natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The notices by which the Comune di Torino announced those tendering procedures stated that the contract was to be awarded on the basis of the lowest price criterion and abnormally low tenders were to be verified and not automatically excluded.
Obvestili, s katerima je Comune di Torino začela omenjena postopka javnega razpisa, določata, da bo naročilo temeljilo na merilu največjega popusta, s preverjanjem in brez samodejne izključitve neobičajno nizkih ponudb.
Those notices were based on a decision of the Giunta Comunale (the Municipal Council) that the criterion of awarding the contracts at the lowest price entailed verification of ‘anomalous’ tenders in accordance with Directive 93/37, even in the case of tenders for contracts with a value below the Community threshold, and Article 21(1)(a) of Law No 109/94 was not to apply in so far as it provided for the automatic exclusion of abnormally low tenders.
Ti obvestili sta temeljili na sklepu Giunta comunale (izvr�ni organ Comune), ki določa, da uporaba merila največjega popusta obsega preverjanje „neobičajnih“ ponudb v skladu z Direktivo 93/37, vključno z naročili z nižjo vrednostjo od skupnostnega praga, s čimer ni uporabil člena 21(1a) zakona �t. 109/94, kolikor ta predvideva samodejno izključitev neobičajno nizkih ponudb.
At the end of the evaluation process, the bids of SECAP and Santorso emerged as the first of the tenders that were not considered to be ‘anomalous’.
Po oceni ponudb so bile ponudbe družb SECAP in Santorso razvr�čene v prvi rang ponudb, ki so se �tele kot „običajne“.
After verifying abnormally low tenders, the Comune di Torino finally rejected SECAP’s and Santorso’s bids in favour of tenders submitted by other companies.
Comune di Torino je po tem, ko je nadaljevala preverjanje neobičajno nizkih ponudb, končno izločila ponudbi družb SECAP in Santorso, v korist ponudb drugih družb.
By decisions of 11 October 2004 and 30 April 2005, that court rejected the actions brought by SECAP and Santorso respectively on the ground that the contracting authorities are not under any obligation automatically to exclude abnormally low tenders but have the option to call for the verification of any anomalies arising from the fact that such tenders are low, which extends to contracts below the Community threshold.
S sodbama z dne 11. oktobra 2004 in z dne 30. aprila 2005 je omenjeno sodi�če zavrnilo tožbi družb SECAP in Santorso, saj naj postopek samodejne izključitve neobičajno nizkih ponudb ne bi bil obvezen za naročnika, ampak mu zgolj daje možnost, da opravi preverjanje morebitne nenavadnosti, ki izhaja iz majhnosti teh ponudb, vključno z javnimi naročili, katerih vrednost je nižja od skupnostnega praga.
The latter concurred with the view of those companies that the rule requiring the automatic exclusion of abnormally low tenders is mandatory but, nevertheless, did not totally dismiss the arguments put forward by the Comune di Torino, which, relying on statistical data, stated that, due to its extreme inflexibility, that rule encouraged undertakings to collude in agreeing on prices in order to influence the outcome of the tendering procedure, thus adversely affecting both the contracting authority and the other tenderers, the vast majority of whom are undertakings established in another Member State.
Ta se strinja s tema družbama glede omejujočega značaja pravila o samodejni izključitvi neobičajno nizkih ponudb, vendar je kljub temu razumel argumente, ki jih je navedla Comune di Torino, ki je s sklicevanjem na statistične podatke trdila, da to pravilo zaradi svoje velike rigidnosti spodbuja tajne dogovore med podjetji, ki se sporazumejo o ceni, da bi vplivali na izid postopka javnega razpisa, s čimer tako povzročijo �kodo tako naročniku kot drugim ponudnikom, ki so v veliki večini podjetja s sedežem v drugi državi članici.
