natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
To se je zgodilo le štiri mesece pred tem, ko je družba ELAS prenehala sklepati nova zavarovanja in razpustila odbor.
This just four months before EL's closure for new business and resignation of the EL board!
Končno je Organ za finančne storitve potrdil, da bodo zavarovanci (nemške) podružnice v enakem položaju kot zavarovanci Združenega kraljestva “, k temu so dodali, da „ družba pričakuje, da bo po prodaji lahko nadomestila znižanje vrednosti polic s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice, ki je posledica spremenjene politike bonusov“.
Finally, the FSA confirmed that " policyholders of the (German) branch will be in the same position as UK policyholders", adding that "on completion of the sale of EL, the company expects to be in a position to restore the cut in the value of with-profits policies that will result from its revised bonus policy."
Sklenil je z upanjem, da bodo informacije omogočile BAV, da „ ublaži nekatere skrbi nemških zavarovancev “.
It concluded hoping the information will enable BAV " to allay some of the broader concerns of German policyholders."
Ko se nato prodaja družbe Equitable Life ni uresničila in ko je bila družba prisiljena prenehati sklepati nova zavarovanja, je BAV 13. decembra 2000 ponovno vzpostavil stik z Organom za finančne storitve in ga zaprosil za razlage glede njihovega avgustovskega pisma.
Then, as the sale of Equitable Life failed to materialize and it was forced to close to new business, BAV contacted the FSA again on 13 December 2000, asking for explanations in the light of their August letter.
Odgovor Organa za finančne storitve je ponovno prišel hitro, 3. januarja 2001, ter – s sklicevanjem na prejšnje telefonske pogovore – poudaril dejstvo, da „družba ELAS ostaja solventna, obstoječe police ostajajo veljavne in družba lahko izpolnjuje pogodbene obveznosti do zavarovancev“, pri tem je tudi navedel, da so „bila številna tiskovna poročila v zvezi z družbo ELAS nepravilna in špekulativna“ ter je končal z navedbo, da Organ za finančne storitve „od družbe ne bo zahteval izvedbe novega vrednotenja“.
The FSA reply came again promptly on 3 January 2001 and - referring to previous phone contacts - reiterated the point that " EL remains solvent, existing policies remain valid and it is able to meet its contractual obligations to policyholders", going as far as defining "many of the press reports in relation to EL have been inaccurate and speculative" and closed by saying that the FSA "will not be requiring the company to provide a new valuation."
Naslednji stiki med zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva in nemškimi zakonodajalci so bili omejeni na razglasitev možnega zaprtja nemške podružnice družbe ELAS (30. junij 2001), na kar je BAV hitro odgovoril in opozoril, da „ so nekateri zavarovanci sklenili polico pri družbi ELAS le zato, ker je imela podružnico v Nemčiji, “ ter izrazil njihovo željo, „ da nemški zavarovanci še naprej prejemajo najboljše storitve “.
Following contacts between the UK and German regulators were limited to announcing the prospective closure of EL's German branch (30 June 2001) which prompted a reply from BAV reminding that " some policyholders only took out a policy with EL because it had a branch in Germany ", and expressing their wish " that German policyholders continue to receive an optimal service in the future."
BAV je končal z zahtevo po „ izjavi o tem, kako se bodo storitve za nemške zavarovance izvajale v prihodnosti “.
BAV closed by requesting "a statement on how the German policyholders are to be served in the future."
Zabeležen ni niti en odgovor Organa za finančne storitve, stiki med zakonodajalci so bili zatem redkejši, zato je moral BAV ponovno dvakrat pisati (7. novembra 2001 in 19 marca 2002), da je Organ za finančne storitve zaprosil za jasno potrditev datuma zaprtja nemške podružnice družbe ELAS, ki se je zaprla 30. septembra 2001.
No reply from FSA appears on record, and contacts between regulators seem to have loosened afterwards, as BAV had to write again twice (on 7 November 2001 and 19 March 2002) asking FSA for a clear confirmation on the closure date of the EL German branch, which was shut down on 30 September 2001.
