natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It is apparent from the Court’s caselaw that the question whether the Court of First Instance applied the correct legal standard when examining the evidence is a question of law, which is amenable, as such, to judicial review on appeal (see Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel v Commission, paragraph 40).
Iz sodne prakse izhaja, da je vpra�anje, ali je Sodi�če prve stopnje uporabilo pravilno pravno normo pri preizkusu dokazov, pravno vpra�anje, na katero se lahko sklicuje v pritožbi (glej zgoraj navedeno sodbo Sumitomo Metal Industries in Nippon Steel proti Komisiji, točka 40).
In the present case, the arguments of the appellants set out in paragraphs 110 to 112 of this judgment are accordingly admissible on appeal.
Zato so v obravnavani zadevi trditve pritožnic iz točk od 110 do 112 v fazi pritožbe dopustne.
As regards the three specific criticisms summarised in paragraph 113 of this judgment, only the second and the third are admissible.
Med tremi posebnimi očitki, povzetimi v točki 113 te sodbe, sta dopustna samo drugi in tretji.
The first of those criticisms does not relate to the relevance of a particular element relied on in order to establish that a collective dominant position existed, but seeks, in reality, a reappraisal of the facts which, under the settled caselaw referred to in paragraph 29 of this judgment, falls, in principle, outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice on appeal (see also to that effect, by way of analogy, Case C-260/05 P Sniace v Commission [2007] ECR I-10005, paragraphs 34 and 35).
Prvi poseben očitek se namreč ne nana�a na upo�tevnost posebnega elementa, uporabljenega za ugotovitev obstoja kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja, ampak se dejansko nana�a na novo presojo dejanskega stanja, kar v skladu z ustaljeno sodno prakso, na katero je bilo opozorjeno v točki 29 te sodbe, načeloma ne spada v pristojnost Sodi�ča v fazi pritožbe (glej v tem smislu po analogiji tudi sodbo z dne 22. novembra 2007 v zadevi Sniace proti Komisiji, C-260/05 P, ZOdl., str. I-10005, točki 34 in 35).
By contrast, the second and third specific criticisms invoke errors of law.
Nasprotno se v okviru drugega in tretjega posebnega očitka sklicuje na napačno uporabo prava.
As regards the merits of this ground of appeal, it should be noted at the outset that the Court has already held, in substance, that the concept of a collective dominant position is included in that of ‘dominant position’ within the meaning of Article 2 of the Regulation (see, to that effect, Kali & Salz, paragraphs 166 and 178). In that regard, the existence of an agreement or of other links in law between the undertakings concerned is not essential to a finding of a collective dominant position. Such a finding may be based on other connecting factors and would depend on an economic assessment and, in particular, on an assessment of the structure of the market in question (see Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Compagnie maritime belge transports and Others v Commission [2000] ECR I-1365, paragraph 45). I - 5073
Glede utemeljenosti tega pritožbenega razloga je treba najprej opozoriti, da je Sodi�če v bistvu že razsodilo, da je pojem kolektivni prevladujoči položaj vključen v pojem „prevladujoči položaj“ v smislu člena 2 Uredbe (glej v tem smislu zgoraj navedeno sodbo Kali & Salz, točki 166 in 178). V zvezi s tem obstoj sporazuma ali drugih pravnih povezav med zadevnimi podjetji ni nujno potreben za ugotovitev kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja. Taka ugotovitev bi lahko izhajala iz drugih korelacijskih dejavnikov in bi bila odvisna od ekonomske presoje in zlasti presoje strukture zadevnega trga (glej sodbo z dne 16. marca 2000 v združenih zadevah Compagnie maritime belge transports in drugi proti Komisiji, C-395/96 P in C-396/96 P, Recueil, str. I-1365, točka 45). I - 5073
In the case of an alleged creation or strengthening of a collective dominant position, the Commission is obliged to assess, using a prospective analysis of the reference market, whether the concentration which has been referred to it will lead to a situation in which effective competition in the relevant market is significantly impeded by the undertakings which are parties to the concentration and one or more other undertakings which together, in particular because of correlative factors which exist between them, are able to adopt a common policy on the market (see Kali & Salz, paragraph 221) in order to profit from a situation of collective economic strength, without actual or potential competitors, let alone customers or consumers, being able to react effectively. 121
Glede trditve o vzpostavitvi ali krepitvi kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja mora Komisija na podlagi prospektivne analize referenčnega trga presoditi, ali ima predložena koncentracija za posledico položaj, v katerem učinkovito konkurenco na zadevnem trgu resno ovirajo podjetja, stranke koncentracije in eno ali več drugih podjetij, ki lahko skupaj, zlasti zaradi med njimi obstoječih korelacijskih dejavnikov, usklajeno ravnajo na trgu (glej zgoraj navedeno sodbo Kali & Salz, točka 221), da bi izkoristili položaj kolektivne ekonomske moči, in sicer ne da bi se sedanji ali prihodnji konkurenti ali celo kupci in potro�niki lahko učinkovito odzvali. 121
Such correlative factors include, in particular, the relationship of interdependence existing between the parties to a tight oligopoly within which, on a market with the appropriate characteristics, in particular in terms of market concentration, transparency and product homogeneity, those parties are in a position to anticipate one another’s behaviour and are therefore strongly encouraged to align their conduct on the market in such a way as to maximise their joint profits by increasing prices, reducing output, the choice or quality of goods and services, diminishing innovation or otherwise influencing parameters of competition.