The Consiglio di Stato refers to the caselaw of the Court according to which, with regard to contracts falling outside the scope of directives on public contracts on account of their subject-matter, the contracting authorities are bound to comply with the fundamental rules of the EC Treaty, in particular the principle of nondiscrimination on the ground of nationality (see, in particular, Case C-324/98 Telaustria and Telefonadress [2000] ECR I-10745, paragraph 60), and to the caselaw which prohibits Member States from introducing provisions which require the automatic exclusion from procedures for the award of public works contracts above the Community threshold of certain tenders determined according to a mathematical
Predložitveno sodi�če se sklicuje na sodno prakso Sodi�ča, v skladu s katero morajo naročniki, kar zadeva pogodbe, ki glede na predmet ne spadajo v okvir uporabe direktiv s področja javnih naročil, upo�tevati temeljna načela Pogodbe ES, predvsem načelo nediskriminacije na podlagi državljanstva (glej zlasti sodbo z dne 7. decembra 2000 v zadevi Telaustria in Telefonadress, C-324/98, Recueil, str. I-10745, točka 60), kot tudi na sodno prakso, ki prepoveduje državam članicam sprejeti določbe, ki predvidevajo, kar zadeva javna naročila gradenj, katerih znesek je vi�ji od skupnostnega praga, izključitev določenih ponudb po uradni dolžnosti glede na matematično
SECAP AND SANTORSO criterion, instead of obliging the awarding authority to apply the examination procedure laid down in Community rules (see, in particular, Case 103/88 Costanzo [1989] ECR 1839, paragraph 19).
SECAP IN SANTORSO merilo, namesto da bi naročniku naložile uporabo postopka kontradiktornega preverjanja, ki ga predvidevajo predpisi Skupnosti (glej zlasti sodbo z dne 22. junija 1989 v zadevi Costanzo, 103/88, Recueil, str. 1839, točka 19).
Having regard to those considerations and since it has doubts concerning the answer to be given to the question whether the rule on the verification of abnormally low tenders may be classified as a fundamental principle of Community law capable of setting aside any conflicting provisions of national law, the Consiglio di Stato decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions, which are worded in exactly the same manner in both Case C-147/06 and Case C-148/06, to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
V teh okoli�činah in glede na dvome v zvezi z odgovorom – ki ga je treba dati na vpra�anje, ali se pravilo o kontradiktornem preverjanju neobičajno nizkih ponudb lahko opredeli kot temeljno načelo prava Skupnosti, ki lahko razveljavi morebitne nacionalne določbe, ki mu nasprotujejo – je Consiglio di Stato prekinilo odločanje in Sodi�ču v predhodno odločanje predložilo ti vpra�anji, ki sta enaki v zadevah C-147/06 in C-148/06:
2008 — JOINED CASES C-147/06 AND C-148/06 deriving from” the principle of competition, considered in conjunction with the principles of administrative transparency and nondiscrimination on grounds of nationality and is it therefore, as such, directly binding, taking precedence over possibly incompatible national provisions adopted by the Member States to regulate public works contracts to which Community law is not directly applicable?’
2008 – ZDRUŽENI ZADEVI C-147/06 IN C-148/06 na podlagi državljanstva, in ali zato ta določba velja neposredno in prednostno pred morebitnimi neskladnimi nacionalnimi predpisi, ki so jih sprejele države članice za ureditev postopkov oddaje javnih naročil, za katere pravo Skupnosti ne velja neposredno?“
By order of the President of the Court of 10 May 2006, Cases C-147/06 and C-148/06 were joined for the purposes of the written and oral procedure and of the judgment.
S sklepom predsednika Sodi�ča z dne 10. maja 2006 sta bili zadevi C-147/06 in C-148/06 združeni za pisni in ustni postopek ter sodbo.
