natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the present case, the Court of First Instance stated at paragraph 105 of its judgment, citing BMI Bertollo as a precedent: ‘The applicant cannot, in any event, in opposition proceedings, rely on an absolute ground for refusal precluding valid registration of a sign by a national office or by OHIM.
V obravnavani zadevi je Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 105 sodbe, v kateri je sodbo BMI Bertollo navajalo kot precedens, navedlo: „Tako se tožeča stranka v nobenem primeru ne more v okviru postopka z ugovorom sklicevati na absolutni razlog za zavrnitev, ki preprečuje, da bi nacionalni urad ali UUNT veljavno registrirala znak.
The absolute grounds for refusal contained in Article 7 of Regulation No 40/94 do not fall to be examined as part of opposition proceedings and that article is not one of the provisions in relation to which the legality of the contested decision must be appraised’.
Absolutnih razlogov za zavrnitev, na�tetih v členu 7 Uredbe �t. 40/94, ni treba preizkusiti v okviru postopka z ugovorom in tega člena ni med določbami, ki jih je treba upo�tevati pri presoji zakonitosti izpodbijane odločbe.“
It may be helpful to recapitulate at this point the relevant provisions of the Regulation.
Tukaj bi lahko bila koristna kratka obnova relevantne določbe Uredbe.
Whereas Article 7 lists absolute grounds for refusal of registration without reference
Medtem ko člen 7 na�teva absolutne razloge za zavrnitev registracije brez omembe
The same point was discussed on appeal to the Court of Justice, but did not form part of the Court’s reasoning in its order (Case C-3/03 P Matratzen Concord v OHIM [2004] ECR I-3657, paragraphs 38 to 42).
II-4335, točka 55). Ista zadeva je bila obravnavana v okviru pritožbe pred Sodi�čem, ni pa bila del razlogovanja Sodi�ča v njegovem sklepu (sklep z dne 28. aprila 2004 v zadevi Matratzen Concord proti UUNT (C-3/03 P, Recueil, str. I-3657, točke od 38 do 42).
Looking at those provisions, I find the reasoning in Durferrit entirely cogent in a situation in which a party seeks to oppose registration of a mark on a ground going to the essential registrability of the mark.
V smislu teh določb menim, da je razlogovanje v sodbi Durferrit popolnoma obvezujoče v situaciji, ko stranka ugovarja registraciji znamke zaradi bistvene registrabilnosti znamke.
On the one hand, such grounds are not among those exhaustively laid down in the provisions governing the opposition proced- ure and, on the other hand, other more appropriate procedures are available under different provisions, either in parallel with the opportunity to bring opposition proceedings or following registration.
Po eni strani ti razlogi ne spadajo med razloge, ki so taksativno na�teti v določbah, ki urejajo postopek z ugovorom, po drugi strani pa so na podlagi različnih določb na voljo drugi, ustreznej�i postopki, bodisi hkrati z možnostjo vložitve ugovora bodisi po registraciji.
However, I am not convinced that such reasoning is equally applicable where a party seeking to register a Community trade mark wishes, as a defence in opposition proceedings, to argue that the mark on which the opposition is based should not have been registered.
Kljub temu pa nisem prepričana, da je tako razlogovanje enako uporabljivo, ko se stranka, ki želi registrirati znamko Skupnosti, v obrambo v postopku z ugovorom sklicuje na to, da znamka, na kateri temelji ugovor, ne bi smela biti registrirana.
Consistently with that approach, there is in my view no reason to refuse to examine an argument relating to the distinctiveness of the earlier mark — which is the basis on which L & D submitted its argument concerning the shape necessary to obtain a technical result — simply because it relates also to an absolute ground for refusal under Article 7. If it is permissible to argue that the earlier mark has only limited distinctiveness, an argument that it lacks distinctiveness to the extent of not being capable of registration should not be excluded from consider ation. Where it is alleged that the earlier mark consists exclusively of a shape necessary to obtain a technical result, examination of that argument might lead to the conclusion that the mark does not consist exclusively of such a shape but none the less, because of its similarity to such a shape, lacks sufficient distinctiveness for likelihood of confusion to be established in the circumstances of the case. 68.
