natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It does not cover the possibility of the provision of documents in the context of other proceedings. e right of access to file described in the notice — which is distinct from the general right to access to documents under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001(10) — enables the persons to whom the Commission has addressed a statement of objections to eectively exercise their rights of defence.
Ne zajema pa možnosti zagotavljanja dokumentov v okviru drugih postopkov. Pravica do dostopa do spisa, opisana v obvestilu – ki jo je potrebno ločiti od splošne pravice do dostopa v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1049/2001(10) – omogoča osebam, ki jim je Komisija poslala obvestilo o nasprotovanju, da učinkovito izkoristijo svojo pravico do obrambe.
To that end, the notice notes that the addressees of the Commission’s objections have a right of access to
Določa, da „spis Komisije“ vključuje vse dokumente, povezane z danim postopkom, zaradi katerega je Komisija podala obvestilo o nasprotovanju.
Commission notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 of the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (OJ C 325, 22.12.2005, p.
Obvestilo Komisije o pravilih dostopa do spisa Komisije v primerih v skladu s členoma 81 in 82 Pogodbe ES, členi 53, 54 in 57 Sporazuma EGP in z Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 (UL C 325, 22.12.2005, str.
7).Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43).
7).Uredba (ES) št. 1049/2001 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 30. maja 2001 o dostopu javnosti do dokumentov Evropskega parlamenta, Sveta in Komisije (UL L 145, 31.5.2001, str. 43).
Report on Competition Policy 2005 file, either in electronic or paper form. e notice indicates when access to file is granted to the parties.
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2005 ki so nujni za razumevanje uporabljene metodologije v študijah ali preverjanje njihove tehnične pravilnosti.
It also describes the procedure for resolution of disagreements on condentiality claims, including the role of hearing ocers.
Opisuje tudi postopek za razreševanje nesporazumov glede zahtevkov za zaupnost, vključno z vlogo pooblaščencev za zaslišanje.
Such a right is, however, more limited in scope than the right of access to file.
Vendar takšna pravica nima tako širokega področja uporabe kot pravica dostopa do spisa.
is information can be provided to the Commission in various ways.
Te informacije je mogoče Komisiji sporočiti na več načinov:
Whistleblowing and leniency applications(11) are given the highest priority.
• Za najpomembnejše veljajo obveščanje o nepravilnostih in prošnje za prizanesljivost (11).
• are the worst form of anticompetitive activity and the Commission devotes signi-cant resources to taking action against them.
Tržne informacije (12) so vedno dobrodošle, ne glede na to, ali se na njihovi podlagi uvede preiskava v posameznem primeru.
Market information(12) is always welcome, whether or not it leads to an investiga-
Komisija lahko vzpostavi poglobljeno razumevanje trga samo tako, da zbira različne informacije iz različnih virov.
Formal complaints(13) that raise clear issues of Community interest and that contain
Dobrodošle so tudi formalne pritožbe (13), ki sprožajo jasna vprašanja o interesu Skupnosti in vsebujejo ustrezne podporne informacije.
Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ C 45, 19.2.2002, p. 3).On the dierent ways of informing the Commission (market information, complaint), see paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Commission notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p.
Obvestilo Komisije o imuniteti pred denarnimi kaznimi in znižanju denarnih kazni v primerih kartelov (UL C 45, 19.2.2002).Glede različnih načinov obveščanja Komisije (tržne informacije, pritožba) glej odstavke 3 in 4 Obvestila Komisije o obravnavanju pritožb s strani Komisije v skladu s členoma 81 in 82 Pogodbe ES (UL C 101, 27.4.2004, str.
65) (referred to hereinafter as the ‘Com-mission notice on complaints’).See the Commission notice on complaints, as well as Article 5 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 and its annex (Form C).
65) (v nadaljnjem besedilu„Obvestilo Komisije o pritožbah“).Glej Obvestilo Komisije o pritožbah in člen 5 Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 773/2004 in njeno prilogo (obrazec C).
I — Antitrust — Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC sion decisions might not have been possible without the information provided by, and the active support of, a complainant.
I – Protimonopolna zakonodaja – členi 81, 82 in 86 ES
BOX 1: ARTICLES 81 AND 82 EC: COMMUNITY INTEREST IN PURSUING ALLEGATIONS OF INFRINGEMENT AND PRIORITY SETTING
OKVIR 1: ČLENA 81 IN 82 ES: INTERES SKUPNOSTI PRI OBRAVNAVI NAVEDB O KRŠITVAH IN DOLOČANJE PREDNOSTNIH NALOG
Potential complainants are invited to take into account the following considerations before lodging a formal complaint with the Commission.
