natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
(c)The fact that the design has been developed under the responsibility of the public sector through the development phase was known totheprivatesectorand washighlighted asanelementofcomplexityfortherele-vantriskallocation withintheconcession scheme.
(c)Dejstvo, daje bilzazasnovo vrazvojnifazi odgovorenjavnisektor,jebilozasebnemu sektorju znano in je bilo tudi poudarjeno kot element zapletenosti pri ustreznirazdelitvi tveganj v okviru koncesijskesheme.
Neverthelessreports by expertsinthefield never outlined this as a major blocking point forthe viability ofthe concessionscheme.
Fazo IOV, ki je bila prvotno zasnovana, da bi se zmanjšala tveganja pri zasnovi, je zasebni sektor videl kot glavno omejitev pri prevze-manjutveganj.
The IOV phase originally conceived to reduce designrisks wasperceivedbytheprivate sectorasa majorconstrainttotheunder-takingthereof.
Kljubtemuporočilastrokovnjakovnatem področjuteganikolinisonavajalakot bistvenoovirozaizvedljivostkoncesijske sheme.
Itis to be recalled that theindustry, having developedthedesignduringthedevelop-ment phase, waslargelyrepresentedinthe candidatesforthe concession contract.
Trebajeopozoriti,dajebilaindustrija,ki jerazvilazasnovoprojektavrazvojnifazi, večinomazastopana med kandidatiza koncesijsko pogodbo.
The attitude of industry to refuse any undertaking of designrisk onthe basis oflack of visibility,involvement and validation capabilities of the IOV phase has been strongly challengedduringnegotiationgiventhat thepotentialconcessionholder wascom-posed mainlyofthesameindustrialactors whohadavisibilityontheirownperform-ance atthe designstage.
Stališče industrije, da zavrača vsa prevzema-njatveganj prizasnovi na podlagi pomanjkanja zmogljivosti na področju preglednosti, vključenosti in validacije v fazi IOV, je bilo močnoomajanomedpogajanji,sajjebil potencialni koncesionar sestavljen večinoma izistihindustrijskihakterjev,kisovfazi zasnove delovali pregledno.
Market risk, design risk and to a lesser extent third party liability risks were the more contentious areas during negotiations.
Tržnotveganje,tveganjeprizasnoviin v manjši meritveganjaškode,povzročene tretjimosebam,sobilamedspornejšimi področji med pogajanji.
Thefounding elementsfor a third partylia-bility mitigationstructure wereagreedat head-of-termslevel.
Otemeljnihelementihstrukturezaublaži-tev škode, povzročene tretjim osebam, je bil dosežen dogovor glede glavnih pogodbenih pogojev.
43.The GJU wasinstructed byitsregulationto ‘charge to [ESA] the carrying-out of activities required during the development phase with regardtothespaceandtheearthsegment associated withthesystem’.
43.Uredbaoustanovitvi GJUtemuskupnemu podjetju da je nalogo, naj agenciji ESA „poveri izvajanje dejavnosti, potrebnih med razvojnofazovzvezizvesoljskimsegmen-tominzemeljskimsegmentom,povezanim ssistemom.“
ESA choseinfavour of anindustrial organi-sationled by a single prime contractor, but stillensuring,atleastonthepartofthe programme funded by ESA Member States, a geographicalreturntosubcontractors.
ESAjeizbralaindustrijskoorganizacijo,na čelukatereje bilsamoeden glavni pogod-beniizvajalec,vendarjekljubtemuvsajza tisti del programa, ki so ga financirale države članice ESA, zagotovila geografsko porazdelitev podizvajalcev.
These activities were carried out by ESA in the framework of the GalileoSat programme, jointly funded by ESA member states on a voluntary basis and the European Communities.
Te dejavnosti je ESA izvajala v okviru programa GalileoSat, ki je so ga ustanovile skupaj države članice ESA na prostovoljni podlagiin Evropskiskupnosti.
Galileo was the first and only GNSS programme actually opened for European space industry participation.
Galileoje bil prviin edini program GNSS, ki je bil dejansko odprt za sodelovanje z evropsko vesoljskoindustrijo.
As a result, the prime contractorchosenwaslikelytoenjoya definitive competitive advantage for future competitions (primarily for the deployment phase).
