natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The forwarding of information by OLAF, although it had to be dealt with seriously by the national authorities, had no binding legal eect on them, as they remained free to decide what action should be taken following the OLAF investigation.
Nacionalni organi morajo sicer podatke, ki jim jih je posredoval OLAF, resno obravnavati, vendar pa jih pravno ne zavezujejo, ampak se lahko sami prosto odločijo, ali bodo upoštevali preiskave OLAF.
Thirdly, and finally, in its order in Strack v Commission, the Court of First Instance held that an ocial who informs OLAF of possible irregularities may not challenge by means of an action for annulment the decision closing the investigation opened in the light of that information.
V sklepu Strack proti Komisiji je Sodišče prve stopnje odločilo, da uradnik, ki je OLAF obvestil o ravnanju, ki je lahko predmet sankcije, ne more vložiti ničnostne tožbe zoper odločbo o ustavitvi preiskave, ki se je opravila na podlagi tega obvestila.
Secondly, two judgments delivered in 2006 in the case known as‘Austrian Banks —“Club Lombard”’held that actions brought against decisions taken by the Commission’s hearing ocer were admissible 5.
Drugič, v dveh sodbah, razglašenih leta 2006 v okviru zadeve, imenovane„Avstrijske banke – ‚klub Lombard‘“, je bilo odločeno, da so tožbe, vložene zoper odločbe pooblaščenca Komisije za zaslišanje5 dopustne.
First, in its judgment in Österreichische Postsparkasse and Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft v Commission, two credit institutions sought the annulment of decisions to transmit to a political party non-condential versions of the statements of objections relating to the fixing of bank charges.
Na eni strani je bila v sodbi Österreichische Postsparkasse in Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft proti Komisiji obravnavana zahteva dveh kreditnih ustanov za razglasitev ničnosti odločb o tem, da se politični stranki posredujeta nezaupni različici obvestil o ugotovitvah o možnih kršitvah v zvezi z določitvijo bančnih tarif.
In its judgment the Court of First Instance
Sodišče prve stopnje je v sodbi odločilo, da odločba Komisije, s katero slednja podjetje, ki je predmet
See judgments of 6 April 2006 in Case T-309/03 Camós Grau v Commission and of 4 October 2006 in Case T193/04 Tillack v Commission, and order of 22 March 2006 in Case T-4/05 Strack v Commission (under appeal, Case C-237/06 P), none yet published in the ECR.
II-1173, in z dne 4. oktobra 2006 v zadevi Tillack proti Komisiji, T-193/04, še neobjavljena v ZOdl., ter sklep Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 22. marca 2006 v zadevi Strack proti Komisiji, T-4/05 (v pritožbenem postopku, C-237/06 P), še neobjavljen v ZOdl.
Commission Decision of 11 June 2002 in Case COMP/36.571/D-l — Austrian Banks (‘Lombard Club’) (OJ L 56, 24.2.2004, p. 1).
Odločba Komisije 2004/138/CE z dne 11. junija 2002 glede postopka uporabe člena 81 ES (v zadevi COMP/36.571/D-1, Avstrijske banke – „klub Lombard“) (UL 2004, L 56, str. 1).
Court of First Instance held that the Commission’s decision notifying an undertaking involved in infringement proceedings that the information transmitted by that undertaking does not qualify for the condential treatment guaranteed by Community law (and may therefore be communicated to another complainant) has legal eect in relation to the undertaking in question, bringing about a distinct change in its legal position.
Sodišče prve stopnje postopka ugotavljanja kršitve, obvešča, da za podatke, ki jih je poslalo, ne velja jamstvo zaupnega obravnavanja na podlagi prava Skupnosti in se torej smejo poslati tretji stranki pritožnici, ustvarja pravne učinke za zadevno podjetje, tako da pomembno spreminja njegov pravni položaj.
It therefore constitutes a challengeable act.
Zato je ta odločba izpodbojni akt.
