natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
15 — The three-month timelimit is laid down both in the context of Directive 94/47 (in the second indent of the first subparagraph of Article 5) and in the context of Directive 97/7 (fourth sentence of Article 6(1)).
15 – Trimesečni rok je določen tako v Direktivi 94/47, člen 5, prvi stavek, točka 1, druga alinea, kot v Direktivi 97/7, člen 6(1), četrti stavek.
13 — Directive 94/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 1994 on the protection of purchasers in respect of certain aspects of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use immovable properties on a timeshare basis (OJ 1994 L 280, p. 83).
13 – Direktiva Evropskega Parlamenta in Sveta 94/47/ES z dne 26. oktobra 1994 o varstvu potro�nikov v zvezi z nekaterimi vidiki pogodb o nakupu pravice do uporabe nepremičnin na podlagi časovnega zakupa (UL L 280, str. 83).
14 — Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts (OJ 1997 L 144, p. 19).
14 – Direktiva 97/7/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 20. maja 1997 o varstvu potro�nikov glede sklepanja pogodb pri prodaji na daljavo (UL L 144, str. 19).
16 — Thus, it has been pointed out that ‘the [Community] legislature has found that being in possession of all objective data concerning a transaction does not prevent the consumer being won over by a contracting party who knows very well — and such is the art of his profession — how to be convincing’, in N. Rzepecki, Droit de la consommation et théorie générale du contrat, Institut de droit des affaires, Aix-en-Provence, 2002, p. 100.
16 – Torej je bilo povzeto, da „je ugotovitev zakonodajalca [Skupnosti] namreč, da posedovanje vseh objektivnih podatkov posla ne preprečuje potro�niku, da se pusti zavesti trgovcu, ki se zna občudovanja vredno izkazati za prepričjivega – kar je najverjetneje tudi umetnost njegovega poklica“, in Rzepecki, N., Droit de la consommation et théorie générale du contrat, Institut de droit des affaires, Aix-en-Provence, 2002, str. 100.
HAMILTON assessed independently of the date at which the contract was concluded or at which the contractual obligations were performed in full.
HAMILTON se presoja neodvisno od datuma sklenitve ali celotne izpolnitve pogodbe.
Thus, national legislation which fixes the starting point of the timelimit during which the right of cancellation may be exercised as the time at which both parties have performed in full their contractual obligations, even if the consumer has not become aware of his right, cannot attain the objectives of Directive 85/577.
Tako nacionalna zakonodaja, ki bi določila, da se začne rok, v katerem se lahko pravica do odstopa uresničuje, od takrat, ko obe stranki popolnoma izpolnita pogodbo, čeprav potro�nik o tej pravici ni bil poučen, ne bi bila v skladu s cilji, ki jih zasleduje Direktiva 85/577.
become aware — of his right, it could be said that there is a principle common to the laws of the Member States according to which both the fairness of commercial transactions and the stability of legal relations imply that in the context of the discretion conferred on them under the third paragraph of Article 4 of Directive 85/577, the Member States may fix a timelimit within which cancellation may be validly exercised, starting from the time — however late that may be — at which the information was received by the consumer.
svoji pravici, lahko �tejemo, da obstaja načelo, ki je skupno pravnim ureditvam držav članic, po katerem lojalnost pri trgovskih poslih in stabilnost pravnih odnosov določata, da v okviru njihove proste presoje, kot je priznana v členu 4, tretji odstavek, Direktive 85/577, države lahko določijo rok, v katerem se odstop lahko veljavno uveljavlja od časa, ko je bil potro�nik o tem seznanjen, čeprav je do tega pri�lo kasneje.
The answer to the questions referred by the national court should therefore be that Directive 85/577 must be interpreted as meaning that a limit on the right of cancellation may be relied on against the consumer only from the time at which he became aware, or could have become aware, of his right.
Zato je treba na vpra�anja, ki jih je zastavilo predložitveno sodi�če, odgovoriti, da je treba Direktivo 85/577 razlagati tako, da se omejitve pravice do odstopa potro�niku lahko oporeka le od trenutka, ko je bil poučen ali bi lahko bil poučen o svoji pravici.
That condition must be
Ta zahteva
On the other hand, the first and third paragraphs of Article 4 and Article 5(1) of Directive 85/577 do not preclude the Member States from fixing, in the exercise of their discretion, a timelimit during which the right of cancellation may be exercised, starting from the time at which it is established that the consumer became aware, or could have become aware, of his right.
