natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Predlogi za euroobveznice se med drugim razlikujejo glede na jamstveno strukturo, kapitalsko strukturo in strukturo upravljanja, zato posledice vsakega primera za gospodarsko upravljanje niso enake.
Proposals for Eurobonds differ inter alia according to their guarantee structure, capital struc-ture and governance structure, hence the implications for economic governance in each case are not uniform.
Glede na navedeno, vsi predlogi euroobveznic predvidevajo skupno izdajanje dolga med državami članicami evroobmočja in določeno obliko vzajemnega jamstva.
That said, all Eurobond proposals imply common debt issuance between euro area Member States and some form of mutual guarantee.
Če je to jamstvo solidarno, ga Pogodba v sedanji obliki prepoveduje.
Where this guarantee is joint and several, it would be precluded by the Treaty as it stands.
Bolj na splošno, tako solidarno jamstvo nujno zmanjšuje spodbudo za trdne fiskalne (in makro) politike sodelujočih držav.
More gener-ally, such mutual guarantees necessarily reduce the incentive for sound fiscal (and macro) policies for the participating countries.
Bistvenega pomena je, da struktura upravljanja vseh takih ureditev zagotavlja, da te učinke zmanjševanja spodbude v celoti izravnajo drugi mehanizmi.
It is crucial that the govern-ance structure of any such arrangement ensures that these incentive-weakening effects are fully offset by other mechanisms.
Videti je, da sedanji predlogi ne zagotavljajo takih okvirov, ki bi bili združljivi s spodbudami, brez večjih sprememb strukture upravljanja EU (vključno s spremembami Pogodbe).
Current proposals do not seem to provide for such incentive-compatible frameworks without substantial changes to the EU governance structure (including Treaty changes).
Če bi taka izdaja izenačila obrestne mere med sodelujočimi državami članicami, bi poleg tega ustvarila posredno subvencijo med fiskalno trdnimi in fiskalno manj trdnimi državami članicami in s tem še bolj oslabila spodbude za fiskalno disciplino v EMU.
Moreover, to the ex-tent that such issuance would equalise interest rates between participating Mem-ber States, it would create an implicit subsidy between fiscally sound and fis-cally less sound Member States, further weakening incentives for fiscal disci-pline within EMU.
Ali mislite, da bi ECB potrebovala več novih instrumentov za reševanje krize evroobmočja?
Do you think the ECB should need further new instruments to cope with the euro area crisis?
Naj najprej poudarim, da je ECB bančnemu sistemu evroobmočja zagotovila izjemno visoko stopnjo likvidnostne podpore med finančno krizo in je zavezana, da bo s tem nadaljevala, dokler bo taka pomoč potrebna.
Let me first state that the ECB has provided to the euro area banking system an exceptional high degree of liquidity support throughout the financial crisis and is committed to continue to do so as long as such support is needed.
Banke evroobmočja imajo že od oktobra 2008 možnost pridobiti, na podlagi zavarovanja z raznovrstnimi vrednostnimi papirji in po fiksni obrestni meri, neomejene zneske likvidnostnih sredstev centralne banke (pri vseh operacijah refinanciranja ECB z zapadlostmi od 1 tedna do trenutno treh mesecev).
Euro area banks have since October 2008 the possibility to obtain, against a broad range of eligible securities as collateral and against a fixed rate, unlimited amounts of central bank liquidity (at any refinancing operation of the ECB at maturities ranging from 1 week to currently three months).
Ta postopek neomejene dodelitve s fiksno obrestno mero dejansko zagotavlja bankam zavarovanje pred likvidnostnimi tveganji po sorazmerno nizki ceni.
This fixed-rate full allotment procedure effectively provides to banks an insurance against liquidity risk at relatively low costs.
Po takem zavarovanju je v sedanjih razmerah veliko povpraševanje in na medbančnih trgih je njegova pridobitev le zelo draga ali pa skoraj nemogoča.
