natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
– ob upoštevanju predloga Komisije Svetu ( KOM(2009)0531 ),
– having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council ( COM(2009)0531 ),
– ob upoštevanju člena 308 Pogodbe ES, v skladu s katerim se je Svet posvetoval s Parlamentom ( C7‑0268/2009 ),
– having regard to Article 308 of the EC Treaty, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament ( C7-0268/2009 ),
– ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora za mednarodno trgovino ( A7‑0059/2009 ),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade ( A7-0059/2009 ),
Komisija predlaga, da bi makrofinančno pomoč Armeniji v višini do 100 milijonov EUR zagotovili v obliki posojila (65 milijonov EUR) in donacije (35 milijonov EUR).
The Commission proposes to provide macro-financial assistance (MFA) to Armenia amounting up to EUR 100 million in the form of a loan (EUR 65 million) and a grant (EUR 35 million).
V zvezi s posojilom je Komisija pooblaščena, da si na finančnih trgih ali od finančnih institucij izposodi do 65 milijonov EUR.
Regarding the loan component the Commission shall be empowered to borrow up to EUR 65 million on the capital markets or from financial institutions.
Pomoč bo po načrtih omogočena v dveh obrokih (predvidoma skozi celotno leto 2010).
The assistance is planned to be made available in two instalments (tentatively over the year 2010).
Z njo se želi podpreti prilagajanje armenskega gospodarstva in financirati zunanje plačilne bilance in proračunske potrebe, kakor jih je opredelil Mednarodni denarni sklad.
It aims at supporting Armenia's economic adjustment and financing its external balance-of-payments and budgetary needs as identified by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
S predlagano pomočjo se bo podprl vladni gospodarski program, katerega cilj je zagotoviti trajnostne davčne in zunanje račune ter ponuditi pomoč Armeniji pri spopadu s posledicami svetovne gospodarske in finančne krize.
The proposed assistance will support the authorities' economic programme with a view to ensure sustainable fiscal and external accounts and contributes also to helping Armenia to address the consequences of the global economic and financial crisis.
Svetovna gospodarska recesija in še posebej naglo nazadovanje ruskega gospodarstva sta močno vplivala na armensko gospodarsko dejavnost, ki je začela upadati v zadnjem četrtletju 2008.
The global economic downturn and particularly the rapid deterioration of the Russian economy had a deep impact on the economic activity in Armenia which started to contract since the last quarter of 2008.
Glede na neprekinjen upad gospodarstva v letu 2009 je armenski dram marca dejansko izgubil približno 22 % vrednosti v primerjavi z eurom ali ameriškim dolarjem.
Given the continuous deterioration in the economy in 2009, in March Armenian Dram was de facto devaluated of around 22% against the EUR and the USD.
Istočasno je Mednarodni denarni sklad odobril aranžma „stand-by“, da bi Armeniji olajšal obvladovanje čedalje slabših gospodarskih razmer in zagotovil gladek prehod na drseči devizni tečaj.
At the same time the IMF approved a Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) to help Armenia to deal with the worsening economic environment and to ensure the smooth transition to the floating exchange rate regime.
Čeprav so bili negativni učinki razvrednotenja povečini ublaženi, so se gospodarske razmere v prvih šestih mesecih leta 2009 dramatično poslabšale.
Although, the negative effects of the devaluation were largely absorbed, the economic situation in the first six months of 2009 worsened dramatically.
Zaradi tega je upravni odbor MDS junija 2009 Armeniji odobril povečanje dostopa do sredstev MDS v okviru aranžmaja „stand-by“.
As a result, in June 2009 the IMF Board approved the augmentation of access of Armenia to IMF resources under the SBA.
Po zadnjih podatkih s sredine julija je gospodarski upad še veliko hujši, kot je bilo predvideno v popravljenih junijskih ocenah.
However, latest indications as of mid July suggest that that economic downturn is even more severe than foreseen in the revised June assumptions.
