natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Once dealers had acquired this right to a bonus, and therefore had proved to the carmaker that they had made their best eorts to develop their territory, the bonus was paid only for cars subsequently registered in the Netherlands and not for additional sales which may have been exports.
Ko so trgovci enkrat dobili pravico do tega dodatka, in so torej proizvajalcu avtomobilov dokazali, da so storili vse za razvoj svojega ozemlja, se je dodatek plačal samo za avtomobile, ki so bili nato registrirani na Nizozemskem, ne pa tudi za dodatne prodaje, pri katerih je šlo lahko tudi za izvoz.
For these reasons, the bonus system applied by Peugeot in the Netherlands did not comply with Article 6(1)(8) of Regulation (EC) No 1475/95(86), which provided that the exemption did not apply where ‘the supplier, without any objective reason, grants dealers remunerations calculated on the basis of the place of destination of the motor vehicles resold or the place of residence of the purchaser’.
Zaradi teh razlogov sistem dodatkov, ki ga je Peugeot uporabil na Nizozemskem, ni bil skladen s členom 6(1)(8) Uredbe (ES) št. 1457/95(86), ki določa, da se izjema ne uporablja, če „dobavitelj brez kakršnega koli objektivnega vzroka trgovcem dodeljuje popuste, izračunane na podlagi namembnega kraja ponovno prodanih motornih vozil ali stalnega bivališča kupca“.
Moreover, the evidence held on file showed that the bonus was economically signicant for dealers throughout the period and that its loss on export sales signicantly aected dealer interest in selling to non-resident consumers.
Poleg tega so dokazi v zadevi kazali, da je bil dodatek v vsem tem obdobju velikega ekonomskega pomena za trgovce in da je njegova izguba pri prodaji za izvoz pomembno vplivala na interes trgovcev za prodajo strankam s tujim državljanstvom.
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of the 28th June 1995 on the application of Article 85(3)
Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 1475/95 z dne 28. junija 1995 o uporabi člena 85(3) Pogodbe pri določenih kategorijah sporazumov o distribuciji in servisiranju motornih vozil.Ta uredba je bila nato nadomeščena z Uredbo Komisije (ES) št. 1400/2002 (UL L 203, 1.8.2002).
Report on Competition Policy 2005 geot Nederland exerted direct pressure by occasionally acting to limit the export sales of certain dealers. e pressure also took the form of threats to reduce supplies, in particular of the most commonly exported models.
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2005 nizozemski trg in Peugeot je njihov izvoz obravnaval kot neprimerno vedenje, za katerega je moral odgovarjati trgovec izvoznik.
As a result of the two measures, exports from the Netherlands declined aer 1997, the year in which the remuneration system was implemented, then fell sharply aer 1999.
Zaradi teh dveh ukrepov se je izvoz iz Nizozemske znižal po letu 1997, ko so uvedli sistem nagrajevanja, nakar je ostro upadel po letu 1999.
Such a drastic decline in exports could not be explained by extraneous factors such as changes in the level of price dierentials between the Netherlands and other Member States.
Takšnega velikega znižanja uvoza ni mogoče razložiti z zunanjimi dejavniki, kot je spremenjena stopnja razlik v cenah med Nizozemsko in državami članicami.
In determining the level of the fine, the Commission took into account the very serious nature and the relatively long duration of the infringement committed by Peugeot and its Dutch subsidiary.
Komisija je pri določanju višine globe upoštevala izredno hudo stopnjo kršitve, ki sta jo zakrivila Peugeot in njegova nizozemska podružnica, in njeno rela- tivno dolgotrajnost.
An appeal against this decision is pending before the Court of First Instance(87).
Pritožba proti tej odločbi bo obravnavana pred Sodiščem prve stopnje(87).
89) cases were opened in 2003/
89) sta se odprli v letu 2003/na
early 2004 following formal and informal complaints by several dealer associations.
začetku leta 2004 po uradnih in neuradnih pritožbah več združenj trgovcev.
