natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
A er discussion with Member States, the Commission published on 21 October a dra notice on the rules for access to the Commission le in antitrust and merger proceedings (35) and launched a public consultation on the dra.
Komisija je po razpravi z državami članicami 21. oktobra objavila osnutek obvestila o pravilih glede dostopa do spisa Komisije v postopkih boja proti monopolom in postopkih združitev (35) ter sprožila javno posvetovanje o osnutku.
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (antitrust), Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (mergers) and the respective implementing regulations (Regulations No 773/2004 and No 802/2004) provide that access to the le must be arranged in all cases involving decisions on the basis of Articles 7, 8, 23 and 24(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and Articles 6(3), 7(3), 8(2) to (6), 14 and 15 of the merger regulation.
Uredba (ES) št. 1/2003 (protimonopolna zakonodaja), Uredba (ES) št. 139/2004 (združitve) in zadevni izvedbeni uredbi (Uredbi (ES) št. 773/2004 in (ES) št. 802/2004) določajo, da mora biti dostop do spisa zagotovljen v vseh primerih, ki zajemajo odločbe na podlagi členov 7, 8, 23 in 24(2) Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003 in členov 6(3), 7(3), 8(2) do (6), 14 in 15 Uredbe o združitvah.
The right of access to the le in antitrust and merger proceedings is distinct from the general right of access to documents under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, which is subject to di erent criteria and pursues a di erent purpose.Commission notice on the internal rules of procedure for processing requests for access to the le in cases under Articles 85 and 86 [now 81 and 82] of the EC Treaty, Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty and Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (OJ C 23, 23.1.1997).Commission practice has evolved owing to new and unprecedented situations, such as very high numbers of parties involved in proceedings, but also with a view to enhancing e ciency in the provision of access to the le through new technological means.Notably in the ‘cement cartel’ case before the Court of First Instance: judgment in Joined Cases T-25/95 etc.
Pravica dostopa do spisa v postopkih boja proti monopolom in postopkih združitev se razlikuje od splošne pravice dostopa do dokumentov po Uredbi (ES) št. 1049/2001, ki je predmet drugačnih meril in sledi drugačnemu namenu.Obvestilo Komisije o internem poslovniku za obdelavo zahtevkov po dostopu do spisa v primerih v skladu s členoma 85 in 86 [sedaj 81 in 82] Pogodbe ES, členoma 65 in 66 Pogodbe ESPJ in Uredbo Sveta (EGS) št. 4064/89 (UL C 23, 23.1.1997).Praksa Komisije se je razvijala zaradi novih stanj brez primere, kot je zelo veliko število strank, vpletenih v postopek, vendar tudi z namenom povečanja učinkovitosti pri zagotavljanju dostopa do spisa prek novih tehnoloških sredstev.Zlasti v primeru „kartela proizvajalcev cementa“ pred Sodiščem prve stopnje: sodba v združenih zadevah T-25/95 itd., Cimenteries CBR SA in drugi, Recueil 2000, str.
Cimenteries CBR and Others [2000] ECR II-491.Commission Decision of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of the Hearing O cer (OJ L 162, 19.6.2001).Draft Commission notice on the rules for access to the Commission le in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (OJ C 259, 21.10.2004).
II-491.Odločba Komisije z dne 23. maja 2001 o pristojnostih in nalogah pooblaščenca za zaslišanje (UL L 162, 19.6.2001).Osnutek obvestila Komisije o pravilih dostopa do spisa Komisije v primerih v skladu s členoma 81 in 82 Pogodbe ES in z Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 (UL C 259, 21.10.2004). Na voljo na spletni strani: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/general_info/access_to_documents.html
I — Antitrust — Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC were submitted in reply to this consultation, mostly by legal practitioners, but also by consumer and trade union associations.