Second, in Bank Austria Creditanstalt v Commission, Bank Austria Creditanstalt sought the annulment of a decision of a hearing ocer rejecting its objection to the publication in the Ocial Journal of the non-condential version of the Commission’s decision.
Na drugi strani je v zadevi Bank Austria Creditanstalt proti Komisiji Bank Austria Creditanstalt zahtevala razglasitev ničnosti odločbe pooblaščenca za zaslišanje o zavrnitvi ugovora glede objave nezaupne različice odločbe Komisije v Uradnem listu.
In its judgment, the Court of First Instance held that a decision taken by the hearing ocer under the third paragraph of Article 9 of Decision 2001/462/EC, ECSC 6 has legal eects inasmuch as it determines whether a text for publication contains business secrets or other information enjoying similar protection or other information which cannot be disclosed to the public either on the basis of rules of Community law aording such information specic protection or because it is information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.
Sodišče prve stopnje je v sodbi menilo, da ima odločba, ki jo pooblaščenec za zaslišanje sprejme na podlagi člena 9, tretji pododstavek, Sklepa 2001/4626, pravne učinke, ker je v njej odločeno, ali besedilo, namenjeno objavi, vsebuje ne le poslovne skrivnosti in druge informacije, ki so podobno varovane, ampak še dodatne informacije, ki se ne smejo razkriti javnosti, bodisi zaradi predpisov prava Skupnosti, ki jih posebej varujejo, bodisi ker gre za informacije, za katere po njihovi naravi velja zavezanost k poklicni tajnosti.
Such a decision therefore also constitutes a challengeable act.
Taka odločba je torej prav tako izpodbojni akt.
, the Court of First Instance dened the scope of the notion of challengeable act as regards decisions which the Commission adopts in the area of State aid on the basis of Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 8.
Tretjič, v sodbi Deutsche Bahn proti Komisiji7je Sodišče prve stopnje opredelilo obseg pojma izpodbojni akt, in sicer glede odločb, ki jih Komisija sprejme na področju državnih pomoči na podlagi člena 4(2) Uredbe št. 659/19998.V tej zadevi je članica Komisije, pristojna za promet, tožečo stranko pisno obvestila, da ni ugodeno njeni pritožbi, s katero je zahtevala začetek postopka, določenega s členom 88(2) ES.
In this case the Member of the Commission responsible for transport had informed the applicant in writing that his complaint seeking the opening of the procedure provided for by Article 88(2) EC would not be upheld.The letter included a clear and detailed statement of the reasons why the national measure should not be considered to be aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC.
Dopis je vseboval jasno in natančno obrazložitev razlogov, zakaj nacionalni ukrep ni pomoč v smislu člena 87(1) ES.
However, the Commission maintained that it was merely a letter providing information and not a decision within the meaning of Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 and that, consequently, it was not a challengeable act insofar as it did not have legal eects.
Kljub temu je Komisija trdila, da je šlo zgolj za informativni dopis, ne pa za odločbo v smislu člena 4(2) Uredbe št. 659/1999, in da zato ta dopis ni izpodbojni akt, ker nima pravnih učinkov.
The Court of First Instance nonetheless held that a letter sent to a complainant undertaking by the Commission falls within the scope of Article 230 EC, where the Commission, having received information regarding alleged unlawful aid and thus being obliged to examine it without delay pursuant to Article 10(1) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, does not merely inform the complainant, as Article 20 of that regulation allows it to, that there are insucient grounds for taking a view on the case, but takes a clear and denitive position, giving reasons and indicating that the measure in question does not constitute aid.
