natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
28 — Opinion in Lindorfer, cited in footnote 19, point 55, referring to Mangold, cited in footnote 2, paragraph 74.
28 – Sklepni predlogi v zadevi Lindorfer, navedeni v opombi 19, točka 55, ki se sklicujejo na sodbo Mangold, navedeno v opombi 2, točka 74.
29 — See the Commission’s Report on the Member States’ Legal Provisions to Combat Discrimination, cited in footnote 24, p.
29 – Glej Poročilo Komisije o zakonskih ukrepih držav članic na področju boja proti diskriminaciji, navedeno v opombi 24, str.
70; see further M. Sargeant (ed.), The Law on Age Discrimination in the EU (2008).
70; glej tudi M. Sargeant (ur.), The Law on Age Discri -mination in the EU (2008).
33 — See Pericles’ Funeral Oration for the Athenian dead in the first year of the (ultimately disastrous) war against Sparta: ‘Our form of government does not enter into rivalry with the institutions of others.
33 – Glej Periklejev nagrobni govor za padle Atence v prvem letu (pogubne) vojne proti Šparti: „Imamo tako državno ureditev, ki ne posnema zakonodaje drugih držav; ravno nasprotno, �e drugim smo v zgled, ne pa, da bi bili oni nam.
Our government does not copy our neighbours’, but is an example to them.
Po pravici imenujemo na�o oblast ljudsko, ker ne izvira od posameznikov, temveč je v rokah ljudskih množic.
It is true that we are called a democracy, for the administration is in the hands of the many and not of the few.
V zasebnih stvareh uživa vsak enake pravice kot vsi drugi.
But while there exists equal justice to all and alike in their private disputes, the claim of excellence is also recognized; and when a citizen is in any way distinguished, he is preferred to the public service, not as a matter of privilege, but as the reward of merit.
Pri upravljanju države nima nobene prednosti tisti, ki pripada nekemu določenemu razredu, temveč vsak, ki je na nekem področju ugleden ter pokaže sposobnost.
Neither is poverty an obstacle, but a man may benefit his country whatever the obscurity of his condition (Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book II, XXXV-XLVI, at XXXVII, in the translation by Benjamin Jowett (1881)).
Kdor more kakorkoli koristiti državi, mu tudi neuglednost njegovega stanu, ki izvira morda iz rev�čine, ne dela ovir.“ (Tukidid, Pelo -pone�ka vojna, Druga knjiga, XXXV–XLVI, zlasti XXXVII, Državna založba Slovenije, Ljubljana, 1958).
34 — A resident alien, having some but not all of the privileges of citizenship.
34 – Tuji prebivalci, ki so uživali nekatere, vendar ne vse privilegije državljanstva.
They evolve with society.
35Oba sta (seveda) izključevala ženske.
As they do so, the law reflects that change by starting to state explicitly that certain forms of discriminatory treatment, previously unnoticed or (if noticed) tolerated, will be tolerated no longer. Such legal changes are an extension — a new and further expression — of the general principle of equality.
Bližja na�emu času je Deklaracija o neodvisnosti Združenih držav Amerike razglasila, da „se vsi ljudje rodijo enaki“, 36 vendar je bila potrebna državljanska vojna in dolgotrajne posledice, preden se je enako obravnavanje začelo dejansko �iriti na potomce črnih sužnjev. 37
rather different model — similarly excluded Helots and slaves.
„katere vidike ekonomskega, socialnega, političnega, državljanskega in osebnega življenja zajema to načelo“ nista nespremenljiva.
35Both (naturally) excluded women.
Razvijata se z družbo.
Nearer to our times, the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America may have proclaimed that ‘all men are created equal’, 36 but it took the Civil War and a rather long aftermath before truly equal treatment began to extend to the descendants of black slaves.
S tem pravo odseva to spremembo, kadar začne izrecno določati, da se določene oblike diskriminatornega obravnavanja, ki se prej niso opazile ali (če so se opazile) so se dopu�čale, ne bodo več dopu�čale. Take spremembe v pravu so podalj - �ek – nov in nadaljnji izraz – splo�nega načela enakosti.
