natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
According to the Court, ‘in such circumstances, the administrative body concerned is, in accordance with the principle of cooperation arising from Article 10 EC, under an obligation to review [a final administrative decision] in order to take account of the interpretation of the relevant provision of Community law given in the meantime by the Court.
Po mnenju sodi�ča je „[v] takih okoli�činah zadevni upravni organ v skladu z načelom sodelovanja iz člena 10 ES dolžan ponovno preučiti [dokončno upravno odločbo], da se upo�teva razlaga zadevne določbe prava Skupnosti, ki jo je medtem sprejelo Sodi�če.
[In addition, that] body will have to determine on the basis of the outcome of that review to what extent it is under an obligation to reopen, without adversely affecting the interests of third parties, the decision in question’. 21
[Poleg tega mora zadevni] organ glede na rezultate te ponovne preučitve določiti, v kak�ni meri je dolžan sporno odločbo odpraviti, ne da bi �kodil interesom tretjih strank“. 21
The conclusion thereby reached by the Court in Kühne & Heitz has given rise to a number of questions. 52.
Re�itev, ki jo je Sodi�če sprejelo v navedeni sodbi Kühne & Heitz, je lahko sprožila nekatera vpra�anja. 52.
I do not think the judgment in Kühne & Heitz can be interpreted in that way. In this regard I agree with the opinion of the Commission of the European Communities that the judgment must be interpreted as meaning that, where domestic law authorises the competent administrative body to withdraw a final administrative decision, that body is, in the circumstances specifically described in the judgment, required, by virtue of Article 10 EC, to withdraw the decision if the review of the decision shows that it has become incompatible with the interpretation of Community law given by the Court in the meantime. 22 51.
Po mojem mnenju take razlage navedene sodbe Kühne & Heitz ni mogoče sprejeti. V zvezi s tem se strinjam s Komisijo Evropskih skupnosti, da je treba to sodbo razlagati v tem smislu, da je pristojni upravni organ – če na podlagi nacionalnega prava lahko odpravi dokončno upravno odločbo in če obstajajo okoli�čine, natančno opisane v navedeni sodbi – na podlagi člena 10 ES dolžan odločbo odpraviti, tudi če iz njene ponovne preučitve izhaja, da je postala nezdružljiva z razlago prava Skupnosti, ki jo je medtem podalo Sodi�če. 22 51.
Thus, the distinction made by the Court between review and withdrawal of the final administrative decision has prompted the Court’s conclusion to be understood as meaning that the obligation which it lays down relates only to a review of the decision and that the competent administrative body must comply in full with the procedural rules governing the withdrawal of such a decision in national law.
Tako je bilo iz tega, da je Sodi�če razlikovalo med ponovno preučitvijo in odpravo dokončne upravne odločbe, mogoče sklepati, da re�itev na podlagi te sodbe pomeni, da se v njej navedena obveznost nana�a samo na ponovno preučitev te odločbe in da je pristojni upravni organ dolžan v celoti upo�tevati postopkovna pravila, ki urejajo odpravo take odločbe v njegovem nacionalnem pravu.
According to this reading of Kühne & Heitz, the competent administrative body would certainly be required, pursuant to Article 10 EC, to review a final administrative decision, but — even if it is clear from 53.
V skladu s tako razlago navedene sodbe Kühne & Heitz bi bil pristojni upravni organ na podlagi člena 10 ES seveda dolžan ponovno preučiti dokončno upravno odločbo, vendar bi lahko, tudi če bi se pri tej ponovni preučitvi pokazalo, da je odločba v nasprotju s poznej�o razlago prava Skupnosti, kot jo je sprejelo Sodi�če, in čeprav bi �lo 53.
It seems to me that, by wording paragraph 27 of the judgment in that way, the Court intended to make it clear that while, by virtue of Article 10 EC and in the circumstances mentioned, a review becomes obligatory for the competent administrative body,
Menim namreč, da je Sodi�če s tako ubeseditvijo točke 27 navedene sodbe želelo povedati, da odprava izpodbijane dokončne upravne odločbe, čeprav postane ponovna
21 — Ibidem, paragraph 27.
