natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Zato niso mogli predvideti bonitetnih posledic in posledic razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev.
As a result they failed to digest the prudential and PRE implications.
Zakonodajalci niso mogli odkriti pozavarovalnih dogovorov, sprejetih za prikritje Hymanovega položaja, in niso preučili javne izjave družbe ELAS iz februarja 2000, da izguba v zadevi Hyman zavarovancev ne bi stala več kot 50 milijonov GBP, če je bilo pozavarovanje v znesku 800 milijonov GBP nominalno potrebno za pokritje takšnega položaja.“
The regulators could not detect the reinsurance arrangements made to cover the Hyman position and did not examine ELAS’ public statement in February 2000 that losing Hyman would cost members no more than £50 million, when reinsurance to the tune of £800 million was nominally being sought to cover the same situation."
Končno ugotavlja: „Če bi zakonodajalec takrat ali prej vztrajal pri zares preudarnih ukrepih, bi bili vsi končni (tj. diskrecijski) bonusi odpovedani za nedoločen čas, dokler finančno stanje družbe ELAS ne bi bilo točno ugotovljeno.
He concludes saying "if the Regulator had insisted on truly prudent action at that time or earlier, all final (i.e. discretionary) bonuses would have been suspended indefinitely until the financial condition of the Society could be fully established.
Zato je dovolj dokazov za trditev, da je bila operativna regulativna napaka v daljšem obdobju zelo velika in da je bila v poznejših fazah namerna, tako da je odpravila več utemeljenih zahtev brez možnosti nadomestila.
In sum, therefore, there is sufficient evidence to maintain that operational regulatory failure was total over an extended period, and that in the later stages it was deliberate, such that it had the effect of extinguishing many just claims without opportunity of recompense.
Če bi zakonodajalci ustavili nadaljevanje takšnega razvoja, bi preprečili končni goljufivi položaj, ki so ga učinkovito opravičili tako, da so omogočili odškodninsko shemo ...
Had the regulators halted this progression, an eventually fraudulent position would have been averted, which effectively they condoned by allowing the Compromise Scheme to take place ...
Operativna napaka, ki je tako odločilna, je mogoča le zaradi splošnega pomanjkanja etično odgovornega odnosa.
Total operational failure of this ultimate kind can only be due to an overall deficiency in ethically responsible attitude.
Drugi so želeli še naprej trditi, da je bil razlog za regulativno napako poleg organizacijskih in operativnih pomanjkljivosti tudi skrivno dogovarjanje.“
Others have wished further to maintain that, over and above organisational and operational deficiencies, regulatory failure must also have been collusive."
V zapisku WE-CONF6 je navedeno, da „je neizogibno, da bolj kot bi nekdo poznal običajne načine zavarovanja, manj verjetno bi ga zavedlo, kar je počela družba Equitable Life, in bolj verjetno bi bil nezaupljiv glede tega, kaj se je dejansko dogajalo s premijami.
The memo WE-CONF6 claimed that " it is inescapable that the more someone knew about conventional assurance methods, the less likely he was to be misled by what Equitable did, and the more likely to be suspicious about what was really happening to the premiums.
Vendar so si zakonodajalci, ki bi morali biti največji strokovnjaki od vseh, zatiskali oči pred celotno zadevo.“
Yet the regulators, who should have been the most expert of all, turned a blind eye to the whole matter."
Zapriseženi revizor in strokovnjak za forenzično računovodstvo Colin SLATER je v svojem pričanju (H4) poudaril nekatere računovodske pomanjkljivosti v delovanju družbe Equitable Life, ki bi jih zakonodajalci lahko opazili in morali opaziti ter se nanje odzvali.
In his testimony (H4) Mr. Colin SLATER, chartered accountant and expert in forensic accounting, highlighted some accounting weaknesses in Equitable Life's operations which the Regulators could and should have noticed and reacted to.
Zlasti je opozoril, da „je bilo julija 2000 ocenjeno, da bo izguba tožbe v zadevi Hyman družbo Equitable Life stala 1 500 milijonov GBP ...