Nasprotno pa člen 4, prvi in tretji odstavek, ter člen 5(1) Direktive 85/577 ne nasprotujeta temu, da države članice v okviru proste presoje določijo rok, v katerem se lahko pravica do odstopa veljavno uresničuje od trenutka, ko je dokazano, da je bil potro�nik poučen ali bil lahko bil poučen o svoji pravici.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court of Justice give the following reply to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart:
Glede na zgoraj navedene preudarke predlagam Sodi�ču, naj na vpra�anja za predhodno odločanje, ki jih je predložilo Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, odgovori:
‘Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises must be interpreted as
Direktivo Sveta 85/577/EGS z dne 20. decembra 1985 za varstvo potro�nika v primeru pogodb, sklenjenih zunaj poslovnih prostorov, je treba razlagati tako, da izključuje,
On the other hand, Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 85/577 do not preclude the Member States from fixing, in the exercise of their discretion, a timelimit during which the right of cancellation may be exercised, starting from the time at which it is established that the consumer became aware, or could have become aware, of his right.’
Nasprotno člena 4 in 5 Direktive 85/577 ne nasprotujeta temu, da države članice v okviru proste presoje določijo rok, v katerem se lahko pravica do odstopa veljavno uresničuje od trenutka, ko je ugotovljeno, da je bil potro�nik poučen ali bil lahko bil poučen o svoji pravici.
10 April 2008 *
SODBA SODIŠČA (prvi senat) z dne 10. aprila 2008 *
2008 — CASE C-412/06
2008 – ZADEVA C-412/06 generalni pravobranilec: M.
Advocate General: M. Poiares Maduro, Registrar: B. Fülöp, Administrator, having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 20 September 2007, after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:
Fülöp, administrator, na podlagi pisnega postopka in obravnave z dne 20. septembra 2007, ob upo�tevanju stali�č, ki so jih predložili:
HAMILTON gives the following
HAMILTON izreka naslednjo
This reference for a preliminary ruling relates to the interpretation of Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises (OJ 1985 L 372, p.
Predlog za sprejetje predhodne odločbe se nana�a na razlago Direktive Sveta 85/577/EGS z dne 20. decembra 1985 za varstvo potro�nika v primeru pogodb, sklenjenih zunaj poslovnih prostorov (UL L 372, str. 31, v nadaljevanju: direktiva o prodaji od vrat do vrat).
The reference has been made in the course of proceedings between Ms Hamilton and Volksbank Filder eG (‘Volksbank’) concerning an application for annulment of a loan contract and repayment of the interest paid.
Ta predlog je bil vložen v okviru spora med A. Hamilton in Volksbank Filder eG (v nadaljevanju: Volksbank) zaradi razveljavitve kreditne pogodbe in vračila plačanih obresti.
The fourth recital in the preamble to the doorstep selling directive states as follows:
V četrti uvodni izjavi direktive o prodaji od vrat do vrat je navedeno:
‘… the special feature of contracts concluded away from the business premises of the trader is that as a rule it is the trader who initiates the contract negotiations, for
„[…] posebna narava pogodb, sklenjenih zunaj poslovnih prostorov prodajalca, [je] taka, da je praviloma prodajalec tisti, ki da pobudo za sklenitev pogodbe, na kar
2008 — CASE C-412/06 which the consumer is unprepared or which he does not [expect]; … the consumer is often unable to compare the quality and price of the offer with other offers; … this surprise element generally exists not only in contracts made at the doorstep but also in other forms of contract concluded by the trader away from his business premises’.
2008 – ZADEVA C-412/06 potro�nik ni pripravljen ali česar ne sprejme; […] potro�nik pogosto ne more primerjati kakovosti in cene ponudbe z drugimi ponudbami; […] ta element presenečenja običajno obstaja ne samo pri pogodbah, ki se sklepajo od vrat do vrat, ampak tudi pri drugih oblikah pogodb, ki jih prodajalec sklene zunaj svojih poslovnih prostorov“.
‘… the consumer should be given a right of cancellation over a period of at least seven days in order to enable him to assess the obligations arising under the contract’.
„[…] potro�nik [bi moral] imeti […] pravico do preklica pogodbe v najmanj sedmih dneh, da bi se mu tako omogočilo oceniti obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz pogodbe“.
Article 1(1) of the doorstep selling directive provides as follows:
Člen 1(1) te direktive določa:
‘This Directive shall apply to contracts under which a trader supplies goods or services to a consumer and which are concluded:
„Ta direktiva se uporablja za pogodbe, ki se med trgovcem, ki dobavi blago ali opravi storitve, in potro�nikom sklenejo:
— during a visit by a trader:
– med obiskom trgovca:
…, where the visit does not take place at the express request of the consumer.’