21 – Ibidem, točka 27.
22 — See the Commission’s observations, paragraph 40.
22 – Glej stali�ča Komisije, točka 40.
body to withdraw its administrative decision to the full extent necessary to take account of the outcome of the review.
da mora svojo upravno odločbo odpraviti v obsegu, kot je to nujno potrebno za upo�tevanje rezultatov ponovne preučitve.
In my view, that is what was meant by the Court in specifying, in Kühne & Heitz, the purpose of the obligation of review, namely ‘to take account of the interpretation of the relevant provision of Community law given in the meantime by the Court’. 25 56.
Po mojem mnenju je prav to želelo sporočiti Sodi�če, ko je v navedeni sodbi Kühne & Heitz podrobno določilo cilj obvezne ponovne preučitve, tj. da se upo�teva razlaga zadevne določbe [prava Skupnosti], ki jo je medtem sprejelo Sodi�če. 25 56.
In addition, the approach chosen by the Court in that judgment, consisting in giving an interpretation of Article 10 EC in close conjunction with the circumstances of the main proceedings, has given rise to doubts as to the scope of the judgment.
Poleg tega je pristop, za katerega se je Sodi�če odločilo v tej sodbi, tj. da je treba člen 10 ES razlagati v tesni povezavi z okoli�činami iz postopka v glavni stvari, lahko sprožil vpra�anja glede dosega navedene sodbe.
Some commentators are uncertain as to whether the judgment establishes a principle or is only a sui generis decision, as could be suggested by the express, and repeated, reference to the circumstances of the main proceedings.
Nekateri so se tako lahko spra�evali, ali gre za načelno sodbo ali samo za sodbo v obravnavanem primeru, kot je bilo mogoče sklepati iz izrecnega in ponovljenega sklicevanja na okoli�čine zadeve v glavni stvari.
In the factual context of Kühne & Heitz I understand the Court’s differentiation between the review and the withdrawal of such a decision. Pursuant to that judgment, the competent administrative body must, when reviewing the administrative decision requiring the repayment of export refunds, determine whether there was a right to export refunds for each product exported, in the case in point poultrymeat parts, and, if so, in what amount. In practical terms, therefore, the review consists in applying to the facts of the case the interpretation given by the Court in Voogd Vleesimport en -export, 23namely that ‘a leg to which a piece of back remains attached must … be described as a leg, within the meaning of tariff subheadings 02.02 B II e) 3 of the old nomenclature and 0207 41 51 000 of the new, if that piece of back is not sufficiently large to give the product its essential character’, 24and in drawing the appropriate conclusions in relation to all the exported goods. 55.
V okoli�činah zadeve, v kateri je bila izdana navedena sodba Kühne & Heitz, razumem komaj opazno razliko, ki jo je Sodi�če navedlo med ponovno preučitvijo in odpravo take odločbe. Na podlagi te sodbe mora pristojni upravni organ med ponovno preučitvijo upravne odločbe, s katero se zahteva povračilo izvoznih nadomestil, ugotoviti, ali je za vsako izvoženo blago, v tem primeru za kose perutnine, obstajala pravica do izvoznih nadomestil, in če je, v kak�nem znesku. Ta ponovna preučitev torej konkretno pomeni, da se za dejstva iz obravnavanega primera uporabi razlaga, ki jo je Sodi�če podalo v sodbi z dne 5. oktobra 1994 v zadevi Voogd Vleesimport en -export 23, in sicer da „[j]e treba nogo, na katero je �e vedno pritrjen del hrbta, […] �teti za nogo, v smislu tarifne pod�tevilke 02.02 B II e) 3 iz stare nomenklature in 0207 41 51 000 iz nove nomenklature, če navedeni del hrbta ni dovolj velik, da bi proizvodu dal svoj bistveni značaj“ 24, in da enako velja za vse izvoženo blago. 55.
In a situation of that kind I think that Article 10 EC requires the administrative
Po mojem mnenju v takem primeru člen 10 ES upravnemu organu torej nalaga,
Some of those doubts can be removed, to a certain extent, by the Court’s subsequent case-law.
Nekatera od teh vpra�anj je v določeni meri mogoče razjasniti na podlagi naknadne sodne prakse Sodi�ča.
