natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
V prejšnji ureditvi so bili ti izkazi zelo skrivnostni, preveč zapleteni, preobsežni in napisani preveč podrobno, tako da se je izgubilo bistvo.
Under the historic regime these statements have been impenetrably mysterious, over-complex, over-wordy, and detailed to the point that overall substantial effect has been buried.
Poročila družbe so bila tako zapletena, da njihova vsebina ni prišla do zakonodajalcev in njihovih svetovalcev v vladnem oddelku za zavarovalniško statistiko“.
The Society's returns were so convoluted that material information escaped notice of regulators and their advisers in GAD."
To pomanjkanje jasnosti glede poročil je lahko v nasprotju z zahtevami člena 10, ki od zakonodajalca Združenega kraljestva zahteva, da opravi podrobno preiskavo in zahteva predložitev dokumentov ali opravi preiskavo na mestu samem.
This lack of clarity of the returns could contravene the requirements of Article 10, which requires of the UK regulator that it make detailed enquiries and require the submission of documents or carry out on-the-spot investigations.
Drugi dokazi kažejo, da so zakonodajalci vedno čezmerno spoštovali in se celo bali vodstva družbe ELAS.
Other evidence seems to suggest that the regulators were always excessively respectful and even fearful of the ELAS management.
Penrose govori tudi o poročilih: „Poročila o pregledih regulativnih poročil družbe Equitable od sredine do poznih osemdesetih let 20. stoletja so bili sorazmerno kratki in zgoščeni dokumenti, dolgi stran ali stran in pol.
Penrose has more to say on returns: "The scrutiny reports on Equitable's regulatory returns from the mid to late 1980s were relatively brief, terse documents, normally running to a page or a page and a half.
Pripravil jih je vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko ...
They were prepared by GAD ...
Poročila o pregledu so evidentirala nekatere najpomembnejše številke, zneske novih sklenjenih poslov, gibanje matematičnih rezervacij in kritje za zahtevano najnižjo stopnjo sredstev za obveznosti“ (pogl.
The scrutiny reports would record a few headline figures, the amount of new business written, the movement in mathematical reserves and the cover for the required minimum margin (RMM) of assets over liabilities."
Sredstva družbe za kritje zahtevane najnižje stopnje so bila ključni indeks ..., ki je od sredine osemdesetih let 20. stoletja z 8,5x leta 1984 padel na 3,8x leta 1988.
The Society's cover for the RMM was clearly a key index ... dropping through the mid to late 1980s, from 8.5x in 1984 to 3.8x in the 1988 returns.
Zaradi pomanjkanja korespondence ni mogoče natančno ugotoviti, kakšni dvomi so obstajali o poročilih ali kako se je obravnavalo padanje kritja za zahtevano najnižjo stopnjo, vendar se zdi, da to vprašanje zakonodajalcev ni preveč skrbelo“ (pogl.
In the absence of the correspondence files, it is not possible to say exactly what doubts may have existed over the returns, or how the downwards trend in cover for RMM was regarded, but it would not appear to have been an issue of any great concern to regulators."
Člen 10 tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju se ni upošteval: dodeljevanje premalo sredstev in nespoštovanje razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev
Article 10 of the 3LD not respected: under-resourcing and non-respect of PRE
Prav tako trdi, da zahteva člen 23(3) prve direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju, kakor je bila spremenjena s tretjo direktivo o življenjskem zavarovanju (člen 10), ustrezna pooblastila in sredstva, da lahko pristojni organi preprečujejo ali odpravljajo vse nepravilnosti, ki škodujejo interesom zavarovancev, kar v tem primeru ni bilo storjeno.
He then goes onto argue that Article 23(3)(b) of the 1LD as amended by the 3LD (Article 10) requires that the powers and means be sufficient to allow the competent authorities to be able to prevent or remedy any irregularities prejudicial to the interests of the policyholders, which was not done in this case.
Bairdovo poročilo (WE 17) podpira tudi teorijo, da so zakonodajalci na področju zavarovalništva prejemali premalo sredstev v ključnem obdobju, ko se je razvila kriza družbe ELAS.