Zatoje bilo verjetno, da bo izbrani glavni pogodbeni izvajalec imel odločilno konkurenčno prednost na prihodnjih natečajih (v glavnem v uvajalni fazi). Tojezelovplivalonaindustrijskopolitiko, kijoje podpirala ESA.
45.ESA was responsible for carrying out the Gal-ileoSat programme andreportedto GJU on its actions. GJU supervision as stated in Art 2 paragraph4, waslimitedtoensuringthat all phases of the programme dovetailed correctly, and was notconceived as areplace-ment of ESAtechnical expertise.
45.ESAjebilaodgovornazaizvajanjepro-grama GalileoSat in je GJUporočalaonje-govihdejavnostih.Kakorjebilonavedeno v odstavku 4 člena 2je bil nadzor GJU ome-jennazagotavljanjepravilneusklajenosti vsehfaz programain ni bil namenjen temu, da bi nadomestil strokovneizkušnjein znanje agencije ESA.
As a consequence of this and of the actions ofseveralinterestedmemberstates,the primecontractoreventuallyelected wasa jointventureofantagonisticcompanies, whichnever managedtoworkefficiently together.
Zaraditegainzaradi ukrepovvečzaintere-siranih državčlanicje bil dokončnoizbrani glavni pogodbeni izvajalec konzorcij podjetij z nasprotujočimi si interesi, ki nikoli niso uspela učinkovitosodelovati.
The GalileoSat declarationforesaw a standard ESA 20 %flexibility onits contribution, creating a de facto 10 % contingency on the total budget, which proved insufficient due tothe programme complexity.
Zaradi vse večjih stroškov in zamud se je ESA decembra 2007 nazadnje odločila za različno industrijsko organizacijo in pogodbeni okvir, napodlagikaterihjeprevzelaneposredne odgovornostiglavnegapogodbenegaizva-jalcainrazličnesklopedeldodelilanepo-sredno podizvajalcem.
Faced withincreasedcosts and delays, ESA finally decided to opt in December 2007, for a differentindustrial organisation and con-tractualframework, wherebyit wouldtake directprimeresponsibilitiesandcontract out directlyto subcontractorsthe different work packages.
Deklaracija GalileoSat je predvidela standardno prožnost agencije ESA v višini 20 % njenih prispevkov, kar ustvarja dejanski varnostni dodatek skupnemu proračunu v višini 10 %,vendarsejeizkazalozanezadostno zaradi zapletenosti programa.
Exploitation ofsuch workisto beincluded in the forthcoming‘GNSs application action plan’.
Izkoriščanjetakegadelajetrebavključiti vprihodnji„akcijskinačrtzaaplikacije GNSS“.
A number of FP6 projects have experienced delays,butaproject-by-projectanalysis pointstovariouscausesnotnecessarily linkedtothetransfer.
Velikoprojektovvokviru6OPjeimelo zamude, vendarje analiza posameznih projektov pokazalarazličnevzroke,ki niso bili nujno povezanis prenosom.
Thedefinitionoftheservices, which were the basisforthe system specifications, had been performed earlier, with FP5funds.
Storitve,kisobileuporabljenekotosnova zaspecifikacijesistema,sobileoprede-ljene predhodno pri financiranju iz sredstev 5OP.
56.Theactivitiesfunded with FP6 include the development of new applications, evaluation of related market potential, investigation of possiblebusiness models,andresearchon business plans suitable for their commercial-isation.Experienceof market development andtechnologicalinnovationshowsthat mostof marketinnovationsarecreatedby the market, and not by a top-down approach.
56.Dejavnosti,financiraneiz6OP,vključujejo razvojnovihaplikacij,ocenopotencialnih zadevnihtrgov, proučitev mogočih poslovnih modelov ter raziskave o poslovnih načr-tih,primernihzanjihovokomercializacijo. Izkušnje na področju razvoja trga in tehnoloških inovacij kažejo, da večino tržnih inovacij ustvari trg in ne pristop „od zgoraj navzdol“.
This is especially true in non mature markets such asthis one, wherethe GJU/GSA would have had difficulties in devising comprehensive developmentstrategies.
Tošeposebnoveljazanezreletrga,kotje ta, nakaterem biimela GJU/GSAtežave pri oblikovanju celovitihrazvojnihstrategij.
The aim of the FP is to foster the development of technologies and services, although leaving the market actors freedom to choose in whichdomainsuchdevelopmentsshall take place.
