natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Vse odločitve sprejema izvršilni odbor kot celota, ne da bi prelagal odgovornost na svoje posamezne člane.
All decisions are taken by the Executive Board in its totality without allocating responsibility to any individual Executive Board member.
Zato so vsi člani izvršilnega odbora po definiciji vključeni v vsa področja njegove pristojnosti, kot so denarna politika, plačilni sistemi, bankovci itd.
Therefore, all Executive Board members are by definition involved in all areas of the Executive Board’s competence, be it monetary policy, payment systems, banknotes, etc.
Narava izvršilnega odbora kot kolegijskega odbora, ki sprejema odločitve, se izraža tudi v načinu, kako je v njegovih publikacijah običajno prikazana organizacijska struktura ECB.
The Executive Board’s nature as collegiate decision-making body is also reflected in the way the organisational structure of the ECB is usually shown in its publications.
Vendar je glede na veliko število vprašanj, ki jih mora izvršilni odbor obravnavati, povsem smiselno, da se njegovi člani iz upravnih razlogov medsebojno dogovorijo, katera področja poslovanja ECB bodo dodeljena kateremu članu izvršilnega odbora, ne da bi se odrekli kolektivni odgovornosti celotnega izvršilnega odbora.
However, given the multitude of issues that the Executive Board has to deal with, it makes perfect sense that, for administrative reasons, Executive Board members agree among themselves which ECB business areas should primarily report to which Executive Board member, without, however, giving up the collective responsibility of the entire Executive Board.
Seveda se zavedam, da poslovnik dodeljuje predsedniku posebno odgovornost v zvezi z „razdelitvijo resorjev“, kar omogoča upoštevanje strokovnega znanja posameznih članov izvršilnega odbora in njegovo kar najboljšo uporabo v korist banke.
I am, of course, aware that the Rules of Procedure attribute a special responsibility to the President, when it comes to the ‘portfolio distribution’, which allows taking into account the expertise of individual Executive Board members and to make best possible use of it for the benefit of the Bank.
Imenovanje članov izvršilnega odbora poteka s časovnim zamikom, kar omogoča občasen pregled dodeljevanja linij poročanja.
As the Executive Board members are appointed in a staggered approach, this allows reviewing the allocation of reporting lines from time to time.
Občasna sprememba odgovornosti med člani izvršilnega odbora krepi tudi kolegialnost v postopku odločanja.
The change from time to time of responsibilities among Executive Board members also strengthens the collegiality of the decision-making process.
Kakšen sistem se vam zdi primeren za zagotovitev pravičnega izmenjevanja članov izvršilnega odbora ECB tudi v smislu enakovredne zastopanosti različnih narodnosti in spola?
What system do you think is appropriate to ensure an equitable rotation of membership on the ECB-executive board also in terms of nationalities and gender?
Pogodba se – po mojem mnenju upravičeno – osredotoča predvsem na merilo poklicnih izkušenj in strokovnega znanja, saj določa, da se člani izvršilnega odbora ECB imenujejo „med osebami, ki imajo ugled in poklicne izkušnje na monetarnem ali bančnem področju“.
The Treaty – and to my mind rightly so - mainly focuses on the criterion of professional experience and expertise, by stating that the members of the ECB’s Executive Board ‘shall be appointed among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters’’.
Ti členi upoštevajo vidik nacionalnosti le omejeno, in sicer z določitvijo, da so lahko člani izvršilnega odbora le državljani držav članic v evroobmočju.
These articles restrict consideration of nationality to stipulating that only nationals of euro area Member States may be members of the Executive Board.
Na ta način se pravna besedila zavestno izogibajo določitvi kakršnih koli pogojev v zvezi z nacionalnostjo (razen očitne omejitve na državljane evroobmočja) ali spolom.
In this manner, the legal texts consciously refrain from laying down any pre-requisites related to nationality (other then the self-evident limitation to euro area nationals) or gender.
Naj dodam, da je ECB nadnacionalna institucija, kar pomeni, da njeni organi odločajo izključno v interesu evroobmočja in ne v skladu z nacionalnimi interesi.
Let me add that the supranational character of the ECB implies that the decisions of its decision-making bodies are taken exclusively with a euro area perspective, and not taking into account particular national interests.
Člani odborov ECB, ki sprejemajo odločitve, ne zastopajo držav članic, iz katerih prihajajo, temveč pri sprejemanju odločitev delujejo kot posamezniki.
The members of the ECB decision-making bodies do not represent their Member States but participate in the decision-making in their personal capacity.
