natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the Opinion in Lombardini and Mantovani, I stated that Italian law implements a mathematical, automatic system for setting the irregularity threshold, which is perfectly in line with the aims of Directive 93/37, allowing the market to establish the threshold, above which a tender may be considered irregular, for each contract.
V sklepnih predlogih v zadevi Lombardini in Mantovani navajam, da je italijanska zakonodaja vzpostavila aritmetični in samodejni mehanizem določitve praga nenavadnosti, ki se povsem sklada s ciljem Direktive 93/37, saj spodbuja, da se za vsak posamezen razpis določi prag, pod katerim je mogoče ponudbo �teti za neobičajno.
OPINION OF MR RUIZ-JARABO — JOINED CASES C-147/06 AND C-148/06 pean Union.
SKLEPNI PREDLOGI RUIZ-JARABOJA – ZDRUŽENI ZADEVI C-147/06 IN C-148/06 o temeljnih pravicah Evropske unije 35v členu 41 Poglavja V, ki je posvečeno državljanstvu.
35Article 41(2) recognises the right of every person to be heard before any individual measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken.
Odstavek 2 tega člena priznava pravico vsake osebe, da pred sprejetjem kakr�nega koli posamičnega ukrepa v njeno �kodo pove svoje mnenje.
dures of Community interest, the contracting authority must take into account, as part of an exchange of views, the contentions of undertakings whose tenders have been classified as abnormally low.
zgoraj navedenimi načeli upravni organ, ki je naročnik, v okviru kontradiktorne razprave prisluhniti navedbam podjetnikov, katerih ponudbe so bile opredeljene kot neobičajno nizke.
Those principles therefore preclude a national provision which, in the case of contracts whose value is below the threshold laid down in the sectoral directives, requires the automatic exclusion of such tenders without allowing the parties to be heard.
Zato so ta načela v nasprotju z nacionalno zakonodajo, ki za naročila, katerih znesek je nižji od praga, ki ga določajo sektorske direktive, predpisuje samodejno izključitev teh ponudb, ne da bi bila izvedena obravnava.
The Charter, whose importance the Court has recently made clear, in particular in the judgments in Parliament v Council 36and Advocaten voor de Wereld, 37requires that, before a tenderer is excluded, he must have the opportunity to state his views in order to persuade the contracting authority that his bid is genuine.
Z Listino, katere pomen je Sodi�če poudarilo pred kratkim, zlasti v sodbah z dne 27. junija 2006 v zadevi Parlament proti Svetu 36in z dne 8. maja 2007 v zadevi Advocaten voor de Wereld, 37se zahteva, da
The right to good administration
Pravica do dobrega upravljanja ponudnik, preden je izločen, predstavi svoje stali�če, da bi naročnika prepričal o ustreznosti svoje ponudbe.
To the foregoing objective, abstract view, which transcends the individual interests of the undertakings participating in a selection process, another, subjective, view must be added, according to which the rights of those undertakings, in particular the right not to be deprived of the opportunity to be heard in administrative procedures, are extremely important.
Temu objektivnemu in abstraktnemu vidiku, ki presega individualne interese podjetnikov, ki so vpleteni v izbirni postopek, se pridružuje �e drug, subjektivni vidik, s katerega so zelo pomembne pravice posameznikov in zlasti prepoved, da bi jim odvzeli pravico do obrambe v upravnem postopku.
However, a tenderer at risk of being excluded as a result of a collusive agreement between other parties is at a disadvantage, and all the more so if, in addition, he is not permitted to provide explanations.
Vendar pa je konkurent, ki tvega, da ne bo izbran zaradi dogovora med drugimi, v slab�em položaju, njegov položaj pa se bo �e poslab�al, če ne bo dobil možnosti, da svojo ponudbo pojasni.
1.36 — Case C-540/03 [2006] ECR I-5769.
1.36 – Zadeva C-540/03, ZOdl., str. I-5769.
