natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Sprejeta besedila, P6_TA(2009)0187 . in mnenja Odbora za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve z dne 20. oktobra 2011 o usklajenemu evropskemu pristopu h kolektivnim tožbam,
Text adopted, P6_TA(2009)0187 . and to the opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of 20 October 2011 on ‘Towards a Coherent Approach on Collective Redress’,
– ob upoštevanju svoje resolucije z dne 15. novembra 2011 o preoblikovanju pravil EU o državni pomoči za storitve splošnega gospodarskega pomena
– having regard to its resolution of 15 November 2011 on reform of the EU state aid rules on Services of General Economic Interest
Sprejeta besedila, P7_TA-PROV(2011)0494 . ,
Texts adopted, P7_TA-PROV(2011)0494 .
– ob upoštevanju svojih resolucij z dne 22. februarja 2005 o XXXIII. poročilu Komisije o politiki konkurence za leto 2003
– having regard to its resolutions of 22 February 2005 on the Commission’s XXXIIIrd Report on Competition Policy 2003
Sprejeta besedila, P6_TA(2005)0032 . , z dne 4. aprila 2006 o poročilu Komisije o politiki konkurence za leto 2004
Texts adopted, P6_TA(2005)0032 . , of 4 April 2006 on the Commission Report on Competition Policy 2004
Sprejeta besedila, P6_TA(2006)0120 . , z dne 19. junija 2007 o poročilu o politiki konkurence za leto 2005
Texts adopted, P6_TA(2006)0120 . , of 19 June 2007 on the Report on Competition Policy 2005
Sprejeta besedila, P6_TA(2007)0263 . , z dne 10. marca 2009 o poročilih o politiki konkurence za leti 2006 in 2007
Texts adopted, P6_TA(2007)0263 . , of 10 March 2009 on the Reports on Competition Policy 2006 and 2007
Sprejeta besedila, P6_TA(2009)0099 . , z dne 9. marca 2010 o poročilu o politiki konkurence za leto 2008
Texts adopted, P6_TA(2009)0099 . , of 9 March 2010 on the Report on Competition Policy 2008
Sprejeta besedila, P7_TA(2010)0050 . in z dne 20. januarja 2011 o poročilu o politiki konkurence za leto 2009
Texts adopted, P7_TA(2010)0050 . and of 20 January 2011 on the Report on Competition Policy 2009
Sprejeta besedila, P7_TA(2011)0023 . ,
Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0023 . ,
– ob upoštevanju mnenja Evropskega ekonomsko-socialnega odbora o poročilu Komisije o politiki konkurence za leto 2010 (INT/594 - CESE 1461/2011),
– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Commission Report on Competition Policy 2010 (INT/594 - CESE 1461/2011),
– ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve ter mnenj odborov za notranji trg in varstvo potrošnikov ter za promet in turizem ( A7-0424/2011 ),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection and the Committee on Transport and Tourism ( A7-0424/2011 ),
A. ker finančna in gospodarska kriza, ki je izbruhnila leta 2008, še ni premagana; ker so se finančni pretresi in strahovi pred recesijo v zadnjih mesecih znova zaostrili;
A. whereas the financial and economic crisis which broke out in autumn 2008 has not yet been overcome; whereas financial turmoil and recessionary fears have become once again acute over the last months;
B. ker se je Komisija na izbruh krize odzvala hitro in odgovorno, tako da je sprejela posebna pravila o državni pomoči, politiko konkurence pa je uporabila kot orodje za obvladovanje krize; ker naj bi bila to začasna ureditev, čeprav je njen časovni okvir presegel prvotna pričakovanja;
B. whereas the Commission responded to the eruption of the crisis in a prompt and reasonable manner by adopting special State aid rules and using competition policy as a crisis management tool; whereas this was, and still is, meant to be a temporary regime although its timeframe has exceeded what was originally expected;
