natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
First, as is apparent from paragraphs 113 to 124 of the present judgment, the considerations linked to the nature of the WTO agreements and to the reciprocity and flexibility characterising them continue to obtain after such a ruling or recommendation has been adopted and after the reasonable period of time allowed for its implementation has expired.
Po eni strani namreč, kot izhaja iz točk od 113 do 124 te sodbe, ugotovitve, povezane z naravo sporazumov STO ter z vzajemnostjo in prožnostjo, ki je značilna zanje, veljajo tudi potem, ko so bile sprejete s takimi sklepi ali priporočili, in potem, ko se je iztekel razumni rok za njihovo izvr�itev.
Second, as is apparent from Article 3(2) of the DSU, recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the agreements concerned.
Po drugi strani je treba poudariti, kot izhaja iz člena 3(2) DPPRS, da priporočila in sklepi ORS ne morejo raz�iriti ali zmanj�ati pravic in obveznosti, navedenih v zadevnih sporazumih.
It should, in particular, be recalled in this regard that the Court has already held in relation to the provisions of the GATT 1994, which have been found by the DSB to have been infringed in the present case, that those provisions are not such as to create rights upon which individuals may rely directly before the courts by virtue of Community law (see, to this effect, the order in OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft, paragraphs 25 and 26).
V zvezi s tem je treba zlasti opozoriti, da je Sodi�če glede določb GATT iz leta 1994, katerih kr�itev je v tem primeru ugotovil ORS, že razsodilo, da določbe tega sporazuma nimajo neposrednega učinka in posameznikom ne podeljujejo pravic, ki bi jih lahko ti neposredno uveljavljali pri sodi�ču na podlagi prava Skupnosti (glej v tem smislu zgoraj navedeni sklep OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft, točki 25 in 26).
It follows from all of the foregoing considerations that the Court of First Instance rightly decided that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period of time allowed for implementing a decision of the DSB, the Community courts could not, in the circumstances of the case in point, review the legality of the conduct of the Community institutions in the light of WTO rules.
Iz zgornjih ugotovitev izhaja, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje pravilno odločilo, da ne glede na iztek roka, določenega za izvr�itev sklepa ORS, sodnik Skupnosti ne more v okoli�činah obravnavane zadeve opraviti nadzora zakonitosti ravnanja institucij Skupnosti glede na predpise STO.
Since, therefore, neither part of the first plea in the appeals is well founded, this plea must be dismissed.
Ker prvi pritožbeni razlog torej ni utemeljen z nobenim od svojih dveh delov, ga je treba zavrniti.
The second plea in the main appeals, the crossappeals and the claims seeking the substitution of grounds
Drugi pritožbeni razlog iz glavnih pritožb, nasprotne pritožbe in zahteva za nadomestitev obrazložitve
By a second plea, FIAMM and Fedon submit that, in holding when it examined their claims expressed in terms of no-fault Community liability that the damage suffered by them was not unusual in nature, the Court of First Instance adopted illogical reasoning and infringed certain principles that are well established in the case-law.
Družbi FIAMM in Fedon z drugim pritožbenim razlogom zatrjujeta, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje svojo odločitev, v okviru preizkusa njunih zahtev, vloženih zaradi nekrivdne odgovornosti Skupnosti, da njuna �koda ni neobičajna, nelogično obrazložilo in da je kr�ilo nekatera načela iz sodne prakse, ki so že dobro ustaljena.
According to FIAMM and Fedon, in the judgments under appeal the Court of First Instance in particular misapplied the dual requirement that damage must be, first, foreseeable and, second, inherent in operating in the sector concerned if it is to be classifiable as usual.
Sodi�če prve stopnje naj bi z izpodbijanima sodbama zlasti kr�ilo dvojno zahtevo, po kateri mora �koda, zato da se lahko opredeli za običajno, biti predvidljiva in sama po sebi del dejavnosti v zadevnem sektorju.
