natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
84 — Sytraval and Brink’s France (cited above, footnote 79), paragraph 64, last sentence; see also Joined Cases C-465/02 and C-466/02 Germany and Denmark v Commission [2005] ECR I-9115, paragraph 106, and Verband der freien Rohrwerke (cited above, footnote 22), paragraph 186, last sentence.
89 – Glej na primer točke 294, 303, 319, 320, drugi stavek, in 321, zadnji stavek, izpodbijane sodbe.
89 — See for example paragraphs 294, 303, 319, 320 (second sentence) and 321 (last sentence) of the judgment under appeal.
I-9115, točka 106) in Verband der freien Rohrwerke in drugi proti Komisiji (navedena v opombi 22, točka 186, zadnji stavek).
BERTELSMANN AND SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA v IMPALA
BERTELSMANN IN SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA PROTI IMPALA govori zoper obstoj zadostne preglednosti trga, vsebovala le nejasne trditve. 90Pri tem
In particular, it is not enough to explain that a particular factor leads or may lead to less market transparency; instead, it is necessary at least to explain why exactly this factor makes the market so opaque that it is not possible to make a finding of a collective dominant position.
Zlasti ne zado�ča trditev, da en konkretni dejavnik vodi ali bi lahko vodil k manjši preglednosti trga; nasprotno je treba vsaj razložiti, zakaj ravno ta dejavnik povzroči, da je trg tako nepregleden, da ni mogoče domnevati kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja.
Otherwise, the reasons for the decision lack persuasiveness and are not comprehensible.
Drugače razlogi odločbe niso sklepčni in razumljivi.
93 campaign discounts, which allegedly militate against the existence of sufficient market transparency, it made only vague assertions.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je v izpodbijani sodbi 93 ravno na to primerno opozorilo.
90There was no explanation as to why the campaign discounts were relevant to market transparency, and it was not apparent how campaign discounts taken by themselves outweighed all the other factors relating to market transparency listed in the decision and thus could exclude the transparency necessary for there to be a collective dominant position. 91Apart from that, the
naj ne bi bilo razloženo, zakaj so reklamni popusti pomembni za preglednost trga, in naj ne bi bilo razvidno, kako lahko reklamni popusti sami zase odtehtajo vse druge dejavnike preglednosti trga, ki jih omenja odločba, in s tem izključijo preglednost, ki je potrebna za kolektivni prevladujoči položaj.
Court of First Instance referred to internal inconsistencies in the reasons given for the decision. 92
91 Sodi�če prve stopnje poleg tega opozarja na notranja protislovja v obrazložitvi odločbe. 92
Simply put, in a merger control decision which to a large extent reads as if it were a prohibition decision, it is essential that a sufficiently precise explanation is given of the considerations on the basis of which the matter ultimately turns, even for informed readers who are familiar with the market.
Poenostavljeno rečeno je v primeru odločbe s področja nadzora koncentracije, ki se dolgo časa bere kot odločba o prepovedi, tudi za razumnega bralca, ki se spozna na tržne razmere, neobhodno potrebna dovolj natančna predstavitev tistih preudarkov, na podlagi katerih se stali�če končno spremeni.
The deficiencies the Court of First Instance found to exist in the reasons given are all the more serious given that the question of market transparency, which was disputed by the parties, was not merely a subsidiary matter but was of major importance for the result of the merger control procedure.
Pomanjkljivosti, ki jih je Sodi�če prve stopnje ugotovilo v obrazložitvi, so toliko resnej�e, kolikor vpra�anje preglednosti trga, ki je sporno med strankami v postopku, ni bilo zgolj obrobno, ampak je imelo pomembno vlogo pri izidu postopka nadzora koncentracij.
94This is because the Commission’s finding that the market was not sufficiently transparent as to allow prices to be coordinated was a major reason it relied
94Kajti ugotovitev Komisije, da trg ni tako pregleden, da bi bilo možno usklajevanje cen, je bila sredi�če njenih preu-
93 — Again, see in particular the last sentence of each of paragraphs 289, 294 and 320 of the judgment under appeal.
