natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
ARCOR access to the local loop. 49Such changes in the prices for access charged by the notified operator will, naturally, be justified where the national regulatory authority finds that the prices are incompatible with the principle of costorientation laid down by Article 3(3) of the regulation.
ARCOR cen dostopa, ki jih zaračunava prigla�eni obratovalec, je seveda lahko utemeljena, ko nacionalni regulativni organ ugotovi, da cene niso v skladu z načelom stro�kovne naravnanosti, določenim s členom 3(3) Uredbe.
comply with the requirements I have already mentioned concerning transparency, nondiscrimination and equal treatment, and must respect the limits arising from the interpretation of the Community concept of costorientation, with the particular significance and scope it enjoys within the context of the regulation.
upo�tevati že navedene zahteve po preglednosti, nediskriminaciji in enakem obravnavanju ter omejitve, ki izhajajo iz razlage Skupnostnega pojma stro�kovne naravnanosti s pomenom in z obsegom, ki ju ima v okviru Uredbe.
In particular, the rates approval decision must strike a balanced compromise between the essential aim of fostering competition on the local loop access market and that of ensuring the necessary level of investment in infrastructure.
Zlasti je potrebno, da odločba o odobritvi cen upo�teva iskanje ravnovesja med bistvenim ciljem spodbujanja konkurence na trgu dostopa do krajevne zanke in ciljem zagotavljanja potrebne ravni vlaganj v infrastrukture.
We come now to the question of the powers of judicial review the national courts should exercise over decisions adopted by the national regulatory authorities where they have exercised this power of discretion.
Zdaj se postavlja vpra�anje, kak�en mora biti sodni nadzor nacionalnih sodi�č glede odločb nacionalnih regulativnih organov, sprejetih ob izvajanju take diskrecijske pravice.
The reply to this question is closely linked to the analysis of the previous questions.
Odgovor na to vpra�anje je tesno povezan z analizo prej�njih vpra�anj.
That analysis showed that the national regulatory authorities have an indisputable margin of discretion when implementing the principle of costorientation, both when deciding which of the cost elements supplied by the local loop provider to take into account and when deciding on the method to be used to calculate the costs connected with provision of access to the local loop.
Ta analiza je pokazala, da imajo nacionalni regulativni organi neizpodbitno diskrecijsko pravico pri izvajanju načela stro�kovne naravnanosti pri določanju elementov posameznih stro�kov ponudnika krajevne zanke, ki se upo�tevajo, in pri opredelitvi metode, ki se uporabi za izračun ustreznih stro�kov zagotavljanja krajevne zanke.
In the light of the considerations set out in the analysis of the previous questions, I see no reason why this discretion should not also extend to determining imputed interest and the setting of reasonable periods for depreciation.
Z vidika ugotovitev, ki sem jih predstavil že pri analizi prej�njih vpra�anj, ne vidim razloga, zakaj se ta pravica ne bi raz�irila tudi na določitev računovodskih obresti in primernih amortizacijskih dob.
As Arcor states in its observations with regard to the latter, the fact that a depreciation period is based on an estimate of the future useful life of the asset inevitably involves an element of prediction and, consequently, the exercise of discretion.
Kot družba Arcor v stali�čih trdi o teh dobah, dejstvo, da amortizacijska doba temelji na oceni prihodnje življenjske dobe sredstev, nujno zahteva napoved in tako izvajanje diskrecijske pravice.
In any event, such powers of discretion on the part of the regulatory authorities must
Taka diskrecijska pravica nacionalnih regulativnih organov mora v vsakem primeru
Neither the regulation nor the relevant directives constituting the former regulatory framework provide for any harmonisation of the national systems relating to judicial procedures and, more specifically, the determination of the scope and extent of judicial review of decisions by the national regulatory authorities, particularly those in which they have exercised a margin of discretion.
