natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
82. pozdravlja, da je EUPOL v Afganistanu ustanovil urad državnega tožilca za boj proti korupciji za preiskovanje zadev zoper javne uradnike na visokih položajih in druge uradnike, osumljene korupcije;
Welcomes the setting up by EUPOL Afghanistan of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office with the aim of investigating cases against high-profile public officials and other officials suspected of corruption;
84. meni, da so glavni vzroki za neučinkovitost splošnega usposabljanja pomanjkanje usklajevanja različnih vidikov usposabljanja policije in da se naloge usposabljanja prepuščajo zasebnim vojaškim in varnostnim izvajalcem;
Believes that major factors behind the ineffectiveness of the overall training are a lack of coordination of the various aspects of police training and the practice of transferring duties to private military and security companies (PMSC);
86. je zbegan zaradi ugotovljenega slabega finančnega nadzora nad temi zasebnimi podjetji ter navaja ugotovitve skupnega poročila zunanjega in obrambnega ministrstva ZDA iz leta 2006, ki še vedno veljajo, namreč da so policijske sile v Afganistanu nesposobne izvajati običajno delo kazenskega pregona ter da ne obstaja učinkovit program usposabljanja na terenu; priznava poskuse glavnega poveljstva v okviru politike proti uporu, da bi do neke mere izvajal nadzor nad zasebnimi tujimi milicami, ki v Afganistanu delujejo nekaznovano;
Is disturbed to learn of the poor financial controls being applied to these private companies, and cites a 2006 joint US Defense and State Department report, the findings of which are still valid today, concluding that the police force in Afghanistan was incapable of carrying out routine law enforcement work and that no effective field training programme existed; acknowledges the attempts by the general command, and under the counter-insurgency policy, to exercise some degree of control over the private foreign militias operating with impunity in Afghanistan;
90. predlaga, naj se povišajo plače afganistanske policije in naj se pregleda celoten proces zaposlovanja, tako da bodo imeli prednost kandidati z osnovno stopnjo pismenosti, ki niso uporabniki drog in so bolje psihološko in fizično usposobljeni kot sedanja policijska enota;
Recommends that salaries for the Afghan police be increased and that the whole recruitment process be reviewed, giving preference to recruits with a basic standard of literacy who are not drug users and are better qualified psychologically and physically than the present cohort;
92. pozdravlja, da je afganistanska vlada na kabulski konferenci zajamčila, da bo s pomočjo mednarodnih partneric izboljšala dostop do sodnega varstva v vsej državi z izvajanjem posebnih ukrepov v naslednjih 12 mesecih ter zmogljivost sodnih ustanov tudi z oblikovanjem in izvajanjem celostne strategije človeških virov;
Welcomes the fact that the Afghan Government pledged at the Kabul Conference to improve, with the support of international partners, access to the delivery of justice throughout the country by implementing concrete measures within the next 12 months, as well as the capacity of judicial institutions, including through the design and implementation of a comprehensive human resources strategy;
94. meni, da bi morala velika, dobro financirana vojaška sila nato z lahkoto ohraniti to stanje brez opija s pomočjo lokalnih kmetijskih razvojnih projektov, ki bi jih vojska ščitila pred talibani in lokalnimi vojnimi poglavarji;
Opines that a large, well-resourced military force should, subsequently, have found it easy to sustain this opium-free situation through local agricultural development projects, protected by its troops against the Taliban and local warlords;
96. opozarja, da več kot 90 % heroina v Evropi prihaja iz Afganistana in da stroški za javno zdravje v evropskih državah dosegajo milijarde dolarjev; poudarja, da je treba izzive mamilske strukture v Afganistanu reševati na državni in na mednarodni ravni z obravnavo vseh povezav mamilske verige, kar zahteva predvsem pomoč kmetom, da bi zmanjšali dobavo, preprečevanje in zdravljenje odvisnosti od mamil, da bi zajezili povpraševanje, ter kazenski pregon posrednikov; zlasti predlaga velike naložbe v oblikovanje splošne kmetijske in podeželske politike, da bi proizvajalcem opija ponudili primerno in trajno alternativo; prav tako vztraja, da je treba okoljsko področje vključiti v kmetijsko in podeželsko strategijo, saj je slabšanje okolja, ki ga na primer povzroča slabo vodenje vodnih virov ali uničevanje naravnih gozdov, ena od glavnih ovir za razvoj kmetijskega gospodarstva;
