natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Med letoma 1989 in 1992 sem sodeloval oziroma vodil gospodarske misije za mednarodno finančno korporacijo Svetovne banke na Poljskem, Češkem in v Angoli.
In 1989-92 I participated or headed economic missions for the IFC-World Bank in Poland, Czech Republic and Angola.
Od marca 2000 sem bil član tako razširjenega sveta kot sveta Evropske centralne banke.
Since March 2000 I have been a member both of the General Council and Governing Council of the European Central Bank.
Katere so najpomembnejše odločitve, pri katerih ste bili udeleženi v svoji poklicni karieri?
What are the most important decisions to which you have been party in your professional life?
Kot finančni minister sem leta 1978 moral sprejeti politiko za spopadanje s težavami v plačilni bilanci, s katerimi se je država otepala od leta 1976.
As Finance Minister in 1978 I had to decide the policies to face a balance of payments crisis that the country was facing since 1976.
Pri pripravi proračuna in zapletenih pogajanjih o sporazumu „standby“ z MDS sem bil postavljen pred težavne izbire glede obrestnih mer (tedaj odgovornost guvernerja) in menjalnega tečaja ter sem moral sprejemati zahtevne odločitve, ki so na koncu pripeljale do pozitivnih rezultatov: zunanji primanjkljaj je bil prepolovljen in prilagoditev portugalskega gospodarstva je bila uspešna.
The preparation of the budget and the complex negotiations of a standby agreement with the IMF, with difficult choices about interest rates (then the responsibility of the Government) and the exchange rate, implied demanding decisions that produced positive results: the external deficit was cut in half and the successful adjustment of the Portuguese economy.
Kot guverner centralne banke sem med letoma 1985 in 1986 izvedel korenito reformo denarnih in deviznih trgov in tako tlakoval pot za bolj tržno usmerjen način izvajanja monetarne politike.
As Governor of the Central Bank I implemented in 1985-86 a deep reform of the Portuguese money and forex markets paving the way for a more market-oriented method of conducting monetary policy.
Liberalizirane so bile obrestne mere, ustvarjen je bil nov trg zakladnih menic, ki ga je upravljala banka Banco de Portugal, ustvarjeni so bili certifikati za obveznice centralne banke in vzpostavljen je bil pravi devizni trg z dnevnim določanjem.
Interest rates were liberalized, a new Treasury-Bill market was created and managed by Banco de Portugal, certificates of central bank debt were created and a true foreign exchange market was formed with a daily fixing.
Hkrati smo bančni sektor odprli za zasebne in tuje banke.
At the same time the opening of the banking sector to private and foreign banks was implemented.
Monetarna in gospodarska politika
B. Monetary and economic policy
Katere vodilne cilje boste kot podpredsednik Evropske centralne banke poskušali doseči v osemletnem mandatu?
What would be the guiding objectives you will pursue during your eight-year mandate as Vice-President of the European Central Bank?
Kot podpredsednika ECB me bodo vodila enaka načela, kot so me na položaju guvernerja banke Banco de Portugal: spoštovanje pravnih vidikov mandata, neodvisnost od političnih in drugih organov, preglednost in najvišji standardi etičnega ravnanja.
As Vice-President of the ECB, I shall be guided by the same principles as in my function as the Governor of the Banco de Portugal: respect for the legal aspects of the mandate, independence from political or other bodies, transparency and highest standards of ethical conduct.
V celoti bom spoštoval pooblastilo iz Pogodbe.
I will fully respect the Treaty mandate.
Zavezan sem h glavnemu cilju ECB, tj. stabilnosti cen, in načelu neodvisnosti centralne banke.
I am committed to the ECB’s primary objective of price stability and the principle of central bank independence.
Prav tako sem zavezan k sekundarnemu cilju, določenem s Pogodbo, tj. podpiranju glavnih gospodarskih politik v Uniji za prispevanje k doseganju njenih ciljev, če to ni v nasprotju z glavnim ciljem stabilnosti cen.
Without prejudice to the primary goal of price stability, I am also committed to the secondary objective defined by the Treaty of supporting the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of its objectives.
Skupaj s kolegi v svetu ECB se bom še naprej po najboljših močeh trudil za srednjeročno stabilnost cen v dobro vseh evropskih državljanov.
Together with my colleagues in the Governing Council of the ECB, we will continue to do our utmost in order to deliver price stability over the medium term to the benefit of all European citizens.
Kako ocenjujete monetarno politiko, ki jo je ESCB izvajal enajst let?
