natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Furthermore, the appellant asserts that the Commission is not seeking the annulment or amendment of the judgment of the Court of First Instance but simply a ruling that the appeal is inadmissible.
Poleg tega naj Komisija Sodi�ču ne bi predlagala, naj sodbo Sodi�ča prve stopnje razglasi za nično ali jo spremeni, temveč le, naj ugotovi, da je pritožba nedopustna.
In the final part of its defence, the Commission lodges a ‘cross-appeal’, in which it claims that the Court of First Instance should have ruled, first and foremost, that the fourth argument alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment was inadmissible because it had been raised for the first time only in the reply.
Komisija v zadnjem delu svojega odgovora na pritožbo vlaga „nasprotno pritožbo“, s katero zatrjuje, da bi moralo Sodi�če prve stopnje kot nedopustno zavrniti predvsem četrto pritožnikovo trditev v zvezi s kr�itvijo načela enakega obravnavanja, saj naj bi bila prvič navedena �ele v repliki.
I shall deal with this specific question below, as a preface to discussion of the substance of the argument itself.
Vsebinsko bom to vpra�anje preučil v nadaljevanju, v uvodu k preizkusu temelja te trditve.
The appellant maintains, moreover, that the Commission’s cross-appeal is unfounded as to the substance, since infringement of the principle of equal treatment had previously been alleged in the complaint lodged under Article 90 of the Staff Regulations.
Pritožnik poleg tega meni, da je nasprotna pritožba Komisije neutemeljena tudi glede temelja, saj je bil ugovor zaradi kr�itve načela enakega obravnavanja vložen že v okviru upravnega postopka, sproženega na podlagi člena 90 Kadrovskih predpisov.
All of the arguments put forward in the proceedings before the Court in support of the claim alleging unequal treatment, although not specifically previously presented in the complaint, were nevertheless closely connected with the assertions previously made.
Vse trditve, predstavljene v okviru pravnega sredstva v podporo stali�ču o obstoju neenakega obravnavanja, naj bi bile vsekakor tesno povezane s predhodno uveljavljanimi razlogi, čeprav niso bile izrecno navedene v pritožbi v upravnem postopku.
Moreover, the three arguments which the Commission maintains the Court of First Instance should have ruled inadmissible from
Tri trditve, za katere Komisija meni, da bi jih moralo Sodi�če prve stopnje takoj zavr-
In its reply, the Commission confirms that the aim of its cross-appeal is not to obtain the annulment or amendment of the
Komisija je v dupliki potrdila, da nasprotne pritožbe ni vložila z namenom doseči razglasitev ničnosti ali spremembo
The Commission’s ‘cross-appeal’ could therefore appear to be inadmissible, since it fails to satisfy the requirement of having been unsuccessful within the meaning of Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, the second paragraph of which provides that an appeal may be brought ‘by any party which has been unsuccessful, in whole or in part, in its submissions’.
Lahko bi torej sklenili, da je „nasprotna pritožba“ nedopustna, ker ne izpolnjuje pogoja, določenega v členu 56, drugi odstavek, Statuta Sodi�ča, v skladu s katerim lahko vloži pritožbo „katera koli stranka, ki v celoti ali delno ni uspela s svojimi sklepnimi predlogi“.
inadmissibility of part of the arguments put forward by the appellant before the Court of First Instance translates into a ground of inadmissibility, in relation to the same arguments, of the appeal lodged by the appellant before the Court of Justice.
sodbe Sodi�ča prve stopnje. 9 Vendar trdi, da je izvorna nedopustnost dela trditev, ki jih je pritožnik uveljavljal pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje, razlog za nedopustnost istih trditev, ki jih pritožnik povzema v pritožbi, vloženi pri Sodi�ču.
Since the arguments in question constitute the totality of those repeated in the appeal, in the view of the Commission the appeal itself should be declared inadmissible in its entirety.
Glede na to, da so prav te trditve tudi edine, na katere se opira pritožnik v okviru pritožbenega postopka pred Sodi�čem, je treba po mnenju Komisije pritožbo v celoti zavrniti kot nedopustno.
