natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
b) r egulativna poročila in ukrepi v zvezi s solventnostjo, ki so jih uporabljali zakonodajalci, niso sledili razvoju v sektorju ...
b) The regulatory returns and measures of solvency applied by the regulators did not keep pace with developments in the industry ...
Tako je minimalni kapital postal vedno manj pomemben ukrep za dejanski finančni položaj družbe ELAS (odst.
Thus regulatory solvency became an increasingly irrelevant measure of the realistic financial position of the Society; (par.
c) zakonodajalci so razumeli pomembnost razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev v skladu z zakonodajo ...
c) The significance of policyholders' reasonable expectations (PRE) under the legislation was understood by the regulators ...
Vendar ni bilo stalnega ali vztrajnega prizadevanja, da bi se določilo, kako morajo razumna pričakovanja zavarovancev vplivati na priznane obveznosti družbe ELAS (odst.
There was, however, no consistent or persistent attempt to establish how PRE should affect the acknowledged liabilities of the Society ; (par.
d) zakonodajalci niso dovolj upoštevali dejstva, da so različni ukrepi, uporabljeni za krepitev položaja solventnosti družbe ELAS, temeljili na predvidenih prihodnjih presežkih (odst.
d) The regulators failed to give sufficient consideration to the fact that a number of the various measures used to bolster the Society's solvency position were predicated on the emergence of future surplus ; (par.
e) s plošna napaka zakonodajalcev in vladnega oddelka za zavarovalniško statistiko je bila, da niso dodatno spremljali vprašanj, ki so se pojavila v času urejanja družbe ELAS, in učinkovito podvomili v vodstvo (odst.
e) There was a general failure on the part of the regulators and GAD to follow up issues that arose in the course of their regulation of the Society, and to mount an effective challenge of the management . (par.
Lord Penrose na koncu navaja, da „ slika, ki jo vidimo, prikazuje družbo ELAS, ki ima resne finančne in vodstvene težave, ki so se začele že pred težavami z zajamčenimi rentami ...
Lord Penrose concluded by stating that "the picture that emerges is of a Society that had deep-seated financial and management problems that pre-dated the emergence of the GAR problem ...
Sodba zgornjega doma v zadevi Hyman je sprožila krizo, vendar ni bila izključno odgovorna zanjo.
The judgement of the House of Lords in Hyman precipitated a crisis, but was not solely responsible for it.
Za boljšo oceno skladnosti zakonodajalcev na področju življenjskih zavarovanj z določbami zakonodaje Skupnosti v Združenem kraljestvu in drugih zadevnih državah članicah je preiskovalni odbor povabil več strokovnjakov in prič, da predstavijo ustne in pisne dokaze v zvezi z zadevo Equitable Life
In order better to assess the life insurance regulators' compliance with the Community law provisions in the UK and the other Member States concerned, the Committee of Inquiry invited a number of experts and witnesses to present the committee with oral and written evidence on the Equitable Life case
H # = ustni dokazi, predloženi na zaslišanju preiskovalnega odbora; WS # = ustni dokazi, predloženi na delavnicah preiskovalnega odbora;
H # = oral evidence given at EQUI Hearing; WS # = oral evidence given at EQUI Workshop;
WE # = pisni dokazi, ki so objavljeni na spletni strani preiskovalnega odbora in dostopni javnosti; ES # = zunanje študije;
WE # = written evidence filed on EQUI website accessible to public; ES # = external study;
WE-FILE # = pisni dokazi, ki niso objavljeni na spletni strani; WE-CONF # = zaupni pisni dokazi. .
WE-FILE # = written evidence not filed on website; WE-CONF # = confidential written evidence. .
Med povabljenimi pričami so bili posamezni zavarovanci in predstavniki združenj zavarovancev, predstavniki vlade, višji uradniki kot predstavniki sedanjih in prejšnjih zakonodajalcev na področju življenjskih zavarovanj v Združenem kraljestvu, na Irskem in v Nemčiji, predstavniki Komisije, aktuarji in strokovnjaki na področju življenjskih zavarovanj, rent in forenzičnega računovodstva ter drugi strokovnjaki ali zainteresirane strani, vključno s sedanjim vodstvom družbe Equitable Life.
