natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Against this background, if the Court of Justice were to decide (as the Greek Government, for example, argues) that the protection afforded to the pregnant woman by Directive 92/85 begins at the time of the fertilisation of the ovum and not at the time of implantation, the Article 10 prohibition on dismissal would go on for an indeterminate and excessive length of time, which would be contrary to the objective of the provision, which is to protect the woman who is already pregnant because of the vulnerability of her situation rather than to protect the woman who wishes to become pregnant, by whatever means, in the future.
Če bi na taki podlagi Sodi�če razsodilo (kot to na primer predlaga gr�ka vlada), da se varstvo noseče ženske, ki ga zagotavlja Direktiva 92/85, začne z oploditvijo jajčeca, in ne z ugnezdenjem, bi se prepoved odpusta iz člena 10 raztezala na nedoločeno in predolgo obdobje, kar bi bilo v nasprotju s ciljem predpisa – za�čititi že nosečo žensko ob upo�tevanju ranljivosti njenega položaja, in ne ženske, ki si tako ali drugače prizadeva zanositi v prihodnosti.
There is a further argument which makes me tend towards withholding the benefits of the measures contained in Directive 92/85 from a worker who, like Ms Mayr, at the time she was dismissed, had undergone an ova extraction procedure but had not yet had the embryos resulting from the in vitro fertilisation transferred to her uterus, meaning that the successful outcome of the procedure and implantation had not yet been confirmed.
Obstaja �e en argument, zaradi katerega moram zavrniti upravičenost do ukrepov iz Direktive 92/85 delavki, pri kateri je bila kot pri S. Mayr v času odpusta opravljena punkcija za odvzem jajčec, vendar zarodki iz oploditve in vitro �e niso bili preneseni v njeno maternico, tako da �e nista bila ugotovljena niti uspeh postopka niti ugnezdenje.
Several days usually elapse between the two events; furthermore, the ova fertilised in the laboratory are not always transferred immediately to the reproductive organs of the woman as they can be frozen for a period for possible future use.
Med tema fazama navadno preteče več dni; poleg tega jajčne celice, oplojene v laboratoriju, niso vedno nemudoma prenesene v rodila ženske, saj jih je mogoče za morebitno uporabo za določen čas zamrzniti.
22 — Article 14 of Law No 40 of 19 February 2004, as indicated by the Italian Government in paragraph 19 of its observations.
22 – Člen 14 zakona �t. 40 z dne 19. februarja 2004 glede na navedbe italijanske vlade v točki 19 njenih stali�č.
This is a prohibition of a general nature to which exceptions are only permitted in cases of force majeure.
Gre za splo�no prepoved, ki priznava izjemo samo v primeru vi�je sile.
23 — B.O.E., 27 May 2006.
23 – B.O.E. z dne 27. maja 2006.
24 — A similar line is taken by the French legislation, with Article L. 2141-4 of the public health code (introduced by the Law of 6 August 2004), stating that in order to store embryos the couple involved (or the survivor in the event of the death of one of them) must make an annual declaration to the effect that they maintain their ‘plan to become parents’, such that, if they do not make such a declaration the ova are destroyed after five years.
24 – V tej smeri gre francoski zakonodajalec, kajti člen L. 2141-4 Zakonika o javnem zdravju (uveden z zakonom z dne 6. avgusta 2004) obvezuje člana zadevnega para (ali preživelega v primeru smrti), da vsako leto izkažeta, da imata „star�evski načrt“; če tega ne storita, se jajčne celice po petih letih uničijo.
In this regard, the Member States have a wide variety of different legislative provisions, ranging from the prohibition on storing fertilised ova contained in the
Države članice imajo �irok spekter določb, ki segajo od prepovedi hranjenja
Although this possibility seems to be prohibited by law in nearly every Member State, technically it is feasible to implant the fertilised ova of one woman in the uterus of another (and this is what happens in the case of so-called surrogate mothers) so that, ultimately, a worker who is not and will not be pregnant could invoke the protection of the directive.