37Discrimin-ation on grounds of religion seemed perfectly natural — indeed, ordained by God — during large portions of the history of Europe and the Mediterranean basin.
Diskriminacija zaradi vere se je zdela popolnoma naravna – celo na podlagi božje zapovedi – v pomembnem delu zgodovine Evrope in Sredozemlja.
In short, the answers to the questions ‘who is covered by the principle of equal
Skratka, odgovora na vpra�anji „koga zajema načelo enakega obravnavanja“ in
35 — A class of serfs in ancient Sparta intermediate in status between ordinary slaves and free Spartan citizens.
35 – Razred sužnjev v antični Šparti z vmesnim položajem med navadnimi sužnji in svobodnimi �partanskimi državljani.
36 — ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness …’ (Declaration of Independence, 4 July 1776).
36 – „Menimo, da so te resnice samoumevne: da se vsi ljudje rodijo enaki; njihov Stvarnik jih je obdaroval z določenimi neodtuljivimi pravicami; med katere sodijo pravica do življenja, svobode in iskanje sreče […]“ (Deklaracija o neodvisnosti, 4. julij 1776).
Marshall I 38suggests that EC law did not, from its very inception, regard age as an obviously suspect ground on which to base distinctions.
V sodbi Marshall I 38je navedeno, da pravo ES od samega začetka ni �telo starosti za očiten sumljiv razlog za razlikovanje.
There, the Court was confronted with age as grounds for termination of employment.
Sodi�če se je v tej zadevi soočilo s starostjo kot razlogom za prenehanje zaposlitve.
That well-known ruling tends to indicate that in 1986 differentiating on the basis of age (as distinct from sex) was considered obviously relevant for the purposes of the termination of employment and hence acceptable under the general principle of equality in EC law.
Ta dobro znana odločitev nakazuje na to, da se je razlikovanje na podlagi starosti (v nasprotju s spolom) v letu 1986 očitno �telo za upo�tevno pri prenehanju zaposlitve in zato za sprejemljivo na podlagi splo�nega načela enakosti prava ES. Če ne bi bilo tako, bi se M. H. Marshall
37 — The Supreme Court of the United States played a large role in the process of establishing that discriminating on grounds of race was unacceptable.
37 – Vrhovno sodi�če Združenih držav Amerike je imelo pomembno vlogo pri ugotavljanju, da je nesprejemljivo diskriminirati zaradi rase.
See, for example, Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1954), in which the Supreme Court overturned its earlier ruling in Plessy v Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), where it had held that ‘separate but equal’ facilities, including schools, ‘for the white and coloured race’ were constitutional.
Glej na primer sodbo Brown proti Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1954), v kateri je vrhovno sodi�če spremenilo svojo prej�njo odločitev v sodbi Plessy proti Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), v kateri je razsodilo, da so bile „ločene, ampak enake“ ustanove, skupaj s �olami, „za belo in črno raso“, ustavne.
Only Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented in the latter case, holding that the ‘Constitution is colour-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among its citizens’.
Le sodnik John Marshall Harlan je v zadnjenavedeni zadevi podal odklonilno mnenje, ker je menil, da je „ustava barvno slepa in ne pozna ter ne dopu�ča razslojevanja državljanov“.
BARTSCH would have relied on the prohibition on discrimination by reference to age to buttress her main argument.
BARTSCH v utemeljitev svoje glavne trditve verjetno sklicevala na prepoved diskriminacije zaradi starosti.
ceptable inequality of treatment — inter alia, discrimination on grounds of age.
kega obravnavanja – med drugim diskriminaciji zaradi starosti.
It thus enables the Community legislator both to define (inter alia) age discrimination more precisely and to lay down rules designed to eliminate it.
Tako omogoča zakonodajalcu Skupnosti, da podrobneje opredeli (med drugim) starostno diskriminacijo in da sprejme predpise za njeno odpravo.
