natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
BELGIUM v COMMISSION of the 2002 crop year, pursuant to Article 31 of Regulation No 2419/2001.
BELGIJA PROTI KOMISIJI od letine 2002 na podlagi člena 31 Uredbe �t. 2419/2001.
agricultural parcels, obtained using the GIS, was not particularly reliable.
ker se na podatke o povr�ini enot rabe ali poljin, pridobljene iz RGIS, ni bilo mogoče povsem zanesti.
The Commission maintains that the obligation to adopt the measures omitted is inherent in compliance with the existing legislation, which requires the Member States, in particular, to carry out administrative checks on all aid applications (Article 8(1) of Regulation No 3508/92) in order to guarantee ‘effective verification’ of compliance with the terms governing the grant of aid (Article 6(1) of Regulation No 3887/92).
Komisija zatrjuje, da obveznost sprejetja opu�čenih ukrepov izhaja iz obstoječih predpisov, ki državam članicam med drugim nalagajo upravni nadzor vseh zahtevkov za pomoč (člen 8(1) Uredbe �t. 3508/92), da zagotovijo „zanesljivo preverjanje“ izpolnjevanja pogojev, pod katerimi se pomoč odobri (člen 6(1) Uredbe �t. 3887/92).
Thirdly, the requirement to take the measures omitted is also incompatible with general principles of Community law, such as the principles of legal certainty and non-discrimination.
Tretjič, obveznost izvedbe opu�čenih ukrepov naj bi bila nezdružljiva tudi s splo�nimi načeli pravnega reda Skupnosti, kot sta načeli pravne varnosti in prepovedi diskriminacije.
On the one hand, the end-result would be to penalise farmers, even where there had been no on-the-spot check, and when that possibility could not be inferred from clear and specific rules and could not, therefore, be anticipated by farmers.
Na eni strani bi to privedlo to tega, da bi se kaznovalo pridelovalce tudi brez nadzora na kraju samem, čeprav ta možnost ni izhajala iz jasnih in izrecnih pravil in je slednja zato tudi niso mogla določiti.
On the other, that requirement would have the effect of discriminating against the Kingdom of Belgium as compared with all of the other Member States, which do not use a GIS based on individual agricultural parcels, but systems that are far less precise and effective in terms of administrative checks.
Na drugi strani pa bi ta obveznost privedla do diskriminacije Kraljevine Belgije nasproti vsem drugim državam članicam, ki niso uporabljale RGIS, temelječega na posamezni enoti rabe ali poljini, ampak veliko manj natančne in manj zanesljive sisteme upravnega nadzora.
The Commission does not consider that to assert that that obligation exists entails the application of remote sensing methodology at the stage of the administrative checks.
Komisija se ne strinja s tem, da bi potrditev obstoja navedene obveznosti povzročila uporabo metodologije daljinskega zaznavanja v fazi upravnega nadzora.
It points out that the use of aerial photographic images for the purposes of administrative checks is an option which the Belgian authorities have taken and is not the same as physical checks carried out using remote sensing.
Opozarja, da je uporaba fotografij iz zraka za upravni nadzor možnost, ki jo imajo belgijski organi in se razlikuje od fizičnega nadzora z daljinskim zaznavanjem.
Fourthly, the Court of First Instance wrongly regarded a tolerance margin to be unacceptable in the context of the administrative checks.
Četrtič, Sodi�če prve stopnje naj bi nepravilno ugotovilo, da je pri upravnem nadzoru nedopustna uporaba tolerančne meje.
The application of a tolerance margin is expressly provided for by Article 6(7) of Regulation No 3887/92 and is also envisaged for administrative checks, even in recommendations from the Commission itself 46and is particularly justified in this case, in which the data on the area of the
Ta naj bi bila izrecno določena v členu 6(7) Uredbe �t. 3887/92 in predvidena tudi za upravni nadzor celo v priporočilih Komisije 46in a fortiori upravičena v obravnavanem primeru,
Commission contends that paragraph 48 of that judgment, which the appellant cites, must be read taking account of the fact that, in the circumstances of that case, only an on-the-spot check could have made it possible to discover the infringement found.
njeno točko 48, na katero se sklicuje pritožnica, brati tako, da se upo�teva dejstvo, da je v okoli�činah primera, obravnavanega v sodbi, samo nadzor na kraju samem omogočil odkritje ugotovljene kr�itve.