I – Protimonopolna zakonodaja – členi 81, 82 in 86 ES
e key features of the dra are:
Najpomembnejše značilnosti osnutka so:
— a distinction between the right to access to the le (of addressees of an SO) and the access to certain documents provided for (for complainants in antitrust proceedings and for other involved parties in merger proceedings);
• razlikovanje med pravico dostopa do spisa (za naslovnike obvestila o nasprotovanju) in dostopa do posebnih dokumentov (za tožnike v protimonopolnih postopkih in za druge vpletene stranke v postopkih združitev);
— a de nition of what constitutes the ‘Commission le’ and a clear distinction between accessible and non-accessible documents;
• de nicija tega, kar sestavlja „spis Komisije“, ter jasno razlikovanje med dostopnimi in nedostopnimi dokumenti;
— a distinction between antitrust and merger proceedings as to the moment when access to the le is granted;
• razlikovanje med protimonopolnimi postopki in postopki združitev glede trenutka odobritve dostopa do spisa;
— a description of procedures for treatment of confidential information and for implementing access to the le, as well as of the procedure for resolution of disagreements on confidentiality claims, including the role of the Hearing O cer.
• opis postopkov za obravnavo zaupnih informacij in za izvedbo dostopa do spisa, pa tudi postopka za reševanje nesporazumov pri zahtevkih za zaupnost, vključno z vlogo pooblaščenca za zaslišanje.
B APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 81, 82 AND 86 EC
B UPORABA ČLENOV 81, 82 IN 86
On 30 April, the Commission adopted a decision imposing a ne of EUR 3.4 million on Compagnie Maritime Belge (CMB), a Belgian shipping company. e ne was imposed because of CMB’s role in the abusive behaviour committed by the liner conference Associated Central West Africa Lines (Cewal), of which CMB was a member, at the end of the 1980s (36).
Komisija je 30. aprila sprejela odločbo, da naloži denarno globo v višini 3,4 milijona EUR belgijski ladjarski družbi Compagnie Maritime Belge („CMB“). Komisija je denarno kazen naložila zaradi vloge, ki jo je družba CMB imela konec 80-ih let pri zlorabi, ki jo je povzročila linijska konferenca Associated Central West Africa Lines (Cewal), katere članica je bila (36).
A previous decision (37), whereby the Commission had already imposed nes on four Cewal members, including CMB, had been partly annulled by the Court of Justice
Prejšnjo odločbo (37), s katero je Komisija že naložila denarno kazen štirim članom linijske konference Cewal, vključno z družbo CMB, je Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti (Sodišče ES) v zvezi z določenimi globami delno razveljavilo (38).
). e ECJ considered that the Commission had made a procedural error by failing to indicate clearly in the statement of objections which preceded the decision that it intended to impose nes on the individual members of Cewal.
Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti je menilo, da je Komisija kršila določbe postopka, ker v obvestilu o nasprotovanju, ki je nastalo pred odločbo, ni jasno navedla, da namerava naložiti globe posameznim članom linijske konference Cewal.
In order not to let the infringements go unpunished (the appeal against the ndings of the infringements had been rejected by both the CFI and the ECJ), the Commission adopted a new decision imposing a ne on CMB following a fresh procedure in line with the ECJ’s ndings (39).is decision is entirely based on the substantive ndings of the original decision.
Da kršitve ne bi ostale nekaznovane (pritožbo proti ugotovitvam kršitev sta zavrnili Sodišče prve stopnje in tudi SES), je Komisija po novem postopku v skladu z ugotovitvami SES sprejela novo odločbo o naložitvi globe družbi CMB (39). Ta odločba v celoti temelji na vsebinskih ugotovitvah prvotne odločbe.
A lower ne than in the original decision was imposed, as certain aggravating circumstances prevailing at the time of that decision were no longer taken into account.
Naložena je bila nižja globa od prvotne, saj nekatere oteževalne okoliščine, ki so prevladovale v času prvotne odločbe, niso bile več upoštevane.
