natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
My analysis of this question would be the same if, contrary to what I have set out above, there were a specific principle of Community law prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age (rather than a general principle of equal treatment that includes equal treatment irrespective of age).
Moja presoja tega vpra�anja bi bila enaka, če bi v nasprotju s tem, kar sem navedla zgoraj, obstajalo posebno načelo prava Skupnosti, ki bi prepovedovalo diskriminacijo zaradi starosti (namesto splo�nega načela enakega obravnavanja, ki vključuje enako obravnavanje ne glede na starost).
Can general principles of Community law be applied horizontally?
Ali se lahko splošna načela prava Skupnosti uporabljajo horizontalno?
The question is whether any general principle of Community law is, or should be, capable of horizontal application.
Vpra�anje je, ali se katero koli splo�no načelo Skupnosti uporablja ali bi se lahko uporabljalo horizontalno.
It is trite Community law that general principles of law are capable of being invoked vertically against the State.
V skladu z ustaljenim pravom Skupnosti se je mogoče sklicevati na splo�na pravna načela vertikalno nasproti državi.
Thus for example the Court has held that various national measures were precluded by Community law on the basis that they were incompatible with the general principle of equal treatment 73 or with specific manifestations of that principle, such as the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality in various contexts, 74respect for fundamental rights, 75the prin- ciple of the protection of legitimate expecta-
Tako je na primer Sodi�če razsodilo, da je pravo Skupnosti nasprotovalo različnim nacionalnim ukrepom, ker niso bili v skladu s splo�nim načelom enakega obravnavanja 73ali s posebnimi pojavnimi oblikami tega načela, kot so prepoved diskriminacije zaradi državljanstva v različnih okoli�činah, 74spo�tovanje temeljnih pravic, 75načelo varstva legitimnih pričakovanj 76in načelo sorazmernosti. 77
In Bostock, the Court held that the principle of equal treatment could not, in a situ -ation arising from the Community milk quota regime, bring about retroactive modification of the relations between the parties to a lease, inter alia, by means of direct effect.
Sodi�če je v sodbi Bostock razsodilo, da načelo enakega obravnavanja v položaju, ki je izhajal iz Skupnostne ureditve mlečnih kvot, ni moglo povzročiti retroaktivne spremembe razmerja med strankama najemne pogodbe, med drugim, z neposrednim učinkom.
78In Otto, the protection against admission of an infringement of Community competition rules, as part of the rights of defence of an individual, was held not to apply in a situation between two private parties. 79
78 V sodbi Otto je razsodilo, da varstvo proti priznanju kr�itve skupnostnih pravil o konkurenci, kot del posameznikovih pravic obrambe, ne velja v razmerju med dvema zasebnima subjektoma. 79
I do not think that those two judgments necessarily establish that general principles of Community law can never apply horizontally.
Menim, da ti sodbi nujno ne ugotavljata, da splo�nih načel prava Skupnosti ni mogoče nikoli uporabljati horizontalno.
To have applied the principle of equal
Če bi se v zadevi Bostock uporabilo načelo enakega
76 — See, for example, Case C-62/00 Marks & Spencer [2002] ECR I-6325 (legitimate expectations in the context of a new national limitation period within which repayment of sums collected in breach of Community law may be sought). 78 — Case C-2/92 [1994] ECR I-955, paragraph 24.
76 – Glej na primer zadevo Marks & Spencer, C-62/00, Recueil, str. I-6325 (legitimna pričakovanja v okviru novega nacionalnega zastaralnega roka, v katerem je mogoče zahtevati povračilo zneskov, plačanih v nasprotju s pravom Skupnosti). 78 – Zadeva C-2/92, Recueil, str.
For a comment on Bostock and generally on the application of general principles against individuals, see Tridimas, cited in footnote 59, pp. 47 to 50.
I-955, točka 24. Za komentar sodbe Bostock in na splo�no glede uporabe splo�nih načel za posameznike glej Tridimasa, navedeno v opombi 59, str. od 47 do 50.