Obstoječe nemške police se zdaj obravnavajo prek urada „ELAS CSC Germany“ v Aylesburyju, Združeno kraljestvo.
Existing German policies are today being served through 'ELAS CSC Germany', Aylesbury, UK.
Kot opozarja irski zakonodajalec na področju financ v WE61, „ je imela družba ELAS podružnico na Irskem od leta 1991 do leta 2001 in je prodajala police irskim državljanom .
As recalled by the Irish Financial Regulator in WE61 " EL operated a branch in Ireland from 1991 to 2001 and sold policies to Irish citizens.
Na podlagi tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju je bila irska podružnica predmet bonitetne ureditve zakonodajalca Združenega kraljestva … ter je prenehala sklepati nove police decembra 2000, istočasno kot sedež v Združenem kraljestvu, ter od takrat ni prodala nobene nove police več.
Under 3LD, the Irish branch was subject to prudential regulation by the UK regulator ... and closed to new business in December 2000, at the same time as the UK head office, and has not sold any new policies since then.
Družba ELAS izvaja storitve preostalim irskim zavarovancem na podlagi čezmejnega delovanja v skladu z določbami tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju ...
EL is servicing its remaining Irish policyholders on a cross-border basis under the provisions of the 3LD ...
Prejeli nismo nobenih dokaznih listin, da je družba ELAS kršila kakršen koli irski zakon o finančnih storitvah“.
There was no documentary evidence put to us that EL had breached any Irish financial services legislation. "
Evidentirana korespondenca med zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva in irskimi zakonodajalci (WE-CONF9) je omejena na tehnične izmenjave v letih 1994 in 1999 v zvezi s spremembami „ zahtevanih podrobnosti ES “ o irski podružnici družbe ELAS, ki je delovala od leta 1991 (WE38).
Correspondence between the UK and Irish regulators on record (WE-CONF9) is limited to technical exchanges in 1994 and 1999 relating to changes in the 'EC requisite details ' of EL's Irish branch, which had been operating since 1991 (WE38).
Dodatne izmenjave so potekale leta 2002, ko je Organ za finančne storitve obvestil Ministrstvo za podjetja, trgovino in zaposlovanje
Further exchanges happened in 2002, when the FSA informed the DETE
Ministrstvo za podjetja, trgovino in zaposlovanje (zakonodajalec na področju zavarovalnic od leta 1998 do leta 2001); Irski zakonodajalec na področju financ (ISFRA) je bil ustanovljen šele 1. maja 2003. o zaprtju irske podružnice družbe ELAS in o svojem delovanju na podlagi ureditev Združenega kraljestva za poslovanje v tuji državi od 8. julija 2002, skupaj s certifikatom o solventnosti.
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (insurance regulator 1989-2001); the Irish Financial Regulator (ISFRA) was established only on 1 May 2003. of the closure of EL's Irish branch and on its operating under passporting agreements from the UK as of 8 July 2002, joining a solvency certificate.
4f) Zavajajoče oglaševanje na nemškem in irskem trgu
4f) Misleading advertising on the German and Irish market
Na začetku leta 2000 je družba Equitable Life začela agresivno oglaševalsko akcijo v Nemčiji, da bi privabila več nemških strank.
In early 2000, Equitable Life started an aggressive marketing campaign in Germany to attract more German clients.
BAV je v oglasih družbe ELAS odkril nepravilnosti, ker so bili takšni oglasi zavajajoči pri uporabi izrazov, kot so jamstva, zajamčeni terminalni bonusi, prejemki iz življenjskega zavarovanja s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice in končni bonusi.
The BAV identified in EL adverts a misconduct on the ground that such advertisements were misleading in their use of terms such as guarantees, guaranteed terminal bonus, with-profit benefits and final bonus.
