natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As the Commission rightly stated, the failure to acquire or adapt the equipment necessary cannot be regarded as a lack of technical feasibility within the meaning of Article 26(3) of the Universal Service Directive.
Kot torej Komisija utemeljeno poudarja, nepridobitve ali neprilagoditve potrebnih naprav ni mogoče �teti za pomanjkanje tehnične izvedljivosti v smislu člena 26(3) Direktive o univerzalnih storitev.
Lastly, as regards the arguments put forward by the Republic of Lithuania regarding the method to be employed in order to transmit location information on callers to the ‘112’ number, it must be held, first of all, that Article 26(3) of the Universal Service Directive does not contain any information in that regard and therefore leaves the Member States to decide the manner in which they wish to actually ensure that that information is transmitted.
Nazadnje, v zvezi s trditvami Republike Litve glede sistema, ki ga je treba uporabiti za posredovanje informacij o lokaciji kličočih na �tevilko „112“, je treba ugotoviti, da v členu 26(3) Direktive o univerzalnih storitvah ni nobene navedbe v zvezi s tem in da zato državam članicam daje izbiro glede načina, kako želijo konkretno zagotoviti posredovanje informacij.
In point 4, Recommendation 2003/558 mentions two methods.
Priporočilo 2003/558 se v točki 4 sklicuje na oba sistema.
The first method, called the ‘push’ method consists in the automatic transmission of that information by the operators of telephone networks, while according to the second method, the ‘pull’ method, that information is provided solely at the request of public safety answering points.
Pri prvemu, ki se imenuje sistem „push“, operaterji javnih telefonskih omrežij samodejno posredujejo navedene informacije, medtem ko se pri drugemu, ki se imenuje sistem „pull“, te informacije posredujejo le na zahtevo centrov za sprejemanje klicev v sili.
Although it follows from the wording of point 4 and the 10th recital in the preamble to Recommendation 2003/558 that the Commission regards the application of the first method to be the most effective and recommends that the Member States impose it, at least after an intermediate period, on public telephone networks operating on their territory, it is equally clear that that recommendation, in the light of its non-binding nature, cannot require the Member States to use a specific method in order to implement Article 26(3) of the Universal Service Directive.
Čeprav iz besedila točke 4 in desete uvodne izjave Priporočila 2003/558 izhaja, da Komisija meni, da je uporaba prvega sistem bolj učinkovita, in državam članicam priporoča, da ga vsaj po vmesnem obdobju naložijo operaterjem javnih telefonskih omrežij, ki delujejo na njihovih ozemljih, je očitno tudi, da navedeno priporočilo ob upo�tevanju njegove nezavezujoče narave držav članic ne more zavezovati, da uporabijo določen sistem za izvajanje člena 26(3) Direktive o univerzalnih storitvah.
Not only is the non-binding nature of Recommendation 2003/558 clear from the fifth paragraph of Article 249 EC, but it is also explicitly confirmed by Article 19 of the Framework Directive on the basis of which the recommendation was adopted.
Ta nezavezujoča narava Priporočila 2003/558 ne izhaja le iz člena 249, peti odstavek, ES, ampak je izrecno potrjena tudi v členu 19 okvirne direktive, na podlagi katere je bilo sprejeto navedeno priporočilo.
It is clear from Article 19(1) that the national regulatory authorities may choose not to follow a recommendation adopted by the Commission on the basis of the latter
Iz člena 19(1) namreč jasno izhaja, da se lahko nacionalni regulativni organi odločijo, da ne bodo upo�tevali priporočila, ki ga je
2008 — CASE C-274/07 provision, on condition that they inform the Commission thereof and communicate to the Commission the reasoning for their position.
2008 – ZADEVA C-274/07 sprejela Komisija na podlagi zadnjenavedene določbe, s tem da morajo o tem obvestiti Komisijo in ji navesti razloge za svoje stali�če.