Once the possible (new) scope of the principle has emerged, the natural next step is to define it more precisely and to put in place the rules to combat the discrimination that has been identified. 39
Ko se pojavi morebitno (novo) področje uporabe načela, je naslednji naravni korak njegova podrobnej�a določitev in vzpostavitev pravila za boj proti ugotovljeni diskriminaciji. 39
For that reason, any argument to the effect that if a principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age had already existed, Article 13 EC or Directive 2000/78 would have been unnecessary is fundamentally misconceived.
Zato je v osnovi nepravilna katera koli trditev, da bi bila člen 13 ES ali Direktiva 2000/78 nepotrebna, če bi načelo prepovedi diskriminacije zaradi starosti že obstajalo.
It is precisely because the general principle of equality has now been recognised also to include equality of treatment irrespective of age that an enabling legislative provision such as Article 13 EC becomes necessary and is duly used as the basis for detailed legislative intervention.
To je ravno zaradi tega, ker je glede načela enakosti sedaj priznano, da vključuje tudi enakost obravnavanja ne glede na starost, da taka določba o zakonodajnem pooblastilu, kot je člen 13 ES, postane potrebna in se pravilno uporablja kot podlaga za podrobne zakonodajne ukrepe.
Admittedly, it may be possible to deal with certain situations (involving some form of straightforward, crude or arbitrary age discrimination) by applying the principle of equal treatment irrespective of age in its bare, unvarnished form. Where the situation is more complex and the dividing line between justifiable differentiation and unjustifiable discrimination is less self-evident, however, effective action to combat discrimination necessarily also involves the elaboration of appropriate definitions.
Čeprav je nekatere položaje (ki vključujejo nekatere oblike odkrite, surove ali samovoljne starostne diskriminacije) mogoče obravnavati z uporabo načela enakega obravnavanja ne glede na starost v njegovi goli, preprosti obliki, pa je, kadar je položaj bolj zapleten in je ločnica med utemeljenim in neutemeljenim razlikovanjem bolj zabrisana, v okviru ukrepov za učinkovit boj proti diskriminaciji vendarle treba ustrezno opredeliti pojme.
Article 13 EC provides the legal basis for legislative action at EC level to ‘combat’ various forms of unac-
Člen 13 ES je pravna podlaga za zakonodajni ukrep na ravni ES za „boj“ proti različnim oblikam nesprejemljivega neena-
39 — Compare R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977), pp. 22 to 28, who defines the difference between rules and principles by reference to the character of the direction they give.
39 – Primerjaj R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977), str. od 22 do 28, ki opredeljuje razliko med pravili in načeli v povezavi z naravo smeri, ki jo kažejo.
A principle states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular decision.
Načelo določa razlog, ki kaže v eno smer, vendar ne zahteva posebne odločitve.
A rule sets out legal consequences that follow automatically when the conditions provided are met.
Pravilo določa pravne posledice, ki nastopijo samodejno, ko so izpolnjeni določeni pogoji.
Conversely, rules lack the dimension of weight that principles have: if two rules conflict, one must be inapplicable or invalid, while two conflicting principles can be weighed against each other.
Nasprotno, pravila nimajo tolik�ne teže, kot jo imajo načela – če si dve pravili nasprotujeta, enega ni mogoče uporabiti ali je neveljavno, medtem ko se lahko dve nasprotujoči si načeli tehtata eno nasproti drugemu.
The obverse of that coin is that detailed specific prohibitions on ‘discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’ cannot have existed at the moment when Article 13 was incorporated into the EC Treaty.
Po drugi strani velja, da podrobne posebne prepovedi „diskriminacije na podlagi spola, rase ali narodnosti, vere ali prepričanja, invalidnosti, starosti ali spolne usmerjenosti“ niso mogle obstajati v času, ko je bil člen 13 ES vključen v Pogodbo ES.
If they had, Article 13 EC would
Če bi obstajale, bi dejansko obstajala nevarnost,
40Still less can they have sprung fully armed, like Athene from the head of Zeus, at that precise moment.
