natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
RACCANELLI by the discrimination to which he has been subject, it is for the referring court to assess, in the light of the national legislation applicable in relation to non-contractual liability, the nature of the compensation which he would be entitled to claim.
RACCANELLI je bila, utrpela �kodo, predložitveno sodi�če glede na veljavno nacionalno zakonodajo na področju nepogodbene odgovornosti presoditi, v kak�ni obliki lahko zahteva povračilo �kode.
A researcher in a similar situation to that of the applicant in the main proceedings, that is, a researcher preparing a doctoral thesis on the basis of a grant contract concluded with the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV, must be regarded as a worker within the meaning of Article 39 EC only if his activities are performed for a certain period of time under the direction of an institute forming part of that association and if, in return for those activities, he receives remuneration.
Raziskovalca v takem položaju, v kakršnem je tožeča stranka v postopku v glavni stvari, ki pripravlja doktorsko disertacijo na podlagi pogodbe o štipendiranju, ki jo je sklenila z združenjem Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV, je treba obravnavati kot delavca v smislu člena 39 ES, le če določen čas opravlja delo pod vodstvom inštituta, ki je del tega združenja, in za to prejema plačilo.
It is for the referring court to undertake the necessary verification of the facts in order to establish whether such is the case in the dispute before it.
Predložitveno sodišče mora opraviti potreben preizkus dejanskega stanja, da bo lahko presodilo, ali gre v zadevi, o kateri odloča, za tak primer.
A privatelaw association, such as the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV, must observe the principle of nondiscrimination in relation to workers within the meaning of Article 39 EC.
Zasebnopravno združenje, kot je Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV, mora v razmerju do delavcev v smislu člena 39 ES spoštovati načelo prepovedi diskriminacije.
It is for the referring court to establish whether, in circumstances such as those of the case in the main proceedings, there has been inequality in the treatment of domestic and foreign doctoral students.
Predložitveno sodišče mora ugotoviti, ali so bili v okoliščinah, kakršne so v obravnavanem postopku v glavni stvari, neenako obravnavani nacionalni in tuji študenti doktorskega študija.
In the event that the applicant in the main proceedings is justified in relying on damage caused by the discrimination to which he has been subject, it is for the referring court to assess, in the light of the national legislation applicable in relation to non-contractual liability, the nature of the compensation which he would be entitled to claim.
Če se lahko tožeča stranka v postopku v glavni stvari utemeljeno sklicuje, da je zaradi diskriminacije, katere žrtev je bila, utrpela škodo, mora predložitveno sodišče glede na veljavno nacionalno zakonodajo na področju nepogodbene odgovornosti presoditi, v kakšni obliki lahko zahteva povračilo škode.
Joined Cases C-152/07 to C-154/07
Združene zadeve od C-152/07 do C-154/07
Arcor AG & Co. KG and Others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (References for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht)
Arcor AG & Co. KG in drugi proti Zvezni republiki Nemčiji (Predlogi za sprejetje predhodne odločbe, ki jih je vložilo Bundesverwaltungsgericht)
(Telecommunications — Networks and services — Tariff rebalancing — Article 4c of Directive 90/388/EEC — Article 7(2) of Directive 97/33/EC — Article 12(7) of Directive 98/61/EC — Regulatory authority — Direct effect of directives — Triangular situation)
„Telekomunikacijski sektor – Omrežja in storitve – Usklajevanje tarif – Člen 4c Direktive 90/388/EGS – Člen 7(2) Direktive 97/33/ES – Člen 12(7) Direktive 98/61/ES – Regulativni organ – Neposredni učinek direktiv – Tristranski položaj“
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 17 July 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ruiz-Jaraboja Colomerja, predstavljeni 1. aprila 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Approximation of laws — Telecommunications — Directives 90/388 and 97/33
Približevanje zakonodaj – Sektor za telekomunikacije – Direktivi 90/388 in 97/33
(European Parliament and Council Directive 97/33, Art. 12(7); Commission Directives 90/388, Art. 4c, and 96/19, recitals 5 and 20 in the preamble)
(Direktiva Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta 97/33, člen 12(7); direktivi Komisije 90/388, člen 4c, in 96/19, peta in dvajseta uvodna izjava)
SUMMARY — JOINED CASES C-152/07 TO C-154/07
POVZETEK – ZDRUŽENE ZADEVE OD C-152/07 DOC-154/07
(European Parliament and Council Directive 97/33, Art. 12(7); Commission Direct- ive 90/388, Art. 4c)
(Direktiva Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta 97/33, člen 12(7); Direktiva Komisije 90/388, člen 4c)
Acts of the institutions — Directives — Direct effect (Art. 249 EC)
Akti institucij – Direktive – Neposredni učinek (člen 249 ES)
principle, laid down in Article 7(2) of Directive 97/33, requires that the charge be derived from actual costs.
