natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For the reasons that I have set out, it therefore seems to me that Mangold should be read as affirming that discrimination on grounds of age is a specific manifestation of discrimination that is prohibited by the general principle of equality of treatment well known in Community law — a principle that indeed long predates both Article 13 EC and Directive 2000/78.
Iz razlogov, ki sem jih navedla, se mi zato zdi, da bi bilo treba sodbo Mangold razlagati tako, da ugotavlja, da je diskriminacija zaradi starosti poseben izraz diskriminacije, ki jo prepoveduje splo�no načelo enakosti obravnavanja, ki je dobro znano v pravu Skupno - sti – načelo, ki je dejansko nastalo pred členom 13 ES in Direktivo 2000/78.
Article 13 EC then plays its allotted part by recognising explicitly certain specific (new) types of discrimination and empowering the Community legislator to act to combat them in particular ways and particular contexts.
Člen 13 ES nato odigra svojo vlogo s izrecnim priznavanjem določenih posebnih (novih) vrst diskriminacije in pooblastilom zakonodajalcu Skupnosti, da ukrepa za boj proti njim na poseben način in v posebnih okoli�činah.
Third, whilst the directive defines what the principle of equal treatment shall mean in respect of matters falling within its scope 48and also defines direct and indirect discrimination, 49it clearly envisages that differentiation on the basis of age in the context of employment and occupation will not always constitute unlawful discrimina-
Tretjič, čeprav Direktiva določa, kaj lahko pomeni načelo enakega obravnavanja glede zadev, ki spadajo na njeno področje uporabe, 48in opredeljuje tudi neposredno in posredno diskriminacijo, 49pa jasno določa, da razlikovanje na podlagi starosti pri
46 — See the title, the preamble and Article 1.47 — Article 3(1).48 — Article 2(1).
46 – Glej naslov, preambulo in člen 1.47 – Člen 3(1).48 – Člen 2(1).
49 — In Article 2(2)a) and 2(2)(b) respectively.
49 – V členih 2(2)(a) in 2(2)(b).
The framing of these provisions draws on the Court’s established caselaw on sex discrimination.
Formulacija teh določb upo�teva ustaljeno sodno prakso Sodi�ča v zvezi s spolno diskriminacijo.
Such a reading also accords with the role and structure of Directive 2000/78.
Taka razlaga se tudi sklada z vlogo in sistematiko Direktive 2000/78.
Such an enacting measure, by its very nature, leaves a greater degree of flexibility to individual Member States.
BARTSCH svoji naravi omogoča posameznim državam članicam večjo stopnjo prožnosti.
Thus, it distinguishes between ‘differences in treatment which are justified, in particular by legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training ob -jectives, and discrimination which must be prohibited’.
Zato razlikuje „med upravičeno različnim obravnavanjem, zlasti tistim na podlagi legitimnih ciljev zaposlovalne politike, trga delovne sile in poklicnega usposabljanja, in diskriminacijo, ki mora biti prepovedana“.
50Crucially, therefore, it lays down a series of specific rules that establish the parameters of what differential treatment on grounds of (inter alia) age is acceptable (and why).
50 Zato je odločilno, da določa vrsto posebnih pravil za ugotovitev meril, v okiru katerih bo različno obravnavanje zaradi (med drugim) starosti sprejemljivo (in zakaj).
In what follows, I shall therefore suggest that the general principle of equality operates in certain circumstances so as to prohibit discrimination based on age, but that there was not, ab initio, a separate, detailed principle of Community law that always prohibited discrimination on grounds of age.
V nadaljevanju bom zato predlagala, da splo�no načelo enakosti deluje v določenih okoli�činah tako, da prepoveduje diskriminacijo na podlagi starosti, vendar da na začetku ni bilo ločenega, natančnega načela prava Skupnosti, ki je vedno prepovedovalo diskriminacijo zaradi starosti.
I shall nevertheless indicate how I would approach the individual questions referred should I be wrong on that issue.
