natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kljub uvedbi eura so trgi masovnih plačil na euro območju še vedno zelo nacionalno zaznamovani in razdrobljeni.
Despite the introduction of the euro, the markets for retail payments within the euro area are still largely national and fragmented.
Zato pozdravljam namen Komisije za oblikovanje enotnega pravnega okvira za evropski plačilni promet.
I therefore welcome the Commission’s intention to create a single legal framework for European payment transactions.
Direktiva o plačilnih storitvah na notranjem trgu lahko podpre prizadevanja bank za uresničitev enotnega plačilnega območja v eurih (Single Euro Payments Area: SEPA).
With a directive on payment services in the internal market it will be possible to support the banks in their efforts to realise a single euro payments area (SEPA).
V nadaljnjem napredovanju postopka oblikovanja direktive je treba paziti, da
In the further progress of the directive process, care must be taken that
– je načrt ureditve uravnotežen in nevtralen,
- the regulatory project turns out to be balanced and neutral;
– se podpirajo učinkoviti in varni postopki ter
- efficient and safe procedures are supported; and finally,
– odprtje trga za nove ponudnike ne povzroči nesorazmernega nadzora.
- the opening up of the market to new suppliers does not produce any asymmetries as regards prudential returns.
Na področju plačilnega prometa velikih vrednosti se je s sistemom TARGET že ustvaril enotni prostor plačilnega prometa.
In the area of large-value payment transactions a single payments area has already been created with the TARGET system.
Eurosistem se zdaj ukvarja z nadaljnjim razvojem sistema TARGET.
TARGET is currently being developed further by the Eurosystem.
Razvil naj bi se sistem z enotno tehnično platformo (TARGET 2), ki bi zmanjšala mogočo občutljivost decentraliziranega sistema s številnimi vmesniki in izboljšala njegovo učinkovitost.
The intention is to develop it into a system with a single technical platform (TARGET 2), to minimise the potential susceptibility to breakdown of a decentralised system with its many interfaces and to improve efficiency.
Temeljna naloga ESCB je podpiranje nemotenega delovanja plačilnih sistemov.
One of the ESCB’s basic tasks is to promote the smooth operation of payment systems.
Da bi ECB izpolnila nalogo, je na področju plačilnega prometa prevzela različne vloge: „vlogo katalizatorja“, nadzorno vlogo in tudi operativno vlogo.
In order to carry out its mandate the ECB has assumed various roles in the area of payment transactions: a ‘catalyst’ role, a supervisory role and also an operational role.
ECB v vlogi „katalizatorja“ spodbuja tržno usmerjen postopek k SEPA.
In its role as a ‘catalyst’ the ECB promotes the market-driven process to the SEPA.
ECB je zastopan v Evropskem svetu za plačila (European Payments Council: EPC) in v delovnih skupinah, povezanih z njim, kot opazovalec.
The ECB is represented in the European Payments Council (EPC) and in its working groups by observer.
Razen tega je Eurosistem za nadaljnje spodbujanje dialoga s končnimi uporabniki začel pogovore z gospodarskimi in potrošniškimi združenji.
To further foster dialogue with the end users the Eurosystem has also entered into talks with employers’ and consumers’ associations.
Prek njih lahko ECB pomembno prispeva k stabilnosti in učinkovitosti plačilnega prometa.
Via these channels the ECB can make an important contribution to the stability and efficiency of payment transactions.
Napredek pri doseganju SEPA se bo neprekinjeno nadzoroval in ocenjeval tudi z vidika odgovornosti za plačilni promet, ki izhaja iz PES, in stabilnosti celotnega finančnega sistema.
Progress towards the SEPA will also be monitored and assessed continually against the background of the responsibility for payment transactions which arises from the EC Treaty and the stability of the entire financial system.
Menim, da mora v zvezi s postopkom oblikovanja SEPA veljati načelo: konkurenčnost in trg pred ureditvijo.
As regards the SEPA process it is my opinion that the principle of ‘competition and market before regulation’ should apply.
Ko bo cilj vzpostavitve SEPA dosežen, je treba udeležencem pred začetkom sporočiti, da se dolgoročno ne bodo mogli izogniti zamenjavi nacionalnih postopkov in struktur.
But if the goal of a SEPA is to be achieved market participants must be made aware from the start that in the long term there is no way round the dissolution of national procedures and structures.
Osamljene uporabe dolgoročno niso združljive s SEPA.
In the long term, insular solutions are not compatible with the SEPA.