V zvezi s tem vprašanjem je WEYER, ki zastopa združenje zavarovancev DAGEV (H3, WE22), podprl trditve, da so bili oglasi družbe Equitable Life primer zavajanja.
Relating to this issue, Mr. WEYER representing policyholders' association DAGEV (H3, WE22) supported claims that Equitable Life's adverts were a case for misrepresentation.
Predvsem dva oglasa, ki sta bila februarja 2000 objavljena v večjih nemških časopisih,
Two advertisements in particular, published in large German newspapers
„Kupuj nemško, zasluži britansko.
" Buy German, earn British.
Visoki donosi, skupaj z visoko stopnjo varstva – najprej smo morali pripraviti idealno varčevalno strategijo za nemške vlagatelje “ in „13 % donosi: Vprašajte vašo zavarovalnico, zakaj vam izplačuje le polovico“, celostranski oglasi v tedniku „Die Welt am Sonntag“ in dnevniku „Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung“ februarja 2000. sta bila izrazito zavajajoča: en oglas („13 %“ glej opombo spodaj) je trdil, da družba ELAS podeljuje zajamčene stopnje, ki so bile dvakrat višje od takratnega nemškega povprečja; drugi oglas („Kupujte nemško, zaslužite britansko“) je implicitno namigoval, da so police družbe ELAS pod nadzorom nemških zakonodajnih organov, kar pa se ni zgodilo v primeru bonitetnega nadzora.
High returns consistent with a high degree of security - the ideal savings strategy for German investors first had to be devised " and " 13% returns: ask your insurer why they only give you half " full-page advertisements in " Die Welt am Sonntag ", weekly newspaper, and " Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung ", daily, in February 2000. in February 2000, appeared grossly misleading: one advert ('13%', see picture below) suggested EL granted guaranteed rates twice the German average at that time; the second advert ('Buy German, Earn British') implicitly suggested EL policies were under surveillance of German regulatory authorities, which was clearly not the case for prudential supervision.
Vendar je WE-CONF17 dodatno osvetlil to točko, ko je pokazal, da je bil poseg zakonodajalca precej neodločen tako v časovnem smislu kot glede učinkovitosti.
However, WE-CONF17 shed additional light on this point, showing that the regulator's intervention was quite 'tame' both in timing and effectiveness.
V prvem pismu 12. aprila 2000 – približno šest tednov po objavi oglasov v tisku – je BAV od ELD zahteval mnenje o obtožbah neprimernega oglaševanja ter vprašanje ponovil 29. maja in 4. julija 2000.
A first BAV letter of 12 April 2000 - some six weeks after the adverts had appeared in the press - asked ELD to comment on allegations of improper advertising, repeating its request on 29 May and 4 July 2000.
ELD je končno poslal odgovor 17. julija 2000, očitno odgovor ni bil zadovoljiv, ker je BAV moral postaviti dodatna vprašanja: Medtem ko je tisk Združenega kraljestva veliko pisal o vplivu odločitve zgornjega doma na družbo ELAS, je BAV 31. julija 2000 ponovno napisal pismo, v katerem je spodbijal zakonitost oglasov in zahteval pojasnitev „ ali se oglas še vedno uporablja v takšni obliki ; če se ne, nam, prosimo, pošljite vzorec posodobljenega oglasa “.
ELD's reply finally came on 17 July 2000, apparently dissatisfying, as BAV had to put additional questions: while the effects of the House of Lords ruling on EL were widely debated in the UK press, BAV wrote again on 31 July 2000, contesting the adverts' legitimacy and asking to specify "whether the advert is still in use in this form; if not please send us a sample of the updated version. "
Tudi to zahtevo je bilo treba ponoviti 12. septembra, preden je BAV končno prejel odgovor ELD 21. septembra 2000, v katerem je ELD potrdil, da je bil oglas umaknjen … šest mesecev po njegovi prvi objavi v nemškem tisku.
Even this request had to be reiterated on 12 September before finally getting a reply from ELD on 21 September 2000, in which ELD confirmed the advert had been withdrawn ... over six months after their first appearance in the German press!
