natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As a preliminary point, Impala pleads that the appeal is inadmissible in that it constitutes an attempt to reopen questions of fact relating to the inadequacy of reasoning in the contested decision and to the manifest error of assessment vitiating the contested decision, which were settled by the Court of First Instance.
Impala se uvodoma sklicuje na nedopustnost pritožbe, ker gre za poskus ponovne obravnave dejanskih vpra�anj v zvezi z nezadostno obrazložitvijo sporne odločbe in očitno napako pri presoji, ki jih je Sodi�če prve stopnje že re�ilo.
The appeal seeks, to a very large extent, to re-examine questions of fact which are beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice.
S pritožbo se namreč v veliki meri predlaga ponovna obravnava dejanskih vpra�anj, ki naj ne bi spadala v pristojnost Sodi�ča.
Impala also submits in this respect that the question whether a decision is sufficiently reasoned is a question of fact.
Impala poleg tega v zvezi s tem meni, da je vpra�anje, ali je odločba dovolj obrazložena, dejansko vpra�anje.
Lastly, it adds that its individual replies to the grounds of appeal raised by the appellants should be understood as being in the alternative.
Nazadnje dodaja, da bi bilo treba njene posamične odgovore na pritožbene razloge pritožnic �teti kot pomožne.
In this regard, it is clear from Article 225 EC and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice that an appeal lies on points of law only.
V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da iz člena 225 ES in člena 58, prvi odstavek, Statuta Sodi�ča izhaja, da je pritožba omejena na pravna vpra�anja.
The Court of First Instance accordingly has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to find the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it and, second, to assess those facts.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je zato edino pristojno, prvič, za ugotavljanje dejstev, razen če bi vsebinska nepravilnost njegovih ugotovitev izhajala iz listin v spisu, ki so mu bile predložene, in, drugič, za presojo teh dejstev.
When the Court of First Instance has found or assessed the facts, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction under Article 225 EC to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the Court of First Instance and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them.
Ko je Sodi�če prve stopnje ugotovilo ali presodilo dejstva, je Sodi�če pristojno, da na podlagi člena 225 ES izvaja nadzor nad pravno opredelitvijo teh dejstev in pravnimi posledicami, ki jih je iz tega izpeljalo Sodi�če prve stopnje.
The Court of Justice thus has no jurisdiction to establish the facts or, in principle, to examine the evidence which the Court of First Instance accepted in support of those facts.
Sodi�če zato ni pristojno za ugotavljanje dejstev in načeloma niti za presojo dokazov, ki jih je Sodi�če prve stopnje sprejelo v podporo tem dejstvom.
Provided that the evidence has been properly obtained and the general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced to it.
Če so bili namreč ti dokazi pravilno pridobljeni in če so bila spo�tovana splo�na načela prava in pravila postopka, ki veljajo zanje, samo Sodi�če prve stopnje presodi vrednost, ki jo je treba pripisati dokazom, ki so mu bili predloženi.
Save where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted, that appraisal does not therefore constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court of Justice (see, inter alia, Case C-185/95 P
Ta presoja torej, razen v primeru izkrivljanja teh dokazov, ni pravno vpra�anje, ki je predmet nadzora Sodi�ča v okviru pritožbe (glej zlasti sodbe z dne 17. decembra 1998 v zadevi Baustahlgewebe proti Komisiji, C-185/95 P, Recueil, str. I-8417, točki 23 in 24; z dne 6. aprila 2006 v zadevi
As regards the present case, as is apparent from, among other things, paragraph 22 of this judgment and contrary to what Impala contends, the appellants do not, by their appeal, seek generally to call into question the findings of fact made by the Court of First Instance, as such.
Pritožnici v tej zadevi, kot izhaja zlasti iz točke 22 te sodbe in v nasprotju s trditvami Impale, s pritožbo na splo�no ne izpodbijata presoje dejstev, ki jo je opravilo Sodi�če prve stopnje.
By contrast, they raise for the most part questions of law which can form a valid basis for an appeal.
Nasprotno, sklicujeta se v bistvu na pravna vpra�anja, ki so lahko zakonita podlaga za pritožbo. Zato je treba splo�ni ugovor nedopustnosti, ki ga uveljavlja Impala, zavrniti.
That being said, to the extent that Impala puts forward more detailed objections of inadmissibility in relation to a number of specific parts of the appeal, those objections fall to be addressed in the context of the grounds of appeal concerned.