By its questions, which it is appropriate to consider together, the Consiglio di Stato asks, in essence, whether the fundamental principles of Community law governing the award of public contracts, to which Article 30(4) of Directive 93/37 gives specific expression, preclude national legislation which, with regard to contracts with a value below the threshold set in Article 6(1)(a) of that directive, obliges contracting authorities, where the number of valid tenders is greater than five, automatically to exclude tenders considered to be abnormally low in relation to the goods, works or services according to a mathematical criterion laid down by that legislation, without allowing those contracting authorities any possibility of verifying the constituent elements of those tenders by requesting the tenderers concerned to provide details of those elements.
Z vpra�anjema, ki ju je treba preučiti skupaj, predložitveno sodi�če v bistvu spra�uje, ali temeljna načela prava Skupnosti, ki prav tako urejajo oddajo javnih naročil, ki so posebej povzeta v členu 30(4) Direktive 93/37, nasprotujejo nacionalni ureditvi, ki kar zadeva razpise, katerih vrednost je manj�a od praga, določenega v členu 6(1)(a) te direktive, nalaga naročnikom, kadar je veljavnih ponudb več kot pet, naj skladno z matematičnim merilom, ki ga predvideva ta ureditev, samodejno izključijo ponudbe, ki se �tejejo za neobičajno nizke glede na gradnje, ne da bi omenjenim naročnikom dajala kakr�no koli možnost preveriti sestavne dele teh ponudb, ob tem, da bi se od ponudnikov zahtevale podrobnosti glede ponudbe.
The strict special procedures prescribed by the Community directives coordinating public procurement procedures apply only to contracts whose value exceeds a threshold expressly laid down in each of those directives (order in Case C-59/00
Spomniti je treba, da se posebni in strogi postopki, ki jih določajo skupnostne direktive o usklajevanju postopkov za oddajo javnih naročil, uporabljajo zgolj za pogodbe,
SECAP AND SANTORSO
SECAP IN SANTORSO katerih vrednost je večja od praga, ki je izrecno določen v vsaki od omenjenih direktiv (sklep z dne 3. decembra 2001 v zadevi Vestergaard, C-59/00, Recueil, str.
Vestergaard [2001] ECR I-9505, paragraph 19).
I-9505, točka 19).
Accordingly, the rules in those directives do not apply to contracts with a value below the threshold set by those directives (see, to that effect, Case C-412/04 Commission v Italy [2008] ECR I-619, paragraph 65).
Tako se predpisi iz teh direktiv ne uporabljajo za naročila, katerih vrednost je manj�a od praga, ki ga določajo ti predpisi (glej v tem smislu sodbo z dne 21. februarja 2008 v zadevi Komisija proti Italiji, C-412/04, ZOdl., str. I-619, točka 65).
That does not mean, however, that contracts below the threshold are excluded from the scope of Community law (order in Vestergaard, paragraph 19).
To ne pomeni, da so ta zadnja naročila izključena iz okvira uporabe prava Skupnosti (zgoraj naveden sklep Vestergaard, točka 19).
However, according to the caselaw of the Court, the application of the fundamental rules and general principles of the Treaty to procedures for the award of contracts below the threshold for the application of Community directives is based on the premiss that the contracts in question are of certain crossborder interest (see, to that effect, Case C-507/03 Commission v Ireland [2007] ECR I-9777, paragraph 29, and Commission v Italy, paragraphs 66 and 67).
Kljub temu v skladu s sodno prakso Sodi�ča uporaba temeljnih pravil in splo�nih načel Pogodbe za postopke oddaj naročil, ki so manj�e vrednosti od praga za uporabo skupnostnih direktiv, predvideva, da imajo zadevna naročila določen čezmejni interes (glej v tem smislu sodbo z dne 13. novembra 2007 v zadevi Komisija proti Irski, C-507/03, ZOdl., str. I-9777, točka 29, in zgoraj navedeno sodbo Komisija proti Italiji, točki 66 in 67).
It is in the light of those considerations that national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings must be examined.
Ob upo�tevanju teh ugotovitev je treba preučiti nacionalno zakonodajo, kot je ta iz postopka v glavni stvari.