Damage caused by customs penalties imposed by a nonmember State in the indus-trial-battery or spectacle-case sector following a dispute in the banana sector is not inherent in the first two of those sectors, as is attested in particular by Article 22(3)(a) of the DSU.
Družbi FIAMM in Fedon namreč menita, da naj �koda, povzročena s carinskimi sankcijami, ki jih je sprejela tretja država v sektorju industrijskih akumulatorjev oziroma etuijev za očala, zaradi spora v sektorju banan, ne bi bila sama po sebi del prvih dveh navedenih sektorjev, o čemer naj bi pričal zlasti člen 22(3)(a) DPPRS.
Such damage is all the less foreseeable because of its novel punitive nature and because it is unprecedented in GATT and WTO history and in relations between the Community and the United States of America.
Tak�na �koda naj bi bila toliko manj predvidljiva, ker naj bi imela nov kaznovalni značaj in ker v zgodovini GATT in STO ni bila poznana v odnosih med Skupnostjo in Združenimi državami Amerike.
The Court of First Instance’s reasoning that, as Article 22(3) of the DSU authorises the adoption of retaliatory measures, the damage incurred is not unusual is contradictory.
Razlaga Sodi�ča prve stopnje, v skladu s katero naj nastala �koda ne bi bila neobičajna, če člen 22(3) DPPRS dovoljuje sprejetje povračilnih ukrepov, je protislovna. To, da se �koda �teje za običajno, ker je posledica akta, ki ga odobrava veljavno pravo,
FIAMM AND OTHERS v COUNCIL AND COMMISSION lawful act can give rise to liability, but this possibility is accepted by the judgments under appeal.
FIAMM IN DRUGI PROTI SVETU IN KOMISIJI bi namreč zanikalo možnost, da bi bila �koda, povzročena z zakonitim aktom, lahko podlaga za odgovornost, kar pa je bilo priznano v izpodbijanih sodbah.
The Council contends that the Court of First Instance was right in holding that the alleged damage falls within the normal risks which an exporter must assume given the current arrangements for world trade.
Svet meni, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje pravilno razsodilo, da navedena �koda izhaja iz običajnih tveganj, ki jih mora izvoznik sprejeti v trenutnem položaju ureditve svetovne trgovine.
However, it contests some of the grounds of the judgments under appeal and asks the Court either to substitute various grounds in those respects or, ruling on the crossappeals brought by it in this regard, to set aside those judgments in part.
Vendar pa izpodbija nekatere obrazložitve izpodbijanih sodb in Sodi�ču predlaga, naj v zvezi s tem nadomesti nekatere obrazložitve z drugačnimi oziroma naj o nasprotnih pritožbah, ki jih je Svet vložil v zvezi s tem, odloči tako, da navedene sodbe delno razveljavi.
First, since barely half of the Member States’ legal systems provide for the possibility — which moreover is subject to very strict conditions — of obtaining compensation for damage resulting from certain lawful acts of public authorities, the Council contests the statement, appearing in paragraph 160 of the FIAMM judgment and paragraph 153 of the Fedon judgment, according to which a general principle common to the Member States exists that enables the liability of the Community to be put in issue even in the absence of unlawful conduct on the part of its institutions.
Prvič, ker naj bi komaj polovica pravnih redov držav članic navedla možnost, ki je poleg tega strogo omejena, pridobitve povračila �kode, ki izhaja iz nekaterih zakonitih aktov državnega organa, Svet izpodbija trditev iz točk 160 sodbe FIAMM in 153 sodbe Fedon, v skladu s katero naj bi obstajalo splo�no načelo, ki je skupno državam članicam in ki omogoča uveljavljanje odgovornosti Skupnosti, tudi če njeni organi niso ravnali nezakonito.
