natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In support of its appeal, L & D submits that the Court of First Instance infringed, first, Article 8(1)(b) of the Regulation, in finding (i) that the silhouette mark had acquired a distinctive character, (ii) that the marks in issue were similar and (iii) that there was a likelihood of confusion, and, second, Article 73, in basing its assessment on evidence relating to marks other than the silhouette mark. 43.
Družba L & D v utemeljitev svoje pritožbe trdi, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje, s tem da je ugotovilo, da (i) je znamka v obliki obrisa pridobila razlikovalni učinek, (ii) da sta nasprotujoči si znamki podobni in (iii) da obstaja verjetnost zmede, najprej kr�ilo člen 8(1)(b) Uredbe in nato člen 73, ker je svojo presojo oprlo na dokaze glede drugih znamk, ne pa glede znamke v obliki obrisa. 43.
The Court’s review is also, in principle, confined to an examination of the grounds of appeal raised before it — in the same way as the role of the Court of First Instance is in principle limited to examining the pleas of the parties — unless there is a question of
Presoja Sodi�ča je načeloma prav tako omejena na preizkus pritožbenih razlogov, ki so bili podani – tako kot je vloga Sodi�ča prve stopnje načeloma omejena na preizkus tožbenih razlogov strank – razen če ne gre za
OHIM and Sämann both contend that the appeal is, on the one hand, inadmissible in its entirety, as seeking a review by the
UUNT in družba Sämann trdita, da je pritožba po eni strani v celoti nedopustna, ker se z njo Sodi�ču predlaga, naj izvede
L & D v OHIM First ground of appeal — infringement of Article 8(1)(b) public policy which it should raise of its own motion.
L & D PROTI UUNT Prvi pritožbeni razlog: kršitev člena 8(1)(b) razlog javnega reda, na katerega mora sodi�če Skupnosti paziti po uradni dolžnosti.
Error in finding that the silhouette mark had acquired a particularly distinctive character
Napačna ugotovitev, da je znamka v obliki obrisa pridobila poseben razlikovalni učinek
— Overall impression
– Celotni vtis
I shall examine L & D’s arguments in turn below, in accordance with those principles. However, it may be helpful first to highlight the uncertainty (to which I shall return in greater detail when examining the ground of appeal relating to breach of the obligation to state adequate reasons) as to precisely which marks were considered as forming the basis of the comparison by the Board of Appeal and by the Court of First Instance, respectively. 46.
Utemeljitve družbe L & D bom v nadaljevanju obravnavala v skladu s temi načeli. Vendar bi bilo lahko koristno, če bi najprej poudarila negotovost (ki jo bom natančneje obravnavala pri obravnavi pritožbenih razlogov glede pomanjkljive obrazložitve) glede tega, katere točno so znamke, na podlagi katerih sta odbor za pritožbe oziroma Sodi�če prve stopnje opravila primerjavo. 46.
L & D submits that the Court of First Instance failed to take sufficient account of striking visual differences (the precise outline, the panel containing the word element and the colour of the base) between the silhouette mark and the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark. It thus failed to comply with the caselaw to the effect that the global assessment must be based on the overall impression given by the mark perceived as a whole. 37 47.
Družba L & D trdi, da Sodi�če prve stopnje ni zadosti upo�tevalo izrazitih vidnih razlik (natančnega obrisa, ozadja z besednim elementom in barve podstavka) med znamko v obliki obrisa in znamko ARBRE MAGIQUE. Zato naj ne bi ravnalo v skladu s sodno prakso, da mora celovita presoja temeljiti na celotnem vtisu, ki ga daje znamka. 37 47.
I agree with OHIM and Sämann that this amounts to a criticism of the Court of First Instance’s assessment of factual matters, which cannot be reviewed on appeal.
Strinjam se z UUNT in družbo Sämann, da gre v tem primeru za kritiko presoje Sodi�ča prve stopnje glede dejanskih vpra�anj, kar ne more biti predmet pritožbe.
