natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In that last regard, since a disloyal Commission official is in a position to sabotage his institution’s mission by supporting the members of an illegal cartel and may thus considerably complicate the investigation carried out by the Commission, for example by destroying or manipulating evidence, by informing the members of the cartel of a forthcoming unannounced investigation and by revealing the entire investigation strategy drawn up by the Commission, information about the existence of such an official must, in principle, be regarded as being capable of making it easier for the Commission to carry out its task of establishing an infringement and putting an end to it.
Kadar je nelojalen uradnik Komisije v takem položaju, da lahko sabotira nalogo svoje institucije s tem, da podpira udeležene pri nezakonitem kartelu in s tem znatno oteži preiskavo Komisije, na primer s tem, da uničuje dokazne elemente ali jih poneverja, udeležene pri kartelu obvešča o pretečem nenapovedanem preverjanju in izdaja celotno strategijo preiskave, ki jo je izdelala Komisija, mora načeloma veljati, da se podatek o takem uradniku šteje za olajšanje naloge Komisije, ki je v tem, da se kršitev dokaže in odpravi.
Such information is particularly useful when it is provided at the beginning of the investigation opened by the Commission into possible anticompetitive conduct.
Koristnost takega podatka je zlasti pomembna, kadar se podatek priskrbi na začetku preiskave o možnem protikonkurenčnem delovanju, ki jo je uvedla Komisija.
In Mannesmannröhren-Werke v Commission, cited above, the Court of First Instance stated that, in order to receive a reduction in the fine on the ground of not contesting the facts, in accordance with point D.2 of the Leniency Notice, an undertaking must expressly inform the Commission that it has no intention of substantially contesting the facts, after perusing the statement of objections.
V zgoraj navedeni sodbi z dne 8. julija 2004 v zadevi Mannesmannröhren-Werke proti Komisiji Sodišče prve stopnje poudarja, da mora podjetje, zato da bi se mu lahko znižal znesek globe na podlagi neugovarjanja dejstvom, v skladu s točko D2 sporočila o sodelovanju, Komisijo izrecno obvestiti o tem, da po seznanitvi z uradnim obvestilom o ugotovitvah o možnih kršitvah ne namerava ugovarjati resničnosti dejstev.
In the absence of such an express declaration, mere passivity on the part of an undertaking cannot be considered to facilitate the Commission’s task, since the Commission is required to establish the existence of all the facts in the final decision without being able to rely on a declaration by the undertaking in doing so.
Pasivnost podjetja naj se v odsotnosti take izrecne izjave ne bi štela za olajševanje naloge Komisije, saj mora ta vsa dejstva dokazati v svoji končni odločbi, brez možnosti, da se v ta namen sklicuje na izjavo podjetja.
As it has already had occasion to state (Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission, cited above, paragraph 85), the Court of First Instance recalled in Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission that the principle ne bis in idem, which is also enshrined in Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, is a general principle of Community law upheld by the Community judicature.
V potrditev že sprejetih ugotovitev (zgoraj navedena sodba v zadevi Archer Daniels Midland in Archer Daniels Midlands Ingredients proti Komisiji, točka 85) je Sodiče prve stopnje v svoji sodbi v zadevi Tokai Carbon in drugi proti Komisiji spomnilo, da načelo prepovedi ponovnega sojenja v isti stvari, ki mu je posvečen tudi člen 4 Protokola št. 7 Konvencije o varstvu človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin, pomeni splošno načelo prava Skupnosti, katerega spoštovanje zagotavlja sodnik.
In the field of Community competition law, the principle precludes an undertaking from being sanctioned by the Commission or made the defendant to proceedings brought by the Commission a second time in respect of anticompetitive conduct for which it has already been penalised or of which it has been exonerated by a previous decision of the Commission that is no longer amenable to challenge.
Na področju prava konkurence Skupnosti to načelo prepoveduje, da bi Komisija ponovno kaznovala ali preganjala podjetje zaradi njegovega vodilnega protikonkurenčnega vedenja, za katero je bilo že kaznovano ali je bilo s predhodno odločbo Komisije, zoper katero ni več pravnih sredstev, ugotovljeno, da podjetje zanj ni odgovorno.
The question none the less arose as to whether the Commission infringes that principle when it imposes sanctions on undertakings in respect of unlawful conduct which has already been punished by the authorities of nonmember States.
Kljub temu se postavi vprašanje, ali Komisija krši to načelo, kadar kaznuje podjetja za kršitve, za katere so jih kaznovali že organi tretjih držav.
