natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
To that end, the French and Dutch national authorities declared that they would refrain from any intervention into the price setting of indirect services on a large number of routes (the socalled ‘sixth freedom’) and that they would ensure that third carriers have the right to a stopover in Amsterdam or Paris in order to o er destinations outside the EU ( h freedom). ese declarations are part of the AF/KLM decision.
V ta namen so francoski in nizozemski nacionalni organi izjavili, da se bodo vzdržali kakršnega koli posega v določanje cen indirektnih storitev pri velikem številu zračnih poti (tako imenovana „šesta svoboščina“) in da bodo zagotovili, da imajo tretji prevozniki pravico vmesnega pristanka v Amsterdamu ali Parizu, da ponudijo namembne kraje zunaj EU (peta svoboščina). Te izjave so del odločbe o AF/KLM.
On 20 April, the Commission received a notification of the proposed acquisition of the undertakings ish GmbH & Co KG, Germany, and ish KS NRW GmbH & Co KG, Germany (the latter two ‘ish’) by the German undertaking Kabel Deutschland GmbH, Germany (KDG). 264.
Komisija je 20. aprila prejela priglasitev predlaganega prevzema podjetij ish GmbH & Co KG, Nemčija, ter ish KS NRW GmbH & Co KG, Nemčija (oba „ish“) s strani nemškega podjetja Kabel Deutschland GmbH, Nemčija („KDG“). 264.
In the last-mentioned Land, ish is the operator of the broadband cable network.
V slednji deželi je operater širokopasovnega kabelskega omrežja družba ish.
Both companies o er, in their respective network areas, the transmission of broadcast signals (TV and radio) as well as Internet access.
Družbi vsaka na svojem področju zagotavljata prenos radiodifuznih signalov (TV in radio) ter dostop do spleta.
Contrary to the KDG/ish merger, these two concentrations fell within the competence of the national competition authority, the German Federal Cartel O ce (FCO).
Nasprotno kot pri združitvi družb KDG in ish sta ti dve koncentraciji spadali pod pristojnost nacionalnega organa za konkurenco, Nemškega zveznega urada za kartele (BKA).
Moreover, in the market for services for digital pay-TV, the market for delivery of signals from the regional broadband cable to the in-house cable systems and the market for the supply of signals to end customers, competition could in the view of the FCO be further impeded if ish were eliminated as competitor to KDG, which was considered already dominant in some regional markets.
Poleg tega so tri predlagane pripojitve k družbi KDG – tj. pripojitev družb ish, iesy Hessen in Kabel Baden-Württemberg – sprožile podobna vprašanja in bi jih zato moral enotno preučiti en sam organ za konkurenco.
It believed that the FCO was best placed to analyse the preliminary competition concerns, as this required the examination of local markets and specific national circumstances.
Zato se je Komisija 7. junija sklenila, da primer napoti na BKA.
On 4 June, the Commission decided to refer to the French competition authorities part of the proposed joint venture in the casinos sector between Accor, the Barrière-Desseigne family group and Colony. is partial referral concerned the assessment of the competitive impact of the transaction on the casino management markets in two French regions, Côte d’Azur and Basque and Landes Coasts.
Komisija je 4. junija sklenila, da bo na francoske organe za konkurenco napotila del predlaganega skupnega podjetja v sektorju igralništva med družbo Accor, družinsko skupino Barrière-Desseigne in družbo Colony. Ta delna napotitev je zadevala presojo učinka na konkurenco, ki bi ga imela transakcija na trgih upravljanja igralništva v dveh francoskih regijah, na Azurni obali ter obalah dežel Basque in Landes.
Based on this de nition, the transaction would have raised competition problems in the two above-mentioned French regions. e Commission therefore concluded that the French authorities were best placed to assess the e ects of the operation on these local markets and decided to refer their competitive assessment back to France.
