natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
(1) Finančna kriza je razkrila pomembne pomanjkljivosti na področju finančnega nadzora, ki ni preprečil kopičenja prevelikih tveganj v finančnem sistemu , in zlasti opozorila na slabosti sedanjega makrobonitetnega nadzora .
(1) The financial crisis has revealed important shortcomings in the financial supervision, which has failed to prevent the accumulation of excessive risks in the financial sector and has in particular highlighted the weaknesses of the existing macro-prudential oversight .
(1) Finančna stabilnost je predpogoj za zagotavljanje delovnih mest, kreditov in rasti v realnem gospodarstvu.
(1) Financial stability is a precondition for the real economy to provide jobs, credit and growth.
Finančna kriza je razkrila pomembne pomanjkljivosti na področju finančnega nadzora, ki ni preprečil kopičenja prevelikih tveganj v finančnem sistemu.
The financial crisis has revealed important shortcomings in financial supervision, which has failed to prevent the accumulation of excessive risks within the financial system .
Kriza ima ogromne posledice za davkoplačevalce, številne državljane Unije, ki so ostali brez dela, in številna mala in srednje velika podjetja.
The crisis has huge consequences for the tax payers, for many Union citizens who are now unemployed and for many small and medium size enterprises ( SME s ) .
V primeru nove krize enakih razsežnosti si države članice ne bi mogle več privoščiti, da jamčijo za finančne institucije, ne da bi kršile pravila Pakta stabilnosti in rasti.
The Members States cannot afford to bail out financial institutions, in the event of a new crisis on the same scale, without breaching the rules of the S tability and G rowth P act.
(1a) Dolgo pred nastopom finančne krize je Parlament redno pozival h krepitvi resnično enakih pogojev za vse udeležence na ravni Unije in obenem opozarjal na precejšnje pomanjkljivosti nadzora Unije nad vedno bolj integriranimi finančnimi trgi (v svojih resolucijah z dne 13. aprila 2000 o sporočilu Komisije o izvajanju okvira za finančne trge: akcijski načrt 1 , z dne 25. novembra 2002 o pravilih bonitetnega nadzora v Evropski uniji 2 , z dne 11. julija 2007 o politiki finančnih storitev (2005–2010) – bela knjiga 3 , z dne 23. septembra 2008 s priporočili Komisiji o hedge skladih in skladih zasebnega kapitala 4 , z dne 9. oktobra 2009 s priporočili Komisiji o nadaljevanju Lamfalussyjevega procesa:prihodnja struktura nadzora 5 , z dne 22. aprila 2009 o spremenjenem predlogu za direktivo Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o začetku opravljanja in opravljanju dejavnosti zavarovanja in pozavarovanja (Solventnost II) 6 in z dne 23. aprila 2009 o predlogu uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o bonitetnih agencijah 7 ).
(1a) L ong before the financial crisis, the European Parliament was already call ing regularly for the reinforcement of a true level playing field for all actors at the Union level while pointing out significant failures in the Union 's supervision of ever more integrated financial markets (in its resolutions of 13 April 2000 on the Commission communication on implementing the framework for financial markets: Action Plan 1 , of 25 November 2002 on prudential supervision rules in the European Union 2 , of 11 July 2007 on financial services policy (2005-2010) – White Paper 3 , of 23 September 2008 with recommendations to the Commission on hedge funds and private equity 4 , of 9 October 2008 with recommendations to the Commission on Lamfalussy follow-up: future structure of supervision 5 , of 22 April 2009 on the amended proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) 6 and of 23 April 2009 on the proposal for a regulation of the European parliament and of the Council on Credit Rating Agencies 7 ).
4 UL C 8 E, 14.1.2010, str.
4 OJ C 8 E, 14.1.2010, p.
5 UL C 9 E, 15.1.2010, str.
5 OJ C 9 E, 15.1.2010, p.
(3) De Larosièrova skupina je v končnem poročilu, ki ga je predstavila 25. februarja 2009, med drugim podala priporočilo za ustanovitev organa na ravni Skupnosti , ki bi bil zadolžen za nadzor tveganj v celotnem finančnem sistemu.
(3) In its final report presented on 25 February 2009, the de Larosière Group recommended, among other things, the establishment of a Community level body charged with overseeing risk in the financial system as a whole.
(3) De Larosièrova skupina je v končnem poročilu, ki ga je predstavila 25. februarja 2009 (de Larosièrovo poročilo) , med drugim podala priporočilo za ustanovitev organa na ravni Unije , ki bi bil zadolžen za nadzor tveganj v celotnem finančnem sistemu.
