natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
· Kršitev predpisane naloge v skladu z Zakonom o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982 (ICA).
· Breach of statutory duty under the Insurance Companies Act 1982 (ICA).
V skladu z WE 71 družba v zvezi s tem ne more uveljavljati zahtevka, „ ker (i) ni mogoče trditi, da zakonodajalec ni obravnaval možnosti izvajanja svojih pristojnosti posredovanja v skladu z Zakonom o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982 ali da noben razumen zakonodajalec za bonitetne zadeve ne bi ravnal na tak način; in (ii) ker Zakon o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982 ne prenaša pravnih sredstev zasebnega prava na družbo ELAS. “
WE 71 considers that the Society does not have any claim in this regard, " since (i) it cannot be said that the regulator failed to consider whether to exercise its powers of intervention under the ICA 1982 or that no rational prudential regulator could have acted in the way in which it did; and (ii) the ICA 1982 does not confer private law remedies on the Society ".
· Glede na WE 71 družba prav tako ne more uveljavljati zahtevka glede nespoštovanja običajnega prava, „ ker (i) v poročilu nič ne nakazuje, da karkoli, kar so zakonodajalci za bonitetne zadeve naredili ali prepovedali, ne spada pod njihovo pristojnost; in ker (ii) zakonodajalci niso imeli dolžnosti povrniti družbi škodo za kakršno koli izgubo, ki jo je morda utrpela zaradi pomanjkljivosti v bonitetni ureditvi, ki so opredeljene v poročilu “.
· According to WE 71, the Society would not have a claim in common law negligence either, " since (i) there is nothing in the Report to indicate that anything which the prudential regulators did, or forbore from doing, fell outside the ambit of their powers; and (ii) the regulators had no duty to hold the Society harmless from any loss which it might have suffered as a result of the shortcomings in prudential regulation identified in the Report ".
· V skladu z WE 71 zahtevki glede zlorabe uradnega položaja verjetno prav tako ne bi bili uspešni: „ Nič ne kaže na to, da je en ali več posameznikov, zaposlenih pri zakonodajalcu za bonitetne zadeve, nezakonito izvajalo pristojnosti, zlasti da bi namenoma škodovali družbi ELAS, ali z nepremišljeno brezskrbnostjo do takšnega mogočega škodovanja. “
· Claims for misfeasance in public office would also be unlikely to succeed, according to WE 71: " There is nothing ... to suggest that any one or more of the individuals employed by the prudential regulators exercised power unlawfully, specifically intending to injure the Society, or with reckless indifference to the possibility of such injury. "
V skladu z Zakonom o finančnih storitvah iz leta 1986 ima zakonodajalec s področja poslovanja
Pursuant to the Financial Services Act 1986 (FSA), the conduct of business regulator
V zadevnem času je bil zakonodajalec s področja poslovanja Organ za zasebne naložbe, katerega pomembne naloge so bile dodeljene Organu za finančne storitve. omejeno zakonsko imuniteto.
The conduct of business regulator at the relevant time was the Personal Investment Authority, the relevant functions of which were contracted out to the FSA. has limited statutory immunity.
Zato zahtevke proti njemu izključuje Zakon o finančnih storitvah iz leta 1986, razen če se izkaže, da je bilo dejanje ali opustitev storjeno v slabi veri (glej ES 3
Thus, claims against it are precluded by the FSA 1986 unless the act or omission is shown to have been done in bad faith (see ES 3
Stran 92. ).
Page 92. ).
Stran 18. ugotavlja, da „ bi se moral oškodovani zavarovanec spoprijeti z izjemno težko nalogo, ker bi moral dokazati vsaj, da je zakonodajalec vedel za nezakonitost in verjetnost povzročitve škode “.
Page 18. concludes that " an aggrieved policyholder would face a Herculean task as he would have to prove, at the very least, knowledge of illegality and of probability of injury on the part of the regulator ".
