natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As regards applications for a reduction in fines, the statistics provided should be seen in the light of the fact that in a single investigation normally more than one undertaking applies for a reduction in fines.
Pri statistiki o prošnjah za znižanje globe se je treba zavedati, da v okviru ene preiskave za znižanje globe običajno zaprosi več kot eno podjetje.
Whether or not evidence can be recorded as having signicant added value — and therefore qualifying for a reduction in the ne — depends on the facts of the case and the strength of the evidence already in the possession of the Commission.
Ali se dokazi zabeležijo zaradi svoje pomembne dodane vrednosti – in tako prispevajo k znižanju globe – je odvisno od dejstev o primeru in trdnosti dokazov, ki jih ima Komisija že na voljo.
Where the information provided by the immunity applicant and the inspections is still insu-cient to prove the infringement, new evidence provided by an applicant for a reduction of fines may allow the Commission to actually prove the infringement.
Če so informacije, ki jih je zagotovil prosilec za imuniteto, in inšpekcijski pregledi premalo, da bi dokazali kršitev, lahko Komisija dejansko dokaže kršitev z novim dokazi, ki jih predloži prosilec za znižanje globe.
Signicant added value can also occur where the leniency applicant does not provide new evidence, but corroborates the already existing evidence and this corroboration is needed to prove the infringement.
Pomembna dodatna vrednost lahko nastopi tudi, kadar prosilec za prizanesljivost ne zagotovi novih dokazov, marveč podpre že obstoječe dokaze in je to potrebno za dokaz kršitve.
Even where the Commission has already been able to find an infringement, additional evidence can still have a signicant added value if it has a direct bearing on the gravity or duration of the suspected cartel. e Commission decisions in Italian Raw Tobacco and Rubber Chemicals discussed below shed light on some aspects of the notion of signicant added value.
Dodatni dokazi imajo lahko dodano vrednost, tudi ko je Komisija že ugotovila kršitev, če se neposredno nanašajo na težo in trajanje domnevnega kartela. Odločbe Komisije v zadevah o italijanskem surovem tobaku in gumarskih kemikalijah, ki so prikazane spodaj, ponazarjajo nekatere vidike pojma pomembne dodane vrednosti.
Further decisions under the 2002 notice that will be issued in the course of 2006 will provide further clarity.
Bodoče odločbe, ki bodo v letu 2006 izdane v skladu z obvestilom iz leta 2002, bodo še bolj razjasnile položaj.
Monochloroacetic acid(
Monokloroocetna kislina(
On the 19th January, the Commission fined three chemicals undertakings — Akzo, Hoechst and Atona (now known as Arkema) — a total amount of nearly EUR 217 million for their participation in a cartel in the market for monochloroacetic acid (MCAA).
Komisija je 19. januarja trem kemijskim podjetjem Akzo, Hoechst in Atona (zdaj znano kot Arkema) izrekla globo v skupni višini skoraj 217 milijonov EUR za sodelovanje v kartelu na trgu monokloroocetne kisline (MCAA).
Hoechst in 1997, escaped the imposition of a ne because of its cooperation with the Commission under the leniency notice.
Clariant, četrto podjetje, ki je prevzelo svoj posel z MCAA od Hoechsta, se je izognilo izreku globe, ker je sodelovalo s Komisijo v smislu obvestila o prizanesljivosti.
As from 1993, the cartel became more formalised with the involvement of AC Treuhand, a Swiss statistical agency, which organised legitimate meetings close to Zurich airport that in fact served as pretext for the participants to meet unocially to discuss the cartel arrangements.
Kartel je bil od leta 1993 bolj formaliziran, saj se je vključil AC Treuhand, švicarska statistična agencija, ki je organizirala zakonita srečanja v bližini züriškega letališča, ki so bila dejansko izgovor za to, da se udeleženci srečujejo neuradno in razpravljajo o ureditvah kartela.
