natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Nemškega finančnega ministra sem spremljal na ministrskih sestankih v okviru Evroskupine, Sveta za ekonomske in finančne zadeve (ECOFIN), Evropske investicijske banke, Evropske banke za obnovo in razvoj, skupin G-7, G-8 in G-20, pa tudi v okviru mednarodnega monetarno-finančnega odbora (IMFC) v Mednarodnem denarnem skladu, pri čemer sem ga večkrat tudi nadomeščal, kadar se sestankov ni mogel udeležiti osebno.
I have accompanied the German Minister of Finance to the meetings at Ministe-rial level of the Eurogroup, the ECOFIN, the EIB, the EBRD, the G7, G8 and G20 as well as the IMFC at the IMF, and repeatedly I represented him in these meetings if he was unable to attend.
Kot generalni direktor za politiko finančnih trgov sem bil zadolžen za dvostranske odnose z vsemi državami zunaj EU.
As Director General for Financial Market Policy I was responsible for bilateral relationships with all countries outside the EU.
Pri tem sem se osredotočal na ZDA, Kitajsko in afriške države.
Here I focussed on the USA, China and African countries.
Kot državni sekretar sem bil zadolžen za vse dvostranske odnose Ministrstva za finance z državami v Evropi in zunaj nje.
As State Secretary I have been responsible for all bilateral relationships of the Finance Ministry inside and outside Europe.
Seveda je na tem področju največ pozornosti namenjene državam članicam EU, a hkrati sem ohranjal tesne vezi zlasti z ZDA in afriškimi državami, kolikor mi je čas to dopuščal.
Here the focus is clearly on the EU Member States, but I have continued to maintain close ties in particular to the USA and African countries as much as time per-mits.
V letu 2011 sem postal sopredsedujoči delovni skupini G-20 (ki je sestavljena iz uradnikov finančnih ministrstev in centralnih bank) za reformo mednarodnega monetarnega sistema.
In 2011 I became Co-Chair of the G20 Working Group (consisting of treasury officials and central bankers) of the Reform of the International Monetary Sys-tem.
Sem član usmerjevalnega odbora v projektu Svetovnega gospodarskega foruma za prihodnost mednarodnega monetarnega sistema, imenovan pa sem bil tudi za člana skupine skrbnikov za načela za stabilne kapitalske tokove in pravično prestrukturiranje dolga.
I am a steering board member of the World Economic Forum’s project on the future of the International Monetary System and I was appointed to the Group of Trustees of the Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Re-structuring
Navedite najpomembnejše vidike svojega akademskega ozadja in najpomembnejše objave na področju monetarne in gospodarske politike ter finančne regulacije.
Please highlight the main aspects of your academic background and most relevant publications on monetary and economic policy and financial regulation matters.
Od leta 1988 do 1994 sem študiral ekonomijo na univerzah v Gießenu in Bonnu, pri čemer sem se na Inštitutu za mednarodno gospodarsko politiko v Bonnu specializiral za monetarno politiko in politiko deviznega tečaja.
I studied Economics at the Universities of Gießen and Bonn from 1988 to 1994 and specialised in Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy at the Institute for Inter-national Economic Policy in Bonn.
V Bonnu sem magistriral; naslov moje magistrske naloge je „Posledice inflacije za rast – teoretična in empirična analiza“ („Die Implikationn von Inflation für Wachstum – eine theoretische und empirische Analyse“).
I obtained a Master’s degree in Bonn with a thesis on “The implications of inflation for growth – a theoretical and empirical analysis” (“Die Implikationn von Inflation für Wachstum – eine theoretische und empirische Analyse”).
V letu 1991/92 sem se udeležil programa MBA na šoli Bocconi’s Scuola di Direzione Aziendale v Milanu.
In 1991/92 I participated in an MBA-programme at Bocconi’s Scuola di Direzione Aziendale in Milan, Italy.
Tam sem se specializiral za strateška in organizacijska vprašanja.
There I specialised in strategy and organisation.
