natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It should also have issued its judgment no later than six weeks after the application was lodged (Article 11(3) of the Regulation).
Tudi sodno odločbo bi moralo izdati v �estih tednih po vložitvi zahtevka (člen 11(3) Uredbe).
The only grounds on which it could have refused to order the child’s return were those set out in Article 13 of the Convention, read subject to Article 11(4) of the Regulation, and Article 20 of the Convention.
Razlogi, iz katerih bi lahko zavrnilo vrnitev, so bili omejeni na na�tete v členu 13 Konvencije, kakor je bil dopolnjen s členom 11(4) in (5) Uredbe, ter v členu 20 Konvencije.
In the event, the Lithuanian court gave its decision — refusing the child’s return — on 22 December 2006, slightly over seven weeks after the application was lodged. 12
V tej zadevi je litovsko sodi�če izdalo odločbo, s katero je zavrnilo vrnitev, 22. decembra 2006, kar je nekaj več kot sedem tednov po vložitvi zahtevka. 12
However, instead of using that possibility, the father appealed against the nonreturn order to the Lithuanian Court of Appeal, which, on 15 March 2007, quashed the decision and ordered the child’s return within one month. 13
Vendar se je oče, namesto da bi uporabil to možnost, pritožil zoper odločbo, da se otrok ne vrne, pri Lietuvos apeliacinis teismas, ki je 15. marca 2007 razveljavilo odločbo in odredilo vrnitev otroka v roku enega meseca. 13
That order, it would seem, should have been enforced within the period laid down, as it appears from the Supreme Court’s judgment of 7 January 2008 that Article 2(6) of the Lithuanian law implementing the Regulation expressly precludes any further appeal from the Court of Appeal’s decision.
Zdi se, da bi se ta odločba morala izvr�iti v predpisanem roku, saj je iz sodbe Lietuvos Auk�čiausiasis teismas z dne 7. januarja 2008 razvidno, da je v členu 2(6) litovskega zakona o izvajanju Uredbe izrecno prepovedana zahteva za varstvo zakonitosti.
Immediate enforcement would, moreover, have been consistent with the fundamental aims of the Convention and the Regulation.
Takoj�nja izvr�itev te odločbe naj bi bila sicer v skladu s temeljnimi cilji Konvencije in Uredbe.
At that stage, pursuant to Article 11(6) of the Regulation, the Lithuanian court should have immediately transmitted a copy of its decision and other relevant documents to the competent court or central authority in Germany, to ensure that the German court received them within one month at the latest.
To sodi�če bi moralo v tej fazi na podlagi člena 11(6) Uredbe takoj poslati izvod odločbe in ustreznih dokumentov pristojnemu sodi�ču ali osrednjemu organu v Nemčiji, da bi jih nem�ko sodi�če prejelo v enem mesecu.
From information given at the hearing, it appears that in fact it was the father’s lawyer who first notified the decision to the German central authority, and that a translation was later sent by the Lithuanian central authority.
Glede na pojasnila, dana na obravnavi, naj bi najprej očetov odvetnik poslal odločbo nem�kemu osrednjemu organu, nato pa naj bi prevod poslal litovski osrednji organ.
However, as a result of the mother’s application for the proceedings to be reopened and the procedural vagaries that have followed upon it, the decision was not enforced, nor has it been enforced to this day.
Kljub temu se po materini vložitvi predloga za obnovo postopka in posledičnih zapletih postopka to ni zgodilo in �e danes je tako.
On the contrary, enforcement of the Court of Appeal’s decision has been suspended on several occasions, even by the Supreme Court itself — despite that fact that the same Supreme Court 14 held, in its judgment allowing the reopening, that such suspension was not possible.
Nasprotno, izvr�itev odločbe Lietuvos apeliacinis teismas je bila večkrat odložena, njeno izvr�itev je odložilo tudi Lietuvos Auk�čiausiasis teismas, in to kljub dejstvu, da je to isto sodi�če 14v odločbi, s katero je dovolilo obnovo postopka, odločilo, da je taka odložitev izključena.
