natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Na eni strani omogočajo ohranjanje lokalne proizvodnje in delovnih mest v regijah, kjer se brezposelnost približuje 30 %.
For one thing, it enables local production and employment to be maintained in regions where the rate of unemployment is close to 30%.
Na drugi strani prihodek od pristaniških pristojbin, namenjen regijam, predstavlja od 37–48 % proračuna lokalnih skupnosti čezmorskih departmajev in je bil uveden kot največja pomoč naložbeni politiki za lokalni razvoj ter mora tak tudi ostati.
For another, the revenue from the dock dues – which is allocated to the regions and makes up between 37% and 48% of local authority budgets in the ODs – is intended, and must continue, to underpin policies promoting investment in local development.
Ob upoštevanju skladnosti režima pristaniških pristojbin z zakonodajo Unije in njegove gonilne sile za gospodarstva v čezmorskih departmajih mora Komisija že sedaj razmisliti o možnosti, da se po letu 2014 ta ukrep ohrani za stalno, da se najbolj oddaljene regije ne bodo vsakih deset let znašle v razmerah ekonomske negotovosti.
Finally, given that the dock dues system as currently implemented is compatible with EU law and that it helps to drive the economies of the ODs, the Commission now needs to consider how to put the measure on a permanent footing from 2014 onwards so that the outermost regions in question do not find themselves subject to economic uncertainty at 10-yearly intervals.
Evropski parlament torej podpira dejstvo, da se po letu 2014 za stalno odpravijo ali zmanjšajo pristaniške pristojbine za francoske čezmorske departmaje.
Parliament therefore supports the necessary step of making permanent, as of 2014, the exemptions from or reductions in dock dues granted in the case of the French ODs.
Člen 51 – skupne seje odborov
(Rule 51 – Joint committee meetings)
Obravnava v odboru
Discussed in commission
François Alfonsi, Zuzana Brzobohatá, John Bufton, Alain Cadec, Salvatore Caronna, Francesco De Angelis, Tamás Deutsch, Elie Hoarau, Danuta Maria Hübner, María Irigoyen Pérez, Seán Kelly, Mojca Kleva, Constanze Angela Krehl, Petru Constantin Luhan, Ramona Nicole Mănescu, Riikka Manner, Iosif Matula, Erminia Mazzoni, Jan Olbrycht, Wojciech Michał Olejniczak, Markus Pieper, Georgios Stavrakakis, Nuno Teixeira, Mihailis Tremopulos (Michail Tremopoulos), Lambert van Nistelrooij, Kerstin Westphal
François Alfonsi, Zuzana Brzobohatá, John Bufton, Alain Cadec, Salvatore Caronna, Francesco De Angelis, Tamás Deutsch, Elie Hoarau, Danuta Maria Hübner, María Irigoyen Pérez, Seán Kelly, Mojca Kleva, Constanze Angela Krehl, Petru Constantin Luhan, Ramona Nicole Mănescu, Riikka Manner, Iosif Matula, Erminia Mazzoni, Jan Olbrycht, Wojciech Michał Olejniczak, Markus Pieper, Georgios Stavrakakis, Nuno Teixeira, Michail Tremopoulos, Lambert van Nistelrooij, Kerstin Westphal
o revizijski politiki: kaj smo se naučili iz krize
on audit policy: lessons from the crisis
Kay Swinburne, Odbor za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve
Kay Swinburne, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
MNENJE Odbora za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve (*) .............................12
OPINION of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (*) ......12
– ob upoštevanju zelene knjige Komisije z dne 13. oktobra 2010 z naslovom „Revizijska politika: kaj smo se naučili iz krize“ ( KOM(2010)0561 ),
– having regard to the Commission Green Paper of 13 October 2010 on audit policy: lessons from the crisis ( COM(2010)0561 ),
– ob upoštevanju svoje resolucije z dne 11. maja 2011 o korporativnem upravljanju finančnih institucij
– having regard to its resolution of 11 May 2011 on corporate governance in financial institutions
Sprejeta besedila, P7_TA(2011)0223 . ,
Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0223 . ,
– ob upoštevanju svoje resolucije z dne 10. marca 2009 o izvajanju Direktive št. 2006/43/ES o obveznih revizijah za letne in konsolidirane računovodske izkaze
– having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2009 on implementation of Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts
UL C 87E, 1.4.2010, str.
OJ C 87E, 1.4.2010, p.
