natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It was none the less a necessary precondition that those national remedies gave effective protection to the individuals concerned and that they were capable of leading to compensation for the damage alleged.
Poleg tega so morala nacionalna pravna sredstva zato na učinkovit način zagotoviti varstvo pravic zadevnih oseb in so morala biti sposobna povrniti zatrjevano �kodo.
In particular, the admissibility of an action for damages based on Article 235 EC could not be subject to the prior exhaustion of national remedies where, even if the disputed Community rules were declared invalid by a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice, the national courts could not allow an action for payment — or any other appropriate action — without the prior intervention of the Community legislature, owing to the lack of a Community provision authorising the competent national agencies to pay the amounts sought.
Zlasti dopustnost od�kodninske tožbe, ki temelji na členu 235 ES, ne bi mogla biti podrejena izčrpanju nacionalnih pravnih sredstev, kadar, ob predpostavki, da je bil zadevni predpis Skupnosti razgla�en za neveljaven s sodbo Sodi�ča, nacionalna sodi�ča ne morejo ugoditi tožbi zaradi plačila ali kateri koli drugi primerni tožbi brez predhodne intervencije zakonodajalca Skupnosti zaradi neobstoja določbe Skupnosti, ki dovoljuje pristojnim nacionalnim organom, da izplačajo zahtevane vsote.
In those circumstances, the exercise of rights by individuals who considered they had been harmed was rendered excessively difficult before the national courts.
V teh primerih je bilo namreč izvr�evanje pravic oseb, ki so menile, da so bile o�kodovane, pred nacionalnimi sodi�či pretirano oteženo.
It would therefore not be in keeping with either the proper administration of justice and the requirements of procedural efficiency or the condition relating to the absence of an effective domestic remedy to compel the individuals concerned to exhaust national legal remedies and to wait until a final decision was made on their claim, after the Community institutions concerned had, if necessary, amended or supplemented the relevant Community provisions in compliance with a prelimin-
Zato ne bi bilo v nasprotju samo z dobrim delovanjem sodnega varstva ali ekonomičnostjo postopka, temveč tudi s pogojem, ki se nana�a na neobstoj učinkovitega notranjega pravnega varstva, zahtevati, da zainteresirane osebe izčrpajo nacionalna pravna sredstva in da se čaka na to, da je bilo o njihovi zahtevi pravnomočno odločeno, potem ko so, odvisno od primera, zadevne institucije Skupnosti spremenile ali dopolnile določbe Skupnosti, ki so se uporabljale, zaradi izvr�itve sodbe, ki jo je Sodi�če izdalo v postopku predhodnega odločanja,
Third, the Commission had argued that the claims for compensation were in any event timebarred under Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, applicable to the proceedings before the Court of First Instance under Article 53 of that Statute.
Tretjič je Komisija trdila, da so od�kodninski zahtevki zastarali na podlagi člena 46 Statuta Sodi�ča, ki se uporablja za postopek pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje na podlagi člena 53 istega statuta.
Article 46 provides that proceedings in matters arising from noncontractual liability are barred after a period of five years from the event giving rise thereto.
Člen 46 določa, da tožbe zaradi nepogodbene odgovornosti zastarajo v petih letih od nastanka kr�itve.
That limitation period began to run from the time the applicants became aware of the event giving rise to the damage.
Zastaralni rok je začel teči z dnem, na kateri so bile tožeče stranke seznanjene z dejstvom, zaradi katerega je nastala �koda.
In the present case, whether that event was the incorrect application of the Community regulations or the unlawfulness of those regulations, the applicants became aware of it at the latest at the time of such application (i.e., in June 1983).
V konkretni zadevi bi se tožeče stranke s tem seznanile, ne glede na to, ali gre za napačno uporabo predpisa Skupnosti ali za njegovo nezakonitost, najkasneje takrat, ko je bil uporabljen ta predpis (to je junija 1983).
Neither the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Rome of 27 January 1989 nor the subsequent judgments of the Corte d’appello in Rome or the Corte di Cassazione could have interrupted that limitation period.
