natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In that regard, in the 212th recital in the preamble to the provisional regulation, the Commission, in order to refute that argument of the exporting producers, maintained that stainless steel wires were not produced, for technical reasons, from flat products and that therefore any downstream effect of the concerted practice found for flat products on stainless steel wires was doubtful.
Tako je Komisija, da bi ovrgla to argumentacijo proizvajalcev izvoznikov, v uvodni izjavi 212 začasne uredbe navedla, da se žica iz nerjavnega jekla iz tehničnih razlogov ne izdeluje iz plo�čatih izdelkov in da je zato upravičeno dvomiti, da bi lahko usklajena ravnanja, ugotovljena v zvezi s temi izdelki, vplivala na proizvodnjo omenjene žice.
The Commission added that the producers of flat products and the producers of long products were not the same and that the number of the latter was significantly higher than that of the former.
Dodala je, da proizvajalci plo�čatih in podolgovatih izdelkov niso isti subjekti in da so drugi �tevilčnej�i od prvih.
It follows from those recitals that, contrary to AGST’s submission, the Community institutions, in accordance with the requirement of the basic regulation to disregard any injury arising from factors other than the subsidised imports, examined whether the data submitted by the Community industry within the framework of the antisubsidy proceeding could have been influenced by the concerted application of the ‘alloy surcharge’ system by the flat product producers.
Iz teh uvodnih izjav v nasprotju s trditvami družbe AGST izhaja, da so institucije Skupnosti v skladu z zahtevami osnovne uredbe, da se ne upo�teva �koda, ki izhaja iz drugih dejavnikov razen subvencioniranega uvoza, preučile, ali je na podatke, ki jih je industrija Skupnosti predložila v okviru protisubvencijskega postopka, lahko vplivala usklajena uporaba sistema dodatne dajatve na zlitine, ki so ga uvedli proizvajalci plo�čatih izdelkov.
In support of its arguments, AGST declares that the 209th to 216th recitals in the preamble to the provisional regulation, in which the Commission had rejected the Indian producers’ objection relating to the existence of an alloy surcharge cartel, correspond, on the whole, to the 43rd, 46th and 47th recitals in the preamble to Regulation No 2450/98, on the basis of which the Court of First Instance, in Mukand and Others v Council, declared that they contained manifest errors of assessment.
Družba AGST v utemeljitev svojih argumentov navaja, da uvodne izjave od 209 do 216 začasne uredbe, v skladu s katerimi je Komisija zavrnila ugovor indijskih proizvajalcev v zvezi z obstojem omejevalnega sporazuma o dodatni dajatvi na zlitine, v celoti ustrezajo uvodnim izjavam 43, 46 in 47 Uredbe �t. 2450/98, za katere je Sodi�če prve stopnje v zgoraj navedeni sodbi Mukand in drugi proti Svetu ugotovilo, da vsebujejo očitno napačne ugotovitve.
In addition, it is not disputed that the alloy surcharge applied to stainless steel wires had been fixed in the same way by the steel bar producers, by multiplying the alloy surcharge applied to flat steel products by a factor of 1.35.
Poleg tega se ne izpodbija, da so dodatno dajatev na zlitine, ki se uporablja za žice iz nerjavnega jekla, na enak način – in sicer z množenjem dodatne dajatve na zlitine, ki se uporablja za plo�čate izdelke, s količnikom 1,35 – uporabljali tudi proizvajalci jeklenih palic.
Thus, the question which arises is whether the anticompetitive conduct of the flat steel producers, linked to the uniform application of the alloy surcharge cartel, constituted, for the stainless steel wires sector, a known factor within the meaning of Article 8(7) of the basic regulation.
Zastavlja se torej vpra�anje, ali je protikonkurenčno vedenje proizvajalcev plo�čatih izdelkov iz jekla v povezavi z enotno uporabo dodatne dajatve na zlitine v sektorju žice iz nerjavnega jekla znan dejavnik v smislu člena 8(7) osnovne uredbe.
In that context, Mukand and Others v Council, upon which AGST relies, concerns the anticompetitive fixing of the amount of the alloy surcharge, applied by the Community producers to flat stainless steel products, which had significantly affected the prices of stainless steel bars and artificially caused their increase, and which would render those prices unreliable for the purposes of the determination of the injury suffered by the Community industry.
V tem smislu se zgoraj omenjena sodba Sodi�ča prve stopnje Mukand in drugi proti Svetu, na katero se sklicuje družba AGST, nana�a na protikonkurenčno določitev vi�ine dodatne dajatve na zlitine, ki so jo proizvajalci Skupnosti uporabljali za plo�čate izdelke iz nerjavnega jekla in ki je znatno vplivala na cene jeklenih palic in umetno povzročila njihovo povi�anje, tako da so izgubile svojo verodostojnost za ugotavljanje �kode za industrijo Skupnosti.
