natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
On 14 December 2000 the Court of Justice delivered the judgment in Emsland-Stärke, in which, as will be recalled, the Court found that the condition for payment of the differentiated or non- differentiated refund under which the product — save where it has perished in transit as a result of force majeure — must have been imported into a nonmember country and, where appropriate, into a specified nonmember country could be imposed only prior to the grant of the refund.
Sodi�če je 14. decembra 2000 izdalo navedeno sodbo Emsland-Stärke, v kateri je, naj opozorim, zlasti menilo, da se izpolnjevanje pogoja za plačilo diferenciranega ali nediferenciranega nadomestila, v skladu s katerim velja, da se je moral proizvod, razen če se je zaradi vi�je sile pokvaril ali uničil med prevozom, uvoziti v tretjo državo, in kadar je to primerno, v določeno tretjo državo, lahko zahteva samo pred dodelitvijo tega nadomestila.
Court in Kühne & Heitz were fulfilled and that consequently the repayment decision of 10 August 1995 should be withdrawn. 22.
KEMPTER preučitev dokončne upravne odločbe, ki jih je Sodi�če določilo v navedeni sodbi Kühne & Heitz, in da je zato treba odpraviti odločbo o povračilu z dne 10. avgusta 1995. 22.
In a judgment of 21 March 2002 the Bundesfinanzhof applied the foregoing interpretation of the Court, mentioning the judgment in Emsland-Stärke.
Tako razlago Sodi�ča je Bundesfinanzhof upo�tevalo v sodbi z dne 21. marca 2002, pri čemer se je sklicevalo na navedeno sodbo Emsland-Stärke.
IV — The reference for a preliminary ruling
IV – Predlog za sprejetje predhodne odločbe
By letter of 16 September 2002, Kempter requested that the Hauptzollamt reopen the procedure and revoke the decision on repayment of the export refunds.
Družba Kempter je v dopisu z dne 16. septembra 2002 organu Hauptzollamt predlagala ponovno odprtje postopka in odpravo odločbe o povračilu izvoznih nadomestil.
In support of this application, Kempter claimed that the legal situation had changed in the meantime.
V podporo temu predlogu je družba Kempter trdila, da se je pravno stanje medtem spremenilo.
In that connection Kempter relied on the judgment delivered by the Bundesfinanzhof on 21 March 2002, of which it states that it was informed on 1 July 2002 by a fax from the company SAB.
Pri tem se je sklicevala na sodbo, ki jo je Bundesfinanzhof izdalo 21. marca 2002 in s katero se je, kot trdi, seznanila 1. julija 2002, in sicer na podlagi telefaksa, ki ji ga je poslala družba SAB.
In the order for reference, the Finanzgericht Hamburg observes, first, that the parties agree that, in the light of Emsland-Stärke, the repayment decision of 10 August 1995 must be considered unlawful.
Finanzgericht Hamburg v predložitveni odločbi najprej ugotavlja, da se stranki strinjata, da je z vidika navedene sodbe Emsland-Stärke odločbo o povračilu z dne 10. avgusta 1995 treba �teti kot nezakonito.
However, they are in dispute as to whether, so as to take account of the Court’s interpretation in that judgment, the Hauptzollamt is obliged to review its decision, which became final before the judgment was delivered.
Vendar se ne strinjata glede vpra�anja, ali je zaradi upo�tevanja razlage, ki jo je Sodi�če sprejelo v navedeni sodbi, Hauptzollampt dolžan ponovno preučiti to odločbo, ki je postala dokončna pred izrekom navedene sodbe.
The Hauptzollamt refused the application by decision of 5 November 2002, stating that this alteration in caselaw did not mean any change in the legal situation, which alone would justify reopening the procedure under Paragraph 51(1)(1) of the VwVfG.
Hauptzollamt je navedeni predlog zavrnil z odločbo z dne 5. novembra 2002, pri čemer je poudaril, da ta preobrat v sodni praksi ne vključuje spremembe prava, ki bi upraviče -vala ponovno odprtje postopka v skladu s členom 51(1)(1) zakona VwVfG.
