natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
ob upoštevanju predloga z dne 23. septembra 2009 o odločbi Sveta o prenosu posebnih nalog v zvezi z delovanjem Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja na Evropsko centralno banko ( KOM(2009)0500 ),
having regard to the proposal of 23 September 2009 for a Council decision entrusting the European Central Bank with specific tasks concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board ( COM(2009)0500 ),
ob upoštevanju predloga z dne 23. septembra 2009 o uredbi Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o ustanovitvi Evropskega bančnega organa (KOM (2009)0501),
having regard to the proposal of 23 September 2009 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Banking Authority ( COM(2009)0501 ),
ob upoštevanju Druge direktive Sveta št. 77/91/EGS z dne 13. decembra 1976 o uskladitvi zaščitnih ukrepov za varovanje interesov družbenikov in tretjih oseb, ki jih države članice zahtevajo od gospodarskih družb glede ustanavljanja delniških družb ter ohranjanja in spreminjanja njihovega kapitala, zato da se oblikujejo zaščitni ukrepi z enakim učinkom v vsej Skupnosti UL L 26, 31.1.1977, str.
having regard to the Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies, in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent OJ L 26, 31.1.1977, p.
, Tretje direktive Sveta 78/855/EGS z dne 9. oktobra 1978 o združitvi delniških družb UL L 295, 20.10.1978, str.
, the Third Council Directive 78/855/EEC of 9 October 1978 concerning mergers of public limited liability companies OJ L 295, 20.10.1978, p.
in Šeste direktive Sveta 82/891/EGS z dne 17. decembra 1982 o delitvi delniških družb UL L 378, 31.12.1982, str.
and the Sixth Council Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982, concerning the division of public limited liability companies OJ L 378, 31.12.1982, p.
ob upoštevanju memoranduma o soglasju z dne 1. junija 2008 o sodelovanju med finančnimi nadzornimi organi, centralnimi bankami in finančnimi ministrstvi Evropske unije za čezmejno finančno stabilnost,
having regard to the Memorandum of Understanding of 1 June 2008 on cooperation between the financial supervisory authorities, central banks and finance ministries of the European Union on cross-border financial stability,
ker je skupina na visoki ravni za finančni nadzor pod vodstvom Jacquesa de Larosièra v priporočilu 13 iz svojega poročila, ki ga je 25. februarja 2009 predložila predsedniku Barrosu, pozvala k uvedbi skladnega in funkcionalnega ureditvenega okvira v EU za krizno upravljanje,
having regard to Recommendation 13 of the report by the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision chaired by Jacques de Larosière submitted to President Barroso on 25 February 2009, which states, ‘[t]he Group calls for a coherent and workable regulatory framework for crisis management in the EU’,
ob upoštevanju členov 42 in 48 Poslovnika,
having regard to Rules 42 and 48 of its Rules of Procedure,
ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve ter mnenja Odbora za pravne zadeve ( A7-0213/2010 ),
having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs ( A7-0213/2010 ),
ker v Uniji obstaja notranji trg za bančne storitve, in ne skupka med seboj neodvisnih storitev, notranji trg pa je odločilnega pomena za svetovno konkurenčnost Unije,
whereas there is an internal market for banking services in the Union, and not an amalgam of services independent of one another, and whereas that internal market is critical for the Union's global competitiveness,
ker je sedanja mednarodna ureditev za obvladovanje krize v bančnem sektorju nezadostna,
whereas there is at present insufficient international regulation of crisis management in the banking sector,
ker se je izkazalo, da so obstoječi nadzorni mehanizmi EU in mednarodni nadzorni mehanizmi za finančni sektor neučinkoviti pri preprečevanju ali zadostnem omejevanju širjenja negativnih vplivov,
whereas existing EU and international supervisory mechanisms for the financial sector have proven ineffective in preventing or sufficiently containing contagion,
ker so stroški obvladovanja krize preveč obremenili davkoplačevalce, rast in delovna mesta,
whereas the cost of management of the crisis fell too heavily on taxpayers, growth and jobs,
ker je za minimalizacijo stroškov za davkoplačevalce, ki nastanejo pri vsaki krizi finančnih trgov in institucij, nujno sodelovanje pri delitvi bremena, najprej delničarjev in nato upnikov,
whereas the participation of shareholders in burden-sharing and then of creditors is crucial for reducing to a minimum the cost for taxpayers arising from any crisis of financial markets and institutions,
ker so bili zaradi neobstoja ali neustreznosti predpisov Unije in nadzora sprejeti neusklajeni ukrepi nacionalnih organov, kar je povečalo tveganje protekcionizma in izkrivljanja konkurence, med drugim z državno pomočjo, ogrožena pa je tudi gradnja notranjega trga finančnih storitev,
whereas the absence or weakness of Union regulations and supervision has resulted in uncoordinated actions by national authorities and has increased the risk of protectionist behaviour and distortion of competition including through State aid and has threatened the construction of an internal market for financial services,