C. ker je Komisija med 1. oktobrom 2008 in 1. oktobrom 2010 sprejela več kot 200 sklepov o državni pomoči za finančni sektor; ker je leta 2009 nominalni znesek pomoči finančnemu sektorju, ki so jo uporabile države članice, znašal 1107 milijard EUR (9,3 % BDP EU); ker znaša največji obseg ukrepov, ki jih je odobrila Komisija od začetka krize do 1. oktobra 2010 (vključno z obema shemama in ad hoc posegi), 4588,90 milijard EUR;
C. whereas between 1 October 2008 and 1 October 2010 the Commission took more than 200 decisions on State aid for the financial sector; whereas in 2009 the nominal amount of aid to the financial sector used by Member States constituted EUR 1 107 billion (9.3% of EU GDP); whereas the maximum volume of Commission-approved measures since the beginning of the crisis until 1 October 2010 (including both schemes and ad hoc interventions) amounts to EUR 4 588.90 billion;
D. ker je Komisija uvedla zahtevo, ki se uporablja od 1. januarja 2011, da vsaka banka, ki je upravičena do dokapitalizacije ali ukrepa za oslabljena sredstva, predloži načrt za prestrukturiranje, ne glede na to, ali velja za načeloma zdravo ali v težavah;
D. whereas the Commission introduced a requirement applicable from 1 January 2011 onwards to submit a restructuring plan for every beneficiary of a recapitalisation or an impaired assets measure, irrespective of whether the bank is considered to be fundamentally sound or distressed;
E. ker so veliki zneski državne pomoči, dodeljene v času krize, na primer v obliki jamstvenih shem, shem dokapitalizacije in dopolnilnih oblik likvidnostne podpore za bančna posojila, prispevali k močnim neravnovesjem javnih financ; ker še vedno ni znano, kako daljnosežen je lahko v prihodnosti vpliv te državne pomoči in predvsem jamstev, dodeljenih bankam, če bodo nekatera jamstva vpoklicana;
E. whereas sizable amounts of State aid given during the crisis in the form of, for example, guarantee schemes, recapitalisation schemes and complementary forms of liquidity support on bank funding have contributed to severe imbalances in public finances; whereas it is still unknown how far-reaching the impact this State aid, in particular of the guarantees provided to banks, may be in the future if some of those guarantees are actually called in;
F. ker bi protekcionizem in neizvrševanje pravil konkurence samo še poglobila in podaljšala krizo; ker je politika konkurence bistveno orodje, ki EU omogoča, da ima dinamičen, učinkovit in inovativen notranji trg in da je konkurenčna na svetovni ravni;
F. whereas protectionism and non-enforcement of competition rules would only deepen and prolong the crisis; whereas competition policy is an essential tool to enable the EU to have a dynamic, efficient and innovative internal market and to be competitive on the global stage;
G. ker kljub vsem prizadevanjem za obvladovanje gospodarske krize karteli ostajajo najresnejša grožnja konkurenci, blaginji potrošnikov in ustreznemu delovanju trgov, zato niso sprejemljivi niti v času gospodarske krize;
G. whereas, notwithstanding all the efforts to cope with the economic crisis, cartels remain the most serious threat to competition, consumer welfare and the proper functioning of markets, and consequently cannot be accepted even during an economic crisis;
2. ugotavlja, da skupni učinek togih načel in prilagodljivih postopkov omogoča politiki konkurence, da je konstruktiven in stabilizacijski dejavnik v finančnem sistemu EU in v realnem gospodarstvu nasploh;
Notes that the combined effect of robust principles and flexible procedures has enabled competition policy to be a constructive and stabilising factor in the EU’s financial system and in the real economy in general;
Priporočila politike konkurence
Competition policy recommendations
Nadzor državne pomoči
Control of State aid
6. poudarja, da je trenutna ureditev državne pomoči pozitivna kot prvotni odziv na krizo, vendar takšna ne more ostati; poudarja, da je treba začasne ukrepe in izjeme odpraviti čim prej in takoj ko bodo gospodarske razmere to omogočale;
