natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
meni, da morajo organi kazenskega pregona imeti na voljo vse, kar potrebujejo za ustrezno izvajanje svojih nalog, tudi dostop do podatkov; vendar poudarja, da je treba potrebo po teh ukrepih, njihov obseg in enotnost pri doseganju ciljev prepričljivo utemeljiti, saj imajo občuten vpliv na osebno življenje državljanov Unije ter poudarja, da je treba vzpostaviti učinkovito varovanje zasebnosti in pravno varnost; meni, da je ta predpogoj nujen za dosego potrebne politične sprejemljivosti ukrepa, za katerega bi državljani lahko menili, da neupravičeno posega v njihovo zasebnost;
Takes the view that law enforcement authorities should be provided with all the tools they need to adequately carry out their tasks, including access to data; emphasises, however, that since such measures have a considerable impact on the personal life of Union citizens, their justification in terms of necessity, proportionality and usefulness in achieving their stated objectives needs to be convincingly substantiated, and stresses that effective safeguards for privacy and legal protection must be put in place; believes that this is a precondition for lending the necessary political legitimacy to a measure which citizens may view as an inappropriate intrusion into their privacy;
obžaluje, da oblika in obrazložitev predloga Komisije še vedno ohranjata pomanjkljivo pravno varnost pri skladnosti s Konvencijo o varstvu človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin in Listino o temeljnih pravicah, kar tudi postavlja pod vprašaj ustreznost vloge Parlamenta pri zakonodajnem postopku; opozarja, da so isti pomisleki glede pomanjkanja pravne varnosti:
Regrets that the formulation and justification of the Commission's proposal have left so many legal uncertainties with respect to compatibility with the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as its legal basis, which has raised questions as to the appropriate role for Parliament in the legislative procedure; notes that the same concerns regarding the proposal's lack of legal certainty:
izraženi v mnenjih Agencije za temeljne pravice, Evropskega nadzornika za varstvo podatkov ter delovne skupine iz člena 29 in delovne skupine za policijo in pravosodje;
are raised in the opinions delivered by the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) , the Article 29 Working Party and the Working Party on Police and Justice;
zahtevajo od Sveta, da obsežno pregleda morebitne izide in vplive prihodnjih pobud EU na tem področju, vključi veliko količino dodatnih informacij, tudi zgoraj omenjena mnenja;
require the Council to undertake a substantial review of the possible scope and impact of a future EU initiative in this domain, and incorporate significant amounts of additional information, including the above-mentioned opinions;
meni, da bo pod temi pogoji Parlament podal svoje uradno mnenje v skladu s postopkom posvetovanja po tem, ko bodo vprašanja, ki jih postavlja v svoji resoluciji, ustrezno obravnavana in ko bo na voljo najmanjša potrebna količina informacij;
Considers that under these conditions Parliament must reserve its formal opinion under the formal consultation procedure until the concerns raised in this resolution are properly addressed and the minimum information necessary is provided;
še naprej izraža močne zadržke glede potrebnosti in dodane vrednosti predloga za ustanovitev EU sistema za evidenco PNR in njenih varoval, ne glede na dosedanje ustne in pisne obrazložitve in pojasnitve Komisije in Sveta; nadalje ugotavlja, da se na mnoga vprašanja, ki so jih je sprožili Parlament, delovna skupina iz člena 29 za policijo in pravosodje, Evropski nadzornik za varstvo podatkov in Agencija za temeljne pravice, ni ustrezno odgovorilo;
Maintains its strong reservations as to the necessity for and added value of the proposal for the establishment of an EU PNR scheme and the safeguards which it contains, notwithstanding the explanations and points of clarification given by the Commission and the Council so far, both orally and in writing; observes, furthermore, that many of the questions raised by Parliament, the Article 29 Working Party, the Working Party on Police and Justice, EDPS and the FRA have not been satisfactorily answered;
se strinja z mnenjem Agencije za temeljne pravice, da sama razpoložljivost komercialnih baz podatkov samodejno ne opravičuje njihove uporabe za namene kazenskega pregona; še več, enaki ali boljši rezultati se lahko z izboljšavo vzajemne pravne pomoči med organi kazenskega pregona;
Shares the FRA's view that the mere availability of commercial databases does not automatically justify their use for law enforcement purposes; moreover, the same or even better results could be obtained by improving mutual legal assistance between law enforcement authorities;
poziva Svet, naj v primeru, da namerava nadaljevati s preučevanjem besedila Komisije, upošteva priporočila iz te resolucije in ustrezno opraviči pogoje nujne družbene potrebe, kar bi ta nov EU ukrep lahko naredilo za "nujnega", kot je navedeno včlenu 8 Konvencije o varstvu človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin; meni, da so to najnujnejši pogoji za uvedbo EU sistema za evidenco PNR; je pripravljen prispevati in sodelovati pri teh dejavnostih na vseh ravneh;
Invites the Council, if it intends to continue the examination of the Commission text, to take into account the recommendations in this resolution and to duly justify the conditions of pressing social need which could make this new EU intervention 'necessary', as required under Article 8 of the ECHR; considers these to be the minimum conditions of support for the introduction of an EU PNR scheme; is ready to contribute and participate in this work at all levels;
ponovno poziva, da se pojasni odnos med uporabo evidence PNR in drugimi ukrepi, kot so Direktiva Sveta 2004/82/ES z dne 29. aprila 2004 o obveznosti prevoznikov, da sporočajo podatke o potnikih UL L 261, 6.8.2004, str.
