natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Specically, in some cases where the case file contained thousands of documents for which con-dentiality had reasonably been claimed, requests for access resulted in delays in the procedure.
V nekaterih primerih, ko je spis vseboval na tisoče dokumentov, za katere je bila upravičeno vložena zahteva za zaupnost, so zahteve za dostop povzročile zamude v postopku.
In view of the need to verify for each document whether the claimed interest in access for the purposes of the rights of defence prevailed over condentiality, a thorough preparation of access to file is essential to a timely procedure.
Ker je treba pri vsakem dokumentu preveriti, ali izraženi interes za dostop za namene pravice do obrambe prevlada nad zaupnostjo, nemoten potek postopka nujno zahteva skrbno pripravo dostopa do spisa.
It is in the interests of all participants that the procedure moves swily and expeditiously. us, the guiding principles for condentiality should be observed by the providers of information and those requesting access to condential information. In particular:
V interesu vseh udeležencev je, da postopek teče nemoteno in kar najhitreje. Tako bi morali tisti, ki zagotavljajo informacije, in tisti, ki zahtevajo dostop do zaupnih informacij, upoštevati poglavitna načela zaupnosti.
Providers of information should submit requests for condentiality that are su-ciently reasoned and limited to the specic passages for which the danger of serious harm can reasonably be claimed.
Kdor zagotavlja informacije, bi moral vložiti dovolj utemeljene zahtevke za zaupnost in jih omejiti na posebna poglavja, pri katerih upravičeno obstaja nevarnost za hudo škodo.
A non-condential version of the information must be provided, and a concise description of each piece of deleted information should be included.
Pomembno je, da se nezaupne različice informacij in opisi izbrisanih informacij pripravijo tako, da lahko vsaka stranka, ki ima dostop do spisa, ugotovi, ali so izbrisane informacije mogoče pomembne za njeno obrambo in ali ima tako dovolj utemeljen razlog, da Komisijo zaprosi za dostop do zadevnih zahtevanih informacij.
It is important that the non-condential versions and the descriptions of the deleted information be established in a manner that enables any party with access to file to determine whether the information deleted is likely to be relevant for its defence and therefore whether there are sucient grounds to request the Commission to grant access to the information claimed in question.
Stranke, ki zahtevajo dostop do zaupnih informacij, morajo predložiti podrobne, utemeljene zahtevke, iz katerih je jasno razviden njihov interes za posamezne dokumente zaradi pravice do obrambe.
Decisions of the hearing ocers
Odločbe pooblaščencev za zaslišanje
In the course of their activities dealing with individual requests for access to file, the hearing ocers took 13 decisions under Article 8 of their mandate in seven cases in 2005.
V letu 2005 sta pooblaščenca za zaslišanje pri svojih dejavnostih v zvezi s posameznimi prošnjami za dostop do spisa v sedmih zadevah sprejela 13 odločb v skladu s členom 8 svojih pooblastil.
Under Article 8, parties can request access to documents which they believe necessary for the proper exercise of their right to be heard and which have not been disclosed to them for reasons of condentiality. e hearing ocer may decide to refuse, or to grant full or partial access to such documents.
Po členu 8 lahko stranke zahtevajo dostop do dokumentov, ki so po njihovem prepričanju nujni za pravilno uveljavljanje pravice do zaslišanja in do katerih niso imeli dostopa zaradi zaupne narave. Pooblaščenec za zaslišanje lahko zahtevo zavrne ali pa odobri polni ali delni dostop do takšnih dokumentov.
It was not necessary for the hearing ocers to take any Article 9 decisions in 2005.
Pooblaščencema za zaslišanje v letu 2005 ni bilo treba sprejeti nobene odločbe v skladu s členom 9 pooblastil.
Under this article of the mandate, the hearing ocers decide that the Commission may disclose information even if an undertaking objects to such disclosure, if they find that the information is not protected, or if the balance between the interest in disclosing the information and the damage that might result by disclosing it falls on the side of disclosure.
