natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Če Svet na priporočilo Komisije ne sprejme sklepa, da ni bilo učinkovitega ukrepanja, in če zadevna država članica še vedno ne sprejme primernih ukrepov, Komisija mesec dni po prvem priporočilu priporoči Svetu, naj sprejme sklep, v katerem navede, da ni bilo učinkovitega ukrepanja.
In case the Council does not adopt the decision on the Commission recommendation that no effective action has been taken, and failure to take appropriate action on the part of the Member State concerned persists, the Commission, after one month from its earlier recommendation, shall recommend to the Council to adopt the decision establishing that no effective action has been taken.
Šteje se, da je Svet sklep sprejel, razen če se z navadno večino odloči za zavrnitev priporočila v desetih dneh od dneva, ko ga je Komisija sprejela.
The decision shall be deemed to be adopted by the Council unless it decides, by simple majority, to reject the recommendation within ten days of its adoption by the Commission.
Pri sprejemanju sklepa o neupoštevanju priporočil iz četrtega in petega pododstavka glasujejo samo člani Sveta, ki predstavljajo države članice, katerih valuta je euro, ne upošteva pa se glas člana Sveta, ki predstavlja zadevno državo članico.
When taking the decision on non-compliance referred to in the fourth and fifth subparagraphs, only members of the Council representing Member States whose currency is the euro shall vote and the Council shall act without taking into account the vote of the member of the Council representing the Member State concerned.
Svet o sprejetem sklepu pošlje uradno poročilo Evropskemu svetu.
The Council shall address a formal report to the European Council on the decisions taken accordingly.
informacije o skladnosti konvergenčnega programa s širšimi smernicami gospodarske politike in nacionalnim programom reform;
information on the consistency of the convergence programme with the broad economic policy guidelines and the national reform programme;
za države članice MMT2
For ERM II Member States, the Council
, ali si zadevna država članica prizadeva za primerno letno izboljšanje svojega proračunskega stanja, iz katerega so izločeni vplivi konjunkture ter enkratnih in začasnih ukrepov, ki je potrebno za dosego srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja, pri čemer je merilo 0,5 % BDP.
shall examine if the Member State concerned pursues an appropriate annual improvement of its cyclically adjusted balance, net of one-off and other temporary measures, required to meet its medium-term budgetary objective, with 0,5% of GDP as a benchmark.
diskrecijska zmanjšanja postavk državnih prihodkov ▌izravnajo bodisi z zmanjšanji odhodkov bodisi z diskrecijskimi povečanji drugih postavk državnih prihodkov ali z obojim.
discretionary reductions of government revenue items are matched either by expenditure cuts or by discretionary increases in other government revenue items or both.
V primeru neobičajnega dogodka, na katerega zadevna država članica ne more vplivati in ki ima velike posledice za finančni položaj javnih financ
case of an unusual event outside the control of the Member State concerned and which has a major impact on the financial position of the general government or in
v obdobjih resnega gospodarskega upada
towards the medium-term objective
v euroobmočju ali celotni EU,
referred to in the
za dosego srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja iz tretjega pododstavka pod pogojem, da to srednjeročno ne ogrozi fiskalne vzdržnosti
, on condition that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term
prilagoditveno pot za dosego srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja
the adjustment path towards the medium term budgetary objective
, ali se proračunsko stanje znatno odmika ali se utegne odmakniti od srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja ali ustreznih prilagoditvenih poti za njegovo dosego▌.
shall monitor the implementation of convergence programmes, on the basis of information provided by Member States with a derogation and of assessments by the Commission and the Economic and Financial Committee, in particular with a view to identifying actual or expected significant divergences of the budgetary position from the medium-term budgetary objective, or from the appropriate adjustment path towards it ▌.
Svet v enem mesecu od dneva sprejetja sklepa o zgodnjem opozarjanju iz prvega pododstavka preuči položaj in na podlagi priporočila Komisije, ki temelji na členu 121(4) PDEU, sprejme priporočilo za potrebne politične ukrepe.
The Council shall, within one month of the date of adoption of the early warning as referred to in the first subparagraph, examine the situation and adopt a recommendation for the necessary policy measures, on the basis of a Commission recommendation, based on Article 121(4) TFEU.
Če Svet na priporočilo Komisije ne sprejme sklepa, da ni bilo učinkovitega ukrepanja, in če zadevna država članica še vedno ne sprejme primernih ukrepov, Komisija en mesec po prvem priporočilu priporoči Svetu, naj sprejme sklep, v katerem opredeli, da ni bilo učinkovitega ukrepanja.
