natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In paragraph 317 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance inferred from the contested decision that ‘campaign discounts have only a limited impact on prices’.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je v točki 317 izpodbijane sodbe na podlagi sporne odločbe sklepalo, da „imajo reklamni popusti le omejen vpliv na cene“.
In paragraph 425 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance stated, as regards the contested decision, that ‘the calculation of the differential between minimum and maximum discounts by customer … made for each of the parties to the concentration was carried out incorrectly’.
Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 425 izpodbijane sodbe glede sporne odločbe navaja, da „izračun razlike med najnižjimi in najvi�jimi popusti za kupca […] opravljen za vsako stranko koncentracije, ni bil izveden pravilno“.
In paragraph 427 of the judgment, the Court of First Instance stated that the data supplied by the parties to the concentration were ‘of doubtful relevance’.
Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 427 te sodbe navaja, da so podatki o popustih, ki so jih predložile stranke koncentracije, „dvomljivi“.
In paragraph 434 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance held, in particular, as follows:
V točki 434 izpodbijane sodbe je med drugim navedeno:
‘… the study drawn up by the economic advisers to the parties to the concentration does not present data that are sufficiently reliable, relevant and comparable … While it is indeed probable that the different types of retailer (supermarkets, independents, specialist chains, etc.) apply different mark-up policies, and that there are differences within each category of operators, and even differences for each individual operator, according to the types of album or their degree of success, it is very unlikely, on the other hand, and the study contains no data in that regard, that a retailer will apply a different sales policy for the same type of album. …’
„[…] strokovno mnenje, ki so ga pripravili ekonomisti strank koncentracije, ne pomeni podatkov, ki bi bili dovolj zanesljivi, upo�tevni in primerljivi […] Čeprav je zelo verjetno, da različni trgovci na drobno (samopostrežne trgovine, neodvisni trgovci, specializirane trgovske verige itd.) izvajajo različno maržno politiko in da obstajajo razlike v vsaki skupini trgovcev in celo pri posameznih trgovcih glede na vrsto albuma ali njegov uspeh, je po drugi strani malo verjetno, in tudi strokovno mnenje ne vsebuje nobenega podatka v tem smislu, da bi trgovec na drobno za isto vrsto albuma uporabljal različno prodajno politiko. […]“
The appellants, supported in that regard by the Commission, submit that the Court of First Instance exceeded the scope of its role in carrying out judicial review, in breach of Article 230 EC and settled caselaw, in substituting its own assessment for that of the Commission, without proving the existence of manifest errors of assessment vitiating the contested decision and without asking for a report from an economic expert to be obtained.
Pritožnici, ki ju v zvezi s tem podpira Komisija, zatrjujeta, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje prekoračilo obseg sodnega nadzora, ki ga mora izvesti, ob kr�itvi člena 230 ES ter ustaljene sodne prakse s tem, da je svojo presojo nadomestilo s presojo Komisije, in sicer ne da bi dokazalo obstoj očitne napake pri presoji v sporni odločbi in ne da bi zahtevalo strokovno ekonomsko mnenje.
Moreover, in its examination of the contested decision, the Court of First Instance itself committed manifest errors of assessment and fundamentally misconstrued the evidence before it as regards essential parts of the case, including in particular the relevance, the complexity and the opacity of discounts.
Poleg tega naj bi Sodi�če prve stopnje pri preizkusu sporne odločbe tudi samo storilo očitno napako pri presoji in bistveno napačno razlagalo dokaze, ki so mu bili predloženi, v zvezi s pomembnimi vidiki zadeve, vključno z upo�tevnostjo, zapletenostjo in nepreglednostjo popustov.
Furthermore, the appellants consider that in paragraphs 425, 427 and 434 of the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance also distorted some of the evidence.
Poleg tega pritožnici menita, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje v točkah 425, 427 in 434 izpodbijane sodbe izkrivilo določene dokaze.
Impala considers that this ground of appeal represents, at least to a significant extent, an attempt to reopen the assessment of the facts by the Court of First Instance, without any proof on the part of the appellants that that court misconstrued the evidence before it.
Impala meni, da ta pritožbeni razlog vsaj znatno pomeni poskus izpodbijanja presoje dejstev, ki jo je izvedlo Sodi�če prve stopnje, ne da bi pritožnici dokazali, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno razlagalo dokaze, ki jih je imelo na voljo.
