natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
ker se je menjalni tečaj eura proti ameriškemu dolarju zmanjšal z 1,39 USD 2. januarja 2009 na 1,26 USD sredi marca 2009, nato znova povečal do najvišje vrednosti 1,51 USD v začetku decembra 2009 in znova izgubljal vrednost leta 2010 ter dosegel najnižjo vrednost 1,19 USD 2. junija 2010,
whereas the exchange rate for the euro against the USD fell from USD 1.39 on 2 January 2009 to USD 1.26 in mid-March 2009, recovered to a peak at USD 1.51 in early December 2009 and depreciated in 2010 to reach a minimum of USD 1.19 on 2 June 2010,
ker kitajske oblasti v letu 2009 niso uskladile menjalnega tečaja renminbija glede na euro in je bil euro umetno močan nasproti kitajski valuti,
whereas the exchange rate for the renminbi against the euro was misaligned by the Chinese authorities during 2009, with an artificially strong euro against the Chinese currency,
ker je ECB znižala obrestne mere na 1 % in nadaljevala obsežne nestandardne ukrepe za podporo posojilni dejavnosti brez primere; ker se je bilančni rezultat ECB znatno povečeval vse leto 2009,
whereas the ECB adjusted interest rates down to 1% and continued substantial and unprecedented non-standard measures to support credit; whereas the ECB balance sheet size has significantly increased throughout the year 2009,
ker so se v drugi polovici leta 2009 pojavili znaki gospodarske stabilizacije v euroobmočju in so četrtletne stopnje rasti sicer še vedno šibke, vendar so dosegle pozitivno vrednost, čeprav se ta trend ni pokazal v vseh državah članicah, saj so nekatere v tem istem obdobju ostale v recesiji,
whereas there have been signs of economic stabilisation in the euro area over the second half of 2009 and quarterly growth rates, though still weak, have turned positive, though these aggregated figures highlight that this trend has not been reflected in all its Member States, some of which remained in recession during the same period,
ker je ECB, preden je prišlo do krize javnega dolga v številnih državah euroobmočja, za leto 2010 pričakovala v euroobmočju rast realnega BDP med 0,1 % in 1,5 %,
whereas the ECB expected a growth rate between 0,1% and 1,5% of real GDP in the euro area for 2010 before the sovereign debt crisis occurred in several countries within the euro area,
pozdravlja dejstvo, da je Lizbonska pogodba začela veljati 1. decembra 2009 in daje ECB status institucije EU, kar povečuje odgovornost Parlamenta kot temeljne institucije, preko katere je ECB odgovorna evropskim državljanom;
Welcomes the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon came into force on 1 December 2009 and gives the ECB the status of an EU institution, which increases the responsibility of Parliament as the primary institution through which the ECB is accountable to the European citizen;
pozdravlja ponovno vzpostavitev monetarnega dialoga z novim Evropskim parlamentom po volitvah junija 2009;
Welcomes the resumption of the Monetary Dialogue with the new European Parliament after the elections of June 2009;
poudarja, da so ukrepi monetarne politike le eden od številnih dejavnikov v zvezi z dejanskim gibanjem cen in da so imele v zadnjih letih pri dvigovanju cen pomembno vlogo špekulativne težnje na posamičnih trgih ter naraščajoče in pričakovano pomanjkanje naravnih virov;
Points out that, when it comes to actual price trends, monetary policy measures are only one factor among others, and that in recent years speculative tendencies in individual markets and growing and anticipated shortages of natural resources have played a particular part in pushing up prices;
poudarja, da ta neravnovesja močno otežujejo primerno monetarno politiko v euroobmočju; zato poziva vlade, naj uskladijo svoje ekonomske politike;
Points out that these imbalances pose considerable difficulties for a suitable monetary policy within the euro zone; calls on governments, therefore, to coordinate their economic policies;
je globoko zaskrbljen, ker med gospodarstvi euroobmočja še vedno obstajajo občutne razlike;
