natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
According to ESA estimates, this willinclude350 millioneurofortherevised industrialframework and 194 million eurofor ESA costs46.
Po ocenah ESA boto zajemalo 350 milijonov EUR za preno-vljenpogodbeniokvirzindustrijoin194 milijonov EUR za stroške ESA46.
consortium agreed to establish two identical Galileo Control Centres (GCC) composed of a GMS (ground mission segment) and a GCS (ground control segment), but to cross-implement the GCC through the Germany-based GMS and the Italy-based GCS, rather than having one operational and one back-up GCC.
47Partnerji v združenem konzorciju so se dogovorili, da bodo vzpostavili dva identična kontrolna centra Galileo (GCC), sestavljena iz GMS (segment operacij na tleh) in GCS (segment zemeljskega nadzora), vendar bosta GCC delovala navzkrižno z GMS v Nemčiji in GCS v Italiji, namesto da bi imeli en delujoči in en rezervni GCC.
It was also agreed to set up a third GMS in cold back-up mode and a third GCS.
Prav tako je bilo dogovorjeno, da se vzpostavi tretji GMS, ki se bo vključil, kadar bo prišlo do nedelovanja glavnega sistema, in tretji GCS.
The stalling of the concession negotiationsin the second half of 2005 (seeparagraph23)alsoaffectedtechnologicaldevelopment:the programme was delayed byfouranda half months,andextracosts of 103 million euro can be attributedtothis delay andtotheimple-mentation ofthe 5 December 2005 agreement47.
Zastoj koncesijskih pogajanj v drugi polovici leta 2005 (glej odstavek 23) je vplival tudi na tehnološki razvoj: program je zamujal za štiri mesece in pol, tej zamudiinizvajanju sporazuma z dne 5. decembra 2005 pa je mogoče pripisati dodatnestroške v višini 103 milijone EUR47.
48The Commission gave this mandate to the GJU in its FP6 work programme of 9 December 2002 (thematic priority 1.4: ‘Aeronautics and space’).
48Komisija je za to pooblastila GJU v svojem delovnem programu za 6. OP z dne 9. decembra 2002 (tematska prednostna naloga 1.4: „aeronavtika in vesolje“).
It was translated into three annual specific support action (FP6) contracts with the GJU.
To je privedlo do treh letnih pogodb v okviru posebnega podpornega ukrepa (6. OP), sklenjenih z GJU.
The GJU’s third task48 was to initiate and manage the necessary research activitiestosupportachievementofthekeytasksandobjectives ofthe Galileo development and validation phase(i.e.technological developmentandearlydevelopmentofusersegments —seealso paragraphs 13 and 14).
Tretja naloga GJU48 je bila začenjanje in upravljanje raziskovalnih dejav-nosti,potrebnihzapodpiranjedoseganjaključnihnaloginciljev razvojnein validacijskefaze Galilea(tj.tehnološkirazvojinzgodnji razvoj uporabniškihsegmentov – glejtudi odstavke 13in 14).
Especially through the survey and interviews of FP6 participants.
Zlasti prek ankete in pogovorov z udeleženci 6. OP.
Between September 2003 and December 2006 the GJU selected, negoti-atedand monitoredatotalof70researchprojects worth110 million euro andfinancedfrom FP6through several callsfor proposals.
GJU je med septembrom 2003 in decembrom 2006 izbral, opravil poga-janjainspremljalskupno70raziskovalnihprojektov,vrednih110 milijonov EUR, ki so bili financirani iz 6. OP prek več razpisov za zbiranje predlogov.
Activities focused on user segment development, which consisted in fosteringinnovativeservicesandapplicationsofappropriatetech-nology (receivers, local components), and on market development in different user communities.
Dejavnostiso bile osredotočene narazvoj uporabniškega segmenta s spodbujanjem inovativnih storitev in aplikacij ustrezne tehnologije (sprejemniki, lokalne komponente) ter na razvoj trgavrazličnihskupnostih uporabnikov.
RTD activities also included some technological development of the Galileo system and EGNOS demonstration activities.
Dejavnosti RTR so vključevale tudi nekatere vidike tehnološkega razvoja sistema Galileo in predstavitvene dejavnosti za EGNOS.
The audit showed49 that the GJU was generally perceived as an efficient
skupni pogled na upravljanje GJU, zlasti na naslednjih področjih: razpisna dokumentacija (izjave o delu), upravljanje pogodb, spremljanje in pregledi.
