natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ta intelektualna pooblastila se med drugim zanašajo na neodvisnost, ustrezno kadrovanje in zadostna proračunska sredstva, namenjena Evropskemu odboru za sistemska tveganja in evropskemu nadzornemu organu.
Such intellectual authority relies, among other, on the ESRB and the ESA’s independence, adequate staffing and budget endowment.
Ali glede Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja menite, da obstaja potencial za navzkrižje interesov z mandatom Evropske centralne banke (ECB) glede denarne politike?
As far as the ESRB is concerned, do you see a potential conflict of interest with the ECB mandate in relation to monetary policy?
Ne vidim nikakršnega navzkrižja interesov.
I see no conflict of interest.
Politične odgovornosti ECB in Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja se jasno razlikujejo.
The policy responsibilities of the ECB and the ESRB are clearly distinct.
Glavni cilj ECB je ohranjanje stabilnosti cen na euroobmočju.
The ECB’s primary objective is to maintain price stability in the euro area.
Poleg tega prispeva k „nemotenemu vodenju politik pristojnih oblasti glede …. stabilnosti finančnega sistema“ in spodbuja nemoteno delovanje tržnih infrastruktur.
Furthermore it contributes “to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to… the stability of the financial system” and promotes the smooth functioning of market infrastructures.
Evropski odbor za sistemska tveganja pa je pristojen za makrobonitetni nadzor nad celotnim finančnim sistemom EU in ugotavlja tveganja za finančno stabilnost ter po potrebi izdaja opozorila o tveganjih in priporočila za ukrepe za odpravo teh tveganj.
The ESRB instead is responsible for macro-prudential oversight across the EU’s financial system, identifies risks to financial stability and, where necessary, issues risk warnings and recommendations for action to address such risks.
Naloga, da uporablja monetarno politiko za ohranjevanje stabilnosti cen, makrobonitetno orodje (ki ga je treba še dodatno razviti) pa za obravnavo tveganj za finančni sistem, je jasna in učinkovita.
There is a clear and efficient assignment to use monetary policy to maintain price stability and a (to be further developed) macro-prudential tool set to address risks to the financial system.
Ob tem je treba priznati, da stabilnosti cen in finančne stabilnosti ni mogoče analizirati neodvisno ene od druge.
Having said this, one has to acknowledge that price stability and financial stability cannot be analysed independently from each other.
Dolgoročno gledano stabilnost cen prispeva k finančni stabilnosti, medtem ko je finančna stabilnost pogoj, da lahko centralna banka ohranja stabilnost cen.
In the long run, price stability contributes to financial stability, while financial stability is a prerequisite for the central bank’s ability to maintain price stability.
Torej se cilji ECB in Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja vzajemno krepijo.
Thus both, the ECB’s and the ESRB’s objectives, mutually reinforce each other.
Vseeno pa lahko pomislimo na veliko situacij, v katerih uporaba instrumentov monetarne politike vpliva na finančno stabilnost in obratno, ko instrumenti makrobonitene politike vplivajo na inflacijo.
Nevertheless, one could also think of situations, in which the use of monetary policy instruments affects financial stability and vice versa in which macro-prudential policy instruments have an impact on inflation.
Prepričan sem, da je neodvisnost ECB in Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja zagotovilo, da bodo njuni politični instrumenti usmerjeni k ciljem, za katere so bila ta orodja načrtovana.
I am confident that the independence of the ECB and ESRB will make sure that the respective policy instruments will be geared to the objectives for which the tools have been designed.
Poleg tega je skoraj po definiciji zajamčena ustrezna zastopanost guvernerjev centralnih bank v Evropskem odboru za sistemska tveganja in nujni pretok informacij o makroekonomskih razmerah in tveganjih za finančno stabilnost.
Furthermore, due to representation of central bank governors in the ESRB, the necessary information flows with respect to both the macroeconomic situation and financial stability risks is guaranteed quasi by definition.
Celo če makrobonitetna politika ne bi bila uspešna (če bi bila neučinkovita ali pa jo pristojni organi ne bi izvajali na zadovoljiv način) za centralno banko zaradi dolgoročnega usklajevanja cen in finančne stabilnosti ni dolgoročnega nasprotja interesov (glej 6. vprašanje).
Even when macro-prudential policy would fail (in the sense of being either ineffective or being implemented in an insufficient manner by the competent authorities), there is no long run conflict for the central bank due to the alignment of price and financial stability in the long run (see question 6).
