natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The objective of the free movement of capital is excluded, for application of the measure freezing funds provided for by that regulation is not capable of giving rise to any credible and serious danger of divergence between Member States.
Cilj prostega pretoka kapitala naj bi bil namreč izključen, saj uporaba ukrepa zamrznitve sredstev, predvidenega v tej uredbi, ne bi mogla povzročiti nobene verjetne in resne nevarnosti za razhajanje med državami članicami.
The objective of the common commercial policy is not relevant either, given that the freezing of the funds of an individual in no way linked to the government of a third country does not concern trade with such a country and does not pursue an objective of commercial policy.
Cilj skupne trgovinske politike naj prav tako ne bi bil upo�teven, ker se zamrznitev sredstev posameznikov, ki niso povezani z vlado tretje države, naj ne bi nana�ala na trgovino s to državo in naj ne bi zasledovala cilja trgovinske politike.
If the submission it principally advances should be accepted, the Commission asks the Court, for reasons of legal certainty and for the sake of the proper performance of the obligations undertaken vis-à-vis the United Nations, to consider as definitive the effects of the contested regulation as a whole, pursuant to Article 231 EC.
Komisija ob domnevi, da bi bila sprejeta trditev, ki jo primarno navaja, Sodi�ču predlaga, naj zaradi pravne varnosti in pravilnega izvajanja obveznosti, sprejetih v okviru Združenih narodov, na podlagi člena 231 ES �teje za dokončne učinke te uredbe v celoti.
In the same situation, the Kingdom of Spain and the French Republic have also made a request to that effect.
Prav tako sta tudi Kraljevina Španija in Francoska republika ob isti domnevi podali tak predlog.
In any case, an exception must be made for persons who, like the applicant, have already brought an action against the regulation.
V vsakem primeru bi morala biti predvidena izjema za posameznike, ki so, tako kot pritožnik, že vložili tožbo zoper to uredbo.
Al Barakaat’s first ground of challenge is that the Court of First Instance held in paragraphs 158 to 170 of Yusuf and Al Barakaat that it was possible for the contested regulation to be adopted on the joint basis of Articles 60 EC, 301 EC and 308 EC.
Al Barakaat s prvim pritožbenim razlogom Sodi�ču prve stopnje očita, da je v točkah od 158 do 170 izpodbijane sodbe Yusuf in Al Barakaat presodilo, da je bilo izpodbijano uredbo mogoče sprejeti na kombinirani podlagi členov 60 ES, 301 ES in 308 ES.
In its view, the Court of First Instance erred in law when it held, in paragraphs 160 and 164 of that judgment, that Articles 60 EC and 301 EC are not concerned solely with the performance of an action by the Community but may also concern one of the objectives specifically assigned to the Union by Article 2 EU, namely, the implementation of the CFSP.
Sodi�če prve stopnje naj ne bi pravilno uporabilo prava, ko je v točkah 160 in 164 te sodbe presodilo, da člena 60 ES in 301 ES ne predvidevata izključno ukrepanja Skupnosti, temveč se lahko prav tako nana�ata na cilje, ki jih člen 2 EU posebej določa za Unijo, namreč izvajanje SZVP.
Second, Al Barakaat criticises the Court of First Instance for finding, in paragraphs 112, 113, 115 and 116 of that judgment, that sanctions decided on against individuals for the purpose of influencing economic relations with one or more third
Drugič, Al Barakaat očita Sodi�ču prve stopnje, da je v točkah 112, 113, 115 in 116 iste sodbe presodilo, da se določbe členov 60 ES in 301 ES nana�ajo na sankcije, sprejete proti posameznikom zaradi vplivanja na ekonomske odnose z eno tretjo državo ali
KADI AND AL BARAKAAT INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION v COUNCIL AND COMMISSION countries are covered by the provisions of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, and that that interpretation is justified both by considerations of effectiveness and by humanitarian concerns.
KADI IN AL BARAKAAT INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION PROTI SVETU IN KOMISIJI več temi, ter da to razlago upravičuje presoja o učinkovitosti in skrb za humanitarni red.
The Council counters that the Court of First Instance was right to rule, in paragraph 161 of Yusuf and Al Barakaat, that, by reason of the bridge supplied by Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, sanctions laid down on the basis of those provisions, as a result of the adoption of a common position or of a joint action under the CFSP providing for the interruption or reduction of the economic relations of the Community with one or more third countries, are intended to attain the CFSP objective pursued by those acts of the Union.