Niti Uredba niti ustrezne direktive starega regulativnega okvira ne predvidevajo uskladitve nacionalnih sistemov o sodnih postopkih niti posebej določitve obsega in intenzivnosti sodnega nadzora glede odločb nacionalnih regulativnih organov, zlasti kadar te izhajajo iz izvajanja diskrecijske pravice.
The reply to this question is primarily a matter for the national procedural law.
Odgovor na to vpra�anje tako najprej izhaja predvsem s področja pristojnosti v nacionalnih postopkovnih sistemih.
Generally speaking, the national procedural rules defining the extent and scope of the judicial review of decisions by regulatory authorities are required to comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
Na splo�no morajo nacionalna postopkovna pravila, ki opredeljujejo intenzivnost in obseg sodnega nadzora nad odločbami nacionalnih regulativnih organov, upo�tevati načeli enakovrednosti in učinkovitosti.
Where they protect rights derived from Community law, these rules may not be less favourable than those applying to similar remedies within domestic law.
Kadar ta pravila zagotavljajo pravice, ki izhajajo iz prava Skupnosti, ne morejo biti manj ugodna od pravil o podobnih nacionalnih pravnih sredstvih.
Nor may they make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by Community law. 50
Prav tako ne morejo praktično onemogočiti ali pretirano otežiti izvajanja pravic, ki jih podeljuje pravni red Skupnosti. 50
But the judicial review which Community law requires the national courts to exercise in order to provide effective legal protection for the rights derived from Community law is not required to be more extensive than the forms of judicial review which the Community courts carry out in similar cases.
Vendar pa se ne zahteva, da je sodni nadzor, ki ga pravo Skupnosti nalaga nacionalnim sodi�čem zaradi zagotavljanja učinkovitega sodnega varstva pravic, ki izhajajo iz predpisov Skupnosti, strožji kot sodni nadzor, ki ga sodi�ča Skupnosti izvajajo v podobnih primerih.
On this point, the Court has indicated that where judicial review of decisions by Community authorities which have made complex assessments is at issue, those authorities enjoy a wide measure of discretion, the exercise of which is normally subject to a limited judicial review.
Sodi�če v zvezi s tem opozarja, da kadar gre za sodni nadzor odločb organov Skupnosti, ki opravljajo zapletene ocene, ti organi uživajo �iroko diskrecijsko pravico, katere izvajanje je običajno podvrženo omejenemu sodnemu nadzoru.
54This limited judicial review is justified by practical reasons connected with the economic or technical
54Tak omejen sodni nadzor je utemeljen s praktičnimi razlogi, povezanimi z ekonomsko ali s tehnično zapletenostjo ocen, ki se opravljajo
An obligation of this kind was already imposed under the former regulatory framework.
Ta organ, ki je lahko sodi�če, mora imeti ustrezno strokovno znanje in izku�nje, da lahko izpolni svoje naloge.
In fact, Article 5a(3) of Directive 90/387 as amended by Direct- ive 97/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997, 51provided that ‘Member States shall ensure that suitable mechanisms exist at national
Države članice zagotovijo, da se vsebina same zadeve primerno upo�teva in da je na voljo učinkovit pritožbeni mehanizem.“
Member States shall ensure that the merits of the case are duly taken into account and that there is an effective appeal mechanism.’
I-8003, točka 33); z dne 10. aprila 2003, Steffensen (C-276/01, Recueil, str. I-3735, točka 60); z dne 4. decembra 2003 v zadevi Evans (C-63/01, Recueil, str.
50 — See, as general references concerning these principles, Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck [1995] ECR I-4599, paragraph 12 and the caselaw cited therein; Case C-231/96 Edis [1998] ECR I-4951, paragraphs 19 and 34; Case C-326/96 Levez [1998] ECR I-7835, paragraph 18 and the caselaw cited therein; Case C-453/99 CourageandCrehan [2001] ECR I-6297, paragraph 29; Case C-255/00 Grundig Italiana [2002] ECR I-8003, paragraph 33; Case C-276/01 Steffensen [2003] ECR I-3735, paragraph 60; Case C-63/01 Evans [2003] ECR I-14447, paragraph 45, Case C-30/02 Recheio — Cash & Carry, [2004] ECR I-6051, paragraph 17. 53 — See, for example, Case C-462/99 Connect Austria [2003] ECR I-5197, paragraph 35.
