natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Leaving aside the Spanish version of Article 10, which does not feature any word qualifying the advantages in question, it is true that, by merely stating that the commercial and financial advantages accorded by the supplier in consideration for extended exclusivity must be ‘particuliers’, the French version of Article 10 of Regulation No 1984/83 is rather imprecise on this point since it could concern, as certain language versions of that provision which use the word ‘special’ suggest, 33either advantages earmarked exclusively for the servicestation operator, that is to say, specific to the contractual relationship concerned, or extraordinary advantages, as suggested by one of the senses of the French adjective ‘particulier’.
Če zanemarimo �pansko različico te določbe, v kateri ni nobene označbe v zvezi z zadevnimi prednostmi, je res, da je, ker v drugih jezikovnih različicah omenja le, da morajo biti gospodarske in finančne prednosti, ki jih dobavitelj dodeli v zameno za podalj�ano izključnost, „posebne“, člen 10 Uredbe �t. 1984/83 v tej točki nenatančen, saj bi se lahko nana�al, kot sledi iz več jezikovnih različic te določbe, v katerih se pojavlja beseda „izrednih“ 33, bodisi na prednosti, ki so bile dodeljene samo imetniku bencinske postaje, to je na prednosti, ki opredeljujejo zadevni pogodbeni odnos, bodisi na izjemne prednosti, kot je mogoče razumeti enega od sprejetih pomenov pridevnika „poseben“.
Those two senses of the word ‘particulier’ may, admittedly, preclude the advantages referred to in Article 10 of Regulation No 1984/83 from merely being insignificant.
Ta pomena besede „poseben“ gotovo izključita možnost, da so lahko prednosti, določene v členu 10 Uredbe �t. 1984/83, preprosto nepomembne.
Consequently, although the literal analysis supports the assertion that the advantages accorded by the supplier must, at the very least, be ‘not insignificant’, it does not, on the other hand, permit the inference that those advantages must be considerable.
Zato čeprav dobesedna razlaga dopu�ča ugotovitev, da prednosti, ki jih dodeli dobavitelj, najmanj „niso nepomembne“, nasprotno ne dopu�ča ugotovitve, da morajo biti znatne.
As recital 15 in the preamble to Regulation No 1984/83 suggests, the idea which governs the according of the advantages in question by the supplier is that of ‘mak[ing] it significantly easier to establish, modernise, maintain and operate … service stations’.
Kot izhaja iz petnajste uvodne izjave Uredbe �t. 1984/83, je zamisel, ki prevladuje pri dobaviteljevem dodeljevanju zadevnih prednosti, da se „občutno olaj�a namestitev oziroma posodobljenje […] bencinskih postaj, njihovo vzdrževanje in poslovanje“ 34.
34In other words, it is a matter of facilitating, as the Commission has contended, access to the retail distribution market and a rapid expansion of the distribution network by making the supplier bear the great majority of the costs and the relationship-specific investments.
Z drugimi besedami gre, kot je poudarila Komisija, za olaj�evanje dostopa do trga distribucije na drobno in hitrega �irjenja distribucijske mreže, pri čemer dobavitelj nosi znatni del stro�kov in posebnih naložb, povezanih s pogodbenim razmerjem 35.
35 Under Article 85(3) of the Treaty, of which Regulation No 1984/83 is only a specific application, the indispensable nature of the restriction on competition constituted by the extended duration of the exclusivity of supply seems to be understandable only if it is highly unlikely that, without the commercial and financial advantages accorded by the supplier, the operator could gain access to the market, in this instance, in the case of a commercial agent, to the market for the services of an intermediary entrusted with the marketing of fuels.
V skladu s členom 85(3) Pogodbe, glede katerega pomeni Uredba �t. 1984/83 le njegovo posebno uporabo, je nujno merilo omejevanja konkurence podalj�ano trajanje izključne nabave, ki ga ni mogoče razložiti drugače kot z zelo majhno verjetnostjo, da bi brez gospodarskih in finančnih prednosti, ki jih je dodelil dobavitelj, imetnik, v tem primeru trgovski zastopnik, vstopil na trg storitev posrednika za trženje goriva.