Stresses that the temporary regime applicable to State aid has been positive as an initial reaction to the crisis, but that it cannot be prolonged unduly; emphasises the need to discontinue temporary measures and exemptions as soon as possible and as soon as the economic situation allows it;
8. je seznanjen z napovedjo posebnih smernic za reševanje in prestrukturiranje bančnega sektorja; predlaga Komisiji, naj upošteva učinek likvidnostne podpore centralnih bank v času faze reševanja v smislu izkrivljanja konkurence in naj pred vlaganjem javnih sredstev zagotovi urejeno prestrukturiranje bank z udeležbo imetnikov deležev in obveznic;
Notes the announcement of specific rescue and restructuring guidelines for the banking sector; suggests to the Commission that it takes into account the impact, in terms of distortion of competition, of the liquidity support provided by central banks during the rescue stage, and provides for the orderly restructuring of banks, with shareholder and bondholder involvement, prior to the injection of public capital;
11. vendar poudarja, da je potekajoča konsolidacija v bančnem sektorju dejansko povečala tržni delež več velikih finančnih institucij, zato poziva Komisijo, naj še dalje pozorno spremlja ta sektor, da bi okrepila konkurenco na evropskih bančnih trgih, tudi z uvedbo načrtov za prestrukturiranje, ki bodo obsegali ločitev bančnih dejavnosti, kjer bančne vloge fizičnih oseb tem institucijam dopuščajo, da financirajo bolj tvegane dejavnosti investicijskega bančništva;
Stresses however that the ongoing consolidation in the banking sector has actually increased the market share of several major financial institutions and, therefore, urges the Commission to maintain a close watch on the sector in order to enhance competition in European banking markets, including by imposing restructuring plans that imply the separation of banking activities where retail deposits allow these institutions to fund riskier investment banking activities;
13. ugotavlja, da učinek podpore ECB in drugih javnih intervencij, ki so jih dobile banke v času krize, ni bil vključen v oceno združljivosti Komisije; poziva Komisijo, naj naknadno oceni te operacije;
Notices that the effects of ECB support and other public interventions received by banks during the crisis have not been included in the Commission’s compatibility assessment; asks the Commission to assess such operations on an ex post basis;
19. vztraja, da morajo vsi predlogi za izvzetje dodatnih storitev splošnega gospodarskega pomena od obveznosti priglasitve temeljiti na dokazih, da so te izjeme utemeljene in potrebne ter da ne bodo neupravičeno izkrivljale konkurence;
Insists that any proposal to exempt in principle further categories of SGEI from the notification requirement must be based on evidence that such an exemption from the rules is justified and necessary, and does not unduly distort competition;
21. popolnoma podpira mnenje Odbora za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve z dne 20. oktobra 2011 delovnem dokumentu služb Komisije o usklajenem evropskemu pristopu h kolektivnim tožbam, zato ga je vključil v to poročilo kot prilogo;
Fully supports the opinion of its Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of 20 October 2011 on the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress’ and incorporates it into this resolution as an annex;
– upoštevati bi bilo treba, da robustni programi skladnosti ne bi smeli imeti negativnih nesorazmernih posledic za kršitelja glede na popravo zadevne kršitve;
– taking into account that the implementation of robust compliance programmes should not have negative implications for the infringer beyond what is a proportionate remedy to the infringement;
– uvedbo različni ravni glob za podjetja glede na to, ali so ravnala namerno ali nenamerno;
