore, in cases where, as in this instance, the liability of the Community has its origin in a legislative measure, that period of limitation does not begin until the damaging effects of that measure have arisen and, therefore, until the time at which the persons concerned were bound to have suffered certain damage (see, in
Zato, kadar gre za primer, kakr�en je v obravnavanem primeru, ko odgovornost Skupnosti izvira iz normativnega akta, začne ta zastaralni rok teči, ko nastanejo �kodljivi učinki tega akta, torej ko je tožečim strankam povzročena nedvomna �koda (glej zlasti sodbi z dne 27. januarja 1982 v združenih
In the present case the Court of First Instance held, in paragraph 131 of the judgment under appeal, that the limitation period began to run when the damage resulting from the total or partial absence of payment of Community aid was suffered for certain by the Cantine.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je v točki 131 izpodbijane sodbe presodilo, da je v obravnavanem primeru zastaralni rok začel teči, ko so vinske kleti nedvomno utrpele �kodo zaradi delnega ali popolnega neizplačila pomoči Skupnosti.
It also stated, in paragraph 132 thereof, that it was not contested that DAI should have paid them the minimum buyingin price for wine not later than the end of June 1983 under Article 9(1) of Regulation No 2499/82.
Poleg tega je v točki 132 navedene sodbe ugotovilo, da ni sporno, da bi jim moral DAI minimalno nakupno ceno za vino izplačati najkasneje junija 1983 ob uporabi člena 9(1) Uredbe �t. 2499/82.
However, in the specific circumstances of the case, the Court of First Instance held, in paragraph 133 of the judgment under appeal, that the damage suffered by the Cantine at the end of June 1983 could not be regarded as being certain, that is to say, imminent and foreseeable, from that date on.
Vendar v posebnih okoli�činah tega spora Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 133 izpodbijane sodbe ni presodilo, da je treba �kodo, ki so jo utrpele vinske kleti na koncu meseca junija 1983, obravnavati, kot da je bila že od tega datuma nedvomna, da je bila torej neizbežna in predvidljiva.
In order to assess whether the damage was certain, the Court of First Instance found, in paragraphs 136 and 145 of the judgment under appeal, that it was necessary to take into consideration the proceedings brought by DAI before the Italian courts specifically concerning the fate of the security provided by Assedile, in the light of the complexity of the system introduced by Regulation No 2499/82 and the exceptional circumstances of the case, in which it was extremely difficult for a prudent and wellinformed trader to be certain, before the outcome of those proceedings, that he could not obtain payment of the aid concerned by way of that security before a national court.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je v točkah 136 in 145 izpodbijane sodbe presodilo, da je treba za presojo nedvomne narave �kode upo�tevati tiste postopke, ki jih je DAI sprožil pri italijanskih sodi�čih in ki se specifično nana�ajo na usodo var�čine, ki jo zagotavlja Assedile, ob upo�tevanju zapletenosti sistema, ki ga je uvedla Uredba �t. 2499/82, in izjemnih okoli�čin te zadeve, v katerih je bilo izredno težko, da bi se skrben in dobro obve�čen gospodarski subjekt pred koncem teh postopkov zavedal tega, da ne bo mogel doseči izplačila zadevnih pomoči pred nacionalnim sodi�čem iz navedene var�čine.
The Court of First Instance accordingly held, in paragraphs 145 to 147 of the judgment under appeal, that it was only after the judgment of the Corte suprema di cassazione of 28 November 1994 that the Cantine could have become aware that they would not obtain payment of the aid in question by way of that security and that the damage which they had suffered could therefore not have been certain before that date, with the result that the fiveyear limitation period laid down in Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice could not have begun to run before that date.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je zato v točkah od 145 do 147 izpodbijane sodbe ugotovilo, so se vinske kleti �ele po sodbi Corte suprema di cassazione z dne 28. novembra 1994 lahko zavedele, da ne bodo dosegle plačila zneskov zadevne pomoči s pomočjo var�čine, ter da zato �koda, ki so jo utrpele, pred tem datumom ni bila nedvomna, tako da petletni zastaralni rok, določen v členu 46 Statuta Sodi�ča, ne bi mogel začeti teči pred tem.
In that regard it must be stated that, in proceeding in that manner, the Court of First Instance adopted a subjective approach to the question whether the conditions giving rise to the noncontractual liability of the Community had been established, according to which the damage caused by an unlawful legislative act cannot be regarded as certain as long as the allegedly injured party does not perceive it as such.
V zvezi s tem je treba ugotoviti, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje tako sprejelo subjektiven pristop izpolnitve pogojev za nepogodbeno odgovornost Skupnosti, v skladu s katerim �kode, nastale zaradi nezakonitega normativnega akta, ni mogoče �teti za nedvomno, dokler je domnevni o�kodovanec kot take ne dojame.
In the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance made the assessment of whether the damage caused to the Cantine was certain contingent on their becoming aware that they would not obtain compensation for their damage before the national courts.
V izpodbijani sodbi je namreč Sodi�če prve stopnje presojo nedvomnega značaja �kode, povzročene vinskim kletem, povezalo z njihovim zavedanjem, da ne bodo mogle doseči povračila �kode pred nacionalnimi sodi�či.
The conditions to which the obligation to make good the damage referred to in the second paragraph of Article 288 EC is subject, and, therefore, the rules on limitation periods which govern actions for compensation in respect of that damage may be based only on strictly objective criteria.
Pogoji, od katerih je odvisna obveznost povračila �kode, določeni v členu 288, drugi odstavek, ES in so torej pravila zastaranja, ki urejajo tožbe za povračilo navedene �kode, lahko utemeljena le na strogo objektivnih merilih.
