natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The composition of the Chamber which delivered the judgment under appeal and the name of the Judge-Rapporteur were already known before the oral procedure before the Court of First Instance; therefore, Chronopost and La Poste could have raised their doubts as to the impartiality of the formation during that oral procedure.
Družbi Chronopost in La Poste bi lahko – ker sta bila sestava, ki je izdala izpodbijano sodbo, in sodnik poročevalec znana že pred ustnim postopkom pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje – svoje dvome o nepristranskosti sestave navedli med tem ustnim postopkom.
Having waived that opportunity, their ground of appeal is therefore new and, accordingly, inadmissible, as the Court of Justice held in Case C-64/98 P Petrides v Commission [1999] ECR I-5187.
Če bi se tej možnosti odpovedali, bi bili njuni tožbeni razlogi torej novi in zato nedopustni, kot je to Sodi�če odločilo v sodbi z dne 9. septembra 1999 v zadevi Petrides proti Komisiji (C-64/98 P, Recueil, str. I-5187).
Second, UFEX and Others contend that that ground of appeal is unfounded.
Združenje UFEX in drugi, drugič, zatrjujejo, da ta tožbeni razlog ni utemeljen.
The composition of the Chamber which delivered the judgment under appeal was in fact consistent with the provisions of Article 118 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, which governs that composition where the Court of First Instance is seised of a case on a referral back by the Court of Justice after a first judgment has been set aside.
Sestava, ki je izdala izpodbijano sodbo, naj bi bila v bistvu v skladu z določbami člena 118 Poslovnika Sodi�ča prve stopnje, ki ureja to sestavo, ki ji je Sodi�če vrnilo zadevo v novo odločanje po razveljavitvi prve sodbe.
Those provisions do not prescribe assignment of a case to a different formation, which would in any event be impossible where the first judgment has been delivered in plenary session.
Te določbe naj ne bi določale dodelitve drugi sestavi, kar bi bilo v vsakem primer nemogoče, če je bila prva sodba izdana na občni seji.
There is no constitutional tradition common to the Member States in that respect.
Na tem področju ni mogoče nasprotovati nobeni ustavni tradiciji, skupni državam članicam.
The collegiate nature of the Court is deemed to neutralise the risk of bias by a member of the formation.
Kolegialnost naj bi nevtralizirala nevarnost pristranskosti člana sestave.
In the light of the approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights (‘the Court of Human Rights’) towards the question of judicial impartiality, it must be noted that it has not been possible to point to any subjective or objective element of bias in the present case.
V zvezi s pristopom Evropskega sodi�ča za človekove pravice k vpra�anju nepristranskosti sodi�č je treba navesti, da v obravnavani zadevi ni bilo mogoče ugotoviti nobenega subjektivnega ali objektivnega dejavnika pristranskosti.
On the contrary, it constitutes sound administration of justice to entrust a case as complex as the case at issue to the same Judge-Rapporteur who heard and determined it before the referral.
Nasprotno, gre za dobro delovanja sodnega organa, da se tako zapletena zadeva, kot je ta v obravnavani zadevi, zaupa istemu sodniku poročevalcu, ki jo je obravnaval in je o njej odločal pred vrnitvijo v novo odločanje.
In their replies, Chronopost and La Poste deny that their ground of appeal is inadmissible as alleged.
Družbi Chronopost in La Poste v repliki ugovarjata nedopustnosti, ki se očita njunemu tožbenemu razlogu.
UFEX and Others are precluded from relying in any way on the novel nature of a ground of appeal alleging infringement of a principle that is fundamental and, in consequence, a matter of public policy that cannot be waived.
Združenje UFEX in drugi se namreč nikakor ne bi mogli sklicevati na to, da gre za nov tožbeni razlog kr�itve načela, ki je temeljno, in ki naj bi bil zato vpra�anje javnega reda, kateremu se naj ne bi bilo mogoče odpovedati.
Furthermore, such a ground of appeal could not have been raised before the delivery of the judgment of the Court of First Instance.