Taki korelacijski dejavniki vključujejo zlasti odnos medsebojne odvisnosti med člani tesnega oligopola, v katerem lahko na trgu z ustreznimi značilnostmi, �e posebej glede tržne koncentracije, preglednosti in homogenosti proizvodov, te stranke predvidijo ravnanje druga druge in so torej močno spodbujene k temu, da uskladijo svoje ravnanje na trgu, tako da povečajo svoj skupni dobiček z zvi�anjem cen, zmanj�anjem proizvodnje, izbire ali kakovosti blaga in storitev, zmanj�anjem inovacij ali drugačnim vplivanjem na dejavnike konkurence.
In such a context, each operator is aware that highly competitive action on its part would provoke a reaction on the part of the others, so that it would derive no benefit from its initiative.
V tem okviru namreč vsak udeleženec ve, da bo njegovo zelo konkurenčno ravnanje sprožilo pri drugih odziv, tako da ne bo imel od svoje pobude nobene koristi.
A collective dominant position significantly impeding effective competition in the common market or a substantial part of it may thus arise as the result of a concentration where, in view of the actual characteristics of the relevant market and of the alteration to those characteristics that the concentration would entail, the latter would make each member of the oligopoly in question, as it becomes aware of common interests, consider it possible, economically rational, and hence preferable, to adopt on a lasting basis a common policy on the market with the aim of selling at above competitive prices, without having to enter into an agreement or resort to a concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 EC and without any actual or potential competitors, let alone customers or consumers, being able to react effectively.
Primer kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja, ki resno ovira učinkovito konkurenco na skupnem trgu ali njegovem znatnem delu, lahko nastane po koncentraciji, kadar bi bil njen rezultat – ob upo�tevanju samih značilnosti zadevnega trga in spremembe teh značilnosti zaradi izvr�itve koncentracije – tak, da bi vsak član zadevnega oligopola ob zavedanju skupnih interesov menil, da je mogoče, ekonomsko donosno in ugodneje sprejeti politiko trajnega usklajenega ravnanja na trgu s ciljem prodaje nad konkurenčnimi cenami, ne da bi bilo treba skleniti sporazum ali se zateči k usklajenemu ravnanju v smislu člena 81 ES, in sicer ne da bi se lahko sedanji ali prihodnji konkurenti ali celo kupci in potro�niki učinkovito odzvali.
Such tacit coordination is more likely to emerge if competitors can easily arrive at a common perception as to how the coordination should work, and, in particular, of the parameters that lend themselves to being a focal point of the proposed coordination.
Možnost takega tihega usklajevanja je večja, če se lahko konkurenti lažje sporazumejo o načinu, kako mora delovati usklajevanje, zlasti o parametrih, ki so lahko predmet načrtovanega usklajevanja.
Unless they can form a shared tacit understanding of the terms of the coordination, competitors might resort to practices that are prohibited by Article 81 EC in order to be able to adopt a common policy on the market.
Konkurenti bi se namreč morali, če se ne bi mogli molče sporazumeti o načinu usklajevanja, nazadnje zateči k ravnanjem, ki so prepovedana s členom 81 ES, da bi lahko sprejeli politiko skupnega delovanja na trgu.
Moreover, having regard to the temptation which may exist for each participant in a tacit coordination to depart from it in order to increase its short-term profit, it is necessary to determine whether such coordination is sustainable.
Poleg tega, zlasti ob upo�tevanju morebitne želje, ki jo ima lahko vsak udeleženec tihega usklajevanja, da ne bo več ravnal usklajeno z namenom kratkoročnega povečanja dobička, je treba presoditi, ali je tako usklajevanje lahko trajno.
