natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
poziva Komisijo, naj oceni strateške in politične posledice nedavnih katastrofalnih poplav v Pakistanu na Afganistan in širšo regijo, ter sprejme vse potrebne ukrepe za pomoč prizadetim prebivalcem države in afganistanskim beguncem, katerih taborišča so bila v celoti poplavljena;
Calls on the Commission to evaluate the strategic and political implications for Afghanistan and the broader region of the recent disastrous floods in Pakistan, and to take every necessary step to assist the affected population of the country and the Afghan refugees whose camps were overwhelmed by the flooding;
poudarja pomembnost dobrega ravnanja z vodo v Afganistanu in njegovi bližini ter poudarja koristi regionalnega in čezmejnega sodelovanja na tem področju, tudi glede boljšega zaupanja med sosedskimi državami v jugozahodni Aziji;
Stresses the importance of good water management in and around Afghanistan and highlights the benefits of regional and cross-border cooperation in this field, inter alia in terms of confidence-building among neighbours in South-West Asia;
je seznanjen z vpletenostjo pakistanske tajne službe (ISI), s ciljem zagotoviti, da bo tudi za Pakistan izid kakršnega koli mirovnega procesa zadovoljiv;
Notes the involvement of the Pakistan Intelligence Service (ISI) aimed at making sure that Pakistan, too, gets a satisfactory outcome from any peace dividend;
vendar poudarja, da se mir v Afganistanu lahko zakorenini le, če se bodo politično dogovorile glavne regionalne sile, vključno z Indijo, Pakistanom, Iranom in državami osrednje Azije, Rusijo, Kitajsko in Turčijo, ter bo doseženo skupno politično stališče nevmešavanja in podpore neodvisnemu Afganistanu; poziva tudi k ureditvi odnosov med Afganistanom in Pakistanom, predvsem s pomočjo končne poravnave vprašanja mednarodne meje med obema državama;
Stresses, however, that for peace to be allowed to take root in Afghanistan will require political deals among key regional powers, including India, Pakistan, Iran and the Central Asian States, Russia, China and Turkey, and a common position of non-interference and support for an independent Afghanistan; calls, too, for normalisation of the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, namely through a final settlement on the issue of the international border between the two countries;
poziva EU, naj še nadalje podpre mirovni in spravni proces v Afganistanu ter afganistanska prizadevanja za ponovno vključitev tistih, ki so pripravljeni odreči se nasilju, in omogoči vladi Karzaja dovolj prožnosti pri izbiri partnerjev za dialog, a vztraja, naj afganistanska ustava in spoštovanje temeljnih človekovih pravic tvorita splošen pravni in politični okvir mirovnega procesa;
Calls on the EU to continue to support the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan as well as Afghan efforts to reintegrate those ready to renounce violence, allowing the Karzai Government enough flexibility in its choice of dialogue partners, but insisting that the Afghan Constitution and respect for fundamental human rights form the overall legal and political framework for the peace process;
pozdravlja nacionalne prednostne programe, ki jih je pripravila afganistanska vlada v skladu z afganistansko nacionalno razvojno strategijo in ki so dobili podporo na kabulski konferenci, ter poziva k njihovi popolni in učinkoviti izvedbi;
Welcomes the National Priority Programmes prepared by the Afghan Government in line with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and supported by the Kabul Conference, and calls for their full and effective implementation;
močno poudarja potrebo po veliko bolj dejavni vlogi EU pri obnovi in razvoju Afganistana, saj dolgoročen mir v državi ali celotni regiji ni mogoč brez bistvenega zmanjšanja revščine in brez trajnostnega razvoja; se zaveda, da razvoj ni možen brez varnosti, prav tako pa ni varnosti brez razvoja;
Cannot stress strongly enough the need for a much more active EU role in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, as no lasting peace is possible in the country itself or in the region as a whole without significant poverty reduction and sustainable development; recognises that there is no development without security, as there is no security without development;
poziva EU in njene države članice, naj skupaj z Združenimi državami usmerijo več mednarodne pomoči preko lokalnih oblasti in vlade v Kabulu ter zagotovijo, da se letala brez pilota, posebne sile in lokalne milice uporabljajo v skladu z ukazi generala Petraeusa o netoleriranju izgub življenj nedolžnega civilnega prebivalstva;
