natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Glede ustreznosti razpoložljivih sredstev zakonodajalca poročilo ugotavlja, „da ima Organ za finančne storitve omejena sredstva in zato stalno izvaja presojo tveganj, da ugotovi, kako najučinkoviteje uporabiti sredstva“ (odst.
Concerning the adequacy of the regulator's available resources, the report recalls how " the FSA has finite resources and, as a consequence, is continually exercising its judgement of risks to determine how to deploy its resources to best effect " (par.
Medtem ko priznava, da „primerjava sredstev za osebje na institucijo kaže, da so sredstva bank in stanovanjskih zadrug dvakrat večja od sredstev za življenjske zavarovalnice“ (odst.
While conceding that "the crude comparator of 'staff resources deployed per institution regulated' shows banks and building societies having more than double the resources of those that are deployed on life insurance companies " (par.
7.9), poroča, da pri Organu za finančne storitve „pomanjkanje sredstev ni razlog za slabo bonitetno ureditev družbe Equitable Life, ... ampak slaba uporaba sredstev“ (odst.
7.9), it reports not seeing at FSA "lack of resources as an issue in the prudential regulation of Equitable Life, ... but rather a better application of resources " (par.
Glede vprašanja odziva Organa za finančne storitve v zadevi Equitable Life priznava, da „je bila zadeva družbe Equitable Life že obravnavana na visoki ravni in predmet razprav, ki jih je začel oddelek za zavarovalništvo Ministrstva za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve, ... ko je bila odgovornost za bonitetno ureditev prenesena na Organ za finančne storitve“ (odst.
Concerning the question of the FSA reaction in the Equitable Life case, it concedes that " when responsibility for the prudential regulation of Equitable Life was transferred to the FSA, Equitable Life ... was already a high profile, “live” issue and was the subject of discussions which had been initiated by HMT-ID" ( Treasury's Insurance Department ) (par.
Vendar je ugotovilo, da „je bilo 1. januarja 1999 jasno, da propada družbe ni mogoče preprečiti in da Organ za finančne storitve ne more storiti ničesar več, kar bi v materialnem smislu ublažilo učinek rezultata sodne zadeve glede obstoječih zavarovancev ali koristno prispevalo h končnemu rezultatu glede družbe Equitable Life“ (odst.
However, it comes to the conclusion that " by 1 January 1999, the “die was cast” and we have seen nothing which the FSA could have done thereafter which would have mitigated, in any material way, the impact of the outcome of the Court case as far as existing policyholders were concerned, or made any material beneficial difference to the final outcome so far as Equitable Life was concerned ." (par.
Vendar poročilo navaja, da „bi Organ za finančne storitve lahko bolje ukrepal na več področjih, ko zakonodajalci za bonitetne zadeve in na področju poslovanja niso opazili težav ali pa so jih opazili in niso ukrepali“ , in kot glavni razlog navaja „slabo komunikacijo in usklajevanje med dvema regulativnima vejama, bonitetno ureditvijo in ureditvijo poslovanja“ (odst.
Nonetheless, the report admits there were " a number of things which the FSA could have done better ... occasions when both the prudential and the conduct of business regulators did not spot issues to be addressed or, having spotted them, did not follow them up ", citing as the main reason " the poor level of communication and coordination between the two arms of regulation, prudential and conduct of business ." (par.
Poročilo v poglavju 7 („Spoznanja“) končno predloži nekaj tehničnih priporočil
In Chapter 7 (" Lessons to be Learned ") the report finally makes a number of technical recommendations
Priporočila so bila zlasti v zvezi: s poostritvijo standardov o solventnosti, z razkritjem finančnega pozavarovanja, s povečanjem nadzora, z neodvisno revizijo delovanja imenovanega aktuarja, z vsebino in pogostostjo regulativnih poročil, z izboljšanjem proaktivne regulativne kulture, z izboljšanjem komunikacije in usklajevanja v Organu za finančne storitve, poleg izboljšanja postopkov za oceno tveganja, da se zagotovi „usklajenost razlage in uporabe v regulativnem postopku“. o prihodnji regulativni strukturi Organa za finančne storitve, da se preprečijo podobne težave.
