natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
167However, after that extensive investigation the concentration must be cleared, notwithstanding any remaining doubts, provided that on the Commission’s prognosis the creation or strengthening of a dominant position is less likely than not.
167 Po takem poglobljenem preizkusu pa mora biti koncentracija odobrena kljub morebitnim preostalim dvomom, pod pogojem, da sta nastanek ali krepitev prevladujočega položaja v skladu z napovedjo Komisije manj verjetna kot njun izostanek.
On the other hand, the concentration is to be prohibited if, following its more extensive investigation, the Commission regards the creation or strengthening of a dominant position as more likely than not, despite any remaining doubts.
Obratno je treba koncentracijo kljub morebitnim preostalim dvomom prepovedati, če Komisija po opravljenem poglobljenem preizkusu meni, da sta nastanek ali krepitev prevladujočega položaja verjetnej�a kot njun izostanek.
— Symmetry of the requirements for clearances and prohibitions
– Sorazmernost zahtev za odobritve in prepovedi
I cannot discern any difference between the legal requirements as to clearance decisions on the one hand and prohibition decisions on the other.
Kar zdaj zadeva pravne zahteve za odločbe o odobritvi po eni strani in odločbe o prepovedi po drugi strani, med njimi ne vidim nobene razlike.
Contrary to the submissions of the appellants, there is no such difference either as regards the degree of plausibility of the prognosis to be made by the Commission or as regards the solidity of the factual basis supporting it.
Tak�na razlika, v nasprotju z mnenjem pritožnikov, ne obstaja niti glede stopnje verodostojnosti napovedi, ki jo mora sprejeti Komisija, niti glede trdnosti dejstev, na katerih temelji.
166This particularly high standard is known principally in the field of criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings.
posebno visoki standard je značilen zlasti za kazenske postopke ali postopke, ki so tem podobni.
In merger control proceedings it is applicable only in the preliminary phase (‘Phase I’), to compensate for the fact that at that stage the investigation of a concentration is merely a summary one.
V postopku nadzora koncentracij se uporablja le v fazi predhodnega preizkusa („faza I“) in sicer kot izravnava za to, da je mogoče v tem delu postopka koncentracijo preučiti zgolj na splo�no.
At that stage, ‘serious doubts’ as to the compatibility of the concentration with the common market will only prevent its being cleared too quickly and force the Commission to make a more extensive investigation in a formal procedure (‘Phase II’) (Article 6(1)(b) and (c) of the Merger
„Resen dvom“ glede njene združljivosti s skupnim trgom potem tudi samo prepreči, da bi bila koncentracija prenagljeno odobrena, in prisili Komisijo, da najprej opravi poglobljen preizkus v okviru uradnega postopka preizkusa („faza II“)
165 — See paragraphs 126 and 173 of the judgment under appeal.
165 – K temu glej že točki 126 in 173 izpodbijane sodbe.
Both Article 2 of the Merger Regulation, which lays down the general review programme for the control of a
Odstavka 2 in 3 tako člena 2 Uredbe o združitvah, ki na splo�no opredeljuje program preizkusa za nadzor načrta
167 — For an example from environmental law, see Case C-127/02 Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee and Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming van Vogels [2004] ECR I-7405, paragraphs 44 and 55 to 59.
167 – Za primer s področja okoljskega prava glej sodbo z dne 7. septembra 2004 v zadevi Waddenvereniging in Vogelbe -schermingsvereniging (C-127/02, ZOdl., str. I-7405, točka 44 in točke od 55 do 59).
166 — To similar effect, see the Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Tetra Laval (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 74: ‘It therefore cannot be claimed that in order to prohibit a concentration the Commission must establish with absolute certainty that the concentration would lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it’ (emphasis added).
