natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
All board members should disclose any conflicts of interest to the board which must decide how they should be managed. 
Vsi člani odbora so dolžni razkriti vsakršno navzkrižje interesov odboru, ki se mora odločiti, kako ga bo obvladal.
Mechanisms to evaluate and maintain the effectiveness of board performance and independence should be developed. 
Potrebno je razviti mehanizme za ocenjevanje in vzdrževanje učinkovitosti dela in neodvisnosti odbora.
These include, for example, limits on the possible number of reappointments and resources granted to the board to have access to independent information or to carry out independent expertise. 
To so na primer omejitve števila možnih ponovnih imenovanj in obsega sredstev za pridobivanje neodvisnih mnenj ali za izvajanje neodvisnih ekspertiz.
For enhancing board independence, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance also consider that it may be regarded as a good practice that the Chair person is separated from the CEO in single board structures. 
Načela korporativnega upravljanja OECD tudi navajajo, da za spodbujanje neodvisnosti odbora velja kot dobra praksa, da je v enotirnih sistemih upravljanja funkcija predsedujočega ločena od funkcije glavnega izvršnega direktorja.
Separation of the Chair from the CEO helps in “achieving an appropriate balance of power, increasing accountability and improving the board&apos; s capacity for decision making independent of management”. 
Ločevanje teh dveh funkcij prispeva k »uravnoteženju moči, povečevanju odgovornosti in večji sposobnosti odločanja odbora, neodvisno od menedžmenta«.
An adequate and clear definition of the functions of the board and of its Chair would prevent situations where the separation might give rise to inefficient opposition between the two company officers. 
Ustrezno in jasno definiranje funkcij odbora in predsedujočega bo preprečilo situacije, ki bi sicer lahko povzročale brezplodna nasprotovanja med dvema direktorjema družbe.
In the case of two-tier board systems, it is similarly considered good practice that the head of the lower board (management board) does not become the Chair of the Supervisory Board on retirement. 
V dvotirnih sistemih upravljanja velja podobno za dobro prakso, da predsednik uprave ne more postati predsednik nadzornega sveta.
Separation of the Chair from the CEO is particularly important in SOEs, where it is usually considered necessary to empower the board&apos;s independence from management. 
Ločitev funkcije predsedujočega od glavnega izvršnega direktorja je posebej pomembno v družbah v državni lasti, kjer se običajno smatra neodvisnost odbora od menedžmenta kot nujna.
The Chair has a key role in guiding the board, ensuring its efficient running and encouraging the active involvement of individual board members in the strategic guidance of the SOE. 
Predsedujoči ima ključno vlogo pri vodenju odbora, zagotavljanju učinkovitega dela in spodbujanju aktivnega sodelovanja posameznih članov odbora pri strateškem vodenju družbe.
When the Chairman and the CEO are separate, the Chairman should also have a role in agreeing with the ownership entity on the skills and experience that the board should contain for its effective operation. 
V primerih ko sta funkciji predsedujočega in glavnega izvršnega direktorja ločeni, je predsedujoči dolžan usklajevati z lastniškim organom zahteve glede znanj in izkušenj, ki jih mora imeti odbor za učinkovito delo.
The separation of the Chair from the CEO should therefore be considered as a fundamental step in establishing efficient SOE boards. 
Ločenost funkcije predsedujočega in glavnega izvršnega direktorja se mora zato smatrati kot osnovni korak pri vzpostavljanju učinkovitih odborov družb v državni lasti.
When employee representation on SOE boards is mandated by the law or collective agreements, it should be applied so that it contributes to the SOE boards&apos; independence, competence and information. 
Ko je predstavništvo v odborih družb v državni lasti opredeljeno z zakonom ali kolektivnimi pogodbami, mora biti uvedeno tako, da bo prispevalo k neodvisnosti, kompetentnosti in obveščenosti odbora.
Employee representatives should have the same duties and responsibilities as all other board members, should act in the best interests of the company and treat all shareholders equitably. 
Zaposleni morajo imeti enake naloge in odgovornosti kot drugi člani odbora in ravnati v najboljšem interesu družbe in vseh njenih delničarjev.
Employee representation on SOE boards should not in itself be considered as a threat to board independence. 
Zastopanost zaposlenih v odboru družbe se ne sme samo po sebi razumeti kot grožnja neodvisnosti odbora.
Procedures should be established to facilitate the professionalism and the true independence of employee board members, and to make sure that they respect their duty of confidentiality. 