Morda se bo banka v tem primeru morala kratko- do srednjeročno sprijazniti z naraščajočimi finančnimi neravnovesji in začasno odstopati od svoje kvantitativne opredelitve stabilnost cen (na primer rahlo zmanjšana inflacija cen življenjskih potrebščin v obdobju hitro naraščajih cen premoženja).
In the short to medium run, the central bank in that case might have to “lean against the wind” of growing financial imbalances and accept to live with a temporary deviation from its quantitative definition of price stability (e.g. slightly lower consumer price inflation in times of a growing general asset price boom).
Takšna politika bi zagotovila dolgoročno stabilnost cen in finančno stabilnost, saj bi pripomogla k obvladovanju finančnega neravnovesja in se s tem izognila močnemu zmanjšanju inflacije ali celo deflaciji v fazi razpleta teh neravnovesij.
Such a policy would secure price and financial stability in the long run, as it would help to contain the financial imbalance and thus avoid strong dis- or even deflation during the unravelling phase of these imbalances.
Načelo uporabe proaktivnih in procikličnih ukrepov je bilo preko monetarnega stebra vedno sestavni del dvostebrne strategije ECB, še zlasti pa povezava med razvojem na monetarnem in kreditnem področju ter dragimi cikli finančnega razcveta in propada.
The principle of leaning against the wind has always been an implicit part of the ECB’s two pillar strategy through the monetary pillar and especially the link between money and credit developments and costly financial boom and bust cycles.
Verjetno je tudi, da se bosta zaradi ustanovitve Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja zmanjšala pogostost in resnost razmer, ki pomenijo večji izziv za oblikovalce monetarne politike.
Also such more challenging situations for monetary policy makers are likely to be diminished in terms of frequency and severity, due to the establishment of the ESRB.
21 Kakšna bo po vašem mnenju vloga ECB pri nadzoru bančnega poslovanja v prihodnosti?
21 How do you see the ECB’s role in banking supervision in the future?
Ustanovitev evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja (ESRB) kot novega organa za makrobonitetni nadzor nad finančnim sistemom EU ter vzporedna krepitev okvira EU za usklajevanje med nacionalnimi organi za mikrobonitetni nadzor z ustanovitvijo evropskih nadzornih organov predstavljata pomemben napredek pri soočanju z izzivi in odpravi pomanjkljivosti, ki so se izkazale s finančno krizo.
The establishment of the ESRB, as a new body responsible for macroprudential supervision of the EU financial system, and the parallel strengthening of the EU coordination framework among national authorities for micro-prudential supervision through the setting-up of the European Supervisory Authorities, represent an important step forward to address the challenges and the lacunae shown by the financial crisis.
ECB bo v novem okviru igrala pomembno vlogo, saj ESRB in tudi njegovemu sekretariatu nudi analitično, statistično, administrativno in logistično podporo.
The ECB will play an important role in the new framework, as it provides the analytical, statistical, administrative and logistical support to the ESRB, including the Secretariat of the ESRB.
Poleg tega bi morala ECB, ob sodelovanju vseh članov razširjenega sveta ECB, ESRB omogočiti dostop do makroekonomskega, finančnega in monetarnega strokovnega znanja vseh centralnih bank EU.
The ECB should also bring to the benefit of the ESRB, with the participation of all the members of the ECB’s General Council, the macro-economic, financial and monetary expertise of all EU central banks.
Ta prispevek bodo podprle dejavnosti ECB in ESCB na različnih področjih centralnega bančništva (analiza finančne stabilnosti, makroekonomska analiza, zbiranje statističnih podatkov) ter splošna sinergija na področju strokovnega znanja, virov in infrastrukture nacionalnih centralnih bank EU.
This contribution will be underpinned by the activities of the ECB and ESCB in the various central banking areas (financial stability analysis, macro-economic analysis, collection of statistical information) and by the overall synergies in terms of expertise, resources and infrastructure of the EU NCBs.
Odbor ECB za bančni nadzor, ki sem mu predsedoval med letoma 2007 in 2011, je bil na tem področju že dejaven.
The Banking Supervision Committee of the ECB, which I chaired between 2007 and 2011, was already active in this domain.
Njegove izkušnje in pripravljalno delo bodo koristni za novi svetovalni tehnični odbor ESRB.
Its experience and preparatory work will be useful for the new Advisory Technical Committee of the ESRB.
ECB se tudi udeležuje sestankov Evropskega bančnega organa (EBA) in na ravni 2 Evropskega odbora za bančništvo (EBC) ter bo zagotovila svoj prispevek k tehničnim razpravam na teh forumih.