37 — Case C-303/05 [2007] ECR I-3633.
37 – Zadeva C-303/05, ZOdl., str. I-3633.
As to the nature of the Charter, see points 76 to 79 of my Opinion in that case.
Glede značaja Listine glej moje sklepne predloge v tej zadevi od točke 76 do točke 79.
The right not to be deprived of the opportunity to be heard is expressly provided for in the legal systems of all the Member States and forms part of the right to good administration enshrined in Article 41, under Chapter V on citizens’ rights, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
Prepoved odvzema pravice do obrambe, izrecno priznavajo pravni sistemi vseh držav članic in je sestavni del pravice do dobrega upravljanja, o kateri govori Listina
Thus, the right to be heard by the administrative authorities is the basis for arguing against the automatic exclusion of abnormally low tenders, since, as I have indicated, the notion of ‘abnormality’ is an indeterminate legal concept which must be substantiated in each case by reference to the particular circumstances of the candidates.
Tako je pravica do predstavitve svojega stali�ča upravnemu organu v nasprotju s samodejno izključitvijo neobičajno nizkih ponudb, saj je, kot sem že navedel, pojem „neobičajen“ nedoločen pravni koncept, ki ga je treba dopolniti v vsakem posameznem primeru glede na značilnosti kandidatov.
tion under which contracting authorities are bound automatically to reject abnormally low tenders for public contracts excluded from the scope of the directives on the coordination of award procedures. On the contrary, under Community law, such authorities must have the opportunity to decide, depending on the circumstances in each case, whether it is appropriate to allow the candidates to be heard in order to verify, in an inter partes procedure, the composition of their tenders. 39
nikom nalagajo, naj pri javnih naročilih, za katera ne veljajo sektorske direktive za uskladitev postopkov naročil, samodejno zavrnejo neobičajno nizke ponudbe, in, nasprotno, priporoča, da se tem organom da možnost, da od primera do primera presodijo, ali kaže začeti obravnavo, med katero bi se s kontradiktornim postopkom preverila struktura teh ponudb. 39
Accordingly, the right to good administration militates against the abolition of the inter partes procedure for the verification of tenders before a decision is taken on their merits and this extends to contracts excluded from the scope of the sectoral directives, because it would entail a weakening of the guarantees laid down in what are known as the ‘remedies’ directives. 38
Zato se z vidika pravice do dobrega upravljanja odsvetuje, da se pred izrekanjem o upo�tevnosti ponudb odpravi kontradiktorni postopek njihovega preverjanja, tudi če gre za naročila, ki ne spadajo na področje uporabe sektorskih direktiv, saj bi se v tem primeru zmanj�ala jamstva, ki jih določata t. i. „revizijski“ direktivi. 38
The discretion of the Member States
Prosta presoja držav članic
However, the freedom of action accorded to the Member States means that they are not obliged to take the route provided for in Article 30(4) of Directive 93/37 and permits them to establish the manner in which the rights conferred by the Community legal system on individuals are to be protected, subject only to the limitations imposed by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, namely that the procedures may not be less favourable than those designed for the protection of rights under national law and must be organised in such a way that, in practice, they do not make it difficult or virtually impossible to achieve the aim pursued. 40
Vendar države članice njihova avtonomija odvezuje obveznosti, da ravnajo po členu 30(4) Direktive 93/37; namesto tega lahko same opredelijo način, kako bodo za�čitile pravice, ki jih državljanom zagotavlja pravo Skupnosti, pri čemer so omejene samo z načeloma enakovrednosti in učinkovitosti: to pomeni, da postopki ne smejo biti manj ugodni od postopkov, predvidenih za za�čito pravic, ki temeljijo na notranji ureditvi, in jih je treba organizirati tako, da ne postane doseganje zastavljenega cilja v praksi težko izvedljivo ali celo nemogoče. 40
It follows from the foregoing that Community law precludes national legisla-
Iz navedenega sledi, da pravo Skupnosti nasprotuje nacionalnim predpisom, ki naroč-
39 — In Case C-247/02 Sintesi [2004] ECR I-9215, the Court declared void a national provision which restricted contracting authorities to taking account of a single criterion for the award of public works contracts, thereby depriving them of the possibility of taking into consideration the nature and specific characteristics of such contracts, and of choosing the criterion most likely to ensure free competition and thus the best tender (paragraph 40).
