natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Furthermore, that alternative method, since it amounts to claiming, as the Court of First Instance observed in paragraph 74 of the judgment under appeal, that the length of time Mrs Girardot would have remained in the service of the Commission if it had recruited her is so hypothetical that it should be completely disregarded and, consequently, that it should be considered that her employment was terminated as soon as it had begun, would result in the provision of compensation for fictitious damage which was neither actual nor certain.
Poleg tega bi bila s to alternativno metodo povrnjena fiktivna �koda, ki ni niti dejanska niti gotova, ker je, kot je ugotovilo Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 74 izpodbijane sodbe, trajanje zaposlitve M.-C. Girardot pri Komisiji, če bi se tam zaposlila, tako hipotetično, da bi ga bilo treba povsem zanemariti, posledično pa bi bilo treba ugotoviti, da jo je Komisija odpustila takoj po tem, ko jo je zaposlila.
It follows that the Commission, which does not, moreover, dispute that the statement of the reasons of the judgment under appeal is sufficient in law, has not demonstrated that the Court of First Instance, in exercising the discretion available to it in this matter, has, by the method adopted, misinterpreted the damage suffered in this case by Mrs Girardot, by not determining the actual and certain damage resulting for her from the loss of an opportunity of being recruited.
Iz tega izhaja, da Komisija, ki ne ugovarja temu, da je izpodbijana sodba v zvezi s tem zadostno pravno obrazložena, ni dokazala, da naj bi Sodi�če prve stopnje z metodo, ki jo je sprejelo, pri izvr�evanju diskrecijske pravice, ki jo ima na tem področju, s tem da ni določilo dejanske in gotove �kode, ki je M.-C. Girardot nastala zaradi izgube možnosti zaposlitve, spremenilo pomen �kode, ki jo je M.-C. Girardot utrpela v obravnavanem primeru.
It is not disputed that there is a direct causal link between that damage and the alleged unlawful conduct in the present case.
Ni sporno, da ima ta �koda neposredno vzročno zvezo z očitano nezakonitostjo v obravnavanem primeru.
By the cross-appeal, Mrs Girardot claims that the Court of First Instance infringed Community law by making several manifest errors of assessment.
Z nasprotno pritožbo M.-C. Girardot zatrjuje, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje s tem, da je storilo več očitnih napak pri presoji, kr�ilo pravo Skupnosti.
First, Mrs Girardot submits that, by adopting only a period of five years as the reference period for calculating the difference in remuneration, the Court of First Instance made a manifest error of assessment, in that, in paragraph 80 of the judgment under appeal, it excluded from the factors under consideration the loss of opportunity of a career, when the prospect of appointment as an established official was not a matter
Prvič, M.-C. Girardot trdi, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje s tem, da je za izračun razlike v plačilu upo�tevalo zgolj petletno obdobje, storilo očitno napako v presoji, saj je v točki 80 izpodbijane sodbe iz presoje izključilo izgubo možnosti kariere, medtem ko
2008 — CASE C-348/06 P of doubt, since at the time the Commission had, in line with clearly defined policy, appointed numerous temporary staff members as established officials, and the eight candidates finally recruited were all appointed as established officials.
2008 – ZADEVA C-348/06 P možnost zaposlitve ni bila negotova, saj je v tistem času Komisija v skladu z jasno opredeljeno politiko zaposlila veliko začasnih uslužbencev, zaposlila je vseh osem kandidatov, ki so nazadnje bili izbrani.
Secondly, Mrs Girardot claims that, by referring to the net monthly earnings corresponding, on average, to the last remuneration paid to her by the Commission in a post in grade A 5, the Court of First Instance made a manifest error of assessment in determining the difference in remuneration, in that, in paragraph 85 of the judgment under appeal, that court disregarded the fact that she had a greater chance of being recruited to a post in grade A 4 than to a post in grade A 5 since five of the eight posts for which she had applied were in grade A 4.
Drugič, M.-C. Girardot trdi, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje s tem, da se je sklicevalo na neto mesečno plačilo, ki v povprečju ustreza zadnjemu plačilu, ki ga je izplačala Komisija za delovno mesto v nazivu A5, storilo očitno napako pri presoji v zvezi z določitvijo razlike v plačilu, tako da v točki 85 izpodbijane sodbe ni upo�tevalo dejstva, da je imela večje možnosti, da se zaposli na delovnem mestu v nazivu A4 kot na delovnem mestu v nazivu A5, ker je bilo pet od osmih delovnih mest, na katera se je prijavila, v nazivu A4.
In addition, the Court of First Instance should have constructed the progression of her career on the basis of the average time taken for promotion from one grade to another and taken account of pension rights she would have acquired in the event of recruitment.
Poleg tega bi Sodi�če prve stopnje moralo napredovanje njene kariere rekonstruirati na podlagi povprečnega časa, potrebnega za napredovanje iz enega v drug naziv, ob upo�tevanju pravic do pokojnine, ki bi bile pridobljene z zaposlitvijo.
Thirdly, Mrs Girardot considers that, by setting the chance she had of being recruited at 50%, the Court of First Instance made a manifest error of assessment as to the probability of that chance materialising, in that, in paragraph 116 of the judgment under appeal, the Court failed to take into account that her chances of being recruited were increased by the fact that for each of the posts in question there was only one other competing candidate, that each of those others was recruited and that a candidate applying for eight posts has more opportunity to be recruited than a candidate who presents himself for only one post.
Tretjič, M.-C. Girardot meni, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje s tem, da je možnost njene zaposlitve določilo na 50 %, storilo očitno napako pri presoji glede verjetnosti uresničitve te možnosti, saj v točki 116 izpodbijane sodbe ni upo�tevalo, da so bile njene možnosti za zaposlitev povečane zaradi dejstva, da je glede vsakega zadevnega delovnega mesta imela zgolj enega protikandidata, da so bili vsi protikandidati izbrani in da ima kandidat, ki se poteguje za osem delovnih mest, večje možnosti, da zaposlitev dobi, kot kandidat, ki se poteguje zgolj za eno delovno mesto.
In addition, a one in two chance does not amount to a strong chance.
Resna možnost naj poleg tega ne bi pomenila eno možnost od dveh.
Fourthly and lastly, Mrs Girardot considers that the Court of First Instance made a manifest error of assessment by not taking into account, in paragraphs 133 to 138 of the judgment under appeal, all the evidence of nonmaterial and physical harm, whereas the medical certificates produced by her within these proceedings record the existence of a depressive syndrome from which she has suffered since the date of the unlawful rejection of her applications.
Četrtič, M.-C. Girardot meni, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje s tem, da v točkah od 133 do 138 izpodbijane sodbe ni upo�tevalo vseh elementov nepremoženjske in telesne �kode, medtem ko so zdravni�ka potrdila, ki jih je predložila v okviru tega postopka, potrjevala, da zaradi nezakonitega zavrženja njenih prijav trpi za depresijo.
At the hearing, the Commission submitted that the cross-appeal was entirely inadmissible since its objective was to challenge the appraisal of facts carried out by the Court of First Instance.
Komisija je na obravnavi trdila, da je nasprotna pritožba v celoti nedopustna, ker se z njo izpodbija presoja dejanskega stanja, ki jo je izvedlo Sodi�če prve stopnje.
As is clear from Article 225 EC and Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, an appeal lies on points of law only and therefore the Court of First Instance alone has jurisdiction to find and to appraise the facts, save where the factual inaccuracy of its findings results from the documents in the case before it.
Kot izhaja iz členov 225 ES in 58 Statuta Sodi�ča, je pritožba omejena na pravna vpra�anja in je tako zgolj Sodi�če prve stopnje pristojno za ugotavljanje dejanskega stanja, razen ko bi vsebinska nepravilnost njegovih ugotovitev izhajala iz listin v spisu, ki so mu bile predložene, in za presojo tega dejanskega stanja.
The appraisal of the facts by the Court of First Instance does not constitute, save where the clear sense of the evidence produced before it is distorted, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice (see, inter alia, EIB v Hautem, cited above, paragraph 44; Case C-121/01 P O’Hannrachain v Parliament [2003] ECR I-5539, paragraph 35; and order of 27 April 2006 in Case C-230/05 P L v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 45.
Presoja dejanskega stanja, razen pri izkrivljanju dokazov, predloženih Sodi�ču prve stopnje, torej ni pravno vpra�anje, ki bi bilo predmet nadzora Sodi�ča (glej zlasti zgoraj navedeno sodbo BEI proti Hautem, točka 44, sodbo z dne 5. junija 2003 v zadevi O’Hannrachain proti Parlamentu, C-121/01 P, Recueil, str. I-5539, točka 35, in sklep z dne 27. aprila 2006 v zadevi L proti Komisiji, C-230/05 P, neobjavljen v ZOdl., točka 45).
In addition, it follows from Article 225 EC, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (see, inter alia, Case C-41/00 P Interporc v Commission [2003] ECR I-2125, paragraph 15, and Case C-68/05 P Konink-
Poleg tega iz členov 225 ES, 58, prvi odstavek, Statuta Sodi�ča in 112(1)(c) Poslovnika Sodi�ča izhaja, da je treba v pritožbi jasno navesti izpodbijane elemente sodbe, katere razveljavitev je predlagana, ter pravne trditve, ki posebej utemeljujejo ta predlog (glej zlasti sodbi z dne 6. marca 2003 v zadevi Interporc proti Komisiji, C 41/00 P, Recueil,
2008 — CASE C-348/06 P lijke Coöperatie Cosun v Commission [2006] ECR I-10367, paragraph 54; order of 19 March 2004 in Case C-196/03 P Lucaccioni v Commission [2004] ECR I-2683, paragraph 40, and order in Meister v OHIM, cited above, paragraph 95).
2008 – ZADEVA C-348/06 P str. I-2125, točka 15, in z dne 26. oktobra 2006 v zadevi Koninklijke Coöperatie Cosun proti Komisiji, C-68/05 P, ZOdl., str I-10367, točka 54; sklep z dne 19. marca 2004 v zadevi Lucaccioni proti Komisiji, C-196/03 P, Recueil, str.
According to the case-law, that requirement is not satisfied by an appeal which, without even including an argument specifically identifying the error of law allegedly vitiating the judgment under appeal, confines itself to repeating or reproducing the pleas in law and arguments submitted to the Court of First Instance, including those founded on facts explicitly rejected by that Court.
V skladu s sodno prakso Sodi�ča slednjih zahtev ne izpolnjuje pritožba, ki samo ponavlja ali dobesedno navaja razloge in trditve, ki so bili predloženi Sodi�ču prve stopnje, skupaj s tistimi, ki so temeljili na dejstvih, ki jih je to sodi�če izrecno zavrnilo, ne da bi vsebovala navedbe, s katerimi bi natančneje opredelila pravno napako v izpodbijani sodbi.
Such an appeal amounts in reality to a request for no more than a re-examination of the application submitted to the Court of First Instance, which the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to undertake (see, inter alia, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission, paragraph 35, and Eurocoton and Others v Council, paragraph 47, both cited above; and the order in Lucaccioni v Commission, cited above, paragraph 41).
Dejansko taka pritožba pomeni predlog za vnovično preučitev tožbe, vložene pri Sodi�ču prve stopnje, za kar pa Sodi�če ni pristojno (glej zgoraj navedeni sodbi Bergaderm in Goupil proti Komisiji, točka 35, in Eurocoton in drugi proti Svetu, točka 47; ter zgoraj navedeni sklep v zadevi Lucaccioni proti Komisiji, točka 41).
Furthermore, according to the caselaw set out in paragraph 45 of this judgment, when Court of First Instance has determined that there is damage, it alone has jurisdiction, within the confines of the claim, to assess the form and extent of reparation for the damage.
Poleg tega je v skladu s sodno prakso, navedeno v točki 45 te sodbe, Sodi�če prve stopnje, ko ugotovi obstoj �kode, edino pristojno, da v okviru zahtevka oceni način in obseg nadomestila te �kode.
In the present case, it must be held that, by this cross-appeal, Mrs Girardot, as she herself stated at the hearing in response to a question from the Court on that point, seeks not to identify errors of law allegedly vitiating the reasoning of the Court of First Instance in the judgment under appeal but rather, by (i) repeating her arguments relied on at first instance and (ii) putting forward supposed new evidence, she
V obravnavanem primeru pa je treba ugotoviti, da M.-C. Girardot s to nasprotno pritožbo, kot je tudi poudarila na obravnavi v odgovor na vpra�anje Sodi�ča glede te točke, ne predlaga, naj se ugotovi obstoj pravnih napak, ki naj bi jih vsebovalo razlogovanje Sodi�ča prve stopnje v izpodbijani tožbi, temveč izpodbija, po eni strani z navajanjem trditev, na katere se je sklicevala na prvi stopnji, po drugi strani pa s predloži-
COMMISSION v GIRARDOT seeks to challenge the assessment of facts which that Court undertook in that judgment for the purposes of determining the extent of reparation for the damage, but she does not either allege any distortion of those facts or advance the slightest legal argument capable of demonstrating why the assessment by Court of First Instance of her arguments was erroneous in law.
KOMISIJA PROTI GIRARDOT tvijo domnevno novih dokazov, presojo dejanskega stanja tega sodi�ča v izpodbijani sodbi glede določitve obsega povrnitve �kode, ne da bi se sklicevala na kakr�no koli izkrivljanje teh dejstev ali na kakr�no koli pravno utemeljitev, da bi dokazala, zakaj naj bi bila presoja teh utemeljitev s strani Sodi�ča prve stopnje napačna.
That being the case, Mrs Girardot therefore does no more than request a re-examination of the judgment under appeal.
S tem M.-C. Girardot torej predlaga ponovni preizkus izpodbijane sodbe.
Consequently, the cross-appeal must be dismissed as inadmissible.
Zato je treba nasprotno pritožbo zavreči kot nedopustno.
It follows from all of the foregoing that the main appeal and the cross-appeal must be dismissed.
Iz zgoraj navedenega izhaja, da je treba glavno pritožbo zavrniti, nasprotno pritožbo pa zavreči.
Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to appeal proceedings pursuant to Article 118 of those Rules, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs, if they are applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
V skladu s členom 69(2) Poslovnika, ki velja za pritožbeni postopek na podlagi člena 118 tega poslovnika, se neuspeli stranki naloži plačilo stro�kov, če so bili ti prigla�eni.
Since Mrs Girardot applied for costs against the Commission and the latter has been unsuccessful in its grounds of appeal, the Commission must be ordered to pay the costs of the main appeal.
M.-C. Girardot je predlagala, naj se Komisiji naloži plačilo stro�kov, in ker ta s svojimi pritožbenimi predlogi ni uspela, se ji naloži plačilo stro�kov v zvezi z glavno pritožbo.
Since the Commission applied for the costs of the cross-appeal against Mrs Girardot and she has been unsuccessful in her grounds of appeal, she must be ordered to pay the costs of that appeal.
Komisija je predlagala, naj se M.-C. Girardot naloži plačilo stro�kov nasprotne pritožbe, in ker ta s svojimi pritožbenimi predlogi ni uspela, se ji naloži plačilo stro�kov v zvezi z nasprotno pritožbo.
Dismisses the main appeal and the cross-appeal;
Glavna pritožba se zavrne, nasprotna pritožba pa se zavrže.