The Baird Report (WE 17) also gives support to the idea that insurance regulators were under-resourced during the crucial years when the ELAS crisis developed .
Pri tem se sklicuje na upad osebja na področju zakonodaje za zavarovalništvo 1. januarja 1999. „... skupno število osebja, ki je sodelovalo pri bonitetnih ureditvi približno 200 zavarovalnic (...), je bilo manj kot 135.
It refers to the breakdown of staff involved in the insurance regulation on 1 January 1999: “...the total number of staff involved in the prudential regulation of approximately 200 insurance companies (…) was less than 135.
Za primerjavo – približno 135 uslužbencev je sodelovalo pri pravni ureditvi 400 pooblaščenih bank, stanovanjskih zadrug v Združenem kraljestvu in podružnic neevropskih institucij v Združenem kraljestvu“ (odstavek 2.23.5).
By way of comparison, there were approximately 135 staff involved in the regulation of 400 authorised UK banks, building societies and UK branches of non-EU institutions” (paragraph 2.23.5).
Tudi HOLMES (WE 84) potrjuje Bairdovo poročilo, ko kritizira pomanjkanje sredstev, ki so bila na voljo zakonodajalcem v devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja.
Mr. HOLMES (WE 84) also gives credence to the Baird report when criticizing the lack of means available to regulators during the 1990’s.
Razen tega navaja, „ da mora biti tudi v zvezi z diskrecijskimi pravicami, ki jih imajo države članice pri odločanju glede ustrezne ravni zakonodajnih sredstev, prostor za dvom, ali je Združeno kraljestvo svojim pristojnim organom zagotovilo sredstva, ki so potrebna za nadzor, pri čemer je standard za to izrecno določen v zakonodaji Skupnosti od novembra 1992.
In addition, he states that “ even allowing for the discretion which Member States possess in deciding upon an appropriate level of regulatory resources, it must be open to doubt whether the UK provided its competent authorities with the means necessary for supervision, the standard explicitly laid down in the Community legislation since November 1992.
LAKE v H1 prav tako trdi, da zahteva člen 23(1), (2) in (3) prve direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju, kakor je bila spremenjena s tretjo direktivo o življenjskem zavarovanju (člen 10), letne računovodske izkaze in redna poročila, skupaj s statističnimi dokumenti, potrebnimi za nadzor, ki morajo pristojnim organom omogočiti ukrepe, primerne in potrebne za zagotavljanje, da poteka poslovanje družbe v skladu z zakonodajo vsake države članice, vključno z domačo državo članico.
Mr. LAKE, also in H1, argues that Articles 23(1), 23(2) and 23(3) of the 1LD as amended by the 3LD (Article 10) require annual accounts and the periodical returns, together with statistical documents, necessary for the purposes of supervision, which must enable the competent authorities to take any measures that are appropriate and necessary to ensure that the undertaking's business continues to comply with the laws in each Member State, including the home Member State.
LAKE prav tako trdi, da Združeno kraljestvo preprosto ni izvedlo pravnih zahtev, da bi pristojnim organom omogočilo spremljanje uporabe zakonodaje Združenega kraljestva v zvezi z razumnimi pričakovanji zavarovancev, kljub temu da je to primerno in potrebno, s čimer je kršilo zakonodajo Skupnosti.
Mr. LAKE also claims that the UK simply did not implement the legal requirements to enable the authorities to monitor the application of its own law in respect of PRE, despite its being appropriate and necessary, and thus breaching Community law.
Primernost zakonodajne ureditve Združenega kraljestva, različni vidiki
Adequacy of UK regulatory regime, differing views
V nasprotju z drugimi pričami izjavlja v H2 sedanji izvršni direktor družbe ELAS Charles THOMSON, „ da so imeli zakonodajalci v Združenem kraljestvu več let široka pooblastila za postavljanje vprašanj v zvezi z družbami in znatna pooblastila za poseganje v izrednih primerih.
