natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ne obstaja razlog, zakaj je izdaja dodatne potrditve dovoljena le ustanovam in ne osebam.
There is no reason why only institutions and not persons can render confirmatory certificates.
(a) vzpostavijo primerne sisteme za obvladovanje tveganja, s katerimi lahko ugotovijo, ali je stranka politično izpostavljena oseba;
(a) have appropriate risk management systems to determine whether the customer is a politically exposed person;
Izraz „sistemi za obvladovanje tveganja“ je preveč nejasen in ne pomeni delujočega orodja, ki bi uveljavil izboljšan skrben pregled poslovanja stranke pri politično izpostavljenih osebah.
The expression 'risk management systems' is too vague and does not represent a workable tool to apply enhanced customer due diligence to politically exposed persons.
Ustanove in osebe, ki jih zajema ta direktiva, morajo dejansko izvajati primerne postopke in politike, s katerimi lahko ugotovijo, ali je stranka politično izpostavljena oseba.
Institutions and persons covered by this Directive should, in fact, apply appropriate procedures or policies to determine whether the customer is a politically exposed person.
Na podlagi teh postopkov in politik bi morale te ustanove in osebe po potrebi vzpostaviti primerno upravljanje informacijske tehnologije.
Based on these procedures and policies, those institutions and persons would have to install appropriate IT management where necessary.
V vseh primerih je izraz „sistemi za obvladovanje tveganja“ neprimeren.
In all cases, the term 'risk management system' is not appropriate.
Prepoved kreditnim ustanovam, da sklenejo ali nadaljujejo s korespondenčnim bančnim odnosom s korespondenčno banko, ki dovoljuje uporabo svojih računov navideznim bankam (tj. posredno razmerje s korespondenčnimi bankami), v praksi ne more veljati, ker banke ne bi imele sredstev, s katerimi bi preverile, ali imajo njihove stranke razmerje z navideznimi bankami.
In practice, the prohibition on credit institutions entering into or continuing a correspondent banking relationship with a respondent bank which permits its accounts to be used by shell banks (i.e. indirect relationships with shell banks) cannot be applicable, as banks would have no means of verifying whether their respondents have relations with shell banks.
Obveznost poznati „strankino stranko“ na splošno ne deluje, ne glede na to, ali je stranka druga kreditna ustanova, pravna oseba ali fizična oseba.
An obligation to know 'the customer's customer' is generally not workable, regardless of whether the customer is another credit institution, legal entity or natural person.
Ta neuporabna določba bi vodila le k birokraciji in birokratskim zadevam, tj. k pošiljanju in evidentiranju vprašalnikov brez možnosti preverjanja.
This inapplicable provision would only lead to bureaucracy and red tape, i.e. sending and filing questionnaires without any possibility of verification.
Države članice lahko dovolijo ustanovam in osebam, zajetim v tej direktivi, da izvajanje ukrepov iz členov 7(1) (a), (b) in (c) zaupajo tretjim osebam.
Member States may permit the institutions and persons covered by this Directive to rely on third parties to perform the requirements laid down in Article 7(1)(a), (b) and (c).
Države članice lahko dovolijo ustanovam in osebam, zajetim v tej direktivi, da izvajanje ukrepov iz členov 7(1) (a), (b) in (c) zaupajo tretjim osebam, prav tako zajetim v tej direktivi.
Member States may permit the institutions and persons covered by this Directive to rely on third parties that are also covered by this Directive to perform the requirements laid down in Article 7(1)(a), (b) and (c).
Predlog spremembe ponuja prednosti, ki izhajajo iz možnosti vključitve tretjih oseb v izvajanje ukrepov; po trenutnemu predlogu se bi morali tisti, ki jih direktiva zajema, zelo dosledno držati upoštevanja in se tako zaščititi pred odgovornostjo, s čimer bi onemogočili vse prednosti tega sistema.
The amendment seeks to deliver some real benefits from the possibility of third compliance; as currently proposed those subject to the Directive would clearly have to duplicate compliance in order protect themselves from liability thus negating any advantage from such a system.
Končno odgovornost nosi tretja oseba v takšnih primerih .
The ultimate responsibility shall remain with the third party in such cases .
Direktiva omogoča tistim, ki jih zajema, da zaupajo tretjim osebam izvajanje skrbnih pregledov iz člena 12.
The Directive permits those covered to rely on third parties to carry out the due diligence checks in Article 12.
Vendar pa hkrati ostane končna odgovornost pregledov v okviru ustanove ali osebe, ki jo zajema področje uporabe Direktive.
At the same time, however, ultimate responsibility for checks remains with the institution or person covered by the scope of the Directive.
