natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This means that the Commission’s authorisationis based on the companies giving undertakings or ‘commitments’ to makevarious divestments that will allow effective competition to be restored after themerger.
To pomeni, da odobritev Komisije temelji na zavezahpodjetij, da bodo izvedla različne odprodaje, ki bodo po združitvi omogočileobnovitev stvarne konkurence.
These commitments are very closely examined by Commission staff.
Komisija te zaveze zelo skrbno preuči.
Insome cases, the merger is prohibited; not only would it create or strengthen adominant position, but the firms have also been unable to propose a solutionto the competition concerns raised by the Commission.
Vnekaterih primerih se združitev ne prepove samo zato, ker bi lahko povzročila aliokrepila prevladujoč položaj, ampak zato ker podjetja niso bila zmožna predlagatirešitve za vprašanja, ki jih je v zvezi s konkurenco odprla Komisija.
Some examples of action taken by the Commission
Primeri ukrepov, ki jih je sprejela Komisija
Mergers in the retail distribution sector
Združitve v prodaji na drobno
In recent years, numerous large retailers have notified merger plans to the European Commission.
V zadnjih letih so Evropski komisiji načrtovane združitve prijavili številni velikitrgovci na drobno.
Examples are the food retailers Kesko/Tuko in Finland(1997), Rewe/Mainl in Austria (1999) and Carrefour/Promodès in France and Spain (2000).
Na primer, trgovci na drobno z živili Kesko/Tuko na Finskem(1997), Rewe/Mainl v Avstriji (1999) in Carrefour/ Promodès v Franciji in Španiji(2000).
In both the Finnish and Austrian cases, the Commissionconsidered that the merger of these retail chains would have created adominant position; in the Finnish case, it decided to prohibit the transaction,while in the Austrian case it accepted the remedies proposed by the companies,which consisted essentially of the sale of certain outlets to competitors.
V finskem in avstrijskem primeru je Komisija menila, da bi združitev tehmaloprodajnih verig ustvarila prevladujoč položaj. V finskem primeru je poselprepovedala, medtem ko je v avstrijskem primeru sprejela rešitve, ki sta jihpredlagali podjetji in pri katerih je šlo v glavnem za prodajo nekaterih trgovintekmecem.
The merger of Carrefour and Promodès was authorised subject to thedivestment of a majorshareholding in acompetitor.
Združitev Carrefoura in Promodèsa so odobrili pogojno, in sicer zzahtevo po odprodajivelikega kapitalskegadeleža, ki sta ga imelipodjetji pri nekemtekmecu.
But theanalysis of competitiveconditions at locallevel was left to thenational competitionauthorities, since themerger involved aseries of very localisedcompetition problems.
Todapreučitev stanjakonkurence na lokalniravni so prepustilidržavnim organom zakonkurenco, ker jebila združitevpovezana z vrstovprašanj lokalnegapomena.
The Commission thus ensured thatcompetition waspreserved or restored in order to allow consumers to continue to benefit from achoice of outlets, attractive prices and a diverse range of consumer goods.
Komisija jetako zagotovila, da soohranili ali obnovili konkurenco, da bi lahko imeli potrošniki še naprej na voljoširoko izbiro trgovin, ugodne cene in bogato ponudbo blaga za široko porabo.
A merger in the insurance sector
Združitev v zavarovalništvu
Insurance policyholders and investors, especially in Italy, stand to benefit fromthe remedies proposed by the companies in the context of INA’s acquisition by Generali; both companies are large international insurance firms.
Imetniki zavarovalnih polic in varčevalci, zlasti v Italiji, naj bi imeli koristi odrešitev, ki sta jih podjetji predlagali v primeru prevzema družbe INA s stranidružbe GENERALI.
The initialanalysis of the takeover led the Commission to form serious doubts about itscompatibility with Community law.
Obe podjetji sta veliki mednarodni zavarovalni družbi.Uvodna preučitev prevzema je pri Komisiji sprožila resne dvome o njegoviskladnosti z zakonodajo Skupnosti.
