natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It is clear from the caselaw that such errors of assessment by the persons concerned have no relevance in determining when time starts to run.
Iz sodne prakse izhaja, da take napake v presoji udeleženih oseb niso pomembne za določitev začetka teka roka.
33 perfectly clear to the applicants once they had entered into contracts with DAI that the aid would be granted to them on the conditions and in accordance with the procedure laid down by Regulation No 2499/82.
33 po sklenitvi pogodb z DAI popolnoma jasno, da jim bo pomoč dodeljena pod pogoji in v skladu s postopkom, določenim v Uredbi �t. 2499/82.
The applicants did not prove before the Court of First Instance that they had been prevented from the outset from obtaining repayment of the sums due by way of aid by claiming payment from, for example, AIMA or the Commission.
Tožeče stranke pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje niso dokazale, da jim je bilo od začetka onemogočeno, da dosežejo poplačilo dolžnih zneskov kot pomoč z zahtevkom zoper na primer AIMA ali Komisijo.
The errors of interpretation which led them to believe that they could have recourse to the security if the distiller became insolvent, and hence to undertake long and fruitless proceedings before the national courts, cannot amount to justification in this context.
Napake v razlagi, zaradi katerih so bile prepričane, da bi lahko prejele var�čino, če bi destilater postal plačilno nesposoben, ter so se zato spustile v dolge in neuspe�ne postopke pred nacionalnimi sodi�či, v zvezi s tem ne morejo pomeniti utemeljitve.
The applicants cannot therefore allege involuntary ignorance of the fact giving rise to the damage.
Tožeče stranke zato ne morejo zatrjevati nenamernega nezavedanja dejstva, zaradi katerega je nastala �koda.
The Commission also argues that the approach taken in the judgment of the Court
Komisija �e ugovarja, da pristop, ki ga je v sodbi uporabilo Sodi�če prve stopnje, ni
In the view of the Commission, the criterion used by the Court of First Instance
Merilo, ki ga je uporabilo Sodi�če prve stopnje, po mnenju Komisije ne more
34 — Case 145/83 [1985] ECR 3539.35 — See paragraphs 139 and 140 of the judgment.
34 – Sodba z dne 7. novembra 1985 (145/83, Recueil, str. 3539).35 – Glej točki 139 in 140 sodbe.
COMMISSION v CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA AND OTHERS cannot be based on the concept of imminent and foreseeable damage within the meaning of the caselaw of the Court.
KOMISIJA PROTI CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA IN DRUGI temeljiti na pojmu neizbežne in predvidljive �kode v smislu sodne prakse Sodi�ča. 36
It cannot justify delaying the moment when time starts to run on the basis of a subjective assessment of the imminent and foreseeable nature of damage which has already occurred.
Ne more pa upravičiti odloga začetka teka roka na podlagi subjektivne presoje neizbežne in predvidljive narave �kode, ki je že nastala.
of the approach taken by the Court of First Instance, that court’s assessment of when time started to run is in part erroneous because it is based on a manifest distortion of the facts.
Sodi�če prve stopnje, njegova presoja začetka teka roka delno napačna, ker temelji na očitnem popačenju dejstev.
As the Court of First Instance itself noted, only four out of the five applicants appealed against the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma.
Kot je navedlo tudi samo Sodi�če prve stopnje, so zoper sodbo Tribunale civile di Roma vložile pritožbo le �tiri od petih tožečih strank.
There is therefore no reason to consider that time started to run vis-à-vis the fifth applicant (Cantina sociale del Vermentino) at the date of the judgment of the Corte di Cassazione.
Zato ni razloga, da se za peto tožečo stranko (Cantina sociale del Vermentino) �teje, da je rok zanjo začel teči z dnem sodbe Corte di Cassazione.
On the basis of the criterion adopted by the Court of First Instance, time would start to run on the date of the judgment of the Tribunale civile di Roma, namely on 27 January 1989.
Na podlagi meril, ki jih je sprejelo Sodi�če prve stopnje, je rok zanjo začel teči z dnem sodbe Tribunale civile di Roma, to je 27. januarja 1989.
