natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
(c) the parties combined market shares are less than 15 % for horizontal overlaps or less than 25 % (combined or individual) for vertical relationships; or
(c) skupni tržni deleži strank znašajo manj kot 15 % za horizontalna prekrivanja ali manj kot 25 % (skupaj ali posamezno) za vertikalna razmerja ali
In line with the notice on a simplified procedure, certain types of concentration have been identified where a notification using the short form would not be appropriate, even though the formal conditions may be fulfilled.
V skladu z obvestilom o poenostavljenem postopku so bile opredeljene določene vrste koncentracije, pri katerih obvestilo na kratkem obrazcu ne bi bilo primerno, čeprav so formalni pogoji morda izpolnjeni.
Such a situation may arise where, for instance, it is di cult to de ne the relevant markets; where one party is a new entrant or an important patent holder; where it is not possible to adequately determine the parties’ market shares; where there are high entry barriers, with a high degree of concentration or known competition problems; where an issue of coordination under Article 2(4) of the new merger regulation arises; where a Member State or a third party expresses substantiated concerns within certain deadlines; and where at least two parties to the concentration are present in closely related neighbouring markets.
Takšen položaj lahko nastane, kadar je na primer težko opredeliti upoštevne trge; kadar je ena od strank na novo vstopila na trg oziroma je imetnik pomembnega patenta; kadar ni mogoče ustrezno določiti tržnih deležev strank; kadar obstajajo velike ovire za vstop na trg z visoko stopnjo koncentracije ali znanimi težavami glede konkurence; kadar se pojavi vprašanje koordinacije po členu 2(4) nove uredbe o združitvah; kadar država članica ali tretja stranka izrazi utemeljene pomisleke v okviru določenih rokov in kadar sta vsaj dva udeleženca koncentracije navzoča na tesno povezanih sosednjih trgih.
Similarly, a full form CO notification may be required in the case of a party acquiring sole control of a joint venture in which it currently holds joint control, where the acquiring party and the joint venture, together, have a strong market position, or where the joint venture and the acquiring party have strong positions in vertically related markets.
Podobno se lahko zahteva celovito obvestilo na obrazcu CO, kadar stranka pridobi izključni nadzor nad skupnim podjetjem, v katerem ima trenutno skupni nadzor, kadar imata stranka, ki pridobi nadzor, in skupno podjetje skupaj močan tržni položaj ali kadar imata skupno podjetje in stranka, ki pridobi nadzor, močan položaj na vertikalno povezanih trgih.
Safeguards have been added to ensure that, should it emerge that the concentration does not qualify for notification under the short form but has already been notified, the Commission may then require full or partial notification under form
Dodani so bili zaščitni ukrepi za zagotovitev, da lahko Komisija, kadar se izkaže, da koncentracija ne izpolnjuje pogojev za obvestilo v skladu s kratkim obrazcem, je pa že bila priglašena, zahteva celovito ali delno priglasitev v skladu z obrazcem CO.
Point (d) has been added to the category of cases that qualify for short form notification.
Točka (d) je bila dodana h kategoriji primerov, primernih za priglasitev na kratkem obrazcu.
See below under‘Notice on a simplified procedure’.
Glej spodaj pod „Obvestilo o poenostavljenem postopku“.
Short form CO requires information on socalled ‘reportable markets’, which can be horizontal or vertical markets.
Zahtevane informacije o trgih, ki jih je treba prijaviti, so omejene na informacije o skupni velikosti trga, prodajnih podatkih priglasiteljev in tržnih deležih.
Following the principle that is already in the notice on a simplified procedure, it is spelled out in the short form CO that data on the basis of all plausible alternative market de nitions must be provided.
Te informacije so omejene izključno na nančne podatke zadnjega leta.
164. e information required on the reportable markets is limited to information concerning the total market size, the notifying parties’ sales data and market shares. is information is limited to last year’s nancial data only.
V primeru horizontalnih in vertikalnih razmerij je treba zagotoviti podatke o tržnih deležih treh največjih tekmecev.
In the case of horizontal and vertical relationships, market shares of the three largest competitors must be provided. is basic information will allow the Commission to ensure that the concentration is one for which a short form notification is appropriate.
Te osnovne informacije bodo Komisiji omogočile, da se bo prepričala, da gre za koncentracijo, za katero je primerna priglasitev na kratkem obrazcu.
Furthermore, the section seeking information on possible cooperative e ects under Article 2(4) of the new merger regulation has been retained in the short form CO.
Poleg tega je na kratkem obrazcu CO ohranjen oddelek za informacije o morebitnih sodelovalnih učinkih po členu 2(4) nove uredbe o združitvah.