S predlagano makrofinančno pomočjo se želi dopolniti pomoč Mednarodnega denarnega sklada, predvideno v okviru aranžmaja „stand-by“, ki ga je sklenil upravni odbor MDS marca 2009, pa tudi proračunsko podporo Svetovne banke, ki bo dostavljena v obliki posojil.
The proposed MFA is intended to complement support from the IMF foreseen under the SBA agreed by the IMF board in March 2009, as well as World Bank support due to take the form of budget support policy loans.
Dodatno pomoč bodo zagotovili Azijska razvojna banka, dvostranski donatorji (Rusija in Združeno kraljestvo) in EU v okviru evropskega sosedskega in partnerskega instrumenta (ENPI).
Additional support will be provided from Asian Development Bank, bilateral donors (Russia and United Kingdom), and EU under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).
Z makrofinančno pomočjo, ki se pripravlja, bi lahko EU ustrezno zapolnila vrzel v financiranju.
The MFA under preparation would be an appropriate contribution of the EU to close the financing gap.
Komisija opozarja na možnost, da armenska vlada ne bo izpolnila pogojev programa MDS, saj bi se lahko proračunski cilj izkazal za težje dosegljivega, kot pa je bilo sprva napovedano, zlasti ker so tveganja v zvezi s predpostavkami o rasti brez dvoma negativna.
The Commission considers that there is a risk that the Government of Armenia will not comply with the IMF programme conditions, as the fiscal target may turn out more difficult to reach than assumed, in particular as the risks to the growth assumptions are clearly on the downside.
Kljub doslednem upoštevanju teh tveganj službe Komisije vseeno menijo, da obstajajo dovolj zanesljivi temelji za nadaljnje zagotavljanje makrofinančne pomoči Armeniji.
While seriously taking into account these risks, the Commission services still consider that there are sufficiently strong grounds to proceed with MFA to Armenia.
Velike potrebe po financiranju, s katerimi se zlasti v letu 2009 sooča Armenija in s katerimi se bo, sicer v manjši meri, soočala tudi v letu 2010, govorijo v prid takojšnjim ukrepom.
The large financing needs faced by Armenia in particular in 2009 and to a lesser extend in 2010 plead in favour of urgent action.
Makrofinančna pomoč bo po napovedih nemudoma vplivala na armenske plačilne bilance in tako zmanjšala finančne omejitve pri izvajanju vladnega gospodarskega programa ter olajšala financiranje proračunskega primanjkljaja.
MFA is forecasted to have an immediate impact on Armenia's balance of payments and would in this way contribute to the alleviation of financial constraints on the implementation of the authorities' economic programme and to financing the budget deficit.
Predvidoma bo podprla tudi splošne cilje stabilizacijskega programa, s katerimi se v dogovoru z Mednarodnim denarnim skladom želi doseči predvsem zunanje ravnovesje, okrepiti devizne rezerve, ohraniti zaupanje v domačo valuto in bančni sistem ter zaščititi revne državljane.
MFA is further expected to support the general objectives of the stabilisation programme agreed with the IMF, which in particular aims at achieving external adjustment, bolstering foreign reserves, maintaining confidence in the domestic currency and banking system and protecting the poor.
Časovne omejitve
Timing constraints
Predlog v zvezi z makrofinančno pomočjo je bil (enako kot vsi prejšnji predlogi) v okviru posvetovalnega postopka predložen Parlamentu v skladu s členom 308 Pogodbe ES.
This MFA proposal (as all past MFA proposals) has been referred to the Parliament under Article 308 of the EC Treaty, i.e. under consultation procedure.
Čeprav Parlament za posredovanje mnenja v skladu z navedenim členom nima določenega časovnega roka, se je doslej vedno izjemno hitro odzval na potrebe po zagotavljanju makrofinančne pomoči.
Although there is no deadline foreseen for Parliament's opinion under that Article, the Parliament has always been very quick in responding to the needs to provide MFA.
