natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
ker v dobrih časih udeleženci na trgu pogosto napačno ocenijo metodologijo in pomen bonitetnih ocen, katerih namen je opredeliti verjetnost neizpolnitve obveznosti, ali ju ne upoštevajo,
whereas, in good times, market participants tend to mistake or disregard the underlying methodology and meaning of credit ratings, which seek to pin down the probability of default,
ker so zadnji dogodki v krizi evra osvetlili pomembno vlogo bonitetnih ocen državnih dolžniških instrumentov, pa tudi nedoslednost in procikličnost pri regulativni uporabi ocen,
whereas the recent developments in the euro crisis have highlighted the significant role of sovereign debt ratings and both inconsistency and pro-cyclicality in the regulatory use of ratings,
ker je neodvisnost ocen od trga in političnega vmešavanja bistvena ter jo je treba zagotoviti ne glede na nove strukture in poslovne modele, ki se lahko pojavijo, ter v okviru gospodarskega upravljanja in testov izjemnih situacij,
whereas independence of ratings from market and political interference is paramount and must be ensured whatever the new structures and business models that may emerge and in the context of economic governance and stress tests,
ker se ocene sicer lahko in tudi se spreminjajo zaradi temeljnih prilagoditev profilu tveganja ali novim informacijam, čeprav bi morale biti zasnovane stabilno, ne pa da nihajo na podlagi razmer na trgu,
while ratings can and do change as a result of fundamental adjustments to risk profile or new information, they should be designed to be stable and not fluctuate on the basis of market sentiment,
ker je sistem Basel II povzročil pretirano zanašanje na zunanje ocene, kar je v nekaterih primerih privedlo do tega, da so se banke odrekle opravljanju samostojnih ocen o svoji izpostavljenosti,
whereas the Basel II system has resulted in excessive reliance on external ratings, leading in some cases to banks deciding against performing autonomous assessments of their exposures,
ker je nedavno sprejeta ureditev bonitetnih ocen v Združenih državah v obliki Dodd-Frankovega zakona prinesla manjše regulativno zanašanje na presojo agencij,
whereas recent regulation of ratings in the United States, with the Dodd-Frank Act, has opted for less regulatory reliance on agencies' judgments,
Makroraven: regulacija finančnega trga
Macro level: financial market regulation
meni, da je treba v luči sprememb uporabe bonitetnih ocen, ko se izdajatelja ocenjuje za namene pridobitve prednostne obravnave znotraj regulativnega okvira in ne za namene pridobitve dostopa do svetovnih kapitalskih trgov, kar najbolj in v realističnem časovnem obdobju zmanjšati pretirano zanašanje globalnega finančnega regulativnega sistema na zunanje bonitetne ocene;
Considers that, in the light of the change in the use of credit ratings, where the issuer is rated to get a preferential treatment under a regulatory framework rather than to gain access to the global capital markets, the over-reliance of the global financial regulatory system on external credit ratings has to be reduced as far as possible and in a realistic timeframe;
meni, da je treba zmanjšati izkrivljanje konkurence, ki je posledica splošne prakse, po kateri bonitetne agencije ocenjujejo udeležence na trgu, medtem ko od njih obenem prejemajo naročila;
Considers that competition biases caused by the common practice that credit rating agencies assess market participants while simultaneously obtaining orders from them, have to be reduced;
se strinja z načeli, ki jih je oktobra 2010 opredelil Odbor za finančno stabilnost in ki predstavljajo splošne smernice za zmanjšanje zanašanja na zunanje bonitetne ocene, ter pozdravlja javno posvetovanje Komisije, ki se je začelo novembra 2010; poziva Komisijo, naj pregleda, ali države članice bonitetne ocene uporabljajo za regulativne namene in kako, da bi zmanjšala splošno pretirano zanašanje nanje v finančnem regulativnem sistemu;
Agrees with the principles set out by the Financial Stability Board in October 2010 giving general guidance on how to reduce reliance on external credit ratings, and welcomes the Commission's public consultation starting in November 2010; asks the Commission to review whether and how Member States use ratings for regulatory purposes in order to reduce the general over-reliance on them of the financial regulatory system;
