natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
To se olajša tako, da se, kadar mora centralna banka izpolnjevati jasne naloge in pooblastila ter obstaja številčna opredelitev zastavljenega cilja, izvaja primerna in razumljiva strategija, ki se z diskrecijskimi odločitvami in osebnimi vplivi omeji na odločitve.
This is made easier if a central bank has a clear mandate to fulfil, there is a quantifiable definition of the target to be achieved and a suitable and comprehensible strategy is pursued, which limits discretionary decisions and personal influence on decision-making.
S tem okvirom, ki ustreza Eurosistemu, ta sistem odločilno prispeva k odgovornosti in preglednosti ter po potrebi tudi učinkovitejši monetarni politiki.
With this framework, which is similar to that of the Eurosystem, the system makes a critical contribution to accountability and transparency, and at the same time, if necessary, to a more efficient monetary policy.
Javnost lahko lažje sledi odločitvam monetarne politike in uspeh monetarne politike izmeri z objektivno preverljivo številčno velikostjo.
The public is able to comprehend decisions on monetary policy more easily and measure monetary policy against a numerical value which is capable of objective verification.
ECB že dolgo zavrača zahteve Evropskega parlamenta, naj objavi zapisnike s sej sveta ECB.
The ECB has long refrained from accepting the European parliament's request to publish the minutes of its Governing Council's meetings.
Kakšne so po vašem ovire za objavo in kakšne nevšečnosti bi utegnile povzročiti?
What do you think are the impediments and inconveniences of such publications?
Bi se strinjali, da ECB objavi zapisnike sej sveta v bližnji prihodnosti?
Would you be in favour of the publication by ECB of the minutes of its Governing Councils meetings in the near-term future?
ECB/Eurosistem je ena najbolj preglednih centralnih bank na svetu.
The ECB/Eurosystem is one of the world’s most transparent central banks.
Kot je navedeno drugje,
As has already been stated in a different context,
– jasne naloge in pooblastila ESCB,
- the ESCB’s clear mandate,
– številčna opredelitev stabilnosti cen ter
- a quantifiable definition of price stability and
– jasna strategija monetarne politike
- an explicit strategy for monetary policy
omogočajo preglednost in odgovornost do širše javnosti.
simplify transparency and accountability for the general public.
Politika, ki si prizadeva za preglednost, mora temeljiti na uresničevanju teh prvin.
Putting these elements into concrete terms should stand at the beginning of a policy which aims at transparency.
ECB to upošteva ter je obveznost zagotavljanja preglednosti in obveznost do javnosti podkrepila s kvantitativno opredelitvijo stabilnosti cen in določitvijo strategije monetarne politike.
The ECB has done this and has with the quantifiable definition of price stability and the establishment of monetary policy strategy emphasised its commitment to transparency and openness.
V zadnjih desetih letih so vse neodvisne centralne banke izboljšale svojo preglednost.
All of the independent central banks have improved their transparency over the last 10 years.
S tem so upoštevale mednarodne standarde in vidik, da je treba z večjo preglednostjo izboljšati učinkovitost monetarne politike; kar je smiselno in potrebno tudi zaradi finančnih trgov, ki so postali bolj zapleteni.
They have thus followed international standards as well as the idea of making monetary policy more efficient by increasing transparency; the increasing complexity of financial markets also makes this sensible and necessary.
Vse večje neodvisne centralne banke so dosegle primerljivo stopnjo preglednosti, čeprav so njihovi instrumenti različni.
All of the major independent central banks have now achieved a comparable level of transparency, even if the instruments are different.
Uporaba posameznih instrumentov je namreč odvisna tudi od zgodovinskega razvoja, različnih nalog in pooblastil ter različnega ustavnega in institucionalnega okvira, v katerem deluje posamezna centralna banka.
The respective instruments used are also dependent on their historical development, their different mandates and the different constitutional and institutional framework in which a central bank acts.
Objava zapisnikov s sej sveta ECB je le eden od možnih instrumentov.
The publication of the minutes of the ECB’s Governing Council is only one of the instruments available.
Menim, da je bolj kot objava zapisnikov ali odločitev pri glasovanju posameznih nosilcev odločanja na področju monetarne politike pomembna predstavitev ključnih ekonomskih argumentov, na katerih je temeljila odločitev monetarne politike.
In my view the presentation of the relevant economic arguments which resulted in a decision on monetary policy is more important than the publication of the minutes or the votes of individual monetary policy decision-makers.
