natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
63 — See, for example, Case C-350/88 Delacre v Commission [1990] ECR I-395, paragraph 15.
63 – Glej na primer sodbo z dne 14. februarja 1990 v zadevi Delacre proti Komisij (C-350/88, Recueil, str. I-395, točka 15).
64 — I note that, although it expressed doubt, the Board of Appeal did not reject or refute the opposition division’s finding that the silhouette mark was not intrinsically distinctive.
64 – Poudarjam, da čeprav je odbor za pritožbe izrazil dvom, ugotovitve oddelka za ugovore, da znamka v obliki obrisa ni resnično razlikovalna, ni zavrnil ali ovrgel.
62 — See paragraph 86 of the judgment under appeal.
62 – Glej točko 86 izpodbijane sodbe.
L & D v OHIM of one or more of Sämann’s marks, together with the length of registered protection of the CAR-FRESHNER mark, was sufficient to demonstrate that the marks collectively, and thus the silhouette mark individually, had acquired a particularly distinctive character, by reason of the reputation they enjoyed with the relevant public, and thus that, in view of the similarity between the Aire Limpio mark and the silhouette mark, there was a likelihood of confusion. 117.
L & D PROTI UUNT več znamk družbe Sämann, skupaj s trajanjem registracije znamke CAR-FRESHNER, so zadostovali za ugotovitev, da so znamke skupaj, znamka v obliki obrisa pa posamično pridobile poseben razlikovalni učinek zaradi svojega ugleda v javnosti in je zato zaradi podobnosti med znamko Aire Limpio in znamko v obliki obrisa pri�lo do verjetnosti zmede. 117.
Those factors constitute, in my view, serious shortcomings in the Board of Appeal’s decision.
Menim, da ti dejavniki pomenijo resne pomanjkljivosti odločbe odbora za pritožbe.
As regards (i) and (ii), it is not possible for the Community judicature to review the legality of the decision without being able to verify that the Board of Appeal identified the mark or marks to which the data related and correctly assessed its or their similarity with the silhouette mark for the purpose of ‘transferring’ the acquired distinctiveness.
Glede (i) in (ii) sodi�če Skupnosti ne more nadzirati zakonitosti odločbe, ne da bi preverilo, ali je odbor za pritožbe identificiral znamko ali znamke, na katere so se podatki nana�ali, in ali je pravilno presodil njeno ali njihovo podobnost z znamko v obliki obrisa z namenom „prenosa“ pridobljene razlikovalnosti.
As regards (iii), it is not possible for the Community judicature to verify that the Board of Appeal did not take that approach because it considered that the similarity between the Aire Limpio mark and the marks enjoying longstanding protection in Italy was insufficient to reach the same conclusion on a direct comparison.
Glede (iii) sodi�če Skupnosti ne more preveriti, ali odbor za pritožbe tega pristopa ni sprejel, ker je menil, da podobnost med znamko Aire Limpio in znamkami, ki v Italiji uživajo dolgotrajno za�čito, ne zadostuje za enako ugotovitev prek neposredne primerjave.
It therefore seems to me that the Board of Appeal’s decision does not contain a sufficient statement of reasons to meet the standard required by Article 73 of the Regulation, namely to allow the Community judicature to exercise its power of review.
Zato menim, da je odločba odbora za pritožbe pomanjkljivo obrazložena glede na standard, ki ga zahteva člen 73 Uredbe, in sicer, da se sodi�ču Skupnosti omogoči, da izvr�i svojo pravico do nadzora.
In that light, I find that the Court of First Instance’s assessment, at paragraph 117 of its judgment, that ‘the contested decision shows in a clear and unequivocal manner the reasoning of the Board of Appeal’, cannot be legitimately drawn from the decision.
Ob upo�tevanju tega menim, da ocena Sodi�ča prve stopnje iz točke 117 njegove sodbe, da „izpodbijana odločba jasno in nedvoumno prikazuje razlago odbora za pritožbe“, legitimno ne izhaja iz odločbe.
