natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1 party access to their networks and allowed customers to fully benefit from the opening of the gas markets in France and Germany.
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2004 – Zvezek 1 stranke do njunih omrežij in omogočile uporabnikom, da v celoti uživajo koristi odprtja plinskih trgov v Franciji in Nemčiji.
In particular, Ruhrgas undertook to introduce a new entry/exit regime, which makes it possible to book gas transport capacities separately at entry and exit points (rather than having to book capacity over a ctitious contractual path between the point where the gas is injected into the transport system and the point where it is withdrawn).
Predvsem družba Ruhrgas se je zavezala, da bo uvedla nov režim vstopa/izstopa, ki ji omogoča ločeno evidentiranje zmogljivosti za transport plina na točkah vstopa in izstopa (namesto evidentiranja navidezne pogodbene poti med točko, kjer plin vstopi v transportni sistem, in točko, kjer ga zapusti).
Gaz de France also undertook to implement a gas release programme over three years in the south of France, in order to allow the development of competition without waiting for the completion in mid-2007 of planned new infrastructure facilitating the access of competing gas to this area.
Družba Gaz de France se je tudi zavezala, da bo v treh letih uresničila program sprostitve plina na jugu Francije, da bi omogočila razvoj konkurence brez čakanja na uresničitev načrtovane nove infrastrukture sredi leta 2007, kar bi pospešilo dostop konkurence na to področje.
In the merger eld, the Commission decided to block the envisaged acquisition of joint control over Gás de Portugal (GDP), the incumbent gas company in Portugal, by Energias de Portugal (EDP), the incumbent electricity company in Portugal, and ENI, an Italian energy company. is operation would have strengthened EDP’s dominant position in their respective markets (electricity wholesale and retail markets and gas markets in Portugal) as a result of both horizontal and vertical e ects.
Na področju združitev se je Komisija odločila zaustaviti predvideno pridobitev skupnega nadzora portugalske elektroenergetske družbe Energias de Portugal (EDP) in italijanske elektroenergetske družbe ENI nad portugalsko plinsko družbo Gás de Portugal (GDP). Ta transakcija bi okrepila prevladujoči položaj družbe EDP na njenih zadevnih trgih (grosistični in maloprodajni trgi električne energije ter plinski trgi na Portugalskem), kar bi bila posledica horizontalnih in vertikalnih učinkov.
In particular, it would have removed GDP’s potential competition in the electricity markets as well as EDP’s most likely entry in the gas markets.
Predvsem pa bi odstranila potencialno konkurenco družbe GDP na trgih električne energije in zelo verjeten vstop družbe EDP na plinske trge.
Moreover, the concentration would have made electricity producers using gas as a fuel highly dependent on their main competitor, i.e. EDP, for their gas supplies.
Poleg tega bi zaradi koncentracije postali proizvajalci električne energije, ki kot gorivo uporabljajo plin, zelo odvisni od svojega glavnega tekmeca, tj. družbe EDP, ki bi jim dobavljala plin.
Last but not least, the Commission issued a letter of formal notice to Greece in a case concerning the Greek lignite mining and electricity generation and supply markets.
Grčija podeljuje domačemu proizvajalcu električne energije izključne rudarske pravice za izkopavanje lignita brez nadomestila.
Greece grants to the incumbent electricity producer exclusive mining rights to extract lignite without compensation. is privileged access to lignite, the cheapest energy source for electricity generation in Greece, enables the electricity incumbent to maintain its dominant position on the electricity generation and supply markets by preventing market entry of potential competitors.
Ta privilegiran dostop do lignita, ki je najcenejši vir energije za proizvodnjo elektrike v Grčiji, omogoča proizvajalcu električne energije, da ohranja svoj prevladujoči položaj na trgih proizvodnje in dobave električne energije, saj potencialnim tekmecem preprečuje vstop na trg.
Electronic communications
Elektronske komunikacije
One of the fundamental changes introduced by the new regulatory framework for electronic communication services is that national regulatory authorities (NRAs) are obliged to de ne relevant electronic communication markets in accordance with the principles of competition law. ey must carry out an analysis of the relevant markets and determine whether those markets are e ectively competitive, meaning that there is no undertaking with significant market power (SMP, equivalent to the competition concept of dominance) on that market.