BAV je 10. oktobra 2000 potrdil umik prvega oglasa ter posredoval za prekinitev objavljanja drugega oglasa, vendar je to ponovno storil z zelo blagimi besedami ter ni izdal nobenega neposrednega ukaza ali postavil določenega roka za umik („Zato vas prosim, da umaknete ta oglas ali vse druge objave s podobno vsebino.“).
On 10 October 2000, BAV acknowledged the withdrawal of the first advert, and intervened to stop the second advert, but again in very subdued wording and without issuing any direct order or setting a specific deadline (" I therefore ask you to withdraw this particular advert or any publicity of similar content ").
Na Irskem ni nobenih poročil o zavajajočem oglaševanju družbe ELAS: Irski zakonodajalec za finančne zadeve je v WE80 izjavil, da „ ni vedel, da bi zadevni irski organi, pristojni za pravno ureditev zavarovalništva, prejeli kakršne koli pritožbe glede zavajajočih oglasov družbe Equitable Life“.
No specific cases of misleading advertising by ELAS were reported in Ireland: the Irish Financial regulator stated in WE 80 that they were " not aware of any complaints having been received by the relevant Irish authorities charged with regulation of the insurance industry regarding misleading advertising by Equitable Life."
SKLEPI, DEL III – ZAKONODAJNI SISTEM
Conclusions PART III - REGULATORY SYSTEM
Blaga regulativna politika zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva
Light Touch regulatory policy by UK Regulators
Obstajajo prepričljive izjave, ki kažejo, da je Združeno kraljestvo dlje časa v prejšnjih dveh desetletjih, pred začetkom veljavnosti tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju in po njem, dosledno izvajalo blago regulativno politiko na področju zavarovalnic, ki se ukvarjajo z življenjskim zavarovanjem.
There have been compelling accounts which indicate that the UK consistently applied, over a substantial period in the past two decades, both before and after the entry in force of the Third Life Directive, a light touch regulatory policy on the life insurance business.
Vloge in izjave kažejo, da se zdaj v Združenem kraljestvu obsežno razvija in izvaja regulativna politika, ki temelji na načelih, ter da bo po pričakovanjih vključena v predloge za projekt plačilne sposobnosti (Solvency II).
Submissions and statements show that a principles-based regulatory policy has now been extensively developed and implemented in the UK and is expected to be integrated into the Solvency II proposals.
Odbor razume, da nobena regulativna ureditev ne more odpraviti tveganja in v celoti preprečiti vseh propadov reguliranih družb, ker bi tak sistem verjetno oviral trgovsko podjetje, konkurenco in inovativnost ter škodoval izbiri potrošnikov.
The committee understands that no regulatory regime can seek to eliminate risk and completely prevent all failures of regulated firms, as any such system would be likely to inhibit commercial enterprise, competition and innovation to the detriment of consumer choice.
Kljub temu obstajajo številne izjave, ki kažejo, da je šla blaga regulativna politika Združenega kraljestva korak predaleč ter s tem prispevala k šibkemu regulativnemu okolju, zaradi česar so se težave v družbi ELAS povečevale brez nadzora, medtem ko bi v strožjem regulativnem sistemu morda postale opazne že prej in bi se končna kriza lahko preprečila.
However, there have been numerous statements which suggest that the UK's light touch regulatory policy went a step too far and thereby contributed to a weak regulatory environment, which allowed the difficulties at ELAS to grow unchecked, when in a stronger regulatory system they might have become apparent at an earlier stage and the final crisis might have been prevented.
Zdi se, da zakonodajalcem v Združenem kraljestvu ni uspelo pravočasno odzvati se na dejstvo, da je družbi ELAS v devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja kronično primanjkovalo sredstev, ker ni ustvarjala ustreznih rezerv za prihodnje končne bonuse , za katere so zavarovanci mislili, da jih lahko pričakujejo (čeprav niso bili zagotovljeni) .
