natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
this in mind today when people argue against the automatic decommitment rule (the n+2 rule) or when people criticise the programming approach.
Zdaj želim povedati nekaj o nevarnostih Jeromovega stališča, da mora evropsko regionalno politiko upravičevati pomemben evropski cilj.
There were elements of the 1989 reform which were a response to the fact that the previous policy had not worked.
To pomeni, da je politika del nekakšne kupčije: „če želite enotni trg, morate plačati“,
“In the Union, we have a third policy which is a part of our economic growth armoury and which provides us with a balancing factor: Cohesion Policy.” Graham Meadows
„V Uniji imamo tretjo politiko, ki je del našega sistema za gospodarsko rast in nam zagotavlja dejavnik za doseganje ravnotežja: kohezijsko politiko.“ Graham Meadows
Graham Meadows: I want to come back to Tassos’s third and Jérôme’s fourth point, that is the idea that the existence of European regional policy is justified if it can be seen as either balancing the negative effects of integration or expressing some 'big idea', like 'making a success of enlargement'.
Vendar naj najprej omenim točko, ki je povezana z začetkom sedanje politične faze v letu 1989.
I think this is wrong, especially the view that the policy can only be justified in relation to a big idea.
Edina stvar, ki je še nismo omenili, je, da je v začetku osemdesetih let 20. stoletja Uniji dejansko zmanjkalo denarja, ker so se izčrpala vsa sredstva iz proračuna SKP.
I actually find that we suffer from this approach which leaves us with a problem.
Komisija se je torej srečala z razmerami, ko je morala sredstva prenesti h kmetijstvu, vendar tega ni mogla, ker so bila neporabljena sredstva namenjena strukturnim skladom.
A second point to mention is that the pre- reform policy was restricted to the co-nancing of public expenditure projects and that, already, the public sector was shrinking because of privatisation.
nato „če želite enotno valuto, morate plačati“ in spet „če želite širitev, morate plačati“.
The reform of the policy deliberately widened its scope to take account of these changing conditions. Remember, the British Prime Minister at the time was Mrs Thatcher.
To razlago zavračam kot cinično, saj nekatere države članice postavlja v slabo luč ter ne upošteva njihovih legitimnih argumentov glede gospodarske rasti, ampak namesto njih uveljavlja zamisel, da so Unijo enostavno poskušale izkoristiti.
But, before going into that, let me just mention a point which relates to the start of the present policy phase in 1989.
Komisija je postala nezadovoljna zaradi te krize denarnega toka, ker so se sredstva dodeljevala nepremišljeno, ne da bi se hkrati pozorno spremljali izdatki.
The only thing that hasn’t yet been mentioned is that, in the early 1980’s, the Union actually ran out of money because the CAP budget had been exhausted.
To je povzročilo razpravo o strukturnih skladih, vključno z željo, da se že od začetka zagotovi končna poraba dodeljenih sredstev.
Convinced that there must be some money somewhere, the Commission searched through its various budget lines and finally discovered large amounts of unused payment credits in the ERDF and ESF, where high levels of budget commitments lay unused.
To je pomembno upoštevati tudi danes, ko nekateri nasprotujejo pravilu samodejne razveljavitve obveznosti (pravilo n + 2) ali kritizirajo programski pristop.
The Commission was therefore faced with a circumstance in which it needed to transfer resources to agriculture but could not because, although the payment credits lay idle, they had been committed to the Structural Funds.
V reformo leta 1989 so bili vključeni elementi, ki so pomenili odziv na dejstvo, da prejšnja politika ni delovala.
I reject this interpretation as being cynical which casts some of the Member States in a bad light, dismissing their legitimate arguments about economic growth and putting in their place the idea that they were just trying to rob the Union stagecoach.
Druga točka, ki jo je treba omeniti, je, da je bila politika pred reformo omejena na sonancira-nje projektov javnih izdatkov in da se je javni sektor zaradi privatizacije že zmanjševal.