On 2 June, the Commission adopted a decision nding that Clearstream Banking AG and its parent company Clearstream International SA (Clearstream) infringed Article 82 EC by refusing to supply cross-border securities clearing and settlement services (41) to Euroclear Bank SA (Euroclear Bank) and by applying discriminatory prices to the detriment of this customer.
Komisija je 2. junija sprejela odločbo, ki ugotavlja, da sta družba Clearstream Banking AG in njena matična družba Clearstream International SA („Clearstream“) kršili člen 82 ES, s tem ko sta zavrnili opravljanje čezmejnih klirinških storitev in poravnave vrednostnih papirjev (41) za družbo Euroclear Bank SA („Euroclear Bank“) ter uporabljali diskriminatorne cene v škodo te stranke.
Clearstream Banking AG is Germany’s only Wertpapiersammelbank (central securities depository (42)). e Commission considered that during the reference period concerned, 1997 to the end of 2001, Clearstream held a dominant position for providing cross-border clearing and settlement services to intermediaries situated in other Member States.
Družba Clearstream Banking AG je edini centralni register vrednostnih papirjev v Nemčiji (42). Komisija je menila, da je imela med zadevnim referenčnim obdobjem, od leta 1997 do konca leta 2001, družba Clearstream prevladujoč položaj za zagotavljanje čezmejnih klirinških storitev in poravnave posrednikom v drugih državah članicah.
While competition law recognises the freedom of companies to freely choose their trading partners, companies in a dominant position have a special responsibility. In the present case, Clearstream’s behaviour qualified as refusal to supply because:
Medtem ko konkurenčno pravo priznava svobodo podjetij, da prosto izberejo svoje trgovinske partnerje, imajo podjetja s prevladujočim položajem posebno odgovornost.V tem primeru je bilo vedenje družbe Clearstream označeno kot zavračanje opravljanja storitev, ker:
Regulation (EEC) No 2988/74 concerning limitation periods in proceedings relating to transport and competition contains an interruptable limitation period of ve years and an overall limitation period of 10 years for the imposition of a ne.
Uredba (EGS) št. 2988/74 o zastaralnih rokih v postopkih, ki so povezani s prometom in konkurenco, vsebuje zastaralni rok petih let, ki ga je mogoče prekiniti, in splošni zastaralni rok desetih let za naložitev denarne kazni.
These limitation periods had not expired as they had been suspended during the court proceedings.COMP/38.096.Securities clearing and settlement are necessary steps for a securities trade to be completed.
Ti zastaralni roki niso zapadli, saj so bili med sodnim postopkom začasno ustavljeni.COMP/38.096.Kliring in poravnava vrednostnih papirjev sta nujna koraka za dokončanje trgovanja z vrednostnimi papirji.
Clearing is the process by which the contractual obligations of the buyer and the seller are established.
Kliring je postopek, s katerim se vzpostavijo pogodbene obveznosti med kupcem in prodajalcem.
Settlement is the transfer of securities from the seller to the buyer and the transfer of funds from the buyer to the seller.Central securities depositories hold securities and enable securities transactions to be processed through book entry.
Poravnava je prenos vrednostnih papirjev od prodajalca h kupcu ter prenos sredstev od kupca k prodajalcu.Centralni registri vrednostnih papirjev hranijo vrednostne papirje in omogočajo obdelavo transakcij z vrednostnimi papirji prek vknjižbe.
In its home country, the central securities depository provides processing services for trades involving those securities that it holds in nal custody.
V matični državi zagotavlja centralni register vrednostnih papirjev storitve obdelave za poklice, ki vključujejo vrednostne papirje, katerih končni skrbnik je.
It can also o er processing services as an intermediary in cross-border clearing and settlement, where the primary deposit of securities is in another country.
Prav tako lahko storitve obdelave ponuja kot posrednik v čezmejnem kliringu in poravnavi, kadar je prvotni depozitar vrednostnih papirjev v drugi državi.
The most widely internationally traded German shares (blue chip shares such as DaimlerChrysler, Siemens, Allianz, Deutsche Post, Deutsche Telekom, Deutsche Bank, Lufthansa and others) are registered shares, as opposed to bearer shares.
