natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In those circumstances, the Court found that the Republic of Malta had failed to comply with the conditions for a derogation and, therefore, had failed to ful¤l its obligations under the directive.
V teh okoliščinah je Sodišče ugotovilo, da Republika Malta ni upoštevala pogojev za odstopanje in torej ni izpolnila obveznosti iz navedene direktive.
In Case C-165/08 Commission v Poland (judgment of 16 July 2009), the Court was required to examine whether, as claimed by the Commission, the Republic of Poland had failed to ful¤l its obli-
V zadevi Komisija proti Poljski (sodba z dne 16. julija 2009, C-165/08) je Sodišče presojalo, ali, kot je trdila Komisija, Republika Poljska s tem, da je na splošno prepovedala trženje semen gensko spremenjenih sort ter njihov vpis v nacionalni katalog sort, ni izpolnila obveznosti iz direktiv
The Republic of Poland submitted, in an original manner, that Directives 2001/18 and 2002/53 could not be applied in the case in point because they pursued the objectives of freedom of movement, protection of the environment and public health, whereas the national legislation pursued ethical or religious objectives.
Republika Poljska je izvirno trdila, da direktivi 2001/18 in 2002/53 v obravnavanem primeru ne moreta veljati, ker sledita ciljem prostega pretoka, varstva okolja in javnega zdravja, nacionalna zakonodaja pa sledi etičnim in verskim ciljem.
In other words, the contested national provisions were actually outside the scope of those directives, which meant that the obstacles to the free circulation of GMOs to which they gave rise, potentially in breach of Article 28 EC, could in some circumstances be justi-¤ed under Article 30 EC.
Z drugimi besedami, sporne nacionalne določbe ne spadajo na področje uporabe navedenih direktiv, čeprav je mogoče ovire za prosti pretok GSO, povzročene z morebitno kršitvijo člena 28 ES, glede na okoliščine zadeve upravičiti na podlagi člena 30 ES.
The Court considered that, for the purposes of deciding the case, it was not necessary to rule on the question whether the Member States retained an option to rely on ethical or religious arguments in order to justify the adoption of internal measures which derogated from the provisions of Directives 2001/18 or 2002/53.
Sodišče je v zvezi s tem menilo, da za rešitev spora ni treba odločiti o vprašanju, ali države članice ohranijo možnost, da se sklicujejo na etične in verske argumente za utemeljitev sprejetja nacionalnih ukrepov, ki odstopajo od določb direktiv 2001/18 in 2002/53.
It was sucient to hold that the Republic of Poland had failed to establish that the true purpose of the contested national provisions was in fact to pursue the objectives relied upon.
Zadostovala je ugotovitev, da Republika Poljska ni dokazala, da sporni nacionalni določbi dejansko sledita navedenim ciljem.
In those circumstances, general prohibitions such as those laid down in the contested national provisions infringed the obligations of the Republic of Poland under Articles 22 and 23 of Directive 2001/18 and Articles 4(4) and 16 of Directive 2002/53.
V teh okoliščinah so bile s splošnimi prepovedmi, kakršne so v spornih nacionalnih določbah, kršene obveznosti, ki za Republiko Poljsko izhajajo tako iz členov 22 in 23 Direktive 2001/18 kot iz členov 4(4) in 16 Direktive 2002/53.
The Court concluded that a Member State which prohibited the free circulation of genetically modi¤ed seed varieties and the inclusion of genetically modi¤ed varieties in the national catalogue of varieties failed to ful¤l its obligations under Articles 22 and 23 of Directive 2001/18 and under Articles 4(4) and 16 of Directive 2002/53.
Sodišče je na podlagi tega presodilo, da država članica, ki prepove prosti pretok semen gensko spremenjenih sort in vključitev gensko spremenjenih sort v nacionalni katalog sort, ne izpolni obveznosti iz členov 22 in 23 Direktive 2001/18 in iz členov 4(4) in 16 Direktive 2002/53.
In Case C-254/08 Futura Imobiliare and Others (judgment of 16 July 2009) which concerned the calculation of waste tax, giving rise to the application of the ‘polluter pays’ principle, the Court interpreted Article 15(a) of Directive 2006/12/EC (37) as meaning that, as Community law currently stands, that provision does not preclude national legislation which, for the purposes of ¤nancing an urban waste management and disposal service, provides for a tax or charge calculated on the basis of an estimate of the volume of waste generated by users of that service and not on the basis of the quantity of waste which they have actually produced and presented for collection.