79 — Case C-60/92 [1993] ECR I-5683, paragraph 16.
79 – Zadeva C-60/92, Recueil, str. I-5683, točka 16.
BARTSCH treatment in Bostock would have accorded a domestic law retroactive effect (and thus offended other fundamental principles). 80
83Sodba Walrave in Koch se je obravnavanja, bi se omogočilo retroaktivno učinkovanje nacionalnega predpisa (in tako kr�ila druga temeljna načela).
The principle invoked in Otto serves to protect an individual against administrative or penal sanctions.
80Namen načela, na katero se sklicuje sodba Otto, je varstvo posameznika proti upravnim ali kazenskim sankcijam.
Where proceedings between individuals could not lead, even indirectly, to such a consequence, the protection would be devoid of purpose.
Kadar postopki med posamezniki ne bi mogli, niti posredno, povzročiti takih posledic, bi bilo varstvo brezpredmetno.
83 Walrave and Koch concerned a private association which had a regulatory function and which could therefore perhaps be assimilated to an emanation of the State.
81 nana�ala na zasebno združenje, ki je imelo regulativno funkcijo in ki ga je bilo zato mogoče enačiti z izrazom države.
The Court went further in Angonese, which concerned access to employment in a private bank, and ruled that ‘the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in [Article 39 EC] must be regarded as applying to private persons’. 84
Sodi�če je �lo dlje v sodbi Angonese, ki se je nana�ala na dostop do zaposlitve v zasebni banki, in razsodilo, da „je treba �teti, da se prepoved diskriminacije zaradi državljanstva, določena v [členu 39 ES,] uporablja za posameznike“. 84
To the extent that general principles are applied vertically, they allow individuals to assert fundamental rights against the State.
Če se ta splo�na načela uporabljajo vertikalno, omogočajo posameznikom, da uveljavijo temeljne pravice nasproti državi.
However, to restrict reliance on such rights to vertical situations risks creating the same (sometimes artificial) distinction between the public and private sector as is familiar in the case of directives. 82
Vendar, če se sklicevanje na take pravice omeji na vertikalne položaje, to lahko povzroči enako (včasih umetno) razlikovanje med javnim in zasebnim sektorjem, kot je po navadi v primeru direktiv. 82
In Mangold the Court applied the general principle of equal treatment (including equal
Sodi�če je v sodbi Mangold uporabilo splo�no načelo enakega obravnavanja (skupaj
Moreover the Court has on occasion recognised that the general principle of equal treatment can be applied horizontally when it is incorporated in a substantive Treaty article.
Poleg tega je Sodi�če včasih priznalo, da se lahko splo�no načelo enakega obravnavanja uporablja horizontalno, kadar je vključeno v materialni člen Pogodbe.
Thus in Walrave and Koch it held that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds
Tako je v sodbi Walrave in Koch razsodilo, da prepoved diskriminacije zaradi državljanstva
80 — See point 37 of the Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann.81 — See Otto, cited in footnote 79, paragraph 17.
81 – Glej sodbo Otto, navedeno v opombi 79, točka 17.
83 — Case 36/74 [1974] ECR 1405, paragraphs 17 and 18.
83 – Zadeva 36/74, Recueil, str. 1405, točki 17 in 18.
In Viking the Court did not expressly refer to the prohibition of discrimination underlying Article 43 EC.
V zadevi Viking se ni izrecno sklicevalo na prepoved diskriminacije iz člena 43 ES.
In Laval, however, it recalled its caselaw according to which ‘Article 12 EC, which lays down the general principle of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, applies independently only to situations governed by Community law for which the Treaty lays down no specific prohibition of discrimination … So far as the freedom to provide services is concerned, that principle was given specific expression and effect by Article 49 EC …’ (paragraphs 54 and 55).
