natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
152 in reply to the statement of objections than is imposed on the submissions by competitors, customers, and other third parties questioned by the Commission in the course of the merger control procedure.
152 njihove dokazne vrednosti in njihove prepričljivosti kot za navedbe konkurentov, kupcev in preostalih tretjih oseb, ki jih Komisija izpra�a v času trajanja postopka nadzora koncentracij.
Admittedly, the Commission is obliged to review the submissions of the parties to the concentration carefully as to their accuracy, completeness and cogency, and in case of reasonable doubt to leave them out of account, but in doing so it must apply the same standards as it does in considering third parties’ submissions.
Komisija sicer mora navedbe udeležencev koncentracije skrbno preučiti glede njihove točnosti, popolnosti in prepričljivosti in jih v primeru upravičenih dvomov ne upo�tevati, vendar pa mora pri tem uporabiti ista merila kot pri presoji navedb tretjih oseb.
Thus, the sole fact that the parties to the concentration put forward certain arguments, facts or evidence for the first time in their response to the statement of objections does not by any means justify a finding that they withheld this information ‘until the last minute’.
Sama okoli�čina, da udeleženci koncentracije določene trditve, dejstva ali dokaze navedejo �ele v odgovoru na izjavo o ugovorih, tako nikakor ne upravičuje domneve, da so te podatke zadrževali „do zadnjega trenutka“.
153 Instead, the rights of defence conferred upon the undertakings concerned give them the right to put forward in the course of their written and oral hearing, that is after receipt of the statement of objections, everything which they consider appropriate to refute the objections and to persuade the Commission to clear their concentration.
153Iz pravic obrambe prizadetih podjetij namreč izhaja pravica, da v okviru pisnega in ustnega zasli�anja, to pomeni po prejemu izjave o ugovorih, navedejo vse, za kar menijo, da bo lahko ovrglo ugovore in prepričalo Komisijo, da odobri njihovo koncentracijo.
Such a submission is not too late, but is made at the point in time specifically envisaged for it in the merger control procedure.
Take navedbe niso prepozne, ampak so podane v posebej za to predvidenem trenutku v postopku nadzora koncentracij.
The rights of defence of the undertakings concerned would be devalued if they were not applied in relation to their defence submissions on individual objections raised by the Commission, or if their defence submissions were from the outset viewed as less credible and less cogent than, for example, information provided by third parties in the course of the market investigation.
Pravice obrambe prizadetih podjetij bi bile razvrednotene, če bi bile njihove navedbe v obrambo k posameznim točkam ugovorov Komisije izključene ali če bi že od vsega začetka veljalo, da imajo njihove navedbe v obrambo manj�o dokazno vrednost ali da so manj prepričljive kot pa na primer navedbe tretjih oseb, ki so podane v okviru tržnih raziskav.
Nor can a higher standard of proof or of cogency be imposed on the submissions put forward by the undertakings concerned
Prav tako ni dopustno za navedbe prizadetih podjetij v odgovoru na izjavo o ugovorih določiti strožjih zahtev glede
Moreover, if in its decision the Commission considers the defence submissions made by the undertakings concerned and is persuaded by them to reconsider and even depart from the provisional conclusions in its statement of objections, this does not in any way mean that the investigation has been ‘delegated’ to them.
Poleg tega nima nobene zveze s „prenosom“ preiskav na prizadeta podjetja, če Komisija v odločbi upo�teva njihove navedbe v obrambo in jih vzame za izhodi�če, da ponovno razmisli o svojih dosedanjih rezultatih preiskave in začasnih sklepih iz izjave o ugovorih ter po potrebi od njih odstopi.
152 — The parties to the concentration are made aware of the progress of the procedure prior to the statement of objections (discussions take place, and the notifying parties are told the areas in which the Commission has serious doubts as regards the compatibility of the concentration with the common market when the formal investigation procedure is initiated under Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation), but this information is much less detailed than a statement of objections and depending on how the market investigation proceeds can also change as matters progress.
