natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Tak pristop zahteva odprtost in občutek odgovornosti na obeh straneh, da bi se dosegel končni cilj odličnega delovanja ECB, ki služi interesom državljanov držav, ki so prevzele evro, ter Evropski uniji kot celoti.
Such an approach requires openness and a sense of responsibility on both sides, in order to achieve the ultimate objective of an excellently performing ECB serving the interest of the citizens of the countries that have adopted the euro and as well the European Union as a whole.
V to sodelovanje se bom zagotovo vključil brez zadržkov ter v duhu zaupanja, partnerstva in spoštovanja.
I will definitely engage in this cooperation with an open mind, in a spirit of trust, partnership and respect.
ECB na ravni ESCB vzdržuje dialog s predstavniki uslužbencev nacionalnih centralnih bank in z združenji sindikatov, s katerimi so slednje povezane, in prepričan sem, da na primer seje, ki potekajo dvakrat letno v Frankfurtu med ECB, predstavniki uslužbencev in združenji sindikatov, omogočajo bogate in koristne razprave o projektih ESCB/Eurosistema.
At the ESCB level, where the ECB maintains a dialogue with the staff represen-tatives of the national central banks and the federations of trade unions to whom they are affiliated, I am convinced that, for instance, the meetings that take place twice a year in Frankfurt between the ECB, the staff representatives and the fed-erations of trade unions allow enriching and useful discussions on ESCB/Eurosystem projects.
Te izmenjave zagotavljajo tudi priložnosti za krepitev sodelovanja znotraj sistema in ekipnega duha, ki ju zavzeto spodbujam.
These exchanges also offer opportunities to foster intra-system cooperation and team spirit, which I wholeheartedly encourage.
Pogodba določa jasen postopek imenovanja članov izvršilnega odbora ECB.
The Treaty lays down a clear appointment procedure for members of the ECB Executive Board.
Izbrani so „med osebami, ki imajo ugled in poklicne izkušnje na monetarnem in bančnem področju“.
They shall be appointed “from among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary and banking matters”.
Pogodba predvideva posvetovalno vlogo Evropskega parlamenta.
The Treaty foresees a consultative role for the European Parliament.
Odbor za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve (ECON) v praksi organizira javne predstavitve kandidatov, ki jih je predlagal Svet.
In practice, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) organises a public hear-ing with the candidate(s) proposed by the Council.
Pretekle izkušnje so pokazale, da je ta ureditev ustrezna.
Past experience has demonstrated that this arrangement was appropriate.
Od ustanovitve ECB je zagotavljala nemoten in verodostojen postopek imenovanja ter izbiro visoko usposobljenih, neodvisnih in poštenih oseb.
Since the set-up of the ECB, it has ensured a smooth and credible appointment proce-dure and the selection of persons of high competence, independence and integ-rity.
Glede na to po mojem mnenju ni potrebna sprememba sedanjega postopka.
Against this background, no change to the current procedure is in my view warranted.
Če bi bilo treba v določeni fazi ta postopek ponovno preučiti, bi se morale o tem odločiti strani, ki sodelujejo pri spreminjanju Pogodb.
If, at some stage, this procedure were to be reconsidered, it is natu-rally up to the parties involved in Treaty amendments to take a position.
Kakšno je vaše mnenje o problematiki „menjave stolčkov“ med nadzornimi ali regulativnimi organi ter zasebnimi ustanovami na istem področju?
What is your view on the problem of "revolving doors" between supervisory or regulartory bodies and private institutions of the same field?
Menite, da bi morala obstajati „abstinenčna obdobja“ med poklicnimi dejavnostmi v javnih in zasebnih institucijah?
Do you think there should be "abstinence periods" between professional activities in public and private institutions?
V zvezi s člani Sveta ECB in izvršilnega odbora ECB je bil priznan in obravnavan obstoj navzkrižja interesov.
