natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
43 — Paragraph 35 of the judgment in Case C-146/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-9767.
43 – Točka 35 sodbe Sodi�ča z dne 6. decembra 2001 v zadevi Komisija proti Franciji (C-146/00, Recueil, str. I-9767).
(c) The access deficit consciously maintaining predatory prices 45and, rather than passing them on to their customers, transferring them to other operators, as the appellants in the main proceedings maintain in their written observations.
SKLEPNI PREDLOGI RUIZ-JARABOJA — ZDRUŽENE ZADEVE OD C-152/07 DO 154/07 c) Deficit dostopa proti tekmecem, s tem da bi zavestno ohranjala plenilske cene 45, katerih stro�ek nosijo drugi operaterji in ne naročniki, kot v pisnih stali�čih razlagajo tožeče stranke v postopkih v glavni stvari.
Losses arise when the costs of providing new undertakings with the use of the local loop exceed the revenues generated by that task.
Izgube nastanejo v trenutku, ko stro�ki omogočanja uporabe krajevnih zank novim podjetjem presegajo dohodke, ki jih ta dejavnost prina�a.
Thus, competition is distorted since the new operators, who are forced to pay the additional charges, have to increase their prices in order to remain profitable, to the detriment of their own competitiveness. Accordingly, the explanation put forward by the German Government at the hearing, to the effect that the situation is beneficial to the other operators, including Arcor, is baseless.
S tem se izkrivlja konkurenca, saj morajo zaradi obveznosti plačila prispevkov novi operaterji zaradi zagotavljanja donosnosti v �kodo svoje konkurenčnosti na trgu povi�ati cene, zaradi česar je razlaga, ki jo je nem�ka vlada podala na obravnavi, in sicer da ureditev koristi alternativnim operaterjem, med drugim Arcorju, povsem neutemeljena.
That shortfall is deeply rooted in the era of the monopoly, when the financial parameters were drawn up by reference to the effort of the end user and the spirit of cooperation precluded excessive charges, which meant that the actual costs of providing the service were not covered.
Ta izgubljeni prihodek ima korenine v tradiciji monopolov, za katere je bilo značilno, da so se ekonomski parametri prilagajali prispevku končnega uporabnika in je solidarnost nasprotovala prevelikim zneskom, tako da realni stro�ki storitve niso bili pokriti.
Deutsche Telekom therefore benefits from protectionism contrary to Article 82 EC et seq., which also appears to be endogamous since, as the undertaking has acknowledged in its observations, the Federal Republic of Germany held a stake of 31.7% in its capital, although at the hearing the representative of Firma 01051 Telekom GmbH put that shareholding as high as 43%. 46
Deutsche Telekom tako, v nasprotju s členom 82 ES in naslednjimi, uživa prednosti protekcionizma, kar se poleg tega zdi endogamno, saj je, kot je podjetje potrdilo v svojih stali�čih, Zvezna republika Nemčija lastnica 31,7 % njegovega kapitala, po navedbah predstavnika Firma 01051 Telekom GmbH, podanih na obravnavi, pa ta delež zna�a celo 43 % 46.
However, the view put forward by the German Government and Deutsche Telekom is no longer consistent with Community law, because the turning point is set at 1 January 1998, with the possibility of an extension until 1 January 2000, for the purpose of ensuring, as a transitional measure, that the former monopolies adapt to the new situation and rebalance the prices they charge.
Vendar pravo Skupnosti ne dopu�ča več hipoteze, ki jo predlagata nem�ka vlada in Deutsche Telekom, kajti dan preobrata je bil določen za 1. januar 1998, z možnostjo podalj�anja do 1. januarja 2000, da bi se prej�njim monopolistom omogočilo, da se prilagodijo novim predpisom in uskladijo zneske, ki jih bodo prejemali.
ARCOR AND OTHERS
ARCOR IN DRUGI strani, da isti člen ne nasprotuje ohranitvi možnosti izravnave teh razlik.
