natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
* treh letih od začetka veljavnosti te uredbe .
* Three years after the entry into force of this Regulation.
Evropska unija (EU) vzpostavlja okvir za varovanje finančne stabilnosti.
The European Union (EU) is establishing a framework for safeguarding financial stability.
Integrirani finančni trg EU, v katerem prevladujejo velike vseevropske skupine, v večini držav EU ne more delovati pravilno, če ostaja nadzor razdrobljen na nacionalni ravni.
An integrated EU financial market, dominated by large pan European groups in most EU countries, cannot work properly if the supervision remains fragmented at the national level.
EU potrebuje novo finančno arhitekturo z integriranim mikrobonitetnim nadzorom, ki vključuje prenos pristojnosti na EU.
The EU needs a new financial architecture with an integrated micro prudential supervision, including a transfer of competence to the EU.
Razen tega bi lahko evropski makronadzor zaznal, da bi nevzdržna rast posojil, napihovanje cen nepremičnin in veliki primanjkljaji na tekočih računih povzročili določena tveganja za makroekonomsko in finančno stabilnost.
In addition, European macro surveillance could have detected that unsustainable credit growth, real state bubbles and large current accounts deficits would have created some risks for macroeconomic and financial stability.
Evropa mora nujno razviti strokovno znanje na področju makrobonitetnega nadzora za odkrivanje sistemskih tveganj, z drugimi besedami, za prepoznavanje tveganj za finančno stabilnost na evropski ravni in, kjer je to potrebno, izdati opozorila in zagotoviti spremljanje.
Europe needs urgently to develop expertise in macro prudential supervision to detect systemic risks, in other words, to identify financial stability risk at the European level, where necessary issue warnings and ensure the follow up.
Tudi če se v prihodnosti ne bo mogoče izogniti finančnim krizam, bi morali biti socialni in ekonomski učinki manj škodljivi, kot se je to zgodilo s sedanjo krizo v primerjavi z dejanskimi učinki velike depresije.
Even if further financial crisis are unavoidable, the social and economic effects should be less harmful in the future, as it happened with the current crisis in comparison to the real effects of the Great Depression.
Evropa potrebuje zakonodajni in institucionalni okvir, da odpravi nesolventnost sistemsko pomembnih finančnih institucij.
Europe needs a legislative and institutional framework to resolve the insolvency of systemic important financial institutions.
Vzpostavila se bosta novi makrobonitetni nadzornik, Evropski odbor za sistemska tveganja (ESRB), in novi mikrobonitetni nadzornik, Evropski sistem finančnega nadzora (ESFS).
A new macro-prudential supervisor, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and a new micro-prudential supervision, the European System of Financial supervisions (ESFS), will be created.
Sama učinkovitost pa je tesno povezana s pristojnostmi ECB, saj ESRB ne bo mogel uveljavljati ukrepov ali sankcij za države članice ali finančne institucije, njegova opozorila pa ne bodo obvezujoča.
And its efficiency is carried by the ECB's prestige since the new ESRB will not be able to impose measures or sanctions on member states or financial institutions, and its warnings will not binding.
Njihova učinkovitost je odvisna od dobrega ugleda Evropske centralne banke (ECB) in priznanega strokovnega znanju njenega osebja.
Their effectiveness depends on the high reputation of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the recognized expertise of its staff.
Vloga ECB bo zelo pomembna pri evropskem makrobonitetnem nadzoru.
The role of the ECB will be essential in the European macro-supervision.
V zadnjih dveh letih je monetarna politika nizkih obrestnih mer krepila napihovanje cen osnovnih in finančnih sredstev, kar je izzvalo krizo, ki jo zdaj občutimo.
In the last years a monetary policy of very low interest rates has nourished bubbles in physical and financial assets, which in bursting have provoked the crisis that we are now suffering.
Končni cilj nadzorne arhitekture je preprečevanje tovrstnih dramatičnih situacij v prihodnosti, zagotavljanje finančne stabilnosti in varovanje potrošnikov.
The ultimate aim of the supervisory architecture is to avoid such dramatic situations in the future, ensure financial stability and protect the consumers.
Preprečevanje ali ublažitev sistemskih tveganj, nevarnosti ali propada velikega dela finančnega sektorja bo zmanjšalo učinke na realno gospodarstvo in evropske državljane v nadaljevanju krize.
Prevention or mitigation of systemic risks, distress or failure of a significant part of the financial sector, will reduce the effects on the real economy and European citizens of further crisis.