After indepth investigations and constructive discussions with the parties, the Commission informed the respective complainants at the end of 2005 that, in view of measures taken by both BMW and GM, there are no longer grounds to pursue the proceedings further as far as the two central issues of the complaints are concerned(90). ese two issues relate to (i) unjustied obstacles to multi-brand distribution and servicing, and (ii) unnecessary restrictions for garages on becoming members of these manufacturers’ authorised repair networks.
Po poglobljenih preiskavah in konstruktivnih pogovorih z vpletenimi stranmi je Komisija konec leta 2005 obvestila pritožnike v posameznih zadevah, da glede na ukrepe, ki sta jih sprejela BMW in GM, ni več razloga, da bi še naprej vodili postopek, vsaj kar zadeva dve osrednji vprašanji v pritožbah.(90) Ti dve vprašanji se nanašata na (i) neupravičeno oviranje distribucije in servisiranja več blagovnih znamk ter (ii) nepotrebne omejitve za mehanične delavnice glede včlanitve v mreže pooblaščenih serviserjev navedenih proizvajalcev.
In order to address concerns expressed by the Commission and to benet from legal certainty under Commission Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002(91), BMW and Gen- eral Motors (GM) have claried and adjusted their respective distribution and servicing agreements by means of circular letters to all members of their various authorised dealer and repairer networks.
BMW in General Motors (GM) sta se odzvala na pomisleke Komisije in si skušala zagotoviti pravno varnost v skladu z Uredbo Komisije (ES) št. 1400/2002,(91) tako da sta razjasnila in prilagodila vsak svoje sporazume o distribuciji in servisiranju ter vsem članom svojih različnih pooblaščenih trgovcev in mrež serviserjev poslala okrožnico.
As regards the possibility for dealers to sell competing brands of cars, BMW and GM have informed their respective networks that they accept the joint and non-ex-
Kar zadeva možnost, da trgovci prodajajo konkurenčne znamke avtomobilov, sta BMW in GM sporočila vsak svojim mrežam, da sprejemata skupno in neizključno rabo vseh prostorov, razen dela razstavnega prostora, ki je namenjen prodaji njunih znamk (npr. sprejemni pult, prostor za stranke, zunanje pročelje, službeni prostori).
Case T-450/05 Automobiles Peugeot and Peugeot Nederland v Commission.Case COMP/38.771 Europäischer BMW- und Mini Partnerverband eV/BMW AG.Case COMP/38.864 PO/General Motors — Opel distribution agreements and Case COMP/38.901 Verband Deutscher Opel-Händler/Adam Opel.With respect to other issues raised by one dealer association, discussions are still ongoing.Commission Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector (OJ L 203, 1.8.2002).
Zadeva T-450/05, Automobiles Peugeot in Peugeot Nederland proti Komisiji.Zadeva COMP/38.771, Europäischer BMW- und Mini Partnerverband e.V./BMW AG.Zadeva COMP/38.864, Sporazumi o distribuciji PO/General Motors-Opel, in zadeva COMP/38.901, Verband Deutscher Opel-Händler/Adam Opel.Pogajanja glede drugih vprašanj, ki jih je sprožilo eno združenje dobaviteljev, še potekajo.Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 1400/2002 o uporabi člena 81(3) Pogodbe za skupine vertikalnih sporazumov in usklajenih ravnanj na področju motornih vozil (UL L 203, 1.8.2002).
In addition, they will allow their dealers to use generic (multi-brand) computer infrastructure and management systems, including accounting methodology and accounting frameworks, provided that such systems’ features, functionality and quality are equivalent to the solutions recommended by BMW and GM.
I – Protimonopolna zakonodaja – členi 81, 82 in 86 ES infrastrukture in sistemov upravljanja, vključno z računovodsko metodologijo in računovodskimi okviri, pod pogojem, da so podoba, funkcionalnost in kakovost takšnih sistemov enakovredni rešitvam, ki jih priporočata BMW in GM.
GM has also made clear that Opel dealers can set up multi-brand Internet sites and that Opel-trained sales personnel can also be used for selling cars of other brands while Opel-specic training is no longer required in respect of staff entrusted with the sale of competing brands.