In case the Council does not adopt the decision on the Commission recommendation that no effective action has been taken, and failure to take appropriate action on the part of the Member State concerned persists, the Commission, after one month from its earlier recommendation, shall recommend to the Council to adopt the decision establishing that no effective action has been taken.
Pri sprejemanju sklepa o neupoštevanju priporočil iz četrtega in petega pododstavka glasujejo samo člani Sveta, ki predstavljajo države članice, katerih valuta je euro, ne upošteva pa se glas člana Sveta, ki predstavlja zadevno državo članico.
When taking the decision on non-compliance referred to in the fourth and fifth subparagraphs, the Council shall act without taking into account the vote of the member of the Council representing the Member State concerned.
, če je zadevna država članica ▌presegla srednjeročni proračunski cilj, ob upoštevanju
if the Member State concerned has ▌overachieved the medium-term budgetary objective, taking into account the
programu▌, ne ogrožajo tega cilja v programskem obdobju.
programme do not jeopardise this objective over the programme period.
Države članice, ki so predmet priporočil, izdanih v skladu s členoma 6(2) in 10(2) za namen spremljanja na kraju samem, lahko izvedejo okrepljeni nadzor.
Enhanced surveillance may be undertaken for Member States which are the subject of recommendations issued pursuant to Article 6(2) and Article 10(2) for the purposes of monitoring in situ.
učinkovitost uredbe, zlasti če so se določbe, ki urejajo postopke odločanja, izkazale za dovolj zanesljive.
the effectiveness of the regulation, particularly whether the provisions governing decision-making have proved sufficiently robust,
Kjer je primerno, se temu poročilu priloži predlog za spremembo te uredbe, med drugim tudi postopkov odločanja.
Where appropriate, this report shall be accompanied by a proposal for amendments to this Regulation, including to the decision-making procedures.
Zakonodajna resolucija Evropskega parlamenta z dne 28. septembra 2011 o predlogu uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o učinkovitem izvrševanju proračunskega nadzora v euroobmočju ( KOM(2010)0524 – C7-0298/2010 – 2010/0278(COD) )
European Parliament legislative resolution of 28 September 2011 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area ( COM(2010)0524 – C7-0298/2010 – 2010/0278(COD) )
ob upoštevanju predloga Komisije Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu ( KOM(2010)0524 ),
having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council ( COM(2010)0524 ),
ob upoštevanju člena 294(2) ter členov 121 in 126 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije, v skladu s katerimi je Komisija podala predlog Parlamentu ( C7-0298/2010 ),
having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 121 and 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament ( C7-0298/2010 ),
ob upoštevanju mnenja Evropskega ekonomsko-socialnega odbora UL C 218, 23.7.2011, str.
having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee OJ C 218, 23.7.2011, p.
ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve ter mnenja Odbora za zaposlovanje in socialne zadeve ( A7-0180/2011 ),
having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs ( A7-0180/2011 ),
sprejme stališče v prvi obravnavi, kakor je določeno v nadaljevanju To stališče nadomešča spremembe, sprejete dne 23. junija 2011 (Sprejeta besedila, P7_TA(2011)0290 ).
Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out This position replaces the amendments adopted on 23 June 2011 (Texts adopted P7_TA(2011)0290 ).
je seznanjen z izjavo Komisije, priloženo k tej resoluciji;
Takes note of the Commission statement annexed to this resolution;
ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije in zlasti člena 136 Pogodbe v povezavi s členom 121(6) Pogodbe,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 136, in combination with Article 121(6) thereof,
ob upoštevanju mnenja Evropskega ekonomsko-socialnega odbora UL C 218, 23.7.2011, str.
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee OJ C 218, 23.7.2011, p.
Države članice, katerih valuta je euro, imajo poseben interes in odgovornost za izvajanje gospodarskih politik, ki spodbujajo delovanje ekonomske in monetarne unije, in za izogibanje politikam, ki jo ogrožajo.
Member States whose currency is the euro have a particular interest and responsibility to conduct economic policies that promote the proper functioning of economic and monetary union and to avoid policies that jeopardise it.