Ena od temeljnih sprememb, ki jih je za storitve elektronskih komunikacij uvedel nov ureditveni okvir, je, da morajo nacionalni regulativni organi (NRO) opredeliti ustrezne trge elektronskih komunikacij v skladu z načeli konkurenčnega prava. Analizirati morajo upoštevne trge in določiti, ali so ti trgi učinkovito konkurenčni, kar pomeni, da na njih ni podjetja z večjo tržno močjo (ZTM, ki ustreza konkurenčnemu konceptu prevladovanja) na navedenem trgu.
If a market is not e ectively competitive, NRAs must impose at least one specific regulatory obligation among those set out in the access directive or the universal service directive.
Če trg ni učinkovito konkurenčen, morajo NRO naložiti vsaj eno posebno regulativno obveznost izmed tistih, določenih v direktivah o dostopu ali univerzalnih storitvah.
Conversely, if a market is e ectively competitive, NRAs may not maintain or introduce any specific regulatory obligations.
Nasprotno pa, če je trg učinkovito konkurenčen, NRO morda ne bodo ohranili ali uvedli nobenih posebnih regulativnih obveznosti.
Following the market analysis procedure, NRAs must notify to the Commission dra regulatory measures concerning the de nition of the relevant markets, the nding or non- nding of SMP and the regulatory remedies proposed, if any. e Commission may either issue comments, which NRAs must take utmost account of, or request the NRA to withdraw the dra measure if the market de nition and/or the determination of SMP is incompatible with Community law.
Po postopku analize trga morajo NRO sporočiti Komisiji osnutke ureditvenih ukrepov v zvezi z opredelitvijo upoštevnih trgov, ugotovitev ali neugotovitev ZTM in morebitne predlagane ureditvene protiukrepe. Komisija lahko bodisi izda komentarje, ki jih morajo NRO v največji meri upoštevati, bodisi zahteva od NRO, da umakne osnutek ukrepa, če opredelitev trga in/ali ugotovitev ZTM nista združljiva s pravom Skupnosti.
In 2004, the Commission’s departments received 89 such notifications and closed 90 cases.
Leta 2004 so službe Komisije prejele 89 takšnih obvestil in zaključile 90 zadev.
In three cases, the Commission requested the NRA to withdraw the dra measure concerned.
V treh primerih je Komisija zahtevala od NRO, da umakne osnutek zadevnega ukrepa.
In the joint cases FI/2003/0024 and FI/2003/0027 (168), concerning the publicly available international telephone services provided at a xed location for residential and non-residential customers in Finland, the Commission found that the Finnish NRA, Ficora, did not provide sufficient evidence and did not take into account existing regulation in the market when reaching the conclusion that there were no operators with SMP on these markets. e Commission contested Ficora’s nding, according to which, despite the high market shares (above 50 %) of TeliaSonera, the latter did not have SMP as a result of low barriers to entry, the large number of undertakings providing international telephone services and the fact that subscribers could easily acquire international telephone services from operators other than the one providing the subscriber connection.
V združenih zadevah FI/2003/0024 in FI/2003/0027 (168), ki zadevata javno razpoložljive mednarodne telefonske storitve, zagotovljene na ksni lokaciji za rezidenčne ali nerezidenčne uporabnike na Finskem, je Komisija ugotovila, da nski NRO, Ficora, pri sprejemanju sklepa, da na teh trgih ni bilo operaterjev z ZTM, ni zagotovil zadostnih dokazov in ni upošteval obstoječe ureditve. Komisija je izpodbijala ugotovitev Ficore, po kateri družba TeliaSonera kljub visokim tržnim deležem (nad 50 %) ni imela ZTM, kar je bila posledica nizkih ovir za vstop, velikega števila podjetij, ki nudijo mednarodne telefonske storitve, in dejstva, da so naročniki lahko preprosto dobili mednarodne telefonske storitve od operaterjev, ki so se razlikovali od tistih, ki so zagotavljali naročniško povezavo.
Furthermore, Ficora’s assessment of the degree of market power of the undertakings in the markets did not take appropriately into account the existence of regulatory remedies and their impact on the perceived level of competition in the market, thereby considerably undermining its conclusions.
Poleg tega Ficora pri oceni stopnje tržne moči podjetij na trgih ni ustrezno upošteval obstoja ureditvenih protiukrepov in njihovega učinka na zaznano raven konkurence na trgu, kar je precej oslabilo njegov sklepe.
In particular, Ficora’s claims that barriers to entry into these markets were low and that there were several undertakings providing international telephone services, and the resulting conclusion of a lack of SMP relied on existing regulation, such as carrier selection, carrier-pre-selection and the
Ficora predvsem trdi, da so bile ovire za vstop na te trge nizke in da je bilo več podjetij, ki so ponujala mednarodne telefonske storitve, posledičen sklep glede pomanjkanja ZTM pa se je zato opiral na obstoječo ureditev, kot so izbira obratovalca, predizbira obratovalca in obveznost medsebojnega povezovanja.