Clearly, if Community law proscribes such losses then the suggestion that they may be neutralised by compensating for them in that way amounts to perpetuating them. 49
Če pravo Skupnosti ne sprejema teh izgub, pomeni zagovarjanje možnosti takega načina njihove izravnave predpostavljanje njihove ohranitve 49.
The distinction between interconnection charges and universal service charges would become blurred if other charges were permitted as an alternative to the rebalancing of tariffs, which specifically promotes the abolition of barriers to carrier preselection and the removal of any deficit.
Če bi kot alternativo k omenjenem ravnotežju cen, ki poleg odstranitve ovir za predizbiro operaterja zagotavlja tudi izravnavo morebitne negativne razlike v stro�kih, sprejeli plačevanje drugačnih prispevkov, bi se ločitev med prispevki za medomrežno povezovanje in prispevki za univerzalno storitev zabrisala.
That gives rise to the need to connect the adjunct and the principal to identical outcomes, 50from which it follows that if a debt is cleared then so are its consequences.
Zato je nujno, da enako usodo doživita tako postransko kot poglavitno 50, iz česar sledi, da se s poravnavo izgub enako razre�ijo tudi njihove posledice.
(d) Charges additional to charges: an ephemeral measure
d) Doplačila k tarifam za povezovanje: kratkotrajen ukrep
Like a hypochondriac, 51Deutsche Telekom complains about an historical shortfall for which, in my opinion, it alone is responsible.
Kot nami�ljeni bolnik 51se Deutsche Telekom pritožuje nad anahronistično izgubo, ki jo je, po mojem mnenju, zakrivil prav on sam.
The arguments of Germany and Deutsche Telekom, to the effect that the Dir -ectives concerned do not preclude such financing, are without foundation.
Trditve Nemčije in Deutsche Telekoma, da obravnavani direktivi ne prepovedujeta takega načina financiranja, niso utemeljene.
I agree with all those who have participated in the preliminary-ruling proceedings that the losses arising from the local loop in 2003 are caused by the practices of the dominant operator, since I see no obstacle at all which would have prevented it from compensating for those losses by increasing its prices.
Strinjam se z vsemi udeleženci postopka za predhodno odločanje, da izgube, ki so v letu 2003 nastale zaradi obveznosti zagotavljanja dostopa do krajevne zanke, izhajajo iz taktik operaterja s prevladujočim položajem, saj ne vidim nobenih ovir, ki bi onemogočale pokritje izgub s povi�anjem tarif.
I must draw attention to the contradiction between asserting, on the one hand, that Article 4c of Directive 90/388 prohibits charges below the actual cost of providing the service and, on the other hand, that
Moram poudariti protislovnost zatrjevanj, po eni strani, da člen 4c Direktive 90/388 prepoveduje prispevke, ki so nižji kot realni stro�ki izvajanja storitve, in, po drugi
47 — On interconnection in a liberalised telecommunications market (Part 2 — Accounting separation and cost accounting) (OJ 1998 L 141, p. 6).
47 – O medomrežnem povezovanju na liberaliziranem telekomunikacijskem trgu (del 2: o ločenem računovodstvu in stro�kovnem računovodstvu) (UL L 141, str. 6)
48 — Communication from the Commission of 27 November 1996 on Assessment Criteria for National Schemes for the Costing and Financing of Universal Service in telecommunications and Guidelines for the Member States on Operation of such Schemes (COM(96) 608).
48 – Obvestilo z dne 27. novembra 1996 (COM(96)608) o merilih za oceno nacionalnih sistemov izračunavanja stro�kov in financiranja univerzalne storitve ter o smernicah glede vpeljave teh sistemov v državah članicah.
In line with the Commission’s assertion that the additional charges designed to cover the connection costs do not constitute payment for the interconnection ser -vices, I agree with the view that, in a sphere not encumbered by legislative obstacles, the addition of those charges becomes a veiled financing mechanism similar to State aid, 55which Community law prohibits.
V skladu s trditvami Komisije, ki je potrdila, da doplačila, namenjena kritju stro�kov povezave, ne pomenijo plačila za storitve medomrežnega povezovanja, se nagibam k tezi, da se v položaju, ko ni regulativnih ovir, vpeljava takih prispevkov spremeni v skrit mehanizem financiranja, podoben državni pomoči 55, ki pa jo pravo Skupnosti zavrača.
I am surprised by the revealing arguments of Deutsche Telekom, to the effect that the guidance set out in the judgment in Commission v Spain 52cannot be extrapolated to the present case because, in the former case, liability for the financial shortfall was apportioned between the telecommunications organisation and the national authorities, a situation which, in the opinion of Deutsche Telekom, is not the same as ‘a deficit attributable solely to the undertaking’. 53
Pojasnila Deutsche Telekoma, da za zadevni primer ni mogoče uporabiti ugotovitev iz sodbe Komisija proti Španiji 52, so presenetljiva, ker se je v omenjeni zadevi odgovornost za razlike v poslovnih izidih delila med organom za telekomunikacije in nacionalnimi organi, kar pa se po njegovem razumevanju razlikuje od stanja, kjer se „kritje izgube nalaga le podjetju“ 53.
Action must be taken against any unjustified charges arising from universal service obligations, and they must be corrected using fair allocation systems.
Vendar se je treba odzvati na morebitna neupravičena bremena iz naslova univerzalne storitve, kajti njihova uskladitev poteka prek sistemov pravične razdelitve bremen.
The Court ruled that Spain had infringed those Directives as a result of the strict price caps set by the regulatory authority. However, in my opinion, although there is some latitude, it must be borne in mind that competition between undertakings is also damaged by additional charges created to sustain the capital of one of those undertakings.
Sodi�če je razsodilo, da Španija ni izpolnila obveznosti, ki ji jih nalagata direktivi, ker je regulativni organ prestrogo določil cenovne pragove, vendar po mojem mnenju kljub določenemu manevrskemu prostoru ni mogoče prezreti, da na izid plemenitega boja med podjetji vplivajo tudi doplačila, ki se priznajo zato, da bi se ohranil kapital katerega izmed teh podjetji.
That rule is not absolutely rigid because caselaw 56excludes from the scope of
Strogost ni popolna, saj sodna praksa 56iz člena 87(1) ES izključuje določene upravne posege, če gre za nadomestila za storitve v okviru obvezne javne službe 57, vendar le pod
Article 87(1) EC certain administrative interventions as consideration for obligatory public service benefits 57 when they do
55 – V sodbi z dne 23. februarja 1961 v zadevi Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg proti Visoki oblasti (30/59, Recueil, str.
55 — In Case 30/59 Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority [1961] ECR 1), the Court gave a wide definition of aid on the grounds that, in addition to positive benefits such as subsidies, it also embraces other benefits which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking.
1) je Sodi�če uporabilo �iroko definicijo pomoči, saj poleg pozitivne podpore, kot so subvencije, omenja tudi druge, ki v raznih oblikah olaj�ujejo bremena, ki ji sicer nosijo proračuni podjetij; v tem smislu se prepovedujejo pomoči, ki na kakr�enkoli način, neposredno ali posredno, podpirajo podjetja, ali pomoči v obliki gospodarske prednosti, ki je prejemnik pomoči ne bi pridobil v normalnih okoli�činah (sodbi z dne 11. julija 1996 v zadevi SFEI in drugi (C-39/94, Recueil, str.
In that connection, Community law prohibits benefits which, in any way, favour an undertaking directly or indirectly or are regarded as an economic advantage which the beneficiary company would not have obtained under normal market conditions (judgments in Case C-39/94 SFEI and Others [1996] ECR I-3547, paragraph 60, and Case C-342/96 Spain v Commission [1999] ECR I-2459, paragraph 41).
I-3547, točka 60) in z dne 29. aprila 1999 v zadevi Španija proti Komisiji (C-342/96, Recueil, str. I-2459, točka 41).
Where the financing of universal service is solely cost-orientated, connection to the local loop, the ultimate beneficiary of which is the customer concerned, is subsidised by that beneficiary through the subscriber line charge and only if the pre-existing operator had difficulties rebalancing its tariffs, which did not occur in the present case, would it make sense to value the deficit 54and compensate for it, although obviously not when the losses are the result of the operator’s own business strategy.
Financiranje univerzalne storitve zgolj glede na dejanske stro�ke pomeni, da stro�ek povezave s krajevno zanko, katere končni uporabnik je konkretni naročnik, krije prav ta uporabnik s plačilom naročnine, tako da je le v primeru, da ima prej�nji operater težave z uskladitvijo tarif – kar pa se v obravnavanem primeru ni zgodilo – smiselna ocenitev izgube 54 in njena izravnava, kar pa gotovo ne velja v primeru, če je izgube zakrivila strategija podjetja.
52 — Case C-500/01.
52 – Zadeva C-500/01.
57 — A concept more common in legal traditions such as those of France and Spain than in the legal traditions of Englishspeaking countries.
57 – Pojem, bolj značilen za �pansko ali francosko pravno tradicijo kot za tradicijo anglosa�kih pravnih sistemov.
54 — Annex I to Commission Recommendation 98/195/EC of 8 January 1998 on interconnection in a liberalised telecommunications market (Part 1 — Interconnection pricing) (OJ 1998 L 73, p. 42).
54 – Priloga I Priporočila Komisije 98/195/ES z dne 8. januarja 1998 o medomrežnem povezovanju na liberaliziranem telekomunikacijskem trgu (Del 1 – Oblikovanje cen medomrežnega povezovanja, UL L 73, str. 42).
ARCOR AND OTHERS not improve the position of the undertakings concerned.
ARCOR IN DRUGI pogojem, da se s tem ne izbolj�uje položaj podjetja.
The final link in the chain is contained in Article 13(1)(a) and (b) of the Universal Service Directive, from which it is clear that the solutions are the use of public funds or a common compensation fund to which all providers contribute, with which the notion of special payments between undertakings is also incompatible.
Konec odisejade nastopi v členu 13(1)(a) in (b) Direktive o univerzalni storitvi, kjer je kot re�itev poleg uporabe javnih skladov omenjen skupen sklad za izravnavo, v katerega vplačujejo ponudniki storitev in ki prav tako ni združljiv z denarnimi transakcijami med posameznimi podjetji.
However, extreme care must be taken not to upset competitors and, to that end, in the field of telecommunications, Article 4c of Directive 90/388 provided for Member States to share those uneconomic effects through supplementary charges or a universal service fund, provided that it was ‘necessary’.
Vendar je treba posebej paziti, da se ne razburijo podjetja v enakem položaju, in s tem namenom je v členu 4c Direktive 90/388 na področju telekomunikacij državam članicam dovoljeno razdeliti te neekonomične učinke z dodatnimi prispevki ali s pomočjo sklada za univerzalno storitev, toda le pod pogojem, da je to „potrebno“.
Accordingly, any measure aimed at minimising the required rebalancing of tariffs is not compatible with Community law.
Tako je za kakr�enkoli ukrep, ki posku�a relativizirati prepisano uskladitev težko najti podlago v pravu Skupnosti; to nalaga državam članicam obveznost določanja cen 60, kar pa morajo, če je to potrebno, udejanjiti s preglednimi mehanizmi za nadomestila, ki niso bila predmet dogovarjanj.
Naturally, that indeterminate legal concept may be supplemented only by regulatory measures which prohibit tariff rebalancing in respect of the cost of the local loop, since, without such obstacles, those additional charges would lack justification. 58
Seveda je mogoče ta nedoločen pravni koncept dopolniti le z regulativnimi merili, ki prepovedujejo gospodarske primerjave s stro�ki lokalne zanke, saj v nasprotnem primeru omenjeni prispevki ne bi bili upravičeni 58.
In the light of all of those consider -ations, it is appropriate for the Court, in reply
Glede na navedeno bi moralo Sodi�če na prvo vpra�anje za predhodno odločanje
The need to cover losses is also referred to in Article 5(1) and (3) of Directive 97/33, which make clear the importance of calculating the contributions by reference to comparable amounts, 59based exclusively on the direct costs of providing the service. That is different to the situation underlying the main proceedings, which involves approved charges imposed on each undertaking without taking account of the overall situation.
Skrb glede kritja izgub se znova pojavi v odstavkih 1 in 3 člena 5 Direktive 97/33, ki kažeta na pomembnost izračuna prispevkov na podlagi primerljivih zneskov 59; izračun temelji izključno na neposrednih stro�kih zagotavljanja storitve, kar je drugače kot v primeru odobritev, ki so razlog za postopke v glavni stvari, ki, ne glede na splo�en položaj, veljajo za vsako podjetje.
60 — The third recital in the preamble to Commission Recommendation 98/195/EC observes pertinently that the setting of interconnection tariffs is the responsibility of the Member States, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.
60 – V tem smislu je v tretji uvodni izjavi v Priporočilu Komisije 98/195 podčrtano, da so za uvedbo prispevkov v skladu z načelom subsidiarnosti za medomrežno povezovanje odgovorne države članice.
58 — Commission Recommendation 98/195/EC is absolutely clear in that regard.
58 – V tem smislu je Priporočilo Komisije 98/195 nedvoumno.
See the judgments in Case C-87/94 Commission v Belgium [1996] ECR I-2043, and Case C-275/98 Unitron Scandinavia and 3-S [1999] ECR I-8291.
59 – To samo po sebi pomeni določitev posameznih prispevkov, ki jih nosijo udeleženci na trgu telekomunikacij.
59 — Which of itself entails specifying the individual contributions which correspond to undertakings operating in the telecommunications market.
61 – Značaj nepisanega vira prava Skupnosti, načela preglednosti, izhaja predvsem iz postopne krepitve njegove prisotnosti v sodni praksi: sodbi Sodi�ča z dne 25. aprila 1996 v zadevi Komisija proti Belgiji (C-87/94, Recueil, str. I-2043) in z dne 18. novembra 1999 v zadevi Unitron Scandinavia in 3-S (C-275/98, Recueil, str. I-8291).
OPINION OF MR RUIZ-JARABO — JOINED CASES C-152/07 TO C-154/07 same subjectmatter in all the Member States, attributes which would be impossible to attain without the absolute primacy of Community law.
SKLEPNI PREDLOGI RUIZ-JARABOJA — ZDRUŽENE ZADEVE OD C-152/07 DO 154/07 kar je dosegljivo le z absolutno primarnostjo prava Skupnosti 62.
62 to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling, to declare that the Competition and Interconnection Directives preclude a rule, such as the one laid down in German law, under which the dominant undertaking may be compensated for losses by contributions additional to the interconnection costs, which are not calculated exclusively by reference to the costs of the service.
odgovoriti, da direktivi o konkurenci in medomrežnem povezovanju nasprotujeta ureditvi, kakr�no predvideva nem�ko pravo, ki dovoljuje, da se izgube operaterja s prevladujočim položajem krijejo s prispevki, ki ne ustrezajo stro�kom medomrežnega povezovanja in ki niso določeni izključno glede na stro�ke zagotavljanja storitve.
However, that absoluteness is weakened if the indivisibility or unconditional nature of the primacy of Community law is called into question, overlooking the fact that the principle concerns Community law as a whole and applies to all provisions of national law.
Toda ta čvrstost je omajana, če se začne dvomiti o nedeljivosti primarnosti ali njeni brezpogojnosti in se zanemarja dejstvo, da načelo velja za vse pravo Skupnosti in vsako normo nacionalnega prava.
B — The second question
B – Drugo odločanje
Having replied to the first question, it is necessary to dispel the uncertainties of the referring court regarding whether it is appropriate to apply the directives concerned in preference to the conflicting national provisions.
Po odgovoru na prvo vpra�anje lahko nadaljujemo z razjasnitvijo dvomov predložitvenega sodi�ča glede uveljavitve obravnavanih direktiv kljub določbam nacionalnega prava, ki jim nasprotujejo.
Moreover, in the second opinion in Pfeiffer, 64 I disagreed with those who claimed
Poleg tega sem v sklepnih predlogih v združenih zadevah Pfeiffer 64že zavrnil
It is essential to hold up the fundamental principle of the primacy of Community law and to question, in accordance with the caselaw of the Court, the application of those provisions, thereby eliminating the conceptual confusion which distorts a crystal-clear view of the situation.
Nujno je dvigniti okope okoli načela primarnosti prava Skupnosti in pod okriljem sodne prakse tega Sodi�ča raziskati učinkovitost teh določb ter tako očistiti konceptualni plevel, ki nam zakriva jasen pogled na resničnost.
that primacy may be attributed only to primary Community law or, at the very most, to regulations, a distinction which must be branded artificial and inaccurate.
mnenje, da primarnost velja le za primarno pravo Skupnosti ali kvečjemu �e za uredbe, razlikovanje, ki ga je treba označiti kot umetno in nenatančno.
64 — Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer and Others [2004] ECR I-8835.
64 – Sodba z dne 5. oktobra 2004 (od C-397/01 do C-403/01, ZOdl., str.
At point 42 of the Opinion of 27 April 2004, I analysed the judgment in Simmenthal, in which the Court confirmed the primacy of both the Treaty and the directly applicable measures of the institutions, and I took the view that when a Community provision precludes a provision of a Member State, the principle of primacy established nearly 40 years ago must be reiterated, irre -spective of the Community source: the Treaty, a regulation or a directive.
I-8835) in sklepni predlogi z dne 27. aprila 2004, kjer sem v točki 42 analiziral sodbo v zadevi Simmenthal, v kateri je Sodi�če potrdilo načelo primarnosti Pogodbe in aktov institucij, ki se neposredno uporabljajo; presodil sem, da se mora, v primeru ko določba Skupnosti nasprotuje normi prava katere izmed držav članic, uveljaviti načelo primarnosti, sprejeto pred skoraj 40 leti, ne glede na to, za kak�en pravni vir Skupnosti gre: Pogodbo, uredbo ali direktivo.
The uniformity of Community law requires that its primary and secondary provisions must have the same meaning, the same compulsory application, and the
Enotnost prava Skupnosti zahteva, naj ima njegova primarna in sekundarna zakonodaja v vseh državah članicah enak pomen, enako obvezujočo moč in enako vsebino,
The direct effects of the Competition and Interconnection Directives
Neposredni učinki direktiv o konkurenci in medomrežnem povezovanju
Accordingly, individuals are able to strengthen their legal rights, while the ef -fectiveness of Community law is protected and is not impaired by any failure to implement a directive or by its incorrect transposition.
S tem je dosežena okrepitev pravne sfere posameznikov in uveljavitev polnega učinka prava Skupnosti, ki se mu ni moč izogniti z morebitno opustitvijo prenosa ali pomanjkljivo vgraditvijo direktiv v nacionalno pravo.
The Court began devising the theory of direct effect in Van Gend & Loos. 65 The Court extended the theory to directives in Van Duyn, 66with regard to the rights directives confer on individuals, 67and systematised it in Ratti 68 and Becker. 69
, jo v zadevi Van Duyn raz�irilo na direktive in pri tem poudarilo „pravice, ki jih direktive dajejo posameznikom 67,“ in jo sistematiziralo v sodbah Ratti 68in Ursula Becker 69.
Those factors combined create the framework for the argument in support of the direct application of Article 4c of Directive 90/388 and Article 12(7) of Dir -ective 97/33, with which Paragraph 43(6) of the TKG of 1996 is incompatible. 72
Kombinacija teh elementov tvorijo temelje argumentacije, ki govori v prid takoj�nji uporabi člena 4c Direktive 90/388 in člena 12(7) Direktive 97/33, ki jima nasprotuje člen 43(6) TKG iz leta 1996 72.
When it is not possible to interpret national law in a manner consistent with Community law, requiring judicial action in order to achieve harmony means that the fine line between legal creation and interpretation becomes blurred. 73
Če razlage nacionalnega prava ni mogoče uskladiti s pravom Skupnosti, bi izsiljenje aktivnost sodnika z namenom doseči skladnost, pomenila zabris občutljivih meja med ustvarjanjem in razlago prava 73.