In referring to Kühne & Heitz on several occasions and in raising the ‘circumstances’ listed in it to the status of 23 — Case C-151/93 [1994] ECR I-4915.24 — Paragraph 20.
Ker se Sodi�če večkrat sklicuje na navedeno sodbo Kühne & Heitz 23 – C-151/93, Recueil, str. I-4915.24 – Točka 20.
‘conditions’, the Court appears to intend to mark the judgment as a reference point in its case-law, which can be detached from the factual details and the national law of that particular case.
29 Dokaz za tako označitev sta navedeni sodbi Kapferer ter i-21 Germany in Arcor, saj se bolj ali manj jasno sklicujeta na navedeno sodbo Kühne & Heitz, da bi se od nje bolje ločili. 30 in v njej na�tete „okoli�čine“ povzdiguje v „pogoje“, se namreč zdi, da želi to sodbo v svojo sodno prakso vključiti kot referenco, ki jo je mogoče ločiti od spremenljivih okoli�čin, ki so povezane z dejanskim stanjem in nacionalnim pravom ter so značilne za zadevo, v kateri je bila sprejeta. 60.
by the Court, without the national court ruling at final instance having sought a preliminary ruling from the Court, contrary to the third paragraph of Article 234 EC.
Najmanj, kar lahko rečemo, je, da je Sodi�če v navedeni sodbi Kapferer previdno glede možnosti prenosa načel iz navedene sodbe Kühne & Heitz, ki se nana�a na dokončno upravno odločbo, v okvir pravnomočne sodne odločbe. 31 Na prvi pogoj iz te sodbe, tj. na obstoj pravice, ki jo zadevnemu organu daje nacionalno pravo, da odpravi odločbo, ki jo je predhodno sprejel, se namreč previdno sklicuje zato, da bi že takoj ugotovilo, da ta pogoj ni izpolnjen v okoli�činah zadeve, v kateri je bila sprejeta navedena sodba Kapferer. 58.
‘condition’ that the body concerned should be empowered to reopen a final decision.
Tako se Sodi�če v navedeni sodbi Kapferer sklicuje na „pogoj“, da mora zadevni organ biti pristojen, da odpravi dokončno odločbo.
26In addition, in i-21 Germany and Arcor 27 the Court states that it follows from paragraph 28 of Kühne & Heitz that ‘the administrative body responsible for the adoption of an administrative decision is, in accordance with the principle of cooperation arising from Article 10 EC, under an obligation to review and possibly to reopen that decision if four conditions are fulfilled’. 28 60.
26 Poleg tega Sodi�če v sodbi z dne 19. septembra 2006 v združenih zadevah i-21 Germany in Arcor 27navaja, da iz točke 28 navedene sodbe Kühne & Heitz izhaja, da „je upravni organ, ki je odgovoren za sprejetje upravne odločbe, v skladu z načelom sodelovanja iz člena 10 ES dolžan ponovno preučiti to odločbo in jo odpraviti, če so izpolnjeni štirje pogoji“. 28 61. Glede navedene sodbe i-21 Germany in Arcor je v njej jasno izražena želja Sodi�ča, da
Accordingly, in Kapferer the Court appears to be at the very least cautious with regard to the possibility of transposing the principles developed in Kühne & Heitz in relation to a final administrative decision to the context of a final judicial decision. 31Whilst the Court refers cautiously to the first condition laid down by that judgment, namely that the body concerned should be empowered under national law to reopen the 29 — As the Commission notes in paragraph 21 of its observations, it is possible to take the view that, in Kühne & Heitz, the Court instituted in favour of individuals, in addition to the State’s obligation to make reparation for the infringement of Community law by a national court ruling at final instance (which derives from Köbler), a second remedy to enable individuals to assert — in spite of the interpretation contrary to Community law of the relevant provisions and the breach of the obligation to seek a preliminary ruling — a right which they are guaranteed by Community law. 59.
