natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
If general, abstract data cannot suffice in the latter case, it seems to me that, a fortiori, they cannot suffice in the former.
Menim, da če v slednjem primeru splo�ni in abstraktni podatki ne zadostujejo, potem a fortiori ne morejo zadostovati niti v prvem primeru.
I therefore agree with L & D that the distinction drawn by the Court of First Instance is incorrect in law. 86.
Zato se strinjam z družbo L & D, da je razlikovanje, ki ga je opredelilo Sodi�če prve stopnje, pravno napačno. 86.
Looking at the prohibition of exclusive reliance on general, abstract data, such as specific percentages, in the light of the list of factors indicated in Philips and Windsurfing Chiemsee as capable of being taken into account, it seems to me that the Court’s meaning is that, in addition to figures whose interpretation may be affected by factors such as the extent of competition, 52some evidence must be presented that the mark in issue is actually perceived as linking the products which bear it with a particular undertaking.
Glede na prepoved izključnega sklicevanja na splo�ne in abstraktne podatke, kot so določeni odstotki, glede na seznam dejavnikov iz sodb Philips in Windsurfing Chiemsee, ki jih je mogoče upo�tevati, menim, da je stali�če Sodi�ča, da je poleg �tevilk, na razlago katerih lahko vplivajo dejavniki, kot je obseg konkurence, 52treba predložiti dokaze, da se sporno znamko dejansko zaznava, kot da proizvode, ki jih pokriva, povezuje z določenim podjetjem.
If such evidence cannot come solely from data such as market share and advertising investment — and I agree it cannot — nor can it come from mere duration of use or registration.
Če taki dokazi ne morejo izhajati zgolj iz podatkov, kot sta tržni delež in investicije v ogla�evanje – strinjam pa se, da ne morejo – potem ne morejo izhajati zgolj iz trajanja uporabe ali registracije.
It remains to be considered whether the duration of use of the earlier mark, the market share it enjoyed and the amounts invested in advertising it constitute ‘general, abstract data’.
Ugotoviti je �e treba, ali trajanje uporabe prej�nje znamke, njen tržni delež in zneski, porabljeni za njeno ogla�evanje, pomenijo „splo�ne in abstraktne podatke“.
The Court of First Instance appears to accept that the two latter criteria constitute ‘general indications, such as specific percentages’ falling within that concept (and that point is not disputed), but that the prolonged use of the earlier mark does not.
Zdi se, da Sodi�če prve stopnje sprejema, da gre pri zadnjih dveh merilih za „splo�ne navedbe, kot so določeni odstotki“, kar spada v ta okvir (ta točka pa ni izpodbijana), pri dolgotrajni uporabi prej�nje znamke pa tega ne sprejema.
On this argument, therefore, I conclude that the Court of First Instance erred in law in paragraph 85 of its judgment by accepting that the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that the earlier mark had acquired a
Glede te utemeljitve zato ugotavljam, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje, s tem da je sprejelo, da je odbor za pritožbe upravičeno ugotovil, da je prej�nja znamka pridobila poseben razlikovalni učinek zgolj na podlagi �tevilk
52 — For example, a very high market share might be due to very limited competition, in which case the mark might be perceived by the relevant public as a generic indication rather than as identifying the origin of the products.
52 – Zelo visok tržni delež je na primer lahko posledica omejene konkurence, zaradi česar upo�tevna javnost znamko lahko zaznava kot generično oznako, ne pa kot kazalec izvora proizvodov.
At point 30 of its decision, the Board of Appeal referred to annual sales of 45 million units, to a market share of more than 50% and to advertising expenditure of more
Odbor za pritožbe se je v točki 30 svoje odločbe skliceval na letno prodajo v vi�ini 45 milijonov enot, na več kot 50-odstotni tržni delež in na stro�ke ogla�evanja, ki presegajo
The fact that the Court of First Instance has made a similar assessment in the circumstances of one case cannot oblige it to make such an assessment in every case.
Dejstvo, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje podobno presodilo v okoli�činah ene zadeve, Sodi�ča prve stopnje ne zavezuje, da tako presodi v vsaki zadevi.
