natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
V skladu s pričakovanim je na trenutke burna razprava s kolegi iz Odbora za ribištvo (ob najmanj treh priložnostih – prva izmenjava mnenj, predstavitev delovnega dokumenta in omenjena javna predstavitev) zaradi nacionalnih vidikov in drugačne politične usmerjenosti na koncu obogatila moj pogled.
Of course, discussions – some of them heated – with my fellow members of the Committee on Fisheries on at least three occasions (at the initial exchange of views, at the presentation of the working document and at the April hearing) also helped to fill out my own perceptions by making me aware of different national perspectives and political sensitivities.
To sem skušal upoštevati v osnutku poročila.
I have done my best to take these into account in my draft report.
Glavne smernice tega osnutka, ki ustrezajo glavnim temam, obravnavanim na omenjenih srečanjih, so:
The document includes proposals on a number of fronts, addressing the major themes that emerged from my research, namely:
· vprašanja, povezana z do sedaj veljavno in izvajano skupno trgovinsko politiko na področju ribiških proizvodov in proizvodov iz ribogojstva ter z medsebojno odvisnostjo med odločitvami, ki se sprejemajo v tem okviru, in trudom, da se ohrani rentabilen in odgovoren evropski ribiški sektor,
· questions about the common commercial policy as it has been and is currently applied in respect of fishery and aquaculture products, and about how far commercial policy decisions are consistent with the retention of a viable and responsible fisheries sector in Europe;
· osnovno vprašanje, kako zagotoviti, da bodo ribiški proizvodi in proizvodi iz ribogojstva, ki se uvažajo v EU v vse večjih količinah, dejansko izpolnjevali prav take zahteve, kot jih mora izpolnjevati proizvodnja v Skupnosti, zlasti okoljske, socialne, zdravstvene in kakovostne,
· the basic question of whether the fishery and aquaculture products being imported into the Union in ever growing quantities really meet the same standards that are required of EU products, especially environmental, social, health and quality standards;
· vprašanje nujne reforme skupne ureditve trgov v sektorju ribiških proizvodov in proizvodov iz ribogojstva, kjer so mehanizmi, stari približno deset let, zastareli in ne ustrezajo novim izzivom, ki so zlasti posledica postopnega ukinjanja carinskih dajatev in vse večje konkurence uvoza,
· the question of urgently needed reform in the common organisation of the market in the sector, as the current system – now some 10 years old – no longer seems appropriate in the face of the new challenges, especially those resulting from the gradual removal of customs duties and the mounting onslaught of competition from imports;
· vprašanje obveščanja potrošnika na splošno in natančneje evropskega znaka za okolje za ribiške proizvode in proizvode iz ribogojstva.
· the question of consumer information generally and, in particular, of European ecolabelling for fishery and aquaculture products.
Tem temam sem dodal še nekaj posebnih ugotovitev o ribogojstvu, da bi poudaril zaostanek EU na tem področju v primerjavi z drugimi regijami sveta, kar je eden od razlogov, zakaj je EU vse bolj odvisna od uvoza, ter opozoril na poročilo Milana v zvezi z ukrepi, potrebnimi za odpravo te zamude.
I have also addressed some specifically aquaculture-related issues, underscoring the fact that the Union’s backwardness in this sector by comparison with other regions of the world is one of the reasons for its growing dependence on imports, and referring to the Milana report for an outline of measures that the EU needs to take in seeking to make up some of the lost ground.
