natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
da pozove visoko predstavnico Unije za zunanje zadeve in varnostno politiko in komisarko za mednarodno sodelovanje, humanitarno pomoč in krizno odzivanje, naj prevzameta vodilno vlogo pri usklajevanju kriznega odzivanja Unije in pri tem uporabita pristojnosti iz Lizbonske pogodbe za učinkovitejše usklajevanje odzivanja Unije na prihodnje krize, ob tem pa upoštevata že opravljeno delo;
that it call on the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response to play a leading role in coordinating the Union’s crisis response, using the responsibilities created under the Lisbon Treaty to coordinate the Union’s response to future crises more effectively, while building on what has already been achieved.
3. priznava, da mora biti uporaba vojaških in civilnih obrambnih sredstev za pomoč ob nesrečah res zadnja možnost, kar je v skladu z evropskim soglasjem o humanitarni pomoči in smernicami iz Osla; opominja, da vojaška sredstva pogosto pomembno prispevajo k odzivanju na nesreče, skupaj s civilno zaščito in humanitarno pomočjo, in opaža, da so včasih potrebna za zapolnjevanje kritičnih vrzeli v zmogljivosti (zlasti strateški most, specializirana sredstva, težka industrija in transport); zato poudarja, da je treba razviti celosten pristop, izboljšati sinergije med civilnimi in vojaškimi zmogljivostmi ter opredeliti področja, kjer bi lahko države članice združile svoja prizadevanja in zmogljivosti na ravni EU, da bi prispevale k odzivanju EU na nesreče, kar je še posebej pomembno v težavnem gospodarskem ozračju;
Acknowledges that military and civil defence assets in disaster relief should be used as a last resort, in compliance with the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid and the Oslo Guidelines; recalls that military means often constitute an important contribution to disaster response, along with civil protection and humanitarian aid, and notes that military assets can be necessary for filling critical capacity gaps (particularly strategic lift, specialised assets, heavy engineering and transport); therefore stresses the need to develop a comprehensive approach and to improve synergies between civil and military capabilities, and to identify areas in which Member States can pool their efforts and capabilities at EU level to contribute to EU disaster response, which is particularly important in a difficult economic climate;
5. spodbuja Svet, naj nadaljuje potekajočo razpravo o izboljšanju predvidljivosti mehanizma za civilno zaščito EU, in poziva k takojšnji ustanovitvi enote EU za civilno zaščito, kot je bilo predlagano v Barnierovem poročilu že leta 2006;
Encourages the Council to continue on-going discussions about improving the predictability of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and calls for the immediate establishment of an EU Civil Protection Force, as suggested by the Barnier report as long ago as 2006;
Gabriele Albertini, Pino Arlacchi, Franziska Katharina Brantner, Frieda Brepoels, Elmar Brok, Arnaud Danjean, Mário David, Marietta Gianaku (Marietta Giannakou), Ana Gomes, Andrzej Grzyb, Takis Hadzigeorgiu (Takis Hadjigeorgiou), Anneli Jäätteenmäki, Tunne Kelam, Andrej Kovačev (Andrey Kovatchev), Eduard Kukan, Vytautas Landsbergis, Sabine Lösing, Ulrike Lunacek, Kiriakos Mavronikolas (Kyriakos Mavronikolas), Alexander Mirsky, Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, Raimon Obiols, Kristiina Ojuland, Ria Oomen-Ruijten, Pier Antonio Panzeri, Vincent Peillon, Alojz Peterle, Hans-Gert Pöttering, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, Nikolaos Salavrakos, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Werner Schulz, Adrian Severin, Charles Tannock, Zoran Thaler, Geoffrey Van Orden, Kristian Vigenin, Graham Watson
