natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
On the basis of its investigation, the Commission considered that both had charged unfair and excessive prices, Vodafone between 1997 and at least September 2003 and between 1998 and at least September 2003 (4). Finally, as far as international
Komisija je na podlagi svojih raziskav ugotovila, da sta obe družbi zaračunavali nepoštene in previsoke cene, družba Vodafone med letoma 1997 in najmanj septembrom 2003 ter družba O2 med letoma 1998 in najmanj septembrom 2003 (4).
2 mobile roaming services are concerned, the Commission is also looking at the competitive e ects resulting from the recent creation of strategic mobile alliances (such as ‘Freemove’ or ‘Starmap’).
Kar zadeva storitve mednarodnega roaminga, Komisija preučuje tudi učinke na konkurenco, ki izhajajo iz nedavne vzpostavitve strateških mobilnih povezav (kot sta „Freemove“ ali „Starmap“).
Press release IP/04/994.
Sporočilo za javnost IP/04/994.
Other case developments and rejections of complaints
Razvoj drugih zadev in zavrnitve pritožb
On 30 April, the Commission closed the Article 82 investigations that it had started in 1999 on its own initiative into the behaviour of Interbrew NV (now Inbev NV) towards Belgian beer wholesalers, a er Interbrew made a number of commitments.
Komisija je 30. aprila zaključila preiskave v okviru člena 82, ki jih je na lastno pobudo začela leta 1999, o ravnanju družbe Interbrew NV (sedaj Inbev NV) do belgijskih trgovcev na debelo s pivom, potem ko je družba ponudila številne zaveze.
Interbrew has in particular undertaken to amend its rebates systems and its partnership and commercial agreements with wholesalers in such a way that rival suppliers are no longer prevented from competing e ectively with Interbrew in Belgium.
Družba Interbrew se je še posebej obvezala, da bo spremenila svoje sisteme popustov ter svoje partnerske in trgovinske sporazume s trgovci na debelo tako, da bodo lahko konkurenčni ponudniki v Belgiji z njo učinkovito tekmovali.
Interbrew rst agreed to make its standardised volume rebate system entirely transparent to all wholesalers rather than just providing them with the rebate rate corresponding to the volume range in which their own purchases for the various types of beer fall and the rates corresponding to the volume ranges situated just above and just below that range.
Družba Interbrew je najprej soglašala, da bo svoj standardiziran sistem količinskih popustov preoblikovala tako, da bo v celoti pregleden za vse trgovce na debelo, namesto informacij zgolj o stopnji popusta, ki ustreza razponu količine, v katero spadajo njihovi nakupi različnih vrst piva, in o stopnjah, ki ustrezajo razponom količine tik nad tem razponom in pod njim.
Another rebate system, specifically designed for wholesalers who are prepared to sell the various types of Interbrew beer in their own tied retail outlets, will also be amended in such a way that the rebates will no longer increase with the number of the wholesaler’s tied outlets but represent a xed amount per hectolitre of a particular type of beer, whatever the number of tied outlets.
Drug sistem popustov, zasnovan posebej za trgovce na debelo, ki so pripravljeni prodajati različne vrste Interbrewovega piva na svojih vezanih maloprodajnih mestih, bo prav tako spremenjen tako, da se popusti ne bodo več zviševali s številom vezanih prodajnih mest trgovcev na debelo, ampak bodo pomenili ksni znesek na hektoliter dane vrste piva, ne glede na število vezanih prodajnih mest.
Under Interbrew’s partnership agreements, Interbrew will no longer have access to the wholesalers’ confidential business data and it will no longer have the right to block a competitor’s bid for the purchase of the wholesaler’s business and to make its own bid instead (abolition of the ‘right of rst refusal’).
Družba Interbrew v okviru svojih partnerskih sporazumov ne bo imela več dostopa do zaupnih poslovnih podatkov trgovcev na debelo ter ne bo imela več pravice blokirati tekmečeve ponudbe za odkup dejavnosti trgovca na debelo in namesto tega predložiti lastne ponudbe (odprava „pravice prve zavrnitve“).