Is deeply concerned that substantial macroeconomic imbalances between the euro zone economies continue to exist;
meni, da je finančna kriza v nekaterih državah euroobmočja resna zadeva za euroobmočje kot celoto in odraža motnje v njegovem delovanju; to kaže na potrebo po reformi in močnejšem usklajevanju gospodarskih politik v euroobmočju;
Considers that the financial crisis in some countries within the euro area is a serious matter for the euro area as a whole and reflects a dysfunction of the euro area; this shows the need for reform and for stronger coordination of the economic policies within the euro area;
poziva Komisijo in centralno banko, naj v skladu s predlogom baselskega odbora pripravita predloge o Baslu III, v katerih bodo določena zavezujoča pravila za uvedbo proticikličnega blažilca; poziva Svet, Komisijo in centralno banko, naj si po prihodnji ratifikaciji predlogov baselskega odbora na ravni G20 prizadevajo za njihovo dosledno in hitro izvedbo;
Urges the Commission and the Central Bank to draw up proposals in line with the proposal by the Basel Committee on Basel III laying down binding rules for the introduction of an anticyclical buffer; calls on the Council, the Commission and the Central Bank to work towards the consistent and speedy implementation of the proposals when the Basel Committee proposals are ratified at G20 level;
opozarja, da se načela pakta o stabilnosti in rasti v preteklosti niso vedno v celoti spoštovala; opozarja, da je cilj ponovnega uravnoteženja javnih financ in zmanjšanja zadolženosti za prezadolžene države sicer nujen, vendar ne bo sam po sebi rešil problematike gospodarskega neravnovesja med državami euroobmočja in širše EU; zato poziva k neomejenemu in skladnejšemu uveljavljanju pakta o stabilnosti in rasti; meni, da bi bilo treba pakt dopolniti z razvojem sistema zgodnjega opozarjanja za ugotavljanje morebitnih neskladnosti, na primer v obliki „evropskega polletja“, da bi ne le povečali nadzora in okrepili usklajenosti ekonomske politike ter tako zagotovili fiskalno konsolidacijo, ampak poleg proračunske razsežnosti obravnavali tudi druga makroekonomska neravnovesja in okrepili postopke uveljavitve;
Points to the fact that the principles of the Stability and Growth Pact were not always fully respected in the past; recalls that, if the objective to regain a balance of public finances and reduce indebtedness is a necessity for over-indebted states, this alone will not solve the problem of economic imbalances between countries of the euro area and, more broadly, of the EU; calls therefore for unrestricted and more coherent application of the Stability and Growth Pact; deems that the Pact should be complemented by the development of an early warning system to identify possible inconsistencies, e.g. in the form of a ‘European semester’, in order not only to enhance surveillance and strengthen economic policy coordination so as to ensure fiscal consolidation but also – beyond the budgetary dimension – to address other macroeconomic imbalances and strengthen enforcement procedures;
je prepričan, da je treba ukrepati takoj, če se želi postopoma zmanjšati proračunske primanjkljaje in obnoviti zaupanje v evropske javne finance;
Believes that action must be taken now in order to start a gradual reduction of fiscal deficits and restore confidence in European public finances;
meni, da je treba za države članice, ki ne upoštevajo pravil glede javnih financ in dostopa do verodostojnih statističnih podatkov na euroobmočju, uvesti razširjen in zaostren sveženj ukrepov, ki bi zagotovil natančnejše spoštovanje pravil;
Considers that Member States not following the rules of the euro area with regard to public finances and access to credible statistics should subjected to an enlarged and incremental spectrum of measures to ensure stricter compliance;
meni, da sta pomanjkanje vnaprej določenega mehanizma za obvladovanje kriz ter ravnanje nekaterih vlad otežila hitro reševanje krize javnega dolga v nekaterih državah članicah euroobmočja in bosta oslabila sposobnost EMU, da bi se hitro odzvala v morebitnih podobnih razmerah v prihodnosti; zato poziva k stalnemu okviru za obvladovanje kriz;