In that judgment, the Court of First Instance held that, although it was not proved that the final sale prices of stainless steel bars had been fixed by Community producers acting in concert, the Community institutions, by failing to take account of the uniform, consistent industrial practice of Community stainless steel bar producers, the objective effect of which was automatically to mirror, in the markets for those products, the artificial price increases achieved through concerted action between the flat product producers, disregarded a known factor, other than the subsidised imports, which could have caused injury to the Community industry at the same time.
V tej sodbi je Sodi�če prve stopnje ugotovilo, da – ne glede na to, da ni bilo ugotovljeno, da bi proizvajalci Skupnosti usklajeno določali končne prodajne cene palic iz nerjavnega jekla – institucije Skupnosti, s tem da niso upo�tevale enotne in stalne industrijske prakse proizvajalcev palic iz nerjavnega jekla v Skupnosti, katerih dejanski namen je bil samodejno doseči umetna povi�anja cen na trgih teh izdelkov z dogovorom med proizvajalci plo�čatih izdelkov, razen subvencioniranega uvoza niso upo�tevale nobenega znanega dejavnika, ki bi lahko hkrati �kodoval industriji Skupnosti.
It is therefore necessary to examine whether the concerted application of the alloy surcharge by the flat product producers which, as was held in Mukand and Others v Council, could have had a significant influence on the prices of stainless steel bars, could also have had such an influence on the prices of stainless steel wire for the purposes of Article 8(7) of the basic regulation.
Zato je treba preučiti, ali je dodatna dajatev na zlitine, ki so jo usklajeno uporabljali proizvajalci plo�čatih izdelkov in za katero je Sodi�če prve stopnje v zgoraj navedeni sodbi Mukand in drugi proti Svetu presodilo, da je lahko znatno vplivala na cene palic iz nerjavnega jekla, lahko imela tak�en vpliv tudi na cene žice iz nerjavnega jekla v smislu člena 8(7) osnovne uredbe.
In that regard, it is necessary to note that the Community institutions stated that the alloy surcharge for stainless steel wires had already been imposed as an element in the final price.
V zvezi s tem je treba poudariti, da so institucije Skupnosti navedle, da so dodatno dajatev na zlitine za žico iz nerjavnega jekla že upo�tevale kot del končne cene.
Those institutions submit that the alloy surcharge for stainless steel wires was, during the period under investigation, a percentage lower on average than 5% of the net average weighted price of those products.
Institucije navajajo, da je dodatna dajatev na zlitine za žico iz nerjavnega jekla v obdobju, v katerem je potekala preiskava, predstavljala delež, ki je bil v povprečju nižji od 5 % tehtane povprečne neto cene teh izdelkov.
Even assuming that the amount of the alloy surcharge was influenced by the flat product producers’ anticompetitive conduct, the effect of the artificial increase of the alloy surcharge on the net average weighted prices of stainless steel wires was so small that it could not cast doubt on the reliability of those prices.
Tudi ob domnevi, da je na vi�ino dodatne dajatve na zlitine vplivalo protikonkurenčno vedenje proizvajalcev plo�čatih izdelkov, bi bil učinek umetnega povi�anja dodatne dajatve na zlitine na tehtane povprečne neto cene tako majhen, da ne bi mogel vplivati na verodostojnost teh cen.
AGST claims that if the alloy surcharge for stainless steel bars artificially increased their prices, since it was multiplied by a yield factor of 1.35, it also inevitably artificially increased the price of stainless steel wires.
Družba AGST meni, da je dodatna dajatev na zlitine, ki je zaradi množenja s količnikom donosnosti 1,35 umetno povi�ala cene palic iz nerjavnega jekla, neizogibno umetno povi�ala tudi ceno žice iz nerjavnega jekla.
In that regard, AGST maintained, at the hearing, that the alloy surcharge for stainless steel wires, during the period under investigation, was, in any event, higher than the 4 or 5% suggested by the Commission.
Na obravnavi je družba AGST v zvezi s tem menila, da je bila dodatna dajatev na zlitine za žice iz nerjavnega jekla med preiskavo vsekakor vi�ja od 4 ali 5 %, vrednosti, ki jo je zatrjevala Komisija.