Po tem členu pooblastil pooblaščenca za zaslišanje odločita, da Komisija lahko razkrije informacije, čeprav podjetje temu nasprotuje, če se ugotovi, da informacije niso zaščitene ali če razmerje med interesom za razkritje informacij in škodo, ki bi lahko nastala z njihovim razkritjem, govori v prid razkritju.
In order to avoid a burdensome procedure, the hearing ocers have instituted the practice of sending so-called ‘pre-Article 9 letters’. ese inform undertakings about the hearing ocers’ preliminary position before taking a denitive and legally binding decision pursuant to Article 9.
Pooblaščenca sta se temu zamudnemu postopku izognila z uvedbo prakse pošiljanja tako imenovanih „pisem pred členom 9“. S temi se podjetja seznanijo s predhodnim stališčem pooblaščencev za zaslišanje, preden se sprejme dokončna in pravno zavezujoča odločba v skladu s členom 9.
A number of such letters were sent in 2005.
V letu 2005 so bila poslana številna tovrstna pisma.
In the course of 2005, the hearing ocers acknowledged that, in line with the caselaw, the parties should be entitled, upon request, to access all documents that are objectively related to the alleged infringement, subject to the normal exceptions on grounds of condentiality or the internal nature of the documents concerned.
V letu 2005 sta pooblaščenca za zaslišanje priznala, da bi morale biti stranke v skladu s sodno prakso na zahtevo upravičene do dostopa do vseh dokumentov, ki so objektivno povezani z domnevno strankino kršitvijo, pri čemer bi veljale običajne izjeme na podlagi zaupne ali interne narave zadevnih dokumentov.
However, the relevant Commission departments enjoy a certain margin of discretion in their decision to join investigations that they consider to be suciently related.
Vendar pa zadevne službe Komisije uživajo določeno stopnjo diskrecije pri svojih odločitvah, da združujejo preiskave, ki se jim zdijo zadosti povezane.
Objective reasons may lead the relevant Commission departments to decide that a comprehensive and thorough analysis of the anticompetitive behaviour under investigation requires an exploration into dierent product or geographic markets at the same time, or not.
Zadevne službe Komisije se na podlagi objektivnih razlogov lahko odločijo, ali je treba zaradi celovite in temeljite analize preiskovanega protikonkurenčnega ravnanja obenem raziskati druge zadevne trge proizvodov ali geografske trge ali ne.
Hearing ocer reports and oral hearings e hearing ocers drew up interim and/or final reports in three merger and twelve antitrust cases in 2005, the hearings for some of which had been held in 2004.
Pooblaščenca za zaslišanje sta v letu 2005 sestavila vmesna in/ali končna poročila v treh primerih združitev in dvanajstih primerih na protimonopolnem področju, pri čemer so bila nekatera zaslišanja opravljena leta 2004.
In 2005 a new procedure was put into place to ensure that undertakings wishing to cooperate with the Commission under the leniency notice are not dissuaded from doing so as a result of discovery in civil damage proceedings in non-EU jurisdictions. is implies that the other members of the suspected cartel do not have access to corporate statements in the usual manner (that is, by CD-ROM/DVD or in the form of hard copies).
V letu 2005 je bil uveden nov postopek, s katerim bi zagotovili, da se podjetja, ki želijo sodelovati s Komisijo v skladu z obvestilom o prizanesljivosti, ne odvračajo od tega zaradi razkritja odškodninskih pravdnih postopkov v jurisdikcijah držav nečlanic EU.
Instead, the parties are permitted to take notes of the recording of the leniency applicant’s statements.
To pomeni, da drugi člani domnevnega kartela nimajo dostopa do izjav podjetja na običajen način (to je na CD-ROM-u/DVD ali v tiskani obliki).