It is apparent from the documents submitted to the Court that that legislation obliges the contracting authority concerned, when awarding contracts with a value below the threshold laid down in Article 6(1)(a) of Directive 93/37, automatically to exclude tenders which, according to a mathematical criterion laid down by that legislation, are considered to be abnormally low in relation to the goods, works or services, the only exception to that rule of automatic exclusion being that it does not apply if the number of valid tenders is lower than five.
Iz spisa, ki je bil predložen Sodi�ču, izhaja, da omenjena zakonodaja nalaga zadevnemu naročniku, kar zadeva oddajo naročil, katerih vrednost je manj�a od praga, določenega v členu 6(1)(a) Direktive 93/37, da samodejno izključi ponudbe, ki se v skladu z matematičnim merilom, ki ga ta ureditev predvideva, �tejejo za neobičajno nizke glede na gradnje, z edino izjemo, da se to pravilo izključitve ne uporablja, kadar je veljavnih ponudb manj kot pet.
Consequently, that rule, which is formulated in clear, imperative and absolute terms, deprives tenderers who have submitted abnormally low bids of the opportunity to demonstrate that those bids are viable and genuine.
Zato omenjeno pravilo, ki je zapisano jasno, obvezno in absolutno, odvzema ponudnikom, ki so vložili neobičajno nizke ponudbe, možnost dokazati, da so te zanesljive in resne.
That aspect of the legislation at issue in the main proceedings could have consequences incompatible with Community law if, in view of its particular characteristics, a given contract is likely to be of certain crossborder interest and therefore attract operators from other Member States.
Ta vidik zadevne ureditve iz postopka v glavni stvari bi lahko vodil do posledic, ki ne bi bile združljive s pravom Skupnosti, če bi dano naročilo, glede na lastne značilnosti, lahko imelo določen čezmejni interes in bi tako pritegnilo gospodarske subjekte iz drugih držav članic.
A works contract could, for example, be of such crossborder interest because of its estimated value in conjunction with its technical complexity or the fact that the works are to be located in a place which is likely to attract the interest of foreign operators.
Naročilo gradenj bi lahko imelo zadevni čezmejni interes zaradi ocenjene vrednosti v povezavi z njegovim tehničnim značajem ali nahajanjem gradenj v okolju, ki bi bilo ugodno za pritegnitev interesa tujih gospodarskih subjektov.
As the Advocate General pointed out at points 45 and 46 of his Opinion, although objective and not in itself discriminatory, such legislation could undermine the general principle of nondiscrimination in procurement procedures which are of crossborder interest.
Kot navaja generalni pravobranilec v točkah 45 in 46 sklepnih predlogov, bi lahko taka ureditev, čeprav je sama po sebi objektivna in nediskriminatorna, �kodila splo�nemu načelu nediskriminacije pri postopkih oddaj naročil, ki imajo čezmejni interes.
Indeed, the application of the rule requiring the automatic exclusion of tenders considered to be abnormally low to contracts of certain crossborder interest may constitute indirect discrimination since, in practice, it places at a disadvantage operators from other Member States which, as they have different cost structures, may benefit from significant economies of scale or, intending to cut their profit margins
Dejansko bi uporaba pravila samodejne izključitve neobičajno nizkih ponudb za naročila, ki imajo določen čezmejni interes, lahko pomenila neposredno diskriminacijo, s čimer bi se v praksi v manj ugoden položaj postavilo gospodarske subjekte iz drugih držav članic, ki bi – ker lahko zaradi drugačne strukture stro�kov koristijo od pomembne ekonomije velikega obsega ali žele zmanj�ati svoje marže, da bi lahko bolj
SECAP AND SANTORSO in order to enter the market in question more effectively, would be in a position to make a bid that was competitive and at the same time genuine and viable but which the contracting authority would not be able to consider as a result of that legislation.
