natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In that regard, in paragraphs 80 to 84 of the judgment under appeal, it rejected the argument seeking to call into question the evidential force of that evidence on the ground that it referred to a period after the appellant’s filing of the application for registration of the trade mark.
Glede tega je v točkah od 80 do 84 izpodbijane sodbe zavrnilo trditev, s katero se je nameravalo izpodbiti dokazno moč tega dokaza, ker se je ta nana�al na obdobje po tem, ko je pritožnik vložil prijavo za registracijo znamke.
It held that the Board of Appeal was able legitimately to hold that the subsequent circumstances enabled conclusions to be drawn on the situation as it was on the date of L & D’s filing of the application for registration. 28
Presodilo je, da je odbor za pritožbe lahko pravilno menil, da so naknadne okoli�čine omogočale sklep o položaju, ki je nastal na dan vložitve prijave za registracijo znamke, ki jo je predložila družba L & D. 28
In paragraph 85 of the judgment under appeal, the Court also rejected the appellant’s argument to the effect that the Board of Appeal was wrong to find that the earlier mark had a particularly distinctive character in Italy by relying solely on general indications regarding the volume of advertising and sales figures.
V točki 85 izpodbijane sodbe je Sodi�če prve stopnje zavrnilo tudi trditev pritožnice, da je odbor za pritožbe nepravilno ugotovil poseben razlikovalni učinek prej�nje znamke v Italiji s sklicevanjem samo na splo�ne navedbe glede obsega ogla�evanja in prometa.
It held, in this connection, first, that the caselaw relied on by L & D did not concern the assessment of whether a registered mark which has already acquired distinctive character is well known and, secondly, that the Board of Appeal took into account not only general indications, but also the prolonged use of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark. 29
Glede tega je ugotovilo, prvič, da se sodna praksa, ki jo je navedla družba L & D, ni nana�ala na presojo prepoznavnosti registrirane znamke, ki je že pridobila razlikovalni učinek, in, drugič, da odbor za pritožbe ni upo�teval le splo�nih navedb, ampak tudi dolgotrajno uporabo znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE. 29
Finally, the Court, in paragraph 86 of the judgment under appeal, rejected L & D’s argument to the effect that the Board of Appeal was wrong to rely on the fact that the earlier mark had had protection in an essentially identical form since 1954, thereby placing the date of the application for registration of the mark on the same footing as the date of actual use of the CAR-FRESHNER mark. The Court found in that regard that, even though the contested decision states that the CAR-FRESHNER mark has been registered since 1954, the Board of Appeal, as regards prolonged use, relied on the established use in Italy of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark. I - 5768
Nazadnje, Sodi�če prve stopnje je v točki 86 izpodbijane sodbe zavrnilo trditev družbe L & D, da se je odbor za pritožbe napačno oprl na dejstvo, da je prej�nja znamka za�čitena v bistvu v enaki obliki od leta 1954, in tako izenačil datum prijave znamke z datumom dejanske uporabe znamke CAR FRESHNER. Sodi�če prve stopnje je glede tega ugotovilo, da čeprav je v sporni odločbi ugotovljeno, da je znamka CAR FRESHNER registrirana od leta 1954, se odbor za pritožbe glede dolgotrajne uporabe sklicuje na izkazano uporabo znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE v Italiji. I - 5768
The Court then held, in paragraphs 89 to 96 of the judgment under appeal, that the goods designated by the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark and by the Aire Limpio mark, as well as those marks themselves, are similar.
Dalje, Sodi�če prve stopnje je v točkah od 89 do 96 izpodbijane sodbe ugotovilo, da so si proizvodi, ki jih označujeta znamka ARBRE MAGIQUE in znamka Aire Limpio, pa tudi sami znamki, podobni.
