natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
V tem kontekstu se centralne banke ne morejo in ne smejo predhodno zavezati, da bodo zagotavljale likvidnost na mednarodni ravni v primeru krize.
In that context, central banks cannot, and should not, commit ex ante to the provision of international liquidity in a crisis.
Ali menite, da bodo imeli Evropski odbor za sistemska tveganja in evropski nadzorni organi učinkovita pooblastila?
Do you believe the ESRB and the ESA's will have effective powers?
Povezavo in usklajevanje med mikro- in makrobonitetnim nadzorom zagotavlja medinstitucionalna struktura Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja (ESRB), pri kateri evropske nadzorne organe (ESA) zastopajo njihovi predsedniki kot člani z glasovalno pravico.
The interplay and coordination between micro- and macro-prudential supervision are ensured by the inter-institutional structure of the ESRB whereby the ESAs are represented through their chairs as voting members.
Poleg tega sodelovanje med ESRB in ESA (in splošneje z nacionalnimi nadzornimi organi) predpisuje določba v zakonodaji v zvezi s splošno dolžnostjo sodelovanja in izmenjave informacij med udeleženci evropskega sistema finančnih nadzornih organov (ESFS
Furthermore, the cooperation between the ESRB and the ESAs (and more generally the national supervisors) is ensured by the provision in the legislation of a broad duty of cooperation and exchange of information among the components of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS
Evropski sistem finančnih nadzornih organov (ESFS) sestavljajo ESRB in ESA, vključno z nacionalnimi finančnimi nadzornimi organi in skupnim odborom ESA. ).
The ESRB and the ESAs, together with the national financial supervisors and the Joint Committee of the ESAs, form the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS). ).
Sodelovanje med makro in mikro nadzornimi organi bo zlasti pomembno, saj naj bi se makrobonitetni nadzor izvajal predvsem z bonitetnimi nadzornimi in regulativnimi orodji.
The cooperation between macro and micro supervisors will be in particular crucial as macroprudential supervision is expected to be implemented mostly through prudential supervisory and regulatory tools.
Zato bo za izvajanje makrobonitetnega mandata, dodeljenega ESRB, potrebno ustrezno usklajevanje z nacionalnimi nadzornimi organi, na katere bo ESRB naslavljal priporočila.
Therefore, the implementation of the macroprudential mandate assigned to the ESRB will require proper coordination with the national supervisory authorities that will be the addressee of the ESRB’s recommendations.
V zvezi s tem bo zlasti pomembna vloga ESA, ki so v skladu z zakonodajnim okvirom pristojni za zagotavljanje ustreznega nadaljnjega ukrepanja na podlagi opozoril in priporočil ESRB.
In this context, of particular importance will be the role of the ESAs, which are mandated by the legislative framework to ensure the proper follow-up to ESRB warnings and recommendations.
Zakonodajni okvir pooblašča ESRB za izdajo opozoril o tveganjih in priporočil glede politike.
As regards the ESRB, the legal framework provides it with the power to issue risk warnings and policy recommendations.
To v veliki meri odraža priporočila de Larosierove skupine za ustanovitev organa, pristojnega za makrobonitetni nadzor, ki bi se izvajal na podlagi in ob upoštevanju pristojnosti in strokovnega znanja ECB, nacionalnih centralnih bank in nacionalnih nadzornih organov.
This largely reflects the recommendations of the De Larosière Group for the establishment of a body responsible for macro-prudential supervision, based on and drawing upon the competence and expertise of the ECB, national central banks and national supervisors.
Odbor ESRB, ki je bil pravno ustanovljen 16. decembra 2010, je že organiziral dve seji splošnega odbora, vzpostavil svetovalne odbore in zdaj v celoti opravlja svoje naloge.
Legally established on 16 December 2010, the ESRB already had two meetings of its General Board, has established its advisory committees and is now fully operational.