40Še manj bi lahko natanko v tistem trenutku skočile kvi�ku, oborožene do zob, kot Atene iz Zeusove glave.
Second, Article 13 EC empowers the Council (acting unanimously), after consulting the European Parliament, to ‘take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on’ various specific grounds.
Drugič, člen 13 ES poobla�ča Svet, da „po posvetovanju z Evropskim parlamentom soglasno sprejme ustrezne ukrepe za boj proti diskriminaciji“ zaradi različnih posebnih razlogov.
It does not itself define those types of discrimination.
Sam ne opredeljuje teh vrst diskriminacije.
It starts from the assumption that, unfortunately, they exist and should be (vigorously) opposed.
Izhaja iz domneve, da žal obstajajo in jim je treba (odločno) nasprotovati.
Taking its lead from Article 13 EC, Directive 2000/78 likewise starts from the assumption that certain forms of discrimination exist.
Enako Direktiva 2000/78 na podlagi člena 13 ES izhaja iz domneve, da nekatere oblike diskriminacije obstajajo.
It proceeds — referring not to existing specific prohibitions on such forms of discrimination, but rather (in general terms) to the need to respect fundamental rights — to define what the principle of equal treatment means in certain contexts, as the necessary precursor to guaranteeing that the principle should be respected.
V nadaljevanju – ne s sklicevanjem na veljavne posebne prepovedi takih oblik diskriminacije, temveč prej (na splo�no) na potrebo po spo�tovanju temeljnih pravic – opredeljuje, kaj pomeni načelo enakega obravnavanja v določenih okoli�činah, kot potrebna predhodna sestavina za zagotavljanje spo�tovanja načela.
The analysis that I here put forward is supported by examining more closely the enabling provision contained in Article 13 EC.
Presoja, ki jo v tem primeru podajam, je podprta s podrobnej�o preučitvijo pooblastitvene določbe iz člena 13 ES.
First, Article 13 EC states that it is ‘without prejudice to the other provisions of [the] Treaty’ (and thus, a fortiori, to the general principles underlying Community law).
Prvič, v členu 13 ES je določeno: „brez poseganja v druge določbe te pogodbe“ (in zato, a fortiori, v splo�na načela, na katerih temelji pravo Skupnosti).
Its use as a legal base for detailed measures to combat, inter alia, discrimination on grounds of age does not undermine the general principle of equality.
Njegova uporaba kot pravne podlage za podrobnej�e ukrepe za boj proti, med drugim, diskriminaciji zaradi starosti ne spodkopava splo�nega načela enakosti.
Rather, it enables specific manifestations of that general principle to be developed more effectively.
Prej omogoča učinkovitej�i razvoj posebnega izraza tega splo�nega načela.
Third, the Community legislator has proceeded on the basis that directives enacted under Article 13 EC do not merely facilitate the application of the prohibitions on discrimination on the grounds enumerated in that Treaty article.
Tretjič, zakonodajalec Skupnosti je izhajal iz ugotovitve, da direktive, sprejete na podlagi člena 13 ES, ne olaj�ujejo le uporabe prepovedi diskriminacije zaradi razlogov iz tega člena Pogodbe, ampak opredeljujejo tudi natančno področje uporabe teh prepovedi v določenih okoli�činah. 41Po mojem mnenju to ne spodkopava predpostavke, da je temeljno načelo (da je treba prepovedati
41 I do not see that as undermining the proposition that the basic principle (that discrimination on grounds of age
41 – Za primerjavo glej Direktivo o rasni diskriminaciji, zlasti člena 2 (pojem diskriminacije) in 3 (področje uporabe).
40 — Further detailed action to combat specific forms of discrimination each already prohibited as general principles of Community law might conceivably have been enacted by the Council under Article 308 EC (ex Article 235) read in conjunction with the Community’s objectives enumerated in Article 2.