Uvesti je potrebno take mehanizme, ki bodo omogočali strokovno in resnično neodvisno delo predstavnikov zaposlenih v odboru in zagotavljali, da bodo spoštovali obveznosti v zvezi z zaupnostjo informacij.
These procedures should include adequate, transparent and democratic election procedures, training and clear procedures for managing conflicts of interest. 
Ti mehanizmi morajo vsebovati ustrezne, pregledne in demokratične glasovalne postopke, izobraževanje in jasne postopke za obvladovanje navzkrižij interesov.
A positive contribution to the board&apos;s work will also require acceptance and collaboration by other members of the board as well as by the SOE management. 
Za pozitiven prispevek predstavnikov zaposlenih k delu odbora bi morali biti tudi drugi člani odbora in menedžmenta pripravljeni za sodelovanje.
The use of specialised board committees in SOEs has increased, in line with practices in the private sector. 
Uporaba specializiranih komisij odbora se je v družbah v državni lasti razmahnila podobno kot v privatnem sektorju.
The type of special committees that boards make use of can vary between companies and industries and includes 
Tipi posebnih komisij, ki jih odbori uporabljajo, variirajo med posameznimi družbami in obsegajo
audit committees, remuneration committees, strategy committees, ethics committees, and in some cases risk and procurement committees. 
revizijske komisije, komisije za nagrajevanje, strateške komisije, komisije za etiko, in v nekaterih primerih komisije za obvladovanje tveganj ter nabavne komisije.
In some countries, an equivalent body to the audit committee performs a similar function. 
V nekaterih državah imajo ekvivalenten organ, ki opravlja podobno funkcijo kot revizijska komisija.
The setting up of specialised board committees could be instrumental in reinforcing the competency of SOE boards and in underpinning their critical responsibility in matters such as risk management and audit. 
Ustanavljanje posebnih komisij odbora je lahko orodje za krepitev kompetentnosti odborov družb v državni lasti in za podpiranje njihovih ključnih odgovornosti v zadevah, kot so obvladovanje tveganj in revizija.
They may be also effective in changing the board culture and reinforcing its independence and legitimacy in areas where there is a potential for conflicts of interests, such as with regards to procurement, related party transactions and remuneration issues. 
Učinkovite so lahko tudi pri spreminjanju interne kulture odbora in krepitvi njegove neodvisnosti in legitimnosti na področjih, kjer obstaja potencialno navzkrižje interesov, na primer v zvezi dobavami, transakcijami s povezanimi družbami in pri nagrajevanju.
When board committees are not mandated by law, the co-ordinating or ownership entity should develop a policy to define in which cases specialised board committees should be considered. 
Ko komisije odbora niso določene z zakonom, mora koordinacijski ali lastniški organ razviti politiko, ki bo opredeljevala, v katerih primerih bi bilo potrebno razmisliti o uvedbi posebnih komisij odbora.
This policy should be based on a combination of criteria, including the size of the SOE and specific risks faced or competencies which should be reinforced within SOE boards. 
Ta politika bi morala biti osnovana na spletu kriterijev, ki bi med drugim vključevali velikost družbe v državni lasti in specifična tveganja, s katerimi se družba sooča, oziroma kompetence, ki bi jih bilo potrebno uveljaviti v odborih družb v državni lasti.
Large SOEs should at least be required to have an audit committee or equivalent body with powers to meet with any officer of the company. 
Od velikih družb v državni lasti je treba najmanj zahtevati, da ustanovijo revizijsko komisijo ali ekvivalenten organ, ki bo pooblaščen za kontaktiranje s katerim koli direktorjem v družbi.
It is essential that specialised board committees are chaired by a nonexecutive and include a sufficient number of independent members. 
Bistveno je, da posebnim komisijam odbora predseduje neizvršni direktor in da jo sestavlja zadostno število neodvisnih članov.
The proportion of independent members as well as the type of independence required (e.g. from management or from the main owner) will depend on the type of committee, the sensitivity of the issue to conflicts of interests, and the SOE sector. 
Delež neodvisnih članov in stopnja potrebne neodvisnosti ( n. pr. od menedžmenta ali glavnega lastnika) bo odvisna od tipa komisije, občutljivosti zadeve na navzkrižja interesov in od sektorja, v katerem družba posluje.
The audit committee, for example, should be composed of only independent and financially literate board members. 
Revizijska komisija mora biti, na primer, sestavljena samo iz neodvisnih in finančno pismenih članov odbora.