Reiterates its calls for clarification of the relationship between the use of PNR and other measures such as Council Directive 2004/82/EC OJ L 261, 6.8.2004, p.
, predlagani sistem vstopa in izstopa, elektronski sistem za odobritev potovanj, biometrija v potnih listih in vizumih, sistema SIS in VIS, Uredba (ES) št. 2320/2002 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. decembra 2002 o določitvi skupnih predpisov na področju varnosti civilnega letalstva UL L 355, 30.12.2002, str.
of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data, the proposed Entry-Exit scheme, the Electronic System for Travel Authorisation, biometrics in passports and visas, SIS, VIS, Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002 OJ L 355, 30.12.2002, p.
ter sistema za varovanje nacionalnih meja; z obžalovanjem ugotavlja, da je izvedba nekaterih navedenih ukrepov občutno odložena, in meni, da bi celostna ocena trenutnega sodelovanja na področju mehanizmov sodelovanja pri varnosti EU in Schengenskega sporazuma ter orodij za zagotavljanje varnosti letalskega prometa in zunanjih meja ter boja proti terorizmu lahko pripomogli k oceni dodane vrednosti predlaganega sistema za evidenco PNR;
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation security, and national border protection schemes; notes with regret that the implementation of some of these measures has been considerably delayed and considers that a full and systematic evaluation of the current EU and Schengen security cooperation mechanisms and tools aimed at ensuring aviation security, protecting external borders and fighting terrorism could help in assessing the added value of the proposed EU PNR scheme;
opozarja, da pogovori o ustrezni pravni podlagi predloga še vedno potekajo, in ponovno ugotavlja, da v skladu s členom 47 Pogodbe EU morajo zakonodajne ukrepe v okviru sodnega in policijskega sodelovanja spremljati ustrezni spremljevalni ukrepi Skupnosti znotraj prvega stebra, ki se jih sprejme po postopku soodločanja s Parlamentom, zlasti tisti, ki opredeljujejo obseg obveznosti gospodarskih subjektov Glej zlasti mnenje pravne službe Sveta na to temo in sklepne predloge generalnega pravobranilca z dne 14. oktobra 2008 v primeru C-301/06, Irska proti Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu Evropske unije, glede Direktive 2006/24/ES o hrambi podatkov.
Recalls that the debate on the appropriate legal basis for the proposal is continuing and reiterates that, according to Article 47 of the EU Treaty, legislative measures within the framework of judicial and police cooperation should be accompanied by the necessary accompanying Community measures to be adopted in codecision with Parliament on all first-pillar aspects, particularly those defining the scope of the obligations to be fulfilled by economic operators See, in particular, the Council Legal Service opinion on this subject and the Opinion of the Advocate General delivered on 14 October 2008 on Case C-301/06, Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union on the Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC.
