natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
ker visoka koncentracija „štiri velikih“ revizijskih družb na trgu lahko povzroči preveliko kopičenje tveganj, in ker so manjše družbe raznolike, njihovo rast in znanje pa bi bilo treba spodbujati z več priložnostmi za konkuriranje,
whereas the high market concentration of the Big Four audit firms may cause an excessive build-up of risk, and whereas smaller firms are diverse and their growth and expertise should be encouraged through increased opportunities to compete,
ker je zato treba ponovno začeti podrobno razpravo o vlogi revizorjev in strukturi revizijskega trga,
whereas, consequently, an in-depth debate needs to be relaunched on the function of the auditor and the structure of the audit market,
odobrava zeleno knjigo Komisije in njen celovit pristop;
Welcomes the Commission's Green Paper and applauds its holistic approach;
pozdravlja načelna vprašanja iz zelene knjige, kako bi bilo mogoče revizijo izboljšati, čeprav v preteklosti ni bilo resnih dokazov, da revizije niso bile izvedene ob upoštevanju veljavnih predpisov in zahtev;
Welcomes the fundamental issue raised in the Green Paper, namely that of how auditing could be improved, even though in the past there has been no serious evidence to suggest that auditing has not been carried out in accordance with the relevant rules and requirements;
meni, da bi morala razprava o vlogi revizorjev potekati vzporedno z okrepitvijo vloge revizijskega odbora, ki je sedaj v glavnem neučinkovita, ter poročanja o financah in tveganju, ki ga morajo zagotavljati podjetja;
Takes the view that the debate on the role of the auditor should go hand in hand with a strengthening of the role of the audit committee – now largely ineffective – and of the financial and risk reporting that companies are required to carry out;
pozdravlja priznavanje sorazmernosti v zeleni knjigi;
Welcomes the recognition of proportionality in the Green Paper;
meni, da imajo obvezne revizije družbeno vlogo in da koristijo javnemu interesu, saj so ena od najbolj bistvenih sestavin demokratičnega gospodarskega in političnega sistema, in skladno s tem pozdravlja namen zelene knjige, da poveča preglednost in izboljša kakovost revizijskih poročil ter tako prispeva k stabilnosti finančnega trga ter izboljša dostop do financiranja; je naklonjen vsem ukrepom, ki temeljijo na dokazih, da znatno izboljšanje kakovosti, redno zunanje ocenjevanje in ustrezen regulativni nadzor še zlasti v finančnih institucijah prevladajo nad stroški in obremenitvami; poudarja potrebo po posebni zakonodaji;
Takes the view that statutory auditing has a social function and is in the public interest, as it is an absolutely fundamental component of the democratic economic and political system and accordingly welcomes the intention of the Green Paper to increase transparency and improve the quality of audit reports in order to contribute to the stability of the financial market and improve access to financing; is in favour of any measures based on the evidence that costs and burdens to financial institutions, in particular, are outweighed by improving their quality significantly, as well as by regular external evaluation and appropriate regulatory oversight; stresses the need for specific legislation;
poudarja, da je kakovosten revizijski sistem sestavni del trdnega okvira upravljanja podjetij; prosi Komisijo, naj Parlamentu in Svetu skladno predstavi svoje predloge glede upravljanja in revidiranja podjetij;
Points out that a high-quality audit system is an integral part of a sound corporate governance framework; asks the Commission to present its proposals on corporate governance and audit to the Parliament and Council in a consistent way;
poudarja pomen revizijskega poročila za delničarje in javnost; priznava načelo „revizija je revizija“ in svari pred velikim tveganjem zaradi uporabe različnih standardov, ki povzroča pravno negotovost; zato je naklonjen razširitvi področja uporabe na vse finančne institucije;
Highlights the importance of the audit report for shareholders and the public; recognises the principle of ‘an audit is an audit’ and warns of the high risk of the application of different standards leading to legal uncertainty; is therefore in favour of the extension of the scope to all financial institutions;
se strinja s Komisijo glede načela, da morajo biti ugotovitve revizijskega poročila osredotočene na vsebino, ne obliko;
Agrees with the Commission on the principle that an audit report's conclusions should focus more on substance than on form;
poziva Komisijo, naj preuči, na kakšen način bi bilo mogoče razširiti naloge revizorjev, da bi poleg preverjanja informacij, zagotovljenih v glavnem finančnem poročilu, obsegale tudi revidiranje informacij o tveganjih, ki jih zagotovi revidirani subjekt; priporoča, da morajo biti revizorji seznanjeni z vsemi primeri, ko je bil odbor za tveganja preglasovan;