In line with the full form CO, a provision concerning the need to inform employees and their representatives has been added.
V skladu s celovitim obrazcem CO je bila dodana določba, ki zadeva potrebo po obveščanju zaposlenih in njihovih predstavnikov.
Finally, a provision has been added in line with the full form CO requiring notifying parties to provide an executive summary of the concentration.
Dodana je bila tudi določba v skladu s celovitim obrazcem CO, ki od priglasiteljev zahteva, da zagotovijo povzetek koncentracije.
It may also lead to little or no change in the behaviour of the joint venture in the market.
To pa zato, ker umik enega ali več obvladujočih podjetij neizogibno zmanjša število zadevnih podjetij.
It will thus not normally result in a strengthening of the combined market position of the remaining undertakings
Lahko tudi pripelje do zelo majhne spremembe vedenja skupnega podjetja na trgu ali pa se to vedenje sploh ne spremeni.
II — Merger control concerned, i.e., the sole controlling parent and the former joint venture, as compared with the situation prior to withdrawal.
Tako bo to v primerjavi s položajem pred umikom običajno imelo za posledico krepitev kombiniranega tržnega položaja preostalih zadevnih podjetij, tj. obvladujočega matičnega podjetja z izključnim nadzorom in nekdanjega skupnega podjetja.
In exceptional circumstances, the change from joint to sole control might raise competition concerns.
V izjemnih okoliščinah lahko sprememba od skupnega k izključnemu nadzoru sproži teževe za konkurenco.
A particular competition concern could arise in circumstances where the former joint venture is integrated into the group or network of its remaining shareholder and the disciplining constraints exercised by the diverging incentives of the other controlling shareholders are removed, thereby enhancing the remaining shareholder’s market position. e safeguards and exclusions section of the notice describes scenarios in which changes from joint to sole control may give rise to competition concerns and stipulates that, in such cases, the Commission may refrain from applying the simplified procedure and launch an investigation and/or adopt a full decision.
Posebna težava za konkurenco bi se lahko pojavila v okoliščinah, ko se nekdanje skupno podjetje integrira v skupino ali mrežo svojega preostalega imetnika deleža ter se odstranijo urejevalne omejitve, do katerih pride zaradi razlikujočih se pobud drugih nadzornih imetnikov deležev in se s tem poveča tržni položaj preostalega imetnika deleža.
As an additional safeguard the Commission may refrain from applying the simplified procedure in cases where neither the Commission nor the competent authorities of Member States have reviewed the prior acquisition of joint control of the joint venture in question. e notice also indicates (point 17) that the Commission will endeavour to issue a decision as soon as practicable following expiry of the 15 working day period during which Member States may request referral pursuant to Article 9 of the new merger regulation. is is the earliest point at which adoption of a decision is legally possible.
Oddelek obvestila o zaščitnih ukrepih in izključitvah opisuje scenarije, v katerih lahko spremembe od skupnega k izključnemu nadzoru povzročijo težave za konkurenco, ter določa, da lahko Komisija v takšnih primerih opusti uporabo poenostavljenega postopka in uvede preiskavo in/ali sprejme odločitev v rednem postopku.
To this end, the rules governing the referral system in the new merger regulation (Articles 4(4), 4(5), 9 and 22) have been simplified and rendered more exible.
Obvestilo tudi navaja (točka 17), da si bo Komisija prizadevala izdati odločbo, takoj ko bo to izvedljivo, po izteku obdobja 15 delovnih dni, med katerim lahko države članice
Second, pre- ling referrals — at least with respect to referrals to the Commission — should over time displace post-filing referrals.
Utemeljitev usklajenega sistema napotitev
Based on the number of requests which have been led since the application of the new rules, it appears that the new system of pre- ling referral to the Commission is a significant success.
Splošni namen novega usklajenega sistema napotitev je uvesti smotrnejši korektivni mehanizem dodeljevanja zadev med Komisijo in državami članicami na podlagi subsidiarnosti ob zagotovitvi, da zadevo obravnava(-jo) organ ali organi, ki je (so) v najboljšem položaju za izvedbo preiskave določene združitve.
Of the 14 requests for referrals to the Commission under Article 4(5) of the merger regulation for which the procedure has been completed, only two have been vetoed by Member States. e great majority of the requests concerned genuine cross-border cases. ese transactions, apart from being notifiable to a large number of Member States, had e ects on competition beyond the territory of one Member State, by a ecting either clearly EEA-wide markets or a number of national markets.
