natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
člen 181(a)(2) ES
Article 181(a)(2) EC
o priporočilu Sveta za imenovanje Lorenza Bina Smaghija za člana Izvršilnega odbora Evropske centralne banke
on the Council's recommendation on the appointment of Lorenzo Bini Smaghi as Executive Board Member of the European Central Bank
PREDLOG SKLEPA EVROPSKEGA PARLAMENTA.............................................................4
PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION................................................4
PRILOGA 1: CURRICULUM VITAE.........................................................................................6
ANNEX 1: CURRICULUM VITAE............................................................................................6
– ob upoštevanju priporočila Sveta z dne 8. marca 2005 (6289/2005)
– having regard to the Council's recommendation of 8 March 2005 (6289/2005)
UL L 68, 15.3.2005, str.
OJ L 68, 15.3.2005, p.
– ob upoštevanju člena 112(2)(b) Pogodbe ES, v skladu s katerim se je Svet posvetoval s Parlamentom ( C6–0054/2005 ),
– having regard to Article 112(2)(b) of the EC Treaty, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament ( C6-0054/2005 ),
– ob upoštevanju člena 102 svojega Poslovnika,
– having regard to Rule 102 of its Rules of Procedure,
– ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve ( A6–0094/2005 ),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs ( A6-0094/2005 ),
PRILOGA 1: CURRICULUM VITAE
ANNEX 1: CURRICULUM VITAE
PRILOGA 2:OBVESTILO POSLANCEM št. 18/2005
ANNEX 2: NOTICE TO MEMBERS No 18/2005
Zadeva: Odgovori na vprašanja kandidatu za člana Izvršilnega odbora Evropske centralne banke, ki jih vloži Lorenzo Bini Smaghi
Subject: Answers to the Questionnaire to the Candidate to be a member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi
Priloženi so odgovori na vprašanja kandidatu za člana Izvršilnega odbora Evropske centralne banke, ki jih je predložil Lorenzo Bini Smaghi.
Please find enclosed the answers to the questionnaire to the Candidate to be a member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi.
ZA NOTRANJO POLITIKO
FOR INTERNAL POLICIES
Odgovori na vprašanja
Answers to the Questionnaire
kandidatu za člana Izvršilnega odbora
to the Candidate to be a member of the Executive Board
Poudarite, prosim, glavne vidike vaših strokovnih izkušenj v monetarnih, finančnih in poslovnih zadevah.
Please highlight the main aspects of your professional experience in monetary, financial and business matters.
Ko sem diplomiral na Univerzi v Louvainu (Licence en Sciences Economiques) in Univerzi v Chicagu (doktorat iz ekonomije) sem se leta 1983 pridružil Banca d’Italia.
After graduating from the University of Louvain (Licence en Sciences Economiques) and the University of Chicago (PhD in Economics), I joined the Banca d’Italia in 1983.
Delal sem na oddelku za raziskave, smer mednarodni odnosi, kjer sem kasneje prevzel odgovornost za enoto, ki je pooblaščena za evropsko monetarno združevanje.
I worked in the Research Department, the International Division, where I later became responsible for the Unit in charge of European Monetary Integration.
Naloge enote so bile upravljanje evropskega monetarnega sistema in pripravljalna dela za Monetarno unijo.
The tasks of the Unit included the management of the European Monetary System and the preparatory work for Monetary Union.
Kot namestnik Monetarnega odbora sem prispeval k pripravljalnemu delu za Maastrichtsko pogodbo.
As Alternate of the Monetary Committee, I contributed to the preparatory work for the Maastricht Treaty.
Prav tako sem predstavljal Banca d’Italia v pododboru za politiko deviznega tečaja in v pododboru za monetarno politiko pri Odboru guvernerjev Centralne banke, ki sta dva glavna posvetovalna organa za usklajevanje politike v prvi in drugi fazi Monetarne unije.