Avtorji WE 71 so poudarili, da „ po njihovem mnenju ni ničesar, kar bi podprlo obtožbo o ravnanju v slabi veri. “
The authors of WE 71 point out that " we do not consider there to be anything ... to support a claim of bad faith. "
Zato na podlagi zakonodaje Združenega kraljestva ni mogoče realno pričakovati, da bodo lahko oškodovani zavarovanci regulativnim organom dokazali odgovornost za izgube.
Hence, on the basis of UK law, there does not appear to be any realistic prospect for aggrieved policyholders to be successful in making the regulatory authorities liable for their losses.
Po pričakovanjih zbrani dokazi kažejo, da do zdaj še ni bila vložena tožba proti zakonodajalcu.
Unsurprisingly, the evidence obtained suggests that no case has been brought against the regulator so far.
Stran 105. obstajajo dobri razlogi za to, da se zakonodajna odgovornost prizna le v posebnih okoliščinah: „ Ureditev sektorja za finančne storitve je zelo zapletena ..., pri čemer je zakonodajalec pozvan k izvajanju in usklajevanju veliko različnih in včasih nasprotujočih si ciljev, vključno z varstvom vlagateljev, stabilnostjo in učinkovitostjo trga.
Page 105. , there are good reasons why regulatory liability should be recognised only in exceptional circumstances: " The regulation of the financial services industry is a highly complex matter ... and the regulator is called upon to pursue and balance a number of divergent and sometimes contradictory objectives, including investor protection, market stability and market efficiency.
Zato mora imeti diskrecijsko pravico za izvajanje nalog, da lahko daje prednost nasprotujočim si ciljem, tako kot zahteva javni interes.
It must therefore enjoy wide discretion in the exercise of its functions so as to be able to prioritize competing objectives as the public interest requires.
Njegove diskrecijske pravice ne sme ovirati strah, da je lahko odškodninsko odgovoren, če se politična izbira izkaže za napačno ali nezakonito. ...
Its discretion should not be fettered by the fear that, in case a policy choice proves wrong or unlawful, it may be liable in damages. ...
Poleg tega je na koncu davkoplačevalec tisti, ki krije stroške, če je odškodninska tožba uspešna.
Furthermore, where an action in damages is successful, it is ultimately the taxpayer who is called upon to cover the costs. "
“ Zato je nadzorna odgovornost omejena v vseh državah članicah EU, čeprav na različnih stopnjah.
For these reasons, supervisory liability is restricted in all EU Member States, albeit to varying degrees.
Avtorji ES 3 pa verjamejo, da kljub navedenim točkam popolna regulativna imuniteta zakonodajalca na področju finančnih storitev ni zaželena.
The authors of ES 3, however, believe that despite the points made above, complete regulatory immunity of financial services regulators would not be desirable.
V zvezi s tem je v ES 3 navedeno, da „ je pojem hude malomarnosti ali očitnega in grobega neupoštevanja diskrecijskih pooblastil boljše merilo kot pojem slabe vere [,ki se uporablja v skladu z zakonodajo Združenega kraljestva], ker ni odvisen od namer zakonodajalca in je bolj dovzeten za določanje ciljev “ (ES 3
In this context ES 3 states that " the concept of gross negligence or manifest and grave disregard of discretionary powers provides a better criterion than the concept of bad faith [which applies under UK law] because it is not reliant on the motives of the regulator and is more susceptible to objective determination " (ES 3
Stran 106. ).
Page 106. ).
Navedeno je tudi, da „ se lahko razlikuje med regulativnimi in nadzornimi nalogami; zdi se, da zakonodajalec lažje odgovarja za odločitve, sprejete na operativni ravni nadzora, kot za odločitve, ki vključujejo izbiro v okviru regulativne politike. “
He also notes that " a distinction may ... be drawn between regulatory functions and supervisory functions; it would appear easier to hold a regulator liable for decisions made at the operational level of supervision rather than for decisions involving regulatory policy choices. "
Združeno kraljestvo ima zakonsko določen sklad, ki je predviden kot zadnja možnost in je namenjen strankam pooblaščenih družb za finančne storitve, ustanovljen pa je bil z Zakonom o finančnih storitvah in trgu.