Izkušnje in napake iz prvega desetletja delovanja ekonomske in monetarne unije kažejo, da bi bilo treba v Uniji izboljšati gospodarsko upravljanje – temeljiti bi moralo na močnejšem nacionalnem lastništvu skupno dogovorjenih pravil in politik ter na trdnejšem okviru nadzora nad nacionalnimi gospodarskimi politikami na ravni Unije.
Experience gained and mistakes made during the first decade of functioning of the economic and monetary union show a need for improved economic governance in the Union, which should be built on stronger national ownership of commonly agreed rules and policies and on a more robust surveillance framework at the Union level of national economic policies.
Izboljšani okvir gospodarskega upravljanja bi moral temeljiti na več medsebojno povezanih in skladnih politikah za trajnostno rast in delovna mesta, zlasti na strategiji Unije za rast in delovna mesta, s posebnim poudarkom na razvoju in krepitvi notranjega trga, spodbujanju mednarodnih trgovinskih povezav in konkurenčnosti, učinkovitem okviru za preprečevanje in odpravljanje čezmernega državnega primanjkljaja (paktu za stabilnost in rast), trdnem okviru za preprečevanje in odpravljanje makroekonomskih neravnovesij, minimalnih zahtevah za nacionalne proračunske okvire ter okrepljeni ureditvi finančnih trgov in nadzoru nad njimi, vključno z makrobonitetnim nadzorom Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja.
The improved economic governance framework should rely on several inter-linked policies for sustainable growth and jobs, which need to be coherent with each other, in particular a Union strategy for growth and jobs, with particular focus upon development and strengthening of the internal market, fostering international trade and competitiveness, an effective framework for preventing and correcting excessive government deficit (the Stability and Growth Pact), a robust framework for preventing and correcting macro-economic imbalances, minimum requirements for national budgetary frameworks, enhanced financial market regulation and supervision including macro-prudential supervision by the European Systemic Risk Board.
Krepitev gospodarskega upravljanja bi morala vključevati tesnejšo in bolj sprotno udeležbo Evropskega parlamenta in nacionalnih parlamentov.
Strengthening economic governance should include a closer and more timely involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments.
Komisija bi morala imeti v postopku okrepljenega nadzora močnejšo usklajevalno vlogo, predvsem v zvezi z ocenami za posamezne države članice, spremljanjem, misijami na mestu samem, priporočili in opozorili.
The Commission should play a stronger coordination role in the enhanced surveillance procedures, mainly as regards Member-State-specific assessments, monitoring, missions in situ, recommendations and warnings.
Vzpostavili bi lahko gospodarski dialog z Evropskim parlamentom, ki bi Komisiji omogočil, da objavi svoje analize, predsedniki Sveta, Komisije in po potrebi Evropskega parlamenta ali Euroskupine pa bi imeli možnost razprave.
An economic dialogue with the European Parliament may be established, enabling the Commission to make its analyses public and for the President of the Council, the Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the European Council or the President of the Eurogroup to discuss.
Takšna javna razprava bi omogočila diskusije o posledicah nacionalnih odločitev in javen medsebojni pritisk.
Such a public debate could enable the discussion of the spillovers of the national decisions and enable public peer pressure.
prilagajanje srednjeročnemu proračunskemu cilju in za njegovo ohranjanje
adjusting to and maintaining
Da bi preprečili napačno prikazovanje javnofinančnega primanjkljaja in podatkov o zadolženosti, bodisi namenoma bodisi zaradi hude malomarnosti, torej bistvenih podatkov za usklajevanje ekonomske politike Evropske unije, je treba predvideti globo za državo članico, ki je odgovorna za takšno napačno prikazovanje.
In order to deter misrepresentation, intentionally or by serious negligence, of government deficit and debt data, which is an essential input to economic policy coordination in the European Union, a fine should be imposed on the Member State responsible for such misrepresentation.
Komisijo bi bilo treba pooblastiti za sprejemanje aktov v skladu s členom 290 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije za dopolnitev pravil o izračunu globe za manipulacijo s statističnimi podatki, pa tudi o postopku, ki mu mora slediti Komisija, če želi ta dejanja raziskati, in sicer kar zadeva natančna merila za določitev višine globe in za izvajanje preiskav.