Finally, the ECB participates in the meetings of the EBA as well as the level 2 European Banking Committee (EBC) and will bring its contribution to the technical discussions in these forums.
Poleg tega, kot veste, ECB pripravlja pravna mnenja o vseh pobudah EU (in nacionalnih pobudah), ki lahko vplivajo na finančno stabilnost, kot je CRD IV (direktiva o kapitalskih zahtevah).
Furthermore, as you know, the ECB provides legal opinions on all EU (and national) initiatives that may affect financial stability, like for instance CRD IV.
22 Katera so po vašem mnenju najbolj pereča vprašanja v zvezi z zakonodajo na področju finančnih storitev?
22 What do you see as the most pressing issues in the financial services legislation?
Prvič, nova pravila Basel III, ki zajemajo nove ukrepe o kazalnikih finančnih vzvodov, likvidnostnih standardih in proticikličnih rezervah.
Firstly, the new Basel III rules, including new measures on leverage ratios, liquidity standards and counter-cyclical buffers.
V Evropi izvajanje teh pravil poteka prek sprememb direktive o kapitalskih zahtevah, ki jo Komisija prav zdaj obravnava.
Implementation of these new rules is underway in Europe via changes to the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV), which the European Commission is currently working on.
Na tem mestu bi želel poudariti, da so nekateri elementi bonitetne ureditve zelo tesno povezani z makrobonitetnim nadzorom, denimo proticiklične rezerve, pri čemer se pričakuje, da bo ESRB igral pomembno vlogo v sodelovanju z EBA.
I would like to stress here that there are elements of the prudential regulation which are very closely linked to macroprudential supervision, such as the counter-cyclical buffers where the ESRB is expected to play an important role in collaboration with the EBA.
Tretjič, krizno upravljanje in reševanje.
Thirdly, crisis management and resolution.
Kar zadeva EU je Evropska komisija napovedala javno razpravo o tem v januarju.
As for the EU, the European Commission has issued a public consultation in January.
Predlagani okvir bi vseboval določbe za izboljšanje pripravljenosti tako organov kot institucij na krize.
The proposed framework would contain provisions to improve the crisis preparedness of both authorities and institutions.
Novi okvir EU bi moral uskladiti nacionalne sisteme in zagotoviti mehanizme za sodelovanje, ki bi bili učinkoviti ob propadu čezmejnih bank.
The new EU framework should harmonize the national regimes and provide for cooperation mechanisms to effectively handle cross-border bank failures.
Prav tako so potrebne verodostojne finančne ureditve, za ta namen pa bi lahko za napolnitev bančnih reševalnih skladov uporabili bančne dajatve.
Credible financing arrangements are also needed, for which purpose bank levies could be used to raise the resources for resolution funds.
Četrtič, bančni sistem v senci.
Fourth, the shadow banking sector.
Skupina G20 je na srečanju novembra 2010 v Seulu odbor za finančno stabilnost (FSB) pozvala, naj do sredine 2011 oblikuje priporočila za okrepitev ureditve in nadzora tega bančnega sistema.
The FSB was requested by the G20 leaders at their November 2010 meeting in Seoul to develop recommendations by mid-2011 to strengthen the regulation and oversight of the shadow banking system.
Petič, makrobonitetni nadzor.
Fifth, Macroprudential Supervision.
Delo, ki ga opravljajo Banka za mednarodne poravnave, Mednarodni denarni sklad in FSB, poteka na nacionalni, regionalni in mednarodni ravni, in sicer na področju (i) odpravljanja podatkovnih vrzeli in krepitve analitičnih orodij za prepoznavanje in ocenjevanje sistemskih tveganj, (ii) oblikovanja političnih odzivov v zvezi s finančnimi institucijami, trgi in infrastrukturo ter (iii) splošnih prizadevanj za oblikovanje skladnih okvirov za makrobonitetni nadzor in politiko.
Work has been carried out at the national, regional and international level, namely by the BIS, IMF, FSB on (i) bridging data gaps and enhancing analytical tools to identify and assess systemic risk, (ii) in designing policy responses addressing financial institutions, markets and infrastructures, and (iii) overall efforts in developing a coherent frameworks for macro-prudential oversight and policy.
Šestič, varstvo potrošnikov.
Sixth, Consumer Protection.
Skupina G20 je odbor za finančno stabilnost, OECD in druge mednarodne organizacije pooblastila, da preučijo možnosti za okrepitev varstva potrošnikov.
The G20 has mandated the FSB, the OECD and other international organizations to explore options to enhance consumer protection.
To bo omogočilo upoštevanje obstoječih pravil ali načel varstva potrošnikov, ki se na evropski ravni že izvajajo, na primer direktiva MiFID ali direktiva o potrošniških kreditih, ki potrošnikom zagotavljata visoko raven varstva.
It will enable taking into account the existing rules or principles for consumer protection that have already been implemented at a European level, such as in the MiFID or credit consumer directive, offering consumers a high level of protection.
Kočno, računovodski standardi.
Lastly, Accounting standards.
Razveseljiva so nedavna prizadevanja uprave za računovodske standarde (FASB) in dveh uprav IASB v odzivu na poziv skupine G20 h približevanju in usklajevanju splošnih računovodskih standardov ZDA (US GAAP) in mednarodnih računovodskih standardov poročanja (MSRP).
The recent efforts by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the IASB two Boards in response to the G20 call for convergence between US GAAP and IFRS are welcome.
Vendar ostajajo precejšnje konceptualne razlike med ključnimi področji, kot so klasifikacija in meritev finančnih instrumentov, ki jih je treba razrešiti, da bi se odzvali na zahtevo skupine G20 po visokokakovostnih računovodskih standardih.
However, significant conceptual differences between key areas remain, such as the classification and measurement of financial instruments that need to be resolved with a view to responding to the G20 request for a single set of high-quality accounting standards.
Želel bi poudariti, da je izvršilni odbor ECB organ, ki odločitve sprejema kot kolegij.
I would like to emphasise that the ECB’s Executive Board is a collegiate decision-making body.
V sklopu te skupne odgovornosti za splošno delovanje ECB razumem, da odbor iz operativnih/praktičnih razlogov skupno odloča o linijah poročanja za vsako področje poslovanja ECB.
Within this collective responsibility for the overall functioning of the ECB, I understand that the Board, for operational/practical reasons, agrees on the reporting lines of each ECB’s business area.
To konkretno pomeni, da vsako področje poslovanja poroča posameznim članom izvršilnega odbora, izvršilni odbor kot celota pa je skupno odgovorno za odločanje ECB.
This concretely means that each business area reports to individual Executive Board members while the Executive Board as a whole is collectively responsible for the ECB’s decision-making.
Obenem tudi razumem, da izvršilni odbor pregleduje dodelitev linij poročanja v določenem obdobju, kar je po mojem zelo dobra praksa, saj po eni strani omogoča upoštevanje specifičnega strokovnega znanja, glede na posamezni primer pa tudi prilagoditev zunanjim dogodkom (denimo ustanovitev novih področij poslovanja, na primer v okviru sistema T2S), eventualno pa tudi krepi kolegialnost odbora.
Having said that, I also understand that the Executive Board reviews the allocation of reporting lines over time, which I consider a very good practice as it on the one hand allows to take into account specific expertise and, as the case may be, to take into account adjustment to external developments (such as the creation of new business units, e.g. for dealing with T2S) and it eventually also strengthens the collegiality of the Board.
Merila za imenovanje članov izvršilnega odbora ECB so zelo jasno opredeljena v Pogodbi o delovanju EU ter v statutu ESCB in ECB, kjer je določeno, da „naj se člane izvršilnega odbora izbere med ljudmi z ugledom in s poklicnimi izkušnjami na monetarnem ali bančnem področju“ in da so lahko „člani izvršilnega odbora samo državljani držav članic (euroobmočja)“.
The criteria for the appointment of ECB’s Executive Board members are very clearly set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and in the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB "the members of the Executive Board shall be appointed among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters”; and “only nationals of [euro area] Member States may be members of the Executive Board”.
Menim, da ta postopek po priporočilu Sveta ter posvetovanju z Evropskim parlamentom in ECB zagotavlja, da sta čim bolje izpolnjeni zahtevi glede imenovanja članov izvršilnega odbora ECB.
In my view, this procedure upon a recommendation from the Council and following consultation of the European Parliament and the ECB ensures that the two requirements for the appointment of members to the Executive Board of the ECB are best met.
Rad bi poudaril, da je ECB nadnacionalna institucija, kar pomeni, da njeni organi odločajo izključno v interesu euroobmočja in ne v skladu z nacionalnimi interesi.
Moreover, I would like to insist on the supranational character of the ECB which implies that the decisions of its decision-making bodies are taken exclusively with a euro area perspective and not with a view to particular national interests.
Zato tudi člani odborov ECB, ki sprejemajo odločitve, ne zastopajo držav članic, iz katerih prihajajo, temveč pri sprejemanju odločitev delujejo kot posamezniki.
This is also why the members of the ECB decision-making bodies do not represent their Member States but participate in the decision-making in their personal capacity.
Menim, da je zahteva, „naj se člane izvršilnega odbora izbere med ljudmi z ugledom in s poklicnimi izkušnjami na monetarnem ali bančnem področju“ ustrezna za zagotovitev kompetentne in v euroobmočje usmerjene sestave izvršilnega odbora ECB.
I consider the requirement to appoint “persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters” sufficient to guarantee a competent and euro area oriented composition of the ECB’s Executive Board.
Pogodba zahteva, da se člane izvršilnega odbora „imenuje med ljudmi z ugledom in s poklicnimi izkušnjami na monetarnem ali bančnem področju“.
The Treaty requires that members of the Executive Board “shall be appointed among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters”.
Ni nobene zahteve, v skladu s katero bi bilo treba imenovati le centralne bančnike.
There is no requirement as such to appoint only central bankers.
Seveda to zahtevo izpolnjujejo centralni bančniki, vendar to nikakor ne izključuje posameznikov z drugačnim poklicnim ozadjem in izkušnjami.
Obviously, this requirement is fulfilled by central bankers, but, certainly does not exclude any other professional background and experience.
Tudi moje poklicne izkušnje ter izkušnje mnogih višjih centralnih bančnikov so precej raznolike in niso le s področja centralnega bančništva.
In fact, my own professional experience, as well as many senior central banking officials, is quite diverse and not limited to central banking.
Poklicno ozadje sedanjih članov izvršilnega odbora je prav tako raznoliko, kar zagotavlja dragoceno dodano vrednost v procesu sprejemanja odločitev.
Also looking at the curricula of the current members of the Executive Board you will find diversity of backgrounds which add valuable expertise to the decision-making process.
Menim, da mora biti neodvisnost centralne banke uravnotežena z odgovornostjo do javnosti in njenih izvoljenih članov.
I consider that central bank independence needs to be balanced with accountability to the public and its elected representatives.
Na splošno je odgovornost osnovni predpogoj za demokratično legitimnost in njen temeljni element.
In general terms, accountability is a fundamental precondition for, and a core element of, democratic legitimacy.
Lahko se jo razume kot obveznost neodvisne centralne banke, da državljanom ustrezno predstavi in utemelji sprejete odločitve, s čimer je v celoti odgovorna za izpolnjevanje svojega mandata.
It can be understood as the obligation of an independent central bank to properly explain and justify its decisions to the citizens and their elected representatives, thereby making it responsible for fulfilling its mandate.
Odgovornost tudi zagotavlja, da se naloge centralne banke opravljajo na zelo strokovni ravni.
Accountability also ensures that the central bank’s tasks are performed with a high level of professionalism.
ECB ima kot organ, ki je bil ustanovljen s Pogodbo in ki deluje v okviru dodeljenih pristojnosti, zakonsko nalogo, da ohranja stabilnost cen, in druge naloge s področja centralnega bančništva za celotno euroobmočje.
As a body established by virtue of the Treaty, and acting within the limits of the powers conferred upon it, the ECB has the statutory task of maintaining price stability and of performing other central banking functions for the euro area as a whole.
Zato je ECB najprej in predvsem odgovorna državljanom EU, bolj formalno pa Evropskemu parlamentu, ki je edina evropska institucija, ki jo neposredno izvolijo državljani EU.
Therefore, the ECB is accountable first and foremost to EU citizens, and – more formally – to the European Parliament, which is the only European institution directly elected by EU citizens.
EBC lahko svojo odgovornost izpolnjuje na več načinov.
The ECB has a number of established means for discharging its accountability.
ECB poleg mesečnih tiskovnih konferenc predsednika in podpredsednika (gl. tudi 28. odgovor) objavlja mesečni bilten ter Evropskemu parlamentu (in Svetu) sako leto predstavi letno poročilo.
Apart from the monthly press conferences of the President and Vice-President (see also answer 28), the ECB publishes its Monthly Bulletin, and its Annual Report is presented to the European Parliament (and Council).
Predsednik ECB štirikrat na leto nastopi v odboru ECON in tudi druge člane izvršilnega odbora ta odbor/Parlament pogosto povabi k razpravi o specifični tematiki.
The ECB President appears before the ECON Committee on a quarterly basis, while other members of the Executive Board are frequently invited to appear in ECON/Parliament on specific topics.
Sam osebno podpiram redni dialog med člani odbora ECB in poslanci Evropskega parlamenta.
I personally am in favour of a regular dialogue between ECB board members and European parliament members.