V okviru zadeve o izračunu dajatve za odstranjevanje odpadkov (sodba z dne 16. julija 2009 v¥zadevi Futura Imobiliare in drugi, C-254/08), v kateri je bilo uporabljeno načelo plačila povzročitelja obremenitve, je Sodišče razložilo člen 15(a) Direktive 2006/12/ES37tako, da glede na trenutno stanje prava Skupnosti ne nasprotuje nacionalni ureditvi, ki za nanciranje storitve upravljanja in odstranjevanja komunalnih odpadkov določa dajatev, ki se izračuna na podlagi ocenjene količine odpadkov uporabnikov te storitve, in ne na podlagi količine odpadkov, ki so jo dejansko proizvedli in predali za odvoz.
The national court based its reasoning on the fact that, in a situation where holders of waste have it handled by a collector, Article 15(a) of Directive 2006/12 provides that, in accordance with the ‘polluter pays’ principle, the cost of disposing of the waste must be borne by those holders.
Sodišče je utemeljilo svoje sklepanje z dejstvom, da navedeni člen 15(a) za primer, ko imetniki odpadkov te predajo pobiralcu, določa, da morajo v skladu z načelom plačila povzročitelja obremenitve strošek odstranjevanja odpadkov nositi ti imetniki.
It is often dicult, indeed onerous, to determine the precise volume of urban waste presented for collection by each‘holder’.
Vendar pa je pogosto težko in celo drago določiti natančno količino komunalnih odpadkov, ki jih pobiralcu preda vsak imetnik.
Accordingly, recourse to criteria founded, ¤rst, on the waste-production capacity of the ‘holders’, calculated on the basis of the surface area of the property which they occupy and of its use, and/or, second, on the nature of the waste produced can provide a means of calculating the costs of disposing of that waste and allocating them among the various ‘holders’, since those two parameters are such as to have a direct impact on the amount of the costs.
V teh okoliščinah lahko uporaba meril – ki temeljijo na eni strani na sposobnosti imetnikov za proizvajanje odpadkov, izračunani glede na površino nepremičnin, ki jih uporabljajo, in glede na njihovo namembnost, in/ali na drugi strani na vrsti proizvedenih odpadkov – omogoči izračun
) Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modi¤ed organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC (OJ 2001 L 106, p. 1).
Direktiva 2001/18/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 12. marca 2001 o namernem sproščanju gensko spremenjenih organizmov v okolje in razveljavitvi Direktive Sveta 90/220/EGS (UL L 106, str. 1).
) Directive 2006/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on waste (OJ 2006 L 114, p. 9).
1).Direktiva 2006/12/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 5. aprila 2006 o odpadkih (UL L 114, str. 9).
However, the Court stated that it was incumbent upon the national court to review, on the basis of the matters of fact and law placed before it, whether the tax for the disposal of private solid urban waste resulted in the allocation to certain ‘holders’, in the case in point hotel establishments, of costs which were manifestly disproportionate to the volumes or nature of the waste that they were liable to produce.
Sodišče je pojasnilo, da pa mora predložitveno sodišče na podlagi dejanskih in pravnih elementov, ki so mu bili predloženi, preveriti, ali dajatev za odstranjevanje zasebnih trdnih komunalnih odpadkov ne povzroči, da se nekaterim imetnikom, v tem primeru hotelskim obratom, zaračunajo stroški, ki so očitno nesorazmerni glede na količino ali vrsto odpadkov, ki bi jih lahko proizvedli.
Visas, asylum and immigration
Vizumi, azil in priseljevanje
Cases in the ¤eld of asylum are increasing in number and the Court has had the opportunity to interpret several directives in this ¤eld for the ¤rst time.
Čedalje več je zadev na področju azila in Sodišče je imelo priložnost, da prvič razlaga več direktiv s¥tega področja.
Thus, in Case C-19/08 Petrosian and Others (judgment of 29 January 2009), the Court dealt with the procedure for transferring an application for asylum and had the opportunity, in that regard, to interpret Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 (38).
Tako je v zadevi Petrosian in drugi (sodba z dne 29. januarja 2009, C-19/08) Sodišče obravnavalo postopek predaje prosilca za azil in v zvezi s tem razlagalo Uredbo (ES) št. 343/200338.
The Petrosian family, of Armenian origin, had applied for asylum in France, then in Sweden.
Družina Petrosian armenskega izvora je vložila prošnjo za azil v Franciji in nato na Švedskem.
The Swedish national authorities wanted to send the family back to France. However, that decision was challenged several times by the Petrosian family, with the result that the six-month period laid down in Article 20(1)(d) of the regulation had expired.
