natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kjer je potrebno, naj makrobonitetni nadzor olajša in dopolnjuje mikrobonitetni nadzor, ki ga izvajajo pristojni organi.
It should instead facilitate and complement where required the conduct of micro-prudential supervision by the competent authorities.
Ali je institucionalno ravnovesje med institucijami Unije primerno?
Is the institutional balance between Union institutions appropriate?
Institucije EU v ESRB sodelujejo na različnih stopnjah.
The EU institutions are involved in the ESRB at different levels.
Komisija je članica splošnega odbora in ima v njem glasovalno pravico, kar ustreza njeni vlogi v zakonodajnih pobudah ter makroekonomskemu in finančnemu nadzoru Unije.
The Commission is a voting member of the General Board, which is appropriate given its role in legislative initiatives as well as in the macro-economic and financial surveillance of the Union.
Svet EU je v splošnem odboru zastopan s strani predsednika Ekonomsko-finančnega odbora, ki sicer nima glasovalne pravice.
The EU Council is represented in the General Board through the presence of the President of the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) as a non-voting member.
Takšna ureditev odraža vlogo Ekonomsko-finančnega odbora, ki Svetu svetuje o zadevah v zvezi z gospodarsko in finančno politiko, tudi glede finančne stabilnosti.
This reflects the role of the EFC in providing advice to the Council in matters relating to economic and financial policies, including financial stability.
Svet bo vključen tudi v postopek opozoril in priporočil v zvezi s tveganji, saj bo opozorila in priporočila ESRB prejemal istočasno kot naslovniki, prav tako pa bo prejemal sporočila s strani naslovnikov.
The Council is also involved in the procedure envisaged for risk warnings and recommendations, as it will receive risk warnings and recommendations at the same time as the addressees, and it will also receive the communications from the addressees.
Evropski parlament bo (skupaj s Svetom) spremljal obveznost poročanja ESRB ter po treh letih izkušenj ocenil učinkovitost zakonodaje.
The European Parliament is mainly involved in the reporting obligations of the ESRB (together with the Council) and also in reviewing the effectiveness of the legislation after three years of experience.
Glede na njegovo vlogo v zakonodaji je takšna ureditev primerna za Parlament, ki mu bo ESRB odgovoren.
This is also appropriate given the role of the Parliament in legislation and in holding the ESRB accountable.
ECB bo skrbela za analitično, statistično in logistično podporo, da bi se izkoristile specifične pristojnosti centralnih bank.
The ECB is entrusted with the provision of the analytical, statistical, analytical and logistical support, so as to exploit the specific competencies of the central banks.
V splošnem je predvideno institucionalno ravnovesje primerno, saj bodo v delovanje ESRB v okviru svojih funkcij vključene vse institucije EU.
The institutional balance is broadly appropriate, as all EU institutions will be involved in the functioning of the ESRB in the context of their respective functions.
Kakšno je vaše mnenje o celotni sestavi ESRB in njegovega pripravljalnega odbora?
What do you think about the overall composition of the ESRB and its Steering Committee?
V skladu s predlogi de Larosièrovega poročila je smiselno, da osrednje volilno telo splošnega odbora ESRB predstavlja Razširjeni svet ECB.
In line with the proposals made by the De Larosière Report, it is appropriate that the ECB’s General Council provides the basis for the voting members of the General Board.
Centralne banke EU so primerna avtoriteta za izvajanje makrobonitetnega nadzora, saj lahko naloge monetarne politike opravljajo le, če so blizu denarnim in finančnimi trgom.
The EU central banks are well suited to be the authorities mainly responsible for macro-prudential supervision, given the close links that central banks have with the monetary and financial markets in order to perform their monetary policy tasks.
Poleg tega je Razširjeni svet ECB uveljavljen organ odločanja, ki že od leta 1999 opravlja široko paleto nalog s področja centralnega bančništva.
In addition, the ECB’s General Council is a well-established decision-making body, which has carried out a wide range of central banking tasks since 1999.
Pozitivna izkušnja z Razširjenim svetom tako služi kot osnova za nemoteno delovanje ESRB.
Therefore, the good experience with the General Council provides a good basis for a smooth functioning of the ESRB.
Sklicevanje na Razširjeni svet pomeni tudi, da bi moral predsednik ECB po uradni dolžnosti postati predsednik ESRB, podpredsednik ECB pa član splošnega odbora ESRB.
Referring to the General Council also implies that the President of the ECB should be the ex officio chair of the ESRB and that the ECB Vice-President is a member of the General Board.