Svet odgovarja, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 161 izpodbijane sodbe Yusuf in Al Barakaat pravilno presodilo, da se zaradi mostu, ki ga vsebujeta člena 60 ES in 301 ES, s sankcijami – določenimi na podlagi teh določb po sprejetju skupnega stali�ča ali skupnega ukrepa na podlagi SZVP, ki predvidevata prekinitev ali omejitev ekonomskih odnosov Skupnosti z eno tretjo državo ali več temi – stremi k uresničitvi cilja SZVP, ki ga zasledujeta ta akta Unije.
The Council also argues that the Court of First Instance was entitled to find that recourse to Article 308 EC as an additional legal basis for the contested regulation was justified, given that that article serves only to enable the extension of the economic and financial sanctions already provided for in Articles 60 EC and 301 EC to individuals and entities not sufficiently linked to any given third country.
Svet prav tako navaja, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje pravilno presodilo, da je bilo sklicevanje na člen 308 ES, kot na dodatno pravno podlago izpodbijane uredbe, upravičeno, saj je ta člen namenjen izključno temu, da se omogoči raz�iritev gospodar -skih in finančnih sankcij, že določenih v členih 60 ES in 301 ES, na posameznike ali subjekte, ki ne izkazujejo nobene zadostne vezi z določeno tretjo državo.
Finally, the Council is of the view that the applicant’s complaint concerning the efficiency and proportionality of the sanctions provided for by that regulation is irrelevant to the issue of the appropriateness of the legal basis of the regulation.
Svet nazadnje meni, da očitki pritožnika glede učinkovitosti in sorazmernosti sankcij, predvidenih v tej uredbi, niso upo�tevni za vpra�anje ustreznosti pravne podlage te uredbe.
With regard to that second complaint, the United Kingdom too takes the view that it has no bearing on the appeal brought by Al Barakaat, given that, as held in paragraph 1 of the operative part of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance found that there was no longer any need to adjudicate on the legality of Regulation No 467/2001.
Združeno kraljestvo glede drugega očitka prav tako meni, da ni upo�teven v okviru pritožbe, ki jo je vložil AL Barakaat, saj je v skladu s točko 1 izreka izpodbijane sodbe Sodi�če prve stopnje presodilo, da ni bilo več treba odločiti o zakonitosti Uredbe �t. 467/2001.
With regard, first, to the challenges made by Al Barakaat to paragraphs 112, 113, 115 and 116 of Yusuf and Al Barakaat, it must be held that those paragraphs relate to the legal basis of Regulation No 467/2001.
Prvič, glede očitkov Al Barakaata zoper točke 112, 113, 115 in 116 izpodbijane sodbe Yusuf in Al Barakaat je treba ugotoviti, da se te točke nana�ajo na pravno podlago Uredbe �t. 467/2001.
Now, that regulation has been repealed and replaced by the contested regulation.
Uredbo �t. 467/2001 je razveljavila in nadomestila izpodbijana uredba.
Moreover, as indicated by the Court of First Instance in Yusuf and Al Barakaat, paragraph 77, without challenge from Al Barakaat in its appeal, the sole object of the action before the Court of First Instance, after Al Barakaat had adjusted its claims for relief and pleas in law to the contested regulation, was annulment of that latter regulation, in so far as it concerns that applicant.
Poleg tega, kot je navedlo Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 77 izpodbijane sodbe Yusuf in Al Barakaat ter ne da bi Al Barakaat to v pritožbi izpodbijal, je bil edini predmet njegove tožbe pri Sodi�ču prve stopnje, potem ko je prilagodil svoje predloge in tožbene razloge izpodbijani uredbi, predlog za razglasitev ničnosti te uredbe, v delu, ki se nana�a nanj.
In those circumstances, those claims cannot in any case lead to the setting aside of that judgment and must therefore be regarded as immaterial.
V teh okoli�činah ti očitki nikakor ne bi imeli za posledico razveljavitve te sodbe in jih je treba �teti za nepomembne.
In any event, the considerations of Yusuf and Al Barakaat to which those claims relate, treated by the Court of First Instance as premisses of its reasoning with regard to the legal basis of the contested regulation, are reproduced in later paragraphs of that judgment and in Kadi and will be examined during the assessment of the grounds of appeal challenging those paragraphs.
V vsakem primeru so preudarki iz izpodbijane sodbe Yusuf in Al Barakaat – na katere se navezujejo ti očitki, ki jih je Sodi�če prve stopnje označilo kot premiso svojega razlogovanja – povzeti v naslednjih točkah te sodbe in tudi v izpodbijani sodbi Kadi ter bodo preučeni v okviru presoje pritožbenih razlogov zoper te točke.
There is, therefore, no reason to examine those heads of claim in so far as they relate to the legal basis of Regulation No 467/2001.