COM(2006) 261 — Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1321/2004 on the establishment of structures for the management of the European satellite radio-navigation programmes, 2 June 2006.
51COM(2006) 261 – Predlog uredbe Sveta o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 1321/2004 o vzpostavitvi upravljavskih struktur Evropskega satelitskega radio-navigacijskega sistema, 2. junij 2006.
75 % of the 482 survey usercommunities and havesucceededin bringing different organisations and stakeholders together.
75 % od 482 anketirancev je poročalo o negativnem učinku na njihove projekte.
However, the ultimate use of the RTD activitiesforthe Galileo programmeislimited.
nanašana Galileo50.Raziskovalniprojektisovzbudilizanimanjein povečaliosveščenostvskupnostihuporabnikovteruspešnopove-zalirazličneorganizacijeinzainteresiranestrani.Vendarjekončna uporaba dejavnosti RTR za program Galileoomejena.
The GJU did not sufficiently exploit the project results to formulate a coherent set of user-validated requirements that could serve the ESA as the basis for the Galileo system specification.
GJUnidovolj izkoristilrezultatov projektov, da bi oblikovalskladen niz zahtev, ki bijih potrdili uporabnikiin bijihlahko ESA uporabila kot osnovo za specifikacije sistema Galileo.
A high number of projects consisted in a detailed analysis of the regulatory efforts required both at EU and Member Statelevel tofoster GNSS applicationsin alarge number of economicandsocialsectors. Nofollow-up wasgiventotheresults ofthese projects.
Številni projekti so vsebovali podrobno analizo zakonodajnih prizadevanj, potrebnih tako na ravni EU kot na ravnidržavčlaniczaspodbujanjeaplikacij GNSSvštevilnihgospo-darskihin družbenih sektorjih, vendar ni bilo nobenega nadaljnjega ukrepanja na podlagitehrezultatov.
Discontinuities, the inappropriateness of FP6 for funding market development activities, the absence of a comprehensive market-development approach and delays account for the limited usefulness of Galileo RTD results.
Za omejeno koristnost rezultatov Galilea na področju RTR so odgovorne prekinitve,neustreznost6. OPzafinanciranjedejavnostizarazvoj trga, pomanjkanje celovitega pristopa krazvojutrgain zamude.
Whenthe Commission proposed winding upthe GJU,itintendedto ensure programme continuity by making a smooth transfer of activi- tiestothe GSA51
Ko je Komisija predlagala ukinitev GJU, je nameravala zagotoviti kontinuiteto programa z nemotenim prenosom dejavnosti na GSA51.
Also called the EGNOS framework agreement.
Imenovan tudi okvirni sporazum
This objective arose because of the financing problems facing EGNOS in January 2006.
Taciljjenastalzaraditežav sfinanciranjem,skaterimiseje januarja 2006 soočal EGNOS.
Ideally, the FP6 activities should have been supported by consolidating their results in a comprehensive top-down marketdevelopmentapproachatthelevelofthe GJU/GSA(seealso EGNOS — paragraph 65).
OP(po razpisu za zbiranje pre-dlogov)vbistvusledijopristopu„odspodajnavzgor“brezcentra-liziranegaizkoriščanjarezultatov.Videalnemprimerubibilotreba dejavnostipodpretiskonsolidacijonjihovihrezultatovzizčrpnim pristopom k razvoju trga od zgoraj navzdol na ravni GJU/GSA (glej tudi EGNOS – odstavek 65).
Without such a pro-active approach, it is difficult to ensure projects’ continued utility for the Galileo programme oncethey have been completed.
Brez takšnega aktivnega pristopa je težko zagotoviti, da bodo projektituditakrat,ko bodokončani,še naprej koristni za program Galileo.
The survey results also confirmed that the cumulative programme delays (in technological development, EGNOS operations and the concession negotiations) adversely affected boththe execution of FP6 projects (for instance through the unavailability of the EGNOS signal) and the futureexploitationofprojectresults(duetotheirimpacton GNSS business andresearch development opportunities).
Rezultatianketesotudi potrdili, dasoskupnezamude pri programu (pritehnološkemrazvoju, operacijah EGNOSin koncesijskih pogajanjih) negativno vplivale tako naizvajanje projektov 6. OP (na primer z nerazpoložljivostjo signala EGNOS) kot na prihodnje izkoriščanje rezultatov projektov (zaradi njihovega učinka na poslovne in razisko-valnorazvojne priložnosti GNSS).
