natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Odbor meni, da je bila v Združenem kraljestvu uporaba tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju pri primeru družbe ELAS pomanjkljiva ter da zakonodajalci in organi Združenega kraljestva niso ustrezno upoštevali končnega namena direktive.
The committee is of the opinion that the application of the 3LD by the UK in respect of the ELAS case was deficient and that UK regulators and authorities did not adequately respect the ultimate purpose of the Directive.
Odbor meni, da se na podlagi kombinacije uradnega prenosa z uporabo, ki je bila v več pogledih pomanjkljiva, v tem primeru sklepa, da je bil postopek izvajanja kot celota neuspešen.
The committee believes that, in the present case, the combination of a formalistic transposition with an application which was defective in several respects leads to the conclusion that the implementation process as a whole was flawed.
Posebna vprašanja v zvezi z uporabo
Specific issues regarding application
Koncept finančnega nadzora celotnega poslovanja
The concept of financial supervision of the entire business
Odbor opozarja, da direktiva določa, da mora finančni nadzor zajemati „ celotno poslovanje zavarovalnice“ .
The committee recalls that the Directive states that financial supervision must cover the “ assurance undertaking's entire business ”.
Člen 8 tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju.
Article 8 3LD.
Odbor kot zakonodajalec poudarja, da je takšna preprosta terminologija nedvoumna ter jo je treba razlagati na široko in ustrezno.
The committee stresses as a legislator that such simple terminology is unambiguous and must be given a wide and proper interpretation.
Odbor meni, da organi Združenega kraljestva pri nadzoru družbe ELAS niso upoštevali koncepta „ finančnega nadzora celotnega poslovanja “ ali so si ga razlagali v nasprotju s členi 8
The committee believes that UK authorities’ supervision of ELAS disregarded or misinterpreted the concept of " financial supervision of the entire business " contrary to Articles 8
220; poglavje 21) in WE 3. konferenca. , 18
21) and WE Conf 3. , 18
Glej del II, oddelek II.1.1 in del II, oddelek II.2.3; glej tudi WE 11. konferenca, WE 16, WE 26 in WE 79. in 25
See Part II Section II.1.1 and Part II Section II.2.3; see also WE Conf 11, WE 16, WE 26 and WE 79. and 25
Glej del II, oddelek II.1.1 in del II, oddelek II.2.3; glej tudi WE 17. tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju.
See Part II Section II.1.1 and Part II Section II.2.3; see also WE 17. of the 3LD.
Odbor meni, da možnost iz odstavka 1.D člena 18 tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju prihodnjih diskrecijskih ali nepogodbenih bonusov ne izključuje iz celotnega poslovanja podjetja ter organov držav članic ne razbremenjuje njihovega najboljšega prizadevanja za spoštovanje pisma in cilja direktive.
The committee believes that the option contained in paragraph 1.D of Article 18 of the 3LD does not exclude future discretionary or non-contractual bonuses from being an integral part of the company's ‘entire business’ and does not exonerate Member State authorities from doing their utmost to respect the letter and the aim of the Directive.
Razen tega se iz gradiva, ki je na voljo odboru
Furthermore, it appears from the material available to the committee
Glej del II, oddelek II.2.3, glej tudi WE 16, WE 26 in WE 79. , zdi, da je eden od glavnih razlogov za finančno krizo družbe ELAS dejstvo, da skozi leta ni ustvarjala ustreznih rezerv za prihodnje diskrecijske ali nepogodbene bonuse.
See Part Section II.2.3, see also WE 16, WE 26 and WE 79. that one of the main reasons for ELAS’ financial downfall was the fact that, throughout the years, it did not properly reserve for future discretionary or non-contractual bonuses.
Pojavljajo se trditve, da družba ELAS ni bila obvezana k ustvarjanju rezerv za prihodnje diskrecijske ali nepogodbene bonuse, ker direktiva to določa kot izbirno možnost in ker se je zakonodajalec Združenega kraljestva odločil, da te možnosti ne izkoristi.
It has been argued that ELAS was not obliged to reserve for future discretionary or non-contractual bonuses because this was optional under the Directive, and the UK regulator decided not to avail itself of this option.
Odbor meni, da je izbirno ustvarjanje rezerv za diskrecijske bonuse ogrozilo moč in notranjo skladnost direktive.
The committee believes that the fact of making the reserving of discretionary bonuses optional undermined the strength and internal coherence of the Directive.
Čeprav so bili regulativni organi Združenega kraljestva upravičeni do uvedbe takšne možnosti, je mogoče sklepati, da to ni bilo v skladu s splošnim ciljem direktive.
Although the UK regulatory authorities were entitled to introduce such an option, it could be argued that this was inconsistent with the overall aim of the Directive.
Vloge, ki jih je prejel odbor
Submissions made to the committee
Zato odbor meni, da zakonodajalcu ni uspelo jamčiti, da je imela družba ELAS vseskozi zadosten minimalni kapital glede na svoje celotno poslovanje.
The committee believes therefore that it is likely that the regulator did not manage to guarantee that ELAS had an adequate solvency margin in respect of its entire business at all times.
Pomanjkanje smotrnih upravnih in računovodskih postopkov ter ustreznih mehanizmov notranjega nadzora
Lack of sound administrative and accounting procedures and adequate internal control mechanisms
Obstajajo jasni znaki, da zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva zavestno niso poskušali ovreči dvojne in zato sporne vloge imenovanega aktuarja družbe ELAS, ki je šest let imel tudi vodilni položaj v družbi, in sicer je bil njen generalni izvršni direktor.
There are clear indications that the UK regulators knowingly failed to challenge the dual, and therefore conflicting, role of the Appointed Actuary of ELAS, who for six years also held a leading management post in the Society as its Chief Executive.
Odbor meni, da je ta dvojnost vlog ustvarila nasprotje interesov, ki škoduje interesom zavarovancev, čemur bi morali zakonodajalci nasprotovati kot primeru slabega vodenja podjetja.
The committee believes that this duality of roles created a conflict of interests detrimental to policyholders' interests which should have been challenged by regulators as an instance of bad corporate governance.
Razen tega odbor meni, da zakonodajalec Združenega kraljestva, ker ni hitro ukrepal v zvezi dvojno vlogo imenovanega aktuarja, ni izpolnil svoje obveznosti, da od družbe ELAS zahteva „ smotrne upravne in računovodske postopke ter ustrezne mehanizme notranjega nadzora “, kot izrecno zahteva tretja direktiva o življenjskem zavarovanju in kar je v nasprotju s členom 8.
Furthermore, the committee believes that, by not taking swift action on the issue of the double role of the Appointed Actuary, the UK regulator did not fulfil its obligation to require from ELAS " sound administrative and accounting procedures and adequate internal control mechanisms " as required explicitly by the 3LD, and contrary to Article 8.
Odbor meni, da je imenovani aktuar, ko je zasedel svoj položaj in ne glede na to, ali zakonodaja Skupnosti zahteva omenjeni koncept, postal del regulativnega in nadzornega sistema Združenega kraljestva, ki je bil kot celota predmet tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju.
The committee considers that, once in place and irrespective of whether the concept was required under Community law, the Appointed Actuary became part of the UK regulatory and supervisory system which, as a whole, was subject to the 3LD.
Razen tega je zaradi nekaterih izjav
Furthermore, certain statements
Glej Bairdovo poročilo (WE 17), odstavek 2.13.6. odbor menil, da je ta neuspeh del širše upravne prakse, ki je ogrozila učinkovitost varnostnih ukrepov, ki jih določa zakonodaja Skupnosti.
See Baird Report (WE 17), paragraph 2.13.6. lead the committee to believe that this failure formed part of a wider administrative practice which undermined the effectiveness of the safeguards contained in Community legislation.
Neupoštevanje razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev
Failure to respect policyholders’ reasonable expectations (PRE)
Glede na nekatere izjave, ki jih je prejel odbor
According to some statements made to the committee
Glej del II, oddelek II.1.1; glej tudi del II, oddelek II.2.3; glej tudi WE 16, poglavje 18, odstavek 220, in WE 26, WE 52-54 in LLOYD v H5. , je koncept razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev vključeval dejstvo, da so zavarovanci pričakovali, da bodo poleg prejemkov iz pogodbe prejeli diskrecijske bonuse.
See Part II Section II.1.1; see also Part II Section II.2.3; see also WE 16, ch.18, para 220, and WE 26, WE 52-54 and LLOYD in H5. , the concept of PRE included the fact that policyholders expected to receive discretionary bonuses in addition to contractual benefits.
Če se je od organov Združenega kraljestva zahtevalo, da razumna pričakovanja zavarovancev obravnavajo kot del svojih obveznosti na podlagi zakonodaje Skupnosti, odbor meni, da bi morali zagotoviti, da rezerve krijejo diskrecijske bonuse.
If UK authorities were obliged to respect PRE as part of their obligations under Community law, the committee considers that they should have also made sure that reserves covered discretionary bonuses.
Odbor meni, da zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva, ker diskrecijskih bonusov niso upoštevali kot celostnega dela celotnega poslovanja družbe in ker od družbe ELAS niso zahtevali, da zagotovi ustrezne tehnične določbe zanje, niso ustrezno upoštevali razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev, s čimer so kršili pismo in cilj člena 18 tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju.
The committee believes that, by not considering discretionary bonuses as an integral part of the company’s entire business and not obliging ELAS to provide adequate technical provisions for them, the UK regulators did not pay due regard to PRE and thereby appear to have breached the letter and aim of Article 18 of the 3LD.
Odbor opozarja, da je člen 10 tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju zahteval, da se organom Združenega kraljestva dodelijo pooblastila in sredstva za zagotavljanje, da se razumna pričakovanja zavarovancev spoštujejo in da se sprejmejo vsi ustrezni in potrebni ukrepi za zagotavljanje, da je poslovanje družbe ELAS še naprej v skladu z zakonodajo Združenega kraljestva
The committee recalls that Article 10 of the 3LD required that UK authorities be given the powers and means to ensure that PRE were respected and that any appropriate and necessary measures were taken to ensure that ELAS' business continued to comply with UK law
Glej del II, oddelek II.1.1. , zato da se preprečijo ali odpravijo vse nepravilnosti, ki škodujejo interesom zavarovanih oseb.
See Part II Section II.1.1. , in order to prevent or remedy any irregularities prejudicial to the interests of the assured persons.
Izjave, ki jih je prejel odbor
Statements made to the committee
Glej del II, oddelek II.1.1 in del II, oddelek II.2.3; glej tudi WE 17. , kažejo, da v devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja zakonodajalci v Združenem kraljestvu niso izvajali svojih številnih pooblastil v zvezi z družbo ELAS, čeprav so imeli dovolj dokazov o bližajoči se krizi.
See Part II Sections II.1.1 and Part II Section II.2.3; see also WE 17. suggest that, during the 1990s, the regulators in the UK did not exercise their extensive powers with respect to ELAS, despite having sufficient indication of the impending crisis.
Nekatere izjave
Some accounts
Glej del II, oddelek II.2.3 in WE 16. kažejo, da se je zakonodajalec zavestno in namerno odločil, da ne posega v primer družbe ELAS.
See Part II Section II.2.3 and WE 16. indicate that the regulator adopted a conscious and deliberate hands-off approach with regards to the ELAS case.
Odbor meni, da lahko to pomeni kršitev obveznosti zakonodajalca, da zagotovi spoštovanje razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev, s čimer je kršil pismo in cilj člena 10 tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju.
The committee believes that this may have constituted a breach of the regulators’ obligation to ensure respect of PRE and therefore was in breach of the letter and aim of Article 10 of the 3LD.
Prevelika prizanesljivost zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva glede minimalnega kapitala
UK regulators' excessive leniency on solvency margin
Več izjav
Several statements
Ta dovoljenja so bila odobrena na podlagi pooblastil notranjega ministra v zvezi z oprostitvijo, ki so vključena v oddelek 68 Zakona o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982, odbor pa še vedno dvomi o združljivosti teh pooblastil s pismom in namenom tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju.
These authorisations were granted on the basis of the waiver powers of the Secretary of State contained in Section 68 of the ICA 1982, whose compatibility with the letter and the purpose of the 3LD remain doubtful to the committee.
Zdi se, da prevelika prizanesljivost zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva v zvezi s tem pomeni kršitev členov 10 in 25 tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju.
The UK regulators' excessive leniency in this regard appears to have been in breach of Articles 10 and 25 of the 3LD.
Odbor meni, da je družba ELAS s tem, ko ji je bilo dovoljeno, da umetno izpolni svoje zahteve glede plačilne sposobnosti, skrivala resnico pred zavarovanci in ogrozila svojo finančno sposobnost v prihodnosti.
The committee believes that by being allowed to artificially meet its solvency requirements, ELAS hid the truth from policyholders and endangered its future financial viability.
Iz tega sledi, da so bila razumna pričakovanja zavarovancev ogrožena ter da so zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva domnevno sprejeli ukrepe, ki niso bili „ primerni in potrebni za preprečevanje ali odpravo vseh nepravilnosti, ki škodujejo interesom zavarovanih oseb ”
It therefore follows that PRE were put at risk and that UK regulators allegedly took measures that were not “ appropriate and necessary to prevent or remedy any irregularities prejudicial to the interests of the assured persons ”
Člen 10 tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju. .
Article 10 3LD. .
Odbor meni, da sta čezmerna poraba prihodnjih dobičkov in zilmerjeve rezerve povzročila, da je bil minimalni kapital kot kazalnik finančnega stanja družbe ELAS dokaj zavajajoč, zaradi česar zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva niso izpolnili svoje obveznosti, da od družbe ELAS zahtevajo „ stalno zadostno mejo solventnosti glede na njeno celotno poslovanje “.
The committee believes that excessive use of future profits and zillmerising rendered the solvency margin relatively misleading as an indicator of the financial health of ELAS and that as a result the UK regulators did not fulfil their obligation to require from ELAS an “ adequate available solvency margin in respect of its entire business at all times ”.
Veliko gradiva
A large quantity of material
Takšna potrebna pooblastila in sredstva ter posledična možnost učinkovitega nadzora so vse bolj pomembni, ker ostaja od začetka veljavnosti tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju domača država članica edina odgovorna za finančni nadzor zavarovalnic, ki se ukvarjajo z življenjskim zavarovanjem.
Such necessary powers and means and the consequent possibility of effective supervision are all the more important since, with the coming into force of the 3LD, the home Member State retains the sole responsibility for the financial supervision of life assurance undertakings.
Zahteve po obveščanju
Information requirements
Gradivo, ki je na voljo odboru
Material available to the committee
Glej oddelek IV. , sproža skrbi, ali je Združeno kraljestvo ustrezno izvajalo zahteve v zvezi z razkritjem, ki so določene v tretji direktivi, ter ali so bile te zahteve v primeru zavarovalnice Equitable Life kršene.
See Section IV. raises concerns as to whether the disclosure requirements laid down in the 3LD were properly implemented by the UK and whether they were breached in the case of Equitable Life.
DEL III – REGULATIVNI SISTEM
PART III - REGULATORY SYSTEM
o oceni regulativnega sistema Združenega kraljestva glede na družbo Equitable Life
on the Assessment of the UK regulatory regime in respect of Equitable Life
KAZALO DEL III
INDEX PART III
Uporaba določb tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju
Applicability of Third Life Directive provisions
Odgovornost za bonitetni nadzor
Prudential supervision responsibility
Odgovornost za nadzor nad poslovanjem
Conduct of Business supervision responsibility
Ocena finančnega položaja družbe
Assessment of companies' financial situation
Izvajanje nadzornih ukrepov
Implementation of supervisory measures
Nadzor nad družbami s sedežem v tujini
Supervision of foreign-based companies
Nadzor nad računovodenjem in finančnim položajem
Supervision of accounting and financial situation
Nadzor nad družbami v težavah
Supervision of companies in difficulty
Evropska komisija in zadeva družbe Equitable Life
The European Commission and the Equitable Life case
Odbor evropskih nadzornikov za zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine ter sienski protokol
CEIOPS and the Siena Protocol
Projekt Solventnost II
The Solvency II project
Vprašanja, na katera je treba odgovoriti
Questions to be answered
Regulativni sistem Združenega kraljestva na področju življenjskega zavarovanja
The UK Life Insurance Regulatory System
Uporaba določb tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju
Application of Third Life Directive provisions
Bonitetni nadzor
Prudential supervision
a) obdobje 1982–1998
a) Period 1982-1998
b) obdobje 1998–2001
b) Period 1998-2001
c) obdobje po letu 2001
c) Period post-2001
Ureditev poslovanja
Conduct of business regulation
Imenovani aktuar
The Appointed Actuary
Pristojnosti ukrepanja zakonodajalca
Regulators' Intervention Powers
Ključne ugotovitve iz Bairdovega poročila in poročila lorda Penrosa o zakonodajalcih na področju življenjskega zavarovanja
Key findings of the Penrose and Baird reports on Life Insurance Regulators
Bairdovo poročilo (oktober 2001)
The Baird Report (October 2001)
Poročilo lorda Penrosa (marec 2004)
The Penrose Report (March 2004)
2.1 Opredelitev bonitetnega nadzora
2.1 Definition of prudential supervision
2.2 Pristojnosti ukrepanja zakonodajalca
2.2 Intervention powers by regulators
2.3 Sodelovanje zakonodajalcev
2.3 Interaction of regulators
2.4 Nesporna dvojna vloga Ransona
2.4 The unchallenged double role of Mr. Ranson
2.5 Domnevne pomanjkljivosti zakonodajalcev na splošno
2.5 Alleged regulator shortcomings in general
a) pomanjkanje znanja in/ali slabo spremljanje
a) Lack of knowledge and/or weak monitoring
b) Samozadovoljnost ali brezskrbna politika zakonodajalcev
b) Complacency or "easy hand" policy by regulators
c) Malomarnost zakonodajalcev
c) Negligence by regulators
2.6 Kronološki pregled potrditve zaskrbljenosti zaradi družbe Equitable Life s strani zakonodajalcev
2.6 Timeline of acknowledgement by regulators of concerns about EL
2.7 Sklepi poročila lorda Penrosa
2.7 The Penrose Report's conclusions
Drugi ustni in pisni dokazi, ki jih je obravnaval odbor
Other Oral and Written Evidence considered by the Committee
Domnevna malomarnost pri bonitetni ureditvi in nadzoru
Alleged negligence in prudential regulation and supervision
a) Trditve o pomanjkljivostih delovanja zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva
a) Claims of operational shortcomings by UK regulators
b) Domnevno oviranje preiskave s strani zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva in skrivno dogovarjanje z družbo ELAS
b) Alleged obstruction by UK regulators and collusion with EL
c) Trditve o usmerjenosti zakonodajalcev k sektorju
c) Claims of Regulators' industry bias
d) Trditve o blagi regulativni politiki zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva
d) Claims of Regulators' 'light touch' regulatory policy
e) Trditve o čezmerni zaščiti družbe Equitable Life s strani zakonodajalcev
e) Claims of Regulators' excessive 'deference' to EL
f) Trditve o prizadevanju zakonodajalcev za preprečitev nesolventnosti družbe Equitable Life
f) Claims of Regulators' drive to avoid EL's insolvency
g) Dvojna vloga izvršnega direktorja družbe Equitable Life in imenovanega aktuarja
g) Double role of EL Chief Executive and Appointed Actuary
h) Primernost virov, ki so na voljo zakonodajalcem
h) Adequacy of resources available to regulators
Težave v zvezi z zajamčenimi rentami
The GAR Problem
b) Osnovne informacije
b) Background information
c) Trditve o nezmožnosti zakonodajalcev, da prepoznajo tveganje zajamčenih rent
c) Claims of regulators' incompetence in failing to recognize GAR risk
Domnevna nepravičnost „odškodninske sheme“ iz leta 2001
Alleged Unfairness in the 2001 'Compromise Scheme'
b) Poročilo neodvisnega aktuarja
b) The independent actuary's report
c) Natančni pogoji odškodninske sheme
c) The Compromise terms in detail
d) Vloga Organa za finančne storitve v „odškodninski shemi“
d) FSA's role in 'Compromise Scheme'
e) Pritožbe zavarovancev
e) Complaints by policyholders
f) Trditve uprave družbe ELAS, ki se ne štejejo za ustrezne
f) Claims of EL management not qualifying as 'fit and proper'
Domnevna malomarnost pri nadzoru izvajanja poslovanja
Alleged negligence in Conduct of Business (CoB) supervision
a) Domnevne zlorabe pri prodaji in zavajanja v Združenem kraljestvu
a) Allegations of mis-selling and misrepresentation in the UK
b) Domnevne zlorabe pri prodaji in zavajanje v drugih državah članicah
b) Allegations of mis-selling in other Member States
c) Obtožbe stalnega preprodajanja vrednostnih papirjev v zvezi s policami zavarovancev
c) Allegations of 'churning' policyholders' contracts
d) Trditve o slabi komunikaciji med zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva
d) Claims of communication failure between UK regulators
e) Komunikacija med tujimi zakonodajalci in zakonodajalcem Združenega kraljestva
e) Communications between UK and foreign regulators
f) Zavajajoče oglaševanje na nemškem in irskem trgu
f) Misleading advertising on the German and Irish market
V odzivu na alinejo 3 mandata je preiskovalni odbor nadaljeval analizo vloge in učinkovitosti zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva in drugih zadevnih držav članic na področju življenjskega zavarovanja, pri čemer si je prizadeval oceniti, ali so stalne regulativne napake nastale pri nadzoru nad sektorjem življenjskega zavarovanja na splošno ter zlasti pri nadzoru poslovnih praks in finančnega položaja družbe Equitable Life.
Responding to indent 3 of the mandate, the Committee of Inquiry proceeded to analyse the role and effectiveness of the Insurance Regulators in the UK and other Member States concerned, endeavouring to assess whether or not there has been consistent regulatory failure in the supervision of the life assurance sector in general and in the supervision of Equitable Life's business practices and financial standing in particular.
Odbor je analiziral tudi obtožbe o regulativnih napakah pri zaščiti zavarovancev in potrošnikov zaradi napačnega izvajanja tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju
The committee also analyzed allegations of regulatory failure in the protection of policyholders and consumers due to incorrect implementation of the Third Life Directive
Direktiva 92/96/EGS z dne 10. novembra 1992, UL L 360, 9.12.1992. , pri čemer je ocenil zlasti primerljivost regulativnega sistema Združenega kraljestva s podobnimi sistemi v okolju EU.
Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992, in OJ L 360 of 9.12.1992. , assessing in particular how the UK regulatory system compared when judged against its peers in an EU environment.
Ugotovitve iz poročila lorda Penrosa
The findings of the Penrose report
Bairdovo poročilo, „Ureditev družbe Equitable Life: neodvisno poročilo“ , ki ga je pripravil Ronnie Baird, direktor oddelka Quality Assurance and Internal Audit, Organ za finančne storitve, ob pomoči Nortona Rosa in ustanove PricewaterhouseCoopers, je Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve objavilo 17. oktobra 2001. , katerih preiskave sovpadajo z deli mandata odbora, so bile izhodiščna točka, vendar so bile obravnavane v širšem evropskem smislu
The Baird Report, " The Regulation of Equitable Life: an independent report " prepared by Ronnie Baird, Director, Quality Assurance and Internal Audit, FSA, assisted by Norton Rose and PricewaterhouseCoopers, was published by the Treasury on 17 October 2001. , whose investigations overlap with parts of the committee's mandate, were taken as a starting point but considered in a wider European context