29 – Kot Komisija poudarja v točki 21 svojih stali�č, je torej mogoče �teti, da je Sodi�če z navedeno sodbo Kühne & Heitz poleg obveznosti povračila s strani države članice, kadar nacionalno sodi�če, ki je odločalo na zadnji stopnji, kr�i pravo Skupnosti (ki izhaja iz navedene sodbe Köbler), za stranko v postopku uvedlo �e drugo pravno sredstvo, da bi se lahko kljub nasprotni razlagi prava Skupnosti sklicevala na veljavne določbe in kr�itev obveznosti vložitve predloga za sprejetje predhodne odločbe, pravico, ki ji jo daje pravo Skupnosti. 59.
Nevertheless, Kühne & Heitz seems mainly intended to govern a specific case, namely that of an application for the review of an administrative decision which has become final after the exhaustion of domestic remedies and which proves to be contrary to Community law as subsequently interpreted 30 — I would also mention that the second question from the Finanzgericht Hamburg in the reference for a preliminary ruling in Case C-274/04 ED & F Man Sugar [2006] ECR I-3269 could have led the Court to set out its position in relation to Kühne & Heitz. However, in view of its reply to the first question, the Court found it unnecessary to reply to the second. 31 — That caution is expressed in the following passage from the judgment: ‘even assuming that the principles laid down in [Kühne & Heitz] could be transposed into a context which, like that of the main proceedings, relates to a final judicial decision’ (paragraph 23). 26 — Paragraph 23.27 — Joined Cases C-392/04 and C-422/04 [2006] ECR I-8559.28 — Paragraph 52 (emphasis added).
Vseeno se zdi, da je navedena sodba Kühne & Heitz namenjena predvsem vodenju natančno določenega primera, tj. predloga za ponovno preučitev upravne odločbe, ki je po izčrpanju nacionalnih pravnih sredstev postala dokončna in za katero se je izkazalo, da je v nasprotju s pravom Skupnosti, kot ga je pozneje razlagalo Sodi�če, ne da bi nacionalno sodi�če, ki je odločalo na zadnji stopnji, pri Sodi�ču vložilo predlog za sprejetje predhodne odločbe, v nasprotju s tem, kar določa 30 – Naj �e navedem, da bi lahko na podlagi drugega vpra�anja, ki ga je Finanzgericht Hamburg postavilo v okviru predhodnega postopka, v katerem je bila izdana sodba z dne 6. aprila 2006 v zadevi ED & F Man Sugar (C-274/04, ZOdl., str. I-3269), Sodi�če zavzelo stali�če v zvezi z navedeno sodbo Kühne & Heitz. Vendar je Sodi�če glede na odgovor na prvo vpra�anje menilo, da na to drugo vpra�anje ni treba odgovoriti. 31 – Ta previdnost je izražena v naslednjem odlomku iz sodbe: „Ob predpostavki, da je načela, ki so bila razdelana v […] sodbi [Kühne & Heitz], mogoče prenesti v okvir, ki se tako kot v postopku v glavni stvari nana�a na pravnomočno sodno odločbo“ (točka 23). 26 – Točka 23.27 – C-392/04 in C-422/04, ZOdl., str. I-8559.28 – Točka 52 (moj poudarek).
Following that judgment, i-21 and Arcor unsuccessfully sought repayment of the fees which they had paid.
Po tej tožbi sta družbi i-21 in Arcor neuspe�no zahtevali vračilo plačanih dajatev.
Each of them therefore brought proceedings before the Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court), which dismissed their actions on the ground that their fee notices had become final and that in the case in point there were no grounds for challenging the administrative body’s refusal to withdraw those assessments.
Zato sta vsaka posebej vložili tožbo na Verwaltungsgericht, ki je obe tožbi zavrnilo z obrazložitvijo, da sta njuni odločbi o odmeri dajatve postali dokončni in da zavrnitve odprave teh odločb s strani upravnega organa v obravnavanem primeru ni mogoče izpodbijati.
