natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the case in the main proceedings, and regarding the risks linked to the sale of goods, the referring court points out, firstly, that the servicestation operator assumes ‘the risk’ linked to the goods from the time of their delivery by the supplier into the storage tank existing in the service station, secondly, that the operator is liable for any damage caused to the goods and for any damage caused by those goods, thirdly, that the operator is required to pay to CEPSA the amount corresponding to the sale of the fuels within nine days following the date of their delivery, regardless of whether they are sold to third parties, failing which the operator is required to pay the price prior to delivery of the goods and the supplier is authorised to activate the bank guarantee equivalent to 15 days’ supply taken out beforehand by the operator, fourthly, that he assumes the volumetric (or volume-difference) risk occasioned by changes in fuel temperature, with the result that he is obliged to pay for the number of litres supplied by CEPSA even though he has sold a lesser quantity and, fifthly, that the transfer of the fuels gives rise to invoicing of VAT between CEPSA and the operator.
Predložitveno sodi�če v zadevi v glavni stvari in glede tveganj, povezanih s prodajo blaga, pojasnjuje, prvič, da imetnik bencinske postaje prevzame „tveganje“ za proizvode, ko jih dobavitelj dobavi v rezervoarje za skladi�čenje na bencinski postaji, drugič, da odgovarja za morebitno �kodo na proizvodih in za vsako �kodo, ki jo ti proizvodi povzročijo, tretjič, da mora imetnik CEPSI plačati gorivo v devetih dneh od dobave, ne glede na to, ali ga je prodal tretjim, in da je imetnik ob morebitnem neplačilu dolžan dobavo proizvodov plačati vnaprej, dobavitelj pa je poobla�čen, da unovči bančno garancijo v vi�ini petnajstdnevne dobave, ki jo je pred tem ustanovil imetnik, četrtič, da prevzema tveganja, povezana s prostornino (oziroma za razlike v prostornini), ki so jih povzročile temperaturne spremembe goriva, in sicer je dolžan plačati litre, ki jih je dobavila CEPSA, tudi če je prodal manj�o količino, in, petič, da prenos goriva zajema zaračunavanje DDV med CEPSO in imetnikom.
As I have already mentioned, it is not necessary, in order for Article 85(1) of the Treaty to be applicable, for the operator to assume all the abovementioned risks, which are, moreover, not exhaustive, provided that he assumes a nonnegligible share of them.
Kot sem že navedel, ni treba, da bi moral imetnik, da bi bilo mogoče uporabiti člen 85(1) Pogodbe, nositi vsa zgoraj navedena tveganja, ki niso izčrpno na�teta, dokler prevzema del, ki ni zanemarljiv.
It is only where, on the one hand, the operator does not bear any of the risks resulting from the contracts negotiated or concluded on behalf of the supplier or, on the other, as explained by the judgment in Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio, he assumes only a negligible share of those risks that the contractual relationship between that agent and the principal relating to the market for the sale of goods to third parties may be regarded as not covered by the concept of ‘agreements between undertakings’ within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
Samo če imetnik ne nosi nobenega tveganja, ki izhaja iz pogodb, doseženih s pogajanji ali sklenjenih za račun naročitelja, in če, kot izrecno izhaja iz zgoraj navedene sodbe Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servici, prevzame le zanemarljiv del navedenega tveganja, se za pogodbeno razmerje med tem zastopnikom in naročiteljem, ki se nana�a na prodajni trg blaga tretjim, lahko �teje, da se zanj ne uporablja pojem „sporazum med podjetji“ v smislu člena 85(1) Pogodbe 24.
