natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
ob upoštevanju dokumenta GD za konkurenco o najboljši praksi v postopkih v skladu s členoma 101 in 102 PDEU http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_best_practices/best_practice_articles.pdf.
having regard to the DG Competition document entitled ‘Best Practices on the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU’ http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_best_practices/best_practice_articles.pdf.
ob upoštevanju dokumenta GD za konkurenco o smernicah za postopke pooblaščencev za zaslišanje v postopkih v skladu s členoma 101 in 102 PDEU http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_best_practices/hearing_officers.pdf.
having regard to the DG Competition document entitled ‘Guidance on procedures of the Hearing Officers in proceedings relating to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU’ http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_best_practices/hearing_officers.pdf.
ob upoštevanju dokumenta GD za konkurenco o najboljših praksah za predložitev gospodarskih dokazov in za zbiranje podatkov v primerih, ki so povezani z uporabo členov 101 in 102 PDEU, in v primeru združitve http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_best_practices/best_practice_submissions.pdf
having regard to the DG Competition document entitled ‘Best practices for the submission of economic evidence and data collection in cases concerning the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and in merger cases’ http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_best_practices/best_practice_submissions.pdf
ob upoštevanju okvirnega sporazuma z dne 20. novembra 2010 o odnosih med Evropskim parlamentom in Komisijo UL L 304, 20.11.2010, str.
having regard to the Framework Agreement of 20 November 2010 on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission OJ L 304, 20.11.2010, p.
(v nadaljnjem besedilu: okvirni sporazum), predvsem njegovih odstavkov 12 „Vsak član Komisije zagotovi reden in neposreden pretok informacij med njim in predsednikom zadevnega parlamentarnega odbora.“
(referred to hereinafter as ‘the Framework Agreement’), in particular paragraphs 12 Each Member of the Commission shall make sure that there is a regular and direct flow of information between the Member of the Commission and the chair of the relevant parliamentary committee.‘
in 16 „V treh mesecih po sprejetju resolucije parlamenta Komisija v pisni obliki sporoči Parlamentu informacije o ukrepih, sprejetih kot odgovor na posebne zahteve, ki jih je Parlament v svojih resolucijah naslovil nanjo, vključno v primerih, ko mnenj Parlamenta ni mogla upoštevati.“
and 16 ’Within 3 months after the adoption of a parliamentary resolution, the Commission shall provide information to Parliament in writing on action taken in response to specific requests addressed to it in Parliament's resolutions, including in cases where it has not been able to follow Parliament's views. [...]‘
ob upoštevanju svoje resolucije z dne 25. aprila 2007 o zeleni knjigi o odškodninskih tožbah zaradi kršitve protimonopolnih pravil ES UL C 74 E, 20.3.2008, str.
having regard to its resolutions of 25 April 2007 on the Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules OJ C 74 E, 20.3.2008, p.
in z dne 26. marca 2009 o beli knjigi o odškodninskih tožbah zaradi kršitve protimonopolnih pravil ES UL C 117 E, 6.5.2010, str.
and of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules OJ C 117 E, 6.5.2010, p.
in mnenja Odbora za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve z dne 20. oktobra 2011 o usklajenemu evropskemu pristopu h kolektivnim tožbam,
and to the opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of 20 October 2011 on ‘Towards a Coherent Approach on Collective Redress’,
ob upoštevanju svoje resolucije z dne 15. novembra 2011 o preoblikovanju pravil EU o državni pomoči za storitve splošnega gospodarskega pomena Sprejeta besedila, P7_TA(2011)0494 .
having regard to its resolution of 15 November 2011 on reform of the EU state aid rules on Services of General Economic Interest Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0494 .
ob upoštevanju svojih resolucij z dne 22. februarja 2005 o XXXIII. poročilu Komisije o politiki konkurence za leto 2003 UL C 304 E, 1.12.2005, str.
having regard to its resolutions of 22 February 2005 on the Commission's XXXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy 2003 OJ C 304 E, 1.12.2005, p.
, z dne 4. aprila 2006 o poročilu Komisije o politiki konkurence za leto 2004 UL C 293 E, 2.12.2006, str.
, of 4 April 2006 on the Commission Report on Competition Policy 2004 OJ C 293 E, 2.12.2006, p.
, z dne 19. junija 2007 o poročilu o politiki konkurence za leto 2005 UL C 146 E, 12.6.2008, str.
, of 19 June 2007 on the Report on Competition Policy 2005 OJ C 146 E, 12.6.2008, p.