That applicant’s action would therefore have been timebarred when it commenced proceedings before the Court of First Instance on 12 October 1998.
Tožba te tožeče stranke je bila torej ob vložitvi pri Sodi�ču prve stopnje 12. oktobra 1998 zastarana.
The approach of the Court of First Instance is moreover, the Commission argues, incompatible with the fundamental requirements of legal certainty to which timelimits are subject.
Komisija ugovarja, da je pristop Sodi�ča prve stopnje med drugim v nasprotju s temeljnimi zahtevami pravne varnosti, ki velja tudi za roke.
It is obvious that if the moment when time starts to run for the purposes of Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice were to depend on the applicant’s subjective perception of the certainty of damage, the injured party would be able to decide when an action for damages was finally timebarred.
Če bi bil trenutek, v katerem začne teči rok iz člena 46 Statuta Sodi�ča, odvisen od subjektivnega dojemanja nedvomne narave �kode tožeče stranke, bi se o�kodovanec očitno lahko odločil, kdaj je od�kodninska tožba končno zastarala.
In a case such as the present, a litigant could simply bring several sets of proceedings, even wholly speculatively, and could then claim that he did not consider the damage sufficiently certain.
V zadevi, kot je ta, bi stranka preprosto sprožila več nizov postopkov, tudi popolnoma preračunljivo, in bi nato lahko ugovarjala, da �koda po njenem mnenju ni bila dovolj nedvomna.
He could thereby artificially extend, even by several years, the timelimit for bringing an action for damages.
S tem bi lahko umetno podalj�ala rok za vložitev od�kodninske tožbe tudi za več let.
The applicants submit, first, that they did not themselves bring the national proceedings.
Tožeče stranke najprej navajajo, da niso same začele nacionalnih postopkov.
Rather, they intervened in the proceedings brought by DAI against AIMA seeking a declaration that the amount guaranteed by the security provided in favour of AIMA could be paid to them.
So le intervenirale v postopku, ki ga je DAI sprožila zoper AIMA, da bi dosegle odločitev, da bi se znesek, zagotovljen z var�čino v korist AIMA, lahko izplačal njim.
The applicants accordingly had to await the outcome of that litigation before bringing proceedings before the Community judicature.
Zato so morale tožeče stranke počakati na izid te tožbe, preden so začele postopek pred sodi�čem Skupnosti.
The Court of First Instance would certainly have dismissed an earlier application on the ground that domestic rights of action had not been exhausted.
Sodi�če prve stopnje bi zgodnej�i predlog zagotovo zavrnilo zato, ker niso bile izčrpane nacionalne pravice do pravnih sredstev.
Finally and in the alternative the Commission submits that even on the basis
Nazadnje in podredno Komisija navaja, da je celo na podlagi pristopa, ki ga je zavzelo
The applicants submit, second, that the Commission’s alternative ground of appeal
Tožeče stranke drugič navajajo, da podrejeni pritožbeni razlog Komisije ni
Preliminary observations is both inadmissible and unfounded.
Predhodna stališča dopusten in ni utemeljen.
It is inadmissible because it was not raised before the Court of First Instance.
Dopusten ni zato, ker ga ni uveljavljala pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje.
It is unfounded because, as a matter of Italian procedure, whatever the outcome of the appeal to the Corte di Cassazione, all five applicants would have been affected in the same way.
Utemeljen ni zato, ker bi izid pritožbenega postopka pred Corte di Cassazione v skladu z italijanskimi postopkovnimi pravili učinkoval na vseh pet pritožbenih strank enako.
If the appeal had been dismissed, the judgment at first instance would have become res judicata in respect of all parties to the proceedings before the Tribunale.
Če bi bila pritožba zavrnjena, bi sodba na prvi stopnji postala pravnomočna za vse stranke postopka pred Tribunale civile di Roma.
Likewise, if the appeal had been allowed, the judgment of the Corte d’appello would have been quashed and the case remitted to the Tribunale, which would have had to rule on the substance vis-à-vis all parties to the proceedings before it.
