natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In those circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the content of those documents was disclosed in good time and in a manner which was sufficiently precise and clear to allow the appellants, if necessary, to reply effectively to the inferences which Impala drew from those documents before the Commission.
V teh okoli�činah ni mogoče trditi, da je bila vsebina teh dokumentov opisana pravočasno in s potrebno natančnostjo in doslednostjo, da bi pritožnici lahko, po potrebi, koristno odgovorili na predloge, ki jih je pred Komisijo podala Impala na podlagi navedenih dokumentov.
By virtue of Article 18(3) of the Regulation, the Commission may base its decisions taken under the Regulation only on objections on which the parties have been able to submit their observations.
Komisija lahko v skladu s členom 18(3) Uredbe svoje odločbe, sprejete na podlagi navedene uredbe, utemelji le na pomislekih, o katerih so lahko stranke predstavile svoja stali�ča.
It follows that, since the appellants were unable to acquaint themselves in sufficient time with the tenor of the confidential documents in question, the Commission could not rely on those documents for the purposes of the contested decision.
Iz tega izhaja, da Komisija sporne odločbe ne bi smela utemeljiti z zadevnimi zaupnimi dokumenti, ker pritožnici nista mogli biti pravočasno seznanjeni z vsebino teh dokumentov.
The Court of First Instance therefore committed an error of law in relying, as a basis for the annulment of the contested decision, on documents submitted by Impala on a confidential basis, since the Commission itself could not have used them for the purposes of adopting that decision by reason of their confidential nature.
Zato je Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno uporabilo pravo, ker je razglasitev ničnosti sporne odločbe utemeljilo z dokumenti, ki jih je Impala predložila kot zaupne, in jih niti Komisija sama zaradi njihove zaupnosti ni mogla uporabiti za sprejetje navedene odločbe.
Without it being necessary to adjudicate on the question whether the taking into account of those documents could have had an impact on the outcome of the examination by the Court of First Instance of the arguments relating to manifest errors of assessment on the Commission’s part, it need only be stated that the error of law identified in the seventh ground of appeal is not, in any event, capable of invalidating the finding of the Court of First Instance in paragraph 325 of the judgment under appeal that, in substance, the contested decision should be annulled on the ground of its inadequate reasoning.
Ne da bi bilo treba odločiti o vpra�anju, ali bi upo�tevanje navedenih dokumentov lahko vplivalo na rezultat preizkusa Sodi�ča prve stopnje glede trditev v zvezi z očitnimi napakami pri presoji, ki jih je storila Komisija, zadostuje poudariti, da napačna uporaba prava, opredeljena v okviru sedmega pritožbenega razloga, v nobenem primeru ne more ovreči ugotovitve Sodi�ča prve stopnje iz točke 325 izpodbijane sodbe, da je treba v bistvu sporno odločbo razglasiti za nično zaradi nezadostne obrazložitve.
Further grounds of appeal thus fall to be examined.
Zato je treba obravnavati preostale pritožbene razloge.
The fifth ground of appeal, alleging an error of law in that the Court of First Instance misconstrued the relevant legal criteria applying to the creation or strengthening of a collective dominant position
Peti pritožbeni razlog: napačna uporaba prava, ker Sodi�če prve stopnje ni upo�tevalo ustreznih pravnih meril, ki se uporabljajo na področju nastanka ali krepitve kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja
In paragraphs 250 to 254 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance made the following observations as regards the concept of a collective dominant position:
Sodi�če prve stopnje je v točkah od 250 do 254 oblikovalo taka stali�ča glede pojma kolektivni prevladujoči položaj:
… The determination of the existence of a collective dominant position must be supported by a series of elements of established facts, past or present, which show that there is a significant impediment of competition on the market owing to the power acquired by certain undertakings to adopt together the same course of conduct on that market, to a significant extent, independently of their competitors, their customers and consumers.
[…] Določitev obstoja kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja mora biti utemeljena z več ugotovljenimi dejanskimi elementi, preteklimi ali sedanjimi, ki potrjujejo bistveno oviro za konkurenco na trgu, zato ker lahko določena podjetja usklajeno ravnajo na trgu, in to v kar naj�ir�em smislu, neodvisno od svojih konkurentov, kupcev in potro�nikov.