In the alternative, Impala submits that the Court of First Instance had the relevant caselaw concerning the scope of its role in carrying out review in mind when it considered the contested decision, in view of its reference in paragraph 328 of the judgment under appeal to paragraph 39 of the judgment in Commission v Tetra Laval, and that it did not therefore exceed the scope of its role in carrying out judicial review.
Podredno, Impala meni, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje upo�tevalo ustrezno sodno prakso v zvezi z obsegom svojega nadzora, ko je obravnavalo sporno odločbo s tem, da se je v točki 328 izpodbijane sodbe sklicevalo na točko 39 zgoraj navedene sodbe Komisija proti Tetra Laval, in zato ni prekoračilo okvira sodnega nadzora, ki ga mora izvesti.
It is necessary at the outset to reject Impala’s argument alleging the inadmissibility of the fourth ground of appeal.
Najprej je treba zavrniti trditve Impale v zvezi z nedopustnostjo četrtega pritožbenega razloga.
Contrary to what Impala contends, by this ground, the appellants do not merely challenge the assessment of the facts at first instance, but invoke questions of law which are admissible on appeal.
V nasprotju s trditvami Impale se namreč pritožnici v okviru tega pritožbenega razloga ne omejujeta na izpodbijanje presoje dejstev na prvi stopnji, ampak se sklicujeta na pravna vpra�anja, ki so v fazi pritožbe dopustna.
As regards the substance, it should first of all be noted that the Commission has a margin of assessment with regard to economic matters for the purposes of the application of the substantive rules of the Regulation, in particular Article 2.
Glede utemeljenosti je treba najprej opozoriti, da ima Komisija pravico do proste presoje glede ekonomskih vpra�anj za namene izvedbe temeljnih pravil Uredbe, zlasti njenega člena 2.
It follows that the review by the Community judicature of a Commission decision relating to concentrations is confined to ascertaining that the facts have been accurately stated and that there has been no manifest error of assessment (see Kali & Salz, paragraphs 223 and 224, and Commission v Tetra Laval, paragraph 38). 145
Iz tega izhaja, da je nadzor, ki ga izvede sodi�če Skupnosti nad odločbo Komisije v zvezi s koncentracijami, omejen na preverjanje, ali je bilo pravilno ugotovljeno dejansko stanje in ali je bila storjena očitna napaka pri presoji (glej zgoraj navedeni sodbi Kali & Salz, točki 223 in 224, in Komisija proti Tetra Laval, točka 38). 145
That being so, while the Court of First Instance must not substitute its own economic assessment for that of the Commission for the purposes of applying the substantive rules of the Regulation, that does not mean that the Community judicature must refrain from reviewing the Commission’s interpretation of information of an economic nature.
Zato, čeprav Sodi�če prve stopnje ne sme svoje presoje o ekonomskih vpra�anjih nadomestiti s presojo Komisije za namene izvedbe temeljnih pravil Uredbe, to ne pomeni, da se mora sodi�če Skupnosti vzdržati nadzora pravne opredelitve ekonomskih podatkov, ki jo je podala Komisija.
Not only must the Community judicature establish, among other
Sodi�če Skupnosti mora namreč med drugim
BERTELSMANN AND SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA v IMPALA things, whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it (see, to that effect, Commission v Tetra Laval, paragraph 39, and Spain v Lenzing, paragraphs 56 and 57).
BERTELSMANN IN SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA PROTI IMPALI ob vsebinski pravilnosti navedenih dokazov, njihovi zanesljivosti in doslednosti preveriti tudi to, ali ti dokazi vsebujejo vse upo�tevne podatke, ki jih je treba upo�tevati pri presoji zapletene okoli�čine, in ali lahko utemeljijo iz njih izvedene sklepe (glej v tem smislu zgoraj navedeni sodbi Komisija proti Tetra Laval, točka 39 in Španija proti Lenzingu, točki 56 in 57).
Accordingly, as regards the present case, in so far as the Court of First Instance carried out an in-depth examination of the evidence underlying the contested decision when considering the arguments raised before it, it acted in conformity with the requirements of the caselaw set out in paragraphs 144 and 145 of this judgment.
V obravnavani zadevi je torej treba ugotoviti, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje ravnalo v skladu z zahtevami sodne prakse, navedenimi v točkah 144 in 145 te sodbe, ker je pri obravnavi trditev, ki so bile navajane pred njim, podrobno preizkusilo dokaze, s katerimi je bila utemeljena sporna odločba.
Nevertheless, that finding is not, of itself, sufficient to reject the fourth ground of appeal.
Vendar ta sklep kot tak ne zadostuje za zavrnitev četrtega pritožbenega razloga.
