natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Strachan (H4) na splošno ugotavlja le, da „ sočustvujemo s položajem zavarovancev in razumemo čustva, ki so jih vodila pri vlaganju številnih pritožb, vendar menimo, da te pritožbe izražajo napačno razumevanje tega, kaj bi lahko oziroma morali storiti zakonodajalci v primerih, kot je primer družbe Equitable Life“ .
Mr STRACHAN (H4) only noted in general that " we sympathise with the position of policyholders and understand the strength of feeling that has led them to make a series of complaints but we consider that these complaints reflect a misunderstanding of what regulators could or should have achieved in a case such as Equitable Life ".
Dodal je, da „ zakonodajni sistem ne more preprečiti vseh napak niti ni temu namenjen “.
He added that " a regulatory system neither can nor should aim at avoiding all failures ".
WE 32 in WE 37 določata zakonodajne cilje Organa za finančne storitve v skladu z oddelkom 2 Zakona o finančnih storitvah in trgu iz leta 2000.
WE 32 and WE 37 outline the FSA's regulatory objectives according to Section 2 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
Zato je Organ za finančne storitve med drugim odgovoren za ohranjanje zaupanja v trg in varstva potrošnikov.
Hence, the FSA is responsible, among other things, for preserving both market confidence and consumer protection.
Nekateri zavarovanci so izrazili nezadovoljstvo glede načina, kako je Organ za finančne storitve izpolnjeval slednji cilj v zvezi z družbo Equitable Life, ter so Organ za finančne zadeve obtožili, da je poskušal ovirati zavarovance pri pridobivanju odškodnine ter ni izpolnil svoje naloge zaščititi potrošnike.
Some policyholders have expressed dissatisfaction with the way in which FSA has pursued the latter objective with regard to Equitable Life and put forward the strong allegation that the FSA has tried to obstruct policyholders from getting redress and failed in its role to protect consumers.
Akcijska skupina EMAG v WE 44 trdi, da je „ Organ za finančne storitve ogrozil spoštovanje varstva vlagateljev, ker njegove letne tekoče stroške večinoma financira industrija “, ter ga imenuje „ organ z monopolnim nadzorom nad varstvom potrošnikov, medtem ko je v resnici podrejen svojim industrijskim gospodarjem “.
EMAG claims in WE 44 that " the FSA is compromised in respect of investor protection because its annual running cost ... is funded by the industry " and calls it " a body with monopolistic control over consumer protection, whilst being in thrall to its industry paymasters ".
Akcijska skupina EMAG Organ za finančne storitve zlasti obtožuje, da ni uveljavil splošnega pristopa k izplačevanju odškodnin oškodovanim vlagateljem.
Specifically, EMAG alleges that FSA had failed to impose a generic approach to compensating aggrieved investors.
Organ za finančne storitve je celo obtožila, da je „ organiziral zakritje krize “, da bi se izognil izplačevanju odškodnin: „ Vsa učinkovita sredstva za odškodnino so bila sistematično vnaprej izključena.“ (WE 44)
It even accused the FSA of having " orchestrated a cover-up " in order to avoid compensation payouts: " There has been systematic foreclosure of any effective means of redress " (WE 44).
Seveda je Organ za finančne storitve vse te obtožbe odločno zavrnil (glej WE 37): „Vem, da se je pred tem odborom izjavilo, da je Odbor za finančne storitve, ker ga financira industrija, nekako odvisen od družb, ki jih ureja.
Naturally, the FSA strongly rejected these allegations (see WE 37): " I am aware that the point has been made to this committee that, because it is funded by the industry, the FSA is somehow "in the pocket" of the firms it regulates.
Ta odbor želim obvestiti, da so takšne skrbi povsem neutemeljene.
I wish to place on record to this committee that such concerns are entirely misplaced.
Smo zakonsko določen upravni organ, ki ga je ustanovil Parlament; ...
We are a statutory regulator established by Parliament; ...
S predpisi urejene družbe morajo v vseh finančnih sektorjih plačevati stroške urejanja.
Regulated firms across all financial sectors must pay for the costs of regulation.