Čeprav se pravno ta možnost zdi izključena v skorajda vseh državah članicah, je oplojene jajčne celice ene ženske tehnično mogoče prenesti v maternico druge (kar se zgodi pri „nadomestnih materah“), tako da bi se lahko nazadnje delavka, ki ni in ne bo noseča, sklicevala na varstvo Direktive.
The argument (raised by the Italian Government) that the chances of success of a transfer of ova fertilised in vitro are low seems to me to be less convincing because it can always be countered that ‘normal’ pregnancies sometimes also end in miscarriage and this would also extinguish the protection.
Manj prepričljiv se zdi argument (ki ga navaja italijanska vlada) o manj�i verjetnosti uspeha prenosa jajčec, oplojenih in vitro, ker bi bilo treba vedno ugovarjati, da se tudi „naravna“ nosečnost včasih konča s spontanim splavom, zaradi česar bi se varstvo prav tako končalo.
The foregoing proposal, limited as it is in terms of subjectmatter to the question put by the Austrian court, does not rule out, however, a more in-depth analysis of the case in the main proceedings to ascertain whether the dismissal of an employee in this way constitutes discrimination contrary to the principle of equal treatment of men and women.
Ta, prvi predlog, ki je stvarno omejen na predlog avstrijskega sodi�ča, ni ovira za bolj poglobljeno analizo glavne zadeve, da se preveri, ali odpust delavke v opisanem položaju pomeni diskriminacijo v nasprotju z načelom enakega obravnavanja mo�kih in žensk.
For these reasons, I suggest that the Court replies to the question referred to it by the Oberster Gerichtshof by stating that an employee who undergoes an in vitro fertilisation procedure is not a ‘pregnant worker’ for the purposes of the first part of Article 2(a) of Directive 92/85/EEC, if, at the time when she was given notice of termination of employment, her ova had been fertilised in a labora-
Zaradi zgoraj navedenih razlogov Sodi�ču predlagam, naj na vpra�anje za predhodno odločanje, ki ga je predložilo Oberster Gerichtshof odgovori, da delavka, pri kateri je bila opravljena oploditev in vitro, ni „noseča delavka“ v smislu prvega dela člena 2(a) Direktive 92/85, če so bile v času, ko je bila odpu�čena, njene jajčne celice že oplojene v laboratoriju, vendar pa �e niso bile prenesene vanjo.
of this provision of Directive 76/207, even if pregnancy does not give rise to inequality based on sex, it only affects women and consequently employment-related decisions which are potentially detrimental to women and which are motivated by the pregnancy constitute discrimination prohibited under Directive 76/207.
v skladu s katero nosečnost, če ne povzroči neenakosti na podlagi spola, zadeva samo žensko, tako da odločitve, sprejete na področju dela, ki bi ji lahko �kodovale in razlog katerih je morebitna nosečnost, pomenijo diskriminacijo, ki je prepovedana z Direktivo 76/207.
Under the principle of equal treatment enshrined in Directive 76/207, merely belonging to the female sex does not justify the application of special and more favourable rules than those which would, in the same circumstances, apply to men.
Na podlagi načela enakega obravnavanja iz Direktive 76/207 sama pripadnost ženskemu spolu ne more upravičiti posebnega režima, ugodnej�ega od režima, ki v enakih okoli�činah velja za mo�ke.
By contrast with Directive 92/85, which is a subsequent directive and is designed to encourage better security and health at work for pregnant workers, workers who have recently given birth or who are breastfeeding, Directive 76/207 had the broader objective of seeking equality of men and women in the workplace.
Glede na poznej�o Direktivo 92/85, ki je namenjena spodbujanju izbolj�anja varnosti in zdravja nosečih delavk in delavk, ki so pred kratkim rodile ali dojijo, je imela Direktiva 76/207 �ir�i cilj, ki si je prizadeval za enakost mo�kih in žensk na področju dela.