Menim, da v skladu s tem pristopom ni razloga, da bi se zavrnil preizkus utemeljitve glede razlikovalnosti prej�nje znamke – na podlagi katere je družba L & D predložila svojo utemeljitev glede oblike, ki je nujna za dosego tehničnega učinka – zgolj zato, ker se prav tako nana�a na absolutni zavrnilni razlog iz člena 7. Če se je dopustno sklicevati na to, da ima prej�nja znamka zgolj omejeno razlikovalnost, utemeljitev, da naj ne bi imela razlikovalnega učinka in naj jo zato ne bi bilo mogoče registrirati, ne bi smela biti izključena. Kadar se zatrjuje, da je prej�nja znamka sestavljena izključno iz oblike, ki je nujna za dosego tehničnega učinka, preizkus te utemeljitve lahko pripelje do ugotovitve, da znamka ni sestavljena izključno iz take oblike, temveč da zaradi podobnosti s tako obliko ni dovolj razlikovalna, da bi lahko bila ugotovljena verjetnost zmede v okoli�činah zadeve. 68.
First, while the Regulation specifies exhaustively the grounds on which registration may be opposed, it lays down no explicit conditions as to the counter-arguments which may be used in defence to opposition.
Prvič, medtem ko Uredba taksativno na�teva razloge, zaradi katerih je mogoče ugovarjati registraciji, ne določa nobenih eksplicitnih pogojev za nasprotne utemeljitve, ki bi jih bilo mogoče uporabiti kot obrambo zoper ugovor.
Since similarity and likelihood of confusion can only be assessed by comparing the allegedly conflicting marks, such arguments may clearly concern the earlier mark as well as the mark whose registration is sought.
Glede na to, da je podobnost in verjetnost zmede mogoče presojati samo na podlagi primerjave domnevno nasprotujočih si znamk, je jasno, da se taka utemeljitev lahko nana�a tako na prej�njo znamko kot na znamko, katere registracija se zahteva.
Second, I agree that it is not possible in opposition proceedings to declare an earlier mark invalid — which was the basis of the decision in Durferrit — and that, if a party to such proceedings seeks such a declaration, the proper course of action is for that party to initiate invalidity proceedings and for the opposition division (or Board of Appeal, as the case may be) to consider whether it is appropriate to suspend the opposition procedure.
Drugič, strinjam se, da v postopku z ugovorom znamke ni mogoče razglasiti za nično – kar je bila podlaga za odločitev v sodbi Durferrit – in če stranka v takem postopku predlaga razglasitev ničnosti, mora sprožiti postopek za razglasitev ničnosti, oddelek za ugovore (ali, odvisno od primera, odbor za pritožbe) pa mora odločiti, ali je treba prekiniti postopek z ugovorom.
However, that course of action seems cumbersome and procedurally inefficient if no such declaration is sought and if examination of the submission could lead to a finding such as the one I have outlined
Toda ta pot se zdi okorna in postopkovno neučinkovita, če se razglasitev ničnosti ne predlaga in če bi preizkus trditve lahko pripeljal do take ugotovitve, kot sem jo predstavila v predhodni točki. Ta pot je posebno okorna, kadar
Thus, in the present case, the argument has focused largely on the degree of distinctiveness of the earlier mark.
V obravnavanem primeru se je torej utemeljitev večinoma nana�ala na stopnjo razlikovalnosti prej�nje znamke.
That argument was, quite rightly, taken into consideration by the opposition division, the Board of Appeal and the Court of First Instance, because that degree of distinctiveness is an aspect of the assessment of likelihood of confusion.
To utemeljitev so oddelek za ugovore, odbor za pritožbe in Sodi�če prve stopnje upravičeno upo�tevali, ker je ta stopnja razlikovalnosti vidik presoje verjetnosti zmede.