Kako ocenjujete trenutno raven konsolidacije finančnih storitev v EU in kakšno je vaše mnenje o obetih za prihodnost na tem področju ?
How do you assess the current level of consolidation in financial services in the EU and what is your view on future prospects in this regard?
Čeprav se je hitrost konsolidacije v zadnjem času nekoliko upočasnila, je konsolidacija finančnega sektorja EU vseeno dosegla napredek.
Even if the pace of consolidation has decreased somewhat of late, there has been further progress on consolidation in the EU’s financial sector.
Nastaja vse več velikih čezmejnih bančnih koncernov.
More and more large cross-border bank groups are being created.
Po letih dokaj majhne dejavnosti se zdaj zaradi večjega števila čezmejnih transakcij spet povečujejo zlasti združevanja in prevzemi podjetij.
After years of rather minimal activity, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in particular are again exhibiting an upward trend at present as a result of an increase in cross-border transactions.
Veliko dejstev kaže, da nedavna oživitev dejavnosti združevanja in prevzemov ni le začasen pojav, ampak začetek dejanskega evropskega povezovanja.
There are good reasons for assuming that the most recent revival in M&A activity is not a temporary phenomenon but marks the start of genuine European integration.
Odstranjevanje ovir za čezmejne dejavnosti v okviru programa akcijskega načrta za finančne storitve, napoved Komisije v beli knjigi o pospeševanju povezovanja evropskega finančnega trga in usklajevanje računovodskih standardov EU so občutno olajšali čezmejno konsolidacijo v EU.
The removal of obstacles to cross-border activity in the context of the FSAP programme, the Commission’s announcement in the White Paper that it would be pressing ahead with the integration of European financial markets, and the harmonisation of EU accounting standards, have made cross-border consolidation noticeably easier.
Ta evropski postopek konsolidacije je načeloma ocenjen pozitivno.
This European consolidation process should fundamentally be assessed positively.
Veliko evropskih bank se je na domačih trgih srečalo z omejitvami za rast.
Many European banks have run into the limits to their growth in their domestic markets.
Čezmejna združevanja bankam dajejo možnost nadaljnjega širjenja, da izkoristijo ekonomijo obsega in prednosti za spojitev ali zboljšajo geografsko in poslovno politično diverzifikacijo.
For them cross-border mergers represent an opportunity for further expansion, to exploit economies of scale and compound advantages, or to improve geographic and trading policy diversification.
S tem so povezani pozitivni učinki za donosnost posamezne bančne skupine in prek izboljšanega dodeljevanja sredstev tudi za evropski finančni sektor.
This is associated not only with positive effects for the profitability of individual banking groups, but also via improvements in the allocation of resources for the European financial sector as a whole.
Z razvojem učinkovitejših finančnih trgov se krepi zlasti odpornost evropskih finančnih sistemov na pretrese.
In particular the resistance of the European financial system to shock is reinforced by the development of more efficient financial markets.
Nujno je, da se institucionalni okvir evropskega finančnega sektorja vzpostavi na podlagi tega razvoja.
It is essential that the institutional framework for the European financial sector should be adjusted to take account of this development.
Na mikroravni gre za ustrezen nadzor čezmejnih koncernov ter pri tem zlasti za vprašanja učinkovite izmenjave informacij in tesnega sodelovanja domačih in tujih nadzornikov ter za okrepitev usklajevalne vloge skupine nadzornikov.
At micro level it is a matter of adequate supervision of cross-border groups and thus in particular a matter of the effective exchange of information and close cooperation between domestic and host-country supervisors, and of the reinforcement of the coordinating role of the group supervisor.
Z razširjanjem postopka Lamfalussy in dela za izvajanje smernice sporazuma Basel II je bil že dosežen občuten napredek.
With the expansion of the Lamfalussy process and work on implementing the Basel II Directives considerable progress has already been made here.
Na makroravni je nujno obširno spremljanje finančnega sistema, da se pravočasno ugotovijo sistemska tveganja, ki lahko ogrozijo učinkovitost skupnega finančnega sistema.
At macro level comprehensive monitoring of the financial system is essential in order to identify systemic risks promptly, which can impair the efficiency of the entire financial system.
Analize BSC stabilnosti bančnega sektorja v EU in razširjena analiza finančne stabilnosti ECB ter nacionalnih centralnih bank euro območja v zvezi s tem zelo pomembno prispevajo.
BSC analyses of stability in the EU banking sector and the expanded analysis of financial stability by the ECB and national central banks in the EU area make an important contribution to this.