39 – S sodbo z dne 7. oktobra 2004 v zadevi Sintesi (C-247/02, ZOdl., str. I-9215) je bila razveljavljena nacionalna določba, ki je naročnikom nalagala uporabo samo enega merila za dodeljevanje javnih naročil, s čimer jih je prikraj�ala za možnost, da bi upo�tevali vrsto in posebnosti takih naročil ter izbrali najustreznej�e merilo za zagotovitev svobodne konkurence in najbolj�o ponudbo (točka 40).
38 — Directive 89/665 and Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors (OJ 1992 L 76, p. 14).
38 – Zgoraj navedena Direktiva 89/665 in Direktiva Sveta 92/13/EGS z dne 25. februarja 1992 o uskladitvi zakonov in drugih predpisov o uporabi pravil Skupnosti za oddajo javnih naročil podjetij na vodnem, energetskem, transportnem in telekomunikacijskem področju (UL L 76, str. 14).
40 — According to settled caselaw and first expressed in Case 33/76 Rewe [1976] ECR 1989.
40 – V skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso, katere temeljni kamen je sodba z dne 16. decembra 1976 v zadevi Rewe (33/76, Recueil, str. 1989).
In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court replies to the Consiglio di Stato in the following manner:
Ob upo�tevanju teh ugotovitev Sodi�ču predlagam, naj na vpra�anje Consiglio di Stato de la República Italiana odgovori:
’The principles of free competition, administrative transparency and nondiscrimination on grounds of nationality, which govern Community public procurement law, together with the right to good administration preclude national legislation which, with regard to the procedure for the award of public contracts excluded from the directives governing that field, obliges the contracting authority automatically to reject abnormally low tenders without providing for any inter partes verification procedure.’
Načela svobodne konkurence, upravne preglednosti in nediskriminacije glede na državljanstvo, ki urejajo pravo Skupnosti na področju oddaje javnih naročil, kakor tudi pravica do dobrega upravljanja, nasprotujejo nacionalnemu predpisu, ki naročniku nalaga, da mora, kar zadeva postopek oddaje javnih naročil, izključenih iz sektorskih direktiv, samodejno in brez kakr�ne koli možnosti kontradiktornega preverjanja zavrniti neobičajno nizke ponudbe.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fourth Chamber)
SODBA SODIŠČA (četrti senat) z dne 15. maja 2008 *
REFERENCE for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy), made by decision of 25 October 2005, received at the Court on 20 March 2006, in the proceedings
V združenih zadevah C-147/06 in C-148/06, katerih predmet sta predloga za sprejetje predhodne odločbe na podlagi člena 234 ES, ki ju je vložilo Consiglio di Stato (Italija), z odločbama z dne 25. oktobra 2005, ki sta na Sodi�če prispeli 20. marca 2006, v postopkih
2008 — JOINED CASES C-147/06 AND C-148/06
2008 – ZDRUŽENI ZADEVI C-147/06 IN C-148/06
Advocate General: D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Registrar: M. Ferreira, Principal Administrator, having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 25 October 2007, after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:
Ferreira, glavna administratorka, na podlagi pisnega postopka in obravnave z dne 25. oktobra 2007, ob upo�tevanju stali�č, ki so jih predložili:
— the French Government, by G. de Bergues and J.-C. Gracia, acting as Agents,
– za francosko vlado G. de Bergues in J.-C. Gracia, zastopnika,
These references for a preliminary ruling concern the interpretation of Article 30(4) of Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of
Predloga za sprejetje predhodne odločbe se nana�ata na razlago člena 30(4) Direktive Sveta 93/37/EGS z dne 14. junija 1993 o usklajevanju postopkov za oddajo javnih
SECAP AND SANTORSO procedures for the award of public works contracts (OJ 1993 L 199, p.