Objavil sem naslednje članke in prispevke:
I published the following articles and contributions:
Poleg tega sem objavil več časopisnih člankov, trenutno pa pripravljam dva prispevka za zbornike.
In addition, I published a number of articles in newspapers and I am currently working on two contributions for collected editions.
Prvi zadeva evro („Evro: včeraj, danes, jutri“) in bo objavljen v zborniku o valutah, ki ga ureja Sara Eisen iz Bloomberga in bo izšel konec leta 2011 pri založbi McGraw Hill.
One is on the Euro (“The Euro: Past, Present and Future”) for a compilation on currencies, edited by Bloomberg’s Sara Eisen, to be published by McGraw Hill at the end of 2011.
Drugi prispevek obravnava finančno krizo in države v razvoju, objavljen pa bo v zborniku prispevkov o razvojni pomoči, ki bo izšel leta 2012.
The other is on the financial crisis and developing countries for a compilation on development aid to be published in 2012.
- od začetka dolžnike krize v nekaterih državah na obrobju evroobmočja se veliko ukvarjam z upravljanjem krize, med drugim tudi z oblikovanjem evropskega instrumenta za finančno stabilnost (EFSF), reformo ekonomskega upravljanja v evroobmočju in pripravo evropskega mehanizma stabilnosti (ESM);
- Since the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in some peripheral Eurozone countries I have been heavily involved in the crisis management, including inter alia setting up the EFSF, reform of the economic governance of the Eu-rozone, preparing the ESM.
- po propadu skupine Lehman Brothers jeseni 2008 sem skupaj z Jensom Weidmannom, ki je bil tedaj zaposlen v kabinetu kanclerke, usklajeval odziv nemške vlade na finančno krizo, med drugim tudi s stabilizacijo banke Hypo Real Estate (HRE), pripravo zakona o stabilizaciji finančnih trgov in oblikovanjem sklada, pozneje pa tudi agencije za stabilizacijo finančnih trgov (SoFFin/FMSA), pri čemer sem postal predsednik medsektorskega usmerjevalnega odbora te agencije.
- In the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in fall 2008, I coordi-nated, together with Jens Weidmann, who at that time was at the Chancel-lor’s office, the German government’s response to the financial crisis, in-cluding inter alia stabilizing the bank Hypo Real Estate (HRE), drafting the law on financial market stabilisation, setting up the Financial Markets Stabi-lisation Fund and – later – agency (SoFFin/FMSA) and becoming Chairman of its inter-ministerial steering committee.
V tej vlogi sem se med drugim ukvarjal s primeroma WestLB in Commerzbank.
In this capacity I then dealt inter alia with the WestLB and Commerzbank cases.
V okviru te naloge je bilo treba oblikovati usklajen odziv ne le na nacionalni, temveč tudi na evropski (med drugim tudi z vidika državnih pomoči) in mednarodni ravni;
This task involved, however, not only the national level, but also the European (i.a. state aid aspects) and international coordination of the response.
- ko se je nemška vlada leta 2009 odločila pripraviti sveženj gospodarskih spodbud, da bi izničili negativne vplive finančne krize na realno gospodarstvo, sem sodeloval pri zasnovi in izvajanju teh ukrepov ter bil član medsektorskega usmerjevalnega odbora t. i. sklada za Nemčijo (Deutschlandfonds).
- To counteract the financial crisis spilling over to the real economy, the German government decided in 2009 to set up an economic stimulus package and I was again involved in its design and implementation and was a member of the inter-ministerial steering committee of the so called fund for Germany (Deutschlandfonds).
Tako sem med drugim sodeloval pri reševanju družbe Opel, ki je podružnica skupine General Motors v Nemčiji;
Thus, I dealt i.a. with the rescue of Opel, General Motor’s branch in Germany.
- sodeloval sem na vseh dosedanjih vrhunskih srečanjih voditeljev skupine držav G-20, ki so zadevala predvsem program finančne obnove in reform po finančni krizi.
