natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
21 — On the concept of ‘perceptible difference’, see the Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-363/99 Koninklijke KPN Nederland [2004] ECR I-1619, point 69 et seq.
22 – Sodba Europig proti UUNT (EUROPIG) (T-207/06, �e neobjavljena v ZOdl., točka 35).
EUROHYPO v OHIM tion pursues an aim which is in the public interest, 24which requires that descriptive considered inter alia that the word sign EUROHYPO was descriptive of ‘financial affairs; monetary affairs; real estate affairs; provision of financial services; financing’, under reference to Article 7(1)(b) of the regulation.
Uredbe zasleduje cilj v splo�nem interesu 24, ki zahteva, da lahko znake ali podatke, ki je med drugim menil, da je besedni znak EUROHYPO opisen za storitve „finančni posli; denarni posli; posli v zvezi s posredova -njem nepremičnin, finančne storitve, finan -ciranje“, in je se pri tem skliceval na člen 7(1)(b) Uredbe.
signs or indications relating to the characteristics of goods or services in respect of which registration is sought may be freely used by all.
opisujejo lastnost blaga ali storitev, za katere se zahteva registracija, vsi prosto uporabljajo 25.
25The notion of public interest underlying Article 7(1)(b) of the regulation is indissociable from the essential function of a trade mark which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked product or service to the consumer or end-user by enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the product or service from others which have another origin. 26
Pojma splo�nega interesa iz člena 7(1)(b) Uredbe ni mogoče ločiti od bistvene naloge znamke, ki je končnemu potro�niku ali uporabniku zagotoviti istovetnost izvora proizvoda ali storitve, označene z znamko, in mu dopustiti, da ta proizvod ali storitev brez možnosti zmede razlikuje od tistih, ki imajo drug izvor 26.
However, Article 7(1)(b) of the regulation refers expressly to ‘trade marks which are devoid of any distinctive character’.
Vendar naj bi se člen 7(1)(b) Uredbe nana�al izrecno na „znamke, ki so brez slehernega razlikovalnega učinka“.
It is the following subparagraph, namely Article 7(1)(c) of the regulation, which gives examples of signs or indications that cannot be used as trade marks because of their descriptive nature.
V naslednji točki, to je v členu 7(1)(c) Uredbe, so na�teti primeri znakov ali označb, ki jih zaradi njihovega razlikovalnega učinka ni mogoče uporabljati kot znamko.
However, the Court, 27 finding that there is a clear overlap between the scope of the grounds set out in Article 7(1)(b) to (d) of
Vendar ker je Sodi�če 27ugotovilo, da obstaja očitno prekrivanje med področji uporabe razlogov za zavrnitev iz člena 7, od
24 — Ekey, F.L. and Klippel, D., cited in footnote 13, p.
24 – Ekey, F., L., in Klippel, D., navedeno zgoraj, str.
893: the authors explain that the rationale of Article 7(1)(c) is the ‘Freihaltungsbedürfnis’ (requirement that this concept should not be monopolised).
893: avtorja navajata, da je ratio legis člena 7(1)(c) „Freihaltungsbedürfnisses“ (nujnost, da se ta pojem ne monopolizira).
In addition, the Court of Justice has pointed out many times, as, for that matter, is mentioned in paragraph 42 of the judgment under appeal, that each of the grounds for refusal to register listed in Article 7(1) of the regulation is independent of the others and calls for separate examination.
Poleg tega je Sodi�če večkrat poudarilo, na kar je sicer opozorjeno v točki 42 izpodbijane sodbe, da je vsak od razlogov za zavrnitev registracije, na�tet v členu 7(1) Uredbe, neodvisen in zahteva posamezno preučitev.
According to the Court, the various grounds for refusal must be interpreted in the light of the public interest underlying each of them.
Sodi�če meni, da je treba navedene razloge za zavrnitev razlagati v smislu splo�nega interesa, ki podpira vsakega izmed njih.
The public interest taken into account may, or even must, reflect different considerations, depending on the ground for refusal in question.
Upo�tevani splo�ni interes lahko ali celo mora odsevati različne ugotovitve v skladu z zadevnim razlogom za zavrnitev 23.
