natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
NASSIM (WE7) je navedel, da „je zakonodajalec z zatiskanjem oči pred očitnim tveganjem nesolventnosti v letih 19901992 potem sprejel samozaščitno politiko zanikanja, da bi prikril nepravilnosti, ki so se zgodile v prejšnjih letih, in se izognil odgovornosti, če bi sklad za življenjsko zavarovanje s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice dejansko propadel.
Mr. NASSIM (WE7) specified that "having turned a blind eye to gross solvency risks in 1990-92, the Regulator adopted thereafter a self-protective policy of denial, to conceal the maladministration that had taken place in previous years, and to absolve itself of responsibility when the collapse of the WP Fund eventually manifested itself.
V obdobju 1996–2002 se je skrivno dogovarjal ter okoliščine, ki so povzročile zaprtje sklada za življenjsko zavarovanje s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice, povezoval s težavami z zajamčenimi rentami in ne s predhodnim in veliko resnejšim izplačevanjem previsokih bonusov v letih 1982–1987.“
It colluded throughout the period 1996-2002 in attributing the circumstances leading to the closure of the WP Fund to problems with Annuity Guarantees, rather than the earlier and far more serious over-bonusing of 1982-87."
V WE8 je NASSIM ugotovil, da „ko je sodba zgornjega doma povzročila krizo v zvezi z zajamčenimi rentami, je med mnogimi strankami, ki so nosile določeno odgovornost v zadevi, zavladala splošna zmeda.
In WE8 Mr. NASSIM concluded that "when the GAR crisis was precipitated by the House of Lords judgement, there was widespread consternation among the many parties with an interested responsibility in the matter.
Dejansko si nihče od njih ni želel, da bi ga imeli za bolj odgovornega za nastali položaj, kot bi lahko končno pokazali dokazi, ki bi se pojavili.
Naturally enough, none of them can have wished to be held any more accountable for the situation than the emergent facts might ultimately dictate.
Splošen potek dogodkov jasno kaže, da so se najprej odzvali tako, da so ocenili in zavarovali svoje položaje, njihova obveznost, da bi pozitivno rešili nastali položaj, pa je prišla na vrsto šele potem.
The overall pattern of events strongly suggests that their first instincts were to review and cover their respective positions, such that their obligations to manage the situation positively may have taken second place.
To je bilo obžalovanja vredno zlasti v primeru vlade, Ministrstva za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve ter zakonodajalcev ...“
In the case of the Government, Treasury and the regulators this was particularly unfortunate ...".
Dodatne obtožbe glede nesposobnosti in/ali skrivnega dogovarjanja je navedel JOSEPHS (WE69), ki omenja „večkratne namerne goljufije strank s strani družbe Equitable Life v približno 15 let.
Additional allegations of incompetence and/or collusion were made by Mr. JOSEPHS (WE69) claiming a " multiple deliberate frauds on the part of Equitable Life against its customers, over a period of approximately 15 years.
Ker so bile ključne informacije, ki so kazale na te goljufije, na voljo v regulativnih poročilih za več let, moramo prav tako sklepati, da so bili zakonodajalci krivi za hudo regulativno napako, ker niso opozorili ministrov na to, kar se je dogajalo, in niso uporabili svojih obsežnih pooblastil, da bi popravili položaj.“
Since the key information pointing to those frauds was available in the Regulatory Returns over an extended period of years, we must also conclude that the Regulators were guilty of gross regulatory failure, in failing to draw Ministers’ attention to what was happening and in failing to use their extensive powers to correct the situation."
Tako so zakonodajalci domnevno dovolili goljufijo „zaradi popolne nesposobnosti, ki je izhajala iz nefunkcionalne organizacijske strukture, v okviru katere so morali delati zakonodajalci, skupaj z neustreznim usposabljanjem in nadzorom ali zaradi skrivnega dogovarjanja, najverjetneje v obliki neuradnih in neprimerno upoštevanih navodil Ministrstva, da bi se družbi Equitable Life omogočila začasna izjema od stroge uporabe bonitetnih predpisov ...
