natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
– ob upoštevanju svoje resolucije z dne 22. aprila 2004 o priporočilu Komisije za spremembe v letu 2004 okvirnih smernic gospodarske politike držav članic in Skupnosti (za obdobje od 2003 do 2005)
– having regard to its resolution of 22 April 2004 on the Commission recommendation on the 2004 update of the Broad Guidelines of the Economic Policies of the Member States and the Community (for the 2003-2005 period)
– ob upoštevanju poročila Računskega sodišča z dne 14. in 15. januarja 2004 o reviziji operativne učinkovitosti upravljanja Evropske centralne banke za proračunsko leto 2002
– having regard to the report by the Court of Auditors of 14 and 15 January 2004 on the audit of the operational efficiency of the management of the European Central Bank for the financial year 2002
5 UL C 45, 20.2.2004, str.
OJ C 45, 20.2.2004, p.
6 UL L 80, 18.3.2004, str.
OJ L 80, 18.3.2004, p.
7 UL L 230, 30.6.2004, str.
OJ L 230, 30.6.2004, p.
– ob upoštevanju spomladanskih gospodarskih napovedi Komisije za leto 2004
– having regard to the European Commission’s 2004 Spring economic forecasts,
– ob upoštevanju členov 106 in 112(1) svojega Poslovnika,
– having regard to Rules 106 and 112(1) of its Rules of Procedure,
– ob upoštevanju poročila Odbora za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve ( A6‑0014/2004 ),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs ( A6‑0014/2004 ),
A. ker sta Evropska centralna banka (ECB) in Evropski sistem centralnih bank (ESCB) povsem neodvisna,
A. Whereas acknowledging the full independence of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB),
B. ker je glavni cilj Evropske centralne banke (ECB) in Evropskega sistema centralnih bank (ESCB) ohranitev stabilnosti cen in podpiranje splošne ekonomske politike Evropske skupnosti, kot to določa člen 2 Pogodbe,
B. Whereas the main objective of the ECB and of the ESCB is to maintain price stability, and otherwise to support the general economic policies of the European Community, as defined by article 2 of the Treaty,
C. ker je leta 2003 prišlo do močnega zasuka v mednarodnem gospodarstvu, v glavnem zaradi Združenih držav Amerike in Azije (svetovna rast BDP: 3,7 %),
C. Whereas 2003 saw a strong rebound of the international economy mainly driven by the United States of America and Asia (world GDP growth: 3.7%),
D. ker je v letu 2003: BDP EU zrasel le za 0,8 %, BDP območja evra pa za 0,4 %; inflacija v območju evra je dosegla zgodovinsko nizke vrednosti (na 2,1 % z 2,3 % leta 2002); presežna likvidnostna sredstva, ki so se akumulirala zaradi močne rasti M3 v višini 7,1 %, medtem ko je bila ciljna stopnja Evropske centralne banke 4,5 %; poslabšanje proračunskega stanja je še naprej dosegalo povprečni primanjkljaj v višini 2,7 % BDP območja evra (2,3 % v letu 2002); posojila zasebnemu sektorju so se občutno povečala in nezaposlenost je ostala nespremenjena,
D. Whereas in 2003: the EU's GDP only grew 0.8% and the euro area's 0.4%; inflation in the euro area reached historically low levels (2.1% from 2.3% in 2002); excess liquidity accumulated with strong M3 growth at 7.1% , the ECB's target being 4.5%; budget deterioration continued reaching an average deficit of 2.7% of euro area GDP (2.3% in 2002); credit to the private sector increased significantly and unemployment remained stable,
E. ker je Evropska centralna banka 8. maja 2003 oznanila, da je njena ciljna stopnja inflacije (HICP) „v srednjeročnem obdobju pod 2 %, vendar blizu 2 %“,
E. Whereas the ECB announced on 8 May 2003 that the rate of inflation (HICP) should be kept "below, but close to 2% over the medium term",
F. ker je v členu 10 Statuta Evropskega sistema centralnih bank in Evropske centralne banke zapisano, da Svetu Evropske centralne banke za sprejemanje odločitev ni potrebno glasovati, ker torej ta člen le razjasnjuje glasovalne postopke ,
F. Whereas Article 10 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB does not call on the Governing Council to take its decisions by vote, but merely clarifies voting procedures,
G. ker člen 10.4 tega protokola določa, da so postopki srečanj zaupni, vendar se Svet Evropske centralne banke lahko odloči, da sklepe razprav javno objavi,