opozarja, da je Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti že oporekalo sporazumu o evidenci PNR med EU in ZDA zaradi napačne prave podlage; zato poziva Komisijo, naj natančno preuči, katera pravna podlaga je ustrezna;
Recalls that the Court of Justice of the European Communities has already challenged the EU-US PNR Agreement on the grounds that its legal basis is wrong; calls therefore on the Commission to examine carefully which legal basis is appropriate;
poudarja, da bi morebitna prihodnja zakonodaja, ki bi uvedla EU sistem za evidenco PNR kot nov okvir za politično sodelovanje v EU, morala vsebovati določbe za redne preglede izvajanja, uporabe, učinkovitosti in napak pri varnosti; meni, da je treba nacionalne parlamente, Evropskega nadzornika za varstvo podatkov, delovno skupino iz člena 29 za policijo in pravosodje in Agencijo za temeljne pravice povabiti, da sodelujejo pri reviziji in ocenjevanju; zato meni, da bi morala nova zakonodaja imeti klavzulo o časovni omejitvi veljavnosti;
Stresses that possible future legislation establishing an EU PNR scheme as a new framework for EU police cooperation should contain provisions for periodic evaluation of its implementation, application, usefulness and breaches of safeguards; considers that national parliaments, the EDPS, the Article 29 Working Party and the FRA should be invited to play a role in both review and evaluation; considers, therefore, that the new legislation should include a sunset clause;
v zvezi s tem poudarja, da nosi vsaka država članica začetno odgovornost za zbiranje podatkov za evidenco PNR in njihovo varnost; poudarja, da je varovanje obvezno, ko se ti podatki posredujejo, izmenjujejo ali prenašajo v ali med državami članicami; zato meni, da mora biti dostop do podatkov iz evidence PNR, ki jih izmenjujejo države članice, strogo omejen zgolj na organe, ki sodelujejo v boju proti terorizmu in organiziranemu kriminalu; meni, da se lahko drugim agencijam za kazenski pregon sodno odobri dostop do teh podatkov;
Emphasises, in this context, that each Member State bears the initial responsibility for the collection of PNR data and their protection; stresses that safeguards are mandatory when PNR data are transmitted, exchanged or transferred to or between other Member States; takes the view, therefore, that access to PNR data exchanged between Member States should be strictly limited only to those authorities that deal with counter-terrorism and organised crime; considers that other law enforcement agencies may be granted access subject to judicial approval;
z zaskrbljenostjo ugotavlja, da potreba po ukrepanju Skupnosti še ni bila dovolj jasno izražena; v zvezi s tem oporeka zahtevi Komisije, da se za začetni cilj postavi usklajevanje nacionalnih shem, ker le malo držav članic ima sistem za uporabo podatkov iz evidence PNR za organe kazenskega pregona in za druge namena, ali načrt zanj; zato meni, da predlog Komisije ne bi dosegel uskladitve nacionalnih sistemov (saj ne obstajajo), ampak bi zgolj ustvaril obveznost za vse države članice, da tak sistem ustvarijo;
Notes with concern that the need for Community action has not yet been sufficiently demonstrated; in this connection, questions the claim by the Commission that the stated aim of the proposal is harmonisation of national schemes, when only a few Member States have a system for the use of PNR data for law enforcement and other purposes, or plans for such a scheme; considers, therefore, that the Commission's proposal does not harmonise national systems (as they are non-existent), but merely creates the obligation for all Member States to set up such a system;
ugotavlja, da Komisija predlaga decentraliziran sistem, kar pomeni, da je evropska dodana vrednost še manj jasna;
Notes that the Commission is proposing a 'decentralised' scheme, which means that the European added value is even less clear;
opozarja, da člen 8 Konvencije o varstvu človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin in člen 52 Listine o temeljnih pravicah zahtevata, da se tako velik poseg v varnost varovanja osebnih podatkov zakonsko opravičen z družbeno nujo, zakonsko podprt in sorazmeren z želenim ciljem, ki mora biti nujen in resničen za demokratično družbo; v zvezi s tem obžaluje dejstvo, da cilj tega poudarjenega policijskega sodelovanja ni omejen na področja boja proti terorizmu in organiziranemu kriminalu;
Recalls that Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights require that such a massive infringement of the right to the protection of personal data be legitimate and justified by a pressing social need, provided for by law and proportionate to the end pursued, which must be necessary and legitimate in a democratic society; in this connection, deplores the fact that the purpose of this envisaged police cooperation measure is not limited to issues such as combating terrorism and organised crime;
izraža zaskrbljenost, da bo predlog v resnici dal organom kazenskega pregona dostop do vseh podatkov brez naloga; poudarja, da Komisija ni prikazala potrebe po novih pooblastilih organov kazenskega pregona, niti da se tega cilja ne da doseči z manj daljnosežnimi ukrepi; kritizira dejstvo, da ni podatkov o tem, kako trenutno obstoječa pooblastila organov kazenskega pregona ne zagotavljajo potrebnega ter kje in kdaj so ti imeli organi dokazano premajhne pristojnosti za doseganje omenjenega cilja; zahteva, da se spodaj našteti obstoječi ukrepi še enkrat pregledajo pred začetkom razvoja EU sistema o evidenci PNR;
Is concerned that, in essence, the proposal gives law enforcement authorities access to all data without a warrant; points out that the Commission has not demonstrated the need for new law enforcement powers, or that this goal cannot be achieved with less far reaching measures; criticises the fact that there is no information as to how existing law enforcement powers fall short of what is needed, and where and when the authorities have demonstrably lacked the powers they needed for the stated purpose; requests that a review of the existing measures mentioned below take place before an EU PNR system is further developed;
ugotavlja, da je Komisija izjavila, da je "EU lahko ocenila vrednost podatkov iz evidence PNR in dosegla njihove zmogljivosti v namen kazenskega pregona", a poudarja, da še vedno ne obstajajo dokazi za to izjavo, saj:
Notes the Commission's claim that 'the EU has been able to assess the value of PNR data and to realise its potential for law enforcement purposes', but stresses that to date there is no evidence to substantiate this claim, given that:
so vse informacije, ki so bile doslej pridobljene v ZDA nepotrjene in ZDA nikoli niso dokončno dokazale, da je obširna in redna uporaba podatkvo iz evidence PNR nujna za boj proti terorizmu in organiziranemu kriminalu,
any information so far provided by the US is anecdotal and the US have never conclusively proven that the massive and systematic use of PNR data is necessary in the fight against terrorism and serious crime,
je bila opravljena samo ena skupna revizija sporazuma med EU in ZDA, ki je ocenila samo izvajanje, ne pa tudi rezultatov;
there has only been one joint review of the US-EU PNR Agreement, which assessed only the implementation, not the results,
predhodni zaključki sistema Združenega kraljestva za uporabo podatkov iz evidence PNR se nanašajo na druge cilje kazenskega pregona, ne boja proti terorizmu, se pravi na cilje, ki ne sodijo na področje uporabe Komisijskega predloga, in na uporabo podatkov iz evidence PNR v posamičnih primerih v okviru tekočih preiskav, na podlagi sodnega naloga in z ustreznimi razlogi; zaenkrat pa ne dokazujejo uporabnosti množičnega zbiranja in uporabe teh podatkov za boj proti terorizmu;
the preliminary conclusions from the UK system for the use of PNR data refer to law enforcement purposes other than counterterrorism, which fall outside the scope of the Commission's proposal, and to the use of PNR on a case-by-case basis in the context of ongoing investigations, on the basis of a warrant and with due cause; so far they provide no evidence of the usefulness of the mass collection and use of PNR data for counterterrorism purposes;
poudarja, da načelo omejitve namena predstavlja eno izmed osnovnih načel o varstvu podatkov; zlasti poudarja, da Konvencija št. 108 določa, da se osebni podatki "shranijo za določene in zakonite namene in ne uporabijo na način, ki ni združljiv s temi nameni" (člen 5(b)); ugotavlja tudi, da so izjeme od tega načela dopustne le, kadar so predpisane z zakonom in predstavljajo potreben ukrep v demokratični družbi, med drugim v interesu "zatiranja kriminala" (člen 9); poudarja, da je iz sodne prakse Evropskega sodišča za človekove pravice jasno, da morajo biti izjeme sorazmerne, natančne in predvidljive, iv skladu z drugim odstavkom 8. člena Konvencije o varstvu človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin;
Stresses that the principle of purpose limitation is one of the basic principles of data protection; points out, in particular, that Convention 108 states that personal data shall be "stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way incompatible with those purposes" (Article 5(b)); notes also that derogations from this principle are allowed only insofar as they are provided for by law and constitute a necessary measure in a democratic society in the interests of, inter alia, the "suppression of criminal offences" (Article 9); points out that the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights has made clear that these derogations must be proportionate, precise and foreseeable, pursuant to Article 8(2) of the ECHR;
obžaluje, da ne obstaja natančna omejitev glede na cilj, kar je osnovno varovalo pri izvajanju omejitvenih ukrepov, in meni, da je tovrstno varovanje še pomembnejše pri tajnih nadzornih ukrepih, saj je tveganje samovoljnih dejanj v teh razmerah večje; meni, da je treba nenatančno določene omenjene cilje in opredelitve natančno opredeliti, da bi se izognili pravnemu izpodbijanju EU sistema o evidenci PNR;
Deplores the lack of precise purpose limitation which is an essential safeguard in the imposition of restrictive measures, and considers that such protection is even more important as regards secret surveillance measures, given the heightened risk of arbitrariness in such circumstances; considers that, as the stated purposes and definitions are imprecise and open-ended, they should be strictly specified to avoid exposing the EU PNR scheme to legal challenge;
ponovno poudarja, da bi lahko bili podatki iz EU sistema o evidenci podatkov o letalskih potnikih zelo uporabni kot dodatni dokazi v posameznih preiskavah o znanih terorističnih osumljencih in njihovih sodelavcih; vendar poudarja, da ni dokazov, da bi bili podatki iz evidence PNR uporabni za množične samodejne raziskave in analize na osnovi meril ali vzorcev tveganja (to je profiliranje ali pridobivanje podatkov) pri iskanju morebitnih teroristov Poročilo CRS za ameriški kongres "Pridobivanje podatkov in državna varnost: Pregled" – avtor: Jeffrey Seifert; "Učinkovit boj proti terorizmu in omejena vloga prediaktivnega pridobivanja podatkov" – CATO Institute; "Varovanje zasebnosti posameznikov v boju proti terorizmu: ocena okvirnega programa"; "Brez sanjske vozovnice do varnosti" – avtor Frank Kuipers, Clingendael Institute, Avgust 2008.
