natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
To dokazuje možnost, ki jo tretja direktiva o življenjskem zavarovanju daje državam članicam, da se same odločijo, ali bodo zadržale nepogodbene bonuse (člen 18, 1.D)
This was illustrated by the option given to Member States in the 3LD to determine whether or not non-contractual bonuses were to be reserved (1.D, article 18 )
Za dodatne informacije glej del II, oddelek II.1. .
See Part II, Section II.1, for further details. .
SKLEPI, DEL V, VLOGA KOMISIJE
Conclusions PART V, ROLE OF THE COMMISSION
Vloga Komisije pri krizi družbe Equitable Life
The Commission’s role in the Equitable Life crisis
Odbor meni, da Komisija ni učinkovito spremljala uporabe tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju, čeprav ugotavlja, da je upoštevala takrat prevladujočo prakso.
The committee is of the opinion that the Commission did not monitor the application of the 3LD effectively, although it may be said to have followed the prevailing practice at that time.
Odbor meni, da bi morala Komisija zavzeti veliko dejavnejše stališče in ne le čakati na prejem pritožb.
The committee believes that the Commission should have taken a much more proactive stance and not simply have waited for complaints to arrive.
Odbor prav tako meni, da bi dinamičen pristop Komisije in držav članic k izvajanju, ob upoštevanju zavezujočega prava zakonodajnih besedil ter ciljev zakonodaje in metode za njeno praktično uporabo, najverjetneje poudaril pomanjkljivosti pri uporabi tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju in jim dal prednost.
The committee believes that a dynamic approach to implementation on the part of the Commission and the Member States, considering both black letter law of the legislative text but also the aims of the legislation and the method of its practical application, would most likely have highlighted and brought to the fore the deficiencies in the application of the 3LD.
Odbor meni, da je bila študija, ki jo je Komisija zahtevala o prenosu tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju v Združenem kraljestvu, neuporabna, nepopolna in slabe kakovosti ter ni sprožila nobenih pomembnih ključnih vprašanj, ena od njenih glavnih slabosti pa je, da je bila opravljena kmalu po prenosu, zaradi česar ni mogla izkoristiti daljšega obdobja za vrednotenje izvajanja.
The committee believes that the study requested by the Commission on 3LD transposition in the UK was unhelpful, incomplete and of poor quality and did not raise any substantial key points, one of its main weaknesses being that it was undertaken shortly after transposition and did not benefit from a longer period in which to evaluate implementation over time.
Odbor verjame, da je uvedba možnosti v direktivi zmanjšala njeno skladnost in učinkovitost ter dodatno ovirala izvajanje in uporabo prava EU, s čimer je omogočila čezmerno urejanje tega področja v državi članici in različne standarde.
The committee believes that the introduction of options within the Directive diminished its coherence and effectiveness and furthermore hindered the implementation and application of EU law, opening the door to Member State gold-plating and differing standards.
Sistematične slabosti, ki jih je poudarila preiskava
Systematic weaknesses highlighted by the Inquiry
Odbor meni, da je primer družbe ELAS, kot je bilo prikazano v različnih delih poročila
The committee is of the opinion that, as has been depicted in the different Parts of this report
Glej del V, oddelek III, glej tudi del II, oddelek II.2.1 in del II, oddelek II.2.2. , pokazal določene sistematične slabosti Komisije pri ustreznem spremljanju izvajanja zakonodaje EU.
See Part V Section III, see also in Part II Section II.2.1, and Part II Section II.2.2. , the ELAS case has brought to the surface the existence, on the part of the Commission, of certain systematic weaknesses related to the proper monitoring of the implementation of EU law.
Odbor meni, da primer družbe ELAS, čeprav se zdi, da se je položaj v zadnjem času izboljšal, dokazuje, da je Komisija v preteklosti sprejela formalno in statično vlogo pri spremljanju prenosa zakonodaje Skupnosti, kar gotovo že dolgo ni več sprejemljivo, čeprav je morda bilo v skladu s takratno prevladujočo filozofijo.