Zaradi objave zapisnikov in glasovanja obstaja nevarnost, da bi javnost več pozornosti namenila postopku sprejemanja odločitev in posameznim mnenjem kot gospodarskim argumentom in dejanskemu rezultatu posvetovanj.
The publication of minutes and voting behaviour conceal the danger that the public will pay more attention to the decision-making process and the opinions of individuals than to the economic arguments and the actual results of consultation.
Prav v monetarni uniji, v kateri so nekatere bistvene gospodarsko-politične pristojnosti ostale na nacionalni ravni, ni mogoče izključiti, da javne razprave vodijo nacionalna mnenja in interesi.
Particularly in a monetary union in which essential competences in economic policy remain at national level it cannot be ruled out that public debate will be led by national considerations and interests.
Neizogibno bi se povečal nacionalni politični pritisk na posamezne člane sveta ECB, ker bi ekonomske argumente zamenjevali z mnenji ter izjave o zadevah z osebami.
Inevitably national political pressure on individual members of the ECB’s Governing Council would increase because economic arguments would be confused with opinions and facts with people.
Kako ocenjujete postopek zamenjave članov izvršilnega odbora ECB?
How do you judge the procedure used to replace ECB board members?
Se vam zdi sprejemljivo, da Svet sprejme predlog posamezne države članice kot najboljšega?
Do you deem it normal that Council adopts the proposal made by a specific Member State as an A point?
Ali se vam ne zdi, da bi Evropski parlament zaradi predhodne demokratične odgovornosti in preglednosti moral imeti možnost, da zasliši več morebitnih kandidatov in pove svoje mnenje, preden se Svet dokončno odloči o imenovanju?
Should ex ante democratic accountability and transparency not imply that the European Parliament at least be given the possibility to hear several potential candidates and give its opinion before Council makes the final decision about the nomination?
Postopek za zapolnitev prostih mest v izvršilnem odboru ECB je določen v členu 11 statuta ESCB in ECB (člen 11.2 in 11.7).
The procedure for filling vacant seats on the ECB Executive Board is regulated in Article 11 of the ESCB and ESB Statute (Articles 11.2 and 11.7).
Ta postopek je veljavno evropsko pravo.
The procedure specified therein is effective European law.
Kot kandidat za člana izvršilnega odbora ECB sprejemam ta postopek in menim, da dodatno pojasnjevanje o postopku ni primerno.
As a candidate for the ECB Executive Board I am subject to that procedure and also consider it appropriate to comment on the procedure.
Kaj lahko ugotovite s primerjavo politik preglednosti, ki jima sledita Banka zveznih rezerv in ECB?
What conclusions do you draw from the comparison between the transparency policies followed by the Federal Reserve Bank and by the ECB?
Kaj menite o objavi zapisnikov sej ameriške ali angleške centralne banke?
What do you think about the publication by the Fed or the Bank of England of the minutes of their meetings?
Bi bilo to politiko mogoče uporabiti za ECB?
Do you think this policy could be applied by the ECB?
Od začetka obstoja si ECB zelo prizadeva, da bi širši evropski javnosti in udeležencem na finančnem trgu natančno, podrobno in hitro pojasnila odločitve monetarne politike ter vidike in analize, na katerih temeljijo te odločitve.
Since its creation the ECB has made great efforts to explain its decisions on monetary policy and the considerations and analyses on which they are based to the general European public and financial market participants precisely, in detail and promptly.
Najpomembnejša komunikacijska sredstva za to so mesečne tiskovne konference, mesečna poročila, letno poročilo, javni nastopi članov sveta ECB ter dialog z Evropskim parlamentom.
The most important channels of communication are the monthly press conferences, monthly reports, annual reports, public appearances by members of the ECB’s Governing Council and dialogue with the European Parliament.
Ker ECB javno razumljivo in prepričljivo prikazuje, da izpolnjuje naloge in pooblastila, ki so ji dodeljena v skladu s Pogodbo ES, lahko državljankam in državljanom v Eurosistemu tudi dokaže, da deluje v skladu z veljavnimi pravili.
While the ECB verifiably and convincingly demonstrates in public that it is fulfilling the mandate which the EC Treaty transferred to it, it can also legitimise itself for the benefit of citizens in the Eurosystem.
Na podlagi jasnih nalog in pooblastil, opredelitve stabilnosti cen ter strategije monetarne politike ima Eurosistem od začetka primerjalno prednost na področju komunikacije.
Thanks to a clear mandate, a definition of price stability and its monetary policy strategy the Eurosystem has a comparative communications advantage from the outset.
V zvezi s stopnjo preglednosti monetarne politike se Eurosistem in zvezni sistem rezerv ne razlikujeta bistveno.
