natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It follows that the Commission is not obliged to maintain the factual or legal assessments set forth in that document.
Iz tega izhaja, da Komisija ni zavezana vztrajati pri presoji dejstev ali pravni presoji, ki izhajata iz tega dokumenta.
On the contrary, it must give as reasons for its ultimate decision its final assessments based on the situation existing at the time the
Nasprotno, svojo končno odločbo mora obrazložiti s svojimi končnimi presojami, ki temeljijo na rezultatih celotne preiskave, kot so
2008 — CASE C-413/06 P formal proceedings are closed (see, by way of analogy, the order in British American Tobacco and Reynolds Industries v Commission, paragraph 15).
2008 – ZADEVA C-413/06 P podani ob koncu formalnega postopka (glej po analogiji zgoraj navedeni sklep Bristih American Tobacco in Reynolds [Industries] proti Komisiji, točka 15).
Furthermore, the Commission is not obliged to explain any differences with respect to its provisional assessments set out in the statement of objections (see, to that effect, the order in British American Tobacco and Reynolds Industries v Commission, paragraph 15, and the judgment in British American Tobacco and Reynolds Industries v Commission, paragraph 70).
Poleg tega Komisiji ni treba pojasniti morebitnih razhajanj v primerjavi z začasno presojo iz obvestila o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah (glej v tem smislu zgoraj navedeni sklep British American Tobacco in Reynolds Industries proti Komisiji, točka 15, in zgoraj navedeno sodbo British American Tobacco in Reynolds proti Komisiji, točka 70).
The fact that the Commission is, by contrast to the position under Articles 81 EC and 82 EC, subject to strict time-limits, has no effect on the provisional nature of the statement of objections.
Dejstvo, da mora Komisija v okviru nadzora koncentracij, v nasprotju s področjem izvajanja členov 81 ES in 82 ES, upo�tevati stroge procesne roke, v ničemer na spremeni začasnosti obvestila o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah.
The effective exercise of the rights of the defence requires that the arguments of the parties to a proposed concentration be taken into account in proceedings for the control of concentrations in the same way as the arguments of the parties affected by proceedings initiated under Articles 81 EC or 82 EC.
Učinkovito izvr�e -vanje pravic do obrambe zahteva, da se trditve strank nameravane koncentracije v postopku nadzora koncentracij upo�tevajo enako kot trditve zadevnih strank v postopkih, sproženih na podlagi členov 81 ES in 82 ES.
It is true that the Court of First Instance expressly recognised, in particular in paragraphs 284 and 285 of the judgment under appeal, the preparatory nature of the statement of objections, including where proceedings for the control of concentrations are involved.
Res je, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje v izpodbijani sodbi, zlasti v točkah 284 in 285, izrecno priznalo začasnost obvestila o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah, vključno kadar gre za nadzor koncentracij.
It also acknowledged that the Commission is not, in accordance with the caselaw relating to Articles 81 EC and 82 EC, obliged to explain any differences by comparison with the statement of objections.
Poleg tega je priznalo, da Komisiji v skladu s sodno prakso glede členov 81 ES in 82 ES ni treba pojasniti morebitnih razhajanj v primerjavi z obvestilom o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah.
However, having regard to the line of argument of the appellants and of the Commission set out in paragraphs 58 and 59 of this judgment, it is necessary to examine the criticisms made by them in relation to a series of specific references to the statement of objections made by the Court of First Instance in its examination of the validity of the contested decision.
Vendar je treba glede na trditve pritožnic in Komisije v točkah 58 in 59 te sodbe preučiti njihove očitke glede večkratnih konkretnih sklicevanj Sodi�ča prve stopnje na obvestilo o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah v okviru njegovega preizkusa zakonitosti sporne odločbe.
In that regard, it is clear from the caselaw that while, in the context of the control of concentrations, a field in which the Commission has a margin of assessment with regard to economic matters, review by the Court of First Instance is limited to establishing whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate and to establishing the
V zvezi s tem iz sodne prakse izhaja, da čeprav je v okviru nadzora koncentracij, ki je področje, na katerem ima Komisija glede ekonomskih vpra�anj pravico do proste presoje, nadzor Sodi�ča prve stopnje omejen na preverjanje pravilnosti dejanskega stanja in neobstoja očitnih napak pri presoji, �e vedno ostaja dejstvo, da je lahko
BERTELSMANN AND SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA v IMPALA absence of a manifest error of assessment, it none the less remains the case that the correctness, completeness and reliability of the facts on which a decision is based may be the subject of judicial review (see, to that effect, Commission v Tetra Laval, paragraph 39, and Case C-525/04 P Spain v Lenzing [2007] ECR I-9947, paragraphs 56 and 57).
