natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the event that, having regard to the answer given to its first question, the referring court must declare that it has jurisdiction to hear and determine the claims of the complainants in the main proceedings based directly on Directive 1999/70, it must be stated that while, in accordance with the answer to the second question, the subjectmatter of Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement is not unconditional and sufficiently precise for individuals to be able to rely upon it before a national court, the fact none the less remains that, under the third paragraph of Article 249 EC, the directive leaves to the national authorities the choice of form and methods but is binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed (see von Colson and Kamann, paragraph 15).
V primeru, da bi se glede na odgovor na prvo vpra�anje predložitveno sodi�če moralo izreči za pristojno za odločanje o zahtevah pritožnikov iz postopka v glavni stvari, ki temeljijo neposredno na Direktivi 1999/70, je treba pojasniti, da čeprav vsebina določbe 5, točka 1, okvirnega sporazuma, kot je bilo odgovorjeno na drugo vpra�anje, ni brezpogojna in dovolj natančna, da bi se posameznik lahko skliceval nanjo pred nacionalnim sodi�čem, pa je v skladu s členom 249, tretji odstavek, ES direktiva za vsako državo članico, na katero je naslovljena, zavezujoča glede cilja, ki ga je treba doseči, vendar prepu�ča nacionalnim organom izbiro oblike in metod (glej zgoraj navedeno sodbo Von Colson in Kamann, točka 15).
The first paragraph of Article 2 of Directive 1999/70 thus provides that the Member States are required to take any necessary measures to enable them at any time to be in a position to guarantee the results imposed by the directive.
V členu 2(1) Direktive 1999/70 je tako določeno, da morajo države članice uvesti vse potrebne ukrepe tako, da bodo vedno lahko zagotavljale rezultate, ki so s to direktivo naloženi.
As has already been observed in paragraph 41 of this judgment, the Member States’ obligation to achieve the result envisaged by a directive and, under Article 10 EC, to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation, is binding on all the authorities of the Member States (see von Colson and Kamann, paragraph 26).
Kot je bilo že opozorjeno v točki 41 te sodbe, obveznost držav članic, da dosežejo rezultat, ki ga določa direktiva, in obveznost na podlagi člena 10 ES, da sprejmejo vse ustrezne ukrepe, splo�ne ali posebne, da bi zagotovile izpolnjevanje te obveznosti, velja za vse organe držav članic (glej zgoraj navedeno sodbo von Colson in Kamann, točka 26).
Such obligations devolve on those authorities, including, where appropriate, in their capacity as a public employer.
Tak�ni obveznosti veljata za te organe vključno v morebitnih primerih, ko nastopajo kot delodajalec javnega sektorja.
As regards the objective laid down by Directive 1999/70 and the framework agreement, the latter proceeds — as is apparent from paragraphs 6 and 8 of the general considerations in the framework agreement — on the premiss that employment contracts of indefinite duration are the general form of employment relationship, while recognising that fixedterm employment contracts are a feature of employment in certain sectors or in respect of certain occupations and activities (see Adeneler and Others, paragraph 61).
Glede cilja, ki je določen z Direktivo 1999/70 in okvirnim sporazumom, slednji, kot izhaja iz točk 6 in 8 njegovih splo�nih ugotovitev, temelji na predpostavki, da so pogodbe o zaposlitvi za nedoločen čas splo�na oblika delovnih razmerij, ob upo�tevanju, da so pogodbe o zaposlitvi za določen čas značilnost zaposlovanja v nekaterih sektorjih, poklicih in dejavnostih (glej zgoraj navedeno sodbo Adeneler in drugi, točka 61).
Consequently, the benefit of stable employment is viewed as a major element in the protection of workers (see Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981, paragraph 64), whereas — as is apparent from the second paragraph of the preamble to the framework agreement and paragraph 8 of the general considerations — it is only in certain circumstances that fixedterm employment contracts are liable to respond to the needs of both employers and workers (see Adeneler and Others, paragraph 62).
Tako je uživanje stabilnosti zaposlitve pomemben element za�čite delavcev (glej sodbo z dne 22. novembra 2005 v zadevi Mangold, C-144/04, ZOdl., str. I-9981, točka 64), medtem ko, kot izhaja iz drugega pododstavka preambule in točke 8 splo�nih ugotovitev, ustrezajo pogodbe o zaposlitvi za določen čas samo v nekaterih okoli�činah potrebam delodajalcev in delavcev (glej zgoraj navedeno sodbo Adeneler in drugi, točka 62).
