natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Zavarovanci, ki so izbrali možnost zajamčene rente od družbe ELAS, so prejeli nižji končni bonus kot tisti, ki so se kljub temu, da so imeli možnost izbire zajamčene rente, odločili, da bodo pokojninske prejemke prejemali v drugi obliki ... vendar po nižji tržni stopnji, ki je takrat prevladovala.
Those policyholders who elected to take the GAR option from ELAS received a lower final bonus than those policyholders who, despite having a GAR option, elected to take their pension benefits in a different form ... but at the lower market rate ruling at the time.
Zavarovanci s policami z zajamčenimi rentami, ki so možnost zajamčene rente uporabili med januarjem 1994 in 20. julijem 2000, so morali dobiti enak končni bonus kot zavarovanci s policami z zajamčenimi rentami, ki te možnosti niso uporabili, zajamčena renta pa se je morala uporabiti za spremenjeno končno vrednost police.
Those GAR policyholders who had exercised their GAR option between January 1994 and 20 July 2000 had to be given the same final bonus as the GAR policyholders who had not taken the GAR option and then the GAR had to be applied to the revised terminal policy value.
Odločilno je bilo, da je zgornji dom odločil, da se stroški izpolnjevanja obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz zajamčenih rent, ne morejo omejiti na skupino zavarovancev s policami z zajamčeno rento“.
Crucially the House of Lords also ruled that the cost of meeting the GAR liabilities could not be ‘ring fenced’ within the class of GAR policyholders."
V skladu s to odločitvijo so bili skupni stroški za družbo Equitable Life ocenjeni na 25 % vrednosti polic z zajamčeno rento ali 1,5 milijarde GBP
Following this ruling, the total cost to EL was estimated to be 25% of GAR policy values, or £1.5 billion
Ta vsota vključuje 200 milijonov GBP za kritje nižjih izplačil zajamčenih pokojninskih rent med januarjem 1994 in 20. julijem 2000 ter 1,3 milijarde GBP za popravek prihodnjih primanjkljajev. .
this sum comprising £200m to cover the lower GAR pension payouts between January 1994 and 20 July 2000 and £1.3bn for correcting future shortfalls. .
Odločitev zgornjega doma je torej pomenila, da je treba izvesti ‚ekonomski prenos‘ zahtevkov v vrednosti 1,1 milijarde GBP (75 % od 1,5 milijarde GBP) od zavarovancev s policami, ki ne vključujejo zajamčenih rent, k zavarovancem s policami z zajamčenimi rentami.“
So the House of Lords ruling meant that an ‘economic transfer’ of claims of £1.1 bn (75% of £1.5bn) from non-GAR to GAR policyholders had to be implemented."(WE29)
V WE-CONF2 je bilo poudarjeno, da „je bila težava z zajamčenimi rentami povezana z dejstvom, da je v preteklosti družba Equitable izvajala politiko povečevanja bonusov in ni povečevala rezerve.
WE-CONF2 underlined how "the GAR problem was compounded by the fact that historically the Society had operated a policy of maximizing bonuses and not building up a reserve.
Argument družbe Equitable je bil, da se je na tržišču zahtevala le rezerva 50 milijonov GBP, na podlagi dejstva, da je ... le majhen odstotek zavarovancev s policami z zajamčenimi rentami uporabilo možnost zajamčene rente.
The Society's argument was that commercially a reserve of only £50m was required, based on the fact that... only a trivial percentage of GAR policyholders exercised their GAR option.
Izračunana teoretična izpostavljenost je bila 170 milijonov funtov.“
The theoretical exposure was calculated at £170m."
Glej tudi odstavek 4.15.3 Bairdovega poročila (WE17).
see also para.4.15.3 of the Baird Report (WE17).
Izpostavljeno je bilo tudi, da so predpisani obračuni za leti 1998 in 1999 vključevali „rezervacije 200 milijonov GBP za ‚kakršne koli dodatne obveznosti, ki bi se lahko pojavile zaradi strank, ki bi želele uporabiti možnosti zajamčenih rent v skladu z njihovimi policami‘.
