natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The application of such treatment in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic would incentivise institutions to increase lending to employees and pensioners. 
Uporaba take obravnave v kontekstu pandemije COVID-19 bi institucije spodbudila k povečanju kreditiranja zaposlenih in upokojencev.
Having regard to the urgency of those adjustments to the prudential regulatory framework, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
Ob upoštevanju nujnosti navedenih sprememb regulativnega bonitetnega okvira, bi morala ta uredba začeti veljati dan po objavi v Uradnem listu Evropske unije.
The competent authority should ensure that such reversals are not motivated by considerations of regulatory arbitrage. 
Pristojni organ bi moral zagotoviti, da vzroki za takšno spremembo odločitve ne izhajajo iz regulativne arbitraže.
Moreover, the effectiveness of that instrument appears to be hampered by the reduced flexibility stemming from the offsetting mechanism attached to such temporary exclusions, which would constrain the ability of institutions to increase exposures to central banks in a crisis situation. 
Poleg tega se zdi, da učinkovitost tega instrumenta ovira manjša prožnost, ki izhaja iz mehanizma izravnave, povezanega s takšnimi začasnimi izključitvami, kar bi omejevalo zmožnost institucij, da v kriznih razmerah povečajo izpostavljenosti do centralnih bank.
Therefore, in order to avoid any undesired consequences related to the offsetting mechanism and to ensure the effectiveness of that exclusion in the face of possible future shocks and crises, the offsetting mechanism should be modified. 
V izogib neželenim posledicam, povezanim z mehanizmom izravnave, in za zagotovitev učinkovitosti te izključitve ob morebitnih prihodnjih pretresih in krizah, bi bilo treba mehanizem izravnave spremeniti.
While the Basel III framework for market risk allows competent authorities to smoothen such extraordinary events in market risk internal models, such supervisory discretion is not fully available under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. 
Čeprav okvir Basel III za tržno tveganje pristojnim organom omogoča, da take ekstremne dogodke ublažijo v okviru notranjih modelov za tržno tveganje, taka nadzorna diskrecijska pravica ni v celoti na voljo na podlagi Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013.
The BCBS agreed on 3 April 2020 to allow more flexibility in the implementation of the transitional arrangements that phase-in the impact of IFRS 9. 
BCBS je 3. aprila 2020 sklenil, da se dopusti večja prožnost pri izvajanju prehodne ureditve, s katero se postopoma upošteva učinek MSRP 9.
Failures in the back-testing requirement, also known as overshootings, if above a certain number per year, would result in an additional quantitative multiplier being applied to the own funds requirements for market risk calculated using internal models. 
Neizpolnjevanje zahteve glede testiranja za nazaj, imenovano tudi preseganje, če presega določeno število na leto, bi povzročilo, da bi se za lastne kapitalske zahteve za tržno tveganje, izračunane z uporabo notranjih modelov, uporabil dodaten kvantitativni multiplikator.
In the exceptional circumstances triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, stakeholders are expected to contribute to efforts towards recovery. 
V izrednih okoliščinah, ki jih je sprožila pandemija COVID-19, se od deležnikov pričakuje, da bodo prispevali k prizadevanjem za okrevanje.
Institutions that have previously decided to use or not to use the transitional arrangements should be able to reverse that decision at any time during the new transitional period, subject to receiving the prior permission of their competent authority. 
Institucije, ki so se pred tem odločile za uporabo prehodne ureditve oziroma njeno neuporabo, bi morale imeti možnost, da v novem prehodnem obdobju to odločitev kadar koli spremenijo, pod pogojem, da pridobijo predhodno dovoljenje svojega pristojnega organa.
Therefore, additional flexibility for competent authorities to mitigate the negative effects of the extreme market volatility observed during the COVID-19 pandemic should be introduced to exclude the overshootings that occurred between 1 January 2020 and 31 December 2021 which are not a result of deficiencies in internal models. 
Zato bi bilo treba uvesti dodatno prožnost za pristojne organe, da bi zmanjšali negativne učinke ekstremne nestanovitnosti trga, ugotovljene med pandemijo COVID-19, da bi izključili preseganja, ki so se zgodila med 1. januarjem 2020 in 31. decembrom 2021, ki niso posledica pomanjkljivosti notranjih modelov.
Subsequently, and subject to the prior permission of the competent authority, institutions should have the possibility of deciding to stop using the transitional arrangements. 