On that point, the Court of First Instance considered that the principle ne bis in idem does not preclude the possibility of concurrent sanctions, one a Community sanction, the other a national one, resulting from two sets of parallel proceedings which pursue distinct ends.
O tem je Sodišče prve stopnje sodilo, da načelo prepovedi ponovnega sojenja o isti stvari ne nasprotuje možnosti seštevanja kazni, na eni strani naloženih s strani Skupnosti, na drugi nacionalnih, ki izhajajo iz dveh vzporednih postopkov z različnimi cilji.
A fortiori, that principle cannot apply where procedures are conducted and penalties imposed by the Commission on the one hand and the authorities of nonmember States on the other, provided that those procedures do not pursue the same ends.
A fortiori se to načelo ne uporabi v primeru, ko postopke vodijo in kazni naložijo na eni strani Komisija in na drugi strani organi tretjih držav, kadar ti postopki ne zasledujejo istih ciljev.
Furthermore, the Court of First Instance held that the Commission was not required, under a general requirement of natural justice, to take account of penalties imposed by the authorities or the courts of a nonmember State which have already been borne by the same undertaking in respect of the same conduct.
Sodišče prve stopnje meni, da Komisija ni bila dolžna na temelju splošne zahteve po pravičnosti upoštevati kazni, izrečenih s strani organov ali sodišč tretjih držav, ki jih je isto podjetje že prestalo za enako dejanje.
The conditions on which it may be concluded that there is an obligation to take account of the penalties imposed by an authority of a Member State which have already been borne by the same undertaking in respect of the same conduct are not satisfied where the penalties were imposed by the authorities of nonmember States.
V bistvu pogoji, v katerih se morajo upoštevati kazni, ki jih je naložil organ države in ki jih je za enako dejanje prestalo isto podjetje, niso izpolnjeni, kadar so kazni izrekli organi tretjih držav.
In those circumstances, given that the applicants pointed to no express provision of a convention requiring the Commission, when determining the amount of a fine, to take account of penalties already imposed on the same undertaking in respect of the same conduct by the authorities or courts of a nonmember State, such as the United States or Canada, they could not validly complain that, in the present case, the Commission had failed to satisfy any such alleged obligation.
Glede na to, da ni izrecno dogovorjene mednarodnopravne določbe, ki bi določila obveznost Komisije, da pri določitvi zneska globe upošteva kazni, ki so jih organi ali sodišča tretje države, kot so Združene države ali Kanada, istemu podjetju že izrekla za enako dejanje, v tem primeru tožeče stranke, Komisiji ne morejo uspešno očitati, da je kršila domnevno obveznost.
The principles thus recalled by the Court of First Instance confirm those already identified in the ‘Lysine’ cases (see, in particular, Archer Daniels Midland and Archer Daniels Midland Ingredients v Commission, paragraphs 85 to 104).
Načela, na katera je tako spomnilo Sodišče prve stopnje, potrjujejo tista načela, ki so bila sprejeta v zadevah „Lysin“ (glej zlasti zgoraj navedeno sodbo v zadevi Archer Daniels Midland in Archer Daniels Midlands Ingredients proti Komisiji, točke od 85 do 104).
The exercise of unlimited jurisdiction
Izvrševanje neomejene pristojnosti
Pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation No 17, the Court of First Instance has unlimited jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 229 EC in an action against a decision imposing a fine and may thus cancel, reduce or increase the fine imposed.
Na podlagi člena 17 Uredbe št. 17 odloča Sodišče prve stopnje, na katerem je vložena tožba zoper odločbo, ki nalaga globo, z neomejeno pristojnostjo v smislu člena 229 ES in lahko naloženo globo razveljavi, zniža ali zviša.
The Court has on a number of occasions exercised its unlimited jurisdiction to reduce fines after finding that certain elements of the infringement were not established to the requisite legal standard (JCB Service v Commission, paragraph 193) or that the Commission had failed to comply with the Guidelines or the Leniency Notice (Tokai Carbon and Others v Commission).
Sodišče prve stopnje je večkrat izvrševalo svojo neomejeno pristojnost za to, da je znižalo zneske glob, potem ko je ugotovilo, da določeni očitani elementi kršitev niso bili pravno zadostno dokazani (sodba v zadevi JCB Service proti Komisiji, točka 193) ali da je Komisija kršila smernice ali sporočilo o sodelovanju (zgoraj navedena sodba v zadevi Tokai Carbon in drugi proti Komisiji).
