natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As is clear in particular from paragraph 86 of the judgment under appeal, the analysis undertaken by the Court involved ascertaining whether the Commission was entitled, on the basis of the text of that framework, to apply to the aid measure in question an adjustment factor of 1 in respect of factor T (the competition factor) and not to examine whether that aid was intended for a declining market.
Kot namreč izhaja zlasti iz točke 86 izpodbijane sodbe, je bila analiza prvostopenjskega sodi�ča opravljena zato, da se ugotovi, ali je lahko Komisija na podlagi besedila tega okvira dodelila zadevnemu ukrepu pomoči korekcijski količnik 1 za količnik T, „stanje konkurence“, in pri tem spregledala preizkus, ali je omenjena pomoč namenjena za trg v zatonu.
In those circumstances it does not appear that, by embarking upon such an analysis of the contested decision, the Court of First Instance exceeded the limits of its power of review established by caselaw in an area giving rise to complex economic and social assessments on the part of the Commission.
V teh okoli�činah se ne zdi, da bi Sodi�če prve stopnje s tako analizo sporne odločbe prekoračilo stopnjo nadzora, ki mu jo priznava sodna praksa na področju kompleksne ocene gospodarskih in socialnih razmer s strani Komisije.
Nor can a failure to respect the wide discretion enjoyed by the Commission when applying Article 87(3) EC be inferred from the interpretation of the multisectoral framework of 1998 given by the Court of First Instance.
Prav tako se iz razlage Sodi�ča prve stopnje glede večsektorskega okvira 1998 ne more sklepati o kr�itvi �iroke diskrecijske pravice, ki jo ima Komisija v okviru uporabe člena 87(3) ES.
In that respect, although the Commission is bound by the guidelines and notices that it issues in the field of State aid, that is so only to the extent that those texts do not depart from the proper application of the rules in the Treaty, since the texts cannot be interpreted in a way which reduces the scope of Articles 87 EC and 88 EC or which contravenes the aims of those articles (see, to that effect, Deufil v Commission, paragraph 22; Case C-351/98 Spain v Commission, paragraph 53; Italy v Commis­sion, point 45, all cited above; and, by analogy, Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission [2006] ECR I-5479, paragraph 72).
V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da čeprav Komisijo zavezujejo okviri in obvestila, ki jih sprejme na področju državnih pomoči, to velja samo, če ta besedila ne odstopajo od pravilne uporabe pravil Pogodbe, saj teh besedil ni mogoče razlagati na način, ki bi zmanj�eval obseg členov 87 ES in 88 ES ali bi bil v nasprotju z njunim ciljem (glej v tem smislu zgoraj navedene sodbe Deufil proti Komisiji, točka 22; z dne 26. septembra 2002 Španija proti Komisiji, točka 53, in Italija proti Komisiji,
GERMANY AND OTHERS v KRONOFRANCE
I-5479, točka 72).
The Court of First Instance was therefore justified in holding, in paragraph 89 of the judgment under appeal, that the multisectoral framework of 1998 should be interpreted in the light of Article 87 EC and of the principle of incompatibility of public aid set out therein, in order to attain the objective sought by that provision, namely undistorted competition in the common market.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je zato v točki 89 izpodbijane sodbe utemeljeno presodilo, da je treba večsektorski okvir 1998 razlagati z vidika člena 87 ES in v njem vsebovanega načela nezdružljivosti javnih pomoči, da bi se dosegel cilj te določbe, to je neizkrivljena konkurenca na skupnem trgu.
The need to appraise the legality of the contested decision with regard to the multisectoral framework of 1998, as interpreted in the light of Articles 87 EC and 88 EC, was all the more justified in the present case in view of a certain ambiguity in the wording of that framework, which the Court of First Instance drew attention to in paragraph 89 of the judgment under appeal.
Nujnost presoje zakonitosti sporne odločbe glede na večsektorski okvir 1998, kot se ga razlaga glede na člena 87 ES in 88 ES, je bila v obravnavani zadevi ob upo�tevanju določene dvoumnosti besedila tega okvira, ki jo je Sodi�če prve stopnje poudarilo v točki 89 izpodbijane sodbe, �e toliko bolj upravičena.
