natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
To lahko stori na tri načine – z zbiranjem in usklajevanjem raziskovalnih prizadevanj (kot v primeru energetske industrijske pobude), z določitvijo tehničnih in pravnih standardov za nove tehnike (kot v primeru zajemanja in shranjevanja ogljika) in s financiranjem (kot v primeru okvirnega raziskovalnega programa).
The EU can do this in three ways – by convening and coordinating research efforts (as it is doing with the Energy Industrial Initiatives), by setting technical and legal standards for new techniques (as it has done with carbon capture and storage), and by funding (as it does through the framework research programme).
Vendar je Komisija v svojem strateškem energetskem tehnološkem načrtu navedla, da je treba povečati javna in zasebna vlaganja v nizkoogljične tehnologije, in sicer s 3 milijard EUR na 8 milijard EUR v obdobju od 2011 do 2020.
But, in its Strategic Energy Technology (SET) plan, the Commission says public and private investment in low carbon technology needs to be increased from Euros 3bn to Euros 8bn a year from now till 2020.
Zunanja energetska politika: Dokument Komisije navaja številne dialoge EU o energiji z mednarodnimi organizacijami, tujimi partnerji in ponudniki.
The Commission document lists the EU’s many energy dialogues with international organisations, foreign partners and suppliers.
Najpomembnejše zunanje pobude z vidika energetske varnosti so tiste, ki so osredotočene na:
But the most important external initiatives, from the crucial energy security aspect, are those focussed on:
· razširitev predpisov EU o notranjem energetskem trgu na sosednje države;
· extending EU internal energy market rules to neighbouring countries.
· iskanje raznolikosti virov in poti pri uvozih energije.
· Seeking diversification of the sources and routes of energy imports.
Poročevalka meni, da je treba prvo točko izvesti z razširitvijo Energetske skupnosti in s tesnim sodelovanjem z Rusijo znotraj konference podpisnic energetske listine in v okviru pogajanj o novem sporazumu o partnerstvu in sodelovanju z Rusijo.
The EP Rapporteur believes the first must be done via the extension of the Energy Community and a strong engagement with Russia within the Energy Charter Conference forum and in the context of the negotiations for a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia.
Moldaviji je treba čestitati za dokončanje postopkov ratifikacije in uskladitev zakonov o plinu s pravnim redom EU ter za pristop k Energetski skupnosti v maju 2010.
Moldova is to be congratulated on completing its ratification procedures and aligning its gas laws with the EU’s acquis and acceding to the Energy Community in May 2010.
Takšna naloga še čaka Ukrajino, ki je pogojno pristopila decembra 2009 in še mora zagotoviti skladnost zakonov o plinu s pravnim redom EU.
The same task still awaits Ukraine which acceded conditionally in December 2009 and still has to ensure that its gas laws comply with the EU acquis .
K uresničitvi druge točke naj bi prispevala izgradnja novih terminalov za utekočinjen zemeljski plin, ki bi lahko oskrbovali Evropo s plinom iz celega sveta.
The second point should be supported by the construction of new Liquefied Natural Gas terminals, able to bring gas to Europe from all over the word.
Takšni terminali lahko prinesejo nove vire in nove poti pri uvozu plina.
LNG terminals can add both new sources and new routes of gas imports.
Razvoj južnega koridorja s projekti, kot je plinovod Nabucco, bi lahko Evropi prav tako zagotovil nove vire ter nove poti pri uvozu plina.
The development of the Southern Corridor through projects like the Nabucco pipeline also could give Europe new sources, as well as a new route for gas imports.
Poročevalka izreka pohvalo Komisiji, ker se je potrudila kreativno razmišljati o možnih mehanizmih povečanja kupne moči EU ter preučila nove instrumente, na primer kaspijsko razvojno sodelovanje, kot način za združevanje evropskega povpraševanja po energiji, kar naj bi proizvajalce plina v Centralni Aziji spodbudilo k prodaji plina Evropi.