23Article 7(1)(c) of the regula-
Člen 7(1)(c)
This was set out for the first time, in regard to Article 3(1)(c) of the trade marks directive (First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks; OJ 1989 L 40, p.
I-12447, točka 31). To je bilo prvič navedeno v zvezi s členom 3(1)(c) direktive o znamkah (Prva direktiva Sveta z dne 21. decembra 1988 o približevanju zakonodaje držav članic v zvezi z blagovnimi znamkami; UL 1989, L 40, str.
26 — SAT.1 v OHIM, cited in footnote 5, paragraphs 23 and 27, and BioID v OHIM, cited in footnote 23, paragraph 60. See, inter alia, Monteiro, J., ‘La marque verbale: examen des décisions majeures concernant l’appréciation des motifs absolus’, Propriété industrielle, March 2006.
26 – Zgoraj navedeni sodbi SAT.1 proti UUNT, točki 23 in 27, ter BioID proti UUNT, točka 60. Glej zlasti Monteiro, J., „La marque verbale: examen des décisions majeures concernant l’appréciation des motifs absolus“, Propriété industrielle, marec 2006.
27 — Koninklijke KPN Nederland, cited in footnote 21, paragraphs 67 and 85, and Case C-265/00 Campina Melkunie [2004] ECR I-1699, paragraphs 8 and 18.
27 – Zgoraj navedena sodba Koninklijke KPN Nederland (točki 67 in 85), in sodba z dne 12. februarja 2004 v zadevi Campina Melkunie (C-265/00, Recueil, str. I-1699, točki 8 in 18).
31 the regulation, 28 has first and foremost taken the view that a word mark which is descriptive of characteristics of goods or services for the purposes of Article 7(1)(c) of the regulation is, on that account, necessarily devoid of any distinctive character with regard to the same goods or services for the purposes of Article 7(1)(b) of the regulation. 29
(b) do (d), Uredbe 28, je najprej ugotovilo, da je besedna znamka, ki opisuje lastnosti proizvodov ali storitev v smislu člena 7(1)(c) Uredbe zaradi tega nujno brez slehernega razlikovalnega učinka glede enakih proizvodov ali storitev v smislu člena 7(1)(b) iste uredbe 29.
It is also interesting 32to observe that, in the proposal for a Council regulation, 33descriptive signs are presented as examples of signs devoid of any distinctive character. 34
Zanimivo pa je 32navesti, da so v predlogu Uredbe Sveta 33opisni znaki predstavljeni kot primer znakov, ki nimajo razlikovalnega učinka 34. Vendar je treba
However, it must be emphasised that this is not the case with the wording finally set out in the regulation.
Ta pristop je bil deležen ostrih kritik dela teorije 30, ki meni, da bi bilo treba različne poudariti, da v končnem besedilu Uredbe ni tako.
Article 7(1), as a rule imposing a prohibition, must be interpreted restrictively.
Člen 7(1) je torej kot prepovedno določbo treba razlagati ozko 35.
35In this wording, the descriptive character referred to in Article 7(1)(c) is presented as an absolute ground for refusing registration, alternative to the ground based on the absence of any distinctive character the different grounds for refusal should be seen as equivalent and independent grounds and not as being in an inclusive relationship with one another, even though the writers concede that merely descriptive signs are as
V tem besedilu je opisni element iz člena 7(1)(c) določen kot absolutni razlog za zavrnitev registracije, ki je alternativen neobstoju razloge za zavrnitev �teti za enakovredne in samostojne razloge, ne pa obravnavati tako, da je eden vključen tudi v drugem, čeprav se avtorji strinjajo, da so znaki, ki so
31 — Eisenführ, G., and Schennen, D., cited in footnote 30, p.
31 – Eisenführ, G., in Schennen, D., navedeno zgoraj, str.
91, and Ekey, F.L., and Klippel, D., cited in footnote 13, p. 878.
91; Ekey, F., L., in Klippel, D., navedeno zgoraj, str. 878.
28 — On this issue, see, inter alia, Simon, I., ‘What’s Cooking at the CFI?
32 – Ekey, F., L., in Klippel, D., navedeno zgoraj, str.
More Guidance on Descriptive and Non-Distinctive Trade Marks’, European Intellectual Property Review, 2003, p.
