natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
vendar ugotavlja, da je bil dosežen omejen napredek pri infrastrukturi, telekomunikacijah in osnovni izobrazbi, ki ga donatorji in afganistanska vlada ponavadi navajajo kot dosežke;
Notes, however, the limited progress made on infrastructure, telecommunications and basic education – usually cited by donors and the Afghan Government as areas of achievement;
poudarja velike stroške vojne, ki je v Afganistanu potekala od leta 2001 do 2009, ki naj bi znašali nad 300 milijard USD, kar je več kot 20-kratnik afganistanskega BDP, in ki naj bi se še povečali na več kot 50 milijard USD letno s predvideno dodatno vojaško prisotnostjo;
Draws attention to the huge cost of the war prosecuted in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2009, estimated at over USD 300 billion and equivalent to more than 20 times Afghanistan's GDP, and set to rise to over USD 50 billion per year with the additional military ‘surge’ that is foreseen;
se zaveda splošnega dojemanja, da je korupcija v afganistanski vladi edini razlog za to, da slednja ne zagotavlja bistvenih storitev državljanom, vendar hkrati ugotavlja, da je bila večina virov za socialno-ekonomski razvoj usmerjena prek mednarodnih organizacij, regionalnih razvojnih bank, nevladnih organizacij, mednarodnih izvajalcev, svetovalcev itd., in ne preko osrednje vlade; poziva afganistansko vlado in mednarodno skupnost, naj izvajata strožji nadzor, da bi preprečili korupcijo in zagotovili, da bo pomoč dosegla svoj cilj;
Acknowledges the widespread perception that Afghan Government corruption is solely responsible for the lack of provision of essential services to citizens, but also notes that the majority of resources for socio-economic development have been channelled through international organisations, regional development banks, NGOs, international contractors, consultants etcetera, and not through the central Government; urges the Afghan Government and the international community to exercise greater control in order to eliminate corruption and to ensure that aid reaches its target;
meni, da mora biti boj proti korupciji osrednji del procesa ustvarjanja razmer za mir v Afganistanu, saj podkupovanje povzroča nepravilno dodelitev sredstev, je ovira v smislu dostopa do osnovnih javnih storitev, kot sta zdravstvo in izobraževanje, in je velika ovira za družbeno-gospodarski razvoj države; prav tako poudarja, da korupcija spodkopava zaupanje v javni sektor in vlado ter zato pomeni glavno grožnjo za državno stabilnost; zato poziva EU, naj pri zagotavljanju pomoči Afganistanu nameni posebno pozornost boju proti korupciji;
Takes the view that the fight against corruption should be at the core of the peace-building process in Afghanistan, since bribery causes misallocation of resources, constitutes an obstacle in terms of access to basic public services such as health and education, and represents a huge impediment to the country's socio-economic development; emphasises likewise that corruption undermines confidence in the public sector and the government, and consequently constitutes a major threat to national stability; therefore, urges the EU, when providing assistance to Afghanistan, to pay special attention to the fight against corruption;
ugotavlja, da je po mnenju afganistanskega finančnega ministra, kot so potrdili drugi neodvisni viri, le 6 milijard (ali 15 %) od skupnih 40 milijard USD pomoči dejansko doseglo afganistansko vlado med letoma 2002 in 2009, in da med 70 in 80 % preostalih 34 milijard USD, posredovanih preko mednarodnih organizacij, regionalnih razvojnih bank, nevladnih organizacij, mednarodnih izvajalcev itd., nikoli ni doseglo predvidenih upravičencev, afganistanskih ljudi; je seznanjen z odločitvijo, sprejeto na konferenci v Kabulu, da naj se 50 % mednarodne pomoči do leta 2012 usmeri prek afganistanskega nacionalnega proračuna, kar je v skladu z zahtevo Afganistana;
Notes that, according to the Afghan Minister of Finance, as corroborated by other independent sources, only USD 6 billion (or 15%) out of a total of USD 40 billion in aid actually reached the Afghan Government between 2002 and 2009, and that, of the remaining USD 34 billion, which was channelled through international organisations, regional development banks, NGOs, international contractors, etcetera, between 70% and 80% never reached the intended beneficiaries, the people of Afghanistan; notes the decision taken at the Kabul Conference that 50% of the international aid should be channelled through the Afghan national budget by 2012, in accordance with Afghanistan's request;
ugotavlja, da je treba nujno vzpostaviti mehanizme za usklajevanje med državami, ki so mednarodni donatorji, in predvideti podrobne ocene evropske in mednarodne pomoči za boj proti nepreglednosti in omejenim mehanizmom za odgovornost donatorjev;
