natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Svet ni pristojen za razlago določb Stabilizacijsko-pridružitvenega sporazuma med Evropsko unijo in Nekdanjo jugoslovansko republiko Makedonijo UL L 84, 20.3.2004, str.
It is not for the Council to interpret the provisions of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between the European Union and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia OJ L 84, 20.3.2004, p.
13 . niti določb Stabilizacijsko-pridružitvenega sporazuma med Evropsko unijo in Hrvaško UL L 26, 28.1.2005, str.
13. or of the SAA between the European Union and Croatia OJ L 26, 28.1.2005, p.
Kar zadeva vprašanji poslanca Kacina glede člena 45(1) Stabilizacijsko-pridružitvenega sporazuma med Evropsko unijo in Hrvaško Ali člena 44(1) Stabilizacijsko-pridružitvenega sporazuma med Evropsko unijo in Nekdanjo jugoslovansko republiko Makedonijo. , Svet želi opozoriti na člen 63 Ali člen 62 Stabilizacijsko-pridružitvenega sporazuma med Evropsko unijo in Nekdanjo jugoslovansko republiko Makedonijo. navedenega sporazuma, ki določa:
As regards the questions raised by the Honourable Member concerning Article 45(1) of the SAA between the European Union and Croatia Or concerning Article 44(1) of the SAA between the European Union and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. , the Council would draw his attention to Article 63 of that Agreement Or to Article 62 of the SAA between the European Union and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. :
„ Za namene tega naslova pogodbenicama nobena določba tega sporazuma ne preprečuje uporabe njunih zakonov in drugih predpisov v zvezi z vstopom fizičnih oseb v državo in bivanjem v njej, zaposlitvijo, delovnimi pogoji, prijavo stalnega prebivališča in opravljanjem storitev, pod pogojem, da jih pogodbenici ne uporabljata tako, da bi z uporabo izničili ali omejili koristi, ki za vsako pogodbenico izhajajo iz posamezne določbe tega sporazuma.
‘For the purpose of this Title, nothing in this Agreement shall prevent the Parties from applying their laws and regulations regarding entry and stay, employment, working conditions, establishment of natural persons and supply of services, provided that, in so doing, they do not apply them in such a manner as to nullify or impair the benefits accruing to any Party under the terms of a specific provision of this Agreement.
Ta določba ne posega v uporabo člena 62. “
This provision shall be without prejudice to the application of Article 62.’
Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-5105/2010
Question for written answer E-5105/2010
Andrey Kovatchev (PPE) , László Tőkés (PPE) , Milan Zver (PPE) in Cristian Dan Preda (PPE)
Andrey Kovatchev (PPE) , László Tőkés (PPE) , Milan Zver (PPE) and Cristian Dan Preda (PPE)
(8. julij 2010)
(8 July 2010)
Zadeva: Arhivi nekdanje jugoslovanske komunistične tajne službe UDBA
Subject: The archives of the former Yugoslav communist secret service UDBA
Po navedbah slovenskega Študijskega centra za narodno spravo so arhivi, ki zadevajo dejavnosti UDBA, nekdanje jugoslovanske totalitarne komunistične tajne službe v Sloveniji, zdaj shranjeni v Srbiji.
According to the Study Centre for National Reconciliation in Slovenia, the archives of the activities of the former Yugoslav totalitarian communist secret service in Slovenia, the UDBA, are now in Serbia.
Državljani Slovenije, države članice EU, nimajo pravice do dostopa do teh arhivov, ki so povezani z njihovo preteklostjo v času jugoslovanskega totalitarnega komunističnega režima.
The citizens of Slovenia, an EU Member State, did not have the right of access to these archives related to their past during the Yugoslav totalitarian communist regime.
Navedeni arhivi so zdaj shranjeni v drugi državi, in sicer v Republiki Srbiji, ki je uradno zaprosila za članstvo v EU 22. decembra 2009.
These archives are now in another country, namely the Republic of Serbia, which officially applied for EU membership on 22 December 2009.