In particular, he reminded how "in July 2000 the Hyman case loss was estimated to cost the Society £1,500m ...
Poznejše informacije so pokazale, da izguba tožbe v zadevi o zajamčenih rentah nikakor ni bila edini dejavnik, ki je prispeval k propadu družbe ELAS ...
Information emerged subsequently has shown that the loss of the GAR case was by no means the only factor contributing to the Society’s downfall ...
Od konca osemdesetih let 20. stoletja je družba Equitable Life poskušala kombinirati prejemke od niveliranja življenjskih zavarovanj s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice s preglednostjo vrednotenja upravljanih skladov, vendar brez ohranjanja premoženja.
From the late 1980s Equitable Life tried to combine the benefits of with-profits smoothing with the transparency of managed fund valuations, but without maintaining any estate.
„Direktorji zavarovalnice za življenjsko zavarovanje s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice opredelijo periodične bonuse, ki izražajo osnovno gibanje uspešnosti naložb.
"The directors of a with-profit office declare periodic bonuses intended to reflect the underlying trend of investment performance.
Tako so vlagatelji s soudeležbo pri dobičku v določenem obsegu zavarovani pred tržnimi nihanji.
In this way with-profit investors are protected to some extent from market swings.
Številne zavarovalnice za življenjsko zavarovanje s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice to okrepijo z ohranjanjem ‚premoženja‘ presežka sredstev, ki ne pripada nikomur.
Many with-profit offices reinforce this by maintaining an ‘estate’ of surplus assets, which belongs to no one.
Pristop družbe Equitable Life je bil predstavljen v dokumentu ‚Z dobičkom brez skrivnosti‘, ki ga je pripravil Roy Ranson in ga 20. marca 1989 predstavil Inštitutu za aktuarstvo.
The Equitable Life approach was set out in the paper ‘With Profits Without Mystery’ prepared by Roy Ranson and presented to the Institute of Actuaries on 20 March 1989.
Koncept ni bil odobren brez pridržkov.
The concept did not meet with unqualified approval.
Med drugim je zadevo komentiral poznejši predsednik Inštituta za aktuarstvo (2000–2002) Clark, pri čemer je izjavil, da ‚avtorji izražajo svoje prepričanje, da imajo sredstva v lasti sedanje generacije zavarovancev‘.
One commentator was Mr. Clark, later President of the Institute of Actuaries (2000-2002) saying ‘the authors state their belief, that the assets are owned by the current generations of policyholders'.
Menim, da so avtorji sklepali, da je ob neupoštevanju niveliranja vsota posameznih deležev sredstev za posamezne police enaka tržni vrednosti sklada.
I believe that the implication the authors draw from this is that, ignoring smoothing, the sum of individual asset shares for individual policies equals the market value of the fund.
To pomeni, da mora biti niveliranje popolnoma uravnotežen koncept, pri katerem mora biti vsako preplačilo eni skupini zavarovancev enakovredno in nasprotno uravnoteženo s premajhnim plačilom drugi skupini.
This means that smoothing must be a totally balanced concept that any over-payment to one group of policyholders must be equally and oppositely balanced by an under-payment to another group.
Kadar to ni uspešno doseženo, je nesolventnost dolgoročno neizogibna, če se preostali del teorije ne upošteva.“
Failure to achieve this must inevitably lead to insolvency in the long run if the rest of the theory is left intact."
Vlada Združenega kraljestva je nasprotovala obtožbam glede operativnih pomanjkljivosti zakonodajalcev in v WE32
Countering accusations of regulators' operational shortcomings, the UK Government detailed in WE32
Navedla je, da je zlasti tretja direktiva o življenjskem zavarovanju „zahtevala, da izračun zavarovalno-tehničnih rezervacij življenjske zavarovalnice temelji na aktuarskih načelih, ki so skupna vsem državam članicam in jih priporoča Posvetovalna skupina Združenj aktuarjev držav ES (Groupe Consultatif des Associations dActuaires dans les Pays des Communautés Européennes).