Contrary to L & D’s argument, there is no general rule of law that a word which lacks meaning is invariably fanciful and distinctive. Error in the finding that the marks were similar
V nasprotju z utemeljitvijo družbe L & D ni splo�nega pravnega pravila, da je beseda brez pomena nujno domi�ljijska in razlikovalna. Napačna ugotovitev podobnosti znamk
— Graphic element in the Aire Limpio mark
– Grafični element v znamki Aire Limpio
L & D argues that the Court of First Instance was wrong to consider that the graphic element of the Aire Limpio mark was clearly dominant in the overall impression and noticeably prevailed over the verbal element. 88.
Družba L & D trdi, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno ugotovilo, da je jasno, da je grafični element v znamki Aire Limpio prevladujoč v celotnem vtisu in da opazno prevlada nad besednim elementom. 88.
L & D submits that the Court of First Instance was wrong to dismiss the word element in the Aire Limpio mark as unimportant because it held no particular meaning for the Italian public. On the contrary, the lack of meaning gave the mark a fanciful and thus distinctive character, in conformity with the Court of First Instance’s previous judgment in Oriental Kitchen. 53 91.
Družba L & D trdi, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje ravnalo napačno, ker je besedni element v znamki Aire Limpio �telo za nepomembnega, ker naj v italijanski javnosti ne bi imel nobenega posebnega pomena. Neobstoj pomena je, nasprotno, znamki dal domi�ljijski značaj in razlikovalni učinek v skladu s predhodno sodbo Sodi�ča prve stopnje v zadevi Oriental Kitchen. 53 91.
That argument is simply a repetition of the submission which I have dealt with at points 52 and 53 above, and must be dismissed for the same reasons.
Ta utemeljitev je zgolj ponovitev trditev, ki sem jih obravnavala v točkah 52 in 53 zgoraj, in jo je treba zavrniti zaradi enakih razlogov.
That argument seeks recognition that the lack of meaning of the words ‘Aire Limpio’ for the Italian public renders the Aire Limpio mark fanciful and distinctive in Italy.
S to utemeljitvijo se domneva, da je zaradi neobstoja pomena besed „Aire Limpio“ za italijansko javnost znamka Aire Limpio v Italiji domi�ljijska in razlikovalna.
It thus concerns an assessment of fact which falls
Zato se nana�a na dejansko presojo, kar ni
53 — Case T-286/02 Oriental Kitchen v OHIM — Mou Dybfrost (KIAP MOU) [2003] ECR II-4953; see in particular paragraph 41 et seq.
53 – Sodba z dne 25. novembra 2003 v zadevi Oriental Kitchen proti UUNT – Mou Dybfrost (KIAP MOU) (T-286/02, Recueil, str.
In L & D’s view, since the outline of a fir tree was not a relevant element to be taken into consideration when assessing simi- I - 5750
Družba L & D meni, da glede na to, da obris jelke ni bil upo�teven element pri I - 5750
L & D v OHIM the Court of First Instance erred in law in concluding that such a risk existed. larity, the marks could not be considered conceptually similar.
L & D PROTI UUNT presoji podobnosti, znamki ni bilo mogoče �teti kot pojmovno podobni. pravo, ker je ugotovilo, da taka verjetnost obstaja.
That argument, based as it is on the previous submission, cannot be accepted.
Te utemeljitve, ki temelji na predhodni trditvi, ni mogoče sprejeti.
Since I am of the view that L & D’s submissions on distinctiveness and similarity are inadmissible and/or unfounded, I do not find it necessary to examine this argument. — Difference between the outlines
Glede na to, da so po mojem mnenju trditve družbe L & D glede razlikovalnosti in podobnosti nedopustne in/ali neutemeljene, menim, da te utemeljitve ni treba preizkusiti. – Razlika med obrisoma
Second ground of appeal — infringement of Article 73 and of the obligation to state adequate reasons
Drugi pritožbeni razlog: kršitev člena 73 in obveznosti obrazložitve
Finally with regard to similarity, L & D argues in the alternative that the outlines of the Aire Limpio and ARBRE MAGIQUE marks are in any event different. 95.
