natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
41. e Competition DG’s objective is to identify whether infringements of Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC are responsible for the apparent malfunctioning of the electricity and gas markets, in which case the Commission could undertake proactive corrective action.
Pričakuje se tudi, da bodo rezultati preiskav odigrali vlogo pri ocenjevanju učinkovitosti trenutnega zakonodajnega okvira za liberalizacijo trgov plina in električne energije.
When preparing the inquiries, the Competition DG consulted industry associations, consumer groups, other Commission departments (including the Transport and Energy DG), and national competition authorities (NCAs) and national regulatory authorities (NRAs) and their European representatives in order to focus the inquiry and ensure its eectiveness. e Competition DG’s goal is to ensure transparency throughout the process. e Commission presented a set of issues resulting from a first analysis of the responses to a number of forums and, in particular, the Energy Council on the 1st December, at which the Commission also reported on the implementation of the legislative package for energy liberalisation. e main concerns identied by the Competition DG in its issues paper(23) relate to the prevailing levels of concentration, vertical foreclosure, the lack of market integration, the lack of transparency and the price formation mechanism.
GD za konkurenco se je med pripravljanjem preiskav posvetoval z industrijskimi združenji, skupinami potrošnikov, drugimi službami Komisije (vključno z GD za energetiko in promet), nacionalnimi organi za konkurenco ter državnimi regulativnimi organi in njihovimi predstavniki na evropski ravni, da bi bila preiskava tako bolj osredotočena in učinkovita. Cilj GD za konkurenco je zagotoviti preglednost celotnega postopka.
A preliminary report is due to be presented in early 2006, followed by an intensive public consultation on the report. e final report on the energy sector inquiry is due at the end of 2006.
Komisija je predstavila sklop vprašanj, ki se porajajo ob prvi analizi odzivov na vrsto forumov in zlasti na Svet za energetiko z dne 1. decembra, ko je Komisija tudi poročala o izvrševanju zakonodajnega paketa za liberalizacijo energetike.
43. e sector inquiries substantially reinforce the Commission’s ability to proactively foster competition in the recently liberalised gas and electricity sectors, but enforcement activities in specic cases to support the liberalisation process were also vigorously pursued in 2005.
Poglavitni pomisleki, ki jih je GD za konkurenco opredelil v svojem Dokumentu o nerešenih vpraša-njih(23), se nanašajo na prevladujoče ravni koncentracije, vertikalno zaprtje trgov, odsotnost tržne integracije, premajhno preglednost in mehanizem oblikovanja cen.
Long-term gas supply agreements in downstream markets
Predhodno poročilo naj bi predstavili v začetku leta 2006, objavi naj bi sledila temeljita
Long-term contracts prevent customers from switching to alternative suppliers ready to oer better value for money.
Dolgoročne pogodbe strankam preprečujejo, da bi se odločile za druge dobavitelje, ki ponujajo ugodnejše cene.
In some cases, contracts currently in force are not due to end for many years and these customers are therefore unable to benet from the developing competition in the sector.
Nekaj trenutno veljavnih pogodb se ne bo izteklo še veliko let, zaradi česar te stranke ne morejo izkoristiti prednosti, ki jih prinaša razvijajoča se konkurenca v sektorju.
Also, there are signicant economies of scale in the gas supply market, due for example to the high cost of balancing and flexibility, which decrease in relative terms as supplied gas volumes increase.
Poleg tega na trgu dobave plina obstajajo precejšnje ekonomije obsega, zaradi na primer visokih stroškov izravnave in prožnosti, ki s povečevanjem dobavljene količine plina v relativnem smislu upadajo.
So long-term contracts in the downstream gas market can also delay the ability of alternative suppliers to build up sucient market share to compete eectively.
Tako se lahko tudi zgodi, da si drugi dobavitelji zaradi dolgoročnih pogodb na prodajnem trgu plina nekaj časa še ne morejo oblikovati dovolj velikega tržnega deleža, da bi lahko učinkovito konkurirali.