What is your assessment of the monetary policy as it has been implemented by the ESCB for eleven years?
Katere spremembe, če sploh, bi spodbujali kot podpredsednik ECB?
What changes, if any, would you promote when becoming ECB Vice-President?
Uvedba evra leta 1999 je bil zgodovinski dogodek v monetarni zgodovini.
The introduction of the euro in 1999 was a historical event in monetary history.
Kot član sveta ECB sem imel v zadnjih desetih letih čast sodelovati pri procesu uvajanja evra.
I had the honour to participate in the euro process as member of the Governing Council of the ECB for the last 10 years.
Verjamem, da je monetarna politika izpolnila cilje Pogodbe, kar potrjujeta povprečna inflacija le 2 % od začetka monetarne unije in čvrsta utrditev inflacijskih pričakovanj, ki je osnovno merilo za dobro monetarno politiko.
I believe that monetary policy has been able to live up to the Treaty's objective, as reflected in an average inflation of just 2% since the beginning of monetary union and the firm anchoring of inflation expectations, a fundamental criterion of a good monetary policy.
Zaveza k srednjeročnemu ohranjanju inflacije pod, vendar blizu 2 % zagotavlja najbolj trdno podlago za našo strategijo monetarne politike.
The commitment to keep inflation, on a medium-term basis, below but close to 2% is what provides the most solid structure to our monetary policy strategy.
Je naš kompas, kot to rad poudari predsednik Trichet.
It is our compass, as President Trichet likes to point out.
Od začetka monetarne unije je minilo več kot desetletje.
More than a decade has passed since the start of monetary union.
ECB je zato v primerjavi z drugimi evropskimi institucijami in osrednjimi centralnimi bankami še vedno zelo mlada institucija.
The ECB therefore still is a very young institution, compared to other European institutions and to other major central banks.
Pogosto se pozablja na izzive, s katerimi se je soočala ECB, ko je začela izvajati monetarno politiko za evroobmočje, kjer je prevladovalo veliko negotovosti.
One easily forgets the challenges that the ECB faced when it started conducting monetary policy for the euro area, with many uncertainties prevailing.
Dejstvo, da je te ovire premagala brez težav in da je ECB polnopravna institucija Unije in spoštovana članica mednarodne skupnosti centralnih bank, že ponazarja, da se je monetarna politika v evroobmočju zelo zadovoljivo razvila in zato po mojem mnenju ne potrebuje večjih sprememb.
The fact that these hurdles have been overcome smoothly, and that the ECB is a fully-fledged Union institution and a respected member of the international community of central banks already indicates that monetary policy in the euro area has developed very satisfactorily and therefore in my view does not require significant changes.
Naj omenim še nekaj drugih dejstev, ki podpirajo mojo oceno.
Let me mention a few other facts that support my assessment.
Utrditev inflacijskih pričakovanj na ravneh, skladnih z opredelitvijo ECB o stabilnosti cen, je po mojem mnenju jasen znak, da finančni trgi in javnost v večini resnično verjamejo, da je enotna monetarna politika sposobna doseči svoj cilj.
The anchoring of inflation expectations around levels consistent with the ECB’s definition of price stability in my view provides a clear signal that financial markets and the public at large attach great credibility to the single monetary policy being able to achieve its goal.
Dejstvo, da so inflacijska pričakovanja ostala razmeroma stabilna tudi v finančni krizi, ko so nekateri napovedovali obdobje deflacije in so bile stopnje inflacije začasno negativne, je mogoče razumeti kot bistven dokaz za verodostojnost monetarne politike ECB.
The fact that inflation expectations remained fairly stable even in the financial crisis, when some were predicting a period of deflation, and when inflation rates temporarily turned negative, can be seen as an essential proof of the credibility of ECB’s monetary policy.
Pravočasen in odločen odziv ECB, ko je prišlo do finančnega pretresa in je ta prerasel v pravo krizo, je še en dokaz, kako uspešna je bila monetarna politika ECB.
The timely and bold reaction of the ECB when the financial turmoil erupted and when it turned into a full-blown crisis is another example of how successful the ECB monetary policy has been.
Znižanje obrestnih mer politike na zelo nizke stopnje in uvedba različnih nestandardnih ukrepov sta potrdila, da se je ECB sposobna po potrebi hitro odzvati.
The reduction of policy interest rates to very low levels and the introduction of various non-standard measures have proven the ECB’s capacity to act quickly if needed.