In that regard, the coordinating undertakings must be able to monitor to a sufficient degree whether the terms of the coordination are being adhered to.
Podjetja, ki usklajujejo svoja ravnanja, morajo biti sposobna zadostno spremljati, ali so pogoji usklajevanja spo�tovani.
There must therefore be sufficient market transparency for each undertaking concerned to be aware, sufficiently precisely and quickly, of the way in which the market conduct of each of the other participants in the coordination is evolving.
Preglednost na trgu bi zato morala biti zadostna, da bi zlasti vsako zadevno podjetje lahko dovolj natančno in pravočasno prepoznalo spremembo ravnanja na trgu vseh drugih udeležencev usklajevanja.
Furthermore, discipline requires that there be some form of credible deterrent mechanism that can come into play if deviation is detected.
Zaradi discipline je potrebna oblika verodostojnega mehanizma odvračanja, ki ga je mogoče vzpostaviti, če se odkrije odstopanje.
In addition, the reactions of outsiders, such as current or future competitors, and also the reactions of customers, should not be such as to jeopardise the results expected from the coordination.
Poleg tega odzivi podjetij, ki ne sodelujejo pri usklajevanju, kot so sedanji ali prihodnji konkurenti ter odzivi kupcev ne bi smeli sprožiti dvoma o pričakovanih rezultatih usklajevanja.
The conditions laid down by the Court of First Instance in paragraph 62 of its judgment in Airtours v Commission, which that court concluded, in paragraph 254 of the judgment under appeal, should be applied in the dispute before it, are not incompatible with the criteria set out in the preceding paragraph of this judgment.
Pogoji, ki jih je Sodi�če prve stopnje navedlo v točki 62 zgoraj navedene sodbe Airtours proti Komisiji, na podlagi katerih je to sodi�če v točki 254 izpodbijane sodbe sklenilo, da bi se morali uporabiti v sporu pred njim, ne kr�ijo meril, navedenih v prej�nji točki te sodbe.
In applying those criteria, it is necessary to avoid a mechanical approach involving the separate verification of each of those criteria taken in isolation, while taking no account of the overall economic mechanism of a hypothetical tacit coordination.
Vendar se je pri uporabi teh meril treba izogniti temu avtomatičnemu pristopu, ki pomeni, da bi ločeno preverjali vsako posamezno merilo in ne bi upo�tevali globalnega ekonomskega mehanizma hipotetičnega tihega usklajevanja.
In that regard, the assessment of, for example, the transparency of a particular market should not be undertaken in an isolated and abstract manner, but should be carried out using the mechanism of a hypothetical tacit coordination as a basis.
Presoja na primer preglednosti nekega trga se ne sme opraviti ločeno in abstraktno, ampak glede na pravila mehanizma hipotetičnega tihega usklajevanja.
It is only if such a hypothesis is taken into account that it is possible to ascertain whether any elements of transparency that may exist on a market are, in fact, capable of facilitating the reaching of a common understanding on the terms of coordination and/or of allowing the competitors concerned to monitor sufficiently whether the terms
Le ob upo�tevanju take predpostavke je namreč mogoče preveriti, ali morebitni elementi preglednosti, ki obstajajo na trgu, dejansko omogočajo ugotoviti, ali gre za molče potrjeno skupno ravnanje in/ali omogočajo zadevnim konkurentom, da zadosti nadzorujejo, ali so pogoji takega ravnanja upo�tevani. V zvezi s tem slednjim je treba za namene
2008 — CASE C-413/06 P of such a common policy are being adhered to. In that last respect, it is necessary, in order to analyse the sustainability of a purported tacit coordination, to take into account the monitoring mechanisms that may be available to the participants in the alleged tacit coordination in order to ascertain whether, as a result of those mech -anisms, they are in a position to be aware, sufficiently precisely and quickly, of the way in which the market conduct of each of the other participants in that coordination is evolving.
2008 – ZADEVA C-413/06 P analize trajnosti domnevnega tihega usklajevanja upo�tevati mehanizme nadzora, ki so morda dostopni udeležencem zatrjevanega tihega usklajevanja, da bi se preverilo, ali bi lahko zaradi takih mehanizmov dovolj natančno in pravočasno prepoznali spremembo ravnanja na trgu vseh drugih udeležencev takega usklajevanja.
As regards the present case, the appellants submit that, even though the Court of First Instance stated in paragraph 254 of the judgment under appeal that it was following the approach adopted in its judgment in Airtours v Commission, in practice, it committed an error of law in inferring the existence of a sufficient degree of transparency from a number of factors which were not, however, relevant to a finding of an existing collective dominant position.