Such insurance is, under current circumstances, in high de-mand and only very costly or impossible to obtain in the interbank markets.
Čeprav ECB poudarja, da je ta instrument začasen, je že izjavila, da bo veljal, dokler bo potreben, vendar vsaj do začetka leta 2012.
While emphasising the temporary nature of this instrument, the ECB has already stated that this measure will remain in place for as long as needed but at least until the beginning of 2012.
ECB nenehno pregleduje splošne razmere.
The ECB is constantly reviewing the overall situa-tion.
V kolikor sedanje težave na finančnih trgih evroobmočja presegajo likvidnostne omejitve solventnih bank in se bolj kot to nanašajo na težave glede solventnosti, je treba rešitve poiskati drugje, zlasti pri nacionalnih vladah, ki bi morale zagotoviti pomoč pri dokapitalizaciji, v skladu z ugotovitvami zadnjih testov izjemnih situacij, če za zadevne banke ne bi bilo mogoče pridobiti tržnega financiranja.
Finally, to the extent that the current problems in euro area financial markets go beyond liquidity constraints on the part of solvent banks and rather relate to sol-vency concerns, solutions need to be sought from other sides, notably national governments who would need to provide support measures for recapitalisation, in line with the findings of the recent stress tests, if no market funding for the banks concerned could be obtained.
Glavnega vzroka za sedanje težave pa ne moremo in ne bi smeli reševati z intervencijo centralne banke.
The root cause of the current problems, however, cannot and should not be dealt with by means of central bank interven-tion.
Zato ne vidim potrebe po novih instrumentih za ECB.
Therefore I do not see the need for new instruments for the ECB.
Kakšno vlogo naj imajo po vašem mnenju bonitetne ocene držav v politiki ECB?
What role should sovereign ratings have in your view on ECB policy?
Ali mislite, da bi morala ECB praviloma sprejeti vse državne obveznice evroobmočja kot vrednostne papirje?
Do you think that ECB should accept as a rule all euro area government bonds as securities?
Pri ocenjevanju kreditnih standardov upravičenih sredstev kot zavarovanja pri operacijah monetarne politike so bonitetne ocene bonitetnih agencij samo eden od uporabljenih podatkov, ne pa edini.
In the assessment of the credit standards of eligible assets as collateral at mone-tary policy operations, ratings from credit rating agencies are one, but not the only, input used.
Eurosistem upošteva tudi druge lastnosti, ki zagotavljajo varstvo pred tveganji.
The Eurosystem also takes into account other features guaran-teeing a high risk protection.
V primeru države, v kateri poteka program prilagajanja, je bistvenega pomena skladnost države s programom in ocena programa, ki jo določi ECB.
In the case of a country under an adjustment pro-gramme, the country's compliance with the programme and the ECB’s assess-ment of the programme is of crucial importance.
V zvezi z državnimi obveznicami evroobmočja in tudi z vsemi drugimi vrednostnimi papirji je standarde določil Eurosistem v svojem bonitetnem okviru.
As regards euro area government bonds, as with all other securities, the Euro-system has set the standards in its Eurosystem Credit Assessment Framework.
Eurosistem si upravičeno pridržuje pravico, da ugotovi, ali izdaja, izdajatelj, dolžnik ali jamstvo izpolnjujejo njegove zahteve po višjih kreditnih standardih na podlagi vseh informacij, ki jih šteje za ustrezne, in lahko zavrne, omeji uporabo sredstva ali uporabi dodatne odbitke, če so potrebni za zagotovitev primernega varstva Eurosistema pred tveganji v skladu s členom 18.1 Statuta ESCB.
The Eurosystem rightly reserves the right to determine whether an issue, issuer, debtor or guarantor fulfils its requirements for high credit standards on the basis of any information it may consider relevant and may reject, limit the use of as-sets or apply supplementary haircuts on such grounds if required to ensure ade-quate risk protection of the Eurosystem in line with Article 18.1 of the Statute of the ESCB.