It would have given the new firm sizeableshares of the market for the supply of various life-assurance products in Italy.
S prevzemom bi dobila nova družba zajetnedeleže na trgu različnih življenjskih zavarovanj v Italiji.
In addition, the investigation revealed links between the two firms and theirmain competitors that could have induced them to coordinate their behaviourin the insurance and investment fields.
Poleg tega je preiskavaodkrila povezave obeh družb z njunimi glavnimi tekmeci, kar bi jih lahkonapeljalo na usklajevanje njihovega obnašanja na zavarovalniškem ininvesticijskem področju.
In January 2000, the Commissionauthorised the planned takeover on condition that the parties put into effecttheir proposal that they would sell their shares in certain subsidiaries, therebyreducing their market shares to less than 30 %, and that they cut off their linkswith their competitors.
Januarja 2000 je Komisija odobrila načrtovani prevzems pridržkom, da stranki izpolnita svoj predlog o prodaji svojih deležev vnekaterih podružnicah, s čimer bi svoj tržni delež zmanjšali na manj kot 30odstotkov, in da pretrgata svoje vezi s tekmeci.
Effective competition was thus restored in Italy in afinancial sector that primarily concerns the public.
Tako je bila v Italiji znovavzpostavljena konkurenca v finančnem sektorju, ki zadeva predvsem državljane.
A merger in the petroleum products sector
Združitev v naftnem sektorju
French citizens and people travelling across France have everything to gain from the Commission’s action in the TotalFina/Elf Aquitaine case. The merging of theoperations of the two main players in the French petroleum products sector wouldhave created a dominant position onseveral markets.
Francoski državljani in ljudje, ki potujejo po Franciji, naj bi z ukrepom Komisije v primeru TotalFina/Elf Aquitaine veliko pridobili.Poslovna združitev dveh največjih francoskihnaftnih družb bi povzročila prevladujočpoložaj na več trgih.
After the merger, TotalFina
Po združitvi bi lahko TotalFina in Elf obvladovala velik del
The merging of theoperations of the twomain players in the French petroleumproducts sector wouldhave created a dominantposition on severalmarkets.
Poslovna združitev dvehnajvečjih francoskih naftnihdružb bi povzročilaprevladujoč položaj na večtrgih.
/ and Elf would have been able to control a large part of the logistical network in France and to push up supply costs for independent distributors and especiallyfor supermarkets, which play an important role in the French market. The supermarkets have helped to reduce fuel prices in France and to keep them at fairlylow levels.
/ logistične mreže v Franciji in zvišala nabavne stroške neodvisnih distributerjev inzlasti supermarketov, ki imajo pomembno vlogo na francoskem trgu.Supermarketi so pomagali znižati cene goriv v Franciji in jih zadržati nasorazmerno nizki ravni.
Furthermore, the combination of TotalFina and Elf service stations on French motorways would have given the new group a market share of some 60 %. The Commission considered that this level of market power would have pushedup prices in a market where they were already high.
Nadalje bi imela nova skupina z združitvijo bencinskihčrpalk TotalFina in Elf na francoskih avtocestah približno 60-odstotni tržni delež.Komisija je menila, da bi tako velika tržna moč za seboj potegnila zvišanje cenna trgu, kjer so že tako visoke.
Lastly, TotalFina and Elfwould have become the leader on the market for LPG, used for heating.
Končno bi TotalFina in Elf prevzela vodilni položajna trgu lahkega kurilnega olja, ki se uporablja za ogrevanje.
In orderto resolve the competition problems identified, TotalFina/Elf undertook to sell alarge proportion of the operations concerned to competitors.
Za rešitev odprtihvprašanj konkurence, se je TotalFina/Elf obvezal, da bo prodal velik del spornihdejavnosti tekmecem.
For example, itproposed selling 70 motorway service stations in France to competitors.
Predlagal je, na primer, prodajo 70 avtocestnih bencinskihčrpalk svojim tekmecem.