opozarja na pomanjkljivosti v standardiziranem pristopu v baselskem regulativnem okviru, ki omogoča določanje regulativnih kapitalskih zahtev za finančne institucije na podlagi zunanjih bonitetnih ocen; meni, da je pomembna vzpostavitev okvira kapitalske ustreznosti, ki bo zagotavljal trdno notranjo oceno tveganja, boljši nadzor nad tako oceno ter izboljšan dostop do informacij, povezanih s posojili; v zvezi s tem podpira večjo uporabo pristopa na osnovi notranjih bonitetnih ocen, če je ta zanesljiv in varen ter so velikost, zmogljivost in izkušenost finančne institucije primerne za ustrezno oceno tveganj; meni, da je za zagotovitev enakih konkurenčnih pogojev pomembno, da notranji modeli spoštujejo parametre, ki so predpisani v uredbi EU, ter da mora zanje veljati strog postopek validacije nadzornih organov; hkrati meni, da bi manjši in manj izkušeni igralci z manjšimi zmogljivostmi morali imeti možnost uporabe zunanjih bonitetnih ocen, če ni možna notranja ocena kreditnega tveganja, pod pogojem, da izpolnjujejo ustrezne zahteve glede potrebne skrbnosti;
Points to shortcomings in the standardised approach in the Basel regulatory framework allowing regulatory capital requirements for financial institutions to be set on the basis of external credit ratings; considers it important to establish a capital adequacy framework that ensures robust internal risk assessment, better oversight of such risk assessment, and improved access to credit-relevant information; supports in this respect the increased use of the internal-ratings-based (IRB) approach provided that it is reliable and safe and that the size, capacity and sophistication of the financial institution allow for an adequate risk assessment; considers that in order to ensure a level playing field it is important that internal models respect parameters prescribed in the EU regulation and be subject to rigorous supervisory validation; considers, at the same time, that smaller and less sophisticated players with lower capacities should be able to use external ratings, if no internal credit risk assessment is viable, provided that they fulfil appropriate due diligence requirements;
poudarja, da je pomembno slediti razvoju na podlagi Basla III ter postopka iz direktive o kapitalskih zahtevah (CRD IV);
Points out the importance of following the developments under Basel III and the ongoing CRD IV process in this respect;
meni, da je treba ponovno zagotoviti zmožnost vlagateljev, da ravnajo s skrbnostjo dobrega gospodarja, kar je predpogoj, da se lahko omogoči povečanje uporabe lastniških notranjih modelov za ocenjevanje kreditnega tveganja; predlaga, da bi morale banke in drugi finančni akterji veliko pogosteje uporabljati primerno notranjo oceno tveganja;
Sees the need to restore investors' ability to conduct their own due diligence as a pre-requisite for enabling increased use of proprietary internal models for credit risk assessment; suggests that banks and other financial players should use proper internal risk assessments much more often;
izraža mnenje, da udeleženci na trgu ne bi smeli vlagati v strukturirane ali druge produkte, če ne morejo sami oceniti osnovnega kreditnega tveganja, oziroma da bi morali uporabiti največjo utež tveganja;
Expresses the view that market participants should not invest in structured or other products if they cannot assess the underlying credit risk themselves, or alternatively that they should apply the highest risk weighting;
poziva Evropsko centralno banko in nacionalne centralne banke, naj opravijo revizijo lastne uporabe zunanjih ocen, razvijejo strokovno znanje za oblikovanje lastnih modelov ocenjevanja bonitetnega standarda upravičenega premoženja, ki se uporablja kot zavarovanje v operacijah za povečevanje likvidnosti, ter zmanjšajo zanašanje na zunanje ocene;
Asks the European Central Bank and the national central banks to review their use of external ratings, and urges them to build up expertise in devising their own models to assess the credit standard of eligible assets used as collateral for liquidity-providing operations, and to reduce their reliance on external ratings;
poziva Komisijo, naj natančno oceni možno uporabo alternativnih instrumentov za ocenjevanje kreditnega tveganja;
Asks the Commission to carefully assess the potential use of alternative instruments to measure credit risk;
se zaveda notranjega navzkrižja interesov, če udeleženci na trgu oblikujejo notranje ocene kreditnega tveganja za lastne regulativne kapitalske zahteve, zato meni, da je treba povečati odgovornost, zmogljivost, pristojnost in vire nadzornikov za spremljanje, ocenjevanje in nadzor ustreznosti notranjih modelov ter za naložitev bonitetnih ukrepov; meni, da nekega notranjega modela ne bi smeli odobriti za regulativno uporabo, če ga nadzornik zaradi njegove zapletenosti ne more ustrezno oceniti; meni, da je pomembna tudi preglednost predpostavk za neodvisno akademsko oceno;
