natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The equity indices to which the implied volatilities refer are the Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50 for the euro area, the Standard & Poor’s 500 for the United States and the Nikkei 225 for Japan. stood in late June 10% higher than the levels recorded at the end of 2006.
Indeksi tečajev delnic, na katere se nanaša implicitna volatilnost, so Dow Jones EURO STOXX 50 za euroobmočje, Standard & Poor's 500 za ZDA in Nikkei 225 za Japonsko. nja na kitajskih trgih. Indeks Dow Jones EU
At the same time, implied stock market volatility picked up strongly and reached levels not observed since 2003 (see Chart 15).
O ljeval trend zviševanja, ki se je začel na začetku leta 2003 (glej graf 14). Gledano v celoti, je indeks Dow
Euro area stock prices tended to rise steadily in the first six months of 2007.
A so leto 2007 kon čali pozitivno, tako da se je okrog 4% svoje vrednosti.
This upward trend was temporarily interrupted in late February and early March, when stock prices in the euro area, mirroring developments in most other major markets, experienced a sharp correction partly triggered by developments in the Chinese markets.
Potem so si trgi opomogli, delno zaradi večje nagnjenosti k tveganju, ter zaradi združitev in prevzemov in zaradi vztrajno ugodnega gibanja dobičkov.
The Dow Jones EURO STOXX index lost around 4% of its value between 6 February and 7 March.
- kov priča dejstvo, da se je med januarjem in junijem dobiček na delnico podjetij, ki so vklju čena čal s v indeks Dow Jones EU
After that, the markets recovered, partly fuelled by increased risk appetite, by M & A activities and by the persistently favourable developments in earnings.
, pove tem ko so cene japonskih delnic, merjene z indeksom Nikkei 225, padle za okrog 11%.
Evidence of the robust manner in which earnings developed can be seen in the fact that between January and June the earnings per share of companies included in the Dow Jones EURO STOXX index grew at an average annual rate of close to 17%.
Nihanja cen delnic euroobmočja so bila podobno kot gibanja na obvezniških trgih posebno izrazita v poletnih mesecih, ko so vlagatelji postali nenaklonjeni tveganemu povprečno medletno stopnjo skoraj 17%. V celoti gledano so bile cene delnic euroobmočja ob koncu junija 10% višje kot ob koncu leta 2006.
All in all, euro area stock prices
fi finančnemu premoženju, kot so delnice.
In September and early October euro area stock prices witnessed a recovery similar to that observed after the shortlived correction in late
Optimizem, ki je prevladoval na svetovnih delniških trgih, se je nenadoma končal z izbruhom fi nančnih pretresov, kar je sprožilo splošno pre- vrednotenje kreditnih in fi nančnih tveganj in večjo
Later on, however, between mid-October and the end of the year, investors’ risk aversion increased again after a number of financial institutions revealed that they had suffered larger than expected losses in US subprime investments.
Pozneje, od sredine oktobra do konca leta, pa se je nenaklonjenost vlagateljev do tveganja spet povečala, potem ko je več fi nančnih institucij razkrilo, da so v naložbah na ameriškem hipotekarnem trgu utrpele večje izgube od predvidenih.
As a result, euro area and global stock prices plummeted and stock market uncertainty, as reflected in implied volatility, rebounded again to reach levels close to those observed in the summer months.
Zato so cene delnic euroobmočja in cene svetovnih delnic strmo padle, negotovost delniških trgov, ki se odraža v implicitni volatilnosti, pa se je spet povečala in dosegla visoke ravni, podobne tistim v poletnih mesecih.
Looking at developments in individual sectors, the telecommunications and utility sectors strongly outperformed the overall index.
Če pogledamo gibanja po posameznih sektorjih, sta bila najuspešnejša sektor telekomunikacij in sektor javnih gospodarskih služb, ki sta dosegla bistveno boljše rezultate od skupnega indeksa.
The strong performance of these sectors was probably due to investors’ preference for firms with relatively steady cash flows.