Cilj OP je spodbujati razvoj tehnologij in storitev, pritem patržnimakterjem pustiti svobodo,dalahkoizberejo,nakaterem področju bo ta razvoj potekal.
This approach has demonstrated its validityin the sense that several companies, notably SMEs, have acquired knowledge andexperience which has positionedthem asleadersonthe market, such as Ifen and Septentriofordual Galileo/GPSreceptors, Polestar for indoor positioning solutions and Telesysforlocation-basedservices.
Ta pristop se jeizkazalzaustreznegazvidika,dajeveč podjetij, zlasti MSP, pridobilo znanje in izku-šnje,skaterimisopostalavodilnanatrgu. Trebaje omeniti podjetji Ifen in Septentrio zadvojne Galileo/GPSsprejemnike,podje-tje Polestar za rešitve ugotavljanja položaja v zaprtih prostorih in podjetje Telesys za lokacijsko odvisnestoritve.
57.The delays on the Galileo/EGNOS programme may explain part ofthe delays in some FP6 projects.
57.Z zamudami pri programu Galileo/EGNOS je mogoče delno pojasniti zamude pri nekaterih projektih v okviru 6OP.
60.EGNOShassufferedfromdelaysthatare mainlyduetotechnologicalissuesnotin the control of the Commission, whichimply development delays.
Kakorveljazavseraziskovalnedejavnosti, rezultati projektov niso gotovi in so odvisni od več dejavnikov, na katere Komisija nima vpliva.
The GSAfosteredthedisseminationofproject results by setting up an Internet-based database of projectresults, organisingtwo successful ‘Growing Galileo’ events taking stock oftheseresults,and publishingacompen-dium ofsuchresults.
GSAjespodbujal razširjanjeprojektnihrezultatovzustano-vitvijospletnepodatkovnezbirkeprojek-tnih rezultatov, organizacijo dveh uspešnih konferenc z naslovom „Growing Galileo“, namenjenih pregledu stanja teh rezultatov, in objavo zbirketehrezultatov.
(a) The conclusion of the EGNOS agreement provedtobeverydifficultduetointrin-sicdifficultiespropertotherelationship betweenthedifferentpartiesinvolvedin EGNOS.
(a)Izkazalo se je, da je bilo sklepanje sporazuma za EGNOS zaradi vprašanj, ki so izhajala iz odnosovmedrazličnimistrankami,kiso sodelovale v programu EGNOS, težavno.
Finally the agreement was finalised bythe end of 2008 and signed on 31 March 2009.
Spo-razumjebildokončnooblikovandokonca leta 2008 in podpisan 31. marca 2009.
Moreover, the ESA’s programme for EGNOS(ARTES9) under which EGNOSis currently operated, is ending on 31 March 2009 time whenthesystemshould becompliant with the technical specifications needed for its exploitation by an economic operator.
Poleg tega se program agencije ESA za EGNOS (ARTES 9), v okviru katerega EGNOS trenutno deluje,izteče 31. marca 2009,tj.takrat ko bi moral biti sistem skladen s tehničnimi specifikacijami, ki jih gospodarski operaterji potrebujejo za njegovo uporabo.
(b)In March 2009 the system will effectively be certifiable,anditisplannedtocertifythe operator by 2010in accordance with Single European Skyregulation.
(b)Sistemsebomarca2009lahkodejansko certificiral,certifikacijaoperaterjapaje predvidenadoleta2010vskladuzuredbo o enotnem evropskem nebu.
Inthisrespectitistobeunderlinedthat from a technical standpoint EGNOS OSand SoL are not different in terms of accessibility by users. They only differ from a certification standpoint.
S tem v zvezije treba poudariti, da se s tehničnega vidika storitvi programa EGNOS OS (odprta storitev) in SoL (Safety of Life – varovanje življenj) ne razlikujeta glede na njuno dostopnostzauporabnike.Razlikujetase samo z vidika certifikacije.
These assumptions justified the GJU attitude not toinvestin market development activi-tiesfor EGNOS.
Na podlagi teh predpostavk je bil utemeljen pristop GJU, da ne vlaga v dejavnosti zarazvojtrga v okviru EGNOS.
61.(b)The integration of EGNOS into Galileo though affirmed as an objective at political level has always beenthesource of problemsfrom a contractualstandpoint.
61. (b) Integracija programa EGNOS v Galileo je spogodbenegavidikavednopovzročala težave,čepravjebilapotrjenakotciljna političniravni.