Kljub temu bom nakazala, kako bi odgovorila na posamezna vpra�anja, predložena v predhodno odločanje, če bi se navedeno izkazalo za napačno.
Can (any) general principle of Community law apply even if the situation giving rise to the reference does not fall within the scope of Community law?
Ali se lahko (katero koli) splošno načelo prava Skupnosti uporablja, tudi kadar položaj, ki je pripeljal do vprašanj, predloženih v predhodno odločanje, ne spada na področje uporabe prava Skupnosti?
That a nuanced approach to prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age was intended is, moreover, reinforced by the Community legislator’s choice of a directive as the enacting measure under Article 13 EC.
Da je bil namen večplastni pristop glede prepovedi diskriminacije zaradi starosti, je poleg tega podkrepljeno z dejstvom, da je zakonodajalec Skupnosti izbral direktivo kot izvedbeni ukrep na podlagi člena 13 ES.
Enactment through a regulation has the consequence that the Community rule is ‘binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States’.
Izvajanje z uredbo ima za posledico, da je predpis Skupnosti „v celoti zavezujoč in se neposredno uporablja v vseh državah članicah“.
51 A directive, in contrast, is ‘binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and method’. 52
51Nasprotno pa je direktiva „za vsako državo članico, na katero je naslovljena, zavezujoča glede cilja, ki ga je treba doseči, vendar prepu�ča nacionalnim organom izbiro oblike in metod“.
50 — Recital 25 and the detailed substantive provisions of Article 6(1).
50 – Uvodna izjava 25 in podrobne materialne določbe člena 6(1).
51 — Article 249 EC.
51 – Člen 249 ES.
All the parties that have submitted observations 53concur that the answer is
Na to vpra�anje je mogoče odgovoriti precej enostavno.
53 — Mrs Bartsch did not submit written observations to the Court and was not represented at the hearing.
Vse stranke, ki so predložile stali�ča, 53se strinjajo, da je odgovor
In particular, the Court may interpret a general principle of Community law in the context of a preliminary reference only when the situation giving rise to the reference falls within the scope of Community law.
Sodi�če lahko razlaga splo�no načelo prava Skupnosti v okviru predhodnega odločanja le, kadar položaj, ki je pripeljal do vpra�anj za predhodno odločanje, spada na področje uporabe prava Skupnosti.
55 The directive does not, however, widen the scope of application of Community law during that period.
55Direktiva pa v tem obdobju ne raz�iri področja uporabe prava Skupnosti.
Such an effect would undermine the legislator’s decision.
Tak učinek bi spodkopal odločitev zakonodajalca.
Finally, unlike the disputed national rules in Mangold, the age-gap clause at issue in the present case did not transpose a Community provision, nor was it adopted during the transposition period for Directive 2000/78.
Nazadnje zadevna klavzula o starostni razliki v obravnavani zadevi, drugače kakor sporna nacionalna pravila v sodbi Mangold, ni prenesla določbe Skupnosti niti ni bila sprejeta v obdobju za prenos Direktive 2000/78.
Does the situation in the main proceedings fall within the scope of Community law?
Ali položaj v postopku v glavni stvari spada na področje uporabe prava Skupnosti?
The Commission takes the opposite view.
Komisija zatrjuje nasprotno.
It notes that the Court has interpreted the scope of application of Community law very widely in situations concerning discrimination based on nationality in respect of the Treaty freedoms, although it accepts that the present case has no connection to the freedoms or to such discrimination.
Ugotavlja, da je Sodi�če v položajih, ki se nana�ajo na diskriminacijo na podlagi državljanstva glede svobo�čin Pogodbe, razlagalo področje uporabe prava Skupnosti zelo �iroko, čeprav se strinja s tem, da obravnavana zadeva nima nikakr�ne zveze s svobo�činami ali tako diskriminacijo.
The Commission considers that the fact that Article 13 EC is an empowering provision does not prevent it from providing the neces-
Po njenem mnenju dejstvo, da je člen 13 ES pooblastitvena določba, temu členu ne preprečuje zagotavljanja potrebne vezi s pravom Skupnosti. Sodi�če je
BSH, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom all submit that neither Article 13 EC nor, before the end of its period for transposition, Directive 2000/78 could bring the situation that gave rise to the main proceedings within the scope of Community law.