Points out that more than 90% of heroin in Europe originates from Afghanistan and that the cost to public health in European countries runs into billions of dollars; emphasises that the challenges posed by the drug economy in Afghanistan must be tackled not only nationally but internationally by addressing all links in the drug chain and that this requires, in particular, assistance to farmers to reduce supply, as well as drug prevention and treatment to curb demand, and law enforcement against the intermediaries; proposes, in particular, massive investment in the establishment of a comprehensive agricultural and rural policy to offer opium producers a credible, lasting alternative; insists also on the need to integrate environment into the agriculture and rural strategy, as degradation of the environment – caused for instance by poor management of water resources or the destruction of natural forest – is one of the main barriers to the development of the agricultural economy;
100. vendar opozarja na ugotovitve nedavnega poročila UNODOC, ki navaja, da talibani prejmejo le 4 % dobička letne preprodaje mamil, lokalni kmetje 21 %, 75 % pa naj bi pristalo v rokah vladnih uradnikov, policije, lokalnih in regionalnih posrednikov in preprodajalcev; ugotavlja, skratka, da afganistanski zavezniki Nata dejansko dobijo večji del dobičkov iz trgovine z drogami;
Draws attention, however, to the findings of the recent UNODC report indicating that the Taliban net only 4% of the profits from the annual narcotics trade, and local farmers 21%, with 75% going to government officials, the police, local and regional brokers, and traffickers; notes, in short, that NATO’s Afghan allies are in fact getting the lion’s share of the profits from the drugs trade;
105. opaža, da bi v Afganistanu lahko načrtovali podoben proces postopne odprave pridelovanja maka, za kar bi bilo potrebnih 100 milijonov EUR letno, tako da bi izrecno namenili 10 % letne pomoči EU državi za obdobje pet let;
Notes that a similar process of phasing out opium poppy cultivation could be envisaged for Afghanistan at a cost of EUR 100 million per year by specifically earmarking 10% of the EU’s annual aid to the country for a period of five years;
Splošne ugotovitve
General Comments
To poročilo temelji na obsežnem posvetovanju poročevalca v zadnjih šestih mesecih glede razmer v Afganistanu in njegovih odnosov z mednarodno skupnostjo, da bi pojasnil, zakaj je bilo v Afganistanu, kljub ogromnim zneskom denarja in prizadevanjem, porabljenih v zadnjih devetih letih, doseženo tako malo.
The report before you is based on the extensive consultations your rapporteur has been engaged in over the past six months on the situation in Afghanistan and its relations with the international community, in an attempt to explain why so little has been achieved in Afghanistan in spite of the huge amounts of money and effort expended over the past nine years.
Vrzel med upanjem in resničnostjo v Afganistanu je postala še bolj izrazita, zato mora nova strategija EU za to državo temeljiti na teh dejstvih.
The gap between hope and reality in Afghanistan has become more striking than ever, and a new EU strategy in that country should thus start from this premise.
Poročevalec se je sklenil osredotočiti le na štiri področja, pri katerih meni, da bi ciljno ukrepanje lahko prineslo dejanske spremembe: mednarodna pomoč, posledice nedavno vzpostavljenega mirovnega procesa, vpliv policijskega usposabljanja ter odprava pridelovanja opija.
Your rapporteur has decided to focus exclusively on four areas where, he believes, targeted action could bring about real changes: international aid, the implications of the recently launched peace process, the impact of police training, and the elimination of opium cultivation .
Ta področja so se izkazala za glavna področja med raziskovanjem poročevalca, med katerim se je srečal z različnimi ministri vlade predsednika Karzaja, tudi s predsednikom samim, predsednikoma zgornjega in spodnjega doma parlamenta, s poveljniki Mednarodne varnostne sile za pomoč, predstavniki mednarodnih organizacij, veleposlaniki sosednjih držav in nekdanjimi voditelji prejšnje talibanske vlade; na terenu je obiskal projekte v Heratu, ki jih vodijo pokrajinske enote za obnovo (PRT) in mednarodne organizacije za sodelovanje.
These have emerged as the key issues during the rapporteur's research, in the course of which he met with various ministers in the Government of President Karzai as well as the President himself, the speakers of the upper and lower parliamentary chambers, ISAF commanders, representatives of international organisations, Ambassadors of neighbouring countries, and former leaders of the previous Taliban Government; he undertook field visits to projects in Herat run by PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) and by international co-operation organisations.
Poročevalec se je v Evropi in v Združenih državah Amerike posvetoval z veleposlaniki držav, prisotnih v Afganistanu, ali njihovimi predstavniki, mednarodnimi nevladnimi organizacijami in s člani ameriškega kongresa.
In Europe and the United States your rapporteur consulted with Ambassadors, or their representatives, of countries involved in Afghanistan, international NGOs, and with members of the US Congress.
