natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
692. e Commission received one formal notication from the Japanese authorities during the year.
Komisija je med letom od japonskih organov prejela eno uradno priglasitev.
During 2005, the Competition DG engaged in cooperation with the competition authorities of a number of other OECD countries, most notably Australia. ese contacts concerned both case-related and more competition policy-related issues.
Leta 2005 je GD za konkurenco začel sodelovati z organi za konkurenco številnih drugih držav OECD, zlasti Avstralije. Ti stiki so zajemali vprašanja, povezana s posameznimi primeri, in tudi splošnejša vprašanja, povezana s politiko konkurence.
Cooperation with China is based on the 2004 terms of reference on structured dialogue on competition policy(357).
Sodelovanje s Kitajsko temelji na Pravilniku strukturiranega dialoga o politiki konkurence iz leta 2004(357).
During 2005, contacts with Chinese authorities on
V letu 2005 so se stiki s kitajskimi organi v zvezi z vprašanji politike konkurence občutno povečali in so obravnavali splošnejša vprašanja politike ter vprašanja v zvezi z ustanovitvijo organa za konkurenco.
Report on Competition Policy 2005 competition policy matters increased considerably and dealt with both general policy issues and questions concerning the establishment of a competition authority.
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2005
European Free Trade Association
Evropsko območje proste trgovine
During the course of the year the Commission continued its close cooperation with the ESA (EFTA Surveillance Authority) in enforcing the Agreement on the European Economic Area.
Med letom je Komisija nadaljevala tudi svoje tesno sodelovanje z Nadzornim organom EFTA pri izvrševanju Sporazuma o Evropskem gospodarskem prostoru.
In May the provisions adapting Protocols 21 and 23 of the EEA Agreement to the changes introduced by Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 entered into force.
Maja so začele veljati določbe, ki protokola 21 in 23 Sporazuma EGS prilagajajo spremembam, uveljavljenim z Uredbo (ES) št. 1/2003.
Protocol 23 deals with cooperation between the ESA and the Commission in the application of Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement.
Protokol 23 obravnava sodelovanje med Nadzornim organom EFTA in Komisijo pri uporabi členov 53 in 54 Sporazuma EGP.
In December the EFTA states which have ratied the EEA Agreement (i.e. Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway) made use of the ‘review clause’ contained in Protocol 21.
Decembra so države Ee, ki so raticirale Sporazum EGP (tj. Lihtenštajn, Islandija in Norveška) uporabile „klavzulo o pregledu“, ki je navedena v Protokolu 21.
Based on this clause the EFTA states requested that the mechanisms for the enforcement of Articles 53 and 54 of the agreement be reviewed.
Na podlagi te klavzule so države Ee zahtevale, da se pregleda mehanizem za izvrševanje členov 53 in 54 Sporazuma.
Cooperation between the Competition DG and the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) is based on a memorandum of understanding (MoU) which was signed in October 2004.
Sodelovanje med GD za konkurenco in Komisijo za pošteno trgovino Koreje temelji na Memorandumu o soglasju, podpisanem oktobra 2004.
In June the first bilateral consultation meeting between the Competition DG and the KFTC under the MoU took place in Brussels with the participation of Commissioner Neelie Kroes and Director-General Philip Lowe on behalf of the European Commission and Chairman Kang on behalf of the KFTC.
Junija je v Bruslju potekal prvi posvetovalni sestanek med GD za konkurenco in Komisijo za pošteno trgovino Koreje, na katerem so sodelovali komisarka Neeli Kroes in generalni direktor Philip Lowe v imenu Evropske komisije ter predsednik Kang v imenu Komisije za pošteno trgovino Koreje.
Information was exchanged on the respective modications recently made to the EC and Korean competition laws.
Izmenjali so si informacije o zadevnih spremembah, ki so bile pred kratkim vnesene v konkurenčno pravo EU in Koreje.
It was also explored how to further improve and strengthen cooperation. e two authorities increasingly cooperate on various competition issues and have exchanged views in particular on investigative methods and on remedies in antitrust cases. e second bilateral consultation meeting will be held in Korea in 2006.
Oba organa vedno bolj sodelujeta pri različnih vprašanjih konkurence in zlasti izmenjujeta stališča o preiskovalnih metodah in korektivnih ukrepih v protimonopolnih zadevah. Drugi posvetovalni sestanek bo potekal leta 2006 v Koreji.