Kaj menite o evropski bonitetni agenciji?
What is your view on a European Credit Rating Agency?
Morebitna ustanovitev nove neodvisne evropske bonitetne agencije bi lahko bila koristna, zlasti zato, ker bi zaostrila konkurenco med bonitetnimi agencijami in s tem pripomogla k boljšemu ocenjevanju, možno pa je tudi, da bi lahko bolj upoštevala evropske finančne posebnosti.
The possible establishment of a new independent European Credit Rating Agency may have potential benefits, notably increasing competition among rat-ing agencies, thereby leading to better assessments, possibly also being able to take better into account some European financial peculiarities.
Vendar bi morala taka agencija ostati popolnoma neodvisna od političnih ali drugih vplivov.
However, such an agency would need to remain fully independent from political or other influ-ences.
Verjetno bi tudi trajalo nekaj časa, dokler taka agencija ne bi mogla verodostojno izdajati bonitetnih ocen, ki bi bile stroge, trdne, neprekinjene in bi se preverjale na podlagi preteklih izkušenj, tako da bi ustrezale zahtevam uredbe o bonitetnih agencijah.
It may also take some time until such an Agency could credibly issue rat-ings that are rigorous, sound, continuous, and subject to validation based on his-torical experience, and thus in compliance with the features required by the CRA Regulation.
Glede na navedeno je po mojem mnenju pomembno poudariti osnovno težavo prekomernega zanašanja na zunanje bonitetne ocene.
Having said this, I think it is important to point to the fundamental problem of over reliance on external ratings.
Odbor za finančno stabilnost, Komisija EU in Baselski odbor za bančni nadzor trenutno opravljajo pomembno delo na tem področju.
The FSB, the EU Commission and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) are currently undertaking important work in this respect.
Kaj menite o programu za trge vrednostnih papirjev?
What is your view on the Securities Markets Programme (SMP)?
Ali postaja ECB po vašem mnenju s tem dejansko fiskalni akter in bi lahko bila ogrožena njena neodvisnost?
In particular, in your view does it turn the ECB to a de facto fiscal player and thus possibly endanger its independence?
Program za trge vrednostnih papirjev, kakor ga je objavila ECB, je bil uveden maja 2010 za podporo prenosu odločitev monetarne politike v zvezi s segmenti finančnih trgov, ki ne opravljajo svoje funkcije, z namenom zagotoviti stabilnost cen v evroobmočju kot celoti.
The Securities Markets Programme (SMP) as communicated by the ECB had been introduced in May 2010 to support the transmission of monetary policy de-cisions on account of dysfunctional financial market segments, with a view to ensuring price stability for the euro area as a whole.
Odločitev o ponovnem začetku kupovanja obveznic avgusta 2011 je bila sprejeta glede na znatno tveganje, da nekateri trgi državnih dolžniških vrednostnih papirjev ne bi več opravljali svoje funkcije in bi se napetosti v odsotnosti intervencije preselile na druge trge.
The decision to start buying bonds again in August 2011 was taken in view of the significant risk of some government debt securities markets becoming dysfunctional and tensions spreading to other markets in the absence of intervention.
Trgi vrednostnih papirjev, zlasti pa trgi državnih obveznic, ki ne opravljajo svoje funkcije, lahko zelo škodljivo vplivajo na prenos usmeritve monetarne politike v realno gospodarstvo (in s tem nazadnje tudi na cene).
Dysfunctional securi-ties markets – and government bond markets in particular – can have severe ad-verse effects on the transmission of the monetary policy stance to the real econ-omy (and ultimately to prices).
Gledano od zunaj, je skoraj nemogoče presoditi, ali in v kolikšni meri se taki škodljivi učinki na prenos usmeritve monetarne politike na realno gospodarstvo tudi resnično dogajajo.
From an outside perspective it is almost impos-sible to judge, if and to what extend such adverse effects on the transmission of the monetary policy stance to the real economy take place in reality.
