natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Da bi bil priznan kot samoupravna organizacija, je moral biti Organ za zasebne naložbe „sposoben in pripravljen podpirati ter ohranjati visoke standarde integritete in pravičnega opravljanja naložbenih poslov ter sodelovati z izmenjavo informacij in drugače z ministrstvom in drugim organom, telesom ali osebo, ki je pristojna za nadzor ali ureditev naložbenih poslov ali drugih finančnih storitev“.
As a condition for recognition as an SRO, PIA had to be “ able and willing to promote and maintain high standards of integrity and fair dealing in the carrying of investment business and to co-operate, by the sharing of information and otherwise, with the Secretary of State and any other authority, body or person having responsibility for the supervision or regulation of investment business or other financial services .”
Pred 1. januarjem 1999, ko je Organ za finančne storitve prevzel vsakodnevno spremljanje skladnosti s pravili poslovanja Organa za zasebne naložbe skupaj z bonitetnim nadzorom zavarovalnic, sta oba zakonodajalca uporabljala različno zakonodajo na različnih mestih in z malo stika, prav tako pa nista uvedla nobenih rednih postopkov izmenjave informacij.
Before 1 January 1999, when FSA took over the day-to-day monitoring of compliance with PIA’s conduct of business rules together with the prudential supervision of life offices, the two regulators operated under separate legislation in different locations with little formal contact and did not set up any regular information-sharing procedures.
Od leta 1999 je osebje, ki je bilo v skladu z dvema sporazumoma o ravni storitev odgovorno za vsakodnevni nadzor zavarovalnic, delovalo v isti stavbi kot Organ za finančne storitve, toda pristojnosti za sprejemanje odločitev na področju pravil poslovanja je ohranil izvršilni odbor Organa za zasebne naložbe, na področju bonitetnih zadev pa Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve, dokler konec leta 2001 ni začel veljati Zakon o finančnih storitvah in trgu.
From 1999 onwards, the staff responsible for the day-to-day supervision of life offices under the two services level agreements were located in the same building in FSA but decision-making powers remained with the PIA Board for CoB rules and with HMT for prudential matters until FSMA came into force at the end of 2001.
Preteklo je veliko časa, da je vsaka stran začela bolje razumevati cilje in težave druge strani, naučili pa sta se tudi, kako sodelovati.
It took some time for each side to acquire a better understanding of the objectives and preoccupations of the other and to learn how to work together.
Samoupravne organizacije so bile razpuščene 1. decembra 2001 (ko je začel veljati Zakon o finančnih storitvah in trgu), Organ za finančne storitve pa je poleg nadzornika za bonitetne zadeve postal tudi edini regulativni organ na področju poslovanja življenjskih zavarovalnic.
On 1 December 2001 (when the FSMA came into force) the SRO were dissolved and the FSA became, in addition to being the prudential supervisor, the sole Conduct of Business regulatory authority for life insurance companies.
Imenovani aktuar
The Appointed Actuary (AA)
Pojem imenovanega aktuarja je uvedel „Zakon o zavarovalnicah“ iz leta 1974, več desetletij pa je bil ključna lastnost regulativnega sistema Združenega kraljestva.
The concept of Appointed Actuary (AA) was introduced by the "Insurance Companies Act" of 1974 and has been for decades a critical feature of the UK regulatory system.
Ideja je bila, „da bi v družbi imenovali posebnega strokovnjaka, na katerega bi se lahko bonitetni pristojni organ pri spremljanju finančnega položaja družbe vedno oprl ...
The idea was to "designate a specific professional person within the company who could be relied on by the prudential competent authority to monitor the financial position of the company on a continuous basis ...
Poklicna dolžnost imenovanega aktuarja je bila spremljanje celotnega finančnega položaja družbe.
It was regarded as the professional responsibility of the AA to monitor the overall financial position of the company.
V vsaki zavarovalnici je običajno bil „prva točka za stike Vladnega oddelka za zavarovalniško statistiko."
He was normally " the first point of contact for GAD within each life office."
Imenovani aktuar je imel posebno dolžnost, da je izvršnemu odboru poročal o finančnem položaju družbe in mu svetoval o razporeditvi bonusov ter po potrebi o razlagi razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev.
The AA had specific duties to report to the board on the financial condition of the company, to advise it on bonus distribution and possibly on the interpretation of Policyholders' Reasonable Expectations (PRE).
Aktuar je moral pripraviti letno poročilo o finančnem položaju družbe, ki ga je predstavil izvršnemu odboru in ga v obliki povzetka vključil v regulativna poročila, ki so bila poslana vladnemu oddelku za zavarovalniško statistiko.