In other words, since the extended duration of the exclusivity of supply entered into by the operator is a decisive factor in the market-sealing effect, 36 that restriction cannot properly be compensated for unless the advantages conferred by the supplier are, at the very least, substantial. 37
Z drugimi besedami, te omejitve, ker je podalj�ano trajanje izključne nabave, ki jo je sprejel imetnik, odločilno merilo za določanje učinka zapore trga 36, ni mogoče veljavno nadomestiti, razen če so prednosti, ki jih podeli dobavitelj, vsaj pomembne 37.
However, it seems to me to follow from the purpose of the legislation in question that the commercial and financial advantages referred to in Article 10 of Regulation No 1984/83 must be of a sufficiently substan-
Zato menim, da iz namena zadevne uredbe izhaja, da mora biti obseg gospodar -skih in finančnih prednosti, določenih v členu 10 Uredbe �t.
34 — Emphasis added.
1984/83, dovolj
35 — See also, to that effect, the Guidelines, points 116(4) and 155.
35 – V tem smislu glej zlasti zgoraj navedene smernice (točki 116(4) in 155).
36 — See, to that effect, Neste, paragraphs 32 and 33.
36 – Glej v tem smislu zgoraj navedeno sodbo Neste (točki 32 in 33).
37 — It is worth noting that Neste, paragraph 34, stresses the onerous nature of the investments made by the supplier.
37 – Opozarjam, da zgoraj navedena sodba Neste (točka 34) vztraja pri velikosti naložb dobavitelja.
33 — Such as the German, English, Dutch, Finnish and Swedish versions.
33 – Kot je v nem�ki, angle�ki, finski, nizozemski in �vedski jezikovni različici.
CEPSA and the cost of the investments cannot be recouped in the short run. 40
CEPSA so dane dolgoročno, ne da bi bilo mogoče izdatke za naložbe hitro povrniti 40.
That is why, as is explained, in essence, in recitals 12 and 13 in the preamble to Regulation No 1984/83, the adoption of special exemption rules in favour of servicestation agreements is justified in so far as those agreements are generally characterised by ‘special’ commercial or financial advantages conferred by the supplier, in consideration for which the reseller enters into, in particular, a longterm exclusive purchasing obligation.
Zato je, kot je v bistvu navedeno v dvanajsti in trinajsti uvodni izjavi Uredbe �t. 1984/83, sprejetje posebnih pravil za izjeme v korist sporazumov o bencinskih postajah upravičeno, če so za te sporazume na splo�no značilne �e „posebej pomembne“ gospodarske in finančne prednosti, ki jih dodeli dobavitelj, in v zameno za katere posrednik sprejme med drugim obveznost dolgoročne izključne nabave.
It follows that, in the case in the main proceedings, the referring court will need to assess whether the commercial or financial advantages conferred by CEPSA are of a significance such that they justify the exclusivity of supply entered into by Tobar being concluded for a duration not exceeding 10 years.
Iz tega sledi, da mora predložitveno sodi�če v zadevi v glavni stvari presoditi, ali so gospodarske in finančne prednosti, ki jih je podelila CEPSA, tako pomembne, da upravičujejo Tobarjevo sklenitev izključne nabave za največ deset let.
In that regard, apart from the fact that it is not a matter for the Court to assess the factual situation in the main proceedings, it is difficult to answer the referring court’s subordinate question as to whether particularly significant investments were conferred by CEPSA under the contract at issue, in the absence of sufficient information, in particular as to the amount of all the investments made by the supplier, their asymmetric nature and the period of their depreciation.