Vlada Republike Slovenije je vlado Republike Srbije večkrat zaprosila, naj slovenskim državljanom omogoči dostop do omenjenih arhivov, vendar se srbska vlada na prošnjo Slovenije ni odzvala.
The Government of the Republic of Slovenia has asked the Government of the Republic of Serbia several times to provide the Slovenian citizens with access to these archives, but this has not happened.
Dostopa do arhivov tajne službe UDBA prav tako nimajo državljani drugih nekdanjih jugoslovanskih republik, še več, niti državljani Republike Srbije ne.
The situation is the same for the citizens of other former Yugoslav republics, whose citizens do not have access to the archives of the UDBA.
Vlada Republike Srbije pripravlja državo na vstop Srbije v EU, kar pomeni, da bo morala svojim državljanom in državljanom vseh držav članic EU omogočiti prost dostop do informacij.
This means that the right of free access to information by the citizens of that country and citizens of all EU Member States must be respected by the Serbian Government.
S kakšni ukrepi bo Komisija spodbudila vlado Republike Srbije, da bo odprla arhive tajne službe UDBA in tako državljanom Srbije, vseh držav članic EU in nekdanjih jugoslovanskih republik, ki niso članice EU, omogočila dostop do informacij?
What measures will the Commission undertake to urge the Government of the Republic of Serbia to open the archives of the UDBA in order to allow for access by the citizens of Serbia, the citizens of all EU Member States, as well as the citizens of former Yugoslav republics which are not EU Member States?
Füle v imenu Komisije
Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
V zvezi z vprašanjem glede dostopa do arhivov nekdanje jugoslovanske komunistične tajne službe UDBA želi Komisija poslance Evropskega parlamenta obvestiti, da zadeva ni v njeni pristojnosti.
With reference to the question regarding access to archives of the former Yugoslav communist secret service UDBA, the Commission would like to inform the Honourable Members of the Parliament that the issue falls outside the remit of the Commission's competences.
Zato Komisija od srbske vlade ne more zahtevati, da zagotovi dostop do omenjenih arhivov.
The Commission is therefore not in a position to urge the Government of Serbia to give access to the abovementioned archives.
Komisija bo Srbijo in druge države kandidatke ter potencialne države kandidatke še naprej spodbujala, da nerešena dvostranska vprašanja s sosednjimi državami rešujejo v duhu dobrih sosedskih odnosov.
The Commission will continue to encourage Serbia, as well as other candidate and potential candidate countries, to address pending bilateral issues with neighbouring states in a spirit of good neighbourly relations.
Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-5723/2010
Question for written answer E-5723/2010
Åsa Westlund (S&D) , Ana Gomes (S&D) , Isabella Lövin (Verts/ALE) , Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE) , Jill Evans (Verts/ALE) , Ivo Vajgl (ALDE) , Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI) in Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)
Åsa Westlund (S&D) , Ana Gomes (S&D) , Isabella Lövin (Verts/ALE) , Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE) , Jill Evans (Verts/ALE) , Ivo Vajgl (ALDE) , Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI) and Willy Meyer (GUE/NGL)
(22. julij 2010)
(22 July 2010)
Zadeva: Učinek sporazuma o ribištvu na Zahodno Saharo
Subject: Effect of fisheries agreement on Western Sahara
Prebivalci Zahodne Sahare so prek gibanja Polisario, ki deluje kot njihov mednarodno priznani zastopnik, že večkrat izrazili izrecno nasprotovanje vključitvi morja ob Zahodni Sahari v Sporazum o partnerstvu v ribiškem sektorju med EU in Marokom, kakor je navedeno v vprašanju za pisni odgovor E-2633/10 .
On several occasions, the people of the Western Sahara, through their internationally recognised representative, the Polisario Front, have expressed their very explicit opposition to the inclusion of the waters off Western Sahara in the EU‑Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement, as detailed in Question (E‑2633/10).
Komisija je v odgovoru na to vprašanje – glede dokumentov ali drugih dokazil, ki jih lahko predloži kot dokaz, da je bil obstoječi sporazum o ribištvu izpogajan in se izvaja v skladu v željami prebivalcev Zahodne Sahare – navedla, „da je odgovornost Maroka, da to zagotovi“, in dodala, da „nikakor ne sme namesto Maroka opravljati dolžnosti te države“.