Clariant, Atona and Akzo all cooperated with the Commission under the leniency notice. e 1996 leniency notice was applicable as the investigation started prior to the introduction of the 2002 notice.
Clariant, Atona in Akzo so vsi sodelovali s Komisijo v okviru obvestila o prizanesljivosti. Uporabljalo se je obvestilo o prizanesljivosti iz leta 1996, ker se je preiskava začela pred uvedbo obvestila iz leta 2002.
Clariant provided decisive evidence of the cartel (which triggered the investigation) and was granted full immunity.
Clariant je zagotovil odločilne dokaze za obstoj kartela (na podlagi katerih je bila uvedena preiskava) in je dobil polno imuniteto. Drugo se je pojavilo podjetje Atona, dodeljeno mu je bilo znižanje globe za 40 %.
Akzo was the third undertaking to cooperate with the Commission and it received a reduction of 25 %.
Tretje podjetje, ki je začelo sodelovati s Komisijo, je bil Akzo, ki mu je bilo na podlagi tega odobreno znižanje globe za 25 %.
In setting the fines, the Commission also took into account the duration of the infringement, the large size and overall resources of some of the undertakings and the fact that some of the undertakings were addressees of previous Commission decisions establishing infringements of the same type.
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2005 nje kršitve, velikost in celotna sredstva nekaterih podjetij ter dejstvo, da je Komisija na nekatera podjetja že v preteklosti naslovila odločbe o ugotavljanju istovrstnih kršitev.
On this basis, Akzo, the largest producer of MCAA, received the highest individual ne of EUR 84.38 million, followed by Hoechst with EUR 74.03 million and Atona with EUR 58.5 million.
Na tej podlagi je Akzo, največji proizvajalec MCAA, dobil najvišjo posamično globo 84,38 milijonov EUR, sledila sta mu Hoechst s 74,03 milijonov EUR in Atona z 58,5 milijonov.
On the 14th September, the Commission fined thread producers from Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland and the United Kingdom a total of EUR 43.497 million for operating cartels in the market for industrial thread.
Komisija je 14. septembra proizvajalcem sukanca iz Nemčije, Belgije, Nizozemske, Francije, Švice in Združenega kraljestva izrekla globo v skupni višini 43,497 milijonov EUR zaradi vodenja kartelov na trgu industrijskega sukanca.
By means of unannounced inspections carried out by the Commission in November 2001 at the premises of several Community producers of textile/haberdashery products and the subsequent investigation, the Commission discovered evidence that undertakings had taken part in the following three cartel agreements and concerted practices: a cartel on the market in thread for industrial customers in Benelux and the Nordic countries from January 1990 until September 2001; a cartel on the market in thread for industrial customers in the United Kingdom from October 1990 until September 1996; and a cartel on the market in thread for automotive customers in the EEA from May/June 1998 until the 15th May 2000.
Komisija je z nenapovedanim inšpekcijskim pregledom, ki ga je novembra 2001 izvedla v prostorih več proizvajalcev Skupnosti za tekstilne/galanterijske izdelke, in preiskavo, ki je sledila, odkrila dokaze, da so podjetja sodelovala v naslednjih treh kartelnih dogovorih in usklajenih ravnanjih: v kartelu na trgu za sukanec za industrijske stranke v Beneluksu in nordijskih državah od januarja 1990 do septembra 2001; v kartelu na trgu sukanca za industrijske stranke v Združenem kraljestvu od oktobra 1990 do septembra 1996 in v kartelu na trgu sukanca za avtomobilske stranke v EGP od maja/junija 1998 do 15. maja 2000.
On the 20th October, the Commission imposed fines totalling EUR 56.05 million on four Italian tobacco processors (Deltana, Dimon — now renamed Mindo, Transcatab and Romana Tabacchi), for colluding over a period of more than six years (1995–2002) on the prices paid to tobacco growers and intermediaries and on the allocation of tobacco suppliers in Italy. e decision was also addressed to Universal Corporation (the US parent company of Deltana and the biggest tobacco merchant worldwide) and Alliance Once International Inc., the company resulting from the merger of the parent companies of Transcatab and Dimon and the second biggest tobacco merchant worldwide.
