natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
By affecting economic relations with entities within a given country, the sanctions necessarily affect the overall state of economic relations between the Community and that country.
Ker sankcije vplivajo na gospodarske odnose med subjekti v določeni državi, nujno vplivajo na splo�no stanje gospodarskih odnosov med Skupnostjo in to državo.
Economic relations with individuals and groups from within a third country are part of economic relations with that country; targeting the former necessarily affects the latter.
Gospodarski odnosi s posamezniki in subjekti iz tretjih držav so del gospodarskih odnosov v tej državi; ker se nana�ajo na prve, nujno vplivajo na zadnje.
To exclude economic relations with individuals or groups from the ambit of ‘economic relations with … third countries’ would be to ignore a basic reality of international economic life: that the governments of most countries do not function as gatekeepers for the economic relations and activities of each specific entity within their borders.
Izključitev gospodarskih odnosov s posamezniki ali subjekti, zajetih v „gospodarsk[ih] odnos[ih] […] s tretjimi državami“, bi pomenilo, da bi prezrli temeljno resnico mednarodnega gospodarstva: da vlade večine držav ne delujejo kot čuvaj gospodarskih odnosov in dejavnosti vsakega posameznega subjekta znotraj njihovih meja.
The Court of First Instance found that Article 308 EC had to be brought into play in order to impose financial sanctions on individuals who do not exercise government control.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je ugotovilo, da je bilo člen 308 ES treba uporabiti, da bi naložili finančne sankcije posameznikom, ki ne izvajajo vladnega nadzora.
However, the reliance on the notion of government control as a distinguishing factor highlights an underlying tension in the reasoning of the Court of First Instance.
Vendar je z uporabo pojma vladni nadzor kot razločevalnega dejavnika poudarjen obstoj določenega protislovja v razlogovanju Sodi�ča prve stopnje.
The Court of First Instance construed Article 308 EC as a ‘bridge’ between the CFSP and the Community pillar.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je člen 308 ES razlagalo kot „most“ med SZVP in stebrom Skupnosti.
However, while Article 301 EC might be seen as a cross-pillar bridge, Article 308 EC surely cannot fulfil that function.
Vendar, če je člen 301 ES mogoče �teti za most med stebri Pogodbe, pa člen 308 ES nikakor ne more izpolnjevati te naloge.
Article 308 EC, like Article 60(1) EC, is strictly an enabling
Člen 308 ES je enako kot člen 60(1) ES strogo določba, ki daje pooblastila: določa načine, ne pa ciljev.
Moreover, the Court of First Instance’s restrictive reading of Article 301 EC deprives
Poleg tega ozko razumevanje člena 301 ES s strani Sodi�ča prve stopnje tej določbi
12 — Paragraph 133 of the judgment under appeal.
12 – Točka 133 izpodbijane sodbe.
III — The jurisdiction of the Community Courts to determine whether the contested regulation breaches fundamental rights provision: it provides the means, but not the objective.
III – Pristojnost sodišč Skupnosti, da določijo, ali se z izpodbijano uredbo kršijo temeljne pravice
Hence, if one excludes the interruption of economic relations with non-State actors from the realm of acceptable means to achieve the objectives permitted by Article 301 EC, one cannot use Article 308 EC to bring those means back in.
Zato, če prekinitev gospodarskih odnosov z nedržavnimi subjekti izključi- mo iz področja sprejemljivih načinov, ki jih za dosego ciljev dovoljuje člen 301 ES, člena 308 ES ni mogoče uporabiti zato, da bi se ti cilji ponovno uvedli.
Either a measure directed against non-State actors fits the objectives of the CFSP which the Community can pursue by virtue of Article 301 EC, or, if it does not, then Article 308 EC is of no help.
Ukrep zoper nedržavne subjekte bodisi ustreza ciljem SZVP, ki jih lahko Skupnost zasleduje na podlagi člena 301 ES, v nasprotnem primeru pa člen 308 ES ni v pomoč.
