natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It should be stated, at the outset, that by its first plea, even though it has formally pleaded an error in law, the appellant is seeking, in essence, to call into question the factual assessment carried out by the Court of First Instance and, in particular, to dispute the probative value of a number of facts which led the Court of First Instance to find that OHIM was not obliged to undertake additional research where it was sufficiently certain as regards the descriptive character of the components EURO and HYPO and of the word EUROHYPO.
Najprej je treba ugotoviti, da pritožnica s prvim pritožbenim razlogom, tudi če formalno navaja napačno uporabo prava, želi izpodbijati presojo dejstev, ki jo je opravilo Sodi�če prve stopnje, in zlasti izpodbijati dokazno vrednost določenih dejstev, ki so pripeljala slednje do ugotovitve, da UUNT ni bil dolžan izvesti dodatnih raziskav, saj je bil dovolj prepričan o opisnosti sestavnih delov „EURO“ in „HYPO“ ter izraza „EUROHYPO“.
It follows from settled caselaw that the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to establish the facts or, in principle, to examine the evidence which the Court of First Instance accepted in support of those facts.
Iz ustaljene sodne prakse pa izhaja, da Sodi�če ni pristojno za ugotavljanje dejstev niti načeloma za presojo dokazov, ki jih je Sodi�če prve stopnje sprejelo v podporo tem dejstvom.
Provided that the evidence has been properly obtained and the general principles of law and the rules of procedure in relation to the burden of proof and the taking of evidence have been observed, it is for the Court of First Instance alone to assess the value which should be attached to the evidence produced to it.
Če so bili dokazi pridobljeni zakonito in če so bila upo�tevana splo�na pravna načela in postopkovna pravila glede dokaznega bremena in izvajanja dokazov, je Sodi�če prve stopnje izključno pristojno za presojo vrednosti elementov, ki so mu bili predloženi.
However, it must be pointed out that, in the context of the first plea, the appellant limits itself to challenging the assessment of the facts carried out by OHIM in the contested decision and, in particular, the alleged incomplete nature of that assessment.
Treba pa je ugotoviti, da je pritožnica v okviru tega pritožbenega razloga zgolj izpodbijala analizo dejstev, ki jo je opravil UUNT v sporni odločbi, in zlasti domnevno nepopolnost take analize.
By contrast, it has not shown, nor even alleged, that the Court of First Instance carried out a clearly incorrect assessment of the evidence.
Nasprotno pa ni dokazala niti zatrjevala, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje očitno napačno presodilo dokaze.
Therefore, the first plea in law must be held to be inadmissible.
Zato je treba prvi pritožbeni razlog razglasiti za nedopustnega.
The second plea in law
Drugi pritožbeni razlog
By its second plea, the appellant claims that the Court of First Instance erred in law in the interpretation of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94.
Z drugim pritožbenim razlogom pritožnica navaja, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje pri razlagi člena 7(1)(b) Uredbe �t. 40/94 napačno uporabilo pravo.
That plea is divided into three separate parts.
Ta pritožbeni razlog se deli na tri ločene dele.
By the first part, the appellant criticises the Court of First Instance for failing to take into account the overall impression produced by the EUROHYPO mark.
S prvim delom tega pritožbenega razloga pritožnica Sodi�ču prve stopnje očita, da ni upo�tevalo, kak�en je celotni vtis, ki ga daje znamka EUROHYPO.
EUROHYPO v OHIM second part, the appellant claims that the Court of First Instance incorrectly interpreted the criteria for refusal of registration set out in Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation No 40/94.
EUROHYPO PROTI UUNT razlagalo merila za zavrnitev registracije, ki so določena v členu 7(1)(b) in (c) Uredbe �t. 40/94.
Finally, as regards the third part, the appellant maintains that the Court of First Instance incorrectly applied the principles identified in the Baby-Dry judgment.
Nazadnje, v okviru tretjega dela tega pritožbenega razloga pritožnica trdi, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno uporabilo načela, ki so se izoblikovala v zgoraj navedeni sodbi Baby-dry.
The first part of the second plea
Prvi del drugega pritožbenega razloga
— Arguments of the parties
– Trditve strank
According to the appellant, the Court of First Instance examined only the descriptive character of the components EURO and HYPO taken separately, and examined the overall impression produced by the mark only as a secondary issue.
Pritožnica trdi, da je Sodi�če analiziralo le opisnost sestavnih delov „EURO“ in „HYPO“ ločeno, pri čemer je le podredno preučilo vtis, ki ga daje znamka kot celota.
