natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This was apparent from paragraphs 19 to 22 of the Commis- sion’s document dated 21 September 2005, 207 and clearly followed from Annex E.2 to that document.
To naj bi izhajalo iz točk od 19 do 22 dopisa Komisije z dne 21. septembra 2005 207in naj bi jasno sledilo iz Priloge E.2 k temu dopisu.
(a) Paragraph 425 of the judgment under appeal
a) Točka 425 izpodbijane sodbe
In paragraph 425 of the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance considers some of the tables produced by the Commission and finds:
V točki 425 izpodbijane sodbe se Sodi�če prve stopnje ukvarja z nekaterimi razpredelnicami, ki jih je predložila Komisija, in ugotavlja:
In order to review the allegation of distortion of evidence sensibly, there must first be ascertained exactly which tables the Court of First Instance was referring to in paragraph 425 of the judgment under appeal.
Da bi se očitek izkrivljanja lahko smiselno preučil, je treba najprej raziskati, na natančno katere razpredelnice se Sodi�če prve stopnje sklicuje v točki 425 izpodbijane sodbe.
Regrettably the authoritative English language version of the judgment is very imprecise on this point.
Žal je zavezujoča angle�ka jezikovna različica sodbe tu pretežno nenatančna.
It none the less appears even from this English language version of paragraph 425 that the Court of First Instance was referring to tables ‘which are intended to show the maximum campaign discounts granted by Sony and BMG for their best-selling albums’ 208and in which a differential between minimum and maximum discounts was calculated by customer.
Kljub temu pa že iz te angle�ke jezikovne različice točke 425 izhaja, da se Sodi�če prve stopnje sklicuje na razpredelnice, „ki naj dokažejo najvi�je reklamne popuste, ki sta jih Sony in BMG priznavala za svoje najbolje prodajane albume“, 208in v katerih je izračunana razlika med najnižjimi in najvi�jimi popusti na kupca.
‘In effect, the calculation of the differential between minimum and maximum discounts by customer … was carried out incorrectly, in most cases, in consideration of the discounts granted by the other party, whereas … that calculation must be made on the basis of the differential between the minimum and maximum discounts granted by one and the same party to its various customers.’
„[…] Izračun razlike med najnižjimi popusti in najvi�jimi popusti na kupca […] je bil zmotno v večini primerov narejen ob upo�tevanju popustov, ki jih je priznala druga stranka, čeprav […] je treba ta izračun narediti na podlagi razlike med najnižjimi popusti in najvi�jimi popusti, ki jih je ista stranka priznala različnim kupcem.“
In this respect the French language version of the judgment under appeal is more precise.
Francoska jezikovna različica izpodbijane sodbe je v tem pogledu natančnej�a.
Even though it is not authoritative in the present case, this language version, in which the judgment was drafted and deliberated, contains additional indications of what the Court of First Instance was in fact intending to refer to in paragraph 425,
Čeprav v obravnavanem primeru ni zavezujoča, lahko ta jezikovna različica, v kateri je bila izpodbijana sodba sestavljena in obravnavana, vendarle ponudi dodatne oporne točke za to, na kaj se je Sodi�če prve stopnje resnično želelo sklicevati v točki 425,
The view of the appellants is that this is a distortion of the evidence.
Pritožnika menita, da gre pri tem za izkrivljanje dokazov.
Specifically, in the proceedings at first instance the Commission stated to the Court of First Instance that it had calculated the differential between minimum and maximum discounts by reference to price discounts from the invoice
Komisija naj bi namreč v prvostopenjskem postopku Sodi�ču prve stopnje razložila, da je razliko med najnižjimi popusti in najvi�jimi popusti izračunala na podlagi popustov na znesek računa, ki jih je ena stranka koncentracije priznala istemu
206 — Case C-551/03 P General Motors v Commission [2006] ECR I-3173, paragraph 54, JCB Service (cited above, footnote 127), paragraph 108, and Wunenburger (cited above, footnote 44), paragraph 67.
206 – Sodbe z dne 6. aprila 2006 v zadevi General Motors proti Komisiji (C-551/03 P, ZOdl., str. I-3173, točka 54); JCB Service proti Komisiji (navedena v opombi 127, točka 108) in Wunenburger proti Komisiji (navedena v opombi 44, točka 67).
209And indeed in the case file the cover sheet to Annex E.4.2 includes a heading which is clearly similar to the introductory words of paragraph 425 of the judgment under appeal, 210and the tables in Annex E.4.2 identify the differential referred to in paragraph 425 between minimum and maximum discounts by customer.
209Dejansko je tudi na naslovnici Priloge E.4.2 v procesnem spisu zapisan naslov, ki je zelo podoben uvodnim besedam točke 425 izpodbijane sodbe, 210in razpredelnice v Prilogi E.4.2 prikazujejo razliko med najnižjimi in najvi�jimi popusti na kupca, omenjeno v točki 425.
Nor does it follow from the Commission’s statements in paragraphs 19 to 22 of its document of 21 September 2005 that the Court of First Instance manifestly misinterpreted the tables in Annex E.4.2.
Tudi iz navedb Komisije v točkah od 19 do 22 njenega dopisa z dne 21. septembra 2005 ne izhaja, da bi Sodi�če prve stopnje razpredelnice iz Priloge E.4.2 razlagalo očitno napačno.
According to their wording, the information provided by the Commission there refers only to Annexes B.6, B.8 and E.2.
Te navedbe Komisije se namreč že glede na njihovo besedilo nana�ajo le na priloge B.6, B.8 in E.2.
By contrast, the passages in the Commission’s document to which the appellants refer do not contain any explanation of the tables in Annex E.4.2 in question at this point.
Nasprotno pa del dopisa Komisije, na katerega se sklicujeta pritožnika, ne vsebuje nobenih pojasnil glede tu spornih razpredelnic iz Priloge E.4.2.
Against this background I find that the complaint of distortion of evidence is unfounded as regards paragraph 425 of the judgment under appeal.
Zato menim, da je očitek izkrivljanja dokazov, kar zadeva točko 425 izpodbijane sodbe, neutemeljen.
(b) Paragraph 427 of the judgment under appeal
b) Točka 427 izpodbijane sodbe
In paragraph 427 of the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance states:
Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 427 izpodbijane sodbe ugotavlja:
Accordingly, I proceed on the footing that paragraph 425 of the judgment under appeal refers to the tables in Annex E.4.2.
Zato izhajam iz tega, da se točka 425 izpodbijane sodbe nana�a na razpredelnice v Prilogi E.4.2.
However, this Annex does not disclose anything suggesting that the Court of First Instance’s discussion in paragraph 425 is clearly incorrect.
Iz te priloge pa ni mogoče razbrati ničesar, kar bi kazalo na očitno nepravilnost ugotovitev Sodi�ča prve stopnje v točki 425.
Admittedly, the tables printed in this Annex, with the exception of the heading in the Annex’s cover sheet, do not contain any explanatory additions.
Razpredelnice v tej prilogi sicer – z izjemo naslova na naslovnici priloge – ne vsebujejo nobenih dodatnih pojasnil.
211 — For example, in the third column of the first table in Annex E.4.2 the lowest discount granted by Sony (SMEI) is compared with the highest discount granted by Bertelsmann (BMG); the same occurs in the third column of the second table in Annex E.4.2.
211 – V tretjem stolpcu prve razpredelnice Priloge E.4.2 se na primer najnižji popust, ki ga priznava Sony (SMEI), primerja z najvi�jim popustom, ki ga priznava Bertelsmann (BMG); isti način je uporabljen v tretjem stolpcu druge razpredelnice Priloge E.4.2.
‘In any event, even on the assumption that the various tables drawn up by the parties to the concentration and produced by the Commission are in fact capable of establishing the more or less important variations alleged, the fact remains that … those variations are of doubtful relevance in so far as … they show only brackets without analysing the weighted averages and variations by reference to the averages …’
„Četudi bi lahko posamezne razpredelnice, ki so jih pripravile stranke koncentracije in ki jih je predložila Komisija, dejansko dokazale domnevna večja ali manj�a nihanja, je […] pomembnost teh nihanj vsaj v toliko dvomljiva, kolikor razpredelnice […] kažejo le razpone, ne da bi analizirale ponderirane povprečne vrednosti in nihanja v razmerju do povprečnih vrednosti […]“
BERTELSMANN AND SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA v IMPALA referring to tables such as those in Annexes B.6 and B.7, which concern invoice discounts and which, moreover, contain the ‘brackets’ referred to by the Court of First Instance.
BERTELSMANN IN SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA PROTI IMPALA razpredelnice, kot so na primer tiste v prilogah B.6 in B.7, ki se ukvarjajo s popusti na znesek računa („invoice discounts“) in ki poleg tega vsebujejo tudi „razpone“, ki jih omenja Sodi�če prve stopnje.
However, the appellants do not make any submissions in relation to these.
Pritožnika pa ravno s tem v zvezi ničesar ne navajata.
The appellants’ opinion is that, to the contrary, many of the items in the tables and charts produced by the Commission to the Court of First Instance in its reply of 11 February 2005 at first instance are indeed based on weighted average values.
Pritožnika pa nasprotno menita, da je veliko podatkov v razpredelnicah in grafih, ki jih je Komisija na prvi stopnji predložila Sodi�ču prve stopnje v odgovoru na tožbo z dne 11. februarja 2005, temeljilo na ponderi -ranih povprečnih vrednostih.
In this connection, they refer to Annexes B.4, B.8, B.9, B.10 and B.13, as well as to the additional explanations given by the Commission at first instance in its document of 14 March 2007.
V zvezi s tem napotujeta na priloge B.4, B.8, B.9, B.10 in B.13 ter na dodatna pojasnila Komisije na prvi stopnji, ki izhajajo iz njenega dopisa z dne 14. marca 2007.
Against this background I find that the complaint of distortion of evidence is unfounded as regards paragraph 427 of the judgment under appeal.
Zato menim, da je očitek izkrivljanja dokazov, kar zadeva točko 427 izpodbijane sodbe, neutemeljen.
(c) Paragraph 434 of the judgment under appeal
c) Točka 434 izpodbijane sodbe
On this point it is to be noted that in its judgment the Court of First Instance makes a clear linguistic distinction between tables and charts.
V zvezi s tem je treba pripomniti, da Sodi�če prve stopnje v svoji sodbi jezikovno jasno razlikuje med razpredelnicami in grafi.
212In paragraph 427 of the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance expressly refers to the various tables produced by the Commission.
212Sodi�če prve stopnje se v točki 427 izpodbijane sodbe izrecno sklicuje na različne razpredelnice, ki jih je predložila Komisija.
I would therefore have expected that to prove their allegation of distortion of evidence the appellants would likewise refer to parts of the case files which contained tables.
Zato bi pričakovala, da se bosta pritožnika v dokaz za očitek izkrivljanja dokazov prav tako sklicevala na dele procesnega spisa, ki vsebujejo razpredelnice.
However, after having looked at Annexes B.4, B.8, B.9, B.10 and B.13, I have to find that although they contain a number of charts, none of these Annexes contain any tables.
Po pregledu prilog B.4, B.8, B.9, B.10 in B.13 pa moram ugotoviti, da te sicer vsebujejo �tevilne grafe, v nobeni od njih pa ni razpredelnic.
In these circumstances the Annexes referred to are just as little capable of establishing the alleged distortion of evidence as are any explanations the Commission has given of these Annexes.
Navedene priloge v teh okoli�činah prav tako ne morejo dokazati zatrjevanega izkrivljanja dokazov, kot tega ne morejo morebitna pojasnila Komisije k prav tem prilogam.
In paragraphs 431 to 434 of the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance considers the question whether it is possible to determine net selling prices to retailers on the basis of retail prices using ‘reverse engineering’.
Sodi�če prve stopnje se v točkah od 431 do 434 izpodbijane sodbe ukvarja z vpra�anjem, ali je mogoče neto prodajne cene, uporabljene nasproti trgovcem na drobno, ugotoviti z „nasprotnim sklepanjem“ (tako imenovani „reverse engineering“) na podlagi vsakokratnih maloprodajnih cen.
The background to this is Impala’s submission at first instance that retailers’ mark-ups were generally transparent and were known with a high degree of accuracy. 213
Ozadje tega vpra�anja je trditev družbe Impala na prvi stopnji, da so marže trgovcev na drobno na splo�no pregledne in zelo natančno znane. 213
It is much more probable that in paragraph 427 the Court of First Instance was
Veliko verjetneje je, da se je Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 427 sklicevalo na
Paragraph 434 of the judgment under appeal includes the following:
Točka 434 izpodbijane sodbe se v odlomkih glasi:
212 — See, for example, paragraphs 393, 401, 415, 416, 420 to 428 and 455 to 457 of the judgment under appeal, which refer to ‘tables’ (in German, ‘Tabellen’), whereas, for example, paragraphs 129 and 419 of the judgment under appeal refer to ‘charts’ (in German, ‘Grafiken’).
212 – Glej na primer točke 393, 401, 415, 416, od 420 do 428 in od 455 do 457 izpodbijane sodbe, kjer je govora o razpredelnicah (angle�ko: „tables“), medtem ko na primer točki 129 in 419 te sodbe omenjata grafe (angle�ko: „charts“).
213 — This context appears from paragraphs 431 and 433 of the judgment under appeal.
213 – Ta kontekst izhaja iz točk 431 in 433 izpodbijane sodbe.
As regards the substance of the study, it is correct that its section 2 concerns retailers’ mark-up policy and in particular whether retailers apply standard mark-ups.
Kar zdaj zadeva vsebino raziskave, sicer drži, da se njen Del 2 ukvarja z maržno politiko trgovcev na drobno in zlasti z vpra�anjem, ali trgovci na drobno uporabljajo standardne marže („standard mark-ups“).
However, the Court of First Instance found the study to lack information as to whether ‘a retailer will apply a different sales policy for the same type of album’.
Sodi�če prve stopnje pa je v raziskavi pogre�alo podatke glede vpra�anja, ali „trgovec na drobno za isto vrsto albuma uporablja različno prodajno politiko“.
215 After reading the study in Annex B.17, I have reached the same conclusion as the Court of First Instance.
215Po preučitvi raziskave v Prilogi B.17 pridem v zvezi s tem do istega sklepa kot Sodi�če prve stopnje.
‘… the study drawn up by the economic advisers to the parties to the concentration does not present data that are sufficiently reliable, relevant and comparable … While it is indeed probable that the different types of retailer (supermarkets, independents, specialist chains, etc.) apply different mark-up policies, and that there are differences within each category of operators, and even differences for each individual operator, according to the types of album or their degree of success, it is very unlikely, on the other hand, and the study contains no data in that regard, that a retailer will apply a different sales policy for the same type of album.’
„[…] raziskava gospodarskih strokovnjakov strank koncentracije ne vsebuje dovolj zanesljivih, upo�tevnih in primerljivih podatkov […] Verjetno je sicer, da različni trgovci na drobno (samopostrežne trgovine, neodvisni trgovci, specializirane trgovine in tako naprej) uporabljajo različno maržno politiko in da obstajajo razlike znotraj vsake skupine tržnih subjektov in celo pri vsakem posamičnem tržnem subjektu glede na vrsto albuma ali njegov uspeh. Malo verjetno pa je, in tudi raziskava v tem smislu ne vsebuje nobenih podatkov, da trgovec na drobno za isto vrsto albuma uporablja različno prodajno politiko […]“
Against this background I find that the complaint of distortion of evidence is unfounded as regards paragraph 434 of the judgment under appeal.
Zato menim, da je očitek izkrivljanja dokazov, kar zadeva točko 434 izpodbijane sodbe, neutemeljen.
The appellants claim that the Court of First Instance disregarded the study drawn up by their economic experts and produced by the Commission as Annex B.17, 214 and in particular section 2 thereof.
Pritožnika očitata, da Sodi�če prve stopnje ni upo�tevalo raziskave, ki so jo pripravili njuni gospodarski strokovnjaki in ki jo je Komisija predložila kot Prilogo B.17, 214zlasti njenega Dela 2.
