natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty (OJ C 9, 14.1.1998, p.
Smernice za metodo določanja denarnih kazni v skladu s členom 15(2) Uredbe št. 17 in členom 65(5) Pogodbe ESPJ (UL C 9, 14.1.1998, str. 3). Združeni zadevi C-65/02 P in C-73/02 P, Thyssen Krupp Stainless in Thyssen Krupp Acciai speciali Terni proti Komisiji, in zadeva C-57/02 P, Acerinox proti Komisiji.Združeni zadevi T-45/98 in T-47/98, Krupp Thyssen Stainless in Acciai speciali Terni proti Komisiji, Recueil 2001, str. II-3757 in zadeva T-48/98, Acerinox proti Komisiji, Recueil 2001, str. II-3859.Zadeva COMP/35.814, Alloy surcharge (UL L 100, 1.4.1998, str. 55).
For a comprehensive description of the decision, see the 1998 Competition Report.
Za izčrpen opis odločbe glej Poročilo o konkurenci za leto 1998.
By judgment of 18 July, the CFI rejected all grounds raised by SAS in support of its claim for annulment or reduction of the ne imposed on it by Commission decision of 18 July 2001 which found that SAS and Maersk Air had infringed Article 81 EC by entering into a series of market-sharing agreements.
Sodišče prve stopnje je s sodbo z dne 18. julija zavrnilo vse argumente, ki jih je navedel SAS v podporo svoji zahtevi za razveljavitev ali znižanje globe, ki mu je bila izrečena z odločbo Komisije z dne 18. julija 2001 in s katero je bilo ugotovljeno, da sta SAS in Maersk Air s sklenitvijo vrste sporazumov o razdelitvi trga kršila člen 81 ES.
With regard to duration, the CFI decided that the Commission rightly considered the date when the agreement was reached as the starting date of the infringement, even though the infringement would not be implemented until later. e Court also decided that, for the purpose of attenuating circumstances, the willingness of a company to cooperate is irrelevant; only the actual degree of cooperation matters.
Glede trajanja je Sodišče prve stopnje odločilo, da je Komisija datum sprejetja sporazuma upravičeno štela za začetni datum kršitve, čeprav se je kršitev začela izvajati šele pozneje. Sodišče se je tudi odločilo, da za namene olajševalnih okoliščin pripravljenost podjetja za sodelovanje ni pomembna, šteje le dejanska stopnja sodelovanja.
By judgment of 27 July, the CFI conrmed in its entirety the Commission’s decision of 5 December 2001 imposing fines for a long-standing cartel established by way of an express agreement on beer ties in Luxembourg. e CFI also conrmed the established case-law according to which no eects need to be demonstrated where the infringement has as its object the restriction of competition. e CFI held that for the purpose of fines this infringement could have been be qualied as very serious solely on the basis of the nature of the infringement, and this would be the case even though it concerned only one Member State, namely Luxembourg.
Sodišče prve stopnje je tudi potrdilo ustaljeno sodno prakso, v skladu s katero ni treba dokazati učinkov, če je cilj kršitve omejevanje konkurence. Sodišče prve stopnje je menilo, da bi bila za namen izreka globe kršitev lahko opredeljena kot zelo resna samo na podlagi narave kršitve, in tako bi bilo, tudi če bi šlo samo za eno državo članico, to je Luksemburg.
In its judgment of 15 September the CFI conrmed part of the Commission’s decision of 10 October 2001 in the Mercedes-Benz case(121) in which the Commission found that DaimlerChrysler AG had, itself or through its Belgian and Spanish subsidiaries, infringed EU competition rules. e decision imposed a ne of over EUR 71 million on DaimlerChrysler for three distinct infringements.
Sodišče prve stopnje je v svoji sodbi z dne 15. septembra potrdilo del odločbe Komisije z dne 10. oktobra 2001 v primeru Mercedes-Benz(121), s katero je Komisija ugotovila, da je DaimlerChrysler AG, sam ali prek belgijskih in španskih podružnic, kršil pravila konkurence EU. Z odločbo je bila DaimlerChryslerju izrečena globa več kot 71 milijonov EUR za tri ločene kršitve.