The EP Rapporteur applauds the Commission for trying to think creatively about “ possible mechanisms to leverage the EU’s buying power ”, and to study new tools such as the Caspian Development Corporation, as a way of aggregating European energy demand in a way that would encourage Central Asian gas producers to sell to Europe.
Z morebitno izjemo projekta Nabucco poročevalka meni, da je načeloma finančna sredstva za vedno večjo prilagodljivost na zunanje energetske šoke bolje porabiti znotraj EU kot izven nje.
With the possible exception of Nabucco, the EP Rapporteur believes that funding for increasing Europe’s resilience to external energy shocks is, as a general rule, better spent inside the EU rather than outside the EU.
Nove plinske čezmejne povezave in skladišča znotraj EU so trajen prispevek k evropski energetski infrastrukturi in praktičen odraz energetske solidarnosti med državami članicami.
This is because new gas cross-border interconnections and storage within the EU constitute a lasting addition to Europe’s energy infrastructure, and are a practical expression of energy solidarity among member states.
Sedanja revizija uredbe o varnosti oskrbe s plinom bo olajšala ta proces.
The current revision of the Gas Security Regulation will help this process.
Vendar je treba v obdobju, ki ga zajema nova energetska strategija, nadaljevati z oblikovanjem bolj integriranega plinskega trga.
But work on creating a more integrated gas market needs to continue in the period covered by the new Energy Strategy.
Zato poročevalka upa, da bo Komisija zagotovila sinergijo med notranjimi in zunanjimi vidiki energije.
The EP Rapporteur therefore hopes that a synergy here between internal and external aspects of energy will be implemented by the Commission.
o poti k novi energetski strategiji za Evropo 2011–2020
on towards a new Energy Strategy for Europe 2011-2020
2. spodbuja države članice EU, naj pri soočanju z izzivi 21. stoletja izkažejo solidarnost ter ukrepe Unije na podlagi člena 194 PDEU podprejo s pozitivno energijo;
Encourages EU Member States to demonstrate solidarity in facing the energy challenges of the 21st century, thus fuelling the Union’s actions based on Article 194 TFEU with positive energy;
11. pozdravlja odločitev ekvadorske vlade, da se odreče izkoriščanju naftnega polja Yasuní v amazonskem pragozdu, da bi obvarovala okolje in zmanjšala svojo odvisnost od izvoza fosilne energije, ter meni, da bi morala EU podpreti tovrstna in podobna prizadevanja.
Welcomes the decision of the Ecuadorian government to renounce to the exploitation of the Yasuni oil field in the Amazonian forest in order to protect the environment and reduce its dependency on the exportation of fossil energy, and considers that the EU should support this effort and other similar ones.
o letnem poročilu ECB za leto 2009
on the ECB annual report 2009
Poročevalec: Burkhard Balz
Rapporteur: Burkhard Balz
– ob upoštevanju letnega poročila Evropske centralne banke (ECB) za leto 2009,
– having regard to the Annual Report 2009 of the European Central Bank (ECB),
– ob upoštevanju člena 284 Pogodbe o Evropski uniji,
– having regard to Article 284 of the Treaty on European Union,
– ob upoštevanju člena 15 protokola o statutu Evropskega sistema centralnih bank in Evropske centralne banke, ki je priložen Pogodbi,
– having regard to Article 15 on the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank annexed to the Treaty,
– ob upoštevanju svoje resolucije z dne 2. aprila 1998 o demokratičnem nadzoru v tretji fazi EMU
– having regard to its resolution of 2 April 1998 on democratic accountability in the third phase of the EMU
– ob upoštevanju sporočila Komisije z dne 7. oktobra 2009 o letni izjavi o euroobmočju za leto 2009 ( KOM(2009)0527 ) in delovnega dokumenta služb Komisije, ki je priložen temu sporočilu ( SEC(2009)1313 /2),
– having regard to the Commission communication of 7 October 2009 on the Annual Statement on the Euro Area 2009 ( COM(2009)0527 ) and the Commission staff working document accompanying that communication ( SEC(2009)1313 /2),
– ob upoštevanju poročila skupine na visoki ravni, ki ji predseduje Jacques de Larosière, z dne 25. februarja 2009,
– having regard to the Report of the High Level Group chaired by Jacques de Larosière of 25 February 2009,
–– ob upoštevanju predloga Komisije s 23. septembra 2009 o uredbi Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o makrobonitetnem nadzoru finančnega sistema v Skupnosti in o ustanovitvi Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja ( KOM(2009)0499 ),
–– having regard to the Commission proposal of 23 September 2009 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community macro prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board ( COM(2009)0499 ),
– ob upoštevanju resolucije z dne 25. marca 2010 o letnem poročilu ECB za leto 2008
– having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2010 on the ECB Annual Report 2008
Sprejeta besedila P7_TA(2010)0090 . ,
Texts adopted, P7_TA(2010)0090 . ,
– ob upoštevanju svoje resolucije z dne 18. novembra 2008 o Euro@10: Prvih deset let ekonomske in monetarne unije ter prihodnji izzivi
– having regard to its resolution of 18 November 2008 on Euro@10: The first 10 years of Economic and Monetary Union and future Challenges
UL C 16E, 22.1.2010, str.
