natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Where an employer treats an employee who is not himself disabled less favourably than another employee is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and it is established that the less favourable treatment of that employee is based on the disability of his child, whose care is provided primarily by that employee, such treatment is contrary to the prohibition of direct discrimination laid down by Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78.
Če se dokaže, da je nezaželeno ravnanje, ki je element nadlegovanja, zoper zaposlenega, ki ni invalid, povezano z invalidnostjo njegovega otroka, kateremu nudi bistveni del oskrbe, ki jo ta potrebuje, se s tak�nim ravnanjem kr�i prepoved nadlegovanja iz člena 2(3) te direktive.
Where it is established that the unwanted conduct amounting to harassment which is suffered by an employee who is not himself disabled is related to the disability of his child, whose care is provided primarily by that employee, such conduct is contrary to the prohibition of harassment laid down by Article 2(3) of Directive 2000/78.
Če delodajalec obravnava zaposlenega, ki ni invalid, manj ugodno, kakor je, je bil ali bi bil obravnavan drug zaposleni v primerljivem položaju, in če se dokaže, da se tega zaposlenega obravnava manj ugodno zaradi invalidnosti njegovega otroka, kateremu nudi bistveni del oskrbe, ki jo ta potrebuje, se s tak�nim obravnavanjem kr�i prepoved neposredne diskriminacije iz člena 2(2)(a) te direktive.
(see paras 38, 50, 56, operative part 1)
(Glej točke 38, 50, 56 in točko 1 izreka.)
(see paras 38, 58, 63, operative part 2)
(Glej točke 38, 58, 63 in točko 2 izreka.)
This reference by the South London Employment Tribunal raises, for the first time, an important question about the scope of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation 2(‘the Directive’).
Predlog, ki ga je vložilo South London Employment Tribunal, vsebuje pomembno vpra�anje, ki do sedaj �e ni bilo postavljeno, o področju uporabe Direktive Sveta 2000/78/ES z dne 27. novembra 2000 o splo�nih okvirih enakega obravnavanja pri zaposlovanju in delu 2(v nadaljevanju: Direktiva).
The Tribunal asks whether the prohibition of discrimination contained in the Directive covers cases where an employee is treated less favourably than her colleagues because, although not herself disabled, she is associated with a disabled person.
Sodi�če spra�uje, ali prepoved diskriminacije iz Direktive zajema primere, ko je zaposlena oseba obravnavana manj ugodno kakor njeni sodelavci zaradi povezanosti z invalidno osebo, čeprav sama ni invalid.
I — Factual background and the questions referred
I – Dejansko stanje in vprašanja za predhodno odločanje
On 4 March 2005 the claimant accepted voluntary redundancy and, accordingly, stopped working for Attridge Law.
Tožeča stranka je 4. marca 2005 sogla�ala s prenehanjem svojega delovnega razmerja zaradi pomanjkanja dela in tako nehala delati za Attridge Law.
On 30 August 2005 she brought a claim for constructive dismissal and disability discrimination against her former employers, arguing that they treated her less favourably than employees with non-disabled children and subjected her to conduct that created a hostile atmosphere for her.
30. avgusta 2005 je vložila tožbo proti nekdanjim delodajalcem zaradi odpovedi pod prisilo in diskriminacije zaradi invalidnosti z utemeljitvijo, da so jo obravnavali manj ugodno kot zaposlene z neinvalidnimi otroki ter da so ustvarili zanjo sovražno okolje.
Among the examples of discriminatory treatment that she alleges she has suffered are that her employers refused to allow her to return to her existing job after coming back from maternity leave; they called her ‘lazy’ when she sought to take time off to care for her son and refused to give her the same flexibility as regards her working arrangements as those of her colleagues with non-disabled children; they said that she was using her ‘fucking child’ to manipulate her working conditions; they subjected her to disciplinary action; and they failed to deal properly with a formal grievance she lodged against her ill treatment.
Kot primere diskriminatornega ravnanja proti njej navaja, da ji delodajalci niso dovolili, da se po porodni�kem dopustu vrne na svoje obstoječe delovno mesto; da so ji govorili, da je „lena“, ko je želela odmor, da bi poskrbela za svojega sina, in da niso bili tako prilagodljivi glede njenih delovnih razmer, kot so bili glede delovnih razmer sodelavcev z neinvalidnimi otroki; da so govorili, da izrablja svojega „prekletega otroka“ za spreminjanje svojih delovnih pogojev; da so proti njej uvedli disciplinski postopek in da niso pravilno obravnavali pritožbe, ki jo je vložila zaradi slabega ravnanja.