93 – Glej �e enkrat zlasti točke 289, 294 in 320, pri vseh zadnji stavek, izpodbijane sodbe.
91 — The second sentence of paragraph 320 of the judgment under appeal; to the same effect see the last sentence of paragraph 289 of the judgment under appeal.
91 – Točka 320, drugi stavek, izpodbijane sodbe; v istem smislu točka 289, zadnji stavek, izpodbijane sodbe.
94 — This distinguishes the present case from Kaysersberg (cited above, footnote 8), paragraphs 159 and 160, in which the Court of First Instance was of the opinion that the inadequacy complained about in the reasons given did not involve a fundamental part of the Commission’s decision.
94 – To obravnavani primer loči od zadeve Kaysersberg proti Komisiji (sodba navedena v opombi 8, točki 159 in 160), pri kateri se po mnenju Sodi�ča prve stopnje očitana pomanjkljiva obrazložitev ni nana�ala na katerega od temeljnih delov odločbe Komisije.
92 — The first sentence of paragraph 320 of the judgment under appeal.
92 – Točka 320, prvi stavek, izpodbijane sodbe.
98 upon for the first clearance decision.
98 darkov v prvi odločbi o odobritvi.
95In this regard the Court of First Instance rightly imposed high standards on the reasons given for the first clearance decision and subjected those reasons to an intense review.
95 Sodi�če prve stopnje je zato v tej točki upravičeno postavilo visoke zahteve za obrazložitev prve odločbe o odobritvi in to obrazložitev temeljito preučilo.
This consideration may be transposed to the field of competition law and merger control. If, in its assessment of the effect on competition of a concentration, the Commission attaches particular importance to certain factors which are relevant to the market, it must not only identify these factors in its decision but must also describe, sufficiently precisely, their effects on the functioning of the markets in question.
To razmi�ljanje je mogoče brez nadaljnjega prenesti na pravo konkurence in na nadzor koncentracij: če Komisija v okviru svoje presoje koncentracije z vidika konkurenčnega prava pripisuje določenim dejavnikom, ki so pomembni za trg, poseben pomen, mora te dejavnike v odločbi ne le omeniti, ampak tudi dovolj natančno opisati njihove učinke na način delovanja zadevnih trgov.
High standards were also justified here because, as regards market transparency, the Commission was required to assess complex economic situations, in relation to which it enjoyed a not insignificant margin of discretion, as is usual in the field of merger control.
V tem primeru so bile visoke zahteve upravičene tudi zato, ker je morala Komisija v zvezi s preglednostjo trga oceniti za -pletene gospodarske povezave, za kar ima – kot je običajno za nadzor koncentracij – �iroko diskrecijsko pravico.
96 However, where the Commission has such a margin of discretion, observance of the guarantees conferred by the Community legal order in administrative proceedings acquires more importance.
96 Če pa Komisija razpolaga s tak�no diskrecijsko pravico, ima upo�tevanje jamstev, ki jih pravni red Skupnosti priznava v upravnem postopku, �e toliko večji pomen.
These guarantees include not least the obligation to give sufficient reasons for a decision. 97
K tem jamstvom nenazadnje spada tudi obveznost, da se odločba zadostno obrazloži. 97
If, in the exercise of its discretion, the Commission takes into account factors which
Če Komisija v okviru svoje diskrecijske pravice upo�teva dejavnike, ki vplivajo na
95 — See paragraphs 286 and 289 of the judgment under appeal, according to which — as according to the view expressed by the Commission in the proceedings at first instance — ‘transparency is the essential, and indeed the only, ground for the assertion that there is no collective dominant position on the markets for recorded music’ (paragraph 289).
95 – K temu glej točki 286 in 289 izpodbijane sodbe, v skladu s katerima je – tudi po podanem stali�ču Komisije v prvosto -penjskem postopku – „preglednost odločilni oziroma edini razlog, na katerem temelji ugotovitev, da na trgih nosilcev zvoka ne obstaja kolektivni prevladujoči položaj“ (točka 289).