In particular they stated that 3LD " required the calculation of the technical reserves of a life insurance company to be based on actuarial principles, common to all member states, and as recommended by the 'Groupe Consultatif des Associations d’Actuaires dans les Pays des Communautés Européennes'.
Ta načela so vključevala omejevanje obrestnih mer, ki se lahko uporabi pri vrednotenju, vendar niso predpisala metode vrednotenja, ki jo je treba uporabiti, zato so jo lahko države članice same izbrale.
These principles included limiting the rates of interest that could be used in the valuation, but did not prescribe the valuation method to be used, the choice of which was left open to member states to decide
Glej člen 18 tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju, ki je bil prenesen s predpisi 58–75 iz Predpisov o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1994 .
see Art.18 3LD, transposed by Regulations 58-75 of Insurance Companies Regulations 1994 . .
Direktiva je uvedla zahtevo po ‚mejah sprejemljivosti‘ v zvezi s sredstvi, vendar je preprečila, da bi države članice zahtevale, da družbe vlagajo v določena sredstva.
The Directive introduced a requirement for “admissibility limits” in relation to assets but prevented member states from requiring companies to invest in particular assets.
Spremenila je pravila o usklajevanju in lokalizaciji sredstev, ki jih je uvedla prva direktiva o življenjskem zavarovanju, tako da so se ta uporabljala v vseh državah članicah.
It amended the asset matching and localisation rules introduced by the First Life Directive so that these applied across all member states
Prvič je tudi dovolila, da se zahtevani minimalni kapital pokrije ... s podrejenim dolžniškim kapitalom.
It also permitted the required solvency margin to be covered ... by subordinated loan capital for the first time
Glej člen 25(1) tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju.
see Art.25, para.1 3LD. .
V skladu z direktivo za to ni bilo potrebno soglasje bonitetnega pristojnega organa, ampak je takšno soglasje postalo obvezno v Združenem kraljestvu in se je prav tako izvajalo z izdajo zahtevka iz oddelka 68 Zakona o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982 s strani bonitetnega pristojnega organa.“
This was not subject to the consent of the prudential competent authority under the Directive but such consent was nonetheless made a requirement in the UK , again implemented by means of the issuance by the prudential competent authority of an order under section 68 of the Insurance Companies Act 1982."
Organi Združenega kraljestva so v WE32 dodatno razložili, da je tretja direktiva o življenjskem zavarovanju „prepovedala predhodno odobritev produktov ali premijskih stopenj s strani bonitetnih pristojnih organov
The UK authorities further explained in WE32 that 3LD " prohibited the prior approval by the prudential competent authority of products or premium rates
Glej člena 29 in 39 tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju. , namesto da bi se zanašala na zahtevani minimalni kapital, pravila o zavarovalno-tehničnih rezervacijah in vrednotenje sredstev ..., da bi zagotovila ustrezno zaščito zavarovancev ...
see Art.29 and 39 3LD. , instead relying on the required solvency margin, the rules concerning the technical reserves and the valuation of assets.... to afford adequate protection to policyholders...
Čeprav je tretja direktiva o življenjskem zavarovanju državam članicam dovolila, da določijo izrecne zahteve glede rezerv za terminalne bonuse, tega ni zahtevala.“
Whilst the Third Life Directive permitted Member states to impose explicit reserving requirements for terminal bonus, it did not require this.
Glej člen 18 tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju.
see Art.18 3LD. "
Potem ko naj bi mu član nadzorne skupine za družbo Equitable Life pri Organu za finančne storitve domnevno povedal, da v zvezi s solventnostjo in ravnjo rezerv družbe Equitable Life „ne vidijo vzroka za zaskrbljenost“ , je VINALL dejal, da osebje Organa za finančne storitve njegovih vprašanj ni jemalo resno in da so celo odložili slušalko.