In response to that question — regarding what documents or other evidence it has to demonstrate that the current fisheries agreement has been negotiated and implemented in a manner consistent with the wishes of the people of Western Sahara — the Commission stated its view ‘that it is Morocco’s responsibility to ensure that this is the case’, adding that ‘is not by any means possible for the Commission to substitute itself to Morocco in exercising its responsibilities’.
Ne strinjamo se s stališčem Komisije, da EU pri vprašanju, ali so njeni sporazumi z drugimi pogodbenicami v skladu z mednarodnim pravom, nima nobene odgovornosti.
We do not share the Commission’s view that the EU has no responsibility whatsoever concerning the question of whether its agreements with other parties comply with international law.
Prav tako nas preseneča njeno mnenje, „da ima lahko sporazum pozitiven vpliv na gospodarstvo Zahodne Sahare“, glede na to, da ni sprejela ustreznih ukrepov, da bi to preverila.
The Commission’s further assertion that the agreement ‘may have a positive effect on the Western Sahara economy’ is surprising, given that it has not taken sufficient steps to verify whether this is the case.
Ali je stališče Komisije, da je izrecno in uradno nasprotovanje gibanja Polisario o vključitvi Zahodne Sahare v omenjeni sporazum nepomembno in ga torej ni treba upoštevati, njeno pravno mnenje?
Is it the Commission’s legal opinion that the explicit and formal opposition expressed by the Polisario Front to the inclusion of the Western Sahara is of no consequence and can be completely ignored?
Kako Komisija upravičuje takšno mnenje?
How does the Commission justify such an opinion?
Kako in kdaj je Komisija zaprosila za informacije o tem, ali raziskave in izkoriščanje potekajo ob upoštevanju interesov in želja prebivalcev Zahodne Sahare, v skladu z njihovo voljo in ob posvetovanju z njihovimi predstavniki?
In what ways, and when, has the Commission requested information on how the exploration and exploitation activities have been carried out in accordance with the interests and wishes of the people of Western Sahara, according to their will and in consultation with their representatives?
Katere ukrepe namerava Komisija sprejeti, da bi ugotovila, ali lahko navedeni sporazum o ribištvu dejansko pozitivno vpliva na gospodarstvo Zahodne Sahare, in da bi zagotovila pozitiven učinek?
What steps will the Commission take to investigate whether the fisheries agreement actually has a positive effect on the Western Sahara economy and to ensure that it will have such an effect?
Komisija je uporabila vse možne uradne in neuradne priložnosti za pridobitev ustreznih informacij od maroških organov.
The Commission has used every possible official and unofficial occasion to solicit relevant information from the Moroccan authorities.
Če in ko bodo te informacije na voljo, jih bo Komisija skrbno pregledala, da ugotovi, ali je upravičeno začeti pogajanja o novem protokolu k Sporazumu o partnerstvu v ribiškem sektorju (FPA).
If and when such information becomes available, it will be carefully scrutinised by the Commission to determine whether entering into negotiations for a new protocol to the Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA) is justified.
Za zdaj Komisija ne sprejema nadaljnjih ukrepov, ki bi lahko vplivali na odločitev o prihodnosti navedenega sporazuma.
For the time being, the Commission is not taking any steps which might pre-empt a decision on the future of this Agreement.
Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-5784/2010
Question for written answer E-5784/2010
Simon Busuttil (PPE) , Michael Gahler (PPE) , John Attard-Montalto (S&D) , Frieda Brepoels (Verts/ALE) , Ivo Vajgl (ALDE) in Sajjad Karim (ECR)
Simon Busuttil (PPE) , Michael Gahler (PPE) , John Attard-Montalto (S&D) , Frieda Brepoels (Verts/ALE) , Ivo Vajgl (ALDE) and Sajjad Karim (ECR)
Zadeva: Prednostni status Jordanije
Subject: Advanced status for Jordan
Ali lahko Svet pojasni, kakšno je sedanje stanje glede prednostnega statusa Jordanije, in poda informacije o tem, kdaj se bo navedeni državi dodelil ta status?