As well as the question whether the Court of First Instance exceeded the scope of its role in carrying out judicial review as regards the intensity of its review of the factual basis of the contested decision, the appellants also maintain, as is mentioned in paragraph 139 of this judgment, that, in examining the factors underpinning the contested decision, the Court of First Instance itself committed manifest errors of assessment and fundamentally misconstrued the evidence before it.
Poleg vpra�anja, ali je Sodi�če prve stopnje prekoračilo stopnjo intenzivnosti nadzora, ki ga mora izvesti glede dejanske podlage sporne odločbe, pritožnici poleg tega navajata, kot izhaja iz točke 139 te sodbe, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje pri preizkusu dejavnikov, ki so podlaga sporne odločbe, tudi samo storilo očitno napako pri presoji in je povsem napačno razlagalo dokaze, ki so mu bili predloženi.
The latter claims overlap partially with other grounds put forward in this appeal, namely, in the first place, the first, second and seventh grounds, together with the first part of the third ground, relating to the manner in which the Court of First Instance dealt with some of the evidence before it and, in the second place, the fifth ground, alleging that the Court of First Instance misconstrued the legal criteria applying to a collective dominant position.
Te trditve se delno ujemajo z drugimi pritožbenimi razlogi, in sicer na eni strani s prvim, drugim in sedmim pritožbenim razlogom ter prvim delom tretjega pritožbenega razloga v zvezi s tem, kako je Sodi�če prve stopnje obravnavalo nekatere dokaze, ki so mu bili predloženi, in na drugi strani s petim pritožbenim razlogom, da Sodi�če prve stopnje ni upo�tevalo pravnih meril, ki se uporabljajo v zadevah kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja.
It is sufficient to hold in that respect, as is apparent from paragraphs 95, 102 and 133 of this judgment, that, in its examination of the line of argument based on the existence of manifest errors of assessment, the Court of First Instance committed errors of law in relation to both the manner in which some of the evidence was dealt with
V zvezi s tem zadostuje poudariti, kot izhaja iz točk 95, 102 in 133 te sodbe, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje pri preizkusu trditev o obstoju očitnih napak pri presoji napačno uporabilo pravo glede obravnavanja nekaterih dokazov in pravnih meril, ki
2008 — CASE C-413/06 P and the legal criteria applying to a collective dominant position arising from tacit coordination.
2008 – ZADEVA C-413/06 P se uporabljajo v zadevah kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja, ki je posledica tihega usklajevanja.
Consequently, without it being necessary to adjudicate either on the appellants’ claims alleging distortion of the evidence or on the question whether the Court of First Instance in fact substituted its own economic assessment in the judgment under appeal for that of the Commission, it must be held that at least that part of the judgment under appeal dealing with the examination of the arguments alleging the existence of manifest errors of assessment is vitiated by errors of law.
Zato, ne da bi se bilo treba izreči o trditvah pritožnic o izkrivljanju dokazov in o vpra�anju, ali je Sodi�če prve stopnje v izpodbijani sodbi dejansko nadomestilo svojo presojo o ekonomskih vpra�anjih s presojo Komisije, je treba ugotoviti, da je ob upo�tevanju prekoračitve okvira sodnega nadzora, ki ga mora izvesti Sodi�če prve stopnje, vsaj v delu izpodbijane sodbe, namenjene preizkusu trditev o obstoju očitnih napak pri presoji, napačno uporabljeno pravo.
As regards that part of the judgment under appeal which concerns the inadequate reasoning of the contested decision, it remains necessary to address the sixth ground of appeal.
Glede dela izpodbijane sodbe, ki se nana�a na nezadostno obrazložitev sporne odločbe, je treba obravnavati �e �esti pritožbeni razlog.
The sixth ground of appeal, alleging an error of law in that the Court of First Instance applied an incorrect standard of reasoning as regards decisions approving a concentration
Šesti pritožbeni razlog: napačna uporaba prava, ker je Sodi�če prve stopnje uporabilo napačno določbo za obrazložitev odločb o odobritvi koncentracije
In paragraphs 255 to 276 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance summarised the relevant elements of the contested decision for the purpose of examining the first plea raised before it.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je v točkah od 255 do 276 izpodbijane sodbe povzelo upo�tevne elemente sporne odločbe, da bi preizkusilo prvi tožbeni razlog, navajan pred njim.
