natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
– ob upoštevanju sklepov spomladanskega srečanja Evropskega sveta na vrhu z dne 26. marca 2010 o Evropi 2020 in gospodarskem vodenju,
– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council's Spring Summit of 26 March 2010 on Europe 2020 and economic governance,
– ob upoštevanju izjave vodij držav in vlad o evro območju z dne 7. maja 2010;
– having regard to the statement of the heads of state or government of the euro area of 7 May 2010,
– ob upoštevanju sklepov izrednega srečanja Sveta za gospodarske in finančne zadeve z dne 9. in 10. maja 2010,
– having regard to the conclusions of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council Extraordinary meeting of 9/10 May 2010,
A. ker je bila naraščajoča nesorazmernost pri razporeditvi dohodka in bogastva (naraščanje dobička in bogastva, strmo padanje deleža dela v nacionalnem dohodku) v zadnjih desetletjih do let 2007 in 2008 glavna gonilna sila velikanske rasti naložb na finančnih trgih in nastanka špekulativnih balonov (spletnega "novega gospodarstva", nepremičnine, itd.);
A. whereas the increasing inequality in the distribution of income and wealth (rising profits and wealth, steep decline of labour's share in national income) in the last decades up to 2007/2008 was the major driving force behind the giant growth of investment in financial markets and the creation of speculative bubbles (Internet 'New Economy', real estate etc.),
B. ker sta politika Evropske unije na splošno in zlasti Lizbonska strategija še poudarila ta razvoj zaradi osredotočenosti na konkurenčnost, zmanjševanje stroškov, odpravljanje socialne države, vedno prožnejše delovne trge, liberalizacijo trgov na splošno in zlasti deregulacijo finančnih trgov;
B. whereas EU policy in general and the Lisbon Strategy in particular aggravated these trends with its focus on 'competitiveness', cost-cutting, dismantling of the welfare state, ever more flexible labour markets, liberalisation of markets in general and de-regulation of financial markets in particular,
C. ker so politike Evropske unije na splošno in Lizbonska strategija tako podžigale politiko držav članic kovanja dobička na račun tuje nesreče v medsebojni igri za premoč in utrle pot gospodarskemu balonu, ki je bil v mnogih državah Evropske unije povezan z nevzdržno gospodarsko rastjo, ki temelji na dolgovih, kar je pripeljalo do naraščajočega primanjkljaja na tekočem računu na eni strani in ravno tako nevzdržne rasti, ki temelji na konkurenčnosti, v maloštevilnih državah Evropske unije na drugi strani, pri čemer so slednje ustvarile velikanske presežke na tekočem računu s politiko deflacije plač, vendar z zmanjšanim notranjim povpraševanjem;
C. whereas EU policies at large and the Lisbon Strategy thus were fuelling a 'beggar thy neighbour' policy of Member States to outcompete each other and paved the way for unsustainable 'bubblenomics' debt driven booms in many EU countries resulting in rising current account deficits on the one hand and equally unsustainable competitiveness driven growth in few other EU countries on the other hand, the latter created huge current account surpluses by a policy of wage deflation but depressed internal demand,
D. ker se evropske institucije in vlade držav članic zaradi svojega trdnega, vendar zmotnega prepričanja, da je gospodarska nestabilnost lahko posledica samo inflacijske ali fiskalne neodgovornosti, niso zmenile za naraščajoče gospodarske razlike, ki jih je ta konkurenčnost povzročila v evro območju in v EU-27;
D. whereas the European Institutions and Member States' governments left the growing economic divergences resulting from this competition within the euro-zone and the EU-27 unattended in their firm but mistaken belief that economic instability can only result from inflation or fiscal irresponsibility,
E. ker glede na to Lizbonska strategija in monetarna struktura projekta Evropske unije nosita velik del odgovornosti za razplet finančne in gospodarske krize in neuspeh pri doseganju svojih lastnih ciljev Lizbonske strategije, saj sta z deregulacijo finančnih trgov omogočili razširitev slabe aktive in spodbujali špekulativne balone tudi v dejanskem gospodarstvu; ker trditve, da lahko neuspeh Lizbonske strategije preprosto pripišemo nezadostnemu izpolnjevanju v državah članicah, pomanjkljivemu nadzoru in podobno, niso prepričljive;
