natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
J. ker se morajo dejavnosti, povezane s kazenskim pregonom, vedno izvajati ob ustreznem spoštovanju temeljnih pravic, med njimi pravice do zasebnosti in družinskega življenja, varstva osebnih podatkov in nediskriminacije; tesno mednarodno sodelovanje v boju proti terorizmu in hudemu kriminalu je sicer nujno, vendar mora potekati v skladu z mednarodno zakonodajo ter evropskimi normami in vrednotami glede enake obravnave in pravnega varstva, med drugim tudi zato, da ne bo spodkopana verodostojnost Evropske unije kot borca za človekove pravice znotraj svojih meja in na mednarodni ravni;
J. Whereas law enforcement must always be conducted with respect for fundamental rights, including rights to private and family life, the protection of personal data and non-discrimination; close international cooperation is indispensable in the fight against terrorism and serious crime, but all such cooperation must comply with international law as well as European norms and values on equal treatment and proper legal protection, not least so that the EU does not undermine its credibility as a promoter of human rights within its borders and at international level;
K. ker se mora Evropska unija izogibati preiskovalnim pristopom, ki bi lahko po nepotrebnem škodili diplomatskim odnosom, ovirali takšno mednarodno sodelovanje ali škodili njeni podobi v svetu in njeni verodostojnosti kot zagovornici mednarodnega prava; ker morajo evropski standardi za enako obravnavanje, nediskriminacijo in pravno varstvo še naprej predstavljati zgled;
K. Whereas the EU should avoid investigative approaches that could unnecessarily harm diplomatic relations, hamper such international cooperation or damage its image in the world and its credibility as a promoter of international law; whereas European standards for equal treatment, non-discrimination and legal protection should continue to set an example;
L. ker je lahko opisno in napovedovalno profiliranje legitimno preiskovalno orodje, če temelji na točno določenih, zanesljivih in svežih podatkih, ne pa na nepreverjenem posploševanju na podlagi stereotipov, in če ukrepi, ki so sprejeti na podlagi teh profilov, ustrezajo pravnim pogojem glede nujnosti in sorazmernosti; ker pa v odsotnosti primernih zakonskih omejitev in zaščitnih ukrepov za uporabo podatkov o etnični pripadnosti, rasi, veri, narodnosti in politični pripadnosti vseeno obstaja precejšnja nevarnost, da utegne profiliranje voditi v diskriminatorne prakse;
L. Whereas both descriptive and predictive profiling may be legitimate investigative tools when they are based on specific, reliable and timely information as opposed to untested generalisations based on stereotypes, and when the actions taken on the basis of such profiles meet the legal tests of necessity and proportionality; whereas, however, , in the absence of adequate legal restrictions and safeguards as regards the use of data on ethnicity, race, religion, nationality and political affiliation, there is a considerable risk that profiling may lead to discriminatory practices;
M. ker je v evropskem kodeksu policijske etike zapisano, da morajo „policijske preiskave temeljiti vsaj na utemeljenem sumu dejanskega ali možnega prekrška ali kaznivega dejanja” in ker je dokazano, da so človekove pravice
M. Whereas, the guidance in the European Code of Police Ethics to the effect that ‘ police investigations shall as a minimum be based upon reasonable suspicion of an actual or possible offence or crime ’, and whereas it is asserted that a likelihood of breach of human rights
Isto besedilo, odstavek 33.
Idem. paragraph 33.
Glej tudi omenjeno poročilo o etničnem profiliranju Evropske mreže neodvisnih strokovnjakov za temeljne pravice, str.
See also the report on "Ethnic Profiling" of the E.U. Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, , above-mentioned, p.