Moreover, in my view, the Court of First Instance did not sufficiently explain its reasons for asserting that the evidence on which the Board of Appeal relied related solely to the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark, or that the Board
Poleg tega menim, da Sodi�če prve stopnje ni zadostno obrazložilo svojih razlogov za trditev, da so se dokazi, na katere se je opiral odbor za pritožbe, nana�ali zgolj na znamko ARBRE MAGIQUE ali da je odbor za pritožbe menil, da je znamka v obliki obrisa
Without forming a view on the factual assessment, I think such reasoning would be defensible.
Ne da bi oblikovala stali�če o dejanski presoji, menim, da bi bilo tako razlogovanje mogoče obraniti.
However, in the Board of Appeal’s decision, it is not explicit in its entirety.
Toda v odločbi odbora za pritožbe to razlogovanje ni popolnoma jasno.
I have pieced it together from various parts of the decision, some explicit, others implicit.
Sestavila sem ga iz različnih, jasnih in nejasnih delov odločbe.
Moreover, there are lacunae which cannot be supplied from the decision itself: (i) on what grounds was it concluded that all Sämann’s marks could be considered so similar to each other that distinctiveness acquired by one was shared by all?; (ii) to which mark or marks did the sales and advertising data relate?; (iii) on what grounds was it justified for the Board of Appeal to take the approach of ‘transferring’ acquired distinctiveness from the marks enjoying longstanding protection in Italy to the silhouette mark, for which registration as a Community trade mark was still pending at the material time, rather than comparing the Aire Limpio mark directly with the former marks?
Poleg tega obstajajo praznine, ki jih ni mogoče zapolniti na podlagi odločbe: (i) na podlagi česa je bilo ugotovljeno, da je vse znamke družbe Sämann mogoče �teti za tako podobne, da vse delijo razlikovalni učinek, ki ga je pridobila ena od njih?; (ii) na katero znamko ali znamke so se nana�ali podatki o prodaji in ogla�evanju?; (iii) kaj upravičuje pristop odbora za pritožbe, da je pridobljeno razlikovalnost znamk, ki v Italiji uživajo dolgotrajno za�čito, raj�i „prenesel“ na znamko v obliki obrisa, ki je v času dejanskega stanja �e vedno čakala na registracijo za znamko Skupnosti, kot pa da bi znamko Aire Limpio neposredno primerjal s prej�njimi znamkami?
Third, at paragraph 117, it erred in its assessment of the Board of Appeal’s reasoning.
v točki 117 je ravnalo napačno pri presoji razlogovanja odbora za pritožbe.
Fourth, it erred, passim, in assuming that the Board of Appeal had based its assessment on evidence relating to the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark when that was not indicated in the decision.
Četrtič, ponovno je ravnalo napačno, ker je domnevalo, da je odbor za pritožbe svojo presojo oprl na dokaze, ki se nana�ajo na znamko ARBRE MAGIQUE, medtem ko to iz odločbe ni bilo razvidno.
I am thus of the view that both the Board of Appeal and the Court of First Instance failed to state adequate reasons for their decisions.
Zato menim, da sta odbor za pritožbe in Sodi�če prve stopnje svoji odločbi obrazložila pomanjkljivo.
In that light, and in view of the fact that no outstanding issues of law raised before the Court of First Instance remain to be dealt with, it seems to me that both the judgment under appeal and the Board of Appeal’s decision should be annulled and the case remitted to OHIM.
Ob upo�tevanju tega in glede na dejstvo, da ni več nobenih pravnih vpra�anj iz postopka pred Sodi�čem prve stopnje, ki bi jih bilo treba obravnavati, menim, da je izpodbijano sodbo in odločbo odbora za pritožbe treba razveljaviti in vrniti UUNT.
Under Article 69(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
V skladu s členom 69(2) Poslovnika se stranki, ki v postopku ni uspela, naloži plačilo stro�kov, če so bili prigla�eni.
I have reached the view that the judgment under appeal is legally flawed in four respects.
Menim, da je izpodbijana tožba pravno napačna s �tirih vidikov.