, z dne 10. marca 2009 o poročilih o politiki konkurence za leti 2006 in 2007 UL C 87 E, 1.4.2010, str.
, of 10 March 2009 on the Reports on Competition Policy 2006 and 2007 OJ C 87 E, 1.4.2010, p.
, z dne 9. marca 2010 o poročilu o politiki konkurence za leto 2008 UL C 349 E, 22.12.2010, str.
, of 9 March 2010 on the Report on Competition Policy 2008 OJ C 349 E, 22.12.2010, p.
in z dne 20. januarja 2011 o poročilu o politiki konkurence za leto 2009 Sprejeta besedila, P7_TA(2011)0023 .
and of 20 January 2011 on the Report on Competition Policy 2009 Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0023 .
ob upoštevanju mnenja Evropskega ekonomsko-socialnega odbora o poročilu Komisije o politiki konkurence za leto 2010 (INT/594 - CESE 1461/2011),
having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Commission Report on Competition Policy 2010 (INT/594 - CESE 1461/2011),
ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve ter mnenj odborov za notranji trg in varstvo potrošnikov ter za promet in turizem ( A7-0424/2011 ),
having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection and the Committee on Transport and Tourism ( A7-0424/2011 ),
ker finančna in gospodarska kriza, ki je izbruhnila leta 2008, še ni premagana; ker so se finančni pretresi in strahovi pred recesijo v zadnjih mesecih znova zaostrili;
whereas the financial and economic crisis which broke out in autumn 2008 has not yet been overcome; whereas financial turmoil and recessionary fears have become once again acute over the last months;
ker se je Komisija na izbruh krize odzvala hitro in odgovorno, tako da je sprejela posebna pravila o državni pomoči, politiko konkurence pa je uporabila kot orodje za obvladovanje krize; ker naj bi bila to začasna ureditev, čeprav je njen časovni okvir presegel prvotna pričakovanja;
whereas the Commission responded to the eruption of the crisis in a prompt and reasonable manner by adopting special State aid rules and using competition policy as a crisis management tool; whereas this was, and still is, meant to be a temporary regime although its timeframe has exceeded what was originally expected;
ker je Komisija med 1. oktobrom 2008 in 1. oktobrom 2010 sprejela več kot 200 sklepov o državni pomoči za finančni sektor; ker je leta 2009 nominalni znesek pomoči finančnemu sektorju, ki so jo uporabile države članice, znašal 1107 milijard EUR (9,3 % BDP EU); ker znaša največji obseg ukrepov, ki jih je odobrila Komisija od začetka krize do 1. oktobra 2010 (vključno z obema shemama in ad hoc posegi), 4588,90 milijard EUR;
whereas between 1 October 2008 and 1 October 2010 the Commission took more than 200 decisions on State aid for the financial sector; whereas in 2009 the nominal amount of aid to the financial sector used by Member States constituted EUR 1 107 billion (9.3% of EU GDP); whereas the maximum volume of Commission-approved measures since the beginning of the crisis until 1 October 2010 (including both schemes and ad hoc interventions) amounts to EUR 4 588.90 billion;
ker je Komisija uvedla zahtevo, ki se uporablja od 1. januarja 2011, da vsaka banka, ki je upravičena do dokapitalizacije ali ukrepa za oslabljena sredstva, predloži načrt za prestrukturiranje, ne glede na to, ali velja za načeloma zdravo ali v težavah;
whereas the Commission introduced a requirement applicable from 1 January 2011 onwards to submit a restructuring plan for every beneficiary of a recapitalisation or an impaired assets measure, irrespective of whether the bank is considered to be fundamentally sound or distressed;
ker so veliki zneski državne pomoči, dodeljene v času krize, na primer v obliki jamstvenih shem, shem dokapitalizacije in dopolnilnih oblik likvidnostne podpore za bančna posojila, prispevali k močnim neravnovesjem javnih financ; ker še vedno ni znano, kako daljnosežen je lahko v prihodnosti vpliv te državne pomoči in predvsem jamstev, dodeljenih bankam, če bodo nekatera jamstva vpoklicana;
whereas sizable amounts of State aid given during the crisis in the form of, for example, guarantee schemes, recapitalisation schemes and complementary forms of liquidity support on bank funding have contributed to severe imbalances in public finances; whereas it is still unknown how far-reaching the impact this State aid, in particular of the guarantees provided to banks, may be in the future if some of those guarantees are actually called in;
ker bi protekcionizem in neizvrševanje pravil konkurence samo še poglobila in podaljšala krizo; ker je politika konkurence bistveno orodje, ki EU omogoča, da ima dinamičen, učinkovit in inovativen notranji trg in da je konkurenčna na svetovni ravni;
whereas protectionism and non-enforcement of competition rules would only deepen and prolong the crisis; whereas competition policy is an essential tool to enable the EU to have a dynamic, efficient and innovative internal market and to be competitive on the global stage;
