natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
§ naložiti strožjo zahtevo po preglednosti, kar zadeva razkritje politike prejemkov za vse zainteresirane strani (delničarje, zaposlene, javnost, vlado) in uvesti pravico do obveščenosti in posvetovanja z zaposlenimi prek delavskih svetov;
§ impose a more radical requirement of transparency as regards disclosure of remuneration policies vis-à-vis all stakeholders (shareholders, employees, public, government) and to introduce a right of information and consultation of employees via the workers councils;
§ vključiti družbeno odgovornost podjetij med dolgoročna merila, s čimer bi utemeljili izplačilo odloženega variabilnega prejemka;
§ include corporate social responsibility targets in the long-term criteria justifying the payment of deferred variable remuneration;
§ v večjih bankah in investicijskih podjetjih zahtevati vzpostavitev neodvisnega odbora za prejemke, ki bo sodeloval s funkcijami za obvladovanje tveganja in zagotavljanje skladnosti, da bi ohranili spodbude, oblikovane za upravljanje tveganja, kapitala in likvidnosti.
§ require the setting up, in banks and investment firms of a considerable size, of independent remuneration committees, which must cooperate with the risk and compliance function in order to guard the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity.
Odbor za zaposlovanje in socialne zadeve poziva Odbor za gospodarske in monetarne zadeve kot pristojni odbor, naj v svoje poročilo vključi naslednje pobude:
The Committee on Employment and Social Affairs calls on the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following amendments in its report:
V tem smislu so še posebej pomembna mednarodno dogovorjena in podprta načela, ki jih je pripravil odbor za finančno stabilnost.
The principles established by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which are internationally agreed and endorsed, are of particular importance in that context.
(3) Za odpravo potencialno škodljivega učinka slabo oblikovanih struktur prejemkov na premišljeno obvladovanje tveganja in nadzor tveganega ravnanja s strani posameznikov je treba zahteve Direktive 2006/48/ES dopolniti z izrecno obveznostjo za kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja, da za osebje, katerega poklicne dejavnosti imajo očitno bistven vpliv na njihov profil tveganja, vzpostavijo in vzdržujejo politike prejemkov in prakse, ki so skladne z učinkovitim obvladovanjem tveganja.
(3) In order to address the potentially detrimental effect of poorly designed remuneration structures on the sound management of risk and control of risk-taking behaviour by individuals, the requirements of Directive 2006/48/EC should be supplemented by an express obligation for credit institutions and investment firms to establish and maintain, for those categories of staff whose professional activities clearly have a material impact on their risk profile, remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with effective risk management.
To osebje bi moralo zajemati vsaj višje vodstvo, uslužbence, ki sprejemajo tveganja, ter uslužbence z nadzornimi funkcijami.
Those categories of staff should include, at least, senior management, risk takers and control functions.
Zato je primerno opredeliti jasna in pregledna ključna načela o premišljenih nadomestilih , ki se določijo ob sodelovanju zaposlenih in njihovih predstavnikov v okviru podjetja, za zagotovitev, da struktura prejemkov ne spodbuja pretiranega tveganja s strani posameznikov in je usklajena s pripravljenostjo za tveganje, vrednotami in dolgoročnimi interesi institucije ter njenih uslužbencev .
It is therefore appropriate to specify clear and transparent core principles on sound remuneration , which are established with the involvement of staff members and their representatives within the firm, to ensure that the structure of remuneration does not encourage excessive risk-taking by individuals and is aligned with the risk appetite, values and long-term interests of the institution and the institution's employees .
Večje kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja bi morala ustanoviti neodvisne notranje odbore za prejemke kot del svoje upravljavske strukture.
Credit institutions and investment firms of a significant size should set up internal independent remuneration committees as part of their governance structure.
Odbori za prejemke bi morali sodelovati z osebami, ki opravljajo funkcijo obvladovanje tveganja in nadzora skladnosti, da bi nadzorovali spodbude, oblikovane za upravljanje tveganja, kapitala in likvidnosti.
Remuneration committees should cooperate with the risk and compliance function in order to supervise the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity.
Oceno uspešnosti je treba vključiti v večletni okvir, na primer obdobje med tremi in petimi leti, za zagotovitev, da postopek ocenjevanja temelji na dolgoročni uspešnosti in da je dejansko plačilo sestavin nadomestila, ki temeljijo na uspešnosti, porazdeljeno po poslovnem ciklu podjetja.