EGNOSINTEGRATION ONLY PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL
INTEGRACIJA EGNOS LE DELNO USPEŠNA
As Galileo’s precursor, EGNOS has a crucial role in the early development of usersegments(see also paragraph 14).
Kot predhodnik Galilea ima EGNOS ključno vlogo pri zgodnjem razvoju uporabniškihsegmentov(glejtudiodstavek14).
The GJU’sfourthtask was to‘oversee the optimalintegration of EGNOSinto Galileo’(see footnote12).
Četrtanaloga GJU je bila „nadzorovati optimalno integracijo EGNOS v Galileo“ (glej opombo 12).
EGNOS and Galileo being two fully independent systems (see Annex II for a detailed comparison of EGNOS and Galileo), integration does notrelatetothetechnicalsharing ofinfrastructure buttothe following.
Ker sta EGNOSin Galileo dva popolnoma neodvisna sistema (za podrobno primerjavo med EGNOS in Galileom glej Prilogo II), se integracija ne nanaša na tehnično delitev infrastrukture, ampak na naslednje:
(a)Integrationintothe Galileo governance and managementstruc-tures was considered necessaryin order to handleissues such as the conclusion of an agreement among the owners of EGNOS 53,
(a)Zaradireševanujavprašanj,kotsosklenitevsporazumamed lastniki EGNOS53
(b)At market level, the purpose of integration was to prepare the way for the market introduction of Galileo, using EGNOS as a precursor system,sinceit willdeliverregionalservicessimilartothreeof thefivefuture Galileoservices.
(b)Na tržni ravni je bil namen integracije utreti pot za uvedbo Galilea natrgtako, da se EGNOS uporabi kot predhodnik sistema, saj bo zagotovil regionalne storitve, podobne trem od petih prihodnjih storitev Galilea.
Due to liability issues and uncertainty about the future of EGNOS financing and governance.
Zaradi vprašanj v zvezi
On the political front, EGNOS and Galileo have been integrated into a single European GNSS policy.
Na politični ravni sta bila EGNOS in Galileo združena v enotno evropsko politiko GNSS.
Similarly, from a financial point of view, Commission funding for EGNOS has been incorporated into Galileo funding.
Podobnoje bilo s finančnega vidika Komisijino financiranje EGNOS vključeno vfinanciranje Galilea.
In the absence of clear milestones and planning for EGNOS, this is only a conservative estimate.
Po previdni oceni, saj za EGNOS
However, EGNOS has suffered from delays, and the main challenges of theprogramme,suchas marketdevelopment,certificationandthe role ofthe differentstakeholders, arestill unresolved:
Vendarje pri EGNOS prišlo do zamudin še vedno so nerešeni glavni izziviprograma,kotsorazvojtrga,certifikacijainvlogarazličnih zainteresiranihstrani:
(a)Since October 2004 a framework agreement on the ownership and future exploitation of EGNOS has beenundernegotiation.
(a)Od oktobra 2004 potekajo pogajanja o okvirnem sporazumu glede lastništva in prihodnjega izkoriščanja EGNOS.
Asof September 2008, there was still no such agreement. The EGNOS OS signal has technically been available since July 2006, but without an economic operatorit cannot be declared operational55.
Tehničnoje signal odprte storitve EGNOS na voljo od julija 2006, vendar brez gospodarskega operaterja ni mogočerazglasiti začetka delovanja55;
(b)The GJU’s market penetration plan was never implemented and a certifiable version of EGNOSis not expected until March 2009, at leasttwo yearslaterthan expected56.
(b)Načrt GJU o prodoru natrg ni bil nikoliizvršen,različice EGNOS, kiselahkocertificira, pa po pričakovanjih ne bo do marca 2009, karje vsaj dveleti pozneje, kotje bilo pričakovano56
REASONS FOR LIMITED SUCCESS
RAZLOGI ZA OMEJEN USPEH
The GJU’s success in attaining its fourth objective was hampered by a number offactors:
Uspeh GJU pri doseganju njegovega četrtega cilja je oviralo več dejavnikov:
(a)the GJU’srole and mandate vis-à-vis EGNOS was not clear;
(a)vlogain pooblastila GJU v zvezi z EGNOS niso bilajasna;
(b)the decision tointegrate EGNOSinto Galileo was detrimentalfor EGNOS;
(b)EGNOSje odločitev o njegoviintegraciji v Galileoškodovala;
(c)the EGNOSinstitutionalframeworkis very complex;
(c)institucionalni okvir EGNOSje zelo zapleten;
(d)the GJU devoted toolittle effort to market development activities.