As regards i-21 Germany and Arcor, that judgment clearly expresses the Court’s intention not to transpose the principles of Kühne & Heitz to a situation where the party seeking the withdrawal of a final administrative decision did not exercise his right to bring an action against that decision. The factual and legal context of the abovementioned judgment must be briefly set out in order to grasp the difference in approach as compared with Kühne & Heitz. An account of the context is all the more necessary as the relevant national provision in i-21 Germany and Arcor, as in the present case, is Paragraph 48(1) of the VwVfG. 64.
se načela iz navedene sodbe Kühne & Heitz ne uporabijo, če stranka, ki predlaga odpravo dokončne upravne odločbe, ni uveljavljala pravice do vložitve pravnega sredstva zoper navedeno odločbo. Na kratko je treba opozoriti na dejanski in pravni okvir, v katerega se ta sodba uvr�ča, da bi bolje razumeli razliko v pristopu, ki je razvidna glede na navedeno sodbo Kühne & Heitz. Ta opis je �e toliko pomembnej�i, ker je v zadevi, v kateri je bila sprejeta navedena sodba i-21 Germany in Arcor, kot tudi v zadevi, ki jo obravnavamo, upo�tevna nacionalna določba člen 48(1) zakona VwVfG. 64.
Since i-21 and Arcor took the view that the Verwaltungsgericht had erred in law in relation not only to national law but also to Community law, they brought appeals on a point of law before the Bundesverwaltungsgericht.
Ker sta družbi i-21 in Arcor menili, da Verwaltungsgericht z vidika nacionalnega prava in prava Skupnosti ni pravilno uporabilo prava, sta nato na Bundesverwaltungsgericht vložili predlog za „revizijo“.
Two telecommunications undertakings, i-21 and Arcor, were charged fees for their individual telecommunications licences.
Telekomunikacijskima podjetjema i-21 in Arcor je bilo naloženo plačilo dajatev iz naslova posamičnega telekomunikacijskega dovoljenja.
They paid the fees without objection and did not appeal within the timelimit of one month from the date of notification of the fee assessments.
Dajatvi sta plačali, ne da bi jima nasprotovali in ne da bi v roku enega meseca od odločbe o odmeri dajatve vložili pravno sredstvo.
The amount of the fees was based on the anticipated general administrative costs of the regulatory authority over a period of 30 years.
Znesek navedenih dajatev je temeljil na vnaprej�njem izračunu splo�nih upravnih stro�kov regulativnega organa za 30 let.
The Bundesverwaltungsgericht wished to ask the Court two questions.
To nacionalno sodi�če je želelo Sodi�ču postaviti dve vpra�anji.
First, it asked whether Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a common framework for general authorisations and individual licences in the field of telecommunications services 32 precluded the imposition
Prvič, predlagalo je, naj odloči, ali člen 11(1) Direktive Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta 97/13/ES z dne 10. aprila 1997 o skupnem okviru za splo�na in posamična dovoljenja na področju telekomunikacijskih storitev 32 nasprotuje temu, da se v okviru posamičnih dovoljenj naloži dajatev, obračunana ob upo�tevanju splo�nih upravnih stro�kov regulativnega organa, povezanih z izvajanjem teh dovoljenj v 30-ih letih, in na to vpra�anje je Sodi�če odgovorilo pritrdilno.
In proceedings for the annulment of a fee assessment notice which was challenged
V okviru tožbe za razglasitev ničnosti odločbe o odmeri dajatve, ki se je izpodbijala v predpisanih rokih, je Bundesverwaltungsgericht razsodilo, da je predpis o dajatvah za telekomunikacijska dovoljenja v nasprotju z nem�kim zakonom o telekomunikacijah in nem�kim ustavnim zakonom, ter potrdilo
Court’s decision in Kühne & Heitz. 34 of a fee for individual licences calculated by taking into account the regulatory authority’s general administrative costs connected with the implementation of those licences over a period of 30 years, to which the Court replied in the affirmative. 68.
Iz predložitvenih odločb izhaja, da je navedeno sodi�če Sodi�ču predlagalo, naj se izrazi o vpra�anju, ali uporaba člena 10 ES in člena 11(1) Direktive 97/13 pomeni omejevanje diskrecijske pravice nacionalnega regulativnega organa glede odprave odločbe o odmeri dajatve 33, zlasti ob upo�tevanju odločitve Sodi�ča v navedeni sodbi Kühne & Heitz 34. 54.
