natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
opozarja, da direktiva o preglednosti določa, da morajo institucije razkriti glavna tveganja v svojih poslovnih poročilih, in da četrta direktiva na področju prava družb zahteva, da institucije opišejo svoje sisteme notranjega nadzora v povezavi s tveganji iz finančnih poročil; meni, da bi morale finančne institucije objaviti svoje sanacijske načrte in poročila nadzornih organov v zvezi s tem;
Notes the Transparency Directive, which requires institutions to disclose principal risks in their business review, and the Fourth Company Law Directive, which requires institutions to describe their internal control systems relating to financial reporting risks; observes that financial institutions should be required to disclose recovery planning and supervisory reports thereon;
meni, da bi morala biti za finančne institucije obvezna priprava letnega poročila o ustreznosti in učinkovitosti delovanja sistema notranjega nadzora, ki bi zahtevala čim manj birokracije, upravni odbor pa bi moral to poročilo sprejeti; nadalje meni, da bi moral biti obvezen tudi ustrezen sestavni del letnega revizijskega poročila zunanjih revizorjev; poudarja pa, da je v EU vsekakor treba preprečiti učinek, podoben učinku ameriškega Sarbanes-Oxleyevega zakona;
Takes the view that it should be mandatory for financial institutions to draft an annual report – involving as little bureaucracy as possible – on the adequacy and effectiveness of their internal control systems and for their board of directors to adopt that report; takes the view, further, that it should likewise be mandatory for the annual report drawn up by a financial institution's external auditors to contain a similar assessment; stresses, however, that a ’Sarbanes-Oxley effect’ must be avoided in the EU;
meni, da je treba v finančnih institucijah več pozornosti nameniti izvajanju ukrepov, ki zvišujejo zavedanje o tveganju, saj je okrepitev zavedanja glede tveganj na vseh ravneh v podjetju – tudi med zaposlenimi – odločilnega pomena za boljše obvladovanje tveganj;
Takes the view that closer attention should be paid to the implementation of measures to raise risk awareness in financial institutions, as increased awareness of risk at all levels of the institution – and amongst its employees – is a decisive factor in improving risk management;
se strinja, da je treba okrepiti ukrepe na ravni EU, da bi preprečili navzkrižje interesov, s čimer bi ohranili objektivno in neodvisno presojo članov uprave v bančništvu, trgovanju z vrednostnimi papirji in zavarovalništvu;
Agrees that it is necessary to strengthen measures at EU level to prevent conflicts of interest in order to safeguard the objectivity and independence of judgement of board members across the banking, securities and insurance sectors;
poziva nadzorne organe EU, naj v posvetovanju z ustreznimi nacionalnimi organi razvijejo merila usposobljenosti za preizkus sposobnosti in primernosti oseb, s katerim ocenijo ustreznost posameznikov za opravljanje nadziranih funkcij, ob upoštevanju vrste, kompleksnosti in velikosti finančne institucije; nadzorni organi morajo postopek ocenjevanja in izdaje dovoljenja izpeljati pravočasno in učinkovito ob ustreznem upoštevanju sodb reguliranih podjetij; pri večjih in sistemsko pomembnih finančnih institucijah bi morali nadzorni organi izvajati poglobljene preglede primernosti, strokovnosti in raznolikosti direktorjev, tako posamično kot kolektivno, ter njihove primernosti za imenovanje, ter, za direktorje, širše sestave organa upravljanja in časa, za katerega se obvežejo, ob upoštevanju njihovih drugih dejavnosti;
Calls on EU supervisors in consultation with the relevant national authorities to develop competence criteria for a ’fit and proper person’ test, by which to assess the suitability of individuals for controlled functions, taking into account the nature, complexity and size of the financial institution; supervisors must perform their assessments and approvals procedure in a timely and efficient manner with due regard for the judgement of regulated firms; for major and systemically relevant financial institutions, supervisors should perform intrusive checks as to the fitness, expertise and diversity of directors both individually and collectively and their suitability in relation to the appointment, and for directors the wider composition of the governing body and their time commitment, taking into account their other activities;
