natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
28. poudarja, da je eurosistem zavrnil razkritje metode, uporabljane za določanje „teoretične cene“ oslabljenih sredstev, upravičenih za uporabo v njegovih likvidnostnih operacijah v okviru programa okrepljene kreditne podpore; poudarja, da je zato nemogoče preveriti, ali je ECB odigrala kvazifiskalno vlogo; zato ECB poziva, naj razkrije svoje metode vrednotenja, ki jih je uporabljala v vsem obdobju krize;
Stresses that the Eurosystem has refused to disclose the method used to determine the 'theoretical price' of impaired assets eligible for its liquidity operations in the framework of the Enhanced Credit Support programme; emphasises that it is therefore impossible to verify whether the ECB has played a quasi-fiscal role; calls, therefore, on the ECB to disclose the valuation methods it has used throughout the crisis,
31. priznava potrebo po nestandardnih ukrepih na področju monetarne politike in se zaveda, da so začasni, vendar poziva k postopni opustitvi teh programov takoj, ko se bodo finančni trgi utrdili in kriza državniških dolgov odpravljena ter pod pogojem, da se vzpostavi okvir Skupnosti za ustrezno obravnavo finančne nestabilnosti; poziva, naj se z ukrepi vzpostavi bolj povezano gospodarsko upravljanje;
Acknowledges the need for non-standard monetary policy measures and notes their temporary nature, but calls for a those programmes to be phased out as soon as the financial markets have stabilised and the sovereign debt crisis has been resolved and provided that a Community framework is established to deal properly with financial instability; calls for measures to establish more integrated economic governance;
33. poudarja, da so pogoji za banke, ki uporabljajo poravnalni sistem TARGET-2, in bolj na splošno programi za zagotavljanje likvidnosti ECB, zaskrbljujoči zaradi kreditnih tveganj za samo ECB; zato ECB poziva za več javnih in rednih objav podatkov o denarnih tokovih med centralnimi bankami euroobmočja, izmerjenih v poravnalnem sistemu Target-2, da se zagotovi večja preglednost in ustrezen pregled nad nedavnim dogajanjem, zato da teh tokov ne bi narobe razlagali kot redne transferje iz držav s presežki v države s primanjkljajem;
Emphasises that conditions imposed on banks benefiting from the Target-2 settlement system and, more generally, ECB liquidity provision facilities are a matter of concern in terms of credit risks for the ECB itself; calls on the ECB, therefore, to provide more regular public information on flows between euro area central banks, as measured under the Target-2 settlement system, for the sake of increased transparency and to provide a proper insight into recent developments so that these flows are not mistakenly interpreted as permanent transfers from current account surplus countries to deficit countries;
36. poziva ECB, naj razišče, ali bi lahko bile zahteve po obveznih rezervah poleg obrestne mere dodaten instrument za ohranjanje finančne stabilnosti, ne da bi to ogrožalo okrevanje;
Asks the ECB to explore whether compulsory-reserve requirements could be an additional instrument, alongside the interest rate, to safeguard financial stability without hampering the recovery;
Gospodarsko in finančno upravljanje
Economic and financial governance
45. poudarja, da je nujno potrebno čimprejšnje izvajanje in uporaba določb paketa o gospodarskem upravljanju; v zvezi s tem poziva k doslednemu in uravnoteženemu izvajanju evropskega pakta za stabilnost in rast ter avtomatičnega mehanizma sankcij za države, ki bodo imele proračunske primanjkljaje;
Emphasises the absolute need to quickly implement and apply the provisions of the economic governance package; in that connection, calls for the consistent and balanced application of the European Stability and Growth Pact and an automatic mechanism for the imposition of sanctions on countries which run budget deficits ;
Preglednost in odgovornost
Transparency and accountability
50. pozdravlja zavezanost ECB svoji odgovornosti Evropskemu parlamentu in poudarja zelo konstruktivno vlogo, ki jo je ECB odigrala na najvišji ravni in prek svojega osebja v postopku soodločanja;
Welcomes the ECB's commitment to its accountability to the European Parliament and stresses the very constructive role played by the ECB at the highest level and through its staff in the codecision procedure;
Zlasti danes je torej pomembno, da se spomnimo, da uspeh eura pomeni tudi uspeh evropske ideje.
And so today, and especially today, it is very important to recall that the success of the euro has also been the success of the idea of Europe.
Leta 1989 je zid delil Evropo na dva nasprotna bloka.
In 1989, a wall divided Europe in two opposite blocks.
Če bo euro prestal sedanje kritično obdobje, se mu bodo morda želele pridružiti še druge evropske države.
