natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It is settled caselaw that the provisions of directives may have direct
V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso so lahko določbe direktiv neposredno
41 — See point 48 and footnote 19 of this Opinion.
41 – K temu ponovno glej točko 48 in opombo 19 teh sklepnih predlogov.
42 — Points 45 to 84 of this Opinion.
42 – Točke od 45 do 84 teh sklepnih predlogov.
43 Wherever the provisions of a directive appear, so far as their subjectmatter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may, in the absence of implementing measures adopted within the prescribed period, be relied on against any national provision which is incompatible with the directive or in so far as they define rights which individuals are able to assert against the State.
47 veljavne: 43posameznik se lahko, če niso bili pravočasno sprejeti ukrepi za prenos, nasproti vsem nacionalnim predpisom, ki niso v skladu z direktivo, sklicuje na tiste določbe direktive, ki so po vsebini brezpogojne in dovolj natančne; na te določbe se lahko sklicuje tudi, če določajo pravice, ki jih posameznik lahko uveljavlja proti državi.
44 Directly effective provi- sions of directives may also be relied upon as against the State in its capacity as employer. 45
44Neposredno veljavne določbe direktiv se lahko uporabijo tudi zoper državo, ki nastopa kot delodajalec. 45
First part of Question 2: Clause 4 of the Framework Agreement
Prvi del drugega vpra�anja: določba 4 okvirnega sporazuma
The first part of Question 2 (Question 2(a)) concerns the direct effect of Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement on fixedterm work, which sets out the principle of nondiscrimination against fixedterm workers.
Prvi del drugega vpra�anja (vpra�anje 2(a)) je namenjen neposredni veljavi določbe 4(1) okvirnega sporazuma o delu za določen čas. Tam je določeno načelo nediskriminacije delavcev, zaposlenih za določen čas.
That caselaw can readily be applied to framework agreements since, while their content may have been agreed between management and labour at Community level (Article 139(1) EC), they are nevertheless an integral component of the directives adopted by the Council for the purposes of their implementation (Article 139(2) EC in conjunction with Article 137 EC) and have the same legal status.
Ta sodna praksa se lahko brez nadaljnjega prenese na okvirne sporazume. Četudi je namreč njihova vsebina dosežena s pogajanji med socialnimi partnerji na ravni Skupnosti (člen 139(1) ES), so kljub temu sestavni del direktiv Sveta, ki so bile sprejete za njihovo izvajanje (člen 139(2) ES v povezavi s členom 137 ES), in imajo tudi njihovo pravno naravo.
The prohibition of discrimination is one of the classic examples of the application of the direct effect of Community law.
Prepovedi diskriminacije so en od klasičnih primerov neposredne veljave prava Skupnosti.
That applies not only in respect of the prohibitions of discrimination contained in primary legislation — particularly in the fundamental freedoms and in provisions such as Article 141 EC 48 — but also the prohibi-
To ne velja le za prepovedi diskriminacije, ki jih vsebuje primarno pravo 48 – zlasti v okviru temeljnih svobo�čin in predpisov, kot je člen 141 ES –, ampak tudi za take prepovedi diskriminacije, ki jih je normoda-
43 — Case 41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337, paragraph 12; Ratti (cited in footnote 30), paragraphs 19 to 23; and Becker (cited in footnote 30), paragraphs 17 to 25; see also Dorsch Consult (cited in footnote 17), paragraph 44.
43 – Sodbe z dne 4. decembra 1974 v zadevi Van Duyn (41/74, Recueil, str. 1337, točka 12); Ratti (navedena v opombi 30, točke od 19 do 23) in Becker (navedena v opombi 30, točke od 17 do 25); glej tudi sodbo Dorsch Consult (navedena v opombi 17, točka 44).
46 — See, in that regard, Adeneler, MarrosuandSardino, Vassallo and Del Cerro Alonso (all cited in footnote 3).
46 – K temu glej sodbe, navedene v opombi 3, Adeneler, Marrosu in Sardino, Vassallo ter Del Cerro Alonso.
47 — In Adeneler (cited in footnote 3), paragraphs 28 and 107, the Court merely restates the position taken by the referring court in relation to the (lack of) direct applicability of the Framework Agreement, without however setting out its own view on that issue.
