natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Centralisation of the ownership function in a single entity is probably most relevant for SOEs in competitive sectors and is not necessarily applicable to SOEs that are mainly pursuing public policy objectives. 
Centralizacija lastniške funkcije v enem samem organu je verjetno najprimernejša oblika za družbe v državni lasti, ki poslujejo v konkurenčnih sektorjih in ni nujno uporabna tudi za družbe v državni lasti, ki v glavnem uresničujejo cilje javne politike.
Such SOEs are not the primary target of these Guidelines, and in their case, sector ministries may remain the most relevant and competent entities to exercise ownership rights which might be indistinguishable from policy objectives. 
Te Smernice se primarno ne nanašajo na takšne družbe v državni lasti in zanje so verjetno sektorska ministrstva še naprej najprimernejši in najbolj kompetentni organi za izvajanje lastniških pravic, ki utegnejo biti neločljive od ciljev politike.
When centralisation of the ownership function is considered, it should not give rise to a new and overly powerful bureaucratic layer. 
Centralizacija lastniške funkcije ne sme povzročati dodatne in prevelike birokracije.
When the ownership function can not be handled by a single entity, some key functions could nevertheless be centralised in order to make use of specific expertise and ensure independence from individual sector ministries. 
V primerih ko lastniške funkcije ne more opravljati en sam organ, je možno nekatere ključne funkcije vseeno centralizirati, zato da je možno uporabiti specifična specialistična znanja in zagotoviti neodvisnost od posameznih sektorskih ministrstev.
One example when such partial centralisation can be useful is the nomination of board members. 
Eden od takih koristnih primerov delne centralizacije je kandidiranje članov odbora.
The clear identification of the ownership function should be sought at different levels of government depending on where ownership is located, for example national, regional, federal or sub-federal levels. 
Za jasno identifikacijo lastniške funkcije se je potrebno zavzemati na vseh vladnih ravneh, kjer je locirano lastništvo, na primer na nacionalnem, regionalnem, federalnem ali na nižjih upravnih ravneh.
These Guidelines do not give direction to determine the appropriate level of SOE management in this respect within a state or a federation. 
Te Smernice v tem smislu ne dajejo usmeritev za določitev primerne ravni vodenja družb v državi ali v federaciji.
They merely indicate that, regardless of the level of authority, the ownership function would be better centralised in or co-ordinated by a single entity. 
Nakazujejo samo, da bi bilo bolje centralizirati ali koordinirati lastniško funkcijo v enem organu ne glede na raven pristojnosti.
Moreover, if there are different administrative levels of ownership, harmonisation of ownership practices should be looked for. 
Če obstajajo različne upravne ravni lastništva, je potrebno ustrezno s tem uskladiti tudi delovne postopke.
Finally, centralisation of the ownership function does not imply the centralisation of the legal ownership. 
In končno centralizacija lastniške funkcije tudi ne implicira centralizacije pravnega lastništva.
The relationship of the co-ordinating or ownership entity with other government bodies should be clearly defined. 
Odnos koordinacijskega oziroma lastniškega organa z drugimi vladnimi organi mora biti jasno definiran.
A number of state bodies, Ministries or administrations have different roles vis-a-vis the same SOEs. 
Različni državni organi, ministrstva in uprave opravljajo različne vloge vis-a-vis družbam v državni lasti.
In order to increase the public confidence in the way the state manages ownership of SOEs, it is important that these different roles are clarified and explained to the general public. 
Za povečanje zaupanja v upravljanje premoženja države v družbah v državni lasti je pomembno, da so te različne vloge jasno obrazložene splošni javnosti.
In particular, the ownership entity should maintain co-operation and continuous dialogue with the state supreme audit institutions responsible for auditing the SOEs. 
Še posebej mora lastniški organ zaradi revidiranja družb v državni lasti vzdrževati koordinacijo in stalen dialog z vrhovnimi revizijskimi institucijami države.
It should support the work of the state audit institution and take appropriate measures in response to audit findings, following in this regard the INTOSAI Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts. 
Podpirati mora delo državne revizijske institucije in uvesti primerne ukrepe v odgovor na njene ugotovitve. Pri tem je dolžan upoštevati Limsko deklaracijo smernic o revizijskih predpisih Mednarodne organizacije vrhovnih revizorskih institucij (INTOSAI Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts).
The co-ordinating or ownership entity should also be held clearly accountable for the way it carries out the state ownership function. 
Koordinacijski oziroma lastniški organ mora imeti tudi jasno opredeljeno odgovornost za izvajanje lastniške funkcije v imenu države.
