natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Če bi družbi Equitable uspelo prepričati zavarovance, da glasujejo za to odškodninsko shemo, to ne bi bistveno izboljšalo njenega finančnega stanja ne glede na 250 milijonov GBP vredno spodbudo družbe Halifax, ker bi družba povzročila bistvene izdatke z odkupom zajamčenih rent.
If Equitable did succeed in persuading its policyholders to vote for what it calls the "compromise", this would not strengthen its financial situation considerably, notwithstanding the £250m kicker from Halifax, as the Society would incur substantial expenditure in buying out the GARs.
Resnična korist ne bi bilo skromno izboljšanje solventnega položaja družbe Equitable, ampak to, da bi se odpravila težava bistveno nestabilnih možnosti zajamčenih rent“ (WE58, str.
The real benefit would not be the modest improvement in Equitable's solvency position, but the fact that the fundamentally unstable GAO problem would be eliminated" (WE58, page 14)
Vendar povečanje vrednosti polic ni bilo zagotovljeno – pravzaprav se je v nekaj tednih 2,5-odstotno povečanje nepričakovano spremenilo v 4-odstotno zmanjšanje skladov! ...
But the increases in policy values were not guaranteed – indeed within just a matter of weeks the 2.5% increases had magically turned into 4% fund reductions! ...
Težko je verjeti, da v času oblikovanja odškodninske sheme vodstvo družbe Equitable Life še ni vedelo, da bodo zavarovance prepričali, da se s podpisom odrečejo svojim pravicam na podlagi popolnoma napačnega prospekta in da se tega ni v celoti zavedal tudi Organ za finančne storitve.
It is difficult to believe that at the time the Compromise was devised the management of Equitable Life didn’t already know full well that they were going to get people to sign away their rights based on a totally false prospectus, with the full knowledge of the FSA.
Če se zavarovancem v zameno za odpoved pravici do tožbe ne bi ponudilo finančno nadomestilo (čeprav majhno), bi bila odškodninska shema pravno neveljavna.
Without a financial 'consideration' (however small) being offered to policyholders in return for giving up their rights to take legal action, the Compromise scheme would have been legally invalid.
Kljub temu so zavarovanci glasovali (čeprav tega niso vedeli) za zmanjšanje vrednosti skladov in izbris pravice do tožbe družbe.
Yet in effect people were voting (although they didn’t know it) for a reduction in their funds and the removal of their right to sue the Society.
Organ za finančne storitve je to dopustil.“
The FSA allowed this to happen."
BELLORD (H2) je prav tako poudaril domnevno nepravičnost odškodninske sheme, „ki so jo odobrili zakonodajalci, pri čemer je veliko zavarovancev izgubilo pravico do odškodnine.
Mr. BELLORD (H2) also underlined the alleged unfairness of the Compromise Scheme "approved by the regulators, where many policyholders lost their right to redress.
Charles Thompson (izvršni direktor družbe ELAS) je v času sodne obravnave februarja 2002 zagotovo vedel, da nimajo sredstev, vendar tega sodišču ni povedal.
Charles Thompson (EL CEO) must have known at the time of the court hearing in February 2002 that they had not got the money, but he failed to tell the court.
WEIR (WE6) je navedel, da „ je Organ za finančne storitve odločno priporočal odškodninsko shemo kot najboljšo možnost za zavarovance, vendar je ta nasvet objavil šele 8 dni po tem, ko mu je parlamentarna varuhinja človekovih pravic podelila imuniteto pred pregledom
Mr. WEIR (WE6) claimed that " the FSA effectively recommended the Compromise as the best option for policyholders but was very careful not to publish this advice until 8 days after it had been granted immunity from scrutiny by the Parliamentary Ombudsman
Ko je Organ za finančne storitve 1. decembra 2002 postal edini zakonodajalec Združenega kraljestva, je postal uradno neodvisen od vlade in tako tudi od pregleda s strani parlamentarnega varuha človekovih pravic. .