Paragraph 275 of the judgment reads as follows:
Točka 275 navedene sodbe se glasi:
‘It follows from the foregoing that [it] was on the basis of product homogeneity, market transparency and also the use of retaliation that the Commission concluded that there was no collective dominant position.’
„Iz navedenega izhaja, da je Komisija ugotovila neobstoj kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja na podlagi homogenosti proizvoda, preglednosti trga in izvr�evanja povračilnih ukrepov.“
In the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance reviewed various sections of the contested decision in order to determine whether it contained reasoning which
Sodi�če prve stopnje je v izpodbijani sodbi obravnavalo različne oddelke sporne odločbe, da bi preverilo, ali je bila dovolj obrazložena glede ugotovitve o nepreglednosti zadevnega trga, in njegov odgovor je bil v vseh primerih nikalen.
The Court of First Instance first of all examined the section of the contested decision which dealt specifically with market transparency.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je najprej obravnavalo oddelke sporne odločbe, ki so posebej namenjeni preglednosti trga.
In that regard, it stated in particular in paragraphs 289, 290 and 294 of the judgment under appeal as follows:
V zvezi s tem je zlasti v točkah 289, 290 in 294 izpodbijane sodbe navedlo:
As regards the section on transparency, it must be observed, by way of preliminary remark, that it contains only three recitals, although according to the [contested decision], and still more so according to the position defended by the Commission in its written submissions to the Court, in the present case transparency is the essential, and indeed the only, ground for the assertion that there is no collective dominant position on the markets for recorded music.
Glede oddelka o preglednosti je treba najprej opozoriti, da vsebuje le tri uvodne izjave, čeprav je preglednost v obravnavani zadevi v skladu s [sporno] odločbo in �e bolj s stali�čem, ki ga zagovarja Komisija v svojih vlogah pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje, glavni, celo edini razlog za trditev, da na trgih posnete glasbe ni kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja. Poudariti je tudi treba, da ni ugotovljeno, da trg ni pregleden niti da ni dovolj pregleden, da bi omogočal tiho dogovarjanje.
At the very most, it is stated, first, at recital 111 in fine, that the need to carry out monitoring at album level, in particular for campaign discounts, “could reduce transparency in the market and may make tacit collusion more difficult” and, second, at recital 113 in fine, that “[h]owever, the Commission has not found sufficient evidence that, by monitoring retail prices or by contacts with retailers, the majors have overcome in the past the deficits as regards the transparency of discounts, in particular campaign discounts as described for the five larger Member States”.
Kvečjemu je navedeno, na eni strani, v uvodni izjavi 111 in fine, da potreba po izvajanju nadzora na ravni albuma, zlasti glede reklamnih popustov ‚lahko zmanj�a preglednost na trgu in oteži tajne sporazume‘ in, na drugi strani, v uvodni izjavi 113 in fine, da ‚Komisija ni na�la dovolj elementov, da bi dokazala, da so velike diskografske hi�e v preteklosti z nadzorom maloprodajnih cen ali prek stikov s trgovci na drobno lahko povečale preglednost na področju reklamnih popustov, kot je bilo navedeno za pet velikih držav članic‘.
Clearly, such vague assertions, which fail to provide the slightest detail of, in particular, the nature of campaign discounts, the circumstances in which such discounts might be applied, their degree of opacity, their size or their impact on price transparency, cannot support to the requisite legal standard the finding that the market is not sufficiently transparent to allow a collective dominant position.
Očitno tako nejasne in nenatančne trditve, zlasti glede reklamnih popustov okoli�čin, v katerih se lahko uporabljajo, njihove stopnje nepreglednosti, njihov obseg ali njihov vpliv na preglednost cen ne morejo v pravno zadostni meri dokazati trditve, da trg ni dovolj pregleden, da bi omogočal kolektivni prevladujoči položaj.
Next, it appears that, apart from the two extracts mentioned above, all the factors set out at recitals 111 to 113 to the [contested decision], far from demonstrating the opacity of the market, show, on the contrary, that the market was transparent.
Dalje, zdi se, da razen dveh odlomkov, navedenih zgoraj, vsi dejavniki, navedeni v uvodnih izjavah od 111 do 113 [sporne] odločbe, ki nikakor ne dokazujejo nepreglednost trga, dokazujejo prav njegovo preglednost.
It follows from the foregoing that, in the section of the [contested decision] dealing with the examination of transparency, the Commission not only did not conclude that the market was opaque or not sufficiently transparent to allow a collective dominant position, but, moreover, mentioned only factors capable of giving rise to great transparency in the market and of facilitating the monitoring of compliance with collusion, with the sole exception of the rather limited and unsubstantiated assertion that campaign discounts could reduce transparency and make tacit collusion more difficult.
