natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
(1 (2 th June 1992 concerning the creation of a sup- plementary protection certicate for medicinal products (OJ L 182, 2.7.1992, p. 1).
Uredba Sveta (EGS) št. 1768/92 z dne 18. junija 1992 o uvedbi dodatnega varstvenega certikata za zdravila (UL L 182, 2.7.1992, str. 1).
I — Antitrust — Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC ity of competition law to situations where such conduct does not violate other laws and where there are no other remedies.
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2005 ski, kjer so kapsule Losec umaknili s trga in jih v teh treh državah nadomestili s tabletami Losec MUPS.
e selective deregistration removed the reference market authorisation on which generic firms and parallel traders arguably needed to rely at the time in order to enter and/or remain on the market.
Zaradi selektivne odjave ni bilo več referenčnega dovoljenja za promet, na katero bi se verjetno morala opirati generična podjetja in vzporedni trgovci, če bi hoteli vstopiti in/ali ostati na trgu.
e Commission found that through its conduct AZ sought to extend, and in part succeeded in extending, de facto the protection aorded well beyond the period provided for in the applicable rules.
Komisija je ugotovila, da je AZ s tem vedenjem skušal, in delno uspel, razširiti de facto zaščito precej čez predpisano obdobje.
is second abuse is also characterised by exclusionary intent in a regulatory context characterised by limited or no discretion on the part of the authorities concerned.
Tudi za to drugo zlorabo je značilen namen izključevanja v regulativnem smislu, ki ga zaznamuje omejena diskrecija zadevnih organov ali njena odsotnost.
Dominant companies have a special responsibility to use specic entitlements, whether private or public, in a reasonable way in respect of market access for other parties.
Prevladujoča podjetja imajo posebno odgovornost za razumno uporabo posebnih upravičenosti, naj bodo javne ali zasebne, glede tržnega dostopa za druge stranke.
e Commission observed in its decision that single acts involving the launch, withdrawal or requests for deregistration would not normally as such constitute an abuse.
Komisija je v svoji odločbi pripomnila, da posamezna dejanja, ki vključujejo začetek, umik ali zahteve za odjavo, kot taka običajno ne bi pomenile zlorabe.
Concerning roaming (i.e. charges for the use of mobile telephones when travelling abroad), on the 10th February the Commission sent statements of objections to the German mobile network operators T-Mobile International AG & Co. KG (T-Mo-bile) and Vodafone D2 GmbH (Vodafone). e objections relate to the rates that both T-Mobile and Vodafone charged foreign mobile network operators for international roaming at the wholesale level (the so-called inter-operator taris — IOTs). e provisional conclusions of the Commission’s investigation into T-Mobile were that T-Mobile abused its dominant position in Germany for the provision of international roaming services at wholesale level on its own network from 1997 until at least the end of 2003, by charging unfair and excessive prices. e Commission has reached the same provi- 39
Kar zadeva sledenje (tj. cene za uporabo mobilnih telefonov v tujini oziroma roaming), je Komisija 10. februarja poslala obvestili o nasprotovanju nemškima operaterjema mobilne telefonije T-Mobile International AG & Co. KG (T-Mobile) in Vodafone D2 GmbH (Vodafone). Nasprotovanje se nanaša na tarife, ki sta jih družbi T-Mobile in Vodafone zaračunali drugim mobilnim operaterjem za mednarodno sledenje v trgovini na debelo (tako imenovane tarife med operaterji – IOT). Začasni sklepi preiskave Komisije glede družbe T-Mobile so bili, da je T-Mobile zlorabljal svoj prevladujoči položaj v Nemčiji za zagotavljanje storitev mednarodnega sledenja v trgovini na debelo v lastnem omrežju od leta 1997 vsaj do konca leta 2003, ker je zaračunaval nepoštene in pretirane cene. Komisija je prišla do enakih začasnih sklepov glede cen, ki jih je Vodafone zaračunaval v obdobju od leta 2000 vsaj do konca leta 2003. Širokopasovne storitve
As regards broadband services, in 2004 the Commission accepted commitments by Deutsche Telekom AG (DT) to terminate behaviour, in the form of a ‘margin squeeze’ as regards shared access to the local loop (line sharing) in Germany, that had provisionally been found to amount to an abuse of a dominant position(41). e resulting settlement was based on the margin squeeze methodology as established in the Deutsche Telekom decision(42).