Publikacije ECB, npr. mesečni bilten, bi morale zagotoviti čim več informacij.
The publi-cations of the ECB, e.g. the monthly bulletin, should provide as much informa-tion as possible.
Po mojem mnenju je nujno, da je program za trge vrednostnih papirjev samo začasen in omejen in da je konec sheme predvidljiv, da lahko okrepljeni instrument za finančno stabilnost prevzame dejavnosti na sekundarnih trgih.
From my perspective, it is essential that SMP will be of a tem-porary and limited nature only and that the end of the scheme is foreseeable since the enhanced EFSF can undertake secondary market operations.
Drugi pomemben vidik je, da so dejavnosti na sekundarnih trgih v celoti sterilizirane, tako da ne ovirajo izvajanja monetarne politike z usmerjanjem kratkoročnih obrestnih mer na denarnih trgih v skladu z usmeritvijo monetarne politike.
A second important aspect is that secondary market operations are fully sterilized so that they do not hinder the implementation of monetary policy by steering short-term money market interest rates in line with the policy monetary stance.
Cilj ECB je samo stabilizirati tiste trge, ki ne delujejo več normalno.
The ECB is only aiming to stabilise those markets that stopped functioning normally.
Prvi in absolutno potreben pogoje za uspeh pa je, da vlade pospešijo fiskalno konsolidacijo in so neomajne pri izvajanju strogih ukrepov, ki so nepogrešljivi.
But the first – and absolutely necessary – condition for success is that governments accelerate fiscal consolidation and are unwavering in their imple-mentation of the tough measures that are indispensable.
Motnje na trgu, v primeru trgov vrednostnih papirjev v nekaterih državah članicah, so posledica dejstva, da morajo vlade posamezno še zagotoviti svojo verodostojnost na trgih, in da medsebojni nadzor, ki ga zahteva pakt za stabilnost in rast, ni bil pravilno izvajan.
Market disruptions, in the case of the securities markets of some member countries, are due to the fact that governments, individually, still have to ensure their full credibility in the markets, and that the peer surveillance called for by the Stability and Growth Pact was not exercised correctly.
Nesporno je, da je bila ECB v določenih primerih edini deležnik v evroobmočju, ki je bil sposoben ukrepati, vendar pa je fiskalno in monetarno politiko načeloma treba jasno ločevati.
It is undisputed that the ECB was at times the only stakeholder in the euro area fully capable of acting, nevertheless fiscal and monetary policy shall be clearly separated as a matter of principle.
Zato mora evroobmočje ukrepati in izvesti potrebne predpogoje (ukrepe za prilagajanje na nacionalni ravni, okrepljeni instrument za finančno stabilnost, evropski mehanizem za finančno stabilnost, boljše strukture upravljanja), da se ponovno vzpostavi spodobnost ukrepanja in omogoči ECB umik iz teh dejavnosti, takoj ko bodo to dovoljevale razmere na trgu.
Therefore, the euro area has to act and implement the necessary prerequisites (adjustment measures on the national level, enhanced EFSF, ESM, better governance struc-tures) to regain full capacity to act and thus enable the ECB to withdraw from these activities, as soon as market conditions permit.
Kdaj predvidevate dejanski umik ECB iz sedanjih nestandardnih ukrepov?
For when do you foresee the ECB's effective exit from the current non-standard measures?
Nestandardni ukrepi monetarne politike ECB so bili sprejeti zato, da bi se glede na oslabljene finančne trge okrepil proces prenosa monetarne politike.
The ECB’s non-standard monetary policy measures have been taken to enhance the transmission process of monetary policy, in view of impaired financial mar-kets.
Izhod iz teh ukrepov je torej povezan s postopnim razvojem razmer na finančnih trgih, to pa je spet v veliki meri odvisno od ustreznih nacionalnih politik, ki jih je treba sprejeti in izvajati.