I also represented the Banca d’Italia in the Foreign Exchange Policy Subcommittee and in the Monetary Policy Subcommittee of the Committee of Central Bank Governors, the two main policy coordination fora in the first and second stages of Monetary Union.
Leta 1994 sem se ob odprtju pridružil Evropskemu monetarnemu inštitutu.
In 1994 I joined the European Monetary Institute, at its inception.
Bil sem predsednik oddelka za politiko, ki pripravlja institucionalni okvir in politiko, ki jo izvaja ECB na področju plačilnih sistemov, bančnega nadzora, mednarodnega sodelovanja in politike deviznega tečaja, računovodstva, bankovcev ter prehoda na enotno valuto.
I headed the Policy Division, which prepared the institutional framework and the policies to be implemented by the ECB in the fields of Payment Systems, Banking Supervision, International Cooperation and Foreign Exchange Policy, Accounting, Banknotes and the Changeover to the single currency.
Leta 1998, takoj po ustanovitvi Evropske centralne banke, sem se kot direktor za mednarodne finančne odnose pridružil zakladnici Italije.
In 1998, just after the creation of the European Central Bank, I joined the Italian Treasury, as Director for International Financial Relations.
Tu sem bil odgovoren za zadeve mednarodnih financ in mednarodnega razvoja v zvezi s Skupino sedmih, Skupino desetih, Skupino dvajsetih, Mednarodnim monetarnim skladom in Svetovno banko.
In this capacity, I have been responsible for international finance and development issues in the context of the Group of Seven, the Group of Ten, the Group of Twenty, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
V vseh posvetovalnih organih sem deloval kot namestnik italijanskega ministra za finance.
I acted as deputy to Italy’s Finance Minister in all these fora.
Tudi kot član Ekonomsko-finančnega odbora (katerega podpredsednik sem od leta 2003) sem bil odgovoren za evropske zadeve.
I have also been responsible for European issues, as member of the Economic and Financial Committee (of which I have been Vice President since 2003).
V tem smislu sem od leta 2001 predsedoval Pododboru Ekonomsko-finančnega odbora o vprašanjih MDS.
In that context, I also chaired, since 2001, the EFC Sub-Committee on IMF issues.
Prav tako sem bil član Odbora Evropske investicijske banke in predsednik Odbora za finančne trge Organizacije za gospodarsko sodelovanje in razvoj.
I have also been member of the Board of the European Investment Bank and chaired the OECD Committee on Financial Markets.
Od leta 2001 sem predsednik SACE, Italijanske izvozno-kreditne agencije, in član odborov Finmeccanica SpA ter MTS.
Since 2001 I have been the President of SACE, the Italian Export Credit Agency, and member of the Boards of Finmeccanica SpA and MTS.
Poudarite, prosim, glavne vidike vaših evropskih in mednarodnih izkušenj.
Please highlight the main aspects of your European and international experience.
Kot je omenjeno zgoraj, se je moja poklicna kariera razvijala na področju vprašanj mednarodne in evropske politike.
As mentioned above, all my professional career has developed in the fields of international and European policy issues.
V Banca d’Italia in Evropskem monetarnem inštitutu sem se na področju usklajevanja in priprave instrumentov ter postopkov za skupno politiko ukvarjal z monetarno politiko in politiko deviznega tečaja.
In the Banca d’Italia and the European Monetary Institute I worked on monetary and foreign exchange policy, both in terms of coordination and preparation of the instruments and procedures for the single policy.
Bil sem član posvetovalnega organa za glavno usklajevanje vprašanj v zvezi s politiko.
I was a member of the main coordination fora for these policy issues.
V zakladnici Italije sem bil odgovoren za večja vprašanja v zvezi z mednarodno in evropsko politiko.
In the Italian Treasury, I have been responsible for major international and European policy issues.
Naj še zlasti omenim delovanje v predsedstvu Skupine sedmih, kjer sem bil odgovoren za pripravo sej in vrha ministra za finance, in delovanje v predsedstvu EU leta 2003.
