natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
See also recital 12 of Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 7).
Glej uvodno izjavo 12 Direktive 2002/19/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 7. marca 2002 o dostopu do elektronskih komunikacijskih omrežij in pripadajočih naprav ter o njihovem medomrežnem povezovanju (Direktiva o dostopu) (UL L 108, str. 7).
7 — Article 4(5) in fact states that ‘[d]isputes between undertakings concerning issues included in this Regulation shall be subject to the national dispute resolution procedures established in conformity with Directive 97/33/EC and shall be handled promptly, fairly and transparently.’
7 – V tem členu je namreč določeno, da „[z]a spore med podjetji glede zadev, vključenih v to uredbo, veljajo nacionalni postopki re�evanja sporov, ki so določeni v skladu z Direktivo 97/33/ES, spori pa se re�ujejo hitro, pravično in pregledno“.
9 — See also Cases C-392/04 and C-422/04 i-21 Germany and Arcor [2006] ECR I-8559, paragraph 24, in which the Court pointed out that the framework directive applies only to legal situations arising from 25 July 2003.
9 – Glej tudi sodbo z dne 19. septembra 2006 v združenih zadevah i-21 Germany in Arcor (C-392/04 in C-422/04, ZOdl., str. I-8559, točka 24), v kateri Sodi�če opozarja, da se Okvirna direktiva uporablja samo za položaje, ki so nastali od 25. julija 2003 dalje.
10 been difficult to achieve by adopting a direct- ive.
10 je bil s hitrostjo, ki bi jo težko dosegli, če bi sprejeli direktivo.
The regulation is dated 18 December 2000 and requires notified operators to provide competing operators with access to their local networks as of 2 January 2001.
Uredba z dne 18. decembra 2000 prigla�enim obratovalcem nalaga obveznost, da konkurenčnim obratovalcem olaj�ajo dostop do svojih krajevnih omrežij od 2. januarja 2001 naprej.
It is easy to comprehend how the regulation came into being in the context of the former regulatory framework. The conclusions of the Lisbon European Council of March 2000 established, as an objective, the development of a digital knowledge-based economy, by fostering access to an inexpensive high-quality communications infrastructure within Europe, and in particular the Internet.
Odprtje krajevne zanke nekdanjih monopolnih obratovalcev konkurenčnim obratovalcem je bilo toliko potrebnej�e, ker – kot je opozorjeno v �esti uvodni izjavi Uredbe 14– leta 2001 za nove udeležence na trgu ne bi bilo gospodarno izvedljivo podvojiti infrastrukture dostopa do krajevne zanke iz bakrenih žic prvotnih obratovalcev in ker druge infrastrukture (kabelska televizija, satelitske povezave, brezžične krajevne zanke) ne ponujajo enake funkcionalnosti ali vsesplo�ne raz�irjenosti.
11The Community legislature was well aware that, at that time, the local loop was one of the least competitive segments of the liberalised telecommunications market, 12
Poleg tega je treba tudi opozoriti, da so bile infrastrukture krajevne zanke v Evropi zgrajene predvsem s prihodki od monopolnih cen, ki so jih uporabniki morali plačevati dolga leta, ko so nacionalni monopolni obratovalci lahko uživali izključne pravice, ki so jih podeljevale države članice 15.
Moreover, it is also important to point out that the local loop infrastructures in Europe were largely built from earnings received from the monopolistic charges which customers have had to pay over the years during which the monopoly national operators were able to benefit from the exclusive rights granted them by the Member States.
Sklepi Evropskega sveta, ki je bil marca 2000 v Lizboni, so za cilj postavili razvoj digitalnega, z znanjem podprtega gospodarstva s spodbujanjem dostopa do kakovostne komunikacijske infrastrukture v Evropi, zlasti do interneta, po zmernih cenah.
15 and this was holding back the rapid development of the digital economy in Europe.