Evropska monetarna politika je v zadnjih dveh desetletjih učinkovito nadzorovala inflacijo.
In the two last decades the European monetary policy has been effective regarding the inflation's control.
Jasna predstava cilja „stabilnosti cen“ (na primer, jasen cilj, ki predvideva dvoodstotno inflacijo) je bila povezana tudi z obrestno mero, ki je jasen in močen instrument monetarne politike.
The clear visualization of the goal "stability of prices" (a clear objective of 2% of annual inflation, for example) was also associated with a clear and powerful instrument of the monetary policy, the interest rate.
V tem smislu so v zadnjih dvajsetih letih prost trgovinski razvoj in generalizacija globalne proizvodne mreže po svetu skupaj z deflacijskim pritiskom prispevali k uravnavanju cen v razvitih državah.
In this sense, the free trade expansion and the generalization of global production networks all over the world during the past twenty years, with its deflationary pressure, has been contributing also to price moderation in developed countries.
Pravzaprav bi lahko trdili, da so bile obrestne mere že leta umetno nizke v primerjavi s tržnimi obrestnimi merami, ki bi prosto določile ponudbo posojil in povpraševanje po naložbah.
As a matter of fact, it could be argued that the interest rates have been artificially low for years in comparison to the market interest rates that would have gauged freely the offer of credits and the demand of investment.
To dejstvo bi lahko bilo eno glavnih vzrokov za sedanjo krizo: lahko bi izkrivili pričakovanja gospodarskih subjektov do točke, ko bi bili spodbujeni k pretirani zadolžitvi za financiranje porabe in naložb.
This fact could have been one of the main causes of the current crisis: they would have distorted the expectations of the economic agents, until the point of inviting them to an excessive indebtedness to fund consumption and investment also excessive.
Vsekakor pa, kot je že omenjeno, obstaja širše soglasje o učinkovitosti monetarne politike.
But in any case there is a quite large consensus about the efficiency of the monetary policy as already mentioned.
Vendar je gospodarska globalizacija, zlasti ob pozornem spremljanju pretoka kapitala, močno zaznamovala finančne trge.
However, the economic globalization, especially intense regarding the capital movements, has deeply modified the financial markets.
Centralne banke so ohranile svoj tradicionalni cilj nadzorovanja inflacije, za ta namen pa so uporabile obrestne mere.
Central banks kept their traditional goal, the control of the inflation, and for such purpose they used the interest rate.
Svoboda pretoka kapitala pa je nenavadno okrepila povezavo med monetarnim in finančnim sektorjem.
But the freedom of capital movements has reinforced extraordinarily the link between the monetary and the financial sector.
Te nove razmere so vedno bolj vplivale na banke, da v svoj načrt vključijo nov cilj: stabilizacijo finančnih trgov.
This new situation increasingly forced central banks to incorporate a new goal into their agenda: the stabilization of financial markets.
Sočasno uresničevanje obeh ciljev (stabilnost cen in stabilnost finančnih trgov) je nemogoče samo z enim instrumentom, in sicer obrestno mero, ne glede na to, kako močno je lahko to sredstvo.
The simultaneously achievement of both goals (stability of prices and stability of financial markets) is impossible only with one instrument, the interest rate, no matter how powerful this tool can be.
Obrestna mera se je izkazala za učinkovito orodje pri nadzorovanju inflacije, vendar ni bila uporabna pri preprečevanju širjenja posojil in napihovanju cen nepremičnin v številnih državah.
The interest rate has been efficient to control inflation, but it has not been useful to avoid the credit expansion and the real state bubbles in several countries.
Treba je vpeljati nov instrument, zadnji dve leti pa obstaja široko soglasje, kateri naj bi to bil: urejanje in nadzor bančnih in finančnih sistemov po vsej EU.
There is a need for a new instrument and there is a large consensus has been developed during the last two years that this tool should be: EU-wide regulation and supervision of the banking and financial systems.
Finančna uredba obstaja že več let, a se je v novem globaliziranem svetu izkazala za neustrezno in nezadostno.
Even though the financial regulation existed for many years, this has been inappropriate and insufficient in the new globalised world.
Pravzaprav sta nadzor in urejanje edini pomembni pristojnosti, za katere so si nacionalne centralne banke po uvedbi evra pridržale pravico zase.
As a matter of fact, supervisions and regulation is the only great competence that the national central banks reserved to themselves nation-wide after the creation of the Euro.
Zato je potrebno in primerno izboljšati urejanje po vsej Evropi.
Thus, today the need and the convenience to improve the regulation with a European dimension are ascertained.