Orders the Commission of the European Communities to pay the costs of the main appeal;
Komisiji Evropskih skupnosti se naloži plačilo stroškov v zvezi z glavno pritožbo.
Orders Mrs Girardot to pay the costs of the cross-appeal.
M.-C. Girardot se naloži plačilo stroškov v zvezi z nasprotno pritožbo.
Case C-425/06
Zadeva C-425/06
Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, formerly Ministero delle Finanze v Part Service Srl, company in liquidation, formerly Italservice Srl
Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, nekdanje Ministero delle Finanze proti Part Service Srl, družba v likvidaciji,nekdanja Italservice Srl
(Sixth VAT Directive — Articles 11A(1)(a) and 13B(a) and (d) — Leasing — Artificial division of the supply into a number of parts — Effect — Reduction of the taxable amount — Exemptions — Abusive practice — Conditions)
„Šesta direktiva o DDV – Člena 11A(1)(a) in 13B(a) in (d) – Zakup – Umetna delitev storitve na več elementov – Učinki – Znižanje davčne osnove – Oprostitve – Zloraba – Pogoji“
Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 21 February 2008 . . . . . .
Sodba Sodi�ča (drugi senat) z dne 21. februarja 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . I - 900
Tax provisions — Harmonisation of laws — Turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax — Sixth Directive — Transactions constituting an abusive practice
Davčne določbe – Usklajevanje zakonodaj – Prometni davki – Skupni sistem davka na dodano vrednost – Šesta direktiva – Transakcije, ki pomenijo zlorabo
SUMMARY — CASE C-425/06
POVZETEK – ZADEVA C-425/06
— the service supplied by the leasing company is subject to a division, the financing element is entrusted to another company to be split into a credit service, an insurance service and a brokerage service;
– storitev lizin�ke družbe je predmet razdelitve, financiranje pa je preneseno na drugo družbo, da bi bilo razdeljeno na storitve kreditiranja, zavarovanja in posredovanja;
The Sixth Directive 77/338 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes must be interpreted as meaning that there can be a finding of an abusive practice when the accrual of a tax advantage constitutes the principal aim of the transaction or transactions at issue.
Šesto direktivo Sveta 77/388/EGS o usklajevanju zakonodaje držav članic o prometnih davkih je treba razlagati tako, da gre za zlorabo, kadar je davčna ugodnost bistveni cilj zadevne transakcije ali zadevnih transakcij.
(see para. 45, operative part 1)
(Glej točko 45 in točko 1 izreka.)
— the service of the leasing company is therefore reduced to a service for renting a vehicle;
– storitev lizin�ke družbe je tako omejena na storitev dajanja vozila v najem;
— the lease payments made by the customer are of an amount which is only slightly higher than the purchase cost of the vehicle;
– obroki, ki jih plača lizingojemalec, skupaj zna�ajo le malo več kot nakupna cena stvari;
It is for the national court to determine whether, for the purposes of the application of value added tax, leasing transactions having the following characteristics can be considered to be an abusive practice under the Sixth Directive 77/338 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes:
Nacionalno sodi�če mora ugotoviti, ali se za namene uporabe davka na dodano vrednost lizin�ke transakcije, za katere so značilni spodaj na�teti elementi, lahko �tejejo za zlorabo glede na Šesto direktivo 77/388 o usklajevanju zakonodaje držav članic o prometnih davkih:
— that service, considered in isolation, therefore seems to be economically unprofitable, so that the viability of the business cannot be ensured solely by means of contracts concluded with the customers;
– ta storitev, obravnavana posamezno, zato ni gospodarsko donosna, tako da gospodarska učinkovitost podjetja ne more biti zagotovljena le s pogodbami, sklenjenimi z lizingojemalci;
— the two companies taking part in the leasing transaction are part of the same group;
– družbi, ki sta sodelovali pri lizingu, sta del iste skupine;
— the leasing company receives the consideration of the leasing transaction only through the cumulative lease payments made by the customer and the amounts transferred from the other company of the same group.
