natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ta pogodba ni dala nikakršnih informacij o posebnih pristojnostih, dodeljenih preiskovalnim odborom Parlamenta, temveč je opredelitev podrobnejših določb prepustila prihodnjim medinstitucionalnim sporazumom.
The Treaty did not provide information on specific powers granted to EP committees of inquiry, leaving instead the definition of any detailed provision to a future inter-institutional agreement.
Parlament je nemudoma začel pripravljati tak sporazum, vendar je bil šele po dolgotrajnih pogajanjih in po izdelavi dveh poročil
The Parliament immediately started to prepare such an agreement, and only after long negotiations and the production of two reports
A3-0302/92 in A4-0003/95 . medinstitucionalni sklep o podrobnih določbah, ki urejajo izvrševanje preiskovalne pravice Evropskega parlamenta, sprejet leta 1995
A3-0302/92 and A4-0003/95 . an inter-institutional decision on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the European Parliament's right of inquiry was adopted in 1995
Sklep 95/167/ES, Euratom, ESPJ. .
Decision 95/167/EC, Euratom, ECSC. .
Parlament svojo pravico uveljavlja kar previdno.
The Parliament has used its right quite prudently.
Od leta 1995 dalje so bili ustanovljeni le trije preiskovalni odbori:
Since 1995 only three committees of inquiry have been set up:
– TRANSIT - za preiskavo tranzitnega režima Skupnosti,
- TRANSIT - of Inquiry into the Community Transit Regime,
– ESB1 – za preiskavo BSE (goveje spongiformne encefalopatije),
- ESB1 - of Inquiry into BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy),
– EQUI - za preiskavo finančnega zloma družbe Equitable Life Assurance Society.
- EQUI - of Inquiry into the crisis of the Equitable Life Assurance Society.
Odbor EQUI je zelo zgodaj med svojimi zasedanji odkril, da imajo preiskovalni odbori omejene pristojnosti, ki niso v skladu s političnim statusom, potrebami in pristojnostmi Evropskega parlamenta.
During its sessions, the EQUI committee soon discovered the limited powers granted to committees of inquiry, which ultimately appeared to be not in line with the political stature, needs and competences of the European Parliament.
V zvezi s tem je odbor EQUI v svojem poročilu navedel naslednje:
In this regard the EQUI committee noted in its report that:
Odbor ima, razen v razmerju do Evropske komisije, zelo malo pristojnosti: ne more pozivati prič, če morebitna priča ne sodeluje v preiskavi, zanjo ni posledic, stroškov ali kazni ter niso predvidene sankcije za krivo pričanje, odsotnost ali zavrnitev pričanja pred odborom.
Except with regard to the European Commission, the committee has very little power: it cannot summon witnesses, there are no consequences, cost or penalty if a possible witness refuses to cooperate with the inquiry, and there are no sanctions for giving false testimony or for refusing to attend or to give evidence before the committee.
Odbor prav tako nima preiskovalnih pristojnosti, ki bi bile podobne sodiščem, v razmerju do nacionalnih uprav ali ko upravni ali zasebni organ odboru noče izročiti dokumentacije.
The committee has no investigative powers similar to the Courts in connection with national administrations or when an administrative or private body refuses to deliver documentation to the committee.
Prav tako ne more med preiskavo prositi nacionalno sodišče za pomoč
Neither does it have the possibility to ask a national Court for assistance in the course of its investigation
Odbor EQUI je poudaril, da so te težave ravno tiste, ki so prišle na dan tudi med medinstitucionalnimi pogajanji leta 1995.
These problems, highlighted by the EQUI committee, were in fact the same controversial points previously emerged during the inter-institutional negotiations in 1995.
Na tej podlagi je Evropski parlament 19. junija 2007
On this basis, the European Parliament produced in 19 June 2007
P6_TA(2007)0264 . objavil priporočilo, v katerem je konferenco predsednikov pozval, naj udejanji priporočila iz poročila odbora EQUI, povezana zlasti s prihodnjo reformo preiskovalnih odborov.