Poleg tega, da Sodi�če ne presoja dejanskega stanja v sporu v glavni stvari, je v zvezi s tem težko odgovoriti na podredno vpra�anje predložitvenega sodi�ča, ali je CEPSA podelila posebej pomembne naložbe v okviru sporne pogodbe, zaradi nezadostnosti informacij, zlasti o znesku vseh naložb dobavitelja, njihovi nesorazmernosti in obdobju amortizacije.
Admittedly, the detail added in recital 13 in the preamble to Regulation No 1984/83, to the effect that the advantages conferred are particularly significant (in French: ‘particulièrement importants’), appears only in certain language versions of that text, 38the others reproducing the adjective which they use in Article 10 of that regulation.
Kljub temu se zdi, da ta okoli�čina ni odločilna, upo�tevaje namen, opisan zgoraj, ki ga zasleduje zadevna ureditev, in dejstvo, da imajo primeri naložb, na�teti v trinajsti uvodni izjavi Uredbe �t.
39However, that circumstance does not seem to be decisive, in the light, on the one hand, of the purpose, described above, pursued by the legislation in question, and, on the other, of the fact that the examples of investments listed in recital 13 in the preamble to Regulation No 1984/83, in all of the language versions of that text, are of an undeniable commercial or financial significance.
1984/83, v vseh jezikovnih različicah tega besedila določen gospodarski in finančni pomen.
Those examples do, however, illustrate, in essence, the point that the advantages in question are, on the one hand, certainly ‘conferred’ by the supplier, that is to say, they are accorded asymmetrically, since the supplier invests more than the operator and, on the other, that they are provided on a longterm basis
Ti primeri poleg tega v bistvu ponazarjajo, da zadevne prednosti „podeli“ dobavitelj, to pomeni, da so podeljene nesorazmerno in ta vloži več kot imetnik ter da
If, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the referring court should form the view that the advantages conferred by CEPSA can justify the stipulation of an exclusive supply clause with a duration not exceeding 10 years, I am of the view that it will also need to take into account in its assessment an additional factor arising from the amendment of the Community legislation.
Če bi moralo v smislu zgornjih ugotovitev predložitveno sodi�če �teti, da prednosti, ki jih je podelila CEPSA, lahko upravičijo pogodbeno določilo o izključni nabavi za največ deset let, menim, da bi moralo pri presoji upo�tevati tudi dodatni element, povezan s spremembo skupnostne ureditve.
38 — That is the case with the Spanish, French and Portuguese versions.
38 – Tako je v �panski, francoski in portugalski jezikovni različici.
The Italian version uses the word ‘cospicui’, which suggests that the advantages in question are at the very least significant, or even considerable, which makes it possible to include that version with those just mentioned.
V italijanski jezikovni različici je uporabljena beseda „cospicui“, ki kaže na vsaj pomembne, to je znatne, prednosti, kar dopu�ča, da to različico dodamo k pravkar navedenim.
39 — See, consequently, the German, English, Dutch, Finnish and Swedish versions.
39 – Glej tudi nem�ko, angle�ko, finsko, nizozemsko in �vedsko jezikovno različico.
40 — See also, to that effect, the Guidelines, point 116(4).
40 – V tem smislu glej zlasti zgoraj navedene smernice (točka 116(4)).
While the issues connected with the duration of the exclusivity clause would not arise if, in the case in the main proceedings, CEPSA’s market share exceeded 30% since it would be such as to preclude immediately application of the block exemption system under Regulation No 2790/1999, it is necessary, in the absence of any information provided by the referring court in this regard, to start from the assumption, which after all is not implausible, that CEPSA does not hold a market share of that size. 41
Glede na to, da se vpra�anje določbe o izključnosti v zadevi v glavni stvari ne bi postavljalo, če bi bil tržni delež CEPSE večji od 30 %, saj bi bila v tem primeru takoj izključena uporaba ureditve skupinskih izjem, ki jo določa Uredba �t. 2790/1999, je treba ob nepredložitvi informacij predložit -venega sodi�ča izhajati iz predpostavke, ki ostaja verjetna, da CEPSA nima tako velikega tržnega deleža 41.
