natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Posledice naraščanja cen nafte na področju monetarne politike so odvisne od učinkov na maloprodajne cene.
The consequences of rising oil prices for monetary policy depend on the impact they have on consumer prices.
Če ima naraščanje cen nafte le začasne učinke na maloprodajne cene, tega monetarna politika ne bo obravnavala.
If rising oil prices have only a passing impact on consumer prices, there is no need to take action in respect of monetary policy.
Če obstaja nevarnost, da naraščanje cen nafte povzroči stalen pritisk na cene, mora monetarna politika ukrepati.
But if there is a danger that rising oil prices will result in permanent pressure on prices, the monetary policy must react.
Ustrezen odziv monetarne politike na obremenitev cen nafte torej predvideva skrbno analizo načinov, prek katerih se naraščanje cen energije prenese na maloprodajne cene.
An adequate response by monetary policy to an oil price shock thus requires the careful analysis of the avenues by which an increase in energy prices will be transferred to consumer prices.
Pri tem je treba razlikovati učinke prve in druge stopnje, pri prvem pa neposredne in posredne učinke.
Here first-round effects must be distinguished from second-round effects, and in the case of first-round effects, direct effects from indirect effects.
Dražja energija povzroča neposredno zvišanje maloprodajnih cen.
An increase in the price of energy will result in an immediate increase in consumer prices.
Prek gibanja cen proizvajalca nastajajo med drugim posredni učinki na maloprodajne cene, ker je energija pomemben dejavnik pri proizvodnji različnega blaga in izvajanju različnih storitev.
On the other hand, an indirect impact on consumer prices is produced via trends in manufacturers’ prices, as energy is a significant input factor in the manufacture of a considerable number of products and services.
Če so učinki naraščanja cen nafte omejeni na te neposredne in posredne učinke prve stopnje, jih monetarni politiki ni treba obravnavati.
If the impact of rising oil prices on those direct and indirect first-round effects remains limited, there is no acute need for action via monetary policy.
V tem primeru se bo gospodarstvo prilagodilo na relativno podražitev blaga in storitev, ki porabljajo veliko energije, in bo naraščanje cen nafte imelo le občasne učinke na stopnjo inflacije.
In that event the national economy will adjust itself to the relative increase in the price of energy-intensive products and services, and rising oil prices will have only a temporary impact on the inflation rate.
Če obstaja nevarnost, da ne bo ostalo pri občasnih učinkih, in se pričakuje, da se bodo pojavili učinki druge stopnje, ki povzročajo močnejšo, trajno prevalitev višjih cen nafte na maloprodajne cene, mora monetarna politika ukrepati.
However, if there is a danger that the effects will not be temporary and it becomes apparent that so-called second-round effects are beginning to take effect which result in higher oil prices being passed on to consumer prices more effectively and more permanently, the monetary policy must react.
Učinki druge stopnje nastanejo, ko kaže, da bo naraščanje cen nafte ogrozilo splošno gibanje plač ali inflacijska pričakovanja.
We speak of second-round effects if rising oil prices threaten to be reflected in general pay trends or in inflation expectations.
Pospeševanje zviševanja plač lahko nastane, če obstaja pripravljenost, da se sprejmejo izgube realnega dohodka, ki so povezane s cenami nafte.
Increases in pay levels may be accelerated in the absence of any will to accept the reductions in real income caused by oil prices.
V tem primeru se lahko znatno poveča in podaljša obremenitev cen ter obstaja nevarnost, da se podražitev razširi na področja gospodarstva, ki niso tako odvisna od energije.
If this is the case the price shock may be increased and prolonged considerably, and there will be a danger that snowballing prices will spread to areas of the national economy which have nothing to do with energy.
Ključno za plačne zahteve so razen tega tudi srednja- in dolgoročna inflacijska pričakovanja.
Medium- to long-term inflation expectations are also of decisive importance to pay claims.
Če monetarni politiki ne uspe, da jih trdno zameji, stabilnosti cen srednje- do dolgoročno ni mogoče več zagotoviti in pritisk na cene povzroči inflacijo, ki se hitro spreminja.
If monetary policy fails to contain them firmly it will no longer be possible to guarantee price stability in the medium to long term, and pressure on prices will lead to accelerating inflation.
Srednje- in dolgoročno usmerjena monetarna politika Eurosistema pomembno prispeva k omejitvi inflacijskih učinkov zadnjega naraščanja cen nafte.
The monetary policy of the Eurosystem, which is oriented to the medium to long term, has made a decisive contribution to limiting the inflationary effects of the latest increase in oil prices.
