natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Nicholas BELLORD trdi v H2, da „ je bilo pri pripravi osnutka tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju ugotovljeno, da so bile predlagane strožje zahteve glede rezerv in da je delegacija Združenega kraljestva te strožje zahteve podprla .
Nicholas BELLORD states in H2 that " w hen it came to the third life directive being drafted, it was found that stricter reserving requirements were being proposed, and the UK delegation was supporting these stricter requirements.
Vendar so Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve in zakonodajalci, ugotovili, da lahko ta direktiva razkrije resnico o družbi Equitable, če gre v nadaljnji postopek v takšni obliki, kot je bila zasnovana, in so zato zavrnili to zamisel, tako da so rezerve opredelili kot izbirne (…).
However, the Treasury, the regulators, realised that if this directive went ahead as drafted, it might reveal the truth about Equitable and therefore they scotched the idea by making the reserving optional (…).
V zvezi s tem trdi WE Conf 11 tudi, da ima tretja direktiva o življenjskem zavarovanju, kot je bila sprejeta, večjo napako, in sicer navedeno dejstvo, da je bilo v končni različici besedila ustvarjanje nadomestil za prihodnje bonuse izbirno (glej tudi oddelek o členu 18 tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju).
In this regard, WE Conf 11 also claims that the 3LD, as adopted, had a major flaw, namely the abovementioned fact that allowance of future bonuses was made optional in the final version of the text (see also the section on Article 18 of the 3LD).
WE Conf-11 navaja, da je bilo to storjeno pod pritiskom, ki so ga predstavniki Združenega kraljestva izvajali ves čas pogajanj za sprejetje direktive.
WE Conf-11 claims this was done under pressure from the UK throughout the negotiations to adopt the directive.
Kot je bilo razloženo drugje, je Združeno kraljestvo pozneje dejansko izbralo to možnost.
As has been explained elsewhere, the UK did indeed subsequently opt out of this provision.
WE-Conf 11 razlaga, kako je lahko zaradi tega družba ELAS zakonito odstopila od ustvarjanja nadomestil za končne bonuse, kar je eden od razlogov, zakaj družba ni imela dovolj sredstev, ko jo je Lordska zbornica prisilila v izplačevanje obljubljenih bonusov zavarovancev s policami z zajamčenimi rentami.
WE-Conf 11 explains how this in turn made it legal for ELAS not to make allowances for terminal bonuses, which was one of the reasons why the company did not have enough assets when the House of Lords forced them to pay GAR policyholders their promised bonuses.
V WE 26 (Burgess Hodgsonovo poročilo za akcijsko skupino EMAG) prav tako razlaga, kako družba ni ustvarila nobenih rezerv za končne bonuse in posledice tega.
WE 26 (Burgess Hodgson report for EMAG) also explains how no reserves were put aside for terminal bonuses and the consequences thereof.
Razlaga, da računovodski podatki, ki jih je družba ELAS predložila zakonodajalcu, niso vključevali nobenih rezervacij za končne bonuse.
It explains how the accounting figures supplied to the Regulator by ELAS did not include any provision for terminal bonuses.
Številke niso bile zadostne za kritje zahtevane najnižje stopnje za obvezna poročila (od leta 1994 do leta 1999 je bila stopnja približno 7 %).
The figures were enough to cover the required minimum margin for statutory reporting purposes (from 1994 to 1999, the margin averaged around 7%).
Vendar poročilo trdi, „ da je zakonodajalec kot aktuarski strokovnjak moral vedeti, da to nikakor ne more biti dovolj za kritje končnih bonusov .
However, the report claims that "it must have been clear to the Regulator, as an actuarial expert, that it could not possibly be enough to cover terminal bonuses.
Lahko bi razumno ocenil, da je za ta namen potrebna približno 20-odstotna stopnja.
He might reasonably have estimated that for this purpose the margin would need to be nearer 20%.