SECAP IN SANTORSO naročil za gradnje (UL L 199, str.
54), as amended by European Parliament and Council Directive 97/52/EC of 13 October 1997 (OJ 1997 L 328, p.
54), kot je bila spremenjena z Direktivo 97/52/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 13. oktobra 1997 (UL L 328, str.
1) (‘Directive 93/97’), and fundamental principles of Community law concerning the award of public contracts.
1, v nadaljevanju: Direktiva 93/37), in razlago temeljnih načel prava Skupnosti pri oddaji javnih naročil.
The references were made in proceedings between, first, SECAP SpA (‘SECAP’) and, secondly, Santorso Soc. coop arl (‘Santorso’) and the Comune di Torino concerning the compatibility with Community law of a requirement laid down in Italian legislation concerning public works contracts having a value lower than the threshold laid down in Directive 93/37 that tenders considered to be abnormally low are to be automatically excluded.
Ta predloga sta bila vložena v okviru sporov med SECAP SpA (v nadaljevanju: SECAP) in Santorso Soc. coop. arl (v nadaljevanju: Santorso) ter Comune di Torino glede združljivosti s pravom Skupnosti pravila italijanske zakonodaje, ki predvideva, kar zadeva javna naročila za gradnje, katerih znesek je nižji od praga, ki je naveden v Direktivi 93/37, samodejno izključitev neobičajno nizkih ponudb.
Pursuant to Article 6(1)(a) thereof, Directive 93/37 applies to ‘… public works contracts whose estimated value net of value added tax (VAT) is not less than the equivalent in [euros] of 5 000 000 special drawing rights (SDRs)’.
Direktiva 93/37 se v skladu z njenim členom 6(1)(a) uporablja za „[…] javna naročila gradenj, katerih ocenjena neto vrednost brez davka na dodano vrednost (DDV) ni nižja kakor enakovreden znesek v [eurih] za 5 000 000 posebnih pravic črpanja (SDR)“.
Article 30 of Directive 93/37, which forms part of Title IV of the directive entitled ‘Common Rules on Participation’, Chapter 3 of which is concerned with the criteria for the award of contracts, provides as follows:
Člen 30 Direktive 93/37 pod naslovom IV „Skupna pravila o udeležbi“, katerega poglavje 3 zadeva kriterije za oddajo naročil, določa:
The criteria on which the contracting authorities shall base the award of contracts shall be:
Kriteriji, na podlagi katerih naročniki oddajo naročila, so:
(a) either the lowest price only;
(a) ali le najnižja cena;
(b) or, when the award is made to the most economically advantageous tender, various criteria according to the contract: e.g. price, period for completion, running costs, profitability, technical merit.
(b) ali, če je naročilo oddano za ekonomsko najugodnej�o ponudbo, različni kriteriji v zvezi s pogodbo: na primer cena, izvedbeni rok, tekoči stro�ki, finančne ugodnosti, tehnična prednost.
If, for a given contract, tenders appear to be abnormally low in relation to the works, the contracting authority shall, before it may reject those tenders, request, in writing, details of the constituent elements of the tender which it considers relevant and shall verify those constituent elements taking account of the explanations received.
Če se za dano naročilo zdijo ponudbe neobičajno nizke glede na gradnje, naročnik pisno zahteva, preden zavrne tak�ne ponudbe, podrobnosti o sestavnih elementih ponudbe, ki so po njegovem mnenju pomembni, in jih preveri ob upo�tevanju prejetih pojasnil.
The contracting authority may take into consideration explanations which are justified on objective grounds including the economy of the construction method, or the technical solution chosen, or the exceptionally favourable conditions available to the tenderer for the execution of the work, or the originality of the work proposed by the tenderer.