Contrary to other witnesses, Charles THOMSON, current CEO of ELAS states in H2 that " for many years the Regulators in the UK had very extensive powers to raise questions with companies and considerable powers to intervene in exceptional cases.
Zlasti ministrstvo je imelo pooblastilo za poseganje, če se niso izpolnjevala razumna pričakovanja zavarovancev ali potencialnih zavarovancev.
Specifically, the Secretary of State had the power to intervene if the reasonable expectations of policyholders or prospective policyholders were not being met.
Tako menim, da so imeli zadevni zakonodajalci v Združenem kraljestvu pred spremembami, ki so bile uvedene kot posledica konsolidirane direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju, in po njih zadostna pooblastila za vzpostavitev učinkovite pravne ureditve“.
In short, my view is that the relevant regulators in the UK both before and after the changes made as a consequence of the consolidated life directive had sufficient powers to regulate effectively. "
Clive MAXWELL iz Ministrstva za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve v H4 priznava dejstvo, „ da je imel takratni zakonodajni sistem težave .
Mr Clive MAXWELL from HMT in H4 acknowledges the fact that there were "problems with the regulatory system in place at the time.
Ne gre za to, da bi bile posamezne direktive – na primer tretja direktiva o življenjskem zavarovanju – nepravilno prenesene, ampak da uporabljen sistem ni bi posodobljen, kot je bilo prepozno ugotovljeno: sistem ni bil najboljši možen sistem“.
It is not that individual directives – the Third Life Directive, for example – were not transposed properly; rather, with the benefit of hindsight, the system in place was not modernised: it was not necessarily the optimum system to be in place."
Dodelitev premajhnih sredstev zakonodajalcem ne pomeni nujno, da je bil pristop Združenega kraljestva neprimeren
Under-resourcing of regulators not necessarily means UK approach was inappropriate
Člen 10 tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju določa, da morajo imeti pristojni organi vsa pooblastila in sredstva za preprečevanje ali odpravo vseh nepravilnosti, ki škodujejo interesom zavarovancev.
Article 10 of the 3LD states that competent authorities must have ‘the power and the means to take any measures to prevent or remedy any irregularities prejudicial to the interests of the assured persons’.
To stališče je podprl Clive MAXWELL v H4, ki je v razpravi o vprašanju sredstev za zakonodajalce izjavil, da Lord Penrose „ v svojem poročilu poudarja nekatera vprašanja, kot so sredstva za različne vidike zakonodajnega sistema, ki se je uporabljal v različnih obdobjih .
This view was supported by Clive MAXWELL in H4, who, when commenting on resourcing issues of the regulators, says that "in his report, Lord Penrose draws attention to some issues such as the resourcing of certain aspects of the regulatory system in place at various points in time.
Kljub temu menim, da je treba povedati, da je to izjavil po dogodku in da izjava na veliko načinov izraža njegovo mnenje o potrebi po strožji pravni ureditvi. [...]
However, I think it is fair to say that his comments were made with the benefit of hindsight and in many ways reflected his own views about the need for a stronger form of regulation. [...]
Zato je treba to upoštevati pri obravnavi potrebe po sredstvih“.
So those sorts of comments about resourcing need to be seen in that light".
Člen 18 – Zavarovalno-tehnične rezervacije Člen 25 – Minimalni kapital
Article 18 – Technical provisions; Article 25 – Solvency margin
Sistem Združenega kraljestva ne spoštuje namena direktive
UK system not respecting intention of the Directive
JOSEPHS (H2) meni, da je bil namen direktive zahtevati natančno ovrednotenje zavarovalnih pogodb, da se ugotovijo obveznosti.
Mr JOSEPHS (H2) believes that the intention of the Directive was that contracts of insurance should be very carefully valued to compute the liabilities.
To mora temeljiti na natančnem besedilu vsake vrste pogodbe.
This should be based on the precise wording of each class of contract.
JOSEPHS meni, „ da sistem Združenega kraljestva tega sploh ni izvajal, če se upoštevajo dokazi glede časa, ki je bil namenjen različnim zadevam – tj. kaj je osebje zakonodajalca opazilo, kaj so storili in tako naprej“ .
