natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
GSK AEVE is the Greek subsidiary of GlaxoSmithKline plc, a pharmaceuticals research and manufacturing company established in the United Kingdom (‘GSK plc’).
GSK AEVE je gr�ka podružnica GlaxoSmithKline plc, družbe za raziskavo in izdelavo farmacevtskih proizvodov s sedežem v Združenem kraljestvu (v nadaljevanju: GSK plc).
GSK AEVE imports, warehouses and distributes pharmaceutical products of the GSK group (‘GSK’) in Greece.
GSK AEVE se ukvarja z uvozom, skladi�čenjem in distribucijo farmacevtskih proizvodov, ki jih zagotavlja skupina GSK (v nadaljevanju: GSK) v Grčiji.
As such, it holds the marketing authorisation in Greece inter alia for the medicinal products Imigran, Lamictal and Serevent for the treatment, respectively, of migraines, epilepsy and asthma (‘the medicinal products in dispute’), which are available in Greece only on prescription.
Tako je na ozemlju Helenske republike imetnik dovoljenja za promet, med drugim proizvodov imigran, lamictal in serevent, ki so zdravila, namenjena zdravljenju migrene, epilepsije in astme (v nadaljevanju: zadevna zdravila), in za katerih izdajo se v Grčiji zahteva zdravni�ki recept.
Each of the appellants in the main proceedings had for a number of years bought those medicinal products in all their forms from GSK AEVE, in order to distribute them both on the Greek market and in other Member States.
Vse tožeče stranke v postopku v glavni stvari so več let od GSK AEVE kupovale navedena zdravila v vseh oblikah za distribucijo na gr�kem trgu in v drugih državah članicah.
Towards the end of October 2000, GSK AEVE altered its system of distribution on the Greek market, citing a shortage, for which it denied responsibility, of those medicines.
GSK AEVE je proti koncu oktobra 2000 spremenila svoj distribucijski sistem na gr�kem trgu, pri čemer se je sklicevala na pomanjkanje navedenih zdravil na njem, za katerega naj ne bi bila odgovorna.
From 6 November 2000 it stopped meeting the orders of the appellants in the main proceedings for the medicinal products in dispute and began itself to distribute those products to Greek hospitals and pharmacies through the company Farmacenter AE (‘Farmacenter’).
Od 6. novembra 2000 je prenehala izpolnjevati naročila tožečih strank v postopku v glavni stvari za zadevna zdravila in je sama začela prodajati ta zdravila v gr�kih bolni�nicah in lekarnah prek družbe Farmacenter AE (v nadaljevanju: Farmacenter).
In December 2000 GSK AEVE applied to the Epitropi Antagonismou (Competition Commission) for negative clearance in the form of a declaration that its new policy of selling the medicines directly to Greek hospitals and pharmacies did not infringe Article 2 of Law 703/1977.
GSK AEVE je decembra 2000 zaprosila Epitropi Antagonismou (komisija za konkurenco) za negativni izvid, v skladu s katerim njena nova politika neposredne prodaje zdravil gr�kim bolni�nicam in lekarnam ne bi kr�ila člena 2 zakona 703/1977.
In February 2001, taking the view that the supply of medicines on the Greek market had to some extent normalised and that stocks at hospitals and pharmacies had been
GSK AEVE je februarja 2001, ko je ocenila, da se je oskrba zdravil na gr�kem trgu v določeni meri normalizirala in da so bile ponovno vzpostavljene zaloge v bolni�nicah
2008 — JOINED CASES C-468/06 TO C-478/06 reconstituted, GSK AEVE started once more to supply the appellants in the main proceedings and other wholesalers with limited quantities of the medicinal products in dispute and shortly afterwards brought its cooperation with Farmacenter to an end.
2008 – ZADEVE OD C-468/06 DO C-478/06 in lekarnah, ponovno začela oskrbovati tožeče stranke v postopku v glavni stvari in druge trgovce na debelo z omejenimi količinami zadevnih zdravil in malo po tem prenehala sodelovati z družbo Farmacenter.