The Court of First Instance compared the silhouette mark with part of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark, and L & D’s argument 45.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je znamko v obliki obrisa primerjalo z delom znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE, iz utemeljitve družbe L & D pa 45.
The Board of Appeal stated that it would compare the Aire Limpio mark to the silhouette mark as representative of the others, then accepted evidence concerning the advertising and sales of Sämann’s car air fresheners, without reference to the mark under which they were advertised or sold, and referred to the fact that the CAR-FRESHNER mark had been protected since 1954.
Odbor za pritožbe je navedel, da bo znamko Aire Limpio primerjal z znamko v obliki obrisa kot predstavnico ostalih znamk, nato pa je sprejel dokaze glede ogla�evanja in prodaje avtomobilskih osvežilcev zraka družbe Sämann, ne da bi navedel znamko, pod katero se ti ogla�ujejo ali prodajajo, in se skliceval na dejstvo, da je znamka CAR-FRESHNER za�čitena od leta 1954. Sodi�če prve stopnje je kljub temu navedlo, da je odbor za pritožbe svoje ugotovitve oprl na uporabo in ugled znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE, in menilo, da je znamka v obliki obrisa del te znamke.
It may help to follow some of the submissions on appeal if those possible discrepancies are borne in mind.
Če se ta morebitna protislovja upo�tevajo, je to lahko koristno za razumevanje nekaterih pritožbenih razlogov.
37 — See point 7 above.
37 – Glej točko 7 zgoraj.
— The Nestlé judgment contains nothing to suggest that those two elements were not compared on the basis of the overall impression given.
– Sodba Nestlé ne izhaja, da ni bila opravljena primerjava med tema dvema elementoma na podlagi celotnega vtisa.
L & D further submits that the Nestlé judgment 39on which the Court of First — Role of the figurative part in the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark
Družba L & D nadalje trdi, da sodba Nestlé, 39 na katero se je Sodi�če prve stopnje – Vloga figurativnega dela v znamki ARBRE MAGIQUE
L & D submits that the Court of First Instance failed to determine the precise role played by the figurative part (the silhouette of a fir tree) in the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark. If the role was merely significant and not predominant, evidence of the use and reputation of that mark could not lead to a finding of distinctive character for the silhouette mark. Instance relied to establish that the silhouette mark had acquired distinctive character as part of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark does not indicate that use as part of a registered mark necessarily leads to acquisition of distinctive character, only that it may do so.
Družba L & D trdi, da Sodi�če prve stopnje ni ugotovilo natančne vloge figurativnega dela (obris jelke) v znamki ARBRE MAGIQUE. Če bi bila ta vloga zgolj pomembna, ne pa prevladujoča, na podlagi dokazov o uporabi in ugledu te znamke ne bi bilo mogoče ugotoviti, da ima znamka v obliki obrisa razlikovalni učinek. sklicevalo pri ugotovitvi, da je znamka v obliki obrisa pridobila razlikovalni učinek kot del znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE, ne navaja, da uporaba kot dela registrirane znamke nujno vodi do pridobitve razlikovalnega učinka, temveč da do tega lahko pripelje.
Moreover, the circumstances of that case were not such that conclusions could be drawn for the present case: (i) Nestlé concerned acquisition of distinctiveness by a mark which it was sought to register, not a mark relied on by an opponent; (ii) it concerned two purely verbal marks, not a figurative mark and a mixed figurative and verbal mark; (iii) in Nestlé, the mark requested was the domin- ant part of a catchy slogan, whereas here the preponderant role of the figurative part of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark is not established; and (iv) in Nestlé, the requested mark and the part of the earlier mark were identical, whereas here the two silhouettes are only similar.
Poleg tega okoli�čine te zadeve niso bile take, da bi bilo v obravnavanem primeru mogoče izpeljati podobne ugotovitve: (i) sodba Nestlé se je nana�ala na pridobitev razlikovalnosti znamke, glede katere se je zahtevala registracija, ne pa glede znamke, na katero se je skliceval vložnik ugovora; (ii) nana�ala se je na dve povsem besedni znamki, ne pa na figurativno znamko ter me�ano figurativno in besedno znamko; (iii) v sodbi Nestlé je bila zahtevana znamka prevladujoči del privlačnega slogana, medtem ko močnej�a vloga figurativnega dela znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE ni ugotovljena in (iv) v sodbi Nestlé sta bili zahtevana znamka in del prej�nje znamke enaka, medtem ko sta v obravnavanem primeru obrisa zgolj podobna.