As regards the degree of transparency of the monetary policy there are no significant differences between the Eurosystem and the Federal Reserve System.
Enako velja tudi za redne objave in sporočanje v zvezi s sejami sveta ECB.
This is also true as regards regular publications and communications subsequent to meetings of the ECB Governing Council.
Predsednik ECB na mesečni tiskovni konferenci, na kateri po uvodni izjavi odgovarja na vprašanja novinarjev, obširno oceni obstoječ gospodarski razvoj s stališča sveta ECB in javnosti izčrpno pojasni odločitve monetarne politike.
At the monthly press conference with its ‘Introductory Statement’ and the subsequent replies to journalists’ questions the President of the ECB sets out in detail the assessment of current economic trends by the ECB’s Governing Council and explains decisions on monetary policy to the public in detail.
Menim, da se vsebina in obseg uvodne izjave, ki je objavljena kmalu po posamezni tiskovni konferenci ECB, in zapisnika Zveznega odbora za odprti trg (Federal Open Market Committee), ki je praviloma objavljen šele tri tedne po posamezni seji, skoraj ne razlikujeta.
In my opinion there is hardly any difference as regards content and scope between the ‘Introductory Statement’, which is published shortly after each ECB press conference, and the ‘minutes’ of the Federal Open Market Committee, which are not usually published until three weeks after a meeting.
Ravnanje ECB in ameriške centralne banke se bistveno razlikuje le v tem, da ECB ne objavi posameznih rezultatov glasovanja.
The only significant difference lies in the fact that unlike the Fed the ECB does not make public the results of individual votes.
Bistvo uvodne izjave so ekonomski argumenti in njihova ocena, ki so zlasti izraženi v rezultatu posvetovanj.
The main focus of the ‘Introductory Statement’ is on the economic arguments and their evaluation, which are expressed in the results of discussions.
Razen argumentov proti objavi glasovanja članov sveta ECB, ki so navedeni v odgovoru na vprašanje D 32, bi bilo treba dodatno opozoriti, da so v skladu s členom 10.4 statuta ESCB seje sveta ECB tajne.
In addition to the arguments against the publication of the voting behaviour of members of the ECB’s Governing Council which have already been presented in my reply to Question D 32, supplementary attention should here be drawn to the fact that under the terms of Article 10.4 of the ESCB Statute the proceedings of the Governing Council of the ECB are confidential.
Kakšno je vaše mnenje o monetarnem dialogu?
What’s your opinion of the monetary dialogue?
Ali bi lahko člani izvršilnega odbora ECB razpravljali o monetarni politiki in svojih odločitvah z drugimi političnimi akterji ali bi to škodovalo neodvisnosti banke?
Might ECB board members discuss monetary policy and its decisions with other political actors or would this harm the bank’s independence?
Monetarni dialog lahko ocenim le kot zunanji opazovalec na podlagi zapisnikov Odbora Evropskega parlamenta za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve.
As an outsider I can judge the monetary dialogue only from the minutes of the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs.
Monetarni dialog temelji na členu 113(3)(2) Pogodbe ES, v skladu s katerim lahko predsednika ECB in druge člane izvršilnega odbora na zahtevo Evropskega parlamenta ali na njihovo lastno pobudo zaslišijo pristojni odbori Evropskega parlamenta.
The monetary dialogue has its roots in Article 113(3)2 of the EC Treaty, according to which the President of the ECB and the other Members of the Executive Board may at the request of the European Parliament or on their own initiative be heard by the competent committees of the European Parliament.
Menim, da je monetarni dialog smiselna ureditev, s katero je mogoče evropskim državljanom in njihovim izvoljenim predstavnikom pojasniti stopnjo, do katere so bile izpolnjene naloge in pooblastila sveta ECB, ter njegove odločitve monetarne politike.
I regard the monetary dialogue as a sensible institution for explaining the degree to which the mandate has been fulfilled and the decisions which have been made on monetary policy by the ECB’s Governing Council for the benefit of the citizens and their elected representatives.
Ta dialog lahko prispeva tudi k javnemu sprejetju monetarne politike sveta ECB in izboljšanju medsebojnega razumevanja.
This dialogue can also help to encourage public acceptance of the monetary policy of the ECB’s Governing Council and mutual understanding.
Menim, da je meja dialoga določena v členu 108 PES, ki velja tudi za Evropski parlament.
In my opinion the dialogue’s limits are contained in Article 108 of the Treaty, which also applies to the European Parliament.