Sodišče prve stopnje pa je odločilo, da dopis, ki ga Komisija pošlje podjetju, ki je vložilo pritožbo, spada na področje uporabe člena 230 ES, če se ta institucija ob tem, da je pridobila podatke o domnevni nezakoniti pomoči, zaradi česar jih mora v skladu s členom 10(1) Uredbe št. 659/1999 brez odlašanja preveriti, ne zadovolji s tem, da, kot ji omogoča člen 20 te uredbe, zainteresirano stranko obvesti, da ni zadostnih razlogov za to, da bi podala svoje mnenje o tej zadevi, temveč zavzame jasno in obrazloženo stališče, s tem da navede, da zadevni ukrep ni pomoč.Tako ravnanje Komisije namreč lahko pomeni le sprejetje odločbe na podlagi člena 4(2) te uredbe.
In so doing, the Commission must be considered to have adopted a decision under Article 4(2) of that regulation.
Komisija zato ne sme izključiti nadzora sodišča Skupnosti s tem, da izjavi, da take odločitve ni sprejela, da jo poizkuša umakniti ali da se v nasprotju s členom 25 Uredbe št. 659/1999 odloči, da odločbe ne bo naslovila na zadevno državo članico.
The Commission is therefore not entitled to exclude that decision from review by the Community court by declaring that it did not take such a decision, attempting to withdraw it or deciding not to send the decision to the Member State concerned, in breach of Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
Zato ni pomembno, da sporni dopis ni posledica sprejetja dokončne odločitve kolegija članov Komisije glede pritožbe ali da taka odločba ni bila objavljena.
In that connection it is irrelevant that the
Četrtič, v sklepu Schneider Electric proti Komisiji9se je Sodišče prve stopnje prvikrat izreklo o dopustnosti tožbe, vložene zoper odločbo Komisije o uvedbi temeljitega preizkusa
Commission Decision 2001/462/EC, ECSC of 23 May 2001 on the terms of reference of hearing ocers in certain competition proceedings (OJ L 162, 19.6.2001, p. 21).
Odločba Komisije 2001/462/ES, ESPJ, z dne 23. maja 2001 o mandatu pooblaščenca za zaslišanje v nekaterih postopkih o konkurenci (UL L 162, str. 21).
Judgment of 5 April 2006 in Case T 351/02 Deutsche Bahn v Commission, not yet published in the ECR.
Sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 5. aprila 2006 v zadevi Deutsche Bahn proti Komisiji, T-351/02, ZOdl., str. II-1047.
Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article [88 EC] (OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1).
Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 659/1999 z dne 22. marca 1999 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za uporabo člena [88 ES] (UL L 83, str. 1).
In this case, the Commission had adopted such a decision in the course of the administrative procedure re-opened following two judgments annulling the decision declaring the concentration between Schneider Electric and Legrand, two producers of low voltage electrical equipment, to be incompatible with the common market, and annulling the decision splitting the two entities 10.
V tem primeru je Komisija tako odločbo sprejela v okviru upravnega postopka, ki ga je ponovno uvedla po dveh sodbah, s katerima sta bili za nični razglašeni odločba o nezdružljivosti koncentracije med podjetjema Schneider Electric in Legrand, dvema proizvajalcema električnih izdelkov z nizko napetostjo, in odločba o razdružitvi teh dveh podjetij10.
The applicant challenged the Commission decisions to open a detailed examination procedure and to formally close the procedure.
Tožeča stranka je izpodbijala odločbi Komisije o začetku postopka temeljitega preizkusa in o formalni ustavitvi postopka.
In its order, the Court of First Instance concluded, on the basis of the facts of the case, that an undertaking which, having secured the annulment by the Court of First Instance of a Commission decision prohibiting it from implementing a concentration, transfers the undertaking it had acquired within the time limit available to the Commission for the adoption of a new decision, cannot claim that it is adversely aected either by a Commission decision, taken after the decision to make that transfer, to reopen the procedure for detailed examination of the operation, or by a Commission decision, subsequent to the transfer, to formally close that procedure which has thus become devoid of purpose.
