natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
poudarja, da morajo na poti do izboljšanja verodostojnosti in učinkovitosti širitvene strategije tudi države članice v celoti in dosledno upoštevati københavenske kriterije, tako da se od držav prosilk ne zahtevajo višji standardi, kot pa veljajo v nekaterih delih EU;
Stresses that, in order to enhance the credibility and the effectiveness of the enlargement strategy, the Copenhagen criteria must be fully respected and complied with by Member States as well, in order to avoid requiring of applicant countries higher standards than those applied in some parts of the EU;
opozarja tudi, da bi gospodarska struktura in interesi vsake nove države članice lahko vplivali na usmerjanje politik in proračuna EU in da bi politične spremembe lahko torej vplivale na naravo same EU; opozarja, da mora strnjena Skupnost narodov in državljanov temeljiti na skladnih politikah in solidarnosti interesov;
Recalls, furthermore, that the economic structure and interests of each new Member State could have an impact on the direction which the EU's policies and budget take and that the policy adaptations required could affect the nature of the EU itself; recalls that a cohesive Community of nations and citizens must be based on coherent policies and solidarity of interests;
meni, da je treba pri vmesnem pregledu večletnega finančnega okvira za obdobje 2007-2013 in pripravi nadaljnjih predlogov finančnih okvirov upoštevati proračunske posledice, pa tudi širše gospodarske in družbene posledice morebitnih širitev v prihodnosti;
Considers that the budgetary as well as the broader economic and social implications of further possible enlargements must be taken into due consideration during the mid-term review of the 2007-2013 multi-annual financial framework and the drafting of subsequent financial frameworks;
izraža prepričanje, da bi morala vsaka država pristopnica še pred pridružitvijo EU poskusiti rešiti svoja glavna notranja vprašanja, zlasti vprašanja v zvezi z ozemeljsko in ustavno ureditvijo; meni, da bi morala EU pred in med pogajanji z vsako takšno državo pomagati pri reševanju teh vprašanj;
Is also convinced that any acceding State should try to resolve its main internal problems, particularly those concerning its territorial and constitutional set-up, before it can join the EU; takes the view that, before and during the negotiations with any such State, the EU should assist in resolving those issues;
zagovarja poudarek na utrjevanju, izpolnjevanju pogojev in obveščanju kot vodilnih načelih širitvene strategije EU;
Endorses the emphasis on consolidation, conditionality and communication as guiding principles of the EU Enlargement Strategy;
zato meni, da mora vsaki širitvi slediti ustrezna konsolidacija in politična koncentracija, tj. resna ponovna presoja politik in sredstev EU, da se na ta način odgovori na pričakovanja evropskih državljanov in zagotovi preživetje EU kot političnega projekta;
Takes the view that every enlargement must be followed by adequate consolidation and political concentration, that is to say, by a serious reassessment of the EU's policies and means in order to respond to the expectations of European citizens and to guarantee the viability of the EU as a political project;
je zaskrbljen, da bi lahko širitev brez zadostne konsolidacije in priprav negativno vplivala na notranjo kohezijo EU in resno škodila sposobnosti ukrepanja EU – z oslabitvijo njenih institucij, z večjo dovzetnostjo držav članic za zunanje pritiske in z ogrožanjem verodostojnosti EU kot svetovnega akterja;
Is concerned that enlargement without adequate consolidation and preparation could negatively influence the EU's internal cohesion and could have serious implications for the EU's capacity to act, since it would weaken its institutions, make Member States more vulnerable to external pressure and undermine the EU's credibility as global actor;
poleg tega meni, da je lahko proces širitve (in s tem proces politične integracije EU) uspešen le, če obstaja jasna in dolgoročna javna podpora članstvu vsake države kandidatke v EU; zato meni, da mora prihodnje širitve spremljati usklajena komunikacijska politika, ki bo vključevala vse institucije EU, vlade držav članic ter predstavnike civilne družbe, in da bi moral biti namen te komunikacijske politike evropskim državljanom pojasniti politične, gospodarske, družbene in kulturne koristi širitve; zato spominja vlade in parlamente držav članic, da so odgovorni za zadostno obveščanje javnosti o vzpodbudnih dosežkih prejšnjih širitev, nespremenjenem stanju v zvezi s trenutnimi pogajanji in zadevah, ki so povezane s pristopom novih držav članic;
