natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kot dodatek k temu mnenju poskuša Clive MAXWELL iz HMT v H4 razložiti, kako je bil pristop Združenega kraljestva k „varnemu in smotrnemu nadzoru označen kot pristop svobodnega oglaševanja.
In H4, Clive MAXWELL from HMT adds to the previous point by trying to explain how the UK's approach to " prudential supervision was characterised as being one of ‘freedom with publicity’.
Zavarovalnice so na podlagi obstoječe zakonodaje svobodno določale svoje politike in sprejemale odločitve, če so javnosti razkrile nekatere informacije.
Insurance companies were given freedom within the applicable legislation to determine their policies and make their own decisions, provided that certain information was disclosed to the public.
Ta pristop je bil namerno oblikovan, da se prepreči neprimerno poseganje v poslovanje družb, ker je prevladovalo mnenje, da to zavira inovativnost in podjetništvo, kar bi negativno vplivalo na možnost izbire zavarovancev in potrošnikov“.
The approach was deliberately designed to avoid undue interference in the affairs of companies, since this was thought likely to inhibit innovation and entrepreneurial behaviour, which would have been to the detriment of policyholders and consumer choice. "
Zakonodajalci so uporabili zakonodajo
The regulators applied the law
Kot odgovor na vprašanje člana, ali je bila vlada Združenega kraljestva zadovoljna, da so zakonodajalci v zvezi z začetkom veljavnosti tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju zvesto upoštevali izvedbene določbe in vsebino direktive, izjavlja MAXWELL v H4, da je v zvezi z „ uporabo zakonodaje v praksi, zakonodajalec uporabil zakonodajo “.
Responding to a question from a Member as to whether the UK Government was satisfied that the regulators, in relation to the entry into force of the 3LD, faithfully applied the implementing provisions as well as the spirit of the directive, Mr MAXWELL states in H4 that regarding "the application of the law in practice, the regulators have applied the law."
Končno odgovorno za krizo je vodstvo družbe ELAS
Ultimate responsibility of the crisis lies in hands of ELAS management
McELWEE izjavlja v H3 tudi, da je „ glavni razlog za krizo družbe Equitable Life v celoti v vodstvu družbe, ki je bilo skorumpirano ali nevedno “.
In H3, Mr MCELWEE also says that “ the ultimate reason why Equitable Life found itself in this crisis lies squarely in the hands of the management, which was variously venal or ignorant.”
To je tudi eden od delnih sklepov Penroseovega poročila (WE 16).
This is also one of the partial conclusions of the Penrose report (WE 16).
Vendar pa Brian CHASE GREY (WE 9) trdi, da je za krizo družbe ELAS odgovorna britanska vlada.
However, Brian CHASE GREY (WE 9) claims that the British Government is responsible for the collapse of ELAS.
V zvezi s tem navaja skrivno dogovarjanje z družbo ELAS, ki je potekalo 6 let za zakritje dokazov o resničnih vzrokih za krizo, pri čemer je po njegovem mnenju to zaroto na vsakem koraku usmerjalo in podpiralo Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve.
He denounces collusion with ELAS over a 6-year period to suppress evidence of the true cause of the collapse, a conspiracy that, according to him, at every stage was inspired, sourced, and supported by HM Treasury.
Glede vprašanja odgovornosti trdi WE Conf 3, da je družba ELAS večkrat lagala glede stanja družbe in glede njene uspešnosti.
On the issue of responsibility, WE Conf 3 claims that ELAS repeatedly lied concerning the state of the company and the successes that they were enjoying.
Družba je delovala malomarno, ker ni shranjevala dobičkov iz borzne rasti za izplačevanje dobičkov upravičenim zavarovancem, prav tako ni ustvarjala rezervacij za prihodnja izplačila zavarovancem s policami z zajamčenimi rentami.
They were negligent in not putting aside gains from stock market growth for ‘with profit’ policyholders nor making provision for future payments of GAR policyholders.
Prav tako navaja, da si je vodstvo izplačevalo visoke plače, visoke bonuse in pokojnine.