Zakonodajalca je treba dejansko vprašati, ali je vedel (ali bi moral vedeti), da sredstva družbe Equitable Life niso krila direktorjevih izjav glede bonusov vse od leta 1993.
In short, the Regulator must be asked whether he knew (or should have known) that Equitable Life’s assets did not cover the Director’s bonus declarations in any year after 1993.
Zakonodajalec bi moral vedeti, da je družba uporabljala končne bonuse: a) za dokazovanje vrednosti polic članom; b) za izplačevanje ob dospelosti ali odkupu; c) za spodbujanje prodaje novih polic prek izjav o preteklih uspehih.
The Regulator would have known that terminal bonuses were used: a) to indicate policy values to members; b) to make payments on maturity or surrender; c) to encourage new policy sales through statements of past performance.
Če bi vedel, da so od leta 1998 pogodbene obveznosti vključevale rezervacije za stroške zajamčenih rent, bi prav tako vedel, da se je njihov učinek zelo zmanjšal zaradi zelo negotove vrednosti pozavarovalne police z irsko družbo Irish European Reinsurance Company Limited.
Whilst he would be aware that from 1998 onwards the contractual liabilities included a provision for GAR cost, he would also have known that its effect was greatly reduced by the rather uncertain value of the reassurance policy with Irish European Reinsurance Company Limited."
Penrose (WE 16) prav tako podpira zamisel, da bi varne in smotrne rezerve razkrile pomanjkljivosti družbe ELAS.
Penrose (WE 16) also supports the idea that prudent reserving would have exposed ELAS' weaknesses.
Trdi, da je bil zakonodajalec Združenega kraljestva izrecno usmerjen na minimalni kapital in ni upošteval vračunanih končnih bonusov, s čimer je najbrž kršil člen 18, ki zahteva, da vključuje nadzor preverjanje vseh poslov družbe in ne le stanja solventnosti.
He claims that the UK Regulator was focused exclusively on solvency margins and took no account of accrued terminal bonus, possibly breaching Article 18, which requires that supervision include verification of a company's entire business and not just its state of solvency.
Penrose izjavlja, da je direktiva „ zahtevala, da se ustvarijo smotrne rezerve za končne bonuse ali da se te realno upoštevajo.
Penrose says that the directive "required prudent reserving for, or some realistic account to be taken of, final bonus.
Ministrstvo za trgovino in industrijo ni izkoristilo te priložnosti, namesto tega je menilo, da je treba ustrezna nadomestila ustvariti implicitno v parametrih sistema.
DTI did not take that opportunity, taking the view instead that “some appropriate allowance should be made implicitly in the parameters of the system”.
Predpisi Združenega kraljestva o izvajanju direktive položaja niso spremenili“.
The UK regulations implementing the directive left the position as it had been previously."
Penrose kritizira tudi pomanjkanje „dejavnega pristopa“ s strani zakonodajalca.
Penrose also criticises the regulator’s lack of a " pro-active approach".
Uporaba prihodnjih dobičkov za pridobitev minimalnega kapitala, ki ni v skladu s členom 25
Use of future profits to fulfil solvency margin not in line with Article 25
SEYMOUR v H7 trdi, da je zakonodajalca Združenega kraljestva zaskrbelo, ko je spoznal resnost težav družbe ELAS in so se začele razprave o uporabi rešilnega sklada za zavarovalnice, (ker bi to pomenilo davek ali dajatev za vse ostale zavarovalnice, da se izplačajo odškodnine zavarovancem družbe ELAS); da bi se izognil temu položaju je „ nato odobril sistem vključevanja petletnega teoretičnega prihodnjega dobička za saldo računovodskih knjig zaprte družbe – ELAS, s čimer je preprečil dostop do odškodninskih skladov“.
Mr. SEYMOUR claims in H7 that when the UK Regulator saw the extent of the problems at ELAS and discussions on the use of the insurance rescue fund started, the UK Regulator panicked (as this would have entailed a tax or levy on all other insurance companies to compensate ELAS policyholders) and to avoid this situation it "then approved a system of including five years of theoretical future profits to balance the books of a closed company – ELAS, thus rendering impossible access to the compensation fund. "
Trdi, da je „ pri tem celoten koncept solventnosti nesmiseln “.