OJ C 16E, 22.1.2010, p.8. ,
– ob upoštevanju mnenja Odbora za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve ( A7-0314/2010 ),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs ( A7-0314/2010 ),
A. ker se je splošni BDP v euroobmočju v letu 2009 skrčil za 4,1 %, po tem ko so se finančni pretresi po propadu družbe Lehman Brothers še poglobili; ker se za to skupno številko skrivajo velike neenakosti med državami članicami euroobmočja,
A. whereas overall real GDP in the euro area shrank by 4.1% in 2009 after the financial turmoil deepened following the collapse of Lehman Brothers; whereas behind such an aggregated figure there are strong disparities between euro-area Member States,
B. ker je splošna letna inflacija znašala 0,3 % in so bila srednjeročna do dolgoročna inflacijska pričakovanja v skladu s ciljem ECB, ohraniti inflacijsko stopnjo pod dvema odstotkoma, a blizu te meje,
B. whereas the average annual inflation stood at 0.3% and the medium to longer-term inflation expectations remained in line with the ECB aim to keep inflation rates below, but close to, 2%,
C. ker se je povprečni delež splošnega javnofinančnega primanjkljaja v euroobmočju povečal na približno 6,3 %, delež javnega dolga glede na BDP v euroobmočju pa z 69,4 % BDP v letu 2008 na 78,7 % v letu 2009,
C. whereas the average general government deficit ratio in the euro area increased to about 6.3% and the public debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 69.4% of GDP in 2008 to 78.7% in 2009 in the euro area,
D. ker se je menjalni tečaj eura proti ameriškemu dolarju zmanjšal z 1,39 USD 2. januarja 2009 na 1,26 USD sredi marca 2009, nato znova povečal do najvišje vrednosti 1,51 USD v začetku decembra 2009 in znova izgubljal vrednost leta 2010 ter dosegel najnižjo vrednost 1,19 USD 2. junija 2010,
D. whereas the exchange rate for the euro against the USD fell from USD 1.39 on 2 January 2009 to USD 1.26 in mid-March 2009, recovered to a peak at USD 1.51 in early December 2009 and depreciated in 2010 to reach a minimum of USD 1.19 on 2 June 2010,
E. ker kitajske oblasti v letu 2009 niso uskladile menjalnega tečaja renminbija glede na euro in je bil euro umetno močan nasproti kitajski valuti,
E. whereas the exchange rate for the renminbi against the euro was misaligned by the Chinese authorities during 2009, with an artificially strong euro against the Chinese currency,
F. ker je ECB znižala obrestne mere na 1 % in nadaljevala obsežne nestandardne ukrepe za podporo posojilni dejavnosti brez primere; ker se je bilančni rezultat ECB znatno povečeval vse leto 2009,
F. whereas the ECB adjusted interest rates down to 1% and continued substantial and unprecedented non-standard measures to support credit; whereas the ECB balance sheet size has significantly increased throughout the year 2009,
G. ker so se v drugi polovici leta 2009 pojavili znaki gospodarske stabilizacije v euroobmočju in so četrtletne stopnje rasti sicer še vedno šibke, vendar so dosegle pozitivno vrednost, čeprav se ta trend ni pokazal v vseh državah članicah, saj so nekatere v tem istem obdobju ostale v recesiji,
G. whereas there have been signs of economic stabilisation in the euro area over the second half of 2009 and quarterly growth rates, though still weak, have turned positive, though these aggregated figures highlight that this trend has not been reflected in all its Member States, some of which remained in recession during the same period,
H. ker je ECB, preden je prišlo do krize javnega dolga v številnih državah euroobmočja, za leto 2010 pričakovala v euroobmočju rast realnega BDP med 0,1 % in 1,5 %,