Čeprav lahko to pravilo poveča pripravljenost tretjih oseb, da predložijo podatke, ne zmanjšuje znatnega bremena na ustanove ali zadevne osebe.
Although this rule might enhance the readiness of third parties to pass on information, it does not reduce the considerable burden placed on the institutions or persons concerned.
Ob soočenju s končno odgovornostjo zanje ni spodbude, da zaupajo podatkom uvajalca brez dvojnega pregledovanja, kar pomeni, da bi bili v praksi pregledi identifikacije v vsakem primeru dvojni.
Faced with ultimate responsibility, there is no incentive for them to rely on information by the introducer without double-checking, which means that, in practice, identification checks would be duplicated anyway.
Trenutno ni skladnosti pri uvajanju Druge direktive o pranju denarja v posamezni državi članici (države članice imajo različne zahteve pri preskriptivnih zahtevah po dokumentih v zvezi z identifikacijo stranke).
There is currently no consistency in the way that each Member State is enacting the Second Money-Laundering Directive (Member States have differing prescriptive documentary requirements regarding client identification).
Ta napaka se kaže v dodatnih stroških strank in urejenih poslov, v omejevanju posla v Evropski uniji na praktični ravni in v dajanju nepoštene prednosti eni državi na račun druge, odvisno od tega, kako različna bi lahko bila raven zahtev.
This failure is resulting in additional costs to customers and regulated businesses and hindering business in the European Union at a practical level, as well as giving an unfair advantage to one State at the expense of another, depending on how different the level of requirements might be.
Tretje osebe ustanovi ali osebi, h kateri napotijo stranko, takoj posredujejo pomembne kopije identifikacijskih in verifikacijskih podatkov ter ostalih pomembnih listin o identiteti stranke ali dejanskega lastnika, z izjemo, da ta in prejšnji odstavek za neodvisne pravne strokovnjake veljata le, če s tem soglašajo njihove stranke.
Relevant copies of identification or verification data and other relevant documentation on the identity of the customer or the beneficial owner shall immediately be forwarded by the third party to the institution or person to which the customer is being referred on request , save that this and the preceding paragraph shall apply to independent legal professionals only when their client has consented .
V primeru, da pravni strokovnjaki podatke posredujejo brez dovoljenja stranke, bi to pomenilo kršitev obveznosti, ki izhajajo iz poslovnega odnosa med stranko in odvetnikom.
It would be a breach of the client/lawyer professional relationship for legal professionals to pass on information without the permission of the client.
Člen 21, odstavek 3 a (novo)
Article 21, paragraph 3 a (new)
Tiste dejavnosti, katerih pravni status zavezuje opravljanje storitev do mej z nezakonitostjo, so izvzete iz zahteve po prepovedi.
Those professions the legal status of which makes the provision of the service in question obligatory, up to the limits of manifest illegality, shall be exempt from the requirement to refrain therefrom.
Nesprejemljivo je, da se strokovne izvajalce, za katere se sumi dejavnost pranja denarja, izvzame iz izvajanja njihovih lastnih storitev (člen 21), če jih tako pouči enota za finančni nadzor.
It is unacceptable for professional operators who suspect money-laundering activity to have to refrain from carrying out their own services (Article 21) if the financial intelligence unit so instructs them.
Zakonodajalec lahko na področju zasebnih transakcij določi le jasno, nedvoumno in nedispozitivno mejo moči do zavrnitve zagotavljanja strokovne storitve, ob varstvu pravice posameznikov, da oblikujejo lastne pravne organizacije ob izvajanju svojih ustavnih gospodarskih svoboščin.
In the field of private transactions legislators can only set a clear, unambiguous and non-discretionary limit to the power to refuse to provide a professional service, in defence of the right of individuals to make their own legal arrangements in exercising their constitutional economic freedoms.
To pravilo zagotavlja, da se lahko storitev zavrne le v primeru, ko je nedvoumno (dvom ni dovolj) protipravna; pravnih hipotez o začasni opustitvi ni.
This rule provides that a service may be refused only in the case of manifest (doubt is not enough) illegality; and there are no legal hypotheses of temporary suspension.
Ustanove in osebe, zajete v tej direktivi, ter njihovi direktorji in zaposleni prizadetim strankam ali ostalim tretjim osebam ne razkrijejo, da so enoti za finančni nadzor v skladu s členi 19, 20 in 21 posredovali podatke, ali da poteka oziroma bo stekla preiskava o pranju denarja.