GSK AEVE then withdrew its application for negative clearance but in the course of February 2001 filed a new application for negative clearance in respect of its sales policy, which in turn was replaced in December 2001 by another such application.
Nato je GSK AEVE umaknila svojo pro�njo za negativni izvid, vendar je februarja 2001 vložila novo pro�njo za negativni izvid glede svoje prodajne politike, ki pa je bila meseca decembra 2001 nadome�čena z drugo, podobno pro�njo. Po razpravah z Epitropi Antagonismou je GSK AEVE pristala na to, da dobavi količine zdravil, ki ustrezajo nacionalni porabi, povečani za 18 %.
Meanwhile, the appellants in the main proceedings and other pharmaceuticals wholesalers, as well as some Greek associations of pharmacists and wholesalers, applied to the Epitropi Antagonismou for a declaration that the sales policy of GSK AEVE and GSK plc in respect of the medicinal products in dispute constituted an abuse of a dominant position under Article 2 of Law 703/1977 and Article 82 EC.
Medtem so tožeče stranke v postopku v glavni stvari in drugi trgovci na debelo z zdravili ter nekatera gr�ka združenja lekarnarjev in trgovcev na debelo zahtevali, naj Epitropi Antagonismou ugotovi, da je prodajna politika zadevnih zdravil GSK AEVE in GSK plc pomenila zlorabo prevladujočega položaja v smislu člena 2 zakona 703/1977 in člena 82 ES.
On 3 August 2001, a decision of the Epitropi Antagonismou ordering interim measures required GSK AEVE to meet the orders of the appellants in the main proceedings for the medicinal products in dispute pending adoption of a final decision in the case.
Epitropi Antagonismou je 3. avgusta 2001 z odločbo o začasnih ukrepih naložila GSK AEVE, naj do sprejetja končne odločbe v tej zadevi izpolnjuje naročila zadevnih zdravil, ki jih nanjo naslavljajo tožeče stranke v postopku v glavni stvari.
GSK AEVE lodged applications with the Diikitiko Efetio Athinon (Administrative Appeal Court, Athens) for a stay of execution and an annulment of that decision, which that court rejected.
GSK AEVE je pri Dioikitiko Efeteio Athinon (upravno pritožbeno sodi�če v Atenah) vložila zahtevo za ustavitev izvr�be in razglasitev ničnosti te odločbe, ki jo je to sodi�če zavrnilo.
Having been informed by GSK AEVE of the difficulties it faced in supplying the wholesalers with the quantities requested, the Ethnikos Organismos Farmakon (National Organisation for Medicines) published a circular on 27 November 2001 which obliged pharmaceuticals companies and all distributors of medicines to deliver quantities equivalent to those required for prescription medicines plus 25%.
Ethnikos Organismos Farmakon (nacionalni urad za farmacevtske izdelke) je 27. novembra 2001, potem ko ga je GSK AEVE obvestila o težavah, s katerimi se je srečevala pri oskrbi trgovcev na debelo z zahtevanimi količinami, objavil okrožnico, v skladu s katero morajo farmacevtske družbe in vsi distributerji zdravil zagotavljati količine, ki ustrezajo potrebam po zdravilih na recept, povečanim za 25 %.
Between 30 April 2001 and 11 November 2002, each of the appellants in the main proceedings brought an action before the Polimeles Protodikio Athinon (Court of First Instance, Athens), claiming that the conduct of GSK AEVE in interrupting supplies of medicinal products which had been ordered and distributing them through Farmacenter constituted unfair and anticompetitive acts and an abuse of the dominant position occupied by GSK AEVE on the markets for the medicinal products in dispute.
Vsaka od tožečih strank v postopku v glavni stvari je 30. aprila 2001 in 11. novembra 2002 vložila tožbo pri Polymeles Protodikeio Athinon (prvostopenjsko sodi�če v Atenah) in trdila, da sta prekinitev dobav naročenih zdravil s strani družbe GSK AEVE in njihovo trženje prek družbe Farmacenter nelojalni in protikonkurenčni dejanji ter pomenita zlorabo prevladujočega položaja, ki ga ima družba GSK AEVE na trgih zadevnih zdravil.