Dalje se naj na tak tožbeni razlog ne bi bilo mogoče sklicevati pred razglasitvijo sodbe Sodi�ča prve stopnje.
In addition, it is not one of the pro -cedural issues on which the Court of First Instance can rule under Article 111 of its Rules of Procedure.
Poleg tega naj tak tožbeni razlog ne bi spadal med procesna vpra�anja, o katerih je Sodi�če prve stopnje pristojno odločati na podlagi člena 111 svojega poslovnika.
Moreover, those Rules of Procedure do not provide for the possibility of objecting to a Judge.
Še več, navedeni poslovnik naj ne bi zajemal določb o ugovarjanju sodelovanja določenega sodnika.
That ground of appeal was invoked in the application before the Court of Justice; therefore it is not a new plea submitted ‘in the course of proceedings’ within the meaning of Article 42(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.
Ker naj bi bil navedeni tožbeni razlog naveden v tožbi pred Sodi�čem, naj ne bi �lo za nov tožbeni razlog, naveden „med postopkom“ v smislu člena 42(2) Poslovnika Sodi�ča.
In their rejoinders, UFEX and Others contend that the argument raised in the reply — that the infringement of a fundamental principle is a matter of public policy — is a new plea in law and therefore inadmissible.
Združenje UFEX in drugi v svoji dupliki zatrjujejo, da je trditev, navedena v repliki, v skladu s katero naj bi bila kr�itev temeljnega načela vpra�anje javnega reda, nov in zato nedopusten tožbeni razlog.
Moreover, the proceedings referred to in Article 42(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice are those commencing before the Court of First Instance and continuing before the Court of Justice on appeal.
Poleg tega naj bi bil postopek, naveden v členu 42(2) Poslovnika Sodi�ča, postopek, ki se je začel pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje in nadaljeval pred Sodi�čem v okviru pritožbe.
The right to a fair trial, which derives inter alia from Article 6(1) of the ECHR, constitutes a fundamental right which the European Union respects as a general principle under Article 6(2) EU (Case C-305/05 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone and Others [2007] ECR I-5305, paragraph 29).
Pravica do po�tenega sojenja, kot izhaja zlasti iz člena 6(1) EKČP, je tako temeljna pravica, ki jo Evropska unija spo�tuje kot splo�no načelo na podlagi člena 6(2) EU (sodba z dne 26. junija 2007 v zadevi Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone in drugi, C-305/05, ZOdl., str. I-5305, točka 29).
That right to a fair trial means that everyone must be entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Pravica do po�tenega sojenja pomeni, da ima vsakdo pravico, da ga pravično in javno ter v razumnem roku zasli�i neodvisno in nepristransko z zakonom ustanovljeno sodi�če.
Such a right is applicable in the context of proceedings brought against a Commission decision (see, to that effect, Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417, paragraph 21).
Tako pravico ima v zvezi s pravnim sredstvom zoper odločbo Komisije (glej v tem smislu sodbo z dne 17. decembra 1998 v zadevi Baustahlgewebe proti Komisiji, C-185/95 P, Recueil, str. I-8417, točka 21).
The guarantees of access to an independent and impartial tribunal, and in particular those which determine what constitutes a tribunal and how it is composed, represent the cornerstone of the right to a fair trial.
Jamstvo za dostop do neodvisnega in nepristranskega sodi�ča in zlasti tisto, ki opredeljuje pojem in sestavo sodi�ča, je temelj pravice do po�tenega sojenja.
That right means that every court is obliged to check whether, in its composition, it constitutes such an independent and impartial tribunal, where this is disputed on a ground that does not immediately appear to be manifestly devoid of merit.
Ta pravica pomeni, da imajo vsa sodi�ča obveznost preveriti, ali s svojo sestavo predstavljajo tako neodvisno in nepristransko sodi�če, kadar se to izpodbija na podlagi, ki naj ne bi bila očitno nebistvena.
That check is necessary for the confidence which the courts must inspire in those subject to their jurisdiction (see, to that effect, Eur. Court HR, Remli v. France, judgment of 23 April 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II, p. 574, § 48).