H. whereas the ECB expected a growth rate between 0,1% and 1,5% of real GDP in the euro area for 2010 before the sovereign debt crisis occurred in several countries within the euro area,
5. poudarja, da ta neravnovesja močno otežujejo primerno monetarno politiko v euroobmočju; zato poziva vlade, naj uskladijo svoje ekonomske politike;
Points out that these imbalances pose considerable difficulties for a suitable monetary policy within the euro zone; calls on governments, therefore, to coordinate their economic policies;
Gospodarska in finančna stabilnost
Economic and financial stability
13. meni, da sta pomanjkanje vnaprej določenega mehanizma za obvladovanje kriz ter ravnanje nekaterih vlad otežila hitro reševanje krize javnega dolga v nekaterih državah članicah euroobmočja in bosta oslabila sposobnost EMU, da bi se hitro odzvala v morebitnih podobnih razmerah v prihodnosti; zato poziva k stalnemu okviru za obvladovanje kriz;
Believes that the lack of a predefined crisis management mechanism and the behaviour of some governments has made a rapid solution to the sovereign debt crisis in some Member States of the euroarea difficult and will weaken the EMU’s ability to react quickly in potentially similar situations in the future; calls therefore for a permanent crisis management framework;
Upravljanje in sprejemanje odločitev
Governance and decision-making
26. ugotavlja, da zasnova, v skladu s katero ESRB oblikuje le opozorila in priporočila brez dejanskega uveljavljanja, ni zadovoljiva za učinkovito izvajanje in odgovornost; obžaluje, da ESRB ne more sama razglasiti izrednih razmer;
Notes that the concept whereby the ESRB only gives warnings and recommendations with no actual enforcement is not satisfactory in terms of effective implementation and responsibility; regrets that the ESRB cannot declare the emergency by itself;
Izhod iz krize
Exit from the crisis
31. opozarja, da se je pred izbruhom finančne krize razmerje med javnim dolgom in BDP v euroobmočju in EU kot celoti, pa tudi razmerje za večino držav članic, zmanjšalo med letoma 1999 in 2007 ter da so se, nasprotno, ravni zadolženosti gospodinjstev in podjetij ter vzvod za finančni sektor v istem obdobju znatno povečali;
Recalls that, before the outbreak of the financial crisis, the ratio of public debt to GDP of the euro area and the EU as a whole, as well as the ratio for the majority of Member States, declined between 1999 and 2007 and that, by contrast, debt levels of households, firms and the leverage of the financial sector experienced a significant increase over the same period;
33. ugotavlja, da je kriza s posledično finančno pomočjo in gospodarskimi spodbujevalnimi svežnji privedla do daljnosežnih varčevalnih ukrepov, ki so pogosto zakasneli, a obenem močno omejujejo sposobnost ukrepanja vlad;
Notes that the crisis, together with subsequent ‘bail-outs’ and economic stimulus packages, has led to far-reaching austerity measures which are often overdue but which at the same time heavily constrain the capacity of governments to act;
Zunanja razsežnost
The external dimension
50. meni, da sprejetje eura v Estoniji odraža njegov status kljub krizi javnega dolga; je prepričan, da bo navedeni status spodbudil države članice, da bodo zaprosile za članstvo v euroobmočju;
Believes that the adoption of the euro by Estonia shows the status of the euro, despite the public debt crisis; believes that this status will encourage Member States to seek membership of the euro area;
V tem poročilu je ocenjeno letno poročilo Evropske centralne banke (ECB) za leto 2009 in delo, ki ga je ECB opravila v tem letu.
