natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Končno, WE75 je bil povezan s pritožbo proti ratifikaciji imenovanja Treevesa kot predsednika družbe Equitable Life leta 2001 s strani Organa za finančne storitve: Opis Treevesa je naslednji: „ Na preveč mestih se poteguje za predsednika, upokojitveno starost je že dosegel, nima izkušenj z življenjskimi zavarovalnicami ... in vodil je zelo drage neuspešne pravne spore “.
Finally, WE75 related of a complaint against the FSA's ratification of Mr. Treves' appointment as chairman of EL in 2001: Mr. Treves is described as " having far too many competing chairmanships and being over retirement age, having no experience in life companies ... and having presided over massively expensive failed legal actions."
Organ za finančne storitve je bil s temi skrbmi seznanjen, vendar do nadaljnje obrazložitve ni prišlo.
The FSA is reported taking note of these concerns but without giving any further justification.
Glej WE75, točka b).
see WE75, point b).
1f) Trditve o prizadevanju zakonodajalcev za preprečitev nesolventnosti družbe Equitable Life
1f) Claims of Regulators' drive to avoid EL's insolvency
Medtem ko se zdi, da je družba Equitable Life namerno izkoristila morebitno sistemsko pomanjkljivost regulativnega sistema Združenega kraljestva, se pojavi vprašanje, ali bi morali zakonodajalci prepoznati ta namen in ali bi ga lahko prepoznali, vendar niso storili nič, da bi preprečili krizo, in so potem – ko je bilo že prepozno – kot rešitev izbrali preprečevanje nesolventnosti družbe.
While Equitable Life appears to have deliberately exploited a possible systemic weakness of the UK regulatory system, the question arises if regulators should or could have recognised this intention but did nothing to prevent its crisis, and then - when it was too late - opted for a solution avoiding the Society's insolvency.
Ta izbira, ki morda ni v korist sektorja ali finančnega trga kot takega, saj bi nesolventnost lahko obremenila obstoječe odškodninske sheme in ogrozila zaupanje v celoten finančni trg Združenega kraljestva, bi lahko negativno vplivala na zavarovance, ki drugače spadajo pod tako shemo.
This choice, possibly not in the interest of the industry or the financial marketplace as such as insolvency might have burdened the existing financial compensation schemes and hurt confidence in the UK financial market as a whole, might have negatively affected policyholders, otherwise falling under such a scheme.
V pričanju je WEIR (H2), ki predstavlja akcijsko skupino zavarovancev, omenil skupno prizadevanje „ vlade Združenega kraljestva, da se družba Equitable Life ne bi zadolžila, da bi se prikrila kakršna koli krivda zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva in bi se na vsak način izognili nesolventnosti.
In his testimony, Mr. WEIR (H2), representing a policyholder action group, claimed a collective effort by the " UK Government to keep Equitable Life afloat, concealing any culpability on the part of UK regulators and avoiding insolvency at any price".
“ Zakonodajalce je obtožil tudi, da so se z upravo družbe Equitable Life dogovorili, da „ zagotovijo, da izgube ... krijejo vlagatelji.
He also accused regulators of collusion with the board of Equitable Life to " ensure that the losses ... are borne by investors .
To ne drži: družba je vseskozi ostala solventna .
This is not the case: at all times the company has remained solvent .
Družba Equitable Life je vedno izpolnjevala vse pogodbene ali zajamčene obveznosti do svojih zavarovancev.
At no time has Equitable defaulted on any contractual or guaranteed liability to its policyholders.
Poleg tega je v vseh regulativnih poročilih navedla, da dosega regulativni minimalni kapital.“
In addition, in each of its regulatory returns it has reported that it is currently meeting its regulatory solvency margins."
Pravzaprav je novembra 2002, potem ko je družba Equitable Life že opozorila, da morda ne bo mogla doseči zahtevanega minimalnega kapitala, Organ za finančne storitve zavrnil poziv za likvidacijo družbe Equitable Life, ker bi bili zavarovanci na slabšem, vendar ni dal natančnejših utemeljitev.
