natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
V zvezi s tem opažam, da je ECB – prav po zaslugi te verodostojnosti in ne da bi ogrozila stabilnost cen – hkrati zagotovila tudi bistveno podporo gospodarstvu med zadnjo finančno krizo, s tradicionalnim znižanjem obrestnih mer, in sicer na najnižjo raven v zgodovini, in „nestandardnimi ukrepi“, da bi zagotovila nemoten prenos denarne politike.
In this respect, I observe that – precisely thanks to its credibility and without endangering price stability – the ECB has indeed also been able to provide crucial support to the economy during the latest financial crisis, via conventional interest rate cuts to historically low levels and in addition to “non-standard measures” with a view to ensuring the smooth transmission of monetary policy.
Kot smo videli v zadnjih letih, finančna nestabilnost poleg tega močno ogroža rast in zaposlovanje.
In addition, as we have seen in recent years, financial instability poses a serious threat to growth and employment.
Analiza porajajočih se tveganj za finančno stabilnost in sodelovanje pri oblikovanju nadzornih, regulatornih in drugih finančnih politik, ki naj bi okrepile odpornost finančnega sistema in preprečile tveganja za finančno stabilnost, neposredno na področjih, na katerih ima ECB pristojnost, ali prek njenega sodelovanja v drugih organih, sta prav tako načina, kako prispevati k pogojem za vzdržno rast.
The analysis of evolving financial stability risks and participation in framing supervisory, regulatory and other financial policies to strengthen the resilience of financial system and to head off financial stability risks, directly in areas where the ECB has authority or through its participation in other bodies, are also ways to contribute to conditions for sustainable growth.
Kako ocenjujete institucionalne odnose med ECB, Svetom in/ali euroskupino?
How do you judge the institutional relation between ECB, Council and/or the Eurogroup?
Ali menite, da je treba usklajevanje in gospodarski nadzor znotraj euroskupine izboljšati?
Do you think that the coordination and economic surveillance inside the Eurogroup should be improved?
ECB v skladu z ustreznimi določbami Pogodbe redno sodeluje na sestankih Ecofina, Euroskupine in njunih pripravljalnih odborov.
The ECB participates, on a permanent basis and in line with the relevant Treaty provisions, in the meetings of the ECOFIN Council, the Eurogroup and their preparatory committees.
Poleg tega predsednik ECB pogosto sodeluje na zasedanjih Evropskega sveta, kjer se razpravlja o vprašanjih, ki zadevajo ECB.
In addition, the ECB President frequently takes part in sessions of European Council meetings that discuss matters of concern to the ECB.
Podobno sta predsedujoči Ecofinu in komisar za ekonomske zadeve redno vabljena na zasedanja sveta ECB.
Symmetrically, the President of the Ecofin Council - as well as the Commissioner for Economic Affairs - is regularly invited at the meetings of the ECB Governing Council.
Tako tesen institucionalni odnos ECB omogoča, da ministre obvešča o svojih odločitvah glede denarne politike in o svoji oceni gospodarskih in finančnih gibanj.
Such a close institutional relationship enables the ECB to inform Ministers about its monetary policy decisions and appraisal of economic and financial developments.
ECB poleg tega z državami članicami EU razpravlja o njihovi fiskalni, makroekonomski in strukturni politiki (v okviru gospodarskega nadzora EU), mednarodnih finančnih zadevah in politikah v finančnem sektorju.
In addition, the ECB discusses, with EU Member States, their budgetary, structural and other macroeconomic policies (as part of the EU's economic surveillance), international financial affairs and financial sector policies.
Torej se ponujajo številne priložnosti za stike ECB s Svetom in euroskupino, ob upoštevanju pristojnosti različnih institucij in neodvisnosti ECB.
Therefore, there are many opportunities for the ECB to interact with the Council and the Eurogroup, bearing in mind the respective responsibilities of the various institutions and the independence of the ECB.