166 – Podobno generalni pravobranilec Tizzano v sklepnih predlogih z dne 25. maja 2004 v zadevi Komisija proti Tetra Laval (C-12/03 P, sodba navedena v opombi 96, točka 74): „Zato ni mogoče zahtevati, da bi morala Komisija, če bi hotela prepovedati koncentracijo, s popolno gotovostjo ugotoviti, da bi ta ustvarila ali krepila prevladujoči položaj, katerega posledica bi bila resno oviranje učinkovite konkurence na skupnem trgu ali na njegovem znatnem delu“ (moj poudarek).
symmetry of the requirements for clearance and for prohibition decisions.
proti tej sorazmernosti zahtev za odločbe o odobritvi in prepovedi.
The requirement laid down there, namely ‘convincing evidence’, 170is mentioned merely by way of reminder that the Commission must have a reliable factual basis for its assessment of probability.
Kajti zahteva po „prepričljivih dokazih“ (angle�ko: „convincing evidence“), 170ki jo vsebuje ta sodba, terja le, da Komisija svojo verjetnostno sodbo utemelji z zanesljivimi dejstvi.
This appears moreover elsewhere in the judgment in Tetra Laval, where the Court says that ‘the quality of the evidence produced by the Commission … is particularly important, since that evidence must support the Commission’s conclusion that … the economic development envisaged by it would be plausible’. 171
To se sicer kaže tudi na drugih mestih v sodbi Komisija proti Tetra Laval, kjer Sodi�če „kakovost“ dokazov, ki jih je predložila Komisija, označuje za „posebej pomembno“, „saj morajo ti dokazi utemeljiti ugotovitve Komisije, da bi bil […] scenarij ekonomskega razvoja, ki ga leta predvideva, verodostojen.“ 171
Ultimately, this symmetry reflects the fact that in each individual case the Commission must strike a fair balance between interests of equal value which are guaranteed by primary law, 168being on the one hand the rights and interests of the parties to the concentration, and on the other the public interest in protecting competition against distortion (Article 3(1)(g) EC).
Ta sorazmernost končno zrcali, da mora Komisija v vsakem posamičnem primeru pravično izravnavati enakovrstne interese, ki jih varuje primarno pravo, 168namreč po eni strani pravice in interese udeležencev koncentracije in po drugi strani javni interes glede varstva konkurence pred izkrivljanjem (člen 3(1)(g) ES).
169 Thus, while the commercial freedom of the participating undertakings and the property rights of their shareholders (Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter of fundamental rights) undoubtedly include the right to realise concentrations of undertakings, this applies only in so far as certain conditions or obligations on, or even the prohibition of, the concentration in question are not necessary for protecting competition from distortion.
169Sicer tako pravica udeleženih podjetij do gospodarske pobude kot tudi lastninske pravice njihovih delničarjev (člena 16 in 17 Listine o temeljnih pravicah) nedvomno vključujejo pravico do uresničitve koncentracij podjetij; to pa velja le, če varstvo konkurence pred izkrivljanjem ne upravičuje določenih pogojev ali zahtev ali celo prepovedi konkretne koncentracije.
The requirement for ‘convincing’ evidence must not be misunderstood as placing the bar higher in relation to prohibition decisions than in relation to clearance decisions.
Zahteva po „prepričljivih“ dokazih se ne sme napačno razumeti tako, da bi bilo s tem merilo za odločbe o prepovedi strožje kot za odločbe o odobritvi.
As the Court made clear in Tetra Laval, the requirement for ‘convincing’ evidence ‘by no means added a condition relating to the requisite standard of proof but merely drew attention to the essential function of evidence, which is to establish convincingly the merits of an argument or … of a decision’. 172
Kot je namreč Sodi�če pojasnilo v sodbi Komisija proti Tetra Laval, z zahtevo po „prepričljivih“ dokazih „nikakor ni dodalo nove zahteve glede potrebnega dokaznega standarda, ampak je zgolj opozorilo na bistveno vlogo dokaza, ki je v tem, da prepričljivo utemelji veljavnost re�itve, oziroma […] odločbe […]“. 172
168 — On this point see, on the one hand, the third and fourth recitals to the Merger Regulation and, on the other, the fifth recital thereto.
168 – K temu glej tretjo in četrto uvodno izjavo Uredbe o združitvah po eni strani in njeno peto uvodno izjavo po drugi strani.
170 — Tetra Laval (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 41; see also Kali & Salz (cited above, footnote 16), paragraph 228, which refers to, ‘cogent and consistent evidence’. The German translation of Tetra Laval, which refers to ‘eindeutig’ evidence, does not appear to me to be a correct translation of the English phrase ‘convincing evidence’; accordingly, here and in the following I use the adjective ‘überzeugend’ to mean ‘convincing’. 171 — Tetra Laval (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 44.
170 – Sodba Komisija proti Tetra Laval (navedena v opombi 96, točka 41); glej tudi sodbo „Kali & Salz“ (navedena v opombi 16, točka 228), ki govori o „tehtnih in prepričljivih dokazih“ (angle�ko: „cogent and consistent evidence“). Menim, da nem�ki prevod sodbe Komisija proti Tetra Laval, ki govori o „jasnih“ dokazih, ne izraža pravilno angle�kega izraza „convincing evidence“; zato tu in v nadaljevanju za „convincing“ vedno uporabljam pridevnik „prepričljiv“. 171 – Sodba Komisija proti Tetra Laval (navedena v opombi 96, točka 44).
169 — See also the first, second and fifth recitals of the Merger Regulation.
169 – Glej tudi prvo, drugo in peto uvodno izjavo Uredbe o zdru -žitvah.
172 — Tetra Laval (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 41 (emphasis added).
172 – Sodba Komisija proti Tetra Laval (navedena v opombi 96, točka 41); moj poudarek.
— No general presumption of compatibility with the common market
– Neobstoj splo�ne domneve o združljivosti s skupnim trgom
Stricter requirements in relation to prohibiting an intended concentration than in relation to clearing it can be inferred from the passage in Tetra Laval quoted above just as little as they can be inferred from the Court’s warning that the Commission must carry out its prospective analysis ‘with great care’.
Da bi za prepoved načrta koncentracije veljale strožje zahteve kot za njeno odobritev, iz navedenih delov sodbe Komisija proti Tetra Laval ni mogoče zaključiti, kot tudi ne iz opozorila Sodi�ča, da mora biti Komisija pri sprejetju svoje odločbe o napovedi „pozorna“.
173 The Commission may by no means grant clearance to a concentration ‘without care’, and in doing so support its analysis with less ‘convincing’ evidence than in the case of a prohibition.
173Komisija namreč nikakor ne sme biti „nepozorna“ pri odobritvi koncentracije in se opirati na manj „prepričljive“ dokaze kot pri njeni prepovedi.
Otherwise it would not be properly performing its core function of protecting competition within the internal market against distortion.
Drugače ne bi mogla izpolniti svoje ključne naloge varstva konkurence pred izkrivljanjem na notranjem trgu.
In each individual case the Commission must make an express finding as to whether the concentration in question is compatible or incompatible with the common market, 176and the participating undertakings are expressly prohibited from putting their concentration into effect before the decision is made (Article 7(1) and (5) of the Merger Regulation).
Komisija mora v vsakem posameznem primeru izrecno odločati o združljivosti ali nezdružljivosti zadevne koncentracije s skupnim trgom, 176pred tako odločitvijo pa je udeleženim podjetjem izrecno prepovedano, da bi koncentracijo izvajala (člen 7(1) in (5) Uredbe o združitvah).
The case of EDP v Commission, 177on which the appellants rely, does not lead to any different conclusion.
Nič drugega ne izhaja iz sodbe EDP proti Komisiji, 177na katero se sklicujeta pritožnika.
In that case the Court made it clear that mere doubts on the Commission’s part are not enough to justify prohibiting a concentration.
Tam Sodi�če prve stopnje sicer pojasni, da samo dvomi Komisije �e ne upravičujejo prepovedi koncentracije.
However, it cannot be taken from that, a contrario, that there is a general presumption that concentrations are compatible with the common market.
Iz tega pa nikakor ni mogoče izpeljati nasprotnega sklepa o splo�ni domnevi združljivosti koncentracije s skupnim trgom.
This is also shown by a glance at the 15th recital to the Merger Regulation, from which it follows that, at best, concentrations having a limited market share may
To izhaja tudi iz 15. uvodne izjave Uredbe o združitvah, v skladu s katero se lahko kvečjemu za
Thus, if the creation or strengthening of a dominant position is more likely than not, the concentration is to be prohibited; by contrast, if the creation or strengthening of such a position is less likely than not, the concentration is to be cleared.
Če sta torej nastanek ali krepitev prevladujočega položaja verjetnej�a kot njun izostanek, je treba koncentracijo prepovedati; če pa sta nasprotno nastanek ali krepitev takega položaja manj verjetna kot njun izostanek, je treba koncentracijo odobriti.
These two assessments of probability are two sides of the same coin.
Ti verjetnostni sodbi sta dve plati iste medalje.
Each is to be made with great care and is to be supported by a factual basis which is not only correct and complete — for that, ‘convincing’ evidence is necessary — but is also capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it. 174
Pri sprejetju vsake izmed njiju je treba biti pozoren in jo podkrepiti z dejstvi, ki niso le točna in popolna – za to so potrebni „prepričljivi“ dokazi –, ampak lahko tudi utemeljijo iz njih izvedene sklepe. 174
175 — These interests are, on the one hand, the rights and interest of the parties to the concentration and, on the other, the public interest in the protection of competition from distortion; again, on this point see above, point 214.
175 – Ti interesi so po eni strani pravice in interesi udeležencev koncentracije in po drugi strani javni interes glede varstva konkurence pred izkrivljanjem; glej ponovno točko 214 teh sklepnih predlogov.
173 — Tetra Laval (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 42.
173 – Sodba Komisija proti Tetra Laval (navedena v opombi 96, točka 42).
176 — See also General Electric (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 61.
176 – Tako tudi sodba General Electric proti Komisiji (navedena v opombi 96, točka 61).
177 — Case T-87/05 EDP v Commission [2005] ECR II-3745, paragraph 64.
174 – Sodbi Komisija proti Tetra Laval (navedena v opombi 96, točka 39) in General Electric proti Komisiji (navedena v opombi 96, točka 63); glej tudi točki 173 in 174 teh sklepnih predlogov.
In my opinion, it is only in the following two categories of case that, very exceptionally, a concentration may be presumed to be compatible with the common market.
Menim, da se lahko le zelo izjemoma v obeh naslednjih skupinah primerov domneva, da je koncentracija združljiva s skupnim trgom.
179 However, in my view this term should not be misunderstood as involving a considerable number of cases.
179Menim pa, da se tega izraza ne sme narobe razumeti v tem smislu, da bi obstajalo večje �tevilo takih primerov.
I think that there can only be a few small and infrequent borderline cases in which, even after extensive market investigations, it is not clear on which side of the line the case falls.
Mislim, da gre le za nekaj redkih mejnih primerov, pri katerih tudi po ob�irnih raziskavah trga ni jasno, na katero stran se obrača jeziček za tehtnici.
Only such instances of non liquet ought to be declared compatible with the common market and cleared on the basis of the principle in dubio pro libertate.
Le taki primeri non liquet naj bi se v skladu z načelom in dubio pro libertate razglasili za združljive s skupnih trgom in odobrili.
However, it is not possible to derive from this category of case a more farreaching general presumption that concentrations are compatible with the common market.
Šir�a splošna domneva o združljivosti koncentracij s skupnim trgom pa tudi iz obstoja te skupine primerov ne more izhajati.
The first category of case concerns notified concentrations on which the Commission has not given a decision in time, in breach of its statutory obligation.
Prva skupina primerov se nana�a na prigla�ene koncentracije, o katerih Komisija v nasprotju s svojo zakonsko dolžnostjo ni odločila v predpisanem roku.