- I prepared and participated in all G20 Leaders’ Summits until now dealing especially with the financial repair and reform agenda after the financial crisis.
Med pomembnimi vrhunskimi srečanji, ki sem se jih udeležil pred tem, sta srečanje skupine G-8 v Kölnu (leta 1999) o odpisu dolga na dvostranski ravni in srečanje skupine G-8 v Gleneaglesu leta 2005 o odpisu dolga na večstranski ravni.
Important summits before that were the 1999 Cologne G8 dealing with bilateral debt relief and the Gleneagles G8 summit in 2005 dealing with multilateral debt relief.
Na vrhunskem srečanju skupine G-20 v Seulu (2010) sem veliko sodeloval pri pripravi svežnja reform Mednarodnega denarnega sklada;
At the G20 summit in Seoul in 2010, I was heavily involved in designing the IMF reform package.
- V zvezi z regulacijo finančnih trgov naj omenim, da sem vodil proces oblikovanja nemškega stališča v pogajanjih na evropski ravni o direktivi o trgih finančnih instrumentov, direktivi o ponudbah za prevzem in direktivi o plačilnih storitvah v času nemškega predsedovanja Svetu leta 2007.
- As regards financial markets regulation I would like to highlight that I was in charge of framing the German position for negotiations on the European level of – for example – the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, the Directive on takeover bids and the Payment Services Directive during the German Council Presidency in 2007.
Na nacionalni ravni sem med drugim vodil izvajanje teh projektov in projektov v okviru procesa Basel 2.
On the national level I lead i.a. the implementation of the former projects and of Basle 2.
Ali imate poslovne ali finančne deleže ali druge obveznosti, ki bi utegnili biti v navzkrižju z vašimi prihodnjimi nalogami, in ali obstaja kakšen drug pomemben osebni ali drugačen dejavnik, ki bi ga moral Parlament upoštevati pri odločanju o vašem imenovanju?
Do you have any business or financial holdings or any other commitments which might conflict you with your prospective duties, and are there any other relevant personal or other factors that need to be taken account of by the Parliament when considering your nomination?
Kar nekaj uspešnih članov centralne banke je poklicno pot začelo v ministrstvih za finance ali kakem drugem ministrstvu, pa jim ni mogoče očitati, da zaradi tega v centralnih bankah ne delujejo neodvisno.
There are quite a number of successful central bankers who started their respec-tive careers in the Treasury or in another Ministry, whose independence as cen-tral bankers is nevertheless undisputed.
V Nemčiji sta taka bančnika zlasti Hans Tietmeyer in Jürgen Stark, v novejšem času pa tudi predsednik nemške centralne banke (Bundesbank) Jens Wiedmann, ki je na ta položaj prišel neposredno iz kabineta kanclerke.
In Germany, this holds particularly true for Hans Tietmeyer and Jürgen Stark, or, to give a very recent example, for the President of the Bundesbank Jens Weidmann, who came into office straight from the Chancellor’s office.
Še en tak novejši primer je Klaas Knot, ki je postal guverner nizozemske centralne banke (De Nederlandsche Bank) julija 2011, tik pred tem pa je delal prav na nizozemskem finančnem ministrstvu.
Another recent example is Klaas Knot who be-came Governor of De Nederlandsche Bank coming directly from the Dutch Ministry of Finance in July 2011.
Po mojem mnenju mora vsak javni uradnik sprejeti in ponotranjiti mandat institucije, institucionalni okvir, kulturo in zgodovinsko ozadje institucije.
I am convinced that it is crucial for any kind of public office that one adopts the mandate of the institution, the institutional context and culture as well as the his-torical background of the institution as one’s own.
Sam vse te vidike ECB dobro poznam, saj sem tesno sodeloval z ECB in z zaposlenimi v ECB v različnih skupinah, odborih in kontekstih od same ustanovitve te institucije in še prej, v okviru Evropskega monetarnega inštituta.