I agree with OHIM that the Court of First Instance found that the figurative part played a role which was not merely significant but also preponderant in the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark. 38
Strinjam se z UUNT, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje ugotovilo, da je imel figurativni del ne zgolj pomembno, temveč prevladujočo vlogo v znamki ARBRE MAGIQUE. 38
It seems clear to me that the Court of First Instance could rightly rely on Nestlé to make a finding, which cannot be challenged
Menim, da je jasno, da se je Sodi�če prve stopnje lahko upravičeno sklicevalo na sodbo Nestlé, da bi ugotovilo, da je obris
38 — Paragraph 76 of the judgment uses the words ‘significant or even predominant ’ (‘significatif voire prédominant’ in French, ‘significativo e incluso predominante’ in Spanish).
38 – V točki 76 sodbe so uporabljene besede „pomembno in celo prevladujočo“ (significatif voire prédominant v franco�čini in significativo e incluso predominante v �pan�čini).
39 — Cited in footnote 20 above.
39 – Navedena v opombi 20 zgoraj.
L & D v OHIM has been found predominant, but do not justify the conclusion that it must always be so. In the present case, the Court of First Instance made a different finding on the facts, and that finding cannot be called into question on appeal. on appeal, that the silhouette had in fact acquired distinctive character as part of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark.
L & D PROTI UUNT element prevladujoč, vendar pa ne upravičujejo ugotovitve, da mora biti vedno tako. V obravnavanem primeru je Sodi�če prve stopnje dejstva ugotovilo drugače, te ugotovitve pa s pritožbo ni mogoče izpodbijati. dejansko pridobil razlikovalni učinek kot del znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE, česar s pritožbo ni mogoče izpodbijati.
As regards the alleged differences between Nestlé and the present case, (i) and (ii) do not appear to require any difference of approach, I have dealt with (iii) in the context of the previous argument and (iv) concerns an assessment of fact.
Glede domnevnih razlik med sodbo Nestlé in obravnavanim primerom se zdi, da (i) in (ii) ne potrebujeta drugačnega pristopa, z (iii) sem se ukvarjala v okviru prej�nje utemeljitve, (iv) pa zadeva presojo dejstev.
— United Kingdom Patent Office guidelines
– Smernice patentnega urada Združenega kraljestva
— Preponderant role of verbal elements
– Močnej�a vloga besednih elementov
L & D claims that the Court of First Instance wrongly dismissed as irrelevant submissions based on the United Kingdom Patent Office’s guidelines on the assessment of descriptive character. Those guidelines merely confirmed that the shape of a fir tree was descriptive for the products in question, and could have been taken into account in the context of the overall assessment. 52.
Družba L & D trdi, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno kot nepomembne zavrnilo trditve na podlagi smernic patentnega urada Združenega kraljestva glede ocene razlikovalnega učinka. Te smernice so zgolj potrdile, da je oblika jelke opisna za zadevne proizvode in da bi jo bilo mogoče upo�tevati v okviru celovite presoje. 52.
Next, L & D submits that the finding that the outline of a fir tree played a significant role in the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark and thus in a significant part of the silhouette mark disregarded caselaw 40to the effect that, in marks containing both graphic and verbal elements, the latter play the preponderant role where the former has little imaginative content — as is the case with the outline of a fir tree. 53.
Dalje, družba L & D trdi, da pri ugotovitvi, da ima obris jelke pomembno vlogo pri znamki ARBRE MAGIQUE in s tem pri pomembnem delu znamke v obliki obrisa, ni bila upo�tevana sodna praksa, 40v skladu s katero imajo slednji pri znamkah, ki vsebujejo grafične in besedne elemente, močnej�o vlogo, če so grafični elementi premalo domi�ljijski – kot v primeru obrisa jelke. 53.