Družba BSH, Nemčija, Nizozemska in Združeno kraljestvo trdijo, da niti na podlagi člena 13 ES niti na podlagi Direktive 2000/78 pred iztekom roka za prenos ni bilo mogoče spraviti položaja, ki je pripeljal do vpra�anj za predhodno odločanje, na področje uporabe prava Skupnosti.
Article 13 EC is merely an empowering provision without direct effect.
Člen 13 ES je zgolj pooblastitvena določba brez neposrednega učinka.
If it were capable of providing the necessary link, it would in effect itself directly prohibit age discrimination, thus contradicting its express terms.
Če bi bil ta člen sposoben zagotoviti potrebno zvezo, bi v bistvu sam neposredno prepovedoval starostno diskriminacijo in bil tako v nasprotju s svojimi izrecnimi določbami.
As to Directive 2000/78, the transposition period, and indeed the very nature of a directive, mean that it cannot provide a link to Community law prior to the end of that period.
Kar zadeva Direktivo 2000/78, rok za prenos in dejansko sama narava direktive pomenita, da ni zagotovljena vez s pravom Skupnosti pred koncem tega obdobja.
The effects of a directive during its transposition period are limited to preventing a Member State from adopting incompatible
Učinki direktive v obdobju za njen prenos so omejeni na to, da preprečujejo državam članicam
On the general principle of equality and non-discrimination, see Case C-442/00 Caballero [2002] ECR I-11915, paragraphs 30 and 32, and Chacón Navas, cited in footnote 18, paragraph 56.
O splo�nem načelu enakosti in prepovedi diskriminacije glej zadevo Caballero, C-442/00, Recueil, str. I-11915, točki 30 in 32, in sodbo Chacón Navas, navedeno v opombi 18, točka 56.
See also Mangold, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 75.
Glej tudi sodbo Mangold, navedeno v opombi 2, točka 75.
That obligation is, however, limited by general principles of law, particularly legal certainty and non-retroactivity, and cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation contra legem: Case C-212/04 Adeneler and Others [2006] ECR I-6057, paragraphs 119 to 123.
Ta obveznost pa je omejena s splo�nimi načeli prava, zlasti z načelom pravne varnosti in prepovedi retroaktivnosti, in ne more biti podlaga za razlago nacionalnega prava contra legem – zadeva Adeneler in drugi, C-212/04, ZOdl., str. I-6057, točke od 119 do 123.
BARTSCH sary link with Community law. In Saldanha 56the Court found that an empowering Treaty provision 57brought a national rule within the scope of the Treaty.
62 mora se sklicevati na potrebno za prenos); v sodbi Saldanha 56 ugotovilo, da je na podlagi pooblastitvene določbe Pogodbe 57nacio- nekatere dovoljene izjeme na podlagi prava ES; 63 oziroma mora sicer spadati na področje nalna določba pre�la v področje uporabe Pogodbe.
58 implementation). 62It must invoke some permitted derogation under EC law.
58 uporabe prava Skupnosti, ker se za položaj uporablja posebno materialno pravilo prava ES. 64
I must begin by observing that general principles of Community law, though fundamental to the proper functioning of EC law, do not operate in the abstract.
Kot prvo moram poudariti, da splo�na načela prava Skupnosti, čeprav so temeljna za pravilno delovanje prava ES, ne delujejo v abstraktnem smislu.
59 Specifically, national measures can be reviewed on the basis of their compliance with such general principles only if they fall within the scope of Community law.
59Nacionalni ukrepi se lahko presodijo predvsem na podlagi njihove skladnosti s temi splo�nimi načeli le, kadar spadajo na področje uporabe prava Skupnosti.