Such long-term contracts may therefore foreclose markets and give rise to competition concerns when they are not indispensable to generate countervailing benets for consumers.
Tako lahko takšne dolgoročne pogodbe, če niso nujne za zagotovitev izravnalnih prednosti za potrošnike, zaprejo trge in povzročijo konkurenčne probleme.
In the course of 2005, the Competition DG continued its endeavours to ensure that pre-liberalisation commercial practices in the energy markets do not undermine the liberalisation process. ese endeavours were rewarded by the removal of territorial restrictions from the gas supply contracts concluded by Gazprom with a number of important historic wholesalers in the EU.
GD za konkurenco si je v letu 2005 še naprej prizadeval zagotoviti, da komercialno ravnanje na energetskih trgih pred liberalizacijo ne bi spodkopavalo procesa liberalizacije. Ta prizadevanja so bila nagrajena z odpravo ozemeljskih omejitev iz pogodb o dobavi plina, ki jih je Gazprom sklenil z vrsto pomembnih tradicionalnih trgovcev na debelo v EU.
In 2003, the Competition DG had ensured that Gazprom and the Italian oil
GD za konkurenco je v letu 2003 poskrbel, da bosta Gazprom in italijanska nana in plinska družba Eni Spa(25) opustila tako ravnanje.
26 and gas company Eni Spa(
Februarja je GD za konku- renco(26) zagotovil izboljšave za pogodbe o dobavi plina med prvotnim avstrijskim prodajalcem plina na debelo OMV in ruskim proizvajalcem plina, družbo Gazprom.
), the Com- petition DG secured improvements to gas supply contracts between the Austrian incumbent gas wholesaler OMV and Russian gas producer Gazprom.
Pred- vsem bo OMV odslej lahko zunaj Avstrije prodajal naprej plin, ki ga kupi od Gazproma, in Gazprom bo lahko prodajal še drugim strankam v Avstriji, ne da bi mu bilo treba najprej ponuditi plin OMV (tako imenovana pravica prve zavrnitve).
In particular, OMV will no longer be prevented from reselling, outside Austria, the gas it buys from Gazprom, and Gazprom will be free to sell to other customers in Austria without having to first oer the gas to OMV (so-called right of first refusal).
OMV je tudi privolil, da bo prispeval k povečanju zmožnosti na plinovodu TAG, po katerem ruski plin skozi Avstrijo potuje v Italijo.
I — Antitrust — Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC shareholder of the TAG pipeline, in October 2003.
Sprejete zaveze so vsebinsko podobne tistim, ki jih je ENI, drugi delničar plinovoda TAG, dal Komisiji oktobra 2003.
In light of these developments, it was decided to close the investigation.
Na podlagi tega je bilo odločeno, da se preiskava konča.
In June(27), the Competition DG closed its investigation into the gas supply contracts between Gazprom and the biggest German wholesale company E.on Ruhrgas AG, which is part of the E.on group, having obtained the removal of territorial restrictions from these contracts.
GD za konkurenco je junija(27) končal preiskavo pogodb o dobavi plina med Gazpromom in največjo nemško veleprodajno družbo E.ON Ruhrgas AG, ki je del skupine E.ON, saj mu je uspelo odpraviti ozemeljske omejitve v teh pogodbah.
Moreover, Gazprom will no longer be bound by a ‘most favoured customer’ provision previously included in these contracts. ese clauses obliged Gazprom to oer Ruhrgas similar conditions to those it oered to Ruhrgas’ competitors on the wholesale market in Germany.
Poleg tega Gazproma ne bo več obvezovala določba o „stranki z največjimi ugodnostmi“, ki je bila pred tem vključena v te pogodbe. Te klavzule so obvezovale Gazprom, da Ruhrgasu ponudi pogoje, podobne tistim, ki veljajo za konkurente Ruhrgasa na trgu na debelo v Nemčiji.