With regard to the possible application of the judgment in Kühne & Heitz in such situations, the Court’s words are unambiguous: 66.
Posledično in v nasprotju s stali�čem, ki ga zagovarja družba i-21, zgoraj navedene sodbe Kühne & Heitz ni mogoče upo�tevati pri ugotavljanju, ali je v okoli�činah, kot so te, ki so predmet obravnave v postopkih v glavni stvari, upravni organ dolžan ponovno preučiti odločbe, ki so postale dokončne.“ 68.
The second question from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht was whether Article 10 EC and Article 11(1) of Directive 97/13 were to be interpreted as meaning that fee assessments which had not been contested within the timelimit laid down by national law had to be set aside where it was permissible, but not mandatory, under national law to set them aside.
Glede morebitne uporabe navedene sodbe v tem primeru je Sodi�če nedvoumno navedlo:
Accordingly, contrary to the arguments advanced by i-21, the judgment in Kühne & Heitz is not relevant for the purposes of determining whether, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, an administrative body is under an obligation to review decisions which have become final.’ 33 — It should be borne in mind that, according to German case-law, the administrative authority in principle has a discretion, under Paragraph 48(1) of the VwVfG, to withdraw an unlawful administrative act that has become final.
Zadeva, v kateri je bila izdana zgoraj navedena sodba Kühne & Heitz, […] je popolnoma drugačna od zadev, v 33 – Naj opozorim, da ima upravni organ v skladu z nem�ko sodno prakso na podlagi člena 48(1) zakona VwVfG načeloma diskrecijsko pravico, da odpravi nezakonit dokončen upravni akt.
However, such discretion may be extinguished if upholding the act in question is ‘outright intolerable’ by reference to the concepts of public policy, good faith, fairness, equal treatment or manifest unlawfulness.
Ta diskrecijska pravica pa se lahko izniči, če ohranitev zadevnega akta „preprosto ni vzdržna“ glede na pojme javnega reda, dobre vere, pravičnosti, enakega obravnavanja ali očitne nezakonitosti.
According to that court, those were not cases in which to uphold the assessments would have been ‘outright intolerable’ and in which the administration’s discretion would have been reduced to such a degree that it had no choice other than to withdraw the notices.
Po mnenju tega sodi�ča ni �lo za primere, v katerih ohranitev odločb o odmeri dajatve „preprosto ne bi bila vzdržna“ in v katerih bi se diskrecijska pravica upravnega organa tako zmanj�ala, da bi te odločbe lahko samo �e odpravilo.
As the outcome reached in Kühne & Heitz is therefore not applicable where the administrative decision whose withdrawal is sought was not appealed against within the timelimit laid down by national law, the question whether or not the competent administrative body was required to withdraw it rests entirely on the relevant national provisions, namely Paragraph 48(1) of the VwVfG. In such a situation, the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States is fully preserved, even if it remains restricted by the principle of effectiveness and the principle of equivalence. It is indeed the latter principle that will play a decisive part here. 71.
Ker re�itve, sprejete v navedeni sodbi Kühne & Heitz, torej ni mogoče uporabiti, če zoper upravno odločbo, katere odprava se zahteva, v rokih, ki jih predpisuje nacionalno pravo, ni bila vložena tožba, je odgovor na vpra�anje, ali je pristojni upravni organ dolžan tako odločbo odpraviti, povsem odvisen od nacionalnih določb, ki se uporabljajo na tem področju, tj. člena 48(1) zakona VwVfG. V takem primeru se načelo postopkovne avtonomije držav članic popolnoma ohrani, čeprav ga �e vedno omejujeta načelo učinkovitosti in načelo enakovrednosti. Sicer pa bo v obravnavanem primeru odločilno prav zadnje načelo. I - 429
The principle of equivalence requires that all the national procedural rules ‘apply without distinction to appeals on the ground of infringement of Community law and to appeals on the ground of disregard of national law’.
Načelo enakovrednosti namreč zahteva, da se vsa nacionalna postopkovna pravila „uporabljajo brez razlikovanja za pravna sredstva, ki temeljijo na kr�itvi prava Skupnosti, in tista, ki temeljijo na nespo�tovanju nacionalnega prava“.