[…] če se obisk ne opravi na izrecno potro�nikovo željo.“
Article 4 of the directive provides that:
Člen 4 iste direktive določa:
Such notice shall be dated and shall state particulars enabling the contract to be identified.
Tak�en pouk mora imeti datum in podatke, ki omogočajo identifikacijo pogodbe. Potro�niku se ga izroči:
(a) in the case of Article 1(1), at the time of conclusion of the contract;
(a) v primeru člena 1(1), ob sklenitvi pogodbe;
2008 — CASE C-412/06
2008 – ZADEVA C-412/06
Article 5 of the doorstep selling directive provides as follows:
Člen 5 direktive o prodaji od vrat do vrat določa:
The consumer shall have the right to renounce the effects of his undertaking by sending notice within a period of not less than seven days from receipt by the consumer of the notice referred to in Article 4, in accordance with the procedure laid down by national law.
Potro�nik ima pravico, da odstopi od pogodbe, tako da v roku, ki ni [kraj�i] od sedmih dni po prejemu pouka iz člena 4, po�lje pisno obvestilo po postopku, določenem v nacionalnem pravu.
According to Article 7 of the directive:
Člen 7 navedene direktive določa:
‘If the consumer exercises his right of renunciation, the legal effects of such renunciation shall be governed by national laws, particularly regarding the reimbursement of payments for goods or services provided and the return of goods received.’
„Če potro�nik uveljavlja svojo pravico do odstopa, ureja pravne učinke takega odstopa nacionalno pravo, zlasti v zvezi z vračilom plačila za dobavljeno blago ali opravljene storitve in vračilom prejetega blaga.“
Article 8 of the doorstop selling directive provides as follows:
Člen 8 iste direktive določa:
‘This Directive shall not prevent Member States from adopting or maintaining more favourable provisions to protect consumers in the field which it covers.’
„Ta direktiva državam članicam ne preprečuje, da na področju, ki ga ureja ta direktiva, sprejmejo ali ohranijo bolj ugodne določbe za varstvo potro�nikov.“
122), in the version applicable to the main proceedings, provides as follows:
122) v različici, ki se uporablja v postopku v glavni stvari, določa:
‘If such notice is not given, the consumer’s right of cancellation [Widerruf] shall not lapse until one month after both parties have performed in full their obligations under the agreement.’
„Če se potro�niku ne posreduje tak pouk, njegova pravica do odstopa [(‚Widerruf‘)] ugasne en mesec po tem, ko obe pogodbeni stranki v celoti izpolnita svoje obveznosti.“
In the application of that provision, incorrect information is equivalent to no information.
Na podlagi te določbe se za nepravilen pouk �teje, kot da ga ni.
The main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
Spor o glavni stvari in vprašanji za predhodno odločanje
In accordance with the Law on consumer credit (Verbraucherkreditgesetz) of 17 December 1990 (BGBl.
Ta pogodba je v skladu z zakonom o potro�ni�kih kreditih (Verbraucherkreditgesetz) z dne 17. decembra 1990 (BGBl. I 1990 str.
2480) that contract contained the following notice concerning the right of cancellation: ‘[i]f the borrower has received the loan, cancellation shall be deemed not to have taken place unless he repays the loan either within two weeks of giving notice of cancellation or within two weeks of the paying out of the loan’.
2840) vsebovala ta pouk o pravici do odstopa: „[č]e je posojilojemalec prejel posojilo, se �teje, da do odstopa ni pri�lo, če ne vrne posojila v dveh tednih ali po izjavi o odstopu ali po nakazilu posojila“.
On 16 December 1992, the employees of Volksbank’s predecessor signed the contract in question and paid the amount of the loan to Ms Hamilton, who later began to pay interest on the loan.
Uslužbenci banke, katere pravna naslednica je Volksbank, so 16. decembra 1992 podpisali navedeno pogodbo in ta banka je nakazala posojilo A. Hamilton, ki je nato začela plačevati obresti tega posojila.
Since the promoter of the real property fund in which Ms Hamilton had bought shares filed for bankruptcy in 1997, there was a significant reduction in the monthly distributions from the fund, which had covered a substantial part of the interest payable under the loan contract at issue.
Družba, ki je upravljala nepremičninski sklad, katerega deleže je kupila A. Hamilton, je leta 1997 vložila predlog za začetek stečajnega postopka, zato so se mesečni prihodki tega sklada, ki naj bi pokrivali glavni del obresti od zadevne kreditne pogodbe, zelo znižali.