Trenutni predlog je Komisija sprejela 14. oktobra 2009 (in ga še isti dan posredovala Parlamentu).
The current proposal was adopted by the Commission on 14 October 2009 (and transferred to Parliament on the same day).
Ker pa bo prvi obrok predvidoma izplačan že januarja 2010, mora Svet sprejeti sklep pred koncem leta 2009, Parlament pa svoje mnenje posredovati še prej (Komisija je neformalno nakazala, naj ga sprejme na plenarnem zasedanju 23.-26. novembra 2009).
However, as the first instalment is planned to be disbursed already in January 2010, the Council should therefore adopt its Decision before the end of 2009, and Parliament its opinion even earlier (informally the Commission has indicated that it should be adopted at plenary session of 23-26 November 2009).
Tako je imel Parlament dejansko manj kot mesec in pol časa za sprejetje stališča (pri čemer se Svet do trenutka, ko je poročevalec zaključeval s pripravo tega osnutka poročila, sploh še ni uradno posvetoval s Parlamentom), to pa je v zakonodajnem postopku enostavno nesprejemljivo.
Thus, the Parliament has been effectively given less than a month and a half for adopting its position (whereas the Council has at the time of finalising this draft report by your rapporteur not even officially consulted Parliament yet) and that is simply not acceptable in a legislative procedure.
Tudi če bi Parlament na primer oporekal osnutku izvedbenih ukrepov Komisije v skladu z regulativnim postopkom s pregledom , rok za to ni krajši od treh mesecev
For example, even for opposing Commission's draft implementing measures under the regulatory procedure with scrutiny the deadline for Parliament is not less than three months
Člen 5a(3)(c) Odločbe Sveta 1999/468/ES. .
Article 5a(3)(c) of Council Decision 1999/468/EC. .
Primer izkazuje popolno pomanjkanje spoštovanja vloge Parlamenta kot zakonodajnega organa, saj ni opravičil za izjeme, kadar gre za institucionalna pooblastila.
It shows complete lack of respect for Parliament's role as a legislator, as there can be no justifications for exceptions to institutional powers.
Čeprav priprava tovrstnih predlogov ni odvisna samo od Komisije, se je Komisija dobro zavedala, da bo prvi obrok razdeljen že v začetku leta 2010 in da bo treba posledično sprejeti ustrezno direktivo dovolj zgodaj pred iztekom leta.
Even if preparation of such proposals does not depend on the Commission alone, the Commission knew fully well that the first tranche should be disbursed already in early 2010 and thus that the respective Decision would have to be adopted in sufficient time before the year's end.
Če sklep ne bo sprejet do začetka 2010, bi to pomenilo, da sredstev ES januarja 2010 ne bo mogoče prenesti v Armenijo.
At the same time, if the Decision is not adopted by the beginning of 2010, it would mean that EC funds would not be transferred to Armenia in January 2010.
Glede na dejanske okoliščine in strateški pomen, ki ga EU pripisuje Armeniji v okviru evropske sosedske politike in pred kratkim vzpostavljenega vzhodnega partnerstva, bo poročevalec storil vse, kar je v njegovi moči, da bi izpolnil zahtevo Komisije v zvezi s časovno omejitvijo.
Considering the factual circumstances and Armenia's strategic importance to the EU in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the newly established Eastern Partnership, your rapporteur could therefore do his utmost to accommodate Commission's request regarding timing.
Pri tem je seveda treba poudariti, da to ne pomeni sprejetja roka, ki ga je s pozno oddajo predloga postavila Komisija, ampak zgolj njegovo toleriranje v danih izjemnih okoliščinah.
Stressing, however, that this does not mean accepting the timing imposed by Commission's late proposal, but only tolerating it in these exceptional circumstances.
Zakaj poročevalec ni vložil predlogov sprememb
Reasons for not proposing any amendments
Poročevalec zaenkrat ni vložil predlogov sprememb k osnutku predloga.
Your rapporteur has not proposed any amendments to the draft proposal for the time being.