V sklepu je Sodišče prve stopnje iz okoliščin zadeve zaključilo, da podjetje, ki je – potem ko je Sodišče prve stopnje odločbo Komisije, ki mu je prepovedovala izvedbo koncentracije, razglasilo za nično – odtujilo prevzeto podjetje v okviru roka, ki ga je za sprejetje nove odločbe imela Komisija, ne more zatrjevati, da odločba Komisije o ponovni uvedbi temeljitega preizkusa posla, ki je bila sprejeta po tem, ko je bila sprejeta odločitev o odtujitvi, ali odločba Komisije o formalni ustavitvi postopka, katerega predmet nadzora je odpadel, posega v njegov položaj.
The Court of First Instance also ruled obiter that the decision to open the formal examination procedure was simply a preparatory step.
Nazadnje je Sodišče prve stopnje odločilo, da odločba o uvedbi formalnega postopka preizkusa pomeni samo pripravljalni ukrep.
While it is true that the disputed measure involves extending the suspension of the transaction, as well as the obligation to cooperate with the Commission during the detailed examination phase, those consequences, which flow directly from the regulation and are naturally induced by the prior control of the compatibility of the transaction, amount to no more than the ordinary eects of any procedural step and do not therefore aect the legal position of Schneider Electric.
Čeprav taka odločba res povzroča podaljšanje začasne prekinitve posla ter nalaga obveznost sodelovanja s Komisijo med temeljitim preizkusom, pa te posledice, ki izhajajo neposredno iz uredbe, ki velja za koncentracije, in ki jih povzroči predhodni nadzor združljivosti posla, ki ga je sprožila priglasitev posla s strani zadevnih podjetij, ne presegajo učinkov procesnega akta in torej ne vplivajo na pravni položaj podjetja Schneider Electric.
In that connection the Court of First Instance rejected the analogy with the Community State aid regime suggested by that undertaking.
Sodišče prve stopnje je v zvezi s tem zavrnilo analogijo s predpisi Skupnosti o državnih pomočeh, ki jo je predlagalo to podjetje.
Unlike a decision taken under Article 88(2) EC, which, according to the caselaw of the Court of Justice, is liable in certain cases to have independent legal eects 11, the decision to open the detailed examination procedure does not, in itself, impose any obligation which does not already follow from the notication of the concentration to the Commission on the initiative of the undertakings concerned.
Za razliko od odločbe, sprejete na podlagi člena 88(2) ES, ki ima v skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča v nekaterih primerih lahko samostojne pravne učinke11, namreč odločba o začetku postopka temeljitega preizkusa sama ne privede do nobene obveznosti, ki ne bi izhajala že iz priglasitve načrtovane koncentracije, ki jo udeležena podjetja naslovijo na Komisijo.
Standing to bring proceedings
Procesno upravičenje a)
According to settled case-law, natural and legal persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may claim to be individually concerned only if that decision aects
V letu 2006 je Sodišče prve stopnje ta načela med drugim uporabilo v zadevi, v kateri je bila izdana sodba Boyle in drugi proti Komisiji13. Ta zadeva se je nanašala na odločbo, ki
Judgments of 22 October 2002 in Case T-310/01 Schneider Electric v Commission [2002] ECR II-4071 and in Case T-77/02 Schneider Electric v Commission [2002] ECR II-4201.
Sodba Sodišča z dne 30. junija 1992 v zadevi Španija proti Komisiji, C-312/90, Recueil, str. I-4117, točke od 21 do 23.
Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-312/90 Spain v Commission [1992] ECR I-4117, paragraphs 21 to 23.
Sodba Sodišča z dne 15. julija 1963 v zadevi Plaumann proti Komisiji, 25/62, Recueil, str. 197, točka 223.
That case concerned a Commission decision addressed to Ireland rejecting a request to increase the objectives of the Multiannual guidance programme for the Irish fishing fleet (‘MAGP IV’).
Sodišče prve stopnje jo je Komisija naslovila na Irsko, s katero je bila zavrnjena zahteva za povečanje ciljev večletnega usmerjevalnega programa za irsko ribiško floto (VUP IV).
The Court of First Instance held that although the applicants, who were owners of vessels belonging to the Irish fishing fleet, were not the addressees of the decision, they were nonetheless concerned by it.