Believes that the lack of a predefined crisis management mechanism and the behaviour of some governments has made a rapid solution to the sovereign debt crisis in some Member States of the euroarea difficult and will weaken the EMU's ability to react quickly in potentially similar situations in the future; calls therefore for a permanent crisis management framework;
poziva k taki zasnovi finančne podpore državam EU v dolžniški krizi, ki bi spodbujala odplačevanje posojil, proračunsko ravnovesje in gospodarske reforme, ter poudarja, da je nevarno spreminjati posojila v finančne prispevke, saj to spodbuja k izposojanju in zadolževanju;
Urges that financial support to EU countries in a debt crisis must be designed to encourage repayment of loans, budgetary balance and economic reform, and stresses the danger of turning loans into financial contributions while encouraging borrowing and the creation of debts;
zato poziva Komisijo, naj predstavi predloge za okrepitev pakta o stabilnosti in rasti, v katere bo vključila specifične cilje za odpravo vrzeli v konkurenčnosti med evropskimi gospodarstvi, da se spodbudi rast, ki ustvarja delovna mesta;
Calls therefore on the Commission to put forward proposals to strengthen the Stability and Growth Pact by including specific targets for closing the competitiveness gap between European economies, in order to stimulate job-creating growth;
izraža zaskrbljenost zaradi morebitnih špekulacij v škodo eura;
Shares concerns about possible speculation against the euro;
meni, da sta rast posojil in razvoj cen sredstev v EU in državah članicah osrednja kazalnika za učinkovito spremljanje finančne stabilnosti v EMU in širše v EU;
Takes the view that credit growth and assets price developments in the EU and in Member States are crucial indicators for an effective monitoring of financial stability within the EMU and, more broadly, the EU;
je zaskrbljen zaradi nenehnih pritiskov na trge državnih obveznic euroobmočja, ki se kažejo v povečevanju razlik; ugotavlja, da je imel beg na varno, ki so ga povzročili valovi panike med sedanjo finančno krizo, obsežne učinke izkrivljanja in je ustvaril drage negativne zunanje učinke;
Is concerned about continuous strains on the euro area sovereign bond markets reflected in widening spreads; deems that the flight to safety provoked by waves of panic experienced during the current financial crisis has had massive distorting effects and created costly negative externalities;
zahteva, da se uredba o bonitetnih agencijah (Uredba (ES) št. 1060/2009) pravočasno izvede, in pozdravlja predlog Komisije z dne 2. junija 2010 o spremembi omenjene uredbe, vendar hkrati poziva Komisijo, naj nadaljuje v tej smeri in pripravi predloge za strožji nadzor nad delom teh agencij, za izboljšanje njihove odgovornosti in za oceno možnosti ustanovitve evropske bonitetne agencije; poudarja, da se je ocenjevanje državnega dolga euroobmočja med krizo izkazalo za težavno;
Asks for a timely implementation of the Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies (Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009) and welcomes the Commission proposal on amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies of 2 June 2010, but at the same time calls on the Commission to go further with proposals for the more rigorous surveillance of the operation of these agencies, for improving the liability of Credit Rating Agencies and for assessing the possibility of create a European Credit Rating Agency; underlines the fact that the rating of euro area sovereign debt has proved problematic during the crisis;
poudarja neodvisnost ECB;
Highlights the independence of the ECB;
meni, da se morajo, ob upoštevanju novega pravnega statusa ECB v skladu z Lizbonsko pogodbo, kandidati za izvršilni odbor, ki jih predlaga Svet, posebej predstaviti zadevnemu parlamentarnemu odboru, nato pa jih z glasovanjem potrdi Evropski parlament; poleg tega je seznanjen, da je imela ECB od začetka krize bistveno vlogo; meni, da bi ta vloga morala vključevati večjo preglednost in odgovornost;
Considers that, given the new legal status of the ECB under the Lisbon Treaty, the candidates for the Executive Board proposed by the Council should be subject to special hearings by the relevant parliamentary committee and then to a vote by the European Parliament; notes that, in addition, the role of the ECB has been crucial since the crisis and deems therefore that such a role should involve reinforced transparency and accountability;
pozdravlja, da je z Lizbonsko pogodbo Euroskupina pridobila status pravne osebe, in sodelovanje ECB na njenih sejah;
Welcomes the conferral of legal personality on the Eurogroup by the Lisbon Treaty and the participation of the ECB in its meetings;
poudarja, da je Evropski parlament odločen nadaljevati monetarni dialog, ki je pomemben element pri demokratičnem nadzoru nad ECB;
Points out the determination of the European Parliament to continue the Monetary Dialogue as an important element in the democratic scrutiny of the ECB;
pozdravlja predlog o ustanovitvi Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja (ESRB), ki bo zapolnil sedanjo vrzel v makrobonitetnem nadzoru; poziva ECB, naj oblikuje jasne modele in opredelitve za zagotovitev učinkovitega delovanja in odgovornosti ESRB; dodaja, da kakršne koli nove naloge, dodeljene ECB v zvezi z Evropskim odborom za sistemska tveganja, ne bodo na noben način ogrozile neodvisnosti ECB;
Welcomes the proposal to establish a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which will close the current gap in macro-prudential supervision; calls on the ECB to establish clear models and definitions to ensure the effective functioning and accountability of the ESRB; adds that any new tasks conferred upon the ECB with regard to the ESRB will not compromise the independence of the ECB in any way;
ugotavlja, da zasnova, v skladu s katero ESRB oblikuje le opozorila in priporočila brez dejanskega uveljavljanja, ni zadovoljiva za učinkovito izvajanje in odgovornost; obžaluje, da ESRB ne more sama razglasiti izrednih razmer;
Notes that the concept whereby the ESRB only gives warnings and recommendations with no actual enforcement is not satisfactory in terms of effective implementation and responsibility; regrets that the ESRB cannot declare the emergency by itself;
pozdravlja predlog, da bi imel predsednik ESRB v Evropskem parlamentu predstavitve izven okvira monetarnih dialogov;
Welcomes the proposal to hold hearings of the Chair of the ESRB before the European Parliament, in a different framework from the Monetary Dialogues;
meni, da je bila oživitev gospodarske dejavnosti v drugi polovici leta 2009 rezultat izrednih ukrepov, ki so jih sprejele vlade in centralne banke po vsem svetu od konca leta 2008 v obliki garancij za bančne obveznosti, injekcij kapitala in shem za podporo sredstev;
Believes that the revival of economic activity in the second half of 2009 was a result of the extraordinary measures taken by governments and central banks worldwide since the end of 2008 in the form of guarantees for bank liabilities, capital injections and asset support schemes;
ugotavlja, da je finančna kriza v euroombočju kriza solventnosti, ki se je v začetku kazala kot likvidnostna kriza; presoja, da tovrstnih razmer na dolgi rok ni mogoče razrešiti samo z dodajanjem novega dolga in likvidnosti v močno zadolžena gospodarstva v povezavi s pospešenimi načrti za fiskalno konsolidacijo;
Notes that the financial crisis in the euro area is a solvency crisis that initially manifested itself as a liquidity crisis; deems that such a situation cannot be resolved in the long term by simply pouring new debt and liquidity into highly indebted economies in combination with accelerated plans for fiscal consolidation;
meni, da je kriza pokazala, da so se gospodarske politike zadnja leta razvijale tako, da so prispevale k sedanji visoki stopnji javnega in zasebnega dolga, za popravilo te stopnje pa bo potrebnih mnogo let; meni, da se bodo nekateri deli Evrope težje soočali s posledicami krize in dosegli trajnostno gospodarsko rast, nove inovacije in ustvarjanje novih delovnih mest; poudarja, da so reforme potrebne po vsej Evropi;