SECAP IN SANTORSO učinkovito prodrli na zadevni trg, tako – lahko dali konkurenčno ponudbo in hkrati resno in zanesljivo, ki je naročnik ne bo mogel upo�tevati zaradi omenjene ureditve.
In addition, as stated by the Comune di Torino and the Advocate General at points 43, 46 and 47 of his Opinion, such legislation could give rise to anti-competi-tive conduct and agreements, namely collusion between national or local undertakings intended to secure public works contracts for themselves.
Med drugim, kot navajata Comune di Torino in generalni pravobranilec v točkah 43, 46 in 47 sklepnih predlogov, bi lahko taka ureditev spodbujala protikonkurenčna ravnanja in dogovore oziroma celo prakso tajnih dogovorov med nacionalnimi in lokalnimi podjetji, zato da bi za zadnje pridržali javna naročila gradenj.
By applying such legislation to contracts of certain crossborder interest, the contracting authorities, lacking any power to assess the soundness and viability of abnormally low tenders, cannot comply with their obligation to observe the fundamental rules of the Treaty on freedom of movement or the general principle of nondiscrimination, as required by the caselaw of the Court cited at paragraph 20 above.
Z uporabo te ureditve za naročila, ki imajo določen čezmejni interes, naročniki, ki so prikraj�ani za kakr�no koli možnost oceniti trdnost in zanesljivost neobičajno nizkih ponudb, ne morejo izpolniti svoje obveznosti spo�tovati temeljna načela Pogodbe na področju prostega pretoka niti splo�nega načela nediskriminacije, kot to zahteva sodna praksa Sodi�ča, navedena v točki 20 te sodbe.
It is also contrary to the contracting authorities’ own interests for them to be deprived of such power, since they are not able to assess tenders which are submitted to them under conditions of effective competition and therefore to award the contract by applying the criteria, which are also laid down in the public interest, of the lowest price or the most economically advantageous tender.
Prikraj�anje take možnosti je prav tako v nasprotju z lastnim interesom naročnikov, ker ne morejo oceniti ponudb, ki so vložene v razmerah učinkovite konkurence, in tako podeliti naročila ob uporabi meril, ki sta prav tako vzpostavljeni v javnem interesu, in sicer najnižje cene ali ekonomsko najugodnej�e ponudbe.
It is in principle for the contracting authority concerned to assess whether there may be crossborder interest in a contract whose estimated value is below the threshold laid down by the Community rules, it being understood that that assessment may be subject to judicial review.
Presojo, pred opredelitvijo pogojev javnega razpisa, morebitnega čezmejnega interesa naročila, katerega ocenjena vrednost je nižja od praga, določenega v skupnostnih predpisih, načeloma opravi zadevni naročnik, če je ta presoja lahko predmet sodnega nadzora.
It is permissible, however, for legislation to lay down objective criteria, at national or local level, indicating that there is certain crossborder interest.
Kljub temu je dovoljeno, da ureditev vzpostavi na nacionalni ali lokalni ravni objektivna merila, ki kažejo na obstoj določenega čezmejnega interesa.
Such criteria could be, inter alia, the fact that the contract in question is for a significant amount, in conjunction with the place where the work is to be carried out.
Taka merila so lahko predvsem vi�ina določenega pomena zadevnega naročila v povezavi z mestom izvedbe gradenj.
The possibility of such an interest may also be excluded in a case, for example, where the economic interest at stake in the contract in question is very modest (see, to that effect, Case C-231/03 Coname [2005] ECR I-7287, paragraph 20).
Prav tako bo na primer mogoče izključiti tak interes v primeru zelo majhnega gospodarskega interesa zadevnega naročila (glej v tem smislu sodbo z dne 21. julija 2005 v zadevi Coname, C-231/03, ZOdl., str. I-7287, točka 20).