Ker se Impala podrobneje sklicuje na nedopustnost v nekaterih delih pritožbe, bi bilo treba te ugovore obravnavati v okviru zadevnih pritožbenih razlogov.
The plea of inadmissibility based on the appellants having omitted to challenge a critical passage of the judgment under appeal
Ugovor nedopustnosti, ker pritožnici nista izpodbijali odločilnega dela izpodbijane sodbe
Impala submits that, in any event, the Court of First Instance held in paragraph 528 of the judgment under appeal that the Commission did not carry out a prospective analysis of whether the concentration would create a collective dominant position, and held that for this reason alone that Impala’s second plea in law at first instance was well founded. That, in itself, is sufficient to annul the contested decision.
Impala trdi, da je v vsakem primeru Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 528 izpodbijane sodbe ugotovilo, da Komisija ni izvedla prospektivne analize, da bi ugotovila, ali bi zadevna koncentracija ustvarila kolektivni prevladujoči položaj, in samo iz tega razloga razsodilo, da je drugi tožbeni razlog Impale utemeljen, kar bi samo po sebi zadostovalo za razglasitev ničnosti sporne odločbe.
Accordingly, even if the appellants succeed on one or more of their grounds of appeal, the
Impala meni, da bi bilo treba zato pritožbo, čeprav bi pritožnicama uspelo dokazati utemeljenost enega ali več
BERTELSMANN AND SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA v IMPALA appeal must in any event be dismissed, since the appellants do not contest the finding that no prospective analysis was carried out.
BERTELSMANN IN SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA PROTI IMPALI pritožbenih razlogov, v vsakem primeru zavreči, ker se z njo ne izpodbija ugotovitve, da ni bila izvedena nobena prospektivna analiza.
In that regard, it is sufficient to hold that the appeal expressly refers, in a list of the passages in the judgment under appeal that are specifically subject to criticism, to paragraph 528 of that judgment, as well as to paragraphs 533, 539 and 541, which also address the question of the creation of a collective dominant position.
V zvezi s tem zadostuje ugotovitev, da se pritožnici v uvodnih opombah na začetku pritožbe pri na�tevanju kritiziranih delov izpodbijane sodbe posebej sklicujeta na točko 528 te sodbe in na točke 533, 539 ter 541 navedene sodbe, ki se prav tako nana�ajo na vpra�anje nastanka kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja.
That being the case, it cannot validly be argued that the appeal is limited to the reasoning of the Court of First Instance regarding the question of the strengthening of a pre-existing collective dominant position with the result that it should be rejected as inadmissible in its entirety.
V teh okoli�činah ni mogoče upravičeno trditi, da je pritožba omejena na ugotovitve Sodi�ča prve stopnje glede vpra�anja krepitve že obstoječega kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja in da jo je treba zato v celoti zavreči kot nedopustno.
The seven grounds of appeal relied on by the appellants overlap in a number of respects.
Sedem pritožbenih razlogov, ki jih navajata pritožnici, se prekriva z različnih vidikov.
Essentially, the first to fourth grounds, together with the seventh ground, concern the manner in which the Court of First Instance carried out its review, particularly with respect to questions of proof.
Prvi, drugi, tretji, četrti ter sedmi pritožbeni razlog se nana�ajo na vrste nadzora, ki ga izvaja Sodi�če prve stopnje, zlasti glede vpra�anj dokazov.
The fifth ground concerns the concept of a collective dominant position.
Peti pritožbeni razlog se nana�a na pojem kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja.
The sixth ground relates to the findings of the Court of First Instance with respect to the failure of the contested decision to state adequate reasons.
Šesti pritožbeni razlog se nana�a na presojo Sodi�ča prve stopnje v zvezi z nezadostno obrazložitvijo sporne odločbe.
It is appropriate to begin the examination of the substance of this appeal by considering the grounds of appeal concerning the manner in which the Court of First Instance approached issues of evidence and proof, and, in the first place, by considering the second part of the third ground.
Začeti je treba s preučitvijo utemeljenosti te pritožbe na podlagi pritožbenih razlogov, ki se nana�ajo na pravila obravnavanja dokazov, ki jih uporablja Sodi�če prve stopnje, in to najprej z obravnavo drugega dela tretjega pritožbenega razloga.