Glede na zgoraj omenjen pomen tesnega sodelovanja med ESRB, evropskimi nadzornimi organi in nacionalnimi nadzorniki je potrebno v splošni odbor vključiti tri predsednike evropskih nadzornih organov ter vodje nacionalnih nadzornikov, ki sicer ne bi imeli glasovalnih pravic.
It is also important to include in the General Board the three Chairs of the European Supervisory Authorities, as well as the heads of national supervisory authorities as non-voting members, given the importance of the close interplay between the ESRB, the ESAs, and national supervisors as explained above.
Upoštevajoč njun pomen v zakonodajnih pobudah, makroekonomskemu nadzoru ter gospodarski in finančni politiki pa je pomembno tudi sodelovanje Komisije in Ekonomsko-finančnega odbora.
The participation of the Commission and the EFC are also relevant, given their role in legislative initiatives, macro-economic surveillance and economic and financial policies.
Sestava pripravljalnega odbora ESRB mora odražati sestavo splošnega odbora ESRB, saj mora pripravljalni odbor predstavljati splošni odbor, katerega seje naj bi pripravljal.
The composition of the ESRB’s Steering Committee should reflect that of the ESRB’s General Board in order to ensure that the Committee is representative of the Board, whose meetings it is meant to prepare.
Vključitev petih predstavnikov centralnih bank (poleg predsednika in podpredsednika ESRB) bi tako zagotovila primerno ravnovesje med centralnimi bančniki in drugimi člani pripravljalnega odbora.
Therefore, the inclusion of five central bank members (in addition to the chair and vice-chair of the ESRB) ensures an appropriate balance among central bankers and the other members of the Steering Committee.
Tako bo zagotovljena tudi primerna zastopanost centralnih bank iz in izven euroobmočja .
In addition, it allows for sufficient representation of the euro area and non-euro area national central banks.
Ker pa se bo s časom število članic euroobmočja spreminjalo, v zakonskih aktih ni smiselno z natančnim in nespremenljivim številom opredeliti, koliko sedežev pripada centralnim bankam iz euroobmočja in koliko tistim izven njega.
However, as the composition of the euro area will change with time, it would not be advisable to lay down in a legal act a specific, immutable allocation of seats between euro area and non-euro area central banks.
Ali lahko nekoliko podrobneje obrazložite svoj pogled na pristojnosti Odbora za sistemska tveganja (ESRB): Kako poskrbeti, da bodo naslovniki upoštevali opozorila in priporočila?
Could you elaborate on your views as to the powers of the ESRB: how to make sure that warnings and recommendations cannot be ignored by the addressees?
Kot je že bilo omenjeno, bo učinkovitost opozoril in priporočil ESRB odvisna od njihove kakovosti, mehanizma „ukrepaj ali pojasni“ med ESRB in naslovniki, možnosti ESRB, da svoja opozorila in priporočila objavi, kot tudi od morebitne vloge Sveta EU in evropskih nadzornih organov (ESA) pri podpori izvajanja opozoril in priporočil.
As mentioned already, the effectiveness of the ESRB warnings and recommendations will rely on their quality, the “act-or-explain” mechanism between the ESRB and the addressees, the possibility of the ESRB to publish its warnings and recommendations, and also the possible role of the EU Council and the ESAs in supporting the implementation of the warnings and recommendations.
Pri tem bosta odločilnega pomena skrbno spremljanje in ocena ESRB v zvezi z nadaljnjimi ukrepi, ki so bili sprejeti na podlagi njenih priporočil.
A close monitoring and assessment by the ESRB of the follow-up action that has been given to its recommendations will be decisive.
Če ESRB meni, da so izvedeni ukrepi ali razlogi za neukrepanje nezadostni, sta na voljo dva ukrepa, in sicer večstranski pritisk in javno razkritje.
When the ESRB considers that the actions taken or reasons for inaction are insufficient, multilateral pressure and public disclosure are two important instruments to be considered.
Ob upoštevanju občutljivosti zadevnih podatkov in morebitnih motenj, ki jih to lahko povzroči v institucijah in/ali na trgih, mora ESRB odločitev o razkritju opozoril in priporočil javnosti sprejeti za vsak primer posebej.
Taking into account the sensitive nature of the underlying information and the disruption it may cause in institutions and/or markets the decision to make the warnings and recommendations public should be made by the ESRB on a case-by-case basis.
Kombinacija teh elementov mora zagotavljati ustrezen okvir spodbud in mehanizmov, na podlagi katerega bo verjetnost ravnanja v skladu z opozorili o in priporočili o tveganjih večja.
The combination of these elements should provide an adequate framework of incentives and mechanisms, which will increase the likelihood of compliance with risk warnings and recommendations.