With this premiss, Article 10 of Directive 92/85 contains a prohibition of dismissal ‘during the period from the beginning of their pregnancy to the end of the maternity leave’, whilst Directive 76/207 does not directly address the situation of dismissal by reason of pregnancy, but limits itself to confirming the principle of equal treatment (Article 5(1)), which ‘shall mean that there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in particular to marital or family status’ (Article 2(1)). 25
Na podlagi te premise je v člen 10 Direktive 92/85 vključena prepoved odpusta „med obdobjem od začetka njihove nosečnosti do konca porodni�kega dopusta“, medtem ko Direktiva 76/207 ne predvideva neposredno možnosti odpusta zaradi nosečnosti, temveč se omejuje na zagotavljanje enakega obravnavanja (člen 5(1)), kar „pomeni, da ne sme biti nobene diskriminacije na podlagi spola, bodisi posredne ali neposredne, �e zlasti ne glede na zakonski ali družinski status“ (člen 2(1)). 25
According to the body of caselaw which has been built up involving the interpretation
Razlaga te določbe Direktive 76/207 je privedla do ustaljene sodne prakse Skupnosti,
729, maintains that Article 10 of Directive 92/85 does not merely make discriminatory dismissals illegal but prohibits any dismissal during pregnancy and maternity.
729, trdi, da člen 10 Direktive 92/85 ni omejen samo na prepoved diskriminatornih odpustov, ampak prepoveduje vsakr�en odpust med nosečnostjo in porodni�kim dopustom.
However, even given its general and unconditional nature, the Article 10 prohibition still maintains a certain connection with the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex in that it tolerates dismissal ‘in exceptional cases not connected with their condition’.
Vendar pa ta prepoved iz člena 10, čeprav je splo�na in brezpogojna, ohranja določeno povezavo s prepovedjo diskriminacije na podlagi spola, ker dopu�ča odpust nosečih žensk „v izjemnih primerih, ki niso povezani z njihovim stanjem“.
However, the principle of equality prohibits applying different rules to similar situations only where there is no objective reason to do so.
Vendar to načelo enakosti izključuje različna pravila za podobne položaje samo, če za te ni objektivnega vzroka.
The legislation contains important exceptions, as demonstrated by Article 2 of Directive 76/207, which permits the Member States to exclude from its field of application activities for which, by reason of their nature or the manner in which they are carried out, the sex of the worker constitutes a determining factor (Article 2(2)), provided that its application is without prejudice to ‘provisions concerning the protection of women, particularly as regards pregnancy and maternity’ (Article 2(3)), or to ‘measures to encourage equal opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing existing
To je pravilo, pri katerem obstajajo pomembne izjeme, kot izhaja iz člena 2 Direktive 76/207, v katerem je državam članicam dovoljeno, da s področja njene uporabe izključijo dejavnosti, pri katerih je spol odločilni dejavnik zaradi same narave dela ali pa zaradi okolja, v katerem se to delo opravlja (odstavek 2), če njena uporaba ne vpliva „na določbe, ki se nana�ajo na varstvo žensk, �e zlasti kar zadeva noseč-
MAYR inequalities which affect women’s opportunities’ in the area of employment. 26
MAYR ki ga upravičuje objektivna potreba, 30 kot je na primer prepoved odpusta delavke med nosečnostjo.
Accordingly, it was held in Stoeckel, 27following the approach put forward by the Advocate General, 28that a prohibition on
Tako je bilo v sodbi z dne 25. julija 1991 v zadevi Stoeckel 27 na podlagi mnenja generalnega pravobranilca 28odločeno, da
In Habermann-Beltermann, 31 the termination of a contract of employment due to pregnancy because of the employee’s temporary inability to perform her duties was not upheld.
V sodbi z dne 5. maja 1994 v zadevi Habermann-Beltermann 31ni bila dovo- je prepoved nočnega dela, ki velja izključno za ženske, v nasprotju z Direktivo 76/207, ker ni bilo dokazano, da ta urnik povzroča različne učinke ali nev�ečnosti glede na spol delavca.