Ms Hamilton therefore decided to reschedule her debt by concluding a building society savings contract and taking out a bridging loan with the effect that, at the end of April 1998, she had entirely repaid the loan to Volksbank’s predecessor, which, consequently, returned the security for the loan.
Zaradi tega se je A. Hamilton odločila, da bo svoj dolg prerazporedila s sklenitvijo pogodbe o stanovanjskem posojilu in o posredni�kem posojilu, in konec aprila 1998 je v celoti odplačala posojilo banki, katere pravna naslednica je Volksbank, ki ji je zato vrnila garancije tega posojila.
In the view of the Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, the loan contract at issue falls under point (i) of the second indent of Article 1(1) of the doorstep selling directive, since Ms Hamilton had negotiated and signed that contract at her home.
Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart navaja, da spada zadevna kreditna pogodba na področje uporabe člena 1(1), druga alinea, (i) direktive o prodaji od vrat do vrat, ker se je A. Hamilton za sklenitev te pogodbe pogajala in jo podpisala na svojem domu.
However, the Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart has doubts as to whether the provisions laid down in the fourth sentence of Paragraph 2(1) of the Law on the cancellation of doorstep transactions and analogous transactions can be regarded as ‘appropriate consumer protection measures’ because they provide that, in a case such as that before it, the right of cancellation is to lapse.
Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart se vseeno spra�uje, ali se določbe člena 2(1), četrta poved, zakona o odstopu od pogodb, ki so bile sklenjene v okviru prodaje od vrat do vrat, in njej podobnih poslov lahko �tejejo za „ustrezne ukrepe za varstvo potro�nikov“, ker v takem primeru, kot je v sporu o glavni stvari, določa ugasnitev pravice do odstopa.
In the event that the Court answers the first question referred in the negative:
Če je odgovor na prvo vpra�anje za predhodno odločanje nikalen:
The questions referred to the Court
Vprašanji za predhodno odločanje
Volksbank considers that the reference for a preliminary ruling is inadmissible since, in its view, the loan contract at issue was not concluded at the doorstep.
Volksbank dvomi, da je vpra�anje za predhodno odločanje dopustno, ker zadevna kreditna pogodba po njenem mnenju ni bila sklenjena v okviru prodaje od vrat do vrat.
Consequently, it considers that the questions referred to the Court are hypothetical.
Zato trdi, da sta zastavljeni vpra�anji hipotetični.
On the other hand, the Commission of the European Communities considers that, by the reference for a preliminary ruling, the Court is being asked to consider whether a further cancellation of the contract was possible after Ms Hamilton had cancelled the loan contract at issue by making an early repayment of the loan.
Nasprotno pa Komisija Evropskih skupnosti meni, da je s predlogom za sprejetje predhodne odločbe Sodi�ču zastavljeno vpra�anje, ali je ponoven odstop od te pogodbe mogoč, potem ko je A.
Consequently, the Commission considers that the reference for a preliminary ruling is admissible.
Zato Komisija meni, da je predlog za sprejetje predhodne odločbe dopusten.
It must be borne in mind in that regard that it is solely for the national court before which a dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court.
V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da je samo nacionalno sodi�če, ki odloča o sporu in ki mora prevzeti odgovornost za sodno odločbo, ki jo je treba sprejeti, pristojno za presojo potrebe za izdajo predhodne odločbe, da bi lahko izdalo sodbo, in ustreznosti vpra�anj, ki jih predlaga Sodi�ču, glede na posebnosti zadeve, o kateri odloča.
However, the
Vendar pa je Sodi�če presodilo, da ne more odločati o vpra�anju za predhodno odločanje,
Court has no jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on a question submitted by a national court where it is quite obvious, inter alia, that the interpretation of Community law sought by that court bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose or where the problem is hypothetical (see Schulte, paragraph 43 and the caselaw cited).
HAMILTON ki ga zastavi nacionalno sodi�če, če je očitno, da zlasti razlaga prava Skupnosti, ki jo želi nacionalno sodi�če, nima nikakr�ne zveze z resničnim dejanskim stanjem ali predmetom spora o glavni stvari, ali kadar je težava hipotetična (glej zgoraj navedeno sodbo Schulte, točka 43 in navedena sodna praksa).
On the one hand, since the questions referred to the Court in the present case concern the interpretation of the doorstep selling directive and, on the other, since the loan contract at issue (as has been pointed out in paragraph 18 of the present judgment) falls under point (i) of the second indent of Article 1(1) of the doorstep selling directive, it is not possible to assert that the questions referred are manifestly hypothetical or bear no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose.