Ali je po vašem mnenju raven javnega razkritja primerna?
Is the level of public disclosure appropriate in your opinion?
Rezultat ESRB, v obliki ocen tveganja, opozoril in priporočil, bo občutljive narave.
The ESRB output, in the form of risk assessments, warnings and recommendations, will have a sensitive nature.
Razkritje ocen ESRB lahko neposredno vpliva predvsem na to, kako udeleženci na trgu dojemajo razmere na področju finančne stabilnosti.
In particular, the disclosure of the ESRB assessments may have a direct impact on the perception of market participants as to financial stability conditions.
Zaradi tega bo moral ESRB skrbno oblikovati politiko komuniciranja.
Accordingly, the ESRB’s communication policy will need to be carefully considered.
Za ESRB bo prav tako pomembno, da javnost obvešča o svojih rednih dejavnostih in doprinosu k zaščiti finančne stabilnosti.
At the same time, it will be important for the ESRB to keep the public informed of its regular activities and contributions to safeguarding financial stability.
Slednje je mogoče doseči na podlagi obveznosti poročanja ESRB Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu, kakor tudi z rednimi objavami o finančni stabilnosti, ki bodo dvigale zavest udeležencev na trgu in javnost o določenih tveganjih in ranljivostih.
This can be achieved through the reporting obligations of the ESRB to the European Parliament and the Council, and also through regular publications on financial stability in order to raise the awareness of market participants and the public to certain risks and vulnerabilities.
Ali menite, da obstaja potencial za navzkrižje interesov z mandatom Evropske centralne banke (ECB) glede denarne politike?
Do you see a potential conflict of interest with the ECB mandate in relation to monetary policy?
Poglavitni cilj ECB je ohranjanje stabilnosti cen.
The primary objective of the ECB is to maintain price stability.
Mandat, podeljen ECB/ESCB, ostaja nespremenjen.
This mandate given to the ECB/ESCB remains unchanged.
Ne le, da Pogodba za glavni cilj monetarne politike nedvoumno postavlja stabilnost cen, ampak v zvezi s sekundarnim ciljem opredeljuje tudi jasen hierarhični mandat.
The Treaty not only unambiguously establishes price stability as the primary objective of monetary policy but defines also a clear hierarchical mandate when it mentions the secondary objective.
Dodelitev specifičnih nalog ECB v zvezi z delovanjem ESRB je dobrodošla, saj krepi prispevek ECB k finančni stabilnosti.
The assignment to the ECB of specific tasks concerning the functioning of the ESRB is welcome, as it enhances the ECB’s contribution to financial stability.
Te nove naloge pa ne gre jemati kot dodaten cilj monetarne politike.
This new task should not be seen as constituting an additional objective of monetary policy.
Ta nova naloga bi namreč naj pripomogla k finančni stabilnosti, ne da bi ob tem ogrozila primarni cilj stabilnosti cen.
Instead, this new task should contribute to financial stability, without compromising on the primary objective of price stability.
Posledično ustanovitev ESRB ne spremeni jasne porazdelitve odgovornosti, kot je navedena v Pogodbi.
Consequently, the creation of the ESRB does not change the clear allocation of responsibilities enshrined in the Treaty.
Nespremenjena bo ostala tudi integriteta celovite makroekonomske analize, ki jo izvaja ESCB, kot tudi notranja organizacijska struktura ECB.
It will also maintain the integrity of the overall macroeconomic analysis conducted within the ESCB as well as the internal organisational structure of the ECB.
Pomembno je zagotoviti, da se ESRB in vsem njegovim članom zagotovi visoka stopnja neodvisnosti od političnih vpliva.
It is important to ensure that the ESRB and all its members are provided with a high degree of independence from political influence.
Zato dejavnosti, s katerimi ECB podpira ESRB, ne smejo vplivati niti na institucionalno, funkcionalno ali finančno neodvisnost ECB niti na izvajanje nalog ESCB v okviru Pogodbe ter statuta ESCB in ECB, še zlasti na lastno neodvisno finančno stabilnost in naloge izvajanja nadzora nad gospodarstvom euroobmočja.
In this regard, the supporting activities by the ECB to the ESRB should neither affect the ECB’s institutional, functional and financial independence nor the ESCB’s performance of its tasks under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB, in particular its own independent financial stability and oversight tasks for the euro area economy.
Kakšen bo po vašem mnenju srednje- in dolgoročen razvoj evropske nadzorne arhitekture?
How do you see the evolution of the European supervisory architecture in the medium and long term?