– lizin�ka družba prejme plačilo za lizing le zaradi skupne vsote obrokov, ki jih plača lizingojemalec, in zneskov, ki jih plača druga družba iste skupine.
leasing company. That result would appear to be contrary to the objective of Article 11A(1) of the Sixth Directive, namely the taxation of everything which constitutes consideration received or to be received from the customer.
Šeste direktive, in sicer da je obdavčeno vse, kar pomeni plačilo, ki je bilo ali bo prejeto od naročnika.
Since the leasing of vehicles under leasing contracts constitutes a supply of services within the meaning of Articles 6 and 9 of the Sixth Directive, such a transaction is normally subject to value added tax, for which the taxable amount is determined in accordance with Article 11A(1) of the Sixth Directive.
Ker namreč dajanje vozil v najem v skladu s pogodbami o lizingu pomeni opravljanje storitev v smislu členov 6 in 9 Šeste direktive, se za tako transakcijo navadno plača davek na dodano vrednost, katerega davčno osnovo je treba določiti v skladu s členom 11A(1).
It is also for the national court to assess if, the contractual structure of the transaction notwithstanding, the evidence put before the court discloses the characteristics of a single transaction.
Nacionalno sodi�če mora prav tako presoditi, ali dejstva, ki so mu predložena, določajo obstoj enotne transakcije, ne glede na njeno opredelitev v pogodbi.
In that context, it may find it necessary to extend its analysis by seeking evidence of indications of the existence of an abusive practice.
V tem okviru bo lahko raz�irilo svojo analizo z iskanjem pokazateljev o obstoju zlorabe.
For that purpose, the national court must verify, first, whether the result sought is a tax advantage, the granting of which would be contrary to one or more of the objectives of the Sixth Directive and, then, whether that constituted the principal aim of the contractual approach adopted.
Zato mora najprej preveriti, ali je rezultat davčna ugodnost, katere podelitev naj bi nasprotovala enemu ali več ciljem Šeste direktive, in nato, ali je ta ugodnost bistveni cilj izbrane pogodbene re�itve.
As regards the second criterion, the national court, in the assessment which it must carry out, may take account of the purely artificial nature of the transactions and the links of a legal, economic and/or personal nature between the operators involved, those aspects being such as to demonstrate that the accrual of a tax advantage constitutes the principal aim pursued, notwithstanding the possible existence, in addition, of economic objectives arising from, for example, marketing, organisation or guarantee considerations.
Nacionalno sodi�če lahko glede drugega merila pri presoji, ki jo mora izvesti, upo�teva popolnoma umetni značaj teh transakcij in tudi pravne, gospodarske in/ali osebne povezave med zadevnimi gospodarskimi subjekti, ker je na podlagi teh elementov mogoče dokazati, da je pridobitev davčne ugodnosti bistveni zasledovani cilj, kljub morebitnemu obstoju drugih gospodarskih ciljev, ki se nana�ajo na primer na trženje, organizacijo in garancijo.
As regards the first criterion, that court can take into account that the anticipated result is the accrual of a tax advantage linked to the exemption, pursuant to Article 13B(a) and (d) of the Sixth Directive, of the services entrusted to the co-contracting company of the
Navedeno sodi�če lahko glede prvega merila upo�teva, da je pričakovan rezultat pridobitev davčne ugodnosti, povezane z oprostitvijo storitev, prenesenih na družbo, ki je sopogodbenica lizin�ke družbe, na podlagi člena 13B(a) in (d) Šeste direktive. Tak rezultat se zdi v nasprotju s ciljem člena 11A(1)
(see paras 54, 55, 57-63, operative part 2)
(Glej točke 54, 55, od 57 do 63 in točko 2 izreka.)
2008 — CASE C-425/06
2008 – ZADEVA C-425/06
Part Service Srl, company in liquidation, formerly Italservice Srl,
Part Service Srl, družba v likvidaciji, nekdanja Italservice Srl,