152 – Pred izjavo o ugovorih so udeleženci koncentracije sicer prav tako obve�čeni o napredovanju postopka (opravljeni so razgovori, dalje priglasitelji z uvedbo uradnega postopka preiskave v skladu s členom 6(1)(c) Uredbe o združitvah izvedo, na katerih področjih Komisija resno dvomi o združljivosti koncentracije s skupnim trgom), te informacije pa so mnogo bolj skope kot izjava o ugovorih in se lahko glede na potek tržne raziskave tudi �e sproti spreminjajo.
153 — If it should appear clearly that in their notification of the concentration or in their answer to the Commission’s questionnaire the undertakings concerned supplied incorrect or incomplete information, this would be an infringement of their obligation to cooperate with the Commission in the merger control procedure and could also lead to the legal consequences laid down in Article 8(5)(a) of the Merger Regulation and Article 14(1)(b) and (c) of the Merger Regulation (revocation of the clearance decision and imposition of fines).
153 – Če pa bi se seveda izkazalo, da so prizadeta podjetja v okviru priglasitve koncentracije ali v odgovoru na zahtevo Komisije za predložitev podatkov navedla netočne ali nepopolne podatke, bi to po eni strani pomenilo kr�itev njihove dolžnosti, da s Komisijo v postopku nadzora koncentracij sodelujejo, in bi po drugi strani lahko pripeljalo do pravnih posledic, navedenih v členu 8(5)(a) Uredbe o združitvah in v členu 14(1)(b) in (c) Uredbe o združitvah (preklic odločbe o odobritvi in naložitev glob).
Finally, the Commission cannot be obliged in every individual case to undertake further market investigations following the statement of objections and after hearing
Končno Komisija ne more biti v vsakem posameznem primeru zavezana, da po izjavi o ugovorih in po zasli�anju prizadetih podjetij opravi �e nadaljnje tržne raziskave.
BERTELSMANN AND SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA v IMPALA
BERTELSMANN IN SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA PROTI IMPALA niso bile opravljene nadaljnje tržne raziskave, upo�tevanje navedb pritožnikov v njuno obrambo s strani Komisije pa je neupravičeno enačilo z nedopustnim prenosom preiskave na stranke koncentracije. 155
Thus, the second ground of appeal and the first part of the third ground of appeal are in substance well founded.
S tem sta drugi pritožbeni razlog in prvi del tretjega pritožbenega razloga v bistvu utemeljena.
Instead, the decision must be made on the basis of the existing information.
Iz tega pa �e ne izhaja, da bi bilo treba izpodbijano sodbo razveljaviti.
Specifically, the Court of First Instance did not just object that in assessing market transparency the Commission relied on the defence submissions by Bertelsmann and Sony and failed to carry out new market investigations.
156Sodi�če prve stopnje namreč ne graja le tega, da se je Komisija pri presoji preglednosti trga oprla na navedbe družb Bertelsmann in Sony v njuno obrambo in da ni opravila novih tržnih raziskav.
Instead, it also reviewed the substance of the Commission’s analysis of market transparency for manifest errors of assessment.
Nasprotno tudi vsebinsko preverja, ali preudarki Komisije glede preglednosti trga vsebujejo očitne napake pri presoji.