Niti sodba Tribunale civile iz Roma z dne 27. januarja 1989 niti kasnej�e sodbe pritožbenega sodi�ča v Rimu in italijanskega kasacijskega sodi�ča niso mogle prekiniti tega zastaranja.
In the present case, contrary to the Commission’s assertion, the applicants did not enjoy any effective judicial protection before the national courts.
V tej zadevi tožeče stranke, v nasprotju s trditvijo Komisije, nimajo učinkovitega sodnega varstva pred nacionalnim sodi�čem.
Without prejudice to the possible merits of the applicants’ claims, in the legal context of the present case a national court was not in any event authorised to order AIMA to pay the applicants the Community aid in question unless Regulation No 2499/82 was rectified retrospectively.
Ne da bi to vplivalo na presojo morebitne utemeljenosti navedb tožečih strank, v pravnem pomenu tega postopka nacionalno sodi�če v nobenem primeru ni imelo pooblastila, da AIMA naloži, naj tožečim strankam izplača znesek zadevnih pomoči Skupnosti, razen če bi se Uredba �t. 2499/82 retroaktivno spremenila.
As the Court of First Instance had already held, 22that would require the Commission to adopt a regulation.
Kot je Sodi�če prve stopnje že navedlo, 22bi bilo v tem primeru nujno, da bi Komisija sprejela uredbo.
Even if the Court of Justice were to find, in the context of a preliminary ruling, that some of the provisions of Regulation No 2499/82 were invalid, only intervention by the Community legislature (as the Commission pointed out in its defence) would make it possible to adopt a legal basis authorising such payment. 23
Tudi če bi Sodi�če v takem primeru v sodbi, izdani na podlagi postopka za sprejetje predhodne odločbe, ugotovilo nezakonitost nekaterih določb Uredbe �t. 2499/82, bi lahko le intervencija zakonodajalca Skupnosti (kar je Komisija med drugim izpostavila v odgovoru na tožbo) omogočila sprejetje pravne podlage, ki bi dovolila tako plačilo. 23
The Court of First Instance dismissed that argument.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je zavrnilo to trditev.
It ruled that the Commission was required to make good the damage sustained by the applicants following the insolvency of DAI, as a result of the absence of a procedure that would guarantee, under the system introduced by Article 9 of Regulation No 2499/82, payment to the producers concerned of the Community aid provided for in that regulation.
Odločilo je, da je bila Komisija dolžna popraviti �kodo, ki so jo tožeče stranke utrpele zaradi plačilne nesposobnosti DAI, ker ni bil izpeljan postopek, ki bi na podlagi sistema, ki ga uvaja člen 9 Uredbe �t. 2488/82, zadevnim proizvajalcem zagotovil plačilo pomoči Skupnosti, ki jo predvideva ta uredba.
The Court of First Instance accordingly concluded that the plea alleging that effective domestic remedies existed must be rejected.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je v skladu z navedenim sklenilo, da se mora ugovor, da obstajajo učinkovita nacionalna pravna sredstva, zavrniti.
24Again, the Commission has not challenged that ruling in the present appeal.
24 Komisija v pritožbi tudi ni izpodbijala te odločitve.
21 — Paragraphs 115 to 117.22 — See paragraph 77 of the judgment.23 — Paragraph 118.24 — Paragraph 120.
21 – Točke od 115 do 117.22 – Glej točko 77 sodbe.23 – Točka 118.24 – Točka 120.
More particularly, the Court of First Instance found that the period of limitation began to run when the damage resulting from the total or partial absence of payment of Community aid was suffered for certain by the applicants.
Natančneje, Sodi�če prve stopnje je ugotovilo, da je zastaralni rok začel teči, ko so tožeče stranke nedvomno utrpele �kodo zaradi delnega ali popolnega neizplačila pomoči Skupnosti.
DAI should have paid them the minimum buyingin price by the end of
DAI bi jim morala v skladu s členom 9(1) Uredbe �t. 2499/82
COMMISSION v CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA AND OTHERS
KOMISIJA PROTI CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA IN DRUGI ni bilo pravne podlage, ki bi dovolila plačilo pomoči proizvajalcem.
June 1983 in accordance with Article 9(1) of Regulation No 2499/82.
27 izplačati minimalno nakupno ceno za vino najkasneje do konca junija 1983.
In the specific circumstances of the present case, however, the damage suffered by the applicants at the end of June 1983 due to the absence of payment could not be considered to be certain, that is to say imminent and foreseeable, from that date on. 25
V posebnih okoli�činah tega spora pa �kode, ki so jo tožeče stranke utrpele zaradi neizplačila ob koncu junija 1983, ni bilo mogoče �teti za gotovo, to je, da je bila od tega datuma neizbežna in predvidljiva. 25
The Court of First Instance then reviewed what it took to be the salient facts.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je nato pregledalo dejstva, ki jih je �telo za izstopajoča. 26
26 It took the view that, in order to assess whether damage was ‘certain’, it was necessary to take into consideration the national proceedings between DAI and AIMA (in which the applicants had intervened) concerning the fate of the security.
Zavzelo je stali�če, da je bilo treba za presojo „nedvomne“ narave �kode upo�tevati nacionalne postopke med DAI in AIMA (v katerih so bile tožeče stranke intervenienti), ki so se nana�ali na usodo var�čine.
It concluded that, in the exceptional circumstances of the present case, it was extremely difficult for a prudent and wellinformed economic operator to be aware that he could not obtain payment of the aid concerned before a national court and that national remedies would, therefore, be ineffective.
Sklenilo je, da je bilo v izjemnih okoli�činah te zadeve izredno težko, da bi se skrben in dobro obve�čen gospodarski subjekt zavedal tega, da ne bo mogel doseči izplačila zadevnih pomoči pred nacionalnim sodi�čem, ter da zato nacionalna pravna sredstva ne bi bila učinkovita.
The absence of a procedure guaranteeing, under the system introduced by Article 9 of Regulation No 2499/82, payment of the Community aid to the producers concerned, in particular in the event of the insolvency of the distiller, was also in the Court of First Instance’s view incompatible with one of the essential purposes of preventive distillation.
Izmenjava dopisov med tožečimi strankami in AIMO na eni ter Komisijo na drugi strani in postopki, začeti pred italijanskimi sodi�či, kažejo, da so tožeče stranke zavrnitev AIMA, da jim izplača zadevno pomoč, na začetku jasno pripisovale nepravilni razlagi Uredbe �t. 2499/82.
In addition, under the 11th recital in the preamble to Regulation No 2499/82, provision needed to be made for the minimum price guaranteed to producers to be paid to them, as a general rule, within a period which would enable them to obtain a profit comparable to that which they would have obtained from a commercial sale.
2499/82, tako da niso mogle dobiti povračila te �kode pred nacionalnim sodi�čem, ker
The exchange of correspondence between the applicants and AIMA on the one hand and the Commission on the other, and the proceedings brought before the Italian courts, showed that the applicants clearly initially attributed AIMA’s refusal to pay them the aid concerned to the incorrect application of Regulation No 2499/82.
Neobstoj mehanizma, ki v okviru sistema, ki ga uvaja člen 9 Uredbe �t. 2499/82, zagotavlja izplačilo pomoči Skupnosti zadevnim proizvajalcem, predvsem pri plačilni nesposobnosti destilaterja, po mnenju Sodi�ča prve stopnje ni bil združljiv z enim od bistvenih namenov preventivne destilacije.
It was reasonable for the parties concerned to be unaware that the origin of the damage they suffered lay in a lacuna in Regulation
2499/82 določiti, da se po splo�nem pravilu minimalna cena, zagotovljena proizvajalcem, izplača v rokih, ki jim omogočajo pridobiti primerljiv dohodek s tistim, ki bi ga pridobili, če bi �lo za tržno prodajo.
25 — Paragraphs 131 to 133.26 — Paragraphs 134 and 135; see points 18 and 24 above.