The exporting producers stated, during the administrative procedure, that the Community producers which had applied an alloy surcharge to steel wires had fixed its amount in the same way as the steel bar producers, by multiplying the alloy surcharge applied to flat steel products by a factor of 1.35, the objective effect
Proizvajalci izvozniki naj bi v upravnem postopku navedli, da so proizvajalci Skupnosti, ki so uporabljali dodatno dajatev na zlitine za jeklene žice, po zgledu proizvajalcev jeklenih palic vi�ino te dajatve določili z množenjem dodatne dajatve na zlitine, ki se uporablja za plo�čate izdelke iz jekla, s količnikom 1,35, dejanski
2008 — CASE C-398/05 of which was automatically to mirror, in the markets for those products, the artificial price increases achieved through the concerted action between the flat product producers.
2008 – ZADEVA C-398/05 namen tega pa je bil samodejno doseči umetna povi�anja cen na trgih teh izdelkov z dogovorom med proizvajalci teh izdelkov.
However, AGST provided no evidence concerning the parallelism between the evolution of the prices of flat products and that of the prices of stainless steel wires because of the uniform application of the yield coefficient of 1.35 by the wire producers to the alloy surcharge applied to flat products which could show that the flat product producers’ anticompetitive conduct could have significant repercussions on the level of stainless steel wire prices which would render them artificially higher.
Družba AGST tako ni predložila nobenih podatkov v zvezi z vzporednim spreminjanjem cen plo�čatih izdelkov in žice iz nerjavnega jekla, izhajajočim iz ravnanja proizvajalcev žice – in sicer enotnega množenja dodatne dajatve na zlitine, ki se uporablja za plo�čate izdelke, s količnikom donosnosti 1,35 – ki bi lahko nakazovalo, da je protikonkurenčno vedenje proizvajalcev plo�čatih izdelkov lahko pomembno vplivalo na raven cen žice iz nerjavnega jekla, s tem da je sprožilo umetno povi�anje teh cen.
In the main proceedings, the Community institutions did not fail to take account of a known factor like the system of applying the alloy surcharge.
Institucije Skupnosti so v zvezi s postopkom v glavni stvari upo�tevale tudi znane dejavnike, kot je sistem uporabe dodatne dajatve na zlitine.
They examined the factor of the application of the alloy surcharge and concluded that it constituted a small percentage of the final price.
Omenjene institucije so dejansko preučile dejavnik uporabe dodatne dajatve na zlitine in ugotovile, da je predstavljal le majhen delež končne cene.
In those circumstances, it is for the parties pleading the invalidity of the regulation to adduce evidence to show that the concerted application of the alloy surcharge by the flat product producers could have had an effect of such magnitude that the final prices of stainless steel wires could no longer be used to establish the existence of injury to the Community industry and of the causal link between that injury and the subsidised imports.
Zato morajo stranke, ki se sklicujejo na neveljavnost uredbe, predložiti dokaze, ki izkazujejo, da je usklajena uporaba dodatne dajatve na zlitine s strani proizvajalcev plo�čatih izdelkov lahko pomembno vplivala na to, da končnih cen žice iz nerjavnega jekla ni več mogoče uporabiti za ugotavljanje obstoja �kode za industrijo Skupnosti in vzročne zveze med to �kodo in subvencioniranim uvozom.
However, the Court file contains no material which could lead to the conclusion that the Community institutions made a manifest error of assessment by relying, in the determination of the injury and of the causal link between that injury and the subsidised imports, on the absence of factors, other than those imports, which, according to AGST, caused injury to the Community industry at the same time.
Spis tako ne vsebuje nobenega elementa, na podlagi katerega bi bilo mogoče ugotoviti, da so institucije Skupnosti storile očitno napako pri presoji, s tem da so se pri ugotavljanju �kode in vzročne zveze med to �kodo in subvencioniranim uvozom oprle na dejstvo, da ne obstajajo dejavniki, razen tega uvoza, ki naj bi po mnenju družbe AGST hkrati povzročili �kodo industriji Skupnosti.
AGST relied solely on Mukand and Others v Council to claim that the conclusions therein apply to Regulation No 1599/1999, since stainless steel wires belong, just like stainless steel bars, in the category of so-called ‘long’ products, and on the similarity between the two products in respect of the calculation of the alloy surcharge.
Družba AGST se je oprla zgolj na zgoraj navedeno sodbo Sodi�ča prve stopnje Mukand in drugi proti Svetu, da bi s tem dokazala, da bi morale ugotovitve iz te sodbe veljati tudi za Uredbo �t. 1599/1999 glede na to, da naj bi se žica iz nerjavnega jekla, tako kot palice iz nerjavnega jekla, uvr�čala v kategorijo podolgovatih izdelkov in da naj bi se za te izdelke uporabljal podoben način izračuna dodatne dajatve na zlitine.