As regards the members of the Governing Council and the Executive Board of the ECB, the existence of a conflict of interests has been recognised and ad-dressed.
Kar se tiče članov Sveta ECB, etična pravila Sveta ECB predvidevajo enoletno prehodno obdobje po koncu mandata za nove zasebne ali poklicne dejavnosti, v zvezi s katerimi bi se lahko pojavilo navzkrižje interesov.
As far as the members of the Governing Council are concerned, the ethical rules of the Governing Council foresee a cooling off period of one year after the cessation of duties for any new private or professional activities for which a conflict of interest could arise.
Za guvernerje nacionalnih centralnih bank se lahko poleg pogojev za zaposlitev, ki veljajo za nacionalne centralne banke, določijo dodatna pravila.
Additional rules may be fixed in the term and conditions of employment with their national central bank for the NCB Governors.
Pogoji za zaposlitev članov izvršilnega odbora določajo, da ti ne smejo zasesti položajev uslužbencev, vodij ali svetovalcev, bodisi plačanih ali neplačanih, v podjetju ali subjektu, ki deluje kot nasprotna stran ESCB pri monetarnih ali deviznih poslih, ali v podjetju ali subjektu, ki pripada njegovi konsolidirani skupini, in sicer eno leto po koncu njihovega mandata v skladu z odločitvijo Sveta ECB.
As far as the members of the Executive Board are concerned, their terms and conditions of employment establish a commitment not to accept any staff, managerial, advisory or consulting position, remunerated or not, with any company or entity having been a counterpart to the ESCB in monetary policy or foreign exchange operations, or with any company or entity pertaining to its consolidated group, within one year following their ceasing to hold office sub-ject to any decision of the Governing Council.
Če povzamem: menim, da je to abstinenčno obdobje 12 mesecev ustrezno.
To conclude: I consider this 12 months abstinence period to be appropriate.
Po mojem mnenju sta neodvisnost in odgovornost „dve plati iste medalje“.
I consider independence and accountability as being ‘two sides of the same coin’.
Neodvisnost centralne banke je nepogrešljiv element režimov monetarne politike naših sodobnih gospodarstev na splošno in zlasti „monetarne ustave“ EMU.
Central bank independence is an indispensable element of the monetary policy regimes of our modern economies in general, and of the “monetary con-stitution” of EMU in particular.
Prav tako mora biti neodvisna centralna banka, da bi ohranila legitimnost, tekom mandata za svoja dejanja odgovorna demokratičnim institucijam in širši javnosti.
At the same time, in order to retain legitimacy, an independent central bank must be accountable to democratic institutions and the general public for its actions in the pursuit of its mandate.
Z drugimi besedami mora ustrezno predstaviti in utemeljiti sprejete odločitve državljanom in predstavnikom.
In other words, it must properly explain and justify its decisions towards citizens and their repre-sentatives.
Pojem demokratične odgovornosti je v osrčju odnosov ECB z Evropskim parlamentom kot institucijo, ki neposredno zastopa evropske državljane.
The concept of democratic accountability is at the heart of the ECB’s relations with the European Parliament, as the institution directly representing the Euro-pean people.
ECB pri izpolnjevanju odgovornosti v veliki meri presega zakonske obveznosti.
The ECB goes well beyond its statutory obligations when discharg-ing its accountability obligations.
Predsednik ECB na primer štirikrat na leto nastopi pred odborom ECON; ECB Evropskemu parlamentu predstavlja letna poročila; člani izvršilnega odbora se udeležujejo začasnih obravnav posebnih tem.
For instance, the ECB President appears be-fore the ECON Committee on a quarterly basis; the ECB’s Annual Report is presented to the European Parliament; Executive Board members take part in ad hoc hearings on specific topics.
Odgovornost in preglednost se med drugim spodbujata tudi prek mesečnih tiskovnih konferenc ECB z uvodno izjavo predsednika ECB ter prek mesečnega biltena ECB, govorov in intervjujev članov izvršilnega odbora.