E. whereas, therefore, the Lisbon Strategy and the monetarist architecture of the EU project share a large responsibility for the unravelling of the financial and economic crisis and the failure to achieve their own Lisbon targets, as they paved the way for contagion by 'toxic assets' via financial market deregulation and promoted speculative bubbles also in the 'real economy'; whereas it is not convincing that the failure of the Lisbon Strategy can simply be attributed to its insufficient implementation by Member States, lack of control and the like,
F. ker so vodilni politiki v Evropski uniji kljub splošnemu govorjenju o skupnem evropskem ukrepanju in solidarnosti začeli s politiko kovanja dobička na račun tuje nesreče na podlagi medsebojno tekmovalnih nacionalnih načrtov, da bi rešili finančni sektor in zagotovili finančne spodbude za oživitev gospodarstva; ker Evropski program za oživitev gospodarstva, ki ga je Svet sprejel decembra 2008, nikoli ni pripeljal do bolj usklajenega odziva Evropske unije na krizo; ker so reševanje bank in do sedaj izvedeni spodbudni ukrepi socializirali finančne sektorje in izgube industrij ter upočasnili recesijo, vendar niso pripeljali do okrevanja;
F. whereas European Union leaders, for all their customary talk of collective European action and solidarity, started a 'beggar thy neighbour' policy of competing national schemes to rescue the financial sector and to provide fiscal stimulus for recovery; whereas the European Economic Recovery Programme adopted by the Council in December 2008 never lead to a more coordinated EU response to the crisis; whereas the bank rescue and stimulus measures implemented so far socialised the financial sectors' and industry's losses and slowed down the recession, but did not generate a recovery,
G. ker so ti načrti za oživitev nastali ne da bi pri tem upoštevali stališče spolov in ker so ženske bile in ostajajo izključene iz odločanja o ukrepih za gospodarsko in finančno okrevanje; ker imajo različni spodbudni ukrepi različne učinke za ženske in moške; in ker je v začetnem obdobju kriza najhuje prizadela gospodarske panoge, v katerih prevladujejo moški, kot sta na primer avtomobilska industrija in gradbeni sektor, je očitno, da bodo imeli srednjeročni in dolgoročni učinki povečane zadolženosti držav zelo hude posledice na panoge, v katerih so zaposlene pretežno ženske, zlasti delovna mesta v javnem sektorju in javne in/ali iz javnih sredstev subvencionirane socialne, zdravstvene in skrbstvene storitve;
G. whereas these recovery plans have been designed without taking into account a gender perspective, and whereas women are and have been largely excluded from decision-making on economic and financial recovery measures; whereas different stimulus measures produce different outcomes for women and men; and whereas in a first phase of the crisis male-dominated sectors of the economy were particularly hit (such as the car industry, construction industry , etc) it is clear that the middle- and long-term effects of state's increased indebtedness will have a very serious effect on sectors where women largely work, and in particular public sectors jobs and publicly organised and/or publicly subsidised social, health and care services,
H. ker se je leta 2009 BNP v Evropski uniji zmanjšal za 4,1 %; ker imajo nekatere države članice letos še vedno negativno gospodarsko rast in ker po napovedih za leto 2010 v Evropski uniji v EU-27 lahko pričakujemo kvečjemu negotovo in medlo stopnjo rasti 0,7 %, dvomestno povprečno stopnjo brezposelnosti, stagnacijo plač in trajno zmanjševanje visokega deleža posojilnih finančnih instrumentov v zasebnem sektorju; ker zasebni sektor še vedno ne zmore novih naložb zaradi nizke stopnje uporabe zmogljivosti, črnogledih gospodarskih napovedi in trdovratnih težav glede dostopa gospodarskih družb do kreditov;
H. whereas GDP contracted by 4.1 % in the EU in 2009; whereas some Member States still have negative economic growth this year and perspectives for the EU for 2010 offer a fragile and sluggish growth rate of 0.7% for the EU-27 at best, with an EU-27 double digit average unemployment rate, wage stagnation and ongoing deleveraging of high private sector debt positions; whereas the private sector is still not in a position to generate new investment due to low levels of capacity utilisation, bleak economic prospects and persistent problems concerning companies access to credit,