The claimant in the main proceedings, Ms Sharon Coleman, worked from 2001 as legal secretary for Attridge Law, a firm of solicitors in London, where Mr Steve Law is a partner.
Coleman, tožeča stranka iz postopka v glavni stvari, je od leta 2001 delala kot strokovna sodelavka pri Attridge Law, odvetni�ki pisarni (firm of solicitors) iz Londona, katere družbenik je S. Law.
Ms Coleman sought to rely on the relevant national law, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, and the Directive.
Coleman se je sklicevala na upo�tevno nacionalno pravo, to je Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (zakon o diskriminaciji zaradi invalidnosti iz leta 1995), in na Direktivo.
Her argument was that the Directive is intended to prohibit discrimination not only against disabled persons themselves, but also against individuals who are victims of discrimination
Zatrjevala je, da je namen Direktive prepovedati diskriminacijo ne samo invalidnih oseb ampak tudi oseb, ki so žrtve diskriminacije
because they are associated with a disabled person.
zaradi povezanosti z invalidno osebo.
The Tribunal, the argument goes on, should interpret the Disability Discrimination Act in conformity with the Directive and thus afford protection against discrimination by association.
Glede na njeno mnenje bi moralo sodi�če razlagati Disability Discrimination Act 1995 skladno z Direktivo in tako varovati pred diskriminacijo zaradi povezanosti.
The defendants in the main action argued that the Act protects only disabled persons and that the Directive is not intended to cover discrimination by association.
Toženi stranki iz postopka v glavni stvari pa sta trdili, da Act �čiti samo invalidne osebe in da namen Direktive ni zajeti diskriminacije zaradi povezanosti.
(3) Where an employer treats an employee less favourably than he treats or would treat other employees, and it is established that the ground for the treatment of the employee is that the employee has a disabled son for whom the employee cares, is that treatment direct discrimination in breach of the principle of equal treatment established by the Directive?
Če delodajalec obravnava zaposleno osebo manj ugodno kot obravnava ali bi obravnaval druge zaposlene in je ugotovljeno, da je razlog za tako obravnavanje zaposlene osebe ta, da ima zaposlena oseba invalidnega sina, za katerega skrbi, ali je tako obravnavanje neposredna diskriminacija, s katero se kr�i načelo enakega obravnavanja, ki je določeno v Direktivi?
Ms Coleman can succeed in her case only if the Directive is to be interpreted as prohibiting discrimination by association.
Coleman lahko uspe v svoji zadevi samo, če se Direktivo razlaga tako, da prepoveduje diskriminacijo zaradi povezanosti.
Thus, the Tribunal did not proceed fully to establish the material facts and examine the substance of the claim, but, instead, stayed that part of the application and held a preliminary hearing only on the issue of whether or not discrimination by association is prohibited.
Tako sodi�če ni popolnoma ugotovilo dejanskega stanja in preučilo temelja zahteve, temveč je namesto tega prekinilo odločanje o tem delu tožbe in razpisalo predhodno obravnavo le o vpra�anju, ali je diskriminacija zaradi povezanosti prepovedana.
Following the hearing it stayed the proceedings and referred the following questions to the Court of Justice:
Po obravnavi je sodi�če prekinilo odločanje in Sodi�ču v predhodno odločanje predložilo ta vpra�anja:
(4) Where an employer harasses an employee, and it is established that the ground for the treatment of the employee is that the employee has a disabled son for whom the employee cares, is that harassment a breach of the principle of equal treatment established by the Directive?’
Če delodajalec nadleguje zaposleno osebo in je ugotovljeno, da je razlog za tako obravnavanje zaposlene osebe ta, da ima zaposlena oseba invalidnega sina, za katerega skrbi, ali je to nadlegovanje kr�itev načela enakega obravnavanja, ki je določeno v Direktivi?“
(2) If the answer to Question (1) above is in the negative, does the Directive protect
Če je odgovor na prvo vpra�anje nikalen, ali Direktiva varuje zaposlene osebe, ki
The four questions referred to the Court by the Employment Tribunal boil down to a single issue of law: does the Directive protect non-disabled people who, in the context of their employment, suffer direct discrimination and/or harassment because they are associated with a disabled person?
Štiri vpra�anja, ki jih je Employment Tribunal postavilo Sodi�ču, se nana�ajo na eno samo pravno vpra�anje: ali Direktiva varuje neinvalidne osebe, ki so v okviru svoje zaposlitve žrtve neposredne diskriminacije in/ali nadlegovanja zaradi povezanosti z invalidno osebo?