Accountability and transparency are also fostered inter alia by the ECB’s monthly press conferences with the Introductory Statement by the ECB Presi-dent, the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin, speeches and interviews by Executive Board members.
Na splošno menim, da je ECB v prvih 13 letih pokazala trdno zavezanost demokratični odgovornosti.
All in all, I believe the ECB has demonstrated over the first 13 years its high commitment to democratic accountability.
Če in ko se bom pridružil instituciji, nameravam te rezultate ohranjati.
I intend to keep up this track record if and when joining the institution.
Centralna banka mora za namene preglednosti pojasniti, kako si razlaga svoj mandat in kako uporablja strategijo monetarne politike za ocenjevanje stanja gospodarstva in sprejemanje odločitev o monetarni politiki.
Transparency requires the central bank to clearly explain how it interprets its mandate and how it applies its monetary policy strategy to assess the state of the economy and to take monetary policy decisions.
To pomaga javnosti pri spremljanju in vrednotenju učinkovitosti centralne banke ter tudi prispeva k zmanjševanju negotovosti v zvezi s prihodnjimi ukrepi politike ter s tem k zmanjševanju nestanovitnosti inflacije.
This not only helps the public to monitor and evaluate the central bank’s performance, but also contributes to reduce uncertainty about the future policy action and, thereby, to a reduction in inflation volatility.
Na splošno sta preglednost in jasnost komunikacije prispevali k boljšemu razumevanju monetarne politike, ki si prizadeva za stabilnost cen, s čimer je monetarna politika postala verodostojnejša in učinkovitejša.
Overall, transparency and clarity in communication has con-tributed to a better understanding of monetary policy aiming at price stability, making monetary policy more credible and effective.
Mednarodna primerjava kaže, da je ECB po preglednosti med vodilnimi na svetu.
In an international comparison, the ECB is among the leading contenders in the world with respect to central bank transparency.
ECB je napovedala formalno strategijo monetarne politike in v skladu s to strategijo pojasnjuje politične odločitve.
The ECB has announced a for-mal monetary policy strategy and explains monetary policy decisions applying that strategy.
V okviru te strategije je ECB jasno kvantitativno opredelila, kako razume stabilnost cen.
Within its strategy, the ECB has clearly specified in quantitative terms what price stability means.
Jasen in nedvoumen cilj ohranjanja stabilnosti cen je v središču vseh odločitev ECB in je osrednja točka za usklajevanje pričakovanj zasebnega sektorja.
The clear and unambiguous objective of main-taining price stability provides a strong focus for all of the ECB’s decisions and created a focal point for coordinating private sector expectations.
Čeprav Fed – tudi zaradi dvojnega mandata – v preteklosti ni bila tako jasna, je iz novejših sporočil razvidno, da Fed opredeljuje stabilnost cen na podoben način kot ECB.
While the Fed – also given its dual mandate – has not been as explicit in the past, recent com-munications suggest that the Fed defines price stability in a similar manner as the ECB.
Centralna banka ima več možnosti za pojasnjevanje svojih odločitev, sporočanje svojih političnih namer in razkrivanje razlik v procesu monetarne politike.
A central bank may have several options to explain its decisions, to signal its policy intentions and to reveal diversity within the monetary policy process.
Iz akademske literature in praktičnih izkušenj ni vedno razvidno, kakšen model preglednosti je v dani situaciji najustreznejši.
From the academic literature and practical experience, it is not always clear what transparency mode is best in given circumstances.
V zvezi s tem bi lahko objava zapisnikov zagotovila dodatne informacije o raznolikosti odbora in obrazložitvi odločitve.
In this respect, the pub-lication of minutes could provide additional information on the diversity of the committee and the reasoning underlying the decision.
Za odbor za monetarno politiko centralne banke Bank of England, ki prakticira individualno odgovornost, je objava zapisnikov sestankov o politiki povsem razumljiva izbira.