This report evaluates the 2009 annual report of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the work done by the ECB during that year.
Ker je bila izjava Evropskega parlamenta o letnem poročilu ECB za leto 2008 pozneje objavljena zaradi volitev leta 2009, ni minilo veliko časa od zadnje izjave Evropskega parlamenta o dejavnosti ECB.
As the statement of the European Parliament on the ECB annual report 2008 had been delayed due to the elections in 2009, there has not much time passed since the last European Parliament’s statement on ECB activity.
Poročilo za leto 2008 je obravnavalo zlasti delovanje ECB med finančno in gospodarsko krizo.
The report on 2008 dealt mainly with the performance of the ECB in the financial and economic crisis.
Na žalost se od takrat razmere niso spremenile.
Unfortunately, this background hasn’t changed since.
Kriza še vedno v veliki meri prevladuje nad gospodarskimi, finančnimi in vedno bolj tudi političnimi ukrepi.
Still, economic, financial and to an increasing part political actions are widely dominated by the crisis.
Letno poročilo ECB za leto 2009 še vedno obravnava zlasti odziv ECB na krizo, izhodno strategijo in upravljanje.
The ECB annual report 2009 therefore still deals primarily with the ECB’s reaction to the crisis, the exit strategy and governance topics.
Finančna kriza
The financial crisis
Finančna in gospodarska kriza sta se začeli pred približno dvema letoma s krizo na trgu drugorazrednih hipotekarnih posojil v ZDA in je dosegla prvi vrhunec s propadom Lehman Brothers in kasnejšimi pretresi na finančnih trgih.
The financial and economic crisis started about two years ago with the US sub-prime mortgage crises and reached a first peak with the clash of Lehman Brothers and the following turmoil in financial markets.
Začela se je kot finančna kriza, ki se je nato spremenila tudi v gospodarsko krizo in prizadela realno gospodarstvo v drugem valu.
Having been a financial crisis at first, it then turned into an economic crisis as well, hitting the real economy in a second surge.
Vlade, centralne banke in ECB so se morale odzvati na najhujšo krizo po krizi iz tridesetih let prejšnjega stoletja.
Governments, central banks and the ECB had to react to the severest crisis since 1930s.
BDP v euroobmočju in tudi zunaj euroobmočja se je skrčil, gospodarska dejavnost se je zmanjšala po vsem svetu in proračunski primanjkljaji so se povečali.
The GDPs both within and without the euro area shrank, economic activity diminished worldwide and budgetary deficits increased.
Upadajoči davčni prihodki in večja poraba za socialno varstvo kot posledica krize so povzročili nastanek javnega dolga, za katerega bo morda potrebnih več let, da se vrne na raven pred krizo.
Falling tax revenues and increased welfare spending due to the crisis brought about government debt that may take years to return to the before crisis level.
Dodatni proračunski spodbujevalni ukrepi so k temu prispevali, vendar niso glavni razlog za nastanek dolgov.
Additional budgetary stimulus measures contributed to this effect, but are not the main cause to the debts.
Vendar so podatki iz leta 2009 pokazali, da so se garancije za bančne obveznosti, injekcije kapitala in sheme za podporo sredstev obrestovali in oživitev gospodarske dejavnosti v drugi polovici leta 2009 je kazala na konec gospodarske krize.
However, figures indicated in 2009 that guarantees for bank liabilities, capital injections and asset support schemes paid off and the revival of economic activity in the second half of 2009 indicated the end of the economic crisis.
Za leto 2010 je bila pričakovana šibka rast.
There was a slight growth expected for 2010.