Sodišče prve stopnje je presodilo, da odločba tožeče stranke – lastnike plovil irske ribiške flote – neposredno zadeva, čeprav niso bile njeni naslovniki.
The request for an increase made by Ireland was made up of all of the individual requests of owners of vessels, including the applicants’requests.
Zahteva Irske za povečanje je bila namreč dejansko sestavljena iz vseh individualnih zahtev lastnikov plovil, med katerimi so tudi tožeče stranke.
Although the decision was addressed to Ireland, it applied to a series of identied vessels and had therefore to be considered to be a series of individual decisions, each aecting the legal situation of the owners of those vessels.
Čeprav je bila izpodbijana odločba naslovljena na Irsko, se je nanašala na vrsto določenih plovil in jo je bilo zato treba šteti za skupek posamičnih odločb, od katerih je vsaka vplivala na pravni položaj lastnikov navedenih plovil.
The number and identity of the vessel-owners in question were fixed and ascertainable even before the date of the contested decision and the Commission was in a position to know that its decision aected solely the interests and positions of those owners.
Število in istovetnost zadevnih lastnikov plovil je bilo mogoče ugotoviti in preveriti še pred izdajo izpodbijane odločbe in Komisija je vedela, da njena odločba zadeva izključno interese in položaj navedenih lastnikov.
The contested decision thus concerned a closed group of identied persons at the time of its adoption, whose rights the Commission intended to regulate.
Izpodbijana odločba je tako zadevala zaprt krog oseb, ki so bile določene v trenutku njenega sprejetja, Komisija pa je imela namen odločiti o njihovih pravicah.
The factual situation thus created therefore characterised the applicants by reference to all other persons and distinguished them individually in the same way as an addressee of the decision.
Tak položaj je torej tožeče stranke razlikoval od vseh drugih oseb in jih individualiziral na podoben način, kot če bi bile naslovniki.
Standing to bring proceedings in litigation on State aid
Procesno upravičenje v sporih glede državnih pomoči
In its judgment in Commission v Aktiongemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum, delivered in 2005, the Court of Justice held, first, that an action for the annulment of a decision taken on conclusion of the preliminary phase of examination of aid under Article 88(3) EC brought by a person who is concerned within the meaning of Article 88(2) EC, where he seeks to safeguard the procedural rights available to him under the latter provision, is admissible and, second, that where an applicant calls in question the merits of the decision appraising the aid as such or a decision taken at the end of the formal investigation procedure, an action for annulment of such a decision is admissible only if he succeeds in establishing that he has a particular status within the meaning of the judgment in Plaumann v Commission 14.
V leta 2005 izrečeni sodbi v zadevi Komisija proti Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum je Sodišče presodilo, prvič, da je, kadar želi zadevna stranka v smislu člena 88(2) ES zaščititi svoje procesne pravice, dopustno vložiti tožbo za razglasitev ničnosti odločbe, sprejete na koncu predhodne faze preizkusa pomoči, določenega v členu 88(3) ES, in drugič, da je, kadar zadevna stranka izpodbija utemeljenost odločbe o presoji pomoči kot take ali odločbe, sprejete na koncu formalnega postopka preiskave, tožbo za razglasitev ničnosti take odločbe dopustno vložiti samo, če zadevna stranka izkaže, da ima poseben status v smislu sodbe v zadevi Plaumann proti Komisiji14.
Judgments of 13 June 2006 in Joined Cases T-218/03 to T-240/03 Boyle and Others v Commission (under appeal, Case C-373/06 P), not yet published in the ECR; see also the judgment of 13 June 2006 in Case T-192/03 Atlantean v Commission, not published in the ECR.
