natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Time would clearly, therefore, have run against them from that point for the purposes of bringing an action for compensation under Article 235 EC.
Njihov rok za vložitev od�kodninske tožbe na podlagi člena 235 ES bi torej očitno tekel od tega trenutka.
‘The cooperative wine-cellars may — as may the guarantor [Assedile] if it decides to take the applicant’s place — obtain satisfaction of their rights to receive payment in the course of the insolvency proceedings, together with all the other creditors and in accordance with the principle of equal treatment of creditors.’
„Zadružne vinske kleti lahko, kot tudi porok [Assedile], če se odloči, da bo uveljavljal regresni zahtevek, dobijo poplačilo svojih terjatev v okviru stečajnega postopka, skupaj z drugimi upniki in v skladu z načelom enakosti upnikov.“
It is possible that the national court paid less than full attention to the wine producers’ interests because they were interveners in DAI’s action, rather than applicants in their own name.
Mogoče je, da se nacionalno sodi�če ni popolnoma posvetilo interesom proizvajalcev vina, ker so bili intervenienti v tožbi DAI, ne pa tožeče stranke.
It seems to me that it would be rather harsh to fault the producers, in the circumstances, for not bringing separ- ate proceedings, presumably against DAI (since it was the distiller who actually owed them the balance of the Community aid payable) with AIMA and perhaps Assedile as additional defendants.
Menim, da bi bilo v teh okoli�činah precej kruto grajati proizvajalce, ker niso vložili ločene tožbe, verjetno zoper DAI (ker je bila destilater, ki jim je dejansko dolgovala razliko do pomoči Skupnosti, ki bi jim morala biti izplačana), z AIMA in morda Assedile kot dodatnima toženima strankama.
As it was, there was already a relevant action (between DAI and AIMA) that was ‘live’ before the national
Pred nacionalnimi sodi�či je v tem času že potekal pomemben postopek (med DAI in AIMA). V interesu učinkovitosti
45 — See the careful discussion of the merits at paragraphs 151 to 178, in particular paragraphs 164 to 172.
45 – Natančneje glej razpravo o utemeljenosti v točkah od 151 do 178, zlasti točke od 164 do 172.
It is to be noted that the Commission does not seek to appeal the judgment of the Court of First Instance on the substance.
Navesti je treba, da Komisija ni vložila vsebinske pritožbe zoper sodbo Sodi�ča prve stopnje. Opira se le na trenutek zastaranja.
In so saying, the national court failed to understand the whole thrust and purpose of the Community aid regime.
S tem nacionalno sodi�če ni razumelo celotne strukture in namena ureditve pomoči Skupnosti.
Crucially, it had also declined to make a reference.
Kar je odločilno, zavrnilo je tudi vložitev predloga za sprejetje predhodne odločbe.
There was, of course, no obligation on it to do so, not being a final court bound by the stricter requirements of the final paragraph of Article 234 EC (and it also seems likely that the Tribunal civile di Roma was directing its mind to the wrong part of the issue in asking itself whether a reference was ‘necessary’).
Seveda, k temu ni bilo zavezano, ker ni bilo končno sodi�če, ki ga zavezujejo strožje zahteve zadnjega odstavka člena 234 ES (in verjetno Tribunale civile di Roma zadeve ni obravnavalo s pravega zornega kota, ker se je spra�evalo, ali je bila predložitev predloga za sprejetje predhodne odločbe „nujna“).
Had it done so, it seems to me
Zato Sodi�ču na tej stopnji
courts. It would have seemed rather natural, in the interests of procedural efficiency and economy, to intervene in that action and to place the wine producers’ entitlement to payment of their Community aid before the national court in that way.
in ekonomičnosti postopka je bilo običajneje intervenirati v tem postopku in na ta način pri nacionalnemu sodi�ču uveljavljati upravičenje proizvajalcev vina do izplačila njihove pomoči Skupnosti.
Had DAI succeeded, or lost following a reference, they would (respectively) have either had a better chance of being paid the aid by DAI or at least known where they stood.