Believes, moreover, that the success of the enlargement process (and, thus, the success of the EU political integration process) can only be achieved if there is clear and long-lasting public support for the EU membership of each candidate country; is therefore of the view that further enlargements should be accompanied by a concerted communication policy involving all EU Institutions and Member States' Governments, as well as representatives of civil society, and that this communication policy should be designed to explain to the EU's citizens the political, economic, social and cultural benefits of enlargement; therefore reminds the governments and parliaments of the Member States that it is their responsibility adequately to inform public opinion about the positive achievements of former enlargements, the status quo of the ongoing negotiations and the issues connected with the accession of new Member States;
meni, da morajo države, ki se jim priznava možnost članstva, storiti vse, da svoji javnosti razložijo vključevanje v EU, jo v njo vključijo in jo na njo tudi pripravijo, civilno družbo pa morajo v ta proces vključiti že v samem začetku;
Takes the view that countries with European prospects should make every effort to explain, involve and prepare their public opinion for integration into the EU, involving civil society in this process from the outset;
izraža tudi prepričanje, da bi morali širitveni strategiji ob boku stati raznoliki zunanji pogodbeni okviri, ki bi bili lahko zasnovani kot medsebojno prepustni koncentrični krogi, s katerimi bi države dobile možnost, da pod strogo določenimi, a jasnimi notranjimi in zunanjimi pogoji po želji menjajo svoj status, če izpolnjujejo merila, opredeljena za posamezni okvir;
Is also convinced that the Enlargement Strategy should be flanked by a more diversified range of external contractual frameworks and that these frameworks could be structured as mutually permeable concentric circles, with countries being offered the opportunity, under strict but clear internal and external conditions, to move from one status to another if they so wish and if they fulfil the criteria pertaining to each specific framework;
potrjuje, da sodelovanje v evropski sosedski politiki niti v načelu niti v praksi ne nadomešča članstva ali statusa, ki nujno vodi do članstva; meni, da je treba konceptualno, politično in pravno vrzel med širitveno strategijo EU in njeno sosedsko politiko zapolniti in tako odgovoriti na pričakovanja vzhodnih sosed Evropske unije; izraža prepričanje, da je okrepljena sosedska politika, kot jo vodi Komisija, sicer pozitiven korak v pravo smer, čeprav z omenjenega stališča ni zadostna, in da je potrebna znatnejša sprememba kakovosti;
Affirms that participation in the ENP does not constitute, either in principle or in practice, a substitute for membership or a stage leading necessarily to membership; takes the view that the conceptual, political and legal gap existing between the EU's Enlargement Strategy and its Neighbourhood Policy needs to be filled in order to respond to the expectations of its eastern neighbours; is convinced that the Commission's strengthened neighbourhood policy is not sufficient in this respect, although it represents an already positive step in the right direction, and that a more substantive qualitative change is required;
zato meni, da bi morala EU, kar zadeva tiste vzhodne sosede, katerim se glede na njihove politične, gospodarske in družbene razmere ter sedanjo sposobnost EU za vključevanje trenutno ne priznava možnosti članstva, obenem pa izpolnjujejo določene demokratične in gospodarske pogoje, vzpostaviti območje, ki bi temeljilo na skupnih politikah, ki bi zlasti zadevale pravno državo, demokracijo in človekove pravice, sodelovanje na področju zunanje in varnostne politike, gospodarska in finančna vprašanja, trgovino, energijo, promet, okoljska vprašanja, pravosodje, varnost, preseljevanje, gibanje brez vizumov in izobraževanje; meni, da bi si morale te skupne politike prizadevati za izpolnitev splošnega cilja, da vzhodne sosede postopoma dosežejo standarde EU in si tako odprejo pot za svojo tesnejšo vključitev v evropsko sredino; je prav tako prepričan, da bi morali zgoraj omenjene skupne politike oblikovati skupaj s sodelujočimi državami na podlagi posebnih mehanizmov odločanja, seveda ob ustrezni finančni podpori; meni, da je poljsko-švedski predlog vzhodnega partnerstva, ki je bil predložen na seji Sveta za splošne zadeve in zunanje odnose od 26. do 27. maja 2008, pozitiven, če bodo prizadevanja za uresničitev pobude iz predloga potekala v okviru EU;