It also reminded that EL's statutory accounts for 1998 and 1999 included " provisions of £200m for 'any additional liabilities which may arise through clients choosing to exercise GAR options under their policies'.
Pomembno se je zavedati, da te rezerve niso bile oblikovane na podlagi poraza v tožbi Hyman, ampak na podlagi pričakovanih obveznosti, tudi če bi družba Equitable Life v tej tožbi zmagala.“
It is important to bear in mind that these reserves were not made against failure in the Hyman litigation, they were against liabilities expected even if the Society was wholly successful in that litigation."
Zdi se, da se družba Equitable Life ni uspela odzvati na razvoj trga, ker ni zagotovila doslednega zavarovanja pred tveganji ali se ni zavarovala v primeru izbire zajamčenih rent ali poraza v tožbi Hyman.
It appears that EL failed to react to market developments by not providing any consistent hedging or cover against the risk of GAR optioned being taken or against defeat in the Hyman litigation.
Leta 1999 je družba Equitable Life sklenila finančno pozavarovanje za več kot 700 milijonov GBP za kritje takojšnjih plačil za uporabljene možnosti zagotovljenih rent, „ vendar to pozavarovanje ni bilo nikoli namenjeno za zahtevke.
In 1999 EL took out a financial reinsurance over £700 million to cover immediate payments required on the exercise of GAR options, "but this reinsurance was never intended to be claimed on.
Pozavarovanje bi bilo pod pogoji, pod katerimi je bilo sklenjeno, primerno le, če bi polica z bonusi ostala nespremenjena.
By its terms the reinsurance could only respond if the Society's bonus policy remained unchanged.
Če bi bilo odločeno, da je polica z diferenciranimi bonusi nezakonita, bi bila polica neveljavna.
Once the differential bonus policy (DBP) was ruled to be unlawful, the policy would be void.
2c) Trditve o nezmožnosti zakonodajalcev, da prepoznajo tveganje zajamčenih rent
2c) Claims of Regulators' incompetence in failing to recognize the GAR risk
V WE58, ki vključuje tehnično analizo vprašanja zajamčenih rent, je poudarjeno, da „so od leta 1997 do konca leta 1998 dolgoročne državne obveznice dejansko zelo padle, zaradi česar se je v zvezi z zajamčenimi rentami znatno povečalo ‚premoženje‘ zavarovancev (zavarovalnice pa so se znašle v težavah).
Delivering a technical analysis of the GAR issue, WE58 highlighted how " between 1997 and end 1998, long gilt yields fell very sharply indeed, causing there to be a sharp increase in the extent to which policyholders were "in the money" (and life offices were in trouble) with regard to GARs.
Ko se je na začetku devetdesetih let 20. stoletja v družbi Equitable Life začela težava z zajamčenimi rentami, se je družba (v nasprotju z večino tekmecev) na videz odločila, da ne bo ustvarjala rezerv, ampak da bo težavo obravnavala na popolnoma drugačen način ...
When, in the early 1990s, the GAR problem began to lap at Equitable's shores, the Society (unlike the generality of its competitors) seemingly decided not to make reserves, but chose to deal with the problem in an entirely different way ...
Zdi se, da je bilo ravnanje družbe Equitable Life posledica njene filozofije, da ne vzdržuje velikega presežnega kapitala.
Equitable's conduct would appear to have been the result of its philosophy of not holding substantial excess capital.
Preprosto, družba Equitable Life je vedela, da ne more spoštovati obljub o zajamčenih rentah, in v skladu s tem si je morala izmisliti svoj sistem za bonuse, da bi bile zajamčene rente neveljavne.“
Quite simply, the Society knew it could not afford to honour its guaranteed annuity promises and, accordingly, sought to construct its bonus rate regime so that the guarantees would be worthless."
Kot je navedeno v WE58, je družba Equitable Life kot možno rešitev hotela zavarovancem zaračunati stroške za zagotavljanje zajamčenih rent, ki bi jih implicitno odštela od (diskrecijskega) končnega bonusa: „ Glede na posebne okoliščine, povezane s pogodbo, bi bilo možno, da bi bil kakršen koli terminalni bonus, dodan ob dospelosti, nekoliko nižji od bonusa za pogodbe brez takšnih možnosti ali jamstev, ter da bi se lahko ta terminalni bonus v nekaterih primerih uporabil za trenutne rente ...