Although the Member States are therefore free to chose the method to be used by the operators of public telephone networks in order to transmit the location information of callers to the ‘112’ number, they are however bound by the clear and precise obligation to achieve a result laid down in Article 26(3) of the Universal Service Dir -ective, which requires them to ensure that that information is made available to the emergency services.
Čeprav države članice torej svobodno izbirajo sistem, ki ga bodo operaterji javnih telefonskih omrežij uporabili za posredovanje informacij o lokaciji kličočih na �tevilko „112“, imajo vendarle jasno in natančno obveznost glede rezultata iz člena 26(3) Direktive o univerzalnih storitvah, ki določa, da morajo zagotoviti, da se te informacije dejansko dajo na voljo dežurnim službam.
In particular, a Member State cannot justify any delay in the implementation of that obligation by the fact that it has decided to put in place the ‘push’ method based on the automatic transmission of location information.
Država članica morebitne zamude pri izpolnjevanju te obveznosti �e posebej ne more opravičevati s tem, da se je odločila uporabiti sistem „push“, ki temelji na samodejnem posredovanju informacij o lokaciji kličoče.
In that connection it must be held that, contrary to the Republic of Lithuania’s assertions, Recommendation 2003/558 does not give extra time to Member States which have opted for the ‘push’ method.
V zvezi s tem je treba ugotoviti, da v nasprotju s trditvami Republike Litve Priporočilo 2003/558 ne določa dodatnega roka za države članice, ki so izbrale sistem „push“.
Not only does the Commission lack powers to legitimately extend the binding timelimit allowed to Member States for compliance with Article 26(3) of the Universal Service Directive, but it also follows from the wording of point 4 of that recommendation that it by no means intends to provide for exemption from compliance with that timelimit.
Ne le da Komisija ni pristojna za veljavno podalj�anje zavezujočega roka, ki je določen za uskladitev držav članic s členom 26(3) Direktive o univerzalnih storitvah, ampak poleg tega iz besedila točke 4 tega priporočila izhaja, da njegov namen nikakor ni, da jih odvrne od spo�tovanja tega roka.
Although point 4 mentions the possibility of implementing the ‘push’ method only after an intermediate period, it explains at the same time that during that period the information on location must at least be provided at the request of the emergency services, that is according to the ‘pull’ method.
Čeprav je v točki 4 navedena možnost uporabe sistema „push“ le po vmesnem obdobju, hkrati določa, da morajo biti v tem obdobju informacije o lokaciji kličočega posredovane vsaj na zahtevo dežurnih služb, torej po sistemu „pull“.
Lastly, as to the alleged uncertainties concerning the method and the period in which to implement the obligation laid down in Article 26(3) of the Universal Service Directive, it must be held that that provision and Recommendation 2003/558 do not
Nazadnje je treba glede domnevne negotovosti v zvezi s sistemom in rokom za izvedbo obveznosti iz člena 26(3) Direktive o univerzalnih storitvah ugotoviti, da
COMMISSION v LITHUANIA give rise to any objective doubt in that respect.
KOMISIJA PROTI LITVI ta določba in Priporočilo 2003/558 ne zbujata nobenega objektivnega dvoma glede tega.
In those circumstances, and taking account of the fact in particular that the Republic of Lithuania itself explained in its defence that Recommendation 2003/558 is not binding on the Member States, it cannot reasonably argue that its delay in effectively implementing Article 26(3) of the Universal Service Directive is justified by a misunderstanding as to its obligations.
Glede na to in ob upo�tevanju tega, da je Republika Litva v odgovoru na tožbo navedla, da Priporočilo 2003/558 za države članice ni zavezujoče, ne more veljavno zatrjevati, da je njena zamuda pri dejanskem izvajanju člena 26(3) Direktive o univerzalnih storitvah upravičena zaradi napačnega razumevanja njenih obveznosti.
