natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Člani izvršilnega odbora tudi velikokrat javno nastopajo ter dajejo intervjuje na lokalni, nacionalni in mednarodni ravni.
In addition, the members of the Governing Council take on numerous public engagements and give interviews at local, national and international level.
ECB se že dolgo izogiba sprejetju zahteve Evropskega parlamenta po objavi zapisnika sestankov svojega sveta.
The ECB has long refrained from accepting the European parliament's request to publish the minutes of its Governing Council's meetings.
Kakšne so po vašem mnenju ovire in težave v zvezi z objavo teh zapisnikov?
What do you think are the impediments and inconveniences of such publications?
Bi se zavzeli za objavo zapisnikov sestankov sveta ECB v bližnji prihodnosti?
Would you be in favour of the publication by ECB of the minutes of its Governing Councils meetings in the near-term future?
Z objavo zapisnikov bi lahko izvršilni odbor ECB uveljavljal svojo odgovornost.
The publication of the minutes of the ECB Governing Council meetings could be seen as one possible means through which the ECB would exercise its accountability.
Vendar je treba priznati, da gre za hkrati kolegialen in nadnacionalen organ.
However, it is important to recognize that the ECB Governing Council is a collegial and, at the same time, a supranational body.
To pomeni, da so člani izvršilnega odbora ECB, ki prihajajo iz različnih držav članic, skupaj odgovorni za odločitve, ki jih odbor sprejme, zato imajo kolektivno odgovornost.
This means that the members of the ECB Governing Council, coming from different Member States, are jointly responsible for the decisions taken by the Council and thus are collectively accountable.
Obstaja skrb, da bi objava zapisnikov ogrožala neodvisnost članov odbora, ker bi lahko bili s tem izpostavljeni neželenim poskusom poseganja v njihovo nepristranskost, s čimer bi postali individualno odgovorni.
There is a concern that the publication of the minutes could hamper the independence of the Governing Council members, because it could expose them to undesirable attempts to impede on their impartiality and thereby to make them individually accountable.
Osebno sem tudi zaskrbljen, da bi lahko to povzročilo kategorizacijo članov izvršilnega odbora glede na njihove države, ki jih v tem odboru ne zastopajo.
Also, I personally am concerned by the fact that it might lead to a categorization of governing council members according to their countries which they do not represent in the governing council.
Zato menim, da je sedanja praksa predsednikovih tiskovnih konferenc, ki potekajo takoj po sestankih o monetarni politiki, ter objava uvodne izjave, kar zagotavlja celovit povzetek politično relevantne ocene ekonomskih sprememb, učinkovit način predstavitve in pojasnitve stališča izvršilnega odbora javnosti, ki obenem ščiti osebna stališča članov.
Therefore, I consider the current practise of the President’s press conferences, held immediately after each monetary policy meeting, and the publication of the introductory statement, which provide a comprehensive summary of the policy-relevant assessment of economic developments, to be an effective means of presenting and explaining the Governing Council’s stance to the public, while at the same time protecting the individual positions of the members.
Ker je javnost s tem pristopom obsežno in v realnem času seznanjena na podlagi vseh ustreznih pojasnitev, ne vidim nobenega pomembnega razloga za to, da bi sedanjo prakso spremenili.
As this approach provides the public with comprehensive information and all relevant explanations in real-time, I see no strong reason to change the current practice.
Poleg tega mora centralna banka pojasniti analitični okvir, ki ga uporabi v notranjem procesu odločanja in pri oceni gospodarskega položaja, in redno pojasnjevati ekonomsko logiko, na kateri temeljijo njene politične odločitve, ter načine, kako dosega ravnovesje.
Besides, the central bank needs to explain the analytical framework used for its internal decision-making and its assessment of the state of the economy, and to frequently make clear what the economic rationale underlying its policy decisions is and how a balancing act is being made.
Kaj menite o objavi zapisnikov sestankov, kot to prakticirata Fed in Bank of England?
What do you think about the publication by the Fed or the Bank of England of the minutes of their meetings?
Ali menite, da bi morala tako ravnati tudi ECB?
Do you think this policy could be applied by the ECB?
Za sodoben sistem preglednosti mora centralna banka jasno pojasniti, kako razlaga svoj mandat, ter biti pripravljena pojasniti svoje politične cilje.
A state of the art transparency regime requires the central bank to clearly explain how it interprets its mandate and to be forthcoming about its policy goals.
Tako lahko javnost nadzoruje in ocenjuje delovanje centralne banke.