Gabriele Albertini, Pino Arlacchi, Franziska Katharina Brantner, Frieda Brepoels, Elmar Brok, Arnaud Danjean, Mário David, Marietta Giannakou, Ana Gomes, Andrzej Grzyb, Takis Hadjigeorgiou, Anneli Jäätteenmäki, Tunne Kelam, Andrey Kovatchev, Eduard Kukan, Vytautas Landsbergis, Sabine Lösing, Ulrike Lunacek, Kyriakos Mavronikolas, Alexander Mirsky, Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, Raimon Obiols, Kristiina Ojuland, Ria Oomen-Ruijten, Pier Antonio Panzeri, Vincent Peillon, Alojz Peterle, Hans-Gert Pöttering, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, Nikolaos Salavrakos, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Werner Schulz, Adrian Severin, Charles Tannock, Zoran Thaler, Geoffrey Van Orden, Kristian Vigenin, Graham Watson
Christian Ehler, Kinga Gál, Georgios Kumucakos (Georgios Koumoutsakos), Barbara Lochbihler, Norbert Neuser, Vittorio Prodi, Potito Salatto, Judith Sargentini, Marietje Schaake, Traian Ungureanu, Renate Weber
Christian Ehler, Kinga Gál, Georgios Koumoutsakos, Barbara Lochbihler, Norbert Neuser, Vittorio Prodi, Potito Salatto, Judith Sargentini, Marietje Schaake, Traian Ungureanu, Renate Weber
Thijs Berman, Corina Creţu, Nirj Deva, Charles Goerens, Catherine Grèze, András Gyürk, Eva Joly, Filip Kaczmarek, Gay Mitchell, Norbert Neuser, Bill Newton Dunn, Maurice Ponga, Birgit Schnieber-Jastram, Michèle Striffler, Alf Svensson, Maria Eleni Kopa (Maria Eleni Koppa), Ivo Vajgl, Anna Záborská, Iva Zanicchi
Thijs Berman, Corina Creţu, Nirj Deva, Charles Goerens, Catherine Grèze, András Gyürk, Eva Joly, Filip Kaczmarek, Gay Mitchell, Norbert Neuser, Bill Newton Dunn, Maurice Ponga, Birgit Schnieber-Jastram, Michèle Striffler, Alf Svensson, Eleni Theocharous, Ivo Vajgl, Anna Záborská, Iva Zanicchi
o novi strategiji za Afganistan
on a new strategy for Afghanistan
Poročevalec: Pino Arlacchi
Rapporteur: Pino Arlacchi
MNENJE Odbora za razvoj ...........................................................................................25
OPINION of the Committee on Development ......................................................26
– ob upoštevanju svojih prejšnjih resolucij o Afganistanu, zlasti resolucij z dne 8. julija 2008 o stabilizaciji Afganistana
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Afghanistan, in particular its resolutions of 8 July 2008 on the stabilisation of Afghanistan
11. , z dne 15. januarja 2009 o proračunskem nadzoru sredstev EU v Afganistanu
11. , of 15 January 2009 on the budgetary control of EU funds in Afghanistan
87. in z dne 24. aprila 2009 o pravicah žensk v Afganistanu
87. , and of 24 April 2009 on women’s rights in Afghanistan
– ob upoštevanju skupne politične deklaracije EU–Afganistan, podpisane 16. novembra 2005, ki temelji na skupnih prednostnih nalogah za Afganistan, kot so vzpostavitev trdnih in odgovornih institucij, reforme varnostnega in pravosodnega sektorja, boj proti mamilom, razvoj in obnova,
– having regard to the EU-Afghanistan joint political declaration signed on 16 November 2005, which is based on shared priorities for Afghanistan such as the establishment of strong and accountable institutions, security and justice sector reform, counter-narcotics, development and reconstruction,
– ob upoštevanju Afganistanskega dogovora iz leta 2006, ki določa tri glavna področja dejavnosti afganistanske vlade za naslednjih pet let: varnost, upravljanje, pravna država in človekove pravice ter gospodarski in družbeni razvoj, pa tudi zaveza k odpravi industrije mamil,
– having regard to the Afghanistan Compact of 2006, which set out the Afghan Government’s three main areas for activity for the subsequent five years: security; governance, rule of law, human rights; and economic and social development, as well as a commitment to the elimination of the narcotics industry,