That ambiguity arises in particular from the use of the conjunctions ‘and/or’ in point 3.10.1 of the framework in relation to the very criteria which the Commission is bound to take into consideration for the purposes of allocating an adjustment factor of 1 in respect of factor T (the competition factor).
Ta dvoumnost izhaja zlasti iz uporabe veznikov „in/ali“ v točki 3.10.1 tega okvira ravno v zvezi z elementi, ki jih mora Komisija pri določitvi korekcijskega količnika 1 iz naslova količnika T, „stanje konkurence“, upo�tevati.
It was in the light of the principles set out in Articles 87 EC and 88 EC as well as the objective of preventing the effects of distortion caused by aid, as expressed for example in point 1.2 of the multisectoral framework of 1998, that the Court of First Instance held that point 3.10.1(iv) of that framework had to be interpreted as meaning that the application of the top adjustment factor of 1, which provides the maximum amount of aid capable of being declared compatible with the common market, implies a prior finding that there is no structural overcapacity in the sector concerned and also that the market is not declining.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je z vidika načel iz členov 87 ES in 88 ES ter cilja preprečevanja učinkov izkrivljanja, ki jih povzročajo pomoči, določenega zlasti v točki 1.2 večsektorskega okvira 1998, presodilo, da je treba točko 3.10.1(iv) tega okvira razlagati tako, da uporaba najvi�jega korekcijskega količnika 1, s katerim dobimo največji znesek pomoči, ki se jo lahko razglasi za združljivo s skupnim trgom, vključuje predhodno ugotovitev neobstoja presežkov strukturnih zmogljivosti v zadevnem sektorju in tudi trga v zatonu.
In that respect, it is clear that a different interpretation, whereby the presence of only one of those two factors would be sufficient to justify applying the maximum adjustment factor, would be liable to go against the principles and the objective referred to in the previous paragraph of this judgment.
V zvezi s tem je treba ugotoviti, da bi lahko bila drugačna razlaga, v skladu s katero bi bila prisotnost enega samega od teh dveh elementov dovolj, da se upraviči uporaba najvi�jega korekcijskega količnika, v nasprotju z načeli in ciljem, poudarjenimi v prej�nji točki te sodbe.
First, such an interpretation would allow the Commission to apply the top adjustment factor to projects that were likely to result in an increase in capacity in a sector which might be characterised by an abso-
Po eni strani tak�na razlaga namreč dopu�ča Komisiji, da uporabi najvi�ji korekcijski količnik za projekte, ki bi lahko povzročili povečanje zmogljivosti
2008 — JOINED CASES C-75/05 P AND C-80/05 P lute decline in demand, without the Commission having taken that circumstance into account.
2008 – ZDRUŽENI ZADEVI C-75/05 P IN C-80/05 P v sektorju, za katerega bi lahko bil značilen absolutni zaton povpra�evanja, ne da bi Komisija upo�tevala to okoli�čino.
Second, that interpretation would have the consequence, for the purposes of applying the adjustment factor of 1, of making the situation of a sector in which the Commission found that there was no structural overcapacity equivalent to a situation in which it lacked the data to come to such a finding, without however being able to rule out the existence of such overcapacity.
Po drugi strani bi bila zaradi namena dodelitve korekcijskega količnika 1 posledica tak�ne razlage izenačenje položaja v sektorju, kjer je Komisija ugotovila neobstoj presežkov strukturnih zmogljivosti, s položajem, v katerem ta institucija zaradi nerazpoložljivih podatkov tega ne bi mogla ugotoviti, vendar ne da bi se lahko prisotnost tak�nih presežkov izključila.
Furthermore, contrary to what the appellants allege, it is clear from reading paragraph 97 of the judgment under appeal that the Court of First Instance did not propose interpreting the multisectoral framework of 1998 as meaning that the Commission is obliged to assess in every case whether the market concerned is declining.