In this way, the Commission ensured that the French fuel markets remainedcompetitive and that consumers continued to benefit from the supply ofpetroleum products at fair prices.
Tako je Komisija zagotovila ohranitev konkurence nafrancoskem naftnem trgu in potrošnikom omogočila naftne derivate po primernihcenah.
The public authorities in the Member States may grant special rights, inparticular monopoly rights, to public or private undertakings to perform servicesof general economic interest in sectors such as postal deliveries, rail transport orelectricity generation and distribution.
Državne oblasti v državah članicah lahko poverijo posebne pravice, še zlastimonopolne, javnim ali zasebnim podjetjem, da opravljajo storitve splošnegagospodarskega interesa v sektorjih, kot so pošta, železniški prevoz aliproizvodnja in distribucija električne energije.
These special rights generally correspondto responsibilities linked to the performance of the public service entrusted tothe undertaking.
Te posebne pravice so na splošnovezane na odgovornosti v zvezi z opravljanjem javnih storitev, ki so bile zaupanepodjetju.
However, the special rights must not go beyond what is necessary for the performance of that service. Otherwise, from the point of view of Community law, they would createsituations that restrict competition.
Vendar te posebne pravice ne smejo presegati tistega, kar je potrebnoza opravljanje samih storitev, sicer bi nastal s stališča zakonodaje Skupnostipoložaj, ki bi pomenil omejevanjekonkurence.
The public authorities in the Member States may grantspecial rights, in particularmonopoly rights, to public orprivate undertakings toperform services of generaleconomic interest.
Državne oblasti v državahčlanicah lahko poverijo posebnepravice,še zlasti monopolne,javnim ali zasebnim podjetjem,daopravljajo storitve splošnegagospodarskega interesa.
Monopolies entrusted to undertakings, where they are not justified by a service ofgeneral economic interest, lead in mostcases to high prices, poorer quality serviceand backwardness in terms of innovationand investment.
Kadar podjetjem zaupani monopoli nisoupravičeni z opravljanjem storitev splošnegagospodarskega interesa, potegnejo v večiniprimerov za seboj višje cene, slabšokakovost storitev in zaostajanje z vidikainovacij in investicij.
That is why the Commissionconsiders that competition should beintroduced in monopoly industries, in the context of the Treaty rules, so as to improve the quality of service and to bring price levels down.
Zato Komisija meni, dabi bilo treba v skladu s pravili Pogodbe vmonopolne dejavnosti uvesti konkurenco, dabi izboljšali kakovost storitev in znižali cene.
In these sectors, a distinction must be made between theinfrastructure and the services provided overthis infrastructure.
Ti monopoli pogosto obstajajo v prometnem,energetskem in telekomunikacijskem sektorju.
While it is often difficult toestablish a second, competing infrastructure, for reasons linked to investment costs andeconomic efficiency, it is possible and desirableto create competitive conditions in respect ofthe services provided.
Vteh sektorjih je treba ločiti med infrastrukturo instoritvami, ki se opravljajo na tej infrastrukturi.Medtem ko je zaradi investicijskih stroškov inekonomske učinkovitosti pogosto težkovzpostaviti drugo konkurenčno infrastrukturo,pa je duha konkurence možno in zaželenovnesti v opravljanje storitev.
The Commission hastherefore developed the concept of separating infrastructure from commercial activities.
Zato je Komisijarazvila zamisel ločitve infrastrukture odposlovnih dejavnosti. Infrastruktura postanetako zgolj nosilec konkurence.
While the right toexclusive ownership may persist as regards the infrastructure (the telephone orelectricity network for example), monopolists must grant access to third partieswishing to compete with them as regards the services offered on their networks(telephone communications or electricity consumption).
Čeprav pravicado izključne lastnine infrastrukture (na primertelefonskega ali električnega omrežja) lahko ostane, morajo monopolistiomogočiti dostop drugim ponudnikom, ki hočejo na njihovem omrežju ponuditikonkurenčne storitve (telefonske zveze ali oskrbo z električno energijo).