As reported in WE58, EL had devised as possible solution to charge policyholders for the cost of providing them a GAR, implicitly deducting it from the (discretionary) final bonus: " it would appear possible, depending on the particular circumstances relating to the contract, that any terminal bonus added at maturity could be somewhat lower than for contracts without such options or guarantees, and that this terminal bonus could in some cases be applied at current annuity rates ...
Družba Equitable Life je ‚maščevanje‘ doživela v obliki neodvisnega finančnega svetovalca Baylissa, strokovnjaka na področju pokojninskih rent, ki je prispeval k širjenju informacij, da je po njegovem mnenju družba Equitable Life nepravično obravnavala zavarovance glede pokojninskih rent, saj je goljufala pri vrednostih dospelih pokojnin in rentah, da bi zavarovance prikrajšala za pravo vrednost njihovih možnosti zajamčenih rent.
Equitable's Nemesis came in the form of an independent financial adviser, Mr Bayliss, who, being a specialist in the retirement annuity sector, was instrumental in spreading the word that Equitable, in his opinion, had been treating its pension policyholders unfairly by juggling pension maturity values and annuity rates so as to deprive policyholders of the true value of their guaranteed annuity options.
Razprava Baylissa in drugih je povzročila tožbo, ki se je navsezadnje končala s porazom družbe Equitable Life v zgornjem domu.
The agitation of Mr Bayliss and others led to the litigation that eventually saw the Society defeated in the House of Lords.
Zato so bili zaradi navidezno visoko razvitega pristopa družbe Equitable Life in dejstva, da družba ni želela obravnavati vprašanja zajamčenih rent zaradi njegove sorazmerne nepomembnosti in vpliva v višini največ 50 milijonov GBP,... (zavarovanci) močno zaskrbljeni, ko so izvedeli, da je ‚nepomembna vsota 50 milijonov GBP pomenila pravzaprav končno katastrofo.“
Thus, EL's seemingly sophisticated approach and its dismissal of the GAR issue as being relatively trivial and having an impact of no more than £50 million ... caused (policyholders) to be mightily concerned to learn that a "£50m bagatelle" was, in fact, a £1.5 billion terminal disaster. "
WE58, stran 7–10
WE58, page 7-10.
NASSIM je v WE7 navedel več domnevnih neuspehov zakonodajalcev, da „ bi v celoti ocenili tveganje zaradi polic družbe Equitable Life ter da bi v skladu s tem posredovali:
Mr. NASSIM specified in WE7 several alleged failures of regulators " to fully assess the risks inherent in Equitable Life's policies and to intervene accordingly :
– od leta 1973 se zakonodajalci niso odzvali na to, da družba ELAS ni oblikovala eksplicitnih rezervacij za vedno pogostejšo obliko bonusov (terminalni bonus) in ni pregledala stanja s stvarnega vidika, ki se je zahteval v skladu s pravilno ali razumno razlago razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev;
- From 1973 onwards the regulators failed to react to ELAS making no explicit reservation for its increasingly dominant bonus form (terminal bonus), and did not examine the position from the realistic aspect required under a proper or reasonable interpretation of PRE;
– kljub sočasnim utemeljenim pripombam aktuarjev zakonodajalci niso nadzorovali aktuarske in zavarovalniške paradigme ‚z dobičkom brez skrivnosti‘.
- Despite contemporary informed actuarial comment the regulators failed to scrutinise the “With Profits Without Mystery (WPWM)” actuarial and insurance paradigm.
Če bi to storili, bi zagotovo ugotovili, da je bila to pravzaprav racionalizacija za razpršitev njenih sredstev in vodenje sklada za življenjsko zavarovanje s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice z občasno negativno vrzeljo tehnične solventnosti.
Had they done so, they would necessarily have discovered that it was in essence a rationalisation for dispersal of its assets, and running a with-profits fund on an intermittently negative technical solvency gap.
