natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
> Total of Structural and Cohesion Funds available: €347 billion representing 35.7 % of the EU budget and 0.38 % of the total GDP of the EU: > of which for Objective 1 regions: 81.5 %; > population in Objective 1 regions: 170 million (35 % of the total, including phasing-out regions). > Main beneciary countries: Poland (€67.3 billion), Spain (€35.2 billion), Italy (€28.8 billion), Czech Republic (€26.7 billion), Germany (€26.3 billion), Hungary (€25.3 billion), Portugal (€21.5 billion), and Greece (€20.4 billion). GDP for Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia; 5.5-6 % for Bulgaria, Poland and Romania; 3.5 % for Greece and around 1-1.5 % for Spain, the new German Länder and the Mezzogiorno. > By 2015, Structural and Cohesion Funds could have created up to 2 million additional jobs. > Based on ex ante assessments by a number of Member States, the strong focus on research and innovation will create an additional 40 000 jobs. > In the field of transport, 25 000 km of newly built or reconstructed roads and 7 700 km of rail are going to be supported by EU Cohesion Policy investments. > Many Member States and regions address climate change and the development of low carbon economies as a priority in their programmes. For example, Luxembourg is aiming for a reduction of CO emissions by 10 %, while Slovakia plans to reduce the energy
Ključna dejstva in številke mer predvideva dodatnih 9 % na BDP za Litvo, Češko republiko in Slovaško; 5,5–6 % za Bolgarijo, Poljsko in Romunijo; 3,5 % za Grčijo ter približno 1–1,5 % za Španijo, vzhodnonemške dežele in južno Italijo. > Do leta 2015 bodo lahko strukturni skladi in Kohezijski sklad ustvarili do dva milijona dodatnih delovnih mest. > Glede na predhodne ocene številnih držav članic bo izrazito osredotočanje na raziskave in inovacije ustvarilo dodatnih 40 000 delovnih mest. > Na področju prometa bodo naložbe kohezijske politike EU podprle 25 000 km novih ali prenovljenih cest in 7 700 km železnice. > Veliko držav članic in regij obravnava podnebne spremembe in razvoj gospodarstva z nižjimi emisijami ogljika kot prednostno nalogo svojih programov. Luksemburg namerava na primer > Skupna razpoložljiva sredstva strukturnih skladov in Kohezijskega sklada: 347 milijard EUR, kar pomeni 35,7 % proračuna EU in 0,38 % skupnega BDP EU. > Od tega je bilo za regije iz cilja 1 namenjenih: 81,5 % > Število prebivalcev v regijah iz cilja 1: 170 milijonov (35 % vseh prebivalcev, vključno z regijami postopnega opuščanja). > Glavne države upravičenke: Poljska (67,3 milijarde EUR), Španija (35,2 milijarde EUR), Italija (28,8 milijarde EUR), Češka republika (26,7 milijarde EUR), Nemčija (26,3 milijarde EUR), Madžarska (25,3 milijarde EUR), Portugalska (21,5 milijarde EUR) in Grčija (20,4 milijarde EUR). za 10 %, Slovaška pa načrtuje zmanjšanje zmanjšati emisije CO2
Expected results intensity of production by over 20 %.
Pričakovani rezultati energijske intenzivnosti proizvodnje za več kot 20 %.
Programmes in Italy, France, Czech Republic, Malta, England and Wales include provision for the development of specic carbon evaluation systems.
Programi v Italiji, Franciji, Češki republiki, na Malti, v Angliji in Walesu vključujejo razvoj posebnih sistemov za oceno emisij ogljika.
> Macroeconomic models estimate that Cohesion Policy investment will add on average around 6 % to the GDP of new Member States, on top of baseline scenarios. For example, the Hermin model predicts an additional 9 % on For more details, see the ‘evaluation’ pages at: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy
> Makroekonomski modeli ocenjujejo, da bo vlaganje v kohezijsko politiko v povprečju prispevalo približno 6 % k BDP novih držav članic, poleg običajnega scenarija. Model Hermin na pri- Za več podrobnosti glej strani „z ocenami“ na spletni strani: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy
ADEBATEBETWEENOFFICIALSOFTHEEUROPEANCOMMISSION
RAZPRAVA MED URADNIKI EVROPSKE KOMISIJE
Looking back to 1988
Pogled v leto 1988
The debate was organised on 5 March 2008 in Brussels.