GM je tudi pojasnil, da lahko Oplovi trgovci vzpostavijo internetne strani za več znamk in da se lahko osebje, ki je usposobljeno za prodajo te znamke, lahko uporabi tudi za prodajo drugih znamk in da se za osebje, ki mu je zaupana tudi prodaja drugih znamk, ne zahteva več posebnega usposabljanja za znamko Opel.
Both BMW and GM have made clear that reporting and auditing obligations of dealers do not extend to commercially sensitive information concerning dealers’ business activities with products of competing suppliers.
BMW in GM sta pojasnila, da se obveznosti trgovcev za poročanje in spremljanje ne nanašajo na tržno občutljive informacije glede poslovnih dejavnosti trgovca z izdelki konkurenčnih dobaviteljev.
In view of the potential deterrent eect of mechanisms for setting sales targets and evaluating performance on multi-brand dealers, GM has conrmed, first, that the sales targets will be mutually agreed with dealers.
Kar zadeva morebiten odvračilni učinek mehanizmov določanja prodajnih ciljev in vrednotenja učinkovitosti trgovcev z več znamkami, je GM potrdil, da se bodo, prvič, za prodajne cilje dogovorili skupaj s trgovci.
Second, targets will be set taking into account possible changes to the dealer’s individual business circumstances (including the start of multi-brand activities) and local market conditions while refraining from assessing GM’s dealers’ performance on the basis of a comparison between local and national market shares.
Drugič, pri postavljanju ciljev se bodo upoštevale morebitne spremembe poslovnih okoliščin posameznega trgovca (vključno z začetkom dejavnosti za prodajo več znamk) in razmere na lokalnem trgu, vzdržali pa se bodo ocenjevanja uspešnosti trgovca znamke GM na podlagi primerjave med lokalnimi in nacionalnimi tržnimi deleži.
Such targets are subject to arbitration in the case of dispute. ird, the evolution of dealer performance in terms of local compared to national market shares of GM brands will not be used to sanction a dealer.
Za takšne cilje se ob morebitnem sporu uvede arbitraža. Tretjič, uspešnost trgovca, določena s primerjavo lokalnih in nacionalnih tržnih deležev znamk GM, se ne bo uporabljala kot podlaga za njegovo kaznovanje.
By contrast, the Commission did not find that BMW’s requirements that its dealers display a minimum of three to four cars (a number which is far from covering the entire BMW model range) could be regarded as an indirect non-compete obligation.
Po drugi strani pa se Komisiji zahteva BMW, da morajo njegovi trgovci postaviti na ogled najmanj tri do štiri avtomobile (število, ki še zdaleč ne pokriva celotne ponudbe modelov znamke BMW), ni zdela posredna protikonkurenčna obveznost.
Showrooms below a certain size may in certain cases simply not be suitable for displaying a representative range of cars by more than one brand, without additional investment.
V razstavnih prostorih, ki ne dosegajo določene velikosti, v nekaterih primerih brez dodatnih vlaganj preprosto ni mogoče postaviti na ogled reprezentativnega vzorca avtomobilov za več kot eno znamko.
As regards multi-brand servicing and access to authorised networks, BMW and GM have eliminated requirements from their contracts that had the eect of preventing newcomers from joining the authorised repairer networks and/or servicing cars of competing brands.
Kar zadeva servisiranje za več znamk in dostop do pooblaščenih mrež, sta BMW in GM odpravila zahteve v pogodbah, ki so preprečevale novim ponudnikom, da bi se pridružili pooblaščenim mrežam servisov in/ali servisirali avtomobile konkurenčnih znamk.
In addition to implementing the principles set out above at points 162–165, BMW and GM have removed all quantitative criteria (e.g. minimum turnover targets and minimum throughput capacity requirements) from their repairer contracts. e BMW contracts contained an incremental scale of minimum capacity requirements in terms of work bays, equipment, stock and warehouse capacity, based on local potential demand rather than on the actual work orders history of each repairer.