Witnesses invited included individual policyholders and representatives of policyholder associations, government representatives, senior officers of present and past life insurance regulators in the UK, Ireland and Germany, representatives of the Commission, actuaries and experts in life insurances, annuities and forensic accounting, as well as other experts or stakeholders, including the current management of Equitable Life.
V skladu s podatki, ki jih je navedel sedanji izvršni direktor družbe Equitable Life THOMSON, je leta 2001 „okrog 1,5 milijona ljudi zanimalo življenjsko zavarovanje družbe s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice in druge police; to je vključevalo okoli 8 000 zavarovancev z življenjskim zavarovanjem s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice na Irskem in okoli 4 000 takšnih zavarovancev v Nemčiji .
According to data provided by Mr. THOMSON, current Chief Executive of Equitable Life, in 2001 " roughly 1.5 million people had an interest in the Society's with-profits fund; this included about 8.000 with-profits policyholders in Ireland and about 4.000 with-profits policyholders in Germany .
Poleg tega je bilo približno 6 500 mednarodnih polic poslanih prek urada družbe ELAS na otoku Guernsey posameznikom s stalnim prebivališčem po vsem svetu, nekaterih tudi v Evropi“ (WE47).
In addition there were approximately 6.500 international policies sold through the Society's Guernsey office to individuals resident throughout the world, some of whom will be in Europe "(WE47).
V zvezi z mednarodnimi zavarovanci družbe Equitable Life, je SEYMOUR (WE53) ponudil natančnejše podatke, ki navajajo, da je imela družba konec devetdesetih let 20. stoletja „13 405 zavarovancev zunaj Združenega kraljestva s stalnim prebivališčem v 13 različnih državah članicah EU
Regarding Equitable Life's international policyholders, Mr. SEYMOUR (WE53) offered more precise data, stating that the Society had in the late 90s " 13.405 policyholders outside the UK , residing in 13 different EU Member States.
Skupaj 12 425 zavarovancev v državah članicah EU (Irska, Nemčija, Belgija, Avstrija, Danska, Finska, Francija, Grčija, Italija, Luksemburg, Nizozemska, Portugalska, Španija, Švedska) in 980 v pridruženih območjih Združenega kraljestva (Kanalski otoki, otok Man, Gibraltar). “.
In all, 12.425 policyholders in EU Member States (Ireland, Germany, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden) and 980 in UK-dependencies (Channel Islands, Isle of Man, Gibraltar). "
Dokazi, ki so jih predstavile druge priče, so se osredotočali na več ključnih vprašanj, ki se lahko razvrstijo v naslednje skupine:
The evidence presented by other witnesses focused on a number of key issues which can be grouped as follows:
Malomarnost pri bonitetni ureditvi in nadzoru
Negligence in prudential regulation and supervision
Priče (vlagatelji peticije, prizadeti zavarovanci ali predstavniki akcijskih skupin zavarovancev) so izrazile usklajena stališča, pri čemer so poudarile več obsežnih vprašanj in pritožb proti zakonodajalcem Združenega kraljestva na področju zavarovalništva in zakonodajalcem v drugih zadevnih državah članicah.
Converging views were expressed by witnesses (petitioners, affected policyholders or representatives of policyholders' action groups) in highlighting a number of wide-ranging concerns and complaints against the UK insurance regulators, as well as regulators in other Member States concerned.
V zvezi s tem posebnim vprašanjem so Tom LAKE, John NEWMAN in Paul BRAITHWAITE v imenu akcijske skupine EMAG
On this specific issue, oral and written evidence considered by the Committee of Inquiry were submitted by Tom LAKE, John NEWMAN and Paul BRAITHWAITE on behalf of EMAG
V svojih izjavah so – v različnem obsegu – obtožili zakonodajalce Združenega kraljestva, da niso pravilno izvajali svojih regulativnih nalog v zvezi z družbo Equitable Life ter da zaradi malomarnosti več let niso prepoznali veliko jasnih opozorilnih znakov pri bonitetnem nadzoru družbe Equitable Life in se nanje odzvali.