Razprava je potekala 5. marca 2008 v Bruslju.
Dirk Ahner has been Director-General at the Regional Policy DG since 2007 and was responsible for prospective studies in the field of agriculture, environment and rural development, in DG Agriculture where he was Deputy Director-General between 2003 and 2006.
Dirk Ahner je od leta 2007 generalni direktor GD za regionalno politiko, med letoma 2003 in 2006 pa je bil namestnik generalnega direktorja GD za kmetijstvo, kjer je bil odgovoren za študije o možnostih na področju kmetijstva, okolja in razvoja podeželja.
Graham Meadows worked for DG REGIO from 1989 until 2006 and was Director-General from 2003 until 2006.
Graham Meadows je bil v GD REGIO zaposlen od leta 1989 do leta 2006, med letoma 2003 in 2006 kot generalni direktor.
He was also an adviser in the Cabinet of Commission President Gaston E. Thorn (1981-1985) and Head of Cabinet of Stanley Clinton Davis, Member of the Commission (1986-1989).
Prav tako je bil svetovalec v kabinetu predsednika Komisije Gastona E. Thorna (1981–1985) in šef kabineta komisarja Stanleya Clintona Davisa (1986–1989).
Jean-Charles Leygues was Deputy Head of the Cabinet of Commission President Jacques Delors (1987-1992) and Deputy Director-General at the Regional Policy DG in 2004-2007.
Jean-Charles Leygues je bil namestnik šefa kabineta predsednika Komisije Jacquesa Delorsa (1987–1992), med letoma 2004 in 2007 pa namestnik generalnega direktorja GD za regionalno politiko.
Philip Lowe has been Director-General of DG Competition since 2002 and was Head of Cabinet of Bruce Millan, the then Commissioner for Regional Policy between 1989 and 1991.
Philip Lowe je od leta 2002 generalni direktor GD za konkurenco in je bil med letoma 1989 in 1991 šef kabineta takratnega komisarja za regionalno politiko Brucea Millana.
Jérôme Vignon, Director for 'Social Protection and Social Inclusion' within DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, was Member of the cabinet of President Jacques Delors in 1985.
Jérôme Vignon, direktor direktorata Socialna zaščita in vključevanje v družbo pri GD za zaposlovanje, socialne zadeve in enake možnosti, je bil leta 1985 član kabineta predsednika Jacquesa Delorsa.
Tassos Bougas is Head of Unit at the Regional Policy DG and was Deputy Head of Cabinet for the Commissioner Georgios Varfis, in charge of coordination of structural policies, in the second half of the 1980s.
Tassos Bougas je vodja enote GD za regionalno politiko in je bil v drugi polovici osemdesetih let 20. stoletja namestnik šefa kabineta komisarja Georgiosa Varfisa, odgovoren za usklajevanje strukturnih politik.
Robert Shotton, Director for General Affairs at DG Health and Consumer Protection, was responsible for the Community Initiatives in DG REGIO between 1989 and 1993 and for the then new Member States Finland, Austria, Sweden and finally Greece.
Robert Shotton, direktor za splošne zadeve pri GD za zdravje in varstvo potrošnikov, je bil med letoma 1989 in 1993 odgovoren za pobude Skupnosti v GD REGIO ter za takratne nove države članice, Finsko, Avstrijo, Švedsko in Grčijo.
All views expressed are not necessarily those of the European Commission.
Vsa izražena stališča niso nujno stališča Evropske komisije.
Jean-Charles Leygues: We would like to discuss three questions.
Jean-Charles Leygues: Razpravljati želimo o treh vprašanjih.
First, has this policy – despite doubts pronounced by some on its bureaucratic burden – been a success story after all?