Urges the EU and its Member States to work together with the United States to channel more of the international aid effort through domestic authorities and the Kabul Government, and to ensure that drones, special forces and local militias against Taliban leaders are used according to General Petraeus‘ orders for zero tolerance on the loss of innocent civilians’ lives;
izkazuje spoštovanje vsem vojaškim uslužbencem in uslužbenkam zavezniških sil, ki so izgubili življenje pri branjenju svobode, in izraža sožalje njihovim družinam ter družinam nedolžnih afganistanskih žrtev;
Pays tribute to the servicemen and women of all the Allied Forces who have lost their lives in defending freedom, and expresses its condolences to their families, as well as to the families of all innocent Afghan victims;
poudarja, da je vojaška prisotnost nekaterih držav članic EU in njihovih zaveznic v Afganistanu del operacij Mednarodnih sil za varnostno pomoč in Nata ter njihovih ciljev glede boja proti grožnji mednarodnega terorizma ter proti proizvodnji mamil in njihovi preprodaji;
Points out that the military presence of some EU Member States and their allies in Afghanistan is part of the NATO/ISAF operation and its objectives of combating the threat of international terrorism and tackling drug cultivation and trafficking;
poudarja, da ta prisotnost lahko pomaga pri ustvarjanju varnostnih pogojev, ki bi omogočili nedavne načrte afganistanske vlade glede uresničevanja izkoriščanja potencialno obsežne rudarske in mineralne državne industrije, s čimer bi bila zagotovljena lastna sredstva, ki jih nujno potrebuje državni proračun;
Stresses that this presence can help create the security conditions that would allow for recent plans by the Afghan Government to exploit the country's potentially vast mining and minerals industry to be put into practice, thus providing it with sorely needed own resources for the national budget;
poudarja, da potencialno obsežni rudarski in mineralni viri na afganistanskem ozemlju pripadajo izrecno le afganistanskemu ljudstvu ter da „zaščita“ teh virov ne sme biti izgovor za stalno prisotnost tuje vojske na afganistanskem ozemlju;
Stresses that the potentially vast mining and minerals resources on Afghan territory belong exclusively to the people of Afghanistan, and that ‘protection’ of these assets can never be used as an excuse for the permanent presence of foreign troops on Afghan soil;
ugotavlja, da v Afganistanu ne more biti stabilnosti ali miru brez države, ki predvsem zagotavlja varnost svojim državljanom na lastno odgovornost;
Notes that there can be no stability or peace in Afghanistan without the state first of all guaranteeing security for its citizens on its own responsibility;
pozdravlja cilj predsednika Karzaja, da bodo lahko do konca leta 2014 vojaške operacije v vseh pokrajinah vodile in izvajale le afganistanske nacionalne varnostne sile, ter zavezo afganistanske vlade do postopnega izvajanja polne oblasti nad svojo varnostjo;
Welcomes President Karzai's objective that, by the end of 2014, only the Afghan National Security Forces should lead and conduct military operations in all provinces, as well as the Afghan Government's commitment to a phased exercise of full authority over its own security;
poudarja, da Afganistan potrebuje učinkovite policijske sile in neodvisno vojsko, ki bodo zmožne zagotavljati varnost, da se tako omogoči posledični umik tuje vojske iz države;
Stresses that Afghanistan must be provided with an efficient police force and an autonomous army capable of ensuring security so as to permit a subsequent withdrawal of the foreign military presence from the country;
ceni zamisel generala Petraeusa, da bi se lokalne, demokratično izvoljene oblasti lahko uskladile z lokalno žandarmerijo za ohranjanje reda in miru ter varovanje lokalnega prebivalstva;
Sees merit in General Petraeus's idea that local, democratically elected authorities could be given a local gendarmerie to maintain law and order and protect the local population;
vendar priznava, da je obstoj samostojnih varnostnih sil precej dolgoročen cilj in zato zlasti poudarja potrebo po bolj usklajenem in celostnem pristopu do usposabljanja policije ter posebej usposabljanja vojaških oficirjev in opozarja na financiranje, vloženo v usposabljanje policije, z omejenimi rezultati; poziva vse udeležene, naj natančno uskladijo svoje delo, da se bodo izognili nepotrebnim podvajanjem in izpolnili dodatne naloge na strateški in operativni ravni;
Recognises, however, that having self-sustaining security forces is a somewhat long-term goal and therefore draws particular attention to the need for a more coordinated and integrated approach in the training of police, as well as, separately, the training of army officers, and draws attention to the funding being invested in police training, with limited results; calls on all those involved to coordinate their work closely in order to avoid unnecessary duplication and to fulfil complementary tasks at strategic and operational levels;