Komisija je 20. oktobra izrekla globo v skupni višini 56,05 milijonov EUR štirim italijanskim predelovalcem tobaka (Deltana, Dimon – zdaj preimenovan v Mindo, Transcatab in Romana Tabacchi), ker so se v obdobju več kot šestih let (1995–2002) na skrivaj dogovarjali glede cen, ki so jih plačali gojiteljem tobaka in posrednikom, in glede dodeljevanja dobaviteljev tobaka v Italiji.
192. is is the second time that the Commission has taken a decision with fines in the raw tobacco sector.
Odločba je naslovljena tudi na Universal Cor-
Case COMP/38.281 Raw tobacco Italy.Case COMP/38.238 Raw tobacco Spain (an unocial version is available on the Competition DG’s website).
Zadeva COMP/38.337 PO/Thread.Zadeva COMP/38.281 Surovi tobak, Italija.
Report on Competition Policy 2005 out surprise inspections).
Globa, izrečena podjetju Mindo/Dimon, vključuje znižanje za 50 %, pri podjetju Transcatab pa znižanje za 30 %.
Nevertheless, based on the specic circumstances of the present case, Deltana’s actual contribution to the establishment of the processors’ infringement justied a reduction of 50 % in the ne imposed.
Vendar pa je bila ugodnost imunitete za Deltano z odločbo zavrnjena, ker je Deltana resno kršila svoje dolžnosti sodelovanja (Deltana je obvestila tekmece, da je zaprosila za prizanesljivost, in tako razkrila obstoj preiskave proti njim, preden je Komisija lahko izvedla nenapovedane inšpekcijske preglede).
Industrial plastic bags are used to pack various products, mainly of an industrial nature, but also products destined for consumers, such as raw materials, fertiliser, agricultural products, animal feed and building materials.
Industrijske plastične vreče se uporabljajo za pakiranje različnih proizvodov, večinoma industrijskih, vendar tudi proizvodov, ki so namenjeni potrošnikom, kot so surovine, gnojila, kmetijski proizvodi, živalska krma in gradbeni material.
BPI was granted full immunity from fines for being the first to provide the Commission with evidence allowing inspections to be organised.
BPI je dobil polno imuniteto pred globo, ker je prvi
Rubber chemicals are synthetic or organic chemicals that improve the production and the characteristics of rubber products, used in a wide range of applications, the most important of which is tyres for cars and other vehicles.
Kemikalije za gumarstvo so sintetične ali organske kemikalije, ki izboljšujejo proizvodnjo in značilnosti izdelkov iz gume za uporabo v najrazličnejše namene, med katerimi prevladujejo pnevmatike za avtomobile in druga vozila.
In 2001, the value of the EEA market was estimated at about EUR 200 million and the value of the worldwide market at EUR 1.5 billion.
V letu 2001 je bila vrednost trga EGP ocenjena na 200 milijonov EUR, vrednost svetovnega trga pa na 1,5 milijarde EUR.
Subsequently, the Commission carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of Bayer, Crompton Europe and General Quimica in September 2002.
Komisija je nato septembra 2002 izvedla nenapovedane preiskave v prostorih podjetij Bayer, Crompton Europe and General Quimica.
Aer these inspections, Crompton (now Chemtura), Bayer and General Quimica applied for leniency.
Po teh inšpekcijskih pregledih so za prizanesljivost zaprosili Crompton (zdaj Chemtura), Bayer in General Quimica.
Whilst there are a number of indications that collusive activities within the rubber chemicals industry were already taking place at least occasionally in the 1970s, the Commission only had suciently firm evidence of the existence of the cartel for the period covering the years 1996–2001 for Flexsys, Bayer and Crompton (now Chemtura) (including Crompton Europe and Uniroyal Chemical Company) and 1999 and 2000 for General Quimica.