The second part of the third ground of appeal, alleging an error of law in that the Court of First Instance applied an excessive burden and standard of proof as regards decisions approving a concentration
Drugi del tretjega pritožbenega razloga: napačna uporaba prava, ker je Sodi�če prve stopnje uporabilo pretiran dokazni standard na področju odločb o odobritvi koncentracij
It is apparent from, among others, paragraphs 289, 366 and 459 of the judgment under appeal that the Court of First Instance considered whether the considerations on which the contested decision was based were capable of justifying the Commission’s finding in that decision that the markets in question were not sufficiently transparent to allow a collective dominant position.
Zlasti iz točk 289, 366 in 459 izpodbijane sodbe izhaja, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje raziskovalo, ali bi bilo mogoče z dokazi, ki so bili podlaga sporne odločbe, utemeljiti presojo Komisije, ki izhaja iz te odločbe, in sicer da zadevni trgi niso bili dovolj pregledni, da bi omogočali kolektivni prevladujoči položaj.
By their third ground of appeal, the appellants maintain that the Court of First Instance committed an error of law by applying an incorrect and excessive standard of proof as regards merger clearance decisions.
Pritožnici v okviru tretjega pritožbenega razloga zatrjujeta, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno uporabilo pravo, ker je uporabilo napačni in pretirani dokazni standard na področju odločitev o odobritvi koncentracij.
In the second part of that ground, the appellants submit that the Court of First Instance misconstrued the burden and standard of proof which applies to those decisions.
Pritožnici v okviru drugega dela tega pritožbenega razloga navajata, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno razlagalo dokazne standarde, ki se uporabljajo pri teh odločbah.
According to the appellants, since it is for the Commission to substantiate a decision prohibiting a concentration, where it has not been able to collect evidence which meets the high standard set by the Community judicature to justify such a prohibition, particularly where the Commission is pursuing a theory of collective dom -inance, it must approve the proposed concentration.
Pritožnici menita, da mora Komisija pri utemeljitvi odločbe o prepovedi koncentracije, če ji ni uspelo zbrati dokazov, ki ustrezajo visokemu standardu, ki ga določa sodna praksa Skupnosti za utemeljitev take prepovedi, zlasti kadar se opira na tezo o kolektivnem prevladujočem položaju, odobriti načrtovano koncentracijo.
It is clear, in particular, from Article 10(6) of the Regulation that if the Commission is unable to substantiate its theory of competitive harm on the basis of convincing evidence, the scheme of the Regulation dictates that it must approve the concentration.
Zlasti iz člena 10(6) Uredbe namreč izhaja, da mora Komisija, če ne more s prepričljivimi dokazi dokazati �kode za konkurenco, odobriti to koncentracijo, kot ji nalaga sistematika Uredbe.
The appellants also maintain in that regard that the Court of First Instance committed an error of law in failing to recognise that the Commission is obliged to satisfy a higher standard of proof when a concentration is prohibited than when such a concentration is approved, since a prohibition represents a serious limitation of the commercial freedom of the notifying parties and since concentrations should benefit from a presumption that they are compatible with the common market.
Poleg tega pritožnici v zvezi s tem trdita, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno uporabilo pravo, ker ni priznalo, da mora Komisija uporabiti vi�ji dokazni standard ob prepovedi koncentracije kot ob odobritvi, ker prepoved pomeni resno oviro za podjetni�ko svobodo priglasiteljev in ker mora za koncentracije veljati domneva združljivosti s skupnim trgom.
It is clear from the caselaw that the Commission must prove that a decision prohibiting a concentration is well founded in accordance with a standard which is stricter than one based on the mere balancing of probabilities and, consequently, that the Commission is not subject to the same burden and standard of proof in the case of an approval decision as it is in the case of a prohibition decision.
Iz sodne prakse naj bi izhajalo, da mora Komisija dokazati utemeljenost odločbe o prepovedi koncentracije v skladu s strožjim merilom, kot je merilo preprostega tehtanja verjetnosti, in da zato obveznost Komisije glede dokazov za odločbo o odobritvi koncentracije in za odločbo o prepovedi take koncentracije ni enaka.
Under a stricter standard than the mere balancing of probabilities, the Commission is, in reality, required only to prove that a decision prohibiting a concentration is well founded.
Na podlagi strožjega pravila, kot je zgolj preprosto tehtanje verjetnosti, bi morala biti namreč obveznost Komisije glede predložitve dokazov v resnici omejena le na predložitev dokazov o utemeljenosti odločbe o prepovedi koncentracije.