I ANTITRUST ARTICLES 81, 82 AND 86 EC
I PROTIMONOPOLNA ZAKONODAJA ČLENI 81, 82 IN 86 ES
A LEGISLATIVE, INTERPRETATIVE AND PROCEDURAL RULES
A ZAKONODAJNA, RAZLAGALNA IN POSTOPKOVNA PRAVILA
Other forms of abuse, such as discriminatory and exploitative conduct, will be the subject of further work by the Commission in 2006. e Competition DG has invited comments on the present discussion paper by 31 March 2006.
Drugim oblikam zlorab, kot je diskriminatorno in izkoriščevalsko vedenje, se bo Komisija še dodatno posvetila v letu 2006. GD za konkurenco je pozval k oddaji pripomb na zadevni dokument za razpravo do 31. marca 2006.
Article 82 EC prohibits the abuse of a dominant position.
Člen 82 ES prepoveduje zlorabo prevladujočega položaja.
Abuses are commonly divided into exclusionary abuses, which exclude competitors from the market, and exploitative abuses, where the dominant company exploits its market power by — for example — charging excessive prices. e discussion paper deals only with exclusionary abuses.
Zlorabe se na splošno delijo na izključevalne zlorabe, ki izključujejo tekmece s trga, in izkoriščevalne zlorabe, kjer prevladujoče podjetje izkorišča svojo tržno moč za, na primer, zaračunavanje pretirano visokih zneskov. Dokument za razpravo obravnava samo izključevalne zlorabe.
Where a dominant company is present on a market, competition on that market is already weak. e object of the competition rules is therefore to prevent conduct by that dominant company which risks weakening competition still further, and harming consumers, whether that harm is likely to occur in the short, medium or long term.
Pravila konkurence so potemtakem usmerjena v to, da se navedenemu prevladujočemu podjetju prepreči ravnanje, ki bo še dodatno oslabilo konkurenco in škodilo potrošnikom, ne glede na to, ali se škoda pričakuje v kratkoročnem, srednjeročnem ali dolgoročnem obdobju. Dokument glede ravnanja, ki temelji na ceni, kot so na primer rabati, obravnava vprašanje, ali naj za neprimerno velja samo ravnanje, ki bi lahko privedlo do izključitve enako učinkovitih konkurentov.
For price-based conduct, such as rebates, the paper considers whether only conduct which would risk excluding equally ecient competitors should be considered as abusive. e paper also considers whether eciencies should be taken into account under Article 82 EC, and, if so, how.
Dokument obravnava še vprašanje, ali je treba v skladu s členom 82 ES upoštevati tudi koristi zaradi učinkovitosti, in kako jih je treba upoštevati.
If they are to be taken into account, the claimed eciencies would have to outweigh the restrictive eect of the conduct in question.
Če bi se učinkovitost upoštevala, bi morala domnevna učinkovitost prevladati nad omejevalnim učinkom zadevnega ravnanja.
Transport block exemption regulations
Uredbe o skupinskih izjemah za promet
Repeal of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 — Liner conference block exemption
Razveljavitev Uredbe Sveta (EGS) št. 4056/86 – Skupinska izjema za linijske konference
3). e Council will decide on this proposal by qualied majority having time transport( consulted the European Parliament.
Uredbe (EGS) št. 4056/86 o pravilih za uporabo členov 85 in 86 ES v zvezi s pomorskim prometom(3).
Aer a three-year review the impact assessment carried out shows that liner conferences do not full the four cumulative conditions of Article 81(3) and that the repeal of the block exemption is likely to lower transport prices whilst maintaining reliable services and enhancing the competitiveness of European industry, in particular that of EU exporters. e proposal envisages a two-year transition period from the time of the adoption of the regulation by the Council for the provisions regarding the liner conference block exemption.
Po triletnem pregledu je presoja vplivov pokazala, da linijske konference ne izpolnjujejo štirih kumulativnih pogojev iz člena 81(3) in da bo razveljavitev skupinske izjeme verjetno znižala cene prevozov in hkrati ohranila zanesljivost storitev ter povečala konkurenčnost evropske dejavnosti, zlasti izvoznikov EU. Predlog za določbe skupinske izjeme za linijske konference predvideva dveletno prehodno obdobje od takrat, ko Svet sprejme uredbo.