First, the Court of First Instance erred at paragraph 85 by accepting that the Board of Appeal was entitled to find that the earlier mark had acquired a particularly distinctive character on the sole basis of sales and advertising figures and the date of first registration in Italy.
Prvič, Sodi�če prve stopnje je v točki 85 ravnalo napačno, ker je sprejelo, da je odbor za pritožbe zgolj na podlagi �tevilk glede prodaje in ogla�evanja ter datuma prve registracije v Italiji pravilno ugotovil, da je prej�nja znamka pridobila poseben razlikovalni učinek.
Second, it erred again at paragraph 105 in dismissing the argument that the shape of the earlier mark was necessary to obtain a technical result, without examining the substance of that argument.
Drugič, v točki 115 je spet ravnalo napačno, ker je zavrnilo utemeljitev, da je oblika prej�nje znamke nujna za dosego tehničnega učinka, ne da bi to utemeljitev vsebinsko preizkusilo. Tretjič, uspela.
should therefore bear the costs.
Zato bi UUNT moral nositi stro�ke.
In the light of all the foregoing considerations, I am of the opinion that the Court should:
Glede na zgoraj navedeno menim, da bi Sodi�če moralo:
— annul the judgment in Case T-168/04;
– razveljaviti sodbo v zadevi T-168/04;
— annul the decision of the Board of Appeal in Case R 326/2003-2;
– razveljaviti odločbo odbora za pritožbe v zadevi R 326/2003-2;
— remit the case to OHIM for a decision on the facts;
– zadevo vrniti UUNT v ponovno odločanje o dejstvih;
— order OHIM to pay the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.
– UUNT naložiti plačilo stro�kov postopka na prvi stopnji in stro�kov pritožbe.
2008 — CASE C-488/06 P
2008 – ZADEVA C-488/06 P
APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, brought on 24 November 2006,
V zadevi C-488/06 P, zaradi pritožbe na podlagi člena 56 Statuta Sodi�ča, vložene 24. novembra 2006,
L & D SA, established in Huércal de Almería (Spain), represented by S. Miralles Miravet, abogado, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), represented by J. García Murillo, acting as Agent, defendant at first instance,
L & D SA, s sedežem v Huércalu de Almería (Španija), ki jo zastopa S. Miralles Miravet, odvetnik, pritožnica, drugi stranki v postopku sta Urad za usklajevanje na notranjem trgu (znamke in modeli) (UUNT), ki ga zastopa J. García Murillo, zastopnica, tožena stranka na prvi stopnji,
L & D v OHIM Julius Sämann Ltd, established in Zug (Switzerland), represented by E. Armijo Chávarri, abogado, intervener at first instance,
L & D PROTI UUNT Julius Sämann Ltd, s sedežem v Zugu (Švica), ki jo zastopa E. Armijo Chávarri, odvetnik, intervenient na prvi stopnji,
2008 — CASE C-488/06 P gives the following
2008 – ZADEVA C-488/06 P izreka naslednjo
By its appeal, L & D SA (‘L & D’) seeks to have set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities of 7 September 2006 in Case T-168/04 L & D v OHIM — Sämann (Aire Limpio) [2006] ECR II-2699 (‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the Court of First Instance dismissed its action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) of 15 March 2004 (Case R 326/2003-2, ‘the contested decision’). By that decision, the Board of Appeal allowed, in part, the appeal of the company Julius Sämann Ltd (‘Sämann’) and refused, in part, L & D’s application for registration of a figurative sign including the word element ‘Aire Limpio’. I — Legal context
S to pritožbo družba L & D SA (v nadaljevanju: družba L & D) predlaga razveljavitev sodbe Sodi�ča prve stopnje Evropskih skupnosti z dne 7. septembra 2006 v zadevi L & D proti UUNT – Sämann Ltd (Aire Limpio) (T-168/04, ZOdl., str. II-2699, v nadaljevanju: izpodbijana sodba), s katero je to sodi�če zavrnilo tožbo zoper odločbo drugega odbora za pritožbe Urada za usklajevanje na notranjem trgu (znamke in modeli) (UUNT) z dne 15. marca 2004 (zadeva R 326/2003-2, v nadaljevanju: sporna odločba). S to odločbo je odbor za pritožbe delno ugodil pritožbi družbe Julius Sämann Ltd (v nadaljevanju: družba Sämann) in delno zavrnil prijavo za registracijo figurativnega znaka, ki vsebuje besedno zvezo „Aire Limpio“, ki jo je vložila družba L & D. I – Pravni okvir
Under Article 7(1)(b) and (e)(ii) of Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p.