However, absence of distinctiveness is also an absolute ground for refusal under Article 7(1)(a) and (b), yet the Court of First Instance — again quite rightly, in my view — did not dismiss the argument as inadmissible on that ground.
Vendar je neobstoj razlikovalnosti tudi absolutni zavrnilni razlog po členu 7(1)(a) in (b), Sodi�če prve stopnje pa na podlagi tega – po mojem mnenju spet upravičeno – ni zavrnilo utemeljitve kot nedopustne.
— Evidence concerning the use of the earlier mark in the preceding paragraph. It is particularly cumbersome where earlier national marks are relied upon and even more problematic where, as in the present case, there is some confusion as to the identity of the earlier mark on whose distinctive character the finding of likelihood of confusion is based.
– Dokazi o uporabi prej�nje znamke se navajajo prej�nje nacionalne znamke, in �e bolj problematična, kadar, kot v obravnavani zadevi, obstaja nekaj zmede glede identitete prej�nje znamke, na podlagi razlikovalnega učinka katere temelji ugotovitev o obstoju zmede.
Finally with regard to the finding of acquired distinctive character, L & D argues that the Court of First Instance misapplied the caselaw it cited 46in concluding that material postdating the application for registration could be accepted as evidence of the pre-existing situation and that acquisition of such character could be found on the basis of general indications concerning volume of publicity or sales. Furthermore, it submits, evidence of volume of sales is less significant for everyday goods of small value such as those in issue. The Court of First Instance was wrong to take the date of registration of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark as the beginning of use without proof of actual use from that date. Moreover, all the sales and publicity data concerned the use of the denomination ‘Arbre Magique’, not of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark. 72.
Nazadnje, družba L & D glede ugotovitve o pridobljenem razlikovalnem učinku trdi, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje, s tem da je ugotovilo, da je podatke, ki so starej�i od prijave za registracijo, mogoče sprejeti kot dokaze o prej obstoječem položaju in je pridobitev takega učinka mogoče ugotoviti na podlagi splo�nih navedb glede obsega ogla�evanja ali prodaje, napačno uporabilo navedeno sodno prakso. 46Poleg tega trdi, da so dokazi o obsegu prodaje manj pomembni glede proizvodov vsakdanje potro�nje majhne vrednosti, kot so na primer zadevni proizvodi. Sodi�če prve stopnje naj bi ravnalo napačno, ko je datum registracije znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE upo�tevalo kot začetek uporabe brez dokaza o dejanski uporabi od tega datuma. Poleg tega so se vsi podatki o prodaji in ogla�evanju nana�ali na uporabo imena Arbre Magique, ne pa na znamko ARBRE MAGIQUE. 72.
Third, the question of what arguments may be raised to counter an objection to registration goes to the rights of the defence.
Tretjič, vpra�anje, na katere utemeljitve se je mogoče sklicevati zoper ugovor o registraciji, se nana�a na pravice obrambe.
Whilst it may be unobjectionable to compel a party who initiates opposition proceedings to use other more appropriate procedures in order to raise absolute grounds for refusal, it seems less equitable to require the party against whom those proceedings have already been initiated to forgo an argument in defence and to initiate other proceedings in order to pursue that argument.
Medtem ko stranko, ki sproži postopek z ugovorom, morda ni sporno prisiliti, da uporabi ustreznej�e postopke, da bi uveljavljala absolutne zavrnilne razloge, se zdi manj pravično od stranke, zoper katero so bili ti postopki že sproženi, zahtevati, da se odreče utemeljitvi v svojo obrambo in sproži druge postopke, da bi uveljavljala to utemeljitev.