– ob upoštevanju Direktive št. 2006/43/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 17. maja 2006 o obveznih revizijah za letne in konsolidirane računovodske izkaze
– having regard to Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts
– ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora za pravne zadeve ter mnenja Odbor za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve ( A7-0200/2011 ),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs ( A7-0200/2011 ),
A. ker se je zaradi nedavne finančne krize pojavil dvom o delu revizorjev,
A. whereas the recent financial crisis has called the work of auditors into question,
B. ker so po nastopu krize pretirano prevzemanje tveganja finančnih institucij izrecno povezovali s prožnimi, pomanjkljivimi in neučinkovitimi mehanizmi upravljanja nadzora in tveganja, zlasti v sistemsko pomembnih finančnih institucijah,
B. whereas, in the wake of the crisis, excessive risk-taking on the part of financial institutions has been significantly linked to flexible, scant and ineffective control and risk management mechanisms, particularly in systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs),
C. ker se je po finančni krizi pokazalo, da imajo lahko revizorji pomembno vlogo zlasti pri krepitvi nadzora nad upravljanjem s tveganji v finančnih institucijah,
C. whereas auditors have been identified as being able to play a key role in strengthening the risk management oversight of financial institutions in particular,
D. ker vloga revizijskih odborov zlasti v finančnih institucijah ni bila v celoti izkoriščena,
D. whereas the role of the audit committees within financial institutions, in particular, has not been fully utilised,
E. ker so kakovostne revizije bistvenega pomena za gospodarsko stabilnost in zaupanje trgov, saj zagotavljajo, da je finančna trdnost podjetij resnična,
E. whereas quality auditing is fundamental for economic stability and market confidence, since it provides guarantees concerning the genuine financial health of companies,
F. ker je neodvisnost revizorja bistvenega pomena za kakovost revizije,
F. whereas the auditor's independence plays a fundamental part in the quality of auditing,
G. ker lahko pride do navzkrižja interesov, kadar revizijske družbe istemu podjetju zagotavljajo različne storitve,
G. whereas conflicts of interests are likely to exist when auditing firms offer different services to the same firm,
H. ker visoka koncentracija „štiri velikih“ revizijskih družb na trgu lahko povzroči preveliko kopičenje tveganj, in ker so manjše družbe raznolike, njihovo rast in znanje pa bi bilo treba spodbujati z več priložnostmi za konkuriranje,
H.whereas the high market concentration of the Big Four audit firms may cause an excessive build-up of risk, and whereas smaller firms are diverse and their growth and expertise should be encouraged through increased opportunities to compete,
I. ker je zato treba ponovno začeti podrobno razpravo o vlogi revizorjev in strukturi revizijskega trga,
I. whereas, consequently, an in-depth debate needs to be relaunched on the function of the auditor and the structure of the audit market,
3. meni, da bi morala razprava o vlogi revizorjev potekati vzporedno z okrepitvijo vloge revizijskega odbora, ki je sedaj v glavnem neučinkovita, ter poročanja o financah in tveganju, ki ga morajo zagotavljati podjetja;
Takes the view that the debate on the role of the auditor should go hand in hand with a strengthening of the role of the audit committee – now largely ineffective – and of the financial and risk reporting that companies are required to carry out;
Vloga revizorja
The role of the auditor
7. poudarja, da je kakovosten revizijski sistem sestavni del trdnega okvira upravljanja podjetij; prosi Komisijo, naj Parlamentu in Svetu skladno predstavi svoje predloge glede upravljanja in revidiranja podjetij;
Points out that a high-quality audit system is an integral part of a sound corporate governance framework; asks the Commission to present its proposals on corporate governance and audit to the Parliament and Council in a consistent way;
11. meni, da morajo biti revizijska poročila kratka in vsebovati jasne, jedrnate ugotovitve, ter da morajo obravnavati vse vidike zakonske naloge revizorja; meni tudi, da bi moral revizor revizijskemu odboru in generalni skupščini zagotavljati dodatna pojasnila o splošnih vprašanjih, na primer o uporabljenih bilančnih metodah in konkretnih vidikih, kot so na primer ključni kazalniki, pomembni zneski, ocene tveganja, povezanega z zadevnimi računovodskimi ocenami, relevantne ocene ter morebitni posebni problemi, ki so se pojavili med izvajanjem revizije;
Takes the view that audit reports should be brief, with clear, concise conclusions , and should address all aspects of the auditors ’ statutory remit ; considers that the auditor should provide the audit committee and the general assembly with additional explanations on general issues such as the methodology used in drawing up the balance sheet , and on specific issues such as key indicators, materiality figures and assessments of the risk involved in the material accounting estimates or materiality judgements made, and any particular problems encountered whilst carrying out the audit;
