natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
meni, da evropska varnostna strategija (2003) in strategija notranje varnosti (2010) skladno izpostavljata številna skupna področja, kot so terorizem, organizirani kriminal in kibernetska varnost, ki zadevajo obe razsežnosti varnosti; se zato strinja, da je treba izboljšati načine za združevanje notranje in zunanje varnostne razsežnosti, kar je Komisija predlagala že v svojem sporočilu z naslovom ’Strategija notranje varnosti EU:pet korakov k varnejši Evropi’ (2010) ( KOM(2010)0673 );
Considers that the European Security Strategy (2003) and the Internal Security Strategy (2010) coherently identify a number of common areas – such as terrorism, organised crime and cybersecurity – which have implications in both security dimensions; agrees, therefore, that the way of bringing together the internal and external dimensions needs to be improved, an idea which has been developed by the Commission in its Communication entitled ’The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe’( COM(2010)0673 );
meni, da se dopolnjevanje ciljev zunanje in notranje varnosti kaže v naslednjih dejstvih:
Considers that the complementarity of external and internal security objectives is mirrored by the fact that:
PVO in COSI (odbor za notranjo varnost, ki je bil ustanovljen s PDEU) ter situacijski center, Komisija in agencije, povezane z varnostjo, kot so EUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX, bodo sodelovali in institucijam EU posredovali skupno oceno ogroženosti;
the PSC and the COSI (the Internal Security Committee, established by the TFEU), as well as SITCEN, the Commission and security-related agencies such as EUROPOL, EUROJUST and FRONTEX will work together and submit a common threat assessment to the EU institutions;
s povezavo schengenskega informacijskega sistema z vsemi ustreznimi vseevropskimi mrežami, kot sta VIS in EURODAC, bo nastal model zbiranja varnostnih informacij z uporabo izkušenj in najboljše prakse iz drugih držav; poudarja, da je treba v zvezi s tem upoštevati tveganja v smislu ogrožanja zasebnosti in etične posledice;
a security information model will be developed by connecting the Schengen Information System to all the other relevant Europe-wide networks such as the VIS and Eurodac, using the experience and best practice from other countries; stresses that the risks to privacy and the ethical implications of this need to be taken into account;
sledenje financiranja terorističnih dejavnosti so omogočili evropsko-ameriški sporazum TFTP in vsi zakonodajni ukrepi, ki nalagajo sledljivost sumljivih transakcij;
the tracking of terrorism financing has been provided for by the EU-US TFTP agreement and by all the legislative measures imposing the traceability of suspect transactions;
opredelitev evropskih ključnih infrastruktur upošteva učinek človeških posegov, kot so teroristični napadi in kibernetski napadi;
the definition of the European critical infrastructures takes into account the impact of man-made actions such as terrorist attacks and cyber attacks;
meni, da je torej z vsemi zgoraj navedenimi pobudami mogoče začeti le ob trdni pravni podlagi in zakonodajnih ukrepih, ki jih je mogoče sprejeti v skladu z običajno notranjo ureditvijo pristojnosti v EU, s kvalificirano večino v Svetu, soodločanjem Evropskega parlamenta ter nenazadnje ob sodnem nadzoru Evropskega sodišča;
Is of the view that all the initiatives listed above could therefore be launched only with a sound legal basis and legislative measures which can be adopted under the ordinary internal EU competence, for which a qualified majority in the Council is the rule and which also involves codecision in Parliament and, last but not least, judicial review by the Court of Justice;
meni, da bo potem logično, da bo v primeru, ko bo ista nevarnost zahtevala uporabo zunanjih in notranjih varnostnih ukrepov, EU dala prednost tistim razpoložljivim ukrepom, ki bodo bolj učinkoviti in pravno zanesljivi, pri čemer slednji izhajajo iz notranje pristojnosti; meni, da bi vloga Evropskega parlamenta morala biti prav tako odločilna za povezane posebne strategije in ukrepe SZVP;
Is of the view that logic will then imply that, when the same threat requires the activation of external and internal security measures, the EU should give priority to the more efficient – and legally sound – measures available, the latter being those arising from internal competence; considers that Parliament's role should also be decisive as regards the related specific CFSP strategies and measures;