Is aware of the inherent conflict of interest if market participants devise internal credit risk assessments for their own regulatory capital requirements, and hence sees the need to increase supervisors' responsibilities, capacity, powers and resources for monitoring, assessing and overseeing the adequacy of the internal models and for imposing prudential measures; considers that if an internal model cannot be appropriately assessed by the supervisor due to its complexity such a model shall not be approved for regulatory use; suggests that transparency of assumptions for independent academic assessment also has a role;
ugotavlja, da bi moral imeti Evropski nadzorni organ (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) za učinkovito izvajanje svojih nadzornih pooblastil pravico do izvajanja nenapovedanih preiskav in pregledov na kraju samem ter da bi moral subjektom, ki jih preverja, pri izvajanju svojih nadzornih pooblastil dati možnost, da se zagovarjajo, zato da se upošteva njihova pravica do obrambe;
States that, in order to exercise its supervisory powers effectively, the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) should have the right to conduct unannounced investigations and on-site-inspections and that, when exercising its supervisory powers, the European Securities and Markets Authority should give the persons which are subject to proceedings an opportunity of being heard in order to respect their rights of defence;
Enaki konkurenčni pogoji
Level playing field
poudarja globalni značaj panoge bonitetnega ocenjevanja ter poziva Komisijo in države članice, naj si skupaj z drugimi državami G20 prizadevajo za globalni pristop, ki bo temeljil na najvišjih standardih tako glede uredbe o bonitetnih agencijah kot uredbe o trgih, ob upoštevanju zmanjševanja prevelikega zanašanja za zunanje bonitetne ocene, da bi tako ohranili enake konkurenčne pogoje in preprečili regulativno arbitražo ter hkrati obdržali trge še naprej odprte;
Highlights the global nature of the credit rating industry and urges the Commission and Member States to work together with other G20 countries on a global approach, based on the highest standards, both in respect of CRA regulation and prudential and markets regulation with respect to reducing the over-reliance on external credit ratings, in order to preserve a level playing field and prevent regulatory arbitrage while keeping markets open;
meni, da so spodbujanje konkurence, povečevanje preglednosti in vprašanje bodočega plačilnega modela najpomembnejše naloge, medtem ko bi moralo biti vprašanje izvora bonitetne agencije sekundarno;
Regards the stimulation of competition, the promotion of transparency and the question of a future pay model as the most important tasks while the question of the origin of a CRA should be secondary;
ponovno poudarja, da Uredba (ES) št. 1060/2009 opredeljuje dva sistema za obravnavo zunanjih bonitetnih ocen iz tretjih držav in da je bil namen sistema odobritve dopustiti zunanje bonitetne ocene iz tretjih držav, ki niso veljale za primerne za uporabo v Evropski uniji, če je bila bonitetni agenciji, ki jo je odobrila, pripisana jasna odgovornost;
Reiterates that Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 devises two systems to deal with external credit ratings from third countries and that the intention behind the endorsement regime was to allow external credit ratings from third countries deemed non-equivalent to be used in the European Union if clear responsibility was attached to an endorsing CRA;
Srednja raven: struktura panoge
Intermediate level: industry structure
poudarja, da večja konkurenca v tej panogi še ne pomeni boljše kakovosti ocen, ter ponovno opozarja, da morajo vse bonitetne agencije spoštovati najvišje standarde glede integritete, razkritja, preglednosti in obvladovanja navzkrižja interesov, kot je določeno v zahtevah Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009, da bi zagotovili kakovost ocen in preprečili izbiranje najugodnejše ocene;
Stresses that increased competition in the sector does not automatically imply better quality of ratings and reiterates that all rating agencies must abide by the highest standards of integrity, disclosure, transparency and conflict of interest management as set out in the requirements of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 in order to ensure the quality of ratings and to avoid ‘rating shopping’;
poziva Komisijo, naj poleg dela, omenjenega v odstavku 9, pripravi natančno oceno učinka, analizo uspešnosti ter oceno stroškov za potrebno financiranje v zvezi s tem; je še posebej prepričan, da stroškov financiranja nikakor ne bi smeli nositi davkoplačevalci, ter meni, da ne bi smeli zagotoviti nobenega dodatnega financiranja ter da bi morala biti nova ustanova ECRaF popolnoma samozadostna za financiranje svojega proračuna po izteku začetnega obdobja;