Nazadnje, družba L & D glede podobnosti podredno zatrjuje, da sta obrisa znamke Aire Limpio in znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE v vsakem primeru različna. 95.
That is clearly an argument as to fact, inadmissible on appeal.
Jasno je, da gre za utemeljitev, ki se nana�a na dejstva in ki je nedopustna v pritožbenem postopku.
In its second ground of appeal, L & D submits that, since the Opposition division and the Board of Appeal had confined their assessment to a comparison of the Aire Limpio and silhouette marks, the Court of First Instance infringed Article 73 of the Regulation by taking account of evidence relating to other marks, in particular the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark. L & D was therefore not in a position to put its case adequately with regard to the allegations and evidence relating to those other marks. Error in the finding of likelihood of confusion
Družba L & D s svojim drugim pritožbenim razlogom trdi, da glede na to, da sta oddelek za ugovore in odbor za pritožbe svojo presojo omejila na primerjavo znamke Aire Limpio in znamk v obliki obrisa, je Sodi�če prve stopnje, s tem da je upo�tevalo dokaze glede drugih znamk, zlasti znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE, kr�ilo člen 73 Uredbe. Družba L & D se tako ni mogla ustrezno braniti zoper navedbe in dokaze glede teh drugih znamk. Napačna ugotovitev verjetnosti zmede
L & D submits that, in the light of its submissions on distinctiveness and similarity, 99.
Družba L & D trdi, da je ob upo�tevanju njenih trditev glede razlikovalnosti in podobnosti Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno uporabilo 99.
OHIM considers that the ground of appeal is inadmissible, as seeking a review of findings of fact and that, in any event, L & D was not only able to, but did, defend its point of view adequately with regard to the use and reputation of the other I - 5751
UUNT meni, da je ta pritožbeni razlog nedopusten, ker naj bi se z njim zahtevala ponovna presoja dejstev, in da je bila družba L & D v vsakem primeru ne zgolj sposobna, temveč je tudi ustrezno branila svoje stali�če glede uporabe in ugleda drugih znamk. I - 5751
55Since I feel more general doubts as to the reasoning of the Board of Appeal and the Court of First Instance, I propose therefore to examine the issue on a rather broader basis.
porajajo splo�nej�i dvomi glede razlogovanja odbora za pritožbe in Sodi�ča prve stopnje, predlagam �ir�o obravnavo tega vpra�anja. 56
Moreover, the fact that the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark had been excluded from the comparison for reasons of economy did not mean that evidence relating to its use and reputation was irrelevant to the Italian public’s impression of the silhouette mark.
Poleg tega dejstvo, da je bila znamka ARBRE MAGIQUE izključena iz primerjave zaradi ekonomičnosti postopka, ne pomeni, da so bili dokazi glede njene uporabe in ugleda nepomembni za vtis italijanske javnosti glede znamke v obliki obrisa.
Sämann adds that the judgment under appeal is clear and unequivocal in its reasoning.
Družba Sämann dodaja, da je izpodbijana sodba jasna in nedvoumno obrazložena.
In paragraphs 113 and 114 of its judgment, the Court of First Instance correctly stated that the scope of the duty to state reasons under Article 73 of the Regulation is the same as that set out in Article 253 EC: to show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the author of the decision in order, on the one hand, to allow interested parties to know the justification for it and thus to be in a pos -ition to protect their rights and, on the other hand, to enable the Community judicature to exercise its power to review the legality of the decision. 57
Sodi�če prve stopnje je v točkah 113 in 114 svoje sodbe pravilno navedlo, da je po členu 73 Uredbe namen obveznosti obrazložitve enak kot po členu 253 ES: jasno in nedvoumno prikazati razloge avtorja odločbe, da bi bilo zainteresiranim osebam po eni strani omogočeno, da se seznanijo z njeno utemeljitvijo zaradi varovanja svojih pravic, po drugi strani pa, da lahko sodi�če Skupnosti izvede nadzor nad zakonitostjo odločbe. 57
The argument on this ground of appeal is brief (though L & D has submitted other arguments concerning the acceptance of evidence relating to the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark 54) and, in itself, does not appear to reveal any obvious breach of the obligation to state reasons. On the one hand, it is quite clear that the Board of Appeal did not confine its comparison to the silhouette mark but also examined the evidence presented to it relating to the use of Sämann’s other marks in Italy. On the other hand, that evidence and the argument concerning it were just as clearly accessible to L & D in the course of the proceedings before both the Board of Appeal and the Court of First Instance. 103.