Contrary to L & D’s assertions, the overall impression given by the design is not that of a comical character, but actually that of an image resembling a fir tree. The graphic representation corresponding to a fir tree therefore appears, visually, as the dom -inant element in the overall impression given by the mark in respect of which registration is sought. Conceptually, the signs in question are both associated with the silhouette of a fir tree. In view of the impression given and the fact that the expression ‘aire limpio’ has no particular meaning for the Italian public, their conceptual similarity must be confirmed. 33
V nasprotju s trditvami družbe L & D celotni vtis, ki je ustvarjen z grafiko, ni vtis �aljivega lika, ampak vtis podobe, ki spominja na jelko. Grafični prikaz jelke naj bi bil na vidni ravni prevladujoči element v celotnem vtisu, ki ga ustvari znamka, katere registracija se zahteva. Na pojmovni ravni se oba zadevna znaka ujemata z obrisom jelke. Ob upo�tevanju vtisa, ki pri tem nastane, in dejstva, da izraz „aire limpio“ nima posebnega pomena pri italijanski javnosti, je treba potrditi njuno pojmovno podobnost. 33
As regards the likelihood of confusion, the Court, in paragraphs 100 to 102 of the judgment under appeal, considered that the average consumer, which comprises the relevant public, will have a tendency to trust mainly the image of the mark applied to those goods, namely the silhouette of a fir tree.
Glede verjetnosti zmede je Sodi�če prve stopnje v točkah do 100 do 102 izpodbijane sodbe ugotovilo, da bo povprečni potro�nik, ki je upo�tevna javnost, težil k temu, da se bo zanesel zlasti na podobo znamke, uporabljene na teh proizvodih, namreč na jelko.
Consequently, in view of, first, the similarity of the goods in question and the visual and conceptual similarity of the marks in question and, secondly, the fact that the earlier mark has a particularly distinctive character in Italy, the Board of Appeal did not err in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion.
Posledično ob upo�tevanju podobnosti zadevnih proizvodov ter vidne in pojmovne podobnosti zadevnih znamk in, drugič, dejstva, da ima prej�nja znamka poseben razlikovalni učinek v Italiji, naj odbor za pritožbe zato ne bi napačno sklepal o obstoju verjetnosti zmede.
The Court then, in paragraph 104 of the judgment under appeal, rejected the appellant’s argument to the effect that the earlier mark has a weak distinctive character owing to the fact that the silhouette of the fir tree is descriptive of the goods in question, stating that the earlier mark is not the mere representation of a fir tree but is
Sodi�če prve stopnje je v točki 104 izpodbijane sodbe nato zavrnilo trditev pritožnice, da je imela prej�nja znamka majhen razlikovalni učinek, ker naj bi obris jelke opisoval zadevne proizvode, saj je ugotovilo, da prej�nja znamka ni le preprost prikaz jelke, ampak je stilizirana in prikazuje druge posebne značilnosti ter ima tudi poseben
2008 — CASE C-488/06 P stylised and has other particular characteristics, and that, in addition, it has acquired a particularly distinctive character.
2008 – ZADEVA C-488/06 P razlikovalni učinek.
As regards the guidelines of the United Kingdom Patent Office, which the appellant claims confirm the descriptive character of the silhouette of the fir tree for the goods concerned, the Court held that they were of no relevance because of the autonomous nature of the Community trade mark regime.
Glede smernic Patentnega urada Združenega kraljestva, ki naj bi po mnenju pritožnice potrjevale opisno naravo obrisa jelke za zadevne proizvode, je Sodi�če prve stopnje presodilo, da niso upo�tevne, saj je sistem znamk Skupnosti samostojen sistem.
