natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
obžaluje, da do zdaj ni bila izvedena nobena ocena ali presoja vplivov politike sankcij EU in da je zato zelo težko izmeriti njene vplive in učinkovitost v praksi ter torej priti do potrebnih zaključkov; poziva Svet in Komisijo, da izvedeta postopek ocenjevanja; vendar meni, da je politika sankcij, uporabljena proti Južni Afriki, učinkovito pripomogla k odpravi apartheida;
Deplores the fact that, to date, no evaluation or impact assessment has been carried out in respect of the EU's sanctions policy and that it is therefore extremely difficult to gauge the policy's impact and effectiveness on the ground and thus to draw the necessary conclusions; calls on the Council and the Commission to carry out this evaluation work; considers, nevertheless, that the sanctions policy used against South Africa proved effective in helping to end apartheid;
meni, da razlike v pravnih podlagah za izvajanje politike sankcij EU, ki vključuje različne ravni odločanja, izvajanja in nadzora, spodkopavajo njeno preglednost in povezanost, posledično pa tudi njeno verodostojnost;
Considers that disparities in the legal bases for the implementation of the EU's sanctions policy, involving different decision-making, implementation and supervision levels, are undermining the transparency and coherence of the EU's sanctions policy and, as a result, the credibility thereof;
meni, da učinkovitost sankcij pomeni, da se njihova uvedba zdi legitimna evropski in mednarodni javnosti ter javnosti v državah, v katerih se pričakujejo spremembe; poudarja, da posvetovanje s Parlamentom v postopku odločanja krepi to legitimnost;
Considers that, for sanctions to be effective, their introduction must be seen as legitimate by public opinion at European and international levels and in countries in which changes are expected; stresses that consultation of Parliament in the decision-making process gives them added legitimacy;
prav tako ugotavlja, da imajo lahko sankcije simbolično vrednost, saj izražajo moralno obsodbo EU in tako povečujejo vidnost in verodostojnost zunanje politike EU; vendar opozarja, da ne sme biti prevelikega poudarka na sankcijah kot simboličnih ukrepih, saj bi jih to utegnilo popolnoma razvrednotiti;
Notes also that sanctions can have symbolic value as an expression of the EU's moral condemnation, thus giving added visibility and credibility to EU foreign policy; warns, however, against placing too much emphasis on the idea of sanctions as symbolic measures, as this could result in them becoming totally devalued;
meni, da mora biti uporaba sankcij predvidena v primeru ravnanja organov ali nedržavnih subjektov ali fizičnih in pravnih oseb, ki pomeni resno ogrožanje varnosti in človekovih pravic, ali v primeru, ko se zaradi tretje stranke izčrpajo vse pogodbene in/ali diplomatske možnosti ali ko so dosegle mrtvo točko;
Considers that recourse to sanctions should be envisaged in the case of actions by authorities or non-state entities or natural and legal persons which seriously undermine security and human rights or where all contractual and/or diplomatic options have been explored or have clearly reached stalemate, owing to the actions of the third party;
meni, da je vsako prostovoljno in nepopravljivo poslabšanje okolja grožnja varnosti ter resna kršitev človekovih pravic; v zvezi s tem poziva Svet in Komisijo, da vsak prostovoljen in nepopravljiv poseg v okolje vključita v razloge, ki lahko vodijo v sprejetje sankcij;
Takes the view that any voluntary and irreversible degradation of the environment constitutes a threat to security and a serious violation of human rights; in this connection, calls on the Council and the Commission to include any voluntary and irreversible damage caused to the environment among the grounds which may lead to the adoption of sanctions;
ugotavlja, da se splošni instrumenti sankcij EU na splošno uporabljajo na prožen način in v skladu s potrebami za vsak primer posebej; kljub temu obžaluje dejstvo, da EU svojo politiko sankcij pogosto uporablja neskladno, s tem da tretje države obravnava različno, čeprav je njihovo upoštevanje človekovih pravic in demokratičnih načel podobno, kar sproža kritike na račun uporabe "dvojnih meril";
Acknowledges that the overall EU sanctions instruments are generally deployed flexibly in accordance with needs on a case-by-case basis; deplores, however, the fact that the EU has often applied its sanctions policy inconsistently, by treating third countries differently even though their human rights and democratic records are similar, and thus triggering criticism for applying "double standards";
je v zvezi s tem prepričan, da morata izvajanje in ocena sankcij Evropske unije zaradi kršenja človekovih pravic načeloma prevladati nad morebitno škodo, ki jo zaradi uvedbe sankcij utrpijo trgovinski interesi Evropske unije in njenih državljanov;