In a case in which all other factors point to the transparency of the market, the factor which, in the Commission’s view, points decisively against the market’s being sufficiently transparent cannot be simply mentioned without further explanation.
V primeru, ko vsi drugi dejavniki kažejo na preglednost trga, ni dovoljeno dejavnika zoper zadostno preglednost trga, ki je z vidika Komisije odločilen, omeniti zgolj pod razno.
As the Court of First Instance correctly emphasises, what is instead necessary is for the Commission to substantiate the effects of this factor in its decision with specific details; 99 it cannot simply rely on the surmise, hesitantly expressed, that ‘this factor could reduce transparency in the market and may make tacit collusion more difficult’, 100and just as little on the mere conjecture that ‘it appears
Kot pravilno poudarja Sodi�če prve stopnje, mora Komisija namreč učinke tega dejavnika v odločbi podkrepiti s konkretnimi navedbami; 99ne sme se zadovoljiti z zgolj obotavljivo izrečeno domnevo, „da bi ta dejavnik lahko povzročil slab�o preglednost trga in otežil tajne dogovore“ 100, prav tako ne zgolj s predpostavko, da so „posebne akcije
96 — Kali & Salz (cited above, footnote 16), paragraph 223, and Case C-12/03 Commission v Tetra Laval [2005] ECR I-987, paragraph 38; see also Gencor (cited above, footnote 16), paragraph 246, and Case T-210/01 General Electric v Commission [2005] ECR II-5575, paragraph 60, from the Court of First Instance. 98 — To this effect, an example from the field of agricultural policy is Case C-358/90 Compagnia italiana alcool v Commission [1992] ECR I-2457, paragraph 42.
96 – Sodbi „Kali & Salz“ (navedena v opombi 16, točka 223) in z dne 15. februarja 2005 v zadevi Komisija proti Tetra Laval (C-12/03 P, ZOdl., str. I-987, točka 38); glej tudi sodbi Sodi�ča prve stopnje Gencor proti Komisiji (nave -dena v opombi 16, točka 246) in z dne 14. decembra 2005 v zadevi General Electric proti Komisiji (T-210/01, ZOdl., str. II-5575, točka 60). 98 – V tem smislu, na primeru zadeve iz kmetijske politike, sodba z dne 7. aprila 1992 v zadevi Compagnia italiana alcool proti Komisiji (C-358/90, Recueil, str. I-2457, točka 42).
99 — The last sentence of paragraph 289 of the judgment under appeal.
99 – Točka 289, zadnji stavek, izpodbijane sodbe.
In addition, see Joined Cases 36/59 to 40/59 Präsident Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft and Others v High Authority [1960] ECR 423, at p. 439 et seq.
Poleg tega glej že sodbo z dne 15. julija 1960 v združenih zadevah Präsident Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft in drugi proti Visoki oblasti (od 36/59 do 40/59, Recueil, str.
BERTELSMANN AND SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA v IMPALA that campaign discounts are less transparent than file discounts’. 101
BERTELSMANN IN SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA PROTI IMPALA verjetno […] manj pregledne kot popusti za kupce“. 101
First, the appellants claim that less stringent requirements are to be imposed in relation to the reasoning of a clearance decision than in relation to a prohibition decision, because the weaker position of third parties in the procedure means that they cannot expect the same degree of precision in the reasoning as the parties to the concentration can in case of a refusal.
Prvič, pritožnika uveljavljata, da bi morale za obrazložitev odločbe o odobritvi veljati manj�e zahteve kot za obrazložitev odločbe o prepovedi, ker tretje osebe zaradi svojega �ibkej�ega položaja v postopku ne bi smele pričakovati enake stopnje natančnosti pri obrazložitvi kot udeleženci koncentracije v primeru prepovedi.
