natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
za vse druge čezmejne nesistemske banke: konsolidacijskemu nadzorniku v kolegiju (ki mora privoliti v vodstvo), v okviru usklajevanja EBA in v posvetovanju s skupinami za čezmejno stabilnost;
for all other cross-border non-systemic banks: the consolidated supervisor within the college (under its agreed governance), under the coordination of the EBA and in consultation with the cross-border stability groups;
za lokalne banke: lokalni nadzornik.
for local banks: the local supervisor.
Oblikovati je treba skupna pravila za obvladovanje krize, vključno s skupnimi metodologijami, opredelitvami in terminologijo, ter ustrezna merila za teste izjemnih situacij v čezmejnih bankah.
Design a common set of rules for crisis management including common methodologies, definitions and terminology, and a set of relevant criteria for stress test for cross-border banks.
Do decembra 2011 je treba oblikovati evropske nadzorne ocene za banke (prikaz tveganja) na podlagi skupnih kvantitativnih in kvalitativnih kazalnikov.
Design, before December 2011, a European supervisory rating for banks (Risk Dashboard) based on a common set of quantitative and qualitative indicators.
neusklajenost ročnosti, obrestnih mer in valut;
mismatch of maturity, interest rate and currency;
likvidnost sredstev;
liquidity of assets;
velike izpostavljenosti in koncentracije tveganja;
large exposures and risk concentrations;
pričakovane izgube;
expected losses;
občutljivost na tržne cene, obresti in devizne tečaje;
sensitivity to market prices, interest and exchange rates;
dostop do financiranja;
access to funding;
izide testov izjemnih situacij;
outcomes of stress tests;
učinkovitost notranje kontrole;
effectiveness of internal controls;
kakovost upravljanja in vodenja podjetja;
quality of management and corporate governance;
zapletenost in nejasnost;
complexity and opacity;
pričakovana tveganja;
risk outlook;
skladnost z zakoni ali drugimi predpisi.
compliance with law or regulatory requirements.
zahtevati prilagoditev kapitala (da bo presegal minimalne zakonske zahteve) ali likvidnosti in spremembe spleta dejavnosti in notranjih procesov;
require adjustments of capital (above the minimum regulatory requirements) or liquidity and changes in the business mix and internal process;
priporočiti ali zahtevati spremembe uprave;
recommend or impose changes of management;
zahtevati zadržanje dividend in omejitve za konsolidacijo kapitalskih zahtev; omejiti pogoje bančnih licenc;
impose dividend retention and restrictions in order to consolidate capital requirements; limit the terms of banking licences;
dovoliti nadzornikom, da sprožijo ločitev samostojnih modulov, tako uspešnih kot neuspešnih, od institucije, da bi zagotovili nadaljnje delovanje osnovnih funkcij;
allow supervisors to trigger separation of stand-alone modules, whether failing or successful, from the institution to ensure core functions can continue to operate;
naložiti celotno ali delno prodajo;
impose a total or partial sale;
prenesti sredstva in obveznosti na druge institucije, da bi zagotovili neprekinjenost sistemsko pomembnega poslovanja;
transfer assets and liabilities to other institutions with the objective to ensure continuity of systemically important operations;
ustanoviti premostitveno banko ali dobro/slabo banko;
create a bridge bank or good bank/bad bank;
zahtevati konverzijo dolga v lastniški delež ali drug konvertibilen kapital, odvisno od vrste institucije, z ustreznimi odbitki;
require swaps of debt into equity, or other convertible capital, depending on the nature of the institution, with appropriate haircuts;
prevzeti začasni javni nadzor;
take temporary public control;
zahtevati začasen odlog (moratorij) za nekatere vrste zahtevkov do banke;
impose a temporary suspension (moratorium) of certain types of claims against the bank;
nadzorovati postopek prenosov sredstev znotraj skupine;
control the process of intra-group asset transfers;
imenovati posebnega upravitelja na ravni skupine;
appoint a special administrator at group level;
urejati postopek prenehanja;
regulate winding-up;
omogočiti EBA, da dovoli posredovanje sklada EU za finančno stabilnost, vključno z zagotavljanjem srednjeročnega kriznega financiranja, kapitalskih injekcij in jamstev;
allow the EBA to authorise the intervention of the EU financial stability fund including for the provision of emergency medium-term funding, capital injections and guarantees;
naložiti upravne in reševalne ukrepe za tiste institucije, ki uporabljajo sklad EU za finančno stabilnost.