25 – Točke od 131 do 133.26 – Točki 134 in 135, glej tudi zgoraj navedeni točki 18 in 24.
Therefore, the damage suffered by the applicants could not have been certain until that date.
Iz navedenega izhaja, da �koda, ki so jo utrpele tožeče stranke, ni mogla biti nedvoumna pred tem datumom.
The Court of First Instance accordingly concluded that in those circumstances, the fiveyear period of limitation provided for in Article 46 of the Statute could not have begun to run before that date.
V skladu s tem je Sodi�če prve stopnje sklenilo, da se v teh pogojih petletni zastaralni rok, ki ga določa člen 46 Statuta, ni mogel začeti pred tem zadnjim datumom.
The present action for damages (namely for compensation equivalent to the amounts owing to the applicants by DAI), brought in 1998, could not be considered to be out of time. 30
Od�kodninska tožba (to je tožba za nadomestilo, enako zneskom, ki jih DAI dolguje tožečim strankam), ki je bila vložena leta 1998, ni bila prepozna. 30
The Court of First Instance found that, in those circumstances, a prudent and wellinformed trader could reasonably expect to obtain payment of the aid concerned.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je ugotovilo, da je v teh okoli�činah lahko skrben in dobro obve�čen proizvajalec razumno pričakoval, da bo prejel plačilo zadevne pomoči.
In particular, as a security had been lodged by the distiller, under Article 11 of Regulation No 2499/82, in order to guarantee that operations were correctly carried out, the risk of insolvency on the part of the distiller would legitimately appear to be covered, as regards the amount of the aid paid earlier to the distiller by way of an advance, where the producers had fulfilled all their obligations and the wine had been distilled in accordance with the provisions of that regulation.
Še posebej, če je destilater zagotovil zavarovanje na podlagi člena 11 Uredbe �t. 2499/82, da bi zagotovil pravilno izvedbo postopkov, je bilo legitimno mogoče pričakovati, da ni tveganja plačilne nesposobnosti destilaterja glede zneska pomoči, ki je predhodno izplačan destilaterju kot predujem, če so proizvajalci izpolnili vse svoje obveznosti in je bilo vino destilirano v skladu z določbami te uredbe.
The exceptional nature of the situation resulting from the abovementioned lacuna in Regulation No 2499/82 in the area of the prevent- ive distillation of table wine was moreover confirmed by the fact that the system provided for in Article 9 of that regulation was extremely unusual. 29
Izjemno naravo položaja, ki izhaja iz zgoraj omenjene pravne praznine Uredbe �t. 2499/82 na področju preventivne destilacije namiznega vina, pa je potrjevalo tudi dejstvo, da je bil sistem, predviden s členom 9 te uredbe, izredno neobičajen. 29
The Commission has appealed against the judgment of the Court of First Instance.
Komisija je vložila pritožbo zoper sodbo Sodi�ča prve stopnje.
The appeal is limited to that part of the judgment ruling on the interpretation of Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice (paragraphs 129 to 150, summarised in points 54 to 58 above).
Pritožba je omejena na del sodbe, v katerem je odločeno o razlagi člena 46 Statuta Sodi�ča (točke od 129 do 150, povzete v zgoraj navedenih točkah od 54 do 58).
For all those reasons, given the complexity of the system introduced by Regulation No 2499/82 and the exceptional circumstances described above, it was only after the proceedings relating to the secur- ity were brought before the Italian courts that the applicants became aware that they would not obtain payment of the aid in question from the security.
Zaradi vseh teh razlogov, ob upo�tevanju zapletenosti sistema, ki ga je uvedla Uredba �t. 2499/82, in izjemnih okoli�čin, ki so bile navedene, so se tožeče stranke �ele po koncu postopkov o var�čini, ki so jih začele pred italijanskimi sodi�či, lahko zavedele, da ne bodo dosegle plačila zneskov zadevne pomoči s pomočjo var�čine.