opozarja Svet in podpredsednico/visoko predstavnico, da sta odgovorna za obveščanje Parlamenta o stanju zunanjih odnosov, še posebej pa odnosov s tretjimi državami in mednarodnimi organizacijami, s katerimi potekajo pogajanja o sklenitvi sporazumov, ki so v interesu EU, ali pa so ti že bili sklenjeni; opozarja Svet, da se mora o sporazumih glede izmenjave tajnih podatkov s tretjimi državami in mednarodnimi organizacijami, ki se ne nanašajo izključno na SZVP, pogajati in jih sklepati na način, ki omogoča, da bo Parlament obveščen in vanje vključen v skladu s členom 218(6) PDEU; v tem okviru si pridržuje pravico do odločanja, ali sporazumi med državami članicami Evropske unije, ki se srečujejo v okviru Sveta, o varstvu tajnih podatkov, ki si jih izmenjujejo v interesu Evropske unije, morebiti posegajo v posebne pravice, ki jih Parlamentu podeljuje Pogodba;
Reminds the Council and the VP/HR that they are obliged to keep Parliament informed about the state of external relations and in particular relations with third countries and international organisations with which international agreements are being negotiated or have been concluded in the EU's interest; reminds the Council that, where they do not relate exclusively to the CFSP, agreements on the exchange of confidential information with third countries and international organisations must be negotiated and concluded in such a way as to enable Parliament to be informed and involved in accordance with Article 218(6) TFEU; bearing that point in mind, reserves the right to determine whether the Agreement between the Member States of the European Union, meeting within the Council, regarding the protection of classified information exchanged in the interests of the European Union does not interfere with the exercise of the prerogatives conferred on it by the Treaty;
Zagotavljanje varnosti s pomočjo operacij
Security through operations
pozdravlja dejstvo, da je EU od leta 2003 do danes izvedla številne operacije (24) na treh celinah, ki so vsebovale različne oblike posredovanja, pri čemer je bila večina civilnih misij osredotočena na policijo, reforme varnostnega sektorja in utrditev pravne države; poudarja, da je bilo doslej 16 od 24 misij SVOP civilne narave;
Welcomes the fact that since 2003 the EU has undertaken numerous operations (24) in three continents involving different types of intervention, the bulk being accounted for by civilian missions specialising in policing, security sector reform (SSR) and consolidation of the rule of law; notes that out of 24 CSDP missions so far 16 have been of a civilian nature;
ugotavlja, da ta trend potrjujejo tudi značilnosti trinajstih misij, ki trenutno potekajo, in da se poleg te razvrstitve od misij v vedno večji meri zahteva, da prevzemajo ’večnamensko’ vlogo, kot v primeru misije EULEX Kosovo, ki združuje številne funkcije (policijski, carinski in pravosodni sistem) s funkcijami usposabljanja, spremljanja in pomoči ter izvršilne naloge, ali pa v nedavni misiji EUTM Somalija, ki ima sedež v Ugandi in naj bi zagotavljala vojaško usposabljanje za varnostne sile začasne zvezne vlade, kar je primer vedno večjega poudarka na nalogah, povezanih z reformo varnostnega sektorja, na področju vojaškega kriznega upravljanja;
Notes that this trend is confirmed by the features of the 13 missions currently under way and that, above and beyond this classification, missions are increasingly being required to assume a ’multifunctional’ character, as in the case of EULEX Kosovo, which combines several functions (police, customs and judicial systems) with training, monitoring and assistance functions as well as executive tasks, or the more recent EUTM Somalia mission, based in Uganda and intended to provide military training to security forces of the Transitional Federal Government, which is an example of the increased emphasis on SSR-related tasks in military crisis management;
pozdravlja tekočo revizijo obstoječih civilnih konceptov SVOP; zlasti ugotavlja, da bo načelo pravne države obravnavano kot osrednji koncept za civilne misije, ki zajemajo policijo, pravosodje, civilno upravo, carino, mejni nadzor in druga zadevna področja, kar bo načrtovalcem in strokovnjakom, ki delajo na terenu, koristilo pri vzpostavljanju in izvajanju misij s krepitvijo in/ali nadomestitvijo (izvršilnih) nalog; podpira prizadevanja za razvoj koncepta misij SVOP na področju pravosodja in ugotavlja, da se je treba izogniti nepotrebnemu podvajanju z morebitnimi drugimi programi Skupnosti; v zvezi s tem poziva visoko predstavnico/podpredsednico, naj Evropskemu parlamentu nujno posreduje podrobne informacije o najemanju zasebnih vojaških družb in zasebnih varnostnih služb v okviru misij SVOP in SZVP, pri čemer naj opredeli strokovne zahteve in standarde poslovanja, ki se zahtevajo od izvajalcev, predpise, ki se uporabljajo, pravne odgovornosti in obveznosti, mehanizme spremljanja, ocenjevanje učinkovitosti in stroške;