11Normodajalec Skupnosti se je zavedal, da je bila krajevna zanka takrat eden od najmanj konkurenčnih segmentov liberaliziranega telekomunikacijskega trga 12, kar je oviralo hiter razvoj digitalne ekonomije v Evropi.
As a result, when the European Council met in Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000, unbundling of the local loop was considered to be an immediate priority.
Tako se je razvezani dostop do krajevne zanke na evropskem vrhu v Santi Marii da Feira junija 2000 obravnaval kot neposredna prednostna naloga.
The regulation thus became the legal instrument designed to implement uniform unbundling of the local loop in all the Member States.
Uredba je tako pravni instrument, ki enotno izvaja razvezani dostop do krajevne zanke v vseh državah članicah.
This unbundling of access was intended to enhance competition, ensure economic efficiency and bring maximum benefit to users.
Ta razvezani dostop bi moral omogočiti krepitev konkurence, zagotavljanje gospodarske učinkovitosti in maksimalne koristi za uporabnike. 13 Vzpostavljen
14 — Almost exactly reproducing recital (8) of Commission Recommendation 2000/417/EC of 25 May 2000 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) (OJ 2000 L 156, p. 44).
14 – Uredba skoraj povzema osmo uvodno izjavo Priporočila Komisije 2000/417/ES z dne 25. maja 2000 o razvezanem dostopu do krajevne zanke, ki omogoča konkurenčno zagotavljanje vseh elektronskih komunikacijskih storitev, vključno s �tiripasovnimi večpredstavnostnimi in z internetnimi storitvami za hitri prenos (UL L 156, str. 44).
12 — See recital (3) of the regulation and the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on unbundled access to the local loop (COM(2000) 394 final, OJ 2000 C 365 E, p. 212).
12 – Glej tretjo uvodno izjavo Uredbe ter predlog Uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o razvezanem dostopu do krajevne zanke (COM(2000)394 konč., UL C 365 E, str. 212).
15 — This situation is expressly mentioned in recital (3) of the regulation which emphasises that the marked absence of competition at local loop level was due to the fact that these operators rolled out their local access networks over significant periods of time protected by exclusive rights and were able to fund investment costs from monopoly rents.
15 – Ta položaj je izrecno naveden v tretji uvodni izjavi Uredbe, v kateri je poudarjeno, da opažen neobstoj konkurence na ravni krajevne zanke izhaja iz dejstva, da so ti obratovalci, za�čiteni z izključnimi pravicami, razvili svoje infrastrukture žičnega krajevnega dostopa v dalj�ih časovnih obdobjih in so lahko financirali investicijske stro�ke z monopolnimi rentami.
13 — See recital (2) of the regulation.
13 – Glej drugo uvodno izjavo Uredbe.
ARCOR down in Article 3(3) of the regulation, to the detriment of beneficiaries.
ARCOR nanosti – predvsem prek bolj specifičnega pojma stro�kov učinkovitega opravljanja storitev – v �kodo upravičencev odstopajo od pojma stro�kovne naravnanosti, kot je določen v členu 3(3) Uredbe.
Certain legal concepts promise much and appear to be very useful, but may, none the less, simply become words largely devoid of meaning and effect.
Vendar je normodajalec Skupnosti hotel upravičeno izključiti tveganje, da bi lahko naložitev take obveznosti prigla�enim obratovalcem povzročila neke vrste razlastitev brez nadomestila.
There is a risk that the concept of costorientation, as provided for in Article 3(3) of the regulation, may be one of those concepts.
Prigla�eni obratovalec bo torej v skladu s členom 3(3) Uredbe imel pravico zaračunavati cene, s katerimi lahko pokrije stro�ke zagotavljanja dostopa do krajevne zanke in pri tem doseže primeren donos.
However, the Community legislature rightly wished to avoid the risk that such an obligation might give rise to a form of expropriation of the notified operators without compensation.
Nekateri pravni pojmi obljubljajo veliko in se zdijo zelo uporabni, vendar lahko vseeno postanejo samo besede brez pomena in učinka.