V zadeviLaval pa je opozorilo na svojo sodno prakso, v skladu s katero se „člen 12 ES, ki povzema splo�no načelo prepovedi diskriminacije zaradi državljanstva, samostojno uporablja le v položajih, ki jih ureja pravo Skupnosti, za katere pa Pogodba ne določa posebnega pravila prepovedi diskriminacije […]. Kar pa zadeva svobodno opravljanje storitev, je to načelo izvedeno in konkretizirano v členu 49 ES […]“ (točki 54 in 55).
82 — Some, but not all, arguments for and against a horizontal effect of directives can apply to general principles.
82 – Nekatere, vendar ne vse, utemeljitve za in proti horizontalnemu učinku direktiv se lahko uporabljajo za splo�na načela.
For a discussion of those arguments, see S. Prechal, Directives in EC Law (2nd ed., 2005), pp. 255 to 261.
Za razpravo o teh utemeljitvah glej S. Prechal, Directives in EC Law (2. izd., 2005), str. od 255 do 261.
84 — Case C-281/98 [2000] ECR I-4139, paragraph 36.
84 – Zadeva C-281/98, Recueil, str. I-4139, točka 36.
It therefore seems to me that one should be slow to exclude the possibility that a general principle of Community law may, in appropriate circumstances, be applied horizontally.
Zato se mi zdi, da moramo biti previdni pri izključevanju možnosti, da se lahko splo�no načelo prava Skupnosti v določenih okoli�činah uporablja horizontalno.
Horizontal application in the present case?
Horizontalna uporaba v obravnavani zadevi?
However, where there is no such framework, as in the present case, the general principle of equality, and specifically equal treatment irrespective of age, has nothing on which to bite.
Vendar kadar ne obstaja tak okvir, kot v obravnavani zadevi, ni ničesar, na kar bi bilo mogoče opreti splo�no načelo enakosti in �e posebej enakega obravnavanja ne glede na starost.
It therefore cannot be applied (either vertically or horizontally) unless and until the Community legislator has enacted the necessary detailed measures under Article 13 EC and any transposition period has expired.
Zato ga ni mogoče uporabljati (vertikalno in horizontalno), razen če in dokler zakonodajalec Skupnosti ne sprejme potrebnih podrobnih ukrepov na podlagi člena 13 ES in do izteka katerega koli roka za prenos.
Once that has happened, the general principle will — as Advocate General Mazák has indicated 87 — be used to interpret the implementing legislation rather than operating autonomously.
Ko se bo to zgodilo, se bo splo�no načelo – kot je navedel generalni pravobranilec Mazák 87 – prej uporabljalo pri razlagi izvedbene zakonodaje kot delovalo samostojno.
I have already indicated that, in my view, the situation giving rise to the reference does not fall within the scope of Community law. 85
Navedla se že, da po mojem mnenju položaj, ki je pripeljal do vpra�anj, predloženih v predhodno odločanje, ne spada na področje uporabe prava Skupnosti. 85
Thus, the precise way in which a Member State chooses to make use of the derogation, in Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78, from the prohibition on age discrimination is, of course, subject to review by the Court against the background of the general principle of equality, and specifically equal treatment irrespective of age.
Tako je za natančen način, na katerega se država članica odloči uporabiti izjemo od prepovedi starostne diskriminacije iz člena 6(1) Direktive 2000/78, v teh okoli�činah seveda določen nadzor Sodi�ča na podlagi splo�nega načela enakosti in �e posebej enakega obravnavanja ne glede na starost.
That review ensures that the social and policy choices made by
Ta nadzor zagotavlja, da socialne in politične odločitve, ki jih sprejme država članica,
In those circumstances, I consider that the general principle of equality, and specifically equal treatment irrespective of age as identified by the Court in Mangold, cannot be applied horizontally.
V teh okoli�činah menim, da splo�nega načela enakosti, in �e posebej enakega obravnavanja ne glede na starost, kot ga je ugotovilo Sodi�če v sodbi Mangold, ni mogoče uporabljati horizontalno.
In so saying, I accept that such a principle can apply (both vertically and horizontally) to the extent that it
S tem dopuščam, da se lahko tako načelo uporablja (vertikalno
86 — See the discussion at points 69 to 76 above.
