natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) (OJ 1992 L 348, p. 1).
Direktiva Sveta 92/85/EGS z dne 19. oktobra 1992 o uvedbi ukrepov za spodbujanje izboljšav na področju varnosti in zdravja pri delu nosečih delavk in delavk, ki so pred kratkim rodile ali dojijo (deseta posebna direktiva v smislu člena 16(1) Direktive 89/391/EGS (UL 1992, L 348, str. 1).
Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women (OJ 1975 L 45, p. 19).
Direktiva Sveta 75/117/EGS z dne 10. februarja 1975 o približevanju zakonodaje držav članic v zvezi z uporabo načela enakega plačila za moške in ženske (UL 1975, L 45, str. 19).
Court of Justice
Dejavnost
15 and for payment for the hours they the 48-hour limit laid down by Directive 93/104 worked in excess of that weekly limit.
, in plačilo nadur, opravljenih zunaj navedenega tedenskega delovnega časa.
The German court requested guidance from the Court of Justice in this regard.
Nemško sodišče je v tem pogledu Sodišče zaprosilo za pojasnila.
The questions referred by it for a preliminary ruling relate to the interpretation of certain provisions of Directives 89/391 16 and 93/104.
Navedena predhodna vprašanja se nanašajo na razlago posameznih določb Direktiv 89/39116 in 93/104.
The Court began by stating that the activity of emergency workers carried out in the framework of an emergency medical service falls within the scope of Directives 89/391 and 93/104.
Sodišče na začetku poudarja, da se za dejavnost reševalcev, ki jo opravljajo v okviru reševalske službe, uporabljata Direktivi 89/391 in 93/104.
None of the exceptions provided for is relevant in this instance.
Pravzaprav v konkretnem primeru ni upoštevna nobena izmed določenih izjem.
Their activity does not involve services essential for the protection of public health, safety and order in cases, such as a catastrophe, the gravity and scale of which are exceptional and which, by their nature, do not lend themselves to planning as regards working time; nor does their activity involve road transport services, its main aim being to provide initial medical treatment to the sick or injured.
Dejansko ne gre niti za nujno potrebne storitve za varovanje varstva, zdravja in javnega reda v primeru težkih in izjemnih okoliščin, kot so naravne nesreče, ki po svoji naravi ne dopuščajo načrtovanja delovnega časa, niti za storitve cestnega prevoza, glede na to, da je temeljni namen predmetne dejavnosti nuditi prvo medicinsko pomoč bolni ali ranjeni osebi.
That being so, the Court held that an extension of the 48-hour maximum weekly period of working time can be valid only if consent has first been expressly and freely given by each worker individually and that it is therefore not sufficient that the relevant worker’s employment contract refers to a collective agreement permitting such an extension.
Zaradi tega je Sodišče presodilo, da prekoračenje najdaljšega tedenskega delovnega časa 48 ur lahko velja le v primeru, ko ga vsak posamezen delavec izrecno in svobodno sprejme, in da v tem pogledu torej ni dovolj, da se pogodba o zaposlitvi zadevnega delavca sklicuje na kolektivno pogodbo, ki tako prekoračenje dopušča.
Applying its decision in Jaeger, the Court, treating emergency workers’ periods of duty time in the same way as time spent by doctors on call, then held that such periods must be taken into account in their totality in the calculation of maximum daily and weekly working time.
V okviru svoje sodbe Jaeger je Sodišče, potem ko je izenačilo dežurno službo zdravnikov z dežurstvom reševalcev, razložilo, da se morajo taka obdobja celovito upoštevati pri določanju najdaljšega dnevnega in tedenskega delovnega časa.
It stated that the 48-hour upper limit on average weekly working time, including overtime, constitutes a rule of Community social law of particular importance from which every worker must benefit, since it is a minimum requirement necessary to ensure protection of his safety and health.
