natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In so far as L & D further seeks to cast doubt on the accuracy of that finding by the Court of First Instance, it must be pointed out that it is an assessment of a factual nature not subject to review by the Court. 61
Če je družba L & D želela podvomiti tudi o natančnosti navedene ugotovitve Sodi�ča prve stopnje, je treba ugotoviti, da gre pri tej za presojo dejstev, nad katero Sodi�če ne opravlja nadzora. 61
(iii) The existence of absolute grounds for refusal of mark No 91 991
iii) Obstoj absolutnih razlogov za zavrnitev znamke �t. 91.991
The third complaint raised by L & D is directed against paragraph 105 of the judgment under appeal, in which the Court of First Instance rejected its arguments seeking to show that mark No 91 991 had, at the most, only a very weak distinctive character owing to the fact that, first, it was made up only of the shape of the product which is marketed under that mark and, secondly, the shape of the earlier mark, namely the silhouette of a fir tree, was necessary to obtain the technical result sought by the product. 63
Tretji očitek družbe L & D se nana�a na točko 105 izpodbijane sodbe, s katero je Sodi�če prve stopnje zavrnilo njene trditve o tem, da je imela znamka �t. 91.991 kvečjemu zelo majhen razlikovalni učinek, prvič zato, ker je bila sestavljena le iz oblike proizvoda, ki se trži pod to znamko, in drugič zato, ker je bila oblika prej�nje znamke, torej obris jelke, potrebna za pridobitev tehničnega učinka, ki se ga želi doseči s proizvodom. 63
L & D submits that the Court of First Instance erred in rejecting those arguments without examining them, holding that ‘the [appellant] cannot, in any event, in opposition proceedings, rely on an absolute ground for refusal precluding valid registration of a sign by a national office or by OHIM’. 64
Družba L & D zatrjuje, da Sodi�če prve stopnje ni pravilno ravnalo, ko je te trditve zavrnilo brez kakr�ne koli presoje in presodilo, da „se tožeča stranka v nobenem primeru ne more v okviru postopka z ugovorom sklicevati na absolutni razlog za zavrnitev, ki preprečuje, da bi nacionalni urad ali UUNT veljavno registrirala znak“. 64
In that regard, it must be pointed out that the two arguments put forward by L & D before the Court of First Instance, which, from the evidence available in the file, do not appear moreover to have been raised before the OHIM bodies, sought not to call into question the validity of mark No 91 991, but to demonstrate the initially very weak distinctive character of that mark. I - 5777
Glede tega je treba povedati, da se s trditvama, ki ju je družba L & D navedla pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje, glede katerih iz spisa ne izhaja, da ju je uveljavljala pred organi UUNT, ne želi ovreči veljavnost znamke �t. 91.991, ampak dokazati zelo majhen razlikovalni učinek, ki ga ima ta znamka. I - 5777
However, an earlier mark can have a particularly distinctive character not only per se, but also because of the reputation it enjoys with the public (see C-251/95 SABEL [1997] ECR I-6191, paragraph 24).
Prej�nja znamka ima poseben razlikovalni učinek lahko kot taka ali zaradi prepoznavnosti v javnosti (glej sodbo z dne 11. novembra 1997 v zadevi SABEL, C-251/95, Recueil, str. I-6191, točka 24).
In paragraphs 78 to 88 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance established that mark No 91 991 has acquired a particularly distinctive character in Italy because of its wellknown nature in that Member State, which stems in par -ticular from its prolonged use as part of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark and the wellknown nature of that latter mark in Italy.
V točkah od 78 do 88 izpodbijane sodbe je Sodi�če prve stopnje ugotovilo, da je znamka �t. 91.991 poseben razlikovalni učinek pridobila zaradi prepoznavnosti v tej državi članici, ki je zlasti posledica njene dolgotrajne uporabe kot dela znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE in prepoznavnosti te znamke na tem ozemlju.