In the proceedings before the Court of First Instance, the appellant claimed that the contested regulation breached the right to a fair hearing, the right to respect for property and the principle of proportionality, and the right to effective judicial review.
Pritožnik je v postopku pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje zatrjeval, da so z izpodbijano uredbo kr�ene pravica do po�tenega sojenja, lastninska pravica in načelo sorazmernosti ter pravica do učinkovitega sodnega nadzora.
13 However, before assessing the substance of these claims, the Court of First Instance examined the scope of its own jurisdiction to assess the conformity of the contested regulation with fundamental rights.
13Vendar je Sodi�če prve stopnje, preden je presodilo vsebino teh trditev, preizkusilo področje svoje pristojnosti, da oceni skladnost izpodbijane uredbe s temeljnimi pravicami.
14In order to ascertain the appropriate scope of judicial review, the Court of First Instance considered the relationship between the Community legal order and the legal order established under the UN Charter.
14Sodi�če prve stopnje je, da bi določilo ustrezno področje sodnega nadzora, preučilo odnos med pravnim redom Skupnosti in pravnim redom, vzpostavljenim na podlagi Ustanovne listine ZN.
The reasoning of the Court of First Instance is extensive and sophisticated, but may be summarised as follows.
Razlogovanje Sodi�ča prve stopnje je poglobljeno in prodorno, vendar ga je mogoče povzeti kakor sledi.
First, the Court of First Instance identified what essentially amounts to a rule of primacy, flowing from the EC Treaty, according to which Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter prevail over rules of Community law.
Prvič, Sodi�če prve stopnje je opredelilo bistvo pravila prednosti, ki izhaja iz Pogodbe ES, v skladu s katerim resolucije Varnostnega sveta, sprejete na podlagi poglavja VII Ustanovne listine ZN, prevladajo nad pravili prava Skupnosti.
The Court of First Instance essentially found that Community law recognises and accepts that, in keeping with Article 103 of the UN Charter, Security Council resolutions take
Sodi�če prve stopnje je v bistvu ugotovilo, da pravo Skupnosti priznava in sprejema, da v skladu s členom 103 Ustanovne listine ZN resolucije Varnostnega sveta ZN prevladajo nad
13 — Paragraph 59 of the judgment under appeal.14 — In paragraphs 181 to 232 of the judgment under appeal.
13 – Točka 59 izpodbijane sodbe.14 – Točke od 181 do 232 izpodbijane sodbe.
My conclusion, therefore, is that the judgment of the Court of First Instance is vitiated by an error in law.
Zato sklepam, da je v sodbi Sodi�ča prve stopnje pravo napačno uporabljeno.
If the Court were to follow my analysis concerning the legal basis it would have enough ground to set aside the judgment under appeal.
Če bi Sodi�če sledilo moji analizi v zvezi s pravno podlago, bi imelo dovolj razlogov za razveljavitev izpodbijane sodbe.
I none the less believe that, where pleas are raised concerning alleged breaches of fundamental rights, it is preferable for the Court to make use of the possibility of reviewing those pleas as well, both for reasons of legal certainty and in order to prevent a possible breach of fundamental rights from subsisting in the Community legal order, albeit by virtue of a measure that merely has a different form or legal basis.
Vendar menim, da je v primeru pritožbenih razlogov v zvezi z zatrjevanimi kr�itvami temeljnih pravic bolj ustrezno, da Sodi�če uporabi tudi možnost nadzora teh pritožbenih razlogov, tako zaradi pravne varnosti kot zaradi preprečitve morebitne kr�itve temeljnih pravic v pravnem redu Skupnosti, čeprav na podlagi ukrepa, ki ima zgolj drugačno obliko ali pravno podlago.
I shall accordingly proceed to assess the appellant’s remaining pleas in law.
Zato bom nadaljeval z oceno drugih pritožbenih razlogov pritožnika.