No indication has been given that the concerted application of the alloy surcharge to flat products led to an increase in the overall level of stainless steel wire prices such that the final prices of those products could not be regarded as a reliable indicator for the purpose of establishing what injury was suffered by the Community industry because of the subsidised imports.
Nič ne kaže na to, da bi usklajena uporaba dodatne dajatve na zlitine za plo�čate izdelke vodila k tak�nemu povi�anju splo�ne ravni cen žice iz nerjavnega jekla, da končnih cen teh izdelkov ne bi bilo mogoče �teti za verodostojen kazalec za ugotavljanje �kode, ki jo je industriji Skupnosti povzročil subvencionirani uvoz.
It follows from all the foregoing that consideration of the question referred has disclosed nothing capable of affecting the validity of Regulation No 1599/1999.
Iz vsega zgoraj navedenega izhaja, da preučitev postavljenega vpra�anja ni pokazala ničesar, kar bi vplivalo na veljavnost Uredbe �t. 1599/1999.
Consideration of the question referred has disclosed nothing capable of affecting the validity of Council Regulation (EC) No 1599/1999 of 12 July 1999 imposing a definitive countervailing duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on stainless steel wires with a diameter of 1 mm or more originating in India and terminating the proceeding concerning imports of stainless steel wires with a diameter of 1 mm or more originating in the Republic of Korea.
Preučitev postavljenega vprašanja ni pokazala ničesar, kar bi vplivalo na veljavnost Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1599/1999 z dne 12. julija 1999 o uvedbi dokončne izravnalne dajatve in o dokončnem pobiranju začasne dajatve, uvedene na žico iz nerjavnega jekla premera 1 mm ali več s poreklom iz Indije ter o ustavitvi postopka v zvezi z uvozom žice iz nerjavnega jekla premera 1 mm ali več s poreklom iz Republike Koreje.
Case C-263/06
Zadeva C-263/06
(Common commercial policy — Protection against dumping — Antidumping duty — Hematite pig iron originating in Russia — Decision No 67/94/ECSC — Determination of customs value for purposes of the application of a variable antidumping duty — Transaction value — Successive sales at different prices — Whether the customs authority may take into consideration the price indicated in a sale of goods effected prior to that on the basis of which the customs declaration was made)
„Skupna trgovinska politika – Za�čita pred dampingom – Protidampin�ka dajatev – Surovo železo, pridobljeno iz hematita, s poreklom iz Rusije – Odločba �t. 67/94/ESPJ – Določanje carinske vrednosti za uporabo spremenljive protidampin�ke dajatve – Transakcijska vrednost – Zaporedne prodaje po različnih cenah – Možnost carinskega organa, da upo�teva prodajno ceno blaga, ki je bila določena pred ceno, na podlagi katere je bila predložena carinska deklaracija“
Opinion of Advocate General Mazák delivered on 11 September 2007 . . .
Mazáka, predstavljeni 11. septembra 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I - 1080
Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 28 February 2008 . . . . . .
Sodba Sodi�ča (četrti senat) z dne 28. februarja 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . I - 1099
(Commission Decision No 2424/88, Arts 1 and 2(1))
ESPJ – Skupna trgovinska politika – Zaščita pred dampingom – Protidampinška dajatev (Odločba Komisije št. 2424/88, člena 1 in 2(1))
SUMMARY — CASE C-263/06
POVZETEK – ZADEVA C-263/06
ECSC — Common commercial policy — Protection against dumping — Fixing of antidumping duties — Method of calculation
ESPJ – Skupna trgovinska politika – Zaščita pred dampingom – Določitev protidampinške dajatve – Metode izračuna
(Council Regulation No 2913/92, Art. 31(1); Commission Decision No 67/94, Art. 1(2))
(Uredba Sveta št. 2913/92, člen 31(1), Odločba Komisije št. 67/94, člen 1(2))
than the minimum price laid down in the antidumping measure.
enaka ali vi�ja od najnižje cene, predvidene s protidampin�kim ukrepom.
(see paras 39-41)
(Glej točke od 39 do 41.)
It follows from Articles 1 and 2(1) of Decision No 2424/88 on protection against dumped or subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Coal and Steel Community that the rules on antidumping are aimed at protecting against dumped or subsidised imports and an antidumping duty may be applied to any dumped product whose release for free circulation in the Community causes injury.
Iz členov 1 in 2(1) Odločbe �t. 2424/88 o za�čiti proti dampin�kemu ali subvencioniranemu uvozu iz držav, ki niso članice Evropske skupnosti za premog in jeklo, izhaja, da je cilj protidampin�kih predpisov za�čita proti dampin�kemu ali subvencioniranemu uvozu in da je protidampin�ko dajatev mogoče uporabiti za kakr�en koli dampin�ki izdelek, katerega sprostitev v prosti promet v Skupnosti povzroča �kodo.