Can the Council indicate the current state of play as to Jordan's ‘advanced status’, and give information on when the ‘advanced status’ will be granted?
Prerast odnosov med Evropsko unijo in Jordanijo v prednostni status je bil v zadnjih letih ena pomembnejših tem na dnevnih redih organov, ustanovljenih v okviru pridružitvenega sporazuma med EU in Jordanijo, ter ad hoc skupin za krepitev odnosov.
Progress towards advanced status in relations between the European Union and Jordan has been a key point on the agendas of bodies established under the EU‑Jordan Association Agreement, and of the EU‑Jordan ad hoc group on the enhancement of relations over the last year.
Posebni predlogi EU za krepitev odnosov so bili vključeni v novi osnutek akcijskega načrta ESP med EU in Jordanijo, ki ga je pripravila Komisija, posvetovanje s Svetom o njem pa je bilo julija 2010.
Specific proposals from the EU on the enhancement of relations were incorporated into the new draft EU‑Jordan ENP Action Plan, prepared by the Commission and on which the Council was consulted in July 2010.
Odvisno od rezultatov zaključnih pogajanj z jordansko stranjo naj bi Pridružitveni svet EU-Jordanija akcijski načrt sprejel do konca leta.
Subject to the outcome of final negotiations with the Jordanian side, the action plan is due to be adopted by the EU‑Jordan Association Council by the end of the year.
Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-5785/2010
Question for written answer E-5785/2010
Ali lahko Komisija pojasni, kakšno je sedanje stanje glede prednostnega statusa Jordanije, in poda informacije o tem, kdaj se bo navedeni državi dodelil ta status?
Can the Commission indicate the current state of play as to Jordan's ‘advanced status’, and give information on when the ‘advanced status’ will be granted?
Na 8. seji pridružitvenega sveta dne 16. novembra 2009 je Evropska unija (EU) pozdravila in podprla možno okrepitev odnosov z Jordanijo, ki je izrazila, da jo zanima okrepljeno partnerstvo.
At the 8th Association Council meeting on 16 November 2009, the European Union (EU) welcomed and endorsed the prospects for reinforced relations with Jordan further to the interest expressed by this country for a stronger partnership.
Tak „prednostni status“ bi uveljavil in povečal politične izmenjave, okrepil sodelovanje države v gospodarskem prostoru EU in sprožil znatno stopnjo povezovanja na različnih področjih politik in v okviru evropskih pobud.
The ‘advanced status’ would institutionalise and increase political exchanges, intensify the country’s participation in the EU economic area, and bring about a significant degree of integration in various policy areas and European initiatives.
Pogajanja o novem Akcijskem načrtu evropske sosedske politike (ESP) med EU in Jordanijo, ki bo opredelil odnos, dobro napredujejo in pričakuje se, da bo načrt sprejet v okviru pridružitvenega sveta EU-Jordanija, ki je načrtovan v zadnjem četrtletju leta 2010.
The negotiations for a new EU‑Jordan European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan, which will define the relationship, are well advanced and its adoption is expected to take place in the framework of the EU‑Jordan Association Council scheduled in the last quarter of 2010.
Akcijski načrt evropske sosedske politike bo tako ostal glavni referenčni dokument za usmerjanje odnosov med EU in Jordanijo v prihodnjih letih.
The ENP Action Plan will thus remain an essential reference guiding EU‑Jordan relations over the next years.
Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-6051/2010
Question for written answer E-6051/2010
(26. julij 2010)
(26 July 2010)
Zadeva: Finančna sredstva EU za afganistanske upornike
Subject: EU money to Afghan insurgency
Vojaške sile ZDA v Afganistanu so se odločile prenesti večino svoje vojaške logistike na zasebne izvajalce, ti pa so sklenili podizvajalske pogodbe za zaščito vojaških konvojev z lokalnimi afganistanskim varnostnimi silami.
In Afghanistan the US military decided to outsource most of its logistics to private contractors, who in turn have subcontracted the protection of military convoys to local Afghan security providers.