poziva Komisijo, naj razvije zakonodajo, ki bo od velikih finančnih institucij zahtevala, da svoje upravne odbore podvržejo rednim zunanjim ocenjevanjem, katerih namen bo zagotoviti visoke standarde prispevka posameznih direktorjev, pa tudi ugotoviti, ali upravni odbor kot celota in njegovi odbori lahko dosežejo strateške cilje institucije in obvladovanje tveganja; zahteva, da velike finančne institucije v svojih letnih poročilih potrdijo, da so začele izvajati tako oceno, navedejo ime zunanjega ocenjevalca, opišejo področje uporabe ocenjevanja in potrdijo, da so delovale v skladu z njegovimi priporočili; poziva evropske nadzorne organe, naj razvijejo smernice o področju uporabe takih ocen v posvetovanju s panogo, delničarji in regulativnimi organi;
Calls on the Commission to develop legislation requiring large financial institutions to submit their boards to regular external evaluation aimed at ensuring not only high standards of contributions by individual directors, but also that the board as a whole and its committees are in a position to deliver on the institution's strategic objectives and management of the risk; requires large financial institutions to confirm in their annual reports that they have undertaken such an evaluation, the name of the external evaluator, a description of the scope of the evaluation and that they have acted on the latter's recommendations; calls on the ESAs to develop guidance on the scope of such evaluations in consultation with the industry, shareholders and regulators;
meni, da morata biti vlogi generalnega direktorja in predsednika uprave ločeni, opozarja pa, da obstajajo nekatere okoliščine, v katerih je združitev vloge v eni osebi kratkoročno nujna; poleg tega vztraja, da je treba pri upravljanju podjetij in politiki prejemkov spoštovati in spodbujati načela, ki jih določajo pogodbe in evropske direktive, kar zadeva enakost plačila in obravnavanja žensk in moških;
Believes the role of the CEO and Chairman should be separated, but notes that there are circumstances when a combined role could be necessary in the short term; emphasises also that corporate management and remuneration policies must comply with and foster the principles of wage parity and equal treatment of women and men established by the Treaties and by EU directives;
meni, da bi morali člani enotirnega ali nadzornega odbora na kolektivni osnovi imeti sveže in ustrezne poklicne kvalifikacije, znanje in izkušnje, tudi na finančnem področju, da lahko skupaj krmarijo finančno podjetje; zahteva, da imajo vse gospodarsko pomembne finančne institucije neizvršne člane upravnih odborov; meni pa, da bi morali imeti v vsaki finančni instituciji člani upravnega odbora različne izkušnje, strokovno znanje in osebnostne značilnosti, da se zagotovi premišljeno in skrbno upravljanje, ter da je treba člane imenovati na podlagi dosežkov;
Believes that on a collective basis members of unitary or supervisory boards should possess recent and relevant professional qualifications, knowledge and experience, including financial, for jointly piloting the financial undertaking; requires all economically significant financial institutions to have non-executive board members; believes, however, that every financial institution should have a board with a diversity of experience, expertise and character so as to provide sound and prudent management and that appointments should be made on merit;
poudarja, da bo večja raznovrstnost v upravnih odborih zmanjšala izpostavljenost krizi in prispevala h gospodarski stabilnosti; poziva Komisijo, naj pripravi večstopenjski načrt za povečanje zastopanosti obeh spolov s ciljem, da bosta v upravnih odborih finančnih institucij zastopana v vsaj 30-odstotnem deležu, in v predvidenem časovnem obdobju zagotovi uresničitev tega cilja ter preveri ukrepe za povečanje strokovne, socialne in kulturne raznovrstnosti;
Emphasises that greater diversity among the members of boards of directors will reduce the financial sector's vulnerability to crises and contribute to economic stability; calls on the Commission to submit a plan to bring about phased increases in gender diversity with the aim of achieving at least 30% representation for each gender on the boards of directors of financial institutions, to ensure that this target is met within a foreseeable period and to consider measures to strengthen diversity in terms of professional, social and cultural background;
poudarja, da bo večja raznovrstnost med člani odborov verjetno izboljšala kakovost razpravljanja in sprejemanja odločitev;
Emphasises that greater diversity among the members of boards is likely to improve the quality of debate and decision-making;
poudarja pomen predstavnikov delavcev v upravnem odboru, zlasti zaradi njihovega dolgoročnega interesa za trajnostno korporativno upravljanje ter njihovih izkušenj in znanja o notranjih strukturah podjetja;