The exit from these measures therefore is linked to the evolution of finan-cial market conditions over time, which in turn depends to a large degree on ap-propriate national policies to be decided upon and implemented.
Odločna fiskalna konsolidacija in strukturne reforme v državah, ki so v finančnih težavah, bi omejila premije za tveganja v donosnosti vrednostnih papirjev.
Decisive fiscal consolidation and structural reforms in financially stressed countries would limit risk premiums in bond yields.
Odločni ukrepi za dokapitalizacijo bank v finančnih težavah bi znatno pripomogli k obnovitvi dostopa teh bank na denarne trge in ECB omogočili, da omeji svojo posredniško vlogo.
Decisive measures for recapitalisation of banks with financial problems would contribute substantially to reviving the access of these banks to money markets, allowing the ECB to reduce its intermediation role.
Program za trge vrednostnih papirjev je začasen, enako kot vsi drugi nestandardni ukrepi monetarne politike, ki jih je ECB sprejela v odgovor na krizo.
The SMP – as all other non-standard monetary policy measures the ECB has taken in response to the crisis – is temporary in nature.
Sklepov Sveta ECB o ključnih obrestnih merah ne nadgrajuje, ampak ga dopolnjuje, ker krepi proces prenosa monetarne politike.
It is complementary rather than supplementary to the Governing Council’s decisions on its key inter-est rates as it enhances the transmission process of monetary policy.
Kot vsi nestandardni ukrepi monetarne politike bi bilo treba program za trge vrednostnih papirjev čim prej postopoma ukiniti, takoj ko se umirijo razmere, ki so botrovale njegovemu začetku.
As all non-standard monetary policy measures, the SMP should be phased out as soon as possible, once the conditions that led to the initiation of the programme have dissipated.
Ali predvidevate, da se bo stališče ECB spremenilo, kar zadeva močno nasprotovanje prestrukturiranju grškega dolga?
Do you foresee the stance of the ECB to change as regards the strong opposition towards a restructuring of Greek debt?
Kar zadeva vprašanje prestrukturiranja dolga v Grčiji, je ECB nenehno vztrajala pri treh ključnih sporočilih.
As regards the question of debt restructuring in Greece, the ECB has been con-stantly insisting on three key messages.
Prvič, ECB je rekla, da mora biti vsako sodelovanje zasebnega sektorja prostovoljno, in to se spoštuje.
First, the ECB said that any participa-tion by the private sector had to be voluntary in nature, and this is being fol-lowed.
Drugič, ECB je rekla, da se je treba izogibati „kreditnim dogodkom“, in videti je, da se bo zgodilo tudi to.
Second, the ECB said that it was necessary to avoid a ‘credit event’, and it also seems likely that this will be avoided.
Tretjič, ECB je tudi rekla, da se je treba izogibati plačevanju le nekaterih obveznosti ( selective default ), tako da bi Grčija spoštovala svoje dolžniške obveznosti in strogo upoštevala dogovorjeni program, s tem pa bi pomagala zagotoviti minimiziranje stroškov za izgube, učinke prelivanja in širitev na druge države evroobmočja.
Third, the ECB also said that a ‘se-lective default’ should be avoided so that Greece honours its debt obligations and strictly adheres to the agreed programme and, in so doing, helps to ensure that costs in terms of losses, spillovers and contagion to euro area peers are minimised.
Sklepi, ki so jih 21. julija sprejeli voditelji držav in vlad, vključujejo vse potrebne previdnostne ukrepe, da lahko obravnavajo pomisleke ECB v tej zvezi.
The decisions taken by the Heads of State or Government on 21 July include necessary precautions to address the ECB’s concerns in this regard.
Kar zadeva specifično vključevanje zasebnega sektorja, ki je predvideno za Grčijo, so voditelji držav in vlad 21. julija priznali, da je bil pristop, zavzet v primeru Grčije, izjemen in edinstven odgovor na izjemne in edinstvene razmere.