On becoming the single UK Regulator on 1 December 2002, the FSA was formally independent from government and thus also from PO scrutiny. !
Po zelo čudnem naključju je Organ za finančne storitve prav na dan prvega zaslišanja o odškodninski shemi na višjem sodišču (26. novembra 2001) objavil senzacionalno sporočilo za javnost glede tako imenovanega ‚Headdonovega spremnega pisma‘, s čimer je popolnoma zasenčil novico o pogojih odškodninske sheme: ‚tipično odvračanje pozornosti‘.
By a very strange coincidence, on the date of the first Compromise hearing in the High Court (26 November 2001) the FSA chose that particular date of all dates to put out a sensational press release concerning the so-called ‘Headdon side letter’ thereby completely drowning out news coverage of the terms of the Compromise: a 'classic spoiler'.
To so posredni dokazi, da je Organ za finančne storitve tesno sodeloval z družbo Equitable Life ter verjetno z Ministrstvom za gospodarstvo in finančne zadeve za izglasovanje odškodninske sheme.“
This is circumstantial evidence that the FSA was working closely with Equitable Life and probably the Treasury to railroad the Compromise through."
V WE7 je NASSIM navedel, da „ seznam izbranih opustitev označuje regulativne napake pred in po odškodninski shemi, ki so bile in ostajajo namerne ...
In WE7 Mr. NASSIM claimed that " the list of elective omissions denotes regulatory failure before and after the Compromise, which was and remains knowingly deliberate ...
Odškodninska shema ureditve se je izvedla v škodo članov in z odvzemom njihovih zakonitih pravic.“
The Compromise Scheme of arrangement was carried through to the detriment of members and with forfeiture of their legal rights."
DEPPE je v WE81 navedel tudi obtožbe o „ goljufivem zavajanju s strani družbe Equitable maja 1999 ...
Mr. DEPPE in WE81 also presented allegations of " fraudulent misrepresentation made by Equitable in May 1999 ...
Družba Equitable je prikrivala obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz zajamčenih rent, in priporočila prodajo rent z življenjskim zavarovanjem s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice.
Equitable had concealed the GAR liability and recommended the sale of with-profits annuities.
Treves tega ni želel storiti in White je zahteval, da si zabeleži njegovo zahtevo in zagotovi, da bo sodnik, ki bo predsedoval tožbi, seznanjen z veliko možnostjo obstoja goljufije.
Mr. Treves refused to give this undertaking and Mr. White asked him to note his request and ensure the presiding judge at the application was made aware the very real possibility of fraudulent behaviour could exist.
Treves izražene želje ni izpolnil ..., ker bi lahko preložila ali ovirala odobritev odškodninske sheme.
Mr. Treves did not carry out the express wish ... because it might have delayed or obstructed the granting of approval for the 'Compromise'.
Zato predsedujoči sodnik nikoli ni bil opozorjen, da so se obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz zajamčenih rent, prikrivale in da so se rente z življenjskim zavarovanjem s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice prodale nič hudega slutečim zavarovancem.“
It was therefore never brought to the attention of the presiding judge that GAR liabilities had been concealed and WP annuities had been sold to unsuspecting policyholders."
Organ za finančne storitve je zanikal obtožbe, da bi zakonodajalec moral vedeti, da naj bi odškodninski shemi primanjkovalo podpornih sredstev.
The FSA denied allegations that the regulator would have known that the Compromise Scheme had been allegedly lacking supporting assets.
Glede vloge Organa za finančne storitve pri posredovanju odškodninske sheme je predstavnik Organa za finančne storitve STRACHAN (H4) pojasnil, da „ se je odškodninska shema družbe Equitable Life iz leta 2002 izvedla v skladu z Zakonom o gospodarskih družbah in ne v skladu z delom VII (Zakona o finančnih storitvah in trgu iz leta 2000), končna odločitev pa je bila potrjena v okviru neodvisnega sodnega postopka.