In Webb 32the Court classified as discriminatory the dismissal of a pregnant worker who had been recruited for an unlimited term with a view, initially, to replacing another employee during the latter’s maternity leave.
V sodbi z dne 14. julija 1994 v zadevi Webb 32je bil odpust noseče delavke, zaposlene za nedoločen čas z namenom, da bi prvotno nadome�čala drugo delavko na porodni�kem dopustu, označen za diskriminatornega.
The Court went on to present the factors which would justify an inequality of treatment in favour of the female workforce in these circumstances and pointed out that the disadvantages of night work, except in the case of pregnancy or maternity, do not expose women to any greater risk than men. 29
Vendar pa to stanje ne upravičuje kakr�nega koli kr�enja načela enakosti, temveč samo tak�no,
105, believes that this is an attempt to extend the scope of the principle of equal treatment of the sexes.
105, meni, da je treba omiliti obseg načela enakega obravnavanja spolov.
The caselaw on dismissals due to repeated periods of absence attributable to birth or pregnancy, but taken after maternity leave has expired, has had a less smooth trajectory.
Večja oklevanja so se v sodni praksi pojavila pri odločitvah o odpustih na podlagi ponavljajočih se prekinitev dela zaradi bolezni, povezanih s porodom ali nosečnostjo, ki so nastopile po izteku porodni�kega dopusta.
28 — Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 24 January 1991.
28 – Sklepni predlogi generalnega pravobranilca Tesaura z dne 24. januarja 1991.
30 — Article 7 of Directive 92/85 makes the exemption of women from night work subject to the submission of a medical certificate stating that this is necessary for the safety or health of the worker concerned.
30 – Tako je v členu 7 Direktive 92/85 oprostitev nočnega dela ženske pogojena s predložitvijo zdravstvenega spričevala, ki navaja, da je to potrebno za varnost ali zdravje delavke.
29 — In this way the Court is attempting to avoid measures which give the appearance of being protective but which mask sexist ideas which are detrimental to women and hinder their access to the labour market and the performance of their everyday activities.
29 – Tako naj bi preprečili navidez za�čitni�ke ukrepe, ki bi skrivali seksistične predstave v �kodo ženske in otežili njen dostop do trga dela ter običajni potek njene dejavnosti.
In this regard the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional Court) has held in judgment 229/1992 that the prohibition on women working in the mining sector is unconstitutional because it corresponds more to a stereotype (i.e. the supposed weakness of the female sex) than to real natural or biological characteristics and introduces an element of discrimination against women.
Španski Tribunal Constitucional je v svoji sodbi 229/1992 odločilo, da je prepoved dela žensk v rudarskem sektorju neustavna, ker bolj ustreza stereotipu (domnevna �ibkost ženskega spola) kot dejanskim naravnim ali biolo�kim posebnostim, kar uvaja diskriminatorni element za žensko.
that the dismissal of a female worker on account of pregnancy constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex within the meaning of Directive 76/207, 34adding that outside the period of the pregnancy and maternity leave a woman can be dismissed, as can a man, on account of absence due to illness even though this may be attributable to the birth or pregnancy.
delavke zaradi nosečnosti pomeni neposredno diskriminacijo na podlagi spola v smislu Direktive 76/207, 34in nato dodano, da je zunaj obdobja nosečnosti in porodni�kega dopusta žensko mogoče odpustiti pod enakimi pogoji kot mo�kega zaradi odsotnosti zaradi bolezni, četudi je slednja posledica poroda ali nosečnosti.
This interpretation was, however, to be abandoned barely a year later in Brown when the Court, following my Opinion, which endorsed the line taken in the Opinion in Larsson, did not take into account, for computation of the period justifying dismissal under UK law, time taken off sick owing to an illness resulting from pregnancy or childbirth which arose during pregnancy and persisted during and after maternity leave.
Vendar pa je bila ta razlaga opu�čena samo leto pozneje, ker v zgoraj navedeni sodbi Brown, v kateri so bili potrjeni moji sklepni predlogi, ki so povzemali bistvo sklepnih predlogov v zadevi Larsson, za izračun obdobja, ki naj bi upravičilo odpust v skladu z britanskim pravom, niso bili upo�tevani dnevi dopusta zaradi bolezni, izhajajoče iz nosečnosti ali poroda, ki je nastopila med nosečnostjo ter je trajala med porodni�kim dopustom in po njem.
It also accepted that, when calculating the period providing grounds for dismissal under
Larsson, sem Sodi�ču predlagal, 35naj potrdi sodno
Høj Pedersen and Others 37confirmed this interpretation by ruling that Danish legislation which allowed an employer to require a pregnant woman to stop working without paying her salary in full on the basis that he cannot find work for her is contrary to Community law.
V sodbi z dne 29. maja 1997 v zadevi Larsson 36 moji sklepni predlogi v zvezi s tem niso bili upo�tevani, ker je Sodi�če ocenilo, da Direktiva 76/207 ne nasprotuje odpustom na podlagi odsotnosti zaradi bolezni, ki izvira iz nosečnosti ali poroda, ne glede na to, da traja �e po poro- doktrina potrjena z odločitvijo, da je danska določba, ki je delodajalcu dovoljevala, da odpusti nosečo žensko, ne da bi ji izplačal celotno plačo, če meni, da je ne more zaposliti, v nasprotju s pravom Skupnosti.
Tele Danmark introduced a refinement, consistent with my Opinion delivered on 10 May 2001, in the case of the termination of fixed-term contracts, by stating that Directive 76/207 precludes the
V sodbi Tele Danmark je bila uvedena manj�a razlika v zvezi z odpovedjo pogodb za določen čas v smislu mojih sklepnih predlogov z dne
34 — As it did in Dekker, a judgment handed down on the same date, in the case of a refusal to appoint a pregnant woman (Case C-177/88 Dekker [1990] ECR I-3941).
34 – Prav tako je bilo v sodbi z istega dne v zadevi Dekker (C-177/88, Recueil, str. I-3941) odločeno glede zavrnitve zaposlitve noseče ženske.
35 — Opinion delivered on 18 February 1997.36 — Case C-400/95 Larsson [1997] ECR I-2757.
35 – Sklepni predlogi z dne 18. februarja 1997.36 – C-400/95, Recueil, I-2757.
MAYR tially detrimental to women is contrary to Directive 76/207.
MAYR nosti in bi lahko �kodoval ženski, v nasprotju z Direktivo 76/207. 41
To date the Court of Justice has considered such discrimination only in cases of dismissal of pregnant workers on the grounds of a matter directly related to the pregnancy where such workers are given notice during the pregnancy or during or at the end of maternity leave.
Do zdaj je Sodi�če to diskriminacijo preučevalo samo pri odpustih nosečih delavk, sporočenih zaradi okoli�čine, neposredno povezane z nosečnostjo, med nosečnostjo, med porodni�kim dopustom in po njem.
Now, however, the Oberster Gerichtshof is offering the Court the opportunity of ruling for the first time on the compatibility with Community law of the termination of an employment contract on the grounds of a worker’s possible future pregnancy, albeit that the termination was agreed prior to the controversial beginning of the pregnancy.
Tu pa Oberster Gerichtshof ponuja Sodi�ču priložnost, da prvič odloči, ali je odpoved pogodbe o zaposlitvi na podlagi morebitnega in prihodnjega materinstva delavke v skladu s pravom Skupnosti, čeprav je bila ta odpoved sprejeta pred spornim začetkom nosečnosti.
That said, a purposive interpretation of Directive 76/207 consistent with the caselaw examined suggests that the situation
Glede na te nove ugotovitve teleolo�ka razlaga Direktive 76/207, ki je v skladu z
All these judgments revolve around the central idea that pregnancy is a physical reality which only affects women, a fact which has, according to Lucinda M. Finley, represented the greatest obstacle to women’s full participation in the world of work.