He had to make an annual report on the company’s financial condition, presented to the board and included in abstract in the company’s regulatory returns, which were sent to GAD.
Imenovani aktuarji tako niso imeli regulativnih funkcij kot takih, vendar naj bi poročali regulativnemu organu, če izvršilni odbor ni upošteval njihovih nasvetov o določenih ključnih zadevah, pri čemer je lahko sprožil zakonodajni ukrep.
Appointed actuaries therefore had no regulatory functions as such but were supposed to report to the regulatory authority if the board did not heed their advice on certain key matters, possibly triggering regulatory action.
Prav tako so morali potrditi oddelek regulativnih poročil z vrednotenjem obveznosti družbe, vključno z mogočim natančnejšim pregledom poročil s strani zakonodajalcev.
They were also required to certify the section of the regulatory returns showing the company's liability valuation, inducing a possible closer scrutiny of the returns by regulators.
Status imenovanega aktuarja se je med življenjskimi zavarovalnicami znatno razlikoval.
The status of the Appointed Actuary varied considerably between life assurance companies.
Reforma organa za finančne storitve ureditve zavarovanja je začela v celoti veljati 1. januarja 2005, opustila je vlogo imenovanega aktuarja, pri čemer bi odbori družb in višje vodstvo prevzeli odgovornost za aktuarska vprašanja, in vključitev teh vprašanj v zunanjo revizijo družbe.
The FSA reform of insurance regulation, taking full effect on 1 January 2005, abolished the role of the Appointed Actuary in favour of requiring company boards and senior management to take responsibility for actuarial issues and bringing these issues within the scope of the company's external audit.
Švica je uvedla vlogo imenovanega aktuarja v švicarski nadzorni sistem, ki temelji na britanskem modelu, kot je poročal predstavnik švicarskega urada za zasebna zavarovanja (H6). .
Switzerland appears to have introduced the figure of 'Appointed Actuary' in the Swiss financial supervisory system based on the British model, as reported by the representative of the Swiss Office of Private Insurance (H6).
Aktuarska stroka je prva želela ustanoviti neodvisni preiskovalni odbor (decembra 2000) o dogodkih zvezi s prenehanjem sklepanja novih poslov družbe Equitable Life in posledicah.
The Actuarial Profession was the first to set up an independent committee of inquiry (December 2000) into the events surrounding the closure of Equitable Life to new business and its implications.
Corleyjevo poročilo
The Corley Report
„Corleyjevo poročilo“ je poimenovano po avtorju Rogerju Corleyju, predsedniku Inštituta za aktuarstvo. , objavljeno septembra 2001, je revidiralo ustreznost strokovnih navodil za imenovane aktuarje, da bi ugotovilo, ali vsebujejo dejavnike, ki so prispevali k težavam družbe Equitable Life.
'Corley Report' named after its author, Roger Corley, President of the Institute of Actuaries. , published in September 2001, led a review of the adequacy of the professional guidance issued to Appointed Actuaries, to see whether there had been any contributory factors to the problems at Equitable Life.
Bonitetni nadzor v Združenem kraljestvu je bil usmerjen k finančnim sredstvom družbe.
The major focus of prudential supervision in the UK was on the company's financial resources.
Za oceno njihove ustreznosti so morali zakonodajalci preveriti zavarovalno-tehnične rezervacije družbe, minimalni kapital in minimalna zajamčena sredstva, imeti pa so morali pristojnosti za pridobitev informacij in sestavo dokumentov, potrebnih za oceno.
In order to assess their adequacy, regulators had to verify the assurance companies' technical reserves, solvency margins and minimum guaranteed funds, with powers to obtain information and the production of documents needed for the assessment.
Bonitetni nadzor je temeljil na razkritju in spremljanju regulativnih poročil, ki so jih predložile družbe in so bila oblikovana za prikaz takratnega stanja solventnosti ter s preskusom prožnosti tudi za prikaz občutljivosti na prihodnje neugodne spremembe.
The prudential supervision was based on the disclosure and monitoring of the regulatory returns submitted by the companies, designed to show not only the company's current solvency position but also, through the resilience tests, their sensitivity to future adverse changes.
Regulativna poročila so bila tudi objavljena, tako da so bile informacije o finančnem položaju življenjske zavarovalnice takoj na voljo finančnim svetovalcem, finančnim novinarjem in konkurenčnim družbam.
The regulatory returns were also published, so that information about the financial position of the life office was readily available to financial advisers, financial journalists and competitors.