47 – Sodi�če v sodbi Adeneler (navedena v opombi 3, točki 28 in 107) le s svojimi besedami podaja mnenje predložitvenega sodi�ča glede (neobstoja) možnosti neposredne uporabe okvirnega sporazuma, ne da bi sicer samo zavzelo stali�če glede tega problema.
45 — See, by way of example, Case 152/84 Marshall [1986] ECR 723 (‘Marshall I’), paragraph 49, and Case C-187/00 Kutz-Bauer [2003] ECR I-2741, paragraphs 31 and 71.
48 – Glej na primer sodbi z dne 21. junija 1974 v zadevi Reyners (2/74, Recueil, str. 631, točke od 24 do 32) in z dne 8. aprila 1976 v zadevi Defrenne (43/75, Recueil, str. 455, „Defrenne II“, točki 38 in 39).
I agree with the referring court that the arrangements are merely to make easier the enforcement of the prohibition of discrimination and its observance in everyday work. 50
Strinjam se z mnenjem predložitvenega sodi�ča, da naj ta način uporabe zgolj olajša uveljavljanje prepovedi diskriminacije in njeno uresničevanje v delovnem vsakdanu. 50
Nevertheless, in the present case, the respondents contest the direct effect of the prohibition of discrimination against fixedterm employees.
Tožena irska ministrstva v obravnavanem primeru kljub temu izpodbijajo neposredno veljavo prepovedi diskriminacije delavcev, zaposlenih za določen čas.
First, they take the view that that prohibition of discrimination is too vague in substance, as evidenced, for example, by the use of undefined legal terms and the reference to the principle of pro rata temporis in Clause 4(2) of the Framework Agreement.
Prvič, menijo, da je ta prepoved diskriminacije po vsebini premalo določna; na to naj bi na primer kazala uporaba nedoločnih pravnih pojmov in sklicevanje na načelo pro rata temporis v določbi 4(2) okvirnega sporazuma.
Second, they contend, by reference to Clause 4(3), that the prohibition of discrimination is not unconditional, as the arrangements for its application still need to be defined by the Member States.
Drugič, z napotilom na točko 3 te določbe uveljavljajo, da prepoved diskriminacije ni brezpogojna, ker naj bi morale države članice �e opredeliti način uporabe.
Such arrangements may be procedural in nature but may equally include substantive provisions or guidelines drawing out the practical consequences of the prohibition of discrimination or demonstrating its effects, perhaps by describing standard cases.
Tak�en način uporabe je lahko postop-kovno-tehnične narave, lahko pa vsebuje tudi vsebinske določbe ali napotke, ki prikazujejo praktične posledice prepovedi diskriminacije ali ponazarjajo njene učinke, na primer s pomočjo primerov pravil.
In that way, account can be taken of the situation in each Member State and the special circumstances of particular sectors and occupations, 51whether in national legislation or in collective agreements.
Na ta način se omogoča upo�tevanje vsakokratnega stanja v državah članicah in posebnih razmer v posameznih sektorjih in poklicih, 51 pa naj gre za državne predpise ali kolektivne pogodbe.
It cannot be inferred from the mere fact that such arrangements have yet to be defined that the prohibition of discrimina-
Zgolj iz dejstva, da je treba opredeliti tak�en način uporabe, ni mogoče sklepati, da v primeru prepovedi diskriminacije obstaja pridržek in da se posameznik brez
As regards, first, Clause 4(3) of the Framework Agreement, the ‘arrangements’ to be defined by the Member States are certainly not a condition to which the
Kar najprej zadeva določbo 4(3) okvirnega sporazuma, „način uporabe“, ki ga morajo opredeliti države članice, nikakor ni pogoj za uporabo načela nediskriminacije.
50 — See, in that regard, Becker (cited in footnote 30), paragraphs 32 and 33, in relation to the ‘conditions’ to be established by the Member States in connection with the implementation of the Sixth VAT Directive.
50 – K temu glej sodbo Becker (navedena v opombi 30, točki 32 in 33), ki se nana�a na „pogoje“, ki jih morajo določiti države članice v povezavi s prenosom Šeste direktive o DDV.
