natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Komisija do ...* Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu predloži potrebne predloge, s katerimi zagotovi nemoten prehod na nadzor institucij iz člena 12b s strani organa in na vzpostavitev novega okvira za obvladovanje finančne krize.
By ...* , the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and the Council the necessary proposals to ensure a smooth shift to the supervision of institutions identified in A rticle 12b by the Authority and the establishment of a new framework for financial crisis management.
UL: prosimo, vstavite datum: šest mesecev od začetka veljavnosti te uredbe.
* OJ please insert date: six months from the date of entry into force of this Regulation.
Člen 66 – odstavek 1 – pododstavek 1
Article 66 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Komisija v treh letih od datuma iz drugega odstavka člena 67 in vsaka tri leta po tem objavi splošno poročilo o izkušnjah, pridobljenih pri delovanju organa in postopkih, določenih v tej uredbi.
Within three years from the date set out in the second paragraph of Article 67 and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall publish a general report on the experience acquired as a result of the operation of the Authority and the procedures laid down in this Regulation.
Komisija do ...* in vsaka tri leta po tem objavi splošno poročilo o izkušnjah, pridobljenih pri delovanju organa , in postopkih, določenih v tej uredbi.
By ...* and every three years thereafter, the Commission shall publish a general report on the experience acquired as a result of the operation of the Authority and the procedures laid down in this Regulation.
V poročilu med drugim oceni:
Th at report shall evaluate , inter alia:
(a) približevanje, ki so ga dosegli pristojni organi pri običajnih nadzornih praksah,
( a) the convergence in supervisory standard practices reached by competent authorities;
(b) delovanje kolegijev nadzornih organov,
( b) the functioning of the colleges of supervisors;
(c) vlogo organa pri nadzoru nad sistemskimi institucijami ter
( c) the role of the Authority on the supervision of systemic institutions; and
(d) izvajanje zaščitne klavzule iz člena 23.
( d) the application of the s afeguard clause established in Article 23.
UL: prosimo, vstavite datum: tri leta po datumu začetka uporabe te uredbe.
*OJ please insert date: three years after the date of application of this Regulation.
Namen predlaganih sprememb je ustvariti obveznost za Komisijo, da predlaga predloge za razjasnitev koncepta fiskalne pristojnosti držav članic in posodobitev uredbe, da bi bila ta bolj skladna z morebitnimi izboljšavami, ki bodo izšle iz izvajanja okvira predpisov Skupnosti za obvladovanje kriznih razmer v bančništvu, ki ga je pred nedavnim Komisija dala v posvetovanje.
The proposed amendments are aimed at creating a commitment for the Commission to put forward proposals to clarify the concept of Member States’ fiscal responsibility and to update the Regulation to make it consistent with any potential improvements which will came from the implementation of a framework of community regulations for crisis management in the banking sector, recently put under consultation by the Commission.
Člen 66 – odstavek 1 – pododstavek 2
Article 66 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
V tem poročilu je ovrednoten tudi napredek, dosežen pri regulativni in nadzorni konvergenci na področju kriznega upravljanja in reševanja v Skupnosti.
That report shall also evaluate progress achieved towards regulatory and supervisory convergence in the fields of crisis management and resolution in the Community.
Vrednotenje temelji na obsežnem posvetovanju, vključno z interesno skupino za bančništvo.
The evaluation shall be based on extensive consultation, including with the Banking Stakeholder Group.
V poročilu iz odstavka 1 se tudi preuči, ali :
Th e report referred to in paragraph 1 shall also examine whether :
(a) je ustrezno nadaljevati z ločenim nadzorom nad bančništvom, zavarovalništvom, poklicnimi pokojninami ter trgi vrednostnih papirjev in finančnimi trgi ali pa je zanje bolje določiti enega samega nadzornika,
( a) it is appropriate to continue separate supervision of bank ing, i nsurance , o ccupational p ension s, s ecurities and financial m arkets , or whether they should be brought under a single supervisor ;
(b) je ustrezno opravljati nadzor nad bonitetnim nadzorom in poslovanjem ločeno ali pa je bolje, če to počne isti nadzornik,
( b) it is appropriate to supervise prudential supervision and the conduct of business separate ly or by the same supervisor ;
(c) je ustrezno poenostaviti in okrepiti strukturo Evropskega sistema finančnega nadzora, da bi povečali skladnost med makro in mikro ravnmi ter med evropskimi nadzornimi organi;
( c) it is appropriate to simplify and reinforce the architecture of the ESFS in order to increase the coherence between the macro and the micro levels and between the ESAs;
(d) je ustrezno povečati regulativna pooblastila evropskih nadzornih organov,
( d) it is appropriate to increase the regulatory powers of the ESAs;
(e) je razvoj Evropskega sistema finančnega nadzora skladen z globalnim razvojem;
( e) the evolution of the ESFS is consistent with that of the global evolution;
(f) je znotraj Evropskega sistema finančnega nadzora dovolj različnosti in odličnosti;
( f) there is sufficient diversity and excellence within the ESFS;
(g) sta odgovornost in preglednost glede na zahteve po objavljanju zadostni.