The committee is of the opinion that, even though the situation seems to have improved recently, the ELAS case attests that the Commission has in the past adopted a formalistic and static role in the monitoring of the transposition of Community law which, while it might have been in line with the philosophy prevailing at the time, is certainly no longer acceptable.
Primer družbe ELAS dodatno utemeljuje nujno potrebo po bolj dinamičnem in obsežnem konceptu za izvajanje zakonodaje ES.
The case of ELAS adds weight to the urgent need for a more dynamic and comprehensive concept of implementation of EC legislation.
Odbor meni, da sedanja preiskava poudarja tudi druge sistematične slabosti v Komisiji, zlasti pomanjkanje virov v smislu osebja za spremljanje izvajanja .
The committee is of the opinion that the present inquiry also highlights another systematic weakness within the Commission, namely the lack of resources in terms of staff devoted to the monitoring of implementation.
Zlasti kaže, kako se je Komisija pri spremljanju preveč zanašala na pogodbene svetovalce, ki so v primeru družbe ELAS pripravili nepopolno študijo slabe kakovosti.
In particular, it shows how the Commission relied too heavily in its monitoring on contracted consultants which, in the ELAS case, produced an incomplete and poor quality study.
DEL VI – VLOGA PREISKOVALNIH ODBOROV
PART VI - ROLE OF COMMITTEES OF INQUIRY
o pooblastilih in pristojnostih parlamentarnih preiskovalnih odborov
on powers and competences of the Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry
KAZALO DEL VI
INDEX PART VI
Omejitve trenutnega statusa
Limitations of the current status
Preiskovalni odbor: trenutno stanje.
I. The Committee of Inquiry: current situation .
Pravica do ustanovitve začasnih preiskovalnih odborov za preiskavo „ domnevnih kršitev ali nepravilnosti pri izvajanju zakonodaje Skupnosti “, razen kadar je zadeva v postopku , je pomemben element nadzornih pooblastil Evropskega parlamenta (EP), med drugim skupaj z obravnavo peticij in imenovanjem varuha človekovih pravic.
The right to set up temporary Committees of Inquiry to investigate " alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Community law" , except when the matter is sub judice, is an important element of the supervisory powers of the European Parliament (EP), together inter alia with the examination of petitions and the appointment of an Ombudsman.
Parlamentarni preiskovalni odbori omogočajo poglobljeno preiskavo posameznega vprašanja.
Parliamentary committees of inquiry (PCI) enable an in-depth investigation of a particular issue.
Poleg tega usmerjajo zanimanje javnosti k vprašanjem v postopku preverjanja in so v tem smislu koristni za vključitev nekaterih tem v politični program ter za povečevanje pristojnosti Parlamenta na področju preverjanja in nadzora.
They also focus the public spotlight on the issues under scrutiny and, in that sense, are useful not only for placing certain topics on the political agenda but also for enhancing Parliament's powers of scrutiny and control.
Redna praksa ustanavljanja preiskovalnih odborov je bila formalno pravno priznana v Maastrichtski pogodbi, s katero je bil v Pogodbo ES dodan nov člen, ki določa, da ima Parlament pravico ustanoviti takšne odbore za preiskavo „ domnevnih kršitev ali nepravilnosti pri izvajanju zakonodaje Skupnosti, razen tedaj ko domnevna dejanja preiskuje sodišče in dokler je primer še v sodnem postopku “.
The regular practice of setting up committees of inquiry was given formal legal recognition in the Treaty of Maastricht, which added a new article to the EC Treaty specifying that Parliament has the right to set up such committees to investigate " alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Community law, except where the alleged facts are being examined by a court and while the case is still subject to legal proceedings ".
Ta nov člen (zdaj člen 193 Pogodbe o ES) ne vsebuje informacij o posebnih pooblastilih, ki jih ima preiskovalni odbor EP, namesto tega pa določa, da se podrobne določbe sprejmejo z medinstitucionalnim sporazumom.
This new Article (today Article 193 TEC) does not provide information on the specific powers that an EP committee of inquiry has and instead provides that the detailed provisions are adopted by interinstitutional agreement.
Ta sporazum je bil dosežen s Sklepom 95/167 Evropskega parlamenta, Sveta in Komisije z dne 19. aprila 1995 o določbah, ki podrobneje urejajo uresničevanje preiskovalne pravice Evropskega parlamenta
This agreement was reached in Decision 95/167 of the EP, the Council and the Commission of 19 April 1995 on the detailed provisions governing the exercise of the European Parliament's right of Inquiry
Sporazum o tem sklepu je bil dosežen po le dveh letih pogajanj in pomembnih koncesijah Parlamenta.
The agreement on this Decision was reached only after two years of negotiations and important concessions by Parliament.
Vendar se je pravica Parlamenta do preiskave močno okrepila v primerjavi s položajem pred Maastrichtsko pogodbo.
However, the right of inquiry of Parliament was considerably reinforced with respect to the situation obtaining before the Treaty of Maastricht.
Razpoložljive izkušnje parlamentarnih preiskovalnih odborov po sprejetju navedenega sklepa so omejene, ker sta bila v tem obdobju ustanovljena le dva parlamentarna preiskovalna odbora
The experience available of PCI since the adoption of the above-mentioned Decision is limited, as only two PCIs have been set up during that period
Po prvih neposrednih volitvah je Parlament pokazal veliko zanimanje za preiskovalni odbor.
Since its first direct election, Parliament has shown great interest on the committee of Inquiry.
V prvih desetih letih po letu 1979 je ustanovil veliko odborov, ki pa so imeli zelo omejena pooblastila.
In fact, during the first ten years after 1979, Parliament set a number of these committees, though with very limited powers.
Od sprejetja Sklepa leta 1995 sta bila ustanovljena le dva preiskovalna odbora: preiskovalni odbor o skupnostnem tranzitnem prometu (4-0053/97) in preiskovalni odbor za BSE.
After the 95 Decision only two committees of inquiry have been set: Committee of Inquiry into the Community Transit System (4-0053/97) and the Committee of Inquiry in relation to BSE.
Oba odbora sta imela približno enak način dela.
Both committees followed more or less the same pattern of work.
Resoluciji Parlamenta o določitvi mandata (kar je bilo v obeh primerih veliko natančneje kot pri preiskovalnem odboru) so sledila zaslišanja in delegacije.
Following the resolution of Parliament setting the mandate (in both cases much more detailed that the one in EQUI), hearings and delegations followed.
Vmesnih poročil ni bilo.
There were no interim reports.
Odbor o skupnostnem tranzitnem prometu je zaprosil za trimesečno podaljšanje, ki je bilo odobreno.
The committee into the Community Transit System asked for a three months extension which was granted.
Na koncu sta oba pripravila dolgo poročilo in osnutek priporočila, ki sta bila predložena na plenarnem zasedanju.
At the end both produced a long report and a draft recommendation that were sent to plenary.
Na plenarnem zasedanju je potekalo glasovanje le o kratkem priporočilu, s katerim je bilo odobreno poročilo (v primeru BSE je šlo za resolucijo). in, kolikor je znano, ni bila opravljena nobena poglobljena študija o pooblastilih, nalogah in ravnanju Parlamenta pri izvajanju pravice do preiskave.
Only the short recommendation endorsing the report was voted by plenary ( in the case of the BSD it was a resolution). and, as far as is known, no in-depth study has been undertaken on the powers, duties and conduct of Parliament when exercising its right of inquiry.
Narava parlamentarnih preiskovalnih odborov je bila opisana v obrazložitvi PROUTOVEGA poročila
The nature of a PCI was described in the explanatory statement of the PROUT report
A2-100/1986 . , ki je v poslovnik prvo uvedlo člene v zvezi s preiskovalnimi odbori.
A2-100/1986 . which first introduced the rules regarding Inquiry committees in the Rules of Procedure.
V njem je navedeno, da „ preiskovalni odbori nikakor niso politični odbori.
It states that " Inquiry committees are not political committees at all.
Ne gledajo v prihodnost, ampak pregledujejo veljavno zakonodajo Skupnosti in način, na katerega jo izvaja Komisija ali države članice.
They do not look to the future and look at the existing body of Community legislation and the way that it is implemented, either by the Commission or by the Member States.
Preverjajo, ali se pri delovanju pravosodja pojavljajo kršitve zakona ali elementi nepravilnosti ali podkupovanja.
They look to see whether there are breaches of the law, or elements of maladministration or corruption in the administration of the law.
Povedano drugače, Parlamentu pomagajo pri njegovi nadzorni vlogi ...“.
In other words, they assist Parliament in its supervisory role ...".
Jasno je, da je zaradi preiskovalne narave takšnih odborov potrebna omejitev njihovih dejavnosti ter manjša razširitev njihovih pooblastil in nalog v zvezi s stalnim ali običajnim začasnim odborom.
It appears clear from the above that the investigative nature of these type of committees calls for precise limits to their activities and a slight extension of their powers and duties with respect to a standing or normal temporary committee.
Obseg in omejitve mandata
Scope and limits of the mandate
Upoštevati je treba, da obseg ukrepanja parlamentarnih preiskovalnih odborov določata primarna in sekundarna zakonodaja, in sicer člen 193 Pogodbe o ES, Sklep 95/167, zadevni poslovnik in mandat, ki ga je sprejel Parlament v skladu s členom 176(3) poslovnika.
It is important to bear in mind that the scope of action of a PCI is defined by primary and secondary law, namely Article 193 TEC, Decision 95/167, the relevant Rules of Procedure and the mandate adopted by Parliament pursuant to Rule 176(3).
Parlament lahko v zvezi s pogodbo, sklepom in poslovnikom ustanovi preiskovalni odbor „ za preiskavo domnevnih kršitev ali nepravilnosti pri izvajanju zakonodaje Skupnosti “ s strani institucije EU, države članice ali oseb, ki so z zakonodajo Skupnosti pooblaščene za izvajanje te zakonodaje.
As for the Treaty, the Decision and the Rules of Procedure, Parliament may set up a committee of Inquiry " to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementations of Community law" by an EU institution, a Member State or persons empowered by Community law to implement that law.
Začasni preiskovalni odbor ne sme preiskovati zadev, o katerih teče postopek pred nacionalnim sodiščem ali sodiščem Skupnosti, dokler sodni postopek ni zaključen (člen 193 Pogodbe o ES in člen 3 Sklepa iz leta 1995).
A temporary committee of inquiry may not investigate matters being examined before a national or Community Court of law until such time as the legal proceedings have been completed (Article 193 TCE and Article 3 of the 1995 Decision).
Zato Pogodba in Sklep določata tri omejitve za parlamentarne preiskovalne odbore: preiskovati morajo domnevne kršitve ali nepravilnosti pri izvajanju zakonodaje Skupnosti; ta dejanja mora domnevno izvesti Skupnost ali nacionalne uprave; poleg tega nimajo pravice preiskovati zadev, ki jih preiskuje nacionalno sodišče ali sodišče Skupnosti.
Thus the Treaty and the Decision set three limits for a PCI: it must investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Community law; these actions should have been allegedly carried out by Community or national administrations; and it does not have the right to investigate matters before a national or Community Court.
Ni jasno, ali lahko odbor preiskuje zadeve, ki jih preiskuje sodišče v državi, ki ni članica EU.
It is uncertain whether the committee can investigate a matter before a Court of a non-Member State.
Pogodba tega ne razlikuje in preprosto navaja „dejanja preiskuje sodišče“, medtem ko Sklep v odstavku 3 člena 2 jasno omenja nacionalna sodišča ali sodišče Skupnosti.
The Treaty makes no distinction and simply refers to "facts are being examined before a Court" whilst the Decision in Article 2, paragraph 3, clearly refers to national or Community Courts.
V zvezi s tem sodna praksa Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti ne obstaja, zato je treba omejitev zadeve v postopku načeloma uporabiti za nacionalna sodišča ali sodišča Skupnosti, razen kadar je namen spora zaustavitev preiskav preiskovalnega odbora.
There is no ECJ case-law on the subject so, in principle, it seems that the sub judice limitation should be applied to national or Community Courts except, perhaps, in those cases where the purpose of the litigation is to stop the investigations of a committee of inquiry.
Omejitev je treba razumeti v ožjem pomenu besede: povezana je le s posebnim vprašanjem v postopku in je ni mogoče razširiti na stranske ali sorodne zadeve.
The limitation should also be understood strictu sensu : it refers only to the specific issue sub judice and cannot be extended to collateral or related matters.
Pomen nepravilnosti ni opredeljen v primarni ali sekundarni zakonodaji Skupnosti.
The meaning of maladministration is not defined by primary or secondary community law.
Vendar je v letnem poročilu varuha človekovih pravic za leto 1996, v katerem je podan odgovor na zahtevo EP, naslednja razlaga izraza nepravilnosti:
However, the Ombudsman's Annual Report for 1996, responding to a request from the EP, explains the term maladministration as follows:
Jasno je, da gre za nepravilnosti, če institucije ali organi Skupnosti ne ukrepajo v skladu s pogodbami in akti Skupnosti, ki so zanje zavezujoči, ali ne upoštevajo pravnih pravil in načel, ki jih določita Sodišče Evropskih skupnosti in sodišče prve stopnje.
Clearly there is maladministration if a Community institution or body fails to act in accordance with the Treaties and with the Community acts that are binding upon it, or if it fails to observe the rules and principles of law established by the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance.
Do nepravilnosti, vključno z upravnimi nepravilnostmi, upravnimi opustitvami, zlorabo pooblastil, nepravičnostjo, napakami ali nesposobnostmi, diskriminacijo, nepotrebnimi zamudami, zavračanjem posredovanja informacij, malomarnostjo itd. lahko pride tudi v veliko drugih primerih.
Many other instances may also amount to maladministration, including administrative irregularities, administrative omissions, abuse of power, unfairness, malfunction or incompetence, discrimination, avoidable delays, refusal of information, negligence, etc.
Letno poročilo Varuha človekovih pravic za leto 1996.
Ombudsman's Annual Report for 1996.
EP je potrdil ta pristop v resoluciji z dne 16. julija 1998
The EP has endorsed this approach in its resolution of 16 July 1998
Preiskovalni odbor ima tudi omejen mandat, kar je prvotni namen njegove ustanovitve in vzrok za njegov obstoj, poleg tega ne more preiskovati prek teh pooblastil, ki mu jih je zaupal Parlament.
The committee of Inquiry is also limited by its mandate, the initial purpose behind its constitution, and its raison d'être, and cannot investigate beyond this mandate as conferred upon it by Parliament.
V sklepu o ustanovitvi preiskovalnega odbora je treba opredeliti ta namen (odstavek 1 člena 2, in fine , sklepa iz leta 1995).
The decision to set up a committee of inquiry has to specify this purpose (Article 2, paragraph 1 in fine of the 1995 Decision).
Nazadnje, preiskovalni odbor ima omejen rok za oddajo poročila, kot je določeno v mandatu (odstavek 1 člena 2, in fine , sklepa).
Finally, the committee of Inquiry is limited by the deadline for submission of its report as specified in the mandate (Article 2, paragraph 1 in fine of the Decision).
Rok ne sme biti daljši od dvanajstih mesecev od dneva ustanovitve, vendar se lahko dvakrat podaljša za tri mesece (odstavek 4 člena 2 sklepa in člen 176(4) poslovnika).
The deadline may be no longer than 12 months from the date when it was set up but may be extended twice by three months (Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Decision and Rule 176(4)).
Pooblastila in naloge
Powers and duties
Način delovanja in pooblastila preiskovalnega odbora so ne glede na določbe iz poslovnika ali Sklepa 95/167 enaki kot za stalne odbore (odstavek 2 člena 176 poslovnika).
Notwithstanding what is provided by the Rules or Decision 95/167, the modus operandi and powers of a committee of inquiry are the same as those provided for standing committees (Rule 176 paragraph 2).
Kadar odbor meni, da je bila kršena ena od njegovih pravic, predlaga predsedniku, da sprejme ustrezne ukrepe (odstavek 6 člena 176 poslovnika).
When a committee considers that one of its rights has been infringed, it shall ask the President to take the appropriate measures (Rule 176, paragraph 6).
Razširjena pooblastila preiskovalnega odbora so večinoma zajeta v členu 3 Sklepa 95/167.
The extended powers granted to a committee of inquiry are mostly found in Article 3 of Decision 95/167.
Odstavek 1 člena 3 določa, da preiskovalni odbor opravi potrebne preiskave za ugotovitev domnevnih kršitev ali nepravilnosti.
Article 3, paragraph 1 provides that a committee shall carry out the inquiries necessary to verify alleged contraventions or maladministration.
To določbo je razlagati brati v povezavi z nadzornimi pooblastili, omenjenimi v tej opombi.
This provision has to be read in connection with the supervisory powers as mentioned in this note.
Institucije Evropske skupnosti in države članice zlasti člen 10 Pogodbe o ES zavezuje, da sodelujejo z odborom.
European Community institutions and Member States are in particular obliged under Article 10 TCE to cooperate with the committee.
Člen 3(4) določa, da organi držav članic, institucije in organi Evropskih skupnosti dajo odboru na voljo dokumentacijo, potrebno za opravljanje njegovih nalog, razen če obstajajo dobro utemeljeni razlogi (nacionalna varnost, zakonodaja Skupnosti itd.).
Article 3(4) establishes that authorities of Member States, institutions and bodies of the European Communities shall provide the committee with the necessary documents for the performance of its duties except for well defined reasons (national security, Community legislation, etc).
Drugi stavek odstavka 5 in odstavek 6 člena 3 dodatno pojasnjujeta to obveznost zagotavljanja informacij (institucije lahko odboru pošljejo dokumente, ki izvirajo iz določene države članice, šele potem, ko so zadevno državo o tem obvestile).
Paragraphs 5, second sentence and paragraph 6 of Article 3 further clarify this obligation to provide information (institutions shall not supply the committee with documents originating in a Member State without first informing the State concerned).
Odbor ima pravico, da ga predstavnik zadevne vlade obvesti o vsaki oviri, ki izhaja iz razlogov tajnosti.
The committee has the right to be notified of any obstacles arising out of secrecy reasons by a representative authorised to represent the government concerned.
To obvestilo mora biti utemeljeno.
This notification has to be reasoned.
Odstavek 8 člena 3 določa, da lahko preiskovalni odbor, če je to potrebno za opravljanje njegovih nalog, zahteva od vseh drugih oseb (pri čemer so mišljene osebe, ki niso uradniki ali javni uslužbenci ali uradniki ES), da pričajo pred njim.
Article 3, paragraph 8 provides that insofar as it is necessary for the performance of its duties, the committee of inquiry may request any other person (meaning persons other than officials or civil servants or EC officials) to give evidence before it.
Jasno je, da odbor ne more prisiliti državljana, da priča, če tega ne želi.
It is quite clear that the committee has no powers to oblige a citizen to give evidence if he or she is not willing.
Če lahko oseba zaradi imenovanja v teku preiskave utrpi škodo, jo začasni preiskovalni odbor o tem obvesti.
On the other hand, the committee shall inform any person named in the course of an inquiry if this might be prejudicial to him or her.
Oseba ima pravico, da jo odbor zasliši, če to želi (odstavek 8 člena 3).
The person has the right to be heard by the committee if requested (Article 3 paragraph 8).