For the Bank of England’s MPC which applies individual accountability it makes perfectly sense to publish minutes of policy meetings.
ECB ima drugačen režim odgovornosti, tj. člani Sveta ECB so kolektivno odgovorni za odločitve, ki jih sprejmejo.
The ECB has a different accountability regime, i.e. members of the Governing Council are collectively accountable for their deci-sions.
Poleg tega statut ECB zahteva, da morajo biti razprave Sveta ECB tajne, kar izključuje možnost objave zapisnikov sej.
Moreover, its statute requires the ECB to keep the deliberations of the Governing Council confidential, this excludes the possibility to publish the min-utes of the meetings.
To Svetu ECB omogoča, da odločitve na področju monetarne politike sprejema popolnoma neodvisno in na način, ki izpostavlja kolektivno odgovornost.
This allows the Governing Council to make monetary pol-icy decisions in full independence and with a view to emphasising the collective accountability of the committee.
Za zagotavljanje informacij, ki jih lahko primerjamo z zapisniki drugih omenjenih centralnih bank, uporablja ECB druga komunikacijska orodja.
The ECB provides other communication tools which provide information that can be compared to minutes of the other central banks mentioned.
Predsednikova uvodna izjava, objavljena na tiskovni konferenci, na primer, zagotavlja celovit povzetek ocene gospodarskih gibanj, pomembnih za politiko.
Notably, the President’s Introductory Statement at the press conference provides a comprehensive summary of the policy-relevant assess-ment of economic developments.
Poleg tega mesečna tiskovna konferenca vključuje del z vprašanji in odgovori, ki ponuja priložnost za sprotno in nepristransko razlago odločitev glede monetarne politike in notranje raznolikosti javnosti.
Moreover, the monthly press conference in-cludes a question and answer session provides a platform for a timely and even-handed explanation of monetary policy decisions and internal diversity to the public.
Ali bi lahko člani sveta ECB razpravljali o monetarni politiki in o svojih sklepih z drugimi političnimi akterji ali bi to ogrožalo neodvisnost banke?
Might ECB board members discuss monetary policy and its decisions with other political actors or would this harm the bank’s independence?
Srečanja predsednika ECB pred odborom ECON vsako četrtletje so bistven element demokratične odgovornosti ECB.
The quarterly hearings of the ECB President before the ECON Committee are an essential component of the ECB’s democratic accountability.
So zelo pomembna priložnost, ob kateri lahko ECB pojasni in utemelji politike ter tako prispeva k izboljšanju razumevanja odločitev ECB po vsej Evropi, predstavniki evropskih državljanov pa lahko ECB zastavijo vprašanja in od nje zahtevajo pojasnila.
They provide a very important occasion not only for the ECB to explain and justify its policies and thereby contribute to enhance the understanding of the ECB’s decisions throughout Europe, but also for the representatives of the people of Europe to pose questions to, and request explanations, from the ECB.
Ta srečanja so omogočila izčrpen in ploden dialog med obema institucijama, ne le v zvezi z gospodarskimi in monetarnimi zadevami, ampak tudi v zvezi s pomembnimi zakonodajnimi dokumenti (npr. reforma nadzornega okvira EU, sveženj za gospodarsko upravljanje itd.).
They have allowed for a thorough and fruitful dialogue between the two institutions, not only on economic and monetary issues but also on important legislative dossiers (e.g. re-form of the EU supervisory framework, economic governance package).
ECB je tesno povezana z drugimi oblikovalci politike EU, kot so, na primer, tisti znotraj Euroskupine in sveta ECOFIN, ali, na nižji ravni, v Ekonomsko-finančnem odboru, delovni skupini Evroskupine in Odboru za ekonomsko politiko EU.
The ECB has close relations with other EU policy-makers such as, for example, the Eurogroup, the ECOFIN Council and, at a lower level, the Economic and Financial Committee, the Euro Working Group and the Economic Policy Com-mittee of the EU.
Navsezadnje ima ECB posebno in jasno opredeljeno vlogo pri izvajanju finančne pomoči in okvirov za krizno upravljanje, ki so bili nedavno vzpostavljeni.
Finally, the ECB has a specific and clearly defined role in the operation of the financial assistance and crisis management frameworks that have recently been established.
Vsi ti stiki se izvajajo ob popolnem spoštovanju mandata in neodvisnosti ECB.
All these contacts take place in full respect of the ECB’s mandate and independ-ence.
Pri tem menim, da razpravljanje o monetarni politiki in odločitvah v okviru te politike s temi akterji ne ogroža neodvisnosti ECB.
However, I do not think that discussing monetary policy and its decisions with these actors harm the independence of the ECB.
ECB se v teh izrednih časih srečuje z veliko izzivi.
The ECB faces many challenges in these extraordinary times.
Omejil se bom na tri medsebojno povezane izzive:
Let me restrict myself here to three of them that are interlinked:
Naj začnem z glavnim ciljem ECB, ki je ohranjanje stabilnosti cen v evroobmočju v srednjeročnem smislu.
Let me start with the main objective of the ECB, maintaining price stability in the euro area over the medium term.
To še zdaleč ni enostavno v sedanjih razmerah z zelo visoko ravnjo negotovosti in oslabljenim prenosom monetarne politike.
This is far from easy in the current context given very high uncertainty and impaired transmission channels of monetary policy.
Obrestne mere ECB morajo biti določene tako, da v srednjeročnem smislu ohranjajo stabilnost cen v celotnem evroobmočju.
ECB policy rates should be set to maintain price stability for the euro area as a whole in the medium term.
Nestandardni ukrepi monetarne politike morajo podpirati delovanje mehanizma prenosa monetarne politike, tako da obrestne mere ECB na bolj ali manj običajen način vplivajo na gospodarstvo in v končni fazi na cene.
Non-standard monetary policy measures need to support the functioning of the transmission mechanism of monetary pol-icy such that ECB interest rates affect the economy and, ultimately, prices in more or less the usual way.
Glede na visoko raven negotovosti v zvezi z makroekonomskim razvojem v tujini in evroobmočju ter spreminjajoče se finančne pogoje v zvezi s krizo državnega dolga je to zelo težka naloga, ki zahteva stalno pozornost in po potrebi pogumno politično delovanje.
Given high uncertainty on macroeconomic devel-opments, abroad and in the euro area, and changing financial conditions related to the sovereign debt crisis, this is a very demanding task, requiring continuous alertness and bold policy action if needed.
Prav tako mora biti ECB v skladu s srednjeročno naravnanostjo monetarne politike usmerjena v prihodnost in pripravljena na umik izrednih ukrepov po normalizaciji pogojev na finančnih trgih.
At the same time, in line with the medium-term orientation of its monetary policy, the ECB has to look ahead and be prepared to withdraw extraordinary measures once financial market condi-tions normalize.
Drugi ključni izziv, s katerim se mora soočiti ECB, je prispevanje k zaščiti stabilnosti finančnega sistema.
Contributing to the safeguarding of financial stability presents another key chal-lenge that the ECB must face.
Ti izzivi so prišli v ospredje prek številnih faz finančne krize.
The financial crisis, through its many stages, has brought these challenges to the fore.
Učinkovito podpiranje delovanja Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja je in ostaja zahtevna naloga, ki zahteva stalno opredeljevanje in ocenjevanje virov makrobonitetnega tveganja, pri čemer se lahko v ta namen uporabljajo tudi obstoječa orodja.
Effectively supporting the operation of the ESRB is and will continue to be a challenging task, requiring the ongoing identi-fication and assessment of sources of macro-prudential risk, while existing tools can also be used for this purpose.