The existence of specialised board committees should not excuse the board from its collective responsibility for all matters. 
Prisotnost posebnih komisij ne sme odvezovati odbora od kolektivne odgovornosti v vseh zadevah.
Specialised board committees should have written terms of reference that define their duties, authority and composition. 
Te specializirane komisije morajo imeti pravilnik, ki določa njihove naloge, pooblastila in nagrajevanje.
Specialised board committees should report to the full board and the minutes of their meetings should be circulated to all board members. 
Poročati so dolžne celotnemu odboru in zapisnike njihovih sestankov morajo dobiti vsi člani odbora.
SOE boards could also establish a nomination committee to co-operate with the ownership entity with regards to the board nomination process. 
Odbori družb v državni lasti lahko ustanovijo tudi kandidacijske komisije za koordiniranje dela z lastniškim organom v zvezi s kandidacijskim postopkom.
In some countries it is the practice that nomination committees can also be set up outside the board structure, particularly including several main owners. 
V nekaterih državah lahko kandidacijske komisije ustanovijo tudi zunaj odbora, posebej pri nekaterih velikih delničarjih.
Regardless of who establishes the nomination committee, it is important to involve the board in thinking about its own composition and succession planning, through its involvement in the search process and its ability to make recommendations. 
Ne glede na to, kdo ustanovi kandidacijsko komisijo, je pomembno pritegniti odbor k razmišljanju o njegovi lastni sestavi in načrtovanju nasledstva s tem, da se ga vključi v proces iskanja in priporočanja kandidatov.
This can contribute to making the nomination process focused on competence. 
To lahko prispeva k temu, da bo kandidacijski proces osredotočen na strokovno usposobljenost kandidatov.
A systematic evaluation process is a necessary tool in enhancing SOE board professionalism, since it highlights the responsibilities of the board and the duties of its members. 
Sistematičen proces ocenjevanja je nujno potreben za večjo strokovno usposobljenost odbora družbe v državni lasti.
It is also instrumental in identifying necessary competencies and board member profiles. 
Je tudi sredstvo za ugotavljanje potrebnih kompetenc in profilov članov odbora.
Finally, it is a useful incentive for individual board members to devote sufficient time and effort to their duties as board members. 
Končno je tudi koristna spodbuda za posamezne člane odbora, da vložijo dovolj časa in napora v izvajanje svojih nalog.
The evaluation should scrutinise both the overall board performance and could also include the effectiveness and contribution of individual board members. 
Pri ocenjevanju bi bilo potrebno skrbno preiskati tako delo celotnega odbora kot tudi učinkovitost in prispevek posameznih članov odbora.
However, the evaluation of individual board members should not impede the desired and necessary collegiality of board work. 
Ocenjevanje posameznih članov odbora pa ne sme ovirati zaželene in potrebne kolegialnosti pri delu odbora.
Board evaluation should be carried out under the responsibility of the Chair and according to evolving best practices. 
Za ocenjevanje članov odbora, ki se mora izvajati v skladu z najboljšo prakso, mora biti zadolžen predsedujoči odbora.
The board evaluation should provide input to the review of issues such as board size, composition and remuneration of board members. 
Ocenjevanje odbora mora med drugim služiti kot osnova za revizijo velikosti in sestave odbora ter nagrajevanja članov odbora.
The evaluations could also be instrumental in developing effective and appropriate induction and training programmes for new and existing SOE board members. 
Ocenjevanje je lahko tudi orodje za razvoj učinkovitih in ustreznih uvajalnih izobraževalnih programov za nove in aktualne člane odborov.
In carrying out the evaluation, the SOE boards could seek advice from external and independent experts as well as by the ownership entity. 
Za izvajanje ocenjevanja lahko odbori družb v državni lasti poiščejo nasvet pri zunanjih in neodvisnih strokovnjakih in pri lastniškem organu.
The Corporate Governance Code for Companies with State Capital Investments 
Kodeks upravljanja družb s kapitalskimi naložbami države
The Law on Corporate Governance of Capital Investments of the Republic of Slovenia (ZUKN) was adopted on 3 May 2010. Article 10 of the Act imposes on the Capital Assets Management Agency of the Republic of Slovenia (hereinafter referred to as: »the Agency«) the obligation to adopt a code for the corporate governance of State capital investments which must stipulate the principles and rules of conduct of the Agency, the managerial and supervisory bodies of these companies and state authorities in the management of such investments. 