It appears that UK regulators failed to react in a timely manner to the fact that ELAS had been chronically short of assets throughout the 1990s, as it did not properly reserve for future terminal bonuses which policyholders had been led to expect (even if they were not guaranteed).
To se je zgodilo, ker zakonodajalci pravil za oblikovanje določb, ki zajemajo prihodnje diskrecijske bonuse, namenoma niso jasno oblikovali in nato dovolili, da jih imenovani aktuarji obravnavajo brez nadzora.
This occurred as a result of the rules for creating provisions covering future discretionary bonuses being kept deliberately vague by regulators, who appeared in turn merely to leave them to be dealt with unchecked by the Appointed Actuaries.
Regulativne pomanjkljivosti zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva
Regulatory shortcomings by UK Regulators
Obstajajo številne izjave in vloge, ki podpirajo ugotovitev o regulativnem neuspehu in pomanjkljivostih pri nadzoru varnega in skrbnega poslovanja s strani različnih zakonodajalcev Združenega kraljestva na področju življenjskega zavarovanja (DTI/HMT/organ za finančne storitve) ter s strani vladne aktuarske službe v zvezi z nadzorom družbe ELAS v devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja in zlasti po začetku veljavnosti tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju leta 1994.
There have been many statements and submissions which support a finding of regulatory failure and prudential supervision shortcomings by the different UK life insurance regulators (DTI/HMT/FSA), as well as by the GAD, in relation to the supervision of ELAS throughout the 1990s and specifically after the Third Life Directive entered in force in 1994.
Prav tako je na voljo veliko gradiva, ki kaže, da bi morali zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva, če bi pravilno in vestno nadzorovali varno in skrbno poslovanje ter izvajali svoja regulativna pooblastila, kot zahtevata člena 10 in 13 tretje direktive o življenjskem zavarovanju, odkriti slabosti in tveganja poslovnega modela in poslovanja družbe ELAS ter se nanje pravočasno odzvati, preden so postale krizne razmere očitne .
Likewise, there is ample material to indicate that if the UK regulators had correctly and diligently exercised their prudential supervisory and regulatory powers, as required by Articles 10 and 13 of the Third Life Directive, they ought in turn to have discovered and reacted to the weaknesses and risks inherent in ELAS's business model and operations at a time before a state of crisis became apparent.
Obstajajo številne izjave, ki navajajo, da zakonodajalcem Združenega kraljestva ni uspelo preprečiti krize v družbi ELAS ter tako niso zaščitili zavarovancev družbe ELAS v Združenem kraljestvu in drugih državah članicah pred finančnimi izgubami kot neposredno posledico te krize.
There have been a significant number of statements to the effect that the UK regulators failed to prevent ELAS from steering into its crisis and therefore failed to protect ELAS policyholders in the UK and other Member States from suffering financial losses as a direct consequence.
Izjave in strokovni nasveti, ki jih je prejel odbor, se zdijo v nasprotju s celostno oceno lorda Penrosa, ki navaja, da „je družba v osnovi sama kriva za svoj propad.
Statements and expert advice received by the committee appear to contradict Lord Penrose's overall assessment that " principally, the Society was author of its own misfortunes .
Napake v regulativnem sistemu so bile drugotni dejavnik
Regulatory system failures were secondary factors
240, točke 7-11. nasprotuje omenjeni oceni, ker v Ugotovitvah navaja, da so regulativne napake dejansko precej prispevale k nastanku šibkega regulativnega okolja, v katerem se je lahko razvila kriza družbe ELAS.
2 see WE16, page 726: para.240, points 7-11. seem to be at odds with his above assessment, in that the Findings state that regulatory failures had indeed substantially contributed to creating a weak regulatory environment in which the ELAS crisis could unfold.