It follows that, in the context of the assessment of the existence of a collective dominant position, although the three conditions defined by the Court of First Instance in [Case T-342/99] Airtours v Commission [[2002] ECR II-2585], which were inferred from a theoretical analysis of the concept of a collective dominant position, are indeed also necessary, they may, however, in the appropriate circumstances, be established indirectly on the basis of what may be a very mixed series of indicia and items of evidence relating to the signs, manifestations and phenomena inherent in the presence of a collective dominant position.
Iz tega izhaja, da so v okviru presoje obstoja kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja trije pogoji, ki jih je opredelilo Sodi�če prve stopnje v sodbi [z dne 6. junija 2002] v zadevi Airtours proti Komisiji, [T-342/99, Recueil, str. II-2585] na podlagi teoretične analize pojma kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja, čeprav so seveda prav tako potrebni, vendarle lahko, odvisno od primera, ugotovljeni posredno na podlagi vseh pokazateljev in dokazov, morda celo zelo različnih, glede znakov, izrazov in pojavov, značilnih pri kolektivnem prevladujočem položaju.
Thus, in particular, close alignment of prices over a long period, especially if they are above a competitive level, together with other factors typical of a collective dominant position, might, in the absence of an alternative reasonable explanation, suffice to demonstrate the existence of a collective dom -inant position, even where there is no firm direct evidence of strong market transparency, as such transparency may be presumed in such circumstances.
Zato lahko dolgotrajnej�e usklajevanje cen, zlasti če so na nadkonkurenčni ravni, skupaj z drugimi običajnimi dejavniki kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja ob neobstoju druge utemeljene razlage zadostuje za dokaz obstoja kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja, tudi kadar ni prepričljivih neposrednih dokazov o veliki preglednosti trga, pri čemer se ta v takih okoli�činah lahko domneva.
It follows that, in the present case, the alignment of prices, both gross and net, over the last six years, even though the products are not the same (each disc having a different content), and also the fact that they were maintained at such a stable level, and at a level seen as high in spite of a significant fall in demand, together with other factors (power of the undertakings in an oligopoly situation, stability of market shares, etc.), as established by the Commission in the [contested decision], might, in the absence of an alternative explanation, suggest, or constitute an indication, that the alignment of prices is not the result of the normal play of effective competition and that the market is sufficiently transparent in that it allowed tacit price coordination.
Iz tega izhaja, da v obravnavani zadevi usklajevanje cen – bruto in neto – v zadnjih �estih letih, čeprav proizvodi niso enaki (vsak fonogram ima različno vsebino) in njihova ohranitev na dovolj stalni ravni in ravni, ki se zdi visoka kljub velikemu zmanj�anju povpra�evanja, skupaj z drugimi dejavniki (moč podjetij v položaju oligopola, stalnost tržnih deležev itd.), kot jih je ugotovila Komisija v [sporni] odločbi, lahko, če ni mogoče najti druge razlage, kaže na to, da usklajevanje cen ni rezultat običajne učinkovite konkurence in da je trg dovolj pregleden, ker je omogočil tiho usklajevanje cen.
However, as [Impala] has based its line of argument on an incorrect application of the various conditions that must be satisfied in order for there to be a collective dominant position, as defined in Airtours v Commission … and, in particular, the condition relating to market transparency, rather than on the theory that a finding of a common policy over a long period, together with the presence of a series of other factors characteristic of a collective dominant position, might, in certain circumstances and in the absence of an alternative explanation, suffice to demonstrate the existence of a dom -inant position, as opposed to the creation of such a position, without its being necessary positively to establish market transparency, the Court will confine itself, in its examination of the pleas in law put forward, to ascertaining that the [contested decision] properly applied the conditions defined in Airtours v Commission.
Ker je [Impala] svoje trditve utemeljila z napačno uporabo različnih pogojev, potrebnih za obstoj kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja, in opredeljenih v [zgoraj navedeni] sodbi Airtours proti Komisiji, in �e posebej tistega v zvezi s preglednostjo trga, in ne s tezo, da bi lahko ugotovitev skupne politike v dalj�em obdobju, skupaj z več drugimi značilnimi dejavniki kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja, v določenih okoli�činah in če ne bi bilo mogoče najti druge razlage, zadostovala za dokaz obstoja takega položaja, v nasprotju z njegovim nastankom, in ne da bi bilo treba ugotoviti, da je trg pregleden, se bo Sodi�če prve stopnje v okviru preizkusa navajanih tožbenih razlogov omejilo na preizkus, ali so bili v [sporni] odločbi pravilno uporabljeni pogoji, ki izhajajo iz sodne prakse v zadevi Airtours proti Komisiji.