EC must be interpreted in the light of the goals pursued by Article 13 itself. 4
COLEMAN člena 13 ES, razlagati v skladu s cilji, ki jih zasleduje sam člen 13. 4
Article 13 EC is an expression of the commitment of the Community legal order to the principle of equal treatment and nondiscrimination.
Člen 13 ES je izraz zaveze pravnega reda Skupnosti načelu enakega obravnavanja in nediskriminacije.
Thus, any interpretation of both that article and any directive adopted under this legal basis must be undertaken against the background of the Court’s caselaw on these principles.
Tako je treba ta člen in katerokoli direktivo, sprejeto na tej pravni podlagi, razlagati v okviru sodne prakse Sodi�ča o teh načelih.
5 The Directive itself states in Article 1 that its purpose is ‘to lay down a general framework for combating
5 V členu 1 Direktive je določeno, da je njen namen „opredeliti splo�ni okvir boja proti diskriminaciji … zato da bi v državah članicah uresničevali načelo
The Directive was adopted under Article 13 EC which was added to the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam and reads as follows: ‘Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’. The first thing to note about Article 13 EC is that it singles out specific grounds of discrimination which it treats as suspect grounds or, to borrow a term from US constitutional law, as ‘suspect classifications’, 3and makes them the target of Community antidiscrimination legislation.
Direktiva je bila sprejeta na podlagi člena 13 ES, ki je bil Pogodbi ES dodan z Amsterdamsko pogodbo in v katerem je določeno: „Brez poseganja v druge določbe te pogodbe in v mejah pristojnosti Skupnosti po tej pogodbi lahko Svet na predlog Komisije in po posvetovanju z Evropskim parlamentom soglasno sprejme ustrezne ukrepe za boj proti diskriminaciji na podlagi spola, rase ali narodnosti, vere ali prepričanja, invalidnosti, starosti ali spolne usmerjenosti.“ Prva stvar, na katero je treba opozoriti v zvezi s členom 13 ES, je ta, da so v njem izbrane določene podlage za diskriminacijo, ki so obravnavane kot sumljive podlage ali, če si izposodim izraz iz ameri�kega ustavnega prava, kot „sumljive kategorije“ („suspect classifications“) 3in ki so predmet protidiskriminacijskih predpisov Skupnosti.
Under this broad provision legislation may be brought with the aim of combating discrimination on those enumerated grounds.
V okviru te �iroke določbe se lahko sprejme predpise z namenom boja proti diskriminaciji na na�tetih podlagah.
While the Council enjoys considerable discretion to adopt measures tailored to particular circumstances and social contexts, Article 13 EC cannot be interpreted so as to allow the adoption of legislation that would be inconsistent with its aims and spirit and limit the protection that the drafters of the Treaty intended to offer.
Čeprav ima Svet precej�njo diskrecijo glede sprejetja ukrepov, ki so prilagojeni posameznim okoli�činam in družbenim okvirom, se člena 13 ES ne more razlagati tako, da dovoljuje sprejetje predpisov, ki niso skladni z njegovimi nameni in duhom in ki omejujejo varstvo, ki so ga avtorji Pogodbe hoteli nuditi.
As a consequence, legislation adopted on the basis of Article 13
Tako je treba predpise, sprejete na podlagi
4 — Indeed, one cannot exclude the possibility of antidiscrimination measures adopted under Article 13 EC that would violate that very same provision (for example, measures offering protection from discrimination based on religious belief to the adherents of only some, but not all, religions).
4 – Seveda se ne more izključiti možnosti protidiskriminacijskih ukrepov, sprejetih na podlagi člena 13 ES, ki bi kr�ili to isto določbo (na primer: ukrepi, ki bi �čitili pred diskriminacijo na podlagi verskega prepričanja le pripadnike nekaterih, ne pa vseh ver).
Also, as Christopher McCrudden suggests in ‘Thinking about the discrimination directives’, (2005) 1 European Journal of Anti-Discrimination Law 17, 20, equal treatment and nondiscrimination as guaranteed by the Directive should be placed within a broader human rights context.
Kot Christopher McCrudden predlaga v „Thinking about the discrimination directives“, (2005) 1 European Journal of Anti-Discrimination Law 17, 20, bi bilo treba enako obravnavanje in nediskriminacijo, kot sta zagotovljena z Direktivo, postaviti v �ir�i okvir človekovih pravic.
Recital 4 to the Directive refers to the ‘universal right’ to ‘equality before the law and protection against discrimination’ which is ‘recognised by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’.
Uvodna izjava 4 Direktive se nana�a na „univerzaln[o] pravic[o]“ do „enakosti pred zakonom in do za�čite pred diskriminacijo“, ki jo „priznavajo Splo�na deklaracija o človekovih pravicah, Konvencija ZN o odpravi vseh oblik diskriminacije žensk, sporazuma ZN o državljanskih in političnih pravicah ter o ekonomskih, socialnih in kulturnih pravicah in Evropska konvencija o varstvu človekovih pravic in temeljnih svobo�čin“.