The applicant’s administrative appeal against that decision was rejected by decision of 25 March 2003.
Uprav- na pritožba tožeče stranke zoper to odločbo je bila zavrnjena z odločbo z dne 25. marca 2003.
With regard to the four conditions set out by the Court in Kühne & Heitz, 8the national court considers that the first two are fulfilled. Indeed, the Hauptzollamt does have power, on the basis of the first sentence of 8 — Here the national court refers only to the four indents of the operative part of the judgment, and not to what could be regarded as constituting the first condition, namely that an application for review must be made to the administrative body.
Med �tirimi pogoji, ki jih je Sodi�če na�telo v navedeni sodbi Kühne & Heitz 8, predložitveno sodi�če meni, da sta prva dva izpolnjena. Hauptzollamt ima namreč v 8 – Predložitveno sodi�če se pri tem sklicuje izključno na �tiri alinee iz izreka te sodbe in ne na tisto, kar bi lahko �teli za prvi pogoj, tj. da se je pri upravnem organu vložil predlog za ponovno preučitev.
Kempter then brought an action before the Finanzgericht Hamburg on 26 April 2004, submitting in particular that in the case in point the conditions for review of a final administrative decision set out by the
Družba Kempter je nato 26. aprila 2004 zadevo predložila Finanzgericht Hamburg, pri čemer je zlasti trdila, da so bili v obravnavanem primeru izpolnjeni pogoji za ponovno
Paragraph 48(1) of the VwVfG, to reopen the repayment decision.
skladu s prvim stavkom člena 48(1) zakona VwVfG v resnici pravico odpraviti odločbo o povračilu.
In addition, the decision has become final as a result of a judicial decision of a national court ruling at final instance. 9
Poleg tega je zadevna odločba postala dokončna na podlagi sodne odločbe nacionalnega sodi�ča, ki je odločalo na zadnji stopnji. 9
The national court considers, however, that it can be seen from the judgment in Kühne & Heitz that, in the case which gave rise to that judgment, the claimant likewise did not request that a preliminary ruling be sought from the Court of Justice. Furthermore, the national court is inclined to the view that the fact that national courts have overlooked the significance of a question of interpretation of Community law should not be held against the individual concerned. 28.
Kljub temu predložitveno sodi�če meni, da je iz navedene sodbe Kühne & Heitz mogoče sklepati, da v zadevi, v kateri je bila ta sodba izdana, tožeča stranka tudi ni predlagala, naj se Sodi�ču predloži vpra�anje za predhodno odločanje. Še več, menilo naj bi, da če nacionalna sodi�ča niso priznala pomena vpra�anja glede razlage prava Skupnosti, tega ni mogoče očitati o�kodovancu. 28.
On the other hand, the national court is uncertain as to whether the third condition in Kühne & Heitz has been fulfilled. The third condition is that the judgment of the national court ruling at final instance must, in the light of a decision given by the Court subsequent to it, be based on a misinterpretation of Community law which was adopted without a question being referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under the third paragraph of Article 234 EC. 31.
Po drugi strani se predložitveno sodi�če spra�uje, ali je izpolnjen tretji pogoj iz navedene sodbe Kühne & Heitz. V skladu s tem pogojem mora sodba nacionalnega sodi�ča, ki je odločalo na zadnji stopnji, ob upo�tevanju poznej�e sodne prakse Sodi�ča temeljiti na napačni razlagi prava Skupnosti, ki je bila podana, ne da bi bilo Sodi�ču v skladu s tretjim odstavkom člena 234 ES predloženo vpra�anje za predhodno odločanje. 31.
In addition, the national court is uncertain as to the implications of the fourth condition laid down by the Court of Justice in Kühne & Heitz, namely that the person concerned must have complained to the administrative body immediately after becoming aware of the Court’s decision. 29.
Poleg tega se predložitveno sodi�če spra -�uje o obsegu četrtega pogoja, ki ga je Sodi�če določilo v navedeni sodbi Kühne & Heitz, tj. da se je morala stranka na upravni organ obrniti takoj po tem, ko se je seznanila s sodno prakso Sodi�ča. 29.