Ker je ESCB vključen v institucionalni okvir EU, to nedvomno pomeni, da ima stike z drugimi institucijami in organi EU.
Since the ECB is tied to the institutional framework of the EU, it will obviously have a relationship with other EU institutions.
Ti odnosi so delno določeni v Pogodbi ES, npr. odnos z ECOFIN ali odnos na strokovni ravni z Ekonomsko-finančnim odborom in Odborom za gospodarsko politiko.
Some of these relationships are institutionalised in the Treaty, including those with the ECOFIN Council or at a technical level with the Economic and Financial Committee and with the Economic Policy Committee.
Ne glede na formalne odnose z drugimi institucijami in organi EU menim, da so redne izmenjave informacij in mnenj za drugimi političnimi nosilci odločanja – vključno s socialnimi partnerji v okviru makroekonomskega dialoga – koristne in smiselne.
Regardless of formal relationships with other EU institutions, I consider the regular exchange of information with other political decision-makers – including employers and trade unions in macroeconomic dialogue – to be helpful and meaningful.
Ti stiki omogočajo ECB, da predstavi tudi svojo denarno politiko in izboljša medsebojno razumevanje, ne da bi bilo potrebno kakršno koli predhodno usklajevanje politike.
These contacts also offer the ECB the opportunity to explain its monetary policy and improve mutual understanding without going into ex ante policy coordination in any way.
Kateri so po vašem mnenju najpomembnejša tveganja in izzivi, s katerimi se sooča ECB ?
What do you see as the most important risks and challenges facing the ECB?
Menim, da so najpomembnejša tveganja in izzivi za Eurosistem in ECB zlasti:
In essence I see the greatest risks and challenges which face the Eurosystem and the ECB in the following three trends:
Zdi se, da načelo neodvisnosti monetarne politike ESCB še ni povsem ustaljeno v evropski politični praksi.
The principle of independence of the ESCB in matters of monetary policy does not yet seem to be firmly anchored in European political practice.
To kažejo ponavljajoča politična posredovanja do ECB v zvezi z monetarno politiko.
This is evident in repeated political representations which are made to the ECB on matters of monetary policy.
Če neodvisnost ni zagotovljena, to zmanjšuje zaupanje v institucijo in valuto.
If independence is not maintained, confidence in the institution and in the currency will be undermined.
Zato ni mogoče zagotoviti stabilnosti denarne vrednosti.
It will not then be possible to guarantee the stability of the value of money.
Tveganje, povezano s postopno ponovno nacionalizacijo gospodarske politike, lahko ogrozi način delovanja monetarne unije ter oslabi sprejetje eura in vlogo ESCB.
The risk of progressive renationalisation of economic policy may jeopardise the operation of the monetary union and undermine acceptance of the euro and the role of ESCB.
Monetarna unija zahteva tesnejše usklajevanje gospodarske in proračunske politike ter upoštevanje vpliva nacionalnih odločitev na druge države članice, na delovanje skupnega trga in monetarno unijo.
The monetary union requires closer coordination of economic and budgetary policy and consideration of the effects of national decisions on other Member States, the operation of the common internal market and the monetary union.
Razlike rasti ali inflacije na euro območju bi se lahko utrdile ali celo povečale.
Divergence in growth and inflation in the euro area might become firmly established or even increase.
Zato bi ECB srednjeročno težje izvajala enotno monetarno politiko ter bi morda bila označena kot krivec za makroekonomsko politiko, ki bi se štela za neustrezno.
This would make it difficult in the medium term for the ECB to implement the single monetary policy and possibly result in its being branded as a scapegoat for a macroeconomic policy which is perceived as inadequate.
Ponovno so države članice pozvane, da si prizadevajo za nasprotno:
Member States are again requested to counteract this:
– Razlike rasti in inflacije se utrdijo, če sta obseg in hitrost izvajanja gospodarskih reform v (zlasti velikih) državah članicah nezadostna.
- Differences in growth and inflation will become firmly established if economic reforms in Member States (particularly the large ones) are not implemented on an adequate scale and sufficiently promptly.
– Razlike se lahko povečajo, če širitev euro območja ne temelji na trajnostni konvergenci.
- Divergences may increase if the euro area undergoes an expansion which does not depend on lasting convergence.