ECB je v skladu z zakonodajnim okvirom pristojna za nudenje analitične, statistične, logistične in upravne podpore ESRB.
The ECB has been entrusted by the legislative framework with the provision of analytical, statistical, logistical and administrative support to the ESRB.
V tem okviru si ECB močno prizadeva za krepitev zmogljivosti in analitičnih orodij za izvajanje analize sistemskega tveganja.
In this context, the ECB is making the utmost effort to enhance its capability and analytical tools to conduct systemic risk analysis.
Bolj natančno je vloga ECB pri podpiranju ESRB (poleg zagotavljanja tajniških storitev) sledeča:
More specifically, the ECB role in supporting the ESRB (apart from providing the Secretariat) is as follows:
· ECB bo ESRB zagotavljala redne prispevke , na podlagi katerih bo lahko ugotavljal in ocenjeval sistemsko tveganje v EU ob upoštevanju organizacije, sprejete za izvajanje nalog ECB v zvezi s finančno stabilnostjo;
· The ECB will provide regular products to the ESRB for the identification and assessment of systemic risk in the EU by relying on the organisation adopted for performing the ECB financial stability tasks;
· Redni prispevki ECB bodo podprti z: (i) analitično infrastrukturo , ki bo razvijala in vzdrževala analitična orodja in metodologije za analizo sistemskega tveganja; (ii) infrastrukturo za makrobonitetne podatke , ki bo temeljila na statistični funkciji ECB in (iii) omrežji tržnih informacij , ki jih bo treba razviti.
· The regular contribution of the ECB will be supported by: (i) analytical infrastructure which will develop and maintain analytical tools and methodologies for systemic risk analysis; (ii) infrastructure for macro-prudential data drawing on the ECB statistical function; and (iii) market intelligence networks to be developed.
Uspeh ESRB bo zelo odvisen od razpoložljivosti visokokakovostnih in pravočasnih informacij, ki omogočajo makrobonitetni nadzor.
The success of the ESRB will crucially depend on the availability of high quality and timely information that enables macroprudential supervision.
Za to bo potrebno tesno sodelovanje med ESRB, tremi ESA, ECB in ustreznimi nacionalnimi (nadzornimi) organi in centralnimi bankami.
This will require a close collaboration between the ESRB, the three ESAs, the ECB and the relevant national (supervisory) authorities and central banks.
Izmenjava informacij bo potrebna predvsem v zbirni obliki (po možnosti z ukrepi razpršitve) in redno (običajno v četrtletnih razmikih) ali le za posamezne institucije, ki pa je v skladu z uredbo ESRB (člen 15) mogoča le za določen namen.
The exchange of information will be needed mainly in aggregated form (whenever possible with dispersion measures) on a regular (usually quarterly) basis or for individual institution-level basis and, following the ESRB regulation (Art. 15), can only occur on an ad-hoc basis.
Pomembna bosta tudi sodelovanje in izmenjava informacij z drugimi oblastmi in podobnimi organi po vsem svetu.
Cooperation and information sharing with other jurisdictions and similar bodies around the world will also be important.
V zvezi z mikrobonitetnim stebrom institucionalnega okvira EU je bil evropskim nadzornim organom dodeljen pomemben niz pristojnosti na področju sprejemanja zakonodaje, izvrševanja predpisov in usklajevanja nadzora ter niz učinkovitih orodij za izvajanje teh nalog.
As regards the microprudential pillar of the EU institutional framework, the ESAs have been allocated a significant set of competences, related to rule-making, enforcement of rules and coordination of supervision and with a set of effective tools to exercise these tasks.
Prvič, v zvezi s sprejemanjem zakonodaje lahko ESA izdajo tehnične standarde za finančno ureditev in nadzor, ki lahko postanejo zakonsko zavezujoči, če jih sprejme Komisija, ali pa ostanejo v okviru mehkega prava.