He says this "makes nonsense of the whole concept of solvency" .
V WE 54 („La Vie d’Or“, zadeva 98/2863 na okrožnem sodišču v Haagu, datum razglasitve 13. junij 2001) SEYMOUR (H7) razloži, kako tožnik trdi, da „ vključitev prihodnjih dobičkov v bilanco stanja ni dala resnične podobe solventnosti zavarovalnice in je zato v nasprotju z direktivami EU o življenjskem zavarovanju . [...]
In WE 54 (‘La Vie d’Or’, Case 98/2863 at the District Court of The Hague, date of pronouncement 13 June 2001), Mr. SEYMOUR (H7) explains how the plaintiff claims that "the inclusion of future profits in the balance sheet did not give a true picture of the assurance company’s solvency and was therefore contrary to the EU Life Directives. [...]
Omeniti je treba, da je bilo postavljeno vprašanje zakonitosti prihodnjih dobičkov v smislu direktiv EU o življenjskem zavarovanju“.
It is important to note that the issue of the legality of future profits in terms of the EU Life Directives was raised."
Prav tako je treba podrobno pregledati raziskavo iz Bairdovega poročila (WE 17) o vprašanju prihodnjih dobičkov.
The Baird report's (WE 17) investigation into the issue of future profits also deserves close scrutiny.
Ko citira izmenjave z Vladnim oddelkom za zavarovalniško statistiko, pravi, da „ direktive EU in zakonodaja Združenega kraljestva omogočajo določitev vrednosti za prihodnje dobičke zavarovalnic .
Quoting exchanges with the GAD, it says that " EU directives and UK legislation permit a value to be placed on the future profits of an insurance company.
To se imenuje ‚implicitna postavka prihodnjih dobičkov‘. (...)
This is referred to as a “future profits implicit item”. (...)
Vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko nam je razložil te postavke: ‚Okvirna zakonodaja … izhaja iz evropskih direktiv, zlasti prve direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju iz leta 1979.
GAD explained to us the background to such items: “The background legislation…stems from the European Directives, particularly the First Life Directive going back to 1979.
Ta določa, da se lahko na podlagi diskrecijske pravice nadzornega organa družbi dovoli, da te postavke obračuna glede na 5/6 svojega minimalnega kapitala pri izračunu prihodnjih dobičkov.
This says that at the discretion of the supervisory authority, the company may be allowed to count such items against 5/6ths of its margin of solvency, to its future profits calculation.
Izračun prihodnjih dobičkov je nato določen v isti direktivi kot 50 % povprečnega dobička, zasluženega v zadnjih petih letih, pomnoženo s pričakovanim trajanjem veljavne police.
The future profits calculation is then specified in the same Directive as being, in effect, 50% of the average profits earned over the last five years multiplied by the expected duration of the policy in force.
Direktiva trdi le, da je nadzornik lahko izvajal svoje diskrecijske pravice ter da se to lahko dovoli kot minimalni kapital“.
The Directive just said that the supervisor could exercise their discretion, and it may be allowed as a solvency margin."
Ta možnost je bila močno omejena s sprejetjem direktive Solventnost I leta 2002 (glej člen 1(4)), ki v celoti prepoveduje to prakso od leta 2009.
This optionality was severely restricted with the adoption in 2002 of the Solvency I Directive (Article 1(4)), which totally prohibits this practice from 2009 onwards.
Baird je razložil, kako je družba ELAS zahtevala in večkrat uspešno pridobila dovoljenje zakonodajalca, da uporabi prihodnje dobičke za izpolnitev zahtev glede solventnosti.
Baird explains how ELAS requested and successfully obtained authorisation from the regulator on numerous occasions to use future profits to meet its solvency requirements.
Zakonodajalec je uporabil svoje posebne pravice iz poglavja 68 Zakona o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982, da odobri več dovoljenj.