The institutions and persons covered by this Directive and their directors and employees shall not disclose to the customer concerned nor to other third persons that information has been transmitted to the financial intelligence unit in accordance with Articles 19, 20 and 21 or that a money laundering investigation is being or may be carried out.
Ustanove in osebe, zajete v tej direktivi, ter njihovi direktorji in zaposleni, z izjemo samostojnih pravnih strokovnjakov, ki nudijo pravne nasvete strankam ali kateri koli osebi v zvezi s sodnimi postopki, prizadetim strankam ali ostalim tretjim osebam ne razkrijejo, da so enoti za finančni nadzor v skladu s členi 19, 20 in 21 posredovali podatke, ali da poteka oziroma bo stekla preiskava o pranju denarja
The institutions and persons covered by this Directive and their directors and employees , not including independent legal professionals in connection with the giving of legal advice to a client or to any person in connection with or in contemplation of legal proceedings, shall not disclose to the customer concerned nor to other third persons that information has been transmitted to the financial intelligence unit in accordance with Articles 19, 20 and 21 or that a money laundering investigation is being or may be carried out.
Pravni strokovnjaki morajo obdržati pravico do obveščanja stranke ter tako izpolniti posebno dolžnost, ki jo imajo do stranke.
The right to inform the client should be retained for legal professionals in order to recognise their special duties to their clients.
Obveznosti o nerazkrivanju se ne sme uporabljati, če za osebo ali ustanovo, zajeto v tej direktivi, veljajo posebne obveznosti o razkrivanju informacij v skladu z nacionalno zakonodajo.
The non-disclosure obligation shall not be applied when a person or institution subject to this Directive is charged with specific disclosure obligations under national legislation.
Države članice zagotovijo objavo prečiščenega pregleda teh statističnih poročil.
Member States shall ensure that a consolidated review of these statistical reports is published.
Statistike o številu preiskav, sodnih pregonov in obsodb zaradi poročil o sumljivi dejavnosti je treba izboljšati.
Statistics on the number of investigations, prosecutions and convictions following suspicious activity reports must be improved.
V zvezi s tem bi morale statistike poleg števila poročil o sumljivih transakcijah zajemati tudi nadaljevanje teh poročil, število preiskanih primerov, število preganjanih oseb in število obsojenih oseb.
In this context, statistics should cover not only the number of suspicious transaction reports but also the follow-up given to those reports, the number of cases investigated, the number of persons prosecuted and the number of persons convicted.
Člen 37, odstavek 1, uvodni del
Article 37, paragraph 1, introductory part
Da bi v boju proti pranju denarja upoštevali tehnični razvoj in da bi zagotovili enotno uporabo te direktive, Komisija v skladu s postopkom, določenim v členu 38(2), sprejme naslednje izvedbene ukrepe:
In order to take account of technical developments in the fight against money laundering and to ensure uniform application of this Directive, the Commission shall, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 38(2), adopt the following implementing measures:
Da bi v boju proti pranju denarja in financiranju terorizma upoštevali tehnični razvoj in da bi zagotovili enotno uporabo te direktive, Komisija v skladu s postopkom, določenim v členu 38(2), sprejme naslednje izvedbene ukrepe:
In order to take account of technical developments in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing and to ensure uniform application of this Directive, the Commission shall, in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 38(2), adopt the following implementing measures:
Ta predlog spremembe nadaljuje predlog spremembe, da je treba financiranje terorizma določiti kot posebno kaznivo dejanje poleg definicije pranja denarja (glej predlog spremembe odstavka 1 člena 1 in odstavka 3 (novo) člena 1).
This amendment follows on from the amendment that terrorist financing should be defined as a separate criminal offence alongside the definition of money laundering (see amendment to Article 1, paragraph 1, and Article 1, paragraph 3 (new).
Člen 37, odstavek 1(a)
Article 37, paragraph 1, point (a)
(a) razlago tehničnih vidikov definicij iz člena 1(2 ) in člena 3(2)(a) in (d), (5), (8), (9), (10), (11) in (12);
(a) clarification of the technical aspects of the definitions in Article 1(2 ) and in Article 3(2)(a) and (d), (5), (8), (9), (10), (11) and (12);
(a) razlago tehničnih vidikov definicij iz člena 1(2 ) in 2a in člena 3(2)(a) in (d), (5), (8), (9), (10), (11) in (12);
(a) clarification of the technical aspects of the definitions in Article 1(2) and 2a and in Article 3(2)(a) and (d), (5), (8), (9), (10), (11) and (12);
Člen 38, odstavek 1
Article 38, paragraph 1
Komisiji pomaga Odbor za preprečevanje pranja denarja, v nadaljevanju »Odbor«.