I consider, however, that the solution I have just outlined is not correct and that a different approach to resolving the problem in question is to be preferred.
Kljub temu menim, da tak�en sklep ni pravilen in da je treba k obravnavi zadevnega vpra�anja pristopiti na drugačen način.
The Commission’s ‘cross-appeal’ is based on the principle that there should be consistency between, on the one hand, the content of the administrative complaint lodged by the appellant under Article 90 of the Staff Regulations and, on the other, the content of the action brought before the Court of First Instance.
„Nasprotna pritožba“ Komisije temelji na načelu ujemanja med vsebino pritožbe v upravnem postopku, ki jo je pritožnik vložil na podlagi člena 90 Kadrovskih predpisov, in vsebino tožbe, vložene pri Sodi�ču prve stopnje.
The ‘cross-appeal’ lodged by the Commission is undoubtedly unconventional, as that institution itself recognises in its reply.
„Nasprotna pritožba“ Komisije je brez dvoma nenavadna, kar je v dupliki priznala tudi sama.
10 In particular, it is significant that the Commission has not sought, as a consequence of such a ‘cross-appeal’, the annulment of the judgment under appeal.
10 Pomembno je zlasti, da Komisija s tak�no „nasprotno pritožbo“ ni predlagala razglasitve ničnosti izpodbijane sodbe.
This shows incontrovertibly that, before the Court of First Instance, the Commission was not unsuccessful in any of its own submissions.
Ta okoli�čina namreč opozarja na neizpodbitno dejstvo, da je Komisija z vsemi predlogi v postopku pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje uspela.
The scope of that principle has been examined and clarified in a long series of rulings by the Community Courts.
Obseg tega načela je bil preučen in pojasnjen v okviru obsežne sodne prakse sodi�č Skupnosti.
In particular, the Court of Justice has stated that the pre-litigation procedure laid down in the Staff Regulations and, in particular, the lodging of a complaint are an ‘essential procedural requirement’.
Sodi�če je zlasti pojasnilo, da sta predhodni postopek, predviden v Kadrovskih predpisih, in zlasti vložitev pritožbe „bistveni postopkovni zahtevi“.
11The Court has also stated that compliance with the timelimits for the pre-litigation procedure in question is a matter of public policy, which
11Sodi�če je potrdilo tudi, da so pogoji zadevnega predhodnega postopka predpostavke javnega reda, katerih izpolnjevanje lahko sodi�če preizkusi po
I note, however, that at point 40 of that document the Commission states that ‘… the Court of Justice should therefore annul the part of the judgment of the Court of First Instance in which it did not rule that the first and third parts of the plea were inadmissible in that they were not raised in the pre-litigation complaint, and also the fourth part since it was raised only in the reply’. However, in the light of the position that I intend to adopt with regard to the ‘cross-appeal’, it is not necessary to determine whether the Commission does or does not, as a preliminary matter, seek the annulment of the judgment under appeal.
Poleg tega naj poudarim, da je Komisija v točki 40 te vloge zatrjevala: „[…] Sodi�če bi moralo zato sodbo Sodi�ča prve stopnje razglasiti za nično v tistem delu, v katerem ni ugotovilo, da so nedopustni prvi in tretji del razloga, ker nista bila predlagana v okviru pritožbe v upravnem postopku, ter četrti del razloga, in sicer zato, ker je bil predlagan �ele v repliki […]Po drugi strani glede na stali�če, ki ga nameravam zavzeti v zvezi z „nasprotno pritožbo“, ni treba ugotoviti, ali je Komisija s tem aktom predlagala razglasitev ničnosti izpodbijane sodbe ali ne.
11 — Case 91/76 de Lacroix v Court of Justice [1977] ECR 225, paragraph 11.
11 – Sodba Sodi�ča z dne 3. februarja 1977 v zadevi de Lacroix proti Sodi�ču Evropskih skupnosti (91/76, Recueil, str. 225, točka 11).
