natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
SOEs should disclose if they follow any code of corporate governance and, if so, indicate which one. 
Družbe v državni lasti so dolžne objaviti, ali upoštevajo kakšen kodeks korporativnega upravljanja in če ga, katerega.
With regards remuneration of board members and key executives, it is viewed as good practice to carry this out on an individual basis. 
Z ozirom na sisteme nagrajevanja članov odbora in izvršnih direktorjev velja individualna obravnava za dobro prakso.
The information should include termination and retirement provisions, as well as any specific facility or in kind remuneration provided to board members. 
Ta mora obsegati tudi člene o prenehanju dela in upokojitvi, kot tudi vse posebne ugodnosti oziroma podobne oblike nagrajevanja članov odbora.
SOEs should be particularly vigilant and improve transparency in the following areas. 
Družbe v državni lasti morajo biti posebej pazljive in povečati preglednost na naslednjih področjih
Examples of such information include 
Sem sodijo naslednje informacije
A clear statement to the public of the company objectives and their fulfilment It is important that each SOE is clear about its overall objectives. 
jasna izjava za javnost o ciljih družbe in njihovem zvrševanju; Pomembno je, da ima vsaka družba v državni lasti jasne skupne cilje.
Regardless of the existing performance monitoring system, a limited set of basic overall objectives should be identified together with information about how the enterprise is dealing with trade-offs between objectives that could be conflicting. 
Ne glede na obstoječ sistem kontrole poslovanja je potrebno identificirati določeno število osnovnih skupnih ciljev, skupaj z informacijo o tem, kako družba kompenzira cilje, ki so si lahko v konfliktu.
When the state is a majority shareholder or effectively controls the SOE, company objectives should be made clear to all other investors, the market and the general public. 
Ko je država večinski delničar ali ima učinkovit nadzor nad družbo v državni lasti, je potrebno cilje družbe razjasniti vsem preostalim delničarjem, trgu in splošni javnosti.
Such disclosure obligations will encourage company officials to clarify the objectives to themselves, and could also increase management&apos;s commitment in pursuing these objectives. 
Takšne zahteve po objavi podatkov bodo spodbudile menedžment, da si bo razjasnil cilje družbe, povečale pa bodo tudi zavezanost menedžmenta z uresničevanju teh ciljev.
It will provide a reference point for all shareholders, the market and the general public for considering the strategy adopted and decisions taken by the management. 
Delničarjem, trgu in splošni javnosti pa bodo predstavljale referenčno točko glede na sprejeto strategijo in odločitve menedžmenta.
SOEs should report on how they fulfilled their objectives by disclosing key performance indicators. 
Družbe v državni lasti so dolžne poročati o izpolnjevanju svojih ciljev z objavljanjem ključnih kazalnikov poslovanja.
When the SOE is also used for public policy objectives, such as general services obligations, it should also report on how these are being achieved. 
Če so družbe v državni lasti zadolžene tudi za izvrševanje nalog splošne politike, kot je izvajanje splošnih storitev, so dolžne poročati tudi o izvrševanju teh nalog.
The ownership and voting structure of the company 
lastniška in glasovalna struktura družbe;
It is important that the ownership and voting structures of SOEs are transparent so that all shareholders have a clear understanding of their share of cash-flow and voting rights. 
Pomembno je, da so lastniški in glasovalni mehanizmi družb v državni lasti pregledni, tako da si je vsak delničar na jasnem o svojem deležu denarnega toka in glasovalnih pravic.
It should also be clear who retains legal ownership of the state&apos;s shares and where the responsibility for exercising the state&apos;s ownership rights are located. 
Jasno mora biti, kdo ima pravno lastništvo nad delnicami države in kje je locirano izvajanje lastniških pravic.
Any special rights or agreements that may distort the ownership or control structure of the SOE, such as golden shares and power of veto, should be disclosed. 
Objaviti je potrebno tudi vse posebne pravice ali dogovore, ki izkrivljajo strukturo lastništva ali kontrole družb v državni lasti, kot so zlate delnice in pravica veta.
Any material risk factors and measures taken to manage such risks 
morebitni pomembni dejavniki tveganja in ukrepi za njihovo obvladovanje;
Severe difficulties arise when SOEs undertake ambitious strategies without clearly identifying, assessing or duly reporting on the related risks. 
Resne težave nastopijo, ko družbe v državni lasti sprejmejo ambiciozne strategije, ne da bi prej jasno identificirale in ocenile ali jasno poročale o možnih tveganjih.