Poleg tega, v nasprotju s trditvami pritožnic, iz točke 97 izpodbijane sodbe jasno izhaja, da Sodi�če prve stopnje ni razlagalo večsektorskega okvira 1998 tako, da je Komisiji v vseh primerih naložena obveznost presoje, ali je zadevni trg v zatonu.
Such an assessment is required according to the Court only if the Commission does not have sufficient data to come to the conclusion that there is structural overcapacity, or when, as in the present case, it intends to apply the maximum adjustment factor of 1 in respect of factor T (the competition factor).
Tak�no presojo prvostopenjsko sodi�če pravzaprav zahteva samo v primeru, če Komisija ne razpolaga z zadostnimi podatki, da bi sklepala o obstoju presežkov strukturnih zmogljivosti, ali, kot v obravnavani zadevi, ko ima namen dodeliti najvi�ji korekcijski količnik 1 iz naslova količnika T, „stanje konkurence“.
Finally, it should be pointed out that in paragraph 99 of the judgment under appeal the Court of First Instance draws an inference of general application, namely that the Commission could not authorise an aid measure without having previously assessed whether the market concerned is declining.
Nazadnje, treba je poudariti, da Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 99 izpodbijane sodbe pride do splo�nega sklepa, da Komisija ne more odobriti ukrepa pomoči, ne da bi predhodno presodila, ali je zadevni trg v zatonu.
It is however clear that such an inference is not only unjustified in view of the findings which precede it but is in contradiction to paragraph 97 of the same judgment.
Ugotoviti je treba, da je tak sklep ne samo neupravičen ob upo�tevanju predhodno navedenih okoli�čin, ampak je celo v nasprotju s točko 97 iste sodbe.
Nevertheless, that contradiction has no effect upon the conclusion that the Court reaches at paragraph 103 of the judgment under appeal as far as the outcome to the presence case is concerned, given that in that paragraph it finds merely that the Commission is precluded from refraining from an assessment of whether the market is declining when it intends to apply an adjustment factor of 1 in respect of factor T (the competition factor).
Vendar tak�no protislovje, kar zadeva re�itev v obravnavani zadevi, v ničemer ne vpliva na sklep Sodi�ča prve stopnje v točki 103 izpodbijane sodbe, glede na to, da se prvostopenjsko sodi�če v tej točki omeji na izključitev tega, da lahko Komisija ne opravi presoje, ali je trg v zatonu, kadar namerava dodeliti korekcijski količnik 1 iz naslova količnika T, „stanje konkurence“.
In view of all the above, the second ground of appeal raised by the Federal Republic of Germany and the first ground of appeal raised by Glunz and OSB must also be rejected.
Glede na zgoraj navedeno je treba drugi pritožbeni razlog, na katerega se sklicuje Zvezna republika Nemčija, in prvi pritožbeni razlog, na katerega se sklicujeta družbi Glunz in OSB, ravno tako zavrniti.
Infringement of Article 64 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance
Kršitev člena 64 Poslovnika Sodišča prve stopnje
By their respective third grounds of appeal, the Federal Republic of Germany as well as Glunz and OSB allege infringement of Article 64 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance.
Zvezna republika Nemčija in družbi Glunz in OSB se v okviru tretjega pritožbenega razloga sklicujejo na kr�itev člena 64 Poslovnika Sodi�ča prve stopnje.
Since the plea alleging that the action was inadmissible had been raised for the first time by the Commission at the hearing, the Court of First Instance, in order to rule on whether Kronofrance had locus standi, should on its own initiative have obtained certain information necessary for ascertaining whether Glunz and Kronofrance were in competition, such as data relating to their marketing areas or the distances between their productions sites.
Ker je Komisija ugovor nedopustnosti tožbe prvič navedla na obravnavi, bi Sodi�če prve stopnje, da bi odločilo o procesnem upravičenju družbe Kronofrance, moralo po uradni dolžnosti zbrati določene podatke, kot so podatki v zvezi z njunimi prodajnimi območji ali z razdaljo med njunimi proizvodnimi obrati, ki so potrebni, da se ugotovi, ali sta bili družbi Glunz in Kronofrance konkurentki.