24 That is because, in economic terms, there is no difference between the position of an agent who does not bear any risks linked to the transactions he negoti-
Z gospodarskega vidika pravzaprav ni razlike med položajem, v katerem je trgovski zastopnik, ki ne nosi tveganja za izvr�ene posle svojega posredovanja,
Those particulars tend to suggest that the fuels are the subject of a transfer of ownership between CEPSA and the operator upon their receipt by the latter and that the
Te navedbe kažejo na to, da je gorivo predmet prenosa lastnine med CEPSO in imetnikom od takrat, ko ga ta prejme, in da imetnik nosi tveganje, povezano s prevozom,
25 — See, to that effect, the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, point 64.
25 – Glej v tem smislu zgoraj navedene sklepne predloge generalne pravobranilke J. Kokott (točka 64).
Moreover, the volumetric risk borne by the operator may be likened, as the Commission has rightly maintained, to a risk of loss of stock. 26
Poleg tega je tveganje za prostornino, ki ga nosi imetnik, podobno tveganju za izgubo zaloge, kar je upravičeno poudarila Komisija 26.
In addition, according to the explanations given in the order for reference, the operator appears to guarantee and assume liability for the unpaid debts of customers who have joined, through the operator, the credit card scheme created and managed by CEPSA, debts which may be of significant amounts, the order for reference mentioning an example of an unpaid debt of more than EUR 30 000.
Poleg tega v skladu s pojasnili v predložitveni odločbi imetnik domnevno jamči in prevzema odgovornost za neplačane dolgove strank, ki so z njegovim posredovanjem pristopile k sistemu kreditne kartice, ki jo je ustanovila in z njo upravlja CEPSA, in lahko dosežejo nezanemarljive vsote, v predložitveni odločbi je na primer omenjen neplačan znesek več kot 30.000 EUR.
Even though the referring court points out that CEPSA assumes the risks linked to transport of the goods, the factors listed above, whilst they need to be assessed in concrete terms by the referring court, tend, in my view, to suggest that Tobar bears nonnegligible risks linked to the sale of the petroleum products which are the subjectmatter of the contract at issue in the main proceedings.
Čeprav predložitveno sodi�če pojasnjuje, da CEPSA prevzame tveganje za prevoz blaga, menim, da pravkar na�teti elementi, čeprav jih mora konkretno presoditi predložitveno sodi�če, kažejo na to, da prevzema Tobar nezanemarljivo tveganje za prodajo naftnih proizvodov, ki so predmet sporne pogodbe.
As regards the allocation of the risks relating to marketspecific investments, it
Glede porazdelitve tveganja med določene tržne naložbe je treba navesti, da
Should the examination to be carried out by the national court show that the servicestation operator assumes a nonnegligible share of the commercial and financial risks linked to the transactions concluded by him for the supplier, that agent will be considered to be an independent economic operator.
Če bi iz presoje, ki jo mora opraviti nacionalno sodi�če, sledilo, da imetnik bencinske postaje nosi nezanemarljivo poslovno in finančno tveganje za poslovanje, ki ga opravlja za svojega dobavitelja, bo treba tega zastopnika �teti za neodvisni gospodarski subjekt.
The exclusive contractual relationship between himself and the supplier will then be covered by the concept of ‘agreements between undertakings’ within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
Za izključno pogodbeno razmerje z dobaviteljem se bo tako uporabljal pojem „sporazum med podjetji“ v smislu člena 85(1) Pogodbe.
It will then follow that the clause relating to the requirement for the operator to sell the fuels at a price
Iz tega bo sledilo, da se določilo o obveznosti imetnika, da prodaja gorivo po ceni, ki jo določi dobavitelj, postavljeno na koncu drugega vpra�anja predložitvenega sodi�ča pod a), ne more izogniti presoji te
26 — See also, in that regard, the Guidelines, point 16.
26 – V tem smislu glej zlasti zgoraj navedene smernice (točka 16).
CEPSA determined by the supplier will be inherent in CEPSA’s ability to delimit the scope of the activities of its agents and will also fall outside the scope of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
CEPSA določbe, dokler so izpolnjeni vsi pogoji za uporabo člena 85(1) Pogodbe 27.