poudarja potrebo po obsežni reformi notranjega ministrstva, brez katere bi lahko prizadevanja za reformo in oblikovanje nove policije spodletela, in v zvezi s tem opozarja, kako pomembni so na ravni notranjega ministrstva, regij in pokrajin nadzor, podpora, posvetovanje in usposabljanje v skladu z nadaljnjim ciljem misije EUPOL;
Highlights the need for a comprehensive reform of the Interior Ministry, without which the efforts to reform and build a new police force could fail, and points in this context to the importance of monitoring, support, advice and training at Interior Ministry, regional and provincial level, in line with a further objective of EUPOL;
meni, da očitna nedoločenost mandata EUPOL in omejeni rezultati, ki jih je do zdaj dosegla, preprečujejo, da bi pridobila vodilno vlogo v okviru EU, ki si jo zasluži; obžaluje, da tri leta po svoji uvedbi EUPOL še vedno ni dosegla treh četrtin svojih odobrenih zmogljivosti; ponovno poziva Svet in države članice EU, naj v celoti izpolnijo svoje obveznosti do te misije;
Believes that the undeniable vagueness of EUPOL's remit and its limited achievements to date prevent it from acquiring the leading EU role it deserves; deplores the fact that three years after its deployment EUPOL still has not reached three-quarters of its authorised strength; and reiterates its call to the Council and the EU Member States to honour in full their commitments towards this mission;
pozdravlja, da je EUPOL v Afganistanu ustanovil urad državnega tožilca za boj proti korupciji za preiskovanje zadev zoper javne uradnike na visokih položajih in druge uradnike, osumljene korupcije;
Welcomes the setting up by EUPOL Afghanistan of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office with the aim of investigating cases against high-profile public officials and other officials suspected of corruption;
izraža zaskrbljenost zaradi podatkov Mednarodne varnostne sile za pomoč (ISAF), po katerih je od 94.000 mož v afganistanski nacionalni policiji skoraj 90 % nepismenih, 20 % je uporabnikov drog, nad 30 % pa jih po enem letu izgine, ne da bi omenili približno 1000 policistov, ki so ubiti v službi vsako leto;
Is disturbed by the ISAF figures indicating that of the 94 000 men in the Afghan National Police almost 90% are illiterate, 20% are drug users, and over 30% go missing after a year, not to mention the 1 000 or so killed in service every year;
meni, da so glavni vzroki za neučinkovitost splošnega usposabljanja pomanjkanje usklajevanja različnih vidikov usposabljanja policije in da se naloge usposabljanja prepuščajo zasebnim vojaškim in varnostnim izvajalcem;
Believes that major factors behind the ineffectiveness of the overall training are a lack of coordination of the various aspects of police training and the practice of transferring duties to private military and security companies (PMSC);
opaža, da prevladovanje praks, kot je hiter pristop, ki jih izvaja nekaj velikih varnostnih podjetij iz ZDA (slabo preverjanje kandidatov, šest tednov usposabljanja brez učbenikov zaradi nepismenosti pripravnikov, minimalno usposabljanje na terenu, pripravniki pa nato dobijo značko, uniformo in pištolo ter so poslani na patruljo), ogroža zavezo EU in držav članic glede oblikovanja strokovne afganistanske policijske sile; poudarja, da potrebujemo skladnejše in trajnejše policijsko urjenje, da se omogoči sodelovanje različnih afganistanskih policijskih sil; poudarja, da se misije policijskega usposabljanja ne smejo osredotočiti le na tehnične vidike, ampak morajo rekrutom zagotoviti pismenost in osnovno poznavanje nacionalnega in mednarodnega prava;
Notes that the commitment by the EU and its Member States to the creation of a professional Afghan police force risks being compromised by the prevalence of practices such as the ‘fast-track’ approach (poor vetting of recruits, six weeks of training with no textbooks because of trainee illiteracy, minimal field training, recruits then given a badge, uniform and gun and sent out on patrol) implemented by a few big US security companies; emphasises the need for more coherent and sustainable police training enabling different Afghan police forces to work together; stresses that police training missions should not only focus on technical aspects but must guarantee recruits‘ literacy and give them a basic knowledge of national and international law;