To ease the transition to a fully competitive regime, the Commission plans to issue appropriate guidelines on competition in the maritime sector in 2007.
Komisija namerava zaradi lažjega prehoda na popolnoma konkurenčno ureditev v letu 2007 izdati ustrezne smernice za konkurenco v pomorskem sektorju.
Prolongation of and amendments to Commission Regulation (EC) No 823/2000 — Consortia block exemption
Podaljšanje veljavnosti in spremembe Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 823/2000 – Uredba o skupinski izjemi za konzorcije
On the 20th April, the Commission adopted Regulation (EC) No 611/2005 amending the existing block exemption regulation for liner shipping consortia(5).
Komisija je 20. aprila sprejela Uredbo (ES) št. 611/2005 o spremembi obstoječe uredbe o skupinski izjemi za konzorcije linijskih prevozov(5). Z njo je veljavnost Uredbe
It prolongs Commission Regulation (EC) No 823/2000 until the 25th
Komisije (ES) št. 823/2000 podaljšana do 25. aprila 2010, poleg tega pa prinaša dve manjši spremembi.
April 2010 and intro- duces two minor amendments. e amendments allow a consortium member the right to withdraw from a consortium agreement without nancial penalty aer an initial pe-
Spremembi članu konzorcija dajeta pravico, da odstopi od konzorcijskega sporazuma brez nančne kazni po izteku začetnega obdobja do 24 mesecev od podpisa sporazuma, kar je v primerjavi s prejšnjo ureditvijo podaljšanje za šest mesecev.
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of the 16th December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1).OJ L 101, 21.4.2005, p. 10.
24.Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1/2003 z dne 16. decembra 2002 o izvajanju pravil konkurence iz členov 81 in 82 Pogodbe ES (UL L 1, 4.1.2003, str. 1).UL L 101, 21.4.2005, str. 10.
I — Antitrust — Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC riod of up to 24 months, which constitutes an extension of six months as compared with the previous regime.
I – Protimonopolna zakonodaja – členi 81, 82 in 86 ES ki jih ponuja konzorcij.
Finally, one of the basic conditions for exemption, namely the existence of eective price competition within the consortium, has been amended: ‘individual condential contracts’ may now also be taken into consideration to demonstrate the existence of such competition.
Spremenjen je tudi eden od osnovnih pogojev za izjemo, namreč obstoj učinkovite cenovne konkurence znotraj konzorcija: pri dokazovanju obstoja takšne konkurence se zdaj lahko upoštevajo tudi „posamične zaupne pogodbe“.
Due to the close links between the two block exemptions, the Commission considered that it is neither necessary nor appropriate to introduce substantial modications to the consortia block exemption before the end of the review of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86.
Zaradi tesnih povezav med obema skupinskima izjemama je Komisija menila, da ni niti potrebno niti primerno uvajati večjih sprememb v skupinsko izjemo za konzorcije, preden se konča pregledovanje Uredbe Sveta (EGS) št. 4056/86.
On the 15th November, the Commission adopted a preliminary dra block exemption regulation, with a view to replacing Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1617/93. e dra is due to be discussed by the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Abuses of Dominant Positions. e preliminary dra block exemption regulation provides that:
Komisija je 15. novembra sprejela predhodni osnutek uredbe o skupinski izjemi, ki bi nadomestila Uredbo Komisije (EGS) št. 1617/93.
December 2006; this exemption would not be prolonged aer that date;
Osnutek čaka na obravnavo pred Svetovalnim odborom za omejevalna ravnanja in prevladujoče položaje v začetku leta 2006.
• consultations on slot allocation and airport scheduling would benet from a block exemption until the 31th
Predhodni osnutek uredbe o skupinski izjemi določa, da bodo:
December 2006; this exemption would not be prolonged aer that date;
• posvetovanja o potniških tarifah za letalske storitve na poteh v EU lahko izkoriščala skupinsko izjemo do 31. decembra 2006; ta izjema se po tem datumu ne bo podaljšala;
• consultations on taris for passenger air services between the EU and third countries would benet from a block exemption subject to data reporting obligations until the 31th
• posvetovanja o dodeljevanju slotov in časovnih razporedih na letališčih lahko izkoriščala skupinsko izjemo do 31. decembra 2006; ta izjema se po tem datumu ne bo podaljšala;
December 2008.
• posvetovanja o tarifah za letalske storitve za potnike med EU in tretjimi državami lahko izkoriščala skupinsko izjemo do 31. decembra 2008, če bodo izpolnjene obveznosti o sporočanju podatkov.
Motor vehicle distribution block exemption regulation
Uredba o skupinski izjemi za distribucijo motornih vozil
On the 1st October, the final part of the Commission’s reform of the competition rules applicable to motor vehicle distribution came into force: ‘location clauses’ in distribution contracts between carmakers and dealers are now no longer covered by the Commission’s motor vehicle block exemption Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002.
Dne 1. oktobra je začel veljati zadnji del reforme Komisije za pravila konkurence, ki se uporabljajo za distribucijo motornih vozil: Uredba Komisije (ES) št. 1400/2002 o skupinski izjemi za motorna vozila zdaj ne zajema več „klavzul o lokaciji“ v pogodbah o distribuciji med avtomobilski izdelovalci in trgovci.
Location clauses are provisions in car distribution agreements which assign a specic main location to the dealer and prohibit the dealer from operating additional sales or delivery outlets at other locations.
Klavzule o lokaciji so določbe v sporazumih o distribuciji avtomobilov, ki določajo posebno glavno lokacijo za trgovca in mu prepovedujejo dodatna prodajna ali dobavna mesta na drugih lokacijah.
It does not apply to exclusive distribution systems, or agreements which only have minimal effects on the market(7).
Ne uporablja se za sisteme izključne distribucije ali sporazume, ki imajo samo minimalne učinke na trg.(7)
For selective distribution agreements, the new rule means that location clauses prohibiting dealers from opening additional sales or delivery outlets will fall outside the ‘safe harbour’ created by the block exemption regulation.
Za sporazume o selektivni distribuciji novo pravilo pomeni, da bodo klavzule o lokaciji, ki trgovcem prepovedujejo odpiranje dodatnih prodajnih ali dobavnih mest, ostale zunaj „varnega pristana“, ki ga je ustvarila uredba o skupinski izjemi.
e underlying policy objective of the new rule is twofold(
Osnovni politični cilj novega pravila je dvoplasten(
• to reduce territorial restrictions so that consumers can benet from eective competition between dealers, particularly on prices and in areas where they have no real opportunity to choose between dealers of the same brand;
16. • zmanjšati ozemeljske omejitve, tako da bodo imeli potrošniki lahko koristi od učinkovite konkurence med trgovci, zlasti na področju cen in v območjih, kjer ni pravih možnosti za izbiro med trgovci iste znamke, in
• to facilitate the development of innovative forms of distribution such as multi-brand outlets.
• spodbuditi razvoj inovativnih oblik distribucije, kot so prodajna mesta za več blagovnih znamk.
By dealing with location clauses under Article 5 of the regulation, the Commission recognised the greater scope for individual assessment, on a case-by-case basis, of whether a clause meets all conditions required to justify an exception under Article 81(3). e most likely potential positive eects of location clauses in selective distribution systems are that they may prevent free riding on the investments and promotion eorts of established dealers.
Komisija je pri obravnavi klavzul o lokaciji v skladu s členom 5 Uredbe priznala širše področje uporabe za posamezne ocene, za vsak primer posebej, glede na to, ali klavzula ustreza vsem pogojem, ki so potrebni, da se upraviči izjema v skladu s členom 81(3). Najverjetnejši pozitivni učinki klavzul o lokaciji pri sistemih selektivne distribucije ležijo v tem, da lahko preprečijo neupravičeno okoriščanje z naložbami in promocijskimi prizadevanji uveljavljenih trgovcev.