Believes in this respect that the application and evaluation of sanctions by the European Union for infringements of human rights must in principle prevail over any harm deriving from their application to the trading interests of the European Union and its citizens;
obžaluje, da so v Evropski uniji nesoglasja glede politike do posamezne države, kot je Kuba, ali dejstvo, da države članice oklevajo, da bi se zoperstavile velikim trgovinskim partnerjem, kot je Rusija, povzročila, da je Unija sprejela zgolj "neuradne sankcije" v sklepih predsedstva, kar pomeni neuravnoteženo oziroma neusklajeno uporabo sankcij Unije; vendar priznava, da so lahko ukrepi iz sklepov Sveta, npr. odlog podpisa sporazumov z nekaterimi državami, kot je Srbija, koristna oblika pritiska na tretje države, da te v celoti sodelujejo z mednarodnimi mehanizmi;
Regrets that the existence of intra-EU disagreements on policies towards a given country such as Cuba or the reluctance of Member States to antagonise major partners such as Russia have led the EU to adopt only "informal sanctions" in Presidency Conclusions, reflecting an unbalanced or inconsistent application of EU sanctions; recognises, however, that measures included in the Council conclusions, such as the deferral of the signing of agreements with countries such as Serbia, could be a useful tool in order to pressurise third countries into cooperating fully with international mechanisms;
v zvezi s Kubo opozarja, da zgoraj navedeno skupno stališče, ki je bilo sprejeto leta 1996 in nato redno ponovno potrjeno, nakazuje načrt v korist mirnega prehoda v demokracijo, ostaja v celoti veljavno ter ni predmet spora v evropskih institucijah; obžaluje, da do sedaj ni bilo nobenega večjega izboljšanja na področju človekovih pravic; je seznanjen s sklepom Sveta z dne 20. junija 2008 za odpravo neuradnih sankcij v zvezi s Kubo, vendar poziva k takojšnji in brezpogojni izpustitvi vseh političnih zapornikov, k poenostavitvi dostopa do zapornikov ter ratifikaciji in izvajanju Mednarodnega pakta o državljanskih in političnih pravicah; ugotavlja, da bo Svet v enem letu odločil, ali bo nadaljeval politični dialog s Kubo glede na to, ali se bo stanje na področju človekovih pravic znatno izboljšalo; opominja, da je stališče Sveta tudi zavezujoče za institucije Evropske unije, kar zadeva dialog z kubanskimi oblastmi in predstavniki civilne družbe; ponavlja svoje stališče do prejemnikov nagrade Saharova Oswalda Paye Sardiñasa in skupine "Damas de Blanco";
Recalls that, with regard to Cuba, the above-mentioned Common Position adopted in 1996 and periodically renewed reflects the roadmap for peaceful transition to democracy, remains fully in force and is not the subject of controversy in the European institutions; regrets that, to date, there has been no significant improvement as regards human rights; notes the Council's decision of 20 June 2008 to lift the informal sanctions with regard to Cuba whilst calling on that country to free all political prisoners immediately and unconditionally, to facilitate access to prisons and to ratify and implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; notes that the Council will decide in a year's time whether to pursue the political dialogue with Cuba. depending on whether or not there have been significant improvements as regards human rights; recalls that the Council's position is also binding on the European Union institutions as regards dialogue both with the Cuban authorities and with the representatives of civil society; reiterates its position with regard to the Sakharov Prize winners Oswaldo Payá Sardiñas and the group known as "Damas de Blanco" ("Ladies in White");
meni, da se argument "neučinkovitosti" sankcij ne sme uporabljati zato, da bi se sankcije preklicale, temveč bi moral biti uporabljen zato, da se preusmeri in ponovno oceni sama sankcija; poleg tega meni, da mora nadaljevanje ali prekinitev sankcij temeljiti samo na tem, ali so bili doseženi njihovi cilji, njihova narava pa je lahko glede na njihovo oceno okrepljena ali spremenjena; meni, da morajo v ta namen sankcije vedno spremljati jasna merila uspešnosti;
Considers that the argument of the "ineffectiveness" of sanctions cannot be used in favour of lifting them and that it should be used instead to re-orientate and reassess the sanction itself; takes the view, moreover, that the continuation or not of sanctions should depend solely on whether their objectives have been achieved, and that their type may be strengthened or altered on the basis of their evaluation; considers that, to this end, sanctions should always be accompanied by clear benchmarks;