16That is precisely the concept of costorientation of rates which lies at the heart of the present case.
Obstaja tveganje, da je lahko pojem stro�kovne naravnanosti, kot je določen v členu 3(3) Uredbe, eden od teh pojmov.
B — The first question
B – Prvo vprašanje
The concept of costorientation contains no reference to the law of the Member States for the purposes of determining its meaning and scope.
Ta pojem ne vsebuje sklicevanja na pravo držav članic, da bi se določila njegov pomen in obseg.
17 It follows from the requirements both of the uniform application of Community law and of the principle of equality, that it is, therefore, an autonomous concept of Community law which must be interpreted in a uniform fashion.
17Iz zahtev po enotnem izvajanju prava Skupnosti in tudi iz načela enakosti izhaja, da je zato samostojen pojem prava Skupnosti, ki ga je treba razlagati enotno. 18
18 An autonomous and uniform interpretation of that kind must be sought taking account not only of the terms constituting the concept in question, but also
Tak�ne samostojne in enotne razlage ni mogoče iskati samo ob upo�tevanju izrazov
This question is basically asking to what extent Article 1(4) of the regulation permits Member States, when adopting national legislation defining the concept of costorientation — for example, by means of a more specific definition of the cost of providing an efficient service — to deviate from the concept of costorientation as laid
V bistvu gre za to, v kolik�ni meri člen 1(4) Uredbe državam članicam dovoljuje, da pri sprejemanju nacionalne zakonodaje o določitvi pojma stro�kovne narav -
17 — This concept first appeared in the Community regulatory framework for telecommunications in Annex II to Directive 90/387, paragraph 4, first subparagraph, according to which charges must be based on objective criteria and … in principle be set on the basis of costorientation.
17 – Ta pojem se je v regulativnem okviru Skupnosti za telekomunikacije prvič pojavil v točki 4, drugi pododstavek, Priloge II k Direktivi 90/387, v kateri je določeno, da morajo „cene temeljiti na objektivnih merilih in […] biti praviloma stro�kovno naravnane“.
16 — See recital (11) of the regulation.
16 – Glej uvodno izjavo 11 Uredbe.
Article 7 of Directive 97/33, which was in force at the material time, adopts a similar approach.
Člen 7 Direktive 97/33, ki je veljala v času dejanskega stanja v tej zadevi, sprejema podobno usmeritev.
It provides that charges for interconnection are to be based on actual costs, including a reasonable rate of return on investment.
Določa, da bodo cene medomrežnega povezovanja določene na podlagi dejanskih stro�kov, vključno s primernim donosom od vlaganj.
18 — See, to that effect, the similar concept of ‘equitable remuneration’ in Case C-245/00 SENA 2003 ECR I-1251, paragraphs 23 and 24.
18 – Glej v tem smislu o podobnem pojmu „pravično nadomestilo“ sodbo z dne 6. aprila 2003 v zadevi SENA (C-245/00, Recueil, str. I-1251, točki 23 in 24).
See also, in particular, the Opinion of Advocate-General Tizzano in that case, at points 32 and 45 to 48.
Glej tudi sklepne predloge generalnega pravobranilca Tizzana k tej zadevi, točke 32 in od 45 do 48.
The other case in which the Court was required to give an interpretation of the concept of charges set on the basis of costorientation was the Mobistar case of 13 July 2006.
Druga sodba, v kateri se je Sodi�če ukvarjalo z razlago pojma stro�kovne naravnanosti cen, je sodba z dne 13. julija 2006 v zadevi Mobistar 22.
22 In its judgment, the Court confirmed in relation to prices charged for ensuring telephone number portability, that ‘Directive [2002/22/EC] does not preclude the adoption of a national measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which fixes in advance and on the basis of an abstract model of the costs, maximum prices which may be charged by the donor operator to the recipient operator as set-up costs, provided that the prices are fixed on the basis of the costs in such a way that consumers are not dissuaded from making use of the facility of portability’.