Believes, similarly, that the crisis revealed a trend in the economic policies of recent years which have contributed to the current high level of public and private debt which will take many years to correct; deems that some parts of Europe will find it more difficult than others to tackle the consequences and developments of the crisis and achieve sustainable economic growth, new innovations and the creation of new jobs; underlines the need for reforms throughout Europe;
opozarja, da se je pred izbruhom finančne krize razmerje med javnim dolgom in BDP v euroobmočju in EU kot celoti, pa tudi razmerje za večino držav članic, zmanjšalo med letoma 1999 in 2007 ter da so se, nasprotno, ravni zadolženosti gospodinjstev in podjetij ter vzvod za finančni sektor v istem obdobju znatno povečali;
Recalls that, before the outbreak of the financial crisis, the ratio of public debt to GDP of the euro area and the EU as a whole, as well as the ratio for the majority of Member States, declined between 1999 and 2007 and that, by contrast, debt levels of households, firms and the leverage of the financial sector experienced a significant increase over the same period;
opozarja, da je veliko povečanje javnega dolga od leta 2008 v več državah članicah sprožilo dejstvo, da so se te države spoprijemale s prekoračenji, ki so jih prej povzročili netrajnostna rast zasebnega dolga in ogromni finančni baloni; zato meni, da je sedanja kriza osvetlila nevzdržnost fiskalnega položaja, če je nevzdržno financiranje zasebnega sektorja;
Recalls that the huge increase of public debt since 2008 in several Member States has been triggered by the fact these countries had to face excesses previously caused by an unsustainable growth of private debt and huge financial bubbles; believes therefore that the current crisis made it clear that the fiscal position is unsustainable if the financing of the private sector is unsustainable;
ugotavlja, da je kriza s posledično finančno pomočjo in gospodarskimi spodbujevalnimi svežnji privedla do daljnosežnih varčevalnih ukrepov, ki so pogosto zakasneli, a obenem močno omejujejo sposobnost ukrepanja vlad;
Notes that the crisis, together with subsequent ‘bail-outs’ and economic stimulus packages, has led to far-reaching austerity measures which are often overdue but which at the same time heavily constrain the capacity of governments to act;
opozarja, da ti varčevalni ukrepi ne smejo voditi do ukrepov, ki bi lahko resno ovirali gospodarsko okrevanje, za katero je potreben nov model gospodarskega upravljanja z instrumenti in časovnim razporedom, ki bodo zagotavljali ravnovesje med procesom fiskalne konsolidacije in ohranjali potrebe po naložbah v delovna mesta in trajnostni razvoj;
Warns that these austerity packages should not lead to measures which could seriously dampen the economic recovery, which requires a new model of economic governance with instruments and a time schedule that will provide a balance between the process of fiscal consolidation and safeguarding needs in terms of investment in jobs and sustainable development;
poudarja, da je pomanjkanje posojil za realno gospodarstvo, zlasti za mala in srednje velika podjetja, izviralo iz manjšega povpraševanja zaradi zmanjšane dejavnosti v realnem gospodarstvu ter iz nepripravljenosti bank za dodeljevanje posojil;
Underlines that the lack of credit reaching the real economy, specifically for SMEs, stemmed from lower demand due to diminished activity in the real economy as well as from the reluctance of banks to grant credit;
poudarja, da so se številne banke držav članic preveč zanašale na likvidnost, ki jo zagotavlja ECB;
Underlines that several Member States' banks have been excessively reliant on liquidity provided by the ECB;
ugotavlja, da so bili nestandardni ukrepi, ki jih je ECB uvedla od oktobra 2008 za podporo posojilom, uspešni pri preprečevanju globlje recesije in dodatnih finančnih pretresov; ponavlja, da mora biti zaključek teh ukrepov dobro časovno načrtovan in skrbno usklajen z nacionalnimi vladami in njihovimi dejavnostmi, zlasti glede na kolektivno in istočasno zatekanje k varčevalnim ukrepom v mnogih državah članicah;