12 The Court of First Instance, for its part, on the basis of that caselaw of the Court of Justice, has stated that the question of consistency between the prior complaint through official channels and the application to the Court is also a public policy issue and may therefore be examined by the Court of its own motion.
12Sodi�če prve stopnje je na podlagi te sodne prakse Sodi�ča ugotovilo, da spada med vpra�anja javnega reda, ki se preizkusijo po uradni dolžnosti, tudi vpra�anje ujemanja med pritožbo v upravnem postopku in pravnim sredstvom, s katerim se sproži sodni postopek.
13I consider that that caselaw of the Court of First Instance, which is closely linked to the doctrine of the Court of Justice, can be wholeheartedly endorsed.
13 Menim, da se lahko s tak�no sodno prakso Sodi�ča prve stopnje, tesno povezano s stali�či Sodi�ča, povsem strinjamo.
Hence, if verification of the consistency between the content of the administrative complaint and the application to the Court is a matter of public policy that can be raised of the Court’s own motion, it is, in my opinion, possible to classify the ‘cross-appeal’ brought by the Commission, leaving aside the nomen iuris, simply as a matter that can be examined by the Court of its own motion.
Če gre torej pri preverjanju, ali se vsebini pritožbe v upravnem postopku in tožbe ujemata, za predpostavko javnega reda, ki se preizkusi po uradni dolžnosti, lahko po mojem mnenju „nasprotno pritožbo“ Komisije – ne glede na njeno nomen iuris – obravnavamo kot argument, ki sproža vpra�anje, o katerem je treba presojati po uradni dolžnosti.
Identification of the ‘cause’ underlying the request for annulment contained in the administrative complaint is more problematic.
Več težav povzroča opredelitev „vzroka“, na katerem temelji predlog za razglasitev ničnosti, vsebovanega v pritožbi v upravnem postopku.
Following that line of reasoning, the question of the consistency, in the present case, between the administrative complaint lodged by the appellant under Article 90 of the Staff Regulations and the action subsequently brought before the Court of First Instance can be examined by the Court of Justice.
V skladu s to razlago je vpra�anje ujemanja med pritožbo, s katero je pritožnik na podlagi člena 90 Kadrovskih predpisov sprožil upravni postopek, in tožbo, ki jo je nato vložil na Sodi�če prve stopnje, lahko predmet preizkusa s strani Sodi�ča.
With regard to the plea alleging a difference in treatment — the only plea repeated by the appellant in the present appeal proceedings — the complaint lodged under
Glede neenakosti obravnavanja, edinega razloga, ki ga pritožnik v okviru tega pritožbenega postopka vnovič uveljavlja, se namreč v pritožbi, vloženi na podlagi člena
14 — See, for example Razzouk and Beydoun v Commission, paragraph 9, and Case C-316/97 P Parliament v Gaspari [1998] ECR I-7597, paragraph 17.
14 – Glej na primer zgoraj navedeno sodbo Razzouk in Beydoun proti Komisiji, točka 9, in sodbo z dne 19. novembra 1998 v zadevi Parlament proti Gaspariju (C-316/97 P, Recueil, str. 7597, točka 17).
13 — Case T-57/89 Alexandrakis v Commission [1990] ECR II-143, paragraph 8.
13 – Sodba Sodi�ča prve stopnje z dne 29. marca 1990 v zadevi Alexandrakis proti Komisiji (T-57/89, Recueil, str.
Article 90 of the Staff Regulations was, in fact, extremely brief, being confined to the following points:
90 Kadrovskih predpisov, dokaj izčrpno, omejuje na naslednje trditve:
The Commission has therefore correctly stated that, of the various arguments put forward by the appellant to support the claim of a difference in treatment, only that based on alleged discrimination between serving officials and former officials appeared in the administrative complaint.
Komisija je torej pravilno ugotovila, da je bila izmed �tevilnih trditev, ki jih je pritožnik navajal v podporo razlogu v zvezi z neenakim obravnavanjem, v pritožbi v upravnem postopku navedena le trditev, ki temelji na domnevni diskriminaciji nekdanjih uradnikov glede na aktivno zaposlene uradnike.