Having regard to those provisions, the application of an antidumping measure thus presupposes that introduction of the goods into the Community market will harm the Community industry.
Glede na te določbe uporaba protidampin�kega ukrepa torej predvideva vnos blaga na trg Skupnosti, ki industriji Skupnosti povzroča �kodo.
The antidumping legislation does not concern a sale of goods as such as long as the goods are not actually exported to the Community customs territory or placed in free circulation within the Community.
Protidampin�ka pravila ne obravnavajo prodaje blaga, preden je dejansko izvoženo na carinsko območje Skupnosti in spro�čeno v prosti promet v Skupnosti.
Antidumping duties are designed to neutralise the dumping margin arising from the difference between the price on export to the Community and the normal value of the product and thereby to nullify the injurious effects of the importation of the goods concerned into the Community.
Namen protidampin�kih dajatev je namreč nevtralizirati stopnjo dampinga, ki je rezultat razlike med ceno izvoza v Skupnost in normalno vrednostjo izdelka, ter s tem odstraniti �kodljive učinke uvoza zadevnega blaga v Skupnost.
Thus, the objective of the antidumping rules does not involve, in principle, the levying of an antidumping duty established on the basis of the price indicated in a prior sale of the goods concerned if the price actually paid or payable by the person making the declaration is equivalent to or greater
Tako cilj protidampin�kih predpisov načeloma ne zahteva naložitve protidampin�ke dajatve, določene na podlagi predhodne prodajne cene zadevnega blaga, če je bila cena, ki jo je deklarant dejansko plačal ali jo mora plačati,
In accordance with Article 1(2) of Decision No 67/94 imposing a provisional antidumping duty on imports into the Community of hematite pig iron, originating in Brazil, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, the customs authorities may not determine the customs value for the purpose of applying the antidumping duty established by that decision on the basis of the price indicated for the goods concerned in a sale prior to that on the basis of which the customs declaration was made in the case where the declared price corresponds to the price actually paid or payable by the importer.
V skladu s členom 1(2) Odločbe �t. 67/94 o uvedbi začasne protidampin�ke dajatve na uvoz surovega železa, pridobljenega iz hematita, s poreklom iz Brazilije, Poljske, Rusije in Ukrajine v Skupnost, carinski organi carinske vrednosti za uporabo protidampin�ke dajatve, uvedene z navedeno odločbo, ne morejo določiti na podlagi prodajne cene zadevnega blaga, ki je bila določena pred ceno, na podlagi katere je bila predložena carinska deklaracija, če prijavljena cena ustreza ceni, ki jo je uvoznik dejansko plačal ali jo mora plačati. Z besedo „prijavljena“, ki je dodana pojmu carinska vrednost, je v tej določbi izraženo, da osnova za uporabo protidampin�ke dajatve ni carinska
CARBONI E DERIVATI the concept of customs value in that provision emphasises that the basis for applying an antidumping duty is not the customs value as such but the customs value declared by the importer.
CARBONI E DERIVATI vrednost kot taka, temveč carinska vrednost, ki jo je prijavil uvoznik.
It follows from that provision, therefore, that the prices indicated in sales which took place prior to that on the basis of which the customs declaration was made by the importer cannot be taken into account for the application of an antidumping duty.
Iz tega izhaja, da cene prodaj, ki so se opravile pred prodajo, katere ceno je uvoznik uporabil za carinsko deklaracijo, ni mogoče upo�tevati za uporabo protidampin�ke dajatve.
in regard to which the customs authorities have no objective reason to doubt its accuracy.
glede katere ne bi imeli objektivnega razloga za dvom v njeno resničnost.
First, where such a doubt exists, the customs authorities need not necessarily determine the customs valuation of imported goods on the basis of the transaction value method if they are not satisfied, on the basis of reasonable doubts, that the declared value represents the total amount paid or payable, and they may refuse to accept the declared price if those doubts continue after they have asked for additional information or documents and have provided the person concerned with a reasonable opportunity to respond to the grounds for those doubts.
Ob takem dvomu carinskim organom na eni strani namreč ni treba določati carinske vrednosti na osnovi metode transakcijske vrednosti in lahko zavrnejo prijavljeno ceno, če se ti dvomi nadaljujejo po morebitni zahtevi za predložitev vseh dodatnih informacij ali dokumentov in potem ko je bilo zadevni osebi primerno omogočeno, da se opredeli glede razlogov.