Suggests, therefore, that, as regards those eastern neighbours which, in view of their political, economic and social situation and the EU's current integration capacity, at present do not enjoy membership prospects but at the same time fulfil certain democratic and economic conditions, the EU should establish an area based on common policies covering, in particular, the rule of law, democracy and human rights, foreign and security policy cooperation, economic and financial issues, trade, energy, transport, environmental issues, justice, security, migration, visa-free movement and education; takes the view that these common policies should pursue the overall goal of assisting the eastern neighbours gradually to achieve EU standards and thus open the way for their closer integration into the European fold; is also convinced that the common policies referred to above should be shaped jointly with the participating countries on the basis of specific decision-making mechanisms, and should be underpinned by adequate financial assistance; takes a positive view of the Polish-Swedish proposal for an Eastern Partnership submitted to the meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council of 26-27 May 2008, provided that the initiative which that proposal involves is pursued within the framework of the EU;
pozdravlja ponovno oživitev "barcelonskega procesa: unija za Sredozemlje" v okviru EU kot pozitiven korak v odnosih EU z južnimi sosedami; meni, da ta novi korak še dodatno govori v prid posebnim pogodbenim večstranskim odnosom tudi z vzhodnimi sosedami EU, ki imajo v primerjavi z južnimi partnericami jasne evropske ambicije in možnosti; opozarja, da bi moral biti prvi konkretni rezultat teh odnosov vzpostavitev prostotrgovinskega območja, čemur bi sledili tesnejši odnosi v obliki nekakšnega evropskega gospodarskega prostora plus (EGP +), "evropskega Commonwealtha" ali posebnih okvirov za regionalno sodelovanje;
Welcomes the re-launch, within the framework of the EU, of the "Barcelona Process: A Union for the Mediterranean" as a positive step in the EU's relations with the southern neighbours; believes that this new development strengthens the argument in favour of specific contractual multilateral relations also with the EU's eastern neighbours, which, compared to the southern partners, have clear European ambitions and perspectives; recalls that, as a first step, these relations should translate themselves into the establishment of a Free Trade Area, to be followed by closer relations along the lines of a European Economic Area Plus (EEA +), of a European Commonwealth or of specific regional cooperation frameworks;
ponovno poudarja, kako je v okviru zgoraj navedenih posebnih okvirov za regionalno sodelovanje pomembno oblikovanje bolj prefinjene in obsežnejše strategije EU za črnomorsko regijo, ki bo presegala trenutno pobudo za sinergijo in predvidela sklenitev sporazuma o sodelovanju za Črno morje, ki bi vključeval EU, Turčijo in vse črnomorske obalne države kot enakovredne partnerice, ob prizadevanju za polno sodelovanje Rusije, in ki bi se lahko pozneje razvil v unijo Črnega morja; meni, da takšen večstranski okvir zadevnim državam ne bi ponudil zgolj možnosti za okrepitev njihovega sodelovanja z EU na različnih političnih področjih, ampak bi Evropski uniji tudi omogočil bolj dejavno vlogo pri iskanju mirnih rešitev za konflikte v tej regiji in tako pozitivno prispeval k varnosti v regiji;
Reiterates, in the context of the above-mentioned specific regional cooperation frameworks, the importance of devising a more sophisticated and comprehensive EU strategy for the Black Sea region, that goes beyond the current synergy initiative and envisages the establishment of a Black Sea Cooperation Agreement, which should include the EU, Turkey and all Black Sea littoral states as equal partners, while seeking the full involvement of Russia, and which could, at a later stage, develop into a Union of the Black Sea; believes that such a multilateral framework would not only offer the countries involved the possibility of strengthening their cooperation with the EU across a wide variety of policy fields, but would also allow the EU to play a more active role in finding peaceful solutions to the region's conflicts, thus contributing positively to security in the region;
prav tako meni, da bi lahko državam, ki se jim priznava možnost za članstvo, čeprav jih čaka še veliko dela do izpolnitve njihovih političnih, gospodarskih in socialnih pogojev, potrebnih za pridobitev statusa države kandidatke, koristilo sodelovanje – na povsem prostovoljni osnovi – v dogovorih, podobnih zgoraj omenjenemu dvo- ali večstranskemu okviru; opozarja, da bi takšen vmesen korak pospešil uporabo vseh instrumentov, ki jih ima EU na voljo za pomoč zadevnim državam na njihovi poti k polnopravnemu članstvu;