Article 10(6) of the Merger Regulation provides that such concentrations are by operation of law deemed to be compatible with the common market (see also Article 7(1) and (5) of the Merger Regulation).
Združljivost takih koncentracij s skupnim trgom se v skladu s členom 10(6) Uredbe o združitvah domneva že na podlagi zakona (glej tudi člen 7(1) in (5) Uredbe o združitvah).
However, given that it is an exception, and given its place in the legislative scheme in conjunction with the provisions as to time-limits, it is not possible to derive from Article 10(6) of the Merger Regulation a more farreaching general presumption that concentrations are compatible with the common market. 178
Šir�a splošna domneva o združljivosti koncentracij s skupnim trgom pa iz določbe člena 10(6) Uredbe o združitvah ne izhaja zaradi njene narave izjeme in zaradi njene ume�čenosti v predpis, ki je povezana z ureditvijo procesnih rokov. 178
Regardless of the exact scope of these two categories of case, it is clear that the present case does not fall into either of them.
Ne glede na natančni doseg zadnjih dveh skupin primerov pa je jasno, da obravnavani primer ne spada v nobeno od njiju.
The Commission did not, in breach of its obligations, allow the timelimit for its decision on the concentration to expire; nor, according to the Court of First Instance, was the evidence unclear.
Niti Komisija ni v nasprotju s svojo obveznostjo zamudila roka za odločitev o koncentraciji niti Sodi�če prve stopnje ni ugotovilo nejasnega stanja dokazov.
180Although the Commission itself referred to a lack of evidence for certain facts at a number of places in its first clearance decision, 181 so far as appears it never classified the present case as a borderline one of non liquet. Instead, at
180Tudi Komisija sama je sicer na več mestih v prvi odločbi o odobritvi govorila o tem, da za določena dejstva ni dovolj dokazov, 181vendar pa obravnavanega primera ni nikoli, kolikor je razvidno, opredelila za mejnega, pri katerem bi pri�lo do položaja non liquet.
The second category of case is concentrations whose investigation by the Commission produces such an unclear state of evidence that it is not possible to make any reliable prognosis as to whether or not they will ultimately create or strengthen a dom -inant position.
Druga skupina primerov se nana�a na koncentracije, pri katerih je po opravljeni preiskavi Komisije stanje dokazov tako nejasno, da ni mogoče zanesljivo napove -dati, ali bodo na koncu ustvarile ali krepile
179 — Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Tetra Laval (cited above, footnote 96), paragraphs 76 to 81, in particular paragraph 76.
179 – Sklepni predlogi generalnega pravobranilca Tizzana z dne 25. maja 2004 v zadevi Komisija proti Tetra Laval (C-12/03 P, sodba navedena v opombi 96, točke od 76 do 81, zlasti točka 76).
180 — See for example paragraphs 290, 294, 303, 347, 362, 407 and 435 of the judgment under appeal.
180 – Glej na primer točke 290, 294, 303, 347, 362, 407 in 435 izpodbijane sodbe.
181 — See for example recitals 80, 87, 94, 101, 108, 111, 113, 150, 153 and 158 of the first clearance decision.
181 – Glej na primer 80., 87., 94., 101., 108., 111., 113., 150., 153. in 158. uvodno izjavo prve odločbe o odobritvi.
178 — In relation to Article 10(6) of the Merger Regulation, see also above, point 102.
178 – K členu 10(6) Uredbe o združitvah glej tudi besedilo v točki 102 teh sklepnih predlogov.
BERTELSMANN AND SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA v IMPALA the oral hearing before the Court of Justice the Commission expressly emphasised that the discussion of borderline cases in which the evidence was unclear was purely hypothetical. 182
BERTELSMANN IN SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA PROTI IMPALA poudarila, da je razprava o mejnih primerih, v katerih je stanje dokazov nejasno, zgolj hipotetična. 182
The appellants argue that the Court of First Instance was not entitled to require the Commission to prove positively an absence of market transparency: instead, the Court of First Instance ought to have been satisfied with reviewing whether, at the time of the first clearance decision, the Commission had sufficient evidence of the existence of market transparency.