During 2005, the Competition DG engaged in cooperation with the competition authorities of Mexico and Brazil concerning case-related and competition poli-
Leta 2005 je GD za konkurenco sodeloval z organi za konkurenco v Mehiki in Braziliji v zvezi z vprašanji, povezanimi s posameznimi primeri, in tudi vprašanji, povezanimi s politiko konkurence (na primer skupna in kolektivna tržna moč, telekomunikacijska vprašanja itd.). Komisija je od mehiških organov prejela pet uradnih priglasitev.
IV — International activities cy-related issues (for example on joint and collective market power, telecommunications issues, etc.). e Commission received ve formal notications from the Mexican authorities.
IV – Mednarodne dejavnosti
C MULTILATERAL COOPERATION
C VEČSTRANSKO SODELOVANJE
ICN cartels working group and Seoul cartels workshop
Delovna skupina Mednarodne mreže za konkurenco za kartele in seulska delavnica o kartelih
Report on Competition Policy 2005 cartels working group in its first year, which it presented to the ICN annual conference in Bonn, were the following:
Delovni dokumenti delovne skupine za kartele iz prvega leta njenega delovanja, ki jih je predstavila na letni konferenci Mednarodne mreže za konkurenco v Bonnu, so bili naslednji:
• a report entitled ‘Building blocks for eective anti-cartel regimes, Vol. 1’ covering the following subjects: dening hardcore cartel conduct, eective institutions in the fight against cartels, and eective penalties;
• poročilo z naslovom „Sestavni deli učinkovitih protikartelnih ureditev, del 1”, ki zajema naslednje teme: opredelitev ravnanja na podlagi kartelnih dogovorov, učinkovitost ustanov pri boju proti kartelom in učinkovite kazni;
• an anti-cartel enforcement manual, including the introduction and chapters on searches/inspections (with best practices) and on leniency programmes (to which further chapters will be added later);
• priročnik za izvrševanje protikartelnih pravil, vključno z uvodom in poglavji o pregledih/inšpekcijah (z najboljšimi praksami) in programi prizanesljivosti (ki se jim bodo kasneje dodala nova poglavja);
• a template for providing information concerning laws and regulations regarding cartels, which ICN member agencies will be invited to fill in.
• model zakonov in drugih predpisov v zvezi s karteli, ki ga bodo lahko dopolnile agencije, ki so članice Mednarodne mreže za konkurenco.
For the 2005/2006 ICN year, the cartels working group has undertaken new work projects on: electronic evidence gathering (on which a chapter for the aforementioned manual will be prepared), cooperation between agencies in cartel investigations (the Competition DG is in the lead on this project), interaction of public and private enforcement, and obstruction of investigations. e results of these projects will be presented at the next ICN annual conference in Cape Town in May 2006, together with the template for information on cartel laws and regulations, filled in by ICN member agencies.
Za leto 2005/2006 je delovna skupina Mednarodne mreže za konkurenco za kartele začela nove delovne projekte o: elektronskem zbiranju dokazov (o katerem se bo pripravilo poglavje za zgoraj navedeni priročnik), sodelovanju med agencijami pri preiskavah kartelov (ta projekt vodi GD za konkurenco), vzajemnem delovanju javnega
In November the annual ICN cartels workshop (organised by the cartels working group) took place in Seoul, South Korea. e Competition DG played an active role in the workshop, participating in sessions on eective institutions for investigating cartels, cooperation between agencies in cartel investigations, and IT forensics.
Novembra je v Seulu v Južni Koreji potekala letna delavnica Mednarodne mreže za konkurenco o kartelih (ki jo je organizirala delovna skupina za kartele). GD za konkurenco je dejavno sodeloval na delavnici in se udeležil zasedanj o učinkovitih ustanovah za preiskovanje kartelov, sodelovanju med agencijami in preiskavah kartelov ter informacijskotehnološki forenziki.
ICN mergers working group — Notication and procedures subgroup
Delovna skupina Mednarodne mreže za konkurenco za združitve – Podskupina za priglasitve in postopke
With these two practices the set of ICN recommendations seems to be complete, and it was agreed that no further recommendations would be developed at this stage.
Ker kaže, da je s tema dvema praksama niz priporočil Mednarodne mreže za konkurenco zaokrožen, je bilo dogovorjeno, da se na tej stopnji ne bodo razvijala dodatna priporočila.
705. e subgroup also finalised work on a couple of other projects: the development of a model form or forms for use by merging parties and competition agencies governing waivers of condentiality protection for materials submitted in connection
To poročilo, ki je bilo predstavljeno v Bonnu, je pokazalo, da je do aprila 46 % jurisdikcij, ki so članice Mednarodne mreže za konkurenco in imajo zakone o združitvah, uvedlo ali predlagalo spremembe, ki njihove režime združitev približujejo priporočenim praksam, dodatnih 8 % pa jih take spremembe načrtuje.