60 For that to be the case, the provision of national law 61 at issue must in general fall into one of three categories.
60 Da bi �lo za tak primer, mora zadevna določba nacionalnega prava 61na
The national rules at issue in Mangold were measures of public law specifically enacted by the Member State in question (Germany) in order to implement a Community law obligation (the transposition of Directive 1999/70).
Zadevna nacionalna pravila v sodbi Mangold so bila ukrepi javnega prava, ki jih je posebej sprejela zadevna država članica (Nemčija), da bi izpolnila obveznost prava Skupnosti (prenos Direktive 1999/70).
The transposition period for that directive had long since expired.
Rok za prenos te direktive se je bil že davno iztekel.
There was, therefore, a Community law framework of relevant rules — Direct- ive 1999/70 and its implementation into national law — to which the general principle of equal treatment (including equal treatment irrespective of age) could be applied.
Zato je obstajal okvir upo�tevnih pravil prava Skupnosti – Direktiva 1999/70 in ukrepi za njeno izvajanje v nacionalno pravo –, za katera bi se lahko uporabilo splo�no načelo enakega obravnavanja (skupaj z enakim obravnavanjem ne glede na starost).
56 — Case C-122/96 [1997] ECR I-5325, paragraph 23.57 — Article 54(3)(g) of the EC Treaty (now Article 44(2)(g) EC).
I-5325, točka 23.57 – Člen 54(3)(g) Pogodbe ES (zdajčlen 44(2)(g) ES).58 – Komisija se o Direktivi 2000/78 ni izrekla.
64 — See, for example, Case C-71/02 Karner [2004] ECR I-3025, paragraphs 48 to 53 (potential impediment to intraCommunity trade); Case 804/79 Commission v United Kingdom [1981] ECR 1045, paragraphs 23 to 30 (Member States acting as trustees of the Community in an area of exclusive Community competence); Joined Cases C-286/94, C-340/95, C-401/95 and C-47/96 Molenheide and Others [1997] ECR I-7281, paragraphs 45 to 48 (measures adopted by a Member State in the exercise of its competences relating to VAT).
61 – Z „določbo nacionalnega prava“ imam v mislih pravilo javnega prava ali (če upo�tevno pravilo javnega prava le prena�a normativne pristojnosti na kvazijavne ali -zasebne organe) pravilo, ki v bistvu izhaja iz javnega prava in katerega socialne in politične odločitve se lahko �tejejo, da izražajo smernice, ki jih določijo javni organi držav članic (glej podrobno presojo Sodi�ča v zadevi Foster proti British Gas, C-188/89, Recueil, str. I-3313, točka 22, ki določa pogoje, v katerih se organ �teje za del „države“ pri vertikalnih neposrednih učinkih).
Seen in that light, the key paragraphs of the Court’s ruling in Mangold are rather easier to understand.
Sodi�če je po ugotovitvi, da splo�no načelo bila naloga nacionalnega sodi�ča, da uporabi temeljno načelo v zadevi, o kateri je odločalo, in da po potrebi razveljavi pravila nacionalnega prava, da se zagotovi učinkovito varstvo.
Having identified that the general principle of equality includes a prohibition on age discrimination, 65the Court first reminded itself of its duty to ‘provide all the criteria of interpretation needed by the national court to determine whether [national] rules are compatible with such a principle’ where ‘[those] rules fall within the scope of Community law’.
70 enakosti vključuje prepoved starostne diskriminacije, 65najprej spomnilo na svojo dolžnost, da mora „predložitvenemu sodi�ču posredovati vse elemente razlage, ki jih to potrebuje za presojo združljivosti [nacionalne] ureditve s takim načelom“, ko „[ta] ureditev preide na področje uporabe prava Skupnosti“.
66 The national rules in question were ‘a measure implementing Directive 1999/70’.
66Zadevna nacionalna pravila so bila „ukrep prenosa Direktive 1999/70“.
67They thus fell within the scope of Community law and also provided something on which the general principle of equality — here, prohibiting (arbitrary) age discrimination — could bite.