The Oranienburg court could then, on application by the father, have ordered the child’s return by virtue of Article 11(8) of the Regulation.
Nato bi lahko Amtsgericht Oranienburg na očetov predlog na podlagi člena 11(8) Uredbe odredilo vrnitev otroka.
That would have been the last word.
To sodi�če bi torej imelo zadnjo besedo.
If, after examining the question of custody in accordance with Article 11(7), it had then certified its judgment in accordance with Article 42 of the Regulation, that decision would have been enforceable in Lithuania as provided for in Articles 42 to 45.
Če bi po preučitvi vpra�anja varstva in vzgoje v skladu s členom 11(7) odredilo vrnitev in izdalo potrdilo o sodni odločbi v skladu s členom 42 Uredbe, bi bila ta odločba izvr�ljiva v Litvi pod pogoji iz členov od 42 do 45.
13 — At the hearing, the agent for the German Government informed the Court that this decision was transmitted by the Lithuanian central authority to the German central authority, which notified it to the father’s lawyer but not, through an oversight, to the Oranienburg court.
13 – Ugotovimo lahko, da je glede na informacije, ki jih je zastopnik nem�ke vlade predstavil na obravnavi, osrednji litovski organ to odločbo poslal osrednjemu nem�kemu organu, ta pa jo je poslal očetovemu odvetniku, vendar pomotoma ne tudi Amtsgericht Oranienburg.
However, it is clear from that court’s judgment of 20 June 2007, and from the Brandenburg appeal court’s confirming judgment of 20 February 2008, that both those courts had cognisance of the decision.
Toda iz sodbe tega sodi�ča z dne 20. junija 2007 in potrditvene sodbe, ki jo je Oberlandesgericht Brandenburg izdalo 20. februarja 2008, je razvidno, da sta se ti sodi�či seznanili z odločbo.
12 — We do not have a copy of this decision, but it appears to be common ground that the refusal was based on Article 13(b) of the Convention, which provides for such a possibility if ‘there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation’.
12 – Te odločbe nimam, vendar se ne zdi sporno, da zavrnitev temelji na členu 13(b) Konvencije, v katerem je predvidena ta možnost, če „obstaja resna nevarnost, da bi bil otrok zaradi vrnitve izpostavljen telesnemu nasilju ali du�evni travmi ali kako drugače pripeljan v neugoden položaj“.
14 — Albeit, according to information given by counsel for the father at the hearing, a different Chamber.
14 – Vendar drug senat glede na informacije, ki jih je na obravnavi navedel očetov zastopnik.
RINAU were given an opportunity to be heard (the mother being represented but not present 15),
RINAU ni bila navzoča, bil pa je njen zastopnik 15) in (c) da so bili razlogi za nevrnitev, ki jih
Even if enforcement of a judgment of a court of a Member State within its own territory is a matter for domestic law, it can only be concluded, at this point, that the outcome of these successive suspensions — the fact that, nearly two years after she was first supposed to return and more than 15 months after the decision ordering her return was issued, the child has still not been brought back to Germany — is totally incompatible with the fundamental aims of the Convention and the Regulation.
Čeprav izvr�itev odločbe sodi�ča države članice na njenem ozemlju spada v njeno nacionalno pravo, lahko v tej fazi samo sklenem, da je položaj, nastal zaradi teh zaporednih odložitev – in sicer da se otrok skoraj dve leti po zadržanju in več kot petnajst mesecev po izdaji odločbe o vrnitvi otroka �e vedno ni vrnil v Nemčijo – popolnoma nezdružljiv s temeljnimi cilji Konvencije in Uredbe.
and (c) the reasons for not ordering return given by the Klaipėda court in its decision (of 22 December 2006, now quashed, subject to the proceedings being reopened) were examined but not accepted.
je Klaipėdos apygardos teismas navedlo v odločbi, da se otrok ne vrne (odločba z dne 22. decembra 2006, zdaj razveljavljena s pridržkom obnove postopka), preučeni in zavrnjeni.
