natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
ker je Komisija v svojem poročilu navedla, da je kljub spodbudi, ki jo je dala kriza, za izvedbo korenite reforme na področju plačnih politik, le 16 držav članic delno ali v celoti izvedlo priporočilo Komisije,
whereas the Commission report states that notwithstanding the momentum towards substantial reform in the area of remuneration policies provided by the crisis, only 16 Member States have fully or partially applied the Commission Recommendation,
pozdravlja pobude, ki sta jih sprejela Komisija in Forum za finančno stabilnost glede politike prejemkov v finančnem sektorju in javnih družbah na splošno; vendar meni, da bi bilo treba pri uvajanju dodatne regulacije za finančne institucije na področju politike prejemkov in kapitalskih zahtev sorazmerno upoštevati velikost finančne družbe in torej prispevek njenih dejavnosti k sistemskemu tveganju;
Welcomes the initiatives taken by the Commission and the FSB on remuneration policies in the financial sector and listed companies in general; takes the view, however, that the financial undertaking's size, and thus its activity's contribution to the systemic risk, should be taken proportionally into account when imposing additional regulation in matters of remuneration policy and capital requirements on financial institutions;
je seznanjen s predlogi iz poročila v zvezi z direktivami o kapitalskih zahtevah, da bi za politiko prejemkov v finančnem sektorju veljala zavezujoča načela;
Notes the proposals in the report on the capital requirements directives for binding principles on remuneration policies in the financial sector;
poudarja, da bi morali odločitev, ali naj finančna institucija ali javna družba ima komisijo za prejemke, sprejeti nadzorni organi; to bi morali storiti na način, ki je ustrezen glede na njihovo velikost in notranjo organizacijo ter naravo, področje in zapletenost njihovega delovanja; meni, da mora politiko prejemkov opredeliti komisija za prejemke, ki mora biti neodvisna in odgovorna delničarjem in nadzornikom, pri oceni pobud sistema nadomestil pa mora – kadar nadzornik meni, da je to ustrezno, tesno sodelovati z odborom za tveganja v družbi;
Stresses that supervisory authorities should decide whether a financial institution or a listed company should have a remuneration committee; they should do so in a way that is appropriate to its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities; takes the view that where the supervisor has deemed it appropriate, remuneration policy should be determined by the remuneration committee, which must be independent and accountable to shareholders and supervisors, and should work closely with the firm's risk committee in the evaluation of the incentives created by the compensation system;
poudarja, da mora imeti komisija za prejemke dostop do vsebine pogodb, s tem da so pogodbe, ki jih pregleduje, zasnovane tako, da omogočajo kaznovanje dejanj hude malomarnosti z zmanjšanjem plačil.
Stresses that a remuneration committee must have access to the subject matter of contracts, with contracts under the scrutiny of this committee designed in a way that makes it possible to punish acts of gross negligence by payment deductions.
meni, da morajo biti predsednik in člani komisije za prejemke z glasovalno pravico člani upravnega organa, ki v finančni instituciji ali javni družbine opravljajo nobene izvršilne funkcije.
Believes that the chair and the voting members of the remuneration committee must be members of the management body who do not perform any executive functions in the financial institution or the listed company concerned.