In light of the foregoing, it must be held that, by not ensuring in practice that authorities handling emergencies are, to the extent technically feasible, given caller location information for all callers to the single European emergency call number ‘112’ when public telephone networks are used, the Republic of Lithuania has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 26(3) of the Universal Services Directive.
Glede na zgoraj navedeno je treba ugotoviti, da Republika Litva s tem, da v praksi ni zagotovila, da so organom, ki re�ujejo nujne primere, pri vseh klicih iz javnega telefonskega omrežja na enotno evropsko �tevilko klica v sili „112“ dane na voljo informacije o lokaciji kličočega, če je to tehnično izvedljivo, ni izpolnila obveznosti iz člena 26(3) Direktive o univerzalnih storitvah.
Since the Commission has applied for costs to be awarded against the Republic of Lithuania and the latter has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs.
Ker je Komisija predlagala, naj se Republiki Litvi naloži plačilo stro�kov, in ker ta s tožbenimi razlogi ni uspela, se ji naloži plačilo stro�kov.
Declares that, by not ensuring in practice that authorities handling emergencies are, to the extent technically feasible, given caller location information for all callers to the single European emergency call number ‘112’ when
Republika Litva s tem, da v praksi ni zagotovila, da so organom, ki rešujejo nujne primere, pri vseh klicih iz javnega telefonskega omrežja na enotno evropsko številko klica v sili „112“ dane na voljo informacije o lokaciji
2008 — CASE C-274/07 public telephone networks are used, the Republic of Lithuania has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 26(3) of Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services;
2008 – ZADEVA C-274/07 kličočega, če je to tehnično izvedljivo, ni izpolnila obveznosti iz člena 26(3) Direktive 2002/22/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 7. marca 2002 o univerzalni storitvi in pravicah uporabnikov v zvezi z elektronskimi komunikacijskimi omrežji in storitvami (Direktiva o univerzalnih storitvah).
Orders the Republic of Lithuania to pay the costs.
Republiki Litvi se naloži plačilo stroškov.
Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06
Združene zadeve od C-468/06 do C-478/06
(References for a preliminary ruling from the Efetio Athinon)
(Predlog za sprejetje predhodne odločbe, ki ga je vložilo Efeteio Athinon)
(Article 82 EC — Abuse of dominant position — Pharmaceutical products — Refusal to supply wholesalers engaging in parallel exports — Ordinary orders)
„Člen 82 ES – Zloraba prevladujočega položaja – Farmacevtski proizvodi – Zavrnitev oskrbe trgovcem na debelo, ki opravljajo vzporedni izvoz – Običajna naročila“
Competition — Dominant position — Abuse — Refusal to supply wholesalers which export to other Member States — Conditions — Refusal liable to eliminate all effective competition
Konkurenca – Prevladujoči položaj – Zloraba – Zavrnitev dobave trgovcem na debelo, ki izvažajo v druge države članice – Pogoji – Zavrnitev, na podlagi katere je odpravljena vsaka dejanska konkurenčnost
(Art. 82 EC)
(člen 82 ES)
SUMMARY — JOINED CASES C-468/06 TO C-478/06
POVZETEK – ZDRUŽENE ZADEVE OD C-468/06 DO C-478/06
Competition — Dominant position — Abuse — Refusal to supply — Conditions (Arts 3(1)(g) EC and 82 EC)
Konkurenca – Prevladujoči položaj – Zloraba – Zavrnitev dobave – Pogoji (člena 3(1)(g) ES in 82 ES)
Competition — Dominant position — Abuse — Refusal to supply wholesalers which export to other Member States — Pharmaceuticals sector — Impact of the effects of parallel trade of medicinal products for the final consumer on the abusive nature of the refusal