15 Secondly, the Court of First Instance held that, in consequence, it had no authority to review, even indirectly, Security Council resolutions in order to assess their conformity with fundamental rights as protected by the Community legal order.
V repliki in na obravnavi je pritožnik izpopolnil svoje trditve in jih oblikoval tako, da bi bolj ustrezale pravu Skupnosti in sodni praksi Sodi�ča.
nor those resolutions could have the effect of precluding the courts from reviewing domestic implementing measures in order to assess their conformity with fundamental rights.
Pogodbo ES. 15 Drugič, Sodi�če prve stopnje je odločilo, da zato ni poobla�čeno nadzorovati, niti posredno, resolucij Varnostnega sveta, da bi ocenilo njihovo skladnost s temeljnimi pravicami, kot jih varuje pravni red Skupnosti.
In his rejoinder and at the hearing, the appellant refined his arguments and tailored them to fit more closely with Community law and the caselaw of this Court.
Ugotovilo je, da zadevne resolucije Varnostnega sveta niso pustile nobene diskrecije, in da zato izpodbijane uredbe ni moglo presoditi ne da bi opravilo tak posredni nadzor resolucije.
The appellant maintains that, so long as the United Nations do not provide a mechanism of independent judicial review that guarantees compliance with fundamental rights of decisions taken by the Security Council and the Sanctions Committee, the Community Courts should review measures adopted by the Community institutions with a view to implementing those decisions for their conformity with fundamental rights as recognised in the Community legal order. The appellant cites the ruling of this Court in Bosphorus 16as a precedent.
Vendar je Sodi�če prve stopnje ugotovilo, tretjič, da je bilo pristojno za nadzor zadevnih resolucij Varnostnega sveta, da bi presodilo njihovo skladnost z varstvom temeljnih pravic, če so te pravice del načel jus cogens.
The appellant challenges this part of the judgment under appeal with a combination of arguments derived from international law and Community law.
Pritožnik izpodbija ta del izpodbijane sodbe na podlagi utemeljitev, ki izhajajo iz mednarodnega prava in prava Skupnosti.
In his statement of appeal, he argues, inter alia, that the reasoning of the Court of First Instance in respect of the binding effect and the interpretation of the relevant Security Council resolutions is flawed from the perspective of international law.
V pritožbi med drugim zatrjuje, da je razlogovanje Sodi�ča prve stopnje v zvezi z zavezujočim učinkom in razlago zadevnih resolucij Varnostnega sveta z vidika mednarodnega prava napačno.
The appellant claims that neither Article 103 of the UN Charter
Pritožnik zatrjuje, da niti člen 103 Ustanovne listine ZN niti te resolucije ne bi mogle sodi�čem preprečiti nadzora nacionalnih izvedbenih ukrepov, da bi ocenila
The United Kingdom has raised a plea of inadmissibility as regards the line of argument based expressly on Community law on the ground that it would amount to a new plea in law.
Združeno kraljestvo je navedlo ugovor nedopustnosti v zvezi s trditvijo, ki temelji izrecno na pravu Skupnosti, ker naj bi ta pomenila nov pritožbeni razlog.
I do not take the same view.
Nisem enakega mnenja.
The reasoning of the Court of First Instance gives rise to legitimate confusion as to how the primacy of Security Council resolutions can be grounded in Community law by virtue of a requirement that is an import from international law.
Razlogovanje Sodi�ča prve stopnje povzroča upravičeno zmedo glede načina, kako lahko primarnost resolucij Varnostnega sveta temelji na pravu Skupnosti zaradi zahteve na podlagi mednarodnega prava.
In that respect, the arguments derived from international law and those derived from Community law are,
16 – Sodba Sodi�ča z dne 30. julija 1996 v zadevi Bosphorus, C-84/95, Recueil, str. I-3953.
15 — Article 103 of the UN Charter provides: ‘In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.’