Pritožnici v obravnavani zadevi navajata, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje, čeprav je v točki 254 izpodbijane sodbe navedlo, da bo sledilo pristopu iz zgoraj navedene sodbe Airtours proti Komisiji, v resnici napačno uporabilo pravo, ko je na obstoj zadostne preglednosti sklepalo iz več dejavnikov, ki pa niso bili upo�tevni za ugotovitev obstoječega kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja.
In that context, the appellants object in particular to the fact that the Court of First Instance indicated in paragraph 251 of the judgment under appeal that the conditions laid down in paragraph 62 of the judgment in Airtours v Commission could ‘in the appropriate circumstances, be established indirectly on the basis of what may be a very mixed series of indicia and items of evidence relating to the signs, manifestations and phenomena inherent in the presence of a collective dominant position’.
V tem okviru pritožnici izpodbijata zlasti dejstvo, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 251 izpodbijane sodbe potrdilo, da so bili pogoji, navedeni v točki 62 zgoraj navedene sodbe Airtours proti Komisiji, lahko „odvisno od primera ugotovljeni posredno na podlagi vseh pokazateljev in dokazov, morda celo zelo različnih, glede znakov, izrazov in pojavov, značilnih za kolektivni prevladujoči položaj“.
In this regard, as the Commission observed at the hearing, objection cannot be taken to paragraph 251 of itself, since it constitutes a general statement which reflects the Court of First Instance’s liberty of assessment of different items of evidence.
V zvezi s tem je treba poudariti, kot je na obravnavi navedla Komisija, da navedena točka 251 ni sama po sebi izpodbojna, ker gre za splo�no izjavo, ki izraža svobodno obravnavanje različnih dokazov s strani Sodi�ča prve stopnje.
Similarly, the investigation of a pre-existing collective dominant position based on a series of elements normally considered to be indicative of the presence or the likelihood of tacit coordination between competitors cannot therefore be considered to be objectionable of itself.
Enako tudi raziskovanja predhodnega kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja, ki temelji na več elementih, ki se običajno �tejejo za pokazatelje obstoja ali verjetnosti obstoja tihega usklajevanja med konkurenti, ni mogoče izpodbijati kot takega.
However, as is apparent from paragraph 125 of this judgment, it is essential that such an investigation be carried out with care and, above all, that it should adopt an approach based on the analysis of such plausible coordination strategies as may exist in the circumstances.
Vendar, kot izhaja iz točke 125 te sodbe, je treba tako raziskavo nujno izvesti s previdnostjo in predvsem na podlagi pristopa, ki temelji na analizi morebitnih sprejemljivih verodostojnih strategij usklajevanja.
In the present case, the Court of First Instance, before which Impala raised arguments relating, in particular, to the parts of the contested decision relating to market transparency, did not carry out its analysis of those parts by having regard to a postulated monitoring mechanism forming part of a plausible theory of tacit coordination.
Vendar je treba v obravnavani zadevi ugotoviti, da Sodi�če prve stopnje, pred katerim je Impala navajala trditve, ki so se nana�ale zlasti na posamezne dele sporne odločbe, namenjene preglednosti trga, ni izvedlo analize navedenih delov glede na zatrjevan mehanizem nadzora, ki spada v sprejemljivo teorijo tihega usklajevanja.
It is true that the Court of First Instance referred in paragraph 420 of the judgment under appeal to the possibility of a ‘known set of rules’ governing the grant of discounts by the majors.
Res je, da se Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 420 izpodbijane sodbe sklicuje na možnost „vseh poznanih pravil“, ki urejajo odobritev popustov s strani velikih.
However — as the appellants rightly submit in the context of the second specific criticism mentioned in paragraph 113 of this judgment, which relates to the question whether certain discount variations established by the Commission in the contested decision were liable to call into question the possibility of adequate monitoring of mutual compliance with the terms of any tacit coordination there may have been — the Court of First Instance was content to rely, in paragraphs 427 to 429 of the judgment under appeal, on unsupported assertions relating to a hypothetical industry professional.
Vendar – kot pravilno poudarjata pritožnici v okviru drugega posebnega očitka, navedenega v točki 113 te sodbe glede vpra�anja, ali so bila nekatera nihanja popustov, ki jih je ugotovila Komisija v sporni odločbi, taka, da bi postavila pod vpra�aj ustrezni nadzor vzajemnega spo�tovanja pogojev morebitnega tihega usklajevanja – se Sodi�če prve stopnje v točkah od 427 do 429 izpodbijane sodbe omeji na nepodprte trditve v zvezi s hipotetičnim strokovnjakom sektorja.