G. Whereas Article 10.4 of this Protocol calls for the proceedings of the meetings to be confidential, whilst the Governing Council may decide to make the outcome of its deliberations public,
H. ker od 1. maja 2004: širitev EU predstavlja pomembne izzive za evropsko monetarno unijo, Evropsko centralno banko in Evropski sistem centralnih bank; nacionalne centralne banke novih držav članic so podpisale Sporazum centralnih bank o mehanizmu menjalnih tečajev (ERM II),
H. Whereas as of 1 May 2004: the EU's enlargement poses important challenges for EMU, the ECB and the ESCB; the National Central Banks of the new Member States signed the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) II Central Bank Agreement,
I. ker so se estonska krona, litovski litas in slovenski tolar 28. junija 2004 pridružili mehanizmu menjalnih tečajev ERM II,
I. Whereas the Estonian kroon, Lithuanian litas and Slovenian tolar joined ERM II on 28 June 2004,
J. ker so se v nekaterih državah članicah začele razprave o koristnosti evrokovancev malih vrednosti in se je pojavil strah, da bi se opustitev njihove rabe lahko odrazila v dvigu inflacije zaradi prakse neprimernega zaokroževanja.,
J. Whereas a debate has started in certain Member States as regards the usefulness of small-value euro coins, and the fear that the abandonment thereof might result in upward inflationary pressures due to abusive rounding-up practices,
5. ugotavlja, da banke postopnega zniževanja obrestnih mer niso vedno prenesle na stranke, če pa so ga, je bilo to narejeno z občutnim časovnim zamikom;
Notes that the successive reductions of interest rates have not always been passed on to clients by banks, or if they have, it has been done with a considerable time lag;
7. pozdravlja odločitev ECB o stopnji inflacije „pod 2 %, a blizu 2 %“, sprejeto dne 8. maja 2003, kot znak politike ECB za zagotavljanje monetarne stabilnosti brez sprejemanja deflacijskih ukrepov;
Welcomes the ECB´s choice of an inflation rate "below, but close to 2%", adopted on 8 May 2003, as a signal of the ECB´s policy to guarantee monetary stability without accepting deflationary pressures;
9. ugotavlja, da je glavni cilj ECB zagotavljanje stabilnosti cen, ker lahko ECB s pomočjo le-te pripomore k doseganju ciljev polne zaposlenosti, tako kot je določeno v lizbonski strategiji;
Recognises that the ECB´s prime objective is to guarantee price stability since through price stability the ECB can contribute to achieving the objective of full employment as defined in the Lisbon strategy;
11. poudarja, da pomeni zahteva po odgovornosti ECB večjo stopnjo preglednosti v postopku sprejemanja odločitev; poziva ECB, naj razmisli o možnosti objavljanja povzetkov zapisnikov;
Insists that the accountability obligation of the ECB implies a high degree of transparency in the decision-making process; urges the ECB to consider the possibility of publishing summary minutes;
14 verjame, da je monetarni dialog med Evropskim parlamentom in ECB uspešen; poudarja, da je zaradi tega denarna politika bolj pregledna in dostopna javnosti; poziva ECB k širjenju dialoga s Parlamentom in k nadaljevanju dela na področju odnosov z javnostmi, ki bo pripomoglo k poistovetenju evropskih državljanov z evrom;
14 Believes that the monetary dialogue between the European Parliament and the ECB has been a success; highlights that these exchanges make monetary policy more transparent and accessible to the public; calls on the ECB to expand this dialogue with the Parliament and to continue its public relations work to strengthen citizens' identification with the euro;
21. poziva ECB, da temeljito razmisli o drugi generaciji bankovcev; spodbuja ECB, naj usmeri pozornost k ponarejanju in naj upošteva te izkušnje pri načrtovanju nove generacije bankovcev;
Invites the ECB to start reflecting on the second generation of banknotes; urges the ECB to be very alert to counterfeiting and to take experience into account in the design of a new generation of banknotes;
Izvoljeni predstavniki vedno težko komentirajo dejanja Evropske centralne banke, saj jim člen 108 Pogodbe prepoveduje, da „bi vplivali“ nanjo!