In the present case, although the security was redeemed by AIMA in February 1991 in accordance with the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma and entered in the EAGGF accounts for that year, the identity of the beneficiary of that security under Regulation No 2499/82 was
V tej zadevi, čeprav je AIMA vrnila bančno nakazilo var�čine februarja 1991 na podlagi sodbe Tribunale civile di Roma in je bilo to istega leta vknjiženo v korist EKUJS, italijansko sodi�če do sodbe italijanskega kasacijskega sodi�ča z dne 28. novembra 1994 ni dokončno odlo-
The Commission submits that the ruling of the Court of First Instance to the effect that time started to run when the applicants were in a position to realise that they would
Komisija navaja, da trditev Sodi�ča prve stopnje, v skladu s katero je rok začel teči, ko so se tožeče stranke zavedele, da
29 — See the legislative context explained in paragraph 144 of the judgment of the Court of First Instance.
29 – Glej zakonodajni okvir, pojasnjen v točki 144 sodbe Sodi�ča prve stopnje.
COMMISSION v CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA AND OTHERS not obtain the aid by recourse to the security provided by DAI in favour of AIMA is based on a manifest error of law.
KOMISIJA PROTI CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA IN DRUGI na podlagi var�čine, ki jo je DAI zagotovila v korist AIMA, ne bodo prejele pomoči, temelji na očitni napačni uporabi prava.
Its sole ground of appeal is that the Court of First Instance thereby infringed Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice.
Njen edini pritožbeni razlog je, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje tako kr�ilo člen 46 Statuta Sodi�ča.
the basis of that caselaw, the Court of First Instance should have held that time began to run when the application of the system of indirect payment of aid to distillation under Article 9 of Regulation No 2499/82 had actually caused damage to the applicants by failing to provide that the aid would be paid directly to the producer if the distiller became insolvent.
Sodi�če prve stopnje bi moralo na podlagi te sodne prakse ugotoviti, da je rok začel teči, ko je uporaba sistema posrednih plačil pomoči za destilacijo na podlagi člena 9 Uredbe �t.
In practice, that was when, because of DAI’s insolvency, the applicants could not obtain payment of the aid in the timelimits laid down by Regulation No 2499/82, namely at the latest 90 days after distillation.
2499/82 dejansko povzročila �kodo tožečim strankam, ker ni zagotovila, da bi se pomoč izplačala neposredno proizvajalcem, če bi destilater postal plačilno nesposoben.
The Commission agrees with the starting point used by the Court of First Instance, namely that the limitation period for an action for noncontractual liability of the Community cannot begin to run before all the requirements governing an obligation to provide compensation for damage are satisfied and in particular before the damage to be made good has materialised.
Komisija se strinja z izhodi�čem Sodi�ča prve stopnje, da namreč zastaralni rok za vložitev tožbe za nepogodbene odgovornosti Skupnosti ne more začeti teči, dokler niso izpolnjeni vsi pogoji, ki urejajo obveznost povračila �kode, in zlasti dokler ne nastane �koda, ki jo je treba povrniti.
31 In cases in which the Community’s liability has its origin in a legislative measure, as in this instance, the limitation period cannot begin to run before all the injurious effects of the measure have been produced and consequently before the time when the applicants were bound to incur damage which was certain in character.
31V zadevah, kjer odgovornost Skupnosti izvira iz zakonodajnih ukrepov, kot v tem primeru, zastaralni rok ne more začeti teči, dokler ne nastanejo vsi �kodljivi učinki ukrepa in, posledično, dokler tožečim strankam ni povzročena �koda nedvomne narave.
32 It follows that the limitation period for an action for noncontractual liability based on a legislative measure begins to run from the objectively ascertainable moment when the application of that measure has actually caused damage to the assets of the applicant.
32Iz navedenega izhaja, da zastaralni rok za vložitev tožbe za nepogodbeno odgovornost, ki izhaja iz zakonodajnega ukrepa, začne teči z objektivno določljivim trenutkom, v katerem je uporaba tega ukrepa dejansko povzročila �kodo premoženju tožeče stranke.