According to the national court, if the condition were to be understood as meaning that a claimant must have relied on Community law when he contested the administrative decision in court and that the national court must have dismissed the action without seeking a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice, the action brought by the applicant should be dismissed.
Finanzgericht Hamburg meni, da če je treba navedeni pogoj razlagati, kot da je morala tožeča stranka upravni akt na sodi�ču izpodbijati s sklicevanjem na pravo Skupnosti in da ga je moralo nacionalno sodi�če zavrniti, ne da bi se pri Sodi�ču vložil predlog za sprejetje predhodne odločbe, potem bi bilo treba tožbo tožeče stranke zavrniti. Ta
9 — In the eyes of the Finanzgericht Hamburg, the fact that, owing to the particular characteristics of the national rules of procedure, the Bundesfinanzhof decided the case by means of an order and not a judgment is not germane.
9 – Po mnenju predložitvenega sodi�ča ni pomembno, da Bundesfinanzhof zaradi posebnosti nacionalnih postopkovnih pravil ni odločilo s sodbo, ampak s sklepom.
The form of the judicial decision is irrelevant provided that the claimant has exhausted all the judicial remedies available to him under national law.
Oblika sodne odločbe naj ne bi bila pomembna, če je tožeča stranka izčrpala vsa sredstva, ki jih ima po nacionalnem pravu na voljo.
KEMPTER which have arisen before the Court’s judgment, the national court does not see why an application, on the basis of Emsland-Stärke, for the revocation of an administrative decision that is final and infringes Community law should, exceptionally, be subject to a limit in time.
KEMPTER žitvenemu sodi�ču ni jasno, zakaj bi morala biti možnost, da se na podlagi navedene sodbe Emsland-Stärke predlaga odprava dokončne upravne odločbe, ki kr�i pravo Skupnosti, izjemoma časovno omejena.
The national court then observes that, in its opinion, the timelimit as regards an application for the review of a final administrative decision should depend on positive awareness of the Court’s decision on the part of the person concerned.
Nadalje meni, da bi moral biti rok za vložitev predloga za revizijo dokončne upravne odločbe povezan z dejansko seznanitvijo stranke s sodno prakso Sodi�ča.
It adds that, with regard to the interpretation of the adverb ‘immediately’ used by the Court in Kühne & Heitz, the word in question is used in relation to the assessment of issues of causality in German law. 10 The national court is inclined to understand the word as meaning ‘without delay’ or ‘without culpable delay’. From that viewpoint, according to the national court, an application for review lodged three months after the person in question becomes aware of the Court’s interpretation should be regarded as meeting the fourth condition laid down by the Court in Kühne & Heitz. 34.
Navaja tudi, da je glede razlage prislova „takoj“, ki ga je Sodi�če uporabilo v navedeni sodbi Kühne & Heitz, namen te besede presojati vzročni element v nem�kem pravu. 10 Finanzgericht Hamburg torej meni, da bi navedeno besedo razumeli v smislu „nemudoma“ ali „brez nepotrebnega odla�anja“. V skladu s tem bi po njegovem mnenju moralo veljati, da predlog za ponovno preučitev, ki se vloži tri mesece po seznanitvi z razlago Sodi�ča, izpolnjuje četrti pogoj, ki ga je to določilo v navedeni sodbi Kühne & Heitz. 36. Zato je prekinilo odločanje in Sodi�ču v predhodno odločanje predložilo ti vpra�anji:
Inasmuch as administrative authorities must apply the interpretation of a provision of Community law supplied by the Court in a preliminary ruling to legal relationships
Ker mora upravni organ pri pravnih razmerjih, nastalih pred sodbo, izdano v postopku predhodnega odločanja, uporabiti razlago določbe prava Skupnosti, kot jo je Sodi�če upo�tevalo v navedeni sodbi, predlo-
10 — The German word is ‘unmittelbar’, which means ‘immediately’ or ‘directly’.