Similarly, Reyners (cited in footnote 48), paragraphs 26 and 31, in relation to a fundamental freedom.
V istem smislu sodba Reyners (navedena v opombi 48, točki 26 in 31), ki se nana�a na eno od temeljnih svobo�čin.
51 — See paragraph 10 of the General Considerations of the Framework Agreement and the third paragraph in the preamble to the Agreement.
49 – Glej na primer sodbi Marshall I (navedena v opombi 45, točka 52) in z dne 21. junija 2007 v združenih zadevah Jonkman in drugi (od C-231/06 do C-233/06, ZOdl., str.
49 — See, for example, Marshall I (cited in footnote 45), paragraph 52, and Joined Cases C-231/06 to C-233/06 Jonkman and Others [2007] ECR I-5149, paragraph 19, on the prohibition in secondary legislation of discrimination on the ground of sex.
51 – Glej točko 10 splo�nih ugotovitev okvirnega sporazuma in tretji odstavek njegove preambule.
IMPACT tion is conditional and that individuals are precluded from relying on the prohibition in the absence of such arrangements.
IMPACT navedenega načina uporabe ne more sklicevati na prepoved diskriminacije.
52 Instead, where no arrangements for application are defined, the minimum protection required for fixedterm employees follows from the Framework Agreement itself.
52 V primeru, da način uporabe ni opredeljen, zahtevano minimalno varstvo za delavce, zaposlene za določen čas, nasprotno izhaja iz samega okvirnega sporazuma.
Such is the case here.
V obravnavanem primeru je to zagotovljeno.
The prohibition of discrimination under Clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement expresses the general principle of equal treatment and nondiscrimination and is intended to protect employees from being treated less favourably — with regard to their employment conditions — on the grounds of their status as fixedterm workers by comparison with comparable permanent workers.
Načelo nediskriminacije v skladu z določbo 4(1) okvirnega sporazuma je izraz splo�nega načela enakega obravnavanja in prepovedi diskriminacije, ki naj delavce varuje pred tem, da bi bili zaradi svojega položaja delavcev, zaposlenih za določen čas, glede pogojev zaposlitve manj ugodno obravnavani kot primerljivi delavci, zaposleni za nedoločen čas.
Applying such guidance to individual cases is one of the classic examples of the work of courts within the scope of Community law.
Uporaba tak�nih določb v posamičnem primeru je klasična naloga sodi�č na področju uporabe prava Skupnosti.
It is generally the case that a provision of a directive is not precluded from having direct effect merely because the directive allows the Member States a certain discretion as to its implementation.
Na splo�no velja, da neposredna veljava neke določbe direktive ni izključena že zato, ker direktiva državam članicam pri prenosu priznava določeno diskrecijsko pravico.
53Instead, such discretion is integral to a directive, which, according to the third paragraph of Article 249 EC, is binding only as to the result to be achieved and leaves the choice of form and methods to the national authorities.
53Taka pravica je nasprotno značilna za direktivo, ki je v skladu s členom 249(3) ES zavezujoča le glede cilja, ki ga je treba doseči, vendar pa nacionalnim organom prepu�ča izbiro oblike in metod.
What determines whether the provision at issue in any given case is directly applicable must therefore be the question as to whether its content is determined with sufficient precision 54 and whether it is capable of being applied by any court. 55
Odločilno za neposredno uporabo vsakokrat zadevne določbe mora torej biti, ali je mogoče njeno vsebino dovolj natančno določiti 54in ali jo lahko uporabi vsako sodi�če. 55
The mere fact that a Community-law provision such as the prohibition of discrimination at issue here is described as a ‘principle’, and incorporates undefined legal terms such as ‘working conditions’ or ‘conditions of employment’, does not mean that that provision lacks precision as to its substance and therefore is not directly effective.