Zagotoviti bo treba, da se ne bo pojavila zmeda v zvezi z zelo različnima mandatoma Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja in Sveta ECB: še posebej je treba poudariti, da ne obstaja kompromis med ciljem stabilnosti cen in vlogo, ki jo lahko ima ECB pri spodbujanju finančne stabilnosti.
It will be important to ensure that confusion does not emerge concerning the very distinct mandates of the ESRB and the ECB’s Governing Council: in particular, it needs to be emphasized that there is no trade-off between the objective of price stability and the role that the ECB can play in fostering financial stability.
V zvezi s tem je finančna kriza sprožila veliko vprašanj glede odnosa med monetarno politiko in finančno stabilnostjo.
In that regard, the financial crisis has raised a number of questions concerning the relation between monetary policy and financial stability.
Ob upoštevanju povedanega je velik izziv tudi splošni razvoj Evrope in zlasti evroobmočja.
Finally, and related to the above, the overall development of Europe, and of the euro area in particular, presents a major challenge.
Kriza državnega dolga je razkrila slabosti gospodarskega upravljanja Evrope, ki ga je treba nujno izboljšati.
The sovereign debt crisis has revealed weaknesses in Europe’s economic governance that need to be repaired urgently.
Prednosti članstva v ekonomski in monetarni uniji so velike, vendar je treba zanj plačati ceno.
There are huge benefits in being part of economic and monetary union, but these do not come for free.
Članstvo v ekonomski in monetarni uniji zahteva močno politično voljo vlad v evroobmočju za izpolnjevanje obveznosti in spoštovanje skupnih pravil.
Membership in Economic and Monetary Union requires a strong political will from the euro area governments to live up to commitments and respect common rules.
Vlade držav članic, ki jih je neposredno prizadela kriza državnega dolga, morajo najprej urediti svoje zadeve.
Governments of the Member States di-rectly affected by the sovereign debt crisis first of all need to get their house in order.
Poleg tega je treba okrepiti institucionalne temelje EMU, tako na nacionalni kot na evropski ravni, da bi bolje izražali visoko stopnjo povezanosti gospodarstev v evroobmočju.
Furthermore, the institutional foundations of EMU need to be strength-ened, both at the national level and at the European level, to reflect better the high degree of integration of the euro area economies.
Monetarno unijo je treba dopolniti z več povezovanja v fiskalno in politično unijo, kar zahteva spremembo Pogodbe o EU.
Monetary Union has to be complemented by more integration towards a fiscal and political union, which requires changes in the EU Treaty.
Pri tem je treba preprečevati novo kopičenje neravnovesij.
This should help avoiding a renewed build-up of imbalances.
Način obvladovanja teh izzivov je pomemben za ECB, saj to vpliva na okolje, v katerem deluje.
The way these challenges will be met matters to the ECB as it affects the environment in which the ECB operates.
Kot zavednemu Evropejcu, ki opaža velik prispevek Evropske unije in evra k blaginji državljanov, mi je ta tema zelo pri srcu.
Also personally, as a dedi-cated European who sees the large contributions that the European Union and the euro bring to the welfare of its citizens, this issue is very close to my heart.
Sharon Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Pascal Canfin, Nikolaos Huntis (Nikolaos Chountis), George Sabin Cutaş, Leonardo Domenici, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Sven Giegold, Sylvie Goulard, Gunnar Hökmark, Jürgen Klute, Werner Langen, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Olle Schmidt, Peter Skinner, Ivo Strejček, Ramon Tremosa i Balcells, Corien Wortmann-Kool
Sharon Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Pascal Canfin, Nikolaos Chountis, George Sabin Cutaş, Leonardo Domenici, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Sven Giegold, Sylvie Goulard, Gunnar Hökmark, Jürgen Klute, Werner Langen, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Olle Schmidt, Peter Skinner, Ivo Strejček, Ramon Tremosa i Balcells, Corien Wortmann-Kool