10 – Nem�ki izraz je „unmittelbar“, ki pomeni „takoj“ ali „neposredno“.
(2) Is an application for the review and amendment of a final administrative decision which is contrary to Community law subject to a limit in time for overriding reasons of Community law, apart from the conditions set out in [Kühne & Heitz]?’ I - 421
Ali je ne glede na pogoje, določene v sodbi v zadevi [Kühne & Heitz], možnost, da se vloži predlog za ponovno preučitev in popravek dokončne upravne odločbe, ki je v nasprotju s pravom Skupnosti, zaradi nujnih razlogov prava Skupnosti časovno omejena?“ I - 421
A — Preliminary remarks on the present line of caselaw
A – Predhodne pripombe o sedanji sodni praksi
The need for the stability of legal situations lies at the heart of the concerns expressed by the Court in several of its recent judgments.
Prav ta zahteva po stabilnosti pravnih razmerij je glavni razlog za pomisleke, ki jih je Sodi�če izrazilo v več najnovej�ih sodbah.
Before examining the two questions referred to the Court, it seems to me necessary to review the current caselaw of the Court relating to the issue of reviewing administrative and judicial decisions which have become final and which prove to be contrary to Community law as subsequently interpreted by the Court.
Preden preučim obe vpra�anji za predhodno odločanje, menim, da je nujno treba povzeti sedanjo sodno prakso Sodi�ča v zvezi z vpra�anjem ponovne preučitve dokončnih upravnih in sodnih odločb, za katere se izkaže, da so v nasprotju s pravom Skupnosti, kot ga je pozneje razlagalo Sodi�če.
It will thus be possible to identify the different situations which have been referred to the Court, the way in which they have been dealt with by it and the particular characteristics of the situation covered by Kühne & Heitz. 38.
Tako bo mogoče opredeliti različne primere, predložene Sodi�ču, način, kako se jih je to lotilo, in posebnosti primera, na katerega se je nana�ala navedena sodba Kühne & Heitz. 41.
Let me begin by pointing out that, beyond the small differences in the various situations involving the review of final national decisions, the main thread of the relevant caselaw is constituted by the importance attached by the Court to the principle of legal certainty.
Ker načelo pravnomočnosti pripomore k izpolnitvi te zahteve po stabilnosti pravnih razmerij, je Sodi�če nanj �e posebej pozorno.
The Court observed that ‘in order to ensure both stability of the law and legal relations and the sound administration
na trditve nekaterih vlad, ki so se na načelo pravnomočnosti sklicevale v podporo stali�ču, da načela odgovornosti države za �kodo, ki so jo posamezniki utrpeli zaradi kr�itev prava Skupnosti, ni mogoče uporabiti pri odločbah nacionalnega sodi�ča, ki je odločalo na zadnji stopnji, odločno potrdilo pomen načela pravnomočnosti. Po njegovem
Accepted long ago by the Court as a general principle of Community law, 11the
Načelo pravne varnosti, ki ga Sodi�če že dolgo priznava kot splo�no načelo prava Skupnosti 11, ima dvojno naravo, ker je njegov
11 — See Joined Cases 42/59 and 49/59 Snupat v High Authority [1961] ECR 53 and Case 13/61 De Geus [1962] ECR 45.
11 – Glej sodbi z dne 22. marca 1961 v zadevi Snupat proti visoki oblasti (42/59 in 49/59, Recueil, str.
KEMPTER so would enable it to remedy an infringement of Community law by the decision at issue’.
KEMPTER tudi s sklicevanjem na sodbo z dne 1. junija 1999 v zadevi Eco Swiss 18izpeljalo načelo, v skladu s katerim „pravo Skupnosti nacionalnega sodi�ča ne obvezuje, da ne uporabi nacionalnih postopkovnih pravil, po katerih odločba postane pravnomočna, čeprav bi se s tem lahko odpravila kr�itev prava Skupnosti, ki jo povzroči zadevna odločba“ 19.