It is, of course, for the referring court to verify that assertion and, in the end, to ascertain CEPSA’s market share.
Seveda je predložitveno sodi�če tisto, ki mora preveriti to trditev, in nato določiti tržni delež CEPSE.
Irrespective of the relevant date from which agreements may be authorised under Regulation No 2790/1999, the latter provides, in particular, in Article 5, that the block exemption does not apply to a direct or indirect noncompete obligation the duration of which is indefinite or exceeds five years (a noncompete obligation which is tacitly renewable beyond that period being deemed
Ne glede na upo�tevni datum, do katerega je mogoče dovoliti sporazume na podlagi Uredbe �t. 2790/1999, ta določa predvsem, da se skupinska izjema v skladu s členom 5 te uredbe ne uporablja za vsako neposredno ali posredno prepoved konkurence, katere trajanje je nedoločeno ali dalj�e od petih let (�teje se, da je bila prepoved konkurence, ki se molče podalj�uje, po preteku petih let dogovorjena za nedoločen čas), in na podlagi
CEPSA the meaning of, respectively, Article 12(1)(c) of Regulation No 1984/83 42 and Article 5 of Regulation No 2790/1999. 43
CEPSA člena 12(1)(c) Uredbe �t. 1984/83 42 in člena 5 Uredbe �t. 2790/1999 43.
In the light of the foregoing observations, I propose that Question 1(b) and (c) submitted by the referring court be answered to the effect that, in the case of a genuine agency contract concluded between a fuel supplier and a servicestation operator, the exclusive purchasing clause may qualify for a block exemption under Regulation No 1984/83 provided that it satisfies the conditions laid down by that regulation, in particular that relating to the duration of such a clause.
Upo�tevaje zgornje ugotovitve, predlagam odgovor na prvo vpra�anje pod b) in c), ki ga je postavilo predložitveno sodi�če, da je lahko, če gre za pristno pogodbo o zastopanju med dobaviteljem goriva in zastopnikom bencinske postaje, določba o izključni nabavi upravičena do skupinske izjeme, določene v Uredbi �t.
It is for the referring court to determine whether that is the situation in the case in the main proceedings, in the light, in particular, of the actual duration of the exclusive purchasing clause stipulated by the parties to the contract at issue, of the amount of the investments made by the supplier and the operator, and of their depreciation.
Predložitveno sodi�če mora presoditi, ali je v zadevi v glavni stvari tako, upo�tevaje med drugim dejansko trajanje določbe o izključni nabavi, dogovorjeni med strankama sporne pogodbe, znesek naložb, ki sta jih opravila dobavitelj in imetnik, in njihovo amortizacijo.
43 — If, in the case in the main proceedings, the national court were to conclude, in the light of national law, that the exclusivity clause was concluded for a duration exceeding 10 years, the examination of the extent of the commercial or financial advantages conferred by CEPSA could ultimately prove irrelevant.
43 – Če bi v zadevi v glavni stvari nacionalno sodi�če glede na nacionalno pravo ugotovilo, da je bila določba o izključnosti dogovorjena za več kot deset let, bi se presoja obsega gospodarskih in finančnih prednosti, ki jih je podelila CEPSA, lahko izkazala za nepotrebno.
In that regard, I observe with interest that it is apparent from the order for reference that the original contract concluded for a period of 10 years may be extended for successive periods each of five years by express agreement in writing on notice of at least six months.
V zvezi s tem z zanimanjem ugotavljam, da iz predložitvene odločbe izhaja, da je mogoče začetno desetletno pogodbo podalj�ati za zaporedna obdobja petih let, vsakokrat z izrecnim pisnim soglasjem z vnaprej�njim �estmesečnim obvestilom.