ker bi bil enoten pristop k preprečevanju propada bančnih skupin bolj v skladu s konceptom notranjega trga,
whereas a uniform approach to preventing the failure of banking groups would be more in keeping with the concept of an internal market,
ker je močan notranji trg finančnih storitev odločilnega pomena za svetovno konkurenčnost Unije,
whereas a strong internal market for financial services is critical for the Union's global competitiveness,
ker morajo bančni akterji nujno prevzeti odgovornost in tako prispevati k uresničitvi osnovnega cilja obnove finančnih trgov, ki stremi k dolgoročnemu financiranju gospodarstva,
whereas players in the banking sector should be made accountable and whereas that accountability should contribute to the crucial objective of rebuilding the financial markets to serve the financing of the economy,
ker morajo institucije EU zaradi krize in v skladu s pričakovanji državljanov v dialogu z G-2O in drugimi mednarodnimi forumi takoj oblikovati primeren okvir za ohranjanje finančne stabilnosti, minimalizacijo stroškov za davkoplačevalce, ohranjanje osnovnih bančnih storitev in zaščito imetnikov vlog v primeru krize,
whereas, as a result of the crisis, there is a need for, and citizens expect, the EU institutions, working in dialogue with the G-20 and other international fora, urgently to create an adequate framework which, in the event of a crisis, preserves financial stability, minimises the cost to taxpayers, preserves basic banking services and protects depositors,
ker finančna stabilnost in povezani finančni trgi zahtevajo čezmejni nadzor čezmejnih in sistemskih finančnih institucij,
whereas financial stability and integrated financial markets require cross-border supervision of cross-border and systemic financial institutions,
ker je namen okvira EU za čezmejno obvladovanje krize pooblastiti ustrezne organe za sprejemanje ukrepov, kar vključuje poseg v upravljanje bančnih skupin, če je to potrebno (zlasti, vendar ne izključno, v depozitnih bankah, kjer je možnost sistemskega tveganja),
whereas the purpose of a EU framework for cross-border crisis management is to empower the authorities to adopt measures that include intervention in the management of banking groups, when this is necessary (and especially, but not exclusively, in deposit-taking banks, where there is a possibility of systemic risk),
ker je namen zakonodajnega okvira EU za čezmejno obvladovanje krize prav tako ureditev čezmejnih bančnih skupin in posameznih bank, ki čezmejno poslujejo samo prek podružnic; ker bi morala za čezmejne bančne skupine veljati enotna ureditev,
whereas the purpose of an EU framework for cross-border crisis management is also to regulate cross-border banking groups and individual banks conducting cross-border operations exclusively through branches; whereas there should also be uniform regulation in regard to cross-border banking groups,
ker odločen odziv na krizo zahteva skladen in celovit pristop, ki vključuje boljši nadzor (izvajanje nove nadzorne strukture EU), boljše predpise (potekajoče pobude, kot so tiste v z zvezi z Direktivo 2006/48/ES, Direktivo 2006/49/ES, Direktivo 94/19/ES, nagrajevanjem vodstvenih delavcev itd.) in učinkovit okvir EU za obvladovanje krize za finančne institucije,
whereas a robust response to crisis requires a coherent and comprehensive approach entailing better supervision (implementation of the new EU supervisory architecture), better regulations (ongoing initiatives such as those relating to Directive 2006/48/EC, Directive 2006/49/EC, Directive 94/19/EC and executive remuneration) and an effective EU crisis-management framework for financial institutions,
ker bi bilo treba zaradi uničujočih posledic propadov za več držav in sektorjev ter gospodarstvo nasploh načelo „onesnaževalec plača“ razširiti na finančni sektor,
whereas the polluter-pays principle should be extended to the financial sector because of the devastating impact of failure across countries, sectors and the entire economy at large,
ker bi bilo treba zgodnje posredovanje v bančnih krizah in njihovo reševanje sprožiti na podlagi jasno določenih meril, vključno s podkapitaliziranostjo, zmanjšano likvidnostjo ter znižanjem kakovosti in vrednosti sredstev; ker bi moralo biti posredovanje tesno vezano na sisteme zajamčenih vlog;
whereas early intervention in banking crises, and their resolution, should be initiated on the basis of clearly defined criteria, including sub-capitalisation, reduced liquidity and the deterioration of asset quality and value; whereas intervention should be tied in with deposit-guarantee schemes,
ker so potrebni strog kodeks ravnanja EU za poslovodstva in mehanizmi za preprečevanje neprimernega obnašanja, razviti pa bi jih bilo treba v skladu z mednarodnimi pobudami,
whereas a strict EU code of conduct for management, as well as mechanisms to deter inappropriate behaviour, are required and should be developed in alignment with similar international initiatives,