19 of justice, it is important that judicial decisions which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of the timelimits provided for in that connection can no longer be called in question’.
mnenju je za to, „da bi se zagotovili stabilnost prava in pravnih razmerij ter učinkovitost sojenja, […] namreč pomembno, da sodnih odločb, ki so postale dokončne po tem, ko so bila izčrpana vsa razpoložljiva pravna sredstva, ali po tem, ko so se iztekli roki zanje, ni več mogoče izpodbijati“.
14 The Court added that ‘recognition of the principle of State liability for a decision of a court adjudicating at last instance does not in itself have the consequence of calling in question that decision as res judicata [because] proceedings seeking to render the State liable do not have the same purpose and do not necessarily involve the same parties as the proceedings resulting in the decision which has acquired the status of res judicata’ 15 and because, in any case, they do not entail a review of the judicial decision which caused the damage.
14Dodalo je, da „priznanje načela odgovornosti države zaradi odločbe sodi�ča, ki je odločalo na zadnji stopnji, samo po sebi �e ne vzbuja dvomov o pravnomočnosti take odločbe, [ker] postopek, katerega namen je pripisati odgovornost državi, nima istega predmeta in ne vključuje nujno istih strank kot postopek, v katerem je bila sprejeta pravnomočna odločba“ 15, ter ker v nobenem primeru ne vključuje revizije sodne odločbe, ki je povzročila �kodo.
In the same line of case-law, this time in relation to final administrative decisions, Kühne & Heitz gave the Court an opportunity to set out the way in which it seeks to reconcile the requirements arising from the primacy of Community law and from the retrospective effect of judgments giving a preliminary ruling with the requirements deriving from the principle of legal certainty in conjunction with the principle of res judicata. 43.
V skladu s to sodno prakso in ker gre tokrat za dokončne upravne odločbe, je Sodi�če na podlagi navedene sodbe Kühne & Heitz lahko pojasnilo, kako namerava zahteve, ki izhajajo iz načela primarnosti prava Skupnosti in iz retroaktivnega učinka njegovih predhodnih odločb, uskladiti z zahtevami, ki izhajajo iz načela pravne varnosti v povezavi z načelom pravnomočnosti. 43.
17It inferred from this, referring also to its judgment in Eco Swiss, 18the principle that ‘Community law does not require a national court to disapply domestic rules of procedure conferring finality on a decision, even if to do
Sodi�če je v sodbi z dne 16. marca 2006 v zadevi Kapferer 16znova opozorilo na
Kühne & Heitz concerned in particular whether a national authority’s obligation to apply a rule of Community law as interpreted by the Court even to legal relationships which arose or were formed before the Court’s preliminary ruling on a question of interpretation could prevail notwithstanding that 19 — Kapferer, paragraph 21.
V tej zadevi je �lo predvsem za vpra�anje, ali je obveznost nacionalnega organa, da pravilo prava Skupnosti, kot ga razlaga Sodi�če, uporabi tudi pri pravnih razmerjih, zahtevo po stabilnosti dokončnih sodnih odločb ter na s tem povezan pomen načela pravnomočnosti v pravnem redu Skupnosti in v nacionalnih pravnih redih. 17Iz tega je
The implications of the principle of res judicata are also at the heart of Case C-119/05 Lucchini, pending before the Court, in which Advocate General Geelhoed delivered his Opinion on 14 September 2006.
19 – Navedena sodba Kapferer, točka 21. Obseg, ki ga je treba pripisati načelu pravnomočnosti, je tudi v jedru zadeve Lucchini Siderurgica (C-119/05), ki poteka pred Sodi�čem in v kateri je generalni pravobranilec Geelhoed 14. septembra 2006 predstavil sklepne predloge.
14 — Paragraph 38.15 — Paragraph 39.16 — Case C-234/04 [2006] ECR I-2585.17 — Paragraph 20.18 — Case C-126/97 [1999] ECR I-3055, paragraphs 46 and 47.
14 – Točka 38.15 – Točka 39.16 – C-234/04, ZOdl, str. I-2585.17 – Točka 20.