Švedski nacionalni organi so hoteli poslati družino nazaj v Francijo, odločbo glede tega pa je družina Petrosian večkrat izpodbijala, tako da se je šestmesečni rok iz člena 20(1)(d) navedene uredbe iztekel.
That period, which‘runs as from the time of the decision on an appeal or review’, is intended to enable the Member State in which the application for asylum was made to transfer that application, whereas the expiry of that period makes that Member State responsible.
Ta rok, ki začne teči z „odločbo o pritožbi ali pregledu“, naj bi omogočil državi članici, pri kateri je bila vložena prošnja za azil, da opravi predajo, njegov iztek pa povzroči, da postane ta država odgovorna.
The main issue in the case was the determination of the event which could trigger the six-month period.
Osrednje vprašanje sodbe se je nanašalo na dogodek, ki povzroči začetek teka šestmesečnega roka.
In its answer the Court made a distinction between two hypotheses, namely where national legislation provides for an appeal with suspensive e¥ect and where it does not.
Sodišče je v odgovoru razlikovalo med dvema primeroma glede na to, ali nacionalni zakonodaji določata odložilni učinek.
Thus, it decided that, where there is no provision for an appeal to have suspensive e¥ect, the period for implementation of the transfer starts to run as from the time of the decision, explicit or presumed, by which the Member State requested to agree to the transfer agrees to take back the person concerned.
Tako je presodilo, da če ni nobenega pravnega sredstva, ki bi lahko imelo odložilni učinek, začne rok za izvedbo predaje teči z izrecno ali domnevano odločbo, s katero država članica, na katero je naslovljena zahteva po privolitvi v predajo, privoli v ponovni sprejem zadevne osebe.
By contrast, if the legislation of the Member State requesting the transfer provides for suspensive e¥ect of an appeal, the period for implementation of the transfer begins to run, not as from the time of the provisional judicial decision suspending the implementation of the transfer procedure, but only as from the time of the judicial decision which rules on the merits of the procedure and which is no longer such as to prevent its implementation.
Kadar pa zakonodaja države članice, ki zahteva predajo, določa odložilni učinek pravnega sredstva, rok za izvedbo predaje ne začne teči že z začasno sodno odločbo, da se izvedba postopka predaje odloži, temveč šele s sodno odločbo, s katero se odloči o utemeljenosti postopka in s katero ni več mogoče ovirati te izvedbe.
In the light of the objective pursued by setting a period for the Member States, the start of that period should be determined in such a manner as to allow the Member States a six-month period which they are deemed to require in full in order to determine the practical details for carrying out the transfer.
Ob upoštevanju cilja določitve roka za države članice je namreč treba začetek tega roka določiti tako, da imajo države članice na voljo šest mesecev, ki jih morajo popolnoma izkoristiti za določitev tehničnih podrobnosti izvedbe predaje.
In addition, the Court took account of the observance of judicial protection and of the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States.
Poleg tega je Sodišče upoštevalo spoštovanje sodnega varstva in procesne avtonomije držav članic.
Then, in Case C-465/07 Elgafaji (judgment of 17 February 2009), the Court had to give judgment on the extent of the subsidiary protection granted by Article 15 of Directive 2004/83/EC (39) on minimum standards for the quali¤cation and status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as refugees.
Nato je v zadevi Elgafaji (sodba z dne 17. februarja 2009, C-465/07) Sodišče presojalo obseg subsidiarne zaščite iz člena 15(c) Direktive Sveta 2004/83/ES39o minimalnih standardih glede pogojev, ki jih morajo izpolnjevati državljani tretjih držav ali osebe brez državljanstva, da se jim prizna status begunca.
The question referred asked whether the condition that there be a‘serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conªict’ laid down in Article 15(c) must, as required by the European Court of Hu-
Predloženo je bilo vprašanje, ali je treba pogoj „resne in individualne grožnje za življenje ali osebnost civilista zaradi samovoljnega nasilja v situacijah mednarodnega ali notranjega oboroženega spopada“ iz točke (c) navedenega člena razumeti, kot zahteva Evropsko sodišče za človekove pravice, tako da se zahteva, da prosilec za subsidiarno zaščito predloži dokaz, da ga ta grožnja posebej zadeva zaradi elementov, ki so značilni za njegov položaj.
) Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for deter- mining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national (OJ 2003 L 50, p. 1).
Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 343/2003 z dne 18. februarja 2003 o vzpostavitvi meril in mehanizmov za določitev države članice, odgovorne za obravnavanje prošnje za azil, ki jo v eni od držav članic vloži državljan tretje države (UL L 50, str. 1).
) Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the quali¤cation and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted (OJ 2004 L 304, p. 12).
Direktiva Sveta 2004/83/ES z dne 29. aprila 2004 o minimalnih standardih glede pogojev, ki jih morajo izpolnjevati državljani tretjih držav ali osebe brez državljanstva, da se jim prizna status begunca ali osebe, ki iz drugih razlogov potrebuje mednarodno zaščito, in o vsebini te zaščite (UL L 304, str. 12).
The Court answered that question in the negative.
Sodišče je na to vprašanje odgovorilo nikalno.
First of all, it armed the autonomy of Article 15 by stating that its content is di¥erent from that of Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and must therefore be interpreted independently.
Najprej je potrdilo samostojnost člena 15 in poudarilo, da je njegova vsebina drugačna od člena 3 Evropske konvencije o človekovih pravicah in da ga je zato treba razlagati samostojno.
Then, it held that the harm de-¤ned in Article 15(c) as consisting of a‘serious and individual threat to the applicant’s life or person’ covers a more general risk of harm than the other two types of harm de¤ned in that article, such as the death penalty, which cover situations in which the applicant is speci¤cally exposed to the risk of a particular type of harm.
Nato je menilo, da škoda, ki je opredeljena v točki (c) kot škoda, ki obsega„resno in individualno grožnjo za življenje ali osebnost“ prosilca, zajema bolj splošno tveganje nastanka škode kot druge vrste škode, opredeljene v istem členu, med katerimi je smrtna kazen, ki zajemajo položaje, v katerih je prosilec posebej izpostavljen tveganju nastanka posebne škode.
In addition, the threats referred to are inherent in a general situation of‘international or internal armed conªict’.
Poleg tega je navedena grožnja neločljivo povezana s splošnim položajem „mednarodnega ali notranjega oboroženega spopada“.
Lastly, the violence in question which gives rise to those threats is described as ‘indiscriminate’, a term which implies that it may extend to people irrespective of their personal circumstances.
Nazadnje, zadevno nasilje, ki pomeni to grožnjo, je opredeljeno kot„samovoljno“, to pa je izraz, ki pomeni, da lahko vpliva na osebe ne glede na njihove osebne okoliščine.
In that regard, the Court stated that the more the applicant is able to show that he is speci¤cally a¥ected by reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances, the lower the level of indiscriminate violence required for him to be eligible for subsidiary protection.
V zvezi s tem je Sodišče pojasnilo, da čim bolj je prosilec morebiti sposoben dokazati, da ga grožnje posamično zadevajo zaradi elementov, ki so značilni za njegov položaj, tem nižja stopnja samovoljnega nasilja bo zadoščala, da se mu prizna pravica do subsidiarne zaščite.
The Court concluded by noting that the interpretation given of Article 15(c) was fully compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights and in particular with the case-law relating to Article 3 thereof.
Sodišče je nazadnje poudarilo, da je taka razlaga člena 15(c) popolnoma v skladu z Evropsko konvencijo o človekovih pravicah in zlasti s sodno prakso v zvezi s členom 3.
Finally, the question referred in Joined Cases C-261/08 and C-348/08 Zurita García and Choque Cabrera (judgment of 22 October 2009) concerned the issue whether the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (‘the CISA’) and the Schengen Borders Code require the competent authorities in the Member States to adopt a decision to expel any third-country national who has been determined to be unlawfully present on the territory of a Member State.
Nazadnje, vprašanje, predloženo v združenih zadevah Zurita García in Choque Cabrera (sodba z¥dne 22.¥oktobra 2009, C-261/08 in C-348/08), je bilo, ali Konvencija o izvajanju Schengenskega sporazuma (v nadaljevanju: KISS) in Zakonik o schengenskih mejah zavezujeta pristojne organe držav članic, da sprejmejo odločbo o odstranitvi zoper vsakega državljana tretje države, za katerega je bilo ugotovljeno, da nezakonito prebiva na ozemlju države članice. Dejansko stanje v tej zadevi se nanaša na M. García in A.
Mrs Garcia and Mr Cabrera brought an action before the relevant national court, which, in turn, made a reference to the Court.
Cabrera sta zadevi predložila nacionalnemu sodišču, ki je nato vložilo predloga za sprejetje predhodne odločbe pri Sodišču.
In its response, the Court noted, ¤rst of all, that there was a discrepancy between the wording of the Spanish-language version and the other language versions of the provision concerned.
Sodišče je v svojem odgovoru najprej ugotovilo neusklajenost besedila med špansko različico zadevnega besedila in drugimi jezikovnimi različicami.
