natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Air Liquide and the Messer Group produce and distribute industrial and medical gases (such as oxygen, nitrogen or argon) as well as connected services. e deal gave Air Liquide — the world leader in the industrial gases sector — a long-sought foothold in the United Kingdom, where there were no overlaps.
Družbi Air Liquide in Messer Group proizvajata in distribuirata pline za industrijske in medicinske namene (kot so kisik, dušik in argon) ter izvajata povezane storitve. S tem poslom bi si družba Air Liquide – svetovno vodilna v sektorju industrijskih plinov – pridobila dolgo iskani vstop na trg v Združenem kraljestvu, kjer ni bilo nobenih prekrivanj.
Nevertheless, it would have also created competition concerns in the already concentrated Europe-wide tonnage gas market serving typically petrochemical and steel companies and in the market for electronic speciality gases.
Vendar pa bi povzročila tudi težave za konkurenco na že koncentriranem evropskem trgu tonažnega plina, ki ga po navadi uporabljajo petrokemična in jeklarska podjetja, ter trgu posebnih plinov za elektroniko.
On a national level, it furthermore raised duopoly concerns in Germany (together with Linde AG) for gases supplied in bulk and cylinders for industrial and medical use.
Na nacionalni ravni so poleg tega obstajali pomisleki o oblikovanju duopola v Nemčiji (skupaj z družbo Linde AG) za pline, dobavljene v cisternah za utekočinjeni zemeljski plin ter v jeklenkah za rabo v industriji in medicini.
To address the Commission’s concerns, Air Liquide committed itself to divesting significant parts of its or Messer’s activities in Germany. ese divestments included parts of Messer’s pipeline networks and several tonnage plants, liquefiers for air gases and lling centres for cylinders as well as the related customer bases.
V odziv na pomisleke Komisije se je družba Air Liquide zavezala, da bo odprodala precejšnje dele svojih obratov ali obratov družbe Messer v Nemčiji. Te odprodaje so vključevale dele cevovodnih omrežij družbe Messer in več tonažnih obratov, naprave za utekočinjanje plinov iz zraka in polnilnih središč za jeklenke ter povezane baze strank.
In January, pharmaceutical company Sanofi-Synthelabo SA announced a takeover bid for Aventis SA which the Commission approved subject to conditions.
Farmacevtska družba Sanofi-Synthélabo SA je januarja napovedala ponudbo za prevzem družbe Aventis SA, ki jo je Komisija pogojno odobrila.
Aventis was itself the result of a merger between Hoechst and Rhône-Poulenc which was cleared in August 1999, subject to conditions. is combination would have created one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world and raised some competitive concerns in the markets where their activities overlapped.
Sam Aventis je bil posledica združitve med družbama Hoechst in Rhône-Poulenc, ki je bila pogojno odobrena avgusta 1999. S to združitvijo bi nastala ena največjih farmacevtskih družb na svetu, sprožila pa bi nekaj težav glede konkurence na trgih, kjer so se dejavnosti družb prekrivale.
II — Merger control for heparins and heparoids (in 11 EU countries) and colorectal cancer treatment (in seven EU countries).
Takšni izdelki so se uporabljali za zdravljenje srčne kapi, slabe arterijske cirkulacije, vnetij ušes, nosu in grla, nespečnosti, največ prekrivanja pa je bilo na trgih heparinov in heparoidov (v 11 državah EU) ter pri zdravljenju kolorektalnega raka (v sedmih državah EU).
A ected areas also included sales of vitamins, muscle relaxants and antibiotics.
Prizadeta področja so vključevala tudi prodajo vitaminov, mišičnih relaksantov in antibiotikov.
To allay the Commission’s doubts, Sanofi either sold the related business or granted licences for it across 14 EU countries with most overlaps occurring in France.
Za odpravo Komisijinih dvomov je družba Sanoprodala povezane poslovne dejavnosti ali podelila licence zanje v 14 državah EU, do največjega števila prekrivanj pa je prišlo v Franciji.
Group 4 Falck, a Danish company, and Securicor, a company based in the United Kingdom, are active providing private security services. ey both o er a wide range of activities such as cash transportation, guarding services, alarm systems and justice services (e.g. management and transport of prisoners).
Danska družba Group 4 Falck in družba Securicor s sedežem v Združenem kraljestvu se ukvarjata z zagotavljanjem storitev zasebnega varovanja. Obe zagotavljata širok razpon dejavnosti, kot so prevoz, varovalne storitve, alarmni sistemi in pravosodne storitve (npr. upravljanje in prevoz zapornikov).
Because of the di erent regulatory framework in each country, the provision of security services is on a national or regional level.
Zaradi različnega ureditvenega okvira v posameznih državah je zagotavljanje varnostnih storitev urejeno na nacionalni ali regionalni ravni.
Addressing the Commission’s concerns, Group 4 Falck and Securicor divested Securicor’s security business in Luxembourg, Group 4 Falck’s manned guarding business in the Netherlands and their cash transportation activities in Scotland.
V odziv na pomisleke Komisije sta družbi Group 4 Falck in Securicor odprodali poslovno dejavnost varovanja družbe Securicor v Luksemburgu, poslovno dejavnost varovanja z osebjem skupine Group 4 Falck na Nizozemskem in njene dejavnosti prevoza gotovine na Škotskem.
Glass containers are bulky products but they are typically delivered within a range of 300–400 km from the production plant and the delivery area of a plant can thus encompass regions on both sides of a national frontier.
Pri stekleni embalaži gre za voluminozne pošiljke izdelkov, ki pa se po navadi dobavljajo v obsegu 300–400 km od proizvodnega obrata, zato lahko dobavno področje obrata zajema regije na obeh straneh državne meje.
In order to alleviate the Commission’s concerns, Owens-Illinois o ered to divest a production plant to an independent, viable competitor in each of the two a ected regions, in Milan in Italy and in Barcelona in Spain.
Da bi družba Owens-Illinois omilila pomisleke Komisije, je ponudila odprodajo proizvodnega obrata neodvisnemu in za preživetje sposobnemu tekmecu v vsaki od obeh prizadetih regij, tj. v Milanu v Italiji in v Barceloni v Španiji.
GIMD is a French group with interests mainly in aeronautics, computing, wine growing and magazines.
GIMD je francoska skupina z dejavnostmi na področju aeronavtike, računalništva, vinogradništva in revij.
Socpresse is also a French company producing national and regional daily newspapers, magazines and specialist publications.
Družba Socpresse je prav tako francosko podjetje, ki izdaja nacionalne in regionalne dnevne časopise, revije in strokovne publikacije.
II — Merger control competitors, which would have put it in a privileged position, particularly as regards advertisers wishing to reach nancial readers.
II – Nadzor združevanja se oglaševalci pogajajo individualno z založniki ali njihovimi agencijami in zato nimajo nobene resnične kupne moči.
To resolve the competition concerns and hence avoid an in-depth investigation, GIMD o ered to dispose of the economic and nancial magazine La Vie Financière, published by the Express-Expansion Group, which, given the quality and reputation of the publication, the Commission felt was enough to dispel its doubts.
Da bi družba GIMD odpravila pomisleke o konkurenci in se tako izognila poglobljeni preiskavi, je ponudila odprodajo ekonomske in nančne revije La Vie Financière, ki jo izdaja skupina Express-Expansion Group, kar je glede na kakovost in sloves publikacije po mnenju Komisije zadoščalo za razpršitev njenih dvomov.
However, in order to ensure that most of the journalists working on La Vie Financière stay with the magazine a er it is sold and do not exercise their right to leave under the clause de cession provided for by French industrial legislation for holders of a press card, the Commission will try to ensure that the purchaser of the publication has sufficient credibility in the publishing sector to ensure the continuity of the title and e ective longterm competition in the market.
Zaradi zagotovitve, da bo večina novinarjev, ki delajo za La Vie Financière, ostala pri tej reviji, tudi ko bo prodana, in da ne bodo uresničili svoje pravice do odhoda v skladu s clause de cession, ki jo določa francoska gospodarska zakonodaja za imetnike novinarskih izkaznic, pa bo Komisija poskusila zagotoviti, da bo kupec publikacije v založništvu dovolj verodostojen, da bo zagotovil neokrnjenost naslova in učinkovito dolgoročno konkurenco na trgu.
Syngenta Crop Protection AG is a subsidiary of Syngenta AG which, like Advanta BV, is active in the breeding, production, processing and sale of various kinds of seeds.
Družba Syngenta Crop Protection AG je hčerinska družba družbe Syngenta AG, ki se, podobno kot družba Advanta BV, ukvarja s pripravo, proizvodnjo, obdelavo in prodajo različnih vrst semen.
A few days later, on 20 August, the Commission approved the proposed acquisition by Fox Paine, a US manager of investment funds, of Advanta’s worldwide activities in seeds for sugar beet, oilseed rape, sorghum, sun ower, grasses as well as the maize and cereals businesses outside North America. On the basis of this transaction, the commitments given by Syngenta in the Syngenta/Advanta concentration were fulfilled. lled.
Komisijin pregled transakcije Fox Paine/Advanta je pokazal, da je imela družba Fox Paine vložke v številnih sektorjih, vključno z večinskim deležem v družbi Seminis, proizvajalki semen iz ZDA, ki razvija, goji in prodaja semena sadja in zelenjave tudi v Evropi.
258. e Commission’s review of the Fox Paine/Advanta transaction showed that Fox Paine has interests in several sectors, including a majority holding in US seed producer Seminis, which develops, grows and sells fruit and vegetable seeds including in Europe. e activities of Seminis and Advanta overlapped in the markets for vining pea seeds and onion seeds, but the market investigation did not reveal any particular competition concern as the parties would continue to face competition from other important players.
Dejavnosti družb Seminis in Advanta so se prekrivale na trgih semen plezalnega graha in čebule, vendar preiskava trga ni odkrila posebnih težav glede konkurence, saj se bodo stranke še naprej srečevale s konkurenco drugih pomembnih akterjev.
On 17 December, the Commission cleared, subject to commitments, the proposed acquisition of UCB’s Surface Specialties (Surface Specialties) business by Cytec Industries Inc.
Komisija je 17. decembra v skladu z zavezami odobrila predlagano pripojitev podjetja UCB’s Surface Specialties (Surface Specialties) k družbi Cytec Industries Inc.
(Cytec) of the USA.
(Cytec) iz ZDA.
Cytec was able to remove these concerns by o ering to divest Surface Specialties’ Fechenheim plant (Germany), which accounts for almost all of Surface Specialties’ European production.
Družba Cytec je odpravila te pomisleke s ponudbo odprodaje obrata Fechenheim družbe Surface Specialties (Nemčija), ki obsega skoraj vso evropsko proizvodnjo družbe Surface Specialties.
BOX 7: A FIRST STEP IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF EUROPEAN AVIATION THE AIR FRANCE/KLM MERGER AND THE AIR FRANCE/ALITALIA ALLIANCE
OKVIR 7: PRVI KORAK PRI KONSOLIDACIJI EVROPSKEGA LETALSTVA ZDRUŽITEV DRUŽB AIR FRANCE IN KLM TER POVEZAVA MED DRUŽBAMA AIR FRANCE IN ALITALIA
Introduction e last three years have been particularly productive for Community law in the eld of aviation. e ‘open skies’ judgments (1) in 2002 and the legislative e ort launched by the Commission in previous years (2) created the legal basis for the development of a truly internal market for the civil aviation industry.
Sodbe v primeru „Odprto nebo“ (1) iz leta 2002 in zakonodajno prizadevanje, s katerim je v zadnjih letih začela Komisija (2), sta oblikovala pravno podlago za razvoj pravega notranjega trga za panogo civilnega letalstva.
It was then the turn of European airline companies to respond to this new legal environment and create EU-wide players, putting an end to the fragmentation of the European aviation industry (3).
Potem so bile na vrsti evropske letalske družbe, da se odzovejo na to novo pravno okolje in oblikujejo akterje po vsej EU ter
Air France (AF) and KLM announced their merger in the second half of 2003 and it was cleared by the Commission on 11 February (4).
Družbi Air France („AF“) in KLM sta napovedali svojo združitev v drugi polovici leta 2003, Komisija pa jo je odobrila 11. februarja (4).
Soon a er the AF/KLM decision, on 7 April, AF was granted an exemption under Article 81(3) EC for its more traditional alliance with Alitalia (AZ) (5
Kmalu po odločbi o AF/KLM je bilo 7. aprila družbi AF odobreno izvzetje po členu 81(3) ES za njeno tradicionalnejšo povezavo z družbo Alitalia
Consolidation would be therefore needed to be able to compete globally with these airlines.COMP/M 3280 — Air France/KLM.
Zato bo potrebna konsolidacija, da bi bili sposobni globalno konkurirati tem letalskim družbam.COMP/M.3280 – Air France/KLM.
This decision has been challenged before the Court of First Instance by a third party (Case T-177/04).COMP/38.248 — Air France/Alitalia.
Ta sklep je pred Sodiščem prve stopnje izpodbijala tretja stranka (zadeva T-177/04).COMP/38.248 – Air France/Alitalia.
This decision has been challenged before the Court of First Instance by a third party (Case T-300/04).
Ta sklep je pred Sodiščem prve stopnje izpodbijala tretja stranka (zadeva T-300/04).
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2004 – Zvezek 1 napere („hub and spoke“) ter koncentrirajo promet v svojih središčih.
However, mergers in the EU between carriers of di erent nationalities used to be di cult owing to the system of bilateral international agreements regulating traffic rights between States.
Vendar pa so bile združitve v EU med prevozniki različnih nacionalnosti zapletene zaradi sistema dvostranskih mednarodnih sporazumov, ki urejajo prometne pravice med državami.
On this basis, traffic rights were granted to carriers from third countries through bilateral agreements, whereby the two signing States o en grant traffic rights only to carriers having the nationality of those States (‘nationality clause’).
Na tej podlagi so se prometne pravice prevoznikom iz tretjih držav podeljevale z dvostranskimi sporazumi, pri čemer dve državi podpisnici pogosto podelita prometne pravice samo prevoznikom z nacionalnostjo teh držav („klavzula nacionalnosti“).
e ‘open skies’ judgments changed this legal landscape. e Court of Justice ruled that those Member States which had undertaken commitments with the United States were not entitled to do so and had breached the exclusive competence of the Community in a number of areas.
Sodbe v primerih „Odprto nebo“ so spremenile to pravno podlago. Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti je odločilo, da tiste države članice, ki so prevzele zaveze z Združenimi državami Amerike, tega niso imele pravico storiti, in so na številnih področjih prekršile izključno pristojnost Skupnosti.
As a result, the nationality clauses contained in bilateral agreements with third countries
Sprememba obstoječih dvostranskih sporazumov in priznanje klavzule Skupnosti s strani tretjih držav sta potrebna za zagotovitev, da
Description of the two transactions e concept of concentration covers ‘only operations bringing about a lasting change in the structure of the undertakings concerned’ (9). e framework agreement of 16 October 2003 (10) signed between AF and KLM provides that two previously independent carriers will merge to become ultimately a single operator in the market (under the name Air France–KLM).
Koncept koncentracije zajema „le transakcije, ki prinesejo trajno spremembo v strukturi zadevnih podjetij“ (9). Okvirni sporazum z dne 16. oktobra 2003 (10), podpisan med družbama AF in KLM, določa, da se bosta dva prej neodvisna prevoznika združila in na koncu postala en sam operater na trgu (pod imenom Air France-KLM).
Former shareholders of AF will hold 81 % of Air France–KLM shares and the minority shareholders of KLM the remaining 19 %.
Prejšnji delničarji družbe AF bodo obdržali 81 % delnic družbe Air France-KLM, manjšinski delničarji iz družbe KLM pa preostalih 19 %.
Although the best way to benefit fully from synergy e ects would be a full merger, the gradual acceptance of the principle of the ‘Community carrier’ concept by third States requires a cautious and progressive approach.
Čeprav bi bila popolna združitev najboljši način za celovito izkoriščenje učinkov sinergije, je zaradi postopnega sprejemanja načela koncepta „prevoznika Skupnosti“ s strani tretjih držav potreben previden in postopen pristop.
In a second phase, the integration between AF and KLM will be enhanced and the merged entity might ultimately operate as a single carrier. e acquisition of key veto rights by AF over KLM from the outset implies that the notified transaction constituted a concentration within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the ECMR.
V drugi fazi se bo integracija med družbama AF in KLM povečala in združena pravna oseba bi lahko na koncu delovala kot en sam prevoznik. Pridobitev ključnih pravic veta s strani družbe AF nad družbo KLM že od začetka pomeni, da je šlo pri priglašeni transakciji za koncentracijo v smislu člena 3(1)(b) ECMR.
Under their extensive alliance, AF and AZ agree to coordinate their operational and commercial policies on a number of routes (i.e. initially the France–Italy bundle of routes), through extensive use of code-sharing, network coordination and route cooperation, share prices and a common sales policy.
V skladu s svojo obsežno povezavo se družbi AF in AZ strinjata, da bosta uskladili svoje operativne in poslovne politike na številnih zračnih poteh (tj. najprej pri celoti zračnih poti Francija–Italija), prek obsežne skupne uporabe kod, koordinacije omrežja in sodelovanja pri zračnih poteh, skupnih cen in skupne prodajne politike.
However, unlike the AF/KLM case, AF and AZ remain two distinct and independent entities in the market. e alliance does not create a new entity either de jure or de facto, nor has it altered the structure of the undertakings concerned, particularly as regards control.
Drugače kot v primeru AF/KLM pa družbi AF in AZ ostajata različni in neodvisni pravni osebi na trgu. Povezava ne ustvari nove pravne osebe niti de jure niti de facto, prav tako pa tudi ne spremeni strukture zadevnih podjetij, zlasti glede nadzora.
Furthermore, the alliance has no independent access to the market as all dealings with customers will continue to take place through AF and AZ. e alliance clearly does not constitute a concentration but a coordination agreement
Poleg tega povezava nima neodvisnega dostopa do trga, saj se vsi posli s strankami še naprej izvajajo prek družb AF in AZ. Povezava očitno ne pomeni koncentracije,
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1 within the scope of Article 81 EC (11
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2004 – Zvezek 1
Market de nition and assessment of the two transactions e substantive assessments of the two cases are similar.
Opredelitev trga in ocena obeh transakcij
14 the assessment of international routes (
Vključevala je presojo mednarodnih zračnih poti (
) and the impact of AF’s and KLM’s partnerships with other carriers.
) ter učinek partnerstev med družbama AF in KLM pri drugih prevoznikih.
Commission to conclude that, post-merger, AZ will no longer have an incentive to compete with KLM in the Italian/Dutch bundle of routes and these routes were therefore included in the competitive assessment of the merger.
Komisija je ugotovila pomisleke o konkurenci na sedmih zračnih poteh v primeru AF/AZ ter na devetih zračnih poteh znotraj Skupnosti in petih medcelinskih zračnih poteh v primeru AF/KLM.
Finally, the AF/KLM decision also assessed other related markets such as cargo transport and maintenance.
To so zračne poti, na katerih imajo stranke visok kombiniran tržni delež, ovire za vstop pa so visoke, predvsem zaradi prenatrpanosti letališč v vsaj enem od obeh krajev P in N.
Competition problems deriving from alliances and concentrations in the aviation sector, and therefore the remedies applied, are similar.
Težave glede konkurence, ki izhajajo iz povezav in koncentracij v letalskem sektorju, in potemtakem tudi uporabljeni ukrepi, so podobni.
