natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Za oblikovanje učinkovitega preventivnega okvira in varnostne mreže, ki bosta varovala in krepila notranji trg, je potreben trden in izčrpen pristop.
A robust, comprehensive approach is needed to create an effective preventive framework and safety net, safeguarding and reinforcing the internal market.
Biti mora večplasten in na skladen način združevati:
The approach must have a multilayered nature combining in a coherent way:
· učinkovito nadzorno arhitekturo EU z Evropskim odborom za sistemska tveganja in tremi sektorskimi organi: bančništvo, zavarovanja in poklicne pokojnine ter vrednostne papirje in trge;
· an effective EU supervisory architecture with an European Systemic Risk Board and three sector authorities: Banking, Insurance and Occupational Pensions and Securities and Markets;
· boljše mednarodne predpise, med drugim z revizijo kapitalskih zahtev, ponovno opredelitvijo kapitala stopnje 1 in stopnje 2, pokrivanjem dodatnih stroškov, sprejetjem kazalnikov likvidnosti, proticikličnih rezerv, kazalnikov finančnega vzvoda, reformo računovodskih standardov in pravil o nagrajevanju vodstvenih delavcev itd.;
· improved international regulations amongst other by revising capital requirements, redefining tier 1 and tier 2 capital, covering additional risks, introducing liquidity ratios, countercyclical buffers, leverage ratios, reforming accounting standards and rules on executive compensation, etc.;
· okvir EU za obvladovanje krize, ki lahko premosti sedanje omejitve, ki so posledica nacionalnih in pogosto nasprotujočih si mehanizmov za reševanje in mehanizmov v primeru insolventnosti.
· an EU crisis management framework that can overcome the present limitations resulting from nationally based and often conflicting resolution and insolvency regimes.
Ne glede na to, kako učinkovit je okvir za obvladovanje krize, bosta tveganje in propad ostala pomembni značilnosti dobro delujočega finančnega trga.
Effective as a crisis management framework may be, risk and failure will remain important features of a well functioning financial market.
Ta negotovost je nujna za preprečevanje moralnega tveganja.
This uncertainty is essential to prevent moral hazard.
Posredovanja morajo biti pripravljena tako, da preusmerijo stroške od davkoplačevalcev in vlagateljev v panogo, v skladu z načelom onesnaževalec plača.
Interventions must be designed to redirect cost away from taxpayers and depositors to the industry, along the polluter pay principle.
Glavnino bremena morajo nositi delničarji in deloma upniki z nezavarovanimi terjatvami z ustreznimi odbitki.
The bulk of the pain must be felt by the shareholders and partially by unsecured creditors through appropriate haircuts.
Pomoč za reševanje je vedno treba vrniti.
Rescue aid must always be repaid.
Potreba po enakih konkurenčnih pogojih v Evropi za finančni sektor ne more spregledati obstoja resnih neravnotežij med državami članicami, ki se kažejo v težavnem sprejemanju skupnih regulativnih in nadzornih instrumentov, reševanju težav med matično državo in državo gostiteljico, odločanju o delitvi bremena in strahom pred zavzetjem institucije.
The need for a European level playing field in the financial sector cannot ignore the existence of serious imbalances among Member States, evident in the difficulty of accepting common regulatory and supervisory tools, settling home/host issues, deciding on burden sharing and fears of institutional capture.
Kriza je poglobila pomanjkanje medsebojnega zaupanja.
Insufficient mutual trust has been amplified by the crisis.
Napredek pri gradnji skupnega pristopa bo dosežen samo z vseobsežnim postopkom konstruktivnega dialoga med kolegiji nadzornikov in predstavniki vlad držav članic od spodaj navzgor.
Progress in building up a common approach will only be achieved through an inclusive, bottom up process of constructive dialogue between colleges of supervisors and representatives of the governments of the Member States.