ker kljub vsem prizadevanjem za obvladovanje gospodarske krize karteli ostajajo najresnejša grožnja konkurenci, blaginji potrošnikov in ustreznemu delovanju trgov, zato niso sprejemljivi niti v času gospodarske krize;
whereas, notwithstanding all the efforts to cope with the economic crisis, cartels remain the most serious threat to competition, consumer welfare and the proper functioning of markets, and consequently cannot be accepted even during an economic crisis;
Poročilo Komisije o politiki konkurence za leto 2010
Commission Report on Competition Policy 2010
ugotavlja, da skupni učinek togih načel in prilagodljivih postopkov omogoča politiki konkurence, da je konstruktiven in stabilizacijski dejavnik v finančnem sistemu EU in v realnem gospodarstvu nasploh;
Notes that the combined effect of robust principles and flexible procedures has enabled competition policy to be a constructive and stabilising factor in the EU's financial system and in the real economy in general;
meni, da je boljša preglednost cen bistvena za spodbujanje konkurence na enotnem trgu in da potrošnikom omogoča resnično izbiro;
Believes that improved price transparency is essential in stimulating competition in the single market and offering real choice to consumers;
pozdravlja obstoječo izmenjavo med Komisijo in združenji potrošnikov na področju evropskega konkurenčnega prava ter spodbuja Komisijo, naj nadalje spodbuja te izmenjave in naj po potrebi vključi druge zainteresirane strani;
Welcomes the existing exchange between the Commission and consumer associations in the field of European competition law and encourages the Commission to further promote these exchanges, including other stakeholders if appropriate;
pozdravlja delovni dokument služb Komisije, ki je bil pripravljen za oceno učinkov začasnih pravil o državni pomoči, ki so bila sprejeta v okviru finančne in gospodarske krize, je seznanjen z oceno Komisije, da je v svetovnem merilu državna pomoč učinkovita pri zmanjševanju finančne nestabilnosti, izboljševanju delovanja finančnih trgov in blaženju učinkov krize na resnično gospodarstvo; se pa sprašuje, ali je tako optimistična analiza vzdržna;
Welcomes the Commission Staff Working Paper drafted to evaluate the effects of temporary State aid rules adopted in the context of the financial and economic crisis; takes note of the Commission's assessment that globally State aid ‘has been effective in reducing financial instability, improving the functioning of financial markets and cushioning the effects of the crisis on the real economy’; wonders, however, whether such an optimistic analysis can be sustained;
poudarja, da je trenutna ureditev državne pomoči pozitivna kot prvotni odziv na krizo, vendar takšna ne more ostati; poudarja, da je treba začasne ukrepe in izjeme odpraviti čim prej in takoj ko bodo gospodarske razmere to omogočale;
Stresses that the temporary regime applicable to State aid has been positive as an initial reaction to the crisis, but that it cannot be prolonged unduly; emphasises the need to discontinue temporary measures and exemptions as soon as possible and as soon as the economic situation allows it;
ugotavlja, da je treba oblikovati nov stalni regulativni sistem za uporabo pravil o državni pomoči, da bi se lahko spopadli s pomanjkljivostmi, ki so bile odkrite v pravnem sistemu v času pred krizo, predvsem kar zadeva finančni sektor, ter da bi odpravili izkrivljanje konkurence, ki je nastalo v času finančne in gospodarske krize;
Notes that a new permanent regulatory system for the application of State aid rules is necessary in order to tackle the flaws found in the pre-crisis legal system, in particular as regards the financial sector, as well as to remedy distortions created during the financial and economic crisis;
je seznanjen z napovedjo posebnih smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje bančnega sektorja; predlaga Komisiji, naj upošteva učinek likvidnostne podpore centralnih bank v času faze reševanja v smislu izkrivljanja konkurence in naj pred vlaganjem javnih sredstev zagotovi urejeno prestrukturiranje bank z udeležbo imetnikov deležev in obveznic;
Notes the announcement of specific rescue and restructuring guidelines for the banking sector; suggests to the Commission that it takes into account the impact, in terms of distortion of competition, of the liquidity support provided by central banks during the rescue stage, and provides for the orderly restructuring of banks, with shareholder and bondholder involvement, prior to the injection of public capital;