In those circumstances, even if L & D could rely on the argument that mark No 91 991 possesses merely a very weak inherent distinctive character, since it consists of the shape of the product which is sold under that mark and that shape is necessary to obtain the desired technical result, the fact remains that such an argument, even if it were well founded, could not, in any event, cast doubt on the finding made by the Court of First Instance that that mark has acquired a particularly distinctive character in Italy because it is well known in that Member State. 68
Tudi če predpostavljamo, da je družba L & D lahko uveljavljala trditev, da ima znamka �t. 91.991 kot taka le majhen razlikovalni učinek, ker je sestavljena iz oblike proizvoda, ki se trži pod to znamko, in je ta oblika potrebna za pridobitev želenega tehničnega učinka, je treba ugotoviti, da taka trditev, tudi če bi bila utemeljena, v teh okoli�činah nikakor ne more omajati ugotovitve Sodi�ča prve stopnje, da je ta znamka dobila poseben razlikovalni učinek v Italiji zaradi prepoznavnosti v tej državi članici. 68
It follows from the foregoing that this complaint is ineffective and must be rejected.
Iz zgoraj navedenega izhaja, da je ta očitek brezpredmeten in ga je treba zavrniti.
By its fourth complaint, L & D criticises the Court of First Instance for having accepted that the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark had a particularly distinctive character, as did therefore mark No 91 991, on the basis of the evidence in the contested decision. I - 5778
Družba L & D s četrtim očitkom Sodi�ču prve stopnje očita, da je priznalo, da je odbor za pritožbe na podlagi dokazov iz sporne odločbe utemeljeno ugotovil poseben razlikovalni učinek znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE in posledično znamke �t. 91.991. I - 5778
First, the Court of First Instance did not err in law in holding that the Board of Appeal was able to rely on data concerning a period subsequent to the application for registration of the Aire Limpio mark.
Prvič, glede tega je treba ugotoviti, da Sodi�če prve stopnje ni napačno uporabilo prava, s tem da je �telo, da se je lahko odbor za pritožbe oprl na podatke, ki se nana�ajo na obdobje po tem, ko je bila vložena prijava za registracijo znamke Aire Limpio.
In fact, as the Court of First Instance correctly recalled in paragraph 81 of the judgment under appeal, the caselaw of the Court of Justice shows that account may be taken of evidence which, although subsequent to the date of filing the application, enables the drawing of conclusions on the situation as it was on that date (see order in Case C-192/03 P Alcon v OHIM [2004] ECR I-8993, paragraph 41).
Kot je namreč Sodi�če prve stopnje pravilno opozorilo v točki 81 izpodbijane sodbe, iz sodne prakse Sodi�ča izhaja, da je mogoče upo�tevati dokaze, ki, čeprav segajo v čas po datumu vložitve prijave, omogočajo sklepanje o položaju, kakr�en je bil na ta datum (glej sklep z dne 5. oktobra 2004 v zadevi Alcon proti UUNT, C-192/03 P, ZOdl., str. I-8993, točka 41).
As a result, the Court of First Instance was fully justified in holding, in paragraphs 82 to 84 of the judgment under appeal, that the fact that the data in question relate to a period subsequent to the date of filing the application for registration of the Aire Limpio mark is not sufficient to deprive those data of their evidential force as regards the finding that mark No 91 991 is well known, since they enable conclusions to be drawn on the situation as it was on the date when that application for registration was filed.
Posledično je Sodi�če prve stopnje v točkah od 82 do 84 izpodbijane sodbe pravilno presodilo, da okoli�čina, da se zadevni podatki nana�ajo na obdobje po vložitvi prijave za registracijo znamke Aire Limpio, ne zadostuje, da bi se tem podatkom odvzela dokazna moč v okviru ugotavljanja prepoznavnosti znamke �t. 91.991, ker omogočajo sklepanje o položaju, kakr�en je bil ob vložitvi zadevne prijave za registracijo.
In that regard, the Court of First Instance specifically explained, in a clear and coherent manner, that, in particular, a market share of 50% in 1997 and 1998 can have been acquired only progressively, which suggests that the situation was not appreciably different in 1996.