Vztrajni gospodarski, finančni in davčni učinki krize, ki povzročajo ogromne javnofinančne primanjkljaje in dolgove držav članic, nedokončanost nadzorne strukture EU in skupnega pravilnika ter skupni učinek povečanih zahtev glede kapitala, likvidnosti, sistemov zajamčenih vlog itd. za banke zahtevajo postopen in uravnotežen načrt za doseganje zaželenega skupnega okvira EU za čezmejno obvladovanje krize.
The persistent economic, financial and fiscal effects of the crisis resulting in huge Member States public deficit and debt burden, the unfinished state of the EU supervision architecture and common regulatory rulebook and the aggregated impact on banks of increased requirements on capital, liquidity, DGS, etc., all call for a gradual and balanced roadmap to reach the desirable EU common framework for cross border crisis management.
Jasno pa je, da je nastopil čas, da se Evropa odloči, ali bo izbrala nadaljnje korake k skupni prihodnosti ali nacionalistično pot.
However, it is evident that the time has arrived for Europe to make choices between further steps towards a common future or a nationalistic path.
Slednje nedvomno ni rešitev.
The latter is definitely not a solution.
Vendar izvajanje prvega zahteva dolgotrajen proces zbliževanja in gradnje medsebojnega zaupanja, medtem pa so potrebne hitre rešitve za reševanje tveganj, ki jih predstavljajo sistemske banke.
But the implementation of the former requires a lengthy process of convergence and mutual trust building, while immediate solutions are needed to tackle the risks posed by Systemic Banks.
Dejansko manj kakor 50 bank (od 12.000 bank v EU) predstavlja 70 % bančništva.
In fact, less than 50 banks (out of 12,000 in the EU) represent 70% of banking assets.
Visoko tveganje, ki ga povzročajo, je posledica njihove velikosti, kompleksnosti in medsebojne povezanosti z ostalim delom sistema.
The high risk they embody results from their size, complexity and interconnectedness with the rest of the system.
Njihove težave pretresajo vse sektorje in države.
Their problems send shock waves across sectors and countries.
Morda je začeti z urejanjem sistemskih bank preveč velikopotezno dejanje, vendar dejstvo, da so na prvem mestu, ustrezno obravnava jedro težave in lahko postane platforma, na kateri bo mogoče srednje- do dolgoročno zgraditi univerzalno ureditev, ki bo zajemala celotni bančni sistem in pozneje še nebančne finančne institucije.
While starting with the Systemic Banks may sound excessively ambitious, prioritizing them addresses the core of the issue and may serve as an embryonic platform to develop in the medium/long run a universal regime covering the whole banking system and eventually non-banking financial institutions.
Ta predlog gradi na tekočih regulativnih spremembah, zlasti glede nadzorne strukture EU, pri čemer postavlja EBA za osrednji organ za gradnjo skupne kulture nadzora in mu daje osrednjo vlogo na področju sistemskih bank.
This proposal leverages on the ongoing regulatory developments, in particular those on the EU supervisory architecture by positioning the EBA as a central piece for the building up of a common culture of supervision and playing a leading role in what Systemic Banks are concerned.
Obvezni načrti izrednih ukrepov in reševanja, razviti za vsako institucijo v okviru kolegija nadzornikov z vložki, ki jih posredujejo čezmejne skupine za stabilnost, se zdijo idealen način za doseganje soglasja o diagnozah in rešitvah za čezmejne banke (sistemske ali ne).
Contingency/resolution mandatory plans, developed for each institution within the colleges of supervisors with input from the cross border stability groups, seem to be the ideal vehicle to developing consensus on diagnosis and solutions for cross border banks (systemic or not).
Odločitev za sklad za stabilnost (zasebno financiran in javno upravljan) za prihodnje obvladovanje krize namesto bančne dajatve temelji na domnevi, da:
The choice for future crisis management of a Stability Fund (privately funded and publicly managed) instead of a bank levy is based on the belief that:
· je takojšnja razpoložljivost sredstev pogoj za učinkovitost pri posredovanju;
· immediate availability of funds is a precondition for efficiency in intervention;
· je pomembno na pregleden način povezati prispevke panoge in stroške čiščenja njenega onesnaženja;
· it is important to link in a transparent way industry contributions and the cost of cleaning its own pollution;
· je njegova vseevropska narava edini način, da se preseže nacionalistično obnašanje ob nastopu krize.