IV — International activities with merger review; and the preparation of a study on filing fees in merger control. e work on waivers and filing fees was presented for endorsement at the annual conference in Bonn in June.
IV – Mednarodne dejavnosti ksami Mednarodne mreže za konkurenco.
To further support the implementation process, it was decided to hold an implementation workshop in spring 2006 to provide examples and guidance on further alignment with the ICN practices.
Od Bonna naprej je delo podskupine osredotočeno na pripravo te delavnice.
Since Bonn, the subgroup’s work has been concentrated on the preparation of this workshop. e subgroup continues to monitor reform eorts and to provide support to ICN members considering changes to legislation, regulations, and agency practices, as well as working with non-members developing new merger review legislation.
Podskupina še naprej spremlja prizadevanja za reformo in zagotavlja podporo članom Mednarodne mreže za konkurenco, ki načrtujejo spremembe zakonodaje, ureditev in praks agencij, ter deluje z nečlani, ki razvijajo novo zakonodajo za preglede združitev.
In 2005, the OECD Competition Committee for the first time held a peer review examination of competition law and policy in the EU. is review follows the 2003 OECD review of economic policies in the euro area.
Leta 2005 je Odbor OECD za konkurenco prvič opravil kolegialni pregled prava in politike konkurence v EU. Ta pregled sledi pregledu gospodarskih politik v območju eura, ki ga je leta 2003 opravila OECD.
It is a common understanding among OECD members that the review of the economic policy of a given jurisdiction must be followed by an indepth review of its competition policy.
Skupen dogovor članov OECD je, da mora pregledu gospodarske politike določene jurisdikcije slediti podroben pregled njene politike konkurence.
708. e review process started with the preparation of a dra review report by the OECD Secretariat, which studied the accomplishments and current challenges facing EU competition policy and institutions, and raised policy options for consideration. e process culminated in the oral examination at the OECD Competition Committee’s October meeting. e OECD Secretariat completed the report aer the oral examination and published it in the OECD publications series(358).
Proces je dosegel vrhunec z ustnim preverjanjem na oktobrskem srečanju Odbora OECD za konkurenco. Sekretariat OECD je po ustnem preverjanju dokončal poročilo in ga objavil v seriji publikacij OECD(358).
• clarify the relationships among the leniency programmes of the EU and the national enforcement agencies;
• pri sprejemanju ekonomskega pristopa k prevladujočemu položaju zagotoviti, da je odgovornost odvisna od učinkov, ki škodujejo konkurenci; v ustreznih primerih mora biti sestavni del takega pristopa ocena možnosti za povračilo;
• in adopting an economics-based approach to dominance, make liability depend upon eects that harm competition; in appropriate cases, assessing the scope for recoupment should be an integral part of such an approach;
• obravnavati sredstva za razširitev sankcij na posameznike in podjetja, na primer usklajevanje pri uporabi zakonodaje držav članic, ki predvidevajo sankcije za posameznike.
The report is available on the OECD website: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/41/35908641.pdf
Poročilo je na voljo na spletni strani OECD: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/41/35908641.pdf
Report on Competition Policy 2005
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2005 meri.
710. e Competition DG is analysing each of these options further in its ongoing policy development projects.
Skupina glavnega ekonomista zagotavlja nadaljnjo podporo.
In the field of leniency policy, the Competition DG is working towards what is broadly referred to as a one-stop-shop system.
Kar zadeva sankcije kartelov, sistem v EU temelji na učinkoviti uporabi kombinacije sankcij za podjetja in posameznike na ravni Skupnosti in nacionalni ravni.
Concerning cartel sanctions, the system in the EU is based on eective application of a combination of corporate and individual sanctions at Community and national level. ere is scope for examining how to fully use the options available in this system.
Treba je preučiti obseg, v katerem se lahko v celoti uporabijo možnosti, ki jih omogoča ta sistem.
In addition to the peer review, the Competition DG continued to participate in and contribute to the work of the OECD Competition Committee. e Competition DG participated in all competition policy round tables of the OECD and participated actively in the peer reviews of the competition policies of Turkey and Switzerland.
Poleg kolegialnega pregleda je GD za konkurenco še naprej sodeloval in prispeval k delu Odbora OECD za konkurenco. GD za konkurenco je sodeloval pri okroglih mizah o politiki konkurence OECD in dejavno sodeloval pri kolegialnih pregledih politike konkurence Turčije in Švice.
It also attended other competition-related OECD meetings such as the Global Forum on Competition and the joint sessions of the Competition Committee with the Trade Committee.