Utemeljitev tega pritožbenega razloga je kratka (čeprav je družba L & D predložila tudi druge utemeljitve glede sprejemljivosti dokazov v zvezi z znamko ARBRE MAGIQUE 54) in ni videti, da sama po sebi razkriva kakr�no koli očitno kr�itev obveznosti obrazložitve. Po eni strani je dokaj jasno, da se odbor za pritožbe ni omejil na primerjavo z znamko v obliki obrisa, ampak je tudi preizkusil dokaze, ki so mu bili predloženi glede uporabe drugih znamk družbe Sämann v Italiji. Po drugi strani so bili ti dokazi in z njimi povezana utemeljitev družbi L & D prav tako dostopni tako v postopku pred odborom za pritožbe kot pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje. 103.
The Board of Appeal based its finding of likelihood of confusion essentially on the particularly distinctive character which ‘the earlier mark’ had acquired in Italy through prolonged use and wide reputation.
Odbor za pritožbe je svojo ugotovitev o verjetnosti zmede v bistvu oprl na poseben razlikovalni učinek, ki ga je „prej�nja znamka“ pridobila v Italiji z dolgotrajno uporabo in zaradi velikega ugleda.
That conclusion therefore required a clear and unequivocal chain of reasoning linking the earlier mark with the evidence of use and reputation.
Ta ugotovitev je zato potrebovala jasno in nedvoumno obrazložitev, ki bi prej�njo znamko povezala z dokazi o uporabi in ugledu.
However, the decision did not unequivocally define what was meant by ‘the earlier mark’.
Toda v odločbi ni bilo nedvoumno opredeljeno, kaj je bilo mi�ljeno s „prej�njo znamko“.
However, the issue of inadequacy of the reasons stated for a decision concerns infringement of an essential procedural requirement and, involving a matter of public policy, must be raised by the Community
Toda vpra�anje pomanjkljive obrazložitve odločbe se nana�a na bistveno kr�itev postopka, ki vključuje vpra�anje javnega reda, in sodi�če Skupnosti mora nanj paziti
56 — It may be noted that the Court of First Instance’s own obligation to provide adequate reasoning in its judgment derives not from Article 73 of the Regulation but from Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice.
56 – Opozoriti je treba, da obveznost Sodi�ča prve stopnje, da ustrezno obrazloži svoje odločbe, ne izhaja iz člena 73 Uredbe, temveč iz člena 36 Statuta Sodi�ča.
57 — See, for example, KWS Saat v OHIM, cited in footnote 34 above, paragraphs 64 and 65.
57 – Glej na primer v opombi 34 navedeno sodbo KWS Saat proti UUNT, točki 64 in 65.
54 — See points 74 and 75 above.
54 – Glej točki 74 in 75 zgoraj.
First, the Board of Appeal stated that it would compare the Aire Limpio mark only with the silhouette mark, as ‘representative of the others’.
Prvič, odbor za pritožbe je navedel, da bo znamko Aire Limpio primerjal zgolj z znamko v obliki obrisa, kot „predstavnico drugih znamk“.
58 However, the force of that is somewhat undermined by the further statement, in the same sentence, that the choice was based on ‘the same reasons of economy as those given in the contested decision’ — since the opposition division had given as its reason that the other marks displayed greater differences, in comparison with the Aire Limpio mark, than did the silhouette mark. 59
58Toda ta navedba je nekoliko omajana z naslednjo navedbo v istem stavku, in sicer da izbira temelji na „enakih razlogih ekonomičnosti postopka kot v izpodbijani odločbi“ – glede na to, da je oddelek za ugovore kot razlog navedel, da se druge znamke bolj razlikujejo od znamke Aire Limpio kot znamka v obliki obrisa. 59
It seems implicit in that reasoning that the silhouette mark and all of Sämann’s other earlier marks protected in Italy were sufficiently similar for each to benefit from distinctiveness acquired by the others.
