natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
· da organ, ki prenaša pristojnosti, na drug organ ne more prenesti pristojnosti, ki niso enake tistim, ki jih ima prenašalec v skladu s Pogodbo, in ki niso predmet istih dolžnosti, in
· that a delegating authority cannot confer on another body powers different from those possessed by the delegator under the Treaty, and not subject to the same duties; and
· da ni mogoče prenesti pristojnosti, ki vključujejo široko diskrecijsko pravico med številnimi različnimi cilji in nalogami, ter s tem prelagati odgovornosti in se izmikati političnemu nadzoru.
· that it is not possible to delegate powers involving a wide margin of discretion between many different objectives and tasks, so shifting responsibilities and escaping political control.
Na tej podlagi so bile obstoječim evropskim agencijam večinoma odobrene naloge informiranja in usklajevanja, možnosti za izvrševanje pristojnosti za sprejemanje odločitev (s pravno zavezujočimi učinki za tretje strani) pa omejene le na posamezne primere.
On this basis, existing European Agencies have been mainly endowed with information and coordination tasks, with the ability to exercise decision-making powers (with legally binding impacts on third parties) being restricted only to individual cases.
Toda vsaka agencija ima svoj lasten institucionalni okvir in njihove naloge je treba v prvi vrsti oblikovati glede na potrebe posameznih sektorjev, v katerih naj bi delovale.
But every Agency has its own institutional setting, and their remit must be developed first and foremost with a view to the needs of the specific sectors in which they are to operate.
Takšen pristop moramo uporabiti pri načrtovanju nove agencije za energetski sektor.
This is the approach we must take in designing this new Agency for the energy sector.
Poročevalec je na splošno prepričan, da narava njegovih predlogov sprememb ne vpliva na osrednja načela iz sodbe v primeru Meroni.
Overall, the Rapporteur's belief is that the core Meroni principles are not affected by the nature of his proposed amendments.
Mnenje, da bo imela Agencija na podlagi predlogov iz tega poročila široko diskrecijsko pravico, je vprašljivo.
The idea that the Agency, under the proposals set out in this report, will have a wide margin of discretionary power is questionable.
Razmere so povsem drugačne od tistih v primeru Meroni, kjer je moral organ, na katerega so bile prenesene pristojnosti, upoštevati „osem različnih ciljev“.
The situation is completely different from the one addressed in the Meroni case, in which the delegated authority had to weigh “eight different aims”.
Agencija bo sprejemala odločitve, ki zahtevajo zelo tehnične presoje in ne bo uveljavljala diskrecijske pravice, za katero je potrebna izbira med številnimi različnimi in nasprotujočimi si javnimi interesi.
The Agency will take decisions which require highly technical evaluations; it will not exercise the sort of discretion that requires a choice between many different and conflicting public interests.
Funkcije, zaupane Agenciji v skladu s členom 4, kakor je bil spremenjen, dejansko ne vključujejo niti splošnih regulativnih pristojnosti niti splošne pravice do presoje, primerljive z razvojem (celo delnim) energetske politike.
In fact, the functions entrusted to the Agency in accordance with Article 4 as amended, do not involve general regulatory powers nor a general freedom of evaluation that can be equated to the development (even in part) of 'energy policy'.
V predlogih sprememb je možnost za sprejemanje zavezujočih odločitev omejena na posamezne odločitve ali pravila v zvezi s strogo tehničnimi zadevami, ki so potrebne za zagotovitev učinkovitega in varnega delovanja notranjega energetskega trga.
In these proposed amendments the possibility of adopting binding decisions is limited to individual decisions or rules concerning strictly technical matters needed to ensure an efficient and safe functioning of the internal energy market.
Po drugi strani pa Komisiji zgolj svetuje o kodeksih, ki se v glavnem nanašajo na konkurenco in tržna pravila.
On the other hand it only gives advice to the Commission on codes which relate mainly to competition and market rules.
Medtem ko je odobritev povsem tehničnih kodeksov ustrezna in povsem tehnična naloga Agencije, je Komisija upravičeno odgovorna za tržne kodekse, saj se nanašajo na politiko konkurence.
Whilst the approval of purely technical codes is an appropriate, purely technical task for the Agency; the Commission rightly takes on responsibility for Market codes, as they relate to competition policy.
Načela iz primera Meroni je zato treba videti v kontekstu, namesto da se jih uporablja na preveč poenostavljen in konzervativen način.
The principles established in the Meroni case must therefore be seen in context, rather than being applied in a simplistic, overly conservative manner.