Na podlagi te opredelitve bi transakcija sprožila težave glede konkurence v dveh zgoraj omenjenih francoskih regijah. Zato je Komisija sklenila, da so francoski organi v najboljšem položaju za presojo učinkov transakcije na te lokalne trge, in odločila, da presojo njihovega vpliva na konkurenco napoti nazaj na Francijo.
On 28 July, the French competition authorities cleared the transaction subject to remedies in the two referred markets. ese remedies consist of the divestment by
Francoski organi za konkurenco so 28. julija odobrili transakcijo v skladu z ukrepi na obeh navedenih trgih.
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1 the parties of two casinos, one on the Côte d’Azur and a second one in the Basque and Landes Coasts.
Ti ukrepi vključujejo odprodajo dveh igralnic s strani strank, ene na Azurni obali in druge na obali dežel Basque in Landes.
On 22 September, the German bearings manufacturer INA Holding Schaeffler KG (INA) and the US insurance group AIG notified to the Commission the joint acquisition of the French producer of precision bearings SNFA.
Nemški proizvajalec ležajev INA Holding Schaeffler KG („INA“) in zavarovalniška skupina AIG iz ZDA sta 22. septembra Komisiji priglasila skupen prevzem francoskega proizvajalca preciznih ležajev SNFA.
INA and SNFA are specialised in the production of precision anti-friction bearings.
Družbi INA in SNFA sta specializirani za proizvodnjo preciznih protitrenjskih ležajev.
AIG is an international insurance group without any activities in the bearings industry.
AIG je mednarodna zavarovalniška skupina brez dejavnosti v industriji ležajev. Precizni ležaji se uporabljajo
Precision bearings are mainly used in applications that require a very high degree of accuracy, in particular in the machine tool industry and in the aerospace sector.
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2004 – Zvezek 1 predvsem pri aplikacijah, ki zahtevajo visoko raven natančnosti, predvsem v industriji strojnega orodja ter v letalskem in vesoljskem sektorju.
On 23 October 2003, the Commission had opened an in-depth inquiry into the proposed transaction owing to concerns that the elimination of competition between the largest and second-largest suppliers of precision machine tool bearings in western Europe would give INA a dominant position. e Commission’s preliminary view based on the market investigation was that the transaction would significantly reduce competition in the market for machine tool angular contact ball bearings (ACBBs) in western Europe as it would have brought together the two largest players and the strongest overall in terms of quality, reliability, innovation and breadth of portfolio.
Komisija je 23. oktobra 2003 začela poglobljeno preiskavo predlagane transakcije zaradi pomislekov, da bi odstranitev konkurence med prvim in drugim največjim dobaviteljem preciznih ležajev za strojno orodje v zahodni Evropi postavila družbo INA v prevladujoči položaj. Po predhodnem mnenju Komisije, ki je temeljilo na preiskavi trga, bi transakcija precej zmanjšala konkurenco na trgu krogličnih ležajev za strojno orodje s kotnim stikom (ACBB) v zahodni Evropi, saj bi združila dva največja akterja, ki sta tudi na splošno najmočnejša v smislu kakovosti, zanesljivosti, inovacij in širine portfelja.
None of the remaining competitors, whether the Swedish supplier SKF or the Japanese company NSK, or other smaller players, would have been able to exert a sufficient and e ective competitive pressure on INA. e Commission also found that customers would be unlikely to exert a sufficient check on INA’s pricing strategy since most machine tool and spindle manufacturers are small businesses with limited bargaining power.
Noben od preostalih tekmecev, niti švedski dobavitelj SKF, niti japonska družba NSK, niti drugi manjši akterji, ne bi bil sposoben izvajati zadostnega in učinkovitega konkurenčnega pritiska na družbo INA. Komisija je tudi ugotovila, da stranke verjetno ne bi v zadostni meri preverjale strategije oblikovanja cen družbe INA, saj so proizvajalci strojnega orodja in vreten večinoma mala podjetja z omejeno pogajalsko močjo.
A nal decision, however, was not issued, since the parties abandoned the transaction in January 2004.