First, DaimlerChrysler had given its German sales agents instructions to sell new cars only to customers in their own contract territory, so as to avoid their competing with other members of the network, and for requiring the payment of a deposit of 15 % of the price of the vehicle for orders for new cars from customers from outside the territory.
Prvič, DaimlerChrysler je svojim nemškim prodajnim zastopnikom naročil, naj nove avtomobile prodajajo samo strankam s svojega pogodbenega območja, s čimer bi se izognili konkuriranju drugim članom mreže, in naj od strank, ki niso iz tega območja, ob naročilu novega avtomobila zahtevajo polog v višini 15 % cene vozila.
Second, DaimlerChrys-ler was sanctioned for having prevented its German agents and Spanish dealers from
Drugič, DaimlerChryslerju je bila izrečena globa, ker je svojim nemškim zastopnikom in španskim trgovcem preprečil dobavo avtomobilov lizinškim družbam, če ni bilo konkretnega kupca, s čimer jim je onemogočil, da bi imele zalogo takoj dobavljivih vozil za prihodnje lizinške pogodbe. Tretjič, DaimlerChrysler je prek
Case T-241/01 SAS v Commission.Joined case T-49/02, T-50/02, T-51/02 Brasserie nationale v Commission.Case T-325/01 DaimlerChrysler v Commission.See the 2001 Competition Report, p. 187.
Zadeva T-241/01, SAS proti Komisiji.Združene zadeve T-49/02, T-50/02, T-51/02, Brasserie nationale proti Komisiji.Zadeva T-325/01, DaimlerChrysler proti Komisiji.Glej Poročilo o konkurenci za leto 2001, stran 187.
I — Antitrust — Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC supplying cars to leasing companies where no customer was identied, thus preventing them from having a stock of immediately available vehicles for upcoming leasing contracts. ird, DaimlerChrysler participated, through its wholly owned Belgian subsidiary, in agreements to restrict discounts to new car buyers in Belgium.
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2005 svoje belgijske podružnice v popolni lasti sodeloval v dogovorih za omejevanje popustov za nove kupce avtomobilov v Belgiji.
Following the appeal brought by DaimlerChrysler, the CFI annulled the decisions as regards the first two infringements which relate to Germany and Spain.
Po pritožbi, ki jo je vložil DaimlerChrysler, je Sodišče prve stopnje razveljavilo odločbe glede prvih dveh kršitev, ki se nanašata na Nemčijo in Španijo.
With respect to the alleged anticompetitive conduct of DaimlerChrysler in Germany, the CFI found that the distribution agreements concluded by DaimlerChrys-ler in Germany came within the denition of genuine agency agreements and fell, therefore, outside the scope of Article 81 EC.
Kar zadeva domnevno protikonkurenčno ravnanje DaimlerChryslerja v Nemčiji, je Sodišče prve stopnje ugotovilo, da se sporazumi o distribuciji, ki jih je Daimler-Chrysler sklenil v Nemčiji, uvrščajo v opredelitev dejanskih agencijskih sporazumov in zato ne sodijo v področje uporabe člena 81 ES.
In particular, the CFI came to this conclusion aer having considered that German agents did not acquire the ownership of the vehicles which they sold in the name and on behalf of DaimlerChrysler to final consumers.
Sodišče prve stopnje je prišlo do te ugotovitve zlasti na podlagi ugotovitve, da nemški zastopniki niso pridobili lastniške pravice za vozila, ki so jih v imenu DaimlerChryslerja prodajali končnim uporabnikom.
In addition, the CFI found that neither the agents’ market-specic investments identi-ed in the Commission’s decision, nor the other service obligations imposed on them, such as repairs under warranty and aer-sales service, entailed commercial risks of such a magnitude that the commercial relationship amounted to an agreement coming within the scope of Article 81.
Poleg tega je Sodišče prve stopnje ugotovilo, da niso niti naložbe zastopnikov za določen trg, ki so bile ugotovljene v odločbi Komisije, niti druge obveznosti za storitve, ki so jim bile naložene, kot so popravila v garancijskem roku in poprodajne storitve, prinašale tolikšnega tržnega tveganja, da bi tržni odnos dosegel stopnjo sporazuma, za katerega bi se uporabljal člen 81.