40 – Svet bi lahko na podlagi člena 308 ES (prej člen 235) v povezavi s cilji Skupnosti iz člena 2 sprejel nadaljnje podrobnej�e ukrepe za boj proti posebnim oblikam diskriminacje, ki so že prepovedane kot splo�na načela prava Skupnosti.
The Member States clearly felt that a separate legal base in the Treaty would be required for such action and duly provided it, in the form of Article 13 EC.
Države članice so očitno menile, da je bila potrebna posebna pravna podlaga v Pogodbi za tak ukrep in so jo pravilno zagotovile v obliki člena 13 ES.
BARTSCH should be prohibited) had already come into existence.
BARTSCH diskriminacijo zaradi starosti) že nastalo.
Rather, it seems to me that — as a matter of legal practicality — it is only possible effectively to combat an evil that has been carefully and specifically defined.
Pravzaprav se mi zdi, da se je – z vidika praktične uporabe prava – mogoče učinkovito boriti le proti zlu, ki je podrobno in posebej opredeljeno.
I therefore agree with the Court in Mangold that the origins of the principle — that is, of the concept that it is now unacceptable to discriminate on any of the grounds enumerated in Article 13 EC — lie neither in Directive 2000/78 as an implementing directive, nor indeed in Article 13 EC as such. They must be found in a prior time and place. 44
Zato se strinjam z mnenjem Sodi�ča v sodbi Mangold, da izvor načela – to je zamisli, da je sedaj nesprejemljivo diskriminirati zaradi katerega koli razloga iz člena 13 ES – ne temelji niti na Direktivi 2000/78 kot izvedbeni direktivi niti na členu 13 ES kot takemu, ampak ga je treba iskati v predhodnem času in drugje. 44
That is, in essence, because the difference between (acceptable) differential treatment and (unacceptable) discrimination 42lies not in whether people are treated differently, but in whether society accepts as justifiable the criteria whose application results in different treatment, or whether, on the contrary, they are considered as arbitrary.
To je v bistvu zato, ker razlika med (sprejemljivim) različnim obravnavanjem in (nesprejemljivo) diskriminacijo 42ne temelji na vpra�anju, ali se ljudje obravnavajo različno, temveč na vpra�anju, ali družba sprejema kot utemeljena merila, katerih uporaba ima za posledico različno obravnavanje, ali, nasprotno, na vpra�anju, ali se �tejejo za samovoljna.
43 Detailed legislation will be needed to address this issue: to classify the application of particular criteria in particular circumstances as acceptable or unacceptable and to give binding legal effect to that classification.
43Potrebna bo podrobna zakonodaja za ureditev tega vpra�anja – opredeliti, ali je uporaba posebnih meril v posebnih okoli�činah sprejemljiva ali nesprejemljiva, in temu pripisati zavezujoč pravni učinek.
It seems to me that, from its inception, Community law would indeed have precluded certain distinctions based on age.
Zdi se mi, da pravo Skupnosti od svojega začetka ne bi dejansko dopu�čalo nekaterih razlikovanj na podlagi starosti.
Suppose that in (say) 1960 a Member State had permitted free movement of workers from other Member States except for those aged between 28 and 29 and between 52 and 53.
Predpostavimo, da bi država članica (na primer) v letu 1960 dovolila prosto gibanje delavcev iz drugih držav članic, razen tistih v starosti med 28 in 29 ter med 52 in 53 let.
Such an (unlikely) arrangement would surely have been caught by the general principle of equal treatment that has always formed part of Community law.
Taka (malo verjetna) ureditev bi zagotovo spadala na področje uporabe splo�nega načela enakega obravnavanja, ki je vedno bil del prava Skupnosti.
Differentiating between workers in accordance
Razlikovanje med delavci bi se v skladu s tema povezanima starostnima obdobjema �telo za samovoljno in neutemeljeno.
42 — On this terminological distinction, see M. Bossuyt, L’interdiction de la discrimination dans le droit international des droits de l’homme (1976), pp. 7 to 27.