Sodi�če v tej sodbi glede zahtevanih cen za zagotavljanje prenosljivosti telefonskih �tevilk trdi, da „Direktiv[a] [2002/22/ES] ne nasprotuje sprejetju nacionalnega predpisa, kot je ta, ki je predmet obravnave v postopku v glavni stvari, ki vnaprej in s pomočjo teoretičnega modela stro�kov določa najvi�je cene, ki jih lahko iz naslova stro�kov vzpostavitve operater [obratovalec] dajalec �tevilke zahteva od obratovalca prejemnika �tevilke, če je oblikovanje tarif stro�kovno naravnano tako, da potro�nikov ne odvrača od uporabe te storitve prenosljivosti“.
23However, the Court pointed out that, in any event, it is important that ‘it is genuinely possible for new operators to contest the application of maximum prices by operators already present in the market by showing that those prices are too high in relation to their cost structure’. 24
23 Vendar pa Sodi�če opozarja, da je „novim obratovalcem vsekakor dana učinkovita možnost, da izpodbijajo uporabo najvi�jih cen s strani obratovalcev, ki so že dejavni na trgu, in sicer tako, da dokažejo, da so te cene previsoke v primerjavi s strukturo stro�kov obratovalcev“. 24
The fact that the concept of costorientation is a Community concept with its own meaning and scope is confirmed, first of all, by two judgments in which the Court was called upon to consider the interpretation of that concept, again in the telecommunications sector.
Da je pojem stro�kovne naravnanosti pojem Skupnosti s svojim pomenom in obsegom, je najprej potrjeno s sodbama, v katerih je Sodi�če imelo priložnost obravnavati njegovo razlago tudi na področju telekomunikacij.
20The first is the judgment of 25 November 2004 in KPN Telecom.
20Prva je sodba z dne 25. novembra 2004 v zadevi KPN Telecom.
21In that judgment, the Court held that costs connected with gathering or supplying basic subscriber data should, in any event, be borne by the provider of a voice telephony service and that they are already included in the costs of and earnings from such a service.
21Sodi�če je v tej sodbi trdilo, da mora stro�ke pridobivanja ali dodeljevanja osnovnih podatkov o naročnikih v vsakem primeru nositi ponudnik storitev govorne telefonije ter da so ti stro�ki že vključeni v stro�ke in dohodke te storitve.
Under these circumstances, transferring the cost of gathering and supplying these data to persons requesting access to them, would result in unjustifiable overcharging for the costs in question and, therefore, would be incompatible with costorientation.
V teh okoli�činah bi prenos stro�kov za pridobivanje ali dodeljevanje podatkov osebam, ki zahtevajo dostop do njih, vodil do neupravičenega prekomernega plačila zadevnih stro�kov in torej ne bi bil združljiv s stro�kovno naravnanostjo. V skladu s sodbo KPN Telecom je del pojma
When it comes to determining the precise meaning and scope of the concept of costorientation, as provided for in
Določitev natančnega pomena in obsega pojma stro�kovne naravnanosti, kot je določen v členu 3(3) Uredbe, ni očitna, kar
19 — See, to that effect, also SENA, cited above, paragraph 23 and the caselaw cited therein.
19 – Glej v tem smislu tudi zgoraj navedeno sodbo SENA, točka 23, in navedeno sodno prakso.
20 — Apart from Case C-146/00 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-9767, paragraph 60.
20 – Razen sodbe z dne 6. decembra 2001 v zadevi Komisija proti Franciji (C-146/00, Recueil, str. I-9767, točka 60).
ARCOR be exercised ‘in conformity with Community law’.
ARCOR sicer potrjuje ta zadeva.
25 The margin of discretion which the Member States have to introduce more detailed provisions in order to specify the cost elements, the methods and the models to be used will, of necessity, be defined by the limits arising from the interpretation of the Community concept of costorientation.
Uredba navaja pojem stro�kov, ne da bi �la dlje glede njegove opredelitve, poleg tega pojem stro�kov ni enopomenski: obstaja več mogočih stro�kov, metod in modelov izračuna stro�kov.
The regulation refers to the concept of costs, without going any further as regards its definition, and the concept of costs is not unambiguous: there are various possible costs, methods and models for cost calculation.
25 Diskrecijska pravica, ki jo imajo države članice za uvedbo podrobnej�ih določb, da bi določile elemente, metode in modele stro�kov, ki jih je treba sprejeti, bo nujno opredeljena z omejitvami, ki izhajajo iz razlage Skupnostnega pojma stro�kovne naravnanosti.
Where the Community legislature has not given any precise guidance regarding cost elements or the cost calculation methods or models to be used, I consider, as, basically, do the interveners in the present case, that the regulation leaves the Member States an inevitable margin of discretion in implementing this concept.
Če normodajalec Skupnosti ni dal natančnih navedb o elementih, metodah in modelih stro�kov, ki jih je treba uporabiti, menim tako, kot v bistvu menijo intervenienti v tej zadevi, da daje Uredba državam članicam neizogiben manevrski prostor pri izvajanju tega pojma.
That degree of latitude will, primarily, allow the national legislatures to determine which elements of the local loop provider’s particular costs are to be taken into account and, in particular, to define the relevant costs of the notified operator as being limited to the costs of providing an efficient service, as well as to define the methods and models to be used to calculate the costs connected with providing the local loop.
Ta možnost nacionalnim zakonodajalcem a priori omogoča, da določijo elemente posebnih stro�kov ponudnika krajevne zanke, ki se upo�tevajo, ter da zlasti natančneje določijo stro�ke prigla�enega obratovalca, kot da so to stro�ki, ki so omejeni na stro�ke učinkovitega opravljanja storitev, in tudi opredelijo metodo in modele izračuna stro�kov zagotavljanja krajevne zanke, ki se uporablja.
Moreover, Article 1(4) of the regulation expressly states that Member States shall have the right ‘to maintain or introduce … measures which contain more detailed provisions than those set out in this Regulation.’
Prav v členu 1(4) Uredbe je izrecno določeno, da imajo države članice pravico, „da […] ohranijo ali uvedejo ukrepe, ki vsebujejo podrobnej�e določbe, kot so tiste, ki jih vsebuje ta uredba“.
Apart from the general limits inherent in the general concept of costorientation revealed inter alia by the abovementioned judgments in KPN Telecom and Mobistar, and the obvious limit whereby that concept prohibits charges based on elements not forming part of costs, 26there are other limits arising from the interpretation of this concept within the specific context of the regulation.
Poleg omejitev, ki so del splo�nega pojma stro�kovne naravnanosti in so se pokazale zlasti v zgoraj navedenih sodbah KPN Telecom in Mobistar, ter očitne omejitve, po kateri ta pojem prepoveduje cene, ki temeljijo na elementih, ki niso del stro�kov 26, obstajajo druge omejitve, ki izhajajo iz razlage tega pojma v posebnem kontekstu Uredbe.
The general structure and purpose of the regulation, which I have already mentioned, indicate what these limits are, thus revealing the importance of the principle of costorientation in achieving the Community legislature’s central aim, namely to ensure effective and immediate unbundling of local loop access and, as a result, the introduction and development of compe-
Splo�na struktura in cilji Uredbe, ki sem jih že navedel, navajajo te omejitve in s tem poudarjajo, da ima načelo stro�kovne naravnanosti značaj instrumenta za uresničitev glavnega cilja normodajalca Skupnosti, da se zagotovi dejanski in takoj�en razvezani dostop do krajevne zanke ter posledično uvede in razvije konkurenca na trgu
25 — Emphasis added.
25 – Moj poudarek.
26 — See, on this point, Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 60, on the method of calculating the net cost of a universal service under Directive 97/33.
26 – Glej v tem smislu zgoraj navedeno sodbo Komisija proti Franciji, točka 60, o načinu izračuna neto stro�kov univerzalne storitve v okviru Direktive 97/33.
The Court also found that, for the purpose of calculating the net cost of a universal service, Directive 97/33 prohibited the ascribing of ‘flat-rate or imprecise values to the net cost of universal service provision, rather than carrying out specific calculations.’
Sodi�če je tudi ugotovilo, da Direktiva 97/33 prepoveduje, da se pri izračunu neto stro�kov univerzalne storitve stro�ki določajo „pav�alno ali netočno, brez posebnega izračuna“.
It is, however, true, as the provision itself states, that this legislative discretion must
Vendar je res, kot opozarja prav ta določba, da se mora zakonodajna diskrecijska pravica izvajati „v skladu z zakono­
OPINION OF MR MADURO — CASE C-55/06
POIARESA MADURA – ZADEVA C-55/06 krajevnega dostopa.
C — The second question
C – Drugo vprašanje
The interpretation of the Community concept thus shows that it lays down a substantial requirement which is designed to limit the prices charged by the notified operator, and a Member State may not depart from that requirement to the detriment of competing beneficiaries of loop access.
Razlaga tega pojma Skupnosti tako kaže, da nalaga vsebinsko zahtevo omejitve cen, ki jih zaračunava prigla�eni obratovalec, od katere država članica ne more odstopati v �kodo konkurentom, ki so upravičeni do dostopa.
The second question asks whether, under Article 3(3) of the regulation, the requirement that the prices charged for local loop access must be set on the basis of costorientation also includes imputed interest and costaccounting depreciation.
Drugo vpra�anje je, ali v skladu s čle -nom 3(3) Uredbe zahteva po stro�kovni naravnanosti cen, ki se zaračunavajo za dostop do krajevne zanke, zajema tudi računovodske obresti in odpise.
The interveners in the case agree that the application of the principle of costorientation also includes depreciation and interest on invested capital, and that these, consequently, form part of the notified operator’s costs.
Intervenienti v tej zadevi se strinjajo, da uporaba načela stro�kovne naravnanosti vključuje tudi odpise in obresti od vloženega kapitala, ki so tako del stro�kov prigla�enega obratovalca.
27 — The link between the central aim of the regulation, which was to foster competition in the short term and the requirement that prices should be set on the basis of costorientation is shown by Article 4(4) of the regulation, which expressly provides that when the national regulatory authority determines that the local access market is sufficiently competitive, it is to relieve the notified operators of the obligation for prices to be set on the basis of costorientation.
27 – Povezava med tem glavnim ciljem Uredbe po spodbujanju kratkoročne konkurence in zahtevo po stro�kovni naravnanosti cen je poudarjena v členu 4(4) Uredbe, v katerem je izrecno določeno, da je treba prigla�ene obratovalce razre�iti obveznosti določanja cen glede na stro�ke, če nacionalni regulativni organ ugotovi, da je trg za krajevni dostop dovolj konkurenčen.
28 — Recital (10) of the preamble to the Regulation in fact states that although commercial negotiation is the preferred method for reaching agreement on … pricing issues for local loop access, experience shows that in most cases the imbalance in negotiating power between the new entrant and the notified operator means that such a market solution cannot be relied on.
28 – V uvodni izjavi 10 Uredbe je namreč navedeno, da čeprav so komercialna pogajanja prednostna naloga za doseganje dogovora o […] cenovnih zadevah za dostop do krajevne zanke, izku�nje kažejo, da neuravnoteženost moči med prigla�enim obratovalcem in novim udeležencem na trgu ne dovoljuje, da se zanesemo na tako tržno re�itev.
417, highlighting the strategic importance of prices.
396 in 417, ki opozarjata na strate�ki pomen cen.
In fact, notified operators try to maintain their advantages by charging high prices without formally denying access to their networks.
Prigla�eni obratovalci namreč posku�ajo z visokimi cenami ohraniti svoje prednosti, ne da bi uradno odrekli dostop do omrežja.