natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Zakonodajalci so tudi zamudili priložnost, da v celoti ocenijo povečano uporabo in predstavitev končnih bonusov družbe ELAS“ (pogl.
The regulators also missed an opportunity to make a full assessment of the Society's increased use and presentation of final bonus."
16–163 in 164).
(Ch.16-163 and 164)
„ Vsako leto od leta 1987 ... do 2000 so skupne vrednosti polic presegale razpoložljiva sredstva po tržni ceni (čeprav z različnimi vsotami in odstotki) na podlagi sklada.
" Each year from 1987... to 2000 aggregate policy values exceeded available assets at market value (albeit by varying amounts and percentages) on a fund basis.
Številke v obdobju po letu 1991, ki bi to dokazale, zakonodajalci niso nikoli prejeli in jih do konca leta 1997 tudi niso nikoli zahtevali“ (pogl.
The figures for the post-1991 period that would have demonstrated this were never in the possession of the regulators and, until the end of 1997, never requested by them."
„Zdi se, da družba ELAS ni zahtevala informacij o položaju družbe novembra 1996, ki jih je prejel vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko in ki bi pokazale trajanje ter celoten obseg presežka.
"Whatever GAD was told about the position as at November 1996, information which would have shown the duration and full extent of the excess seems not to have been requested from the Society.
Pri dveh pomembnih vprašanjih (terminalni bonusi in položaj presežnih vrednosti polic) zakonodajalci niso zahtevali in analizirali takšnih dodatnih številk ali dokumentov, kar bi jim omogočilo ustrezno obravnavanje težav, o katerih se je takrat razpravljalo z družbo“ (pogl.
Thus on two important issues (terminal bonus and the excess policy values position) there seems to have been a failure by the regulators to ask for and analyse such further figures or documents as would have enabled them to make a proper assessment of problems that were then being discussed with the company ."
„Ne glede na to, da se je v vladnem oddelku za zavarovalniško statistiko (maja 1998) povečevala zaskrbljenost in jo je glede številnih zadev tudi izrazil, razpoložljivi dokumenti ne izražajo podobne zaskrbljenosti Ministrstva za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve ali ocene, da je vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko izrazil zaskrbljenost pred zakonodajalcem.
"Whatever level of concern was developing within GAD (in May 1998) and being expressed on these various issues, the documents available do not reflect any corresponding concern on the part of the Treasury, or appreciation that GAD may have been communicating concern to the regulator.
Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve je ostalo popolnoma pasivno in se zanašalo na ukrepanje vladnega oddelka za zavarovalniško statistiko “ (pogl.
The Treasury remained wholly passive, depending on GAD to initiate any action required ."
„Zaskrbljenost je bila vse večja, ostala pa je na nizki stopnji.
"Concern was growing, but remained low level.
Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve ni oporekalo vladnemu oddelku za zavarovalniško statistiko, da brez njegove dejavne udeležbe nadaljuje dialog z družbo ELAS, ... kar je bilo v skladu s sporazumom o ravni storitev (revidiran sporazum je bil sklenjen decembra 1998).
HM Treasury appear to have been content to allow GAD to conduct the dialogue with the Society without active Treasury participation ... consistent with the service level agreement (a revised agreement was concluded in December 1998).
Vendar se ob branju sporazuma o ravni storitev le potrjuje vtis, da je vsako širše regulativno stališče, ki bi se lahko oblikovalo, podrejeno stalnim tehničnim razpravam na izključno aktuarski podlagi.
However, reading the service level agreement only deepens the impression that any broader regulatory view that might have been formed was being subordinated to ongoing technical discussions on a purely actuarial basis.
Razvoj ureditve je bil v prehodni fazi.
It was a transitional phase in the development of regulation.
Težko se je izogniti stališču, da je bila ureditev spregledana, glavni akter v razpravah ni imel regulativnih pristojnosti in da je pristojni zakonodajalec slabo sodeloval v postopku, ki bi zahteval zakonodajni ukrep “ (pogl.