Nemške delnice, s katerimi se mednarodno največ trguje (prvorazredne delnice, kot so Daimler Chrysler, Siemens, Allianz, Deutsche Post, Deutsche Telekom, Deutsche Bank, Lufthansa in druge), so imenske delnice, v nasprotju s prinosniškimi delnicami.
• Clearstream Banking AG is the only nal custodian of German securities kept in collective safe custody, which is the only significant form of custody today for securities traded.
• je družba Clearstream Banking AG edini končni skrbnik nemških vrednostnih papirjev na skupnem skrbniškem računu, ki je danes edina pomembna oblika varstva za trgovane vrednostne papirje.
New entry into this activity is unrealistic for the foreseeable future. erefore, Clearstream Banking AG can be regarded as an unavoidable trading partner;
Nov vstop v to dejavnost v napovedljivi prihodnosti ni stvaren. Zato je mogoče družbo Clearstream Banking AG označiti kot neizogibnega trgovinskega partnerja;
• Euroclear Bank could not duplicate the services that it was requesting; and
• družba Euroclear Bank ni mogla podvajati storitev, ki jih je zahtevala; in
• Clearstream’s behaviour had the e ect of impairing Euroclear Bank’s ability to provide e cient cross-border clearing and settlement services to clients in the single market.
• je vedenje družbe Clearstream oviralo zmožnost družbe Euroclear Bank, da zagotovi učinkovite čezmejne klirinške storitve in poravnave strankam na enotnem trgu.
Euroclear Bank obtained the services it was seeking in November 2001, more than two years a er it requested them.
Družba Euroclear Bank je storitve, ki jih je zahtevala, prejela novembra 2001, kar je več kot dve leti po zahtevi.
During the entire period Clearstream Banking AG denied Euroclear Bank clearing and settlement services for registered shares. e dilatory behaviour of Clearstream vis-à-vis Euroclear Bank contrasts with the usual period of not more than four months within which other comparable customers were supplied with clearing and settlement services.
Med celotnim obdobjem je družba Clearstream Banking AG zavračala opravljanje klirinških storitev in poravnave za družbo Euroclear Bank za imenske delnice. Zavlačevanje družbe Clearstream pri storitvah za družbo Euroclear Bank je v nasprotju z običajnim obdobjem največ štirih mesecev, v katerem so bile za druge primerljive stranke opravljene klirinške storitve in poravnave.
As regards price discrimination, the Commission found that, between January 1997 and January 2002, Clearstream charged, for equivalent services, a higher per transaction price to Euroclear Bank than to other securities depositories outside Germany. e Commission examined in detail the content of the services and the costs of providing them in order to establish whether the price di erence could be justified, and concluded that this was not the case.
Kar zadeva cenovno diskriminacijo, je Komisija ugotovila, da je med januarjem 1997 in januarjem 2002 družba Clearstream za enakovredne storitve družbi Euroclear Bank zaračunala višjo ceno na transakcijo kot drugim depozitarjem vrednostnih papirjev zunaj Nemčije. Komisija je podrobno preučila vsebino storitev in stroške njihovega opravljanja, da bi tako določila, ali je razlika v ceni upravičena, ter sklenila, da ni tako.
Among other things, the Commission took into account the fact that there is no Community caselaw or jurisprudence dealing with the competition analysis of clearing and settlement.
Med drugim je Komisija upoštevala dejstvo, da ni sodne prakse Skupnosti, ki bi se ukvarjala z analizo konkurence kliringa in poravnave.
In addition, there is a wide-ranging debate on clearing and settlement within di erent institutions and fora in order to better de ne the role of the di erent protagonists in the industry.
Poleg tega obstaja obsežna razprava o kliringu in poravnavi v različnih institucijah in forumih, da bi tako bolje opredelili vlogo različnih protagonistov v panogi.