From this angle, the framework agreement seeks to place limits on successive recourse to the latter category of employment relationship, a category regarded as a potential source of abuse to the disadvantage of workers, by laying down as a minimum a number of protective provisions designed to prevent the status of employees from being insecure (see Adeneler and Others, paragraph 63).
Ob upo�tevanju tega stali�ča je namen okvirnega sporazuma urediti zaporedno sklepanje te vrste delovnih razmerij, ki je lahko vir zlorab v �kodo delavcev, pri čemer predvideva nekaj minimalnih varstvenih določb, ki naj bi preprečile poslab�anje položaja delavcev (glej zgoraj navedeno sodbo Adeneler in drugi, točka 63).
As is apparent from Clause 1(b) of the framework agreement, its purpose is to establish a framework to prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixedterm employment contracts or relationships.
Kot izhaja iz določbe 1(b) tega okvirnega sporazuma, je njegov namen vzpostaviti okvir za preprečevanje zlorab, ki izhajajo iz veriženja pogodb o zaposlitvi ali delovnih razmerij za določen čas.
According to its own terms, Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement specifically pursues that objective of prevention.
Določba 5, točka 1, navedenega okvirnega sporazuma zasleduje specifično ta cilj preprečevanja, kot izhaja iz njenega besedila.
It follows that the Member States are required under Article 10 EC and the third paragraph of Article 249 EC, as well as under Directive 1999/70 itself, to take any appropriate measure, whether general or particular, to achieve the objective of that directive and of the framework agreement of preventing the abusive use of fixedterm contracts.
Tako imajo države članice na podlagi členov 10 ES in 249, tretji odstavek, ES ter na podlagi same Direktive 1999/70 obveznost, da sprejmejo vse ustrezne ukrepe, splo�ne ali posebne, da bi dosegle cilj iz navedene direktive in okvirnega sporazuma, ki je preprečevanje zlorab pri uporabi pogodb o zaposlitvi za določen čas.
However, that obligation would be rendered ineffective if an authority of a Member State, acting in its capacity as a public employer, were authorised to renew contracts for an unusually long term in the period between the deadline for transposing Directive 1999/70 and the date on which the transposing legislation entered into force, thereby depriving the persons concerned for an unreasonable period of time of the benefit of the measures adopted by the national legislature for the purpose of transposing Clause 5 of the framework agreement.
Ta obveznost bi izgubila polni učinek, če bi bil organ države članice, ki nastopa kot delodajalec javnega sektorja, poobla�čen za obnovitev pogodb za neobičajno dolgo obdobje v obdobju po poteku roka za prenos Direktive 1999/70 in pred začetkom veljavnosti zakona, s katerim je bila ta direktiva prenesena, in s tem bi se zadevnim osebam za nerazumno dolgo obdobje odvzelo koristi, ki izhajajo iz ukrepov, ki jih je nacionalni zakonodajalec sprejel ob prenosu določbe 5 okvirnega sporazuma.
In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the third question must be that Article 10 EC, the third paragraph of Article 249 EC, and Directive 1999/70 must be interpreted as meaning that an authority of a Member State acting in its capacity as a public employer may not adopt measures contrary to the objective pursued by that directive and the framework agreement as regards prevention of the abusive use of fixedterm contracts, which consist in the renewal of such contracts for an unusually long term in the period between the deadline for transposing Directive 1999/70 and the date on which the transposing legislation entered into force.
Ob upo�tevanju zgoraj navedenih ugotovitev je treba na tretje vpra�anje odgovoriti, da je treba člena 10 ES in 249, tretji odstavek, ES ter Direktivo 1999/70 razlagati tako, da organ države članice, ki nastopa kot delodajalec javnega sektorja, ni poobla�čen za sprejetje ukrepov, ki so v nasprotju s ciljem, zasledovanim z navedeno direktivo in okvirnim sporazumom, v zvezi s preprečevanjem zlorab pri uporabi pogodb o zaposlitvi za določen čas, to je obnovitev tak�nih pogodb za neobičajno dolgo obdobje v obdobju po poteku roka za prenos te direktive in pred začetkom veljavnosti zakona za prenos.
Question 4
Četrto vprašanje
In the event that, having regard to the answer given to its first question, the referring court is not required to declare that it has jurisdiction to hear and determine the claims of the complainants in the main proceedings based directly on Direct- ive 1999/70, it is necessary to answer the fourth question, by which the referring court queries, in essence, whether it is under an obligation, by virtue of its obligation to interpret domestic law in conformity with Community law, to give the 2003 Act retrospective effect to the date by which that directive should have been transposed.