· its pan European nature is the only way to overcome nationalistic behaviour when crisis hit.
Čeprav velikost sklada zahteva nadaljnje raziskave, morajo prispevki temeljiti na tveganju.
Although the size of the fund requires further research, contributions must be risk based.
Likvidnost sklada je treba upravljati konservativno in hkrati dobro uporabljati glede na strateško agendo EU.
The liquidity of the Fund must be managed conservatively while still being put to good use given the EU’s strategic agenda.
Predlagana ločitev sklada za stabilnost od sistemov zajamčenih vlog je posledica priznanja njihovih različnih namenov in strahu, da bi mešanje sredstev v najslabšem primeru lahko ogrozilo izplačila vlagateljem.
The proposed separation of the Stability Fund from the Deposit Guarantee Schemes emanates from the recognition of their different purposes and the fear that the comingling of funds could, in the worst case, jeopardize the payment to depositors.
Potrebno strokovno znanje in obseg postopkov reševanja pri obravnavanju sistemskih bank bi lahko upravičila ustanovitev posebne agencije (kot v primeru FDIC v ZDA).
The expertise required and scope of resolution procedures involved in dealing with Systemic Banks would potentially warrant the creation of a specific agency (as is the case of FDIC in the US).
Zaradi omejevanja birokracije in stroškov pa je bolj priporočljivo začeti z manj obsežno infrastrukturo, ki bo delovala kot posebna enota v okviru EBA.
However, bureaucracy and costs containment, strongly recommends starting with a lighter infrastructure working as a special unit within the EBA.
Obstoječi zakoni in sodne prakse o insolventnosti in stečaju se med državami precej razlikujejo in se ponavadi osredotočajo na varstvo upnikov in delničarjev, ne pa na ohranjanje stabilnosti finančnega sistema.
Existing laws and court practices on insolvency and bankruptcy are materially different across countries and tend to focus on protection of creditors and shareholders rather than on preserving the stability of the financial system.
Zato bo priprava univerzalnega evropskega reševalnega mehanizma zahtevala izredno zapleten proces usklajevanja.
Thus, the delivery of a universal European resolution regime will require an extremely complex harmonisation process.
Videti je, da je treba zato, da bi v bližnji prihodnosti dosegli napredek, sprejeti pravo evropskih bančnih družb (po vzoru obstoječe direktive o evropskem pravu družb) za vse sistemske banke.
A European Bank Corporate Law (inspired on the existing European Company Law Directive), to be adopted by all Systemic Banks, seems to be then necessary to achieve progress in the near future.
Ta trenutek zahteva ambiciozen, vendar uravnotežen in realističen pristop.
The moment calls for an ambitious although balanced and realistic approach.
Treba je izkoristiti to zgodovinsko priložnost.
This historical window of opportunity needs to be seized.
Evropski parlament bo ukrepal v skladu s svojim mandatom in upravičil pričakovanja in zaupanje evropskih državljanov.
The European Parliament will act according to its mandate and meet the expectations and trust of the European citizens.