Prvič, ali je bila ta politika kljub dvomom nekaterih zaradi birokratskih bremen, ki jih povzroča, dejansko uspešna?
Second, what has been the original model of development behind the design of Cohesion Policy?
Drugič, kakšen je bil prvotni model razvoja, na katerem temelji oblikovanje kohezijske politike?
Third, has this model – and if yes, how? – changed over four legislative and budgetary periods since 1988 including continued enlargement of the EU?
Tretjič, ali se je ta model – in če se je, kako? – spremenil med štirimi zakonodajnimi in proračunskimi obdobji od leta 1988, vključno z nenehno širitvijo EU?
Tassos Bougas: In my view, there were originally two groups of thought in the Commission, the 'integrationists' following an approach as designed in the 'Integrated Mediterranean Programmes' (IMP) who advocated for a strong role of the Commission, next to the Member States and the regions and a second group favouring a more moderating
Tassos Bougas: Mislim, da sta na začetku v Komisiji obstajali dve stališči; prvo je bilo „integra-cionistično“ in je sledilo pristopu iz integriranih programov za Sredozemlje, ki so zagovarjali močno vlogo Komisije poleg vloge držav članic in regij, drugo stališče pa je bilo naklonjeno zmernejši vlogi Komisije, pri čemer so nosilci politike države članice. Tako je še danes in
Dirk Ahner: Welcome to this meeting which is dedicated to looking back in order to learn what has happened and how since this famous and maybe unique 'moment Delors' in 1988 when Cohesion Policy was born it has made this radical turn from project management to a more strategic approach focusing on regional actors.
Dirk Ahner: Dobrodošli na tem srečanju, ki je namenjeno pregledu dosedanjega razvoja, da bi razumeli, kaj se je zgodilo ter kako se je med slavnim in morda edinstvenim „Delorsovim obdobjem“ v letu 1988, ko je bila oblikovana kohezijska politika, zgodil temeljit preobrat od upravljanja projektov k bolj strateškemu pristopu s poudarkom na regionalnih udeležencih.
I would like to look together with you into the development of the policy since then and to finally exchange views on its prospects beyond 2013.
Skupaj z vami želim pregledati razvoj politike po tem obdobju in na koncu razprave izmenjati mnenja glede njene prihodnosti po letu 2013.
On the latter aspect, we are currently collecting expertise and advice from both academics and practitioners on the rationale of the policy, future challenges facing the regions and the possibilities for simplification and better governance.
V zvezi s tem zdaj zbiramo strokovno znanje in nasvete akademikov in strokovnih delavcev glede temeljnega cilja politike, prihodnjih izzivov, s katerimi se bodo srečevale regije, ter možnosti za poenostavitev in boljše upravljanje.
Commissioner Danuta Hübner will present the results of these reflections in a report in spring 2009.
Komisarka Danuta Hübner bo v poročilu spomladi 2009 predstavila rezultate teh razmišljanj.
UK, the slogan of an 'integrated approach' gave new impetus to regional development eorts in Scotland and the north-west, for example; it wasn't simply a question of the technical integration of financial instruments it also highlighted the issue of precisely who was responsible at EU, national and regional level for the design and implementation of each part of a regional programme.
takšen položaj je delno povzročil razlikovanje med bolj eksperimentalnimi in „komunitarnimi“ instrumenti politike, kot so inovativna metoda zasnove in izvajanja javnih politik, inovativni ukrepi, pobude Skupnosti in omrežja, ter tistimi operativnimi programi, ki jih upravljajo predvsem države članice in regije.
role for the Commission with the Member States being the policy’s drivers.
Razprava o učinkovitem modelu razvoja je potekala vzporedno z realpolitiko in njenimi dvomi, ali naj bogate države še naprej financirajo sklade, iz katerih brez posledic črpajo drugi.
This continues since then and, to a certain extent, it has underpinned the distinction between the more experimental and 'communitarian' instruments of the policy, such as the innovative method of conception and implementation of public policies, innovative actions, Community Initiatives and networks, and those operational programmes managed more on behalf of the Member States and regions.