Pojasnilo je, da je zgornja meja 48 ur, kar zadeva povprečen tedenski delovni čas, upoštevaje nadure, pravno pravilo socialnega prava Skupnosti, ki je posebnega pomena in do katerega je upravičen vsak delavec, kot do minimalnega pravila za zaščito njegovih varnosti in zdravja.
Therefore, national legislation the effect of which, as regards periods of duty time completed by emergency workers, is to permit, including by means of a collective agreement or works agreement based on such an agreement, the 48-hour maximum period of weekly working time to be exceeded is incompatible with the requirements of Directive 93/104.
Posledično je vsaka nacionalna ureditev, ko gre za dežurstva reševalcev, katere učinek je tak, da v okoliščinah posameznega primera na podlagi kolektivne pogodbe ali na podlagi sporazuma podjetja, ki temelji na taki kolektivni pogodbi, dopušča prekoračenje najdaljšega tedenskega delovnega časa 48 ur, nezdružljiva z zahtevami Direktive 93/104.
Finally the Court found, in standard fashion, that Directive 93/104 fulfils, so far as the maximum period of weekly working time is concerned, the conditions necessary for it to have direct effect since, as regards its content, it is unconditional and sufficiently precise.
Končno je Sodišče, tako kot navadno, ugotovilo, da Direktiva 93/104, kar zadeva najdaljši tedenski delovni čas, izpolnjuje zahtevane pogoje za priznanje neposrednega učinka, če se s stališča vsebine izkaže za nepogojno in dovolj natančno.
Applied to the present instance, that principle had to lead the national court to do whatever lay within its jurisdiction to ensure that the maximum period of weekly working time set at 48 hours was not exceeded.
Čeprav je res, da Direktiva sama po sebi posamezniku ne more nalagati obveznosti in je kot take tudi ni mogoče uveljavljati zoper posameznika, je Sodišče vendarle opozorilo na načelo skladne razlage
Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 1993 L 307, p. 18).
Direktiva Sveta 93/104/ES z dne 23. novembra 1993 o določenih vidikih organizacije delovnega časa (UL 1993, L 307, str. 18).
Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work (OJ 1989 L 183, p. 1).
Direktiva Sveta 89/391/EGS z dne 12. junija 1989 o uvajanju ukrepov za spodbujanje izboljšav varnosti in zdravja delavcev pri delu (UL 1989, L 183, str. 1).
In its judgment of 13 July 2004 in Case C-27/04 Commission v Council, not yet published in the ECR, it was called on to address implementation of the Stability Pact.
V zadevi Komisija proti Svetu (sodba z dne 13. julija 2004, C-27/04, še neobjavljena v ZOdl.) je moralo Sodišče odločiti o udejanjanju Pakta stabilnosti.
It will be recalled that, in June 1997 in Amsterdam, the European Council, with a view to completing Economic and Monetary Union, adopted a resolution on the Stability and Growth Pact, the objective of which is to prevent excessive deficits from arising and to ensure sound management of public finances in the euro zone.
Spomnimo naj na to, da je Evropski svet v Amsterdamu junija 1997 v skrbi za dosego gospodarske in denarne unije sprejel Resolucijo o Paktu za stabilnost in rast, katerega cilj je preprečiti prekomerni javnofinančni primanjkljaj in zagotoviti zdrave javne financev evroobmočju.
It was in this context that, in 2003, an excessive deficit procedure was initiated against France and against Germany.
Postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem proti Franciji in Nemčiji v letu 2003 se je tako začel ravno v tem okviru.
On a recommendation from the Commission, the Council found that an excessive deficit existed in both those States.
Po priporočilu Komisije je Svet ugotovil, da imata navedeni državi čezmerni primanjkljaj.
It therefore adopted two recommendations asking them to reduce their deficits and setting a deadline for the adoption of corrective measures (on the basis of Article 104(7) EC).
Prav tako je sprejel priporočili, v katerih jima je naložil, naj zmanjšata primanjkljaj, in jima zato določil rok za sprejem ukrepov za njegovo zmanjšanje (na podlagi člena 104(7) ES).
