natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Institucionalni okvir Eurosistema se opira na decentraliziran pristop delovanja, ki omogoča, da se v celoti izkoristijo strokovna znanja in obstoječe infrastrukture nacionalnih oblasti.
The Eurosystem institutional framework relies on a decentralised operational approach which allows exploiting fully the national authorities’ expertise and existing infrastructures.
To je se izkazalo kot učinkovito pri upravljanju institucionalnih nalog, ki jih opredeljuje Pogodba, tudi v okviru finančne krize.
This setting has proved effective in managing the institutional tasks assigned by the Treaty also in the context of the financial crisis.
Zagotavlja namreč ustrezen okvir za izvajanje nalog na področju nadzora.
It could provide an appropriate framework for the exercise of supervisory responsibilities.
Vredno je omeniti, da argumenti, ki se običajno navajajo v prid previdnosti glede vključevanja centralnih bank v finančni nadzor, ne vzdržijo na nacionalni ravni znotraj okvira Evropske monetarne unije.
It is worth pointing out that the arguments normally used to argue for caution regarding the involvement of central banks in financial supervision do not hold at national level within the context of European monetary union.
Koliko in kako hitro bi morale finančne institucije povečati svoj lastniški kapital?
To what extent and how quickly should financial institutions increase their equity capital?
Da bi zmanjšali prihodnja tveganja, bodo banke morale biti pozorne zlasti na to, da zagotovijo ustrezne kapitalske rezerve.
To cushion the risks that lie ahead, banks will need to be especially mindful in ensuring that they have adequate capital buffers in place.
V zvezi s tem se strinjam z bistvom predvidene uredbe Odbora za finančno stabilnost in Baselskega odbora za bančni nadzor ter njeno uvedbo leta 2012, pod pogojem, da bo omogočala nujna prehodna obdobja in podedovana načela.
In this perspective I agree with the main thrust of the envisaged regulation by the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and its introduction in 2012, provided with indispensable transition periods and grandfathering principles.
Prav tako bo morda treba nekatere banke, posebej tiste, ki so prejele državno pomoč, temeljito prestrukturirati, da bodo dolgoročno sposobne preživetja, ko tovrstna pomoč ne bo več na razpolago.
In addition, some banks, especially those which have received state support, may need fundamental restructuring in order to confirm their long-term viability when such support is no longer available.
To bi lahko vključevalo krčenje bilanc stanja, tako da se banke znebijo podjetij, ki niso sposobna preživetja, s čimer bi se okrepile njihova sposobnost ustvarjanja dobička.
This could involve the shrinking of balance sheets through the shedding of unviable businesses with a view to enhancing their profit-generating capacities.
Obenem bi morale banke v celoti izkoristiti prednosti nedavnega dviga dobičkonosnosti in okrepiti svoje kapitalsko stanje, tako da nujno prestrukturiranje poslovanja in okrepitev zmogljivosti za blaženje šokov ne bi materialno vplivali na zagotavljanje kredita gospodarstvu.
At the same time, banks should take full advantage of the recent recovery in their profitability to strengthen their capital positions, so that the necessary restructuring of businesses and the enhancement of shock-absorbing capacities do not impinge materially on the provision of credit to the economy.
Kako bi lahko odpravili motnje v konkurenci, ki so se pojavile po krizi, in reševalne ukrepe, ki so jih uvedle vlade in centralne banke držav članic?
How can the competitive disturbances that have developed following the crisis and rescue measures taken by the government and central banks of the Member States be eliminated?
Čeprav so vladni ukrepi za podporo finančnemu sistemu učinkovito pripomogli k temu, da smo se izognili poglobitvi finančne krize, je prisotna skrb, da bi lahko podporni ukrepi sami ustvarili občutna izkrivljanja konkurence (i) znotraj držav, saj vladne podpore in reševalne sheme zagotavljajo prednost bankam, upravičenim do pomoči, pred tistimi, ki nimajo dostopa do podpornih shem, in (ii) med državami, če je javna podpora ene države ugodnejša od podpore drugih držav.
Although government measures in support of the financial system have been effective in averting an escalation of the financial crisis, a concern exists that support measures could themselves create considerable distortions of competition (i) within countries, as government support and rescue schemes provide an advantage to benefiting banks relative to banks without access to support schemes and (ii) across countries when public support by one country is more favourable than in other countries.
Čeprav so prizadevanja za usklajevanje podpornih ukrepov v EU zajezila posledice takšnega izkrivljanja, obstajajo dokazi, da je prišlo do izkrivljanja konkurence.