Emphasises the importance of employee representatives being on the board of directors, in particular in view of their long-term interest in the sustainable management of the institution and because of their experience and knowledge of its internal structures;
meni, da morajo finančne institucije v javni lasti in finančni organi zagotoviti odprt in neodvisen postopek imenovanja;
Considers that publicly owned financial institutions and financial authorities must ensure open and independent appointment processes;
poudarja, da morajo direktorji opravljanju svojih obveznosti posvetiti dovolj časa, za kar bi morali smernice pripraviti nadzorni organi EU, nadzorovati pa bi jih morali upravni odbor in nacionalni nadzorni organi;
Stresses that directors must devote sufficient time to the performance of their duties, the guidelines for which should be developed by EU supervisory bodies and be monitored by the board and national supervisory bodies;
meni, da je treba nasprotovati temu, da bi kdor koli sodeloval v preštevilnih upravnih odborih različnih finančnih skupin;
Believes that there should be a presumption against any person serving on an excessive number of boards of directors of different financial groups;
poziva k učinkovitemu izvajanju pravil o oblikah posvetovanja in udeležbe zaposlenih, izbranih v skladu z Direktivo 2001/86/ES o dopolnitvi Statuta evropske družbe glede udeležbe zaposlenih;
Calls for efficient implementation of the rules on consultation and employee participation systems opted for in the context of Directive 2001/86/EC supplementing the Statute for a European Company;
meni, da bi morala biti višje vodstvo in odbor direktorjev dejansko odgovorna ter zavezana k vzpostavitvi in izvajanju načel korporativnega upravljanja na vseh ravneh podjetja/korporacije;
Is of the opinion that both senior management and the board of directors should be actually accountable and liable for the setting up and application of corporate governance principles at all levels of the company/corporation;
meni, da so nujni jasno opredeljeni evropski minimalni standardi glede odgovornosti članov upravnih odborov v finančnih institucijah;
Regards a clearly defined European minimum standard for the accountability of the members of the boards of directors of financial institutions as necessary;
ugotavlja, da so upravitelji Evropske centralne banke, Evropske investicijske banke, Evropskega investicijskega sklada in centralnih bank vseh držav članic moški; ugotavlja, da so trenutno na direktorskih položajih v centralnih bankah držav članic in v finančnih institucijah le maloštevilne ženske;
Notes that the European Central Bank, the European Investment Bank, the European Investment Fund and the central banks of all Member States are led by male governors; notes that only very few women are currently represented in governing positions within the central banks of the Member States and of the financial institutions;
meni, da bi morali direktorji imeti dolžnost skrbnega ravnanja in obveznost, da nadzornim organom poročajo o pomembnih tveganjih;
Believes that directors should have a general duty of care and be obliged to report material risks to supervisors;
poziva Komisijo in države članice, naj sprejmejo ukrepe, da bodo imenovanja direktorjev finančnih institucij in organov Evropske unije uravnovešena glede na spol;
Invites the Commission and Member States to take gender-balanced measures as regards the appointment of governors within the financial institutions and bodies of the European Union;
spodbuja Komisijo, naj pospešuje politike, ki podjetjem v finančnem sektorju v današnjem gospodarskem okolju pomagajo ovrednotiti in zagotoviti bolj uravnoteženo zastopanost moških in žensk v organih odločanja;
Encourages the Commission to promote policies which can help companies in the financial sector in today's economic environment to value and manage a more balanced representation of men and women in the decision-making bodies;
vztraja, da morata korporativno upravljanje in politika prejemkov spoštovati in spodbujati načela, ki jih določajo pogodbe in evropske direktive, kar zadeva enakost plačila ter enakopravno obravnavanje žensk in moških;
Emphasises that corporate management and remuneration policies must comply with and foster the principles of wage parity and equal treatment of women and men established by the Treaties and by EU directives;
meni, da bi morale politike prejemkov temeljiti na dolgoročnem delovanju posameznika in njegovega podjetja, s čimer bi se zagotovilo, da te politike ne prispevajo k pretiranemu prevzemanju tveganja, ter da politike prejemkov ali plačila prejemkov v nobenem primeru ne bi smele ogroziti stabilnosti podjetja;