Poleg uresničitve načel, navedenih v odstavkih 162–165 zgoraj, sta BMW in GM odpravila vsa kvantitativna merila (npr. cilji minimalnega prometa in minimalne zahteve za zmožnost za obdelavo) v svojih pogodbah o servisiranju. Pogodbe BMW so vsebovale progresivno plačilno lestvico z minimalnimi zahtevami za zmožnosti v smislu delovnih predelkov, zalog in skladiščnih zmogljivosti, ki so temeljili bolj na lokalnih potencialnih potrebah kot na dejanskih naročilih za delo, ki jih je dobival posamezni serviser.
BMW now merely requires that each authorised repairer has at least three mechanical work bays
BMW zdaj zahteva samo, da ima vsak pooblaščeni serviser najmanj tri mehanične delovne predelke in ustrezno opremo za zagotavljanje kakovostnih storitev. Podobne popravke pogodb je uvedel GM.
Report on Competition Policy 2005 and corresponding equipment in order to ensure quality service.
Te spremembe bodo omogočile lokalnim tržnim silam, da določijo gostoto in kraj servisov, tako da bodo zadovoljene potrebe potrošnikov.
BMW and GM also both introduced an ‘opening clause’ to their servicing contracts which means that authorised repairers are free to source all equipment, tools and IT hardware and soware from other than the designated suppliers (provided that the alternative products are of equivalent functionality and quality).
BMW in GM sta v svoje pogodbe o servisiranju vnesla „klavzulo o odprtju“, kar pomeni, da lahko pooblaščeni serviserji uporabljajo vso opremo, orodje in programsko in strojno računalniško opremo vseh, in ne samo imenovanih dobaviteljev (če
Such generic tools, equipment and IT infrastructure can be used for servicing cars of dierent brands.
Takšna generična orodja, oprema in informacijska infrastruktura se lahko uporabljajo za servisiranje avtomobilov različnih znamk.
In order to remove potential obstacles to joint purchasing and stocking of spare parts, BMW and GM made clear that authorised repairers are free to organise buying groups and to jointly warehouse spare parts. ey agreed to abolish the requirement that each authorised repairer should have its own warehouse on-site, without prejudice to the requirement to keep stocks only of so-called ‘over-the-counter parts’ at their premises (e.g. brake pads, light bulbs, filters — frequently demanded by customers).
BMW in GM sta želela odstraniti morebitne ovire za skupno nabavo in zaloge rezervnih delov, zato sta pojasnila, da se pooblaščeni serviserji lahko prostovoljno združujejo v skupine dobaviteljev in skupaj skladiščijo rezervne dele. Dogovorila sta se za odpravo zahteve, da mora vsak pooblaščeni serviser imeti lastno skladišče na kraju opravljanja dejavnosti, brez poseganja v zahtevo, da mora imeti v svojih prostorih zalogo tako imenovanih „delov, ki se kupujejo pri okencih“ (npr. zavorne ploščice, žarnice za žaromete, filtre – to so deli, ki jih stranke pogosto iščejo).
In March and August, the Commission published reports on car price dier-entials within the EU based on November and May data respectively.
Komisija je marca in avgusta objavila poročili o razlikah v cenah avtomobilov znotraj EU, ki sta temeljili na podatkih iz novembra in maja.
During the year, price dispersion as measured by the average standard deviation of pre-tax prices between the 25 national markets continuously decreased to 6.3 % compared to 6.9 % in the August 2003 issue.
Med letom se je razpršenost cen, merjena s povprečnim standardnim odstopanjem cen pred odmero davka med 25 nacionalnimi trgi držav članic, stalno zniževala vse do 6,3 % v primerjavi s 6,9 % v izdaji avgusta 2003.
Compared with May 2004, car prices at May 2005 have increased by 0.4 % in the EU compared to 1.9 % for headline ination over the same period.
V primerjavi z majem 2004 so se cene avtomobilov maja 2005 v EU povečale za 0,4 % ob 1,9-odstotnem povečanju izmerjene inacije v enakem obdobju.