Reiterates that PNR data may be very useful as supportive, additional evidence in a specific investigation into known terrorism suspects and associates; points out, however, that there is no evidence that PNR data are useful for massive automated searches and analyses on the basis of risk criteria or patterns (i.e. profiling or data mining) in seeking potential terrorists CRS report for the American Congress 'Data Mining and Homeland Security: An Overview' by Jeffrey Seifert; 'Effective counter-terrorism and the limited role of predicative data mining' by CATO Institute; 'Protecting individual privacy in the struggle against terrorists: a framework for program assessment'; 'No dream ticket to security' by Frank Kuipers, Clingendael Institute, August 2008.
nadalje poudarja, da EU določbe o varovanju podatkov omejujejo profiliranje na temelju osebnih podatkov (člen 8 Listine o temeljnih pravicah in Konvencije o varstvu človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin); zato se strinja z mnenjem Agencije za temeljne pravice, da se profiliranje, ki temelji na podatkih iz evidence PNR, opravlja samo na podlagi obveščevalnih podatkov in da temelji na posameznih primerih in objektivnih merilih;
Stresses, furthermore, that EU data protection rules place restrictions on the use of profiling on the basis of personal data (Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the ECHR); concurs, therefore, with the FRA's opinion that profiling based on PNR data should only be intelligence-led, based on individual cases and factual parameters;
ponovno izraža zaskrbljenost glede ukrepov, ki predvidevajo nediskriminatorno uporabo podatkov iz evidence PNR za profiliranje in opredelitev dejavnikov tveganja; opozarja, da je treba vsako profiliranje na osnovi etničnega porekla, državljanstva, vere, spolne usmerjenosti, spola, starosti ali zdravstvenega stanja izrecno prepovedati kot neskladno s prepovedjo vse diskriminacije v Pogodbah in Listini o temeljnih pravicah;
Reiterates its concerns regarding the measures outlining an indiscriminate use of PNR data for profiling and for the definition of risk assessment parameters; recalls that any kind of profiling based on ethnicity, nationality, religion, sexual orientation, gender, age or medical condition should be expressly banned as incompatible with the prohibition of any discrimination as defined in the Treaties and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights;
opozarja, da morata Komisija in Svet v primeru vseh širitev ciljev predloga natančno razjasniti razlog za uporabo podatkov iz evidence PNR in zakaj obstoječi organi kazenskega pregona ne zadostujejo; meni, da je treba ustvariti zakonodajne temelje za vsak cilj posebej;
Recalls that, in the event of any extension of the proposal's scope, the Commission and the Council should clarify in detail for each stated purpose what use will be made of the PNR data and why existing law enforcement powers are not sufficient; considers that, for each specific purpose, the appropriate legal basis must be established;
poudarja, da je absolutni predpogoj za kakršni koli EU sistem za evidenco PNR sprejetje ustreznega okvira za varstvo podatkov v tretjem stebru, pa tudi posebnih pravil za prenos in uporabo podatkvo iz tega sistema, za katere ne velja evropski okvir varstva podatkov za prvi in tretji steber; poudarja, da je treba pojasniti, kateri predpisi o varstvu podatkov bi veljali za enote za informacije o potnikih, in zagotoviti sledljivost za vse dostope, prenašanje in uporabo podatkov iz evidence PNR;
Stresses that the adoption of an adequate data protection framework under the third pillar is an absolute precondition for any EU PNR scheme, as are specific rules for the transfer and use of PNR data that are not covered by the EU data protection framework under the first and third pillars; stresses the need to clarify which data protection rules apply to Passenger Information Units (PIUs) and to ensure the traceability of all access, transfer and use of PNR data;