Had that information been obtained, the Court would have held that Kronofrance was not ‘individually concerned’ within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC.
Na podlagi teh podatkov bi Sodi�če prve stopnje razsodilo, da družbe Kronofrance odločba „posamično ne zadeva“ v smislu člena 230, četrti odstavek, ES.
According to Kronofrance, on the other hand, the Court of First Instance did not infringe Article 64 of its rules of procedure.
Družba Kronofrance meni nasprotno, in sicer, da Sodi�če prve stopnje ni kr�ilo člena 64 Poslovnika.
It is a matter solely for that court to decide whether the evidence before it in a case needs to be supplemented.
Samo Sodi�če prve stopnje naj bi namreč lahko odločalo, ali je treba dokaze, s katerimi razpolaga v zadevi, dopolniti.
Furthermore, the probative value of that evidence does not constitute a question that is subject to review by the Court of Justice, except in the case of distortion or where it is apparent from the documents in the case-file that the findings of the Court of First Instance are inaccurate.
Poleg tega naj dokazna moč teh dokazov ne bi bila vpra�anje, ki je podvrženo nadzoru Sodi�ča, razen v primeru izkrivljanja ali kadar iz dokumentov v spisu izhaja vsebinska nepravilnost ugotovitev, do katerih je pri�lo Sodi�če prve stopnje.
Finally, it is clear from paragraphs 38 to 41 of the judgment under appeal that the Court had sufficient evidence to give judgment.
Nazadnje, Sodi�če prve stopnje naj bi, kot izhaja iz točk od 38 do 41 izpodbijane sodbe, razpolagalo z zadostnimi dokazi za odločanje.
There was thus no reason to collect other information.
Torej ni imelo nikakr�nega razloga za zbiranje drugih podatkov.
Whether or not the evidence before it is sufficient is a matter to be appraised by it alone and is not subject to review by the Court of Justice on appeal, except where that evidence has been distorted or the inaccuracy of the findings of the Court of First Instance is apparent from the documents in the case-file (Ismeri Europa v Court of Auditors, paragraph 19, and Joined Cases C-24/01 P and C-25/01 P Glencore and Compagnie Continentale v Commission [2002] ECR I-10119, paragraphs 77 and 78).
Vpra�anje, ali imajo postopkovni dokumenti dokazno moč ali ne, je odvisno od njegove proste presoje dejstev, ki v okviru pritožbene stopnje ni predmet nadzora Sodi�ča, razen v primeru izkrivljanja dokazov, predloženih Sodi�ču prve stopnje, ali če iz dokumentov v spisu izhaja vsebinska nepravilnost ugotovitev slednjega (zgoraj navedena sodba Ismeri Europa proti Računskemu sodi�ču, točka 19, in sodba z dne 7. novembra 2002 v zadevi Glencore in Compagnie Continentale proti Komisiji, C-24/01 P in C-25/01 P, Recueil, str. I-10119, točki 77 in 78).
Consequently, no distortion or inaccuracy having been alleged in the present case, it must be held that the Court of First Instance was fully entitled to consider that the evidence in the case-file and the explanations given during the hearing, as summarised in paragraphs 38 to 41 of the judgment under appeal, were sufficient to enable
Ker se v obravnavani zadevi ni zatrjevalo nikakr�no izkrivljanje ali vsebinska nepravilnost, je lahko Sodi�če prve stopnje upravičeno menilo, da so dokazi v spisu in pojasnila, podana v ustnem postopku in poudarjena v točkah od 38 do 41 izpodbi-
GERMANY AND OTHERS v KRONOFRANCE it to decide the question of the admissibility of the action, without any need for measures of organisation of the procedure.
NEMČIJA IN DRUGI PROTI KRONOFRANCE jane sodbe, zadostni in da lahko, ne da bi bili potrebni naknadni ukrepi procesnega vodstva, odloči o dopustnosti tožbe.
Infringement of the second paragraph of Article 230 EC
Kršitev člena 230, drugi odstavek, ES
Finally, by their fourth ground of appeal, Glunz and OSB maintain that the judgment under appeal is contrary to the second paragraph of Article 230 EC, in so far as it rules on matters outside the scope of the pleas raised in support of the action for annulment.