BERTELSMANN IN SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA PROTI IMPALI pravilnost, popolnost in zanesljivost dejstev, na katerih temelji odločba, predmet sodnega nadzora (glej v tem smislu zgoraj navedeno sodbo Komisija proti Tetra Laval, točka 39, in sodbo z dne 22. novembra 2007 v zadevi Španija proti Lenzing, C-525/04 P, ZOdl., str. I-9947, točki 56 in 57).
Indeed, that is one of the ways in which the Community judicature can verify whether the factual and legal elements upon which the exercise of the power of assessment depends were present (see, to that effect, Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München [1991] ECR I-5469, paragraph 14).
Zlasti tako lahko namreč sodi�če Skupnosti preveri, ali so bili podani dejanski in pravni elementi, od katerih je odvisno izvr�evanje pravice do proste presoje (glej v tem smislu sodbo z dne 21. novembra 1991 v zadevi Technische Universität München, C-269/90, Recueil, str.
It follows that notwithstanding the preparatory and provisional nature of the statement of objections and despite the fact that the Commission is not obliged to explain any differences by comparison with the statement of objections, the Court of First Instance is not necessarily precluded from using the statement of objections in order to interpret a decision of the Commission, particularly as regards the examination of its factual basis.
I-5469, točka 14). Iz tega izhaja, da kljub pripravljalni in začasni naravi obvestila o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah in kljub dejstvu, da Komisiji ni treba pojasniti morebitnih razhajanj v primerjavi z obvestilom o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah, Sodi�če prve stopnje lahko uporabi obvestilo o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah pri razlagi odločbe Komisije, zlasti glede preizkusa njene dejanske podlage.
Thus, for example, the references to the statement of objections made by the Court of First Instance in paragraphs 300, 302 and 308 of the judgment under appeal when reaching its findings in relation to the reasoning of the contested decision were, as the Advocate General pointed out in substance in points 165 and 166 of her Opinion, made for purely illustrative purposes, or simply for the sake of completeness.
Tako je na primer sklicevanje Sodi�ča prve stopnje na obvestilo o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah v točkah 300, 302 in 308 izpodbijane sodbe v okviru njegove presoje obrazložitve sporne odločbe, kot je v bistvu v točkah 165 in 166 sklepnih predlogov poudarila generalna pravobranilka, samo opisno, če ne celo preob�irno.
The same applies to certain of the paragraphs of the judgment cited by the appellants which concern the evaluation by the Court of First Instance of the arguments alleging manifest errors of assessment, namely paragraphs 338, 339, 341, 362, 402, 456, 467, 532 and 538 of the judgment under appeal, which serve merely to illustrate and to supplement what the Court of First Instance had, in any event, already directly deduced from the contested decision.
Enako velja za nekatere druge točke navedene sodbe, na katere se sklicujeta pritožnici, ki se nana�ajo na presojo Sodi�ča prve stopnje o trditvah glede o očitnih napakah pri presoji, in sicer točke 338, 339, 341, 362, 402, 456, 467, 532 in 538 izpodbijane sodbe, ki so namenjene le opisovanju in dopolnjevanju tistega, kar je Sodi�če prve stopnje v vsakem primeru ugotovilo že na podlagi sporne odločbe.
However, some of the references in the judgment under appeal to the statement of objections show that, notwithstanding the position it itself adopted as to the provisional nature of that statement, the Court of First Instance treated what, in paragraph 410 of the judgment, it termed ‘findings of fact made previously’ in that statement as being more reliable and more conclusive than the findings set out in the contested decision itself.
Vendar je treba ugotoviti, da določena sklicevanja na obvestilo o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah v izpodbijani sodbi kažejo na to, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje kljub svojim ugotovitvam o začasni naravi tega obvestila priznalo, da je, kot je navedlo v točki 410 navedene sodbe, „predhodno ugotovljeno dejansko stanje“ v navedenem obvestilu zanesljivej�e in odločilnej�e od ugotovitev, ki izhajajo iz sporne odločbe.
The Court of First Instance, in effect, relied in that regard on a distinction between those ‘findings of fact made previously’, on the one hand, and ‘assessments’, on the
Sodi�če se je v zvezi s tem v bistvu oprlo na razliko med tem „predhodno ugotovljenim dejanskim stanjem“ in „presojami“, ki bi se lahko pozneje veljavno
2008 — CASE C-413/06 P other, which could, in its view, more legitimately be modified.