It is difficult to avoid the view that regulation was falling between two stools, the major player in discussions having no regulatory power, and the empowered regulator having little part in the processes that would have instructed regulatory action ."
„Zaslišanje višjega sodišča bi se moralo začeti 5. julija 1999.
"The High Court hearing was due to commence on 5 July 1999.
Okoli 8. junija je višji nadzornik objavil dokument z naslovom ‚Sodna zadeva družbe ELAS – mogoč potek dogodkov‘.
On about 8 June the senior line supervisor circulated a paper entitled 'Equitable Life Court Case-Possible Scenarios'.
Preiskovalci so ugotovili, da je bil to prvi dokument, ki ga je pripravil vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko ali Organ za finančne storitve in je vseboval dejansko obravnavo sodne zadeve. ...
So far as the inquiry has discovered, this was the first document prepared by GAD or FSA which recorded any substantive consideration of the court case. ...
Opredelitev posledic najslabšega možnega poteka dogodkov je bila usmerjena k takojšnjim ali kratkoročnim upravnim težavam.
The formulation of the consequences of the worst-case scenario was focused on immediate or short-term administrative problems.
Opredelitev ni ugotovila nobenih dolgoročnih pomislekov v zvezi s prihodnostjo družbe ELAS“ (pogl.
It did not identify any longer term considerations relating to the Society's future."
18–1 in 6).
(Ch.18-1 and 6)
„ Prvi sestanek z družbo ELAS o sodni zadevi je potekal 29. junija (nekaj dni pred začetkom zaslišanja in več kot šest mesecev od sporočila družbe ELAS Ministrstvu za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve o začetku postopka “ (pogl.18-17).
" The first meeting with the Society about the court case took place on 29 June 1999 (a few days before the hearing was due to commence and over six months since the Society had notified HMT of their intention to raise proceedings )."
Prejšnji dokument o poteku dogodkov ni bil posodobljen do dneva pred sprejetjem odločitve zgornjega doma britanskega parlamenta“ (pogl.18-47).
There was no updating of the earlier scenario document (prepared for the High Court hearing) until the day before the House of Lords' judgment."
14.11.1990: „ Burt (glavni aktuar vladnega oddelka za zavarovalniško statistiko) je izrazil zaskrbljenost o položaju družbe ELAS, zlasti če bi se padec trga nadaljeval ali celo ostal na trenutni ravni.
14.11.1990: " Burt (principal actuary at GAD) expressed concern about the position of the Society, particularly if the market were to fall any further or even remain at its present level.
Ranson je potrdil, da če bi trg padel za dodatnih 20 %, bi „imeli težave in bi moral razmisliti, katere ukrepe je treba sprejeti.
Ranson acknowledged that if the market fell by a further 20% they would “have problems and he would have to consider what action should be taken.
14.5.1992 : „ Na rob Burtovega (vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko) zapiska je poleg tega nekdo iz nadzorne skupine pri Ministrstvu za trgovino in industrijo zapisal, da ‚Paul Burt meni, da so plačevali preveč v bonusih. ...
14.05.1992 : " In the margins of the Burt (GAD) memo, one of the supervisory team at DTI noted, in addition, that “Paul Burt thinks they have been paying too much in bonuses." ...
Pod pomanjkljivosti pa je navedel: ...
And under weaknesses it listed: ...
Položaj Ransona kot glavnega izvršnega direktorja in aktuarja lahko povzroči težave, ker ni nikogar, ki bi razkril nepravilnosti, če bi se zadeve zapletle ...
Mr Ranson's position as Principal Executive and Actuary may create problems because there is nobody to blow the whistle when things go wrong ...
Pickford (vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko) je povedal, da mu je všeč filozofija družbe do svojih zavarovancev, vendar se mu zdi, da je njena solventnost sporna ..., in navedel, da bi bil zaskrbljen glede delovanja družbe, če bi se zgodili dramatični padci na trgu .
Pickford (GAD) noted that he liked the Society's philosophy for its policyholders, but felt that its solvency strength was arguable ... and stated that he would be concerned about the Society's performance if there were dramatic falls in the market.