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1 obligation to interconnect. e Commission pointed out that a key principle of market analysis was to assess whether e ective competition was or was not entirely or primarily a result of regulation in place, and whether the status of competition in the de ned market was likely to be di erent in the absence of such regulation.
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2004 – Zvezek 1 bilo stanje konkurence na opredeljenem trgu verjetno drugačno, če takšne ureditve ne bi bilo.
In case FI/2004/0082 (169), concerning the market for access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks in Finland, the Commission concluded that the dra measure notified by Ficora lacked the evidence to support the conclusion that TeliaSonera had significant market power in the Finnish market for access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks.
V primeru FI/2004/0082 (169), ki zadeva trg za dostop in izvor klica v javnih mobilnih telefonskih omrežjih na Finskem, je Komisija sklenila, da je osnutku ukrepa, ki ga je prijavil Ficora, manjkalo dokazov v podporo sklepu, da ima družba TeliaSonera precejšnjo tržno moč na nskem trgu za dostop in izvor klica v javnih mobilnih telefonskih omrežjih.
Although TeliaSonera had a market share in excess of 60 %, there were two other mobile network operators on the supply side, and in addition to the network operators more than 10 service providers on the demand side of the market.
Čeprav je tržni delež družbe TeliaSonera presegal 60 %, sta bila na strani ponudbe še dva operaterja mobilnega omrežja, na strani povpraševanja na trgu pa poleg operaterjev omrežij več kot deset ponudnikov storitev.
Service providers have been able to conclude wholesale agreements, including mobile virtual network operator agreements, on a commercial basis — without any regulatory obligation for mobile network operators to provide access — with all mobile network operators in the relevant market. e Commission found that in addition to the apparent dynamics resulting from the (downstream) retail market, mobile network operators were competing for and were able to conclude agreements with di erent service providers due to their ability to provide exible o ers or types of services that were not provided by other mobile network operators.
Ponudniki storitev so lahko sklepali veleprodajne pogodbe, vključno s pogodbami o operaterjih mobilnih virtualnih omrežij, na komercialni podlagi – brez kakršne koli regulativne obveznosti za operaterje mobilnih omrežij za zagotovitev dostopa – z vsemi operaterji mobilnih omrežij na upoštevnem trgu. Komisija je ugotovila, da so poleg očitne dinamike, ki je posledica maloprodajnega trga (v spodnjem delu verige vrednosti), operaterji mobilnih omrežij tekmovali in lahko sklepali pogodbe z različnimi ponudniki storitev zaradi svoje zmožnosti nudenja prožnih ponudb ali vrst storitev, ki jih drugi operaterji mobilnih omrežij niso ponujali.
Furthermore, Ficora did not provide convincing evidence that the switching costs would significantly hinder the ability of a service provider to change its wholesale provider.
Poleg tega Ficora ni predložil prepričljivih dokazov, da bi stroški spremembe dobavitelja precej ovirali zmožnost ponudnika storitev, da zamenja svojega veletrgovca.
Finally, in case AT/2004/0090 (170), concerning the Austrian market for transit services in the xed public network, the Commission did not agree with the Austrian NRA’s conclusion that operators providing transit services for themselves were part of the transit market, and that therefore the market share of Telekom Austria was below 50 % and consequently it did not have SMP.
V primeru AT/2004/0090 (170) glede avstrijskega trga tranzitnih storitev v ksnem javnem omrežju se Komisija ni strinjala s sklepom avstrijskega NRO, da so bili operaterji, ki opravljajo tranzitne storitve za lastne potrebe, del trga tranzitnih storitev in da je bil zato tržni delež družbe Telekom Austria pod 50 % ter družba posledično ni imela ZTM.
In particular, the Austrian NRA did not substantiate to a sufficient extent its nding that network operators purchasing transit services could promptly shi to selfprovision in response to price change, in the light of the high investments and the substantial planning and time associated with network roll-out.
Avstrijski NRO predvsem ni v zadostni meri utemeljil svoje ugotovitve, da bi lahko operaterji omrežij, ki kupujejo tranzitne storitve, v odziv na spremembo cene nemudoma prešli na samooskrbo, saj je razvijanje omrežja povezano z visokimi naložbami ter precejšnjim načrtovanjem in časom.
Furthermore, the Commission found that insufficient evidence was provided as to the ability and willingness of these operators to begin actually supplying the commercial transit market on a systematic basis, and that therefore selfprovision fell outside the scope of the relevant market, leaving Telekom Austria with a market share of about 90 %.
Poleg tega je Komisija ugotovila, da ni bilo predloženih zadostnih dokazov o zmožnosti in pripravljenosti teh operaterjev, da dejansko začnejo načrtno oskrbovati komercialni tranzitni trg, ter da je zato samooskrba izpadla iz okvira upoštevnega trga, tako da je družbi Telekom Austria pripadel približno 90-odstotni tržni delež.
Decision of 5.10.2004, C(2004) 3682 nal, available at: http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ ecctf/home Decision of 20.10.2004, C(2004) 4070 nal, available at: http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home
Odločba z dne 5.10.2004, C(2004) 3682 konč., na voljo na naslovu: http://forum.europa.eu.int/ Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home Odločba z dne 20.10.2004, C(2004) 4070 konč., na voljo na naslovu: http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home
EU/US open aviation area negotiations
Pogajanja med EU in ZDA o odprtem letalskem prostoru
Following the ‘open skies’ court cases, the EU and the USA entered into negotiations with a view to establishing an open aviation area between these two major trading partners.
Po sodbah, imenovanih „Odprto nebo“ so se EU in ZDA začele pogajati o vzpostavitvi odprtega letalskega prostora med tema velikima trgovskima partnericama.
In June, a comprehensive dra agreement which would have resolved several legal issues and paved the way towards the full liberalisation of air services between the EU and the USA was submitted to the transport ministers of the EU.
Junija je bil ministrom EU za promet predložen izčrpen osnutek sporazuma, ki bi rešil več pravnih vprašanj in utrl pot v smeri popolne liberalizacije storitev zračnega prometa med EU in ZDA.
On 3 March, the Commission tabled proposals for a third railway package, including measures to open up the market for cross-border passenger services with e ect from 2010. is would include the right for a train operator to pick up and set down passengers at any station along the line of route, including between stations located in the same Member State (cabotage).
Komisija je 3. marca predstavila predloge za tretji železniški sveženj, vključno z ukrepi za odprtje trga čezmejnih potniških storitev, ki bo veljal od leta 2010. Vključeval bi pravico železniškega prevoznika, da pobere in odloži potnike na kateri koli postaji vzdolž smeri proge, vključno med postajami, ki so v isti državi članici (kabotaža).
While a Member State would be permitted to limit this right of access for origins and destinations already covered by a public service contract, this limitation would have to be strictly proportionate to the need to maintain the economic equilibrium of the contracted service.
Medtem ko bi bilo državi članici dovoljeno omejiti to pravico dostopa za kraje začetne in končne postaje, ki jih že zajema javno naročilo za storitve, bi bila ta omejitev strogo sorazmerna potrebi po ohranjanju gospodarskega ravnotežja pogodbeno sklenjene storitve.
Also with e ect from 2010, the concept of ‘international grouping’ would be abolished. e package was considered by Parliament on 23 November.
Od leta 2010 bo odpravljen tudi koncept „mednarodnega združenja“.
At the end of the year, it was awaiting its rst reading in plenary.
Parlament je 23. novembra obravnaval ta sveženj.
On 29 April, the second railway package was nally adopted following conciliation. e main stumbling block was market opening for rail freight transport services.
Drugi železniški sveženj je bil po uskladitvi dokončno sprejet 29. aprila. Glavna ovira je bilo odprtje trga storitev tovornega železniškega prometa.
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1 through the ‘financial services action plan’.
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2004 – Zvezek 1 trga sta dopolnilni orodji za dosego tega cilja.
In particular, the Competition DG has been active in promoting the liberalisation and proper functioning of securities markets, including trading, clearing and settlement.
GD za konkurenco je bil še posebej dejaven pri pospeševanju liberalizacije in pravilnega delovanja trgov vrednostnih papirjev, vključno s poslovanjem, obračunom in poravnavo.
Without improvements, the margin between investors’ returns and the cost of nance for issuers will be higher than it need be.
Brez izboljšav bo razlika med donosi vlagateljev in stroški nanciranja za izdajatelje višja, kot bi bilo treba.
Competition enforcement and advocacy therefore have beneficial e ects such as better allocation of nancial resources to the benefit both of investors and of the public at large, as the return on investments in uences, for example, the amount of pensions.
Okrepitev in zagovarjanje konkurence ima zato koristne učinke, kot je boljše dodeljevanje nančnih sredstev v korist vlagateljev in širše javnosti, saj donosnost naložb na primer vpliva na znesek pokojnin.
In the USA, the cost of settling an equity transaction has been calculated at EUR 0.10, while the cost of settling a standard cross-border trade in Europe can be EUR 35 or more.
Izračunano je bilo, da znaša strošek izpeljave transakcije z navadnimi delnicami v ZDA 0,10 EUR, medtem ko lahko strošek izpeljave standardnega čezmejnega posla v Evropi 35 EUR ali več.
Since 2001 high-level groups and expert groups, such as the Lamfalussy group of wise men and the Giovannini group, have identified cross-border clearing and settlement, and in particular issues related to access and pricing, as the main source of inefficiencies for the proper functioning of European securities markets. e rst decision in this area was adopted on 2 June in the Clearstream case (referred to above in section I.B.1).
Od leta 2001 so skupine visokih predstavnikov in strokovne skupine, kot sta Lamfalussyeva skupina modrih mož in Giovanninijeva skupina, ugotovile, da so čezmejni obračun in poravnava, predvsem pa težave, povezane z dostopom in določanjem cen, glavni vir neučinkovitosti za primerno delovanje evropskih trgov vrednostnih papirjev. Prva odločba na tem področju je bila sprejeta 2. junija v primeru Clearstream (navedenem v zgornjem oddelku I.B.1).
Work is proceeding with the Internal Market DG on payment systems as well as on securities markets.
Delo z GD za notranji trg glede plačilnih sistemov in trgov vrednostnih papirjev se nadaljuje.
B OTHER SECTORS
B DRUGI SEKTORJI
Professional services, meaning in this context services provided by liberal professions, have an important role to play in improving the competitiveness of the
Poklicne storitve, kar v tem smislu pomeni storitve, ki jih ponujajo svobodni poklici, imajo pomembno vlogo pri izboljševanju konkurenčnosti evropskega gospodarstva.
European economy. ey are inputs for the economy and business, and their quality and competitiveness have substantial spillover e ects. e Italian Antitrust Authority has estimated that in Italy 6 % of exporting rms’ costs on average are due to professional services. us, greater variety in prices and quality, as well as greater innovation in professional services could go a long way to improve the competitiveness of European enterprises and foster GDP growth in the EU.
Tako bi lahko večja raznolikost in kakovost ter večja inovativnost poklicnih storitev precej izboljšale konkurenčnost evropskih podjetij in pospešile rast BDP v EU.
For these reasons the modernisation of professional services should be seen as part of the Lisbon agenda.
Zaradi teh razlogov je treba posodobitev poklicnih storitev obravnavati kot del lizbonske agende.
On 9 February, the Commission adopted a report on competition in professional services (171). e main purpose of this report is to set out the Commission’s thinking on the scope for reforming or modernising specific professional rules.
Komisija je 9. februarja sprejela poročilo o konkurenci na področju poklicnih storitev (171). Glavni namen tega poročila je podrobno razložiti mnenje Komisije o možnostih preoblikovanja in posodobitve posebnih poklicnih pravil.
In this report the ve main categories of potentially restrictive regulation in the EU professions are identified: (i) price xing, (ii) recommended prices, (iii) advertising regulations, (iv) entry requirements and reserved rights, and (v) regulations governing business structure and multidisciplinary practices.
V njem je opredeljenih pet glavnih kategorij potencialno omejevalne ureditve pri poklicih v EU: (i) določanje cen, (ii) priporočene cene, (iii) predpisi o oglaševanju, (iv) zahteve za vstop in rezervirane pravice ter (v) predpisi, ki urejajo strukturo poslovanja in multidisciplinarne prakse.
On the one hand, the report concludes that a significant body of empirical research shows the negative e ects that excessive or outdated restrictive regulations may have for consumers.
Poročilo po eni strani ugotavlja, da pomembne empirične raziskave kažejo negativne učinke, ki jih lahko imajo na uporabnike pretirani ali zastareli omejevalni predpisi.
Indeed, such regulations may eliminate or limit competition between service providers and thus reduce the incentives for professionals to work cost-e ciently, at lower prices, to increase quality or to o er innovative services.
Takšni predpisi lahko odpravijo ali omejijo konkurenco med ponudniki storitev in tako zmanjšajo spodbude nosilcem svobodnih poklicev, da delajo stroškovno učinkovito po nizkih cenah, povečujejo kakovost in ponujajo inovativne storitve.