Ta sistem je namenjen predvsem obravnavanju vprašanja „večkratne vložitve“, tj. priglasitve različnim organom za konkurenco v EU, medtem ko se ohranijo glavne prednosti nadzora združevanja v ES, ki so izvedba celotnega postopka na enem mestu, primernost, pravna varnost in upravna učinkovitost.
In these cases, the Commission is better placed to deal with such transactions.
V ta namen so bila pravila, ki urejajo sistem napotitev v novi uredbi o združitvah (členi 4(4), 4(5), 9 in 22), poenostavljena in so postala bolj prožna.
Businesses clearly recognise the advantage of having their case dealt with by the Commission in order to avoid multiple ling requirements, to benefit from a coordinated investigation and, where applicable, from coherent remedies.
Ključni vidik preoblikovanja je, da lahko zdaj na podlagi prostovoljne zahteve, ki jo vložijo združujoča se podjetja, pride do napotitev od Komisije k državam članicam in obratno pred uradno vložitvijo pri kateri koli jurisdikciji EU.
Only a small number of cases concerned ‘pure’ multiple ling transactions with no tangible e ect on cross-border competition.
Glede na novost postopkov napotitve, določenih v novi uredbi o združitvah, so bile te spremembe dopolnjene z novim obvestilom o načelih, merilih in metodologiji, na katerih morajo temeljiti odločbe o napotitvah.
As regards referrals of mergers with a Community dimension to Member States during the pre-notification phase (Article 4(4)) of the merger regulation, so far only two requests have been submitted. is is in line with expectations that such requests for reallocation to a Member State would be limited in number.
Subsidiarnost pomeni, da je treba pristojnost načeloma predodeliti agenciji za konkurenco, ki je v najboljšem položaju za obravnavanje združitve, ob upoštevanju učinka zadeve na konkurenco ter preiskovalnih orodij in strokovnega znanja, ki jih ima agencija na voljo.
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1
II – Nadzor združevanja konkurenco, ker so bile zahteve za napotitve poenostavljene.
However, in specific circumstances, the Commission retains a residual function and should at the request of the undertakings concerned, expressly assess the ancillary nature of such restrictions if a case presents ‘novel and unresolved questions giving rise to genuine uncertainty’ de ned as questions ‘not covered by the relevant Commission notice in force or a published Commission decision.’
Vendar pa Komisija v posebnih okoliščinah ohrani preostalo funkcijo in na zahtevo zadevnih podjetij izrecno presodi pomožno naravo takšnih omejitev, če prinaša primer „nova in nerešena vprašanja, ki povzročajo resnično negotovost“, opredeljena kot vprašanja, „ki jih ustrezno veljavno obvestilo Komisije ali objavljena odločba Komisije ne obravnava“.
In contrast to the previous notice, which stipulated a three-year time limit for non-competition clauses in joint ventures, the new notice allows such clauses for the lifetime of a joint venture. is is because the need for non-competition clauses in joint ventures is not generally limited to a transitional period.
Novo obvestilo zagotavlja smernice o razlaganju obvestila o „pomožnih omejitvah“, da bi olajšalo samooceno udeležencev in izboljšalo pravno varnost.
Notice on the assessment of horizontal mergers
Vsebuje jasne smernice, na primer o najdaljših obdobjih, za katera je mogoče sprejeti omejitve,
See Article 6(1)(b), second subparagraph; Article 8(1), second subparagraph and (2), third subparagraph.
Glej drugi pododstavek člena 6(1)(b); drugi pododstavek člena 8(1) in tretji pododstavek člena 8(2).
II — Merger control between competing rms (so-called horizontal mergers) and reflect the re-wording of the substantive test for the competitive assessment of mergers in the new merger regulation (127
Poročilo o politiki konkurence za leto 2004 – Zvezek 1 in zajema tudi veliko večino klavzul, ki po izkušnjah Komisije veljajo kot pomožne za koncentracije.
176. e guidelines make it clear that mergers and acquisitions will only be prohibited to the extent that they enhance the market power of companies in a manner which is likely to have adverse consequences for consumers, notably in the form of higher prices, poorer quality products, or reduced choice.
Novo obvestilo obravnava klavzule o nekonkuriranju kot pomožne omejitve za obdobje do treh let, če sta vključeni znanje in dobro ime, in do dveh let, če gre samo za prenos dobrega imena. Pojasnjuje tudi pravila za geografski obseg omejitev ter klavzule o nesodelovanju in varovanju tajnosti.
In this regard, the guidelines explain that mergers may result in significant harm to competition in two broad ways, either because the concentration eliminates an important source of competition from the market (‘non-coordinated e ects’), or because it makes anticompetitive coordination between the remaining rms more likely (‘coordinated e ects’).