V okviru paradigme ‚z dobičkom brez skrivnosti‘ ni bilo nobenega preudarno pravičnega zagotovila ali dobre možnosti za izpolnitev razumnih pričakovanj zavarovancev;
Under the WPWM paradigm there was no prudently equitable assurance, or real prospect of fulfilling policyholders’ reasonable expectations;
– od leta 1987 so zakonodajalci dovolili, da je sklad za življenjsko zavarovanje s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice deloval z večinoma negativno vrzeljo tehnične solventnosti, ki je za takratne in prihodnje zavarovance naznanjala obveznost in ne dobička;
- From 1987 onwards the regulators allowed a with-profits fund to operate on a mostly negative technical solvency gap which betokened liability for present and future policyholders rather than profit;
– zakonodajalci na splošno niso upoštevali učinkov nasprotij interesov med zasebnimi in podjetniškimi/institucionalnimi strankami družbe Equitable Life ter stališča vladnega oddelka za zavarovalniško statistiko, ki je družbo priporočil kot institucionalnega ponudnika za pokojninsko zavarovanje v javni upravi.“
- The regulators generally failed to appreciate the effects of conflicts of interest between the Society’s private and corporate/institutional clients, and the GAD’s position in recommending the Society as a civil service institutional pension scheme provider".
SLATER (WE34) je izjavil, da zakonodajalci več kot deset let niso v celoti priznali potencialne nevarnosti prakse družbe Equitable Life „ v zvezi z določanjem prevelikih bonusov glede na dejansko donosnost naložb in podobno dolgo zgodovino podcenjevanja obveznosti “.
In his statement, Mr. SLATER (WE34) claimed that over more than a decade, the Regulators failed to fully acknowledge the potential danger of Equitable Life's practice of " voting bonuses in excess of the investment returns actually achieved and the similarly long history of understating liabilities ."
Ni vzdrževala obljubljenega rezervnega sklada ...
It was not maintaining a promised reserve fund ...
Zakonodajalec bi lahko zlahka ugotovil, da je to piramidna shema in da rezerve ne obstajajo, ter odpravil pomanjkljivosti, kot zahteva direktiva.
The regulator could easily have determined the existence of a pyramid scheme together with the absence of reserves and taken remedial action as required by the directive.
WE-CONF23 prav tako vsebuje obtožbe zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva zaradi malomarnosti v zvezi s prepoznavanjem tveganja glede zajamčenih rent in neukrepanja v zvezi s tem ter navaja, da bi „ vsaka dobra preiskava razkrila odsotnost določbe o zajamčenih rentah.
WE-CONF23 also accused the UK Regulators of negligence in recognizing and failure to react to the GAR risk, stating that " any diligent investigation would have revealed the absence of a GAR provision.
Dejstvo, da zakonodajalci niso ukrepali in zaprli družbe Equitable Life ali izvršili temeljite prenove, je spodbudilo direktorje, da niso ukrepali, ter s tem povzročilo izgube, ki so jih navsezadnje imeli tisti, ki so police imeli 16. julija 2001. “
The fact that the regulators did not act to close down Equitable Life or enforce a substantial reconstruction encouraged the directors to do nothing and thus compounded the losses eventually suffered by those who held policies on 16 July 2001 ."
V H5 je BAYLISS navedel, da „ni bilo nobenega dvoma, da ... v novi regulativni ureditvi Organa za finančne storitve donosi niso bili zadostni v smislu pojasnitve resnične situacije ali možnih obveznosti, ki so se skrivale v teh skladih ...
In H5 Mr. BAYLISS stated that "there was no doubt that ... in the new regulatory regime of the FSA, the returns were not adequate in terms of explaining the true situation or potential liabilities that hid in those funds ...
Zgodbam družbe Equitable Life o minimalnem kapitalu so verjeli zelo dolgo: dokler se tvoji produkti prodajajo, da lahko kriješ stroške, potem je vse v redu.
They had been buying Equitable’s story on solvency margins for a very long time: as long as you are generating new sales to cope with it, then you are OK.
Če je družba dovolj velika, lahko pokriješ primanjkljaj.
If your new business is big enough, you can backfill the hole ...
Stvar je v tem, da so zakonodajalci ugotovili, da obstaja težava z zajamčenimi rentami leta 1998, vendar niso vedeli, kako naj ukrepajo.