Kar zadeva širokopasovne storitve, je Komisija v letu 2004 sprejela zaveze Deutsche Telekoma AG (DT), da bo prekinil ravnanje, pri katerem je neupravičeno pritiskal na marže konkurentov (margin squeeze) na področju skupnega dostopa do krajevne zanke (delitev voda) v Nemčiji, za katerega so začasno ugotovili, da že dosega zlorabo prevladujočega položaja(41). Sledila je poravnava, ki je temeljila na metodologiji
Aer consulting the German national regulatory au- thority — the Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) — the settlement was accepted by the Commission and led to a substantial decrease in line-sharing fees.
Komisija je po posvetovanju z nemškim nacionalnim regulativnim organom – Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) – sprejela poravnavo, zaradi česar so se precej zmanjšale tarife za souporabo vodov.
However, in an application to the BNetzA dated 24 May, DT announced its intention to increase line-sharing fees again.
Vendar pa je DT dne 24. maja poslal vlogo BNetzA, v kateri je naznanil svoj namen, da bo spet povečal pristojbine za souporabo vodov.
Aer verifying that this would have led to a reoccurrence of the margin squeeze which took place prior to the settlement, the Commission’s departments intervened and requested DT to comply with its commitments.
Službe Komisije so najprej potrdile, da bi to spet povzročilo pritisk na marže, kakršen je obstajal že pred poravnavo, nato pa posredovale in zahtevale od DT, da izpolni svoje zaveze.
In order to prevent the Commission from starting formal proceedings, DT led a new application with the BNetzA in which it applied for the same taris as in 2004.
Ker se je DT želel izogniti uvedbi uradnega postopka Komisije, je pri BNetzA vložil novo prošnjo, v kateri je zaprosil za enake tarife kot v letu 2004.
BNetzA — with which the Commission’s departments cooperated closely in this case — nally approved wholesale taris which were lower than those applied for and lower than necessary for DT to comply with its commitments(43). e Commission expects the improved conditions for the provision of broadband services via line sharing to inuence competition positively and increase broadband penetration in Germany, which will ultimately increase consumer choice and decrease consumer prices.
BNetzA – s katerim so službe Komisije v tem primeru tesno sodelovale – je končno odobril veleprodajne tarife, ki so bile nižje od navedenih v vlogi in nižje od ravni, ki jo je moral DT izpolnjevati, da bi ravnal v skladu s svojimi zavezami(43). Komisija pričakuje, da bodo izboljšani pogoji za zagotavljanje širokopasovnih storitev s souporabo vodov pozitivno vplivali na konkurenco in povečali uporabo širokopasovnih storitev v Nemčiji, zaradi česar bodo uporabniki na koncu imeli več izbire in plačevali manj.
See press release IP/03/717, 21.5.2003.The decision is under appeal before the CFI as CaseT-271/03 (OJ C 264, 1.11.2003, p.
Glej Sporočilo za javnost IP/03/717, 21.5.2003. Na odločbo je vložena pritožba pred Sodiščem prve stopnje in se vodi kot zadeva T-271/03 (UL C 264, 1.11.2003, str.
29).See press release IP/05/1033, 3.8.2005.
29).Glej Sporočilo za javnost IP/05/1033, 3.8.2005.
One reason for the further decrease of the wholesale line sharing fees is that BNetzA based its ex ante margin squeeze test on the costs of DT (which were the basis for the Deutsche Telekom decision) and on the (most probably higher) costs of an ecient operator.