ker je pomembno, da Komisija opravi celovito oceno učinka pri obravnavanju vprašanja, ali bi bile primerne nove smernice za upravljanje podjetij,
whereas it is important that the Commission carries out full impact assessments in any consideration of the question whether new guidelines for the management of companies would be appropriate,
ker bi morala Komisija po treh letih delovanja Evropskega bančnega organa (EBA), ureditve EU za reševanje bank, sklada EU za finančno stabilnost in enote za reševanje preučiti, ali bi bilo okvir za obvladovanje kriz ustrezno razširiti še na druge, nebančne finančne ustanove, vključno z zavarovalnicami ter upravljavci premoženja in skladov, vendar ne omejeno nanje; prav tako bi morala preučiti, ali bi bilo izvedljivo in primerno ustanoviti omrežje nacionalnih skladov za stabilnost za vse ustanove, ki ne sodelujejo v skladu EU za finančno stabilnost, kot je predlagano v priporočilu 3 v prilogi,
whereas within three years of a European Banking Authority (EBA), an EU banking resolution regime, an EU financial stability fund and a resolution unit becoming operational, the Commission should study the appropriateness of expanding the scope of the crisis-management framework to other non-bank financial institutions including, but not limited to, insurance companies and asset and fund managers and should also study the feasibility and appropriateness of establishing a network of national stability funds for all the institutions that do not participate in the EU financial stability fund, as proposed in recommendation 3 in the Annex,
ker bi se bilo treba izogniti moralnemu tveganju, da se prepreči prevzemanje prevelikih tveganj, potreben pa je tudi okvir, ki bo varoval sistem, in ne posameznih „prestopnikov“ v njem, zlasti pa se reševalnih skladov ne bi smelo uporabljati za reševanje delničarjev bank ali izplačevanje nagrad upravi za njen neuspeh; ker bi se morale institucije, ki uporabljajo ureditev EU za reševanje bank v tem kontekstu, spoprijeti s posledicami, kot so upravni in reševalni ukrepi; ker bi morala postati odprava „moralnega tveganja“ vodilno načelo pri prihodnjem finančnem nadzoru,
whereas moral hazard should be avoided to prevent excessive risk taking, and a framework that protects the system, not delinquent participants in that system, is called for, in particular no resolution funds should be used to bail out shareholders of banks or to reward the management for its own failure; whereas, institutions which make use of an EU banking resolution regime in this context and should face consequences such as administrative and reparation measures; whereas the elimination of moral hazard should therefore become a guiding principle in future financial supervision,
ker je zaradi sedanjih gospodarskih, finančnih in socialnih težav, pa tudi številnih novih zakonskih zahtev za banke potreben postopen in razumen pristop, ne smejo pa postati ovira za ambiciozen in nujen program,
whereas the present economic, financial and social problems and multiple new regulatory demands on banks, require a gradual and sensible approach but should not deter from an ambitious and urgent agenda,
ker prenos sredstev znotraj bančne skupine v nobenem primeru ne bi smel ogroziti finančne in likvidnostne stabilnosti prenosnika sredstev in bi ga bilo treba opraviti po pošteni tržni oceni oziroma ceni; ker bi bilo treba oblikovati jasna načela za ovrednotenje oslabljenih sredstev in za obravnavo podrejenih družb in podružnic s sedežem v gostiteljskih državah,
whereas asset transfer within a banking group should not, in any event, endanger the financial and liquidity stability of the transferor and should be effected at a fair market valuation or price; whereas clear principles should be developed for the valuation of impaired assets and for the treatment of subsidiaries and branches domiciled in host countries,
ker bi morala Unija oblikovati skupno stališče, kdo naj ukrepa v primeru krize v finančnih institucijah, kaj naj bi naredil ter kdaj in kako,
whereas the Union should build a common understanding of who should do what, when and how in the event of crisis in financial institutions,
ker bi morali ukrepi za bančni sektor spodbujati realno gospodarstvo ter njegove potrebe po kratko- in dolgoročnem financiranju in naložbah,
whereas the measures applicable in the banking sector should promote the real economy in its short and long-term financing and investment needs,
ker bi bilo treba globoke vrzeli med nacionalnimi regulativnimi ureditvami in mehanizmi v primeru insolventnosti premostiti z usklajenim okvirom ter okrepljenim dialogom med nacionalnimi nadzorniki in organi v skupinah za čezmejno stabilnost,
whereas wide gaps between national regulatory and insolvency regimes should be bridged through a harmonised framework and reinforced dialogue among national supervisors and authorities within the cross-border stability groups,
ker je vse večja velikost, kompleksnost in medsebojna povezanost tako na regionalni kot na svetovni ravni pokazala, da ima lahko propad institucij, ne glede na njihovo velikost, stranske učinke za celoten finančni sistem, zato bi bilo treba postopoma in v več fazah vzpostaviti učinkovit okvir za reševanje kriznih razmer za vse banke, pri tem pa v začetku usmeriti pozornost v ustanove z najvišjo koncentracijo tveganja; ker bi moral takšen okvir za reševanje kriznih razmer čim bolj upoštevati podobna prizadevanja mednarodnih forumov,