The Court of First Instance based its decision, in the judgment under appeal, on the presumption that, where the components which comprise a composite mark are descriptive, the mark as a whole is, in principle, also descriptive.
Sodi�če prve stopnje naj bi se v izpodbijani sodbi oprlo na domnevo, v skladu s katero velja, da če so deli sestavljene znamke opisni, je znamka kot celota načeloma tudi opisna.
OHIM contests that line of argument contending that the Court of First Instance devoted a part of its reasoning precisely to the direct and specific assessment of the distinctive character of the compound trade mark as a whole and did not rely solely on a presumption.
UUNT izpodbija to argumentacijo in trdi, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje del svoje presoje namenilo prav neposredni in posebni presoji razlikovalnega učinka sestavljene znamke kot celote in se ni oprlo zgolj na domnevo.
As regards a compound trade mark, such as that at issue in the present case, the assessment of its distinctive character cannot be limited to an evaluation of each of its words or components, considered in isolation, but must, on any view, be based on the overall perception of that mark by the relevant public and not on the presumption that elements individually devoid of distinctive character cannot, on being combined, have a distinctive character (see, to that effect, Case C-329/02 P SAT.1 v OHIM [2004] ECR I-8317, paragraph 35).
V zvezi s sestavljeno znamko, kot je ta v obravnavanem primeru, presoja njenega razlikovalnega učinka ne more zajemati le analize vsakega od njenih izrazov ali delov ločeno, ampak se mora v vsakem primeru opreti na to, kako to znamko kot celoto zaznava upo�tevna javnost, in ne na domnevo, da sestavni deli, ki so ločeno brez razlikovalnega učinka, združeni ne morejo imeti takega učinka (v tem smislu glej sodbo z dne 16. septembra 2004 v zadevi SAT.1 proti UUNT, C-329/02 P, ZOdl., str. I-8317, točka 35).
The mere fact that each of those elements, considered separately, is devoid of any distinctive character does not mean that their combination cannot present such character (Case C-37/03 P BioID v OHIM [2005] ECR I-7975, paragraph 29).
Zgolj okoli�čina, da je vsak od sestavnih delov ločeno brez razlikovalnega učinka, namreč ne izključuje, da ima lahko kombinacija teh delov tak učinek (sodba z dne 15. septembra 2005 v zadevi BioID proti UUNT, C-37/03 P, ZOdl., str. I-7975, točka 29).
At paragraph 54 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance rightly held that in order to assess the distinctive character of a compound mark, not only must the various elements of which it is composed be examined but also the mark as a whole.
V točki 54 izpodbijane sodbe pa je Sodi�če prve stopnje pravilno ugotovilo, da je za presojo opisnosti sestavljene znamke treba preučiti ne samo različne dele, iz katerih je sestavljena, ampak tudi znamko kot celoto.
Admittedly, in the same paragraph, the Court of First Instance stated that a mark consisting of a word composed of elements, each of which is descriptive of the characteristics of those goods or services in respect of which registration is sought, is itself descriptive of the characteristics of those goods and services.
V isti točki 54 je Sodi�če prve stopnje res potrdilo, da znamka, sestavljena iz besede, ki je sestavljena iz delov, ki oba opisujeta lastnosti proizvodov ali storitev, za katere se zahteva registracija, tudi sama opisuje lastnosti teh proizvodov ali storitev.
However, that finding did not affect the analysis of the Court of First Instance on that point, since it did not limit itself to assessing, as a secondary issue, the overall impression produced by the trade mark applied for, but devoted a part of its reasoning to evaluating, with regard to a compound mark, the descriptive character of the sign as a whole.
Ne glede na to, ta ugotovitev ni vplivala na preučitev Sodi�ča prve stopnje v tem delu, saj vtisa, ki ga ustvarja celotna prijavljena znamka, ni preučilo le podredno, ampak je namenilo del obrazložitve presoji opisnosti celotnega znaka sestavljene znamke.
At paragraph 55 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance held that the impression created by the mark at issue was not sufficiently far removed from that produced by the mere combination of the elements of which it is composed to amount to more than the sum of its parts and that the appellant had not shown that that compound word had become part of everyday language and had acquired a meaning of its own.
V točki 55 izpodbijane sodbe je Sodi�če prve stopnje namreč presodilo, da vtis, ki ga daje zadevna znamka, ni dovolj oddaljen od vtisa preproste združitve delov, ki jo sestavljata, da bi pomenila več kot le vsoto svojih sestavnih delov, in da pritožnica ni dokazala, da bi ta beseda postala del vsakdanje rabe in bi v vsakdanji rabi pridobila lasten pomen.