It is always a difficult exercise for elected representatives to comment on the actions of the European Central Bank, given that Article 108 of the Treaty prohibits them from ‘seeking to influence’ it!
Na srečo pa člen 113 omogoča Evropskemu parlamentu splošno razpravo o letnem poročilu ECB, ki je predmet tega poročila.
Fortunately, Article 113 provides for a general debate to be held by the European Parliament on the ECB’s Annual Report, which is the subject of this report.
Poročilo ECB za leto 2003 zlasti upošteva „načelo odgovornosti“ ECB do Parlamenta (poglavje 5, str.
In particular, the ECB’s 2003 report invokes the “principle of accountability” of the ECB towards Parliament (Chapter 5, p.
Tretji del našega poročila bomo posvetili temu načelu.
We will devote the third part of our report to that principle.
Ker nas je ECB prosila, bomo v prvem delu poročila ocenili, ali politika, ki jo je izvajala do konca leta 2003, izpolnjuje cilje, zastavljene po pogodbah; v drugem delu si bomo ogledali glavne spremembe v doktrini ECB v letu 2003.
Since the ECB has expressly asked us to do so, we will consider in the first part of our report whether the policy it actually implemented up until the end of 2003 fulfils the objectives assigned to it under the Treaties; in the second part we will look at the major changes which took place in the ECB’s doctrine in 2003.
V četrtem delu bomo pogledali različna vprašanja v trenutnih razgovorih o denarni politiki.
In the fourth part we will look at various issues in the current debates on monetary policy.
Pogoji člena 105 določajo, da je „primarni cilj ESCB vzdrževanje stabilnosti cen.
Under the terms of Article 105, ‘The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability.
Od druge polovice leta 2003 je inflacija cen blizu 2 %, a manj kot 2 %, kljub ponavljajočim se zunanjim pretresom (cena nafte in hrane raste).
As for price inflation, this has been close to but less than 2% since the second half of 2003 in spite of recurrent external shocks (oil and food price rises).
Čeprav izhaja razlog za dejstvo, da se ti pretresi ne odražajo na plačah (in posledični odsotnosti inflacijske spirale), v večji meri iz zgradbe delovnega trga, pa je ECB treba čestitati za njen prispevek k tej stabilnosti.
Although the fact that these shocks are not having any repercussions on pay (and the consequent absence of an inflationary spiral) is mainly due to the structures of the labour market, the ECB should be congratulated for its contribution to this stability.
Po drugi strani je leto 2003 znano po „izjemnosti območja evra“.
On the other hand, 2003 has been notable for a ‘euro area exceptionalism’.
Medtem ko so preostali svet in celo druge države EU (večinoma Velika Britanija) zabeležile zmanjševanje recesije (ZDA: +3,1 % BDP; Japonska: +2,5 % BDP; Velika Britanija: +2,2 % BDP), je gospodarstvo na območju evra izkazalo dodatno upadanje od leta 2002 (BDP: +0,4 %, v primerjavi z +0,9 % v letu 2002).
While the rest of the world, and even the rest of the EU (mainly the United Kingdom) have emerged from the recession (USA: +3.1%; Japan: + 2.5%; UK: +2.2% of GDP), the Eurozone’s economy has shown an additional slowdown from 2002 (GDP: +0.4% , following + 0.9% in 2002).
Ta „evroskleroza“ lahko ima več vzrokov (tudi demografske), toda dokler je odvisna od gospodarske politike, bodisi prek proračunov bodisi prek denarne politike (kar, kot bomo videli, ECB priznava), ne moremo mimo dejstva, da evropski pristojni organi v primerjavi z ameriškimi in britanskimi delujejo izrazito počasneje.
This ‘eurosclerosis’ may have many causes (including demographics), but in so far as it is influenced by economic policy, whether through budgets or monetary policy (which, as we will see, the ECB acknowledges), one cannot but note the marked inertia of the European authorities as compared with those of the USA and Britain.