86 – Glej razpravo v točkah od 69 do 76 zgoraj. Po mojem mnenju je v zadevi Mangold �lo za tak primer.
85 — See points 67 to 75.
85 – Glej točke od 67 do 75.
88 general principle of equality, and specific -ally equal treatment irrespective of age, operating through the directive will apply to ‘all persons, as regards both the public and private sectors, including public bodies, in relation to … (c) employment and working conditions, including … pay’.
Direktive 2000/78 nedvomno izhaja, da se bo splo�no načelo enakosti in �e posebej enakega obravnavanja ne glede na starost, ki deluje prek Direktive, uporabljalo „za vse osebe, bodisi v javnem bodisi v zasebnem sektorju, vključno z javnimi telesi, kar zadeva […] (c) zaposlitev in delovne pogoje, vključno s […] plačilom“.
On this analysis, once the period for transposition of Directive 2000/78 expired, 89
Na podlagi te presoje se bo z iztekom roka za prenos Direktive 2000/78 89 dejansko
I also agree with the United Kingdom that it is not appropriate to expect a private employer to make, without guidance, the social and policy choices that lie behind the Article 6(1) derogation.
Strinjam se tudi z Združenim kraljestvom, da ni primerno pričakovati od zasebnega delodajalca, da brez navodil sprejme socialne in politične odločitve, ki stojijo za izjemo iz člena 6(1).
It is explicitly for the Member State to make those choices and to bear the responsibility for them.
Država članica je izključno pristojna sprejeti te odločitve in prevzeti odgovornost zanje.
the general principle of equality, and specifically equal treatment irrespective of age, could indeed be invoked ‘horizontally’ operating through Directive 2000/78 without the need for any other element bringing the employment relationship within the scope of Community law.
mogoče sklicevati „horizontalno“ na splo�no načelo enakosti in �e posebej enakega obravnavanja ne glede na starost prek Direktive 2000/78brez potrebe po katerem koli drugem elementu, na podlagi katerega bi bilo mogoče spraviti delovno razmerje v področje uporabe prava Skupnosti.
The choices that Member States have made in implementing that directive will fall to be assessed against that background.
Odločitve, ki so jih države članice sprejele pri prenosu te direktive, bo treba presoditi ob upo�tevanju tega.
I add immediately that, once a Member State has implemented Directive 2000/78, both the rules that the Member State puts in place through its legislation and an individual employer’s application of those rules within his private law arrangements with his employees will be subject to judicial control by the national courts and, as appropriate, by this Court. Article 3(1) of Directive 2000/78 makes it clear beyond doubt that the
Takoj dodajam, da ko država članica prenese Direktivo 2000/78, bo za pravila, ki jih sprejme s svojo zakonodajo, in uporabo teh pravil s strani posameznega delodajalca v okviru njegovih sporazumov zasebnega prava z zaposlenimi, veljal sodni nadzor nacionalnih sodi�č in po potrebi Sodi�ča. Iz člena 3(1)
Accordingly, I suggest that (if necessary) the Court should rule in answer to the second question referred by the national court that the general principle of equality, and specifically equal treatment irrespective of age,
Zato predlagam, naj (če bo potrebno) Sodi�če pri odgovoru na drugo vpra�anje nacionalnega sodi�ča razsodi tako, da splo�nega načela enakosti in �e posebej enakega obravnavanja ne glede na starost ni mogoče
88 — Member States ‘unarguably enjoy broad discretion in their choice of the measures capable of attaining their object -ives in the field of social and employment policy’: see Mangold, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 63, and Palacios de la Villa, cited in footnote 20, paragraph 68.
88 – Države članice imajo „nesporno �iroka pooblastila pri izbiri ukrepov, s katerimi lahko uresničijo svoje cilje na področju socialne politike in zaposlovanja“ – glej sodbi Mangold, navedeno v opombi 2, točka 63, in Palacios de la Villa, navedeno v opombi 20, točka 68.
In Mangold, the Court concluded that the measures in question failed the proportionality test (paragraph 65).