67Zato spadajo na področje uporabe prava Skupnosti in tudi zagotavljajo nekaj, na kar bi bilo mogoče opreti splo�no načelo enakosti – v tem primeru prepoved (samovoljne) starostne diskriminacije.
In the present case, there is no pertin- ent specific substantive rule of Community law governing the situation on which the general principle of equality can bite.
V obravnavani zadevi ne obstaja ustrezno posebno materialno pravilo, ki bi urejalo položaj, v katerem bi se bilo mogoče opreti na splo�no načelo enakosti.
Unlike Mangold, there are no national rules implementing a directive whose transposition period has already expired.
V nasprotju z zadevo Mangold ne obstajajo nacionalna pravila za izvajanje direktive, katere rok za prenos se je že iztekel.
There is no relevant Treaty provision or other Community secondary legislation.
Ne obstaja nobena upo�tevna določba Pogodbe ali druga sekundarna zakonodaja Skupnosti.
There is only Article 13 EC 71(which is an empowering provision lacking direct effect) and Direct-
Obstajata le člen 13 ES 71(ki je pooblastitvena določba brez neposred -nega učinka) in Direktiva 2000/78 (katere
Given that the general principles are fundamental to the whole system of Community law, it then followed that ‘observance of the general principle of equal treatment, in particular in respect of age, [could not] as such be conditional upon the expiry of the period allowed the Member States for the transposition of [Directive 2000/78]’.
Ker so splo�na načela temeljnega pomena za celoten sistem prava Skupnosti, je nato ugotovilo, da „spo�tovanje splo�nega načela enakega obravnavanja, zlasti ne glede na starost, kot tako ne [bi moglo] biti odvisno od izteka roka, ki države članice zavezuje za prenos [Direktive 2000/78]“. 68Njen
69In the particular context of Mangold, however, the general principle could be applied without further elaboration to the national
V posebnih okoli�činah zadeve Mangold pa je bilo mogoče uporabiti splo�no načelo brez podrobnej�e opredelitve nacionalnih pravil za izvajanje Direktive 1999/70. Zato je
71 — Contrary to what the Commission argues, the situation in the present case differs from the one in Saldanha, cited in footnote 56.
71 – V nasprotju s tem, kar trdi Komisija, se položaj v obravnavani zadevi razlikuje od tistega v sodbi Saldanha, navedeni v opombi.
In that case, the Court held that rules that, in the context of company law, seek to protect the interests of shareholders come within the scope of the Treaty and are for that reason subject to the prohibition on discrimination based on nationality.
V tej zadevi je Sodi�če razsodilo, da pravila, ki v okviru prava družb težijo k varstvu interesov delničarjev, sodijo v področje uporabePogodbe in zato velja zanje prepoved diskriminacije na podlagi državljanstva.
That was so because Article 44(2)(g) EC ‘empowers the Council and the Commission, for the purpose of giving effect to the freedom of establishment, to coordinate to the necessary extent the safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article [48 EC] with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community’ (paragraph 23).
To je bilo zato, ker člen 44(2)(g) ES „poobla�ča Svet in Komisijo, da za namene uveljavljanja svobode ustanavljanja usklajujeta, kolikor je to potrebno, za�čitne ukrepe, ki jih od družb ali podjetij iz drugega odstavka člena [48 ES] za za�čito interesov družbenikov in tretjih zahtevajo države članice, zato da bi te za�čitne ukrepe izenačili v vsej Skupnosti“ (točka 23).
This statement should be read within the context of an entire chapter of the EC Treaty on the right of establishment (Title III, Chapter 2), as well as, by the time the judgment in Saldanha was handed down (1997), a large legislative framework of directives: see in general V. Edwards, EC Company Law (1999) and, specifically on the scope of Article 44(2)(g) EC, pp. 5 to 9.
To navedbo je treba razlagati v okviru celotnega poglavja Pogodbe ES o svobodi ustanavljanja (naslov III, poglavje 2), kot tudi, do izreka sodbe Saldanha (1997), �irokega zakonodajnega okvira direktiv – glej na splo�no V.
That situation is clearly different from the present case.