Če bi DAI po predložitvi predloga za sprejetje predhodne odločbe uspela ali izgubila, bi imeli ali bolj�e možnosti, da bi jim DAI izplačala pomoč, ali bi vsaj vedeli, v kak�nem položaju so.
If it was an error to intervene in those proceedings rather than to commence separate proceedings, it seems to me that that error was objectively excusable.
Če je bila njihova napaka to, da so intervenirali v postopkih, namesto da bi sprožili ločene postopke, je bila po mojem mnenju ta napaka upravičena.
As interveners, the wine producers (and their clear interests) were given short shrift by the national court.
Proizvajalce vina (in njihove očitne interese) kot interveniente je nacionalno sodi�če obravnavalo zelo hitro.
Save with the (undoubted) benefit of hindsight, I find it difficult to read into the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma any clear (let alone express) indication to them that they had a good claim but were in the wrong place to pursue it.
Razen (nedvomne) prednosti naknadnega preizkusa, ni mogoče v sodbi Tribunale civile di Roma najti nobenega jasnega (kaj �ele izrecnega) napotka proizvajalcem vina, da so imeli dober zahtevek, vendar so ga uveljavljali na napačnem mestu.
On the contrary, they were told that they were in no better and no worse position than any other person to whom DAI owed money.
Nasprotno, pojasnjeno jim je bilo, da niso niti v bolj�em niti slab�em položaju kot vsaka druga oseba, ki ji je DAI dolgovala denar.
They stretched from 27 January 1986 (the date of the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma) via the judgment of the Corte d’appello on 19 November 1991 through to the final dismissal of the appellants’ appeal by the Corte di Cassazione on 28 November 1994.
Trajal je od 27. januarja 1986 (datum sodbe Tribunale civile di Roma), od izdaje sodbe Corte d’appello (pritožbeno sodi�če) z dne 19. novembra 1991 do sodbe Corte di Cassazione (kasacijsko sodi�če) z dne 28. novembra 1994, s katero je bila pritožba pritožnikov pravnomočno zavrnjena.
It is impossible to ascertain from the file before this Court whether the applicants drew attention to the substance of their claim under EC law within that procedural appeal, or raised again the question of whether this Court should be asked for guidance in understanding the workings of Regulation No 2499/82, with a view to unravelling the mess left behind by DAI’s insolvency.
Is spisa Sodi�ča ni mogoče ugotoviti, ali so tožeče stranke v tej postopkovni pritožbi opozorile tudi na svoj materialni zahtevek na podlagi prava ES ali pa so ponovno postavile vpra�anje, ali bi bilo treba Sodi�če zaprositi za napotilo glede razumevanja delovanja Uredbe �t. 2499/82, da se razjasni zmeda, ki je nastala zaradi nesolventnosti DAI.
It may not have been possible for them to do so to any significant extent, or at all.
V teh okoli�činah proizvajalci vina niso imeli veliko možnosti ali sploh nobene za uspeh. Sama jim ne bi želela nasprotovati z ugotovitvijo, da se nikoli ne bi smeli pritožiti in da bi se moralo ugotoviti, da je rok začel teči pred 28. novembrom 1994.
In particular, I do not deduce from the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma any straightforward judicial guidance that the wine producers would get nowhere in the national courts (either within the context of DAI’s action or, indeed, in separate proceedings) because there was no mechanism for protecting their interests by preventing the forfeiture of DAI’s security to AIMA and
Zlasti pa iz sodbe Tribunale civile di Roma ne izhaja nobena neposredna sodna usmeritev, da proizvajalci vina pred nacio -nalnimi sodi�či ne bi ničesar dosegli (ne v okviru tožbe DAI ne v ločenih postopkih), ker ni bilo mehanizma za za�čito njihovih interesov tako, da bi se preprečilo unovčenje
COMMISSION v CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA AND OTHERS were bound to incur damage which was certain in character. 48
KOMISIJA PROTI CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA IN DRUGI ženim osebam povzročena �koda nedvomne narave. 48
It seems to me, moreover, likely that, had the applicants sought to bring proceedings against the Commission before the Court of First Instance without first going to the national court, the Commission would have argued that they ought to be pursuing their claim before the national courts, which were perfectly capable of granting them an effective remedy.