Finally, regarding the commercial agreements by which Interbrew grants wholesalers a number of incentives such as nancial support or gadgets mainly in return for promotional activities, Interbrew has accepted to (i) abolish any product exclusivity requirement, (ii) make the eligibility
Končno je družba Interbrew v zvezi s trgovinskimi sporazumi, s katerimi zagotavlja trgovcem na debelo
See press release IP/04/574, 30.4.2004.
Glej sporočilo za javnost IP/04/574, 30.4.2004.
I — Antitrust — Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC criteria fully transparent and (iii) make it clear that the same incentives are open to all wholesalers without exception.
I – Protimonopolna zakonodaja – členi 81, 82 in 86 ES številne pobude, kot so nančna podpora ali naprave, večinoma v zameno za promocijske dejavnosti, soglašala, da bo (a) odpravila vse zahteve po ekskluzivnosti proizvoda, (b) omogočila popolno preglednost meril upravičenosti ter (c) jasno navedla, da so iste pobude odprte za vse trgovce na debelo, brez izjeme.
52) and Sundbusserne v Port of Helsingborg (
) in Sundbusserne proti pristanišču
On 23 July, the Commission took two decisions (54) rejecting two complaints lodged by ferry operators — Scandlines Sverige AB and Sundbusserne AS — against the Port of Helsingborg in Sweden. ese two parallel complaints related to alleged abuses within the meaning of Article 82 EC involving excessive port fees charged by the port of Helsingborg for services provided to ferry operators active on the Helsingborg–Elsinore route between Sweden and Denmark.
Komisija je 23. julija sprejela dve odločbi (54), ki zavračata dve pritožbi operaterjev trajektov – Scandlines Sverige AB in Sundbusserne AS – proti pristanišču Helsingborg na Švedskem. Ti dve vzporedni pritožbi sta se nanašali na domnevne zlorabe v smislu člena 82 ES, ki vključujejo pretirane pristaniške pristojbine, ki jih je za storitve operaterjem trajektov zaračunalo pristanišče Helsingborg na progi Helsingborg–Elsinore med Švedsko in Dansko.
A er extensive investigation, the Commission came to the conclusion that the available evidence was insufficient to demonstrate to the requisite legal standard that the prices at issue were excessive. e decisions point to more general di culties in applying Article 82 EC to excessive pricing cases, particularly in cases where no useful benchmarks are available.
Po obsežni preiskavi je Komisija sklenila, da razpoložljivi dokazi ne zadostujejo, da bi se z zahtevanim dokaznim standardom dokazalo, da so bile zadevne cene pretirane. Odločbi kažeta na splošnejše težave pri uporabi člena 82 ES v primerih pretiranih cen, zlasti kjer ni na voljo nobenih koristnih kazalcev.
Given that existing caselaw on this issue is rather limited (55), the decisions may provide useful guidance when determining the economic value of a service and whether a price is excessive/unfair and thus constitutes an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 82 EC.
Ker je sodna praksa pri tem vprašanju precej omejena (55), lahko odločbi zagotovita koristne smernice pri določanju ekonomske vrednosti storitve ter pretirane/nepoštene cene, ki tako pomeni zlorabo prevladujočega položaja v smislu člena 82 ES.
A statement of objections had been issued on 22 March 2002 alleging that KPN Mobile had refused to supply direct interconnection to independent operators and had engaged in a margin squeeze between its wholesale mobile termination rates and the retail prices for mobile virtual private network (MVPN) services.
Dne 22. marca 2002 je bilo predloženo obvestilo o nasprotovanju z navedbami, da je družba KPN Mobile zavrnila ponudbo neposredne medsebojne povezave neodvisnim operaterjem ter povzročila stroškovni pritisk na marže razkorak med lastnimi cenami mobilnih povezav na debelo in drobnoprodajnimi cenami za storitve mobilnega virtualnega zasebnega omrežja (MVZO).
In deciding not to continue the case ex o cio the Commission took into account the fact that action by the Dutch regulator OPTA had in the meantime prompted a reasonable direct interconnection o er by KPN Mobile. e wholesale mobile interconnection rates in the Netherlands had also decreased and the OPTA was in the process of further analysing the markets for termination on individual mobile networks in the Netherlands in the context of the new regulatory framework for electronic communications introduced in the Netherlands in spring 2004.