Glede tega je Sodi�če prve stopnje med drugim jasno in dosledno pojasnilo predvsem to, da je bil 50-odstotni tržni delež v letih 1997 in 1998 lahko dosežen samo postopoma, kar naj bi omogočilo sklepanje, da položaj leta 1996 ni bil občutno drugačen.
Secondly, it is necessary to dismiss L & D’s contentions against paragraph 85 of the judgment under appeal, in which the Court rejected the appellant’s argument seeking to show that the Board of Appeal was wrong to find that the earlier mark had a particularly distinctive character in Italy by relying solely on general indications regarding the sales figures and volume of advertising. I - 5779
Drugič, zavrniti je treba trditve družbe L & D v zvezi s točko 85 izpodbijane sodbe, s katero je Sodi�če prve stopnje zavrnilo trditev pritožnice glede tega, da je odbor za pritožbe nepravilno ugotovil poseben razlikovalni učinek prej�nje znamke v Italiji, pri čemer se je oprl le na splo�ne podatke glede prometa in obsega ogla�evanja. I - 5779
In fact, as the Court of First Instance correctly found, the Board of Appeal, in order to establish whether the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark was well known, took into account not only indications concerning the sales figures and volume of advertising, but also the prolonged use of that trade mark.
Kot je namreč pravilno ugotovilo Sodi�če prve stopnje, odbor za pritožbe pri ugotavljanju prepoznavnosti znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE ni upo�teval le podatkov glede prometa in obsega ogla�evanja, ampak tudi dolgotrajno uporabo te znamke.
Since that finding in itself justifies the conclusion reached by the Court of First Instance in paragraph 85 of the judgment under appeal, the Court finds that the second ground given in that paragraph, according to which the caselaw relied on by L & D concerns the acquisition of the distinctive character of a mark which is the subject of an application for registration and not the assessment of whether a registered mark is well known, was included merely for the sake of completeness. 77
Ker ta ugotovitev sama po sebi upravičuje sklepanje Sodi�ča prve stopnje v točki 85 izpodbijane sodbe, je treba ugotoviti, da je drugi razlog, ki je naveden v tej točki, namreč da se sodna praksa, ki jo navaja družba L & D, nana�a na pridobitev razlikovalnega učinka znamke, ki se jo prijavi za registracijo, in ne na presojo prepoznavnosti registrirane znamke, podreden. 77
Accordingly, any defects in that ground are not sufficient to cast doubt on the conclusion of the Court of First Instance, so that L & D’s argument seeking to establish such defects is ineffective. 78
V teh okoli�činah napake, ki bi jih lahko imel ta razlog, ne morejo zadostovati za ovrženje navedenega sklepanja Sodi�ča prve stopnje, tako da je trditev družbe L & D, katere namen je ugotovitev teh napak, brezpredmetna. 78
Thirdly, concerning the argument put forward by L & D that the Court of First Instance, in paragraph 86 of the judgment under appeal, wrongly took as a basis the prolonged use of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark by placing the date of registration of that mark on the same footing as its actual use, that assertion is not correct in fact. Contrary to what the appellant submits, the Court, in order to establish the prolonged use of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark, referred not to its date of registration, but to the fact that that use is established in Italy and, indeed, not disputed by L & D. In addition, since it was not claimed that those findings of the Court of First Instance distorted the facts in any way, the Court’s assessment of the facts cannot be checked by the Court of Justice on appeal. 79
Tretjič, glede trditve družbe L & D, da se je Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 86 izpodbijane sodbe nepravilno oprlo na dolgotrajno uporabo znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE, ko je datum registracije te znamke izenačilo z njeno dejansko uporabo, je treba ugotoviti, da je ta trditev brez dejanske podlage. V nasprotju s tem, kar trdi pritožnica, se Sodi�če prve stopnje za ugotovitev dolgotrajne uporabe znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE ni sklicevalo na datum njene registracije, ampak na dejstvo, da je �lo za uporabo v Italiji, in tudi to, da družba L & D tej uporabi ni ugovarjala. Poleg tega Sodi�če v okviru pritožbe ne more preverjati presoje dejstev, ki jo je opravilo Sodi�če prve stopnje, saj se glede ugotovitev tega sodi�ča ni očitalo nobenega izkrivljanja. 79