Medtem so bile zaradi naraščajočega dolga vlade po vsej EU prisiljene sprejeti odločitev o daljnosežnih varčevalnih ukrepih.
Meanwhile the increasing debt pushed governments all over the EU to decide on far reaching austerity packages.
Ti svežnji nujni potrebni in v nekaterih primerih celo zapozneli.
These packages are necessary and in some cases were even overdue.
Vendar dolg močno omejuje sposobnost ukrepanja vlad in v nekaterih državah lahko ogrozi sposobnost vlade, da bi spodbudila gospodarsko okrevanje.
However, the debt puts heavy restraints on governments’ capacity to act and in some countries risks to undermine government’s ability to promote economic recovery.
Zato se v letu 2010 finančna in gospodarska kriza v tretjem valu lahko razvije v krizo javnega dolga.
By 2010, the financial and economic crisis risks therefore also to develop into a public debt crisis in a third surge of the crisis.
Odziv ECB na krizo
The ECB ’ s response to the crisis
ECB je nadaljevala svojo politiko iz leta 2008 za ohranjanje inflacijske stopnje pod 2 %, a blizu te vrednosti, ob povečevanju likvidnosti na trgih.
The ECB continued its policy from 2008, aiming for an inflation rate below, but close to 2%, while increasing liquidity in the markets.
Zato je ECB znižala obrestne mere na 1 % in nadaljevala nestandardne ukrepe, uvedene v letu 2008, med letom 2009.
The ECB therefore adjusted interest rates down to 1% and continued the non standard measures introduced in 2008 throughout the year 2009.
Pet bistvenih elementov povečane kreditne podpore: celotna dodelitev s fiksno obrestno mero, razširitev seznama jamstev, daljše zapadlosti za operacije refinanciranja, zagotavljanje likvidnosti v tujih valutah in podpora finančnemu trgu z omejenim, a znatnim nakupom kritih obveznic.
The five key elements of the enhanced credit support were fixed rate full allotment, an expansion of the list of collateral, longer maturities for refinancing operations, liquidity provisions in foreign currencies, and financial market support through a measured but significant covered bond purchase program.
Ti ukrepi so se izkazali za splošno uspešne in so številnim finančnim institucijam omogočili, da so se izognile propadu.
These measures proved to be widely successful and kept many financial institutions from collapse.
Vendar likvidnost ni bila vedno prenesena na realno gospodarstvo, zato ukrepi ECB niso razvili celotnega potenciala za okrevanje gospodarstva.
However, liquidity was not always passed on to real economy, therefore not unfolding the full recovery potential of the ECB’s measures.
Kljub dejstvu, da so nekatere banke lahko bile nenaklonjene tem ukrepom, je bil vzrok večinoma zmanjšano povpraševanje po posojilih kot posledica zmanjšane gospodarske dejavnosti po krizi.
In spite of the fact that some banks might have been reluctant, this was however mostly due to a decreased demand of credit in consequence of the diminished economic activity following the crisis.
Ker so bili ti ukrepi nestandardni, niso bili namenjeni dolgoročni uporabi.
As these measures were non standard measures they were not supposed to be applied on a longer term.
V večini primerov je do postopnega opuščanja prišlo samodejno, kjer pa se to ni zgodilo, je potrebno previdno časovno načrtovanje.
In most cases, the phasing out comes naturally, where this is not the case, a careful timing is needed.
Postopno opuščanje je treba uvesti postopoma in v skladu s potrebami trgov – s čimer je ECB že začela v decembru 2009.
Phasing out must be done gradually and according to the needs of the markets - as it was already begun by the ECB in December 2009.
Potrebno je tesno sodelovanje z vladami držav članic v zvezi z njihovimi programi in da države članice zmanjšajo te programe, zlasti ker je finančna kriza v Grčiji in drugih državah eura odprla novo poglavje v razvoju te krize.
A close coordination with the national governments of member states concerning their programs and their cutting back of these programs is needed; especially since the financial crisis in Greece and other euro countries opened a new chapter in the development of this crisis.