natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Court of First Instance was thus justified in holding that the disputed refusal of access was lawful ‘given the particular nature of such documents’ and because ‘the independence of the opinions of [a] legal service … can constitute an interest to be protected’. 36
Tako je Sodi�če prve stopnje odločilo, da je zavrnitev spornih dostopov utemeljena „s stali�ča posebn[ih značilnosti] teh dokumentov“ in ker „neodvisnost mnenj pravne službe […] lahko pomeni interes, ki ga je potrebno varovati“. 36
I readily admit that the analysis which I am suggesting imposes significant limits on the case-by-case examination of the exception on the ground of confidentiality in respect of legal advice.
Prostovoljno priznavam, da analiza, ki jo predlagam, določa pomembne omejitve za presojo izjeme zaupnosti pravnih mnenj v vsakem primeru posebej.
That is, however, once again, merely the consequence of the difficulty of giving a practical effect and a reasonable meaning in practice to a perfectly contradictory legislative formulation.
Vendar je to posledica težave, da se popolnoma nasprotujočemu zakonskemu besedilu da koristen učinek in razumen pomen v praksi.
Thus, although there is no doubt, as the Court of First Instance ruled on another occasion, that ‘the obligation for an institution to undertake a concrete, individual assessment of the content of the documents covered in the application for access is an approach to be adopted as a matter of principle …, which applies to all the exceptions in paragraphs 1 to 3 of Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001, whatever may be the field to which the documents sought relate’, 37the extent to which that requirement applies in connection with the implementation of the exception on the ground of confidentiality in respect of legal advice and in connection with the application of the other exceptions differs.
Torej, čeprav ni dvoma, „da je obveznost institucije, da konkretno in posamično presodi vsebino dokumentov, navedenih v pro�nji za dostop, načelna obveznost, ki se nana�a na vse izjeme, ki so omenje- ne v odstavkih od 1 do 3 člena 4 Uredbe �t. 1049/2001, ne glede na področje, iz katerega izhaja dokument“, 37 kot je med drugim razsodilo Sodi�če prve stopnje, se obseg te zahteve v zvezi z uporabo izjeme zaupnosti pravnih mnenj razlikuje od obsega v zvezi z uporabo drugih izjem.
In the latter cases, whether the disclosure of a document may actually be detrimental to the interest protected depends not only on the subjectmatter of the document,
V slednjih primerih je vpra�anje, ali razkritje dokumenta lahko dejansko �kodi varovanemu interesu, odvisno ne le od vsebine dokumenta, temveč tudi od značilnosti informacij, ki jih vsebuje.
It follows from the above that the Court of First Instance did not fail to have regard to the requirement for an individual and specific examination of the documents requested for the purposes of applying the exception on the ground of confidentiality in respect of legal advice.
Iz navedenega sledi, da Sodi�če prve stopnje ni kr�ilo zahteve po posamični in konkretni presoji zapro�enih dokumentov z namenom uporabe izjeme zaupnosti pravnih mnenj.
36 — Paragraphs 78 and 79 of the judgment under appeal.
36 – Točki 78 in 79 izpodbijane sodbe.
37 — Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau v Commission, paragraph 85, and API v Commission, paragraph 57.
37 – Zgoraj navedeni sodbi Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau proti Komisiji, točka 85, in API proti Komisiji, točka 57.
38 — See Franchet and Byk v Commission, paragraphs 104 to 134.39 — See Kuijer v Council.
39 – Glej zgoraj navedeno sodbo Kuijer proti Svetu.
OPINION OF MR POIARES MADURO — JOINED CASES C-39/05 P AND C-52/05 P
POIARESA MADURA – ZDRUŽENI ZADEVI C-39/05 P IN C-52/05 P prevladujočega javnega
(a) The identification of the overriding public interest
Izjema od izjeme v zvezi z obstojem prevladujočega javnega interesa a) Opredelitev interesa
The confidentiality of legal advice cannot however be absolute.
Načelo nerazkritja omenjenih mnenj iz člena 4(2), druga alinea, Uredbe �t.
The principle of nondisclosure of that advice which is laid down by the second indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 must, according to the wording of that provision, give way if an ‘overriding public interest’ none the less justifies the disclosure of the document requested.
1049/2001 se mora v skladu s to določbo umakniti, če „prevladujoči javni interes“ kljub temu upravičuje razkritje zapro�enega dokumenta.
Moreover, it is also for the purpose of weighing the interest protected by the exception to the right of access provided for in favour of legal advice against possible overriding public interests that a specific examination of the document requested is necessary. 40
Sicer pa se konkretna presoja zapro�enega dokumenta zahteva tudi zaradi vzpostavitve ravnotežja med interesom, ki ga varuje izjema od pravice do dostopa, ki je določena za pravna mnenja, in morebitnimi prevladujočimi javnimi interesi. 40
The first complaint referred to above raises the sensitive question of the nature of the ‘overriding public interest’ within the meaning of the second indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 which would justify the disclosure of a legal opinion by way of derogation from the confidentiality which that kind of document is as a rule guaranteed.
Prvi navedeni očitek se nana�a na občutljivo vpra�anje značilnosti „prevladujočega javnega interesa“ v smislu iz člena 4(2), druga alinea, Uredbe �t. 1049/2001, ki bi upravičil razkritje pravnega mnenja kljub zaupnosti, ki je načeloma zagotovljena tej vrsti dokumentov.
Is this a question of the public interest in access to documents which, in the specific circumstances of the present case, would prevail over the public interest which demands that legal advice be protected, or of a public interest which is different from and superior to the public interest in access to documents?
Ali gre za javni interes dostopa do dokumentov, ki v posebnih okoli�činah primera prevlada nad javnim interesom, ki zahteva varstvo pravnih mnenj, ali za javni interes, ki je prevladujoč in se razlikuje od javnega interesa dostopa do dokumentov?
By favouring the latter option, the Court of First Instance made the applicant responsible for the task of identifying a public interest which is different from and superior to the public interest in transparency, openness, democracy and the participation of citizens in the decisionmaking process.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je s tem, da je dalo prednost drugi možnosti, prosilcu naložilo, da opredeli prevladujoči javni interes, ki bi se razlikoval od javnega interesa preglednosti, odprtosti in demokracije ter od sodelovanja državljanov v postopku odločanja.
That is a task so formidable that there is hardly any likelihood that access to a document would ever be granted on the ground that there is an overriding public interest.
To je tako težka naloga, da obstaja le majhna verjetnost, da bi bil kadar koli odobren dostop do dokumenta, ker obstaja prevladujoči javni interes.
41 An applicant comes up against the insuperable difficulty of identifying public interests which would be of more importance than the ‘usual’ public interest connected with transparency.
41Ta naloga zajema nepremostljivo težavo opredelitve javnih interesov, ki bi bili pomembnej�i od „običajnega“ javnega interesa, ki se nana�a na preglednost.
He also complains that the Court of First Instance made it impossible for itself to ascertain whether the Council had properly weighed the overriding public interest against the need for protection of legal advice by not ordering that the legal opinion in question be produced.
Sodi�ču prve stopnje očita tudi, da ni preverilo, ali je Svet pravilno pretehtal prevladujoči javni interes in potrebo po varovanju pravnih mnenj, s tem da ni zahtevalo predložitve spornega pravnega mnenja.
41 — As has been correctly pointed out in academic legal writing: see in particular Kranenborg, H.R., ‘Is it time to revise the European regulation on public access to documents?’, European public law Vol.
41 – Kot je pravilno poudarila pravna stroka: glej predvsem Kranenborg, H. R., „Is it time to revise the European regulation on public access to documents?“, European public law vol. 12, 2006, �t. 2, str.
251, in particular pp. 259, 261 and 262.
251, posebej str. 259, 261 in 262.
40 — See, to that effect, API v Commission, paragraph 54.
40 – V tem smislu glej zgoraj navedeno sodbo API proti Komisiji, točka 54.
42It is also more in that direction that the caselaw of the Court of First Instance subsequent to the judgment under appeal seems to be moving.
42 Zdi se, da je v to smer usmerjena tudi sodna praksa Sodi�ča prve stopnje, ki je poznej�a od izpodbijane sodbe.
Referring to the exceptions laid down in Article 4(3), the Court of First Instance points out that they give the institutions a discretion ‘which allows them to balance, on the one hand, their interest in maintaining the confidentiality of their deliberations against, on the other hand, the interest of the citizen in gaining access to documents’. 43
S sklicevanjem na izjeme iz člena 4(3) Sodi�če prve stopnje poudarja, da dajejo institucijam diskrecijsko pravico, „ki jim omogoča, da tehtajo med svojim interesom do ohranitve tajnosti posvetovanj in interesom državljanov za dostop do dokumentov“. 43
However, that interpretation of the wording of Regulation No 1049/2001 is not necessary.
Tako razumevanje besedila Uredbe �t. 1049/2001 se ne ponuja.
The argument put forward by the Court of First Instance that, in so far as the principles of transparency, openness, democracy and the participation of citizens in the decisionmaking process underlie all the provisions in that regulation, the overriding public interest capable of justifying the disclosure of a document by way of derogation from the general confidentiality of legal advice must, as a rule, be distinct from those principles does not convince me.
Trditev Sodi�ča prve stopnje, da če določbe te uredbe temeljijo na načelih preglednosti, odprtosti in demokracije ter sodelovanja državljanov v postopku odločanja, se mora prevladujoči javni interes, ki lahko upraviči razkritje dokumenta kljub načelni zaupnosti pravnih mnenj, od teh načel praviloma razlikovati, me ne prepriča.
In actual fact, what is imposed, in my opinion, by the last phrase in Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 is the obligation, for the institution concerned, to weigh the public interest protected by the exception on the ground of confidentiality against the public interest in access to documents, in the light of the content of the document requested and the specific circumstances of the case.
Po mojem mnenju zadnji stavek člena 4(2) Uredbe �t. 1049/2001 v bistvu nalaga zadevni instituciji obveznost, da pretehta javni interes, ki ga varuje zaupnost, in javni interes dostopa do dokumentov ob upo�tevanju vsebine zapro�enega dokumenta in posebnih okoli�čin primera.
In other words, the ratio legis of that provision, so far as concerns the exception on the ground of confidentiality in respect of legal advice, is that, although the public interest which underlies the protection of legal advice prevails as a rule over the public interest in access to documents, an analysis of the circumstances of the case and of the content of the legal opinion requested may tip the scales in the opposite direction.
Z drugimi besedami je ratio legis te določbe, kar zadeva izjemo zaupnosti pravnih mnenj, v tem da če je javni interes, na katerem temelji varstvo pravnih mnenj, načeloma večji od javnega interesa dostopa do dokumentov, lahko analiza okoli�čin primera in vsebine zapro�enega pravnega mnenja prevesi tehtnico na nasprotno stran.
It seems to me that that is the only reading capable of giving any effect to the exception to the exceptions on the ground of confidentiality, based on the existence of an overriding public interest.
V bistvu se mi zdi, da lahko le na podlagi te razlage učinkuje izjema od izjem zaupnosti, ki se nana�a na obstoj prevladujočega javnega interesa.
The illustrations of overriding public interests provided by the Council at the hearing demonstrate that.
To dokazujejo tudi prikazi prevladujočih javnih interesov, ki jih je Svet podal na obravnavi.
Even though the Council shares the Court of First Instance’s analysis that those interests must be distinct from the principles underlying Regulation No 1049/2001, the illustrations make clear the difficulty, if not the impossibility of the distinction.
Čeprav se Svet strinja z analizo Sodi�ča prve stopnje, v skladu s katero se morajo ti prevladujoči javni interesi razlikovati od načel, na kateri temelji Uredba �t. 1049/2001, je na podlagi teh prikazov jasna težava, če ne nezmožnost tega razlikovanja.
For example, the possibility, which was referred to, of disclosing noncontroversial legal advice: it is explained by the fact that the objective of the protection of legal advice, which consists in the preservation of an institution’s ability to obtain frank and independent advice and the desire not to provide challenges in respect of the legality of a legislative act, does not require the confidentiality of that advice, with the result that the public interest in access to documents regains precedence.
Tako je navedeno možnost razkritja nespornih pravnih mnenj mogoče razložiti z dejstvom, da cilj varstva pravnih mnenj, ki ga sestavljata ohranitev možnosti institucije, da pridobi odkrito in neodvisno mnenje, in skrb, da se ne povzroči očitkov o zakonitosti zakonodajnega akta, ne zahteva zaupnosti teh mnenj, tako da ima ponovno prednost javni interes dostopa do dokumentov.
Similarly, the case of legal opinions issued for publication, which is justified by the fact that disclosure has the specific aim of cutting
Enako velja v primeru pravnih mnenj, ki so izdana za objavo, ki je upravičena z dejstvom, da
42 — Opinion in Sison v Council, point 27.
42 – Zgoraj navedeni sklepni predlogi v zadevi Sison proti Svetu, točka 27.
43 — Case T-264/04 WWF European Policy Programme v Council [2007] ECR II-911, paragraph 44.
43 – Sodba Sodi�ča prve stopnje z dne 25. aprila 2007 v zadevi WWF European Policy Programme proti Svetu (T-264/04, ZOdl., str. II-911, točka 44).
That is also the interpretation which Advocate General Geelhoed defended in taking the view that it ‘is clear from the explicit wording’ of Article 4(2) and (3) of Regulation No 1049/2001 that those provisions ‘require institutions, in considering whether access to documents should be refused, to balance the particular interest to be protected by refusing disclosure (e.g. protection of commercial interests, court proceedings or the institutions’ decisionmaking process) against the general, public interest in the document concerned being
Prav to razlago je zagovarjal generalni pravobranilec Geelhoed, s tem da je navedel, da „jasno izhaja iz besedila“ člena 4(2) in (3) Uredbe �t. 1049/2001, da ti določbi „nalagata institucijam, kadar odločajo o zavrnitvi dostopa do nekaterih dokumentov, da pretehtajo poseben interes, ki naj se ga varuje z zavrnitvijo razkritja (na primer varstvo trgovskih interesov, sodnih postopkov ali postopka odločanja) in splo�ni interes, da bi bil zadevni dokument
Likewise, the passage of time must be taken into account by the institution concerned in so far as it may lessen the intensity of the public interest considerations justifying the general confidentiality of legal advice to the point of tipping the scales in favour of the public interest in transparency.
Prav tako lahko potek časa povzroči izgubo intenzivnosti preudarkov javnega interesa, ki upravičuje načelno zaupnost pravnih mnenj, tako da prevesi tehtnico v korist javnega interesa preglednosti, ki ga mora zadevna institucija upo�tevati.
That could in particular be the case where the legislative act which had been the subject of the legal opinion requested has, in the meantime, been repealed.
Tako je predvsem takrat, kadar je zakonodajni akt, ki je predmet zapro�enega pravnega mnenja, kasneje odpravljen.
the applicant a burden of proof which is far too heavy: how could he show the interest in disclosing a legal opinion notwithstanding the general interest in keeping it confidential when he does not know its content?
preveliko dokazno breme: kako naj bi izkazal interes, ki ga mora imeti za razkritje pravnega mnenja, kljub načelnemu interesu, da se ga ohrani v tajnosti, če ne pozna njegove vsebine?
He will, as in the present case, more often than not be reduced to relying on the overriding public interest in general terms.
Največkrat bo, tako kot je to v obravnavanem primeru, omejen na sklicevanje na splo�en prevladujoč javni interes.
Only the Council can, — and must —, carry out such an assessment on the basis of the content of the document in question and of the specific circumstances of the case.
Le Svet lahko – in mora – to presoditi na podlagi vsebine spornega dokumenta in posebnih okoli�čin obravnavanega primera.
Moreover, in a decision subsequent to the judgment which is the subject of the present appeal, the Court of First Instance seems no longer to wish to place such a burden of proof on the applicant.
Poleg tega se zdi, da Sodi�če prve stopnje v sodbi, ki je poznej�a od izpodbijane sodbe, ni več hotelo naložiti prosilcu takega dokaznega bremena.
It held that the fact that a party requesting access does not invoke a public interest distinct from the principles of transparency and democracy ‘does not automatically imply that it is unnecessary to weigh up the interests at stake’ in so far as ‘the invocation of those same principles may, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, be so pressing that it overrides the need to protect the documents in question.’ 46
V bistvu je presodilo, da dejstvo, da se prosilec za dostop ne sklicuje na noben javni interes, ki bi se razlikoval od načel preglednosti in demokracije, „ne pomeni avtomatično, da uravnoteženje prisotnih interesov ni potrebno“, če „sklicevanje na ta ista načela lahko […] glede na posebne okoli�čine obravnavanega primera pomeni tak pritisk, da presega potrebo po varstvu spornih dokumentov“. 46
In the present case, the Council thus had to balance the need to protect legal advice, related to the safeguarding of the stability of the Community legal order and the independence of the advice of its legal service, against the public interest in transparency.
V obravnavani zadevi bi torej moral Svet tehtati med potrebo po varstvu pravnih mnenj, ki se nana�a na ohranjanje stabilnosti pravnega reda Skupnosti in neodvisnost mnenj njegove pravne službe, ter pravnim interesom preglednosti.
That duty of striking a balance, which lies with the institution concerned, cannot be limited, contrary to the findings of the Court of First Instance in the judgment under appeal, 44to the prior demonstration by the applicant that, having regard to the specific facts of the case, the principle of transparency is so pressing that it overrides the need to protect the legal opinion in question.
Za razliko od stali�ča, ki ga je Sodi�če prve stopnje zavzelo v izpodbijani sodbi, 44ta obveznost zadevne institucije, da tehta, ne sme biti omejena na to, da mora predlagatelj najprej izkazati, da je glede na posebne okoli�čine obravnavanega primera načelo preglednosti močnej�e od potrebe po varstvu spornega pravnega mnenja.
That would be to forget that one of the fundamental reasons for the specific and individual examination imposed on the institution concerned lies in that duty of balancing public interests.
To bi pomenilo, da se pozabi, da je eden od bistvenih razlogov za posamično in konkretno presojo, ki je naložena zadevni instituciji, v nalogi tehtanja javnih interesov.
45 It would above all place on
45To bi prosilcu naložilo predvsem
By holding that the overriding public interest capable of justifying the disclosure of a document must, as a rule, be distinct from the principles of transparency, openness and of democracy or of the participation of citizens in the decisionmaking process which underlie Regulation No 1049/2001, unless the applicant adduces evidence to establish that, having regard to the specific facts of the case, the invocation of those same principles is so pressing that it overrides the need to protect the document requested, the Court of First Instance thus misinterpreted the last phrase of Article 4(2) of Regulation
Sodi�če prve stopnje je s tem, da je presodilo, da se mora prevladujoči javni interes, ki lahko upraviči razkritje dokumenta, načeloma razlikovati od načel preglednosti, odprtosti in demokracije ali sodelovanja državljanov v postopku odločanja, na čemer temelji Uredba �t. 1049/2001, razen če prosilec dokaže, da je v posebnih okoli�činah primera sklicevanje na navedena načela tako nujno, da presega potrebo po varovanju spornega dokumenta, razvilo napačno razlago člena 4(2), zadnji stavek, Uredbe
44 — See paragraph 83 of the judgment under appeal.45 — See API v Commission, paragraph 54.
44 – Glej točko 83 izpodbijane sodbe.45 – Glej zgoraj navedeno sodbo API proti Komisiji, točka 54.
46 — Ibidem, paragraph 97.
46 – Prav tam, točka 97.
demonstrated, the Court of First Instance misinterpreted the concept of an overriding public interest which would justify a derogation from the confidentiality of legal advice, it is neither necessary nor even possible to give an opinion on the merits of the plea raised by Mr Turco in that regard.
dujočega javnega interesa, ki bi upravičil odstopanje od zaupnosti pravnih mnenj, ni treba niti ni mogoče odločiti o utemeljenosti pritožbenega razloga, ki ga je v zvezi s tem navedel M. Turco.
(b) The review of the balancing of public interests
b) Nadzor nad tehtanjem javnih interesov
In so doing, that Court did not give itself an opportunity to review whether the Council had properly assessed the opposing public interests.
S tem naj si Sodi�če prve stopnje ne bi omogočilo preizkusa, ali je Svet pravilno ocenil nasprotujoče si javne interese.
It is, in fact, for that Court of First Instance to review the Council’s balancing of public interests which is required by the use of the exception on the ground of confidentiality in respect of legal advice, whilst leaving to that institution a wide discretion.
Naloga Sodi�ča prve stopnje je, da preveri tehtanje javnih interesov, ki jih zahteva dejstvo, da je zadevna institucija uporabila izjemo zaupnosti pravnih mnenj, s tem da tej instituciji prepusti določeno diskrecijsko pravico.
Effective judicial review will normally require the Court of First Instance to have become aware of the content of the legal advice in question, whilst keeping it confidential from the applicant, as permitted under Article 67(3) of its Rules of Procedure.
Učinkovit sodni nadzor običajno pomeni, da se Sodi�če prve stopnje seznani z vsebino spornega pravnega mnenja, pri čemer ga v razmerju do tožeče stranke ohrani v zaupnosti, kot mu to omogoča člen 67(3) Poslovnika Sodi�ča.
Moreover, for that purpose, the Court of First Instance generally calls on the institution concerned to produce the legal opinion in question.
Poleg tega Sodi�če prve stopnje običajno pozove zadevno institucijo, da predloži sporno pravno mnenje.
47 The usefulness of such a measure of organisation of procedure still, however, depends on an assessment to be carried out by the Court of First Instance in each case.
47Vendar je uporabnost takega ukrepa procesnega vodstva �e vedno odvisna od presoje, ki jo mora opraviti Sodi�če prve stopnje v vsaki zadevi.
In the present case, since, as has been
Ker je v obravnavanem primeru Sodi�če prve stopnje, kot je bilo prikazano, napačno razlagalo pojem prevla-
47 — See Mattila v Council and Commission, paragraph 18; Kuijer v Council, paragraph 21; and Franchet and Byk v Commission, paragraph 36.
47 – Glej zgoraj navedene sodbe Mattila proti Svetu in Komisiji, točka 18; Kuijer proti Svetu, točka 21, ter Franchet in Byk proti Komisiji, točka 36.
Under Article 61 of the Statute of the Court, if the appeal is well founded, the Court of Justice may itself give final judgment in the matter, where the state of the proceedings so permits.
Če je pritožba utemeljena, lahko Sodi�če v skladu s členom 61 Statuta Sodi�ča samo dokončno odloči o zadevi, če stanje postopka to dovoljuje.
That applies in the present case.
To je v obravnavanem primeru mogoče.