Zato ni treba preučiti teh očitkov, kolikor se nana�ajo na pravno podlago Uredbe �t. 467/2001.
It is appropriate to rule in the second place on the merits of the principal argument put forward by the Commission, that Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, in the light of their wording and context, are in themselves an appropriate and sufficient legal base for the contested regulation.
Drugič, presoditi je treba o utemeljenosti trditve, ki jo primarno uveljavlja Komisija, da sta bila člena 60 ES in 301 ES glede na svoje besedilo in svoj kontekst primerna in zadostna pravna podlaga za izpodbijano uredbo.
That argument is directed against paragraphs 92 to 97 of Kadi and paragraphs 128 to 133 of Yusuf and Al Barakaat, in which the Court of First Instance ruled to the contrary.
Ta trditev je usmerjena zoper točke od 92 do 97 izpodbijane sodbe Kadi ter točke od 128 do 133 izpodbijane sodbe Yusuf in Al Barakaat, v katerih se je Sodi�če prve stopnje izreklo nasprotno.
The Court of First Instance in fact rightly ruled that, having regard to the wording of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, especially to the expressions ‘as regards the third countries concerned’ and ‘with one or more third countries’ used there, those provisions concern the adoption of measures vis-à-vis third countries, since that concept may include the rulers of such a country and also individuals and entities associated with or controlled, directly or indirectly, by them.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je namreč pravilno presodilo, da z vidika besedila členov 60 ES in 301 ES, zlasti v njih navedenih izrazov „se nana�ajo na zadevne tretje države“ in „z eno tretjo državo ali več temi“, te določbe predvidevajo sprejetje ukrepov zoper tretje države, pri čemer lahko slednji pojem vključuje voditelje take države ter tudi posameznike in subjekte, ki so z njimi povezani oziroma jih ti posredno ali neposredno nadzorujejo.
The restrictive measures provided for by Resolution 1390 (2002), which the contested regulation was intended to put into effect, are measures notable for the absence of any link to the governing regime of a third country.
Omejevalni ukrepi, določeni v Resoluciji 1390(2002), ki jo izvaja izpodbijana uredba, pa so ukrepi, za katere je značilno, da ne izkazujejo nobene vezi z vodilnim režimom v tretji državi.
Following the collapse of the Taliban regime, those measures were aimed directly at Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the persons and entities associated with them, as they appear in the summary list.
Po padcu režima talibanov so ti ukrepi namreč usmerjeni neposredno proti Osami bin Ladnu, mreži Al Kaida ter z njima povezanimi posamezniki in subjekti, navedenimi na konsolidiranem seznamu.
They do not, therefore, as such, fall within the ambit of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC.
Zato ne spadajo na področje uporabe členov 60 ES in 301 ES.
To accept the interpretation of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC proposed by the Commission, that it is enough for the restrictive measures at issue to be directed at persons or entities present in a third country or associated with one in some other way, would give those provisions an excessively broad meaning and would fail to take any account at all of the requirement, imposed by their very wording, that the measures decided on the basis of those provisions must be taken against third countries.
Če se sprejme razlaga členov 60 ES in 301 ES, ki jo predlaga Komisija – da zadostuje, da se zadevni omejevalni ukrepi nana�ajo na posameznike ali subjekte, ki so v tretji državi oziroma so z njo v drugačni zvezi – se tem določbam da pre�irok obseg in se sploh ne upo�teva zahteve, ki izhaja iz izrazov teh določb, da je treba ukrepe, določene na podlagi teh določb, sprejeti zoper tretje države.
In addition, the essential purpose and object of the contested regulation is to combat international terrorism, in particular to cut it off from its financial resources by freezing the economic funds and resources of persons or entities suspected of involvement in activities linked to terrorism, and not to affect economic relations between the Community and each of the third countries where those persons or entities are, always supposing, moreover, that their place of residence is known.
Poleg tega je bistveni cilj in predmet izpodbijane uredbe boj proti mednarodnemu terorizmu, zlasti z odtegnitvijo finančnih sredstev, tako da se zamrzne sredstva in gospodarske vire posameznikov ali subjektov, za katere se domneva, da so vključeni v dejavnosti, ki so povezane z mednarodnim terorizmom, ne pa vplivati na gospodarske odnose med Skupnostjo in vsako od tretjih držav, v katerih so ti posamezniki ali subjekti, če je njihovo prebivali�če sploh znano.
The restrictive measures provided for by Resolution 1390 (2002) and put into effect by the contested regulation cannot be considered to be measures intended to reduce economic relations with each of those third countries, or, indeed, with certain Member States of the Community, in which are to be found persons or entities whose names are included in the list reproduced in Annex I to that regulation.