875, poudarjata, da je v uredbi nazadnje določeno, da so vsi absolutni razlogi za zavrnitev enako pomembni.
322; Handler, M., ‘The Distinctive Problem of European Trade Mark Law’, European Intellectual Property Review, 2005, p.
Uredba je tako jasno zavrnila zelo raz�irjeno mnenje, da naj bi bil edini razlog za zavrnitev neobstoj razlikovalnega učinka, drugi razlogi pa le njegova izvedba.
33 — ‘Article 6 (Absolute grounds for refusal) 1.
33 – „Člen 6 [Absolutni razlogi za zavrnitev] 1.
Trade marks … which are not distinctive, shall not be registered; in particular …: (a) those which consist solely of signs or indications which in trade may be requisite for the purpose of showing the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of production of the goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods or service’ (OJ 1980 C 351, p. 5).
Kot znamka se ne registrirajo […] znamke, ki so brez slehernega razlikovalnega učinka, predvsem: (a) znamke, ki jih sestavljajo izključno znaki ali podatki, ki se lahko v gospodarskem prometu zahtevajo za označevanje vrste, kakovosti, količine, namena, vrednosti, geografskega izvora, časa proizvodnje blaga ali opravljanja storitve ali druge lastnosti blaga ali storitve“ (UL 1980, C 351, str. 5).
434) explains that, on the initiative of the German delegation, among others, the draft text, which provided that the ground for refusal was the lack of distinctive character and that descriptive character was only an example of this, was amended so as to differentiate between trade marks devoid of distinctive character and descriptive trade marks.
434) pojasnjuje, da je bil med drugim na pobudo nem�ke delegacije osnutek besedila, v katerem je določeno, da je bil razlog za zavrnitev neobstoj razlikovalnega učinka in da je bila opisna narava le eden od njegovih primerov, spremenjen tako, da je bilo uvedeno razlikovanje med znamkami, ki nimajo razlikovalnega učinka, in opisnimi znamkami.
Lack of distinctiveness is not a generic concept of which subparagraphs (c) and (d) would be merely examples.
Neobstoj razlikovalnega učinka ni generičen pojem, v zvezi s katerim bi bili točki (c) in (d) le primera.
It is true that situations covered by subparagraphs (c) and (d) often also lack distinctiveness, but this is not always inevitably the case, just as it is not only signs falling under subparagraphs (c) and (d) that may lack distinctiveness); and Ekey, F.L. and Klippel, D., cited in footnote 13, p.
Seveda niti primeri iz točk (c) in (d) pogosto nimajo razlikovalnega učinka, vendar to ni vedno neizogibno, enako kot ne morejo biti brez razlikovalnega učinka le znaki iz (c) in (d)) – in Ekey, F., L., in Klippel, D., prav tam, str.
874 (according to these authors, the different grounds for refusal under Article 7(1) are parallel and equivalent.
874 – avtorja menita, da so različni razlogi za zavrnitev iz člena 7(1) primerljivi in enakovredni.
None is subject to another, nor are they interdependent.
Niso niti podrejeni niti medsebojno odvisni.
Nor do they overlap; rather, grounds for refusal are autonomous, so that, for the application to be rejected, it is sufficient that one of the grounds is met).
Niti se ne prekrivajo; prej gre za neodvisne razloge za zavrnitev, tako da za zavrnitev zahteve zadostuje, da je izpolnjen en razlog.
35 — Eisenführ, G. and Schennen, D., cited in footnote 30, p. 86.
35 – Eisenführ, G., in Schennen, D., navedeno zgoraj, str. 86.
The Court of Justice held that ‘that criterion is relevant in the context of Article 7(1)(c) of the regulation but it is not the yardstick against which Article 7(1)(b) thereof should be judged’.
Če bi �teli, da je opisni element le primer neobstoja razlikovalnega učinka, bi zanikali vso koristnost spremembe tega besedila.
In September 2005, in BioID v OHIM, the Court of Justice, as it had been invited to do by Advocate General Léger 40 in his Opinion, 41 set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance for the same reason and in the same terms.
Poleg tega je, kot je bilo v sodni praksi večkrat opozorjeno 37, vsak od razlogov za zavrnitev registracije, na�tet v členu 7(1) Uredbe, neodvisen in zahteva posamezno preučitev.