In all, the Court of First Instance therefore rightly held that the Commission ought not to have restricted itself to ‘vague assertions’ 102as regards the factors which were decisive for its decision, which were ‘unsubstantiated’, ‘rather limited’ 103 and in addition internally contradictory. 104
Sodi�če prve stopnje je zato nazadnje upravičeno zaključilo, da se Komisija pri dejavnikih, ki so odločilni za njeno odločbo, ne sme omejiti zgolj na „nejasne trditve“, 102ki so „nestvarne“, „nimajo velike sporočilnosti“ 103in poleg tega vsebujejo notranja protislovja. 104
Neither Article 253 EC nor the third indent of Article 41(2) of the Charter of fundamental rights distinguishes between decisions which benefit their respective addressees and those which are disadvantageous for them as regards the requirement to state reasons.
Niti člen 253 ES niti tretja alinea člena 41(2) Listine o temeljnih pravicah pri zahtevah glede obrazložitve ne razlikujeta med odločbami, ki so za konkretnega naslovnika ugodne, in tistimi, ki so zanj neugodne.
Against this background I am of the view that the Court of First Instance did not make any error of law in finding that the first clearance decision gave insufficient reasons as regards the Commission’s finding in relation to (insufficient) market transparency. 105
Glede na navedeno menim, da Sodi�če prve stopnje ni napačno uporabilo prava, ko je pri ugotovitvah Komisije glede (pomanjkljive) preglednosti trga izhajalo iz nezadostne obrazložitve prve odločbe o odobritvi.
101 — On this point see recital 80 of the first clearance decision, quoted in paragraphs 315 and 316 of the judgment under appeal (emphasis added).
Le zaradi celovitosti v nadaljevanju obravnavam �e nekatere druge argumente, ki sta jih pritožnika navedla v okviru �estega pritožbenega razloga.
In any event, where a third party has been included in a merger control procedure and has been formally heard by the Commission — as was the case with Impala here — the duty to state reasons is intended also to protect its rights and interests.
Vsaj takrat, ko je tretja oseba vključena v postopek nadzora koncentracij in jo Komisija uradno zasli�i – kot se je to zgodilo v primeru Impala –, je obveznost obrazložitve namenjena tudi varstvu njenih pravic in interesov.
The third party may expect at least persuasive, comprehensible and internally consistent reasons as regards the essential factual and legal considerations on which the Commission bases its clearance decision.
Tretja oseba lahko takrat pričakuje vsaj sklepčno, razumljivo in neprotislovno obrazložitev bistvenih dejanskih in pravnih preudarkov Komisije, ki jih je upo�tevala pri izdaji odločbe o odobritvi.
It is precisely these minimum requirements which are the subject of the present case. 106
V obravnavanem primeru gre ravno za te minimalne zahteve. 106
102 — The last sentence of paragraph 289 of the judgment under appeal.
101 – K temu glej 80. uvodno izjavo prve odločbe o odobritvi, ki je navedena v točkah 315 in 316 izpodbijane sodbe (moj poudarek).
103 — Paragraph 294 of the judgment under appeal.104 — Paragraph 320 of the judgment under appeal.105 — Paragraph 325 of the judgment under appeal.
102 – Točka 289, zadnji stavek, izpodbijane sodbe.103 – Točka 294 izpodbijane sodbe.104 – Točka 320 izpodbijane sodbe.105 – Točka 325 izpodbijane sodbe.
106 — See above, point 119 et seq.
106 – Glej zgoraj točko 119 in naslednje teh sklepnih predlogov.
Admittedly, it is correct that the proced -ural position of third parties in merger control as regards their right to a hearing is weaker than that of parties to the concentration.
Sicer drži, da je procesnopravni položaj tretjih oseb v okviru nadzora koncentracij glede njihovega zaslišanja manj izrazit kot tisti udeležencev koncentracije.
107 However, it cannot be concluded from this that a third party is likewise subject to restrictions when challenging a decision for insufficient reasoning.
107Iz tega pa ni mogoče sklepati, da za tretjo osebo pri uveljavljanju pomanjkljivosti obrazložitve prav tako veljajo omejitve.