After those periods had expired, the Commission recommended to the Council that it adopt decisions establishing that neither France nor Germany had taken adequate measures to reduce their deficit in response to the Council’s recommendations.
Po poteku navedenih rokov je Komisija Svetu predlagala sprejem odločitve, s katero bi ugotovil, da niti Nemčija niti Francija nista sprejeli ustreznih ukrepov za zmanjšanje primanjkljajev po priporočilih Sveta.
The Commission thus requested the Council to give the two Member States concerned notice to take measures to reduce their deficit (Article 104(9) EC).
Komisija je Svetu predlagala tudi to, naj na predmetni državi naslovi poziv za sprejem ukrepov za zmanjšanje primanjkljaja (člen 104(9) ES).
However, on 25 November 2003 the Council, unable to achieve the majority required for taking that decision, merely adopted conclusions in which it decided to hold the excessive deficit procedures in abeyance and declared itself ready to take a decision under Article 104(9) EC should it appear that the relevant Member State was not complying with the commitments entered into by it.
Kljub temu se je 25. novembra 2003 Svet ob nezmožnosti, da bi dosegel zahtevano večino za sprejem te odločitve, omejil na sprejem sklepov, v katerih je odločil o mirovanju postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem in v katerih se je izrekel, da je pripravljen sprejeti odločitev na podlagi člena 104(9) ES, če bi prišlo do tega, da država članica ne bi spoštovala obveznosti, ki jih je sprejela.
Faced with what it considered to be a breach of the Treaty rules, in January 2004 the Commission brought an action challenging both the Council’s failure to adopt a decision and its conclusions.
Ker je Komisija štela, da gre za kršitev pravil Pogodbe, je januarja 2004 vložila tožbo tako zoper odločitev Sveta, da ne bo sprejel odločitve, kot tudi zoper njegove odločitve.
So far as concerns, first, the Council’s inability to adopt the decision recommended by the Commission, the Court declared this part of the action inadmissible.
Glede nezmožnosti Sveta, da sprejme odločitev, ki jo je predlagala Komisija, je Sodišče tožbo razglasilo za nedopustno.
It held that failure by the Council to adopt acts provided for in Article 104(8) and (9) EC that are recommended by the Commission cannot be regarded as giving rise to acts open to challenge for the purposes of Article 230 EC.
Presodilo je, da pri nesprejetju aktov iz člena 104(8) in (9) ES in Priporočil Komisije ne more iti za akte, ki jih je mogoče izpodbijati v smislu člena 230 ES.
Where the Commission recommends to the Council that it adopt decisions under Article 104(8) and (9) EC and the required majority is not achieved within the Council, no decision is taken for the purpose of those provisions.
Pravzaprav s tem, da je Komisija Svetu priporočila sprejem odločitev na podlagi člena 104(8) in (9) ES in da v Svetu ni bila dosežena zahtevana večina, v smislu navedene določbe ni bila sprejeta nobena odločitev.
The Court added as an incidental point that ‘… if the Council does not adopt formal instruments recommended by the Commission pursuant to Article 104(8) and (9) EC, the latter can have recourse to the legal remedy provided for by Article 232 EC, in compliance with the conditions prescribed therein’ (paragraph 35).
V pripombi ob robu je Sodišče dodalo, da ima „v primeru, ko Svet ne sprejme formalnih instrumentov, ki jih je priporočila Komisija na podlagi člena 104(8) in (9) ES, slednja možnost uporabiti pravno sredstvo iz člena 232 ES, če so izpolnjeni v njem določeni pogoji“ (točka 35).
On the other hand, the action was declared admissible in so far as it was directed against the Council’s conclusions.
Nasprotno pa je bila tožba zoper odločitve Sveta razglašena za dopustno.
They were indeed intended to have legal effects, at the very least inasmuch as they held the ongoing excessive deficit procedures in abeyance and in reality modified the recommendations previously adopted by the Council under Article 104(7) EC.