This is the generalprinciple on which the Community liberalisation directives are based.
To jesplošno načelo, na katerem temeljijo direktive Skupnosti o liberalizaciji.
As a rule, and bearing in mind the sectors concerned, the process of opening upthese sectors to competition has a positive impact for intermediate users andcontributes to an overall improvement in the competitiveness of our economy, and also for final consumers, who benefitfrom lower prices and more efficient services.
Praviloma, odvisno seveda od posameznega sektorja, prinaša odpiranje tehsektorjev konkurenci ugodne učinke za vmesne uporabnike in prispeva h krepitvisplošne konkurenčnosti našega gospodarstva; pozitivne učinke ima tudi zakončne porabnike, ki imajo koristi od nižjih cen in učinkovitejših storitev.
The process of opening up these sectors tocompetition has a positiveimpact for intermediateusers, and also for finalconsumers.
Odpiranje teh sektorjevkonkurenci prinaša ugodneučinke za vmesne odjemalcein tudi za končne porabnike.
The opening-up of the telecommunications sector to competition is the best example ofthe success of the liberalisation process.Exposing the public operators with formermonopoly power over infrastructures andservices to competition with new telecommu- nications companies has resulted in a considerable fall in charges (by as muchas 35 % for certain types of communication) and an overall improvement in theservice provided to the user, in terms of quality of service, wider range of supplyand technological innovation.
Odprtost telekomunikacijskega sektorja zakonkurenco je najboljši primer uspešnostiprocesa liberalizacije. Izpostavitev javnihponudnikov z nekdanjimi monopolnimipravicami nad infrastrukturo in storitvamikonkurenčnemu boju z novimi telekomunikacijskimi družbami je povzročilaobčuten padec stroškov (nič manj kot 35 % zadoločene vrste zvez) in splošno izboljšanje storitev za uporabnika v smislu kakovosti opravljenih storitev, bogatejšeponudbe storitev in tehnoloških inovacij.
In a sector of the economy which is experiencingrapid growth driven by the emergence of the Internet and of electroniccommerce, the liberalisation of the telecommunications industry is a source ofcompetitiveness and new jobs.
V gospodarskem sektorju, ki doživljahitro rast, ki jo še dodatno pospešuje pojav interneta in elektronske trgovine,liberalizacija telekomunikacij krepi konkurenčnost in prinaša nova delovnamesta.
Community law (Article 86)
(86.člen)
The Commission has various means of applying the principle of opening upmonopoly markets.
Komisija ima različne možnosti, da uveljavi načelo odpiranja monopolnih trgov.
The Commission checks that Member States, when they grant special orexclusive rights, comply with the Community competition rules.
• Komisija preverja, ali se države članice pri podeljevanju posebnih in izključnihpravic držijo pravil Skupnosti o konkurenci.
It is particularlyvigilant in ensuring that public authorities, when setting the conditions in whichservices of general interest entrusted to undertakings are performed, do not gobeyond what is strictly necessary to the performance of those services.
Še zlasti je pozorna na to, da državneoblasti pri postavljanju pogojev, pod katerimi podjetja opravljajo storitve splošnegainteresa, ki so jim zaupane, ne gredo dlje od tistega, kar je nujno potrebno zaopravljanje takšnih storitev.
The Commission may also initiate the opening-up of markets.
• Komisija lahko tudi sama začne z odpiranjem trgov.
Depending on the circumstances, it may itself adopt a European liberalisation directive, or propose that such a directive be adopted by the Council and the European Parliament.
Komisija možnost, da sama sprejme direktivo o liberalizaciji ali da predlaga njen sprejem Svetu in Evropskemu parlamentu. Direktiva je zakonsko besedilo
A directive is a piece of Community legislation which sets a common objective to be attained by all Member States, one that each Member State will incorporate
Skupnosti, ki določa skupni cilj, obvezujoč za vse države članice. Vsaka članica
Article 86 into its own legislation and enforce.
86. člen pa ga mora prenesti v svojo zakonodajo in uveljaviti.