P6_TA(2007)0264 . a recommendation calling the Conference of Presidents to enact those recommendations already contained within the EQUI Committee's report, mainly related to the future reform of inquiry committees.
Zakaj naj se reforma začne zdaj?
Why start this reform now?
Lizbonska pogodba je spremenila institucionalno ravnovesje Unije in okrepila politični status Parlamenta.
The Treaty of Lisbon modified the institutional balance of the Union and strengthened the political stature of Parliament.
Člen 14 PEU izrecno določa, da Parlament izvaja politični nadzor.
Article 14 TEU expressly sets out that Parliament exercises political control.
Pogodba je tudi spremenila postopek za določitev pravil o uresničevanju pravice do preiskave.
The Treaty also changed the procedure for determining the provisions governing the exercise of the right of inquiry.
Člen 226 določa: „Podrobne določbe ... določi Evropski parlament na lastno pobudo z uredbami, sprejetimi po posebnem zakonodajnem postopku, in po odobritvi Sveta in Komisije.“
Article 226 says that: " The detailed provisions.....shall be determined by the European Parliament, acting by means of regulations on its own initiative in accordance with a special legislative procedure, after obtaining the consent of the Council and the Commission".
To je bila v preteklosti skupna odločitev treh glavnih evropskih institucij, Lizbonska pogodba pa pravico do pobude podeljuje Parlamentu.
Whereas in the past it was a shared decision between the three main European institutions, the treaty of Lisbon explicitly gives the right of initiative to the Parliament.
Vseeno mora Parlament od Sveta in Komisije pridobiti formalno privolitev.
Nevertheless, the Parliament still has to obtain formal consent from the Council and from the Commission.
Še en razlog, ki govori v prid temu, da se revizija opravi sedaj, je, da so zadnje spremembe statuta varuha človekovih pravic
Another reason to start this revision now is that the latest amendments to the Ombudsman's Statute
25. varuhu podelile večje pristojnosti v primerjavi s preiskovalnimi odbori Parlamenta.
25. gave the Ombudsman broader powers compared to the Parliament's committees of inquiry.
Priporočilo Evropskega parlamenta z 19. junija 2007, ki je temeljilo na poročilu odbora EQUI in katerega namen je bil izboljšanje delovanje in učinkovitosti prihodnjih preiskovalnih odborov, je že predvidelo reformo predpisov, ki urejajo delovanje teh odborov.
Aiming at improving the functioning and effectiveness of future committees of inquiry, the European Parliament's recommendation of 19 June 2007, based on the report of the EQUI Committee, already envisaged a reform of the rules governing such committees.
V skladu s študijo, ki jo je odbor opravil v zvezi z razmerami v 12 državah članicah in Švici, so nacionalni parlamenti pri opravljanju preiskav v veliko boljšem položaju.
According to the study made by the committee on the situation in 12 Member States and Switzerland, national parliaments are much better equipped for undertaking inquiries than the EP.
Kasneje je politični oddelek posodobil raziskavo in jo razširil na države članice, ki prvotno niso bile vključene.
Subsequently, the Policy Department updated the survey and extended it to those Member States that were not included in the former survey.
Rezultati kažejo, da ima večina držav članic ustavni sistem, ki predvideva preiskovalne odbore.
The results show that the majority of Member States have a constitutional system that provides for inquiry committees.
V večini držav članic imajo ti odbori preiskovalne pristojnosti, ki so, čeprav manj obsežne, podobne pristojnostim pravih sodišč.
In most of the Member States these committees have investigative powers similar to those of proper courts, even if to a lesser extent.
V večini držav članic, ki imajo podlago za preiskovalne odbore, lahko le-ti tudi pozivajo priče k pričanju.