The regulator used his prerogatives under section 68 of the ICA 1982 to grant the repeated authorizations.
To je po Bairdovem mnenju družbi dovolilo, da spodbuja zunanji videz finančne moči.
This, according to Baird, allowed the company to enhance the external perception of its financial strength.
Baird priporoča, da zakonodajalec pregleda izvajanje diskrecijske pravice v zvezi s pooblastili za uporabo prihodnjih dobičkov za izpolnjevanje zahtev glede solventnosti.
Baird recommended reviewing the exercise of discretion by the regulator in relation to authorisations for using future profits to meet solvency requirements.
To je tesno povezano z enim od področij preiskave, ki se izvaja v smislu pravilnega prenosa tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju.
This is closely linked to one of the lines of investigation being pursued in terms of correct transposition of the 3LD.
Vprašanje je, ali so imele diskrecijske pravice, ki jih je izvajalo ministrstvo na podlagi oddelka 68 Zakona o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982, pomembno vlogo v zadevi družbe ELAS, kot trdi Baird.
The issue is whether the discretion exercised by the Secretary of State based on section 68 of the ICA 1982 played a prominent role in the ELAS affair, as is claimed by Baird.
V tem smislu je treba oceniti, ali je sama diskrecijska pravica v skladu s tretjo direktivo o življenjskem zavarovanju.
What needs to be evaluated in this context is whether the discretion itself is compatible with the 3LD.
Nasprotno direktiva pristojnim organom dopušča odstopanje od uporabe pravil le v omejenem številu primerov in pod strogimi pogoji (glej člena 21(2) in 22(6) tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju), vendar se zdi, da direktiva pristojnemu organu države članice nikjer ne daje pravice odstopanja, kot jo določa oddelek 68 Zakona o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982.
The Directive, by contrast, allows the competent authority to waive the application of rules only on a limited number of occasions and subject to stringent conditions (see Articles 21(2) 3LD and 22(6) 3LD) but it seems that nowhere in the Directive is the competent authority of a Member State entrusted with waiver powers as those prescribed by section 68 of the ICA 1982.
Zdi se, da obstaja zaradi takšnih pooblastil večje tveganje za popustljivo ali nedosledno izvajanje, kar lahko koristi nekaterim družbam, drugim pa ne, s čimer se lahko ogrozi uporaba usklajenih standardov.
It seems that such powers entail the risk of being exercised in a lenient way, or in an inconsistent way that might have been beneficial to some companies but not to others, thereby possibly undermining the application of harmonised standards.
Mogoče je, da bi bilo mogoče preprečiti ali vsaj čim bolj omejiti krizo družbe ELAS, če bi bila ta pooblastila kakor koli omejena.
It is possible that, if those powers had been somehow constrained, the ELAS collapse would have been avoided or at least minimized.
Člen 28 – Javni interes; Člen 31 – Informacije za zavarovance
Article 28 – General good; Article 31 – Information to policyholders
C.O.B/bonitetna ločitev je bila škodljiva
C.O.B/prudential separation was prejudicial
Kar zadeva vprašanje komunikacije z zavarovancem, LAKE v H1 izjavlja, da so bile informacije za zavarovance, ki jih zahteva tretja direktiva o življenjskem zavarovanju, pod nadzorom zakonodajalca s področja poslovanja, ki je bil ločen od zakonodajalca za bonitetne zadeve, ter da je ta pravna delitev odgovornosti med ureditvijo poslovanja in bonitetnimi ureditvami škodovala zavarovancem družbe ELAS.
On issues regarding communication with the policyholder, Mr. LAKE says (H1) that the policyholder information required by the 3LD came under the control of the conduct of business regulator which was separate from the prudential regulator, and that this legal division of responsibilities between prudential was prejudicial to ELAS policyholders.
Glede zadev v zvezi z izvajanjem, ki so bile obravnavane na sodiščih v Združenem kraljestvu, nazadnje izjavlja, da ne pozna primera, pri katerem bi se obravnavalo neizvajanje zakonodaje EU.