This allegedly contains comprehensive economic information which indicates that the Court of First Instance was wrong to find that retailers followed a uniform mark-up policy.
Vsebovala naj bi obsežne gospodarske podatke, ki naj bi kazali na to, da je domneva Sodi�ča prve stopnje, da trgovci na drobno uporabljajo enotno maržno politiko, napačna.
This submission does not convince me.
Ta trditev me ne prepriča.
It is clear from merely reading the disputed paragraph 434 of the judgment under appeal that the Court of First Instance, far from disregarding this study, considered it.
Že samo iz branja tu sporne točke 434 izpodbijane sodbe izhaja, da tam Sodi�če prve stopnje omenjene raziskave nikakor ne ignorira, ampak jo nasprotno obravnava.
Thus, the fourth ground of appeal is unfounded in its entirety, as are the points made in paragraphs 101 and 102 of the appeal, the substance of which overlaps with the fourth ground of appeal.
S tem je četrti pritožbeni razlog v celoti neutemeljen. Isto velja za navedbe v točkah 101 in 102 pritožbe, ki se vsebinsko prekrivajo s tem četrtim pritožbenim razlogom.
214 — This is Annex B.17 to the Commission’s response at first instance.
214 – Gre za Prilogo B.17 k odgovoru Komisije na tožbo na prvi stopnji.
215 — Paragraph 434 of the judgment under appeal (emphasis added).
215 – Točka 434 izpodbijane sodbe (moj poudarek).
C — The use of undisclosed evidence in the judgment under appeal (seventh ground of appeal)
C – Uporaba zaupnih podatkov v izpodbijani sodbi (sedmi pritožbeni razlog)
Since the appellants complain inter alia that they were not able to comment on the latter documents before the Court of First Instance, it must first be considered whether there has been any breach of the adversarial principle before the Court of First Instance.
Ker pritožnika med drugim trdita, da glede zadnjih dokumentov pred Sodiščem prve stopnje nista mogla zavzeti stali�ča, je treba najprej preučiti možno kr�itev načela kontradiktornosti postopka pred Sodiščem prve stopnje.
By their seventh ground of appeal the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance erred in law by basing its judgment on evidence that was not disclosed to the applicants, on which they had no opportunity of commenting, and which was not before the Commission at the time it adopted the first clearance decision.
Pritožnika s sedmim pritožbenim razlogom Sodi�ču prve stopnje očitata, da je sodbo z napačno uporabo prava utemeljilo z dokazi, ki jima niso bili razkriti, do katerih nikoli nista mogla zavzeti stali�ča in ki tudi Komisiji niso bili predloženi ob sprejetju prve odločbe o odobritvi.
Given that such evidence could not have provided a basis for the Commission’s decision, the setting aside of the first clearance decision could likewise not be based on it.
Ker tak�na dokazna sredstva niso mogla biti podlaga za odločbo Komisije, tudi razglasitev ničnosti prve odločbe o odobritvi ne bi smela biti utemeljena z njimi.
There is no doubt that a judicial decision cannot be based on facts and documents of which the parties themselves — or one of them — have no knowledge and on which they therefore have not been able to comment either.
Nedvomno sodna odločba ne sme temeljiti na dejstvih in dokumentih, za katere stranke same – ali ena od njih – niso vedele in glede katerih zato tudi niso mogle zavzeti stali�ča.
219 However, in the present case, in the proceedings at first instance the appellants were not in the position of a party to the action, but participated merely as interveners in support of the Commission.
219 V obravnavanem primeru pa pritožnika v prvostopenjskem postopku sploh nista imela položaja stranke v sporu, ampak sta v spor vstopila zgolj kot intervenienta na strani Komisije.
As such they have a weaker position in the proceedings than an applicant or a defendant.
Kot tak�na imata v postopku �ibkej�i položaj kot tožeča in tožena stranka.
In particular, the second sentence of Article 116(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance expressly provides that the President may, on application by one of the parties, omit secret or confidential information from being disclosed to an intervener, and this is not infrequent in competition law proceedings in particular.