Mr JOSEPHS believes that " the UK system was not doing that at all, judging by the evidence of the amount of time given to various things - i.e., what the regulator's staff saw, what they did and so on ".
Ali se člena 18 in 25 tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju nista upoštevala?
Articles 18 and 25 of 3LD not respected?
Različni načini za izračun solventnosti
Different ways to calculate solvency
JOSEPHS potrjuje v H2 to stališče z izjavo, da se člen 18 tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju o zavarovalno-tehničnih rezervacijah ni upošteval, ker je „ družba Equitable vztrajala pri enakopravni obravnavi vseh polic, ne glede na to, ali so bile napisane kot pogodbe z določenim prejemkom ali v poznejši obliki kot naložbene pogodbe.
Mr. JOSEPHS, in H2, also reinforces this view by claiming that Article 18 of the 3LD on technical provisions was not respected given that " Equitable insisted on treating all policies alike, whether they were written as ‘defined benefit’ contracts, or in the later form as ‘investment’ contracts ."
“ Pogodbe „ so bile napisane tako, da so imetnikom dale absolutno pravico do deleža pri dobičku od naložb družbe, sorazmerno z vplačanimi neto premijami “.
The contracts " were written so as to give their holders the absolute right to share in the investment return of the Society pro rata to net premiums paid ."
Člen 18 zahteva, da se ta pravica kaže v izračunanih obveznostih za te police, kar se po navedbah JOSEPHSA ni zgodilo.
Article 18 makes it an obligation that this right be reflected in the calculated liabilities for those policies, which, according to Mr. JOSEPHS, was not the case.
Svojo izjavo zaključuje s trditvijo, „ da je to omogočilo stalen prenos sredstev podpisnikov novejših polic izbranim zavarovancem “.
He concludes that it " enabled the continued transfer of assets from holders of the newer policies to the favoured cohorts. "
Kljub temu vladni aktuar in vodja vladnega oddelka za zavarovalniško statistiko Christopher DAYKIN v H4 trdi, da je „ družba Equitable Life v zvezi z osnovo za rezerve sprejela pristop rezerv za bruto premije, ki se je razlikoval od pristopa, uporabljenega v večini drugih družb, vendar je bilo prej treba dokazati enakovrednost tega pristopa glede na to, kako vpliva na zahtevo po rezervah za neto premije.
However, Christopher DAYKIN, Government Actuary, Head of GAD, claims in H4 that "as regards the reser ving basis, Equitable Life adopted a gross premium reserving approach, which was different to the approach used by most other companies but it had to demonstrate the equivalence of what it was doing to the net premium reserve requirement.
To je vedno uspešno storila.
It always succeeded in doing that satisfactorily.
Zato so bile rezerve družbe – vsaj do leta 1998 – vedno v skladu z zahtevami predpisov.
So its reserves – at least up until 1998 – were always in line with the requirements of the regulations."
Člen 25 o zahtevi glede minimalnega kapitala zahteva, da ima družba presežek sredstev glede na obveznosti, vsaj v višini zahtevanega minimalnega kapitala.
Article 25 on the minimum solvency requirement requires a company to have an excess of assets over liabilities, at least equivalent to the solvency margin requirement.
Vendar se zdi, da obstajajo drugi načini za izračun solventnosti.
However, it seems there are different ways of calculating solvency.
David STRACHAN iz Organa za finančne storitve poskuša pojasniti to vprašanje s trditvijo: „Družba Equitable je bila vedno solventna in je v svojih regulativnih poročilih vedno poročala, da izpolnjuje zahteve glede minimalnega kapitala.
David STRACHAN, FSA tries to clarify the issue in H4 by saying that "Equitable has always been solvent and in its regulatory returns it has always reported that it is currently meeting its regulatory solvency requirements.