Ne zato, ker bi bil predlog sklepa popoln, pač pa zato, ker se je poročevalec znašel v precej težavnem položaju.
Not because the proposal for the Decision would be perfect, but because your rapporteur finds himself in a very difficult position.
Prvič, sprejetje poročila s predlogi sprememb bi se lahko v sedanjem časovnem okviru s postopkovnega stališča izkazalo za nemogoče in bi lahko pomenilo, da se sredstva januarja 2010 ne bi prenesla v Armenijo.
Firstly, from procedural point of view, adoption of a report with amendments might turn out to be impossible under the current timetable and could thus mean no transfer of funds to Armenia in January 2010.
Drugič, ta „postopkovna realnost“ ne pomeni, da se poročevalec povsem strinja s predlogom.
Secondly, this "procedural reality" does not mean that your rapporteur would fully agree with the proposal.
Poročevalec se na primer ne more strinjati z izjavo, da „ pogodba za sprejetje tega sklepa ne predvideva drugih pooblastil, razen tistih iz člena 308 “ (uvodna izjava 11).
For example, your rapporteur cannot agree with the statement that " the Treaty does not provide, for the adoption of this Decision, powers other than those of Article 308 " (recital 11).
Vzrok za uporabo člena 308 namesto člena 181a ni v sami Pogodbi, ampak v Izjavi št. 10, priloženi Pogodbi iz Nice, ki določa, da „ plačilnobilančna pomoč tretjim državam ne sodi na področje uporabe člena 181a “.
The reason for using Article 308 and not Article 181a is not in the Treaty, but in Declaration No. 10 attached to the Treaty of Nice, setting out that " balance ‑of ‑payments aid to third countries falls outside the scope of Article 181a ".
Parlament je že leta 2003
The Parliament has already back in 2003
P5_TA(2003)0233 . označil člen 308 kot neprimeren in izrazil obžalovanje nad odločitvijo, da se takšna izjava vstavi v Pogodbo iz Nice.
P5_TA(2003)0233 . referred to Article 308 as inadequate and expressed its regrets over the decision to include such a Declaration in the Treaty of Nice.
Povedati je treba tudi, da je predlog precej splošen in bo večina podrobnosti dogovorjenih v memorandumu o soglasju.
It must be also said that the proposal is very general and most of the specific details are to be agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding.
Poročevalec prav tako meni, da bi bilo potrebnih več predlogov sprememb, s katerimi bi izboljšali jasnost, preglednost in odgovornost predloga (v smislu pogojevanja, uporabe zunanjih revizorjev za neodvisne ocene, posebnih zahtev za armensko vlado ipd.).
At the same time your rapporteur is of the opinion that several amendments might be necessary in order to improve the clarity, transparency and accountability of the proposal (in terms of conditionality, use of external auditors for independent assessment, specific requests to Armenian government etc).
In tretjič, še enkrat je treba poudariti, da je imel poročevalec enostavno precej omejen čas za razmislek o dejanskem predlogu.
And thirdly, it must be repeated once more that your rapporteur simply had very limited time to reflect on the actual proposal.
Zaradi tega je bil poročevalec, čeprav se povsem strinja s potrebo po zagotovitvi makrofinančne pomoči Armeniji, postavljen pred težko odločitev.
Therefore, while entirely in agreement with the need to provide Armenia with exceptional MFA, your rapporteur had a difficult choice to make.
Glede na zgoraj navedeno poročevalec predlaga sprejetje nespremenjenega predloga.
Considering the above, your rapporteur suggests accepting the proposal unamended.
Kljub temu pa si pridržuje pravico, da vloži predloge sprememb po obravnavi predloga v odboru ter izmenjavi mnenj s Svetom in Komisijo.
However, your rapporteur reserves the right to propose his amendments following the consideration of the proposal in the Committee, and exchange of views with the Council and Commission.