Omejevalnih ukrepov, ki so določeni v Resoluciji 1390(2002) in jih izvaja izpodbijana uredba, se namreč ne more �teti za ukrepe, namenjene omejitvi gospodarskih odnosov z vsako od teh tretjih držav – tudi ne tistih gospodarskih odnosov z nekaterimi državami članicami Skupnosti – v katerih so posamezniki ali subjekti, katerih ime je vključeno na konsolidirani seznam v Prilogi I k tej uredbi.
Nor can the argument supported by the Commission be justified by the expression ‘in part’ appearing in Article 301 EC.
Trditve Komisije se poleg tega ne more utemeljiti z izrazom „delno“ iz člena 301 ES.
In point of fact, that expression refers to the possible limitation of the scope ratione materiae or personae of the measures that might, by definition, be taken under that provision.
Ta izraz se namreč nana�a na morebitno omejitev stvarnega ali osebnega obsega ukrepov, ki jih je po potrebi mogoče sprejeti v okviru te določbe.
It has, however, no effect on the necessary status of the persons to whom those measures might be addressed and cannot, therefore, warrant extending the application of the measures to such persons who are in no way linked to the governing regime of a third country and who, by the same token, do not fall within the ambit of that provision.
Vendar ta izraz ne vpliva na lastnost, ki jo morajo imeti potencialni naslovniki teh ukrepov, in zato ne more utemeljiti raz�iritve uporabe teh ukrepov na naslovnike, ki nimajo nobene zveze z vodstvenim režimom tretje države in zaradi tega ne spadajo na področje uporabe te določbe.
The Commission’s argument relating to the similarity of the words used in Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations and in Article 301 EC, from which it deduces that the latter provision constitutes a platform for the implementation by the Community of all measures adopted by the Security Council that call for action by the Community, cannot succeed either.
Prav tako ni mogoče uspeti s trditvijo Komisije glede terminolo�ke skladnosti med členom 41 Ustanovne listine Združenih narodov in členom 301 ES, na podlagi katere je sklepala, da je ta določba temelj, za to da Skupnost izvede vse ukrepe, ki jih sprejme Varnostni svet in zahtevajo ukrepanje Skupnosti.
Article 301 EC specifically refers to the interruption of economic relations ‘with one or more third countries’, whereas such an expression is not used in Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Člen 301 ES namreč posebej predvideva prekinitev gospodarskih odnosov „z eno tretjo državo ali več temi“, medtem ko člen 41 Ustanovne listine Združenih narodov ne vsebuje tak�nega izraza.
What is more, in other respects the ambit of Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations does not coincide with that of Article 301 EC, for the first provision enables the adoption of a series of measures other than those referred to by the second, including measures of a fundamentally different nature from those intended to interrupt or reduce economic relations with third countries, such as the breaking off of diplomatic relations.
Še več, z drugega vidika, področje uporabe člena 41 Ustanovne listine Združenih narodov prav tako ne sovpada s področjem uporabe člena 301 ES, saj je na podlagi prve določbe mogoče sprejeti �tevilne druge ukrepe, kot so predvideni z drugo določbo, vključno z ukrepi, ki so bistveno drugačni od tistih, ki so usmerjeni k prekinitvi ali omejitvi gospodarskih odnosov s tretjimi državami, kakr�na je prekinitev diplomatskih odnosov.
The Commission’s argument that Article 301 EC builds a procedural bridge between the Community and the European Union, so that it must be interpreted as broadly as the relevant Community competences, including those relating to the common commercial policy and the free movement of capital, must also be rejected.
Prav tako je treba zavrniti trditev Komisije, da člen 301 ES vzpostavlja postopkovni most med Skupnostjo in Unijo, tako da je treba to določbo razlagati tako �iroko kot upo�tevne pristojnosti Skupnosti, med njimi tiste, ki se nana�ajo na skupno trgovinsko politiko in prosti pretok kapitala.
That interpretation of Article 301 EC threatens to reduce the ambit and, therefore, the practical effect of that provision, for, having regard to its actual wording, the subject of that provision is the adoption of potentially very diverse measures affecting economic relations with third countries which, therefore, by necessary inference, must not be limited to spheres falling within other material powers of the Community such as those in the domain of the common commercial policy or of the free movement of capital.
Taka razlaga člena 301 ES lahko namreč zoži področje uporabe in posledično polni učinek te določbe, kajti ta z vidika svojega besedila predvideva sprejetje potencialno zelo različnih ukrepov, ki posegajo v gospodarske odnose s tretjimi državami in zato, a priori, ne smejo biti omejeni na področja, ki izhajajo iz drugih stvarnih pristojnosti Skupnosti, kakr�ne so te na področju skupne trgovinske politike Skupnosti ali prostega pretoka kapitala.