The assessment of performance should be set in a multi-year framework, for example of three to five years, in order to ensure that the assessment process is based on longer-term performance and that the actual payment of performance-based components of remuneration is spread over the business cycle of the firm.
Pri oceni dolgoročne uspešnosti, s katero se utemelji odloženo izplačilo variabilnega prejemka, je treba upoštevati tudi cilje na področju družbene odgovornosti podjetij in trajnostnega razvoja, na primer z uporabo modela Evropske fundacije za upravljanje kakovosti (EFQM).
Corporate social responsibility and sustainable development targets should be included in the assessment of longer-term performance justifying the payment of deferred variable remuneration, for example by use of the European Foundation for Quality Managment (EFQM) model.
(5a) Ker zagotovljeni variabilni prejemki niso združljivi z dobrim upravljanjem tveganja ali z načelom določanja prejemkov glede na uspešnost, se jih ne sme vključiti v pripravo strategije na področju prejemkov in bi jih bilo treba praviloma prepovedati.
(5a) Guaranteed variable remuneration is incompatible with sound risk management and the principle of performance-based remuneration and should not be included in planning remuneration strategy and should, as a general rule, be prohibited.
(5b) V okviru določanja elementov in ciljev, na podlagi katerih se oceni dolgoročna uspešnost, bo treba, poleg skupne ocene s tem povezane uspešnosti in tveganja, vključiti in upoštevati učinkovitost in cilje na področju družbene odgovornosti, s čimer bo odloženo izplačilo variabilnega prejemka postalo v določeni meri sprejemljivo.
(5b) In drawing up the points and objectives on the basis of which long-term performance will be evaluated, account should be taken not only of performances and the related risks, but also of the performance and objectives in the field of social responsibility, which would to some extent make acceptable the payment of deferred variable remuneration.
Številni vidiki gospodarskih utemeljitev so intuitivnega značaja ter zadevajo ohranjanje delovnih mest in večjo dejavnost delavcev, povečanje produktivnosti, izboljšanje odnosov z lokalnim družbenim okoljem in s pomembnejšimi – neposredno in/ali posredno zainteresiranimi – akterji.
Many aspects of economic arguments are intuitive and concern increased efforts to maintain jobs and activate workers, greater productivity, better relations with local communities and the main parties directly and/or indirectly concerned.
Način utemeljevanja, ki vključuje družbeno odgovornost podjetij, je lahko tudi vir inovacij po merilih kakovosti storitev in zanesljivosti.
A business model which incorporates CSR may also constitute a source of innovation based on the criteria of quality of services and reliability.
Ena od poglavitnih spodbud za družbeno odgovornost podjetij pa je upravljanje in preprečevanje tveganja.
However, one of the principal incentive forces of CSR is risk management and prevention.
(5c) Kreditne institucije ali investicijska podjetja bi morala zagotoviti, da celotni variabilni prejemki ne bodo omejili njihove sposobnosti za okrepitev njihove kapitalske osnove.
(5c) Credit institutions or investment firms should ensure that their total variable remuneration does not limit their ability to strengthen their capital base.
Obseg, v katerem je treba povečati kapital, bi moral biti funkcija sedanjega kapitalskega položaja institucije ali podjetja.
The extent to which capital needs to be built up should be a function of the current capital position of an institution or of a firm.
V tem smislu bi morali imeti pristojni nacionalni organi pooblastilo, da omejijo variabilne prejemke, med drugim kot delež skupnih neto prihodkov, kadar ti prejemki niso v skladu z ohranjanjem dobre kapitalske osnove.
In that context, national competent authorities should have the power to limit variable remuneration, inter alia, as a percentage of total net revenue where it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base.
(5d) Vodstveno osebje kreditnih institucij in investicijskih podjetij bi morala od svojih zaposlenih zahtevati, da ne uporabljajo osebnih strategij varovanja pred tveganjem ali zavarovanja, da bi se izognilo učinkom uravnavanja tveganja, ki jih vključujejo njihovi sporazumi o prejemkih.
(5d) The managers of credit institutions and investment firms should ensure their staff members undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or insurance to undermine the risk-alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements.