Vse te sodbe se vrtijo okoli osrednje ideje, da je nosečnost fizična stvarnost, ki zadeva samo ženske, kar je bila po mnenju Lucinde M. Finley glavna ovira za njihovo polno vključitev v svet dela.
40It follows that any work-related measure based on pregnancy which is poten-
40Zato je vsak ukrep na tem področju, ki temelji na noseč-
For reasons of prudence and respect for the dictates of legal certainty, I must nevertheless point out the importance in this matter of carefully appraising the facts in order to define the temporal scope of the protection.
Vseeno moram zaradi previdnosti in potrebnega upo�tevanja pravne varnosti opozoriti na pomen skrbne presoje dejstev za časovno razmejitev področja uporabe varstva v tej zadevi.
The directive puts the right of a woman not to be discriminated against above the principle of equality.
Direktiva namreč pred načelo enakosti postavlja varovanje pravic ženske, da bi preprečila njeno diskriminacijo.
In particular, Article 2 refers to the protection of the female sex as regards pregnancy and maternity (Article 2(3)) and expressly prohibits discrimination relating to marital or family status (Article 2(1)).
V členu 2 je zlasti poudarjeno varstvo žensk v zvezi z nosečnostjo in materinstvom (odstavek 3) in izrecno prepovedana diskriminacija, ki vpliva na zakonski ali družinski status (odstavek 1).
Unlike the case of Directive 92/85, there is nothing in Directive 76/207 which limits its provisions to a phase of a woman’s life, so there is no reason to preclude its application before or after pregnancy or the postpartum period.
V nasprotju z Direktivo 92/85 ni v nobeni določbi Direktive 76/207 njeno področje uporabe omejeno na določeno obdobje v življenju ženske, tako da nič ne preprečuje njene uporabe pred nosečnostjo, po njej ali po porodu.
In my view, the determining factor in ascertaining discrimination lies in whether the decision to dismiss has been taken on the basis of the maternity, whether current or merely potential.
Po mojem mnenju je odločilni dejavnik za potrditev diskriminacije v tem, da naj bi bil odpust sprejet ob upo�tevanju materinstva, obstoječega ali samo potencialnega.
It is not a question of giving indefinite and armour-plated protection against dismissal to all women of childbearing age or women who have a desire to have children, or even those who have started a long and painful course of assisted reproduction treatment, but of preventing employers acting in a manner contrary to either the principle of equality between men and women or the fundamental aim of protecting procreation which is of transcendental importance in any modern society.
Tu ne gre za to, da se za nedoločen čas „zavarujemo“ proti odpustu vsake ženske, ki je v rodni dobi ali ki ima željo roditi, ali ženske, ki naj bi prestala dolg in mučen postopek umetne oploditve, temveč da preprečimo ukrepe delodajalca, ki so v nasprotju z načelom enakosti mo�kih in žensk ali z osnovnim ciljem varstva razmnoževanja, ki je vi�jega pomena v vsaki sodobni družbi.
Although it falls to the national court to evaluate this claim, Ms Mayr had taken sick leave when the follicular puncture was carried out (two days before the dismissal) and therefore her employer could perhaps have known about her situation.
Čeprav mora to trditev presoditi nacionalno sodi�če, je bila ga.
In any event, pursuant to Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex (OJ 1998 L 14, p.
Mayr na bolni�kem dopustu od dneva, ko so ji opravili punkcijo foliklov (dva dni pred odpustom), tako da je delodajalec morda poznal njen položaj.
6), it would be for Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner OHG to prove that its decision did not involve any breach of the principle of equal treatment.
Vseeno bi moral na podlagi Direktive Sveta 97/80/ES z dne 15. decembra 1997 o dokaznem bremenu v primerih diskriminacije zaradi spola Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner dokazati, da njegova odločitev ne vsebuje nobene kr�itve načela enakega obravnavanja.