In this connection it is to be emphasised that the passages in the Court of First Instance’s judgment which are disputed here were not the first place where the Court of First Instance found there to have been manifest errors of assessment, it having already found one much earlier, at paragraph 377 of the judgment under appeal: ‘Accordingly, it must be held that the evidence, as mentioned in the Decision, does not support
V tej zvezi je treba poudariti, da Sodi�če prve stopnje ni �ele v tu spornih delih izpodbijane sodbe ugotovilo očitne napake pri presoji, ampak že veliko prej, v točki 377: „Dokazi, navedeni v odločbi, tako ne utemeljujejo sklepov, ki so bili izvedeni iz njih.“ Ta ugotovitev �e ni v nikakr�ni zvezi s tu spor-
Against this background I am of the view that the Court of First Instance misunderstood the legal position in stating that the parties to the concentration could not ‘wait until the last minute before submitting evidence to the Commission with a view to refuting objections raised at the proper time by the Commission’ and that such evidence had to be ‘particularly reliable, objective, relevant and cogent’ if it were to be capable of validly refuting the objections raised by the Commission; in addition, the Court of
Glede na navedeno menim, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno presodilo pravno stanje, ko je izpeljalo, da stranke koncentracije ne morejo „do zadnjega trenutka čakati s tem, da Komisiji predložijo dokaze, s katerimi naj se ovržejo ugovori, ki jih je Komisija pravočasno predstavila“, in da bi morali biti taki dokazi „še posebej zanesljivi, objektivni, upo�tevni in prepričljivi“, da bi se z njimi lahko uspe�no ovrgli ugovori Komisije; Sodi�če prve stopnje je tudi neupravičeno grajalo, da po sprejetju izjave o ugovorih
155 — On this point, see again in particular paragraphs 414 and 415 of the judgment under appeal (emphasis added).
155 – K temu ponovno glej zlasti točki 414 in 415 izpodbijane sodbe (moj poudarek).
156 — On this point, see again the caselaw cited above, footnote 127.
156 – K temu ponovno glej sodno prakso, navedeno v opombi 127.
Standard of proof for clearance of concentrations (second part of the third ground of appeal) the conclusions drawn from it.’
Dokazni standard za odobritev koncentracij (drugi del tretjega pritožbenega razloga)
By the second part of their third ground of appeal the appellants claim that the Court of First Instance erred in law by applying an erroneous and excessively high standard of proof for Commission merger clearance decisions. 158
Pritožnika z drugim delom tretjega pritožbenega razloga uveljavljata, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno uporabilo pravo, saj je določilo napačen in pretiran dokazni standard za odobritev koncentracij s strani Komisije. 158
In paragraphs 384 to 387 of the judgment under appeal too the Court of First Instance found the Commission to have made a manifest error of assessment which was not based on the Commission’s taking into account of the defence submissions by the parties to the concentration as regards campaign discounts, but was based on the incorrect substantive assessment of the results of the market investigation, and in particular of answers given by retailers.
Sodi�če prve stopnje tudi v točkah od 384 do 387 izpodbijane sodbe ugotavlja očitno napako Komisije pri presoji, ki ni utemeljena z upo�tevanjem navedb udeležencev koncentracije v obrambo glede reklamnih popustov, ampak s tem, da je Komisija vsebinsko napačno analizirala rezultate tržne raziskave, zlasti odgovore trgovcev na drobno.
In general, the Court of First Instance failed to understand that the standards of proof the Commission was required to apply in relation to clearance decisions and prohibition decisions are not the same; they claim that there is an asymmetry as regards the standard of proof and a general presumption that concentrations are compatible with the common market.
Pritožnika kritiko izpodbijane sodbe utemeljujeta tako: Sodi�če prve stopnje naj bi na splo�no narobe presodilo, da za Komisijo v primeru odločb o odobritvi in odločb o prepovedi velja isti dokazni standard; trdita, da obstaja nesorazmernost dokaznega standarda in splo�na domneva o združljivosti koncentracij s skupnim trgom.
Specifically, in the present case the Court of First Instance erroneously required the Commission to obtain positive evidence of a lack of market transparency; according to the appellants, the Court of First Instance should have reviewed only whether, at the time of the first clearance decision, the Commission had sufficient evidence for the existence of market transparency.
Sodi�če prve stopnje naj bi konkretno v obravnavanem primeru od Komisije neupravičeno zahtevalo, naj priskrbi pozitivni dokaz za neobstoj preglednosti trga; po mnenju pritožnikov bi Sodi�če prve stopnje lahko zgolj preizkusilo, ali je Komisija v trenutku izdaje prve odločbe o odobritvi razpolagala z zadostnimi dokazi za obstoj preglednosti trga.
Each of these two manifest errors of assessment was in itself sufficient to justify the Court of First Instance in annulling the first clearance decision.
Vsaka od teh dveh očitnih napak pri presoji že sama zase utemeljuje razglasitev ničnosti prve odločbe o odobritvi s strani Sodi�ča prve stopnje.
Apart from that, as already mentioned, the finding of a failure to give reasons, which the Court of First Instance made without any error in law, was likewise enough to justify the annulment of the first clearance decision. 157
Ne glede na to pa, kot je že bilo omenjeno, tudi pomanjkljiva obrazložitev, ki jo je s pravilno uporabo prava ugotovilo Sodi�če prve stopnje, upravičuje razglasitev ničnosti prve odločbe o odobritvi. 157
158 — The following discussion applies also to the part of the sixth ground of appeal contained in paragraphs 98 to 100 and 102 of the appeal.
158 – Naslednje ugotovitve veljajo tudi za tisti del �estega pritožbenega razloga, ki ga vsebujejo točke od 98 do 100 ter točka 102 pritožbe.
157 — See above, points 93 to 144.
157 – Glej zgoraj točke od 93 do 144 teh sklepnih predlogov.
BERTELSMANN AND SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA v IMPALA
BERTELSMANN IN SONY CORPORATION OF AMERICA PROTI IMPALA a) Zatrjevana nesorazmernost zahtev za odločbe o odobritvi in o prepovedi v Uredbi o združitvah
The Commission’s decision to clear or to prohibit any given concentration thus necessarily depends on an assessment of probability which is made ex ante.
Odločitev Komisije, da konkretno koncentracijo odobri ali prepove, se tako nujno opira na ex ante sprejeto verjetnostno sodbo.
The Court recognised this too in Tetra Laval, where it held that merger control involved ‘a prediction of events which are more or less likely to occur in future’. 159
To priznava tudi Sodi�če v sodbi Komisija proti Tetra Laval, ko navaja, da gre pri nadzoru koncentracij za „napovedovanje dogodkov, ki se bodo bolj ali manj verjetno zgodili v prihodnosti“. 159
I consider first the appellants’ argument that the standards of proof in the Merger Regulation are asymmetrical, and that there is a general presumption that concentrations are compatible with the common market.
Najprej bom obravnavala argument pritožnikov, da je dokazni standard v Uredbi o združitvah nesorazmeren in da obstaja splo�na domneva o združljivosti koncentracij s skupnim trgom.
— Merger control decisions are based on prognoses
– Odločbe s področja nadzora koncentracij so odločbe o napovedi
Judicial review of such an assessment of probability is not so much about whether the Commission’s prognosis on a concentration’s positive or negative effects on competition is capable of being proved but rather about its plausibility.
Pri sodnem preizkusu tak�ne verjetnostne sodbe ne more iti toliko za dokazljivost kot nasprotno za verodostojnost napovedi Komisije, da bo koncentracija pozitivno ali negativno vplivala na konkurenco.
The Commission need provide evidence only for the facts on which it has based its prognosis, for example the elements of the market structure it has established (in the present case, for example, the diverse factors which speak in favour of or against a finding of market transparency).
Komisija mora biti zmožna dokazati le dejstva, s katerimi je utemeljila svojo napoved, tako na primer elemente sestave trga, ki jih je ugotovila (v obravnavanem primeru denimo različne dejavnike, ki govorijo za oziroma proti domnevi preglednosti trga).
In this regard the Court held in Tetra Laval that the ‘evidence must support the Commission’s conclusion that … the economic development envisaged by it would be plausible’. 160
V tem smislu Sodi�če v sodbi Komisija proti Tetra Laval ugotavlja, da „morajo ti dokazi utemeljiti ugotovitve Komisije, da bi bil […] scenarij ekonomskega razvoja, ki ga leta predvideva, verodostojen“. 160
The standard by reference to which the Commission’s prognosis as to the market development envisaged is plausible or
Standard, po katerem se napoved Komisije o pričakovanem razvoju trga oceni za verodostojno ali neverodostojno, bi se
159 — Tetra Laval (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 42; see also General Electric (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 64.
159 – Sodba Komisija proti Tetra Laval (navedena v opombi 96, točka 42); glej tudi sodbo General Electric proti Komisiji (navedena v opombi 96, točka 64).
160 — Tetra Laval (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 44 (emphasis added).
160 – Sodba Komisija proti Tetra Laval (navedena v opombi 96, točka 44; moj poudarek).
By way of introduction it is to be observed that merger control decisions by the Commission are different in a material respect from decisions in cartel proceedings under Article 81 EC and in proceedings for abuses of a dominant position under Article 82 EC. In the merger control context, the Commission is not required to assess and, as the case may be, punish — supposedly unlawful — conduct by undertakings which has already occurred, but instead to give a prognosis as to the market’s future development.
Uvodoma je treba poudariti, da se odločbe Komisije s področja nadzora koncentracij od odločb, izdanih v postopku v zvezi z omejevalnim sporazumom v skladu s členom 81 ES in v postopku sankcioniranja zlorab prevladujočega položaja v skladu s členom 82 ES, razlikujejo v eni bistveni točki: pri nadzoru koncentracij se od Komisije ne zahteva, naj presodi – domnevno protizakonito – ravnanje podjetij v preteklosti in ga po potrebi kaznuje, ampak nasprotno, da poda napoved o prihodnjem razvoju trga.
It must assess whether a concentration is capable of creating or strengthening a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it (Article 2(2) and (3) and Article 8(2) and (3) of the Merger Regulation).
Presoditi mora, ali bi lahko koncentracija ustvarila ali krepila prevladujoči položaj, katerega posledica bi bila resno oviranje učinkovite konkurence na skupnem trgu ali na njegovem znatnem delu (člen 2(2) in (3) ter člen 8(2) in (3) Uredbe o združitvah).
It is the task of the Community Courts to review the Commission’s prognosis for any manifest errors of assessment, in other words as to whether the Commission has based it on evidence which is factually accurate, reliable and consistent and is capable of substantiating the prognosis.
Naloga sodi�ča Skupnosti je, da pri vsaki napovedi Komisije preveri, da ni bila narejena očitna napaka pri presoji, torej da preveri, ali jo je Komisija oprla na točna in popolna dejstva in ali lahko ta dejstva utemeljijo napoved.
163 implausible should be defined having regard to the specific features of merger control proceedings.
163 moral določiti z upo�tevanjem posebnosti postopka nadzora koncentracij.
In merger control decisions under Article 8 of the Merger Regulation, the Commission neither imposes any sanctions nor infringes the personal freedom or physical integrity of any natural person.
Komisija v odločbah s področja nadzora koncentracij v skladu s členom 8 Uredbe o združitvah ne naloži nobenih kazni, prav tako ne posega v svobodo gibanja ali telesno nedotakljivost fizičnih oseb.
Instead, the Commission grants or refuses clearances of an administrative law nature for an economic activity, namely the concentration of undertakings.
Komisija nasprotno zgolj izda ali zavrne izdajo upravnopravnih odobritev za neko ekonomsko dejavnost, namreč za koncentracijo podjetij.
Moreover, this takes place in a procedure which is characterised by a requirement for speed and a finely balanced, comparatively strict system of time-limits. 161
Poleg tega do tega pride v postopku, za katerega sta značilna zahteva po pospe�itvi in dobro uravnotežen, sorazmerno strog režim rokov. 161
Given these features of merger control proceedings, the appropriate standard would be, in my view, that the Commission should base its decision on the market development which, on the balance of probabilities, it considers most likely at the end of its months-long, intense investigation of a concentration.