Thus, even if the transmission procedure provided for in Article 11(6) of the Regulation was not formally observed in every particular, the aim sought was well and truly achieved, and it is quite clear, from both the judgment of the Oranienburg court of 20 June 2007 and that of the Brandenburg appeal court of 20 February 2008 dismissing the mother’s appeal, that both courts ruled in full knowledge of the background.
Tako čeprav se postopek po�iljanja iz člena 11(6) Uredbe formalno ni upo�teval v vseh podrobnostih, je bil cilj tega postopka dosežen in iz odločbe Amtsgericht Oranienburg z dne 20. junija 2007 in sodbe Oberlandesgericht Brandenburg z dne 20. februarja 2008, s katero je bila zavrnjena pritožba matere, je jasno razvidno, da sta ti sodi�či odločali ob polnem poznavanju dejstev.
I come now to the Oranienburg court’s judgment granting divorce, awarding sole custody definitively to the father and ordering (yet again) the child’s return (delivered on 20 June 2007 and confirmed on 17 February 2008 by the Brandenburg appeal court).
Zdaj bom obravnavala sodbo o razvezi, ki jo je Amtsgericht Oranienburg izdalo 20. junija 2007 in v kateri je varstvo in vzgojo dokončno dodelilo izključno očetu ter odredilo (�e enkrat) vrnitev otroka (sodba, ki jo je 17. februarja 2008 potrdilo Oberlandesgericht Brandenburg).
That judgment was certified in accordance with Article 42 of the Regulation, which normally means that it must be ‘recognised and enforceable’ in Lithuania ‘without the need for a declaration of enforceability and without any possibility of opposing its recognition’.
O tej sodbi je bilo izdano potrdilo v skladu s členom 42 Uredbe, kar običajno pomeni, da „se prizna in je izvr�ljiva“ v Litvi, „ne da bi bila potrebna razglasitev izvr�ljivosti in brez možnosti nasprotovanja njenemu priznanju“.
The status of that decision and of its accompanying certificate, in the light of the provisions of the Regulation, raises doubts for the referring court, expressed in its fifth question.
Predložitveno sodi�če ima zaradi statusa te odločbe na podlagi določb Uredbe in potrdila o njej pomisleke, izražene v petem vpra�anju.
That question, I consider, is best addressed first, as it appears to lie at the core of the matter, and the answer to it may guide the approach to several other questions.
Koristno se mi zdi naprej obravnavati to vpra�anje, saj se mi zdi ključno, odgovor nanj pa bi lahko nakazal odgovor na več drugih vpra�anj.
15 — It appears from the German judgments in the case-file that the mother was represented and able to submit observations, though not physically present, in the proceedings giving rise to the Oranienburg court’s judgments of 14 August 2006 and 20 June 2007, and that she was present and heard in the proceedings giving rise to the Brandenburg appeal court’s confirmatory judgment of 20 February 2008.
15 – Iz nem�kih sodb v spisu je razvidno, da je mati imela zastopnika in je lahko predložila stali�ča, čeprav ni bila navzoča, v postopkih, v katerih sta bili izrečeni sodbi Amtsgericht Oranienburg z dne 14. avgusta 2006 in z dne 20. junija 2007, ter da je bila osebno navzoča in zasli�ana v postopku, v katerem je Oberlandesgericht Brandenburg izreklo potrditveno sodbo z dne 20. februarja 2008.
That information was confirmed at the hearing before the Court of Justice, when the mother was again present.
Ta dejstva so bila potrjena med obravnavo pred Sodi�čem, na kateri je bila mati prav tako navzoča.