With respect to the conduct of DaimlerChrysler in Spain, the CFI found that under Spanish law every leasing company must already have an identied customer for the leasing contract at the time of acquiring the vehicle. e type of conduct sanctioned by the Commission, therefore, derived from the applicable national legislation and was not the result of the implementation of an agreement contrary to EC competition rules.
Kar zadeva ravnanje DaimlerChryslerja v Španiji, je Sodišče prve stopnje ugotovilo, da mora v skladu s špansko zakonodajo vsaka lizinška družba ob pridobitvi vozila že imeti določenega kupca za lizinško pogodbo. Ravnanje, ki ga je Komisija kaznovala, je tako izhajalo iz veljavne nacionalne zakonodaje in ni bilo posledica izvrševanja sporazuma v nasprotju s pravili konkurence ES.
By judgments of the 25th October and the 6th December, the CFI conrmed the Commission’s decision of the 5th December 2001 in the Belgian beer cartel case by re- jecting the arguments adduced by Danone and Haacht.
Sodišče prve stopnje je s sodbama z dni 25. oktobra in 6. decembra potrdilo odločbo Komisije z dne 5. decembra 2001 v primeru belgijskega pivovarskega kartela, v katerih je zavrnilo argumente Danoneja in Haachta.
Only Danone’s ne was slightly reduced because one of the circumstances identied by the Commission as aggravating had no causal link with the extension of the cartel.
Le globa, izrečena Danoneju, se je nekoliko znižala, kajti ena od okoliščin, ki jo je Komisija spoznala za oteževalno, ni bila vzročno povezana z razširjenjem kartela.
267. is judgment is particularly important with regard to the aggravating circumstance of recidivism. e CFI considered that recidivism justies a very signicant increase in the fine.
Odločilo je, da je nagnjenje k ponovitvi kršitve mogoče ugotoviti, če že obstajajo odločbe, s katerimi je Komisija ugotovila kršitev, vendar ni izrekla globe, in potrdilo, da so lahko odločitve, ki so bile sprejete že dolgo nazaj, ustrezna podlaga za sum o nagnjenju k ponovitvi kršitve.
It decided that recidivism can be found where there are previous
Sodišče prve stopnje je tudi potrdilo, da ne obstaja obveznost za opredelitev upoštevnega trga za kršitve po namenu in da se znižanje za sodelovanje ne uporablja pri odgovorih, ki ne presegajo tistih, ki jih podjetje
Report on Competition Policy 2005
I – Protimonopolna zakonodaja – členi 81, 82 in 86 ES mora podati na zahtevo za informacije.
As a consequence, there is no right to a reduction of the ne for providing factual answers to questions put by the Commission in a request for information concerning the dates of meetings and the identity of the participants.
Zato pravica do znižanja globe ne obstaja pri zagotavljanju dejstev v odgovor na vprašanja, ki jih je zastavila Komisija v prošnji za informacije glede datumov sestankov in identitete udeležencev.
In four judgments handed down on the 29th November, the CFI fully con-rmed the Commission’s assessment and dismissed all applications for annulment or reduction of fines that had been imposed in a price-xing and market-sharing cartel in zinc phosphate, an anti-corrosion mineral pigment widely used in the manufacture of industrial paints. e CFI considered that, in view of the gravity and duration of the infringement, the fines were justied and were calculated in an appropriate manner.
Sodišče prve stopnje je v štirih sodbah, ki jih je izreklo 29. novembra, v celoti potrdilo oceno Komisije in je zavrnilo vse prošnje za razveljavitev ali znižanje glob, ki so bile naložene kartelu za določanje cen in razdelitev trga s cinkovim fosfatom, mineralnim protikorozijskim barvilom, ki se široko uporablja v proizvodnji industrijskih barv. Sodišče prve stopnje je menilo, da so bile globe glede na težo in trajanje kršitve upravičene in da so bile ustrezno izračunane.