In paragraph 428 of the judgment, the Court of First Instance itself acknowledged that Impala, the applicant before that court, ‘admittedly did not explain precisely what those various rules governing the grant of campaign discounts are’.
Vendar Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 428 navedene sodbe samo priznava, da Impala, tožeča stranka v postopku pred tem sodi�čem, „nikakor ni natančno navedla, katera naj bi bila ta različna pravila, ki urejajo odobritev reklamnih popustov“.
It must be pointed out in that regard that Impala represents undertakings which, even if they are not members of the oligopoly formed by the majors, are active on the same markets.
V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da Impala zastopa podjetja, ki so, čeprav niso člani oligopola, ki so ga ustanovili veliki, dejavna na istih trgih.
In those circumstances, it is clear that the Court of First Instance disregarded the fact that the burden of proof was on Impala in relation to the purported qualities of such a hypothetical ‘industry professional’.
V teh okoli�činah je treba ugotoviti, da Sodi�če prve stopnje ni upo�tevalo dejstva, da dokazno breme glede domnevnih sposobnosti tega hipotetičnega „strokovnjaka sektorja“ nosi Impala.
In the light of the above and without there being any need to adopt a position on the third specific criticism mentioned in paragraph 113 of this judgment, it must be held that, in misconstruing the principles which should have guided its analysis of the arguments raised before it concerning market transparency in the context of an allegation of a collective dominant position, the Court of First Instance committed an error of law.
Glede na navedeno in ne da bi bilo treba sprejeti stali�če o utemeljenosti tretjega posebnega očitka, navedenega v točki 113 te sodbe, je treba ugotoviti, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje s tem, da je kr�ilo načela, ki bi jih moralo uporabiti pri svoji analizi trditev glede preglednosti trga v okviru zatrjevanega kolektivnega prevladujočega položaja, napačno uporabilo pravo.
That error vitiates the part of the judgment under appeal which concerns the examination by the Court of First Instance of the arguments relating to the manifest errors
Ta napaka se nana�a na del izpodbijane sodbe v zvezi s preizkusom Sodi�ča prve stopnje glede trditev o očitnih napakah pri presoji, ki jo je storila Komisija, vključno
2008 — CASE C-413/06 P of assessment committed by the Commission, including the finding of that court in paragraph 377 of the judgment under appeal.
2008 – ZADEVA C-413/06 P z ugotovitvijo Sodi�ča prve stopnje v točki 377 izpodbijane sodbe.
However, it is not, of itself, capable of invalidating that court’s finding in paragraph 325 of the judgment under appeal that, in substance, the contested decision had to be annulled because it was inadequately reasoned.
Vendar napaka sama po sebi ne sproža dvoma o ugotovitvah Sodi�ča prve stopnje v točki 325 izpodbijane sodbe, da bi v bistvu morala biti sporna odločba razgla�ena za nično zaradi nezadostne obrazložitve.
Further grounds of appeal thus fall to be examined.
Zato je treba preučiti �e druge pritožbene razloge.
The fourth ground of appeal, alleging an error of law in that the Court of First Instance exceeded the scope of its role in carrying out judicial review
Četrti pritožbeni razlog: napačna uporaba prava, ker je Sodi�če prve stopnje prekoračilo okvir sodnega nadzora, ki ga mora izvesti
In a number of paragraphs in the judgment under appeal, for example, in paragraphs 347 and 361, the Court of First Instance used expressions such as ‘a high level of transparency of prices’ and ‘a high degree of transparency on the market’.
Sodi�če prve stopnje v nekaterih točkah izpodbijane sodbe, kot sta točki 347 in 361, uporablja izraze kot „visoka stopnja preglednosti cen“ ali „velika preglednost trga“.
Moreover, in paragraph 299 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance described the finding in the contested decision that list prices were ‘rather aligned’ as being ‘a prudent conclusion to say the least, as the alignment was in fact very marked’.
Poleg tega Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 299 izpodbijane sodbe opi�e ugotovitev iz sporne odločbe, da so bile katalo�ke cene „precej usklajene“, kot „najmanj previdno, pri čemer je bila uskladitev zelo opazna“.
In paragraph 307 of the judgment, the Court of First Instance held that ‘the variation in the general levels of invoice discounts applied by the parties to the concentration, as referred to at recital 78 to the [contested decision], is very low’.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je v točki 307 te sodbe ugotovilo, da je „nihanje splo�ne ravni popustov na računu, ki jih priznavajo stranke koncentracije, kot je bilo poudarjeno v uvodni izjavi 78 [sporne] odločbe, zelo majhno“.