Spričo teh lastnosti postopka nadzora koncentracij se mi zdi primerno vodilo, da mora Komisija izhajati iz tak�nega razvoja trga, ki se ji ob koncu večmesečne poglobljene presoje koncentracije zdi najverjetnej�i (angle�ko: „balance of probabilities“).
The Court of First Instance gave a very accurate summary of this not long ago in General Electric: ‘A prospective analysis … makes it necessary to envisage various chains of cause and effect with a view to ascertaining which of them are the most likely.’ 162
Sodi�če prve stopnje je to na primer nedavno zelo ustrezno povzelo v sodbi General Electric proti Komisiji: „Preiskava domnevnega razvoja […] zahteva, da se preučijo različne vzročne zveze in da se izhaja iz tiste, ki je najverjetnejša“. 162
I would consider it inappropriate to set the bar higher in the context of merger control and, for example, to require that the market development envisaged by the Commission should be ‘very probable’ or ‘particularly likely’ in order to be accepted by the Court.
Zdelo bi se mi neprimerno, če bi se merilo pri nadzoru koncentracij poostrilo in bi se na primer zahtevalo, da mora biti razvoj trga, kot ga napoveduje Komisija, „zelo verjeten“ ali „�e posebej verjeten“, da bi ga Sodi�če prve stopnje upo�tevalo.
164 Such a higher standard of probability would seriously weaken the Commission in carrying out its competition policy functions.
164 Po eni strani bi tak poostren standard verjetnosti znatno oslabil konkurenčnopolitično funkcijo Komisije.
The Commission would have to clear concentrations with open eyes even though they would probably lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, and thus would have detrimental effects on competition.
Komisija bi potem namreč morala z odprtimi očmi odobriti koncentracije, čeprav bi te verjetno ustvarile ali krepile prevladujoči položaj in s tem �kodljivo vplivale na konkurenco.
The Commission would be able to intervene only in cases in which such detrimental effects of a concentration would be ‘very probable’ or ‘particularly likely’. In
Komisija bi lahko posredovala le �e v tistih primerih, pri katerih bi koncentracija „zelo verjetno“ ali „�e posebej verjetno“ imela take �kodljive
Thus, if it is more likely than not that a dominant position will be created or
Če sta torej nastanek ali krepitev prevladujočega položaja verjetnej�a kot njun
163 — Tetra Laval (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 39, Spain v Lenzing (cited above, footnote 97), paragraph 57, and General Electric (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 63; see also above, paragraphs 173 and 174.
163 – Sodbe Komisija proti Tetra Laval (navedena v opombi 96, točka 39); Španija proti Lenzing (navedena v opombi 97, točka 57) in General Electric proti Komisiji (navedena v opombi 96, točka 63); glej tudi točki 173 in 174 teh sklepnih predlogov.
161 — Paragraph 12 above.
161 – Glej točko 12 teh sklepnih predlogov.
164 — For a different view, see the Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Tetra Laval (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 74, who holds that the notified transaction must very probably lead to the creation or strengthening of a dom -inant position if it is to be prohibited.
162 – Sodba General Electric proti Komisiji (navedena v opombi 96, točka 64, zadnji stavek; moj poudarek).
162 — General Electric (cited above, footnote 96), paragraph 64, last sentence (emphasis added).
164 – Drugače generalni pravobranilec Tizzano v sklepnih predlogih z dne 25. maja 2004 v zadevi Komisija proti Tetra Laval (C-12/03 P, sodba navedena v opombi 96, točka 74), ki za prepoved zahteva, da bi prigla�ena koncentracija zelo verjetno ustvarila ali krepila prevladujoči položaj.
Regulation).
(člen 6(1)(b) in (c) Uredbe o združitvah).