impose administrative and reparation measures for those institutions using the Fund.
Priporočilo 2 o čezmejnih sistemskih bankah
Recommendation 2 relating to cross-border systemic banks
Evropski parlament meni, da bi se moral zakonodajni akt, ki bi naj bil sprejet, osredotočiti na ureditev naslednjega:
The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to regulate the following:
To vključuje posebno „osemindvajseto“ ureditev za postopke insolventnosti za čezmejne sistemske banke, ki se lahko pozneje razširi še na vse čezmejne banke.
This shall include a special ‘28th’ regime for in insolvency procedures for cross-border systemic banks, which may later be extended to all cross-border banks;
Na podlagi teh meril bo odbor nadzornikov redno in po posvetovanju z Evropskim odborom za sistemska tveganja opredeljeval takšne banke (člen 12b poročila Odbora za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve z dne 17. maja 2010 o predlogu uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o ustanovitvi Evropskega bančnega organa (poročilo o EBA)).
On the basis of such criteria; such banks will be identified on a regular basis by the board of supervisors, after consultation of the European Systemic Risk Board, (Article 12b of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee's report of 17 May 2010 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Banking Authority (the ‘EBA Report’);
Priporočilo 3 o skladu EU za finančno stabilnost
Recommendation 3 relating to an EU financial stability fund
Ustanovi se sklad EU za finančno stabilnost, za katerega bo pristojen EBA in iz katerega se bodo financirala posredovanja (sanacija ali redno prenehanje) za ohranjanje stabilnosti sistema in omejevanje širjenja negativnih vplivov propadlih bank.
An EU Financial Stability Fund (Fund) shall be created, under the responsibility of the EBA, to finance interventions (rehabilitation or orderly winding-up) aimed at preserving the system's stability and limiting contagion from failing banks.
Komisija do aprila 2011 predloži Parlamentu predlog s podrobnostmi o ustanovni listini sklada EU za finančno stabilnost, njegovi strukturi, upravljanju, velikosti in operativnem modelu ter natančen časovni načrt izvajanja (v skladu s točkama 2 in 3 spodaj).
The Commission shall present to Parliament, by April 2011, a proposal with details of the Fund's charter, structure, governance, size, operating model as well as a precise calendar for implementation (in accordance with points 2 and 3 below).
Sklad EU za finančno stabilnost bo:
The Fund shall be:
ločen in neodvisen od sistemov zajamčenih vlog;
separate and independent from deposit-guarantee schemes;
primerno velik, da bo lahko podpiral začasna posredovanja (na primer posojila, nakupi sredstev, kapitalski vložki) in pokrival stroške postopkov za reševanje ali postopkov v primeru insolventnosti;
adequately sized to support temporary interventions (such as loans, asset purchases and capital injections) and cover costs of resolution or insolvency procedures;
nastajal postopoma, ob upoštevanju sedanjega gospodarskega okolja;
gradually built, recognising the present economic environment;
zamišljen tako, da ne bo ustvarjal moralnega tveganja, in ne bo na voljo za reševanje delničarjev bank ali izplačevanje nagrad upravi za njen neuspeh.