3. maja 2010 je bil sprejet Zakon o upravljanju kapitalskih naložb Republike Slovenije (ZUKN). Njegov 10. člen nalaga Agenciji za upravljanje kapitalskih naložb Republike Slovenije (v nadaljevanju agencija), da sprejme kodeks upravljanja družb s kapitalskimi naložbami države, ki mora določati načela in pravila ravnanja agencije, organov vodenja in nadzora teh družb in državnih organov pri upravljanju tovrstnih naložb.
Pursuant to Article 21 of ZUKN the Agency&apos;s Council adopted the Corporate Governance Code (hereinafter referred to as: &quot;the Code&quot;) upon the proposal of the Agency&apos;s Management Board on 14 January 2011. 
Skladno z 21. členom ZUKN je svet agencije na predlog njene uprave dne 13.1.2011 sprejel Kodeks upravljanja družb s kapitalskimi naložbami države (v nadaljevanju: kodeks).
In the formulation of this Code the following was taken into consideration 
Pri oblikovanju tega kodeksa so bili upoštevani
the Slovenian legislation, EU guidelines and recommendations, OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, other internationally recommended standards of diligent and sound corporate governance of Companies with State Capital Investments and companies in general, and Slovenian Recommendations concerning good corporate governance. 
slovenska zakonodaja, smernice in priporočila EU, smernice OECD o upravljanju podjetij v državni lasti, načela OECD za korporativno upravljanje, drugi mednarodno priznani standardi za odgovorno in kakovostno upravljanje družb s kapitalskimi naložbami držav in gospodarskih družb na splošno ter slovenska priporočila dobrega korporativnega upravljanja.
The execution of the rights of shareholders and partners in a responsible manner is a key challenge for contemporary corporate governance and the Agency will become a model for responsible governance not only for companies connected to the State but also for all institutional shareholders in the Republic of Slovenia. 
Odgovorno izvajanje pravic delničarjev in družbenikov je ključni izziv sodobnega korporativnega upravljanja in agencija bo postala zgled odgovornega upravljanja ne le za družbe, povezane z državo, temveč za vse institucionalne delničarje v Republiki Sloveniji.
Pursuant to the law, the Code is publicly published on a web page of the Agency. 
Kodeks je skladno z zakonom javno objavljen na spletni strani agencije.
It is composed of 99 items. It is divided into two major sections, that is, firstly; Principles, Criteria and Procedures of the Agency&apos;s conduct, and secondly, Expectations with regard to Companies in which the Republic of Slovenia is a Partner or a Shareholder. 
Sestavlja ga 99 točk, razdeljen pa je na dva velika sklopa, in sicer na načela, merila in postopke ravnanja agencije ter na pričakovanja v zvezi z družbami, v katerih je Republika Slovenija družbenica ali delničarka.
The first section contains a commitment of the Agency&apos;s bodies with regard to the principles, procedures and criteria for their own conduct. The provisions of this Code must be respected by the Agency and any deviations from them will be immediately publicly disclosed and explained. 
Prvi sklop predstavlja zavezo organov agencije glede načel, postopkov in meril lastnega ravnanja -pri opravljanju nalog bodo spoštovali določbe tega kodeksa ter nemudoma javno razkrili in pojasnili vsakršne odmike od njih.
All the Agency&apos;s employees must adhere to this rule and with regard to non-routine issues or questions linked to corporate governance they may turn to the Agency&apos;s Management Board or the Council at any time. 
K temu bodo zavezani vsi zaposleni agencije in v zvezi z netipičnimi izzivi ali vprašanji, povezanimi s korporativnim upravljanjem, se lahko kadar koli obrnejo na upravo in svet agencije.
The second section of the Code recommends principles, procedures and criteria for the conduct of members of managerial and supervisory bodies of companies with capital investments of the Republic of Slovenia. 
Drugi sklop kodeksa priporoča načela, postopke in merila za ravnanje članov organov vodenja in nadzora družb s kapitalskimi naložbami Republike Slovenije.
This section does not include binding rules concerning the operation of companies&apos; bodies but the Agency will strive to inform all members of these bodies about the provisions of this Code. 
Ta del ne vključuje zavezujočih pravil delovanja organov družb, vendar si bo agencija prizadevala, da se bodo vsi člani slednjih seznanili z določbami tega kodeksa.
As the Code summarizes cases of good practice concerning corporate governance the Agency will also strive for companies to adopt the Code in the manner stipulated by the law. 
Ker le-ta povzema dobre prakse korporativnega upravljanja, si bo agencija prizadevala tudi, da ga bodo družbe sprejele tako, kakor določa zakonodaja.