V primeru, da se glede na odgovor na prvo vpra�anje predložitvenemu sodi�ču ne bi bilo treba izreči za pristojno za odločanje o zahtevah pritožnikov iz postopka v glavni stvari, ki temeljijo neposredno na Direktivi 1999/70, je treba odgovoriti na četrto vpra�anje, s katerim predložitveno sodi�če v bistvu spra�uje, ali mora na podlagi obveznosti, da se nacionalno pravo razlaga skladno s pravom Skupnosti, priznati zakonu iz leta 2003 retroaktivni učinek od dne izteka roka za prenos te direktive.
As a preliminary point, it must be noted that the fourth question relates only to section 6 of the 2003 Act, which is the measure that transposes Clause 4 of the framework agreement.
Uvodoma je treba ugotoviti, da se to četrto vpra�anje nana�a samo na člen 6 zakona iz leta 2003, ki je ukrep, s katerim je prenesena določba 4 okvirnega sporazuma.
It is indicated in the order for reference that the complainants in the main proceedings have, on the other hand, conceded that the wording used in section 9 of the 2003 Act makes it impossible for retrospective effect to be given to that section (which effectively transposes Clause 5 of the framework agreement), and to interpret it in that way would be contra legem.
V predložitveni odločbi je namreč navedeno, da so pritožniki nasprotno priznali, da iz samega besedila člena 9 zakona iz leta 2003 izhaja, da ta člen, s katerim je bila prenesena določba 5 okvirnega sporazuma, ne more imeti retroaktivnega učinka, drugačna razlaga pa bi bila contra legem.
It is thus necessary to consider whether, in the situation referred to in paragraph 93 of this judgment where it would have jurisdiction only to rule on the complaints in the main proceedings in so far as they are based on an infringement of the 2003 Act, the referring court is required — in accordance with the obligation to interpret national law in conformity with Community law — to give section 6 of the 2003 Act retrospective effect to the date by which Directive 1999/70 should have been transposed.
Zato je treba preučiti, ali mora na podlagi zahteve po skladni razlagi predložitveno sodi�če v primeru iz točke 93 te sodbe, ko bi bilo pristojno samo za odločanje o zahtevah iz postopka v glavni stvari, ki temeljijo na kr�itvi zakona iz leta 2003, priznati členu 6 navedenega zakona retroaktivni učinek od dne poteka roka za prenos Direktive 1999/70.
The referring court states in that regard that, while it is true that the wording of section 6 of the 2003 Act does not expressly preclude a retrospective construction, a domestic rule of construction does preclude the retrospective application of legislation unless there is a clear and unambiguous indication to the contrary.
Predložitveno sodi�če v zvezi s tem pojasnjuje, da čeprav besedilo tega člena zakona iz leta 2003 izrecno ne izključuje, da bi bil tak�en retroaktivni učinek priznan tej določbi, pa pravilo nacionalnega prava o razlagi zakonov prepoveduje, da bi se zakon retroaktivno uporabljal, razen v primerih, ko je jasno in nedvoumno navedeno nasprotno.
In that regard, when applying domestic law and, in particular, legislative provisions specifically adopted for the purpose of implementing the requirements of a directive, national courts are bound to interpret that law, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result sought by it and thus to comply with the third paragraph of Article 249 EC (see, in particular, Pfeiffer and Others, paragraph 113 and the caselaw cited).
V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da morajo nacionalna sodi�ča ob uporabi nacionalnega prava in zlasti določb posebne ureditve, sprejete z namenom izvajanja zahtev iz direktive, to pravo povsod, kjer je to mogoče, razlagati ob upo�tevanju besedila in cilja te direktive, da bi dosegla rezultat, ki ga slednja zasleduje, in se tako ravnala v skladu s členom 249, tretji odstavek, ES (glej zlasti zgoraj navedeno sodbo Pfeiffer in drugi, točka 113, in navedena sodna praksa).
The requirement that national law be interpreted in conformity with Community law is inherent in the system of the EC Treaty, since it permits national courts, for the matters within their jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of Community law when they determine the disputes before them (see, inter alia, Pfeiffer and Others, paragraph 114, and Adeneler and Others, paragraph 109).
Zahteva po skladni razlagi nacionalnega prava je dejansko neločljivo povezana s sistemom Pogodbe ES, ker nacionalnim sodi�čem omogoča, da v okviru pristojnosti zagotovijo polni učinek prava Skupnosti, kadar odločajo v sporih, ki so jim predloženi (glej zlasti zgoraj navedeni sodbi Pfeiffer in drugi, točka 114, in Adeneler in drugi, točka 109).
The principle that national law must be interpreted in conformity with Community law none the less requires national courts to do whatever lies within their jurisdiction, taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that the directive in question is fully effective and achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it (see Pfeiffer and Others, paragraphs 115, 116, 118 and 119, and Adeneler andOthers, paragraph 111).