Although it is certainly for the referring court to determine the scope of that term under the relevant national law, the use of a period of notice is rather curious, particularly since it is not clear from the order for reference and from the proceedings before the Court whether that period of notice relates to the intention not to extend the contract (which necessarily implies that the contract must be extended in the absence of such notice and is therefore tacitly renewable) or to the intention to extend it (which implies that, if notice is properly given, the other party does not seem to be in a position to refuse the extension of the contract).
Čeprav je gotovo, da mora predložitveno sodi�če določiti pomen tega določila v skladu z upo�tevnim nacionalnim pravom, se uporaba vnaprej�njega obvestila izkaže za zelo vpra�ljivo, predvsem zaradi dejstva, ker iz predložitvene odločbe in iz razprav pred Sodi�čem jasno ne izhaja, ali se to obvestilo nana�a na namen, da se pogodba ne podalj�a (kar nujno pomeni, da je treba pogodbo brez takega obvestila obvezno podalj�ati in je tako podalj�ana molče) oziroma na namen, da se podalj�a (kar pomeni, da druga stranka pri pravilno danem obvestilu ne more zavrniti podalj�anja pogodbe).
The hypothesis of the contractual relationship between two independent undertakings (distribution contract)
Predpostavka pogodbenega odnosa med neodvisnima podjetjema (distribucijska pogodba)
By its Question 2(c), at the end, the referring court appears, moreover, to contemplate the possibility that the agreement, despite the fact that it cannot qualify for a block exemption under Regulation No 1984/83 in view of the obligation on the operator to charge the retail price fixed by the supplier, could regain its ‘validity’ by virtue of the fact that the supplier authorised the operator, in November 2001, to lower the selling price without affecting the supplier’s receipts.
Z drugim vpra�anjem pod c) na koncu se zdi, da predložitveno sodi�če poleg tega zajame možnost, v skladu s katero bi lahko sporazum, čeprav glede na imetnikovo obveznosti, da mora spo�tovati končno maloprodajno ceno, ki jo je določil dobavitelj, ne bi mogel biti upravičen do skupinske izjeme, določene v Uredbi �t. 1984/83, ponovno pridobil „veljavnost“ zato, ker naj bi dobavitelj imetniku novembra 2001 dovolil, da zniža prodajno ceno, ne da bi to vplivalo na prihodke prvega.
In the case of a contractual relationship of the type ‘distribution contract between two economically independent undertakings’, which could, in principle, qualify for application of the block exemption provided for by Regulation No 1984/83, it seems to me, along the lines of what the Commission has submitted, that the applicability of that regulation, in particular that of the condition relating to the duration of the agreement, depends on the compatibility with Article 85 of the Treaty of the clause relating to the obligation for the servicestation operator to sell the fuel at the price fixed by the supplier.
Ob predpostavki pogodbenega odnosa v obliki „distribucijske pogodbe med dvema gospodarsko neodvisnima podjetjema“, ki je načeloma upravičen do uporabe skupinske izjeme, določene v Uredbi �t. 1984/83, menim, da je uporaba te uredbe, predvsem pogoja glede trajanja sporazuma, kot je poudarila Komisija, odvisna od skladnosti določila o obveznosti imetnika bencinske postaje, da prodaja gorivo po ceni, ki jo je določil dobavitelj, s členom 85 Pogodbe.
In that regard, it is important first of all to point out that it is not a matter for the Court to establish the scope of the supplier’s decision affecting the contractual clause relating to the fixing, by the latter, of the retail price of the fuels.
V zvezi s tem je treba najprej opozoriti, da Sodi�če ne odloča o obsegu dobaviteljeve odločitve, ki vpliva na pogodbeno klavzulo, s katero ta določi končno prodajno ceno goriva.
That question falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling and appears to me, as the Commission stated in its written observations, to be a matter for national law.
To vpra�anje ne sodi v pristojnost Sodi�ča v okviru vpra�anja za predhodno odločanje, za katero menim, da se, kot je navedla Komisija v pisnih stali�čih, uporablja nacionalno pravo.