Ta preveritev je potrebna za zaupanje, ki ga morajo sodi�ča demokratične družbe uživati pri posameznikih (glej v tem smislu sodbo Evropskega sodi�ča za človekove pravice z dne 23. aprila 1996 v zadevi Remli proti Franciji, Recueil des arrêts et décisions 1996-II, str.
It follows from this that, if, in an appeal, a challenge is made in that respect on a ground that is, as in the present case, not manifestly devoid of merit, the Court of Justice is obliged to check the correctness of the composition of the formation of the Court of First Instance which delivered the judgment under appeal.
Iz tega izhaja, da mora Sodi�če, če se v okviru pritožbe to izpodbija na podlagi, ki kot v obravnavani zadevi ni očitno nebistvena, preveriti zakonitost sestave Sodi�če prve stopnje, ki je izdala izpodbijano sodbo.
In other words, a ground of appeal alleging an irregularity in the composition of the Court of First Instance, such as that which is now before the Court of Justice, must be regarded as involving a matter of public policy which must be raised by the Court of its own motion (see, on the raising of matters of public policy by the Court of its own motion, in particular, Case C-367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France [1998] ECR I-1719, paragraph 67).
Z drugimi besedami, pritožbeni razlog nezakonitosti sestave Sodi�če prve stopnje, kot je ta, ki je bil predložen Sodi�ču, je treba �teti za pritožbeni razlog javnega reda, ki ga je treba preveriti po uradni dolžnosti (glej v zvezi s preverjanjem po uradni dolžnosti zlasti sodbo z dne 2. aprila 1998 v zadevi Komisija proti Sytraval in Brink’s France, C-367/95 P, Recueil, str. I-1719, točka 67).
Consideration of such a plea may therefore take place at any stage in the proceedings (see, to that effect, Case C-166/95 P Commission v Daffix [1997] ECR I-983, paragraph 25).
Obravnavanje takega pritožbenega razloga je mogoče v katerikoli fazi postopka (glej v tem smislu sodbo z dne 20. februarja 1997 v zadevi Komisija proti Daffix, C-166/95 P, Recueil, str. I-983, točka 25).
In those circumstances, the failure of the Commission, a principal party at first instance, to raise before the Court of First Instance the irregularity invoked by Chronopost and La Poste in support of their ground of appeal before the Court of Justice, and the argument that, as a result, they — interveners at first instance — are no longer entitled to do so in the context of their appeal, cannot properly be relied upon in opposing the Court’s consideration of such a plea.
V teh okoli�činah se na dejstvo, da Komisija, glavna stranka v postopku na prvi stopnji, pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje ni uveljavljala nezakonitosti, na katero se sklicujeta družbi Chronopost in La Poste v utemeljitev svojega pritožbenega razloga pred Sodi�čem, in da je zato zadevne osebe, intervenientke na prvi stopnji, v nobenem primeru ne morejo več dopustno uveljavljati v okviru svoje pritožbe, ni mogoče učinkovito sklicevati pri nasprotovanju temu, da bi Sodi�če obravnavalo tak pritožbeni razlog.
In that regard, it is apparent from the documents in the files submitted to the Court, and undisputed, that the duties of the Judge-Rapporteur in the formation of the Chamber which delivered the judgment under appeal were entrusted to the member who had been both President and Judge-Rapporteur in the formation of the Chamber which had delivered the judgment in Ufex and Others v Commission.
V zvezi s tem iz Sodi�ču predloženih dokumentov iz spisa izhaja in ni izpodbojno, da so bile naloge sodnika poročevalca v sestavi, ki je izdala izpodbijano sodbo, zaupane enemu od njenih članov, ki je bil hkrati predsednik in sodnik poročevalec v sestavi, ki je izdala zgoraj navedeno sodbo Ufex in drugi proti Komisiji.
Nevertheless, it has not been established that, in thus designating the Judge-Rappor-teur, the Court of First Instance failed to comply with the duty of impartiality by which its members are bound, and thus disregarded the fundamental right to a fair trial.