Sama okoli�čina, da je določba prava Skupnosti, kot je v obravnavanem primeru zadevna prepoved diskriminacije, označena kot „načelo“ in da uporablja nedoločne pravne pojme, kot so „delovni pogoji“ ali „pogoji zaposlitve“, ne govori proti njeni vsebinski določnosti in s tem proti njeni neposredni veljavi. 56Nasprotno je mogoče
56Instead, any doubts as to the interpretation of such terms can be resolved by means of a reference for a preliminary ruling. 57
I-7091, točke od 84 do 86), ki se nana�ata na temeljne svobo�čine, ter sodba Becker (navedena v opombi 30, točki 33 in 34), ki se nana�a na direktivo.
52 — Similarly, see Reyners (cited in footnote 48), paragraphs 25, 26 and 29; and Case C-413/99 BaumbastandR [2002] ECR I-7091, paragraphs 84 to 86, in relation to fundamental freedoms; also Becker (cited in footnote 30), paragraphs 33 and 34, in relation to a directive.
53 – K temu glej na primer sodbe Becker (navedena v opombi 30, točka 30); z dne 24. marca 1987 v zadevi McDermott in Cotter (286/85, Recueil, str.
54 — Similarly, see Pfeiffer (cited in footnote 53), paragraph 105.
54 – Glej v tem smislu sodbo Pfeiffer (navedena v opombi 53, točka 105).
56 — See, for example, the settled caselaw on the ‘principle of equal pay for male and female workers’ (Article 141 EC) since Defrenne II (cited in footnote 48), paragraph 28, and the equally settled caselaw on the ‘principle of equal treatment for men and women’, not least in relation to ‘working conditions’, for example, Marshall I (cited in footnote 45) and Johnston (cited in footnote 20).
56 – Glej na primer ustaljeno sodno prakso glede „načela enakega plačila za mo�ke in ženske“ (člen 141 ES) od sodbe Defrenne II (navedena v opombi 48, točka 28) in prav tako ustaljeno sodno prakso glede „načela enakega obravnavanja mo�kih in žensk“, nenazadnje v zvezi z „delovnimi pogoji“ (na primer sodbi Marshall I, navedena v opombi 45, in Johnston, navedena v opombi 20).
55 — Case 131/79 Santillo [1980] ECR 1585, paragraph 13; similarly, Marshall I (cited in footnote 45), paragraph 55; Marshall II (cited in footnote 53), paragraph 37; and the Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven in Case C-128/92 Banks [1994] ECR I-1209, point 27.
1585, točka 13); podobno sodbi Marshall I (navedena v opombi 45, točka 55) in Marshall II (navedena v opombi 53, točka 37) ter sklepni predlogi generalnega pravobranilca Van Gervena z dne 27. oktobra 1993 v zadevi Banks (C-128/92, Recueil, str. I-1209, točka 27).
57 — See, to that effect, Van Duyn (cited in footnote 43), paragraph 14.
57 – V tem smislu sodba Van Duyn (navedena v opombi 43, točka 14).
Nor does the reference in the present case to ‘objective grounds’, on which different treatment of fixedterm workers and com -parable permanent workers may be justified (see Clause 4(1) the Framework Agreement), preclude the direct effect of the prohibition of discrimination.
Prav tako v obravnavanem primeru napotilo na „objektivne razloge“, ki lahko upravičijo različno obravnavanje delavcev, zaposlenih za določen čas, in primerljivih delavcev, zaposlenih za nedoločen čas (glej določbo 4(1) okvirnega sporazuma), ne izključuje neposredne veljave prepovedi diskriminacije.
On the contrary, it is settled caselaw that the mere fact that it is possible in exceptional cases to derogate from the provisions of directives does not deprive those provisions of direct effect. 58
Nasprotno v ustaljeni sodni praksi velja, da sama možnost, da se v izjemnih primerih odstopi od določb direktive, ne nasprotuje njihovi neposredni veljavi.
It too, ultimately, simply articulates the general consequence of the principle of non-discrimination: the employment conditions of fixedterm workers may not be less favourable than those of comparable permanent workers except on object- ive grounds.
58 izhaja iz načela nediskriminacije: delavcem, zaposlenim za določen čas, ne smejo biti pri pogojih zaposlitve brez objektivnega razloga kratene ugodnosti, ki jih imajo primerljivi delavci, zaposleni za nedoločen čas.