Vsaka uradna preiskava zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva se je v skladu z Zakonom o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982 morala začeti na pobudo bonitetnega nadzornika (Ministrstvo za trgovino in industrijo, Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve ali Organ za finančne storitve in ne vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko), ko družba ni izpolnjevala veljavnih meril dobrega in bonitetnega upravljanja ali ko je kršila posebne zahteve iz Zakona o zavarovalnicah.
Based on the Insurance Companies Act 1982 , any formal intervention by UK regulators had to issue from the prudential supervisor (DTI, HMT or FSA, not the GAD) whenever a company was not meeting the established criteria of sound and prudent management or when a company was found in breach of specific ICA requirement.
Na primer, neučinkovito ohranjanje minimalnega kapitala bi lahko povzročilo, da bi bonitetni nadzornik v skladu z oddelkom 33 Zakona o zavarovalnicah zahteval predložitev kratkoročnega finančnega načrta, ki bi družbi pomagal, da bi ponovno delovala v skladu s predpisi
For instance, failure to maintain the minimum solvency margin could lead to a request from the prudential supervisor under Section 33 of the ICA to submit a short-term financial scheme to bring the company back into compliance
Glej poglavje 3.2.1 ES-2. .
see ES-2, Chapter 3.2.1. .
Zakonodajalec lahko v skladu z oddelki 38–44 Zakona o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982 tudi naloži več kazni, kot je, da zahteva predčasno predložitev regulativnega poročila družbe, omeji maksimalne skupne prihodke od premij, prenese sredstva družbe na skrbnika in v skrajnem primeru družbi odvzame dovoljenje za trgovanje.
The regulator could also impose a number of penalties, such as ordering the company to deliver its regulatory returns early, limiting the maximum aggregate premium income, transferring company assets to a trustee and ultimately the withdrawal of the company's trading authorization, as detailed by ICA 82, Sections 38-44.
Oddelek 45
Section 45
Vendar je bila uporaba oddelka 45 omejena na zadeve, ko je bil namen zaščite zavarovanca nedosegljiv z izvajanjem pristojnosti iz oddelkov 38–44 in izključuje „omejitev prostega razpolaganja s sredstvi družbe“
Recourse to Section 45 was however limited to cases when the purpose of policyholder protection was considered not achievable by the exercise of powers under Sections 38-44 and to preclude " restricting the company's freedom to dispose of its assets."
Poglavje 45(2) Zakona o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982. .
ICA 82(45)(2).
Spremembe Zakona o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982, ki so bile uvedene z izvajanjem tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju in začele veljati 1. julija 1994, „so uvedle nova merila za dobro in bonitetno upravljanje, ki so določena v novi Prilogi 2C, in dodale podlago, na kateri lahko ministrstvo v skladu z oddelkom 11 zavarovalnici prepove sklepanje novih poslov, ker družba ne izpolnjuje katerega od meril dobrega in bonitetnega upravljanja, ga morda ne izpolnjuje ali ga ni izpolnjevala“
Amendments to ICA 82 introduced with the implementation of 3LD and taking effect from 1st July 1994 " introduced new criteria for 'sound and prudent management' set out in a new Schedule 2C to the Act, and added to the grounds on which, under section 11, the Secretary of State could direct that an insurance company should cease writing new business, that any of the criteria of sound and prudent management were not being, might not be, or might not have been fulfilled in respect of the company."
Medtem ko so nadzorniki Združenega kraljestva in Irske imeli podobna izvršilna pooblastila, so nemški nadzorniki za zavarovanja „zadevo obravnavali širše in podrobneje ter podpirali bolj intervencijski pristop ...
Thus while the UK and Irish supervisors had similar enforcement powers, the German insurance supervisor's powers were " more extensive and specific and would support a more interventionist approach ...
Nemški sistem predvideva bolj moteč sistem spremljanja in preiskave kot druge države članice ter predstavnikom nadzornega organa omogoča, da se udeležijo sej nadzornega odbora, uvedejo ad hoc preiskavo, ne da bi pri tem morali navesti razlog, ter zamenjajo člane uprave in nadzornega odbora“.
The German system contemplated a more intrusive system of monitoring and inspection than in other Member States, allowing representatives of the supervisory authority to attend supervisory board meetings, providing for ad hoc inspections without the need to show due cause, up to the replacing of members of management and of the supervisory board."
Kar zadeva izvajanje pravil poslovanja, lahko intervencijska pooblastila Organa za zasebne naložbe v zvezi z življenjskimi zavarovalnicami (kot so omejitve glede ravnanja s sredstvi ali zahteva po ohranjanju nekaterih sredstev) izvaja le bonitetni nadzornik (Ministrstvo za trgovino in industrijo/Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve) in ne spadajo med pristojnosti Organa za zasebne naložbe.