Recommendations were made in particular in relation to: tightening of solvency standards; disclosure of financial reinsurance; introduction of multiple control levels; independent review of AA; content and frequency of regulatory returns; improvement of proactive regulatory culture; improvement of communication and coordination within FSA, along with the improvement of risk-assessment processes, in order to ensure " consistency of interpretation and application across the regulatory process". on the future FSA regulatory structure to prevent similar shortcomings.
Podrčtavanje besedila je dodal poročevalec.
Underlining in this section was added by the rapporteur.
Poročilo lorda Penrosa obravnava zlasti vlogo zakonodajalcev in opisuje ter razlaga pregled regulativnih poročil družbe Equitable Life od poznih osemdesetih let 20. stoletja s strani zakonodajalcev.
The Penrose Report deals in great detail with the role of regulators, describing and commenting on the regulators' scrutiny of Equitable Life's regulatory returns since the late 1980s.
Vendar je bilo poročilo „izrecno izključeno iz ugotavljanja krivde ali obravnave odškodnine“
The report was however " explicitly precluded from allocating blame or addressing compensation."
Lord Penrose v delu 6 (poglavja 15 do 18) navaja, kako so zakonodajalci za bonitetne zadeve obravnavali finančni položaj družbe ELAS in kako so se lotili svojih nadzornih nalog, kaj so menili o odnosu med bonitetno ureditvijo ter ureditvijo poslovanja in kako so se odzvali na nastalo krizo.
In Part 6 (Chapters 15 to 18), Lord Penrose relates how the financial strength of the Society was perceived by the prudential regulators and how they approached their supervisory tasks, how they regarded the relationship between prudential and conduct of business regulation and how they responded as the crisis unfolded.
Odstavka 7 in 8 iz poglavja 15 opredeljujeta cilj bonitetnega nadzora kot „finančno stabilnost zavarovalnice in njeno sposobnost obvladovanja nastalih tveganj ter izpolnjevanja obveznosti.
Chapter 15, par.7 and 8 define the focus of prudential supervision as " the financial soundness of the insurer and its ability to handle the risks to which it is exposed and meet its liabilities.
Kot je bilo leta 1995 opredeljeno v sporazumu o ravni storitev med Ministrstvom za trgovino in industrijo ter vladnim oddelkom za zavarovalniško statistiko:
Thus, as defined in a 1995 service level agreement between DTI and GAD:
· učinkovita ureditev zavarovalništva (v okviru dolžnosti in pristojnosti iz Zakona o zavarovalništvu iz leta 1982), da bodo zavarovanci zaupali v sposobnosti zavarovalnic Združenega kraljestva glede izpolnjevanja obveznosti in razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev;
· To regulate the insurance industry effectively (within the duties and powers set out in the [1982] Act) so that policyholders could have confidence in the ability of UK insurers to meet their liabilities and fulfil policyholders' reasonable expectations.”
· zaščita potrošnikov z zagotavljanjem, da družbe, ki niso ustrezne, nimajo zadosti sredstev in so slabo upravljane, ne nadaljujejo dejavnosti življenjskega zavarovanja v Združenem kraljestvu;
· To protect consumers by ensuring persons or companies who are not fit and proper, appropriately resourced or soundly managed do not carry on insurance business in the UK .
Na kratko: „Glavni namen zakonodaje o nadzoru zavarovalnic je javnost zaščititi pred škodo zaradi nesolventnosti, nepoštenosti ali nesposobnosti zavarovalnice.“
Or to put it briefly: " The main purpose of insurance supervisory legislation is to protect the public from loss through the insolvency, dishonesty or incompetence of an insurer. "
Lord Penrose dodaja, da „so bila poleg obveščanja zakonodajalcev z Ministrstva za trgovino in industrijo ter svetovalcev z vladnega oddelka za zavarovalniško statistiko regulativna poročila javni dokumenti in je bila preglednost odvisna od zahteve po dodatni disciplini življenjskih zavarovalnic s kritično analizo podrobnosti o njihovem finančnem položaju s strani komentatorjev ...“ (odst.