Po devetih letih mednarodne vpletenosti je še vedno potrebno precejšnje izboljšanje razmer v Afganistanu; varnostne razmere so se poslabšale, osrednji socialno-ekonomski kazalniki pa so izjemno nezadovoljivi.
After nine years of international involvement, things have yet to improve significantly in Afghanistan – security has deteriorated and the key socio-economic indicators are extremely disappointing.
S tem je povezano dejstvo, da so se odločitve prepogosto sklepale brez zadostne afganistanske vključitve, tuji subjekti, vojaški ali civilni, pa so delovali na način, ki je za Afganistance nespoštljiv in samovoljen.
Linked to this is the fact that far too often decisions have been taken without there being sufficient Afghan involvement, and foreign entities, whether military or civilian, have operated in ways perceived by the Afghans as disrespectful and high-handed.
Osrednji nazor tega poročila je torej potreba po izvršitvi pogojev, ki bodo omogočili hitro "afganistacijo" afganistanske krize, s ciljem stabilne vlade, ki jo bo podpirala mednarodna skupnost in bo osredotočila vsa svoja prizadevanja na socialno-ekonomski razvoj.
The central tenet of this report is, therefore, the need to bring about the conditions which will allow for a swift "Afghanisation" of the Afghan crisis, with the goal of achieving a stable government, supported by the international community, and focussing all efforts on socio-economic development.
Zato mora EU voditi mednarodna prizadevanja za obravnavo Afganistana kot suverene države in ne kot nekakšno nikogaršnjo zemljo.
It therefore makes a case for the EU to lead an international effort in treating Afghanistan as a sovereign state and no longer as a kind of "no man's land".
Mednarodna pomoč
International Aid
Največja težava Afganistana je revščina.
Afghanistan's most serious problem is poverty.
Pozornost zbuja dejstvo, da več Afganistancev umre zaradi revščine kot zaradi oboroženega konflikta: umrljivost mater terja več kot 25.000 življenj vsako leto v nasprotju z "le" 2.186 civilisti, ki so bili ubiti med januarjem in novembrom 2009, več kot polovica prebivalstva države pa živi pod pragom revščine, kljub ogromnim zneskom mednarodne pomoči, ki se steka v Afganistan.
It is startling to realise that many more Afghans are dying because of poverty than as a result of the armed conflict: maternal mortality claims over 25 000 lives per year, as opposed to "only" 2 186 civilians killed between January and November 2009, and more than half of the country's population lives below the poverty threshold, and all this against the backdrop of the large amounts of international aid pouring into Afghanistan.
V čem je torej težava?
So what exactly is going wrong?
Za začetek je bilo izjemno težko pridobiti zanesljive podatke o dosedanjih načinih in učinkih mednarodnega civilnega in vojaškega posredovanja, kar je še vedno velika ovira za razumevanje, kaj se danes dogaja v Afganistanu.
First of all, it has been extraordinarily difficult to obtain reliable data on the modalities and impact of the international civilian and military intervention so far, and this remains a major stumbling block to understanding what is going on in Afghanistan today.
Prav tako ni usklajevanja in komunikacije med donatorji, kaj šele med donatorji in domnevnimi upravičenci, Afganistanci.
Equally, there is a marked absence of co-ordination and communication among donors let alone between donors and the supposed beneficiaries, the Afghans.
Na nedavnem srečanju v Kabulu se je finančni minister poročevalcu potožil, da vlada ni prejela prav nobenih informacij o približno eni tretjini mednarodne pomoči, ki je bila v Afganistanu porabljena od leta 2001.
In a recent meeting in Kabul, the Minister of Finance lamented to your rapporteur that the Government has received no information whatsoever on around one third of the international assistance spent in Afghanistan since 2001.
Drugi sogovorniki so izrazili podobne pritožbe.
Other interlocutors have voiced similar complaints.
Združene države Amerike so začele zbirati, čeprav pozno, pomembne podatke o pomoči in njenem učinku s pomočjo posebnega generalnega inšpektorja za afganistansko obnovo (SIGAR), kar je treba pozdraviti.
The United States has started to collect, if belatedly, relevant data on aid and its impact through its Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and this is to be welcomed.
S svoje strani pa je treba pozvati EU, da oblikuje obsežno bazo podatkov na podlagi analiz vseh pomoči EU za Afganistan, da bi povečala preglednost in vzpostavila mehanizme, da bodo donatorji prevzeli celotno odgovornost.
The EU, for its part, is urged to set up a comprehensive database on and analysis of all EU aid to Afghanistan, with a view to having in place greater transparency and mechanisms for holding donors fully accountable.