Its accountability should be, directly or indirectly, to bodies representing the interests of the general public, such as the Parliament. 
Neposredno ali posredno mora biti odgovoren organom, kot je parlament, ki zastopajo interese splošne javnosti.
Its accountability to the legislature should be clearly defined, as well as the accountability of SOEs themselves, which should not be diluted by virtue of the intermediary reporting relationship. 
Njegova odgovornost do zakonodaje mora biti jasno definirana, prav tako tudi odgovornost samih družb v državni lasti in se ne sme razvodeniti s posrednim poročanjem.
Accountability should go beyond ensuring that the exercise of ownership does not interfere with the legislature&apos;s prerogative as regards budget policy. 
Odgovornost mora biti širša od zagotavljanja ločevanja izvajanja lastniške funkcije in posebnih zakonodajnih pravic v zvezi s proračunsko politiko.
The ownership entity should report on its own performance in exercising state ownership and in achieving the state objectives in this regards. 
Lastniški organ je dolžan poročati o svojih rezultatih izvajanja lastniške funkcije v imenu države in s tem povezanih ciljih države.
It should provide quantitative and reliable information to the public and its representatives on how the SOEs are managed in the interests of their owners. 
Javnosti in njenim predstavnikom je dolžan posredovati kvantitativne in zanesljive informacije o načinu vodenja družb v državni lasti v interesu njenih lastnikov.
Specific mechanisms such as ad hoc or permanent commissions could be set up to maintain the dialogue between the co-ordinating or ownership entity and the legislature. 
Za vzdrževanje dialoga med koordinacijskim oziroma lastniškim organom in zakonodajnimi organi se lahko uvede posebne mehanizme, kot so stalne ali ad hoc komisije.
In the case of Parliament hearings, confidentiality issues should be dealt with through specific procedures such as confidential or closed meetings. 
Pri parlamentarnih komisijah se mora zaupne zadeve obravnavati v posebnih postopkih, na primer na zaupnih ali zaprtih sestankih.
While generally accepted as a useful procedure, the form, frequency and content of this dialogue may differ according to the constitutional law and the different parliamentary traditions and roles. 
Čeprav ta postopek v splošnem velja za koristnega, se oblika, pogostost in vsebina tega dialoga lahko razlikuje glede na ustavno pravo in različne parlamentarne navade in vloge.
The accountability requirements should not restrict unduly the autonomy of the co-ordinating or ownership entity in fulfilling their responsibilities. 
Zahteve po odgovornosti ne smejo neupravičeno omejevati avtonomije koordinacijskega oziroma lastniškega organa pri izvajanju njegovih nalog.
For example, cases where the co-ordinating or ownership entity needs to obtain the legislature&apos;s ex ante approval should be limited and include significant changes in the overall ownership policy, significant changes in the size of the state sector and significant transactions (investments or disinvestment). 
Primeri, ko koordinacijski oziroma lastniški odbor potrebuje od zakonodaje ex ante odobritev, morajo biti na primer omejeni, zahtevki pa morajo vsebovati opis večjih sprememb splošne lastniške politike, pomembnih sprememb obsega državnega sektorja in pomembnih transakcij (investiranja in dezinvestiranja).
More generally, the ownership entity should enjoy a certain degree of flexibility vis-a-vis its responsible ministry in the way it organises itself and takes decisions with regards to procedures and processes. 
Na splošno mora odgovorno ministrstvo omogočati lastniškemu organu določeno stopnjo prožnosti pri načinih organiziranja in sprejemanja odločitev v zvezi s postopki in procesi.
The ownership entity could also enjoy a certain degree of budgetary autonomy that can allow flexibility in recruiting, remunerating and retaining the necessary expertise, including from the private sector. 
Lastniški organ lahko tudi uživa določeno stopnjo avtonomije pri proračunu, kar omogoča prožnost pri zaposlovanju, nagrajevanju in pridobivanju potrebnih specialističnih znanj, med drugim tudi od privatnega sektorja.
To avoid either undue political interference or passive state ownership, it is important for the co-ordinating or ownership entity to focus on the effective exercising of ownership rights. 
V izogib neprimernemu političnemu vmešavanju ali pasivnemu državnemu lastništvu je pomembno, da se koordinacijski oziroma lastniški organ osredotoča na učinkovito izvajanje lastniških funkcij.
The state as an owner should typically conduct itself as any major shareholder when it is in a position to significantly influence the company and be an informed and active shareholder when holding a minority post. 