Na podlagi člena 7(1)(b) in (e)(ii) Uredbe Sveta (ES) �t. 40/94 z dne 20. decembra 1993 o znamki Skupnosti (UL 1994, L 11, str.
1), registration is to be refused for ‘trade marks which are devoid of any distinctive character’ and signs which consist exclusively of ‘the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result’, respectively.
1) se kot znamka ne registrirajo „znamke, ki so brez slehernega razlikovalnega učinka“, pa tudi znaki, sestavljeni izključno iz „oblike blaga, ki je nujna za doseg tehničnega učinka“.
Article 8 of Regulation No 40/94 provides:
Člen 8 Uredbe �t. 40/94 določa:
For the purposes of paragraph 1, “Earlier trade marks” means:
Za namen odstavka 1 izraz ‚prej�nje znamke‘ pomeni:
(a) trade marks of the following kinds with a date of application for registration which is earlier than the date of application for registration of the Community trade mark… :
(a) znamke naslednje vrste z datumom zahtev za registracijo, ki predhodi datumu zahteve za registracijo znamke Skupnosti […]:
(i) Community trade marks;
(i) znamke Skupnosti;
Article 73 of Regulation No 40/94 provides:
Člen 73 Uredbe �t. 40/94 določa:
‘Decisions of the Office shall state the reasons on which they are based.
„V odločbah Urada se navedejo razlogi, na katerih odločbe temeljijo.
They shall be based only on reasons or evidence on which the parties concerned have had on opportunity to present their comments.’
Temeljijo lahko le na razlogih ali dokazih, na katere so imele zadevne stranke priložnost podati pripombe.“
II — Background to the dispute
II – Dejansko stanje
On 30 April 1996, L & D filed an application with OHIM to register as a Community trade mark the figurative mark containing the word element ‘Aire Limpio’ (‘the Aire Limpio mark’), reproduced below: I - 5762
Družba L & D je 30. aprila 1996 pri UUNT vložila prijavo za registracijo spodaj prikazane figurativne znamke, ki vsebuje besedni element „Aire Limpio“ (v nadaljevanju: znamka Aire Limpio), kot znamke Skupnosti: I - 5762
The goods and services in respect of which registration was sought are in Classes 3, 5 and 35 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and correspond, for each of those classes, to the following description:
Proizvodi in storitve, za katere je bila zahtevana registracija znamke, sodijo v razrede 3, 5 in 35 Nicejskega aranžmaja o mednarodni klasifikaciji blaga in storitev zaradi registracije znamk z dne 15. junija 1957, kot je bil revidiran in spremenjen, ki ustrezajo naslednjim opisom:
— Class 5: ‘Scented air fresheners products’;
– razred 5: „parfumirani osvežilci zraka“;
— Class 35: ‘Advertising; commercial business handling; commercial administration; office works’.
– razred 35: „oglasna dejavnost; vodenje komercialnih poslov; poslovna administracija; pisarni�ki posli“.
On 29 September 1998, Sämann filed a notice of opposition under Article 42 of Regulation No 40/94 to the registration applied for, on the basis of a number of earlier trade marks.
Družba Sämann je 29. septembra 1998 vložila ugovor zoper registracijo prijavljene znamke na podlagi člena 42 Uredbe �t.
The grounds relied on in support of its opposition were those referred to in Article 8(1)(b) and (5) of Regulation No 40/94.
40/94 in se sklicevala na več prej�njih znamk.
Those earlier marks included Community figurative mark No 91 991, reproduced below, lodged on 1 April 1996 and registered on 1 December 1998 for goods in Class 5 (‘mark No 91 991’):
Razlogi za njen ugovor so bili tisti, ki so navedeni v členih 8(1)(b) in 5 Uredbe �t. 40/94.