– ob upoštevanju konference o Afganistanu v Londonu januarja 2010, kjer je mednarodna skupnost obnovila svojo zavezo do Afganistana in kjer so bili opredeljeni temelji za mednarodno soglasje o strategiji za nevojaško rešitev afganistanske krize ter o določitvi, da se bo prehod varnostnih pristojnosti na afganistanske sile začel leta 2011 in bo v veliki meri zaključen do leta 2014,
– having regard to the London Conference on Afghanistan held in January 2010, where the international community renewed its commitment to Afghanistan, and which laid the foundations for an international consensus on a strategy entailing a ‘non-military’ solution to the Afghan crisis, as well as establishing that the transfer of security responsibilities to Afghan forces would begin in 2011 and be largely completed by 2014,
– ob upoštevanju resolucije št. 1890 (2009) Varnostnega sveta ZN, ki v skladu s poglavjem VII Ustanovne listine ZN podaljšuje dovoljenje Mednarodnim varnostnim silam za pomoč (Isaf) v Afganistanu, kot je opredeljeno v resolucijah št. 1386 (2001) in št. 1510 (2003), za obdobje dvanajstih mesecev po 13. oktobru 2009 in ki poziva države članice OZN, sodelujoče v okviru Isaf, naj "sprejmejo vse potrebne ukrepe za izpolnitev svojega mandata",
– having regard to Resolution 1890 (2009) of the UN Security Council, which extends the authorisation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as defined in Resolutions 1386 (2001) and 1510 (2003), for a period of 12 months beyond 13 October 2009, and calls on the UN member states participating in ISAF ‘to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate’,
– ob upoštevanju predlaganega skrbniškega sklada za vzpostavitev miru in ponovno vključevanje, za katerega so se udeleženci konference v Londonu zavezali k začetni vsoti 140 milijonov USD, z namenom vključevanja talibanov in drugih upornikov,
– having regard to the proposed ‘Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund’ to which London Conference participants pledged an initial sum of USD 140 million, with the aim of integrating Taliban and other insurgents,
– ob upoštevanju afganistanske nacionalne posvetovalne mirovne skupščine v Kabulu z začetka junija 2010, ki je sklenila doseči nacionalno soglasje glede vprašanja sprave s sovražniki,
– having regard to Afghanistan’s National Consultative Peace Jirga held in Kabul at the beginning of June 2010, which set out to find a national consensus on the issue of reconciliation with enemies,
– ob upoštevanju konference v Kabulu z dne 20. julija 2010, na kateri je bil ocenjen napredek pri izvajanju odločitev, sprejetih na konferenci v Londonu, in ki je afganistanski vladi ponudila novo priložnost, da pokaže svojo vodilno vlogo in dejavno sodelovanje v tem procesu v sodelovanju z mednarodno skupnostjo pri krepitvi varnosti in zmogljivosti afganistanskih varnostnih sil, izboljšanju dobrega upravljanja in pravne države, ter opredeli naslednje korake, tudi glede boja proti proizvodnji drog in trgovanju z njimi ter korupciji, glede miru in varnosti, gospodarskega in družbenega razvoja, človekovih pravic in enakosti med spoloma; ob upoštevanju sklepov konference v Kabulu, v katerih je določeno, da se nadzor vseh vojaških operacij v vseh pokrajinah do konca leta 2014 prenese na afganistanske enote,
– having regard to the Kabul Conference held on 20 July 2010, which assessed progress in implementing decisions taken at the London Conference, and provided a fresh opportunity for the Afghan Government to show leadership and ownership of the process, with the cooperation of the international community, in strengthening security, reinforcing the capabilities of the Afghan security forces and improving good governance and the rule of law, and to chart the way forward, including on combating drug production and trafficking and corruption, and on peace and security, economic and social development, human rights and gender equality; having regard to the conclusions of the Kabul Conference establishing that control of military operations in all provinces is to be transferred to the Afghan forces by the end of 2014,