Even assuming that such a principle can be established, the Court of First Instance was in any event wrong in its view that it is capable of applying in a situation such as that here since, in particular:
Tudi če se tako načelo lahko dokaže, naj bi Sodi�če v vsakem primeru napačno ugotovilo, da bi se to načelo v primeru, kot je obravnavani, lahko uveljavljalo, zlasti, ker naj bi:
— liability for legislative omission would limit both the freedom of choice inherent in the Commission’s right of initiative and the legislature’s discretion, calling into question the separation of powers and institutional balance intended by the Treaty;
– odgovornost za zakonodajno opustitev ogrožala prosto izbiro, ki je sama po sebi zajeta v pravici Komisije do iniciative in v okviru diskrecijske pravice zakonodajalca, pri čemer se zopet postavi vpra�anje ločitve oblasti in ravnotežja institucij, ki se zahtevata s Pogodbo;
— the lack of proportionality between Community liability for an unlawful legislative measure, which is subject to very strict conditions as regards the unlawfulness of the conduct, and liability for a lawful legislative omission, which would require only special and unusual damage and therefore be more easily brought into play, betrays an inconsistency;
– nesorazmernost med odgovornostjo Skupnosti zaradi nezakonitega normativnega akta, za katero veljajo zelo strogi pogoji glede nezakonitosti ravnanja, in odgovornostjo za zakonito zakonodajno opustitev, ki bi bila pogojena le z nastankom posebne in neobičajne �kode, in bi jo bilo zato lažje uveljavljati, bi pomenila nedoslednost;
— the position thus adopted by the Court of First Instance conflicts with the reasoning followed by it in concluding that it is not possible to rely on WTO rules in an action for compensation founded on unlawful Community conduct, in particular with the need not to deprive the Community organs of the scope for manoeuvre enjoyed by the organs of the Community’s trading partners.
– bilo stali�če Sodi�ča prve stopnje v protislovju z njegovo razlago glede sklepa o nezmožnosti sklicevanja na predpise STO v okviru od�kodninske tožbe, ki temelji na nezakonitem ravnanju Skupnosti, �e zlasti ker je nujno, da se organom skupnosti ne odvzame manevrskega prostora, ki ga imajo organi poslovnih partnerjev Skupnosti.
Second, the judgments under appeal wrongly concluded that there was damage that was certain, since FIAMM and Fedon had not proved the existence, extent or the precise amount of such damage.
Drugič, z izpodbijanimi sodbami naj bi bil napačno ugotovljen obstoj nedvomne �kode, pri čemer družbi FIAMM in Fedon namreč nista dokazali niti obstoja, niti obsega, niti natančnega zneska take �kode.
Third, with regard to the causal link, the Court of First Instance failed to observe the requirement that the damage must be a sufficiently direct consequence of the conduct of the institution concerned.
Tretjič, Sodi�če prve stopnje naj bi glede vzročne zveze spregledalo zahtevo, da mora �koda dovolj neposredno izhajati iz ravnanja zadevne institucije.
There is no automatic link between the DSB’s decision of 25 September 1997 and the introduction of the increased customs duty at issue, since the United States authorities, in the exercise of their discretion, decided in principle to impose the duty and determined the products upon which it would be charged and its rate when, in particular, they could have accepted the compensation offered by the Community.
Noben avtomatizem naj namreč ne bi obstajal med sklepom ORS z dne 25. septembra 1997 in uvedbo dodatne carinske dajatve, ker so organi Združenih držav diskrecijsko odločili o njeni uvedbi, o seznamu proizvodov, na katere se naloži dajatev, in o vi�ini teh dajatev, medtem ko bi med drugim lahko sprejeli nadomestila, ki jim jih je ponudila Skupnost.
The Commission too submits that the Court of First Instance rightly concluded in the judgments under appeal that there was no unusual damage.
Tudi Komisija meni, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje v izpodbijanih sodbah pravilno ugotovilo, da ne gre za neobičajno �kodo.
In order for damage to be usual, it is in particular not necessary for the risk of it occurring to be inherent in the sector in which the business operates.
Da je �koda običajna, se naj ne bi zahtevalo, da je tveganje za njen nastanek značilno za sektor dejavnosti gospodarskega subjekta.