With respect to the first type of location clauses mentioned in the regulation — i.e. clauses prohibiting additional sales outlets — it is dicult to see how restrictions on additional sales outlets could be required by carmakers to avoid free riding. e regulation allows carmakers to require that secondary sales outlets comply with all qualitative standards applicable to dealerships in the area where the outlet is to be opened, and to check this compliance in advance. is will normally avoid the danger of unfair
Kar zadeva prvi tip klavzul o lokaciji, navedenih v Uredbi – tj. klavzul, ki preprečujejo dodatna prodajna mesta – je težko predvideti, kako bi lahko proizvajalci avtomobilov zahtevali omejitve za dodatna prodajna mesta, da bi se tako izognili neupravičenemu okoriščanju. Uredba dovoljuje proizvajalcem avtomobilov, da zahtevajo, da sekundarna prodajna mesta ustrezajo vsem kakovostnim standardom, ki se uporabljajo za trgovino na območju, kjer se bo mesto odprlo, in da to skladnost vnaprej preverijo.
See in this context, for instance, the Porsche case, press release IP/04/585, 3.5.2004.See press release IP/05/1208, 30.9.2005.
V tej zvezi glej npr. zadevo Porsche, obvestilo za javnost IP/04/585, 3.5.2004.Glej sporočilo za javnost IP/05/1208, 30.9.2005.
I — Antitrust — Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC free riding on the investment and promotion eorts of existing dealers.
I – Protimonopolna zakonodaja – členi 81, 82 in 86 ES nese pooblastila, kot je preverjanje skladnosti z merili kakovosti.
With respect to the second type of location clause mentioned in the regulation − i.e. clauses prohibiting dealers from setting up additional delivery outlets − an individual analysis under Article 81 EC might be more likely to lead to a dierent result. ere may be a greater risk that such delivery points are (mis)used to free ride on the investments, marketing eorts and goodwill of the dealer established in the target territory.
Kar zadeva drugi tip klavzule o lokaciji, naveden v Uredbi – tj. klavzule, ki trgovcem prepovedujejo odpiranje dodatnih dobavnih mest – je več možnosti, da bodo posamezne analize v skladu s členom 81 ES dale drugačne rezultate. Obstaja možnost večjega tveganja, da bi se taka dobavna mesta (zlo)rabila za neupravičeno okoriščanje z naložbami, trženjskimi prizadevanji in dobrim imenom trgovca s sedežem na ciljnem ozemlju.
In practice, if delivery points are de facto used to carry out ‘sales’ (as opposed to mere ‘handover services’), a manufacturer might successfully invoke the derogation under Article 81(3), provided that limiting the opening of delivery outlets is the only way to prevent such free-riding risks, which could lead to a destabilisation of its distribution network.
Če se dobavna mesta v praksi dejansko uporabljajo za izvajanje „prodaj“ (v nasprotju z zgolj „storitvami prenosa“), lahko proizvajalec uspešno uveljavi izjemo v skladu s členom 81(3), pod pogojem, da je omejevanje odpiranja dobavnih mest edini način, s katerim je mogoče odpraviti tveganje za špekulacije, ki bi lahko oslabile njegovo distribucijsko omrežje.
On the 13st December, the Commission adopted a notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in antitrust and merger cases(9). e notice provides the framework for the exercise of the right to access to the file in accordance with the provisions referred to expressly in the notice.
Komisija je 13. decembra sprejela obvestilo o pravilih glede dostopa do spisa Komisije v protimonopolnih primerih in primerih združevanj. (9) Obvestilo zagotavlja okvir za uresničevanje pravice dostopa do spisa v skladu z določbami, na katere se izrecno sklicuje sporočilo.