Moreover, at paragraph 56 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance examined whether the mark at issue was a lexical invention which had an unusual structure, finding that that was not the case.
Poleg tega je Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 56 te sodbe preučilo, ali je zadevna znamka leksikalni izum nenavadne zgradbe, in ugotovilo, da ni tako.
Finally, at paragraph 57 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance held that the mark EUROHYPO, considered as a whole, was descriptive of the services in question.
Na koncu, v točki 57 izpodbijane sodbe je Sodi�če prve stopnje ugotovilo, da je znamka „EUROHYPO“ kot celota za zadevne storitve opisna.
Therefore, the Court of First Instance cannot be criticised for not having verified whether the mark, taken as a whole, had a descriptive character or for having done so merely as a secondary point.
Zato Sodi�ču prve stopnje ni mogoče očitati, da ni preverilo, ali je znamka kot celota opisna, oziroma da je to preverilo le podredno.
It follows that the first part of the second plea in law must be rejected as unfounded.
Zato je treba prvi del prvega pritožbenega razloga zavrniti kot neutemeljen.
The second part of the second plea
Drugi del drugega pritožbenega razloga
The appellant claims that the Court of First Instance incorrectly applied, in an assessment carried out on the basis of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94, a crite-
Pritožnica trdi, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje pri analizi, ki je bila opravljena na podlagi člena 7(1)(b) Uredbe �t. 40/94, napačno uporabilo merilo, ki je upo�tevno le pri
2008 — CASE C-304/06 P rion which is relevant solely for the purposes of the application of Article 7(1)(c) of that regulation.
2008 – ZADEVA C-304/06 P uporabi člena 7(1)(c) te uredbe.
The Court of First Instance held that a compound mark composed of descriptive elements met the conditions for registration where the word in question had become part of everyday language and had acquired a meaning of its own, whereas, according to the appellant, that criterion is relevant only in the context of the application of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je namreč presodilo, da znamka, sestavljena iz opisnih sestavnih delov, izpolnjuje pogoje za registracijo, če je zadevna beseda postala del vsakdanje rabe in če je v vsakdanji rabi pridobila lasten pomen, medtem ko – kot trdi pritožnica – je to merilo upo�tevno le v okviru uporabe člena 7(1)(c) navedene uredbe.
The appellant also maintains that while it is true that there is overlap between the respective scope of the grounds for refusal set out in Article 7(1)(b) to (d) of Regulation No 40/94, that does not relieve the Court of First Instance of having to interpret, independently, the grounds for refusal in the light of the different general interest objectives pursued by each of those provisions.
Pritožnica poleg tega poudarja, da čeprav obstaja prekrivanje področij uporabe, ki so navedena v členu 7(1), od (b) do (d), Uredbe �t. 40/94, je Sodi�če prve stopnje vseeno dolžno samostojno razlagati razloge za zavrnitev z vidika različnih ciljev splo�nega interesa, ki jih zasleduje vsaka od teh določb.
OHIM replies to those arguments by stating that the scope of the grounds for refusal set out in Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation No 40/94 are overlapping and, by that token, a descriptive sign normally falls within the scope of the grounds for refusal set out in both provisions.
UUNT na te trditve odgovarja, da se področji uporabe določb člena 7(1)(b) in (c) Uredbe �t. 40/94 ujemata in da zato opisni znak po navadi spada na področje uporabe obeh določb.
Therefore, the Court of First Instance did not err in law in interpreting Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94.
Zato naj Sodi�če prve stopnje v okviru razlage člena 7(1)(b) navedene uredbe ne bi napačno uporabilo prava.
It must, first, be borne in mind that, while the Court of Justice has had occasion to find a degree of overlap between the respective scope of the absolute grounds for
Najprej je treba spomniti na to, da čeprav je Sodi�če že poudarilo, da obstaja dolo -čeno prekrivanje področij uporabe absolutnih razlogov za zavrnitev registracije
The Court of Justice has also had occasion to make it clear that the various grounds for refusal must be interpreted in the light of the public interest underlying each of them.
Sodi�če je prav tako že pojasnilo, da je treba omenjene razloge za zavrnitev razlagati v smislu splo�nega interesa, ki je podlaga za vsakega od njih.
The public interest taken into account in the examination of each of those grounds for refusal may, or even must, reflect different considerations, depending upon which ground for refusal is at issue (Henkel v OHIM, paragraphs 45 and 46; SAT.1 v OHIM, paragraph 25; and BioID v OHIM, paragraph 59).