And I am very familiar with all these aspects of the ECB as an institution, since I closely co-operated with the ECB and ECB staff in various groups, committees and settings since its es-tablishment and even before that with the European Monetary Institute.
Če postanem član odbora ECB, bom zvest evru in ECB.
If I shall become an ECB board member, my loyalty belongs to the Euro and the ECB.
Katere vodilne cilje boste poskušali doseči v okviru mandata v Evropski centralni banki?
What would be the guiding objectives you will pursue during mandate at the European Central Bank?
Vodilno načelo bo mandat, ki ga Evropski centralni banki dodeljuje Pogodba, zlasti z vidika ciljev in nalog ECB.
The guiding principle will be the Treaty mandate of the ECB, especially the ob-jectives and the tasks of the ECB.
To pomeni, da je glavni cilj ohraniti stabilnost cen in – brez ogrožanja stabilnosti cen – podpirati splošne gospodarske politike Unije.
This means the primary objective is to main-tain price stability and – without prejudice to price stability – to support the gen-eral economic policies in the Union.
Poleg tega bi rad poudaril, da mora ECB v skladu s Pogodbo tudi prispevati k zagotavljanju stabilnosti finančnega sistema, kar je drugi vodilni cilj.
In addition, I would like to highlight the ECB’s task to contribute to the stability of the financial system as laid down in the Treaty as another guiding objective.
Deloval bom neodvisno in v skladu z mandatom ECB, ki ga določa Pogodba, v splošnem interesu državljanov Evropske unije in zlasti celotnega evroobmočja.
I will act with independence in line with the Treaty mandate of the ECB, acting in the general interest of the citizens of the European Union and especially the Eurozone as a whole.
V celoti se zavedam, da kot član odbora ECB ne bom smel delovati kot zastopnik države, iz katere prihajam.
I am fully aware that no board member of the ECB should act as an agent of the Member State he or she is citizen of.
Monetarna politika ECB
B. ECB monetary policy
Kako ocenjujete monetarno politiko, ki jo je Evropski sistem centralnih bank (ESCB) izvajal dvanajst let?
What is your assessment of the monetary policy as it has been implemented by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) for 12 years?
Katere spremembe, če sploh, bi spodbujali?
What changes, if any, would you promote?
V skladu s Pogodbo mora ECB ohranjati srednjeročno stabilnost cen v celotnem evroobmočju.
The Treaty gives the ECB the mandate to maintain price stability over the me-dium term for the euro area as a whole.
Glede na povprečno inflacijo v obdobju, odkar je začela ECB izvajati monetarno politiko, je treba ugotoviti, da je ECB zelo uspešna.
Looking at the average inflation since the ECB started conducting monetary policy, one cannot but conclude that the ECB has been very successful.
Povprečna stopnja inflacije v evroobmočju je približno 2 %, medtem ko je bila povprečna stopnja inflacije v zadnjih 30 letih obstoja nemške marke približno 3 %.
The average inflation rate in the euro area stands at around 2% as compared to an average inflation rate of around 3% of the Deutsche Mark during its last 30 years.
Ta uspeh je bil dosežen kljub številnim preglavicam v evroobmočju, ki so segale od hitre rasti cen surovin do pritiska za zniževanje inflacije zaradi zelo hude svetovne gospodarske recesije.
This success has been achieved despite numerous headwinds in the euro area, ranging from large increases in commod-ity prices to downward inflation pressure stemming from the very severe and global economic recession.
Še pomembneje je, da javnost in finančni trgi trdno verjamejo in zaupajo, da bo ECB dosegla svoj cilj.
What is even more important is the strong believe and unambiguous trust of the public and financial markets that the ECB will meet its objective.
Inflacijska pričakovanja so ves čas blizu ravni, ki so v skladu s cilji Sveta ECB, da stopnjo inflacije srednjeročno ohrani pod 2 %, vendar blizu tej vrednosti.
Inflation ex-pectations have been anchored around levels consistent with the Governing Council’s aim to maintain inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the me-dium term.
Celo v času hude gospodarske krize, ko so bile stopnje inflacije v evroobmočju nekaj mesecev negativne, so bila srednjeročna inflacijska pričakovanja nespremenjena, kar je v skladu s ciljem Sveta ECB.
Even in the period of the severe economic crisis, with inflation rates turning negative for a few months in the euro area, medium term inflation ex-pectations remained anchored, in line with the ECB’s Governing Council objec-tive.
To dokazuje izjemno verodostojnost monetarne politike ECB, kar je za centralno banko zelo pomembno.
This bears witness to the very high degree of credibility of the ECB’s monetary policy, which is the major asset for a central bank.
Tako uspešne monetarne politike po mojem mnenju ne bi bilo smiselno spreminjati.
I see no reason for changing this successful monetary policy course.
Izhajajoč iz izkušenj zadnje krize, ali menite, da naj ECB ne bi upoštevala gibanja cen premoženja?
Building on the lessons from the current crisis, should the ECB disregard the evolution of asset prices?
Upadanje ravni in manjše nihanje inflacije cen blaga in storitev sta očitni dejstvi, ki zaznamujeta zadnjih 30 let gospodarskega razvoja v svetu.
The decline in the level and in the variability of goods and service price inflation is a clear stylised fact that characterises the last 30 years of economic develop-ments across the world.
Na to so pomembno vplivale bistvene izboljšave v institucijah, ki sprejemajo odločitve, in splošno dojemanje stabilnosti cen kot družbene vrednote, ki jo je treba ohranjati za dobro vseh državljanov.
One important factor behind these developments is the decisive improvement in the quality of the policymaking institutions and in the wide acceptance of price stability as a social value that ought to be preserved in the interest of all citizens.
Strukturne spremembe, tudi globalizacija svetovnih gospodarstev, so najbrž prispevale k stabilnosti cen, a preudarno oblikovanje politik ostaja ključna gonilna sila.
Structural change also in the form of globalisation of the world economies has probably contributed to the achievement of price sta-bility but sound policymaking remains the essential driver.
Toda stabilna inflacija cen domačega blaga in storitev v monetarni politiki ne sme biti samoumevna.
However, monetary policy cannot take for granted the stability of domestic good and service inflation.
Zelo podrobno je treba spremljati vse dogajanje na tem področju.
Very close monitoring of all relevant developments is war-ranted.
Obenem je finančna kriza, ki se je začela sredi leta 2007, le zadnji – in zelo resen – v nizu dogodkov, ki dokazuje, kako težko centralne banke spremljajo gibanje cen premoženja.
At the same, the financial crisis that started in mid-2007 is only the last, ex-tremely serious episode that confirms how important it is for central banks to monitor asset price developments.
Mednarodna razprava o finančni in gospodarski krizi v akademski sferi in med nosilci odločitev v gospodarski politiki je po mojem mnenju prispevala k razširjenemu mnenju, da morajo države in centralne banke v primeru izrednih dogodkov na makroekonomski ravni nasploh in zlasti v primeru neugodnega gibanja cen premoženja aktivno ukrepati.
The international debate about the financial and economic crisis in academia and among economic policy makers, as I ob-serve it, led to a wide-spread pro-active view on the role of the state and of cen-tral banks when it comes to macro economic aberrations in general and unfa-vourable asset price developments in particular.
Toda odgovor nanj je treba iskati šele, če tudi kljub vsem prizadevanjem ni mogoče preprečiti nastanka takega balona.“
But it should come only second, in case the evolution of a major bubble in spite of all efforts could not have been prevented.”
Pri tem ne gre za določanje ciljnih cen nekaterih vrst premoženja, temveč za to, da je treba preprečiti, da bi se nevzdržno gibanje cen premoženja sprevrglo v pravo finančno krizo, ki bi (pa četudi šele v daljni prihodnosti) lahko onemogočala centralni banki, da ohrani stabilnost cen, s tem pa bi zelo negativno vplivala na končni rezultat in na stabilnost cen.