I cannot accept that the Court of First Instance erred in law in stating that the Board of Appeal’s decision could be assessed only on the basis of the Regulation as interpreted by the Community courts.
Ne morem sprejeti, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno uporabilo pravo, s tem, da je navedlo, da je odločbo odbora za pritožbe mogoče presojati zgolj na podlagi Uredbe, kot jo razlagajo sodi�ča Skupnosti.
It made a finding of fact as to the descriptive character of the shape for the products in question, and not even OHIM’s own guidelines could invalidate that finding if it did not conflict with the Regulation or the case-law.
Ugotovilo je, da je oblika jelke opisovalna glede na zadevne proizvode, če pa ta ugotovitev ni v nasprotju z Uredbo ali sodno prakso, je ne morejo ovreči niti smernice UUNT.
That must be all the more true where national guidelines are concerned, and L & D does not identify I - 5741
To je �e toliko bolj res v primeru nacionalnih smernic, družba L & D pa ne navaja nobenih neskladij z zakonodajo ali sodno prakso. Prav tako ni protislovno (kot tudi trdi družba I - 5741
Nor is there any contradiction (as L & D also claims) in describing the silhouette mark both as having the shape of a fir tree and as not being a faithful representation of a fir tree. derive no support from the caselaw it cites, whose tenor is simply that a colour applied to telecommunications equipment, or a surface pattern applied to glassware, are not necessarily perceived as identifying the trade origin of goods.
L & D) opisati znamko v obliki obrisa, kot da ima obliko jelke in da hkrati ni verodostojen prikaz jelke. prakso, ki jo navaja in iz katere izhaja zgolj to, da ni nujno, da se barva, ki se uporablja za telekomunikacijsko opremo, ali vzorec na povr�ini steklovine zaznava, kot da opredeljuje trgovski izvor blaga.
That caselaw still requires a factual assessment to determine whether a colour, pattern, shape or other aspect is in fact likely to be so perceived in each case.
Po tej sodni praksi se �e vedno zahteva dejanska presoja, da bi se ugotovilo, ali se barva, vzorec, oblika ali drug vidik dejansko lahko zaznavajo kot taki v posameznem primeru.
In any event, it cannot plausibly be maintained that a trade mark whose shape has distinctive character is automatically likely to lose its distinctiveness when products are manufactured in that shape.
V vsakem primeru ni mogoče verodostojno trditi, da naj bi znamka, katere oblika ima razlikovalni učinek, avtomatsko izgubila svojo razlikovalnost, če so proizvodi izdelani v tej obliki.
— Shape of product necessary to obtain a technical result
– Oblika proizvoda, ki je nujna za dosego tehničnega učinka
As regards the second aspect, the question for this Court is not whether the shape of a fir tree is in fact necessary to obtain the desired technical result of gradual release of deodorant from an air freshener but whether the Court of First Instance was correct to exclude that argument from consideration, as relating to an absolute ground for refusal and thus as extraneous to the subjectmatter of opposition proceedings.
Glede drugega vidika pa vpra�anje za Sodi�če ni, ali je oblika jelke dejansko nujna za dosego želenega tehničnega učinka postopnega spro�čanja di�ave iz osvežilca zraka, temveč ali je Sodi�če prve stopnje ravnalo pravilno, ko ni upo�tevalo te utemeljitve, ker se je nana�ala na absolutni zavrnilni razlog in je bila tako za postopek z ugovorom nepomembna.
In L & D’s view, the Court of First Instance should have considered, as a matter of law, that the silhouette mark was insufficiently distinctive because it merely reproduced part of the appearance of the products sold under it, 41namely their shape. That shape was, moreover, necessary to obtain the technical result required of an air freshener and could not be registered under Article 7(1)(e) of the Regulation. The Court should not have refused to allow the latter argument because it concerned an absolute ground for refusal whereas the action concerned opposition proceedings — it could have been taken into account as part of the overall assessment of distinctive character. 57.