Poleg tega se mi zdi, da bi Komisija, če bi tožeče stranke zoper njo vložile tožbo pri Sodi�ču prve stopnje, ne da bi se prej obrnile na nacionalno sodi�če, ugovarjala, da bi morale svoj zahtevek najprej uveljavljati pred nacionalnimi sodi�či, ki so jim bila sposobna nuditi učinkovito pravno varstvo.
It would, in all likelihood, have deployed arguments similar to those that it presented in the context of these proceedings. 47
Povsem verjetno bi navedla ugovore, podobne tistim, ki so bili predstavljeni v okviru tega postopka. 47
Against that background, I turn to consider the analysis of the Court of First Instance of the timelimit provided for by Article 46 of the Statute.
Na podlagi navedenega bom presojala analizo roka iz člena 46 Statuta, ki jo je opravilo Sodi�če prve stopnje.
In the present case the Court of First Instance ruled that the period of limitation began to run when the damage resulting from the total or partial absence of payment of Community aid was suffered for certain by the applicants.
V tej zadevi je Sodi�če prve stopnje odločilo, da je zastaralni rok začel teči, ko so tožeče stranke nedvomno utrpele �kodo zaradi delnega ali popolnega neizplačila pomoči.
49That court considered that in the exceptional circumstances (i) a prudent and wellinformed trader could reasonably expect to obtain payment of the aid and (ii) (given in particular the complexity of the system introduced by Regulation No 2499/82 50 and the exceptional nature of the situation relating to the lacuna in that regulation) it was extremely difficult for such a trader to be aware that he could not obtain such payment before a national court.
49To sodi�če je ugotovilo, da je v izjemnih okoli�činah (i) skrben in dobro obve�čen gospodarski subjekt lahko utemeljeno pričakoval, da bo dosegel izplačilo pomoči, ter (ii) (zlasti glede na zapletenost sistema, ki ga uvaja Uredba �t. 2499/82, 50in izjemno naravo položaja zaradi pravne praznine v tej uredbi) težko, da bi se ta gospodarski subjekt zavedal, da ne bo mogel doseči tega izplačila pred nacionalnim sodi�čem.
Consequently, in order to assess whether damage was certain, it was necessary to take into consideration the national proceedings, concerning specifically the fate of the security.
Zato je za presojo, ali je bila �koda nedvomne narave, moralo nujno upo�tevati nacionalni postopek, posebej glede usode var�čine.
It seems to me that those two limbs could equally well have been phrased (and might perhaps have been more felicitously phrased) in terms of what a reasonable bystander,
Menim, da bi lahko ta elementa prav tako dobro (in morda celo primerneje) opredelili v okviru presoje, kako bi razumni opazovalec položaja lahko razumel objektivni
According to the caselaw of the Court of Justice, time starts to run in cases of noncontractual liability originating in a legislative measure when the injurious effects of that measure have been produced, and consequently when the persons concerned
V skladu s sodno prakso Sodi�ča rok v zadevah nepogodbene odgovornosti, ki nastanejo na podlagi zakonodajnega ukrepa, začne teči, ko so nastali �kodljivi učinki ukrepa in, posledično, ko je bila udele-
48 — Birra Wührer, cited in note 31, paragraph 10.49 — Paragraph 131.
48 – V opombi 31 navedena sodba Birra Wührer, točka 10.49 – Točka 131.
47 — See paragraph 89 of the judgment of the Court of First Instance.
47 – Glej točko 89 sodbe Sodi�ča prve stopnje.
The Court of First Instance explains cogently at paragraph 118 that the applicants did not, in fact, enjoy any effective judicial protection before the national courts; a conclusion with which (in the light of just over 10 years of litigation before the national courts) it is hard to disagree.
Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 118 utemeljeno pojasnjuje, da tožeče stranke dejansko niso imele učinkovitega sodnega varstva v okviru nacionalnih sodi�č; sklep, ki mu je težko nasprotovati (z vidika nekaj več kot desetletnega pravdanja pred nacionalnimi sodi�či).
However, it is not so clear that that would necessarily have been equally apparent had the litigation started in the Court of First Instance rather than in the national courts.
Vendar pa ni tako jasno, da bi bilo to enako očitno, če bi se postopek prej začel pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje, kot pa pred nacionalnimi sodi�či.
50 — See the comments of Advocate General Darmon in the related context of the proportionality of the penalty imposed by the third subparagraph of Article 9(2) of Regulation No 2499/82: ‘It is hard not to feel confused when confronted with this peculiar mixture of penalties expressly prescribed and penalties which have to be implied, and with the juxtaposition of principal and ancillary obligations, both of which are penalised with equal severity through total forfeiture of aid …’ (point 27 of the Opinion in Lingenfelser, cited in note 9).
50 – Glej pripombe generalnega pravobranilca Darmona v podobnih okoli�činah sorazmernosti naložene kazni na podlagi tretjega pododstavka člena 9(2) Uredbe �t. 2499/82: „Ne morem si pomagati, da ne bi bil zmeden pred tem nenavadnim me�anjem kazni, ki so izrecno predpisane, in implicitnih kazni ter ob postavitvi glavne obveznosti poleg stranske, ki sta enako strogo sankcionirani s popolno izgubo pomoči […]“ (Točka 27 v opombi 9 navedenih sklepnih predlogov Lingenfelser).
With that gloss, I fully endorse the approach adopted by the Court of First Instance, at least with regard to the four applicants who appealed against the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma. 51
S tem pojasnilom se popolnoma pridružujem pristopu, ki ga je zavzelo Sodi�če prve stopnje, vsaj glede �tirih tožečih strank, ki so vložile pritožbo zoper sodbo Tribunale civile di Roma. 51 položaj.
observing the situation, would have supposed the objective situation to be.
Objektivno gledano se mi zdi, da bi glede na zakonodajo Skupnosti kvazipogodbena razmerja med AIMA in proizvajalci vina, dejstvo, da so proizvajalci vina izpolnili svojo obveznost, in očitni namen zakonodaje Skupnosti, izražen v uvodnih izjavah Uredbe �t.
Objectively, looking at the Community legislation, the quasi-contractual relations between AIMA and the wine producers, the fact that the wine producers had complied with their obligations and the apparent purpose of the Community legislation as expressed in the recitals to Regulation No 2499/82, it seems to me that such a bystander would have supposed that the proper course of redress was by way of proceedings before the national court to obtain payment of the Community aid with, in all probability, a reference under Article 234 EC.
2499/82, ta opazovalec predvideval, da je prava pot do od�kodnine postopek pred nacionalnim sodi�čem za pridobitev pomoči Skupnosti, po vsej verjetnosti s predlogom za sprejetje predhodne odločbe na podlagi člena 234 ES.
Such payments are generically made at national level, and are claimed (if necessary) via national proceedings, with the Member State then accounting to the Community through the procedure for the clearance of EAGGF accounts.
Ta izplačila na splo�no potekajo na nacionalni ravni in se (če je treba) zahtevajo v nacionalnih postopkih, pri čemer država članica zneske obračuna s Skupnostjo po postopku za potrditev obračuna EKUJS.
I find it difficult to accept the idea that a reasonable bystander, viewing the situation objectively, would have jumped to the conclusion in 1983 that the wine producers should launch a damages claim against the Commission.
Ne morem sprejeti zamisli, da bi razumen opazovalec, ki položaj opazuje objektivno, v letu 1983 menil, da bi morali proizvajalci vina sprožiti od�kodninsko tožbo zoper Komisijo.
The present case, like Adams, is, for the reasons given by the Court of First Instance, an exceptional case.