The arguments concerning the duration and extent of use specifically of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark raise questions which I prefer to deal
Utemeljitve glede trajanja in obsega uporabe znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE zastavljajo vpra�anje, ki jih bom raj�i obravnavala v nadaljevanju v okviru
I therefore take the view that the Court of First Instance erred in law in paragraph 105 of its judgment by dismissing L & D’s allegation as inadmissible without examining its substance. I - 5746
Zato menim, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje, s tem da je trditev družbe L & D zavrnilo kot nedopustno, ne da bi jo preizkusilo po vsebini, napačno uporabilo pravo. I - 5746
L & D v OHIM with below in the context of the statement of reasons. At this point, I shall confine myself to examining the arguments concerning the date and nature of the evidence accepted. ‘…it is not possible to accept the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal was wrong to find that the earlier mark had a particularly distinctive character in Italy by relying solely on general indications regarding the volume of advertising and sales figures.
L & D PROTI UUNT navedbe razlogov. Tukaj se bom omejila na preskus utemeljitev glede datuma in narave sprejetih dokazov. „[…] ni mogoče sprejeti stali�ča tožeče stranke, da naj bi odbor za pritožbe napačno ugotovil poseben razlikovalni učinek prej�nje znamke v Italiji s sklicevanjem zgolj na splo�ne navedbe glede obsega ogla�evanja in prometa.
Admittedly, the distinctive character of a mark cannot be shown to exist solely by reference to general, abstract data, such as specific percentages (Case C-299/99 Philips [2002] ECR I-5475, paragraph 62).
Razlikovalni učinek znamke seveda ne more biti dokazan zgolj na podlagi splo�nih in abstraktnih podatkov, kot so določeni odstotki (sodba z dne 18. junija 2002 v zadevi Philips, C-299/99, Recueil, str.
Nevertheless, … firstly, … that caselaw concerns the acquisition of the distinctive character of a mark which is the subject of an application for registration and not, as in the present case, the assessment of whether a registered mark which has already acquired distinctive character is well known.
I-5475, točka 62). V vsakem primeru, […] prvič, […] ta sodna praksa se nana�a na pridobitev razlikovalnega učinka znamke, ki je predmet zahteve za registracijo, in ne, kot v obravnavanem primeru, na oceno, ali je registrirana znamka, ki je že pridobila razlikovalni učinek, splo�no znana.
Secondly, in order to establish, in the present case, whether the mark is well known, the Board of Appeal did not only take into account general indications, such as specific percentages, but also the prolonged use of the mark ARBRE MAGIQUE, which, furthermore, the applicant did not dispute.’
Drugič, da bi se v obravnavanem primeru dokazalo, da je znamka splo�no znana, odbor za pritožbe ni upo�teval zgolj splo�nih navedb, kot so določeni odstotki, ampak tudi dolgotrajno uporabo znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE, česar tožeča stranka tudi ni izpodbijala.“
As regards the possibility of accepting evidence of use of the earlier mark after the filing of the application to register the Aire Limpio mark, I do not consider that the Court of First Instance committed any error in law.
Glede možnosti sprejetja dokazov o uporabi prej�nje znamke po vložitvi prijave za registracijo znamke Aire Limpio menim, da Sodi�če prve stopnje prava ni uporabilo napačno.
This Court stated in Alcon 47 that ‘the Court of First Instance could without inconsistency in its reasoning or error of law take account of material which, although subsequent to the date of filing the application, enabled the drawing of conclusions on the situation as it was on that date’.
Sodi�če je v sodbi Alcon 47 navedlo, da „[bi] Sodi�če prve stopnje […] lahko, ne da bi to pomenilo nasprotujočo si razlago ali nepravilno uporabo prava, upo�tevalo dokaze, ki omogočajo sklepanje o položaju na ta datum, čeprav segajo v čas po datumu vložitve prijave“.
Whether that constitutes a general rule (as L & D asserts) or not, it does not preclude the Board of Appeal and the Court of First Instance from drawing the conclusions which they did on the basis that a large market share is not acquired overnight. 78.
Vpra�anje, ali je to splo�no pravilo (kot trdi družba L & D) ali ne, odboru za pritožbe in Sodi�ču prve stopnje ne preprečuje, da bi sprejela ugotovitve, kot sta jih sprejela na podlagi tega, da si velikega tržnega deleža ni mogoče pridobiti čez noč. 78.