Without its even being necessary to consider whether the opposite approach would lead the Court to step outside the framework of the dispute as defined by the parties, or whether it would merely constitute an application of the law in the context of a plea raised by [Impala], the Court must follow the approach thus outlined, in view of the inter partes principle, since that issue has not been discussed before the Court.’
Ne da bi se bilo treba vpra�ati, ali bi zaradi nasprotnega pristopa Sodi�če prve stopnje prekoračilo okvir spora, kot so ga opredelile stranke, oziroma ali bi to pomenilo le uporabo prava v okviru tožbenega predloga [Impale], je treba na podlagi načela kontradiktornosti slediti temu pristopu, ker to vpra�anje ni bilo obravnavano pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje“.
Paragraph 309 of the judgment under appeal reads as follows:
Iz točke 309 izpodbijane sodbe izhaja:
‘Furthermore, it follows from the last sentence of recital 77 to the [contested decision] that discounts are not capable of really affecting the transparency of the market as regards prices resulting from, in particular, public list prices, since it is stated that “[i]f a significant deviation from pricing policies was being implemented by the majors through the grant of discounts, this deviation would have been reflected in their average net prices”.’
„Poleg tega iz zadnjega stavka uvodne izjave [sporne] odločbe izhaja, da popusti niso taki, da bi dejansko vplivali na preglednost trga glede cen, ki izhaja zlasti iz javnih katalo�kih cen, ker je ugotovljeno, da ‚če bi se velike diskografske hi�e močno oddaljile od dogovorjene politike glede cen, s tem da bi odobrile popuste, bi se to pokazalo pri njihovih povprečnih neto cenah‘.“
As regards the question of the impact of variations in discounts on the transparency of the market, the Court of First Instance stated in particular in paragraph 420 of the judgment under appeal, that ‘as [Impala] observed, the differences in the ranges of discounts over time could be the result of differences in performance and do not preclude the discounts being based on a known set of rules’.
Glede vpliva nihanja popustov na preglednost trga je Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 420 izpodbijane sodbe zlasti navedlo, da „[kot] je opozorila [Impala], so razlike v obsegu popustov v različnih obdobjih lahko rezultat razlik uspeha in ne izključujejo tega, da popusti temeljijo na celoti znanih pravil“.
In paragraph 427 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance stated that certain evidence on which the Commission relied ‘do[es] not preclude the possibility that [variations of discount by customer] may, at least for an industry professional, be explained quite readily on the basis of a number of general or specific rules governing the grant of discounts’.
Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 427 izpodbijane sodbe navaja, da nekateri dokazi, na katere se opira Komisija, „ne izključujejo, da si lahko [nihanja popustov za kupca] strokovnjak v sektorju razloži enostavno na podlagi določenih splo�nih posebnih pravil, ki urejajo odobritev popustov“.
Paragraph 428 of the judgment under appeal reads as follows:
V točki 428 izpodbijane sodbe je določeno:
‘Although, as the Commission emphasised, [Impala] admittedly did not explain precisely what those various rules governing the grant of campaign discounts are, or, according to the Commission, referred to too high a number of such rules, which would render their application complex and therefore not particularly transparent, the fact remains that, as already stated, the Commission did not carry out an investigation in the market in that regard or, at least, did not adduce any evidence of the opacity of campaign discounts, apart from the tables drawn up by the parties to the concentration, which, in addition to their imperfections, were in any event intended solely to establish the existence of certain variations in campaign discounts but do not demonstrate that the explanation for those variations might not be more or less readily apparent to an industry professional. …’
„Čeprav, kot je poudarila Komisija, [Impala] res ni natančno navedla, katera naj bi bila ta različna pravila, ki urejajo odobritev reklamnih popustov ali, kot meni Komisija, jih je navedla preveč, kar pomeni, da jih ni mogoče uporabiti enostavno in pregledno, �e vedno ostaja dejstvo, da, kot je že bilo ugotovljeno, Komisija v zvezi s tem ni izvedla preiskave na trgu ali vsaj ni predložila nobenega dokaza o nepreglednosti reklamnih popustov, razen seznamov strank koncentracije, ki so poleg njihovih pomanjkljivosti namenjeni le za ugotavljanje obstoja določenih nihanj navedenih popustov in ne dokazujejo, da si teh nihanj strokovnjak sektorja ne bi mogel bolj ali manj enostavneje pojasniti […]“
In paragraph 429 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance stated that, ‘although the combination of variables necessarily has the effect of increasing the hypothetical situations, the Commission has not demonstrated that the exercise would be rendered excessively difficult for a market professional’.
Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 429 izpodbijane sodbe navaja, da „[č]eprav kombinacija spremenljivk nujno poveča �tevilo hipotetičnih primerov, Komisija vendarle ni dokazala, da bi bilo izvr�evanje močno oteženo za strokovnjaka na trgu“.
The appellants maintain that, in holding that the Commission had committed manifest errors of assessment and had inadequately reasoned the contested decision as regards market transparency, the Court of First Instance misconstrued the position under Community law as regards the concept of a collective dominant position.
Pritožnici navajata, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje s tem, da je ugotovilo, da je Komisija storila očitne napake pri presoji in nezadostno obrazložila sporno odločbo glede preglednosti trga, kr�ilo pravo Skupnosti glede pojma kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja.
According to the appellants, the test of market transparency as an indication of a
Pritožnici menita, da je merilo v zvezi s preglednostjo trga kot pokazatelj
BERTELSMANN AND SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA v IMPALA collective dominant position, as laid down by the Court of First Instance in its judgment in Airtours v Commission, and which the Court of First Instance purported to follow in the judgment under appeal, required the Commission to establish, first, that the majors had a plausible mechanism for monitoring each other’s net wholesale prices and, secondly, given that the contested decision was essentially based on the existence of tacit collusion, that the majors had actually applied such a monitoring mechanism.
BERTELSMANN IN SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA PROTI IMPALI kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja na trgu, kot ga je določilo Sodi�če prve stopnje v zgoraj navedeni sodbi Airtours proti Komisiji in za katerega je Sodi�če prve stopnje trdilo, da ga bo uporabilo v izpodbijani sodbi, nalagalo Komisiji, naj dokaže, prvič, da so imeli veliki prepričljiv mehanizem spremljanja svojih neto grosističnih cen in, drugič, da so veliki, ker se je sporna odločba v glavnem nana�ala na vpra�anje obstoja tajnega dogovarjanja, dejansko uporabljali tak mehanizem spremljanja.
According to the appellants, the Court of First Instance in practice applied a watereddown test for establishing market transparency, as is apparent in particular from paragraph 251 of the judgment under appeal, in that it inferred that transparency from a number of factors which, as a matter of law, are not sufficient to establish the required degree of transparency.
Pritožnici menita, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje za ugotovitev preglednosti trga uporabilo manj strogo merilo, kot izhaja zlasti iz točke 251 izpodbijane sodbe, ker je na to preglednost sklepalo iz določenih dejavnikov, ki v pravu ne zadostujejo za ugotovitev zahtevane stopnje preglednosti.
In particular, by ignoring the relevance of discounts in assessing transparency at the level of net wholesale prices, the Court of First Instance committed an error of law in failing to identify a method by which significant changes to the net wholesale prices of the other majors could be observed in a sufficiently precise and timely manner to identify deviation from any tacitly agreed price levels with precision and in good time.
Sodi�če prve stopnje naj bi s tem, da je prezrlo upo�tevnost popustov za presojo preglednosti na ravni grosističnih neto cen, napačno uporabilo pravo in ni opredelilo metode, ki bi omogočala dovolj natančno in ustrezno nadzorovati velike spremembe grosističnih neto cen drugih velikih za natančno in časovno opredelitev vsakega odklona na ravni tiho dogovorjenih cen.
According to the appellants, a hypothesis of pre-existing tacit collusion would imply that the appellants and the other majors had actually monitored their net wholesale prices and had sufficiently precise and timely information regarding the changes in each other’s net wholesale prices.
Pritožnici menita, da predhodno tiho dogovarjanje pomeni, da so pritožnici in drugi veliki dejansko nadzorovali svoje grosistične neto cene in imeli dovolj natančne in primerne podatke o spremembah grosističnih neto cen drug drugega.
Neither the Court of First Instance, nor Impala, nor the Commission could identify a mechanism by which the majors could actually monitor net wholesale prices or prove that such a mechanism had been used.
Vendar naj niti Sodi�če prve stopnje, niti Impala, niti Komisija ne bi mogli ugotoviti mehanizma spremljanja grosističnih neto cen s strani velikih oziroma dokazati, da je bil tak mehanizem uporabljen.