It was in this way that the European Unioninitiated the opening-up of the telecommunications, transport, postal, gas andelectricity markets.
Po tej poti je začela Evropska unija z odpiranjem trgov telekomunikacij, prevoza, poštnih storitev teroskrbe s plinom in elektriko.
The Commission checks that these objectives are actuallyachieved.
Komisija preverja, ali so ti cilji dejansko doseženi.
Lastly, the Commission checks that the Community competition rules are properlycomplied with by undertakings that have been granted special or exclusive rights.Where such an undertaking is entrusted by the public authorities with theperformance of a service of general economic interest, the Commission musthere take account of the particular task conferred on the undertaking in question.The application of the competition rules must not obstruct the performance ofthat task.
• Končno Komisija preverja, ali podjetja, katerim so bile podeljene posebne aliizključne pravice, poslujejo povsem v skladu s konkurenčnimi pravili Skupnosti.Kadar državne oblasti podjetju zaupajo opravljanje storitev splošnega interesa,mora Komisija pri nadzoru upoštevati posebno nalogo, ki jo je to podjetje dobilo.Uveljavljanje konkurenčnih pravil ne sme onemogočiti opravljanja takšne naloge.
Some examples of actiontaken by the Commission
Primeri ukrepov,ki jih je sprejela Komisija
Mobile telephones in Spain
Mobilna telefonija v Španiji
The liberalisation of mobile telephony in Europe wasintroduced by a 1996 Community directive opening upthe mobile and personal communications market tocompetition.
Liberalizacija na področju mobilne telefonije se je v Evropizačela leta 1996 z direktivo Skupnosti, ki je odprla trgmobilnih in osebnih zvez konkurenci.
At the end of 1996, the Commission foundthat the second mobile telephone operator in Spain,Airtel Móvil, had been required to pay around
Konec leta 1996 je Komisija odkrila, da je moral drugi španski ponudnikmobilne telefonije, Airtel Móvil plačati okoli 510 milijonovevrov za pravico do poslovanja na španskem trgu, medtem ko je bilo državnemu ponudniku, družbi
EUR 510 million for the right to operate on the Spanish market, while Telefónica, the State operator, had been allowed to provide mobile telephone services without
Telefónica dovoljeno, da ponudi storitve mobilne telefonije brez plačila kakršnekoli koncesije. Plačani znesek je
paying any fee at all. The amount paid corresponded to a third of the investmentrequired to cover the entire territory of Spain.
8 pomenil tretjino investicij, potrebnih za pokritje celotnega španskega ozemlja.
This gave Telefónica a competitive
Stem je dobila Telefónica konkurenčno prednost pred svojim novim tekmecem, kar
In restoring thebalance between Telefónica and Airtel Móvil, the Commissionsought to stimulatecompetition in theinterest of mobile telephone users in Spain.
Z vzpostavitvijo ravnovesjamed Telefónico in Airtel Móvilom je hotela Komisija spodbuditikonkurenco v interesuuporabnikov mobilnetelefonije v Španiji.
advantage over its new competitor, enabling it tostrengthen its dominant position on the mobiletelephony market.
ji je omogočilo, da je še okrepila svoj prevladujočipoložaj na trgu mobilne telefonije.
The Commission thereforerequired the Spanish Government to reimbursethe EUR 510 million to Airtel Móvil or to proposeequivalent corrective measures.
Komisija jezato zahtevala od španske vlade, da Airtel Móvilupovrne 510 milijonov evrov ali da predlagaustrezne popravne ukrepe.
In restoring thebalance between Telefónica and Airtel Móvil, the Commission sought to stimulate competitionin the interest of mobile telephone users in Spain, who would benefit from new services and lower prices.
Z vzpostavitvijoravnovesja med Telefónico in Airtel Móvilom jehotela Komisija spodbuditi konkurenco v interesuuporabnikov mobilne telefonije v Španiji, ki naj biimeli koristi od novih storitev in nižjih cen. Aprila
In April 1997, the Commission accepted the correctivemeasures proposed by the Spanish Government with a view to ending the distortion of competition.