I-14447, točka 45) in z dne 17. junija 2004 v zadevi Recheio – Cash & Carry (C-30/02, ZOdl., str. I-6051, točka 17). 53 – Glej zlasti sodbo z dne 22. maja 2003 v zadevi Connect Austria (C-462/99, Recueil, str.
51 — OJ 1997 L 295, p. 23.
I-5197, točka 35).
54 — Judgment of 21 January 1999 in Upjohn (Case C-120/97, ECR p.
54 – Sodba z dne 21. januarja 1999 v zadevi Upjohn (C-120/97, Recueil, str.
I-223, paragraph 34 and caselaw cited therein and paragraph 35).
I-223, točka 34 in navedena sodna praksa ter točka 35).
ARCOR limits of that margin of discretion.
ARCOR na nekaterih področjih, ki se poleg tega lahko pogosto hitro razvijajo 55.
It follows that the competent national judicial bodies must conduct a judicial review enabling them to assess whether, depending on the specific national circumstances prevailing at the time the decision was adopted, a rates approval decision issued by a national regulatory authority has struck an appropriate balance between the essential aim of fostering competition within the local network and the aim of ensuring the necessary level of investment in infrastructure.
V vsakem sodni nadzor, s katerim lahko preverijo, ali je odločba o odobritvi cen, ki jo je izdal nacionalni regulativni organ, glede na posebne nacionalne okoli�čine v trenutku odobritve zagotovila ravnovesje med bistvenim ciljem spodbujanja konkurence na krajevnem omrežju in ciljem zagotavljanja potrebne ravni vlaganj v infrastrukture.
55In any event, the fact that the applicable national procedural law applicable restricts the extent of the judicial review cannot have the effect of decisions by the regulatory authorities not being subject to effective judicial review.
primeru posledica dejstva, da veljavno nacionalno procesno pravo omejuje intenzivnost sodnega nadzora, ne more biti, da se odločbe regulativnih organov izognejo učinkovitemu sodnemu nadzoru.
On this point, the Court has emphasised that any national procedure for judicial review of a decision by a regulatory authority must, in any event, enable the court or tribunal seised of an application ‘effectively to apply the relevant principles and rules of Community law when reviewing its legality.’ 56
Sodi�če v zvezi s tem poudarja, da mora vsak nacionalni postopek sodnega nadzora odločbe regulativnega organa v vsakem primeru omogočiti sodi�ču, ki se mu predloži tožba, „da v okviru nadzora zakonitosti te odločbe učinkovito uporablja ustrezna načela in pravila prava Skupnosti“. 56
When considering an appeal against a rates approval decision, as in the present case, the competent national judicial bodies must, therefore, have the opportunity to assess whether, when exercising the margin of discretion which it enjoys, the national regulatory authority has respected the limits arising from the interpretation of the Community concept of costorientation and whether the rates approval decision has satisfied the criteria and objectives laid down in the regulation.
Pri analizi tožbe zoper odločbo o odobritvi cen, kot se obravnava v tem primeru, morajo pristojni nacionalni sodni organi tako imeti možnost, da preverijo, ali so se pri izvajanju diskrecijske pravice, ki jo ima nacionalni regulativni organ, upo�tevale omejitve, ki izhajajo iz razlage Skupnostnega pojma stro�kovne naravnanosti, ter ali je odločba o odobritvi cen upo�tevala merila in cilje Uredbe.
In this connection, it is important to distinguish between exercising a margin of discretion and interpreting the relevant legal criteria determining the precise
Pri tem je treba razlikovati med izvajanjem diskrecijske pravice in razlago ustreznih pravnih meril, ki določa prav omejitve te diskrecijske pravice. Pristojni nacionalni sodni organi morajo tako izvajati
55 — See, for example, the Opinion of Advocate-General Léger in Upjohn, cited above, points 50 and 51.