Dejansko se uporabljajo vsaj tri različne podlage: pristop, ki ga je opisal Chris Daykin in ki označuje ureditev iz večjega dela devetdesetih let 20. stoletja ter je v skladu s tretjo direktivo o življenjskem zavarovanju; obstaja podlaga za izračun, ki ga je pripravil Lord Penrose v svojem poročilu na podlagi številk, ki jih je družba Equitable pripravila za svoje namene – teh številk ni pripravil zakonodajalec; tretja podlaga – sedanja – so novo realne zahteve Organa za finančne storitve glede solventnosti.
There are, in fact, at least three different bases that are used: the approach Chris Daykin has described which characterised the regime for much of the 1990s and was consistent with the Third Life Directive; there is a basis of calculation which was produced by Lord Penrose in his report that was based on figures produced by Equitable for its own purposes – those figures were not provided to the regulator; the third basis, which is the current basis, is the FSA’s new realistic solvency requirements".
Vendar je v odgovoru na vprašanje poslanca med H5 vodilni direktor Annuity Direct Stuart BAYLISS izjavil, da so zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva „ zelo dolgo verjeli zgodbi, ki jo je družba Equitable širila o svojem minimalnem kapitalu .
However, answering a Member's question during H5, Stuart BAYLISS, Managing Director of Annuity Direct, says that the UK regulators "had been buying Equitable’s story on solvency margins for a very long time.
To sega vse do prikaza nove prodaje: dokler se tvoji produkti prodajajo, da lahko kriješ stroške, potem je vse v redu.
It goes back to that illustration on new sales: as long as you are generating new sales to cope with it, then you are OK.
Če je družba dovolj velika, lahko pokriješ primanjkljaj.
If your new business is big enough, you can backfill the hole.
To so počeli in v neki meri so nekateri zakonodajalci to morali vedeti.
That is what they were doing and, to a certain extent, some of the regulators presumably must have seen that.
Ne morem si predstavljati, da tega niso storili, ker je to nekaj, kar je potrebno za rast družbe“.
I cannot imagine that they could not have done, because it was something that the growth pattern of the company required them to keep growing".
Alan BEVERLY iz Komisije prav tako izhaja iz te trditve v H6, pri čemer se sklicuje na sheme za jamstvo zavarovanja: „dejstvo v zadevi družbe Equitable Life je, da družba ni postala plačilno nesposobna, družba ni bankrotirala.
Alan BEVERLY, from the Commission, also builds on this point in H6, with reference to insurance guarantee schemes: "the point on the Equitable Life case is that Equitable Life did not become insolvent, it did not fail.
Zato celo obstoječa odškodninska shema – shema jamstev za zavarovanja v Združenem kraljestvu – v zadevi družbe Equitable Life ni imela pomembne vloge. [...]
Therefore, even the existing compensation scheme – the insurance guarantee scheme in the UK – did not come into play in the case of Equitable Life. [...]
Zato to nikakor ne pomeni, da bi to bilo pomembno v zadevi družbe Equitable Life, ker v njenem primeru ni prišlo do plačilne nesposobnosti ali bankrota, čeprav bi na evropski ravni obstajala direktiva, ki bi določala usklajen sistem sheme jamstev za zavarovanja“.
Therefore, even if there had been a directive at European level setting up a harmonised insurance guarantee scheme system, it is far from clear that would have been relevant in the case of Equitable Life because there was no insolvency or failure as such".
Stalno pomanjkanje sredstev zaradi nizkih rezerv
Persistent asset shortfall due to poor reserving
V zvezi z vprašanjem člena 18 o zavarovalno-tehničnih rezervacijah daje WE 79 (dokument združenja vlagateljev o pomanjkanju sredstev) koristen vpogled v domnevne vzroke za položaj družbe ELAS.
On the issue of Article 18 on Technical provisions, WE 79 (Paper by Investors Association on asset shortfall) gives useful insight into what it claims were the causes for ELAS' situation.
Dokument navaja, da je bila „ ključna pomanjkljivost bonitetne ureditve v Združenem kraljestvu, da ni ustvarila rezervacij za izplačevanje prihodnjih donosov iz naložb ljudem, ki so bili upravičeni do teh donosov, in sicer zavarovancem z naložbenimi policami .