In most Member States which have a legal basis for inquiry committees there is also the possibility for them to summon witnesses to give evidence.
Sankcije za nespoštovanje poziva se med državami razlikujejo.
In case of non-compliance, sanctions vary from country to country.
V primerjavi s temi določbami so veljavna pravila o preiskovalnih odborih Evropskega parlamenta veliko bolj restriktivna, zlasti kar zadeva pozivanje prič in sankcije za nespoštovanje poziva.
Compared to these provisions, the present set of rules concerning inquiry committees in the European Parliament are much more restrictive, in particular concerning the summoning of witnesses and sanctions for those refusing to cooperate.
Glede na to, da pogodba Parlamentu podeljuje pravico do pobude, se uporabi postopek iz člena 41 poslovnika (pravica do pobude, prenesena na Evropski parlament s pogodbami).
Because the Treaty gives the Parliament the right of initiative, the procedure used is the one set out by Rule 41 of the Rules of Procedure "Rights of initiative conferred on Parliament by the Treaties".
Ker je postopek bil spremenjen, Parlament ne zgolj spreminja stari sklep, temveč lahko predlaga novo uredbo, kakor je povedano zgoraj
Since the procedure has changed, the Parliament does not simply make amendments to the old decision, but can propose instead a new regulation as reminded above
Tehnična podrobnost, vendar je vredna omembe: člen 107b Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti za atomsko energijo je bil razveljavljen s protokolom št. 2, ki je bil priložen Lizbonski pogodbi, ki spreminja Pogodbo o Evropski uniji in Pogodbo o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti; vendar zaradi člena 106a Pogodbe o ustanovitvi ESAA člen 226 PDEU velja za Evropsko skupnost za atomsko energijo. .
A technical detail, but worth mentioning: Article 107b of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community was repealed by Protocol No 2 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community; however, by virtue of Article 106a of the EAEC Treaty, Article 226 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU is applicable to the European Atomic Energy Community. .
Kakšne so predlagane izboljšave?
What are the proposed improvements?
Preiskovalni odbor mora imeti pri preiskavi domnevnih kršitev prava Unije ali nepravilnosti potrebna sredstva za izvajanje svojih nalog.
Committees of inquiry must have the necessary means to carry out their tasks of examining alleged contraventions of Union law or maladministration.
To je v skladu s sodno prakso Sodišča, iz katere sledi: kadar je s členom Pogodbe instituciji ali organu Unije dodeljena določena naloga, je treba sprejeti, da se na ta organ prenese pooblastila, ki so nujna za izvajanje naloge, sicer postane ta določba popolnoma brezpredmetna
This is in line with the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice: where an article of the Treaty confers a specific task on a Union institution or body it must be accepted, if that provision is not to be rendered wholly ineffective, that it confers on that body "necessarily and per se the powers which are indispensable in order to carry out that task"
Glej sodbo z dne 9. julija 1987 v zadevi št. 281/85. .
Cf. judgement 9 July 1987 in Case 281/85. .
Poročevalec je uporabil različne vire, da je lahko predlog za novo uredbo oblikoval čisto od začetka, kar je prvič v zgodovini te institucije.
In order to draft a proposal for a new regulation from scratch ― for the first time in the history of this House ― your rapporteur drew inspiration from various sources.
Med najpomembnejšimi viri pri oblikovanju uredbe sta bila statut in poslovnik Sodišča Evropske unije, zlasti členi 24–30, 47–53 in 75.
The Statute and Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the EU, especially Articles 24-30 and Articles 47-53, 75 respectively, was one of the most important sources of inspiration.
Dragocen primer tega, kako podeliti pooblastila za preiskavo na nadnacionalni ravni, sta bila tudi Uredba (EC) št. 1073/1999 o preiskavah, ki jih izvaja OLAF, in Sklep 94/262/ESPJ, ES, Euratom o nalogah varuha človekovih pravic.
Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 concerning investigations conducted by OLAF and Decision 94/262/ECSC, EC, Euratom on the Ombudsman's duties gave valuable examples on how to establish powers of inquiry on a supranational level.
Dokument političnega oddelka (Študija o parlamentarnih preiskovalnih odborih) pa je nudil pregled pooblastil in postopkov preiskovalnih odborov v posameznih državah.
The document by the Policy Department ( Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry: A Survey) gave an overview on the powers and procedures of committees of inquiry in various countries.
Seveda se je upoštevalo tudi druga besedila, ki so bila v preteklosti oblikovana v zvezi s preiskovalnimi odbori Evropskega parlamenta
Naturally, previous texts produced in connection with EP's committees of inquiry were not ignored
Poročilo o krizi družbe „Equitable Life Assurance Society“ ( A6-0203/2007 ); Poročilo z dne 21. julija 1995 o spremembi člena 136 Poslovnika (A4-0187-95); Poročilo z dne 12. januarja 1995 o podrobnih določbah, ki urejajo pravico Evropskega parlamenta do preiskave ( A4-0003/95 ); Delovni dokument z dne 3. januarja 1995 o pravici Evropskega parlamenta do preiskave (Poročevalec: Alexander Langer); Poročilo z dne 14. oktobra 1992 o parlamentarnih preiskovalnih odborih ( A3-0302/92 ); Delovni dokument z dne 2. junija 1992 o parlamentarnih preiskovalnih odborih (Poročevalec: François Musso). .
Report on the Crisis of the Equitable life Assurance Society ( A6-0203/2007 ); Report of 21 July 1995 on amendment of Rule 136 of the Rules of Procedure (A4-0187-95); Report of 12 January 1995 on the detailed provisions governing the EP's right of inquiry ( A4-0003/95 ); Working Document of 3 January 1995 on EP's right of inquiry (Rapporteur: Alexander Langer); Report of 14 October 1992 on parliamentary committees of inquiry ( A3-0302/92 ); Working document of 2 June 1992 on parliamentary committees of inquiry (Rapporteur: François Musso). .
Pri razmisleku so pomagali tudi odlični dokumenti, sporočila in prispevki, ki jih je pripravila naša pravna služba.
Excellent documents, notes and contributions from our Legal Service also helped to move forward the reflection.
Nenazadnje se bodo v novem pravnem instrumentu brez dvoma pojavile tudi nekatere nesporne in koristne določbe iz starega sklepa.
Finally, some uncontested and useful provisions contained in the old decision will no doubt survive in the new legal instrument.
Ta predlog uredbe ponuja bolj jasno in logično strukturo, kot jo je nudil stari sklep.
This proposal for a regulation offers a clearer and more logical structure compared to the one provided by the old decision.
Najpomembnejše izboljšave je mogoče najti v oddelku 3 pod naslovom Preiskava.
The most important improvements can be found in Section 3 (Investigation).
Izhodišče našega razmišljanja je bilo prepričanje, da bi morali vsi sklepi preiskave temeljiti na prvinah z dokazno vrednostjo.
The starting point of our reflection was the belief that all conclusions of an inquiry should be based solely on elements which have evidential value.
S tem namenom bi moral biti preiskovalni odbor sposoben v mejah svojih pooblastil izvesti celotno preiskavo, ki naj bi bila potrebna za izpolnitev njegove naloge, to je s pomočjo dejanskih dokazov odkriti resnico o določenih elementih iz preteklosti.
To this end, a committee of inquiry should be able to carry out, within the limits of its mandate, any investigation considered necessary in order to fulfil its task, namely to find out the truth about certain elements of the past with the help of factual evidence.
V skladu s predlaganim osnutkom uredbe lahko odbor izvaja vse vrste preiskave, s podrobnimi določbami za najpomembnejše ukrepe, in sicer opravi preiskave na kraju samem, zahteva dokumente, zasliši uradnike in druge uslužbence Unije ter držav članic, pozove priče in zaprosi za izvedenska poročila.