Vloga Parlamenta pri zagotavljanju makrofinančne pomoči
Parliament's role in providing MFA
Poročevalec želi v skladu s prejšnjimi resolucijami Parlamenta poudariti tudi, da se tako obsežnega instrumenta, kot je makrofinančna pomoč, ne more preprosto obravnavati kot „izrednega“.
The rapporteur would also like to stress, in line with previous Parliament resolutions, that such a substantial instrument as MFA cannot be simply regarded as "exceptional".
Zato je neopravičljivo, da takšen instrument nima zakonite pravne podlage in še naprej temelji na začasnih sklepih Sveta za posamezne ukrepe.
It is therefore unjustifiable that such an instrument lacks a regular legal basis and continues to be based on ad hoc Council decisions for each operation.
V zvezi s tem je treba poudariti, da bosta po začetku veljave Lizbonske pogodbe ustrezna pravna podlaga za sklep o dodelitvi makrofinančne pomoči člena 209(1) in 212(2) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije, in sicer odvisno od tega, ali institucije EU državo upravičenko uvrščajo med države v razvoju ali ne.
In this respect it must be stressed that after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the appropriate legal basis for a Decision granting MFA will be Article 209(1) and 212(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), depending on whether the beneficiary country is classified as developing country or not by the Union institutions.
V obeh primerih se uporabi redni zakonodajni postopek.
In both cases, the ordinary legislative procedure applies.
Člen 213 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije ne velja za sklepe o dodelitvi makrofinančne pomoči.
Article 213 TFEU should not apply to Decisions granting MFA.
Vlogo Evropskega parlamenta je treba okrepiti.
Moreover, the role of the Parliament should be enhanced.
Komisija mora izboljšati zlasti poročanje Parlamentu o dejanskem izvajanju tega instrumenta pomoči in mu posredovati naknadno poročilo o oceni (poleg letnega poročanja, predvidenega v členu 6 tega predloga).
In particular, the Commission should improve its reporting to Parliament as concerns the actual implementation of this aid instrument and provide Parliament with an ex post evaluation report (in addition to the annual reporting foreseen in Article 6 of the proposal).
Obveznosti Sveta in Komisije
Commitments by the Council and the Commission
Četudi bo odbor sprejel predlog za zagotavljanje makrofinančne pomoči in ne bo vložil predlogov sprememb, poročevalec od Sveta in Komisije zahteva, da se v izjavah Parlamentu posvetita zgornjim vprašanjem.
Even if the proposal for MFA would be accepted by the Committee without amendments, your rapporteur requests the Council and Commission to address the above concerns in statements to Parliament.
o predlogu sklepa Sveta o zagotavljanju makrofinančne pomoči Gruziji
on the proposal for a Council decision providing macro-financial assistance to Georgia
– ob upoštevanju predloga Komisije Svetu ( KOM(2009)0523 ),
– having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council ( COM(2009)0523 ),
– ob upoštevanju člena 308 pogodbe o ES, v skladu s katerim se je Svet posvetoval s Parlamentom ( C7‑0269/2009 ),
– having regard to Article 308 of the EC Treaty, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament ( C7-0269/2009 ),
– ob upoštevanju poročila neodvisne mednarodne misije za ugotavljanje dejstev glede spora v Gruziji iz septembra 2009 (Tagliavinijino poročilo),
– having regard to the Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia of September 2009 (Tagliavini Report),
– ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora za mednarodno trgovino ( A7-0060/2009 ),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade ( A7-0060/2009 ),
Komisija predlaga, da se Gruziji zagotovi makrofinančna pomoč v obliki donacij v več obrokih, in sicer v najvišjem znesku 46 milijonov EUR.
The Commission proposes to provide macro-financial assistance (MFA) to Georgia in the form of grant instalments in a maximum amount of EUR 46 million.
Pomoč je namenjena za financiranje primanjkljaja v državnem proračunu in naj bi se izplačala v dveh obrokih (prva tranša konec leta 2009 in druga začetek leta 2010).
The assistance is intended to be allocated to the financing of the deficit of the state budget and is planned to be disbursed in two instalments (the first tranche before the end of 2009 and the second in early 2010).