In the Britannia case, the CFI stated that the Commission was not obliged, in setting the upper limit of 10 % of the turnover, as set out in Article 15(2) of Regulation
Sodišče prve stopnje je v primeru Britannia ugotovilo, da pri določitvi zgornje meje 10 % prometa, kot je določeno v členu 15(2) Uredbe (ES) št. 17, Komisija ni imela obveznosti sklicevati se na promet, dosežen v poslovnem letu pred odločbo, s katero je bila izrečena globa.
Figure 1New cases
Slika 1Nove zadeve
Cases opened on Commission's own initiative
Primeri, začeti na pobudo Komisije
Figure 2Cases closed
Slika 2Zaključene zadeve
Formal decisions
Formalne odločbe
Figure 3Changes in the number of pending cases at the year end
Slika 3Spremembe števila nerešenih zadev ob koncu leta
New Cases
Nove zadeve
Pending cases up to 31 December of each year
Nerešene zadeve do 31. decembra vsako leto
II MERGER CONTROL
II NADZOR ZDRUŽEVANJA
In total the Commission took 296 final decisions.
Vsega skupaj je Komisija sprejela 296 dokončnih odločitev.
It took 291 clearance decisions following an initial investigation (‘Phase I’).
Po začetnih preiskavah („faza I“) je sprejela 291 odločb o odobritvi.
Of these, 15 were conditional clearances and 167 decisions (57 %) were taken in accordance with the simplied procedure. e Commission took ve decisions following indepth investigations (‘Phase II’).
Izmed teh je bilo 15 odobritev pogojnih in 167 odločb (57 %) je bilo sprejetih po poenostavljenem postopku. Komisija je sprejela pet odločb po poglobljenih preiskavah („faza II“).
Of these there were no prohibitions, two clearances without conditions and three conditional clearance decisions.
Med temi ni bilo prepovedi, pač pa dve odobritvi brez pogojev in tri pogojne odločbe o odobritvi.
In addition, the Commission referred seven cases to national competition authorities pursuant to Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (the ‘merger regulation’)(125). e Commission also received 14 requests pursuant to Article 4(4) of the merger regulation, 27 requests under Article 4(5) as well as four requests pursuant to Article 22.
Poleg tega je Komisija predložila sedem primerov nacionalnim organom za konkurenco v skladu s členom 9 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 („Uredba o združitvah“)(125). Komisija je prejela tudi 14 zahtev v skladu s členom 4(4) Uredbe o združitvah, 27 zahtev v skladu s členom 4(5) in štiri zahteve v skladu s členom 22.
For further details as regards the outcome of these requests see Section 3 below.
Za dodatne podrobnosti o rezultatih teh zahtev glej oddelek 3 spodaj.
Despite the high total number of notications, there were only ve decisions taken pursuant to Article 8 of the merger regulation. ere were no prohibition decisions taken under Article 8(3).
Kljub visokemu skupnemu številu priglasitev je bilo v skladu s členom 8 Uredbe o združitvah sprejetih samo pet odločb. Sprejeta ni bila nobena odločba o prepovedi v skladu s členom 8(3). Poleg tega so trije priglasitelji v fazi II svoje priglasitve umaknili.
Table 1 — Prohibitions and Phase II withdrawals, 1995–2005
Preglednica 1 – Prepovedi in umiki v fazi II, 1995–2005
Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ L 24, 29.1.2004).
Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 z dne 20. januarja 2004 o nadzoru koncentracij podjetij (UL L 24, 29.1.2004).
Report on Competition Policy 2005
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2005 sije, in določiti: (i) kakršen koli problem, ki izhaja iz zasnove in uporabe protiukrepov; (ii) učinkovitost politike Komisije na področju protiukrepov v zvezi z združitvami v referenčnem obdobju in (iii) področja, na katerih je potrebno dodatno izboljšati obstoječo politiko in prakso Komisije na področju protiukrepov v zvezi z združitvami.
278. e study analysed 40 Commission decisions, which included 96 dierent remedies. ese 96 remedies accounted for 42 % of the 227 remedies adopted by the Commission during this five-year reference period and are a representative sample as regards the types of remedies accepted, the number of remedies accepted in Phase I or aer an indepth Phase II investigation, and the dierent industrial sectors involved.