Referring to the FSA's role in brokering the Compromise Scheme, the FSA representative Mr. STRACHAN (H4) explained that "the Equitable Life 2002 Compromise Scheme was carried out under the Companies Act rather than under Part VII (of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000) and the final decision was sanctioned under an independent Court process.
Kljub temu smo družbo Equitable spodbujali, da stori več kot zahteva Zakon o gospodarskih družbah za zagotovitev, da so interesi zavarovancev čim bolj zaščiteni, zlasti z imenovanjem neodvisnega aktuarja, ki bi izrazil svoje mnenje o poštenosti predloga.
Nevertheless, we encouraged Equitable to go beyond what was required by the Companies Act to ensure that policyholders' interests were protected as far as possible, particularly through the appointment of an independent actuary to opine on the fairness of the proposals.
Nadzirali smo tudi proces dodeljevanja ustrezne odškodnine zavarovancem, ki so družbo Equitable zapustili prezgodaj, da bi izkoristili odškodninsko shemo ...
We also oversaw the process of giving appropriate compensation to policyholders who left Equitable too early to benefit from the Compromise Scheme ...
Na podlagi sheme, ki je bila predložena za zavarovance s policami z zajamčenimi rentami in zavarovance s policami, ki ne vključujejo zajamčene rente, smo sklenili, da je bila raven povečanja vrednosti polic poštena ponudba za pravice do zajamčenih rent in opustitev zahtevkov glede zlorab pri prodaji.
We concluded that, on the basis of the scheme that was presented for both GAR and non-GAR policyholders, the level of the increase in policy values was a fair offer for the GAR rights and mis-selling claims given up.
Zagotovo so bile razlike, na splošno pa je bila to razumna odškodninska shema.“
Clearly, there were variations, but, overall, this was a reasonable compromise scheme."
Izvršni direktor Thompson je prav tako zavrnil domneve, da družba ELAS zavarovancev ni odkrito obvestila, da odškodninska shema ne bo prinesla dokončne stabilizacije sklada za življenjsko zavarovanje s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice (WE-CONF16), ampak da bo vsak padec trga vrednostnih papirjev povzročil dodatna zmanjšanja vrednosti polic (kar se je dejansko zgodilo aprila in julija 2002), ter navedel, da „ je sklad za življenjsko zavarovanje s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice vedno vlagal v mešanico naložb in so zato nanj vedno vplivala tržna gibanja.
Allegations that policyholders were not openly informed by EL that the Compromise scheme would not bring final stabilisation to the with-profits fund (WE-CONF16) but that any stock market fall would require further cuts in policy values (as indeed happened in April and July 2002), were also rejected by CEO Mr. Thomson, who claimed that " the with-profits fund has always been invested in a mix of investments and has consequently always been subject to the impact of market movements.
Nikoli ni bilo nakazovanj, da bo odškodninska shema spremenila koncept življenjskih zavarovanj s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice.
There was never any suggestion that the Compromise Scheme would change the concept of with-profits.
Poleg tega odbor ni mogel predvideti prihodnosti naložbenih trgov“ (WE70).
Further, the Board was not in a position to second-guess the future of investment markets."
V nadaljevanju je navedel, da „ če je odbor v času objave dokumentacije odškodninske sheme ... in razprave na sodišču vedel, da je 2,5-odstotno povečanje verjetno popolnoma varljivo, razen če bi prišlo do takojšnjega in nepričakovanega povečanja vrednosti na trgu lastniških vrednostnih papirjev (ko se je 56 % skladov v vsakem primeru vodilo v gotovini in vrednostnih papirjih s stalno obrestno mero), je to zagotovo nekaj, na kar bi bilo treba opozoriti tiste, vključno s sodiščem, ki naj bi odobrili odškodninsko shemo.
4) He went on to state that " if the Board was aware, when the Scheme documentation was issued ... and debated in court, that the 2.5% uplift was likely to be entirely illusory unless there was some immediate and unheralded rise in equity markets (when 56% of funds were held in cash and fixed interest securities in any event) that was surely something that ought to have been mentioned to those, including the court, from whom approval of the Scheme was being sought.