designed in a way that does not create moral hazard: the Fund shall not be used to bail out bank shareholders or to reward the management for its own failure;
naložbene smernice za sredstva sklada EU za finančno stabilnost (tveganje, likvidnost, usklajevanje s cilji EU);
investment guidelines for the Fund's assets (risk, liquidity, alignment with EU targets);
merila za izbor upravljavca sredstev sklada EU za finančno stabilnost (notranji ali prek zasebne ali javne tretje stranke, kot je na primer Evropska investicijska banka);
selection criteria for the Fund's asset manager (internal or via a private or public third party such as the European Investment Bank);
možnost, da bi bili prispevki upravičeni za vključitev v izračun predpisanih kapitalskih kazalnikov;
the possibility of contributions qualifying for calculation of regulatory capital ratios;
upravne ukrepe (kazni ali kompenzacijske sheme) za čezmejne sistemske banke, ki uporabljajo sredstva sklada EU za finančno stabilnost;
administrative measures (penalties or compensation schemes) for those cross-border systemic banks which make use of the Fund;
pogoje za morebitno širitev področja uporabe sklada EU za finančno stabilnost na druge čezmejne banke, poleg čezmejnih sistemskih bank;
conditions for eventual expansion of the scope of the Fund to include all cross-border banks beyond cross-border systemic banks;
obseg (in ustreznost) oblikovanja mreže nacionalnih skladov za vse institucije, ki ne sodelujejo v skladu EU za finančno stabilnost.
scope (and appropriateness) of the creation of a network of national funds to cater for all institutions that do not participate in the Fund.
Priporočilo 4 o enoti za reševanje
Recommendation 4 relating to a resolution unit
Enota bo:
That unit shall:
delovala v okviru strogih meja, ki jih določa pravni okvir in pristojnost EBA;
operate within the strict boundaries defined by the legal framework and the EBA's competencies;
sestavljena iz pravnih in finančnih strokovnjakov, posebej usposobljenih za prestrukturiranje, preobrat in likvidacijo bank;
comprise a pool of legal and financial expertise specially skilled in bank restructurings, turnarounds and liquidation;
tesno sodelovala z nacionalnimi organi pri izvajanju, tehnični pomoči in izmenjavi osebja;
cooperate closely with national authorities on implementation, technical assistance and sharing of staff;
predlagala dodelitev sredstev iz sklada EU za finančno stabilnost;
propose disbursements from the Fund;
če se pojavi potreba po reševanju ali prenehanju poslovanja čezmejnih institucij, bi morali neodvisni strokovnjaki, ki jih imenuje EBA, opraviti temeljito preiskavo, da bi osvetlili, za katere vzroke in čigavo odgovornost gre.
where the need for a resolution or winding-up of a cross-border institution arises, an in-depth investigation should be carried out by independent experts appointed by the EBA in order to analyse and highlight the causes and responsibilities involved.
Parlament bi bilo treba obvestiti o rezultatih teh preiskav.
Parliament should be informed of the results of the investigations.
ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije, zlasti členov 122 in 143 te pogodbe,
having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 122 and 143 thereof,
ob upoštevanju dokumenta evroskupine z dne 7. junija 2010 o evropskem instrumentu za finančno stabilnost,
having regard to the Euro Group's terms of reference of 7 June 2010 on a European Financial Stability Facility,
ob upoštevanju sklepa 16 držav članic evroobmočja z dne 7. junija 2010,
having regard to the decision of 7 June 2010 of the 16 euro area Member States,
ob upoštevanju sporočila Komisije z dne 12. maja 2010 o okrepitvi usklajevanja ekonomskih politik ( KOM(2010)0250 ),
having regard to the Commission communication of 12 May 2010 on reinforcing economic policy coordination ( COM(2010)0250 ),
ob upoštevanju Uredbe Sveta (EU) št. 407/2010 z dne 11. maja 2010 o vzpostavitvi Evropskega mehanizma za finančno stabilizacijo,
having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism,
ob upoštevanju Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 332/2002 z dne 18. februarja 2002 o ustanovitvi aranžmaja za zagotavljanje srednjeročne finančne pomoči za plačilne bilance držav članic,
having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002 of 18 February 2002 establishing a facility providing medium-term financial assistance for Member States' balances of payments,
ob upoštevanju izjave vodij držav in vlad evroobmočja z dne 7. maja 2010;
having regard to the statement of 7 May 2010 of the Heads of State and Government of the euro area,
ob upoštevanju sklepov Ekonomsko-finančnega sveta z dne 9.–10. maja 2010,
having regard to the conclusions of the ECOFIN Council of 9-10 May 2010,
ob upoštevanju izjave vodij držav in vlad evroobmočja z dne 25. marca 2010;
having regard to the statement of 25 March 2010 by the Heads of State and Government of the euro area,
ob upoštevanju sklepov Evropskega sveta z dne 25-26. marca 2010,
having regard to the conclusions of the European Council of 25-26 March 2010,
ob upoštevanju izjave držav članic evroobmočja z dne 11. aprila 2010 o podpori držav članic evroobmočja Grčiji,
having regard to the statement by the Member States of the euro area of 11 April 2010 on the support to Greece by euro area Member States,
ob upoštevanju vprašanja Komisiji z dne 24. junija 2010 o evropskem instrumentu za finančno stabilnost, Evropskem mehanizmu za finančno stabilizacijo in prihodnjih ukrepih ( O-0095/2010 – B7-0318/2010 ),
having regard to the question of 24 June 2010 to the Commission on the European Financial Stability Facility and European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism and future actions ( O-0095/2010 – B7-0318/2010 ),
ob upoštevanju člena 115(5) in člena 110(2) Poslovnika,
having regard to Rules 115(5) and 110(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
ker avtorji Maastrichtske pogodbe niso predvideli možnosti dolžniške krize znotraj evroobmočja,
whereas the authors of the Maastricht Treaty had not foreseen the possibility of a sovereign debt crisis inside the euro area,
ker se je javni dolg, ki so ga izdale države članice evroobmočja, jeseni leta 2009 večal še hitreje,
whereas the spreads of sovereign debt issued by Member States of the euro area widened more rapidly during autumn 2009,
ker so se razmere na trgu državnega dolga za nekatere države članice spomladi leta 2010 precej poslabšale, maja 2010 pa so dosegle kritično raven,
whereas the situation in the sovereign debt market for certain Member States worsened considerably during spring 2010 and reached a critical stage in May 2010,
ker so na trgu državnega dolga nastale razmere, ki jih je treba bolje razumeti;
whereas there have been developments in the sovereign debt markets that need to be better understood,
ker je finančna pomoč Evropske unije za namen Uredbe Sveta (EU) št. 407/2010 z dne 11. maja 2010 v skladu s členom 2.2 te uredbe omejena na kritje, razpoložljivo v okviru zgornje meje lastnih sredstev za odobritve plačil; ker člen 3.5 določa, da Komisija in država članica prejemnica skleneta memorandum o soglasju, v katerem so podrobno določeni splošni pogoji gospodarske politike v zvezi s finančno pomočjo Unije in ki ga Komisija pošlje Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu,