meni, da je treba učinkovitost sankcij preučevati na več ravneh, tako na ravni dejanske učinkovitosti ukrepov, tj. njihove zmožnosti vplivati na zasebne in poklicne dejavnosti ciljnih oseb kot članov ciljnega režima ali na delovanje tega režima, kot tudi na ravni njihove politične učinkovitosti, kar pomeni njihovo zmožnost, da prekinejo ali spremenijo dejavnosti ali politike, ki so bile razlog za njihovo sprejetje;
Considers that the effectiveness of sanctions should be analysed at a number of levels, both in terms of the measures" intrinsic effectiveness, i.e. their ability to have an impact on the private and professional activities of the individuals targeted as members of a target regime, or on the operation thereof, and in terms of their political effectiveness, i.e. their ability to bring about a stop to, or to alter, the activities or policies which have led to their adoption;
meni, da je učinkovitost sankcije odvisna od sposobnosti Evropske unije, da jo izvaja celotno obdobje, ter v zvezi s tem obžaluje uporabo določb, kot so določbe o časovni omejitvi, ki omogočajo samodejno odpravo sankcij;
Believes that the effectiveness of a sanction depends on the European Union's capacity to maintain it for the full period and, in this connection, deplores the use of provisions such as "sunset clauses" involving the automatic lifting of sanctions;
nasprotuje uporabi posplošenih, nerazlikovalnih sankcij proti kateri koli državi v vseh okoliščinah, saj ta pristop povzroča dejansko popolno izolacijo prebivalstva; meni, da lahko gospodarske sankcije, ki niso usklajene z drugimi političnimi instrumenti, le stežka zagotovijo politične reforme v zadevnem režimu; zato vztraja, da mora vsako sankcijo proti državnim organom sistematično spremljati podpora civilni družbi zadevne države;
Opposes the application, in all circumstances, of generalised, indiscriminate sanctions to any country, since this approach leads de facto to the total isolation of the population; considers that, unless coordinated with other political instruments, economic sanctions can succeed only with great difficulty in facilitating political reform within the regime targeted; stresses, therefore, that any sanctions taken against government authorities should systematically be coupled with support for civil society in the country concerned;
Sankcije kot del splošne strategije o človekovih pravicah
Sanctions as part of an overall human rights strategy
poudarja, da se večina sankcij EU uvede na podlagi zadev, povezanih z varnostjo; kljub temu poudarja, da morajo kršitve človekovih pravic predstavljati zadostno podlago za uporabo sankcij, ker prav tako ogrožajo varnost in stabilnost;
Points out that most EU sanctions are being imposed on the basis of security concerns; underlines however that human rights violations should constitute a sufficient basis for the application of sanctions since they likewise represent a threat to security and stability;
poudarja, da je glavni namen sankcij doseči spremembo politike ali dejavnosti v skladu s cilji skupnega stališča SZVP ali sklepi, ki jih sprejme Svet, ali mednarodnim sklepom, na katerem sankcije temeljijo;
Points out that the main purpose of sanctions is to bring about a change of policy or activities in line with the objectives of the CFSP Common Position or conclusions adopted by the Council, or the international decision on which the sanctions are based;
vztraja na tem, da se je Svet s sprejetjem zgoraj navedenih Osnovnih načel o uporabi omejevalnih ukrepov (sankcij) zavezal k uporabi sankcij kot dela obsežnega in celostnega političnega pristopa; v zvezi s tem poudarja, da ta pristop vključuje vzporeden političen dialog, spodbude in pogojenost ter v skrajnem primeru celo uporabo prisilnih ukrepov, kot so določeni v teh osnovnih načelih; meni, da je treba klavzule o človekovih pravicah in demokraciji, sistem splošnih preferenc in razvojno pomoč uporabljati kot orodja tega obsežnega in celostnega političnega pristopa;
Insists on the fact that the Council, by adopting the above-mentioned Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions), has committed itself to using sanctions as part of a comprehensive and integrated policy approach; stresses in this respect that this approach includes in parallel political dialogue, incentives and conditionality, and could even involve, as a last resort, the use of coercive measures, as set out in the Basic Principles; considers that human rights and democracy clauses, the system of generalised preferences and development aid should be used as tools of such a comprehensive and integrated policy approach;
poudarja, da se izvajanje klavzule o človekovih pravicah ne more šteti za popolnoma avtonomno ali enostransko sankcijo EU, saj izhaja neposredno iz dvostranskega ali večstranskega sporazuma, ki določa vzajemno obveznost glede spoštovanja človekovih pravic; meni, da ustrezni ukrepi, ki so sprejeti v skladu s to klavzulo, zadevajo izključno izvajanje zadevnega sporazuma, ki vsaki pogodbenici daje zakonito podlago, da prekine ali razveljavi sporazum; zato meni, da se izvajanje klavzul o človekovih pravicah in avtonomnih ali enostranskih sankcij nujno medsebojno dopolnjujeta;