15 – Člen 103 Ustanovne listine ZN določa: „Če je navzkrižje med obveznostmi članov Združenih narodov po tej Ustanovni listini in med njihovimi obveznostmi po kateremkoli drugem meddržavnem dogovoru, prevladujejo njihove obveznosti po tej Ustanovni listini“.
It is generally recognised that this obligation extends to binding Security Council decisions.
Na splo�no je priznano, da se ta obveznost razteza na odločbe Varnostnega sveta.
See the Order of 14 April 1992 of the International Court of Justice in Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jama­hiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 14 April 1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p.
Glej sklep Mednarodnega sodi�ča z dne 14. aprila 1992 v Vprašanja razlage in uporabe Konvencije iz Montreala iz leta 1971, ki je bila rezultat letalske nesreče Lockerbie (Libijska arabska džamahirija proti Združenemu kraljestvu), Začasni ukrepi, Sklep z dne 14. aprila 1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992, str.
3, at paragraph 39.
3, točka 39.
Treaty is not merely an agreement between States, but an agreement between the peoples of Europe.
POIARESA MADURA – ZADEVA C-402/05 P ni le sporazum med državami članicami, ampak je sporazum med narodi Evrope.
It considered that the Treaty had established a ‘new legal order’, beholden to, but distinct from the existing legal order of public international law.
Štelo je, da je Pogodba vzpostavila „nov pravni red“, ki izhaja iz obstoječega pravnega reda mednarodnega javnega prava, vendar se od njega razlikuje.
In other words, the Treaty has created a municipal legal order of trans-national dimensions, of which it forms the ‘basic constitutional charter’.
Drugače rečeno, Pogodba je ustvarila pravni red Skupnosti z nadnacionalno razsežnostjo in predstavlja njegovo „temeljno ustanovno listino“.
Admittedly, the appellant would have been better advised to support his plea, from the outset, with both lines of argument.
18 pritožnik, od začetka, podprl tožbeni razlog z dvema vrstama trditev.
Yet, even though he initially directed most of his arrows from the angle of international law, there was never a misunderstanding among the parties about the thrust of his claim, namely, that the Court of First Instance wrongly portrayed the nature of the Community’s obligations under international law and the relationship of those obligations with the duties of the Community Courts under the Treaty.
Vendar čeprav se je najprej postavil neposredno na stali�če mednarodnega prava, stranke niso nikoli napačno razumele teže njegove trditve, zlasti, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno opisalo naravo obveznosti Skupnosti na podlagi mednarodnega prava ter odnos med temi obveznostmi in obveznostmi, ki jih imajo sodi�ča Skupnosti na podlagi Pogodbe.
Indeed, in each of their written and oral submissions to this Court, the Council and the Commission, as well as the United Kingdom, have given ample consideration to the key issue raised by the appellant: the relationship between the international legal order and the Community legal order.
V vseh svojih pisnih in ustnih stali�čih so namreč Sodi�če, Svet in Komisija ter Združeno kraljestvo dali velik pomen ključnemu vpra�anju pritožnika: odnosu med mednarodnim pravnim redom in pravnim redom Skupnosti.
I fail to see, therefore, why the Court should characterise part of the appellant’s arguments as an additional plea in law.
Zato ne razumem, zakaj bi moralo Sodi�če del pritožnikove trditve �teti za nov pritožbeni razlog.
Instead, I believe the Court should consider his plea to be admissible in its entirety.
Menim, da bi Sodi�če moralo namesto tega njegov pritožbeni razlog v celoti �teti za dopustnega.
This does not mean, however, that the Community’s municipal legal order and the international legal order pass by each other like ships in the night.
Vendar to ne pomeni, da pravni red Skupnosti in mednarodni pravni red obstajata brez kakr�negakoli medsebojnega vpliva.
On the contrary, the Community has traditionally played an active and constructive part on the international stage.
Nasprotno, Skupnost je tradicionalno imela aktivno in konstruktivno vlogo na mednarodnem prizori�ču.