Believes that remuneration policies must be based on the long-term performance of the individual and their firm to ensure remuneration policies do not contribute to excessive risk-taking, and that remuneration policies or payments should never undermine the stability of a firm;
pozdravlja spremembe v politiki prejemkov, ki so jih že uvedle finančne institucije, ko so bonuse povezale z dolgoročnim poslovnim uspehom in določile, da jih ni mogoče izplačati prej kot po treh letih; poleg tega pozdravlja dejstvo, da je ob neizpolnitvi poslovnih ciljev mogoče zahtevati vračilo bonusov;
Welcomes the changes to remuneration policy that have already been introduced by financial institutions, whereby bonuses are linked to the long-term success of the business and only paid out after three years at the earliest; also welcomes the fact that it is possible to demand repayment of bonuses if economic objectives have not been met;
poudarja, da morajo biti vse delniške opcije ustrezno razkrite, zanje pa mora veljati prepoved odtujitve za obdobje najmanj treh let; meni, da je treba namesto delnic bolj uporabljati instrumente varnostnega kapitala, saj je pri njih navzkrižje interesov, ki bi povzročilo kratkoročnost upravljanja, manjše;
Stresses that all share options must be properly disclosed and have vesting periods of at least three years; considers that greater use should be made of contingent capital instruments rather than shares, as they have less conflict of interest in inducing short termism;
opozarja, da je vprašanje prejemkov v finančnih institucijah obravnavano v direktivi o kapitalskih zahtevah III;
Notes that the issue of remuneration in financial institutions has been dealt with in CRD III;
poudarja, da je v direktivi o kapitalskih zahtevah in Solventnosti II predvidena stroga politika nadomestil; pričakuje, da se bo med letoma 2011 in 2013 z drugimi že sprejetimi zakonodajnimi ukrepi hitro začela izvajati; poziva Komisijo, naj leta 2015 objavi poročilo o oceni;
Stresses the importance of a strict remuneration policy as foreseen in the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD III) and Solvency II; expects these and other existing legislative measures to be rapidly implemented between 2011 and 2013; calls upon the Commission to publish an evaluation report in 2015;
ugotavlja, da imajo države članice različne strukturne pristope; spodbuja prakse, ki krepijo korporativno upravljanje v skladu s pravno obliko, obsegom, naravo, kompleksnostjo in poslovnim modelom finančne institucije;
Acknowledges that structural approaches differ among Member States; encourages practices which strengthen corporate governance according to the legal form, size, nature, complexity and business model of the financial institution;
ugotavlja, da se obstoječa priporočila za prejemke direktorjev družb, ki kotirajo na borzi, ne uporabljajo ne enako ne zadovoljivo; zato poziva Komisijo, naj na ravni EU predlaga zakonodajo o prejemkih za direktorje družb, ki kotirajo na borzi, da bi zagotovili, da struktura prejemkov v teh družbah ne bo spodbujala prekomernega sprejemanja tveganja, in enake konkurenčne pogoje v EU;
Notes that the application of existing recommendations for the remuneration of directors of listed companies is neither uniform nor satisfactory; calls therefore on the Commission to come forward with legislation at EU level on remuneration for directors of listed companies in order to ensure that the structure of remuneration in listed companies does not encourage excessive risk-taking, as well as to ensure a level playing field in the EU;
poudarja zlasti zaskrbljenost, da delničarji sedaj ne izvajajo in ne morejo izvajati potrebnega nadzora nad politiko prejemkov v finančnih institucijah;
Highlights in particular concerns that shareholders cannot and do not currently exercise due control over remuneration policies in financial institutions;
vztraja, da je potrebna popolna preglednost, da bi delničarji lahko izvajali ustrezen nadzor nad politikami prejemkov, ter poziva zlasti k objavi števila zaposlenih v vsaki instituciji, ki prejmejo skupne prejemke, višje od 1 milijona EUR, v razredih v obsegu najmanj 1 milijona EUR;
Insists that full transparency is necessary for shareholders to be able to conduct proper oversight of remuneration policies, and calls in particular for the publication of the number of staff in each institution receiving total remuneration greater than EUR 1 million, in bands of at least EUR 1 million;
meni, da bi morali delničarji pomagati opredeliti vzdržne politike prejemkov in imeti možnost, da bi na skupščini izrazili svoje mnenje o tej politiki, ter pravico zavrniti politiko prejemkov, ki jo je določila komisija za prejemke;
Is of the opinion that shareholders should help determine sustainable remuneration policies and should be given the opportunity to express their views on the remuneration policies, with the right to reject the remuneration policy defined by the remuneration committee at the general meeting;
meni, da bi okrepljen tristranski dialog med nadzornimi organi, revizorji (notranjimi in zunanjimi) in institucijami povečal verjetnost odkrivanja večjih ali sistemskih tveganj na zgodnji stopnji; spodbuja nadzorne organe, Evropski odbor za sistemska tveganja, revizorje in institucije, naj si prizadevajo za odprto razpravo in se pogosteje srečujejo, da bi olajšali bonitetni nadzor; poleg tega priporoča, naj potekajo dvostranska srečanja med revizorji in nadzornimi organi večjih finančnih institucij; meni, da je odgovornost upravnega odbora in notranjega revizorja, da zagotovita obstoj potrebnih notranjih kontrol za odkrivanje sistemskih tveganj in uvedbo postopka, po katerem se obvestijo odbor in nadzorni organi, da bi preprečili negativne posledice;
Believes that an enhanced three-way dialogue between supervisors, auditors (both internal and external) and institutions would improve the likelihood of substantial or systemic risk being detected at an early stage; encourages supervisors, the European Systemic Risk Board, auditors and institutions to engage in open discussions and to increase the frequency of meetings in order to facilitate prudential supervision; further recommends that bilateral meetings take place between auditors and supervisors of major financial institutions; believes that it is the board and Internal Auditor's responsibility to ensure that necessary internal controls are in place to detect systemic risks and to establish a procedure for informing the board and supervisors of these risks in order to avoid negative consequences;
poudarja, da glavne vloge revizorjev ne smejo neupravičeno ogroziti dodatne dolžnosti, kot sta preverjanje in ocenjevanje informacij, ki niso povezane z revizijo, kar ne sodi v okvir njihovega strokovnega znanja; meni, da bi morali revizorji poročati neposredno nadzornim organom, ko zaznajo kaj, kar pomembno zadeva nadzor, in bi morali sodelovati v vsepanožnih ocenah posebnih kontrol;
Stresses that the primary role of auditors should not be unduly compromised by the burden of extra duties, such as an examination and assessment of non-audit information that falls outside their area of expertise; believes auditors should report directly to supervisors when aware of something of material concern to supervision and should participate in pan-industry assessments of specific controls;
vztraja, da morajo javni organi, vključno z evropskimi nadzornimi organi in nacionalnimi nadzornimi organi, upoštevati visoke standarde neodvisnosti in njihove ustreznike v korporativnem upravljanju;
Insists that public authorities, including ESAs and national supervisors, must adhere to high standards of independence and corporate governance equivalents;
spodbuja institucionalne delničarje, naj na ustrezen način prevzamejo aktivnejšo vlogo pri spremljanju dela upravnega odbora in njegove strategije, da bosta odražala dolgoročne interese koristnikov;
Encourages institutional shareholders to take a more active role in holding the board and its strategy to account in an appropriate way and to reflect the long-term interests of their beneficiaries;
poziva k zakonodaji, ki bo obvezala vse, ki so pristojni za upravljanje naložb v imenu tretjih strani v EU, da javno izjavijo, ali uporabljajo kodeks stevardstva, in če ga, katerega in zakaj, če pa ne, zakaj ne;
Calls for legislation requiring all those authorised to manage investments on behalf of third parties in the EU to state publicly whether or not they apply and disclose against a stewardship code; if so, which one and why, and if not why not;
meni, da bi bilo treba v primeru večjih poslov nad določenim in sorazmernim zneskom pridobiti izrecno soglasje delničarjev ali pa bi morala veljati zahteva, da je treba delničarje pred izvedbo posla o tem obvestiti, če je sodelovanje vlagateljev izvedljivo, če je upoštevano načelo zaupnosti in če ni ogroženo vsakodnevno poslovanje finančnih institucij; organ ESMA lahko po posvetovanju z ustreznimi nacionalnimi organi izda smernice v zvezi z ustreznimi mejnimi zneski;
Believes that significant transactions above a defined and proportionate size should require specific shareholder approval or be subject to an obligation to inform shareholders before the transaction can take effect, provided that involvement of the shareholders is feasible, the principle of confidentiality is met and the daily business of the financial institution is not undermined; ESMA may issue guidelines concerning the appropriate benchmark in consultation with the relevant national authorities;