The paper states that "the key weakness in the prudential regime as operated in the UK was that it made no provision for paying future investment returns to the people who were entitled to those returns, namely the policyholders of ‘investment policies’.
Pravila so bila namerno nenatančna z odločitvijo, da rezervacije za prihodnje bonuse ostanejo v pristojnosti aktuarja.
The rules were deliberately left vague with the decision on provision for future bonuses left at the whim of the Actuary.
Vendar posledice odsotnosti takšnih rezervacij niso bile prav nič nenatančne, ker bi zaradi pomanjkanja takšnih rezervacij sklad za življenjsko zavarovanje s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice skoraj zagotovo propadel.
However the consequences of not making such provisions were not vague at all, since in the absence of those provisions the with-profits fund would almost certainly fail."
Poročilo meni, da je bila glavna težava družbe ELAS znatno pomanjkanje sredstev v primerjavi z dejanskimi obveznostmi.
The report is of the opinion that the overarching problem at ELAS was a massive shortage of assets, as measured against the realistic liabilities.
To pomanjkanje sredstev je trajalo vsaj od leta 1985 do trenutka, ko je družba Equitable prenehala sklepati nove pogodbe konec leta 2000.
This asset shortage persisted from 1985 at the latest, up until the point when Equitable closed to new business at the end of 2000.
Zajemalo je naslednje dejavnike:
It was made up of the following elements:
„ A) družba ni ustrezno poskrbela za prihodnje zajam č ene bonuse, do katerih so bili pogodbeno upravi č eni imetniki naložbenih pravic;
"A) Failure to allow properly for future guaranteed bonuses to which holders of investment policies were contractually entitled;
B) družba ni ustrezno poskrbela za rezervacije za jamstva iz pogodb (kot so zloglasne zajamčene rente);
B) Failure to make proper provision for guarantees in the contracts (such as the notorious GARs);
C) družba ni zagotovila vidnih rezervacij za že dodeljene nezajamčene bonuse;
C) Failure to make any visible provision for non-guaranteed bonuses already allotted;
D) preveč svobodna in poljubna razlaga pravil zakona (in strokovnih navodil).
D) An excessively liberal and self-serving interpretation of the Statutory Rules (and possibly the Professional Guidance)."
Poročilo ugotavlja, da je v obdobju od leta 1990 do leta 2000 ves čas primanjkovalo sredstev v višini od 5 do 7 milijard GBP, kar je izključevalo „ vse rezervacije za kon č ne bonuse, za katere je družba trdila, da niso bili zajam č eni, kljub dejstvu da so bili zavarovanci zavedeni v pri č akovanju, da bodo prejeli izpla č ilo teh bonusov v višini, ki je odvisna od stanja na trgu v č asu izstopa iz sklada .
The report concludes that, throughout the period 1990 to 2000, there was a persistent asset shortage ranging from around £5 billion to around £7 billion excluding "any provision for the ‘Final Bonuses’, which it was claimed were ‘non-guaranteed’, despite the fact that policyholders had been led to expect that those bonuses would also be paid, depending only on the state of the markets at the time of leaving the Fund.
Dejansko v celotnem zadevnem obdobju družba ni imela sredstev za kritje končnega bonusa. [...]
In effect, the whole of final bonus was uncovered by any assets throughout the period in question. [...]
V tem primeru je šlo za precejšnje vsote, ocenjujemo, da so vsote v tem obdobju zrasle s 3 milijard GBP leta 1990 na 11 milijard GBP leta 2000 ter znašale približno 45 % sredstev iz zadevnega 11-letnega obdobja“.
The sums in question were substantial, and we estimate them to have increased from around £3 billion in 1990 to £11 billion in 2000, averaging about 45% of assets over the 11 years in question."
Odsotnost rezerv za terminalne bonuse Možnost izbire v Združenem kraljestvu je bila škodljiva
No reserves for terminal bonuses: choice of option in UK law was detrimental