Stresses that the implementation of the human rights clause cannot be regarded as an entirely autonomous or unilateral EU sanction, as it stems directly from the bilateral or multilateral agreement, which establishes a reciprocal undertaking to respect human rights; considers that appropriate measures taken in accordance with this clause exclusively concern the implementation of the relevant agreement in giving either party the lawful basis for suspending or annulling the agreement; considers, therefore, that the implementation of human rights clauses and autonomous or unilateral sanctions necessarily complement each other;
zato pozdravlja sistematično vključitev klavzul o človekovih pravicah in vztraja pri vključitvi posebnega mehanizma izvajanja v vse dvostranske sporazume s tretjimi državami, vključno s sektorskimi sporazumi; v zvezi s tem opozarja na pomembnost priporočil, oblikovanih za učinkovitejše in bolj sistematično izvajanje klavzule, in sicer oblikovanje ciljev in referenčnih meril ter redno ocenjevanje; ponovno zahteva izvajanje klavzul o človekovih pravicah prek preglednejšega postopka posvetovanja med stranmi, vključno s Parlamentom in civilno družbo, ki podrobno določi politične in pravne mehanizme za primer zahteve za dvostransko sodelovanje, opuščene na podlagi ponavljajočih se in/ali sistematičnih kršitev človekovih pravic, ki kršijo mednarodno pravo; podpira postopkovni model po Sporazumu iz Cotonouja za odzivanje na hude kršitve človekovih pravic, za demokratična načela in pravno državo; meni, da se je sistem intenzivnega političnega dialoga (člen 8 Sporazuma iz Cotonouja) in posvetovanj (člen 96 Sporazuma iz Cotonouja) pred sprejetjem ustreznih ukrepov in po njem v več primerih izkazal kot uspešen instrument za izboljšanje razmer na kraju samem;
Welcomes, therefore, the systematic inclusion of human rights clauses and insists on the incorporation of a specific implementation mechanism in all new bilateral agreements, including sector-specific agreements, signed with third countries; recalls, in this connection, the importance of the recommendations issued with a view to more effective and systematic implementation of the clause, namely the formulation of objectives and reference criteria and regular evaluation; reiterates its call for the human rights clauses to be implemented through a more transparent procedure of consultation between the parties, including the European Parliament and civil society, detailing the political and legal mechanisms to be used in the event of a request for bilateral cooperation being suspended on the grounds of repeated and/or systematic human rights violations in breach of international law; supports the procedural model established under the Cotonou Agreement for reacting to grave violations of human rights, for democratic principles and for the rule of law; believes that the system of intensive political dialogue (Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement) and consultations (Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement), before and after the adoption of appropriate measures, has in several cases provided a successful instrument for improving the situation on the ground;
poziva Komisijo in države članice, naj ne predlagajo prostotrgovinskih in/ali pridružitvenih sporazumov – četudi vključujejo klavzule o človekovih pravicah – vladam držav, kjer po poročilih Urada visokega komisarja za človekove pravice pri Združenih narodih prihaja do hudih kršitev človekovih pravic;
Urges the Commission and the Member States not to propose free trade agreements and/or association agreements – even containing human rights clauses – to governments of countries where, according to reports by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations, massive human rights violations are being perpetrated;
meni, da lahko nesprejetje ustreznih in omejevalnih ukrepov v primeru stalnih kršitev človekovih pravic resno ogrozi strategijo o človekovih pravicah, politiko sankcij in verodostojnost Unije;
Considers that failure to take appropriate or restrictive measures in the event of a situation marked by persistent human rights violations seriously undermines the Union's human rights strategy, sanctions policy and credibility;
meni, da je politika sankcij precej učinkovitejša, če je del skladne strategije o človekovih pravicah; ponovno poudarja svoj poziv Svetu in Komisiji, da se v vsakem strateškem dokumentu države ali v drugih podobnih dokumentih izdela posebna strategija v zvezi s človekovimi pravicami in razmerami, kar zadeva demokracijo;