13. priporoča, da morajo revizorji, kadar naletijo na probleme, ki bi utegnili ogroziti nadaljnje delovanje revidiranega subjekta, opozoriti nadzornike ali pristojne organe; priporoča organizacijo dvostranskih srečanj med revizorji in nadzorniki večjih finančnih ustanov;
13.Stresses that supervisors or the relevant authorities must be alerted by auditors when they spot problems that might jeopardise the future of the entity being audited; recommends that bilateral meetings take place between auditors and supervisors of major financial institutions;
16. meni, da je poklicni dvom bistvenega pomena pri reviziji in da vpliva na vse njene faze; poudarja, da je ta dvom rezultat nepristranskosti in neodvisnosti revizorja ter njegove strokovne presoje, ki izhaja iz izkušenj in je ni mogoče nadomestiti z zgolj formalnimi postopki;
Takes the view that professional scepticism is vital in auditing and has an impact on each and every stage of an audit; points out that this scepticism comes about as a result of the objectivity and independence of the auditor , combined with professional judgement developed by experience for which box-ticking procedures cannot be a substitute;
Mednarodni standardi revidiranja
International Standards on Auditing (ISAs)
21. predlaga, da Komisija nujno sprejme mednarodne standarde revidiranja, pojasnjene z uredbo, ki bi omogočili uskladitev revizij na evropski ravni in olajšali nalogo nadzornih organov; meni, da je revidiranje enoten postopek, ne glede na velikost revidiranega podjetja, njegovo uporabo pa je treba vseeno prilagoditi značilnostim malih in srednjih podjetij; opozarja Komisijo, da poleg podjetij, za katere naj bi se uporabljali mednarodni standardi revidiranja, obstajajo tudi druga podjetja, ki so iz njih sicer izvzeta, vendar bi morale njihovo finančno situacijo kljub temu revidirati pooblaščene revizorske družbe ;
21.Suggests that the Commission urgently adopt the International Standards on Auditing (ISA), clarified through a regulation, which would make it possible to harmonise audits at European level and facilitate the task of supervisory bodies; takes the view that auditing is a single procedure, regardless of the size of the audited company, but that its application needs to be adapted to the characteristics of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); reminds the Commission that, aside from those companies to which the International Standards on Auditing should apply, there are also other companies which, despite being exempted from those standards, should nevertheless have their financial situations audited by authorised audit firms;
22. se strinja, da je konflikt neizbežen, če revizorja imenuje in plačuje podjetje, ki ga ta revidira; za sedaj pa ne vidi razloga, da bi obrazložitev takega imenovanja podala tretja oseba; poziva glede na pravkar povedano in brez poseganja v člen 37 (2) of Direktive št. 2006/43/ES, naj se okrepi vloga revizijskega odbora;
Agrees that there is an inevitable conflict in the auditor being appointed and paid by the audited entity; does not, however, currently see any justification for this appointment to be made by a third party; calls, with this in mind and without prejudice to Article 37 ( 2 ) of Directive 2006/43/EC , for the audit committee’s role to be strengthened;
27. poziva Komisijo, naj zagotovi, da bo praksa podjetij pomagala ohranjati vzpostavljeno zaščito, vključno z zaščito, povezano z obvezno menjavo glavnih revizijskih partnerjev, tudi če ti menjajo podjetja;
Calls on the Commission to ensure that company practices help to preserve the protections provided, including protection linked to the mandatory rotation of the main audit partners, even where those partners change firms;
30. meni, da je bistveno ohraniti neodvisnost revizorjev in da bi bilo treba zunanjim revizorjem prepovedati, da revidiranemu podjetju zagotavljajo storitve, ki bi lahko povzročilo neizpolnjevanje veljavnih zahtev glede neodvisnosti ali drugih etičnih zahtev; priznava, da je za spodbujanje rasti evropskega gospodarstva nujno, da vsa podjetja, ne glede na njihovo velikost, vključno z malimi in srednjimi podjetji, lahko najamejo neodvisne revizorje in revizijske družbe s širokim spektrom znanj in spretnosti;
Considers it essential to preserve the independence of the auditor; takes the view that external auditors should be banned from providing to the audited company services that could give rise to non-compliance with the applicable requirements regarding independence, or with other ethical requirements; recognises that, in order to boost growth in the European economy, it is necessary to ensure that all undertakings, regardless of their size, and including SMEs, can contract independent auditors and audit firms that have a wide range of skills;
36. meni, da bi moralo biti možno v primeru dokazane zlorabe funkcije direktorja podjetja ali subjekta javnega interesa in/ali revizijske družbe vse vpletene kazensko preganjati;
Considers that, where there is proof of abuse of the position of director of an undertaking or of a public-interest entity and/or of the audit firm, it must be possible to prosecute all concerned;
Revizije skupin
Group a udits
39. podpira predloge v zeleni knjigi glede revizije skupin;
39.Supports the Green Paper's proposals on group audits;
44. poziva k boljši dvosmerni komunikaciji med revizorji in finančnimi nadzorniki finančnih institucij, zlasti glede posameznih področij, ki vzbujajo skrb, vključno z medsebojnim vplivanjem različnih finančnih produktov; poziva, naj revizorji in evropski nadzorni organi vzpostavijo enako komunikacijo za čezmejne subjekte;
44.Calls for enhanced, two-way communication between auditors and financial supervisors of financial institutions, especially in relation to specific areas of concern, including the interaction between different financial products; calls for the same communication to be established for cross-border entities by auditors and the European supervisory authorities;
45. poudarja, da je treba uskladiti nadzorne prakse v zvezi z revizijo in poziva Komisijo, naj razmisli o vključitvi Evropske skupine organov za nadzor revizorjev v Evropski sistem finančnega nadzora, po možnosti prek Evropskega organa za vrednostne papirje in trge;
45.Points to the need to harmonise audit supervisory practices and asks the Commission to consider integrating the European Group of Auditors’ Oversight Bodies into the European System of Financial Supervision, possibly through the ESMA;
47. poziva Komisijo in države članice, naj zagotovijo skladnost z ugotovitvami, ki so jih nacionalna računska sodišča objavila med opravljanjem revizorskih nalog;
47.Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure compliance with the findings published by national audit offices in pursuit of their audit remit;
Koncentracija in struktura trga
Concentration and market structure
48. meni, da bi glede na obstoječo sestavo revizijskega trga propad ene od štirih velikih revizijskih hiš pomenil grožnjo za verodostojnost celotnega revizorskega poklica;
48.Believes, in view of the current configuration of the audit market, that the collapse of one of the Big Four firms would undermine the credibility of the auditing profession as a whole;
49. je prepričan, da bi kljub temu, da propad revizijskih družb ne more imeti neposrednega domino učinka na gospodarstvo, družbe, ki veljajo za „prevelike, da bi lahko propadle“, lahko povzročile moralno tveganje, zato bi bilo treba okrepiti načrte za krizno ukrepanje v zvezi z njimi; verjame tudi, da je treba te načrte oblikovati tako, da je verjetnost, da bi revizijska družba brez utemeljenega razloga zapustila trg, čim manjša, in da se zmanjša negotovost in zmedo, ki bi ju to povzročilo;
49.Takes the view that, even though audit firm failure may not have a direct domino effect on the rest of the economy, firms that are deemed ‘too big to fail’ could create the risk of moral hazard and that the contingency plans relating to the major auditing firms should be reinforced; believes, furthermore, that these plans should be designed to minimise the risk of an audit firm leaving the market without good reason and to reduce the uncertainty and disruption that would cause;
51. podpira uvedbo načrtov za ohranitev (living wills) štirih velikih revizijskih hiš in tistih revizorjev, ki zagotavljajo pomembne revizijske storitve v finančnem sektorju, vključno z določitvijo čezmejnih načrtov ukrepov za urejen prenos pogodb strank, če bi se pomemben akter umaknil s trga;
Supports the introduction of living wills for the Big Four audit firms and those auditors providing significant audit services to the financial sector, as well as the laying down of cross-border contingency plans for the orderly transfer of client contracts should a significant player withdraw from the market;
53. poziva Komisijo, naj poskrbi za enake konkurenčne pogoje na trgu revizorjev in da na evropski ravni zmanjša zapletenost določb na področju revizije; meni , da sta lažji dostop do trga in odstranitev ovir za družbe, ki želijo vstopiti na trg, bistvena za privabitev večjega števila udeležencev na revizijskim trg; meni, da so revizijski odbori, ne pa vodstva podjetij, najprimernejši za izbiro vrste revizije, ki bo najbolje zadovoljila potrebe revidiranega subjekta in za spremljanje učinkovitosti in kakovosti revizije, ter da je treba poseben poudarek nameniti neodvisnosti revizorja; meni, da bi morala Komisija preučiti načine, ki bodo omogočili subjektom v javnem interesu, javnemu sektorju in evropskim institucijam, da bolje ocenijo kakovost revizijskih storitev, ki jih zagotavljajo revizijske družbe, ne glede na njihovo velikost;
53.Calls on the Commission to establish equal competitive conditions for all firms operating on the auditing market and to simplify the rules governing auditing at European level; takes the view that easier access to the market and the removal of obstacles for firms wishing to enter the market are vital if a larger number of participants is to be attracted on to the auditing market; considers that audit committees and not the boards of companies are best placed to select the type of audit that best meets the audited entity’s needs and to monitor the effectiveness and quality of that audit, and that particular emphasis should be placed on the auditor’s independence; believes that the Commission should explore ways that will allow public-interest entities, the public sector and European institutions better to judge the quality of audit services provided by audit firms, irrespective of their size;
54. ugotavlja, da bi izvajanje skupnih revizij utegnilo pozitivno vplivati na diverzifikacijo revizijskega trga; opozarja na različne tržne razmere in različne izkušnje glede skupnih revizij v državah članicah; poziva Komisijo, naj oceni potencialne koristi in stroške obvezne uvedbe za revizijska podjetja, zlasti za mala revizijska podjetja, ter za revidirane družbe, zlasti finančne institucije, oceni pa naj tudi njen vpliv na koncentracijo na revizijskem trgu in finančno stabilnost;
54.Recognises that the implementation of joint audits could have positive effects on the diversification of the audit market; recalls that different Member States have different market situations and different experiences of joint audits; calls on the Commission to assess the potential benefits and the costs of mandatory introduction both for audit firms, in particular small audit firms, and for audited companies – in particular financial institutions – and how it might affect the concentration of the audit market and financial stability;
56. poziva Komisijo, naj preuči uporabo restriktivnih dogovorov bank in drugih finančnih institucij o posojilih in drugih finančnih produktih za podjetja, ki bi lahko omejili izbiro revizorja;
56.Calls on the Commission to investigate the use of restrictive covenants by banks and other financial institutions on loans and other financial products for companies, which may be limiting auditor choice;
58. poziva k spodbujanju združevanja malih in srednje velikih revizijskih družb; poziva Komisijo, naj razmisli o uvedbi certifikatov kakovosti in registra revizijskih družb, da bodo lahko male in srednje velike revizijske družbe pokazale, da zadovoljivo opravljajo svoje delo; zahteva, da bi morali pri oddaji javnih naročil spodbujati uporabo drugih podjetij, ne pa štirih velikih revizijskih hiš, in da bi morali javni organi določiti odstotek uporabe teh družb, ki bi služil kot merilo;
58.Calls for mergers between small and medium-sized audit firms to be encouraged; urges the Commission to look into creating a quality certificate and register for audit companies, so that small and medium-sized audit firms can show that their work is of a satisfactory standard; considers that the public procurement sector should aim to use non-Big Four firms and that public bodies should set a benchmark percentage for use of such firms;
59. poziva Komisijo, da je treba pri javnih razpisih subjektov javnega interesa določiti, da morata biti pošten dostop do razpisnega postopka zagotovljen za vsaj dve družbi, ki ne spadata med velike štiri; meni, da bi morali imeti v tem postopku odločilno vlogo revizijski odbori, v katerih bi morali sodelovati tudi delničarji; poziva Komisijo, naj pregleda prakse revizijskega odbora v zvezi z razpisnimi postopki, pri čemer naj posebno pozornost nameni vidikom upravnih obremenitev, povezanim s formalnimi razpisnimi postopki, pri čemer naj zagotovi, da bo končna odločitev delničarjev glede imenovanja revizorjev utemeljena na predlogu revizijskega odbora; meni, da bi moral ta predlog vsebovati opis uporabljenega postopka, uporabljena merila in razloge za priporočilo revizijskega odbora;
59.Calls on the Commission, in connection with tendering by public-interest entities, to stipulate that fair access to the tendering process must be provided for at least two non-Big Four audit firms alongside the Big Four firms; takes the view that audit committees must be given a key role in this process, in which shareholders must also take part; calls on the Commission to review audit committee practices in relation to tendering processes, with a special focus on aspects of administrative burdens associated with a formal tendering process and with a view to ensuring that the shareholders' final decision on the appointment of auditors is based on a proposal from the audit committee; takes the view that this proposal should include a description of the procedure followed, the criteria used and the reasons underlying the audit committee's recommendation;
60. poziva Komisijo (Generalni direktorat za konkurenco), naj izvede natančno raziskavo revizijskega trga;
60.Calls on the Commission (DG COMP) to conduct a detailed investigation of the audit market;
Ustvarjanje evropskega trga
Creation of a European market