Družba L & D meni, da bi Sodi�če prve stopnje kot odgovor na pravno vpra�anje moralo ugotoviti, da znamka v obliki obrisa ni zadosti razlikovalna, ker zgolj prikazuje del videza proizvodov, ki se pod njo prodajajo, 41namreč njihovo obliko. Ta oblika je poleg tega nujna za dosego tehničnega učinka osvežilca zraka in je v skladu s členom 7(1)(e) Uredbe ni mogoče registrirati. Sodi�če prve stopnje naj te utemeljitve ne bi smelo zavrniti, ker se je nana�ala na absolutni zavrnilni razlog, medtem ko je tožba zadevala postopek z ugovorom – mogoče bi jo bilo upo�tevati kot del celovite presoje razlikovalnega učinka. 57.
As regards the first aspect of that submission, it seems to me that L & D can 59.
Glede prvega vidika te trditve menim, da se družba L & D ne more opreti na sodno 59.
The Court of First Instance had already considered that issue on two previous occasions.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je to vpra�anje že obravnavalo v dveh predhodnih zadevah.
The first case in which it did so was Durferrit.
Prva je bila zadeva Durferrit.
42 A party opposing registration of a trade mark had included among the grounds for challenging the Board of Appeal’s decision rejecting the opposition an allegation
42Stranka, ki je nasprotovala registraciji znamke, je med svoje razloge za izpodbijanje odločbe odbora za pritožbe, s katero je bil ugovor zavrnjen, vključila trditev, da naj bi znamka
42 — Case T-224/01 Durferrit v OHIM — Kolene (NU-TRIDE) [2003] ECR II-1589, paragraphs 72 to 75.
41 – Sodbi z dne 6. maja 2003 v zadevi Libertel (C-104/01, Recueil, str.
L & D v OHIM that the mark was contrary to public policy and accepted principles of morality within the meaning of Article 7(1)(f) of the Regulation. The Court dismissed the plea as immaterial on the ground that Article 7(1)(f) ‘is not one of the provisions in relation to which the legality of the contested decision must be appraised’. It reasoned as follows. 61.
L & D PROTI UUNT nasprotovala javnemu redu in sprejetim moralnim načelom v smislu člena 7(1)(f) Uredbe. Sodi�če je tožbeni razlog zavrnilo kot nepomemben na podlagi tega, da člen 7(1)(f) „ni ena od določb, glede na katero je treba presoditi zakonitost izpodbijane odločbe“. Utemeljitev sodbe je naslednja. 61.
Furthermore, pursuant to Article 58 of the Regulation, an action may be brought before the Board of Appeal only by a party to a proceeding before OHIM and, under Article 63(4), an action before the Community courts is available only to parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.
Poleg tega lahko v skladu s členom 58 Uredbe pritožbo pri odboru za pritožbe vloži zgolj stranka v postopku pred UUNT, v skladu s členom 63(4) pa tožbo pri sodi�čih Skupnosti lahko vložijo zgolj stranke v postopku pred odborom za pritožbe.
Persons submitting observations in the context of Article 41(1), whether they have filed a notice of opposition or not, are not parties to the proceedings; they may not appeal to the Board of Appeal or, a fortiori, to the Community courts against a decision by OHIM on the absolute ground of refusal relied on.
Osebe, ki predložijo pripombe v smislu člena 41(1), ne glede na to, ali so vložile pisni ugovor ali ne, niso stranke v postopku; ne morejo se pritožiti pri odboru za pritožbe ali, a fortiori, pri sodi�čih Skupnosti zoper odločbo UUNT na podlagi absolutnih zavrnilnih razlogov.
The way in which the examination of applications is organised under Articles 36 to 43 of the Regulation, and in particular the wording and structure of Articles 42 and 43 governing opposition procedures, make it clear that the absolute grounds for refusal in Article 7 do not fall to be examined as part of an opposition procedure, which may be based only on the relative grounds in Article 8.