(d)GJUseje premalo posvečal dejavnostim zarazvojtrga.
Agreement between the
Sporazum med Evropsko
The GJU’s role and mandate vis-à-vis EGNOS was not clear.
Vloga in pooblastila GJU v zvezi z EGNOS niso bila jasna.
The GJU statutes stated only that the GJU would‘oversee the optimal integration of EGNOS in Galileo’.
V statutu GJU je bilo navedeno samo, da bo GJU nadziral optimalno integracijo EGNOS v Galileo.
European Community, the European Space Agency and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation on a European contribution to the development of a global navigation satellite system (GNSS), signed in 1998 (OJ L 194, 10.7.1998, p. 16).
V skladu stripartitnim sporazumom57 je bila ESA prek svo- skupnostjo, Evropsko vesoljsko agencijo in Evropsko organizacijo za varnost zračne plovbe o evropskem prispevku k razvoju sistema za globalno satelitsko navigacijo (GNSS), podpisan leta 1998 (UL L 194, str. 16).
For instance: longterm financial
Na primer: dolgoročna finančna
Even though the decision to integrate EGNOS into the concession nego-tiationssecuredcontinued Communityfunding,itatthesametime held upthe achievement ofthe EGNOS programme because:
Čeprav je odločitev o vključitvi EGNOS v koncesijska pogajanja zagotovila neprekinjeno financiranje s strani Skupnosti, je hkrati zadrževala dokončanje programa EGNOS, ker: obveznost, stabilni tehnični temelji, jasne smernice za prihodnje vodenje, jasna hierarhija ciljev pri razširitvi EGNOS zunaj Evrope, jasna vizija o združljivosti EGNOS in Galilea.
(a)delaysintheconcession negotiations put backthe EGNOStech-nological development deadlines; and commitment, stable technical baseline, clear path towards future governance, prioritisation of objectives with regard to EGNOS extension outside Europe, clear vision on complementarity of EGNOS and Galileo.
(a)so bili zaradi zamud pri koncesijskih pogajanjih prestavljeniroki zatehnološkirazvoj EGNOSin
According to the bilateral
V skladu z dvostranskimi
(b)allactivityinconnection withtheappointmentofaneconomic operatorfor EGNOS wasstopped becausethis wastheresponsi-bility ofthe Galileo concession holder.
(b)ker so bile ustavljene vse dejavnosti v zvezi z imenovanjem gospodarskega operaterjaza EGNOS,sajje bilzato odgovoren koncesionar za Galileo.
agreements between ESA and eight national air traffic (management) service providers and other agencies.
sporazumi med ESA in osmimi nacionalnimi ponudniki storitev (upravljanja) zračnega prometa ter drugimi agencijami.
In addition, the need to conclude a framework agreement for EGNOS madethe concession negotiations more complex.
Poleg tega so postala koncesijska pogajanja bolj zapletena, ker je bilo trebaskleniti okvirnisporazum za EGNOS.
The EGNOS institutional framework is very complex.
Institucionalni okvir EGNOS je zelo zapleten.
The various financial stakeholders in EGNOS all have different priorities.
Različni investitorji v EGNOS imajo različne prednostne naloge.
Asthe owner of EGNOS assets for the duration of the ARTES-9 programme, the ESA acts on behalf ofthe countries with afinancial stakeinthat programme.
ESA kot lastnica sredstev EGNOS v obdobjutrajanja programa ARTES-9 deluje vimenu držav, kiimajo finančniinteres pri tem programu.
Any transfer of ownership is conditional on their consent59.
Vsak prenoslastništvaje odvisen od njihovega soglasja59.
The Commission has no ownership rights to EGNOS, but through the GSA, according to Regulation (EC) No1321/2004,itshouldbecomethe owner of EGNOS assets.
Komisija nimalastninske pravice do EGNOS, vendar bi morala v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1321/2004 prek GSA postati lastnica sredstev EGNOS.
The absence of a clear mandate for the GJU as EGNOS programme manager resulted in doubts as to whether the GJU was empoweredto negotiate aframework agreementfor EGNOS.