(3) In its final report presented on 25 February 2009 (the de Larosière Report) , the de Larosière Group recommended, among other things, the establishment of a Union level body charged with overseeing risk in the financial system as a whole
(Sprememba velja za celotno besedilo.)
(The change should apply throughout the text).
(5) Komisija je v sporočilu z naslovom „Evropski finančni nadzor“ z dne 27. maja 2009 določila vrsto reform sedanjih ureditev za varovanje finančne stabilnosti na ravni EU , med katere zlasti spada tudi ustanovitev Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja (ESRB), odgovornega za makrobonitetni nadzor.
(5) In its Communication entitled “European Financial Supervision” of 27 May 2009 , the Commission set out a series of reforms to the current arrangements for safeguarding financial stability at the EU level, notably including the creation of a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) responsible for macro-prudential oversight.
Svet na seji dne 9. junija 2009 in Evropski svet na seji dne 18. in 19. junija sta podprla stališče Komisije in pozdravila odločitev, da bo podala zakonodajne predloge, ki bodo omogočali polno vzpostavitev novega okvira v letu 2010.
The Council on 9 June 2009 and the European Council at its meeting of 18 and 19 June supported the view of the Commission and welcomed the Commission’s intention to bring forward legislative proposals so that the new framework is in place in the course of 2010.
V skladu s stališči Komisije je Svet med drugim sklenil, da bi ECB „morala ESRB zagotavljati analitično, statistično, upravno in logistično podporo ter pri tem v tehničnem smislu uporabiti tudi nasvete nacionalnih centralnih bank in nadzornih organov“.
In line with the views of the Commission, it concluded inter alia that the ECB “should provide analytical, statistical, administrative and logistical support to the ESRB, also drawing on technical advice from national Central Banks and supervisors”.
(5) Komisija je v sporočilu z naslovom „Evropski finančni nadzor“ z dne 27. maja 2009 določila vrsto reform sedanjih ureditev za varovanje finančne stabilnosti na ravni Unije , med katere zlasti spada tudi ustanovitev Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja (ESRB), odgovornega za makrobonitetni nadzor.
(5) In its Communication entitled “European Financial Supervision” of 27 May 2009, the Commission set out a series of reforms to the current arrangements for safeguarding financial stability at Union level, notably including the creation of a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) responsible for macro-prudential oversight.
V skladu s stališči Komisije je Svet med drugim sklenil, da bi ECB „morala ESRB zagotavljati analitično, statistično, upravno in logistično podporo ter pri tem v tehničnem smislu uporabiti tudi nasvete nacionalnih centralnih bank in nadzornih organov“.
In line with the views of the Commission, it concluded inter alia that the ECB “should provide analytical, statistical, administrative and logistical support to the ESRB, also drawing on technical advice from national central banks and supervisors”.
Podpora, ki jo ECB zagotavlja ESRB, pa tudi naloge, prenesene na ESRB in njemu dodeljene, ne smejo posegati v načelo neodvisnosti ECB pri izvajanju njenih nalog v skladu s Pogodbo o delovanju Evropske unije.
The support provided by the ECB to the ESRB as well as the tasks conferred upon and assigned to the ESRB should be without prejudice to the principle of the independence of the ECB in the performance of its tasks pursuant to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
(5a) Zaradi povezovanja mednarodnih finančnih trgov mora biti Unija izredno dejavna na globalni ravni.
(5a) Given the integration of international financial markets, there is a need for a strong commitment on the part of the Union at the global level .
Evropski organ za sistemska tveganja bi moral uporabiti strokovno znanje znanstvenega odbora na visoki ravni ter sprejeti vse globalne odgovornosti, ki so potrebne za zagotovitev razpoznavnosti stališča Unije v zvezi z vprašanji finančne stabilnosti, zlasti s tesnim sodelovanjem z Mednarodnim denarnim skladom, Odborom za finančno stabilnost ter z vsemi partnerji skupine G-20.
T he ESRB sh ould draw expertise from a high - level scientific committee and take on all the global responsibilities required in order to en sure that the voice of the Union is heard on financial stability matters, in particular in cooperating closely with the I nternational M onetary F und (IMF) , the F inancial Services Board (F SB ) and all the partners of the G roup of Twenty (G- 20 ) .
(5b) Evropski odbor za sistemska tveganja bi moral med drugim prispevati k izvajanju priporočil Mednarodnega denarnega sklada, Odbora za finančno stabilnost in Banke za mednarodne poravnave skupini G-20 pri začetni obravnavi njihovega poročila o smernicah za ocenjevanje sistemske pomembnosti finančnih institucij, trgov in instrumentov, objavljenega oktobra 2009, ki določa, da je treba sistemsko tveganje obravnavati dinamično, da bi se upošteval razvoj finančnega sektorja in svetovnega gospodarstva.
(5b) The ESRB sh ould contribute , inter alia , to wards implement ing the recommendations of the IMF, the FSB and the B ank for I nternational S ettlements (BIS) to the G-20, in the initial consideration of their report on Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments published in October 2009 which states that systemic risk must be dynamic to take into account the evolution of the financial sector and of the global economy.
Sistemsko tveganje se lahko pojmuje kot tveganje za razkroj finančnih storitev, ki ga povzročijo motnje v delovanju celotnega finančnega sistema ali njegovih delov, in ki ima lahko resne negativne posledice za realno gospodarstvo.
Systemic risk may be seen as a risk of disruption to financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system and has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real economy.
(5c) Poročilo o smernicah za ocenjevanje sistemske pomembnosti finančnih institucij prav tako navaja, da se ocene sistemskih tveganj lahko razlikujejo zaradi različnega gospodarskega okolja.
(5c) The report on Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions also states that the assessment of systemic risk is likely to vary depending on the economic environment.
Ocene bodo prav tako odvisne od finančne infrastrukture ter ukrepov kriznega upravljanja ter sposobnosti obvladovanja motenj, ko se te pojavijo.
It will also be conditioned by the financial infrastructure and crisis management arrangements, and the capacity to deal with failures when they occur.
Institucije so lahko sistemsko pomembne za lokalne, nacionalne ali mednarodne finančne sisteme in gospodarstva.
Institutions may be systemically important for local, national or international financial systems and economies.
Ključna merila, ki pomagajo ugotavljati sistemsko pomembnost trgov in institucij, so velikost (obseg finančnih storitev, ki jih zagotavlja posamezni sestavni del finančnega sistema), nadomestljivost (zmožnost drugih sestavnih delov sistema, da zagotovijo iste storitve v primeru motenj) in medsebojna povezanost (povezave z drugimi sestavnimi deli sistema).
The key criteria helping to identify the systemic importance of markets and institutions are size (the volume of financial services provided by the individual component of the financial system), substitutability (the extent to which other components of the system can provide the same services in the event of a failure) and interconnectedness (linkages with other components of the system).
Ocena, ki temelji na teh treh merilih, bi morala biti dopolnjena s podatki o šibkih točkah v finančnem sistemu in zmožnosti obvladovanja finančnih motenj v institucionalnem okviru.
An assessment based on th o se three criteria should be complemented with reference to financial vulnerabilities and the capacity of the institutional framework to deal with financial failures.
(5d) Naloga Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja bi moralo biti spremljanje in ocenjevanje sistemskega tveganja v običajnih razmerah, da se omeji izpostavljenost sistema nevarnosti izpada njegovih sestavnih delov ter okrepi njegova odpornost v primeru pretresov.
(5d) The ESRB's task should be to monitor and assess systemic risk in normal times for the purpose of mitigating the exposure of the system to the risk of failure of systemic components and enhancing the financial system’s resilience to shocks.
S tem ciljem bi moral Evropski odbor za sistemska tveganja zagotoviti finančno stabilnost ter ublažiti negativne posledice za notranji trg in realno gospodarstvo.
In this respect, the ESRB should ensure financial stability and mitigate the negative impacts on the internal market and the real economy.
Da bi odbor izpolnil svoje cilje, bi moral analizirati vse pomembne informacije, zlasti zakonodajo, ki bi lahko vplivala na finančno stabilnost, kot so predpisi o računovodstvu, stečaju in reševanju v primeru krize.
In order to accomplish its objective s , the ESRB should analyse all the relevant information , in particular relevant legislation with a potential impact on financial stability , such as accounting, bankruptcy and bail - out rules.
(6) V obstoječi ureditvi Skupnosti se premalo pozornosti posveča makrobonitetnemu nadzoru.
(6) The present Community arrangements place too little emphasis on macro-prudential oversight.
Odgovornost za makrobonitetno analizo je razdrobljena, izvajajo jo različni organi na različnih ravneh, pri čemer ni mehanizma, s katerim bi zagotovili, da se makrobonitetna tveganja ustrezno prepoznajo ter da se izdajo jasna opozorila in priporočila, ki se nato upoštevajo in udejanjajo.
Responsibility for macro-prudential analysis remains fragmented, and is conducted by various authorities at different levels with no mechanism to ensure that macro-prudential risks are adequately identified and that warnings and recommendations are issued clearly, followed up and translated into action.
(6) Pravilno delovanje Unije in globalnega finančnega sistema ter blažitev tveganj, kateremu je izpostavljen, zahteva večjo skladnost med makro in mikro nadzorom.
(6) A proper functioning of Union and global financial systems and the mitigation of threats thereto require enhanced consistency between macro and the micro supervision.
Turner v svojem pregledu iz marca 2009 „Regulativni odziv na globalno bančno krizo“ pravi: „Boljše ureditve zahtevajo večje nacionalne pristojnosti, kar pomeni manj odprt notranji trg, ali pa večjo stopnjo evropske integracije“.
As stated in the Turner review, “A regulatory response to the global banking crisis”, of March 2009, "Sounder arrangements require either increased national powers, implying a less open single market, or a greater degree of European integration".
Glede na to, da trden finančni sistem pomembno vpliva na konkurenčnost in rast v Uniji ter na realno gospodarstvo, so institucije Unije v skladu s priporočili Larosièrove skupine izbrale večjo stopnjo evropske integracije.
Given the role of a sound financial system in terms of its contribution to competitiveness and growth in the Union and its impact on the real economy, the Union institutions, as recommended in the de Larosière Report, have opted for a greater degree of European integration.
(6a) Novo oblikovani sistem nadzora na makro ravni zahteva verodostojno in visoko strokovno usposobljeno vodstvo.
(6a) This newly designed system of macro supervision requires credible and high-profile leadership.
Zato bi moral biti predsednik Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja predsednik Evropske centralne banke glede na njegovo ključno vlogo ter mednarodno in notranjo verodostojnost, kar bi bilo tudi v skladu z Larosièrovim poročilom.
Therefore, given its key role and its international and internal credibility, and in the spirit of the de Larosière R eport, the President of the E CB should be the Chair of the ESRB.
Poleg tega bi bilo treba poostriti zahteve glede odgovornosti ter razširiti sestavo organov Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja, da bi zajeli številne različne izkušnje, izobrazbe in mnenja.
In addition, the accountability requirements should be increased as well as the enlargement of the composition of the ERSB bodies to encompass a wide range of experience, backgrounds and opinions.
(6b) Larosièrovo poročilo nadalje pravi, da makrobonitetni nadzor ni smiseln, če na kakršen koli način ne vpliva na nadzor na mikro ravni, medtem ko mikrobonitetni nadzor ne more učinkovito varovati finančne stabilnosti brez ustreznega upoštevanja dogajanj na makro ravni.
(6b) The de Larosière R eport also states that macro-prudential supervision is not meaningful unless it can somehow impact on supervision at the micro-level whilst micro-prudential supervision cannot effectively safeguard financial stability without adequately taking account of macro-level developments.
(6c) Treba je vzpostaviti Evropski sistem finančnega nadzora in združiti akterje finančnega nadzora tako na nacionalni ravni kot na ravni Unije, da bi ti delovali kot mreža.
(6c) A European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) should be established, gathering the actors of financial supervision both at a national and at the Union level, to act as a network.
V skladu z načelom lojalnega sodelovanja iz člena 4(3) Pogodbe o EU bi si morali sodelujoči v Evropskem sistemu finančnega nadzora zaupati in se medsebojno spoštovati, zlasti pri zagotavljanju ustreznih in zanesljivih tokov informacij med njimi.
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation in accordance with Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union , the parties to the ESFS sh ould cooperate with trust and full mutual respect, in particular to ensur e that appropriate and reliable information flows between them.
Na ravni Unije bi morali mrežo sestavljati Evropski odbor za sistemska tveganja in trije nadzorni organi na mikro ravni: Evropski nadzorni organ (bančništvo), ustanovljen z uredbo (EU) št. .../2010, Evropski nadzorni organ (vrednostni papirji in trgi), ustanovljen z uredbo (EU) št. .../2010, in Evropski nadzorni organ (zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine), ustanovljen z uredbo (EU) št. .../2010.
At the Union level, the network should comprise the ESRB and three micro-supervisory authorities: the European Supervisory Authority (Banking) , established by Regulation (EU) No …/2010, the European Su p ervisory Authority (Securities and Markets) , established by Regulation (EU) No …/2010, and the European Supervisory Authority (Insurance and Occupational Pensions) established by Regulation (EU) No …/2010.
(7) Skupnost potrebuje poseben organ, pristojen za makrobonitetni nadzor nad celotnim finančnim sistemom EU, ki bi ugotavljal tveganja za finančno stabilnost ter po potrebi izdajal opozorila o tveganjih in priporočila za ukrepe za odpravo teh tveganj.
(7) The Community needs a specific body responsible for macro-prudential oversight across the EU financial system, which would identify risks to financial stability and, where necessary, issue risk warnings and recommendations for action to address such risks.
Zaradi tega je treba ustanoviti Evropski odbor za sistemska tveganja (ESRB) kot nov neodvisen organ, odgovoren za izvajanje makrobonitetnega nadzora na evropski ravni.
Consequently, a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) should be established as a new independent body, responsible for conducting macro-prudential oversight at the European level.
(8) ESRB bi moral po potrebi izdajati splošna opozorila in priporočila v zvezi s celotno Skupnostjo , posameznimi državami članicami ali skupinami držav članic, pri čemer bi določil rok za ustrezen politični odziv.
(8) The ESRB should, where appropriate, issue warnings and recommendations of a general nature concerning the Community as a whole, individual Member States or groups of Member States, with a specified timeline for the relevant policy response.
(8) ESRB bi moral po potrebi izdajati in objavljati splošna opozorila in priporočila v zvezi s celotno Unijo , posameznimi državami članicami ali skupinami držav članic, pri čemer bi določil rok za ustrezen politični odziv.
(8) The ESRB should, where appropriate, issue and make public warnings and recommendations of a general nature concerning the Union as a whole, individual Member States or groups of Member States, with a specified timeline for the relevant policy response.
Kadar so takšna opozorila ali priporočila naslovljena na posamezno državo članico ali skupino držav članic, bi moral ESRB imeti pristojnost, da predlaga tudi ustrezne podporne ukrepe.
Where such warnings or recommendations are addressed to individual , or a group of , Member States, it may be possible for the ESRB to propose appropriate support measures.
ESRB bi moral po potrebi razglasiti obstoj izrednih razmer.
Where appropriate, the ESRB should declare the existence of an emergency situation.
(8a) ESRB se mora odločiti, ali naj priporočilo ostane zaupno ali naj se objavi, pri čemer se mora zavedati, da javno razkritje lahko v nekaterih okoliščinah prispeva k upoštevanju priporočil.
(8a) The ESRB should decide whether a recommendation should be kept confidential or made public, bearing in mind that public disclosure can help to foster compliance with the recommendations in certain circumstances.
(8b) Evropski odbor za sistemska tveganja bi moral izdelati barvno kodo, s katero bi zainteresiranim stranem omogočil boljše ocenjevanje narave tveganj.
(8b) A colour code should be elaborated by the ESRB, in order to allow interested parties better to assess the nature of the risk.
(8c) Če Evropski odbor za sistemska tveganja zazna tveganje, ki lahko resno ogrozi normalno delovanje in integriteto finančnih trgov ali stabilnost celotnega finančnega sistema Unije ali njegovih delov, bi moral izdati opozorilo o obstoju izrednih razmer.
(8c) If the ESRB detects a risk which may seriously jeopardi s e the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the Union's financial system , it should issue a warning declaring the existence of an emergency situation.
V takšnem primeru bi moral odbor nemudoma obvestiti Evropski parlament, Svet, Komisijo in evropske nadzorne organe o svojem opozorilu.
In such a case the ESRB sh ould promptly inform the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the European Supervisory Authorit ies (ESA s ) of its warning.
V nujnih primerih bi moral Evropski odbor za sistemska tveganja izdati opozorilo o izrednih razmerah.
In the event of an emergency, the ESRB sh ould issue an emergency warning.
(9) Pomen in legitimnost takšnih opozoril in priporočil bi povečali tako, da bi jih pošiljali prek Sveta in, kadar bi bilo to primerno, Evropskega bančnega organa, ustanovljenega z Uredbo (ES) št. …/… Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta, Evropskega organa za vrednostne papirje in trge, ustanovljenega z Uredbo (ES) št. …/… Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta, in Evropskega organa za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine, ustanovljenega z Uredbo (ES) št. …/… Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta .
(9) In order to increase their weight and legitimacy, such warnings and recommendations should be transmitted through the Council and, where appropriate, the European Banking Authority established by Regulation (EC) No …/… the European Parliament and of the Council, the European Securities and Markets Authority established by Regulation (EC) No …/… of the European Parliament and of the Council, and the European Insurance or the Occupational Pension Authority established by Regulation (EC) No …/…of the European Parliament and of the Council .