On 24 March, the Commission adopted a prohibition decision with nes against Micro so Corporation (Microso ) in pursuance of Article 82 EC (44). is decision concluded that Microso had abused its dominant position in the PC operating system market (45
Komisija je 24. marca v skladu s členom 82 ES proti družbi Microso(„Microso “) sprejela odločbo o prepovedi, ki predvideva naložitev globe (44). Ta odločba ugotavlja, da je družba Microso zlorabila svoj prevladujoči položaj na trgu
) in two ways.
) na dva načina.
(1) Refusal to supply interoperability information
(1) Zavrnitev dajanja podatkov za interoperabilnost
Microsowithheld from competitors in the work group server operating system market information necessary for their products to fully interoperate with Microso ’s dominant PC operating system, Windows.
Družba Microsoje tekmecem na trgu operacijskega sistema za skupinske strežnike prikrivala informacije, potrebne, da bi bili lahko njihovi izdelki v celoti interoperabilni s prevladujočim operacijskim sistemom družbe Microsoza osebne računalnike (Windows).
While Microso had previously
Medtem ko je družba Microsov preteklosti, ko je vstopila
Case COMP/37.792 available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/ 37792/en.pdf Microsoft held around 95 % of this market.
Zadeva COMP/37.792 je na voljo na spletni strani: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf Družba Microsoft je pokrivala okoli 95 % tega trga.
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1 disclosed this type of interoperability information when it entered the work group server operating system market, it then adopted a policy of refusing to make such disclosure to its competitors, thereby disrupting previous levels of supply.
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2004 – Zvezek 1 na trg operacijskega sistema za skupinske strežnike, razkrivala te vrste informacij o interoperabilnosti, je potem sprejela politiko zavrnitve takšnega razkrivanja svojim tekmecem in tako ovirala prejšnjo raven ponudbe.
In 1998, Microso turned down a formal request by Sun Microsystems for such interoperability information.
Leta 1998 je družba Microsozavrnila formalno zahtevo družbe Sun, ki je zahtevala informacije o interoperabilnosti.
On the basis of an extensive market inquiry, the Commission concluded that the information in question was indispensable to compete in the work group server operating system market and that, by withholding it, Microso had been able to establish a dominant position, and risked eliminating all remaining competition in that market. e Commission further concluded that Microso ’s refusal to supply limited technical development, worked to the detriment of consumers: if competitors had access to the information withheld, they would be able to provide consumers with new and enhanced products without copying Microso ’s own o ering.
Na podlagi obsežne tržne raziskave je Komisija odločila, da so bile zadevne informacije neizogibne za konkuriranje na trgu operacijskega sistema za skupinske strežnike ter da je družba Microso s prikrivanjem teh informacij pridobila prevladujoč položaj in bi lahko celo izključila vso ostalo konkurenco na tem trgu. Komisija je nadalje odločila, da je zavrnitev dajanja informacij s strani družbe Microso omejevala tehnični razvoj v škodo potrošnikov: če bi imeli tekmeci dostop do prikritih informacij, bi lahko potrošnikom zagotovili nove in boljše proizvode, ne da bi pri tem posnemali ponudbo družbe Microso.
In order to put an end to the infringement, the Commission required Microsoto take the following main remedial actions:
Da bi Komisija ustavila kršitev, je od družbe Microsozahtevala sprejetje naslednjih glavnih ukrepov:
— to disclose the relevant interoperability information and allow its use for the development of compatible work group server operating systems products (‘the interoperability remedy’);
• da razkrije ustrezne podatke za interoperabilnost in omogoči njihovo uporabo za razvoj kompatibilnih proizvodov operacijskega sistema za skupinske strežnike („ukrep interoperabilnosti“);
— to make available a version of the Windows PC operating system which does not include Windows Media Player (‘the untying remedy’).
• da zagotovi različico operacijskega sistema za osebne računalnike Windows, ki ne vsebuje predvajalnika Windows Media Player („ukrep nevezanosti“).
