natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
(25) This is particularly true of business relationships with individuals holding, or having held, important public positions, particularly those from countries where corruption is widespread. 
(25) To še posebej velja za poslovne odnose s posamezniki, ki zavzemajo ali so zavzemali pomembne javne položaje, zlasti če prihajajo iz držav z visoko stopnjo korupcije.
Such relationships may expose the financial sector in particular to significant reputational and/or legal risks. 
Takšni poslovni odnosi lahko v precejšnji meri ogrozijo ugled finančnega sektorja in/ali ga izpostavijo pravnemu tveganju.
The international effort to combat corruption also justifies the need to pay special attention to such cases and to apply the complete normal customer due diligence measures in respect of domestic politically exposed persons or enhanced customer due diligence measures in respect of politically exposed persons residing in another Member State or in a third country. 
Mednarodna prizadevanja v boju zoper korupcijo opravičujejo, da se tem primerom posveti posebna pozornost in da se uporabijo ukrepi glede običajne dolžnosti skrbnosti pri ugotavljanju identitete stranke za domače politično izpostavljene osebe ali ukrepi glede poglobljene dolžnosti skrbnosti pri ugotavljanju identitete stranke za politično izpostavljene osebe, ki prebivajo v drugi državi članici ali tretji državi.
(26) Obtaining approval from senior management for establishing business relationships should not imply obtaining approval from the board of directors but from the immediate higher level of the hierarchy of the person seeking such approval. 
(26) Pridobitev odobritve s strani višjega vodstva za vzpostavitev poslovnih odnosov ne pomeni pridobitve odobritve uprave, temveč gre za odobritev na neposredno višji hierarhični ravni, kot je oseba, ki je za odobritev zaprosila.
(27) In order to avoid repeated customer identification procedures, leading to delays and inefficiency in business, it is appropriate, subject to suitable safeguards, to allow customers to be introduced whose identification has been carried out elsewhere. 
(27) Da bi se izognili podvajanju postopkov identifikacije strank ter s tem zastojem in neučinkovitosti v poslovanju, je ob ustreznih zaščitnih ukrepih primerno sprejeti tudi stranke, ki so že bile identificirane drugje.
Where an institution or person covered by this Directive relies on a third party, the ultimate responsibility for the customer due diligence procedure remains with the institution or person to whom the customer is introduced. 
Kadar se oseba ali ustanova, za katero velja ta direktiva, zanese na tretjo osebo, nosi dokončno odgovornost za uporabo postopka za ugotavljanje identitete stranke ustanova ali oseba, pri kateri je bila stranka sprejeta.
The third party, or introducer, also retains his own responsibility for all the requirements in this Directive, including the requirement to report suspicious transactions and maintain records, to the extent that he has a relationship with the customer that is covered by this Directive. 
Tudi tretja oseba, to je oseba, ki je stranko predstavila, je, dokler ima poslovni odnos s stranko, za katero velja ta direktiva, še nadalje odgovorna za izpolnjevanje obveznosti iz te direktive, vključno z obveznostjo prijave sumljivih transakcij in za hrambo zapiskov in dokazil.
(28) In the case of agency or outsourcing relationships on a contractual basis between institutions or persons covered by this Directive and external natural or legal persons not covered hereby, any anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing obligations for those agents or outsourcing service providers as part of the institutions or persons covered by this Directive, may only arise from contract and not from this Directive. 
(28) V primerih zastopanja ali zunanjih izvajalcev, ki temeljijo na pogodbenem odnosu med ustanovami ali osebami, za katere velja ta direktiva, in zunanjimi fizičnimi ali pravnimi osebami, za katere ta direktiva ne velja, lahko kakršni koli obvezni finančni ukrepi proti pranju denarja in financiranju terorizma za te zastopnike in zunanje izvajalce kot dele ustanov ali oseb, za katere velja ta direktiva, izhajajo samo iz pogodbe in ne iz te direktive.
The responsibility for complying with this Directive should remain with the institution or person covered hereby. 
Ustanova ali oseba, za katero ta direktiva velja, je še naprej odgovorna za izpolnjevanje zahtev iz te direktive.