Points out the urgent need to establish coordination mechanisms among international donor countries and to provide for detailed evaluations of European and international aid to combat the lack of transparency and the limited mechanisms for donor accountability;
obsoja dejstvo, da se velik del evropskega in drugega mednarodnega denarja pomoči izgubi med distribucijsko verigo, kar se je zelo nazorno pokazalo ob nedavnem škandalu v zvezi s Kabulsko banko, ter poudarja štiri glavne razloge za to: izgubljanje sredstev, prekomerni stroški posredovanja in varnosti, prekomerno zaračunavanje in korupcija;
Condemns the fact that a significant proportion of European and other international aid money is lost along the distribution chain – a situation drastically highlighted in the recent scandal around the Kabul Bank – and draws attention to the four main ways in which this happens: waste, excessive intermediary and security costs, overbilling and corruption;
vendar ugotavlja, da se izgube EU ublažijo z dejstvom, da je 50 % pomoči Unije usmerjene preko večstranskih skrbniških skladov (v primerjavi z 10 % v primeru ZDA), ki imajo zelo visoko stopnjo učinkovitosti (približno 80 %);
Notes, however, that EU losses are mitigated by the fact that 50% of the Union's aid (as compared with 10% of US aid) is allocated through multilateral trust funds, whose rate of effectiveness is very high (around 80%);
poziva EU, naj vzpostavi centralizirano bazo podatkov o stroških in vplivih vse pomoči EU za Afganistan ter naj jih analizira, saj pomanjkanje obsežnih, posodobljenih in preglednih podatkov ogroža učinkovitost pomoči;
Calls on the EU to set up a centralised database on, and to analyse the costs and impact of, all EU aid to Afghanistan, as the lack of comprehensive, up-to-date and transparent data undermines aid efficiency;
poudarja pomen usklajevanja prizadevanj za obnovo in razvoj na regionalni ravni, da se zagotovi čezmejni razvoj v regiji, kjer etnične in plemenske vezi pogosto presegajo državne meje;
Stresses the importance of coordinating reconstruction and development efforts at regional level in order to promote cross-border development in a region where ethnic and tribal links often transcend national borders;
ugotavlja, da je treba spodbujati večje vključevanje lokalnih in regionalnih afganistanskih oblasti ter poudarja, da so na tej ravni za ustrezno rabo sredstev nujne pripadnost, pravna država in demokracija; opozarja, da bo za dodeljevanje sredstev na lokalni in regionalni ravni potrebna odobritev osrednje vlade, da se tako okrepi njena vloga in odgovornost;
Notes that increased involvement by Afghan local and regional governments should be promoted, and emphasises that, at this level, allegiance, the rule of law and democracy are imperative for the proper use of funds; points out that the allocation of funds at local and regional level shall require the approval of the central Government, thus enhancing its role and responsibility;
poziva visoko predstavnico za zunanjo in varnostno politiko, Svet in Komisijo, naj oblikujejo skupno ekipo raziskovalcev, ki bo enkrat letno ocenila vse ukrepe in misije EU in držav članic v Afganistanu, in sicer z uporabo nedvoumnih kvalitativnih in kvantitativnih kazalnikov, zlasti kar zadeva razvojno pomoč (vključno z javnim zdravstvom in kmetijstvom), dobro vodenje (tudi na področju pravosodja in človekovih pravic) in varnost (še posebej urjenje afganistanskih policistov); v zvezi s tem poziva tudi k oceni relativnega učinka ukrepov EU na splošne razmere v državi, k oceni ravni usklajevanja in sodelovanja med organi EU in drugimi mednarodnimi misijami in ukrepi ter k objavi ugotovitev in priporočil na podlagi takšne ocene;
Calls on the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, the Council and the Commission to set up a joint team of researchers to evaluate all EU and Member State measures and missions in Afghanistan once a year, using explicit qualitative and quantitative indicators, especially with regard to development aid (including public health and agriculture), good governance (including the justice sector and respect for human rights) and security (especially the training of Afghan police); calls too, in this context, for an evaluation of the relative impact of EU measures on the overall situation in the country and of the level of coordination and cooperation between EU bodies and other international missions and measures, and for the findings and recommendations of such an evaluation to be published;
poudarja, da se varnostne razmere in ozemeljska razporeditev ukrepov pomoči medsebojno pogojujejo, zato zahteva, da se pomoč za Afganistan posreduje neposredno prizadetim prebivalcem v Afganistanu;
Stresses that the security situation and the geographical distribution of assistance are mutually dependent and calls, therefore, for help to be dispatched directly to the population in Afghanistan immediately affected;
poudarja, da mora biti boj proti korupciji v Afganistanu prednostna naloga; priznava, da lokalna korupcija obstaja, a upa, da se bo preprečevala s krepitvijo legitimnosti afganistanskih državnih institucij, s tem da se jim dodeli odgovornost za odobritev dodelitve financiranja in zagotavljanje učinkovitosti pomoči;
Stresses that combating corruption in Afghanistan must be a priority; recognises that local corruption exists but hopes that this will be countered through strengthening the legitimacy of Afghan state institutions by making them responsible for approving the allocation of funding and ensuring the effectiveness of aid;
zagovarja politiko vse pogostejšega javnega naročanja znotraj samega Afganistana, kadar je to mogoče, namesto uvažanja blaga in storitev;
Advocates a policy of increasing procurement within Afghanistan itself wherever possible rather than importing goods or services;
zato meni, da bi morali biti za razdeljevanje humanitarne pomoči v državi odgovorni nepristranski humanitarni organi, vojaki pa bi lahko pri tem sodelovali samo v zelo izjemnih primerih, ob priznanju nevtralnosti, nepristranskosti in neodvisnosti humanitarnih organov, ob popolnem upoštevanju zadevnih mednarodnih standardov, ki so določeni v smernicah ZN za uporabo sredstev vojaške in civilne obrambe pri humanitarnih nujnih primerih ter priporočeni v evropskem soglasju o humanitarni pomoči;
Takes the view that impartial humanitarian bodies should be responsible for the distribution of aid in the country and that military personnel should be involved only in entirely exceptional circumstances, in recognition of the neutral, impartial and independent nature of the work of humanitarian bodies and in full compliance with the relevant international standards, as codified in the ‘Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Humanitarian Emergencies’ (MCDA) and advocated in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid;
meni, da so zaradi vsake zlorabe načel nevtralnosti, nepristranskosti in neodvisnosti, ki jo občutijo takšni organi pri svojem delu, ti vse bolj izpostavljeni na terenu, predvsem zato, ker bodo še naprej prisotni na terenu dolgo časa po odhodu čet;
Points out that any perceived breach of the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence by such bodies in their work makes them more vulnerable on the ground, particularly as they will continue to be present on the ground long after troops have been withdrawn;
kot se je na široko poročalo v medijih in v poročilu predstavniškega doma ZDA o vojnih poglavarjih, opaža, da je ameriška vojska v Afganistanu večino svojih logističnih dejavnosti oddala zasebnim zunanjim izvajalcem, ki nato oddajo varovanje vojaških konvojev lokalnim afganistanskim varnostnim podizvajalcem, kar ima pogubne posledice;
Notes that, as widely reported in the press and in the US House of Representatives report ‘Warlord, Inc.’, the US military in Afghanistan has outsourced most of its logistics to private contractors, who in turn subcontract the protection of military convoys to local Afghan security providers, with disastrous consequences;
opaža, da je odločitev prenosa ameriške vojaške dobavne verige v zasebne roke brez zanesljivih meril za zagotavljanje odgovornosti, preglednosti in zakonitosti povzročila izsiljevanje in korupcijo, saj si vojni poglavarji, lokalni mafijski šefi in tudi talibanski poveljniki na koncu polastijo velik del posla vojaške logistike v Afganistanu, vrednega 2,2 do 3 milijarde USD;
Notes that the decision to place the US military supply chain in private hands without any reliable criteria for assuring accountability, transparency and legality is fuelling extortion and corruption, as warlords, local mafia bosses and ultimately Taliban commanders end up taking a significant share of the USD 2.2-3 billion business of military logistics in Afghanistan;
je zgrožen nad dejstvom, da sta denar za varovanje in izsiljevanje na vseh stopnjah vojaške dobavne verige največji vir financiranja upora, kot je priznala državna sekretarka ZDA Hilary Clinton med svojim pričanjem v odboru za zunanje odnose v senatu decembra 2009;
Is appalled by the fact that protection money and extortion at every level of the military supply chain constitute the most significant source of funding for the insurgency, as recognised by US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in December 2009;
ker vojaška logistika ZDA in Nata/ISAF sledita istim smernicam, je prav tako zaskrbljen, da v vseh primerih morda ne bo mogoče zagotoviti popolne sledljivosti finančnih prispevkov EU;
Is equally appalled by the fact that, since US and NATO/ISAF military logistics follow similar lines, the full traceability of EU financial contributions might not be fully guaranteed in all cases;
v celoti odobrava nove smernice o pogodbenih poslih, ki jih je septembra 2010 izdalo vojaško poveljstvo Nata v Afganistanu – vrednost teh poslov je trenutno ocenjena na 14 milijard USD letno – in katerih namen je zmanjšati korupcijo in oklestiti sredstva, ki se posredno stekajo v roke upornikov in talibanov; upa, da bo ta sprememba politike pogodbenih poslov uveljavljena kmalu;
Fully welcomes the new guidelines issued in September 2010 by the NATO military command in Afghanistan on contracting – currently worth around an estimated USD 14 billion per year – which aim to reduce corruption and decrease the funds that flow indirectly to the insurgency and the Taliban; hopes this change of orientation in contracting policy will be implemented quickly;
v zvezi s tem pozdravlja nedavni odlok predsednika Karzaja, s katerim je vsem domačim in tujim zasebnim varnostnim podjetjem v Afganistanu določil štirimesečni rok za prenehanje delovanja;
Welcomes, in this context, the recent decree by President Karzai setting a four-month deadline for all local and foreign private security firms in Afghanistan to cease operation;
poudarja, da so dobro vodenje, pravna država in spoštovanje človekovih pravic temelji za stabilen in cvetoč Afganistan; zato poudarja, da so verodostojni pravosodni postopki temeljni vidik mirovnega procesa, spoštovanje človekovih pravic in preprečevanje razmaha nekaznovanosti pa bi morala biti brezpogojna elementa v vseh njegovih fazah; v zvezi s tem poziva afganistansko vlado, naj začne prednostno izvajati strategijo reforme pravosodnega sistema;
Stresses that good governance, the rule of law and human rights are the foundations for a stable and prosperous Afghanistan; stresses, therefore, that a credible justice process is a fundamental aspect of the peace process and that respect for human rights and the prevention of widespread impunity should be non-negotiable aspects at all stages of the peace process; calls, in this respect, on the Afghan Government to implement a judicial reform strategy as a matter of priority;
meni, da večina krivde za sedanji zastoj v Afganistanu leži na zgodnjih napačnih izračunih koalicijskih sil, ki so še pred novo strategijo proti upornikom predvidevale hitro vojaško zmago nad talibani in lahek prehod k stabilni državi, ki bi jo vodila legitimna vlada z močno podporo zahodnih držav;
Believes that much of the blame for the present stalemate in Afghanistan rests with early miscalculations made prior to the new counter-insurgency strategy by coalition forces who foresaw a speedy military victory over the Taliban and an easy transition to a stable country run by a legitimate government with strong Western backing;
zato meni, da je bila prisotnost moči talibanov podcenjena in zmožnost vlade Karzaja glede zagotavljanja vladanja precenjena, posledica tega pa je, da naloga obnove in razvoja države ni dobila dovolj pozornosti;
Believes, consequently, that the presence of the Taliban was underestimated and the ability of the Karzai government to provide governance overestimated, and that, as a result, little attention was paid to the task of rebuilding and developing the country;
meni, da so te napake zanetile ponovni upor talibanov v več kot polovici države, kar je zaostrilo slabšanje varnostnih razmer v celotni regiji in spoštovanja človekovih pravic, zlasti pravic žensk;
Fears that these errors have fuelled the resurgence of the Taliban in over half the country, exacerbating the deterioration in security in the entire region and in respect for human rights, particularly those of women;
poudarja, da pretekla vojaška usmeritev ni prinesla želenih rezultatov, zato odločno podpira bolj civilen pristop;
Points out that the military focus of the past did not achieve the desired results, and therefore strongly supports a more civilian approach;
priznava, da je edina možna rešitev politična rešitev in da bi ta morala vključevati pogajanja – ki bi morala potekati ob prekinitvi ognja – s talibani in z drugimi bojujočimi se skupinami ter ostalimi političnimi akterji v državi, pripravljenimi sodelovati v vladi nacionalne enotnosti, ki bi bila zmožna zaključiti civilno vojno, ki razsaja v državi že skoraj tri desetletja, in zagotoviti spoštovanje pravne države ter temeljnih človekovih pravic; meni, da je treba novi politiki proti uporništvu ob upoštevanju časovnega načrta predsednika Obame dati možnost, da pokaže rezultate, da bo mogoče doseči politično rešitev;