The Commission became angry about this 'cash flow crisis' because of the lightness and ease with which funds had been committed without close follow-up on the expenditure side.
Reforma politike je namerno razširila njegov obseg, da bi se upoštevale te spreminjajoče se razmere.
This fed in to the discussion about the Structural Funds including the desire to make sure right from the beginning that money committed was nally spent. It is worth keeping
Če se spomnite, je bila britanska predsednica vlade takrat gospa Thatcher.
This approach robs the policy of its dignity.
Ta pristop zmanjšuje verodostojnost politike. In to ni prav.
If the policy was the result of a deal why is it still going on?
Če je bila politika rezultat kupčije, zakaj se še vedno izvaja?
Why has it increased in size since?
Zakaj se je od takrat njen obseg povečal?
PAGE30 single currency on the poorest.
STRAN30 vsako leto po tem.
He wanted that the richer Member States should remain interested and involved in the policy and he made this, for example, very clear during the German reunification when the new German Länder became immediate beneficiaries of the Structural Funds.
Enako je bila za doseganje uravnotežene rasti tako leta 1989 kot vsako leto po tem potrebna regionalna in kohezijska politika. Notranji trg stalno povzroča rast in neenakosti, evropska regionalna in kohezijska politika pa si stalno prizadeva za zmanjšanje teh razlik.
'The deal' is therefore a complex one.
Dokler bo obstajala rast, bodo obstajali tudi neenakosti in prizadevanja za njihovo zmanjšanje, zato bodo stalna tudi prizadevanja za uravnoteženo rast.
explanation for the policy’s emergence which is not only more truthful but also more helpful to us as we plot the policy’s next phase of development.
Vendar imamo v Uniji tretjo politiko, ki je del našega sistema za gospodarsko rast in nam zagotavlja dejavnik za doseganje ravnovesja: kohezijsko politiko.
This explanation is that the policy is in place to balance growth.
Cilja regionalne in kohezijske politike sta odpravljanje neenakosti, ki jih stalno povzroča rast, ter pomoč počasi razvijajočim se regijam pri doseganju hitrejše rasti in splošne stopnje rasti Unije.
The Union has three policies for growth.
Mislim, da je ta razlaga pravilnejša in pomembnejša.
It has the single market, including its trading agreements with third countries and it has the single currency.
Dopolnjuje Jérômovo zamisel o „kupčiji“.
We know as economists that this produces growth, and we know as well that this market- driven growth is sure to be unbalanced.
Morda je regionalna in kohezijska politika v nekem trenutku nastala kot del kratkoročne kupčije, vendar to ne zmanjšuje njene upravičenosti.
It produces a churning of the economy which widens income disparities; we see this happening in China and Brazil, both countries which have a less developed regional policy than the Union.
Razlog za obstoj te politike je, da Uniji zagotavlja možnost bolj uravnoteženega doseganja rasti.
If we overplay the idea of 'the deal', we underplay the economic importance of the internal market and the single currency.
Tassos Bougas: Kohezijske politike ni bilo mogoče opredeliti kot enostavni prerazporeditveni mehanizem na ravni Skupnosti.
The internal market brought Germany, for example, benet in 1989 and it has brought Germany benet in every single year since then.
Poudarjam dejstvo, da je bila oblikovana kot pogojena distributivna politika s tremi ravnmi pogojenosti.
In the same way, Regional and Cohesion Policy was needed to balance growth in 1989 and has been needed in every year since then.
Prva je, da morajo prednostne naloge kohezijske politike prispevati k izvajanju prednostnih nalog Skupnosti, druga, da prenosi sredstev iz kohezijske politike ne smejo nadomeščati nacionalnih prizadevanj in jih je treba uporabljati za naložbe, zadnji pogoj pa je zavezanost odgovornosti in dobremu upravljanju.
The internal market is constantly creating growth and disparities, European Regional and Cohesion Policy works constantly to lessen these disparities.
Biti mora „politika za vse“, ne le za revne. Že od začetka je jasno, da mora koristiti vsem državam.
But in the Union, we have a third policy which is a part of our economic growth armoury and which provides us with a balancing factor: Cohesion Policy.
Jérôme Vignon: Poudariti moram naslednje.
Regional and Cohesion Policy seeks to balance the disparities which are constantly created by growth and to help the slower- growing regions to grow more quickly and to reach the overall growth rate of the Union.
Jacques Delors si je odločno prizadeval, da se kohezijska politika in uporaba sredstev iz strukturnih skladov ne bi preoblikovali v enostavno prerazporejanje.
I find this explanation more correct and more important. It enriches Jérôme’s idea about 'the deal'.
„Kupčija“ je morala preprečevati vplive enotnega trga in enotne valute na najrevnejše.
It is possible that Regional and Cohesion Policy was created at a certain moment as part of a short- term deal but that doesn’t mean that does not limit its justication for existence.The reason for the policy is that it gives the Union the chance to achieve growth in a more balanced way.
Želel je, da bi bogatejše države članice ohranile zanimanje za politiko in ostale vključene vanjo, kar je na primer zelo jasno izjavil ob ponovni združitvi Nemčije, ko so nove nemške zvezne dežele takoj postale upravičene do sredstev iz strukturnih skladov.
“It should be 'a policy for all', not just for the poor.”
Ta „kupčija“ je torej zelo zapletena.
Jérôme Vignon: This brings me to insist on something.
Imamo politiko, ki je veliko več kot preprost razdelitveni mehanizem.
Jacques Delors was really keen to avoid that Cohesion Policy and the use of the Structural Funds would turn into pure redistribution.
Če pretirano poudarjamo zamisel o kupčiji, lahko zanemarimo gospodarski pomen notranjega trga in enotne valute.
'The deal' was to counteract the effects of the single market and the
Notranji trg je Nemčiji na primer koristil leta 1989 in tudi
Tassos Bougas: It was not an option to de-ne Cohesion Policy as a purely redistributive mechanism at the Community level.
Sporočilo je ustvarjanje razmer, v katerih imajo vsi možnost sodelovanja na notranjem trgu in pridobivanja koristi tega trga.
I would highlight the fact that it was designed as a conditional distribution policy with three levels of conditionality.The first being, that the Cohesion Policy's priorities should contribute to the implementation of Community priorities, the second that the Cohesion Policy's transfers should not replace the national eort and should be used for investments and nally the obligation of accountability and good management.
Njen cilj je bil, da državam članicam in regijam omogoči spodbujanje trgovine in vlaganj na njihovih ozemljih, vendar v evropskem okviru.
It should be 'a policy for all', not just for the poor.
Ni pomenila dodeljevanja nančnih sredstev za revnejše regije, da bi izravnala posledice njihove liberalizacije.
It has been clear from the beginning that all countries should prot from it.
Vendar ne morete pričakovati, da bodo podjetja vlagala v regije, ki so prikrajšane zaradi slabe infrastrukture in neustrezno kvalificirane delovne sile, tj. jim manjka vse, kar prispeva k uspehu podjetja in je notranje vprašanje.
Cohesion Reports.
STRAN31 proračuna regijam, ker so revne.
The same is true for 'additionality'.
Kohezijska politika se ni opredelila z „ovirajočo manjšino glasov v Svetu“, kot so menili nekateri.
Some of the bigger Member States have failed to deliver on this, and these facts have weakened our position.
Naslednji dejavnik, ki ga nismo ustrezno upoštevali, je bila mogoča politična kompleksnost celostnega pristopa.
So, if I look into the future, I would question whether we could not better develop and deliver on the question of financial innovation.
Celostni pristop ne more nikoli biti cilj sam po sebi, ker ga je treba uskladiti z interesi učinkovitosti in demokracije. Nekatere države so sorazmerno
“The key message of Cohesion Policy was … creating the conditions in which everyone had the opportunity to participate in and benefit from the internal market.” Philip Lowe
„Ključno sporočilo kohezijske politike je bilo … ustvarjanje razmer, v katerih imajo vsi možnost sodelovanja na notranjem trgu in pridobivanja koristi tega trga.“ Philip Lowe
Philip Lowe: The key message of Cohesion Policy was not redistributing income.
Jérôme Vignon: Kohezijska politika je pomenila uravnoteženost dostojanstva, dostojanstva med neenako bogatimi in vplivnimi državami članicami in regijami, ter misel, da nihče ne sme biti odvisen od pomoči. To je bila politična zasnova predloga.
It was aimed at enabling Member States and regions to stimulate trade and investment on their own territories but within the European framework.
Dva od teh elementov, ki sta upravičila velik vpliv Evropske komisije, sta bili vprašanji ocenjevanja in dodatnosti, ki morata neto plačnikom zagotoviti, da se bodo finančna sredstva povsod varno uporabljala. Mislim, da je ena od težav, da v zvezi s temi posebnimi inovacijami nismo bili uspešni.
But you cannot expect companies to invest in regions which are handicapped by poor infrastructures and inadequate skills in the labour force – in short everything that contributes to the possibility of success of business but which is beyond the door of a factory.
Ocenjevanje in dodana vrednost sta po mojem mnenju veliki napaki, in na primer v kohezijskih poročilih ni veliko dokazov o naših uspehih.
'Mobilising energy in the regions' was the driving force of Cohesion Policy as opposed to simply giving a part of the European budget to the regions because they were poor.
Enako velja za dodatnost. Nekatere večje države članice v zvezi s tem niso bile uspešne, kar je oslabilo naš položaj.
Cohesion Policy was not dened by the 'blocking minority in the Council', as some used to say.
Če torej razmišljamo o prihodnosti, se sprašujem, ali ne bi mogli bolje obravnavati vprašanje nančnih inovacij in odgovoriti nanj.
Philip Lowe: One positive factor which we underestimate – in opposition to the initial pessimism on the 'masse critique' of Structural Funds intervention in macroeconomic terms – is the positive effect of Cohesion Policy on business expectations.
Philip Lowe: Pozitivni dejavnik, ki ga podcenjujemo – v nasprotju z začetnim pesimizmom v zvezi s kritično maso ukrepanja strukturnih skladov v makroekonomskem smislu – je pozitivni učinek kohezijske politike na poslovna pričakovanja.
Significant investment in areas which were poorest, and the reduction of the political and commercial risk which was a consequence of EU support, is what membership gave to these much poorer countries.
Članstvo je tem veliko revnejšim državam zagotovilo precejšnja vlaganja na najrevnejših območjih ter zmanjšanje političnega in poslovnega tveganja, kar je bilo posledica pomoči EU.
Whereas the maximum we reached was 4 % in terms of GDP, the effect was in many cases much larger.
Čeprav je največ, kar smo dosegli, 4 % v smislu BDP, je bil učinek pogosto veliko močnejši.
Which contributed also to another effect which Grigoris Varfis kept explaining to me: 'Do not forget that we are not dealing with the weakest countries and regions.
To pa je povzročilo še en učinek, na katerega me je nenehno opozarjal Grigoris Vars: „Ne pozabi, da tu ne gre za najšibkejše države in regije.
We are dealing with the weakest administrations'.
Gre za najšibkejše uprave.“ majhne, njihove nacionalne vlade pa si lastijo izraz „združevanje“.
Jérôme Vignon: It was the balance of dignity, dignity between unequally wealthy and unequally mighty Member States and regions and it considered that nobody should be dependent on assistance.
Ni jim bilo všeč, da je Komisija razglasila lastništvo nad celostnim pristopom ter združevanje izenačila s prenosom pristojnosti.
The underlying logic was, of course, that those receiving more should be committed to some achievements.
Naj vam povem nekaj anekdot o načelu partnerstva med obdobjem pogajanj o prvih programih strukturnih skladov.
I referred in the beginning to the innovations related to budgetary management.
Z irskimi partnerji smo se srečevali vsak teden, pogosto zaradi vprašanj ločevanja med financiranjem ESS in ESRR.
Two of those elements which justified giving strong influence to the European Commission were the questions of evaluation and of additionality – which should assure the net contributors that the money would be safely used everywhere.
Med pripravami na eno od srečanj, na katerih so se srečevali irski vladni ministri, je ministrski predsednik Charlie Haughey svojim kolegom nekoč rekel: „Kaj pravi Sandro Gaudenzi, da moramo storiti danes?“ Ob drugi priložnosti smo jim predlagali, naj v partnerska pogajanja o programih za jugozahodno Irsko vključijo župana Corka, vendar je odgovoril: „Sploh me ne zanima, kaj bo povedal župan Corka.
I think one of the difficulties is that we have not been able to deliver on those specific innovations.
Bistvo je, da moramo dosegati težavne odločitve na ravni nacionalne vlade.
The other factor we used to underestimate was the potential political complexity of the integrated approach. An integrated approach can never be an end in itself because it has to be balanced against the interests of efficiency and democracy.
Smo gospodarstvo s tremi in ne šestdesetimi milijoni ljudi, zato ne sprejemamo enotnega pristopa za vse.“ Vprašanje celostnega pristopa je torej treba povezati z vprašanjem, za katero raven se uporablja in kakšne pogoje povzroči na vsaki ravni.
No agreement was possible at that stage.
Celo najrevnejši predstavnik, na primer iz Extremadure, je dobil svojega natakarja.
nopoly of the word 'integration'.
Leta 1990 so ljudje mislili, da je to novo obdobje za regije.
Let me tell some anecdotes on the partnership principle during the period of the negotiations of the first Structural Funds programmes.
Ljudje iz Strathclyda so sedeli poleg ljudi iz Bavarske, in šele dve leti pozneje je postalo jasno, da to dejansko ni svet, v katerem živimo.
We used to see our Irish partners on a weekly basis, often on the issue of the split between the ESF and the ERDF funding.
Vprašanje je seveda bilo, kje so pristojnosti in kje je legitimnost.
We are an economy of three million, not of sixty million people, and we don’t accept a ‘one size fits it all’ approach”.
Z regionalno politiko je bilo v nekaterih državah mogoče pridobiti legitimnost, v drugih pa ne.
So, the issue of the integrated approach has to be linked with the issue of what level you apply it to and what is the conditionality you get from it at each level.
Ta konferenca v Münchnu je bila precej pomembna, vendar mislim, da se takšen trenutek ne bo več ponovil.
Another story relates to the Copenhagen European Council in 1987 at a time when the Framework Regulation was not yet decided.
Naslednja zgodba je povezana z Evropskim svetom v Köbenhavnu leta 1987, ko še ni bila sprejeta okvirna uredba.
DG XXII was not supposed to be there but at the last moment someone said that
GD XXII naj ne bi bil prisoten, vendar je v zadnjem trenutku nekdo sklenil, da bi bilo bolje, če bi bil tam.
The president of Bavaria had called together a big conference which took place in Munich – including a waiter behind every seat.
S seboj sem prinesel nov elektronski kalkulator; seveda takrat še nisem imel osebnega računalnika.
Even the poorest representative from, e.g. Extremadura, got his waiter! In 1990, people thought that this was a new era for the regions.
Ob koncu dneva so me poklicali v pisarno poleg sejne sobe Sveta, ker so voditelji držav računali neto salde.
People from Strathclyde sat next to people from Bavaria, and it took about two years to find out that this wasn’t exactly the world we were living in.
In tako smo nazadnje imeli obsežne sklope podatkov, ker je bilo končno vprašanje, ali govorimo o „neto kupčiji“, s katero bi pomagali najrevnejšim državam članicam, ali o širšem okviru evropske strukturne politike.
The issue, of course, was about where power lies and where legitimacy lay.
Na tej stopnji ni bilo mogoče doseči sporazuma.
So, all the national money as well was brought into the same management system.
Ko sem se tisto sobotno popoldne vračal na letališče, sem ženi kupil bel danski pulover, in od takrat vedno pravi, da je bil to edini konkreten rezultat Evropskega sveta v Köbenhavnu!
For the first time, this gave the ministry of finance which received the EU funding the opportunity to see and control what everybody was doing, an important step forward for them. In next step they had to find more projects to
Vendar je februarja 1988, ko je potekalo posebno zasedanje Evropskega sveta in smo skupaj s kanclerjem Kohlom obiskali druge delegacije, prišlo do nekakšne prelomne točke, vsaj v smislu politične vizije, ki je presegla vprašanje neto saldov.
“In reality, we got into the process of 'building government' for a number of years in that region and in that country [Greece] to make the theoretical vision possible on the ground.” Robert Shotton
„Kohezijska politika je pomenila uravnoteženost dostojanstva, dostojanstva med neenako bogatimi in vplivnimi državami članicami in regijami, ter misel, da nihče ne sme biti odvisen od pomoči.“ Jérôme Vignon
Robert Shotton: I would like to talk a bit about my experience out in the regions.
Robert Shotton: Najprej želim povedati nekaj o svojih izkušnjah v regijah.
Somebody once had to write a first paper called a 'programme' and one of the first was proudly presented to Crete, a draft of a few pages.
Nekdo je nekoč moral napisati prvi dokument z imenom „program“ in eden od prvih programov je bil kot osnutek na nekaj straneh ponosno predstavljen Kreti.
We got down there to see the regional authorities in Crete and they said: “Yes, this is very nice, but we need a telephone.
Obiskali smo regionalne organe na Kreti in rekli so: „Da, to je zelo v redu, vendar potrebujemo telefon. Ta telefon nas povezuje le z Atenami.
We are not allowed to call Brussels directly.
Niso nam dovoljeni neposredni klici v Bruselj.
So, could you get us another telephone, please?”
Ali nam lahko torej priskrbite drug telefon, prosim?
We discussed that and finally they got another telephone.
“ O tem smo razpravljali in na koncu so dobili drug telefon.
Next was, “We need a new car, what about a new car?” And we said: “OK, we’ll see what we can do about a new car.
Sledilo je: „Potrebujemo nov avtomobil, kaj pa nov avtomobil?“ In rekli smo: „Dobro, videli bomo, kaj lahko storimo glede novega avtomobila.
But will you be able to take on this programme and manage it?”
Vendar nas zanima, ali boste lahko prevzeli ta program in ga upravljali? “ Mislim, da je med intelektualno zasnovo in stvarnostjo v tej državi, ki je bila – in ne le v tej državi – zelo oddaljena od teorije, obstajala velika razlika.
In reality we got into the process of 'building government' for a number of years in that region and in that country to make the theoretical vision possible on the ground.
V praksi smo začeli postopek„izgradnje vlade“, ki je v tej regiji in državi potekal več let, da bi uresničili teoretično vizijo.
That’s how things were, only 10 years ago. And then they got to more difficult things such as public-private partnerships or sophisticated RTD projects, and they were struggling to cope with that.
Pozneje – in to je povezano z zgodbo o prenosu pristojnosti – je prišlo do čudne mešanice regij, ki so menile, da so pomembne, in regij, ki se jim je zdelo, da niso več pomembne.
We also tried to tackle corruption and leakages in the system, which is large scale in many parts of the Union, and we made more progress there so that there is more accountability in the system.
Bavarski predsednik je sklical veliko konferenco, ki je potekala v Münchnu, na kateri je za vsakim se-
When these were added together across the country, this showed how much it is that Greece spends and on what.
Eden od prvih ukrepov, ki je bil za osrednje organe v Grčiji zelo pomemben, je bila opredelitev, kdo porablja kaj.