It points out that, in paragraph 40 of that judgment, the Court makes no distinction between administrative checks and on-the-spot checks when it states that ‘the finding of a difference between the area declared and the area actually determined in the course of checks carried out by the competent authorities entails, by itself, the application of a penalty.’
Opozarja, da v točki 40 omenjene sodbe Sodi�če ne razlikuje med upravnim nadzorom in nadzorom na kraju samem, medtem ko potrjuje, da „ugotovitev razhajanja med prijavljeno povr�ino in povr�ino, ki je bila dejansko ugotovljena med pregledom, ki so ga opravili pristojni organi, sama po sebi vsebuje uporabo sankcije“.
The way in which the Court of First Instance construed the legislation at issue is not contrary to the principles of legal certainty and non-discrimination.
Razlaga obravnavanih določb na strani Sodi�ča prve stopnje naj ne bi bila v nasprotju z načeloma pravne varnosti in prepovedi diskriminacije.
On the one hand, the Court of First Instance stated in its judgment that the Belgian authorities had the possibility of carrying out on-the-spot checks.
Na eni strani naj bi Sodi�če prve stopnje v sodbi opozorilo, da so imeli belgijski organi možnost opraviti nadzor na kraju samem.
On the other, once they had opted for a particular method of checking, the Belgian authorities had to abide by that method and ensure that the checks were effective, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Regulation No 3887/92.
Na drugi strani, potem ko so belgijski organi izbrali določen način nadzora, bi se ga morali držati in zagotoviti njegovo zanesljivost v skladu s členom 6(1) Uredbe �t. 3887/92.
In support of its contention, the appellant advances arguments based on the text of those provisions, on other provisions of Article 6 of Regulation No 3887/92 and on general principles of Community law.
Pritožnica v utemeljitev teh trditev, poleg trditev, temelječih na besedilu teh določb, navaja tudi trditve, temelječe na drugih določbah istega člena 6 Uredbe �t. 3887/92 in na splo�nih načelih prava Skupnosti.
Finally, in the Commission’s view, the tolerance margin under Article 6(7) of Regulation No 3887/92 concerns on-the-spot checks exclusively.
Na koncu po mnenju Komisije tolerančna meja iz člena 6(7) Uredbe �t. 3887/92 zadeva samo nadzor na kraju samem.
The Commission’s own recommendations, which the appellant has cited, certainly provide for the application
V njenih priporočilih, ki jih omenja pritožnica, naj bi bila pri upravnem nadzoru podatkov
Before I embark on an analysis of those arguments, I would point out — as, moreover, did the Court of First Instance in the judgement under appeal — that it is established caselaw that where the Commission
Preden začnem preučevati te trditve, opozarjam, kot je to že naredilo Sodi�če prve stopnje v izpodbijani sodbi, da v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso Komisija, kadar zavrne, da bi EKUJS kril nekatere odhodke,
BELGIUM v COMMISSION to take the appropriate action in response to this and, secondly, that their conduct when faced with this anomaly did not constitute an appropriate response, since that response ought to have consisted in the adoption of the measures omitted.