Eden od razlogov za nadaljnje upadanje veleprodajnih tarif za delitev vodov je, da je BNetzA utemeljila svoj ex ante preskus o razkoraku na stroških, ki jih je imel DT (in so bili podlaga za odločbo o Deutsche Telekomu), in na (najverjetneje višjih) stroških dejanskega operaterja.
Thereby, both possibilities which are set out in the notice on the application of the competition rules on access agreements in the telecommunications sector (OJ C 265, 22.8.1998, p.
Zato sta bili pri oblikovanju preskusa o razkoraku upoštevani obe možnosti iz Obvestila o uporabi pravil konkurence pri sporazumih o dostopu v telekomunikacijskem sektorju (UL C 265, 22.8.1998, str. 2).
I — Antitrust — Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2005 verigi športnih vsebin za mobilne platforme.
It involved a comprehensive review of the behaviour of all actors involved in the acquisition, resale and exploitation of mobile rights to sports events.
Ugotovitve preiskave sektorja in nadaljnji ukrepi so opisani v poročilu, ki strnjeno predstavlja sklepe preiskave sektorja(44).
81. e results of the sector inquiry gave the Commission a clear view of current market developments and the prevailing marketing and exploitation patterns along the entire value chain of sports content for mobile platforms. e findings of the sector inquiry and follow-up actions have been described in a report summarising the conclusions of the sector inquiry(44).
To poročilo opozarja na vrsto potencialno protikonkurenčnih poslovnih ravnanj, ki so jih odkrili med preiskavo sektorja in lahko omejijo razpoložljivost inovativnih mobilnih športnih storitev za potrošnike.
82. is report highlights a number of potentially anticompetitive business practices, which were found during the sector inquiry, which may limit the availability of innovative mobile sport services to consumers. e report focuses on four main areas of competition concerns revealed by the inquiry.
Poročilo se posveča štirim poglavitnim področjem težav glede konkurence, na katera je opozorila preiskava:
Embargoes: situations where overly restrictive conditions (serious time embargoes or unnecessary limitations of clip length) are imposed upon mobile rights that limit the practical availability of 3G content.
Prepovedi: položaji, ko se za mobilne pravice uvedejo preveč omejevalni pogoji (resne časovne prepovedi ali omejevanje dolžine odlomkov), ki omejujejo dejansko razpoložljivost vsebin 3G.
It also announced that the Competition DG will, together with the national competition authorities concerned, review potentially harmful case situations with a national dimension which were identied during the sector inquiry.
Poročilo je tudi oznanilo, da bo GD za konkurenco skupaj z zadevnimi nacionalnimi organi za konkurenco pregledal potencialno škodljive položaje v primerih z nacionalno dimenzijo, ki so jih odkrili med preiskavo sektorja.
Consultation procedure under Article 7 of the framework directive (2002/21/EC)
Posvetovalni postopek v skladu s členom 7 Okvirne direktive (2002/21/ES)
Under the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services(45), national regulatory authorities (NRAs) are obliged to dene relevant electronic communication markets appropriate to national circumstances in accordance with the principles of EU competition law.
Nacionalni regulativni organi morajo v skladu z ureditvenim okvirom za omrežja in storitve elektronskih komunikacij(45) opredeliti upoštevne trge elektronskih komunikacij, ki v skladu z načeli konkurenčnega prava EU ustrezajo položaju v določeni državi.
Following the market analysis procedure, NRAs must make accessible to the Commission all dra regulatory measures concerning the denition of the relevant markets, the finding or non-nding of signicant market power (SMP) and the regulatory remedies proposed, if any. e Commission may either issue comments, which NRAs must take utmost account of, or request the NRA to withdraw the dra measure if the market denition and/or the determination of SMP is incompatible with Community law.