Involvement in international trade is, whatever the product market concerned, accompanied by the risk that an importing country will adopt decisions affecting trade for the most diverse reasons.
Že vključitev v mednarodno trgovino naj bi na katerem koli trgu zadevnih proizvodov vključevala tveganje, da država uvoznica sprejme odločitve, ki vplivajo na menjavo iz najrazličnej�ih razlogov.
While thus concluding that the second plea in the appeals should be dismissed, the Commission submits however, like the Council, that the Court of First Instance made various errors of law as regards the question of Community liability in the absence of unlawful conduct on the part of its institutions.
Komisija o predlogu zavrnitve drugega pritožbenega razloga vendarle meni, tako kot Svet, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje večkrat napačno uporabilo pravo glede vpra�anja odgovornosti Skupnosti, ko njeni organi niso ravnali nezakonito.
Since the operative parts of the judgments under appeal are nevertheless justified, it asks the Court of Justice to substitute various grounds in this regard.
Ker je bi izrek izpodbijanih sodb vendarle utemeljen, predlaga Sodi�ču, naj v zvezi s tem nadomesti nekatere obrazložitve.
First, so far as concerns the affirmation as to the very existence of the principle of such liability, the Court of First Instance could not, according to the Commission, make so significant an innovation on the basis of merely the vague reasoning contained in paragraph 159 of the FIAMM judgment and paragraph 152 of the Fedon judgment.
Prvič, glede trditve o samem obstoju načela take odgovornosti, je treba po mnenju Komisije ugotoviti, da si Sodi�če prve stopnje ne more privo�čiti tako pomembne iznajdbe in se zadovoljiti z nejasno obrazložitvijo, ki je v točkah 159 sodbe FIAMM in 152 sodbe Fedon.
This principle has never been accepted by the caselaw, which has systematically left the question to one side, merely setting out a purely hypothetical reference framework in this regard without in any way laying down the conditions under which and fields and situations in which such liability could where appropriate be incurred.
To načelo namreč naj ne bi bilo nikoli priznano s sodno prakso, ki naj bi sistematično pridržala to vpra�anje tako, da se je v zvezi s tem omejila na oblikovanje referenčnega okvira, ki je povsem odvisen od primera, ne da bi bili kakorkoli določeni pogoji, področja in predpostavke, v katerih bi se ta odgovornost eventualno lahko uporabila.
Furthermore, by setting out in paragraph 160 of the FIAMM judgment and paragraph 153 of the Fedon judgment the conditions to which liability is subject, the Court of First Instance implicitly but necessarily held that this principle applies in the type of situation covered by the present case, without establishing, however, whether such a conclusion is justified in the light of principles common to the legal systems of the Member States.
Poleg tega naj bi Sodi�če prve stopnje z navajanjem – v točkah 160 sodbe FIAMM in 153 sodbe Fedon – pogojev, od katerih je odvisna taka odgovornost, implicitno vendar neizbežno razsodilo, da se navedeno načelo uporablja v primerih, ki jih zajema ta zadeva, vendar ni preverilo, ali je tak sklep upravičen glede na načela, ki so skupna pravnim redom držav članic.
In particular, the Court of First Instance did not focus its examination on instances of liability of the public authorities resulting from legislative activity, referring on the contrary, in paragraph 159 of the FIAMM judgment and paragraph 152 of the Fedon judgment, in the most general manner to the possibility of obtaining compensation from the perpetrator of damage in the absence of fault on his part.
Sodi�če prve stopnje zlasti naj ne bi osredotočilo svojega preizkusa na primere odgovornosti javnih organov, ki izhaja iz zakonodajne dejavnosti, pri čemer se ravno nasprotno sklicuje na točko 159 sodbe FIAMM in na točko 152 sodbe Fedon oziroma splo�neje na možnost pridobitve nadomestil od povzročitelja �kode, ki pa ni kriv za nastalo �kodo.