This helps the public to monitor and evaluate the central bank’s performance.
Poglavitni cilj ECB glede preglednosti monetarne politike mora biti učinkovitost te politike pri uresničevanju njenih zakonsko določenih ciljev.
With regard to monetary policy, the bank’s overriding concern with regard to transparency must be the effectiveness of monetary policy in meeting its statutory objectives.
ECB je napovedala formalno strategijo monetarne politike in politične odločitve pojasnjuje dejansko na podlagi te strategije ter v realnem času.
The ECB has announced a formal monetary policy strategy and explains monetary policy decisions applying that strategy de facto, in real-time.
V sedanjem času je za večino centralnih bank preglednost bistvena komponenta njihovega okvira monetarne politike.
Nowadays, most central banks consider transparency to be a crucial component of their monetary policy framework.
Zaželena so prizadevanja za izboljšanje preglednosti, če s tem javnost bolje razume monetarno politiko in da ta postane bolj verodostojna in učinkovitejša.
Efforts to enhance transparency are welcome, if they contribute to ensuring that monetary policy is better understood by the public and becomes more credible and effective.
V zvezi s tem večina centralnih bank, tudi Fed in ECB, poudarja pomen učinkovitega komuniciranja in ustreznih izmenjav z javnostjo.
In this respect, most central banks, including the Fed and the ECB, have stressed the importance of effective communication and proper interaction with the public.
Ker ima lahko centralna banka več možnosti za okrepitev svojega obveščanja, ni vedno jasno, kakšen model preglednosti je v dani situaciji najustreznejši.
Because a central bank may have several options to enhance its communications, it is not always clear what transparency mode is best under given circumstances.
Objava zapisnikov organov, ki sprejemajo odločitve, je eden izmed možnih načinov za obveščanje javnosti o sprejetih odločitvah.
Concerning the publication of the minutes of decision making bodies, this is one possible element in the array of means of communicating decisions.
V določenih okoliščinah lahko zagotovi koristne dodatne informacije glede raznolikosti stališč znotraj teh organov in glede razlogov, na podlagi katerih je bila dana odločitev sprejeta.
Under certain circumstances, it may provide useful additional information on the diversity of views within a decision making body and the reasoning underlying the decision.
Vendar, kot sem navedel v odgovoru na 27. vprašanje, ima lahko to vprašanje precejšne negativne vidike, ki komunikacije ne izboljšujejo.
However, as I explained in the answer to question 27, it may entail notable downsides which do not enhance communication.
Zato je objavljanje zapisnikov, kot je praksa bank Fed in Bank of England, eden od možnih pristopov.
Against this background, the approach by the Fed and the Bank of England to publish attributed minutes is one possible approach.
Dejstvo, da ECB ne objavlja svojih zapisnikov, je treba pojasniti na podlagi specifičnih potreb in okoliščin te banke in Eurosistema v širšem smislu.
The fact that the ECB does not publish its minutes has to be seen in light of the specific needs and circumstances of the ECB and the Eurosystem more broadly.
Izvršilnemu odboru omogoča, da odločitve na področju monetarne politike sprejema popolnoma neodvisno in na način, pri čemer je v ospredju kolektivna odgovornost njegovih članov.
It allows the Governing Council to make monetary policy decisions in full independence and with a view to emphasising the members' collective accountability.
Poleg tega je v skladu z zahtevo Pogodbe, da morajo biti razprave izvršilnega odbora zaupne.
Moreover, it is in line with the Treaty requirement to keep the deliberations of the Governing Council confidential.
Kaj menite o monetarnem dialogu?
What is your opinion of the monetary dialogue?
Ali bi lahko člani sveta ECB razpravljali o monetarni politiki in o svojih sklepih z drugimi političnimi akterji ali bi to ogrožalo neodvisnost banke?
Might ECB Board members discuss monetary policy and its decisions with other political actors or would this harm the bank’s independence?
Četrtletna srečanja med predsednikom ECB in Odborom za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve so edinstvena priložnost za ECB, da svojo monetarno politiko predstavi predstavnikom evropskih državljanov in dobi povratne informacije.
The quarterly meetings between the President of the ECB and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs are a prime opportunity for the ECB to explain its monetary policy to the representatives of the European citizens and to receive feedback.
Poleg tega se člani izvršilnega odbora udeležujejo sej odbora ECON in plenarnih zasedanj, pa tudi poslanci EP neuradno obiščejo ECB, zlasti odbor ECON enkrat na leto.