Po postopku analize trga morajo nacionalni regulativni organi dati na voljo Komisiji vse osnutke ureditvenih ukrepov v zvezi z opredelitvijo upoštevnih trgov, ugotovitve ali neugotovitve večje tržne moči in predlagane ureditvene korektivne ukrepe, če obstajajo. Komisija lahko bodisi izda komentarje, ki jih morajo nacionalni regulativni organi popolnoma upoštevati, bodisi zahteva od nacionalnega regulativnega organa, da umakne osnutek ukrepa, če opredelitev trga in/ali ugotovitev večje tržne moči nista skladna z zakonodajo Skupnosti.
In 2005, the Commission received 201 notications from NRAs (a net increase compared with 89 notications in 2004).
Komisija je v letu 2005 prejela 201 priglasitev nacionalnih regulativnih organov (neto povečanje v primerjavi z 89 priglasitvami v letu 2004).
In 2005, the Commission adopted one decision requesting the withdrawal of notied measures(46).
Komisija je v letu 2005 sprejela eno odločbo, s katero je zahtevala umik priglašenih ukrepov.(46) V navedeni zadevi – kjer je šlo za veleprodajno fiksno priključevanje klicev v Nemčiji – je nacionalni regulativni organ predlagal, da bi kot operaterja imenovali Deutsche Telekom, saj je imel pomembno moč na trgu za zagotavljanje veleprodajnih storitev priključevanja na svojem omrežju.
In that case — which concerned wholesale fixed call termination in Germany — the NRA had proposed to designate Deutsche Telekom as an operator having SMP in the market for the provision of wholesale termination services on its own network. e NRA concluded that the 53 alternative fixed network operators in Germany did not have SMP, despite their monopoly positions for the provision of wholesale termination services on their respective networks, in light of Deutsche Telekom’s countervailing buyer power. e Commission considered, however, that the NRA had not provided sucient evidence to support the countervailing buyer power argument.
Nacionalni regulativni organ je sklenil, da 53 alternativnih operaterjev fiksnega omrežja v Nemčiji kljub monopolnemu položaju za opravljanje veleprodajnih storitev priključevanja na svojih omrežjih nima pomembne tržne moči, ker je upošteval izravnalno kupno moč podjetja Deutsche Telekom. Vendar pa je Komisija menila, da nacionalni regulativni organ ni predložil dovolj dokazov, ki bi podprli utemeljitev izravnalne kupne moči.
In two of these cases the NRA withdrew the notication prior to the Commission adopting a decision, on the basis of preliminary concerns expressed by the Commission’s depart-ments(47). In the third case — which concerned the market for wholesale mobile access and call origination in Ireland — the Commission did not object to the NRA’s finding of collective dominance.
V dveh od teh primerov je nacionalni regulativni organ umaknil priglasitev na podlagi predhodnih pomislekov, ki so jih izrazile službe Komisije, preden je Komisija sprejela odločbo.(47) V tretjem primeru, ki je zadeval trg na debelo za mobilni dostop in izviranje klicev na Irskem, Komisija ni ugovarjala ugotovitvi nacionalnega regulativnega organa o kolektivni prevladi.
Finally, the Commission accepted the French NRA’s proposal to include in the relevant market for fixed voice calls so-called ‘voice over Internet protocol’ (VoIP) services, which enable customers to make and receive calls in the same manner as traditional telephony services(48). e French NRA made a distinction between pure inter-
Komisija je tudi sprejela predlog francoskega regulativnega organa, da bi na upoštevni trg za fiksne glasovne klice vključili tako imenovane storitve „govor po internetnem protokolu“ (VoIP), ki omogočajo strankam, da opravljajo in prejemajo klice na enak način kot pri tradicionalnih telefonskih storitvah(48).
33).Commission Decision C(2005)1442 in Case DE/2005/0144 available at: http://circa.europa.eu/ Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home Case UK/2004/0111 (in respect of managed transmission services) and Case FR/2005/0179; notices about withdrawals available at: http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home Commission decision in Cases FR/2005/221 to FR/2005/0226, SG-Gree (2005) D/205048.
Odločba Komisije C(2005) 1442 v zadevi DE/2005/0144, na voljo na: http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home Zadeva UK/2004/0111 (glede upravljanih storitev prenosa) in zadeva FR/2005/0179; obvestila o preklicu na voljo na: http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home Odločba Komisije v zadevah FR/2005/221 do FR/2005/0226, SG-Gree (2005) D/205048.
Infringement proceedings under Article 226 EC concerning the competition directive (2002/77/EC)
EU za elektronske komunikacije, to je tako imenovano Direktivo o konkurenci(49).
90. e Commission continued its infringement proceedings against those Member States which were late in adopting the necessary measures under national law to comply with the requirements of the competition directive.
Komisija je nadaljevala postopek ugotavljanja kršitev proti državam članicam, ki so zamujale pri sprejemanju potrebnih ukrepov po nacionalni zakonodaji za doseganje skladnosti z zahtevami Direktive o konkurenci.
In the course of 2005, the Commission closed the proceedings pending against Belgium, Estonia and the Czech Republic aer these Member States informed the Commission of the adoption of national measures.
Komisija je v letu 2005 dokončala postopek, ki je tekel proti Belgiji, Estoniji in Češki, potem ko so jo te države članice obvestile, da so sprejele dodatne ukrepe.
On the other hand, by the judgment of the 14th April the Court of Justice found that Greece had not yet adopted the necessary measures to comply with the competition directive(50
Po drugi strani je Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti v sodbi z dne 14. aprila ugotovilo, da Grčija še ni sprejela potrebnih ukrepov za skladnost z Direktivo o konkurenci(50).
June the Court of Justice concluded that Luxembourg had failed to adopt the measures necessary to comply with this directive(51
16. junija sklenilo, da Luksemburg ni sprejel potrebnih ukrepov za skladnost s to direktivo.(51) Vendar pa je Luksemburg 23. junija Komisiji priglasil ukrepe, ki bodo uskladili nacionalno zakonodajo z Direktivo o konkurenci.
( electronic communications networks and services (OJ L 249, 17.9.2002, p. 21).
Direktiva Komisije 2002/77/ES z dne 16. septembra 2002 o konkurenci na trgih za elektronska komunikacijska omrežja in storitve (UL L 249, 17.9.2002, str. 21).
50) 51) tory framework for electronic communications.Case C-299/04 Commission v Greece, judgment of the 14th April 2005.Case C-349/04 Commission v Luxembourg, judgment of the 16th June 2005.
GD za informacijsko družbo je odgovoren za skladnost držav članic s preostalimi direktivami v ureditvenem okviru za elektronske komunikacije.Zadeva C-299/04, Komisija Evropskih skupnosti proti Helenski republiki, sodba z dne 14. aprila 2005.Zadeva C-349/04, Komisija Evropskih skupnosti proti Velikemu vojvodstvu Luksemburg, sodba z dne 16. junija 2005.Postopek 2004/2197 – Liberalizacija – Švedska – Kršitev Direktive 2002/77/ES.
By limiting the rights of cable-TV operators to provide broadcasting transmission services in a territory which may not include more than one third of the population, the Hungarian Media Act restricts the right to establish or provide electronic communications networks or services and prevents further consolidation of the cable-TV market.
I – Protimonopolna zakonodaja – členi 81, 82 in 86 ES populacije, madžarski zakon o medijih omejuje pravico do vzpostavljanja ali zagotavljanja omrežij ali storitev elektronskih komunikacij in preprečuje nadaljnje združevanje trga kabelske televizije.
EU competition policy in the postal sector is applied in a context of yet incomplete liberalisation of postal markets. e postal directive(53) allows that, to the extent necessary to ensure the operation of the universal service under financially balanced conditions, Member States may reserve certain postal services to the universal postal service operators, which still account for a vast portion of the market.
Politika konkurence EU v poštnem sektorju se uporablja v položaju še nedokončane liberalizacije poštnih trgov. Poštna direktiva(53) dovoljuje, da lahko države članice, v kolikor je to potrebno za zagotavljanje univerzalnih storitev v finančno uravnoteženih razmerah, rezervirajo določene poštne storitve za splošne operaterje poštnih storitev, kar še vedno pomeni ogromen del trga.