– introducing a distinction on the level of fines for undertakings who have acted intentionally or negligently;
– upoštevati bi bilo treba medsebojno vplivanje javnih in zasebnih obveznosti po protimonopolni zakonodaji EU; Komisija bi morala zagotoviti, da bodo pri določitvi glob upoštevana vsa nadomestila, ki so bila tretjim stranem že izplačana; to bi moralo veljati tudi za podjetja, ki so zaprosila za prizanesljivost; poleg tega bi lahko kršitelje spodbudili, da bi nastalo škodo poravnali na zunajsodni osnovi, preden se sprejme končna odločitev;
– taking into account the interaction between public and private liabilities under EU antitrust law; the Commission should make sure fines take into account any compensation already paid to third parties; this should be also applicable to undertakings benefiting from leniency; furthermore the infringer could be encouraged to pay damages on an out-of-court settlement basis before the final decision on the fine is taken;
– pogoje, kdaj bi morala matična družba z odločujočim vplivom na podrejeno družbo, ki pa ni neposredno vpletena v kršitev, solidarno odgovarjati za protimonopolne kršitve svojih podrejenih družb;
– specifying conditions under which parent companies who exercise decisive influence over a subsidiary but are not directly involved in an infringement should be made jointly and severally liable for antitrust infringements on the part of their subsidiaries;
– zahtevo, da je treba, kar zadeva povratništvo, vzpostaviti jasno povezavo med kršitvijo, ki se preiskuje, in preteklimi kršitvami na eni strani ter podjetjem na drugi; upoštevati bi bilo treba najdaljši dovoljeni rok;
– requiring, as regards recidivism, a clear connection between, on one hand, the infringement under investigation and past infringements and, on the other, the undertaking concerned; a maximum time-limit should be taken into consideration;
30. poziva Komisijo, naj pri analiziranju možnih zlorab prevladujočega položaja podrobneje preuči ekonomiko „curljanja navzdol“, če odkrije, da prevladujoči položaj ni bil zlorabljen;
Urges the Commission to take a closer look at trickle-down economics when analysing possible abuses of dominant positions, when it discovers that the dominant position has not been abused;
31. meni, da gospodarska in finančna kriza ne more biti opravičilo za milejše evropske politike glede nadzora nad združevanjem; poziva Komisijo, naj zagotovi, da združitve, še posebej tiste, ki so namenjene reševanju ali prestrukturiranju bank v težavah, ne bodo ustvarjale institucij, ki bi bile prevelike, da bi jih pustili propasti, in sistemskih institucij na splošno;
Believes that the economic and financial crisis cannot justify a relaxation of EU merger control policies; calls on the Commission to ensure that mergers, and in particular mergers designed to rescue or restructure ailing banks, do not create more ‘too big to fail’ and more generally systemic institutions;
37. ponovno poziva Komisijo, naj v svojem naslednjem letnem poročilu preuči, koliko lahko koncentracija dobaviteljev nujno potrebnih surovin škodi dejavnosti odjemalskih sektorjev in večji ekološki učinkovitosti gospodarstva, saj so nekatere izredno pomembni za uveljavljanje ekološko učinkovite tehnologije, kot so fotonapetostni paneli in litij-ionske baterije;
Recalls its invitation to the Commission to examine in its next annual report the extent to which the concentration of critical raw materials suppliers may be harmful to the activity of client sectors and a more eco-efficient economy, since some of these are of paramount importance for the deployment of eco-efficient technologies such as photovoltaic panels and lithium-ion batteries;
1. , da se zagotovi kakovost bonitetnih ocen;
1. in order to ensure the quality of ratings;
42. ponavlja svoje zahteve, naj Komisija izvede preiskavo konkurence v agroživilski panogi, da preuči učinek tržne moči, ki jo imajo veliki dobavitelji in trgovci na drobno nad delovanjem tega trga;
