natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ti posamezni sklepi so kot del usklajevanja gospodarskih politik držav članic v Svetu v skladu s členom 121(1) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije ključna dopolnitev ukrepov, ki jih Svet sprejme v skladu s členom 121 Pogodbe in Uredbo (EU) št. […/…].
As part of the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States conducted within the Council as specified in Article 121(1) TFEU, these individual decisions are an integral follow-up to the measures adopted by the Council in accordance with Article 121 TFEU and Regulation (EU) No […/…].
(14) Ker ta uredba vsebuje splošna pravila za učinkovito izvajanje Uredbe (EU) št. […/…], bi se morala sprejeti v skladu z rednim zakonodajnim postopkom iz člena 121(6) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije.
(14) Since this Regulation contains general rules for effective enforcement of Regulation (EU) No […/…], it should be adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure referred to in Article 121(6) TFEU.
(15) Ker države članice zaradi tesnih medsebojnih trgovinskih in finančnih povezav ter prelivanja učinkov nacionalnih gospodarskih politik na celotno Unijo in euroobmočje ne morejo zadovoljivo doseči učinkovitega okvira za odkrivanje in preprečevanje makroekonomskih neravnovesij in se lahko ta okvir bolje doseže na ravni Unije, lahko Unija v skladu z načelom subsidiarnosti iz člena 5 Pogodbe o Evropski uniji sprejme ukrepe.
(15) Since an effective framework for detection and prevention of macroeconomic imbalances cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States because of the deep trade and financial inter-linkages between Member States and the spillover effects of national economic policies on the Union and the euro area as a whole and can be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union.
V skladu z načelom sorazmernosti, kot je določeno v istem členu, ta uredba ne presega tega, kar je potrebno za doseganje navedenih ciljev –
In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in the same Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives.
(15a) Določbe te uredbe so popolnoma skladne s členom 3 Pogodbe o Evropski uniji in s horizontalnimi klavzulami Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije, torej s členi 7, 8, 9, 10 in 11 te pogodbe, z Listino o temeljnih pravicah ter z določbami protokola št. 26 o storitvah splošnega interesa, ki je priložen Pogodbam, in členom 153(5) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije.
(15a) The provisions of this R egulation are fully consistent with Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union and horizontal clauses of the TFEU, namely Articles 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 TFEU , the Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as provisions of Protocol (No 26 ) on services of general interest annexed to the Treaties and Article 153(5) TFEU.
(15b) Ta uredba ne vpliva na uveljavljanje temeljnih pravic, kakor so priznane v državah članicah in v zakonodaji Unije.
(15b) This Regulation does not affect the exercise of fundamental rights as recognized in the Member States and by Union law.
Prav tako ne vpliva na pravico do pogajanja, sklepanja in izvajanja kolektivnih pogodb ter pravico do stavke v skladu z nacionalnimi zakoni in prakso, ki spoštujejo zakonodajo Unije.
Nor does it affect the right to negotiate, conclude and enforce collective agreements and to take industrial action in accordance with national law and practices which respect Union law.
(15c) Za spodbujanje odgovornosti in nacionalnega lastništva bi se moral Svet sestajati in odločati javno, kadar razpravlja ter sprejema sklepe in priporočila o teh pomembnih vprašanjih, ki zadevajo interese Evropske unije in njenih državljanov.
(15c) In order to foster accountability and national ownership, the Council sh ould convene and deliberate publicly when it discuss es and adopt s conclusions and recommendations on these important issues that affect the interests of the European Union and its citizens.
Ta uredba določa sistem sankcij za učinkovito odpravljanje makroekonomskih neravnovesij v euroobmočju.
This Regulation lays down a system of sanctions for effective correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area.
Uredba se za takšno državo članico začne uporabljati dan po objavi.
This Regulation shall apply to such a Member State from the day after such publication.
Za namene te uredbe se uporabljajo opredelitve pojmov iz člena 2 Uredbe (EU) št. […/…].
For the purposes of this Regulation, the definitions set out in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No […/…] shall apply.
Poleg tega se uporablja naslednja opredelitev:
In addition, the following definition shall apply:
– „izredne gospodarske razmere“ so razmere, v katerih se presežek javnofinančnega primanjkljaja nad referenčno vrednostjo šteje za izjemnega v smislu druge alinee člena 126(2)(a) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije in v skladu z Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 1467/97
– ‘exceptional economic circumstances’ means circumstances where an excess of a government deficit over the reference value is considered exceptional within the meaning of the second indent of Article 126(2)(a) TFEU and as specified in Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
UL L 209, 2.8.1997, str 6. .
OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p.
Svet na predlog Komisije zahteva obrestni depozit , če je sprejeto njegovo priporočilo o korektivnih ukrepih v skladu s členom 10(4) Uredbe št. .../2011, v katerem ugotovi, da zadevna država članica ▌ni sprejela priporočenih korektivnih ukrepov v skladu s priporočilom.
An interest-bearing deposit shall be imposed by the Council, acting on a proposal by the Commission, if a Council recommendation on corrective action is adopted in accordance with Article 10(4) of ▌ Regulation (EU) No …/2011, where the Council ▌concludes ▌that the Member State concerned has not taken the recommended corrective action following a recommendation .
Svet na predlog Komisije naloži letno globo, če:
A yearly fine shall be imposed by the Council, acting on a proposal by the Commission, if:
(a) je v istem postopku v zvezi s čezmejnim neravnovesjem sprejeto njegovo drugo priporočilo v skladu s členom 8(2) Uredbe (EU) št. .../2011, v katerem Svet ugotovi, da je država članica predložila pomanjkljiv načrt korektivnih ukrepov tudi po njegovem prvem priporočilu za spremembo njenega načrta, ali če
(a) a second Council recommendation in the same imbalance procedure is adopted in accordance with Article 8(2) of Regulation (EU) No …/2011 where the Council concludes that the Member State has submitted an insufficient corrective action plan, even after the first Council recommendation on amending its corrective action plan or if,
(b) je v istem postopku v zvezi s čezmejnim neravnovesjem sprejeto njegovo drugo priporočilo v skladu s členom 10(4) Uredbe (EU) št. .../2011, v katerem Svet ugotovi, da država članica ni sprejela priporočenih korektivnih ukrepov tudi po njegovem prvem priporočilu o teh ukrepih.
(b) a second Council recommendation in the same imbalance procedure is adopted in accordance with Article 10(4) of Regulation (EU) No …/2011 where the Council concludes that the Member State has not taken the recommended corrective action even after the first Council recommendation on corrective action.
Globa se naloži tako, da se zahtevani obrestni depozit pretvori v letno globo v skladu s členom 3(1).
The fine shall be imposed by means of converting the interest-bearing deposit imposed into a yearly fine in accordance with Article 3(1).
Šteje se, da je Svet sklep sprejel, razen če se s kvalificirano večino v desetih dneh od dneva, ko je Komisija sprejela predlog, odloči za njegovo zavrnitev.
The decision shall be deemed adopted by the Council unless it decides, by qualified majority, to reject the proposal within ten days of the Commission adopting it.
Svet lahko v skladu s členom 293(1) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije spremeni predlog.
The Council may amend the proposal in accordance with Article 293(1) TFEU .
Zadevna država članica lahko zahteva izredno sejo Sveta, na kateri se glasuje o sklepu.
The Member State concerned may request that an extraordinary meeting of the Council be convened to take a vote on the decision.
Obrestni depozit ali letna globa, ki jo predlaga Komisija, znaša 0,1 % BDP zadevne države članice v prejšnjem letu.
The interest-bearing deposit or the yearly fine to be proposed by the Commission shall be 0.1% of the GDP of the Member State concerned in the preceding year.
V primeru namernega in resnega neupoštevanja priporočil Sveta in Komisije se lahko globa poveča do 0,3 % BDP.
In the case of deliberate and severe non-compliance with Council or Commission recommendations the fine may be raised up to 0.3% of GDP.
Komisija lahko z odstopanjem od odstavka 2 zaradi izrednih gospodarskih razmer ali na podlagi utemeljene prošnje zadevne države članice, naslovljene na Komisijo, ali zaradi upoštevanja vseh kumulativnih učinkov sankcij, naloženih v skladu z Uredbo (EU) št. .../2011 o pospešitvi in razjasnitvi izvajanja postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem ter z Uredbo (EU) št. .../2011 o učinkovitem izvrševanju proračunskega nadzora v euroobmočju, v desetih dneh od sprejetja sklepa Sveta iz odstavka 1, predlaga zmanjšanje zneska globe ▌.