Posledično bi morale institucije po predhodnem dovoljenju pristojnega organa imeti možnost, da se odločijo za prenehanje uporabe prehodne ureditve.
Therefore, before that date, the competent authorities would not be able to make use of that instrument to address the increase in exposures to central banks that is expected to occur as a result of monetary policy measures employed to mitigate the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Zato pristojni organi pred tem datumom ne bi imeli možnosti uporabiti ta instrument za obravnavanje povečanja izpostavljenosti do centralnih bank, do katerega naj bi prišlo zaradi ukrepov monetarne politike, sprejetih za zmanjšanje gospodarskega učinka pandemije COVID-19.
Based on the experience from the COVID-19 pandemic, the Commission should assess whether such flexibility should be made available also during future episodes of extreme market volatility. 
Na podlagi izkušenj s pandemijo COVID-19 bi morala Komisija oceniti, ali bi morala biti taka prožnost na voljo tudi v prihodnjih obdobjih ekstremne nestanovitnosti trga.
In the Union, the revision was introduced by Regulation (EU) 2019/876. 
Sprememba je bila v Uniji uvedena z Uredbo (EU) 2019/876.
In the context of the accelerated uptake of digital services as a consequence of public measures adopted to address the COVID-19 pandemic, the date of application of those changes should be advanced. 
V okviru pospešenega uvajanja digitalnih storitev kot posledice javnih ukrepov, sprejetih za obravnavo pandemije COVID-19, bi bilo treba za začetek uporabe teh sprememb določiti zgodnejši datum.
In view of the urgency entailed by the exceptional circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, it was considered to be appropriate to provide for an exception to the eight-week period referred to in Article 4 of Protocol No 1 on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union, annexed to the Treaty on European Union, to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. 
Zaradi nujnosti, ki je nastala zaradi izrednih okoliščin zaradi pandemije COVID-19 je bilo primerno določiti izjemo od roka osmih tednov iz člena 4 Protokola št. 1 o vlogi nacionalnih parlamentov v Evropski uniji, ki je priložen Pogodbi o Evropski uniji, Pogodbi o delovanju Evropske unije in Pogodbi o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti za atomsko energijo.
It is therefore justified to align the minimum coverage requirements for non-performing exposures that benefit from guarantees granted by national governments or other public entities with those for non-performing exposures that benefit from guarantees granted by official export credit agencies. 
Zato je upravičeno, da se zahteve glede minimalnega kritja za nedonosne izpostavljenosti, zavarovane z jamstvi, ki jih zagotavljajo nacionalne vlade ali drugi javni subjekti, uskladijo z zahtevami za nedonosne izpostavljenosti, zavarovane z jamstvi, ki jih zagotavljajo uradne izvozne agencije.
However, the discretion to exclude such exposures only becomes applicable on 28 June 2021. 
Vendar pa se diskrecijiska pravica do izključitve takšnih izpostavljenosti začne uporabljati šele 28. junija 2021.
In 2017, the BCBS revised the calculation of the leverage ratio exposure value of regular-way purchases and sales awaiting settlement in order to ensure that the treatment properly reflects the inherent leverage associated with those trades and that possible accounting differences do not affect the calculation among institutions with comparable positions. 
BCBS je leta 2017 spremenil izračun vrednosti izpostavljenosti količnika finančnega vzvoda za običajne nakupe in prodaje, ki čakajo na poravnavo, za zagotovitev, da obravnava ustrezno odraža finančni vzvod, povezan s temi posli, in da morebitne računovodske razlike ne vplivajo na izračun institucij s primerljivimi pozicijami.
As the SME supporting factor and the infrastructure supporting factor allow for a more favourable treatment of certain exposures to SMEs and infrastructure, their application in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic would incentivise institutions to increase much-needed lending. 
Ker faktor za podporo MSP in faktor za podporo infrastrukturnim projektom omogočata ugodnejšo obravnavo nekaterih izpostavljenosti do MSP in infrastrukturnih projektov, bi njuna uporaba v kontekstu pandemije COVID-19 spodbudila institucije k povečanju zelo potrebnega kreditiranja.
Since the objective of this Regulation, namely maximising the capacity of institutions to lend and to absorb losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, while still ensuring the continued resilience of such institutions, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. 