The UK has a statutory fund of last resort for customers of authorised financial services firms, set up by the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA).
To je odškodninska shema za finančne storitve, iz katere se lahko plača odškodnina, če zavarovalnica ne more izplačati zneska, to pomeni, da nima dovolj sredstev za plačilo zahtevkov ali je nesolventna.
This is the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS), which can pay compensation if an insurer is in default, i.e. has insufficient assets to meet claims or is insolvent.
Odškodninska shema za finančne storitve se financira iz pristojbin družb, ki jih odobri Organ za finančne storitve.
The FSCS is funded by levies on firms authorised by the FSA.
V WE 6
In WE 6
Stran 5. je tedanja sekretarka za finančne zadeve na Ministrstvu za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve Ruth Kelly navedla: „ Če bi bil v zvezi z družbo Equitable Life uveden postopek v primeru nesolventnosti, je zdaj vzpostavljena zakonsko določena varovalna mreža, ki jo zagotavlja odškodninska shema za finančne storitve in iz katere bi se izplačalo 90 % zajamčene vrednosti polic “ .
Page 5. , the then Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Ruth Kelly, is quoted as saying: “ In the event that Equitable Life were to be subject to insolvency proceedings, there is now a statutory safety net, provided by the financial services compensation scheme, which would pay out 90 per cent of guaranteed policy values ".
Vendar shema oškodovancem družbe Equitable Life ni bila na voljo, ker družba ni bila nikoli razglašena za nesolventno.
However, the scheme was not available to Equitable Life victims, since the company was never declared insolvent.
Zavarovanci so navedli, da je vlada Združenega kraljestva namerno „ za vsako ceno ohranjala plačilno sposobnost družbe Equitable Life, da bi se izognila kakršnim koli stroškom odškodninske sheme za finančne storitve; da bi se izognila kakršnim koli stroškom preostalega sektorja finančnih storitev “ in s tem „ da bi se za vsako ceno izognila nesolventnosti in tako zagotovila, da izgube krijejo vlagatelji “ (WEIR, H2).
Policyholders alleged that it has been the intention of the UK government " to keep Equitable Life afloat at any price ... avoiding any cost to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme; avoiding any cost to the rest of the financial services industry ", and thus " avoiding insolvency at any price ... to ensure that the losses ... are borne by the investors " (Mr WEIR, H2).
SEYMOUR je v H7 nadaljeval v podobni smeri: „ Ko je bilo ugotovljeno, da družba ELAS nima dovolj sredstev za izpolnitev neposrednih pogodbenih obveznosti, so se začele razprave o rešilnem skladu za zavarovalnice, s katerim bi se uvedel davek ali dajatev za vse ostale zavarovalnice, da se izplačajo odškodnine zavarovancem družbe ELAS.
Mr SEYMOUR struck a similar note in H7: " When it was realised that ELAS could not match its immediate contractual liabilities to its assets, discussions started as to the insurance rescue fund, which would have entailed a tax or levy on all other insurance companies to compensate ELAS policyholders.
Zakonodajalec Združenega kraljestva je potem odobril sistem vključevanja petletnega teoretičnega prihodnjega dobička za saldo računovodskih knjig zaprte družbe – ELAS – s čimer je preprečil dostop do odškodninskega sklada .“
The UK regulator then approved a system of including five years of theoretical future profits to balance the books of a closed company – ELAS – thus rendering impossible access to the compensation fund ."
Družba ELAS je zavrnila te obtožbe, pri čemer je navedla, da sklad ni bil nikoli „tehnično nesolventen“ (glej WE-CONF 5
ELAS rejects these allegations, stating that the fund has never been 'technically insolvent' (see WE-CONF 5
DAYKIN in STRACHAN (H4) sta prav tako poudarila, da je družba bila vedno solventna.
Mr DAYKIN and Mr STRACHAN (H4) also emphasised that the company has always been solvent.