Lord Penrose further recalls that " besides informing the regulators at DTI and their advisers at GAD, regulatory returns were public documents and this transparency was relied upon to impose additional discipline on life companies by exposing details of their financial position to critical analysis by informed commentators ..." (par.
2.2 Pristojnosti ukrepanja zakonodajalcev
2.2 Intervention powers by regulators
Zakonodajalci za bonitetne zadeve so skladu z Zakonom o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982 in na posebni podlagi imeli pristojnosti, da odvzamejo dovoljenje za sklepanje novih poslov in ukrepajo v več okoliščinah.
Under the Insurance Companies Act 1982 and on specific grounds, the prudential regulators had the power to issue a direction withdrawing a company's authorisation to conduct new business and the power to intervene in a number of circumstances.
Poleg tega so preostale pristojnosti zakonodajalcu za bonitetne zadeve omogočile, da sprejme ukrepe, potrebne za zaščito zavarovancev ali potencialnih zavarovancev pred tveganjem, da družba ne bi mogla izpolniti svojih obveznosti ali razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev
In addition, a "residual power" enabled the prudential regulator to take any action needed to protect policyholders or potential policyholders against the risk that the company might be unable to meet its liabilities or fulfil the policyholders' PRE
Glej oddelke 11, 37, 38 in 45 Zakona o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982. .
see ICA 82, Sections 11,37,38,45. .
Lord Penrose v poročilu ugotavlja, da „so regulativno vlogo Ministrstva za trgovino in industrijo podpirale številne pristojnosti ministrstva v skladu z zakonom, vključno s pristojnostmi za zahtevo po informacijah, odklonitvijo dovoljenja za nove nadzornike in ukrepanjem pri vodenju posla na različne načine, ki je na koncu vključevalo odvzem dovoljenja za sklepanje novih poslov ...“ (odst.
In his report, Lord Penrose specifies that " the regulatory role of DTI was underpinned by various powers of the Secretary of State under the Act, including powers to require information, to withhold approval for new controllers, and to intervene in the running of the business in various ways, ultimately including withdrawal of authorisation to write new business..." (par.10)
Zakonodajalec bi moral uskladiti več nasprotujočih si interesov, na primer pričakovanja različnih skupin zavarovancev ali interese dejanskih in potencialnih zavarovancev“ (odst.
The regulator would have to balance a number of competing interests, for instance the expectations of several groups of policyholders, or the interests of actual and potential policyholders." (par.
Sporazum določa shemo prednostnih ocen (1–4), ki jih podeljuje vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko na podlagi svojega pregleda poročil (1 = glavna prednostna naloga, 4 = neprednostna naloga).
The agreement set out a scheme of priority ratings (1-4) to be assigned by GAD on the basis of their initial scrutiny of returns (1=top priority, 4=low priority).
„Sodelovanje regulativnih organov za bonitetne zadeve in poslovanje ... (deloma obravnavani kot zakonodajalci z rutinskim pristopom) je bilo razmeroma omejeno v osemdesetih letih 20. stoletja.
"Interaction between prudential and CoB regulatory bodies ... (partly viewed as 'tick-box' regulators) seems to have been relatively limited in the 1980s.
Leta 1992 je bila oblikovana dodatna formalizacija sodelovanja z mehanizmom, poznanim kot ‚kolegij zakonodajalcev‘: redni sestanki med različnimi regulativnimi organi za finančne storitve, ki jih pripravi in na njih predseduje organ, ki je glavni zakonodajalec za določeno vrsto družbe: v primeru življenjskih zavarovalnic je bilo to Ministrstvo za trgovino in industrijo. “ (odst.
From 1992 there was some additional formalisation of the interaction through the mechanism known as a 'college of regulators': regular meetings between various financial services regulatory bodies, hosted and chaired by the body perceived as the lead regulator for a certain type of firm: for life insurers, this was DT." (par.26 and 29).