This is complemented by further appearances of Executive Board members in ECON and in plenary as well as by informal visits of MEPs to the ECB including notably the annual visit of the ECON Committee.
Vse to je del izpolnjevanja odgovornosti ECB do Evropskega parlamenta in bi moralo prispevati k nadvse učinkovitem in konstruktivnem dialogu med institucijami.
All of this forms part of the discharging of the ECB’s accountability towards the European Parliament and should contribute to a very productive and constructive dialogue between the two institutions.
Drugih rednih izmenjav z evropskimi institucijami in organi, na primer Euroskupino in svetom ECOFIN, ni.
Beyond that, there is regular interaction with European institutions and bodies such as the Eurogroup and the ECOFIN Council.
V skladu z določbami Pogodbe in ob upoštevanju neodvisnosti banke poteka tudi izmenjava informacij s Komisijo in nacionalnimi vladami na tehnični ravni, in sicer v posameznih odborih EU.
Exchange of information at the technical level with the Commission and national governments also takes place, i.a. in various EU committees, in line with the provisions of the Treaty and respecting the bank’s independence.
Katera so po vašem mnenju najpomembnejša tveganja in izzivi, s katerimi se sooča ECB?
What do you see as the most important risks and challenges facing the ECB?
V sedanjem času je kar nekaj izzivov na različnih področjih, naj se osredotočim na tri pomembnejše.
The current times are quite challenging in many respects but let me focus on three main ones.
Prvič, normalizacija monetarne politike.
The first one is the normalisation of monetary policy.
Euroobmočje se postopoma normalizira po veliki gospodarski in finančni krizi, čeprav različne države, trgi in sektorji ne dosegajo enakega napredka.
Gradually, the euro area is recovering from the deep economic and financial crisis, although progress is not even among countries, markets and sectors.
ECB bo sčasoma zopet vzpostavila nekdanje ravni ključne obrestne mere, nestandardni ukrepi pa bodo postopoma odpravljeni, tako da ne bodo več potrebni za prenos monetarne politike v gospodarstvo, končno pa tudi v cene.
At some point in time, the ECB will return key interest rates to levels as seen before, while non-standard measures will be phased out to the extent that they would no longer be needed to ensure the transmission of monetary policy to the economy and, ultimately, prices.
Izziv predstavlja ustrezna časovna umestitev teh ukrepov, zlasti v sedanjem okolju, ki je še vedno zaznamovano z negotovostjo in ranljivostjo.
Setting the right timing for these actions is a challenge, especially in the current environment which is still characterised by uncertainty and vulnerabilities.
Pri tem je predvsem pomembno boljše razumevanje vloge finančnega sektorja v mehanizmu prenosa.
A better understanding of the role of the financial sector in the transmission mechanism is of the essence.
Bistvenega pomena pa bo tudi dober delovni odnos z Evropskim odborom za sistemska tveganja in evropskimi nadzornimi organi.
Also, a good working relation with the ESRB and the ESAs will be essential.
Tretji večji izziv, ki bi ga želel na tem mestu izpostaviti, zadeva prihodnost Evrope in Evropske monetarne unije.
The third main challenge I would like to mention here concerns the future of Europe and EMU.
Nacionalne politike, sprejete na začetku sedanje krize, niso uvedle potrebnih mehanizmov za zagotovitev stabilnosti in nemotenega delovanja EMU.
The national policies adopted in the run-up to the current crisis have fallen short of what is needed for EMU to be stable and smoothly functioning.
Fiskalna konsolidacija, strukturne reforme in odprava neravnovesij v mnogih primerih niso zadostovale in evropski predpisi ponekod niso bili upoštevani oziroma so bili celo spremenjeni, če niso ustrezali državni politični agendi.
Fiscal consolidation, structural reforms and correction of imbalances have in many cases been insufficient, and European rules have sometimes been ignored or even amended if they did not fit the domestic political agenda.
Zato je potreben nov evropski okvir upravljanja, pri čemer je treba države članice opomniti, da ima EU, zlasti EMU, prednosti, vendar so z njimi povezane tudi obveznosti.
A new European governance framework is therefore needed, reminding Member States that benefits of the EU and especially of EMU come with responsibilities.
Kot je dejala ECB, potrebujemo „kvantitativni preskok“.
As the ECB said, we need a “quantum leap”.
Za vzdržno Evropo ni sprejemljivo, če bi rekli, da se je treba le nekako prebiti skozi te kritične čase.
Just muddling through is no option for a viable Europe at the current juncture.