Let me mention in particular the 2001 Presidency of the Group of Seven, during which I was responsible for the preparation of the Finance Ministers meetings and the Summit, and the 2003 EU Presidency.
Ob tem sem napisal veliko knjig in člankov o mednarodnih in evropskih zadevah.
I have also written several books and articles on international and European issues.
Naštejte najpomembnejše odločitve, pri katerih ste sodelovali v svojem poklicnem življenju.
What are the most important decisions to which you have been party in your professional life?
Sodeloval sem v mnogih razpravah na različnih političnih področjih, neposredno ali v zvezi s skupinami in posvetovalnimi organi, katerih član sem bil.
I have been party to several decisions, in different policy areas, directly or in the context of the groups and fora in which I participated.
V Banca d’Italia sem, kot odgovorna oseba za enoto, pooblaščeno za zadeve evropskega monetarnega sistema, prispeval zlasti k pomembnejšim odločitvam v zvezi s postopki zamenjave lire do njenega umika iz mehanizma deviznih tečajev leta 1992.
In the Banca d’Italia, as responsible for the Unit in charge of the EMS, I have contributed in particular to the major decisions related to exchange realignments of the Lira, until its exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992.
Prav tako sem prispeval k sklepom Evropskega sveta iz oktobra 1990, ki so opredelili mandat medvladne konference, ki je vodila k Maastrichtski pogodbi.
I have also contributed to the October 1990 European Council Conclusions, that defined the mandate of the Intergovernmental Conference that led to the Maastricht Treaty.
V zakladnici Italije sem bil odgovoren za položaj Italije v odborih za mednarodne finančne ustanove.
In the Italian Treasury, I have been responsible for Italy’s positions in the Boards of the International Financial Institutions.
Kot član Ekonomsko-finančnega odbora sem sodeloval tudi pri pomembnejših odločitvah Ekonomsko-finančnega sveta, zlasti v zvezi z izvajanjem Pakta za stabilnost in rast ter postopki njegove reforme.
As member of the EFC, I have also been party to major decisions taken by Ecofin, in particular in the context of the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and of its process of reform.
Monetarna in ekonomska politika
B. Monetary and economic policy
Naštejte glavne cilje, za katere bi si prizadevali kot član Izvršilnega odbora Evropske centralne banke med vašim osemletnim mandatom.
What would be the guiding objectives you will pursue during your eight-year mandate as a Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank?
ECB ima jasen mandat.
The ECB has a clear mandate.
Pri delu v Evropski centralni banki bom uporabil vse intelektualne in vodilne sposobnosti, strokovne izkušnje in integriteto za zagotovitev, da se bo mandat izvajal kar se da učinkovito in pregledno.
I will put all my intellectual qualities, managerial skills professional experience and integrity to the service of the ECB, to ensure that it implements its mandate in the most efficient and transparent manner.
Kako naj ECB, če to ni v nasprotju s ciljem stabilnosti cen, izpolni svoje sekundarne obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz Pogodbe (prispevek k ekonomski rasti in polni zaposlenosti) in s katerimi instrumenti to lahko stori?
Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, how in your view should the ECB fulfill its secondary obligations under the Treaty (to contribute to economic growth and full employment) and what instruments could the ECB use to do so?
Pogodba jasno navaja, da mora ECB v skladu s primarnim ciljem za zagotavljanje stabilnosti cen, podpirati gospodarsko politiko Evropske unije, katere cilj je zlasti pospeševanje rasti in zaposlovanja.
The Treaty clearly states that, subject to the primary objective of ensuring price stability, the ECB should support the economic policies of the European Union, aimed in particular at fostering growth and employment.
ECB ima več instrumentov za doseganje tega cilja.
The ECB has several instruments to achieve this objective.
Naj omenim najbolj očitnega: monetarna politika.
Let me start by the most obvious one: monetary policy.