2008 – ZADEVA C-413/06 P spremenile.
In particular, in paragraph 379 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance classified the statement in the statement of objections that ‘there is sufficient evidence that the majors are aware of each other’s commercial terms’ as not being ‘an assessment by the Commission that might be modified, but rather a finding of fact resulting from its investigation’.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je zlasti v točki 379 izpodbijane sodbe trditev iz obvestila o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah, da „obstaja dovolj dokazov, da so veliki vzajemno seznanjeni s poslovnimi pogoji drug drugega“, opredelilo kot „ugotovitev dejstev, ki izhaja iz preiskave Komisije, in ne kot presojo Komisije, ki bi jo bilo mogoče spremeniti“.
That statement by the Court of First Instance should be understood in the light of other statements made previously in the judgment under appeal.
To trditev Sodi�ča prve stopnje je treba razumeti glede na druge predhodne trditve v izpodbijani sodbi.
Thus, in paragraph 335 of the judgment, the Court of First Instance stated, among other things, that ‘the findings set out in the [contested decision] must be compatible with the findings of fact made in the statement of objections, in so far as it is not established that the latter findings were incorrect’.
Sodi�če prve stopnje tako v točki 335 te sodbe med drugim navaja: „presoje iz [sporne] odločbe morajo biti skladne z ugotovljenim dejanskim stanjem iz obvestila o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah, če se to ne izkaže za nepravilno ugotovljenega“.
In addition, in paragraph 378 of the judgment, the Court of First Instance stated that ‘the conclusions drawn from [the evidence as mentioned in the contested decision] are also markedly different from the findings made in the statement of objections’.
Poleg tega Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 378 navedene sodbe navaja, da „se sklepi, ki […] so izvedeni iz [dokazov, kot so navedeni] v [sporni] odločbi, prav tako jasno razlikujejo od ugotovitev iz obvestila o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah“.
Thus, the Court of First Instance did not merely use the statement of objections as a basis for verifying the correctness, completeness and reliability of the factual material which underpinned the contested decision.
Zato Sodi�če prve stopnje ni omejeno na uporabo obvestila o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah, zato da bi preverilo pravilnost, popolnost in zanesljivost dejstev, ki so podlaga za sporno odločbo.
It treated a particular category of conclusions set out in that statement as established, whereas those conclusions could, however, only be considered as being provisional.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je namreč določeno kategorijo ugotovitev iz tega obvestila �telo za dokazano, medtem ko je te ugotovitve mogoče �teti le za začasne.
That conception of the statement of objections can also be seen in other paragraphs of the judgment under appeal.
Tako pojmovanje obvestila o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah izhaja med drugim iz drugih točk izpodbijane sodbe.
Thus, in paragraphs 409 and 410 of the judgment, the Court of First Instance criticised the fact that the Commission did not refute the ‘findings of fact made previously’ in the statement of objections.
Sodi�če prve stopnje tako v točkah 409 in 410 te sodbe kritizira dejstvo, da Komisija ni zanikala „predhodno ugotovljenega dejanskega stanja“ v obvestilu o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah.
In addition, in paragraph 424 of the judgment, the appellants and the Commission were criticised for not having asserted, ‘still less demonstrated’, that a ‘finding’ in the statement of objections was incorrect.
Poleg tega je v točki 424 navedene sodbe tožečim strankam in Komisiji očitano, da niso trdile „niti a fortiori dokazale“, da bi bila „ugotovitev“ iz navedenega obvestila nepravilna.
In paragraph 446 of the judgment under appeal, it was similarly indicated that ‘the observation that there was no evidence that discounts significantly affected prices constitutes a finding of fact rather than an assessment’.
V točki 446 izpodbijane sodbe je prav tako navedeno, da je stali�če, da ni bilo nobenega dokaza o tem, da so popusti znatno vplivali na cene, ugotovitev dejstev in ne presoja.
Moreover, in paragraphs 398, 419, 447 and 451 of the judgment, the Commission was, in essence, criticised for having relied to a considerable extent, for the purposes of the contested decision, on the impact of ‘campaign discounts’, whereas, as the Court of First Instance indicated in paragraph 447 of the judgment, the Commission ‘did not even consider it necessary to mention [those] discounts in the statement of objections’.