Čeprav je veliko znamenj, da so v industriji gumarskih kemikalij skrivne dejavnosti vsaj občasno potekale že od 70. let prejšnjega stoletja, je imela Komisija dovolj dokazov o obstoju kartela samo za obdobje 1996–2001 za Flexsys, Bayer in Crompton (zdaj Chemtura) (vključno s Crompton Europe in Uniroyal Chemical Company) in za obdobje med 1999 in 2000 tudi za General Quimica.
Repsol YPF SA and Repsol Quimica SA, although they did not themselves participate in the arrangements in question, were nevertheless held responsible for the conduct of their wholly owned subsidiary General Quimica.
Čeprav Repsol YPF SA in Repsol Quimica SA sama nista sodelovala v zadevnem ravnanju, vseeno veljata za odgovorna za ravnanje General Quimica, hčerinske družbe, ki je v celoti v njuni lasti.
2005 was the first full year of implementation of the new enforcement system set up by Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.
Leta 2005 se je prvič vse leto uporabljal novi sistem izvrševanja, ki ga je vzpostavila Uredba (ES) št. 1/2003.
It saw a further deepening of the cooperation between the EU Member States’ national competition authorities (NCAs) and the Commission. e mechanisms provided for by the regulation aiming at ensuring an ecient and consistent enforcement of the law operated smoothly throughout the year.
V njem se je še poglobilo sodelovanje med nacionalnimi organi za konkurenco držav članic EU in Komisijo. Mehanizmi, ki jih vzpostavlja uredba za zagotavljanje učinkovitega in usklajenega izvrševanja zakonodaje, so gladko delovali vse leto.
During 2005, the ECN was used as a forum for EU competition authorities to discuss general policy issues.
V letu 2005 je bila Evropska mreža za konkurenco forum za organe za konkurenco EU, v katerem so razpravljali o splošnih vprašanjih politike konkurence.
Work took place in four dierent forums:
Delo je potekalo v štirih različnih forumih:
First, the Director-General of the Competition DG and the heads of all NCAs met in order to discuss important competition policy issues; it is planned that this meeting should take place once a year.
Prvič, generalni direktor GD za konkurenco in vodje vseh nacionalnih organov za konkurenco so se sestali, da bi se pogovorili o pomembnih vprašanjih politike konkurence. Predvideno je, da bi ta sestanek potekal enkrat na leto.
In 2005, the discussion focused on the review of Article 82 policy.
V letu 2005 je bila razprava osredotočena na pregled politike člena 82.
Report on Competition Policy 2005 dure for corporate statements in the context of leniency.
V letu 2005 se je ena delovna skupina ukvarjala s prehodnimi vprašanji, ki se porajajo ob novem sistemu izvrševanja.
Plenary meetings also allow preliminary discussions between network members on policy proposals from the Commission such as the Green Paper on actions for damages.
Druga je bila predvidena za obravnavo morebitnih težav, ki bi nastale zaradi razlik med programi prizanesljivosti. Tretja delovna skupina se je ukvarjala z vprašanji, ki zadevajo raznovrstnost postopkov in kazni v državah članicah.
205. ird, there are six working groups dealing with specic issues.
Četrta delovna skupina je obravnavala informacije in sporočanje o Evropski mreži za konkurenco.
In 2005, one working group was dedicated to transitional issues arising from the new enforcement system; another was devoted to addressing the possible diculties arising from discrepancies between leniency programmes; the third working group addressed issues related to the heterogeneity of procedures and sanctions in the Member States; the fourth working group dealt with information and communication about the ECN; the h working group is dedicated to issues relating to abuse of dominant position and the sixth working group consists of chief competition economists from the agencies within the ECN. ese working groups provide an excellent forum for sharing experiences on concrete issues and developing best practices.