L & D argues, first, that there is no relevant distinction to be drawn, as regards acquisition of distinctive character, between the situation in Philips and that in the present case and, second, that the statement regarding prolonged use is itself of a general and unconfirmed nature. 77.
Družba L & D najprej trdi, da glede pridobitve razlikovalnega učinka ni pomembne razlike med položajem v sodbi Philips in položajem v obravnavanem primeru in, drugič, da je izjava o dolgotrajni uporabi sama po sebi splo�na in nepotrjena. 77.
As regards the possibility of relying on general indications concerning volume of publicity or sales, the Court of First Instance stated at paragraph 85 of its judgment:
Sodi�če prve stopnje je glede možnosti sklicevanja na splo�ne navedbe glede obsega ogla�evanja ali prodaje v točki 85 svoje sodbe navedlo:
Philips concerned an application to register a mark which was alleged to have acquired distinctive character and thus not
Sodba Philips se je nana�ala na prijavo za registracijo znamke, ki naj bi pridobila razlikovalni učinek, in zato zaradi neobstoja
47 — Cited above in footnote 22, paragraph 41.
47 – V opombi 22 navedena sodba, točka 41.
48 The passage on which the
48 Odlomek, na katerega se je nosti izpolnjeno.
Court of First Instance relied in the judgment under appeal is itself based on the judgment in Windsurfing Chiemsee.
Sodi�če prve stopnje sklicevalo v izpodbijani sodbi, temelji na sodbi v zadevi Windsurfing Chiemsee. 49
In both judgments the Court stated that in assessing the distinctive character of a mark in such circumstances, account may be taken of its market share, of how intensive, geographically widespread and longstanding its use has been, of the amounts invested in promoting it, of the proportion of the relevant class of persons who, because of it, identify goods as originating from a particu- lar undertaking; and of statements from chambers of commerce and industry or other trade and professional associations.
Sodi�če je v obeh sodbah navedlo, da je v takih okoli�činah pri presoji razlikovalnega učinka znamke treba med drugim upo�tevati njen tržni delež, intenzivnost, geografski obseg in trajanje njene uporabe, zneske, investirane v njeno ogla�evanje, delež upo�tevne javnosti, ki zaradi tega blago zaznava, kot da izvira iz določenega podjetja, in izjave gospodarskih zbornic ali drugih trgovskih ali poklicnih združenj.
If, on that basis, it is found that at least a significant
Če je na tej podlagi ugotovljeno, da vsaj pomemben del upo�tevne javnosti zaradi znamke zaznava proizvode, kot da izvirajo iz določenega podjetja, je merilo pridobljene razlikoval-
I do not see how it could be acceptable to refer solely to general, abstract data in order to establish, in a case such as the present, that a mark has acquired a particularly distinctive character by reason of the reputation it enjoys with the public but not, when seeking to register a mark, that it has become distinctive in consequence of the use which has been made of it.
Ne vidim, zakaj bi se bilo mogoče sklicevati zgolj na splo�ne in abstraktne podatke, da bi se, kot v obravnavanem primeru, ugotovilo, da je znamka pridobila poseben razlikovalni učinek zaradi svojega ugleda v javnosti, ne pa pri zahtevi za registracijo znamke, ki je postala razlikovalna zaradi svoje uporabe.
In both cases, the criterion is the same.
V obeh primerih je merilo enako.
A mark acquires distinctive character if, although not inherently likely to be perceived as distinguishing the products of a particular undertaking, it none the less comes to be so perceived.
Znamka pridobi razlikovalni učinek, če se jo, čeprav ni verjetno, da bo sama po sebi zaznana, kot da razlikuje proizvode določenega podjetja, začne tako zaznavati.
The way in which such perception may be established cannot differ according to whether it is to be used in order to demonstrate that a mark can be registered or in order to assess likelihood of confusion with another mark whose registration is sought. 51
Način, kako je tako zaznavanje mogoče ugotoviti, se ne more razlikovati glede na to, ali bo uporabljen, da bi se ugotovilo, da je znamko mogoče registrirati, ali da bi se ocenilo verjetnost zmede z drugo znamko, katere registracija se zahteva. 51
50 — Windsurfing Chiemsee, paragraphs 51 and 52; Philips, paragraphs 60 to 62.