– ob upoštevanju predsedniškega odloka z dne 17. avgusta 2010, s katerim je bil za zasebne družbe za varovanje, prisotne v Afganistanu, določen štirimesečni rok za razpustitev, z izjemo zasebnih podjetij za varovanje, delujočih na zaprtih območjih, ki jih uporabljajo tuja veleposlaništva, podjetja in nevladne organizacije,
– having regard to the presidential decree of 17 August 2010, which set a four-month deadline for private security companies present in Afghanistan to disband, with an exception for private security firms working inside compounds used by foreign embassies, businesses and NGOs,
– ob upoštevanju predsedniških volitev v Afganistanu avgusta 2009, odločilnega končnega poročila misije EU za opazovanje volitev, objavljenega decembra 2009, in parlamentarnih volitev z dne 18. septembra 2010,
– having regard to the presidential elections held in Afghanistan in August 2009, to the critical final report of the EU Election Observation Mission published in December 2009, and to the parliamentary elections held on 18 September 2010,
– ob upoštevanju vseh pomembnih sklepov Sveta in zlasti sklepov GAERC z dne 27. oktobra 2009, akcijskega načrta Sveta za okrepljeno sodelovanje v Afganistanu in Pakistanu ter sklepov Sveta za zunanje zadeve z dne 22. marca 2010,
– having regard to all the relevant Council Conclusions, in particular the GAERC Conclusions of 27 October 2009 and the Council’s Action Plan for Enhanced Engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions of 22 March 2010,
– ob upoštevanju imenovanja 1. aprila 2010 posebnega predstavnika EU/vodje delegacije EU za Afganistan in ob upoštevanju sklepa Sveta z dne 11. avgusta 2010 o podaljšanju mandata posebnega predstavnika Vygaudasa USACKASA do 31. avgusta 2011,
– having regard to the appointment, as of 1 April 2010, of a ‘double-hatted’ EU Special Representative/ Head of EU Delegation to Afghanistan, and having regard to the Council decision of 11 August 2010 extending the mandate of Special Representative Vygaudas Usackas until 31 August 2011,
– ob upoštevanju izjave Sveta z dne 18. maja 2010 o podaljšanju policijske misije Evropske unije v Afganistanu (EUPOL Afganistan) za tri leta, od 31. maja 2010 do 31. maja 2013,
– having regard to the Council declaration of 18 May 2010 extending the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) for three years, from 31 May 2010 to 31 May 2013,
– ob upoštevanju državnega strateškega dokumenta za obdobje 2007–2013, ki določa zavezo Komisije glede Afganistana do leta 2013,
– having regard to the Country Strategy Paper for 2007-2013 which sets out the Commission’s commitment to Afghanistan until 2013,
– ob upoštevanju poročila OZN o človekovem razvoju za leto 2009, ki Afganistan postavlja na 181. mesto od 182 držav,
– having regard to the United Nations 2009 Human Development Report, which ranks Afghanistan 181st out of 182 countries,
– ob upoštevanju ocene nacionalnega tveganja in izpostavljenosti za obdobje 2007–2008, ki jo je pripravil sam Afganistan, in njenih predvidevanj, da je za odpravo revščine v Afganistanu potrebnih približno 570 milijonov USD, da bi ljudi, ki živijo pod pragom revščine, dvignil nad ta prag,
– having regard to Afghanistan’s own National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007‑2008 and its estimates that the cost of eliminating poverty in Afghanistan by lifting all those below it up to the poverty threshold would be some USD 570 million,
– ob upoštevanju poročila za leto 2008 agencije za usklajevanje pomoči v Afganistanu (ACBAR) o nedoseganju učinkovitosti pomoči v Afganistanu, v katerem so poudarjeni ogromni zneski pomoči, ki se na koncu spremenijo v poslovne dobičke za izvajalce (tudi do 50 % na pogodbo), pomanjkanje preglednosti pri javnih naročilih in razpisih ter visoki stroški plač in nadomestil za delavce, ki so napoteni v tujino,