Calls on the Commission to look into how the role of the auditor might be extended to include audits of risk reports provided by the entity being audited, in addition to verification of the information supplied in the main financial statements; recommends that auditors should be made aware of all instances where the risk-committee has been over-ruled;
meni, da morajo biti revizijska poročila kratka in vsebovati jasne, jedrnate ugotovitve, ter da morajo obravnavati vse vidike zakonske naloge revizorja; meni tudi, da bi moral revizor revizijskemu odboru in generalni skupščini zagotavljati dodatna pojasnila o splošnih vprašanjih, na primer o uporabljenih bilančnih metodah in konkretnih vidikih, kot so na primer ključni kazalniki, pomembni zneski, ocene tveganja, povezanega z zadevnimi računovodskimi ocenami, relevantne ocene ter morebitni posebni problemi, ki so se pojavili med izvajanjem revizije;
Takes the view that audit reports should be brief, with clear, concise conclusions, and should address all aspects of the auditors' statutory remit; considers that the auditor should provide the audit committee and the general assembly with additional explanations on general issues such as the methodology used in drawing up the balance sheet, and on specific issues such as key indicators, materiality figures and assessments of the risk involved in the material accounting estimates or materiality judgements made, and any particular problems encountered whilst carrying out the audit;
poziva, naj se v revizijska poročila o finančnih institucijah vključijo zahteve za večje razkrivanje v zvezi z vrednotenjem manj likvidnih finančnih sredstev, da se omogoči primerjava vrednotenja finančnih instrumentov med institucijami;
Calls for financial institutions' audit reports to include enhanced disclosure requirements for the valuation of less liquid assets, so as to allow a comparison of financial instrument valuations between institutions;
priporoča, da morajo revizorji, kadar naletijo na probleme, ki bi utegnili ogroziti nadaljnje delovanje revidiranega subjekta, opozoriti nadzornike ali pristojne organe; priporoča organizacijo dvostranskih srečanj med revizorji in nadzorniki večjih finančnih ustanov;
Stresses that supervisors or the relevant authorities are to be alerted by auditors when they spot problems that might jeopardise the future of the entity being audited; recommends that bilateral meetings take place between auditors and supervisors of major financial institutions;
opozarja na potencialno odgovornost, ki jo lahko prinese zagotavljanje dodatnih informacij poleg tistih, ki se zahtevajo na podlagi uredbe; vseeno meni, da družba od revizorjev zahteva naprej in navzven usmerjeno odgovornost, še zlasti pri velikih in sistemsko pomembnih korporacijah; meni, da bi bilo treba informacije v zvezi s tveganji, zunajbilančnimi operacijami ali morebitnimi prihodnjimi izpostavljenostmi, ki so v javnem interesu in so voljo revizorjem, vedno razkriti upravnim organom, v večini primerov pa z njimi seznaniti tudi javnost;
Notes the potential liability that may attach to providing additional information over and above that required by regulation; believes, nevertheless, that society demands that auditors have both a forward- and outward-looking responsibility, especially with regard to large and systemically relevant corporations; takes the view that information available to auditors that is in the public interest and relates to risk, off-balance sheet operations or future potential future exposures should always be disclosed to regulators and in most circumstances made available to the public;
poziva k okrepitvi vloge revizijskih odborov v vseh finančnih institucijah, od katerih je treba zahtevati, naj odobrijo oceno modela tveganj, ki vključuje primerjave podjetja z opredeljenimi merili, vključno s poročanjem o morebitnih prihodnjih finančnih potrebah, bančnih sporazumih, prihodnjih denarnih tokovih, upravljanju tveganj, načrtih vodstva, spoštovanju glavnih računovodskih načel ter o vseh predvidljivih tveganjih v zvezi s poslovnim modelom podjetja; zahteva, da se ta ocena vsako leto predstavi izvršilnim in nadzornim odborom finančnih institucij, skupaj s popolnim revizijskim poročilom, v obravnavo in odobritev;
Calls for the role of the audit committees of all financial institutions to be strengthened by requiring them to approve a risk model assessment which includes firm-specific comparisons to benchmarks including reporting potential future financing needs, bank covenants, future cash flows, risk management, management estimates and adherence to major accounting principles and any foreseeable risks with respect to the company's business model; calls for this assessment be presented on an annual basis to the executive and supervisory boards of financial institutions, along with the full audit report, for consideration and approval;