The application and interpretation of Community law is accordingly guided by the presumption that the Community wants to honour its international commitments.
Uporabo in razlago prava Skupnosti je tako vodila domneva, da Skupnost želi spo�tovati svoje mednarodne zaveze.
19The Community Courts therefore carefully examine the obligations by which
19Sodi�ča Skupnosti zato previdno preučujejo obveznosti, ki jih ima Skupnost
The logical starting point of our discussion should, of course, be the landmark ruling in Van Gend en Loos, in which the Court affirmed the autonomy of the Community legal order.
Razpravo je treba seveda logično začeti s temeljno sodbo Van Gend en Loos, v kateri je Sodi�če potrdilo avtonomnost pravnega reda Skupnosti.
17The Court held that the
17 Sodi�če je odločilo, da Pogodba
17 — Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, at p. 12.
17 – Sodba Sodi�ča z dne 5. februarja 1963 v zadevi Van Gend en Loos (26/62, Recueil, str.
KADI v COUNCIL AND COMMISSION
KADI PROTI SVETU IN KOMISIJI na mednarodnem prizori�ču, in za potrebe pravne presoje te obveznosti upo�tevajo.
Member States and Community institutions are under a duty of loyal cooperation.
20 lojalnega sodelovanja.
20 an international agreement is concluded in breach of that duty, it can be denied effect in the Community legal order.
23Če je mednarodni sporazum sprejet v nasprotju s to dolžnostjo, je mogoče zanikati njegov učinek v pravnem redu Skupnosti.
Even more apposite, in the context of the present case, is the fact that the Court has verified, on occasion, whether acts adopted by the Community for the purpose of giving municipal effect to international commitments were in compliance with general principles of Community law.
Poleg tega je v obravnavani zadevi dejstvo, da je Sodi�če včasih preverilo, ali so akti, ki jih je sprejela Skupnost zato, da bi dala učinek mednarodnim sporazumom, skladni s splo�nimi načeli prava Skupnosti, toliko bolj pomembno.
For instance, in Germany v Council the Court annulled the Council decision concerning the conclusion of the WTO Agreement to the extent that it approved the Framework Agreement on Bananas.
Na primer v zadevi Nemčija proti Svetuje Sodi�če sklep v zvezi s sklenitvijo Sporazuma STO razglasilo za ničnega v delu, v katerem je bil z njim potrjen Okvirni sporazum o bananah.
24The Court considered that provisions of that Framework Agreement infringed a general principle of Community law: the principle of non-discrimination.
24Sodi�če je odločilo, da so določbe tega okvirnega sporazuma kr�ile splo�no načelo prava Skupnosti, in sicer načelo prepovedi diskriminacije.
Yet, in the final analysis, the Community Courts determine the effect of international obligations within the Community legal order by reference to conditions set by Community law.
Vendar sodi�ča Skupnosti v končni analizi opredelijo učinek mednarodnih obveznosti v pravnem redu Skupnosti s tem, da navedejo pogoje, ki jih določa pravo Skupnosti.
The caselaw provides a number of examples.
V sodni praksi je več primerov.
There are cases in which the Court has barred an international agreement from having effect within the Community legal order on the ground that the agreement was concluded on the wrong legal basis.
Obstajajo zadeve, v katerih je Sodi�če preprečilo, da bi imel mednarodni sporazum učinek v pravnem redu Skupnosti, ker naj bi bil tak sporazum sprejet na napačni pravni podlagi. Sodi�če je nedavno to storilo v zadevi Parlament proti Svetu in Komisiji.
21The Court’s approach is easy to understand once one realises that it would have ‘fundamental institutional implications for the Community and for the Member States’ 22if an agreement that was adopted without a proper legal basis — or according to the wrong decision-making procedure — were to produce effects within the Community legal order.