Zdi se, da iz tega razlogovanja izhaja, da so si bile znamka v obliki obrisa in vse druge prej�nje znamke družbe Sämann, za�čitene v Italiji, zadosti podobne, da bi lahko ena izkoristila pridobljeno razlikovalnost druge.
However, apart from citing the date of registration of the CAR-FRESHNER mark, the Board of Appeal gave no details from which specific evidence could be linked to a specific mark or marks.
Toda razen navajanja datuma registracije znamke CAR-FRESHNER odbor za pritožbe ni podal nobenih podrobnosti, na podlagi katerih bi bilo posamične dokaze mogoče povezati s posamično znamko ali znamkami.
Moreover, its assumption of such close similarity between Sämann’s various marks was supported by no specific justification of the kind that would seem called for in the light of the opposition division’s finding that the similarity between the Aire Limpio mark and the silhouette mark was (appreciably) greater than that between the Aire Limpio mark and Sämann’s other marks.
Poleg tega svoje domneve o tako veliki podobnosti med različnimi znamkami družbe Sämann ni podprl z nobenimi posebnimi utemeljitvami, ki bi bile pravilne ob upo�tevanju ugotovitve oddelka za ugovore, da je podobnost med znamko Aire Limpio in znamko v obliki obrisa (precej) večja od podobnosti med znamko Aire Limpio in drugimi znamkami družbe Sämann.
Then the Board of Appeal accepted, as evidence of use and reputation of the earlier mark, data concerning advertising and sales of Sämann’s car air fresheners, without reference to any specific mark under which they were advertised or sold. 60
Odbor za pritožbe je nato kot dokaz o uporabi in ugledu prej�nje znamke sprejel podatke o ogla�evanju in prodaji osvežilcev zraka za avtomobile družbe Sämann, ne da bi se skliceval na posamezno znamko, pod katero so se ti ogla�evali ali prodajali. 60
In contrast with my understanding of the Board of Appeal’s decision, the Court of First Instance stated that the Board had based its findings on the use and reputation of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark and had considered the silhouette mark to be a part of that mark.
V nasprotju z mojim razumevanjem odločbe odbora za pritožbe je Sodi�če prve stopnje navedlo, da je odbor za pritožbe svoje ugotovitve oprl na uporabo in ugled znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE ter menil, da je znamka v obliki obrisa del te znamke.
Finally, the fact that the CAR-FRESHNER mark had been protected in Italy since 1954 was cited as evidence of prolonged use of the mark in an essentially identical form, explaining its market share and reputation with the public. 61
Nazadnje je bilo dejstvo, da je bila znamka CAR-FRESHNER v Italiji za�čitena od leta 1954, navedeno kot dokaz o dolgotrajni uporabi znamke v enaki obliki z obrazložitvijo njenega tržnega deleža in ugleda v javnosti. 61
58 — Point 23 of the Board of Appeal’s decision.59 — See point 6 of the Board of Appeal’s decision.60 — Point 30.
58 – Točka 23 odločbe odbora za pritožbe.59 – Glej točko 6 odločbe odbora za pritožbe.60 – Točka 30.
61 — Point 31.
61 – Točka 31.
It may be added that, in contrast to the figures for market share and advertising in Italy, the original reference to yearly sales of 45 million items did not indicate the geographical market concerned.
Dodati je treba, da v nasprotju s �tevilkami glede tržnega deleža in ogla�evanja v Italiji v zvezi s prvotnim sklicevanjem na letno prodajo 45 milijonov enot ni bil naveden zadevni geografski trg.
Neither of those statements appears to me to be confirmed by a reading of the Board of Appeal’s decision.
Menim, da nobena od teh navedb ne izhaja iz besedila odločbe odbora za pritožbe.