The Court also rejected L & D’s arguments intended to show that the earlier mark should not have been registered because, first, it was made up only of the shape of the product which is marketed under that mark and, secondly, the shape of the earlier mark, namely the silhouette of a fir tree, was necessary to obtain the technical result sought by the product. In this connection, the Court observed in paragraph 105 of the judgment under appeal that the appellant could not, in any event, in opposition proceedings, rely on an absolute ground for refusal precluding valid registration of a sign by a national office or by OHIM. 36
Poleg tega je Sodi�če prve stopnje zavrnilo trditve družbe L & D, katerih namen je bil dokazati, da bi bilo treba zavrniti registracijo prej�nje znamke, ker je, prvič, v bistvu sestavljena le iz oblike proizvoda, ki se trži pod to znamko, in, drugič, ker je oblika prej�nje znamke, namreč obris jelke, potrebna, da se doseže želeni tehnični učinek proizvoda. Glede tega je v točki 105 izpodbijane sodbe Sodi�če prve stopnje ugotovilo, da se v okviru postopka z ugovorom ugovarjajoča stranka v nobenem primeru ne more sklicevati na absolutni razlog za zavrnitev, ki nasprotuje temu, da bi nacionalni urad ali UUNT znak veljavno registriral. 36
As regards the second plea, alleging infringement of Article 73 of Regulation No 40/94, that was rejected in paragraphs 113 to 118 of the judgment under appeal.
Drugi tožbeni razlog, kr�itev člena 73 Uredbe �t. 40/94, je bil zavrnjen v točkah od 113 do 118 izpodbijane sodbe.
The Court held that the contested decision showed in a clear and unequivocal manner the reasoning of the Board of Appeal and that it was apparent from that decision that the appellant had had an opportunity to present its comments on all the factors on which the decision was based and on the use, by the Board of Appeal, of the evidence relating to the use of the earlier marks.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je ugotovilo, da je v sporni odločbi jasno in nedvoumno prikazana razlaga odbora za pritožbe in da iz te odločbe izhaja, da je pritožnica imela možnost izraziti stali�če o vseh elementih, na katerih temelji sporna odločba, ter tudi o tem, kako je odbor za pritožbe uporabil dokaze v zvezi z uporabo prej�njih znamk.
IV — Procedure before the Court of Justice and the forms of order sought
IV – Postopek pred Sodiščem in predlogi strank
In its appeal, L & D claims that the Court should: — set aside the judgment under appeal in its entirety;
Družba L & D v pritožbi Sodi�ču predlaga, naj: – izpodbijano sodbo v celoti razveljavi;
L & D v OHIM — annul points 1 and 3 of the operative part of the contested decision, in so far as that decision, first, annuls in part the Opposition Division’s decision and refuses to register the Aire Limpio mark for goods in Classes 3 and 5 and, secondly, orders each of the parties to bear its own costs in connection with the opposition and appeal proceedings; and
L & D PROTI UUNT – razveljavi točki 1 in 3 izreka sporne odločbe v delu, v katerem je, prvič, delno razveljavljena odločba oddelka za ugovore in zavrnjena registracija znamke Aire Limpio za proizvode iz razredov 3 in 5 in, drugič, vsaki stranki naloženo plačilo njihovih stro�kov v okviru postopka ugovora in pritožbe, ter
OHIM and Sämann contend that the Court should dismiss the appeal and order the appellant to pay the costs.
UUNT in družba Sämann predlagata zavrnitev pritožbe in naložitev plačila stro�kov pritožnici.
As a preliminary point, OHIM and Sämann argue that the appeal is inadmissible, claiming that the pleas raised by L & D seek a review of the assessment of the facts made by the Court of First Instance. In addition, Sämann claims, the appeal identically reproduces the grounds of the action against the contested decision. 40
UUNT in družba Sämann najprej zatrjujeta, da je pritožba nedopustna, saj menita, da družba L & D v pritožbenih razlogih predlaga, naj se opravi ponovna presoja dejstev, ki jo je opravilo Sodi�če prve stopnje. Poleg tega družba Sämann meni, da je v pritožbi navedena enaka obrazložitev kot v tožbi zoper sporno odločbo. 40
First of all, it is clear from Article 225 EC and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice that an appeal lies on points of law only and that the appraisal of the facts thus does not constitute, save where they have been distorted, a
Glede tega je treba najprej spomniti, da iz člena 225 ES in člena 58, prvi odstavek, Statuta Sodi�ča, izhaja, da je pritožba omejena na pravna vpra�anja in da presoja teh dejstev torej ni, razen ob njihovem izkrivljanju, vpra�anje, ki je predmet nadzora
2008 — CASE C-488/06 P point subject to review by the Court (see Case C-214/05 P Rossi v OHIM [2006] ECR I-7057, paragraph 26, and judgment of 20 September 2007 in Case C-193/06 P Nestlé v OHIM, paragraph 53).
