natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Vendar bi bilo treba zakonodajne pristojnosti obravnavati v postopku soodločanja, kjer je to primerno, in ne v postopku komitologije, da ne bi spodkopali pristojnosti Evropskega parlamenta.
However legislative powers should be addressed through codecision where appropriate, and not through Comitology, so as not to undermine the European Parliament's powers.
IV – Evropska regulativna agencija za energijo (Agencija)
IV - The European Regulatory Energy Agency (Agency)
Treba bi bilo jasno določiti naloge nacionalnih in evropskih regulativnih organov, da se prepreči podvajanje.
Clear duties of national and European regulatory bodies should be set out to ensure no duplication.
Regulativni organ bi morali spremljati vse pogoje, določene v direktivi za nacionalne regulatorje.
The Regulatory Authority should monitor any conditions set out in the Directive for National Regulators.
Posledica neizvajanja pravil, določenih v direktivi, bi morale biti jasne sankcije.
Failure to comply with the rules set out in the directive should lead to clear sanctions.
Pristojnosti in neodvisnost predlagane evropske regulativne agencije bi bilo treba zagotoviti tako, da bi bila odgovorna Evropskemu parlamentu.
The powers and independence of the proposed European Regulatory Agency should be assured through accountability to the European Parliament.
Treba je priznati, da je pri čezmejnih vprašanjih regulativna vrzel, in da morajo biti deli evropskega trga med seboj bolje povezani.
On cross border issues there is a need to recognise the regulatory gap and the need for better interconnections in parts of the European market.
Zato je dobrodošel predlog, da bi bila Agencija pristojna za odločanje o izjemah za povezovalce in izjemah za infrastrukturo, ki leži na ozemlju dveh ali več držav članic.
Thus the proposal to give the Agency the power to decide on exemptions for interconnectors and on exemptions if the infrastructure is located on the territory of more than one Member State is welcome.
Če pristojne nacionalne regionalne agencije ne morejo doseči dogovora o ustreznem regulativnem režimu, lahko evropska agencija izda razpis za postavitev nujnih povezovalcev, pri čemer se posvetuje z ustreznimi organi.
If the competent NRAs are unable to reach agreement on an appropriate regulatory regime the European Agency may put essential interconnectors out to tender in consultation with the appropriate authorities.
Stroške bi morali potrošniki kriti v pravno urejeni in pregledni obliki.
Costs should be passed on to the consumer in a regulated and transparent framework.
Vloga Agencije pri urejanju čezmejnih vprašanj bi morala biti dejavnejša.
The Agency should have a more active role in regulation of cross-border issues.
V - Regionalni trgi z električno energijo
V - Regional Electricity Markets
Naš končni cilj bi moral biti prizadevanje za enotno evropsko omrežje električne energije, dosegli pa bi ga s primernimi, jasnimi in vedno večjimi koraki.
Ultimately our goal should be to work towards a single European network in electricity through appropriate, clear and incremental steps.
Jasno mora biti, da je cilj treba dosegati hkrati s popolnim ločevanjem lastništva in ne sme šteti za alternativni model.
It should be made clear that this should be carried out along with full ownership unbundling and not considered an alternative model.
Upravljavci prenosnih omrežij bi morali dobiti jasen načrt za uresničitev cilja in časovni razpored, kar bi zagotovilo, da bi se stvari začele premikati.
TSOs should be given a clear route map and timetable to ensure that this is moved on.
Treba je poiskati ravnovesje med pristojnostmi, ki jih imajo upravljavci prenosnih omrežij, in pristojnostmi regulativnih organov.
A balance has to be found on which powers are with the TSOs and which are with regulatory authorities.
V splošnem lahko regulatorji bolje opredelijo kodekse komercialnih dejavnosti – na primer pravila za izravnavo in pravila o prezasedenosti, medtem ko bi tehnični kodeks moral biti odgovornost upravljavcev prenosnih omrežij.
In general regulators are better placed to define codes for commercial activities – e.g. balancing rules, congestion rules whereas technical codes should be the responsibility of TSOs.
Razvoj omrežnega kodeksa EU bi zagotovil, da se regionalni trgi ne bi razhajali.
Development of an EU grid code would ensure that regional markets would not drift apart.
Za zagotavljanje integriranega trga brez zapletov v širšem evropskem okviru je bistveno opredeliti regije in spodbuditi regionalno sodelovanje.
Defining regions and stimulating regional cooperation to ensure a smoothly integrated market in the wider European context is crucial.