To dogajanje je zame, ne le kot prepričanega Evropejca, temveč tudi kot monetarnega politika, pomembno, saj zadeva okoliščine, v katerih ECB izvaja svojo monetarno politiko, da bi dosegla svoj poglavitni cilj, namreč stabilnost cen.
These developments are relevant to me not only as a dedicated European, but also as a monetary policymaker since they affect the conditions under which the ECB conduct its monetary policy with a view to achieving its primary objective of price stability.
Burkhard Balz, Sharon Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Pascal Canfin, Nikolaos Huntis (Nikolaos Chountis), George Sabin Cutaş, Rachida Dati, Leonardo Domenici, Derk Jan Eppink, Diogo Feio, Vicky Ford, Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Sven Giegold, Sylvie Goulard, Liem Hoang Ngoc, Wolf Klinz, Philippe Lamberts, Astrid Lulling, Hans-Peter Martin, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, Ivari Padar, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Olle Schmidt, Edward Scicluna, Peter Simon, Peter Skinner, Theodor Dumitru Stolojan, Ivo Strejček, Marianne Thyssen, Corien Wortmann-Kool
Burkhard Balz, Sharon Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Pascal Canfin, Nikolaos Chountis, George Sabin Cutaş, Rachida Dati, Leonardo Domenici, Derk Jan Eppink, Diogo Feio, Vicky Ford, Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Sven Giegold, Sylvie Goulard, Liem Hoang Ngoc, Wolf Klinz, Philippe Lamberts, Astrid Lulling, Hans-Peter Martin, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, Ivari Padar, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Olle Schmidt, Edward Scicluna, Peter Simon, Peter Skinner, Theodor Dumitru Stolojan, Ivo Strejček, Marianne Thyssen, Corien Wortmann-Kool
o prednostnih nalogah in splošnem pregledu novega političnega okvira EU za boj proti nasilju nad ženskami
on priorities and outline of a new EU policy framework to fight violence against women
– ob upoštevanju določb pravnih instrumentov OZN na področju človekovih pravic, zlasti tistih, ki zadevajo pravice žensk, kot so ustanovna listina Organizacije združenih narodov, Splošna deklaracija o človekovih pravicah, mednarodna pakta o državljanskih in političnih pravicah ter o gospodarskih, družbenih in kulturnih pravicah, Konvencija o preprečevanju in odpravljanju trgovine z osebami in izkoriščanja prostituiranja drugih ter Konvencija o odpravi vseh oblik diskriminacije žensk (CEDAW) in njen izbirni protokol, Konvencija proti mučenju in drugim krutim, nečloveškim ali poniževalnim kaznim ali ravnanju ter Konvencija o statusu beguncev in načelu nevračanja iz leta 1951,
– having regard to the provisions of the UN legal instruments in the sphere of human rights, in particular those concerning women's rights, such as the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and its Optional Protocol, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and the principle of non-refoulement,
– ob upoštevanju drugih instrumentov OZN o nasilju nad ženskami, kot so Dunajska deklaracija in akcijski program z dne 25. junija 1993, sprejeta na svetovni konferenci o človekovih pravicah (A/CONF.
– having regard to other UN instruments on violence against women, such as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 25 June 1993 adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights (A/CONF.