BELGIJA PROTI KOMISIJI med prijavljeno povr�ino in povr�ino RGIS „nepravilnost, ki kaže na potencialne nepravilnosti zahtevka za pomoč“, na kar so se bili belgijski organi dolžni ustrezno odzvati, in drugič, da se belgijski organi ob ugotovitvi take nepravilnost niso ustrezno odzvali, saj bi se ustrezno odzvali, če bi sprejeli opu�čene ukrepe.
refuses to charge certain expenditure to the EAGGF on the ground that it was incurred as a result of a breach of Community rules for which a Member State can be held responsible, the Commission is not required to demonstrate exhaustively that the checks carried out by the Member States are inadequate or that the figures supplied by them are incorrect, but is required to provide evidence of the serious and reasonable doubt it entertains concerning the checks carried out by the national authorities or concerning the correct application of the Community law in force.
ker so nastali na podlagi kr�itev ureditve Skupnosti, za katere je odgovorna država članica, ni dolžna izčrpno dokazati pomanjkljivosti nadzora, ki ga je opravila taka država članica, ali nepravilnost podatkov, ki jih je slednja posredovala, ampak le predložiti dokaz o resnih in utemeljenih dvomih, ki jih ima glede nadzora, ki so ga opravili nacionalni organi, ali glede pravilne uporabe veljavne ureditve Skupnosti.
The reason for this mitigation of the burden of proof on the Commission is that it is the State which is best placed to collect and check the data required for the clearance of EAGGF accounts, and which is consequently required to adduce the most detailed and comprehensive evidence that its checks are actually carried out and, if appropriate, that the Commission’s assertions are incorrect. 47
To ublažitev dokaznega bremena za Komisijo je mogoče pojasniti z dejstvom, da je država članica v najprimernej�em položaju za zbiranje in preverjanje podatkov, potrebnih za potrditev obračuna EKUJS, in je zato dolžna predložiti najpodrobnej�i in najpopolnej�i dokaz o zanesljivosti svojega nadzora ter morebiti o nepravilnosti trditev Komisije. 47
At paragraph 52 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance acknowledged that the Community legislation in force at the relevant time did not expressly require the Belgian authorities to adopt the measures omitted in response to the anomalies that were uncovered.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je v točki 52 izpodbijane sodbe priznalo, da veljavna ureditev Skupnosti v zadevnem obdobju belgijskim organom ni izrecno nalagala, da ob ugotovitvi navedenih nepravilnosti sprejmejo opu�čene ukrepe.
The question essentially raised by the first three limbs of the second ground of appeal is, in substance, whether the Court of First Instance did not thus misconstrue the scope of the obligations which those provisions impose upon the Member States.
Glavno vpra�anje, ki ga vsebujejo prvi trije deli drugega pritožbenega razloga, je v bistvu, ali Sodi�če prve stopnje s tem ni nepravilno razlagalo obsega obveznosti, ki jih v breme držav članic določajo zgorajnavedene določbe.
It follows that the Court of First Instance was right to focus, in its analysis, on ascertaining whether the results of the checks which the Commission carried out were such as to cause it to entertain serious and reasonable doubt it concerning the effectiveness of the checks which the Belgian authorities had conducted in this case.
Iz tega izhaja, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje s svojo analizo pravilno želelo preveriti, ali so rezultati Komisijinega nadzora pri tej instituciji vzbudili resne in utemeljene dvome o zanesljivosti nadzora belgijskih organov v obravnavanem primeru.
In that connection, in relation to the first complaint raised by the Commission in the summary report, the Court of First Instance upheld the complaint, after first finding that a positive discrepancy between the declared area and the GIS area constituted ‘an anomaly indicating a potential irregularity in the aid application’, and that the Belgian authorities were required
Temu je Sodi�če prve stopnje v zvezi s prvim očitkom Komisije v zbirnem poročilu pritrdilo, potem ko je ugotovilo, prvič, da je pozitivno razhajanje
It is true that, according to the Court’s caselaw, as cited by the Court of First Instance, the obligation to adopt certain supervisory measures and inspection procedures not expressly imposed on the Member
Res je, da v skladu s sodno prakso Sodi�ča, ki jo je navedlo Sodi�če prve stopnje, obveznost sprejetja določenih ukrepov za spremljanje in sprejetje podrobnih pravil za nadzor, ki jih na obravnavanem področju
48 the correct utilisation of Community resources, that the Member States are required to set up comprehensive administrative checks and on-the-spot inspections, thus guaranteeing the proper observance of the substantive and formal conditions for the grant of the premiums in question. 49
48 zadeva pravilno uporabo sredstev Skupnosti, izhaja, da so države članice dolžne uvesti celovit upravni nadzor in nadzor na kraju samem, ki zagotavljata, da bodo pravilno upo�tevane materialne in formalne zahteve za odobritev zadevnih pomoči. 49
It does not seem to me, in this case, that that obligation can give rise to the consequences which the Commission and Court of First Instance have drawn from it vis-à-vis the Belgian authorities.