It also claims that management paid itself large salaries, large bonuses and large pension benefits.
Prav tako vsebuje pritožbe nad delom revizorjev družbe Ernst & Young, ker niso pravilno revidirali računovodskih izkazov družbe Equitable Life ter se prepričali, da družba nima dovolj denarja za kritje skladov za zavarovance s policami z zajamčenimi rentami.
It also contains claims against the auditors, Ernst & Young, for not conducting a proper audit of Equitable Life’s Accounts and ascertaining that there was not enough money to cover GAR policyholders' funds.
Ureditev se mora razvijati, odgovor pa je Solventnost II
The regime must evolve, and the answer is Solvency II
Clive MAXWELL iz HMT navaja v H4, da „ ne more noben sistem nadzora ostati nespremenjen na trgu, ki se neprestano spreminja .
In H4, Clive MAXWELL from HMT says that " no system of supervision can stand still in ever-changing markets.
Pomembno je, da se evropski okvir za nadzor zavarovalnic za življenjsko zavarovanje še naprej razvija, da bo zagotovil ustrezno varstvo zavarovancem.
It is important that the European framework for the supervision of life insurance companies continues to evolve to secure an appropriate level of protection for policyholders.
Vlada Združenega kraljestva zato podpira projekt Evropske komisije Solventnost II.“
The UK Government, therefore, supports the European Commission’s Solvency II project ".
Člen 8 – Bonitetni nadzor
Article 8 - Prudential supervision
Člen 8 tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju se ne upošteva
Article 8 of the 3LD not respected
Člen 15(3) prve direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju, kakor je bil spremenjen s tretjo direktivo o življenjskem zavarovanju (člen 8), določa, da morajo pristojni organi domače države članice od vsake zavarovalnice zahtevati, da uporablja smotrne upravne in računovodske postopke ter ustrezne mehanizme notranjega nadzora.
Article 15(3) of the 1LD as amended by the 3LD (Article 8) provides that the competent authorities of the home Member State shall require every assurance undertaking to have sound administrative and accounting procedures and adequate internal control mechanisms.
LAKE trdi v H1, da se tudi ta določba ni pravilno upoštevala.
Again, this provision was not correctly followed, argues Mr. LAKE in H1.
Njegova utemeljitev je: bistven del nacionalnega zavarovalniškega okvira Združenega kraljestva je kvalificiran imenovani aktuar, ki ga imenujejo zavarovalnice za svetovanje glede rezerv, bonusov, pričakovanj itd. ter ki bi moral delno delovati kot varuh interesov zavarovancev.
His argument is as follows: an essential part of the UK national insurance framework is the qualified Appointed Actuary whom insurers appoint to advise on reserving, bonuses, expectations etc. and who should act partly as a guardian of policy-holders' interests.
LAKE trdi, da je dejstvo, da leta 1992 „imenovani aktuar Roy Ranson postal izvršni direktor družbe ELAS, ne da bi prej odstopil s položaja imenovanega aktuarja, kar je bilo očitno v nasprotju z interesi zavarovancev, vendar pa zakonodaja Združenega kraljestva ni zagotavljala možnosti za odstavitev Ransona“ (H1).
Mr. LAKE claims that the fact that in 1992 " Appointed Actuary Roy Ranson became CEO of ELAS without relinquishing the role of Appointed Actuary was clearly prejudicial to the interests of policy-holders but that UK legislation did not provide for the removal of Mr Ranson " (H1).
Po mnenju LAKEA je to razlog, da so bili organi Združenega kraljestva zaradi napačnega izvajanja nemočni.
It follows, according to Mr. LAKE, that faulty implementation rendered the UK authorities powerless.
Vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko Združenega kraljestva se ni strinjal z dvojno vlogo Ransona, vendar ni storil ničesar.
The UK GAD explicitly expressed its disapproval of Mr Ranson's dual role but did nothing.