Vendar pa dokončna odločba ni bila izdana, saj so stranke januarja 2004 opustile transakcijo.
On 11 October, the Austrian companies RWA Rai eisen-Ware Austria AG (RWA) and AMI Agro Linz Melamine International GmbH (AMI) gave up the planned creation of the joint venture Inter-Fert Düngemittel GmbH (Inter-Fert) and withdrew the corresponding notification with the Commission. e establishment of the joint venture would have united the leading Austrian producer of fertilisers, AMI, with the most important agricultural wholesale organisation in Austria, RWA.
Avstrijski družbi RWA Rai eisen-Ware Austria AG („RWA“) in AMI Agro Linz Melamine International GmbH („AMI“) sta se 11. oktobra odrekli načrtovani ustanovitvi skupnega podjetja Inter-Fert Düngemittel GmbH („Inter-Fert“) in umaknili zadevno priglasitev pri Komisiji. Ustanovitev skupnega podjetja bi družbo AMI, vodilno avstrijsko proizvajalko gnojil, združila z družbo RWA, najpomembnejšo kmetijsko organizacijo za prodajo na debelo v Avstriji.
In neighbouring Bavaria, the Commission also identified competition concerns regarding the trade in fertilisers.
II – Nadzor združevanja tekmecev družbe BayWa s trga.
276. e Commission’s preliminary conclusion was that RWA alone had market shares in a range of 55 % to 65 % in the markets for certain types of fertiliser individually or all fertilisers together and that the operation would have removed AMI as an important competitor in the Austrian wholesale market.
To bi povzročilo okrepitev prevladujočega položaja družbe BayWa na bavarskih maloprodajnih trgih gnojil in precejšnje oviranje konkurence na večjem delu skupnega trga.
In order to eliminate the competition concerns with regard to Austria and Bavaria, the parties proposed commitments which, however, were not considered sufficient to eliminate the competition concerns for the a ected markets in Austria and Bavaria. is was confirmed when the commitments were market tested.
Da bi odpravili težave glede konkurence v zvezi z Avstrijo in Bavarsko, sta stranki predlagali zaveze, ki pa niso veljale kot zadostne za odpravo pomislekov glede prizadetih trgov v Avstriji in na Bavarskem. To je bilo potrjeno s tržnim preverjanjem zavez.
A er the parties were notified of the Commission’s institution of second phase proceedings they withdrew their notification. cation.
Potem ko sta bili stranki obveščeni, da je Komisija uvedla drugo fazo postopka, sta svojo priglasitev umaknili.
C SELECTED COURT CASES
C IZBRANE SODNE ZADEVE
Article 21(3) of the merger regulation (155) in the context of the examination of a notified concentration in the Secil/Holderbank/Cimpor case (156). In the Article 21(3) decision
Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti je 22. junija izdalo sodbo (154) v prid Komisije v primeru, povezanem z odločbo Komisije z dne 22. novembra 2000, sprejeto v skladu s členom 21(3) uredbe o združitvah (155), v okviru preučitve priglašene koncentracije v primeru Secil/Holderbank/Cimpor (156).
(‘the decision’), the Commission called on the Portuguese Government to take the necessary measures to comply with Community law and to withdraw two decisions (despachos of 5 July 2000 and 11 August 2000) which that government had taken to oppose, on the basis of national privatisation legislation, the proposed concentration, which had been notified to the Commission and had a Community dimension.
V členu 21(3) odločbe („odločba“) je Komisija pozvala portugalsko vlado, naj sprejme ustrezne ukrepe za uskladitev s pravom Skupnosti in prekliče dve odločbi (despachos z dne 5. julija 2000 in 11. avgusta 2000), ki jih je navedena vlada sprejela, da bi na podlagi nacionalne privatizacijske zakonodaje nasprotovala predlagani koncentraciji, ki je bila priglašena Komisiji in je imela razsežnost Skupnosti.
Case C-42/01 Portuguese Republic v Commission, not yet reported.Article 21(3) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, now Article 21(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004.COMP/M.2054.