meni, da bi morali, kjer je to ustrezno, delničarji imeti možnost prispevati k opredelitvi vzdržne politike prejemkov in bi lahko v ta namen imeli možnost, da bi na skupščini družbe z nezavezujočim glasovanjem o poročilu o prejemkih izrazili svoje mnenje o tej politiki;
Is of the opinion that, where appropriate, shareholders should be given the opportunity to contribute towards the determination of sustainable remuneration policies, and could for this purpose be given the opportunity to express their views on remuneration policies by means of a non-binding vote on the remuneration report at the company's general meeting;
poudarja, da bi morala nadomestila članov neizvršnega odbora vsebovati le fiksno plačo, ne pa plače po učinku ali na podlagi tečaja delnic;
Stresses that non-executive board members' compensation should only consist in fixed pay and should not include performance- or share-based pay;
poudarja, da bi morali biti člani, odgovorni za nadzor tveganja, neodvisni od poslovnih enot, ki jih nadzorujejo, in da bi morali imeti ustrezno moč ter prejemati nadomestilo neodvisno od uspešnosti teh enot;
Underlines that members engaged in risk control should be independent from the business units they control, have appropriate authority and be compensated independently of the performance of these business units;
Učinkovita uskladitev nadomestil s previdnostjo pri prevzemanju tveganj
Effective alignment of compensation with prudent risk-taking
poudarja, da bi prejemki morali biti prilagojeni vsem vrstam tveganj, sorazmerni z izidi tveganj in občutljivi na časovni vidik sedanjih in možnih tveganj, ki vplivajo na splošno uspešnost in stabilnost družbe;
Underlines that remuneration should be adjusted for all types of risks, symmetrical with risk outcomes, and sensitive to the time horizon of current and potential risks that have an impact on the overall performance and stability of the firm;
poudarja, da pri upravljanju javnih družb direktorjev ne smejo voditi le osebni finančni interesi; meni, da so v mnogih primerih osebni finančni interesi direktorjev, ki prejemajo variabilne prejemke, v nasprotju z dolgoročnimi interesi družbe, tudi z interesi zaposlenih in delničarjev;
Points out that directors should not be driven by personal financial interest in their management of listed companies; considers that the personal financial interest of directors linked to variable remuneration is in many case in conflict with the long-term interest of the company, including the interests of its employees and stakeholders;
meni, da bi morali biti sistemi nadomestil sorazmerni z velikostjo, notranjo organizacijo in zapletenostjo finančnih institucij, odražati pa bi morali raznolikost različnih finančnih sektorjev, kot so bančništvo, zavarovanja in upravljanje skladov;
Believes that compensation systems should be proportionate to the size, internal organisation and complexity of financial institutions and should reflect the diversity between different financial sectors such as banking, insurance and fund management;
poudarja, da mora ureditev upravljanja operativnega tveganja višjega vodstva, prevzemalcev tveganja in nadzora revidirati nadzornik, ki opravi tudi temeljite preglede; meni, da bi takšni postopki morali veljati tudi za zaposlene, ki jih skupni prejemki, vključno s pokojninskimi prispevki, uvrščajo v isti plačilni razred kot te kategorije osebja;
Stresses that the operational risk management arrangements of senior management, risk takers and control functions should be reviewed by, and subject to thorough checks by, the supervisor; considers that such procedures should also apply to staff whose total remuneration, including pension provisions, takes them into the same bracket as these categories as staff;
meni, da bi morale stopnje variabilnih prejemkov temeljiti na vnaprej določenih in izmerljivih merilih učinkovitosti, ki bi morala spodbujati dolgoročno vzdržnost družbe;
Considers that the levels of variable remuneration should be based on predetermined and measurable performance criteria, which should promote the long-term sustainability of the company;
poudarja, da bi morala nadomestila za uspešnost povezati skupni znesek prejemkov s splošno uspešnostjo družbe in kapitalsko osnovo družbe, posamezna nadomestila zaposlenih za uspešnost pa bi morala temeljiti na skupni oceni uspešnosti posameznika, poslovne enote in skupnih izidov družbe;
Stresses that performance-related remuneration should link the size of the bonus pool to the overall performance and capital base of the firm, while an employee's individual performance-related remuneration should be based on a combined assessment of the performance of the individual, that of the business unit concerned and the overall results of the institution;
meni, da je osebni finančni interes direktorjev, povezan z variabilnimi prejemki, pogosto v navzkrižju z dolgoročnim interesom družbe; poudarja, da mora biti politika prejemkov direktorjev in drugih zaposlenih, ki so odgovorni za tvegane odločitve, skladna z uravnoteženim in pravilno delujočim sistemom za obvladovanje tveganj in da mora biti med fiksnimi in variabilnimi prejemki ustrezno razmerje; nujno poziva k splošni uvedbi ukrepov, s katerimi bi zmanjšali ali celo ukinili variabilne prejemke za tiste kategorije zaposlenih, ki s svojim delom povzročijo poslabšanje rezultatov družbe;