Therefore, according to the draft regulation proposed, the committee could carry out any type of investigation, with detailed provisions for the most important ones, i.e. to conduct on-the-spot investigations, to request documents, to hear officials and other servants of the Union and Member States, to summon witnesses and to request an expert's report.
Preiskovalni odbori morajo imeti dostop do vseh dokumentov, bodisi administrativnih ali drugih, in do vseh informacij, ki lahko olajšajo njihovo delo.
Committees of inquiry should have access to all documents ― administrative or otherwise ― and to any information which may facilitate their work.
Imeti morajo možnost, da informacije prejmejo od Unije in nacionalnih organov ter od fizičnih in pravnih oseb.
They should be able to obtain such information both from Union and national bodies and from natural or legal persons.
Vendar so za to lahko pooblaščeni le v primerih, ko med zaprošeno informacijo ali dokumentom ter nalogo, ki jo opravljajo, obstaja povezava.
Nevertheless, this power should be used only in those cases where there is a link between the piece of information or document requested and the task of the committee of inquiry in question.
Na tej osnovi bi moral imeti preiskovalni odbor tudi možnost, da k pričevanju pozove vse osebe (uradnike Unije ali nacionalne uradnike, strokovnjake, predstavnike pravnih oseb itd.), katerih dokazno gradivo ali strokovno znanje bi bilo potrebno za uspešnejšo preiskavo primera.
On the same basis, committees of inquiry should be able to summon before them any person (Union or national officials, technical experts, spokespersons for legal persons, etc.) whose evidence or expertise is deemed necessary to better investigate the case in question.
Za dosego omenjenih ciljev uvaja osnutek uredbe neposredno obveznost predložitve dokumentov, za katere je zaprosil odbor, in pričevanja.
In order to achieve the above aims, the draft regulation establishes a direct obligation to make available the documents requested by the committee and to appear and to testify as a witness.
Vendar pa se lahko ohrani postopek iz prvotnega sklepa, po katerem lahko uradnike in druge uslužbence EU in držav članic, ki se udeležijo postopka, imenuje njihova hierarhija.
However, a procedure contained in the original decision could be maintained: officials and other servants of the EU or Member States can be designated by their hierarchy to take part in the proceedings.
V tem primeru je mogoče pričakovati, da bodo ti dejansko delovali po navodilih.
In that case it is not unrealistic to imagine that they would practically act under instructions.
Če odbor z dokumenti ali izjavami, podanimi po tem postopku, ne bo zadovoljen, bo lahko uporabil svoja nova, večja pooblastila, in sicer bo lahko te osebe neposredno pozval k pričanju.
However, if not satisfied with the documents or statements submitted according to this procedure, the committee could use its new, stronger powers ― namely to summon those persons directly as witnesses.
Na ta način se ne bo ukinilo starega načina, ki temelji na dobri volji in lojalnem sodelovanju med institucijami EU in državami članicami, vendar pa bo nevarnost tega, da bi odbor uveljavil svoja nova okrepljena pooblastila, institucije EU ali države članice, ki so predmet preiskave, spodbudila k preudarnosti.
Thus the old modality (which is based on the good will and loyal cooperation of EU institutions and Member States) is not abolished, but the threat by the committee of using its new enhanced powers could mean the "beginning of wisdom" for those EU institutions or Member States under investigation.
Zelo pomembna izboljšava tega pravnega načina bi bila, če bi bile osebe, ki so bile ustrezno pozvane k pričevanju, dolžne, da na vprašanja, ki jim jih zastavijo člani odbora, odgovorijo s pripravljenostjo, v celoti in po resnici.
A very important improvement of this new legal modality would be that duly summoned witnesses will have the obligation to willingly, fully and truthfully answer the questions presented to them by members of the committee.