In their statements they have - to different degrees - accused the UK regulators of failing to exercise properly their regulatory functions in respect of Equitable Life and of negligently failing, over a number of years, to recognize, and to react to, a number of clear warning signs in the prudential supervision of Equitable Life.
SEYMOUR v H7 trdi: „Člen 23 tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju zahteva, da zakonodajalec nadzoruje in natančno spremlja poslovanje zavarovalnice, ki ima sedež na njegovem ozemlju poudarjam oboje: ‚na svojem ozemlju in poslovanje, ki se izvaja ‚zunaj tega ozemlja.
In H7, Mr. SEYMOUR claimed that "Article 23 of the Third Life Directive requires that the regulator had to supervise and know thoroughly what was happening to an assurance business whose head office was in his territory – I stress both 'in' his territory as well as the business carried out 'outside' that territory.
Določa tudi, da mora nadzornik odpraviti vse nepravilnosti, ki ogrožajo interese zavarovancev.“
It also states that the supervisor had to “remedy any irregularities prejudicial to the interests of the assured persons”.
KWANTESOVA (H7), ki zastopa podporno skupino zavarovancev, je povedala, da „je bila vlada Združenega kraljestva na začetku devetdesetih let 20. stoletja ena od glavnih podpornic tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju in zelo vztrajna glede trdne ureditve na področju življenjskih zavarovanj.
Representing a policyholders' support group, Ms. KWANTES (H7) claimed that " the UK government was one of the main backers of the Third Life Directive in the early 1990s and were very insistent on robust regulation of the Life Industry.
Desetletje pozneje pa smo izvedeli, da je bila ureditev le ‚blag pristop‘, kar koli že to pomeni.
A decade later we are told that the regulation was only 'light touch', whatever that means.
Po mojem mnenju se lahko regulira ali ne regulira, vmesne možnosti ni.“
In my opinion you either regulate or you don't regulate, there is no half-way house."
V WE7 je NASSIM trdil, da „so zakonodajalci porabili veliko preveč časa za razprave o okoliščinah, v katerih bi lahko uporabili diskrecijska pooblastila, na koncu pa jih niso nikoli uporabili, ko je bilo to glede na splošno situacijo potrebno.
In WE7 Mr. NASSIM claimed that " the regulators spent over-much time debating the circumstances under which they might use their discretionary powers and in the event never used them when the overall situation required them to do so.
Zato niso prepoznali nobene od pomembnih zaporednih faz pri izoblikovanju tega položaja ali se odzvali nanjo.“
As a result they did not recognise or react to any of the important successive stages in the development of that position."
V H8 je BAIN povedal, da „je pomanjkanje nadzora družbi Equitable Life omogočilo prepričanje, da lahko dela kar želi, ker je delovala v neurejenem prostoru“.
In H8 Mr. BAIN claimed that " lack of supervision allowed Equitable Life to believe it could do whatever it liked, because it was operating in a regulation-free zone."
V zvezi s komunikacijsko kulturo družbe Equitable Life, na podlagi katere bi moral skrben zakonodajalec končno opaziti njeno potencialno finančno slabost, je memorandum, predložen odboru Ministrstva za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve spodnjega doma januarja 2001
Referring to Equitable Life's communication culture, which should have allowed an attentive Regulator to eventually spot its potential financial weaknesses, a memorandum supplied to the House of Commons Treasury Committee in January 2001
Za več podrobnosti glej WE58. , poudaril, kako „se družba Equitable Life v preteklosti ni branila razkriti svoje sorazmerno slab pokritje minimalnega kapitala, ampak ga je namesto tega spodbujala kot zaželen rezultat tega, kar se je njej zdel dober pristop, kako zavarovancem povrniti čim večji delež donosa, zasluženega z njihovimi premijami.
see WE58 for more details. highlighted how " Equitable historically did not shy away from revealing its relatively thin solvency cover but, instead, promoted it as the desirable outcome of what it viewed as its virtuous approach to returning to policyholders as high as possible a proportion of the returns earned on their premiums.
Glede na široko poročanje o tem v medijih je po našem mnenju verjetno, da bi se veliko ljudi, ki je postalo zavarovanec v zadnjih dveh desetletjih ..., zavedalo filozofije družbe ELAS, ki ni povečevala in vzdrževala znatno presežene stopnje solventnosti.
Given the wide reporting of this in the media, we think it likely that many persons who became policyholders during the past two decades ... would have been aware of EL's philosophy on not accruing and maintaining substantial excess solvency.
Ključno pri sorazmerno nizkem pokritju minimalnega kapitala družbe ELAS je, da je bila vedno bolj izpostavljena finančnim težavam kot druge življenjske zavarovalnice in to v obliki slabih novic glede sredstev v primeru slabih tržnih pogojev za naložbe ali glede obveznosti v primeru nenačrtovanega povečanja obveznosti, ki bi jih povzročile zadeve, kot je regulativno ukrepanje.“
The point about EL's relatively thin solvency cover is that it always was going to be more exposed than most other life offices to financial adversity, whether in the form of bad news on the asset side in the event of poor investment market conditions, or on the liability side in the event of unplanned liability inflation brought on by issues such as regulatory intervention".
Nekdanji zavarovalniški agent družbe Equitable Life LLOYD (H5) je menil, da je celo vse zavarovalniške agente družbe Equitable Life „uprava družbe Equitable Life razočarala ...
The former Equitable Life sales representative Mr. LLOYD (H5) felt that even the Equitable's sales force were all " let down by the board of Equitable Life ...
Njena dolžnost je bila, da zavarovance in zavarovalniške agente obvesti o tveganjih, povezanih z dodajanjem zneskov obstoječemu skladu za življenjsko zavarovanje s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice, saj bi morala biti ta tveganja znana pred letom 1998 in po možnosti še prej ...
It had the duty to tell the policyholders and the sales staff about the risks associated with adding further sums to the existing with-profits fund, and those risks should have been known by 1998, and possibly sooner ...
Mislim tudi, da so nas zakonodajalci razočarali; nihče v družbi, ki ni bil v upravnem odboru, ni imel dostopa do vseh razpoložljivih informacij, vendar so ga zakonodajalci zagotovo morali imeti.“
I also feel we were failed by the regulators; no-one in the company outside the board had access to all of the information available, but the regulators most certainly should have had this."
V odgovoru na te obtožbe je predstavnik Organa za finančne storitve STRACHAN
Replying to these allegations, the FSA representative Mr. STRACHAN
Direktor oddelka za večje skupine za zavarovalniške posle za fizične osebe pri Organu za finančne storitve.
Director of the Major Retail Groups Division at the FSA.
Ne prizadevamo si za ureditev, v kateri se neuspehi družb ne zgodijo, ker se zavedamo, da takšne ureditve niti ni zaželeno niti ni mogoče doseči v prostem tržnem gospodarstvu.
We are not seeking to operate a regime in which firm failures do not occur, since we recognise that such a regime is neither desirable nor possible to achieve in a free market economy.
To ključno načelo je značilno za trenutni in prejšnji pristop Združenega kraljestva k predpisom na področju zavarovalništva.“
This key principle characterises both the UK 's current and former approach to insurance regulation."
To mnenje je ponovil predstavnik Ministrstva za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve Združenega kraljestva MAXWELL
This position was echoed by the UK Treasury representative Mr. MAXWELL
Direktor Ministrstva za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve, pristojen za politiko finančnih storitev.
Director for Financial Services Policy at HMT.
(H4), ki je navedel, da „ureditev ni bila statična.
(H4) who stated that " regulation was not static.
Ko se je trg razvijal, je razvoj potekal na ravni zakonodajne in regulativne politike, vendar si ureditev ni prizadevala za preprečitev vseh napak ali težav v družbah, ki jih ureja, in si za to še vedno ne prizadeva ...
There was evolution at both the legislative and regulatory policy level as the market evolved, but the regime did not, and still does not, seek to prevent all failures of or problems with regulated firms ...
Ko je leta 1998 postalo jasno, da družba Equitable Life ni izrecno predvidela zajamčenih rent pri določanju rezerv, se je Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve odzvalo hitro in odločno.“
When it became clear in 1998 that Equitable Life had made no explicit provision for annuity guarantees when setting its reserves, the Treasury reacted swiftly and firmly."
Podobno sta se izrazila McELWEE (H3), ko je navedel da s tehničnega vidika „neuspeh na trgu ni neskladen z dobrim nadzornim sistemom“ , in BJERRE-NIELSEN (H7), ki je izjavil: „Ne verjamem, da lahko mi kot zakonodajalci ali nadzorniki zajamčimo, da nikoli ne bo kakršne koli krize, propada, neuspeha ali pritožb.“
A similar note had been struck by Mr. McELWEE (H3) when stating that from a technical point of view " market failure is not inconsistent with a good supervisory regime" and by Mr. BJERRE-NIELSEN (H7) saying " I do not think that we as regulators or supervisors are able to guarantee that there will never be any kind of crisis, collapse, failures or complaints. "
Predstavnik Komisije TERTÁK (H1), direktor za področje finančnih storitev, ni želel komentirati nobenih ocen učinkovitosti ali mogočih pomanjkljivosti prejšnjih ali sedanjih finančnih zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva, ampak je poudaril njihovo vlogo pri nadzoru nacionalnega izvajanja ustreznih direktiv EU.
The Commission representative Mr. TERTÁK (H1), director for financial services, declined to comment on any appreciation of the effectiveness or possible shortcomings of former or current UK financial regulators, highlighting instead its role in the supervision of national implementations of the relevant EU Directives.
Vendar Komisija, kot je poudaril predstavnik Komisije BEVERLY v H7 in ponovil komisar McCREEVY v H8, „ ni mogla biti – in ni imela sredstev, da bi bila – zakonodajalec zakonodajalcev.“
However, as emphasised by Commission representative Mr. BEVERLY in H7 and repeated by Commissioner McCREEVY in H8, the Commission " could not - and had no means to - be the regulator of regulators".
Nekdanji izvršni direktor družbe Equitable Life (in imenovani aktuar) Christopher HEADDON, ki je zavrnil povabilo odbora, da nastopi na zaslišanju, je v WE45 razložil svojo „zaskrbljenost o objektivnosti članov odbora in načinu preverjanja dokazov (ali natančneje nepreverjanja).
Declining the committee's invitation to appear at one of the hearings, the former Equitable Life Chief Executive (and Appointed Actuary) Christopher HEADDON in WE45 aired his "concerns about the objectivity of the committee members and the way in which evidence is tested (or, more accurately, not tested).
Domneva se, da je bila družba Equitable Life v približno 20 letih pred sklenitvijo novih poslov decembra 2000 vodena neuspešno ...
It appears that there is a presumption of huge failing in the management of Equitable Life in the 20 years or so prior to its closure to new business in December 2000 ...
Poročevalci ne upoštevajo vpliva padanja vrednosti lastniškega kapitala v obdobju 2000–2003, zaradi katerega so se vrednosti polic pri vseh življenjskih zavarovalnicah znatno zmanjšale.
Commentators fail to recognise the influence of the long bear market in equities in 2000-2003, which saw the policy results for all life offices reduce significantly.
Očitna predpostavka članov odbora o zelo neuspešnem vodenju, kot je navedeno zgoraj, ima verjetno enako napako.
The committee members’ apparent presumption of huge failing, as described above, would seem to suffer from the same failure.
Zavarovanci ne morajo enostavno razlikovati med zmanjšanjem vrednosti polic, ki ga povzročijo določeni dogodki v družbi ELAS, in splošnim zmanjšanjem, ki vpliva na celoten sektor.
Policyholders cannot easily distinguish between a reduction in policy values caused by the particular events at the Society and the general reduction which affected the whole industry.
Očitno se jih je veliko pritoževalo zaradi zmanjšanih pričakovanj , ne pa zaradi dejanske izgube glede na trg.
Many of them appear to be complaining of reduced expectations rather than any actual loss relative to the market.
Kern Alexander je navedel naslednje krize finančnega sektorja Združenega kraljestva pred zadevo Equitable Life: nesolventnost družbe Johnson Matthey Bankers (1984), propad BCCI (1991), škandal v zvezi z družbo Lloyd's (1994), propad banke Barings (1995), škandal v zvezi s hipotekarnim življenjskim zavarovanjem (1999).
Dr. Kern Alexander cited the following UK financial sector crisis prior to the Equitable Life case: Johnson Matthey Bankers insolvency (1984), BCCI collapse (1991), Lloyd's scandal (1994), Barings Bank collapse (1995), endowment mortgages scandal (1999).
Ti primeri kažejo, da je bil v osemdesetih in devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja sistem bančnega in zavarovalniškega nadzora v Združenem kraljestvu pomanjkljiv, kar je spodbudilo regulativno reformo, kot je opredeljeno v Zakonu o finančnih storitvah in trgih iz leta 2000 .
These cases suggest that an inherent weakness existed in the UK banking and insurance supervising system throughout the 1980s and 1990s, prompting the regulatory reform as defined in the Financial Services and Market Act (FSMA) 2000 .
V WE7 je Michael NASSIM podrobno razložil obtožbe v zvezi z neuspešnim delovanjem zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva, pri čemer je navedel, da „zakonodajalci niso posredovali na učinkovit način, čeprav so morali vedeti, da bo imelo takšno izplačevanje previsokih bonusov neizogibne posledice.
In WE7, Mr. Michael NASSIM detailed allegations of operational failure by the UK regulators, stating that "the Regulators did not intervene in any effective way, although they should have known that such over-bonusing would have inevitable effects.
To pomeni, da je zakonodajalec z nedejavnostjo družbi ELAS omogočil, da je dosegla položaj velikega tveganja glede solventnosti v neposrednem in konstruktivnem smislu.
In other words, the Regulator, by inaction, allowed the Society to be put in grave solvency peril, both in immediate terms and in constructive terms.
Izgube upravičencev so nastale zlasti zaradi brezbrižnega vedenja vodstva družbe ELAS, ki je imelo v obdobju 1973–1987 kritične posledice.
The claimants’ losses flowed primarily from reckless behaviour by the Society’s management which over the period 1973-1987 had critical consequences.
To vedenje je bilo takšno, ki bi ga moral zakonodajalec v skladu s svojim obsegom dolžnosti in pooblastil neposredno spremljati, nanj opozarjati in doseči, da se konča.
This behaviour was of a kind which fell squarely within the scope of the Regulator’s duties and powers to monitor, warn and compel retraction.
Zakonodajalec ni ukrepal ali ni učinkovito ukrepal in je dovolil, da je njegovo ravnanje temeljilo na statusu aktuarja namesto na predpisanih nalogah.
The Regulator took no action or no effective action and allowed actuarial etiquette to guide its conduct instead of statutory duty.
Zato je zakonodajalec za bonitetne zadeve enako odgovoren za zadevne izgube.“
As a result the Prudential Regulator became equally responsible for the losses in question."
NASSIM je prav tako trdil, da „se zakonodajalci niso vprašali, zakaj je družba ELAS neustrezno razširila svojo dolgotrajno prekomerno razdelitev z neprimernimi prilagoditvami in podrejenimi dolgovi, ki so predvidevali prihodnji premijski dohodek in negativno vplivali na prihodnji dobiček.
Mr. NASSIM also claimed that "the regulators failed to question why the Society inappropriately extended its chronic over-allocation by using inappropriate adjustments and subordinated loans which anticipated future premium income and impacted adversely upon future profits.