Neuspeh glede prepoznavanja tveganj pri zajamčenih rentah
Failure to recognize the GAR risks
Obstaja veliko gradiva, ki kaže, da zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva niso prepoznali ali so celo malomarno podcenjevali možen vpliv polic z zajamčenimi rentami na finančno stabilnost družbe ELAS, zlasti v primeru znatnega padca na finančnih trgih in glede na sloves družbe ELAS, da uporablja sistem nizke plačilne sposobnosti in majhnih rezerv.
There is a large body of material which suggests that the UK regulators failed to recognize - or even negligently underestimated - the potential impact of GAR policies on the financial stability of ELAS, particularly in the event of a substantial downturn in financial markets and given ELAS' reputation of applying thin solvency and reserve margins.
Ko so zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva to tveganje končno priznali, je bilo prepozno, da bi spremenili položaj in vsi naknadni regulativni ukrepi so bili le zapoznel poskus omejitve škode.
It seems that when this risk was finally recognized by UK Regulators, it was to too late to reverse the situation and any subsequent regulatory action could only be a belated attempt at damage limitation.
Le malo dvoma je o tem, da je padanje vrednosti lastniškega kapitala v obdobju 2001–2002 prispevalo k pospešitvi krize družbe ELAS po sprejetju odločitve lordske zbornice.
There can be little doubt that the equity bear market in 2001-2002 contributed to an acceleration of the ELAS crisis after the House of Lords' ruling.
Vendar neugodnih tržnih sil ni mogoče izpostaviti kot edinega razloga za krizo družbe ELAS, kar dokazuje dejstvo, da niso vse zavarovalnice v Združenem kraljestvu, ki se ukvarjajo z življenjskim zavarovanjem, imele finančne krize takšnih razsežnosti.
However, adverse market forces alone cannot be held out as the sole reason for the ELAS crisis, as is witnessed by the fact that not all UK life offices suffered a financial crisis of this magnitude.
V primeru družbe ELAS razpoložljivo gradivo kaže, do so številni dejavniki že pred padanjem cen na trgu, zlasti vprašanje zajamčenih rent, ustvarili podlago za poznejše finančne težave družbe.
In the ELAS case, the available material suggests that a number of factors which clearly pre-dated the bear market, and in particular the GAR issue, had already created the basis for the Society's future financial problems.
Čezmerna zaščita družbe ELAS
Excessive deference to ELAS
Prav tako je očitno, da so zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva izkazovali neupravičeno spoštovanje ali zaščitniški odnos do družbe ELAS, zlasti zaradi njene dolge zgodovine in s tem velikega ugleda, zaradi česar je družba veljala za najboljšo izbiro na področju življenjskega zavarovanja ter za predobro in preveč ugledno, da bi lahko delala napake.
It is also apparent that the UK regulators behaved with undue awe or deference towards ELAS, particularly given its long history and hitherto highly reputable status, leading them to consider it as the top pick of the life insurance industry and apparently believed to be too good and too reputable to make mistakes.
Številne priče in izjave so potrdile, da je prav ta zaščitniški odnos veliko prispeval k nastanku dopustnega bonitetnega pristopa k nadzoru in šibkega regulativnega okolja, ki sta dovolila, da je družba ELAS delovala brez nasprotovanj, zaradi česar so se finančne slabosti družbe z leti nadgrajevale brez nadzora.
A number of witnesses and statements have asserted that it was precisely this attitude of deference which contributed significantly to the creation of a permissive prudential approach to supervision and a weak regulatory environment which in turn permitted ELAS to operate unchallenged, thus allowing the Society's financial weakness to build up unchecked over the years.
Prelaganje odgovornosti med zakonodajalci Združenega kraljestva
Shifting of responsibilities between UK regulators
Odbor meni, da je prelaganje regulativnih odgovornosti med različnimi regulativnimi organi Združenega kraljestva do ustanovitve organa za finančne storitve očitno škodovalo učinkovitosti nadzornih in regulativnih ukrepov v devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja.
The committee believes that the shifting of regulatory responsibilities between different UK regulatory bodies until the creation of the FSA was clearly detrimental to the efficiency of supervisory and regulatory action throughout the 1990s.