Referring to enforcement of CoB rules, the use of intervention powers by PIA in relation to life insurers (such as restrictions on dealing with assets or a requirement to maintain certain assets) could be exercised only by the prudential supervisor (DTI/HMT) and were outside the PIA’s powers.
Ministrstvo za trgovino in industrijo/Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve je bilo treba o predlagani uporabi intervencijskih pooblastil Organa za zasebne naložbe/družbe Securities & Investments Board obvestiti vnaprej, ker je imelo pravico do vložitve veta na predlagani intervencijski ukrep.
The proposed use of intervention powers by the PIA/SIB had to be notified in advance to the DTI/HMT, which had a power of veto over the proposed intervention action.
Glej poglavji 6 in 7 ES-2.
see ES-2, chapter 6 and 7.
Odgovornost zakonodajalcev je natančneje opredeljena v delu V tega poročila.
The subject of regulators' liability has been elaborated in more detail in Part V of this report
Glede odgovornosti zakonodajalcev je treba omeniti, da lahko nadzorni organ v skladu z običajnim pravom odgovarja za kaznivo dejanje „zlorabe uradnega položaja“ .
As far as Regulators' liability is concerned, it may be worth noting that under Common Law a supervisory authority may be held liable only for the tort of 'misfeasance in public office'.
To zahteva element nepoštenosti, pri čemer je odgovornost omejena na škodo, ki bi jo organ kot mogočo posledico ukrepanja/opustitve ukrepanja
This would require a proven element of 'bad faith', with liability limited to losses that could have been foreseen by the authority as a likely consequence of its action/omission
Glej tudi sklepe WE71. lahko predvidel.
see also the conclusions of WE71. .
Samoupravne organizacije in njihovi uradi niso bili odškodninsko odgovorni za ukrepanje ali opustitev svojih funkcij, razen če je bilo dejanje ali opustitev storjeno v slabi veri
Self-regulating Organisations (SRO) and their officers were not liable in damages for actions or omissions in their functions, unless the act or omission was proved to have been done in 'bad faith'
Oddelek 187(1) Zakona o finančnih storitvah iz leta 1986. .
Financial Services Act 1986, section 187(1). .
V zakonodaji ES je nadzorna odgovornost omejena na resne kršitve pri izvajanju zakonodaje ES, vendar le če so bile kršene pravice posameznika in če obstaja neposredna vzročna povezava s škodo, ki jo je utrpela oškodovana stranka.
Under EC law, supervisory liability is limited to 'serious breaches' in the implementation of EC law but only if the infringement has affected individual rights and there is a direct causal link with the damage sustained by the injured party.
Nedavna sodba Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti je dodatno oslabila nadzorno odgovornost in nadzornim organom dala pravico, da ukrepajo le v javnem interesu, kar pomeni, da se nadzorne funkcije izpolnjujejo za zaščito pluralnosti interesov in ne interesov katere koli posebne skupine vlagateljev
Recent ECJ rulings appear to have further weakened supervisory liability, asserting supervisory authorities' responsibility to act 'only in the public interest' , meaning that supervising functions are to be fulfilled to protect a plurality of interests rather than the interests of any particular group of investors
Glej sodbo Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti v zadevi C-222/02 Peter Paul et al. proti Nemčiji z 12. oktobra 2004. .
see ECJ ruling in case C-222/02 Peter Paul et al. v Germany, 12 October 2004. .
Po objavi poročila lorda Penrosa leta 2004 so bile v pravni študiji
Following the publication of the Penrose Report in 2004, a legal study
Glej WE71: britansko podjetje Herbert Smith je zagotovilo pravno svetovanje v pismu direktorjem družbe ELAS z 14.4.2004 in obravnavalo morebitne pritožbe zoper zakonodajalce za bonitetne zadeve (na podlagi Zakona o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982) in zakonodajalce na področju poslovanja (na podlagi Organa za finančne storitve iz leta 1986), vključno s pritožbami glede kršenja izvršilnih zasebnih pravic iz tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju. ocenjene možnosti pritožb družbe ELAS ali njenih posameznih zavarovancev zoper zakonodajalce Združenega kraljestva, ki temeljijo na njihovih regulativnih napakah, kot je poudarjeno v poglavju 19 tega poročila.
see WE71: the legal advice was given by UK law firm Herbert Smith in a letter to the directors of EL on 14.4.2004, and considered potential claims against prudential regulators (based on ICA 82) and against CoB regulators (based on FSA 86), including claims in respect of the breach of 'enforceable private rights' arising from the 3 EC Life Directives. assessed the chances of claims by EL or by its individual policyholders against UK regulators, based on their regulatory failings, as highlighted in Chapter 19 of the Report.