Finally, in so far as L & D further disputes the evidential value of the data relating to sales and advertising on the grounds that they relate to the ‘ARBRE MAGIQUE’ name and the present case concerns low-cost goods in everyday use, it need only be pointed out that the assessment by the Court of First Instance of the evidence produced before it does not constitute, unless that evidence has been distorted, an I - 5780
Končno, ker družba L & D dokazni moči podatkov glede prodaje in ogla�evanja �e naprej ugovarja, ker se nana�ajo na ime „ARBRE MAGIQUE“ in ker gre v tem primeru za poceni proizvode za vsakdanjo uporabo, zado�ča opozoriti, da presoja, ki jo opravi Sodi�če prve stopnje glede dokazov, ki so mu bili predloženi, razen ob njihovem izkrivljanju, ni pravno vpra�anje, ki je predmet nadzora Sodi�ča (glej I - 5780
L & D v OHIM issue of law subject to review by the Court (see judgment of 17 April 2008 in Case C-108/07 P Ferrero Deutschland v OHIM, paragraph 30). 80
L & D PROTI UUNT sodbo z dne 17. aprila 2008 v zadevi Ferrero Deutschland proti UUNT, C-108/07 P, točka 30). 80
Since the arguments raised by L & D in support of this complaint are ineffective, inadmissible or unfounded, it must be rejected. 81
Ker so trditve družbe L & D v podporo tega očitka brezpredmetne, nedopustne ali neutemeljene, je treba ta očitek zavrniti. 81
Accordingly, the first branch of the first plea must be rejected.
V teh okoli�činah je treba prvi del prvega pritožbenega razloga delno zavreči in delno zavrniti.
(b) The second branch of the first plea
b) Drugi del prvega pritožbenega razloga
By this second branch, L & D challenges the analysis made by the Court of First Instance in paragraphs 91 to 96 of the judgment under appeal of the similarities between mark No 91 991 and the Aire Limpio mark. The appellant submits, inter alia, that the Court was wrong in holding that the graphic element of the Aire Limpio mark has a clearly dominant character in the overall impression, which noticeably prevails over the word element. 83
V drugem delu družba L & D izpodbija analizo podobnosti med znamko �t. 91.991 in znamko Aire Limpio, ki jo je opravilo Sodi�če prve stopnje v točkah od 91 do 96 izpodbijane sodbe. Pritožnica med drugim zatrjuje, da Sodi�če prve stopnje ni pravilno �telo, da je grafični element znamke Aire Limpio očitno prevladujoč v celotnem vtisu, ki znatno prevlada nad besednim elementom. 83
However, the fact remains that the Court of First Instance made in that context an assessment of the facts which, unless the appellant claims those facts were distorted, cannot be reviewed by the Court of Justice on appeal.
Vendar je treba ugotoviti, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje glede tega presojalo dejstva, česar Sodi�če v okviru pritožbe ne more nadzirati, saj pritožnica ni zatrjevala izkrivljanja teh dejstev.
Furthermore, it must be added that, contrary to what L & D maintains, there is no rule to the effect that the name used in a trade mark must be regarded as distinctive and fanciful where it is devoid of any specific meaning. Moreover, as observed in paragraph 55 above, nor does the Court’s caselaw show that the word element of I - 5781
Poleg tega je treba dodati, da v nasprotju s tem, kar trdi družba L & D, ni nobenega pravila, da je treba del znamke, v katerem je ime, �teti za razlikovalnega in domi�ljijskega, če nima posebnega pomena. Poleg tega, kot je bilo ugotovljeno v točki 55 I - 5781
2008 — CASE C-488/06 P a complex mark is systematically dominant in the overall impression given by that mark.
2008 – ZADEVA C-488/06 P te sodbe, iz sodne prakse Sodi�ča tudi ne izhaja, da je besedni element sestavljene znamke sistematično prevladujoč v celotnem vtisu te znamke.