42 – O tej terminolo�ki razliki glej M. Bossuyt, L’interdiction de la discrimination dans le droit international des droits de l’homme (1976), str. od 7 do 27.
44 — The transition from concept to full implementation is, I think, often more likely to be evolutionary than the result of some ‘big bang’.
44 – Menim, da je prehod od zamisli do polne uveljavitve velikokrat verjetno bolj evolucijski kot posledica nekega „velikega poka“.
For example, it would be difficult to pinpoint the exact moment between (say) 1780 and 1807 when the principle emerged that, thanks to the work of reformers such as Peter Peckard, Thomas Clarkson and William Wilberforce, found specific expression in ‘An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade’ (47 Georgii III, Session 1, cap. XXXVI).
Na primer, težko bi bilo določiti točen trenutek nastanka načela med (na primer) letoma 1780 in 1807, ki je po zaslugi dela reformatorjev, kot so bili Peter Peckard, Thomas Clarkson in William Wilberforce, pri�lo posebej do izraza v „Aktu o odpravi trgovine s sužnji“ (47 Georgii III, Session 1, cap. XXXVI).
43 — Thus (for example) the principle behind rationing is to apply specific criteria to differentiate between potential recipients and thus to allocate scarce resources.
43 – Tako (na primer) stoji za načelom razlogovanja uporaba posebnih meril za razlikovanje med potencialnimi prejemniki in tako porazdelitev omejenih virov.
Criteria that are regarded as justifiable are accepted; other criteria are opposed as arbitrary or unfair.
Sprejemljiva so merila, ki se �tejejo za utemeljena; drugim merilom se nasprotuje kot samovoljnim in nepravičnim.
But what is justifiable is determined by the view taken by society in that particular time and place.
Kaj je utemeljeno, pa je določeno z mnenjem družbe v tem posebnem času in kraju.
See further the Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Case C-303/06 Coleman, point 16, and my Opinion of 24 April 2008 in Case C-353/06 Grunkin and Paul, points 62 and 71, and see, on the element of arbitrariness in discrimination: Bossuyt, cited in footnote 42, pp. 37 to 39 and 97 to 128.
Glej tudi sklepne predloge generalnega pravobranilca Poiaresa Madura, predstavljene 31. januarja 2008 v zadevi Coleman, C-303/06, točka 16, in moje sklepne predloge, predstavljene 24. aprila 2008 v zadevi Grunkin in Paul, C-353/06, točki 62 in 71; ter o elementu samovoljnosti in diskriminacije glej Bossuyta, navedenega v opombi 42, str. od 37 do 39 in od 97 do 128.
What has happened over the intervening years is that society’s perception of more subtle forms of differential treatment on grounds of age has changed from unthinking acceptance to focussed examination.
V vmesnih letih se je zgodilo to, da se je dojemanje družbe prikritih oblik različnega obravnavanja zaradi starosti spremenilo od nepremi�ljenega sprejemanja do podrobne preučitve.
First, that directive specifically addresses the question of combating discrimination based on, inter alia, age in employment and occupation.
Prvič, ta direktiva posebej ureja vpra�anje boja proti diskriminaciji na podlagi, med drugim, starosti pri zaposlovanju in delu.
46 Clearly age discrimination may arise in other contexts; but these are not (as yet) addressed by an implementing directive based on Article 13 EC.
46 Očitno starostna diskriminacija lahko nastane v drugih okoli�činah; vendar te (�e) niso urejene z izvedbeno direktivo na podlagi člena 13 ES.
Second, the Member States unquestionably envisaged that, once the transposition period had elapsed, equal treatment as derived from the directive should indeed be applied ‘horizontally’, to ‘all persons, as regards both the public and private sectors, including public bodies’. 47
Drugič, države članice so nedvomno predvidele, da bi bilo treba po izteku roka za prenos enako obravnavanje, kot izhaja iz Direktive, dejansko uporabiti „horizontalno“ „za vse osebe, bodisi v javnem bodisi v zasebnem sektorju, vključno z javnimi telesi“. 47