Pritožnika trdita, da Sodi�če prve stopnje ne bi smelo od Komisije zahtevati pozitivnega dokaza o neobstoju preglednosti trga; Sodi�če prve stopnje bi se moralo namreč zadovoljiti s tem, da preveri, ali je Komisija v trenutku izdaje prve odločbe o odobritvi razpolagala z zadostnimi dokazi za obstoj preglednosti trga.
183It is apparent that this line of argument is based on the idea that the standard of proof for clearing a concentration must be lower than that for prohibiting it.
183To stali�če očitno temelji na prepričanju, da bi moral biti dokazni standard za odobritev koncentracije nižji od tistega za njeno prepoved.
I do not find this line of argument convincing, for two reasons.
To stali�če me iz dveh razlogov ne prepriča.
Altogether, therefore, the appellants’ submissions that in merger control proceedings the requirements in relation to clearance and prohibition decisions are asymmetrical and that there is a general presumption that concentrations are compatible with the common market are to be rejected.
Skupno je tako treba zavrniti navedbe pritožnikov, da Uredba o združitvah temelji na nesorazmernosti zahtev za izdajo odločb o odobritvi in o prepovedi ter na splo�ni domnevi o združljivosti koncentracij s skupnim trgom.
Nor does the present case fall into one of the two categories of case in which, by way of exception, there is a presumption that the concentration is compatible with the common market.
Predpostavljati tudi ni mogoče, da obravnavani primer spada v eno od obeh skupin primerov, pri katerih izjemoma velja domneva o združljivosti koncentracije s skupnim trgom.
First, it follows from the symmetry of the standard of proof applicable in relation to clearance and prohibition decisions 184
Po eni strani iz sorazmernosti dokaznega standarda za odločbe o odobritvi in o prepovedi izhaja, 184 da to, ali Komisija preučuje preglednost trga z vidika morebitne odobritve ali pa z vidika morebitne prepovedi koncentracije, ne more utemeljiti nikakr�nega razlikovanja.
The negative finding that a market is not so transparent as to allow a collective dominant position leads to the same result and accordingly requires the same degree of evidence as the positive finding that the market in question is so opaque as to preclude a finding of a collective dominant position.
Negativna ugotovitev, da trg ni tako pregleden, da bi omogočal kolektivni prevladujoči položaj, vodi do istega sklepa in zahteva isto stopnjo dokazov kot pozitivna ugotovitev, da je zadevni trg tako nepregleden, da izključuje domnevo o kolektivnem prevladujočem položaju.
The two findings are two sides of the same coin.
Obe ugotovitvi sta dve plati iste medalje.
And both
Obe tudi
It remains to be considered whether in the present case the Court of First Instance applied the correct standard of proof in relation to the Commission’s findings on market transparency.
Preučiti je �e treba, ali je Sodi�če prve stopnje v obravnavanem primeru za ugotovitve Komisije v zvezi s preglednostjo trga uporabilo pravilni dokazni standard.
183 — In particular, the appellants refer to paragraphs 289, 366, 381 to 387, 389, 407, 420, 428, 429, 433, 449 to 457 and 459 of the judgment under appeal.
183 – Navedbe pritožnikov se v podrobnostih nana�ajo na točke 289, 366, od 381 do 387, 389, 407, 420, 428, 429, 433, od 449 do 457 in 459 izpodbijane sodbe.
182 — At first instance too, the Commission said it felt it possible to defend the first clearance decision on the basis of a ‘balance of probabilities’ (see paragraph 7 of its response at first instance).
182 – Komisija je tudi v prvostopenjskem postopku poudarila, da je sposobna prvo odločbo o odobritvi braniti v skladu z načeli „balance of probabilities“ (glej točko 7 njenega odgovora na tožbo na prvi stopnji).