The limited period of service of fixedterm workers may, however, constitute just such an objective reason for granting them certain benefits only partly (pro rata temporis), not fully.
Omejeno trajanje delovnih razmerij delavcev, zaposlenih za določen čas, pri njihovem delodajalcu pa je ravno lahko tak objektivni razlog, ki omogoča, da se jim določene ugodnosti ne priznajo v polnem obsegu, ampak le delno (pro rata temporis).
60 Whether that is the case and in what circumstances is a matter of assessment of the particular facts of each case.
60 Ali in kdaj gre za tak primer, je vpra�anje presoje konkretnih okoli�čin posamičnega primera.
The clarity of the substance of the prohibition of discrimination is, in any event, equally unaffected by the reference to the principle of pro rata temporis.
Napotilo na načelo pro rata temporis pa vsekakor nič ne spremeni glede vsebinske jasnosti prepovedi diskriminacije.
The principle of nondiscrimination set out in Clause 4(1) of the Framework Agreement does, as a whole, therefore, satisfy all the requirements for its direct application.
Načelo nediskriminacije iz določbe 4(1) okvirnega sporazuma tako skupno izpolnjuje vse pogoje za njegovo neposredno uporabo.
The possibility of differentiation on objective grounds is recognised within the framework of all of the prohibitions of discrimination contained in Community law.
Podobno nalogo pojasnitve izpolnjuje tudi sklicevanje na načelo pro rata temporis z dodatkom „kjer je to primerno“ v določbi 4(2) okvirnega sporazuma.
In applying the principle of nondiscrimination, the referring court will, however, need to satisfy itself that the established civil servants employed in Ireland’s civil service can indeed be regarded as comparable permanent workers in relation
Predložitveno sodi�če pa se bo moralo pri uporabi načela nediskriminacije prepričati o tem, ali je mogoče uradnike irskega javnega sektorja dejansko �teti za primer­ljive delavce, zaposlene za nedoločen čas, v razmerju do začasnih uslužbencev, zaposlenih za določen čas, kot so pritožniki. To
The same applies, incidentally, to the fundamental freedoms under the EC Treaty, which are also directly applicable notwithstanding the exceptions for which they provide; see, by way of example, Van Duyn (cited in footnote 43), paragraph 7, and Baumbast and R (cited in footnote 52), paragraphs 85 and 86.
Sicer pa nič drugega ne velja glede temeljnih svobo�čin Pogodbe ES, katerih primeri izjem prav tako niso ovira za možnost njihove neposredne uporabe; glej le sodbi Van Duyn (navedena v opombi 43, točka 7) ter Baumbast in R (navedena v opombi 52, točki 85 in 86).
59 — See, by way of example, Advocaten voor de Wereld (cited in footnote 21), paragraph 56.
59 – Glej le sodbo Advocaten voor de Wereld (navedena v opombi 21, točka 56).
60 — In that regard, see also Clause 4(4) of the Framework Agreement.
60 – K temu glej tudi določbo 4(4) okvirnega sporazuma.
Second part of Question 2: Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement to fixedterm unestablished workers such as the complainants. That depends on an overall assessment of all the circumstances of each case.
Drugi del drugega vpra�anja: določba 5 okvirnega sporazuma je odvisno od skupnega ovrednotenja vseh okoli�čin posamičnega primera.
I should point out merely in passing that, in relation to the European Civil Service, for example, the Community courts have rejected any comparability between officials and other servants of the European Communities. 61
Le obrobno je treba v tej zvezi pripomniti, da so recimo sodi�ča Evropskih skupnosti glede evropskih uslužbencev zanikala primerljivost uradnikov in drugih uslužbencev Evropskih skupnosti. 61
By the second part of Question 2 (Question 2(b)), the Labour Court asks whether Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement on fixedterm work is directly effective.
Labour Court želi z drugim delom drugega vpra�anja (vpra�anje 2(b)) izvedeti, ali določba 5(1) okvirnega sporazuma o delu za določen velja neposredno.
That provision requires Member States to introduce one or more of the measures listed in order to prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixedterm employment contracts or relationships.