The two international figurative marks Nos 178 969 and 328 915 are particularly relevant for the purposes of this appeal.
Med njimi je bilo tudi 17 drugih mednarodnih in nacionalnih figurativnih znamk, ki so si podobne, in se druga od druge razlikujejo, razen ene izmed njih, po belem podstavku in/ali po napisu na kro�nji.
Those two marks, registered on 21 August 1954 and 30 November 1966 respectively for goods in Classes 3 and 5 and protected, in par -ticular, in Italy, look like this:
Ti znamki, ki sta bili registrirani 21. avgusta 1954 in 30. novembra 1966 za proizvode iz razredov 3 in 5 in sta za�čiteni v Italiji, sta videti takole:
By decision of 25 February 2003, OHIM’s Opposition Division rejected the opposition in its entirety.
Z odločbo z dne 25. februarja 2003 je oddelek za ugovore UUNT ugovor v celoti zavrnil.
In this connection, it considered, essentially, that the shape of a fir tree, as the element shared by the two marks, was descriptive with regard to deodorising or air freshener goods and, therefore, was not very distinctive.
Presodil je, da oblika jelke kot element, ki je skupen obema znamkama, opisuje parfumerijske izdelke in osvežilce zraka, zaradi česar ima majhen razlikovalni učinek.
The significant graphic and verbal differences between the two marks thus outweighed the weakly distinctive similarities, creating an overall impression that was sufficiently different to rule out any likelihood of confusion or association.
Pomembne grafične in besedne razlike med obema znamkama so pretehtale podobnosti s �ibkim razlikovalnim učinkom, saj je bil celoten vtis, ki je bil tako ustvarjen, dovolj različen, da je bila izključena kakr�na koli verjetnost zmede ali povezovanja.
Having reached that conclusion, the Opposition Division considered that it was not necessary to examine the other earlier marks relied on by Sämann, since those marks displayed even greater differences in relation to the Aire Limpio mark than did mark No 91 991.
Ko je oddelek za ugovore to ugotovil, je presodil, da ni treba preizkusiti prej�njih znamk, ki jih je navedla družba Sämann, saj se te znamke od znamke Aire Limpio razlikujejo �e bolj kot znamka �t. 91.991.
By the contested decision of 15 March 2004, the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM allowed in part the appeal brought by Sämann against the Opposition Division’s decision.
S sporno odločbo z dne 15. marca 2004 je drugi odbor za pritožbe UUNT delno ugodil pritožbi, ki jo je vložila družba Sämann zoper odločbo oddelka za ugovore.
In accepting the ground of appeal alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94, the Board of Appeal allowed the opposition in part and refused to
S tem da je odbor za pritožbe sprejel pritožbeni razlog kr�itve člena 8(1)(b) Uredbe �t. 40/94, je delno ugodil ugovoru in zavrnil registracijo znamke Aire Limpio za proi-
2008 — CASE C-488/06 P register the Aire Limpio mark for goods in Classes 3 and 5.
2008 – ZADEVA C-488/06 P zvode iz razredov 3 in 5.
As regards, by contrast, the services in Class 35, it confirmed the Opposition Division’s decision and rejected the opposition.
Nasprotno pa je glede storitev iz razreda 35 potrdil odločbo oddelka za ugovore in je zavrnil ugovor.
In its assessment, however, it reached the opposite conclusion to that of the Opposition Division.
Pri presoji je ugotovil nasprotno kot oddelek za ugovore.
Thus, it held that the prolonged use and wellknown nature in Italy of the ‘earlier mark’ gave it a particularly distinctive character and that there was, having regard to that distinctiveness and the conceptual similarity between the two marks, a likelihood of confusion, at least on the part of the Italian public.
Tako je presodil, da je dolgotrajna uporaba in prepoznavnost, ki ju je bila „prej�nja znamka“ deležna v Italiji, tej znamki dala poseben razlikovalni učinek in da je glede na ta učinek in pojmovno podobnost med obema znamkama obstajala verjetnost zmede vsaj pri italijanski javnosti.