Holmes (WE 84) prav tako podrobno obravnava vprašanje pomanjkanja dobrih upravnih in računovodskih postopkov ter ustreznih mehanizmov notranjega nadzora, in sicer vprašanje imenovanega aktuarja, pri čemer citira navedbe Penroesa (WE 16) in ponavlja obtožbe, ki jih ta navaja v WE 16.
Mr. HOLMES (WE 84) also goes into detail on the issue of lack of sound administrative and accounting procedures and adequate internal control mechanisms, namely the Appointed Actuary issue problem, quoting at length Penrose (WE 16) and repeating the allegations contained therein.
Vendar je Clive MAXWELL iz HMT med izpraševanjem H4 zavrnil to trditev z besedami, da „se tretja direktiva o življenjskem zavarovanju ne sklicuje na posameznika z nazivom imenovani aktuar .
However, Clive MAXWELL from HMT, under questioning during H4, rejects this claim, arguing that " the Third Life Directive does not refer to an individual called an Appointed Actuary.
Vprašanje, ali lahko imenovani aktuar prevzame določen položaj, zato ne zadeva tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju.
The question of whether an Appointed Actuary could take on that particular role is therefore not a matter for that Third Life Directive.
Tudi v številnih drugih zavarovalnicah za življenjsko zavarovanje je bilo običajno, da je imel imenovani aktuar v sistemu Združenega kraljestva takšno vlogo“.
It was a common arrangement with a number of other life insurance companies that the Appointed Actuary played that sort of role within the UK system."
Penrose ugotavlja splošen neuspeh pri bonitetnem nadzoru družbe ELAS
Penrose detects general failings as regard prudential supervision of ELAS
Penrosovo poročilo (WE 16) ugotavlja splošen neuspeh pri bonitetnem nadzoru družbe ELAS: „Predpis in nasveti Vladnega oddelka za zavarovalniško statistiko so bili izrecno usmerjeni na minimalni kapital za pogodbene obveznosti in niso upoštevali vračunanih terminalnih ali končnih bonusov, kljub temu da je bila v času poročila iz leta 1989 izpostavljenost tržnim padcem resnična ter da so vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko in zakonodajalci to vedeli“ (pogl.
The Penrose report (WE 16) detects general failings as regard prudential supervision of ELAS: "Regulation, and GAD's advice, were focused exclusively on the solvency margin over contractual liabilities and took no account of accrued terminal or final bonus, notwithstanding that at the date of the 1989 report exposure to falling markets was real and was known to GAD and the regulators."(Ch.16-16) .
Nič ni bilo storjeno za vzpostavitev ustreznega sistema“ (pogl.
No special steps were taken to put in place a suitable system."
V podporo tem trditvam navaja WE Conf 3, da zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva niso obravnavali težav družbe ELAS, ko so pred letom 1997, morda celo že leta 1991, resne težave organizacije postale znane.
Supporting these ideas, WE Conf 3 claims UK regulators did not deal with ELAS' problems when serious difficulties within the organisation were known before 1997 and possibly even as early as 1991.
Zakonodajalci niso ugotovili, da je imela družba nezadostna sredstva za kritje izplačil zavarovancem s policami z zajamčenimi rentami.
They did not realise that there were insufficient funds to cover policyholders with GARs.
Razumna pričakovanja zavarovancev, ki jih ščiti zakonodaja Združenega kraljestva
PRE protected by UK law
LAKE trdi v H1, „ da zakonodaja Združenega kraljestva določa, da morajo pristojni organi ščititi razumna pričakovanja zavarovancev ali potencialnih zavarovancev“.
Mr. LAKE in H1 claims that " in UK law the 'reasonable expectations of the policyholders or potential policyholders' (PRE) have the protection of the competent authorities ".
Dokazi Holmesa (WE 84) podpirajo to tezo: „Varstvo razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev v skladu z zakonodajo Združenega kraljestva je bilo izjemno pomembno, ker se je v osemdesetih in devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja bilanca prejemkov, ki jih je zagotavljala družba na podlagi njenih polic, premaknila stran od zajamčenih prejemkov k nezajamčenim terminalnim bonusom. [...]