Direktive 97/33, obvezuje k določanju tarife na podlagi dejanskih stro�kov.
Consequently, Article 12(7) of Directive 97/33 does not allow a national regulatory authority to approve a connection charge the rate of which is not cost-oriented, when it has the same characteristics as an interconnection charge and is levied as a supplement to such a charge.
Zato člen 12(7) Direktive 97/33 nacionalnemu regulativnemu organu ne dovoljuje, da odobri priključnino, katere vi�ina ni stro�kovno naravnana, če ima enake lastnosti kot tarifa za medomrežno povezovanje in se zaračunava kot dodatek k tej tarifi.
Article 12(7) of Directive 97/33 on interconnection in telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of the principles of open network provision, as amended by Directive 98/61, and Article 4c of Directive 90/388 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services, as amended by Directive 96/19, the latter article read in conjunction with recitals 5 and 20 in the preamble to Directive 96/19, must be interpreted as precluding a national regulatory authority from requiring an operator of a network interconnected with a public network to pay to the market-dominant subscriber network operator a connection charge which is additional to an interconnection charge and is intended to compensate the latter operator for the deficit incurred as a result of providing the local loop for the year 2003.
Člen 12(7) Direktive 97/33 o medomrežnem povezovanju v telekomunikacijah za zagotavljanje univerzalne storitve in medobratovalnosti z uporabo načel zagotavljanja odprtosti omrežja, kot je bila spremenjena z Direktivo 98/61, in člen 4c Direktive 90/388 o konkurenci na trgih telekomunikacijskih storitev, kot je bila spremenjena z Direktivo 96/19, slednjega v zvezi z uvodnima izjavama 5 in 20 Direktive 96/19, je treba razlagati tako, da nacionalni regulativni organ operaterju omrežja, ki je medomrežno povezano z javnim omrežjem, ne more naložiti obveznosti, da operaterju naročni�kega omrežja s prevladujočim položajem za leto 2003 poleg tarife za medomrežno povezovanje plača tudi priključnino za izravnavo primanjkljaja, ki slednjemu nastane zaradi zagotavljanja krajevnih zank.
Secondly, the effect of such a charge is only to protect the market-dominant subscriber network operator by enabling it to maintain a cost for the calls of its own subscribers which is below the actual cost and, accordingly, to fund its own deficit from the subscribers of the other operators of interconnected networks.
Drugič, posledica priključnine je zgolj varovanje operaterja naročni�kega omrežja s prevladujočim položajem na trgu, s tem da mu ta omogoča, da za svoje naročnike ohranja nižje stro�ke klicev od dejanskih in tako financira lasten primanjkljaj z naročniki drugih operaterjev medomrežno povezanih omrežij.
Such funding, which is separate from any funding of universal service obligations, is contrary to the principle of free competition.
Tako financiranje, ki ne poteka v okviru financiranja obveznosti v zvezi z univerzalno storitvijo, ni združljivo z načelom svobodne konkurence.
First, such a connection charge is within the scope of Article 12(7) of Direct- ive 97/33 and must therefore be subject to the same pricing conditions as the interconnection charge stricto sensu, namely with due regard to the principle of the cost orientation of tariffs.
Prvič, za tako priključnino se namreč uporabi člen 12(7) Direktive 97/33, za njeno določanje pa veljajo enaki pogoji kot za tarifo za medomrežno povezovanje v ožjem smislu, in sicer upo�tevanje načela stro�kovne naravnanosti cen.
That
To načelo, določeno v členu 7(2)
ARCOR AND OTHERS after 1 January 2000, the final date for completion of tariff rebalancing by the Member States, as is clear from recital 5 in the preamble to Directive 96/19 read in conjunction with recital 20 therein and from Article 4c of Directive 90/388.
ARCOR IN DRUGI uvodnih izjavah 5 in 20 Direktive 96/19 in členu 4c Direktive 90/388 končni datum za dokončanje navedenega tarifnega usklajevanja držav članic.
by the fact that the market-dominant subscriber network operator, a third party in relation to the dispute between the public telecommunications network operators and the regulatory authority, is capable of suffering adverse repercussions because it levied the connection charge and because, if that charge were removed, it would have to increase its own subscribers’ rates.
katere se plačuje navedena priključnina. Na to možnost ne vpliva okoli�čina, da lahko operater naročni�kega omrežja, ki na trgu prevladuje in je tretja oseba v sporu med operaterji javnih telekomunikacijskih omrežij in regulativnim organom, zato ker je pobiral priključnino, utrpi negativne učinke in bi moral, če se ta tarifa ukine, povi�ati lastne naročni�ke tarife.