‘(b) Infringement of the principle of equal treatment
„b) Kr�itev načela enakega obravnavanja
The new pension scheme established by the European Commission on 1 May 2004 is not even justified in the light of the principle of equal treatment.
Novi pokojninski sistem, ki ga je uvedla Komisija s 1. majem 2004, ni v skladu niti z načelom enakega obravnavanja.
It must therefore be ascertained whether, in the case in point, the other arguments presented by the appellant in the judicial proceedings to support the claim of a difference in treatment can be regarded as being ‘closely linked’ to that set out in the administrative complaint.
Zato je treba presoditi, ali je v obravnavanem primeru mogoče �teti, da so trditve, ki jih uveljavlja pritožnik v sodnem postopku v podporo stali�ču, da je podana kr�itev načela enakega obravnavanja, „tesno povezane“ s trditvijo, navedeno v pritožbi v upravnem postopku.
The purpose of the correction coefficient is to guarantee the same purchasing power to officials and former officials in the same situation.
Namen korekcijskega koeficienta je namreč zagotoviti enako kupno moč uradnikom in nekdanjim uradnikom, ki so v enakem položaju.
The situation in the case in point is rather delicate, being situated on the fine line between admissibility and inadmissibility.
V konkretnem primeru se okoli�čine zdijo precej neprijetne, saj se ume�čajo v mejno območje, znotraj katerega je težko potegniti ločnico med dopustnostjo in nedopustnostjo.
It is clear that creating two correction coefficients for the same place, in this case London, gives rise to discrimination between officials living in London for professional reasons and former officials living there in retirement.
Očitno je, da se zaradi upo�tevanja dveh različnih korekcijskih koeficientov za isto mesto prebivanja, v tem primeru za London, uradniki, ki zaradi delovnih obveznosti prebivajo v Londonu, obravnavajo drugače od nekdanjih uradnikov, ki izberejo London za kraj prebivali�ča po upokojitvi.
As I have pointed out above, the Community Courts have ruled repeatedly on the question of consistency between the administrative complaint and the application to the Court, adopting a position that seeks to reconcile the interests of the appellant and those of the administration, which tend to be conflicting.
Kot sem opozoril zgoraj, je Sodi�če že večkrat odločalo glede vpra�anja ujemanja med pritožbo v upravnem postopku in tožbo, pri čemer je zavzelo stali�če, ki sku�a uskladiti nasprotujoče si interese pritožnika in upravnega organa.
The Court of Justice has stated that one of the purposes of the administrative complaint is to allow the administration to know with sufficient certainty what the complainant is contesting and what his requests are.
Treba je namreč spomniti, da je Sodi�če pojasnilo, da je namen pritožbe v upravnem postopku tudi ta, da se upravnemu organu omogoči dovolj natančna seznanitev s predmetom očitkov pritožnika in z njegovimi zahtevami.
Former officials, including Mr Campoli, who live in the same city of London, who have a lower correction coefficient than that applied to officials, are clearly discriminated against because, since 1 May 2004, they no longer enjoy the same treatment.’
Nekdanjim uradnikom in med temi tudi F. Campoliju, ki živijo v Londonu, se pokojnina izračuna z upo�tevanjem korekcijskega koeficienta, ki je manj�i od tistega, upo�tevanega za plače uradnikov, kar je očitno diskriminatorno, saj od 1. maja 2004 ti skupini nista deležni enakega obravnavanja.“
Coöperatie Cosun v Commission, 17in which a plea introduced on appeal alleging a difference in treatment in relation to persons other than those indicated in the action before the Court of First Instance, in which a difference in treatment was also alleged, was considered a new plea in law.
Komisiji, 17v kateri je bila kot nov razlog �teta trditev, s katero je pritožnica v okviru pritožbenega postopka utemeljevala neenako obravnavanje, ki naj bi ga bila deležna v primerjavi z drugimi subjekti, ker so bili ti različni od navedenih – prav tako v zvezi z neenakim obravnavanjem – v tožbi, vloženi pri Sodi�ču prve stopnje.