Welcomes the ongoing revision of the existing civilian CSDP concepts; notes in particular that the rule of law will be seen as a central concept for civilian missions covering police, justice, civilian administration, customs, border monitoring and other relevant areas of use to planners and experts on the ground in setting up and conducting missions with strengthening and/or substitution (executive) tasks; endorses the work being done to develop the concept of CSDP justice missions, while observing that needless overlapping with possible Community programmes has to be avoided; calls, in this light, for urgent detailed information to be provided by the HR/VP to the European Parliament on the hiring of private security and military companies (PMSCs) in CSDP and CFSP missions, specifying professional requirements and corporate standards demanded from contractors, applicable regulations and legal responsibilities and obligations, monitoring mechanisms, effectiveness evaluation and costs involved;
ugotavlja tudi, da je Lizbonska pogodba potrdila razširitev misij, ki sodijo v okvir petersberških nalog, ki je dejansko že potekala v letih pred pričetkom veljavnosti Pogodbe, ter na ta način preoblikovala in vzpostavila okrepljen politično-pravni okvir, ki je skladen z dejanskim stanjem;
Recognises also that the Lisbon Treaty has provided for an extension of the Petersberg-type missions, de facto already under way in the years preceding the entry into force of the Treaty, and has thus brought about innovation and provided a stronger political and legal framework consistent with reality;
odločno zagovarja potrebo po nadgradnji pridobljenih izkušenj, da bi misijam dali nov zagon (misija EUTM Somalija predstavlja edino novo misijo v zadnjih dveh letih), saj so misije merilo uspešnosti izvajanja pristojnosti SVOP in tako tudi verodostojnosti Unije kot akterja na mednarodni ravni;
Urges that the experience acquired be turned to account in order to give new impetus to missions (the EUTM Somalia mission is the only new intervention to have been undertaken in the last two years), since missions are the acid test of the CSDP mandate and an important touchstone of the EU's credibility as an international player;
poudarja potrebo po nujnem doseganju konkretnega napredka na različnih tehničnih, pravnih in operativnih področjih, še posebej pa na politično-strateškem področju; zelo priporoča, da se vsaka misija umesti v jasno politično strategijo (na srednji in dolgi rok), ter poudarja, da misije niso nadomestilo za politiko: takšna povezava je bistvenega pomena za operativni uspeh posameznega posredovanja ter za prekinitev začaranega kroga, v katerem SVOP ne nastopa kot instrument SZVP, ampak jo nadomešča, zaradi česar prihaja do številnih nedoslednosti;
Points out that clear-cut progress is needed urgently as regards technical, legal, operational, and above all political and strategic aspects; maintains in particular that every mission should be encompassed within a clear (medium- and long-term) political strategy and underlines that missions are not undertaken as a substitute for policy; considers such linkage to be essential in order to ensure the operational success of interventions and, more generally, break the vicious circle in which the CSDP, rather than being a tool of the CFSP, is tending to replace it, with all the inconsistencies which that entails;
z zaskrbljenostjo ugotavlja, da povezava z jasno politično strategijo do danes ni bila vzpostavljena in da v večini primerov tudi v prihodnje ne bo vzpostavljena, kar bo imelo negativne vplive na uspešnost in učinkovitost misij, na primer:
Notes with concern that linkage to a clear political strategy has to date been lacking and in most cases is still not being provided, a shortcoming which adversely affects the effectiveness and efficiency of missions, for example:
misija EUPOL v Afganistanu ima le ciljni vpliv na ozek krog uradnikov na visoki ravni in je bila šele pred kratkim vključena v akcijski načrt EU AFPAK;
EUPOL Afghanistan is having only a targeted impact concentrating only on high-level officials, and was only recently embedded in the EU AFPAK action plan;
misija EULEX Kosovo, najpomembnejša civilna misija EU, je naletela na številne ovire, predvsem zaradi pomanjkanja zakonodaje za podporo misiji in pomanjkanja kadrov; ne glede na to ima pomembno vlogo na področju oblikovanja pravne države in še naprej zagotavlja stabilnost v regiji;
EULEX Kosovo, the most important civilian mission of the EU, encountered many obstacles, mainly due to the lack of supporting legislation and staff constraints; however, it plays an important role in the field of the rule of law and continues to provide stability in the region;