whereas European Union financial assistance for the purposes of Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 shall, according to Article 2.2 of the regulation, be limited to the margin available under the own resources ceiling for payment appropriations; whereas Article 3.5 provides that the Commission and the beneficiary Member States shall conclude a memorandum of understanding, detailing the economic policy conditions attached to Union financial assistance, which the Commission shall communicate to Parliament and the Council,
ker so države članice evroobmočja 7. junija 2010 v skladu s sklepi z zasedanja Ekonomsko-finančnega sveta dne 9.–10. maja 2010 vzpostavile Evropski instrument za finančno stabilnost (EFSF) kot družbo z omejeno odgovornostjo (
whereas, on 7 June 2010, the euro area Member States – in line with the conclusions of the ECOFIN Council of 9-10 May 2010 – established the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) as a limited liability company (
) v skladu z luksemburško zakonodajo, pri čemer države članice evroobmočja temu instrumentu zagotavljajo sredstva v višini do 440 milijard evrov na sorazmerni osnovi,
) under Luxembourg law, with euro area Member States providing guarantees for EFSF issuance up to a total of EUR 440 billion on a pro-rata basis,
pozdravlja nedavne ukrepe za zaščito stabilnosti evra, sprejete na ravni EU in na nacionalni ravni; obžaluje, da evropski oblikovalci politike kljub stalnemu poglabljanju finančne krize niso že prej sprejeli odločnih ukrepov;
Welcomes the recent actions taken at EU level and at national level to safeguard the stability of the euro; regrets that European policymakers did not take decisive action earlier, despite the steady worsening of the financial crisis;
vendar poudarja, da so ti ukrepi zgolj začasni in da bo treba doseči dejanski napredek v zvezi s fiskalno in strukturno politiko v posameznih državah članicah, pa tudi z vzpostavitvijo novega, močnejšega okvira za gospodarsko upravljanje, ki bo usmerjen k preprečevanju nastanka podobnih kriz v prihodnosti ter povečanju potenciala rasti in trajnostnemu makroekonomskemu usklajevanju v EU;
Stresses, however, that these actions are merely of a temporary nature and that real progress will have to be made on fiscal and structural polices in the individual Member States, and on establishing a new, stronger framework for economic governance, geared to preventing future occurrences of similar crises, as well as increasing growth potential and sustainable macroeconomic rebalancing in the EU;
meni, da sedanje krize ni mogoče trajno rešiti preprosto z dodajanjem novega dolga že tako globoko zadolženim državam;
Considers that the current crises cannot be resolved in the long run by simply pouring new debt into highly indebted countries;
meni, da morajo predpisi, ki urejajo družbe, ustanovljene za posebne namene, ne glede na Uredbo Sveta (EU) št. 407/2010 z dne 11. maja 2010 in Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 332/2002 z dne 18. februarja 2002 predvideti možnost, da države, ki niso v evroobmočju, sodelujejo v družbi, ustanovljeni za posebne namene, če se tako same odločijo;
Believes that, notwithstanding Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 and Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002 of 18 February 2002, the rules governing the special purpose vehicle (SPV) should provide for the possibility of countries not in the euro area opting in to the SPV facility;
je seznanjen s sporočilom Komisije KOM(2010)0250 o okrepitvi usklajevanja ekonomskih politik kot pomembnem prispevku k močnejšemu usklajevanju ekonomskih politik v EU; meni, da bi morali zakonodajni predlogi o okrepljenem gospodarskem nadzoru vključevati novo sekundarno zakonodajo na podlagi člena 121(6) Pogodbe; meni tudi, da bi moral biti cilj bodočega okvira za nadzorovanje doseganje trajnostnih javnih financ in gospodarske rasti, konkurenčnosti, socialne kohezije in zmanjšanja trgovinskih neravnovesij;
Takes note of Commission communication COM(2010)0250 on reinforcing economic policy coordination as an important contribution to stronger economic policy coordination in the EU; considers that legislative proposals on enhanced economic surveillance should include new secondary legislation on the basis of Article 121(6) of the Treaty; considers that the future surveillance framework should aim to achieve sustainable public finances and economic growth, competitiveness, social cohesion and a lessening of trade imbalances;
meni, da je treba pri vzpostavljanju novih instrumentov in postopkov EU upoštevati vloge evropskih institucij, vključno z zakonodajno in proračunsko vlogo Parlamenta ter neodvisno vlogo ECB pri odločanju o monetarni politiki,