( g) accountability and transparency in relation to publication requirements are adequate.
Sedanja finančna kriza je razkrila to, na kar je Evropski parlament opozarjal že pred več leti, in sicer pomanjkljivo finančno ureditev ter šibkost mehanizmov za nadzor trgov.
The current financial crisis has brought to light something that Parliament criticised many years ago: the lack of adequate financial regulation and the weakness of the market supervisory mechanisms.
Ko je potekala razprava o akcijskem načrtu za finančne storitve (glej García-Margallovo poročilo o sporočilu Komisije o izvajanju okvira za finančne trge: akcijski načrt (1999)
When the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) was under discussion (see García-Margallo Report on the Commission communication on ‘Implementing the framework for financial markets: Action Plan’ (1999)
UL C 40, 7.2.2001, str.
OJ C 40, 7.2.2001, p.
453. ), je Parlament opozoril, da si je za preprečitev sistemske krize treba še naprej z enako močjo prizadevati za uresničitev treh ciljev načrta: liberalizacijo trgov, okrepitev mehanizmov za nadzor in uskladitev davkov na prihranke.
453. ), Parliament warned that, if a crisis in the system were to be avoided, it was essential to pursue equally all three objectives in the Plan: liberalisation of the markets, strengthening of control mechanisms and harmonisation of taxation on savings.
V poznejših poročilih (Van den Burgovo poročilo o pravilih bonitetnega nadzora v Evropski uniji (2002)
Subsequent reports (Van den Burg Report on prudential supervision rules in the European Union (2002)
UL C 25E, 29.1.2004, str.
OJ C 25E, 29.1.2004, p.
394. , Van den Burgovo poročilo o politiki finančnih storitev (2005–2010) – bela knjiga (2007)
394. , Van den Burg Report on financial services policy (2005-2010) - White Paper (2007)
Ni objavljeno v Uradnem listu. , ter Van den Burgovo in Daianujevo poročilo s priporočili Komisiji o nadaljevanju Lamfalussyjevega procesa: prihodnja struktura nadzora (2008)
Not published in the Official Journal. and Van den Burg & Daianu Report with recommendations to the Commission on Lamfalussy follow-up: future structure of supervision (2008)
UL C 9E, 15.1.2010, str.
OJ C 9E, 15.1.2010, p.
48. ) je poudaril, da zgolj usklajevanje med nacionalnimi nadzornimi organi, katerih pristojnost se konča na mejah njihovih držav, ne zadostuje za nadzor finančnih institucij, ki pojmujejo notranji trg kot prostor brez dejanskih meja.
48. ) stressed that on its own coordination between national supervisors whose jurisdiction stopped at their own country’s borders would not be sufficient to control financial institutions that view the internal market as a truly borderless region.
Poleg tega so v nekaterih pravilih že poudarjena temeljna načela oziroma je nakazan splošni trend pri oblikovanju prihodnje evropske nadzorne strukture (Skinnerjevo poročilo o direktivi Solventnost II (2009), Gauzèsovo poročilo o uredbi o bonitetnih agencijah (2009)).
Furthermore, some of the rules have already laid down the fundamental principles for the future European Supervisory Structure and given a general idea of the direction in which it should go (Skinner- Solvency II Report (2009); Gauzès-CRA regulation (2009)).
Da bi zapolnili regulativne vrzeli in odpravili krhkost nadzornih sistemov, je Komisija naročila skupini strokovnjakov pod vodstvom Jacquesa Larosièra, naj pripravi poročilo, v katerem bo predstavila, kaj smo se iz krize naučili, in dala potrebna priporočila, da se ta ne bi več ponovila.
To close the regulatory gaps and correct the weaknesses in the supervisory system, the Commission commissioned a group of experts presided over by Jacques de Larosière to produce a report that would draw on the lessons learnt from the crisis and make the recommendations necessary to try and stop another such crisis occurring.