misija EUBAM Rafah in misija EUPOL COPPS, ki je splošno priznana in sprejeta kot ključni mednarodni strokovni sogovornik o vprašanjih v zvezi z delovanjem policije na palestinskih ozemljih, nista pomembno vplivali na razvoj sporov zaradi neobstoja močne politične in diplomatske strategije, ki bi jo bilo treba oblikovati za ponovno okrepitev delovanja na palestinskih ozemljih;
EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS, which is widely recognised and accepted as the key international expert interlocutor on policing issues in the Palestinian territories, have not been in a position to significantly affect developments in the conflict, because they are not based on any clearcut political and diplomatic strategy, which, however, needs to be sought in order to pave the way for a renewed commitment in the Palestinian territories;
misija EUFOR Althea v Bosni in Hercegovini (ki se je začela leta 2004 z izvajanjem sporazumov Berlin Plus) bi lahko dosegla glavne cilje, za kar pa bi bilo treba s političnega vidika oceniti možnosti za zaključek misije in za vrnitev pomembnih finančnih in človeških virov (več kot 1.400 oseb);
EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina (launched in 2004 under the Berlin Plus arrangements) may have achieved its main aims, and a political assessment should therefore be made with a view to determining whether the mission should be considered completed and the substantial financial and human resources (more than 1 400 people) recovered;
EU je uspešno prevzela vodilno vlogo v mednarodnih prizadevanjih za boj proti piratstvu z misijo EUNAVFOR Somalija (operacija Atalanta), vendar je treba nujno rešiti vprašanje sodne obravnave piratov, zlasti na podlagi Langovega poročila, ki je bilo pred kratkim predloženo Varnostnemu svetu Združenih narodov; operacija Atalanta se sooča s pomanjkanjem izvajanja jasne regionalne strategije, s katero bi odpravili temeljne vzroke za piratstvo in se učinkovito spopadli s kronično nestabilnostjo Afriškega roga; nujno je treba sprejeti ukrepe za izboljšanje zmogljivosti za pomorski nadzor v regiji;
the EU has successfully taken the lead in international efforts to fight piracy through EUNAVFOR Somalia (operation Atalanta) but the issue of judicial treatment of pirates needs to be urgently solved, notably based on the Lang report recently submitted to the UN Security Council; operation Atalanta is being hampered by the lack of implementation of a clear regional strategy to tackle the root causes of piracy and deal effectively with the chronic instability in the Horn of Africa; actions enhancing regional maritime surveillance capabilities should be taken urgently;
misija EUTM se lahko izkaže za protiproduktivno, ker lahko poveča vojaške zmogljivosti morebitnih novih pripadnikov milic v Somaliji;
EUTM may prove counterproductive by enhancing the military capabilities of possible recruits to militias in Somalia;
misiji EUPOL DR Kongo in EUSEC DR Kongo sta v državi od leta 2007 oziroma 2005, vendar imata le omejene pozitivne učinke na ciljne skupine (če sploh); priporoča, da se več pozornosti nameni spolnemu nasilju, da se poveča uspešnost obeh misij;
EUPOL RD Congo and EUSEC RD Congo have been in the country since 2007 and 2005 respectively but have only had limited positive effects on target groups if any; recommends a stronger focus on the issue of sexual violence in order to increase the effectiveness of both missions;
pozdravlja sklep Sveta o izvajanju operacije EUFOR Libija v podporo operacijam za humanitarno pomoč, če bi to zahteval Urad ZN za usklajevanje humanitarnih dejavnosti; poziva Svet, naj nemudoma zagotovi humanitarno pomoč Misrati in drugim naseljenim krajem, zlasti s pomočjo ladjevja; je zelo zaskrbljen zaradi vse večjega števila žrtev konflikta v Libiji ter zaradi poročanj, da naj bi Gadafijev režim proti civilnemu prebivalstvu uporabljal kasetno strelivo in drugo orožje; globoko obžaluje, da je bil mandat misije EUFOR omejen na humanitarne vidike, medtem ko je EU imela jasno priložnost za prevzem vodilne vloge pri pomorskem nadzoru (uveljavljanje embarga in pomoč agenciji Frontex) in humanitarni pomoči ter zaščiti civilistov v Libiji; v zvezi s tem opozarja na svojo resolucijo z dne 10. marca 2011, v kateri poziva visoko predstavnico, naj preuči možnost uveljavljanja embarga z uporabo zračnih in pomorskih zmogljivosti SVOP; obžaluje, da so se nekatere države članice odločile vložiti veto na razširitev mandata za EUFOR v Libiji, hkrati pa so začele samostojno izvajati takšne operacije; poziva k začetku načrtovanja potencialne operacije SVOP v srednjeročnem do dolgoročnem okviru v Libiji na področjih reforme varnostnega sektorja, okrepitve institucij in upravljanja meja;