Glede na reakcijski čas, ki ga meri gospodarska statistika (ta lahko traja od 12 do 18 mesecev), bi morali gledati obdobje od konca leta 2001 do začetka leta 2003.
In view of the reaction times measured by economic statistics (which vary from 12 to 18 months), we should be looking at the period from the end of 2001 to the beginning of 2003.
ZDA so se premaknile od uravnoteženega proračuna do primanjkljaja v višini več kot 4 % BNP; primanjkljaj območja evra se je povečal z 2,4 % na 2,7 % BDP.
The USA moved from a balanced budget to a deficit of more than 4% of GNP; the euro area’s deficit increased from 2.4% to 2.7%.
Od začetka leta 2001 do sredine leta 2003 so obrestne mere ameriških zveznih skladov padle s 6,5 % na 1,5 % in dosegle negativne realne obrestne mere; stopnja refinanciranja ECB je padla samo s 4,5 % na 2 % BDP, s stalno ravnjo 3,25 % za celotno leto 2002.
From the beginning of 2001 to mid-2003, the American federal funds’ interest rates fell from 6.5% to 1.5%, reaching negative real rates; the ECB refinancing rate fell only from 4.5% to 2%, with a plateau of 3.25% for the whole of 2002.
V celotnem obdobju so se mere gibale med 1 % in 1,5 % nad tistimi iz zveznih skladov.
For the whole of this period, its rates remained between 1% and 1.5% above those of the Fed.
Šele od decembra leta 2002 naprej je ECB zaradi kritik socialno-gospodarske skupnosti (in celo IMF) začela zniževati obrestne mere zaradi tveganja deflacije.
It was only from December 2002, in the face of criticisms from the socio-economic community (and even the IMF) that the ECB started to lower its rates owing to the risk of deflation.
8. maja 2003 je v zvezi s tem posredovala teoretično opravičilo, kot bomo videli pozneje, da je namreč zniževala realne obrestne mere in sprejela določeno raven inflacije, da bi se tako borila proti deflaciji.
On 8 May 2003 it gave the theoretical justification for this which we will see later, namely that it was reducing real rates, and accepting a certain level of inflation, so as to combat deflation.
Ta zapozneli znak prilagodljivosti je treba pozdraviti.
This belated sign of flexibility is to be welcomed.
Hkrati pa je treba poudariti, da sama denarna politika ne odgovarja za zamude v gospodarski obnovi območja evra.
But it needs to be stressed that monetary policy alone is not responsible for the delays in the euro area’s economic recovery.
Obrestne mere niso bile tako velike, da bi preprečevale vlaganja, razen morda – na žalost – dolgoročna vlaganja (raziskave in izobraževanje, prihranek energije), ki jih zahteva lizbonsko-gothenburška strategija.
Interests rates were not high enough to discourage investment, except perhaps –unfortunately – for the long-term investments (research and education, energy saving) required by the Lisbon-Gothenburg strategy.
Po drugi strani je padec hierarhije obrestnih mer v ZDA/EU pripeljal do presenetljivega dviga vrednosti evra v letih od 2002 do 2003, to pa je vodilo v izgubo konkurenčnosti, ki po poročilu ECB za leto 2003 več kot presega (v smislu izvoza) rast svetovnega povpraševanja po izdelkih in storitvah EU v prvi polovici leta 2003.
On the other hand, the overturning of the USA/EU interest rates hierarchy led to a spectacular rise in the value of the euro over 2002-2003, leading to a loss of competitiveness which the ECB’s 2003 report admits more than outweighs (in terms of exports) the growth of world demand for EU products and services in the first half of 2003.
Tu ECB ni izpolnila svoje naloge „podpirati cilje lizbonske strategije“.
Here the ECB clearly failed to fulfil its mandate to ‘support the Lisbon objectives’.
Ne smemo pa pozabiti, da mora Svet določiti smernice za politiko menjalnih tečajev.
However, it has to be remembered that it is up to the Council to set the guidelines for exchange rate policy.
(Člen 111(3)).
(Article 111(3)).
