natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
25 Consequently, it ordered that the regulation be annulled for infringement of the parallelism of competences and procedures, without there being any ‘need to rule on the question whether the Council was able, without infringing the rules regarding the powers of the institutions,
25Zato je razglasilo ničnost Uredbe zaradi kr�itve vzporednosti pristojnosti in postopkov, ne da bi bilo „treba odločiti o vpra�anju, ali bi si Svet lahko, ne da bi kr�il pravila Pogodbe o pristojnosti institucij, pripisal pristojnost, da z odločanjem s kvalificirano večino na predlog Komisije sprejme splo�na pravila obveznega označevanja govedine“. 26Kot vidimo, ostaja problem nere�en.
27 — It must be stated again that that provision does not strictly speaking provide for a delegation of legislative power but more precisely an extension of the government’s regulatory power in the area of the law.
27 – Razložiti je treba �e to, da ta določba ne predvideva dobesedno prenosa zakonodajnih pristojnosti, ampak, natančneje, raz�iritev pristojnosti vlade za sprejemanje podzakonskih aktov na področju zakona.
1.25 — Ibid., paragraph 42.
1.25 – Ibid., točka 42.26 – Ibid., točka 45.
it adopts in compliance with the procedure provided for by the Treaty, a secondary legal basis empowering it to deal with certain aspects of a legislative matter by following a simplified procedure, rather than regulating the legislative matter in its entirety according to the procedure provided for by the Treaty.
oziroma zaporedni podobni precedensi, in psiholo�ki element (opinio juris necessitatis), to je prepričanje tistih, ki so usklajeni s to uporabo, da s tem ko to počnejo, upo�tevajo obvezno pravilo. Del doktrine 29potrjuje priznanje v pravnem redu Skupnosti obstoja običajev Skupnosti, če so izpolnjeni pogoji zanje.
The Court itself has not yet formally ruled on that issue.
Sodi�če se �e ni uradno izreklo. Niti ni pokazalo, da je temu načelu nenaklonjeno.
Although it has refused to take into account certain practices, or to go even further and detect in them a custom, that is because they do not satisfy the necessary constitutive conditions.
Če je zavrnilo upo�tevanje določene prakse, da bi a fortiori v njej videlo običaj, je bilo to zato, ker ni vsebovala sestavnih delov.
30 Furthermore, whilst it has not expressly categorised the practices referred to as customs, the Court has acknowledged the legality of a resolution of the Parliament to hold meetings of its committees and political groups in Brus-
30Poleg tega, čeprav zadevne prakse ni izrecno opredelilo kot običaj, pa je Sodi�če priznalo
In her Opinion in Parliament v Council of 13 December 2001, Advocate General Stix-Hackl replied in the affirmative, taking the view, without however giving any further explanation, that a secondary legal basis ‘is, in principle, permissible provided that certain requirements are fulfilled’.
V sklepnih predlogih v zadevi Parlament proti Svetu z dne 13. decembra 2001 je generalna pravobranilka C. Stix Hackl pritrdilno odgovorila, meneč, ne da bi stvar dalje razlagala, da je izvedena pravna podlaga „načeloma dopustna, če so izpolnjeni nekateri pogoji“.
28In support of the legality of recourse to secondary legal bases, the Council for its part, submits that there is a practice which has developed to that effect.
28V utemeljitev zakonitosti uporabe izvedenih pravnih podlag se Svet sklicuje na obstoj prakse, ki naj bi se razvila v tem smislu.
It refers to a series of measures which were adopted before the contested directive and already contained secondary legal bases.
Navaja več aktov, sprejetih pred sporno direktivo, ki naj bi že vsebovali izvedene pravne podlage.
Even if those precedents were actually relevant, the question is whether a practice constitutes merely the temporary result of circumstances and political compromises which lose their cogency once the balance of power changes, or whether it may give rise to a rule of law following a process of consolidation through custom.
Ob predpostavki, da so ti precedensi dejansko upo�tevni, je vpra�anje, ali je praksa le začasna posledica okoli�čin in političnih kompromisov, ki izgubijo svojo vsebino, takoj ko se razmerja moči spremenijo, ali če lahko zaradi nje nastane pravno pravilo po postopku konsolidacije po običajni poti.
I would point out in that regard that the development of a custom requires a combination of two elements: a substantive element (repetitio), consisting of general and prolonged usage, of a line of consistent precedents, and a psychological element (opinio juris necessitatis), the belief on the part of those who comply with that usage that they are obeying a mandatory rule by so doing. Some academic legal
V zvezi s tem opozarjam, da se za nastanek običaja zahteva zveza dveh elementov: materialni element (repe­titio), to je splo�na in dolgotrajna uporaba
30 — See, for example, Case 230/81 Luxembourg v Parliament [1983] ECR 255, paragraph 44: although the plea alleging an infringement of the Parliament’s practice of holding part of its plenary sittings in Luxembourg which was relied on against a resolution of the Parliament by which it decided to hold all its plenary sittings in Strasbourg was rejected, that was because that practice could not have given rise to a custom as it had not been approved by the Member States but had, on the contrary, been challenged by France.
30 – Glej na primer sodbo z dne 10. februarja 1983 v zadevi Luksemburg proti Parlamentu (230/81, Recueil, str. 255, točka 44): čeprav je bil tožbeni razlog, ki se nana�a na kr�itev prakse Parlamenta, da ima del plenarnih zasedanj v Luksemburgu, ki je bil naveden zoper resolucijo Parlamenta, da so vsa plenarna zasedanja v Strasbourgu, zavrnjen, je bilo to zato, ker ta praksa – ki je države članice niso potrdile, nasprotno, Francija jo je izpodbijala – ni mogla postati običaj. Z drugimi besedami je manjkal opinio juris.
28 — Case C-93/00, point 41.
28 – Zgoraj navedeni sklepni predlogi v zadevi C-93/00, točka 41.
PARLIAMENT v COUNCIL precedents from both the institutions 36and the Member States, 37on the ground that a practice cannot derogate from or override the rules of the Treaty.
35Sodi�če je tudi zavrnilo veljavnost precedensov, ki izhajajo iz institucij 36in iz držav članic, 37 ker praksa ne more razveljaviti in/ali prevladati nad pravili Pogodbe.
sels and the legality of the management committee procedure, because they corresponded respectively to a parliamentary practice which had not been called into question by the Member States 31 and to ‘a consistent practice of the Community institutions’. 32
zakonitost resolucije Parlementa, da združi svoje komisije in politične skupine v Bruslju ter resolucije o postopku odbora za upravljanje, ker sta ustrezali parlamentarni praksi, ki je države članice niso izpodbijale, 31in „stalni praksi institucij Skupnosti“ 32.
Consequently, I cannot share the view of the Council, supported by the French Government, that nothing in the Treaty precludes a measure which is adopted on the basis of a Treaty provision and under the procedure provided for therein from referring to the adoption of supplementary legislative measures under a simplified procedure.
Zato ni mogoče sogla�ati z mnenjem Sveta, ki ga podpira francoska vlada, da nič v Pogodbi ne nasprotuje temu, da akt, sprejet na podlagi določbe Pogodbe in po postopku, ki ga ta določa, napotuje na sprejetje dodatnih zakonodajnih ukrepov po poenostavljenem postopku.
Recourse to secondary legal bases is precluded by the principle, laid down by Article 7 EC, that the institutions must act within the limits of their powers; ‘[e]ach institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty’.
Uporabi izvedenih pravnih podlag nasprotuje načelo dodelitve pristojnosti, določeno v členu 7 ES, da „vsaka institucija deluje v mejah pristojnosti po tej pogodbi“.
38 It is the Treaties that lay down the procedures culminating in the adoption of legislative measures.
38 To so namreč pogodbe, ki urejajo postopke za sprejemanje zakonodajnih aktov. Institucija torej ne more sama prosto določiti
An institution cannot therefore itself freely decide upon the way in which it
35 – Sodba z dne 23. februarja 1988 v zadevi Združeno kraljestvo proti Svetu (68/86, Recueil, str. 855, točka 38).
Nevertheless, the possible acknowledgment of the legal value of practices emanating either from the institutions or the Member States must in any event be strictly delimited.
Vendar mora biti morebitno priznanje pravne veljave praks, ki izhajajo bodisi iz institucij bodisi iz držav članic, vsekakor strogo omejeno.
The status of rules of law may be conferred on practices which, combining the elements which go to make up a custom, have the effect of mitigating the terseness of the Treaties or helping to fill their lacunae in order to ensure the effectiveness of the decision-making process.
Kot pravno pravilo se lahko priznajo prakse, ki s tem da združujejo sestavne dele običaja omiljujejo kratkobesednost pogodb oziroma celo njihove vrzeli za zagotavljanje učinkovitosti postopka odločanja.
While extra-statutory customs may thus be sanctioned, practices which run counter to the Treaties cannot under any circumstances be accepted.
Čeprav so tako lahko določeni običaji praeter legem, pa ne bi nikakor smele biti dopu�čene prakse, ki nasprotujejo pogodbam.
To accept customs contrary to the law would be to disregard the rigid nature of the founding Treaties, which may be revised only in accordance with the formal procedure laid down for that purpose.
Sprejetje običajev contra legem bi kr�ilo togost ustanovitvenih pogodb, saj se te lahko spremenijo le po uradnem postopku, ki je za to pripravljen.
33 The Court treats the founding Treaties as a constitutional charter giving rise to a legal order the subjects of which are the citizens of the European Union.
33Sodi�če namreč ustanovitvene pogodbe opredeljuje kot ustanovno listino, ki sestavlja pravni red, katerega subjekti so državljani Unije.
34That reinforced legitimacy implies that the rules laid down by the Treaties ‘are not at the disposal of the Member States or of the institutions themselves’. 35
34 Ta okrepljena legitimnost vključuje to, da pravila, postavljena s pogodbami, „niso na razpolago niti
Thus, the Court has rejected the validity of
36 – Glej zlasti sodbo z dne 9. avgusta 1994 v zadevi Francija proti Komisiji (C-327/91, Recueil, str.
36 — See, inter alia, Case C-327/91 France v Commission [1994] ECR I-3641: in reply to a plea alleging that it did not have the competence to conclude the Agreement between the Commission and the United States regarding their respective competition laws, the Commission relied on a practice followed whereby it had competence to conclude administrative agreements.
I-3641): v odgovor na tožbeni razlog, ki se nana�a na nepristojnost za sklenitev sporazuma EGS-Združene države v zvezi z uporabo pravil o konkurenci teh dveh pogodbenic, se je Komisija sklicevala na prakso, ki ji pripisuje pristojnost za sklepanje upravnih sporazumov.
However, the Court rejected that argument on the ground that the power to conclude agreements had been conferred on the Council by Article 228 EC and that ‘a mere practice cannot override the provisions of the Treaty’ (paragraph 36).
Vendar je Sodi�če to utemeljevanje zavrnilo, ker je bila pristojnost za sklepanje sporazumov podeljena Svetu s členom 228 ES in ker „sama praksa Sveta ne sme odstopati od pravil Pogodbe“ (točka 36).
See also Case C-426/93 Germany v Council [1995] ECR I-3723, paragraph 21.
Glej tudi sodbo z dne 9. novembra 1995 v zadevi Nemčija proti Svetu (C-426/93, Recueil, str. I-3723, točka 21).
37 — See Case 174/84 Bulk Oil [1986] ECR 559, paragraph 65.
37 – Glej sodbo z dne 18. februarja 1986 v zadevi Bulk Oil (174/84, Recueil, str. 559, točka 65).
31 — Ibid., paragraphs 48 and 49.32 — See Köster, paragraph 6.33 — See Case 43/75 Defrenne [1976] ECR 455, paragraph 58.