Naša pooblastila za zbiranje pristojbin so zakonsko predpisana, plačevanje pristojbin pa je obvezno za vseh 33 000 ali več družb, ki jih pravno urejamo v skladu z objektivnimi obrazci in ukrepi.
Our fee-raising powers are statutory and our fees are levied compulsorily on each of the 33,000 or more firms we regulate according to a series of objective formulae and measures.
Osebje Organa za finančne storitve, ki nadzoruje družbe, nima nobene politike glede postopka plačevanja pristojbin, prav tako vanj niso dejavno vključeni; ta postopek vodi ločena organizacijska služba pri Organu za finančne storitve z ločeno linijo za poročanje o upravljanju prek odbora Organa za finančne storitve.“
The FSA staff who supervise firms have no policy or operational involvement in the fee-levying process, which is managed by a separate organisational function within FSA with a separate management reporting line through to the FSA board ."
V zvezi z varstvom potrošnikov na splošno in zlasti z zavarovanci družbe ELAS STRACHAN (H4) poudarja naslednje: „ Organ za finančne storitve potrošnikom zagotavlja vse informacije o svojih ciljih, načrtih, politikah in pravilih .
In relation to the protection of consumers in general and ELAS policyholders in particular Mr STRACHAN (H4) pointed out the following: " The FSA provides full information for consumers about its objectives, plans, policies and rules.
Potrošniki imajo dostop do Organa za finančne storitve prek telefonske linije za pomoč potrošnikom, prav tako je naše spletno mesto drug pomemben vir pomoči za potrošnike, ker jim zagotavlja njim namenjene obsežne informacije o finančnih produktih, predpisih in njihovih pravicah.
Consumers have access to the FSA through its Consumer Helpline [and] our website is a further important source of assistance for consumers, providing comprehensive information specifically for them on financial products, regulation and their rights.
V zvezi s tem se je zlasti skliceval na vpliv Organa za finančne storitve na družbo ELAS pri pripravi odškodninske sheme (glej oddelek IV.2).
In this respect he referred in particular to the FSA's exercise of influence on ELAS when the compromise scheme was devised (see section IV.2.)
Skratka oškodovani zavarovanci niso prejeli nobene odškodnine na podlagi posameznih pritožb Organu za finančne storitve.
In summary, individual complaints to FSA did not result in redress for aggrieved policyholders.
Akcijska skupina EMAG je obvestila odbor, da je Organ za finančne storitve zaradi večjega števila pritožb sprožil notranjo preiskavo (WE 14
EMAG informed the committee that the large number of complaints led the FSA to set up an internal inquiry (WE 14
Preiskava je bila opravljena pod vodstvom direktorja za notranjo revizijo Ronnija Bairda, da bi ugotovili, ali je Organ za finančne storitve nadzor družbe ELAS v 23-mesečnem obdobju pred krizo družbe opravil neuspešno.
The inquiry was conducted under the leadership of its Director for Internal Audit, Mr Ronnie Baird, in order to determine if the FSA had failed during the 23-month period of its supervision immediately prior to the closure of ELAS to new business.
BRAITHWAITE je v H11 poudaril, da niso imeli vpogleda v obdobje začetne malomarnosti od leta 1990 do leta 1998.
Mr BRAITHWAITE pointed out in H11 that it was precluded from looking at the period of primary negligence from 1990 to 1998.
Preiskava prav tako ni obravnavala vprašanja mogoče odškodnine za trpljenje zavarovancev.
Nor did the inquiry address the question of possible redress for policyholders' grievances.
Zavarovanci so se v skladu s peticijo akcijske skupine EMAG pritožili tudi na Ministrstvu za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve (WE 14
Policyholders also complained to HM Treasury according to EMAG's petition (WE 14
Stran 29. ).
Page 29. ).
Avgusta 2001 je Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve začelo preiskavo pod vodstvom višjega sodnika lorda Penrosa.
In August 2001, HM Treasury set up an inquiry under senior judge Lord Penrose.
Njegove naloge so bile preiskati okoliščine, ki so vodile do krize družbe Equitable Life, in ugotoviti, kaj se iz tega lahko naučimo za izvajanje, upravljanje in pravno ureditev zavarovalnic za življenjsko zavarovanje.