It follows from the foregoing that the second branch of the first plea is inadmissible.
Iz zgoraj navedenega izhaja, da je drugi del prvega pritožbenega razloga nedopusten.
(c) The third branch of the first plea
c) Tretji del prvega pritožbenega razloga
By this third branch, L & D maintains that the Court of First Instance erred in law in concluding that there was a likelihood of confusion without taking into consideration the weak distinctive character of mark No 91 991 and the differences between the marks in question. 87
V tem tretjem delu družba L & D trdi, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje s tem, da je ugotovilo obstoj verjetnosti zmede, ne da bi upo�tevalo majhen razlikovalni učinek znamke �t. 91.991 in razlike med zadevnimi znamkami, napačno uporabilo pravo. 87
However, as has already been held, the Court of First Instance did not err in law in finding that mark No 91 991 possesses a particularly distinctive character and that that mark and the Aire Limpio mark have visual and conceptual similarities.
Kot pa je že bilo ugotovljeno, Sodi�če prve stopnje, s tem da je �telo, da ima znamka �t. 91.991 poseben razlikovalni učinek in da sta si ta znamka in znamka Aire Limpio vidno in pojmovno podobni, ni napačno uporabilo prava.
Accordingly, the third branch of the first plea must be rejected.
V teh okoli�činah je treba tretji del prvega pritožbenega razloga zavrniti.
Since none of the three branches of the first plea, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94, has been accepted, that plea must be rejected.
Ker ni bil sprejet nobeden od delov prvega pritožbenega razloga, ki se nana�a na kr�itev člena 8(1)(b) Uredbe �t. 40/94, je ta pritožbeni razlog treba delno zavreči in delno zavrniti.
The second plea, alleging infringement of Article 73 of Regulation No 40/94
Drugi pritožbeni razlog: kr�itev člena 73 Uredbe �t. 40/94
By its second plea, L & D submits that the Court of First Instance infringed Article 73 of Regulation No 40/94 by taking as its basis evidence which concerned not mark No 91 991 but the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark. The appellant claims that it was not able sufficiently to defend itself against that evidence since the Opposition Division and the Board of Appeal discounted the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark from the comparative examination to determine whether there was a likelihood of confusion. 91
V drugem pritožbenem razlogu družba L & D zatrjuje, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje kr�ilo člen 73 Uredbe �t. 40/94, ker se je oprlo na dokaze, ki se ne nana�ajo na znamko �t. 91.991, ampak na znamko ARBRE MAGIQUE. Pritožnica trdi, da ni imel dovolj možnosti za obrambo v zvezi s temi dokazi, ker sta oddelek za ugovore in odbor za pritožbe znamko ARBRE MAGIQUE izključila iz primerjalne analize za ugotovitev obstoja verjetnosti zmede. 91
It should first of all be recalled that Article 73 provides that decisions of OHIM are to state the reasons on which they are based and are to be based only on reasons or evidence on which the parties concerned have had on opportunity to present their comments.
Glede tega je treba najprej opozoriti, da mora UUNT v skladu z navedeno določbo v odločbah navesti razloge, na katerih odločbe temeljijo, pri čemer lahko te temeljijo le na razlogih, na katere so imele zadevne stranke priložnost podati pripombe.
In the present case, it is common ground that the Court of First Instance referred to the same evidence as that already relied on by the Board of Appeal to establish that mark No 91 991 is well known.
V tem primeru je nesporno, da se je Sodi�če prve stopnje sklicevalo na iste dokaze, na katere se je oprl že odbor za pritožbe, ko je ugotavljal prepoznavnost znamke �t. 91.991.