By the 31th December 2006 at the latest, the postal directive requires the Commission to table proposals introducing, if appropriate, the full liberalisation of the EU postal market by 2009.
Poštna direktiva zahteva od Komisije, da najpozneje do 31. decembra 2006 vloži predloge, ki uvajajo, če je primerno, popolno liberalizacijo poštnega trga EU do leta 2009.
Certain Member States have abolished their monopolies or announced plans to do so in advance of that date.
Nekatere države članice so odpravile monopole ali naznanile načrte, da bodo to storile pred iztekom navedenega datuma.
Against that background, in 2005, the Commission examined the dra laws on postal services in a number of Member States. e Commission took the view that the dra postal law of the Czech Republic contained provisions which would have extended
Glede na vse to je Komisija v letu 2005 preučila osnutke zakonodaje o poštnih storitvah v vrsti držav članic. Komisija je menila, da osnutek poštnega zakona Češke vsebuje določbe, ki bi razširile monopol prvotnega operaterja onkraj področja uporabe Poštne direktive in bi tako spet monopolizirale trg, ki je bil v tej državi članici že odprt za konkurenco.
June 2002 amending Directive 97/67/EC with regard to the further opening to competition of Community postal services (OJ L 176, 5.7.2002, p. 21).
25); Direktiva 2002/39/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 10. junija 2002 o spremembi Direktive 97/67/ES glede nadaljnjega odpiranja trgov poštnih storitev v Skupnosti konkurenci (UL L 176, 5.7.2002, str.
) de- cision — the first commitment decision pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. e decision declared the commitments of the German football league concerning the joint and exclusive selling of media rights for football matches legally binding and ended the proceedings.
Komisija je 19. januarja sprejela odločbo o nemški Bundesligi(55) – prva odločba o zavezah v skladu s členom 9 Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003. Ta odločba je razglasila zaveze nemške nogometne lige o skupni in ekskluzivni prodaji medijskih pravic za nogometne tekme za pravno obvezujoče in končala postopek.
With the Bundesliga decision, the Commission conrmed its antitrust policy in the media field with regard to the sale and acquisition of valuable audiovisual sports rights.
Komisija je z odločbo o Bundesligi potrdila svojo protimonopolno politiko na medijskem področju, kar zadeva prodajo in pridobivanje dragocenih avdiovizualnih športnih pravic.
Because of the structure of the media sector, where a limited number of operators are trading a small amount of valuable exclusive audiovisual sports rights, competition concerns easily arise in this sector.
V medijskem sektorju se zaradi njegove strukture, kjer omejeno število operaterjev trguje z maloštevilnimi dragocenimi ekskluzivnimi avdiovizualnimi športnimi pravicami, hitro pojavijo konkurenčni pomisleki.
On the supply side, there are oen only a few providers of premium sports rights. e concentration on the supply side is increased by joint selling, i.e. the pooling of club rights and marketing by a single entity(56). ere is also
Na strani dobave je pogosto le nekaj tistih, ki zagotavljajo športne pravice za najpomembnejše športe. Koncentracija na strani prodaje se še povečuje s skupno prodajo, pri kateri se pravice klubov združujejo in je za prodajo zadolžen samo en subjekt(56).
2, paragraph 5.4).COMP/37.214 — Joint selling of the media rights to the German Bundesliga.
COMP/37.214 – Skupna prodaja medijskih pravic nemški Bundesligi.
Full text published on the Competition DG’s website: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37214/ en.pdf See the Commission’s UEFA Champions League decision (OJ L 291, 8.11.2003, p.
Celotno besedilo je objavljeno na spletni strani GD za konkurenco: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/ decisions/37214/en.pdf Glej odločbo Komisije glede Lige prvakov UEFA (UL L 291, 8.11.2003, str.