This is because a person who, because directly and individually affected, is able to clear the hurdle of an interest in bringing proceedings as a third party must be able to bring proceedings on the same conditions as all other applicants (Article 230(4) EC); he must be able to rely on the same grounds of invalidity as they can, including that of insufficient reasoning.
Kajti kdor kot tretja oseba na podlagi neposredne in posamične prizadetosti pridobi pravico vložiti tožbo, jo lahko vloži pod enakimi pogoji kot vse druge tožeče stranke (člen 230(4) ES); uveljavlja lahko iste ničnostne razloge kot one, skupaj s pomanjkljivostmi pri obrazložitvi.
Specifically, whether a statement of reasons satisfies the legal requirements of Article 253 EC depends ultimately on object- ive criteria, including in particular whether the essential factual and legal considerations are logical, comprehensible and free from contradiction.
Ali neka obrazložitev končno ustreza pravnim zahtevam člena 253 ES, je odvisno od objektivnih meril, h katerim spadajo zlasti sklepčnost, razumljivost in neprotislovnost bistvenih dejanskih in pravnih preudarkov.
109If, as in the present case, a statement of reasons is not logical, comprehensible and free from contradiction on an essential matter, the decision in question is to be annulled even if the applicant’s rights of defence have not suffered any damage as regards his other pleas.
109 Če obrazložitev, kot v obravnavanem primeru, v neki bistveni točki ni sklepčna, razumljiva in neprotislovna, je treba zadevno odločbo razglasiti za nično celo tedaj, če je bilo pravno varstvo tožeče stranke glede na preostale očitke primerno.
Otherwise, it would be in practice impossible for an applicant in an annulment action to succeed on the ground that the reasoning was insufficient while also raising other grounds of invalidity.
Drugače bi bilo praktično nemogoče, da bi tožeča stranka z ničnostno tožbo, poleg preostalih ničnostnih razlogov, uspe�no uveljavljala pomanjkljivosti v obrazložitvi.
Second, the appellants claim that in the present case both Impala and the Court of First Instance had easily understood the reasons for the first clearance decision.
Drugič, pritožnika uveljavljata, da sta tako Impala kot tudi Sodi�če prve stopnje brez težav v obravnavanem primeru razumela razloge za sprejetje prve odločbe o odobritvi.
From this they conclude that the decision included sufficient reasons.
Iz tega sklepata, da naj bi bila zadevna odločba zadostno obrazložena.
Contrary to the appellants’ view, it is incidentally by no means contradictory for the Court of First Instance in the present case to have found at one and the same time that the reasons given were insufficient and that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment.
Drugače kot menita pritožnika, v preostalem nikakor ne gre za notranje protislovje, če je Sodi�če prve stopnje v obravnavanem primeru hkrati ugotovilo pomanjkljivost v obrazložitvi in očitno napako pri presoji Komisije.
A decision by the Commission may be vitiated by both procedural and substantive flaws.
Odločba Komisije ima lahko tako postopkovne kot tudi materialnopravne pomanjkljivosti.
The fact that the reasons given for a decision — for example on account of not being logical — are deficient does not preclude the possibility that the same decision is also substantively flawed.
To, da je obrazložitev odločbe – na primer zaradi nesklepčnosti – pomanjkljiva, ne izključuje, da je imela ista odločba poleg tega vsebinske napake.
This argument is likewise not to the point.
Tudi ta argument ni trden.
The fact that the applicant has been able to make his other pleas sufficiently clear before the Court of First Instance may constitute an initial factor pointing to the conclusion that adequate reasons were given.
Dejansko je sicer lahko prvi pokazatelj za zadostno obrazložitev, če je tožeča stranka uspela pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje zadostno uveljaviti preostale očitke.
108However, this cannot be regarded as more than a rebuttable presumption.
108 Vendar pa v tem ni mogoče videti kaj več kot ovrgljive domneve.
Third, the appellants claim that, in laying down requirements as to the reasons to be given in a merger control decision, account must be taken of the confidentiality of sensitive commercial information.
Tretjič, pritožnika uveljavljata, da je treba pri določitvi zahtev za obrazložitev odločbe s področja nadzora koncentracij upo�tevati zaupnost občutljivih poslovnih podatkov.