Vključitev dodatnih vidikov v postopek imenovanja, kot je zastopanost po nacionalnosti in spolu, bi uvedla samovoljne elemente, ki bi lahko dejansko negativno vplivali na izbiro najbolj sposobnih oseb.
Introducing further considerations into the appointment procedure, such as nationality and gender representation, would introduce arbitrary elements which might actually be counter-productive in choosing the most competent persons.
Postopek imenovanja, ki predvideva posvetovanje z Evropskim parlamentom, je pomembno varovalo v celotnem izbirnem procesu, saj zagotavlja skladnost z določenimi merili.
The appointment procedure foreseeing the consultation of the European Parliament constitutes an important safeguard in the overall selection process in order to ensure compliance with the stipulated criteria.
Kot sem že omenil, Pogodba in Statut zahtevata, da morajo biti člani izvršilnega odbora osebe, „ki imajo ugled in poklicne izkušnje na monetarnem ali bančnem področju“.
The Treaty and the Statute require, as I have said before, that members of the Executive Board have to be ‘persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters’.
Seveda to ne pomeni, da morajo biti člani nujno predstavniki centralnih bank, vendar ni presenetljivo, da so bogate izkušnje centralnih bank pomembne in jih je vredno upoštevati.
Of course, this does not mean that they necessarily have to be central bankers but it is not surprising that a rich central bank experience is relevant and to be taken into account.
To ne pomeni, da druge poklicne izkušnje in znanja niso dragoceni.
This does not mean that other professional backgrounds and experiences would not be very valuable.
Če upoštevamo poklicno ozadje in izkušnje sedanjih in preteklih članov izvršilnega odbora, dejansko vidimo, da člani niso bili vedno le predstavniki centralnih bank ter da so njihova znanja in izkušnje raznoliki, kar zagotavlja dragoceno dodano vrednost v procesu sprejemanja odločitev.
As a matter of fact, if one looks at the curricula and the professional experience of the current and past members of the Executive Board, it is obvious that they were not always and only central bankers but have a diversity of expertise and experience which adds valuable input to the decision-making process.
Tudi moje poklicne izkušnje ter izkušnje mnogih višjih centralnih bančnikov dejansko kažejo, da sem v času kariere pridobil obsežen in raznolik vpogled v vrsto področij, tako v javnem kot zasebnem sektorju in v akademskih krogih, kar mi bo zagotovo dobro služilo na področju delovanja ECB.
In fact, my own professional experience, as well as that of many senior central banking officials, shows that in the course of my career I have broad and diverse insights in a range of positions both in the public and the private sector as well as academia, which would certainly serve me well in the ECB context.
Kakšen bo vaš osebni pristop k socialnemu dialogu z uslužbenci ECB?
What will be your personal approach of the social dialogue at the ECB?
Uslužbenci ECB so glavna dragocenost te institucije.
ECB staff is the Institution's main asset.
Z njimi si želim vzpostaviti ploden in učinkovit socialni dialog, h kateremu bi prispevalo tudi ohranjanje konstruktivnega sodelovanja z njihovimi predstavniki, ki so bili izvoljeni, da zastopajo interese vseh uslužbencev (tj. z odborom uslužbencev), in tistimi, ki v skladu z ustreznimi merili, zastopajo posebno interesno skupino (tj. s predstavniki reprezentativnih sindikatov).
I would like to nourish a fruitful and effective social dialogue with staff, also fostered by maintaining a constructive cooperation with the staff representatives who have been elected to represent the interest of all staff (i.e. the Staff Committee) and those who, in compliance with the relevant criteria, represent a specific constituency (i.e. recognised trade union representatives).
K temu bi pristopil tako, da bi z obojimi delil informacije, jih že v zgodnji fazi vključeval v svoje delo ter se z njimi posvetoval o pomembnih zadevah.
My approach would be to share information with both, involve them at an early stage and consulting them on relevant matters.
Skratka, s predstavniki uslužbencev nameravam sodelovati v duhu partnerstva, dobre vere in medsebojnega spoštovanja.
All in all, I aim at working with staff representatives amicably in a spirit of partnership, good faith and mutual respect.
Poleg tega ECB, na ravni ESCB/Eurosistema, z izdajo e-novic dvakrat letno in organizacijo dveh letnih sestankov za socialni dialog ESCB v Frankfurtu vzdržuje dialog s predstavniki uslužbencev nacionalnih centralnih bank in z združenji sindikatov, s katerimi so slednje povezane.