„Svoj denar hočemo nazaj“ in„Deutschland ist nicht der Zahlmeister Europas“ sta bili izjavi, ki sta zaznamovali vzdušje ob prihodu Jacquesa Delorsa, njegov odziv pa je bil, da se bodo strukturni skladi preoblikovali v strukturno politiko s ciljem socialne kohezije. Veliki premik so dejansko podprli štirje bistveni elementi, ki delno še vedno obstajajo.
Jérôme Vignon: It is true that before the big bang of 1988, a certain fermentation of the concept of economic and social cohesion and the Structural Funds had occurred in the Member States and the universities.
Prvi, tj. „institucionalni moment“, ni več tako pomemben kot prej. Pravno besedilo iz leta 1987 pravi: „da bi bil ,Enotni akt‘ uspešen“.
The debate about an ecient development model existed in parallel with the 'Realpolitik' which questioned whether the rich countries should continue to put money into funds absorbed without any impact by the others.
Politično sporočilo za države članice, ki jim je dokončno oblikovanje skupnega trga najbolj koristilo, je bilo, da so pripravljene na prizadevanja v okviru kohezijske politike.
'I want my money back!' and 'Deutschland ist nicht der Zahlmeister Europas!' formed part of the landscape prepared upon the arrival of Jacques Delors and his answer was that the Structural Funds would be transformed into structural policies aiming at social cohesion.
Poleg tega je pristop večletnega proračuna spremljalo resno upravljanje, načrtovanje, ocenjevanje in izvajanje nadzora.
In fact, the big bang was supported by four crucial elements some of which are still with us.
„Več denarja“ je povzročilo le več omejitev, ki jih je nadzorovala Komisija.
Philip Lowe: I remember between 1979 and 1981 being a member of a Commission task force under the leadership of Jean Jaeger which worked on the question of how to achieve better eciency of structural instruments in view of the limits placed on the Community budget.
Philip Lowe: Spominjam se, ko sem bil med letoma 1979 in 1981 član delovne skupine Komisije pod vodstvom Jeana Jaegerja, ki je obravnavala vprašanje doseganja boljše učinkovitosti strukturnih instrumentov ob upoštevanju omejenega proračuna Skupnosti.
At that time, this group was not thinking so much about the grand principles of Cohesion Policy such as solidarity but about how the eciency and eectiveness of Community interventions could be improved through an 'integrated approach' which would put the dierent structural instruments (ERDF, ESF, EIB loans, etc.) at the service of regional or national objectives and allow countries such as Greece to benet globally from a volume of investments which would have signicant macroeconomic impact and consequent tangible results on growth.
Ta skupina takrat ni toliko razmišljala o velikih načelih kohezijske politike, kot je solidarnost, ampak o tem, kako bi bilo mogoče učinkovitost in uspešnost ukrepov Skupnosti izboljšati s celostnim pristopom, s katerim bi se različni strukturni instrumenti (ESRR, ESS, posojila EIB itd.) uporabili za doseganje regionalnih ali nacionalnih ciljev ter državam, kot je Grčija, omogočili splošne koristi od obsežnih naložb, ki bi imele pomemben makroekonomski vpliv in povzročile konkretne rezultate v smislu rasti.
This enthusiasm about 'eciency and eective-ness' was shared by many of the Member States’ finance ministries during that period.
V tem obdobju je bilo nad„učinkovitostjo in uspešnostjo“ navdušenih tudi več ministrstev za finance v državah članicah.
A Commission report prepared by the Task Force was presented to the ECOFIN Council in 1984 when Graham and I were members of the Cabinet of President Gaston Thorn.
Poročilo Komisije, ki ga je pripravila delovna skupina, je bilo svetu ECOFIN predloženo leta 1984, ko sva bila z Grahamom člana kabineta predsednika Gastona Thorna.
It was at that moment that the notion of 'economic and social cohesion' began to be discussed explicitly.
Takrat se je začelo izrecno razpravljati o pojmu „ekonomska in socialna kohezija“.