Member States with traditionally low pre-tax prices generally did not experience signicant increases in consumer prices for cars.
Države članice, kjer so cene pred odmero davka že tradicionalno nizke, niso občutile velikih povečanj v maloprodajnih cenah avtomobilov.
Prices increased somewhat in Denmark (+2.4 %) and Greece (+1.8 %), whereas they decreased in Finland (–2 %), Estonia (–8.3 %) and Poland (–7.6 %). is seems to indicate that car prices have not tended to converge upwards towards price levels in high-price countries.
Cene so se nekoliko zvišale na Danskem (+2,4 %) in v Grčiji (+1,8 %), medtem ko so se znižale na Finskem (–2 %), v Estoniji (–8,3 %) in na Poljskem (–7,6 %). To najbrž kaže, da cene avtomobilov niso rasle in se približevale ravni cen v državah z visokimi cenami.
A new directorate
Novi direktorat
I — Antitrust — Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC majority of cartel cases and takes a leading role, in close cooperation with the Directorate for Policy and Strategic Support, in developing policy in the area of cartel enforcement.
I – Protimonopolna zakonodaja – členi 81, 82 in 86 ES je zagotoviti učinkovito in zanesljivo vodenje obsežnih preiskav kartelov.
173. e Cartels Directorate employs some 60 sta, about 40 of whom are case handlers. e major task of the new Cartels Directorate is to ensure the ecient and sound handling of a large volume of cartel investigations.
Zadolžen je za racionalizacijo in pospešitev obravnave teh preiskav, ki so po naravi zapletene in dolgotrajne, tako da bi bilo uvedene preiskave mogoče dokončati v razumnem času.
Its task is to streamline and accelerate the handling of these investigations which by nature are complex and lengthy, so that the investigations started can be completed within a reasonable timeframe. e work of the Cartels Directorate will put the spotlight on the costs of cartels not only to final consumers but also on industrial customers.
Delo direktorata za kartele bo opozorilo na ceno kartelov, ki je ne plačujejo samo končni potrošniki, temveč tudi industrijske stranke.
Such cartels give rise to no benets for consumers or for the economy and have adverse eects on competitiveness and growth in the EU.
Takšni karteli ne prinašajo nobenih koristi niti potrošnikom niti gospodarstvu in slabo vplivajo na konkurenčnost in rast v EU.
In terms of case work regarding hardcore cartels, the leniency programme continued to give rise to a steady stream of cases being reported to the Commission.
Na področju dela glede kartelnih dogovorov program prizanesljivosti še naprej zagotavlja ustaljen pripad novih zadev na Komisijo.
However, only a limited number of those cases actually led to investigations being opened.
Vendar so se preiskave začele le pri omejenem številu teh primerov. Komisija je v letu 2005 dobila 17 prošenj za imuniteto in 11 prošenj za znižanje glob. V šestih primerih je bila dodeljena pogojna imuniteta.
In terms of final decisions, the Commission issued ve final decisions in which it fined 37 undertakings(92) a total of EUR 683 million (compared with 21 undertakings and a total of EUR 390 million in fines in 2004).
Kar zadeva končne odločbe, je Komisija izdala pet končnih odločb, s katerimi je 37 podjetjem(92) izrekla skupaj za 683 milijonov EUR glob (v primerjavi z 21 podjetji in skupaj 390 milijoni EUR glob v letu 2004).
Statements of objections were issued in eight cartel cases.
V osmih primerih kartelov so bila podana obvestila o nasprotovanju.
It is noted that three out of the ve cartel decisions adopted in 2005 were based on the 1996 leniency notice, but this ratio will of course change in the future: most of the statements of objections issued in 2005 resulted from applications led under the 2002 leniency notice(93).
Opozoriti je treba, da so tri od petih odločb o kartelih, sprejetih v letu 2005, temeljile na obvestilu o prizanesljivosti iz leta 1996, vendar se bo to razmerje v prihodnosti seveda spremenilo: večina izjav o ugovorih, izdanih v letu 2005, je posledica vlog, izpolnjenih v skladu z obvestilom o prizanesljivosti iz leta 2002(93).