55 – Glej zlasti sklepne predloge generalnega pravobranilca Légerja v zgoraj navedeni zadevi Upjohn, točki 50 in 51.
I therefore propose that the Court reply to the referring court to the effect that, when assessing whether charges have been set on the basis of costorientation, the national regulatory authority has a margin of discretion with regard, in particular, to the method used to calculate the costs and also to issues relating to the determination of imputed interest and reasonable depreciation periods.
Tako Sodi�ču predlagam, naj predložitvenemu sodi�ču odgovori, da ima nacionalni regulativni organ pri preverjanju stro�kovne naravnanosti cen diskrecijsko pravico, ki zadeva predvsem metodo izračuna stro�kov ter tudi vpra�anja v zvezi z določitvijo računovodskih obresti in primernih amortizacijskih dob.
Effective judicial review of a rates approval decision must make it possible to ascertain whether or not the rates approval decision in question is in breach of the aims of the regulation and the criteria of nondiscrimination and equal treatment.
Učinkovit sodni nadzor odločbe o odobritvi cen mora omogočati, da se preveri, ali zadevna odločba o odobritvi cen ne kr�i ciljev, določenih z Uredbo, ter meril prepovedi diskriminacije in enakega obravnavanja.
It must also make it possible to ascertain whether the limits arising from the interpretation of the Community concept of costorientation have been respected and, in particular, whether the decision shows that an appropriate balance has been struck between the essential aim of fostering competition within the local network and the aim of ensuring the necessary level of investment in infrastructure.
Omogočati mora tudi, da se preveri, ali so se upo�tevale omejitve, ki izhajajo iz razlage Skupnostnega pojma stro�kovne naravnanosti, ter zlasti, ali odločba dokazuje, da se je zagotovilo ravnovesje med bistvenim ciljem spodbujanja konkurence na krajevnem omrežju in ciljem zagotavljanja potrebne ravni vlaganj v infrastrukture.
56 — Upjohn, cited above, paragraph 36.
56 – Glej zgoraj navedeno sodbo Upjohn, točka 36.
G — The sixth question
G – Šesto vprašanje
By this question, the referring court is, basically, asking whether, although a rates approval decision adopted by a national regulatory authority is not addressed to them, competitors as beneficiaries of access to the notified operator’s local network, must have a right of appeal against such a decision where they consider that the rates approved have not been set on the basis of costorientation.
Predložitveno sodi�če želi s tem vpra�anjem v bistvu izvedeti, ali morajo imeti konkurenti, ki so upravičeni do dostopa do krajevne zanke prigla�enega obratovalca, čeprav niso naslovniki odločbe o odobritvi cen, ki jo je sprejel nacionalni regulativni organ, pravico do pravnega sredstva zoper tako odločbo, če menijo, da cene niso stro�kovno naravnane.
For further discussion of this, I would, therefore, refer to my Opinion in the Tele2 UTA Telecommunication case, cited above. 58
V sklepnih predlogih, predstavljenih 15. februarja 2007 v zadevi Tele2 UTA Telecommunication 57, sem se v okviru postopka tržne analize v novem regulativnem okviru ukvarjal s težavo, ki je v veliki meri enakovredna težavi, ki se obravnava v tem vpra�anju.
Article 5a, like Article 4(1) of the framework directive, is an expression of the general principle of Community law whereby Member States have the responsibility of
Člen 5a in tudi člen 4(1) Okvirne direktive sta izraz splo�nega načela prava Skupnosti, po katerem so države članice odgovorne za zagotavljanje učinkovitega
I already pointed out in that Opinion that, according to Article 5a of Direct- ive 90/387, which constituted part of the
V teh sklepnih predlogih sem že povedal, da morajo države članice v skladu s členom 5a Direktive 90/387, ki je del nekdanjega regulativnega okvira za telekomunikacije, ki ga dopolnjuje Uredba, zagotavljati „obstoj ustreznih mehanizmov na nacionalni ravni, ki stranki, ki jo zadeva odločba
59 — An identical guarantee is provided by Article 4(1) of the framework directive which, within the new regulatory framework for telecommunications, more or less replaces Article 5a(1) of Directive 90/387.