Glede procesnega upravičenja na področju državnih pomoči glej tudi sodbo z dne 27. septembra 2006 v zadevi Werkgroep Commerciële Jachthavens Zuidelijke Randmeren in drugi proti Komisiji, T-117/04, še neobjavljena v ZOdl., v kateri je Sodišče prve stopnje izključilo možnost procesnega upravičenja združenja ali njegovih članov za izpodbijanje odločbe, sprejete na koncu formalnega postopka preiskave iz člena 88(2) ES.
Judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-78/03 P Commission v Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum [2005] ECR I-10737.
Sodba Sodišča prve stopnje z dne 10. maja 2006 v zadevi Air One proti Komisiji, T-395/04, ZOdl., str. II-1343.
Two judgments delivered in 2006 enabled the Court of First Instance to clarify the application of that distinction where the Commission took a decision without initiating the formal review procedure 15.
V obravnavani zadevi je Sodišče prve stopnje presodilo, da za preizkus dopustnosti zadošča ugotovitev, da tožeča stranka in prejemnik pomoči neposredno ali posredno opravljata prevoze na isti mednarodni letalski progi in da ima tožeča stranka namen razširiti svoje dejavnosti na opravljanje rednih linijskih letalskih prevozov na progah z italijanskih, predvsem regionalnih letališč, ali nanja, glede katerih torej lahko konkurira prejemniku pomoči.
First, in Air One v Commission 16, the applicant, an Italian airline company, complained to the Commission alleging that the Italian authorities granted unlawful aid to the air carrier Ryanair in the form of reduced prices for the use of airport and groundhandling services.
Drugič, v zadevi British Aggregates proti Komisiji17 je Komisija, ne da bi sprožila formalni postopek preiskave, odločila, da ne bo vložila ugovora zoper zadevno dajatev.
The applicant also called upon the Commission to order the Italian Republic to suspend those aid payments.
Sodišče prve stopnje opominja, da če tožeča stranka izpodbija utemeljenost odločbe o presoji pomoči kot take, zgolj dejstvo, da jo je mogoče šteti za zadevno stranko v smislu člena 88(2) ES, ne more zadoščati za to, da se tožba razglasi za dopustno.
Insofar as this was an action for failure to act, which represents one and the same means of redress as an action for annulment, the Court of First Instance needed to establish the admissibility of an action brought by the applicant for annulment of at least one of the measures which the Commission could have adopted on conclusion of the preliminary procedure for examination of aid.
Zato mora tožeča stranka izkazati, da ima poseben status v smislu zgoraj navedene sodbe Plaumann proti Komisiji.
To that end the Court of First Instance applied the caselaw of the Court of Justice and, in that connection, it claried the denition of ‘sucient relationship of competition’for an undertaking to be considered a competitor of the recipients of aid and, therefore, concerned within the meaning of Article 88(2) EC.
To velja zlasti v primeru, kadar bi pomoč, ki jo obravnava zadevna odločba, znatno prizadela tržni položaj tožeče stranke.
In this case, the Court of First Instance held, in ruling the action admissible, that it was sucient to establish that the applicant and the recipient of aid jointly operate, directly or indirectly, an international airline and that the applicant aims to develop scheduled passenger transport services from or to Italian airports, inter alia regional airports, in relation to which it may be in competition with the recipient.
Sodišče prve stopnje pa ugotavlja, da se v obravnavani zadevi tožeča stranka – združenje podjetij – ne omejuje na izpodbijanje zavrnitve Komisije, da bi uvedla formalni postopek preiskave, ampak prav tako postavlja pod vprašaj utemeljenost izpodbijane odločbe.
Second, in British Aggregates v Commission 17, the Commission had decided, without initiating the formal review procedure, not to raise objections to the levy under examination.
Sodišče prve stopnje je torej obravnavalo, ali je tožeča stranka pojasnila, zakaj bi sporni ukrep lahko znatno vplival na položaj vsaj ene izmed njenih članic na zadevnem trgu, in ugotovilo, da je bil namen tega ukrepa na splošno spremeniti razdelitev trga med neobdelanimi granulati, ki so obdavčeni, in njihovimi substituti, ki so oproščeni davka.