Posledice tega so katastrofalne: odločitev, da bo ameriška oskrbovalna veriga prešla v zasebne roke, podžiga izsiljevanje in korupcijo, saj znaten delež od 2,2 oziroma 3 milijard USD, porabljenih za vojaško logistiko v Afganistanu, konča v žepih vojaških vodij, vodij lokalnih mafijskih združb in končno tudi talibanskih poveljnikov.
This has had disastrous consequences: the decision to place the US military supply chain into private hands is fuelling extortion and corruption, as warlords, local mafia bosses, and ultimately Taliban commanders end up taking a significant share of the USD 2.2‑3 billion spent on military logistics in Afghanistan.
Navedeni znesek presega sredstva, ki jih talibani dobijo od svoje „obdavčitve“ proizvodnje mamil (po podatkih ZN ta znašajo 15 % njihovega vojnega proračuna).
This amount surpasses the funding going to the Taliban from their ‘taxation’ of the narcotics industry (calculated by the UN at 15 % of their war budget).
Denar za zagotavljanje zaščite in izsiljevanje sta na vseh stopnjah vojaške oskrbovalne verige najpomembnejši vir sredstev za upor, kot je decembra 2009 v svoji izjavi pred odborom senata za odnose s tujino navedla državna sekretarka ZDA Hilary Clinton.
Protection money and extortion at every level of the military supply chain are the most significant source of funding for the insurgency, as recognised by US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in December 2009.
Ker vojaški logistiki ZDA in Nata sledita podobnim smernicam, se utegne zgoditi, da bodo evropski davkoplačevalci navsezadnje finančno podpirali delovanje talibanov prek subjektov, ki naj bi se borili proti njim.
Since US and NATO military logistics follow similar lines, European taxpayers could end up funding the Taliban through the very entities that are supposed to combat them.
Nato in vse koalicijske sile v Afganistanu bi torej morale zopet same skrbeti za vojaško oskrbovalno verigo.
NATO and all coalition forces in Afghanistan should, therefore, return to a situation whereby they provide their own military supply chain.
Ali lahko visoka predstavnica Catherine Ashton razjasni navedeno vprašanje in predstavi ukrepe, ki jih je EU sprejela, da bi se to stanje uredilo?
Can High Representative Catherine Ashton shed light on this issue and inform us what the EU is doing to remedy the situation?
Svet ne more komentirati vojaških oskrbovalnih verig zveze NATO in ZDA.
The Council is not in a position to comment on the military supply chains of NATO and the US.
Kar zadeva pomoč EU Afganistanu, ta za obdobje od 2007 do 2010 znaša 610 milijonov EUR, za obdobje od 2011 do 2013 pa je predvidenih nadaljnjih 600 milijonov EUR.
As far as EU assistance is concerned, EUR 610 million has been committed to Afghanistan for the period 2007‑10 and a further EUR 600 million will be committed for the period 2011‑13.
Pri financiranju prek mednarodnih organizacij Komisija pred začetkom kakršnega koli izplačevanja preveri njihove finančne postopke, pozneje pa ima možnost preveriti, ali so bili postopki tudi ustrezno uporabljeni.
In the case of funding through international organisations, the Commission examines their financial procedures before making any payments and is able to check subsequently if the procedures have been correctly applied.
Pri programih, ki jih sama upravlja, Komisija nadzoruje usmerjanje svoje pomoči z obiski na terenu, finančnimi revizijami in ocenjevanji.
For programmes under direct management, the Commission monitors its assistance through field visits, audits and evaluations.
Kadar se finančna sredstva EU usmerjajo prek drugih izvajalskih partnerjev, kot so mednarodne nevladne organizacije, veljajo za nadzor, naročila in finančne revizije enaki pogoji.
These monitoring, procurement and auditing conditions also apply when EU funds are channelled through other implementing partners, such as international NGOs.
Na nedavni konferenci v Kabulu 20. julija so vsi donatorji potrdili svojo zavezo, da bodo v prihodnjih letih do 50 % svojih finančnih sredstev usmerjali prek sistemov afganistanske vlade (ali skrbniških skladov, v katerih je udeleženih več donatorjev), če bo afganistanska vlada izboljšala svoje zmogljivosti za ustrezno upravljanje skladov.