Finally, on implementation cases brought to UK court proceedings he says that he knows of none which relate to non-implementation of the EU Law.
Vendar je David STRACHAN iz Organa za finančne storitve v H4 predstavil drugačno stališče in trdil, „ da se je tretja direktiva o življenjskem zavarovanju izvajala na način, ki je zagotovil jasnost v zvezi z zadevnimi obveznostmi domačih in tujih zakonodajalcev [...].
However, David STRACHAN from the FSA presented a different view in H4, claiming that " the Third Life Directive has been implemented in a way that has ensured clarity as to the respective responsibilities of the home and host regulators [...].
V skladu z tretjo direktivo o življenjskem zavarovanju je naloga zakonodajalca v državi podružnice – v tem primeru zakonodajalca tuje države – da uporabi svoja pravila.
Consistent with the Third Life Directive, it falls to the regulator of those branches – the host regulator in this case – to apply its own rules.
Tako se izogne zapletenemu položaju, v katerem bi za zavarovance veljali različni ukrepi za varstvo poslovanja, odvisno od tega, ali poslujejo z domačo ustanovo ali s podružnico ustanove EGP“.
This avoids an otherwise confusing situation in which policyholders would be subject to different conduct of business protections depending on whether they were doing business with a domestic institution or a branch of an EEA institution."
Priloga II se ne spoštuje
Annex II not respected
Leslie SEYMOUR je v H7 zagotovil pisne dokaze (WE 53), na podlagi katerih trdi, da Priloga II k tretji direktivi o življenjskem zavarovanju – preštevilčena Priloga IV v kodificirani direktivi – ki zahteva, da so zavarovanci jasno in pravilno obveščeni o svoji polici, ni bila upoštevana.
Leslie SEYMOUR in H7 provides written evidence (WE 53) claiming that Annex II of the 3LD – renumbered Annex IV in the CD –, which requires that the policyholder be given information regarding his policy ‘clearly’ and ‘accurately’, was not respected.
WE 53 kaže prodajne dokumente družbe ELAS, v katerih je razloženo vrhunsko delovanje pokojninskih skladov družbe ELAS in ki navajajo, da je družba ELAS lahko opravljala vrhunske storitve zaradi nižjih tekočih stroškov.
WE 53 shows ELAS sales documents explaining the superior performance of ELAS pension funds and claiming that ELAS was able to provide superior performance due to its lower running costs.
Prav tako trdi, da upravlja naložbe vrhunsko.
It also claimed to have superior investment management.
V drugem dokumentu je razloženo, kako je družba ELAS izvajala izravnavo, tako da je zadrževala rezerve, zavarovanci pa bi vsako leto prejeli bonus z neko vsoto denarja, ki ga je družba ustvarila in zadržala za kritje prihodnjih padcev na borzi ali padcev pri naložbah.
Another document explains how ELAS proceeded with 'smoothing', by holding reserves, and that each year the policyholder would receive a bonus, with a certain amount of money that the company had made being retained to cover any future downturns in the stock markets or in the investments they had.
SEYMOUR trdi, da so bile vse te obljube lažne, zato informacije niso bile jasne in natančne.
Mr SEYMOUR claims that all these promises were false and therefore the information was not clear and accurate.
SEYMOUR trdi, da „ zahteva direktiva, da zavarovanci prejemajo redne, jasne in natančne informacije o zavarovalnicah .
Mr SEYMOUR says that "the Directive requires that policyholders receive regular, clear and accurate information about the insurance undertaking.
Zakonodajalec ni storil ničesar, da bi zagotovil izvajanje tega pomembnega dela direktive.“
The regulator did nothing to ensure that this vital part of the Directive was put into effect."