Ne glede na to je nujno, da države članice izboljšajo usklajevanje politik in da se gospodarski nadzor okrepi.
Notwithstanding the above, there is a need for Member States to further improve policy coordination and for economic surveillance to be reinforced.
Da bi zagotovili predvsem nemoteno delovanje EMU in v celoti sledili temu, kar s seboj prinaša članstvo v območju z enotno valuto, mora euroskupina svoje razprave usmeriti v dosego vzdržnega fiskalnega položaja v evroobmočju, okrepitev svojega potenciala rasti in se na splošno izogibati nastajanju nevzdržnih nesorazmerij.
In particular, to ensure a smooth functioning of EMU and to fully abide by what membership of a single currency area means, the Eurogroup must focus its discussions on achieving sustainable fiscal positions in the euro area, enhancing its growth potential and, generally, avoid unsustainable imbalances from arising.
To zahteva tudi okrepljen medsebojni pritisk med državami članicami.
This also requires enhanced peer pressure between Member States.
Kakšno je vaše mnenje o zakonodajnih predlogih o reformi gospodarskega upravljanja, o katerih trenutno teče razprava?
What do you think of the "economic governance reform" draft legislative proposals currently discussed?
Trenutna prizadevanja za okrepitev gospodarskega upravljanja v EU in evroobmočju so nadvse pomembna.
The current efforts to strengthen economic governance in the EU and the euro area are of the utmost importance.
Zlasti v evroobmočju je treba poglobiti in razširiti nadzor v skladu z že doseženo stopnjo gospodarske povezanosti ter v podporo nemotenemu delovanju EMU.
In particular within the euro area, there is a need to deepen and broaden surveillance so as to reflect the deep level of economic integration that has already been achieved and to support the smooth functioning of EMU.
Obstoječa pravila in postopki niso zagotovili preudarnih fiskalnih politik v vseh državah: mnoge države članice so v krizo vstopile z že visokim javnim dolgom in nezadostnim manevrskim prostorom.
Existing rules and procedures did not guarantee prudent fiscal policies in all countries: many Member States entered the crisis with an already high public debt and insufficient margins of manoeuvre.
Poleg tega makroekonomska neravnovesja niso dobila primerne vloge pri oblikovanju upravljanja EMU: stiske glede državnega dolga niso prizadele samo držav s težavami na področju javnih financ, temveč tudi tiste z visokim zunanjim primanjkljajem, neuravnoteženo rastjo ali zelo zadolženim zasebnim sektorjem.
Moreover, macroeconomic imbalances were not given an adequate role in the design of EMU governance: sovereign debt tensions hit not only countries with problems of public finances, but also those with a high external deficit, unbalanced growth and/or a highly indebted private sector.
Navsezadnje je manjkal tudi ustrezen okvir za zaščito finančne stabilnosti evroobmočja v kriznih razmerah.
Finally, an appropriate framework to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area in crisis situations was missing altogether.
V tem pogledu sta nova usmerjenost v zmanjšanje visokega javnega dolga in omejevanje rasti javne porabe pomembna koraka za okrepitev fiskalnega nadzora.
In this respect, the new focus on correcting high government debt and containing public spending growth are important steps to reinforce fiscal surveillance.
Poleg tega je treba nakopičena dolgotrajna makroekonomska neravnovesja v evroobmočju prepričljivo obravnavati znotraj novega okvira.
In addition, the build-up of lasting macroeconomic imbalances within the euro area needs to be addressed convincingly in the new framework.
Zato zelo podpiram razširitev področja nadzora.
I therefore very much support the broadening of the scope of surveillance.
Da bo novi okvir makroekonomskega nadzora učinkovit, se mora usmeriti na škodljiva neravnovesja, predvsem vztrajno izgubo konkurenčnosti, ter upoštevati specifične značilnosti evroobmočja.