Thus, fraud was allegedly permitted to happen by regulators either "due to sheer incompetence, flowing from the dysfunctional organisation structure under which the regulators were required to work, combined with inadequate training and supervision, or due to collusion, most probably in the form of an informal and inadequately considered Ministerial instruction to afford Equitable Life some temporary exemption from the strict application of the prudential regulations ...
Na podlagi dejstva, da bi bilo takšno navodilo nezakonito, se lahko razloži, zakaj ni bilo nikoli preklicano.“
The fact that such an instruction would have been unlawful might explain why it was never rescinded!"
Eno od teh pričakovanj je bilo preprosto, da direktorji poslujejo pošteno ter pravično obravnavajo različne vrste in generacije zavarovancev.“ Na koncu se je JOSEPHS vprašal, kako „kako zakonodajnim oddelkom, ki vključujejo aktuarje in druge zavarovalniške strokovnjake, v 15 letih ni uspelo odkriti očitnih goljufij, ki so bile povezane z dejavnostmi družbe Equitable Life, ali če so jih odkrili, zakaj niso sprejeli nobenih učinkovitih ukrepov, da bi jih preprečili.“
In conclusion, Mr. JOSEPHS asked how " the regulatory departments, containing actuaries and other insurance experts, failed for 15 years to detect the strong stench of fraud which surrounded Equitable’s activities, or if they did detect it, how they avoided any effective action going after the source of that stench."
V H11 je BRAITHWAITE navedel, da ni dvomil, da „je bila razsežnost morebitne katastrofe (Ministrstvu za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve leta 1998) jasna.
In H11, Mr. BRAITHWAITE stated that he had no doubt that " the depth of potential catastrophe was recognized (in 1998 by the UK Treasury).
Glej tudi ustni dokaz lorda Neilla (H11), ki navaja, da je „namen [elektronskega sporočila] ‚zagotoviti osnovo Službi varuha človekovih pravic za finančne storitve‘, na podlagi katere bo obravnavala pritožbe, povezane s poročilom lorda Penrosa, ter da bo razprava v zvezi s tem med Organom za finančne storitve in Službo varuha človekovih pravic za finančne storitve potekala v tednu po 18. juniju 2004.“
see also oral evidence by Lord Neill (H11) quoting the email as " seeking to' provide FOS with a basis' for considering Penrose-related complaints and that discussion to this end would take place between the FSA and the FOS in the week following 18 June 2004."
Končno je WE-CONF16 podvomil v „izrazito selektivno razlago ‚zaupnosti‘ v zadevi Equitable Life“, s katero je Organ za finančne storitve preprečil izvajanje svoje obveznosti obveščanja zavarovancev o tem, ali je bila sprožena zahtevana preiskava o zadevi Equitable Life ali ne, čeprav je bil istočasno na spletni strani Organa za finančne storitve omogočen dostop do sporočil za javnost, ki so razkrila, da preiskava poteka in kakšen je njen napredek.
Finally, WE-CONF16 questioned the FSA's " highly selective interpretation of 'confidentiality' in the EL case", preventing it from informing policyholders whether a requested investigation on the EL case had been set up or not , while at the same time the FSA website gives access to press releases disclosing FSA investigations being conducted as well as their progress.
WE-CONF8 nasprotuje tem obtožbam in izrecno zavrača vse trditve ali obtožbe o „skrivnem dogovarjanju“ med zakonodajalci in družbo ELAS ter jih opisuje kot „zelo resne“ .
Countering these allegations, WE-CONF8 emphatically dismissed any claim or allegation of 'collusion' between the regulators and EL, describing such accusations as " very serious" .
Ob odsotnosti preverljivih dokazov mora ostati to stališče ene osebe o dogodkih. “
In the absence of any verifiable evidence this should remain one man's view of events ."
Glej WE-CONF5.
see WE-CONF5.
1c) Trditve o pristranskosti zakonodajalcev do sektorja
1c) Claims of Regulators' industry bias
Številne priče (LAKE (H1), BRAITHWAITE (H1, H11), BELLORD (H2), JOSEPHS (H2), KWANTESOVA (H7), SCAWEN (H3); SEYMOUR (H7)) so večkrat zatrdile, da so bili domnevno neodvisni zakonodajalci na področju življenjskih zavarovanj v Združenem kraljestvu izjemno pristranski do zavarovalniškega sektorja.
A number of witnesses (Mr. LAKE (H1), Mr. BRAITHWAITE (H1, H11), Mr. BELLORD (H2), Mr. JOSEPHS (H2), Mrs. KWANTES (H7), Mr. SCAWEN (H3); Mr. SEYMOUR (H7)) repeatedly claimed a strong industry-bias of the, supposedly independent, UK life insurance regulators.
Po njihovem mnenju je ta dejavnik preprečil njihovo nepristransko oceno dejavnosti družbe Equitable Life in pravočasno ukrepanje za preprečitev njenega propada ali je na to vsaj vplival.
In their view, this factor has prevented, or at least affected, their impartial assessment of Equitable Life's operations and timely action to prevent its downfall.
V ustnem pričanju je JOSEPHS (H2) zatrdil, da je od osemdesetih let 20. stoletja bonitetni regulativni sistem Združenega kraljestva „ prepustil učinkovit nadzor sektorju, čeprav je dajal vtis, da vsebuje uporablja pravilne predpise “.
In his oral testimony, Mr. JOSEPHS (H2) asserted that, starting from the 1980s, the UK prudential regulatory system "left effective control in the hands of the industry, in spite of giving the appearance of proper regulations ".
To je vodilo k šibkemu regulativnemu okolju, za katerega se je izkazalo, da ne more učinkovito zaščititi vlagateljev.
This would have lead to a weak regulatory environment that proved unable to provide investors with effective protection.
Izjave, ki to potrjujejo, sta predložila LAKE (H1) in BRAITHWAITE (H1, H11), ki sta menila, da so zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva „ preveč usmerjeni v sektor in premalo v potrošnike, “ in trdila, da „ Organ za finančne storitve svoje stranke obravnava kot industrijske družbe “.
Confirming statements were presented by Mr. LAKE (H1) and Mr. BRAITHWAITE (H1, H11), who considered UK regulators to be "too industry-oriented and not sufficiently consumer-oriented" and claiming that " the FSA perceives its customers as being industry firms."
Predstavnik Organa za finančne storitve STRACHAN (H4) je obtožbe o pristranskosti do sektorja odločno zavrnil ter dejal, da „ so skrbi, da Organ za finančne storitve deluje v skladu z navodili družb, ki jih ureja, povsem odveč: smo zakonsko določen zakonodajalec, ki ga je ustanovil parlament “.
Allegations of being industry-biased were firmly rejected by the FSA representative Mr. STRACHAN (H4) calling "entirely misplaced such concerns, that the FSA would somehow be 'in the pocket' of the firms it regulates: we are a statutory regulator established by Parliament."
Strokovnjak McELWEE je v H3 presodil, da so obtožbe, da bi lahko bil (ali je bil) Organ za finančne storitve pri svojem nadzornem in regulativnem ravnanju lahko bil (ali je bil) usmerjen v industrijo, „neupravičene“ .
Allegations that the FSA could be (or have been) too 'industry-biased' in its supervisory and regulatory operations had also been judged " unfair " by expert Mr. McELWEE in H3.
1d) Trditve o blagi regulativni politiki zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva
1d) Claims of Regulators' 'light touch' regulatory policy
Za boljšo določitev blage narave regulativne ureditve Združenega kraljestva je zavarovanec SEYMOUR (H7) citiral Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve
In order better to specify the 'light touch' nature of the UK regulatory regime, policyholder Mr. SEYMOUR (H7) quoted the UK Treasury
39. , ki razlaga predlog zakona o novem Organu za finančne storitve: „ Kadar koli bo mogoče, bo politika blaga ...
39 . commenting on the bill creating the new FSA: " There will be a light touch where possible ...
Predlog zakona se izogiba preobremenjujoči ureditvi, ki bi le preprečevala inovativnost in zviševala stroške strank.
The Bill avoids over-burdensome regulation that would serve only to stifle innovation and to increase consumer costs.
Namesto tega bo moral Organ za finančne storitve dokazati, da so bremena, ki jih želi določiti, sorazmerna s koristmi, ki bodo iz tega izhajale.“
Instead the FSA will be under a duty to demonstrate that the burdens that it seeks to impose are proportionate to the benefits that will result."
Drug vlagatelj peticije BELLORD (H2) je prav tako vztrajal pri „ zelo domačih odnosih med zakonodajalci in družbo Equitable Life “, pri čemer je poudaril nekatere ugotovitve iz Penrosovega poročila, ki kažejo, da so poročila iz konca osemdesetih let 20. stoletja, ki so bila na voljo vladnemu oddelku za zavarovalniško statistiko, že namigovala na nevarne poslovne prakse družbe Equitable Life, vendar jih ta oddelek sploh ni upošteval.
Another petitioner, Mr. BELLORD (H2), also insisted on the " very cosy relationship between regulators and EL ", highlighting some findings by the Penrose Report that suggest that reports available to the Government Actuary's Department (GAD) dating back to the late 1980s had already hinted at Equitable Life's dangerous business practices but had remained totally unheeded by the GAD
Glej tudi „kronološki pregled“ v oddelku III.2.6 tega dela.
see also 'timeline' in Section III.2.6 of this Part. .
Blag pristop je mogoče opaziti v pismu nemškemu zakonodajalcu BAV iz januarja 2001, tj. nekaj tednov po množičnem odstopu članov uprave družbe Equitable Life in prenehanju sklepanja novih poslov.
A 'light touch attitude' exudes from a letter of January 2001, i.e. just weeks after the mass resignation of the EL board and its closure to new business, to the German regulator BAV.
V tem pismu je Organ za finančne storitve poudaril, da „družba Equitable Life ostaja solventna, obstoječe police ostajajo veljavne, pogodbene obveznosti do zavarovancev pa lahko izpolni“ .
In this letter, the FSA reiterated the point that " EL remains solvent, existing policies remain valid and it is able to meet its contractual obligations to policyholders."
Zatrdil je tudi, da „ je bilo veliko tiskovnih poročil v zvezi z družbo Equitable Life netočnih in špekulativnih, “ ter odločno dodal, da Organ za finančne storitve „ne bo zahteval, da se družba ponovno oceni“ .
It even claimed that "many of the press reports in relation to EL have been inaccurate and speculative" and added peremptorily that the FSA "will not be requiring the company to provide a new valuation."
Predstavnica zavarovanca KWANTESOVA (H7) pa je povzela: „ Mislim, da zakonodajalci v resnici niso bili pri stvari.
Or, as summed up by policyholders' representative Ms. KWANTES (H7): " I think the truth was the regulators were asleep at the wheel.
Očitno so se bali družbe Equitable in delali z njo v rokavicah ...
They appeared to stand in awe of Equitable and handled it with kid gloves ...
Če se je zakonodajalec zavedal, da ima družba Equitable težave, zakaj ni ničesar rekel?
If the regulator was aware that Equitable had problems why didn't they say something?
Te obtožbe, zlasti „ pomanjkanje izziva za vodstvo družbe Equitable Life s strani zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva, “ so bile izrecno zavrnjene v WE-CONF8, ki se sklicuje neposredno na ugotovitve prvega poročila parlamentarne varuhinje za človekove pravice
These allegations, in particular the " lack of challenge to EL's senior management by the UK regulators" were emphatically rejected by WE-CONF8, which referred directly to the findings of the First Parliamentary Ombudsman's report
Oddelki 168–170 in odstavek 9 povzetka ugotovitev navajajo, da Organ za finančne storitve (skupaj z vladnim oddelkom za zavarovalniško statistiko) ni mogel obravnavati vprašanja rezerv zajamčenih rent in kakršne koli napačne razlage finančnega položaja družbe Equitable Life „ na manj odločen način “, da njegov pristop ne more biti opisan kot pasiven ter da „ je Organ za finančne storitve še naprej vztrajal, da družba Equitable izpolnjuje svoje celotne zahteve glede rezerv, ob velikem odporu te družbe “. .
sections 168-170 and para.9 of the summary of findings, claiming that the FSA (with GAD) could not be said to have addressed the GAR reserving issue and any misrepresentation of EL's financial position " in anything less than a resolute manner", that their approach could not be described as 'passive' and that " FSA continued to insist throughout that Equitable conform to their full reserving requirements in the face of strong resistance from Equitable ." .
Prav tako so bile zavrnjene kakršne koli trditve o neukrepanju pri ugotavljanju odgovornosti revizorjev družbe Ernst & Young, ki so pregledali poslovanje družbe Equitable Life, kar je vprašanje, ki se obravnava kot „zadeva za strokovne organe“.
It equally dismissed any claims of inaction in investigating the responsibilities of EL's auditors Ernst & Young, an issue considered to be " a matter for the professional bodies ".
Zavrnjene so bile tudi trditve, da se upravi družbe Equitable Life ni preprečil začetek pravnega postopka proti revizorjem na podlagi tega, da „ je imela družba Equitable Life več različnih pravnih obveznosti in obveznosti glede zaupnosti do svojih zavarovancev ter je bila v celoti odgovorna za svoje odločitve “.
Equally dismissed were claims of not preventing EL management from engaging in legal action against its auditors, on the grounds that " EL had a discrete set of legal and fiduciary obligations to its policyholders and was entirely responsible for its own decisions ."
1e) Trditve o preveliki popustljivosti zakonodajalcev do družbe Equitable Life
1e) Claims of Regulators' excessive 'deference' to EL
V H5 je BAYLISS opisal, kako so bili takrat zakonodajalci popustljivi do družbe Equitable Life zaradi „ dejstva, da je Roy Ranson vcepil – predvsem kot posameznik – mišljenje, da se družba Equitable ne more motiti.
In H5, Mr. BAYLISS described how an attitude of deference by the regulators towards Equitable Life existed at the time, due "to the fact that Roy Ranson instilled – and it was him principally as an individual – the huge belief that Equitable could do no wrong.
Precenila je samo sebe in svojih 300 zavarovalniških agentov.
It oversold to itself and to its 300 salesmen.
To do konca ni bilo kaznivo, ampak je bilo slabo upravljanje, zakonodajalec pa tega ni ustavil, kot bi moral ...
It was not criminal until the end, but it was mismanagement and it was not halted by the regulator as it should have been ...
To je bilo odvisno od rasti družbe Equitable in vrednosti, ki naj bi jo imela na trgu.
This was down to Equitable’s stature and the value it was perceived to have in the marketplace.
Družba naj bi bila dobra, boljša kot ostale, veliko boljša ...
It was supposedly the ‘good company’, and better than the others, so much better than the rest ...
Mislim, da krivulje učenja še nismo zaključili ...
I do not think we have finished the learning curve ..."
“ BAYLISS ni izključil neuspehov družb v finančnem sektorju v prihodnosti in zaključil: „ Mislim, da ne bo več nobenega primera, ki bi bil v celoti povezan z arogantnostjo vodstva in strpnostjo do te arogantnosti.
Not excluding financial sector company failures in the future, Mr. BAYLISS concluded saying that " I do not think there will be another one entirely related to the arrogance of the management and the tolerance of that arrogance.
Skrb, da je družba Equitable Life s svojim imenom in ugledom‚ ustrahovala‘ Organ za finančne storitve, je delno podprl zavarovalni agent Družbe Equitable Life LLOYD (H5), ki je navedel: „Popolnoma se strinjam, da sta moč stališča uprave in njen ugled, ko je prišlo do razprave o poslih družbe Equitable Life z zakonodajalci in našimi revizorji, najbrž do neke mere prisilila zakonodajalce, da so se strinjali s to uveljavljeno vzajemno življenjsko zavarovalnico, ki je iznašla izraz ‚aktuar in po vsej verjetnosti o tem vedela več kot oni ...
Concerns that the FSA might have been 'intimidated' by the name and authority of Equitable Life were partly upheld by EL salesman Mr. LLOYD (H5) when stating that " I am absolutely of the view that the strength of the board’s position and its authority when it came to discussing Equitable’s affairs with the regulators and our own auditors, probably did, to some extent, intimidate the regulators into agreeing with this long-established mutual life office, which had invented the term ‘actuary’ and possibly knew more about it than they did ...
Takrat bi nas na to moral kdo opozoriti.“
We should have all been warned at that point ."
Vendar so izvršni direktorji družbe Equitable Life
However, Mr. LLOYD's competence to issue the latter statement has been questioned and challenged by the EL executives
Glej odgovor nekdanjega izvršnega direktorja družbe Equitable Life HEADDONA (WE45) in WE-CONF8. dvomili v LLOYDOVO pristojnost, da da to izjavo, in so jo izpodbijali na podlagi tega, da LLOYD kot preprost predstavnik zavarovalniških agentov ni neposredno seznanjen s stiki družbe Equitable Life z zakonodajalci ali nima takšnih izkušenj.
see reply of the former EL CEO Mr. HEADDON (WE45) and WE-CONF8. on the grounds that, being a simple sales representative, he would have lacked any first-hand knowledge or experience of Equitable Life's contacts with regulators.
Ob sklicevanju na sporno prodajo „vodenih pokojnin“ s strani družbe Equitable Life je BAIN v WE72 navedel angleškega neodvisnega finančnega svetovalca, ki pravi, da „ je bila kakovost nasvetov, ki naj bi jo Organ za finančne storitve zahteval od družbe Equitable Life, drugačna od tega, kar je zahteval drugje “.
Referring to the controversial sale of 'managed pensions' by EL, Mr. BAIN quoted in WE72 an English IFA as saying “ the quality of advice the FSA seemed to require from Equitable was different from what they required elsewhere ."
To navedbo je potrdil JOSEPHS (WE69), ki je rekel: „ Združenje vlagateljev je od več izvršnih direktorjev zavarovalnice slišalo, da se druge družbe, ponavadi tiste, ki niso vzajemne, urejajo veliko bolj strogo kot družba Equitable Life “.
This point was confirmed by Mr. JOSEPHS (WE69) stating that " Investors Association has heard from more than one insurance executive that other companies, usually non-mutuals, were regulated far more strictly than Equitable Life".
Drug jasen namig o „popustljivosti“ do družbe Equitable Life je mogoče najti v pismu z dne 7. avgusta 2000, v katerem Organ za finančne storitve odgovarja nemškemu zakonodajalcu BAV, ki zahteva najnovejše informacije o družbi Equitable Life po odločitvi zgornjega doma.
Another clear hint of 'deference' to EL is found in a letter of 7 August 2000, where the FSA replies to the German regulator BAV asking for an update on EL after the House of Lords ruling.
BAV je bil obveščen, da je družba Equitable Life „ ostala solventna “, v nadaljevanju pa je bilo zelo optimistično navedeno, da „ se družba pripravlja na prodajo in … da se pričakuje, da se bo veliko družb zanimalo za nakup družbe Equitable Life zaradi njenega dobrega slovesa kot učinkovite družbe v sektorju Združenega kraljestva ...
BAV was informed that EL " remained solvent ", adding in very optimistic terms that " the company is putting itself up for sale and ... there are not expected to be any shortage of companies interested in acquiring Equitable Life, because of its strong reputation in the UK industry for efficiency ...
Vodstvo družbe učinkovito obravnava položaj, zadovoljni smo, da si pri tem prizadevajo za ukrepanje v najboljših interesih zavarovancev“.
The management of the company appear to be handling the situation effectively and we are satisfied that in doing so they are seeking to act in the best interests of policyholders."
Ta izjava je bila dana le štiri mesece preden je družba ELAS prenehala sklepati nova zavarovanja in razpustila odbor.
This statement was made just 4 months before EL's closure for new business and the resignation of the EL board!