With regard to the specific private sector involvement foreseen for Greece, the euro area Heads of State or Government on 21 July recognised that the approach followed for Greece was exceptional and unique in response to an exceptional and unique situation.
Vse druge države članice evroobmočja so potrdile, da so trdno odločene v celoti spoštovati svoj državni dolg in svoje sprejete obveznosti za vzdržno fiskalno konsolidacijo in strukturne reforme.
All other euro area member countries solemnly reaffirmed their firm determination to honour fully their own individual sovereign debt and their commitments to sustainable fiscal consolidation and structural reform.
Po mnenju ECB je ta odločnost absolutno temeljnega pomena in meni, da je verodostojnost vsega državnega dolga odločilen element za zagotavljanje finančne stabilnosti v evroobmočju kot celoti.
The ECB views this firm determination as absolutely fundamental and sees the credibility of all the sovereign debt a decisive element for ensuring financial stability in the euro area as a whole.
Z vidika predvidenega drugega programa evroobmočja/MDS za Grčijo, ki je bil načeloma prav tako sklenjen 21. julija, mora trojica zagotoviti analizo vzdržnosti dolga.
In light of the envisaged second euro area/IMF programme for Greece, which was in principle also decided on 21 July, a debt sustainability analysis must be provided by the Troika.
Program in vključevanje zasebnega sektorja morata biti pripravljena tako, da se v Grčiji ohrani ali doseže vzdržna zadolženost.
The programme and the private sector involvement have to be designed in a way to maintain or achieve a sustainable debt situation for Greece.
ECB je del trojice in bo spoštovala svojo usmeritev glede zagotavljanja finančne stabilnosti v evroobmočju kot celoti.
The ECB is part of the Troika and will follow its stance on ensuring fi-nancial stability in the euro area as a whole.
Kako boste zagotoviti preglednost v zvezi s programom za trge vrednostnih papirjev in programom za nakup kritih obveznic?
How will you ensure transparency regarding the SMP and Covered Bond Purchase Programme?
ECB v celoti podpira načela preglednosti in odprtosti.
The ECB fully subscribes to the principles of transparency and openness.
Vendar pa se lahko pojavijo razmere, ki zahtevajo odstopanje od teh načel.
But there can be conditions which call for a deviation from these principles.
Navajanje več podrobnosti o transakcijah, ki se opravljajo v okviru programa za trge vrednostnih papirjev in programa za nakup kritih obveznic, bi lahko škodovalo učinkovitosti in uspešnosti navedenih programov.
As re-gards giving more details about transactions conducted in the context of the SMP and the CBPP, this could harm the effectiveness and efficiency of these programmes.
Udeležencem na finančnih trgih pa bi lahko omogočilo predvidevanje nakupov s strani Eurosistema in razvoj strategij trgovanja, ki bi jim omogočile okoriščanje z intervencijami ECB.
It could allow financial market participants to anticipate purchases by the Eurosystem, and develop trading strategies that would allow it to benefit from the ECB’s interventions.
To bi pomenilo, da bi moral Eurosistem kupiti večje količine obveznic, da bi dosegel predvidene učinke.
This would imply that the Eurosystem would need to purchase larger amounts of bonds to achieve its desired effects.
Kar zadeva nakupe v okviru programa za trge vrednostnih papirjev, ki še potekajo, ECB že tedensko zagotavlja informacije o zneskih, za katere je skupno intervenirala na obvezniških trgih.
As re-gards the purchases in the context of the SMP that are still ongoing, the ECB al-ready provides on a weekly basis information on the amounts for which it inter-vened on bond markets on an aggregate basis.
Kako ocenjujete povečanje obveznosti in terjatev članic ECB v okviru sistema Target II?
How do you evaluate the grown Target II liabilities and receivables of the ECB members?
Veliki čezmejni plačilni tokovi med bankami v evroobmočju so običajna značilnost monetarne unije.
Large cross-border payment flows between banks in the euro area are a normal feature of monetary union.