Skupaj z vladnimi podpornimi ukrepi za finančni sektor in stimulacijski davčni ukrepi, ki so bili sprejeti v sklopu evropskega načrta za oživitev gospodarstva konec leta 2008, je monetarna politika pomagala preprečiti še hujši razvoj dogodkov.
Together with governments’ support measures for the financial sector and the fiscal stimulus measures adopted in the context of the European Economic Recovery Plan of end-2008, monetary policy has helped avoiding that things turned even worse.
Vsa ta dejstva dokazujejo, da sta bila tako strategija kot okvir za izvajanje monetarne politike dobro zasnovana.
All these facts prove that both the strategy and the framework for implementing monetary policy have been well designed.
Zato pripisujem velik pomen pojasnilu, ki smo ga po natančni analizi delovanja monetarnega okvira dali maja 2003, saj je šlo za prizadevanje, pri katerem sem aktivno sodeloval.
In this regard, I attach great importance to the clarifying statement we issued in May 2003 after having deeply analyzed the functioning of our monetary framework, an endeavour in which I actively participated.
Želim poudariti pet točk te izjave.
I want to stress five points of that statement.
Prvič, nov količinski cilj stabilnosti cen, opredeljen kot inflacija „pod, vendar blizu 2 %“ zagotavlja zadostno mejo varnosti za zaščito pred nevarnostmi deflacije in hkrati obravnava vprašanje morebitnih odstopanj v meritvah HICP in posledice razlik v inflaciji znotraj evroobmočja.
First, the new quantified objective for price stability, defined as inflation «below but close to 2%» that provides a sufficient safety margin to guard against the risks of deflation while at the same time addressing the issue of the possible presence of a measurement bias in the HICP and the implications of inflation differentials within the euro area.
Druga točka, ki je povezana z jasno dodelitvijo različnih časovnih okvirov k prejšnjima dvema stebroma, določa, da se je treba najprej posvetiti ekonomski analizi, ki je zelo pomembna za delovanje politike.
The second point is related to the clear assignment of different time frames to the previous two pillars and to deal first in our communication with the economic analysis that is very relevant for the operational horizon of policy.
Četrta točka izhaja iz namena poudariti srednje- do dolgoročnost monetarne analize in nas pripelje do odločitve, da „ne bomo več preverjali referenčne vrednosti na letni osnovi“.
The fourth item results from the intention to underline the medium to long-term horizon of monetary analysis and led us to decide that we would « no longer conduct a review of the reference value on an annual basis».
Zadnja točka se nanaša na predstavo, da bo „monetarna analiza upoštevala razvoj številnih monetarnih kazalnikov, vključno z M3, njegovih delov in nasprotij, še zlasti posojil“.
Finally, the last point relates to the concept that « monetary analysis will take into account developments in a wide range of monetary indicators including M3, its components and counterparts, notably credit».
Po skrbnem premisleku teh nekaj točk kaže na pomembnost vloge različnih vidikov obsežne in izčrpne analize, ki jo uporabljamo pri ocenjevanju inflacijskih tveganj.
If carefully reflected upon, these several points put into proper perspective the role of the different aspects of the comprehensive, full information analysis that we apply to assessing inflation risks.
Kljub temu obseg in globina nedavne finančne krize pozivata k premisleku o načinu, kako se politiko izvaja na več ravneh, vključno z monetarnim področjem.
Nevertheless, the scale and depth of the recent financial crisis calls for a reflection on the way policy is conducted at several levels, including the monetary area.
Še posebej je kriza postavila v ospredje vprašanja, ki se nanašajo na finančne dejavnike, sistemsko tveganje in finančno stabilnost.
In particular, the crisis brought to the forefront issues relating to financial factors, systemic risk and financial stability.
Tradicionalno razmišljanje, da stabilnost cen na trgu blaga in storitev ustvarja tudi okolje, ki zagotavlja finančno stabilnost, so izpodbili dogodki iz preteklih let, ko je prišlo do več padcev cen premoženja skupaj z nizko inflacijo.
The traditional thinking that price stability in the market of goods and services also provides the environment that ensures financial stability has been invalidated by the events of the past few years that show a succession of bubbles in asset prices coexisting with a regime of low inflation.
Medtem ko so instrumenti iz uredbe in bonitetni nadzor pomembni za reševanje vprašanj finančne stabilnosti, so moteči učinki hitre rasti in padanja cen premoženja, ki smo jim bili priča pri trenutni krizi, sprožili razprave o upoštevanju cen pri izvajanju monetarne politike in tudi o vlogi kreditnih agregatov.