je zbegan zaradi ugotovljenega slabega finančnega nadzora nad temi zasebnimi podjetji ter navaja ugotovitve skupnega poročila zunanjega in obrambnega ministrstva ZDA iz leta 2006, ki še vedno veljajo, namreč da so policijske sile v Afganistanu nesposobne izvajati običajno delo kazenskega pregona ter da ne obstaja učinkovit program usposabljanja na terenu; priznava poskuse glavnega poveljstva v okviru politike proti uporu, da bi do neke mere izvajal nadzor nad zasebnimi tujimi milicami, ki v Afganistanu delujejo nekaznovano;
Is disturbed to learn of the poor financial controls being applied to these private companies, and cites a 2006 joint US Defense and State Department report, the findings of which are still valid today, concluding that the police force in Afghanistan was incapable of carrying out routine law enforcement work and that no effective field training programme existed; acknowledges the attempts by the general command, and under the counter-insurgency policy, to exercise some degree of control over the private foreign militias operating with impunity in Afghanistan;
priporoča, naj se usposabljanje policije čim prej neha izvajati v okviru zasebnih izvajalcev;
Recommends that police training should, as soon as possible, cease to be carried out by private contractors;
poziva k boljšemu mednarodnemu sodelovanju in usklajevanju, da bi občutno povečali zmogljivosti policijskega usposabljanja in dodatno izboljšali učinkovitost programov usposabljanja; predlaga, naj EUPOL in Mednarodne sile za varnostno pomoč Nata uvedejo obsežen program usposabljanja, ki bo vključeval enote nacionalne policije, kot je bilo dogovorjeno z afganistansko vlado, s čimer bi preprečili podvajanje, izgubljanje sredstev in razdrobitev;
Calls for improved international cooperation and coordination to increase police training capacities significantly and to further improve the effectiveness of training programmes; proposes that a large-scale training programme be launched by EUPOL and NATO/ISAF, incorporating the national police units as agreed with the Afghan Government and thereby eliminating duplication, waste and fragmentation;
poziva visoko predstavnico za zunanjo in varnostno politiko ter države članice EU, naj pospešijo policijsko usposabljanje v Afganistanu in bistveno povečajo število policijskih inštruktorjev na terenu, da bo uresničitev cilja londonske konference o 134.000 usposobljenih afganistanskih policistov do konca leta 2011 postala izvedljiva; poziva visoko predstavnico za zunanjo in varnostno politiko, naj spremeni afganistansko misijo EUPOLA tudi s pooblastilom za usposabljanje nižjega osebja v vseh pokrajinah, s povečanjem števila tednov za osnovno usposabljanje in zagotavljanjem, da se patrulje in druge policijske dejavnosti skupaj izvajajo na terenu; poziva države članice, naj združijo svoje dvostranske misije policijskega usposabljanja in se vzdržijo izdajanja opozoril nacionalnim policistom v EUPOL;
Urges the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and the EU Member States to intensify police training in Afghanistan and to increase significantly the number of police trainers on the ground so that the objective of the London Conference to reach 134 000 trained Afghan police officers by the end of 2011 becomes a realistic scenario; urges the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy to amend EUPOL Afghanistan's mission by also mandating training for low-grade personnel in all provinces, by increasing the number of weeks dedicated to basic training, and by ensuring that patrols and other policing activities are conducted jointly in the field; urges the EU Member States not only to merge their bilateral police training mission with EUPOL but also to refrain from imposing caveats for national police deployed in EUPOL;
predlaga, naj se povišajo plače afganistanske policije in naj se pregleda celoten proces zaposlovanja, tako da bodo imeli prednost kandidati z osnovno stopnjo pismenosti, ki niso uporabniki drog in so bolje psihološko in fizično usposobljeni kot sedanja policijska enota;
Recommends that salaries for the Afghan police be increased and that the whole recruitment process be reviewed, giving preference to recruits with a basic standard of literacy who are not drug users and are better qualified psychologically and physically than the present cohort;
poudarja, da policijsko usposabljanje ne more prinesti rezultatov brez ustrezno delujočega sodstva, in zato poziva mednarodno skupnost, naj zagotovi večjo finančno in tehnično podporo za okrepitev sodnega sistema, tudi z zvišanjem plač sodnikov na vseh stopnjah; poleg tega poziva Svet, naj v sodelovanju z ZN vzpostavi specializirano misijo za usposabljanje sodnikov in javnih uslužbencev ministrstva za sodstvo in kazenskega sistema v Afganistanu;