Komisija je pri odločitvi, da ne bo nadaljevala zadeve po uradni dolžnosti, upoštevala dejstvo, da je ukrep nizozemskega regulatorja OPTA medtem spodbudil družbo KPN Mobile, da je dala sprejemljivo ponudbo o neposredni medsebojni povezavi.
Finally, the Commission had come to the conclusion in its investigation that in the specific context of the MVPN services the existence of a margin squeeze under Article 82 EC could not be properly established.
Prav tako so se na Nizozemskem znižale cene mobilnih medsebojnih povezav na debelo, regulator OPTA pa je nadaljnje preučeval trge za priključitev na posamezna mobilna omrežja na Nizozemskem v okviru novega ureditvenega okvira za elektronske komunikacije, ki je bil na Nizozemskem uveden
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2004 – Zvezek 1 spomladi 2004.
In November, B2 Bredband AB (B2) withdrew its complaint against TeliaSonera AB, the incumbent telecommunications operator in Sweden. e Commission subsequently closed its case.
Novembra je družba B2 Bredband AB (B2) umaknila svojo pritožbo proti družbi TeliaSonera AB, prvotnemu telekomunikacijskemu operaterju na Švedskem.
BOX 3: OVERVIEW OF ENFORCEMENT AGAINST HARDCORE CARTELS
Komisija je posledično zaključila primer.
During 2004, the Commission maintained its emphasis on anti-cartel activity established during the previous three years by issuing another six decisions against unlawful horizontal agreements, involving some 30 companies. ese cases were: copper plumbing tubes, sodium gluconate, French beer, raw tobacco in Spain, hard haberdashery — needles and choline chloride (1). Fines totalling over EUR 390 million were imposed in these decisions.
Decembra 2003 je Komisija na družbo TeliaSonera naslovila obvestilo o nasprotovanju z navedbami, da je podjetje zlorabilo prevladujoč položaj z določanjem prenizkih cen, ko se je potegovalo za veliko pogodbo za gradnjo in upravljanje širokopasovnega omrežja optičnih vlaken za zagotavljanje visokohitrostnega dostopa do spleta v Malmöju.
In the course of the year there were a number of developments in the ght against cartels. ree aspects are in particular worth mentioning, namely developments in the eld of leniency, the consequences for anti-cartel enforcement of the introduction of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and the clarification of the rules governing legal privilege.
Komisija je trdila, da je bila ponudba družbe TeliaSonera za to pogodbo namerno določena pod stroški ter operaterju ni omogočala povračila naložb in stroškov, ki izhajajo iz zagotavljanja infrastrukture in storitev iz te pogodbe ter da je telekomunikacijski operater TeilaSonera z določitvijo tako nizke cene preprečil razvoj alternativne infrastrukture in vstop konkurenčnim ponudnikom storitev na trg.
See below for summaries of the individual decisions.
Vendar pa je Komisija po dodatni preiskavi, ki je sledila izdaji obvestila o nasprotovanju, sklenila, da ni mogoče z zadostno gotovostjo določiti, da je imela družba TeliaSonera ob predložitvi ponudbe na upoštevnih trgih prevladujoč položaj.
of cases now reaching decision stage are dealt with under the 2002 notice (
OKVIR 3: PREGLED IZVRŠEVANJA UKREPOV PROTI KARTELNIM DOGOVOROM
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003e entry into force of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in May (
Ti primeri so bili: bakrene vodovodne cevi, natrijev glukonat, francosko pivo, surov tobak v Španiji, trda galanterija – šivanke in holin klorid (1).
Commission’s powers of investigation. ree key aspects are worth highlighting.
Treba je omeniti zlasti tri vidike, in sicer razvoj na področju prizanesljivosti, posledice uvedbe Uredbe št. 1/2003 za uveljavljanje protikartelnih pravil ter pojasnitev pravil, ki urejajo pravni privilegij.
First, the regulation extends the Commission’s powers of search to include premises other than business premises, including the private residences of stamembers of an undertaking, on reasonable suspicion that business records are being kept at such premises (5).