While the instruments of regulation and prudential supervision are prominent to deal with financial stability issues, the disruptive effects of asset price booms and crashes, as we have seen in the present crisis, have reignited the debate about the consideration of asset prices in the conduct of monetary policy and also about the role of credit aggregates.
Prej omenjeno monetarno strategijo smo ocenjevali pet let po vzpostavitvi monetarne unije in lahko se zgodi, da se bo svet ECB po krizi, ki se je začela 2007, v prihodnosti odločil za novo ocenjevanje strategije.
We undertook the evaluation of the monetary strategy that I mentioned before, five years after the beginning of the monetary union and it may happen that in the aftermath of the crisis that started in 2007 the Governing Council decides in the future to proceed to a new assessment of the strategy.
Vendar trenutno ne vidim večje potrebe po spreminjanju ali pojasnjevanju naše monetarne strategije.
As it stands now I see no immediate need to make any changes or clarifications regarding our monetary strategy.
Pogosto se pojavljajo trditve, da se je inflacija zaradi strukturnih sprememb svetovnega gospodarstva preselila z življenjskih potrebščin na premoženje.
It is often asserted that due to structural changes in the world economy inflation has shifted from inflation in consumer prices to inflation in asset prices.
Kako gledate na te trditve in kakšne bodo po vašem mnenju posledice za monetarno politiko?
What is your view on this assertion and which consequences for the monetary policy do you see?
V zadnjih dveh desetletjih je bila inflacija cen življenjskih potrebščin v pomembnih industrijsko razvitih gospodarstvih uspešno obvladana.
Over the past two decades consumer price inflation has been successfully contained in the major industrialised economies.
Nizka in stabilna inflacija ni „naraven“ pojav, temveč je v veliki meri dokaz zaveze centralnih bank cilju stabilnosti cen, kot je določeno v pretežnem delu statutov centralnih bank po vsem svetu.
Low and stable inflation are not “natural” phenomena but are to a large extent testimony of central banks’ commitment to the objective of price stability, as is laid down in a large number of central bank statutes around the globe.
Neodvisne centralne banke so pomagale utrditi inflacijska pričakovanja in tako ublažiti širjenje relativnih cenovnih pretresov na celokupne cene življenjskih potrebščin in plače.
Independent central banks have helped to anchor inflation expectations and thereby to dampen the propagation of relative price shocks to overall consumer prices and wages.
Pozitivni pretresi na področju ponudbe, ki so povezani z globalizacijo in vključevanjem pomembnih poceni proizvajalcev v svetovno trgovino, so prav tako pripomogli k obdobju nizke inflacije.
Positive supply shocks linked with globalization and the inclusion of important low cost producers in world trade also helped to support the period of low inflation.
Vendar smo hkrati priča velikim nihanjem cen različnega blaga in premoženja.
At the same time, however, we have been observing large swings in a variety of commodity and asset prices.
Po eni strani je imela globalizacija blaga in storitev ter večje povpraševanje držav v gospodarskem vzponu opazen vpliv na cene nafte, plina in drugih surovin.
On one side, globalisation in goods and services and increasing demand by emerging economies have had a discernible impact on the prices of oil, gas and other raw materials.
Po drugi strani pa je vedno bolj globaliziran in premalo reguliran finančni sistem, ki ga je spodbujala velika svetovna likvidnost, vodil do velike neusklajenosti cen premoženja, kar je bilo še najbolj opazno med nedavno finančno krizo.
On the other side, an increasingly globalised and under-regulated financial system fuelled by ample global liquidity has led to large asset price misalignments, most noticeable during the recent financial crisis.
Zaradi izkušenj iz zadnjih dveh let in pol so številni opazovalci začeli dvomiti o vlogi monetarne politike pri brzdanju inflacije cen premoženja.
The experience over the past two and a half years has led many observers to question the role of monetary policy in containing asset price inflation.
Naj se centralna banka odzove na cene premoženja posredno ali neposredno, ker bi lahko bila v prihodnosti ogrožena stabilnost cen?
Should a central bank react to asset prices directly or indirectly with regard to possible future threats to price stability?
Lahko centralna banka ugotovi, v katerih primerih velika rast cen vodi k njihovemu strmemu padcu?
Can central banks detect which of the observed asset price booms are bubbles?
To so pomembna vprašanja in na večino še vedno manjka povsem zadovoljiv odgovor.
These are important questions and to most of them a fully satisfying answer is still lacking.
Predkrizni splošni pogled na monetarno politiko in cene premoženja je dvomil o sposobnosti centralnih bank, da prepoznajo neusklajenost cen premoženja v realnem času, in je predvideval, da bo nizka inflacija na trgu blaga in storitev dovolj za preprečevanje bistvene neusklajenosti cen premoženja.
The pre-crisis consensus view about monetary policy and asset prices questioned the ability of central banks to identify asset price misalignments in real time and assumed that ensuring low inflation in the market of goods and services would be enough to avoid significant asset price misalignments.
Pri tem soglasju je bilo izpostavljeno, da bo odločna ublažitev monetarnih razmer po poku balona dovolj za ohranitev prave gospodarske dejavnosti in za zmanjšanje verjetnosti deflacije.
Given this consensus, it was pointed out that a decisive easing of monetary conditions after the bursting of the bubble would be sufficient to sustain real economic activity and to minimise the probability of deflation.
Trenutna kriza je postavila pod vprašaj obe predstavi in je prepričljivo pokazala, da so lahko gospodarski stroški velike neusklajenosti cen premoženja in njenega poznejšega popravka usodni.
The present crisis challenged both assumptions and has forcefully demonstrated that the economic costs of large asset price misalignments and their subsequent correction can be devastating.
Premoženjski baloni so pred krizo nastali v obdobju relativno nizke inflacije, in čeprav centralne banke ne morejo zanesljivo napovedati, kdaj bo finančno neravnovesje odpravljeno, so številni oblikovalci politik prepoznali nastajanje skrb zbujajočega neravnovesja pred izbruhom krize.
In fact, the asset price bubbles that preceded the crisis happened in a period of general low inflation and although central banks may not anticipate the exact timing of the unwinding of financial imbalances, many policy makers did identify the building up of such imbalances as a source of concern in the run up to the crisis.
To opravičuje dejstvo, da bi centralna banka morala aktivno spremljati razvoj cen premoženja in kreditne tokove ter povezana tveganja, ki jih ta predstavljajo za srednjeročno stabilnost cen.
This justifies that a central bank should actively monitor developments in asset prices and credit flows and the associated risks that they entail for price stability in the medium term.
Vse centralne banke na neznaten način upoštevajo napovedovanje cen premoženja, ko razmišljajo o monetarni politiki.
In a trivial sense all central banks consider the indications of asset prices in thinking about monetary policy.
Učinke premoženja, ki izhajajo iz naraščanja vrednosti premoženja, bo na primer vedno treba upoštevati, ker vplivajo na svetovno povpraševanje in pritiskajo na inflacijo.
For instance, the wealth effects stemming from asset appreciations will always have to be considered as they influence global demand, putting pressure on inflation.
Poleg te vloge je več razlogov proti večjemu vključevanju cen premoženja v cilje monetarne politike, vendar je tudi to mogoče izpodbijati.
Beyond this role, there are several arguments against a tighter integration of asset prices in monetary policy objectives but those arguments also have good rebuttals.
Splošno mnenje je, da ni mogoče določiti točnih ciljev za cene premoženja kot konkretnega cilja monetarne politike.
A point of general agreement is that no precise targets concerning asset prices could ever be defined as a concrete goal for monetary policy.
Po drugi strani pa monetarna politika ni eksaktna znanost in ekonomisti in centralni bančniki ne bi smeli ponoviti napak nekaterih teoretikov, ki jih Keynes označuje kot ljudi, ki se „raje natančno motijo, kot da bi imeli približno prav“.
On the other hand, though, monetary policy is not an exact science and economists and central bankers should not fall into the mistake of certain theoreticians stigmatized by Keynes as people who «prefer to be rigorously wrong rather than approximately right».
Ker lahko motnje na finančnem trgu ustvarijo obdobja nestabilnih cen v obe smeri, centralne banke ne smejo zavzeti nesorazmernega stališča, da se skušale samo izogniti posledicam zlomov na finančnih trgih in ne bi storile ničesar, ko cene rastejo ali nastajajo baloni.
After all, financial market disruptions can create episodes of unstable prices, in either direction, and central banks should not assume the asymmetric position that they only act to avoid the consequences of crashes in financial markets and do nothing when price booms or bubbles are developing.
Kljub temu ne gre pozabiti, da je primerni glavni cilj monetarne politike srednjeročno ohranjanje stabilnost cen življenjskih potrebščin.
Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the appropriate primary objective of monetary policy is to maintain price stability in consumer prices over the medium term.