Velika uspešnost teh sektorjev je bila verjetno posledica naklonjenosti vlagateljev do podjetij z razmeroma stalnimi denarnimi tokovi.
At the same time, the financial sector underperformed by comparison with the overall index.
Hkrati je bil finančni sektor v primerjavi s skupnim indeksom manj uspešen.
The poor performance of this sector was related to increasing concerns about its profitability in the context of its generally strong exposure to assets linked either directly or indirectly to the ailing subprime mortgage market in the United States.
Slabša uspešnost tega sektorja je povezana z večjo zaskrbljenostjo glede dobičkonosnosti v okolju močne izpostavljenosti tega sektorja finančnemu premoženju, ki je neposredno ali posredno povezano s šibkim hipotekarnim trgom v ZDA.
In early 2008 continued credit risk concerns coupled with lower earnings expectations contributed to lower stock prices.
Pretresi na fi nančnih trgih so presenetljivo malo vplivali na pričakovano in dejansko dobičkonosnost podjetij euroobmočja.
Between December 2006 and December 2007 the earnings per share of firms included in the Dow Jones EURO STOXX index grew by 15%.
Dobiček na delnico podjetij, ki so vključena v indeks Dow Jones EURO STOXX, se je med decembrom 2006 in decembrom 2007 zvišal za 15%.
At the same time, analysts expected earnings to grow at an annual rate of around 9% in 2008.
Hkrati so analitiki pričakovali, da bodo dobički v dvanajstih
The fact that euro area firms’ profitability was largely unaffected by the financial market turmoil probably helped to dampen the overall decline observed in the second half of 2007.
Na začetku leta 2008 je k nižjim tečajem delnic prispevala nadaljnja zaskrbljenost glede kreditnega tveganja skupaj z nižjimi pričakovanji glede dobičkov.
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE EPISODES OF FINANCIAL TURBULENCE IN 2007 AND 1998
PODOBNOSTI IN RAZLIKE MED NEMIRNIM DOGAJANJEM NA FINANČNIH TRGIH V LETIH 2007 IN 1998
In the second half of 2007 global financial market prices were seriously affected by a general repricing of financial risk, which spread from one specific credit market segment (assets backed by US subprime mortgages) to the credit markets as a whole and the financial system more generally.
V drugi polovici leta 2007 je na cene na fi nančnih trgih resno vplivalo splošno prevrednotenje finančnega tveganja, ki se je z enega segmenta kreditnega trga (finančno premoženje, zavarovano z ameriškimi drugorazrednimi hipotekami) razširilo na celotne kreditne trge in na finančni sistem na splošno.
The sequence and nature of the events characterising the recent turmoil resemble to some extent those of the financial market turbulence experienced in the second half of 1998, typically referred to as the “LTCM crisis”.
Zaporedje in narava dogodkov, ki sta značilna za zadnje pretrese, sta v glavnem podobna tistim med nemirnim dogajanjem v drugi polovici leta 1998, ki se navadno omenjajo kot „kriza LTCM”.
Looking at financial market indicators, this box highlights the main similarities and differences between the two episodes.
V tem okvirju z analizo kazalnikov finančnega trga osvetljujemo glavne podobnosti in razlike med tema epizodama.
In the first half of 1998 most advanced economies experienced favourable market conditions in the form of surging stock prices, stable longterm bond yield developments and a narrowing of corporate bond spreads, partly fuelled by strong macroeconomic conditions (see Charts A and B on US and euro area bond yields and stock prices). The generally tranquil global financial market environment began to change in the summer of 1998.
V prvi polovici leta 1998 je večina razvitih gospodarstev doživljala ugodne tržne razmere v obliki strmo rastočih cen delnic, stabilne donosnosti dolgoročnih obveznic in zmanjševanja razponov donosnosti podjetniških obveznic, kar so deloma spodbujale ugodne makroekonomske razmere
These worries culminated on 17 August, when Russia announced debt restructuring, devaluation and a moratorium on private principal repayments.
( glej grafa A in B o donosnosti obveznic in te čajih delnic v Z
Flight-to-safety portfolio shifts led to lower yields on longterm government bonds (see Chart A).