Sklepi niso bili spodbudni, kar zadeva mogoče tožbe, v njih pa je bilo jasno navedeno, da „družba ELAS nima realističnih pritožb zoper zakonodajalce“ .
The conclusions were not encouraging as far as possible legal action is concerned, stating quite clearly that " the Society has no realistic claims against the regulators".
Pritožbe glede „malomarnosti iz običajnega prava“ ali „kršitve zakonske obveznosti“ s strani zakonodajalcev za bonitetne zadeve so bile neupravičene, ker „ni mogoče reči, da zakonodajalec ni premislil o izvajanju svojih intervencijskih pooblastil v skladu z Zakonom o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982 ali da noben razumen zakonodajalec za bonitetne zadeve ni ravnal tako, kot bi lahko“; poleg tega Zakon o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982 ne prenaša zasebnih pravnih sredstev na družbo ELAS“.
Claims of 'common law negligence' or 'breach of statutory duty' by the prudential regulators were considered too weak, as " it cannot be said that the regulator failed to consider whether to exercise its powers of intervention under the ICA 1982 or that no rational prudential regulator could have acted in the way it did; and further, the ICA 1982 does not confer private law remedies on the Society ."
O potencialnih pritožbah glede zlorabe uradnega položaja je navedeno, „da nič ne kaže na to, da je en ali več posameznikov, zaposlenih pri zakonodajalcu za bonitetne zadeve, nezakonito izvajalo svoje pristojnosti, zlasti da bi škodovali družbi ELAS, ali delovalo z nepremišljeno brezskrbnostjo do takšnega mogočega škodovanja.
As to potential claims of 'misfeasance in public office' , it concluded that " there is nothing... to suggest that any one or more of the individuals employed by the prudential regulators exercised power unlawfully, specifically intending to injure the Society, or with reckless indifference to the possibility of such injury.
Realistično ni mogoče pričakovati dodatnih dokazov o tem“.
There does not appear to be any realistic prospect of such evidence emerging."
Nobena izjava ni podprla tožbe zavarovancev zoper zakonodajalce na področju poslovanja na podlagi „kršitve človekovih pravic“ ali delovanja v „slabi veri“.
Finally, no arguments were found supporting legal action by policyholders against the CoB regulators, claiming 'breach of human rights' or 'bad faith'.
Ključne ugotovitve iz Bairdovega poročila in poročila lorda Penrosa o zakonodajalcih na področju življenjskega zavarovanja
Key findings of the Penrose and Baird reports on Insurance Regulators
Bairdovo poročilo je notranja revizija, ki jo je naročil Organ za finančne storitve, in zato obravnava zlasti njegovo posebno vlogo pri oceni zadeve Equitable Life.
The Baird Report was an internal audit commissioned by the FSA and therefore focuses mainly on its own specific role in the assessment of the Equitable Life case.
Vendar vsebuje ugotovitve, ki lahko nekoliko osvetlijo vlogo zakonodajalcev na področju financ na splošno in zlasti to zadevo
However, it contains findings that can shed some light on the role of financial regulators in general and on this case in particular
Kot navaja BRAITHWAITE (H11), Bairdovo poročilo ne zajema obdobja začetne malomarnosti, 1990–1998, ampak le 23 mesecev pred zaprtjem, za kar je bil odgovoren Organ za finančne storitve. .
As recalled by Mr. BRAITHWAITE (H11), the Baird report was precluded from looking at the period of primary negligence, from 1990-98 and it covered only the 23 months prior to closure, for which the FSA was responsible. .
Na splošno poročilo opredeljuje vlogo zakonodajalca za bonitetne zadeve, ki je „... takšno presojanje, da se zagotovita stalna solventnost in izpolnjevanje razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev družbe, ne da bi pri tem nerazumno posegal v upravljanje družbe“ (odst.
In general terms, the report defines the role of the prudential regulator as having "... to exercise judgements so that it is confident that the company will remain solvent and meet the reasonable expectations of policyholders, without intruding unreasonably into the management of the company" (par.
Vendar hkrati opozarja, da pristojnosti Organa za finančne storitve vključujejo soglasno stališče, da „si je nerealistično in nezaželeno v družbi, ki spodbuja konkurenčnost, inovacije in izbiro potrošnikov, prizadevati za 100-odstotno uspešnost pri preprečevanju propada družb“.
But at the same time it recalls that the FSA remit included a consensus view that "it is neither realistic nor necessarily desirable in a climate which seeks to encourage competition, innovation and consumer choice, to seek to achieve 100% success in avoiding company failure ."