Peta delovna skupina je posvečena vprašanjem, povezanim z zlorabo prevladujočega položaja, šesto delovno skupino pa sestavljajo glavni ekonomisti s področja konkurence iz organov v Evropski mreži za konkurenco. Delovne skupine so odličen forum za delitev izkušenj pri konkretnih vprašanjih in za razvoj najboljših praks.
Finally, there were 13 ECN sectoral subgroups dedicated to particular sec-tors(101). Some scheduled regular meetings whereas others communicated mainly via electronic means; they can address any sector-specic issues and allow for a useful ex- change of experience and best practices; for example, in 2005, the telecommunications subgroup examined price squeezing in the telecommunications markets and the energy subgroup dealt with long-term gas supply contracts. e sectoral subgroups ensure a good upstream coordination and lead to a common approach and broad consistency in the application of EU competition law, beyond individual cases.
Poleg tega je bilo še 13 sektorskih podskupin Evropske mreže za konkurenco, ki so posvečene določenim sektorjem.(101) Nekatere so imele redne sestanke, medtem ko so druge komunicirale predvsem prek elektronskih sredstev.
Adapting national laws to ensure ecient enforcement by NCAs
Obravnavajo lahko vsa vprašanja, povezana z določenim sektorjem, in omogočajo koristno izmenjavo izkušenj in najboljših praks.
Convergence has also been observed in the types of decisions which can be taken by NCAs: more now have the power to order interim measures and to accept commitments.
Sektorske podskupine zagotavljajo dobro usklajevanje od spodaj navzgor in pomagajo vzpostaviti skupni pristop in široko skladnost pri uporabi konkurenčnega prava EU, ki presega posamezne primere.
Banking, securities, insurance, food, pharmaceuticals, professional services, healthcare, environment, energy, railways, motor vehicles, telecoms, media.
Bančništvo; vrednostni papirji; hrana; farmacevtski proizvodi; svobodni poklici; zdravstveno varstvo; okolje; energija; železnice; motorna vozila; telekomunikacije; mediji.
Of the authorities which as yet have no programme (Spain, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Malta, Denmark), at least three are now considering whether to introduce one. is is a very signicant development for cartel enforcement in the Community as leniency programmes are the cornerstone of ecient cartel detection.
Vsaj trije izmed organov oblasti, kjer za zdaj programa še nimajo (Španija, Italija, Portugalska, Slovenija, Malta, Danska), razmišljajo o njegovi uvedbi. To je zelo pomembno za izvrševanje protikartelnega prava v Skupnosti, saj so programi prizanesljivosti temelj učinkovitega odkrivanja kartelov.
It will also greatly ease the decision of potential applicants to seek the benet of leniency programmes as they can now be protected almost everywhere in the EU.
To bo tudi precej olajšalo odločitev morebitnih prosilcev za izkoriščanje ugodnosti programov prizanesljivosti, saj jim je tako omogočena zaščita skoraj povsod v EU.
Cooperation between the ECN members in individual cases is organised around two principal obligations on the NCAs to inform the Commission: at the outset of proceedings (Article 11(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003) and before the final decision (Article 11(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003). e first requirement to inform facilitates the swi reallocation of cases in the few cases where it appears necessary, whereas the second plays an important role in ensuring consistent application of EU law.
Sodelovanje med člani Evropske mreže za konkurenco v posameznih primerih poteka na podlagi dveh poglavitnih obveznosti nacionalnih organov za konkurenco, da obveščajo Komisijo: na začetku postopka (člen 11(3) Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003) in pred dokončno odločbo (člen 11(4) Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003). Prva zahteva za informiranje omogoča hitro prerazporeditev zadev v tistih redkih primerih, ko se to zdi potrebno, medtem ko ima druga pomembno vlogo pri zagotavljanju usklajene uporabe zakonodaje EU.
It is on the basis of this information that, if need be, reallocation discussions take place with a view to ensuring the most ecient work-sharing arrangement for a particular case within the ECN.