Večinoma mirne razmere na svetovnih fi nančnih trgih so se poleti leta 1998 za čele spreminjati. Kazalo je, da
Chart A US and euro area longterm bond yields in 1998 and 2007
Graf A Donosnost dolgoročnih obveznic v ZDA in euroobmočju leta 1998 in 2007
Chart B US and euro area stock prices in 1998 and 2007
Graf B Tečaji delnic v ZDA in euroobmočju leta 1998 in 2007
(percentages per annum)
(odstotki na leto) čunan na novo
1998 United States2007 United States1998 euro area2007 euro area
1998 euroobmočje2007 euroobmočje
Sources: Reuters and ECB calculations.Notes: The x-axis corresponds to the 120 business days before and after 17 August 1998 and 30 July 2007 respectively.
Vira: Reuters in izračuni ECB.Opombe: Os x ustreza 120 delovnim dnem pred 17. avgustom 1998 in 30. julijem 2007 oziroma po tema datumoma.
The 1998 date was that of the announcement of the Russian moratorium and the 2007 date was the point at which a German bank, IKB, warned of heavy losses from conduits/SIVs investing in US structured credit instruments.
Datum leta 1998 predstavlja razglasitev ruskega moratorija, datum leta 2007 pa točko, ko je nemška banka IKB posvarila pred močnimi izgubami iz sredstev prehodnih družb/strukturiranih investicijskih družb, investiranih v strukturirane kreditne instrumente ZDA.
The strong market reaction to the Russian default led to mounting concerns about a global credit crunch.
7 na svetovno gospodar- stvo, in drugič, zaskrbljenost trga v zvezi z vzdržnostjo ruskega dolga je začela naraščati.
Many hedge funds and banks’ proprietary desks reported big losses, mainly as a result of the widening of corporate bond spreads and other risk spreads.
Takšne skrbi so dosegle vrhunec 17. avgusta, ko je Rusija najavila prestrukturiranje dolga, devalvacijo in moratorij na odplačila zasebnih glavnic.
The widening of spreads resulted in margin calls and a corresponding need for additional liquidity in order to fund positions.
Te najave so sprožile odprodajo na svetovnih trgih lastniškega kapitala in na trgih podjetniških obveznic.
In early September 1998 shortterm funding problems became particularly severe for one of the largest hedge funds – Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM).
Preusmeritve portfeljev v okviru umika v varnejše naložbe so povzročile znižanje donosnosti dolgoročnih državnih obveznic (glej graf A).
There were widespread concerns that LTCM would be forced to unwind big positions in already tight market conditions, which could in turn give rise to severe systemic risks for the global financial system.
Zaradi močne reakcije trga na neizpolnjevanje fi nančnih obveznosti v Rusiji se je povečala zaskrbljenost, da bo prišlo do svetovne kreditne stiske.
However, several actions over the next few weeks helped the market to begin functioning normally again: first, on 23 September a private rescue plan was announced for LTCM; and second, the Federal Reserve decided to lower policy rates by a total of 100 basis points in three steps.
Mnogi hedge skladi in banke so poročali o velikih izgubah, večinoma zaradi večanja razponov podjetniških obveznic in drugih razponov tveganja.
Overall, the crisis had little impact on the real economy.
Večanje razponov je povzročilo pozive h kritju in temu ustrezno potrebo po dodatni likvidnosti za financiranje pozicij.
As regards the first similarity, in both cases the environment prior to the turbulence was characterised by prolonged periods of general upward movements in asset prices across most segments, coupled with low levels of financial market volatility.
Pojavila se je splošna zaskrbljenost, da bo sklad LTCM prisiljen zapreti velike pozicije v že tako zaostrenih tržnih razmerah, kar bi lahko po drugi strani povzročilo velika sistemska tveganja za svetovni finančni sistem.
These very favourable market conditions may have led some investors to take investment decisions on the basis of risk assessments which turned out to be too optimistic.