Togost proračunske politike na območju evra (ki je v nasprotju celo s tisto iz Velike Britanije) je brez dvoma rezultat procikličnih določil Pakta stabilnosti.
Finally, the rigidity of the euro area’s budgetary policy (which contrasts even with that of the UK) is clearly the result of the pro-cyclic provisions of the Stability Pact.
Oktobra leta 2002 je predsednik Prodi izjavil, da je ta pakt „neumen“, in dejansko se je Svet novembra 2003 vzdržal njegove uporabe, saj so ga vse velike države EU (ki predstavljajo 80 % evropske proizvodnje) prenehale upoštevati, medtem ko sta Velika Britanija in ZDA že zdavnaj presegli 3-odstotni prag primanjkljaja.
From October 2002, President Prodi acknowledged that this pact was ‘stupid’, and in fact, in November 2003 the Council refrained from applying it, since all the big countries of the EU (accounting for 80% of European production) stopped complying with it , while the UK and USA had long since passed the 3% deficit threshold.
SPREMEMBE V TEORIJI ECB
CHANGES IN THE ECB THEORY
8. maja 2003, ko so obrestne mere še vedno padale, je ECB najavila spremembe svoje teoretične osnove.
On 8 May 2003, while interest rates were still falling, the ECB announced the changes to its theoretical basis.
Natančneje je določila „gospodarski steber“.
The ‘economic pillar’ was more clearly defined.
Medtem ko si je ECB prej zadala, da je treba stopnjo inflacije „v srednjeročnem obdobju vzdrževati pod 2 %“, zdaj cilja na stopnjo „pod 2 %, a blizu 2 %“.
While the ECB had hitherto been basing itself on an inflation objective of ‘below 2% over the medium term’, it is currently aiming at a rate ‘below, but close to, 2% over the medium term’.
To ne predstavlja samo 1 % padca v inflacijskem cilju.
This does not merely represent a 1% slippage in the inflation objective.
Teoretično opravičilo je zelo pomembno.
The theoretical justification is very important.
ECB se zaveda svoje naloge prispevanja k obuditvi rasti z zelo nizkimi ali negativnimi obrestnimi merami, kar je mogoče le, če nominalne cene rastejo dovolj hitro.
The ECB recognises its mission to contribute to the resumption of growth by means of very low or negative interest rates, which is only possible if nominal prices rise sufficiently rapidly.
To priznanje ECB (ki zagotovo ni teoretičen dosežek, kot bomo videli) je treba pozdraviti.
This recognition by the ECB (which is certainly not a theoretical breakthrough, as we will see) is to be welcomed.
To potrjuje univerzalno empirično ugotovitev, da M3 že nekaj let nima večjega vpliva na cene blaga in storitev.
This confirms the universal empirical observation that, for some years now, M3 has hardly had any influence on the prices of goods and services.
ECB je treba čestitati za ta razvoj.
The ECB should be congratulated for this development.
Treba pa je poudariti, da lahko prevelika likvidnost vzpodbudi nastanek špekulativnih balončkov na finančnih in nepremičninskih trgih, kar povzroča problem (ki je tudi univerzalen) pomanjkanja usmerjenosti posojilne politike.
However, it needs to be stressed that excess liquidity may encourage the formation of speculative bubbles in the financial and real estate markets, which raises the problem (which is also universal) of the lack of directionality in lending policy.
Z drugimi besedami, kakšen je najboljši način, da bi agentom in državam Evropske unije ponudili denar po zelo nizkih ali celo negativnih obrestnih merah za financiranje dolgoročnih profitnih vlaganj, nakazanih v politikah iz Lizbone (izobraževanje, raziskave) in iz Gothenburga (prihranek energije), ne da bi tako ustvarjena likvidnost pripomogla k tržnim špekulacijam?
In other words, what is the best way of offering the agents and the States of the European Union money at very low or even negative rates to fund the long-term profitability investments implied in the policies of Lisbon (education, research) and Gothenburg (energy saving), without the liquidity thus created benefiting market speculation?
ECB skupaj z Evropsko investicijsko banko bi lahko posredovala nekaj predlogov.
The ECB, together with the European Investment Bank, might make some suggestions.