Potencialne pritožnike prosimo, da pred vložitvijo formalne pritožbe pri Komisiji pretehtajo naslednje vidike.
For example, where a suspected infringement aects competition mainly in the territory of one Member State it may be that the national competition authority (NCA) of that country will want to take a case forward.
Če na primer domnevna kršitev vpliva na konkurenco predvsem na ozemlju ene države članice, bo primer najbrž hotel obravnavati nacionalni organ za konkurenco te države.
Even where a case has eects on competition in more than one Member State, NCAs can cooperate in gathering evidence for a competition case, and two or three Member States’ competition authorities can take a case forward together.
Tudi če primer vpliva na konkurenco v več kot eni državi članici, lahko nacionalni organi za konkurenco sodelujejo pri zbiranju dokazov za primer o konkurenci in ta primer lahko skupaj obravnavajo dva ali trije organi za konkurenco držav članic.
More extensive guidance on work sharing in the ECN is available on the Commission’s website(1).
Izčrpnejše smernice za delitev dela v Evropski mreži za konkurenco so na voljo na spletni strani Komisije(1).
Many cases can appropriately be dealt with by national courts including claims for performance of contractual obligations, the application of the civil sanction of nullity in Article 81(2) or applications for interim measures(2). e Commission also strongly supports the right of those harmed by anticompetitive con-
Vsak potencialni pritožnik, ki razmišlja, da bi pri Komisiji vložil formalno pritožbo, bi se moral tudi zavedati, da Komisija vse informacije, ki jih dobi, jemlje zelo resno, vendar nima dovolj sredstev, da bi raziskala vsak problem, na katerega je opozorjena. Komisija si mora določiti prednostne naloge in svoja omejena sredstva osredotočiti na raziskovanje in preganjanje najhujših kršitev ter obravnavanje primerov, ki
Report on Competition Policy 2005
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2005 so pomembni za razvoj politike konkurence EU in zagotavljajo skladno uporabo členov 81 in 82 ES(5).
Basing itself on the information available, the Commission uses one or several of the following criteria, as appropriate in the individual case, in order to decide whether or not there is sucient Community interest to carry out an indepth investigation into a complaint(6):
Komisija na podlagi razpoložljivih informacij glede na posamezen primer uporablja enega ali več naslednjih meril, na podlagi katerih se odloči, ali obstaja zadosten interes Skupnosti za poglobljeno preučitev pritožbe(6):
• the signicance of the impact on the functioning of competition in the internal market, as indicated in particular by:
• pomembnost vpliva na delovanje konkurence na notranjem trgu, zlasti glede na:
– the geographic scope of the conduct complained of, or the economic signi-cance of the conduct complained of, or the size of the market, or the importance for end consumers of the products concerned or of the conduct complained of; or
– geografski obseg ali gospodarski pomen spornega ravnanja; ali velikost trga; ali pomen za končne uporabnike zadevnih proizvodov ali spornega ravnanja, ali;
– the market position of the undertakings targeted by the complaint or the overall functioning of the market in question;
– tržni položaj podjetij, proti katerim je usmerjena pritožba; ali splošno delovanje upoštevnega trga;
• the extent or complexity of the investigation required, the likelihood of establishing an infringement and whether in light of these elements it is proportionate to conduct an indepth investigation;
• obseg in zapletenost zahtevane preiskave, verjetnost, da bo kršitev ugotovljena, in ali je glede na te elemente smiselno izvesti poglobljeno preiskavo;
• the possibility for the complainant to bring the case before a national court in a Member State, in particular taking into account whether the case is or has already been the subject of private enforcement or is of a type that can appropriately be dealt with in this way;
• možnost, da pritožnik vloži tožbo pred nacionalnim sodiščem v državi članici, zlasti glede na to, ali je primer že bil ali je trenutno predmet zasebne tožbe oziroma ali je take narave, da ga je mogoče ustrezno obravnavati na tak način;
But where the Commission does not believe there is a sucient Community interest to warrant an indepth investigation, it will normally reject the complaint with reference to one or more of these criteria.
I – Protimonopolna zakonodaja – členi 81, 82 in 86 ES menila, da interes Skupnosti ni dovolj velik, da bi upravičil poglobljeno preiskavo, bo navadno zavrnila pritožbo s sklicevanjem na eno ali več od teh meril.
e Commission endeavours to inform complainants within four months from the receipt of a complaint whether or not it intends to investigate the case.