Prav tako bi bila, če bi bilo pritožbi ugodeno, sodba Corte d’appello razveljavljena in zadeva vrnjena Tribunale civile di Roma, ki bi moralo vsebinsko odločiti glede vseh strank postopka pred njim.
In the proceedings before the Court of First Instance, the Commission tried (successively) to argue that the conduct in question could not be attributed to the Commission, that there were effective domestic remedies, and that the applicants’ action was timebarred.
V postopku pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje je Komisija posku�ala (uspe�no) ugovarjati, da ji ni bilo mogoče pripisati zadevnega ravnanja, da je obstajalo učinkovito nacionalno pravno varstvo in da je tožba tožečih strank zastarala.
The Court of First Instance dealt with each point with considerable care.
Sodi�če je vsako vpra�anje obravnavalo zelo skrbno.
It dismissed each in turn and went on to examine the merits.
Vsa po vrsti je zavrnilo in nadaljevalo s presojo utemeljenosti.
It concluded that the conditions were met for the Community to incur liability as regards the unlawfulness of the conduct complained of, the existence of the damage and the causal link between that conduct and the damage pleaded.
Sklenilo je, da so izpolnjeni pogoji za odgovornost Skupnosti, ki se nana�ajo na nezakonitost očitanega dejanja, obstoj �kode in vzročno zvezo med tem ravnanjem in zatrjevano �kodo.
37 Accordingly, the Court of First Instance made an interlocutory decision that the Commission was required to compensate the applicants for the damage which had resulted for them from the total or partial absence of payment of the share represented by the Community aid — which they were entitled to claim under Regulation No 2499/82 — forming part of the unpaid debts owed to them by DAI. 38
37V skladu s tem je Sodi�če z vmesno sodbo odločilo, da mora Komisija povrniti �kodo, ki je nastala tožečim strankam zaradi delnega ali celotnega neplačila dela njihovih neplačanih terjatev do DAI, ki ustreza pomoči Skupnosti, ki jo imajo pravico zahtevati na podlagi Uredbe �t. 2499/82. 38
37 — Paragraph 178 of the judgment of the Court of First Instance.
37 – Točka 178 sodbe Sodi�ča prve stopnje.38 – Točka 179.
In the event that the Court accepts some of the Commission’s arguments based on the timelimit for bringing proceedings before the Court of First Instance, the applicants put forward, in the alternative, a [so-called] cross-appeal.
Tožeče stranke so, če bi Sodi�če sprejelo katerega od ugovorov Komisije glede roka za vložitev tožbe pri Sodi�ču prve stopnje, podredno vložile tako imenovano nasprotno pritožbo.
In essence, their argument here is that the Court of First Instance ruled, in paragraphs 159 to 162 of its judgment, that the Community had been unjustly enriched because the aid had not been paid in full to the applicants, but (rather) the security had been entered by AIMA in the EAGGF accounts.
V njej v bistvu ugovarjajo, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje v točkah od 159 do 162 sodbe odločilo, da Skupnost ni bila upravičeno obogatena, ker pomoč ni bila v celoti izplačana tožečim strankam, temveč je (nasprotno) AIMA nakazala var�čino na račune EKUJS.
Time could accordingly not start to run before that unjust enrichment occurred (in 1991).
Zato rok ne bi mogel začeti teči pred nastankom neupravičene obogatitve (v letu 1991).
However, the applicants could not have known that had happened until 1997, when the Commission notified them of the relevant facts.
Vendar pa tožeče stranke niso mogle vedeti za neupravičeno obogatitev pred 1997, ko jih je Komisija obvestila o pomembnih dejstvih.
COMMISSION v CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA AND OTHERS lacuna can only be filled by the Community legislator.
KOMISIJA PROTI CANTINA SOCIALE DI DOLIANOVA IN DRUGI pravno praznino lahko zapolni le zakonodajalec Skupnosti.