Although the efforts for harmonisation of support measures in the EU have contained the distortionary effects, some evidence pointing to distortions of competition has appeared.
Evropska komisija, ki je odgovorna za spremljanje razmer na trgu in pregled javnih podpornih ukrepov držav članic, zaenkrat še ni poročala o kakšnih koli primerih občutnega izkrivljanja.
The European Commission, which is responsible for monitoring the situation in the market and reviewing Member States’ public support measures, has thus far not reported any instances of significant distortion.
Obenem se lahko potencialna izkrivljanja pojavijo zaradi razpona donosov vladnih obveznic.
At the same time, one indication of potential distortions emerges from spreads of government guaranteed bonds.
Donosi se razlikujejo pri bankah, ki imajo enako bonitetno oceno vendar sedež v različnih državah.
These spreads diverge for banks with the same rating but which are head-quartered in different countries.
To nakazuje, da je bilo deželno tveganje ključno gonilo tovrstnih razponov, prav tako pa kaže na izkrivljenost, pri kateri „šibke banke iz močnejših držav prejmejo cenejšo finančno pomoč“.
This suggests that sovereign risk has been a key driver of these spreads but it also points to a distortion whereby ‘weak banks from strong countries obtain cheaper funding’.
Okrepljeno zavarovanje vlog bo najverjetneje prav tako pripeljalo do izkrivljanja čezmejne konkurence.
Enhanced deposit insurance is also likely to have distortionary effects on cross-border competition.
Vendar bodo v prihodnjih mesecih tako programi izdajanja vladnih obveznic kot okrepljena zavarovanja vlog postopoma opuščeni, kar bo omejilo glavne vire izkrivljanja konkurence, čeprav ni mogoče izključiti možnosti, da bodo imeli začasni vplivi na posamezne elemente konkurence morda dolgotrajen vpliv na konkurenco na trgu.
However, both government guaranteed bond programmes and enhanced deposit insurance are likely to be phased out over the coming months, thereby eliminating the main sources of competitive disturbances, while it cannot be ruled out that temporary impacts on factors of competition could have a long-lasting impact on market competition.
Dodaten negotov znak, da se je stopnja konkurence v sektorju bančništva v euroobmočju morda spremenila, je mogoče razbrati iz dejstva, da se je razpršitev obrestnih mer za posojila prebivalcem in za vloge v drugi polovici leta 2008 občutno povečala in da so obrestne mere ostale visoke (glede na pretekle izkušnje) vse leto 2009.
Another tentative indication that the degree of competition in the banking sector across euro area countries may have changed can be gauged from the fact that cross-country dispersion of retail bank loan and deposit rates markedly increased in the second half of 2008 and have remained high (from a historical perspective) throughout 2009.
Empirični dokazi prav tako kažejo, da je prenos obrestnih mer politik v obrestne mere za prebivalce celo v času finančne krize v grobem deloval v skladu s preteklimi izkušnjami.
That being said, empirical evidence suggests that even during the financial crisis the pass-through of policy rates to retail bank interest rates in the euro area has functioned broadly in line with historical experiences.
Poleg tega podatki iz raziskave o posojilih med bankami Eurosistema prav tako ne kažejo na to, da bi konkurenca (ali pomanjkanje le-te) imela pomembni vlogo pri občutnem neto krčenju kreditnih standardov bank v euroobmočju v tretjem četrtletju leta 2007.
In addition, information from the Eurosystem’s Bank Lending Survey also does not suggest that competition (or lack thereof) has been a major factor in the observed net tightening of euro area banks’ credit standards since Q3 2007.
Podporni ukrepi Centralne banke v okviru Eurosistema so namenjeni celotnemu sektorju bančništva, zato je tveganje, da bi vključevali diskriminatorne elemente, manjše.
Central bank support measures within the Eurosystem aim at the banking sector as a whole and as such entail fewer risks of entailing discriminatory treatment.
Čeprav ni nujno, da se ob tem ne morejo pojaviti določena izkrivljanja trga, je tveganje, da bi ti ukrepi na področje konkurence med bankami vpeljali izkrivljanja, omejeno, vsaj kratkoročno.
Although they are not necessarily free from risks of introducing certain market distortions, the risk of these measures introducing distortions in the field of bank competition is limited, at least in the short run.
To velja tako za standardne operacije refinanciranja, ki jih Eurosistem ponuja monetarnim finančnim institucijam (MFI) euroobmočja, kot tudi za nestandardne ukrepe, ki so bili uvedeni med finančno krizo.