9-13. posameznikov in celotne družbe ogrožene prav zaradi pomanjkanja utemeljenega suma, če profiliranje temelji na stereotipih ali predsodkih;
9-13. threatening individuals and society as whole arises in the absence of such reasonable suspicion, when profiling is based on stereotypes or prejudice;
N. ker napovedovalno profiliranje, kjer se uporabljajo širši profili, ki so bili oblikovani s povezovanjem različnih podatkovnih zbirk, in kjer prihaja do nepreverjenega posploševanja ali oblikovanja vedenjskih vzorcev, ki naj bi kazali na verjetno kaznivo ali teroristično dejanje, ki bo storjeno v prihodnosti ali ki še ni bilo odkrito, zbuja resne pomisleke glede varovanja zasebnosti in je lahko v nasprotju s pravico do zasebnosti v skladu s členom 8 EKČP in členom 7 listine
N. Whereas ‘predictive profiling’, using broad profiles developed through cross-referencing between databases and reflecting untested generalisations or patterns of behaviour judged likely to indicate the commission of some future or as-yet-undiscovered crime or terrorist act raises strong privacy concerns and may constitute an interference with the rights to respect for private life under Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 7 of the Charter
Mnenje Agencije Evropske unije za temeljne pravice o predlogu okvirnega sklepa Sveta o uporabi podatkov o imenih potnikov za namene kazenskega pregona, 4. odstavek. ;
Opinion of the European Agency for Fundamental Rights on the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for law enforcement purposes, paragraph 4. ;
O. ker je iz sodne prakse Evropskega sodišča za človekove pravice jasno, da so odstopanja od člena 8(2) EKČP dovoljena le, če so v skladu z zakonodajo in so v demokratični družbi potrebna
O. Whereas the ECtHR case-law makes clear that derogations from Article 8(2) ECHR are only allowed if they are in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society
P. ker je Evropsko sodišče za človekove pravice v omenjenem primeru S. in Marper proti Združenemu kraljestvu ugotovilo, da pri podatkovnih zbirkah DNK v Združenem kraljestvu obstaja „nevarnost stigmatiziranja”, saj se osebe, ki niso bile obsojene za noben prekršek, obravnava enako kot osebe, obsojene zaradi kaznivih dejanja, kar sproža vprašanja o zakonitosti postopkov profiliranja, ki temeljijo na obdelavi osebnih podatkov oseb, ki jih sodišče ni spoznalo za krive
P. Whereas the ECtHR's above-mentioned finding in S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom , of a 'risk of stigmatisation' from the fact that persons not convicted of any offence are treated in the same way as convicted criminals in the UK DNA database must also raise questions about the legality of profiling operations based on processing of personal data of persons not found guilty by the courts
Že omenjena sodba ESČP v primeru S. in Marper proti Združenemu kraljestvu, 125. odstavek. ;
Judgment of the ECtHR in Case S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom , above-mentioned, paragraph 125. ;
(i) je bilo v študiji inštituta Cato ugotovljeno:
(i) A study for the Cato Institute observed:
„Čeprav je podatkovno rudarjenje lahko večkrat koristno, pa ni primerno za odkrivanje terorističnih dejavnosti.
“ t hough data mining has many valuable uses, it is not well suited to the terrorist discovery problem.
Obžalovanja vredno bi bilo, če bi podatkovno rudarjenje bilo sprejeto v organih nacionalne varnosti in kazenskega pregona ter v tehnoloških krogih, saj bi uporaba tega postopka pomenila zapravljanje davkoplačevalskega denarja, nepotrebne kršitve zasebnosti in državljanskih svoboščin ter napačno uporabo dragocenega časa in energije ljudi, ki skrbijo za nacionalno varnost”
It would be unfortunate if data mining for terrorism discovery had currency within national security, law enforcement, and technology circles because pursuing this use of data mining would waste taxpayer dollars, needlessly infringe on privacy and civil liberties, and misdirect the valuable time and energy of the men and women in the national security community"
Politična analiza instituta Cato, št. 584, 11.12.2006: „Effective Terrorism and the limited role of predictive data-mining“, avtorja Jeff Jonas in Jim Harper. ,
Cato Institute Policy Analysis No 584, 11 December 2006, ‘Effective Terrorism and the limited role of predictive data-mining’ by Jeff Jonas and Jim Harper. ;
(ii) v študiji ameriškega nacionalnega raziskovalnega sveta o podatkovnem rudarjenju in tehnologijah za spremljanje vedenja, ki je bila opravljena za ministrstvo za domovinsko varnost, pa je bilo ugotovljeno, da:
(ii) A US National Research Council study of data-mining and behavioural surveillance technologies for the Department of Homeland Security concluded that:
„avtomatsko identificiranje teroristov prek podatkovnega rudarjenja ... kot cilj v prizadevanjih za tehnološki razvoj ni izvedljivo in ni zaželeno”
‘a utomated identification of terrorists through data mining…is neither feasible as an objective nor desirable as a goal of technology development efforts .