Treba je povezati „energetske otoke“, na primer baltske države, ki niso povezane z omrežjem Zveze za koordinacijo prenosa električne energije.
It is essential to link up "energy islands" like the Baltic states which have not been connected to the UCTE (Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity) grid.
Tam potrebujemo spodbude, da bi se spoprijeli z ovirami, ki povzročajo zamude pri vzpostavljanju nove energetske uvozne in izvozne infrastrukture.
We need incentives in place to tackle the obstacles that cause delays in the creation of new energy import and export infrastructure.
Agencija bi zato pri svojem delu morala upoštevati tudi regionalno razsežnost.
The Agency should thus operate also with respect to the regional dimension.
VI – Lastništvo tretje države
VI - Third Country ownership
Energetika je nedvomno področje, kjer bi morali biti nacionalni in evropski interesi najvažnejši, zlasti kar zadeva zanesljivost oskrbe.
Energy is undoubtedly an area where national and European interests should be considered paramount in particular in the context of security of supply.
Podrobneje je treba pojasniti, kakšen bo vpliv te določbe v zvezi z sedanjimi naložbami tretjih držav v prenosne sisteme EU in kakšne bodo omejitve naložbenega sklada za nakup odvzete infrastrukture kot posledice zahtev ločevanja.
There is a further need for clarification on what the impact of this clause would be in relation to current third country investments in EU transmission systems, and the limitation on an investment pool for the buying up of divested infrastructure as a result of the unbundling requirements.
Poročevalka poudarja, da je njena prednostna opcija lastništvo infrastrukture z večinskim deležem javnega sektorja.
The rapporteur should point out that her preferred option for ownership of infrastructure would be a majority holding by the public sector.
o predlogu direktive Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o spremembi Direktive 2003/54/ES o skupnih pravilih za notranji trg z električno energijo
on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/54/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity
Evropski zakonodajalec je v svojem prvem energetskem svežnju leta 1996 sklenil, da bo postopoma liberaliziral takrat še monopolni evropski energetski sistem.
The European legislator decided in 1996, in its first "energy package", to gradually liberalise the then monopoly-based European energy system.
V drugem svežnju leta 2003 sta Parlament in Svet sklenila, da bosta razširila odpiranje trga na vse potrošnike do sredine leta 2007 in podala tudi podrobne določbe o regulativnem pristopu.
In its 2003 "second package" Parliament and Council decided to extend market opening to all consumers by mid-2007, thereby giving detailed provisions on the regulatory approach.
Vendar evropski trg za plin in elektriko na področju pravičnega dostopa do prenosnega omrežja, medsebojne povezanosti med nacionalnimi energetskimi trgi (čezmejna medsebojna povezanost) in vzdrževanja zanesljivosti oskrbe še vedno slabo deluje.
However, the European markets for gas and electricity still show dysfunctions concerning fair access to transmission grids, interconnection between national energy markets (cross border interconnections) and the maintenance of security of supply.
Aktualni predlog Komisije, tretji energetski sveženj, zato predlaga večje število ukrepov, s katerimi bi te pomanjkljivosti odpravili in napredovali k v celoti povezanemu notranjemu trgu.
The current Commission proposal, the "third energy package", therefore suggests several measures as to how to overcome these dysfunctions and to move forward in the creation of a fully integrated internal market.
Določbe o ločevanju
Unbundling provisions
Samoumevno je, da so pravne, funkcijske in upravljavske določbe o ločevanju iz drugega energetskega svežnja temeljnega pomena in jih je treba v vseh državah članicah učinkovito izvajati.
It goes without saying that legal, functional and management unbundling provisions, as provided by the "second energy package", are of fundamental importance and must be implemented effectively in all Member States.
Vendar se zdi, da je razprava o prihodnjem oblikovanju notranjega trga včasih preveč osredotočena na morebitne prednosti določb o ločevanju.
However, the discussion on the future design of the internal market sometimes seems to be centred too exclusively on the possible merits of unbundling provisions.
Vprašanje je, ali se ločevanje lastništva, ki ga izvajajo nekatere države članice in so ga razvile kot del nacionalne zakonodaje o konkurenci, lahko uporabi kot model za celotno EU.
It is doubtful if ownership unbundling (OU) as practiced in certain Member States, where it has been developed as part of national competition law, can be used as a model for the whole of the EU.
Presoja vpliva, ki jo je opravila Komisija, dejansko ne zagotavlja dovolj dokazov, ki bi potrdili, da je ločevanje lastništva dejansko najprimernejši ukrep za povečanje konkurenčnosti in oblikovanje delujočega notranjega trga.
In fact, the Commission impact assessment does not provide enough evidence to conclude that OU is really the most appropriate measure to both, increase competition and to create a functioning internal market.
Poleg tega bi lahko v državah članicah povzročilo težave glede varovanja lastninskih pravic, kot je to določeno v njihovih ustavah.
Furthermore, it could cause problems in Member States concerning the protection of property rights as laid down in their respective constitutions.
Zato predlagamo, da se državam članicam omogoči, da same izberejo regulativni model, ki je za njihovo gospodarstvo najprimernejši.
That is why we suggest giving Member States the option to choose a regulatory model which is most appropriate to their own economy.
Poleg ločevanja lastništva in neodvisnih upravljavcev sistemov – oba modela sta vključena v izvirni predlog Komisije – je predlagana celovita tretja možnost , ki so jo pripravile nekatere države članice.
Apart from OU and Independent Systems Operators (ISO), the two models contained in the original Commission proposal, a comprehensive third option , elaborated by several Member States, is proposed.
To bi moralo voditi k notranjemu trgu, v katerem bi lahko obstajalo več različnih modelov hkrati.
This should lead to an internal market where different models could coexist.
Agencija za sodelovanje energetskih regulatorjev bi v tesnem sodelovanju z nacionalnimi regulativnimi organi, kot tudi z nacionalnimi organi in organi za konkurenco na ravni EU strogo nadzorovala vse modele.
All models would be subject to strict regulation at EU level through the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) in close cooperation with the National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs) as well as the national and EU competition authorities.
S tem pristopom bi lahko zagotovili pregleden in pravičen dostop do omrežja in sprostili energetski trg EU.
This approach could ensure transparent and fair access to the grid and provide a liberalized EU energy market.
Pregleden dostop do prenosnih omrežij in naložbenih možnosti
Transparent access to the transmission networks and investment opportunities
Upravljavci prenosnih omrežij bi morali biti odgovorni za pregledne in nediskriminacijske postopke priključevanja v omrežje.
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) should be responsible for transparent non-discriminatory procedures for connection to the grids.
Nacionalni regulativni organi bi te postopke morali odobriti.
These procedures should be approved by NRAs.
Upravljavci prenosnih omrežij bi morali priskrbeti vse potrebne informacije podjetjem, ki želijo povezati nove elektrarne (tudi jedrske), omogočiti prenos elektrike prek svojih omrežij ali vlagati v povezave med prenosnimi omrežji (in s tem krepiti zanesljivost oskrbe).
TSOs should be obliged to provide all necessary information to all interested companies seeking to connect new power plants (including nuclear ones), transport the electricity through the TSO's grids or invest in the transmission systems interconnections (thereby enhancing security of supply).
Regionalno sodelovanje bi bilo dobro spodbujati, da bi usklajevanje med nacionalnimi regulativnimi organi in agencijo za sodelovanje energetskih regulatorjev znotraj regij in med njimi potekalo bolje in gladko.
Regional cooperation could be promoted for better and smoother coordination within and between the regions by NRAs and ACER.
Uravnotežen zakonodajni pristop: evropsko omrežje upravljavcev prenosnega omrežja, nacionalni regulativni organi, agencija za sodelovanje energetskih regulatorjev, Komisija
A balanced regulatory approach: ENTSO, NRAs, ACER, Commission
Ustrezno regulativno ravnovesje je izjemno pomembno pri oblikovanju notranjega energetskega trga, zlasti če se države članice ne odločijo za model ločevanja lastništva.
The right regulatory balance, in particular if Members States opt for models other than OU, plays the most important role in the creation of an internal energy market.
Za zaščito javnega interesa je bistveno, da so nacionalni regulativni organi in agencija za sodelovanje energetskih regulatorjev kar najbolj neodvisni od vpliva politike ali gospodarstva.
In order to protect the public interest it seems crucial that the NRAs as well as ACER dispose of the highest degree possible of independence, bereft of any political or business interference.
Nadalje je treba zagotoviti skladnost uredbenega modela in jasno razdeliti pristojnosti in odgovornosti.
Furthermore, it must be guaranteed that the regulatory model is coherent, disposing of a clear-cut repartition of competencies and responsibilities.
V zvezi s tem predlog Komisije ne ponuja zadovoljivega odgovora: po eni strani je za agencijo za sodelovanje energetskih regulatorjev predvidena zgolj posvetovalna vloga, kar bi močno omejilo sprejemanje sklepov, ki bi bili pravno obvezujoči za tretje strani.
It is in this regard that the Commission proposal does not give a satisfactory answer: It foresees, on the one hand, to assign ACER an almost purely advisory role, leaving it very limited scope to take individual decisions which are legally binding on third parties.
Po drugi strani pa bi imelo evropsko omrežje upravljavcev prenosnega omrežja široke pristojnosti, kar bi pomenilo, da bi se upravljavci prenosnih omrežij skoraj regulirali sami, kar pa je vloga, ki je glede na njihove številne dokumente o stališčih niso pripravljeni sprejeti.
On the other hand however, very wide scope is given to the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO), which means that TSOs are assigned a role of "para self-regulation", a role which TSOs, following their various position papers, are not inclined to assume.
Celotni pristop vodi k nejasnemu in neuravnovešenemu uredbenemu okviru, v katerem ima agencija za sodelovanje energetskih regulatorjev šibko vlogo v primerjavi s Komisijo in evropskim omrežjem upravljavcev prenosnega omrežja.
The entire approach leads to a regulatory framework which is unclear and unbalanced, leaving ACER in a very weak position vis-à-vis both, the Commission and ENTSO.
S stališča Parlamenta je tudi vprašljivo, ali je primerno, da postopek komitologije obravnava tako veliko število bistvenih upravnih vprašanj, kot je to predvidela Komisija.
Finally, it is questionable from Parliament's point of view whether, as foreseen by the Commission, such a big number of key regulatory issues should be dealt with by Comitology procedure.
Regionalni pristop
The Regional Approach
Videti je, kot da Komisija v svojem predlogu ne podpira povsem ideje o regionalnih trgih.
In its proposal the Commission does not seem to back the idea of Regional markets wholeheartedly.
Vendar bi regionalni trgi lahko bili smotrn vmesni korak k oblikovanju v celoti integriranega evropskega energetskega trga.
However, regional markets could be a viable intermediary step to the creation of a fully integrated European energy market.
Vzpostavitev regionalnih upravljavcev omrežij bi bilo močan dejavnik pri pridobivanju vlaganj v prenosne sisteme in zlasti v čezmejne povezave, kar bi izboljšalo zanesljivost oskrbe.
The creation of Regional Systems Operators (RSOs) would be a strong vector to provide investment for transmission systems and, in particular, cross border interconnections, thereby improving security of supply.
Regionalni upravljavci omrežij bi morali poskrbeti za regionalne načrte za vlaganja, ki bi jih nadzorovali nacionalni regulativni organi in agencija za sodelovanje energetskih regualtorjev, kar bi zagotovilo učinkovito usklajevanje.
RSOs should provide regional investment plans which should be monitored by NRAs and ACER to guarantee effective coordination.
Da bi se vloga regionalnih trgov okrepila, bi lahko agencija za sodelovanje energetskih regulatorjev ustanovila regionalne odbore (podobne odborom njene predhodnice, Skupine evropskih regulatorjev za električno energijo in plin (ERGEG)), ki bi bili pristojni za regionalni regulativni nadzor.
In order to enhance the role of Regional Markets, ACER could establish "regional committees" (similar to the ones of the Agency's forerunner, ERGEG) which could be responsible for "Regional regulatory supervision".
(7) Učinkovito ločevanje lahko zagotovi samo odprava notranjih spodbud za vertikalno integrirana podjetja, da diskriminirajo konkurente , kar zadeva dostop do omrežja in naložbe.
(7) Only the removal of the inherent incentive for vertically integrated companies to discriminate against competitors as regards network access and investment can ensure effective unbundling.
Ločevanje lastništva, pri katerem se lastnik omrežja imenuje za upravljavca omrežja in je neodvisen od kakršnih koli interesov v zvezi z dobavo in proizvodnjo, je očitno najbolj učinkovit in stabilen način za razreševanje notranjih navzkrižij interesov in zagotavljanje zanesljivosti oskrbe.
Ownership unbundling, which implies the network owner being appointed as the network operator and being independent from any supply and production interests, is clearly the most effective and stable way to solve the inherent conflict of interest and to ensure security of supply.
Zato je Evropski parlament v svoji Resoluciji o možnostih za notranji trg s plinom in električno energijo, sprejeti 10. julija 2007, ločevanje lastništva na ravni prenosa opredelil kot najučinkovitejše orodje, ki na nediskriminatoren način spodbuja naložbe v infrastrukturo, pošten dostop do omrežja za nove udeležence in preglednost na trgu.
For this reason, the European Parliament in its Resolution on Prospects for the internal gas and electricity market adopted on 10 July 2007 referred to ownership unbundling at transmission level as the most effective tool to promote investments in infrastructures in a non-discriminatory way, fair access to the grid for new entrants and transparency in the market.
Od držav članic je zato treba zahtevati, da zagotovijo, da ista oseba ali osebe ne morejo izvajati nadzora nad podjetjem za proizvodnjo ali dobavo in hkrati imeti deleža v ali uveljavljati pravic nad upravljavcem prenosnega omrežja ali prenosnim omrežjem, vključno s pomočjo pravic manjšinskih delničarjev do blokiranja odločitev strateškega pomena, kot so naložbe.
Member States should therefore be required to ensure that the same person or persons are not entitled to exercise control, including through minority blocking rights on decisions of strategic importance such as investments, over a production or supply undertaking and, at the same time, hold any interest in or exercise any right over a transmission system operator or transmission system.
Nadzor nad upravljavcem prenosnega omrežja mora izključevati možnost imetja deleža v podjetju za dobavo ali uveljavljanja kakršne koli pravice nad njim.
Conversely, control over a transmission system operator should preclude the possibility of holding any interest in or exercising any right over a supply undertaking.
Ločevanje lastništva, pri katerem se lastnik omrežja imenuje za upravljavca omrežja in je neodvisen od kakršnih koli interesov v zvezi z dobavo in proizvodnjo, je učinkovit in stabilen način za razreševanje notranjih navzkrižij interesov in zagotavljanje zanesljivosti oskrbe.
Ownership unbundling, which implies the network owner being appointed as the network operator and being independent from any supply and production interests, is an effective and stable way to solve the inherent conflict of interest and to ensure security of supply.
Zato je Evropski parlament v svoji Resoluciji o možnostih za notranji trg s plinom in električno energijo, sprejeti 10. julija 2007, ločevanje lastništva na ravni prenosa opredelil kot najučinkovitejše orodje, ki na nediskriminatoren način spodbuja naložbe v infrastrukturo, pošten dostop do omrežja za nove udeležence in preglednost na trgu.
For this reason, the European Parliament in its Resolution on prospects for the internal gas and electricity market adopted on 10 July 2007 referred to ownership unbundling at transmission level as the most effective tool to promote investments in infrastructures in a non-discriminatory way, fair access to the grid for new entrants and transparency in the market.
Tudi po ločevanju lastništva ostaja omrežje naravni monopol, ki ga je treba uravnavati.
Even after its ownership has been unbundled, a network remains a natural monopoly that has to be regulated.
(10a) Pri izpolnjevanju določil glede učinkovitega in uspešnega ločevanja lahko vertikalno integrirana podjetja ohranijo lastništvo nad omrežnimi sredstvi in hkrati zagotavljajo učinkovito ločevanje interesov, če podjetje omrežja opravlja vse dejavnosti upravljavca omrežij ter če se uvedejo podrobna ureditev in obsežni regulativni kontrolni mehanizmi.
(10a) Assuming that they comply with the provisions on effective and efficient corporate unbundling, vertically integrated companies can continue to own network assets while ensuring an effective separation of interests, provided that the network company performs all the functions of a network operator and necessary provision is made for detailed regulation and comprehensive regulatory oversight mechanisms.
Državam članicam je treba zagotoviti tretjo praktično možnost, ki ne posega bistveno v strukture lastništva v državah članicah in omogoča vertikalno integriranim podjetjem, da ob upoštevanju strogih pogojev in obveznosti še naprej skupaj upravljajo omrežje.
Member States must be allowed a third practicable option which, without encroaching massively on their ownership structures, would enable vertically integrated companies, assuming that they satisfied stringent conditions and requirements, to continue operating their networks within their integrated set-up.
(11) Če je podjetje, ki ima v lasti prenosni sistem, del vertikalno integriranega podjetja, morajo imeti države članice možnost izbire med ločevanjem lastništva in, kot odstopanjem, določitvijo upravljavcev omrežij, ki niso vezani na interese v zvezi z dobavo in proizvodnjo.
(11) Where the undertaking owning a transmission system is part of a vertically integrated undertaking, Member States should therefore be given a choice between ownership unbundling and, as a derogation, setting up system operators which are independent from supply and generation interests.
Popolno učinkovitost rešitve v zvezi z določitvijo neodvisnega upravljavca omrežja je treba zagotoviti s posebnimi dodatnimi pravili.
The full effectiveness of the independent system operator solution needs to be assured by way of specific additional rules.