Dejansko imajo odločitve pravni učinek, najmanj kolikor povzročijo mirovanje postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, ki je v teku, in pravzaprav spreminjajo že sprejeta priporočila Sveta na podlagi člena 104(7) ES.
The Court stated that the Council had rendered any decision to be taken under Article 104(9) EC conditional on an assessment which would no longer have the content of the recommendations adopted under Article 104(7) EC as its frame of reference, but the unilateral commitments of the Member State concerned.
Sodišče ugotavlja, da je Svet morebitno odločitev o posredovanju na podlagi člena 104(9) ES dejansko pogojil s presojo, katere referenčni okvir ni več vsebina priporočil, sprejetih na podlagi odstavka 7 te določbe, pač pa enostranska obveznost zadevne države članice.
Court of Justice adopted by the Council under Article 104(7) EC, it constituted a breach of Article 104(7) and (13) EC, that is to say a breach of the Commission’s right of initiative and of the voting rules.
Tako v zaključkih zajeta odločitev, ki prinaša spremembo priporočil, sprejetih s strani Sveta na podlagi člena 104(7) ES, pomeni kršitev člena 104(7) in (13) ES, torej kršitev pravice do iniciative Komisije in pravil glasovanja.
The Court stated that ‘… it follows from the wording and the broad logic of the system established by the Treaty that the Council cannot break free from the rules laid down by Article 104 EC and those which it set for itself in Regulation No 1467/97.
Sodišče je presodilo, da „izhaja iz besedila in sistematike, uvedene s Pogodbo, da se Svet ne more osvoboditi pravil, ki jih določa člen 104 ES in ki si jih je sam postavil z Uredbo št. 1467/97.
Thus, it cannot have recourse to an alternative procedure, for example in order to adopt a measure which would not be the very decision envisaged at a given stage or which would be adopted in conditions different from those required by the applicable provisions.’
Tako se ne more zateči k alternativnemu postopku, na primer za sprejem posameznega akta, ki ne bi bila sama odločitev, predvidena na določeni stopnji postopka oziroma sprejeta v okoliščinah, drugačnih od tistih, ki jih zahtevajo določbe, ki se jih uporablja“ (točka 81).
The case involved determining whether the method applied by O2 for converting into euros amounts hitherto expressed in deutschmarks was compatible with that regulation.
, in sicer v okviru pravde med nemškim pravnim subjektom, zadolženim za ukrepanje v primeru kršitev zakonov o varstvu potrošnikov (Verbraucher-Zentrale), in podjetjem O2, ki posluje z omrežjem mobilne telefonije.
O2 converted the price per minute of its various tariffs by rounding them to the nearest cent, and in fact rounded the relevant tariff up to the nearest cent.
O2 je ceno na minuto za različne ponudbe tarif dejansko preračunal z zaokroževanjem do najbližjega stota evra, pravzaprav do zgornjega stota.
Article 5 of Regulation No 1103/97 states that ‘monetary amounts to be paid or accounted for when a rounding takes place after a conversion into the euro unit … shall be rounded up or down to the nearest cent’.
Na podlagi člena 5 zgoraj navedene uredbe se „denarni zneski, ki jih je treba plačati ali vknjižiti, potem ko je bil znesek (…) preračunan in zaokrožen v enote evra, [se] zaokrožijo navzgor ali navzdol na najbližji stot“.
The Court had to decide first whether a tariff, such as the per-minute price at which O2 invoiced its customers’ telephone calls, is a monetary amount to be paid or accounted for within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 5 of Regulation No 1103/97 or whether it is only the final sum for which the consumer is actually invoiced which may constitute such an amount.
Sodišče je moralo najprej odločiti, ali je določena tarifa, kot je cena na minuto, po kateri je O2 svojim strankam zaračunaval telefonske pogovore, denarni znesek, ki ga je treba plačati ali vknjižiti, v smislu člena 5, prvi pododstavek, Uredbe št. 1103/97, oziroma ali lahko pomeni tak znesek zgolj končni znesek, ki se ga dejansko zaračuna potrošniku.