Delovanje Evropske centralne banke, demokratična odgovornost in preglednost
D. Functioning of the ECB and democratic accountability and transparency
Ali se ne bi morale različne pristojnosti članov izvršilnega odbora sčasoma spreminjati v skladu s spremembami nalog in prednostnih nalog ECB?
Shouldn't the different responsibilities of Board members change with time, in line with the changes occurred in the ECB's tasks and priorities?
Naloge, ki jih mora ECB izpolnjevati ali izvrševati, so navedene v Pogodbi ES ter statutu ESCB in ECB.
The tasks which the ECB has to perform are specified in the EC Treaty and the ESCB and ECB Statute.
Menim, da mora biti vsak član izvršilnega odbora načeloma sposoben izvajati naloge centralne banke.
It is my opinion that every member of a board of directors is fundamentally able to carry out all central bank tasks.
To je razvidno iz dejstva, da izvršilni odbor ECB deluje kot kolegij in je kolektivno odgovoren za ustrezno izvajanje tekočih poslov (člen 11.6 statuta).
This is apparent to me from the fact that the ECB executive board acts as a committee and is collectively responsible for dealing with its current business (Article 11.6 of the Statute).
Hkrati različni oddelki banke poročajo izvršilnemu odboru ECB o svojih članih.
At the same time the various business areas of the bank will report to the ECB executive board on one of its members.
To je potrebno zaradi funkcionalnih razlogov in kaže tudi posebno odgovornost opravljanja nekaterih nalog posameznih članov.
This happens for operational reasons, but also demonstrates the special responsibility for specific tasks which individual members assume.
Pri nalogah je in ostaja prednostna naloga ESCB zagotavljanje stabilnosti cen.
As far its tasks are concerned, the main task of the ECSB is and will be to ensure price stability.
To je pravzaprav samoumevno in gre le za to, da je treba naloge ustanov izpolnjevati čim bolj učinkovito.
This is only natural, but it is important to carry out the institution’s tasks as efficiently and effectively as possible.
Kateri sistem je po vašem mnenju ustrezen za zagotavljanje enakopravnega kroženja članstva v izvršilnem odboru ECB tudi glede na narodnost?
What system do you think is appropriate to ensure an equitable rotation of membership on the ECB-executive board also in terms of nationalities?
Ali ECB kot evropski instituciji škoduje, da v njenem izvršilnem odboru v naslednjem štiriletnem obdobju ponovno ne bo predstavnikov majhnih držav?
Is it damageable to the ECB as a European institution that now again, for four years, there will be no representative of the small countries in the ECB executive board?
Katere sklepe bi moral Svet sprejeti v zvezi s tem?
What Council ought to have concluded on this?
– so člani izvršilnega odbora v medsebojnem soglasju izvoljeni ter imenovani „med osebami, ki imajo ugled in poklicne izkušnje na monetarnem ali bančnem področju“;
- members of the Executive Board shall be ‘appointed from among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters by common accord’;
– lahko le državljani držav članic postanejo člani izvršilnega odbora.
- only nationals of Member States may be Members of the Executive Board.
Menim, da mora biti odločitev o izbiri kandidata dejansko odvisna le od sposobnosti in državljanstva države članice euro območja.
I am convinced that only competence and nationality of a Member State in the euro area should actually be critical to the selection of a candidate.
Narodnost sama ne sme imeti vloge v resnično nadnacionalni ustanovi.
But nationality itself should not play any part in a truly supranational institution.
ECB je zavezana vsem državljanom euro območja in na njem obravnava določen pravni okvir za celotno euro območje in ne le za posamezno gospodarstvo ali regijo.
The ECB is committed to every citizen of the euro area and acts within the legal framework it has been given for the euro area as a whole and not for an individual national economy or a region.
To mora biti smernica za ravnanje članov izvršilnega odbora ECB.
This should be a guiding principle for the behaviour of Members of the ECB Executive Board.
Ali se vam ne zdi, da bi moral biti izvor predstavnikov v izvršilnem odboru bolj raznolik, namesto da so v njem le predstavniki centralnih bank ?
What is your view on the need to increase the diversity of backgrounds represented in the ECB board rather than relying solely on central bankers?
Postopek imenovanja novih članov izvršilnega odbora je določen v členu 11 statuta ESCB in ECB.
The procedure for nominating new Members of the Executive Board is regulated in Article 11 of the ESCB and ECB Statute.
Kot je že navedeno v odgovoru na vprašanje D 29, člen 112(2)(b) Pogodbe ES zahteva, da kandidati spadajo med osebe, ki imajo ugled in poklicne izkušnje na monetarnem ali bančnem področju.