This is not akin to targeting prices of certain assets, but rather to avoid unsus-tainable developments in asset prices to degenerate into full fledged financial crisis that – even far away in the future – could potentially hinder the ability of the central bank to maintain price stability and could, hence, be very costly in terms of output and price stability.
Strategija ECB na področju monetarne politike je zasnovana tako, da se pri razmisleku o politikah upošteva gibanje cen premoženja, toda ne kot cilj, temveč kot ključni kazalnik prihodnje gospodarske aktivnosti v smislu vpliva gibanja cen premoženja na bogastvo, strošek kapitala in stanje bilanc v različnih sektorjih evroobmočja.
The ECB’s monetary policy strategy incorporates asset price dynamics into the policy deliberations, not as a target, but rather as leading indicators of future economic activity through their impact on wealth, the cost of capital and the balance sheet positions of various euro area sectors.
Poleg tega je mogoče zaradi srednjeročne naravnanosti monetarne politike ECB upoštevati tudi tveganja za finančno stabilnost, ki se običajno razvijajo dlje časa kot drugi gospodarski pretresi.
Moreover, the medium-term orientation of the ECB’s monetary policy allows taking into consideration the risks to financial stability, which normally build-up over longer horizons com-pared to other economic shocks.
V okviru monetarne analize ECB je mogoče predvsem spremljati interakcije med oblikovanjem cen na premoženjskih trgih ter posojili in likvidnostjo v finančnem sektorju; navsezadnje so finančna neravnovesja pogosto povezana s prekomerno monetarno rastjo in porastom posojil.
In particular, within the context of the ECB’s monetary analysis it is possible to follow the interactions between price forma-tion in asset markets and credit and liquidity creation in the financial sector, not least as financial imbalances are often accompanied by excessive monetary and credit growth.
Na podlagi teh informacij lahko ECB oceni srednje- in dolgoročne napovedi gibanja cen.
This information contributes to the overall assessment shaping the ECB’s medium to long-term outlook for price developments.
V splošnem srednjeročna naravnanost monetarne strategije ECB in pomembna vloga monetarne analize v širšem okviru ECB, usmerjenem v stabilnost, omogočata, da ECB pri oblikovanju odločitev na področju monetarne politike ustrezno upošteva nastajanje in posledice finančnih neravnovesij in neusklajenosti cen premoženja.
Overall, the medium term orientation of the ECB’s monetary strategy and the prominent role of the monetary analysis within the ECB’s broader stability ori-ented framework for monetary policy making, ensures that the implications of financial imbalances and asset price misalignments and their unwinding are given due consideration in the ECB’s formulation of monetary policy decisions.
Kako ocenjujete posledice rastočih cen surovin za monetarno politiko?
How do you assess the consequences of rising commodity prices for monetary policy?
Odgovor na to vprašanje mora temeljiti na razlikovanju med začasnimi in trajnimi učinki rasti cen surovin ter na oceni, ali lahko taka rast povzroči tudi sekundarne učinke.
In answering this question, it is essential to distinguish between temporary and lasting effects of commodity price increases and, whether they risk triggering second round effects.
V primeru začasnih učinkov monetarna politika ni treba igrati aktivne vloge, saj je usmerjena srednjeročno.
In the case of temporary effects, monetary policy does not need to play an active role, given the medium-term orientation of monetary pol-icy.
Toda rast cen surovin je pomembna za monetarno politiko, če je dlje časa prisoten trend rasti teh cen ali če se prvotno začasni učinki prelevijo v sekundarne – posredne – učinke ter prek plač in določanja cen, pa tudi zaradi večjih inflacijskih pričakovanj, povzročijo inflacijo cen življenjskih potrebščin.
Commodity price increases, however, are monetary-policy relevant in case of sustained upward trends in commodity prices or if the initial temporary ef-fects start being translated into second-round effects on consumer price inflation through wages and price-setting and through higher inflation expectations.