If it were otherwise, there would be a risk of undermining the principle of legal certainty on which the rules on limitations periods specifically rely and which require that legal rules be clear and precise in order that interested parties can ascertain their position in situations and legal relationships governed by Community law (see, inter alia, Case C-63/93 Duff and Others [1996] ECR I-569, paragraph 20).
Sicer bi namreč to lahko �kodilo načelu pravne varnosti, na katerega se opirajo pravila zastaranja in s katerim se zahteva, da so pravna pravila prava Skupnosti jasna in določena ter da zagotavljajo predvidljivost dejanskih stanj in pravnih razmerij, ki izhajajo iz pravnega reda Skupnosti (glej zlasti sodbo z dne 15. februarja 1996 v zadevi Duff in drugi, C-63/93, Recueil, str. I-569, točka 20).
Furthermore, it must be observed that preventing the limitation period for proceedings against the Community for noncontractual liability from starting to run as long as the party who has allegedly been harmed is not personally convinced that he has suffered damage has the result that the point in time at which those proceedings become timebarred varies according to the individual perception that each party may have as to the reality of the damage, something which is at variance with the requirement of legal certainty necessary for the application of limitation periods.
Poleg tega je treba ugotoviti, da je posledica zadržanja zastaralnega roka tožbe zaradi nepogodbene odgovornosti Skupnosti za toliko časa, dokler domnevni o�kodovanec ni osebno prepričan, da je bil o�kodovan, sprememba trenutka ugasnitve navedene tožbe v skladu z osebnim dojemanjem, ki bi ga lahko imela posamezna stranka, glede obstoja �kode, kar je v nasprotju z zahtevo po pravni varnosti, potrebno za uporabo zastaralnih rokov.
In that connection, it must also be observed that the Court has rejected the argument that the limitation period referred to in Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice cannot begin to run until the victim has specific and detailed knowledge of the facts of the case, since knowledge of the facts is not one of the conditions which must be met in order for the limitation period to begin running (see order in Autosalone Ispra dei Fratelli Rossi v Commission, paragraph 31).
V zvezi s tem je prav tako treba ugotoviti, da je Sodi�če zavrnilo trditev, v skladu s katero naj zastaralni rok iz člena 46 Statuta Sodi�ča začne teči, �ele ko o�kodovanec natančno in podrobno pozna dejansko stanje zadeve, ker seznanitev z dejstvi ni pogoj, ki mora biti izpolnjen za začetek teka zastaralnega roka (glej zgoraj navedeni sklep Autosalone Ispra dei Fratelli Rossi proti Komisiji, točka 31).
The subjective appraisal of the reality of the damage cannot therefore be taken into consideration in order to determine the moment at which the limitation period begins in proceedings being brought against the Community for noncontractual liability.
Subjektivne presoje obstoja �kode se tako ne upo�teva pri določitvi začetka tega zastaralnega roka za tožbo zaradi nepogodbene odgovornosti Skupnosti.
It follows that, in the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance was unable to establish whether the damage caused to the Cantine was certain and therefore it could not determine the time at which the limitation period for their action for compensation began to run by relying on the perception of the Cantine with regard to the harmful effects of Regulation No 2499/82.
Iz tega izhaja, da Sodi�če prve stopnje v izpodbijani sodbi ni moglo ugotoviti nedvomne narave �kode, povzročene vinskim kletem, in torej določiti začetka tega zastaralnega roka za njihovo tožbo zaradi odgovornosti, pri čemer se je sklicevalo na to, kako so vinske kleti dojemale �kodljive učinke Uredbe �t. 2499/82.
The Court of First Instance ought, on the contrary, to have based itself for that purpose on exclusively objective criteria.
Sodi�če prve stopnje bi se moralo v zvezi s tem nasprotno opreti na izključno objektivna merila.
It is on precisely such criteria that the Court has already relied for the purpose of determining the date on which the limitation period provided for in Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice begins to run.
In prav na ta merila se je Sodi�če že oprlo pri določitvi začetka zastaralnega roka, določenega v členu 46 Statuta Sodi�ča.
As is clear from paragraph 33 of Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, the Court has held that that limitation period begins to run from the moment at which the financial loss suffered by the victim actually materialised.
Kot namreč izhaja iz točke 33 zgoraj navedene sodbe Holcim (Deutschland) proti Komisiji, je Sodi�če presodilo, da je navedeni rok začel teči, ko je premoženjska �koda o�kodovancu dejansko nastala.
It follows therefore that the start of that period is linked to the objective loss actually caused to the assets of the party which claims to have suffered harm.
Iz tega torej izhaja, da je začetek tega roka vezan na objektivno izgubo, do katere je dejansko pri�lo v premoženju domnevno o�kodovane stranke.
In the present case, the Court of First Instance ought therefore, in the judgment under appeal, to have made the fiveyear limitation period for the action for compensation brought before it by the Cantine under Article 235 EC start to run from the date on which the damage caused by Regulation No 2499/82 objectively materialised in the form of an adverse impact on their assets.
Sodi�če prve stopnje bi torej v obravnavanem primeru moralo v izpodbijani sodbi �teti, da je petletni zastaralni rok za tožbo zaradi odgovornosti, ki so jo na podlagi člena 235 ES vložile vinske kleti, začel teči od dneva, ko je �koda, povzročena z Uredbo �t. 2499/82, objektivno nastala ter povzročila premoženjsko izgubo vinskih kleti.