To be effective, the new macroeconomic surveillance framework must focus on the most harmful imbalances, in particular persistent losses of competitiveness, and take into account the specificities of the euro area.
Uvedba tako imenovanega evropskega semestra naj bi zagotovila, da bodo različni procesi nadzora prinesli skladne rezultate, hkrati pa bodo ostali pravno in postopkovno ločeni.
The introduction of the so-called “European Semester” should ensure that the various surveillance processes lead to consistent results, while remaining legally and procedurally separate.
Odločno odobravam predloge Evropskega parlamenta za večjo stopnjo samodejnosti v postopkih nadzora, tako da bodo odkloni od trdnih politik takoj odpravljeni.
I very much welcome proposals by the European Parliament to introduce greater automaticity in surveillance procedures so as to immediately correct deviations from sound policy making.
Po mojem mnenju je to ključnega pomena za večjo skladnost s priporočili politik ter boljšo verodostojnost nadzornega okvira.
In my view, this is key in improving compliance with policy recommendations and enhancing the credibility of the surveillance framework.
Zato bi morali izkoristiti vse možnosti v tej smeri, vključno s pogostejšo uporabo obratnega glasovanja s kvalificirano večino, kadar je to mogoče: predlogi Parlamenta za uvedbo političnih ukrepov in ukrepov, ki se nanašajo na ugled, namenjenih spodbujanju čimprejšnje skladnosti z nadzornim okvirom, zgodnejša in bolj postopna uporaba finančnih sankcij ter uvedba nove kazni za potvarjanje statistike ter strožje minimalne zahteve za nacionalne proračunske okvire držav evroobmočja so nadaljnji ukrepi v pravi smeri, da bi nadzor postal bolj učinkovit in da bi odpravili nekatere pretekle napake.
We should therefore exploit all possibilities in this regard, including greater use of reversed qualified majority voting where possible: proposals by Parliament to introduce political and reputational measures to foster early compliance with the surveillance framework; earlier and more gradual application of financial sanctions and the introduction of a new fine in case of falsification of statistics; as well as stricter minimum requirements for the national budgetary frameworks of euro area countries are further steps in the right direction to make surveillance more effective and correct some of the mistakes that were made in the past.
Zdaj je zelo pomembno, da se zagon za reforme izkoristi za uspešno dokončanje trenutnega trialoga do junijskega roka, ki ga je zastavil Evropski svet, ter da privede do drznega kompromisa med Svetom in Parlamentom, ki bo vključeval tudi Komisijo, pri čemer bodo v celoti izkoriščene možnosti, ki izhajajo iz Pogodb.
It is now of the greatest importance that the reform momentum that has been created is used to conclude successfully the ongoing trialogue by the June 2011 deadline set by the European Council, resulting in an ambitious compromise between the Council and the Parliament, also involving the Commission, exploiting fully the possibilities offered by the Treaties.
Nezavezujoč dogovor o evropskem mehanizmu za stabilnost (ESM), sprejet na Evropskem svetu 24.–25. marca 2011, predvideva vključitev ECB v nekatere dele postopkov ESM.
The Term Sheet on the ESM agreed by the European Council on 24-25 March 2011 foresees the involvement of the ECB in parts of the ESM's processes.
Prvič, po prošnji države članice iz evroobmočja za pomoč bo ECB v povezavi s Komisijo in Mednarodnim denarnim skladom ocenila, ali je ogrožena finančna stabilnost evroobmočja kot celote, kar bi zahtevalo aktiviranje ESM in v tem primeru izvedbo temeljite analize vzdržnosti javnega zadolževanja.
First, following a request for financial assistance from a euro area Member State, the ECB will liaise with the Commission and the IMF in assessing whether there is a risk to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole warranting an activation of the ESM and, if so, in conducting a rigorous debt sustainability analysis.