Ne zdi pa se mi, da je v obravnavanem primeru mogoče iz te obveznosti v breme belgijskih organov izpeljati posledice, kot sta jih Komisija in Sodi�če prve stopnje.
It is based, for that purpose, first and foremost on the declarations farmers provide in the aid ap -plications.
Sodi�če je poudarilo, da „učinkovit postopek zahteva, da so podatki, ki jih mora v skladu s členom 6 [Uredbe �t.
The Court has pointed out that ‘[a]n effective procedure presupposes that the information to be provided by an applicant for aid [pursuant to Article 6 of Regulation No 3887/92] is complete and accurate from the outset in order that he may make a proper application for the grant of compensatory payments and avoid the imposition of penalties’. 50
3887/92] predložiti prosilec pomoči, od začetka popolni in pravilni, da lahko vloži pravilen zahtevek za dodelitev kompenzacijskih plačil in se izogne naložitvi kazni“. 50
It is clear from those provisions, viewed in the light of the obligation of sincere cooperation with the Commission embodied in Article 10 EC, as regards, more particularly,
Iz teh določb, če se jih presoja glede na obveznost lojalnega sodelovanja s Komisijo iz člena 10 ES, kar, povedano natančneje,
49 — Germany v Commission, paragraph 20, and Spain v Commission, paragraph 36.
49 – Glej zgoraj navedeni sodbi Nemčija proti Komisiji, točka 20, in Španija proti Komisiji, točka 36.
48 — Germany v Commission, paragraph 16, and Spain v Commission, paragraph 35.
48 – Zgoraj navedeni sodbi z dne 12. junija 1990 v zadevi Nemčija proti Komisiji, točka 16, in Španija proti Komisiji, točka 35.
50 — Case C-63/00 Schilling and Nehring [2002] ECR I-4483, paragraph 34.
50 – Sodba z dne 16. maja 2002 v zadevi Schilling in Nehring (C-63/00, Recueil, str. I-4483, točka 34).
The Court has further held that ‘[t]he grant of aid under the IACS involves procedures relating to a large number of applications’, consequently, ‘[t]he effective protection of the financial interests of the Community in such a context entails that the recipients of aid take an active part in the correct implementation of those procedures and take responsibility for the correctness of the amounts granted to them under the IACS’. 51
Sodi�če je tudi poudarilo, da „gre pri izvedbi pomoči, odobrenih na področju IUNS, za postopke, ki se nana�ajo na veliko �tevilo zahtevkov“, zaradi česar „učinkovito varstvo finančnih interesov Skupnosti na tem področju pomeni, da prejemniki pomoči aktivno sodelujejo pri pravilnem poteku teh postopkov in so odgovorni za pravilnost zneskov, ki so jim odobreni na področju IUNS“. 51
In the system set in place by Regulations Nos 3508/92 and 3887/92, the on-the-spot checks — including those carried out to verify the accuracy of the area declared in the aid applications — are, therefore, designed to provide a means of verification which is of limited scope (sampling) and is framed by a series of provisions which both regulate how the checks are to be carried out (see Articles 6(7) and 7(1) of Regulation No 3887/92) and also clearly specify the circumstances in which they are to be carried out.
V sistemu, ki ga določata uredbi �t. 3508/92 in 3887/92, je nadzor na kraju samem tudi pri preverjanju obstoja povr�in, prijavljenih v zahtevkih za pomoč, torej zasnovan kot sredstvo za preverjanje izvajanja, ki je omejeno (na vzorec) in ga opredeljuje več določb, ki poleg tega, da določajo podrobna pravila postopka (glej člena 6(7) in 7(1) Uredbe �t.