This means that within the framework of regular reporting a Corporate Governance Statement will be formulated stating that the Code has been adopted and disclosing which of the Code&apos;s regulations have not been observed and providing an explanation why they have not been observed. 
To pomeni, da bodo v sklopu rednega poročanja oblikovale izjavo o upravljanju, v kateri so sprejele kodeks, in razkrile, katerih priporočil kodeksa niso spoštovale, ter pojasnile zakaj.
The Agency will regularly review the efficiency and adequacy of the Code in the light of the regulatory framework and the actual environment of companies&apos; operations in which the Republic of Slovenia holds capital investments and will amend and modify it when necessary. 
Agencija bo redno preverjala učinkovitost in primernost kodeksa glede na pravno in dejansko okolje poslovanja družb, v katerih ima kapitalske naložbe Republika Slovenija, ter ga po potrebi spreminjala in dopolnjevala.
Definitions of terms mentioned in this document 
Pomen v tem dokumentu navedenih izrazov
»Agency« is the Capital Assets Management Agency of the Republic of Slovenia established on the basis of ZUKN. 
Agencija je Agencija za upravljanje kapitalskih naložb Republike Slovenije, ustanovljena na podlagi ZUKN.
»Stakeholders« in companies are individuals and interest groups that contribute, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to the ability and activities in creating added value for companies, and are therefore also the vehicle for potential gains and risks undertaken by the company. 
Deležniki v družbah so posamezniki in interesne skupine, ki prostovoljno ali neprostovoljno prispevajo k zmožnostim ali dejavnostim ustvarjanja dodane vrednosti družb ter so zato tudi nosilci možnih koristi in tveganja v družbi.
Examples of Stakeholders are, in addition to shareholders and partners, also employees, creditors, clients and the business and ecological environment of the company. 
Primeri deležnikov so poleg delničarjev ali družbenikov še zaposleni, upniki, stranke in poslovno ter ekološko okolje družbe.
»Shareholder« is a holder of a security or a holder of a share and it refers to all partners, not only shareholders in companies limited by shares with State capital investments. 
Delničar je imetnik vrednostnega papirja ali imetnik poslovnega deleža in se nanaša na vse družbenike, ne le na delničarje v kapitalskih družbah s kapitalskimi naložbami države.
&quot;Company with State Capital Investments&quot; is a company in which the Republic of Slovenia holds a capital investment irrespective of the size of this share. 
Družba s kapitalsko naložbo države je družba, v kateri ima Republika Slovenija kapitalsko naložbo neodvisno od velikosti tega deleža.
This includes also a company in which a capital investment is held by a company on behalf of which and for the account of which the Agency exercises its voting rights on the basis of statutory provisions. 
Sem prištevamo tudi družbo, v kateri ima kapitalsko naložbo družba, v imenu in za račun katere agencija uresničuje glasovalne pravice na podlagi zakonskih določb.
»Supervisory Board« means a body of supervision in a company regardless of the legal form of the company and the system of governance. 
Nadzorni svet pomeni organ nadzora v družbi, ne glede na statusno obliko družbe in sistem upravljanja.
The term »Supervisory Board« may also mean the Board of Directors. 
Termin nadzorni svet tako lahko pomeni tudi upravni odbor.
»Management Board« means a body of management in a company regardless of the legal form of the company and the system of governance. 
Uprava pomeni organ vodenja v družbi, ne glede na statusno obliko družbe in sistem upravljanja.
The term »Management Board« may also mean a managing director in a company with limited liability or executive officers in companies with a unitary board system. 
Termin uprava lahko pomeni tudi direktorja v družbi z omejeno odgovornostjo ali izvršne direktorje v družbah z enotirnim sistemom upravljanja.
»National Authorities« represent the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia (hereinafter referred to as: »the National Assembly&quot;) and the Government of the Republic of Slovenia (hereinafter referred to as: »the Government&quot;), the Agency or any body which adopts decisions on behalf of the Republic of Slovenia. 
Državni organi predstavljajo Državni zbor Republike Slovenije (v nadaljnjem besedilu: državni zbor) in Vlado Republike Slovenije (v nadaljnjem besedilu: vlada), agencijo ali kogar koli, ki sprejema odločitve v imenu Republike Slovenije.
»Capital Investment« is a share or shareholding of the Republic of Slovenia in an individual company. 
Kapitalska naložba je delnica ali delež Republike Slovenije v posamezni gospodarski družbi.