Considers that the personal financial interest of directors linked to variable remuneration is, in many cases, in conflict with the long-term interests of the company; stresses that policy on the remuneration of directors and other staff who bear responsibility for risky decisions should be consistent with a balanced and properly functioning system of risk management, and that there should be an appropriate ratio between fixed and variable pay; calls urgently for the introduction, across the board, of measures for the reduction, or indeed the withdrawal, of the variable pay of categories of staff whose performance is responsible for a deterioration in their company's results;
meni, da bi bilo treba pri določitvi stopnje variabilnih nadomestil upoštevati kvantitativne ukrepe, pa tudi merila uspešnosti glede na kakovost;
Is of the opinion that not only quantitative measures, but also quality-linked performance criteria and human judgement should be taken into consideration in order to determine the level of variable compensation;
meni, da zagotovljene premije ne bi smele biti del sistemov nadomestil;
Considers that guaranteed bonuses should not be part of the compensation plans;
meni, da mora biti razlika med najvišjimi in najnižjimi prejemki v podjetju ali družbi razumna – ne zgolj iz etičnih razlogov, pač pa tudi zaradi socialne pravičnosti in gospodarske zdržnosti;
Is of the opinion, not only for ethical reasons but also in the interests of social justice and economic sustainability, that the difference between the highest and the lowest remuneration in a company should be reasonable;
poudarja, da bi morale družbe vzpostaviti notranji postopek, ki bi ga odobril nadzornik za reševanje sporov, do katerih bi lahko prišlo med upravljavci tveganj in operativnimi enotami;
Stresses that firms should establish an internal procedure, approved by the supervisor, to address conflicts which may occur between their risk management and operational units;
poudarja, da je treba ta načela razširiti na prejemke vseh zaposlenih, katerih poklicne dejavnosti bistveno vplivajo na profil tveganj družbe, v kateri delajo, tudi tistih, ki opravljajo naloge višjega vodstva, prevzemalcev tveganja in nadzora, ter zaposlenih, ki jih skupni prejemki, vključno s pokojninskimi prispevki, uvrščajo v isti plačilni razred;
Underlines the need to extend these principles to the remuneration of all employees whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of the company they work for, including senior management, risk-takers, control functions and those staff whose total remuneration, including pension provisions, takes them into the same bracket;
poudarja, da zavarovanje za direktorje in uradnike v primeru odgovornosti, ki ščiti direktorje družb, uradnike in višje vodstvo pred zahtevki zaradi tveganih ali malomarnih odločitev ali ukrepov, ki so jih sprejeli pri upravljanju poslov, ni skladno z vzdržnim upravljanjem tveganj na področju prejemkov;
Stresses that directors' and officers' liability insurance designed to protect companies' directors, officers and senior managers against claims arising from risky or negligent decisions and actions taken whilst managing their business are not in line with sustainable risk management in the field of remuneration;
poudarja, da morajo biti variabilni in fiksni prejemki uravnoteženi;
Stresses that there must be an appropriate balance between variable and fixed remuneration;
predlaga, da se variabilni prejemki izplačajo le, če so vzdržni glede na finančno stanje in kapitalsko osnovo institucije in utemeljeni glede na dolgoročno uspešnost družbe; meni, da bi morali imeti pristojni nadzorni organi pravico, da za finančne institucije omejijo skupno vsoto variabilnih prejemkov za okrepitev lastniškega kapitala;
Suggests that variable remuneration should be paid only if it is sustainable in the light of the financial situation and capital base of the institution, and justified in the light of the long-term performance of the firm; considers that for financial institutions, the competent supervision authority should have the right to limit the overall amount of variable remuneration in order to strengthen equity capital;
poudarja, da je treba znaten delež variabilne sestavine prejemka odložiti za dovolj dolgo obdobje; obseg deleža in trajanje odloga je treba določiti v skladu s poslovnim ciklom, z naravo poslovanja, njegovimi tveganji in dejavnostmi uslužbenca; pravica do prejemkov, izplačljivih v skladu z dogovorom o odložitvi, se ne bi smela pridobiti pred pravico do sorazmerno plačljivih prejemkov; vsaj 40 % variabilne sestavine prejemka je treba odložiti; v primeru zelo visokega zneska variabilne sestavine prejemka je treba odložiti plačilo vsaj 60 % zneska, pri čemer odlog ne sme trajati manj kot pet let;