It is clear that Community law does not intend a wine producer who has complied with his obligations under Regulation No 2499/82 to be deprived of his aid through an error of the distiller’s for which he can in no way be held to blame.
2499/82, odreče pomoč zaradi napake destilaterja, ki je nikakor ni mogoče očitati proizvajalcu.
In that connection, I also recall that in Lingenfelser 39the Court declared the third subparagraph of Article 9(2) of Regulation No 2499/82 invalid because it penalised with total loss of the aid any failure by the distiller to meet the timelimit for paying the producer.
V zvezi s tem naj poudarim, da je Sodi�če v zadevi Lingenfelser 39razveljavilo tretji pododstavek člena 9(2) Uredbe �t. 2499/82, ker je kaznovala s popolno izgubo pomoči vsako destilaterjevo neizpolnitev roka za plačilo proizvajalcu.
In so doing, the Court clearly attached considerable importance to the fact that the purpose of Regulation No 2499/82 in general and Article 9(1) in particular is to ensure that the producer can obtain a profit comparable to that which he would have obtained from a commercial sale. 40
S tem je Sodi�če očitno pripisalo precej�njo pomembnost dejstvu, da je namen Uredbe �t. 2499/82 na splo�no in posebej člena 9(1) zagotoviti, da proizvajalec pridobi dobiček, ki je primerljiv s tistim, ki bi ga prejel, če bi �lo za tržno prodajo. 40
In the specific circumstances of the present case, I do not accept that the damage suffered by the applicants at the end of June 1983 as a result of DAI’s failure to pay them can be regarded as being certain (that is to say, imminent and foreseeable) from that date on.
V posebnih okoli�činah obravnavane zadeve ne priznavam, da se �koda, ki so jo utrpele tožeče stranke na koncu junija 1983 kot posledico neplačila DAI, lahko obravnava, kot da je bila že od tega datuma gotova (to je da je bila neizbežna in predvidljiva).
It seems to me, rather, that — in the context of their quasi-contractual relations with AIMA — the applicants had what an outside observer would have characterised as an objective legitimate expectation that the national court would appreciate that they were intended to be the beneficiaries of the Community aid and would make some appropriate order to ensure that they got paid.
Bolj se mi zdi, da so imele tožeče stranke – v smislu svojih kvazipogodbenih odnosov z AIMA –, kot bi to opredelil zunanji opazova - lec, objektivno legitimno pričakovanje, da bo njihovo nacionalno sodi�če upo�tevalo, da bi morale biti prejemnice pomoči Skupnosti, in bi sprejelo ustrezen sklep, ki bi jim zagotovil izplačilo.
They had, after all, complied with all their obligations under Regulation No 2499/82 and preventive distillation had duly been carried out.
Ne nazadnje so izpolnile vse svoje obveznosti na podlagi Uredbe �t. 2499/82, preventivna destilacija pa je bila opravljena v rokih.
41In consequence, I reject the idea that time began to run against the applicants even before the proceedings in which they were subsequently involved had started before the national court.
41Posledično zavračam predlog, da je rok zoper tožeče stranke začel teči pred začetkom postopka pred nacionalnim sodi�čem, v katerem so bile nato udeležene.
In the present case, it is similarly an omission on the part of the distiller that gives rise to the applicants’ action.
Podobno je v obravnavani zadevi opustitev ravnanja destilaterja povod za tožbo tožečih strank.
Indeed, the failure to pay them the aid to which they were entitled lay at the heart of all three breaches of the regulation identified by the national court in dismissing DAI’s action.
Neplačilo pomoči tožečim strankam, do katere so bile upravičene, je bilo posledica vseh treh kr�itev uredbe, ki jih je nacionalno sodi�če ugotovilo ob zavrnitvi tožbe DAI.
In order to decide what is the correct point from which the fiveyear timelimit for bringing this action started to run, it is therefore in my view essential to analyse with some care the decision of the national court at first instance (the Tribunale civile di Roma).
Za odločitev, kateri je pravilni trenutek, od katerega je začel teči petletni rok za vložitev te tožbe, je po mojem mnenju bistveno, da se pozorno preuči odločitev nacionalnega sodi�ča na prvi stopnji (Tribunale civile di Roma).