1997 je Komisija sprejela popravne ukrepe, ki jih je španska vlada predlagala zaodpravo neenakih konkurenčnih pogojev.
Television advertising in Belgium
Televizijske reklame v Belgiji
The Commission prohibited the exclusive right to broadcast television advertisinggranted to the commercial station VTM by the Flemish Community authorities in Belgium.
Komisija je prepovedala izključno pravico za oddajanje televizijskih reklam, ki sojo oblasti flamske skupnosti v Belgiji podelile komercialni postaji VTM.
Granting VTM an exclusive right to broadcast, from Flanders, advertisingaimed at Flemish viewers was equivalent to excluding any operator from another Member State that wished to set itself up in Belgium in order to broadcastadvertising aimed at the Flemish public over the Belgian cable televisionnetwork.
Podelitevizključne pravice VTM-u, da iz Flandrije oddaja televizijska reklamna sporočila,namenjena flamskim gledalcem, je pomenila isto kot izključitev katerokoli postajeiz druge države članice, ki bi hotela priti v Belgijo, da bi po belgijskem kabelskemomrežju oddajala televizijska reklamna sporočila za flamske gledalce.
The Commission decided that there was no necessary relation betweenthe stated cultural policy objective of preserving pluralism in the Flemish printedpress and the granting in Flanders of a monopoly on commercial television to VTM.
Komisija jemenila, da razglašeni cilj kulturne politike, da se ohrani pluralizem flamskegatiska, nima nujno zveze s podelitvijo monopola zasebni komercialni televiziji VTM-v Flandriji.
These measures ultimately constituted a form of discrimination withprotectionist consequences that also affected Belgian viewers from the Flemish Community, whose choice of television stations was restricted.
Ta ukrep je pomenil obliko diskriminacije, katere protekcionističniučinki so prizadeli tudi belgijske gledalce iz flamske skupnosti, ki so imeliomejeno izbiro televizijskih programov.
Scrutiny of State aid
Nadzorovanjedržavne pomoči
State aid that distorts intra-Community competition is prohibited by the Treaty.By giving certain firms or products favoured treatment to the detriment of otherfirms or products, it seriously disrupts normal competitive forces.
Z ugodnejšim obravnavanjem nekaterih podjetij ali izdelkov v škodo drugihpodjetij ali izdelkov vnaša državna pomoč resne motnje v običajni konkurenčniboj.
But in certaincases, the European Commission will apply the exceptions allowed by the Treatyand have regard to the beneficial impact of an aid scheme in Union termsoverall, and authorise aid where it is justified on grounds of, for example,regional development or the promotion of policies of common interest:protection of the environment, research and development, training, etc.
Vendar Evropska Komisija v nekaterih primerih uveljavlja izjeme, ki jihdovoljuje Pogodba in upošteva ugodne učinke pomoči za celotno Skupnost.Pomoč odobri, ko je upravičena na primer, zaradi regionalnega razvoja alipodpore politik skupnega interesa: varstva okolja, raziskav in razvoja,izobraževanja in usposabljanja itd..
Aid given by public authorities most commonly supports a firm, an economicactivity or a region in order to promote its development or alleviate its difficulties.
Pomoč, ki jo dajejo državne oblasti, največkrat podpira podjetje, gospodarskodejavnost ali regijo, da bi pospešila njihov razvoj ali ublažila njihove težave.
At first sight, particularly from the recipient’sangle, State aid might well seem to be beneficial.
Naprvi pogled, še zlasti z vidika prejemnika pomoči, se lahko zdi državna pomoč koristna.
But very often all it achieves is to delay inevitablerestructuring operations without helping the recipientactually to return to competitiveness.
Toda zelo pogosto je ves njen učinek v tem, dase odlaša z neizogibnim prestrukturiranjem, ne da biprejemniku pomoči pomagali k dejanski povrnitvikonkurenčnosti.