I note that the certificate accompany- ing that decision uses the standard form provided for and contains all the required information and statements, and that the judgment itself indicates, in line with Article 42(2) of the Regulation, that (a) it was not considered appropriate to hear the child, having regard to her age, (b) the parties
Ugotavljam, da je bil za potrdilo o tej odločbi uporabljen predvideni obrazec, da potrdilo vsebuje vse zahtevane informacije in trditve ter da je v sami odločbi v skladu s členom 42(2) Uredbe navedeno, (a) da se je menilo, da zasli�anje otroka zaradi njegove starosti ni primerno, (b) da so stranke imele možnost biti zasli�ane (mati
The Supreme Court wishes to know essentially whether, in the procedural circumstances of the case, the Regulation allowed the German court to order the child’s return and issue the certificate under Article 42.
Lietuvos Auk�čiausiasis teismas želi s tem vpra�anjem izvedeti predvsem, ali je bilo v okoli�činah postopka v obravnavani zadevi nem�ko sodi�če na podlagi določb Uredbe pristojno odrediti vrnitev otroka in izdati potrdilo iz člena 42 Uredbe.
It transpired at the hearing that some very divergent — even diametrically opposing — views as to the meaning of those provisions are variously held by different Member States and by the Commission.
Na obravnavi se je izkazalo, da imajo države članice in Komisija zelo različna, celo popolnoma nasprotna stali�ča o pomenu teh določb.
On the one hand, they are interpreted to mean that, initially, only the courts of the Member State where the child is actually present have jurisdiction, in the framework of the Convention and Article 11 of the Regulation, to order his or her return, and that such jurisdiction cannot be exercised by the courts of the Member State of habitual residence unless and until there is a final, enforceable nonreturn order, having the force of res judicata, issued by a court of the Member State where the child is actually present.
Po eni strani obstaja razlaga, da so najprej samo sodi�ča države članice, v kateri je otrok, pristojna, da na podlagi Konvencije in člena 11 Uredbe odredijo njegovo vrnitev, ter da to pristojnost lahko izvajajo sodi�ča države članice običajnega prebivali�ča, samo če in �ele ko obstaja pravnomočna in izvr�ljiva sodna odločba, da se otrok ne vrne, ki jo izda sodi�če države članice, v kateri je otrok.
On the other hand, there is the view that the courts of the Member State of habitual residence also, at all times, enjoy jurisdiction to order the child’s return, either by virtue of Article 8 (read with Article 10) of the Regulation or in the context of the Convention and Article 8 of the Regulation. 16
Po drugi strani obstaja stali�če, da imajo tudi sodi�ča države članice običajnega prebivali�ča vedno pristojnost, da odredijo vrnitev otroka bodisi na podlagi člena 8 Uredbe (v povezavi s členom 10) bodisi na podlagi Konvencije in člena 11 Uredbe 16.
In view of those diverging interpretations, I think it is essential for the Court to give a very clear ruling on this aspect of the Regulation.
Na podlagi teh različnih razlag se mi zdi bistveno, da Sodi�če zelo jasno odloči o tem vidiku Uredbe.
For my part, I would immediately dismiss any assumption that the courts of the Member State where the child is actually present have exclusive jurisdiction up to the time they issue a nonreturn order.
Menim, da je treba takoj zavrniti trditev, da imajo sodi�ča države članice, v kateri je otrok, izključno pristojnost, dokler ne sprejmejo odločbe, da se otrok ne vrne.
16 — Inasmuch as Articles 12 and 13 of the Convention do not determine jurisdiction but issue instructions to any competent court, and Article 11(1) to (5) of the Regulation refer to those articles.
16 – Ker člena 12 in 13 Konvencije ne vsebujeta pravil o pristojnosti, temveč navodila za vsa pristojna sodi�ča, in ker se člen 11, od (1) do (5), Uredbe sklicuje na to.
With regard to the competence of the courts of the Member State of habitual residence to order the child’s return, a further distinction should be drawn between two possible bases of jurisdiction: Article 8 of the Regulation (read in conjunction with Article 10 and, where appropriate, Article 12(1)) and Article 11(8) of the Regulation (read in conjunction with the provisions of the Convention).