Tako so bile finančne informacije, predložene kot del dokumentacije odškodninske sheme, do obravnave dobrih strani sheme že zelo zastarele.
As it was, the financial information provided as part of the scheme documentation was seriously out of date by the time the merits of the scheme came to be debated.
Odbor družbe pa očitno ni imel sodobnejših finančnih informacij ..., ki bi pokazale, da so povečanja vrednosti polic, ki jih je povzročila odškodninska shema, verjetno varljive“ (odst.
But the Society's board clearly did have financial information more recent than that ... which would have shown that the Scheme uplifts in policy values were likely to be illusory." (par.
3f) Trditve uprave družbe ELAS, ki se ne štejejo za ustrezne
3f) Claims of EL management not qualifying as 'fit and proper'
V zvezi z domnevnim prikrivanjem informacij ob predložitvi odškodninske sheme zavarovancem je akcijska skupina EMAG leta 2005 Organu za finančne storitve poslal zahtevo za začetek preiskave v skladu z oddelkom 168 Zakona o finančnih storitvah in trgu iz leta 2000, da se preveri, ali so trije vodilni družbe ELAS (predsednik, generalni izvršni direktor in imenovani aktuar) ustrezne osebe za izvajanje svojih nalog.
In the context of the alleged withholding of information when presenting the Compromise Scheme to policyholders, in 2005 EMAG sent a request to the FSA to open an investigation under Section 168 of FSMA 2000, in order to verify if 3 EL top managers (the Chairman, the Chief Executive and the Appointed Actuary) qualified as 'fit and proper persons' to perform their functions.
Če bi se glede na predložene dokaze o odškodninski shemi pri preiskavi Organa za finančne storitve ugotovilo, da so dejansko prikrivali ključne informacije, se morda ne bi obravnavali kot ustrezne osebe za izvajanje svojih nalog.
If, in the light of evidence presented on the Scheme, the FSA investigation came to the conclusion that they had indeed withheld key information, they might not qualify as 'fit and proper' to perform their function.
V takem primeru lahko Organ za finančne storitve prekliče odobritev teh oseb ali uvede disciplinske postopke v skladu z oddelki 63 in 66 Zakona o finančnih storitvah in trgu iz leta 2000.
In that case, the FSA could withdraw that person's approval or take disciplinary proceedings under Section 63 and 66 of FSMA 2000.
Anthony BOSWOOD, QC (WE76) se je strinjal, da če je bilo dokazano, da so vodilni družbe ELAS morda „ prikrivali informacije, ki so bile pomembne za odškodninsko shemo ..., pomeni takšno namerno prikrivanje, da zadevne osebe mogoče niso ustrezne, kar je pogoj, da lahko Odbor za finančne storitve začne preiskavo “ v skladu z oddelkom 168(5) Zakona o finančnih storitvah in trgu 2000.
Mr. Anthony BOSWOOD, QC (WE76) agreed to the point that if it was proven that EL top managers might have " concealed information which they knew to be relevant to the Scheme ... deliberate concealment of that nature would, in turn, suggest that the persons concerned might not be 'fit and proper persons', the precondition for the exercise of the FSA power to investigate " in Section 168(5) of FSMA 2000.
Malomarnost pri nadzoru izvajanja poslovanja
Negligence in Conduct of Business (CoB) supervision
Obtožbe neuspešnega izvajanja poslovanja je obravnavalo veliko število zavarovancev, ne le proti zakonodajalcem Združenega kraljestva, ampak tudi proti irskemu (DETE/ISFRA)
Allegations of CoB failure were addressed by a large number of policyholders not only against the UK regulators but also against the Irish Regulator (DETE/ISFRA)
Zakon o centralni banki in irskem organu za finančne storitve iz leta 2003 navaja, da je bil bonitetni nadzor zavarovalniškega sektorja in storitev maja 2003 v celoti prenesen z Ministrstva za podjetja, trgovino in zaposlovanje (DETE) na irski organ za finančne storitve (ISFRA) ter da je treba ukrepe DETE v zavarovalniškem sektorju pred začetkom veljavnosti Zakona iz leta 2003 obravnavati kot ukrepe ISFRA in/ali ministra za finance (WE64).
The Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Act 2003 stated that prudential supervision of the insurance sector and the services provided moved in May 2003 in its totality from the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE) to the Irish Financial Services Authority (ISFRA), and that actions of DETE in the insurance sector before the commencement of the 2003 Act should be construed as actions of ISFRA and/or the Minister for Finance (WE64).
WE80 v nadaljevanju pojasnjuje, da do leta 2003 ni bilo nobenih pravil glede izvajanja poslovanja za prodajo zavarovalnih polic, razen pravilnika o zagotavljanju informacij (S.I. 15 iz leta 2001) in S.I. 360 iz leta 1994, ki sta izvršljiva prek sodišč. in nemškemu zakonodajalcu (BAV/BaFin)
WE80 further explains that until 2003, there were no CoB rules specific to the sale of insurance apart from the 'Provision of Information Regulations' (S.I. 15 of 2001) and S.I. 360 of 1994, both requirements enforceable through the Courts. and the German Regulator (BAV/BaFin)
BaFin je od BAV prevzel odgovornost za zavarovalniški sektor maja 2002. , ki sta bila v skladu z določbami tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju odgovorna za nadzor izvajanja poslovanja družbe ELAS na svojem ozemlju.
BaFin took over responsibility for the insurance sector from BAV in May 2002. , who, according to 3LD provisions, were responsible for CoB supervision of EL's operations on their territory.
V WE-CONF10 se je zavarovanec pritožil zlasti glede zavrnitve s strani nemških zakonodajalcev – pri čemer se je sistematično skliceval na „načelo domače države“, kot je opredeljeno v tretji direktivi o življenjskem zavarovanju – da bi prevzeli kakršno koli odgovornost za nepravilno poslovanje družbe ELAS v Nemčiji.
In WE-CONF10 a policyholder complained in particular about the refusal by German regulators - systematically referring to the 'Home Country principle' as defined by 3LD - to assume any responsibility for improper operations of EL in Germany.
To trditev je podprl WESTPHAL, ki je v WS2 navedel, da „ ima nacionalni nadzor pogosto preveč pasivno vlogo pri spremljanju in izvajanju“ ter da „nadzor v nekaterih državah članicah ne bo postal aktiven, če ne bo dosežena kritična masa pritožb.“
This claim was supported by Mr. WESTPHAL in WS2 stating that " national supervision often plays a too passive role in the monitoring and enforcement process" and that "unless a 'critical mass' of complaints is reached, supervision will not get active in some Member States."
4a) Obtožbe v zvezi z zlorabami pri prodaji in zavajanjem v Združenem kraljestvu
4a) Allegations of mis-selling and misrepresentation in the UK
Maja 2003 je služba finančnega varuha človekovih pravic v Združenem kraljestvu spoznala družbo Equitable Life za krivo bistvenega napačnega navajanja dejstev.
In May 2003 the UK Financial Ombudsman Service found Equitable Life guilty of 'material misrepresentations of fact' .
Zakonodajalci navajajo dve osnovni vrsti obtožb proti družbi ELAS:
Fundamentally, policyholders have been making two types of allegations against EL:
– zlorabe pri prodaji z zavestnim prikazovanjem neresničnih dejstev o finančnem stanju družbe, zlasti v zvezi s tveganji glede zajamčenih rent;
- mis-selling by knowingly misrepresenting facts about the company's financial position, especially in relation to the GAR risks;
– opustitev (verjetno na podlagi prevare), ker niso usmerili pozornosti na tveganja zajamčenih rent, kadar je bilo to tveganje zadeva, ki bi jo bilo treba razkriti obstoječim zavarovancem in potencialnim prihodnjim zavarovancem.
- omission (possibly based on deceit), by failing to draw attention to the GAR risks, when that risk was a matter to be disclosed to existing and prospective policyholders.