In their applications, those appellants asked for GSK AEVE to be ordered, first, to supply them with quantities of medicines corresponding to the monthly average of those it had delivered to them in the period from 1 January to 31 October 2000 and, second, to pay them damages and compensate them for loss of profits.
V svojih tožbah navedene tožeče stranke zahtevajo, naj se družbi GSK AEVE naloži, da jim dobavlja količine zdravil, ki ustrezajo mesečnemu povprečju tega, kar jim je dobavljala v obdobju od 1. januarja do 31. oktobra 2000, in jim plača od�kodnino in nadomestilo za izgubljeni dobiček.
Some of the applications contained a more specific request for GSK AEVE to be ordered to continue supplies by providing quantities corresponding to the monthly average of medicines that it had delivered to them during the same period plus a certain percentage.
V nekaterih navedenih tožbah je bilo natančno zahtevano, naj se navedeni družbi naloži nadaljevanje oskrbe na podlagi mesečnega povprečja zdravil, ki jim jih je dobavljala družba GSK AEVE v istem obdobju, povečanega za določen odstotek.
In view of both the complaints mentioned in paragraph 15 of this judgment and the request for negative clearance that were pending before it, the Epitropi Antagonismou by decision of 22 January 2003 asked the Court a series of questions relating to the interpretation of Article 82 EC in a reference for a preliminary ruling, which was registered at the Court Registry under the number C-53/03.
Ko je Epitropi Antagonismou odločalo obenem o zahtevah iz točke 15 te sodbe in pro�nji za negativni izvid, je z odločbo z dne 22. januarja 2003 Sodi�ču postavila vrsto vpra�anj glede razlage člena 82 ES s predlogom za sprejetje predhodne odločbe, ki je bil registriran v sodnem tajni�tvu Sodi�ča pod �t. C-53/03.
Between January and October 2003, the Polimeles Protodikio Athinon gave judgment on the actions commenced by the appellants in the main proceedings against GSK AEVE.
Med januarjem in oktobrom 2003 je Polymeles Protodikeio Athinon odločilo o vloženih tožbah tožečih strank v postopku v glavni stvari proti GSK AEVE.
Although it ruled that the actions were admissible, with the exception of the claims for compensation for loss of profits, that court dismissed them as unfounded, on the ground that the refusal on the part of GSK AEVE to supply was not unjustified and could thus not constitute abuse of that company’s dominant position.
Čeprav je to sodi�če ugotovilo, da so tožbe dopustne, razen zahtev za nadomestilo za izgubljeni dobiček, je tožbe zavrnilo kot neutemeljene, ker zavrnitev prodaje s strani družbe GSK AEVE ni bila neutemeljena in torej ne more pomeniti zlorabe njenega prevladujočega položaja.
The appellants in the main proceedings appealed against those judgments before the Efetio Athinon (Court of Appeal, Athens).
Tožeče stranke v postopku v glavni stvari so zoper te sodbe pritožile pri Efeteio Athinon (pritožbeno sodi�če v Atenah).
GSK AEVE cross-appealed in some of the cases.
V nekaterih navedenih zadevah je družba GSK AEVE vložila nasprotno pritožbo.
That court however suspended its examination of some of the cases before it pending the Court’s decision in respect of the reference for a preliminary ruling made by the Epitropi Antagonismou.
To sodi�če pa je odložilo odločanje o nekaterih zadevah, ki so ji bile predložene, do odločitve Sodi�ča o predlogu za sprejetje predhodne odločbe, ki ga je vložila Epitropi Antagonismou.
By its judgment of 31 May 2005 in Case C-53/03 Syfait and Others [2005] ECR I-4609, the Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to answer the questions referred by the Epitropi Antagonismou, since the latter was not a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 234 EC.
S sodbo z dne 31. maja 2005 v zadevi Syfait in drugi (C-53/03, ZOdl., str. I-4609) je Sodi�če razsodilo, da ni pristojno odgovoriti na vpra�anja, ki jih je postavila Epitropi Antagonismou, ker slednja ni sodi�če v smislu člena 234 ES.