59 – Enako zagotovilo je določeno s členom 4(1) Okvirne direktive, ki grosso modo v novem regulativnem okviru za telekomunikacije nadome�ča člen 5a(1) Direktive 90/387.
60 — Paragraph 35.61 — Ibid., paragraph 42.
57 – C-426/05, ki trenutno poteka pred Sodi�čem.58 – Natančneje v točkah od 14 do 40.
57 — Case C-426/05, currently pending before the Court.58 — More specifically, points 14 to 40.
60 – Točka 35.61 – Ibidem, točka 42.
ARCOR tions between Deutsche Telekom and Arcor, but of the decision by the national regulatory authority, which is deemed to have complied with the costorientation requirement laid down by Article 3(3) of the regulation.
62 mora družba Arcor plačati družbi Deutsche Telekom, ni rezultat pogajanj med družbama Deutsche Telekom in Arcor, ampak odločbe nacionalnega regulativnega organa, ki naj bi upo�tevala zahtevo po stro�kovni naravnanosti, določeno s členom 3(3) Uredbe.
62 A decision by a national regulatory authority, such as the decision at issue in the main proceedings, setting the rates which the notified operator is entitled to charge competing operators as beneficiaries, is a decision against which, according to Community law, there must be a right of appeal before an independent judicial body.
Odločba nacionalnega regulativnega organa, kot se obravnava v zadevi o glavni stvari, ki določa cene, ki jih ima prigla�eni obratovalec pravico zaračunavati konkurenčnim obratovalcem upravičencem, mora biti odločba, ki jo je po pravu Skupnosti mogoče izpodbijati pred neodvisnim sodnim organom.
The question which has been posed in this case is, however, more specific and asks whether, although the rates approval decision is not addressed to them, competitors as beneficiaries of access, such as Arcor, must have the right to bring an action to contest the rates for access on the grounds that they have not been set on the basis of costorientation, in breach of Article 3(3) of the regulation.
Vendar se v obravnavanem primeru postavlja bolj specifično vpra�anje, ali morajo konkurenti, ki so upravičeni do dostopa, kot je družba Arcor, čeprav niso naslovniki te odločbe o odobritvi cen, imeti tako pravico, da lahko na sodi�ču izpodbijajo določene cene dostopa, ker naj v nasprotju s členom 3(3) Uredbe ne bi bile stro�kovno naravnane.
Contrary to what Deutsche Telekom, the German Government and the Federal Republic of Germany, as a party to the dispute before the referring court, maintain, it is my view that Community law confers upon competitors as beneficiaries of access to the local loop, such as Arcor in this case, the right to bring proceedings to contest rates which have not been set on the basis of costorientation.
V nasprotju s trditvami družbe Deutsche Telekom, nem�ke vlade in Zvezne republike Nemčije kot strankami v sporu pred predložitvenim sodi�čem menim, da pravo Skupnosti podeljuje konkurentom, upravičenim do dostopa do krajevne zanke, kot je v obravnavanem primeru družba Arcor, pravico, da pred sodi�čem izpodbijajo cene, ki niso stro�kovno naravnane.
Where it requires that charges for access must be set on the basis of costorientation, Article 3(3) of the regulation protects not only the interests of the notified ope -rator, by ensuring that it is able to cover its costs, but also the interests of competitors as beneficiaries of access to the notified operator’s local loop. 63
Člen 3(3) Uredbe lahko z zahtevo, da so cene dostopa stro�kovno naravnane, �čiti ne samo interese prigla�enega obratovalca, ko mu zagotavlja, da bodo njegovi stro�ki pokriti, ampak tudi interese konkurentov, upravičenih do dostopa do krajevne zanke prigla�enega obratovalca. 63
It is, first of all, important to recall that, at the time of the rates approval decision of 30 March 2001, Deutsche Telekom and Arcor were parties to a contract.