As has already been stated in answer to Question D 29, Article 112.2(b) of the EC Treaty requires that candidates be from among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters.
Menim, da je običajno, da člani izvršilnega odbora centralnih bank euro območja spadajo med te ljudi.
In my opinion it is natural that Members of the Executive Board of the central banks of the euro area are from among such persons.
V zvezi s tem ne sme biti nobene izključenosti.
But there should be no exclusivity in this respect.
Menim, da je raznolikost zamisli, stališč, prepričanj in izkušenj v izvršilnem odboru takšne nadnacionalne ustanove zaželena, če ne celo potrebna.
I regard the diversity of ideas, opinions, convictions and experience on the Executive Board of a supranational institution as desirable, if not essential.
Zdajšnji izvršilni odbor že kaže takšno raznolikost.
In my opinion the current Executive Board reflects such diversity.
Vsi zdajšnji člani izvršilnega odbora imajo široko poklicno ozadje in večina je v dozdajšnjem poklicnem življenju opravljala več funkcij, od akademikov, nekdaj visoko uvrščenih uradnikov, namestnikov finančnih ministrov ali članov izvršilnih odborov centralnih bank v svojih državah članicah.
All of the current Members of the Executive Board have a broad professional background and most of them have held a number of positions in their previous professional lives either as academics, former senior civil servants, Deputy Finance Ministers or Members of the Executive Board of the central banks in their own countries.
Ali bi lahko podrobneje pojasnili svoj pogled na pojem demokratične odgovornosti v zvezi z ECB in centralnim bančništvom na splošno?
Could you elaborate on your views on the concept of democratic accountability with regards to the ECB and central banking in general?
V moderni demokraciji zakonodajalec naloge in pooblastila centralnih bank opredeli v ustavi ali preprostem zakonu.
In modern democracies the mandate of the central bank is laid down by the legislature either in the constitution or by a simple Act of Parliament.
Centralna banka deluje kot „zastopnik načel države ali družbe“ in ji je za boljše izpolnjevanje nalog in pooblastil večinoma zagotovljena neodvisnost.
Central banks act as ‘agent in a principal-agent relationship vis-à-vis society at large’ and in most cases they have been granted independent status in order to better fulfil their mandate.
Ta položaj je treba demokratično legitimirati.
This status must be legitimised democratically.
Zahteva obveznost odgovornosti, ki je odvisna od stopnje demokratične legitimacije, v primerjavi v s suverenostjo.
It requires an accountability to the electorate which depends on the degree of democratic legitimation.
V skladu z akademsko literaturo o teoriji demokracije je treba načelo demokratične legitimacije obravnavati v povezavi z dopolnilnimi načeli delitve oblasti, pravne države in seveda zavezanosti ustavi (v EU: Pogodbi ES).
According to the academic literature of democratic theory the principle of the democratic legitimation of an institution must be looked at in conjunction with the complementary principles of the separation of powers, the rule of law and obviously the relationship to the constitution (in the EU to the EC Treaty).
Neodvisnost centralnih bank od navodil političnih organov je poskus „usmerjanja državne oblasti k združljivosti splošne blaginje“.
The independence of the central banks from the direction of political bodies represents the attempt to ‘align executive power with compatibility with the common good’.
Demokratična legitimnost neodvisnih centralnih bank je v različnih demokratičnih sistemih različno urejena.
The democratic legitimacy of independent central banks is regulated differently in different democratic systems.
Tudi njihove naloge in pooblastila se lahko razlikujejo glede na število zastavljenih ciljev.
Its mandate can also vary on the basis of the number of objectives it has to pursue.
To želim razložiti na podlagi primerjave ZDA in EU ter se dotakniti tudi vprašanja D 34.
I should like to comment on this on the basis of a comparison of the United States and the EU, and in so doing touch on a problem which arises from Question D 34.
– V Združenih državah Amerike so naloge in pooblastila monetarne politike določene v skladu z ustavo ameriškega kongresa (člen I oddelka 8.5: „Kongres je pristojen, da kuje denar in ureja njegovo vrednost ...“).
- In the United States , Congress has the mandate for monetary policy under the Constitution (Article I, Section 8.5: ‘The Congress shall have power to coin money, regulate the value thereof, …’).
Leta 1913 je svoje naloge in pooblastila, ki so v skladu z ustavo, prenesel na nov sistem zveznih rezerv.
In 1913 it transferred its own mandate under the Constitution to the newly-established Federal Reserve System.