Če želi monetarna politika še naprej zagotavljati verodostojnost, ne da bi podlegla aktivizmu obrestne politike, je potrebna velika skrb.
Great vigilance is required if monetary policy wishes to further safeguard its credibility without lapsing into the actionism of an interest policy.
Kazalnike učinkov druge stopnje je treba pozorno opazovati.
The indicators for second-round effects must be monitored with considerable attention.
Za ustvarjanje pričakovanj je predvsem pomembno jasno posredovanje odločitev monetarne politike.
With regard to the creation of expectations the clear communication of decisions on monetary policy is of particular importance.
To vključuje tudi stalno pripravljenost centralne banke, da predvidljiva inflacijska tveganja obravnava takoj in po potrebi aktivno.
This also means that the Central Bank must always be ready to deal with prominent risks of inflation without delay and where necessary energetically.
Kako naj bi po vašem mnenju, brez poseganja v cilj stabilnosti cen, ECB izpolnjevala svoje dodatne obveznosti po Pogodbi (prispevati h gospodarski rasti in polni zaposlenosti) in s katerimi sredstvi bi to lahko dosegla?
Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, how in your view should the ECB fulfil its secondary obligations under the Treaty (to contribute to economic growth and full employment) and what instruments could the ECB use to do so?
Pogodba o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti navaja, da je poglavitni cilj evropskega sistema centralnih bank ohranjanje stabilnosti cen.
The Treaty establishing the European Community identifies the guarantee of price stability as a priority objective for the European system of central banks.
Monetarna politika, ki mora zagotavljati stabilnost cen, najboljše prispeva k trajnostni gospodarski rasti in visoki ravni zaposlovanja.
A monetary policy which is committed to price stability is the most effective contribution to permanent economic growth and high levels of employment.
Ta izjava temelji na spoznanju, da monetarna politika z zagotavljanjem stabilnosti cen realnim velikostim ne more dati trajne spodbude.
This statement is based on the knowledge that monetary policy cannot give a permanent impulse to real values beyond a guarantee of price stability.
Zaradi različnih nalog, ki jih mora ECB opravljati skupaj z nacionalnimi emisijskimi bankami Eurosistema na področju plačilnega prometa in stabilnosti finančnega sistema, se lahko tudi tako prispeva k okrepitvi institucionalnega okvira za finančni sektor ter s tem za rast in zaposlovanje v Skupnosti.
Owing to the different tasks for which the ECB is responsible in the sphere of payment transactions and the stability of the financial system, in conjunction with the money-issuing banks of the Eurosystem, a contribution can also be made via this route to strengthening the institutional framework for the financial sector and thereby for growth and jobs in the Community.
Le v okolju, kjer je zagotovljena stabilnost cen, lahko tržne dejavnosti razvijejo svojo pravo učinkovitost in inovativnost.
It is only in an environment marked by price stability that market economies can display their full efficiency and innovative power.
Razen tega inflacija tudi povzroča znatno prerazdelitev premoženja in dohodka.
Inflation also brings a considerable redistribution of assets and income.
Zlasti prejemniki nižjih dohodkov in državljani z majhnim premoženjem se komaj lahko zavarujejo pred izgubo denarnega premoženja, ki je povezana z inflacijo.
Recipients of low incomes and citizens with limited assets in particular are scarcely able to protect themselves against losses of monetary assets caused by inflation.
Prav najšibkejše družbene skupine so izpostavljene neopazni razlastitvi.
It is precisely the weakest groups in the community which are exposed to creeping expropriation.
Ti učinki pojasnjujejo socialno funkcijo stabilnega denarja in ključen pomen monetarne politike, ki je usmerjena v stabilnost cen in podprta s trdno fiskalno politiko za učinkovito gospodarstvo.
These effects clarify the social function of stable money and the fundamental importance which a monetary policy oriented towards price stability and supported by a solid fiscal policy has for an effective economy.
Če se ozrete v preteklost, ali menite, da je bila prvotna zasnova pakta stabilnosti in rasti najustreznejši način za dosego zastavljenih ciljev ?
Looking backwards, do you think that the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as initially devised was best suited to reach the defined objectives?
Pakt stabilnosti in rasti spada k institucionalnemu okviru ekonomske in monetarne unije ter je del politične unije.
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is part of the institutional framework of economic and monetary union and part of the political union.
Je instrument za usklajevanje in spremljanje proračunskih politik držav članic EU ter izraža obljubo evropskih vlad, da bodo s trajno solidnimi javnimi financami prispevale k stabilnosti skupne valute.