Kaj menite o enotnem evropskem nadzornem organu?
In particular, what do you think of a single European supervisory authority?
Ustanovitev treh evropskih nadzornih organov (ESA) predstavlja velik korak naprej.
The establishment of the three ESAs is a major step forward.
To omogoča nadaljevanje prizadevanj na podlagi izkušenj in dela odborov Lamfalussy na 3. ravni, ki so imeli pomembno vlogo pri spodbujanju zbliževanja na področju nadzora v Evropi in vzpostavljanju medsebojnega zaupanja med nacionalnimi nadzorniki.
It allows building on the experience and the work conducted by the Level 3 “Lamfalussy” Committees, which played an important role to foster supervisory convergence in Europe and to forge mutual trust among the national supervisors.
Z vzpostavitvijo ESA naj bi odpravili eno večjih pomanjkljivosti teh odborov, in sicer neobvezujočo naravo njihovih smernic.
The establishment of the ESAs seeks to remedy one of the major weaknesses of these Committees, namely the non-binding nature of their guidelines.
Možnost izdajanja pravno obvezujočih tehničnih standardov bi omogočila pripravo pravilnika EU o finančnih storitvah, ki bi spodbujal enake možnosti za vse in prispeval k ustrezni zaščiti deponentov, vlagateljev in potrošnikov v Evropi.
The possibility to issue legally binding technical standards will allow creating an EU financial services rulebook, which will promote a level playing field and contribute to the adequate protection of depositors, investors and consumers in Europe.
Ne vidim koristi v tem, da bi imeli enotni organ za bonitetni nadzor nad vsemi finančnimi institucijami, vključno z bančništvom, zavarovalništvom in pokojninskimi skladi.
I do see the merits in having a single authority for the prudential supervision of all financial institutions, including banking, insurance and pension funds.
Nadzor in upravljanje morata slediti razvoju finančnih trgov in dejansko smo priča postopni integraciji različnih podsektorji finančnega sistema, pri čemer je pojav finančnih konglomeratov le najvidnejša posledica.
Supervision and regulation need to keep up with the developments in financial markets and indeed we have been witnessing a progressive integration between the different sub-sectors of the financial system, of which the emergence of financial conglomerates is but the most noticeable implication.
Zato je v trenutnem okolju pomembno, da se pri nadzoru sprejme integrirani pristop, ki omogoča poglobljeno razumevanje (ne povsem) novih poslovnih modelov, ne pa ločen pristop za bančništvo in zavarovalništvo, ki morda ne bi zajel medsebojne povezanosti podsektorjev ter z njimi povezanih tveganj.
In the current environment it is therefore important for supervision to adopt an integrated approach that allows for a deep understanding of the (not so) new business models instead of a separated approach for banking and insurance, which may fail to capture the interconnectedness among sub-sectors and the associated risks.
Po drugi strani sam jasno ločujem med nadzorom nad finančnimi institucijami in nadzorom nad trgi vrednostnih papirjev.
On the other hand, I make a clear cut distinction between supervision of financial institutions and the supervision of the securities markets.
Upoštevati je treba, da sta cilja teh dveh funkcij popolnoma različna in si v nekaterih primerih celo nasprotujeta, le malo skupnega pa imajo tudi načini delovanja in viri podatkov omenjenih dveh področjih finančnega nadzora.
It is important to acknowledge that the objectives of these two functions are inherently distinct, and actually conflicting in certain instances, and even the modus operandi and data resources of the two areas of financial supervision share little similarities.
Možno navzkrižje interesov izhaja iz dejstva, da mora biti prevladujoč javni cilj nadzora nad institucijami zaščita interesov deponentov in strank, medtem ko je cilj nadzora nad trgi vrednostnih papirjev najprej zaščititi interese vlagateljev in delničarjev.
The possible conflict of interest stems from the fact that the supervision of institutions must have as its predominant public goal to defend the interests of depositors and clients whereas the perspective of securities market supervision is to cater first for the interest of investors and shareholders.
Iz teh dveh načel izhajata dva različna pristopa do prizadevanj za institucionalno stabilnost.
Two different attitudes stem from these two principles regarding the concern with institutional stability.
Menim, da obstajajo tudi močni argumenti za nadzor nad poslovanjem finančnih institucij v odnosu do strank, ki bi jih morali obravnavati skupaj z bonitetnim nadzorom.
In my view, there are also strong arguments for the supervision of the conduct of business of financial institutions in the relationship with their costumers to be undertaken in close proximity with prudential supervision.