In that context, Article 6(4) of the regulation provides that the competent national authority is to select the premium or aid applications which are to be subject to on-the-spot checks ‘on the basis of a risk analysis and an element of representativeness of the aid applications submitted.’
3887/92), jasno določajo tudi pogoje. Člen 6(4) iste uredbe glede tega določa, da pristojni organ določi zahtevke, ki so predmet nadzora na kraju samem, zlasti „na podlagi analize tveganj in dejavnika reprezentativnosti vloženih zahtevkov za pomoč“.
According to the Court, it is apparent from the provisions of Regulations Nos 3508/92 and 3887/92 that ‘the national authorities are not required, or above all able, to carry out checks to verify the accuracy of all the statements made in aid applications submitted to them’.
Po navedbah Sodi�ča iz določb uredb �t. 3508/92 in 3887/92 izhaja, da „nacionalnim organom ni treba in da predvsem ne morejo opraviti nadzora, s katerim bi preverili resničnost vseh prijav v prejetih zahtevkih za pomoč“.
52 With regard, in particular, to on-the-spot checks within the meaning of Article 6(3) of Regulation No 3887/92, the Court has, therefore, underlined, with reference to livestock aid applications, that they ‘are to relate to a significant percentage of applications’, but that ‘that percentage may be only 10% of … aid applications submitted by farmers’ 53 — the percentage stipulated in the first indent of Article 6(3), which the second indent thereof set at 5% for area aid applications.
52Zlasti glede nadzora na kraju samem iz člena 6(3) Uredbe �t. 3887/92 je Sodi�če poudarilo, pri čemer se je sklicevalo na zahtevke za pomoč za živali, da ta nadzor „zadeva znatni vzorec zahtevkov“, da pa lahko „tak vzorec predstavlja samo 10 % zahtevkov […] ki so jih vložili pridelovalci“, 53kar je odstotek, ki je določen v prvi alinei navedene določbe, ki se v drugi alinei spremeni v 5 % pri zahtevkih za pomoč na povr�ino.
The implementation of on-the-spot checks for a particular application therefore presupposes that, within that system, the application has been selected following a prior risk analysis relating to all of the applications submitted and based on criteria specifically listed in Article 6(4) of Regulation No 3887/92, on additional criteria which that provision allows the individual Member States to define and, possibly, other criteria, the application of which must prove necessary to secure the effectiveness of the control system, such as, for example, according to
Predpostavka za izvedbo nadzora na kraju samem za določen zahtevek pri takem sistemu je torej ta, da je ta zahtevek izbran na podlagi predhodne analize tveganj, katere predmet je bila celota predloženih zahtevkov in ki temelji na merilih, ki so izrecno navedena v členu 6(4) Uredbe �t. 3887/92, na dodatnih merilih, ki jih v skladu s to določbo lahko določijo posamezne države članice, in morda na drugih merilih, katerih uporaba je nujna posledica zagotovitve zanesljivosti sistema nadzora, kot so na primer
Article 9(2) of Regulation No 3887/92 in effect provides that a positive discrepancy between a declared area and a ‘determined’ area is to result in the refusal (or cancellation) of the aid only if the declared area is 20% greater than the determined area.
54 tivno razhajanje med prijavljeno povr�ino in „ugotovljeno“ povr�ino povzroči odklonitev (ali preklic) pomoči, le če slednjo presega za več kot 20 %.
Secondly, I would point out that the Court has also held that ‘administrative controls and on-farm inspections were designed by the Community legislature as two means of verification which, although separate, complement each other’, 56 clearly indicating that they must not duplicate each other.
Drugič, opozarjam, da je Sodi�če tudi potrdilo, da je „upravni nadzor in nadzor na kraju samem normodajalec Skupnosti zasnoval kot dve sredstvi za pregledovanje, ki se, čeprav sta različni, dopolnjujeta“, 56 kar očitno pomeni, da nista enaki.
