natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Prvi sklop pobud: Krepitev legitimnosti in učinkovitosti evropske varnostne strategije tako navznoter kot navzven
First set of suggestions: To reinforce the legitimacy and effectiveness of the European Security Strategy, both internally and externally
1. z zadovoljstvom ugotavlja, da nova evropska varnostna strategija ("EVS") priznava potrebo po obravnavi številnih družbenih dejavnikov, ki vplivajo na varnost, vključno z dejavniki, ki lahko ogrozijo temeljne svoboščine in človekove pravice, kršijo načela pravne države in vodijo k odtujevanju mladih; v tem okviru ugotavlja, da spoštovanje človekovih in temeljnih pravic pri vseh ukrepih za krepitev varnosti tako navznoter kot navzven predstavlja ne le mednarodno obveznost, ampak tudi nujni sestavni del vsake EVS, ki si prizadeva v kar največji možni meri povečati legitimnost in učinkovitost med prebivalstvom nasploh; posledično meni, da je za krepitev legitimnosti in učinkovitosti ukrepov EVS izrednega pomena, da Evropska unija ukrepa in tudi od drugih zahteva, da ukrepajo, seveda ob upoštevanju načel prava, listine Združenih narodov ter evropskih in mednarodnih sporazumov o človekovih in temeljnih pravicah;
Notes with satisfaction the recognition given by the new European Security Strategy (“ESS”) to the need to address a multitude of social factors affecting security, including those that can threaten fundamental freedoms and human rights, violate the rule of law and lead to the alienation of young people; in this context, notes that the respect for human and fundamental rights in the context of all actions to enhance security, both internally and externally, constitutes, apart from being an international obligation, a necessary ingredient of any ESS aspiring to maximise its legitimacy and effectiveness among the general population; considers, therefore, that in order to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of ESS actions, it is of paramount importance that the European Union both act, and insist that others act, in full respect of the rule of law, the United Nations Charter and European and international human and fundamental rights accords;
3. opozarja, da v skladu s členom 47 PEU, "... nobena določba v tej pogodbi ne vpliva na pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropskih skupnosti..." ; na osnovi tega načela meni, da izvajanje evropske varnostne strategije ne sme privesti do posrednega ali neposrednega omejevanja temeljnih pravic, ki jih ščiti pravni red Skupnosti (npr. evropska merila glede varovanja podatkov), zaradi ukrepov, ki bi izhajali iz drugega ali tretjega stebra;
Recalls that according to Article 47 of the TEU, “... nothing in this Treaty shall affect the Treaties establishing the European Communities ”; considers that, as a consequence of that constitutional principle, the implementation of the ESS must not lead to a weakening, directly or indirectly, of the fundamental rights as protected by Community law (for instance, the European standards on data protection) by measures based on the second or the third pillar;
Drugi sklop pobud: Krepitev in poenostavitev političnih ukrepov EU za boj proti organiziranemu čezmejnemu kriminalu in terorizmu ob hkratnem zagotavljanju polnega spoštovanja temeljnih pravic
Second set of suggestions: To strengthen and simplify EU policy against organised cross-border crime and terrorism, while ensuring full respect for fundamental rights
9. obžaluje, da se Svet še vedno ne meni za pobude Evropskega parlamenta o oblikovanju resnične evropske notranje varnostne strategije, temelječe na evropskem notranjem pravnem redu, o preoblikovanju Europola v pravi organ Evropske unije in o pripravi čvrstega pravnega okvira za izmenjavo podatkov med varnostnimi in obveščevalnimi službami na nacionalni in evropski ravni, kar bi omogočalo učinkovit boj proti organiziranemu kriminalu in terorizmu na eni strani ter polno upoštevanje zahtev o varstvu podatkov in varovanju temeljnih pravic državljanov EU;
Regrets that the Council continues to ignore Parliament’s suggestions of establishing a true European internal security strategy founded on the concept of a European internal legal order, transforming Europol into a true European body and creating a solid legal framework for data exchanges between the security and intelligence services at national and European levels that would allow the fight against organised crime and terrorism to be efficient, while fully complying with data protection requirements and respecting the fundamental rights of EU citizens;
12. zato prosi, da postane izvajanje EVS predmet stalnega parlamentarnega nadzora na evropski in nacionalni ravni; prosi, da je redno neposredno obveščen o politikah in mehanizmih EVS, zlasti tistih, s šibkimi točkami ali pomanjkljivimi sredstvi;
Requests, therefore, that the implementation of the ESS be subject to continuous parliamentary scrutiny at European and national level; asks to be kept directly informed about the policies or mechanisms of the ESS, especially those containing weaknesses or a lack of resources;
- priprave celovitih in usklajenih ukrepov kriznega upravljanja na ravni EU za krize s čezmejnimi posledicami znotraj EU,
– set up integrated and coordinated EU crisis-management arrangements for crises with cross-border effects within the EU,
- vzpostavitve "programa solidarnosti" glede posledic terorističnih groženj in napadov,
– establish “a Solidarity Programme” addressing the consequences of terrorist threats and attacks,
- ocene zmogljivosti, ki bi jih države članice lahko prispevale v mehanizem civilne zaščite v primeru napada,
– assess the capabilities that Member States could make available to the Civil Protection Mechanism in the event of an attack,
- razvoja zmogljivosti civilne zaščite, ki naj vključuje skupne vaje, usklajevanje javnega obveščanja in večjo razpoložljivost medicinskih virov,
– develop civil protection capabilities, including joint exercises and coordination of public information, and improved availability of medical resources,
- prilagoditve evropskega programa za varovanje kritične infrastrukture z možnimi čezmejnimi učinki,
– adopt a European Programme for critical infrastructure protection with potential trans-boundary effects,
- krepitve mehanizma za hitro ukrepanje pri sodelovanju med pristojnimi organi za policijsko preiskovanje;
– strengthen the rapid response mechanism for cooperation between the competent authorities in police investigation;
ponovno torej opozarja, da so vse te dejavnosti temeljnega pomena za razvoj skladne in popolne EVS, zato jih je potrebno razvijati na čvrsti pravni osnovi, ki naj združi Evropski parlament kot zakonodajalca in proračunski organ pod nadzorom nacionalnih parlamentov.
recalls that all these activities are of fundamental importance to the development of a coherent and complete ESS and should be pursued on a sound legal basis which involves the European Parliament as a legislator and budgetary authority and comes under the scrutiny of the national parliaments.
RAPPORTEUR'S EXPLANATORY NOTE
RAPPORTEUR’S EXPLANATORY NOTE
The European Security Strategy (“ESS”) adopted by the European Council in December 2003 outlines a very general scope for the Union and its Member States in improving the Union’s internal and external security.
The European Security Strategy (“ESS”) adopted by the European Council in December 2003 outlines a very general scope for the Union and its Member States in improving the Union’s internal and external security.
The ESS, to its credit, recognises that a number of social factors – including poverty, malnutrition, disease, and economic collapse – all contribute to a climate of instability and increased security threats, as they can often lead to regional conflict and failed states and, as a consequence, fuel support or tolerance for organised crime and terrorism.
The ESS, to its credit, recognises that a number of social factors – including poverty, malnutrition, disease, and economic collapse – all contribute to a climate of instability and increased security threats, as they can often lead to regional conflict and failed states and, as a consequence, fuel support or tolerance for organised crime and terrorism.
The ESS identifies five “key threats” against Europe today: (a) Terrorism; (b) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; (c) Regional Conflicts (which, according to the ESS, by threatening minorities, fundamental freedoms, and human rights, can lead to extremism, organised crime and terrorism); (d) State Failure; and (e) Organised Crime.
The ESS identifies five “key threats” against Europe today: (a) Terrorism; (b) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; (c) Regional Conflicts (which, according to the ESS, by threatening minorities, fundamental freedoms, and human rights, can lead to extremism, organised crime and terrorism); (d) State Failure; and (e) Organised Crime.
In addressing these threats, the ESS explicitly recognises that a whole host of means (including economic, humanitarian, civilian, diplomatic, judicial, intelligence, police, trade, development, cultural, and others) should be utilised in conjunction with each other, and that military means may be only one of many methods to be used in an effective European threat-averting strategy.
In addressing these threats, the ESS explicitly recognises that a whole host of means (including economic, humanitarian, civilian, diplomatic, judicial, intelligence, police, trade, development, cultural, and others) should be utilised in conjunction with each other, and that military means may be only one of many methods to be used in an effective European threat-averting strategy.
The ESS further notes that the pursuit of building security in the Union's neighbourhood can largely help in addressing regional threats, whereas threats of a global nature must be tackled through effective multilateral structures where "strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority."
The ESS further notes that the pursuit of building security in the Union’s neighbourhood can largely help in addressing regional threats, whereas threats of a global nature must be tackled through effective multilateral structures where “strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority”.
Significantly, regarding Europe's security goals, the ESS stresses that the EU must appropriately utilise all the means available to it in "spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights".
Significantly, regarding Europe’s security goals, the ESS stresses that the EU must appropriately utilise all the means available to it in “spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights”.
This is of paramount importance, according to the ESS, as these are "the best means of strengthening the international order."
This is of paramount importance, according to the ESS, as these are “the best means of strengthening the international order.”
However, the ESS makes no reference to the human and fundamental rights obligations of the EU when implementing ESS actions.
However, the ESS makes no reference to the human and fundamental rights obligations of the EU when implementing ESS actions.
Finally, with regard to the specific competencies of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the ESS references are few and far between.
Finally, with regard to the specific competencies of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the ESS references are few and far between.
The ESS notes with satisfaction recent measures, including the adoption of the European Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing, and the EU-US agreement on mutual legal assistance.
The ESS notes with satisfaction recent measures, including the adoption of the European Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing, and the EU-US agreement on mutual legal assistance.
The ESS also mentions that "common threat assessments" are the "best basis for common actions" and states that "this requires improved sharing of intelligence among Member States and with partners."
The ESS also mentions that “common threat assessments” are the “best basis for common actions” and states that “this requires improved sharing of intelligence among Member States and with partners.”
(The AFET Rapporteur agrees on this point and states that, in his view, any contributions by the Union in this regard "must be initially limited in scope and in nature in order to have full effect.").
(The AFET Rapporteur agrees on this point and states that, in his view, any contributions by the Union in this regard “must be initially limited in scope and in nature in order to have full effect.”).
Finally, the ESS Report also concludes, without elaboration, that "better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the fight both against terrorism and organised crime."
Finally, the ESS Report also concludes, without elaboration, that “better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the fight both against terrorism and organised crime.”
(The AFET Rapporteur takes note of this provision but notes, appropriately, the "sparsity of content within the ESS on linking the two concepts to coherently address threats.")
(The AFET Rapporteur takes note of this provision but notes, appropriately, the “sparsity of content within the ESS on linking the two concepts to coherently address threats”.)
From the European Union point of view, the AFET Report indicates a slow but sure improvement in the cooperation among Member States (whether on the level of heads of state, Defence ministers, or heads of national armies) towards the goal of strengthening external security.
From the European Union point of view, the AFET Report indicates a slow but sure improvement in the cooperation among Member States (whether on the level of heads of state, Defence ministers, or heads of national armies) towards the goal of strengthening external security.
Indeed, the interaction between the political, the institutional and the operational layers in this domain has arguably created a momentum which could increase the Union's gradual ability to establish a real common defence policy as outlined in the Constitutional Treaty.
Indeed, the interaction between the political, the institutional and the operational layers in this domain has arguably created a momentum which could increase the Union’s gradual ability to establish a real common defence policy as outlined in the Constitutional Treaty.
By contrast, the push factors and political will present in external security-building are either weak or inexistent as far as the establishment of a credible and democratically accountable internal security policy is concerned, even as the Constitutional Treaty (which is planned to enter into force in November 2006) foresees a solidarity clause in case of terrorist attacks or natural catastrophes.
By contrast, the push factors and political will present in external security-building are either weak or non-existent as far as the establishment of a credible and democratically accountable internal security policy is concerned, even as the Constitutional Treaty (which is planned to enter into force in November 2006) foresees a solidarity clause in case of terrorist attacks or natural catastrophes.
This situation was denounced in the Working Group X "Freedom, Security and Justice" final report to the Convention which broadly acknowledged that " ... current operational collaboration lacks efficiency, transparency and responsibility," and became even more pronounced in the analysis of the European Council after the Madrid attacks and in the recent Hague five-year plan.
This situation was denounced in the Working Group X “Freedom, Security and Justice” final report to the Convention which broadly acknowledged that “ ... current operational collaboration lacks efficiency, transparency and responsibility,” and became even more pronounced in the analysis of the European Council after the Madrid attacks and in the recent Hague five-year plan.
This gap between aspirations and reality in dealing with internal security matters is not surprising, as the internal security order has been treated from the beginning (and still is) as a "forbidden area" for the European Institutions.
This gap between aspirations and reality in dealing with internal security matters is not surprising, as the internal security order has been treated from the beginning (and still is) as a “forbidden area” for the European Institutions.
Having said that, it is beyond doubt that the cultural, legal and institutional barriers presently blocking the European security area will have to be appropriately addressed if the Union is ever to establish an internal security policy that fully respects its democratic values and of the demands of its citizens.
Having said that, it is beyond doubt that the cultural, legal and institutional barriers presently blocking the European security area will have to be appropriately addressed if the Union is ever to establish an internal security policy that fully respects its democratic values and of the demands of its citizens.
A so-called "pragmatic" or piecemeal approach in this domain is a false shortcut, as is currently arguably demonstrated by our experience with Europol, the new Schengen System and the External Borders Agency.
A so-called “pragmatic” or piecemeal approach in this domain is a false shortcut, as is currently arguably demonstrated by our experience with Europol, the new Schengen System and the External Borders Agency.
In fact, Europol was negotiated before the Amsterdam Treaty but was not updated thereafter, the Schengen System was created for controlling external borders but now the Member States plan to transform it into a multi-purpose police tool, without a redefinition of its mission, while the External Borders Agency will be operational in a few months, but without having taken into due account the links needed with police services.
In fact, Europol was negotiated before the Amsterdam Treaty but was not updated thereafter, the Schengen System was created for controlling external borders but now the Member States plan to transform it into a multi-purpose police tool, without a redefinition of its mission, while the External Borders Agency will be operational in a few months, but without having taken into due account the links needed with police services.
So it is not surprising that the lack of a long term perspective and of possible interactions between these initiatives has created an even more confusing situation that raises serious questions of democratic accountability, protection of fundamental rights, and efficiency.
So it is not surprising that the lack of a long term perspective and of possible interactions between these initiatives has created an even more confusing situation that raises serious questions of democratic accountability, protection of fundamental rights, and efficiency.
From the Rapporteur's point of view, the internal security strategy (more than the external security domain) can only be founded on a strong political commitment and on a more solid legal framework, as provided for by the European Constitution.
From the Rapporteur’s point of view, the internal security strategy (more than the external security domain) can only be founded on a strong political commitment and on a more solid legal framework, as provided for by the European Constitution.
Particular emphasis must be given to the respect of citizens' fundamental rights, as enshrined in the Constitution, within any discussion of internal police or other cooperation.
Particular emphasis must be given to the respect of citizens’ fundamental rights, as enshrined in the Constitution, within any discussion of internal police or other cooperation.
Before the Constitution's entry into force, the Union can only continue the preparatory work according to what has already been suggested in the EP recommendation on the future of the Freedom Security and Justice Area.
Before the Constitution’s entry into force, the Union can only continue the preparatory work according to what has already been suggested in the EP recommendation on the future of the Freedom Security and Justice Area.
The suggested amendments to the Kuhne report are aimed at:
The suggested amendments to the Kuhne report are aimed at:
· Enhancing the legitimacy and effectiveness of ESS and minimising negative spill-over effects that could undermine European security, by ensuring that, when acting to avert security threats, the EU ensures that international law and fundamental and human rights obligations are fully respected.
· Enhancing the legitimacy and effectiveness of ESS and minimising negative spill-over effects that could undermine European security, by ensuring that, when acting to avert security threats, the EU ensures that international law and fundamental and human rights obligations are fully respected.
· Reinforcing the legitimacy of European Union action in this domain by establishing real democratic control by the European and the national parliaments.
· Reinforcing the legitimacy of European Union action in this domain by establishing real democratic control by the European and the national parliaments.
· Reinforcing the coherence between European Union and Member States in international fora, when negotiating international agreements or participating in fora dealing with freedom, security and justice.
· Reinforcing the coherence between European Union and Member States in international fora, when negotiating international agreements or participating in fora dealing with freedom, security and justice.
· Defining a European internal security plan to be understood as a complement to national security strategies, with a clear role for European Agencies (such as Europol), in order to enhance transparency, democratic accountability for policy and actions.
· Defining a European internal security plan to be understood as a complement to national security strategies, with a clear role for European Agencies (such as Europol), in order to enhance transparency, democratic accountability for policy and actions.
· Building a central alarm system inside the Commission which could collect the appropriate information for preventing and combating transboundary threats.
· Building a central alarm system inside the Commission which could collect the appropriate information for preventing and combating transboundary threats.
Odbor(-i), zaprošeni za mnenje Datum razglasitve na zasedanju
Committees asked for its opinion Date announced in plenary
Datum predložitve– A[6]
Date tabled – A[6]
o skupnem stališču Sveta v zvezi s sprejetjem direktive Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o minimalnih pogojih za izvajanje Uredbe Sveta (EGS) št. 3820/85 in Uredbe Sveta (EGS) št. 3821/85 o socialnih predpisih za dejavnosti v tovornem prometu
on the Council common position for adopting a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum conditions for the implementation of Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 3820/85 and 3821/85 concerning social legislation relating to road transport activities
– ob upoštevanju skupnega stališča Sveta (11336/1/2004 – C6‑0249/2004 ),
– having regard to the Council common position (11336/1/2004 – C6‑0249/2004 ),
Besedila, sprejeta dne 20.4.2004, P5_TA(2004)0306 . o predlogu Komisije Parlamentu in Svetu ( KOM(2003)0628 ))
Texts Adopted, 20.4.2004, P6_TA(2004)0306 . on the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council ( COM(2003)0628 )
– ob upoštevanju priporočila za drugo obravnavo Odbora za promet in turizem ( A6‑0073/2005 )
– having regard to the recommendation for second reading of the Committee on Transport and Tourism ( A6-0073/2005 ),