Če bi družba postala nesolventna, bi bile možnosti zavarovancev po njegovem mnenju bistveno slabše.
According to him, had the company become insolvent, the prospects for policyholders would have looked substantially worse.
V H8 je to stališče ponovil: „ Domneva se, da bi bilo za družbo bolje, če bi postala nesolventna.
In H8 he repeated this view: " There is the suggestion that it would have been better for the Society to become insolvent.
V zvezi s tem je Lord PENROSE navedel: „ Po odločitvi zgornjega doma so se zakonodajalci pri obravnavi vprašanja, ali naj se družba zapre, soočili z nasprotujočimi si interesi.
In this respect, Lord PENROSE notes the following: " Following the House of Lords' decision, when considering whether the Society should close, regulators were faced with competing interests.
Morebitna uskladitev interesov obstoječih in potencialnih zavarovancev je upravičen in nujen del bonitetne ureditve in ne obtožujem zakonodajalcev, ker so sklenili, da jih je treba, čeprav me skrbi, da Organ za finančne storitve in vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko nista imela dovolj neodvisnih informacij in nista dovolj poznala poslovanja družbe, da bi lahko bila prepričana, da je prodaja možna.
It is a legitimate and necessary part of prudential regulation that the interests of existing and potential policyholders may need to be balanced, and I do not find fault with the regulators for arriving at the conclusion that they did, although I am concerned that FSA and GAD did not have sufficient independent knowledge and understanding of the Society's business to justify their confidence that a sale could be achieved.
Prav tako menim, da odločitev ni izražala navzkrižja med bonitetnimi cilji in cilji poslovanja, kar je domneva, ki temelji na nerazumevanju narave bonitetne ureditve.
Nor do I consider that the decision reflected a conflict between prudential and conduct of business objectives, a suggestion that is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of prudential regulation.
Zakonodajalci pa so še naprej predvidevali, da bo na voljo odškodnina, če bo odločitev, da se družba ne zapre, komur koli škodovala.
However, the regulators proceeded on an assumption that if anyone were disadvantaged by a decision not to close the Society, compensation would be available.
Za zagotovitev tega ni bilo predloženo nobeno pravno zagotovilo, prav tako niso bila preučena pravna vprašanja.
No legal assurance was sought that this would be so, and there was no examination of the legal issues involved.
Zabeležilo se ni nobeno priznanje, da se bodo sredstva za odškodninske zahtevke, če bodo sprejeti, črpali iz sklada za življenjsko zavarovanje s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice, niti nobeno prizadevanje za natančno oceno tveganja, kateremu so bili zavarovanci izpostavljeni sorazmerno s prejemkom, ki ga je zahtevalo vodstvo za nadaljevanje prodaje.
There was no recognition recorded that if compensation claims were sustained, those claims would be at the expense of the with profits fund, nor any attempt to quantify the risks to which potential policyholders were exposed relative to the benefit claimed by management for continuing to trade.
Ukrepi, ki bi lahko zmanjšali možnost nadaljnjih obtožb zavajanja, se niso upoštevali.
No consideration was given to measures that might have mitigated the potential for subsequent claims of misrepresentation.
Družba je lahko nadaljevala oglaševanje in tako so tisti, ki so sklepali nove ali dodatne police pri družbi, storili to na povabilo in ne zgolj prostovoljno, ne da bi bili ob tem seznanjeni z obstoječim tveganjem.
The Society was permitted to continue its advertising, and so those taking new or further policies with the Society did so by invitation and not as mere volunteers without the risks of doing so being made known to them.
Med postopkom, v katerem se lahko osebe, ki so negativno ocenjene, zagovarjajo, je bilo predstavljeno, da kritika ukrepov in odločitev zakonodajalcev v zvezi s prodajo produktov ne daje dovolj teže pristojnosti Organa za finančne storitve, da bi zahteval shemo, v okviru katere bi oškodovani zavarovanci prejeli odškodnino brez sodnega postopka.
In the course of maxwellisation it has been represented that criticism of regulators' actions and decisions relating to product sales fails to give adequate weight to FSA's power to require a scheme under which affected policyholders would be compensated without need for litigation.
To ne upošteva dejstva, da bi se lahko sprejeli ukrepi za vnaprejšnjo zaščito novejših zavarovancev.
This misses the point that steps could have been taken to protect late joiners in advance.
Družba je od njih zahtevala, da odklonijo kakršne koli možne prejemke od prodaje podjetja.
The Society required them to disclaim any potential benefit from the sale of the business.
Razumna protistoritev bi bila zaščita zavarovancev pred izgubo tako, da se jim omogoči prenos brez kazni, če prodaja ne uspe.
A reasonable counterpart would have been to have protected them from loss by allowing an option to transfer out without penalty in the event of the sale process failing.
Če bi pomislili na ogroženo skupino, bi se dala prednost zaščiti in ne odškodnini za nastalo škodo “ (WE 16
Thought for the cohort at risk would have identified the need for protection rather than ex post facto compensation " (WE 16
Strani 724 in 725. ).
Pages 724 and 725. ).
Kot je omenjeno, obstaja več tisoč oškodovancev, ki so kupili police zunaj Združenega kraljestva.
As mentioned above, there are several thousand victims who had purchased policies outside the UK.
Veliko ljudi je kupilo police za življenjsko zavarovanje s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice pri podružnicah družbe Equitable Life, ki jih je na Irskem in v Nemčiji ustanovila v skladu z določbami tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju.
A significant number bought with-profits policies through Equitable Life's branches, which it had established under the provisions of the Third Life Directives in Ireland and Germany.
Glede na informacije, ki jih je predložil nemški zakonodajalec na področju financ, je družba ELAS prek nemške podružnice prodajala police med 22. decembrom 1992 in 30. septembrom 2001 (WE 21
According to information received from the German financial regulator, ELAS sold policies from its German branch between 22 December 1992 and 30 September 2001 (WE 21
Irski zakonodajalec na področju financ pa je navedel, da je podružnica družbe Equitable Life na Irskem delovala od leta 1991 do leta 2001 (O'DEAJEVA, H4).
The Irish financial regulator indicated that that Equitable Life operated a branch in Ireland from 1991 to 2001 (Ms O'DEA, H4).
Vendar korespondenca med irskimi in britanskimi zakonodajalci kaže, da se je irska podružnica uradno zaprla 8. julija 2002.
Exchange of correspondence between Irish and British regulators however suggests that the Irish branch formally closed on 8 July 2002.
THOMSON (H2) je navedel, da se po 8. decembru 2000 na Irskem niso sklepala nova zavarovanja.
Mr THOMSON (H2) claimed that no new contracts were sold in Ireland after 8 December 2000.
Družba Equitable Life s sedeža v Združenem kraljestvu še naprej izvaja storitve preostalim irskim in nemškim zavarovancem na podlagi čezmejnega delovanja v skladu z določbami tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju (WE 61
Equitable Life is continuing to service its remaining Irish and German clients on a cross-border basis under the provisions of the Third Life Directive from its UK office (WE 61
Stran 1. in WE 85
Page 1. and WE 85
Vse police, ki jih je družba ELAS prodala prek podružnic na Irskem in v Nemčiji, so bile brez zajamčenih rent (WEYER, H3; KNOWDOVA, H2; WE 21).
All policies sold by ELAS through its branches in Ireland and Germany were non-GAR policies (Mr WEYER, H3; Ms KNOWD, H2; WE 21).
Obsega finančne škode, ki so jo zaradi krize utrpeli zavarovanci, ki niso iz Združenega kraljestva, na podlagi razpoložljivih informacij ni mogoče oceniti.
The magnitude of the financial damage suffered due to the crisis by non-UK policyholders as a whole cannot be assessed on the basis of the available information.
Odbor je prejel veliko pisem nemških in irskih zavarovancev z informacijami o okoliščinah, v katerih so kupili police, o njihovi korespondenci z družbo ELAS in finančnimi organi, izgubi, ki so jo utrpeli, ter njihovem ukrepanju, da bi dobili odškodnino.
The committee has received numerous letters from German and Irish policyholders, with information about the circumstances under which they acquired policies, their correspondence with ELAS and the financial authorities, losses they have suffered and actions they have taken in order to obtain redress.
Irski zavarovanec (KNOWDOVA, H2) in predstavnik nemške akcijske skupine zavarovancev (WEYER, H3) sta pred odborom predložila dodatne ustne dokaze.
One Irish policyholder (Ms KNOWD, H2) and a representative of a German policyholders' action group (Mr WEYER, H3) furthermore gave oral evidence before the committee.
Poleg tega je delegacija odbora 6. oktobra 2006 obiskala Dublin in se sestala z oškodovanimi irskimi zavarovanci.
Moreover, on 6 October 2006, a committee delegation visited Dublin and met with aggrieved Irish policyholders.
Po obisku je odbor udeležencem poslal natančen vprašalnik, zlasti o naslovih, na katere so pošiljali zahtevke za odškodnino.
Following this visit, a questionnaire was sent by the committee to the participants with detailed questions, in particular concerning the avenues they pursued in trying to obtain redress.
a) Spodbude za naložbe pri družbi ELAS
Motivations for investing with ELAS
Veliko zavarovancev je poudarilo, da so se pri odločitvi glede naložbe v polico za življenjsko zavarovanje s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice Equitable Life zanašali na dolgoleten ugled družbe Equitable Life kot najstarejše vzajemne življenjske zavarovalnice v Združenem kraljestvu.
Many policyholders emphasised that, when they decided to invest in an Equitable Life with-profits policy, they relied on the long-standing reputation of Equitable Life as the oldest UK mutual life insurer.
Nekateri so opozorili tudi na odlično bonitetno oceno družbe (glej na primer WE-FILE 15, WE-FILE 33), kot je poudarjena v prodajnem gradivu družbe Equitable (glej prilogo k WE-FILE 15).
Some also alluded to the Society's excellent credit rating (see for instance WE-FILE 15, WE-FILE 33), such as emphasised in Equitable's sales material (see annex to WE-FILE 15).
Irski zavarovanci so na sestanku v Dublinu 6. oktobra 2006 odboru povedali, da jih je družba Equitable Life zanimala, ker so lahko police kupili neposredno pri podružnici družbe, pri čemer so se izognili provizijam, ki jih posredniki zaračunavajo za police konkurenčnih družb.
Irish policyholders told the committee during the meeting in Dublin on 6 October 2006 that they were attracted to Equitable Life by the fact that they could purchase policies directly from the Society's branch and thus avoid commission fees charged by intermediaries for policies offered by ELAS competitors.
Poleg tega so mednarodni zavarovanci poudarili, da jih je pri odločitvi o naložbi družba ELAS obvestila, da sektor ustrezno nadzirajo zakonodajalci (glej tudi izjave SEYMOURJA v WE 36 in H7; DUGGANA v WE-FILE 14).
In addition, international policyholders pointed out that, when they invested, they were informed by ELAS that the industry was properly supervised by regulators (see also Mr SEYMOUR in WE 36 and H7; Mr DUGGAN in WE-FILE 14).
Mednarodni zavarovanci so odboru povedali, da so na njihovo odločitev o naložbi v družbo Equitable vplivali tudi oglasi in prodajno gradivo družbe, ki so poudarjali „ izjemno uspešnost “ sklada (glej WE 53
International policyholders informed the committee that their decision to invest with Equitable was also influenced by advertisements and sales-material from the Society, which emphasised the " supreme performance " of the fund (see WE 53
C-1. ) ali navajali „nenavadno številko“ 10,75-odstotne vmesne stopnje večanja vrednosti v letu 2000 (WE-FILE 12 in WE-FILE 15).
C-1. ) or referred to the "extraordinary figure" of 10.75% interim rate for bringing values forward during 2000 (WE-FILE 12 and WE-FILE 15).