Stresses that police training cannot deliver without a properly functioning judiciary and calls, therefore, on the international community to provide increased financial and technical support to strengthen the judicial system, including through an increase in the salary of judges at all levels; further requests the Council to put in place, in coordination with the UN, a specialised mission to train judges, as well as public officials in the Ministry of Justice and the penal system, in Afghanistan;
pozdravlja, da je afganistanska vlada na kabulski konferenci zajamčila, da bo s pomočjo mednarodnih partneric izboljšala dostop do sodnega varstva v vsej državi z izvajanjem posebnih ukrepov v naslednjih 12 mesecih ter zmogljivost sodnih ustanov tudi z oblikovanjem in izvajanjem celostne strategije človeških virov;
Welcomes the fact that the Afghan Government pledged at the Kabul Conference to improve, with the support of international partners, access to the delivery of justice throughout the country by implementing concrete measures within the next 12 months, as well as the capacity of judicial institutions, including through the design and implementation of a comprehensive human resources strategy;
opozarja, da iz Afganistana izvira 90 % svetovnega nezakonitega opija, a da se leta 2001, ko so koalicijske sile vkorakale v Kabul, v Afganistanu mak ni prideloval zaradi uspeha OZN, ki je dosegla prepoved njegove pridelave;
Points out that Afghanistan is the source of 90% of the world's illicit opium, and yet that when coalition forces entered Kabul in 2001 no opium poppies were being grown in Afghanistan owing to the UN's success in achieving a ban on their cultivation;
meni, da bi morala velika, dobro financirana vojaška sila nato z lahkoto ohraniti to stanje brez opija s pomočjo lokalnih kmetijskih razvojnih projektov, ki bi jih vojska ščitila pred talibani in lokalnimi vojnimi poglavarji;
Opines that a large, well-resourced military force should, subsequently, have found it easy to sustain this opium-free situation through local agricultural development projects, protected by its troops against the Taliban and local warlords;
vendar opaža, da je pridelava opija še vedno glavno socialno, gospodarsko in varnostno vprašanje, ter poziva EU, naj ga obravnava kot strateško prednostno nalogo v svojih politikah za Afganistan;
Notes, however, that opium production is still a key social, economic and security issue, and calls on the EU to consider this as a strategic priority in its policies towards Afghanistan;
opozarja, da več kot 90 % heroina v Evropi prihaja iz Afganistana in da stroški za javno zdravje v evropskih državah dosegajo milijarde dolarjev; poudarja, da je treba izzive mamilske strukture v Afganistanu reševati na državni in na mednarodni ravni z obravnavo vseh povezav mamilske verige, kar zahteva predvsem pomoč kmetom, da bi zmanjšali dobavo, preprečevanje in zdravljenje odvisnosti od mamil, da bi zajezili povpraševanje, ter kazenski pregon posrednikov; zlasti predlaga velike naložbe v oblikovanje splošne kmetijske in podeželske politike, da bi proizvajalcem opija ponudili primerno in trajno alternativo; prav tako vztraja, da je treba okoljsko področje vključiti v kmetijsko in podeželsko strategijo, saj je slabšanje okolja, ki ga na primer povzroča slabo vodenje vodnih virov ali uničevanje naravnih gozdov, ena od glavnih ovir za razvoj kmetijskega gospodarstva;
Points out that more than 90% of heroin in Europe originates from Afghanistan and that the cost to public health in European countries runs into billions of dollars; emphasises that the challenges posed by the drug economy in Afghanistan must be tackled not only nationally but internationally by addressing all links in the drug chain and that this requires, in particular, assistance to farmers to reduce supply, as well as drug prevention and treatment to curb demand, and law enforcement against the intermediaries; proposes, in particular, massive investment in the establishment of a comprehensive agricultural and rural policy to offer opium producers a credible, lasting alternative; insists also on the need to integrate environment into the agriculture and rural strategy, as degradation of the environment – caused for instance by poor management of water resources or the destruction of natural forest – is one of the main barriers to the development of the agricultural economy;
opaža, da je zaradi nekaznovanosti, ki je bila dana pridelovalcem in preprodajalcem, pridelava v dveh letih dosegla stopnje pred letom 2001 z majhnim številom vplivnih vojnih poglavarjev, ki vodijo ogromen kartel;
Notes that, as a result of the impunity given to growers and traffickers, within two years cultivation reached pre-2001 levels, with a small number of powerful warlords running a huge cartel;