Ta določba državam članicam nalaga, naj za preprečevanje zlorab, ki izhajajo iz veriženja pogodb o zaposlitvi ali delovnih razmerij za določen čas, uvedejo enega ali več ukrepov, ki so tam na�teti.
61 — Joined Cases 118/82 to 123/82 Celant v Commission [1983] ECR 2995, paragraph 22; and Case 37/87 Sperber v Court of Justice [1988] ECR 1943, paragraphs 8 and 9; also the judgment of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal of 19 October 2006 in Case F-59/05 De Smedt v Commission [2006] ECR-SC I-A-1-109 and II-1-409, paragraphs 70 to 76, the latter confirmed by order of the Court of First Instance in Case T-415/06 P De Smedt v Commission, not yet published in the ECR-SC, paragraphs 54 and 55.
I-A-1-109 in II-A-1-409, točke od 70 do 76), potrjena s sklepom Sodi�ča prve stopnje z dne 9. julija 2007 v zadevi De Smedt proti Komisiji (T-415/06 P, RecFP. točki 54 in 55).
62 — See, by way of example, Cordero Alonso (cited in footnote 21), paragraphs 45 and 46, and Jonkman (cited in footnote 49), paragraph 39.
62 – Glej le sodbi Cordero Alonso (navedena v opombi 21, točki 45 in 46) in Jonkman (navedena v opombi 49, točka 39).
By contrast, both the respondents and the referring court reject altogether the notion of any direct effect. They refer to the
Nasprotno pa tako tožena irska ministrstva kot tudi predložitveno sodi�če na splo�no zavračajo neposredno veljavo; opo-
— objective reasons justifying the renewal of fixedterm employment contracts or relationships (Clause 5(1)(a));
objektivne razloge, ki upravičujejo obnovitev pogodb o zaposlitvi ali delovnih razmerjih za določen čas (določba 5(1)(a));
I should make it clear from the outset that I prefer the latter view.
Takoj naj povem, da menim, da ima slednje stali�če prednost.
— definition of the maximum total duration of successive fixedterm employment contracts or relationships (Clause 5(1)(b));
– določitev najdalj�ega skupnega trajanja zaporednih pogodb o zaposlitvi ali delovnih razmerij za določen čas (določba 5(1)(b));
— definition of the number of renewals of fixedterm employment contracts or relationships (Clause 5(1)(c)).
– določitev �tevila obnovitev pogodb o zaposlitvi ali delovnih razmerij za določen čas (določba 5(1)(c)).
Certainly the Framework Agreement proceeds on the premiss that the benefit of stable employment is viewed as a major element in the protection of workers, whereas successive recourse to fixedterm employment contracts is regarded as a potential source of abuse to the disadvantage of workers and contributes to greater in security in the status of employees. 63 That is why the social partners sought to ‘establish a frame- work to prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixedterm employment contracts or relationships’. 64
Okvirni sporazum zanesljivo izhaja iz razmi�ljanja, da je stabilna zaposlitev pomemben element varstva delavcev, medtem ko je zaporedno sklepanje pogodb o zaposlitvi za določen čas lahko vir zlorab v �kodo delavcev in prispeva k poslab�anju položaja zaposlenih.
To that end, however, the Member States are merely required to comply with the very general obligation under Clause 5(1) of the Framework Agreement to introduce into their national law one or more of the following measures, in so far as their national law does not yet include equivalent legal measures:
Državam članicam pa je za ta namen v določbi 5(1) okvirnega sporazuma naložena le zelo splo�na obveznost, da v svoje nacionalno pravo, kadar ni ustreznih pravnih ukrepov, vključijo enega ali več naslednjih ukrepov:
While the Member States are thus required to make effective and binding provision in their domestic law for at least one of the measures to prevent abuse referred to in Clause 5(1)(a) to (c), 65 the Framework Agreement does not prescribe precisely which one(s).
Na podlagi navedenega morajo države članice sicer v nacionalnem pravnem redu dejansko in zavezujoče sprejeti vsaj enega od ukrepov, na�tetih v določbi 5(1), od (a) do (c), katerih namen je preprečiti zlorabe, 65 okvirni sporazum pa ne določa natančno, katere.