Vendar ni bilo ugotovljeno, da naj Sodi�če prve stopnje, s tem da je tako imenovalo sodnika poročevalca, ne bi spo�tovalo zahteve o nepristranskosti, ki zavezuje njegove člane, niti da naj bi kr�ilo temeljno pravico do po�tenega sojenja.
It must be observed, first of all, that the fact that the same Judge in the two successive formations was entrusted with the duties of Judge-Rapporteur is, by itself, irrelevant to the assessment of compliance with the requirement of impartiality, since those duties are performed in a collegiate formation of the Court.
Prvič, ugotoviti je treba, da dejstvo, da so bile sodniku, prisotnemu v dveh zaporednih sestavah, zaupane naloge sodnika poročevalca, samo po sebi ne vpliva na presojo v zvezi s spo�tovanjem zahteve po nepristranskosti, ker se navedene naloge izvajajo v kolegijski sestavi.
Second, there are two aspects to the requirement of impartiality: (i) the members of the tribunal themselves must be subjectively impartial, that is, none of its members must show bias or personal prejudice, there being a presumption of personal impartiality in the absence of evidence to the contrary; and (ii) the tribunal must be objectively impartial, that is to say, it must offer guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect (see, to that effect, in particular, Eur.
Drugič, v zvezi z zahtevo po nepristranskosti obstajata dva vidika. Na eni strani mora biti sodi�če subjektivno nepristransko, noben njegov član torej ne sme biti pristranski in ne sme imeti osebnih predsodkov, pri čemer se osebna nepristranskost domneva, dokler se ne dokaže nasprotno.
Court HR, Fey v. Austria, judgment of 24 February 1993, Series A no. 255-A, p.
Na drugi strani mora biti sodi�če objektivno nepristransko, ponujati mora primerno jamstvo, da se v zvezi s tem izključi vsak upravičen dvom (glej v tem smislu zlasti sodbe Evropskega sodi�če za človekove pravice z dne 24. februarja 1993 v zadevi Fey proti Avstriji, serija A, �t. 255-A, str. 12, točka 28; z dne 25. februarja 1997 v zadevi Findlay proti Združenemu kraljestvu, Recueil des arrêts et décisions 1997-I, str. 281, točka 73, in z dne 4. oktobra 2007 v zadevi Forum Maritime S.A. proti Romuniji, �t. 63610/00 in 38692/05, �e neobjavljena v Recueil des arrêts et décisions).
However, it must be noted that Chronopost and La Poste do not allege personal bias on the part of the members of the Court of First Instance in the present case.
Na eni strani je torej treba poudariti, da v obravnavani zadevi družbi Chronopost in La Poste ne uveljavljata osebne pristranskosti članov Sodi�ča prve stopnje.
Furthermore, the fact that the same Judge sits in two Chambers hearing and determining the same case in succession, cannot, by itself, give rise to doubt as to the
Na drugi strani okoli�čina, da isti sodnik sodeluje v dveh sestavah, ki sta zaporedoma obravnavali in odločali o isti zadevi, sama po sebi, če ne obstaja noben drug objektivni dokaz, ne more povzročati dvoma o nepristranskosti sodi�ča.
2008 — JOINED CASES C-341/06 P AND C-342/06 P impartiality of the Court of First Instance in the absence of any other objective evidence.
2008 – ZDRUŽENI ZADEVI C-341/06 P IN C-342/06 P
In that respect, it is not apparent that the referral of the case back to a Chamber with an entirely different composition from that which first heard and determined the case must, or can, under Community law, be regarded as a general obligation.
V zvezi s tem se ne zdi, da bi bilo treba – ali je mogoče – vrnitev zadeve v novo odločanje sestavi, ki je popolnoma drugačna od sestave, ki je zadevo najprej obravnavala in o njej odločala, v okviru prava Skupnosti �teti za splo�no obveznost.
Moreover, the Court of Human Rights considered that it cannot be stated as a general rule resulting from the obligation to be impartial that a court quashing an administrative or judicial decision is bound to send the case back to a different judicial authority or to a differently composed branch of that authority (see, in particular, Eur. Court HR, Ringeisen v. Austria, judgment of 16 July 1971, Series A no.