Moreover, that interpretation finds no support in the wording of Article 301 EC, which confers a material competence on the Community the scope of which is, in theory, autonomous in relation to that of other Community competences.
Taka razlaga se poleg tega ne opira na besedilo člena 301 ES, ker daje slednji Skupnosti stvarno pristojnost, katere obseg načeloma ni odvisen od drugih pristojnosti Skupnosti.
It is necessary to examine in the third place the alternative argument raised by the Commission that, if it was not possible for the contested regulation to be adopted on the sole legal basis of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC, recourse to Article 308 EC would not be justified, for that latter provision is, in particular, applicable only if no other provision of the EC Treaty confers the powers necessary to adopt the measure concerned.
Tretjič, preučiti je treba trditev, ki jo podredno navaja Komisija, da če izpodbijane uredbe ni bilo mogoče sprejeti le na podlagi členov 60 ES in 301 ES, sklicevanje na člen 308 ES ne bi bilo utemeljeno, zlasti ker se ta določba uporabi samo, če nobena druga določba Pogodbe ES ne daje potrebne pristojnosti za sprejetje zadevnega akta.
The restrictive measures imposed by the contested regulation fall within the Community’s powers of action, in particular its powers in the sphere of the common commercial policy and free movement of capital.
Omejevalni ukrepi, ki jih določa navedena uredba, pa naj bi izhajali iz pooblastil za ukrepanje Skupnosti, zlasti iz njene pristojnosti na področju skupne trgovinske politike ter prostega pretoka kapitala in plačil.
In this connection, the Court of First Instance held, in paragraphs 100 of Kadi and 136 of Yusuf and Al Barakaat, that no specific provision of the EC Treaty provides for the adoption of measures of the kind laid down in the contested regulation relating to the campaign against international terrorism and, more particularly, to the imposition of economic and financial sanctions, such as the freezing of funds, in respect of individuals and entities suspected of contributing to the funding of international terrorism, where no connection whatsoever has been established with the governing regime of a third State, with the result that the first condition for the applicability of Article 301 EC was satisfied in the case in point.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je v točki 100 izpodbijane sodbe Kadi ter v točki 136 izpodbijane sodbe Yusuf in Al Barakaat v zvezi s tem presodilo, da nobena določba Pogodbe ES ne določa sprejetja ukrepov, ki so primerljivi s tistimi iz sporne uredbe o boju proti mednarodnemu terorizmu – zlasti z naložitvijo ekonomskih in finančnih sankcij, kakr�ne so zamrznitve sredstev posameznikom in subjektom, za katere se domneva, in pri katerih se ni vzpostavila nikakr�na vez z ozemljem ali vodstvenim režimom tretje države, da prispevajo k financiranju mednarodnega terorizma – tako da je prvi pogoj za uporabo člena 308 ES v tem primeru izpolnjen.
A Community measure falls within the competence in the field of the common commercial policy provided for in Article 133 EC only if it relates specifically to international trade in that it is essentially intended to promote, facilitate or govern trade and has direct and immediate effects on trade in the products concerned (see, inter alia, Case C-347/03 Regione autonoma Friuli­Venezia Giulia and ERSA [2005] ECR I-3785, paragraph 75 and the caselaw there cited).
Po eni strani spada akt Skupnosti v pristojnost na področju skupne trgovinske politike iz člena 133 ES le, če se posebej nana�a na mednarodno menjavo, tako da je v bistvu namenjen spodbujanju, olaj�anju ali urejanju gospodarske menjave ter ima neposreden in takoj�ni učinek na trgovino ali menjavo z zadevnimi proizvodi (glej zlasti sodbo z dne 12. maja 2005 v zadevi Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia in ERSA, C-347/03, ZOdl., str. I-3785, točka 75 in navedena sodna praksa).
With regard to its essential purpose and object, as explained in paragraph 169 above, the contested regulation is intended to combat international terrorism and it provides to that end a series of restrictive measures of an economic and financial kind, such as freezing the economic funds and resources of persons or entities suspected of contributing to the funding of international terrorism.
Pomemben cilj in predmet izpodbijane uredbe, kot je bilo navedeno v točki 169 te sodbe, je boj proti mednarodnemu terorizmu ter v ta namen določa naložitev celote gospodarskih in finančnih omejevalnih ukrepov, kakr�na je zamrznitev sredstev in gospodarskih virov posameznikov ali subjektov, za katere se domneva, da prispevajo k financiranju mednarodnega terorizma.