o okviru EU za čezmejno obvladovanje krize v bančnem sektorju
on a Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector
A. ker imamo v Uniji notranji trg za bančne storitve in ne skupka med seboj neodvisnih storitev, notranji trg pa je odločilnega pomena za svetovno konkurenčnost Unije,
A. whereas there is an internal market for banking services in the Union, and not an amalgam of services independent of one another, and whereas that internal market is critical for the Union’s global competitiveness,
5. meni, da bi morali uvesti zgodnje posredovanje v bančnih krizah in njihovo reševanje na podlagi jasno določenih meril, vključno z podkapitaliziranostjo, zmanjšano likvidnostjo ter znižanjem kakovosti in vrednosti sredstev; meni, da bi moralo biti posredovanje tesno vezano na sisteme zajamčenih vlog;
Believes that early intervention in banking crises, and their resolution, should be initiated on the basis of clearly defined criteria, including sub-capitalisation, reduced liquidity and the deterioration of asset quality and value; takes the view that intervention should be tied in with deposit guarantee schemes;
7. podobno meni, da je namen zakonodajnega okvira EU za čezmejno obvladovanje krize ureditev čezmejnih bančnih skupin in posameznih bank, ki čezmejno poslujejo samo prek podružnic; meni tudi, da bi morala za čezmejne bančne skupine veljati enotna ureditev;
Considers, similarly, that the purpose of a EU framework for cross-border crisis management is also to regulate cross‑border banking groups and individual banks conducting cross‑border operations exclusively through branches; believes also that there should be uniform regulation in regard to cross-border banking groups;
- enaka zaščita upnikov in manjšinskih delničarjev v vseh državah članicah, v katerih ima banka podružnice/podrejene družbe;
- equal protection of creditors and minority shareholders in all the Member States where a bank has branches/subsidiaries;
9. meni, da bi bilo treba vseeno določiti odstopanja od nekaterih zahtev, ki jih nalaga pravo družb EU, da bi se omogočilo posredovanje, kjer to upravičuje javni interes;
Expresses the opinion that derogations should nevertheless be made from certain of the requirements imposed by EU company law, to permit intervention by an authority in banking activities where this is justified in the public interest;
11. meni, da je mogoče izboljšati sodelovanje in komunikacijo med organi in upravitelji, odgovornimi za reševanje in nesolventnost čezmejnih bančnih skupin z uvedbo niza predhodnih smernic;
Believes that cooperation and communication between authorities and administrators responsible for the resolution and insolvency of cross‑border banking groups can be improved by establishing a set of ex-ante guidelines;
Raffaele Baldassarre, Luigi Berlinguer, Sebastian Valentin Bodu, Françoise Castex, Christian Engström, Marielle Gallo, Gerald Häfner, Daniel Hannan, Klaus-Heiner Lehne, Antonio Masip Hidalgo, Alajos Mészáros, Evelyn Regner, Dimiter Stojanov (Dimitar Stoyanov), Alexandra Thein, Diana Wallis, Rainer Wieland, Cecilia Wikström, Zbigniew Ziobro, Tadeusz Zwiefka
Raffaele Baldassarre, Luigi Berlinguer, Sebastian Valentin Bodu, Françoise Castex, Christian Engström, Marielle Gallo, Gerald Häfner, Daniel Hannan, Klaus-Heiner Lehne, Antonio Masip Hidalgo, Alajos Mészáros, Evelyn Regner, Dimitar Stoyanov, Alexandra Thein, Diana Wallis, Rainer Wieland, Cecilia Wikström, Zbigniew Ziobro, Tadeusz Zwiefka
Burkhard Balz, Slavi Binev (Slavi Binev), Godfrey Bloom, Sharon Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Pascal Canfin, Nikolaus Huntis (Nikolaos Chountis), George Sabin Cutaş, Rachida Dati, Leonardo Domenici, Diogo Feio, Elisa Ferreira, Vicky Ford, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Sven Giegold, Enikő Győri, Liem Hoang Ngoc, Othmar Karas, Wolf Klinz, Jürgen Klute, Rodi Kraca Cagaropulu (Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou), Astrid Lulling, Hans-Peter Martin, Arlene McCarthy, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, Sławomir Witold Nitras, Ivari Padar, Alfredo Pallone, Ani Podemata (Anni Podimata), Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Olle Schmidt, Edward Scicluna, Peter Simon, Theodor Dumitru Stolojan, Ivo Strejček, Kay Swinburne, Ramon Tremosa i Balcells, Corien Wortmann-Kool
Burkhard Balz, Slavi Binev, Godfrey Bloom, Sharon Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Pascal Canfin, Nikolaos Chountis, George Sabin Cutaş, Rachida Dati, Leonardo Domenici, Diogo Feio, Elisa Ferreira, Vicky Ford, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Sven Giegold, Enikő Győri, Liem Hoang Ngoc, Othmar Karas, Wolf Klinz, Jürgen Klute, Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou, Astrid Lulling, Hans-Peter Martin, Arlene McCarthy, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, Sławomir Witold Nitras, Ivari Padar, Alfredo Pallone, Anni Podimata, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Olle Schmidt, Edward Scicluna, Peter Simon, Theodor Dumitru Stolojan, Ivo Strejček, Kay Swinburne, Ramon Tremosa i Balcells, Corien Wortmann-Kool