At the recent Kabul Conference on 20 July, all donors underlined their commitment to channel up to 50 % of their funds through Afghan Government systems (or multi-donor trust funds) in the years ahead, provided the Government of Afghanistan improves its capacity to properly manage funds.
Velik del pomoči EU se že zdaj usmerja prek skrbniških skladov, v katerih je udeleženih več donatorjev, ki jih na primer upravlja Svetovna banka.
A significant proportion of EU assistance is already channelled through multi-donor trust funds, which are managed for example by the World Bank.
Takšna uporaba skladov po eni strani zagotavlja usklajen pristop z drugimi donatorji, po drugi pa tudi bolj učinkovito združevanje virov.
Utilising funds in this manner ensures both a coherence of approach with other donors and more effective pooling of resources.
Poleg tega EU dodatno usmerja tehnično sodelovanje z afganistansko vlado v upravljanje javnih financ, da bi se izboljšalo finančno upravljanje ministrstev.
In addition, the EU is increasing its focus on public finance management in its technical cooperation with the Afghan Government in order to improve financial management of the ministries.
To bo afganistanski vladi omogočilo, da bo lahko v prihodnosti od donatorjev prejemala neposredno proračunsko podporo.
This will prepare the Afghan Government to receive direct budget support from donors in the future.
Zaradi zapletenega in težavnega stanja v državi so bili sprejeti vsi možni previdnostnimi ukrepi za ustrezno upravljanje skladov EU v Afganistanu.
Taking into account the complex and difficult situation which the country presents, all possible precautions are in place to manage properly EU funds in Afghanistan.
To je bila tudi sklepna ugotovitev v „Poročilu o proračunskem nadzoru sredstev EU v Afganistanu“, ki ga je decembra 2008 predložila poročevalka Odbora za proračunski nadzor Evropskega parlamenta Véronique Mathieu.
Indeed, this was the conclusion of the ‘Report on budgetary control of EU funds in Afghanistan’ submitted by MEP Rapporteur Véronique Mathieu, European Parliament Committee on Budgetary Control, in December 2008.
Potočnika v imenu Komisije
Joint answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
Pisna vprašanja : E-8405/10 , E-8454/10 , E-8647/10 , P-9667/10 , E-8466/10 , E-8591/10 , E-8613/10 , E-9473/10 , E-8659/10 , E-8625/10 , P-8922/10 , E-8853/10 , E-8728/10 , E-8860/10 , E-8535/10 , E-8577/10 , E-8600/10 , E-9063/10 , E-9395/10 , P-8720/10 , E-8710/10 , E-9002/10 , P-9462/10
Written questions : E-8405/10 , E-8454/10 , E-8647/10 , P-9667/10 , E-8466/10 , E-8591/10 , E-8613/10 , E-9473/10 , E-8659/10 , E-8625/10 , P-8922/10 , E-8853/10 , E-8728/10 , E-8860/10 , E-8535/10 , E-8577/10 , E-8600/10 , E-9063/10 , E-9395/10 , P-8720/10 , E-8710/10 , E-9002/10 , P-9462/10
Zaradi velikega števila vprašanj v zvezi z industrijsko nesrečo v obratu za proizvodnjo aluminijevega oksida podjetja MAL Zrt. v kraju Ajka na Madžarskem Komisija odgovarja na več pisnih vprašanj v tem dokumentu.
Due to the large number of the questions regarding the industrial accident at the alumina production plant operated by MAL Zrt. in Ajka, Hungary, the Commission presents its replies regarding several written questions in this document.
Najprej želi Komisija izraziti svoje najgloblje sožalje družinam žrtev nesreče.
First of all, the Commission expresses its deepest sympathy to the families of the victims of the accident.
Vprašanja o odzivanju na krizo:
Questions on crisis response
Odzivanje na izredne razmere in zaščita državljanov spadajo pod pristojnost držav članic.
Emergency response and safeguarding citizens falls within the remit of the Member States.