S. ker podatkovno rudarjenje ni učinkovito, saj je filtriranje ogromne količine razpoložljivih podatkov enako kot „iskanje igle v senu”; ker je obseg „digitalnih odtisov”, ki jih za seboj pustijo državljani, ki spoštujejo zakone, širši od tistega, ki zadeva storilce kaznivih dejanj in teroriste, saj ti vložijo veliko napora v to, da bi skrili svojo identiteto; ker je zelo visoka stopnja „lažnih pozitivnih rezultatov”, ko pade sum na popolnoma nedolžne ljudi in lahko pride do vdiranja v njihovo zasebnost, medtem pa resnični osumljenci ostajajo neidentificirani;
S. Whereas the effectiveness of data-mining is weakened by the ‘needle in the haystack’ problem of analysts having to filter through the huge quantity of available data; that the extent of ‘digital tracks’ left by law-abiding citizens is even greater than that of criminals and terrorists who make considerable efforts to conceal their identities; and that there are significant rates of ‘false positives’ whereby not only do wholly innocent people come under suspicion resulting in potential invasion of individual privacy but real suspects meanwhile remain unidentified;
T. ker je problem tudi to, da se ne odkrije storilcev kaznivih dejanj, ki ne ustrezajo profilu, kot je pokazal primer vodje bombnih napadov v Londonu 7. julija 2005, „na katerega so postale obveščevalne službe pozorne, ker naj bi se družil z drugimi moškimi, ki so bili osumljeni načrtovanja terorističnega bombnega napada, vendar ga niso preganjale, saj ni ustrezal dovolj kategorijam, ko je bil pred julijem 2005 oblikovan profil osumljenca za teroristično dejanje”
T. Whereas the inverse problem is the possibility of missing perpetrators who do not fit the profile, an example being the ringleader of the 7 July 2005 London bombings who “had come to the attention of the intelligence services as an associate of other men who were suspected of involvement in a terrorist bomb plot...but ...was not pursued because he did not tick enough of the boxes in the pre-July 2005 profile of the terror suspect”
Poročilo posebnega poročevalca Združenih narodov o spodbujanju in zaščiti človekovih pravic in temeljnih svoboščin v boju proti terorizmu, 62. odstavek. ;
Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, paragraph 62 ;
V. ker je učinkovito zbiranje informacij o posameznih osumljencih in njihovo sledenje najboljši način za odkrivanje in preprečevanje terorizma in bi bilo za preventivni boj morda bolj učinkovito, če bi izvajali naključna preverjanja in kontrole, ki bi prizadele vse ljudi enako in se jim teroristi ne bi mogli izogniti
V. Whereas the efficient collection of information about specific suspects and following of specific leads is the best approach to detect and pre-empt terrorism and as a supplement to this, random checks and controls which affect everyone equally and are impossible for terrorists to evade may be more effective than profiling in preventive counter-terrorism efforts
Isto besedilo, 61. odstavek. ;
Idem, paragraph 61. ;
Etnično profiliranje
Ethnic profiling
W. ker upoštevanje dejavnikov, kot so narodnost, državna pripadnost ali vera, pri preiskavah kazenskega pregona ni prepovedano, če poteka v skladu s standardi nediskriminacije, med drugim v skladu s členom 14 EKČP, vendar mora izpolnjevati merila učinkovitosti, nujnosti in sorazmernosti, da lahko predstavlja legitimno možnost obravnave, ki ne pomeni diskriminacije;
W. Whereas the use of ethnicity, national origin or religion as factors in law enforcement investigations is not precluded as long as such use conforms to non-discrimination standards, including Article 14 of the ECHR, but it must pass the scrutiny tests of effectiveness, necessity and proportionality if it is to constitute a legitimate difference of treatment that does not constitute discrimination;
X. ker lahko profiliranje, ki temelji na stereotipih, pri širši javnosti sproži občutke ksenofobije in sovraštva do oseb določene narodnosti, državne pripadnosti ali vere
X. Whereas profiling based on stereotypical assumptions may exacerbate sentiments of hostility and xenophobia in the general public towards persons of certain ethnic, national or religious background
Isto besedilo, 40. odstavek. ;
Idem, paragraph 40. ;
Y. ker gre v skladu s sodno prakso Evropskega sodišča za človekove pravice v primerih, ko rasa predstavlja izključno osnovo za ukrepe sodnega pregona, za prepovedano diskriminacijo
Y. Whereas the ECtHR case-law has established that where race constitutes an exclusive basis for law enforcement action it amounts to prohibited discrimination
Na primer že omenjena sodba ESČP v primeru Timishev proti Rusiji . ; ker v praksi ni vedno jasno, ali je bila rasa ali narodnost edini oziroma odločilen dejavnik za ukrepanje, in se pogosti zgodi, da se šele pri analizi vzorcev kazenskega pregona jasno pokaže pomen teh dejavnikov;