Komisija je v svojem predlogu kot prvo priporočila, da se ustanovi mreža nacionalnih nadzornih organov, ki bi delovala v povezavi z novim Evropskim nadzornim organom (ESA), sestavljenim iz treh stebrov: steber za banke (EBA), steber za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine (EIOPA) ter steber za vrednostne papirje in trge (ESMA).
The Commission proposal recommends, firstly, the establishment of a network of national supervisors which would work in tandem with a new European Supervisory Authority (ESA) formed of three pillars: one pillar for Banks (EBA), one pillar for Insurance and Occupational Pensions (EIOPA), and one pillar for Securities and Markets (ESMA).
Skupni odbor evropskih nadzornih organov bi moral zagotoviti ustrezno konsolidirano ureditev in nadzor evropskih finančnih trgov.
A ‘Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities’ is proposed to ensure rules are correctly consolidated and to supervise the European financial markets.
Komisija je kot drugo priporočila, da se ustanovi Evropski odbor za sistemska tveganja (ESRB) za spremljanje in ocenjevanje morebitne grožnje finančni stabilnosti, ki izhaja iz makroekonomskega razvoja.
Secondly, the Commission proposal recommends setting up a European Systematic Risk Board (ESRB) to monitor and assess potential threats to financial stability that arise from macro-economic developments.
Parlament se strinja s takšno zasnovo in dodaja dve pomembni točki: vključitev ESRB v evropske nadzorne organe in podelitev večjih pristojnosti novim organom, do bodo dobili resnično evropsko razsežnost.
Parliament is in agreement with this approach, adding two important points: integration of the ESRB into the European Supervisory Authorities (ESA) and more powers being granted to the new authorities to give them a truly European dimension.
Komisija je kot tretje poudarila, da je treba uvesti učinkovit instrument za določitev usklajenih tehničnih standardov na področju finančnih storitev, da bi zagotovili, tudi prek enotnega pravilnika, ustrezne pogoje ter zaščito deponentov, vlagateljev in potrošnikov v Evropski uniji.
Thirdly, the Commission emphasises the need to introduce an effective instrument to establish harmonised t e c h nica l standards for financial services to ensure, also through a single Rulebook , a level-playing field and adequate protection for depositors, investors and consumers in the European Union.
Tehnični standardi so pomemben instrument za dosego te uskladitve in jih zato Komisija še posebej skrbno obravnava.
Technical standards are a powerful instrument in achieving this harmonisation and the Commission therefore handles them with special care.
Parlament se strinja s tem pristopom, ima pa dve pomembni zahtevi: pri oblikovanju tehničnih standardov je treba dati ustrezno vlogo Parlamentu (člen 290 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije) in poudariti vodilno vlogo Evropskega bančnega organa.
Parliament agrees with this approach, but makes two important claims: when these technical standards are drawn up, Parliament must play the role due to it (Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) and the European Banking Authority’s leading role in drawing up these standards must be stressed.
Kadar Komisija v celoti ali delno ne odobri predlogov tega organa, Parlament in Svet pozoveta njegovega predsednika in pristojnega komisarja, da pojasnita razloge za to.
In this way, whenever the Commission does not fully or partially approve the Authority’s proposals, the Commission President and the Commissioner responsible will be required to explain the reasons for this before Parliament and the Council.
Na področjih, ki jih tehnični standardi ne zajemajo, organ lahko uporabi smernice in priporočila za izvajanje evropske zakonodaje.
In areas not covered by the technical standards, the Authority may issue guidelines and recom mendations on the application of EU law.
Parlament želi, da smernice in priporočila, ki jih odobri organ, čim bolj zavezujejo nacionalne nadzorne organe.
Parliament would wish for the guidelines and recommendations approved by the Authority to be as binding as possible on national supervisory authorities.
Zato poziva, naj predsednik organa „prijavi“ nacionalne nadzorne organe, ki teh smernic in priporočil ne izpolnjujejo, ter predstavi ukrepe, ki jih namerava sprejeti, da bi jih k temu obvezal.
Parliament therefore asks that the Authority’s President be able to ‘report’ national supervisory authorities who fail to comply and to state the measures the Authority intends adopting to make compliance mandatory.
Objava takšnega neizpolnjevanja je velika spodbuda za to, da nacionalni organi izpolnijo priporočila in smernice, ki jih organ odobri.
Publicising those occasions on which national authorities fail to comply constitutes a powerful incentive for them to comply with the Authority’s recommendations and guidelines.
Odnosi med Komisijo in zasebnimi institucijami so posebej občutljivo vprašanje.
Relations between the Commission and private institutions are a particularly delicate issue.
Kadar nacionalni nadzorni organ ne ravna v skladu s temi odločbami, se lahko nacionalni organ obrne na finančne institucije na področjih, kjer se neposredno uporablja zakonodaja Evropske unije, da bi povrnil zaupanje v trge.
When a national supervisory authority fails to comply with these decisions, the national authority will be able to turn to financial institutions in areas to which EU law is directly applicable, to restore market confidence.
Pravica, da se lahko obrne na zasebne finančne institucije, je po mojem mnenju edini možni instrument, da bi zagotovili resnično izvajanje odločb, ki jih je sprejel organ.
The right to turn to private financial institu t ions is, in my opinion, the only instrument possible to guarantee that decisions taken by the Authority are complied with.
Glavne novosti tega poročila zadevajo nadzor finančnih institucij, zlasti čezmejnih.
The main new points of this report refer to supervision of the financial institutions, and cross-border ones in particular.
Posebno pozornost je treba nameniti velikim finančnim institucijam, tako imenovanim ustanovam, ki so „prevelike, da bi propadle“, katerih stečaj lahko povzroči propad celotnega finančnega sistema.
Special attention needs to be paid to those large financial entities whose bankruptcy could cause the collapse of the whole financial system, the so-called ‘too big to fail’ bodies.
Ni smiselno, da bi še naprej uporabljali mehanizme, ki so se med krizo izkazali za neučinkovite.
Continuing with mechanisms whose inefficiency has been evident during the crisis does not make any sense.
„Nacionalna“ možnost bi pomenila, da bi morali imeti nadzorni organi držav gostiteljic možnost, da bi tuje banke prisilili poslovati prek hčerinskih družb in ne prek podružnic ter da bi neposredneje nadzirali njihov kapital in likvidnost.
Going for the ‘national’ choice would mean it must be possible for the supervisory authorities in the host countries to force foreign banks to operate through subsidiaries instead of through branches, as well as giving the supervisory authorities more direct control over foreign banks’ capital and liquidity.
„Evropska“ možnost bi pomenila, da bi lahko kolegiji nadzornikov narekovali pravila, ki bi jih bilo treba spoštovati, če se nacionalni nadzorni organi ne bi mogli sporazumeti.
The ‘Europe’ solution would mean giving the Colleges of Supervisors the right to dictate rules, compliance with which would be mandatory, when national supervisory authorities cannot reach an agreement.
Poleg tega bi pomenila, da bi bil organ odgovoren za nadzor finančnih institucij, katerih stečaj bi lahko ogrozil trdnost sistema.
The ‘Europe’ choice would also mean the Authority would be responsible for supervising financial bodies whose bankruptcy could threaten the stability of the system.
Organ bi vedno deloval prek nacionalnih organov, ki bi v tem primeru delovali po njegovem pooblastilu in navodilih.
The Authority would always act through the national authorities which, in this case, would be acting as bodies responsible to and following the instructions of the former.
Pri opredelitvi institucij evropske razsežnosti bi se upoštevali nacionalni standardi (FSA, MDS, BIS).
National standards (FSA, IMF, BIS) would be taken into account in defining institutions with an EU dimension.
Sprememba iz enega modela v drugega bi bila lahko postopna, tako da bi začeli z institucijami z največjim tveganjem in nadaljevali z ostalimi v razumnem času.
The change from one model to another could be made gradually, beginning with those entities where there is the greatest risk and moving on to the rest over a reasonable period of time.
V poročilu Parlamenta je predlagana tudi ustanovitev Evropskega sklada, ki bi ga s prispevki financirale finančne institucije in bi bil namenjen zaščiti deponentov in pomoči institucijam v težavah, kadar bi lahko njihov stečaj porušil celoten sistem.
Parliament’s report also proposes the creation of a European Fund financed by contributions from the financial institutions, to protect depositors and go to the rescue of institutions in difficulty where their bankruptcy could ruin the entire system.
Če bi bila sredstva sklada nezadostna, bi lahko sklad izdal dolžniške certifikate.
In the event that the Fund’s resources should prove insufficient, the Fund would be able to issue public debt.
Kadar tudi to ne bi zadostovalo in bi bilo treba absolutno uporabiti javna sredstva za preprečitev propada sistema, bi bilo treba vključiti države članice.
Should even this not suffice and the use of public funds be deemed absolutely essential to prevent the system collapsing, the Member States would have to intervene.
Breme teh javnih sredstev bi se razdelilo med prizadete države v skladu z memorandumom o soglasju, sprejetem na podlagi predhodnih pogajanj.
The burden of these government interventions would be shared among the Member States affected in accordance with a previously negotiated Memorandum of Understanding.
Predlog Komisije je bil oblikovan skoraj izključno z bančnega vidika, ne da bi se upošteval vidik prejemnikov posojil.
The Commission proposal has been drafted almost exclusively from a banking point of view, forgetting the viewpoint of parties seeking loans.
Zato se predlaga, da se malim in srednje velikim evropskim podjetjem, ki so veliko bolj odvisna od bančnega financiranja kot velika podjetja, ki običajno krijejo svoje potrebe na trgu, nameni posebna vloga.
For this reason, it is proposed that a special role be given to small and medium-sized enterprises, as they depend a great deal more on bank financing than do large firms, as the latter are accustomed to meeting their needs normally by turning to the markets.
Predstavniki organizacij malih in srednje velikih podjetij bi bili del interesne skupine in bi izvolili dva člana odbora nadzornikov.
Representatives from SME organisations should form part of the Stakeholder Group and elect two members of the Board of Supervisors.
Evropski parlament v svojem poročilu stremi k temu, da bi presegel predlog Komisije in bi vanj vključil predloge, ki jih je dal že pred leti.
Parliament’s report seeks, in short, to go beyond the Commission’s proposal and retrieve proposals that were made in Parliament many years ago.
Laroisèrovo poročilo je bilo dobro zasnovano, vendar ni bilo tako daljnosežno, kot bi si njegovi avtorji želeli.
The Larosière Report was a well‑structured report but did not go as far as its writers would have liked.
Predlog Komisije je bil šibkejši, verjetno zato, da bi bil lažje dosežen dogovor s Svetom.
The Commission’s proposal is weaker, probably to facilitate an agreement with the Council.
Sporazum Sveta, ki je bil sprejet decembra 2009, je še bolj oslabil že tako šibki predlog Komisije.
The Council agreement of December 2009 devalued even more the already weak Commission proposal.
Zato so štiri parlamentarne skupine (PPE, PSE, ALDE in Verts) v javnem sporočilu izjavile, da želijo iti dlje od drugih dveh institucij.
Therefore, four of Parliament’s Groups (PPE, PSE, ALDE and the Greens) made it known through a public note that they wished to go further than the other two institutions.
Pri oblikovanju tega parlamentarnega poročila bi lahko sledili dvema različnima strategijama: skušati uganiti želje Sveta, da bi hitro dosegli sporazum, ali pa gledati na stvari s povsem evropskega vidika.
Two different strategies could have been followed in drawing up this Parliamentary report: either try to anticipate the Council’s wishes in order to reach a rapid agreement or, alternatively, look at things from a clearly European point of view.
Parlament se je odločil, da bo raje izkoristil priložnost za dosego napredka pri evropski izgradnji.
Preference was given to profiting from this opportunity to help the European integration process leap forward.
Izbral je drugo možnost, zato v tem poročilu podpira ustanovitev resničnega evropskega organa.
The second strategy was chosen and the report therefore backs the setting up of a truly European Authority.
Evropski parlament upa, da se bo na podlagi tega poročila preučila možnost, da bi ustanovili resničen evropski organ z jasnimi pristojnostmi, hkrati pa bi uvedli mehanizem za reševanje prihodnjih kriz, tako da bi bilo manj možnosti, da bi se morali evropski davkoplačevalci spoprijemati s posledicami zloma finančnega sistema.
The hope is that this report will lead to the possibility of setting up a truly European Authority, with clear powers, being explored, as well as the possibility of establishing, at the same time, a mechanism to resolve future crises that will make it less likely that European taxpayers will find themselves having to deal with the repercussions of a breakdown in the financial system.
Sedaj imajo besedo evropski poslanci.
It is now up to Members of the European Parliament to express their views.
Pomanjkanje ustrezne finančne regulacije na evropski ravni in slabosti tržnih nadzornih mehanizmov so bile v času gospodarske in finančne krize, ki je zajela Evropo leta 2008 in posledice katere še vedno občutimo, očitne.
The lack of adequate financial regulation at a European level and the weakness of the market supervisory mechanisms were clearly evident during the economic and financial crisis that hit Europe in 2008, the repercussions of which we are still suffering.
Komisija je na podlagi poročila skupine strokovnjakov, ki ji je predsedoval Jacques de Larosière, pripravila štiri predloge, za obravnavo katerih je v Parlamentu pristojen Odbor za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve.
The Commission has drawn up four proposals – for whose passage through Parliament the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs is responsible – based upon the report by the group of experts presided over by Jacques de Larosiere.