Disclosure of material risk factors is particularly important when SOEs operate in newly de-regulated and increasingly internationalised industries where they are facing a series of new risks, such as political, operational, or exchange rate risks. 
Objava podatkov o bistvenih dejavnikih tveganja je posebej pomembna, ko družbe v državni lasti poslujejo v nanovo dereguliranih in vse bolj internacionaliziranih industrijah, kjer se soočajo s celo vrsto novih tveganj, kot so politična, operativna ali tečajna.
Without adequate reporting of material risk factors, SOEs may give a false representation of their financial situation and overall performance. 
Brez ustreznega poročanja o bistvenih dejavnikih tveganja lahko družbe v državni lasti predstavljajo izkrivljeno sliko svoje finančne situacije in celotnega poslovanja.
This in turn may lead to inappropriate strategic decisions and unexpected financial losses. 
To lahko vodi do neustreznih strateških odločitev in nepričakovanih finančnih izgub.
Appropriate disclosure by SOEs of the nature and extent of risk incurred in their operations requires the establishment of sound internal risk management systems to identify, manage, control and report on risks. 
Ustrezna objava informacij o naravi in obsegu izpostavljenosti tveganjem pri poslovanju narekuje družbam v državni lasti, da vzpostavijo zdrav notranji sistem obvladovanja tveganj za ugotavljanje, obvladovanje, nadzor in poročanje o tveganjih.
Companies in extracting industries should disclose their reserves according to best practices in this regard, as this may be a key element of their value and risk profile. 
Družbe v bazičnih industrijah so dolžne objaviti svoje rezerve v skladu z najboljšimi praksami, saj je to lahko ključni element pri ocenjevanju njihove vrednosti in profila tveganja.
Public Private Partnerships should also be adequately disclosed. 
Javno zasebna partnerstva morajo biti tudi ustrezno objavljena.
Such ventures are often characterised by transfers of risks, resources and rewards between public and private partners for the provision of public services or public infrastructure and may consequently induce new and specific material risks. 
Za takšne mešane družbe so pogosto značilni prenosi tveganj, virov in plačil med javnimi in zasebnimi partnerji za zagotavljanje javnih storitev ali javne infrastrukture in lahko posledično sprožijo nova in specifična materialna tveganja.
Any financial assistance, including guarantees, received from the state and commitments made on behalf of the SOE 
morebitna državna finančna pomoč, vključno z državnimi garancijami ter sprejete obveznosti v imenu družbe v državni lasti;
To give a fair and complete picture of an SOE's financial situation, it is necessary that mutual obligations, financial assistance or risk sharing mechanisms between the state and the SOEs are appropriately disclosed. 
Za pošteno in celovito sliko finančne situacije družbe v državni lasti je pomembno, da so medsebojne obveznosti, finančna pomoč oziroma mehanizmi porazdelitve tveganj med državo in družbami v državni lasti ustrezno objavljeni.
Disclosure should include details on any state grant or subsidy received by the SOE, any guarantee granted by the state to the SOE for its operations, as well as any commitment that the state undertakes on behalf of an SOE. 
Objave morajo obsegati podrobnosti o vsaki dotaciji ali podpori države družbi v državni lasti, vsako dano garancijo države za aktivnosti družbe, kot tudi o obveznostih, ki jih je država sprejela v imenu družbe v državni lasti.
Disclosure of guarantees could be done by SOEs themselves or by the state. 
Podatke o garancijah lahko objavi družba v državni lasti sama ali to stori država.
It is considered good practice that Parliaments monitor state guarantees in order to respect budgetary procedures. 
Za dobro prakso velja, da državne garancije nadzira parlament zaradi proračunskih postopkov.
Any material transactions with related entities 
vse pomembne transakcije s povezanimi družbami.
Transactions between SOEs and related entities, such as an equity investment of one SOE in another, might be a source of potential abuse and should be disclosed. 
Transakcije med družbami v državni lasti in povezanimi družbami, kot investiranje lastniškega kapitala ene družbe v državni lasti v drugo, so lahko vir potencialnih zlorab in morajo biti objavljene.
Reporting on transactions with related entities should provide all information that is necessary for assessing the fairness and appropriateness of these transactions 
Poročanje o transakcijah s povezanimi družbami mora vsebovati vse informacije, ki so potrebne za ugotavljanje poštenosti in ustreznosti teh transakcij.
In a number of countries, SOE boards tend to be too large, lack business perspective and independent judgment. 
V številnih državah so odbori družb v državni lasti preveliki, primanjkuje jim poslovne širine in vizije ter sposobnosti neodvisne presoje.