This applies to both the standard refinancing operations offered by the Eurosystem to euro area Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) and to the non-standard measures introduced during the financial crisis.
Treba pa je upoštevati, da so bili ukrepi, ki so jih zaradi krize sprejele centralne banke po svetu, prilagojeni specifičnim potrebam prevladujočih finančnih in ekonomskih struktur v njihovih gospodarstvih.
However, it has to be borne in mind that the measures undertaken by central banks around the world in the context of the crisis were tailored to the specificities of the financial and economic structures prevailing in their economies.
Poleg tega so se operativni okviri med globalnimi centralnimi bankami razlikovali že pred finančno krizo.
Moreover, operational frameworks across global central banks differed also prior to the financial crisis.
Kakršna koli izkrivljanja enakih pogojev na mednarodni ravni, ki so posledica kriznih ukrepov centralnih bank, bi prav tako morala izginiti, ko se ti ukrepi nehajo izvajati, zato ne gre pričakovati, da bodo imeli dolgotrajen vpliv na konkurenco med bankami.
Finally, any distortions to the international level-playing field implied by the central bank crisis-measures should evaporate once these measures are terminated and thus should not be expected to have any long-lasting impact on bank competition.
Čeprav se načeloma zdi, da so izkrivljanja konkurence v glavnem omejena, izkrivljanja spodbud predstavljajo naslednji večji pomislek, ki izhaja iz podpornih ukrepov.
While competitive distortions appear in principle to have been largely contained, the distortions of incentives present another important concern arising from the support measures.
Reševalni ukrepi so bili namreč namenjeni predvsem podpori velikih in sistemsko pomembnih bank, katerih zlom bi ogrozil stabilnost finančnega sistema.
More specifically, the rescue measures have been primarily in support of large and systemically important banks whose failure may have threatened the stability of the financial system.
Zato se v zvezi s temi bankami na trgu morda pojavljajo predstave o implicitnem vladnem jamstvu za njihovo reševanje, zaradi česar se lahko poslužujejo dobičkonosnega, a tveganega poslovanja brez ustrezne tržne discipline.
Consequently, these banks may be benefiting from market perceptions of an implicit bail-out guarantee from the government, allowing them to pursue profitable but risky business without the appropriate market discipline.
Za rešitev tega tako imenovanega vprašanja o „prevelikih, da bi padli“, je bilo predloženih že več predlogov.
Several proposal have been put forward to deal with this so-called ‘too-big to fail’ issue.
Kako bi finančne institucije lahko prisilili/spodbudili, da zmanjšajo svojo nagnjenost k tveganju?
How can financial institutions be forced/ incentivised to reduce their risk appetite?
Reforma zakonodaje o krepitvi odpornosti finančnega sistema, ki trenutno poteka, bo vsebovala več elementov za spodbujanje preudarnega obvladovanja tveganja v bankah.
The ongoing regulatory reform on strengthening the resilience of the financial system will contain several elements that will provide incentives for prudent risk management for banks.
Poleg tega bo uvedba usklajenega okvira likvidnosti od bank zahtevala, da se financirajo na podlagi stabilnejših strukturnih virov financiranja.
Moreover, the introduction of a harmonised liquidity framework will require banks to finance themselves using more stable funding sources on a structural basis.
Nenazadnje so bila sprejeta tudi načela ustrezne izravnave, ki bodo odvračala od sprejemanja prekomernega tveganja na račun dolgoročne donosnosti in preudarnega obvladovanja tveganja.
Finally, principles of sound compensation have been agreed that will discourage excessive risk-taking at the expense of long-term profitability and prudent risk management.
Če bodo ti ukrepi združeni in če se bodo ustrezno izvajali, lahko občutno prispevajo k odvračanju od kratkoročnih špekulacij in izkoreninjenju pomanjkljivih praks za obvladovanje tveganja, ki smo jim bili priča v preteklosti.
These measures if taken together and properly implemented can significantly contribute to deterring short-termism and eliminating the flawed risk management practices we observed in the past.
Katera so po vašem mnenju najbolj pereča vprašanja v zvezi z zakonodajo na področju finančnih storitev, ki jih je treba rešiti po akcijskem načrtu za finančne storitve?
What do you see as the most pressing issues in financial services legislation which remain to be completed after the Financial Services Action Plan?
Ena najpomembnejših lekcij, ki smo se jih naučili v finančni krizi, je, da tesne medsebojne povezave med finančnimi trgi po svetu predstavljajo skupne probleme, ki jih je treba reševati ustrezno in z usklajenimi ukrepi.