Drugič, če se bo na podlagi analize vzdržnosti ocenilo, da lahko program za makroekonomsko prilagoditev stvarno povrne javni dolg v vzdržno smer, bo ECB v povezavi s Komisijo in Mednarodnim denarnim skladom ocenila dejanske potrebe države članice po financiranju.
Second, if, on the basis of a sustainability analysis, it is concluded that a macroeconomic adjustment programme can realistically restore the public debt to a sustainable path, the ECB will liaise with the Commission and the IMF in assessing the actual financing needs of the Member State concerned.
Tretjič, osebje ECB bo prispevalo, kjer je to ustrezno, tudi s svojim tehničnim znanjem, k pogajanjem o programu za makroekonomsko prilagoditev ter poznejšemu spremljanju izvajanja takega programa.
Third, ECB staff will contribute, with its technical expertise where relevant, to the negotiation of a macroeconomic adjustment programme and the subsequent monitoring of the implementation of such programme.
To sledi uveljavljeni praksi za posojila Grčiji in pomoč iz evropskega instrumenta za finančno stabilnost (EFSF) in evropskega mehanizma za finančno stabilizacijo (EFSM).
This follows the established practice for the Greek Loan Facility and for assistance under the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM).
Tako kot za operacije denarne politike v Eurosistemu se bodo kot jamstvo lahko uporabljali dolžniški instrumenti, ki jih bo izdal ESM (kot obveznice EFSF); ESM kot tak ne bo imel dostopa do operacij denarne politike v Eurosistemu.
As for Eurosystem monetary policy operations, debt instruments issued by the ESM (like EFSF bonds) will be eligible as collateral; the ESM itself will not be granted access to Eurosystem monetary policy operations.
Kaj bi izdaja evroobveznic pomenila za gospodarsko upravljanje v evroobmočju?
What would the issuance of Eurobonds imply for economic governance in the euro area?
„Evroobveznice“ ali obveznice s skupnim jamstvom vseh držav članic evroobmočja naj bi bile instrument za povečevanje obsega in likvidnosti na trgih državnih dolgov, ki bi znižal stroške zadolževanja in predstavljal mehanizem za reševanje sedanje krize državnega dolga.
‘Eurobonds’, or bonds guaranteed in a joint and several manner by all euro area Member States, have been proposed as an instrument to increase the size and liquidity of sovereign debt markets which, in turn, would reduce borrowing costs and constitute a possible mechanism to resolve the ongoing sovereign debt crisis.
Toda obstoječi institucionalni okvir, v katerem so fiskalne politike decentralizirane, ni skladen z zgoraj opisanim konceptom evroobveznic.
However, the current institutional framework where fiscal policies are decentralized is not compatible with a concept of Eurobonds as described above.
Enotna dolgoročnejša obrestna mera za celotno evroobmočje bi prinesla predvsem posredno subvencijo, ki bi jo države članice s trdnim fiskalnim sistemom plačevale državam članicam z manj trdnim fiskalnim sistemom.
Most importantly, a single euro area-wide longer-term interest rate would introduce an implicit subsidy from fiscally sound to fiscally less sound Member States.
Tako bi lahko neprimerno nagrajevali nepremišljene politike in ogrozili spodbude za fiskalno preudarnost v prihodnosti.
This might unduly reward unsound policies and impair incentives for fiscal prudence in the future.
Hkrati bi se pred očmi fiskalno preudarnih držav članic del koristi te preudarnosti prenesel v druge države.
At the same time, fiscally sound Member States would see part of the benefits of their prudence transferred to other states.
Obstajajo kompleksnejši predlogi, v skladu s katerimi evroobveznice ne bi v celoti nadomestile državnih, a se zaenkrat zdi, da so tudi ti povezani s tehničnimi in ekonomskimi težavami.
There are more complex proposals, in which Eurobonds do not fully replace national issuances, but at this stage they also seem to present technical and economic problems.