Na predavanju v Sinagapurju leta 2005
The president of the European Central Bank, in a lecture in Singapore in 2005
„Napihovanje cen sredstev in monetarna politika“
"Asset price bubbles and monetary policy"
Govor predsednika ECB Jean-Claude Tricheta, 8. junija 2005 v Singapurju.
Speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, Mas lecture, 8 June 2005, Singapore .
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2005/html/sp050608.en.html so predsednika Evropske centralne banke vprašali o napihovanjih cen osnovnih in finančnih sredstev.
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2005/html/sp050608.en.html , was asked on the bubbles generation in the prices of physical or financial assets.
Posledični strošek se izraža v spodbujanju zavarovanj, ki preprečuje najslabši možni scenarij.
The consequent cost is translated into an incentive of insurances that stops worse scenarios.
Ta ukrep se zdi upravičen, vendar se zdi glede na izkušnje sedanje finančne krize manj ustrezen: finančni sistem se lahko prilagodi različnim spremembam obrestnih mer, na primer pogojem pogodb za posojila (za hipotekarna posojila se lahko podaljša obdobje amortizacije).
This measure seems reasonable but given the experience from the recent financial crisis it seems less suitable: the financial system can adapt to the variation of interest rates changing, for instance, the conditions of the contracts of credit (for the mortgage credits their period of amortisation can be extended).
V teh okoliščinah sprememba obrestne mere le malo vpliva na zmanjševanje napihovanja cen: če se obrestne mere ne zvišajo bistveno, kar bi v celoti oškodovalo gospodarstvo, bi umetno nizke obrestne mere še vedno vplivale na krepitev in obstoj napihovanja cen.
In these circumstances, the modification of the interest rate has little effect in deflating the bubbles: if interest rates are not raised significantly, in which case the economy as a whole would be damaged, still artificially low interest rates would continue nourishing the bubbles that would subsist.
V zvezi s tem je treba uvesti boljši nadzor.
It is in this sense that a better supervision is necessary.
Sistem dinamičnih rezervacij Banke Španije na primer ni preprečil nastanka enega velikih napihovanj cen nepremičnin v Španiji: znesek nabranega dolga nepremičnih investitorjev pri španskem bančništvu znaša 30 % španskega bruto domačega proizvoda iz leta 2009 (325,000 milijonov eurov).
The system of dynamic provisions of the Bank of Spain, for example, did not avoid the generation of one huge bubble in real estate in Spain: the amount of the accumulated debt from the real estate promoters with the Spanish banking is equivalent to a 30% of the 2009 Spanish GDP (325.000 million €).
Nujne izboljšave finančnega urejanja in nadzora so osnova razprave o novi finančni arhitekturi, ki jo gradijo evropske institucije in katere manjši sestavni del je to poročilo.
The necessary improvements in the financial regulation and supervision are in the basis of the debate of all the new financial architecture that the European institutions are constructing and of which this report is a minor part.
Ustrezen ukrep za institucije, ki so prevelike, da bi propadle, je nadzor stopnje finančnega vzvoda: manjša stopnja finančnega vzvoda spodbuja k razmišljanju o ohranjanju njihove velikosti ali delitvi na manjše enote, prilagojene običajnim dejavnostim komercialnega bančništva.
The control of the degree of leverage would seem a suitable measure for the too big to fail institutions: a smaller level of leverage incentivises them to consider if they want to preserve their size, or to divide into smaller entities adjusted to the traditional activities of the commercial banking.
Stopnja finančnega vzvoda zato vpliva na zmanjšanje ravni stopnje finančnega vzvoda kreditnih enot: bodisi za to, da se zniža posojilo, ki bo namenjeno za stanovanjski sektor, bodisi da se zviša njihov osnovni kapital, ki bo omogočil prevzetje presežka izgub, ki vodijo v preprečevanje napihovanja cen.
The degree of leverage, therefore, forces to reduce the degree of leverage to the credit entities: either to reduce the credit that will be destined to the housing sector or to increase their capital base to enable to assume the excess of losses with burst the bubble.
Nacionalni nadzorniki niso uspeli preprečiti kopičenja tveganj v številnih nacionalnih sistemih.
National supervisors did not manage to stop the accumulation of risks in several national systems.
V drugih predlogih o urejanju finančnih trgov obstajata dva skupna elementa: na eni strani bi bilo nujno zmanjšati visoko stopnjo finančnega vzvoda, to je zmanjšati razmerje skupnih sredstev/kapitala; na drugi strani pa bi bilo nujno zvišati kapitalske zahteve finančnih enot.