I have set out above (at point 29) the central passage from its judgment.
Zgoraj (v točki 29) sem navedla osrednji del sodbe tega sodi�ča.
41 — See paragraph 141 of the judgment of the Court of First Instance.
41 – Glej točko 141 sodbe Sodi�ča prve stopnje.
The national court then said, dismis -sively, that ‘[i]t is clear from this that [Regulation No 2499/82] is easy to interpret and that it is not necessary to refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruing’.
Nacionalno sodi�če je nato sklepno ugotovilo, da „[i]z navedenega izhaja, da se da zadevno uredbo preprosto razlagati in da ni treba predložiti Sodi�ču vpra�anja za prehodno odločanje“.
That is quite true, provided that one concentrates exclusively — as the national court clearly did — on the various timelimits within which the distiller was required to take various steps in order to avoid forfeiting the security that it had lodged in return for advance payment of Community aid.
To drži, če bi se osredotočili izključno na različne roke, v katerih je moral destilater različno ukrepati, da bi se izognil izgubi var�čine, ki jo je zagotovil v zameno za predujem pomoči Skupnosti.
In so saying, the national court made two correct statements and one significant error.
Pri tej navedbi je nacionalno sodi�če izreklo dve pravilni ugotovitvi, enkrat pa se je očitno zmotilo.
The Community arrangements for market support in the agricultural sector do indeed all depend, correctly, upon making sure that those claiming support comply with the necessary conditions laid down by the Community regulations.
Drži, da so dogovori Skupnosti za podporo trga v kmetijstvu res vsi odvisni od zagotovitve, da tisti, ki zahtevajo podporo, izpolnjujejo nujne pogoje, ki jih določajo pravila Skupnosti.
42 The wine and grape producers were indeed the ‘intended ultimate recipients of the aid’.
42Proizva-jalci vina in grozdja so bili res „tisti, ki jim je pomoč v končni fazi namenjena“.
However, it seems to me that, on a proper construction of Regulation No 2499/82, the distillers (DAI) were not, in any true sense, the ‘intended recipients of the aid’ in so far as concerns the minimum buyingin price.
Vendar se mi zdi, da pri pravilni razlagi Uredbe �t. 2499/82 destilaterji niso bili „prejemniki pomoči“ v pravem smislu glede minimalne nakupne cene.
Rather, they were the conduit through which that aid was intended — provided that the wine duly entered the distillery and was distilled — to be transmitted to the wine producers. 43
Bili so bolj posrednik, prek katerega se je pomoč prenesla proizvajalcem vina, če je vino pri�lo pravočasno v destilarno in je bilo destilirano. 43
Thus, it would be wrong to conclude that the national court ignored Community law in reaching its decision.
Sklep, da nacionalno sodi�če pri svoji odločitvi ni upo�tevalo prava Skupnosti, ne bi bil pravilen.
It did look at Regulation No 2499/82, but only to the extent of examining the timelimits in Article 9 of that regulation for DAI to act and to supply relevant proofs of its actions.
Uredbo �t. 2499/82 je upo�tevalo, vendar le zato, da bi preverilo roke iz člena 9 te uredbe, v katerih je DAI morala ukrepati, in da bi priskrbelo pomembne dokaze o njenih dejanjih.
It concentrated exclusively upon the relationship between DAI and AIMA (as reflected by the lodging of the security provided by Assedile).
Osredotočilo se je izključno na odnos med DAI in AIMA (kot se je kazal v sklenitvi zavarovanja, ki ga je zagotovila Assedile).
It proceeded (quite correctly) to identify three separate ways in which DAI had failed to meet its obligations under the regulation: (i) it had failed, apart from payments totalling ITL 110 795 870 (EUR 57 221), 44 to pay the producers the minimum price; (ii) it had failed to pay them within the 90-day timelimit and (iii) it had failed to provide proof before 1 June 1984 that it had made the payments.