– having regard to the 2008 report by the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), ‘Falling Short – Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan’ , which highlights the vast sums of aid ending up as corporate profits for contractors (as much as 50% per contract), the minimal transparency in procurement and tendering processes, and the high cost of expatriate salaries and allowances,
– ob upoštevanju poročila misije Združenih narodov za pomoč v Afganistanu (MANUA) o zaščiti civilnega prebivalstva v oboroženih konfliktih iz avgusta 2010,
– having regard to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) report of August 2010 on ‘Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’,
– ob upoštevanju priporočil sklada Peace Dividend Trust, ki zagovarja politiko dajanja prednosti Afganistancem in spodbuja lokalna afganistanska javna naročila blaga in storitev namesto njihovega uvažanja, pri čemer naj bi imeli največjo korist Afganistanci,
– having regard to the recommendations of the Peace Dividend Trust, which advocate an ‘Afghan first’ policy, encouraging local Afghan procurement of goods and services, as opposed to importing them, with the aim of benefiting Afghans first and foremost,
– ob upoštevanju strategije Nata in Isafa za boj proti upornikom v Afganistanu in njenega izvajanja pod poveljstvom generala Davida Petraeusa, in ob upoštevanju pregleda strategije, ki ga je za december 2010 napovedal predsednik Obama,
– having regard to the NATO/ISAF counter-insurgency strategy for Afghanistan and its implementation under the command of General David Petraeus, and to the strategy review announced by President Obama for December 2010,
– ob upoštevanju poročila osebja kongresne večine ZDA (US Congressional Majority Staff) o vojnih poglavarjih ter izsiljevanju in korupciji v dobavni verigi ZDA v Afganistanu (odbor za nadzor in vladno reformo, predstavniški dom ZDA, junij 2010),
– having regard to the US Congressional Majority Staff report entitled ‘Warlord, Inc: Extortion and Corruption Along the US Supply Chain in Afghanistan’ (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, US House of Representatives, June 2010),
– ob upoštevanju prizadevanj Urada OZN za droge in preprečevanje kriminala (UNODC) in zlasti njegovega poročila z oktobra 2009 o zasvojenosti, zločinu in uporu ter nadnacionalni grožnji afganistanskega opija ter svetovnega poročila tega urada o drogah za leto 2010,
– having regard to the work of the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and, in particular, its October 2009 report on ‘Addiction, Crime and Insurgency – the transnational threat of Afghanistan opium’ and its World Drug Report 2010,
– ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora za zunanje zadeve in mnenja Odbora za razvoj ( A7–0333/2010 ),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Development ( A7‑0333/2010 ),
A. ker je mednarodna skupnost večkrat poudarila, da podpira zadevne resolucije Varnostnega sveta Združenih narodov, ki zagovarjajo varnost, blaginjo in človekove pravice vseh afganistanskih državljanov; ker je kljub temu mednarodna skupnost izrecno priznala, da devet let vojne in mednarodne vpletenosti ni bilo uspešnih pri izkoreninjanju talibanskega upora ter vzpostavljanju miru in stabilnosti v državi; ker je bila leta 2009 uvedena nova politika boja proti upornikom ter so bile vojaške sile okrepljene s približno 45.000 vojaki,
A. whereas the international community has repeatedly reaffirmed its support for the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions upholding the security, prosperity and human rights of all Afghan citizens; whereas, however, the international community has implicitly recognised that nine years of war and international involvement have not succeeded in eliminating the Taliban insurgency and bringing peace and stability to the country; and whereas a new counter-insurgency policy has been introduced as of 2009 and around 45 000 troops have been dispatched as reinforcements,