Naročnik lahko upo�teva pojasnila, ki so utemeljena z objektivnimi razlogi, vključno z ekonomičnostjo konstrukcijske metode, ali zaradi izbrane tehnične re�itve ali zaradi izjemno ugodnih pogojev, ki so na voljo gradbeniku za izvedbo gradnje, ali pa zaradi izvirnosti storitve, ki jo predlaga ponudnik.
The content of Article 30(4) of Directive 93/37 is reiterated and developed in Article 55, entitled ‘Abnormally low tenders’, of Directive 2004/18//EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114).
Vsebina člena 30(4) Direktive 93/37 je natančneje povzeta v členu 55 Direktive 2004/18/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 31. marca 2004 o usklajevanju postopkov za oddajo javnih naročil gradenj, blaga in storitev (UL L 134. str.
The purpose of that directive, as set out in recital 1 of its preamble, was a recasting within a single measure of the directives which applied to the procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts and, under Article 80(1), the date for transposition of that directive into the legal systems of the Member States was to be no later than 31 January 2006.
V skladu s prvo uvodno izjavo so v Direktivi 2004/18 združene direktive, ki ločeno urejajo postopke za oddajo javnih naročil gradenj, blaga in storitev, v skladu s členom 80(1) pa naj bi bila ta direktiva prenesena v pravne rede držav članic najpozneje do 31. januarja 2006.
The reason for which tenders which appear to be abnormally low in relation to the goods, works or services are not automatically excluded is apparent from the first paragraph of recital 46 in the preamble to Directive 2004/18, which states that ‘[c]ontracts should be awarded on the basis of objective criteria … which guarantee that tenders are assessed in conditions of effective competition.
Razlog za samodejno neizključitev ponudb, ki se izkažejo za neobičajno nizke glede na blago, gradnje ali storitve, izhaja iz prvega odstavka uvodne izjave 46 Direktive 2004/18, v skladu s katerim je „[n]aročila […] treba oddati na podlagi objektivnih meril, […] ki jamčijo ocenjevanje ponudb v razmerah učinkovite konkurence.
As a result, it is appropriate to allow the application of two award criteria only: “the lowest price” and “the most economically advantageous tender”’.
Zato je primerno dovoliti uporabo samo dveh meril za oddajanje naročila: ‚najnižja cena‘ in ‚ekonomsko najugodnej�a ponudba‘“.
Those two award criteria are referred to in Article 30(1)(a) and (b) of Directive 93/37 and Article 53(1)(a) and (b) of Directive 2004/18.
Ti merili za oddajanje naročila sta omenjeni v členu 30(1)(a) in (b) Direktive 93/37 in 53(1)(a) in (b) Direktive 2004/18.
Article 21(1)(a) of that law, in the version applicable to the disputes in the main proceedings (‘Law No 109/94’), is worded as follows:
Člen 21(1a) omenjenega zakona, v različici, ki se uporablja v sporih v glavni stvari (v nadaljevanju: zakon �t. 109/94), določa:
‘In cases of awards of contracts for works to a value equivalent in euros to 5 000 000 SDRs or above on the basis of the lowest-bid criterion mentioned in paragraph 1, the authority concerned must assess the irregular nature of the tenders referred to in Article 30 of … Directive 93/37 … in relation to all tenders undercutting the indicative price to an extent equal to or greater than the arithmetical mean of the percentage discounts of all the tenders admitted, excluding 10%, rounded up to the nearest digit, of those offering the highest and lowest discounts respectively, increased by the arithmetical mean of the difference in the percentage discounts which are in excess of the said mean.
„Ob naročilu gradenj v vrednosti 5 milijonov ali več SDR v eurih ob uporabi merila najnižje cene v smislu odstavka 1 zadevni upravni organ presodi nenavadnost – v smislu člena 30 Direktive 93/37/ […] – vsake ponudbe, pri kateri je popust enak ali vi�ji od aritmetične sredine odstotnih vrednosti popusta vseh dopustnih ponudb (to je brez 10 %, zaokroženo navzgor, ponudb z vi�jim oziroma nižjim popustom), povečane za aritmetično sredino odstotkov popusta, ki presegajo zgoraj navedeno sredino.