I would add to this list the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Chapter III of which is devoted to equality, and which includes a specific provision on the integration of persons with disabilities (Article 26).
K seznamu bi dodal �e Listino o temeljnih pravicah, katere naslov III je namenjen enakosti in ki vsebuje posebno določbo o vključenosti invalidov (člen 26).
A recent development in the area of international human rights which concerns disability issues is the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol.
Nedaven razvoj na področju mednarodnih človekovih pravic, ki se nana�a na zadeve v zvezi z invalidnostjo, je sprejetje Konvencije Združenih narodov o pravicah invalidov in opcijskega protokola k njej. Konvencijo je sprejela Generalna skup�čina 13. decembra 2006, za podpis pa je na voljo od 30. marca 2007 dalje, ko jo je podpisalo 81 držav in Evropska skupnost.
It provides, inter alia, that the signatory parties are to prohibit ‘all discrimination on the basis of disability’ (Article 5(2)).
V njej je med drugim določeno, da države pogodbenice prepovejo „vsako diskriminacijo zaradi invalidnosti“ (člen 5(2)).
5 — It has been pointed out in the literature on discrimination that no conclusive answer as to whether discrimination by association is prohibited flows from Article 13 EC and the directives that were adopted under it.
5 – V literaturi o diskriminaciji je bilo poudarjeno, da člen 13 ES in direktive, ki so bile sprejete na tej podlagi, ne dajejo dokončnega odgovora na vpra�anje, ali je diskriminacija zaradi povezanosti prepovedana.
However, it has been suggested that such discrimination will probably be treated as falling within the scope of the antidiscrimination directives.
Vendar pa je bilo omenjeno, da se bo tako diskriminacijo verjetno obravnavalo, kot da spada na področje uporabe protidiskriminacijskih direktiv. Glej Schiek, D., Waddington L. in Bell M. (ur.) Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Non-Discrimination Law, Hart Publishing, 2007, str. od 169 do 170.
The Court’s caselaw is clear as regards the role of equal treatment and nondiscrimination in the Community legal order.
Zahteva, da bi posamezniki morali biti sposobni oblikovati in voditi potek svojega življenja prek niza odločitev med različnimi pomembnimi možnostmi.
Equality is not merely a political ideal and aspiration but one of the fundamental principles of Community law.
9Izvajanje avtonomije predpostavlja, da so ljudem dane na voljo pomembne možnosti, med katerimi lahko izbirajo.
6As the Court held in that individuals should be able to design and conduct the course of their lives through a succession of choices among different valuable options.
Ko ravnamo kot avtonomne osebe in sprejemamo odločitve o tem, kako naj bi se razvijalo na�e življenje, se udejanjajo na�a osebna integriteta, občutek za dostojanstvo in samospo�tovanje.
Mangold the Directive constitutes a practical aspect of the principle of equality.
6Kot je Sodi�če menilo v zadevi Mangold, je Direktiva praktični vidik načela enakosti.
7In order to determine what equality requires in any given case it is useful to recall the values underlying equality.
7 Da bi se določilo, kaj so zahteve enakosti v kateremkoli primeru, se je treba spomniti vrednot, na katerih temelji enakost.
These are human dignity and personal autonomy.
To sta človekovo dostojanstvo in osebna avtonomija.
At its bare minimum, human dignity entails the recognition of the equal worth of every individual.
Kot skrajni minimum prina�a človekovo dostojanstvo to, da so vsi posamezniki priznani kot enakovredni.
One’s life is valuable by virtue of the mere fact that one is human, and no life is more or less valuable than another.
Življenje nekoga je dragoceno že zaradi samega dejstva, da je človek, in nikogar�nje življenje ni vredno več ali manj kot življenje drugega.
As Ronald Dworkin has recently reminded us, even when we disagree deeply about issues of political morality, the structure of political institutions and the functioning of our democratic states we nevertheless continue to share a commitment to this fundamental principle.
Kot nas je nedavno spomnil Ronald Dworkin, tudi ko se globoko ne strinjamo glede zadev politične morale, strukture političnih institucij in delovanja na�ih demokratičnih držav, smo �e vedno zavezani temu temeljnemu načelu.
8 Therefore, individuals and political institutions must not act in a way that denies the intrinsic importance of every human life.
8Tako posamezniki in politične institucije ne smejo delovati na način, ki zanika imanentno pomembnost vsakega člove�kega življenja.