Načelo skladne razlage kljub temu zahteva, naj nacionalna sodi�ča naredijo vse v svoji pristojnosti, ob upo�tevanju celotnega nacionalnega prava in ob uporabi načinov razlage, ki jih nacionalno pravo priznava, da bi zagotovila polni učinek zadevne direktive in dosegla re�itev v skladu z njenim ciljem (glej zgoraj navedeni sodbi Pfeiffer in drugi, točke 115, 116, 118 in 119, ter Adeneler in drugi, točka 111).
In the present case, since, according to the information given in the order for reference, domestic law appears to include a rule that precludes the retrospective application of legislation unless there is a clear and unambiguous indication to the contrary, it is for the referring court to ascertain whether there is a provision in that legislation, in particular in the 2003 Act, which contains such an indication capable of giving retrospective effect to section 6 of the 2003 Act.
Ker v obravnavanem primeru v skladu z navedbami v predložitveni odločbi nacionalno pravo vsebuje pravilo, ki izključuje retroaktivno uporabo zakona, razen v primerih, ko je jasno in nedvoumno navedeno nasprotno, mora predložitveno sodi�če preveriti, ali obstaja v tem pravu, zlasti v zakonu iz leta 2003, določba s tak�no navedbo, ki priznava retroaktiven učinek členu 6 navedenega zakona.
In the absence of such a provision, Community law — in particular the requirement for national law to be interpreted in conformity with Community law — cannot be interpreted as requiring the referring court to give section 6 of the 2003 Act retrospective effect to the date by which Directive 1999/70 should have been transposed, as the referring court would otherwise be constrained to interpret national law contra legem.
V primeru neobstoja take določbe se ne more razlagati prava Skupnosti, zlasti zahteve po skladni razlagi, tako da nalaga predložitvenemu sodi�ču, da členu 6 zakona iz leta 2003 prizna retroaktiven učinek od dne poteka roka za prenos Direktive 1999/70, ker bi se v nasprotnem primeru prisililo predložitveno sodi�če, da razlaga nacionalno pravo contra legem.
In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the fourth question must be that, in so far as the applicable national law contains a rule that precludes the retrospective application of legislation unless there is a clear and unambiguous indication to the contrary, a national court hearing a claim based on an infringement of a provision of national legislation transposing Directive 1999/70 is required, under Community law, to give that provision retrospective effect to the date by which that directive should have been transposed only if that national legislation includes an indication of that nature capable of giving that provision retrospective effect.
Ob upo�tevanju zgoraj navedenih ugotovitev je treba na četrto vpra�anje odgovoriti, da v primeru, da je v veljavnem nacionalnem pravu pravilo, ki izključuje retroaktivno uporabo zakona, razen v primerih, ko je jasno in nedvoumno navedeno nasprotno, mora nacionalno sodi�če, ki mu je bila predložena zahteva zaradi kr�itve določbe nacionalnega zakona, s katerim je bila prenesena Direktiva 1999/70, na podlagi prava Skupnosti priznati navedeni določbi retroaktiven učinek od dne poteka roka za prenos te direktive le, če obstaja v nacionalnem pravu tak�na navedba, s katero je tej določbi podeljen tak�en retroaktiven učinek.
Question 5
Peto vprašanje
In the event that, having regard to the answer given to its first question, the referring court must declare that it has jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim based directly on Directive 1999/70, it is necessary to answer the fifth question, by which the referring court asks whether ‘employment conditions’ within the meaning of Clause 4 of the framework agreement include conditions of an employment contract relating to remuneration and pensions.
V primeru, da bi se glede na odgovor na prvo vpra�anje predložitveno sodi�če moralo izreči za pristojno za odločanje o zahtevah, ki temeljijo neposredno na Direktivi 1999/70, je treba odgovoriti na njegovo peto vpra�anje, s katerim spra�uje, ali pogoji zaposlitve v smislu določbe 4 okvirnega sporazuma zajemajo pogoje v zvezi s plačilom in pokojninami, določene v pogodbi o zaposlitvi.
In that regard, as the Court has already held, the Council, in adopting Direct- ive 1999/70, in order to implement the framework agreement, relied on Article 139(2) EC, which provides that agreements concluded at a Community level are to be implemented for matters covered by Article 137 EC (Case C-307/05 Del Cerro Alonso [2007] ECR I-7109, paragraph 33).