Welcomes the decision of the Council to conduct the operation EUFOR Libya in support of humanitarian assistance operations if requested by UN OCHA; appeals to the Council to provide immediate humanitarian support to Misrata and other population centres, specifically by naval means; is profoundly concerned about the increasing number of victims of the conflict in Libya and the Gaddafi regime's reported use of cluster munitions and other arms against the civilian population; deeply regrets that the mandate of EUFOR was limited to humanitarian aspects when there was a clear case for the EU to take the lead in maritime surveillance (embargo enforcement and assistance to Frontex) and in humanitarian assistance and protection of civilians in Libya; recalls in this regard its resolution of 10 March 2011 calling on the HR/VP to explore the option of enforcing the embargo by using air and naval CSDP assets; regrets the decision of some Member States to veto a broader mandate for EUFOR Libya while at the same time conducting such operations on their own; calls for a start to be made on planning a potential CSDP operation in the medium to long term in Libya in the areas of security sector reform, institution-building and border management;
poziva k tesnejšemu usklajevanju na terenu, pri čemer je bistvenega pomena vloga vodij delegacij (danes so to uradniki Evropske službe za zunanje delovanje in ne več Komisije) in posebnih predstavnikov Evropske unije; meni, da mora takšno usklajevanje potekati na različnih ravneh, predvsem pa:
Calls for closer coordination on the ground, in which the Heads of Delegation (now EEAS officials and no longer Commission officials) and the EUSRs will have a crucial role to play; considers that such coordination should apply at several levels, in particular:
med misijami EU, ki delujejo na istem območju, s čimer bi se izognili nedoslednosti in podvajanju prizadevanj, kot se je na primer v preteklosti dogajalo v Bosni in Hercegovini zaradi nekdanjih razlik med pristojnostmi misije EUFOR Althea in misije EUPM na področju boja proti organiziranemu kriminalu;
between missions operating in the same theatre, so as to avoid inconsistencies and overlapping of forces of the kind that occurred in the past, for example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina because of the divergences in the mandates of EUFOR Althea and the EUPM mission to combat organised crime;
med misijami SVOP ter ostalimi akterji in instrumenti Unije, predvsem na ozemlju Palestine in Afrike;
between CSDP and other EU actors and instruments, especially in Palestine and in the African missions;
med projekti razvojnega sodelovanja in misijami SVOP v okviru SZVP;
between development cooperation projects and CSDP missions as a part of CFSP;
med EU in drugimi mednarodnimi akterji, ki delujejo na istem področju, s čimer bi izboljšali sodelovanje na strateški (na primer dejavnosti za usposabljanje afganistanskih varnostnih sil, ki so razdeljene med EU, ZDA in NATO) in operativni ravni (predvsem s sklicevanjem na sporazume, ki urejajo manevrski prostor za delovanje na terenu, omogočajo izmenjavo tajnih podatkov in zagotavljajo varovanje evropskega osebja s strani enot Nata);
between the EU and other international players operating in the same area, so as to make for the best possible cooperation from the strategic point of view (for instance as regards the training of Afghan security forces, the activities being split between the EU, the United States and NATO) and in operational terms (with particular reference to agreements to regularise freedom of action on the ground, in order to allow the exchange of classified information, or concerning the protection of European personnel by NATO troops);
priporoča reformo mehanizma ATHENA, s katero bi racionalizirali in povečali delež skupnih stroškov (ki so v tem trenutku ocenjeni na približno 10 %) ter tako zagotovili pravičnejšo porazdelitev bremen vojaških operacij, v katerih bi morali sodelujoči v misiji, ki že nosijo izjemno odgovornost glede tveganj in stroškov, glede na sedanje razmere prevzeti še dodatno ekonomsko odgovornost;
Recommends that the ATHENA mechanism be reformed with a view to rationalising and increasing the proportion of common costs (at present estimated to be about 10%) so as to make for fairer burden-sharing in military operations, in which the participants in a mission, who already bear a heavy responsibility in terms of risks and costs, are obliged in the current situation to undertake a further economic responsibility;
poziva, naj se skladno z določbami Lizbonske pogodbe oblikuje zagonski sklad za pripravljalne dejavnosti pred pričetkom vojaških operacij, ki bo pospešil dodeljevanje sredstev, in naj se ta ukrep vključi v predlog za revizijo mehanizma ATHENA;
Calls for the establishment, as provided for in the Lisbon Treaty, of the start-up fund for preparatory activities in the lead-up to military operations to speed up the disbursement of funds, and for this measure to be covered by the ATHENA mechanism review proposal;