Glede licenčnih pogodb obvestilo še vedno ne zahteva nobenega roka, določa pa jasna pravila za ozemeljske omejitve in sporazume, ki ščitijo izključno dajalca licence. Najdaljše obdobje za obveznosti nakupa in dobave je bilo zaradi vertikalne narave teh omejitev podaljšano s treh na pet let.
Account will likewise be taken of the fact that customers of the merging rms may enjoy significant ‘buyer power’ such that they can easily resort to alternative suppliers.
Smernice za horizontalne združitve določajo analitični pristop, ki ga ima Komisija pri presoji morebitnega konkurenčnega učinka združitev med konkurenčnimi podjetji (tako imenovane horizontalne združitve), in izražajo preoblikovano besedilo stvarnega preizkusa za presojo konkurenčnosti združitev v novi uredbi o združitvah (127).
Finally, the guidelines specify that the Commission will carefully consider, in its overall assessment of the likely competitive impact of a merger, any substantiated claim made by the parties that the merger will result in e ciency gains.
Smernice jasno določajo, da bodo združitve in prevzemi prepovedani le, če povečujejo tržno moč podjetij na način, ki bi lahko škodljivo vplival na potrošnike, predvsem v obliki višjih cen, slabše kakovosti izdelkov ali zmanjšane izbire.
For such e ciencies to be taken into account, they must benefit consumers, they must only be attainable via the merger, they must be likely to be realised and they must be verifiable. able.
V zvezi s tem smernice razlagajo, da imajo združitve lahko za posledico precejšnjo škodo za konkurenco na dva pretežna načina, bodisi zato, ker koncentracija odstrani s trga pomemben vir konkurence („neusklajeni učinki“), bodisi zato, ker povečuje verjetnost protikonkurenčnega usklajevanja med preostalimi podjetji („usklajeni učinki“).
Article 2(3) of the new merger regulation provides that‘a concentration which would significantly impede e ective competition, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the common market’.The HHI, or Herfindahl-Hirschman index, is an internationally recognised measure of market concentration.
Člen 2(3) nove uredbe o združitvah določa, da „koncentracija, ki bi bistveno ovirala učinkovito konkurenco, zlasti kot posledica ustvarjanja ali krepitve prevladujočega položaja, se razglasi za nezdružljivo s skupnim trgom“.Indeks HHI ali Herfindahl-Hirschmanov indeks je mednarodno priznano merilo tržne koncentracije.
The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individual market shares of all the rms in the market.
Indeks HHI se izračuna s seštevanjem kvadratov posameznih tržnih deležev vseh podjetij na trgu.
The index gives proportionately greater weight to the market shares of the larger rms, in line with their relative importance in the competitive process.
Indeks daje sorazmerno večjo težo tržnim deležem večjih podjetij, skladno z njihovim relativnim pomenom v procesu konkurence.
Report on competition policy 2004 — Volume 1
II – Nadzor združevanja
B COMMISSION CASES
B ZADEVE KOMISIJE
On 7 January, the Commission authorised the proposed acquisition of Editis (formerly called Vivendi Universal Publishing, or VUP) by the Lagardère group subject to the divestment of around 60 % of its assets.
Komisija je 7. januarja odobrila predlagano pripojitev družbe Editis (ki se je prej imenovala Vivendi Universal Publishing ali VUP) k skupini Lagardère na podlagi odprodaje približno 60 % njenih sredstev.
In this case there were numerous complaints from associations of book readers, retailers, wholesalers, publishers, authors and illustrators.
V tem primeru je prišlo do številnih pritožb združenj knjižnih bralcev, prodajalcev na drobno, prodajalcev na debelo, založnikov, avtorjev in ilustratorjev.
In reply to the Commission’s objections, Lagardère agreed to divest almost all of Editis with the exception of certain assets (Larousse, Dunod, Dalloz and the Anaya group) accounting for around 40 % of the worldwide turnover of the company, while only less than 25 % of Editis in the French-speaking regions of the EU (i.e. the relevant markets) was retained.
V odziv na nasprotovanje Komisije se je družba Lagardère strinjala, da bo odprodala skoraj vsa sredstva družbe Editis, razen nekaterih (Larousse, Dunod, Dalloz in skupine Anaya), ki prispevajo skoraj 40 % svetovnega prometa družbe, medtem ko so ohranili manj kot 25 % družbe Editis v francosko govorečih regijah EU (tj. na upoštevnih trgih).
COMP/M.2978.See the 2003 Competition Report.