42 The same conclu- sion was reached by the Court of Justice in its judgment in Deutsche SiSi-Werke v OHIM, delivered in January 2006.
Zato se ne moremo, kot je to storjeno v izpodbijani sodbi, zadovoljiti s tem, da bi domnevali, da je neizbežno, da element, ki je opisni, nima razlikovalnega učinka, ne da bi upo�tevali alternativo teh učinkov, kot izhaja iz besedila Uredbe 38.
43 laid down in Article 7(1)(b). 36 Therefore, it is this wording, and not the one set out in the proposal, which must be applied.
stopnje razveljavilo, ker je temeljila na merilu, v skladu s katerim se znamke, ki se v gospodarskem prometu splo�no uporabljajo za označevanje zadevnih proizvodov in storitev, ne morejo registrirati kot znamke.
To take the view that descriptiveness is merely an example of absence of distinctiveness would effectively mean that this amendment to the wording had no purpose.
Sodi�če je torej menilo, da je „to merilo […] upo�tevno v okviru člena 7(1)(c) Uredbe, vendar ni tisto, v skladu s katerim je treba razlagati točko (b) tega člena.
In addition, as has been stated many times in the caselaw, 37each of the grounds for refusal to register listed in Article 7(1) of the regulation is independent and requires separate examination.
Sodi�če je, kot mu je predlagal generalni pravobranilec Léger“ 40v sklepnih predlogih 41, septembra 2005 v sodbi BioID proti UUNT zadevno sodbo Sodi�ča prve stopnje razveljavilo iz enakih razlogov in z enakimi izrazi 42.
Consequently, I cannot be satisfied, as the judgment under appeal was, with the assumption that an element which is descriptive is necessarily devoid of any distinct ive character and so disregard the fact that the regulation is worded in such a way that these characteristics are put forward in the alternative. 38
Tako je storilo tudi v sodbi Sodi�ča v zadevi Deutsche SiSI-Werke proti UUNT, izrečeni januarja 2006 43.
Thus, in September 2004, in SAT.1 v OHIM, 39the Court of Justice set aside the
Sodi�če je tako septembra 2004 s sodbo SAT.1 proti UUNT 39sodbo Sodi�ča prve
40 — Cited in footnote 23, points 80 and 81: ‘… I believe that the Court misinterpreted Article 7(1)(b) of the regulation by basing its conclusion, that the sign in question is devoid of distinctive character, on its finding that “the overall mark is likely to be commonly used in trade to present the goods and services” referred to in the application for registration. … I conclude that the contested judgment is vitiated by the same errors of law as the judgment in SAT.1 v OHIM (SAT.2), cited above.
40 – Sklepni predlogi, predstavljeni 2. julija 2005, točki 80 in 81: „[…] menim, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje, s tem da je ugotovilo, da znak nima razlikovalnega učinka, iz presoje, v skladu s katero, ‚znamka kot celota, ki se v gospodarskem prometu lahko splo�no uporablja za predstavitev proizvodov in storitev‘, na katero se ta zahteva za registracijo nana�a, člen 7(1)(b) Uredbe razlagalo napačno.
I therefore suggest that the Court of Justice draw the same conclusions as in SAT.1 v OHIM (SAT.2), and set aside the contested judgment’.
Na podlagi tega ugotavljam, da je v izpodbijani sodbi, tako kot v zgoraj navedeni sodbi SAT.1 proti UUNT (SAT.2), napačno uporabljeno pravo.
36 — From the point of view of systematic interpretation, it is apparent both from the internal scheme and the external scheme of Article 7(1) of the regulation that these are two different criteria.
36 – Ob upo�tevanju sistematične razlage tako iz notranjega kot iz zunanjega sistema člena 7(1) Uredbe izhaja, da gre za različni merili.
The external scheme — that is, the structure of the text — clearly shows that subparagraphs (b) and (c) are two distinct points.
Zunanji sistem – torej zgradba besedila – jasno kaže, da sta (b) in (c) različni točki. V skladu z notranjim sistemom – torej organizacijo vsebine besedila – sta cilja teh točk različna (v zvezi z notranjim in zunanjim sistemom glej Heck, P., „Das Problem der Rechtsgewinnung, Gesetzauslegung und Interessenjurisprudenz“, Begriffsbil­dung und Interessenjurisprudenz, Verlag Gehlen, Berlin, Zürich, 1968, str. 188 in 189).