Poglavje 5 izrecno ugotavlja, da mora ECB tako kot vse „javne oblasti odgovarjati splošni javnosti, iz katere izhajajo njena pooblastila in samostojnost“, ter pravilno določa posrednika, ki ji omogoča uresničevati to načelo: Evropski parlament.
Chapter 5 explicitly recognises that the ECB, like all ‘public authorities, need[s] to be accountable to the general public, from which its mandate and independence ultimately derive’ and correctly identifies the intermediary enabling it to put this principle into practice: the European Parliament.
To je, poleg objave z dne 8. maja, najboljša novica v tem poročilu!
This, together with the 8 May announcement, is the best piece of news in this report!
Zdaj moramo definirati, kaj pomeni „odgovoren“.
We now need to define what we mean by ‘accountable’.
Poročilo ECB daje slutiti, da ta odgovornost ne pomeni nič drugega kot obveznost odgovora na vprašanje „Kaj ste naredili?“.
The ECB report seems to suggest that this accountability means no more than being required to answer the question “What have you done?”.
Toda demokratična odgovornost gre dlje od tega: pooblašča državljane, da ugovarjajo: „Toda tega nismo zahtevali od vas“.
But democratic accountability goes further than this: it authorises the citizens to object: “But that’s not what we asked you to do”.
Treba je priznati, da v praksi pogodbe ne dovoljujejo, da bi se ta demokratična odgovornost v celoti izvajala.
It has to be acknowledged that, in practice, the treaties do not permit this democratic accountability to be fully exercised.
Celo hierarhija dejavnosti ECB (nadzor inflacije – polna zaposlenost – trajen razvoj) je večkrat služila kot vzrok za to, da je ECB shajala brez ciljev 2 in 3.
Even the hierarchy of the ECB’s missions (inflation control – full employment – sustainable development) has often served as an argument for the ECB to dispense with objectives 2 and 3.
Če Unija želi, da ECB ustrezno sodeluje pri teh ciljih, mora to jasno izraziti in si zagotoviti načine, s katerimi bo izvajala sankcije proti Banki, če slednja tega ne bo izvajala.
If the Union wants the ECB to cooperate properly in these objectives, it must say so more firmly and must provide itself with the means to impose sanctions on the Bank for failure to do so.
Pobudo bi lahko prevzela od statutov Ameriške zvezne banke.
It could usefully take its inspiration from the statues of the Federal Bank of the USA.
Do takrat pa mora ECB okrepiti svoje dobre namene o „odgovornosti“ s temi dejavnostmi:
In the mean time, the ECB should confirm its good resolutions on ‘accountability’ by:
· se odziva na redne zahteve Parlamenta po objavi izmenjanih dokazov in glasovanja o odločitvah, tako da lahko vsaj ugotovimo, kateri dokazi so bili uporabljeni in ali je bilo v zvezi z njimi doseženo soglasje;
· responding fully to Parliament’s regular request that it publish the arguments exchanged and the votes on its decisions, so that we can at least find out what arguments were used and whether there was a consensus on them;
· v celoti in brez arogance sodeluje v razgovorih socialno-gospodarske in akademske skupnosti.
· participating fully and without arrogance in the discussions of the socio-economic and academic community.
ECB več mesecev od leta 2001 do leta 2003 ni priznala, kar je končno potrdila dne 8. maja, in ponavljala vedno isti odgovor, da „je največji prispevek, ki ga ECB lahko da k rasti in zaposlovanju to, da zagotovi stabilnost cen“.
For months on end from 2001 to 2003 the ECB refused to admit what it eventually acknowledged on 8 May, and merely trotted out the reply that ‘the best contribution which the ECB can make to growth and employment is to ensure price stability’.
Ta ideja je milo rečeno neortodoksna (tj. bolj ko se inflacija upočasnjuje, bližje je polna zaposlenost) in je nasprotna mnenju ekonomistov, da obstaja razmerje med inflacijo in nezaposlenostjo, izraženo z negativno usmerjenostjo „Phillipsove krivulje“.
This idea which is to say the least unorthodox (i.e. that the more inflation slows, the closer full employment comes) is the opposite of the consensus among economists that there is a trade-off between inflation and unemployment expressed by the negative slope of the ‘Philips curve’.