According to the appellants, the failure to accept such an ‘asymmetric’ standard of proof permeates the assessment by the Court of First Instance of the contested decision and of the evidence on which the Commission relied.
Pritožnici menita, da Sodi�če prve stopnje pri presoji sporne odločbe in dokazov, ki jih je predložila Komisija, ni upo�tevalo takega „neenakega“ dokaznega standarda.
The appellants go on to submit that, as a result, the Court of First Instance committed an error of law in requiring the Commission to prove the absence of transparency in the recorded music market, when it should have examined whether, at the date of the contested decision, there was sufficient evidence to prove to the requisite legal standard that that transparency existed.
Pritožnici poleg tega menita, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje zato napačno uporabilo pravo, ker je od Komisije zahtevalo, naj dokaže neobstoj preglednosti trga posnete glasbe, medtem ko bi moralo preučiti, ali so na dan, ko je bila izdana sporna odločba, obstajali zadostni dokazi, ki bi omogočali v pravno zadostni meri ugotoviti obstoj navedene preglednosti.
That error vitiates the whole of the judgment under appeal and, in particular, in various respects described in detail in the appeal, paragraphs 381 to 387, 389, 420, 428, 429 and 433.
Ta napaka naj bi bila podana v celi izpodbijani sodbi in zlasti glede različnih vidikov, podrobneje opisanih v uvodnem delu pritožbe, v točkah od 381 do 387, 389, 420, 428, 429 in 433.
According to Impala, to follow the appellants’ line of argument in support of the second part of the third ground of appeal and to accept that there is a presumption in favour of the approval of concentrations could have grave repercussions for the merger control regime, such as the risk of abuse of the system.
Impala meni, da bi priznanje trditev pritožnic za utemeljitev drugega dela tretjega pritožbenega razloga in priznanje obstoja domneve v korist odobritve koncentracij lahko imelo resne posledice za ureditev nadzora teh koncentracij, kot je nevarnost zlorabe sistema.
That line of argument ignores the delicate balance created by the Community legislation on merger control between private and public interests and the symmetrical double obligation imposed on the Commission to prohibit mergers which are incompatible with the common market and to approve those that are compatible with it.
Navedene trditve naj ne bi upo�tevale občutljivega ravnovesja, ki ga je ustvarila ureditev Skupnosti v zvezi z nadzorom koncentracij, med zasebnimi in javnimi interesi ter „dvojno simetrično obveznostjo“ Komisije, da prepove koncentracije, ki niso združljive s skupnim trgom, in odobri tiste, ki so z njim združljive.
The standard of proof required in that regard is that of the balance of probabilities and it is for the Commission to demonstrate where the balance falls. Impala also submits that the
Zahtevani dokazni standard naj bi glede tega ustrezal tehtanju verjetnosti in Komisija
2008 — CASE C-413/06 P
2008 – ZADEVA C-413/06 P bi morala dokazati, kaj je verjetneje.
Court of First Instance concluded that the Commission had found a large body of convincing evidence showing that there was transparency on the markets concerned, but that it had ultimately decided that there was not sufficient transparency on the basis of ‘less transparent’ campaign discounts.
Poleg tega Impala trdi, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje ugotovilo, da je Komisija zbrala dovolj prepričljivih dokazov o obstoju preglednosti zadevnih trgov, vendar je nazadnje presodila, da ta preglednost ni bila zadostna zaradi obstoja „manj preglednih“ reklamnih popustov.
The Court of First Instance also found that the evidence that was supposed to establish that insufficiency of transparency did not support it.
Na drugi strani je Sodi�če prve stopnje prav tako ugotovilo, da dokazi, namenjeni utemeljitvi te nezadostne preglednosti, tega ne morejo podpreti.
Impala also considers that in putting forward the arguments referred to in paragraph 41 of this judgment the appellants appear to be inviting the Court to reopen the findings of fact made by the Court of First Instance.
Impala poleg tega meni, da se zdi, da pritožnici z navajanjem trditev iz točke 41 te sodbe od Sodi�ča zahtevata, naj ponovi presojo o dejstvih, ki jo je izvedlo Sodi�če prve stopnje.
As a preliminary remark, it is clear from the Court’s caselaw that an alleged failure to have regard to the rules of evidence is a question of law, which is admissible in an appeal (see, to that effect, Case C-199/92 P Hüls v Commission [1999] ECR I-4287, paragraph 65, and Joined Cases C-403/04 P and C-405/04 P Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel v Commission [2007] ECR I-729, paragraph 40).