The Commission shall be assisted by a Committee on the Prevention of Money Laundering, hereinafter “the Committee”.
Komisiji pomaga Odbor za preprečevanje pranja denarja, v nadaljevanju »Odbor«, ki Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu skupaj s Komisijo predloži letno poročilo o svojih dejavnostih in posvetovanjih.
The Commission shall be assisted by a Committee on the Prevention of Money Laundering, hereinafter “the Committee” , which Committee shall, together with the Commission, deliver an annual report on its activities and deliberations to the European Parliament and to the Council .
Vprašanja, obravnavana v okviru Odbora, niso le tehnične narave in zadevajo tudi splošno delovanje in vsebino direktive.
The issues to be dealt with by the Committee are not just technical and reflect on the overall functioning and content of the Directive.
Zato je treba zagotoviti demokratičen nadzor.
There should therefore be some democratic oversight.
V treh letih po začetku veljavnosti te direktive in nato vsaj vsaka tri leta po tem Komisija pripravi poročilo o izvajanju te direktive in ga predloži Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu.
Within three years of the entry into force of this Directive, and at least at three yearly intervals thereafter, the Commission shall draw up a report on the implementation of this Directive and submit it to the European Parliament and the Council.
V treh letih po začetku veljavnosti te direktive in nato vsaka tri leta po tem Komisija pripravi poročilo o izvajanju te direktive in ga predloži Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu.
Within three years of the entry into force of this Directive, and at least at three yearly intervals thereafter, the Commission shall draw up a report on the implementation of this Directive and submit it to the European Parliament and the Council.
Poročilo se sklicuje zlasti na področja, ki jih je treba pregledati, kot določa člen 2 Uredbe 2001/97/ES.
The report shall relate, in particular, to the fields to be reviewed as laid down in Article 2 of Directive 2001/97/EC.
Zagotovitev, da se pregled, ki ga zagotavlja druga direktiva (Direktiva 2001/97/ES), izvaja tudi v tretji direktivi.
To ensure that the review provided for in the second directive (Directive 2001/97/EC) is also carried out under the third.
MNENJE Odbora za peticije
OPINIONOF THE COMMITTEE ON PETITIONS
Parlament je že obravnaval kočljivo vprašanje v zvezi z usklajevanjem potrebe po vzdrževanju javnega reda in varnosti ter potrebe po varstvu temeljnih pravic.
This is not the first time that Parliament has had to address the delicate issue of balancing the need to maintain public order and security and the need to safeguard fundamental rights.
Odbor za državljanske svoboščine, pravosodje in notranje zadeve je pred nedavnim predložil samoiniciativno poročilo o prihodnosti območja svobode, varnosti in pravice (Bourlangesovo poročilo [ A6-0010/2004 ], ki je bilo sprejeto 14. oktobra 2004 [T6-0022/2004]) (in zagotovil njegov sprejem s strani Parlamenta) ter predlog spremembe (sprejet na plenarni seji s 329 glasovi za), ki predvideva predhodno ocenjevanje vseh novih predlogov zakonodajnih aktov z vidika podpore temeljnih pravic.
The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs has recently submitted (and secured Parliament's adoption of) an own-initiative report on the future of the area of freedom, security and justice (the Bourlanges report [ A6-0010/2004 ], which was adopted on 14 October 2004 [T6-0022/2004]), and also an amendment (adopted in plenary with 329 votes in favour) which provides for the preliminary assessment of any new proposal for a legislative act from the point of view of upholding fundamental rights.
Predhodna ocena, s katero se zagotovi, da so podprte temeljne pravice iz Listine o temeljnih pravicah EU, bo potrebna za vse zakonodajne akte EU ali ES.
Prior assessment intended to ensure that the fundamental rights defined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights are upheld will have to be carried out in respect of any EU or EC legislative act.
Zato predlog direktive o preprečevanju uporabe finančnega sistema za pranje denarja (vključno z namenom financiranja terorizma) spada v sivo območje, kjer se lahko izkaže, da je treba posamezne pravice in svoboščine žrtvovati zaradi višjega splošnega interesa preprečevanja in zatiranja teroristične dejavnosti.
The proposal for a directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering (including terrorist financing) therefore belongs in the grey area in which individual rights and freedoms may have to be sacrificed in the higher general interest of preventing and repressing terrorist activity.
Kot kaže, se zakonodajalec vsekakor zaveda nevarnosti, da lahko področje uporabe predlagane zakonodaje povzroči navzkrižje interesov – in sicer tako močno, da v zadnji uvodni izjavi predloga (uvodna izjava 29) poudari, da direktiva „spoštuje temeljne pravice in upošteva načela, ki jih priznava“ Pogodba iz Nice (ki je zdaj vključena v drugi del Ustavne pogodbe), in da je v skladu z Evropsko konvencijo o človekovih pravicah.