Iz teh razlogov bi bilo izdajanje evroobveznic ustrezno le v institucionalnem okviru, v katerem bi se določen del pristojnosti na fiskalnem področju prenesel z nacionalne ravni na raven Unije, s čimer bi se internalizirale tako koristi kot tudi obveznosti v zvezi z izdajanjem evroobveznic.
For these reasons, the issuance of Eurobonds would only seem appropriate in an institutional framework where some degree of fiscal competence is transferred from the national to the union level, thereby internalising both the benefits and the responsibilities related to Eurobond issuance.
Vendar bi bile za to potrebne velike institucionalne spremembe, ki v sedanjih razmerah verjetno ne bi bile deležne velike podpore.
This avenue, however, would require major institutional changes that appear unlikely to gain widespread support at the current juncture.
Kako bi se po vašem mnenju morala odzvati ECB na dejanske odbitke vrednosti državnih obveznic, katerih izdajatelj je država članica evroobmočja?
How in your view should the ECB react if a haircut on government bonds of a Eurozone Member State became reality?
Odbitki vrednosti državnih obveznic so posledica procesa prestrukturiranja državnega dolga.
A haircut in government bonds is the consequence of a sovereign debt restructuring process.
Prestrukturiranje dolga prinaša več stroškov kot koristi.
A debt restructuring is an option whose costs would outweigh the benefits.
Ob polnem izvajanju programa reform v Grčiji bi se začelo razmerje med dolgom in BDP trajnostno zniževati po letu 2013.
With the adjustment programme for Greece being fully implemented, the debt-to-GDP ratio would start declining in a durable manner after 2013.
Jasno je, da gre za velik izziv; toda v primerjavi z vsemi drugimi možnostmi je izvajanje gospodarskega programa najverjetneje najcenejša pot naprej za vse vpletene strani.
It is clear that this represents a major challenge; however, compared to any alternative, delivering the economic programme remains, with all probability, the least costly way forward for all parties involved
V primeru prestrukturiranja bi bila hkrati ogrožena ustreznost zavarovanja državnih obveznic in verjetno tudi obveznic vseh drugih izdajateljev v zadevni državi.
In case of a restructuring, the collateral adequacy of the government bonds concerned - and probably of all other issuers of the country - would be undermined.
Prav tako bi bila najverjetneje ogrožena finančna trdnost domačih bank (ki so v splošnem zelo izpostavljene prestrukturiranim obveznicam).
In the same vein, the financial soundness of the domestic banks (that are generally heavily exposed to the restructured bonds) would be most likely impaired.
Poleg tega je prestrukturiranje državnega dolga povezano z resnimi finančnimi in makroekonomskimi tveganji.
Moreover, a sovereign debt restructuring would imply severe financial and macroeconomic risks.
Zaradi prestrukturiranja v državi članici evroobmočja je lahko znatno ogrožena stabilnost finančnega sistema, kar močno vpliva na obete za rast v evroobmočju.
A restructuring in a euro area member state poses a significant risk of destabilising the financial system, with severe consequences for the growth outlook of the euro area.
Prav tako ni mogoče izključiti znatnih učinkov na druge države članice evroobmočja, z izgubo zaupanja in poslabšanjem pričakovanj v zvezi s prihodnjim prestrukturiranjem v tej ali kateri drugi državi.
Finally, significant spill-over effects on other euro area countries cannot be excluded, with a negative impact on confidence and expectations of further restructuring in the country concerned or elsewhere.
V državah članicah evroobmočja bi se lahko pojavili dvomi o vzdržnosti dolga in večje obrestne marže.
Doubts about debt sustainability and higher spreads could emerge across euro area countries.
Za rešitev krize državnega dolga v evroobmočju je potrebna fiskalna disciplina in po potrebi konsolidacija.
The way forward to solving any sovereign debt crisis in the euro area relies on fiscal discipline and consolidation when needed.