Ker cilja te uredbe, in sicer maksimalno povečanje sposobnosti institucij za kreditiranje in pokrivanje izgub v zvezi s pandemijo COVID-19 ob hkratnem zagotavljanju stalne odpornosti teh institucij, države članice ne morejo zadovoljivo doseči, temveč se zaradi svojega obsega in učinkov lažje doseže na ravni Unije, lahko Unija sprejme ukrepe v skladu z načelom subsidiarnosti iz člena 5 Pogodbe o Evropski uniji.
Based on the experience from the COVID-19 pandemic, the Commission should assess whether additional binding powers should be granted to competent authorities to impose restrictions on distributions in exceptional circumstances. 
Na podlagi izkušenj s pandemijo COVID-19 bi morala Komisija oceniti, ali bi bilo treba pristojnim organom podeliti dodatna zavezujoča pooblastila za uvedbo omejitev razdelitev v izrednih razmerah.
Adopted in the aftermath of the financial crisis that unfolded in 2007-2008, and largely based on international standards agreed in 2010 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), known as the Basel III framework, that prudential regulatory framework has contributed to enhancing the resilience of institutions operating in the Union and to making them better prepared to deal with potential difficulties, including difficulties stemming from possible future crises. 
Ta bonitetni regulativni okvir, ki je bil sprejet po finančni krizi v letih 2007-2008 in v veliki meri temelji na mednarodnih standardih, o katerih se je leta 2010 dogovoril Baselski odbor za bančni nadzor (v nadaljnjem besedilu: BCBS) in so znani kot okvir Basel III, je prispeval k izboljšanju odpornosti institucij, ki poslujejo v Uniji, in njihovi boljši pripravljenosti na soočanje z morebitnimi težavami, vključno s težavami, ki izhajajo iz možnih prihodnjih kriz.
Therefore, and in order to ensure a level playing field internationally for institutions established in the Union and operating also outside the Union, the date of application for the leverage ratio buffer requirement set out in that Regulation should be deferred by one year to 1 January 2023. 
Da se torej na mednarodni ravni zagotovijo enaki konkurenčni pogoji za institucije s sedežem v Uniji, ki poslujejo tudi zunaj Unije, bi bilo treba datum začetka uporabe zahteve po blažilniku količnika finančnega vzvoda iz navedene uredbe odložiti za eno leto, na 1. januar 2023.
Since its entry into force, Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 has been amended several times to address remaining weaknesses in the prudential regulatory framework and to implement some outstanding elements of the global financial services reform that are essential to ensuring the resilience of institutions. 
Uredba (EU) št. 575/2013 je bila od začetka veljavnosti večkrat spremenjena, da so se odpravile preostale pomanjkljivosti v bonitetnem regulativnem okviru in izvedli nekateri preostali elementi globalne reforme finančnih storitev, ki so bistvenega pomena za zagotovitev odpornosti institucij.
To avoid unnecessary constraints on institutions investing in such bonds, it is appropriate to reintroduce the transitional arrangements for exposures to central governments and central banks where those exposures are denominated in the domestic currency of another Member State with respect to the treatment of such exposures under the credit risk framework and to prolong the transitional arrangements with respect to the treatment of such exposures under the large exposure limits. 
V izogib nepotrebnim omejitvam za institucije, ki vlagajo v take obveznice, je ustrezno, da se za izpostavljenosti do enot centralne ravni države in centralnih bank, kadar so te izpostavljenosti denominirane v valuti druge države članice, ponovno uvedejo prehodne ureditve glede obravnave teh izpostavljenosti znotraj okvira za kreditno tveganje, prehodne ureditve glede obravnave teh izpostavljenosti znotraj okvira omejitev velikih izpostavljenosti pa se podaljšajo.
The European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA) established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (9) , the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) (ESMA) established by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (10) and the competent authorities have provided temporary capital, liquidity and operational relief to institutions to ensure that institutions can continue to fulfil their role in funding the real economy despite the more challenging environment. 
Evropski nadzorni organ (Evropski bančni organ) (EBA), ustanovljen z Uredbo (EU) št. 1093/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (9) , Evropski nadzorni organ (Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge) (ESMA), ustanovljen z Uredbo (EU) št. 1095/2010 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (10) , in pristojni organi so institucijam zagotovili začasno kapitalsko, likvidnostno in operativno razbremenitev, da lahko institucije, kjub težavnejšem okolju, še naprej izpolnjujejo svojo vlogo pri financiranju realnega gospodarstva.