Recognises that the only possible solution is a political one and that this should include negotiations – which should eventually take place against the backdrop of a ceasefire – with the Taliban and other combatant groups, as well as other political players in the country, who are ready to participate in a government of national unity capable of putting an end to the civil war that has raged there for almost three decades and of ensuring full respect for the rule of law and fundamental human rights; believes that, in order to achieve the political solution, the new counter-insurgency policy must be given time to show results in line with the timetable announced by President Obama;
odločno meni, da morajo biti trije glavni pogoji EU za takšen mirovni proces in udeležbo talibanskih skupin zaveza vseh strani, udeleženih v pogajanjih, k izgonu Al Kajde iz države in njenega spodbujanja mednarodnega terorizma ter vseh ostalih terorističnih skupin; sprejetju ukrepov za odpravo pridelovanja maka; vzpostavitvi politike za spodbujanje in spoštovanje temeljnih človekovih pravic in afganistanske ustave;
Firmly believes that the EU's three main prerequisites for such a peace process and the involvement of Taliban groups must be a commitment by all parties involved in negotiations to banish from the country Al-Qaeda and its promotion of international terrorism, as well as any other terrorist group; to take action to eliminate poppy cultivation; and to establish a policy of promoting and respecting fundamental human rights and the Afghan Constitution;
prav tako meni, da bi moralo o drugih vprašanjih odločati afganistansko ljudstvo glede na svojo voljo in zmogljivosti;
Believes, too, that all other issues should be left to the will and capacity of the Afghan people themselves;
priznava, da talibani niso enotni in da obstaja vsaj 33 najvišjih vodij, 820 srednjih/nižjih vodij in med 25.000 in 36.000 „pehotnih vojakov“, ki so razčlenjeni med 220 skupnostmi, od katerih se nekateri bojujejo iz ideoloških, drugi pa iz denarnih razlogov; zato je prepričan, da bi bilo treba odslej spodbujati pogajanja na lokalni ravni med demokratično izvoljeno lokalno oblastjo in pripadniki oborožene opozicije, „ki so se odrekli nasilju, niso povezani z mednarodnimi terorističnimi organizacijami, spoštujejo ustavo in so pripravljeni sodelovati pri gradnji mirnega Afganistana“, kot je zapisano v 13. in 14. odstavku sporočila iz Kabula z dne 20. julija 2010;
Recognises that the Taliban are not a single uniform entity and that there are at least 33 top leaders, 820 mid-level/junior leaders, and 25 000 to 36 000 ‘foot soldiers’ distributed among 220 communities, some fighting for ideological and others for monetary reasons; believes, therefore, that negotiations should, from now on, be encouraged at local level between the democratically elected local government and members of the armed opposition ‘who renounce violence, have no links to international terrorist organisations, respect the Constitution and are willing to join in building a peaceful Afghanistan’, in accordance with paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Kabul communiqué of 20 July 2010;
pozdravlja program afganistanske vlade za mir in ponovno vključevanje, v katerem lahko sodelujejo vsi pripadniki afganistanske oborožene opozicije in njihovih skupnosti, na podlagi zgoraj navedenih 13. in 14. odstavka sporočila iz Kabula;
Welcomes the Afghan Government's Peace and Reintegration Programme, which is open to all Afghan members of the armed opposition and their communities on the basis of the above-mentioned paragraphs 13 and 14 of Kabul communiqué;
poudarja, da mora vsaka strategija razorožitve in ponovne integracije natančno upoštevati težavo vračanja nekdanjih borcev in beguncev v domače vasi;
Points out that any disarmament and reintegration strategy must take close account of the problem of the return of ex-combatants and refugees to their villages of origin;
poudarja, da je pomembno povečati verodostojnost, odgovornost in usposobljenost afganistanske vlade in uprave, da se izboljša njen ugled med lastnimi državljani;
Highlights the importance of increasing the credibility, responsibility and competence of the Afghan Government and administration, in order to improve its reputation among its own citizens;
poudarja bistveno vlogo Pakistana, saj talibani nimajo nobene spodbude, da bi se vključili v resna pogajanja, dokler bo pakistanska meja za njih odprta; priporoča širše mednarodno sodelovanje in udeležbo v procesu, vključno z udeležbo drugih sosedskih držav in vodilnih regionalnih akterjev, zlasti Irana, Turčije, Kitajske, Indije in Ruske federacije;
Stresses the key role of Pakistan, as there is no incentive for the Taliban to undertake any serious negotiations as long as the Pakistan border remains open to them; recommends wider international coordination and involvement in the process, including that of other neighbouring countries and leading regional players – notably Iran, Turkey, China, India and the Russian Federation;