The legislator does certainly appear to be aware of the danger that the scope of the proposed legislation may give rise to a conflict of interests - so much so that in the proposal's final recital (recital 29) he makes a point of emphasising that the directive 'respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised' in the Nice Charter (which has now been incorporated into the second part of the Constitutional Treaty), and also complies with the European Convention on Human Rights.
Vendar pa vsebina določb predloga vključuje le navadno navedbo načela pod ravnijo politične etike, sprejete s strani Parlamenta, ki si že od razglasitve Listine v Nici pri izvajanju svojih pooblastil, ki so mu bila dodeljena kot instituciji, prizadeva za upoštevanje vsebine omenjene listine.
However, the substance of the provisions laid down in the proposal embodies merely a commonplace statement of principle that falls short of the political ethic adopted by Parliament, which - ever since the Charter was proclaimed in Nice - has endeavoured to abide by the substance of that charter as it exercises the powers conferred upon it as an institution.
V svojem mnenju o Ustavni pogodbi priznava, da vse institucije zavezuje ista obveznost: vključitev Listine o temeljnih pravicah EU v del II Ustave, kar pomeni, da se morajo s standardi Pogodbe o Ustavi za Evropo ujemati vse določbe prava Evropske Unije in vse dejavnosti institucij Evropske unije ali dejavnosti, ki temeljijo na pravu Evropske unije (predlog resolucije EP o Pogodbi o Ustavi 2004/2129(INI) ).
In its opinion on the Constitutional Treaty it recognises that all the EU institutions are bound by the same obligation: the incorporation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in part II of the Constitution, which means that all provisions of European Union law and all measures taken by the EU institutions or based on EU law will have to comply with those standards (EP resolution T6 0004/2005 of 12/1/05).
Tudi Komisija je vedno izkazovala svojo željo, da sprejme podoben proaktiven pristop k Ustavni pogodbi, kot je poudaril njen nekdanji predsednik gospod Prodi v sporočilu svojim uslužbencem ob zaključku zadnje medvladne konference: „Vključitev Listine o temeljnih pravicah v to besedilo ter jasen izraz vrednot in ciljev EU in temeljnih načel, ki veljajo za odnose med EU in njenimi državami članicami, pomenijo, da lahko to temeljno besedilo opišemo kot našo Ustavo“.
The Commission too has always demonstrated that it wishes to adopt a similar pro-active approach to the Constitutional Charter, as emphasised by its former President - Mr Prodi - at the end of the last IGC in a message addressed to his own officials: 'The inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in this text and the clear statement of the EU's values and objectives and of the basis principles governing relations between the EU and its Member States mean that we can describe this basic text as our Constitution'.
V primeru Peticije 693/2003
In the case referred to in Petition 693/2003
Peticija o običajnih dejavnostih odvetnikov pri svetovanju strankam in zastopanju strank pred sodiščem bi lahko temeljne pravice in svoboščine bile ogrožene.
Petition relating to the normal activities performed by lawyers in advising their clients and representing them in court, fundamental rights and freedoms could be at stake.
To velja za varstvo osebnih podatkov (II-68 Ustavne pogodbe), svobodo izražanja in obveščanja (II-71 Ustavne pogodbe), svobodo izbire poklica in pravico do dela (II-75.2 Ustavne pogodbe) ter pravico do pritožbe pri nepristranskem sodniku.
This applies to the protection of personal data (II-68 of the Constitutional Treaty), freedom of expression and information (II-71 of the Constitutional Treaty), the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work (II-75.2 of the Constitutional Treaty), and the right to appeal to an impartial judge.
Kot vlagatelji peticije podrobno dokazujejo, neodvisnost odvetnika (ki je potrebna za zagotovitev, da „ima vsakdo možnost svetovanja, obrambe in zastopanja“ – II-107 Ustavne pogodbe) temelji na varstvu zaupnosti v zadevah strank.
As the petitioners argue at length, a lawyer's independence (which is essential to the provision whereby 'everyone shall the possibility of being advised, defended and represented' - II-107 of the Constitutional Treaty) is based on the preservation of confidentiality in dealings with clients.
Zahteve v zvezi z zagotavljanjem podatkov, navedene v Poglavju III obravnavanega predloga, bi ogrozile neodvisnost in zaupnost.
Both independence and confidentiality would be jeopardised by the requirements to provide information which are referred to in Chapter III of the proposal under consideration.