poziva Komisijo, naj podaljšanje začasne državne pomoči bančnemu sektorju po letu 2011 poveže z izboljšanimi in strožjimi pogoji, povezanimi z zmanjšanjem sestave in velikosti bilance stanja, vključno s primernim osredotočenjem na posojila prebivalstvu kot tudi močnejšimi omejitvami bonusov, razdeljevanja dividend in drugih bistvenih dejavnikov; meni, da bi morali biti ti pogoji izrecni ter da bi jih morala Komisija naknadno oceniti in povzeti;
Urges the Commission to link the extension of the temporary State aid to the banking sector beyond 2011 with enhanced and more stringent conditions related to the reduction of the balance sheet composition and size, including a proper focus on retail lending as well as stronger restrictions on bonuses, distribution of dividends and other crucial factors; deems that these conditions should be explicit and should be assessed and summarised on an ex post basis by the Commission;
je seznanjen z ukrepi, ki jih je Komisija sprejela doslej, da bi zmanjšala obseg bilance stanja nekaterih institucij, ki so medsebojno povezane ali prevelike, da bi jih pustili propasti, in so v času krize prejele državno pomoč; meni, da je potrebnih več ukrepov s takšnim namenom;
Takes note of the measures adopted so far by the Commission in order to reduce the balance sheet size of certain ‘too big or interconnected to fail’ institutions which have received State aid over the crisis; deems that more measures are required with that purpose;
vendar poudarja, da je potekajoča konsolidacija v bančnem sektorju dejansko povečala tržni delež več velikih finančnih institucij, zato poziva Komisijo, naj še dalje pozorno spremlja ta sektor, da bi okrepila konkurenco na evropskih bančnih trgih, tudi z uvedbo načrtov za prestrukturiranje, ki bodo obsegali ločitev bančnih dejavnosti, kjer bančne vloge fizičnih oseb tem institucijam dopuščajo, da financirajo bolj tvegane dejavnosti investicijskega bančništva;
Stresses however that the ongoing consolidation in the banking sector has actually increased the market share of several major financial institutions and, therefore, urges the Commission to maintain a close watch on the sector in order to enhance competition in European banking markets, including by imposing restructuring plans that imply the separation of banking activities where retail deposits allow these institutions to fund riskier investment banking activities;
poudarja, da je ECB v času krize izvedla več nestandardnih likvidnostnih injekcij; je seznanjen z oceno Komisije, ki v svoji študiji omenja, da te vrste ukrepov niso del državne pomoči v strogem smislu; poudarja pa, da morajo biti ukrepi na ravni EU usklajeni in da bi morala Komisija pri ocenjevanju državne pomoči bankam, ki dobivajo tudi podporo ECB ali drugih centralnih bank, upoštevati učinke te podpore in drugih javnih intervencij;
Notes that the ECB performed several non standard liquidity injections over the crisis; takes note of the Commission's assessment that this type of measure does not constitute State aid strictly speaking, as the Commission mentions in its study; stresses, however, that policy action at EU level must be coordinated and that the Commission should take the effects of support from the ECB or other central banks and of other public interventions into account when evaluating State aid given to banks which are also the beneficiaries of support from the ECB or other central banks;
ugotavlja, da učinek podpore ECB in drugih javnih intervencij, ki so jih dobile banke v času krize, ni bil vključen v oceno združljivosti Komisije; poziva Komisijo, naj naknadno oceni te operacije;
Notices that the effects of ECB support and other public interventions received by banks during the crisis have not been included in the Commission's compatibility assessment; asks the Commission to assess such operations on an ex post basis;
poziva Komisijo, naj hitro predstavi predvideni zakonodajni predlog, ki bo v resničnem evropskem okviru obravnaval reševanje bank v težavah in zagotovil skupen pravilnik ter skupen sveženj instrumentov in sprožilcev za posredovanje ter bo čim bolj omejil udeležbo davkoplačevalcev, in sicer z oblikovanjem usklajenih samofinanciranih panožnih skladov za reševanje (prek pristopa na podlagi tveganja);
Calls on the Commission to quickly come forward with the foreseen legislative proposal to address in a true European framework the resolution of failing banks, guaranteeing a common rulebook as well as a common set of intervention tools and triggers, and limiting taxpayers' involvement to a minimum, namely through the creation of harmonised self-financed (on a risk based approach) industry resolution funds;
poudarja, da je državno pomoč treba dodeljevati na način, ki ne bo izkrivljala konkurence ali dajala prednosti obstoječim podjetjem pred novonastajajočimi;
Stresses that State aid must be allocated in a way that does not distort competition or favour established companies at the expense of emerging ones;