Sodi�ča (glej sodbi z dne 18. julija 2006 v zadevi Rossi proti UUNT, C-214/05 P, ZOdl., str. I-7057, točka 26, in z dne 20. septembra 2007 v zadevi Nestlé proti UUNT, C-193/06 P, točka 53).
However, it must be stated that, in the present case, the appeal brought by L & D does not seek only to challenge findings of a factual nature made by the Court of First Instance but seeks, at least in part, a declaration of errors of law in the judgment under appeal. 42
Vendar je treba ugotoviti, da se v tem primeru namen pritožbe, ki jo je vložila družba L & D, ni le izpodbijati ugotovitve Sodi�ča prve stopnje glede dejstev, ampak se z njo želi vsaj deloma ugotoviti pravne napake v izpodbijani sodbi. 42
Secondly, the plea of inadmissibility alleging that the appeal identically reproduces the grounds of the action brought before the Court of First Instance, a plea which, moreover, Sämann has not further clarified, must also be rejected.
Dalje, zavrniti je treba tudi ugovor nedopustnosti, s katerim se uveljavlja, da se v pritožbi ponavlja obrazložitev tožbe, vložene pri Sodi�ču prve stopnje, ki pa ga družba Sämann ni bolj natančno opredelila.
It is evident from the Court’s caselaw that, provided that the appellant challenges the interpretation or application of Community law by the Court of First Instance, as L & D does in its appeal, the points of law examined at first instance may be discussed again in the course of an appeal (see, inter alia, Case C-496/99 P Commission v CAS Succhi di Frutta [2004] ECR I-3801, paragraph 50). 44
Iz sodne prakse Sodi�ča namreč izhaja, da če pritožnik ugovarja razlagi ali uporabi prava, ki jo je izvedlo Sodi�če prve stopnje, kot je to storila družba L & D v pritožbi, se lahko o pravnih vpra�anjih, glede katerih je bila opravljena presoja na prvi stopnji, ponovno razpravlja v okviru pritožbe (glej v tem smislu zlasti sodbo z dne 29. aprila 2004 v zadevi Komisija proti CAS Succhi di Frutta, C-496/99 P, Recueil, str. I-3801, točka 50). 44
Accordingly, the appeal must be declared admissible.
Iz tega izhaja, da je pritožba dopustna.
In support of its appeal, L & D advances two pleas in law, alleging infringement of Articles 8(1)(b) and 73 of Regulation No 40/94 respectively. 1.
Družba L & D v podporo pritožbe navaja dva pritožbena razloga, in sicer kr�itev člena 8(1)(b) Uredbe �t. 40/94 in kr�itev člena 73 te uredbe. 1.
The first plea, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94
Prvi pritožbeni razlog: kr�itev člena 8(1)(b) Uredbe �t. 40/94
The first plea is divided into three branches based on the absence, respectively, of distinctiveness of mark No 91 991, of similarities between that mark and the Aire Limpio mark and of a likelihood of confusion between those two marks.
Prvi pritožbeni razlog se razdeli na tri dele, in sicer neobstoj razlikovalnega učinka znamke �t. 91.991, neobstoj podobnosti med to znamko in znamko Aire Limpio in nazadnje neobstoj verjetnosti zmede med tema znamkama.
(a) The first branch of the first plea
a) Prvi del prvega pritožbenega razloga
L & D’s arguments, in the context of the first branch of its first plea, essentially hinge on four complaints concerning: — the inference of the particularly distinctive character of mark No 91 991 from data relating to the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark;
Trditev družbe L & D glede prvega dela prvega pritožbenega razloga v bistvu poudarja �tiri očitke: – ugotovitev posebnega razlikovalnega učinka znamke �t. 91.991 na podlagi podatkov o znamki ARBRE MAGIQUE;
— the existence of absolute grounds for refusal of mark No 91 991; and
– obstoj absolutnih razlogov za zavrnitev znamke �t. 91.991 in
— the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the particularly distinctive character of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark.