29 determined by the supplier, referred to at the end of Question 2(a) submitted by the referring court, will also be caught by that provision, provided that all the conditions for the application of Article 85(1) of the Treaty are satisfied.
V takem pnikov, in se zanjo člen 85(1) Pogodbe prav tako ne bo uporabljal 29.
27If that is the case, such a clause will fall under the prohibition laid down in Article 85(1)(a) of the Treaty.
primeru bi tako določilo spadalo med prepovedi, določene v členu 85(1)(a) Pogodbe.
The subsequent question will then arise as to whether the obligation imposed on the operator to sell the fuels at a specific price would fall within the block exemption provided for in Articles 10 to 13 of Regulation No 1984/83, 28a question which will be considered at a later stage in this Opinion.
Zato se postavlja naslednje vpra�anje, ki bo obravnavano v nadaljevanju sklepnih predlogov, ali se lahko za obveznost, naloženo imetniku, da prodaja gorivo po določeni ceni, uporablja skupinska izjema iz členov od 10 do 13 Uredbe �t. 1984/83 28.
However, should the referring court find that the servicestation operator assumes only a negligible fraction of the risks linked to the transactions concluded on behalf of the principal, the intermediary’s obligations arising from the contractual relationship in respect of the market for goods sold to third parties will fall outside the scope of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
Nasprotno se, če bi predložitveno sodi�če ugotovilo, da imetnik bencinske postaje nosi le zanemarljivo tveganje za poslovanje za naročiteljev račun, člen 85(1) Pogodbe za posrednikove obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz pogodbenega razmerja na trgu proizvodov, prodanih tretjim, ne bo uporabljal.
Consequently, as the Court has already stated, the obligation imposed on the operator to sell fuel at a price
Kot je Sodi�če že pojasnilo, bo zato imetnikova obveznost, da prodaja gorivo po ceni, ki jo določi dobavitelj, v pristojnosti CEPSE, da omeji področje dejavnosti dvojih zasto-
For all of those reasons, I propose that Question 1(a) and Question 2(a) should be answered to the effect that, so far as the market for the sale of goods to third parties is concerned, the clauses of an agency contract, including a clause relating to the fixing of the retail price, between a supplier of fuel and the operator of a service station, pursuant to which the latter assumes, at the very most, only a negligible share of the financial and commercial risks linked to the sale of those goods, do not constitute agreements between undertakings within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty, even if that contract also contains a non-competition or exclusivity clause by which the operator undertakes to purchase supplies exclusively from the supplier.
Iz vseh navedenih razlogov predlagam odgovor na prvo vpra�anje pod a) in na drugo vpra�anje pod a), da, glede trga prodaje blaga tretjim, pogodbena določila, vključno z določanjem maloprodajne cene, ki vežejo dobavitelja goriva in imetnika bencinske postaje, na podlagi katerih zadnjenavedeni prevzema največ zanemarljivo finančno in poslovno tveganje za prodajo navedenega blaga, ne pomenijo sporazuma med podjetji v smislu člena 85(1) Pogodbe, tudi če je v tej pogodbi klavzula o prepovedi konkurence oziroma o izključnosti, s katero se imetnik zaveže, da bo nabavljal izključno pri dobavitelju.
The non-competi-tion or exclusivity clause present in such a contract, by which the operator undertakes to purchase supplies exclusively from the supplier and which relates to the market for agency services, constitutes an agreement between undertakings within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
Sporazum med podjetji v smislu člena 85(1) Pogodbe pa pomeni klavzula o prepovedi konkurence oziroma o izključnosti, določena v taki pogodbi, s katero se imetnik zaveže izključno nabavljati pri dobavitelju, in se nana�a na trg posrednikovih storitev.
Similarly, a distribution contract concluded between a fuel supplier and a servicestation operator constitutes an agreement between undertakings within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty where that operator assumes, in a nonnegligible proportion, one or more financial or commercial risks linked to the sale of that fuel to third parties.