Mr HOLMES's (WE 84) evidence supports this thesis: "The protection of PRE under UK law was of great importance because of the shift in the 1980's and 1990's in the balance of benefits provided by ELAS under its policies away from guaranteed benefits to un-guaranteed terminal (later final) bonus. [...]
Ker zajamčeni prejemki ustrezajo opredelitvi obveznosti iz nacionalne zakonodaje in zakonodaje Skupnosti in je zato zanje treba ustvariti rezerve, je bilo v zakonodajni shemi Združenega kraljestva edino varstvo za neizplačane terminalne ali končne bonuse obveznost obravnavati vprašanje, ali mora država poseči v družbo, da zaščiti razumna pričakovanja zavarovancev v zvezi s takšnimi bonusi“.
Whereas guaranteed benefits qualified as 'liabilities' under national an Community law, and therefore had to be reserved for, the only protection accorded to unallocated terminal or final bonus under the UK regulatory scheme was the obligation to consider whether to intervene in order to protect the reasonable expectations raised in relation to such bonus".
Razumna pričakovanja zavarovancev je ustvarila praksa družbe ELAS
PRE were created by ELAS' practice
Glede vprašanja razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev izjavlja Penrose (WE 16), da so mu zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva povedali, da razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev v zvezi s terminalnimi bonusi ni ustvarila praksa družbe na področju bonusov.
On the issue of PRE, Penrose (WE 16) states that he was told by the UK regulators that PRE in respect of terminal bonuses were not created by the society's bonus practice.
Vendar se Penrose s tem ne strinja in izjavlja, da razumna pričakovanja zavarovancev izhajajo iz prakse družbe na področju terminalnih bonusov (z drugimi zavarovanci so razumno pričakovali, da so poleg pogodbenih prejemkov upravičeni do diskrecijskih bonusov ali da jih bodo prejeli).
Instead he argues in the opposite direction, stating that PRE did arise by reason of the Society's terminal bonus practice (in other words, that policyholders had reasonably expectations that they were entitled or would receive discretionary bonuses in addition to contractual benefits).
V odstavku 220 poglavja 18 WE 16 je navedeno: „Vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko ter Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve sta za preiskavo povedala, da so Vladni oddelek in zakonodajalci ves čas priznavali pomembnost končnih bonusov, vendar praksa družbe na področju bonusov ni izpolnila razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev v zvezi s končnimi bonusi.
Paragraph 220, chapter 18, WE 16, states: "GAD and the Treasury have told the inquiry that the relevance of terminal bonus was always recognised by GAD and the regulators, but that PRE in respect of terminal bonus was not created by the Society's bonus practice.
Opozarjata na zapise, ki kažejo, da končni bonusi niso bili zajamčeni.
They point to the notes that stated that terminal bonus was not guaranteed.
Za ugotovitev, da bi imeli zavarovanci razumna pričakovanja za prejem določenega zneska bonusov, ni nujno stališče, da bi se razumna pričakovanja vseeno ustvarila.
It is not necessary to conclude that policyholders would have reasonable expectations of receiving a precise amount of bonus to take the view that reasonable expectations would still have been created.
Položaja, ko družba ne bi mogla izplačati vrednosti polic brez dviga tržne vrednosti ali medgeneracijskih prenosov, zavarovanci družbe ne bi razumeli na podlagi informacij, ki so jim bile zagotovljene, ter družbi ne bi sporočili svojih razumnih pričakovanj“.
A position where the Society could not afford to honour the policy values without rising market values or inter-generational transfers would not have been understood by the Society's policyholders on the information provided to them, and would not have informed their reasonable expectations."
Učinkovit nadzor v rokah industrije življenjskih zavarovanj
Effective control in the hands of the life assurance industry
„Združenje vlagateljev ugotavlja, da je bil bonitetni sistem Združenega kraljestva oblikovan tako, da daje videz ustrezne ureditve, vendar pušča učinkovit nadzor industriji življenjskih zavarovanj, “ ugotavlja JOSEPHS v H2.