Tenders must be accompanied, when submitted, by explanations concerning the most significant price components, indicated in the tender notices or the letters of invitation, which together add up to not less than 75% of the basic contract value.
Ponudbam morajo biti že ob predložitvi priložena dokazila, ki se nana�ajo na najpomembnej�e cenovne postavke, navedene v obvestilu o razpisu ali pisnem povabilu k sodelovanju, na podlagi katerih je mogoče priti do zneska v vrednosti najmanj 75 % osnovne tržne vrednosti.
The tender notice or letter of invitation must specify the manner in which explanations are to be submitted but must also state which explanations may be necessary in order for tenders to be admitted.
V obvestilu o razpisu ali pisnem povabilu k sodelovanju morajo biti natančneje določeni načini predložitve pojasnil in navedeno, katera so morebiti potrebna, da bi bila ponudba dopustna.
Explanations are not required for elements for which minimum values may be ascertained from official data.
Pojasnila niso potrebna za elemente, za katere je lahko minimalna vrednost ugotovljena na podlagi uradnih podatkov.
If, upon examination, the explanations requested and provided are insufficient for the possibility that the tender contains inconsistencies to be excluded, the tenderer shall be requested to supplement the supporting documentation and the decision whether to exclude the tender may be taken only after further verification, it being possible for arguments to be exchanged.
Če pregled zahtevanih in prejetih pojasnil ne zadostuje, da bi se izključila nekoherentnost ponudbe, se ponudnika povabi, naj dopolni dokazne dokumente, o izključitvi pa se lahko odloči le po poznej�em kontradiktornem postopku preverjanja.
For public works contracts with a value below the Community threshold only, the authority concerned shall automatically exclude tenders having a percentage discount equal to or greater than the percentage referred to in the first subparagraph.
Kar zadeva samo javna naročila za gradnje v znesku, nižjem od praga Skupnosti, zadevni upravni organ uporabi samodejno izključitev iz postopka za ponudbe, katerih odstotni delež popusta je enak ali vi�ji od deleža, določenega v prvem pododstavku tega odstavka.
The automatic exclusion procedure shall not apply if the number of valid tenders is lower than five.’
Postopek samodejne izključitve se ne uporablja, ko je �tevilo veljavnih ponudb manj�e od pet.“
SECAP took part in a competitive tender procedure announced by the Comune di Torino in December 2002 for a public works contract with an estimated value of EUR 4 699 999.
SECAP je sodeloval na javnem razpisu za zbiranje ponudb, ki ga je objavila Comune di Torino decembra 2002 glede javnega naročila za gradnje, katerih ocenjena vrednost je bila 4.699.999 EUR.
At the time of that call for tenders, the threshold for the application of Directive 93/37 was set, in accordance with Article 6(1)(a) thereof, at EUR 6 242 028.
Na dan tega javnega razpisa je prag za uporabo Direktive 93/37, ki je določen v skladu z njenim členom 6(1)(a), zna�al 6.242.028 EUR.
Santorso took part in a similar tender procedure, announced in September 2004, for a contract with an estimated value of EUR 5 172 579.
Santorso je sodeloval na podobnem javnem razpisu, ki je bil objavljen septembra 2004, z ocenjeno vrednostjo 5.172.579 EUR.
At that time, the threshold for the application of Directive 93/37 was EUR 5 923 624.
Tistega dne je prag za uporabo Direktive 93/37 zna�al 5.923.624 EUR.
Consequently, in both cases the estimated value of the contracts in question was below the relevant thresholds for the application of Directive 93/37.
Zato je bila v obeh primerih ocenjena vrednost zadevnih javnih naročil nižja od ustreznih pragov za uporabo Direktive 93/37.