Splo�ni interes, ki se ga upo�teva pri preizkusu vsakega od teh razlogov za zavrnitev, lahko odraža različne ugotovitve o zadevnih razlogih za zavrnitev in jih celo mora odražati (zgoraj navedene sodbe Henkel proti UUNT, točki 45 in 46; SAT.1 proti UUNT, točka 25, in BioID proti UUNT, točka 59).
In that regard, it should be noted that the notion of general interest underlying Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 is, manifestly, indissociable from the essential function of a trade mark, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked product or service to the consumer or end-user by enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the product or service from others which have another origin (SAT.1 v OHIM, paragraphs 23 to 27, and BioID v OHIM, paragraph 60).
V zvezi s tem je treba poudariti, da se pojem splo�nega interesa, ki ga vsebuje člen 7(1)(b) Uredbe �t. 40/94, očitno zamenjuje z bistveno nalogo znamke, ki je zagotoviti potro�niku ali končnemu uporabniku istovetnost izvora proizvoda ali storitve, ki ju znamka označuje, in mu omogočiti, da ta proizvod ali storitev brez možnosti zmede razlikuje od tistih, ki izvirajo od drugod (zgoraj navedeni sodbi SAT.1 proti UUNT, točki 23 in 27, in BioID proti UUNT, točka 60).
In the present case, the reasoning followed by the Court of First Instance is based on an incorrect interpretation of the principles mentioned in paragraphs 54 to 56 of this judgment.
V tem primeru pa presoja Sodi�ča prve stopnje izhaja iz napačne razlage načel, navedenih v točkah od 54 do 56 te sodbe.
It is apparent from paragraphs 45, 54, 55 and 57 of the judgment under appeal that the Court of First Instance assessed the distinctive character of the mark EUROHYPO by carrying out solely an analysis of its descriptive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94.
Treba je namreč ugotoviti, da iz točk 45, 54, 55 in 57 izpodbijane sodbe izhaja, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje presojo razlikovalnega učinka znamke „EUROHYPO“ opravilo samo z eno analizo njene opisnosti v smislu člena 7(1)(c) Uredbe �t. 40/94.
Consequently, the judgment under ap - peal contains no separate examination of the ground for refusal laid down in Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation on the basis of which, however, the Court of First Instance rejected the second plea, raised at first instance, against the contested decision.
Zato ta sodba ne vsebuje nobene posamezne preučitve razloga za zavrnitev iz člena 7(1)(b) iste uredbe, na podlagi katere pa je Sodi�če prve stopnje zavrnilo drugi tožbeni razlog, uveljavljan na prvi stopnji zoper sporno odločbo.
In so doing, the Court of First Instance assessed the mark EUROHYPO without, in particular, taking into account the public interest which Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 aims specifically to protect, that is, to guarantee the identity of the origin of the designated product or service.
S tem je Sodi�če prve stopnje analiziralo znamko EUROHYPO, ne da bi pri tem upo�tevalo zlasti splo�ni interes, ki ga posebej varuje člen 7(1)(b) Uredbe �t. 40/94, in sicer zagotoviti istovetnost izvora proizvoda ali storitve, ki ju znamka označuje.
Moreover, in the context of such an assessment, the Court of First Instance used an incorrect criterion to determine whether the mark in question could be registered.
Poleg tega je Sodi�če prve stopnje v okviru take analize uporabilo napačno merilo za presojo, ali je mogoče zadevno znamko registrirati.
According to that criterion, a mark composed of descriptive elements could meet the conditions for registration where the word has become a part of everyday language and has acquired a meaning of its own.
Na podlagi tega merila bi znamka, sestavljena iz opisnih sestavnih delov, lahko izpolnjevala pogoje za registracijo, če je beseda postala del vsakdanje rabe in v vsakdanji rabi pridobila lasten pomen.
But, while that criterion is relevant in the context of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94, it cannot form a basis for the interpretation of Article 7(1)(b).
Vendar pa čeprav je to merilo upo�tevno v okviru točke (c) člena 7(1) Uredbe �t. 40/94, se na njegovi podlagi ne sme razlagati točke (b) tega člena.
Although that criterion permits excluding the use of a trade mark to describe a product or a service, nevertheless, it does not allow it to be determined whether a mark is capable of guaranteeing the identity of the origin of the designated product or service to the consumer or end user.
Čeprav to merilo omogoča izključitev uporabe znamke za opis proizvoda ali storitve, pa ne omogoča ugotovitve, ali znamka lahko zagotovi potro�niku ali končnemu uporabniku istovetnost izvora proizvoda ali storitve, ki ju označuje.