B. ker na vidiku ni jasnega razpleta v Afganistanu, koalicija mednarodnih sil ni zmožna poraziti talibanov in drugih upornikov, uporniško gibanje in talibani pa ne zmorejo prevladati nad vojaškimi silami,
B. whereas there is no obvious end in sight in Afghanistan, with a coalition of international forces in place but unable to defeat the Taliban and the other insurgents, and an insurgency and Taliban movement unable to prevail against these military forces,
C. ker je general Stanley McChrystal leta 2009 izjavil, da ni navedb o kakršni koli večji prisotnosti Al Kajde v Afganistanu, visoki ameriški uradniki pa potrjujejo, da je Al Kajda danes komaj še prisotna v Afganistanu,
C. whereas, in 2009, General Stanley McChrystal stated that he did not see indications of any large Al‑Qaeda presence in Afghanistan, and senior American officials confirm that Al‑Qaeda is now hardly present in Afghanistan,
D. ker so se varnostne in življenjske razmere poslabšale, kar je zmanjšalo ljudsko soglasje, ki ga je prisotnost koalicije uživala v določenem časovnem obdobju in ker ljudstvo vedno bolj dojema koalicijo kot okupacijsko silo, ker je treba z ljudmi iz Afganistana vzpostaviti novo in širše partnerstvo, v katerem bodo pri prizadevanju za mir in spravo vključene nezastopane skupine in civilna družba,
D. whereas security and living conditions have deteriorated, eroding the popular acceptance the coalition’s presence enjoyed at one stage, and whereas the coalition is being increasingly perceived by the population as an occupying force; whereas a new, broader partnership with the people of Afghanistan is needed, involving unrepresented groups and civil society in peace and reconciliation efforts,
E. ker je EU eden glavnih donatorjev razvojne in humanitarne pomoči za Afganistan; ker je partner, ki je zavezan prizadevanju za obnovo in stabilizacijo,
E. whereas the EU is one of the major donors of development assistance and humanitarian aid to Afghanistan; whereas it is a committed partner in reconstruction and stabilisation efforts,
F. ker so se pri Afganistanskem dogovoru leta 2006 in na konferenci v Kabulu donatorji dogovorili, da bodo vedno večji delež svoje pomoči, do 50 %, posredovali preko glavnega proračuna afganistanske vlade, in sicer neposredno ali prek mehanizmov odškodninskega sklada, ko je to možno, a ker se trenutno le 20 % razvojne pomoči realizira preko vladnega proračuna,
F. whereas, under the 2006 Afghanistan Compact and at the Kabul Conference, donors agreed to channel an increasing proportion of their aid, up to 50%, through the Afghan Government’s core budget, either directly or through trust-fund mechanisms, wherever possible, but whereas only 20% of development aid is channelled through the government budget at present,
G. ker pomanjkanje zadostnega usklajevanja ogroža učinkovitost prispevkov EU za pomoč Afganistanu,
G. whereas the lack of sufficient coordination is undermining the effectiveness of EU aid contributions to Afghanistan,
H. ker je bilo med letoma 2002 in 2009 Afganistanu namenjenih nad 40 milijard USD mednarodne pomoči; ker se je število otrok, ki obiskujejo šolo, v tem obdobju povečalo, medtem ko po ocenah Unicefa 59 % afganistanskih otrok pod petim letom starosti še vedno ne dobi zadosti hrane, pet milijonov otrok pa ne more hoditi v šolo,
H. whereas between 2002 and 2009 a sum of over USD 40 billion in international aid was channelled towards Afghanistan; whereas the number of children attending school has increased over this period but whereas, according to UNICEF estimates, 59% of Afghanistan’s children under the age of five still do not get enough to eat, and five million children are unable to attend school,