Leniency remains a very important enforcement tool in cartel cases.
V primerih kartelov ostaja zelo pomembno orodje izvrševanja prizanesljivost.
Whilst the Commission’s first leniency notice of 1996 resulted in more than 80 applications in six years of operation, the leniency notice of 2002(94) has increased the number of applications (both for immunity and a reduction of fines) to 165 in less than four years (i.e. about three per month on average): 86 of these applications were for immunity and 79 for reduction of fines.
Komisija je na podlagi svojega obvestila o prizanesljivosti iz leta 1996 dobila več kot 80 vlog v šestih letih delovanja, medtem ko se je z obvestilom o prizanesljivosti iz leta 2002(94) število prošenj povečalo (tako za imuniteto kot za znižanje globe) na 164 v manj kot štirih letih (tj. povprečno tri na mesec): 86 je bilo prošenj za imuniteto in 79 za znižanje globe.
However, the high number of applications received does not reect the number of cartel investigations the Commission has opened since 2002.
Vendar pa visoko število prispelih prošenj ne odseva števila preiskav kartelov, ki jih je Komisija odprla od leta 2002.
In deciding which hard-
Takšni primeri pa so vseeno vključeni v zgornjo statistiko, saj je Komisija v teh primerih na začet-
Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ C 45, 19.2.2002).
To število ne vključuje prosilcev za imuniteto.Novo obvestilo se uporablja, če je Komisija dobila prošnjo za prizanesljivost po 19. februarju 2002.Obvestilo o imuniteti pred denarnimi kaznimi in o znižanju kazni v primerih kartelov (UL C 45, 19.2.2002).
Report on Competition Policy 2005 core cartels to target, the Commission, within the framework of the European Competition Network, focused its eorts on violations that have an impact in at least several Member States or in the EEA as a whole.
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2005 ku izdala pogojno odločbo o imuniteti.
Moreover, under the 2002 notice, immunity may be granted when an undertaking has provided sucient evidence for the Commission to launch inspections.
Po obvestilu iz leta 2002 pa se imuniteta lahko podeli, če je podjetje predložilo zadostne dokaze, da Komisija lahko začne preglede.
Such evidence may not be sucient to actually prove the infringement and complementary fact-nding is necessary most oen than not.
Takšni dokazi so mogoče nezadostni, da bi dejansko dokazali kršitev, zato se največkrat zahteva še dodatno ugotavljanje dejanskega stanja.
Five immunity applications were formally rejected as the information provided to the Commission neither allowed it to carry out surprise inspections nor to find an infringement under Article 81 EC. (e undertakings concerned chose, however, not to withdraw the evidence provided, but asked the Commission to consider the information for a reduction of a ne instead, should the Commission nevertheless impose a ne in the future in relation to the alleged violation.)
Pet prošenj za imuniteto je bilo formalno zavrnjenih, ker Komisija na njihovi podlagi ni mogla niti izvesti nenapovedanih pregledov niti ugotoviti kršitve v skladu s členom 81 ES. (Vendar pa so se zadevna podjetja odločila, da zagotovljenih dokazov ne bodo umaknila, temveč so prosila Komisijo, naj namesto tega pretehta informacije za morebitno znižanje globe, če bi v prihodnosti kljub temu izrekla globo za domnevne kršitve.)
Finally, the Commission informed an undertaking to which it had granted conditional immunity that its status would not be conrmed in the final cartel decision. e undertaking had breached its duty of cooperation by disclosing to other competitors that it had applied for immunity before inspections were carried out by the Commission.
Poleg tega je Komisija obvestila podjetje, ki mu je podelila pogojno imuniteto, da v končni odločbi o kartelu njegovega statusa ne bo potrdila. Podjetje je drugim tekmecem razkrilo, da je zaprosilo za imuniteto, preden je Komisija izvedla inšpekcijske preglede, in je s tem prekršilo svojo dolžnost sodelovanja.