In fact, in November 2002, after Equitable Life had warned it may be unable to meet the FSA's required minimum capital margins, the FSA had rejected a call to liquidate Equitable Life on the grounds that policyholders would be worse off, without giving more specific arguments.
V H8 je izvršni direktor družbe Equitable Life THOMSON trdil, da „ je bila možnost, da bi družba Equitable Life postala nesolventna, obravnavana v dokumentaciji za odškodninsko shemo leta 2001, ter da je bilo takrat in je še danes očitno, da bi bil rezultat likvidacije znatno manj zadovoljiv za zavarovance, “ vendar ni dodatno opredelil argumentov, ki podpirajo njegovo stališče.
In H8, the EL CEO Mr. THOMSON claimed that " the option for the Society to become insolvent was dealt with in the documentation for the Compromise Scheme in 2001, where it was obvious then, and remains so now, that liquidation would have produced a much less satisfactory outcome for policyholders" , but again without specifying any further the arguments supporting his position.
Schneiter (švicarski zakonodajalec na področju življenjskega zavarovanja) je o tej zadevi kot neodvisen strokovnjak povedal, da je treba po njegovem mnenju „nesolventnost zavarovalnice obravnavati kot ukrep v zadnji sili“ (H6).
Asked on this issue as an independent expert, Mr. Schneiter (Swiss insurance regulator) also stated that in his opinion " insolvency of an insurer should only be seen as a last resort measure" (H6).
1g) Dvojna vloga: izvršni direktor družbe Equitable Life in imenovani aktuar
1g) Double role of Equitable Life CEO and Appointed Actuary
Splošno sprejeta opredelitev „bonitetnega nadzora“ v Združenem kraljestvu je vključevala „ zagotovitev, da so direktorji in večji delničarji življenjske zavarovalnice sposobni in primerni .“
The generally accepted definition of 'prudential supervision' in the UK included "ensuring that the directors and major shareholders of a life office were fit and proper."
V zvezi s tem je bilo ugotovljeno, da je Ranson postal izvršni direktor družbe Equitable Life leta 1991, vlogi imenovanega aktuarja pa se ni odrekel do upokojitve leta 1997.
On this point, it has been established that Mr. Ranson had become Chief Executive of Equitable Life in 1991 without relinquishing his role of Appointed Actuary until his retirement in 1997.
Predstavniki akcijske skupine EMAG in veliko zavarovancev se je v pritožbah sklicevalo na to in trdilo, da so to dejstvo ter neukrepanje zakonodajalcev in nepripravljenost za nasprotovanje Ransonovi dvojni vlogi škodovali njihovim interesom.
EMAG representatives and a large number of policyholders' complaints have referred to it, claiming that this fact, as well as the regulators' inaction and refusal to challenge Mr. Ranson's double role, had been prejudicial to their interests.
Podobno je navedel CHASE GREY (WE9), ki je Organ za finančne storitve obtožil hude malomarnosti in neučinkovitosti pri opravljanju regulativne dolžnosti.
A similar allegation was presented by Mr. CHASE GREY (WE9), who accused the FSA on this issue of gross negligence and failure in their regulatory duty.
WE-CONF25 prav tako vključuje obtožbe, da zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva niso posredovali in uporabili pristojnosti, zagotovljene v oddelku 45 Zakona o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982.
WE-CONF25 equally blamed UK Regulators for not intervening on this matter by using powers provided to them by Section 45 of ICA82.
Navedeno je predvsem, da „ drugi ukrepi, ki bi jih lahko zakonodajalci sprejeli v skladu z oddelkom 45, vključujejo na primer zahtevo, da družba Equitable Life okrepi vodstvo, in/ali zahtevo, da se vlogi izvršnega direktorja in imenovanega aktuarja, ki ju je na začetku devetdesetih let 20. stoletja imel Ranson, ločita “.
In particular, it stated that " alternative steps which the regulators could have taken under section 45 include, for example, requiring Equitable to strengthen its management, and/or requiring it to split the roles of Chief Executive and Appointed Actuary, both of which were occupied by Mr. Ranson in the early 1990s."
NASSIM (WE7) potrjuje, da „so zakonodajalci in vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko zaporednim izvršnim direktorjem/generalnim direktorjem družbe ELAS omogočili tudi vlogo imenovanega aktuarja
Mr. NASSIM (WE7) confirms that " the regulators and GAD allowed successive chief executives/managing directors of ELAS also to hold the post of Appointed Actuary
Headdon je bil nekaj časa prav tako izvršni direktor in imenovani aktuar družbe Equitable Life obenem. , kljub priznanju, da obstaja možnost navzkrižja interesov na tem položaju, in dejstvu, da je to v celoti škodovalo osnovi regulativnega postopka, ki je temeljil na delitvi moči med imenovanim aktuarjem in ostalimi izvršilnimi organi “ .
Mr. Headdon had also been both CEO and AA of Equitable Life for some time. , despite a recognition of the potential for conflict of interest in this position, and the fact that it completely undermined the basis of the regulatory process which was founded on the separation of powers between the AA and the rest of the Executive."
Vprašanje, ali lahko imenovani aktuar prevzame to vlogo, zato ne zadeva tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju.
The question of whether an Appointed Actuary could take on that particular role is therefore not a matter for the Third Life Directive.
Tudi v številnih drugih zavarovalnicah za življenjsko zavarovanje je bilo običajno, da je imel imenovani aktuar takšno vlogo v sistemu Združenega kraljestva ...
It was a common arrangement with a number of other life insurance companies that the Appointed Actuary played that sort of role within the UK system ...
Stvari se spreminjajo, vendar tretja življenjska direktiva ni nikjer posebej omenjala vloge imenovanega aktuarja.
Things move on, but within the terms of the Third Life Directive, there was no particular reference to the role of an Appointed Actuary.
Poskusi, ki bi jih lahko zakonodajalec uporabil, da bi ugotovil, kdo je sposoben in primeren za opravljanje vloge izvršnega direktorja – za upravljanje, vodenje – zavarovalnice, niso omenjali njegove vloge aktuarja.“
Indeed, the tests the regulator could apply as to who was fit and proper to carry out the role of a Chief Executive – to be managing, to be a director – of an insurance company did not include a reference to their role as an actuary."
Po Headdonovi odločitvi, da zapusti družbo Equitable Life 1. marca 2001, Organ za finančne storitve „ ni podprl predloga, da bi (novi izvršni direktor) Thomson prevzel obe vlogi, družba Equitable Life pa je njegovo mnenje sprejela “.
Following Mr. Headdon's decision to leave Equitable Life on 1 March 2001 the FSA has " discouraged the suggestion that (the new CEO) Mr. Thomson should combine the two roles, and that view was accepted by Equitable ."
Spremembe regulativne ureditve od takrat so vključevale „ opuščanje vloge imenovanega aktuarja, pri čemer bi odbori in višje vodstvo prevzeli odgovornost za aktuarska vprašanja, in vključitev teh vprašanj v zunanjo revizijo družbe “ (WE-CONF8).
Changes to the regulatory regime since then have included " abolishing the role of the Appointed Actuary in favour of requiring boards and senior management to take responsibility for actuarial issues and bringing these issues within the scope of the firm's external audit ."
Vendar je dodal, da bi švicarski zakonodajalec tako vprašanje obravnaval kot jasen primer „ slabega upravljanja družbe “, ki lahko povzroči navzkrižje interesov, zato bi ga bilo treba obravnavati v skladu s tem.
He added however that the Swiss regulator would consider such an issue as a clear case of " bad corporate governance ", leading to a potential conflict of interest, and that it would have to be addressed accordingly.
V vsakem primeru bi dejstvo, da ima izvršni direktor tudi vlogo imenovanega aktuarja v isti družbi, nemudoma sprožilo natančen pregled celotne politike družbe s strani švicarskega zakonodajalca na področju življenjskega zavarovanja.
In any case, the fact that a chief executive covered the roles of CEO/AA in the same company would immediately trigger a detailed scrutiny of the company's overall policies by the Swiss insurance regulator.
Končna odločitev glede združljivosti dvojne vloge bi se potem sicer obravnavala za vsak primer posebej.
A final judgement on the compatibility of the double role would then, however, be dealt on a case-by-case basis.
1h) Primernost virov, ki so na voljo zakonodajalcem
1h) Adequacy of resources available to regulators
V zvezi s strukturami in sredstvi, ki so na voljo zakonodajalcem Združenega kraljestva na področju zavarovalništva, je lord Penrose navedel, da „ oddelek za zavarovanje na Ministrstvu za trgovino in industrijo ni imel ustreznih virov za sodelovanje pri regulativnem postopku.
On the subject of structures and resources available to the UK insurance regulators, Lord Penrose found that " the DTI insurance division was ill-equipped to participate in the regulatory process.
Zakonodajalci oddelka za zavarovanje so bili povsem odvisni od vladnega oddelka za zavarovalniško statistiko glede nasvetov o matematičnih rezervacijah, implicitnih postavkah, tehničnih zadevah na splošno in razumnih pričakovanjih zavarovancev ter kot posamezniki niso imeli posebnega ustreznega znanja in spretnosti ali izkušenj, da bi v zvezi s tem neodvisno ocenili položaj družbe Equitable Life.“
Insurance division regulators were fundamentally dependent on GAD for advice on the mathematical reserves, implicit items, technical matters generally, and PRE, and were not individually equipped with specific relevant skills or experience to assess independently the Society's position in these respects".
Dodal je, da „ se je kadrovska zasedba, ki je bila na voljo zakonodajalcu za bonitetne zadeve, spreminjala, vendar sta število osebja, ki je bilo neposredno odgovorno za družbo, in njihov položaj v državni upravi na splošno ostala enaka ...
He added that " the staffing levels available to the prudential regulators varied, but the number of staff with direct responsibility for the Society and their grades within the civil service remained broadly constant ...
Zato niso ustrezno opravljali svojih nalog.“
As a consequence they did not properly undertake their functions."
Ob sklicevanju na Bairdovo poročilo je LAKE (H1) prav tako trdil, da so zakonodajalci na področju zavarovalništva v devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja prejemali veliko premalo sredstev, in obtožil vlado Združenega kraljestva, da ne spoštuje členov 23(1), 23(2) in 23(3) prve direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju, kakor je bila spremenjena s tretjo direktivo o življenjskem zavarovanju, ki zahteva „ustrezna pooblastila in sredstva, da lahko pristojni organi preprečujejo ali odpravljajo vse nepravilnosti, ki škodujejo interesom zavarovancev, kar v tem primeru ni bilo storjeno“ .
Referring to evidence in the Baird report, Mr. LAKE (H1) also claimed that the insurance regulators were seriously under-resourced throughout the 1990s and accused the UK Government of contravening Articles 15(3) and 23(3) of the 1LD as amended by the 3LD, which required that " the powers and means be sufficient to allow the competent authorities to be able to prevent or remedy any irregularities prejudicial to the interests of the policy-holders, which was not done in this case ."
Prav tako „ so morala zagotovljena sredstva omogočiti, da pristojni organi domače države članice zahtevajo, da vsaka zavarovalnica uporablja smotrne upravne in računovodske postopke ter ustrezne mehanizme notranjega nadzora .
Likewise, " resources provided had to enable that the competent authorities of the home Member State shall require every assurance undertaking to have sound administrative and accounting procedures and adequate internal control mechanisms.
Ta določba se prav tako ni pravilno upoštevala. “
Again, this provision was not correctly followed. "
Obravnavanje težav v zvezi z zajamčenimi rentami je glavni del dokazov in pritožb, ki so jih vlagatelji peticije in zavarovanci predložili preiskovalnemu odboru, zlasti glede domnevne nezmožnosti zakonodajalcev, da prepoznajo morebitno ogrožanje solventnosti družbe Equitable Life zaradi zajamčenih rent, ter njihovo dodatno nezmožnost, da ustrezno obvestijo in/ali opozorijo potencialne zavarovance, da so izpostavljeni tveganju.
The handling of the problem related to Guaranteed Annuity Rates (GAR) appears at the core of evidence and complaints put forward to this Committee of Inquiry by petitioners and policyholders, in particular regarding the alleged failure by regulators to recognize the GAR risk potential for EL's solvency and their subsequent failure to adequately inform and/or warn prospective policyholders about this risk exposure.
2a) Kronološki pregled v zvezi z zajamčenimi rentami
2a) GAR Timeline
1957 Družba Equitable Life je začela prodajati zajamčene pokojninske rente s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice , ki so določene s posebnimi domnevami glede obrestnih mer in pričakovane življenjske dobe.
1957 Equitable Life began selling with-profits pension annuities with 'guaranteed rates' (GARs) fixed to specific assumptions as to interest rates and life expectancy.
Police z zajamčenimi rentami so se prodajale do leta 1988; police s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice, ki so ponujale zajamčene obrestne mere , pa so se prodajale do leta 1996.
GAR policies were sold until 1988 ; with-profits policies offering 'guaranteed interest rates' (GIRs) were sold until 1996
1970-1982 Leta visoke inflacije v Združenem kraljestvu (stopnja inflacije na drobno 10–22 % na leto).
1970-1982 UK high-inflation years (retail inflation rate 10-22% p.a.)
1990 Inflacija v Združenem kraljestvu je znatno padala , temu primerno pa so se zmanjševali tudi donosi dolgoročnih državnih obveznic.
1990 UK inflation drops significantly, with long-term gilt yields falling accordingly.
Obveznosti zavarovalnic z veliko policami z zajamčenimi rentami so se znatno povečale: družba Equitable Life, ki je imela minimalne rezerve in je dajala maksimalna izplačila, je bila še posebej prizadeta.
Insurers with large books of GAR policies saw their liabilities increase dramatically: EL, holding minimum reserves and giving maximum payouts, was to be particularly badly hit
Glej tudi vprašanje o „vodenih pokojninah/dohodku iz črpanja sredstev iz pokojninskega sklada“, kot je natančno opisano v WE72.
see also the issue of "Managed Pensions/Income Drawdown" as detailed in WE72.
1993 Trenutne rente na trgu so padle pod zajamčene rente, ki jih je obljubljala družba ELAS , kar je družbi ELAS občutno zvišalo stroške za zagotavljanje zajamčenih rent; uporabljena je bila polica z diferenciranimi bonusi
1993 Market current annuity rates fell below the GAR annuity rates promised by ELAS , thereby raising substantially the cost to ELAS of providing GAR pensions; Differential Bonus Policy (DBP) applied
7.9.1998 Družba Equitable Life je pisala svojim odvetnikom v odvetniški družbi Denton Hall in jih prosila za pravni nasvet glede zajamčenih rent in police z diferenciranimi bonusi;
7.9.1998 EL writes to Denton Hall, the Society's solicitors, seeking legal advice on the GAR and Differential Bonus Policy;
zajamčene rente so formalno postale sporno vprašanje.
GAR formally becomes an issue
Januar 1999 Na glavnem civilnem sodišču Združenega kraljestva se začne tožba Hyman.
Jan.1999 Hyman litigation is launched in the UK High Court
Družba S&P deklasificira bonitetne ocene družbe Equitable Life z AA (naložbeni razred) na A+(negativno).
S&P downgrades EL's credit rating from AA to A+/watch negative
Glej WE-FILE22.
see WE-FILE22.
20.7.2000 Z odločitvijo zgornjega doma se je končala tožba Hyman.
20.7.2000 House of Lords ruling ended the Hyman litigation
WE-CONF21 potrjuje, da je družba Equitable Life še naprej sklepala nove posle po tem datumu do prenehanja sklepanja novih poslov 8. decembra 2000.
WE-CONF21 confirms that EL continued to take in new business after this date until it closed down to new business on 8 December 2000.
Za podrobnosti o tem obdobju glej tudi poglavje 18 Penrosovega poročila (WE16).
For details on this period see also Chapter 18 of the Penrose report (WE16).
2b) Osnovne informacije
2b) Background information
Za boljše razumevanje vprašanja o zajamčenih rentah bi bilo dobro opredeliti različne skupine vključenih zavarovancev:
For a better understanding of the GAR issue, it may be useful to identify different groups of policyholders involved:
– zavarovanci s policami z zajamčenimi rentami, tj. tisti, katerih police vključujejo možnost zajamčene rente;
- GAR policyholders, i.e. those having a guaranteed annuity option on their policy
– zavarovanci s policami brez zajamčenih rent, tj. tisti, katerih police ne vključujejo možnosti zajamčene rente;
- non-GAR policyholders, i.e. those holding policies lacking this option
– novejši zavarovanci, tj. tisti, ki so police družbe Equitable Life kupili po 30. septembru 1998.
- Late-Joiners (LJ), i.e. policyholders who bought EL policies after 30 September 1998
Tržne sile, ki so povzročile težave glede zajamčenih rent, so bile natančno raziskane in jasno opredeljene: povezane so zlasti s hitrim in nepričakovanim padcem obrestnih mer v Združenem kraljestvu v začetku devetdesetih let 20. stoletja.
The market forces leading to the GAR problem have been extensively researched and clearly identified: they mainly relate to the rapid and unexpected fall in UK interest rates in the early 1990s.
V WE29 je navedeno, da „ so konec leta 1993 in 1995 rente na odprtem trgu padle pod zajamčene rente in ostale na tej stopnji.
WE29 recalls how "in late 1993 and in 1995, open market rates fell below GARS and have remained below ever since.
Poleg tega domneve v zvezi s pričakovano življenjsko dobo, ki so bile uporabljene za določitev velikosti izplačil zajamčenih pokojninskih rent, niso bile popravljene v skladu s podaljšanjem življenjske dobe od določitve teh domnev, zaradi česar so se dodatno povečali stroški za pokojnine.
In addition, the assumptions concerning life expectancy used to determine the size of the GAR pension payments were not revised in the light of improvements in mortality that had taken place since they had been set, further raising the cost of the pensions.
Takratni odbor teh dodatnih stroškov ni upošteval pri dodeljevanju letnih bonusov in vrednosti polic vseh zavarovancev (tistih s policami z zajamčenimi rentami in tistih s policami brez zajamčenih rent) so se povišale za isto stopnjo.“
The Board at the time did not take these extra costs into account when it awarded annual bonuses and all members’ policy values (both GAR and non-GAR) increased at the same rate."
Da bi uprava popravila to negativno gibanje na trgu, je „ popravila stanje glede na dodatne stroške za zajamčene rente s ‚polico z diferenciranimi končnimi bonusi‘, ki je bila prvič uporabljena leta 1993, pri čemer je menila, da je to v okviru njene diskrecijske pravice
In an effort to correct this adverse market movement, " the Board corrected for the extra cost of the GARs through a ‘differential final bonus policy’ first introduced in 1993, which it considered was within the discretion it had
Diskrecijska pravica, ki jo zahteva vodstvo družbe Equitable Life v skladu s členom 65 memoranduma in s statutom družbe ELAS. .
discretion power claimed by EL management under Art.65 of the Memorandum and Articles of Association of ELAS. .
Namen je bil objaviti končne bonuse, s katerimi se je vrednost skupnih prejemkov na splošno izenačila z nominalnim deležem vsakega zavarovanca v skladu za življenjsko zavarovanje s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice ...
The intention was to declare final bonuses that made the value of total benefits broadly equal to each policyholder’s notional share of the with-profits fund ...