meni, da sistema kvalifikacij v revizijskih poročilih ni treba revidirati, saj ima odvračilno funkcijo in prispeva h kakovosti finančnega poročanja;
Believes that the system of qualifications in audit reports should not be reassessed, since it has a dissuasive function and contributes to the quality of financial information;
meni, da je reden in tekoč dialog med zunanjim in notranjim revizorjem ter revizijskim odborom bistvenega pomena za uspešno revizijo, saj je treba delničarje sproti obveščati na primer o razlogih za izvolitev, ponovno izvolitev ali prenehanje opravljanja funkcije revizorja, in sicer s konkretnimi pojasnili v zvezi s poročilom revizijskega odbora;
Believes that fluent, regular dialogue between the external auditor, the internal auditor and the audit committee is vital to allow effective auditing, as the shareholders need to be kept informed – for example as to why an auditor is appointed, reappointed or withdrawn – by means of specific clarifications relating to the audit committee report;
meni, da bi morali revizorji pri zadevah, ki so povezane z njihovo vlogo revizorja, imeti pravico do nastopa na generalnih skupščinah družbe;
Takes the view that auditors should have the right to be heard at general meetings of the company in matters that relate to their role as auditors;
meni, da je v zakonu treba jasno opredeliti oba vidika revidiranja, notranjega in zunanjega;
Believes there is a need for the two facets of auditing – internal and external – to be clearly circumscribed in law;
predlaga, da Komisija nujno sprejme mednarodne standarde revidiranja, pojasnjene z uredbo, ki bi omogočili uskladitev revizij na evropski ravni in olajšali nalogo nadzornih organov; meni, da je revidiranje enoten postopek, ne glede na velikost revidiranega podjetja, njegovo uporabo pa je treba vseeno prilagoditi značilnostim malih in srednjih podjetij; opozarja Komisijo, da poleg podjetij, za katere naj bi se uporabljali mednarodni standardi revidiranja, obstajajo tudi druga podjetja, ki so iz njih sicer izvzeta, vendar bi morale njihovo finančno situacijo kljub temu revidirati pooblaščene revizorske družbe ;
Suggests that the Commission urgently adopt the International Standards on Auditing (ISA), clarified through a regulation, which would make it possible to harmonise audits at European level and facilitate the task of supervisory bodies; takes the view that auditing is a single procedure, regardless of the size of the audited company, but that its application needs to be adapted to the characteristics of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); reminds the Commission that, aside from those companies to which the International Standards on Auditing should apply, there are also other companies which, despite being exempted from those standards, should nevertheless have their financial situations audited by authorised audit firms;
Upravljanje in neodvisnost revizijskih družb
Governance and independence of audit firms
se strinja, da je konflikt neizbežen, če revizorja imenuje in plačuje podjetje, ki ga ta revidira; za sedaj pa ne vidi razloga, da bi obrazložitev takega imenovanja podala tretja oseba; poziva glede na pravkar povedano in brez poseganja v člen 37 (2) of Direktive št. 2006/43/ES, naj se okrepi vloga revizijskega odbora;
Agrees that there is an inevitable conflict in the auditor being appointed and paid by the audited entity; does not, however, currently see any justification for this appointment to be made by a third party; calls, with this in mind and without prejudice to Article 37 (2) of Directive 2006/43/EC, for the audit committee's role to be strengthened;
meni, da mora revizorja, kjer je predpisan, imenovati revizijski odbor in ne upravni odbor podjetja, ki ga je treba revidirati, prav tako pa bi morala imeti vsaj polovica članov revizijskega odbora izkušnje v računovodstvu in revidiranju; meni, da bi moral revizijski odbor sprejemati ukrepe za zagotavljanje neodvisnosti revizorja, zlasti v zvezi s svetovalnimi storitvami, ki jih revizor zagotavlja ali ponuja;
Takes the view that the auditor, where that role is a statutory one, should be appointed by the audit committee and not by the management board of the company to be audited, in which connection the members of the audit committee should have the relevant experience, at least half of them in accounting and auditing; considers that the audit committee should take steps to ensure that the auditor is independent, in particular as regards any consultancy services which the auditor provides or offers to provide;
meni, da mora pravila za zagotavljanje neodvisnosti revizorjev in kakovosti revizije natančno pregledati poklicno popolnoma neodvisen javni revizijski organ;