His terms of reference were to inquire into the circumstances leading to the Equitable Life crisis and to identify lessons to be learned for the conduct, administration and regulation of life assurance business.
Vendar njegova preiskava (in s tem poročilo, objavljeno 8. marca 2004) ni obravnavala dveh vprašanj, in sicer kdo je odgovoren za težave družbe in kdo je zaradi tega upravičen do odškodnine (WE 16
However, his inquiry (and thus the report published on 8 March 2004) did not address two questions, namely, who is at fault for the problems encountered by the Society and who deserves compensation as a consequence (WE 16
Stran 744. ).
Page 744. ).
V zvezi s slednjim vprašanjem je lord Penrose ugotovil, da je „ povabil posamezne zavarovance, da [mu] pomagajo pri pripravi zahtevkov ter mu s tem pomagajo oblikovati stališče glede možnih obveznosti družbe ...,“ ter da je bilo na podlagi tako prejetih informacij „ jasno, da so v igri zelo visoki zahtevki “ (WE 16
On the latter issue, Lord Penrose notes that he had " invited individual policyholders to assist [him] by formulating their claims in order to ... help form a view about the potential liabilities of the Society ... " and that the information thus received " made clear that very substantial claims were involved " (WE 16
Vendar je lord Penrose poudaril, da „ ne more presojati pritožb zavarovancev “, ter izjavil, da „ bodo pričakovanja, ki so jih mnogi izrazili v tem poročilu, zagotovila stališča o veljavnosti zahtevkov, njihova vrednost pa bo za neizogibno razočaranje “ (WE 16
However, Lord Penrose emphasises that he " cannot adjudicate on the policyholders' complaints " and states that " the expectation that many have expressed that this report will provide views on the validity of claims and their value will inevitably be disappointed " (WE 16
Kljub temu je lord Penrose močno poudaril, da ne sme podcenjevati vpliva dogodkov v družbi Equitable na ljudi in da „ škoda, ki so jo utrpeli zavarovanci, ni bila le finančna, ampak je bilo prizadeto tudi njihovo samospoštovanje in zaupanje v lastno sposobnost obvladovanja svojih poslov “ (WE 16
Nevertheless, Lord Penrose was keen to point out that the human impact of the events at Equitable should not be understated and that "... damage [was] done not only to policyholders' financial resources but to their self-esteem and their confidence in their ability to manage their affairs " (WE 16
Stran 285. ).
Page 285. ).
Svojo navedbo zaključuje s trditvijo, da „ so bili z redkimi izjemami tisti, ki so utrpeli največ škode, nedolžne žrtve te zadeve “ (WE 16)
He concludes that " with few exceptions, those who have suffered have been the innocent victims of this affair " (WE 16)
Skratka, niti Bairdovo niti Penrosovo poročilo ali katera koli druga uradna preiskava
In conclusion, neither the Baird and Penrose reports nor any of the other official investigations
Corleyjevo poročilo (WE 50) ali prvo poročilo parlamentarne varuhinje človekovih pravic (Bonitetna ureditev družbe Equitable Life); 4. poročilo – seja 2002–2003). niso pripomogli k odškodnini za zavarovance.
'The Corley Report' (WE 50) or UK Parliamentary Ombudsman's first report ("The prudential regulation of Equitable Life; 4th Report-Session 2002-2003). resulted in remedy for policyholders.
Z izražanjem nezadovoljstva zavarovancev se akcijska skupina EMAG v WE 44 pritožuje, da „ je bilo objavljenih več poročil zaporedno, vendar ni bilo nobeno pristojno za obravnavo krivdne odgovornosti ali odobritev odškodnine “.
Expressing the frustration of policyholders, EMAG complains in WE 44 that " report after report has been published but none had the remit to address culpability or authorise compensation ".
Ta oddelek obravnava ukrepe, ki jih je družba Equitable Life sprejela kot odziv na krizo, in ugotavlja, ali so ti ukrepi prispevali k vračanju odškodnine zavarovancem.