First, as regards rule-making, the ESAs can issue technical standards for financial regulation and supervision, which may either become legally binding through adoption by the Commission or have a soft law nature.
S temi orodji naj bi ESA oblikovali pravilnik EU, s čimer bi odpravili zgoraj omenjeno veliko vrzel v veljavnem okviru, tj. obstoječe razlike v ključnih regulativnih elementih po državah.
Through these tools the ESAs are expected to set up a EU rulebook, thereby addressing the above-mentioned main lacunae of the current framework, namely the existing divergences across countries in key regulatory elements.
Drugič, ESA morajo zagotoviti, da se predpisi o nadzoru dosledno uporabljajo.
Second, the ESAs should ensure that supervisory rules are applied in a consistent manner.
V ta namen imajo ESA zelo učinkovito pooblastilo, in sicer možnost sprejemanja pravno zavezujočih odločitev za nacionalne nadzorne organe ali (če jih ti ne upoštevajo) celo za posamezne finančne institucije v posebnih primerih, ko je ogrožena finančna stabilnost.
To this aim, the ESAs are granted a very effective power, namely the possibility to take legally binding decisions addressed to national supervisors or (in case of non compliance by them) even to specific financial institutions in some specific instances, when justified by financial stability considerations.
Taka pomembna pooblastila (za katera velja poseben postopek) je mogoče uveljaviti zlasti za obravnavanje (i) kršitev zakonodaje EU s strani nadzornih organov, (ii) razhajanj med nacionalnimi nadzornimi organi v čezmejnih zadevah in (iii) primerov, ko Svet razglasi izredne razmere.
Such important powers (subject to a specific procedure) may be triggered for addressing in particular (i) the breach of EU law by supervisors; (ii) the disagreement between national supervisory authorities in cross-border situations; and (iii) when the Council declares an emergency situation.
V zadnjih dveh primerih velja za pooblastila ESA pomembna „fiskalna klavzula“ iz člena 38 Uredbe ESA, ki določa, da pooblastila ESA ne smejo vplivati na nacionalne fiskalne pristojnosti.
In the latter two cases the ESAs’ powers are subject to the important “fiscal clause” laid down by article 38 of the ESA regulation, providing that ESAs’ powers can not impinge on the national fiscal responsibilities.
Nazadnje poudarjam, da ESA nimajo posebnega orodja za obvladovanje in reševanje krize.
Finally, I note that the ESAs are not allocated any specific tool as regards crisis management and resolution.
S stališča ECB je treba v kratkoročnem smislu poudariti naslednje ključne izzive za ESA:
From the ECB’s point of view it is very important to underline in the short term the following key challenges for the ESAs:
1) opredelitev operativnega okvira za sodelovanje in izmenjavo informacij med ESA in ESRB ter med ESRB in ECB;
1) the definition of the operational framework concerning the cooperation and exchange of information of the ESAs with the ESRB, together with the latter and the ECB.
2) vzpostavitev verodostojnega režima testov izjemnih situacij.
2) the completion of a credible stress-test regime.
Ali glede Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja menite, da obstaja potencial za navzkrižje interesov z mandatom Evropske centralne banke (ECB) glede denarne politike?
As far as ESRB is concerned, do you see a potential conflict of interest with the ECB mandate in relation to monetary policy?
Kot veste, je glavni cilj ECB ohranjanje stabilnosti cen v evroobmočju.
As you are well aware, the ECB’s primary objective is to maintain price stability in the euro area.
Poleg tega prispeva k „nemotenemu vodenju politik pristojnih oblasti glede …. stabilnosti finančnega sistema“ in spodbuja nemoteno delovanje tržnih infrastruktur.
Furthermore, it contributes “to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to… the stability of the financial system” and promotes the smooth functioning of market infrastructures.
Na drugi strani pa je na novo ustanovljeni Evropski odbor za sistemska tveganja pristojen za makrobonitetni nadzor nad celotnim finančnim sistemom EU, ugotavljanje tveganj za finančno stabilnost ter izdajanje morebitnih potrebnih opozoril o tveganjih in priporočil za ukrepe za odpravo teh tveganj.
On the other hand, the newly created ESRB is importantly responsible for macro-prudential oversight across the EU’s financial system, identifying risks to financial stability and issuing any necessary risk warnings and recommendations for action to address such risks.
Ne glede na to je jasno, da stabilnosti cen in finančne stabilnosti ni mogoče analizirati neodvisno ene od druge.
This notwithstanding, it is clear that price stability and financial stability cannot be analysed independently from each other.
Dolgoročno gledano stabilnost cen prispeva k finančni stabilnosti, medtem ko je finančna stabilnost pogoj, da lahko centralna banka ohranja stabilnost cen.
In the long-run, price stability contributes to financial stability, while financial stability is a prerequisite for the central bank’s ability to maintain price stability.
Torej se cilji ECB in ESRB vzajemno krepijo.
Thus both, the ECB’s and the ESRB’s objectives, are mutually self-reinforcing.
Dejansko bo treba za celovito upoštevanje vloge ESRB kot organa, pristojnega za makrobonitetno politiko EU, vzpostaviti dialog med tema dvema organoma o vprašanjih politike, ki lahko vplivajo na sistemsko tveganje.
Indeed, while fully respecting the ESRB’s role as the body responsible for EU macroprudential policy, it will be important for there to be dialogue between the two bodies on policy issues that can affect systemic risk.
Prepričan sem, da je institucionalna neodvisnost ECB in ESRB zagotovilo, da bodo njuni politični instrumenti usmerjeni k ciljem, za katere so bili ti instrumenti načrtovani.
I am fully confident that the institutional independence of the ECB and ESRB will make sure that the respective policy instruments will be geared to the objectives for which these have been designed.
Kakšna bo po vašem mnenju vloga ECB pri nadzoru bančnega poslovanja v prihodnosti?
How do you see the ECB's role in banking supervision in the future?
Vloga ECB pri finančnem nadzoru je jasno določena v Pogodbi, in sicer vključuje prispevanje k nemotenemu vodenju politik pristojnih nacionalnih organov na področju bančnega nadzora in finančne stabilnosti.
The ECB’s role in financial supervision is clearly defined by the Treaty in terms of contribution to the smooth conduct of the policies pursued by competent national authorities in the field of banking supervision and financial stability.
Poleg tega Pogodba zagotavlja državam članicam možnost, da pooblastijo ECB za izvajanje posebnih nalog v zvezi s politikami na področju bonitetnega nadzora kreditnih in drugih finančnih institucij.
Moreover, the Treaty provides Member States with the possibility to assign to the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit and financial institutions.
To možnost so izkoristile, na primer s pooblastitvijo ECB za nudenje analitične, statistične, logistične in upravne podpore ESRB.
This possibility has been exploited for instance by attributing to the ECB the responsibility to provide the analytical, statistical, logistical and administrative support to the ESRB.
Podpiram nov institucionalni okvir EU, osredotočen na ESRB in ESA, in pričakujem, da bosta nemotena povezanost in učinkovito delovanje zadevnih dveh stebrov, makro- in mikrobonitetnega nadzora, zagotovila učinkovit okvir za spodbujanje finančne stabilnosti v EU.
I support the new EU institutional framework centred on the ESRB and the ESAs and I expect that the smooth interplay and effective functioning of its two pillars, macro and microprudential supervision will provide an effective framework to promote financial stability in the EU.
Katera so po vašem mnenju najbolj pereča vprašanja v zvezi z zakonodajo na področju finančnih storitev?
What do you see as the most pressing issues in the financial services legislation?
Pod okriljem G20 je Odbor za finančno stabilnost, kateremu imam čast predsedovati, opravil ogromno dela.
Under the auspices of the G20, the Financial Stability Board, which I have the honour to Chair, has done a remarkable amount of work.
Vendar tako na mednarodni kot na evropski ravni delo še zdaleč ni končano.
However, both at international level as well as at European level the work is far from finished.
Naj omenim štiri področja, ki morajo hitreje napredovati.
Let me mention four issues on which work needs to progress and stay apace.
Prvič, glavni izziv v zvezi s pravili Basel III je pravočasno, celovito in dosledno izvajanje novega okvira ter celovitejša ocena nekaterih novih ukrepov, kot so kazalniki vzvoda in likvidnostni standardi, ter morebitna prilagoditev nanje v obdobju opazovanja.
Firstly, as regards Basel III, the main challenge ahead lies in a timely, full and consistent implementation of the new framework, as well as a fuller assessment of and possible adjustments to some of the new measures, such as the leverage ratio and liquidity standards, during the observation period.
Prilagajanje na te ukrepe bo temeljilo na informacijah, zbranih med opazovanjem, in bo vključevalo obvladovanje nenačrtovanih posledic za posamezne banke, bančni sektor, finančni trg in gospodarstvo kot celoto.
Adjustments to these measures will be based on the information gathered during the observation period, and will address any unintended consequences for individual banks, the banking sector, the financial market and the economy as a whole.
Poleg tega je za vzpostavitev enakih konkurenčnih pogojev in preprečevanje regulativne arbitraže na svetovni ravni in ravni EU pomembno, da se pravila Basel III v celoti in dosledno prenesejo v nacionalno zakonodajo in predpise (v Evropi prek Direktive o kapitalskih zahtevah – CRD IV), in sicer tako po črki zakona kot v duhu.
Furthermore, in order to create a level playing field and avoid regulatory arbitrage, globally as well as in the EU, it is important that Basel III is fully and consistently transposed into national legislation and regulation (in Europe via CRD IV), in both letter and spirit.
Glede na nedavne razprave o osnutku besedila CRD IV opozarjam, da pravila Basel III določajo minimalne standarde, ki jih države lahko presežejo.
I note, with reference to recent discussions of the draft CRD IV text, that Basel III sets minimum standards which countries should be free to exceed.
Drugič, v zvezi s sistemsko pomembnimi finančnimi institucijami si Odbor za finančno stabilnost in Baselski odbor za bančni nadzor prizadevata, da bosta na novembrskem vrhu G20 v potrditev predložila priporočila o opredelitvi globalnih sistemsko pomembnih finančnih institucij (G-SIFI) ter o ustrezni stopnji nadomestitve dodatnih izgub in ukrepih za izboljšanje orodij in režimov za reševanje.
Secondly, as regards systemically important financial institutions, the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision are committed to delivering to the November G20 Summit for endorsement recommendations on the identification of G-SIFIs, as well as the appropriate degree of additional loss absorbency and measures to improve resolution tools and regimes.
Bistveno je, da se ti izvajajo na mednarodno dosleden način, odbor za finančno stabilnost pa bo ustanovil strokovni svet za ocenjevanje, ki bo to spremljal.
It is crucial that these are implemented in an internationally consistent way, and the FSB will establish a Peer Review Council to monitor this.
Tretjič, bistveno je, da se razvije dosleden okvir za obvladovanje in reševanje kriz, na podlagi katerega bi lahko verodostojno obravnavali problematiko čezmejnih institucij in tako učinkovito obvladovali krize v prihodnosti.
Thirdly, development of a consistent crisis management and resolution framework that can credibly address cross-border institutions is crucial if we are able to deal effectively with crisis in the future.
V zvezi s tem bo zakonodajni predlog Evropske komisije o okviru za obvladovanje krize, ki naj bi bil po pričakovanjih pripravljen jeseni, pomemben mejnik.
In this context, the legislative proposal of the European Commission on a crisis management framework expected in the fall will constitute a landmark.
Bistveno je, da se v zvezi z razvojem okvira za reševanje sprejme celovita zbirka pooblastil in verodostojnih finančnih ureditev, ki preprečujejo zanašanje na državne proračune.
As regards the development of a resolution framework, it is essential that a comprehensive toolbox of powers and credible financing arrangements that avoid the reliance on state budgets is agreed upon.
Medtem ko na mednarodni ravni že vlada precejšnje soglasje glede najučinkovitejših orodij za reševanje v nacionalnem okviru, odbor za finančno stabilnost še naprej pripravlja priporočila za obravnavanje čezmejnih vprašanj in analizira možnosti uporabe dolga, na katerega je mogoče prenesti izgube (z odpisom ali preoblikovanjem v lastniški kapital) z različnih vidikov (tj. dokapitalizacija ali pokrivanje izgub s strani nosilcev podrejenega in prednostnega dolga).
While there much agreement at international level as regards the most effective resolution tools in a domestic context, the FSB is currently further working on recommendations to address cross-border issues, and on analysing the potential for bail-inable debt from different perspectives (i.e. recapitalization or absorption of losses by subordinated and senior debt holders).
Nazadnje je pomembno, da se nadalje krepi nadzor t.i. „bančništva v senci“.
Lastly, it is vital that work progresses on strengthening oversight on what is referred to as “shadow banking”.
Bolje je treba razumeti zapleteno verigo dejavnosti in subjektov, ki opravljajo vlogo kreditnih posrednikov zunaj reguliranega bančnega sektorja, ter posledično oceniti ustreznost veljavnega regulativnega okvira in opredeliti področja sistemskih tveganj, ki so zunaj obsega reguliranih bančnih dejavnosti.
It is important to better understand the complex chain of activities and entities involved in credit intermediation outside the regulated banking sector and consequently assess the adequacy of the current regulatory framework and identify areas of systemic risk concerns that are outside the perimeter of regulated banking activities.
Ob upoštevanju zgoraj navedenega svoje obveznosti in kolektivne odgovornosti v zvezi s trdnejšim finančnim sistemom ne bomo izpolnili, če se dogovorjene reforme ne bodo dosledno izvajale v vseh večjih jurisdikcijah.
In all of the above, we will fall short of our commitment to, and collective responsibility for, a more resilient financial system if implementation of agreed reforms does not occur in a consistent manner across major jurisdictions.
ZDA in EU imata v zvezi s tem posebno odgovornost.
The US and the EU have a special responsibility in this regard.
Nacionalni in regionalni organi ne smejo dovoliti, da nacionalni interesi oslabijo izvajanje globalnih reform, ki so potrebne za preprečevanje prihodnjih kriz.
It would be a serious mis-judgment of national and regional authorities to allow national interests to weaken implementation of global reforms necessary to avert future crises.
Odgovornosti izvršilnega odbora ECB so določene v členu 12 Statuta ESCB in ECB („Statut“), na podlagi katerega je pristojen za izvajanje denarne politike v skladu z odločitvami sveta ECB in pripravljanje sej sveta ECB.
The responsibilities of the ECB’s Executive Board are laid down in Article 12 of the Statute of the ESCB and the ECB (“the Statute”) which allocates to it the tasks of implementing monetary policy in accordance with the decisions laid down by the Governing Council and of preparing the meetings of the Governing Council.
Poleg tega člen 11 Statuta določa, da je izvršilni odbor odgovoren za tekoče poslovanje ECB.
In addition Article 11 of the Statute stipulates that the Executive Board shall be responsible for the current business of the ECB.
Oba člena se nanašata na izvršilni odbor kot celoto, kar je v skladu s sestavo izvršilnega odbora kot kolegijskega organa, ki sprejema odločitve.
Both articles refer to the Executive Board as a whole, which is in line with the construction of the Executive Board as a collegiate decision-making body.