E.g., judgment of the ECtHR in Case Timishev v. Russia , above-mentioned. ; whereas in practice it is not always clear if race or ethnicity was the exclusive or decisive basis for such action and it is often only when patterns of law enforcement practice are analysed that the predominant weight of these factors clearly emerges;
Z. ker ni nobenih mednarodnih ali evropskih predpisov, ki bi izrecno prepovedovali etnično profiliranje, je pa iz sodne prakse Evropskega sodišča za človekove pravice, iz konvencije o odpravi vseh oblik rasne diskriminacije in iz sklepov Evropske komisije za boj proti rasizmu in nestrpnosti pri Svetu Evrope jasno, da takšna praksa ni v skladu s prepovedjo diskriminacije
Z. Whereas while there is no international or European norm which expressly forbids ‘ethnic profiling’, ECtHR case-law would suggest that conclusion and both ICERD and ECRI have made clear that such practice does violate the prohibition against discrimination
Mnenje Agencije Evropske unije za temeljne pravice o okvirnem sklepu Sveta o uporabi podatkov o imenih potnikov za namene kazenskega pregona, 39. odstavek. ;
Opinion of the European Agency for Fundamental Rights on the Council Framework Decision for a Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for law enforcement purposes, paragraph 39. ;
Poročilo svetovne konference proti rasizmu, diskriminaciji, ksenofobiji in s tem povezani nestrpnosti, (A/CONF.189/12), akcijski načrt, 72. odstavek. ; ker Evropska komisija za boj proti rasizmu in nestrpnosti pri Svetu Evrope v svojem priporočilu št. 8 o preprečevanju rasizma v boju proti terorizmu poziva vlade, naj zagotovijo, da zakonodaja in predpisi s področja kazenskega pregona in njihovo izvajanje ne bodo privedli do diskriminacije; ker je Evropska mreža neodvisnih strokovnjakov za temeljne pravice mnenja, da predstavljajo teroristični profili, ki temeljijo na značilnostih, kot so državljanstvo, starost ali kraj rojstva, „veliko nevarnost diskriminacije”
Report of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (A/CONF.189/12), Programme of Action, paragraph 72. ; that ECRI, in its above-mentioned Recommendation No. 8 on Combating racism while fighting terrorism, has asked governments to ensure that no discrimination ensues from legislation and regulations or their implementation in the field of law enforcement; and that the EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights believes that terrorist profiles on the basis of characteristics such as nationality, age or birthplace "presents a major risk of discrimination"
Evropska mreža neodvisnih strokovnjakov za temeljne pravice, dokument „The balance between freedom and security in the response by the European Union and its member States to the Terrorist Threats”, (2003), str.
EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, "The balance between freedom and security in the response by the European Union and its member States to the Terrorist Threats" (2003), p.
AC. ker bi bilo treba pri omenjenih postopkih slediti spodnjim smernicam in ker je za popolno in učinkovito zaščito potrebna kombinacija vseh naštetih varnostnih ukrepov;
Whereas the following guidelines should be applied to such operations and whereas a combination of all these protections is required in order to provide full and effective protection;
(a) vsakršna obdelava osebnih podatkov za namene kazenskega pregona in boja proti terorizmu mora temeljiti na objavljenih zakonskih predpisih, ki nalagajo omejitve za uporabo in so jasni, specifični in zavezujoči, ter mora biti podvržena natančnemu in učinkovitemu nadzoru neodvisnih organov za varstvo podatkov in strogim kaznim za kršitve; obsežno hranjenje podatkov zaradi previdnosti ni sorazmerno z osnovnimi zahtevami za učinkovit boj proti terorizmu ;
(a) all processing of personal data for law enforcement and anti-terrorist purposes should be based on published legal rules imposing limits on use, which are clear, specific and binding and subject to close and effective supervision by independent data protection authorities and to stringent penalties for breach; mass data storage for precautionary motives is disproportionate in relation to the basic requirements of an effective fight against terrorism ;
(b) treba bi bilo vzpostaviti pravni okvir, ki bi omogočil jasno opredelitev profiliranja z avtomatskim iskanjem računalniških podatkov ali kako drugače, da bi se oblikovala jasna pravila za legitimno uporabo in določile omejitve; treba je uvesti tudi potrebne zaščitne ukrepe za varstvo podatkov za posameznike in mehanizme za ugotavljanje odgovornosti;
(b) a legal framework should be established providing a clear definition of profiling, whether through the automated mining of computer data or otherwise, with a view to establishing clear rules on legitimate use and laying down limits; it is also necessary to introduce the necessary data protection safeguards for individuals and mechanisms for establishing responsibility;