In particular, the Commission, the European Central Bank and EBA have provided clarity regarding the application of the flexibility already embedded in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 by issuing interpretations and guidance on the application of the prudential framework in the context of COVID-19. 
Zlasti so Komisija, Evropska centralna banka in EBA pojasnili uporabo prožnosti, ki je že vgrajena v Uredbo (EU) št. 575/2013, in sicer z izdajo razlag in usmeritev glede uporabe bonitetnega okvira v kontekstu COVID-19.
The extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic and the unprecedented magnitude of challenges triggered calls for immediate action to ensure that institutions are able to channel funds to businesses and households effectively and to mitigate the economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Izjemne okoliščine zaradi pandemije COVID-19 in razsežnost izzivov brez primere so sprožile pozive k takojšnjemu ukrepanju za zagotovitev, da lahko institucije učinkovito usmerjajo sredstva v podjetja in gospodinjstva ter zmanjšajo gospodarski šok zaradi pandemije COVID-19.
EBA, the European Central Bank and other competent authorities have issued recommendations for institutions to suspend dividend payments and share buybacks during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
EBA, Evropska centralna banka in drugi pristojni organi so izdali priporočila, v skladu s katerimi naj bi institucije med pandemijo COVID-19 zadržale izplačila dividend in odkup delnic.
The prudential treatment of certain software assets was amended by Regulation (EU) 2019/876 in order to further support the transition towards a more digitalised banking sector. 
Z Uredbo (EU) 2019/876 je bila spremenjena bonitetna obravnava nekatere programske opreme, da bi se nadalje podprl prehod v bolj digitaliziran bančni sektor.
While most of the final elements still need to be implemented in Union law, the leverage ratio buffer requirement for global systemically important institutions has already been implemented through the amendments introduced by Regulation (EU) 2019/876. 
Medtem ko je večino končnih elementov še treba prenesti v pravo Unije, se je zahteva po blažilniku količnika finančnega vzvoda za globalne sistemsko pomembne institucije že prenesla s spremembami, uvedenimi z Uredbo (EU) 2019/876.
To mitigate the potential impact that a sudden increase in expected credit loss provisions could have on institutions' capacity to lend to clients at times when it is most needed, the transitional arrangements should be extended by two years, and institutions should be allowed to fully add back to their Common Equity Tier 1 capital any increase in new expected credit loss provisions that they recognise in 2020 and 2021 for their financial assets that are not credit-impaired. 
Da se zmanjša morebiten učinek, ki bi ga lahko imelo nenadno povečanje oslabitev in rezervacij za pričakovane kreditne izgube na zmožnost institucij za kreditiranje strank v času, ko je to najbolj potrebno, bi bilo treba prehodno ureditev podaljšati za dve leti, institucijam pa omogočiti, da svojemu navadnemu lastniškemu temeljnemu kapitalu v celoti dodajo nazaj vsako povečanje oslabitev in rezervacij za nove pričakovane kreditne izgube, ki jih v letih 2020 in 2021 pripoznajo za svoja finančna sredstva, ki niso oslabljena.
Regarding loans granted by credit institutions to pensioners or employees with a permanent contract against the unconditional transfer of part of the borrower's pension or salary to that credit institution, Article 123 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 was amended by Regulation (EU) 2019/876 to allow for the more favourable treatment of such loans. 
V zvezi s krediti, ki jih kreditne institucije odobrijo upokojencem ali zaposlenim s pogodbo za nedoločen čas na podlagi brezpogojnega prenosa dela pokojnine ali plače kreditojemalca na to kreditno institucijo, je bil člen 123 Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013 spremenjen z Uredbo (EU) 2019/876, da se omogoči ugodnejša obravnava takšnih kreditov.
The severe economic shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the exceptional containment measures have had a far-reaching impact on the economy. 
Resen ekonomski šok, ki ga je povzročila pandemija COVID-19, in izredni ukrepi za zajezitev širjenja bolezni imajo daljnosežen učinek na gospodarstvo.
Pending the application of the amended provisions on the calculation of the leverage ratio as introduced by Regulation (EU) 2019/876, Article 429a should continue to apply in the wording as introduced by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/62 (11) . 
Do začetka uporabe spremenjenih določb o izračunu količnika finančnega vzvoda, kakor so bile uvedene z Uredbo (EU) 2019/876, bi se moral še naprej uporabljati člen 429a, v besedilu, kakor je bilo uvedeno z Delegirano uredbo Komisije (EU) 2015/62 (11) .