" The Investors' association concludes that the UK prudential system was designed to give the appearance of proper regulation but it left effective control in the hands of the life assurance industry ", is the conclusion drawn by Mr JOSEPHS in H2.
Preiskovalni odbor je zaprosil, da preveri, „ali je takšen dosleden vzorec prikrivanja in napačnega usmerjanja združljiv z zakonodajno ureditvijo iz direktive ES o življenjskem zavarovanju ali pa bi moral biti združljiv z njo.“
He asked EQUI to examine " whether such a consistent pattern of concealment and misdirection is or should be compatible with the regulatory regime implicit in the EC Life Directives ."
Organa za finančne storitve ne vodi industrija
FSA not industry-led
V zvezi z obtožbami, da vodi in financira Organ za finančne storitve industrija ter da deluje v korist industrije, meni McELWEE v H3, da to ni pravična oznaka.
Referring to allegations that the FSA is ‘industry-led’ as well as industry-funded and that the FSA is ‘facing the way of the industry’, Mr. McELWEE in H3 believes that this is not a fair characterisation.
Po njegovem mnenju ima „ Organ za finančne storitve štiri predpisane cilje: zaupanje v trg, ozaveščenost javnosti, varstvo potrošnikov in zmanjšanje finančnega kriminala.
According to him, “the FSA has got four statutory objectives: market confidence, public awareness, consumer protection and the reduction of financial crime.
Po zakonu mora Organ za finančne storitve čim bolj delovati na način, ki je združljiv s temi cilji.
Under statute, the FSA must, as far as possible, act in a way that is compatible with those objectives.
Od teh so vsaj trije cilji usmerjeni k potrošnikom, eden, ohranjanje zaupanja v trg, pa je nevtralen, ker obravnava področje med potrošnikom in izvajalcem.
Of these at least three appear to me to be consumer-facing and one, the maintenance of market confidence, at least neutral as between consumer and practitioner.
Na višji ravni imajo koristi od tega cilja dejansko potrošniki, ker koristi udeležencem na trgu.
At a higher level, of course, even this is ultimately to the benefit of consumers, to the extent that it benefits market participants.
Te koristi se nazadnje prenesejo tudi potrošnikom“.
Those benefits are also ultimately passed on to consumers.”
Isto meni David STRACHAN iz Organa za finančne storitve, ki je v H4 razložil, „ da je Organ za finančne storitve neodvisen od vlade Združenega kraljestva.
The same message was put across by David STRACHAN from the FSA in H4, explaining that "the FSA is independent of the UK Government.
Tudi financira se ne iz običajnih davkov.
Nor is it funded through general taxation.
Namesto tega se v celoti financiramo iz pristojbin, ki nam jih plačujejo družbe, ki jih zakonsko urejamo ali ki poslujejo na borzah Združenega kraljestva. [...]
Rather, we are funded entirely through our power to levy fees on the firms we regulate or which use the UK ’s stock markets and exchanges. [...]
Smo zakonsko določen upravni organ, ki ga je ustanovil Parlament; nismo samoregulativen organ ali trgovinsko združenje s prostovoljnim članstvom. [...]
We are a statutory regulator established by Parliament; we are not a self regulatory body or a trade association with voluntary membership. [...]
S predpisi urejene družbe v vseh finančnih sektorjih morajo plačevati stroške urejanja“.
Regulated firms across all financial sectors must pay for the costs of regulation."
Člen 10 – Pooblastila za nadzor in računovodska poročila
Article 10 – Supervisory powers & accounting returns
Družba ELAS je postala piramidna shema
ELAS became a Ponzi fund
LAKE prav tako verjame, da „ so napake vlade Združenega kraljestva in zakonodajnih organov dovolile, da je sklad družbe ELAS za življenjsko zavarovanje s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice postal piramidna shema, v kateri so se privlačna izplačila subvencionirala z vedno višjimi vlaganji novih in obstoječih zavarovancev “ (H1).
Mr. LAKE also believes that " the failures by the UK Government and regulatory authorities allowed ELAS' with-profits fund to become a “Ponzi fund” in which attractive payouts were subsidised from growing investments by new and existing policyholders " (H1).