Ko se varno doseže cilj stabilnosti cen, tj. ko stopnja inflacije znaša manj kot 2 odstotka ali skoraj toliko, lahko monetarna politika začne podpirati gospodarsko dejavnost.
When the objective of price stability is safely achieved, i.e. the inflation rate is below and close to 2 per cent, there may be room for monetary policy to support economic activity.
Ključni pogoj je, da se stabilnost cen doseže na varen način.
The key condition to be satisfied is that price stability must be safely achieved.
Pri ocenjevanju tega, se mora stabilnost cen izmeriti ne samo glede na opazovano stopnjo inflacije, ampak tudi, gledano srednjeročno, glede na načrtovanje ter pričakovanja inflacije.
To assess this, price stability has to be measured not only with respect to the observed rate of inflation but also to inflation projections and expectations over the medium term.
Obenem je, glede na to, da monetarne razmere z zamudo vplivajo na cene in inflacijo (v povprečju med 12 in 18 mesecev), treba oceniti prostor za monetarno politiko, ki se nadalje širi, tj. za dodatno znižanje obrestne mere, glede na morebiten vpliv na inflacijo v naslednjih 12 in 18 mesecih.
Furthermore, given that monetary conditions affect prices and inflation with a lag (on average between 12 and 18 months), the room for further expansionary monetary policy, i.e. for further reducing the interest rate, has to be assessed in light of the potential impact on inflation over the following 12 to 18 months.
Zato obstaja omejitev možnosti za zmanjšanje obrestnih mer, ki nastane zaradi vpliva na ustvarjanje likvidnosti in morebitnega vpliva na cene premoženja, ki bi lahko v prihodnje prispeval k povečanju inflacije in jo odražal.
There is thus a limit to the possibility of cutting interest rates, that is given by the impact on liquidity creation and on the possible effect on asset prices, which might contribute or signal the pick up in future inflation.
Da povzamem, manevrski prostor za monetarno politiko je pogojen z opazovano in načrtovano inflacijo.
To sum up, the room for manoeuvre for monetary policy is conditional not only on observed inflation but also on projected inflation.
V zadnjih letih je monetarna politika na območju eura podpirala gospodarsko dejavnost z vzdrževanjem obrestnih mer na nižji ravni, kot bi bile v primeru, če bi bila rast večja.
Over the last few years, monetary policy in the euro area has supported economic activity by keeping interest rates lower than would have been the case had growth been stronger.
To se lahko ugotovi, na primer, s primerjavo stopnje obrestnih mer na območju eura s stopnjo rasti BDP.
This can be assessed for instance by comparing the level of interest rates in the euro area with the growth rate of GDP.
Pod pogoji za normalno rast in brez inflacijskega pritiska so obrestne mere v skladu s stopnjo rasti proizvodnje oziroma so nekoliko višje.
Under normal growth conditions and with no inflationary pressures, interest rates tend to be in line with, or a bit higher than, the rate of growth of output.
V zadnjih dveh letih je realna rast v povprečju znašala od 1 do 2 odstotka, nominalna pa od 4 do 5 odstotkov, realne obrestne mere so bile kratkoročno negativne in nominalne dvoodstotne.
In the last two years, while growth averaged around 1 to 2 per cent in real terms, and 4 to 5 per cent in nominal terms, short-term interest rates have been negative in real terms and at 2 per cent in nominal terms.
Tudi dolgoročne obrestne mere so bile manjše kot nominalna rast BDP in so tako pospeševale pogoje za dobro likvidnost na območju eura.
Even long term interest rates have been lower than nominal GDP growth, thus fostering conditions of ample liquidity in the euro area.
Tako nizke stopnje obrestnih mer so bile mogoče, ker so inflacijska pričakovanja ostala pod nadzorom zaradi verodostojnosti protiinflacijske politike ECB.
Such low levels of interest rates have been possible because inflation expectations have remained subdued, thanks to the credibility of the ECB’s anti-inflationary policy.
Bi lahko obrestne mere še dodatno znižali, kot so to storili v ZDA?