Investigations, also opened in 2001, continue as concerns imports by Italian and Spanish operators of Algerian gas.
Nadaljujejo se preiskave, tudi odprte v letu 2001, glede uvoza alžirskega plina za italijanske in španske kupce.
During 2005, the regulatory framework for the internal market in electricity and gas was further developed.
V letu 2005 se je ureditveni okvir za notranji trg električne energije in plina še dodatno razvil.
On the 28th September the Council and Parliament adopted a regulation on the conditions for third-party access to the natural gas transmission network, which is expected to improve opportunities for cross-border trade by new entrants(28). A directive on security of supply and infrastructure development in electricity will be adopted in early 2006(29).
Svet in Parlament sta 28. septembra sprejela Uredbo o pogojih za dostop tretjih strank do omrežja za prenos zemeljskega plina, s katero naj bi po pričakovanjih izboljšali priložnosti novih tekmecev za čezmejno trgovanje.(28) Direktiva o varnosti dobave in razvoju infrastrukture na področju električne energije bo sprejeta v začetku leta 2006(29).
It is expected to provide a reliable regulatory frame- work conducive to new investments in electricity generation and infrastructure.
Pričakuje se, da bo vzpostavila zanesljiv ureditveni okvir, ki bo ugoden za nove naložbe v proizvodnjo električne energije in infrastrukturo.52.
During 2005, the Commission continued its eorts to ensure that Member
Komisija si je v letu 2005 še naprej prizadevala zagotoviti, da bodo države čla- nice uveljavile drugi direktivi o plinu(30
States implement the second gas(30
) in električni energiji(31
) and electricity(31
), ki sta temelj ureditve
57).Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the 26th June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC (OJ L 176, 15.7.2003, p. 37).
57).Direktiva 2003/54/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 26. junija 2003 o skupnih pravilih notranjega trga z električno energijo in o razveljavitvi Direktive 98/30/ES (UL L 176, 15.7.2003, str. 37).
Report on Competition Policy 2005
Dosežen je bil precejšen napredek. Drugi direktivi o plinu in električni energiji sta tudi obvezali Komisijo, da mora do konca leta 2005 poročati o napredku na področju oblikovanja notranjih trgov plina in elektrike. Komisija je predložila poročilo Svetu za energetiko 1. decembra.
e Court of Justice also claried some important aspects of the regulatory framework when, on the 7th
Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti je tudi razjasnilo nekaj pomembnih vidikov ureditvenega okvira, ko je 7. junija izreklo sodbo v zadevi VEMW(32).
Although the case specically concerned long-term reservations of interconnector capacity into the Netherlands, it has important implications for many historic long-term capacity reservations on interconnectors that continued to exist aer the entry into force of the first electricity directive(33).
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da je šlo pri prednostnem dostopu, ki ga nizozemska zakonodaja in ureditev podeljujeta zgodovinskim pogodbam o dobavi (v tem primeru 23 % vseh zmogljivosti za povezovalne daljnovode), za diskriminacijo, ki je prepovedana po Direktivi o električni energiji iz leta 1996, saj člena 7 in 16 te direktive zahtevata enako obravnavo vseh starih in novih uporabnikov omrežja.
54. e Court found that the priority access granted by Dutch legislation and regulation to historic supply contracts (23 % of the overall interconnector capacity in this particular case) constituted discrimination prohibited by the 1996 electricity directive, because Articles 7 and 16 of that directive require all old and new users of the network to be treated equally. e Court adopted this approach on the basis of the reasoning that any other interpretation would risk jeopardising the transition from a monopolistic, compartmentalised market to an open, competitive one. e Court also considered that the Netherlands could have asked for an exemption under the directive for existing contracts, but failed to do so in good time.
Sodišče sprejema ta pristop z utemeljitvijo, da bi vsaka druga razlaga lahko ogrozila prehod z monopolnega in razdeljenega na odprt in konkurenčen trg. Sodišče je tudi menilo, da bi Nizozemska lahko zaprosila za izjemo po tej direktivi za obstoječe pogodbe, vendar tega ni storila pravočasno.