(6) Priporočilo Komisije z dne 30. aprila 2009 o politikah prejemkov v sektorju finančnih storitev določa tudi načela za premišljene politike prejemkov v zvezi z načinom, kako lahko podjetja izpolnjujejo to obveznost, ki so skladna s to direktivo in dopolnjujejo njena načela.
(6) Commission Recommendation of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services sector also sets out principles on sound remuneration policies as to how firms might comply with this obligation, that are consistent with and complement the principles set out in this Directive.
(6) Plačila v zvezi s premišljenimi politikami prejemkov iz Priporočila Komisije z dne 30. aprila 2009 o politikah prejemkov v sektorju finančnih storitev so skladna s to direktivo in dopolnjujejo njena načela.
(6) The principles regarding sound remuneration policies set out in Commission Recommendation of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services sector are consistent with and complement the principles set out in this Directive.
Posledično je primerno zagotoviti , da so pristojni organi pooblaščeni, da zadevnim subjektom naložijo kvalitativne ali kvantitativne ukrepe, ki so namenjeni rešitvi težav, ugotovljenih v zvezi s politikami prejemkov v nadzorniškem pregledu „stebra 2“.
Consequently, it is appropriate to ensure that competent authorities have the powers to impose qualitative or quantitative measures on the relevant entities that are designed to address problems that have been identified in relation to remuneration policies in the Pillar 2 supervisory review.
(12) Za zagotovitev ustrezne preglednosti struktur prejemkov in povezanega tveganja morajo kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja razkriti podrobne informacije o politikah in praksah prejemkov ter – zaradi zaupnosti – skupni znesek za zaposlene in vodstveno osebje, katerih poklicne dejavnosti bistveno vplivajo na profil tveganja institucije.
(12) In order to ensure adequate transparency to the market of their remuneration structures and the associated risk, credit institutions and investments forms should disclose detailed information on their remuneration policies , practices and, for reasons of confidentiality, aggregated amounts for those members of staff and managers whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of the institution.
Te informacije morajo biti na voljo vsem zainteresiranim stranem (delničarjem, uslužbencem in širši javnosti).
That information should be made available to all stakeholders (shareholders, employees and the general public).
V zvezi z obveščanjem delavcev in posvetovanjem z njimi je treba upoštevati vlogo evropskih svetov delavcev.
The role of the European works councils should be respected in regard to the provision of information to and consultation of employees.
(26a) Opravljeno je bilo posvetovanje z Evropsko centralno banko.
(26a) The European Central Bank has been consulted.
Odbor evropskih zakonodajalcev za vrednostne papirje tesno sodeluje z Odborom evropskih bančnih nadzornikov pri zagotovitvi smernic o politikah prejemkov za osebje, udeleženo pri zagotavljanju investicijskih storitev in dejavnosti v smislu točke 2 člena 4(1) Direktive 2004/39/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 21. aprila 2004 o trgih finančnih instrumentov.
The Committee of European Securities Regulators shall cooperate closely with the Committee of European Banking Supervisors in ensuring the existence of guidelines on remuneration policies for categories of staff involved in the provision of investment services and activities within the meaning of point 2 of Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments.
Člen 1 – točka 9 – odstavek 1 a (novo)
Article 1 – point 9 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Člen 136 – odstavek 1 – pododstavek 2 – točka e a (novo)
Article 136 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point e a (new)
V členu 136(1) se doda naslednja točka:
In Article 136(1), the following point is added:
„(ea) zahteva, da kreditne institucije omejijo variabilni prejemek kot delež skupnega neto prihodka, kadar je to potrebno za ohranjanje dobre kapitalske osnove.“
"(ea) requiring credit institutions to limit variable remuneration as a percentage of total net revenue where required for the maintenance of a sound capital base."
Za namene določitve ustrezne ravni lastnih sredstev na podlagi pregleda in ovrednotenja, izvedenih v skladu s členom 124, pristojni organi ocenijo, ali je potrebna naložitev posebne zahteve po lastnih sredstvih, ki presega minimalno raven, za zajetje tveganj, ki jim je kreditna institucija lahko izpostavljena, ob upoštevanju naslednjega:
For the purposes of determining the appropriate level of own funds on the basis of the review and evaluation carried out in accordance with Article 124, the competent authorities shall assess whether any imposition of a specific own funds requirement in excess of the minimum level is required to capture risks to which a credit institution is or might be exposed, taking into account the following:
(c) izida postopka nadzorniškega pregleda , izvedenega v skladu s členom 124.
(c) the outcome of the supervisory review process carried out in accordance with Article 124.
(c) izida pregleda in ovrednotenja, izvedenih v skladu s členom 124.
(c) the outcome of the review and evaluation carried out in accordance with Article 124.
Priloga V – oddelek 11 – točka 22 – uvodni del
Annex V – Section 11 – point 22 – introductory part
Pri pripravi in uporabi politik prejemkov za osebje, katerega poklicne dejavnosti imajo očitno bistven vpliv na njihov profil tveganja, kreditne institucije izpolnjujejo naslednja načela na način, ki je primeren glede na njihovo velikost, notranjo organiziranost in naravo, področje in celovitost njihovih dejavnosti:
When establishing and applying the remuneration policies for those categories of staff whose professional activities clearly have a material impact on their risk profile, credit institutions shall comply with the following principles in a way that is appropriate to their size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of their activities:
Priloga V – oddelek 11 – točka 22 – točka a
Annex V – Section 11 – point 22 – point a
(a) politika prejemkov je skladna s premišljenim in učinkovitim obvladovanjem tveganja in ga spodbuja ter ne spodbuja tveganja, ki presega raven sprejemljivega tveganja za kreditno institucijo;
(a) the remuneration policy is consistent with and promotes sound and effective risk management and does not encourage risk-taking that exceeds the level of tolerated risk of the credit institution;
(a) politika prejemkov je skladna s premišljenim in učinkovitim obvladovanjem tveganja in ga spodbuja , ne spodbuja tveganja, ki presega raven sprejemljivega tveganja za kreditno institucijo , ter vključuje ukrepe za preprečevanje asimetrije informacij in navzkrižja interesov ;
(a) the remuneration policy is consistent with and promotes sound and effective risk management , does not encourage risk-taking that exceeds the level of tolerated risk of the credit institution and includes measures to avoid asymmetries of information and conflicts of interest ;
Priloga V – oddelek 11 – točka 22 – točka c
Annex V – Section 11 – point 22 – point c
Priloga V – oddelek 11 – točka 22 – točka d a (novo)
Annex V – Section 11 – point 22 – point d a (new)
(da) opravi se posamezna ocena položaja zadevnih članov osebja, da se ugotovi, ali imajo bistven vpliv na profil tveganja; vodstvo in osebje, ki opravlja nadzorne funkcije, se v vsakem primeru šteje za osebje, katerega poklicne dejavnosti imajo bistven vpliv na profil tveganja kreditnih institucij ali investicijskih podjetij;
(da) an individual assessment of the position of the relevant members of staff is made to determine whether they have a material impact on the risk profile; senior management and staff members engaged in control functions are, in any event deemed to constitute categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profile of credit institutions and investment firms;
Treba je pojasniti področje uporabe v zvezi z osebjem.
There needs to be a clarification of the scope of application regarding the categories of staff.
Ta direktiva bi morala veljati le za osebje, ki ima očitno bistven vpliv na profil tveganja kreditnih institucij ali investicijskih podjetij.
This directive should only apply to staff that has a clear material impact on the risk profile of credit institutions and investment firms.
Priloga V – oddelek 11 – točka 22 – točka d b (novo)
Annex V – Section 11 – point 22 – point d b (new)
(db) člani osebja , ki opravljajo nadzorne funkcije, so neodvisni od poslovne enote, ki jo nadzirajo, imajo ustrezna pooblastila in prejmejo plačilo v skladu z doseženimi cilji, povezanimi z njihovo funkcijo, neodvisno od uspeha poslovnih področij, ki jih nadzirajo;
(db) staff members engaged in control functions are independent from the business units they oversee, have appropriate authority, and are compensated in accordance with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas that they control;
Priloga I – točka 1
Annex 1 – point 1
Priloga V – oddelek 11 – točka 22 – točka e a (novo)
Annex V – Section 11 – point 22 – point e a (new)
(ea) ocena uspešnosti se opravi v večletnem okviru, ki zajema vsaj 3 leta, s čimer se zagotovi, da postopek ocenjevanja temelji na dolgoročni uspešnosti in da se dejansko plačilo sestavin prejemka, ki temelji na uspešnosti, porazdeli na obdobje, ki upošteva poslovni cikel podjetja in njegova poslovna tveganja;
(ea) the assessment of performance is set in a multi-year framework over a period of at least three years in order to ensure that the assessment process is based on longer-term performance and the actual payment of performance-based components of remuneration is spread over a period which takes account of the underlying business cycle of the firm and its business risks;
(ea) določanje variabilne sestavine prejemka iz delniških opcij ali podobnih instrumentov je prepovedano;
(ea) making up variable components of remuneration from stock options or similar instruments is prohibited;
Nedavne izkušnje so pokazale, da uporaba delniških opcij ali podobnih instrumentov za variabilno sestavino prejemka spodbuja kratkoročne usmeritve, manipulativne prakse za povečanje „vrednosti delnic“ kreditnih institucij in pretirano tveganje – pričujoči predlog poskuša odvračati ravno od takšnega ravnanja.
Recent experience has shown that using stock options or similar instruments as a variable component of remuneration provides incentives for short-term orientation, manipulative practices to increase the ‘shareholder value’ of credit institutions, and excessive risk-taking – behaviour which the current proposal seeks to discourage.
Priloga V – oddelek 11 – točka 22 – točka e b (novo)
Annex V – Section 11 – point 22 – point e b (new)
(eb) skupni variabilni prejemki ne omejujejo sposobnosti kreditne institucije, da okrepi svojo kapitalsko osnovo;
(eb) the total variable remuneration does not limit the ability of the credit institution to strengthen its capital base;
Priloga V – oddelek 11 – točka 22 – točka e a (novo)
Annex V – Section 11 – point 22 – point e c (new)
(ec) zajamčeni variabilni prejemek je izjema, do njega pride le pri zaposlitvi novega osebja, omejen pa je na prvo leto zaposlitve;
(ec) guaranteed variable remuneration is exceptional, occurs only in the context of hiring new staff and is limited to the first year of employment;
Priloga V – oddelek 11 – točka 22 – točka f
Annex V – Section 11 – point 22 – point f
(f) fiksne in variabilne sestavine celotnega prejemka so ustrezno uravnotežene; fiksna sestavina predstavlja dovolj visok del celotnega prejemka, da omogoča izvedbo popolnoma fleksibilnega bonusa, vključno z možnostjo brez bonusa ;
(f) Fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced; the fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible bonus policy, including the possibility to pay no bonus ;
(f) fiksne in variabilne sestavine celotnega prejemka so ustrezno uravnotežene; fiksna sestavina predstavlja dovolj visok del celotnega prejemka, da omogoča izvedbo omejevalne politike o variabilnih sestavinah prejemka, vključno z možnostjo , da se ne plačajo nobene variabilne sestavine prejemka ;
(f) fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced; the fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a restrictive policy on variable remuneration components , including the possibility of paying no variable remuneration component ;
Priloga V – oddelek 11 – točka 22 – točka h
Annex V – Section 11 – point 22 – point h
(h) merjenje uspešnosti, kot podlage za bonuse ali skupne fonde bonusov, vključuje prilagoditev za trenutna in prihodnja tveganja , ter upošteva stroške kapitala in potrebno likvidnost;
(h) the measurement of performance used to calculate bonuses or bonus pools includes an adjustment for current and future risks and takes into account the cost of the capital and the liquidity required;
(h) merjenje uspešnosti, kot podlage za izračun variabilne sestavine prejemka ali skupne fonde variabilnih sestavin prejemka, vključuje prilagoditev za vse vrste trenutnih in prihodnjih tveganj , ter upošteva stroške kapitala in potrebno likvidnost;
(h) the measurement of performance used to calculate variable remuneration components or pools of variable remuneration components includes an adjustment for all types of current and future risks and takes into account the cost of the capital and the liquidity required;
Priloga V – oddelek 11 – odstavek 22 – točka i
Annex V – Section 11 – paragraph 22 – point i
(i) plačilo večjega dela visokega bonusa se odloži za ustrezno obdobje in je povezano s prihodnjo uspešnostjo podjetja .
(i) payment of the major part of a significant bonus is deferred for an appropriate period and is linked to the future performance of the firm.