To se zdi ustrezen pravni okvir, s katerim bi zagotovili, da je politični nadzor, ki ga izvaja Evropski parlament kot edina neposredno izvoljena institucija Unije, resen, učinkovit in v skladu s pričakovanji evropskih državljanov o demokratični odgovornosti in dobrem upravljanju.
This legal setting appears appropriate enough to ensure that the political control exercised by the European Parliament ― the only directly elected Union institution ― is ultimately serious, efficient and in line with the European citizens' expectations of democratic accountability and good governance.
Hkrati pa bi moralo biti neizpolnjevanje teh obveznosti ustrezno kaznovano.
On the same note, non compliance with these obligations should entail appropriate penalties.
V skladu z načeloma nullum crimen sine lege in nulla poena sine lege, ki sta zapisana v členu 49 Listine o temeljnih pravicah, bi morala uredba države članice zavezati k temu, da bi bile jasno opredeljene kršitve – kot so neutemeljena nepripravljenost, da bi zagotovili zaprošene dokumente, neutemeljena zavrnitev, da bi se odzvali na poziv in se udeležili zaslišanja kot priče, lažno pričanje in podkupovanje prič – ustrezno kaznovane v skladu z nacionalno zakonodajo.
In order to respect the principles of nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege, as set out in Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the regulation should oblige Member States to ensure that precisely defined infringements ― groundless refusal to provide the requested documents; groundless refusal to obey the summons and to attend for examination as a witness; false testimony; and bribing of witnesses ― will be subjected to appropriate sanctions according to their national laws.
Evropski parlament ni sodišče, saj sam nima pooblastil za izrekanje kazni posameznim državljanom.
The European Parliament is no court; indeed, it has no power in itself to impose penalties on individual citizens.
Vendar pa so se vse države članice ob sprejetju Lizbonske pogodbe sporazumele, da bodo Evropskemu parlamentu podelile pravico preiskovanja kršitev ali nepravilnosti pri izvajanju prava Unije.
Nevertheless, when all the Member States have adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, they have also agreed to give the European Parliament the right to investigate contraventions and maladministration in the implementation of Union law.
S tem so se obvezale, da bodo njihovi upravni sistemi nudili pomoč vsem morebitnim preiskovalnim odborom Evropskega parlamenta.
This should bind them to oblige their own administrative system to give assistance to any eventual EP inquiry committees.
Konec koncev pa je cilj ustanovitve preiskovalnega obora odpraviti nezakonito ali krivično stanje.
Finally, the aim of setting up a committee of inquiry is to provide a remedy for an illegal or unfair situation.
Da bi poiskali najprimernejše rešitve, bi morale preiskave voditi v različne zaključke.
Inquiries should thus have a wide range of possible outcomes, in order to provide the most appropriate solution.
Pri tem velja znova poudariti, da je, ne glede na pooblastila preiskovalnega odbora za izvajanje nalog, končna odločitev v rokah Parlamenta.
In this occasion it should be recalled that the final power of decision ― regardless of the powers conferred to the committees of inquiry to perform their duties ― ultimately belongs to Parliament.
Zaključki preiskovalnega odbora se lahko Parlamentu predložijo v obliki končnega poročila.
The conclusions of the committees of inquiry could thus be submitted in the form of a final report to Parliament.
Nato je od Parlamenta odvisno, ali iz končnega poročila sprejme enega ali več priporočil, tako da na primer poročilo objavi, predlaga zakonodajno pobudo, napoti zadevo na pristojne organe Unije ali nacionalne organe, naslovi zadevo na varuha človekovih pravic ali glede na okoliščine sprejme druge ustrezne ukrepe.
It would then be up to Parliament to take up one or more of the recommendations contained in the final report, such as deciding to publish the report, putting forward a legislative initiative, referring the matter to the competent Union or national authorities, referring the matter to the Ombudsman or taking any other appropriate action, according to the specific circumstances.