15.9.1992 : „Ranson je 10. septembra Burtu (vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko) poslal nekaj osnovnih informacij.
15.09.1992 : " On 10 September Ranson sent some background information to Burt (GAD).
Te informacije ... so razkrile, kakšna je skupna vrednost polic (v pismu opredeljena kot ‚sedanje vrednosti zajamčenih prejemkov plus končni/terminalni bonusi po takratnih stopnjah‘) dejansko presegala deleže naložb:
This information ... laid bare the current reality of the excess of aggregate policy values (defined in the letter as “present values of guaranteed benefits plus final/terminal bonuses at the rates then current”) over asset shares as follows:
To so bile informacije, ki niso bile na voljo v poročilih.
This was information that would not have been available in the returns.
Na neki točki je bilo to pismo posredovano Ministrstvu za trgovino in industrijo“ (pogl.
At some stage this letter was passed on to DTI."
4.11.1992 : „ Medtem je poročilo o pregledu povzročilo vznemirjenje na Ministrstvu za trgovino in industrijo .
04.11.1992 : " Meanwhile the scrutiny report had caused some disquiet at DTI .
Menim, da moramo vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko zaprositi za boljšo oceno položaja in možnosti, ki so na voljo družbi v primeru nadaljevanja velikega padca na trgu ...
I think we should ask GAD for a better assessment of the position and of the options available to the company in the event of a significant further downturn in the market...
Kako dolgo lahko še nadaljuje s sedanjimi bonusi ob nični donosnosti?‘“ (pogl.
How long could it continue with present bonuses in the face of a zero yield??"
11.1.1993 : „Družba je vložila zahtevek iz oddelka 68
11.01.1993 : "the Society had applied for and been granted a Section 68
Oddelek 68 Zakona o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982. za implicitno postavko prihodnjih dobičkov 360 milijonov GBP, kar ji je bilo tudi odobreno,“ (in potem spet za vedno večje zneske v naslednjih letih).
Section 68 of the Insurance Companies Act 1982. order for a future profits implicit item of £360m." (and again for increasing amounts in the following years).
V zapisku vladnega oddelka za zavarovalniško statistiko je ugotovljeno: „Na splošno domnevam, da bi lahko družba Equitable in večina družb preživela kratkoročni padec trga, tudi velik.
The GAD memo concluded: " Overall I suspect that Equitable could survive a short-term fall in market levels, even a substantial one, as well as most companies.
Vendar je njen portfelj razlog za zaskrbljenost, če bi obdobje znižane vrednosti delnic trajalo dalj časa.
Their portfolio, however, must leave room for concern, were there to be a prolonged period of depressed share value.
Njen nedavni premik k vrednostnim papirjem s stalno obrestno mero bo ublažil težave, čeprav na račun pričakovanih končnih koristi zavarovancev“ (pogl.
Their recent shift towards fixed interest securities will ease the difficulties, although they argue at the expense of the expected ultimate benefit to policyholders .”
30.11.1993 : Na tem sestanku zakonodajalcev in družbe ELAS „ sta bila obstoj zajamčenih rent in predlagana Ransonova rešitev očitno razkrita vladnemu oddelku za zavarovalniško statistiko ter Ministrstvu za trgovino in industrijo ...
30.11.1993 : At this meeting between regulators and the Society " the existence of the annuity guarantees and Ranson's proposed solution were apparently disclosed to both GAD and DTI ...
Vendar se to ni dodatno obravnavalo in tudi ne ponovno omenjalo v regulativnih listinah, dokler vprašanje ni bilo izpostavljeno leta 1998.
However it was not followed up and did not receive another mention in the regulatory papers until after the issue had been exposed in 1998.
Tako je vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko odkril vprašanje zajamčenih rent ...“ (pogl.
Thus GAD had uncovered a GAR issue..."