As the Court of First Instance notes in the judgment under appeal, the Court of Justice has stated that ‘administrative controls preceding on-farm inspections must be carried out in such a way as to enable the national authorities to draw all possible conclusions, be they matters of certainty or of doubt, regarding compliance with the conditions for granting premiums’. 55
Kot je poudarilo Sodi�če prve stopnje v izpodbijani sodbi, je Sodi�če navedlo, da mora biti „upravni nadzor, preden se opravi nadzor na kraju samem, opravljen tako, da nacionalnim organom omogoči, da pridejo do vseh možnih ugotovitev, naj si gre za gotovosti ali dvome, zato da se upo�tevajo pogoji za odobritev pomoči“. 55
It does not, in particular, seem to me to be possible to consider that, during the material period, the administrative checks had to be organised by the Member States in such a way as to enable them to ascertain, inter alia, the accuracy of the area declared in the aid application.
Zdi se mi zlasti, da ni mogoče ugotoviti, da bi v zadevnem obdobju države članice morale organizirati upravni nadzor tako, da bi jim med drugim omogočal ugotavljanje pravilnosti povr�ine, prijavljene v zahtevku za pomoč.
In its response to the appeal, the Commission did not go so far as to claim that such a requirement existed, nor, moreover, was a requirement of that nature upheld in the judgment under appeal.
Komisija v odgovoru na tožbo ni potrdila take zahteve in ta ni bila potrjena niti v izpodbijani sodbi.
The approach which the Court of First Instance adopted, and which the Commission defends, was rather that once the Belgian authorities adopted an instrument, the GIS, which was not compulsory and not designed to measure the area of agricultural parcels but was none the less capable of providing data on those areas, they should have drawn the appropriate conclusions from that data.
Pristop Sodi�ča prve stopnje, kot ga zagovarja Komisija, je bil bolj ta, da je ugotovilo, da bi morali belgijski organi, ko so uvedli sistem, kot je RGIS, ki ni obvezen in namenjen merjenju povr�in enot rabe ali poljin, ampak vseeno primeren za zagotovitev informacije o tej povr�ini, na podlagi teh informacij priti do ustreznih ugotovitev.
54 — Spain v Commission, paragraphs 34 to 41, in which the Court pointed out, in particular, that the list of factors to be taken into account in the risk analysis, pursuant to Article 6(4) of Regulation No 3887/92, is not definitive.
54 – Zgoraj navedena sodba Španija proti Komisiji, točke od 34 do 41, v kateri je Sodi�če med drugim poudarilo, da seznam dejavnikov, ki jih je treba upo�tevati pri analizi tveganj iz člena 6(4) Uredbe �t. 3887/92, ni izčrpen.
55 — Germany v Commission, paragraph 17, and Spain v Commission, paragraph 40, cited in paragraph 54 of the judgment under appeal.
55 – Zgoraj navedeni sodbi z dne 3. oktobra 1996 v zadevi Nemčija proti Komisiji, točka 17, in Španija proti Komisiji, točka 40, ki sta omenjeni v točki 54 izpodbijane sodbe.
56 — Germany v Commission, paragraph 43, and Spain v Commission, paragraph 38.
56 – Zgoraj navedeni sodbi Nemčija proti Komisiji, točka 43, in Španija proti Komisiji, točka 38.
In that sense, I therefore agree with the Belgian Government that, in view of that lack of precision, a positive discrepancy between the declared area and the GIS area could not per se be considered to be ‘an anomaly indicating a potential irregularity in the application’, such as to require, in any event, either calculation of the amount of the aid on the basis of the GIS area or an on-the-spot check.
V tem smislu se torej strinjam z belgijsko vlado glede ugotovitve, da pozitivnega razhajanja med prijavljeno povr�ino in povr�ino RGIS zaradi te nenatančnosti ni mogoče �teti za tako „nepravilnost, ki kaže na potencialne nepravilnosti zahtevka“, da bi bilo treba v vsakem primeru zahtevati bodisi izračun zneska pomoči na podlagi povr�ine RGIS bodisi nadzor na kraju samem.