V okviru četrtega pritožbenega razloga družbi Glunz in OSB trdita, da je izpodbijana sodba v nasprotju s členom 230, drugi odstavek, ES, ker se je z njo odločilo zunaj okvirov tožbenih razlogov, ki so bili navedeni v podporo tožbi.
The Court of First Instance annulled the contested decision on the basis that it infringed the Treaty, in that the Commission had failed to take into account the fact that the sector in question was declining, whereas that argument had been raised by Kronofrance not in the context of its plea relating to infringement of the Treaty, but solely in support of the plea by which it alleged misuse of powers.
Sodi�če prve stopnje naj bi namreč sporno odločbo razglasilo za nično zaradi kr�itve Pogodbe, ker Komisija ni upo�tevala dejstva, da je zadevni sektor v zatonu, čeprav te trditve tožeča stranka na prvi stopnji ni navedla v okviru tožbenega razloga v zvezi s kr�itvijo Pogodbe, ampak le v podporo tistemu, v okviru katerega je navedla zlorabo pooblastil.
Thus, by failing to distinguish between manifestly different arguments and pleas, the Court of First Instance erred in law, a fortiori because, according to the caselaw, a plea relating to infringement of the Treaty, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 230 EC, cannot be raised by the Community judicature of its own initiative.
Sodi�če prve stopnje naj bi s tem, ko ni razlikovalo med očitno različnimi trditvami in tožbenimi razlogi, napačno uporabilo pravo, in to �e toliko bolj, ker v skladu s sodno prakso sodi�če Skupnosti ni dolžno po uradni dolžnosti preučiti tožbenega razloga v zvezi s kr�itvijo pogodbe v smislu člena 230, drugi odstavek, ES.
Kronofrance contends that it based its application on all the grounds mentioned in Article 230 EC and included all the necessary reasoning in its written pleadings.
Družba Kronofrance zatrjuje, da je svojo tožbo utemeljila z vsemi tožbenimi razlogi, omenjenimi v členu 230 ES, pri čemer je v vlogah navedla vso potrebno obrazložitev.
In any event, it is not bound to devote a plea to a specific defect in the contested decision, since such a flaw is apparent from the summary of the facts and law contained in its written and oral observations.
V vsakem primeru naj ne bi bila zavezana, da tožbeni razlog posveti določeni napaki sporne odločbe, če tak�na pomanjkljivost izhaja iz dejanskih in pravnih elementov v njenih pisnih ali ustnih stali�čih.
By this ground of appeal, Glunz and OSB essentially seek a declaration that the Court of First Instance erred in giving judgment on an infringement of Article 87 EC when examining an argument raised by Kronofrance in support of its plea alleging misuse of powers.
S tem pritožbenim razlogom želita družbi Glunz in OSB v bistvu doseči, da se ugotovi, da je Sodi�če prve stopnje napačno presodilo o kr�itvi člena 87 ES, ko je preučevalo trditev tožeče stranke na prvi stopnji v podporo njenemu tožbenemu razlogu glede zlorabe pooblastil.
By so doing, the Court gave a decision on an argument which it did not have the power to raise of its own initiative and which Kronofrance had not put forward.
S tem naj bi Sodi�če prve stopnje odločilo o trditvi, katere mu ni treba obravnavati po uradni dolžnosti, in ki je tožeča stranka ni navedla.
It should be pointed out at the outset that this ground of appeal is based on a false premise, namely that the Court of First Instance gave judgment on the plea alleging an infringement of Article 87 EC.
Najprej je treba poudariti, da ta pritožbeni razlog temelji na napačni premisi, da naj bi Sodi�če prve stopnje odločilo o tožbenem razlogu glede kr�itve člena 87 ES.
It should be stated, in that regard, that the Court of First Instance did not give any judgment on that plea.
Vendar je treba v zvezi s tem pojasniti, da Sodi�če prve stopnje o tem tožbenem razlogu sploh ni razsodilo.