Država kot lastnica se mora na splošno obnašati kot vsak drug velik delničar, ki ima moč, da lahko pomembno vpliva na družbo, ter mora biti obveščena in aktivna delničarka tudi v primerih manjšinskega lastništva.
It would be well advised to exercise its rights in order to protect its ownership and optimise its value. 
Zelo priporočljivo je, da svoje pravice izvaja z namenom, da ščiti svoje lastništvo in optimizira njegovo vrednost.
As defined by the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, four basic shareholder rights are 
V skladu z Načeli korporativnega upravljanja OECD so štiri osnovne delničarske pravice naslednje
i) to participate and vote in shareholder meetings; ii) to obtain relevant and sufficient information on the corporation on a timely and regular basis; iii) to elect and remove members of the board; and iv) to approve extraordinary transactions. 
(i) sodelovati in glasovati na skupščinah delničarjev; (ii) pravočasno in redno dobivati ustrezne in zadovoljive informacije o družbi; (iii) voliti in razreševati člane odbora; (iv) odobravati izredne transakcije.
The co-ordinating or ownership entity should exercise these rights fully and judiciously, as this would allow the necessary influence on SOEs without infringing on their day-to-day management. 
Koordinacijski oziroma lastniški odbor je dolžan izvajati te pravice razumno in v polnem obsegu, saj bo to omogočalo potreben vpliv na družbe v državni lasti brez vmešavanja v njihovo tekoče vodenje.
The effectiveness and credibility of SOE governance and oversight will, to a large extent, depend on the ability of the ownership entity to make an informed use of its shareholder rights and effectively exercise its ownership functions in SOEs. 
Učinkovitost in kredibilnost upravljanja družb v državni lasti ter nadzor nad njimi bo v veliki meri odvisen od sposobnosti lastniškega organa, da bo obveščeno uporabljal svoje lastniške pravice in učinkovito izvajal svoje lastniške funkcije.
An ownership entity needs unique competencies and should have professionals with legal, financial, economic and management skills that are experienced in carrying out fiduciary responsibilities. 
Lastniški organ potrebuje posebne kompetence in mora imeti strokovnjake s pravnimi, finančnimi, ekonomskimi in menedžerskimi znanji, ki imajo izkušnje pri izvajanju fiduciarnih nalog.
Such professionals must also clearly understand their roles and responsibilities as civil servants with respect to the SOEs. 
Ti strokovnjaki morajo tudi jasno razumeti svojo vlogo in naloge javnih uslužbencev do družb v državni lasti.
In addition, the ownership entity should include competencies related to the specific obligations that some SOEs under their supervision are required to undertake in terms of public service provisions. 
Razen tega mora imeti lastniški organ kompetence v zvezi s specifičnimi obveznostmi, ki so jih posamezne družbe v državni lasti pod njegovim nadzorom dolžne prevzeti v skladu s predpisi o javnih storitvah.
The co-ordinating or ownership entity should also have the possibility to have recourse to outside advice and to contract-out some aspects of the ownership function, in order to exercise the state&apos;s ownership rights in a better manner. 
Koordinacijski oziroma lastniški organ mora imeti za kakovostnejše izvajanje svojih lastniških pravic tudi možnost dostopa do zunanjih svetovalcev in sklepanja pogodb z njimi za izvajanje posameznih elementov lastniške funkcije.
They could, for example, make use of specialists for carrying out evaluation, active monitoring, or proxy voting on its behalf where deemed necessary and appropriate. 
Specialiste bi na primer lahko najel za izvajanje ocenjevanja, aktivnega nadzora ali glasovanja v njegovem imenu, kjer bi se to lahko izkazalo za primerno.
Its prime responsibilities include 
Primarne naloge med drugim obsegajo
Being represented at the general shareholders meetings and voting the state shares The state as an owner should fulfil its fiduciary duty by exercising its voting rights, or at least explain if it does not do so. 
biti zastopana na skupščinah delničarjev in glasovati v imenu državnih delnic; Država kot lastnica bi morala izvrševati svojo fiduciarno odgovornost z izvajanjem svojih glasovalnih pravic ali vsaj obrazložiti, če tega ne počne.
The state should not find itself in the position of not having reacted to propositions put before the SOEs&apos; general shareholder meetings. 
Država se ne sme znajti v položaju, da ne bi reagirala na predloge, predložene na skupščinah delničarjev.
For the state to be able to express its view on issues submitted for approval at shareholders&apos; meetings, it is necessary that the co-ordinating or ownership entity organises itself to be able to present an informed view on these issues and articulate it to SOE boards via the general shareholders meeting. 
Da bi bila država zmožna izražati svoja stališča o zadevah, predloženih v odobritev na skupščinah delničarjev, se mora koordinacijski oziroma lastniški organ organizirati tako, da bo sposoben predstavljati argumentirana stališča o teh zadevah in jih razčleniti družbi v državni lasti prek skupščine delničarjev.
It is important to establish appropriate procedures for state representation in general shareholders meetings. 
Za zastopanje države na skupščinah delničarjev je pomembno uvesti primerne postopke.
This could be achieved for example by clearly identifying the co-ordinating or ownership entity as representing the state&apos;s shares. 
To je možno doseči na primer tako, da se za zastopnika državnih delnic nedvoumno določi koordinacijski oziroma lastniški organ.
The co-ordinating or ownership entity should ensure that SOEs have efficient and well-functioning professional boards, with the required mix of competencies to fulfil their responsibilities. 
Koordinacijski oziroma lastniški organ mora zagotavljati, da bodo imele družbe v državni lasti učinkovite in dobro delujoče, profesionalne odbore z zahtevano kombinacijo kompetenc za izvrševanje nalog.
This will involve establishing a structured nomination process and playing an active role in this process. 
To vključuje vzpostavitev strukturiranega kandidacijskega postopka in opravljanja aktivne vloge v tem procesu.
This will be facilitated if the ownership entity is given sole responsibility for organising the state&apos;s participation in the nomination process. 
To velja v primerih, ko ima lastniški organ izključno odgovornost organizirati udeležbe države v kandidacijskem postopku.
The nomination of SOE boards should be transparent, clearly structured and based on an appraisal of the variety of skills, competencies and experiences required. 
Kandidiranje v odbore družb v državni lasti mora biti pregledno, jasno strukturirano in osnovano na oceni vrste zahtevanih strokovnih znanj, kompetenc in izkušenj.
Competence and experience requirements should derive from an evaluation of the incumbent board and the demands aligned with the company&apos;s long term strategy. 
Zahteve po kompetencah in izkušnjah morajo izvirati iz ocene zadolženega odbora ter zavez, ki izhajajo iz dolgoročne strategije družbe.
These evaluations should also take into consideration the role played by employee board representation when this is required by law or mutual agreements. 
Te ocene morajo tudi upoštevati vlogo zastopnikov zaposlenih v primerih, ko to določajo zakon in medsebojne pogodbe.
To base nominations on such explicit competence requirements and evaluations will likely lead to more professional, accountable and business oriented boards. 
Kandidiranje, ki bo osnovano na tako eksplicitnih zahtevah po kompetencah in ocenah, bo gotovo pripeljalo do bolj strokovno, odgovorno in podjetniško naravnanih odborov.
Where the state is not the sole owner, the co-ordinating or ownership entity should consult with other shareholders ahead of the general shareholders meetings. 
V primerih ko država ni edini lastnik, se je koordinacijski oziroma lastniški organ dolžan pred skupščinami delničarjev posvetovati z drugimi delničarji.
SOE boards should also be able to make recommendations to the ownership entity based on the approved board member profiles, skill requirements and board member evaluations. 
Odbori družb v državni lasti morajo imeti tudi možnost priporočati lastniškemu organu ustrezne profile, znanja in ocene, ki so potrebni za delo članov odbora.
Setting up nomination committees may be useful, helping to focus the search for good candidates and in structuring further the nomination process. 
Ustanovitev kandidacijskih komisij bi bilo lahko koristno, ker bi pripomoglo k iskanju dobrih kandidatov in strukturiranju kandidacijskega postopka.
In some countries, it is also considered to be good practice to establish a specialised commission or “public board” to oversee nominations in SOE boards. 
Kot dobra praksa se je v nekaterih državah izkazalo tudi ustanavljanje specializiranih komisij ali »javnih odborov«, ki nadzirajo kandidiranje v odbore družb v državni lasti.
Even though such commissions or public boards might have only recommendation powers, they could have a strong influence in practice on increasing the independence and professionalism of SOE boards. 
Četudi imajo takšne komisije oziroma javni odbori morda pooblastila samo za priporočanje, lahko močno vplivajo na povečevanje neodvisnosti in strokovnosti odborov družb v državni lasti.
Proposed nominations should be published in advance of the general shareholders meeting, with adequate information about the professional background and expertise of the respective candidates. 
Predlagane kandidate je potrebno objaviti pred zasedanjem skupščin delničarjev skupaj z ustreznimi informacijami o njihovi strokovni izobrazbi in usposobljenosti.
It could also be useful if ownership entities maintain a database of qualified candidates, developed through an open competitive process. 
Koristno bi tudi bilo, če bi lastniški organi vzdrževali bazo podatkov o strokovno usposobljenih kandidatih, ki so jih pridobili v odprtem kandidacijskem postopku.
The use of professional staffing agencies or international advertisements is another means to enhance the quality of the search process. 
Drugi načini za povečevanje kakovosti kandidacijskih postopkov je sodelovanje s strokovnimi kadrovskimi agencijami ali mednarodni razpisi.
These practices would help in enlarging the pool of qualified candidates for SOE boards, particularly in terms of private sector expertise and international experience. 
Takšne prakse bi pripomogle k boljšemu izboru kvalificiranih kandidatov za odbore družb v državni lasti, predvsem v smislu specialističnih znanj iz privatnega sektorja in mednarodnih izkušenj.
The process may also favour greater board diversity, including gender diversity. 
Proces lahko favorizira tudi večjo raznolikost odbora, tudi glede spola.
In order for the co-ordinating or ownership entity to make informed decisions on key corporate matters, they should ensure that they receive all necessary and relevant information in a timely manner. 
Za argumentirane odločitve koordinacijskega oz. lastniškega odbora o ključnih korporativnih zadevah si mora ta zagotoviti, da pravočasno dobiva vse potrebne in relevantne informacije.
They should also establish means that make it possible to monitor SOEs&apos; activity and performance on a continuous basis. 
Vzpostaviti mora tudi orodja, ki mu bodo omogočala stalen nadzor nad aktivnostmi in poslovanjem družb v državni lasti.
The co-ordinating or ownership entity should ensure that adequate external reporting systems are in place for all SOEs. 
Koordinacijski oziroma lastniški odbor mora zagotoviti, da bodo vzpostavljeni ustrezni sistemi poročanja navzven.
The reporting systems should give the co-ordinating or ownership entity a true picture of the SOE&apos;s performance and financial situation, enabling them to react on time and to be selective in their intervention. 
Sistemi poročanja bi morali dajati koordinacijskemu oz. lastniškemu odboru pravo sliko poslovanja oz. finančnega položaja družbe v državni lasti in omogočati odboru pravočasno odzivanje in selektivnost pri posredovanjih.
The co-ordinating or ownership entity should develop the appropriate devices and select proper valuation methods to monitor SOEs&apos; performance in respect of established objectives. 
Koordinacijski oziroma lastniški odbor mora razviti ustrezna orodja in izbrati primerne ocenjevalne metode za nadzor poslovanja družb v državni lasti z vidika zastavljenih ciljev.
It could be helped in this regard by developing systematic benchmarking of SOE performance, with private or public sector entities, both domestically and abroad. 
V tem smislu bi bilo koristno razviti sistematične analize primerjanja poslovanja družb v državni lasti s poslovanjem domačih in tujih družb privatnega in javnega sektorja (benchmarking).
This benchmarking should cover productivity and the efficient use of labour, assets and capital. 
Takšne primerjalne analize bi morale zajemati produktivnost ter učinkovitost uporabe delovne sile, sredstev in kapitala.
This benchmarking is particularly important for SOEs in non-competitive sectors. 
Sistematično primerjanje na osnovi izdelanih kriterijev (benchmarking) je še posebej pomembno pri družbah v državni lasti, ki poslujejo v nekonkurenčnih sektorjih.
It would allow the SOEs, the co-ordinating or ownership entity and the general public to better assess SOE performance and reflect on their development. 
Družbam v državni lasti, koordinacijskemu oziroma lastniškemu organu ter splošni javnosti bi dovoljevalo bolje oceniti poslovanje družb v državni lasti in boljše odzivanje na njihov razvoj.
Effective monitoring of SOE performance can be facilitated by having adequate accounting and audit competencies within the co-ordinating or ownership entity to ensure appropriate communication with relevant counterparts, both with SOEs&apos; financial services, external auditors and specific state controllers. 
Učinkovit nadzor poslovanja družb v državni lasti bi bil lahko podprt z ustreznimi knjigovodskimi in revizijskimi kompetencami znotraj koordinacijskega oziroma lastniškega odbora, kar bi zagotavljalo komunikacijo z relevantnimi službami, to jo s finančnimi službami družb v državni lasti, zunanjimi revizorji in posebnimi državnimi kontrolorji.