Najpomembnejši argument se navezuje na dejstvo, da bosta upravljanje in nadzor nad majhnimi bančnimi posli, zavarovalniškimi izdelki in storitvami ter načinom njihovega trženja in prodaje strankam skoraj zagotovo vplivala na donosnost in solventnost finančnih institucij, s tem pa posegla v bonitetni nadzor.
The most notable of those arguments relates to the fact that the regulation and supervision of retail banking and insurance products and services and of the way they are marketed and sold to clients is bound to have an implication in the profitability and solvency of financial institutions, thereby impinging on prudential supervision.
Prav tako prihaja do pomembnih negativnih vplivov, ki so posledica neustreznega ravnanja s podatki, zbranimi v okviru nadzora poslovanja, nedavno pa je prišlo tudi do resnih težav pri presoji, ki so se pojavile zaradi neustreznega poslovanja pri odnosu bank do njihovih uporabnikov.
Moreover, there are important negative externalities resulting from an inappropriate handling of information collected in the context of business conduct supervision and there have even been recent cases of significant prudential problems being triggered by inappropriate business conduct in the relationship of banks with their retail clients.
Če upoštevamo vse pomisleke, se bolj nagibam k modelu dveh vrhov mikrobonitetnega nadzora, ki temelji na dveh glavnih institucionalnih stebrih: po eni strani bonitetni nadzor vseh finančnih institucij, kot tudi zaščita tradicionalnih strank na področju majhnih bančnih poslov in zavarovalništva, vključno z varovanjem njihovih sredstev in zaščito njihovih interesov glede komercialnega odnosa s finančnimi institucijami; po drugi strani pa varovanje integritete in učinkovitosti trgov vrednostnih papirjev, vključno z zaščito tistih, ki vlagajo v te trge.
All things considered, I tend to be inclined towards a twin-peaks model of micro-prudential supervision grounded on two main institutional pillars: on the one hand, the prudential supervision of all financial institutions as well as the protection of the retail traditional banking and insurance costumer, including both the safeguard of their funds and the protection of their interests in the commercial relation with financial institutions; on the other hand, the safeguard of the integrity and efficiency of the securities markets, including the protection of the investor in those markets.
Kakšna bo po vašem mnenju vloga ECB pri nadzoru bančnega poslovanja v prihodnosti?
How do you see the ECB’s role in banking supervision in the future?
V splošnem so izkušnje, ki jih je prinesla finančna kriza, okrepile argumente v prid posredovanja centralnih bank v bonitetni nadzor.
In general, the experience of the financial crisis has strengthened the arguments in favour of the involvement of central banks in prudential supervision.
V vedno bolj tržno usmerjenem in medsebojno povezanem finančnem sistemu obstaja možnost, da motnje vplivajo na temeljne tržne mehanizme, kot je distribucija likvidnosti, da imajo čezmejen vpliv in da se širijo bolj nepredvidljivo.
In an increasingly market-based and interconnected financial system, disturbances are likely to affect core market mechanisms, such as the distribution of liquidity, have cross-border implications and propagate in a more unpredictable manner.
Za ustrezno oceno takšne dinamike je potreben čezmejni sistematski vpogled, kot tudi ustrezna sredstva in znanja za analiziranje finančne stabilnosti, kar lahko zagotovijo centralne banke.
An adequate appreciation of such dynamics requires a cross-border systemic perspective as well as appropriate resources and expertise for financial stability analysis as it is the case with central banks.
V času finančne krize so v ospredje prišle sinergije med centralnim bančnim poslovanjem in funkcijami nadzora, še posebej pri zbiranju in ocenjevanju podatkov.
Moreover, during the financial crisis the synergies between the central banking and the supervisor functions have been evident with particular regard to the gathering and assessment of the information.
Na podlagi teh izkušenj je mnoge države članice načrtujejo krepitev vloge centralnih bank pri bonitetnem nadzoru.
Taking stock of such experience, in a number of Member States it is planned to strengthen the role of central banks in prudential supervision.
Ti dogodki bi lahko na daljši rok vodili do dodatnega premisleka o institucionalni vlogi ECB in možnosti, ki je omenjena v Pogodbi, da se specifične naloge na področju bonitetnega nadzora prenesejo na ECB, tudi v luči nadaljnjih širitev euroobmočja in zahtev po intenzivnejšem nadzoru nad tako imenovanimi institucijami, ki so „prevelike, da bi lahko padle“.
Such developments may over time suggest further considering the institutional role of the ECB and the possibility given by the Treaty to confer specific tasks in the field of prudential supervision upon the ECB, also in the light of further enlargement of the euro-area and the requirements of more intense supervision of the so-called «too big to fail» institutions.