Pripravljavec mnenja: Yannick Jadot
Draftsman: Yannick Jadot
Odbor za mednarodno trgovino poziva Odbor za ribištvo kot pristojni odbor, da v svoj predlog resolucije vključi naslednje pobude:
The Committee on International Trade calls on the Committee on Fisheries, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:
o prejemkih direktorjev javnih družb in politiki prejemkov v sektorju finančnih storitev
on remuneration of directors of listed companies and remuneration policies in the financial services sector
MNENJE Odbora za zaposlovanje in socialne zadeve ..................................13
OPINION of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs ..............14
– ob upoštevanju priporočila Komisije z dne 30. aprila 2009 o plačnih politikah v sektorju finančnih storitev (C(2009) 3159),
– having regard to the Commission Recommendation of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services sector (C(2009) 3159),
– ob upoštevanju priporočila Komisije z dne 30. aprila 2009 o dopolnitvi priporočil 2004/913/ES in 2005/162/ES glede sistema prejemkov direktorjev javnih družb (C(2009) 3177),
– having regard to the Commission Recommendation of 30 April 2009 complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies (C(2009) 3177),
– ob upoštevanju predloga Komisije za Direktivo Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o spremembi direktiv 2006/48/ES in 2006/49/ES v zvezi s kapitalskimi zahtevami za trgovalno knjigo in za dodatna listinjenja ter v zvezi z nadzorniškim pregledom politik prejemkov ( KOM(2009)0362 ),
– having regard the Commission proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the trading book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies ( COM(2009)0362 ),
– ob upoštevanju načel Foruma za finančno stabilnost z dne 2. aprila 2009 za premišljeno prakso nadomestil in priloženih izvedbenih standardov z dne 25. septembra 2009,
– having regard to the Financial Stability Forum's (FSB) Principles for Sound Compensation Practices of 2 April 2009 and the accompanying Implementation Standards of 25 September 2009,
– ob upoštevanju načel na visoki ravni za politiko prejemkov Odbora evropskih bančnih nadzornikov (CEBS) z dne 20. aprila 2009,
– having regard to the Committee of European Banking Supervisors' (CEBS) High-level Principles for Remuneration Policies of 20 April 2009,
– ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora evropskih bančnih nadzornikov o nacionalnem izvajanju njegovih načel na visoki ravni za politiko prejemkov z dne 11. junija 2010,
– having regard to the CEBS report on national implementation of CEBS High-level Principles for Remuneration Policies of 11 June 2010,
– ob upoštevanju načel za nadomestila in metodologije za oceno standardov, ki jih je januarja 2010 predlagal Baselski odbor za bančni nadzor,
– having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's Compensation Principles and Standards Assessment Methodology of January 2010,
– ob upoštevanju dokumenta Organizacije za gospodarsko sodelovanje in razvoj (OECD) iz februarja 2010 o upravljanju družb in finančni krizi – sklepi in novi primeri dobre prakse za boljše izvajanje načel,
– having regard to the OECD's paper of February 2010 on Corporate governance and the financial crisis - conclusions and emerging good practices to enhance implementation of the Principles,
– ob upoštevanju svoje resolucije z dne 18. maja 2010 o deontoloških vprašanjih glede upravljanja družb
– having regard to its resolution of 18 May 2010 on deontological questions related to companies management
Sprejeta besedila P7_TA(2010)0165 . ,
Texts adopted, P7_TA(2010)0165 . ,
– ob upoštevanju zelene knjige Komisije z dne 2. junija 2010 o korporativnem upravljanju finančnih institucij in politiki prejemkov (KOM(2010)284),
– having regard to the Commission Green Paper of 2 June 2010 on corporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration policies (COM(2010)284),
– ob upoštevanju poročila Komisije z dne 2. junija 2010 o izvajanju Priporočila Komisije 2009/385/ES (Priporočilo iz leta 2009 o prejemkih direktorjev) o dopolnitvi priporočil 2004/913/ES in 2005/162/ES glede sistema prejemkov direktorjev javnih družb v državah članicah EU (KOM(2010)285),
– having regard to the Commission report of 2 June 2010 on the application by Member States of the EU of the Commission 2009/385/EC Recommendation (2009 Recommendation of directors' remuneration) complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime for remuneration of directors of listed companies (COM(2010)285),
– ob upoštevanju poročila Komisije z dne 2. junija 2010 o izvajanju Priporočila Komisije 2009/384/ES o plačnih politikah v sektorju finančnih storitev v državah članicah EU,
– having regard to the Commission report of 2 June 2010 on the application by Member States of the EU of the Commission 2009/384/EC Recommendation on remuneration policies in the financial services sector (COM(2010)286),
– ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve ter mnenja Odbora za zaposlovanje in socialne zadeve (A7 0208/2010),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs ( A7‑0208/2010 ),
A. ker je bila v finančnem sektorju in nekaterih javnih družbah politika prejemkov za kategorije zaposlenih, ki s svojo poklicno dejavnostjo bistveno vplivajo na profil tveganja podjetja ali družbe, takšna, da je spodbujala transakcije za kratkoročno dobičkonosnost, kot posledica pa so se čedalje bolj tvegani poslovni modeli razvili do take mere, da so bili v škodo delavcev, varčevalcev in vlagateljev ter trajnostne rasti na splošno,
A. whereas, in the financial sector and in some listed companies, remuneration policies for categories of staff whose professional activity has a material impact on the company’s risk profile have been such as to encourage transactions seeking short-term profits, with increasingly risky business models being developed to that end, to the detriment of workers, savers and investors, and sustainable growth in general,