Najprej, iz sodne prakse Sodi�ča izhaja, da je zatrjevana kr�itev pravil, ki se uporabljajo na področju dokazov, pravno vpra�anje, ki je v fazi pritožbe dopustno (glej v tem smislu sodbi z dne 8. julija 1999 v zadevi Hüls proti Komisiji, C-199/92 P, Recueil, str. I-4287, točka 65, in z dne 25. januarja 2007 v združenih zadevah Sumitomo Metal Industries in Nippon Steel proti Komisiji, C-403/04 P in C-405/04 P, ZOdl., str.
Thus, in so far as Impala, under its general plea of inadmissibility, specifically argues that the third ground of appeal is inadmissible in its entirety, that argument cannot be accepted.
I-729, točka 40). Ker se Impala v okviru splo�nega ugovora nedopustnosti sklicuje posebej na nedopustnost tretjega pritožbenega razloga v celoti, te trditve ni mogoče sprejeti.
As regards the substance, as Impala points out, at the heart of the second part of the third ground of appeal is the premiss that the standard of proof will differ according to whether a decision approving a concentration or a decision prohibiting a concentration is involved.
Glede vsebine, kot poudarja Impala, je drugi del tretjega pritožbenega razloga osredotočen na tezo, da se dokazni standard razlikuje glede na to, ali gre za odločbo o odobritvi koncentracije ali odločbo o prepovedi te koncentracije.
In this connection, it is common ground between the parties that in the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance applied the same standard of proof to the contested decision — an approval decision — as that which it would have applied to a prohibition decision.
V zvezi s tem med strankami ni sporno, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje v izpodbijani sodbi uporabilo enak dokazni standard glede sporne odločbe, ki je odločba o odobritvi koncentracije, kot tisti, ki bi ga uporabilo za odločbo, ki prepoveduje tako koncentracijo.
In that regard, it should be noted at the outset that there is nothing in Article 2(2) or (3) of the Regulation which states that it imposes different standards of proof in relation to decisions approving a concentration, on the one hand, and decisions prohibiting a concentration, on the other.
V zvezi s tem je treba najprej opozoriti, da iz besedila v odstavkih 2 in 3 člena 2 Uredbe ne izhaja, da ta določa različni dokazni standard za odločbe o odobritvi koncentracije na eni strani in odločbe o prepovedi koncentracije na drugi strani.
Thus, as the Court has, in substance, already held, the prospective analysis called for in relation to the control of concentrations, which consists of an examination of how a concentration might alter the factors determining the state of competition on a given market in order to establish whether it would give rise to a significant impediment to effective competition, makes it necessary to envisage various chains of cause and effect with a view to ascertaining which of them is the most likely (see, to that effect, Case C-12/03 P Commission v Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I-987, paragraph 43).
Zato, kot je v bistvu Sodi�če že razsodilo, za prospektivno analizo, potrebno na področju nadzora koncentracij, ki obsega preučitev, kako bi lahko koncentracija spremenila dejavnike, ki določajo stanje konkurence na danem trgu, zato da se ugotovi, ali bi imela za posledico resno oviranje učinkovite konkurence, si je treba zamisliti različen niz razlogov in učinkov za ugotovitev, kateri od njih je najverjetnej�i (glej v tem smislu sodbo z dne 15. februarja 2005 v zadevi Komisija proti Tetra Laval, C-12/03 P, ZOdl., str. I-987, točka 43).
Contrary to what the appellants submit, it cannot therefore be inferred from the Regulation that there is a general presumption that a notified concentration is compatible with, or incompatible with, the common market.
V nasprotju s trditvami pritožnic iz Uredbe torej ni mogoče sklepati na splo�no domnevo združljivosti ali nezdružljivosti prigla�ene koncentracije s skupnim trgom.
That interpretation of the Regulation is not invalidated by Article 10(6), which provides that a notified concentration is to be deemed compatible with the common market where the Commission has not taken a decision on the compatibility of that concentration within the prescribed period.
Take razlage Uredbe ni mogoče ovreči z njenim členom 10(6), na podlagi katerega se razume, da je prigla�ena koncentracija združljiva s skupnim trgom, če Komisija v ustreznem roku ni sprejela odločbe o združljivosti te koncentracije.