(c) zbiranje in hranjenje osebnih podatkov in uporaba tehnik profiliranja v zvezi z osebami, ki niso osumljene določenega zločina ali grožnje, morajo ustrezati zelo strogim merilom nujnosti in sorazmernosti;
(c) the collection and retention of personal data and use of profiling techniques in respect of persons not suspected of a specific crime or threat should be subject to particularly strict “necessity” and “proportionality” tests;
(d) dejanske in obveščevalne podatke ter podatke o različnih kategorijah posameznikov, na katere se podatki nanašajo, je treba jasno ločevati;
(d) factual and intelligence data, and data on different categories of data subjects, should be clearly distinguished;
(e) dostop do policijskih kartotek in kartotek tajnih služb bi moral biti dovoljen le za vsak primer posebej, za posebne namene in pod sodnim nadzorom v državah članicah;
(e) access to police and secret service files should be allowed only on a case-by-case basis, for specified purposes, and should be under judicial control in the Member States;
(f) dejavnosti profiliranja ne bi smele omejevati usmerjenih preiskovalnih dejavnosti policijskih služb držav članic, omejevalna zakonodaja o profiliranju pa ne bi smela preprečevati upravičenega dostopa do podatkovnih zbirk kot dela takih usmerjenih preiskav;
(f) profiling activities should not detract from targeted investigative policing by Member States' police services, and restrictive legislation on profiling should not prevent legitimate database access as part of such targeted investigations;
(g) hramba osebnih podatkov bi morala biti časovno omejena;
(g) there should be time limits on the retention of personal information;
(h) statistika o narodnosti je pomembno orodje za odkrivanje kazenskega pregona, ki usmerja nesorazmerno, nepooblaščeno in neupravičeno pozornost na narodnostne manjšine; oblikovanje visokega standarda varstva za osebne podatke (podatke, povezane z določljivim posameznikom) ne preprečuje pridobivanja anonimnih statističnih podatkov, vključno s spremenljivkami o narodnosti, rasi, veri in državni pripadnosti, ki so potrebni za opredelitev diskriminacije med kazenskim pregonom; delovno skupino iz člena 29 bi bilo treba zaprositi, naj oblikuje smernice za to vprašanje;
(h) ethnic statistics are an essential tool to enable the detection of law enforcement practices that focus disproportionate, unwarranted and unjustified law enforcement attention on ethnic minorities; the creation of a high standard of protection for personal data (data linked to an identifiable individual) does not therefore preclude the generation of anonymous statistical data including variables on ethnicity, ‘race’, religion, and national origin that is necessary to identify any discrimination in law enforcement practices; the Article 29 Working Party should be asked to issue guidance on this issue;
(i) zbiranje podatkov o posameznikih le zato, ker so določenega rasnega ali etničnega porekla, verskega prepričanja, spolne usmerjenosti ali vedenja, političnega prepričanja ali ker so pripadniki določenih gibanj ali organizacij, ki niso prepovedane z zakonom, je prepovedano; treba je vzpostaviti zaščitne ukrepe v zvezi z varstvom in postopke za pritožbo zoper diskriminatorno uporabo instrumentov kazenskega pregona;
(i) the collection of data on individuals solely on the basis that they have a particular racial or ethnic origin, religious conviction, sexual orientation or behaviour, political opinions or are members of particular movements or organisations which are not proscribed by law should be prohibited; it is necessary to establish safeguards regarding protection and procedures for appealing against the discriminatory use of law enforcement instruments;
(j) javni organi se lahko pri sprejemanju odločitev o posameznikih zanesejo le na računalnike in se odpovejo človeški presoji samo izjemoma in ob zelo strogih zaščitnih ukrepih;
(j) reliance by private or public bodies on computers to take decisions on individuals without human assessment should be allowed only exceptionally and under strict safeguards;
(k) z zakonodajo bi morali biti predpisani strogi zaščitni ukrepi, ki bi zagotovili ustrezen in učinkovit sodni in parlamentarni nadzor nad dejavnostmi policije in tajnih služb, vključno z dejavnostmi za boj proti terorizmu;
(k) there should be strong safeguards established by law which ensure appropriate and effective judicial and parliamentary scrutiny of the activities of the police and the secret services, including their counter-terrorism activities;
(l) zaradi posledic, ki jih bodo morda čutili posamezniki, na katere se nanašajo podatki, je treba zagotoviti učinkovita in dostopna pravna sredstva ter posredovati jasne informacije o postopkih, ki vključujejo pravici do dostopa in popravka;
(l) in view of the possible consequences for individuals, redress should be effective and accessible with clear information being given to the data subject on the applicable procedures accompanied by rights of access and rectification;