Komisija si prizadeva, da bi pritožnike v štirih mesecih od prejema pritožbe obvestila, ali namerava primer raziskati.
A key action identied in the Lisbon strategy, which was relaunched on 22 and the 23th March, was to improve the regulatory environment at both EU and national level in order to enhance competitiveness.
Ključni ukrep, opredeljen v lizbonski strategiji, ki je doživela ponovni zagon 22. in 23. marca, je bil izboljšati zakonodajno okolje na ravni EU in na nacionalni ravni ter tako spodbuditi konkurenčnost.
Work aimed at achieving ‘better regulation’ began in
Delo za doseganje „boljše zakonodajne ureditve“ se je začelo v letu 2002 v okviru akcijskega načrta Komisije, ki je bil revidiran 16. marca.
March. is covers all pending EU legislative proposals, existing rules (simplication) and new legislative and policy proposals.
To zajema vse zakonodajne predloge EU v postopku sprejetja, obstoječa pravila (poenostavitev) ter nove zakonodajne in politične predloge.
14 sessment guidelines in June(
Komisija je v skladu z akcijskim načrtom junija sprejela revidirane Smernice o presoji vplivov(14), ki se nanašajo na vse zakonodajne in politične pobude, zajete v letnem delovnem programu Agencije.
Commission’s annual work programme.
Pregledovanje z vidika konkurence je zato sestavni del presoje vpliva.
Such assessments explore alternative options to solve a dened problem and evaluate their economic, environmental and social impact.
Rezultat pregleda z vidika konkurence je lahko izbira manj omejevalnih zakonodajnih metod ali metod, ki temeljijo na trgu, za dosego določenih ciljev politike, s čimer se je mogoče izogniti nepotrebnim ali pretiranim omejevanjem konkurence. To je v interesu tako potrošnikov kot gospodarstva.
Report on Competition Policy 2005 tiveness’(15).
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2005 nacionalnim sodiščem (zasebno uveljavljanje).
Competition screening therefore forms an integral part of impact assessment. e impact assessment guidelines list — non-exhaustively — the types of proposals which need to be screened for possible negative impacts on competition (for instance rules on liberalised network industries, measures which have an impact on barriers to entry and exit, exemptions from competition rules, etc.)(16
Eden od ciljev posodobitve protimonopolnih pravil ES je bil spet oživiti vlogo nacionalnih sodišč in nacionalnih organov za konkurenco pri izvrševanju teh pravil.
29. e basic ‘competition test’ applied in the context of competition policy screening involves asking two fundamental questions at the outset.
Uredba (ES) št. 1/2003 poudarja skupno odgovornost Komisije, nacionalnih sodišč in nacionalnih organov za konkurenco na tem področju in zagotavlja orodja, potrebna za uresničitev povečanega in skladnega izvrševanja protimonopolnih pravil ES.
First: what restrictions of competition may directly or indirectly result from the proposal (does it place restrictions on market entry, does it aect business conduct, etc.)?
Na področju javnega izvrševanja Komisija in nacionalni organi za konkurenco pri uporabi protimonopolnih pravil ES zdaj tesno sodelujejo z Evropsko mrežo za konkurenco.
Competition screening may result in the choice of less restrictive regulatory or in market-based methods to achieve certain policy objectives, thereby avoiding unnecessary or disproportionate restrictions of competition. is is in the interests of both consumers and industry.
Ta nacionalna sodišča imajo izključno pristojnost za prisojanje odškodnin žrtvam kršitev konkurenčnega prava.
Green Paper on actions for damages for breach of the EC antitrust rules
Zelena knjiga, ki jo je Komisija sprejela 19. decembra(17), je posvečena odškodninskim tožbam zaradi kršitev protimonopolnih pravil.
30. e competition rules set out in Articles 81 and 82 EC can be enforced both by competition authorities (public enforcement) and by private parties bringing proceedings before a national court (private enforcement).
Ne samo, da tožbe za denarne odškodnine omogočijo žrtvam kršitev protimonopolne zakonodaje ES, da dobijo nadomestilo, temveč tudi dodatno spodbujajo podjetja, da upoštevajo protimonopolna pravila ES.
One of the aims of the modernisation of EC antitrust rules was to revitalise the role of national courts and national competition authorities (NCAs) in the enforcement of these rules.
Tožbe za denarne odškodnine ne krepijo le učinkov ugotovitev o kršitvah organov za konkurenco, temveč morajo biti tudi samostojno sredstvo izvrševanja.