Assuming, therefore, that such a decision on the part of the fuel supplier is regarded as a ‘unilateral amendment’ to the contractual price clause 45 and that such an amendment is possible under Spanish domestic law, it would then be a question of ascertaining, on the one hand, whether that amendment actually has the effect of removing the restriction on competition which consists in the fixing, by the supplier, of the retail price of the fuels and, on the other, whether, if the answer to
„enostransko spremembo“ pogodbenega določila o ceni 45 in da bi bila taka sprememba možna v notranjem �panskem pravu, bi �lo za odločitev o tem, ali je dejanski učinek te spremembe prenehanje omejitve konkurence, ki jo pomeni dobaviteljeva določitev končne maloprodajne cene goriva, in o tem, ali ima ob pritrdilnem odgovoru na prej�nje vpra-
In that case, the clause relating to the imposition by the supplier of the retail price of the fuels constitutes a restriction on competition which falls within the scope of Article 85(1) of the Treaty and is not included among the obligations which, apart from the exclusivity clause provided for in Article 10 of Regulation No 1984/83, may be imposed on the operator under Article 11 of that regulation, with the result that an agreement requiring the operator to charge the retail price fixed by the supplier is not covered by Articles 10 to 13 of that regulation.
Pravzaprav klavzula o določitvi končne maloprodajne cene goriva v tem primeru pomeni omejitev konkurence, za katero se uporablja člen 85(1) Pogodbe in ni med obveznostmi, ki lahko ob določbi o izključnosti iz člena 10 Uredbe �t.
44 It follows that, in such a case, there is no need to rule on the permissible duration of the exclusive dealing agreement under Regulation No 1984/83.
1984/83 zavezujejo imetnika na podlagi člena 11 te uredbe, kar pomeni, da sporazum, ki določa, da mora ta spo�tovati končno maloprodajno ceno, ki jo določi dobavitelj, ni zajet s členi od 10 do 13 zadevne uredbe 44.
I think it would be useful to make a few substantive observations in this connection.
Menim, da je v zvezi s tem koristno podati nekaj temeljnih pripomb.
As regards the issue of whether the alleged unilateral amendment by CEPSA of the contractual price clause has the effect of bringing that clause into line with Article 85 of the Treaty, the content of CEPSA’s decision of November 2001, as set out by the referring court, appears to grant the operator greater freedom, since the latter no longer appears to be compelled to charge the retail price fixed by the supplier and could therefore grant discounts to its customers, thereby fostering inter-brand competition between distributors.
Glede vpra�anja, ali je bilo z domnevno enostransko spremembo pogodbenega določila o ceni CEPSE to usklajeno s členom 85 Pogodbe, se zdi, da vsebina odločitve CEPSE iz novembra 2001, kot jo je obrazložilo predložitveno sodi�če, daje več svobode imetniku, saj ta tako ne bi bil več prisiljen uporabljati končne prodajne cene, ki jo je določil dobavitelj, in bi lahko strankam odobril popuste, kar bi spodbudilo konkurenco znotraj znamke med distributerji.
Nevertheless, even if the view were to be taken that unilaterally bringing a clause requiring a distributor to resell a product the price of which is fixed by the supplier into line with Article 85 of the Treaty could have the effect of retroactively rendering such a clause valid, something which I doubt, 46 that consequence would nevertheless not render superfluous an examination of the compatibility of the clause relating to the exclusivity of supply with Article 85 of the Treaty, in particular as regards the duration of such exclusivity.
Ne glede na to, tudi če bi bilo treba �teti, da bi bil lahko učinek enostranske uskladitve določila, s katerim je distributer zavezan prodajati proizvod po ceni, ki jo je določil dobavitelj, s členom 85 Pogodbe, ponovna veljavnost takega določila za nazaj, o čemer v vsakem primeru dvomim 46, presoja skladnosti določbe o izključni nabavi s členom 85 Pogodbe, predvsem glede trajanja take izključnosti, ne bi bila odveč.