V primeru Agencije za sodelovanje energetskih regulatorjev (katere pravna podlaga je člen 95 ES) potrebujejo pozornejšo ponovno presojo.
In the case of the Agency for the Co-operation of Energy Regulators (whose legal base is Article 95 EC) they require a more careful re-evaluation.
Vodenje in struktura Agencije
Governance and Structure of the Agency
Predlagane spremembe strukture in delovanja Agencije so namenjene zagotovitvi najučinkovitejšega ravnovesja med potrebami za regulativno neodvisnost na eni strani in ustreznim političnim nadzorom na drugi strani.
The proposed changes to the structure and operation of the Agency are designed to secure the most effective balance between the needs for regulatory independence on one hand, and appropriate political control on the other.
Ključno načelo po mnenju poročevalca je, da je neodvisnost Agencije odločilnega pomena ne le za njeno učinkovitost, ampak tudi za njeno verodostojnost.
A key principle for the Rapporteur is that the independence of an Agency is critical not only for its effectiveness but also for its credibility.
V zvezi s tem predlogi sprememb, ki jih predlaga poročevalec, uvajajo naslednje ključne spremembe:
With that in mind, the Amendments proposed by the Rapporteur introduce the following key changes:
· večja vloga odbora regulatorjev in Parlamenta pri imenovanju direktorja.
· A stronger role for the Board of Regulators and the Parliament in the appointment of the Director .
Direktorja še vedno imenuje upravni odbor, vendar to stori na podlagi seznama vsaj 2 imen, ki ju imenuje odbor regulatorjev in ne Komisija.
The Director is still appointed by Administrative Board, but on the basis of a list of at least 2 names nominated by the Board of Regulators, rather than the Commission.
· Učinkovitejši in preglednejši upravni odbor.
· A more efficient and transparent Administrative Board .
Članstvo je racionalizirano na skupno 5 članov: po 2 imenujeta Komisija in Svet, en član pa je imenovani predstavnik Evropskega parlamenta, s čimer se zagotovi upoštevanje mnenja tega zakonodajnega telesa.
Membership is streamlined considerably, with 5 members in total - 2 each nominated by the Commission and Council; but also a nominated representative of the European Parliament, to ensure that the legislature's views are reflected.
Člani morajo delovati neodvisno in podati izjavo o zavezah in interesih, ki bi lahko vplivali na njihovo neodvisnost.
Members will be required to undertake to act independently and make a declaration of commitments and interests that might prejudice that independence.
· Uveden je rok za zagotovitev hitrega sprejemanja odločitev Agencije.
· A time-limit is introduced to ensure speedy decision-making by the Agency .
Agencija bo morala odločitve sprejemati v določenem roku – predlagani so trije meseci.
The Agency will be required to make decisions within a fixed time limit - three months is suggested.
Če v tem času ne bo prišlo do odločitve, bo za odločitev spet pristojna Komisija.
If a decision is not forthcoming within that time, the decision reverts to the Commission.
· Večja finančna neodvisnost Agencije.
· Increased financial independence for the Agency .
Agencija ima večji okvir za zbiranje finančnih sredstev na trgu (v zameno za opravljene storitve/sprejete odločitve) in pri nacionalnih regulatorjih.
There is increased scope for the Agency to raise finances from the marketplace (in return for services rendered/ decisions made) and national regulators.
Posvetovanje, spremljanje in poročanje
Consultation, Monitoring and Reporting
Ustrezen način za prenos zavezujoče pristojnosti na Agencijo (tako, da se bo še dodatno okrepila usklajenost z načeli iz primera Maroni) je vzpostavitev primernega pravnega okvira, ki zagotavlja, da bo posvetovanje opravljeno z vsemi vpletenimi stranmi, ki Agenciji daje jasno izraženo dolžnost v zvezi s preglednostjo in ki razširja odgovornost (z obveščanjem in poročanjem) Agencije Evropskemu parlamentu.
The proper way to confer of binding power to the Agency (in a step which will further enhance its compatibility with the Meroni principles) is to build up an adequate legal framework that guarantees that all affected parties will be consulted; gives the Agency a clearly stated duty of transparency; and, in particular, extends the accountability (through information provision and reporting) of the Agency towards the European Parliament.
V ta namen bi predlagana nova člena 8b (novo) in 8c (novo) v predlagano uredbo vključila natančne zahteve za Agencijo, in sicer:
To this end, the proposed new articles 8b (new) and 8c (new) would include in the proposed regulation precise requirements for ACER:
· da se posvetuje z vsemi stranmi, ki jih zadeva kateri koli ukrep, sprejet v okviru te uredbe ;
· to carry out consultations with all the parties concerned in any measures undertaken under the Regulation ;
· da zagotovi visoko raven preglednosti in lahek dostop do informacij z jasno ureditvijo, določeno v njenem poslovniku; in
· to ensure a high level of transparency, and provide easy access to information , through clear arrangements laid down in its Rules of Procedure; and
· da spremlja razvoj na trgu plina in električne energije, zlasti vprašanja v zvezi s potrošniki, in pripravi letno poročilo, namenjeno Parlamentu in Komisiji , v katerem (po potrebi) pripravi predloge ukrepov za izboljšanje odpiranja trgov.
· to monitor developments in gas and electricity markets - particularly consumer issues - and produce an annual report for the attention of the Parliament and the Commission , setting out (if appropriate) proposals for action to improve the opening of markets.
Cilj tretjega energetskega svežnja je, da energetski trg, ki je do pred enim desetletjem temeljil na monopolu, z liberalizacijo preoblikuje v trg z dejansko in trajnostno konkurenco.
The aim of the 3rd Energy Package is to gradually move the energy market, which up to a decade ago had been based on a monopoly system, from a liberalisation stage towards a stage at which competition is genuine and sustainable .
Za dosego tega cilja je treba urediti odnos med regulativnimi postopki in razvojem s pristopom, ki bo:
To achieve this purpose the relationship between regulatory processes and market development should be governed by an approach which is:
· usmerjen v prihodnje stanje trga (tj. pristop, usmerjen v prihodnost), ko bodo razmere veliko bolj konkurenčne in raznolike, in
· geared to the future state of the market (i.e. a forward-looking approach) in which conditions will be much more competitive and diversified; and
· bo osredotočen na izvajanje prava konkurence, da bi se število predhodnih pravil, ki se uporabljajo za vsak primer posebej, čim bolj zmanjšalo.
· focused on the implementation of competition law, to minimize as much as possible the ex-ante rules applied on a case-by-case basis.
Te cilje je treba doseči na evropski ravni s konkurenčnim okvirom in uskladitvijo predhodnih pravil.
These objectives can be pursued at European level, with competitive framework and ex-ante rules being harmonised.
To pomeni, da se bo ureditev energetskega sektorja postopoma spreminjala, dokler se ne bodo uporabljala le še pravila konkurence.
This means that regulation of the energy sector will be progressively scaled down until the rules applying are competition rules.
Poudariti je treba, da bodo uredbe za posamezne sektorje še naprej imele svojo vlogo, če ne bodo dosežne razmere učinkovite konkurence.
It must be pointed out that unless an efficient competitive environment is achieved, sector-specific regulation will continue to play a role.
Energetski sektor bo postal sistem, ki prvenstveno temelji na konkurenci, šele takrat, ko bo jasno, da ta panoga več nima naravnega monopola in se obravnava kot „navadna“ industrija.
But the energy sector will only be brought under a system based primarily on competition rules once it has been established that the industry is no longer a natural monopoly and has become a "normal" industry.
Agencija za sodelovanje energetskih regulatorjev bo torej odigrala pomembno vlogo pri prihodnosti evropskega energetskega trga in njegovega razvoja po izvedbi tretjega energetskega svežnja.
The future of the European energy market and its development after the implementation of the 3rd Energy Package will therefore require an important role to be played by the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators.
Agenciji je zato treba dati večjo raven pristojnosti in neodvisnosti, kakor jo predlaga Komisija.
This is why the power and independence of the Agency must be enhanced, over and above the level proposed by the Commission.
Finančni vpliv
Financial impact
Letni stroški Agencije se krijejo iz sredstev Skupnosti.
The Agency’s annual costs will be covered by Community grants.
Agencija ima omejene prihodke, ki izhajajo iz pristojbin, ki jih plačajo tretje strani in se zaračunajo, ko Agencija sprejme določene odločitve.
The Agency has limited revenues stemming from fees to be paid by third parties which are charged when the Agency takes certain decisions.
Komisija predlaga, da ima Agencija za sodelovanje energetskih regulatorjev glede na svoje naloge 40–50 zaposlenih.
The Commission proposes that the new Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators should have, given its tasks, a limited staff of 40-50 people.
Ta ocena temelji na obširni analizi kadrovskih potreb nacionalnih regulativnih organov in analizi minimalnih virov, ki so potrebni za izvajanje predlaganih nalog, zlasti v luči možnosti za sinergije pri izkoriščanju virov v nacionalnih regulativnih organih v pomoč delu agencije.
This assessment is based on an analysis of the staff requirements of national regulatory authorities and an analysis of the minimum resources necessary to carry out the tasks proposed, in particular in the light of possibilities for synergies in harnessing the resources within national regulatory authorities to assist the work of the agency.
Po mnenju Komisije je predlagano število zaposlenih skladno s potrebami teh organov.
According to the Commission, the proposed staff numbers are in line with these authorities' needs.
Poleg tega Komisija meni, da bi bilo število potrebnih zaposlenih precej višje, če bi naloge Agencije poskušala izvajati Komisija.
Besides, the Commission argues that if the Commission itself were to endeavour to perform the Agencies' tasks, the number of staff required would be much higher.
S proračunskega stališča ima pripravljavka mnenja pomisleke v zvezi z ustanovitvijo Agencije za sodelovanje energetskih regulatorjev zaradi negotovosti glede njenega financiranja.
From a budgetary point of view , your draftswoman has some concerns regarding the setting-up of the new Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators because of uncertainties regarding its financing .
Pomisleki se osredotočajo na naslednje točke:
These concerns centre around the following points:
1) Nova Agencija za sodelovanje energetskih regulatorjev se mora financirati iz podrazdelka 1a večletnega finančnega okvira za obdobje od 2007 do 2013, v katerem so rezerve sedaj še posebej omejene.
1) The new Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators has to be financed under subheading 1a of the multiannual financial framework 2007 - 2013 where margins have become particularly limited.
Financiranje nove agencije za energijo ni vključeno ne v zadnje finančno načrtovanje Komisije z dne 31. januarja 2008 ne v tabele, priložene letni strategiji politik za 2009, v katerih je navedeno zgolj, da se bo agencija " financirala na podlagi ustreznih znižanj pri drugih ukrepih (v glavnem ukrepih v okviru institucionalnih pooblastil) na področju prometa in energije."
The financing of the new Energy Agency is included neither in the Commission's last financial programming of 31 January 2008 nor in the tables annexed to the APS for 2009, in which it is simply stated that the agency " will be financed by corresponding reductions in other actions (mostly actions under institutional prerogatives) within the transport and energy policy area."
Dodatnih podrobnosti o izvajanju financiranja ni.
No further details of this exercise are provided.
Komisija je Odboru za proračunski nadzor potrdila, da namerava agencijo financirati, ne da bi zmanjšala rezervo podrazdelka 1a, torej s prerazporeditvijo, iz katere bodo izvzete vrstice, za katere je potrebno soodločanje.
To the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Commission confirmed that it aims at financing the agency without reducing the margin in subheading 1a, i.e. by redeployment outside any co-decided lines.
Komisiji doslej še ni uspelo natančno razložiti, kako namerava to izvesti.
The Commission has so far been unable to specify exactly how this will be done.
Tudi če bo rezultat tega manevra na papirju nespremenjena rezerva, to pomeni, da se bo agencija financirala z uporabo zadnjih "prosto razpoložljivih" sredstev v podrazdelku 1a in da bo za vsako prednostno nalogo, ki bi se pojavila v prihodnosti, potrebno formalno reprogramiranje (tako je že napovedano reprogramiranje, potrebno za ustanovitev načrtovanega novega organa za trg evropskih elektronskih komunikacij).
However, even if this manoeuvre were to leave the margin untouched on paper, this means that the financing of the agency will be carried out using the last "freely available" resources in subheading 1a and that any newly emerging priority in the future will require formal reprogramming (as has already been announced to be necessary for the creation of the planned new Electronic Communications Market Authority).
To pa se zdi pripravljavki mnenja nesprejemljivo (gl. predlog spremembe 1).
This seems unacceptable to your draftswoman (see Amendment 1).
2) S tem v zvezi je treba ponovno poudariti, da agencije, kot je nova agencija iz tega predloga, izvajajo predvsem upravne naloge.
2) In this context, it has to be pointed out once more that agencies such as the new agency proposed here fulfil predominantly administrative tasks.
Zato bi bilo treba resno premisliti o možnosti financiranja takih organov iz razdelka 5 večletnega finančnega okvira, ki ima to prednost, da rezerve niso tako majhne kot pri razdelkih za poslovanje (gl. predlog spremembe 2).
Some serious thought should therefore be given to the possibility of financing such bodies under heading 5 of the MFF, which has the additional advantage that margins are not as tight as with the other, operational headings (see Amendment 2).
3) Ko bo Komisija končno objavila podrobnosti o načrtovanem financiranju, bo seveda za ustanovitev te agencije potreben postopek iz člena 47 medinstitucionalnega sporazuma.
3) Of course, an Article 47 IIA procedure will be required for the setting-up of this new agency once the Commission has finally made public the details of its intended financing.
Če se bo zakonodajalec odločil za ustanovitev te agencije, bo proračunski organ moral doseči sporazum o financiranju v okviru določb medinstitucionalnega sporazuma (gl. predlog spremembe 3).
If the legislator should decide in favour of setting up this agency, the budgetary authority will have to come to an agreement on its financing within the framework of the provisions of the IIA (see Amendment 3).
Odbor za proračun poziva Odbor za industrijo, raziskave in energetiko kot pristojni odbor, naj zaradi negotovosti glede njegovega financiranja zavrne sedanji predlog Komisije in v osnutek zakonodajne resolucije vključi naslednje predloge sprememb:
The Committee on Budgets calls on the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, as the committee responsible, to reject the current Commission proposal on the grounds of uncertainties regarding its financing, and to incorporate the following amendments in its draft legislative resolution:
1a. meni, da referenčni znesek, naveden v zakonodajnem predlogu, ni združljiv z zgornjo mejo podrazdelka 1a sedanjega večletnega finančnega okvira 2007–2013, ne da bi ogrožal financiranje drugih prednostnih nalog; ugotavlja, da je Komisija objavila, da namerava novo Agencijo za sodelovanje energetskih regulatorjev financirati izključno s prerazporejanjem v podrazdelku 1a; poudarja, da proračunski organ do sedaj še ni bil obveščen, kako naj bi se prerazporejanje natančno izvedlo, in torej še vedno ni jasno, katere programe ali prednostne naloge zadeva, kakšne posledice izhajajo iz tega v celotnem finančnem obdobju in ali bo v podrazdelku 1a ostala zadostna rezerva;
Considers that the reference amount indicated in the legislative proposal is not compatible with the ceiling of subheading 1a of the current multiannual financial framework 2007 - 2013 without jeopardising the financing of other priorities; notes that the Commission has communicated its intention to finance the new Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators exclusively by redeployment within subheading 1a; reiterates, however, that the budgetary authority has not yet received any information as to the details of this redeployment exercise so that it remains unclear, to date, which programmes or priorities are affected and what consequences arise from this throughout the financial period, and whether a sufficient margin will remain in subheading 1a;
1b. poudarja, da bo predlagana Agencija izvajala predvsem upravne naloge in bo v pomoč Komisiji; zato meni, da bi bilo za financiranje nove agencije treba preučiti vse možnosti v večletnem finančnem okviru za obdobje od 2007 do 2013, vključno z razdelkom 5, kjer se zdi, da so še na voljo zadostne rezerve;
Points out that the proposed Agency will fulfil mainly administrative tasks and assist the Commission; is consequently of the opinion that all possibilities of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2007 - 2013, including Heading 5 where sufficient margins still seem to be available, should be explored to finance the new agency;
1c. poudarja, da je treba za ustanovitev Agencije uporabiti določbe iz točke 47 medinstitucionalnega sporazuma z dne 17. maja 2006; poudarja, da bo Parlament, če se zakonodajni organ odloči, da bo to agencijo ustanovil, začel pogajanja z drugo vejo proračunskega organa, da bi se pravočasno sklenil sporazum o financiranju te agencije v skladu z ustreznimi določbami medinstitucionalnega sporazuma;
Underlines that the provisions of Point 47 of the Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) of 17 May 2006 shall be applied for the setting-up of the Agency; stresses that, should the legislative authority decide in favour of setting up such an agency, Parliament will enter into negotiations with the other arm of the budgetary authority with a view to coming to a timely agreement on the financing of this agency in line with the relevant provisions of the IIA;
Predlog Komisije o ustanovitvi agencije za usklajevanje nacionalnih regulatorjev na evropski ravni prihaja v pravem trenutku in je logična posledica razvoja evropskega energetskega programa v zadnjih nekaj letih.
The Commission’s proposal to set up a European agency to coordinate national energy regulators is a timely one and is the logical consequence of the evolution of the European energy programme over a number of years.
Prvotno so v 27 evropskih državah javne storitve na področju energije in zemeljskega plina zagotavljala podjetja, največkrat državna, ki so imela skorajda nacionalni ali regionalni monopol.
Initially, public electricity and gas services in the 27 Member States were most commonly provided by companies – usually public – which had a virtual national or regional monopoly.