It could be maintained, as essentially does the Commission, that despite being based on the same legal premiss, that is to say infringement of the principle of equal treatment, the appellant’s arguments in support of his claim of discrimination in relation to other former officials cannot be considered to have been foreshadowed, even indirectly or implicitly, in the administrative complaint.
Lahko bi trdili, kar je v bistvu stali�če Komisije, da pritožnikove trditve v zvezi z diskriminatornim obravnavanjem določenih skupin nekdanjih uradnikov v primerjavi z drugimi skupinami nekdanjih uradnikov niso bile vsebovane, niti na posreden ali impliciten način, v pritožbi v upravnem postopku, čeprav temeljijo trditve te pritožbe na isti pravni podlagi kot trditve tožbe, to je na določbah, ki prepovedujejo kr�itev načela enakega obravnavanja.
As we have seen, the only situation cited in that complaint as a point of reference for assessing whether the appellant is the victim of discrimination is that of officials still in employment.
Edina okoli�čina, ki naj bi dokazovala to kr�itev v �kodo pritožnika, že navedena v pritožbi v upravnem postopku, se namreč nana�a na neenako obravnavanje nekdanjih uradnikov glede na aktivno zaposlene uradnike.
I note, however, that that judgment does not relate to the principle of consistency between the administrative complaint and the action before the Court but to the question of pleas in law in the appeal that were not raised in the action at first instance.
Poudariti pa moram, da se ta sodba ni nana�ala na načelo ujemanja med pritožbo v upravnem postopku in tožbo, temveč na vpra�anje uveljavljanja razlogov, ki niso bil predlagani v okviru postopka na prvi stopnji, v okviru pritožbenega postopka.
It seems obvious to me that the two situations are not the same.
Očitno je torej, da gre za dva različna položaja.
In particular, one of the reasons which, in my opinion, militate in favour of a less strict approach in assessing the principle of consistency between the complaint and the action before the Court and to which consideration should be given is the fact, highlighted in the caselaw of the Court of Justice, that the administrative complaint is usually drawn up without the assistance of a lawyer.
Zlasti je treba med razlogi, ki po mojem mnenju narekujejo manj strog pristop pri presoji, ali je izpolnjeno načelo ujemanja, ko se to nana�a na vsebino pritožbe v upravnem postopku in vsebino tožbe, upo�tevati dejstvo – na katero je opozorilo tudi Sodi�če –, da je pritožba v upravnem postopku običajno sestavljena brez pomoči odvetnika.
18 This is obviously not the case with an action brought before the Court of First Instance, where it is logical to expect greater precision and completeness.
18Jasno je, da v primeru tožbe, vložene pri Sodi�ču prve stopnje, ni tako, zato je razumljivo, da se v zvezi z vsebino tega akta zahteva večja natančnost in popolnost.
Against that background, the three arguments under examination should therefore be considered not simply as arguments to support a plea that has already been made but as ‘new pleas’ in the true sense.
V skladu s tak�nim razumevanjem bi bilo torej treba �teti, da trije novi vidiki, navedeni v tožbi, niso le trditve, s katerimi je dodatno podprt že predlagan razlog, temveč dejanski „novi razlogi“.
In other words, when a difference in treatment is claimed there are as many different ‘pleas’ as there are (groups of) persons in relation to whom there is claimed to be discrimination.
Povedano drugače, kadar SE uveljavlja kr�itev načela enakega obravnavanja, naj bi bilo različnih „razlogov“ za to toliko, kolikor je (skupin) subjektov, v primerjavi s katerimi naj bi bila oseba, ki vlaga pravno sredstvo, po svojih navedbah v tem smislu o�kodovana.