After allegedly having been told by a member of the FSA Equitable supervisory team that in relation to the solvency and reserve levels of Equitable " they could see no cause for concern ", Mr. VINALL reported that the FSA staff would not take his questions seriously and had even hung up on him.
Na pisne pritožbe so odgovarjali s sklepi, da ni imel podlage za trditev, da je Organ za finančne storitve deloval nestrokovno, pri čemer je to ugotovitev ponovil tudi komisar za pritožbe pri Organu za finančne storitve.
Written complaints were answered concluding that he had no grounds to claim the FSA had acted unprofessionally, a finding repeated by the FSA Complaints Commissioner.
Po njegovem mnenju je zaradi zavrnitve Organa za finančne storitve, da bi zavarovancu zagotovil točne informacije, pri družbi ostal dlje, kot bi bilo treba, na koncu pa je moral plačati 20 % kazni, ko je zapustil družbo.
In his view, the FSA's refusal to provide accurate information to the policyholder led him to stay with the company longer than he should have, with the consequence of having to pay a 20% penalty when leaving the company.
V elektronskem sporočilu z dne 7. junija 2006 (priloga k WE43) je Urad parlamentarne varuhinje človekovih pravic Združenega kraljestva VINALLU potrdil, da so se „zavedali pritožb več posameznikov ... da jim je Organ za finančne storitve zagotovil, da ni razloga za skrb glede solventnosti družbe.“
In an e-mail of 7 June 2006 (annex to WE43) the Office of the UK Parliamentary Ombudsman confirms to Mr. VINALL they were "aware of the complaints having been made by many individuals ... that they had been reassured by the FSA that there was no reason to be alarmed as to the solvency of the Society."
Med več obtožbami, da so zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva (zlasti Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve ter Organ za finančne storitve) že leta 1998 vedeli za mogoče težave z zajamčenimi rentami pri družbi Equitable Life, vendar niso ukrepali, je tudi članek v reviji SAGA
Among a number of allegations that UK regulators (in particular HM Treasury and FSA) knew already in 1998 of a potential GAR problem at Equitable but took no action, an article in SAGA magazine
Do zdaj prejete informacije so neprepričljive, zaradi česar se postavljajo resna vprašanja o solventnosti družbe.
The information received to date is unconvincing and raises serious questions about the company's solvency
Glej WE53, Priloga N-1. “
see WE53 annex N-1. ."
HARDING v WE-FILE17 posebej poudarja domnevno regulativno napako, ki je sledila odločitvi zgornjega doma (20. julij 2000), z besedami „morda je bilo prepozno za rešitev družbe Equitable Life brez finančne injekcije vlade, (vendar) ni bilo prepozno za zagotovitev, da se pravice zavarovancev s policami brez zajamčenih rent prav tako upoštevajo pred prenosom premoženja od enega zavarovanca do drugega.“
In WE-FILE17, Mr. HARDING specifically points out alleged regulatory failure subsequent to the House of Lords ruling (20 July 2000), as "it may have been too late to save the Equitable in the absence of a cash injection from the Government, (but) it was not too late to ensure that the rights of non-GARs were also considered before transferring wealth from one policyholder to another."
Kar zadeva komentar o spornem zniževanju vrednosti polic v obdobju 2000/2001, je v WE-CONF8 navedeno, da „bi morala odločitev o zniževanju vrednosti polic in njihovi razdelitvi sprejeti uprava družbe ELAS.
Commenting on the controversial policy cuts in 2000/2001, WE-CONF8 states that " the decision on the policy cuts, and how these were to be distributed, was one for the Society's board to make.
Organ za finančne storitve bi lahko posredoval le, če bi predlagana zniževanja vrednosti kršila pogodbene pravice ali razumna pričakovanja zavarovancev na splošno ali katerega koli razreda zavarovancev ...
The FSA would only have grounds to intervene if the proposed cuts breached either the contractual rights or the reasonable expectations of policyholders in general or any class of policyholder ...
Vendar je bila ‚vrednost police‘, ki jo je dala družba ELAS na voljo zavarovancem, kombinacija pogodbene vrednosti in (diskrecijskega) končnega bonusa ...