I. ker se je na koncu leta 2009 Evropski svet dogovoril o strategiji o izhodu iz krize in proti 20 državam članicam začel s postopki zaradi čezmernega primanjkljaja, po katerih morajo do 2013/2014 ali prej proračunski primanjkljaj zmanjšati pod 3 % BNP; ker so številne države članice že začele z napadi na plače in občutno zmanjšale javno porabo, ter zmanjšale plače in pokojnine v javnem sektorju, zmanjšale in privatizirale javne službe ter uvedle ukrepe za dvig DDV, socialnih prispevkov in obvezne starosti upokojitve;
I. whereas at the end of 2009 the European Council agreed on an 'exit strategy' and launched deficit procedures against 20 Member States, requiring them to cut budget deficits under 3% of GDP by 2013/14 or earlier; whereas many Member States have already launched attacks on wages and implemented severe cuts in public spending, driving down public sector wages and pensions, downsizing and privatising public services, as well as measures to raise VAT, social security contributions and the statutory retirement age,
J. ker strategije Evropske unije za izhod iz krize in ravnanje finančnega sektorja kažeta na globoko zakoreninjen cinizem: primanjkljaji so visoki, javni dolg pa v nebo leteč, zlasti zato, ker so vlade reševale finančni sektor pred posledicami lastnih špekulacij in škode, ki so jih povzročile gospodarstvu; ker se finančni trgi zdaj obračajo prav na tiste vlade, ki so jih rešile, vlade pa prelagajo breme odplačevanja javnega dolga istemu finančnemu sektorju upnikov na navadne delavce, upokojence in podobno, katerih delovna mesta, plače, socialne storitve in pravice so ogrožene;
J. whereas the EU 'exit strategy' and the behaviour of the financial sector expose a deep seated cynicism: deficits are high and public debt is soaring mainly because governments were saving the financial sector from the results of its speculation and the damage it was inflicting on the economy; whereas financial markets now turn on the very same governments that rescued them in the first place, and governments put the burden to repay public debt to the same financial sector creditors on the ordinary population of workers, pensioners etc. whose jobs, wages, social benefits and rights are under attack,
K. ker je Komisija v svoji oceni programov stabilnosti in konvergence 24 držav članic Evropske unije z dne 17. in 24. marca 2010 in z dne 14. aprila 2010 večino teh držav pozvala k večjemu zmanjšanju javne porabe in k večjim strukturnim reformam; ker Komisija predlaga uvedbo mehanizma še strožjega nadzora primanjkljaja pri srednjeročnem proračunskem načrtovanju držav članic; ker sklepi spomladanskega srečanja Sveta o gospodarskem vodenju poleg tega spodbujajo k uporabi člena 136 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije kot instrumenta za strožji nadzor proračuna in k osredotočenosti na pereče izzive konkurenčnosti in gibanje plačilne bilance;
K. whereas the Commission in its assessment of the stability and convergence programmes of 24 EU Member States of 17 and 24 March 2010 and 14 April 2010 urged most of them to go for tougher public spending cuts and more 'structural reforms'; whereas the Commission proposes to establish mechanisms for even tighter deficit oversight of Member States' medium-term budgetary planning; whereas the Spring Council's conclusions on 'economic governance' also advocate to use Article 136 of the Treaty (TFEU) as an instrument to achieve tighter budgetary surveillance and to focus on the 'pressing challenges of competitiveness and balance of payments developments',
L. ker tako proračunsko varčevanje, kot ga zagovarjata Komisija in Svet in izvaja večina držav članic, povečuje deflacijske pritiske na še vedno negotovo in majavo gospodarstvo, izničuje samodejne stabilizatorje kot so sistemi socialne zaščite in javnih naložb, ki so se pokazali za učinkovite pri premagovanju upada in pomeni nevarnost, da gospodarstvo ponovno zdrsne v recesijo in s tem razblini vsa upanja, da se bo javni dolg zmanjšal in da bo prišlo do fiskalne konsolidacije;
L. whereas such fiscal retrenchment as advocated by the Commission and the Council and pursued by most Member States increases deflationary pressures on a still fragile and stagnating economy, dismantles the 'automatic stabilisers' such as social protection systems and public investment that proved effective in resisting the downturn and risks to push the economy back into recession, then also dashing all hopes that public debt will be reduced and fiscal consolidation be achieved,
M. ker je Evropska Komisija glede na to predlagala pet ciljev za novo strategijo EU 2020 kot dokaz za svoj domnevni "realizem"; ker ti cilji temeljijo zlasti na nekdanjih ciljih Lizbonske strategije; ker se Svet na svojem spomladanskem srečanju ni mogel dogovoriti o ciljih, povezanih s tistimi, ki prezgodaj prekinejo šolanje in visokim šolstvom ter z zmanjševanjem revščine in socialne in izključenosti; ker je slednje zelo presenetljivo glede na visokoletečo retoriko vlad držav članic in Sveta o tem, kako je treba vlagati v ljudi in znanje in o resnem reševanju problema revščine v evropskem letu boja proti revščini 2010,
M. whereas, against this background, the European Commission proposed five targets for the new EU 2020 strategy as a demonstration of its supposed 'realism'; whereas these targets are largely based on former Lisbon Strategy targets; whereas the EU Spring Council could not find agreement on the targets on early school leavers and higher education and on reducing poverty and social exclusion; whereas the latter is remarkable in the light of the fiery rhetoric from Member States governments and the Council about the need to invest in people and skills and about seriously addressing poverty in the European Year Against Poverty 2010,
N. ker politike EU, Lizbonska strategija in zlasti strategija EU 2020 večinoma ne obravnavajo vprašanja demografskih sprememb in vprašanj prostorskih sprememb, ki se obenem pojavljajo v povezavi s tem (za katere so značilni vzorci hitre urbanizacije in demografski razvoj, ki se odraža v mestih držav članic);
N. whereas EU policies, the Lisbon Strategy, and in particular the EU 2020 Strategy largely fail to address the issue of demographic transition and the issues of simultaneously occurring spatial transitions linked to that (characterized by swift urbanization patterns as well as by national demographic trends being projected at the urban level),
Splošne pripombe o Evropi 2020 in gospodarskem vodenju EU
General Remarks on Europe 2020 and EU economic governance
3. meni, da je strategija EU 2020 manj ambiciozna celo od neuspele lizbonske strategije; ostro kritizira, da v strategiji EU 2020 sploh ni obravnavano vprašanje enakosti žensk; poudarja, da glede na vse večjo nezaposlenost strategija ni jasno usmerjena k vprašanju, kako učinkovito zmanjšati nezaposlenost z instrumenti gospodarske politike in politike zaposlovanja za trajnostni razvoj in polno zaposlenost;
Considers that the EU 2020 Strategy lacks ambition even in comparison to the failed Lisbon Strategy; strongly criticises that equality for women is not at all being addressed by EU 2020; points out that against the background of increased unemployment, the strategy does not provide a clear focus on how to effectively reduce it via economic and employment policy instruments for sustainable development and full employment;
5. poudarja, da sta kljub nekaterim plitvim izjavam o oblikovanju okolju prijaznega gospodarstva in socialni koheziji, neoliberalni duh in politična usmerjenost strategije EU 2020 zelo podobna tistim iz lizbonske strategije: osredotočenje na konkurenčnost, večja liberalizacija na enotnem trgu, spodbujanje dodatne privatizacije z javno-zasebnimi partnerstvi, oživljanje podjetniškega duha, kot da vse te politike niso prispevale k gospodarski krizi (na primer vloga zgrešenega podjetništva pri razvoju novega gospodarstva in balonov finančnih inovacij ter posledičnega poka);
Points out that, despite some superficial rhetoric about 'greening the economy' and social cohesion, the neo-liberal spirit and policy direction of EU 2020 remains much the same as the Lisbon Strategy's: focus on 'competitiveness', more liberalisation in the single market, promoting further privatisation via public private partnerships, reviving the spirit of entrepreneurship – as if all these policies had not contributed to the unravelling of the economic crisis (e.g. the role of misguided entrepreneurship in the development of the New Economy and financial innovation bubbles and their consecutive bust);
Učinkovito usklajeni ukrepi naslednjih treh do pet let so odločilni za premagovanje stagnacije, spodbujanje trajnostnega razvoja in boj proti nezaposlenosti
Effective co ordin ated action within the next 3- 5 years is decisive to overcome stagnation, promote sustainable development and fight unemployment
10. predlaga, da bi del naložbenih programov načrta za oživitev predvsem obravnaval industrijske veje, ki jih je najbolj prizadela kriza, da bi upoštevali potrebo po dosegu polne in dostojne zaposlitve: preusmerjanje avtomobilske industrije k trajnostnim prometnim storitvam, razširitev železniških omrežij in nudenje celovitih regionalnih železniških storitev (železniški program Evropa 2025), spodbujanje zelenega ladjedelstva in stabilizacija jeklarske industrije v tem smislu; vztraja, da morajo EU in države članice temu preusmerjanju dodati ukrepe za ohranitev delovnih mest, usposabljanje, ponovno usposabljanje in razvijanje usposobljenosti ter varne prehode v zaposlovanju za delavce zadevnih industrij;
Suggests that a part of the recovery plan's investment programmes should particularly address industry branches most hit by the crisis, in order to comply with the need to achieve full and decent employment: re-conversion of the car industry towards sustainable transport services, extension of railway networks and supply of spatially inclusive and comprehensive regional train services (Programme Rail Europe 2025), promotion of 'green' shipbuilding and stabilisation of the steel industry in that context; insists that the EU and the Member States should accompany such re-conversion by measures for job retention, training, re-training and skills development, and secure employment transitions for workers in the industries concerned;
Novi viri financiranja in nova ureditev za trajnostno oživitev
New Sources of Finance and new regulation for a sustainable recovery
25. poudarja, da se bankam še vedno, tudi po izvedenih reševanjih in državnih jamstvih (ki znašajo v Evropi 3 bilijone EUR), implicitno, a trdno, jamči podpora javnega sektorja, hkrati pa jim zanjo ni treba plačevati nikakršnih dajatev; poziva Svet, naj sprejme sistem za uvedbo davka na bilančno vsoto na obveznosti bank (z izjemo depozitov); poudarja, da bi vlade s prilagajanjem davčne stopnje obsegu bilance lahko povečale dajatve velikih bank in tako začele reševati problem bank, ki so „prevelike, da bi propadle“;
Points out that banks continue to have an implicit but strong guarantee on a public sector bailout even after the rescue operations and government guarantees (amounting to 3 trillion Euros in Europe), but that at the same time they do not have to pay any fee for this; calls on the Council to agree on a scheme for introducing balance sheet levies on bank’s liabilities (excluding deposits); points out that by modulating the levy rate in function of the size of the balance sheets, governments can increase the levy on big banks, thereby addressing the problem of banks becoming ‘too big to fail’;
Nadaljnje ugotovitve v zvezi s cilji in področji politike strategije Evropa 2020
Further remarks on Europe 2020 targets and policy areas
34. obžaluje, da Komisija varčevanje z energijo, naravnimi viri ter surovinami obravnava zgolj v kontekstu konkurenčnosti naše industrije in gospodarstev v prihodnosti, s čimer to postaja ujetnik poslovnih interesov, ki bodo vztrajali, da so sprejemljivi zgolj ukrepi, ki dajejo takojšnje dobičke; poziva k reviziji mehanizma za čisti razvoj in sistema za trgovanje z emisijami, ki sedaj resno ogrožata cilj zmanjšanja emisij CO 2 v EU in po svetu;
Regrets the fact that the Commission puts the conservation of energy, natural resources and raw materials entirely in the context of the 'future competitiveness of our industry and our economies', making it thus hostage to business interests who will insist that only those measures which bring immediate profits are acceptable; calls for a revision of the Clean Development Mechanism and the Emission Trade system, actually undermining seriously the target of reducing CO 2 emissions in the EU and worldwide.