Trdi, da je zakon ščitil zadrževanje sredstev za izpolnjevanje pričakovanih izplačil, vendar organi Združenega kraljestva niso izpolnili svoje naloge izvršiti zakon.
He claims that retention of funds to meet expected payouts was protected by law but UK authorities failed in their duty to enforce the law.
SEYMOUR je v H7 menil isto: „Zakonodajalec Združenega kraljestva bi lahko hitro ugotovil obstoj piramidne sheme, skupaj z odsotnostjo rezerv – kot so ugotovili Penrose, Burgess in Hodgson – ter odpravil pomanjkljivosti, kot to zahteva direktiva.
Mr SEYMOUR in H7 is of the same view: "the UK regulator could easily have determined the existence of a pyramid scheme, together with the absence of reserves – as did Penrose and Burgess and Hodgson – and taken remedial action as required by the Directive.
To je bilo bistveno, zlasti ker je bil objavljen rezervni sklad ključni element prodaje v Skupnosti.“
This was essential, particularly as the declared presence of a reserve fund was a key selling point throughout the Community."
Preveliko zanašanje na blag pristop
Over-reliance on 'light touch' approach
LAKE v H1 trdi, da krijejo te napake pri izvajanju pooblastila za odpravo predsodkov zavarovancev, neustreznost regulativnih poročil, nezadostna sredstva, neizvedljivo razdelitev odgovornosti v zvezi z ureditvijo informacij za potrošnike in „ preveliko zanašanje na agencije, ki jih vodi industrija, ter na tradicionalen blag pristop “.
M. LAKE claims in H1 that those implementation failures cover the powers to deal with prejudices to policy-holders, inadequacy of regulatory returns, inadequate resources, unworkable divisions of responsibility in respect of regulation of consumer information " and over-reliance on industry-led agencies and the traditional “light touch” approach ".
Trdi, da Združeno kraljestvo zaradi tega pristopa nasprotuje sprejetju cilja direktiv o življenjskem zavarovanju ter je bilo zato neuspešno pri njihovem izvajanju in izvrševanju.
He claims that this approach made the UK reluctant to adopt the aim of the life directives and thus failed in their implementation as well as in their execution.
SEYMOUR se v H7 strinja s tem mnenjem: zahteva Direktive po nadzoru „ uporablja ves čas besedo ‚bo‘ .
Mr SEYMOUR in H7 corroborates this view: on the Directives’ requirement for supervision, "the word ‘shall’ is mentioned all over the place.
Edina razlaga v zvezi s predpisi Združenega kraljestva je blag pristop, ki je po mojem mnenju zakrivanje oči pred resnico“.
The only interpretation that has been quoted for UK regulation is ‘light touch’ – which I call ‘head in the sand’ regulation. "
To je vključeno v direktive; je povsem razumno.
It is in the directives; it is totally reasonable.
Prav tako je popolnoma razumno, da zakonodajalec, ki mora nadzorovati in vedeti vse, kar se dogaja v zavarovalnici, katere sedež je na njegovem ozemlju, počne točno to ter zagotavlja, da ljudje ne prejemajo napačnih informacij in da družba ne posluje v nasprotju z oglaševalnim gradivom“.
It is also totally reasonable that the regulator who has to supervise and know thoroughly what was happening to an insurance business, whose head office was in his territory, does just that, and makes sure that people are not given wrong information and that the company is not able to run its business contrary to its sales material."
Poročila družbe ne dosegajo zahtev direktive
The Society's returns did not meet the directive's requirements
V zvezi z računovodskimi poročili izjavlja Penrose (WE 16), da „ dokler bodo evropske direktive določale obvezen preskus solventnosti, bodo morali finančni izkazi izpolnjevati zakonodajne zahteve, razvite za ta namen.
On the accounting returns, Penrose (WE 16) says that "so long as there is a regulatory solvency test prescribed under European Directives, there will be a need for financial statements that meet the regulatory requirements developed for that purpose.