natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Such measures could have a particular effect on trade between Member States, especially with regard to the movement of capital and payments, and on the exercise by economic operators of their right of establishment.
Taki ukrepi bi lahko zlasti vplivali na trgovino med državami članicami, predvsem na pretok kapitala in plačil ter tudi na izvr�evanje pravice do ustanavljanja, ki jo imajo gospodarski subjekti.
In addition, they could create distortions of competition, because any differences between the measures unilaterally taken by the Member States could operate to the advantage or disadvantage of the competitive position of certain economic operators although there were no economic reasons for that advantage or disadvantage.
Poleg tega bi lahko pri�lo do izkrivljanja konkurence, saj bi se lahko z morebitnimi razlikami med enostransko sprejetimi ukrepi s strani držav članic dajalo prednost ali �kodilo konkurenčnemu položaju določenih gospodarskih subjektov, ne da bi bile te prednosti ali neugodnosti utemeljene z gospodarskimi razlogi.
The Council’s statement in the fourth recital in the preamble to the contested regulation that Community legislation was necessary ‘notably with a view to avoiding distortion of competition’ is shown, therefore, to be relevant in this connection.
Trditev Sveta iz četrte uvodne izjave izpodbijane uredbe, da je treba sprejeti zakonodajo Skupnosti, „da se prepreči izkrivljanje konkurence“, je zato s tega vidika umestna.
At this point it is appropriate to rule on the effect of the errors of law, recorded in paragraphs 196 and 223 above, on the validity of the judgments under appeal.
V tej fazi je treba odločiti glede vpliva napačno uporabljenega prava, kot je bilo ugotovljeno v točkah 196 in 223 te sodbe, na veljavnost izpodbijanih sodb.
It is to be borne in mind that, according to caselaw, if the grounds of a judgment of the Court of First Instance reveal an infringement of Community law but its operative part appears well founded on other legal grounds the appeal must be dismissed
Treba je spomniti, da je v skladu s sodno prakso treba pritožbo zavrniti, če obrazložitev sodbe Sodi�ča prve stopnje kaže na kr�itev prava Skupnosti, medtem ko je njen izrek vendarle utemeljen z drugimi pravnimi razlogi (glej zlasti sodbo
(see, in particular, Case C-167/04 P JCB Service v Commission [2006] ECR I-8935, paragraph 186 and the caselaw cited).
I-8935, točka 186 in navedena sodna praksa).
Clearly the conclusion reached by the Court of First Instance in paragraphs 135 of Kadi and 158 of Yusuf and Al Barakaat concerning the legal basis of the contested regulation, that is to say, that the Council was competent to adopt that regulation on the joint basis of Articles 60 EC, 301 EC and 308 EC, appears justified on other legal grounds.
Ugotoviti je treba, da je sklep Sodi�ča prve stopnje v točki 135 izpodbijane sodbe Kadi ter v točki 158 izpodbijane sodbe Yusuf in Al Barakaat glede pravne podlage izpodbijane uredbe, in sicer da je bil Svet pristojen za sprejetje te uredbe na kombinirani podlagi členov 60 ES, 301 ES in 308 ES, utemeljen z drugimi pravnimi razlogi.
Although, as held in paragraphs 196 to 204 above, the inclusion of Article 308 EC in the legal basis of the contested regulation cannot be justified by the fact that that measure pursued an objective covered by the CFSP, that provision could nevertheless be held to provide a foundation for the regulation because, as shown in paragraphs 225 to 231 above, that regulation could legitimately be regarded as designed to attain an objective of the Community and as, furthermore, linked to the oper ation of the common market within the meaning of Article 308 EC.
Čeprav se vključitve člena 308 ES v pravno podlago izpodbijane uredbe, kot je bilo navedeno v točkah od 196 do 204 te sodbe, ne more utemeljiti s tem, da ta akt zasleduje cilj, ki izhaja iz SZVP, bi lahko to uredbo vendarle utemeljili s to določbo, saj je bilo legitimno �teti, kot izhaja iz točk od 225 do 231 te sodbe, da je namen te uredbe uresničitev cilja Skupnosti in da je poleg tega povezana z delovanjem skupnega trga v smislu člena 308 ES.
Moreover, adding Article 308 EC to the legal basis of the contested regulation enabled the European Parliament to take part in the decision-making process relating to the measures at issue which are specifically aimed at individuals whereas, under Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, no role is provided for that institution.
Poleg tega je njegova vključitev v pravno podlago izpodbijane uredbe Evropskemu parlamentu omogočila udeležbo v postopku odločanja glede zadevnih ukrepov, ki se nana�ajo posebej na posameznike, medtem ko v okviru členov 60 ES in 301 ES za to institucijo ni predvidena nobena vloga.
Accordingly, the grounds of appeal directed against the judgments under appeal inasmuch as by the latter the Court of First Instance decided that Articles 60 EC, 301 EC and 308 EC constituted the legal basis of the contested regulation must be dismissed in their entirety as unfounded.
Zato je treba pritožbene razloge, uperjene zoper izpodbijani sodbi, kot je presodilo Sodi�če prve stopnje, da so členi 60 ES, 301 ES in 308 ES pravna podlaga za izpodbijano uredbo, v celoti zavrniti kot neutemeljene.
Concerning the ground of appeal relating to infringement of Article 249 EC
Pritožbeni razlog: kršitev člena 249 ES
By its second ground of appeal Al Barakaat complains that the Court of First Instance held, in paragraph 188 of Yusuf and Al Barakaat, that the contested regulation satisfies the condition of general application laid down in Article 249 EC, given that it is addressed in a general and abstract manner to all persons who might actually hold funds belonging to one or more persons mentioned in the Annex to the regulation.
Al Barakaat z drugim pritožbenim razlogom Sodi�ču prve stopnje očita, da je v točki 188 izpodbijane sodbe Yusuf in Al Barakaat presodilo, da je izpodbijana uredba zadostila zahtevi glede splo�ne uporabe, določene v členu 249 ES, saj je splo�no in abstraktno naslovljena na skupino oseb, ki lahko ima na voljo sredstva, ki pripadajo enemu posamezniku ali več posameznikom, ki so navedeni v prilogi k tej uredbi.
Al Barakaat maintains that it is wrong not to consider the person whose funds are frozen as the addressee of the act concerned, because the implementation of the decision must reasonably be founded on a legal measure directed against the person in possession of the resources.
Al Barakaat poudarja, „da ker se mora izvr�itev odločitve, na razumen način, opreti na pravni ukrep, usmerjen zoper tiste, ki razpolagajo s sredstvi, ni pravilno, da se posameznikov, katerih sredstva so zamrznjena, ne �teje za naslovnike zadevnega akta“.
What is more, according to that appellant, it is contradictory to state, on the one hand, in paragraph 112 of Yusuf and Al Barakaat, that the measures at issue were restrictive measures directly affecting individuals or organisations and, on the other, in paragraph 188 of that judgment, that those measures were not addressed to those individuals or organisations, but rather constituted a kind of implementing measure addressed to other persons.
Poleg tega bi bilo v točki 112 izpodbijane sodbe Yusuf in Al Barakaat protislovno trditi, da gre za omejevalne ukrepe, ki prizadenejo neposredno posameznike ali organizacije, v točki 188 iste sodbe pa, da se ti ukrepi ne nana�ajo na te posameznike ali organizacije, temveč so oblika izvedbenih pravil, naslovljenih na druge posameznike.
The Kingdom of Spain, the United Kingdom, the Council and the Commission broadly endorse the analysis of the Court of First Instance.
Kraljevina Španija, Združeno kraljestvo ter Svet in Komisija v bistvu odobravajo analizo Sodi�ča prve stopnje.
The Court of First Instance rightly held in paragraphs 184 to 188 of Yusuf and Al Barakaat that the fact that the persons and entities who are the subject of the restrictive measures imposed by the contested regulation are expressly named in Annex I thereto, so that they appear to be directly and individually concerned by it, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, does not mean that that act is not of general application within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 249 EC or that it is not to be classified as a regulation.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je v točkah od 184 do 188 izpodbijane sodbe Yusuf in Al Barakaat pravilno presodilo, da okoli�čina, da so te osebe in subjekti – ki so predmet omejevalnih ukrepov, ki jih nalaga sporna uredba – poimensko navedeni v Prilogi I k izpodbijani uredbi, tako da se zdi, da jih ta neposredno in posamično zadeva v smislu člena 230, četrti odstavek, ES, ne pomeni, da se ta akt ne uporablja splo�no v smislu člena 249, drugi odstavek, ES in da se ne more opredeliti kot uredba.
In fact, while it is true that the contested regulation imposes restrictive measures on the persons and entities whose names appear in the exhaustive list that constitutes Annex I thereto, a list which is, moreover, regularly amended by the removal or addition of names, so that it is kept in line with the summary list, the fact remains that the persons to whom it is addressed are determined in a general and abstract manner.
Čeprav je res, da izpodbijana uredba nalaga omejevalne ukrepe posameznikom in subjektom, katerih imena so na izčrpnem seznamu, ki sestavlja njeno Prilogo I in se poleg tega redno posodablja, s tem ko se imena odstranjujejo ali dodajajo, tako da ostane skladen s konsolidiranim seznamom, je vendarle treba ugotoviti, da so naslovniki te uredbe opredeljeni na splo�no in abstraktno.
The contested regulation, like Resolution 1390 (2002) which it is designed to put into effect, lays down a prohibition, worded exceptionally broadly, of making available funds and economic resources to those persons or entities (see, to that effect, Möllendorf and Möllendorf­Niehuus, paragraphs 50 to 55).
Izpodbijana uredba, tako kot Resolucija 1390(2002), ki jo izvaja, vsebuje posebej �iroko zapisano prepoved, da se navedenim posameznikom in subjektom da na voljo gospodarska sredstva in vire (glej v tem smislu zgoraj navedeno sodbo Möllendorf in Möllendorf-Niehuus, točke od 50 do 55).
As the Court of First Instance quite rightly held in paragraphs 186 and 188 of Yusuf and Al Barakaat, that prohibition is addressed to whoever might actually hold the funds or economic resources in question.
Kot je Sodi�če prve stopnje pravilno ugotovilo v točkah 186 in 188 izpodbijane sodbe Yusuf in Al Barakaat, se ta prepoved nana�a na vsakogar, ki bi lahko imel na voljo zadevna materialna sredstva ali gospodarske vire.
That is how that prohibition falls to be applied in circumstances such as those of the case giving rise to the judgment in Möllendorf and Möllendorf­Niehuus, which concerned the question whether the contested regulation forbids the final registration
Taka prepoved se uporabi tudi v okoli�činah, kot so v zadevi, v kateri je bila izrečena zgoraj navedena sodba Möllendorf in Möllendorf-Niehuus, ki se je nana�ala na vpra�anje, ali izpodbijana uredba prepoveduje končno vknjižbo prenosa lastninske
2008 — JOINED CASES C-402/05 P AND C-415/05 P of the transfer of ownership of real property in a land register following the conclusion of a contract of sale if one of the purchasers is a natural person appearing in the list in Annex I to the regulation.
2008 – ZDRUŽENI ZADEVI C-402/05 P IN C-415/05 P pravice na nepremičnini v zemlji�ko knjigo po sklenitvi prodajne pogodbe, če je eden od kupcev fizična oseba, vpisana na seznam iz Priloge I k tej uredbi.
In paragraph 60 of that judgment, the Court decided that a transaction such as that registration is prohibited under Article 2(3) of the contested regulation if, in consequence of that transaction, an economic resource would be made available to a person entered in that list, which would enable that person to obtain funds, goods or services.
Sodi�če je v točki 60 te sodbe odločilo, da je transakcija, kot je ta vknjižba, v skladu s členom 2(3) Uredbe �t. 881/2002 prepovedana, ker bi to pomenilo dajanje gospodar -skega vira na voljo osebi, vpisani na ta seznam, kar bi ji omogočalo pridobiti sredstva, blago in storitve.
In the light of the foregoing, Al Barakaat’s ground of appeal relating to infringement of Article 249 EC must also be dismissed as unfounded.
Ob upo�tevanju vsega navedenega je treba pritožbeni razlog, ki ga je navedel Al Barakaat glede kr�itve člena 249 ES, prav tako zavrniti kot neutemeljen.
Concerning the grounds of appeal relating to infringement of certain fundamental rights
Pritožbeni razlog: kršitev določenih temeljnih pravic
The heads of claim concerning the part of the judgments under appeal relating to the limits of the review by the Community judicature, in the light of fundamental rights, of the internal lawfulness of the contested regulation
Očitki, ki se nana�ajo na del izpodbijanih sodb v zvezi z nadzorom notranje zakonitosti izpodbijane uredbe s strani sodi�ča Skupnosti, z vidika temeljnih pravic
KADI AND AL BARAKAAT INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION v COUNCIL AND COMMISSION gave rise to other errors of law in the assessment of the pleas in law relating to breach of certain of the applicant’s specific fundamental rights.
KADI IN AL BARAKAAT INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION PROTI SVETU IN KOMISIJI mednarodnega prava, kar naj bi nadalje povzročilo napačno uporabo prava pri presoji tožbenih razlogov v zvezi s kr�itvijo nekaterih posebnih temeljnih pravic pritožnika.
That part contains five claims.
Ta del vsebuje pet očitkov.
2008 — JOINED CASES C-402/05 P AND C-415/05 P support of this enjoy immunity from jurisdiction would have to apply generally, and the matters covered by jus cogens would not then constitute an exception to that principle.
2008 – ZDRUŽENI ZADEVI C-402/05 P IN C-415/05 P predmet sodnega nadzora in so deležne sodne imunitete, uporabilo na splo�no, ne da bi vpra�anja, ki izhajajo iz ius cogens, pomenila izjemo od tega načela.
According to Mr Kadi, the re-examination procedure before the Sanctions Committee, based on diplomatic protection, does not afford protection of human rights equivalent to that guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’), as demanded by the European Court of Human Rights in Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland of 30 June 2005, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2005-VI, § 155.
Kadija pa postopek ponovnega preizkusa pred sankcijskem odborom, ki temelji na diplomatski za�čiti, ne nudi varstva človekovih pravic, ki je enakovredno tistemu, ki ga zagotavlja Evropska konvencija o varstvu človekovih pravic in temeljnih svobo�čin, podpisana v Rimu 4. novembra 1950 (v nadaljevanju: EKČP), kakr�no zahteva ESČP v sodbi z dne 30. junija 2005 v zadevi Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi (Bosphorus Airways) proti Irski (Recueil des arrêts et décisions 2005-VI, točka 155).
Furthermore, he states that that head of claim is not a new ground of appeal but a development of the fundamental proposition, raised in the notice of appeal, that the Community is bound, when it decides to act by legislative means to give effect to a resolution of the Security Council, to ensure, as a condition of the lawfulness of the legislation it intends thus to introduce, that that legislation should observe the minimum criteria in the field of human rights.
Še več, ta očitek naj ne bi pomenil novega pritožbenega razloga, temveč nadgradnjo temeljnega predloga, navedenega v pritožbi, da je Skupnost, ko sprejme odločitev za izvajanje resolucije Varnostnega sveta s sprejetjem zakonodaje, zavezana skrbeti za to, da kot pogoj zakonitosti zakonodaje, ki jo namerava vpeljati, leta upo�teva minimalna merila s področja človekovih pravic.
By the first part of its third ground of appeal, Al Barakaat criticises the Court of First Instance’s preliminary observations in Yusuf and Al Barakaat on the relationship between the international legal order under the United Nations and the domestic legal order or the Community legal order and on the extent of the review of lawfulness which the Court of First Instance had to carry out.
Al Barakaat s prvim delom tretjega pritožbenega razloga graja uvodne ugotovitve Sodi�ča prve stopnje v izpodbijani sodbi Yusuf in Al Barakaat glede povezave med mednarodnim pravnim redom Združenih narodov in nacionalnim pravnim redom ali pravnim redom Skupnosti ter glede obsega nadzora zakonitosti, ki ga je Sodi�če prve stopnje moralo izvesti.
A resolution of the Security Council, binding per se in public international law, can have legal effect vis-à-vis persons in a State only if it has been implemented in accordance with the law in force.
Resolucija Varnostnega sveta, ki je zavezujoča po mednarodnem javnem pravu, bi lahko imela pravni učinek za posameznike v državi le, če je bila izvedena v skladu z veljavnim pravom.
In this appellant’s view, there are no legal grounds for inferring the existence of special treatment or of an exception with regard to implementation of resolutions of the Security Council to the effect that a Community regulation intended to carry out such implementation need not accord with Community rules on the adoption of regulations.
Obstajala naj ne bi nobena pravna podlaga za posebno obravnavanje ali izjemo glede izvajanja resolucij Varnostnega sveta, v smislu, da ne bi bilo treba, da je uredba Skupnosti, ki določa tak�no izvajanje, skladna s pravili Skupnosti glede sprejetja uredb.
Conversely, the French Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the Council approve, in essence, the analysis made in that connection by the Court of First Instance in the judgments under appeal and endorse the conclusion drawn therefrom that, so far as concerns the internal lawfulness of the contested regulation, the latter, inasmuch as it puts into effect resolutions adopted by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in principle escapes all review by the Community judicature, even concerning observance of fundamental rights, and so for that reason enjoys immunity from jurisdiction.
Francoska republika, Kraljevina Nizozemska, Združeno kraljestvo in Svet pa se nasprotno v bistvu strinjajo z analizo, ki jo je v zvezi s tem v izpodbijanih sodbah opravilo Sodi�če prve stopnje, ter z njegovimi sklepi glede notranje zakonitosti izpodbijane uredbe, in sicer da se ta, kolikor izvaja resolucije Varnostnega sveta, ki so bile sprejete na podlagi VII. poglavja Ustanovne listine Združenih narodov, načeloma izogne vsakr�nemu nadzoru sodi�ča Skupnosti, vključno glede spo�tovanja temeljnih pravic, in je zato v tem okviru deležna sodne imunitete.
However, unlike the Court of First Instance, those parties take the view that no review of the internal lawfulness of resolutions of the Security Council may be carried out by the Community judicature.
Vendar te stranke, v nasprotju s Sodi�čem prve stopnje, menijo, da sodi�ča Skupnosti ne morejo izvr�evati nobenega nadzora notranje zakonitosti resolucij Varnostnega sveta.
They therefore complain that the Court of First Instance decided that such review was possible in the light of jus cogens.
Sodi�ču prve stopnje zato očitajo odločitev, da je tak nadzor mogoč glede na ius cogens.
They argue that the judgments under appeal, by allowing an exception in that regard, but without identifying its legal basis, in particular under the provisions of the Treaty, are inconsistent, inasmuch as the arguments excluding in a general manner the exercise of judicial review by the Community judicature of resolutions of the Security Council also militate against the recognition of powers to carry out such a review solely in the light of jus cogens.
Izpodbijani sodbi naj bi bili, kolikor v zvezi s tem dopu�čata izjemo, ne da bi opredelili njeno pravno podlago, zlasti na podlagi določb Pogodbe, protislovni, če se s trditvami, ki na splo�no izključujejo izvajanje sodnega nadzora resolucij Varnostnega sveta s strani sodi�č Skupnosti, prav tako nasprotuje priznanju pristojnosti za izvr�evanje tak�nega nadzora samo z vidika ius cogens.
Further, the French Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the Commission consider that the Court of First Instance erred in law when it ruled that the fundamental rights at issue in these cases fell within the scope of jus cogens.
Poleg tega Francoska republika, Kraljevina Nizozemska, Združeno kraljestvo in Komisija menijo, da Sodi�če prve stopnje ni pravilno uporabilo prava, ko je presodilo, da zadevne temeljne pravice v tej zadevi izhajajo iz ius cogens.
A norm may be classified as jus cogens only when no derogation from it is possible.
Pravilo se lahko opredeli kot ius cogens samo, če ne dopu�ča nobene izjeme.
The rights invoked in the cases in point — the right to a fair hearing and the fight to respect for property — are, however, subject to limitations and exceptions.
Pravici, navedeni v tem primeru – pravica do po�tenega sojenja in pravica do spo�tovanja lastnine – pa sta predmet omejitev in izjem.
The United Kingdom has brought a cross-appeal in this connection, seeking to have set aside the parts of the judgments under appeal dealing with jus cogens, viz., paragraphs 226 to 231 of Kadi and 277 to 281 of Yusuf and Al Barakaat.
Združeno kraljestvo je v tej zvezi vložilo nasprotno pritožbo za razveljavitev dela izpodbijanih sodb, ki se nana�a na ius cogens, namreč točk od 226 do 231 izpodbijane sodbe Kadi ter od 277 do 281 izpodbijane sodbe Yusuf in Al Barakaat.
The Commission maintains that two reasons may justify not giving effect to an obligation to implement resolutions of the Security Council such as those at issue, whose strict terms leave the Community authorities no discretion in their implementation; they are, first, the case in which the resolution concerned is contrary to jus cogens and, second, the case in which that resolution falls outside the ambit of or violates the purposes and principles of the United Nations and was therefore adopted ultra vires.
Komisija zatrjuje, da se z dvema razlogoma lahko upraviči, da se ne sprejme obveznosti izvajanja resolucij Varnostnega sveta, kakr�ne so v tem primeru, v katerih natančni izrazi organom Skupnosti pri izvajanju teh resolucij ne dopu�čajo nobenega prostora pri razlagi, in sicer če bi bila zadevna resolucija v nasprotju z ius cogens in če bi ta resolucija spadala na področje uporabe ali kr�ila cilje in načela Združenih narodov ter bi bila zato sprejeta ultra vires.
The Commission takes the view that, given that, according to Article 24(2) of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council is bound by the purposes and principles of the United Nations, including, according to Article 1(3) of the Charter, the development of human rights and their promotion, an act adopted by that body in breach of human rights, including the fundamental rights of the individuals at issue, might be regarded as having been adopted ultra vires and, therefore, as not binding on the Community.
Ker je Varnostni svet v skladu s členom 24(2) Ustanovne listine Združenih narodov zavezan s cilji in načeli Združenih narodov, vključno z razvijanjem in s podpiranjem človekovih pravic v skladu s členom 1(3) te listine, se za akt, ki ga sprejme ta organ ob njihovi kr�itvi, namreč lahko �teje, da je bil sprejet ultra vires in za Skupnost zato ni zavezujoč.
In the Commission’s view, however, the Court of First Instance was right to hold that the Community judicature cannot in principle review the validity of a resolution of the Security Council in the light of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Vendar Komisija meni, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje pravilno presodilo, da sodi�če Skupnosti načeloma ne more nadzorovati veljavnosti resolucije Varnostnega sveta glede na cilje in načela Ustanovne listine Združenih narodov.