o zahtevi za zaščito imunitete in privilegijev Valdemarja Tomaševskega
on the request for defence of the immunity and privileges of Valdemar Tomaševski
– ob upoštevanju zahteve za zaščito imunitete Valdemarja Tomaševskega, posredovane predsedniku Evropskega prlamenta 2. februarja 2010 in razglašene na plenarnem zasedanju 24. marca 2010,
– having regard to the request by Valdemar Tomaševski for defence of his immunity, forwarded to the President of the European Parliament on 2 February 2010 and announced in plenary sitting on 24 March 2010,
– po zagovoru Valdemarja Tomaševskega v skladu s členom 7(3) svojega poslovnika,
– having heard Valdemar Tomaševski in accordance with Rule 7(3) of its Rules of Procedure,
– ob upoštevanju členov 8 in 9 protokola št. 7 o privilegijih in imunitetah Evropske unije, ki je priložen pogodbam, in člena 6(2) Akta o volitvah poslancev Evropskega parlamenta s splošnimi neposrednimi volitvami z dne 20. septembra 1976,
– having regard to Articles 8 and 9 of the Protocol (No 7) of 8 April 1965 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union, and Article 6(2) of the Act of 20 September 1976 concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage,
– ob upoštevanju statuta evropskih poslancev z dne 28. septembra 2005,
– having regard to the Statute for Members of the European Parliament adopted on 28 September 2005,
– ob upoštevanju člena 6(2) in člena 7 svojega poslovnika,
– having regard to Rules 6(3) and 7 of its Rules of Procedure,
– ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora za pravne zadeve ( A7-0214/2010 ),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs ( A7‑0214/2010 ),
A. ker je Valdemar Tomaševski poslanec Evropskega parlamenta,
A. whereas Valdemar Tomaševski is a Member of the European Parliament,
B. ker zoper Valdemarja Tomaševskega ne teče sodni postopek v smislu člena 8 protokola in torej ne gre za primer poslanske imunitete,
B. whereas Valdemar Tomaševski is not facing legal proceedings within the meaning of Article 8 of the Protocol, so that this case does not concern parliamentary immunity,
C. ker kodeks ravnanja za politične predstavnike države, ki je bil uveden z zakonom 19. septembra 2006 (X.N-816), njegovo spoštovanje pa zagotavlja glavna komisija za uradno etiko Republike Litve, ki je politični organ, ustanovljen z zakonom 1. julija 2008 (N.X-1777), določa, da velja tudi za evropske poslance, izvoljene v Litvi,
C. whereas the Code of Conduct for State Politicians (hereinafter 'the Code of Conduct'), introduced by Law No X-816 of 19 September 2006, which is enforced by the Chief Official Ethics Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, a political body established by Law No X-1777 of 1 July 2008, states explicitly that it is also applicable to Members of the European Parliament elected in Lithuania,
D. ker je 22. januarja 2010 glavna komisija za uradno etiko Republike Litve sprejela sklep, s katerim je Valdemarju Tomaševskemu na podlagi tega kodeksa ravnanja izdala „javno opozorilo“ v zvezi z njegovimi političnimi dejavnostmi evropskega poslanca,
D. whereas, on 22 January 2010, the Lithuanian Chief Official Ethics Commission adopted a decision publicly admonishing Valdemar Tomaševski on the basis of the Code of Conduct in relation to political activities conducted as a Member of the European Parliament,
E. ker so v skladu s členom 2 statuta poslancev Evropskega parlamenta
E. whereas, in accordance with Article 2 of the Statute for Members of the European Parliament
F. ob upoštevanju načela primarnosti prava Unije,
F. having regard to the principle of the precedence of Union law,
G. ker omenjeni sklep in zakonodaja Republike Litve, na katerem sklep temelji, predstavljata kršitev prava Unije, saj ne spoštujeta načeli svobode in neodvisnosti evropskega poslanca, ki ju določa člen 2 statuta poslancev,
G. whereas the decision in question and the legislation of the Republic of Lithuania on which it is based breach European Union law by not observing the principles of the freedom and independence of Members of the European Parliament established by Article 2 of the Statute for Members of the European Parliament,
H. ker je naloga Evropske komisije kot varuhinje pogodb, da zoper Republiko Litvo začne postopek zaradi kršitve na podlagi člena 258 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije,
H. whereas the Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, should now initiate infringement proceedings against the Republic of Lithuania under Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
2. naroči svojemu predsedniku, naj to odločitev in poročilo pristojnega odbora nemudoma posreduje Evropski komisiji in pristojnim organom Republike Litve.