37 — See above.
37 – Glej zgoraj.
38 — Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, in his Opinion delivered on 14 May 2002 in DKV v OHIM, cited in footnote 16, states, in point 40: ‘It is … to my mind preferable that the Community Courts apply the grounds for refusal with the same rigour as that employed by the registration authorities.
38 – Generalni pravobranilec Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer v točki 40 sklepnih predlogih, predstavljenih 14.maja 2002 v zgoraj navedeni zadevi DKV proti UUNT navaja, da se mu „[…] zdi bolje, da sodi�če Skupnosti pokaže enako strogost, kot jo organ, pristojen za registracijo, pri opredelitvi razlogov za zavrnitev.
Each of the conditions for registration in Article 7(1)(b), (c) and (d), in requiring a sign to be capable of distinguishing the goods and services under consideration and not to be descriptive or generic, is independent of the others, and must be considered separately.
Vsak pogoj za registracijo – naveden v členu 7(1)(b), (c) in (d), ki zahteva, da mora imeti znak za upo�tevane proizvode in storitve razlikovalen učinek in da ne sme biti niti opisen niti generičen glede na te proizvode in storitve – je neodvisen od drugih in zahteva posamezno preučitev.
That does not preclude the same sign in practice being caught by more than one category.
To pa ni ovira, da bi se lahko v praksi enaki znaki pogosto nana�ali na več primerov.
Thus, a sign that is wholly descriptive will in general be devoid of any distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b).’
Tako znak, ki je v celoti opisen, na splo�no ne bo imel razlikovalnega učinka v smislu točke (b)“.
42 — Cited in footnote 23, paragraphs 61 to 63: ‘… in paragraphs 23, 34, 41 and 43 of the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance primarily accepted the fact that the trade mark applied for is likely to be commonly used in trade, in order to establish that it fell within Article 7(1)(b) of the regulation. … It must, however, be stated that, as the Court of Justice held in paragraph 36 of SAT.1 v OHIM, cited above, that criterion, although relevant in relation to Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94, is not the yardstick by which Article 7(1)(b) must be interpreted. … Consequently, it must be held that the head of claim alleging that the Court of First Instance applied a criterion relevant in the context of Article 7(1)(c) of the regulation rather than in that of Article 7(1)(b) is well founded.’
42 – Zgoraj navedena sodba, točke od 61 do 63: „[…] Sodi�če prve stopnje je v točkah 23, 34, 41 in 43 izpodbijane sodbe, da bi ugotovilo, da za prijavljeno znamko velja člen 7(1)(b) navedene uredbe, predvsem sprejelo dejstvo, da se lahko na splo�no uporablja v gospodarskem prometu. […] Ne glede na to je treba ugotoviti, da kot je Sodi�če razsodilo v točki 36 zgoraj navedene sodbe SAT.1 proti UUNT, če je to merilo upo�tevno za člen 7(1)(c) Uredbe, točke (b) te določbe ni treba razlagati ob upo�tevanju tega. […] Zato je treba ugotoviti, da je očitek, da Sodi�če prve stopnje merila, ki naj bi bilo upo�tevno, ni uporabilo v okviru člena 7(1)(b) Uredbe, ampak v okviru točke (c) te določbe, utemeljen“.
39 — Cited in footnote 5, paragraph 36.
39 – Zgoraj navedena sodba, točka 36.
43 — Cited in footnote 16, paragraph 63.
43 – Zgoraj navedena sodba, točka 63.
OPINION OF MS TRSTENJAK — CASE C-304/06 P likely to be understood by the German public as an abbreviation of ‘Europäische Hypothekenbank’ (‘European mortgage bank’).
Hypothekenbank“, torej „evropske hipotekarne banke“.
Yet this word does not appear to enable the relevant public to identify the origin of the goods or services protected and to distinguish them from those of other undertakings, and thus does not seem able to fulfil the essential function of a trade mark.