9.12.1994 : „V informativnem obvestilu vladnega oddelka za zavarovalniško statistiko z dne 6. decembra, ki je bilo pripravljeno za sestanek, so bila navedena nedavna vprašanja ..., vloge za zahtevke iz oddelka 68 v zvezi z investicijskimi holdingi, razvrstitev kritičnih bolezni in načrti večjih zdravstvenih stroškov s strani družbe ter Ransonova dvojna vloga.
09.12.1994 : "A GAD briefing note dated 6 December prepared for the meeting listed recent issues ... applications for certain section 68 orders in relation to investment holdings, the Society's classification of critical illness and major medical expenses plans, and Ranson's dual role.
Seznam vprašanj je bil ozko usmerjen.
The list of concerns was narrowly focused.
Zajamčena renta ali vprašanje bonusov ni bilo omenjeno ...
It omitted reference to either the annuity guarantee or the bonus issue ...
To je bil prvi sestanek, ki se ga je udeležil nekdo drug iz družbe in ne Ranson“ (pogl.
It was the first meeting attended by anyone from the Society other than Ranson."
16–152 in 153).
(Ch.16-152 and 153)
Notranje sporočilo z dne 8. novembra je višjega nadzornika opozorilo na članek.
An internal note dated 8 November drew the article to the attention of the senior line supervisor.
Navajalo je: Družba Equitable Life ima drugačen način izračunavanja rezerv kot večina [družb], vendar lahko njeno finančno moč zagotovo potrdijo poročila Ministrstva za trgovino in industrijo, čeprav ne nujno iz obrazca 9.
It noted that: EL has a different way of calculating their reserves than most [companies] but surely their financial strength can be ascertained from the DTI returns, albeit not necessarily from Form 9.
Kako bi mu [lahko] sicer S+P
Otherwise how [would] S+P
Družba Standard & Poor's. dal tako dobro oceno?“ (pogl.
Standard & Poor's. be able to give them such a good rating ?”
8.11.1996 : „Pregledujoči aktuar je ugotovil, da mora biti družba zelo previdna pri svojih izjavah o bonusih, da ne bi zavajala strank v zvezi z dobičkom.
08.11.1996 : "The scrutinising actuary noted that the Society had to be very careful about their bonus statements to ensure that customers were not misled about the benefits.
Očitno se to ni dodatno preučilo, saj se ugotovitve nadaljujejo z drugim vprašanjem, in sicer z močjo vrednotenja.
There appears to have been no follow-up on this point, as the notes moved to another issue, the strength of the valuation.
Ranson ... je nameraval ostati, ‚dokler spremembe ne bodo uveljavljene‘“ (pogl.
Ranson ... intended to stay on "until the changes had been consolidated.""
16–203 in 204).
(Ch.16-203 and 204)
13.1.1998 : „Pregledujoči aktuar je vprašal, ali je prav, da skupni tekoči deleži naložb presegajo skupne tekoče sprejemljive naložbe, in zahteval podatek o skupnih deležih naložb za vse veljavne pogodbe s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice ob koncu leta 1996.
13.01.1998 : "The scrutinising actuary asked whether it was correct that total current asset shares exceeded total current admissible assets and requested a figure for the accumulated asset shares for all in-force accumulating with profits contracts at the end of 1996.
Headdon je odgovoril ..., da ima nekaj težav z razumevanjem vprašanja o deležih naložb, vendar potrdil, da skupna nominalna vrednost polic skupaj s končnimi bonusi presega pripisana sredstva“ (pogl.
Headdon responded ... that he had some difficulty in understanding the question about assets shares, but confirmed that the total face value of the policies including final bonus was in excess of the attributable assets."
16–234 in 235).
(Ch.16-234 and 235)
6.12.1999 : „Sestanka sta se udeležila nadzornika Organa za finančne storitve, glavni in pregledujoči aktuar ter Nash, Headdon, Thomas (direktor sektorja naložb) in generalni direktor, direktor oddelka za prodajo in trženje iz družbe ...
06.12.1999 : "The meeting was attended by the two FSA line supervisors, the principal and scrutinising actuaries and Nash, Headdon, Thomas (the investment director) and the general manager, sales and marketing, from the Society ...
Nadzorniki so z obiskom želeli ‚zapolniti nekatere pomanjkljivosti v poznavanju družbe‘ ...
The supervisors intended “to fill in some of the gaps in its knowledge about the Society” at the visit ...
Vprašanje rezerv zajamčenih rent je bilo obravnavano in višji nadzornik je napovedal, da bo vladni aktuar pisal vsem družbam in jim pojasnil svoja januarska navodila, kar lahko pomeni, da bo morala družba Equitable Life povečati svoje rezerve.
The issue of GAR reserving was taken up and the senior line supervisor announced that the Government Actuary would be writing to all companies to clarify his January guidance, which could mean that Equitable would need to increase its reserves.
Velik del sklepov poročila (poglavje 19, odstavki 149–163) obravnava regulativno ureditev Združenega kraljestva.
The Report dedicates a substantial part of its conclusions (Chapter 19, paragraphs 149-163) to the UK regulatory regime.
Poudarjajo, kako „se je bonitetna ureditev zavarovalnic osredotočala na sistem poročil ... in bila v primeru družbe leta 1991 in po njem dopolnjena z obiski življenjskih zavarovalnic.
It highlights how " prudential regulation of life insurance companies focused on a system of returns ... and in the case of the Society, supplemented in and after 1991 by visits to life offices.
(Družba Equitable Life je bila ena od prvih obiskanih zavarovalnic.)
(Equitable was among the first offices to be visited.)
V poročilih je bilo treba navesti informacije v zvezi z dolgoročnimi posli družbe kot odziv na posebna vprašanja.“ Vendar v zvezi z izvajanjem nadzora ugotavlja, da „se je upoštevalo, da ni pravi namen ureditve nadomestiti presojo zakonodajalca glede tega, kaj je optimalno z regulativnega vidika, s presojo vodstva“ (odst.
The returns required information relating to the long-term business of the Society in response to specific questions."
Lord Penrose dodatno razlaga, da je vladni oddelek za zavarovalniško statistiko za preiskavo povedal, da je bilo „ prevladujoče načelo ureditve in nadzornega spremljanja, da je treba načeloma zaupati imenovanemu aktuarju, ki sodeluje z družbo ter je poklicno odgovoren za dnevno spremljanje njenega finančnega položaja in določitev zavarovalno-tehničnih rezervacij .
Lord Penrose further explains how the GAD had told his inquiry that it was “the overriding principle of regulation and of supervisory monitoring that reliance should principally be placed on the appointed actuary, who was close to the company and had a professional responsibility to monitor its financial position on a day-to-day basis and to establish technical provisions .”
Čeprav se lord Penrose strinja, da „je neprizadevanje za določitev stalnega aktuarskega pristopa pomenilo prednost,“ ugotavlja, da je v sredini sedemdesetih let 20. stoletja „ sistem preveč zaupal v imenovanega aktuarja,“ kar je dejstvo, ki ga je jasno „priznal Organ za finančne storitve v svojem predlogu za reformo te vloge “ (odst.
While not disputing that there " had been an advantage in not seeking to prescribe a fixed actuarial approach", Lord Penrose states that in the mid-70s " the system placed too great a reliance on the appointed actuary", a fact apparently " recognised by FSA in their proposals for reform of this role ." (par.155).
V zvezi z vprašanjem struktur in virov zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva na področju zavarovalništva lord Penrose zelo jasno navaja, da „ oddelek za zavarovanje na Ministrstvu za trgovino in industrijo ni imel ustreznih virov za sodelovanje pri regulativnem postopku .
Regarding the question of structures and resources of the UK insurance regulators, Lord Penrose states very clearly that " the DTI insurance division was ill-equipped to participate in the regulatory process.
Osebje ministrstva je bilo neprimerno in zlasti tisti, ki so sodelovali na ravni nadzora, niso bili usposobljeni, da bi lahko znatno prispevali k postopku.
It had inadequate staff, and those involved at line supervisor level in particular were not qualified to make any significant contribution to the process.
Zakonodajalci oddelka za zavarovanje so bili popolnoma odvisni od vladnega oddelka za zavarovalniško statistiko glede nasvetov o matematičnih rezervacijah, implicitnih postavkah, tehničnih zadevah na splošno in razumnih pričakovanjih zavarovancev ter kot posamezniki niso imeli posebnih ustreznih znanj in spretnosti ali izkušenj, da bi v zvezi s tem neodvisno ocenili položaj družbe.
Insurance division regulators were fundamentally dependent on GAD for advice on the mathematical reserves, implicit items, technical matters generally, and PRE, and were not individually equipped with specific relevant skills or experience to assess independently the Society's position in these respects.
Glede na količino dela, ki ga je bilo treba opraviti in je zelo presegalo redne preglede poročil, so imeli uradniki na višjih položajih malo možnosti za vključevanje v redni regulativni postopek,“ pri čemer dodaja, da „je bila takrat izražena potreba po večjih regulativnih virih“ .
Given the volumes of work to be handled, which extended far beyond the regular scrutiny of returns, higher-grade officers had little opportunity to become involved in routine regulation", adding that " a need for greater regulatory resource had been identified at that time".
Čeprav lord Penrose potrjuje, da „so bili aktuarji vladnega oddelka za zavarovalniško statistiko zelo cenjeni,“ pravi, da „jih je pogosto oviralo razumevanje, kaj je bilo sprejemljivo v široko in nejasno opredeljenih standardih prakse,“ pri čemer navaja, da „ je vlada zahtevala ‚blag pristop‘ k regulativni politiki in ustrezno razporedila sredstva “.
Although Lord Penrose confirms that " GAD actuaries were held in high regard by the regulators" he says that " they were often inhibited by their understanding of what was acceptable within broad and ill-defined standards of practice", suggesting that " Government required a 'light touch' approach to regulation, and allocated resources accordingly ."
Navaja tudi, da „ bi lahko več sredstev morda izboljšalo možnosti za opredelitev težav “ , in namiguje na politično vzdušje Združenega kraljestva v večini devetdesetih let 20. stoletja, ko je bil cilj vlade, da „deregulira, zmanjša regulativno breme podjetij, prepreči poseganje v zasebne družbe in pusti, da prevladajo tržne sile “ (odst.
He further suggests that " increased resources ... might have improved the chances of identifying problems ", and hints at the UK political climate prevailing for most of the 1990s, when the Government's objective " was to deregulate, to reduce regulatory burdens on business, to avoid interference in private companies, and to let market forces prevail ." (par.159, 160 and 161)
“ Delno tudi zato „dejansko nobene primarne zakonodaje na regulativnem področju, za katerega je bilo pristojno Ministrstvo za trgovino in industrijo, niso naprej predložili ministri,“ pri čemer dodaja, da ni videl „nobenega seznama zaželenih zakonodajnih sprememb, ki bi temeljno strukturno reformo določile kot možen predmet zakonodaje“ (odst.
Partly for this reason "v irtually no primary legislation in the regulatory area for which DTI was responsible was taken forward by Ministers", adding that he saw no " wish list of legislative amendments that identified fundamental structural reform as a possible subject for legislation." (par.162)
Poglavje 19, stran 726. svoje preiskave v zvezi z vlogo zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva na področju zavarovalništva navaja naslednje točke:
Chapter 19, page 726. of his inquiry in relation to the role of the UK insurance regulators:
a) p redpisi Združenega kraljestva so temeljili na prevelikemu zaupanju imenovanemu aktuarju, ki je bil v primeru družbe ELAS tudi izvršni direktor v kritičnem obdobju od leta 1991 do leta 1997, kljub priznavanju možnosti nasprotja interesov v zvezi s tem položajem (odst.
a) UK regulation was based on an over-reliance on the Appointed Actuary, who in the case of the Society was also the chief executive over the critical period from 1991 to 1997, despite recognition of the potential for conflict of interest inherent in this position ; (par.