38. močno obsoja zavezo Komisije in Sveta, da bosta nadaljevala agendo o boljši zakonodaji, ki se je v okviru EU 2020 prekrstila v „pametno zakonodajo“, katere namen je omejiti regulativno kapaciteto javnih organov; poudarja, da niso zgolj grenki rezultati finančne krize pokazali, da je nujno potrebna temeljna okrepitev javne regulacije; poudarja, da je treba okrepiti obvezne trajnostne ocene o ciljih na področju okolja, sociale, spolov in enakosti ter oceniti stroške ukrepanja in neukrepanja; poudarja, da morajo imeti države članice pravico, da vzpostavijo nadzor cen, da bi prilagodile naraščajoče cene osnovnih dobrin;
Strongly criticises the Commission's and the Council's commitment to continue with the 'better regulation' agenda, newly baptised 'smart regulation' in the framework of EU 2020, which aims at limiting the regulatory capacity of the public authorities; underlines that not only the bitter results of the financial crisis have demonstrated the urgency of a fundamental strengthening of public regulation; points out the need to strengthen compulsory sustainability assessments on environment, social, gender and equality objectives and assess costs of action and inaction; underlines that Member States must have the right to establish price controls in order to adjust rising basic goods prices;
Gospodarsko upravljanje EU, evropski mehanizem za finančno stabilizacijo in razprava v Svetu o spremembi Pogodbe
EU economic governance, the European Financial Stabilisation mechanism and the Council's debate about changing the Treaty
43. ugotavlja, da je Svet za ekonomske in finančne zadeve poudaril potrebo po hitrem napredku pri ureditvi in nadzoru finančnega trga, zlasti v zvezi s trgi izvedenih finančnih instrumentov ter vlogo bonitetnih agencij, pa tudi v zvezi z velikim prispevkom finančnega sektorja k stroškom krize; poziva Komisijo in Svet, naj pospešita pripravo učinkovitih predlogov na to temo;
Takes note that the ECOFIN Council underlined the need to make rapid progress on financial market regulation and supervision, in particular with regard to derivative markets and the role of rating agencies and also with regard to a substantial contribution of the financial sector to the cost of the crises; calls on the Commission and the Council to speed up delivering effective proposals on this;
46. zaradi razprave o enotnem trgu vztraja, da je treba v primarno zakonodajo vključiti klavzulo o socialnem napredku, pri čemer se določi, da imajo temeljne pravice na splošno in pravica do stavke, sindikalnega boja, kolektivnih pogajanj itd. vedno prednost pred „temeljnimi svoboščinami“ notranjega trga;
Insists, with a view to the debate on the single market, on the introduction of a Social Progress Clause in EU primary law, stipulating that fundamental rights in general and the right to strike and industrial action, to collective bargaining etc. always have primacy over the 'fundamental freedoms' of the internal market;