Konkurenca – Prevladujoči položaj – Zloraba – Zavrnitev dobave trgovcem na debelo, ki izvažajo v druge države članice – Sektor farmacevtskih proizvodov – Vpliv učinkov vzporedne trgovine z zdravili za končne potrošnike na zlorabni značaj zavrnitve
Competition — Community rules — Scope ratione materiae — Practices aimed at preventing or restricting parallel exports — Included
Konkurenca – Pravila Skupnosti – Vsebinsko področje uporabe – Praksa, s katero se poskuša prepovedati ali omejiti vzporedni izvoz – Vključitev
Competition — Community rules — Scope ratione materiae — Pharmaceutical sector subject to national price regulation — Included
Konkurenca – Pravila Skupnosti – Vsebinsko področje uporabe – Sektor farmacevtskih proizvodov, za katerega velja nacionalna zakonodaja na področju cen – Vključitev
(Arts 81 EC and 82 EC)
(člena 81 ES in 82 ES)
Competition — Dominant position — Abuse — Refusal to supply wholesalers which export to other Member States — Pharmaceutical sector — Effect of national regulation concerning prices of medicinal products on the abusive nature of the refusal
Konkurenca – Prevladujoči položaj – Zloraba – Zavrnitev dobave trgovcem na debelo, ki izvažajo v druge države članice – Sektor farmacevtskih proizvodov – Vpliv nacionalne zakonodaje na področju cen zdravil na zlorabni značaj zavrnitve
(Arts 3(1)(g) and (t) EC and 82 EC)
(člena 3(1)(g) in (t) ES ter 82 ES)
State, but equally if it leads to the elimination of effective competition from them in the distribution of the products on the markets of the other Member States.
na trgu navedene države članice, temveč tudi če vodi k odpravi njihove dejanske konkurenčnosti pri distribuciji proiz -vodov na trge drugih držav članic.
(see paras 34, 35)
(Glej točki 34 in 35.)
The refusal by an undertaking occupying a dominant position on the market of a given product to meet the orders of an existing customer constitutes abuse of that dominant position under Article 82 EC where, without any objective justification, that conduct is liable to eliminate a trading party as a competitor.
Zavrnitev s strani podjetja s prevladujočim položajem na trgu določenega proizvoda, da izpolni naročila stalne stranke, pomeni zlorabo tega prevladujočega položaja v smislu člena 82 ES, ker lahko, brez vsake objektivne utemeljitve, to ravnanje odpravi konkurenčnosti trgovskega partnerja.
With regard to a refusal by an undertaking to deliver its products in one Member State to wholesalers which export those products to other Member States, such an effect on competition may exist not only if the refusal impedes the activities of those wholesalers in that first Member
Z vidika zavrnitve s strani podjetja, da svoje proizvode v državi članici dobavi trgovcem na debelo, ki te proizvode izvažajo v druge države članice, je obstoj takega vpliva na konkurenco mogoč ne le če ta zavrnitev ovira dejavnosti teh trgovcev na debelo
LÉLOS KAI SIA AND OTHERS practice cannot be regarded as an abuse of the dominant position occupied by that undertaking.
LÉLOS KAI SIA IN DRUGI ne moremo �teti za zlorabo prevladujočega položaja, ki ga ima to podjetje.
product — which cashes in on the reputation of a brand name known to and valued by consumers — cannot stop supplying a long-standing customer who abides by regular commercial practice, if the orders placed by that customer are in no way out of the ordinary.
znamke, ki jo potro�niki poznajo in cenijo – ne sme prenehati dobavljati stalni stranki, ki spo�tuje trgovsko rabo, če naročila te stranke niso neobičajna.
Such conduct is inconsistent with the objectives laid down in Article 3(1)(g) EC, which are set out in detail in Article 82 EC, particularly in points (b) and (c) of the second paragraph of that article, since the refusal to sell would limit the markets to the prejudice of consumers and would amount to discrimination which might in the end eliminate a trading party from the relevant market.
Tako ravnanje naj bi bilo v nasprotju s cilji, navedenimi v členu 3(1)(g) ES, ki so podrobno določeni v členu 82 ES, predvsem drugi odstavek, točki b in c, ker bi zavrnitev prodaje omejevala trge v �kodo potro�nikov in bi vodila do diskriminacije, ki bi na koncu lahko odstranila trgovca z zadevnega trga.
In order to determine whether the refusal by a pharmaceuticals company occupying a dominant position on the national distribution market for certain medicinal products to meet the orders of wholesalers involved in parallel exports to other Member States where the selling prices of those medicines are set at a higher level indeed falls within the prohibition laid down in Article 82 EC, in particular at point (b) of the second paragraph of that article, it must be examined whether there are objective considerations based on which such a
Da bi se ugotovilo, ali zavrnitev – s strani farmacevtskega podjetja s prevladujočim položajem na nacionalnem trgu distribucije določenih zdravil – izpolnjevanja naročil trgovcev na debelo, vključenih v vzporedni izvoz v druge države članice, kjer so prodajne cene teh zdravil vi�je, spada v prepoved, ki jo določa člen 82 ES, zlasti njegov drugi odstavek, točka b, je treba preučiti, ali obstajajo objektivni preudarki, na podlagi katerih take prakse
In that connection, such an undertaking cannot rely on the fact that the parallel exports which it seeks to limit are of only minimal benefit to the final consumers.
Glede tega se tako podjetje ne more opreti na dejstvo, da ima vzporedni izvoz, ki ga sku�a omejiti, le majhno korist za končnega potro�nika.
Parallel exports of medicinal products from a Member State where the prices are low to other Member States in which the prices are higher open up in principle an alternative source of supply to buyers of the medicinal products in those latter States, which necessarily brings some benefits to the final consumer of those products.
Vzporedni izvoz zdravil iz države članice, v kateri so cene teh zdravil nizke, v države članice, v katerih so cene vi�je, namreč načeloma kupcem teh zdravil v slednjih državah daje na voljo alternativni vir oskrbe, kar gotovo pomeni prednost za končnega potro�nika teh zdravil.
The attraction of the other source of supply which arises from parallel trade in the importing Member State lies in the fact that that trade is capable of offering the same products on the market of that Member State at lower prices than those applied on the same market by the pharmaceuticals companies.
Privlačnost drugega vira dobave, ki nastopi z vzporedno trgovino v državi članici uvoza, je prav v dejstvu, da lahko ta trgovina ponuja enake proizvode na trgu te države članice po nižji ceni od tiste, ki jih uporabljajo farmacevtska podjetja na istem trgu.
As a result, even in the Member States where the prices of medicines are subject to State regulation, parallel trade is liable to exert pressure on prices and, consequently, to create financial benefits not only for the social health insurance funds, but equally for the patients concerned, for whom the proportion of the price of medicines for which they are responsible will be lower.
Kot posledica se lahko tudi v državah članicah, v katerih so cene zdravil predmet državne ureditve, z vzporedno trgovino izvaja pritisk na cene in zato se ustvarijo finančne ugodnosti ne le za sklade zdravstvenega zavarovanja, temveč tudi za zadevne bolnike, za katere bo delni znesek cene zdravila, ki ga plačajo sami, nižji.
At the same time, parallel trade in medicines from one Member State to another is likely to increase the choice available
Obenem lahko vzporedna trgovina z zdravili iz ene države članice v drugo poveča izbiro, ki jo imajo pravne osebe v slednji državi članici, ki pridobi zaloge zdravil na podlagi
SUMMARY — JOINED CASES C-468/06 TO C-478/06 and the prices that those exports would obtain for final consumers in the other Member States.
POVZETEK – ZDRUŽENE ZADEVE OD C-468/06 DO C-478/06 izvozi zagotovili končnim potro�nikom v drugih državah članicah.
to entities in the latter Member State which obtain supplies of medicines by means of a public procurement proced- ure, in which the parallel importers can offer medicines at lower prices.
postopka javnega naročila, v okviru katerega lahko vzporedni uvozniki ponujajo zdravila po nižjih cenah.
(see paras 65, 66)
(Glej točki 65 in 66.)
(see paras 38, 39, 51, 53, 55-57)
(Glej točke 38, 39, 51, 53 in od 55 do 57.)
The fact that there is a degree of State price regulation in the pharmaceuticals sector cannot preclude the Community rules on competition from applying.
Okoli�čina, da obstaja državna ureditev cen v sektorju farmacevtskih proizvodov, ne more izključiti uporabe pravil Skupnosti o konkurenci.
First, the control exercised by Member States over the selling prices or the reimbursement of those products does not entirely remove their prices from the law of supply and demand.
Po eni strani namreč nadzor, ki ga izvajajo države članice nad prodajnimi cenami ali povračili teh proizvodov, ne zavaruje popolnoma njihove cene pred zakonom ponudbe in povpra�evanja.
Secondly, where a pharmaceutical product is protected by a patent which confers a tempor- ary monopoly on its holder, the price competition which may exist between a producer and its distributors, or between parallel traders and national distributors, is, until the expiry of that patent, the only form of competition which can be envisaged.
Po drugi strani, kjer je farmacevtski proizvod za�čiten s patentom, ki podeljuje začasen monopol njegovemu imetniku, je cenovna konkurenca, ki lahko obstaja med proizvajalcem in njegovimi distributerji ali med vzporednimi trgovci in nacionalnimi distributerji, do poteka tega patenta edina predvidljiva oblika konkurence.
(see paras 61, 64, 67)
(Glej točke 61, 64 in 67.)
In relation to the application of Article 81 EC, an agreement between producer and distributor which might tend to restore the national divisions in trade between Member States might be such as to frustrate the objective of the Treaty to achieve the integration of national markets through the establishment of a single market.
V okviru uporabe člena 81 ES je Sodi�če razsodilo, da sporazum med proizvajalcem in distributerjem, s katerim se vzpostavijo nacionalne pregrade v trgovini med državami članicami, lahko ogroža cilje Pogodbe za dosego integracije nacionalnih trgov z vzpostavitvijo enotnega trga.
Thus, agreements aimed at partitioning national markets according to national borders or making the interpenetration of national markets more difficult, in particular those aimed at preventing or restricting parallel exports, have been held by the Community judicature to be agreements whose object is to restrict competition within the meaning of that article of the Treaty.
Tako je sodi�če Skupnosti sporazume, s katerimi se je sku�alo predeliti nacionalne trge po nacionalnih mejah ali otežiti prodor na nacionalne trge, predvsem tiste, s katerimi se je merilo na omejevanje vzporednega izvoza, večkrat opredelilo kot sporazume, ki imajo za cilj omejevanje konkurence v smislu navedenega člena Pogodbe.
In the light of the abovementioned Treaty objective as well as that of ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted, there can be no escape from the prohibition laid down in Article 82 EC for the practices of an undertaking in a dominant position which are aimed at avoiding all parallel exports from a Member State to other Member States, practices which, by partitioning the national markets, neutralise the benefits of ef -fective competition in terms of the supply
Z vidika omenjenega cilja Pogodbe in cilja, na podlagi katerega ne sme priti do izkrivljanja konkurence na notranjem trgu, se tej prepovedi iz člena 82 ES prav tako ne morejo izogniti prakse podjetja s prevladujočim položajem, s katerimi se sku�a izogniti vsem vzporednim izvozom iz države članice v drugo državo članico, in sicer so to prakse, ki z deljenjem nacionalnih trgov nevtralizirajo koristi učinkovite konkurence v smislu oskrbe in cen, ki bi jih ti
LÉLOS KAI SIA AND OTHERS are reasonable and in proportion to the need to protect its own commercial interests.
LÉLOS KAI SIA IN DRUGI