It is the tool for coordinating and supervising the budgetary policies of EU Member States and is a manifestation of the promise by European governments to contribute to the stability of the common currency by means of permanently sound public finances.
V monetarni uniji so pravila proračunske politike za solidne javne finance pomembna zato, ker sta učinek discipline na finančne trg in s tem spodbuda za zanesljivo finančno politiko na nacionalni ravni manj izrazita.
Rules of budgetary policy are important in a monetary union because the disciplining effect of financial markets in conjunction with the incentive for a sound financial policy is less marked at national level.
Neustrezno obnašanje posameznih držav bi negativno vplivalo na vse sodelujoče države.
The consequences of incorrect action by an individual country would have to be borne by all of the participating nations.
Razen tega centralna banka brez solidnih javnih financ ne more zagotoviti srednjeročne stabilnosti denarne vrednosti.
Nor is it possible without sound public finances for a central bank to guarantee the stable value of money.
S tem ciljem pakta stabilnosti in rasti je bilo povezano tudi pričakovanje, da se preprečijo možne napetosti med nacionalnimi vladami in Evropsko centralno banko ter tudi med večjimi in manjšimi državami članicami.
This objective also associated the SGP with the expectation that potential tensions both between national governments and the ECB and between smaller and larger Member States would be avoided.
Leta 1997 sprejeti pakt je bil rezultat političnega sporazuma.
The Pact, which was adopted in 1997, was the product of a political compromise.
Slabosti so bile že takrat očitne in znane, med drugim
Its weaknesses were already obvious and familiar at that time, and included the fact that:
– so bile Svetu namesto odločitvenega avtomatizma na različnih stopnjah postopka prepuščene diskrecijske pravice;
- the Council retained discretionary powers at various stages of the procedure in place of an automatic mechanism for decision-making; and
– pri ocenjevanju proračunskega stanja in v svetu ECOFIN odločajo (potencialni) „grešniki“, kar zmanjšuje medsebojni pritisk in disciplino.
- (potentially) ‘sinner upon sinner’ will make decisions when the budgetary situation is being assessed and in the ECOFIN Council, thus reducing group pressure and discipline.
Da bi odpravili del teh slabosti, je v letih 1996/1997 potekala razprava o prevalitvi dokaznega bremena: v primeru prekoračitve triodstotnega praga primanjkljaja je treba utemeljiti domnevo za čezmerni primanjkljaj, ta domneva pa se lahko razveljavi le z večino, ki je predvidena v pogodbi.
To eliminate some of these weaknesses a turn-around on the burden of proof was discussed in 1996/1997: if the 3% deficit limit were exceeded it would be reasonable to assume that there was an excessive deficit, an assumption which could be disposed of only by means of the Treaty’s majority requirement.
Vendar je bil ta predlog politično nesprejemljiv.
But this proposal was politically unacceptable.
Še vedno menim, da bi bilo cilje pakta stabilnosti in rasti mogoče doseči tudi s paktom v takšni obliki, kot je bil sprejet leta 1997, če bi za to obstajala politična volja.
I remain of the opinion that the SGP’s goals could have been achieved even with the Pact in the form adopted in 1997 had there been the political will to do so.
Zlasti gospodarsko ugodnejša leta bi bilo treba izkoristiti za temeljno izboljšavo stanja javnih financ, da bi si tako pridobili manevrski prostor.
In particular the years which were more favourable economically would have had to be used for a fundamental improvement in the public financial situation in order thereby to create scope for action.
Neodvisno od kakovosti pravil je osnovni politični in strukturni problem ekonomske in monetarne unije v tem, da številne države članice še vedno niso prilagodile svojega obnašanja spremenjenim pogojem v ekonomski in monetarni uniji.
Regardless of the quality of the rules, there is a fundamental political or structural problem for economic and monetary union in that many Member States have not yet adjusted the way they act to the changed conditions of an economic and monetary union.
Zdi se, da vedno bolj prevladujejo nacionalni pomisleki o evropskih zahtevah.
National considerations of European requirements seem increasingly to dominate.
Glede na pakt stabilnosti in rasti, kaj menite o leta 2005 sprejeti reformi in kako ocenjujete sedanje izvajanje te reforme ?
Concerning the Stability and Growth Pact, what are your views on the reform adopted in 2005 and your assessment of its current implementation?
Reforma pakta stabilnosti in rasti je povzročila daljnosežne spremembe in na splošno oslabitev dosedanjih pravil.
The reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) resulted in extensive changes and a net weakening of the existing rules.
S tem so se poslabšali okvirni pogoji za skupno monetarno politiko.
As a result there has been a deterioration in the basic conditions for the common monetary policy.
Omilitev proračunske discipline lahko povzroči neprimerno visok proračunski primanjkljaj in povečanje stanja dolga, zaradi česar mlajšim in prihodnjim generacijam grozi, da bodo finančno še bolj obremenjene.
A relaxation of budgetary discipline can lead to disproportionately high budgetary deficits and an increase in the debt position, which threatens to further increase the financial burden on younger and future generations.
Tudi zaradi tega ocenjujem to reformo kot korak v napačno smer.
But it is not only for this reason that I regard the reform as a step in the wrong direction.
Spremembe pakta stabilnosti in rasti prinašajo sicer tudi nekaj obrobnih izboljšav, na primer v zvezi z gospodarskopolitičnim sodelovanjem med Komisijo, Svetom in državami članicami.
It is true that the changes in the SGP bring some marginal improvements, for example as regards cooperation on economic policy between the Commission, the Council and the Member States.
Vendar se preventivni del pakta ni okrepil, kot je bilo načrtovano.
Nevertheless, they fail to produce the intended reinforcement of the Pact’s preventive element.
Postopek v zvezi s primanjkljajem se je znatno oslabil.
The deficit procedure itself has been weakened considerably.
Zlasti prekoračitev triodstotnega praga primanjkljaja je mogoče upravičevati s številnimi „drugimi“ dejavniki, ki vplivajo nanj v daljšem obdobju.
Exceeding the 3% deficit ceiling in particular can be justified with reference to a number of ‘miscellaneous’ influencing factors over a protracted period of time.
Kot naslednja posledica reforme bi lahko celotna pravila postala bistveno bolj zapletena in nepregledna zaradi številnih dejavnikov vplivanja, ki jih je mogoče upoštevati, in velike teže obravnav posameznih držav.
As a further consequence of the reform the entire regulatory mechanism might become considerably more complicated and less transparent as a result of the multiplicity of influencing factors which can be taken into account and the greater weight attaching to the points of view of individual nations.
Predvideti je mogoče tudi povečano birokracijo, ker bodo zapletenejša pravila ob upoštevanju načela enakega obravnavanja otežila operativno uporabo.
An increase in bureaucratic effort is foreseeable because the complicated rules will make any operational application which allows for the principle of equal treatment more difficult.
Možne negativne posledice sprememb je mogoče omiliti tako, da se večja prilagodljivost pakta ne izkorišča in da se nova pravila strogo izvajajo.
The potential negative impact of the changes can be reduced by not exploiting the Pact’s greater flexibility and applying the new rules strictly.
Zdaj si Komisija in Svet jasno prizadevata, da bi bile diskrecijske pravice čim bolj omejene.
Obviously both the Commission and the Council are currently endeavouring to restrict discretionary powers.
Ker so nova pravila začela veljati pred kratkim, je še prezgodaj za podajanje ocen.
As it is only a short while since the new rules came into force it is too early to make a judgement.
Dejanski preskus nas še čaka.
The real test is still to come.
Navedite svoje pripombe o postopkih za čezmerni primanjkljaj, ki trenutno potekajo.
Please comment on the currently running excessive deficit procedures.
Kako presojate nedavno odločitev o podaljšanju odloga, ki ga je dobila nemška vlada za zmanjšanje primanjkljaja pod zgornjo mejo 3 %?
How do you judge the recent decision to lengthen the delay the German government is granted for lowering its deficit under the 3% ceiling?
Ali škoduje verodostojnosti pakta stabilnosti in rasti?
Does it damage the SGP’s credibility?
Dejstvo, da ima Nemčija že od leta 2002 visok proračunski primanjkljaj in je v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, je vredno velikega obžalovanja in menim, da je slabo znamenje za druge države članice euro območja in nove članice EU.
It is a matter of extreme regret and in my own view a poor signal to the other Member States in the euro area and the new members of the EU that Germany should have exhibited an excessive budgetary deficit and been subject to excessive deficit procedures since 2002.
Z nadaljnjim neupoštevanjem pravil pakta stabilnosti in rasti je bila povezana izguba verodostojnosti evropskih pravil proračunske politike.
Its continuing failure to comply with the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact has been accompanied by a loss of credibility for the European rules on budgetary policy.
To je končno vodilo v politično motivirano spremembo teh pravil.
This ultimately resulted in a politically-motivated change in those rules.