V nadaljevanju je (povsem pravilno) opredelilo tri različne načine, na katere DAI ni izpolnila obveznosti na podlagi uredbe: (i) proizvajalcem ni plačala minimalne cene, razen plačil v skupnem znesku 110.795.870 ITL (57.221 EUR); 44(ii) ni jim plačala v devetdesetdnevnem roku in (iii) pred 1. junijem 1984 ni dokazala, da je opravila plačila.
(All three are, of course, different strands of the same basic breach by DAI of its obligations: namely, that it had not paid the wine producers the full amount of the minimum buyingin price due to them for their wine delivered for distillation.)
(Vsi trije so seveda sestavni deli iste osnovne kr�itve obveznosti DAI, to je da proizvajalcem vina ni izplačala polnega zneska dolžne minimalne nakupne cene za njihovo vino, ki so ga dobavili za destilacijo.)
43 — Even if there were any doubt about this, it is important to note that the Commission has not challenged the judgment of the Court of First Instance on the substance.
43 – Tudi če bi kdo podvomil o tem, je treba navesti, da Komisija ni vsebinsko izpodbijala sodbe Sodi�ča prve stopnje.
It would accordingly be neither appropriate nor indeed in accordance with this Court’s power of review on appeal for it to question the interpretation of the legislation by the Court of First Instance.
Zato ne bi bilo niti primerno niti v skladu s pristojnostjo tega Sodi�ča, da presoja pritožbo zoper njo, da bi podvomilo v razlago zakonodaje Sodi�ča prve stopnje.
44 — See point 26 above.
44 – Glej zgoraj navedeno točko 26.
In so doing, the national court failed to focus at all upon the underlying (and fundamental) issue, who should end up receiving the Community aid in question?
S tem se nacionalno sodi�če sploh ni osredotočilo na prvo (in temeljno) vpra�anje, kdo je končni prejemnik zadevne pomoči Skupnosti.
It is evident that it regarded the intervening wine producers (the intended recipients of the minimum buyingin price; and the only players intended, under the Community regime, to benefit financially from that buyingin price) as being on a par with everyone else who was owed money by DAI as it went under.
Očitno je, da je proizvajalce vina, ki so bili intervenienti (tisti, ki jim je namenjena minimalna nakupna cena, in edini, ki jim je po pravilih Skupnosti namenjena finančna korist od te nakupne cene), obravnavalo enakovredno z drugimi, ki jim je DAI dolgovala denar, ko je propadla.
The sums owing to them as that element of Community aid were equated to DAI’s other debts in the insolvency.
Če bi jo, bi po mojem mnenju verjetno doseglo enak sklep, kot ga je Sodi�če prve stopnje, to je da je v Uredbi �t.
This is abundantly clear from the only paragraph of the judgment that specifically addresses their interests: likely that it would have reached the same conclusion as has the Court of First Instance, namely that there was a lacuna in Regulation No 2499/82 leading to different treatment of wine producers depending upon whether their Member State had chosen the Article 9 or the Article 10 procedure; that the difference in treatment was not justified; and that responsibility for that violation lay with the Community institution that had drafted Regulation No 2499/82, i.e. the Commission.
2499/82 pravna praznina, ki povzroča različno obravnavanje proizvajalcev vina glede na to, ali je njihova država članica izbrala postopek na podlagi člena 9 ali člena 10; da razlika v obravnavanju ni bila upravičena in da je za to kr�itev odgovorna institucija Skupnosti, ki je predlagala Uredbo �t. 2499/82, to je Komisija.
45 Although the answers given to the national court would (inevitably) have led to the applicants failing to recover the Community aid due to them through their intervention in the national proceedings, they would then objectively have known that the claim lay against the Commission.
45 Čeprav tožeče stranke zaradi odgovorov, ki bi bili dani nacionalnemu sodi�ču, z intervencijo v nacionalnih postopkih (neizogibno) ne bi pridobile dolgovane pomoči Skupnosti, bi takrat objektivno izvedele, da imajo zahtevek zoper Komisijo.