Prav tako pomeni sporazum med podjetji v smislu člena 85(1) Pogodbe distribucijska pogodba, sklenjena med dobaviteljem goriva in imetnikom bencinske postaje, če ta imenik prevzame nezanemarljiv del enega ali več finančnih in poslovnih tveganj, povezanih s prodajo tega goriva tretjim.
In order to determine whether Article 85(1) of the Treaty is applicable in the case in the main proceedings, it is for the national court
Da bi bilo mogoče določiti uporabo člena 85(1) Pogodbe v zadevi v glavni stvari, mora nacionalno sodi�če, upo�tevaje določbe sporne pogodbe, presoditi dejansko porazdelitev finančnega in poslovnega tveganja med imetnikom bencinske postaje in dobaviteljem, upo�tevaje tveganje, povezano s prodajo blaga tretjim, in tveganje, povezano z določenimi tržnimi
27 — In this regard, it should be recalled that, in order to assess whether an exclusive purchasing agreement has the object or effect of appreciably restricting competition in the internal market and is liable to affect trade between Member States, it is important to take into account the economic and legal context in which the agreement occurs and where it may combine with other agreements to have a cumulative effect on competition.
27 – V zvezi s tem naj opozorim, da je treba, da bi presodili, ali je namen oziroma učinek določenega sporazuma o izključni nabavi znatna omejitev konkurence na notranjem trgu in ali lahko ta vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami, upo�tevati gospodarske in pravne okoli�čine, v katerih ima ali bi lahko skupaj z drugimi imel zbirni učinek na konkurenco.
That is why it is necessary to analyse the effects of such a contract, taken together with other contracts of the same type, on the opportunities of national competitors, or those from other Member States, to gain access to the relevant market or to increase their market share (see, in particular, Case C-234/89 Delimitis [1991] ECR I-935, paragraphs 13 to 15, and Neste, paragraph 25).
Zato je treba presoditi učinke, ki jih ima taka pogodba, v povezavi z drugimi istovrstnimi pogodbami, na možnosti konkurentov iz iste države članice ali iz drugih držav članic, da vstopijo na upo�tevni trg oziroma pridobijo svoj delež (glej zlasti sodbo z dne 28. februarja 1991 v zadevi Delimitis (C-234/89, Recueil, str. I-935, točke od 13 do 15) in zgoraj navedeno sodbo Neste (točka 25).
Against that background, and provided that the conditions for the application of Article 85(1) of the Treaty are satisfied, the obligation imposed on the operator to sell the fuel at a price fixed by the supplier appears to be incompatible with Article 85(1)(a) of the Treaty.
V tem okviru in s pridržkom, da so izpolnjeni pogoji za uporabo člena 85(1) Pogodbe, obveznost prodaje goriva po ceni, ki jo določi dobavitelj, naložena imetniku, ni skladna s členom 85(1)(a) Pogodbe.
B — Applicability of the block exemption provided for by Regulation No 1984/83 (and subsequently by Regulation No 2790/1999) (Question 1(b) and (c), Question 2(b) and (c))
B – Uporaba skupinske izjeme, določene v Uredbi št. 1984/83 (in pozneje v Uredbi št. 2790/1999) (prvo vprašanje pod b) in c) in drugo vprašanje pod b) in c))
Those rules, which differ from the general provisions applicable to exclusive purchasing agreements, are contained in Articles 10 to 13 of Regulation No 1984/83.
Ta pravila, s katerimi se odloži uporaba splo�nih določb, ki veljajo za sporazume o izključni nabavi, so zajeta v členih od 10 do 13 Uredbe �t. 1984/83.
Article 10 of that regulation exempts from the prohibition laid down in Article 85(1) of the Treaty the exclusive purchasing obligation imposed on the reseller by the supplier of petroleumbased motorvehicle and other fuels, ‘in consideration for the according of special commercial or financial advantages’.