Iz načina, kako je organiziran preizkus prijav v skladu s členi od 36 do 43 Uredbe, zlasti iz besedila in sistematike členov 42 in 43, ki urejata postopek z ugovorom, jasno izhaja, da se absolutnih razlogov za zavrnitev iz člena 7 ne preizku�a v okviru postopka z ugovorom, ki lahko temelji zgolj na relativnih razlogih iz člena 8.
Although under Article 41(1) third parties may submit observations to OHIM concerning absolute grounds, the effect is simply that OHIM must consider reopening the examination procedure to check whether registration is precluded.
Čeprav v skladu s členom 41(1) tretje osebe lahko UUNT sporočijo pripombe glede absolutnih razlogov, je učinek tega zgolj ta, da mora UUNT odločiti, ali bo ponovno začel postopek preizkusa, da bi preveril, ali je registracija mogoča.
It is thus not in the context of opposition proceedings that OHIM must take account of such observations, even if they are in fact submitted in the course of such proceedings.
V okvir postopka z ugovorom tako ne spada, da UUNT take pripombe upo�teva, tudi če bi bile dejansko predložene med tem postopkom.
If appropriate, OHIM may suspend the opposition procedure.
Če je treba, UUNT lahko postopek prekine z ugovorom. 43
It did not provide detailed justification for transposing the approach in Durferrit to that rather different situation, stating simply that if the applicant was of the view that the earlier mark had been registered in breach of Article 7, it ought to have applied for its cancellation under Article 51.
Sodi�če prve stopnje ni natančno utemeljilo prenosa pristopa iz sodbe Durferrit v to dokaj drugačno situacijo, navedlo je zgolj, da bi prijavitelj moral zahtevati, da se prej�nja znamka razglasi za nično v skladu s členom 51, če bi menil, da je bila registrirana v nasprotju s členom 7.
1), as amended.
1), kot je bila spremenjena.
44 — Case T-186/02 BMI Bertollo v OHIM — Diesel (DIESELIT) [2004] ECR II-1887, paragraph 71.
44 – Sodba z dne 30. junija 2004 v zadevi BMI Bertollo proti UUNT – Diesel (DIESELIT) (T-186/02, ZOdl., str. II-1887, točka 71).
45 to third parties, Article 8 concerns opposition by proprietors of existing trade marks, on grounds relating to a conflict with the rights of those proprietors.
Skupnosti, temveč zgolj v postopkih za izbris, ki jih sproži zadevna država članica. 45 tretjih oseb, se člen 8 nana�a na ugovor imetnikov obstoječih znamk zaradi konflikta s pravicami teh imetnikov.
The registration pro -cedure is governed by Title IV (Articles 36 to 45) and is structured as follows: (i) examination of formal conditions of filing; (ii) exami -nation of absolute grounds for refusal; (iii) search for possibly conflicting earlier trade marks; (iv) publication of the application; (v) observations by third parties concerning absolute grounds for refusal in Article 7; (vi) opposition by proprietors of existing trade marks on relative grounds in Article 8; (vii) possible withdrawal, restriction, amendment or division of the application; (viii) registration.
Postopek registracije je urejen v Naslovu IV (členi od 36 do 45) in ga sestavljajo: (i) preizkus izpolnjevanja formalnih zahtev za prijavo; (ii) preizkus absolutnih zavrnilnih razlogov; (iii) poizvedba o morebitnih prej�njih nasprotujočih znamkah; (iv) objava prijave; (v) pripombe tretjih oseb glede absolutnih zavrnilnih razlogov iz člena 7; (vi) ugovor imetnikov obstoječih znamk na podlagi relativnih razlogov iz člena 8; (vii) morebiten umik, zožitev, sprememba ali delitev prijave; (viii) registracija.
Once a trade mark is registered, Articles 51 and 52 provide respectively for absolute and relative grounds of invalidity to be raised on application to OHIM or on the basis of a counterclaim in infringement proceedings.
Ko je znamka registrirana, člena 51 in 52 določata absolutne oziroma relativne razloge za ničnost na podlagi zahteve, vložene pri UUNT, ali na podlagi nasprotne tožbe v postopku zaradi kr�itve pravic.