Finally, 2005 also saw the start of trading in CO emission rights(
In končno, v letu 2005 se je začelo trgovati s pravicami za emisije CO2(34).
2 not relevant only to the energy sector, its eects are possibly most clearly felt in electric- ity markets. e emissions trading system appears to have had an eect on electricity prices as electricity generators partly factor the price of emission rights into the prices they charge end consumers.
Kot kaže, je sistem trgovanja z emisijami vplival na cene električne energije, saj proizvajalci električne energije v ceno, ki jo zaračunajo končnim uporabnikom, delno vključijo tudi ceno za pravice emisij.
( tablishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32).
20).Direktiva 2003/87/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 13. oktobra 2003 o vzpostavitvi sistema za trgovanje s pravicami do emisije toplogrednih plinov v Skupnosti in o spremembi Direktive Sveta 96/61/ES (UL L 275, 25.10.2003, str. 32).
I — Antitrust — Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2005
On the 17th June 2004, a preliminary assessment within the meaning of Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 was sent to Repsol.
Dne 17. junija 2004 je bila podjetju Repsol poslana predhodna ocena v smislu člena 9(1) Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003.
Repsol would also not conclude any new agreement with DODO(36) stations longer than ve years; and until the end of 2006, not buy any new DODO station. e implementation of the proposed commitments would be monitored by a trustee appointed by Repsol.
Repsol tudi ne bo sklenil nobene nove pogodbe s postajami DODO(36) za obdobje, daljše od petih let, in do konca leta 2006 ne bo kupil nobene nove postaje DODO. Uresničitev predlaganih zavez bo spremljal zaupnik, ki ga bo imenoval Repsol.
Following the outcome of the market test of the proposed commitments, Repsol submitted revised commitments and the Commission envisages proceeding to the adoption of a decision pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, which would make these revised commitments binding.
Po izidu tržnih preskusov predlaganih zavez je Repsol predložil revidirane zaveze in Komisija pričakuje nadaljevanje do sprejetja odločbe v skladu s členom 9(1) Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003, s čimer bi postale revidirane zaveze obvezujoče.
Alrosa–De Beers trade agreement r d
Trgovinski sporazum Alrosa – De Beers
June, the Commission published a notice(
Komisija je 3. junija objavila obvestilo(37) v skladu s členom 27(4) Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003, da bi tako tržno preverila zaveze(38), ki sta jih dala Alrosa in De Beers v smi- slu člena 9(1) Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003.
27(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in order to market test commitments(38) submitted by Alrosa and De Beers within the meaning of Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. e subject matter of the Commission’s investigation pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 EC and to Articles 53 and 54 EEA is a trade agreement between these two companies, which are both active in the mining and supply of rough diamonds. e agreement was originally notied to the Commission, but this notication lapsed on 1 May 2004.
Predmet preiskave Komisije v skladu s členoma 81 in 82 ES in členoma 53 in 54 EGS je trgovinski sporazum med tema družbama, ki obe delujeta na področju pridobivanja in dobave neobdelanih diamantov. Sporazum je bil prvotno priglašen Komisiji, vendar je priglasitev zapadla 1. maja 2004.
Report on Competition Policy 2005
I – Protimonopolna zakonodaja – členi 81, 82 in 86 ES
By entering into the trade agreement with Alrosa, its largest competitor, De Beers would gain control over a signicant source of supply on the rough diamonds market and obtain access to an extended range of diamonds otherwise not accessible to it. is would, on the one hand, eliminate Alrosa as a source of supply on the market outside Russia, and would enhance the already existing market power of De Beers with the eect of hindering the growth or maintenance of competition in a market for rough diamonds.