Ta izraz upo�tevni javnosti ne bi omogočil, da bi ugotovila izvor zavarovanih proizvodov ali storitev in jih razlikovala od tistih iz drugih podjetij, in se tako ne zdi, da bi lahko izpolnjeval bistveno funkcijo znamke.
On the contrary, a word that may be understood as ‘European mortgage bank’ is likely to restrict unduly the availability of such a concept for the other operators which offer goods or services of the same type as those in respect of which registration is sought.
Nasprotno, izraz, ki bi ga bilo mogoče razumeti kot „evropska hipotekarna banka“, lahko neupravičeno omejuje razpoložljivost takega pojma za druge subjekte, ki ponujajo enake proizvode in storitve, kot so tisti, za katere se zahteva registracija.
As the appellant states, Article 7(1)(b) of the regulation is directed precisely at avoiding this. 45
Kot zatrjuje pritožnica, je namen člena 7(1)(b) Uredbe to ravno preprečiti 45.
In the present case, the situation is entirely comparable.
Položaj v obravnavani zadevi je vsekakor primerljiv.
Both the judgment of the Court of First Instance and the decision of the Board of Appeal have taken the view that the word sign EUROHYPO is not distinctive, and consequently that its registration must be refused under Article 7(1)(b), on the ground that it is composed of two descriptive words whose combination does not create an impression sufficiently far removed from these elements to amount to more than the sum of its parts, while the question of descriptiveness is covered by Article 7(1)(c).
Tako v sodbi Sodi�ča prve stopnje kot v odločbi odbora za pritožbe je bilo ugotovljeno, da besedni znak EUROHYPO nima razlikovalnega učinka in je treba zato na podlagi člena 7(1)(b) njegovo registracijo zavrniti, ker je sestavljen iz dveh opisnih izrazov, katerih kombinacija ne ustvarja vtisa, ki bi bil dovolj oddaljen od teh sestavnih delov, da bi pomenil več kot njuna vsota, medtem ko je vpra�anje opisnosti obravnavano v členu 7(1)(c).
Following the examples of SAT.1 v OHIM, BioID v OHIM and Deutsche SiSi-Werke v OHIM, it must be held that the ground of appeal alleging that the Court of First Instance applied a criterion relevant in the context of Article 7(1)(c) of the regulation but not in that of Article 7(1)(b) is well founded.
Po zgledu sodb SAT.1 proti UUNT, BioID proti UUNT in Deutsche SiSI-Werke proti UUNT je treba ugotoviti, da je očitek, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje uporabilo merilo, ki naj ne bi bilo upo�tevno v okviru člena 7(1)(b) Uredbe, ampak v okviru točke (c) istega člena, utemeljen.
However, in an appeal, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is confined to a review of the findings of law on the pleas argued before the Court of First Instance.
Vendar je pristojnost Sodi�ča v okviru pritožbe omejena na presojo pravnih vpra�anj, ki so bila obravnavana na prvi stopnji 46.
46 Therefore the judgment under appeal must be set aside in so far as the Court of First Instance erred in law in its interpretation of Article 7(1)(b) of the regulation by using a criterion relevant in the context of Article 7(1)(c) of the regulation.
Izpodbijano sodbo je treba torej razveljaviti, saj je Sodi�če prve stopnje nepravilno uporabilo pravo pri razlagi člena 7(1)(b) Uredbe, ker je uporabilo merilo, upo�tevno v okviru člena 7(1)(c) Uredbe.
It is true that the descriptive character of the word sign EUROHYPO has been established above.
Opisnost besednega znaka EUROHYPO je bila zgoraj ugotovljena.
In this regard, and given that it is quite evident from the wording of Article 7(1) of the regulation that it is sufficient that one of the absolute grounds for refusal listed applies for the sign not to be registrable as a Community trade mark, 44the word sign EUROHYPO should be refused registration for the relevant services because of its descriptive character for the purposes of Article 7(1)(c).
V zvezi s tem in ker iz člena 7(1) Uredbe zelo jasno izhaja, da že obstoj enega od navedenih absolutnih razlogov za zavrnitev zado�ča, da znak ne more biti registriran kot znamka Skupnosti 44, bi bilo treba besedni znak EUROHYPO za zadevne storitve zavrniti zaradi njegove opisnosti v smislu točke (c) navedenega člena.