If the euro makes it through the critical moments of our time, it may even be possible that other European countries knock on its door to join it.
Čeprav se zaradi nedavnih napetosti ne zdi tako, je bil euro od leta 2008 „otok stabilnosti v nestabilnem in razburkanem morju svetovne finančne krize“, kot je pred kratkim potrdil britanski finančnik David Marsh.
Although recent tensions may indicate the opposite, since 2008 the euro has been an ‘island of stability in the unstable and agitated sea of the global financial crisis’ as the British financer David Marsh recently acknowledged.
Moralno in gospodarsko razdejanje, ki bi sledilo, bi za vse vpletene države imelo strašne posledice.
Its subsequent moral and economic wreckage would have had terrible consequences for all countries involved.
Seveda ima tudi euro nekaj odgovornosti za sedanje dogodke: če v prvih letih enotne valute ne bi bilo negativnih realnih obrestnih mer v nekaterih obrobnih državah, bi bile cene premoženja v teh državah manj prenapihnjene.
Obviously, the euro has also some responsibility in current events: without the negative real interest rates that have some peripheral countries have experienced in the first years of the single currency, the asset price bubbles that they suffered would not have been so strong.
Vendar se strokovnjaki strinjajo vsaj v tem, da bi bila finančna kriza v Evropi brez eura veliko hujša.
However, if there is any consensus today in the academic field it is that without the euro this financial crisis would have been much worse for Europe.
Splošno sprejeto mnenje je tudi, da bi bila brez eura enotni trg in prosto gibanje oseb, ki sta največja uspeha EU, najbrž obsojena na propad.
It is also a shared view to acknowledge that without the euro, the single market and the free movement of people, which are the greatest successes of the EU, would have probably imploded.
Vseeno pa so sedanje stalne težave finančnih trgov privedle euroobmočje na rob razpada.
And yet, today, the permanent convulsion in which financial markets live is bringing the euro zone close to the break-up.
Z vsako novo državo, z vsakim novim reševanjem dolžniška kriza grozi tudi večjim državam, imuni nista niti Španija in Italija.
Country after country, bail-out after bail-out, the debt crisis menaces to create a contagion effect on ever bigger countries, Spain and Italy are not impervious from it.
Euro pri svoji funkciji, da v primeru hude bančne krize zagotovi mehak pristanek, ni odpovedal; euro ni odpovedal pri svoji funkciji sidrišča proti inflaciji, ker je ECB zagotovilo za uspeh na tem področju; nenazadnje, euro ni odpovedal v vlogi mehanizma za združevanje pri krepitvi enotnega trga, kot od njegovega nastanka dokazujejo okrepljeni gospodarski tokovi med državami.
The euro has not failed in its function to ensure a soft landing in front of a big banking crisis; the euro has not failed in its anchoring function against inflation as the ECB is a guarantee of success in that field; and finally the euro has neither failed as an integration mechanism deepening the single market, as the rising commercial flows between countries acknowledge since its birth.
Ekonomska teorija uči, da upravičenost enotne valute temelji na njeni sposobnosti za uravnavanje večjih makroekonomskih neravnovesij, če obstajajo.
Economic theory teaches us that the viability of a single currency is based on its capacity to belittle big macroeconomic imbalances when existing.
Prav tako ni bila uspešna notranja disciplina v euroobmočju, zlasti na področju skladnosti s Paktom stabilnosti in rasti, saj so bile od leta 1999 evidentirane kršitve v številnih državah, vključno z Nemčijo in Francijo, ki pa niso bile kaznovane.
What has also failed is the eurozone’s internal discipline, particularly on the compliance of the Stability and Growth Pact, as since 1999 dozens of violations were accounted for many countries, including Germany and France, and fines have never been enacted.
Nenazadnje, klavzula o nereševanju iz finančnih težav, ki ECB prepoveduje odkup državnega dolga, ni bila dovolj strogo upoštevana.
Lastly, the no bail-out provision that forbids the purchasing of sovereign debt by the ECB has been interpreted in a limp mode.
Zaradi vsega tega je postalo euroobmočje občutljivo za špekulativne napade, usmerjene v državni dolg manj učinkovitih in manj konkurenčnih držav.
Because of all this, the eurozone has become vulnerable to speculative attacks focused on the sovereign debt of the less efficient and competitive countries.
Ti špekulativni procesi se bodo v prihodnosti še naprej pojavljali, dokler ne bo rešeno vprašanje ekonomskega upravljanja euroobmočja.
These speculative processes will make a comeback in the future until the economic governance of the eurozone is solved.
Brez finančne stabilnosti bodo reforme v obrobnih državah euroobmočja nemogoče in neučinkovite.