Evropsko sodi�če za človekove pravice je poleg tega navedlo, da se ne sme določiti splo�no načelo, ki izhaja iz dolžnosti nepristranskosti, in sicer da je sodi�če, ko razveljavi upravno ali sodno odločbo, zavezano zadevo vrniti v novo odločanje drugemu sodnemu organu ali drugače sestavljenemu delu tega organa (glej zlasti sodbi z dne 16. julija 1971 v zadevi ESČP Ringeisen proti Autriche, izdaja A, �t.
13, § 97, and Diennet v. France, judgment of 26 September 1995, Series A no. 325-A, § 37).
13, točka 97, in z dne 26. septembra 1995 v zadevi Diennet proti Franciji, izdaja A, �t.
It must also be observed that, under Article 27(3) of the ECHR, when a case is referred to the Grand Chamber of the Court of Human Rights, on a referral following a Chamber’s judgment, no Judge from the Chamber which rendered the judgment is to sit in the Grand Chamber, with the exception of the President of the Chamber and the Judge who sat in respect of the State Party concerned.
Poleg tega je treba opozoriti, da na podlagi člena 27(3) EKČP, kadar je zadeva predložena velikemu senatu Evropskega sodi�ča za človekove pravice v zvezi s ponovno obravnavo sodbe določenega senata, ne sme noben sodnik iz senata, ki je izrekel sodbo, sodelovati v velikem senatu, razen predsednika senata in sodnika, ki je sodeloval v imenu zadevne države.
The ECHR thus accepts that Judges who heard and determined the case initially may sit in another formation hearing and determining the same case again, and that that is not in itself incompatible with the requirements of a fair trial.
ESČP tako priznava, da sodniki, ki so zadevo najprej obravnavali in o njej odločali v drugi sestavi, lahko isto zadevo ponovno obravnavajo in da se ta okoli�čina sama po sebi ne zdi nezdružljiva z zahtevami do po�tenega sojenja.
In those circumstances, it has not been established in the present case that the composition of the Chamber which delivered the judgment under appeal was unlawful merely as a result of the presence in that Chamber of a member of the Court of First Instance who had already sat in the Chamber which previously heard and determined the case.
V teh okoli�činah v obravnavani zadevi ni dokazano, da je bila sestava, ki je izdala izpodbijano sodbo, nezakonita zgolj zato, ker je bil prisoten član Sodi�ča prve stopnje, ki je že sodeloval v sestavi, ki je pred tem obravnavala zadevo in o njej odločala.
The first ground of appeal must therefore be rejected.
Prvi tožbeni razlog je treba torej zavrniti.
Second ground of appeal: procedural defect in connection with the Court’s substantive ruling on an inadmissible plea
Drugi pritožbeni razlog: kršitev postopka, ker je Sodišče prve stopnje vsebinsko odločilo o nedopustnem tožbenem razlogu
La Poste submits, in the first part of this ground of appeal, that the Court of First Instance failed to rule on the plea of inadmissibility which it had put forward in opposition to a plea advanced by UFEX and Others alleging that the Postadex transfer constituted State aid, a plea which had not been advanced in the proceedings giving rise to the judgment in Ufex and Others v Commission, and which was therefore new in the proceedings giving rise to the judgment under appeal.
Družba La Poste v prvem delu pritožbenega razloga zatrjuje, da Sodi�če prve stopnje ni odločalo o ugovoru nedopustnosti, ki ga je uveljavljala zoper tožbeni razlog združenja UFEX in drugih v zvezi s tem, da je bil prenos službe Postadex državna pomoč, tožbeni razlog, ki v postopku, v katerem je bila razgla�ena zgoraj navedena sodba Ufex in drugi proti Komisiji, ni bil naveden in ki naj bi bil torej nov tožbeni razlog v postopku, v katerem je bila razgla�ena izpodbijana sodba.
In the second part, it submits that, in ruling on that plea, which was new, the Court of First Instance infringed Article 48(2) of its Rules of Procedure.