Številne študije, tudi poročilo sklada Peace Dividend Trust o afganistanskem kompaktnem projektu za spremljanje javnih naročil (Afghanistan Compact Procurement Monitoring Project), so ugotovile, da je največji lokalni gospodarski učinek (približno 80 %) dosežen, ko so sredstva zagotovljena neposredno vladi in ne s financiranjem mednarodnih podjetij (ki so posredniki) ali nevladnih organizacij (manj kot 20 %).
Numerous studies, including a 2007 report by the Peace Dividend Trust, "Afghanistan Compact Procurement Monitoring Project", have concluded that by far the greatest local economic impact (around 80%) is achieved when resources are provided directly to the government as opposed to funding to (intermediaries such as) international companies or NGOs (less than 20%).
A vendar se široko razširjena praksa posredovanja večine pomoči prek številnih mednarodnih organizacij, mednarodnih finančnih institucij, regionalnih razvojnih bank, nevladnih organizacij, zasebnih izvajalcev in ne prek osrednje vlade še vedno nadaljuje, večina pomoči pa se zgubi na različnih točkah med dobavno verigo.
And yet the widespread practice of channelling most of the aid through a plethora of international organisations, IFIs, regional development banks, NGOs, private contractors and not through central government continues, and much of the aid tends to be lost at different points along the supply chain.
Ogromni zneski izginejo v provizijah (ki lahko znašajo tudi do 50 % na pogodbo) izvajalcev in podizvajalcev; visoke plače in velikodušna nadomestila za delavce, napotene v tujino, ki delajo za svetovalna podjetja, in za izvajalce zahtevajo dodatne zneske.
Vast sums are lost in fees (which can be as high as 50% per contract) to contractors and sub-contractors; high salaries and generous allowances for expatriates working for consultancies and contractors absorb further amounts.
Poročevalec zato zahteva spremembo načina, na katerega pomoč doseže Afganistan, in predlaga, da je treba veliko več pomoči nameniti neposredno prek afganistanskih institucij in ne prek mednarodnih organov za sodelovanje in razvoj.
Your rapporteur therefore argues for a "re-focussing" of the way aid reaches Afghanistan, proposing that much more of the aid should be channelled directly through Afghan institutions rather than through international co-operation and development bodies.
Medtem ko lokalna korupcija jasno zbuja zaskrbljenost, pa se je mednarodna pozornost raje osredotočala nanjo kot na svoje neuspehe.
While local corruption is clearly a concern, international attention has tended to focus on this rather than on its own failures.
Korupcija je korupcija, od koder koli izvira, a spomniti je treba, da gre skozi roke afganistanske osrednje vlade le 15 % mednarodne pomoči: tako lokalna korupcija predstavlja največ med 7,5 in 9 % skupne civilne pomoči za Afganistan.
Corruption is corruption, wherever it originates, but it should be recalled that no more than 15% of international aid passes through the hands of Afghan central government: as such, local corruption constitutes at most 7.5% - 9% of total civilian aid given to Afghanistan.
Vprašanje bi moralo biti obravnavano s kazalniki učinkovitosti pomoči in okrepljenimi mehanizmi spremljanja, o katerih se morajo dogovoriti donatorji in afganistanska vlada; afganistanska vlada bo z odgovornostjo za izvrševanje pomoči pridobila dodatno legitimnost, to pa bo tudi olajševalni dejavnik pri reševanju lokalne korupcije.
This issue should in any case be addressed through aid effectiveness indicators and strengthened monitoring mechanisms to be agreed on by both donors and the Afghan Government; the added legitimacy the Afghan Government will gain by being responsible for implementing aid, and being seen to do this, will also be a mitigating factor in tackling local corruption.
Opaža, da je vlada Karzaja v preteklosti oblikovala osnovni oris, kaj naj bi vključeval mirovni proces za Afganistan, a da so se posebni elementi začeli pojavljati šele po konferenci v Londonu, tudi namera po začetku pogovorov s talibani in dogovor med več kot 70 državami za ustanovitev skrbniškega sklada (s približno 1 milijardo USD v obdobju petih let) za pomoč pri vključevanju talibanov in drugih upornikov.
Notes that the Karzai Government has in the past set out a basic outline of what a peace process for Afghanistan should involve, but that it is only since the London Conference that specific elements have begun to emerge, including the intention to start talks with the Taliban and an agreement among more than 70 countries to create a trust fund (of roughly USD 1 billion over a period of five years) to help integrate Taliban and other insurgents.