Recalls its demands to the Commission to carry out a competition inquiry in the agro-food industry to investigate the effect of the market power that major suppliers and retailers hold on the functioning of that market;
59. z veseljem pričakuje rezultate študij Komisije in Parlamenta o financiranju obmorskih pristaniških struktur, kar bi obema institucijama omogočilo oceno, ali se sedanja pravila uporabljajo usklajeno ali pa jih je treba prilagoditi;
Looks forward to the results of the Commission’s and Parliament’s studies on the financing of seaport structures, which should enable both institutions to evaluate whether the present rules are applied in a coherent way or whether they need to be redefined;
Dialog o konkurenci med Parlamentom in Komisijo
Competition dialogue between Parliament and the Commission
Dialog o konkurenci
Competition Dialogue
61. ob 40. obletnici poročila o politiki konkurence, ki ga pripravlja Komisija, poziva k sprejetju sporazuma med Parlamentom in Komisijo, s katerim bi okrepili vlogo Evropskega parlamenta kot neposredno izvoljenega telesa, ki zastopa evropske državljane; s takšno praktično ureditvijo bi morali poglobiti potekajoči dialog in brez poseganja v izključna pooblastila Komisije po Pogodbi morda institucionalizirati redni dialog med Komisijo in Parlamentom z določitvijo postopkov in obvez v zvezi s spremljanjem izvajanja priporočil Parlamenta;
Calls, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Commission’s Report on Competition Policy, for the conclusion of an agreement between Parliament and the Commission setting up a comprehensive dialogue on competition policy which should strengthen the role of Parliament as the directly elected body representing European citizens; notes that this practical arrangement should deepen the existing dialogue and maybe institutionalise, without prejudice to the Commission’s exclusive powers under the Treaty, regular dialogue between Parliament and the Commission by setting out the procedures and commitments regarding the follow-up given to Parliament's recommendations;
Letno poročilo o politiki konkurence
Annual Competition Report
– opis zakonodajnih in nezakonodajnih ter zavezujočih in nezavezujočih instrumentov, ki so bili sprejeti v posameznem letu, in obrazložitev sprememb;
– a description of the legislative and non-legislative, binding and non-binding, instruments adopted during the year in question, together with a justification for the changes made;
– povzetek prispevkov Parlamenta in zainteresiranih strani v kontekstu javnih posvetovanj z obrazložitvijo razlogov, zakaj je nekatere predloge sprejela, drugih pa ne;
– a summary of the contributions received from Parliament and from stakeholders in the context of public consultations, together with a justification as to why it has accepted some of the views expressed and not others;
– opis ukrepov, ki jih je Komisija v posameznem letu sprejela za povečanje preglednosti njenega odločanja in za zagotovitev boljšega upoštevanja ustreznega postopka; ta del naj bi vključeval tudi poročilo o dialogu o konkurenci s Parlamentom;
– a description of the measures taken by the Commission during the year in question to enhance the transparency of its decision-making and ensure greater regard for due process; this section should include a report on Competition Dialogue with Parliament;
Letni delovni program o konkurenci
Annual Competition Work Programme
Priloga (povezana z odstavkom 21)
Annex ( with reference to paragraph 2 1 )
Iz mnenja Odbora mnenja Odbora za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve z dne 20. oktobra 2011 o usklajenemu evropskemu pristopu h kolektivnim tožbam.
From the Opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of 20 October 2011 on Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress.