However, examination of the 25 legal orders of the Member States indicates that, in contrast to cases such as expropriation in the public interest or compensation paid by the State for damage caused by dangerous activity on its part or on account of a specific relationship between it and the victim, which are irrelevant here, any obligation to pay compensation as a result of a lawful State act reflecting a broad discretion, on account for example of considerations of solidarity or fairness, is unknown to the law of a large number of Member States.
Pregled 25 pravnih redov držav članic naj bi pokazal, da, za razliko od primerov, kot so razlastitev za uporabo za javne namene ali nadomestilo države za �kodo, ki je bila povzročena z njenim nevarnim ravnanjem ali zaradi posebnega razmerja, ki jo povezuje z žrtvijo, ki v tem primeru niso upo�tevni, obveznost plačila nadomestila zaradi zakonitega državnega akta, ki pomeni �iroko diskrecijsko pravico, zaradi – na primer – upo�tevanja solidarnosti ali pravičnosti, naj namreč ne bi obstajala v pravih mnogih držav članic.
While liability of such a type can be found, in exceptional circumstances, in the legal orders of certain other Member States, it is, as a general rule, limited solely to administrative acts, with the notable exception of French law which alone clearly accepts this type of liability in the case of legislative activity, provided that the damage is unusual, special, serious and direct, that the legislature is not pursuing the common good and that the legislature has not ruled out compensation as a matter of principle.
Če taka vrsta odgovornosti obstaja – v izjemnih okoli�činah – v pravnih redih nekaterih držav članic, naj bi bilo to na splo�no omejeno le na upravne akte, razen znane izjeme v francoskem pravu, ki naj bi edino jasno dopu�čalo to vrsto odgovornosti, ko gre za zakonodajno dejavnost, če je �koda neobičajna, posebna, huda in neposredna, če zakonodajalec ni sledil splo�nemu interesu in če ni izključil načela povrnitve �kode.
Furthermore, the principle specific to French law cannot be transferred to the Community legal order.
Poleg tega pa načela, značilnega za francosko pravo, ni mogoče prenesti v pravni red Skupnosti.
While the basis of that principle is the fact that, in France, judicial review by the Conseil d’État (Council of State) of the constitutionality of laws is precluded, Community law provides for review of the legality of measures of the legislature by reference to the Treaty and fundamental principles and for the possibility of the liability of the Community to be put in issue if those higherranking norms are infringed.
Kajti, čeprav naj bi bil temelj tega načela v okoli�čini, da je v Franciji izključen sodni nadzor ustavnosti zakonov s strani Conseil d’État, pa naj bi pravni red Skupnosti zase določal nadzor zakonitosti aktov zakonodajalca v zvezi s Pogodbo in temeljnimi načeli, ter možnost uveljavljati odgovornost Skupnosti v primeru kr�itve teh nadrejenih norm.
Second, the Commission submits that, in concluding in the judgments under appeal that there was real and certain damage, the Court of First Instance in particular distorted the Commission’s arguments, failed to verify specifically that the damage was real and certain and infringed the principles for determining who has the burden of proof.
Drugič, Komisija meni, da naj bi Sodi�če prve stopnje, s tem ko je v izpodbijanih sodbah ugotovilo obstoj dejanske in gotove �kode, med drugim izkrivilo njeno utemeljevanje, da naj ne bi konkretno preverilo dejanskosti in gotovosti te �kode in da naj bi kr�ilo načela v zvezi s tem, kdo ima dokazno breme.
Third, the Commission contends, for reasons analogous to those set out by the Council, that the Court of First Instance erred in the legal characterisation of the facts in concluding that the condition relating to the causal link was met in the case in point.
Tretjič, Komisija meni, iz podobnih razlogov, kot jih je navedel Svet, da se je Sodi�če prve stopnje zmotilo pri pravni opredelitvi dejstev, ko je ugotovilo, da je pogoj glede vzročne zveze v obravnavani zadevi izpolnjen.
The Kingdom of Spain also contends that the second plea in the appeals should be dismissed.