157/23), ter Deklaracija o odpravi nasilja nad ženskami z dne 20. decembra 1993 (A/RES/48/104),
157/23) and the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women of 20 December 1993 (A/RES/48/104),
– ob upoštevanju resolucij Generalne skupščine OZN z dne 12. decembra 1997 z naslovom „Preprečevanje kaznivih dejanj in ukrepi kazenskega pravosodja za odpravo nasilja nad ženskami” (A/RES/52/86), z dne 18. decembra 2002 z naslovom „Prizadevanje za odpravo kaznivih dejanj proti ženskam v imenu časti” (A/RES/57/179) in z dne 22. decembra 2003 z naslovom „Odprava družinskega nasilja nad ženskami” (A/RES/58/147),
– having regard to the UN General Assembly resolutions of 12 December 1997 entitled ‘Crime prevention and criminal justice measures to eliminate violence against women’ (A/RES/52/86), of 18 December 2002 entitled ‘Working towards the elimination of crimes against women committed in the name of honour’ (A/RES/57/179), and of 22 December 2003 entitled ‘Elimination of domestic violence against women’ (A/RES/58/147),
– ob upoštevanju poročil posebnih poročevalcev visokega komisarja OZN za človekove pravice o nasilju nad ženskami in splošnega priporočila št. 19, ki ga je sprejel odbor za odpravo diskriminacije nad ženskami (enajsto zasedanje, 1992),
– having regard to the reports by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Special Rapporteurs on violence against women and to General Recommendation No 19 adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (11th session, 1992),
– ob upoštevanju Pekinške izjave in izhodišč za ukrepanje, sprejetih na četrti svetovni konferenci o ženskah, ki je potekala 15. septembra 1995 v Pekingu, ter resolucij Parlamenta z dne 18. maja 2000 o ukrepih po pekinških izhodiščih za ukrepanje in z dne 10. marca 2005 o ukrepih po 4. svetovni konferenci o ženskah – Izhodišča za ukrepanje (Peking +10)
– having regard to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action adopted by the Fourth World Conference on Women on 15 September 1995 and to Parliament’s resolutions of 18 May 2000 on the follow-up to the Beijing Action Platform and of 10 March 2005 on the follow-up to the Fourth World Conference on Women - Platform for Action (Beijing+10)
247. in z dne 25. februarja 2010 o izhodiščih OZN za ukrepanje na področju enakosti spolov (Peking +15),
247. and of 25 February 2010 on the follow-up to the Beijing Action Platform (Beijing +15),
– ob upoštevanju resolucije Generalne skupščine OZN z dne 19. decembra 2006 z naslovom „Povečanje prizadevanj za odpravo vseh oblik nasilja nad ženskami” (A/RES/61/143) ter resolucij Varnostnega sveta OZN št. 1325 in št. 1820 o ženskah, miru in varnosti,
– having regard to the UN General Assembly resolution of 19 December 2006 entitled ‘Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women’ (A/RES/61/143), and to UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security ,
– ob upoštevanju dela posebnega odbora Sveta Evrope za preprečevanje nasilja nad ženskami in v družini ter boj proti njima, ustanovljenega decembra 2008 z namenom priprave prihodnje konvencije Sveta Evrope na to temo,
– having regard to the work of the Council of Europe’s Ad hoc Committee on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (CAHVIO), established in December 2008 to prepare a future Council of Europe Convention on this subject,
– ob upoštevanju sklepov Sveta za zaposlovanje, socialno politiko, zdravje in varstvo potrošnikov z dne 8. marca 2010 o nasilju,
– having regard to the EPSCO Council Conclusions of March 8 2010 on violence,
– ob upoštevanju svoje zakonodajne resolucije z dne 14. decembra 2010 o osnutku direktive Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o evropski odredbi o zaščiti
– having regard to its legislative resolution of 14 December 2010 on the draft directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Protection Order
Sprejeta besedila, P7_TA(2010)0470 . ,
Texts adopted, P7_TA(2010)0470 . ,
– ob upoštevanju strategije za enakost žensk in moških za obdobje 2010– 2015, ki jo je Komisija predstavila 21. septembra 2010,
– having regard to the Commission's Strategy for equality between women and men 2010‑2015 which was presented on 21 September 2010,
– ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora za pravice žensk in enakost spolov ( A7–0065/2011 ),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality ( A7‑0065/2011 ),
A. ker nasilja na podlagi spola ne more zaustaviti en sam posamičen poseg, vendar pa lahko kombinacija infrastrukturnih, pravnih, sodnih, izvršilnih, izobraževalnih, zdravstvenih in drugih s storitvami povezanih ukrepov bistveno zmanjša to nasilje in njegove posledice,
A. whereas no single intervention will eliminate gender-based violence, but a combination of infrastructural, legal, judicial, enforcement, educational, health, and other service-related actions can significantly reduce it and its consequences,
B. ker izraz „nasilje nad ženskami” sicer nima mednarodno priznane opredelitve, vendar so ga pri OZN opredelili kot vsako dejanje nasilja na podlagi spola, ki ženskam povzroča ali bi lahko povzročilo fizično, spolno ali psihično škodo ali trpljenje, vključno z grožnjami s tovrstnimi dejanji, prisilo ali samovoljnim odvzemom prostosti, bodisi v javnem ali v zasebnem življenju
B. whereas although there is no internationally recognised definition of the term ‘violence against women’, it is defined by the United Nations as any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life
1. člen Deklaracije OZN o odpravi nasilja nad ženskami z dne 20. decembra 1993(A/RES/48/104); 113. točka pekinških izhodišč OZN za ukrepanje iz leta 1995. ,
Article 1 of the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women of 20 December 1993 (A/RES/48/104); point 113 of the United Nations 1995 Beijing Platform for Action. ,