Although the contested decision does not specifically mention the mark to which that evidence relates, the fact none the less remains that L & D itself complains in its application before the Court of First Instance that the figures relating to sales and advertising costs used by the Board of Appeal do not concern mark No 91 991, but concern primarily goods bearing the ‘ARBRE MAGIQUE’ name. 94
Čeprav je res, da v sporni odločbi ni izrecno navedena znamka, na katero se ti dokazi nana�ajo, je vendar treba ugotoviti, da je družba L & D pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje sama navedla, da se podatki glede prometa in izdatkov za ogla�evanje, ki jih je upo�teval odbor za pritožbe, niso nana�ali na znamko �t. 91.991, ampak v glavnem na proizvode z imenom „ARBRE MAGIQUE“. 94
In addition, Sämann’s opposition was also based on the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark and that party had already submitted the evidence in question at the stage of the proceedings before the Opposition Division.
Poleg tega je treba ugotoviti, da je ugovor družbe Sämann temeljil tudi na znamki ARBRE MAGIQUE in da je ta družba zadevne dokaze predložila že med postopkom pred oddelkom za ugovore.
Accordingly, L & D cannot profitably claim not to have had an opportunity to present its comments on the evidence taken into consideration by the Court of First Instance and the Board of Appeal. 96
V teh okoli�činah družba L & D ne more utemeljeno trditi, da ni imela priložnosti podati pripomb o dokazih, ki sta jih upo�tevala Sodi�če prve stopnje in odbor za pritožbe. 96
Therefore, it is necessary to reject the second plea and, consequently, to dismiss L & D’s appeal. VI — Costs
Zato je treba drugi pritožbeni razlog zavrniti in torej zavrniti pritožbo družbe L & D. VI – Stroški
According to the first paragraph of Article 122 of the Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to costs.
Člen 122, prvi odstavek, Poslovnika, določa, da če pritožba ni utemeljena, Sodi�če odloči o stro�kih.
Under Article 69(2) of those Rules, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to Article 118 thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
V skladu s členom 69(2) tega poslovnika, ki se na podlagi člena 118 tega poslovnika uporablja za pritožbeni postopek, se neuspeli stranki naloži plačilo stro�kov, če so bili ti prigla�eni.
As OHIM has applied for costs against L & D and the latter has been unsuccessful, L & D must be ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings. On those grounds, the Court (Second Chamber) hereby:
Ker je UUNT predlagal, naj se stro�ke naloži družbi L & D, in ker ta s pritožbenimi razlogi ni uspela, se ji naloži plačilo stro�kov te pritožbe. Iz teh razlogov je Sodi�če (drugi senat) razsodilo:
Orders L & D SA to pay the costs. [Signatures]
Družbi L & D se naloži plačilo stroškov. Podpisi
Case C-500/06
Zadeva C-500/06
(Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Giudice di pace di Genova)
(Predlog za sprejetje predhodne odločbe, ki ga je vložilo Giudice di pace di Genova)
(Articles 3(1)(g) EC, 4 EC, 10 EC, 43 EC, 49 EC, 81 EC, 86 EC and 98 EC — National legislation prohibiting advertisements for medical or surgical treatments of a cosmetic nature)
„Členi 3(1)(g) ES, 4 ES, 10 ES, 43 ES, 49 ES, 81 ES, 86 ES in 98 ES – Nacionalna zakonodaja, ki prepoveduje ogla�evanje zdravstveno-kirur�kih storitev na področju lepotnih posegov“
Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 17 July 2008 . . . . . . . . . . .
Bota, predstavljeni 31. januarja 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Preliminary rulings — Admissibility — Limits — Clearly irrelevant questions and hypothetical questions put in a context not permitting a useful answer
Vprašanja za predhodno odločanje – Dopustnost – Meje – Vprašanja, ki so očitno neupoštevna, in hipotetična vprašanja, zastavljena v kontekstu, v katerem ni mogoče dati koristnega odgovora
(Arts 43 EC, 48 EC, 49 EC and 55 EC; Council Directive 89/552, Arts 3(1) and 14(1))
Prosto gibanje oseb – Svoboda ustanavljanja – Svoboda opravljanja storitev (členi 43 ES, 48 ES, 49 ES in 55 ES; Direktiva Sveta 89/552, člena 3(1) in 14(1))
SUMMARY — CASE C-500/06
POVZETEK – ZADEVA C-500/06