In those circumstances, the appellant is right to claim that the judgment under appeal is vitiated by an error in law in the interpretation of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94.
V teh okoli�činah pritožnica utemeljeno trdi, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje pri razlagi člena 7(1)(b) Uredbe �t. 40/94 napačno uporabilo pravo.
It follows from the foregoing, without it being necessary to examine the third part of the second plea of the appeal, that the judgment under appeal must be set aside inasmuch as the Court of First Instance held that the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM did not infringe Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 by refusing, in the contested decision, to register the term EUROHYPO as a Community trade mark for the services, ‘financial affairs, monetary affairs, real estate affairs, provision of financial services, financing …’, in Class 36 of the Nice Agreement.
Iz navedenega izhaja, ne da bi bilo treba preučiti tretji del drugega pritožbenega razloga, da je treba izpodbijano sodbo razveljaviti v delu, v katerem je Sodi�če prve stopnje presodilo, da četrti odbor za pritožbe UUNT, s tem ko je s sporno odločbo zavrnil registracijo izraza „EUROHYPO“ kot znamko Skupnosti za storitve iz razreda 36 v smislu Nicejskega aranžmaja, „[f]inančni posli; denarni posli; posli v zvezi s posredovanjem nepremičnin, finančne storitve, financiranje […]“, ni kr�il člena 7(1)(b) Uredbe �t. 40/94.
The action before the Court of First Instance
Tožba pred Sodiščem prve stopnje
Pursuant to the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, the Court of Justice, where it has quashed the decision of the Court of First Instance, may itself give final judgment in the matter, where the state of the proceedings so admits.
V skladu s členom 61, prvi odstavek, druga poved, Statuta Sodi�ča lahko Sodi�če v primeru razveljavitve odločbe Sodi�ča prve stopnje samo odloči o zadevi, če se o njej lahko odloči.
Such is the case in the present proceedings.
V tem primeru je tako.
As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind, as is apparent from paragraph 56 of this judgment, that for a trade mark to possess a distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94, it must serve to identify the product in respect of which registration is applied for as originating from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish that product from those of other undertakings (Henkel v OHIM, paragraph 34 and the caselaw cited).
Najprej je treba poudariti, da tako kot izhaja iz točke 56 te sodbe, razlikovalni učinek znamke v smislu člena 7(1)(b) Uredbe �t. 40/94 pomeni, da je ta znamka primerna, da proizvode, za katere se zahteva registracija, označuje kot proizvode, ki izhajajo iz določenega podjetja, in jih tako razlikuje od proizvodov drugih podjetij (zgoraj navedena sodba Henkel proti UUNT, točka 34 in navedena sodna praksa).
In that regard, it is apparent from settled caselaw that that distinctive character must be assessed, first, by reference to the products or services in respect of which registration has been applied for and, second, by reference to the perception of the relevant public (Joined Cases C-473/01 P and C-474/01 P Procter & Gamble v OHIM [2004] ECR I-5173, paragraph 33, and Case C-25/05 P Storck v OHIM [2006] ECR I-5719, paragraph 25). 68
V zvezi s tem izhaja iz ustaljene sodne prakse, da je ta razlikovalni učinek treba presojati po eni strani glede na proizvode ali storitve, za katere se zahteva registracija, in po drugi strani glede na to, kako ga zaznava upo�tevna javnost (sodbi z dne 29. aprila 2004 v združenih zadevah Procter & Gamble proti UUNT, C-473/01 P in C-474/01 P, Recueil, str. I-5173, točka 33, in z dne 22. junija 2006 v zadevi Storck proti UUNT, C-25/05 P, ZOdl., str. I-5719, točka 25). 68
In the present case, it should be noted that, as the Board of Appeal stated in the contested decision, without it being disputed by the appellant, the relevant services are aimed at all consumers.
V tem primeru je treba ugotoviti, kot je v sporni odločbi poudaril odbor za pritožbe, ne da bi mu pritožnica nasprotovala, da so zadevne storitve namenjene vsem potro�nikom.
Moreover, it is common ground that the absolute ground for refusal was invoked only in relation to one of the languages spoken in the European Union, namely German.
Poleg tega ni sporno, da je bil absolutni razlog za zavrnitev uveljavljan le v zvezi z enim jezikom Evropske unije, in sicer nem�čino.
Consequently, the relevant public against which the distinctive character of the trade mark must be measured is the average Germanspeaking consumer, reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect.
Zato je upo�tevna javnost, glede na katero je treba presoditi razlikovalni učinek znamke, povprečen nem�ki potro�nik, ki je normalno obve�čen in razumno pazljiv ter preudaren.