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 emphasises the joint responsibility of the Commission, the national courts and the NCAs in that regard, and provides the necessary tools to achieve an increased and coherent enforcement of the EC antitrust rules.
Zasebno uveljavljanje protimonopolnih pravil ES tako postane orodje, ki razširja področje izvajanja členov 81 in 82 ES. Poleg tega se posamezna podjetja ali podjetniki z možnostjo, da dejansko podajo zahtevke za odškodnino, neposredno vključujejo v izvajanje pravil konkurence.
With regard to public enforcement, the Commission and the NCAs now work closely together within the ECN (European Competition Network) to apply the EC antitrust rules.
Takšne neposredne izkušnje povečujejo neposreden pomen pravil konkurence za podjetja in potrošnike.
With regard to private enforcement, Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 abolished the Commission’s monopoly on the application of Article 81(3), thus empowering national courts to apply Articles 81 and 82 EC in their entirety. ose national courts have exclusive competence to award damages to the victims of competition law infringements.
Tožbe za denarne odškodnine s povečanjem stopnje izvrševanja protimonopolnih pravil ES prispevajo k upoštevanju teh pravil in s tem k učinkoviti konkurenci v Evropi. Tako so pomembno orodje za oblikovanje in ohranjanje konkurenčnega gospodarstva, kar je ključni element lizbonske strategije, ki si prizadeva za rast gospodarstva Evropske unije in ustvarjanje delovnih mest za državljane Evrope.
Commission on the 19th December(17). e Commission wishes to encourage this kind of action, of which there have been very few so far(18), because it serves a double pur- pose. Not only do actions for damages allow victims of infringements of EC antitrust law to obtain compensation, they also create an additional incentive for undertakings to
Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti je v svoji sodbi Courage proti Crehanu iz leta 2001 potrdilo, da imajo žrtve kršitev protimonopolnih pravil ES pravico zahtevati odškodnino in da morajo države članice zagotoviti postopkovni okvir, ki omogoča učinkovit sistem za popravo krivic.(19) Glavni cilj Zelene knjige je opredeliti poglavitne ovire za učinkovitejši sistem zahtevkov za odškodnine in določiti različne možnosti za nadaljnji razmislek in morebitne ukrepe, ki bi olajšali zahtevke za denarno odškodnino zaradi kršitev protimonopolne zakonodaje ES.
See section 9 of the annexes to the impact assessment guidelines.See section 9.2 of the annexes to the impact assessment guidelines.The Green Paper can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html#greenpaper. It is accompanied by a Commission staff working paper, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html#stapaper, which gives the background to and elaborates on the political options mentioned in the Green Paper.See the study that was commissioned by the Commission and published in 2004, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/studies/studies.html
Zelena knjiga je na voljo na: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/ documents.html#greenpaper Priložen ji je delovni dokument Komisije, na voljo na: http:// ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/documents.html#stapaper, ki predstavlja ozadje in natančneje razlaga politične možnosti, omenjene v zeleni knjigi.Glej študijo, ki jo je izvedla Komisija in je bila objavljena leta 2004, na voljo na: http://ec.europa. eu/competition/cartels/studies/studies.html Zadeva C-453/99, Courage proti Crehanu, Recueil 2001, str. I-6297.
I — Antitrust — Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC respect the EC antitrust rules.
I – Protimonopolna zakonodaja – členi 81, 82 in 86 ES
33. e Green Paper addresses a number of key issues, such as access to evidence, the necessity to prove fault, calculation of damages, the possibility to invoke the passingon defence, standing for indirect purchasers, the possibility of representative and collective action, the costs of actions, the coordination of public and private enforcement and the rules on jurisdiction and applicable law.
Zelena knjiga obravnava vrsto ključnih vprašanj, kot so dostop do dokazov, potreba po dokazovanju krivde, izračun denarnih odškodnin, možnost sklicevanja na ugovor prelaganja škode na stranke, procesna legitimacija posrednih kupcev, možnost zastopniške ali kolektivne tožbe, stroški tožb, usklajevanje med javnim izvrševanjem in zasebnim uveljavljanjem in pravila o jurisdikciji in veljavni zakonodaji.
B APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 81, 82 AND 86
B UPORABA ČLENOV 81, 82 IN 86
As regards the application of the EU antitrust rules in the energy sector, the single most important action taken in 2005 was the launch of the sector inquiries into
Kar zadeva uporabo protimonopolnih pravil EU v energetiki, je bil najpomembnejši ukrep, sprejet v letu 2005, začetek preiskav sektorjev plina in električne energije.