Funding from the EU waslimited.
Financiranjesstrani EUje bilo omejeno.
Forthisreasonthecandidatesforthecon-cessioncontract wererequiredtoaddress the EGNOS integration into Galileo as an optionalscenario.
Prejete ponudbe so jasno kazale, da integracija obehsistemov prinaša koristi,in poga-janjazakoncesijskopogodbopozdružitvi obeh kandidatov so bila opravljena na podlagi scenarija, kije predvidevalintegracijo.
Delays and cost overruns have been experi-encedin theframework of the ARTES 9 pro-grammefor varioustechnicalreasons.
Zaradi različnih tehničnih razlogov so nastale zamudeinprekoračitvestroškovvokviru programa ARTES 9.
The bidsreceived were clearlyshowingthe benefits of integrating the two systems, and the negotiations of the concession contract after the merger of the two candidates were carried out on anintegratedscenario.
(c) Institucionalni okvir EGNOS je zapleten zaradidogodkov,kisospremljalinjegovo vzpostavitev.
63.(a)Independently from the concession process, EGNOS faced a series of technological issues, under the control of neither the Commission nor GJU, which also resulted in programmatic delays.
63.(a)Poleg težav pri koncesijskem postopku se je pri programu EGNOS pojavila vrsta tehnoloških vprašanj, na katere nista mogla vplivati niti Komisija niti GJU,zaradičesarjeprav tako prišlo do programskih zamud.
(c)The EGNOSinstitutionalframeworkiscom-plexduetohistoricalreasonsonhowthe programme wasset up.
(d)GJUje naročil pripravo več poslovnih načrtov za EGNOS in študije o možni komercializaciji njegovih storitev, ki so pokazale dokaj omejen potencial glede zmožnosti programa EGNOS, da ustvarja prihodke.
(b)Itisverydifficulttoappointanoperator for an infrastructure which is not completed fromatechnicalstandpoint.Moreoverit would have been impossible for the Commis-siontoentrustan operator without having rights onthe assetsto be operated.
Poleg tega bi bilo nemogoče, da bi Komisija to nalogo zaupala ope-raterjuinnebiimelapravice,daupravlja s premoženjem.
The appointment of an EGNOS economic operator is now under finalisation under the responsibility of the European Commission.
Razpravessektorjemletalstvaso pokazale, dajetežkovzpostaviti mehanizem ustvarjanja prihodkov za sam signal EGNOS, ki je zavsakegauporabnikaodprtindostopen zastonj.
Discussionsheldwiththeaviationsector haveshownthedifficultyofestablishing arevenuegenerationmechanismforthe EGNOS signal itself which is open and acces-sibleto any userforfree.
Imenovanjegospodarskegaoperaterjaza program EGNOS je sedaj v fazi dokončne priprave, za to pa nosi odgovornost Evropska Komisija.
Theneedtoconcludeaframeworkagree-ment had a limited impact on the concession negotiations.
Potreba po sklenitvi okvirnega sporazuma je le malo vplivala na koncesijska pogajanja.
(b)The winding up of the GJU does not have anyimpact ontherole of GJUinthat phase ofthe programme.
(b)Ukinitev GJU nima nobenega vpliva na vlogo GJU v zadevnifazi programa.
64.The GJUreceivedaclear mandate to integrate EGNOS into Galileo which made it necessarytonegotiateaframeworkagree-ment withthe various EGNOS stakeholders, to clear the path for the ultimate transfer of ownership of EGNOS.
Po drugi strani je bilo zaprtje GJU potrebno, da se je preprečilo podvajanje vlog med GJU in GSA.
Theframework agreement negotiationsled by GJU wereultimatelynotsuccessfuldue to the complex institutional framework recognised by the Court itself, but have served asasoundbasisforthecurrentfinalised agreement withthe Commission.
Pogajanjaookvirnemsporazumu,kijihje vodil GJU, nazadnje niso bila uspešna zaradi zapletenegainstitucionalnega okvira, ki ga je priznalo Sodiščesamo, vendar pasoslu-žilakottrdnapodlagazasedanjidokončni sporazums Komisijo.
The ESA/GJU agreement was intended to setforthapartnershipbetweenthepar-tiesco-financingtheproject whereby ESA would have applied its own rules for placing contracts.