Believes at the same time that countries which enjoy recognised membership prospects but still have considerable ground to cover before they can attain the political, economic and social conditions necessary to achieve candidate status, could usefully participate, on a totally voluntary basis, in arrangements similar to the above-mentioned bilateral or multilateral frameworks; recalls that such an intermediate step would facilitate the deployment of all instruments available to the EU in order to help the countries concerned on their path towards full membership;
v zvezi s tem pozdravlja sporočilo Komisije z naslovom "Zahodni Balkan: okrepitev evropske perspektive" z dne 5. marca 2008 ( KOM(2008)0127 ), ki začrtuje številne ukrepe za podporo državam v tej regiji pri njihovem prizadevanju za vključitev v EU in ukrepe za poglobitev odnosov EU z njimi na področju trgovine, energetike, izobraževanja in/ali raziskovalne dejavnosti; izraža zadovoljstvo s podpisom Stabilizacijsko-pridružitvenega sporazuma z dne 7. novembra 2007 z Republiko Srbijo in z dne 16. junija 2008 z Bosno in Hercegovino, ki je po njegovem mnenju nadaljnji korak na poti krepitve vezi med zadevno regijo in EU; v zvezi s tem poziva k pospešitvi pogajanj o liberalizaciji vizumskega režima z državami Zahodnega Balkana, da bi se jim omogočilo lažje sodelovanje v programih Skupnosti;
Welcomes in this context the Commission Communication on the Western Balkans: Enhancing the European Perspective, of 5 March 2008 ( COM(2008)0127 ), which outlines a range of measures for supporting the countries in the region in their efforts towards EU integration and for deepening the EU's relations with them, whether in the areas of trade, energy, education and/or research; expresses satisfaction at the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement on 7 November 2007 with the Republic of Serbia and on 16 June 2008 with Bosnia-Herzegovina, which it regards as a further step in consolidating the ties between the region concerned and the EU; calls in this respect for the negotiations for visa liberalisation with the countries of the western Balkans to be speeded up, in order to facilitate their participation in Community programmes;
poziva Komisijo, naj v skladu s smernicami, predstavljenimi v tej resoluciji, pripravi konkretne predloge za bolj raznovrstno politiko zunanjih odnosov s sosedami EU, pri obravnavi lastne upravne zasnove pa vsaj vzpostavi strukturno vez med delovanjem generalnega direktorata za širitev in generalnega direktorata RELEX;
Urges the Commission to come up with concrete proposals for a more diversified external relations policy towards the EU's neighbours, along the lines outlined in the present resolution, and, when considering its own administrative set-up, at least to establish a link between the activities carried out by the Enlargement and the RELEX Directorates-General;
ob upoštevanju svojih prejšnjih resolucij o Zimbabveju, zlasti resolucije z dne 24. aprila 2008 Sprejeta besedila, P6_TA(2008)0184 .
having regard to its previous resolutions on Zimbabwe, in particular that of 24 April 2008 Texts adopted, P6_TA(2008)0184
ob upoštevanju sklepov Sveta o Zimbabveju, sprejetih 29. aprila 2008 ter 26. in 27. maja 2008,
having regard to the Council Conclusions on Zimbabwe adopted on 29 April 2008 and on 26-27 May 2008,
ob upoštevanju resolucije o [takrat] bližajočem se odločilnem krogu volitev v Zimbabveju, ki jo je sprejela Afriška komisija o človekovih pravicah in pravicah ljudstev (Afriška komisija) na svoji 43. redni seji, ki se je odvijala od 7. do 22. maja 2008 v Ezulwiniju v Kraljevini Svazi,
having regard to the resolution on the [then] forthcoming election run-off in Zimbabwe, adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples" Rights (the African Commission) meeting at its 43rd Ordinary Session in Ezulwini, Kingdom of Swaziland, from 7 to 22 May 2008,
ob upoštevanju sklepov predsedstva Evropskega sveta 19. in 20. junija 2008, ki potrjujejo pripravljenost EU, da sprejme dodatne ukrepe proti tistim, ki so odgovorni za nasilje,
having regard to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council of 19-20 June 2008, which reiterated the readiness of the EU to adopt additional measures against those responsible for the violence,
ob upoštevanju predhodne izjave misije opazovalcev Južnoafriške razvojne skupnosti (SADC) o odločilnem krogu zimbabvejskih predsedniških volitev in volitev v skupščino z dne 29. junija 2008,
having regard to the preliminary statement of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Election Observer Mission on the Zimbabwe presidential run-off and House of Assembly by-elections of 29 June 2008,
ob upoštevanju vmesne izjave vseafriške misije za opazovanje parlamentarnih volitev o odločilnem krogu zimbabvejskih predsedniških volitev in volitev v skupščino z dne 30. junija 2008,