33 – Glej sodbo z dne 8. aprila 1976 v zadevi Defrenne (43/75, Recueil, str. 455, točka 58).
34 — See Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, paragraph 21.
34 – Glej mnenje 1/91 z dne 14. decembra 1991 (Recueil, str.
38 — That principle is also expressed in another way in Article 5 EU: ‘the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors shall exercise their powers under the conditions and for the purposes provided for, on the one hand, by the provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Communities and of the subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying and supplementing them and, on the other hand, by the other provisions of this Treaty’.
38 – To načelo je izraženo drugače v členu 5 EU: „Evropski Parlament, Svet, Komisija, Sodi�če in Računsko sodi�če izvajajo svoje pristojnosti pod pogoji in v namene, predvidene z določbami pogodb o ustanovitvi Evropskih skupnosti ter poznej�ih pogodb in aktov, ki prve spreminjajo in dopolnjujejo, pa tudi z drugimi določbami te pogodbe“.
Only the Treaty may, if necessary, empower the Council to amend the decision-making process, as illustrated by bridging clauses such as the second indent of Article 67(2) EC or the second subparagraph of Article 175(2) EC.
Le s slednjo se lahko, če je to potrebno, pooblasti Svet, da spremeni postopek odločanja, kot to ponazarjajo premostitvene klavzule, na primer člen 67(2), drugi alinea, ES in člen 175(2), drugi pododstavek, ES.
In other words, it follows from the principle that the institutions must act within the limits of their powers that certain powers are not available to them.
Z drugimi besedami, iz načela dodelitve pooblastil kakr�ne koli vrste izhaja načelo nerazpoložljivosti pristojnosti.
the applicable decision-making procedure.
Določa namreč veljaven postopek odločanja.
The competent Community institution, the voting rules to which the adoption of the measure by the Council is subject and the extent of the Parliament’s participation in the adoption of the act are therefore dependent on that choice.
Od njega so torej odvisni zlasti pristojna institucija Skupnosti, pravila glasovanja, od katerih je odvisno sprejetje akta v Svetu, in obseg sodelovanja Parlamenta pri sprejetju akta.
In addition, any dispute as regards the choice of the appropriate legal basis does not have only purely formal significance.
Tako je tudi vsak spor o izbiri ustrezne pravne podlage le formalen.
Where the legal basis propounded by an applicant provides for a decision-making procedure which is different from that required under the legal basis chosen by the author of the act, the choice of legal basis has ramifications for the determination of the content of the act.
Od trenutka, ko pravna podlaga, ki jo zahteva tožeča stranka, določa drugačen postopek odločanja, kot je ta, ki ga ureja pravna podlaga, ki jo je izbral izdajatelj akta, izbira pravne podlage vpliva na določitev vsebine akta.
Consequently, that choice cannot be at the discretion of an institution, but must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review, such as the aim and content of the measure. 42
Zato ta izbira ne more biti odvisna od diskrecijske presoje institucije, temveč mora temeljiti na objektivnih elementih, ki so lahko predmet sodnega nadzora, kot sta cilj in vsebina akta 42.
Furthermore, the legislative procedures laid down by the Treaties establish the extent to which each institution is to be associated with the taking of decisions and thus establishes an institutional balance.
Poleg tega zakonodajni postopki iz pogodb določajo obseg združenja vsake institucije pri sprejemanju odločb in tako določajo institucionalno ravnovesje.
The fact that an institution amends the decision-making process thus causes it to undermine the principle of institutional balance, a principle upheld by the Court 39which ‘means that each of the institutions must exercise its powers with due regard for the powers of the other institutions’ 40 and that it is not open to an institution to ‘deprive the other institutions of a prerogative granted to them by the Treaties themselves’. 41
Ker institucija spreminja postopek odločanja, s tem tudi �kodi načelu institucionalnega ravnovesja, ki ga je določilo Sodi�če, 39 ki „pomeni, da mora vsaka institucija izvr�evati lastna pooblastila ob spo�tovanju pooblastil drugih institucij“ 40 in ki instituciji prepoveduje, da „drugim institucijam odvzame pravico, ki jim jo podeljujejo same pogodbe“. 41
Likewise, a challenge to the recourse had to secondary legal bases does not have only a purely formal significance, since the purpose of establishing secondary legal bases is to make it possible to adopt acts of a legislative nature by way of a simplified procedure, as opposed to that provided for under the appropriate legal basis in the Treaty.