Priporočilo Sveta o imenovanju člana izvršilnega odbora Evropske centralne banke
Appointment of a Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank
s priporočili Komisiji o zaščiti evropskih zdravstvenih delavcev pred krvno prenosljivimi infekcijami, ki jih povzročajo injekcijske igle
with recommendations to the Commission on protecting European healthcare workers from blood borne infections due to needlestick injuries
PRILOGA PREDLOGU RESOLUCIJE: PODROBNA PRIPOROČILA GLEDE VSEBINE ZAHTEVANIH PREDLOGOV 6
ANNEX TO THE MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION: DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO THE CONTENT OF THE PROPOSAL REQUESTED 6
– ob upoštevanju člena 192 Pogodbe ES,
– having regard to Article 192 of the EC Treaty,
– ob upoštevanju člena 39 in člena 45 Poslovnika,
– having regard to Rules 39 and 45 of the Rules of Procedure,
– ob upoštevanju Direktive Sveta 89/391/EGS z dne 12. junija 1989 o uvedbi ukrepov za izboljšanje varnosti in zdravja delavcev pri delu
– having regard to Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work
UL L 183, 29.6.1989, str.
OJ L 183, 29.6.1989, p.
– ob upoštevanju Direktive Sveta 89/655/EGS z 30. novembra 1989 o minimalnih varnostnih in zdravstvenih zahtevah za uporabo delovne opreme delavcev pri delu
– having regard to Council Directive 89/655/EEC of 30 November 1989 concerning the minimum safety and health requirements for the use of work equipment by workers at work
UL L 393, 30.12.1989, str.
OJ L 393, 30.12.1989, p.
– ob upoštevanju Direktive 2000/54/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 18. septembra 2000 o varovanju delavcev pred tveganji zaradi izpostavljenosti biološkim dejavnikom pri delu
– having regard to Directive 2000/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on the protection of workers from risks related to exposure to biological agents at work
UL L 262, 17.10.2000, str.
OJ L 262, 17.10.2000, p.
– ob upoštevanju sporočila Komisije o praktičnem izvajanju določb o zdravju in varnosti pri delu ( KOM(2004)0062 ),
– having regard to the Commission communication on the practical implementation of the provisions of the Health and Safety at Work Directives ( COM(2004)0062 ),
– ob upoštevanju Evropskega poročila o konkurenčnosti za leto 2004 ( SEC(2004)1397 ),
– having regard to the European Competitiveness Report 2004 ( SEC(2004)1397 ),
– ob upoštevanju sporočila Komisije o prilagajanju spremembam pri delu in v družbi: nova strategija Skupnosti o zdravju in varnosti na delovnem mestu 2002–2006 ( KOM(2002)0118 ),
– having regard to the Commission communication on adapting to change in work and society: a new Community strategy on health and safety at work 2002-2006 ( COM(2002)0118 ),
– ob upoštevanju svoje resolucije z dne 24. februarja 2005 o spodbujanju zdravja in varnosti na delovnem mestu
– having regard to its resolution of 24 February 2005 on promoting health and safety at the workplace
UL L 304 E, 1.12.2005, str.
OJ C 304 E, 1.12.2005, p.
– ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora za zaposlovanje in socialne zadeve (A6 0137/2006),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs ( A6‑0137/2006 ),
A. ker lahko poškodbe z injekcijskimi iglami povzročijo prenos več kot 20 življenjsko nevarnih virusov, med drugim hepatitisa B, hepatitisa C in virusa HIV/AIDS, in so zato resen problem za javno zdravje,
A. whereas needlestick injuries may lead to the transmission of more than 20 life-threatening viruses, including hepatitis B, hepatitis C, and HIV/Aids, and thus presents a serious public health problem,
B. ker razširjenost hepatitisa B, hepatitisa C in virusa HIV vedno bolj narašča ter ker program Združenih narodov za boj proti aidsu (UNAIDS) poroča o več kot 40 milijonih primerov okužbe s HIV na svetu in več kot 5 milijonih primerov okužbe s hepatitisom C,
B. whereas the prevalence of hepatitis B, hepatitis C, and HIV is increasing, and the United Nations programme to combat AIDS (UNAIDS) has reported that there are over 40 million cases of HIV and over five million cases of hepatitis C worldwide ,
C. ker so neodvisne študije pokazale, da se je večini poškodb z injekcijskimi iglami mogoče izogniti z boljšim usposabljanjem, boljšimi delovnimi pogoji in uporabo varnih medicinskih pripomočkov,
C. whereas independent studies have shown that the majority of needlestick injuries can be prevented by better training, better working conditions, and the use of safer medical instruments ,
D. ker je obstoječa evropska zakonodaja o zaščiti zdravstvenih delavcev pred poškodbami z injekcijskimi iglami dejansko neučinkovita,
D. whereas the existing European legislation protecting health workers from needlestick injuries has proved ineffective in practice,