whereas the increasing size, complexity and interconnectedness on both regional and global levels have shown that the failure of institutions, irrespective of their size, may have spill-over effects across the financial system, therefore calling for an effective crisis resolution framework to be put in place for all banks, in a gradual and phased process, recommending that an initial focus be put on the institutions with the highest concentration of risk; whereas such a crisis-resolution framework should take into account similar efforts of international forums to the greatest extent possible,
ker omejeno število bank (čezmejne sistemske banke) zaradi svoje velikosti, kompleksnosti in medsebojne povezanosti v Evropi pomeni izredno visoko stopnjo sistemskega tveganja, kar zahteva nujno in ciljno usmerjeno posebno ureditev, medtem ko so za druge čezmejne finančne institucije potrebne bolj splošno pravične ureditve za reševanje,
whereas a limited number of banks (cross-border systemic banks) represent an extremely high level of systemic risk due to their size, complexity and interconnectedness across the Union, calling for an urgent and targeted special regime, more generally equitable resolution regimes are required for other cross-border financial institutions,
ker okvir EU za obvladovanje kriz za to, da bo učinkovito omogočal posredovanje, zahteva skupen sklop pravil, ustrezna strokovna znanja in finančna sredstva, kar bi moral biti tudi osnovni temelj predlagane prednostne ureditve za čezmejne sistemske banke,
whereas an EU crisis-management framework, in order to be effective in supporting interventions, requires a common set of rules, appropriate expertise and financial resources, which should therefore also be the key pillars of the proposed priority regime for cross-border systemic banks,
ker bi bilo treba nadzor, pristojnosti za zgodnje posredovanje in ukrepe, povezane z reševanjem, obravnavati kot tri medsebojno povezane korake k skupnemu okviru,
whereas supervision, early intervention powers and measures related to resolution should be considered as three interlinked steps of a common framework,
ker bi se morala pospešena posebna ureditev za sistemske banke srednje- ali dolgoročno razviti v splošno ureditev, ki bo zajemala vse čezmejne finančne institucije v Uniji, to pa bi moralo vključevati usklajeno ureditev EU za primer insolventnosti,
whereas the fast-track special regime for cross-border systemic banks should evolve in the medium or long term towards a universal regime covering all cross-border financial institutions in the Union and this should include a harmonised EU insolvency regime,
ker bi moral biti vsak sklad stabilnosti, ki se razvije za celotno Unijo, omejen samo na reševanje prihodnjih kriz in se ne bi smel uporabljati za poplačilo že opravljenih intervencij ali težave, ki izhajajo iz finančne krize v letih 2007 in 2008,
whereas any stability fund developed on a pan-Union basis should be ring-fenced for the purposes of future crisis resolution alone and not to be used for the repayment of past interventions or problems resulting from the financial crisis of 2007/2008,
zahteva od Komisije, naj Parlamentu do 31. decembra 2010 na podlagi členov 50 in 114 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije predloži enega ali več zakonodajnih predlogov o okviru EU za obvladovanje krize, skladu EU za finančno stabilnost in o enoti za reševanje, ki bodo upoštevali podrobna priporočila, navedena v prilogi, in pobude, ki so jih sprejeli mednarodni organi, kot sta skupina G-20 in Mednarodni denarni sklad, s ciljem zagotoviti enake konkurenčne pogoje za ves svet in na podlagi natančne analize vseh možnosti, vključno s presojo vplivov;
Requests the Commission to submit to Parliament by 31 December 2010, on the basis of Articles 50 and 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, one or more legislative proposals relating to an EU crisis-management framework, an EU financial stability fund (Fund), and a resolution unit following the detailed recommendations made in the Annex hereto, taking into account initiatives taken by international bodies, such as the G-20 and the International Monetary Fund, in order to ensure a global level playing field and based on a profound analysis of all alternatives available, including an impact assessment;
je mnenja, da bi bilo treba finančne posledice zahtevanega predloga pokriti z ustreznimi proračunskimi sredstvi (razen prispevkov v sklad EU za finančno stabilnost, za katere morajo biti odgovorne sodelujoče banke);
Considers that the financial implications of the requested proposal should be covered by appropriate budgetary allocations (excluding the contributions to the Fund which are to be a responsibility of participating banks);
naroča svojemu predsedniku, naj to resolucijo in priložena podrobna priporočila posreduje Komisiji, Svetu ter parlamentom in vladam držav članic.
Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the accompanying detailed recommendations to the Commission, the Council, and the parliaments and governments of the Member States.
Priporočilo 1 o skupnem okviru EU za obvladovanje krize
Recommendation 1 relating to a common EU crisis-management framework
Evropski parlament meni, da bi se moral zakonodajni akt, ki naj bi bil sprejet, osredotočiti na naslednje:
The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate as follows:
spodbujati stabilnost finančnega sistema;
to promote the stability of the financial system;
omejevati oziroma preprečevati širjenje negativnih finančnih vplivov;
to limit or prevent financial contagion;
omejiti javne stroške posredovanj;
to limit the public cost of interventions;
optimizirati položaj vlagateljev in jim zagotoviti enako obravnavo po vsej Uniji;
to optimise the position of depositors and guarantee their equal treatment across the Union;
ohraniti opravljanje osnovnih bančnih storitev;
to preserve the provision of core banking services;
izogniti se moralnemu tveganju in stroškom za panogo in delničarje, internalizirati negativne zunanje učinke, ki jih povzročajo finančni trgi in institucije;
to avoid moral hazard, charge costs to industry and shareholders and internalise negative externalities created by financial markets and institutions;
zagotoviti enakopravno obravnavo vseh razredov upnikov v Uniji, med drugim pravično obravnavo vseh podrejenih družb in podružnic iste čezmejne institucije v vseh državah članicah;
to ensure equal treatment of each class of creditors in the Union including the fair treatment of all subsidiaries and branches of the same cross-border institution in all Member States;
zagotoviti spoštovanje pravic zaposlenih;
to ensure respect for the rights of employees;
okrepiti notranji trg finančnih storitev EU in njegovo konkurenčnost.
to strengthen the internal market for financial services and its competitiveness.
Da bi izboljšali sodelovanje in preglednost, je treba pod vodstvom EBA redno izvajati medsebojne preglede nadzornikov na podlagi predhodne samoocene.
In order to improve cooperation and transparency, carry out peer reviews of supervisors on a regular basis under the leadership of the EBA building on prior self-assessment.
Ko se pojavi potreba po reševanju ali prenehanju poslovanja čezmejnih institucij, se mora izvesti temeljita preiskava (prek neodvisnih strokovnjakov, ki jih imenuje EBA), da bi osvetlili, za katere vzroke in čigavo odgovornost gre.
Where the need for a resolution or the winding-up of a cross-border institution arises, carry out an in-depth investigation (via independent experts appointed by the EBA) in order to highlight the causes and responsibilities involved.
Ustreznemu nadzornemu organu je treba poveriti odgovornost za obvladovanje krize (vključno s pooblastili za zgodnje posredovanje) in odobritev načrta dela v posebnih razmerah vsake banke, kot sledi:
Attribute to the relevant supervisor the responsibility for crisis management (including powers of early intervention) and the approval of each bank's contingency plan, as follows:
za čezmejne sistemske banke: EBA v tesnem sodelovanju s kolegijem nacionalnih nadzornikov in skupinami za čezmejno stabilnost (kot je opredeljeno v memorandumu o soglasju z dne 1. junija 2008);
for cross-border systemic banks: the EBA, in close cooperation with the college of national supervisors and the cross-border stability groups (as defined in the Memorandum of Understanding of 1 June 2008);