V drugem delu pritožbenega razloga zatrjuje, da je Sodi�če s tem, da je odločalo o tem novem tožbenem razlogu, kr�ilo določbe člena 48(2) svojega poslovnika.
UFEX and Others argue that the first part of that ground of appeal is inadmissible in that it relies on confused and contradictory arguments and does not state which provision of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance has been infringed.
Združenje UFEX in drugi ugovarja dopustnosti prvega dela tega pritožbenega razloga, ker naj bi temeljil na nejasnih, nasprotujočih si trditvah in naj ne bi navedel, katera določba Poslovnika Sodi�ča prve stopnje je bila kr�ena.
Furthermore, the first part is unfounded, as the Court of First Instance was not obliged to address a plea which in itself was inadmissible because it had been raised only by an intervener.
Nadalje, ta del pritožbenega razloga naj ne bi bil utemeljen, ker Sodi�če prve stopnje ni bilo zavezano obravnavati ugovora, ki sam po sebi ni bil dopusten, ker ga je navedla le intervenientka.
In addition, in stating that the Court of First Instance expressed that ground of appeal in different terms when considering it under the plea put forward in the application alleging a manifest error of assessment, La Poste admits that the plea was appropriately raised and therefore not new.
Poleg tega družba La Poste s tem, da zatrjuje, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje ta pritožbeni razlog opredelilo drugače, ko ga je obravnavalo v okviru tožbenega razloga v zvezi z očitno napako pri presoji, priznava, da je navedeni tožbeni razlog ustrezno uveljavljen in torej ni bil nov.
Thus, since the Court of First Instance was entitled to express the arguments submitted in the application in different terms, the second part is equally unfounded.
Ker je Sodi�če prve stopnje lahko formalno drugače opredelilo trditev iz tožbe, drugi del pritožbenega razloga ne more biti utemeljen.
La Poste, in its reply, denies that the first part of its second ground of appeal is inadmissible, as contended.
Družba La Poste v repliki izpodbija nedopustnost, očitano prvemu delu njenega drugega tožbenega razloga. Trdi, da je ta jasen.
Furthermore, even if the plea of inadmissibility which it advanced before the Court of First Instance had itself been inadmissible, the Court should have made an express finding to that effect.
Čeprav bi bil ugovor nedopustnosti, ki ga je uveljavljala pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje, nedopusten, bi slednje moralo to izrecno ugotoviti.
2008 — JOINED CASES C-341/06 P AND C-342/06 P the caselaw of the Court of Justice concerning the inadmissibility of pleas raised by an intervener is more nuanced than UFEX and Others claim, and does not preclude consideration of those pleas on a case-by-case basis.
2008 – ZDRUŽENI ZADEVI C-341/06 P IN C-342/06 P tožbenih razlogov, ki jih uveljavlja interevenient, bolj različna, kot to navajajo združenje UFEX in drugi, in naj ne bi izključevala preizkusa teh tožbenih razlogov v posameznih primerih.
The plea in the present case is admissible because, according to La Poste, its pleas are directed towards the same objective as those of the Commission, the new plea by UFEX and Others was raised well after the intervention and, having been accused of infringing the rules on State aid, La Poste had an interest in raising pleas omitted by the Commission.
Tožbeni razlog v obravnavani zadevi naj bi bil dopusten, ker družba La Poste meni, najprej, da njeni tožbeni razlogi zasledujejo enake cilje kot tožbeni razlogi Komisije, nadalje, da so združenje UFEX in drugi tožbeni razlog uveljavljali �ele po intervenciji in, nazadnje, da je imela družba La Poste, ki je bila obtožena kr�itve pravil v zvezi z državnimi pomočmi, interes uveljavljati tožbeni razlog, ki ga je Komisija opustila.
In their rejoinder, UFEX and Others reiterate that a plea put forward by an intervener is not admissible, and that the novel nature of a plea is not a matter of public policy.
Združenje UFEX in drugi so v dupliki ponovno navedli, da tožbeni razlog, ki ga je uveljavljala intervenientka, ni dopusten in da vpra�anje, ali gre za nov tožbeni razlog, ni bilo vpra�anje javnega reda.