Is the answer to that question affected by the fact that the parallel trade is particularly profitable for the wholesalers because of the different prices, resulting from State intervention, in the Member States of the European Union, that is to say by the fact that pure conditions of competition do not prevail in the pharmaceuticals market, but a regime which is governed to a large extent by State intervention?
Ali na odgovor na to vpra�anje vpliva dejstvo, da razlike v ceni znotraj Evropske unije, ki so posledica posredovanja države ali, drugače rečeno, podreditve trga farmacevtskih izdelkov sistemu, v katerem ni čiste konkurence in ki ga, nasprotno, zaznamuje visoka stopnja državne intervencije v gospodarstvo, povzročajo vzporedno trgovino, ki je posebej donosna za trgovce na debelo?
Is it ultimately the duty of a national competition authority to apply Community competition rules in the same way to markets which function competitively and those in which competition is distorted by State intervention?
Končno, ali je primerno, da nacionalno sodi�če uporabi pravila Skupnosti konkurence na enak način za trge, ki delujejo po sistemu konkurence, in za trge, na katerih je konkurenca izkrivljena zaradi posredovanja države?
(a) Do the percentage by which normal domestic consumption is exceeded and/or the loss suffered by an undertaking holding a dominant position compared with its total turnover and total profits constitute appropriate criteria?
Zlasti a) Ali je merilo odstotka prekoračitve normalne nacionalne porabe in/ali merilo �kode, ki jo je podjetje v prevladujočem položaju utrpelo glede na njegov skupni promet in na njegov celotni dobiček, mogoče �teti za primerni merili?
If so, how are the level of that percentage and the level of that loss determined (the latter as a percentage of turnover and total profits), above which the conduct in question may be abusive?
Če je odgovor pritrdilen, na kak�en način je treba določiti vi�ino odstotka prekoračitve in raven �kode – če je zadnja določena kot odstotek prometa in celotnega dobička – na podlagi katerih bo zadevno ravnanje označeno kot zloraba?
(b) Is an approach entailing the balancing of interests appropriate, and, if so, what are the interests to be compared?
b) Ali je primeren pristop, ki temelji na uravnove�anju interesov, in če je tako, kateri interesi naj bi pri�li v po�tev pri tem uravnove�anju?
(i) is the answer affected by the fact that the ultimate consumer/patient derives limited financial advantage from the parallel trade and
Ali na odgovor vpliva dejstvo, da ima bolnik, ki je končni potro�nik, omejeno finančno korist od vzporedne trgovine?
(ii) is account to be taken, and to what extent, of the interests of social insurance bodies in cheaper medicinal products?
Ali je treba upo�tevati interese nosilcev socialnega zavarovanja, da so zdravila cenej�a, in če je tako, v kolik�ni meri?
(c) What other criteria and approaches are considered appropriate in the present case?’
c) Katera druga merila in pristopi bi bili v tem primeru primerni?“
By Decision 318/V/2006 of 1 September 2006, the Epitropi Antagonismou ruled on the complaints lodged with it against GSK.
Z odločbo 318/V/2006 z dne 1. septembra 2006 je Epitropi Antagonismou odločila o zahtevah, ki so ji bile predložene zoper družbo GSK.
In the decision it found that GSK did not occupy a dominant position on the markets for Imigran and Serevent in view of their interchangeability with other medicinal products, but that a dominant position existed with respect to Lamictal, on account of the fact that epilepsy sufferers may find it difficult to adjust to other medicines which treat that condition.
V tej odločbi je ugotovila, da družba GSK nima prevladujočega položaja na trgu zdravil imigran in serevent, glede na njuno zamenljivost z drugimi zdravili, da pa tak prevladujoč položaj obstaja glede zdravila lamictal, glede na to, da se lahko epileptični bolniki srečuje s težavami pri prilaganju drugim zdravilom za zdravljenje te bolezni.
In the same decision, the Epitropi Antagonismou found that GSK had infringed Article 2 of Law 703/1977 during the period from November 2000 to February 2001, but that there had been no infringement of that article in the period after February 2001 and no infringement of Article 82 EC during either of those periods.