Tudi Kraljevina Španija predlaga zavrnitev drugega pritožbenega razloga.
As practice shows, there is nothing unforeseeable or exceptional in the imposition of retaliatory measures within the framework of the WTO, including in sectors other than those concerned by a dispute.
Naložitev povračilnih ukrepov v okviru STO, tudi v sektorjih, ki niso predmet spora, naj namreč ne bi bila nikakor nepredvidljiva niti izjemna, kar naj bi dokazovala tudi praksa.
By the cross-appeal which it has brought in Case C-120/06 P and in its statement in intervention in Case C-121/06 P, the Kingdom of Spain further requests that the judgments under appeal be set aside in so far as the Court of First Instance held that Community law includes, by way of a general principle common to the Member States, a system of liability for lawful acts.
Kraljevina Španija v nasprotni pritožbi, ki jo je vložila v zadevi C-120/06 P, in v intervencijski vlogi v zadevi C-121/06 P poleg tega predlaga razveljavitev izpodbijanih sodb v delu, v katerem je Sodi�če prve stopnje odločilo, da pravo Skupnosti obsega, na podlagi splo�nega načela, ki je skupno državam članicam, sistem odgovornosti zaradi zakonitega akta.
Moreover, in conferring upon that principle a scope as wide as that resulting from the conditions set out in paragraph 160 of the FIAMM judgment and paragraph 153 of the Fedon judgment, the Court of First Instance failed to have regard to the finding which it itself made in paragraph 159 of the FIAMM judgment and paragraph 152 of the Fedon judgment.
Poleg tega naj bi Sodi�če prve stopnje, s tem da je temu načelu dalo tako velik pomen kot je ta, ki izhaja iz pogojev, navedenih v točkah 160 sodbe FIAMM in 153 sodbe Fedon, zanemarilo ugotovitev, ki jo je samo podalo v točkah 159 sodbe FIAMM in 152 sodbe Fedon.
Acceptance of the possibility of Community liability for a legislative omission although no rule obliging the Community to act can be invoked by the person harmed disregards the principle of reciprocity which the Court of First Instance relied on in rejecting the possibility of liability for unlawful conduct.
Priznanje možnosti, da je Skupnost odgovorna zaradi normativne opustitve, čeprav se prizadeta stranka ne more sklicevati na noben predpis, ki zavezuje Skupnost k delovanju, naj bi bilo poleg tega tak�no, da kr�i načelo vzajemnosti, ki ga je Sodi�če prve stopnje navedlo kot razlog za zavrnitev možnosti odgovornosti za nezakonito ravnanje.
In its observations on the statement in intervention of the Kingdom of Spain, Fedon contends that the Court of First Instance was right in holding that a principle of liability for lawful conduct of the Community institutions has been laid down and delimited by settled caselaw, as the Court of Justice noted in Dorsch Consult v Council and Commission.
Družba Fedon v svojih pripombah glede intervencijske vloge Kraljevine Španije navaja, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje pravilno ugotovilo, da je bilo načelo odgovornosti zaradi zakonitega ravnanja organov Skupnosti potrjeno in omejeno z ustaljeno sodno prakso, kot naj bi Sodi�če navedlo v zgoraj navedeni sodbi Dorsch Consult proti Svetu in Komisiji.
Since the second paragraph of Article 288 EC is intended to safeguard the fundamental principle of a State based on the rule of law that protects individuals and, in particular, their rights to property and pursuit of an economic activity, it must, having regard to the liberal orientation of the Community legal system, be interpreted in such a way as to favour the most liberal principles characterising the legal systems of the Member States.
Za zagotovitev temeljnega načela pravne države, ki varuje posameznike in zlasti njihove lastninske pravice in pravico do gospodarske iniciative, bi bilo treba člen 288, drugi odstavek, ES, glede na liberalno usmeritev pravnega reda Skupnosti, razlagati tako, da se da prednost najbolj liberalnim načelom pravnih redov držav članic.