The Commission considers that the Court of First Instance, having correctly summarised the above caselaw, takes a position which is diametrically opposed to it.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je namreč ugotovilo, da je �koda nastala več let kasneje, ko so se tožeče stranke zavedele neuspeha svojih poskusov, da bi pred nacionalnimi sodi�či dosegle poplačilo pomoči iz var�čine.
31 — Joined Cases 256/80, 257/80, 265/80 and 267/80 and 5/81 Birra Wührer and Others v Council and Commission [1982] ECR 85, paragraph 10.
31 – Sodba z dne 27. januarja 1982 v združenih zadevah Birra Wührer in drugi proti Svetu in Komisiji (256/80, 257/80, 265/80 in 267/80 ter 5/81, Recueil, str. 85, točka 10).
That conclusion, which at first sight the Court of First Instance appears to reach on the basis of findings of fact alone, is in reality (says the Commission) based on the incorrect legal view that the condition relating to the existence of certain damage must be determined subjectively rather than objectively.
Ta sklep, za kateri se na prvi pogled zdi, da ga je Sodi�če prve stopnje sprejelo le na podlagi ugotovitve dejanskega stanja, je po navedbah Komisije v resnici utemeljen na napačnem pravnem stali�ču, da se mora pogoj glede obstoja nedvomne �kode določiti subjektivno ne pa objektivno.
In other words, the Court of First Instance presupposed that the damage flowing from application of an unlawful legislative
Z drugimi besedami, Sodi�če prve stopnje je domnevalo, da �koda, ki je nastala zaradi uporabe nezakonitega zakonodajnega ukrepa, ne more
32 — Ibid.
32 – Prav tam.
That judgment does not concern the determination of when time starts to run, but rather when the limitation period expires.
V tej sodbi ne gre za določitev začetka teka roka, pač pa izteka zastaralnega roka.
Moreover in Adams the Court took account of the lack of awareness of the event giving rise to the damage, not the illegality of that fact.
Poleg tega je Sodi�če v zadevi Adams upo�tevalo nezavedanje dejstva, zaradi katerega je nastala �koda, ne pa njegove nezakonitosti.
measure cannot be certain unless the person concerned considers it to be so, even though the measure has already, to his knowledge, had harmful effects on him.
biti nedvomna, če je zadevna oseba ne �teje za nedvomno, čeprav je osebi že znano, da ji je ukrep �kodoval.
The Court of First Instance took no account of the fact that, since 1983, Regulation No 2499/82 objectively caused harm to the applicants.
Sodi�če prve stopnje ni upo�tevalo dejstva, da je Uredba �t. 2499/82 objektivno povzročala �kodo tožečim strankam že od leta 1983.
Instead, it concentrated on the applicants’ perception of those harmful effects.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je namreč sklenilo, da ne zadostuje, da so tožeče stranke vedele, da so zaradi uporabe Uredbe �t. 2499/82 utrpele �kodo.
It added to the test a wholly subjective element, namely that the applicants should be aware that they could obtain redress only by way of an action for compensation against the Commission.
Preizkusu je dodalo popolnoma subjektiven element, to je, da se morajo tožeče stranke zavedati, da bi lahko prejele od�kodnino le z od�kodninsko tožbo zoper Komisijo.
The Commission stresses that, as the Court of First Instance noted, 35it was
Komisija poudarja, kot je navedlo Sodi�če prve stopnje, 35da je bilo tožečim strankam
According to the Commission, such an approach cannot be justified on the basis that account must be taken of any doubts which the applicants might have had concerning the legality of Regulation No 2499/82 or the misconceived choices they made in seeking to obtain payment of the aid by appropriating the security provided in favour of AIMA.
Po navedbah Komisije navedenega pristopa ni mogoče upravičiti z utemeljitvijo, da se morajo upo�tevati vsi dvomi, ki bi jih tožeče stranke lahko imele glede zakonitosti Uredbe �t. 2499/82, ali napačne odločitve, ki so jih sprejele za pridobitev izplačila pomoči s prisvojitvijo var�čine, zagotovljene v korist AIMA.