Obvestilo o prizanesljivosti iz leta 2002 (2) je še vedno pomembno orodje izvrševanja prava.
Such action can be carried out only with prior authorisation by the national judicial authority of the Member State concerned.
Veliko število primerov, ki jih je sprožilo obvestilo o prizanesljivosti iz leta 2002, kaže, da je zelo učinkovito, celo bolj kot obvestilo iz leta 1996.
Second, the Commission’s search powers are strengthened by its ability to seal business premises for the time necessary to conduct the inspection (6). ird, the
Večina primerov, ki so prišli do stopnje odločanja, se obravnava v okviru obvestila iz leta
Legal privilege
Uredba (ES) št. 1/2003
(ECJ) annulled by order of 27 September (8
Začetek veljavnosti Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003 (
) in the case.
Komisije za vodenje preiskav. Treba je poudariti tri ključne vidike.
An envelope containing some of the documents seized in the inspection but which the parties claimed to be covered by legal privilege (10) and which had been retained in the registry of the Court of First Instance was returned to the Commission. e ECJ noted the Commission’s commitment not to disclose the documents under dispute to third parties until the conclusion of the main
Prvič, Uredba razširja pooblastila Komisije za preiskave, ki bodo poleg poslovnih prostorov zajemale tudi druge prostore, vključno z zasebnimi stanovanji uslužbencev podjetja, če obstaja utemeljen sum, da je v teh prostorih shranjena poslovna dokumentacija (5). Takšen ukrep se lahko izvaja samo s predhodnim pooblastilom nacionalnega sodnega organa zadevne države članice.
Notice on immunity from nes and reduction of nes in cartel cases (OJ C 45, 19.2.2002).The application for leniency must have reached the Commission after 19 February 2002 for the new notice to apply.See above point 1.Article 21 of the regulation.Article 20 of the regulation.Article 19 of the regulation.Case C-7/04 P (R).
Za povzetke posameznih odločb glej spodaj. Obvestilo o imuniteti pred denarnimi kaznimi in o znižanju kazni v primerih kartelov (UL C 45, 19.2.2002).
For more details, see below under court cases.
Da bi veljalo novo obvestilo, je morala Komisija prejeti zahtevek za prizanesljivost po 19. februarju 2002.
Joined Cases T-125/03 R and T-253/03 R Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros.
Glej zgornjo točko 1.
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1 proceedings.
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2004 – Zvezek 1 pooblastila, da za namene preiskave opravi razgovor z vsako zično ali pravno osebo,
See Case 155/79 AM & S v Commission [1982] ECR 1575. 58 )
Glej tudi Poročilo o konkurenci za leto 2003, točko 33.Glavni primer o tem vprašanju je pred Sodiščem potekal konec leta.Glej zadevo 155/79 AM & s proti Komisiji, Recueil 1982, str. 1575. 58
On 3 September, the Commission adopted a decision nding that the leading European copper plumbing tube producers, Boliden AB (together with its former subsidiaries Boliden Fabrication AB and Boliden Cuivre & Zinc SA), Halcor SA, HME Nederland BV, IMI plc (together with its (former) subsidiaries IMI Kynoch Ltd and IMI Yorkshire Copper Tube Ltd.), KM Europa Metal AG (together with its wholly owned subsidiaries Europa Metalli SpA and Tréfimétaux SA), Mueller Industries, Inc. (together with its subsidiaries WTC Holding Company, Inc., Mueller Europe Ltd, DENO Holding Company, Inc. and DENO Acquisition EURL), Outokumpu Oyj (together with its wholly owned subsidiary Outokumpu Copper Products Oy) and Wieland Werke AG (together with its subsidiaries Austria Buntmetall AG and Buntmetall Amstetten GmbH), had breached European Community competition rules by colluding to x prices and share markets in the EEA market for copper plumbing tubes. Following an investigation which started in 2001, the Commission established that the infringement lasted from mid-1988 to early 2001. 50. e relevant product is used primarily for water, oil, gas and heating installations in the construction industry. e main customers for plumbing tubes are distributors, wholesalers and retailers that sell the plumbing tubes to installers and other end consumers. e aggregated market value of plain (EUR 970.1 million) and plasticcoated (EUR 180.9 million) copper plumbing tubes amounts to EUR 1 151 million (EEA in 2000).