Could interest rates have been lowered even further, as in the US for instance?
Obstaja več znakov, da to ne bi bilo primerno.
There are several indications that this would not have been appropriate.
Prvič, podaljšano obdobje negativnih realnih obrestnih mer ustvarja odstopanja v gospodarstvu in zato ni zaželeno, razen če ga upravičujejo posebne okoliščine, kot je deflacija.
First, a protracted period of negative real interest rates creates distortions in the economy and is thus not desirable unless exceptional circumstances justify it, such as deflation.
V zadnjih letih območje eura ni bilo ogroženo z deflacijo, medtem ko se je inflacija ZDA leta 2002 spustila na razmeroma nizko raven in vzbudila skrb za morebitno deflacijsko tveganje.
In recent years the euro area has not been at risk of deflation, while US inflation fell to a relatively low level in 2002, raising concerns of a possible deflationary risk.
Drugič, načrtovana inflacija na območju eura je ostala nad dvema odstotkoma in tako ni upravičila dodatnih znižanj obrestnih mer.
Second, projected inflation in the euro area has remained above 2 per cent, thus not justifying further rate cuts.
Tretjič, obstaja dokaz, da je na finančne trge vplivala dobra likvidnost, ki je znatno povečala cene premoženja v nekaterih državah območja eura.
Third, there is evidence that financial markets have been characterised by ample liquidity, that has given rise to substantial increases in asset and housing prices in some euro area countries.
Dodatno znižanje obrestnih mer bi povzročilo tveganje zaostrovanja težave.
A further reduction in interest rates would have created a risk of fuelling a bubble.
Da povzamem, prostor za podporo monetarne politike gospodarski dejavnosti bo na voljo, ko se doseže stabilnost cen.
To sum up, there can be room for monetary policy to support economic activity when price stability has been achieved.
Takšen prostor se je v zadnjih nekaj letih v veliki meri uporabljal na območju eura.
Such a room has been widely used in the last few years in the euro area.
Obstajajo tudi druge možnosti, s katerimi lahko ECB podpira rast in zaposlovanje na območju eura, ki jih bom na kratko omenil.
There are other ways through which the ECB can support growth and employment in the euro area, that I would mention briefly.
Poglavitna možnost je, da prispeva k oblikovanju integriranega finančnega trga, še zlasti denarnega trga.
The main one is to contribute to the creation of an integrated financial market, in particular the money market.
Skupni integriran finančni trg v Evropi je eden ključnih pogojev za trajno dolgoročno rast.
A single integrated financial market in Europe is one of the key conditions for sustained long-term growth.
Drug instrument je vloga ECB pri spodbujanju finančne stabilnosti, še zlasti z nadzorom plačilnih sistemov in s prispevkom k usklajevanju nadzornih dejavnosti.
Another instrument is the ECB’s role in promoting financial stability, in particular through the oversight of the payment systems and the contribution to the coordination of supervisory activities.
Finančna stabilnost je ključna sestavina za doseganje makrogospodarske stabilnosti.
Financial stability is a key ingredient to achieve macroeconomic stability.
Ta vprašanja bom prav tako obravnaval v odgovorih na vprašanja oddelka C.
I will also address these issues in the answers to the questions of section C.
Na seji 22. in 23. marca je Evropski svet potrdil reformo, ki jo je predlagal Ekonomsko-finančni svet.
At its 22-23 March meeting, the European Council endorsed the reform proposed by Ecofin.
Pred razlago svojih ugotovitev bom navedel nekaj uvodnih pripomb.
Before explaining my assessment, let me provide a few preliminary comments.
Več kot sedem let po uvedbi Pakta za stabilnost in rast je bilo upravičeno, da se na podlagi izkušenj oceni njegovo delovanje.
More than 7 years after the start of the Stability and Growth Pact, it was reasonable to assess its functioning in light of experience.