Obravnavana zadeva je, tako kot zadeva Adams, iz razlogov, ki jih je podalo Sodi�če prve stopnje, izjemna zadeva.
In Adams, the applicant had notified the Commission of anti-competitive practices engaged in by his employer Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG (‘Roche’). He subsequently brought an action against the Commission for compensation for damage allegedly suffered as a result of wrongful acts or omissions on its part which led to his arrest, detention and conviction in Switzerland for 51 — See points 30 and 32 above and 107 below.52 — Cited in footnote 34.
V zadevi Adams je tožnik Komisiji priglasil protikonkurenčne prakse, ki jih je izvajal njegov delodajalec Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG (v nadaljevanju: Roche). Kasneje je proti Komisiji vložil tožbo za povračilo �kode, ki naj bi jo utrpel zaradi nezakonitih dejanj ali opustitev Komisije, saj je bil zaradi svoje priglasitve v Švici aretiran, 51 – Glej zgoraj navedeni točki 30 in 32 ter spodaj navedeno točko 109.
Rather, applying the test (as set out by the Commission) that ‘the limitation period cannot begin to run before all the injurious effects of the measure have been produced and consequently before the time when the applicants were bound to incur damage which was certain in character’, I consider that such a bystander would have said that, although the general nature of the damage that the applicants were likely to suffer if they were not paid the Community aid might be obvious in June 1983, its unavoidable nature was not.
Ob uporabi merila (ki ga navaja Komisija), da „zastaralni rok ne more začeti teči, dokler ne nastanejo vsi �kodljivi učinki ukrepa in, posledično, dokler tožečim strankam ni povzročena �koda nedvomne narave“, namreč prej sklepam, da bi ta opazovalec ugotovil, da čeprav bi bila splošna narava �kode, ki bi jo tožeče stranke verjetno utrpele, če jim pomoč Skupnosti ne bi bila izplačana, verjetno očitna v juniju 1983, pa njena neizogibna narava ne bi bila.
The applicants were ‘bound to incur damage which was certain in nature’ only when it became objectively clear that proceedings before the national court would not result in their receiving the aid.
Tožeče stranke so „utrpele �kodo nedvomne narave“ �ele, ko je postalo objektivno očitno, da na podlagi postopkov pred nacionalnim sodi�čem ne bodo prejele pomoči. To je bil trenutek,
COMMISSION v CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA AND OTHERS economic espionage arising out of that notification.
KOMISIJA PROTI CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA IN DRUGI priprt in obsojen za gospodarsko vohunjenje.
The Court found that, following a visit by Roche’s lawyer to the Commission on 8 November 1974, the Commission’s knowledge of the gravity of the risk to which it had exposed Mr Adams by its earlier conduct 53was sufficient to give rise to liability.
Sodi�če je ugotovilo, da je Komisija po obisku Rochevega odvetnika 8. novembra 1974 vedela za resnost tveganja, kateremu je s svojim prej�njim ravnanjem 53izpostavila g. Adamsa, kar je zadostovalo za nastanek odgovornosti.
of the limitation cannot constitute a valid defence to a claim by a person who has suffered damage where that person only belatedly became aware of the event giving rise to it and thus could not have had a reasonable time in which to submit his application to the Court or to the relevant institution before the expiry of the limitation period.
ni veljavna obramba zoper zahtevek osebe, ki je utrpela �kodo, ko je bila ta oseba pozno seznanjena z dejstvom, zaradi katerega je nastala �koda, in tako ni mogla v razumnem času, pred iztekom zastaralnega roka, vložiti svojega predloga na Sodi�ču ali pristojni instituciji.
In this case it must be borne in mind that the Court has based its conclusion in regard to the Community’s liability on the fact that the Commission had not attempted to inform and to consult the applicant following [Roche’s lawyer’s] visit of 8 November 1974.
Treba je upo�tevati, da je Sodi�če svoj sklep glede odgovornosti Skupnosti v tej zadevi utemeljilo s tem, da Komisija po obisku [Rochevega odvetnika] 8. novembra 1974 tožeče stranke ni poskusila obvestiti in se z njo posvetovati.
