natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
of the parties to the main action has taken the initiative of raising a point concerning the interpretation or the validity of Community law, but also extend to cases where a question of this kind is raised by the national court or tribunal itself which considers that a decision thereon by the Court of Justice is “necessary to enable it to give judgment”’. 51
51 podlagi svojega nacionalnega prava pristojno, da po uradni dolžnosti preuči zakonitost upravnega akta z vidika prava Skupnosti, in če meni, da lahko odloči le na podlagi tega prava, načeloma dolžno pri Sodi�ču vložiti predlog za sprejetje predhodne odločbe glede razlage.
It follows from this caselaw that, where the application of Community law appears necessary to a national court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law in order to determine a dispute before it, the third paragraph of Article 234 EC requires that court to refer to the Court of Justice any question of interpretation that arises, even if the claimant in the main proceedings has not raised a plea based on Community law, subject however to the qualifications accepted by the Court in Cilfit and Others and recently referred to by it in Intermodal Transports.
Tretjič, menim, da bi bila razlaga, v skladu s katero bi se za izpolnitev tega tretjega pogoja tožeča stranka v postopku v glavni stvari morala sklicevati na pravo Skupnosti, težko razumljiva v primeru, kot je ta v postopku v glavni stvari.
This analysis does not mean that a national court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law would be obliged, by virtue of Community law, to raise a plea based on Community law of its own motion. It means merely that
Ta analiza ne pomeni, da je nacionalno sodi�če, zoper odločitve katerega po nacionalnem pravu ni pravnega sredstva, na podlagi prava Skupnosti po uradni dolžnosti dolžno upo�tevati tožbeni razlog, ki izhaja iz tega prava.
51 — Case 126/80 Salonia [1981] ECR 1563, paragraph 7.
51 – Sodba z dne 16. junija 1981 v zadevi Salonia (126/80, Recueil, str.
I would also mention that, in Cilfit and Others, the Court observed that ‘it follows from the relationship between the second and third paragraphs of Article [234 EC] that the courts or tribunals referred to in the third paragraph have the same discretion as any other national court or tribunal to ascertain whether a decision on a question of Community law is necessary to enable them to give judgment’ (paragraph 10).
1563, točka 7). Naj opozorim, da je Sodi�če v navedeni sodbi Cilfit in drugi podrobno navedlo, da „iz povezave med drugim in tretjim odstavkom [člena 234 ES] izhaja, da imajo sodi�ča, na katera se nana�a tretji odstavek, glede vpra�anja, ali je odločba glede vpra�anja prava Skupnosti nujno potrebna za to, da lahko navedena sodi�ča odločijo, enako diskrecijsko pravico kot vsa druga nacionalna sodi�ča“ (točka 10).
52 in a situation where the parties to the main proceedings have not relied on Community law, and provided that the national court has power, by virtue of national law, to examine of its own motion the legality of an administrative act in the light of Community law and it considers that Community law must be applied in order for judgment to be given, it is required in principle to seek a preliminary ruling on a question of interpretation from the Court of Justice.
52 je odločalo na zadnji stopnji, z vidika sodne prakse Sodi�ča po sprejetju te odločbe temelji na napačni razlagi prava Skupnosti, ki je bila podana, ne da bi bilo Sodi�ču predloženo vpra�anje za predhodno odločanje v skladu s tretjim odstavkom člena 234 ES, ne zahteva, da bi se tožeča stranka v postopku v glavni stvari v okviru pravnega sredstva po nacionalnem pravu, ki ga je vložila zoper izpodbijano upravno odločbo, sklicevala na pravo Skupnosti.
In those circumstances, can a person really be blamed for having failed to base the action he brought before a national court ruling at final instance on Community law, in this case Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation No 3665/87, where that provision, as interpreted and applied consistently by the national courts before Emsland-Stärke, would not have enabled him to win his case?