In addition, in order to ensure the availability of that discretion during the current COVID-19 pandemic, the possibility of temporarily excluding certain exposures to central banks should already be available before the leverage ratio requirement set out in point (d) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 becomes applicable on 28 June 2021. 
Poleg tega bi za zagotovitev, da je ta diskrecijska pravica na voljo med trenutno pandemijo COVID-19, morala biti možnost začasne izključitve nekaterih izpostavljenosti do centralnih bank že na voljo, preden se 28. junija 2021 začne uporabljati zahteva glede količnika finančnega vzvoda iz točke (d) člena 92(1) Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013.
For the extraordinary support measures adopted to alleviate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic to be fully effective with regard to keeping the banking sector more resilient and providing an incentive to the institutions to continue lending, it is necessary for the alleviating effect of those measures to be immediately reflected in the way in which regulatory capital requirements are determined. 
Da bi bili izredni ukrepi podpore, sprejeti za ublažitev učinka pandemije COVID-19, v celoti učinkoviti pri ohranjanju odpornejšega bančnega sektorja in spodbujanju institucij k nadaljnjemu kreditiranju, je potrebno, da se ublažitveni učinek teh ukrepov takoj odrazi v načinu določitve regulativnih kapitalskih zahtev.
The extraordinary impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is also observed in relation to the extreme levels of volatility in the financial markets, which together with uncertainty are leading to increased yields for public debt that, in turn, give rise to unrealised losses on institutions' holdings of public debt. 
Izredni učinek pandemije COVID-19 se kaže tudi v iekstremnih stopnjah nestanovitnosti na finančnih trgih, ki skupaj z negotovostjo vodijo v povečanje donosov na javni dolg, kar posledično vodi do nerealiziranih izgub v institucijah iz naslova naložbe v dolžniške instrumente.
It is therefore necessary to advance the date of application of the two supporting factors so that they can already be used by institutions during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Zato je treba določiti zgodnejši datum začetka uporabe obeh faktorjev za podporo, da ju lahko institucije uporabijo že med pandemijo COVID-19.
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4) establishes, together with Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (5) , the prudential regulatory framework for credit institutions and investment firms (‘institutions') operating in the Union. 
Uredba (EU) št. 575/2013 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (4) skupaj z Direktivo 2013/36/EU Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (5) določa bonitetni regulativni okvir za kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja (v nadaljnjem besedilu: institucije), ki poslujejo v Uniji.
In addition to the flexibility already provided in the existing rules, targeted changes to Regulations (EU) No 575/2013 and (EU) 2019/876 would ensure that the prudential regulatory framework interacts smoothly with the various measures that address the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Poleg prožnosti, že zagotovljene v obstoječih pravilih, bi ciljno usmerjene spremembe uredb (EU) št. 575/2013 in (EU) 2019/876 zagotovile, da ta regulativni okvir nemoteno součinkuje z različnimi ukrepi za obravnavo pandemije COVID-19.
Regulations (EU) No 575/2013 and (EU) 2019/876 should therefore be amended accordingly, 
Uredbi (EU) št. 575/2013 in (EU) 2019/876 bi bilo zato treba ustrezno spremeniti -
In order to limit the possible volatility of regulatory capital that might occur if the COVID-19 pandemic results in a significant increase in expected credit loss provisions, it is necessary to extend the transitional arrangements also in Union law. 
Da bi se omejila morebitna nestanovitnost regulativnega kapitala, do katere bi lahko prišlo, če bi pandemija COVID-19 povzročila znatno povečanje oslabitev in rezervacij za pričakovane kreditne izgube, je treba prehodno ureditev podaljšati tudi v pravu Unije.
The BCBS, EBA and ESMA clarified that institutions are expected not to mechanically apply their existing expected credit loss approaches in exceptional situations such as the COVID-19 pandemic but instead to use the flexibility inherent in IFRS 9, for example to give due weight to long-term economic trends. 
BCBS, EBA in ESMA so pojasnili, da se institucijam v izrednih razmerah, kot je pandemija COVID-19, namesto avtomatične uporabe svojih obstoječih pristopov za pričakovane kreditne izgube, dopušča večja prožnost, ki jo omogoča MSRP 9, na primer z ustreznim upoštevanjem dolgoročnih gospodarskih gibanj.