Teh 96 protiukrepov je predstavljalo 42 % vseh 227 protiukrepov, ki jih je Komisija sprejela v tem petletnem referenčnem obdobju, tako da gre za reprezentativen vzorec glede vrste sprejetih protiukrepov, števila sprejetih protiukrepov v fazi I ali po poglobljeni preiskavi v fazi II in glede vključitve različnih industrijskih sektorjev.
A team of case handlers carried out 145 interviews with practitioners who were involved in the design and implementation of the remedies at the time, including committing parties (40 interviews), purchasers (61 interviews), trustees (37 interviews), and customers and competitors (seven interviews). e study thus created a well-re-ceived opportunity for the business and legal communities to provide feedback to the Commission on all aspects of merger remedies, while being assured full anonymity.
Skupina oseb za obravnavo primerov je opravila 145 pogovorov s strokovnimi delavci, ki so sodelovali pri zasnovi in izvajanju protiukrepov, vključno s strankami, ki so predlagale zaveze (40 pogovorov), kupci (61 pogovorov), skrbniki (37 pogovorov) ter strankami in tekmeci (7 pogovorov). Študija je tako predstavljala dobrodošlo priložnost za podjetja in pravne skupnosti, da Komisiji posredujejo povratne informacije glede vseh vidikov protiukrepov v zvezi z združitvami, pri čemer imajo zagotovljeno popolno anonimnost.
Nevertheless, the findings also identied a number of serious issues regarding the design and implementation of the analysed remedies which require further attention.
Vendar so izsledki pokazali tudi vrsto resnih vprašanj glede zasnove in uporabe analiziranih protiukrepov, ki se jim bo treba še posvetiti.
Chart 1 below illustrates the number and type of such serious unresolved design and/or implementation issues the study encountered in the dierent stages of the life of the analysed remedies that most likely led to reducing the eectiveness of the remedies to restore conditions of eective competition.
Spodnji gračni prikaz št. 1 prikazuje število in vrsto takšnih resnih nerešenih vprašanj glede zasnove in/ali izvajanja, na katere je študija naletela na različnih stopnjah trajanja analiziranih protiukrepov in ki so zelo verjetno znižali učinkovitost protiukrepov pri vnovični vzpostavitvi razmer učinkovite konkurence.
Of these issues, the failure to adequately dene the scope of the divested business was the most frequent problem, followed by unsuitable purchasers being approved, the incorrect carve-out of assets and the incomplete transfer of the divested business to the new owner.
Kot najpogostejša težava se je pokazala nezadostna opredelitev obsega odprodanih podjetij, čemur so sledile odobritve neustreznih kupcev, nepravilno oblikovanje premoženjskih sredstev in nepopoln prenos odprodanega posla novemu lastniku.
Chart 1 — Number of serious unresolved issues
Gračni prikaz št. 1 – število resnih nerešenih vprašanj
However, in the absence of a full new market investigation for each remedy, the study’s evaluation can only provide indications.
Ker pa ni bila opravljena celotna raziskava novega trga za vsak protiukrep, so ocene iz študije samo indikativne.
Of the 85 thus analysed, 57 % of remedies were fully eective, while 24 % were considered only partially eective.
In od 85 tako analiziranih protiukrepov jih je bilo 57 % popolnoma učinkovitih, 24 % pa jih je bilo le delno učinkovitih.
Few remedies, 7 %, had clearly failed to achieve their intended objective and were thus considered ineective.
Nekaj protiukrepom, 7 %, očitno ni uspelo doseči zastavljenega cilja in so zato obveljali za neučinkovite.
As regards dierent types of
Rezultati te študije bodo objavljeni v letu 2006.
Report on Competition Policy 2005 remedies, the study found that, overall, remedies for the exit from a joint venture were the most eective type of remedy (no failure), while the eectiveness of access remedies was the weakest.
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2005
In this respect, it has to be taken into account that the recast merger regulation allows for a notication not only on the basis of a binding agreement or the announcement of a public bid, but already on the basis of good-faith intentions (Article 4(1)). e information note states, as a general principle, that the requirements for the proof of the abandonment must correspond in terms of legal form, format, intensity, etc. to the initial act that was considered sucient to make the concentration notiable.