3665/87, če pa na podlagi tega člena, kot so ga nacionalna sodi�ča ves čas razlagala in uporabljala pred navedeno sodbo Emsland-Stärke, ne bi mogla uspeti?
The reply to that question seems obvious and it is understandable that, in such a context, a person would base his legal strategy on arguments other than pleas based on Community law. 53
Po mojem mnenju je odgovor na to vpra�anje jasen in lahko razumem, da stranka v postopku v takih okoli�činah svojo strategijo opre na druge tožbene razloge, ki ne izhajajo iz prava Skupnosti. 53
Third, I consider that an interpretation under which fulfilment of the third condition would require the claimant in the main proceedings to have relied on Community law would be difficult to understand in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings.
Predložitveno sodi�če s tem vpra�anjem predlaga Sodi�ču, naj odloči, ali je možnost, da se vloži predlog za ponovno preučitev in popravek dokončne upravne odločbe, ki je v nasprotju s pravom Skupnosti, poleg tega, da mora izpolnjevati pogoje iz navedene sodbe Kühne & Heitz, časovno omejena zaradi nujnih razlogov prava Skupnosti. 110.
That is why, having regard to all the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court’s reply to the first question referred should be that, in order to be fulfilled, the condition laid down in Kühne & Heitz that 52 — See the order for reference, English version, p. 9.
Glede na navedene ugotovitve zato Sodi�ču predlagam, naj na prvo vpra�anje za predhodno odločanje odgovori, da se za izpolnitev pogoja iz navedene sodbe Kühne & Heitz, da odločba nacionalnega sodi�ča, ki 52 – Glej francosko različico predložitvene odločbe, str. 9 in 10.
53 — Any different reply could encourage the pleading of Community law solely as a precaution against the eventuality that, at some time in the future, the judgment given by a national court ruling at final instance may be contradicted by a judgment of the Court of Justice, which does not seem to me to be the primary aim of the direct effect of Community law.
53 – Drugačen odgovor bi lahko stranke v postopku napeljal k temu, da bi se na pravo Skupnosti sklicevale samo zato, da bi se zavarovale, če bi se kadar koli v prihodnosti zgodilo, da bi bila odločba nacionalnega sodi�ča, ki bi odločilo na zadnji stopnji, pozneje v nasprotju s sodbo Sodi�ča, kar po mojem mnenju ni glavni namen neposrednega učinka prava Skupnosti.
It appears from the order for reference that the requirement which proved to be contrary to Community law, namely, it may remembered, that in the case of a nondifferentiated refund proof that the product in question was indeed imported into a nonmember country within 12 months following the date of acceptance of the export declaration could be demanded even after payment of the aid, was in accordance with
Naj opozorim, da to vpra�anje izhaja iz posebnih okoli�čin postopka v glavni stvari, tj. da je družba Kempter �ele v dopisu z dne 16. septembra 2002, tj. 19 mesecev po izreku navedene sodbe Emsland-Stärke, organu Hauptzollamt predlagala, naj odpravi odločbo o povračilu z dne 10. avgusta 1995.
It is apparent from the grounds of the order for reference that the second question, which is formulated in general terms by the Finanzgericht Hamburg, has two aspects.
Iz obrazložitve predložitvene odločbe izhaja, da drugo vpra�anje, ki ga je Finanzgericht Hamburg ubesedilo na splo�no, vsebuje dva vidika.
54 the decision of a national court ruling at final instance is, in the light of a decision given by the Court subsequent to it, based on a misinterpretation of Community law which was adopted without a question being referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under the third paragraph of Article 234 EC does not presuppose that the claimant in the main proceedings relied on Community law in the legal action under national law brought by him against the disputed administrative decision.
54 časovna omejitev možnosti, da se na podlagi navedene sodbe Emsland-Stärke predlagata ponovna preučitev in odprava dokončne upravne odločbe, ki kr�i pravo Skupnosti, združljiva s pravom Skupnosti.
First, the national court is uncertain as to the implications of the fourth condition laid down by the Court of Justice in Kühne & Heitz, namely that the person concerned must have complained to the administrative body immediately after becoming aware of the Court’s decision. C — The second question referred
Predložitveno sodi�če tako Sodi�ču v bistvu predlaga, naj odloči, ali pravo Skupnosti nasprotuje temu, da je možnost, da se vloži predlog za ponovno preučitev in odpravo upravne odločbe, ki je po izčrpanju nacionalnih pravnih sredstev postala dokončna in za katero se je izkazalo, da je v nasprotju s pravom Skupnosti, kot ga je pozneje razlagalo Sodi�če, ne da bi nacionalno sodi�če, ki je odločalo na zadnji stopnji, pri Sodi�ču vložilo predlog za sprejetje predhodne odločbe, časovno omejena.
The national court’s second question to the Court is whether, apart from the conditions set out in Kühne & Heitz, an application for the review and amendment of a final administrative decision which is contrary to Community law is subject to a limit in time for overriding reasons of Community law. 115.
Po drugi strani se predložitveno sodi�če v �ir�em smislu spra�uje, ali je poleg tega četrtega pogoja treba upo�tevati tudi, da je možnost, da se vloži predlog za ponovno preučitev in odpravo dokončne upravne odločbe, ki je v nasprotju s pravom Skupnosti, časovno omejena zaradi pravne varnosti ali pa, nasprotno, ni časovno omejena.
Inasmuch as the national administrative authorities must apply the interpretation of a provision of Community law supplied by the Court in a preliminary ruling to legal relationships which have arisen before the Court’s judgment, the national court expresses doubts as to whether it is compatible with Community
Ker mora upravni organ pri pravnih razmerjih, nastalih pred sodbo, izdano v postopku predhodnega odločanja, uporabiti razlago določbe prava Skupnosti, ki jo je Sodi�če podalo v navedeni sodbi, predložitveno sodi�če dvomi, da je
It may be recalled that this question arises from the particular context of the main proceedings, namely the fact that Kempter did not apply to the Hauptzollamt for the withdrawal of the repayment decision of 10 August 1995 until it sent its letter of 16 September 2002, that is to say, 21 months after judgment was delivered in Emsland-Stärke.
Družba Kempter v pisnih stali�čih najprej poudari, da pravo Skupnosti ne vsebuje nobene posebne določbe o prekluzivnem ali zastaralnem roku predloga za ponovno preučitev.
54 — See points 31 to 35 of this Opinion.
Dodaja tudi, da lahko stranka v skladu z navedeno sodbo Kühne & Heitz pravico do ponovne preučitve uveljavlja samo, če to dovoljuje nacionalna določba. Pri odločanju, ali je ta pravica časovno omejena, je torej treba upo�tevati nacionalne določbe o zastaranju. 54 – Glej točke od 31 do 35 teh sklepnih predlogov.
law to impose a limit in time on an application, on the basis of Emsland-Stärke, for the review and withdrawal of an administrative decision which has become final and is contrary to Community law.
Ker je bil predlog družbe Kempter vložen pred tem datumom, ga torej naj ne bi bilo mogoče �teti za prepoznega. 55
Kempter also claims that, if the Community rules on timelimits or limitation periods were to be applied by analogy, its application should still not be regarded as out of time.
Družba Kempter tudi trdi, da se, če bi se po analogiji uporabile določbe Skupnosti, ki urejajo prekluzivni ali zastaralni rok, za njen predlog ne bi smelo �teti, da je bil vložen prepozno.
It puts forward a number of arguments in this regard.
V zvezi s tem navaja več trditev.
In particular, it observes that a certain period of time was necessary for the Court’s interpretation in Emsland-Stärke to give rise to a new administrative practice and to a change in the caselaw in Germany.
Tako zlasti opozarja, da je bil potreben določen čas, da je na podlagi razlage, ki jo je Sodi�če podalo v navedeni sodbi Emsland-Stärke, v Nemčiji pri�lo do nove upravne prakse in sprememb v sodni praksi.
Kempter points out that Emsland-Stärke was not taken into account in national caselaw until a Bundesfinanzhof judgment of 21 March 2002.
Družba Kempter namreč navaja, da se je navedena sodba Sodi�ča upo�tevala v nacionalni sodni praksi �ele s sodbo Bundesfinanzhof z dne 21. marca 2002.
In its written observations, Kempter notes first that there is no specific provision in Community law relating to a timelimit or limitation period for an application for review.
Poleg pogoja, ki ga je Sodi�če določilo v navedeni sodbi, isti vladi menita, da pravo Skupnosti ne nasprotuje temu, da je pravica
Kempter adds that, in accordance with Kühne & Heitz, the person concerned can assert his right to review of an administrative decision only if that is permitted under national law. Therefore, in order to decide whether or not that right is subject to 119.
55 – Družba Kempter te trditve opira na sodbo z dne 25. julija 1991 v zadevi Emmott (C-208/90, Recueil, str. I-4269), v kateri je Sodi�če odločilo, da „pravo Skupnosti nasprotuje temu, da se pristojni organi države članice na nacionalna postopkovna pravila o tožbenih rokih sklicujejo v okviru postopka, ki ga pred nacionalnimi sodi�či zoper njih sproži posameznik, da bi za�čitil pravice, ki izhajajo neposredno iz člena 4(1) Direktive Sveta 79/7/EGS z dne 19. decembra 1978 o postopnem izvr�evanju načela enakega obravnavanja mo�kih in žensk v zadevah socialne varnosti, dokler ta država članica določb te direktive ustrezno ne prenese v svoj nacionalni pravni red“.
In any case, Kempter considers that, as an application for the withdrawal of the repayment decision had no chance of succeeding on the basis of national law alone, any Community limitation period could not have begun to run before the date when the Opinion of Advocate General Léger in Kühne & Heitz was delivered, that is to say, 17 June 2003. In that Opinion, Article 10 EC was interpreted for the first time as meaning that such a decision had to be open to review. Therefore, as Kempter’s application was I - 440
V vsakem primeru meni, da predlog za odpravo odločbe o povračilu samo na podlagi nacionalnega prava ni imel nobene možnosti za uspeh, zato naj morebitni zastaralni rok Skupnosti ne bi mogel začeti teči pred datumom predložitve sklepnih predlogov generalnega pravobranilca Légerja v zadevi, v kateri je bila izdana navedena sodba Kühne & Heitz, tj. pred 17. junijem 2003. V teh sklepnih predlogih naj bi bil člen 10 ES prvič I - 440
Community law does not prevent the right to apply for review of an unlawful administrative decision from being limited in time.
Zaradi razlogov pravne varnosti predlaga, naj se četrti pogoj iz navedene sodbe Kühne & Heitz dopolni tako, da se mora stranka obrniti na upravni organ takoj po seznanitvi s sodbo Sodi�ča v zvezi z vpra�anjem za predhodno odločanje in v roku po izreku navedene sodbe, ki se zdi primeren glede na načela nacionalnega prava ter skladen z načeloma enakovrednosti in učinkovitosti. do vložitve predloga za ponovno preučitev nezakonite upravne odločbe časovno omejena.
Consequently national procedural rules may legitimately provide that an application of this type must be submitted within certain timelimits.
Nacionalna postopkovna pravila bi torej lahko utemeljeno določala, da je tak predlog treba vložiti v določenih rokih.
The compatibility of those timelimits with Community law must be assessed in the light of the principle of equivalence (which requires timelimits to be not less favourable than those laid down by the rules relating to similar domestic claims) and the principle of effectiveness (which requires timelimits not to make it impossible in practice to exercise rights conferred by Community law).