A relevant, but different, value is that of personal autonomy. It dictates
Osebna avtonomija ima pomembno, vendar
The aim of Article 13 EC and of the Directive is to protect the dignity and autonomy of persons belonging to those suspect classifications.
Namen člena 13 ES in Direktive je varovati dostojanstvo in avtonomijo oseb, ki spadajo v navedene sumljive kategorije.
The most obvious way in which such a person’s dignity and autonomy may be affected is when one is directly targeted because one has a suspect characteristic.
Najočitnej�i način, kako se lahko prizadene dostojanstvo in avtonomijo osebe, je ta, da se osebo neposredno napade, ker ima sumljivo lastnost.
Treating someone less well on the basis of reasons such as religious belief, age, disability and sexual orientation undermines this special and unique value that people have by virtue of being human.
Manj ugodno obravnavanje nekoga na podlagi razlogov, kot so versko prepričanje, starost, invalidnost in spolna usmerjenost, krati to posebno in edinstveno vrednost, ki jo imajo osebe na podlagi tega, da so ljudje.
Recognising the equal worth of every human being means that we should be blind to considerations of this type when we impose a burden on someone or deprive someone of
Priznavanje enake vrednosti vsakemu živemu bitju pomeni, da je treba biti slep za preudarke te vrste, ko se nekomu nalaga breme ali se ga prikraj�a za ugodnost. Z drugimi besedami, to so lastnosti, ki ne bi smele vpli-
6 — See, inter alia, Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00 Omega Air and Others [2002] ECR I-2569 and the caselaw cited therein.
6 – Glej med drugim sodbo z dne 12. marca 2002 v združenih zadevah Omega Air in drugi (C-27/00 in C-122/00, Recueil, str.
See also the discussion in Tridimas, T., The General Principles of EU Law (2nd ed.), Oxford University Press, 2007, and Dashwood, A., and O’Leary, S., (eds), The Principle of Equal Treatment in EC Law, Sweet and Maxwell, 1997
I-2569) in navedeno sodno prakso. Glej tudi razpravo v Tridimas, T., The General Principles of EU Law (2. izdaja), Oxford University Press, 2007, in Dashwood, A., in O’Leary, S., (ur.), The Principle of Equal Treatment in EC Law, Sweet and Maxwell, 1997.
For the sake of accuracy it should be noted that some authors include the value of personal autonomy within that of dignity.
Zaradi natančnosti je treba omeniti, da vključu -jejo nekateri avtorji pomembnost osebne avtonomije v pomembnost dostojanstva.
The same happens with the treatment of these two concepts in the caselaw of some constitutional courts.
Do takega obravnavanja teh dveh pojmov pride tudi v sodni praksi nekaterih ustavnih sodi�č.
This, which might be of relevance in the context of the interpretation of legal provisions that refer only to the value of human dignity, is of no relevance for present purposes.
Za namene te zadeve to ni upo�tevno, čeprav je to lahko pomembno v okviru razlage pravnih določb, ki se nana�ajo samo na človekovo dostojanstvo.
10 — Ibid., p. 154.
10 – Prav tam, str. 154.
One way of undermining the dignity and autonomy of people who belong to a certain group is to target not them, but third persons who are closely associated with them and do not themselves belong to the group.
Eden izmed načinov, kako kratiti dostojanstvo in avtonomijo ljudem, ki spadajo v določeno skupino, je napad ne na njih ampak na tretje osebe, ki so z njimi tesno povezane in ki same ne spadajo v to skupino.
A robust conception of equality entails that these subtler forms of discrimination should also be caught by antidiscrimination legislation, as they, too, affect the persons belonging to suspect classifications.
Trden pojem enakosti pomeni, da bi protidiskriminacijski predpisi morali zajemati tudi te subtilnej�e oblike diskriminacije, ker prav tako prizadenejo osebe, ki spadajo v sumljive kategorije.
Indeed, the dignity of the person with a suspect characteristic is affected as much by being directly discriminated against as it is by seeing someone else suffer discrimination merely by virtue of being associated with him.
Dostojanstvo osebe s sumljivo lastnostjo je krateno tako z neposredno diskriminacijo kot tudi takrat, ko vidi, da je nekdo diskriminiran samo zaradi povezanosti z njo.
In this way, the person who is the immediate victim of discrimination not only suffers a wrong himself, but also becomes the means through which the dignity of the person belonging to a suspect classification is undermined.
Tako se osebi, ki je neposredna žrtev diskriminacije, ne zgodi samo krivica, ampak postane tudi sredstvo, s katerim je krateno dostojanstvo osebe, ki spada v sumljivo kategorijo.