Both the concepts of eciency and cohesion were then advanced by Jacques Delors as of 1985 and they enabled him to dominate the debate about a new vision for Europe – maybe everywhere except the Anglo-Saxon world. But even in the
Jacques Delors je leta 1985 razširjal koncepta učinkovitosti in kohezije, s čimer je prevzel vodenje razprave o novi viziji za Evropo – verjetno povsod, razen v anglosaksonskem svetu.
The first one, the 'institutional moment', is not as important as it was.
Vendar je tudi v Združenem kraljestvu slogan celostnega pristopa zagotovil nov zagon za prizadevanja za regionalni razvoj, na primer na Škotskem in v severozahodnem delu.
The legal text of 1987 said 'in order to make the ‘Single Act’ a success'.
To ni bilo le preprosto vprašanje tehničnega vključevanja nančnih instrumentov.
The political message to the Member States beneting most from the completion of the common market was that they were ready to make an eort through Cohesion Policy.
Izpostavilo se je tudi vprašanje, kdo natančno je na ravni EU, nacionalni
In addition, the multiannual budget approach would be accompanied by a serious managing, programming, evaluation and control exercise. 'More money' only came with more restrictions controlled by the Commission.
Drugi element zadeva prenos pristojnosti, politično zamisel, ki je v več državah članicah postala pomembna ob koncu devetdesetih let 20. stoletja in je povzročila ustanovitev Odbora regij leta 1992.
Probably, that kind of political deal remains historically unique even if nowadays making a success of enlargement is fundamentally linked to economic and social cohesion.
Kohezijska politika je okrepila vpliv tistih večinoma proevropskih udeležencev na regionalni ravni, ki so podpirali Enotni evropski akt.
The second element concerns 'devolution', a political idea which gained momentum in many Member States at the end of the 1990s and led to the creation of the Committee of the Regions in 1992.
STRAN28 vprašanje znotraj Komisije ostaja, kakšno naj bo usklajevanje med generalnimi direktorati, ki upravljajo različna sredstva.
Cohesion Policy empowered those, mostly pro-European, actors at regional level who were in favour of the Single European Act.
Ker usklajevanje „od zunaj“ prek novega GD ni bilo uspešno, je celostni pristop k sredstvom še vedno aktualen, saj mislim, da je postalo očitno, da sodelovanje ne deluje.
As coordination 'from the outside' through a new DG has not been the way, the integrated approach of the funds remains on the agenda because it has become evident, in my view, that 'marching together' does not work.
Opredelitev upravičenosti in financiranja za oba pristopa, tj. pristop na podlagi infrastrukture in pristop celostnega razvoja, je razrešila in delno zaključila to razpravo v Komisiji in tudi v državah članicah.
The third supporting element at the end of the 1980s was the intellectual attempt to rethink development policies in general.
Tretji podporni element ob koncu osemdesetih let 20. stoletja je bil intelektualni poskus splošnega ponovnega razmisleka o razvojni politiki.
The scene was traditionally dominated by those academics who were convinced that regional convergence would mainly be dependent on infrastructure investment.
Na tem področju so tradicionalno prevladovali tisti akademiki, ki so bili prepričani, da je regionalna konvergenca odvisna zlasti od naložb v infrastrukturo.
A new school of thought, however, was convinced that only an integrated approach would be able to unlock the endogenous local potential and create sustainable growth.
Vendar je bila nova miselna struja prepričana, da lahko le celostni pristop omogoči izkoriščanje notranjega lokalnega potenciala in ustvari trajnostno rast.
This development concept was tested for the first time by the IMPs and involved predominately local instead of national stakeholders.
Ta koncept razvoja se je prvič preveril z integriranimi programi za Sredozemlje in je namesto nacionalnih vključil večinoma lokalne zainteresirane strani.
Though the original idea of Jacques Delors, to accept only programmes suggested by the regional level was finally not put into practice, it dominated the negotiations with the Member States and led to further decentralisation of tasks.