Prvič, ker se vpra�anji za predhodno odločanje v tej zadevi nana�ata na razlago direktive o prodaji od vrat do vrat in, drugič, ker zadevna kreditna pogodba spada, kot je bilo navedeno v točki 18 te sodbe, na področje uporabe člena 1(1), druga alinea, (i) navedene direktive, ni mogoče trditi, da sta vpra�anji za predhodno odločanje očitno hipotetični ali da nimata nikakr�ne zveze z resničnim dejanskim stanjem ali predmetom spora o glavni stvari.
Consequently, the reference for a preliminary ruling is clearly admissible.
Zato je treba ugotoviti, da je predlog za sprejetje predhodne odločbe dopusten.
Thus, the national rules at issue in the main proceedings do not
Zato nacionalna ureditev, ki se obravnava v postopku v glavni stvari, ni
2008 — CASE C-412/06 constitute an appropriate measure for the protection of the consumer.
2008 – ZADEVA C-412/06 ustrezni ukrep za varstvo potro�nikov.
She adds that the doorstep selling directive provides that the trader must inform the consumer of his right of cancellation and that the period of not less than seven days laid down in Article 5(1) of that directive begins to run only from the time at which the trader gives the consumer notice of that right.
Dodaja, da direktiva o prodaji od vrat do vrat določa, da mora trgovec potro�nika poučiti o njegovi pravici do odstopa in da rok, ki ni kraj�i od sedmih dni, iz člena 5(1) navedene direktive začne teči �ele od takrat, ko potro�nik od trgovca prejme pouk o tej pravici.
Volksbank contends that, pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 4 of the doorstep selling directive, the appropriate consumer protection measures are those which are likely to protect the consumer from the risks inherent in a financial investment, and are unrelated to the question of cancellation of a contract concluded at the doorstep.
Volksbank trdi, da so ustrezni ukrepi za varstvo potro�nikov v skladu s členom 4, tretji odstavek, direktive o prodaji od vrat do vrat tisti, ki lahko varujejo potro�nika pred tveganji v zvezi z denarnimi naložbami ne glede na odstop od pogodbe, sklenjene od vrat do vrat.
In the event that the Court does not accept that argument, Volksbank contends, on the one hand, that the judgment in Heininger concerned secured credit agreements and not loan contracts such as the one at issue in the main proceedings and, on the other hand, that the period for the exercise of the right of cancellation runs, in the case before the referring court, from the performance in full of the loan contract at issue and not from its conclusion, as was the case in Heininger.
V vsakem primeru Volksbank trdi, prvič, da se zgoraj navedena sodba Heininger nana�a na kredite za nakup nepremičnine, in ne na kreditne pogodbe, kot je pogodba, ki se obravnava v postopku v glavni stvari, in, drugič, da rok za uveljavljanje pravice do odstopa v zadevi v glavni stvari teče od celotne izpolnitve zadevne kreditne pogodbe, ne pa od njene sklenitve, kot je bilo v zadevi, v kateri je bila izdana navedena sodba.
The German Government points out, on the one hand, that since the contractual relationship at issue in the main proceedings, which lasted nearly six years, functioned correctly, the trader must be in a position to consider — once the contract has been performed in full and one month has elapsed after the end of such performance — that the relationship can no longer be the subject of a dispute.
Nem�ka vlada po eni strani poudarja, da mora imeti trgovec, ker je pogodbeno razmerje, ki se obravnava v postopku v glavni stvari, ki je trajalo skoraj �est let, potekalo pravilno, možnost, da po izpolnitvi pogodbe in po izteku enomesečnega roka od te izpolnitve �teje, da tega razmerja ni več mogoče izpodbijati.
On the other hand, the national rules at issue in the main proceedings give the consumer sufficient time, in particular, during the entire time that the contract is in effect and for one month after both parties have performed their obligations thereunder in full, to decide to cancel a contract entered into at the doorstep.
Po drugi strani pa daje nacionalna ureditev, ki se obravnava v postopku v glavni stvari, potro�niku dovolj časa, zlasti med celotnim trajanjem pogodbe in en mesec po njeni celotni izpolnitvi, da se odloči o odstopu od pogodbe, sklenjene od vrat do vrat.
In addition, the limit in time placed on the right of cancellation is also provided for in a number of other directives intended to protect the consumer.
Poleg tega je časovna omejitev te pravice določena tudi v nekaterih drugih direktivah za varstvo potro�nikov.