V zvezi s pristojnostjo sodi�ča države članice običajnega prebivali�ča za odreditev vrnitve otroka je treba nato razlikovati med dvema mogočima podlagama za pristojnost: členom 8 Uredbe (v povezavi s členom 10 in po potrebi členom 12(1)) in členom 11 Uredbe, zlasti odstavkom 8 (v povezavi z določbami Konvencije).
It is true that Article 12 of the Convention envisages those courts being seised of a request for an order to return the child, and it does indeed appear logical to apply to them in the first place, since their decision will never require exequatur proceedings in order to obtain enforcement.
V členu 12 Konvencije je sicer določeno, da se predlog za izdajo odločbe o vrnitvi otroka vloži pri teh sodi�čih, in dejansko se zdi logično, da se zadevna oseba obrne najprej nanje, saj za izvr�itev njihove odločbe nikakor ne bo potreben postopek za priznanje izvr�ljivosti.
Likewise, the drafting of Article 11 of the Regulation gives the impression that a first decision is envisaged in the Member State where the child is actually present.
Res je tudi, da je iz besedila člena 11 Uredbe mogoče sklepati, da se predvideva, da bo najprej sprejeta odločba v državi članici, v kateri je otrok.
However, I would recall that the Convention does not lay down any rules of jurisdiction, and I note that nothing in the Regulation explicitly limits jurisdiction to order the child’s return to the courts of the Member State where he or she is actually present.
Vendar pa opozarjam, da Konvencija ne vsebuje nobenega pravila o pristojnosti, in ugotavljam, da pristojnost za odreditev vrnitve otroka v nobeni določbi Uredbe ni izrecno omejena na sodi�ča države članice, v kateri je otrok.
They unquestionably have that jurisdiction, but there is nothing to say that it must be exclusive.
Te pristojnosti ni mogoče zanikati, toda nikjer se ne zahteva, da je izključna.
the child’. Moreover, since Article 10(b)(iv) speaks of ‘a judgment on custody that does not entail the return of the child … issued by the courts of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention’, 17it must be concluded that the same courts may also issue a decision on custody which does entail return.
je v členu 10, točka (b)(iv), omenjena „sodna odločba o varstvu in vzgoji otroka, ki ne nalaga vrnitve otroka, [ki so jo] izdala sodi�ča države članice, kjer je otrok običajno prebival neposredno pred neupravičeno premestitvijo ali zadržanjem“ 17, je treba sklepati, da ta sodi�ča lahko izdajo tudi odločbo o varstvu in vzgoji, ki nalaga vrnitev otroka.
Finally, if a court has jurisdiction, under Articles 8 or 12 of the Regulation, in all matters relating to parental responsibility and, thus, to custody (connected, where relevant, with an application for divorce), it is simply not conceivable that such jurisdiction should not include the power to ensure the child’s actual presence with the person to whom custody has been granted.
Nazadnje, če je sodi�če na podlagi člena 8 ali 12 Uredbe pristojno za vsa vpra�anja o star�evski odgovornosti in torej o varstvu in vzgoji (morebiti povezana s predlogom za razvezo), je nedoumljivo, da ta pristojnost ne pokriva pristojnosti za zagotovitev dejanske navzočnosti otroka pri osebi, ki ji je bil dodeljen v varstvo in vzgojo.
And that power must in turn include the power to take any interim measures which appear necessary in the course of the proceedings.
Ta pristojnost mora vključevati pristojnost za sprejetje vseh začasnih ukrepov, ki bi se med postopkom izkazali za potrebne.
To preclude the Court with jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility from ordering the child’s return would be tantamount to depriving it of any real jurisdiction to make any provisional or final ruling on custody.
Prepovedati sodi�ču, pristojnemu za vpra�anja star�evske odgovornosti, da odredi vrnitev otroka, bi pomenilo temu sodi�ču odvzeti vso dejansko pristojnost, da odloči o začasni ali trajni dodelitvi varstva in vzgoje.
Moreover, general jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility necessarily comprises jurisdiction to order the return of an abducted child.
Poleg tega splo�na pristojnost v zvezi s star�evsko odgovornostjo nujno vključuje pristojnost za odreditev vrnitve ugrabljenega otroka.