Združljivost teh rokov s pravom Skupnosti bi bilo treba presojati z vidika načela enakovrednosti (ki zahteva, da roki ne smejo biti manj ugodni od tistih, ki jih določajo pravila za podobne nacionalne zahtevke) in načela učinkovitosti (ki zahteva, da roki v praksi ne smejo onemogočati izvajanja pravic, priznanih s pravom Skupnosti).
With regard to the fourth condition set out by the Court in Kühne & Heitz, which states that ‘the person concerned complained to the administrative body immediately after becoming aware of [the] decision of the Court’ causing the final administrative decision to be unlawful, the Czech and Finnish Governments share the view expressed by the national court that the subjective timelimit thus created by the Court for applying for review of such a decision should be linked to positive awareness of that caselaw on the part of the person concerned. Therefore, an application for review submitted three months after the date when Kempter actually became aware of the Court’s interpretation fulfils that condition. 121.
Ob upo�tevanju teh trditev je treba najprej preučiti obseg tega četrtega pogoja, ki predvideva, da „se je stranka obrnila na upravni organ takoj po tem, ko se je seznanila s sodno prakso [Sodi�ča]“.
The Commission states that, in its opinion, the national court’s second question relates only to the interval between the delivery of the Court’s judgment causing the administrative decision to be unlawful and Kempter’s application for the review and withdrawal of the decision, that is to say, more than 19 months.
Komisija navaja, da se drugo vpra�anje za predhodno odločanje po njenem mnenju nana�a samo na čas med izrekom sodbe Sodi�ča, iz katere izhaja, da upravna odločba Ni zakonita, ter predlogom za ponovno preučitev in odpravo navedene odločbe, ki ga je predložila družba Kempter, kar v obravnavanem primeru zna�a več kot 19 mesecev.
In the Commission’s view, the national court does not appear to be referring to the period of time between that application and either the adoption of the original administrative decision (that is to say, the repayment decision of 10 August 1995) or the date when the applicant became aware of the judgment of the Court rendering that decision unlawful (that is to say, 1 July 2002, when the Bundesfinanzhof’s judgment of 21 March 2002 was sent to the applicant by fax).
Po drugi strani se Komisiji zdi, da se predložitveno sodi�če ne sklicuje na čas, ki je pretekel med navedenim predlogom in sprejetjem prvotne upravne odločbe (tj. odločbe o povračilu z dne 10. avgusta 1995) ali seznanitvijo tožeče stranke s sodbo Sodi�ča, iz katere izhaja, da ta odločba ni zakonita (tj. 1. julijem 2002, ko ji je bila po telefaksu poslana sodba Bundesfinanzhof z dne 21. marca 2002).
The Commission further states that, because of the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States, it is not in favour of setting a timelimit at Community level.
Ob upo�tevanju pomena, ki ga je treba pripisati načelu pravne varnosti in zlasti zahtevi po gotovosti pravnega stanja, pa se vseeno ne nagibam k sprejetju take razlage.
In view of those arguments, it is necessary first of all to examine the implications of the fourth condition, which states that ‘the person concerned complained to the administrative body immediately after becoming aware of [the] decision of the Court’.
Taka razlaga bi namreč dajala prednost subjektivnosti pogoja, ki ga je tako določilo Sodi�če, kar bi lahko otežilo dokazovanje datuma dejanske seznanitve s sodno prakso Sodi�ča. Po drugi strani menim, da je upo�tevanje datuma izreka sodbe Sodi�ča, ki nikakor ni subjektiven, skladnej�e z zahtevami, ki izhajajo iz načela pravne varnosti, kot je gotovost pravnega stanja.
However, when changing that ‘circumstance’ into a ‘condition’ in i-21 Germany and Arcor, the Court retained the same wording and did not make it clear whether that condition should be understood as relating to actually becoming aware of the judgment giving a preliminary ruling or whether it was to be interpreted as referring to the date when the judgment was delivered.