Takes the view that the rules guaranteeing the independence of auditors and audit quality must undergo a detailed review by a public supervisory body entirely independent of the profession;
podpira vzpostavitev mednarodnega kodeksa dobrega upravljanja za revizijske družbe, ki opravljajo revizijo subjektov javnega interesa;
Supports the creation of an international code of good governance for auditing firms that audit public-interest entities;
se strinja, da je neodvisnost revizorja najpomembnejša in da je treba sprejeti ukrepe za preprečevanje pretirane domačnosti; predlaga, naj Komisija opravi oceno učinka, ki bo zajela vrsto možnosti, zlasti zunanjo rotacijo in učinek skupnih prostovoljnih revizij; meni, da je zunanja rotacija način krepitve neodvisnosti revizorjev, vendar ponavlja, da najboljša regulativna rešitev ni zunanja rotacija, temveč redno menjavanje notranjih revizorjev, kot je tudi potrjeno v Direktivi 2006/43/ES, ter da sedanja ureditev rotacije partnerjev zagotavlja potrebno neodvisnost za učinkovitost revizij;
Agrees that the independence of the auditor is of paramount importance and that steps need to be taken to prevent excessive familiarity; suggests that the Commission should undertake an impact assessment covering a range of options, in particular external rotation and the impact of voluntary joint audits; regards external rotation as a means of strengthening the independence of auditors, but reiterates its view that it is not external rotation but rather regular changes in internal auditors which represents the best regulatory solution, as confirmed by Directive 2006/43/EC, and that the existing partner rotation arrangements provide the independence necessary for audits to be effective;
poziva Komisijo, naj zagotovi, da bo praksa podjetij pomagala ohranjati vzpostavljeno zaščito, vključno z zaščito, povezano z obvezno menjavo glavnih revizijskih partnerjev, tudi če ti menjajo podjetja;
Calls on the Commission to ensure that company practices help to preserve the protections provided, including protection linked to the mandatory rotation of the main audit partners, even where those partners change firms;
predlaga, da je treba upoštevati tudi druge možnosti, ki bi bile drugačne od fiksnega ciklusa rotacije, ali se z njim dopolnjevale, na primer, da je pri skupni reviziji rotacijski ciklus dvakrat daljši kot pri uporabi enega revizorja, saj se dinamika pri načelu „trije v prostoru“ razlikuje od dinamike pri načelu „dva v prostoru“, rotacija skupnih revizij pa bi se lahko tudi razporedila;
Suggests that options other than or additional to a fixed rotation cycle should be considered – for example, if joint audits are used the rotation cycle could be double that for when a single auditor is used, as the dynamics of ‘three in the room’ are different from those of ‘two in the room’, and joint audit rotation could also be staggered;
meni, da bi bilo treba jasno ločevati med revizijskimi in nerevizijskimi storitvami, ki jih opravlja revizijska družba za stranko, da bi se izognili navzkrižjem interesov iz člena 22(2) Direktive št. 2006/43/ES in v skladu s kodeksi ravnanja v revizijski praksi; opozarja, da bi tako lahko preprečili prakso ponujanja revizijskih storitev po znižani ceni („low balling“) z namenom, da se nato nižja cena izravna z zaračunavanjem dodatnih storitev; meni, da bi moralo ločevanje veljati za vse družbe in njihove stranke; poziva Komisijo, naj ob upoštevanju priporočila o neodvisnosti zakonitega revizorja iz leta 2002 pripravi seznam pogojev, ki bi morali biti izpolnjeni, da bi se take storitve štele za nezdružljive z revizijskimi storitvami; priznava, da ima lahko zagotavljanje nerevizijskih storitev, kadar te niso nezdružljive z neodvisnostjo revizorja, pomembno vlogo pri širitvi spretnosti in znanja malih in srednje velikih revizijskih družb, vendar je prepričan, da storitev notranje in zunanje revizije ne bi smeli zagotavljati sočasno;
Takes the view that there should be clear demarcation between the audit services and non-audit services that an audit firm provides to a customer, with a view to avoiding conflicts of interest as referred to in Article 22(2) of Directive 2006/43/EC and in accordance with codes of auditing practice; points out that this could restrict ‘lowballing’, the practice of offering cut-price auditing with a view to then offsetting the lower price by charging for additional services; takes the view, therefore, that the demarcation must apply to all firms and their clients; calls on the Commission, with reference to the 2002 Recommendations on Statutory Auditor Independence, to draw up a list of conditions under which such services would be deemed incompatible with audit services; recognises that the provision of non-audit services, where not incompatible with auditor independence, can play an essential role in broadening the skills base of small and medium-sized audit firms, but takes the view that internal and external audit services should not be provided simultaneously;