Without financial stability, reforms for the peripheral countries of the euro will be impossible and ineffective.
Evropske institucije so do sedaj odlagale sprejemanje odločitev, s čimer so zgolj pridobile nekaj časa med čakanjem na oživitev gospodarstva, ki bi okrepila bančne bilance stanja, in upale, da bo gospodarska rast v srednji in severni Evropi zadnjih štiri šest četrtletij končno dosegla obrobne države euroobmočja.
European institutions have, until now, followed a kick-the-can-down-the-road strategy that has only been useful to win some time while waiting for an economic recovery that may strengthen banks balance sheets and hoping that economic growth, which has been present in central and northern Europe for six quarters, arrives finally to the peripheral countries of the eurozone.
Ta strategija bi lahko bila uspešna, vendar je tvegana.
This strategy may work, but it is risky.
Zaradi špekulativnega napada bi lahko zašla s poti in pripeljala euro na rob prepada.
A speculative attack can make it lose track and bring the euro very close to an abyss.
Morda je čas za dvom v uradno izjavo, da Grčija nima težav s solventnostjo, ker je vsak dan manj verjetna: namesto da bi zadrževala špekulacije, se zaradi nje pojavljajo dvomi v načrte za prilagajanje drugih držav.
Maybe it is time to question the official statement that says that Greece does not have a solvency problem, as this thesis is less sustainable every day: instead of containing speculations, it is feeding doubts on other countries’ adjustment plans.
V maju 2010 je ECB začela izvajati program trga vrednostnih papirjev, torej je opravljala kvazifiskalno vlogo, s katero je morala nadomestiti pomanjkanje skupne fiskalne politike na evropski ravni.
In May 2010, the ECB began the Securities Market Program (SMP), acting nearly in a ‘quasi fiscal role’ that has had to fill the lack of a common fiscal policy on a European scale.
Vseeno pa ta strategija ne bo mogla trajati v nedogled, saj podpira tiste, ki dvomijo v neodvisnost ECB, enega od ustanovnih stebrov eura kot enotne valute, in trdijo, da v njenih pomembnejših sklepih manjka preglednosti.
Nevertheless, this strategy cannot be indefinitely maintained and strengthens those who put into question the independence of the ECB, one of the founding pillars of the euro as a single currency, and also the lack of transparency in its main decisions.
Zato v mojem poročilu prosim za objavo zapisnika Sveta ECB, ki bi lahko zmanjšal neskladnosti v medijih.
This is why in my report I ask for the publication of the Governing Council minutes that may reduce the impact of discrepancies on the media.
Njegovo neobjavo si razlagam kot znak šibkosti evropskega povezovanja, saj se bo potrebna individualna odgovornost še naprej obravnavala kot možen vir sporov med državami članicami.
I interpret its non-publication as a sign of weakness for the European integration, as the necessary individual accountability will remain to be interpreted as a possible source of disputes between Member States.
Zaradi obstoja eura so bile nekatere obrobne države, ki so v preteklosti nižale vrednost svoje valute, da bi s tem ponovno povečale konkurenčnost, prisiljene v izvajanje strogih varčevalnih ukrepov za boj proti krizi.
The euro’s existence has meant that some peripheral countries that historically depreciated their currency in order to regain competitiveness have been pushed into applying harsh austerity measures to fight the crisis.
Vendar je to prava odločitev, ker mora euro ostati trdna valuta, saj EU ne sme zaiti v inflacijo ali preveliko gospodarsko prerazporeditev.
However, this is the right choice as the euro needs to keep being a stable currency as the EU should not walk its way into inflationary horizons or excessive economic redistribution.
Evropska monetarna unija ima dolžnost, da obdrži inflacijo pod nadzorom in ščiti kupno moč valute.
The European Monetary Union has the duty to keep inflation under control and protect the purchasing power of the currency.
Prav tako mora zmanjšati moralno tveganje, ki se pojavi s tajno prerazporeditvijo v korist držav, kjer vlade z nenadzorovano kreditno ekspanzijo umetno višajo denarno osnovo hitreje kot druge.
It also needs to reduce the moral hazard that may imply the undercover redistribution in favour of those countries whose governments inflate the monetary base faster than the others through uncontrolled processes of credit expansion.
Prerazporeditev se še okrepi, če ECB prevečkrat sprejme dolg držav članic kot jamstvo in še toliko bolj, če dolg odkupi.
This redistribution is enhanced if the ECB accepts too often debt emitted by the Member States as a guarantee, and even more so if it buys them.