Zadeva C-42/01, Portugalska republika proti Komisiji, sodba še neobjavljena v Recueil.Člen 21(3) Uredbe Sveta (EGS) št. 4064/89, zdaj člen 21(4) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004.COMP/M.2054.
Member States could easily avoid the scrutiny of the Commission by not communicating such measures.
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2004 – Zvezek 1 krepitve korporativne zmogljivosti in učinkovitosti nacionalnega proizvodnega aparata
By adopting the decisions declining to authorise the acquisition of more than 10 % of the shares in Cimpor, the Portuguese Republic, in the Commission’s view, in e ect prohibited the acquisition and thereby raised barriers to the freedom of establishment and free movement of capital enshrined in the Treaty, which could not be considered warranted under any essential grounds of public interest recognised in the caselaw of the Court.
S sprejetjem odločb o zavrnitvi odobritve nakupa več kot 10 % delnic družbe Cimpor je Portugalska republika po mnenju Komisije dejansko prepovedala pripojitev ter s tem postavila ovire na Pogodbi temelječi svobodi ustanavljanja in prostega pretoka kapitala, česar ne more upravičiti noben razlog javnega interesa, priznan v sodni praksi Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti.
In any event, the Portuguese Government had not advanced any such grounds. e interest underlying the two decisions of the Portuguese Minister of Finance, which were not notified to the Commission, contrary to Article 21(3) of the merger regulation, was thus found incompatible with Community law (158).
Poleg tega portugalska vlada tovrstnih razlogov sploh ni uveljavljala. Interes, ki je bil osnova za obe odločbi portugalskega ministra za nance, ki v nasprotju s členom 21(3) uredbe o združitvah nista bili sporočeni Komisiji, je bil tako spoznan za nezdružljivega z zakonodajo Skupnosti (158).
Objective of Decree Law No 380/93.It should be noted that, during the proceedings, on 4 June 2002, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in Case C-367/98.
Cilj Zakonskega odloka št. 380/93.Omeniti je treba, da je med postopkom Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti 4. junija 2002 izdalo sodbo v zadevi C-367/98.
In that action, the Commission challenged on the basis of internal market rules, inter alia, Portuguese Law No 11/90 (framework law on privatisation) as well as Decree Law No 380/93 (prior authorisation).
V tem sodnem postopku je Komisija na podlagi pravil notranjega trga med drugim izpodbijala portugalski zakon št. 11/90 (okvirni zakon o privatizaciji) in Zakonski odlok št. 380/93 (predhodno dovoljenje).
The Court found that the Portuguese rules provided for a manifestly discriminatory treatment of investors from other Member States with the e ect of restricting free movement of capital.
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da so portugalska pravila predvidevala očitno diskriminacijsko obravnavanje vlagateljev iz drugih držav članic, kar je imelo za posledico omejevanje prostega pretoka kapitala.
As to the argument based on the need to safeguard the nancial interests of the Portuguese Republic, the Court emphasised that it was settled caselaw that such economic grounds, put forward in support of a prior authorisation procedure, cannot serve as justification for restrictions on freedom of movement.
Glede argumenta, ki je temeljil na potrebi po zaščiti nančnih interesov Portugalske republike, je Sodišče poudarilo, da po ustaljeni sodni praksi takšni ekonomski razlogi, predloženi v podporo postopka za predhodno dovoljenje, ne morejo biti utemeljitev za omejevanje prostega pretoka.
By adopting and maintaining in force, in particular, Law No 11/90 and Decree Law No 380/93, the Portuguese Republic had failed to full its obligations under Article 73b (now Article 56) of the Treaty.
S sprejetjem in ohranjanjem veljavnosti predvsem Zakona št. 11/90 in Zakonskega odloka št. 380/93 Portugalska republika ni izpolnila svojih obveznosti v skladu s členom 73b (zdaj členom 56) Pogodbe.