However, given that the Spanish version appeared to be the only language version in which expulsion appeared as an obligation and not an option for the authorities, the Court concluded that the real intention of the legislature was not to impose an obligation on the Member States to expel.
Ker je namreč samo v španski različici odstranitev obveznost, in ne možnost, ki jo imajo organi, je Sodišče presodilo, da prava volja zakonodajalca ni bila naložiti državam članicam obveznosti odstranitve.
In addition, the Court noted that the CISA favours the voluntary departure of a third-country national who is in a Member State unlawfully.
Poleg tega je Sodišče ugotovilo, da KISS daje prednost prostovoljnemu odhodu državljana, ki na ozemlju prebiva nezakonito.
Furthermore, although the CISA provides that, in certain circumstances, a third-country national must be expelled from a Member State on the territory of which he was apprehended, that consequence is, however, subordinate to the conditions laid down in the national law of the Member State concerned.
Poleg tega, čeprav KISS določa, da je treba v nekaterih okoliščinah državljana tretje države odstraniti iz države članice, na ozemlju katere je bil prijet, pa določa tudi, da je ta posledica odvisna od pogojev nacionalnega prava zadevne države članice.
Consequently, the Court considered that it is for the national law of each Member State to adopt, particularly with regard to the conditions under which expulsion may take place, the means for applying the basic rules established in the CISA relating to third-country nationals who do not ful¤l, or no longer ful¤l, the short-stay conditions for its territory.
Zato je Sodišče menilo, da mora nacionalno pravo vsake države članice določiti, zlasti kar zadeva pogoje za izvedbo odstranitve, način uporabe osnovnih pravil iz KISS v zvezi z državljani tretjih držav, ki ne izpolnjujejo ali ne izpolnjujejo več pogojev za kratkoročno prebivanje na njenem ozemlju.
The Court concluded that neither the CISA nor the Schengen Borders Code obliges the Member States to adopt a decision to expel a third-country national who is unlawfully present on the territory of a Member State.
Sodišče je presodilo, da niti KISS niti Zakonik o schengenskih mejah ne nalagata državam članicam obveznosti sprejetja odločbe o odstranitvi v zvezi z državljanom tretje države, ki nezakonito prebiva na ozemlju države članice.
A number of important judgments were delivered in 2009 in the ¤eld of private international law.
Razvoj in dejavnost prvič razlagalo Rimsko konvencijo o uporabi prava v pogodbenih obligacijskih razmerjih40.
Several questions relating to Article 4 of the Convention were referred to the Court, which began by noting that the Convention was concluded in order to continue, in the ¤eld of private international law, the work of uni¤cation of law set in motion by the adoption of the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments (41).
Sodišče je na podlagi več predloženih vprašanj o členu 4 Konvencije najprej opozorilo, da je bila ta sklenjena, da bi se nadaljevalo delo za poenotenje prava na področju mednarodnega zasebnega prava, ki se je začelo s sprejetjem Bruseljske konvencije o pristojnosti in priznavanju ter izvrševanju sodnih odločb41.
According to the Rome Convention, the parties are free to choose the law applicable to the contract which they enter into.
V skladu z Rimsko konvencijo lahko pogodbeni stranki prosto izbereta pravo, ki se uporablja za pogodbo, ki jo skleneta.
If no choice is made, the contract is to be governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected.
Če ga ne izbereta, se za pogodbo uporablja pravo države, s katero je ta pogodba najtesneje povezana.
The Convention also provides for a presumption in favour of the place of residence of the party who e¥ects the performance characteristic of that contract and for special connecting criteria, in particular as regards contracts for the carriage of goods.
Konvencija poleg tega določa domnevo v korist kraja, v katerem ima prebivališče pogodbena stranka, ki je dolžna opraviti za posamezno pogodbo značilno izpolnitev, in posebne navezne okoliščine, med drugim za pogodbe o prevozu blaga.
In that regard, the Court held that the connecting criterion provided for in Article 4(4) of the Convention applies to a charter-party, other than a ‘single voyage charter-party’, only when the main purpose of the contract is not merely to make available a means of transport, but the actual carriage of goods.
V¥zvezi s tem je Sodišče presodilo, da se navezna okoliščina iz člena 4(4) navedene konvencije uporabi za pogodbo o zakupu vozila, ki ni „pogodba o zakupu vozila za en sam prevoz“, zgolj kadar glavni predmet pogodbe ni le dajanje prevoznega sredstva v uporabo, ampak prevoz blaga v pravem pomenu besede.