Za nadaljnjo izvedljivost projekta euro je pomembno, da se zgradi jasen okvir, ki bo omogočal pomoč državam z likvidnostnimi težavami in hkrati spodbujal davčno odgovornost in trajnostno konvergenco ravni konkurenčnosti med državami članicami.
In order to continue making the euro a viable project, it is necessary to build a clear framework that allows to help countries with liquidity problems, but at the same time be able to incentivise fiscal responsibility and a sustained convergence of competitiveness levels among member countries.
Ves ta čas je sistem deloval le z odzivi na tržno disciplino, finančno pomoč je omogočal, če je bila država v težavah.
All this time, the system has worked only by reacting to market discipline, organising bail-outs only when a country was in trouble.
Vendar pa obstaja še ena pot. okrepitev povezovanja na fiskalnem področju z ustreznimi prenosi suverenosti z držav članic na EU.
However, there is another way: making progress enhancing fiscal integration through relevant transfers of sovereignty from the Member States to the EU.
Seveda je ta pot zapletena, zato je pomembna zavest, da obstaja srednja pot, ki je kratkoročno bolj realna in v katero bi bilo mogoče hkrati vključiti tržno disciplino in potrebno zunanjo davčno disciplino držav članic; srednja pot, ki je lahko učinkovita, vendar jo je treba zelo natančno načrtovati.
Of course this is a complicated path and so it is important to keep in mind that there is a middle way, more realistic in the short-term, in which it is possible to integrate at the same time market discipline and the necessary external fiscal discipline of member countries, a middle way that can be effective but has to be designed with great precision.
Sedanji neuspehi v euroobmočju pomenijo dragoceno izkušnjo, da ne bomo ponavljali istih napak.
The present failures in the euro area are a valuable experience in order not to repeat the same mistakes.
Zato predlagam ustanovitev evropskega ministrstva za finance in evropske zakladnice, ki bo lahko izdajala euroobveznice.
In this sense I propose the creation of a European Ministry of Finances and a European Treasury able to emit Eurobonds.
Zavedam se, da se bo ta predlog lahko uresničil šele po nujni reformi Pakta stabilnosti in rasti. ki bo omogočila boljši nadzor nad nedelujočimi proračunskimi politikami držav članic v euroobmočju.
I am conscious that this proposal can only become a reality after a much-needed reform on the Stability and Growth Pact that allows for a better control of the dysfunctional budgetary policies in the eurozone Member States.
Euroobveznice bodo lahko z modelom modrih in rdečih obveznic hkrati pomemben vir financiranja za države z nizko zadolženostjo in zelo drago financiranje za države, ki kršijo pravila.
Eurobonds can simultaneously achieve a remarkable source of financing for countries with low levels of debt and a very expensive financing for those countries that break the rules, following the red and blue bonds model.
Nenazadnje bi euroobveznice dale nov zagon euru kot svetovni rezervni valuti, ker bi privedle k nastanku evropskega trga z zadolžnicami, ki bi bil petkrat večji od nemškega in skoraj tako velik kot severnoameriški.
Finally, Eurobonds can give an impulse to the euro as a global reserve currency, as with them a debt obligations market would be born on a European scale, five times bigger than the German one and closely as big as the North American.
Načrtovalci eura so se pri gradnji monetarne unije zavedali, da bo enotna valuta v državah z raznolikimi gospodarskimi in proizvodnimi strukturami povzročila nestabilnost.
The euro’s architects built a monetary union while conscious of the instability that a single currency would generate in countries with a wide range of different economic and production structures.
Morda so mislili, da bodo koraki k večji politični uniji sprejeti, ko bodo nujno potrebni.
Possibly those architects thought that steps towards a bigger political union would come when the need for them was great.
Danes, ko je dolžniška kriza v euroobmočju v polnem razmahu, je končno prišel čas za to.
Today, with the full explosion of the debt-crisis in the eurozone, their time has finally come.