Udeležil se je tudi drugih srečanj OECD, povezanih s konkurenco, kot so Svetovni forum o konkurenci in skupne seje Odbora za konkurenco ter Odbora za trgovino. Komisarka Neelie Kroes je imela glavni govor z naslovom „Regulacija za konkurenco in rast” (Regulating for Competition and Growth) na Svetovnem forumu o konkurenci OECD v mesecu februarju.
In March, the OECD Council adopted a recommendation on merger review and in October the Competition Committee adopted best practices for formal exchange of information between competition authorities in hardcore cartel investigations and a report on action against hardcore cartels(359).
Svet OECD je marca sprejel priporočilo za pregled združitev, oktobra pa je Odbor za konkurenco sprejel Najboljše prakse za uradno izmenjavo informacij med organi za konkurenco v preiskavah kartelnih dogovorov in poročilo o ukrepih proti kartelnim dogovorom(359).
In 2005, OECD Competition Committee meetings were held in February, June and October.
Leta 2005 so srečanja Odbora OECD za konkurenco potekala februarja, junija in oktobra.
Structural separation was seen as a complement to regulation of access to the track infrastructure.
Razprava je tudi pokazala, da je imelo dejstvo, da se lahko premoženje, ki je ponujeno za odprodajo, nahaja zunaj EU, samo omejen vpliv, kar zadeva spremljanje izvajanja nekega korektivnega ukrepa.
Both texts are published on the OECD website: www.oecd.org/competition
Obe besedili sta objavljeni na spletni strani OECD: www.oecd.org/competition
IV — International activities circumstances of the market, competition for the market is also a potentially valuable tool for introducing a form of competition.
IV – Mednarodne dejavnosti izvodov je pokazala, da med državami obstajajo razlike o tem, kako naj se pristopa k temu vprašanju: nekatere države imajo pristop, ki temelji bolj na formalni obliki ravnanja, medtem ko imajo druge države ekonomski pristop ali so v prehodu k ekonomskemu pristopu.
It also emerged from the discussion that for the purposes of monitoring implementation of a remedy, the fact that the assets oered for divestment may be located outside the EU had only a limited impact.
Razprava je pokazala, da so nadomestne storitve pogosto predmet manjšega števila ali različnih regulativnih obveznosti, kar povzroča potencialno regulativno asimetričnost med storitvami.
715. e Committee working parties held round tables on the impact of substitute services on regulation and private remedies. e first round table concentrated on telecom, transport and energy services and addressed issues that arise over regulation of substitute services. e discussion showed that oen substitute services are subject to few or dierent regulatory obligations, which gives rise to potential regulatory asymmetry between the services.
Na splošno je treba take asimetričnosti odpraviti, tako da so edine ureditvene razlike tiste, ki so potrebne za izražanje razlik v tržni moči, zunanjih vplivih ali drugih tržnih nepopolnostih v zvezi s samimi osnovnimi storitvami.
In general, such asymmetries should be eliminated so that the only dierences in regulation that remain are those which are necessary to reect dierences in market power, externalities or other market failures in the underlying services themselves. e discussion also highlighted the fact that active competition law enforcement is likely to be required to avoid incumbent firms’ behaviour limiting competition from the substitute services.
Razprava je poudarila tudi dejstvo, da bo verjetno potrebno aktivno izvrševanje konkurenčnega prava, da se izognemo obnašanju prvotnih podjetij, ki omejuje konkurenco nadomestnih storitev.
Some authorities (e.g. the OFT) are also looking at the impact of cartels to justify their own work.
Urad za pošteno trgovanje) za utemeljitev svojega dela preučujejo tudi vpliv kartelov.
717. e third Competition Committee meeting held round tables on entry barriers and resale below cost (RBC) laws and regulations. e first round table showed that OECD member countries have clearly been moving from an analysis that focused on
Prva okrogla miza je pokazala, da se države članice OECD jasno odmikajo od analize, ki se je osredotočala na vrednotenje tega, ali bi določeni dejavniki oblikovali ovire za vstop, k analiziranju postopka konkurence in vplivu ovir za vstop v takem procesu.
Report on Competition Policy 2005 evaluating whether certain factors would form barriers to entry, towards analysing the competition process and the impact of barriers to entry in such a process. e member countries are also developing their economic tests in measurement of entry barriers; they oen combine both quantitative and qualitative assessment in the case of technical and regulatory barriers to entry, whereas for behavioural barriers quantitative assessment is usually not considered possible.
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2005 dnevni sestanek, na katerem so sodelovali državni tožilci, o sodelovanju med organi za konkurenco in državnimi tožilci pri preiskavah kartelov.