V isti odločbi je Epitropi Antagonismou ugotovila, da je družba GSK kr�ila člen 2 zakona 703/1977 v obdobju od novembra 2000 do februarja 2001, da pa tega člena ni kr�ila v obdobju po februarju 2001 in da v nobenem od teh obdobij ni kr�ila člena 82 ES.
The appellants in the main proceedings have applied to the Diikitiko Efetio Athinon for an annulment of that decision.
Tožeče stranke v postopku v glavni stvari so zahtevale razglasitev ničnosti te odločbe pred Dioikitiko Efeteio Athinon.
By order of the President of the Court of 29 January 2007, Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06 were joined for the purposes of the written and oral procedures and the judgment.
S sklepom predsednika Sodi�ča z dne 29. januarja 2007 so bile zadeve od C-468/06 do C-478/06 združene za pisni in ustni postopek ter sodbo.
By its questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court essentially asks whether there is an abuse of a dominant position contrary to Article 82 EC if a pharmaceuticals company occupying such a position on the national market for certain medicinal products refuses to meet orders sent to it by wholesalers on
Z vpra�anji, ki jih je treba preučiti skupaj, predložitveno sodi�če v bistvu spra�uje, ali gre za zlorabo prevladujočega položaja, ki je prepovedana s členom 82 ES, če farmacevtska družba, ki ima tak položaj na nacionalnem trgu določenih zdravil, zavrača
LÉLOS KAI SIA AND OTHERS account of the fact that those wholesalers are involved in parallel exports of those products to other Member States.
LÉLOS KAI SIA IN DRUGI izpolnjevanje naročil, ki ji jih po�iljajo trgovci na debelo, ker so ti trgovci dejavni pri vzporednem izvozu teh zdravil v druge države članice.
In that context, the referring court asks the Court about the relevance of a series of factors, such as the degree of regulation to which the pharmaceuticals sector is subject in Member States, the impact of parallel trade on the pharmaceuticals com -panies’ revenues, and the question whether that parallel trade is capable of generating financial benefits for the ultimate consumers of the medicinal products.
V tem smislu predložitveno sodi�če spra�uje Sodi�če o pomembnosti vrste dejavnikov, kot so stopnja ureditve, ki velja za farmacevtski sektor v državah članicah, o vplivu vzporedne trgovine na prihodke farmacevtskih podjetij in o vpra�anju, ali lahko ta vzporedna trgovina ustvari finančne ugodnosti za končne potro�nike teh zdravil.
In its observations lodged before the Court, GSK AEVE contends that its refusal to supply the requested quantities of medicinal products to the appellants in the main proceedings does not constitute an abuse.
GSK AEVE v svojih stali�čih, predloženih Sodi�ču, trdi, da njena zavrnitev dobave zahtevanih količin zdravil tožečim strankam v postopku v glavni stvari ne more pomeniti zlorabe.
First, it was not a case of an actual refusal inasmuch as, apart from a period of a few weeks between November 2000 and February 2001, GSK AEVE was always prepared to supply the wholesalers with sufficient quantities.
Po eni strani naj ne bi �lo za dejansko zavrnitev dobave, saj je bila razen v obdobju nekaj tednov med novembrom 2000 in februarjem 2001 vedno pripravljena dobaviti zadostne količine trgovcem na debelo.
Second, it did not put the wholesalers at risk of being eliminated from the market, since its supplies enabled them to cover all the requirements of the Greek market, and even requirements that went beyond those of that market.
Po drugi strani slednjih ni spravila v položaj, da bi utegnili biti odstranjeni s trga, saj so jim njene dobave omogočile, da so pokrili vse potrebe na gr�kem trgu in celo zunaj tega trga.
According to GSK AEVE, the decisive factors for the question whether the conduct of a company that refuses to supply certain goods is abusive depend on the economic and regulatory context of the situation in question.