V zvezi s tem se je, kot je Sodi�če že ugotovilo, Svet pri sprejetju Direktive 1999/70, katere namen je bil uveljavitev okvirnega sporazuma, oprl na člen 139(2) ES, ki določa, da izvajanje sporazumov, sklenjenih na ravni Skupnosti, spada med zadeve iz člena 137 ES (sodba z dne 13. septembra 2007 v zadevi Del Cerro Alonso, C-307/05, ZOdl., str. I-7109, točka 33).
Those matters include, in Article 137(1)(b) EC, ‘working conditions’.
Med temi zadevami so v členu 137(1)(b) ES „delovni pogoji“.
It cannot be determined from the wording of Article 137(1)(b) EC alone, any more than from that of Clause 4 of the framework agreement, whether or not the working conditions or employment conditions respectively referred to in those two provisions include conditions relating to matters such as the remuneration and pensions at issue in the main proceedings.
Ugotoviti je treba, da le na podlagi besedila člena 137(1)(b) ES ali besedila določbe 4 okvirnega sporazuma ni mogoče presoditi, ali delovni pogoji oziroma pogoji zaposlitve iz teh dveh določb vsebujejo pogoje v zvezi s tak�nimi elementi, kot so plačilo in pokojnine, ki so obravnavani v postopku v glavni stvari, ali pa teh pogojev ne vsebujejo.
In that regard, the fact, noted by the United Kingdom Government, that a number of Community-law provisions — such as Article 3(1)(c) of Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training
V zvezi s tem se na podlagi dejstva, ki ga je poudarilo Združeno kraljestvo, da je v določenem �tevilu določb prava Skupnosti – kot so člen 3(1)(c) Direktive Sveta 76/207/EGS z dne 9. februarja 1976 o izvr�evanju načela enakega obravnavanja mo�kih in žensk v zvezi z dostopom do zaposlitve, poklicnega usposabljanja in napredovanja
2008 — CASE C-268/06 and promotion, and working conditions (OJ 1976 L 39, p.
2008 – ZADEVA C-268/06 ter delovnih pogojev (UL L 39, str.
40), as amended by Direct- ive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 (OJ 2002 L 269, p.
40), kot je bila spremenjena z Direktivo 2002/73/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 23. septembra 2002 (UL L 269, str.
15), Article 3(1)(c) of Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (OJ 2000 L 180, p.
15), člen 3(1)(c) Direktive Sveta 2000/43/ES z dne 29. junija 2000 o izvajanju načela enakega obravnavanja oseb ne glede na raso ali narodnost (UL L 180, str.
22), or even Article 3(1)(c) of Council Direct ive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p.
22) ali člen 3(1)(c) Direktive Sveta 2000/78/ES z dne 27. novembra 2000 o splo�nih okvirih enakega obravnavanja pri zaposlovanju in delu (UL L 303, str.
16) — expressly state that the term ‘employment and working conditions’ (to which those provisions refer) includes remuneration does not permit the conclusion to be drawn from the absence of a statement to that effect in Clause 4 of the framework agreement that, for the purposes of applying that clause, the term ‘employment conditions’ does not cover financial aspects such as those at issue in the main proceedings.
16) – izrecno navedeno, da pojem pogojev zaposlitve in delovnih pogojev, na katerega se nana�ajo te določbe, zajema plačilo, iz neobstoja navedbe v tem smislu v določbi 4 okvirnega sporazuma ne more sklepati, da se pojem pogojev zaposlitve za namen uporabe te določbe ne nana�a na tak�ne finančne vidike, kot so obravnavani v postopku v glavni stvari.
In that regard, as the Court has already noted (Del Cerro Alonso, paragraph 36), it is apparent from the wording of Clause 1(a) of the framework agreement that one of its objectives is to ‘improve the quality of fixedterm work by ensuring the application of the principle of non-discrimination’.
Kot je Sodi�če v zvezi s tem že poudarilo (zgoraj navedena sodba Del Cerro Alonso, točka 36), izhaja iz besedila določbe 1(a) okvirnega sporazuma, da je eden izmed njegovih namenov „izbolj�ati kakovost dela za določen čas z zagotavljanjem uporabe načela nediskriminacije [prepovedi diskriminacije]“.
Similarly, the third paragraph of the preamble to the framework agreement states that this framework agreement ‘illustrates the willingness of the Social Partners to establish a general framework for ensuring equal treatment for fixedterm workers by protecting them against discrimination’.
Prav tako preambula okvirnega sporazuma v tretjem pododstavku določa, da ta okvirni sporazum „[k]aže pripravljenost socialnih partnerjev, da vzpostavijo splo�ni okvir za zagotavljanje enake obravnave delavcev, zaposlenih za določen čas, tako da jih �čitijo pred diskriminacijo“.