Burkhard Balz, Udo Bullmann, Pascal Canfin, Nikolaos Huntis (Nikolaos Chountis), George Sabin Cutaş, Leonardo Domenici, Diogo Feio, Elisa Ferreira, Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Sven Giegold, Sylvie Goulard, Othmar Karas, Wolf Klinz, Jürgen Klute, Rodi Kraca-Cagaropulu (Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou), Werner Langen, Astrid Lulling, Arlene McCarthy, Ivari Padar, Alfredo Pallone, Ani Podimata (Anni Podimata), Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Olle Schmidt, Edward Scicluna, Peter Simon, Peter Skinner, Theodor Dumitru Stolojan, Ivo Strejček, Kay Swinburne, Marianne Thyssen, Ramon Tremosa i Balcells, Corien Wortmann-Kool
Burkhard Balz, Udo Bullmann, Pascal Canfin, Nikolaos Chountis, George Sabin Cutaş, Leonardo Domenici, Diogo Feio, Elisa Ferreira, Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Sven Giegold, Sylvie Goulard, Othmar Karas, Wolf Klinz, Jürgen Klute, Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou, Werner Langen, Astrid Lulling, Arlene McCarthy, Ivari Padar, Alfredo Pallone, Anni Podimata, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Olle Schmidt, Edward Scicluna, Peter Simon, Peter Skinner, Theodor Dumitru Stolojan, Ivo Strejček, Kay Swinburne, Marianne Thyssen, Ramon Tremosa i Balcells, Corien Wortmann-Kool
o boju proti nezakonitemu ribolovu na globalni ravni – vloga EU
on combating illegal fishing at the global level - the role of the EU
Poročevalka: Isabella Lövin
Rapporteur: Isabella Lövin
IZID KONČNEGA GLASOVANJA V ODBORU...................................................................26
RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE.........................................................................25
– ob upoštevanju Konvencije o biološki raznovrstnosti in Deklaracije o okolju in razvoju iz Ria, sprejete na konferenci Združenih narodov o okolju in razvoju junija 1992,
– having regard to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and to the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in June 1992,
– ob upoštevanju Sporazuma Organizacije Združenih narodov za prehrano in kmetijstvo (FAO) o spodbujanju upoštevanja mednarodnih ohranjevalnih in upravljavskih ukrepov s strani ribiških plovil na odprtem morju, ki je bil sprejet na 27. zasedanju konference FAO novembra 1993 (sporazum o usklajevanju),
– having regard to the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, approved at the 27th session of the FAO Conference in November 1993 (‘Compliance Agreement’),
– ob upoštevanju sporazuma iz leta 1995 za izvajanje določb Konvencije Združenih narodov o pomorskem pravu z dne 10. decembra 1982, ki se nanašajo na ohranjanje in upravljanje čezconskih staležev rib in izrazito selivskih staležev rib (sporazum ZN o staležih rib iz avgusta 1995),
– having regard to the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (‘UN Fish Stocks Agreement’ – UNFSA of August 1995),
– ob upoštevanju kodeksa odgovornega ribištva Organizacije Združenih narodov za prehrano in kmetijstvo, ki ga je sprejela konferenca FAO oktobra 1995,
– having regard to the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, adopted in October 1995 by the FAO Conference,
– ob upoštevanju Konvencije o dostopu do informacij, udeležbi javnosti pri odločanju in dostopu do pravnega varstva v okoljskih zadevah, sprejete junija 1998 (aarhuške konvencije),
– having regard to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, adopted in June 1998 (‘Aarhus Convention’),
– ob upoštevanju mednarodnega akcijskega načrta FAO za preprečevanje nezakonitega, neprijavljenega in nereguliranega ribolova, za odvračanje od njega ter za njegovo odpravljanje (IPOA-IUU), ki ga je svet FAO potrdil junija 2001,
– having regard to the FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU), endorsed by the FAO Council in June 2001,
– ob upoštevanju sporočila Komisije o akcijskem načrtu Skupnosti za izkoreninjenje nezakonitega, neprijavljenega in nereguliranega ribolova iz maja 2002 ( KOM(2002)0180 ),
– having regard to the Communication from the Commission on a Community action plan for the eradication of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing of May 2002 ( COM(2002)0180 ),
– ob upoštevanju deklaracije s svetovnega vrhunskega srečanja o trajnostnem razvoju od 26. avgusta do 4. septembra 2002 v Johannesburgu,
– having regard to the Declaration made at the World Summit on Sustainable Development held from 26 August to 4 September 2002 in Johannesburg,
– ob upoštevanju svoje resolucije z dne 15. februarja 2007 o izvajanju akcijskega načrta EU proti nezakonitemu, neprijavljenemu in zakonsko neurejenemu ribolovu
– having regard to its resolution of 15 February 2007 on the implementation of the EU action plan against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing
UL C 287E, 29.11.2007, str.
OJ C 287E, 29.11.2007, p.502. ,
1. , Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1006/2008 z dne 29. septembra 2008 o dovoljenjih za ribolovne dejavnosti ribiških plovil Skupnosti zunaj voda Skupnosti in dostopu plovil tretjih držav do voda Skupnosti (uredba o dovoljenjih za ribolov)
1. , Council Regulation (EC) No 1006/2008 of 29 September 2008 concerning authorisations for fishing activities of Community fishing vessels outside Community waters (the ‘Fishing Authorisations Regulation’)
UL L 286, 29.10.2008, str.
OJ L286, 29.10.2008, p.