The problem was that the regulators realised there was a problem with GARs in 1998 and they did not know what to do about it.
Kar zadeva vprašanje o intervenciji in kdaj naj bi ta bila, so zakonodajalci prek varuhinje človekovih pravic za to vprašanje izvedeli zagotovo leta 1997 in 1998.
As to the other question of intervention and when, the regulators were aware through the Ombudsman, certainly in 1997 and 1998, that this was an issue.
Imeli so dokumentacijo, ki smo jo posredovali novinarjem, in sicer zagotovo poleti leta 1998, če jim je niso posamezne stranke posredovale že prej ...
They had the documentation that we circulated to the press, certainly in the summer of 1998, if they had not had it earlier through individual clients sending it in ...
Mislim, da so imeli enako težavo, in sicer se niso mogli odločiti, ali naj ukrepajo ali ne.“
I think they had the same problem of wanting or not wanting to intervene."
Baylis je moral vedeti, da če bi bile njegove zahteve izpolnjene, družba Equitable Life ne bi mogla poslovati ter je ne bi bilo več vredno reševati, če bi bilo k njenim obveznostim dodanih 1,5 milijarde GBP in bi bil njen glavni produkt uničen.
Mr.Bayliss must have realised that if his demands were met then not only would Equitable have been put out of business, but, by adding £1.5 billion to their liabilities and destroying their major product, the Society would not have been worth rescuing.
Najbrž je vedel, da družba Equitable Life ne bo mogla več poslovati, če izpolni njegove zahteve.
He must have known that if Equitable Life met his demands then they would be put out of business.
Ker glavnega produkta družbe Equitable Life ni bilo več mogoče prodajati, ni bilo smiselno, da bi jo prevzela kakšna druga družba.
And as Equitable's main product was unmarketable, there was no point in any other company taking them over.
Ali je Stuarta Baylissa druga večja življenjska zavarovalnica določila, da onemogoči poslovanje družbe Equitable Life?
Was Stuart Bayliss set up by other major LifeCos to put Equitable Life out of business?
Dvomim, da bomo kdaj izvedeli, vendar se mi to zdi edina logična razlaga za Baylissova dejanja.
I doubt if we will ever know, but this seems to me the only logical explanation for Mr. Bayliss' actions.
Družba Equitable Life je bila v sektorju pokojnin v Združenem kraljestvu pomembna in uspešna, zato lahko razumem, zakaj bi druge življenjske zavarovalnice želele, da je ne bi bilo več .“
Equitable was a major and successful player in the UK pensions industry and I can well understand that other LifeCos would like to see them go ."
WE29, Priloga A.2, podrobnosti: „od 30. junija 2001 je bilo v skupinskih pokojninskih shemah 70 000 posameznih zavarovancev z življenjskim zavarovanjem s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice z zajamčenimi rentami, 415 000 zavarovancev s policami brez zajamčene rente, 105 000 zavarovancev s polico z zajamčeno rento in 510 000 zavarovancev s policami brez zajamčene rente“. .
WE29, annex A.2 details: " as of 30 June 2001 there were 70.000 individual with-profits policyholders with GARs, 415.000 individual policyholders without GARs, 105.000 GAR and 510.000 non-GAR policyholders in group pension schemes ". .
Ta shema naj bi stabilizirala soudeležbo pri dobičku z zmanjšanjem izpostavljenosti policam z zajamčenimi rentami in odpravila tveganje tožbe proti družbi Equitable Life zaradi zlorabe pri prodaji z utemeljitvijo, da se domnevna tveganja v zvezi z obveznostmi, ki izhajajo iz zajamčenih rent, niso razkrila prihodnjim zavarovancem ob nakupu police.
The scheme was meant to stabilize the with-profits fund by reducing exposure to GARs, while at the same time eliminate the risk of legal action against EL for mis-selling, claiming the potential risks of GAR liabilities had not been disclosed to them when taking out their policies.
Kot je navedeno v WE80, irski zakonodajni organi niso bili vključeni v postopek v zvezi s sporazumom o odškodninski shemi.