50 – Sodbi Windsurfing Chiemsee, točki 51 in 52; in Philips, točke od 60 do 62.
48 — The application was for registration as a national mark, and thus fell under the essentially identical provisions of Directive 89/104 (see footnote 4 above). Articles 3(1) of the Directive and 7(1) of the Regulation preclude registration of trade marks which, inter alia, (b) are devoid of distinctive character, (c) consist exclusively of indications which may serve in trade to designate characteristics of the products concerned (including their geographical origin) or (d) consist exclusively of signs or indications which have become customary in the trade; Article 3(3) of the Directive provides: ‘A trade mark shall not be refused registration or be declared invalid in accordance with paragraph 1(b), (c) or (d) if, before the date of application for registration and following the use which has been made of it, it has acquired a distinctive character…’ and Article 7(3) of the Regulation reads: ‘Paragraph 1(b), (c) or (d) shall not apply if the trade mark has become distinctive in relation to the goods or services for which registration is requested in consequence of the use which has been made of it.’
48 – Prijava je bila vložena za registracijo nacionalne znamke in je zato spadala pod določbe Direktive 89/104/EGS (glej opombo 4 zgoraj).V skladu s členom 3(1) Direktive in členom 7(1) Uredbe se med drugim ne smejo registrirati (b) znamke, ki so brez slehernega razlikovalnega učinka, (c) znamke, ki jih sestavljajo izključno označbe, ki lahko v gospodarskem prometu označujejo lastnosti blaga (vključno z geografskim poreklom) ali (d) znamke, ki se sesto -jijo izključno iz znakov ali označb, ki so postali običajni v jezikovni rabi ali v dobroverni ustaljeni praksi trgovanja; člen 3(3) Direktive določa: „Registracija znamke se ne zavrne, znamka pa se ne razglasi za neveljavno v skladu z odstavkom 1(b), (c) ali (d), če je pred datumom prijave za registracijo in z njeno uporabo dobila razlikovalen značaj […],“ člen 7(3) Uredbe pa določa: „Odstavek 1(b), (c) in (d) se ne uporablja, če je znamka z uporabo pridobila razlikovalni učinek za blago ali storitve, za katere se zahteva registracija.“
49 — Joined Cases C-108/97 and C-109/97 [1999] ECR I-2779.
49 – Sodba z dne 4. maja 1999 v združenih zadevah Windsurfing Chiemsee (C-108/97 in C-109/97, Recueil, str. I-2779).
51 — See also, by way of analogy, the Opinion in Case C-371/02 Björnekulla Fruktindustrier [2004] ECR I-5791, at point 71 et seq. (especially points 73 and 75), where Advocate General Léger considers that the same criteria should be applied both when determining whether a mark has acquired sufficient distinctive character for registration and when determining whether a registered mark has not lost that degree of distinctiveness.
51 – Po analogiji glej tudi sklepne predloge z dne 13. novembra 2003 v zadevi Björnekulla Fruktindustrier (C-371/02, Recueil, str. I-5791, točko 71 in naslednje (posebno točki 73 in 75), v katerih generalni pravobranilec Léger meni, da je enako merilo treba uporabiti tako pri ugotavljanju, ali je znamka pridobila zadostni razlikovalni učinek, da bi jo bilo mogoče registrirati, kot pri ugotavljanju, ali je znamka izgubila to stopnjo razlikovalnosti.
If that is not merely circular, it assumes that a greater degree of distinctiveness must be shown in order to establish likelihood of confusion than is necessary for a mark to be registered.
Če ne gre zgolj za vrtenje v začaranem krogu, se domneva, da je treba izkazati vi�jo stopnjo razlikovalnosti za ugotovitev verjetnost zmede, kot je nujna za registracijo znamke.