Notes that the non-standard measures which the ECB has introduced since October 2008 to support credit have been successful in avoiding a deeper recession and additional financial turmoil; reiterates that lifting these measures needs to be well timed and carefully coordinated with national governments and their activities, especially in view of the collective and simultaneous resorting to austerity measures in many Member States;
je vseeno zaskrbljen zaradi morebitnega nesomernega vpliva izhodne strategije ECB zaradi občutnih razlik med državami članicami euroobmočja, kar zadeva poslovni cikel;
Is concerned, however, with the potential asymmetric impact of ECB's exit strategy, given the substantial differences between euro area Member States regarding the business cycle;
bi izrazil zadovoljstvo, če bi Evropska centralna banka v okviru sporazumov o ponovnem nakupu na splošno kot jamstvo sprejela državne obveznice držav euroobmočja, s čimer bi sledila preverjeni praksi britanske Bank of England ter ameriške Federal Reserve Bank;
Would welcome a move from the European Central Bank generally to accept government bonds from euro area countries as security in the context of repurchase agreements, thereby following the tried and tested practice used by the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Bank;
poudarja, da sta postopen izhod iz javnih primanjkljajev in dolgotrajnost javnih financ bistvenega pomena za celotno euroobmočje;
Emphasises that a gradual exit from public deficits and the long-term sustainability of public finances are of crucial importance for the euro area as a whole;
je seznanjen s številnimi predlogi v EU za dokončanje bonitetnega mehanizma, obvladovanje kriz in regulacijo bančnega sektorja „v senci“;
Notes the number of proposals in the EU to complete the prudential arrangements, to manage the crisis and to regulate the shadow banking sector;
je zaskrbljen zaradi procikličnih vidikov veljavnih regulativnih, bonitetnih, računovodskih in davčnih predpisov, ki povečujejo nihanja, neločljivo povezana z delovanjem tržnega gospodarstva;
Shares concerns about the pro-cyclical aspects of the current regulatory, prudential, accounting and taxation rules which amplify the fluctuations that are inherent in the functioning of a market economy;
poudarja, da je treba odločno povečati varnostni kapital bank in izboljšati kakovost kapitala, ter pozdravlja predloge baselskega odbora za ožjo opredelitev temeljnega kapitala in uvedbo višjih kapitalskih deležev; vendar opozarja na povezavo med finančnim in realnim gospodarstvom ter na morebitne posledice regulacije enega na drugega;
Highlights the need for a decisive increase in banks' capital buffers and to enhance the quality of capital, and welcomes the Basel Committee's proposals for a narrower definition of core capital and the introduction of higher capital ratios; also draws attention to the link between the financial and the real economy and the impacts that regulating one can have on the other;
meni, da mora biti globalni finančni sistem manj krhek in da je treba spoznanja iz krize zasnovati na globalni ravni, da bi zmanjšali sistemska tveganja, se soočili s finančnimi baloni in izboljšali kakovost obvladovanja tveganj in preglednost finančnih trgov, s čimer bi ponovno potrdili, da je njihova osnovna vloga financiranje realnega gospodarstva;
Considers that the global financial system needs to be made less fragile and that lessons from the crisis must be drawn on a global level in order to reduce systemic risk, tackle financial bubbles and improve the quality of risk management and the transparency of financial markets, reaffirming that their basic role is to finance the real economy;
ugotavlja, da je euro med letom 2009 pridobival status mednarodne valute, v letu 2010 pa je bil pod hudim pritiskom;
Notes that the euro had gained status as an international currency throughout 2009, but was subject to heavy pressure in 2010;