Asks the Commission to produce, together with the work referred to in paragraph 9, a detailed impact assessment, viability analysis, and cost estimate for the necessary financing in this respect; is strongly of the opinion that financing costs should under no circumstances be borne by taxpayers and considers that no further funding should be provided and that the new ECRaF should be fully self-sufficient financing its own budget after the start-up period;
meni, da morajo biti za zagotovitev verodostojnosti nove ustanove ECRaF njeno vodstvo, osebje in upravljalna struktura popolnoma neodvisne in avtonomne, kar pomeni, da ne upoštevajo navodil držav članic, Komisije in vseh drugih javnih organov, pa tudi finančne industrije in bonitetnih agencij, ter da morajo delovati v skladu s spremenjeno Uredbo (ES) št. 1060/2009;
Considers that, to ensure its credibility, the management, staff and governance structure of the new ECRaF need to be fully independent and autonomous, i.e. not bound by instructions vis-à-vis the Member States, the Commission and all other public bodies as well as the finance industry and other CRAs, and that they need to operate in accordance with amended Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009;
poziva Komisijo, naj opravi natančno preiskavo glede stroškov, koristi in upravljalne strukture take mreže evropskih bonitetnih agencij, pri tem pa upošteva, kako bi lahko bonitetne agencije, ki delujejo na nacionalni ravni, spodbudili k vstopu v partnerske ali skupne omrežne strukture z namenom izkoriščanja obstoječih virov in osebja, s čimer bi jim omogočili zagotavljanje večje pokritosti in konkurenčnost drugim bonitetnim agencijam, ki delujejo na čezmejni ravni; predlaga, da bi Komisija lahko preučila načine za podporo omrežij bonitetnih agencij, vendar meni, da bi morala biti takšna omrežja pobuda, ki jo vodi panoga;
Asks the Commission to conduct a detailed investigation into the costs, benefits and governance structure of such a network of European CRAs, including considerations of how nationally active CRAs could be encouraged to move to partnership or joint-network structures in order to draw on existing resources and staffing, thus possibly enabling them to provide increased coverage and allowing them to compete with CRAs active at cross-border level; suggests that the Commission could investigate methods of supporting networks of CRAs, but takes the view that any such network should be an industry-led initiative;
meni, da bo verjetno potrebna začetna podpora za vzpostavitev takega omrežja, a verjame, da bi moralo biti samozadostno in donosno iz lastnih prihodkov; poziva Komisijo, naj oceni potrebo in možne vire začetnega financiranja ter možne pravne strukture za ta projekt;
Sees a potential need to support the initial set-up of such a network but considers that the network ought to be self-sufficient and profitable from its own revenue; asks the Commission to assess the necessity and potential means of start-up financing and possible legal structures for this project;
meni, da bi morala Komisija raziskati in oceniti tudi možnost resnično neodvisne evropske bonitetne agencije; poziva Komisijo, naj preuči predvsem vprašanje osebja tovrstne agencije, ki bi moralo biti zares neodvisno, in njenega financiranja, ki bi ga morali pridobiti iz pristojbin v zasebnem finančnem sektorju;
Considers that the establishment of a truly independent European Credit Rating Agency should also be explored and assessed by the Commission; asks the Commission to explore particularly the issue of its staff, which should be fully independent and the issue of its resources, which should come from fees from the private financial sector;
meni, da mora biti namen bonitetnih ocen povečanje količine informacij za trg, in sicer na način, ki vlagateljem zagotavlja stalno oceno bonitetnega tveganja ne glede na panogo ali državo; meni, da je pomembno uporabnikom omogočiti boljši pregled nad bonitetnimi agencijami, ter v zvezi s tem opozarja na bistveno vlogo večje preglednosti njihovih dejavnosti;
Considers that credit ratings must serve the purpose of increasing information to the market in a manner that provides investors with a consistent assessment of credit risk across sectors and countries; considers it important to enable users to better scrutinise CRAs and in this respect highlights the central role of increased transparency in their activities;
poudarja, da je treba povečati obseg razkrivanja informacij o produktih na področju strukturiranih finančnih instrumentov, ki bodo vlagateljem omogočale obveščeno presojo, da bi tako vlagateljem omogočili ustrezno oceno tveganja, ravnanje s skrbnostjo dobrega gospodarja in izpolnitev fiduciarnih obveznosti; meni, da bi izkušeni vlagatelji morali biti zmožni oceniti boniteto osnovnih posojil, iz katere lahko nato izpeljejo tveganje listinjenega produkta; podpira obstoječe pobude Evropske centralne banke in drugih, da bi v zvezi s tem dali na razpolago več informacij o strukturiranih finančnih instrumentih; poziva Komisijo, naj oceni potrebo po večjem razkrivanju informacij za vse produkte na področju finančnih instrumentov;