Namen pomoči je pokriti preostale zunanje finančne potrebe Gruzije v obdobju 2009–2010, kot jih je opredelil Mednarodni denarni sklad (MDS).
It aims at covering Georgia's residual external financing needs in 2009-2010 as identified by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Sredstva bodo usmerjena v državni proračun Gruzije, da bi se rešile nujne proračunske potrebe.
The funds will be channelled to the state budget of Georgia to help meet acute budgetary needs.
Gruzija je zapadla v hudo gospodarsko recesijo po izbruhu vojaškega spora z Rusijo avgusta 2008, ki je povzročil neposredno in posredno škodo, prav tako pa je notranje razselil precej prebivalstva.
Georgia has experienced a severe economic downturn since the eruption of the military conflict with Russia in August 2008 that caused both direct and indirect damages, as well as resulted in large number of internally displaced population.
Poleg tega je svetovna finančna kriza, ki je izbruhnila jeseni leta 2008, še dodatno poslabšala gospodarski položaj Gruzije.
In addition, the global financial crisis that broke out in the fall of 2008 further aggravated Georgia’s economic situation.
Predlagana makrofinančna pomoč naj bi se izvajala vzporedno z aranžmajem "stand-by" (SBA), ki ga je MDS odobril septembra 2008.
The proposed MFA is intended to run in parallel to the stand-by arrangement (SBA) that was approved by the IMF in September 2008.
Izplačila ES so vezana na uporabo sredstev MDS in so zato neposredno povezana s tem, kako država upravičenka izvaja dogovorjene makroekonomske in strukturne politike ter kako hitro oživlja svoje gospodarstvo.
The EC disbursements are tied to the use of IMF resources and therefore have a direct link to the implementation by the beneficiary of the agreed macroeconomic and structural policies and its pace of economic recovery.
Na konferenci donatorjev v Bruslju 22. oktobra 2008 so države članice ter drugi dvostranski donatorji in večstranski upniki obljubili Gruziji znatno pomoč, pri čemer je tudi ES ponudila največ 500 milijonov EUR.
At the Brussels donors’ conference of 22 October 2008, significant assistance was pledged to Georgia by the Member States and other bilateral donors and multilateral creditors, including up to EUR 500 million from the EC.
Viri financiranja ES vključujejo načrtovana sredstva v okviru evropskega instrumenta sosedstva in partnerstva (ENPI) in krizne instrumente, kot so instrument za stabilnost, instrument za humanitarno pomoč in instrument za makrofinančno pomoč.
The sources of EC funding include both programmed funds under the envelope of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and crisis instruments, such as the Instrument for Stability, Humanitarian Aid and MFA.
Makrofinančna pomoč dopolnjuje druge instrumente pomoči z zagotavljanjem kratkoročne makroekonomske pomoči Gruziji v okviru gospodarskega programa, ki ga podpira MDS, medtem ko je proračunska podpora ENPI, ki prav tako prispeva k pokrivanju finančnih potreb Gruzije, vezana na posebne sektorske reforme.
The MFA complements other assistance instruments by providing short-term macro-economic support to Georgia in the context of the IMF-supported economic program whereas the ENPI budget support, while also contributing to covering Georgia's financing needs, is linked to specific sectoral reforms.
Ob prvem pregledu aranžmaja "stand-by" (SBA) (december 2008) so se gruzijske oblasti kljub temu odločile, da ne bodo črpale sredstev iz druge tranše MDS v okviru tega aranžmaja (upoštevajoč razmeroma dobre možnosti za tuje neposredne naložbe v letu 2009 in zaradi strahu pred poslabšanjem zaupanja vlagateljev v državo).
At the time of the first review of the SBA (December 2008) the Georgian authorities nonetheless decided not to draw the second tranche from IMF under the SBA (in view of a relatively positive outlook for foreign direct investment in 2009 and the fear to damage investor confidence in the country).