Enako je izpodbijanje uporabe izvedenih pravnih podlag le popolnoma formalno, ker je cilj določitve izvedenih pravnih podlag omogočiti sprejetje zakonodajnih aktov po postopku, ki je poenostavljen glede na postopek, ki ga določa ustrezna pravna podlaga iz Pogodbe.
In the present case, as I have already stated, the procedures for the taking of decisions provided for under the contested secondary
V obravnavanem primeru, kot sem že poudaril, se podrobna
Moreover, it is because it affects the institutional balance that the Court attaches so much importance to the choice of legal basis.
39 – Od 1958: glej sodbo z dne 13. junija 1958 v zadevi Meroni proti Haute autorité (9/56, Recueil, str. 9, str.
It is the choice of legal basis that determines
44); glej nato zgoraj navedeno sodbo Köster, točka 9, in sodbo z dne 29. oktobra 1980 v zadevi Roquette Frères proti Svetu (138/79, Recueil, str. 3333, točka 33).
39 — As from 1958: see Case 9/56 Meroni v ECSC High Authority [1957-1958] ECR 133, 152; Köster, paragraph 9; and Case 138/79 Roquette v Council [1980] ECR 3333, paragraph 33.
40 – Zgoraj navedena sodba z dne 22. maja 1990 v zadevi Parlament proti Svetu, točka 22.
40 — Case 70/88 Parliament v Council, paragraph 22.41 — Case 149/85 Wybot [1986] ECR 2391, paragraph 23.
41 – Sodba z dne 10. julija 1986 v zadevi Wybot (149/85, Recueil, str. 2391, točka 23).
44The Court’s reminder that it is imperative that the deci-sion-making procedures provided for by the Treaty be complied with is clear and general in application.
44Opozorilo Sodi�ča o nujnosti spo�tovanja postopkov odločanja, ki so določeni v Pogodbi, je jasno in splo�no.
legal bases (qualified majority within the Council and consultation of the Parliament) differ from the procedures laid down by Article 67(5) EC, the legal basis for which the Parliament and the Commission argue (unanimity within the Council and consultation of the Parliament if the designation of safe countries still formed part of the necessary legislation; qualified majority within the Council and co-decision if the contested directive should be regarded as the final stage of the necessary legislation).
pravila za sprejemanje odločitev, ki jih določajo izpodbijane izvedene pravne podlage (kvalificirana večina Sveta in posvetovanje s Parlamentom), razlikujejo od postopkov, ki jih ureja člen 67(5) ES, ki je pravna podlaga, ki jo zahtevata Parlament in Komisija (soglasje Sveta in posvetovanje s Parlamentom, če je določitev varnih držav �e del potrebne zakonodaje; kvalificirana večina Sveta in soodločanje, če je sporno direktivo treba �teti za končno fazo potrebne zakonodaje).