But the 'policy value' EL made available to its policyholders were a combination of the contractual value and the ( discretionary ) final bonus ...
V tem primeru so znižanja izražala slabe donose naložb v letih 2000 in 2001 ter so bila na splošno skladna s padci, ki so se v tem obdobju zgodili na glavnih naložbenih trgih.“
In this case the cuts reflected the poor investment returns over 2000 and 2001 and were broadly in line with the falls in that period that occurred in the major investment markets."
Kar zadeva obtožbe o nepravočasni oceni mogočih posledic tožbe, navaja Hyman v WE-CONF8, da „je bila po mnenju Organa za finančne storitve odločitev za pridobitev razsodbe v preskusni zadevi na sodišču razumna, saj je družba ELAS dobivala vedno večje število pritožb zavarovancev s policami z zajamčenimi rentami.
Referring to allegations of untimely assessment of possible consequences of the Hyman litigation, WE-CONF8 states that " the FSA considered the decision to seek judgement on a test case in the courts was reasonable, given that EL was faced with an increasing number of complaints from GAR policyholders.
Družba ELAS teh pritožb ni želela obravnavati posamezno, ampak je želela varnost precendensa ,“ pri čemer opozarja, da lord Penrose prav tako „ni našel razlogov za kritiziranje uprave ali izvršnega vodstva družbe ELAS, ker je sprejelo ukrepe za preskus pravnih vprašanj, ki so se pojavila.“
Rather than dealing with these complaints individually, EL wanted the certainty of a precedent ", recalling how Lord Penrose had also found " no reasons to criticize the Society's board or executive management for taking steps to test the legal issues that had arisen
WE16, poglavje 1, odstavek 120.
WE16, chapter 1, para.120. "
Na koncu trdi, da je uprava družbe ELAS „pripravila krizni načrt za več različnih mogočih rezultatov, pri čemer je opredelila, da bi morala v najslabšem primeru najti kupca za družbo.“
It concluded saying that the EL board had " carried out contingency planning for a wide range of possible outcomes, identifying that in the worst case it would have to seek a buyer for the business."
Končno je v WE-CONF25, v katerem se domneva regulativno napako zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva, ob podpori podrobnih pravnih instrumentov zapisano, da „bi lahko [zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva] posredovali pred julijem 1994 in po njem ter bi to tudi morali narediti v skladu s pooblastili iz oddelka 45 Zakona o zavarovalnicah iz leta 1982,“ da bi odpravili resne pomanjkljivosti pri poslovanju družbe ELAS zaradi izplačevanja previsokih bonusov in zagotovitve zajamčenih rent.
Finally, alleging regulatory failure by UK Regulators, WE-CONF25 claims, with the support of detailed legal arguments, that the UK regulators " could and should have intervened, both before and after July 1994, resorting to powers provided under Section 45 of ICA 82 ", to rectify the serious deficiencies in EL's conduct of business due to over-bonusing and provision of GARs.
Zlasti po 1. juliju 1994 bi lahko „menili, da so pomanjkljivosti pri poslovanju družbe ELAS tako hude, da upravičujejo določitev smernice v skladu z oddelkom 11 Zakona (kakor je bil spremenjen) zaradi odsotnosti dobrega in preudarnega upravljanja.
In particular, after 1 July 1994, they could have "taken the view that the deficiencies in the conduct of the Society’s business were so grave as to justify the giving of a direction under section 11 of the Act (as amended), on the ground of the absence of sound and prudent management.
Če bi zakonodajalec to naredil, bi lahko ... uporabil pooblastila iz oddelka 45(2)(a) za preprečitev ali omejitev plačila končnih bonusov.
Having done this, the regulator could ... have made use of the power conferred by section 45(2)(a) to prevent or restrict the payment of final bonuses.
Ker očitno ni bilo dvoma, da so zajamčene rente sprožile vprašanje pravne odgovornosti družbe Equitable Life, bi jih morali zakonodajalci zato upoštevati pri vsakem obravnavanju oddelkov 45(2)(d) in 35A ...