It is clear from the information before the Court that the applicant could not have become aware of that fact until the preparatory inquiry in these proceedings, since [Roche’s lawyer’s] visit was mentioned for the first time in the Commission’s defence.
Iz podatkov, s katerimi razpolaga Sodi�če, izhaja, da se tožnik z navedenim ni mogel seznaniti pred pripravljalno preiskavo v tem postopku, ker je bil obisk [Rochevega odvetnika] prvič omenjen v odgovoru na tožbo Komisije.
Therefore, he could not have sought to establish the Community’s liability on that basis before the normal date of expiry of the limitation period’. 54
Zato ni mogel zahtevati, naj se odgovornost Skupnosti na tej podlagi ugotovi pred normalnim iztekom zastaralnega roka“. 54
The Commission argued that it was timebarred by virtue of Article 43 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, the predecessor to the present Article 46.
Komisija je ugovarjala, da je tožba zastarala na podlagi člena 43 Statuta, predhodnika sedanjega člena 46.
Mr Adams argued that the events had not become known to him until 1980, when his new lawyer had had the opportunity to study the documents relating to the criminal proceedings.
Adams je ugovarjal, da je za dejstva zvedel �ele leta 1980, ko je imel njegov novi odvetnik možnost preučiti dokumente v zvezi s kazenskim postopkom.
He had not believed the information supplied by the Swiss police and had been unable to read the Swiss judgments which were in German.
Ni verjel podatkom �vicarske policije in ni mogel prebrati �vicarskih sodb, ki so bile v nem�čini.
Nor could he possibly have known of the events relating to the visit by Roche’s lawyer to the Commission on 8 November 1974.
Niti ni nikakor mogel poznati dejstev glede obiska Rochevega odvetnika pri Komisiji 8. novembra 1974.
Adams is, of course, and as Commission implicitly argues, distinguishable in various respects from the present case (although I confess to some puzzlement over the Commission’s argument that it concerns not the determination of when time starts to run but rather when the limitation period expires, since the one surely depends on the other).
Zadeva Adams se, seveda, v več vidikih razlikuje od obravnavane, kot izrecno trdi Komisija (čeprav se, priznam, čudim njeni trditvi, da zadeva ne obravnava določitve začetka teka zastaralnega roka, temveč določitev izteka tega roka, glede na to, da sta gotovo odvisna drug od drugega).
It does, however, demonstrate that the Court is prepared to depart from the normal application of the rules of prescription in an exceptional case.
Vendar pa dokazuje, da je Sodi�če v izjemnih primerih pripravljeno odstopiti od normalne uporabe pravil o zastaranju.
In such rare, exceptional cases I consider that it may be necessary to approach those rules more sympathetically in order to prevent prescription from being relied on as a defence in circumstances where that would be manifestly unjust.
Menim, da bi bilo treba v takih redkih, izjemnih primerih ta pravila obravnavati bolj prizanesljivej�e, da bi se preprečilo sklicevanje na zastaranje v obrambi v okoli�činah,v katerih to očitno ne bi bilo pravično.
53 — Namely, handing over to Roche staff edited photocopies of memoranda supplied to it by Mr Adams which had enabled Roche to identify him as the main suspect in the complaint that it had lodged with the Swiss Public Prosecutor’s Office, and which had therefore led to his arrest and supplied the police and the Swiss courts with substantial evidence against him.
53 – Namreč, ker je osebju Rocha predala obdelane kopije poročil, ki ji jih je priskrbel Adams, kar je Rochu omogočilo, da ga označi kot glavnega osumljenca v tožbi, ki jo je vložil pri �vicarskem državnem tožilstvu, ter ki so nato vodile do njegove aretacije, policiji in �vicarskim sodi�čem pa priskrbele bistvene dokaze zoper njega.
54 — Paragraphs 50 and 51 of the judgment.
54 – Točki 50 in 51 sodbe.