One of the main lessons from the financial crisis is that the close interconnections existing between financial markets across the globe pose common problems that have to be addressed in an appropriate way with a concerted action.
Zato mora agenda EU na področju predpisov ustrezno odražati pobude in priporočila, pripravljena na mednarodni ravni, zlasti s strani G20, ki se je v finančni krizi izkazala kot zelo pomembna.
Therefore, as it has been already the case, the regulatory agenda for the EU should properly respond to the initiatives and recommendations being put forward at international level, and in particular by the G20, whose importance has emerged during the financial crisis.
Akcijski načrti in priporočila G20 so že vodili do obsežnih premikov v zvezi z nadzorom in finančno stabilnostjo s strani mednarodnih organov, kot sta Odbor za finančno stabilnost in Baselski odbor za nadzor bank, ki je še posebej pomemben v okviru EU.
The action plans and recommendations by the G20 have already triggered a substantive amount of important work on the regulatory supervisory and financial stability arrangements from international bodies such as the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision for the banking sector which is of particular relevance in the EU context.
Če govorimo o pomembnejših vprašanjih, ki bi jih bilo treba reševati s pobudami na področju zakonodaje, lahko ločujemo med dvema glavnima vrstama vprašanj.
When considering the more important issues that should be addressed through regulatory initiatives we can distinguish between two main set of issues.
Prvič, pobude na področju zakonodaje, ki so povezane s krepitvijo bonitetnega okvira in ki izhajajo iz mednarodnih pobud
First, regulatory initiatives related to the enhancement of the prudential framework stemming from international initiatives.
Zaključek reformnega programa Baselskega odbora in njegovo izvajanje v Evropi sta ključnega pomena za oblikovanje odpornejšega bančnega sistema, ki lahko dolgoročno podpira zdravo gospodarsko rast, ne da bi pri tem oviral delovanje trga in oživitev gospodarstva.
The completion of the Basel Committee reform programme, and the subsequent implementation in Europe, is critical to achieving a more resilient banking system that can support sound economic growth over the longer term, without impinging on the functioning of the market and economic recovery.
Poleg tega želim v okviru mednarodnih reform poudariti pomen naslednjih štirih vprašanj:
Moreover, within the context of international reforms I wish to underline the importance of four issues:
a) Potreba po tem, da se doseže mednarodno soglasje v zvezi z rešitvami problemov, ki so jih ustvarile sistemsko pomembne finančne institucije (SIFI).
a) The need to reach an international consensus related to the solutions to the problems created by the systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).
V zvezi s temi institucijami je treba specifičen zakonodajni pristop in dodatne nadzorne predpise, da se zagotovi učinkovito spremljanje njihovih dejavnosti in tveganj.
There is a need to agree on the specific regulatory approach that should be adopted for the SIFIs and what should be the additional supervisory procedures in order to ensure an effective monitoring of their activities and risks.
V nedavnem sporočilu ECB o SIFI, pripravljenem kot prispevek Odboru za finančne storitve, so podrobno preučeni glavni cilji za predpise o SIFI in ukrepi, ki bi jih bilo treba sprejeti za zmanjšanje tveganja, da pride do zloma katere od teh institucij, in za ugotavljanje posledic takšnega zloma. „Cilja predpisov sta dva: (i) povečati odpornost institucij na šoke in zmanjšati prispevek SIFI k sistemskemu tveganju, pri čemer je treba posebej omeniti učinka okužbe in prelivanja; (ii) ublažiti problem moralnega hazarda in s tem povezanega jamstva za reševanje.
A recent ECB note on SIFIs, elaborated as a contribution to the Financial Services Committee, addresses comprehensively the main objectives for the regulation on SIFIs and the measures that could be adopted to reduces the risk of failure of a SIFI and to measure the consequence of such failures: “There are two objectives of regulation: (i) increasing the shock-absorbing capacity of institutions and lowering a SIFI’s contribution to systemic risk, with special reference to the potential for contagion and spill-over effects; (ii) mitigating the moral hazard problem and the associated bail-out guarantee.
Lahko bi celo rekli, da so ukrepi za doseganje enega cilja ključnega pomena pri doseganju drugega.“
Indeed, it can be argued that actions addressing one objective are instrumental in achieving the other as well.»
b) Reševanje bonitetnega tveganja, ki ga predstavljajo finančni centri na morju in nesodelujoče sodne oblasti.
b) Addressing prudential risks presented by offshore financial centres and non-cooperative jurisdictions.