Since Community law does not define those concepts, the Court had recourse to the teleological method of interpretation and thus concerned itself with the aims of the measure in question.
Kjer pravo Skupnosti ne opredeljuje navedenih pojmov, je Sodišče uporabilo metodo teleološke razlage in se tako oprijelo ciljev akta, ki ga je presojalo.
Two general principles of law are identifiable in Regulation No 1103/97: the need to protect citizens’ legal certainty at the time of transition to the euro and the correlative requirement that the continuity of contracts and other legal instruments should not be affected, these principles sharing a general objective pursued when introducing the new single currency, namely that the transition to the euro should be neutral for citizens and undertakings.
Iz Uredbe št. 1103/97 je mogoče razbrati dve splošni načeli, in sicer potrebo po varstvu pravne varnosti državljanov pri prehodu na evro in soodvisno potrebo po tem, da ostane kontinuiteta pogodb in drugih pravnih instrumentov neprizadeta, pri tem pa navedeni načeli delita splošni interes, ki ga zasleduje uvedba nove enotne valute, to je cilj nevtralnega prehoda na evro za državljane in podjetja.
As the 12th recital in the preamble to the regulation suggests, that objective requires that ‘a high degree of accuracy in conversion operations’ be achieved.
Predmetni cilj torej zahteva, kot je navedeno v dvanajsti uvodni izjavi te uredbe, da se zagotovi „zelo natančno preračunavanje“.
Having regard to those objectives, the Court interpreted Regulation No 1103/97 restrictively and ruled that ‘a tariff, such as the per-minute price at issue in the main proceedings, does not constitute a monetary amount to be paid or accounted for within
Sodišče je glede na navedene cilje sprejelo strogo razlago člena 5 Uredbe o evru in štelo, da „tarifa, taka kot cena na minuto, ki je predmet spora v glavni stvari, ne pomeni denarnega zneska, ki ga je treba plačati ali vknjižiti v smislu člena 5, prvi pododstavek, Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1103/97 […], in se torej ne zaokroži v vsakem primeru na najbližji stot“ (točka 1 izreka).
Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 of 17 June 1997 on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro (OJ 1997 L 162, p. 1).
Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1103/97 z dne 17. junija 1997 o nekaterih določbah v zvezi z uvajanjem evra (UL 1997, L 162, str. 1).
Court of Justice
Člani Sodišča
In the case in point, the Court stated that the conversion in question is ‘liable to have a real impact on the price actually borne by consumers’ (paragraph 54).
Rojen leta 1939; barrister; Queen’s Counsel; uradnik v sekretariatu Evropske komisije za človekove pravice; strokovni sodelavec pri generalnem pravobranilcu J. P.
C. Gulmann, Judge; A. Borg Barthet, President of Chamber; R. Silva de Lapuerta, President of Chamber; A. Rosas, President of Chamber; P. Jann, President of Chamber; V. Skouris, President of the Court; C.W.A. Timmermans, President of Chamber; L.A. Geelhoed, First Advocate General; K. Lenaerts, President of Chamber; F.G. Jacobs, Advocate General.
Rojen leta 1936; član Conseil d’État (Francija); direktor, pozneje generalni direktor pravne službe pri Svetu Evropskih skupnosti (1968-1973); generalni direktor Nacionalne agencije za zaposlovanje (1973-1975); direktor splošnega sektorja na ministrstvu za industrijo (1977-1979); direktor pravne službe pri OECD (1979-1985); direktor Mednarodnega inštituta za javno upravo (1985-1994); pravni svetovalec, direktor pravne službe na ministrstvu za zunanje zadeve (1987-1994); sodnik Sodišča od 7. oktobra 1994.
A. Tizzano, Advocate General; N. Colneric, Judge; D. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Advocate General; J.-P. Puissochet, Judge; A.M. La Pergola, Judge; P. Léger, Advocate General; R. Schintgen, Judge, S. von Bahr, Judge; J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, Judge.