In order to supplement the rules on calculation of the fines against manipulation of statistics as well as on the procedure to be followed by the Commission for the investigation of such actions, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of detailed criteria for establishing the amount of the fine and for conducting the investigations to be carried out by the Commission.
bi bilo treba prilagajanje srednjeročnemu proračunskemu cilju in njegovo izpolnjevanje zagotoviti prek
adjustment and adherence to the medium-term budgetary objective should be ensured through
obveznosti položitve obrestnega depozita, kar bi začasno veljalo za države članice, katerih valuta je euro in ki ne dosegajo zadostnega napredka pri konsolidaciji proračuna.
an obligation to lodge an interest-bearing deposit temporarily imposed on a Member State whose currency is the euro that is making insufficient progress with budgetary consolidation.
To bi moralo veljati, ko ▌država članica
This should be the case when ▌a Member State
kljub primanjkljaju, nižjemu od referenčne vrednosti 3 % BDP, bistveno odstopa od srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja ali ustreznega prilagajanja temu cilju in tega odstopanja ne uspe odpraviti
, even with a deficit below the 3% of GDP reference value, deviates significantly from the medium-term budgetary objective or the appropriate adjustment path towards it and fails to correct the deviation
– če je morala zadevna država članica v okviru preventivnega dela Pakta za stabilnost in rast že položiti obrestni depozit ali v primerih posebej resnih kršitev pravnih obveznosti na področju proračunske politike, določenih v Paktu za stabilnost in rast–,
when an interest bearing deposit has already been imposed on the Member State concerned in the preventive part of the Stability and Growth Pact or in cases of particularly serious non-compliance with the legal budgetary policy obligations laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact,
Da bi preprečili retroaktivno uporabo sankcij v okviru preventivnega dela Pakta za stabilnost in rast, določenih v tej uredbi, bi se morale sankcije v vsakem primeru uporabljati samo v zvezi z ustreznimi priporočili, ki jih Svet sprejme v skladu s četrtim pododstavkom člena 6(2) Uredbe (ES) št. 1466/97 po začetku veljavnosti te uredbe.
In order to avoid the sanctions under the preventive part of the Stability and Growth Pact foreseen under this Regulation, to be applied retroactively, said sanctions should in any case only apply in respect of the relevant recommendations adopted by the Council under the fourth subparagraph of Article 6(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 adopted after the entry into force of this Regulation.
Da bi preprečili retroaktivno uporabo sankcij, določenih v tej uredbi, tudi v okviru korektivnega dela Pakta za stabilnost in rast, bi se morali navedeni ukrepi v vsakem primeru uporabljati samo v zvezi z ustreznimi priporočili in sklepi o odpravi čezmernega javnofinančnega primanjkljaja, ki jih Svet sprejme po začetku veljavnosti te uredbe.
Likewise, in order to avoid the sanctions under the corrective part of the Stability and Growth pact laid down in this Regulation to be applied retroactively, said measures should in any case only apply in respect of the relevant recommendations and decisions to correct an excessive government deficit adopted by the Council after the entry into force of this Regulation.
Stopnjevanje in enaka obravnava med državami članicami sta tako zagotovljena, če so obrestni depozit, brezobrestni depozit in globa, določeni v tej uredbi, enaki 0,2 % BDP, tj. nespremenljivemu delu globe, povezanem s členom 126(11) Pogodbe.
Thus, graduation and equal treatment between Member States are ensured if the interest-bearing deposit, the non-interest-bearing deposit and the fine specified in this Regulation are equal to 0,2% of GDP, the size of the fixed component of the fine linked to Article 126(11) of the Treaty.
Tudi Komisija bi morala imeti možnost, da zaradi izjemnih gospodarskih okoliščin priporoči zmanjšanje obsega sankcij ali jih preklice.
The Commission should also be able to recommend reducing the size of a sanction or cancelling it on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances.
Brezobrestni depozit bi bilo treba izplačati po zmanjšanju čezmernega primanjkljaja, medtem ko je treba obresti iz teh depozitov in globe dodeliti
The non-interest-bearing deposit should be released upon correction of the excessive deficit while the interest on such deposits and the fines collected should be
mehanizmom za stabilnost, ki jih vzpostavijo
assigned to stability mechanisms to provide financial assistance, created by
za zagotavljanje finančne pomoči in ohranitev stabilnosti celotnega euroobmočja
in order to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole
Te posamezne odločitve so kot del usklajevanja gospodarskih politik držav članic, ki se izvaja znotraj Sveta, kot je določeno v členu 121(1) PDEU, ključna dopolnitev ukrepov, ki jih je Svet sprejel v skladu s členoma 121 in 126 PDEU, ter uredbama (ES) št. 1466/97 in (ES) št. 1467/97.
As part of the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States conducted within the Council as specified in Article 121(1) TFEU, these individual decisions are an integral follow-up to the measures adopted by the Council in accordance with Articles 121 and 126 TFEU and Regulations (EC) No 1466/97 and (EC) No 1467/97.
Ker ta uredba vsebuje splošna pravila za učinkovito izvrševanje uredb (ES) 1466/97 in (ES) 1467/97, jo je treba sprejeti v skladu z rednim zakonodajnim postopkom, določenim v členu 121(6).
Since this Regulation contains general rules for the effective enforcement of Regulations (EC) No 1466/97 and (EC) No 1467/97, it should be adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure referred to in Article 121(6).
Predmet Člen 1 Vsebina in področje uporabe
Subject matter Article 1 Subject matter and scope
Za okrepitev dialoga med institucijami Unije, zlasti Evropskim parlamentom, Svetom in Komisijo, pa tudi za zagotovitev večje preglednosti in odgovornosti lahko pristojni odbor Evropskega parlamenta povabi predsednike Sveta, Komisije in po potrebi Evropskega sveta ali Euroskupine, da nastopijo pred njim in razpravljajo o sklepih, sprejetih v skladu s členi 3, 4 in 5 te uredbe.
In order to enhance the dialogue between the Union institutions, in particular the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the European Parliament may invite the President of the Council, the Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the European Council or the President of the Eurogroup to appear before the committee to discuss decisions taken pursuant to Articles 3, 4 and 5 of this Regulation.
„preventivni del Pakta za stabilnost in rast“ pomeni večstranski sistem nadzora, kot določa Uredba (ES) št. 1466/97 iz julija 1997;
‘the preventive part of the Stability and Growth Pact’ means the multilateral surveillance system as organised by Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of July 1997;
„korektivni del Pakta za stabilnost in rast“ pomeni postopke za
‘the corrective part of the Stability and Growth Pact’ means the procedure for the
čezmernemu primanjkljaju držav članic, kot je določeno v členu 126 Pogodbe in Uredbi (ES) št. 1467/97 z dne 7. julija 1997;
of Member States' excessive deficit as regulated by Article 126 of the Treaty and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997;
„izjemne gospodarske okoliščine“ pomenijo okoliščine, v katerih presežek državnega primanjkljaja nad referenčno vrednostjo velja za izjemnega v skladu z drugo alineo člena 126(2)(a) Pogodbe in kot je določeno v Uredbi (ES) št. 1467/97.
‘exceptional economic circumstances’ means circumstances where an excess of a government deficit over the reference value is considered exceptional within the meaning of the second indent of Article 126(2)(a) of the Treaty and as specified in Regulation (EC) No 1467/97.
Sankcije v preventivnem delu Pakta za stabilnost in rast Člen 3 Obrestni depozit
Sanctions in the preventive part of the Stability and Growth Pact Article 3 Interest-bearing deposit
Z odstopanjem ▌
By derogation ▌the Commission
Komisija na podlagi utemeljene prošnje zadevne države članice, ki jo slednja naslovi na Komisijo v
, following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned addressed to the Commission within
Če so okoliščine, zaradi katerih je bilo oblikovano priporočilo iz odstavka 1,
If the situation giving rise to the recommendation referred to in paragraph 1 no longer
, Svet na podlagi
, the Council, on the basis of a
Sankcije v korektivnem delu Pakta za stabilnost in rast Člen 4 Brezobrestni depozit
Sanctions in the corrective part of the Stability and Growth Pact Article 4 Non-interest-bearing deposit
položitev brezobrestnega depozita ▌.
the lodging of a non-interest-bearing deposit ▌.
Komisija, znaša 0,2 % BDP zadevne države članice v preteklem letu.
by the Commission shall amount to 0,2% of the GDP of the Member State concerned in the preceding year.
Z odstopanjem ▌lahko Komisija v izjemnih gospodarskih okoliščinah ali na podlagi utemeljene prošnje zadevne države članice, naslovljene na Komisijo v
By derogation ▌, the Commission may, on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned addressed to the Commission within
dneh po sprejetju odločitve Sveta v skladu s členom 126(6) PDEU,
of adoption of the Council decision in accordance with Article 126(6) TFEU,
, ko Svet v skladu s členom 126(8)
in accordance with Article 126(8)
sklep, da država članica ni sprejela učinkovitih ukrepov za
that the Member State has not taken effective action
s kvalificirano večino
Commission acting by a qualified majority