719. e round table on hospital services showed that competition is being introduced more and more in the provision of hospital services and that this has a benecial eect on eciency in provision of the services.
Okrogla miza o bolnišničnih storitvah je pokazala, da se pri zagotavljanju bolnišničnih storitev vse bolj uvaja konkurenca in da to koristno vpliva na učinkovitost pri zagotavljanju teh storitev.
During 2005, the Competition DG presented eight written submissions to the Competition Committee covering the following discussion topics in OECD round tables:
V letu 2005 je GD za konkurenco Odboru za konkurenco predložil osem pisnih stališč, ki so zajemala naslednje teme razprav na okroglih mizah OECD:
• competition and eciency in the provision of hospital services.
• • • • • • • • strukturna ločitev v železniškemu prevozu;čezmejni korektivni ukrepi pri pregledu združitev;konkurenca na podlagi prednosti lastnih proizvodov;ocenjevanje ukrepov in virov organov za konkurenco;vpliv nadomestnih storitev na regulativo;zbiranje dokazov;ovire za vstop;konkurenca in učinkovitost pri zagotavljanju bolnišničnih storitev.
V OUTLOOK FOR 2006
V PREDVIDEVANJA ZA LETO 2006
The 2005 Report on Competition Policy provides an opportunity to set out the direction that will be taken by the Commission in the competition policy field in 2006.
Letno poročilo za leto 2005 zagotavlja možnost za določitev usmeritve, ki jo bo Komisija upoštevala na področju politike konkurence v letu 2006.
• to focus enforcement actions on those practices that are most harmful for the EU economy;
• usmerjanje ukrepov izvrševanja na tiste prakse, ki najbolj škodujejo gospodarstvu EU;
• to enhance competitiveness within the EU by helping to shape the regulatory framework;
• povečanje konkurenčnosti v EU z zagotavljanjem pomoči pri oblikovanju ureditvenega okvira;
• to focus action on key sectors for the internal market and the Lisbon strategy.
• usmerjanje delovanja na ključne sektorje za notranji trg in lizbonsko strategijo.
In 2006, the Competition DG will give high priority to the prevention and deterrence of cartels.
Protimonopolna zakonodaja GD za konkurenco bo v letu 2006 dal posebno prednost preprečevanju in odvračanju kartelov.
Cartels articially raise the price of goods and services, reduce supply and hamper innovation, so that consumers end up paying more for less quality.
Karteli umetno dvigajo cene blaga in storitev, zmanjšujejo po- nudbo in ovirajo inovacije, tako da potrošniki plačujejo več za manjšo kakovost.
Cartels can also signicantly increase the input costs for European businesses. e detection and deterrence of cartels therefore brings important benets to the EU economy and to European consumers.
Karteli tudi bistveno povečujejo stroške vlaganj za evropska podjetja. Odkrivanje in odvračanje kartelov zato zagotavljata pomembne koristi za gospodarstvo EU in evropske potrošnike.
In support of these priorities, the Competition DG’s guiding principles as regards enforcement will continue to be prioritisation of enforcement actions according to the degree of harmfulness of anticompetitive practices vis-à-vis consumers, both business and individuals.
V podporo tem prednostnim nalogam bodo vodilne smernice GD za konkurenco glede izvrševanja še naprej določale prednostne ukrepe izvrševanja glede na stopnjo škodljivosti protikonkurenčnih praks do potrošnikov, tako podjetij kot posameznikov.
Priority will be given to those actions that address competition problems with the highest negative impact on consumer welfare, account being taken of the volume of spending aected by the anticompetitive practice and the nature of the conduct. e existence of a signicant impact on the competitive process (market foreclosure) can be used as a proxy for consumer harm.
Prednost bodo imeli ukrepi, ki obravnavajo težave glede konkurence z največjim negativnim vplivom na blaginjo potrošnikov, pri čemer se upošteva obseg porabe, na katero vpliva protikonkurenčna praksa in narava ravnanja. Obstoj bistvenega vpliva na proces konkurence (izključitev trga) je mogoče uporabiti kot približek za škodo potrošnikov.
An additional element to be taken into account when dening the priorities for enforcement is the precedent value
Dodaten element, ki ga je treba upoštevati pri opredelitvi prednostnih nalog za izvrševanje, je predhodna vrednost posebnega posega, ki doseže cilj pojasnitve uporabe konkurenčnih pravil za zapletena pravna ali gospodarska vprašanja.
Report on Competition Policy 2005 of a specic intervention which achieves the objective of clarifying the application of competition rules to complex legal or economic issues.
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2005