having regard to the interim statement of the Pan-African Parliament Election Observer Mission to the presidential run-off and parliamentary by-elections in Zimbabwe of 30 June 2008,
ob upoštevanju predhodne izjave opazovalne misije Afriške unije v Zimbabveju z dne 29. junija 2008,
having regard to the preliminary statement of the African Union (AU) Observer Mission to Zimbabwe of 29 June 2008,
ob upoštevanju resolucije o Zimbabveju, sprejete na 11. vrhunskem srečanju Afriške unije, ki je potekalo v Šarm el Šejku v Egiptu 30. junija in 1. julija 2008,
having regard to the resolution on Zimbabwe adopted by the AU Assembly at the 11th AU Summit, held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on 30 June-1 July 2008,
ker so 27. junija 2008 potekale predsedniške volitve v Zimbabveju, kljub temu, da se je predsedniški kandidat Morgan Tsvangirai umaknil zaradi omejitev in čedalje večjega nasilja nad opozicijsko stranko in njenimi privrženci,
whereas the Zimbabwean presidential run off took place on 27 June 2008 despite the withdrawal of the presidential candidate Morgan Tsvangirai due to increasing violence and restrictions on the opposition party and supporters,
ker so opazovalci SADC, vseafriškega parlamenta in Afriške unije dejali, da je bil odločilni krog predsedniških volitev zaznamovan z nasiljem, da ni upošteval standardov Afriške unije in SADC ter da ni odražal volje ljudstva,
whereas monitors from the SADC, the Pan-African Parliament and the AU said the run-off vote was undermined by violence, fell short of AU and SADC standards and did not reflect the will of the people,
ker je glede na uradne rezultate, ki jih je objavila zimbabvejska volilna komisija, opozicijska stranka Gibanje za demokratične spremembe (MDC) dobila večino sedežev v zimbabvejski skupščini, medtem ko je na predsedniških volitvah Morgan Tsvangirai dobil 47,9 %, Robert Mugabe pa 43,2 % glasov,
whereas, according to official results released by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) won a majority of seats in the House of Assembly, while Morgan Tsvangirai won 47,9% and Robert Mugabe won 43,2% of the votes in the presidential election,
ker je Robert Mugabe pred odločilnim krogom volitev izjavil, da opozicijsko gibanje ne bo nikoli vodilo Zimbabveja in da jim je pripravljen tudi z bojem preprečiti prevzem oblasti,
whereas Robert Mugabe declared before the run-off election that the MDC would never rule Zimbabwe and that he was prepared to fight to prevent them from taking power,
ker so Morgana Tsvangiraia med predvolilno kampanjo večkrat aretirali in ker so ga zasledovali oboroženi vojaki ter ga prisilili, da je poiskal zatočišče na nizozemskem veleposlaništvu v mestu Harare,
whereas, during the election campaign, Morgan Tsvangirai was arrested several times, pursued by armed soldiers and forced to take refuge in the Dutch Embassy in Harare,
ker je bil generalni sekretar gibanja MDC Tendai Biti 12. junija 2008 aretiran ter obtožen prevrata in izdaje,
whereas MDC Secretary-General Tendai Biti was arrested on 12 June 2008 and charged with subversion and treason,
ker so državni mediji prepovedali oglaševalsko kampanjo gibanja MDC ter tako preprečili svobodno in pošteno volilno kampanjo; ker so shod gibanja MDC, načrtovan za 22. junija 2008 v Harareju, ovirali nasilni podporniki stranke Zimbabvejske afriške nacionalne unije - domoljubna fronta (ZANU-PF),
whereas the state media banned MDC campaign adverts, thus impeding a free and fair electoral campaign; whereas the MDC rally planned for 22 June 2008 in Harare was obstructed by violent supporters of the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF),
ker je predsednik Afriškega nacionalnega kongresa Jacob Zuma 24. junija 2008 opozoril, da so razmere v Zimbabveju ušle izpod nadzora, ter pozval Združene narode in SADC k posredovanju,
whereas on 24 June 2008 the President of the African National Congress, Jacob Zuma, described the situation in Zimbabwe as 'out of control', calling for urgent intervention by the United Nations and the SADC,
ker je Varnostni svet Združenih narodov končno soglasno obsodil kampanjo nasilja, ki jo vodi zimbabvejska vlada, čeprav zaradi nasprotovanja Južne Afrike volitev ni uspel razglasiti za nelegitimne,
whereas the UN Security Council (UNSC) has at last unanimously condemned the campaign of violence being waged by the Zimbabwean Government, though falling short of declaring this election illegitimate, owing to South Africa's objection,
ker se Afriška unija ni strinjala z nobenimi smernicami ali jasnim časovnim okvirom za začetek in konec pogajanj in ker je vrh tega zaradi trenj znotraj SADC dialog malo verjeten,
whereas the AU did not agree on any guidelines or a clear timetable for starting and ending negotiations and whereas, in addition, divisions within the SADC make dialogue unlikely,