Ko je Sodi�če to „okoli�čino“ nato v navedeni sodbi i-21 Gremany in Arcor spremenilo v „pogoj“, je vseeno ohranilo enako ubeseditev in ni pojasnilo, ali je treba za ta pogoj �teti, da je povezan z dejansko seznanitvijo s sodbo glede vpra�anja za predhodno odločanje, ali pa ga je treba razlagati, kot da je povezan z datumom njenega izreka.
In view of the words used by the Court, I understand the interpretation proposed
Glede na besede, ki jih je uporabilo Sodi�če, razumem razlago, ki jo je predlagalo
KEMPTER by the national court and supported by the Czech and Finnish Governments, to the effect that the phrase ‘becoming aware of that decision of the Court’ relates to the date when the applicant was actually informed of the decision, and not the date of delivery of the Court’s judgment.
KEMPTER takoj po tem, ko se je seznanila s sodno prakso [Sodi�ča]“. Zato je po mojem mnenju treba izpodbijati obstoj tega pogoja.
It may be recalled that the documents in the file show that a certain period of time was necessary for the Court’s interpretation in Emsland-Stärke to give rise to new administrative practice and a change in the caselaw in Germany.
Opozarjam, da iz spisa izhaja, da je bil potreben določen čas, da je na podlagi razlage, ki jo je Sodi�če podalo v navedeni sodbi Emsland-Stärke, v Nemčiji pri�lo do nove upravne prakse in sprememb v sodni praksi.
That judgment of the Court was not taken into account in national caselaw until a Bundesfinanzhof judgment of 21 March 2002.
Navedena sodba Sodi�ča se je namreč v nacionalni sodni praksi upo�tevala �ele od sodbe Bundesfinanzhof z dne 21. marca 2002.
In those circumstances, it could appear unjust to object that Kempter did not submit an application for review to the Hauptzollamt immediately after the Court’s preliminary ruling.
V navedenih okoli�činah se morda ne bi zdelo pravično, da bi družbi Kempter očitali, da predloga za ponovno preučitev organu Hauptzollamt ni predložila takoj po izreku sodbe Sodi�ča glede vpra�anja za predhodno odločanje.
These observations show the drawbacks inherent in a strict interpretation of the condition that ‘the person concerned complained to the administrative body immediately after becoming aware of [the] decision of the Court’.
S tega vidika se mi ne zdi prav, da bi se ta časovni okvir določil kot pogoj za nastanek obveznosti ponovne preučitve na podlagi člena 10 ES, kot to velja za druge pogoje, ki jih je Sodi�če določilo v navedeni sodbi Kühne & Heitz. 132.
It would give preference to the subjective dimension of the condition set out by the Court, which could entail difficulties regarding proof of the date when the person concerned actually became aware of the Court’s decision.
Še več, ker je ta pogoj postopkovno pravilo za izvajanje obveznosti ponovne preučitve, ki izhaja iz člena 10 ES, časovne omejitve za vložitev predlogov za ponovno preučitev in odpravo dokončnih upravnih odločb, ki so v nasprotju s pravom Skupnosti,
Community law therefore does not preclude such applications from being subject to a time-limit.
kot je ta v postopku v glavni stvari, po mojem mnenju ne bi smelo neposredno določiti Sodi�če.
Therefore it would, in my view, be consistent with the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States if the latter were left to set the period within which such applications must be submitted.
Menim, da bi bilo tudi v skladu z načelom postopkovne avtonomije držav članic, če bi njim prepustili določitev roka za vložitev takih predlogov.
This seems to me to be more in accordance with the Court’s approach in Kühne & Heitz seeking to reconcile the principle of the primacy of Community law with the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States and that of legal certainty. 134.
Zdi se mi, da je taka re�itev skladnej�a s pristopom Sodi�ča v navedeni sodbi Kühne & Heitz, katere namen je bil uskladiti načelo primarnosti prava Skupnosti z načelom postopkovne avtonomije držav članic in načelom pravne varnosti. 138.