Komisija je 3. septembra sprejela odločbo, ki ugotavlja, da so vodilni evropski proizvajalci bakrenih vodovodnih cevi, Boliden AB (skupaj s svojima nekdanjima hčerinskima družbama Boliden Fabrication AB in Boliden Cuivre & Zinc SA), Halcor SA, HME Nederland BV, IMI plc (skupaj s svojima (nekdanjima) hčerinskima družbama IMI Kynoch Ltd. in IMI Yorkshire Copper Tube Ltd.), KM Europa Metal AG (skupaj s svojima hčerinskima družbama v celotni lasti, Europa Metalli SpA in Tréfimétaux SA), Mueller Industries, Inc. (skupaj s svojimi hčerinskimi družbami v celotni lasti, WTC Holding Company, Inc., Mueller Europe Ltd., DENO Holding Company, Inc., in DENO Acquisition EURL), Outokumpu Oyj (skupaj s svojo hčerinsko družbo v celotni lasti, Outokumpu Copper Products Oy) in Wieland Werke AG (skupaj s svojima hčerinskima družbama Austria Buntmetall AG in Buntmetall Amstetten Ges.m.b.H.) kršili pravila konkurence Evropske skupnosti z dogovarjanjem o določanju cen in delitvi trgov na trgu EGP za bakrene vodovodne cevi. Po preiskavi, ki se je začela leta 2001, je Komisija ugotovila, da je kršitev trajala od sredine leta 1988 do začetka leta 2001. 58)
Halcor EUR 9.16 million and HME EUR 4.49 million.
Najvišja globa je bila izrečena podjetjem skupine KME, in sicer v višini 67,08 milijona EUR.
Outokumpu and KME were rewarded by a mitigating factor for their cooperation outside the 1996 leniency notice.
Zaradi sodelovanja zunaj obvestila o prizanesljivosti iz leta 1996 sta bili družbi Outokumpu in KME nagrajeni z nižjo globo.
Outokumpu was the rst undertaking to disclose the whole duration of the cartel extending over more than 12 years, KME the rst to disclose decisive evidence with respect to cooperation concerning plasticcoated copper plumbing tubes.
Družba Outokumpu je bilo prvo podjetje, ki je razkrilo trajanje kartela, ki je deloval več kot 12 let, družba KME pa prvo podjetje, ki je razkrilo odločilne dokaze o sodelovanju pri s plastiko prevlečenih bakrenih vodovodnih ceveh.
On the other hand, Outokumpu was penalised by an aggravating factor for a repeat infringement, since it had been an addressee of another Commission decision condemning a cartel in the stainless steel sector in 1990, and received an increase for deterrence.
Na drugi strani je bila družba Outokumpu kaznovana z oteževalnim dejavnikom zaradi ponavljajočih se kršitev, saj je bila naslovnik druge odločbe Komisije iz leta 1990, ki je obsodila kartel v sektorju nerjavnega jekla, ter tako prejela zvišanje globe z namenom odvračanja.
On 29 September, the Commission ned four companies of the Jungbunzlauer Group EUR 19.04 million for their part in xing the price and sharing the market for sodium gluconate, a chemical mainly used to clean metal and glass.
Komisija je 29. septembra štirim podjetjem skupine Jungbunzlauer naložila globo v višini 19,04 milijona EUR zaradi sodelovanja pri določanju cen in delitvi trga za natrijev glukonat, kemično sestavino za čiščenje jekla in stekla.
As to the company of the Jungbunzlauer Group, the decision adopted in 2001 was withdrawn in 2002 on account of a factual mistake in the grounds of the decision regarding its liability for the infringement.
Kar zadeva podjetje skupine Jungbunzlauer, je bila odločba, sprejeta leta 2001, leta 2002 umaknjena zaradi v obrazložitvi odločbe napačno ugotovljenih dejstev glede odgovornosti za kršitev.
In de ning the amount of the ne, the Commission took into account the limited size of the sodium gluconate market.