Thus it lists four ‘circumstances’ characterising the main proceedings which, taken together, will give rise, through Article 10 EC, to an obligation of review on the part of the administrative body to which an application to that effect is addressed. The circumstances to which the Court refers in the grounds and in the operative part of the judgment should be recalled:
Treba je opozoriti, katere so te okoli�čine, ki jih Sodi�če navaja v obrazložitvi in izreku sodbe: ki so nastala in se oblikovala, preden je Sodi�če izdalo sodbo v zvezi s predlogom za razlago, lahko veljala, čeprav je upravna odločba postala dokončna, �e preden je bil vložen predlog za njeno revizijo zaradi upo�tevanja navedene sodbe Sodi�ča.
— national law grants the administrative body the power to reopen the final administrative decision;
– upravni organ lahko na podlagi nacionalnega prava odpravi dokončno upravno odločbo;
Observing that legal certainty is one of a number of general principles of Community law and that the finality of an administrative decision, which is acquired upon expiry of reasonable timelimits for legal remedies or by exhaustion of those remedies, contributes to such legal certainty, the Court concluded that ‘Community law does not require that administrative bodies be placed under an obligation, in principle, to reopen an administrative decision which has become final in that way’. 20
Sodi�če je opozorilo, da je pravna varnost eno od mnogih splo�nih načel prava Skupnosti in da upravna odločba, ki je postala dokončna po izteku primernih pritožbenih rokov ali po izčrpanju pravnih sredstev, pripomore k tej varnosti, ter iz tega sklepalo, da „pravo Skupnosti ne zahteva, da je upravni organ načeloma dolžan odpraviti dokončno upravno odločbo“. 20
— that decision has become final as a result of a judgment of a national court ruling at final instance;
– zadevna odločba je postala dokončna na podlagi sodbe nacionalnega sodi�ča, ki je odločalo na zadnji stopnji;
The direction of the approach sought by the Court was accordingly set: having regard to the requirements of the principle of legal certainty, the rule is that a national authority is not obliged, under Community law, to reopen an administrative decision that has become final.
Narava pristopa, ki ga je zagovarjalo Sodi�če, je bila torej določena: glede na zahteve načela pravne varnosti velja, da nacionalni organ v skladu s pravom Skupnosti ni dolžan odpraviti dokončne upravne določbe.
It will be obliged to review such a decision and, as the case may be, to reopen it only exceptionally, in circumstances which the Court tried to set out exhaustively.
Tako odločbo je dolžan ponovno preučiti in po potrebi razveljaviti samo izjemoma, in sicer v okoli�činah, ki jih je Sodi�če posku�alo taksativno omejiti.
— the judgment is, in the light of a decision given by the Court subsequent to it, based on a misinterpretation of Community law which was adopted without a question being referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under the third paragraph of Article 234 EC; and
navedena sodba glede na poznej�o sodno prakso Sodi�ča temelji na napačni razlagi prava Skupnosti, ki je bila podana, ne da bi bilo Sodi�ču v skladu s tretjim odstavkom člena 234 ES predloženo vpra�anje za predhodno odločanje, in
In so doing, the Court drew heavily on the particular context of the case before it.
Tako na�teje �tiri „okoli�čine“, ki so značilne za postopek v glavni stvari in bodo, upo�tevane kot celota, upravnemu organu, pri katerem bo vložen
— the person concerned complained to the administrative body immediately after becoming aware of that decision of the Court.
– stranka se je obrnila na upravni organ takoj po seznanitvi s to sodno prakso.
20 — Kühne & Heitz, paragraph 24. I - 424
20 – Navedena sodba Kühne & Heitz, točka 24. I - 424
KEMPTER the review that the decision is contrary to the subsequent interpretation of Community law laid down by the Court and although the other circumstances mentioned in that judgment are present — could refuse to withdraw the decision if national law confers upon it a discretion in that respect.
KEMPTER za druge okoli�čine, navedene v tej sodbi, zavrnil odpravo navedene odločbe, če mu nacionalno pravo v zvezi s tem daje diskrecijsko pravico.