– nezadostnost dokazov o posebnem razlikovalnem učinku znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE.
(i) The inference of the particularly distinctive character of mark No 91 991 from data relating to the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark
i) Ugotovitev posebnega razlikovalnega učinka znamke �t. 91.991 na podlagi podatkov o znamki ARBRE MAGIQUE
By its first complaint, L & D submits that the Court of First Instance was wrong to infer the particularly distinctive character of mark No 91 991 exclusively from data relating to the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark. In this connection, it casts doubt, inter alia, on whether it is actually possible to make such an inference in circumstances such as those of the present case. 49
Družba L & D s prvim očitkom zatrjuje, da ni pravilno, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje posebni razlikovalni učinek znamke �t. 91.991 ugotovilo izključno na podlagi podatkov o znamki ARBRE MAGIQUE. Glede tega dvomi zlasti o možnosti takega sklepanja v okoli�činah, kot so v tem primeru. 49
As the Court of First Instance recalled in paragraph 73 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of Justice has already held that the acquisition of the distinctive character of a mark may also be as a result of its use as part of another registered trade mark.
Kot je opozorilo Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 73 izpodbijane sodbe, je Sodi�če že presodilo, da lahko pridobitev razlikovalnega učinka znamke izhaja tudi iz njene uporabe kot dela druge registrirane znamke.
It is sufficient that, in consequence of such use, the relevant class of persons actually perceives the product or service, designated by the mark, as originating from a given undertaking (see, to that effect, Nestlé, paragraphs 30 and 32).
Zadostuje, da kot posledica te uporabe upo�tevna javnost dejansko zazna proizvod ali storitev, označen s prej�njimi znamkami, kot da izvira iz določenega podjetja (glej v tem smislu zgoraj navedeno sodbo Nestlé, točki 30 in 32).
Although the facts in Nestlé differed from those in the present case, that does not necessarily mean, contrary to what L & D submits, that that finding of general application does not apply also to a factual and procedural context such as that at issue in the present case. I - 5774
Čeprav je res, da je bilo dejansko stanje v zgoraj navedeni sodbi Nestlé drugačno od dejanskega stanja v tej zadevi, iz tega, v nasprotju s tem, kar zatrjuje družba L & D, ne izhaja, da se ta splo�na ugotovitev ne uporablja tudi za dejansko stanje in postopek, kot je ta v postopku v glavni stvari. I - 5774
In particular, the fact that Nestlé concerned the acquisition of distinctive character by a mark which it was sought to register, whereas the present case concerns establishing whether an earlier mark has a particularly distinctive character in order to ascertain whether there is a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94, does not, as the Advocate General pointed out in point 51 of her Opinion, justify any difference of approach.
Zlasti ne more biti drugačen pristop, kot je poudarila generalna pravobranilka v točki 51 sklepnih predlogov, utemeljen z okoli�čino, da se je navedena sodba Nestlé nana�ala na pridobitev razlikovalnega učinka za znamko, za katero se zahteva registracija, medtem ko gre v tem primeru za ugotovitev posebnega razlikovalnega učinka prej�nje znamke, da bi se določil obstoj verjetnosti zmede v smislu člena 8(1)(b) Uredbe �t. 40/94.
The Court of First Instance was, consequently, justified in observing in paragraph 75 of the judgment under appeal that, if mark No 91 991 could be regarded as part of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark, it was possible to establish the particularly distinctive character of the former on the basis of evidence relating to the use and wellknown nature of the latter.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je zato v točki 75 izpodbijane sodbe utemeljeno lahko ugotovilo, da je, če se lahko znamka �t. 91.991 �teje za del znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE, na podlagi dokazov o uporabi in prepoznavnosti druge znamke mogoče ugotoviti poseben razlikovalni učinek prve znamke.