This section examines actions undertaken by Equitable Life in response to the crisis and whether these have served to bring relief to policyholders.
Prav tako je bilo jasno, da ni mogoče realno pričakovati uspešne tožbe proti zakonodajalcu Združenega kraljestva“ (THOMSON (H2)).
We were also clear that there was no realistic prospect of successfully suing the UK regulator " (Mr THOMSON (H2).
Družba ELAS je predložila nasvete, ki jih je prejela od vodilnega sveta, v obliki dokumenta WE 71.
ELAS provided the advice it received from leading Counsel as WE 71.
Dokument obravnava možne zahtevke družbe in/ali zavarovancev proti zakonodajalcem za bonitetne zadeve in zakonodajalcem, ki urejajo poslovanje.
The document considers potential claims by the Society and/or policyholders against both the prudential regulators and conduct of business regulators.
Odvetniška družba je navedla, da „ tožba družbe proti zakonodajalcem ne bi bila stroškovno učinkovita “, in je zato družbi svetovala, „ naj takšne tožbe ne vloži “.
The law firm indicates that " we do not consider that legal action by the Society against the regulators would be cost-effective " and therefore advised the Society " not to proceed with such an action ."
Kar zadeva financiranje zahtevkov zavarovancev s strani družbe, so „ugotovili ... težave pri vlaganju takšnih zahtevkov in zaskrbljenost, ali jih družba lahko financira ali mora financirati,“ ter sklenili, da “ni očitno, kako bi lahko bil takšen potek upravičen“ (WE 71).
As to the funding by the Society of claims by policyholders, they " identified ... difficulties of bringing such claims and concerns as to whether the Society can or ought to fund such claims " and concluded that " it is difficult to see how such a course could be justified " (WE 71).
V nasprotju s tem je „ v skladu z upoštevanjem pravnega, revizijskega in aktuarskega svetovanja ter ob zelo močni podpori zavarovancev in akcijskih skupin“ družba nadaljevala sodni pregon proti nekdanjim direktorjem in revizorjem zaradi domnevnih kršitev obveznosti , „ki je svoj vrh dosegel s sodnim postopkom [leta 2005]“ (THOMSON, H2).
By contrast, " following consideration of the legal, audit and actuarial advice that [it] received and with very strong backing from policyholders and from action groups ", the Society proceeded to pursue its former directors and its former auditors for alleged breaches of duty " culminating in court proceedings [in 2005] " (Mr THOMSON, H2).
Odbor je prejel več dokumentov iz zadeve ELAS proti Ernst&Young (WE-CONF 14).
The committee has received a number of documents from the Court case ELAS vs. Ernst&Young (WE-CONF 14).
V skladu z dokumenti Sodišča sta bili ugotovljeni dve vrsti domnevnih kršitev.
According to the court documents, two types of breach were alleged.
Prvič, v letih 1997, 1998 in 1999 naj bi obvezna poročila domnevno vključevala zelo natančne zavarovalno-tehnične rezervacije v zvezi z možnostmi zajamčenih rent.
First, in each of the years 1997, 1998 and 1999 it is alleged the statutory accounts should have included very substantial technical provisions in relation to GAOs.
Drugič, v letih 1998 in 1999 naj bi računi domnevno razkrili morebitne obveznosti in nejasnosti glede zadeve Hyman.
Second, for each of the years 1998 and 1999 it was also alleged that the accounts should have disclosed contingent liabilities and uncertainties in respect of the Hyman litigation.
Družba ELAS je trdila, da je utrpela izgubo, ker ni prodala premoženja podjetja (septembra 1998 ali 2000), izgubo priložnosti takšne prodaje in izgubo zaradi navedbe bonusov, ki ne bi bili navedeni.
ELAS claimed to have suffered loss by not selling the business and assets (either in September 1998 or 2000), loss of the chance of such sales and loss by declaring bonuses which would not have been declared.
THOMSON (H2) je poudaril, da je bila izguba, obravnavana na teh postopkih, izguba podjetja, tj. znižanje vrednosti družbe kot celote in ne izguba posameznih zavarovancev.