De Beers bi s sklenitvijo trgovinskega sporazuma z družbo Alrosa, njegovim največjim tekmecem, dobil nadzor nad pomembnim virom dobave na trgu neobdelanih diamantov in si tako zagotovil dostop do širše ponudbe diamantov, kot jo ima na voljo sicer. Družba Alrosa tako po eni strani ne bi bila več vir dobave na trgu zunaj Rusije in bi povečala že obstoječo tržno moč De Beersa, kar bi privedlo do oviranja rasti ali ohranjanja konkurence na trgu neobdelanih diamantov.
With respect to pricing, sorting and valuation, Alrosa and De Beers would conclude an agreement similar to the trade agreement. e implementation of the proposed commitments would be monitored by trustees appointed by Alrosa and De Beers, respectively.
Alrosa in De Beers bi glede določanja cen, razvrščanja in določanja vrednosti sklenila sporazum, ki bi bil podoben trgovinskemu sporazumu. Uresničitev predlaganih zavez bi spremljala pooblaščenca, ki bi ju ločeno imenovala Alrosa in De Beers.
Following the outcome of the market test of the proposed commitments, the Commission is considering whether to proceed to the adoption of a decision pursuant to Article 9(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, which would make revised commitments binding.
Po izidu tržnega preskusa predlaganih zavez Komisija presoja, ali nadaljevati s postopkom sprejetja odločbe v skladu s členom 9(1) Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003, s čimer bi postale revidirane zaveze obvezujoče.
During 2005 the Competition DG carried out ‘competition screening’ exercises in relation to a number of dra legislative texts in the chemicals sector, such as the planned revision of the plant protection directive (Directive 91/414/EEC)(39), which regulates the placement of plant protection products on the market, and the Commission’s proposal for a regulation concerning the registration, evaluation, authorisation
GD za konkurenco je v letu 2005 izvedel dejavnosti pregledovanja („screening“) z vidika konkurence za vrsto osnutkov zakonodajnih besedil v sektorju kemikalij, kot je načrtovana revizija fitofarmacevtske Direktive 91/414/EGS(39), ki ureja pripušča- nje fitofarmacevtskih sredstev na trg, in predlog Komisije za Uredbo o registraciji, ocenjevanju, avtorizaciji in omejevanju kemikalij(40) (REACH), ki uvaja registracijo kakih
40) (REACH), which will provide for registration of some and restriction of chemicals(
30 000 obstoječih in vseh prihodnjih kemikalij.
Council Directive 91/414/EEC of the 15th July 1991 concerning the placing of plant protection
Direktiva Sveta 91/414/EGS z dne 15. julija 1991 o dajanju fitofarmacevtskih sredstev v promet (UL L 230, 19.8.1991, str. 1).COM(2003) 644 konč.
A competitive European pharmaceutical industry is high on the agenda of the Commission, notably in view of the Lisbon strategy.
Konkurenčna evropska farmacevtska industrija je eno od prednostnih področij, s katerimi se ukvarja Komisija, predvsem glede na lizbonsko strategijo.
Unilateral supply quota systems could nonetheless be caught by Article 82 EC.
Enostranske dodatne sisteme dobavnih kvot pa bi bilo mogoče obravnavati v smislu člena 82 ES.
Possible objective justications for such systems may however have to be taken into consideration.
Pri tem pa bi bilo potrebno upoštevati morebitne objektivne utemeljitve za takšne sisteme.
BOX 2: ASTRAZENECA: ABUSE OF GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR
OKVIR 2: ASTRAZENECA: ZLORABA JAVNIH POSTOPKOV V SEKTORJU FARMACEVTSKIH IZDELKOV
On the 15th June, the Commission adopted a decision ning AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc (AZ) EUR 60 million for having infringed Article 82 EC and Article 54 EEA by misusing public procedures and regulations in a number of EEA states with a view to excluding generic firms and parallel traders from competing against
Komisija je 15. junija sprejela odločbo („Odločba“), s katero je podjetjema AstraZeneca AB in AstraZeneca Plc („AZ“) naložila globo 60 milijonov EUR, ker sta kršili člen 82 ES in člen 54 EGS z zlorabo javnih postopkov in predpisov v vrsti držav EGP, s čimer sta želeli generičnim podjetjem in čezmejnim trgovcem onemogočiti, da bi konkurirali njunemu izdelku Losec, ki se uporablja za zdravljenje razjed(1).