Underlines that a substantial proportion of the variable remuneration component should be deferred over a sufficient period; the size of the proportion and the length of the deferral period should be established in accordance with the business cycle, the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the staff member in question; remuneration payable under deferred arrangements should become a vested right no faster than that payable on a pro-rata basis; at least 40% of the variable remuneration component should be deferred; in the case of a variable remuneration component of a particularly high amount, at least 60% of the amount should be deferred and the deferral period should be no less than 5 years;
meni, da bi moral biti znaten delež variabilnega nadomestila dodeljen v negotovinskih instrumentih, kot so podrejeni dolg, varnostni kapital, delnice ali instrumenti, vezani na delnice, če taki instrumenti pomenijo spodbudo, skladno z ustvarjeno dolgoročno vrednostjo in časovno razsežnostjo tveganja;
Believes that a substantial proportion of variable compensation should be awarded in non-cash instruments such as subordinated debt, contingent capital, shares or share-linked instruments, as long as these instruments create incentives aligned with long-term value creation and the time horizons of risk;
meni, da bi se morala politika prejemkov uporabljati za vse prejemke, vključno s pokojninami in plačami, da se izognemo špekuliranju s premijami; nadalje meni, da bi morale biti pokojninske premije dodeljene v obliki negotovinskih instrumentov, kot so podrejeni dolg, varnostni kapital, delnice ali instrumenti, vezani na delnice, za uskladitev z dolgoročnimi spodbudami;
Considers that remuneration policies should apply to total remuneration, including pensions and salaries, to avoid ‘bonus arbitrage’; believes, furthermore, that ‘pension bonuses’ should be awarded in non-cash instruments such as subordinated debt, contingent capital, shares or share-linked instruments in order to align long-term incentives;
predlaga, da se odpravnina („zlata padala“) v primerih predčasne prekinitve pogodb omeji na največ dve leti fiksne sestavine direktorskih plač in da se odpravi v primeru neizpolnjevanja obveznosti ali prostovoljnega odhoda;
Suggests setting an upper limit of the equivalent of two years of the fixed component of directors' pay on severance pay (‘golden parachutes’) in cases of early termination, and banning severance pay in cases of non-performance or voluntary departure;
poziva, naj se pri opredeljevanju politike prejemkov upošteva enakost med ženskami in moškimi;
Calls for equality between men and women to be taken into account in determining pay policies;
ponovno poudarja, da je treba kaznovati vse oblike diskriminacije v družbah, zlasti pri opredeljevanju politike prejemkov, pri razvoju poklicne poti in v postopku zaposlovanja direktorjev;
Reiterates the need to punish all forms of discrimination in companies, particularly in the determination of remuneration policies, in career development and in the process of recruiting directors;
meni, da bi morale družbe jasno, podrobno in pravočasno razkrivati informacije o svoji praksi nadomestil in da bi nadzorni organi morali imeti dostop do vseh informacij, ki jih potrebujejo za oceno skladnosti z veljavnimi načeli;
Believes that firms should disclose clear, comprehensive and timely information about their compensation practices and that supervisory authorities should have access to all the information they need to evaluate compliance with the applicable principles;
poziva družbe v državni lasti, naj kot druge družbe izvajajo popolno preglednost glede svoje politike prejemkov in bonusov;
Calls for state enterprises, like other companies, to exercise complete transparency concerning their pay and bonus policies;
poziva tudi k objavi podrobnosti o pokojninski in dodatni pokojninski ureditvi v družbah, tudi tistih v državni lasti;
Calls, too, for the publication of details of companies' pension and supplementary pension arrangements, including those of state enterprises;
poziva Komisijo, naj okrepi svoja priporočila z dne 30. aprila 2009 o plačni strukturi in prilagoditvi tveganj v skladu z načeli, ki jih je opredelil odbor za finančno stabilnost in septembra 2009 potrdila skupina G20;
Calls on the Commission to reinforce its recommendations of 30 April 2009 on pay structure and risk alignment as required by the principles established by the Financial Stability Board and endorsed by the G20 in September 2009;
poziva Komisijo, naj sprejme trdna zavezujoča načela o politiki prejemkov v finančnem sektorju na podlagi predlogov za bančništvo v poročilu o direktivi o kapitalski ustreznosti, ter obveznost javnega razkritja, ki temelji na postopku „upoštevaj ali pojasni“ za družbe, ki teh načel ne upoštevajo;
Calls on the Commission to adopt strong binding principles on remuneration policies in the financial sector, building on the proposals for banking in the report on the CRD, and a disclosure-driven regime based on a comply-or-explain procedure for listed companies which do not respect these principles;
poziva nadzornike v finančnem sektorju, naj izvajajo načela za nadomestila in metodologijo za oceno standardov, ki jih je januarja 2010 predlagal Baselski odbor za bančni nadzor;
Urges supervisors in the financial sector to implement the Compensation Principles and Standards Assessment Methodology proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in January 2010;