In so far as L & D seeks, by this complaint, to cast doubt upon the finding, in paragraph 76 of the judgment under appeal, that mark No 91 991 constitutes part of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark, since the representation of the silhouette of the fir tree plays a significant or even predominant role in the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark and corresponds to the sign of mark No 91 991, it must be observed that the Court made an assessment of a factual nature in this respect. 54
Če želi družba L & D s tem očitkom ovreči ugotovitev iz točke 76 izpodbijane sodbe, da je znamka �t. 91.991 del znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE, ker ima obris jelke pomembno, če ne celo prevladujočo vlogo v znamki ARBRE MAGIQUE in je enak znaku znamke �t. 91.991, je treba ugotoviti, da je pri tej ugotovitvi Sodi�ča prve stopnje �lo za presojo dejstev. 54
As pointed out in paragraph 40 of this judgment, an appeal lies on points of law only and the assessment of the facts does not constitute, save where they have been distorted, a point subject to review by the Court of Justice.
Kot je bilo poudarjeno v točki 40 te sodbe, je pritožba omejena na pravna vpra�anja in presoja dejstev, razen ob njihovem izkrivljanju, torej ni vpra�anje, ki je predmet nadzora Sodi�ča.
Furthermore, inasmuch as L & D further submits that the assessment of the Court of First Instance, according to which the silhouette of a fir tree plays a predominant role in the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark, diverges from the caselaw of the Court of Justice, it need only be stated that, contrary to what the appellant asserts, that caselaw does not in any way show that, in the case of mixed trade marks comprising both graphic and word elements, the word elements must systematically be regarded as dominant. I - 5775
Poleg tega, ker družba L & D zatrjuje tudi, da presoja Sodi�ča prve stopnje, v skladu s katero ima obris jelke prevladujočo vlogo v znamki ARBRE MAGIQUE, odstopa od sodne prakse Sodi�ča, zado�ča ugotovitev, da v nasprotju s tem, kar trdi pritožnica, iz te sodne prakse nikakor ne izhaja, da je treba pri me�anih znamkah, ki vsebujejo grafične in besedne elemente, zadnje sistematično obravnavati kot prevladujoče. I - 5775
It follows from the foregoing that this complaint must be rejected as in part inadmissible and in part unfounded.
Iz zgoraj navedenega izhaja, da je treba ta očitek delno zavreči kot nedopustnega in delno zavrniti kot neutemeljenega.
By its second complaint, L & D criticises the Court of First Instance for having rejected, in paragraph 104 of the judgment under appeal, its argument to the effect that mark No 91 991 has a weak distinctive character owing to the fact that the silhouette of the fir tree is descriptive of the goods in question. 58
Družba L & D drugim očitkom Sodi�ču prve stopnje očita, da je v točki 104 izpodbijane sodbe zavrnilo njeno trditev, da ima znamka �t. 91.991 majhen razlikovalni učinek, ker naj bi obris jelke opisoval zadevne proizvode. 58
First, the Court of First Instance did not err in law in holding that the guidelines of the United Kingdom Patent Office which, according to the appellant, confirm the descriptive character of the silhouette of the fir tree for the goods in question, were of no relevance.
Glede tega je najprej povedati, da Sodi�če prve stopnje, s tem da je presodilo, da smernice Patentnega urada Združenega kraljestva, ki naj bi po mnenju pritožnice potrjevale opisnost obrisa jelke za zadevne proizvode, niso upo�tevne, ni napačno uporabilo prava.
As regards L & D’s argument criticising as contradictory to other statements in the judgment under appeal the Court’s finding that mark No 91 991 is not the mere representation, faithful to reality, of a fir tree, suffice it to note that there is no contradiction between that finding and the description of that mark as being the ‘silhouette of a fir tree’. I - 5776
Glede trditve družbe L & D, katere namen je ugotoviti, da je ugotovitev Sodi�ča prve stopnje, da znamka �t. 91.991 ni samo podoba jelke, ki je taka kot v resnici, glede na ostale ugotovitve v izpodbijani sodbi protislovna, zado�ča poudariti, da med navedeno ugotovitvijo in opisom te znamke, kot da gre za „obris jelke“, ni nobenega protislovja. I - 5776