Considers that, when establishing new EU instruments and procedures, account needs to be taken of the respective roles of the European institutions, including the legislative and budgetary role of Parliament and the independent role of the ECB in decision making on monetary policy;
poziva Komisijo, naj pripravi oceno učinka Evropskega mehanizma za finančno stabilizacijo, zlasti na proračun EU in druge finančne instrumente EU ter posojila EIB,
Asks the Commission to provide an assessment of the impact of the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, in particular on the EU budget and other EU financial instruments and loans by the EIB;
poziva Komisijo, naj pripravi tudi oceno učinka Evropskega instrumenta za finančno stabilnost, zlasti na delovanje trga evroobveznic in njihovo nihanje; poziva Komisijo, naj poleg tega oceni izvedljivost in uporabnost postopka odločanja za te družbe, ustanovljene za posebne namene, da bi poiskali dolgoročno rešitev,
Asks the Commission to provide an assessment of the impact of the European Financial Stability Facility, in particular on the functioning of the euro bond markets and their spreads; asks the Commission to assess, in addition, the practicability and accountability of the decision-making procedure for this special purpose vehicle (SPV), with a view to a longer-term solution;
sprašuje, ali so predvideni kakšni ukrepi za zagotovitev enakega obravnavanja; v zvezi s tem ugotavlja, na primer, da se zdi obrestna mera za Evropski mehanizem za finančno stabilnost drugačna od sprejetega paketa za Grčijo, ker bodo posojilojemalci EFSF plačali neto vrednost celotnih stroškov družbi, ustanovljeni za posebne namene, za zbiranje sredstev; poleg tega sprašuje, kako je mogoče zagotoviti poštenost za države, ki niso članice ekonomske in monetarne unije, če Evropski mehanizem za finančno stabilnost deluje zgolj po tem, ko so bila porabljena sredstva v višini 60 milijard evrov;
Asks if any measures are envisaged to ensure equal treatment; notes, for instance, in this regard that the interest rate for the EFSF appears different from the package agreed for Greece because EFSF borrowers will pay the net all-in cost to the SPV for raising the funds; asks, furthermore, how fairness can be assured for non-EMU members if the EFSF operates only after the EUR 60 billion facility has been used up;
opaža, da javni dolg v evroobmočju nima nujno ničnega nominalnega kreditnega tveganja, kot določa direktiva o kapitalskih zahtevah, in da se je zaradi nedavnih dogodkov povečalo kreditno tveganje dolgoročnega dolga, ki ga izdajo države članice; meni, da bi morala Evropski bančni organ in Evropski odbor za sistemska tveganja obravnavati ta problem;
Observes that the sovereign debt in the euro area does not necessarily have zero nominal credit risk as presumed by the Capital Requirements Directive and that current developments have increased the credit risk of long-term debt issued by Member States; takes the view that the European Banking Authority and the European Systemic Risk Board should address this problem;
ugotavlja, da ima direktiva o kapitalskih zahtevah nično utež tveganja za javne obveznice;
Notes that the Capital Requirements Directive has zero risk weighting for sovereign bonds;
poziva ECB, naj poda podrobno razlago za svoje nedavne odločitve, da kupi javne obveznice na sekundarnem trgu, in meni, da bi morala ECB pripraviti izhodno strategijo z jasnim časovnim razporedom za končanje te prakse;
Asks the ECB to give a detailed explanation of its recent decisions to buy government bonds on the secondary market, and considers that the ECB should prepare an exit strategy with a clear timetable for ceasing this practice;
meni, da je treba za dolgoročno rešitev obravnavati problem notranjih neravnovesij in nevzdržnega bremena dolgov, torej strukturnih vzrokov sedanje krize; meni, da takšna dolgoročnejša vizija vključuje izravnavanje notranjih makroekonomskih neravnovesij v evroobmočju in v EU, ter torej obravnavanje znatnih razlik v konkurenčnosti med državami članicami;
Believes that a longer-term solution requires tackling the problem of internal imbalances and unsustainable debt and, therefore, the structural roots of the current crisis; considers that such a longer-term vision involves correcting internal macroeconomic imbalances within the euro area and the EU, and hence tackling substantial differences of competitiveness between Member States;