In the different proposals made on how to regulate the financial markets, there are two common elements: on the one hand, it would be necessary to reduce the high degree of leverage, that is, to reduce the ratio total assets / capital; and on the other hand, it would be necessary to increase the capital requirements of the financial entities.
Za ustrezno kapitalsko osnovo je to nujno, da bi se soočale z morebitnimi izgubami, ki bi se lahko nakopičile v prihodnjih finančnih krizah.
This is essential in order to have a suitable capital basis, to face the possible losses that might be generated in the future financial crises.
Treba je upoštevati, da je glavna naloga finančnega sistema preusmerjanje varčevanja v naložbe.
We should bear in mind that the main function of the financial system is to channel saving towards investment.
V tem postopku je finančnim enotam nemogoče preprečiti, da prevzemajo tveganja: tudi če so tveganja bolje nadzorovana, še vedno obstaja možnost novih predvidenih napihovanj cen.
In this process it is impossible to stop the financial entities from assuming risks: and even if now the risks are subjected to a better supervision, the possibility of new speculative bubbles will not disappear.
V konkretnem primeru bančništva bodo velike banke, dokler so prepletena trgovinska in naložbena posojila, podvržene tveganju svojega kapitala pri nakupu in prodaji finančnih sredstev, namesto da bi podprle realno gospodarstvo, pri čemer se depoziti spreminjajo v posojila družinam in podjetjem.
In the concrete case of banking, as long as the businesses of commercial and investment loans are mixed, the big banks will be led to risk their capital in the purchase and sale of financial assets, instead of backing up the real economy converting the deposits picked up into credits to families and companies.
Pravzaprav bankam ni treba ravnati na noben drug način.
As a matter of fact, banks do not have any duty to act in any another way.
Prav zato potrebuje nova uredba prilagodljivost, da bi lahko zmanjšala stopnjo finančnega vzvoda, če se zaznajo skrb zbujajoči znaki.
For this reason the new regulation needs flexibility to be able to reduce leverage if alarming signs are detected.
V prvih letih obdobja med letoma 1996–2006 bi se morale pojaviti oranžna ali rdeča luč, ko je v Španiji razširjanje posojil povzročilo skokovit porast: v teh desetih letih so se posojila povečala za 20 % letno.
Some orange or red light, for example, should have appeared in the first years of period 1996-2006, when in Spain the credit expansion lead to a very high increase: during ten years credit grew in a rhythm of the 20% annual.
V tem primeru bi bilo nujno ukrepati proti finančnim enotam (velikim ali malim), ki so se izpostavile hipotekarnim posojilom, pri čemer so omejile svojo stopnjo finančnega vzvoda.
In this case it would have been necessary to act against the financial entities (big or small) who exposed themselves more to the mortgage loan limiting their leverage limit.
Po drugi strani je nadzorovanje finančnega sektorja na evropski ravni ključnega pomena za učinkovitost dobrih regulatornih politik, ob upoštevanju neuspelih nacionalnih analiz nekaterih kriznih indikatorjev.
On the other hand, the monitoring of the financial sector at a European level is the key issue for the effectiveness of good regulatory policies, taking into account the failure of the national minded analysis of several crisis indicators.
Predsednik ECB je novembra 2008 na peti konferenci centralnih bank dejal, da “(…) so že leta 2006 kazali opozorilni znaki glede globalnih trgov, ko je bilo ocenjeno, da so na trgu idealni pogoji ter da bi že najmanjša sprememba pogojev povzročila resne motnje na finančnih trgih. (…) Dejal je še, da je bilo mogoče videti težave na obzorju, ne pa tudi, kje natanko.
As the President of the ECB stated in November 2008 in the 5th ECB Central Banking Conference: “(…) there were warning signs, even back in 2006, that global markets were “priced for perfection” and that even a small change in conditions could severely disrupt financial markets. (…) We knew that a storm was brewing but, admittedly, we did not know exactly where.
Prav tako niso znali napovedati, kaj bi jih sprožilo, niti, kdaj bi nastopile
Neither did we know what would trigger it, or when it would come.
„Undervalued risk and uncertainty: Some thoughts on the market turmoil“
"Undervalued risk and uncertainty: Some thoughts on the market turmoil"
Govor predsednika ECB Jean-Claude Tricheta na peti konferenci ECB o centralnem bančništvu v Frakfurtu na Majni, 13. novembra 2008.
Speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB at the Fifth ECB Central Banking Conference, Frankfurt am Main, 13 November 2008
V zvezi s tem so številne zamisli, ki jih predvideva Larosière poročilo, vključene v sveženj o finančnem nadzoru in bodo pristojnim politikam omogočile urejanje in nadzor finančnih trgov.
In that sense, the ideas that the Larosière report launched, a lot of them included in the supervisory package today in discussion, will enable a competent policy for regulation and supervision of financial markets.
Glavni uspeh pa bo v povezavi med mikro- in makronadzorom ter tekoči komunikaciji med tema ravnema.
The core of its success will be the interconnection between the micro and macro supervision, and the fluid information between the two levels.
Na ta način bo sekretariat ESRB imel glavno vlogo pri zagotavljanju učinkovite in hitre izmenjave podatkov med različnimi udeleženimi akterji, pri čemer pa bo vedno zagotovljena potrebno zaupnost.
In this way, the Secretariat of the ESRB will have a major role in ensuring the efficient and fast exchange of data between the different actors involved, always strictly guaranteeing the confidentiality needed.
Kot je bilo zastavljeno na začetku, morajo organi za mikronadzor in enota ESRB tesno sodelovati.
As conceived from the beginning, the Micro-Supervisory Authorities and the ESRB are a unit and shall work closely together.
Z novo arhitekturo bi morala EU predvideti znake še pred krizo in pravočasno ukrepati.
With the new architecture the EU should be able to hear the thunders before the storm, and react in the due time.
Prenos posebnih nalog v zvezi z delovanjem Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja na Evropsko centralno banko
Specific tasks for the European Central Bank concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board
Burkhard Balz, Sharon Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Pascal Canfin, Nikolaos Huntis (Nikolaos Chountis), George Sabin Cutaş, Leonardo Domenici, Derk Jan Eppink, Diogo Feio, Vicky Ford, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Sven Giegold, Sylvie Goulard, Othmar Karas, Astrid Lulling, Arlene McCarthy, Ivari Padar, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Olle Schmidt, Edward Scicluna, Peter Simon, Peter Skinner, Theodor Dumitru Stolojan, Ramon Tremosa i Balcells
Burkhard Balz, Sharon Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Pascal Canfin, Nikolaos Chountis, George Sabin Cutaş, Leonardo Domenici, Derk Jan Eppink, Diogo Feio, Vicky Ford, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Sven Giegold, Sylvie Goulard, Othmar Karas, Astrid Lulling, Arlene McCarthy, Ivari Padar, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Olle Schmidt, Edward Scicluna, Peter Simon, Peter Skinner, Theodor Dumitru Stolojan, Ramon Tremosa i Balcells
o predlogu Uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o makrobonitetnem nadzoru finančnega sistema v Skupnosti in o ustanovitvi Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community macro prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board
Poročevalka: Sylvie Goulard
Rapporteur: Sylvie Goulard
Spremembe osnutka akta
Amendments to a draft act
MNENJE Odbora za pravne zadeve ...........................................................................53
OPINION of the Committee on Legal Affairs ......................................................53
MNENJE Odbora za ustavne zadeve ........................................................................58
OPINION of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs ................................58
– ob upoštevanju predloga Komisije Parlamentu in Svetu ( KOM(2009)0499 ),
– having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council ( COM(2009)0499 ),
– ob upoštevanju člena 251(2) in člena 95 Pogodbe ES, na podlagi katerih je Komisija Parlamentu podala predlog ( C7‑0166/2009 ),
– having regard to Article 251(2) and Article 95 of the EC Treaty, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament ( C7‑0166/2009 ),
– ob upoštevanju sporočila Komisije Parlamentu in Svetu z naslovom Posledice začetka veljavnosti Lizbonske pogodbe za še nedokončane medinstitucionalne postopke odločanja ( KOM(2009)0665 ),
– having regard to the Commission Communication to Parliament and the Council entitled 'Consequences of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon for ongoing interinstitutional decision-making procedures' ( COM(2009)0665 ),
– ob upoštevanju člena 294(3) in člena 114 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije,
– having regard to Article 294(3) and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
– ob upoštevanju mnenja Evropske centralne banke z dne 26. oktobra 2009
– having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank of 26 October 2009
– ob upoštevanju mnenja Evropskega ekonomsko-socialnega odbora z dne 22. januarja 2010,
– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 22 January 2010,
– ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve in mnenj Odbora za proračun, Odbora za pravne zadeve ter Odbora za ustavne zadeve ( A7‑0168/2010 ),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Budgets, the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs ( A7‑0168/2010 ),