Na podlagi teh informacij potekajo pogovori o prerazporeditvi, če se ta izkaže za potrebno, kar je najučinkovitejša ureditev za razdelitev dela pri posameznem primeru v okviru Evropske mreže za konkurenco.
New case investigations launched by NCAs in 2005 by type of infringement
Vsekakor pa je treba tudi opozoriti, da se, kot že predvideno v Obvestilu o mreži(102) in
Art. 81
Preiskave novih primerov, ki so jih nacionalni organi začeli v letu 2005, po vrsti kršitve
Report on Competition Policy 2005
Kot so pokazale izkušnje iz leta 2005, obstajata dve poglavitni področji, za kateri bi lahko zatrdili, da je delitev dela odigrala vlogo.
From the experience in 2005, there were two principal areas in which work sharing in the ECN can be said to have played a role.
Za take primere je značilna močna potreba po zaupnosti in hitrosti.
An example can be cited in relation to the investigation in the at glass sec-tor(103). is investigation goes back to the fact that several NCAs had indications of a price-xing cartel.
Mogoče je navesti primer v zvezi s preiskavo v sektorju ravnega stekla(103). Ta preiskava je temeljila na tem, da je več nacionalnih organov za konkurenco naletelo na navedbe o kartelu za določanje cen.
On the basis of information received pursuant to Article 12, the Commission organised inspections.
Komisija je na podlagi informacij, ki jih je prejela v skladu s členom 12, organizirala inšpekcijske preglede. Trenutno pregleduje zbrane dokaze.
In order to ensure consistent application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, Article 11(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 requires NCAs to inform the Commission at the latest 30 days before they adopt a prohibition decision or a decision accepting commitments.
Da bi se zagotovila usklajena uporaba členov 81 in 82 ES, člen 11(4) Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003 od nacionalnih organov zahteva, da obvestijo Komisijo najpozneje 30 dni preden sprejmejo odločbo o prepovedi ali odločbo, s katero sprejemajo zaveze.
In 2005, the Commission received information pursuant to Article 11(4) of envisaged decisions in almost 80 cases, from 18 dierent NCAs. ese cases related to a large variety of infringements in various sectors of the economy.
Komisija je leta 2005 od 18 različnih organov za konkurenco v skladu s členom 11(4) dobila informacije o predvidenih odločbah v skoraj 80 primerih. Ti primeri so se nanašali na pisano množico kršitev v različnih gospodarskih sektorjih.
In a number of instances, the departments of the Competition DG at various levels entered into discussions with the NCA and provided comments and advice to the authority on an infor-
Te pripombe, ki niso uradno stališče Komisije, se obravnavajo kot interna korespondenca med organi za konkurenco in v skladu z Uredbo (ES) št. 1/2003 stranke nimajo dostopa do nje.
Network notice, paragraph 6.Press release MEMO 05/63, 24.2.2005.This possibility had been anticipated in the Commission notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p.
Ta možnost je bila predvidena v Obvestilu Komisije o obravnavanju pritožb s strani Komisije v skladu s členoma 81 in 82 Pogodbe ES (UL C 101, 27.4.2004, str.
65, paragraphs 19 ff.).
65, odstavki 19 in naprej).
Art. 82
Odprti in konstruktivni pogovori med organi za konkurenco in EU v letu 2005 so omogočili gladko in usklajeno izvrševanje konkurenčnega prava EU.
Application of EU competition rules by national courts in the EU: Report on the implementation of Article 15 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003
Uporaba pravil konkurence EU s strani nacionalnih sodišč EU: poročilo o izvajanju člena 15 Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003
Article 15(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 gives national judges the option of asking the Commission for information in its possession or for an opinion on questions concerning the application of the EU competition rules.
Nacionalnim sodnikom člen 15(1) Uredbe (ES) št. 1/2003 omogoča, da zaprosijo Komisijo za informacije, ki jih ima, ali za mnenje glede vprašanj, ki zadevajo uporabo pravil konkurence EU.