By de nition, competition concerns in this sector do not usually arise from restrictions on physical capacity requiring the divestiture of a given business (e.g. aeroplanes or subsidiaries), but rather from barriers to entry, namely access to airport slots (16).
Konkurenčni pomisleki v tem sektorju praviloma ne izhajajo iz omejitev zične zmogljivosti, ki zahteva odprodajo določene dejavnosti (npr. letal ali podružnic), temveč iz ovir za vstop, to je dostopa do letaliških slotov (16).
In this regard the parties agreed to put slots at the disposal of competitors in both cases so that the latter might be able to operate ights on the routes where the Commission found competition concerns. ese remedies were accompanied by other measures (frequency freeze and the obligation to enter into agreements concerning the frequent-flyer programme, interlining and intermodal transport services, etc.).
V zvezi s tem so se stranke dogovorile, da bodo v obeh primerih dale letališka mesta (slote) na voljo tekmecem, tako da bodo ti lahko opravljali polete na zračnih poteh, kjer je imela Komisija pomisleke o konkurenci. Te ukrepe so spremljali drugi ukrepi (zamrznitev pogostosti poletov in obveznost sklepanja sporazumov glede programa pogostega letalskega potnika (frequent-flyer programme), interlining in kombinirane prometne storitve itd.).
However, remedies should also reflect the particularities derived from the di erent nature of an alliance and a concentration.
Protiukrepi morajo izražati tudi posebnosti, ki izhajajo iz različne narave povezave in koncentracije.
A cooperative alliance does not represent a permanent change in the market and an Article 81(3) decision is granted for an initial period of six years, subject to review a er that period.
Kooperativna povezava ne pomeni stalne spremembe na trgu, odločba po členu 81(3) se podeli za začetno obdobje šestih let, po tem obdobju pa sledi pregled.
By contrast, a concentration (and hence a merger decision) has a lasting impact on the structure of the companies and the market. at is why structural remedies are particularly important in merger cases, given that they are able to ensure such a permanent e ect by their very nature (17).
Nasprotno ima koncentracija (in potemtakem odločba o združitvi) trajen učinek na strukturo družb in trg. Zato so strukturni ukrepi posebej pomembni v primerih združitve, saj imajo lahko že po svoji naravi takšen trajni učinek (17).
Where the use of divestiture is di cult or impossible, ‘the change in the market structure resulting from a proposed concentration can lead to major barriers or impediments to entry into the relevant market.
Kadar je uporaba odprodaje zapletena ali nemogoča, „sprememba strukture trga, ki je posledica predlagane koncentracije, lahko vodi do velikih ovir ali motenj za vstop na upoštevni trg.
Such barriers might arise from control over infrastructure, in particular networks . . .
Takšne ovire lahko nastanejo nadzora nad infrastrukturo, zlasti omrežji ...
In such circumstances, remedies may aim at facilitating market entry by ensuring that competitors will have access to the necessary infrastructure . . .’ Cf. paragraph 28 of the Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 447/98 (OJ C 68, 2.3.2001).See judgment in Case T-102/96 Gencor [1999] ECR II-753.
V takšnih okoliščinah imajo protiukrepi lahko za cilj pospešitev vstopa na trg z zagotavljanjem, da bodo tekmeci imeli dostop do potrebne infrastrukture …“ Glej odstavek 28 sporočila Komisije o protiukrepih, sprejemljivih v skladu z Uredbo Sveta (EGS) št. 4064/89 in Uredbo Komisije (ES) št. 447/98 (UL C 68, 2.3.2001).Glej sodbo v zadeviT-102/96 Gencor, Recueil 1999, str. II-753.
With regard to remedies concerning long-haul routes, specific to the AF/KLM case, the Commission’s assumption that indirect ights represent a competitive constraint for direct ights needed to be ensured.
Glede ukrepov za medcelinske zračne poti, lastne primeru AF/KLM, je bilo treba preveriti domnevo Komisije, da indirektni leti konkurenčno omejujejo direktne.