SKLEPI, DEL II, PRENOS
Conclusions PART II, TRANSPOSITION
Prenos tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju
Transposition of the Third Life Directive (3LD)
Kljub nekaterim ugotovljenim razlikam med notranjimi predpisi Združenega kraljestva in členi tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju
Despite having identified some discrepancies between specific domestic UK regulations and articles of the 3LD
Glej del II, oddelek II.2.1; del II, oddelek II.2.2; del II, oddelek II.2.3; in WE 20. odbor meni, da narava in število takšnih razlik nista dovolj pomembna, da bi zaznamovala to, kar se lahko imenuje uraden postopek prenosa, kot neustrezen postopek.
See Part II, sections II.2.1, Part II, section II.2.2; Part II, section II.2.3; and WE 20. , the committee considers that the nature and number of such discrepancies is not important enough to characterize what may be termed as the formal transposition process as defective.
Kljub temu odbor priznava eno izjemo pri številnih pooblastilih, ki jih notranja zakonodaja Združenega kraljestva podeljuje notranjemu ministru (kot določa oddelek 68 Zakona o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982), in sicer da odstopi od uporabe bonitetnih ureditev.
The committee makes one exception, nevertheless, as regards the ample powers domestic UK legislation bestows on the Secretary of State (as prescribed by Section 68 of the ICA 1982) to waive the application of prudential regulations.
Ta pooblastila se zdijo nezdružljiva s pismom in ciljem direktive ter so se uporabljala neprimerno
These powers appear to be incompatible with the letter and the aim of the Directive and were used inappropriately
7.2.2 na str.
7.2.2 at p.
228. (zlasti pri pogostih odobritvah dovoljenj za vključitev prihodnjih dobičkov v minimalni kapital), zato obstaja v tem primeru resna zaskrbljenost, da se tretja direktiva o življenjskem zavarovanju ni v celoti prenesla pravilno.
228. (particularly when granting authorization on numerous occasions to include future profits in the solvency margin), and that therefore, in this particular instance, there are serious concerns that the 3LD was not correctly transposed in full.
Odbor verjame, da se v Združenem kraljestvu prenos tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju ni izvedel na način, ki bi dovoljeval učinkovito izpolnjevanje njenih osnovnih ciljev.
The committee believes that the transposition of the 3LD by the UK, was not carried out in a way which allowed the effective fulfilment of its underlying objectives.
Odbor meni, da tehnika razpršenega izvajanja direktive, ki jo uporablja Združeno kraljestvo (tj. direktiva ni bila prenesena v en sam nacionalni zakon, ampak je razpršena po različnih aktih različne pomembnosti), ni dovolj jasna in ni najboljši način za uvajanje načel in standardov ES v domačo zakonodajo.
The committee believes that the UK technique of implementing the Directive in a piecemeal fashion (i.e., the directive was transposed not into one single national law but spread throughout different acts of varying hierarchy) lacks clarity and does not seem to be the best way of incorporating EC principles and standards into domestic legislation.
Uporaba tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju
Application of the 3LD
Odbor meni, da je jasno, da obveznosti, ki jih direktive določajo državam članicam, ne zadevajo le njihovih zakonodajnih pristojnosti, ampak so razširjene tudi na njihove upravne in sodne pristojnosti.
The committee considers it clear that the obligations imposed by Directives on Member States do not only concern their legislative competences but extend also to their administrative and judicial competences.
Razen tega sprejetje nacionalnih ukrepov za izvajanje direktive ne izniči njenih vplivov.
Furthermore, the adoption of national measures implementing a Directive does not exhaust its effects.
Popolna uporaba direktive je zagotovljena le, kadar se nacionalni izvedbeni ukrepi dejansko uporabljajo tako, da omogočajo doseganje pričakovanih rezultatov.
Full application of a Directive is only secured when national implementing measures are actually being applied in such a way as to achieve the result sought by it.
V nasprotnem primeru bi razlike pri uporabi direktiv dejansko negativno vplivale na enotnost in enakovrednost v pravnem redu Skupnosti.
Indeed, divergences in the application of Directives would otherwise have a negative effect on uniformity and equivalence within the Community legal order.