As stated in WE80, the Irish Regulatory authorities were not involved in the Compromise Scheme agreement process.
Pogoji odškodninske sheme so bili, da „se bodo vsi zahtevki, povezani z zajamčenimi rentami, ki jih ima vsak zavarovanec in/ali jih lahko ima v povezavi s skladom za zajamčene rente in/ali s skladom, ki ni namenjen zajamčenim rentam, ... opustili in se poravnali v celoti, dokončno in nepreklicno, “pri čemer so bile izrecno izključene „kakršne koli pritožbe ali zahtevki, predloženi kateremu koli varuhu človekovih pravic (vključno s Službo varuha človekovih pravic) “.
The terms of the Compromise were that “ all and any GAR-Related Claims that each Scheme Policyholder has and/or may have in relation to their GAR Fund and/or Non-GAR Fund ... shall be waived and settled fully, finally and irrevocably ”, excluding explicitly “ any complaint or claim to any ombudsman (including the Financial Ombudsman Service )”.
3a) Kronološki pregled v zvezi z „odškodninsko shemo“
3a) Timeline surrounding the 'Compromise Scheme'
četrtek, 20. julij 2000 : Odločitev zgornjega doma , ki potrjuje odločitev pritožbenega sodišča, je izplačila diferenciranih vrednosti bonusov iz polic z zajamčenimi rentami razglasila za nezakonita (ter tako prisilila družbo Equitable Life, da se odloči za prodajo).
20 July 2000 : House of Lords ruling , upholding the Appeal Court's ruling, declared unlawful the payout of differential bonus levels on GAR policies (thus forcing EL to put itself up for sale)
V WE58 je navedeno, da je „ pristop družbe Equitable Life k nadzoru stroškov in učinkovitosti delovanja … pomenil, da bo vedno posebno neprivlačna za možne kupce (celo brez upoštevanja težav z zajamčenimi rentami) iz preprostega razloga, da je postala tako smotrna in nedonosna, da bi imeli delničarji le zelo majhne dobičke, če bi se družba preoblikovala iz vzajemne družbe.
WE58 explains how "Equitable's approach to cost controls and operating efficiency... meant that it was always going to be peculiarly unattractive to a prospective purchaser (even leaving aside problems with guaranteed annuities) for the simple reason that it had become so efficient and lean that there would be only very slim profits to be generated for a shareholder were the Society ever to de-mutualise".
petek, 8. december 2000 : Družba Equitable Life je prenehala sklepati nove posle in zvišala kazni za zmanjšanje sredstev na 10 %.
8 December 2000 : EL closed to new business and increases penalty fees for withdrawing funds to 10%
Družba Equitable Life je 8. decembra 2000 izgubila bonitetno stopnjo naložbenega razreda (AA/A+, v katerem je bila od leta 1993), saj jo je družba S&P deklasificirala v BB/negativno (WE-FILE22).
On 8 Dec 2000 Equitable Life lost its investment grade credit rating (AA/A+ held since 1993), as S&P downgraded it to BB/Watch negative (WE-FILE22).
sreda, 20. december 2000: Uprava družbe Equitable Life je ponudila odstop.
20 December 2000: EL Board offered their resignation
ponedeljek, 5. februar 2001 : Halifax je ponudil 1 milijardo GBP za odkup „poslovnih sredstev“ (zavarovalniških agentov in polic za življenjsko zavarovanje brez klavzule o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice) in obljubil dodatna sredstva, če se doseže dogovor glede polic s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice.
5 February 2001 : Halifax agreed to pay £1 billion to buy EL's 'operating assets' (sales force and non-with-profits policies), promising additional funds in case a compromise is found over with-profits policies
Halifax plc zagotovo ni ‚kupil‘ družbe Equitable Life.
" Equitable Life certainly has not been "bought" by Halifax plc.
Dogovori s Halifaxom so zadevali nekatere dejavnosti družbe Equitable Life ter niso vključevali preoblikovanja družbe Equitable Life in/ali prenosa njenega dolgoročnega poslovanja kateri koli osebi.
The arrangements entered into with Halifax were in respect of certain operations of the Society and did not involve the demutualisation of Equitable and/or the transfer of its long term business to any person.