Consequently, one of the essential questions for the Commission in these proceedings was whether the Commission had the competence to adopt an Article 21(3) decision under these circumstances or whether it should have reverted to an infringement procedure under Article 226 of the Treaty. e Commission maintained that Article 21(3) should be interpreted as covering a situation where the Member State has not communicated to the Commission the public interest, other than public security, plurality of the media or prudential rules, it intends to protect prior to taking the measures.
Naloga Komisije pri ugotavljanju interesov, zaščitenih z nacionalnimi ukrepi, lahko postane bolj negotova in zapletena, če ji ti interesi niso bili sporočeni, vendar pa ima Komisija vedno možnost, da zadevno državo članico zaprosi za informacije.
285. e Commission’s task in identifying the interests protected by the national measures may be made more uncertain and complex if these interests have not been communicated to it, but the Commission always has the possibility of asking the Member State concerned for information. e Court acknowledges that in this case the Commission also did so.
V takšnih primerih mora Komisija nujno najprej preučiti, ali so navedeni ukrepi utemeljeni z enim od interesov, navedenih v drugem pododstavku člena 21(3) uredbe o združitvah (javna varnost/pluralizem medijev/pravila nadzora).
In such cases, the Commission inevitably rst needs to examine whether those measures are justified by one of the interests specified in the second subparagraph of Article 21(3) of the merger regulation (public security/plurality of media/prudential rules). e Court thus concluded that, in adopting the contested decision, the Commission did not encroach on the jurisdiction of the Court or national courts and did not infringe Article 21(1) of the merger regulation, Article 220 of the Treaty and Article 226 of the Treaty, nor did it commit any misuse of procedure.
Sodišče je tako sklenilo, da Komisija pri sprejemanju izpodbijane odločbe ni posegla v pristojnost Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti ali nacionalnih sodišč ter ni kršila člena 21(1) uredbe o združitvah, člena 220 Pogodbe in člena 226 Pogodbe, niti ni na noben način prekršila pravil postopka.
In this judgment, the Court clearly emphasised the precise allocation of competencies between the national and Community authorities and interventions that can be made by the national and by the Community authorities with a view to e cient merger control respecting sound administration, legal certainty and the legitimate interests of the undertakings concerned.
V tej sodbi je Sodišče jasno poudarilo jasno razmejitev pristojnosti med nacionalnimi organi in organi Skupnosti ter posege, ki jih lahko opravijo nacionalni organi in organi Skupnosti zaradi učinkovitega nadzora združevanja ob upoštevanju dobrega upravljanja, pravne varnosti in legitimnega interesa zadevnih podjetij.
Most importantly, the Court recognises Article 21(3) as being a lex specialis taking priority over an action for failure to full obligations under Article 226 of the Treaty.
Najpomembneje je, da Sodišče priznava člen 21(3) kot lex specialis, ki ima prednost pred ukrepanjem zaradi neizpolnjevanja obveznosti po členu 226 Pogodbe.
On 28 September, the Court of First Instance (CFI) delivered a judgment (159) annulling on procedural grounds the Commission decision of 28 June 2000 (‘the decision’) in the MCI/Sprint case (160) following an appeal by MCI.
Sodišče prve stopnje je 28. septembra po pritožbi družbe MCI izdalo sodbo (159) o razveljavitvi odločbe Komisije z dne 28. junija 2000 („odločba“) v primeru MCI/Sprint (160) zaradi postopkovnih razlogov.
In the decision, the Commission had prohibited the merger between MCI, formerly MCI WorldCom, and Sprint, both US-based global communications companies, on the ground that it would lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in the global market for the provision of top-level or universal Internet connectivity.
V odločbi je Komisija prepovedala združitev družb MCI, prej MCI WorldCom, in Sprint, ki imata sedež v ZDA ter se ukvarjata z globalnimi komunikacijami, ker naj bi ta vodila k ustvarjanju ali krepitvi prevladujočega položaja na svetovnem trgu zagotavljanja vrhunske ali univerzalne internetne povezljivosti.
In substance, MCI claimed that the Commission lacked the competence to adopt the decision on 28 June 2000, when the notifying parties had formally withdrawn their notification on 27 June by a letter saying: ‘e parties no longer propose to implement the proposed merger in the form presented in the notification.
V bistvu je družba MCI trdila, da Komisija ni imela pristojnosti za sprejetje odločbe z dne 28. junija 2000, ko sta priglasitelja 27. junija uradno preklicala svojo priglasitev v dopisu z naslednjo vsebino: „Stranki nič več ne predlagata izvršitve predlagane združitve v obliki, ki je predstavljena v priglasitvi.
Case T-310/00 MCI v Commission, not yet reported.COMP/M.1741.
Zadeva T-310/00, MCI proti Komisiji, sodba še neobjavljena v Recueil.COMP/M.1741.
It further stated that the Commission could not base its competence on its subjective view of the intentions of the parties to pursue a merger and pointed out that, if the Commission had doubts as to the meaning of the letter, it could have asked for formal proof that the merger agreement had really been abandoned by means of a request pursuant to Article 11 of the merger regulation.
Nadalje navaja, da Komisija ne bi mogla utemeljiti svoje pristojnosti na svojem subjektivnem pogledu na namere strank, da uresničita združitev, in poudarja, da bi Komisija, če je dvomila o pomenu dopisa, lahko zahtevala uradno dokazilo, da se je od sporazuma o združitvi zares odstopilo, in sicer z zahtevo v skladu s členom 11 uredbe o združitvah.
Number of nal decisions adopted each year since 1998 and number of notications
Število dokončnih odločb, sprejetih vsako leto od leta 1998, in število priglasitev
Breakdownby typeofoperation(1995–2004)
Razčlenitev po vrsti transakcije (1995–2004)
Others6 %
Ponudba za
Joint venture/control42 %
Skupno podjetje/nadzor podjetje/nadzor
Acquisition of majority45 %
Pridobitev večinskega deleža večinskega deleža
III SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS
III RAZVOJ DOGODKOV PO SEKTORJIH
A LIBERALISED SECTORS
A LIBERALIZIRANI SEKTORJI
In particular, the Commission established an ECN energy subgroup and liaised regularly with energy regulators (161).
Komisija je predvsem ustanovila Podskupino ECN za energetiko in se redno povezovala z zakonodajalci na energetskem področju (161).
As far as the legislative process is concerned, 2004 was the year in which the directives adopted by the Commission in 2003 in order to accelerate the completion of the internal gas and electricity markets were to be transposed by the Member States.
V zvezi z zakonodajnim postopkom je treba omeniti, da je bilo leto 2004 tisto leto, v katerem naj bi bile direktive, ki jih je Komisija sprejela leta 2003, da bi pospešila uresničitev notranjega trga plina in elektrike, prenesene v zakonodajo držav članic.
In the Gaz de France case (162) the Commission confirmed by formal decision that territorial restriction clauses infringe Article 81 EC.
V primeru Gaz de France (162) je Komisija s formalno odločbo potrdila, da klavzule omejevanja ozemlja kršijo člen 81 ES.
Such clauses, traditionally included in gas supply and transportation/service contracts prevent customers from obtaining gas supplies from operators established in other Member States and constitute a sizeable obstacle to the creation of a genuinely competitive and integrated gas market at European level.
Takšne klavzule, ki so tradicionalno vključene v pogodbe o dobavi plina ter pogodbe o transportu/nudenju storitev, uporabnikom preprečujejo, da bi jim plin dobavljali operaterji s sedežem v drugih državah članicah, ter pomenijo precejšnjo oviro pri oblikovanju pristno konkurenčnega in integriranega trga plina na evropski ravni.
See above section I.C.3.See above point 81.COMP/36.246.IP/04/573.IP/03/1129.IP/01/1641.IP/03/547.
Glej zgornji oddelek I.C.3.Glej spodnjo točko 81.COMP/36.246.IP/04/573.IP/03/1129.IP/01/1641.IP/03/547.