V sporazumu med ESA in GJU naj bi bilo opredeljenopartnerstvo medstrankami,ki sofinancirajoprojekt,vskladuskaterimbi agencija ESA uporabljala lastna pravila za naročanje.
Implementation and reporting arrangements werenotdetailedasinstandardcontrac-tualrelationshipsduetothecooperative nature of the agreement.
Ker gre za sporazum o sodelovanju, izvajanje in poročanje ni bilotako podrobno urejeno kotpristandardnihpogodbenihodnosih.
The specific reporting modalities were established bythe GJU executive committee when payment obliga-tionsto ESAstartedtofall due.
Posebne načine poročanja je določil izvršilni komite GJU, ko so začele zapadati obveznosti plačil do agencije ESA.
67.The allocation oftasks betweenthe parties during the development phase was inspired by the principle of cooperation between the parties in order to create a joint platform for the development ofthe programme.
67.Razdelitev nalog med stranke v razvojni fazi je bila izvedena na podlagi načela sodelovanja med strankami, da bi se ustvarila skupna platforma zarazvoj programa.
The delegation agreement between the Commission and ESA signed on December2008 for the deployment phase, provides for strict monitoring andreporting obligations.
Sporazumoprenosupooblastil med Komisijo in ESA, ki je bil podpisan decembra 2008 zauvajalnofazo,določastrogeobveznosti spremljanjain poročanja.
This approach has been readdressed for the purposesofthedeploymentphasebythe GNSSregulation whichclearly providesfor a strict division of roles and responsibilities betweentheinvolved parties.
Tapristopsejezanameneuvajalnefaze ponovnoproučilvuredbio GNSS,vkateri jejasnodoločenastrogarazdelitevvlogin odgovornosti med zadevnimistrankami.
68.(a)Regarding GJU main tasks see Commission’s position under point 17.
68.(a)Karzadeva glavne naloge GJU, glejstališče Komisijeiztočke 17.
The Commission notes that this governance structure,and notablythe dual role of ESA were clearly identified in the founding regulation ofthe GJU.
Komisijaopozarja,dastabilitavodstvena strukturainzlastidvojnavlogaagencije ESA jasno opredeljeni v uredbi o ustanovitvi GJU.
The Commission has clearly taken its political responsibilities in the programme.
Zavsakoodločitevjemogočeopredeliti organ, kateremuje bila zaupana naloga, da josprejme.
In 2005–07 the concession negotiations were in process and deliveredin December 2006 the expected heads ofterms.
Za program te razsežnosti je verjetno, da bo vzbudil različna pričakovanja zainteresiranih strani in zlasti države članice so lahko imele alispodbujaledrugačnecilje,vendartoni spremenilociljev,zastavljenihnazačetku programa.
A programme ofthis magnitudeislikelyto raise a diverse range of stakeholder expectations, and notably Member States may have held and promoted different objectives but thishasnotchangedtheobjectivessetat the outset ofthe programme.
Koncesijskapogajanjasopotekalavobdo-bju2005–2007in na njihovi podlagiso bili decembra 2006 sklenjeni pričakovani glavni pogodbeni pogoji.
Correctiveactions weretakenatthetime when evidence ofthefailure ofthe concession negotiation became clear.
Koje postalojasno, dakoncesijska pogajanja ne bodo uspela, so bili sprejeti popravni ukrepi.
(b)The choice of a PPP concession model capable to capture different phases of the project (deployment, operation, commercial exploi-tation)correspondsindeedtoalongterm strategic vision and planning.
(b)Izbirakoncesijskega modela v oblikijavno-zasebnegapartnerstva,kilahkozajema različnefazeprojekta(uvedba,obratova-nje, komercialna uporaba) dejansko ustreza dolgoročnistrateški vizijiin načrtovanju.
Difficulties experienced in the negotiations up to the end of 2006 were not sufficient to conclude ontheimpossibility of delivering the Galileoinfrastructure undera PPPcon-cessionscheme.
Neuspehtegaprocesanevplivanadolgo-ročni pristop, ki gajesprejel Svet.
Thelack of success of this process does not affectthelongtermapproachadoptedby the Council.
Napodlagitežavpripogajanjihdokonca leta 2006 ni bilo mogočesklepati, da infrastrukture programa Galileo ne bo mogoče vzpostavitivokvirukoncesijskesheme v oblikijavno-zasebnega partnerstva.