GSK AEVE meni, da so dejavniki, pomembni za ugotovitev, ali ima ravnanje podjetja, ki zavrne dobavo blaga, naravo zlorabe, odvisni od ekonomskega in uredbenega okvira zadevnega položaja.
Thus, in the case of a supply restriction in medicinal products in order to limit parallel trade, it is necessary to take into account the omnipresent regulation of prices and distribution in the pharmaceuticals sector, the negative consequences of an unlimited parallel trade upon the investments of pharmaceuticals companies in the field of research and development, and the minimal benefit of that trade for the final consumers of those products.
Glede omejitve oskrbe zdravil, namenjenih omejevanju vzporedne trgovine, bi bilo treba upo�tevati vsesplo�no ureditev cen in distribucijo v sektorju zdravil, negativne posledice neomejene vzporedne trgovine na izvedene naložbe farmacevtskih podjetij na področju raziskav in razvoja ter minimalno korist te trgovine za končne potro�nike teh zdravil.
By contrast, the appellants in the main proceedings, as well as the Italian and Polish Governments and the Commission of the European Communities, maintain in their observations that the refusal by an undertaking in a dominant position to supply medicinal products to wholesalers with the aim of restricting parallel trade constitutes in principle an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 EC.
Nasprotno tožeče stranke v postopku v glavni stvari, italijanska in poljska vlada ter Komisija Evropskih skupnosti v svojih stali�čih ocenjujejo, da če podjetje v prevladujočem položaju zavrne dobavo zdravila trgovcem na debelo, da bi se omejila vzporedna trgovina, načeloma pomeni zlorabo prevladujočega položaja v smislu člena 82 ES.
According to them, none of the factors raised by the referring court and which were taken up by GSK AEVE to justify its refusal to supply is capable of altering the abusive nature of that practice.
Po njihovem mnenju nobeden od dejavnikov, na katere se sklicuje predložitveno sodi�če in ki jih je povzela GSK AEVE za utemeljitev zavrnitve dobave, ne more odvzeti tej praksi značaja zlorabe.
The existence of a refusal to supply liable to eliminate competition
Obstoj zavrnitve dobave, s katero bi bila lahko odpravljena konkurenca
Article 82 EC prohibits any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant pos -ition within the common market or in a substantial part of it as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Spomniti je treba, da člen 82 ES prepoveduje kot nezdružljivo s skupnim trgom vsako zlorabo prevladujočega položaja enega ali več podjetij na skupnem trgu ali njegovem znatnem delu, kolikor bi lahko prizadela trgovino med državami članicami.
According to point (b) of the second paragraph of that article, such abuse may, in particular, consist in limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers.
V skladu z drugim odstavkom, točka b), tega člena je tak�na zloraba zlasti omejevanje proizvod - nje, trgov ali tehničnega razvoja na �kodo potro�nikov.
With regard to a refusal by an undertaking to deliver its products in one Member State to wholesalers which export those products to other Member States, such an effect on competition may exist not only if the refusal impedes the activities of those wholesalers in that first Member State, but equally if it leads to the elimination of effective competition from them in the distribution of the products on the markets of the other Member States.
Z vidika zavrnitve s strani podjetja, da svoje proizvode v državi članici dobavi trgovcem na debelo, ki izvažajo te proizvode v druge države članice, ni mogoč obstoj takega vpliva na konkurenco le, če ta zavrnitev ovira dejavnosti teh trgovcev na debelo na trgu navedene države članice, temveč tudi, če vodi k odpravi njihove dejanske konkurenčnosti pri distribuciji proizvodov na trge drugih držav članic.
In this case it is common ground between the parties in the main proceedings that, by refusing to meet the Greek wholesalers’ orders, GSK AEVE aims to limit parallel exports by those wholesalers to the markets of other Member States in which the selling prices of the medicinal products in dispute are higher.
V tem primeru med strankami v postopku v glavni stvari ni sporno, da sku�a GSK AEVE z zavrnitvijo izpolnitve naročil gr�kih trgovcev na debelo omejiti vzporedni izvoz s strani le-teh na trge drugih držav članic, v katerih je prodajna cena zadevnih zdravil vi�ja.