Sodi�če je v zadevi Mangold ugotovilo, da zadevni ukrepi niso ustrezali načelu sorazmernosti (točka 65). V zadevi Palacios de la Villa pa je menilo, da ni bilo nerazumno, da so nacionalni organi presodili, da je lahko sporni ukrep nujen in primeren (točka 72).
89 — For Germany, that happened on 2 December 2006: see point 12.
89 – Za Nemčijo se je iztekel 2. decembra 2006; glej točko 12.
OPINION OF MS SHARPSTON — CASE C-427/06 of age?
SHARPSTON – ZADEVA C-427/06 navanja ne glede na starost?
On the other, what did the Community legislator intend to cover by the principle of equal treatment irrespective of age formulated in Directive 2000/78?
Po drugi strani, kaj je imel zakonodajalec Skupnosti namen zajeti z načelom enakega obravnavanja ne glede na starost, ki je določeno v Direk -tivi 2000/78?
cannot be applied between private employers on the one hand and their employees or pensioners and their survivors on the other as a ground for challenging a rule of private law that was not enacted in order to implement a Community law obligation or take advantage of a permissible derogation under Community law, and where there is no substantive rule of Community law that is otherwise applicable.
uporabljati med zasebnimi delodajalci po eni strani in delavci ali upokojenci ter njihovimi preživelimi družinskimi člani po drugi strani kot podlago za izpodbijanje pravila zasebnega prava, ki ni bilo sprejeto za izpolnitev obveznosti prava Skupnosti, ali da bi se izkoristila izjema na podlagi prava Skupnosti in kadar ne obstaja materialno pravilo prava Skupnosti, ki se sicer uporablja.
Analysis on the basis of a general principle prohibiting age discrimination
Presoja na podlagi splo�nega načela prepovedi starostne diskriminacije
Question 3(a)
Vprašanje 3(a)
The referring court essentially asks whether a provision such as an age-gap clause in an occupational pension scheme falls within the scope of the general principle of equality, and specifically equal treatment irrespective of age.
Predložitveno sodi�če v bistvu spra�uje, ali taka določba, kot je klavzula o starostni razliki v sistemu poklicnega pokojninskega zavarovanja, spada na področje uporabe splo�nega načela enakosti in �e posebej enakega obravnavanja ne glede na starost.
There are two possible approaches to the analysis of that question.
Obstajata dve možnosti za presojo tega vpra�anja.
On the one hand, what types of age-related discrimination are covered by the general principle of equality, and specifically equal treatment irrespective
Po eni strani, katere vrste s starostjo povezane diskriminacije zajema splo�no načelo enakosti in �e posebej enakega obrav-
The first issue is whether the general principle covers relative as well as absolute ages.
Prvo vpra�anje je, ali splo�no načelo zajema relativno in absolutno starost.
The answer to that question depends on what is understood under ‘discrimination on grounds of relative age’.
Odgovor na to vpra�anje je odvisen od tega, kaj se razume pod „diskriminacijo zaradi relativne starosti“.
The term might be taken to cover only less favourable treatment of A (an individual) because he is a particular number of years older (or younger) that B (another individual) or C (a group of individuals).
Pojem je mogoče razumeti tako, da zajema le manj ugodno obravnavanje A (posameznika), ker je za določeno �tevilo let starej�i (ali mlaj�i) od B (drugega posameznika) ali C (skupine posameznikov).
More broadly, it might also be taken to cover less favourable treatment of E and F (a pair of individuals, taken together) because the age difference between them as a pair is greater or less than the age difference between other comparable pairs of individuals (G and H, I and J, and so on).
Bolj splo�no, lahko bi ga bilo mogoče razumeti tudi tako, da zajema manj ugodno obravnavanje E in F (dveh posameznikov skupaj), ker je starostna razlika med njima kot para večja ali manj�a od starostne razlike med drugimi primerljivimi pari posameznikov (G in H, I ter J in tako naprej).
The personal autonomy 90of Mr Bartsch has been adversely affected by the inability to make proper provision for his spouse after his death, and by penalising the exercise of his freedom to choose a spouse who is more than 15 years his junior.
Bart- scha je neugodno vplivala nezmožnost sprejetja ustreznih ukrepov za njegovega zakonca po njegovi smrti in kaznovanje izvr�evanja njegove pravice, da izbere zakonca, ki je več kot 15 let mlaj�i od njega.
In my view, discrimination on grounds of relative age encompasses both those situations.
Po mojem mnenju zajema diskriminacija zaradi relativne starosti oba navedena položaja.
Both make use of age as the criterion justifying differential adverse treatment and I cannot see a plausible reason for distinguishing between them.
Pri obeh se starost uporablja kot merilo za upravičenost različnega neugodnega obravnavanja in ne vidim sprejemljivega razloga za razlikovanje med njima.
The same logic leads me to the conclusion that there is no reason to exclude discrimination based on relative ages from the scope of the general principle of equality, and specifically equal treatment irrespective of age.
Po enaki logiki pridem do ugotovitve, da ni razloga za izključitev diskriminacije na podlagi relativne starosti iz področja uporabe splo�nega načela enakosti in �e posebej enakega obravnavanja ne glede na starost.
A person’s age, albeit expressed in relative rather than absolute terms, is still the basis for the decision which has an adverse effect on them.
Starost osebe, čeprav izražena prej relativno kot absolutno, je �e vedno podlaga za odločitev, ki ima zanjo neugoden učinek.
An application by analogy of the Court’s caselaw on direct discrimination based on sex would lead to the conclusion that, since direct discrimination cannot be objectively justified (see, for example, Dekker), 91all treatment that differentiates directly on grounds of age is prohibited.
Analogna uporaba sodne prakse Sodi�ča v zvezi z neposredno diskriminacijo na podlagi spola bi pripeljala do ugotovitve, da je vsako obravnavanje, ki razlikuje neposredno zaradi starosti, prepovedano, ker neposredne diskriminacije ni mogoče objektivno upravičiti (glej na primer sodbo Dekker).
Nevertheless, the Community legislator appears clearly to have envisaged, in Directive 2000/78, that certain categories of such treatment should be capable of objective justification.
91Kljub temu je zakonodajalec Skupnosti v Direktivi 2000/78 jasno predvidel, da bi bilo mogoče nekatere kategorije takega obravnavanja objektivno upravičiti.
92 That, to my mind, reinforces the analysis that I have put forward in respect of the answer to question 2.
92Po mojem mnenju to potrjuje presojo, ki sem jo predlagala glede odgovora na vpra�anje 2.
90 — On the importance of choice for personal autonomy, see the Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Coleman, cited in footnote 43, points 9 to 11, and the works cited in the footnotes thereto.
90 – O pomenu izbire za osebno avtonomijo glej sklepne predloge generalnega pravobranilca Poiaresa Madura v zadevi Coleman, navedene v opombi 43, točke od 9 do 11, in v opombah navedena dela.
91 — Case C-177/88 [1990] ECR I-3941, paragraph 12.
91 – Zadeva C-177/88, Recueil, str. I-3941, točka 12.
See further E. Ellis, EU Anti-Discrimination Law (2nd ed., 2005), pp. 111 to 113.92 — See points 109 to 110 below.
Glej tudi E. Ellis, EU Anti-Discrimination Law (2. izdaja, 2005, str. od 111 do 113).
This approach also resolves the issue as to whether only discrimination arising from the age-gap clause that affects the deceased employee falls under the prohibition, or whether discrimination affecting the surviving spouse (in this case, Mrs Bartsch) is also caught.
Ta presoja re�uje tudi vpra�anje, ali spada v prepoved le diskriminacija, ki izhaja iz klavzule o starostni razliki, ki �koduje umrlemu zaposlenemu, oziroma ali vanjo spada tudi diskriminacija, ki �koduje preživelemu zakoncu (v tej zadevi B. Bartsch).