(i)Under a PPP concession schemethe exploitation modelandroadmapissupposedto be delivered bythe privatesector.
(i)Za modelizkoriščanjainčasovninačrtje vokvirukoncesijskeshemevoblikijavno-zasebnegapartnerstvaodgovorenzasebni sektor.
Only by the beginning of 2007 did the Com-missionhavetheelementstoassessthat the concession process prolongation would not have delivered good valueforthe pub-licsectorandthereforetoterminatethe negotiations.
Komisijajeimelašelenazačetkuleta2007 na voljo elemente, ki so ji omogočali oceno, da podaljšanje koncesijskega postopka ne bi bilo ugodno za javni sektor, in zaradi katerih seje zato odločila končati pogajanja.
Following the GNSS regulation the Commission will be in charge to define such roadmap for Galileoin parallel withthedeployment oftheinfrastructure.
V skladu z uredbo o GNSS bo Komisija hkratiodgovornazapripravotakega časovnega načrta za Galileo in za uvedbo infrastrukture.
74.The difficulties experienced in the development phase were due to reasons which were largely outside the Commission’s control and mostlynotinfluencedbythe management principles guidingits actions.
74.Težave v razvojni fazi so nastale zaradi razlogov, na katere Komisija ni imela vpliva in na kateretudi načela upravljanja, ki usmerjajo njene ukrepe, večinoma niso vplivala.
Asfar as EGNOSis concerned the establish-mentoftheroadmap willbea matterfor negotiationsin the context of the selection ofthefuture EGNOS operator.
Pri programu EGNOS pa bo pripravačasov-nega načrta predmet pogajanj v okviru izbire prihodnjega operaterja EGNOS.
(a)The Commission managed to get clear objectives for the European GNSS programmes, endorsed by Council and Parliament.
(a)Komisiji je uspelo določiti jasne cilje za programe evropskega GNSS,kistajih odobrila Svetin Parlament.
(ii)The problems encounteredin negotiating a framework agreement for EGNOS depended largely on the dynamics between the EGNOS stakeholders.
(ii)Do težav pri pogajanjih za okvirni sporazum za EGNOS je prihajalo večinoma zaradi dinamike med zainteresiranimi stranmi v okviru EGNOS.
(e)Therisk matrixforthe concession has been developedin a comprehensiveform during the dialogue phase and withthe assistance of experienced advisors bythe GJU.
(e)Model za obvladovanje tveganj za koncesijo jebilrazvitvcelovitiobliki medfazodia-loga,pritempasopomagaliizkušenisve-tovalci GJU.
The negotiation ofthe agreement has been taken over by the GSA and concluded by the Commission withoutanydiscontinuity or gap of negotiating power.
Pogajanja o sporazumu je prevzel GSA, zaključila pajihje Komisija, ne da bise pri tempojavljalikakršnikoliprelomialiosla-bitve pogajalske moči.
An extensive set of documents on theiden-tificationandpossibleallocationofsuch risks have been produced during the course ofthenegotiationswiththeconcession candidates.
Medpogajanjiskandidatizakoncesijsko pogodbojebilapripravljenaobširnavrsta dokumentov o opredelitviin možni razdeli-tvitakihtveganj.
The EC–EOIG agreement was finalized by December 2008 and signed on 31 March 2009.
Zaradi narave projekta, kakor je opisana zgoraj, ni bilo mogoče izčrpno določiti in oceniti obsegatehtveganj že na začetku.
Thenatureoftheproject,asdescribed above, did not allow athoroughidentifica-tionandappreciationofthe magnitudeof theserisks upfront.
Sporazum med EK in EOIG je bil dokončno oblikovandecembra2008inpodpisan 31. marca 2009.
(iii)Takingintoaccountthepoliticalandstra-tegic nature of the programme the Commission hastaken caretoregularlyinform and checkthe consensus at Council meetings.
(iii)Ob upoštevanju politične in strateške narave programa je Komisija Svet na njegovih sejah redno obveščalain preverjalasoglasje.
Difficulties experienced in the negotiations up to the end of 2006 were not sufficient to conclude ontheimpossibility of delivering the Galileoinfrastructure undera PPPcon-cessionscheme.
Napodlagitežavpripogajanjihdokonca leta 2006 ni bilo mogočesklepati, da infrastrukture programa Galileo ne bo mogoče vzpostavitivokvirukoncesijskesheme v oblikijavno-zasebnega partnerstva.