It must also be noted that, although in the proceedings before the Court of First Instance the Commission maintained that the appellant’s requests regarding the household allowance and the education allowance were inadmissible because they were not included in the complaint, it did not raise any
Poudariti je treba �e, da je Komisija v postopku pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje sicer podala ugovor nedopustnosti glede tožbenih zahtevkov v zvezi z gospodinjskim dodatkom in dodatkom za �olanje, ker ju pritožnik ni navedel že v pritožbi v upravnem postopku,
According to the Commission, that would also be the implication of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Koninklijke
Komisija meni, da tak�no razumevanje podpira tudi sodba Sodi�ča v zadevi Koninklijke Coöperatie Cosun UA proti
17 — Case C-68/05 P [2006] ECR I-10367, paragraphs 95 to 98.
17 – Sodba z dne 16. maja 2006 (C-68/05 P, ZOdl., str. I-10367, točke od 95 do 98).
16 — See, for example, Case 133/88 Casto Del Amo Martinez v Parliament [1989] ECR 689, paragraph 13.
18 – Zgoraj navedena sodba Casto Del Amo Martinez proti Parlamentu, točka 13.
18 — Casto Del Amo Martinez v Parliament, paragraph 11.
16 – Glej na primer sodbo z dne 14. marca 1989 v zadevi Casto Del Amo Martinez proti Parlamentu (133/88, Recueil, str. 689, točka 13).
CAMPOLI v COMMISSION objection of inadmissibility with regard to the plea based on a difference in treatment.
CAMPOLI PROTI KOMISIJI medtem ko glede dopustnosti tožbenega razloga v zvezi s kr�itvijo načela enakega obravnavanja ni ugovarjala.
I shall now move on to examine the substance of the three arguments put forward by the appellant.
V nadaljevanju bom torej vsebinsko preučil tri trditve, ki jih pritožnik navaja v podporo pritožbenemu zahtevku.
It is clear that that factor cannot be considered decisive for ruling on a question which, as we have seen above, can be raised of the Court’s own motion.
Očitno je torej, da ne gre za dejavnik, ki bi lahko ključno vplival na odločitev v zvezi z vpra�anjem, o katerem je treba presojati po uradni dolžnosti.
Nevertheless, to my mind, it is undeniable that it is not entirely without significance.
Po drugi strani pa ni mogoče trditi, da je povsem nepomemben.
C — The legality of the ‘country method’
C – Zakonitost „metode države“
I consider that submission of the arguments in question before the Court of First Instance did not infringe the principle of consistency.
Kljub temu menim, da pritožnik z navajanjem zadevnih trditev v postopku pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje ni kr�il načela ujemanja.
Indeed, it appears to me that, in the light of the caselaw I have cited, and in particular the abovementioned assertion of the need for the complaint to be interpreted with an open mind, since it is a document drawn up without legal assistance, to rule that such arguments are inadmissible could excessively restrict the right to effective judicial protection, which is a general principle of Community law. 19
Glede na navedeno sodno prakso in zlasti pojasnila, da je treba pritožbo v upravnem postopku obravnavati v odprtem duhu, saj gre za akt, sestavljen brez pomoči odvetnika, bi namreč lahko s tem, da bi te trditve zavrnili kot nedopustne, povzročili pretiran pritisk in otežili uresničevanje pravice do učinkovitega sodnega varstva, ki spada med splo�na načela pravnega reda Skupnosti. 19
The appellant maintains that, by upholding the legality of the legislature’s decision to replace the ‘capital method’ with the ‘country method’, the Court of First Instance wrongly gave precedence to the legislature’s discretion over the principle of equal treatment.
Pritožnik trdi, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje s tem, da je potrdilo zakonitost zakonodajalčeve odločitve o nadomestitvi „metode glavnega mesta“ z „metodo države“, napačno dalo prednost diskrecijski pravici zakonodajalca pred načelom enakega obravnavanja.
In the appellant’s view, this is particularly evident at paragraph 105 of the judgment under appeal.
To naj bi zlasti očitno izhajalo iz točke 105 izpodbijane sodbe.
He also alleges that the Court of First Instance failed to observe the obligation to state reasons for its decision.
Sodi�če prve stopnje naj bi tak�no stali�če tudi nezadostno obrazložilo.