Report on Competition Policy 2005 gas and electricity. On the 13th
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2005 jo zagotoviti ponudb konkurenčnih dobaviteljev.
) launching sector inquiries into the gas and electricity sectors pursuant to the Commission’s powers under Article 17 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. e justication for the sector inquiries was set out in a Communication from the Commissioner for Competition, in agreement with the Commissioner for Energy(21).
Ti dejavniki so nakazovali, da trgi ne delujejo optimalno, in so upravičili uvedbo preiskave v skladu s členom 17 Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003 ter uporabo preiskovalnih sredstev, ki jih ima na voljo Komisija.
To help put the Lisbon strategy back on track, the Commission decided to pursue a more proactive application of the competition rules, notably through sectoral screenings, in order to ensure open and competitive markets in Europe in particular in the energy sector(22).
Posebna pozornost je namenjena temu, ali imajo proizvajalci električne energije pomembno tržno moč in ali lahko vplivajo na cene na debelo.
37. e inquiries focus on the recently liberalised electricity and gas industries.
V okviru te presoje se bodo verjetno izvedle tudi ekonometrične analize.
Signicant price rises occurred in 2004 and 2005 and customers have increasingly complained of their inability to secure competitive oers from suppliers. ese elements suggested that the markets are not functioning optimally and justied the opening of an inquiry under Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and the use of the investigative instruments available to the Commission.
Poleg tega bodo pod drobnogledom ovire za vstop in ovire za čezmejne tokove, kot so tiste, ki lahko nastanejo zaradi dolgoročnih sporazumov o dobavi v določenih državah članicah ter pravnih in operativnih ureditvah za povezovalne daljnovode, ki povezujejo nacionalna omrežja električne energije.
Econometric analyses are likely to be part of this assessment.
Pri plinu se preiskava osredotoča na dolgoročne pogodbe o uvozu, sporazume o izmenjavi in ovire za čezmejne tokove plina.
In addition, a close look will be taken at entry barriers and barriers to cross-bor-der flows such as those that may arise from long-term supply agreements in certain Member States and the legal and operational regimes for the interconnectors that link national electricity grids.
Podrobno se bodo preučile izravnalne zahteve za plinsko omrežje in skladiščenje plina, kar velja tudi za dolgoročne prodajne pogodbe in učinke, ki jih imajo lahko na stroške prehoda in vstop na trg.
In gas, the inquiry focuses on the long-term import contracts, swap agreements and barriers to cross-border flows of gas. e balancing requirements for gas network users and gas storage will also be investigated closely as well as downstream long-term contracts and the eects they may have on switching costs and market entry.
Preiskave plina in električne energije preučujejo različna vprašanja, saj je konkurenca v teh sektorjih različno razvita in se tudi proizvodne strukture precej razlikujejo.
Commission Decision (EC) No C(2005) 1682 of the 13th June 2005 initiating an inquiry into the gas and electricity sectors pursuant to Article 17 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.
Kljub vsemu pa se bodo upoštevale povezave med tema sektorjema.
See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/others/sector_inquiries/energy/decision_en.pdf See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/others/sector_inquiries/energy/communication_en.pdf Communication to the spring European Council‘Working together for growth and jobs — A new start for the Lisbon agenda’, COM(2005) 24 of 2.2.2005. See in particular pages 8 and 19.
Plin je dejansko vse pomembnejše prvotno gorivo za proizvodnjo električne energije in bolj konkurenčni trgi plina bi lahko imeli neposreden blagodejen učinek na trge z električno energijo.
40. e gas and electricity inquiries examine dierent issues because competition in these sectors is at dierent stages of development and because they have quite dier-ent production structures.
Cilj GD za konkurenco je opredeliti, ali je očitno slabo delovanje trgov za električno energijo in plin posledica kršitev členov 81, 82 in 86 ES.
Nevertheless, the links between these sectors will be taken into account.
Če se to izkaže za resnično, bi Komisija lahko sprejela proaktivne korektivne ukrepe.
Indeed, gas is an increasingly important primary fuel for electricity generation and more competitive gas markets could have an immediate benecial impact on the electricity markets.
GD za konkurenco bo glede na dejstva, zbrana med preiskavo, in posledično ugotovljene prednostne naloge za izvrševanje preiskal zadeve po členih 81, 82 in 86 ES, takoj ko bodo zaznane.