Zakon o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982 je Ministrstvu za trgovino in industrijo podelil tudi nalogo, da ugotovi, ali sta bili zavarovalnica in njena uprava (tj. direktorji, imenovani aktuar in večji delničarji) primerni, da bi prevzeli svojo vlogo.
Under the 1982 Insurance Companies Act the DTI was also assigned the task of considering whether an insurance company and its management (i.e. directors, appointed actuary and significant shareholders) were 'fit and proper' to assume their role.
Zlasti skrb zbujajoča je vloga Roya RANSONA, ki je od leta 1982 imenovani aktuar družbe Equitable Life, 30. junija 1991 pa je postal izvršni direktor družbe ELAS, ne da bi odstopil s prejšnjega položaja.
An issue of particular concern appears the role of Mr. Roy RANSON, Appointed Actuary of Equitable Life since 1982, who on 30 June 1991 became Chief Executive of the Society without relinquishing his former post.
Tu se zastavlja vprašanje mogočega navzkrižja interesov, ki bi negativno vplivalo na interese zavarovancev.
This raised the question of a possible conflict of interest negatively affecting the policyholders' interests - a problem addressed by regulators on several occasions but without any formal action being taken by them.
To težavo so zakonodajalci obravnavali večkrat, vendar niso formalno ukrepali.
The report details how " GAD was consulted .
Ministrstvo za trgovino in industrijo je 26. aprila obvestilo družbo ELAS, da je nezaželeno, da je ena oseba na dveh položajih ...
The Society was informed by DTI on 26 April that it was considered undesirable for the same person to hold both positions ...
Ranson je dejal, da notranji aktuarji družbe ELAS potrebujejo dodatnih 12 mesecev izkušenj višjega vodstva pred prevzemom vloge imenovanega aktuarja.
Ranson said that the Society's in-house actuaries needed a further 12 months or so of senior management experience before assuming the role of appointed actuary.
Zaželeno je bilo, da Ranson ostane imenovani aktuar dodatnih 12–18 mesecev, dokler se ne določi notranje zamenjave ...
It was preferred that he should remain the appointed actuary for 12-18 months until an in-house replacement was appointed ...
Daykin se je strinjal, da je začasni dvojni položaj Ransona sprejemljiv in Burt je 13. maja obvestil Ministrstvo za trgovino in industrijo, da se vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko strinja z odločitvijo “ (pogl.
Daykin agreed that the temporary situation could be accepted and Burt informed DTI on 13 May that GAD were content on the basis that it was intended to be for a limited period ."
16–35 in 36).
(Ch.16-35 and 36).
Dejansko je RANSON na obeh položajih ostal veliko dlje, kot je bilo sprva določeno (12–18 mesecev), tako je na obeh položajih ostal več kot 6 let, julija 1997 pa se je upokojil.
In reality, Mr. RANSON was allowed to overstay in his double role far beyond the initially allocated "transition period" of 12-18 months, finally staying on for over 6 years until his retirement in July 1997.
2.5 Domnevne pomanjkljivosti zakonodajalcev na splošno
2.5 Alleged Regulators' shortcomings in general
Poročilo lorda Penrosa navaja več pomanjkljivosti zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva pri izpolnjevanju regulativnih in nadzornih dolžnosti, ki so povzete v tem dokumentu in glede na resnost razdeljene v tri skupine.
The Penrose report cites a number of shortcomings by UK regulators in the accomplishment of their regulatory and supervision duties which are here summarized for easier comprehension in three groups according to severity.
Ponovno je treba upoštevati sklicevanje na časovni okvir, povezan z uporabo prve ali tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju (tj. pred julijem 1994 ali po tem), da se pravilno ocenijo ugotovitve iz poročila.
Again, a reference to the time-frame related to the application of the First (1LD) or Third (3LD) Life Directives (i.e. before/after July 1994) should be taken into account to correctly assess the report's findings.
„Poročila o pregledih regulativnih poročil družbe Equitable od sredine do poznih osemdesetih let 20. stoletja so bili sorazmerno kratki in zgoščeni dokumenti, dolgi stran ali stran in pol.
" The scrutiny reports on Equitable's regulatory returns from the mid to late 1980s were relatively brief, terse documents, normally running to a page or a page and a half.
Sredstva družbe za kritje zahtevane najnižje stopnje so bila ključni indeks ..., ki je od sredine osemdesetih let 20. stoletja z 8,5x leta 1984 padel na 3,8x donosa iz leta 1988.
The Society's cover for the RMM was clearly a key index ... dropping through the mid to late 1980s, from 8.5x in 1984 to 3.8x in the 1988 returns.
„Za obdobje pred letom 1991 ni nobene korespondence Ministrstva za trgovino in industrijo, ki bi obravnavala družbo Equitable Life.
"There are no DTI correspondence files dealing with Equitable for the period prior to 1991.
Nekateri starejši dokumenti so bili uničeni ... leta 1998, medtem ko so bila regulativna poročila vse do leta 1981 (manjkali sta leti 1987 in 1988) še na voljo“ (pogl.
A group of earlier files was destroyed ... in 1998 while the regulatory return files were still available (1987 and 1988 missing) back to 1981."
15–46 in 53).
(Ch.15-46, 47 and 53)
„Pregled poročila iz leta 1989 je bil končan 5. decembra 1990.
"The scrutiny of the 1989 returns was completed on 5 December 1990.
To poročilo ima le eno stran“ (pogl.
The report was only a page ."
Pickford (aktuar vladnega oddelka za zavarovalniško statistiko) je ugotovil, da so leta 1991 „njegove pristojnosti večinoma zadevale solventnost in ne izjav glede bonusa.
Pickford (GAD actuary) observed that in 1991 “our remit was mostly concerned with solvency, rather than bonus declarations .
Tehnike za določanje deleža sredstev so se takrat šele razvijale.
Asset share techniques were only just being developed at this time.
Nobena organizacija ni pregledovala obvestil o bonusu.
Neither organisation made it their practice to look at bonus statements.
Zakonodajalci pristopa družbe ELAS do bonusov, ki je bil edinstven, niso omenili do marca 1993“ (pogl.
Indeed, the Society's approach to bonuses, which I understand was unique, was not mentioned by the regulators until March 1993."
„Nadzorniki in višji nadzorniki niso bili ustrezno usposobljeni ali imeli dovolj izkušenj za oblikovanje neodvisnega mnenja o pomenu takšnih vprašanj“ (pogl.
"Line supervisors and senior line supervisors were not equipped by qualification or experience to form an independent view on the significance of such issues."
Pri analizi donosa iz leta 1991 je bilo spregledano, da „v stopnjah vrednotenja, ki so se uporabljale leta 1991, ni bilo presežka.
In the analysis of the 1991 returns it went unnoticed that "there appeared to be “little or no margin” in the valuation rates used in 1991.
Da bi lahko izplačala bonuse, napovedane leta 1989 in 1991, bi družba morala zaslužiti 11,25 % na leto.
In order to pay the bonuses declared in 1989 and 1991 the company needed to earn 11¼% per annum.
Družba je v dveh letih dejansko zaslužila +3 % namesto zahtevanih 23 %“ (pogl.
In fact the company earned +3% over the two years instead of the required 23%."
„Od vladnega oddelka za zavarovalniško statistiko ni bilo pričakovati, da bo poudaril vprašanja izjav glede bonusov, razen v primerih, ko je spor nastal zaradi razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev.
"GAD was not expected to “give a great deal of emphasis to bonus declaration issues, except in cases where PRE was a source of dispute”.
Sporazum o ravni storitev ni prispeval k temu, da bi vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko z družbami proaktivno obravnaval vprašanje bonusov“ (pogl.
The service level agreement did not provide for GAD proactively to pursue bonus policy issues with companies."
„Poročilo o pregledu iz leta 1993 obsega okoli 17 strani.
"The scrutiny report on the 1993 returns ... ran to some 17 pages.