meni, da je bistveno ohraniti neodvisnost revizorjev in da bi bilo treba zunanjim revizorjem prepovedati, da revidiranemu podjetju zagotavljajo storitve, ki bi lahko povzročilo neizpolnjevanje veljavnih zahtev glede neodvisnosti ali drugih etičnih zahtev; priznava, da je za spodbujanje rasti evropskega gospodarstva nujno, da vsa podjetja, ne glede na njihovo velikost, vključno z malimi in srednjimi podjetji, lahko najamejo neodvisne revizorje in revizijske družbe s širokim spektrom znanj in spretnosti;
Considers it essential to preserve the independence of the auditor; takes the view that external auditors should be banned from providing to the audited company services that could give rise to non-compliance with the applicable requirements regarding independence, or with other ethical requirements; recognises that, in order to boost growth in the European economy, it is necessary to ensure that all undertakings, regardless of their size, and including SMEs, can contract independent auditors and audit firms that have a wide range of skills;
ugotavlja zlasti, da revizijskih storitev na področjih, za katera se šteje, da bi bila lahko izpostavljena navzkrižju interesov, vključno z nekaterimi svetovalnimi storitvami in ocenami kompleksnih strukturiranih produktov, ne bi smelo izvajati isto podjetje, ter vztraja, da bi to morali spremljati pristojni nadzorni organi;
Notes in particular that audit services which are deemed to give rise to a conflict of interest must not be carried out by the same company, including certain advisory services and evaluations of complex structured products, and maintain that this should be monitored by the competent supervisory authorities;
verjame, da imajo revizijski odbori pomembno nadzorno vlogo pri zagotavljanju neodvisnosti revizorja, in prosi Komisijo, naj glede tega pripravi navodila, ki bi jih lahko uporabili revizijski odbori;
Believes that audit committees have an important oversight role in ensuring that the auditor remains independent, and asks the Commission to provide guidance to assist audit committees in this respect;
priporoča, da bi moral revizijski odbor, ki deluje znotraj nadzornega odbora, ne pa izvršilni odbor, odločiti, ali bo dovolil zagotavljanje nerevizijskih storitev zadevnim finančnim družbam, ter se pogajati o ponudbi in podrobnostih glede pooblastila; poziva Komisijo, naj opravi oceno učinka glede izvedljivosti in učinkov omejevanja nerevizijskih storitev glede na prihodek;
Recommends that the audit committee, as an entity of the supervisory board, not the executive board, should decide whether to permit the provision of non-audit services to a given financial company and should negotiate the tender and details of the mandate; calls on the Commission to conduct an impact assessment on the viability and effects of a cap on non-audit services in relation to revenue;
meni, da bi bilo treba objaviti honorarje, ki jih lahko revizijska družba ali mreža revizijskih družb računa posamezni stranki, kadar presežejo določen prag, poleg tega bi morali nadzorniki imeti možnost izvajanja kontrol, določanja omejitev ali drugih načrtovalskih zahtev, kadar presežejo določen odstotek njenih celotnih prihodkov, s čimer bi preprečili izgubo ekonomske neodvisnosti revizijske družbe; vseeno opozarja, da intervencije v manjših družbah ne bi smele omejevati rasti ter da je pridobitev velike in pomembne stranke, ki bo na začetku pomenila velik odstotek dela, osnovni element procesa rasti;
Takes the view that the fees an audit firm or a network of audit firms can charge a single client should be published when they exceed a given threshold and that supervisors should be able to intervene with checks, limits or other planning requirements when they exceed a certain percentage of its total income, so as to prevent a situation in which the audit firm loses its economic independence; points out, however, that for smaller firms such intervention should not restrict growth and that securing a large and significant client that provides a high percentage of the audit firm's work in the early stages is an essential part of the growth process;
meni, da bi morale revizijske družbe, ki opravljajo revizije subjektov javnega interesa, objavljati njihove računovodske izkaze in da bi bilo treba revidirati tako te izkaze kot metode, ki jih te družbe uporabljajo, da se zagotovi njihova neoporečnost;
Believes that firms that audit public-interest entities ought to publish their accounts and that these accounts, as well as the methods used, should be checked to ensure that they are in order;