Konkretneje to pomeni, da bi morale države članice še naprej izvajati ambiciozne ukrepe za konsolidacijo, dokler ne bi bili pretirani primanjkljaji odpravljeni, pri čemer bi čim prej jasno opredelile tudi povezane davčne in varčevalne ukrepe.
More specifically, countries should maintain ambitious consolidation efforts until excessive deficits are corrected, clearly specifying the underlying tax and spending measures as soon as possible.
Okrepiti je treba javnofinančno upravljanje (s sprejetjem strogih večletnih fiskalnih predpisov in sankcij v primeru neizvajanja), da bi povečali verodostojnost prihodnjih ciljev na fiskalnem področju.
Fiscal governance should be strengthened (adopting stringent multi-annual fiscal rules with sanctions in case of non-compliance) to foster credibility of the fiscal target in later years.
Ključne so tudi gospodarske reforme za spodbujanje konkurenčnosti in rasti.
Economic reforms to stimulate competitiveness and growth are also crucial.
Zato bi morala ECB v primeru, če bi res prišlo do takih neljubih razmer, seveda ukrepati v okviru, ki ga določa Pogodba (gl. tudi 16. vprašanje).
Therefore, in the unfortunate event that such an outcome occurs, the ECB would of course have to operate within the margins set out by the Treaty (also see question 16).
Ali predstavljata mandat ECB in dejstvo, da ima le-ta obveznice držav članic evroobmočja, za navzkrižje interesov?
Does the ECB´s mandate and the fact that it holds bonds of Eurozone Member States create a conflict of interest ?
Naj najprej opozorim na tri bistvene značilnosti našega programa trga vrednostnih papirjev: po svoji naravi je začasen in vrednostno omejen, njegovi denarni učinki pa se v celoti sterilizirajo.
Let me first of all recall three essential features of our Securities Market Programme (SMP): it is by its very nature temporary, it is of limited amount and its monetary effects are fully sterilised.
Namen odločitve o nakupu (državnih) obveznic držav članic evroobmočja (in drugih že uvedenih začasnih nestandardnih ukrepov) je bil zagotoviti globino in likvidnost na tistih segmentih trga javnega in zasebnega dolga, ki niso več opravljali svoje funkcije, da bi tako ohranili mehanizem prenosa denarne politike.
The decision to purchase (government) bonds of euro area countries was taken (in addition to other temporary non-standard policy measures already in place) to support the depth and liquidity in those euro area public and private debt securities market segments which had become dysfunctional, in order to preserve the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
To delovanje je nepogrešljivo, če želimo zagotoviti učinkovito izvajanje denarne politike.
Such functioning is indispensable for an effective conduct of monetary policy.
Tako je bilo posredovanje ECB na nekaterih trgih državnih obveznic ključno, saj je lahko ECB tako še naprej izvajala svojo funkcijo, tj. zagotavljala srednjeročno stabilnost cen v celotnem evroobmočju.
In this respect, the ECB’s intervention in some government bond markets have been essential in allowing the ECB to continue to deliver what it is expected to deliver, namely price stability over the medium term for the euro area as a whole.
Tako dejstvo, da ima ECB državne obveznice nekaterih držav članic evroobmočja, nikakor ne vpliva na njeno delovanje in izvajanje mandata.
Thus, the ECB’s actions to continue achieving its mandate are in no way affected by the fact that it holds sovereign bonds of some euro area Member States.
ECB namerava kupljene obveznice obdržati do dospetja.
The ECB intends to hold the bonds purchased until maturity.
Na njeno bilanco stanja torej ne vplivajo nihanja tržnih cen zaradi sprememb naravnanosti denarne politike.
Its balance sheet is therefore not affected by any fluctuations in market prices on account of changes in the monetary policy stance.
Povedano bolj splošno, odločitve ECB o standardnih ukrepih – ključnih obrestnih merah ECB – niso nikakor povezane z nestandardnimi ukrepi.
More in general, decisions on the ECB’s standard measures – the key ECB interest rates - are taken independently of the non-standard measures.