The Court further observed that, in the context of its unlimited jurisdiction, its assessment of the appropriateness of the fine could take into account information not mentioned in the Commission decision.
V zgoraj navedeni sodbi v zadevi Tokai Carbon in drugi proti Komisiji je Sodišče prve stopnje prvič izvrševalo neomejeno pristojnost za zvišanje zneska globe na vmesni stopnji njenega izračuna.
Regulation No 4064/89
Uredba št. 4064/89
The only decision delivered in the field of concentrations in 2004 was a judgment annulling a Commission decision prohibiting the concentration between the United
Edina odločitev v letu 2004 s področja koncentracij je sodba, ki je razglasila ničnost odločbe Komisije o prepovedi koncentracije med ameriškima podjetjema za telekomunikacije, WorldCom (zdaj imenovan MCI) in Sprint23
However, the judgment of 28 September 2004 in Case T-310/00 MCI v Commission, not yet published in the ECR, did not involve a determination of the substance of the case, as the ground of annulment concerned the Commission’s lack of power to adopt the decision.
Sodba z dne 28. septembra 2004 v zadevi MCI proti Komisiji (T-310/00, še neobjavljena v Recueil) se ni omejila na odločanje v temelju, razlog za razglasitev ničnosti je bila namreč nepristojnost Komisije za sprejem odločbe.
After the parties had jointly notified the merger pursuant to Regulation No 4064/89 24 on 10 January 2000, they formally stated on 27 June 2000 that they were withdrawing their notification and that they no longer intended to implement the proposed merger in the form set out in the notification.
Stranki, ki sta dne 10. januarja 2000 skupno priglasili koncentracijo na podlagi Uredbe št. 4064/8924, sta dne 27. junija uradno razglasili, da umikata priglasitev in da nimata namena izvesti koncentracije v obliki, predstavljeni v tej priglasitvi.
On 28 June 2000, the Commission none the less adopted its decision declaring the merger incompatible with the common market and the EEA Agreement.
Ne glede na to je Komisija dne 28. junija 2000 sprejela odločbo o nezdružljivosti koncentracije s skupnim trgom in Sporazumom EGP.
The Court found that the communication which WorldCom and Sprint sent to the Commission on 27 June 2000 concerned not the abandonment, as a matter of principle, of any idea of, or proposal for, a merger, but only the abandonment of the proposed merger ‘in the form presented in the notification’, i.e. in the form envisaged by the notified merger agreement.
Sodišče prve stopnje meni, da sporočilo, ki sta ga dne 27. junija 2000 WorldCom in Sprint naslovila na Komisijo, ni zajemalo načelne opustitve vsakršne ideje ali načrta koncentracije, ampak samo opustitev načrta „v obliki, predstavljeni v priglasitvi“, kar pomeni v obliki, ki je bila načrtovana v priglasitvi sporazuma o združitvi.
Press releases issued on the same day in the United States by the two undertakings confirmed that at the time WorldCom and Sprint still entertained some hopes of merging their activities in one form or another.
Sporočila za javnost, ki sta jih podjetji WorldCom in Sprint objavili v Združenih državah, potrjujejo, da sta v tem času še imeli določeno upanje na združitev svojih dejavnosti v taki ali drugačni obliki.
In reality, it was only by the press release of 13 July 2000 that the notifying parties announced that they were definitively abandoning their proposed merger.
V resnici sta podjetji svoj dokončni odstop od načrta koncentracije razglasili v sporočilu za javnost z dne 13. julija 2000.
However, the Court of First Instance further stated that a merger agreement capable of forming the subject-matter of a Commission decision does not automatically exist (or continue to exist) between two undertakings simply because they are considering merging (or continue to consider merging).
Sodišče dodaja, da to, da dve podjetji načrtujeta združitev (ali nadaljujeta načrtovanje združitve), ipso facto ne zadošča za obstoj (ali nadaljevanje obstoja) sporazuma o koncentraciji med njima, ki je lahko predmet odločbe Komisije.
Commission competence cannot rest on the mere subjective intentions of the parties.
Pristojnost Komisije ne more temeljiti že na samih subjektivnih namerah strank.
Just as it does not have the power to prohibit a merger before a merger decision has been concluded, the Commission ceases to have that power as soon as that agreement is abandoned, even if the undertakings concerned continue negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement in a modified form.