Nemška zvezna vlada je v posodobljenem programu stabilnosti 2006 napovedala, da v tekočem letu predvidoma ne bo mogla doseči triodstotnega praga primanjkljaja in da ne predvideva dodatnih korektivnih ukrepov.
In the Updated Stability Programme for 2006 the Federal German Government announced that the deficit ceiling of 3% would probably be missed during the current year and that it would not be taking any corrective action.
Zato je logično, da sta Komisija in Svet v skladu s paktom stabilnosti in rasti menila, da morata Nemčiji dovoliti odlog.
It is therefore logical that the Commission and Council felt obliged to grant Germany a delay.
To je prišlo še bolj v poštev, ko si Nemčija ni prizadevala za minimalno izboljšanje strukturnega finančnega salda 0,5 % BDP na leto, ki se zahteva v skladu s spremenjenimi pravili.
This is all the more applicable given that even the minimum improvement in the structural financial balance of 0.5% of GDP a year is not being aimed at following the changes to the rules.
V okviru zaostritve postopka obstaja zakonita možnost, da se rok za popravek čezmernega primanjkljaja podaljša do leta 2007.
In the context of the tightening of procedures there is legally scope for extending the period for correcting the excessive deficit until 2007.
Cilj bi moral biti, da se postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem za Nemčijo čim prej konča, zlasti ker naj bi bil delež primanjkljaja v tekočem letu nižji od napovedanega.
The aim would have had to be to terminate the excessive deficit procedure for Germany at the earliest opportunity, especially since the proportion of the deficit quota in the current year will probably to turn out to be less than was announced.
Zaradi ugodnega konjunkturnega razvoja bi se lahko triodstotna zgornja meja v tem letu upoštevala brez dodatnih ukrepov, če se ohrani že načrtovana omejevalna politika porabe.
As a result of favourable economic trends the 3% ceiling could be achieved this year without further action if the restrictive spending policy already in place was maintained.
To mora povečati verodostojnost pakta, saj
This should boost the Pact’s credibility because
– se je izrecno zvezna vlada opredelila za pakt stabilnosti in rasti,
- the Federal Government has expressly professed its faith in the Stability and Growth Pact;
– je zgodaj sporočila, da sprejema zaostritev postopka;
- it has stated at an early stage that it will accept a tightening-up of procedures;
– si zaradi reforme nemškega federalizma prizadeva za nadaljnji napredek pri nacionalnem izvajanju določb pakta stabilnosti in rasti ter v ustavo zapiše zlasti delitev finančne odgovornosti med zvezno državo in deželami.
- further progress on the domestic implementation of the provisions of the SGP is aimed at as part of the reform of German federalism, and in particular in establishing the allocation of financial powers between the Federal Government and states in Basic Law.
Kako ocenjujete institucionalne odnose med ECB, Svetom in/ali Euroskupino?
How do you judge the institutional relation between ECB, Council and/or the Eurogroup ?
Do katere mere sme biti politika ECB neusklajena z ekonomsko politiko, če se centralna banka ne strinja z odločitvami te politike?
In how far the ECB policy should enter into conflict with economic policy if the central bank does not agree with its decisions?
Kaj pa razhajanje mnenj med postopkom v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem?
What about differing judgments during excessive deficit procedures?
Institucionalni odnosi med ECB in Svetom (in/ali Euroskupino) morajo ustrezati posebnostim evropske ekonomske in monetarne unije.
The institutional relationship between the ECB and the Council (and/or the Eurogroup) must reflect the distinctive features of the European economic and monetary union.
Pri tem je treba spoštovati posebne odgovornosti posameznih institucij, tako kot so urejene v Pogodbi ES, s sekundarno zakonodajo ali neuradno, npr. za Euroskupino.
The specific responsibilities of the individual institutions must be respected, just as they are regulated in the EC Treaty, by secondary legislation or informally, e.g. for the Eurogroup.
V skladu s Pogodbo
Under the terms of the Treaty
– je ECB, neodvisno od političnih vplivov in navodil, odgovorna za skupno monetarno politiko in zagotavljanje stabilnosti denarne vrednosti kot prednostnega cilja;
- the ECB is responsible – independently of political influences and directives – for the common monetary policy and for guaranteeing monetary stability as a priority objective;
– ima tudi Svet deljene pristojnosti za upoštevanje evropskih pravil proračunske politike, tudi v skladu s paktom stabilnosti in rasti;
- the Council shares responsibility for compliance with European rules on budgetary policy even under the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact;