natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Če bi se Evropski svet držal svoje odločitve, da takoj po volitvah v Evropski parlament začne postopek imenovanja Komisije in njenega predsednika, bi to izvedel po določbah pogodbe iz Nice.
If the European Council adheres to its d e cision to initiate the procedure for the appointment of the Commission - and especially its President - without delay after the e lections to the European Parliament, this procedure would therefore be initiated in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Nice.
Vseeno bi bilo bolje, če bi se Evropski svet po določilih lizbonske pogodbe predhodno neformalno posvetoval.
However, it is desirable that the European Council should informally apply the prior consultation proc e dure provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon .
Po svojem imenovanju mora predsednik predlagati sestavo nove Komisije.
Once appointed, the Pr e sident should propose the composition of the new Commission.
Njegov predlog naj bi postal formalen šele po začetku veljavnosti lizbonske pogodbe.
I t is indicated that this proposal should be formally made only after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon .
Parlament mora potem z glasovanjem potrditi sestavo kolegija.
Parliament must then approve the composition of the Commission as a body by means of a vote .
Kar zadeva predsedstvo Evropskega sveta, sta bila v izjavi, priloženi sklepom Evropskega sveta iz decembra 2008, določena spodaj navedena prehodna ukrepa.
With regard to the Presidency of the European Council, a declaration in the annex to the conclusions of the European Council of December has laid down the following transitional measures:
Če bi začela lizbonska pogodba veljati, ko se bo polletno obdobje predsedovanja Svetu že začelo, Evropski svet – da bi se upoštevala pripravljalna dela in bi se zagotovilo nepretrgano delovanje – soglaša z naslednjima ukrepoma:
In the event that the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force at a date when a six-monthly Presidency of the Council has already begun, the European Council agrees that, as a matter of transition, in order to take into account the preparatory work and ensure harmonious continuity of work:
− pristojni organi države članice, ki v določenem polletnem obdobju predseduje Svetu, bodo do izteka tega obdobja še naprej predsedovali vsem preostalim srečanjem Sveta in Evropskega sveta ter srečanjem s tretjimi državami;
− the competent authorities of the Member State holding the six-monthly Presidency of the Council at that time will continue to chair all the remaining meetings of the Council and the European Council, as well as third-country meetings, until the end of the period of office;
− naslednje polletno predsedstvo Sveta bo moralo med svojim polletnim mandatom na podlagi določb pogodbe sprejeti konkretne potrebne ukrepe, kar zadeva organizacijske in stvarne vidike predsedovanja Evropskemu svetu in Svetu za zunanje zadeve.
− the following six-monthly Presidency of the Council will be in charge of taking the necessary specific measures relating to the organisational and material aspects of the Presidency of the European Council and of the Foreign Affairs Council during its period of office, in conformity with the Treaty.
Medinstitucionalnemu načrtovanju zakonodajnega obdobja naproti
E. TOWARDS AN INTERINSTITUTIONALLY PROGRAMMED LEGISLATIVE TERM
Do zdaj je bilo strateško in operativno načrtovanje med institucijami več let bolj ali manj ločeno.
To date, we have had several effectively separate strategic and operational programming exercises among the institutions.
Komisija je razvila dialog o strateškem in zakonodajnem načrtovanju z Evropskim parlamentom in vzporedno s Svetom.
As things stand, the Commission develops a dialogue on strategic and legislative programming with Parliament, and a parallel dialogue with the Council.
Obe veji zakonodajne oblasti pa med seboj nikoli ne sodelujeta pri vsebinskem dialogu v zvezi z njunimi prednostnimi politikami in operativnim načrtovanjem njunih dejavnosti.
However, it never happens that the two branches of the legislative authority undertake a substantial dialogue on their political priorities and the operational programming of their respective activities.
Posplošitev soodločanja in nove določbe lizbonske pogodbe spodbujajo k vzpostavitvi takega medinstitucionalnega načrtovanja.
The generalisation of codecision and the new provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon make it desirable that there should be interinstitutional programming of this type.
Novosti iz lizbonske pogodbe
The innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon
Novosti, ki jih pri načrtovanju prinaša lizbonska pogodba, omogočajo, da se to stanje – ob ustrezni politični volji – izboljša.
The modifications introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon with regard to programming make it possible to improve this state of affairs if the political will exists.
Kar zadeva Komisijo , tj. institucijo, ki ima zlasti pravico do zakonodajne pobude, člen 17 določa, da „daje pobude za letno in večletno načrtovanje Unije z namenom doseči med-institucionalne sporazume“.
With regard to the Commission , the institution which essentially has the right of legislative initiative, Article 17 states that it shall 'initiate the Union's annual and multiannual programming with a view to achieving interinstitutional agreements'.
Kar zadeva Evropski svet , člen 15 PEU določa: "1.
With regard to the European Council , Article 15(1) TEU states: '1.
Evropski svet daje Uniji potrebne spodbude za njen razvoj in zanj opredeljuje splošne politične usmeritve in prednostne cilje.
The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political directions and priorities thereof.
Ne opravlja zakonodajne funkcije.“
It shall not exercise legislative functions'.
Kar zadeva Svet , člen 16 PEU določa, da „opravlja funkcijo oblikovanja politike in usklajevanja v skladu s Pogodbama“.
With regard to the Council , Article 16 TEU states that 'it shall carry out policy-making and coordinating functions as laid down in the Treaties'.
Izjava 9 vsebuje osnutek sklepa Evropskega sveta o predsedovanju v Svetu, pri čemer člen 1(2) tega osnutka sklepa določa: "2.
Declaration 9 contains a draft European Council decision on the exercise of the Council presidency, whose Article 1(2) states: ' 2.
Vsak član skupine (trojke) izmenično predseduje za obdobje šestih mesecev vsem sestavam Sveta, razen Svetu za zunanje zadeve.
'Each member of the group shall in turn chair for a six-month period all configurations of the Council, with the exception of the Foreign Affairs configuration.
Ostali člani skupine predsedstvu na podlagi skupnega programa pomagajo pri izpolnjevanju vseh njegovih obveznosti.
The other members of the group shall assist the Chair in all its responsibilities on the basis of a common programme.
Člani skupine se lahko med seboj dogovorijo za drugačno ureditev.“
Members of the team may decide alternative arrangements among themselves'.
Člen 3 istega osnutka sklepa določa, da „Svet za splošne zadeve, v sodelovanju s Komisijo, zagotavlja v okviru večletnega načrtovanja usklajeno in kontinuirano delo različnih sestav Sveta.
Article 3 of the same draft decision adds: 'the General Affairs Council shall ensure consistency and continuity in the work of the different Council configurations in the framework of multiannual programmes in cooperation with the Commission.
Predsedujoče države članice sprejmejo ob pomoči generalnega sekretariata Sveta vse ukrepe, potrebne za organizacijo in nemoten potek dela Sveta.“
The Member States holding the Presidency shall take all necessary measures for the organisation and smooth operation of the Council's work, with the assistance of the General Secretariat of the Council'.
Lizbonska pogodba prav tako zagotavlja pravno podlago za večletno finančno načrtovanje (glej točko 3).
The Treaty of Lisbon also provides a legal basis for multiannual financial programming (cf. point 3 below).
Povezava s političnim in zakonodajnim načrtovanjem je potrebna tudi, če to ni posebej določeno v pogodbi.
This implies a link between political and legislative programming, even if such a link is not explicitly stated in the Treaty.
Nekaj vprašanj o obsegu in vsebini načrtovanja
Some questions on the scope and content of programming
Načrtovanje je že po svoji naravi potrebna medinstitucionalna naloga: če bi imela vsaka institucija Unije popolnoma samostojen program politik brez posvetovanja z drugimi institucijami in z opredelitvijo svojega časovnega razporeda glede na svoje prednostne naloge, bi bilo usklajevanje med institucijami zelo težko in bi slabo vplivalo na skladnost politik Unije in potek postopkov.
Programming is, by its nature, a necessary interinstitutional exercise: were each EU institution to pursue its own political agenda in splendid isolation, not consulting with the other institutions, and define its own calendar following its own priorities, articulation between the institutions would be very difficult, and both the coherence of the Union's policies and the implementation of procedures would suffer.
Načrtovanje je torej praktično potrebno, saj je potrebno usklajevati dejavnosti različnih institucij v zvezi z nekaterimi skupno določenimi cilji.
Programming is, then, a practical necessity, as a requirement entailing coordinating the different institutions' activities around certain jointly defined objectives.
Vendar njegov cilj nikakor ni ogrožanje posebnih pristojnosti posameznih institucij in postopkov odločanja iz pogodb, zlasti rokov, ki jih določata pogodbi in so zavezujoči.
However, in no circumstances does it mean calling in question either the specific powers of each institution or the decision-making procedures laid down in the Treaties - still less the deadlines established by those Treaties, which are mandatory.
Opozoriti je treba, da so medinstitucionalni sporazumi končno uradno priznani v členu 295 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije: „Evropski parlament, Svet in Komisija se med seboj posvetujejo in v medsebojnem soglasju določijo načine svojega sodelovanja.
Formal recognition has at last been given to interinstitutional agreements in Article 295 TFEU, which states: 'The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission shall consult each other and by common agreement make arrangements for their cooperation.
V ta namen lahko v skladu s Pogodbama sklenejo med-institucionalne sporazume, ki so lahko zavezujoči.“
To that end, they may, in compliance with the Treaties, conclude interinstitutional agreements which may be of a binding nature'.
Iz besedila te določbe je mogoče preprosto sklepati, da so lahko medinstitucionalni sporazumi zavezujoči ali ne, odvisno od želje strank.
It is hardly difficult to deduce from this provision that interinstitutional agreements may or may not be binding, depending on the parties' intention.
Prav tako je jasno, da načelo, v skladu s katerim so sklenjeni medinstitucionalni sporazumi, tudi če so zavezujoči, ne more omejevati pristojnosti institucij, kot so opredeljene v pogodbah.
It is also equally clear that such agreements, even where they are recognised as binding, cannot constrain the powers of the institutions as defined in the Treaties.
Kar zadeva obseg in vsebino načrtovanja, lahko prav tako razlikujemo med:
With regard to the scope and content of programming, one may also distinguish between:
a) pobudami za strateško načrtovanje z večinoma politično vsebino, s katerimi se opredelijo prednostne naloge in politični cilji Unije za določeno obdobje;
a) strategic programming initiatives with an essentially political content, defining the Union's political objectives and priorities for a certain period;
b) pobudami, katerih namen je operativno načrtovanje dejavnosti (organizacija dela, določitev časovnega razporeda, izmenjava informacij o poteku postopkov itd.).
b) initiatives aimed more at the operational programming of activities (organisation of work, definition of calendars, exchange of information on the following of procedures, etc).
Zadevno poročilo je osredotočeno na potrebe prve vrste načrtovanja, pri čemer se upošteva pomen drugega za dobro izvajanje ciljev, opredeljenih s strateškim načrtovanjem.
The present report will concentrate on the requirements of the first type of programming, while not denying the importance of the second type for achieving the objectives defined via strategic programming.
Izjava št. 9 je lahko zavajajoča, ker se v členu 3 sklicuje na „večletno načrtovanje“ v zvezi z vlogo Sveta za splošne zadeve, v členu 1(2) pa na „skupne programe“ (za 18 mesecev) skupin treh predsedstev.
Declaration 9 could cause confusion insofar as its Article 3 refers to 'multiannual programmes' in the context of the role of the General Affairs Council, while its Article 12 speaks of the 'common programme' (for 18 months) of the groups of three presidencies.
Očitna razlaga je, da se večletno načrtovanje nanaša na načrtovanje Komisije (člen 17(1) PEU), pri čemer je treba skupne programe predsedniških trojk vključiti v večletno načrtovanje.
The obvious interpretation would be that 'multiannual programming' refers to that which is initiated by the Commission (Article 17(1) TUE), and 'common programme' to the joint programmes of the presidential troikas, which are to be integrated into the multiannual programming.
Dobro bi bilo, če bi Svet določil odnos med tema dvema vrstama načrtovanja.
It would be useful if the Council could specify more clearly the relationship between these two types of programming.
Kadar govorimo o načrtovanju, govorimo zlasti o triu Komisija–Parlament–Svet.
When one speaks of programming. one thinks above all of the trio Commission/Parliament/Council.
Vendar je treba prav tako upoštevati dva druga udeleženca: Evropski svet v vlogi dajanja političnih spodbud in visokega predstavnika v vlogi predsednika Sveta za zunanje zadeve.
However, two other players must be taken into account, namely: the European Council, in view of its role of political dynamisation; and the High Representative, in his capacity as President of the Foreign Affairs Council.
Povezanost strateškega in finančnega načrtovanja (večletni finančni okvir)
The link between strategic programming and financial programming (multiannual financial framework)
Pogodba pravzaprav določa, da Svet po odobritvi Evropskega parlamenta sprejme uredbo o določitvi večletnega finančnega okvira za dobo najmanj petih let.
The Treaty provides for the adoption by the Council, with the approval of Parliament, of a regulation setting out the multiannual financial framework, to cover at least five years.
Večletno finančno načrtovanje ima jasno politično in zakonodajno naravo: določa politične prednostne naloge Unije (na področjih dejavnosti, ki morajo biti finančno podprta) in sredstva za njihovo dosego.
The political and legislative nature of multiannual financial programming is clear: it defines the Union's political priorities (in the areas of activity to receive financial support), as well as the means for realising them.
Opredelitev večletnega finančnega okvira vedno spremlja zakonodajni paket, v okviru katerega Komisija uresniči potrebne pobude, da se Uniji zagotovijo operativni programi, za katere so predvidena sredstva.
The definition of a multiannual financial framework is, besides, always accompanied by a legislative package in which the Commission lays down the initiatives required to equip the Union with the operational programmes for which the appropriations are foreseen.
Vseeno pa finančni predpisi ne predstavljajo vse zakonodajne dejavnosti Unije v določenem obdobju.
Legislation having a financial impact is not, however, the only kind of legislative activity of the Union over the period concerned.
Čez več zakonodajnih obdobij se raztezajo tudi politični programi, ki so dolgotrajni, zadevajo pa prihodnost Unije, denimo lizbonska strategija.
Moreover, certain long-term political projects concerning the future of the Union - an example being the Lisbon strategy - may extend over several legislative terms.
Pogodbi/programu za zakonodajno obdobje naproti?
Towards a contract/programme for the legislative term
V tem smislu je priporočljivo, da načrtovanje med institucijami dobi obliko nekakšne "pogodbe" oziroma "programa za zakonodajno obdobje" s strateškim načrtom za posamezno zakonodajno obdobje, o katerem bi se sporazumele vse institucije.
In this context, it is recommended that interinstitutional programming should be part of a full-blown 'contract' or 'programme for the term', embodying a strategic programme for the legislative term agreed among the institutions.
Za to bi morala Komisija ob prevzemu dolžnosti predstaviti politične prednostne naloge in strateške cilje petletnega mandata.
To this end, the Commission should, at the beginning of its term, present the political priorities and strategic objectives for the five years of its term of office.
V svoji predstavitvi, ki bi morala biti opravljena pred koncem prvega leta nastopa njenih funkcij, bi morala Komisija predstaviti tudi osnovne usmeritve glede potrebnih evropskih sredstev za financiranje svojih strateških ciljev.
When making this presentation, which should be done before the end of the calendar year in which it assumes office, the Commission should also include the initial elements relating to the necessary evolution of the Union's finances in the context of supporting its strategic objectives.
Na podlagi prednostnih nalog in ciljev, ki bi jih predstavila Komisija, bi se potem institucije – Komisija, Parlament in Svet – dogovorile o pravem "programu" oziroma "pogodbi za zakonodajno obdobje", ki bi usmerjala delovanje Unije v tem obdobju.
On the basis of the priorities and objectives presented by the Commission, the institutions - Commission, Parliament and Council - could then agree on a full 'programme' or 'contract for the term' which would guide the Union's action over the period.
Ta pogodba oziroma program bi lahko bil v obliki "skupnega programa", nekakšne skupne deklaracije.
This 'contract' or 'programme' could take the form of a 'joint programme' or a special type of 'joint declaration'.
Ali bi mu lahko prisodili zavezujočo naravo?
The question is whether such a programme could be made binding.
A čeprav nanj lahko gledamo kot na nekakšen medinstitucionalni sporazum, pa bi ga bilo bolj smiselno šteti za politično zavezo, katere izpodbijanje lahko povzroči izgubo političnega zaupanja med institucijami.
Even if it can be considered as a kind of interinstitutional agreement, it would seem more logical to see it more as a political commitment: if it were called in question, the fallout would be limited to a disturbance of the mutual trust between the institutions.
Če pa je tak odnos zaupanja institucionaliziran, kot je na primer med Evropskim parlamentom in Komisijo, ima lahko izguba zaupanja seveda pomembne politične posledice.
Nonetheless, where the relationship of trust is institutionalised, as it is between Parliament and the Commission, its disturbance could of course have significant political consequences.
Na podlagi skupne pogodbe oziroma programa bi morala torej Komisija pred koncem meseca junija v letu po prevzemu dolžnosti (N+1, pri čemer je N leto volitev v Evropski parlament) predstaviti predloge za večletni finančni okvir in seznam zakonodajnih pobud, potrebnih za uresničitev specifičnih programov izvedba tega finančnega okvira.
On the basis of this common 'contract' or 'programme', the Commission could then, by the end of the month of June of the year following the beginning of its term (N+1, N being the year of election of the European Parliament), present its proposals for the multiannual financial framework, accompanied by the list of legislative initiatives required for implementing the specific executing programmes.
Tako bi se lahko pogajanja o večletnem finančnem okviru razširila na drugo polovico leta N+1, celo v začetek leta N+2, finančni okvir bi bil sprejet pred koncem leta N+1 ali najkasneje do konca prvega trimesečja leta N+2, veljati pa bi začel na začetku naslednjega leta (N+2 ali – če potrebno – N+3)
The negotiations on the framework could continue over the second half of year N+1 and possibly into the beginning of year N+2, such that it could be adopted by the end of year N+1 or at the latest before the end of the first quarter of year N+2, and would thus come into force at the start of the next year (N+2 or, where applicable, N+3).
V zvezi s tem glej poročilo gospoda Bögeja o političnih izzivih in proračunskih sredstvih razširjene Unije 2007–2013 in poročilo gospe Guy-Quint. .
See, in this connection, the Böge report on the political challenges and budgetary resources of an enlarged Union (2007-2013), and also the Guy-Quint report.
Ker lizbonska pogodba določa finančni okvir za vsaj pet let, bi imel ta časovni razpored prednost, saj obdobje, ki ga finančni okvir pokriva, v veliki meri sovpada z mandatom Evropskega Parlamenta in Komisije.
Given that the Treaty of Lisbon provides for a financial framework of at least five years, the above calendar would have the advantage that the period covered by the multiannual financial framework would largely correspond to the term of office of Parliament and the Commission.
Treba bi bilo torej preiti s sedanjih finančnih programov za sedem let na petletne programe, kar pomeni prehodno obdobje.
To achieve this, it would, however, be necessary to replace the present seven-year financial programming model by a five-year one.
Najboljša rešitev bi bila, da se sedanji finančni okvir, ki velja do konca leta 2013, podaljša za dve dodatni leti, to je do konca leta 2015
This would require a transitional phase: the most reasonable solution would be to extend the existing financial framework (which currently goes up to the end of 2013) by an additional two years, i.e. bringing it up to the end of 2015
Medinstitucionalni sporazum o proračunski disciplini in dobrem finančnem poslovodenju z dne 17. maja 2006. .
Interinstitutional agreement on budgetary discipline and sound financial management of 17 May 2006. .
To bi dejansko lahko naredili brez težav, saj lizbonska pogodba zahteva, da preidemo s sedanjega „ad hoc“ sistema, ki temelji na medinstitucionalnih sporazumih, na zakonodajni akt (uredbo), sprejet po posebnem zakonodajnem postopku.
This is easily achievable, since the Treaty of Lisbon requires that the existing ad hoc arrangements based on interinstitutional agreements be replaced by a legislative act (a regulation) adopted under a special legislative procedure.
Vsekakor bo ta „prehod“ potreben po uveljavitvi pogodbe.
This shift will in any case have to happen once the Treaty is in force.
Trenutek je torej ugoden za to, da se doseže dogovor glede predlaganega podaljšanja, izvedli pa bi ga lahko sočasno z oceno, predvideno v sedanjem medinstitucionalnem sporazumu .
This would be an excellent moment for reaching an agreement on the proposed prolongation, a process which could go in tandem with the evaluation required under the existing interinstitutional agreement.
Pogodba oziroma program za zakonodajno obdobje bi ob večletnem finančnem okviru predstavljal bistveno vsebino večletnega načrtovanja iz člena 1(2) in člena 3 osnutka sklepa iz izjave 9, kar zadeva Komisijo in Svet za splošne zadeve.
The 'contract' or 'programme' for the legislative term would constitute, together with the multiannual financial framework, the essential content of the multiannual programming foreseen in Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the draft decision included in Declaration 9 with regard to the Commission and the General Affairs Council.
Tako bi pogodba oziroma program lahko služila kot okvir za druga področja načrtovanja, določena z lizbonsko pogodbo, zlasti pri:
Thus conceived, these would serve as a framework for the other programming exercises provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon, notably: