natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Shemo je končno potrdila velika večina vsake kategorije
The Scheme finally met with the approval of an overwhelming majority of each class
Zavarovanci s policami z zajamčenimi rentami in zavarovanci s policami brez zajamčenih rent so bili vključeni v različne volilne kategorije. zavarovancev družbe Equitable.
GAR and non-GAR policyholders were in different voting classes. of Equitable's policyholders.
Upoštevati je treba, da je Justice Lloyd zavrnil predlog, da bi se morali zavarovanci v tujini obravnavati kot ločena kategorija za namen volitev glede sporazuma o odškodnini.
It is notable that Mr Justice Lloyd rejected the suggestion that overseas policyholders should be treated as a separate class for the purposes of voting for the compromise agreement.
Argumenti za to odločitev so navedeni v ES 3, strani 32 in 33.
The arguments for this decision are outlined in ES 3, pages 32 and 33.
Tudi rentniki z življenjskim zavarovanjem s klavzulo o soudeležbi zavarovanca pri dobičku zavarovalnice se niso obravnavali kot ločena kategorija.
Nor were the with-profits annuitants treated as a separate class.
Odškodninska shema je postala pravno veljavna 8. februarja 2002, ko jo je potrdilo višje sodišče.
The compromise scheme took legal effect on 8 February 2002 after approval by the High Court.
Družba ocenjuje, da je ob začetku veljavnosti odškodninske sheme „š e vedno obstajalo približno milijon ljudi z interesom za življenjsko zavarovanje s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice “, čeprav je med letom 2001 sodelovanje prekinilo veliko zavarovancev (WE 47
The Society estimates that when the Compromise Scheme took effect, " there were still close to a million people with an interest in the with-profits fund ", although a significant number of policyholders had left during 2001 (WE 47
Stran 2. ).
Page 2. ).
Uprava družbe Equitable je takrat trdila, da je shema vključevala „pravično vrednost odškodnine za zavarovance s policami z zajamčenimi rentami na podlagi realne ocene vrednosti zakonitih pravic, ki so se jim odrekli, ... odškodnino porazdeljuje med različne zavarovance s policami z zajamčenimi rentami glede na njihove pravice; znižuje to odškodnino za vrednost vsakega možnega odškodninskega zahtevka, ki ga opustijo zavarovanci s policami brez zajamčenih rent; odškodnina je v obliki sorazmernega povišanja vrednosti polic zavarovancev s policami z zajamčenimi rentami v zagotovljeni in nezagotovljeni obliki“ (WE 29
Equitable's Board claimed at the time that the Scheme involved "fair value compensation to GAR policyholders based on a ‘realistic estimate’ of the value of their legal rights given up ..., it apportions the compensation to different GAR policyholders in accordance with their rights; it reduces that compensation by the value of any possible claim for compensation given up by the non-GAR policyholders and the compensation takes the form of a proportionate increase in GAR policyholders’ policy values in both guaranteed and non-guaranteed form " (WE 29
Glej WE 29, stran 19. ).
see WE 29, page 19. ).
V nasprotju s tem so zastopniki zavarovancev trdili, da je bila shema „ nepravična “
By contrast, representatives of policyholders claimed that the scheme was " inequitable "
Dodatek k peticiji 29/205 z dne 9. novembra 2005 o Organu za finančne storitve in varuhu človekovih pravic za finančne storitve; stran 2. in da je „ namerno zanemarila in zmanjšala vrednost pravnega nasveta, [ki pravi,] da so imeli zavarovanci brez [polic z zajamčenimi rentami] dober argument glede zlorab pri prodaji
Addendum to petition 29/2005 dated 9 November 2005 concerning FSA and FOS; page 2. and that it " deliberately obfuscated and discounted legal advice [indicating] that policyholders without [GAR] had a strong case for mis-selling"
Druga predložitev v preiskavi, ki jo vodi Lord Penrose, glede izkušenj, ki se lahko pridobijo iz propada družbe Equitable Life – študija primera glede periodičnih regulativnih napak vlade in Organa za finančne storitve; Skupina članov družbe Equitable, 27. marec 2003; stran 50. .
A second submission to the inquiry conducted by Lord Penrose into the lessons that can be learned from the Equitable Life debacle - a case study in serial regulatory failure by the government and its agent, the Financial Services Authority; EMAG; 27 March 2003; page 50. .
Akcijska skupina EMAG je v WE-CONF 16 zlasti menila, da je prvo splošno znižanje vrednosti za 16 % julija 2001 – kar po njenem mnenju ni bil le rezultat izgubljene zadeve glede polic z zajamčenimi rentami in padca na trgih delnic, ampak (v veliki meri) tudi posledica desetletja izplačevanja previsokih bonusov s strani družbe ELAS – nepravično prizadelo novejše zavarovance s policami brez zajamčenih rent, ki prej niso imeli koristi od previsokih bonusov kot zavarovanci (zlasti tisti s policami z zajamčenimi rentami) pred letom 1990.
In particular, EMAG considers in WE-CONF 16 that the first across-the-board cut in values of 16% in July 2001 - which in its view was not only a result of the lost GAR case and a fall in stock markets but also (to a large extent) a consequence of a decade of over-bonusing by ELAS - fell unfairly upon more recent non-GAR policyholders, who had not previously benefited from over-bonusing as did pre-1990 (predominantly GAR) policyholders.
Kot je poudarjeno v točki II.3., je THOMSON (H8) menil drugače: „Razlog za uvedbo pavšalnih znižanj je bilo doseganje večje pravičnosti za vse zavarovance.
As outlined under point II.3., Mr THOMSON (H8) took a different view: " The reason for applying reductions at a flat rate was to achieve greater fairness to all policyholders.
BOSWOOD je v mnenju (WE 76
Mr BOSWOOD in his opinion (WE 76
Stran 3. ) podprl stališče akcijske skupine EMAG, da se pri pavšalnem znižanju niso upoštevali previsoki bonusi, dodeljeni starejšim zavarovancem.
Page 3. ) supports the view of EMAG that the flat-rate cut failed to take into account the over-bonusing to early policyholders.
Akcijska skupina EMAG je menila, da je odškodninska shema družbi ELAS omogočila, da izboljša položaj.
EMAG believes that the Compromise Scheme had given ELAS an opportunity to rectify the situation.
Namesto tega je shema predlagala povišanje vrednosti polic z zajamčenimi rentami za 17,5 % v primerjavi s povišanjem vrednosti polic brez zajamčenih rent za 2,5 %.
Instead, the scheme proposed GAR uplifts of 17.5% against non-GAR uplifts of 2.5%.
Lord PENROSE v poročilu ni želel komentirati pravičnosti odškodninske sheme (WE 16
In his report, Lord PENROSE declines to comment on the fairness of the Compromise Scheme (WE 16
Stran 275. ).
Page 275. ).
Razen tega so zavarovanci odboru sporočili, da povišanje vrednosti polic ni bilo zagotovljeno: „V nekaj tednih se je povišanje za 2,5 % nepojasnjeno spremenilo v znižanje za 4 % “ (WEIR, H2), zato so zavarovanci „izgubili pravice do odškodnine v zameno za povišanje, za katerega se je izkazalo, da ni bilo realno“ (BELLORD, H2).
Moreover, policyholders told the committee that the increases in policy values were not guaranteed: " Within a matter of weeks, the 2.5% increase magically turned into a 4% reduction " (Mr WEIR, H2), so policyholders " lost their rights to redress in return for an uplift which turned out to be a cheque that bounced " (Mr BELLORD, H2).
Po povišanju vrednosti polic, ki je bilo kreditirano 1. marca 2002, je družba 15. aprila 2002 objavila dodatno znižanje za 4 %, ki je več kot le izničilo povišanje za 2,5 %, ki je bilo zavarovancem s policami brez zajamčenih rent kreditirano le šest tednov pred tem.
Indeed, after the uplift in policy values had been credited on 1 March 2002, the Society announced a further cut of 4% on 15 April 2002, which more than eliminated the 2.5% uplift credited to non-GAR policyholders just six weeks before.
Rentniki z življenjskim zavarovanjem s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice so imeli podobno izkušnjo, ko je družba po potrditvi sporazuma znižala skupno stopnjo donosa.
The with-profits annuitants suffered a similar experience, as the Society reduced the Overall Rate of Return by 4% subsequent to the approval of the agreement.
Zato so nekateri zavarovanci dvomili v pravno veljavnost sporazuma o odškodnini (glej na primer ustno izjavo WEIRA, H2, in SCAWENA, WE 23
Therefore, some policyholders expressed doubts as to the legal validity of the compromise agreement (see for instance oral statement by Mr WEIR, H2 and Mr SCAWEN, WE 23
Zaradi tržnih gibanj smo morali znižati nezagotovljene bonuse.
That risk was clearly identified in the documents... "
To tveganje je bilo v dokumentih jasno opredeljeno .. .“ (WE-CONF 5
(WE-CONF 5
Strani 1 in 2. ) .
Pages 1 and 2. ) .
Vseeno je profesor BLAKE v WE 29
However, Professor BLAKE suggests in WE 29
Stran 6. navedel, da so bile informacije, ki jih je uprava zagotovila zavarovancem v zvezi s predlogom odškodninske sheme, nezadostne.
Page 6. that the information provided to policyholders by the Board in connection with the Compromise Scheme Proposal was inadequate.
Med drugim je kritiziral, da je bila „ večina informacij glede statusa sklada zastarela, da skoraj ni bilo informacij o tem, kaj se bo zgodilo s skladom, [ko bi odškodninska shema začela veljati, in] ni bilo jasno določeno, čemu se ... zavarovanci odrekajo z glasovanjem za [shemo] “ (WE 29
Among other things, he criticised that " most of the information concerning the status of the fund was out of date, there was virtually no information on what was going to happen to the fund after [the compromise scheme would take effect and it] was not clearly spelled out what ... policyholders were foregoing by voting for the [scheme] " (WE 29
Stran 6. ).
Page 6. ).
SCAWEN je trdil tudi, da ni bilo razkrito popolno finančno stanje družbe.
Mr SCAWEN also claims that the full state of the Society's finances had not been disclosed.
V nasprotnem primeru rentniki z življenjskim zavarovanjem s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice „ gotovo ne bi sprejeli ponudbe “ (WE 23
Otherwise, with-profits annuitants would " surely not have accepted the offer " (WE 23
Stran 19. ).
Page 19. ).
Akcijska skupina EMAG je kritizirala, da „ dokumentacija odškodninske sheme ni obravnavala previsokih bonusov, njihovih koristi za zavarovance s policami z zajamčenimi rentami, nepravičnega znižanja vrednosti polic za 16 % za zavarovance s policami, ki ne vključujejo zajamčene rente, [in] možnost kompenzacijske prilagoditve v korist zavarovancev s policami brez zajamčenih rent“ (WE-CONF 16).
EMAG criticised that " the Compromise documentation did not address the over-bonusing, the benefit derived from it by GAR policyholders, the unfair nature of the 16% policy value cut to non GAR policyholders [and] the possibility of a compensating adjustment in favour of non-GAR policyholders " (WE-CONF 16).
Razen tega je akcijska skupina EMAG podrobno komentirala drugo znižanje vrednosti polic 15. aprila 2002, ki je več kot le izničilo povišanje, kreditirano zavarovancem s policami brez zajamčenih rent.
Moreover, EMAG comments in detail on the second cut in policy values of 15 April 2002, which more than eliminated the uplift credited to non-GAR policyholders.
Kot je navedeno, je skupina ELAS trdila, da je bilo to potrebno zaradi „ tržnih gibanj “.
As stated above, ELAS argued that this had become necessary due to " market movements ".
Akcijska skupina EMAG je navedla padec trga za približno 6 % (kar ustreza padcu osnovnih sredstev družbe Equitable Life za 3 %) med julijem 2001, ko je bilo uvedeno znižanje za 16 %, in aprilom 2002, ko je prišlo do drugega znižanja.
EMAG contends that the market fell by about 6% (equivalent to a 3% fall in Equitable Life's asset values) between July 2001, when the 16% cut was introduced, and April 2002, when the second cut was made.
Vendar „ se je ta padec zgodil pred objavo odškodninske sheme decembra 2001 [in] pred znižanjem vrednosti polic aprila 2002 ni bilo dodatnega večjega padca trga “ (WE-CONF 16).
However, " all of this fall happened before the Compromise Scheme was published in December 2001 [and] there was no further significant market fall before the policy value cut in April 2002 " (WE-CONF 16).
Akcijska skupina EMAG je menila, da je družba ELAS s tem, da ni pojasnila zavarovancem s policami brez zajamčenih rent, da bi bilo v odsotnosti takojšnjega vzpona trga z delnicami potrebno dodatno znižanje vrednosti polic, morda namerno zavajala zavarovance.
EMAG considers that by failing to explain to non-GAR policyholders that, without an immediate surge in the stock market, a further policy value cut would be required, ELAS may have deliberately misled policyholders.
Stran 4. ) se je strinjal z oceno akcijske skupine EMAG in menil, da „ je to nekaj, o čemer bi bilo treba tiste, vključno s sodiščem, od katerih se je pričakovala potrditev sheme, obvestiti “.
Page 4. ) agrees with EMAG's assessment and suggests that " this is something which ought to have been mentioned to those, including the court, from which approval for the scheme was sought ".
Vendar je ta organ to zavrnil s sklicevanjem na diskrecijsko pravico (WE-CONF 16).
The latter however refused to do so with reference to its discretion (WE-CONF 16).
THOMSON je odgovoril na obtožbe, da je bila dokumentacija odškodninske sheme nezadostna, in poudaril, da je shemo sprejelo višje sodišče.
Mr THOMSON responded to allegations that the compromise documentation had been inadequate by underlining that the scheme was sanctioned by the High Court.
Navedel je izjavo sodnika (H8): „ Nobenega dvoma ni, da gre za shemo, ki jo lahko inteligenten in pošten človek, član zadevne kategorije, ki deluje v svojem interesu, upravičeno potrdi.
He quoted the judge as follows (H8): " I am in no doubt that it is a scheme such as an intelligent and honest man, a member of the class concerned and acting in respect of his interest, might reasonably approve.
Prepričan sem tudi, da niti zaradi kakršnega koli pomanjkanja informacij ali česa drugega v postopku niti ob upoštevanju katerega koli vsebinskega vprašanja, ki mi je bilo posredovano, ni razloga za domnevo, da ne gre za ustrezno shemo, ki jo mora po potrditvi zahtevane večine v različnih kategorijah sprejeti Sodišče.
I am also satisfied that neither on account of any inadequacy of information or otherwise in the procedure, nor in respect of any of the substantive points made to me, is there the slightest reason to suppose that it is not a proper scheme which having been approved by the requisite majorities of the various classes ought to be sanctioned by the Court.
Tako bom zahteval. “
I will so order. "
Zavarovanci so na splošno kritizirali dejstvo, da jim je Organ za finančne storitve priporočil, naj sprejmejo odškodnino, ali jim je to celo svetoval.
Policyholders in general criticised the fact that the FSA recommended policyholders to accept the compromise or even promoted it.
Zdi se, da so tisti, ki se niso strinjali z odškodninsko shemo, ki jo je sprejel Organ za finančne storitve, in so umaknili svoja sredstva, na boljšem kot tisti, ki so jih obdržali.
Those who did not go along with the compromise that was endorsed by the FSA and withdrew their funds appear likely to end up better off than those who remained.
Ob upoštevanju nedvoumnega sprejetja odškodninske sheme s strani Organa za finančne storitve je lahko to zanj neprijetno, ker naj bi varoval razumna pričakovanja zavarovancev
In view of its unequivocal endorsement of the compromise, this should be embarrassing to the FSA, since it is supposed to protect the policyholders' reasonable expectations.
Druga predložitev v preiskavi, ki jo vodi Lord Penrose, glede izkušenj, ki se lahko pridobijo iz propada družbe Equitable Life – študija primera glede periodičnih regulativnih napak vlade in Organa za finančne storitve; Skupina članov družbe Equitable, 27. marec 2003; stran 50. .“
A second submission to the inquiry conducted by Lord Penrose into the lessons that can be learned from the Equitable Life debacle - a case study in serial regulatory failure by the government and its agent, the Financial Services Authority; EMAG; 27 March 2003; page 50. "
V izjavi pred odborom je STRACHAN (H4) komentiral sodelovanje Organa za finančne storitve pri odškodninski shemi: „ Odškodninska shema se je vzpostavila kot del neodvisnega sodnega postopka na podlagi Zakona o gospodarskih družbah.
In his statement before the committee, Mr STRACHAN (H4) commented on the FSA's involvement in the compromise: " The Compromise Scheme was undertaken as part of an independent court process under the Companies Act.
Razen tega je „ pregledal in ocenil predloge odškodninske sheme, ki so bili predloženi zavarovancem družbe Equitable Life z življenjskim zavarovanjem s klavzulo o soudeležbi pri dobičku zavarovalnice, da bi zagotovili, da so se ustrezno upoštevali interesi vseh zavarovancev“ (WE-CONF 8).
Furthermore, the FSA " reviewed and assessed the Compromise Scheme proposals being put to Equitable Life's with-profits policyholders to ensure that the interests of all policyholders had been properly taken into account " (WE-CONF 8).
Pri tem je Organ za finančne storitve upošteval naslednje: „Prvič, da bi uspešna odškodninska shema načeloma ponudila najboljšo možnost za stabilnost družbe Equitable Life in njenih zavarovancev.
In doing so, the FSA took account of the following considerations: " Firstly, that a successful compromise scheme would, in principle, offer the best prospect of stability for Equitable Life and its policyholders.
Drugič, kar zadeva vprašanja pravičnosti, ocena, ali je prišlo do pravičnega nadomestila za pravice in zahtevke vsake prizadete skupine.
The second – which concerns the fairness issues – was an assessment as to whether there was a fair exchange for the rights and the claims of each group affected.
Tretja ugotovitev je bila, da je treba zavarovancem zagotoviti jasne in razumljive informacije, ter, četrtič, upoštevali smo oceno predloga, ki jo je predložil neodvisni aktuar“ (STRACHAN, H4).
The third consideration was that there should be clear and comprehensive information provided to policyholders and, fourthly, we took account of the independent actuary’s assessment of the proposal " (Mr STRACHAN, H4).
Neodvisni aktuar je v poročilu zapisal, da „ so bili z aktuarskega vidika pogoji sheme pošteno in razumno določeni“ (WE-CONF 9
The independent actuary stated in his report that " from an actuarial point of view the terms of the Scheme have been established in a fair and reasonable way " (WE-CONF 9
Povzetek poročila neodvisnega aktuarja; stran 125. ).
Summary of the Independent Actuary's Report; page 125. ).
Vendar so zavarovanci navedli, da aktuar domnevno ni obravnaval več pomembnih vprašanj, ki bi bila pomembna za njihovo razumevanje predloga (glej WE-CONF 16), in so se razen tega spraševali o njegovi neodvisnosti od družbe ELAS (glej WE 75).
Policyholders, however, alleged that the actuary failed to address a number of important issues, which would have been important for policyholders' understanding of the proposal (see WE-CONF 16) and furthermore questioned his independence from ELAS (see WE 75).
V oceni odškodninske sheme (WE 67) je Organ za finančne storitve ugotovil: „ Organ za finančne storitve je zadovoljen, da je v zvezi z ustreznimi skupinami zavarovancev s policami z zajamčenimi rentami in tistimi s policami brez zajamčenih rent, raven povišanja vrednosti polic poštena ponudba v zameno za pravice do zajamčenih rent in opustitev zahtevkov glede zlorab pri prodaji .
In its assessment of the compromise scheme (WE 67) the FSA concludes as follows: " The FSA is content that, in relation to the relevant groups of guaranteed annuity rate (“GAR”) and non-GAR policyholders, the level of increase to policy values is a fair offer in exchange for the GAR rights and potential mis-selling claims that would be given up.
Čeprav v vsaki zadevni skupini obstajajo razlike med posameznimi osebami, smo zadovoljni, da v skupinah ni kategorij zavarovancev, ki bi dobivali nesorazmerno višje ali nižje prejemke “.
While there are variations from person to person, within each relevant group, we are content that there are no categories of policyholder within the groups who would receive disproportionately greater or lesser benefits ".
Razen tega je Organ za finančne storitve navedel, da „ je bila shema ureditve v interesu zavarovancev in ustrezen način za odpravo nejasnosti, ki so negativno vplivale na družbo; zato nismo videli nobenega razloga, da bi predstavili stališča sodišču, ki je imelo končno odgovornost za odločitev“ (WE-CONF 8).
The FSA furthermore suggests that, " the scheme of arrangements was in policyholders' interests and was an appropriate way of removing the uncertainties that were adversely affecting the firm; accordingly we saw no reason to make representations to the court, which had final responsibility for the decision " (WE-CONF 8).
Stran 9. ne komentira pravičnosti odškodninske sheme, ampak poudarja njene splošne prednosti: „ Prvič, zadevnim strankam je zagotovila varnost ter zavarovance (in družbo Equitable) zaščitila pred dolgim in dragim sodnim postopkom.
Page 9. does not comment on the fairness of the Compromise Scheme but rather points out its advantages in general: " Firstly, it provided certainty for the parties concerned, shielding policyholders (and Equitable) for extensive and costly litigation.
Drugič, potrdili so jo zakonodajalec (Organ za finančne storitve), večina članov in Sodišče.
Secondly, it met with the approval of the regulator (FSA), the majority of members, and the court.
Tretjič, omogočila je, da se je sporazum s Halifax plc uresničil pod najboljšimi možnimi pogoji.
Thirdly, it enabled a deal with Halifax plc to materialise under the best possible terms.
Četrtič, shema se zdi boljša od drugih nadomestnih možnosti, kot je stečaj družbe Equitable.
Fourthly, it seems preferable to other alternatives, such as the winding-up of Equitable. "
“ Avtorji ES 3 menijo, da „ lahko oškodovani zavarovanci na splošno lažje dosežejo odškodnino prek sistema kolektivnih odškodnin, kot je odškodninska shema, kot pa z individualno uporabo pravnih sredstev “, vendar te točke ne obravnavajo podrobneje.
The authors of ES 3 express their view that " on balance, an aggrieved policyholder is more likely to get satisfaction through a system of collective satisfaction, such as the Compromise Scheme, than through individual recourse to legal remedies ", without further elaborating on this point.
Če povzamemo, dokazi kažejo, da je bil glavni cilj odškodninske sheme ureditve, ki je začela pravno veljati 8. februarja 2002, ko jo je potrdila zahtevana večina zavarovancev in sprejelo višje sodišče, odprava pravne negotovosti in obveznosti družbe Equitable Life ter s tem stabilizacija sklada.
In summary, evidence suggests that the primary aim of the Compromise Scheme of Arrangement, which took legal effect on 8 February 2002 after it had been approved by the requisite majority of policyholders and sanctioned by the High Court, was to remove legal uncertainties and liabilities from Equitable Life and thereby stabilise the fund.
Kljub temu shema ni zagotovila odškodnin za izgube zavarovancev zaradi znižanja vrednosti polic leta 2001, ki ga je povzročilo več posebnih okoliščin v družbi Equitable, vključno s prakso družbe v devetdesetih letih 20. stoletja, ko je izplačevala previsoke bonuse.
The Scheme, however, did not serve to compensate policyholders for losses they had incurred through the 2001 reduction in policy values, which was caused by a number of particular circumstances at Equitable, including the Society's practice during the 1990s of paying excessive bonuses.
Zvišanje vrednosti polic zavarovancem s policami brez zajamčenih rent, ki so se v zameno za to odpovedali pravici do vlaganja zahtevkov, so več kot izničila nadaljnja znižanja.
In particular, the uplifts in policy values granted to non-GAR policyholders, who in exchange waived their right to pursue claims, were more than eliminated by subsequent cuts.
Številne izjave, kažejo, da je družba, ko je predlagala shemo, morda vedela, da zvišanj vrednosti polic ne bo mogoče vzdrževati v običajnih razmerah.
Numerous accounts suggest that the Society may have been aware at the time it proposed the scheme that the uplifts in policy values could not be sustained under normal circumstances.