It is true that OHIM is recorded as stating at the hearing that the evidence of established use in Italy concerned the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark and
Res je, da je UUNT na obravnavi navedel, da se dokazi o dejanski uporabi v Italiji nana�ajo na znamko ARBRE MAGIQUE, ne pa
62 However, I do not consider that such a statement can legitimately complete, far less correct, the reasoning as it appears from a straightforward reading of the Board of Appeal’s decision.
62 Kljub temu menim, da taka navedba ne more legitimno dopolniti, kaj �ele popraviti razlogovanja, ki izhaja iz preprostega branja odločbe odbora za pritožbe.
In that light, the Board of Appeal’s reasoning could be viewed as inconsistent with the Court’s caselaw to the effect that, while the reasons on which a decision following a well-established line of decisions is based may be given in a summary manner, for example by a reference to those decisions, the Community authority must give an explicit account of its reasoning if the decision goes appreciably further than the previous decisions. 63
Ob upo�tevanju tega je razlogovanje odbora za pritožbe mogoče �teti za nezdružljivo s sodno prakso Sodi�ča, glede na to da mora organ Skupnosti, medtem ko je obrazložitev odločbe, ki sledi ustaljeni sodni praksi, mogoče podati v obliki povzetka, na primer s sklicevanjem na te odločbe, podati natančno obrazložitev, ali gre odločba dlje kot predhodne odločbe. 63
Attempting to reconstitute an adequate chain of reasoning which reflects what seems to have been decided in substance, I reach the following interpretation.
Da bi obnovila ustrezno razlogovanje, ki naj bi prikazalo, kaj je bilo vsebinsko odločeno, sprejemam naslednjo razlago.
It therefore seems to me that the Board of Appeal failed to explain fully and clearly the precise chain of reasoning which led it to find that the silhouette mark had a particularly distinctive character as a result of the sales volume, advertising budget and length of registration of one or more other marks, and that the Court of First Instance compensated for that failure by making certain assumptions about the chain of reasoning on grounds which are unclear.
Zato menim, da odbor za pritožbe ni natančno in jasno razložil, kako je pri�el do ugotovitve, da ima znamka v obliki obrisa poseben razlikovalni učinek kot rezultat obsega prodaje, stro�kov ogla�evanja in trajanja registracije ene ali več drugih znamk in da je Sodi�če prve stopnje to napako poskusilo popraviti s tem, da je oblikovalo določene domneve glede tega razlogovanja na podlagi nejasnih razlogov.
The Board of Appeal decided, first, that Sämann’s marks protected in Italy, together with the silhouette mark, were all similar to the Aire Limpio mark in the same way and to the same degree so that, for the purpose of assessing the likelihood of confusion, the acquired 64distinctiveness of one (or more) was shared by all.
Odbor za pritožbe je najprej odločil, da so znamke družbe Sämann, ki so za�čitene v Italiji, skupaj z znamko v obliki obrisa enako in do enake stopnje podobne znamki Aire Limpio, tako da vse delijo pridobljeno 64 razlikovalnost ene (ali več) znamk.
Second, the evidence of sales volume and advertising expenditure in Italy in respect
Drugič, dokazi o obsegu prodaje in stro�kih ogla�evanja v Italiji glede ene ali
That seems particularly regrettable since the approach taken — essentially, attributing the distinctive character of one mark also to another mark — is unusual and would not, at first sight, appear to have been necessary.
To je posebej obžalovanja vredno glede na to, da je pristop, ki ga je zavzelo – pripisovanje razlikovalnega učinka ene znamke drugi znamki – nenavaden in na prvi pogled ne bi bil nujen.
On the assumption that the silhouette mark is indeed sufficiently similar to the mark or marks whose distinctive character was established for that character to be ascribed to it, the latter might have been compared directly with the Aire Limpio mark for the purpose of establishing likelihood of confusion.
Pod domnevo, da je znamka v obliki obrisa dejansko zadosti podobna znamki ali znamkam, katerih razlikovalni učinek je mogoče prenesti nanjo, bi bilo slednjo mogoče neposredno primerjati z znamko Aire Limpio, da bi ugotovili verjetnost zmede.