Similarly, with regard to the Council’s argument in favour of the legality of secondary legal bases, which is drawn from the existence of a practice, I would point out that the Court of Justice, in consistently rejecting customs contrary to the law as part of the Community legal order, 45 has already refused to accept that precedents may be relied on to substantiate the Council’s preference for a basis other than the appropriate legal basis, on the ground that ‘a mere practice on the part of the Council cannot derogate from the rules laid down in the Treaty and therefore cannot create a precedent binding on the Community institutions with regard to the correct legal basis’. 46
Enako je glede trditev Sveta v prid zakonitosti izvedenih pravnih podlag zaradi obstoja prakse treba opozoriti, da je Sodi�če v smeri svoje zavrnitve običajev contra legem v pravnem redu Skupnosti 45že zavrnilo, da bi se bilo mogoče sklicevati na precedense za utemeljitev, da Svet daje prednost drugemu temelju, kot je ustrezna pravna podlaga, iz razloga, po katerem „sama praksa Sveta ne sme odstopati od pravil Pogodbe ES in zato ne more ustvariti precedenčnega primera, ki bi institucije Skupnosti zavezoval pri izbiri pravilne pravne podlage“. 46
In the light of all of these considerations, I propose that the Court should hold that the Council was not entitled to adopt, in the
Glede na vse navedeno predlagam Sodi�ču, naj razsodi, da Svet nikakor ni bil poobla�čen, da v sporni direktivi sprejme
The use of secondary legal bases cannot therefore be allowed, because it undermines the principle that the institutions must act within the limits of their powers and the principle of institutional balance.
Uporabe izvedenih pravnih podlag torej ni mogoče sprejeti, ker �kodi načelu dodelitve pooblastil in načelu institucionalnega ravnovesja.
Furthermore, the Court’s reply to the applicant who complained that Council Directive 85/649/EEC of 31 December 1985 prohibiting the use in livestock farming of certain substances having a hormonal action had been adopted on the basis of Article 43 EC, and not in accordance with the procedure laid down by the secondary legal basis provided for that purpose, was that ‘the rules regarding the manner in which the Community institutions arrive at their decisions are laid down in the Treaty and are not at the disposal of the Member States or of the institutions themselves’.
Poleg tega je Sodi�če tožeči stranki – ki se je pritoževala, da je bila Direktiva Sveta z dne 31. decembra 1985 o prepovedi uporabe v živinoreji določenih snovi, ki imajo hormonalno delovanje, sprejeta na podlagi člena 43 ES, in ne po postopku, ki je bil za to določen v izvedeni pravni podlagi – odgovorilo, da so „pravila o izražanju volje institucij Skupnosti določena v Pogodbi in niso na razpolago niti državam članicam niti institucijam“.
43 The lesson to be drawn from that approach cannot be limited, as the Council claims, merely to censuring only secondary legal bases which have the effect of making the procedure provided for by the
43In ni mogoče, kot je to storil Svet, omejiti nauka
44 — In that case, the secondary legal basis replaced the qualified majority provided for by the Treaty with unanimous adoption by the Council.
45 – Glej zgoraj točko 29 teh sklepnih predlogov.
45 — See point 29 of this Opinion above.
43 – Zgoraj navedena sodba z dne 23. februarja 1988 v zadevi Združeno kraljestvo proti Svetu, točka 38.
46 — See Case C-271/94 Parliament v Council [1996] ECR I-1689, paragraph 24; Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council [1996] ECR I-5755, paragraph 19; and Case 68/86 United Kingdom v Council, paragraph 24.
46 – Glej sodbi z dne 26. marca 1996 v zadevi Parlament proti Svetu (C-271/94, Recueil, str. I-1689, točka 24) in z dne 12. novembra 1996 v zadevi Združeno kraljestvo proti Svetu (C-84/94, Recueil, str.
B — The pleas alleging an insufficient statement of reasons and a breach of the principle of cooperation in good faith contested directive, the contested secondary legal bases with a view to the adoption of legislative measures under a simplified procedure as compared with that provided for by Article 67(5) EC.
B – Tožbena razloga glede nezadostne obrazložitve in kršitve načela lojalnega sodelovanja izpodbijane izvedene pravne podlage z namenom sprejetja zakonodajnih ukrepov po postopku, ki je poenostavljen glede na postopek, določen v členu 67(5) ES.
Consequently, the pleas of lack of competence and infringement of the Treaty raised by the Parliament should be upheld and the contested provisions should be annulled.
Sprejeti je treba tudi tožbene razloge glede nepristojnosti in kr�itve Pogodbe, ki jih je navedel Parlament, izpodbijane določbe pa je treba razglasiti za nične.