Ta trditev se je pokazala za neresnično, saj se je izkazalo, da družba Equitable Life v letih pozitivnega delovanja trga ni nakopičila nobenih znatnih rezerv, ki bi omogočile kakršno koli „izravnavo“.
see WE53, annex D. This claim proved to be untrue, as EL turned out not to have accumulated any significant reserves in the years of positive market performance to allow for any 'smoothing out'.
V obvestilu zavarovancem z dne 26. januarja 2000 (WE53) je družba Equitable Life trdila, da negativna sodba drugostopenjskega sodišča ne bo vplivala na profil ekonomskega tveganja družbe ELAS, pri čemer je vztrajala, da „ to ne bo imelo finančnega vpliva na družbo Equitable.
In a note to policyholders dated 26 January 2000 (WE53), Equitable Life claimed that the negative Court of Appeal ruling would not affect EL's economic risk profile, asserting " there will be no financial impact on the Equitable.
Zato solventnost družbe Equitable in njen status neodvisne vzajemnosti nista ogrožena“.
The Equitable's solvency and status as an independent mutual are therefore not in question".
Glej WE53, Prilogi G in H. .
see WE53, annex G and H. .
Drugo obtožbo, ki zadeva družbo ELAS v zvezi z zlorabami pri prodaji in zavajanjem, je predložil NASSIM (WE7), ki je navedel, da so zakonodajalci „ namerno spregledali ‚zaostreno nevednost‘ in splošne goljufive zlorabe pri prodaji, saj je družba svojemu osebju, ne glede na informacije o odsotnosti provizij, katere je sporočila zavarovancem, plačala še nedoločeno provizijo od prodaje.
Another allegation of mis-selling and misrepresentation by EL was presented by Mr. NASSIM (WE7) who claimed that the regulators have " deliberately overlooked 'incentivised ignorance' and fraudulent general mis-selling, as despite what the Society told policyholders about the absence of commission fees, it paid its staff an as yet unspecified commission on sales.
Prav tako ni znano, ali je bila provizija enaka za vse produkte družbe ali je bila večja za produkte z življenjskim zavarovanjem s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice.
Nor do we know whether the commission was the same for all the Society’s products, or if it was greater for with-profits products.
Z zavrnitvijo priznanja ali dokumentacije splošnih zlorab pri prodaji in nerazkrivanja so družba in organi prenesli dokazno breme na vsakega posameznega zavarovanca ...
By refusing to admit or document general mis-selling and non-disclosure, the Society and the authorities have transferred the burden of proof to each individual policyholder ...
Ni presenetljivo, da je Organ za finančne storitve pozneje povedal, da je izvedel lastno preiskavo in ni odkril primera zlorabe pri prodaji družbe Equitable, pri čemer ni hotel objaviti dokazov.“
It is hardly surprising that the FSA has belatedly said that it has conducted its own investigation and found no case for mis-selling by the Equitable, while refusing to publish the evidence."
JOSEPHS (WE69) je navedel, da „obstaja neprekinjena veriga dokazov, ki kaže, da je družba Equitable namerno oblikovala nezakonite in zavajajoče zapise o poslovanju, ki bi trajali najmanj 15 let, zato, da bi te napačne podatke o poslovanju uporabila kot glavno orodje za pridobivanje novih zavarovancev in povečanje sredstev družbe.
Mr. JOSEPHS (WE69) claimed that "a continuous chain of evidence exists that demonstrates that Equitable set out to create an unlawful and misleading performance record that would survive for at least 15 years, and to use these rigged performance figures as their primary tool to bring in new policyholders and to increase the assets of the Society.
Vendar so ukrepi, potrebni za oblikovanje napačnih podatkov o poslovanju, ogrozili tudi varnost financ družbe ELAS, tako da dlje kot je trajalo goljufivo ravnanje, večja je bila izguba zavarovancev ...
However, the measures required to create the false performance figures also undermined the security of EL’s finances, so that the longer the deceptions continued, the greater was the scale of policyholders’ losses ...