natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
At the end of the year, the Commission issued guidance on enforcement priorities when dealing with abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings. e guidance continues the effects-based approach used by the Commission in several Article 82 cases, and consolidates the analytical framework to identify the existence of consumer harm, in a transparent and predictable manner.
Komisija je konec leta izdala smernice za izvajanje prednostnih nalog pri obravnavanju izključevalnih ravnanj, s katerimi prevladujoča podjetja zlorabljajo svoj položaj. Tudi smernice upoštevajo pristop, zasnovan na učinkih, ki ga je Komisija uporabila pri številnih zadevah, kjer je bil uporabljen člen 82, ter pregledno in predvidljivo utrjujejo analitični okvir za ugotovitev škode za potrošnike.
As a result of the guidance, the Commission intends that dominant undertakings will have a clearer understanding of which types of cases the Commission will prioritise because of their harm to consumers. e Commission
S smernicami bo Komisija zagotovila, da bodo prevladujoča podjetja bolje razumela, katere vrste zadev bo Komisija zaradi škode za potrošnike obravnavala prednostno. Komisija upa, da bodo smernice tudi odvračale prevladujoča podjetja od določenih vrst zlorab.
Report on Competition Policy 2008 hopes that the guidance will also dissuade dominant undertakings from engaging in certain types of abusive conduct.
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2008 prvič, zagotoviti, da se konkurenčni pomisleki odpravijo učinkoviteje in, drugič, podjetjem, ki so udeležena pri združitvah, pojasniti, kako najbolje odpraviti konkurenčne pomisleke, ki jih ugotovi Komisija.
Also in the field of state aid, the Commission has moved towards an effects-based analysis of the measures notified by Member States.
Na področju državnih pomoči je Komisija začela ukrepe, ki jih priglasijo države članice, ocenjevati v okviru analize učinkov.
A balancing test is applied to compare the positive effects of the aid measure on objectives of common interest with the possible distortions of competition created by it.
Preizkus izravnave se uporablja za primerjavo pozitivnih učinkov ukrepa pomoči na cilje skupnega interesa z morebitnim izkrivljanjem konkurence, ki je posledica ukrepa.
Along this line, the Commission has iden-ti ed 26 categories of aid that no longer need to be notified if they respect the conditions set in the general block exemption regulation (GBER).
Komisija je v tem okviru opredelila 26 kategorij pomoči, ki jih ni treba več priglasiti, če izpolnjujejo pogoje iz uredbe o splošni skupinski izjemi.
Areas covered by the GBER include environmental protection, research, innovation, training, employment, regional development, risk capital and support to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). is approach contributes not only to better regulation and cutting red tape, but also constitutes a step to align competition policy in the field of state aid with the Commission’s wider approach to key policies for the future.
Področja, ki jih navedena uredba zajema, vključujejo varstvo okolja, raziskave, inovacije, usposabljanje, zaposlovanje, regionalni razvoj, tvegani kapital ter pomoč malim in srednjim podjetjem. Ta pristop prispeva k boljšemu upravljanju in poenostavljanju upravnih postopkov, pomeni pa tudi korak naprej pri usklajevanju politike konkurence na področju državne pomoči s širšim pristopom Komisije za ključne politike za prihodnje.
Focusing our actions where anti-competitive practices do the most harm
Osredotočenje ukrepov na primere protikonkurenčnega ravnanja, ki povzroči največ škode
Since the beginning of my mandate as Competition Commissioner, competition enforcement in individual cases has remained a top priority.
Izvrševanje pravil o konkurenci pri posameznih primerih je že od začetka mojega mandata komisarke za konkurenco najpomembnejša prednostna naloga, zato nam bo leto 2008 najverjetneje ostalo v spominu kot leto, ko je bil nadzor državnih pomoči osrednji del naših prizadevanj.
As such, 2008 will most likely be remembered as the year when state aid control played a leading role in our enforcement efforts.
Komisija je leta 2008 dejansko sprejela več ducatov odločb na področju bančništva.
Indeed, the Commission took several dozen banking decisions in 2008. ese decisions included rescue or recapitalisation aid to individual banks (with aid to Bradford and Bingley of the United Kingdom in less than 24 hours), along with general aid schemes to support financial stability (guarantee, recapitalisation, purchase and/or holistic schemes) in 15 Member States.
Te odločbe so zajemale pomoč posameznim bankam za reševanje ali dokapitalizacijo (vključno s pomočjo banki Bradford and Bingley iz Združenega kraljestva, odobreni v manj kot 24 urah), pa tudi splošne sheme pomoči za podporo finančne stabilnosti (jamstva, dokapitalizacije, nakupi in/ali celovite sheme) v 15 državah članicah.
Also, as in previous years the fight against cartels has been high on the agenda.
Tako kot prejšnja leta je bil med pomembnimi nalogami tudi boj proti kartelom.
Policing dominant firms e Commission has also been active in fighting abuses of dominant positions throughout 2008.
Komisija je bila leta 2008 dejavna tudi v boju proti zlorabam prevladujočega položaja.
In the energy sector, as a follow-up to the findings of the energy sector inquiry and a er sustained investigations by the Commission, the company E.ON voluntarily offered to divest significant parts of its business to address the concerns raised in the course of the
V sektorju energetike je na podlagi izsledkov poizvedbe v sektorju energetike in dolgotrajne preiskave Komisije podjetje E.ON prostovoljno predlagalo, da odproda več delov svojih poslov in tako odpravi pomisleke, ugotovljene med preiskavo.
In 2008, the Commission imposed a second penalty payment — of EUR 899 million — on the company Microso for noncompliance with a Commission decision requiring it to share essential interoperability information with its rivals on reasonable terms.
Komisija je leta 2008 podjetju Microso naložila drugo denarno kazen v višini 899 milijonov EUR, in sicer za nespoštovanje odločbe Komisije, na podlagi katere mora podjetje svojim tekmecem pod razumnimi pogoji posredovati ključne informacije o interoperabilnosti.
Microso remains the only company to fail to comply with a Commission competition policy decision.
Microso je še vedno edino podjetje, ki ne upošteva odločbe Komisije na področju politike konkurence.
Ensuring a level playing field across the internal market
Zagotovitev enakih konkurenčnih pogojev na celotnem notranjem trgu
State aid control continues to be of fundamental importance to preserving the level playing field. e Commission remains committed to achieving a more efficient and timely recovery of unlawful and incompatible aid.
Nadzor državnih pomoči je še vedno ključen za ohranjanje enakih konkurenčnih pogojev. Komisija si še naprej prizadeva za učinkovitejša in bolj pravočasna vračila nezakonitih in nezdružljivih pomoči.
However, state aid control is not only about prohibitions or recovery.
Vendar pa pri nadzoru državnih pomoči ne gre le za prepovedi in povračila.
More importantly, it is about fostering the development of the EU’s economy, focusing on key sectors with high potential for the future.
Pomembno je zlasti spodbujanje razvoja gospodarstva EU z osredotočenjem na ključne sektorje z velikimi možnostmi za prihodnost.
Research and development and innovation (R & D & I), risk capital investments in SMEs and the environment are some of those niche sectors. In 2008, we approved 88 notified schemes for R & D & I, and 18 schemes related to risk capital investments. Also, in the field of renewable energies, the Commission approved aid of EUR 2 350 million in Germany. e Commission also has the duty to monitor the functioning of public monopolies, so as to detect possible protectionist measures being implemented at national level.
Naloga Komisije je tudi spremljati delovanje javnih monopolov ter tako odkriti morebitne protekcionistične ukrepe, ki se izvajajo na nacionalni ravni.
Commission decisions against the exclusive access to lignite granted to the Greek stateowned electricity incumbent — Public Power Corporation (PPC) — and against the monopoly of the postal incumbent — Slovenská Pošta — for delivering services of hybrid mail in Slovakia, are some examples of our work in this field.
Primera našega dela na tem področju sta odločbi Komisije proti izključnemu dostopu do lignita, ki je bil odobren grškemu proizvajalcu električne energije Public Power Corporation v državni lasti, in proti monopolu poštnega operaterja Slovenská Pošta za dostavo hibridne pošte na Slovaškem.
It is not to be forgotten that, when undertaking these types of actions, the Commission always bears in mind the need for Member States to provide services of general economic interest.
Ne smemo pozabiti, da Komisija pri takih ukrepih vedno upošteva, da morajo države članice zagotavljati storitve splošnega gospodarskega interesa.
Delivering strong results that benefit citizens
Doseganje dobrih rezultatov, ki so v korist državljanov
Competition policy makes the EU’s economy stronger and provides European companies a better starting position to compete abroad.
Politika konkurence krepi gospodarstvo EU in evropskim podjetjem zagotavlja boljše začetne pogoje za konkuriranje v tujini.
In 2008 alone, the Commission estimates that competition enforcement has saved consumers more than EUR 11 billion and led to over EUR 3 billion in fines and penalty payments.
Komisija ocenjuje, da so zaradi uveljavljanja pravil konkurence samo leta 2008 potrošniki prihranili več kot 11 milijard EUR, več kot tri milijarde EUR pa so znašala plačila glob in denarnih kazni.
Competition policy is not a static and rigid policy; it must take account of changing economic realities. is combination of firm principles with flexible processes has allowed competition policy to play a constructive and stabilising role in the EU’s financial system and the real economy at large.
Politika konkurence ni statična in toga politika, saj mora upoštevati spreminjajoče se gospodarske razmere. Zaradi te kombinacije trdnih načel in prožnih postopkov je politika konkurence konstruktiven in stabilizacijski dejavnik v finančnem sistemu EU in širšem realnem gospodarstvu.
Also in 2008, competition policy has delivered on its goal to improve the functioning of markets and to advance consumer welfare.
Poleg tega so bili leta 2008 na področju politike konkurence doseženi pomembni rezultati pri uresničevanju cilja izboljšanja delovanja trgov in blaginje potrošnikov.
is forms a good basis for continued delivery of results in the future.
To je dobra podlaga tudi za prihodnje dosežke.
Antitrust — Articles 81 and 82 EC
Instrumenti 1.1 Protimonopolna pravila – člena 81 in 82 Pogodbe ES
Energy and environment
Razvoj dogodkov po sektorjih 2.1 Energetika in okolje
The European Competition Network and national courts
Evropska mreža za konkurenco in nacionalna sodišča
Report on Competition Policy2008
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2008
Published in conjunction with the General Report on the Activities of the European Union 2008
Objavljeno v povezavi s Splošnim poročilom o dejavnostih Evropske unije – 2008
Section 3 gives an overview of consumer-related activities developed in the past year.
V drugem poglavju je obravnavano, kako so se ti in drugi instrumenti izvajali v izbranih sektorjih.
Section 4 focuses on cooperation within the European Competition Network (ECN) and with national courts, while Section 5 deals with international activities.
V četrtem poglavju je poudarek na sodelovanju z Evropsko mrežo za konkurenco in nacionalnimi sodišči, medtem ko so v petem poglavju obravnavane mednarodne dejavnosti.
Lastly, Section 6 gives a brief description of interinstitutional cooperation.
V zadnjem, šestem poglavju je na kratko opisano medinstitucionalno sodelovanje.
Due to the very difficult financial and economic circumstances that Europe experienced in 2008, and the way they impacted on the viability of European businesses, particular attention is paid in this year’s report to the European Commission’s assessment of rescue and restructuring measures.
Zaradi zelo težkih finančnih in gospodarskih razmer, s katerimi se je Evropa soočala v letu 2008, ter zaradi njihovega vpliva na sposobnost preživetja evropskih podjetij je v letošnjem poročilu posebna pozornost namenjena oceni Evropske komisije v zvezi z ukrepi za reševanje in prestrukturiranje.
A request to that end was also made by the European Parliament in its resolution concerning the annual reports on competition policy for 2006 and 2007 (1).
To je zahteval tudi Evropski parlament v svoji resoluciji o letnih poročilih o politiki konkurence za leti 2006 in 2007 (1).
Further information can be found in a detailed Commission Staff Working Document and on the website of the Competition DG (2).
Dodatne informacije so na voljo v podrobnem delovnem dokumentu služb Komisije in na spletni strani Generalnega direktorata za konkurenco (2).
See point 30 of the European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2009 on the Report on Competition Policy 2006 and 2007 (2008/2243(INI)).http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html.
Glej točko 30 Resolucije Evropskega parlamenta z dne 10. marca 2009 o poročilih o politiki konkurence za leti 2006 in 2007 (2008/2243(INI)).http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_sl.html
Cartels are amongst the most serious violation of competition law. ey shield participants from competition, thus allowing them to raise prices, restrict output and divide markets.
Karteli so ena od najresnejših kršitev konkurenčnega prava. Karteli ščitijo udeležence pred konkurenco in jim tako omogočajo, da višajo cene, omejujejo proizvodnjo in ločujejo trge.
Cases such as the Bananas cartel (3) show that the impact of the cartel on final consumers may be direct when they are purchaser or user of a product or service.
Primeri, kot je kartel trgovcev z bananami (3), kažejo, da je učinek kartela na končne potrošnike lahko neposreden, kadar so potrošniki kupci ali uporabniki izdelka ali storitve.
Commission enforcement action — and that of the competition authorities in the Member States — puts a stop to this overcharging, preventing it continuing into the future and deters companies from engaging in such behaviour again.
Izvršilni ukrepi Komisije in organov za konkurenco v državah članicah preprečujejo to povišanje cen in njihovo nadaljnje višanje v prihodnosti ter odvračajo družbe od takšnega ravnanja.
Also in markets where the direct customers are industrial clients — where the breach of competition law takes place earlier in the supply chain — consumers ultimately benefit from fighting such cartels.
Za potrošnike je koristen tudi boj proti takšnim kartelom na trgih, na katerih neposredne stranke prihajajo iz industrijskega sektorja in na katerih se konkurenčno pravo krši v zgodnejših fazah dobavne verige.
For instance, in the Car Glass (4) case, the product was car windows which consumers purchase as part of their cars and when they want repairs done.
V zadevi Avtomobilsko steklo (4) so bili na primer izdelki avtomobilska okna, ki jih potrošniki kupijo kot del svojih avtomobilov ali ob popravilu svojega avtomobila.
Overcharging for component parts such as car windows will affect the overall price of the car or repair. e advantages of lower prices resulting from competition cannot be passed on to consumers.
Povišanje cen za sestavne dele, kot so avtomobilska okna, vpliva na skupno ceno avtomobila ali popravila. Prednosti nižjih cen zaradi konkurence ni mogoče prenesti na potrošnike.
Even if a higher price for an input product can be absorbed by a manufacturer before he sells on the final product, this can still ultimately create a detriment to the consumer — for example, if it results in other services being cut or less money being available for innovation and the development of future, better products.
Tudi če lahko proizvajalec nadomesti višjo ceno za surovino, preden proda končni izdelek, to še vedno lahko škodi potrošniku, če se zato na primer zmanjšajo druge storitve ali če je ne voljo manj denarja za inovacije in razvoj prihodnjih, boljših izdelkov.
In turn, the benefits of competition are lost and, hence, overall welfare suffers. ers.
Tako se koristi konkurence izgubijo, kar posledično škodi splošni blaginji.
When the Commission prohibits anti-competitive behaviour and fines cartel members, its ultimate purpose is not only to punish those members for past behaviour, but above all to deter every company from continuing or engaging in anti-competitive behaviour. e Commission itself is not involved in seeking compensation for customers in individual cases.
Kadar Komisija prepove protikonkurenčno ravnanje in naloži globe članom kartela, njen končni cilj ni le kaznovati te člane za preteklo ravnanje, ampak zlasti odvrniti vsako družbo od tega, da nadaljuje protikonkurenčno ravnanje ali ga začne. Komisija sama ne sodeluje pri zahtevah za odškodnino za stranke v posameznih zadevah.
Actions for recovery of damages following Commission decisions can be submitted to national courts (for details, see Chapter 11 of the White Paper on damages actions for breach of
Tožbe za odškodnino na podlagi odločb Komisije je mogoče predložiti nacionalnim sodiščem (za podrobne informacije glej poglavje 11 Bele knjige o odškodninskih tožbah zaradi kršitve protimonopolnih pravil ES (5), v katerem so navedeni konkretni predlogi politike za odpravljanje ovir, ki trenutno omejujejo učinkovit sistem odškodnin).
Press Release IP/08/1509, 15.10.2008.Press Release IP/08/1685, 12.11.2008.
Sporočilo za javnost IP/08/1509, 15.10.2008.Sporočilo za javnost IP/08/1685, 12.11.2008.Dodatne informacije o tem vprašanju in o pobudi politike Komisije na tem področju so na voljo na spletni strani http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html.
9. e preventive effect when fines are imposed is wider than the actual individual case. rough its fining policy, the Commission encourages a culture of compliance with competition law at the level of the entire company group.
Komisija s svojo politiko naložitve glob spodbuja kulturo skladnosti s konkurenčnim pravom na ravni celotne skupine podjetij.
In the Car Glass case, for example, the Commission increased the fines for the company Saint-Gobain by 60 % because it was a repeat offender, having previously been fined for two cartels in the at glass sector (6).
V zadevi Avtomobilsko steklo je Komisija na primer povišala globe za družbo Saint-Gobain za 60 %, ker je bila ta družba ponovni kršitelj, saj je že bila oglobljena zaradi dveh kartelov v sektorju ravnega stekla (6).
Alternatively, it may also come from individuals linked to a company who want to ‘blow the whistle’, or even from cartel members themselves, making use of the leniency programme.
Takšne dokaze lahko zagotovijo tudi posamezniki, ki so povezani z družbo in ki želijo razkriti nepravilnosti, ali celo sami člani kartela, ki uporabijo program prizanesljivosti.
Indeed, strong cartel sanctions provide an incentive for them to withdraw from the secret agreement and to cooperate with the Commission under the leniency programme by providing incriminating evidence. is set of provisions is not aimed as such at enabling some infringers to escape fines for breaching the law; instead, it pursues the higher objective of putting an end to, and allowing a targeted investigation of, damaging corporate agreements.
Stroge sankcije zoper kartele lahko te člane dejansko spodbudijo, da prekinejo tajni dogovor in sodelujejo s Komisijo v okviru programa prizanesljivosti tako, da predložijo obremenilne dokaze. Cilj tega sklopa določb ni omogočiti nekaterim kršiteljem, da se izognejo globam za kršenje prava, ampak preprečiti škodljive poslovne dogovore in omogočiti ciljno preiskavo takšnih dogovorov.
Under the 2006 leniency programme, the first company to provide evidence can obtain full immunity from fines. is benefit acts as an extremely strong incentive to break the ‘code of silence’ of cartels.
V skladu s programom prizanesljivosti iz leta 2006 lahko prva družba, ki predloži dokaze, pridobi popolno imuniteto pred globami. Ta ugodnost je zelo močna spodbuda za prekinitev obveze o molčečnosti kartelov.
Indeed, the pre-condition for any beneficial cial
Temeljni pogoj za kakršno koli ugodno obravnavanje je, da podjetja predložijo vse dokaze, ki jih imajo, in s tem pomagajo dokazati obstoj kartela.
Further information on this issue and on the policy initiative of the Commission in this field can be accessed here: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html.Commission decision of 23 July 1984 in Case COMP/30.988 Flat Glass (Benelux) (OJ L 212, 8.8.1984, p.
Odločba Komisije z dne 23. julija 1984 v zadevi COMP/30.988, Ravno steklo (Beneluks), UL L 212, 8.8.1984, str.
13) and Commission decision of 7 December 1988 in Case COMP/31.906 Flat Glass (Italy) (OJ L 33, 4.2.1989, p. 44).
13, ter Odločba Komisije z dne 7. decembra 1988 v zadevi COMP/31.906, Ravno steklo (Italija), UL L 33, 4.2.1989, str.
In 2008 the Commission continued its strong enforcement against cartels, fining
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2008 kartelnih zadevah (8
In the Car Glass case the Commission imposed the highest fine for a cartel case to date, amounting to EUR 1 383 million.
V zadevi Avtomobilsko steklo je Komisija naložila najvišjo globo v kartelni zadevi do sedaj, in sicer v višini 1 383 milijonov EUR.
In 2008 the Commission services also made some general estimates of the harm to the economy caused by cartels. e Commission services looked at the 18 cartels which were the subject of Commission decisions during the years 2005 to 2007, the size of the markets involved, the cartels’ duration and the very conservative assumptions regarding the estimated overcharge.
Poleg tega so službe Komisije leta 2008 izvedle splošne ocene škode, ki jo je gospodarstvo utrpelo zaradi kartelov. Službe Komisije so proučile 18 kartelov, ki so bili obravnavani v odločbah Komisije v obdobju 2005–2007, velikost zadevnih trgov, trajanje kartelov in zelo konzervativne predpostavke glede ocenjenega povišanja cen.
Assuming an overcharge of between 5 % to 15 %, the harm suffered ranges from around EUR 4 billion to EUR 11 billion for these 18 cartels.
Ob predpostavki, da so se cene povišale za 5–15 %, znaša škoda, ki jo je povzročilo teh 18 kartelov, približno 4–11 milijard EUR.
Taking the middle point of this overcharge range — 10 % — gives a conservative estimate of consumer harm of EUR 7.6 billion due to these cartels.
Na podlagi srednje vrednosti teh povišanih cen, tj. 10 %, je konzervativna ocena škode, ki so jo ti karteli povzročili potrošnikom, 7,6 milijarde EUR.
Indeed, economic literature on the subject suggests that the average overcharge in prices can be as high as 20 % to 25 %.
Na podlagi literature s področja gospodarstva v zvezi s to temo je mogoče sklepati, da povprečno povišanje cen morda znaša kar 20–25 %.
Strong cartel enforcement ensures that cartels that may otherwise be formed are discouraged. e Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has recently carried out a wide-ranging expert survey on this matter.
Strogi izvršilni ukrepi proti kartelom odvračajo od oblikovanja kartelov, ki bi v nasprotnem primeru morda nastali. Urad za pošteno trgovanje je nedavno izvedel obsežno strokovno raziskavo v zvezi s tem.
This survey suggests that, for every cartel discovered, five cartels may not have been put into effect or may have been abandoned. is assumption suggests that an additional saving flowing from the 18 cartel decisions in 2005–07, possibly of the order of some EUR 60 billion, could have accrued.
Na podlagi raziskave je mogoče sklepati, da se z vsakim odkritim kartelom prepreči oblikovanje petih novih kartelov ali pa to prispeva k opustitvi petih dodatnih kartelov. To pomeni, da je 18 odločb proti kartelom v obdobju 2005–2007 morda prispevalo k dodatnemu prihranku, in sicer v višini približno 60 milijard EUR.