Pravzaprav je splošno znano, da so bile glavne težave pri izvajanju Pakta za stabilnost in rast v bistvu posledica nezmožnosti proračunske politike, da izvede ustrezno prilagoditev, zlasti v pozitivnih obdobjih, da bi se izognila čezmernim primanjkljajem.
Overall, it is widely recognised that the main problems with the implementation of the SGP were due primarily to the inability of budgetary policies to pursue appropriate adjustment, especially in good times, so as to avoid excessive deficits.
Vendar so izkušnje tudi pokazale, da je izboljšava pri izvajanju pravil in postopkov Pakta mogoča.
On the other hand, experience also showed that some improvement in the implementation of the rules and procedures of the Pact is possible.
Na primer, popravljanje proračunskega stanja z upoštevanjem cikličnega položaja držav članic je bilo v celoti vpeljano šele leta 2002.
For instance, the correction of budgetary positions to take the cyclical situation of member countries into account was fully introduced only in 2002.
Drug primer je različna pravna razlaga Sveta in Komisije, ali je člen 104.7 Pogodbe upošteval ponovitev priporočila državi, ki se srečuje s čezmernim primanjkljajem, če so se osnovni gospodarski pogoji spremenili.
Another example is the different legal interpretation given by the Council and the Commission to whether article 104.7 of the Treaty allowed for a repetition of a recommendation to a country experiencing an excessive deficit if the underlying economic conditions changed.
Zaradi zatekanja k Evropskemu sodišču in njegovem odločanju je treba Pakt za stabilnost in rast pojasniti, kot je navedeno v deklaraciji, ki je bila priključena osnutku evropske ustave, ki so jo junija 2004 potrdili predsedniki držav in vlad.
The recourse to the European Court of Justice, and the judgment by the latter, made it necessary to clarify the SGP, as indicated in the Declaration annexed to the draft European Constitution approved in June 2004 by the Heads of State or Government.
Reforma Pakta za stabilnost in rast uvaja večje možnosti za gospodarsko analizo in presojo ocene proračunske politike in zlasti, ali je treba primanjkljaje obravnavati kot čezmerne.
The reform of the SGP introduces greater room for economic analysis and judgment in the assessment of budgetary policies, and in particular on whether deficits have to be considered excessive.
Na koncu bo odvisno od tega, kako se bo Pakt na področju preprečevanja in popravljanja dejansko izvajal.
Ultimately, it will depend on how the reformed pact will be implemented in concrete terms, both in the preventive and corrective arms.
Vseeno pa bo v naslednjih nekaj mesecih morda obstajala nevarnost, da bo reforma povečala negotovost, kako bodo pri oceni prekomernega proračunskega primanjkljaja upoštevani nekateri „pomembni dejavniki“.
However, in the next few months, there may be a risk that the reform will give rise to some uncertainty on how some “relevant factors” will be taken into consideration in the assessment of an excessive budget deficit.
Nekateri bodo morda zmotno menili, da se bo sedaj dopuščalo znatno povečane proračunske primanjkljaje in bodo temu primerno ukrepali.
Some may be led to believe that significantly larger budget deficits will now be tolerated, and will act accordingly.
To bi lahko vključevalo nesporazume in morebitno napetost.
This could induce some misunderstanding and potential tension.
Dokument, ki sta ga sprejela Ekonomsko-finančni svet in Evropski svet, vsekakor pojasnjuje, da mora biti vsak primanjkljaj, ki presega tri odstotke in je upravičen s pomembnimi dejavniki in posebnimi okoliščinami, „blizu“ treh odstotkov in „začasen“.
Indeed, the document approved by Ecofin and by the European Council makes it clear that any deficit above 3 per cent, to be justified by relevant factors and by exceptional circumstances, has to be “close to” the 3 per cent and “temporary”.
Ministri, ki sestavljajo Ekonomsko-finančni svet, dobro razumejo, kaj pomeni „blizu“ 3 odstotkov in „začasno“.
Ecofin ministers have a clear understanding of what is “close to” and “temporary”.