(see paras 22-24, 28-33, operative part 1)
(Glej točke od 22 do 24, od 28 do 33 in točko 1 izreka.)
(see paras 37, 38, operative part 2)
(Glej točki 37 in 38 ter točko 2 izreka.)
A directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual, but can only confer rights.
Na podlagi same direktive posamezniku ne morejo biti naložene obveznosti, temveč lahko pridobi le pravice.
Consequently, an individual may not rely on a directive against a Member State where it is a matter of a State obligation directly linked to the performance of another obligation falling, pursuant to that directive, on a third party.
Zato se posameznik ne more sklicevati na direktivo v postopku zoper državo članico, če gre za obveznost države, neposredno povezano z izvr�itvijo druge obveznosti, ki je na podlagi te direktive naložena tretji osebi.
On the other hand, mere adverse repercussions on the rights of third parties, even if the repercussions are certain, do not justify preventing an individual from relying on the provisions of a directive against the Member State concerned.
Nasprotno pa zgolj zaradi negativnih učinkov na pravice tretjih oseb, tudi če so ti zanesljivo izkazani, posamezniku ni mogoče odreči možnosti, da se sklicuje na določbe direktive zoper zadevno državo članico.
Article 4c of Directive 90/388, as amended by Directive 96/19, and Article 12(7) of Directive 97/33 on interconnection in telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of the principles of open network provision, as amended by Directive 98/61, produce direct effect and can be relied on directly before a national court by individuals to challenge a decision of the national regulatory authority.
Člena 4c Direktive 98/388, kot je bila spremenjena z Direktivo 96/19, in 12(7) Direktive 97/33 o medomrežnem povezovanju v telekomunikacijah za zagotavljanje univerzalne storitve in medobratovalnosti z uporabo načel zagotavljanja odprtosti omrežja, kot je bila spremenjena z Direktivo 98/61, neposredno učinkujeta in se lahko posamezniki nanju pred nacionalnimi sodi�či neposredno sklicujejo, da bi s tem izpodbili odločbo nacionalnega regulativnega organa.
That applies to actions brought by private persons against a Member State, represented by the national regulatory authority, which has sole competence to set the rates of both the connection charge and the interconnection charge to which the former is added. That possibility is not affected
To velja v primeru sporov, ki so jih sprožili posamezniki zoper državo članico, v imenu katere je deloval nacionalni regulativni organ, ki je edini pristojen določati zadevno priključnino kot tudi tarifo za medomrežno povezovanje, poleg
(see paras 35, 36, 40)
(Glej točke 35, 36 in 40.)
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERALRUIZ-JARABO COLOMER delivered on 1 April 2008 1
SKLEPNI PREDLOGI GENERALNEGA PRAVOBRANILCADÁMASA RUIZ-JARABOJA COLOMERJA, predstavljeni 1. aprila 2008 1
I — Introduction by the liberalisation 4 fostered by the Competition 5and Interconnection Directives, 6 and completed by the ‘new regulatory framework’, 7 adopted on 7 March 2002 and published on 24 April 2002. 8
I – Uvod je značilna liberalizacija 4, ki sta jo pospe�ili direktivi o konkurenci 5in medomrežnem povezovanju 6in katere vrh je „novi regulativni okvir“ 7, sprejet 7. marca 2002 in objavljen 24. aprila 2002 8.
The undertakings required to pay those additional charges dispute their validity, 9 invoking the principles of free competition,
Podjetja, obvezana k takim dopla -čilom, izpodbijajo njihovo veljavnost 9in v
5 — Amended by Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996, with regard to the implementation of full competition in telecommunications markets (OJ 1996 L 74, p. 13).
5 – Spremenjena z Direktivo Komisije 96/19/ES z dne 13. marca 1996 glede vzpostavitve popolne konkurence na trgih telekomunikacij (UL L 74. str. 13).
The Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court), Germany has requested the Court of Justice to rule on the scope attributed to the financing of certain universal service obligations by Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services (‘Competition Directive’ or ‘Directive 90/388’) 2and Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on interconnection in telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (‘Interconnection Directive’ or ‘Directive 97/33’). 3
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (zvezno up -ravno sodi�če) poziva Sodi�če, naj se izreče o obsegu, ki ga glede financiranja določenih obveznosti zagotavljanja univerzalne storitve predvidevata Direktiva Komisije 90/388/EGS z dne 28. junija 1990 o konkurenci na trgih za telekomunikacijske storitve (v nadaljevanju: Direktiva o konkurenci 2 oz. Direktiva 90/388) in Direktiva 97/33/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 30. junija 1997 o medomrežnem povezovanju v telekomunikacijah glede zagotavljanja univerzalne storitve in medobratovalnosti z uporabo načel zagotavljanja odprtosti omrežij (v nadaljevanju: Direktiva o medomrežnem povezovanju 3 oz. Direktiva 97/33).
6 — In particular, following the wording inserted by Dir -ective 98/61/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 1998 (OJ 1998 L 268, p.
6 – Posebej upo�tevajoč različico, ki je posledica Direktive 98/61/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. septembra 1998 (UL L 268, str.
37), which is applicable ratione temporis.
37), ki se uporablja ratione temporis.
7 — In my Opinion in Deutsche Telekom, I use that term to refer to four Directives of the European Parliament and of the Council: Directive 2002/19/EC of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive); Dir -ective 2002/20/EC of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive); Directive 2002/21/EC of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive); and Directive 2002/22/EC of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive).
7 – V sklepnih predlogih v zgoraj navedeni zadevi Deutsche Telekom s tem izrazom označujem �tiri direktive Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta: Direktivo 2002/19/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 7. marca 2002 o dostopu do elektronskih komunikacijskih omrežij in pripadajočih naprav ter o njihovem medomrežnem povezovanju (v nadaljevanju: Direktiva o dostopu); Direktivo 2002/20/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 7. marca 2002 o odobritvi elektronskih komunikacijskih omrežij in storitev (v nadaljevanju: Direktiva o odobritvi); Direktivo 2002/21/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 7. marca 2002 o skupnem regulativnem okviru za elektronska komunikacijska omrežja in storitve (v nadaljevanju: Okvirna direktiva) in Direktivo 2002/22/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 7. marca 2002 o univerzalni storitvi in pravicah uporabnikov v zvezi z elektronskimi komunikacijskimi omrežji in storitvami (v nadaljevanju: Direktiva o univerzalnih storitvah).
The referring court asks whether it is lawful to impose, for the benefit of the dominant operator in the public telecommunications network, charges additional to connection charges in a sector characterised
Predložitveno sodi�če se spra�uje o zakonitosti nekaterih stro�kov poleg stro�kov priključnine, ki se plačujejo v korist prevladujočega operaterja javnih telekomunikacijskih omrežji, in sicer v sektorju, za katerega
9 — The Spanish expression ‘disfrutar de una conminación’ (literally, ‘to enjoy an obligation’) is a contradiction in terms. However, intentionally created paradoxes have always existed, such as the title of the opera The Happy Slaves which the Bilbaoan Juan Crisóstomo de Arriaga, nicknamed the Spanish Mozart, composed in 1820, before he died at the young age of 20, leaving a musical legacy rich in chromaticisms and beautiful modal ambiguities.
9 – Izraz „uživati v obvezi“ vsebuje pomensko nasprotje; podobnih, namenoma ustvarjenih paradoksov, nikoli ni manjkalo, kot lep primer pa lahko navedemo naslov opere „Los esclavos felices“ („Srečni sužnji“), ki jo je Bilbajčan Juan Crisóstomo de Arriaga, imenovan tudi �panski Mozart, ustvaril leta 1820, preden ga je presenetila smrt pri zgodnji starosti dvajsetih let; za seboj je zapustil glasbeno zapu�čino, bogato v kromatiki in lepih premenah tonovskih načinov.
ARCOR AND OTHERS the prohibition of discrimination and administrative transparency.
ARCOR IN DRUGI utemeljitev navajajo načela svobodne konkurence, prepovedi diskriminacije in preglednosti uprave.
That trend crystallised in a new framework, contrasting with the state involvement in the provision of the service which had moulded it to the predominant political will, 11to the detriment of the liberalisation of the sector.
Skupno učinkovanje teh dejavnikov oblikuje nov okvir, ki je nasprotje državnemu poseganju v izvajanje storitve, ki vodi k postopni podreditvi politični volji 11 ter �kodi liberalizaciji trgovine.
II — The legislation applicable
II – Veljavna zakonodaja
The judgment in Italy v Commission 13sent shockwaves through the world of tele- communications by holding that the rules on competition apply to public bodies holding special or exclusive rights.
Sodba Italija proti Komisiji 13je imela silovit vpliv v svetu telekomunikacij, s tem da je bilo ugotovljeno, da pravila konkurence veljajo tudi za javne organe s posebnimi ali izključnimi pravicami.
The creation of a competitive, harmonised European market, founded on the free choice of telephony operators, commenced in 1987 with the drafting of the Green Paper on telecommunications. 10
Priprava Zelene knjige o telekomunikacijah 10iz leta 1987 je začetek vzpostavitve konkurenčnega in preglednega evropskega trga, ki temelji na svobodni izbiri operaterja telekomunikacijskih storitev.
Notwithstanding the adjustments made in caselaw, there were notable gaps in the system, made evident by the complexity of the field and the continued existence of markets dominated by the state operator, whose participation could be achieved only by means of specific statutory measures.
Navkljub prilagoditvam v sodni praksi so sistem hromile opazne pomanjkljivosti, ki so izhajale iz kompleksnosti pravne podlage in nadaljnjega obstoja trgov, ki so jih obvladovali nacionalni operaterji in katerih liberalizacijo je bilo mogoče doseči le s konkretnimi zakonodajnimi ukrepi.
The administrative deregulation of the sector significantly transformed its legal status, which had been based on the notion of publicatio or keeping the operation of telecommunications networks in the hands of public bodies: the traditional system of state monopolies, incapable of satisfying the demands of the ever-increasing number of users resulting from the revolution which had taken place in the industry, disappeared.
Upravna deregulacija sektorja je zahtevala temeljito preoblikovanje njegove pravne zasnove, ki je do tedaj temeljila na konceptu publicatio, kar v �panskem pravnem sistemu označuje vodenje sektorja s strani javnih ustanov, in hkrati povzročila izginotje tradicionalnega sistema državnih monopolov, nezmožnih zadostiti zahtevam uporabnikov, katerih �tevilo je po revoluciji v panogi vse bolj nara�čalo.
12 — Replaced by Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic communications networks and services (OJ 2002 L 249, p. 21).
12 – Nadome�čena z Direktivo Komisije 2002/77/ES z dne 16. septembra 2002 o konkurenci na trgih za elektronska komunikacijska omrežja in storitve (UL L 249, str. 21).
10 — Green Paper on the development of the common market for telecommunications services and equipment, Brussels, 16 December 1987, COM (87) 290 final, pp. 6, 16 et seq., supplemented by a number of proposals aimed at ensuring the uniformity of the authorisation mechanisms provided for in the legislation of the Member States, such as the proposals contained in the Green Paper on the Liberalisation of Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks — Part II, Brussels, 25 January 1995, COM(94) 682 final, p. 61 et seq.
10 – „Zelena knjiga o razvoju skupnega trga telekomunikacijskih storitev in opreme“, sprejeta v Bruslju, dne 16. decembra 1987 (COM(87)290 konč.), str. 6, 16 in naslednje, dopolnjena z nekaterimi predlogi, namenjenimi zagotovitvi poenotenja mehanizmov izdajanja pooblastil iz nacionalnih zakonodaj, kot na primer tisti, vsebovani v „Zeleni knjigi o liberalizaciji telekomunikacijske infrastrukture in kabelskega televizijskega omrežja,“ drugi del, sprejeto v Bruslju, 25. januarja 1995, COM(94) 682 konč., str.
13 — Case 41/83 [1985] ECR 873.
13 – Sodba z dne 20. marca 1985 (41/83, Recueil, str. 873).
OPINION OF MR RUIZ-JARABO — JOINED CASES C-152/07 TO C-154/07 encouraged the entry of new operators into the market, by ensuring the establishment of a permanent equilibrium between those involved in open network provision. 18
SKLEPNI PREDLOGI RUIZ-JARABOJA — ZDRUŽENE ZADEVE OD C-152/07 DO 154/07 vstop na trg drugim, novim operaterjem in poskrbela za vzpostavitev trajnega ravnotežja med vsemi udeleženci na trgu storitev omogočanja dostopa do javnega omrežja 18.
Directive 88/301/EEC 14and consolidated two years later by Directive 90/388, which abolished special and exclusive rights. There were a number of exceptions, including, in particular, voice telephony, in respect of which the openingup to competition was delayed until Commission Directive 96/19 of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388.
88/301/EGS 14, preči�čena dve leti pozneje z Direktivo 90/388, s katero so bile odpravljene posebne in izključne pravice (z nekaterimi izjemami, med katerimi je treba omeniti govorno telefonijo, ki je bila načelom svobodne konkurence podvržena �ele z Direktivo Komisije 96/19 z dne 13. marca 1996, ki je spremenila že omenjeno Direktivo 90/388), začeli množiti.