Ker GJU kot upravitelj programa EGNOS niimeljasnihpooblastil,sosepojavilidvomi,alijepooblaščenza pogajanja o okvirnemsporazumu za EGNOS.
The Commission acknowledged
Komisija je v svojem sporočilu
In addition, the GJU‘s attention was dominated by institutional, financial andinternationalcooperationissuesandlimitedtimeandresources were devotedtotheearly developmentofasetofserviceenablersfor EGNOS:the GJU did not exploit FP6 marketdevelopmentresultsin a centralised way(paragraph 56) and did notimplementthe EGNOS market penetration plan.
Poleg tega je GJU pozornost posvečal predvsem vprašanjem institucio-nalnega,finančnegain mednarodnegasodelovanja,le maločasain virovpajebilonamenjenihzgodnjemurazvojusklopaelementovza omogočanje storitev za EGNOS: GJU ni centralizirano izkoristil rezultatov razvoja trga pri 6. OP (odstavek 56) in ni izvedel načrta o prodoru EGNOS natrg.
The GSA was still in the process of being built up and its relationships with the Commission and ESA not settled.’
GSA je bila še v procesu izgradnje, njeni odnosi s Komisijo in ESA pa niso bili urejeni.
The following sections focus on the division of roles and on how the Commission fulfilled its role as the key promoter of the Galileo programme.
Naslednjirazdelkiseosredotočajonarazdelitevvloginnato,kako je Komisija izpolnjevala svojo vlogo glavne pobudnice programa Galileo.
The division of roles between the entities involved in the development and validation phase of the programme(EU and ESA Member States, Commission, GJU and ESA) was not clearly defined.
Razdelitev vlog med subjekti, ki so sodelovali pri razvojni in validacijski fazi programa (države članice EU in ESA, Komisija, GJU in ESA), ni bila jasno opredeljena.
The GJU’s ability to manage the programme effectively was constrained by:
Sposobnost GJU za uspešno upravljanje programasta omejevali:
(a)Its governance structure(Figure 2)The GJUstatutes gaveitasupervisoryrolevis-à-visthetechno-logicaldevelopment work to be done by the ESA.
(a)njegova vodstvena struktura(diagram 2).GJU je bila po njegovem statutu dodeljena nadzorna vloga v zvezi z dejavnostmi tehnološkega razvoja, ki naj bi jih opravila ESA.
However,the ESA was both a founding member of the GJU (and thus represented on the Executive Committee and the Administrative Board) and a ’contractor’(recipient offunding andresponsibleforimplemen-tation underthe ESA/GJU agreement).
Vendar je bila ESA ustanovna članica GJU(injebilatorejzasto-pana vizvršilnemkomitejuin upravnem odboru)in„pogodbena izvajalka“(prejemnicafinančnihsredstevinodgovornazaizva-janjevskladussporazumom med ESAin GJU).
Thus,in practice,the GJU was notin a positionto supervisethe ESA effectively duetothis conflict ofinterestforthe ESA withinthe GJU.
Zaradi navzkrižja interesov za ESA znotraj GJU je GJU v praksi tako ni mogel uspešno nadzirati.
(b)Itstemporary nature
(b)njegova začasna narava.Zaprtje GJU pred koncem razvojne in validacijske faze je ogrozilo njegovo avtoriteto60
Later formally adopted by the
Pozneje ga je uradno sprejel
The ESA/GJU agreement on implementing technological development activities in the development and validation phase (negotiated by the
Sporazum med ESA in GJU o izvajanju dejavnosti tehnološkega razvoja v razvojni in validacijski fazi (ki ga je Komisija s pogajanji dosegla, upravni odbor GJU in podpisal direktor.
GJU Administrative Board and signed by the Executive Director.
predenje GJUzačeldelovati61)nibildovoljpodroben(boljšibibil model sporazumov med ESA in EUMETSAT6263). Zato so bila pravila, ki
Commissionbeforethe GJUbecameoperational61
62 urejajo naročanje64
) wasnotspecific enough (a better model would be the ESA–Eumetsat agreements62,63).
, prenoslastništva, poročanjeinizvajanje65
The agreement did not clarify the roles of the different actors.
Vsporazumu niso bile pojasnjenevlogerazličnihakter- jev.