By derogation from paragraph 2, the Commission may, on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned addressed to the Commission or in order to take into account any cumulative effect of sanctions imposed in accordance with Regulation (EU) No …/2011 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure and Regulation (EU) No …/2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, within ten days of adoption of the Council conclusions referred to in paragraph 1, propose to reduce the amount of the fine ▌.
Če je država članica položila obrestni depozit ali plačala letno globo za določeno koledarsko leto in Svet pozneje v skladu s členom 10(1) Uredbe (EU) št. […/…] ugotovi, da je država članica v zadevnem letu sprejela priporočene korektivne ukrepe, se depozit skupaj z obrestmi ali globa, plačana za zadevno leto, vrneta državi članici sorazmerno glede na čas.
If a Member State has constituted an interest-bearing deposit or has paid a yearly fine for a given calendar year and the Council thereafter concludes, in accordance with Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) No …/2011 that the Member State has taken the recommended corrective action in the course of that given year, the deposit paid for the given year together with the accrued interest or the fine paid for the given year shall be returned to the Member State pro rata temporis .
Če država članica manipulira s finančnimi podatki, potvarja statistične podatke ali namerno posreduje zavajajoče informacije, pri čemer pride zlasti do kršitev evropskih statističnih pravil, na katerih temeljijo sklepi iz Uredbe (EU) št. .../2011 [o preprečevanju in odpravljanju makroekonomskih neravnovesij], se lahko Svet na predlog Komisije odloči, da od te države zahteva plačilo globe.
In the event that a Member State manipulates financial data, falsifies statistics or deliberately provides misleading information, in particular resulting in a violation of the European statistical rules, on which decisions in Regulation (EU) No …/ 2011 [on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances] are based, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt a decision requiring the Member State to pay a fine.
Ta globa se izplača v enkratnem znesku v višini 0,5 % BDP zadevne države članice v preteklem letu.
Such a fine shall be a one-off payment of 0.5% of the GDP of the Member State concerned in the preceding year.
Svet lahko predlog Komisije spremeni v skladu s členom 293(1) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije.
The Council may amend the Commission’s proposal in accordance with Article 293(1) TFEU.
Celotni letni znesek kumulativnih glob, naloženih državi članici, z izjemo glob iz odstavka 4a, ne presega 0,5 % njenega BDP.
The total yearly amount of the cumulative fines imposed on a Member State, excluding the fine referred to in paragraph 4a, shall not exceed 0.5% of its GDP.
Člen 4 Dodelitev
Article 4
Globe, zbrane v skladu s členom 3 te uredbe, pomenijo druge prihodke iz člena 311 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije in se dodelijo mehanizmu za stabilnost za države članice, katerih valuta je euro ▌.
Fines collected in accordance with Article 3 of this Regulation shall constitute other revenue, as referred to in Article 311 TFEU , and shall be allocated to the stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro ▌.
Glasovanje v Svetu
Voting within the Council
Za ukrepe iz člena 3 glasujejo samo člani Sveta, ki predstavljajo države članice, katerih valuta je euro, in države članice, ki to uredbo izvajajo prostovoljno.
For the measures referred to in Article 3, only members of the Council representing Member States whose currency is the euro and Member States applying this Regulation on a voluntary basis shall vote .
Svet ne upošteva glasu člana Sveta, ki zastopa zadevno državo članico.
The Council shall act without taking into account the vote of the member of the Council representing the Member State concerned.
Kvalificirana večina članov Sveta iz odstavka 1 se določi v skladu s členom 238(3)(a) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije .
A qualified majority of the members of the Council mentioned in the first paragraph shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) TFEU .
Da bi se povečali javni nadzor, odgovornost in nacionalno lastništvo pri razpravah o odločitvah iz člena 3 in pri njihovem sprejemanju, je posvetovanje Sveta odprto za javnost v skladu s členom 8(3) Sklepa Sveta 2006/683/ES, Euratom z dne 15. septembra 2006 o sprejetju poslovnika Sveta.
In order to increase public scrutiny, accountability and national ownership, when discussing and adopting the decisions referred to in Article 3, Council deliberations shall be open to the public in accordance with Article 83 of Council Decision 2006/683/EC , Euratom of 15 September 2006 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure.
Gospodarski dialog
Economic dialogue
Za okrepitev dialoga med institucijami Unije, zlasti Evropskim parlamentom, Svetom in Komisijo na eni strani ter nacionalnimi parlamenti, vladami in drugimi pristojnimi organi držav članic na drugi, pa tudi za zagotovitev večje preglednosti in odgovornosti, lahko pristojni odbor Evropskega parlamenta organizira predstavitve in javne razprave o makroekonomskem in proračunskem nadzoru, ki ga izvajata Svet in Komisija.