— in addition, Microso had to submit a proposal for the establishment of a monitoring mechanism in the form of a monitoring trustee.
• poleg tega mora družba Microso predložiti predlog za vzpostavitev mehanizma spremljanja v obliki skrbnika spremljanja.
Micrososubmitted such a proposal.
Družba Microso je ta predlog sprejela.
This ne amounted to 1.62 % of Microsoft’s worldwide turnover in the last available business year.
Ta denarna kazen je znašala 1,62 % svetovnega prometa družbe Microsoft v zadnjemrazpoložljivem poslovnem letu.
Microso submitted an application for annulment of the decision before the Court of First Instance (CFI) (47), as well as an application for interim measures seeking the suspension of the interoperability remedy and the untying remedy pending the outcome of its application for annulment (48
Družba Microsoje pred Sodiščem prve stopnje vložila zahtevo za razveljavitev odločbe (47) in tudi zahtevo po začasnih ukrepih za zadržanje protiukrepov interoperabilnosti in nevezanosti med čakanjem na rezultat na svojo zahtevo po
Microso ’s application for interim measures (49).
Komisija se je odločila, da ne bo izvrševala teh ukrepov pred odredbo razveljavitvi ( predsednika Sodišča prve stopnje v zvezi z zahtevo družbe Microsopo začasnih ukrepih (49).
On 22 December, the President dismissed Microso ’s application for interim measure in its entirety (50).
Predsednik je 22. decembra v celoti zavrnil zahtevo družbe Microso po začasnih ukrepih (50).
BOX 2: APPLICATION OF EU COMPETITION RULES TO MOBILE AND BROADBAND INTERNET SERVICES
OKVIR 2: UPORABA PRAVIL KONKURENCE EU ZA MOBILNE IN ŠIROKOPASOVNE MEDMREŽNE STORITVE
In 2004, competition in the electronic communications sector intensified and growth was strong in some market segments (1
Leta 2004 se je konkurenca v elektronskih komunikacijah zaostrila in na nekaterih
States, the sector’s two key drivers of growth were xed broadband services and mobile services.
V razširjeni EU s 25 državami članicami sta bila dva ključna dejavnika rasti tega področja ksne širokopasovne storitve in mobilne storitve.
In the context of broadband Internet access services, the Commission’s action regarding a presumed margin squeeze led Deutsche Telekom — the incumbent operator of xed lines in Germany — to reduce its line sharing fees (2) significantly.
V okviru storitev širokopasovnega dostopa do medmrežja je dejavnost Komisije glede domnevnega stroškovnega pritiska na marže (margin squeeze) privedla do tega, da je družba Deutsche Telekom – prvotni operater ksnih linij v Nemčiji – precej znižala svoje pristojbine za delitev linij (2).
In the light of these reductions, the Commission was in a position to close its investigation into the alleged abuse of Deutsche Telekom’s dominant position on the market for the provision of broadband access to its xed telecommunications network. e Commission accepted Deutsche Telekom’s commitments to bring the margin squeeze to an end on a lasting basis from 1 April 2004 (3).
Z vidika teh tarifnih znižanj je Komisija lahko zaključila svojo preiskavo o domnevni zlorabi prevladujočega položaja družbe Deutsche Telekom na trgu širokopasovnega dostopa do njenega ksnega telekomunikacijskega omrežja.
As regards mobile communications, the Commission issued two statements of objections on 26 July concerning international roaming in the United Kingdom.
Komisija je sprejela zavezo družbe Deutsche Telekom, da bo od 1. aprila 2004 na trajni podlagi odpravila cenovni pritisk na marže. (3)
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1 e objections relate to the rates that O and Vodafone charged other mobile
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2004 – Zvezek 1
2 network operators for international roaming at wholesale level.
Ugovori se nanašajo na stopnje, ki sta jih družbi O2 in Vodafone zaračunali drugim mobilnim operaterjem za roaming v ponudbi na veliko.