Mr THOMSON (H2) pointed out that the loss pursued through these proceedings was corporate loss, i.e. the diminution of the value of the society as an entity and not individual policyholder losses.
V H8 je THOMSON menil, da je „obžalovanja vredno, da ni možno ugotoviti, kdo je odgovoren za nastale okoliščine“ , ker bi „težko verjel, da so v celoti naključne“ (H8).
In H8 Mr THOMSON deemed it " a pity that nobody can be held to account for what happened " because he would have " some difficulty in believing that this was entirely accidental " (H8).
Stran 4. ). „ Predsednik družbe ELAS ..., ki je po poklicu odvetnik, in generalni izvršni direktor ... sta (po mojem mnenju zelo hinavsko) pojasnila potrebo po prekinitvi teh ukrepov na podlagi ugotovitev družbe ELAS med postopkom, da ne morejo dokazati izgube, kar pomeni točko, ki bi jo sposoben odvetnik preveril pred začetkom postopkov “ (WE 40
The ELAS Chairman ... - by profession a lawyer - and (the)Chief Executive ... have each explained (in my view with great hypocrisy) the need to discontinue these actions on the basis that ELAS in the course of the proceedings had found that they were unable to prove loss, a point a competent lawyer would have checked before proceedings commenced " (WE 40
Stran 5. ).
Page 5. ).
V dopisu z dne 2. decembra 2005, namenjenem zavarovancem (priloženem k WE 35), je družba ELAS v zvezi s tožbo proti nekdanjim direktorjem pojasnila: „ Vaša uprava je vložila zahtevke na podlagi natančne preučitve podrobnih pravnih nasvetov.
In a letter of 2 December 2005 addressed to policyholders (annexed to WE 35), ELAS provides the following explanations in relation to the litigation against former directors: " Your board launched the claims based on careful consideration of detailed legal advice.
Ob upoštevanju teh nasvetov je uprava menila, da bi zanemarili naše dolžnosti kot direktorji in odgovornosti do zavarovancev, če ne bi vložili zahtevkov v vašem imenu, dokler je bilo to stroškovno učinkovito.
In the light of that advice, the Board considered that it would have been a dereliction of our duties as directors and our responsibilities to policyholders not to pursue the claims on your behalf, while it remained cost-effective to do so.
Nadaljevali smo obravnavo zahtevkov ob stalnem sodelovanju s pravno skupino, da bi se prepričali, ali smo obveščeni o razvoju pomena in stroškovne učinkovitosti zahtevkov.
We have continued to review the claims with the legal team throughout, in order to ensure that we kept up to date with developments in the strength and cost-effectiveness of the claims.
Na podlagi odločnih nasvetov naše pravne skupine smo sklenili, da je treba tožbo proti nekdanjim direktorjem rešiti s čim nižjimi dodatnimi stroški. ...
Based on the firm advice of our legal team, we concluded that we must settle the litigation against the former directors with as little additional costs as possible. ...
Jasno je, da to ni rezultat, za katerega smo si v zadnjih štirih letih tako prizadevali, in zelo obžalujemo, da prek sodišč nismo mogli zagotoviti odškodnine za zavarovance.
Clearly, this is not the outcome for which we have worked so hard over the last four years and we are extremely sorry that we have been unable, through the Courts, to secure redress for policyholders.
Lord Penrose je glede propada družbe oblikoval jasne in prepričljive zaključke.
Lord Penrose reached clear and forceful conclusions as to the downfall of the Society.
Vendar moramo priznati, da je drugačno vprašanje, kako Sodišče prepričati, da je vloga nekdanjih direktorjev odgovornost, ki pravno pomeni krivdo in odškodnino.“
However, we must accept that it is a different matter to satisfy a Court that the role of the former directors constitutes a responsibility that leads in law to culpability and redress ."
Odškodninsko shemo izčrpno obravnava del IV poročila.
The Compromise Scheme is dealt with exhaustively in Part IV of the report.
Vendar se bodo zaradi pomena za položaj oškodovanih zavarovancev nekateri njeni vidiki spodaj ponovno obravnavali s posebnim poudarkom na zaskrbljenosti, ki so jo izrazili zavarovanci.