Tako kot Komisija ni pristojna, da bi prepovedala koncentracijo pred sklenitvijo sporazuma o združitvi, neha biti pristojna, kakor hitro ta sporazum preneha, ne glede na nadaljevanje
Commission Decision 2003/790/EC of 28 June 2000 declaring a concentration incompatible with the common market and the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.1741 – MCI WorldCom/Sprint) (OJ 2003 L 300, p. 1).
Odločba Komisije 2003/790/ES z dne 28. junija 2000 o nezdružljivosti koncentracije s skupnim trgom in Sporazumom EGP (Zadeva COMP/M.1741 – MCI WorldCom proti Sprintu) (UL 2003, L 300, str. 1).
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 1989 L 395, p. 1, corrigendum OJ 1990 L 257, p.
Uredba Sveta (EGS) št. 4064/89 z dne 21. decembra 1989 o nadzoru koncentracij podjetij (UL L 395, str. 1, popravek v UL 1990, L 257, str.
13, since repealed by Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 2004 L 24, p. 1)).
13, razveljavljen z Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 z dne 20. januarja 2004 o nadzoru koncentracij podjetij (UL L 24, str. 1)).
The concept of State aid a)
Pojem državnih pomoči a)
The benefit and the specificity of the State measure are characteristic elements of the concept of State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC.
Prednost in posebnost državnih ukrepov so značilni elementi pojma državne pomoči v smislu člena 87 (1) ES25.
25 The Commission was condemned on a number of occasions for not having correctly appraised the criteria in question (judgments of 16 March 2004 in Case T-157/01 Danske Busvognmaend v Commission, of 16 September 2004 in Case T-274/01 Valmont Nederland v Commission, of 21 October 2004 in Case T-36/99 Lenzing v Commission and of 1 December 2004 in Case T-27/02 Kronofrance v Commission, none yet published in the ECR).
Komisija je bila večkrat grajana, ker ni pravilno presodila zadevnih meril (sodbe z dne 16. marca 2004 v zadevi Danske Busvognmaend proti Komisiji, T-157/01, z dne 16. septembra 2004 v zadevi Valmont Nederland proti Komisiji, T-274/01, z dne 21. oktobra 2004 v zadevi Lenzing proti Komisiji, T-36/99, in z dne 1. decembra 2004 v zadevi Kronofrance proti Komisiji, T-27/02, še neobjavljene v Recueil).
The concept of State aid covers not only positive benefits, such as subsidies, loans or the taking of shares in undertakings, but also interventions which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which, without therefore being subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect.
Pojem državne pomoči ne zajema le pozitivnih koristi, kot so subvencije, posojila ali pridobitev nadzora nad podjetji, ampak tudi posredovanje, ki na različne načine zmanjša stroške, ki normalno bremenijo proračun podjetja, in ki je iste narave in ima popolnoma enak učinek, ne da bi šlo za subvencije v strogem pomenu besede.
Thus, in its judgment of 21 October 2004 in Lenzing v Commission, the Court of First Instance held that where public bodies with responsibility for collecting social security contributions tolerate late payment of such contributions, their conduct gives a recipient undertaking in serious financial difficulties, by mitigating, for that undertaking, the burden associated with the normal application of the social security system, a significant commercial advantage which cannot be wholly removed by the interest and default surcharges which it is required to pay.
V zgoraj navedeni sodbi z dne 21. oktobra 2004 v zadevi Lenzing proti Komisiji je Sodišče prve stopnje odločilo, da vedenje oseb javnega prava, pristojnih za zbiranje prispevkov za socialno zavarovanje, ki dopuščajo plačilo navedenih prispevkov z zamudo, ponuja podjetju v velikih finančnih težavah občutno gospodarsko korist, ker se mu z odlogom znižajo stroški, ki bi jih imelo v primeru običajne uporabe sistema socialnega zavarovanja; podjetju naložene obresti in zamudne obresti ne morejo v celoti odpraviti te koristi.
By concluding in that case that those bodies had acted in the same way as a hypothetical private creditor in, so far as possible, the same situation vis-à-vis its debtor as those bodies, the Commission made a manifestly incorrect application of the private creditor test; and, accordingly, the Court annulled the contested decision.
Komisija je napravila očitno napako pri uporabi merila zasebnega upnika, ker je v tem primeru odločila, da so te osebe ravnale kot zasebni hipotetični upnik, ki bi bil po možnosti v enakem položaju do svojega dolžnika kot te osebe, in Sodišče prve stopnje je razglasilo ničnost sporne odločbe.
It was also by reference to the private creditor test that the Court of First Instance determined whether the Commission had been entitled to conclude that the reduction of some of the debts of the German company Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau to the publiclaw body responsible for the restructuring of undertakings of the former German Democratic Republic (‘the BvS’) constituted State aid.