As is apparent from paragraph 35 of the judgment under appeal, the Court limited its analysis to the second plea in the action before it, which alleged that the Commission wrongly refused to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 88(2) EC.
Kot izhaja iz točke 35 izpodbijane sodbe, je namreč Sodi�če prve stopnje omejilo svojo analizo na preučitev drugega predloženega tožbenega razloga, ki je izhajal iz tega, da je Komisija neupravičeno zavrnila uvedbo formalnega postopka preiskave iz člena 88(2) ES.
In the context of that plea, as is evident from paragraph 48 of the judgment, Kronofrance had maintained that, by approving the aid granted by the German authorities to Glunz after only a preliminary examination, the Commission had infringed inter alia Article 4(4) of Regulation No 659/1999,
Kot izhaja iz točke 48 navedene sodbe, je v okviru tega tožbenega razloga tožeča stranka trdila, da je Komisija, s tem da je odobrila pomoč, ki so jo družbi Glunz samo na podlagi predhodnega preizkusa dodelile nem�ke oblasti, kr�ila zlasti člen 4(4) Uredbe �t. 659/1999, v katerem se
GERMANY AND OTHERS v KRONOFRANCE which obliges it to open the formal investigation procedure once ‘doubts are raised’ as to the compatibility with the common market of the notified measure.
NEMČIJA IN DRUGI PROTI KRONOFRANCE institucijo zavezuje, da uvede postopek formalne preiskave, če „obstajajo dvomi“ o združljivosti prijavljenega ukrepa s skupnim trgom.
It was only in order to come to a decision as to whether such doubts existed that the Court of First Instance examined the question of the interpretation of Article 87 EC, thereby considering that question a prerequisite for being able to decide upon the legality of the contested decision with regard to Article 88(2) EC.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je vpra�anje razlage člena 87 ES preučilo le zato, da bi odločilo o obstoju tak�nih dvomov, pri čemer je to vpra�anje �telo kot predpogoj, da bi lahko odločilo o zakonitosti sporne odločbe z vidika člena 88(2) ES.
In those circumstances, the fact that Kronofrance raised a separate plea alleging infringement of Article 87 EC, without relying on the argument relating to the misapplication of the multisectoral framework of 1998, is irrelevant.
V teh okoli�činah dejstvo, da je tožeča stranka na prvi stopnji navedla ločen tožbeni razlog glede kr�itve člena 87 ES, ne da bi to utemeljila s trditvijo o napačni uporabi večsektorskega okvira 1998, ni upo�tevno.
It follows that the final ground of appeal must also be dismissed.
Iz tega izhaja, da je treba zadnji pritožbeni razlog prav tako zavrniti.
In the light of all the above, the two appeals must be rejected in their entirety.
Glede na zgoraj navedeno je treba pritožbi v celoti zavrniti.
Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 118 thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the appellants
V skladu s členom 69(2) Poslovnika, ki velja za pritožbeni postopek na podlagi člena 118 tega poslovnika, se neuspeli stranki naloži plačilo stro�kov, če so bili ti
2008 — JOINED CASES C-75/05 P AND C-80/05 P have been unsuccessful in their grounds for appeal, they must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by Kronofrance.
2008 – ZDRUŽENI ZADEVI C-75/05 P IN C-80/05 P prigla�eni. Ker pritožnice s svojimi pritožbenimi razlogi niso uspele, se jim v skladu s predlogi družbe Kronofrance naloži plačilo stro�kov.
In accordance with the same article of the Rules of Procedure, the Commission must be ordered to bear its own costs.
V skladu z istim členom tega poslovnika se Komisiji naloži plačilo njenih stro�kov.
Orders the Federal Republic of Germany to pay the costs relating to Case C-75/05 P;
Zvezni republiki Nemčiji se naloži plačilo stroškov iz zadeve C-75/05 P.
Orders Glunz AG and OSB Deutschland GmbH to pay the costs relating to Case C-80/05 P;
Glunz AG in OSB Deutschland GmbH se naloži plačilo stroškov iz zadeve C-80/05 P.
Case C-279/06
Zadeva C-279/06