However, given its relevance for the situation of aggrieved policyholders, certain aspects of it will be revisited below with particular emphasis on the concerns expressed by policyholders.
Oddelek 425 Zakona o gospodarskih družbah Združenega kraljestva iz leta 1985 družbam omogoča, da uveljavijo odškodninsko shemo ureditve med družbo in njenimi člani ali upniki ali katero koli njihovo kategorijo, če se s tem strinjajo zainteresirane stranke in sodišče.
Section 425 of the UK Companies Act 1985 enables a company to put into effect 'a compromise scheme of arrangement' between the company and its members or its creditors or any class of them, subject to the consent of interested parties and of the court.
Shema postane zavezujoča, če jo potrdita večina po številu, ki pomeni tri četrtine vrednosti upnikov ali kategorije upnikov ali članov ali kategorije članov, in sodišče (glej ES 3
The scheme becomes binding if it is approved by a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors or class of creditors or members or class of members and by the court (see ES 3
Strani 27 in 28. ).
Pages 27 and 28. ).
Družba ELAS je to shemo oblikovala, da bi stabilizirala sklad za življenjsko zavarovanje s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice z zmanjšanjem izpostavljenosti zajamčenim rentam in hkrati z odpravljanjem tveganj tožbe proti družbi ELAS zaradi zlorab pri prodaji na podlagi domnevnega prikrivanja tveganja zajamčenih rent prihodnjim zavarovancem s policami brez zajamčenih rent.
ELAS devised such a scheme with the intention of stabilizing the with-profits fund by reducing exposure to GARs and, at the same time, eliminating the risk of legal action against ELAS for mis-selling on the basis of alleged failure to disclose the GAR risk to prospective non-GAR policyholders.
V praksi je bilo predlagano, da bi se zavarovancem s policami z zajamčenimi rentami njihova vrednost polic povišala za 17,5 % v zameno za odpoved pravicam do zajamčene rente.
In practice, it was proposed that GAR policyholders would get an increase of 17.5% in their policy value in exchange for giving up their rights to a guaranteed annuity rate.
Hkrati je bilo zavarovancem s policami brez zajamčenih rent ponujeno povišanje vrednosti polic za 2,5 %
At the same time, non-GAR policyholders were offered an increase of 2.5 % in policy values
Rentnikom je bilo ponujeno povečanje skupne bruto rente za 2,5 % (glej WE 23, stran 19). v zameno za odpoved pravici do vlaganja zahtevkov v obliki tožbe ali prek Službe varuha človekovih pravic za finančne storitve.
Annuitants were offered a 2.5% uplift on the Total Gross Annuity (see WE 23, page 19). in return for giving up their right to pursue claims, either by legal action or through the Financial Ombudsman Service.
V skladu z ES 3
According to ES 3
Stran 30. je bila shema rezultat dolgega postopka posvetovanja, ki je vključeval zavarovance in zakonodajalce, ter se je razvijal ob znatnem obveščanju javnosti.
Page 30. , the Scheme was the result of an extensive consultation process involving policyholders and regulators and was developed under intense publicity.
Akcijska skupina EMAG ga je označila kot „obširen postopek posvetovanja, ki je pomenil le estetsko izboljšanje vsebine s strani službe za odnose z javnostmi“ (WE 75).
EMAG called it a " massive consultation process that was just cosmetic PR window dressing " (WE 75).
V ES 3 je poudarjena tudi stopnja časovnega pritiska, ker je bilo plačilo Halifaxa v višini 250 milijonov GBP odvisno od tega, ali bo odškodninska shema začela veljati do 1. marca 2002.
In ES 3 it is also emphasised that there was a certain degree of time pressure because a payment of £250 million by Halifax was conditional upon a compromise becoming effective by 1 March 2002.
Zato „ je bil čas, ki je bil na voljo za zaključek razvoja in potrditev sheme, veliko krajši, kot bi bil običajno potreben za tako zapleteno shemo “ (ES 3
Hence, " the time available for the completion of the development and the approval of the scheme was much shorter than a scheme of such complexity would normally require " (ES 3