Člen 10 navedene uredbe iz prepovedi, določene v členu 85(1) Pogodbe, izvzema obveznost izključne nabave, ki jo preprodajalcu naloži dobavitelj goriva za motorna vozila in drugega goriva na osnovi naftnih proizvodov „v zameno za dodelitev posebnih gospodarskih ali finančnih prednosti“.
Article 11 of Regulation No 1984/83 sets out the other restrictions on competition, apart from that provided for in Article 10, which may be imposed on the reseller, including ‘the obligation not to sell motorvehicle fuel and other fuels which are supplied by other undertakings in the service station designated in the agreement’.
Člen 11 Uredbe �t. 1984/83 določa druge prepovedi konkurence, ki so lahko naložene preprodajalcu poleg tistih, ki so določene v členu 10, med njimi „obveznost, da na bencinski postaji, določeni v sporazumu, ne preprodaja goriva za motorna vozila ali drugega goriva, ki ga dobavljajo tretja podjetja“.
Article 12(1)(c) of that regulation states that Article 10 does not apply where the agreement is concluded for an indefinite duration or for a period of more than 10 years.
Člen 12(1)(c) te uredbe navaja, da se člen 10 ne uporablja, če je pogodba sklenjena za nedoločen čas oziroma za več kot deset let.
By its Question 1(b) and Question 2(b), the referring court essentially asks whether the contract at issue in the case in the main proceedings could benefit from the application of the system of block exemption established by Regulation No 1984/83, which applies to exclusive purchasing agreements entered into for the purpose of resale, if that contract fulfils the conditions laid down by that regulation.
Predložitveno sodi�če s prvim vpra�anjem pod b) in z drugim vpra�anjem pod b) v bistvu spra�uje, ali bi lahko bila pogodba v zadevi v glavni stvari upravičena do uporabe ureditve skupinskih izjem, vzpostavljeni z Uredbo �t. 1984/83, ki se uporablja za sporazume o izključni nabavi za preprodajo, če navedena pogodba izpolnjuje pogoje iz te uredbe.
The national court refers in particular to the conditions relating to the maximum duration of the exclusivity (or non-competition) clause and the question of the extent of the commercial and financial advantages which must be granted by the supplier in order for such a clause to be concluded for a duration exceeding five years (Question 1(b), at the end, and (c)).
Predložitveno sodi�če na�teva predvsem pogoje, ki se nana�ajo na čas najdalj�ega možnega trajanja klavzule o izključnosti (oziroma prepovedi konkurence) in na vpra�anje obsega gospodarskih in finančnih ugodnosti, ki jih mora nakloniti dobavitelj, da bi bilo mogoče tako klavzulo dogovoriti za obdobje, dalj�e od petih let (prvo vpra�anje pod b) na koncu in pod c)).
In addition, it raises the question of the effect of the
Poleg tega spra�uje o vplivu pogodbenega določila o dolo-
In my opinion, the answer to the questions set out in point 58 of this Opinion depends on the classification of the contract at issue in the main proceedings, according to whether it results in recognition of the existence of a genuine agency relationship
Menim, da je odgovor na vpra�anja iz točke 58 zgoraj teh sklepnih predlogov odvisen od opredelitve sporne pogodbe v zadevi v glavni stvari, in sicer od tega, ali gre za pristen odnos zastopanja med strankama v zadevi v glavni stvari ali za pogodbeni odnos
‘agreement between undertakings’ within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
CEPSA blja pojem „sporazum med podjetji“ v smislu člena 85 Pogodbe 31.
31 between the parties to the main proceedings or of a contractual relationship between two independent undertakings (distribution contract), hypotheses which must be considered in turn below.
med dvema neodvisnima podjetjema (distribucijska pogodba), to je za primera, ki bosta po vrsti obravnavana v nadaljevanju.