Instead, according to the appellants, the Court of First Instance applied an incorrect test in assessing the degree of transparency required for a finding of collective dominance on the recorded music market in question.
Nasprotno, pritožnici menita, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje uporabilo napačno merilo pri presoji stopnje preglednosti, ki se zahteva za ugotovitev kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja na zadevnih trgih posnete glasbe.
It considered elements that are irrelevant to the criterion relating to market transparency, while disregarding
Upo�tevalo naj bi namreč elemente, ki niso upo�tevni za merilo v zvezi s preglednostjo trga, in ni upo�tevalo drugih
2008 — CASE C-413/06 P elements that are clearly pertinent to that issue.
2008 – ZADEVA C-413/06 P elementov, ki so očitno upo�tevni glede tega.
In that last respect, the appellants submit that the Court of First Instance committed errors of law by, in particular:
Nazadnje, pritožnici menita, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno uporabilo pravo, med drugim zato ker:
— inferring, in paragraph 309 of the judgment under appeal, transparency of discounts from their impact on average net prices;
– je v točki 309 izpodbijane sodbe na preglednost popustov sklepalo iz njihovega vpliva na povprečne neto cene;
— dismissing, in paragraph 429 of the judgment under appeal, the relevance of complex pricing structures when assessing transparency; and
– je v točki 429 izpodbijane sodbe pri presoji preglednosti prezrlo upo�tevnost zapletenih struktur cen in
— dismissing, in paragraphs 298, 306, 310 and 395 of the judgment under appeal, the relevance of price variations for assessing transparency.
– je v točkah 298, 306, 310 in 395 izpodbijane sodbe prezrlo upo�tevnost spreminjanja cen za presojo preglednosti.
Impala suggests first of all that the fifth ground of appeal represents an attempt by the appellants to reopen the factual assessments made by the Court of First Instance, rather than alleging errors of law.
Impala najprej navaja, da je peti pritožbeni razlog poskus pritožnic, da bi izpodbijali presojo Sodi�ča prve stopnje o dejanskem stanju, ne da bi zatrjevali napačno uporabo prava.
In the alternative, Impala submits that the Court of First Instance applied the correct test for establishing market transparency in the judgment under appeal, namely the test laid down in paragraph 62 of that court’s judgment in Airtours v Commission.
Drugič, Impala meni, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje v izpodbijani sodbi uporabilo pravilno merilo za ugotavljanje preglednosti trga, in sicer merilo, navedeno v točki 62 zgoraj navedene sodbe Sodi�ča prve stopnje Airtours proti Komisiji.
In that regard, Impala contends in particular that the only factor that the Commission had found to be ‘less’ transparent was that of campaign discounts.
Impala v zvezi s tem navaja zlasti, da so bili edini element, za katerega je Komisija ugotovila, da je bil „manj“ pregleden, reklamni popusti.
However, the Court of First Instance found that the underlying evidence on which the Commission based its finding did not support that finding, despite the Court of First Instance having undertaken an exhaustive examination of that evidence.
Vendar naj bi Sodi�če prve stopnje ugotovilo, da odločilni dokazi, s katerimi je Komisija utemeljila svojo ugotovitev, te ugotovitve kljub izčrpni obravnavi teh dokazov ne potrjujejo.
The true position is that the fifth ground of appeal does not concern the legal test for market transparency, but rather the assessment by the Court of First Instance of the factual elements that may establish that transparency.
Dejansko naj bi se peti pritožbeni razlog nana�al na presojo Sodi�ča prve stopnje o dejanskih elementih, ki potrjujejo to preglednost, in ne na pravno merilo preglednosti trga.
According to Impala, the judgment under appeal does not misapply the test laid down in paragraph 62 of the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Airtours v Commission, since that court neither applied a watereddown test nor did it fail to consider transparency at the required level.
Impala meni, da v izpodbijani sodbi ni bilo napačno uporabljeno merilo, določeno v točki 62 zgoraj navedene sodbe Sodi�ča prve stopnje Airtours proti Komisiji, ker Sodi�če prve stopnje ni niti uporabilo manj strogega merila niti ni opustilo obravnavanja preglednosti na zahtevani ravni.
Impala also challenges the arguments summarised in paragraph 113 of this judgment.
Impala poleg tega prereka trditve, povzete v točki 113 te sodbe.