Stranke kartela na področju natrijevega glukonata so predstavljale skoraj celotno svetovno proizvodnjo.
Moreover, Jungbunzlauer received a 20 % reduction in its ne because it cooperated with the Commission under the 1996 leniency notice.
Kršitev je bila zelo resna, skupina Jungbunzlauer pa je sedem let kršila pravila konkurence Skupnosti.
COMP/36.756.See 2001 Competition Report, point 48.COMP/37.750 — Brasseries Kronenbourg, Brasseries Heineken. i.e. hotels, restaurants and cafes.
COMP/36.756.Glej Poročilo o konkurenci za leto 2001, točko 48.
EUR 1.5 million was imposed on Groupe Danone and Brasseries Kronenbourg, the aggravating circumstance of a repeat infringement having been taken into account in determining this ne.
Družbi Groupe Danone in Brasseries Kronenbourg sta dobili globo 1,5 milijona EUR, ob upoštevanju oteževalne okoliščine ponavljajoče se kršitve pri določanju te kazni.
On 20 October, the Commission imposed nes totalling EUR 20 million on four Spanish raw tobacco processors (Cetarsa, Agroexpansión, World Wide Tobacco España and Taes) as well as on an Italian processor (Deltafina) for entering into an anticompetitive agreement aimed at xing the maximum average price they would pay to raw tobacco producers in Spain as well as the quantities of raw tobacco they would buy. e cartel lasted from 1996 to 2001.
Komisija je 20. oktobra štirim španskim predelovalcem tobaka (Cetarsa, Agroexpansión, World Wide Tobacco España in Taes) in tudi italijanskemu predelovalcu (Delta na) naložila skupno 20 milijonov EUR globe zaradi sklenitve protikonkurenčnega sporazuma, katerega cilj je bil določitev najvišje povprečne cene, ki bi jo plačali proizvajalcem surovega tobaka v Španiji, in tudi količin surovega tobaka za nakup. Kartel je deloval med letoma 1996 in 2001.
As of 1998, the processors put in place a sophisticated enforcement and monitoring system.
Od leta 1998 so predelovalci vzpostavili visoko razvit sistem izvrševanja in spremljanja.
As of 1999, they also agreed between themselves the price ranges for raw tobacco they would then negotiate with the producer representatives for inclusion in the standard cultivation contracts, which provide a framework for the establishment of the nal price of raw tobacco at the moment of delivery. e parent companies of Agroexpansión and WWTE were considered jointly and severally liable for their subsidiaries’ behaviour.
Od leta 1999 so se med seboj sporazumeli tudi o razponu cen za surovi tobak, o katerih so se potem kolektivno pogajali s predstavniki proizvajalcev in so bile vključene v standardne pogodbe o pridelavi, ki zagotavljajo okvir za določitev končne cene surovega tobaka v trenutku dobave. Matični podjetji Agroexpansión in WWTE sta bili skupno in solidarno odgovorni za ravnanje svojih hčerinskih družb.
In the same decision, the Commission also prohibited a cartel involving the associations representing the raw tobacco producers (ASAJA, UPA, COAG and CCAE). e Commission found that they colluded during the same period on the price ranges and minimum prices of raw tobacco they would then collectively negotiate with the processors when discussing the standard cultivation contracts and imposed on them a symbolic ne of EUR 1 000 each to take account of the role played by the national regulatory framework on their behaviour. is circumstance was also taken into account as a mitigating circumstance in determining the processors’ nes.
V isti odločbi je Komisija prepovedala tudi kartel med združenji, ki so predstavljala proizvajalce surovega tobaka (ASAJA, UPA, COAG in CCAE). Komisija je ugotovila, da so se združenja v istem obdobju dogovarjala o razponu cen in najnižjih cenah za surovi tobak, o katerih so se potem v razpravah o standardnih pogodbah o pridelavi skupno pogajala s predelovalci, ter vsakemu od njih naložila simbolično globo v višini 1000 EUR, da bi tako upoštevala vlogo, ki jo je imel nacionalni ureditveni okvir
I — Antitrust — Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC
I – Protimonopolna zakonodaja – členi 81, 82 in 86 ES pri njihovem ravnanju.