3. vseeno ugotavlja, da na vse bolj povezanem enotnem trgu, na katerem spletno trgovanje hitro narašča, obstaja potreba po vseevropskem pristopu do kolektivnih tožb;
Recognises, however, that in an increasingly integrated single market in which online trade is growing rapidly, there is a need for an EU-wide approach in the area of collective redress;
5. ugotavlja, da v mnogih državah članicah že obstajajo oblike izvrševanja na zasebni ravni, vendar se nacionalni sistemi zelo razlikujejo in številne države članice še nimajo jasnih posebnih pravil o kolektivnih tožbah niti ne o sodnem varstvu;
Notes that forms of private enforcement already exist in many Member States, but that the national systems are widely divergent and that many Member States do not have clear and explicitly established specific rules on collective redress, including judicial redress;
12. meni, da bi bilo treba ustrezno upoštevati specifična vprašanja s področja konkurence in da morajo instrumenti, ki bi veljali za kolektivne tožbe, v celoti in ustrezno upoštevati posebnosti protimonopolnega sektorja;
Believes that the specific issues arising in the competition field should be taken into account appropriately and that any instrument applicable to collective redress must take full and proper account of the specificities of the antitrust sector;
– skupina tožnikov mora biti pred vložitvijo tožbe natančno opredeljena (postopek opt-in);
– the group of claimants must be clearly identified before the claim is brought (opt-in procedure);
– v imenu jasno opredeljene skupine lahko tožbo vložijo javni organi, kot so varuh človekovih pravic ali tožilci, pa tudi predstavniški organi;
– public authorities such as ombudsmen or prosecutors, as well as representative bodies, may bring an action on behalf of a clearly identified group of claimants;
– merila za opredelitev predstavniških organov, ki lahko vložijo tožbo, morajo biti opredeljena na ravni EU;
– the criteria used to define the representative bodies qualified to bring representative actions need to be established at EU level;
– sistem skupinskih tožb je treba zavrniti, saj bi pretirano spodbujal k pravdanju, utegnil bi biti v nasprotju z ustavo nekaterih držav članic in vplivati na pravice žrtev, ki bi v sodnem postopku sodelovale nevede, sodba sodišča pa bi bila zanje vseeno zavezujoča;
– a class-action system must be rejected on the grounds that it would promote excessive litigation, may be contrary to some Member States’ constitutions and may affect the rights of any victim who might participate in the procedure unknowingly but would still be bound by the court’s decision;
(a) dovoljene posamezne tožbe:
(a) individual actions allowed:
– tožniki morajo imeti v vsakem primeru možnost, da izkoristijo možnost alternativnega individualnega odškodninskega zahtevka pred pristojnim sodiščem;
– claimants must under all circumstances be free to make use of the alternative of individual compensatory redress before a competent court;
– kolektivni tožniki ne smejo biti v boljšem položaju kot individualni tožniki;
– collective claimants must not be in a better position than individual claimants;
(b) povrnitev manjše in razpršene škode:
(b) compensation for minor and diffuse damages:
– tožniki v zadevah manjših in razpršenih škod lahko ustrezno dostopajo do sodnega varstva prek kolektivnih tožb in si tako zagotovijo pravično odškodnino;
– claimants of minor and diffuse damages should have appropriate means of access to justice through collective redress and should secure fair compensation;
(c) odškodnina le za dejansko škodo:
(c) compensation for actual damage only:
– prizna se lahko le odškodnina za dejansko utrpljeno škodo: kaznovalne odškodnine in nepoštena obogatitev morajo biti prepovedane;
– compensation may be awarded only for the actual damage sustained: punitive damages and unfair enrichment must be prohibited;
– vsak tožnik mora svoj zahtevek podpreti z dokazi;
– each claimant must provide evidence for his claim;
– dodeljena odškodnina mora biti med posamezne žrtve porazdeljena sorazmerno s škodo, ki so jo utrpele;
– the damages awarded must be distributed to individual claimants in proportion to the harm they sustained individually;
– odvetniške nagrade, vezane na uspeh, v Evropi niso običajna praksa in jih je treba zavrniti;
– by and large, contingency fees are unknown in Europe and must be rejected;
(d) načelo Kdor izgubi, plača:
(d) loser pays principle:
– ne morejo se voditi postopki, če je tožnik zaradi pomanjkanja finančnih sredstev brez obrambe; poleg tega pravdne stroške in s tem procesno tveganje nosi stranka, ki izgubi; določitev predpisov za kritje stroškov je v pristojnosti držav članic;
– there may be no action if the claimant is defenceless as a result of a lack of financial means; moreover the procedural costs, and hence the risk, involved in legal action are to be borne by the party which loses the case; it is a matter for the Member States to lay down rules on the allocation of costs in this context;