Ravno tako je Sodišče prve stopnje s sklicevanjem na merilo zasebnega upnika presojalo, ali je Komisija lahko sklenila, da ima zmanjšanje enega dela dolgov nemške družbe Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau do osebe javnega prava, odgovorne za preoblikovanje podjetij nekdanje Nemške demokratične republike („BvS“), lastnost državne pomoči.
The restricted review which the court carries out of the complex economic appraisals of that nature led to the conclusion that, in the light of the circumstances of the case, the Commission had not committed a
Omejen nadzor, ki ga Sodišče prve stopnje izvaja nad zapletenimi gospodarskimi presojanji te narave, je glede na okoliščine tega primera Sodišče prve stopnje pripeljal do sklepa, da Komisija ni
As established in Article 87(1) EC, a State aid incompatible with the common market is an advantage, granted by the State or through State resources in any form whatsoever in favour of certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, which affects trade between Member States and which distorts or threatens to distort competition.
Kot izhaja iz člena 87(1) ES je državna pomoč, ki ni združljiva s skupnim trgom, korist, ki jo dodeli država, ali kakršna koli vrsta pomoči iz državnih sredstev z dajanjem prednosti posameznim podjetjem ali proizvodnji posameznega blaga, ki prizadene trgovino med državami članicami in izkrivlja ali bi lahko izkrivljala konkurenco.
Proceedings manifest error of assessment in finding that the BvS had not behaved like a private creditor operating under normal market conditions.
Sodišče prve stopnje napravila očitne napake z oceno, da se BvS ni vedla kot zasebni upnik, delujoč v običajnih tržnih pogojih.
As none of the other pleas was upheld, the action for annulment was dismissed (judgment of 8 July 2004 in Case T-198/01 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission, not yet published in the ECR; under appeal, Case C-404/04 P).
Ker ni bil sprejet noben drug razlog, je bila ničnostna tožba zavrnjena ((sodba z dne 8. julija 2004 v zadevi Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau proti Komisiji, T-198/01, še neobjavljena v Recueil; pritožba (sodba C-404/04 P)).
In its judgment in Valmont Nederland v Commission, moreover, the Court of First Instance adopted for the first time the solution arrived at by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 24 July 2003 in Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg [2003] ECR I-7747, according to which State intervention in favour of an undertaking in return for discharging public service obligations does not constitute aid, provided that a number of conditions are satisfied. 26
V zgoraj navedeni sodbi v zadevi Valmont Nederland proti Komisiji je Sodišče prve stopnje prvič prevzelo rešitev, ki jo je Sodišče sprejelo v svoji sodbi z dne 24. julija 2003 v zadevi Altmark Trans in Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg (C-280/00, Recueil, str. I7747), v skladu s katero se posredovanje države v korist podjetja v zameno za izvrševanje obveznosti javnih služb ne šteje za pomoč, pod pogojem, da je izpolnjenih več meril26.
In that case, the Commission had considered that the financing granted by a Netherlands municipality to an undertaking to construct a car park constituted State aid in part, on the ground that it corresponded to business costs which that undertaking should normally have borne and placed it at an advantage.
V tem primeru je Komisija menila, da je bilo financiranje,kigajezagradnjoparkirišča nizozemska občina dodelila podjetju, delno državna pomoč, ker je pokrilo stroške obratovanja, ki bi normalo bremenili to podjetje in mu je bilo v korist.
The Commission none the less considered that the other part of the financing benefited other undertakings and did not benefit the applicant.
Komisija je kljub temu menila, da je bil drugi del financiranjavkoristtretjihpodjetijinnidajalprednostitožeči stranki.
The Court of First Instance found, first, that the undertaking bore a burden in allowing others to use its car park in various ways regularly and free of charge, under an agreement concluded, in the public interest as much as in that of the third parties concerned, with a territorial authority and, second, that a portion of the financing granted by the territorial authority for the construction of that car park effectively benefited Valmont.
Sodišče prve stopnje na eni strani meni, da je imelo to podjetje stroške s tem, da je tretjim osebam na podlagi pogodbe, sklenjene s teritorialno skupnostjo v splošnem interesu in v interesu zadevnih tretjih oseb, dovolilo, da na različne načine redno in zastonj uporabljajo njegovo parkirišče, in na drugi strani, da je dejanske koristi od enega dela financiranja,ki ga je teritorialna skupnost dodelila za ureditev parkirišča, imel Valmont.