They may also include an excessive number of members from the state administration. 
V njih je tudi marsikdaj preveliko število članov iz državne uprave.
Moreover, they may not be entrusted with the full range of board responsibilities and can therefore be overruled by senior management and by the ownership entities themselves. 
Razen tega mnogokrat tudi nimajo pooblastil za opravljanje vseh nalog odbora in jih zaradi tega lahko preglasuje višji menedžment in sami lastniški organi.
Moreover, their function may also be duplicated by specific state regulatory bodies in some areas. 
Na nekaterih področjih se njihova funkcija lahko tudi duplira s posameznimi regulatornimi organi.
Empowering and improving the quality of SOE boards is a fundamental step in improving the corporate governance of SOEs. 
Pooblaščanje in izboljšanje kakovosti odborov družb v državni lasti je osnovni korak za izboljšanje korporativnega upravljanja v teh družbah.
It is important that SOEs have strong boards that can act in the interest of the company and effectively monitor management without undue political interference. 
Pomembno je, da imajo družbe v državni lasti močne odbore, da lahko delujejo v interesu družbe in da lahko učinkovito nadzirajo menedžment brez neprimernega političnega vmešavanja.
To this end, it will be necessary to ensure the competency of SOE boards, enhance their independence and improve the way they function. 
V ta namen je potrebno zagotoviti kompetentnost odborov družb v državni lasti, povečati njihovo neodvisnost in izboljšati njihov način dela.
It is also necessary to allow them clear and full responsibility for their functions and ensure that they act with integrity. 
Nujno jim je potrebno tudi podeliti jasno in polno odgovornost za njihove funkcije in zagotoviti, da jih lahko pošteno opravljajo.
A. The boards of SOEs should be assigned a clear mandate and ultimate responsibility for the company&apos;s performance. 
A. Odborom družb v državni lasti mora biti dodeljen jasen mandat in najvišja odgovornost za poslovanje družbe.
The board should be fully accountable to the owners, act in the best interest of the company and treat all shareholders equitably. 
Odbor mora biti v celoti odgovoren lastnikom, dolžan je ravnati v najboljšem interesu družbe in nepristransko obravnavati vse delničarje.
SOE boards should, in principle, have the same responsibilities and liabilities as stipulated in company law. 
Odbori družb v državni lasti bi morali imeti načeloma enake odgovornosti in obveznosti, kot jih določa pravo družb.
However, in practice, board members may have a reduced liability, particularly the ones nominated by the state. 
V praksi pa imajo člani odborov marsikdaj manjše obveznosti, posebej tisti, ki jih je predlagala država.
The responsibilities of SOE boards should be articulated in relevant legislation, regulations, the government ownership policy and the company charters. 
Odgovornosti odborov družb v državni lasti morajo biti artikulirane v ustrezni zakonodaji, predpisih, vladni lastniški politiki in v ustanovnih aktih družbe.
It is essential and should be emphasised that all board members have the legal obligation to act in the best interests of the company and to treat all shareholders equitably. 
Treba je poudariti, da je bistveno, da so vsi člani odborov po zakonu odgovorni, da ravnajo v najboljšem interesu družbe in da nepristransko obravnavajo vse delničarje.
The collective and individual liability of board members should be clearly stated. 
Kolektivna in osebna odgovornost članov odbora mora biti jasno opredeljena.
There should not be any difference between the liabilities of different board members, whether they are nominated by the state or any other shareholders or stakeholders. 
Med obveznostmi posameznih članov odbora ne sme biti razlik ne glede na to, ali jih predlaga država, drugi delničarji ali deležniki.
Training should be required in order to inform SOE board members of their responsibilities and liabilities. 
Člane odbora družbe v državni lasti je potrebno seznaniti z njihovimi odgovornostmi in obveznostmi na seminarju.
To encourage board responsibility and in order for boards to function effectively, they should follow best practices adhered to in the private sector and be limited in size. 
Za spodbujanje odgovornosti in učinkovitosti dela odbora bi morali odbori uporabljati najboljše prakse privatnega sektorja in biti številčno omejeni.
Experience indicates that smaller boards allow for real strategic discussion and are less prone to become rubberstamping entities. 
Sodeč po izkušnjah omogočajo manjši odbori boljše strateške razprave in so manj nagnjeni k pojavom birokratizma.
To underline the board&apos;s responsibilities, a Directors&apos; Report should be provided along with the annual statements and submitted to the external auditors. 