Rojen leta 1938; sodnik, dodeljen na ministrstvo za pravosodje (19661970); šef kabineta, pozneje svetovalec v kabinetu ministra za kakovost življenja (1976); svetovalec v kabinetu ministra za pravosodje (19761978); namestnik direktorja za kazenske zadeve in pomilostitve na ministrstvu za pravosodje (1978-1983); sodnik na Cour d’Appel de Paris (Višje sodišče v Parizu) (1983-1986); namestnik šefa kabineta ministra za pravosodje, ministrstvo za pravosodje (1986); predsednik Tribunal de grande instance de Bobigny (Prizivno sodišče v Bobignyju) (1986-1993); šef kabineta ministra za pravosodje in generalni pravobranilec na Cour d’Appel de Paris (1993-1994); izredni profesor na Univerzi René Descartes (Paris V) (1988-1993); generalni pravobranilec na Sodišču od 7. oktobra 1994.
G. Arestis, Judge; P. Kuˉris, Judge; K. Schiemann, Judge; J. Kokott, Advocate General; C. Stix-Hackl, Advocate General; L.M. Poiares P. Maduro, Advocate General; J. Makarczyk, Judge; E. Juhász, Judge.
Rojen leta 1935; doktorat iz prava na Univerzi na Dunaju (1957); imenovan za sodnika in dodeljen na zvezno ministrstvo za pravosodje (1961); sodnik za zadeve s področja medijskega prava na Straf-Bezirksgericht Wien (Okrajno kazensko sodišče na Dunaju) (1963-1966); tiskovni predstavnik ministrstva za pravosodje (1966-1970), nato zaposlen na oddelku za mednarodne zadeve istega ministrstva; svetovalec odbora za pravosodje in tiskovni predstavnik Parlamenta (1973-1975); imenovan za sodnika ustavnega sodišča (1978); stalni sodnik poročevalec na istem sodišču do konca leta 1994; sodnik Sodišča od 19. januarja 1995.
Born 1948; graduated in law from the Free University, Berlin (1970); awarded doctorate in constitutional and administrative law at Hamburg University (1973); Assistant Professor at Hamburg University (197277); Professor of Public Law at Bielefeld University (1978); Professor of Public Law at the University of Thessaloniki (1982); Minister of Internal Affairs (1989 and 1996); Member of the Administrative Board of the University of Crete (1983-87); Director of the Centre for International and European Economic Law, Thessaloniki (from 1997); President of the Greek Association for European Law (1992-94); Member of the Greek National Research Committee (1993-95); Member of the Higher Selection Board for Greek Civil Servants (199496); Member of the Academic Council of the Academy of European Law, Trier (from 1995); Member of the Administrative Board of the Greek National Judges’ College (1995-96); Member of the Scientific Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1997-99); President of the Greek Economic and Social Council in 1998; Judge at the Court of Justice since 8 June 1999; President of the Court of Justice since 7 October 2003.
Rojena leta 1948; študirala v Tübingenu, Münchnu in Ženevi; po opravljenih akademskih raziskovanjih v Londonu je postala doktorica pravnih znanosti na Univerzi v Münchnu; sodnica na Arbeitsgerichtu Oldenburg (Delovno sodišče v Oldenburgu); habilitirana na Univerzi v Bremnu kot predavateljica delovnega prava, sociologije prava in socialnega prava; docentka ad interim na Pravni fakulteti Univerze v Frankfurtu in v Bremnu; predsednica Landesarbeitsgerichta Schleswig – Holstein (Deželno delovno sodišče Schleswig – Holstein) (1989); sodelovala kot strokovnjakinja pri projektu European Expertise Service (EU) o reformi delovnega prava v Kirgistanu (19941995); gostujoča profesorica za delovno pravo, predvsem evropsko delovno pravo, na Univerzi v Bremnu; sodnica Sodišča od 15. julija 2000.