Čeprav se prvotna zamisel Jacquesa Delorsa, naj se sprejmejo le programi, predlagani na regionalni ravni, nazadnje ni uresničila, je prevladala v pogajanjih z državami članicami in povzročila nadaljnjo decentralizacijo nalog.
Jean-Charles Leygues: Concerning your third point, Jérôme, on the 'ght of the two schools', the 'believers in infrastructure' and those convinced that innovation and an integrated approach would lead to a homogenous development, I think the final solution was simple and pragmatic.
Zadnji element prvotnega osnutka od takrat velja za vsa naslednja obdobja. Končno, pri določanju ciljev politike je treba te cilje poimenovati z imenom, ki jasno dokazuje, da obstaja „pomemben evropski razlog“ za delovanje.
Dening eligibility and funding for both infrastructure and integrated development approaches, solved and partially finished that debate inside the Commission and in the Member States as well.
Razvoj podeželja je bil eden od takšnih razlogov, saj je bil pomemben del reforme SKP. Zelo po-
“Delors’ answer was that the Structural Funds would be transformed into structural policies aiming at social cohesion.” Jérôme Vignon
„Delorsov odgovor je bil, da se bodo strukturni skladi preoblikovali v strukturno politiko s ciljem socialne kohezije.“ Jérôme Vignon
The last element of the original blueprint has been valid ever since for all subsequent periods.
Tassos Bougas: Opozarjam vas na gospodarsko in politično ozadje ter zelo pomembne razlike, ki so zaznamovale to razpravo.
Finally, when formulating the policy’s objectives one has to give a name to these, a name which makes it clear that there is an 'important European reason' to act.
Stopnje rasti so bile v osemdesetih letih 20. stoletja v revnejših državah članicah precej nizke.
'Rural development' was such a reason because it was an important part of the CAP reform.
Poleg tega se je kohezijska politika obravnavala kot regulatorni mehanizem, ki naj bi odpravil mogoče negativne zunanje učinke zaradi razvoja politik Skupnosti s posebnim poudarkom na možnostih notranjega trga.
Making enlargement, economic restructuring and the common market a success,
Končno, poleg bolj pasivnega ali negativnega „združevanja z zakonodajo“ je Skupnost potrebovala politike, namenjene državljanom, in je prek nekaterih -nančnih spodbud Skupnosti vzpostavila „pozitivno združevanje“.
Tassos Bougas: I would remind of the econ- omic and political context and the quite important disparities which framed that debate.
Kohezijska politika je imela tri cilje: odpravljanje neenakosti, obvladovanje mogočih negativnih zunanjih učinkov in spodbujanje pozitivnega združevanja.
Growth rates in the 1980s, were quite modest in the poorer Member States.
Padoa-Schio-ppovo poročilo je predstavilo prav to.
In addition, Cohesion Policy was perceived as a regulatory mechanism in the sense that it was meant to alleviate potential negative externalities produced by the development of Community policies, with a particular focus on the perspectives of Internal Market.
Graham Meadows: Ponovno se želim dotakniti Tassosove tretje in Jérômove četrte točke, tj. zamisli, da je obstoj evropske regionalne politike upravičen, če se lahko obravnava, kot da izravnava negativne učinke združevanja ali membni evropski cilji so seveda tudi uspešna širitev, gospodarsko prestrukturiranje in skupni trg.
Finally, in addition to a more passive or negative 'integration by law', the Community needed policies that addressed the citizens and, through some community financial incentives set up a 'positive integration'.
Politična zamisel „če si boste pomagali sami, vam bo pomagala Evropa“ je bila v zvezi s tem precej uspešna, in mislim, da je oznaka, da je strukturna politika EU „na voljo Evropi“, danes še vedno upravičena, čeprav jo bo treba v prihodnosti dodatno obravnavati. Nerešeno
PAGE29 fold objective: address disparities; alleviate potential negative externalities and support positive integration.
STRAN29 izraža neko pomembno zamisel, kot je zagotavljanje uspešne širitve.
The Padoa-Schioppa report put these exact issues on the table.
Mislim, da je to napačno, zlasti stališče, da lahko politiko upravičuje le pomembna zamisel.