Points out that, in order to enable investors to adequately assess risk and to fulfil their due-diligence and fiduciary duties, increased disclosure of information on products is necessary in the field of structured finance instruments to allow investors to make informed judgments; considers that sophisticated investors should be able to assess the underlying credits from which they can then derive the risk of a securitised product; supports the existing initiatives of the ECB and others to make more information available about structured finance instruments in this respect; calls on the Commission to assess the need to increase disclosure of information for all products in the field of financial instruments;
ugotavlja, da večina bonitetnih agencij poleg dejavnosti ocenjevanja izdaja številna mnenja, kritike, opozorila ter opažanja, ki imajo velik vpliv na trge; meni, da bi jih bilo treba razkriti po vnaprej določenih merilih in protokolih, ki zagotavljajo preglednost in zaupnost;
Notes that, in addition to their rating activity, most Credit Rating Agencies issue a number of outlooks, reviews, warnings and watches which do have a significant impact on the markets; is of the opinion that they should be disclosed according to predetermined criterion and protocols that ensure transparency and confidentiality;
poziva Komisijo, naj predlaga revizijo Direktive 2003/71/ES in Direktive 2004/109/ES, da bi tako zagotovila, da bodo širše na voljo dovolj točne in popolne informacije o strukturiranih finančnih instrumentih;
Asks the Commission to propose a revision of Directive 2003/71/EC and Directive 2004/109/EC in order to ensure that sufficient accurate and complete information on structured finance instruments is more widely available;
meni, da je v zvezi s tem bistveno, da se vidiki varovanja podatkov v celoti upoštevajo pri katerem koli bodočem ukrepu;
Considers it vital in this respect that data protection aspects are fully considered in any potential future measure;
tehta, ali bi bilo izdajatelje dobro zavezati k razpravi o vsebini in metodi strukturiranega finančnega instrumenta s tretjo stranjo, ki izvaja nenaročeno bonitetno oceno ali pripravlja notranjo oceno tveganja;
Ponders whether it would be advantageous to oblige issuers to discuss the content and method behind a structured finance instrument with a third party that is either conducting an unsolicited credit rating or devising an internal risk assessment;
ponovno opozarja na obveznost Komisije iz uvodne izjave (5) spremenjene Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009 o preglednosti informacij; poziva Komisijo, naj opravi potrebno analizo, da bi Parlamentu in Svetu predstavila njen rezultat z morebitnimi spremembami zakonodaje kot del sedanjega pregleda Uredbe (ES) št. 1060/2009, ki ga izvaja;
Reiterates the obligation on the Commission in Recital (5) of the amended Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 regarding transparency of information; asks the Commission to conduct the necessary analysis in order to present the result with potential amendments to the legislation to Parliament and Council as part of the current review of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 it is undertaking;
je seznanjen z napredkom glede preglednosti in razkritja v obeh uredbah o bonitetnih agencijah; spodbuja Komisijo, naj izvede oceno učinka teh uredb po končanem postopku registracije za bonitetne agencije, da bi opozorila na bodoča področja, na katerih bi bilo razkritje koristno za uporabnike;
Notes the progress made on transparency and disclosure by CRA1 and CRA2; encourages the Commission to carry out an impact assessment of these regulations following the completion of the CRA registration process to highlight future areas where further disclosure for users may be beneficial;
poziva, da je poleg večje preglednosti postopka ocenjevanja in notranje revizije potreben strožji nadzor, ki ga nadzorni organi EU izvajajo nad bonitetnimi agencijami, ter odločnejši nadzor nacionalnih nadzornih organov nad tem, kako finančne institucije uporabljajo ocene oziroma so od njih odvisne;
Calls for, alongside increased transparency of the rating process and its internal auditing, stronger supervision of CRAs by EU supervisory authorities and of more intrusive supervision by national supervisory authorities of the use /dependency on ratings by financial institutions;
Dve obvezni oceni
Two obligatory ratings