B. ker je Komisija v svoji zeleni knjigi o korporativnem upravljanju finančnih institucij in politiki prejemkov poudarila, da so bile finančne institucije zaradi pomanjkanja učinkovitih kontrolnih mehanizmov izpostavljene prevelikim tveganjem in da bi bilo treba pri korporativnem upravljanju upoštevati stabilnost finančnega sistema, ki je odvisen od dejanj številnih udeležencev,
B. whereas the Commission's Green Paper on corporate governance in financial institutions and remuneration policies stresses that the lack of effective control mechanisms contributed significantly to excessive risk-taking on the part of financial institutions, and that corporate governance should take account of the stability of the financial system, which depends on the actions of many players,
C. ker so neprimerne strukture prejemkov nekaterih finančnih institucij, ki spodbujajo prekomerna in nepremišljena tveganja, prispevale k kopičenju tveganj, zaradi katerih je prišlo do sedanje finančne, gospodarske in socialne krize ter so zato glavna skrb oblikovalcev politike in regulatorjev,
C. whereas inappropriate remuneration structures of some financial institutions that incentivise excessive and imprudent risk-taking played a role in the accumulation of risks that led to the current financial, economic and social crisis, and are therefore a major issue of concern for policy-makers and regulators,
D. ker morajo finančne institucije kot del svoje družbene odgovornosti na celovit način upoštevati družbeno okolje, v katerem delujejo, pa tudi interese vseh sodelujočih strani, na primer strank, delničarjev in zaposlenih,
D. whereas financial institutions must take into account, as part of their corporate social responsibility, the social environment in which the institution operates, as well as the interests of all of parties involved, such as its clients, shareholders and employees, in an integrated manner,
E. ker so se na svetovni, evropski in nacionalni ravni začele izvajati številne pobude za obravnavanje sporne prakse prejemkov in ker je bistveno, da se na svetovni ravni sprejme usklajen pristop ter tako zagotovijo enaki konkurenčni pogoji, pa tudi globalna konkurenčnost Evrope in spodbujanje trajnostne in poštene konkurence med trgi,
E. whereas numerous initiatives have been launched at the global, European and national levels to address the issue of problematic remuneration practices, and whereas a globally coordinated approach is essential in order not only to guarantee a level playing field, but also to ensure the global competitiveness of Europe and to promote sustainable and fair competition between market places,
F. ker je v načelih premišljene prakse nadomestil, ki jih je sprejel Forum za finančno stabilnost in so jih potrdili voditelji skupine G-20, opredeljenih pet elementov za premišljeno prakso prejemkov in ker je treba upoštevati pomen spodbujanja sočasnega izvajanja teh načel,
F. whereas the FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices, which were endorsed by the G20 leaders, set out five elements for sound remuneration practices, and having regard to the importance of promoting simultaneous implementation of these principles,
G. ker je treba dogovorjena načela in že sprejete ukrepe glede politike prejemkov nenehno pregledovati in po potrebi prilagoditi, da se po vsej Evropi ustvarijo enotne razmere in da se zagotovi konkurenčnost evropske finančne industrije na svetovni ravni,
G. whereas the agreed principles and measures already taken in respect of remuneration policy should be continually reviewed and, where necessary, adapted in order to create uniform conditions throughout Europe and secure the global competitiveness of the European finance industry,
H. ker so različne znanstvene študije in praktične izkušnje pokazale, da je vpliv nezavezujočih priporočil na politiko prejemkov omejen, zaradi česar je treba uvesti močnejši instrument, ki bo zagotovil spoštovanje teh načel,
H. whereas several scientific studies, as well as practical experience, have demonstrated the limited impact of non-binding recommendations on remuneration policies, which underlines the need to put in place a stronger instrument in order to ensure respect for the principles,
I. ker je Komisija v svojem poročilu navedla, da je kljub spodbudi, ki jo je dala kriza, za izvedbo korenite reforme na področju plačnih politik, le 16 držav članic delno ali v celoti izvedlo priporočilo Komisije,
I. whereas the Commission report states that notwithstanding the momentum towards substantial reform in the area of remuneration policies provided by the crisis, only 16 Member States have fully or partially applied the Commission Recommendation,
1. pozdravlja pobude, ki sta jih sprejela Komisija in Forum za finančno stabilnost glede politike prejemkov v finančnem sektorju in javnih družbah na splošno; vendar meni, da bi bilo treba pri uvajanju dodatne regulacije za finančne institucije na področju politike prejemkov in kapitalskih zahtev sorazmerno upoštevati velikost finančne družbe in torej prispevek njenih dejavnosti k sistemskemu tveganju;
Welcomes the initiatives taken by the Commission and the FSB on remuneration policies in the financial sector and listed companies in general; takes the view, however, that the financial undertaking's size, and thus its activity's contribution to the systemic risk, should be taken proportionally into account when imposing additional regulation in matters of remuneration policy and capital requirements on financial institutions;
Učinkovito upravljanje nadomestil
Effective governance of compensation
4. poudarja, da mora imeti komisija za prejemke dostop do vsebine pogodb, s tem da so pogodbe, ki jih pregleduje, zasnovane tako, da omogočajo kaznovanje dejanj hude malomarnosti z zmanjšanjem plačil.
Stresses that a remuneration committee must have access to the subject matter of contracts, with contracts under the scrutiny of this committee designed in a way that makes it possible to punish acts of gross negligence by payment deductions.
Prav tako je treba finančne institucije pozvati k uporabi malusa, kar pomeni, da je treba vrniti nadomestilo za uspešnost, če se ugotovi, da je bila uspešnost nizka;
Furthermore, financial institutions should be urged to make use of a malus, i.e. a return of performance-related compensation as a result of the discovery of poor performance;
Meni, da bi se morali direktorji in člani odbora izogibati temu, da bi bili istočasno v odborih drugih družb, če obstaja možnost, da bi prišlo do navzkrižja interesov;
Takes the view that directors and board members should avoid simultaneously sitting on the boards of other companies if there is a potential for any conflict of interest occurring;
7. poudarja, da bi morala nadomestila članov neizvršnega odbora vsebovati le fiksno plačo, ne pa plače po učinku ali na podlagi tečaja delnic;
Stresses that non-executive board members' compensation should only consist in fixed pay and should not include performance- or share-based pay;
9. poudarja, da bi prejemki morali biti prilagojeni vsem vrstam tveganj, sorazmerni z izidi tveganj in občutljivi na časovni vidik sedanjih in možnih tveganj, ki vplivajo na splošno uspešnost in stabilnost družbe;
Underlines that remuneration should be adjusted for all types of risks, symmetrical with risk outcomes, and sensitive to the time horizon of current and potential risks that have an impact on the overall performance and stability of the firm;
21. poudarja, da zavarovanje za direktorje in uradnike v primeru odgovornosti, ki ščiti direktorje družb, uradnike in višje vodstvo pred zahtevki zaradi tveganih ali malomarnih odločitev ali ukrepov, ki so jih sprejeli pri upravljanju poslov, ni skladno z vzdržnim upravljanjem tveganj na področju prejemkov;
Stresses that directors’ and officers’ liability insurance designed to protect companies’ directors, officers and senior managers against claims arising from risky or negligent decisions and actions taken whilst managing their business are not in line with sustainable risk management in the field of remuneration;
Uravnotežena struktura sistema prejemkov
Balanced structure of the remuneration package
27. predlaga, da se odpravnina („zlata padala“) v primerih predčasne prekinitve pogodb omeji na največ dve leti fiksne sestavine direktorskih plač in da se odpravi v primeru neizpolnjevanja obveznosti ali prostovoljnega odhoda;
Suggests setting an upper limit of the equivalent of two years of the fixed component of directors' pay on severance pay ('golden parachutes') in cases of early termination, and banning severance pay in cases of non-performance or voluntary departure;
Učinkovit nadzor in udeležba zainteresiranih strani
Effective supervisory oversight and involvement by stakeholders
35. poziva nadzornike v finančnem sektorju, naj izvajajo načela za nadomestila in metodologijo za oceno standardov, ki jih je januarja 2010 predlagal Baselski odbor za bančni nadzor;
Urges supervisors in the financial sector to implement the Compensation Principles and Standards Assessment Methodology proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in January 2010;
43. poziva Komisijo, naj spodbudi države članice, da bi javne družbe in družbe za finančne storitve opomnile na njihovo družbeno odgovornost, omadeževano javno podobo in potrebo po dobrem zgledu v mednarodni družbi blaginje;
Calls on the Commission to encourage the Member States to remind listed companies and financial services companies of their social responsibility, their tarnished image and the need to set a good example in a prosperous international society;
Sedanjo finančno in gospodarsko krizo so med drugim povzročila prekomerna tveganja, ki so jih prevzemale številne družbe v finančnem sektorju.
The financial and economic crisis we find ourselves in was caused inter alia by excessive risk taking by a very wide variety of firms in the financial sector.
Investicijske banke, banke in hedge skladi niso prevzemali prekomernih tveganj le na ravni posameznih družb, temveč so na splošno in še v večji meri povečali sistemsko tveganje.
Investment banks, banks, hedge funds were all involved not just in building up excessive risks at the level of individual firms but even more so in the aggregate build up of systemic risk.
Odločitve za prevzem takih tveganj so sprejemali odbori in predsedniki uprav, ki so te družbe vodili, ter uslužbenci, ki so v njih delali.
The decisions to take on these risks were driven by the boards and CEOs who ran these firms and the employees who worked for them.
Njihova motivacija za takšno ravnanje je bila preprosta:
Their motivation for doing this was simple:
– čim večja so tveganja, ki jih družba prevzame, tem večji je možni dobiček,
- The higher the risks a firm takes, the greater the profitability is likely to be.
– čim večji je dobiček družbe, tem večja so izplačana nadomestila.
- The greater the profitability of a firm, the greater the compensation paid.
Vendar se po ugotovitvah pravosodnega ministra države New York Andrewa Cuoma višina vseh izplačanih nadomestil z zmanjšanjem dobičkov ni občutno spremenila, saj so vedno davkoplačevalci tisti, ki pokrivajo razlike.
However, the level of overall compensation paid did not vary significantly as profits diminished, as demonstrated by the Attorney General for the State of New York, Andrew Cuomo; indeed, there is always the taxpayers to bail out.
S tem so uslužbenci finančnega sektorja v obliki premij nagrajeni za prekomerna tveganja, ki jih nalagajo družbam, v katerih delajo.
This makes that employees in the financial sector get the upside, in the form of bonuses, of the excessive risks they load on to the firms they work for.
Zanje je edina slabost ta, da so lahko odpuščeni in tako ne prejmejo nobenega nadomestila.
Their personal downside is limited to being fired, the equivalent of zero compensation.
Negativne posledice pa se kažejo zunaj in znotraj družb, v katerih delajo.
The downside instead falls within and outside of the firms they work for.
Poročevalec je prepričan, da bi morali razmisliti o strukturah spodbujanja za posamezne uslužbence, da se kriza ne bi ponovila in da bi spremenili takšno nelogično razmišljanje.
To make sure such a crisis will not happen again and to make change these illogic reasoning, the rapporteur is convinced the incentive structures faced by the individual employee should be looked at.
Zato je treba sprejeti ukrepe za zmanjšanje tveganj in za preoblikovanje strukture spodbujanja.
Therefore, steps have to be taken to decrease the risks taken and to redesign the incentive structure.
Samo tako bi lahko dobičke finančnih institucij in nadomestila članom odbora in predsednikom uprav zmanjšali na sprejemljivo raven.
Only in this way, the profits of the financial institutions and the compensations paid to the board members and CEOs could be reduced till an acceptable level.
Od začetka krize je bilo sprejetih več nacionalnih pobud za omejitev politike prejemkov in prekomernih premij, in sicer v različnih oblikah (pravila ravnanja, davčni ukrepi, zgornja meja plač, okrepitev pravil o upravljanju družb itd.).
Several national initiatives have been taken since the start of the crisis in order to moderate some remuneration policies and some bonuses excesses and this under different forms (code of conduct tax measures, salary caps, strengthen of corporate governance rules etc).
Poročevalec pozdravlja te pobude in meni, da so koristne.
The rapporteur welcomes these initiatives and considers them as useful.
Meni pa tudi, da je treba za politiko prejemkov v finančnem sektorju in javnih družbah sprejeti evropsko pobudo, da bi preprečili neusklajen pristop in ustvarili enake konkurenčne pogoje.
However, in order to avoid a non-coordinated approach and to create a level playing field, the rapporteur is of the opinion that a European initiative has to be taken on remuneration policy in the financial sector and listed companies.
Zaradi tega so za prejemke direktorjev v finančnem sektorju in javnih družbah potrebni usklajeni evropski ukrepi.
For these reasons, a coordinated European action on remuneration of directors in the financial sector and in listed companies is needed.