As there seems to be no doubt that GARs gave rise to a legal liability on the part of Equitable, they would therefore have had to be taken into account in any consideration by the regulators of section 45(2)(d) and section 35A ...
Najočitnejši ukrep, ki bi ga lahko zakonodajalci zahtevali od družbe Equitable Life in ki ne vključuje prepovedi iz pododdelka 45(2), bi bila zahteva, da družba preneha s takšnim delovanjem, ki ustvarja razumna pričakovanja zavarovancev.“
The most obvious action which the regulators could have required Equitable to take, not involving the prohibition in sub-section 45(2), would have been to require the Society to put a stop to the very practice that was producing the reasonable expectations on the part of policyholders."
Glej odstavke 9-12 in 18-20 WE-CONF25.
see WE-CONF25, para.9-12, 18-20.
WE-CONF25 ugotavlja, da „bi takšna zahteva brez dvoma spadala
WE-CONF25 concludes by stating that "such a requirement would clearly have fallen
na področje pristojnosti in dolžnosti zakonodajalca za bonitetne zadeve, ker izhaja iz potrebe po upoštevanju razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev in zmožnosti družbe ELAS, da jih izpolni ...
within the scope of the powers and duties of the prudential regulator, as deriving from the need to have regard to the reasonable expectations of policyholders and the Society’s ability to fulfil them ...
Tako se mi zdi, da če bi zakonodajalci ob priznavanju resne težave izplačevanja previsokih bonusov posvarili upravo družbe Equitable Life, bi bilo zares zelo malo verjetno, da se ne bi naredilo nekaj v zvezi s tem ali dalo nekaj narediti v zvezi s tem.“
All in all, it seems to me that had the regulators, in recognition of a serious problem of over-bonusing, waved a big stick at the Equitable board it is very unlikely indeed that nothing would or could have been done about the problem."
1b) Domnevno oviranje preiskave s strani zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva in skrivno dogovarjanje z družbo ELAS
1b) Alleged obstruction by UK regulators and collusion with EL
Še bolj ostro stališče sta imela zavarovanca CHASE GREY (WE9) in WEIR (WE6), ki sta trdila, da so zakonodajalci ovirali preiskavo in sklepali dogovore, da bi prikrili svojo regulativno napako in odgovornosti.
An even tougher stance was taken by policyholders Mr. CHASE GREY (WE9) and Mr. WEIR (WE6), arguing that, in their opinion, there was collusion and obstruction by the regulators to conceal their regulatory failure and responsibilities.
Zlasti CHASE GREY (WE9) je trdil, da „je uvedba nezajamčenih polic za življenjsko zavarovanje s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice leta 1987 pomenila dogovor z namenom goljufije v skladu z angleškim običajnim pravom.
In particular, Mr. CHASE GREY (WE9) claimed that " the introduction of the non-guaranteed with-profits policy in 1987constituted a conspiracy to defraud, as defined by English Common Law.
Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve in/ali Organ za finančne storitve bi lahko z ustrezno preiskavo odkrila slab kapitalski položaj družbe ELAS in dogovor z namenom goljufije.
The deficient capital position of ELAS and the conspiracy to defraud were discoverable by the Treasury and/or FSA by reasonable inquiry.
Britanska vlada ... je stalno delovala zmedeno in ovirajoče, da bi prikrila svojo regulativno napako.“
The British Government ... has consistently acted by obfuscation and obstruction to conceal its failure of regulation ."
WE-CONF6 trdi, da „so družba ELAS in regulativne organizacije v obdobju približno 15 let (1987–2001) prestopile mejo, ker so stalno delovale tako, da so zmedle in zavajale tedanje ali prihodnje zavarovance.“
WE-CONF6 claimed that " over a period of approximately 15 years (1987-2001) both the Society and the regulatory organisations set over it, consistently acted in ways designed to confuse and deceive policyholders, whether actual or prospective."