Zlasti člen 116(2), drugi stavek, Poslovnika Sodi�ča prve stopnje izrecno predvideva, da lahko predsednik na predlog stranke izloči tajne ali zaupne listine, preden jih prejme intervenient, kar se ravno v konkurenčnopravnem postopku neredko zgodi. 220
The main point of attack of this ground of appeal is the Court of First Instance’s discussion of price transparency, and in particular of the majors’ — disputed — opportunity of overseeing the retail market with the assistance of weekly reports from their agents.
Glavni očitek tega pritožbenega razloga so navedbe Sodi�ča prve stopnje glede preglednosti cen in zlasti glede – sporne – možnosti nadzora „top“ skupin družb nad maloprodajnim trgom s pomočjo tedenskih nadzornih poročil njihovih trgovskih zastopnikov.
216 In this connection the Court of First Instance first emphasises one of the Commission’s findings, namely that Sony and Bertelsmann had a system of weekly reports which contained information about their competitors too.
216Pri tem Sodi�če prve stopnje najprej poudarja ugotovitev Komisije, da naj bi pri družbah Sony in Bertelsmann obstajal sistem tedenskih poročil, ki naj bi vsebovala tudi podatke o konkurentih.
217By way of supplement to this, in its judgment the Court of First Instance refers also to certain documents produced by Impala and classified as confidential. 218
217 Poleg tega pa se Sodi�če prve stopnje v sodbi sklicuje tudi na določene dokumente, ki jih je predložil Impala in ki imajo oznako zaupno. 218
216 — Paragraphs 352 to 361 and 451 of the judgment under appeal.
216 – Točke od 352 do 361 in točka 451 izpodbijane sodbe.
217 — See paragraph 352 of the judgment under appeal, which quotes from recital 113 of the first clearance decision.
219 – Sodbe z dne 22. marca 1961 v združenih zadevah Snupat proti Visoki oblasti (42/59 in 49/59, Recueil, str.
219 — Joined Cases 42/59 and 49/59 Snupat v High Authority [1961] ECR 53, at p.
111, 169); z dne 10. januarja 2002 v zadevi Plant in drugi proti Komisiji in South Wales Small Mines (C-480/99 P, Recueil, str. I-265, točka 24) in z dne 2. oktobra 2003 v zadevi Corus UK proti Komisiji (C-199/99 P, Recueil, str.
See also the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Feldbrugge v The Netherlands (1986) Series A, No. 99, p.
Glej tudi sodbi Evropskega sodi�ča za človekove pravice z dne 29. maja 1986 v zadevi Feldbrugge proti Nizozemski (serija A, �t. 99, str. 16, člen 44) in z dne 31. oktobra 2006 v zadevi Aksoy (Eroğlu) proti Turčiji (�t.
220 — See for example the order in Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v Commission [2006] ECR II-1747.
220 – Glej na primer sklep z dne 15. junija 2006 v zadevi Deutsche Telekom proti Komisiji (T-271/03, ZOdl., str. II-1747).
218 — Paragraphs 356 to 360, 389 and 451 of the judgment under appeal.
218 – Točke od 356 do 360 ter točki 389 in 451 izpodbijane sodbe.
cases the taking of evidence is characterised by the fact that the documents considered often contain trade secrets or other information which may be published either not at all or only subject to significant restrictions.
Za presojo dokazov v zadevah konkurenčnega prava Skupnosti je namreč značilno to, da preučeni dokumenti pogosto vsebujejo poslovne skrivnosti ali druge informacije, ki se ne smejo razkriti ali se smejo razkriti le z znatnimi omejitvami.
221Thus, it is already inherent in the scheme of the Rules of Procedure that the Court of First Instance can base its judgment, if necessary, on evidence which was not available to interveners (see also Article 67(3)(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, and moreover Article 287 EC).
221 Torej že iz ureditve Poslovnika izhaja, da lahko Sodi�če prve stopnje po potrebi sodbo utemelji z dokazi, ki intervenientom niso bili dostopni (k temu glej tudi člen 67(3)(1) Poslovnika Sodi�ča prve stopnje, dalje tudi člen 287 ES).