Edwards, EC Company Law (1999), in zlasti o področju uporabe člena 44(2)(g) ES str. od 5 do 9.Ta položaj se očitno razlikuje od tistega v obravnavani zadevi.
65 — Paragraph 74.66 — Both quotations from paragraph 75.67 — Ibid.68 — Paragraph 76.69 — Ibid.
65 – Točka 74.66 – Oba navedka iz točke 75.67 – Ibid.68 – Točka 76.69 – Ibid.
BARTSCH ive 2000/78 (for which, at the material time, the transposition period was still running and which, accordingly, should be disregarded).
BARTSCH rok za prenos je v času dejanskega stanja v postopku v glavni stvari �e tekel in se zato ne uporablja).
The analysis thus far suffices, in my view, to answer the national court.
Po mojem mnenju zgornja presoja zadostuje za odgovor nacionalnemu sodi�ču.
In the remainder of this Opinion, I therefore examine questions 2 and 3 in the alternative (in case the Court should arrive at a different conclusion on question 1).
V nadaljevanju teh sklepnih predlogov bom zato podredno preučila vpra�anji 2 in 3 (če bo Sodi�če pri�lo do drugačnega zaključka pri vpra�anju 1).
In those circumstances, it is not possible to rely on the general principle of equality both to create an applicable substantive rule of Community law and to determine how that substantive rule should be applied.
V teh okoli�činah se ni mogoče sklicevati na splo�no načelo enakosti, da bi se ustvarilo veljavno materialno pravilo prava Skupnosti in da bi se ugotovilo, kako se slednje uporablja.
I therefore consider that there is no specific substantive rule of Community law that may serve as the basis for applying the general principle of equality to the situation giving rise to the reference.
Zato menim, da ne obstaja posebno materialno pravilo prava Skupnosti, ki bi lahko bilo podlaga za uporabo splo�nega načela enakosti za položaj, ki je pripeljal do vpra�anja za predhodno odločanje. V tem smislu bi odgovorila na vpra�anje 1(b).
By its second question, the referring court essentially asks whether the prohibition on age discrimination identified by the Court in Mangold can be applied horizontally. 72
Predložitveno sodi�če z drugim vpra�anjem v bistvu spra�uje, ali se lahko prepoved starostne diskriminacije, ki jo je Sodi�če ugotovilo v sodbi Mangold, uporablja horizontalno. 72
72 — It seems to me that it is a misnomer to use the term ‘direct effect’ (whether vertical or horizontal) to describe the impact of a general principle of Community law.
72 – Neprimerno se mi zdi uporabljati izraz „neposredni učinek“ (vertikalni ali horizontalni) za opisovanje učinka splo�nega načela prava Skupnosti.
‘Direct effect’ in a Treaty article or a provision in a directive means that the individual can take the clear, precise and nonconditional Community law text and rely on that text to override some contrary provision of national law (or to fill a lacuna).
„Neposredni učinek“ v členu Pogodbe ali določbi direktive pomeni, da se lahko posameznik sklicuje na jasno, določno in nepogojno pravno besedilo Skupnosti, da bi se razveljavila nasprotujoča določba nacionalnega prava (ali da bi se zapolnila praznina).
In contrast, a general principle of Community law is applied to a set of legislative rules and affects the interpretation to be given to them.
Nasprotno se splo�no načelo prava Skupnosti uporablja za vrsto pravnih pravil in vpliva na njihovo razlago.
Sometimes, it may mean that a particular interpretation is impermissible.
Včasih to lahko pomeni, da je določena razlaga nedopustna.
But the general principle does not, as such, act as a substitute for an existing legislative text.
Vendar splo�no načelo kot tako ne nadome�ča veljavnega zakonodajnega besedila.
To my mind, it is not, therefore, ‘directly effective’, although it unequivocally can, and sometimes does, affect the proper conclusion in law.
Po mojem mnenju zato ne „učinkuje neposredno“, čeprav nedvoumno lahko, in včasih dejansko, vpliva na pravilno pravno presojo.