Sedaj se pojavljata dva vzporedna pristopa: pogovori med širokim spektrom talibanov, od Mullaha Omarja do pehotnih vojakov ter vlado Karzaja, Pakistanom in Združenimi narodi na eni strani ter med Mednarodno varnostno silo za pomoč in zunanjim ministrstvom ZDA ter srednje in nižje uvrščenimi talibani (polovica 820 srednjih/nižjih vodij in večina pehotnih vojakov, ki bi bili pripravljeni odložiti orožje in se ponovno vključiti v lokalne skupnosti) na drugi strani.
At present two parallel approaches appear to be taking place: talks between a broad spectrum of Taliban, from Mullah Omar to the foot soldiers, and the Karzai Government, Pakistan and the United Nations on the one hand, and between ISAF and the US Department of State and mid- to low-ranking Taliban (half of the 820 mid-level/junior leaders and the most of the foot soldiers, who would be prepared to lay down their arms and reintegrate into local communities) on the other.
Ob času priprave poročila je bila ameriška administracija še vedno neodločena, ali naj sledi prvemu pristopu, vendar je možno, da bo ameriški predsednik Obama po poletni vojaški ofenzivi sprejel bolj jasno odločitev glede tega vprašanja.
At the time of writing, the US Administration is still undecided about whether to go along with the former approach, but it is likely that after the summer military offensive, President Obama will take a clearer decision on the issue.
Poročevalec trdno meni, da mora EU močno podpreti mirovni proces in vladi Karzaja omogočiti neodvisnost pri svoji izbiri partnerjev za dialog, a vztrajati pri treh glavnih pogojih: afganistanska zaveza, da izženejo Al Kajdo iz države, odprava pridelovanja maka in volja za vzpostavitev osnovnega spoštovanja temeljnih človekovih pravic.
It is your rapporteur's firm belief that the EU should strongly support the peace process, allowing the Karzai Government autonomy in its choice of dialogue partners, but insisting on three main pre-requisites: an Afghan commitment to banishing Al Quaeda from the country, the elimination of poppy cultivation, and the will to establish a basic respect for fundamental human rights.
O vseh ostalih vprašanjih naj odloča afganistansko prebivalstvo.
All other issues should be left to the Afghan people themselves to determine.
Policijsko usposabljanje
Police Training
Na konferenci v Londonu je bilo določeno, da se bo prehod pristojnosti na področju varnosti na afganistanske sile začel leta 2011 in bo večinoma dokončan do leta 2014.
The London Conference established that the transfer of security responsibilities to Afghan forces would begin in 2011 and be largely completed by 2014.
Glavni instrument za izboljšanje afganistanske zmogljivosti glede zagotavljanja varnosti svojim državljanom je razširitev njegove vojske na 171 000 vojakov in policijske s sedanjih 94 000 na 134 000 do konca leta 2011, s končnim ciljem 240 000 vojakov in 160 000 policistov v petih letih.
The main instrument for increasing the Afghan state's ability to deliver security to its citizens is the expansion of its army to 171 000 soldiers, and from the current 94 000 to 134 000 police by the end of 2011, with a final objective of 240 000 and 160 000 respectively within five years.
To so težko dosegljivi cilji in jih je treba zamenjati z bolj realističnimi in kakovostnimi cilji.
These goals are very difficult to attain, and should be substituted by targets both more realistic and qualitative in nature.
Le širjenje obstoječih parametrov (nadaljevanje istega pristopa) brez pomembnih sprememb v usposabljanju, organizaciji in odnosih policije s vzporednimi pravosodnimi institucijami ne bo izboljšalo afganistanske varnosti.
Merely expanding existing parameters (the “more of the same” approach) without undertaking substantial changes in the training, organization, and relations of the police with parallel judicial institutions will do little to improve Afghan security.
Pet let po padcu talibanov je bilo v skupnem poročilu zunanjega in obrambnega ministrstva ZDA navedeno, da policija v Afganistanu ni zmožna izvajati običajnega dela kazenskega pregona.
Five years after the fall of the Taliban, a joint US Defense Department and US State Department report found that the police in Afghanistan were incapable of carrying out routine law enforcement work.
V poročilu je bilo tudi ugotovljeno, da upravitelji programov usposabljanja, vrednih 1,1 milijarde USD (sedaj na bi ta znesek znašal 6 milijard USD), niso znali povedati, koliko častnikov je dejansko službovalo ali kam je izginilo na tisoče tovornjakov in drugih delov opreme.
The report also concluded that managers of the USD 1.1 billion training programme (now said to account for USD 6 billion) could not say how many officers were actually on duty or where thousands of trucks and other pieces of equipment had gone.