Instructs its President to forward this decision and the report of its committee responsible immediately to the Commission and to the relevant authorities of the Republic of Lithuania.
2. februarja 2010 je evropski poslanec Valdemar Tomaševski poslal pismo predsedniku Evropskega parlamenta, v katerem ga je prosil, naj zaščiti neodvisnost njegovega mandata poslanca Evropskega parlamenta, ki je bila okrnjena z opozorilom z 22. januarja 2010 glavne komisije za uradno etiko Litve, ki je odvisna od parlamenta Republike Litve.
On 2 February 2010, Member of the European Parliament Valdemar Tomaševski sent a letter to the President of the European Parliament requesting that the independence of his office of Member of the European Parliament be defended, as it was jeopardised by the admonishment issued on 22 January 2010 by the Lithuanian Chief Official Ethics Commission, a body of the Lithuanian Parliament.
22. januarja 2010 je glavna komisija za uradno etiko Republike Litve sklenila:
On 22 January 2010, the Lithuanian Chief Official Ethics Commission decided:
"da brez poseganja v pravico poslanca Evropskega parlamenta Valdemarja Tomaševskega, da se svobodno izraža in ščiti pravice narodnih manjšin, ugotavlja, da javno ravnanje in oblika delovanja, ki ju je izbral Valdemar Tomaševski, državljan Republike Litve, odgovoren politik, predsednik parlamentarne politične stranke v Litvi, ne spoštujeta ne države ne državljanov, nista v skladu s pravičnostjo in ne povečujeta zaupanja do države in njenih institucij."
‘to note, notwithstanding Valdemar Tomaševski ’s rights, as a Member of the European Parliament, to express his views freely and to defend the rights of minorities, that the public behaviour of and course of action chosen by Valdemar Tomaševski – a citizen of the Republic of Lithuania, political leader and chair of a Lithuanian political party represented in parliament – are disrespectful of the State and its citizens, are unfair and do not promote trust in the State and its institutions’.
Glavna komisija za uradno etiko Republike Litve je to odločitev sprejela zatem, ko ji je zadevo 5. novembra 2009 predložilo združenje "Lietuvos Sajūdis" v zvezi z javnimi izjavami Valdemarja Tomaševskega, poslanca Evropskega parlamenta (politična skupina EKR), predsednika stranke "Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija" (parlamentarne politične stranke) v zvezi z diskriminacijo, katere žrtve naj bi bili Poljaki v Republiki Litvi.
The Lithuanian Chief Official Ethics Commission issued this decision following a complaint lodged with it on 5 November 2009 by the association Lietuvos Sajūdis regarding public statements made by Valdemar Tomaševski, Member of the European Parliament (ECR Group) and chair of the Lietuvos Lenkų Rinkimų Akcija, a political party represented in the Lithuanian Parliament, on the discrimination which he claims Poles in Lithuania face.