meni, da bi bilo treba z državno pomočjo podpreti inovacijske in raziskovalne grozde in na ta način podpirati podjetništvo;
Is of the opinion that State aid should support innovation and research clusters and thereby support entrepreneurship;
poziva Komisijo, naj zagotovi, da načrtovana poenostavitev pravil o državni pomoči za storitve splošnega gospodarskega pomena ne bo privedla do slabšega nadzora prekomernih nadomestil;
Calls on the Commission to ensure that the intended simplification of State aid rules for SGEI will not lead to a deterioration in the monitoring of overcompensation;
je seznanjen z namero Komisije, da v zvezi z državno pomočjo za storitve splošnega gospodarskega pomena uvede ureditev „de minimis“; poudarja, da so za določitev storitev, ki naj bi bile zajete po tem pravilu, potrebna jasna in nedvoumna merila;
Takes note of the Commission's intention to introduce a ‘de minimis’ arrangement in respect of State aid for SGEI; underlines that clear and unambiguous criteria are needed to determine what services would be covered by it;
vztraja, da morajo vsi predlogi za izvzetje dodatnih storitev splošnega gospodarskega pomena od obveznosti priglasitve temeljiti na dokazih, da so te izjeme utemeljene in potrebne ter da ne bodo neupravičeno izkrivljale konkurence;
Insists that any proposal to exempt in principle further categories of SGEI from the notification requirement must be based on evidence that such an exemption from the rules is justified and necessary, and does not unduly distort competition;
poudarja pomembnost spodbujanja konkurence v vseh sektorjih, nenazadnje tudi v sektorju storitev, ki predstavlja 70 % evropskega gospodarstva; poleg tega poudarja pravico do ustanavljanja novih podjetij in vzpostavljanja novih storitev;
Underlines the importance of fostering competition in all sectors and not least in the service sector, which constitutes 70 % of the European economy; further highlights the right to establish new companies and services;
v primeru, da Komisija predstavi predlog horizontalnega okvira, ki ureja kolektivne tožbe, bi bilo treba, kjer je to primerno, sprejeti načelo nadaljnjega ukrepanja, po katerem bi se zasebno izvrševanje s skupinsko tožbo lahko izvajalo, če je bila pred tem že izdana odločba Komisije ali nacionalnega konkurenčnega organa o kršitvi; ugotavlja, da vzpostavitev načela nadaljnjega ukrepanja na splošno ne izključuje možnosti sprejemanja tako samostojnih kot nadaljnjih ukrepov;
Suggests, should the Commission submit a proposal for a horizontal framework governing collective redress, that where appropriate a principle governing follow-on action could be adopted whereby private enforcement under collective redress may be implemented if there has been a prior infringement decision by the Commission or a national competition authority; notes that establishing the principle of follow-on action does not in general preclude the possibility of providing for both stand-alone and follow-on actions;
ugotavlja, da so mehanizmi alternativnega reševanja sporov pogosto odvisni od trgovčeve pripravljenosti do sodelovanja, in meni, da bi bil učinkovit sistem pravnih sredstev za uveljavljanje odškodnine velika spodbuda za stranke, da bi se dogovorile za izvensodno poravnavo, s katero je mogoče številne primere preprečiti in posledično zmanjšati število pravdnih postopkov; spodbuja vzpostavitev mehanizmov alternativnega reševanja sporov na evropski ravni, da se omogoči hitro in poceni reševanje sporov kot bolj privlačna možnost od sodnih postopkov; po drugi strani pa poudarja, da bi morali ti instrumenti ostati alternativa sodnemu varstvu (kot pove že ime) in ne predpogoj zanj;
Notes that ADR mechanisms often depend on the trader's willingness to cooperate, and believes that the availability of an effective judicial redress system would act as a strong incentive for parties to agree to out-of-court settlements, which is likely to obviate the need for a considerable number of cases, thereby reducing the volume of litigation; encourages the setting-up of ADR schemes at European level so as to make for fast and cheap settlement of disputes as a more attractive option to court proceedings; stresses however, that these mechanisms should remain, as the name indicates, merely an alternative to, not a precondition for, judicial redress;
poudarja, da mora Komisija po sodbi v zadevah 360/09
Emphasises that following the Court judgments in Cases 360/09,
in 437/08,
, and 437/08,
, zagotoviti, da kolektivna tožba ne ogroža učinkovitosti sistema prizanesljivosti in postopka poravnavanja po konkurenčnem pravu;
, the Commission must ensure that collective redress does not compromise the effectiveness of the competition law leniency system and settlement procedure;