(29) Suspicious transactions should be reported to the financial intelligence unit (FIU), which serves as a national centre for receiving, analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities suspicious transaction reports and other information regarding potential money laundering or terrorist financing. 
(29) Sumljive transakcije bi bilo treba sporočiti Finančni obveščevalni enoti (Financial intelligence unit - FIU), ki deluje kot centralni državni organ za sprejemanje, analiziranje in obveščanje pristojnih organov o poročilih sumljivih transakcij in drugih podatkih o morebitnem pranju denarja ali financiranju terorizma.
This should not compel Member States to change their existing reporting systems where the reporting is done through a public prosecutor or other law enforcement authorities, as long as the information is forwarded promptly and unfiltered to FIUs, allowing them to conduct their business properly, including international cooperation with other FIUs. 
To ne sili držav članic, da spremenijo svoje obstoječe sisteme obveščanja, kadar postopek prijave poteka preko državnega tožilstva ali drugih organov odkrivanja in pregona, če so podatki posredovani FIU nemudoma in neprečiščeni, da lahko ta svoje naloge opravi temeljito, kar vključuje tudi mednarodno sodelovanje z ostalimi FIU.
(30) By way of derogation from the general prohibition on executing suspicious transactions, the institutions and persons covered by this Directive may execute suspicious transactions before informing the competent authorities, where refraining from the execution thereof is impossible or likely to frustrate efforts to pursue the beneficiaries of a suspected money laundering or terrorist financing operation. 
(30) Z odstopanjem od splošne prepovedi izvrševanja sumljivih transakcij lahko ustanove in osebe, za katere velja ta direktiva, izvršijo sumljive transakcije, preden so o tem obveščeni pristojni organi, če neizvršitev ni mogoča ali bi lahko onemogočila pregon upravičenca sumljive transakcije pranja denarja ali financiranja terorizma.
This, however, should be without prejudice to the international obligations accepted by the Member States to freeze without delay funds or other assets of terrorists, terrorist organisations or those who finance terrorism, in accordance with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. 
To pa ne bi smelo vplivati na mednarodne obveznosti, ki so jih prevzele države članice, da se finančna sredstva ali ostalo premoženje teroristov, terorističnih združenj ali tistih, ki financirajo terorizem, takoj zamrzne v skladu z zadevnimi resolucijami Varnostnega sveta Združenih narodov.
(31) Where a Member State decides to make use of the exemptions provided for in Article 23(2), it may allow or require the self-regulatory body representing the persons referred to therein not to transmit to the FIU any information obtained from those persons in the circumstances referred to in that Article. 
(31) Če se država članica odloči uporabiti izjeme, predvidene v členu 23(2), lahko samoregulativnemu organu, ki zastopa osebe iz tega člena, dovoli oziroma od njega zahteva, da FIU ne posreduje nikakršnih podatkov, ki jih je pridobil od teh oseb v okoliščinah, navedenih v temu členu.
(32) There has been a number of cases of employees who report their suspicions of money laundering being subjected to threats or hostile action. 
(32) Obstajajo primeri, da so bili zaposleni, ki so poročali o sumih pranja denarja, izpostavljeni grožnjam in drugim sovražnim dejanjem.
Although this Directive cannot interfere with Member States&apos; judicial procedures, this is a crucial issue for the effectiveness of the anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing system. 
Ta problematika je odločilnega pomena za učinkovitost sistemov boja proti pranju denarja in boja proti financiranju terorizma, četudi ta direktiva ne more posegati v sodne postopke držav članic.
Member States should be aware of this problem and should do whatever they can to protect employees from such threats or hostile action. 
Države članice bi se morale tega problema zavedati in storiti vse v njihovi moči, da bi zaposlene zaščitile pred takšnimi grožnjami in drugimi sovražnimi dejanji.
(33) Disclosure of information as referred to in Article 28 should be in accordance with the rules on transfer of personal data to third countries as laid down in Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [6]. 
(33) Razkritje podatkov, kakor je določeno v členu 28, bi moralo biti v skladu s pravili o posredovanju osebnih podatkov tretjim državam, kakor so določena v Direktivi 95/46/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. oktobra 1995 o varstvu posameznikov pri obdelavi osebnih podatkov in o prostem pretoku takih podatkov [6].
Moreover, Article 28 cannot interfere with national data protection and professional secrecy legislation. 
Hkrati člen 28 ne sme ovirati nacionalne zakonodaje o varstvu podatkov in poslovni skrivnosti.
(34) Persons who merely convert paper documents into electronic data and are acting under a contract with a credit institution or a financial institution do not fall within the scope of this Directive, nor does any natural or legal person that provides credit or financial institutions solely with a message or other support systems for transmitting funds or with clearing and settlement systems. 
(34) Ta direktiva ne velja za osebe, ki zgolj spreminjajo dokumente v papirni obliki v elektronske podatke in imajo s kreditno ali finančno ustanovo v ta namen sklenjeno pogodbo, niti za katero koli fizično ali pravno osebo, ki kreditnim ali finančnim ustanovam zgolj zagotavlja sisteme sporočil, druge sisteme podpore za prenos sredstev ali klirinški sistem in sistem poravnave.
(35) Money laundering and terrorist financing are international problems and the effort to combat them should be global. 
(35) Pranje denarja in financiranje terorizma sta mednarodna problema, zato je potreben globalen pristop v boju proti njima.
Where Community credit and financial institutions have branches and subsidiaries located in third countries where the legislation in this area is deficient, they should, in order to avoid the application of very different standards within an institution or group of institutions, apply the Community standard or notify the competent authorities of the home Member State if this application is impossible. 
Da bi se izognili uporabi različnih standardov v ustanovah ali skupini ustanov, bi morale kreditne in finančne ustanove Skupnosti, ki imajo izpostave in podružnice v tretjih državah, kjer je zakonodaja na tem področju pomanjkljiva, uporabiti standarde Skupnosti oziroma obvestiti pristojne organe domače države članice, kadar ta uporaba ni mogoča.
(36) It is important that credit and financial institutions should be able to respond rapidly to requests for information on whether they maintain business relationships with named persons. 
(36) Pomembno je, da so kreditne in finančne ustanove sposobne hitro posredovati podatke o morebitnih poslovnih odnosih z imenovanimi osebami.
For the purpose of identifying such business relationships in order to be able to provide that information quickly, credit and financial institutions should have effective systems in place which are commensurate with the size and nature of their business. 
Za določitev takšnih poslovnih odnosov in hitro posredovanje zadevnih podatkov morajo finančne in kreditne ustanove razpolagati z učinkovitimi sistemi, ki ustrezajo obsegu in načinu poslovanja.
In particular it would be appropriate for credit institutions and larger financial institutions to have electronic systems at their disposal. 
Elektronski sistemi bi še posebej ustrezali kreditnim in večjim finančnim ustanovam.
This provision is of particular importance in the context of procedures leading to measures such as the freezing or seizing of assets (including terrorist assets), pursuant to applicable national or Community legislation with a view to combating terrorism. 
Ta določba je še zlasti pomembna v zvezi s postopki, ki povzročajo ukrepe, kot sta zamrznitev ali zaseg premoženjskih sredstev (vključno s premoženjem teroristov), ki so v skladu z zadevnimi nacionalnimi zakonodajami ali zakonodajo Skupnosti v zvezi z bojem proti terorizmu.
(37) This Directive establishes detailed rules for customer due diligence, including enhanced customer due diligence for high-risk customers or business relationships, such as appropriate procedures to determine whether a person is a politically exposed person, and certain additional, more detailed requirements, such as the existence of compliance management procedures and policies. 
(37) Ta direktiva določa podrobna pravila za dolžnost skrbnosti pri ugotavljanju identitete strank, vključno z okrepljeno dolžnostjo skrbnosti pri ugotavljanju identitete strank ali poslovnih odnosov z velikim tveganjem, kot so na primer pravila za ustrezne postopke za ugotavljanje, ali je oseba politično izpostavljena, kot tudi za nekatere dodatne, bolj podrobne zahteve, kot na primer strategije in postopke zagotavljanja spoštovanja zadevnih predpisov.
All these requirements are to be met by each of the institutions and persons covered by this Directive, while Member States are expected to tailor the detailed implementation of those provisions to the particularities of the various professions and to the differences in scale and size of the institutions and persons covered by this Directive. 
Vse ustanove in osebe, za katere velja ta direktiva, morajo izpolnjevati te zahteve, medtem ko se od držav članic pričakuje, da podrobnosti prenosa teh določb uskladijo s posebnostmi različnih poklicev in z razlikami v obsegu ustanov in oseb, za katere velja ta direktiva.
(38) In order to ensure that the institutions and others subject to Community legislation in this field remain committed, feedback should, where practicable, be made available to them on the usefulness and follow-up of the reports they present. 
(38) Da bi ustanove in ostali subjekti, za katere velja zakonodaja Skupnosti na tem področju, ostali motivirani, jim je treba, če je to mogoče, posredovati povratne informacije o koristnosti njihovih poročil in o nadaljnjem ukrepanju.
To make this possible, and to be able to review the effectiveness of their systems to combat money laundering and terrorist financing Member States should keep and improve the relevant statistics. 
Da bi lahko to omogočili in spremljali učinkovitost svojih sistemov boja proti pranju denarja in financiranju terorizma, morajo države članice zbirati in izboljšati ustrezne statistične podatke.
(39) When registering or licensing a currency exchange office, a trust and company service provider or a casino nationally, competent authorities should ensure that the persons who effectively direct or will direct the business of such entities and the beneficial owners of such entities are fit and proper persons. 
(39) Pri vpisu ali registraciji menjalnice, družbe, ki nudi podjetniške ali fiduciarne storitve, ali igralnice na nacionalni ravni morajo pristojni organi zagotoviti, da so osebe, ki dejansko vodijo posle takšnih ustanov ali jih bodo vodile, in dejanski lastniki takšnih ustanov primerne osebe.
The criteria for determining whether or not a person is fit and proper should be established in conformity with national law. 
Merila, s katerimi se ugotovi, ali je oseba primerna, morajo biti določena v skladu z nacionalno zakonodajo.
As a minimum, such criteria should reflect the need to protect such entities from being misused by their managers or beneficial owners for criminal purposes. 
Ta merila morajo odražati najmanj nujnost, da se takšne ustanove zaščiti pred zlorabo v kriminalne namene s strani uprave ali dejanskega lastnika.
(40) Taking into account the international character of money laundering and terrorist financing, coordination and cooperation between FIUs as referred to in Council Decision 2000/642/JHA of 17 October 2000 concerning arrangements for cooperation between financial intelligence units of the Member States in respect of exchanging information [7], including the establishment of an EU FIU-net, should be encouraged to the greatest possible extent. 
(40) Zaradi mednarodnega značaja pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma je treba spodbujati v največjem možnem obsegu usklajevanje in sodelovanje med FIU-ji v skladu s Sklepom Sveta 2000/642/PNZ z dne 17. oktobra 2000 o dogovoru glede sodelovanja med enotami za finančni nadzor (FIU-ji) držav članic pri izmenjavi informacij [7], vključno z vzpostavitvijo mreže FIU-jev v EU.
To that end, the Commission should lend such assistance as may be needed to facilitate such coordination, including financial assistance. 
V ta namen mora Komisija ponuditi pomoč, ki je potrebna za lažje uresničevanje takšnega usklajevanja, vključno s finančno podporo.
(41) The importance of combating money laundering and terrorist financing should lead Member States to lay down effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties in national law for failure to respect the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive. 
(41) Države članice morajo zaradi pomembnosti boja proti pranju denarja in financiranju terorizma v nacionalni zakonodaji sprejeti učinkovite, sorazmerne in odvračilne kazni za primere nespoštovanja nacionalnih določb, sprejetih na podlagi te direktive.
Provision should be made for penalties in respect of natural and legal persons. 
Sprejeti bi bilo treba predpise glede kazni za fizične in pravne osebe.
Since legal persons are often involved in complex money laundering or terrorist financing operations, sanctions should also be adjusted in line with the activity carried on by legal persons. 
Ker so pravne osebe pogosto udeležene v kompleksnih operacijah pranja denarja ali financiranja terorizma, bi se morale kazni prilagoditi glede na dejavnosti pravnih oseb.
(42) Natural persons exercising any of the activities referred to in Article 2(1)(3)(a) and (b) within the structure of a legal person, but on an independent basis, should be independently responsible for compliance with the provisions of this Directive, with the exception of Article 35. 
(42) Fizične osebe, ki v okviru pravne osebe, vendar samostojno, opravljajo dejavnosti iz člena 2(1)(3)(a) in (b), bi morale biti odgovorne za spoštovanje določb te direktive, z izjemo člena 35.
(43) Clarification of the technical aspects of the rules laid down in this Directive may be necessary to ensure an effective and sufficiently consistent implementation of this Directive, taking into account the different financial instruments, professions and risks in the different Member States and the technical developments in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. 
(43) Za zagotovitev učinkovitega in doslednega izvajanja te direktive bi bilo treba pojasniti tehnične vidike pravil, določenih v tej direktivi, pri čemer se upošteva različne finančne instrumente, poklicne dejavnosti in tveganja v različnih državah članicah ter tehnični razvoj v boju proti pranju denarja in financiranju terorizma.
The Commission should accordingly be empowered to adopt implementing measures, such as certain criteria for identifying low and high risk situations in which simplified due diligence could suffice or enhanced due diligence would be appropriate, provided that they do not modify the essential elements of this Directive and provided that the Commission acts in accordance with the principles set out herein, after consulting the Committee on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. 
V skladu s tem mora imeti Komisija pooblastila za sprejetje izvedbenih ukrepov, kot so nekatera merila za prepoznavanje razmer majhnega oziroma velikega tveganja, kjer bi lahko zadostovala poenostavljena dolžnost skrbnosti pri ugotavljanju identitete ali bi bila bolj primerna poglobljena dolžnost skrbnosti pri ugotavljanju identitete, pod pogojem, da ti ukrepi ne spreminjajo bistvenih elementov te direktive in da Komisija deluje v skladu z načeli, opredeljenimi v tej direktivi, po posvetovanju z Odborom za preprečevanje pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma.
(44) The measures necessary for the implementation of this Directive should be adopted in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission [8]. 
(44) Ukrepe za izvajanje te direktive je potrebno sprejeti v skladu s Sklepom Sveta 1999/468/ES z dne 28. junija 1999 o določitvi postopkov za uresničevanje Komisiji podeljenih izvedbenih pooblastil [8].
To that end a new Committee on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, replacing the Money Laundering Contact Committee set up by Directive 91/308/EEC, should be established. 
V skladu s tem se ustanovi Odbor za preprečevanje pranja denarja in financiranja terorizma, ki nadomesti Kontaktni odbor za pranje denarja, ustanovljen z Direktivo 91/308/EGS.
(45) In view of the very substantial amendments that would need to be made to Directive 91/308/EEC, it should be repealed for reasons of clarity. 
(45) Potrebne so bistvene spremembe Direktive 91/308/EGS, zato bi bilo treba navedeno direktivo zaradi večje jasnosti razveljaviti.
(46) Since the objective of this Directive, namely the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale and effects of the action, be better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. 
(46) Ker cilja te direktive, in sicer preprečevanje uporabe finančnega sistema za pranje denarja in financiranje terorizma, države članice ne morejo zadovoljivo doseči in ker ta cilj zaradi obsega in učinkov predlaganega ukrepa lažje doseže Skupnost, lahko Skupnost sprejme ukrepe v skladu z načelom subsidiarnosti iz člena 5 Pogodbe.
In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. 
V skladu z načelom sorazmernosti iz tega člena ta direktiva ne prekoračuje okvirov, ki so potrebni za doseganje navedenega cilja.
(47) In exercising its implementing powers in accordance with this Directive, the Commission should respect the following principles 
(47) Pri opravljanju svojih izvedbenih pooblastil v skladu s to direktivo bi morala Komisija upoštevati naslednja načela