Za večji poudarek odgovornosti odbora mora biti poročilo vodstva sestavni del letnega poročila in ga je potrebno predložiti zunanjim revizorjem.
The Directors&apos; Report should give information and comment on the organisation, financial performance, material risk factors, significant events, relations with stakeholders, and the effects of directions from the co-ordinating or ownership entity. 
Poročilo vodstva mora vsebovati informacijo in komentar o organiziranosti, finančnem poslovanju, bistvenih dejavnikih tveganja, pomembnih dogodkih, odnosih z deležniki ter vplivu usmeritev koordinacijskega ali lastniškega organa.
In many instances, SOE boards are not granted full responsibility and the authority required for strategic guidance, monitoring of management and control over disclosure. 
V mnogih primerih odbori družb v državni lasti nimajo polne odgovornosti in potrebnih pooblastil za strateško vodenje, nadzor menedžmenta in kontrole nad objavo podatkov.
SOE boards may see their roles and responsibilities encroached from two ends; by the ownership entities and by management. 
Odbori družb v državni lasti mnogokrat čutijo vmešavanje v njihovo vlogo in odgovornosti z dveh strani, s strani lastniških organov na eni in menedžmenta na drugi strani.
The co-ordinating or ownership entity, if not the government itself, may be tempted to become too involved in strategic issues, although it is their responsibility to define the overall objectives of the company, particularly since the difference between defining objectives and setting strategies can be rather unclear. 
Koordinacijski oz. lastniški organ, če ne celo sama vlada, se lahko znajde v skušnjavi, da bi preveč posegal v strateške zadeve, kljub temu da je odgovoren za definiranje splošnih ciljev družbe, še posebej zato, ker med določanjem ciljev in postavljanjem strategij ni jasno začrtane meje.
SOE boards may also encounter difficulties in monitoring management as they do not always have the legitimacy, or even the authority, to do so. 
Odbori družb v državni lasti se včasih tudi soočajo s težavami pri nadziranju menedžmenta, ker nimajo vedno legitimne pravice ali celo pooblastil za to.
Furthermore, in certain countries, there is a strong link between the management and the ownership function or directly with the government. 
Razen tega obstaja v nekaterih državah močna vez med menedžmentom in lastniško funkcijo ali neposredno z vlado.
SOE senior management tends to report to the ownership function or the government directly and thereby circumvent the board. 
Višji menedžment družb v državni lasti teži k poročanju neposredno lastnikom ali vladi, in to mimo odbora.
In order to carry out their role, SOE boards should actively i) formulate, monitor and review corporate strategy, within the framework of the overall corporate objectives; ii) establish appropriate performance indicators and identify key risks; iii) monitor the disclosure and communication processes, ensuring that the financial statements fairly present the affairs of the SOE and reflect the risks incurred; iv) assess and follow management performance; v) develop effective succession plans for key executives. 
Za opravljanje svoje vloge morajo zato odbori družb v državni lasti aktivno (i) izražati, nadzirati in revidirati korporativno strategijo v okviru skupnih korporativnih ciljev; (ii) vzpostaviti ustrezne kazalnike poslovanja in identificirati ključna tveganja; (iii) nadzirati objavo podatkov in komunikacijske postopke, zagotavljati, da finančna poročila predstavljajo poslovanje družbe pošteno in odražajo izpostavljenost tveganjem; (iv) ocenjevati in spremljati rezultate menedžmenta; (v) pripraviti učinkovite načrte nasledstva za izvršne direktorje.
One key function of SOE boards should be the appointment and dismissal of CEOs. 
Ena od ključnih funkcij odborov družb v državni lasti je imenovanje in razreševanje glavnih izvršnih direktorjev.
Without this authority it is difficult for SOE boards to fully exercise their monitoring function and feel responsible for SOEs&apos; performance. 
Brez tega pooblastila odbori težko celovito opravljajo svojo nadzorno funkcijo in se težko čutijo odgovorne za poslovanje družb v državni lasti.
In some cases, this might be done in concurrence or consultation with the ownership entity. 
V nekaterih primerih je to možno v sodelovanju ali s posvetovanjem z lastniškim organom.
In some countries, a full owner can directly appoint a CEO and this possibility extends to SOE. 
V nekaterih državah lahko 100-odstotni lastnik neposredno imenuje glavnega izvršnega direktorja in to možnost razširi na družbo v državni lasti.
This may also occur when the state is a dominant owner in SOEs that are assigned important public service purposes. 
To se lahko zgodi tudi, ko je država obvladujoč lastnik v družbah, ki so zadolžene za opravljanje pomembnih javnih storitev.
To ensure that the integrity of the board is maintained, good practice would require consultation with the board. 
Za zagotovitev integritete odbora velja posvetovanje z odborom za dobro prakso.
Regardless of the procedure, appointments should be based on professional criteria. 
Ne glede na postopek morajo imenovanja temeljiti na profesionalnih kriterijih.
Rules and procedures for nominating and appointing the CEO should be transparent and respect the line of accountability between the CEO, the board and the ownership entity. 
Pravila in postopki za izbiro in imenovanje glavnega izvršnega direktorja morajo biti pregledna in morajo upoštevati ravni odgovornosti med glavnim izvršnim direktorjem, odborom in lastniškim organom.
Any shareholder agreements with respect to CEO nomination should be disclosed. 
Vsi delniški dogovori v zvezi s kandidiranjem glavnega izvršnega direktorja morajo biti objavljeni.
It follows from their obligation to assess and follow management performance that the SOE boards should also have a decisive influence over the compensation of the CEO. 
Odbori družb v državni lasti imajo tudi odločilen vpliv na nagrajevanje glavnega izvršnega direktorja. Ta pravica izvira iz njihove obveznosti ocenjevanja in spremljanja rezultatov menedžmenta.
They should ensure that the CEO&apos;s remuneration is tied to performance and duly disclosed. 
Odbori morajo zagotoviti, da je nagrajevanje glavnega izvršnega direktorja povezano z rezultati in mora biti primerno objavljeno.
Good practice calls for the Chair to be separate from the CEO. 
Dobra praksa narekuje ločenost funkcij predsedujočega in glavnega izvršnega direktorja.
A central prerequisite in empowering SOE boards is to structure them so that they can effectively exercise objective and independent judgement, be in position to monitor senior management and take strategic decisions. 
Glavni predpogoj pri pooblaščanju odborov družb v državni lasti je, da so organizirani tako, da lahko učinkovito izrekajo objektivna in neodvisna mnenja, da lahko nadzirajo višji menedžment in sprejemajo strateške odločitve.
As underlined in the Principles, “in order to exercise its duties of monitoring managerial performance, preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing demands on the corporation, it is essential that the board is able to exercise objective judgement”. 
Kot poudarjajo Načela, »je za izvajanje nalog nadzora nad rezultati menedžmenta, preprečevanja navzkrižij interesov in uravnavanje konkurenčne pozicije družbe bistveno pomembno, da odbor lahko izreka objektivna mnenja«.
All board members should be nominated through a transparent process and it should be clear that it is their duty to act in the best interests of the company as a whole. 
Vse člane odbora je potrebno kandidirati v preglednem postopku, pri čemer mora biti jasno, da je njihova obveznost delati v najboljšem interesu družbe kot celote.
They should not act as individual representatives of the constituencies that appointed them. 
Člani ne smejo ravnati kot bi bili individualni predstavniki volilnih skupin, ki so jih kandidirale.
SOE boards should also be protected from undue and direct political interference that could detract them from focusing on achieving the objectives agreed on with the government and the ownership entity. 
Odbori družb v državni lasti morajo biti tudi zaščiteni pred neprimernim in neposrednim političnim vmešavanjem, ki jih lahko zavaja stran od ciljev, dogovorjenih z vlado in lastniškim organom.
A central requirement to enhance the objectivity of SOE boards is to nominate a sufficient number of competent non-executive board members who are capable of independent judgement. 
Osrednja zahteva za povečanje objektivnosti odborov družb v državni lasti je izbira zadostnega števila kompetentnih neizvršnih članov odbora, sposobnih izrekanja neodvisnih mnenj.
These board members should have the relevant competence and experience and it is advisable that they be recruited from the private sector. 
Ti člani odbora morajo imeti ustrezne kompetence in izkušnje in priporočljivo je, da so rekrutirani iz privatnega sektorja.
It will help in making boards more business-oriented, particularly for SOEs that operate in competitive markets. 
K večji podjetniški naravnanosti odborov prispeva poslovanje družb v državni lasti na konkurenčnih trgih.
Their expertise could also include qualifications related to the SOE&apos;s specific obligations and policy objectives. 
Njihovo strokovno znanje lahko tudi obsega usposobljenost za izvrševanje posebnih nalog in političnih ciljev.
In some countries, diversity in board composition is also an issue and it includes gender consideration. 
V nekaterih državah je raznolikost v sestavi odborov tudi pomembna in vključuje med drugim tudi zastopanost obeh spolov.