Več ukrepov, sprejetih v naslednjih nekaj tednih, pa je omogočilo, da je trg spet začel delovati normalno: 23. septembra je bil najavljen zasebni načrt za reševanje sklada
As a result, those investors probably placed too much weight on recent experience, extrapolating recent trends that were at odds withlong-run equilibrium values and probabilities.
, ameriška centralna banka pa je sklenila v treh korakih znižati svoje klju čne obrestne mere za skupno 100 bazičnih točk. Kriza na splošno ni veliko vplivala na realno gospodarstvo.
Second, in both cases the financial turbulence erupted in the absence of major inflationary or economic shocks, the two crises being triggered, instead, by relatively small shocks
Pri obeh epizodah nemirnega dogajanja (leta 2007 in leta 1998) lahko opazimo dve pomembni podobnosti. Prva se nanaša na razmere na fi nančnih trgih pred pretresi, druga pa na dejstvo, da je v obeh primerih pretrese sprožil razmeroma majhen šok.
(i.e. unexpected defaults in sizeable, although not extremely large, market segments) which gave rise to general repricing of financial risk, leading to extreme price movements in specific market segments (particularly the credit market segment).
Kar zadeva drugo podobnost, v obeh primerih so pretresi izbruhnili v obdobju, ko ni bilo večjih inflacijskih ali gospodarskih šokov, temveč so obe krizi sprožili razmeroma majhni šoki (tj. nepričakovano neizpolnjevanje obveznosti v precejšnjih, vendar ne izjemno velikih segmentih trga), ki so povzročili splošno prevrednotenje fi finančnega tveganja, zato je prišlo do izjemno velikih spre- memb cen v posameznih segmentih trga (zlasti v segmentu kreditnega trga).
It cannot be ruled out that the strong market reactions may have been amplified by the abovementioned tranquil market environment, in which valuations for some asset classes seem, at least ex post, to have been somewhat elevated from a fundamental point of view.
Ni mogoče prezreti, da so bili močni odzivi trga še večji zaradi prej navedenih mirnih razmer na trgu, kjer je bilo vrednotenje nekaterih razredov finančnega premoženja, vsaj gledano nazaj, s temeljnega vidika nekoliko visoko.
Despite the similarities reported above, developments during the two crises differ in a number of respects.
Kljub zgoraj navedenim podobnostim pa se razvoj dogodkov v obeh krizah razlikuje v številnih pogledih.
First, the financial innovations of the past decade in the field of credit risk transfer have substantially increased the difficulty of determining the sectors and specific entities in which such risks ultimately reside.
Prvič, zaradi fi nančnih inovacij v zadnjem desetletju na področju prenosa kreditnega tveganja je občutno težje določiti sektorje in posamezne subjekte, kjer dejansko tiči tveganje.
Although the increased use of securitisation, where illiquid loans are converted into liquid instruments, has enhanced investors’ diversification opportunities, the pricing of these new products is, in many cases, extremely complex.
Čeprav se je z večjo uporabo listinjenja, kjer se nelikvidna posojila pretvorijo v likvidne instrumente, povečala možnost vlagateljev za razpršitev, je določitev cene teh novih proizvodov velikokrat izjemno zapleteno.
The surge in the use of these instruments and uncertainties regarding counterparties’ exposures may partly explain recent developments in a number of market segments.
Skokovit porast uporabe teh instrumentov in negotovost v zvezi z izpostavljenostjo nasprotnih strank je lahko delni razlog za nedavna dogajanja v številnih segmentih trga.
Second, the recent turmoil has predominantly affected spreads and liquidity in the credit and money markets.
Drugič, zadnji pretresi so pretežno vplivali na razpone in likvidnost na kreditnih in denarnih trgih.
In 1998, by contrast, liquidity dried up in the government bond markets, too, as many risky investment strategies pursued during this period also involved positions in government debt securities.
Nasprotno se je leta 1998 znižala tudi likvidnost na trgih državnih obveznic, ker je veliko tveganih naložbenih strategij v tem obdobju vključevalo tudi pozicije v državne dolžniške vrednostne papirje.
Third, the two charts show that there was some decoupling of asset price reactions in the euro area and the United States during the two financial crises.
Tretjič, grafa kažeta, da je med obema fi finančnima krizama prišlo do dolo čenega razhajanja med euroobmočjem in Z
In 1998 stock prices dropped more sharply in the euro area than in the United States.
A pri odzivanju cen fi finančnega premoženja. Leta 19
By contrast, longterm bond yields declined by similar amounts in the two economies.
% v zadnjem pa se je donosnost dolgoročnih obveznic v obeh gospodarstvih podobno znižala.
In 2007, too, expected growth differentials may have contributed to the somewhat different patterns seen in euro area and US asset prices.
Možno je, da so tudi leta 2007 pričakovane razlike v rasti prispevale k nekoliko različnim gibanjem cen finančnega finančnega premoženja v euroobmočju in v Z
For instance, the interest rate differential between US and euro area longterm bond yields narrowed in the months following the outbreak of the turmoil, even turning negative for the first time since early 2004.
A na primer se je v mesecih po nastopu pretresov zmanjšala in je bila prvič po začetku leta 2004 celo negativna.
It seems that in the latter part of 2007 market participants viewed the euro area economy as being somewhat more resilient to the recent turmoil than the US economy.
Kaže, da so udeleženci na trgu v zadnjih mesecih leta 2007 menili, da je gospodarstvo euroobmočja nekoliko odpornejše proti zadnjim pretresom kot gospodarstvo Z
At the same time, US and euro area stock prices have moved more or less in tandem during the recent turbulence, suggesting a strong international factor driving stock prices on both sides of the Atlantic.
A med zadnjimi pretresi gibali bolj ali manj vzporedno, kar kaže, da na tečaje delnic na obeh straneh Atlantika vpliva mo čan mednarodni dejavnik.
Fourth, emerging markets have weathered the 2007 market turmoil much better than in 1998.
Četrtič, nastajajoči trgi so pretrese leta 2007 prestali veliko bolje kot leta 1998.
The moderate impact in 2007 suggests that emerging markets have, over the past decade, become more resilient to shocks in the global financial system.
2007 kaže, da so nastajajoči trgi v zadnjem desetletju postali odpornejši proti šokom v svetovnem nem sistemu.
While emerging markets’ indebtedness played a central role in the 1998 turmoil, emerging markets have hardly been involved in the recent turmoil, cushioning instead the resulting risks for the global economy.
Medtem ko je zadolženost nastajajočih trgov v pretresih leta 1998 igrala osrednjo vlogo, ti v zadnje pretrese skoraj niso bili vpleteni, temveč so blažili nastala tveganja za svetovno gospodarstvo.
housing market dynamics.
ECBLetno poročilo2007
The moderation in loan growth observed towards the end of 2007 may also have reflected the dampening impact of tighter credit standards as banks became more worried about housing market prospects and the general economic outlook.
stanovanjskih posojil je decembra 2007 znašala
At the same time, the annual growth rate of loans to households by nonMFIs (i.e. OFIs and insurance corporations and pension funds) continued to exceed that of MFI loans to households in 2007.
POSTOPNO UMIRJANJE DINAMIKE ZADOLŽEVANJA GOSPODINJSTEVDinamika zadolževanja gospodinjstev se je leta 2007 upočasnila kot posledica zaviralnega učinka višjih posojilnih obrestnih mer, previdnejše ocene kreditnih tveganj s strani posojilodajalcev in umirjanja dinamike stanovanjskih trgov.
The moderation in the annual growth rate of loans for house purchase also reflected the dampening impact of the increases in key ECB interest rates since December 2005.
I gospodinjstvom decem- časnitvijo rasti cen stanovanj in aktivnosti na stanovanjskem trgu v številnih gospodarstvih euroobmočja.
Continuing the trend observed in 2006, MFI lending rates for house purchase rose by 66 basis points between December 2006 and the end of December 2007 (see Chart 17).
Rezultati ankete Eurosistema o bančnih posojilih to oceno potrjujejo, saj so po ugotovitvah bank slabša pričakovanja na stanovanjskem trgu in vedno bolj tudi spremembe zaupanja potrošnikov v letu 2007 dejavniki, ki so prispevali k zmanjšanju povpraševanja gospodinjstev po stanovanjskih posojilih.
Rates increased more strongly for loans for house purchase with a floating rate and an initial rate fi fixation period of up to one year or over ten years than for loans with intermediate maturities.
Umirjanje rasti posojil proti koncu leta 2007 je bilo verjetno tudi posledica zaviralnega učinka strožjih kreditnih standardov, saj so banke postajale vse bolj zaskrbljene glede obetov na stanovanjskem trgu in splošnih gospodarskih obetov.
Similarly, although at a lower level, the annual growth rate of consumer credit declined to 5.3% in December 2007, down from 7.7% at the end of 2006.
bra 2007 ostala visoka in je znašala 6,2%, potem ko je sredi leta 2007 znašala 7,2%, ob koncu leta 2006 pa 8,2%.
The annual growth rate of consumer credit has declined in line with falling consumer confidence and the gradual moderation seen in the
Postopno in stalno zniževanje posojil gospodinjstvom kaže, da je bilo znižanje posledica predvsem temeljnih dejavnikov in da so finančni pretresi doslej le omejeno vplivali na posojila gospodinjstvom.
The annual growthrate of loans for house purchase was 7.1% in December 2007, having stood at 9.6% in December 2006 (see Chart 16).
I gospodinjstvom po namenu kaže, da so bili glavno gibalo zadolževanja še naprej nakupi stanovanj. Letna stopnja rasti
This moderation wasconsistent with the slowdown observed in house price growth and housing market activity in a number of euro area economies.
Umirjanje letne stopnje rasti stanovanjskih posojil je bilo tudi posledica zaviralnega učinka zviševanja ključnih obrestnih mer ECB od decembra 2005.
The results of the Eurosystem’s bank lending survey support this assessment, as in the course of 2007 banks identified housing market prospects and, increasingly, developments in consumer confidence as factors contributing to the dampening of households’ demand for housing
Posojilne obrestne mere MFI so sledile trendu, ki smo mu bili priča leta 2006, in so se med decembrom 2006 in koncem decembra 2007 dvignile za 66 bazičnih točk (glej graf 17). Obrestne mere za stanovanjska
Chart 16 MFI loans to households
Graf 16 Posojila MFI gospodinjstvom
Chart 17 Interest rates for lending to households and nonfinancial corporations
Graf 17 Obrestne mere za posojila gospodinjstvom in nefinančnim družbam
(annual percentage changes)
(medletne spremembe v odstotkih)
(percentages per annum; excluding charges; rates on new business; weight-adjusted) shortterm rates for lending to nonfinancial corporationslong-term rates for lending to nonfinancial corporationsrates for loans to households for house purchaserates for loans to households for consumer credit totallending for house purchase consumer creditother lending
(odstotki na leto; brez stroškov; obrestne mere za nove posle; ponderirano) kratkoročne obrestne mere za posojla nefinančnim družbamdolgoročne obrestne mere za posojla nefinančnim družbamobrestne mere za stanovanjska posojila gospodinjstvomobrestne mere za potrošniška posojila gospodinjstvom skupajstanovanjska posojila potrošniški kreditidruga posojila
Source: ECB.Notes: For the period from December 2003 onwards, the weight-adjusted MFI interest rates are calculated using country weights constructed from a 12-month moving average of new business volumes.
Vir: ECB.Opombe: Za obdobje od decembra 2003 dalje se ponderirane obrestne mere MFI izračunajo s pomočjo uteži držav na podlagi 12-mesečne drseče sredine obsega novih poslov.
For the preceding period, from January to November 2003, the weight-adjusted MFI interest rates are calculated using country weights constructed from the average of new business volumes in 2003.
Za obdobje od januarja do novembra 2003 se ponderirane obrestne mere MFI izračunajo s pomočjo uteži držav na podlegi povprečja obsega novih poslov v letu 2003.