V tem smislu je treba upoštevati, da preoblikovana Uredba o združitvah ne omogoča priglasitve samo na podlagi zavezujočega sporazuma ali objave javne ponudbe, temveč že na podlagi dobrovernih namenov (člen 4(1)). Informativni dokument kot splošno načelo navaja, da morajo zahteve za dokaz o opustitvi po pravni naravi, obliki, intenzivnosti itd. ustrezati prvotnemu aktu, v skladu s katerim je bilo koncentracijo mogoče priglasiti.
If, aer a notication has been made on the basis of good-faith intention, a binding agreement is subsequently concluded, the relevant act is the later one.
Če se po priglasitvi na podlagi dobrovernega namena pozneje sklene sporazum, se upošteva poznejši akt.
Consequently, the information note submits that, in cases where there is a binding agreement, there must be proof of the legally binding cancellation of the agreement; expressions of intention to cancel the agreement, or not to implement it, or unilateral declarations by one of the parties will not be considered sucient.
Zato informativni dokument navaja, da mora biti pri zavezujočih sporazumih zagotovljen dokaz o pravno zavezujočem preklicu sporazuma; izrazi o namenu preklica sporazuma ali enostranske izjave strank ne zadostujejo. Izražanje močnejšega namena za odpoved sporazuma ali za njegovo neizvajanje ali enostranske izjave ene od strank ne bodo štele za zadostne.
In cases of good-faith intention to conclude an agreement, a document reversing a letter of intent or a memorandum of understanding is required.
Pri dobrovernem namenu za sklenitev sporazuma se zahteva dokument, ki razveljavlja pismo o nameri, ali memorandum o soglasju. Dobroverni namen je mogoče dokazati tudi z drugimi sredstvi.
Other proof may be relevant for other forms of good-
Pri koncentracijah, ki so dejansko obstajale, morajo stranke pokazati, da je ponovno vzpostavljen položaj, ki je obstajal pred koncentracijo.
( http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/abandonment.pdf
2) (v nadaljnjem besedilu„Obvestilo o napotitvi primerov“).
II — Merger control faith intention.
II – Nadzor združevanja
During the course of 2005 each of the four provisions in the merger regulation relating to the referral of cases from the Commission to Member States and vice versa (Articles 4(4), 4(5), 9 and 22) was resorted to.
V letu 2005 so bile uporabljene vse štiri določbe Uredbe o združitvah, ki se nanašajo na napotitve primerov od Komisije k državam članicam, in obratno (členi 4(4), 4(5), 9 in 22).
Article 4(4): during 2005 the Commission received 14 requests for referral pursuant to Article 4(4), a considerable increase on the two requests lodged between the st May and the 31 th December 2004; 11 requests for referral were acceded to, and the
• člen 4(4): Komisija je v letu 2005 dobila 14 prošenj za napotitev v skladu s členom 4(4), kar je precejšnje povečanje glede na dve prošnji, ki sta bili vloženi med 1. majem in 31. decembrom 2004.
1 cases transferred in their entirety; two requests were withdrawn and one remained pending at the end of the year;
11 prošenj za napotitev je bilo ugodno rešenih in primeri so bili v celoti preneseni, dve prošnji sta bili umaknjeni, ena pa na koncu leta še čaka na obravnavo;
Article 4(5): during 2005 the Commission received 27 requests for referral pursuant to Article 4(5); no requests were vetoed by Member States and three remained pending at the end of the year; 24 requests resulted in the cases acquiring a ‘Community dimension’, a figure which represents roughly 8 % of the cases notied to the Commission during this period(128);
• člen 4(5): Komisija je v letu 2005 dobila 27 prošenj za napotitev v skladu s členom 4(5); države članice niso zavrnile nobene prošnje in tri so na koncu leta še čakale na obravnavo; 24 prošenj se je končalo s primeri, ki so pridobili „dimenzijo Skupnosti“, kar je približno 8 % primerov, priglašenih Komisiji v tem obdobju(128);