To reach that conclusion, it relied, first, on data relating to Sämann’s advertising and sales of car air fresheners and, secondly, on the fact that the CAR-FRESHNER mark had been protected since 1954.
Te ugotovitve je oprl, prvič, na dokaze glede ogla�evanja in prodaje avtomobilskih osvežilcev zraka družbe Sämann in, drugič, na dejstvo, da je znamka CAR-FRESHNER za�čitena od leta 1954.
III — Procedure before the Court of First Instance and the judgment under appeal
III – Postopek pred Sodiščem prve stopnje in izpodbijana sodba
By application lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 14 May 2004, L & D brought an action against the contested decision. It raised two pleas to that end, alleging infringement of Articles 8(1)(b) and 73 of Regulation No 40/94 respectively. By the judgment under appeal, the Court of First Instance dismissed that action. I - 5766
Družba L & D je 14. maja 2004 v sodnem tajni�tvu Sodi�ča prve stopnje vložila tožbo na razveljavitev sporne odločbe. Podala je dva tožbena razloga, in sicer kr�itev člena 8(1)(b) Uredbe �t. 40/94 in kr�itev člena 73 navedene uredbe. Sodi�če prve stopnje je z izpodbijano sodbo to tožbo zavrnilo. I - 5766
As regards the first plea, the Court first observed, in paragraph 70 of the judgment under appeal, that the finding of the Board of Appeal to the effect that mark No 91 991 had a particularly distinctive character in Italy was based on the acceptance of the prolonged use and wellknown nature of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark.
Glede prvega tožbenega razloga je Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 70 izpodbijane sodbe najprej ugotovilo, da ugotovitev odbora za pritožbe, da je imela znamka �t. 91.991 v Italiji posebni razlikovalni učinek, temelji na dejstvu dolgotrajne uporabe in prepoznavnosti znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE.
It considered in that regard that the Board of Appeal was right to hold that the representation of the silhouette of the fir tree, which plays a significant or even predominant role in the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark, corresponds to the sign of mark No 91 991.
V zvezi s tem meni, da je odbor za pritožbe pravilno presodil, da obris jelke, ki ima v znamki ARBRE MAGIQUE pomembno in celo prevladujočo vlogo, ustreza znaku znamke �t. 91.991.
As a result, it held that the Board of Appeal had been fully entitled to hold that mark No 91 991 constituted part of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark.
Zato je presodilo, da je odbor za pritožbe pravilno ugotovil, da je prej�nja znamka Skupnosti �t. 91.991 del prej�nje znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE.
Accordingly, the first mark could have acquired a distinctive character following its use as part of the second mark.
Tako naj bi prva znamka lahko pridobila razlikovalni učinek, ker se je uporabljala kot del druge znamke.
The Court concluded that the Board of Appeal had rightly examined all the evidence relating to the use and wellknown nature of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark in order to establish the prolonged use, the wellknown nature and, therefore, the particularly distinctive character of mark No 91 991.
Sodi�če prve stopnje je na podlagi tega ugotovilo, da je odbor za pritožbe pravilno preizkusil vse dokaze v zvezi z uporabo in prepoznavnostjo znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE, da bi ugotovil dolgotrajno uporabo, prepoznavnost in torej posebni razlikovalni učinek znamke �t. 91.991.
As regards the actual examination of the evidence, the Court of First Instance held, in paragraph 78 of the judgment under appeal, that the contested decision had rightly stated that it was apparent from the evidence in the case-file that mark No 91 991, as part of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark, had been the subject of prolonged use in Italy, was well known there and therefore had a particularly distinctive character.
Glede tako imenovanega preizkusa dokazov je Sodi�če prve stopnje v točki 78 izpodbijane sodbe presodilo, da je pravilno, da je sporna odločba določala, da iz dokazov iz spisa izhaja, da se je znamka �t. 91.991 kot del znamke ARBRE MAGIQUE v Italiji dolgotrajno uporabljala, je tam prepoznavna in ima zato poseben razlikovalni učinek.