I thus reach the conclusion that, to start with, in a case of child abduction, it is possible to apply for an order for the child’s return to the competent court of the Member State of habitual residence, to the competent court of the Member State where the child is actually present — or even to the competent court called upon to decide on an application for divorce, legal separation or marriage
Tako sklepam, da je na začetku ob ugrabitvi otroka mogoče zahtevati izdajo odločbe o vrnitvi otroka ali pri pristojnem sodi�ču države članice, v kateri je otrok, ali pri pristojnem sodi�ču države članice njegovega običajnega prebivali�ča ali celo pri pristojnem sodi�ču, ki mora odločiti o predlogu za razvezo, prenehanje življenjske
According to Article 2(7) of the Regulation, parental responsibility includes, in particular, rights of custody and, according to Article 2(9), the term ‘rights of custody’ includes in particular the right to determine the child’s place of residence.
V skladu s členom 2, točka 7, Uredbe star�evska odgovornost vključuje predvsem pravico do varstva in vzgoje, v skladu s točko 9 istega člena pa pravica do varstva in vzgoje obsega predvsem pravico določitve kraja otrokovega prebivali�ča.
Chapter II, Section 2, of the Regulation is entitled ‘Parental responsibility’ and includes, in particular, Article 11, entitled ‘Return of
Oddelek 2 poglavja II je naslovljen „Star�evska odgovornost“ in vsebuje predvsem člen 11 z naslovom „Vrnitev otroka“. Poleg tega, ker
17 — Emphasis added.
17 – Moj poudarek.
VIEW OF MS SHARPSTON — CASE C-195/08 PPU annulment, if the latter is in a third Member State. 18
STALIŠČE E. SHARPSTON – ZADEVA C-195/08 PPU skupnosti ali razveljavitev zakonske zveze, če je v tretji državi članici 18.
If the order does not entail the child’s return, and is issued by a court of a Member State other than that in which the child is actually present, there will obviously be no attempt to have it recognised or enforced in any State, but appeal proceedings under domestic law will of course remain available.
Če se v odločbi ne zahteva vrnitev otroka in če odločbo izda sodi�če države članice, ki ni država, v kateri je otrok, se očitno ne bo prizadevalo za njeno priznanje in izvr�itev v katerikoli državi, vendar bodo pravna sredstva zoper to odločbo po nacionalnem pravu seveda ostala mogoča.
The effects of the order issued may, however, differ depending on the court chosen.
Nasprotno pa se lahko učinki izdane odločbe razlikujejo glede na izbrano sodi�če.
If, on the other hand, a nonreturn order is issued by a competent court in the Member State where the child is actually present, then the machinery of Article 11(6) to (8) will be set in motion — the order must be transmitted to the competent court of the Member State of habitual residence, which will invite the parties to make submissions and examine the question of custody and which may, finally, issue a decision ordering the child’s return which will be recognised and enforceable in another Member State without the need for a declaration of enforceability and without any possibility of opposing its recognition if it is certified in accordance with Article 42(2).
Nasprotno, če odločbo, da se otrok ne vrne, sprejme pristojno sodi�če države članice, v kateri je otrok, se začne izvajati mehanizem iz člena 11, od (6) do (8), Uredbe – pristojno sodi�če države članice običajnega prebivali�ča se obvesti o odločbi, to sodi�če pozove stranke, preuči vpra�anje varstva in vzgoje in, nazadnje, to sodi�če lahko izda odločbo o vrnitvi otroka, ki bo v vseh drugih državah članicah samodejno izvr�ljiva in ki ji ne bo mogoče nasprotovati, če bo v zvezi z njo izdano potrdilo v skladu s členom 42(2).
If the order entails the child’s return, it will be enforceable, ex hypothesi, in the Member State where the child is actually present if it is issued by a court of that State.
Če odločba vključuje vrnitev otroka, bo hipotetično izvr�ljiva v državi članici, v kateri je otrok, če jo sprejme sodi�če te države.