Najprej je treba spomniti, da sta bili družbi Deutsche Telekom in Arcor sopogodbenici v trenutku odobritve cen 30. marca 2001.
According to the referring court, the rates approved by the national regulatory authority in the present case were set by agreement between Deutsche Telekom and Arcor in their contract.
Po mnenju predložitvenega sodi�ča cene, ki jih je nacionalni regulativni organ odobril v obravnavanem primeru, veljajo, kot je bilo dogovorjeno v pogodbi med družbama Deutsche Telekom in Arcor.
Consequently, where the national regulatory authority sets the rates in accordance with the regulation, it in effect establishes the price which Arcor is required to pay for access to Deutsche Telekom’s local loop.
Posledično odločba nacionalnega regulativnega organa, kadar določa cene v skladu z Uredbo, dejansko določa ceno, ki jo mora družba Arcor plačati za dostop do krajevne zanke družbe Deutsche Telekom.
Both Deutsche Telekom and Arcor are contracting parties whose contractual rela-
Družbi Deutsche Telekom in Arcor sta sopogodbenici, na katerih pogodbeno razmerje vpliva odločba regulativnega
63 — In fact, as we saw in point 37 above, this requirement provides a criterion to limit excessive charges.
63 – Kot smo videli zgoraj v točki 37, ta zahteva dejansko ponuja merilo za omejevanje čezmernih cen.
62 — See my Opinion in the Tele2 UTA Telecommunication case, cited above.
62 – Glej moje sklepne predloge v zgoraj navedeni zadevi Tele2 UTA.
64 They operator benefiting from that access must have the right of appeal against such a decision in order to contest the rates set, on the ground that they fail to satisfy the costorientation requirement laid down by the regulation.
64 Obe družbi morata imeti pravico, da pred sodi�čem izpodbijata to odločbo z utemeljitvijo, da dovoljuje cene, ki ne upo�tevajo zahteve po stro�kovni naravnanosti, določeni s členom 3(3) Uredbe.
must both have the right to bring proceedings to contest that decision on the ground that it approved rates incompatible with the costorientation requirement laid down in Article 3(3) of the regulation.
določenih z odločbo nacionalnega regulativnega organa o odobritvi cen, priznati pravica do pravnega sredstva zoper tako odločbo, da lahko izpodbija neskladnost določenih cen z zahtevo po stro�kovni naravnanosti, določeno z Uredbo.
The aim of the regulation is to foster competition on the local access market.
Cilj Uredbe je spodbujati konkurenco na trgu krajevnega dostopa.
The requirement that charges must be set on the basis of costorientation is instrumental in achieving that aim and, as Article 4(1) of the regulation expressly recalls, the national regulatory authorities are required to ensure that charging for unbundled access to the local loop fosters fair and sustainable competition.
Zahteva po stro�kovni naravnanosti cen je instrument za uresničitev tega cilja in nacionalni regulativni organi, kot je izrecno določeno v členu 4(1) Uredbe, morajo zagotavljati, da se z določanjem cen razvezanega dostopa do krajevne zanke pospe�uje po�tena in znosna konkurenca.
In the light of those aims, it would not be tenable for the notified operator to be granted the right to bring proceedings to contest rates on the ground that they are incompatible with the costorientation requirement, whereas competing operators, as new entrants to that market who are required to pay the charges set by the regulatory authority, do not have that same right.
Z vidika teh ciljev ne bi bilo sprejemljivo, da je prigla�enemu obratovalcu podeljena pravica, da pred sodi�čem izpodbija cene, ki niso združljive s stro�kovno naravnanostjo, konkurenčni obratovalci kot novi udeleženci na trgu, ki morajo plačati cene, ki jih določi regulativni organ, pa nasprotno nimajo te pravice.