V Evropski uniji so nadzorni odbori 3L3 izvedli dopolnilno označevanje, v okviru katerega so pripravili usklajeni seznam nesodelujočih sodnih oblasti, v zvezi s katerimi je več nadzornih organov EU poročalo o dolgotrajnih problemih.
Within the European Union, the 3L3 supervisory committees have carried out complementary mapping, identifying a consolidated list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, on which several EU supervisors have reported the existence of persistent problems.
Direktiva o kapitalskih zahtevah, Direktiva MiFID in Direktiva o solventnosti II bi morale vključevati načela v zvezi z dejavnostmi nesodelujočih sodnih oblasti in jih tudi omejevati (ali celo prepovedovati) v primeru, da sodna oblast ne sodeluje s pristojnimi organi držav članic ali če ovirajo izmenjavo podatkov o podružnicah na morju za namene konsolidiranega nadzora.
The Capital Requirement Directive, the MiFID, as well as the Solvency II Directive, should include principles concerning activities in non-cooperative jurisdictions, restricting (or even forbidding) such activities whenever a jurisdiction does not cooperate with Member States competent authorities or if they obstruct the sharing of information on off-shores subsidiaries for consolidated supervision purposes.
V teh priporočilih je navedeno, da če se ovire pri posredovanju podatkov izkažejo za nepremostljive in alternativne možnosti niso zadovoljive, mora domači nadzorni organ gostitelju poslati jasno sporočilo, da se banka lahko sama odloči za prenehanje izvajanja zadevne operacije, ali pa to od nje zahteva domači nadzorni organ.
These recommendations foresee that if impediments to information sharing prove to be insurmountable, and there are no satisfactory alternative arrangements, the home supervisor should make it clear to the host that the bank may decide for itself, or be required by its home supervisor, to close down the operation in question.
Poleg tega je treba zagotoviti, da sta sedež ali matična banka izključena iz opredelitve tretje osebe, če zakonodaja omejuje razkritje podatkov „tretjim osebam“.
Furthermore, it is important to ensure that if the law restricts disclosure of information to “third parties”, the head office or parent bank is excluded from the definition of a third party.
Vsa ta načela, utemeljena na mednarodnih standardih in delu, ki poteka na ravni FSB in EU, bi morala vključevati tudi razvoj zbirke orodij za izvrševanje bonitetnega nadzora.
All these principles grounded on international standards and on work being developed at the FSB and EU levels, should include the establishment of a toolbox for prudential enforcement.
Ta zbirka orodij bi lahko vključevala postopen pristop, ki bi segal od krepitve dialoga in pogajanj s problematičnimi sodnimi oblastmi do krepitve potrebne skrbnosti institucij, ki poslujejo v zadevnih sodnih oblasteh, in/ali zahtev za več lastnih sredstev in/ali omejitev dejavnosti ali celo do zaključka poslovanja.
This toolbox could include a step-by-step approach, going from the intensification of dialogue and negotiations with problematic jurisdictions to the intensification of due diligence by institutions operating in those jurisdictions and/or requirements for higher own funds and/or restriction on activities or even closure of operations.
c) Razvoj bolj usklajenih režimov sankcioniranja na evropski ravni, ob upoštevanju priporočil iz poročila de Larosière (priporočilo 20): „Evropske institucije bi prav tako morale sprožiti proces, ki bo vodil do mnogo bolj usklajenih režimov sankcioniranja na enotnem trgu.
c) The development of more harmonised sanctioning regimes at the European level, in the light of recommendations of the “de Larosière Report” (recommendation 20): “The European Institutions should also set in motion a process which will lead to far more consistent sanctioning regimes across the Single Market.
Nadzor ne more biti učinkovit, če so režimi sankcioniranja šibki in se med seboj zelo razlikujejo.
Supervision cannot be effective with weak, highly variant sanctioning regimes.
Ključnega pomena je, da lahko vsi nadzorni organi v EU in drugje izvajajo režime sankcioniranja, ki so ustrezno usklajeni, strogi in imajo učinek odvračanja.
It is essential that within the EU and elsewhere, all supervisors are able to deploy sanctions regimes that are sufficiently convergent, strict, resulting in deterrence.
Trenutno stanje je popolnoma drugačno.
This is far from being the case now.
Enako bi morali storiti v zvezi s pristojnostmi nadzora, da bi spodbudili usklajen in učinkovit nadzor na enotnem trgu.
The same exercise should be initiated with respect to supervisory powers in order to foster a coherent and effective supervision in the Single Market.”