COMP/M.2978.Glej Poročilo o konkurenci za leto 2003.
II — Merger control dominant positions of the new entity along the whole of the book chain and notably in the more industrialised part of the publishing business: marketing, distribution and pocket format publishing. e new entity would have controlled access both to wellknown authors, whose sales are the lifeblood of publishers, and to sales outlets, which cannot absorb, let alone promote, more than a limited proportion of the works published each year.
Prvotna transakcija bi imela za posledico oziroma bi okrepila prevladujoče položaje nove pravne osebe vzdolž celotne knjižne verige, predvsem pa v bolj industrializiranem delu založniške dejavnosti: trženju, distribuciji in izdajanju žepnega formata. Nova pravna oseba bi nadzorovala dostop do znanih avtorjev, katerih prodaje so življenjsko pomembne za založnike, in do prodajnih mest, ki ne morejo vsrkati, kaj šele promovirati, več kot omejenega deleža del, objavljenih vsako leto.
Given the scope of the competition problems raised by the combination of Hachette Livre and Editis, the case could only be cleared subject to very substantial remedies.
Glede na obseg konkurenčnih problemov, povzročenih s kombinacijo družb Editis in Hachette Livre, bi bilo mogoče transakcijo odobriti le na podlagi pomembnejših ukrepov.
Such remedies not only had to provide solutions for markets (publishing rights, marketing and distribution services, sale of books) in which the merger would bring together the two leading players, but they also had to address the numerous vertical and conglomerate links between these markets.
Takšni ukrepi bi morali ponuditi rešitve za trge (založniške pravice, tržne in distribucijske storitve, prodaja knjig), na katerih bi združitev spojila vodilna akterja, prav tako pa tudi obravnavati številne vertikalne in konglomeratske povezave med temi trgi.
On 3 August, the Commission decided to approve the French company Wendel Investissements as the purchaser of all the assets of Editis divested in accordance with the remedies in the clearance decision.
Komisija je 3. avgusta sklenila, da bo v skladu z ukrepi odločbe o odobritvi kot kupca celotnega odprodanega premoženja družbe Editis odobrila francosko podjetje Wendel Investissements.
It comprises only socalled ‘artist and repertoire’ (A & R) activities, i.e. the discovery and development of performing artists (singers), and the marketing and sale of records.
Ukvarja se samo z dejavnostmi, zajetimi pod naslovom „Umetnik in repertoar“, tj. odkrivanjem in razvojem izvajalcev (pevcev), ter trženjem in prodajo nosilcev zvoka.
By contrast, SonyBMG will not be active in the manufacturing and the physical distribution (logistics) of records.
Nasprotno pa podjetje SonyBMG ne bo dejavno na področju izdelave in zične distribucije (logistike) nosilcev zvoka.
Following the merger, Universal and SonyBMG will both have market shares of approximately 25 %, ahead of EMI and Warner.
Po združitvi bosta imela Universal in Sony BMG približno 25-odstotna tržna deleža, kar bo pred družbama EMI in Warner.
According to the CFI, the Commission must prove the likelihood of a common understanding among the companies and the markets must be sufficiently transparent to permit monitoring of respect of the common understanding by the companies involved.
V skladu s stališčem Sodišča prve stopnje mora Komisija dokazati verjetnost skupnega dogovora podjetij, trgi pa morajo biti dovolj pregledni, da omogočijo nadzor izpolnjevanja skupnega dogovora udeleženih podjetij.
However, these ndings were not sufficient to establish by themselves price coordination. e Commission therefore also analysed the development of the majors’ discounts and found that certain discounts were not fully transparent and were di cult to monitor.
Vendar te ugotovitve same po sebi še niso zadoščale kot dokaz za usklajevanje cen. Zato je Komisija analizirala tudi razvoj dogodkov na področju popustov velikih družb in ugotovila, da nekateri popusti niso bili popolnoma pregledni in jih je bilo težko spremljati.
In addition, market transparency was reduced by the largely di erentiated music content, in spite of a certain homogeneity in the format, pricing and marketing of records.
Poleg tega je bila preglednost trga kljub določeni meri enotnosti formata, določanja cen in trženja nosilcev zvoka zmanjšana zaradi zelo različne glasbene vsebine.
On balance, the Commission therefore concluded that there was not sufficiently strong evidence to establish an existing collective dominant position of the ve majors in the markets for recorded music.
Zato je Komisija posledično sklenila, da ni bilo dovolj močnih dokazov za ugotovitev obstoječega položaja skupne prevlade petih velikih družb na trgih posnete glasbe.