S prenosom te naloge je bila ameriški centralni banki kot dejanskemu ustavnemu organu monetarne politike naložena izrecna obveznost prevzemanja odgovornosti.
With the delegation of this responsibility the Fed was given explicit accountabilities to Congress, as the real authority for monetary policy.
Kongresu se je pri imenovanju članov Odbora za zvezne rezerve priznala pravica do soodločanja in veta.
Congress gave itself the right to share in decisions and the right of veto when Members of the Federal Reserve Board were appointed.
Naloge in pooblastila, ki jih je kongres podelil ameriški centralni banki, so se preteklem desetletju spremenila.
The mandate which Congress gave the Fed has been modified over the years.
Danes Odbor za zvezne rezerve izpolnjuje tri neprednostne cilje: „… največje zaposlovanje, stabilne cene in zmerne dolgoročne obrestne mere (Federal Reserve Act oddelek 2A)“.
Today the Federal Reserve has to pursue three non-prioritised targets: ‘… maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates’ (Federal Reserve Act Section 2A).
Odbor za zvezne rezerve teh ciljev ni natančneje opredelil.
The Federal Reserve has not defined these targets in any greater detail.
– V EU odgovornost monetarne politike ECB/ESCB temelji neposredno na Pogodbi ES (kot mednarodnega prava).
- In the EU ECB/ESCB responsibility for monetary policy derives directly from the EC Treaty (as international law).
ESCB ima drugačen status, ki je povezan z ustavo, kot zvezni sistem rezerv.
The ESCB thus has a different ‘constitutional’ status to the Federal Reserve System.
V Pogodbi ES so določene tudi naloge in pooblastila: „Poglavitni cilj ESCB je ohranjanje stabilnosti cen“ (člen 105 PES).
The Treaty also defines its mandate: ‘The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability’ (Article 105 of the EC Treaty).
V nasprotju z ameriško centralno banko ima ESCB prednostno nalogo, da uresničuje cilj.
In contrast to the Fed the ESCB thus has to pursue a priority objective.
Demokratična legitimnost ESCB povezuje z dejstvom, da so Pogodbo ES (maastrichtsko pogodbo), s katero je bil uveden ESCB, podpisale in ratificirale vse države članice v skladu s svojimi ustavnimi določbami.
The ESCB derives its democratic legitimacy from the fact that the Maastricht Treaty, which created the ESCB, was signed and ratified by all of the Member States in agreement with its constitutional provisions.
ECB s političnim postopkom imenovanja članov izvršilnega odbora ECB v skladu s členom 112 PES ohranja politično legitimnost, tako da se člani predstavijo izvoljenim predstavnikom v Evropskem parlamentu, medtem ko jih v medsebojnem soglasju izvolijo ter imenujejo voditelji držav in vlad držav članic.
The ECB also derives political legitimacy via the political process for appointing Members of the ECB Executive Board in accordance with Article 112 of the EC Treaty, inasmuch as they are heard by the elected representatives in the European Parliament and are appointed by common accord by the governments of the Member States at the level of head of state or government.
V zvezi z demokratično legitimacijo centralne banke velja, da je manj problematična, če je določen cilj.
As far as the democratic legitimation of a central bank is concerned, this is a little less problematic, if an objective is specified.
To je zagotovljeno v maastrichtski pogodbi.
This has been safeguarded in the Maastricht Treaty.
Težave z legitimacijo bi nastale šele, če bi centralna banka morala uresničevati več ciljev in bi prišlo do ocenjevanja in odločanja med njimi.
Problems of legitimation would arise only if the central bank had to pursue several objectives, i.e. if evaluation and decisions were involved.
Obveznost odgovornosti centralne banke je treba določiti tako izčrpno in jasno ter jo izvajati tako, da je v skladu z obsegom njenih nalog in pooblastil.
The accountability of a central bank must consequently be defined and exercised all the more comprehensively and clearly, the broader the terms in which its mandate is framed.
Tako bi morala ameriška centralna banka pri doseganju treh ciljev pojasniti morebitna nasprotja ciljev in po potrebi zakonodajalcu utemeljiti prednostno obravnavanje nekaterih ciljev.
Thus the Fed, in its pursuit of three targets, would have to explain potential conflict between targets and if necessary justify its own prioritisation of targets before the legislature.
Odgovornost centralne banke je predvsem izpolnjevanje nalog in pooblastil.
At its heart the accountability of a central bank consists first and foremost in the fulfilment of its mandate.
To odgovornost mora upravičiti pred državljani in njihovimi parlamentarnimi predstavniki.
It has to be accountable to the citizens and their representatives in parliament.