Considers that a sanctions policy will be much more effective when it forms part of a coherent human rights strategy; reiterates its request to the Council and the Commission to devise a specific strategy on human rights and the situation as regards democracy as part of each country strategy paper and other similar types of documents;
meni, da morajo v primeru uvedbe sankcij dialogi in posvetovanja o človekovih pravicah nujno vključevati razprave o napredku, ki je bil dosežen pri izpolnjevanju ciljev in meril uspešnosti, kot so bili določeni ob sprejetju omejevalnih ukrepov; hkrati meni, da cilji, doseženi med dialogi in posvetovanji o človekovih pravicah, v nobenem primeru ne morejo nadomestiti uresničitve ciljev, povezanih s sankcijami;
Considers that, in the case of the imposition of sanctions, the human rights dialogues and consultations should necessarily and systematically incorporate discussions on progress made in the fulfilment of the objectives and benchmarks set out at the time of the adoption of the restrictive measures; considers, at the same time, that the objectives achieved in human rights dialogues and consultations should under no circumstances replace the achievement of the objectives underpinning sanctions;
zavzema stališče, da ima usklajeno ukrepanje mednarodne skupnosti močnejši učinek kot neskladni in neenaki ukrepi, ki jih sprejmejo države ali regionalni subjekti; zato pozdravlja dejstvo, da mora politika sankcij EU še naprej temeljiti na pojmu prednosti v korist režima ZN;
Takes the view that coordinated action by the international community has a stronger impact than disparate and uneven actions by States or regional entities; welcomes, therefore, the fact that the EU's sanctions policy should continue to be based on the notion of a preference in favour of the UN regime;
poziva Svet, da v primeru odsotnosti sankcij Varnostnega sveta ZN sodeluje z državami, ki niso v EU in ki sankcionirajo, pri posredovanju informacij in pri usklajevanju ukrepov na mednarodni ravni, da se prepreči izmikanje sankcijam ter da se kar najbolj povečata učinkovitost in uporaba sankcij EU ter drugih sankcij v skladu z mednarodnim pravom;
Calls on the Council, in the absence of UN Security Council sanctions, to cooperate with non-EU sanctioning states, to share information, and to coordinate action at international level to prevent sanctions evasions and to maximise the effectiveness and implementation of EU sanctions and other sanctions, in conformity with international law;
meni, da si mora EU za spodbujanje človekovih pravic in zagotavljanje usklajenosti ukrepov in sankcij prizadevati za sodelovanje z drugimi regionalnimi organizacijami, kot sta Afriška unija in Združenje držav jugovzhodne Azije (ASEAN);
Considers that the EU should seek cooperation with other regional organisations, such as the African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in order to promote human rights and ensure coordination of actions on sanctions;
poziva EU, da sistematično razvija dialog z državami, ki ne sankcionirajo, da se doseže skupno stališče o omejevalnih ukrepih, zlasti na regionalni ravni; poudarja, da sankcije pogosto ne morejo doseči zahtevane spremembe politike ali dejavnosti, če je mednarodna skupnost razdeljena in glavni akterji niso vključeni v njihovo izvajanje, kot je pokazal primer Burme/Mjanmara;
Calls on the EU to systematically develop a dialogue with non-sanctioning states with a view to reaching a common position on restrictive measures, especially at regional level; points out that, as shown in the case of Burma/Myanmar, sanctions do not often bring about the required change of policy or activities when the international community is divided and major players are not involved in their implementation;
poziva Svet in Komisijo, da na dnevni red političnega dialoga z državami, ki ne sankcionirajo, sistematično vključita vprašanje njihove vloge in vpliva v zvezi s ciljnim režimom ali nedržavnimi subjekti ne glede na to, ali gre za posameznike, organizacije ali podjetja;
Calls on the Council and the Commission systematically to include on the agenda for political dialogues with non-sanctioning states the issue of their role and influence vis-à-vis the target regime or non-state actors, whether individuals, organisations or companies;
meni, da se mora možnost podpisa sporazuma o prosti trgovini z regijo ciljne države uporabljati kot "korenček" in sredstvo za izvajanje pritiska ter da mora tak sporazum v vsakem primeru izključiti državo, ki je predmet sankcij;
Considers that the prospect of the signing of a free trade agreement with the regions in which a target country is situated should be used as a "carrot" and means of pressure and that such an agreement should, in any case, not include the country to which sanctions are being applied;
Oblikovanje jasnih postopkov sprejemanja odločitev, ciljev, meril uspešnosti in mehanizmov za pregled
Setting-up of clear decision-making processes, objectives, benchmarks and review mechanisms