poziva Komisijo in države članice, naj spodbujajo skupno mednarodno strukturo za razkritje števila posameznikov v plačilnih razredih nad enim milijonom evrov, da bodo zajeti glavni elementi plače, bonusi, dolgoročne nagrade in pokojninski prispevki;
Calls on the Commission and Member States to promote a common international structure for disclosure of the number of individuals in pay brackets from EUR 1 million upwards, to include the main elements of salary, bonus, long-term award and pension contribution;
poziva Komisijo, naj preuči vlogo notranjih in zunanjih revizorjev kot del zagotavljanja celotnega spektra učinkovitega upravljanja družb;
Invites the Commission to consider the roles of both internal and external auditors as part of ensuring the full spectrum of effective corporate governance;
poziva Komisijo, naj preuči krepitev vloge neizvršnih direktorjev, tudi tako, da jim družbe omogočajo stalno usposabljanje in neodvisne svežnje prejemkov, ki odražajo njihovo neodvisno vlogo, ter dodeli nadzornikom pooblastila za pogovore z osebami, ki jim je bilo to odobreno;
Calls on the Commission to investigate strengthening the roles of non-executive directors, including ensuring that firms provide on-going training and independent remuneration packages that reflect the independent role of non-executive directors, as well as providing the powers to supervisors to conduct ‘approved persons’ interviews;
poziva Komisijo, naj v svojih zakonodajnih predlogih pojasni vlogo nadzornih organov v politiki prejemkov;
Calls on the Commission to clarify in its legislative proposals the role of the supervisory authorities in remuneration policy;
poudarja, da se variabilni prejemki ne smejo izplačevati s pomočjo sredstev ali metod, ki omogočajo izogibanje plačevanju davkov na dohodek za te prejemke;
Stresses that variable remuneration should not be paid through vehicles or methods that facilitate the avoidance of payment of income taxes on this remuneration;
poziva, naj se zagotovi, da se regulacija prejemkov ne bo izvajala na škodo temeljnih pravic, zagotovljenih s pogodbami, zlasti pravice socialnih partnerjev, da v skladu z nacionalno zakonodajo in tradicijo sklepajo in izvajajo kolektivne pogodbe;
Calls for it to be ensured that, when remuneration is being regulated, this is not done to the detriment of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Treaties, in particular the right of the social partners – in accordance with national laws and practices – to conclude and enforce collective agreements;
poziva Komisijo, naj vzpostavi okvir Evropske unije za krizno upravljanje, da bi tako preprečili novo finančno krizo, ob upoštevanju pobud, ki jih sprejmejo mednarodna telesa, kot sta skupina G20 in Mednarodni denarni sklad;
Calls on the Commission to set up an EU crisis management framework in order to avoid a new financial crisis, taking into account initiatives taken by international bodies such as the G20 and the IMF;
poziva Komisijo, naj spodbudi države članice, da bi javne družbe in družbe za finančne storitve opomnile na njihovo družbeno odgovornost, omadeževano javno podobo in potrebo po dobrem zgledu v mednarodni družbi blaginje;
Calls on the Commission to encourage the Member States to remind listed companies and financial services companies of their social responsibility, their tarnished image and the need to set a good example in a prosperous international society;
meni, da je nadaljevanje poslovanja ali ohranjanje podružnic v nesodelujočih državah na splošno v nasprotju z dolgoročnim interesom družb, in poziva k oblikovanju evropske strategije za boj proti davčnim oazam, da bi začeli uresničevati izjave skupine G20 v Londonu in Pittsburghu;
Considers that continuing to do business or maintain branches in non-cooperative countries is contrary to the long-term interests of companies generally, and calls for the development of a European strategy to combat tax havens in order to implement the pronouncements made by the G20 in London and Pittsburgh;
naroči svojemu predsedniku, naj to resolucijo posreduje Svetu, Komisiji ter regulativnim organom EU in nacionalnim regulativnim organom.
Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the EU and national regulatory authorities.
Zakonodajna resolucija Evropskega parlamenta z dne 7. julija 2010 o stališču Sveta v prvi obravnavi z namenom sprejetja Uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o novih živilih, spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 1331/2008 ter razveljavitvi Uredbe (ES) št. 258/97 in Uredbe Komisije (ES) št. 1852/2001 (11261/3/2009 – C7-0078/2010 – 2008/0002(COD) )
European Parliament legislative resolution of 7 July 2010 on the Council position at first reading for adopting a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on novel foods, amending Regulation (EC) No 1331/2008 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 258/97 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1852/2001 (11261/3/2009 – C7-0078/2010 – 2008/0002(COD) )
ob upoštevanju stališča Sveta v prvi obravnavi (11261/3/2009 – C7–0078/2010 ),
having regard to the Council position at first reading (11261/3/2009 – C7-0078/2010 ),