Iz navedenega izhaja, da se je Komisija v oddelku [sporne] odločbe, namenjenem preizkusu preglednosti, poleg tega, da ni ugotovila, da trg ni bil pregleden ali dovolj pregleden, da bi omogočil kolektivni prevladujoči položaj, sklicevala samo na dejavnike, ki bi lahko ustvarili veliko preglednost trga in omogočili nadzor spo�tovanja dogovorov, z izjemo manj pomembne in neutemeljene trditve, da bi lahko reklamni popusti zmanj�ali preglednost in otežili tihe sporazume.
It must therefore be stated that that section could clearly not, in itself, be considered to support to the requisite legal standard the assertion that the market was not sufficiently transparent.’
Zato je treba ugotoviti, da ta oddelek kot tak očitno ne more v pravno zadostni meri dokazati trditev, da trg ni dovolj pregleden.“
The Court of First Instance next examined the reasoning set out in the contested decision relating to the possibility of a ‘common understanding on prices’ between the majors and analysed that reasoning in paragraphs 295 to 324 of the judgment under appeal, by seeking evidence that would explain the alleged insufficiency of transparency on the markets in question.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je nato preučevalo razlogovanje v sporni odločbi glede morebitne „skupne politike cen“ med velikimi in je to analiziralo v točkah od 295 do 324 izpodbijane sodbe ter pri tem iskalo pokazatelje, ki bi lahko pojasnili zatrjevano nezadostnost preglednosti na zadevnih trgih.
In that regard, the Court of First Instance made, among others, the following findings:
V zvezi s tem je Sodi�če prve stopnje zlasti ugotovilo:
It is thus apparent that the only element of opacity found in the contested decision consists in the assertion, at recital 80 (and at the corresponding recitals for the other large countries), that “[h]owever, it appears that campaign discounts are less transparent than file discounts and that their monitoring requires also a careful observation of promotional developments on the retail market”.
Tako se zdi, da je edini element nepreglednosti, naveden v [sporni] odločbi trditev v uvodni izjavi 80 (in v drugih uvodnih izjavah, ki se nana�ajo na druge velike države), da ‚so reklamni popusti manj pregledni kot običajni popusti in da njihov nadzor zahteva tudi natančno spremljanje nihanj te vrste popustov na maloprodajnem trgu‘.
It should also be observed that the [contested decision] does not state that the market is opaque, or even that it is not sufficiently transparent to allow
Prav tako je treba opozoriti, da iz [sporne] odločbe ne izhaja, da je trg nepregleden niti da ni dovolj pregleden, da bi omogočal usklajevanje cen, temveč
BERTELSMANN AND SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA v IMPALA coordination of prices, but at the most that campaign discounts are less transparent, although the [contested decision] does not provide the slightest information as regards their nature, the circumstances in which they are granted or their actual importance for net prices, or their impact on the transparency of prices.
BERTELSMANN IN SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA PROTI IMPALI kvečjemu, da naj bi bili reklamni popusti manj pregledni, čeprav v [sporni] odločbi ni naveden nikakr�en podatek o njihovi naravi, okoli�činah, v katerih so bili odobreni, ali njihovem konkretnem vplivu na neto cene in njihovem vplivu na preglednost cen.
It should further be borne in mind that, as stated above, the Commission described in the [contested decision] numerous elements and factors which favour the transparency of the market and facilitate the monitoring of compliance with a collusive arrangement.
Poleg tega je treba opozoriti, kot je bilo navedeno zgoraj, da je Komisija v [sporni] odločbi opozorila na več elementov in dejavnikov, ki spodbujajo preglednost trga in omogočajo nadzor spo�tovanja tajnega sporazuma.
It follows that the few assertions relating to campaign discounts contained in the section of the [contested decision] dealing with the examination of the coordination of prices in the large countries, in so far as they are imprecise, unsupported, and indeed contradicted by other observations in the [contested decision], cannot demonstrate the opacity of the market or even of campaign discounts.
Iz tega izhaja, da trditve o reklamnih popustih v oddelku [sporne] odločbe, namenjene preizkusu usklajevanja cen v velikih državah, ker so nenatančne, neutemeljene in celo izpodbite z drugimi stali�či, ki izhajajo iz [sporne] odločbe, ne morejo dokazati nepreglednosti trga niti nepreglednosti reklamnih popustov.