In order to enhance the dialogue between the Union institutions, in particular the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the one hand, and the national parliaments, governments and other relevant bodies of the Member States on the other, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the European Parliament may conduct hearings and organise public debates on macro-economic and budgetary surveillance undertaken by the Council and the Commission.
* UL vstavite datum: xxx let po začetku veljavnosti te uredbe. * in nato vsaka tri leta objavi poročilo o uporabi te uredbe.
* OJ please insert date: xxx years after the date of entry into force of this Regulation. * and every three years thereafter the Commission shall publish a report on the application of this Regulation.
(a) ali je izvedbeni sistem prispeval k ravnanju držav članic v skladu z vodilnimi načeli stabilnih cen, zdravih javnih financ in monetarnih pogojev ter uravnotežene plačilne bilance v Uniji;
(a) whether the enforcement system has contributed to the compliance of Member States to the guiding principles of stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments in the Union;
(b) ali so globe učinkovite, ustrezne in sorazmerne;
(b) whether the fines are effective, appropriate and proportional;
(c) ali je treba sistem glob spremeniti.
(c) whether the system of fines needs to be amended.
Če so v poročilu navedene ovire za pravilno delovanje določb o ekonomski in monetarni uniji v Pogodbah, zlasti v zvezi z izvršilnimi ukrepi, Komisija pošlje potrebna priporočila Evropskemu svetu.
If the report identifies obstacles to the proper functioning of the provisions in the Treaties governing economic and monetary union, particularly with regard to enforcement measures, it shall make the necessary recommendations to the European Council.
Predlogi Komisije za izboljšano gospodarsko upravljanje so bistveni za prihodnost Evropske unije in gospodarsko rast, zlasti v euroobmočju.
The Commission proposals for improved economic governance are of major importance for the future of the EU and economic growth, in particular in the euro area.
Poročevalci Evropskega parlamenta so se zaradi tega odločili, da jih bodo intenzivno obravnavali kot sveženj in jih izboljšali, da bi oblikovali trden in skladen okvir za naslednja desetletja.
The rapporteurs of the European Parliament have therefore decided to work intensively on the Commission proposals as a package and improve them in order to establish a strong and coherent framework for the next decades.
Predloge Komisije so vzeli kot izhodišče.
The rapporteurs have taken the Commission proposals as a starting point.
To je prvi primer, ko Parlament in Svet soodločata o makroekonomskem razvoju Unije.
This is the first time the parliament is co-deciding with the Council on macroeconomic developments of the Union.
Poročevalci se zavedajo, da nova pooblastila v skladu z Lizbonsko pogodbo s seboj prinašajo tudi nove odgovornosti.
The rapporteurs are aware that these new powers given by the Lisbon Treaty bring with them also new responsibilities.
Svet ne sme sprejeti končne odločitve, dokler Evropski parlament ne soglaša s celotnim svežnjem.
The Council may take no final decision without the agreement of the European Parliament on the whole package.
V okviru tega postopka naj bi zagotovili skladnost in pravočasno sprejetje vseh delov svežnja.
The aim is to within this procedure guarantee coherence and timely adoption of all parts of the package.
Izkušnje iz prvega desetletja ekonomske in monetarne unije kažejo jasno potrebo po izboljšanem okviru gospodarskega upravljanja, ki bi moral temeljiti na močnejšem nacionalnem lastništvu skupno dogovorjenih pravil in politik ter na trdnejšem okviru nadzora nad nacionalnimi gospodarskimi politikami na evropski ravni.
Experience gained during the first decade of the Economic and Monetary Union shows a clear need for an improved economic governance framework, which should be built on stronger national ownership of commonly agreed rules and policies and on a more robust surveillance framework at the European level of national economic policies.
Poročevalci zato zagovarjajo obsežno reformo okvira upravljanja, ki bi temeljil na metodi Skupnosti (Unije) ter na močni in neodvisni Komisiji, ki bi nadzorovala in usmerjala v novem globljem in širšem okviru nadzora gospodarske politike.
The rapporteurs favour therefore an extensive reform of the governance framework based on the Community (Union) method and a strong and independent Commission as overseeing and giving directions in the new deeper and wider economic policy surveillance framework.
Treba se je učiti iz preteklih napak, zato je razširitev nadzora za preprečitev makroekonomskih neravnovesij še posebej pomembna.
It is necessary to learn from past mistakes; therefore it is particularly important to broaden the surveillance to prevent harmful macroeconomic imbalances.
Nujno je treba zagotoviti, da bo nadzor v prihodnje presegal fiskalno politiko, saj se je kopičenje makroekonomskih neravnovesij izkazalo za škodljivo in je povečalo ranljivost.
There is an urgent need to ensure that the surveillance in the future goes beyond fiscal policy, as the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances has proved harmful and has lead to increased vulnerability.
V okviru za preprečevanje in odpravljanje makroekonomskih neravnovesij je treba poudariti zgodnje odkrivanje in preprečevanje tistih, ki bi lahko bila škodljiva.
The framework on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances needs to emphasise early detection and prevention of potentially harmful macroeconomic imbalances.
Makroekonomski nadzor ne more temeljiti na togem in poenostavljenem okviru.
The macroeconomic surveillance cannot be based on a static and simplistic framework.
Nujno je treba zagotoviti, da bo postopek temeljil na natančni ekonomski analizi prek poglobljenih pregledov, s katerimi bi preučili številne ekonomske dejavnike, pri tem pa ustrezno upoštevali okoliščine, značilne za posamezne države.
It is crucial to ensure that the procedure is based on thorough economic analysis through in-depth reviews investigating a broad range of economic factors while taking country-specific circumstances duly into account.
Da bi zagotovili verodostojen in učinkovit nadzorni okvir, ga je treba okrepiti z določitvijo letnih glob za neizpolnjevanje priporočil ali obveznosti, da se pripravi primeren načrt korektivnih ukrepov.
In order to ensure a credible and efficient surveillance framework, it must be strengthened by establishing yearly fines for non-compliance with recommendations or the obligation to draw up a sufficient corrective action plan.
Ta izvedbeni mehanizem bi začel veljati samo, če bi se preventivni ukrepi izkazali za neučinkovite, ker države članice ne bi bile zmožne sprejeti potrebne ukrepe v zvezi s priporočili ali ne bi predložile primernega načrta korektivnih ukrepov.
This enforcement mechanism will come into effect only if the preventive measures fail on grounds of the inability of a Member State to take necessary action with regards to recommendations, or fails to provide a sufficient corrective action plan.
Državi članici ni mogoče naložiti globe zgolj zaradi obstoja makroekonomskih neravnovesij, pri tej odločitvi štejejo dejavnosti in ukrepi, ki jih je sprejela.
Fines cannot be imposed on a Member State simply because of the existence of macroeconomic imbalances, it is the action and measures taken that are decisive on whether to impose fines or not.
Globe dosežejo svoj odvračilen namen le, če je njihova uporaba pravilo, ne pa izjema.
The fines can only be an effective deterrence if the application of the fines is the rule, not the exemption.
Zaradi tega obstaja jasna potreba po višji stopnji avtomatizma, pri čemer ni prostora za politično barantanje.
There is therefore a clear need for a higher degree of automaticity, without giving room for political bargaining.
Tako se šteje, da je Svet sprejel odločitev o naložitvi globe, razen če se s kvalificirano večino odloči za zavrnitev predloga v desetih dneh od dneva, ko ga je Komisija sprejela.
The decisions on the imposition of fines shall therefore be deemed adopted by the Council unless it decides, by qualified majority, to reject the proposal within ten days of the Commission adopting it.
Zadevna država članica lahko od Sveta zahteva, da se mora za sprejetje te odločitve sestati.
The Member State concerned should have the right to request the Council to convene in order to take this decision.
To je pomembno zaradi zagotovitve, da bodo vse države članice obravnavane enako.
This is necessary in order to ensure that all Member States will be treated equally.
Ker mora biti pri makroekonomskem nadzoru poudarek na preventivnih in korektivnih ukrepih z več fazami, bi moral za naložitev globe zadostovati že razlog, da država članica, ki je v postopku zaradi čezmernega primanjkljaja, ni sprejela potrebnih ukrepov ali predložila primernega načrta korektivnih ukrepov.
As the emphasis in the macroeconomic surveillance is to be on the preventive and corrective action with several phases, failure for a Member State subject to an excessive deficit procedure to take the necessary measures or provide a sufficient corrective action plan should in itself a reason for imposing fines.