AZ’s dominance on the national PPI markets concerned e Commission’s findings on dominance during the relevant years in the countries concerned are based on AZ’s high market shares and position as incumbent on the PPI market, among other things. e first mover in a pharmaceutical market is generally able to obtain and maintain higher prices than later entrants to the market. e Commission’s decision also considers the issue of monopsony buyers (i.e. national health systems) and price regulation.
Ugotovitve Komisije o prevladi v zadevnih letih v upoštevnih državah med drugim temeljijo na visokih tržnih deležih in obstoječem položaju AZ na trgu zaviralcev proteinske črpalke. Kdor prvi deluje na trgu farmacevtskih izdelkov, lahko na splošno dosega in ohranja višje cene kot tisti, ki so na trg vstopili pozneje.
It observes that the bargaining power of monopsony buyers is considerably reduced vis-à-vis companies oering genuinely innovative new products (such as Losec).
Odločba preučuje tudi vprašanje monopsonskih kupcev (tj. nacionalnih zdravstvenih sistemov) in urejanje cen ter navaja, da je pogajalska moč monopsonskih kupcev v primerjavi z družbami, ki ponujajo pristno inovativne nove izdelke (kot je Losec), precej zmanjšana.
Misuse of the regulatory system
Napačna uporaba regulativnega sistema
AZ’s first abuse involved misuse of a Council regulation adopted in 1992(2) creating a supplementary protection certicate (SPC) under which the basic patent protection for pharmaceutical products can be extended. e abuse essentially consisted of a pattern of misleading representations made by AZ as of mid-1993 before patent oces in a number of EEA countries in connection with its SPC applications for omeprazole (the active substance in AZ’s product Losec).
Prva zloraba AZ je zajemala napačno uporabo Uredbe Sveta, sprejete leta 1992(2), ki uvaja dodatni varstveni certikat, s katerim je mogoče podaljšati dobo osnovne patentne zaščite za farmacevtske izdelke. Pri zlorabi je šlo v bistvu za to, da je AZ na uradih za patente v vrsti držav EGP od sredine leta 1993 podajal zavajajoče napačne razlage v zvezi z uporabo dobe patentnega varstva za omeprazol (aktivna snov v Losecu, ki ga proizvaja AZ).
Due to this misleading information AZ obtained extra protection in several countries. e entry of cheaper generic versions of Losec was thus delayed, entailing costs for health systems and consumers.
Zaradi teh zavajajočih informacij je AZ dobil dodatno zaščito v več državah. Tako je bil vstop cenejših generičnih različic Loseca odložen, kar je povzročilo stroške zdravstvenim sistemom in potrošnikom.
e Commission found that the use of such procedures and regulations may be abusive in specic circumstances, in particular where the authorities or bodies applying such procedures have little or no discretion.
Komisija je ugotovila, da je lahko uporaba takšnih postopkov in uredb v posebnih okoliščinah napačna, zlasti kjer imajo oblasti ali organi, ki uporabljajo te postopke, malo omejeno ali sploh nikakršno diskrecijsko pravico.
e existence of remedies under other legal provisions cannot by itself exclude the application of Article 82 EC, even if they cover aspects of the exclusionary conduct. e Commission found in its decision that there is no reason to limit the applicabil-
Obstoj protiukrepov v skladu z drugimi zakonodajnimi določbami sam po sebi ne more izključevati uporabe člena 82 ES, čeprav pokrivajo vidike izključevalnega ravnanja. Komisija je v svoji odločbi ugotovila, da ni razloga za omejevanje uporabe konkurenčnega prava zgolj na primere, ko tako ravnanje ne krši drugih zakonov in kjer ni drugih protiukrepov.