The hypothesis of a genuine agency relationship
Predpostavka pristnega odnosa zastopanja
In such a situation, as explained by CEPSA and Tobar, only the exclusivity or non-competition clause tying the agent to his principal, considered, in itself, as an agreement between undertakings within the meaning of Article 85(1) EC, is capable of benefiting from the application of the provisions of Articles 10 to 13 of Regulation No 1984/83.
V tem primeru, kot sta navedla CEPSA in Tobar, je lahko le določilo o izključnosti oziroma prepovedi konkurence, dogovorjeno med zastopnikom in njegovim naročiteljem, ki samo po sebi �teje kot sporazum med podjetji v smislu člena 85(1) Pogodbe, upravičeno do uporabe določb členov od 10 do 13 Uredbe �t. 1984/83.
In that regard, the referring court is uncertain, essentially, (Question 1(c)) whether an exclusivity of a duration not exceeding 10 years, such as that referred to in Article 12(1)(c) of Regulation No 1984/83, must be subject to the according, by the fuel supplier, of significant commercial or financial advantages or whether such advantages must merely be ‘not insignificant’, in the absence of any specific indication as to the extent of those advantages in the wording of Article 10 of that regulation. 32
Predložitveno sodi�če v zvezi s tem v bistvu spra�uje (prvo vpra�anje pod c)), ali mora biti izključnost, dogovorjena do desetih let, kot določa člen 12(1)(c) Uredbe �t. 1984/83, pogojena z dodelitvijo znatnih gospodarskih in finančnih prednosti dobavitelja goriv oziroma ali morajo biti prednosti preprosto take, da „niso nepomembne“, glede na to, da besedilo člena 10 te uredbe obsega navedenih prednosti ne določa natančneje 32.
31 — See points 33 to 37 of this Opinion.
31 – Glej točke od 33 do 37 teh sklepnih predlogov.
It is, however, obvious that the provisions of that regulation cannot apply to the contractual obligations imposed on a commercial agent on the market for the sale of goods to third parties if, on that market, that agent does not assume, under the contractual clauses tying him to his principal, any financial and commercial risks or incurs only a negligible share of those risks linked to that activity, since, in such a case, those obligations do not fall within the concept of an
V vsakem primeru je očitno, da se določbe te uredbe ne morejo uporabljati za pogodbene obveznosti trgovskega zastopnika na trgu prodaje blaga tretjim, ker na tem trgu zastopnik na podlagi pogodbenih določil, ki ga vežejo nasproti naročitelju, ne prevzema nikakr�nega finančnega in poslovnega tveganja oziroma nosi le zanemarljiv del tega tveganja, povezanega s to dejavnostjo, saj se v takem primeru za te obveznosti ne upora-
32 — It should be noted that, under Article 12(2) of Regulation No 1984/83, where the agreement relates to a service station which the supplier lets to the reseller (operator), or allows the reseller to occupy on some other basis, in law or in fact, exclusive purchasing obligations or bans on dealing in competing products specified in Title III of the regulation (applicable to servicestation agreements) may be imposed on the reseller for the whole period for which the reseller in fact operates the premises.
32 – Opozoriti je treba, da je mogoče v skladu s členom 12(2) Uredbe �t. 1984/83, če se sporazum nana�a na bencinsko postajo, za katero je preprodajalcu (imetniku) dal na voljo prostore dobavitelj oziroma mu je podelil dejanske ali pravne ugodnosti, preprodajalcu naložiti obveznosti izključne nabave in prepovedi konkurence, določene v Naslovu III Uredbe (ki se uporablja za pogodbe o bencinskih postajah) za celotno obdobje, v katerem dejansko posluje z bencinsko postajo. To vpra�anje ni predmet razlage, za katero je zaprosilo predložitveno sodi�če, glede na to, da je to med drugim navedlo, da je v zadevi v glavni stvari imetnik bencinske postaje njen lastnik.
See also points 45 and 74 of the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in that case.
Glej tudi točki 45 in 74 zgoraj navedenih sklepnih predlogov generalne pravobranilke J. Kokott.