In the spirit of the framework agreement between the ESA and the
V duhu okvirnegasporazuma med ESAin Evropskoskupnostjo66 bi se moralete vloge dopolnjevati: ESA kot pristojnitehnični organ, Komisija,kiobravnavapolitičnorazsežnost,ter GJU,kiobravnava uporabniške zahtevein certifikate.
62Eumetsat (the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites) is an intergovernmental organisation, formed to service a total of 21 Member and nine Cooperating
organizacija za uporabo meteoroloških satelitov) je medvladna organizacija, ki je bila ustanovljena za nudenje storitev skupno 21 državam članicam in devetim sodelujočim državam.
The ESA was both involved in programme management (through the GJU) and responsible for the day-to-day management of the technological development activities of both Galileo and EGNOS.
ESA je sodelovala pri upravljanju programa (prek GJU), odgovorna pa je bila tudi za tekoče upravljanje tehnološkega razvoja tako Galilea kot EGNOS.
The unclear division of roles resulted in unclear lines of accountability.
Zaradi nejasne delitve vlog je prišlo do nejasne razdelitve odgovornosti.
Many decisions relating to Galileo wereaffectedbythefactthat nooneactor(Commission, GJU,ESA, Member States) assumed full responsibility:thedecisioninfavourofseparatedevelopmentand deployment phases,the choice of a PPP, acceptance ofthe bidders’ merger proposal, the ESA/GJU agreement, incomplete budgeting, delays to EGNOS technological development and the IOV industrial organisation.
Naštevilneodločitvevzveziz Galileomjevplivalodejstvo,da nobenakter(Komisija, GJU, ESA, državečlanice) ni prevzel popolne odgovornosti: odločitev zaločenost razvojnein uvajalne faze,izbira javnozasebnega partnerstva, sprejetje predloga ponudnikov o združitvi, sporazum med ESA in GJU, pomanjkljivo načrtovanje proračuna, zamude pritehnološkemrazvoju EGNOSinindustrijska organizacija za validacijo v orbiti.
development of the space segment of Eumetsat programmes, and Eumetsat is responsible for the overall system.
Upravljanje so dodatno otežili posegi držav članic v upravljanje posameznih delov programa(odstavka 23in 49).
Management of the programme was also made more difficult by interventions by Member States in the management of individual programme components(paragraphs 23 and 49).
vesoljskega segmenta programov EUMETSAT, EUMETSAT pa je odgovoren za celoten sistem.
ESA applies the ‘fair-returns’ principle as part of its industrial policy.
ESA kot del svoje industrijske politike uporablja načelo „pravičnega vračila“.
In other words, a country paying a contribution to ESA will receive, within a certain margin, industry contracts of a value equivalent to that contribution.
Z drugimi besedami, država, ki ESA plačuje prispevek, prejme, v določeni meri, industrijske pogodbe, katerih vrednost je enakovredna temu prispevku.
In theory, this principle applies to only 50 % of the budget for development and validation.
Teoretično se to načelo uporablja za samo 50 % proračuna, namenjenega razvoju in validaciji.
In practice, it is not possible to apply such rules to 50 % of an activity that is managed as being one and indivisible.
V praksi teh pravil ni možno uporabljati za 50 % dejavnosti, ki se upravlja kot samostojna in nedeljiva enota.
For example, on the implementation and financing of certain change notices, such as authentication, data exchange, high precision positioning service and the 5 December agreement.
Na primer v zvezi z izvajanjem in financiranjem določenih sprememb pogodbe, kot so avtentifikacija, izmenjava podatkov, zelo natančna storitev določanja položaja in sporazum z dne 5. decembra.
Framework agreement between the European Community and the European Space Agency (OJ L 261, 6.8.2004, p. 64).
Okvirni sporazum med Evropsko skupnostjo in Evropsko vesoljsko agencijo (UL L 261, 6.8.2004, str. 64).
Galileo Security Board
Nadzorni odbor GJU(države članice EU)
GJU Supervisory Board(EU Member States)
Varnostni odborza Galileo
ESA PB-Nav(ESA Member States)
Upravni odbor za satelitske navigacijske programe ESA (države članice ESA)
GJU Administrative Board
Upravni odbor GJU
GJU Executive Committee
Izvršilni komite GJU
Galileo Joint Undertaking
Skupno podjetje Galileo
ESA-GJU agreement
Sporazum ESA-GJU
Study contracts
Donacije za raziskavein razvoj
Consultants
Drugi izvajalci