21Pristop Sodi�ča je mogoče enostavno razumeti, ko spoznamo, da bi bil „temeljnega institucionalnega pomena za Skupnost in države članice“, 22če bi imel sporazum, ki je bil sprejet brez ustrezne pravne podlage – ali v skladu z napačnim postopkom odloča - nja –, učinke v pravnem redu Skupnosti.
A similar concern underpins cases in which the Court has held that, when entering into commitments on the international stage,
Na podobni skrbi temeljijo zadeve, v katerih je Sodi�če odločilo, da imajo države članice in institucije Skupnosti, ko sprejemajo zaveze na mednarodnem prizori�ču, dolžnost
All these cases have in common that, although the Court takes great care to respect the obligations that are incumbent on the Community by virtue of international law, it seeks, first and foremost, to preserve
Vsem tem zadevam je skupno, da si je Sodi�če, čeprav je zelo pazilo, da je spo�tovalo obveznosti, ki jih ima Skupnost na podlagi mednarodnega prava, prizadevalo varovati predvsem ustavni okvir, ki ga je
21 — Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 [2006] ECR I-4721.
21 – Sodba Sodi�ča z dne 30. maja 2006 v povezanih zadevah C-317/04 in C-318/04, ZOdl., str. I-4721.
22 — Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759, paragraph 35.
24 – Sodba Sodi�ča z dne 10. marca 1998 v zadevi Zvezna republika Nemčija proti Svetu Evropske unije (C-122/95, Recueil, str. I-973).
24 — Case C-122/95 [1998] ECR I-973.
22 – Mnenje 2/94 z dne 28. marca 1996, Recueil, str. I-1759, točka 35.
25Thus, it would be wrong to conclude that, once the Community is bound by a rule of international law, the Community Courts must bow to that rule with complete acquiescence and apply it unconditionally in the Community legal order.
25 Tako bi bilo napačno sklepati, da morajo sodi�ča Skupnosti, kadar Skupnost zavezujejo pravila mednarodnega prava, ta pravila spo�tovati s popolno privolitvijo in jih brezpogojno uporabiti v pravnem redu Skupnosti.
The relationship between international law and the Community legal order is governed by the Community legal order itself, and international law can permeate that legal order only under the conditions set by the constitutional principles of the Community.
Odnos med mednarodnim pravom in pravnim redom Skupnosti ureja sam pravni red Skupnosti, in mednarodno pravo lahko pronica v ta pravni red le pod pogoji, ki jih določajo ustavna načela Skupnosti.
26In that ruling, the Court assessed whether a regulation that was adopted to implement a Security Council resolution which imposed a trade embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia infringed fundamental rights and the principle of proportionality.
26V tej zadevi je Sodi�če preizkusilo, ali so bile z uredbo, ki je bila sprejeta za izvedbo resolucije Varnostnega sveta, s katero je bil naložen trgovski embargo proti Zvezni republiki Jugoslaviji, kr�ene temeljne pravice in načelo sorazmernosti.
The Court held that the interest of ‘putting an end to the state of war in the region and to the massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina’ outweighed the interest of a wholly innocent party to be able to pursue its economic activities using assets it had leased from a company based in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Sodi�če je odločilo, da je interes „končati vojno stanje v regiji ter masovno kr�enje človekovih pravic in mednarodnega humanitarnega prava v Republiki Bosni in Hercegovini“ prevladal nad interesom, da bi popolnoma nedolžna stranka lahko nadaljevala svoje gospodarske dejavnosti, s tem da bi uporabila sredstva, ki jih si jih je sposodila pri podjetju s sedežem v Zvezni republiki Jugoslaviji.
27 The Court made no suggestion whatsoever that it might not have powers of review because the regulation was necessary in order to implement a sanctions regime that was drawn up by the Security Council. 28
27Sodi�če ni podalo nobenega predloga, da morebiti ni pristojno za nadzor uredbe, ker je bila ta nujna za izvedbo ureditve sankcij, ki jo je sprejel Varnostni svet. 28