Poleg tega je Komisiji v točkah 398, 419, 447 in 451 te sodbe v bistvu očitano, da se je za namene sporne odločbe v veliki meri oprla na vpliv „reklamnih popustov“, medtem ko Komisija v obvestilu o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah, kot je navedlo Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 447 navedene sodbe, „ni niti menila, da [jih] je treba omeniti“.
As the Commission points out, it can happen that, in their reply to the statement of objections, the notifying parties will supplement or clarify their ‘case’ regarding the functioning of the market or markets in question in the light of that statement, so that new elements may be added or facts previously examined by the Commission may be put in an entirely different light.
Vendar kot poudarja Komisija, lahko priglasitelji v odgovoru na obvestilo o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah glede na to obvestilo dopolnijo ali pojasnijo svoje „stali�če“ o delovanju zadevnega trga ali zadevnih trgov, tako da bi bili lahko dodani novi dokazi ali bi bilo lahko dejansko stanje, ki ga je že ugotovila Komisija, ume�čeno v popolnoma drug kontekst.
In those circumstances, even if the lack of justification for certain of the individual findings of fact provisionally made by the Commission in the statement of objections is not established, the Commission’s evaluation of those findings in that new context may be radically different.
V teh okoli�činah, čeprav ni dokazana neutemeljenost določenih posamičnih začasnih ugotovitev Komisije v obvestilu o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah, je lahko presoja Komisije o teh ugotovitvah v spremenjenem kontekstu popolnoma drugačna.
In the judgment under appeal, it appears that the Court of First Instance, by focusing on the discrepancies between the contested decision, which was the subject of the action brought before it, and the ‘findings of fact previously made’ in the statement of objections, excluded that possibility.
Zdi se, da Sodi�če prve stopnje v izpodbijani sodbi s tem, da se je osredotočilo na razlike med sporno odločbo, ki je predmet tožbe, vložene pri njem, in „predhodno ugotovljenim dejanskim stanjem“ v obvestilu o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah, ni upo�tevalo te možnosti.
As the Commission argues, the approach adopted by the Court of First Instance in some paragraphs of the judgment under appeal appears to assume that the Commission’s provisional conclusions in the statement of objections are invariably based on unequivocal evidence.
Kot zatrjuje Komisija, pristop Sodi�ča prve stopnje, ki izhaja iz nekaterih točk izpodbijane sodbe, namreč temelji na domnevi, da so začasni sklepi Komisije v navedenem obvestilu prepričljivo utemeljeni z nedvoumnimi dokazi.
Apart, possibly, from noncontroversial elements which, for example, by reason of their empirical and verifiable nature are obvious to such a degree that they cannot be contested, it should not be assumed that assessments made in a statement of objections cannot be modified in the light of the replies to such a statement.
Vendar iz nespornih dokazov, ki so na primer zaradi svoje empiričnosti in preverljivosti tako očitni, da jih ni mogoče izpodbijati, ni mogoče domnevati, da trditev v obvestilu o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah ni mogoče spremeniti glede na odgovore na to obvestilo.
Furthermore, even if it were accepted that the Court of First Instance was entitled to make a distinction between the findings of fact and the assessments made in the statement of objections, it must be held that in paragraphs 379 and 446 of the judgment under appeal, it categorised as findings of fact certain complex assessments which could not in any event be considered as findings of fact that could not be modified.
Poleg tega, tudi če domnevamo, da je bilo Sodi�če prve stopnje upravičeno razlikovati med ugotovljenim dejanskim stanjem in presojo iz obvestila o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah, je treba ugotoviti, da je zlasti v točkah 379 in 446 izpodbijane sodbe kot ugotovitve dejstev opredelilo določene zapletene presoje, ki jih nikakor ne bi mogli �teti za ugotovitve dejstev, ki jih ne bi bilo mogoče spremeniti.
In those circumstances, it must be held that the Court of First Instance committed an error of law in so far as, in its examination of the line of argument alleging the existence of manifest errors of assessment, it treated certain elements in the statement of objections as being established, without demonstrating the reasons for which, notwithstanding the final position adopted by the Commission in the contested decision, those elements should be considered as being established beyond dispute.
V teh okoli�činah je treba ugotoviti, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno uporabilo pravo, ker je pri preizkusu trditev o obstoju očitne napake pri presoji nekatere elemente iz obvestila o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah �telo za dokazane, ne da bi navedlo razloge, zakaj bi se te elemente, kljub končnemu stali�ču Komisije v sporni odločbi, moralo �teti za nesporno ugotovljene.