Thus, in their view, the Court of First Instance made an error in law in that in paragraph 411
Zato naj bi Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno uporabilo pravo, ko je v točki 411 izpodbijane sodbe od Komisije zahtevalo,
107 — Kaysersberg (cited above, footnote 8), paragraph 105.
107 – Sodba Kaysersberg proti Komisiji (navedena v opombi 8, točka 105).
108 — To this effect see Case C-342/03 Spain v Council [2005] ECR I-1975, paragraph 59, and Kaysersberg (cited above, footnote 8), paragraph 160.
108 – V tem smislu na primer sodbi z dne 10. marca 2005 v zadevi Španija proti Svetu (C-342/03, ZOdl., str. I-1975, točka 59) in Kaysersberg proti Komisiji (navedena v opombi 8, točka 160).
109 — See above, point 119.
109 – Glej zgoraj točko 119 teh sklepnih predlogov.
In all, it follows that the Court of First Instance did not make any errors in law in reaching the conclusion in paragraphs 325 and 542 of the judgment under appeal that insufficient reasons were given for the first clearance decision, which had, for that reason, to be set aside.
Skupno zato Sodi�če prve stopnje ni napačno uporabilo prava, ko je v točkah 325 in 542 izpodbijane sodbe pri�lo do sklepa, da prva odločba o odobritvi ni dovolj obrazložena in jo je zato treba razglasiti za nično.
Accordingly, the first and third parts of the sixth ground of appeal are unfounded.
Prvi in tretji del �estega pritožbenega razloga sta tako neutemeljena.
The Court of First Instance’s references to the statement of objections (first ground of appeal and second part of the sixth ground of appeal)
Sklicevanje Sodi�ča prve stopnje na izjavo o ugovorih (prvi pritožbeni razlog in drugi del �estega pritožbenega razloga)
This submission too is not convincing.
Tudi te trditve niso prepričljive.
It is clearly based on a misunderstanding of paragraph 411 of the judgment under appeal.
Očitno temeljijo na napačni razlagi točke 411 izpodbijane sodbe.
In that paragraph the Court of First Instance by no means required the Commission to disclose business secrets of individual market participants.
Sodi�če prve stopnje tam namreč nikakor ni zahtevalo od Komisije, naj izda poslovne skrivnosti posame -znih tržnih subjektov.
It merely — and correctly — rejected the Commission’s argument that because of their confidential character certain figures could not have been included at all in the first clearance decision.
Zavrnilo je le – in to upravičeno – stali�če Komisije, da določenih �tevilčnih podatkov sploh ni bilo mogoče vključiti v prvo odločbo o odobritvi zaradi njihove zaupnosti.
This is because the obligation of professional secrecy (Article 287 EC) cannot be interpreted so broadly as to undermine the requirement to state reasons for a decision. 110
Kajti obveznost varovanja poslovne skrivnosti (člen 287 ES) se ne sme razlagati tako �iroko, da bi se z njo izvotlila zahteva po obrazložitvi odločb. 110
In their first ground of appeal and in the second part of their sixth ground of appeal the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance wrongly used the statement of objections as a benchmark for its substantive assessment of the first clearance decision and wrongly required of the Commission that it justify any deviations from the objections in its decision.
Pritožnika s prvim pritožbenim razlogom in drugim delom �estega pritožbenega razloga uveljavljata, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno za merilo sodnega preizkusa prve odločbe o odobritvi uporabilo izjavo o ugovorih in od Komisije napačno zahtevalo, naj morebitna odstopanja od ugovorov obrazloži v odločbi.
So far as figures include business secrets, the Commission’s present practice in competition law is to replace such figures in its decision with ranges of figures, or otherwise to summarise them or describe them.
Če �tevilčni material vsebuje poslovne skrivnosti, ustreza ustaljeni praksi Komisije na področju prava konkurence, da te �tevilke v odločbi nadomesti z razponi ali jih na kak�en drugačen način povzame ali opi�e.