To je bil prvi pregled v novi obliki, ki je vseboval več informacij o družbi in tudi oddelke, ki so obravnavali ‚Ključne lastnosti‘ in ‚Točke ukrepov‘.
This was the first new style scrutiny and contained not only much more information about the company but also sections which highlighted 'Key Features' and 'Action Points'.
Poročila v novi obliki, ki so bila pozneje formalizirana v sporazumu iz leta 1995 med Ministrstvom za trgovino in industrijo in vladnim oddelkom za zavarovalniški nadzor, so zelo pripomogla h količini in kakovosti informacij, predloženih Ministrstvu za trgovino in industrijo“ (pogl.
The new style reports, later formalised in the 1995 agreement between DTI and GAD, were a vast improvement in the quantity and quality of information supplied to DTI."
Nadzornik je 9. decembra 1997 pisal nemškim nadzornikom v odgovor na vprašanje o položaju družbe ELAS: „Družba Equitable Life je vzajemna življenjska zavarovalnica.
On 9 December 1997, the line supervisor wrote to her German counterparts in response to a query about the Society's position: “Equitable is a mutual insurance company.
To pomeni, da so lastniki zavarovanci, delničarjev pa ni.
This means that it is owned by its policyholders and there are no shareholders.
Članstvo ne prinaša nobenih obveznosti, razen obveznosti plačevanja premij.
Being a member does not involve any obligations other than the obligation to pay the premiums.”
To stališče ni sprejemljivo.
I cannot endorse this view.
Družba Equitable Life je bila in še vedno je družba z neomejeno odgovornostjo“ (pogl.
Equitable was and is an unlimited liability company".
b) Premajhna odločnost ali brezskrbna politika zakonodajalcev
b) Complacency or " easy hand " policy by Regulators
„Predpis in nasveti vladnega oddelka za zavarovalniško statistiko so bili izrecno usmerjeni na minimalni kapital za pogodbene obveznosti in niso upoštevali vračunanih terminalnih ali končnih bonusov, čeprav je bila med poročilom iz leta 1989 izpostavljenost tržnim padcem resnična ter so vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko in zakonodajalci to vedeli“ (pogl.
" Regulation, and GAD's advice, were focused exclusively on the solvency margin over contractual liabilities and took no account of accrued terminal or final bonus, notwithstanding that, at the date of the 1989 report, exposure to falling markets was real and was known to GAD and the regulators ."
Višji nadzornik Ministrstva za trgovino in industrijo, ki je od leta 1986 do leta 1991 nadzoroval družbo ELAS, je preiskovalcem povedal, da nikoli ni nikogar iz družbe ELAS srečal osebno.
The senior DTI line supervisor for the Society from 1986 to 1991 has told the inquiry that he had never met anyone from the Society face to face.
To stanje je bilo razloženo tako: ‚Ker se je zdelo, da je družba ELAS dobro upravljana in zanesljiva, ni bilo razloga za pripravo sestanka.‘“ (pogl.
This state of affairs was explained on this basis: “As ELAS were perceived to be well run and sound there would have been no reasons to seek a meeting.”
„Pickford (vladni oddelek za zavarovalniški nadzor) je dejal, da se zadeva ni iztekla po pričakovanjih, hkrati pa je nezadovoljen, da mu ni uspelo zaslišati ali preiskati nobenega drugega direktorja družbe ELAS“ (pogl.
"Pickford (GAD) said that it had not gone as expected and that he had come away quite angry and frustrated that they had not been able to see and assess any other of the Society's managers."
„Dojemanje edinstvenosti družbe ELAS je bilo omenjeno v številnih izjavah zakonodajalcev v preiskavi.
" The perception of the Society's uniqueness was echoed in a number of the regulators' statements taken by the inquiry .
Žal pa dejstvo, da je bila družba ELAS edinstvena, ni vzbudilo večjega interesa glede posledic za zavarovance“ (pogl.
It is unfortunate that appreciation that the Society was unique did not provoke a keener interest in the implications for policyholders."