None the less, that error is not of itself capable of undermining the finding of the Court of First Instance in paragraph 377 of the judgment under appeal that ‘the evidence, as mentioned in the [contested decision], does not support the conclusions drawn from it’.
Ta napaka sama po sebi ne more ovreči presoje Sodi�ča prve stopnje v točki 377 izpodbijane sodbe, da „z dokazi, ki so navedeni v [sporni] odločbi, ni mogoče utemeljiti ugotovitev, ki iz nje izhajajo“.
Consequently, it is not of itself capable of leading to the setting aside of the judgment under appeal.
Zato kot taka ne more privesti do razveljavitve izpodbijane sodbe.
Further grounds of appeal thus fall to be examined.
Zato je treba preučiti druge pritožbene razloge.
The second ground of appeal, together with the first part of the third ground, alleging errors of law in that the Court of First Instance required the Commission to undertake new market investigations following the response to the statement of objections and applied an unduly high standard of proof to the evidence submitted in response to the statement of objections
Drugi pritožbeni razlog in prvi del tretjega tožbenega razloga: napačna uporaba prava, ker je Sodi�če prve stopnje menilo, da bi morala Komisija opraviti nova preverjanja po odgovoru na obvestilo o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah, in uporabilo pretiran dokazni standard za dokaze, predložne v odgovoru na obvestilo o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah
In its examination of the plea alleging manifest errors of assessment in relation to the issue of market transparency, the Court of First Instance stated in paragraph 414 of the judgment under appeal, in particular, that ‘the parties to the concentration cannot wait until the last minute before submitting evidence to the Commission with a view to refuting objections raised at the proper time by the Commission, since the Commission would then no longer be in a position to carry out the necessary investigations.
Sodi�če prve stopnje v okviru preizkusa tožbenega razloga o očitnih napakah pri presoji glede preglednosti trga v točki 414 izpodbijane sodbe navaja zlasti, da „stranke koncentracije ne smejo čakati do zadnjega, da bi predložile Komisiji dokaze za zavrnitev očitkov, ki jih je pravočasno navedla Komisija, ker ta potem ne bi več mogla opraviti potrebnih preverjanj.
In such a hypothetical situation, that evidence must at the very least be particularly reliable, objective, relevant and cogent if it is to be capable of validly refuting the objections raised by the Commission’.
V takem primeru morajo biti ti dokazi posebej zanesljivi, objektivni, upo�tevni in prepričljivi, da bi bilo mogoče utemeljeno zavrniti očitke Komisije“.
The Court of First Instance also held, in paragraph 415 of the judgment under appeal, that the Commission cannot ‘go so far as to delegate, without supervision, responsibility for conducting certain parts of the investigation to the parties to the concentration, in particular where, as in the present case, those aspects constitute the crucial element on which the [contested decision] is based and where the data and assessments submitted by the parties to the concentration are diametrically opposite to the information gathered by the Commission during its investigation and also to the conclusions which it drew from that information’.
Sodi�če prve stopnje poleg tega v točki 415 izpodbijane sodbe meni, da Komisija ne more „brez nadzora prenesti odgovornost za izvajanje nekaterih vidikov preiskave na stranke koncentracije, zlasti kadar so ti vidiki, kot v obravnavani zadevi, odločilen element, na katerem temelji [sporna] odločba, podatki in ocene, ki so jih podale stranke koncentracije, pa so diametralno nasprotne podatkom, ki jih je zbrala Komisija med svojo preiskavo, ter njenim ugotovitvam na podlagi preiskave“.
In addition, in a number of places in the judgment under appeal, among others in paragraphs 398, 428 and 451, the Court of First Instance stated that the Commission did not, following the response of the parties to the concentration to the statement of objections, carry out any new market investigations in order to test the validity of its altered assessment of the proposed concentration.
Poleg tega v različnih delih izpodbijane sodbe, zlasti v točkah 398, 428 in 451, Sodi�če prve stopnje poudarja, da Komisija po odgovoru strank koncentracije na obvestilo o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah ni opravila novih raziskav trga, da bi preverila utemeljenost njene spremenjene presoje načrtovane koncentracije.
By the second ground of appeal, the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance committed an error of law in holding, in essence, that the Commission is required to undertake new market investigations following the response to the statement of objections.
Pritožnici v okviru drugega pritožbenega razloga navajata, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno uporabilo pravo, ker je v bistvu razsodilo, da mora Komisija izvesti nove raziskave trga po prejemu odgovora na obvestilo o ugotovitvah o možnih kr�itvah.