However, in certain cases, account must be taken of the fact that the borders straddle conurbations which are situated in the territory of different Member States and that, in those circumstances, even low-value contracts may be of certain crossborder interest.
Kljub temu je treba upo�tevati dejstvo, da v določenih primerih meje potekajo čez pozidane povr�ine, ki se nahajajo na ozemlju različnih držav članic, in da lahko v takih okoli�činah tudi naročila majhne vrednosti pomenijo določen čezmejni interes.
Even where there is certain crossborder interest, it may be acceptable automatically to exclude some tenders on account of their being abnormally low if recourse to that rule is justified by the unduly large number of tenders, a fact which might oblige the contracting authority concerned to examine on an inter partes basis such a high number of bids that it would exceed the administrative capacity of those authorities or might, due to the delay which such an examination would entail, jeopardise the implementation of the project.
Tudi ob obstoju določenega obmejnega interesa se samodejna izključitev določenih ponudb, ker so neobičajno nizke, lahko izkaže kot sprejemljiva, če je sklicevanje na to pravilo upravičeno s prevelikim �tevilom ponudb, glede na to, da bi se zaradi obveze naročnika, naj kontradiktorno preveri nekatere od teh množičnih ponudb, preseglo upravne zmožnosti omenjenega naročnika ali bi bila lahko zaradi zamude, ki bi jo povzročilo to preverjanje, v nevarnosti uresničitev projekta.
In such circumstances, national or local legislation or even the contracting authorities themselves would be entitled to set a reasonable threshold for the automatic exclusion of abnormally low tenders.
V takih okoli�činah lahko nacionalna ali lokalna ureditev ali celo sam naročnik določi razumen prag za uporabo samodejne izključitve neobičajno nizkih ponudb.
However, the threshold of five valid tenders set by the third paragraph of Article 21(1)(a) of Law No 109/94 cannot be regarded as reasonable.
Kljub temu se prag petih veljavnih ponudb, ki je določen v členu 21(1a), tretja alinea, zakona �t. 109/94, ne more �teti za razumljiv.
As regards the actions in the main proceedings, it is for the referring court to carry out a detailed assessment of all the relevant facts concerning both the contracts in question in order to determine whether, in each case, there is certain crossborder interest.
Kar zadeva postopek v glavni stvari, mora predložitveno sodi�če opraviti podrobno presojo vseh upo�tevnih elementov, ki zadevajo ti naročili, da bi preverilo obstoj določenega čezmejnega interesa v teh primerih.
The answer to the questions referred must therefore be that the fundamental rules of the Treaty on freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services and the general principle of nondiscrimination preclude national legislation which, with regard to contracts with a value below the threshold set by Article 6(1)(a) of Directive 93/97 which are of certain crossborder interest, imposes an absolute duty on the contracting authorities, where the number of valid tenders is greater than five, automatically to exclude tenders considered to be abnormally low in relation to the goods, works or services according to a mathematical criterion laid down by that legislation without allowing those contracting authorities any possibility of verifying the constituent elements of those tenders by requesting the tenderers concerned to provide details of those elements.
Zato je treba na zastavljeni vpra�anji odgovoriti tako, da temeljna pravila Pogodbe o pravici do ustanavljanja in prostega pretoka storitev kot tudi splo�no načelo nediskri -minacije nasprotujejo nacionalni ureditvi, ki – kar zadeva razpise, katerih vrednost je manj�a od praga, določenega v členu 6(1)(a) Direktive 93/37, in ki imajo določen čezmejni interes – obvezuje naročnike, kadar je veljavnih ponudb več kot pet, da skladno z matematičnim merilom, ki ga predvideva ta ureditev, samodejno izključijo ponudbe, ki se �tejejo za neobičajno nizke glede na gradnje, ne da bi omenjenim naročnikom dajala kakr�no koli možnost preveriti sestavne dele teh ponudb, ob tem ko se bi od ponudnikov zahtevale podrobnosti glede ponudbe.