natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In this regard, on 19 October, the Commission hosted a workshop at which representatives of national competition authorities met to exchange experiences and to discuss the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002.
V zvezi s tem je Komisija 19. oktobra gostila delavnico, na kateri so predstavniki nacionalnih organov za konkurenco izmenjali izkušnje in razpravljali o izvajanju Uredbe (ES) št. 1400/2002.
In October, the Commission published a study on access to technical information by independent operators in the car sector. e study, which IKA (University of Aachen) carried out at the Commission’s request, looked at how manufacturers have complied with the regulation in terms of providing technical information to garages, tool manufacturers and publishers.
Komisija je oktobra objavila študijo o dostopu neodvisnih operaterjev do tehničnih informacij v avtomobilski industriji. Študija, ki jo je na prošnjo Komisije izvedla IKA (Univerza v Aachnu), je preučevala, kako so proizvajalci izvajali uredbo v smislu zagotavljanja tehničnih informacij avtomehaničnim delavnicam, proizvajalcem orodij in izdajateljem.
Positive trends as regards car price dierentials
Pozitivni trendi pri razlikah v cenah avtomobilov
In March and July, the Commission published reports on car price di erentials within the European Union.
Komisija je marca in julija objavila poročili o razlikah v cenah avtomobilov znotraj Evropske unije.
While July 2003’s issue of the report showed that for one third of models, price di erentials exceeded 20 % across the euro area, the proportion fell to nearly one quarter of the models in the latest issue.
Medtem ko izdaja poročila iz julija 2003 kaže, da so za eno tretjino modelov razlike v cenah presegle 20 % na celotnem območju eura, se je delež v zadnji izdaji znižal na skoraj eno četrtino modelov.
Compared with July 2003, the price index for cars in the EU in July 2004 has increased by only 0.6 % compared to 2.3 % for headline in ation.
V primerjavi z julijem 2003 je cenovni indeks za avtomobile v EU julija 2004 narasel za samo 0,6 %, v primerjavi z 2,3-odstotnim povečanjem izmerjene in acije.
For the rst time, last July’s issue of the car price report includes prices in the 10 new Member States, which do not appear to be very di erent from those in the EU-15: some models are cheaper in some new Member Sates, but others are not.
Zadnja julijska izdaja poročila o cenah avtomobilov prvič zajema cene v desetih novih državah članicah, ki se ne razlikujejo zelo od držav članic EU 15: nekateri modeli so cenejši v nekaterih novih državah članicah, medtem ko drugi niso.
Compared with July 2003, the price index for cars in July 2004 significantly increased in Poland (+ 8.4 %) and Latvia (+ 4.1 %) but decreased in Estonia (– 6.8 %), Lithuania (– 4.9 %) and the Czech Republic (– 3.3 %).
V primerjavi z julijem 2003 je cenovni indeks za avtomobile julija 2004 pomembno narasel na Poljskem (+8,4 %) in v Latviji (+4,1 %) ter se znižal v Estoniji (–6,8 %), Litvi (–4,9 %) in na Češkem (–3,3 %).
Porsche distribution and after-sales service agreements
Sporazumi družbe Porsche o distribuciji in pogarancijskem vzdrževanju
On 30 April, the Commission closed proceedings in respect of the new standard importer, dealer and authorised repairer agreements that Porsche had notified. e carmaker agreed to modify these agreements, which are used across the EU and EEA, so as to ensure that they no longer contain any of the ‘hardcore restrictions’ set out in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002.
Komisija je 30. aprila zaključila postopke v zvezi z novimi standardnimi sporazumi o uvozu, prodaji in pooblaščenih servisih, ki jih je priglasila družba Porsche. Proizvajalec avtomobilov se je strinjal, da bo spremenil te sporazume, ki se uporabljajo po vsej EU in EGP, da bi tako zagotovil, da ne bodo več vsebovali nobenih „nedopustnih omejitev“, določenih v členu 4 Uredbe (ES) št. 1400/2002.
In particular, the amended distribution agreements no longer restrict the ability of Porsche dealers to subcontract the provision of a er-sales services to any authorised Porsche service centre, while Porsche service centres are no longer obliged to sell new cars.
Spremenjeni sporazumi o distribuciji predvsem ne omejujejo več zmogljivosti trgovcev družbe Porsche, da sklepajo pogodbe o opravljanju pogarancijskega vzdrževanja s katerim koli pooblaščenim servisnim centrom družbe Porsche, medtem ko za servisne centre družbe Porsche ne velja več obveza, da prodajajo nove avtomobile.
e Commission decided not to pursue its investigation further as regards other provisions of Porsche’s distribution agreements, since it appeared that Porsche had a share of less than 5 % on all national markets in the EU for the sale of highend sports cars and sport utility vehicles.
Komisija se je odločila, da ne bo nadaljevala svoje preiskave o drugih določbah sporazumov družbe Porsche o distribuciji, ker se je izkazalo, da je imela družba Porsche na vseh nacionalnih trgih EU za prodajo visokokakovostnih športnih avtomobilov in športnih terenskih avtomobilov manj kot 5-odstotni delež.
It is to be recalled that the de minimis notice explains that a supplier that operates a distribution system in a market where almost all operators use the same type of restrictive agreements does not significantly contribute to the cumulative e ect if its market share does not exceed 5 % and if the agreements do not contain hardcore restrictions.
Treba je opozoriti, da obvestilo de minimis ugotavlja, da ponudnik, ki deluje v distribucijskem sistemu na trgu, kjer skoraj vsi operaterji uporabljajo isto vrsto omejevalnih sporazumov, ne prispeva opazno h kumulativnemu učinku, če njegov tržni delež ne preseže 5 % in če sporazumi ne vsebujejo nedopustnih omejitev.
As regards a er-sales agreements, Porsche has accepted that it may not come within the scope of the block exemption if it uses quantitative selective distribution for its network of authorised Porsche service centres, since its network’s share of the market for the repair of Porsche cars is above 30 %, and the de minimis notice clearly does not apply. e use of purely qualitative selection opens the network to qualified operators who wish to run an authorised Porsche service centre, and to that end Porsche agreed to make the relevant qualitative criteria available to any interested repairer.
Kar zadeva sporazume o pogarancijskem vzdrževanju, je družba Porsche sprejela, da uporaba kvantitativne selektivne distribucije za svojo mrežo pooblaščenih servisnih centrov ni deležna skupinske izjeme, saj je tržni delež njene mreže za popravilo avtomobilov znamke Porsche višji od 30 % in obvestilo de minimis v tem primeru očitno ne velja. Uporaba samo kakovostne selekcije odpira mrežo usposobljenim operaterjem, ki bi želeli očitno pooblaščen servisni center Porsche, zato se je družba Porsche strinjala, da bo vsakemu zainteresiranemu serviserju dala na razpolago ustrezna kakovostna merila.
On 20 October, the Commission adopted a decision based on Article 86 regarding certain provisions of Germany’s postal regulatory framework which bar commercial mail preparation rms from earning discounts for handing over pre-sorted letters at Deutsche Post AG’s (DPAG) sorting centres. Based on a complaint led by
Komisija je 20. oktobra sprejela odločbo na podlagi člena 86 o nekaterih določbah nemškega poštnega regulativnega okvira, ki komercialnim družbam za pripravo pošte prepoveduje pridobivanje popustov za predajo predhodno razvrščenih
COMP/38.745, not yet published in the O cial Journal.
COMP/38.745, še ni bilo objavljeno v Uradnem listu.
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2004 – Zvezek 1 pisem v centru za razvrščanje družbe Deutsche Post AG’s (DPAG).
BdKEP, a German association of postal service providers, the Commission found that the contested provisions of the German postal law induce DPAG to abuse its dominant position, thereby infringing Article 82, in two ways.
Na podlagi pritožbe, ki jo je vložila družba BdKEP, nemško združenje ponudnikov poštnih storitev, je Komisija ugotovila, da sporne določbe nemške poštne zakonodaje družbo DPAG na dva načina napeljujejo k zlorabi njenega prevladujočega položaja in s tem kršitvi člena 82.
First, the provisions prompt DPAG to extend its market power from the (reserved) market for upstream basic postal services into the (liberalised) market for mail preparation services.
Prvič, določbe spodbujajo družbo DPAG k širjenju tržne moči od trga (z omejeno konkurenco) za osnovne poštne storitve na začetku verige na (liberaliziran) trg storitev za pripravo pošte.
Secondly, they induce DPAG to discriminate between, on the one hand, bulk mailers who have access to the downstream sorting centres and the related discounts and, on the other, commercial providers of such services who do not have access to these discounts. is places a major competitive disadvantage on these rms and prevents the German mail preparation market from developing its potential.
Drugič, te odločbe spodbujajo družbo DPAG k diskriminaciji pošiljateljev masovne pošte, ki imajo dostop do centrov za razvrščanje navzdol v verigi in s tem povezanih popustov, na eni strani, ter na drugi strani komercialnih ponudnikov takšnih storitev, ki nimajo dostopa do teh popustov. To pomeni veliko konkurenčno slabost za te družbe in nemškemu trgu za pripravo pošte preprečuje, da bi izkoristil vse svoje možnosti.
DPAG has the exclusive right to clear, sort, transport and deliver letters weighing less than 100 grams (the socalled reserved area). e provision of mail preparation services, including the pre-sorting of the mail and its transport from the sender’s premises to a chosen access point to the incumbent’s network, does not fall within the ambit of the reserved area of the postal directive (83).
Družba DPAG ima izključno pravico za potrjevanje, razvrščanje, transport in dostavo pisem, ki tehtajo manj kot 100 gramov (tako imenovano rezervirano območje).
101. e Commission found that the German government failed to demonstrate that barring commercial providers from the discounts mentioned above was justified on the basis of Article 86(2) and recalled that, as established in its 1998 notice on the application of the competition rules to the postal sector (84), commercial mail preparation rms should be able to choose freely from amongst available access points to the public postal network on a non-discriminatory basis (85).
Opravljanje storitev priprave pošte, vključno z njenim predhodnim razvrščanjem in transportom od pošiljatelja do izbrane točke dostopa do omrežja obstoječega lastnika, ne spada v področje rezerviranega območja Poštne direktive. (83)
On 19 November, the Commission adopted a decision rejecting the complaint led by l’Union Française de l’Express and three of its members, DHL, FedEx and Crie,
Komisija je ugotovila, da nemška vlada ni dokazala, da je bila prepoved dostopa komercialnih ponudnikov do zgoraj navedenih popustov upravičena na podlagi člena 86(2), ter opozorila, da morajo, kot je določeno v njenem obvestilu iz leta 1998 o uporabi pravil konkurence v poštnem sektorju (84), imeti komercialna podjetja za pripravo pošte možnost svobodne izbire razpoložljivih točk dostopa do javnih poštnih omrežij na nediskriminacijski podlagi (85).
Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service (OJ L 15, 21.1.1998), as amended by Directive 2002/39/EC of 10 June 2002 (OJ L 176, 5.7.2002).Notice from the Commission on the application of the competition rules to the postal sector and on the assessment of certain State measures relating to postal services (OJ C 39, 6.2.1998).Both Germany and DPAG have appealed against this decision: Cases T-490/04 and T-493/04.COMP/38.663 — UFEX.
Direktiva 97/67/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 15. decembra 1997 o skupnih pravilih za razvoj notranjega trga poštnih storitev Skupnosti in izboljšanje kakovosti storitev (UL L 15, 21.1.1998), kakor je bila spremenjena z Direktivo 2002/39/ES z dne 10. junija 2002 (UL L 176, 5.7.2002).Obvestilo Komisije o uporabi pravil konkurence v poštnem sektorju in o oceni nekaterih državnih ukrepov v zvezi s poštnimi storitvami (UL C 39, 6.2.1998).Nemčija in družba DPAG sta se pritožili zoper to odločbo: zadevi T-490/04 in T-493/04.
In relation to the lack of Community interest in further investigating the case, the new rejection decision notes, among other grounds, that the practices complained of — which have not in any event been duly established — were brought to an end more than 10 years ago and that, since then, no lasting anticompetitive e ects attributable to them had been apparent in the relevant market.
V zvezi s pomanjkanjem interesa Skupnosti za nadaljnjo preiskavo primera nova odločba o zavrnitvi med drugim navaja, da je bilo sporno ravnanje – ki nikakor ni bilo dokončno ugotovljeno – končano pred več kot desetimi leti in da od takrat na upoštevnem trgu niso bili vidni nobeni trajni protikonkurenčni učinki, ki bi jih lahko pripisali temu ravnanju.
C ECN: OVERVIEW OF COOPERATION
C EVROPSKA MREŽA ZA KONKURENCO ECN: PREGLED SODELOVANJA
One of the key objectives of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and of the modernisation package was greater involvement of national public enforcers in the application of EU competition rules.
Eden ključnih ciljev Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003 in posodobitvenega svežnja je bil večja vključenost nacionalnih javnih organov za izvrševanje pri uporabi pravil konkurence EU.
104. e ECN is composed of the national competition authorities (NCAs) designated pursuant to Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and the Commission.
Člena 11 in 12 Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003 ter obvestilo o mreži za konkurenco (87) so glavni stebri, ki podpirajo delovanje sistema in sodelovanje v okviru Evropske mreže za konkurenco (ECN).
See above section I.A.I.
COMP/38.663 – UFEX.Glej zgoraj oddelek I.A.I.
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1
Leto 2004 je bilo prvo leto, v katerem je Evropska mreža za konkurenco v celoti delovala in je bila vključena v posamezne primere uporabe pravil konkurence EU.
In order to allow e cient allocation of cases, authorities within the network inform each other before or just a er the rst formal investigative measure in all cases involving the application of Article 81 or 82.
Da se zagotovi učinkovita dodelitev primerov, se organi v mreži med seboj obvestijo pred začetkom prvega uradnega preiskovalnega ukrepa ali nemudoma po njem v vseh primerih, ki se nanašajo na uporabo člena 81 ali 82.
In 2004, a total of 298 cases were submitted to the network: 99 by the Commission and 199 by the NCAs.
Leta 2004 je bilo mreži predloženih 298 primerov: 99 jih je predložila Komisija in 199 nacionalni organi za konkurenco.
As expected, reallocation of cases notified to the network was extremely rare (less than 1 % of the cases).
Kot je bilo pričakovano, je bila ponovna dodelitev primerov, priglašenih mreži, izredno redka (manj kot 1 % primerov).
Cases remain normally with the authority which started to investigate them.
Primeri običajno ostanejo v pristojnosti organa, ki je začel njihovo preiskavo.
In one instance, reallocation occurred at a later stage when the Commission opened proceedings in order to accept commitments for the whole of the Community (88) although some NCAs were acting on the case.
V enem primeru je do ponovne dodelitve prišlo pozneje, ko je Komisija začela postopek, da bi sprejela zaveze za celotno Skupnost (88), čeprav so o primeru odločali nekateri nacionalni organi za konkurenco.
Mutual assistance in fact-finding nding
Medsebojna pomoč pri poizvedbah
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 provides the network members with tools allowing them to assist each other by carrying out investigative measures on behalf of another authority (Article 22) and, more generally, by exchanging information (Article 12).
Uredba (ES) št. 1/2003 članom mreže zagotavlja orodja, ki jim omogočajo medsebojno pomoč z izvedbo preiskovalnih ukrepov v imenu drugega organa (člen 22) in splošneje z izmenjavo informacij (člen 12).
From the very rst days of application of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, Article 22 was used by several authorities: inspections were carried out at the request of several NCAs and the information gathered was transmitted pursuant to Article 12.
Že od prvih dni veljavnosti Uredbe (ES) 1/2003 je člen 22 uporabilo več organov za konkurenco: pregledi so bili opravljeni na zahtevo več nacionalnih organov za konkurenco, zbrane informacije pa so bile poslane v skladu s členom 12.
In total, Article 22 was used 11 times in eight months.
Člen 22 je bil v osmih mesecih skupaj uporabljen enajstkrat.
General convergence of national laws
Od teh primerov se jih je 18 nanašalo na člen 81, 13 na člen 82 in 2 na oba.
Almost all of these changes resulted in a higher degree of convergence between national systems and Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.
Skoraj vse te spremembe so povzročile večjo stopnjo zbliževanja med nacionalnimi sistemi in Uredbo (ES) št. 1/2003.
In all, 20 Member States abolished or are planning to abolish their national notification system, and 17 have fully or partially convergent leniency programmes. ese developments contribute greatly to simplification of compliance for business and to better functioning of the system.
Skupaj je 20 držav članic odpravilo svoje nacionalne sisteme priglasitve ali načrtuje njihovo odpravo, 17 pa jih ima v celoti ali delno skladne programe prizanesljivosti. Ta napredek veliko prispeva k poenostavitvi skladnosti poslovanja in k boljšemu delovanju sistema.
Application of EU competition rules by national courts in the EU: Report on the implementation of Article 15 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003
Uporaba pravil konkurence ES v nacionalnih sodiščih EU: Poročilo o izvajanju člena 15 Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003
Article 15(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 gives national judges the option of asking the Commission for information in its possession or for an opinion on questions concerning application of the EU competition rules.
Člen 15(1) Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003 zagotavlja nacionalnim sodnikom možnost, da lahko zaprosijo Komisijo za informacije, s katerimi razpolaga, ali mnenje o vprašanjih glede uporabe pravil konkurence EU.
In 2004 the Commission received nine requests for an opinion; six requests came from Spanish courts and all dealt with a similar type of distribution agreement in the energy sector, which mainly raised questions as to the distinction between agent and retailer within the meaning of EU competition law and contained both clauses relating to the setting of a maximum fuel retail price and non-compete clauses for fuel that might result in foreclosure of the market. e Commission’s replies to these six requests were largely based on its preliminary assessment in the Repsol CPP case (89).
Leta 2004 je Komisija prejela devet zahtevkov za mnenje; šest zahtevkov so poslala španska sodišča in vsi so se nanašali na podobno vrsto sporazumov o distribuciji na področju energetike, ki so predvsem sprožili vprašanja o razliki med zastopnikom in prodajalcem na drobno v smislu konkurenčnega prava EU ter so vsebovali klavzule o določitvi najvišje maloprodajne cene za gorivo in klavzule o nekonkuriranju za gorivo, ki bi lahko pripeljale do vnaprejšnje izključitve trga.
See point 6 of the Article 27(4) notice (OJ C 258, 20.10.2004).
Glej točko 6 člena 27(4) obvestila (UL C 258, 20.10.2004).
Article 15(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 allows the Commission and NCAs to submit observations to national courts on issues relating to the application of EU competition rules. e Commission has so far not used this possibility, but the Belgian, French and German competition authorities have.
Člen 15(3) Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003 Komisiji in nacionalnim organom za konkurenco dovoljuje, da nacionalnim sodiščem predložijo pripombe o vprašanjih glede uporabe evropskih pravil konkurence. Komisija do sedaj te možnosti še ni izkoristila, medtem ko so jo belgijski, francoski in nemški organi za konkurenco že uporabili.
It should be noted, though, that already before 1 May 2004 these competition authorities had the power to submit observations to their national courts under their national law.
Vendar pa je treba poudariti, da so bili ti organi za konkurenco že pred 1. majem pooblaščeni, da v skladu s svojo nacionalno zakonodajo predložijo pripombe svojim nacionalnim sodiščem.
Since 2002, the Commission co nances projects aimed at training national judges in EU competition law.
Od leta 2002 Komisija so nancira projekte, katerih namen je usposabljanje nacionalnih sodnikov o konkurenčnem pravu EU.
In 2004, the Commission co nanced four training projects (91) and launched a call for proposals which resulted in the conclusion of another
Leta 2004 je Komisija so nancirala štiri projekte usposabljanja (91) in objavila poziv za zbiranje predlogov, kar je pripeljalo do sklenitve dodatnih 10 pogodb z dodelitvijo več kot 400 000 EUR za usposabljanje več kot 700 nacionalnih sodnikov iz vseh 25 držav članic EU leta 2005 (92
The non-confidential versions of the national judgments can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/ comm/competition/antitrust/national_courts/index_en.html Further details on the co nanced projects can be found on the Competition DG’s website: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/proposals2/table_of_projects_co_financed_out_ of_3rd_call.pdf The calls for proposals for this training programme can be found on the Competition DG’s website.
Različice nacionalnih sodb, ki niso zaupne, so na voljo na naslovu: http://europa.eu.int/comm/ competition/antitrust/national_courts/index_en.html Dodatni podatki o so nanciranih projektih so na voljo na spletni strani GD za konkurenco: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/proposals2/table_of_projects_co_financed_out_ of_3rd_call.pdf Poziv za zbiranje predlogov za ta program usposabljanja lahko najdete na spletni strani GD za konkurenco. Poziv za leto 2005 je na voljo na: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/competition/proposals2/20040316_call/call_en.pdf
I — Antitrust — Articles 81, 82 and 86 EC topics: longterm contracts in the downstream gas sector and sector inquiries in the energy sector.
I – Protimonopolna zakonodaja – členi 81, 82 in 86 ES
120. e ECA (European competition authorities) set up an air traffic working group during the plenary meeting in Athens in April 2002 in order to improve cooperation between them with regard to their dealings with the airline industry and seek to enhance competition in this sector. e ECA considers that competition between airlines is in uenced by some specific features of the airline industry, in particular its network character.
Njen namen je zagotoviti forum za obravnavo ključnih vprašanj in razviti skupni pristop za uporabo pravil konkurence EU na energetskih trgih ter spodbuditi spremljanje konkurence na energetskih trgih EU.
On 13 May, the working group published a ‘report on mergers and alliances in civil aviation (93)’, which provides an overview of the current enforcement practices of the ECA concerning market de nition, competition assessment and remedies.
Podskupina za energetiko naj bi imela tehnične sestanke in srečanja na visoki ravni, na katere so lahko povabljeni regulativni organi.
Financial services
Delovna skupina za zračni promet ECA
In the nancial services sector, ECN subgroups were active during 2004 in the areas of payment cards, insurance and securities.
Evropski organi za konkurenco (ECA) so na plenarnem zasedanju aprila 2002 v Atenah ustanovili Delovno skupino za zračni promet, da bi izboljšali medsebojno sodelovanje pri svojih poslih z industrijo zračnega prevoza in si prizadevali okrepiti konkurenco v tem sektorju.
123. e ECN subgroup for payment card networks met for the rst time in Brussels on 17 June. e main purpose of the meeting was for the Commission to present to national competition authorities the results of its market studies on credit and debit card payments in Europe.
Evropski organi za konkurenco menijo, da na konkurenco med letalskimi prevozniki vplivajo nekatere posebne lastnosti industrije zračnega prevoza, zlasti njen mrežni značaj.