Besides, at ESCB/Eurosytem level, the ECB maintains a dialogue with the staff representatives of the constituent central banks and the federations of trade unions to whom they are affiliated, by issuing a bi-annual newsletter and by hosting two annual ESCB Social Dialogue meetings in Frankfurt.
To so pomembna orodja, s pomočjo katerih je predstavnike uslužbencev in združenja sindikatov mogoče obveščati o novostih v zvezi s projekti ESCB/Eurosistema ter z njimi o njih razpravljati.
These are important tools whereby developments concerning ESCB/Eurosytem projects can be shared and discussed with the staff representatives and the federations of trade unions.
S temi praksami nameravam nadaljevati, saj ugodno vplivajo na sodelovanje znotraj sistema in na oblikovanje ekipnega duha.
I intend to continue with these practices with a view to foster intra-system cooperation and team spirit.
Ali bi podprli postopek potrditve v Evropskem parlamentu (kljub ustavnim vprašanjem, ki bi jih sprožila takšna sprememba)?
Would you be in favour of a confirmation procedure by the European Parliament (notwithstanding the constitutional issues that such a change would raise)?
Evropski parlament je v zadnjih letih, in zlasti z Lizbonsko pogodbo, pridobil številne daljnosežne pristojnosti.
The European Parliament has in recent years gained a wide range of far reaching competences, in particular under the Lisbon Treaty.
Pogodba določa tudi jasen postopek imenovanja članov izvršilnega odbora ECB, po katerem ima Evropski parlament, ki lahko kandidate, ki jih predlaga Svet, zasliši in zanje glasuje, posvetovalno vlogo.
The Treaty also provides for a clear appointment procedure for members of the Executive Board of the ECB, giving a consultative role to the European Parliament which holds a hearing and vote on the candidates proposed by the Council.
Menim, da je ta postopek imenovanja ECB vsa ta leta dobro služil.
I believe that this appointment procedure has served well the ECB over the years.
Za tak postopek je bistvenega pomena, da poteka nemoteno in da zagotavlja, kot mu je uspevalo doslej, neprekinjeno delovanje vodstva ter verodostojnost izbirnega postopka v očeh državljanov in trgov EU.
It is essential that such a procedure runs smoothly and ensures, as it has done, appropriate continuity at the helm of the institution and credibility of the selection process towards EU citizens and markets.
V duhu zahteve, naj se člane imenuje med „osebami, ki imajo ugled in poklicne izkušnje na monetarnem ali bančnem področju“, je zagotavljal visoko sposobne in predane osebe, ki jih odlikujeta neodvisnost in poštenost.
In line with the spirit of the requirement to appoint ‘persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters’, the procedure has provided persons of high competence, commitment, independence and integrity.
Glede na rezultate, dosežene s sedanjim postopkom, ne vidim potrebe po njegovih spremembah.
I therefore do not see the need for changes to the current procedure, considering the outcomes that the procedure has obtained.
Da centralne banke lahko učinkovito opravljajo svojo nalogo, morajo imeti visoko stopnjo neodvisnosti.
In order to effectively fulfil their mandate, central banks need to have a high degree of independence.
Ta neodvisnost pa mora iti z roko v roki z odgovornostjo.
This independence must go hand in hand with accountability.
Na demokratično odgovornost centralnih bank lahko gledamo kot na njihovo obveznost, da državljanom ustrezno predstavijo in utemeljijo sprejete odločitve ter pred njimi prevzamejo odgovornost za izpolnjevanje svoje naloge.
The democratic accountability of central banks can be viewed as their obligation to properly explain and justify their decisions and to assume responsibility for fulfilling their mandate towards the citizens.
Centralne banke s svojo odgovornostjo in preglednostjo povečujejo svojo verodostojnost, ki je že v normalnih razmerah pomemben dejavnik, še posebej pomembna pa je v kriznih časih, kakršne trenutno doživljamo.
By being accountable and transparent, central banks increase their credibility, which is a solid asset in normal times and a significant element in crisis times like those we have been experiencing.
Neodvisnost ECB je jasno opredeljena v Pogodbi, ki določa tudi njeno odgovornost.
The ECB’s independence is firmly established within the Treaty which also provides for its accountability.
ECB je najprej in predvsem odgovorna evropskim državljanom, institucionalno pa Evropskemu parlamentu, kot instituciji, ki jo sestavljajo neposredno izvoljeni predstavniki evropske javnosti.
The ECB’s accountability is first and foremost to the European citizens and, institutionally, to the European Parliament, as the institution comprising the directly elected representatives of the European public.
Izpolnjevanje odgovornosti ECB do Evropskega parlamenta je osrednjega pomena za njeno demokratično legitimnost.
The discharging of the ECB’s accountability towards the European Parliament is central to the ECB’s democratic legitimacy.
Zavedam se, da je ECB v preteklosti svoje sodelovanje z Evropskim parlamentom, ne le v zvezi z gospodarskimi in monetarnimi zadevami, ampak tudi v zvezi z lansko reformo nadzornega okvira EU in letošnjim zakonodajnim svežnjem o upravljanju, vedno visoko cenila.
I am aware that in the past the ECB has always highly appreciated its exchanges with the European Parliament, not only on economic and monetary issues but also on the reform of the EU supervisory framework last year and on the governance legislative package this year.
Z veseljem si bom prizadeval za nadaljevanje tega plodnega dialoga.
I am looking forward to pursuing this fruitful dialogue.
Zelo pomembna se mi zdi tudi cela vrsta drugih dobro uveljavljenih sredstev, prek katerih, kot zelo dobro veste, ECB izpolnjuje svojo odgovornost prek meja zakonskih obveznosti.
I also view as very important the array of other, well established, means, through which, as you very well know, the ECB discharges its accountability going beyond statutory obligations.
ECB Evropskemu parlamentu (in Svetu) predstavlja letna poročila; predsednik ECB štirikrat na leto nastopi v odboru ECON; k razpravam o specifičnih tematikah so povabljeni tudi drugi člani Izvršilnega odbora.
The ECB’s Annual Report is presented to the European Parliament (and Council); the ECB’s President appears before the ECON Committee on a quarterly basis; other Executive Board members are invited to hearings on specific topics.
Med dopolnilnimi ukrepi so mesečne tiskovne konference ECB z uvodno izjavo predsednika ECB; mesečni bilten ECB; druge uradne objave; govori in intervjuji članov Izvršilnega odbora.
Complimentary elements include the ECB’s monthly press conferences with the Introductory Statement by the ECB President; the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin; other official publications; speeches and interviews by Executive Board members.
Prepričan sem, da ECB izpolnjuje najstrožje zahteve glede preglednosti in odgovornosti centralne banke, in ta dosežek nameravam ohraniti tudi v prihodnje.
I am convinced the ECB meets the highest requirements in terms of central bank transparency and accountability and I intend to preserve these achievements.
Neodvisna centralna banka mora spoštovati zahteve glede svoje pravne odgovornosti.
An independent central bank must comply with its legal accountability requirements.
Odgovornost je osnovni predpogoj za demokratično legitimnost in njen temeljni element; od neodvisne centralne banke zahteva, da svoje naloge izpolnjuje v skladu z najvišjimi standardi profesionalnosti, in ima bistveno vlogo pri ohranjanju srednjeročne stabilnosti cen.
Accountability is a fundamental precondition for, and a core element of, democratic legitimacy; it imposes discipline on an independent central bank to perform its tasks with highest standards of professionalism and it is essential in order to contribute to the maintenance of price stability over the medium-term.
Pri odgovornosti se upoštevajo načela, ki so določena v Pogodbi.
The process of accountability follows the principles set out in the Treaty.
Tako je ECB odgovorna državljanom EU in njihovim predstavnikom v Evropskem parlamentu, edini evropski instituciji, ki jo neposredno izvolijo državljani EU.
First, the ECB is accountable to EU citizens, and their representatives in the European Parliament, which is the only European institution directly elected by them.
Statut ESCB pa določa, da so seje tajne.
Second, the Statute of the ESCB stipulates that the proceedings of the meetings shall be confidential.
Odgovornost se mora odražati v učinkoviti oskrbi javnosti z informacijami, ki so potrebne za razumevanje odločitev sveta ECB glede denarne politike.
Accountability should be effective in providing the public with information relevant for the understanding of the Governing Council’s monetary policy decisions.
V tem pogledu bi objava prepodrobnih informacij lahko imela celo nasprotni učinek od želenega, ker bi sporočila o politiki lahko postala nejasna.
In this respect, publication of too detailed information may be even counterproductive, because policy messages may become unclear.
Drži, da bi objava zapisnika s številom glasov članov sveta javnosti zagotovila dodatne informacije glede raznolikosti stališč znotraj tega organa.
It is true that the publication of minutes with the balance of votes of the Governing Council members would provide the public with additional information on the diversity of views within the Governing Council.
Vendar pa je svet ECB kolegialen organ odločanja, ki si tako kot številni drugi odbori za denarno politiko prizadeva za kolektivno odgovornost.
However, the ECB’s Governing Council is a collegial decision-making body, and like many other monetary policy committees, pursues collective accountability.
To pomeni, da so njegovi člani skupaj odgovorni za odločitve, ki jih sprejme svet.
This means that the members of the Governing Council are jointly responsible for the decisions taken by the Governing Council.
Sprotna objava zapisnikov bi člane sveta lahko izpostavila neželenim in neprimernim poskusom medijev, da bi člane prikazali kot individualno odgovorne, s čimer bi ogrožala kolektivno odgovornost in osebno neodvisnost članov sveta.
A timely publication of minutes could have the undesirable effect that Governing Council members face undue attempts by the media to make them individually accountable, thereby hampering collective accountability and personal independence.
Poleg tega javnost informacije, ki so potrebne za popolno razumevanje odločitev ECB glede denarne politike, že prejema prek drugih komunikacijskih orodij.
At the same time, other communication tools already ensure that the public receives the information needed to fully understand the ECB’s monetary policy decisions.
Pri ocenjevanju delovanja ECB si slednja pomaga s kvantitativno opredelitvijo stabilnosti cen in strategijo denarne politike; k lažjemu zunanjemu ocenjevanju ECB pripomore sprotna objava zadevnih informacij, na primer v izjavah za javnost, mesečnem biltenu ECB in v predsednikovi uvodni izjavi po mesečnih tiskovnih konferencah.
The quantitative definition of price stability and the monetary policy strategy help the public to assess the performance of the ECB; this external assessment of the ECB is facilitated by the timely publication of relevant information such as in press releases, the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin and the President’s Introductory Statement following the monthly press conferences.
Menim, da je za centralne banke, ki si prizadevajo za stabilnost cen, preglednost bistvenega pomena, kar potrjujejo prakse vseh pomembnejših centralnih bank.
I believe that transparency is essential for central banks aiming at price stability, and that this is confirmed by the practices followed by all the major central banks.
Preglednost prispeva k zmanjšanju negotovosti glede prihodnjih ukrepov glede politike, zmanjšanju nestanovitnosti inflacije in utrditvi inflacijskih pričakovanj.
Transparency contributes to a reduction in uncertainty about future policy actions and in inflation volatility and contributes to the anchoring of inflation expectations.
ECB, Ameriška centralna banka (Fed) in Bank of England so svoje prakse izboljšale in jih lahko danes po preglednosti uvrščamo med vodilne na svetu.
The ECB, the Fed and the Bank of England have improved their practices and today they can be seen among the leading contenders in the world in terms of central bank transparency.
Da centralna banka ustreza zahtevam preglednosti, mora jasno razložiti, kako si razlaga svojo nalogo, ter biti pripravljena obrazložiti cilje svoje politike, s čimer javnosti pomaga nadzorovati in ocenjevati svoje delovanje.
Transparency requires the central bank to clearly explain how it interprets its mandate and to be forthcoming about its policy goals, in order to help the public to monitor and evaluate the central bank’s performance.
Poleg tega mora predstaviti analitični okvir, ki ga uporabi v notranjem procesu odločanja in pri oceni gospodarskega položaja, ter pogosto pojasnjevati ekonomsko logiko, na kateri temeljijo njene odločitve glede politike.
In addition, the central bank needs to explain the analytical framework used for its internal decision-making and its assessment of the state of the economy, and to frequently make clear the economic rationale underlying its policy decisions.
Med centralnimi bankami je zaznati skupno težnjo k večji preglednosti, pri čemer je ECB po mojem mnenju v preteklosti imela veliko vlogo.
There is a common tendency towards greater transparency among central banks, and I believe that in the past the ECB has led the way in many respects.
ECB je napovedala formalno strategijo denarne politike in v skladu s to strategijo politične odločitve redno pojasnjuje.
The ECB has announced a formal monetary policy strategy and regularly explains monetary policy decisions applying that strategy.
Tako ECB kot Bank of England sta pomen stabilnosti cen jasno kvantitativno opredelili.
Both the ECB and the Bank of England have clearly specified in quantitative terms what price stability means.
To za Fed v preteklosti ni veljalo, iz novejših sporočil pa je razvidno, da slednja stabilnost cen opredeljuje na podoben način kot ECB.
This has not been the case for the Fed in the past, but recent communications give indications that the Fed defines price stability in a similar manner as the ECB.
Vse tri centralne banke, Fed, Bank of England in ECB, poudarjajo pomen učinkovitega komuniciranja in ustreznih izmenjav z javnostjo.
All three central bank, the Fed, the Bank of England and the ECB, have stressed the importance of effective communication and proper interaction with the public.