natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The ECB's competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union since the proposed regulation contains provisions affecting (1) the task of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to define and implement monetary policy in accordance with the first indent of Article 127(2) of the Treaty, (2) the ECB's tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions in accordance with Article 127(6) of the Treaty and (3) the ESCB's contribution to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the stability of the financial system, as referred to in Article 127(5) of the Treaty. 
Pristojnost ECB, da poda mnenje, izhaja iz členov 127(4) in 282(5) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije, saj predlagana uredba vsebuje določbe, ki vplivajo na (1) nalogo Evropskega sistema centralnih bank (ESCB), da opredeli in izvaja denarno politiko, v skladu s prvo alineo člena 127(2) Pogodbe, (2) naloge ECB, ki se nanašajo na politike bonitetnega nadzora kreditnih institucij, v skladu s členom 127(6) Pogodbe in (3) prispevek ESCB k nemotenemu vodenju politik pristojnih organov glede stabilnosti finančnega sistema, kakor je navedeno v členu 127(5) Pogodbe.
(11) See section 5 of the explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposed regulation. 
(11) Glej oddelek 5 obrazložitvenega memoranduma k predlagani uredbi.
Therefore the exclusion of central bank reserves calculated at that date will create less capacity for banks for a potential increase in lending to the real economy. 
Zato bo izključitev centralnobančnih rezerv, izračunanih na navedeni datum, za banke ustvarila manj zmožnosti za potencialno povečanje kreditiranja realnega gospodarstva.
The BCBS also clarified that jurisdictions which have already implemented the transitional arrangements (including the European Union) may choose in particular to add back less than 100 % during 2020 and 2021, or take other measures to prevent the add-back from including ECL amounts established before the outbreak of COVID-19 (13) . 
Odbor BCBS je prav tako pojasnil, da se lahko jurisdikcije, ki so že izvedle prehodno ureditev (vključno z Evropsko unijo), zlasti odločijo, da v letih 2020 in 2021 ponovno dodajo manj kot 100 %, ali sprejmejo druge ukrepe, s katerimi preprečijo, da bi to ponovno dodajanje vključevalo zneske pričakovanih kreditnih izgub, določene pred izbruhom COVID-19 (13) .
The ECB notes that an increase in central bank liquidity resulting from the conduct of monetary policy will lead to an increase in the quantity of reserves held by the banking system, as is the case for the recently announced monetary policy measures in relation to the COVID-19 crisis. 
ECB ugotavlja, da se bodo zaradi povečanja centralnobančne likvidnosti na podlagi vodenja denarne politike količinsko povečale rezerve v bančnem sistemu, tako kot pri nedavno najavljenih ukrepih denarne politike v zvezi s krizo zaradi COVID-19.
Furthermore, should there be a need to renew the exclusion at the end of the period during which the discretion is exercised (initially a maximum one-year period), the recalibration would be based on the amount of the reserves held at the renewal date, which may have further increased in the meantime. 
Poleg tega bi v primeru, če bi bilo treba po koncu obdobja, za katero se uveljavlja diskrecijska pravica (prvotno največ eno leto), izključitev podaljšati, ponovno umerjanje temeljilo na znesku rezerv na datum podaljšanja, ki se je lahko v vmesnem času še povečal.
The ECB welcomes the fact that the proposed regulation implements a targeted exclusion of an increase in central bank reserves, which can support a smooth implementation and transmission of monetary policy measures. 
ECB pozdravlja to, da predlagana uredba določa ciljno usmerjeno izključitev povečanja centralnobančnih rezerv, s čimer se lahko podpira nemoteno izvajanje in transmisija ukrepov denarne politike.
For all other NPEs which are secured in full or in part by qualifying collateral, minimum deduction requirements gradually increase over time until the relevant NPEs are fully covered. 
Pri vseh drugih nedonosnih izpostavljenostih, ki so v celoti ali delno zavarovane s kvalificiranim premoženjem, se minimalne zahteve za odbitke v času postopoma povečujejo, dokler ustrezne nedonosne izpostavljenosti niso v celoti pokrite.
The adjusted leverage ratio will apply throughout the full period during which the discretion is exercised and will not change, unlike under the recalibration mechanism currently in force. 
Prilagojeni količnik finančnega vzvoda se bo uporabljal v celotnem obdobju, v katerem se uveljavlja diskrecijska pravica, in se ne bo spreminjal, kot je to možno v okviru zdaj veljavnega mehanizma ponovnega umerjanja.
(14) Letters (a) to (e) of Article 201(1) of CRR refer to (a) central governments and central banks; (b) regional governments or local authorities; (c) multilateral development banks; (d) international organisations exposures to which a 0 % risk weight under Article 117 is assigned; (e) public sector entities, claims on which are treated in accordance with Article 116. 
(14) V točkah od (a) do (e) člena 201(1) CRR so navedene (a) enote centralne ravni držav in centralne banke; (b) enote regionalne ali lokalne ravni držav; (c) multilateralne razvojne banke; (d) mednarodne organizacije, izpostavljenosti do katerih na podlagi člena 117 prejmejo utež tveganja 0 %; (e) subjekti javnega sektorja, terjatve do katerih se obravnavajo v skladu s členom 116.
While CRR does not contain an explicit reference to the extraordinary circumstances described in the BCBS text, some flexibility for the competent authority in assessing the results of the back-testing is allowed. 
Čeprav CRR izrecno ne omenja izjemnih okoliščin, opisanih v besedilu odbora BCBS, pa pristojnim organom omogoča nekaj fleksibilnosti pri oceni rezultatov testiranja za nazaj.
In particular, a credit institution will be required to calculate the adjusted leverage ratio only once, on the basis of the value of the institution's eligible central bank reserves and total exposure measure on the day when the institution's competent authority declares that exceptional circumstances exist that warrant the exercise of the discretion. 
Natančneje, kreditna institucija bo morala prilagojeni količnik finančnega vzvoda izračunati samo enkrat, in sicer na podlagi vrednosti primernih centralnobančnih rezerv in mere skupne izpostavljenosti institucije na dan, ko pristojni organ institucije izjavi, da obstajajo izjemne okoliščine, ki upravičujejo uveljavljanje diskrecijske pravice.
If this discretion is exercised, the Basel standards require a recalibration (i.e. an increase) of the leverage ratio requirement to offset the exclusion of central bank reserves. 
Če se ta diskrecijska pravica uporabi, baselski standard zahteva ponovno umerjanje (tj. povečanje) zahteve po količniku finančnega vzvoda zaradi izravnave izključitve centralnobančnih rezerv.
The extraordinary levels of volatility recorded in financial markets since the outbreak of COVID-19 impact the capital requirements for market risk for institutions using the internal model approach for market risk in two ways: (a) the Value at Risk figures increase as a consequence of the observed higher volatility, and (b) the quantitative market risk multipliers reflecting the number of back-testing overshootings increase (21) . 
Izjemno velika nestanovitnost na finančnih trgih od izbruha COVID-19 vpliva na kapitalske zahteve za tržno tveganje za institucije, ki uporabljajo pristop notranjih modelov za tržno tveganje, na dva načina: (a) zaradi ugotovljene večje nestanovitnosti se povečajo tvegane vrednosti in (b) kvantitativni multiplikatorji za tržno tveganje, ki odražajo število preseganj pri testiranju za nazaj, se zvišajo (21) .
In this regard the ECB provided temporary capital and operational relief (3) and announced further flexibility in the prudential treatment of loans backed by public guarantees (4) . 
(2) ECB je v zvezi s tem zagotovila začasno kapitalsko in operativno razbremenitev (3) ter najavila dodatno fleksibilnost pri bonitetni obravnavi posojil, zavarovanih z državnimi jamstvi (4) .
However, CRR does not allow the competent authority to apply a similar treatment to hypothetical overshootings and disregard them for the purposes of calculating the back-testing addend. 
CRR pa pristojnemu organu ne dovoljuje, da bi podobno obravnaval hipotetična preseganja in jih ne bi upošteval pri izračunu prištevka pri testiranju za nazaj.
The Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHoS) which oversees the BCBS endorsed on 27 March 2020 that the timeline for implementing the final elements of the Basel III reform be postponed by one year, including the leverage ratio buffer for global systemically important banks, which will become applicable in the Union on 1 January 2022. 
Skupina guvernerjev centralnih bank in vodij nadzornih organov, ki nadzira delo odbora BCBS, je 27. marca 2020 odobrila enoletni odlog časovnega okvira za izvajanje končnih elementov reforme Basel III, vključno z blažilnikom količnika finančnega vzvoda za globalne sistemsko pomembne banke, ki se bo začel v Uniji uporabljati 1. januarja 2022.
Competent authorities should therefore be able to set the reference date for the recalibration so that the recalibration remains stable for the period of the exceptional circumstances. 
Zato bi bilo treba pristojnim organom omogočiti, da določijo referenčni datum za ponovno umerjanje, zato da ponovno umerjanje v obdobju izjemnih okoliščin ostane stabilno.
Credit institutions might not be willing to use their buffers for additional lending due to concerns of being obliged to cancel Additional Tier 1 coupons and face the potentially negative reactions of market participants. 
Kreditne institucije morda ne bodo pripravljene uporabiti blažilnikov za dodatno kreditiranje zaradi skrbi, da bodo morale preklicati kupone za dodatni temeljni kapital in se soočiti z morebitnimi negativnimi odzivi tržnih udeležencev.
The ECB has also encouraged institutions to avoid excessive procyclical effects in the application of the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 (5) , reduced temporarily the qualitative market risk multiplier to cater for the extraordinary levels of market volatility (6) and issued a recommendation on dividend distributions aimed at preserving capital resources within the banking system to enhance its capacity to support the real economy (7) . 
ECB je prav tako pozvala institucije k izogibanju pretiranim procikličnim učinkom pri uporabi Mednarodnega standarda računovodskega poročanja (MSRP) 9 (5) , začasno zmanjšala kvalitativni multiplikator za tržno tveganje v odziv na izjemno veliko tržno nestanovitnost (6) ter izdala priporočilo o razdelitvi dividend, da bi kapitalski viri ostali v bančnem sistemu, s čimer bi se povečala njegova zmožnost za podporo realnemu gospodarstvu (7) .
However, by the time a competent authority exercises its discretion, which could be on 28 June 2021 or a date thereafter, the amount of central bank reserves held by a credit institution could already have increased significantly owing to monetary policy measures. 
Lahko pa se zgodi, da se bodo do takrat, ko bo pristojni organ uveljavil diskrecijsko pravico, kar bi bilo lahko 28. junija 2021 ali pozneje, centralnobančne rezerve, ki jih ima kreditna institucija, že precej povečale zaradi ukrepov denarne politike.
If the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio of credit institutions falls below the level of the combined buffer requirement, credit institutions can distribute resources only within the limits of the maximum distributable amount (10) . 
Če se količnik navadnega lastniškega temeljnega kapitala kreditnih institucij zniža pod raven zahteve po skupnem blažilniku, lahko kreditne institucije razdelijo sredstva samo do maksimalnega zneska za razdelitev (10) .
Given uncertainty over the duration of the exceptional circumstances, the recalibration mechanism may substantially impede the effectiveness of the measure in facilitating the proper implementation and transmission of monetary policy. 
Ker je trajanje izjemnih okoliščin negotovo, bi lahko mehanizem ponovnega umerjanja bistveno oviral učinkovitost ukrepa pri olajševanju pravilnega izvajanja in transmisije denarne politike.
The unprecedented implications of the global crisis triggered by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic have prompted public authorities globally to take swift and decisive actions aimed at ensuring that credit institutions can continue to fulfil their role in funding the real economy and are able to support economic recovery, notwithstanding the likely increasing losses they will face due to the crisis. 
Javni organi po vsem svetu so morali zaradi posledic svetovne krize brez primere, ki jo je povzročila pandemija koronavirusa (COVID-19), hitro in odločno ukrepati, da bi kreditnim institucijam omogočili, da lahko še naprej izpolnjujejo svojo vlogo pri financiranju realnega gospodarstva in da lahko podprejo gospodarsko okrevanje, ne glede na verjetnost povečanja izgub zaradi krize.
(7) Recommendation of the European Central Bank of 27 March 2020 on dividend distributions during the COVID-19 pandemic and repealing Recommendation ECB/2020/1 (ECB/2020/19) ( OJ C 102 I, 30.3.2020, p. 1 ). 
(7) Priporočilo Evropske centralne banke z dne 27. marca 2020 o politiki razdelitve dividend med pandemijo bolezni COVID-19 in o razveljavitvi Priporočila ECB/2020/1 (ECB/2020/19) ( UL C 102 I, 30.3.2020, str. 1 ).
The final leverage ratio standard published by the BCBS in December 2017 (18) provides that, in order to facilitate the implementation of monetary policies, a jurisdiction may temporarily exempt central bank reserves from the leverage ratio exposure measure in exceptional macroeconomic circumstances. 
Končni standard za količnik finančnega vzvoda, ki ga je odbor BCBS objavil decembra 2017 (18) , določa, da lahko jurisdikcija zaradi lažjega izvajanja denarnih politik centralnobančne rezerve v izjemnih makroekonomskih okoliščinah začasno izključi iz mere izpostavljenosti za izračun količnika finančnega vzvoda.
The ECB welcomes the proposal to temporarily extend the more beneficial treatment of Article 47c(4) of CRR to NPEs guaranteed by national government or other public entities, which is also in line with the ECB's suggestion (16) . 
ECB pozdravlja predlog za začasno razširitev ugodnejše obravnave iz člena 47c(4) CRR na nedonosne izpostavljenosti, za katere jamči država ali drugi javni subjekti, kar je tudi skladno s predlogom ECB (16) .
The proposed regulation envisages an alignment of the applicable timeline in CRR with the new timeline endorsed by the GHoS i.e. 1 January 2023 rather than 1 January 2022 (17) . 
Predlagana uredba predvideva uskladitev veljavnega časovnega okvira v CRR z novim časovnim okvirom, ki ga je odobrila skupina guvernerjev in vodij nadzornih organov, tj. 1. januarjem 2023 namesto 1. januarja 2022 (17) .
The ECB has made use of the supervisory flexibility permitted by the current legal framework to support credit institutions to keep providing credit to households, viable businesses and corporates hardest hit by the current economic fallout (2) . 
ECB je uporabila nadzorniško fleksibilnost, ki jo omogoča sedanji pravni okvir, da pomaga kreditnim institucijam pri nadaljnjem kreditiranju gospodinjstev, podjetij, ki so sposobna preživeti, in družb, ki jih je trenutni gospodarski upad najbolj prizadel.
While individual credit institutions are able to shift these reserves around, the banking system will not be able to avoid holding these additional reserves and the accompanying increase in the leverage ratio total exposure measure. 
Medtem ko lahko posamezne kreditne institucije te rezerve prerazporejajo, se bančni sistem ne bo mogel izogniti razpolaganju s temi dodatnimi rezervami in s tem povezanemu povečanju mere skupne izpostavljenosti za izračun količnika finančnega vzvoda.
Firstly, this solution would allow tailoring the scope of the additional measures to address the effects related to COVID-19, distinguishing them from the day-one impact that the increase in provisions had on CET1 capital due to the introduction of IFRS 9. 
Prvič, ta rešitev bi omogočila prilagoditev obsega dodatnih ukrepov za obravnavo posledic v zvezi s COVID-19 in njihovo razlikovanje od učinka prvega dne, ki ga je imelo povečanje rezervacij zaradi uvedbe MSRP 9 na navadni lastniški temeljni kapital.
On 3 April 2020, the BCBS agreed on amendments (12) to the existing transitional arrangements for the regulatory treatment of ECL in light of the COVID-19 crisis. 
Odbor BCBS je 3. aprila 2020 dosegel dogovor o spremembah (12) zdaj veljavne prehodne ureditve za regulativno obravnavo pričakovanih kreditnih izgub ob upoštevanju krize zaradi COVID-19.
As a further general observation regarding the readiness to provide loans to the economy, the ECB points to the following. 
ECB ima v zvezi s pripravljenostjo za kreditiranje gospodarstva še naslednjo splošno pripombo.
Date of application of the leverage ratio buffer 
Datum začetka uporabe blažilnika količnika finančnega vzvoda
(12) See BIS press release of 3 April 2020, Basel Committee sets out additional measures to alleviate the impact of Covid-19, available at https://www.bis.org/press/p200403.htm 
(12) Glej sporočilo BIS za javnost z dne 3. aprila 2020 z naslovom Basel Committee sets out additional measures to alleviate the impact of Covid-19, dostopno na naslovu https://www.bis.org/press/p200403.htm.
A recalibration based on the central bank reserves held by a credit institution on the date a competent authority exercises its discretion might not fully facilitate the implementation and effective transmission of monetary policy measures. 
Ponovno umerjanje na podlagi centralnobančnih rezerv, ki jih ima kreditna institucija na datum, ko pristojni organ uveljavi svojo diskrecijsko pravico, morda ne bi najbolj olajšalo izvajanja in učinkovite transmisije ukrepov denarne politike.
The ECB supports the decision to make use of the extended timeline agreed at international level for the finalisation of the Basel III reforms for the purposes of their transposition into Union law. 
ECB podpira odločitev, da se za prenos reform Basel III v pravo Unije uporabi daljši časovni okvir za dokončanje teh reform, ki je bil dogovorjen na mednarodni ravni.
On 6 and 12 May 2020 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament, respectively, for an opinion on a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 575/2013 and (EU) 2019/876 as regards adjustments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (1) (hereinafter the ‘proposed regulation'). 
Evropska centralna banka (ECB) je 6. in 12. maja 2020 prejela zahtevi Sveta Evropske unije oziroma Evropskega parlamenta za mnenje o predlogu uredbe Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o spremembi uredb (EU) št. 575/2013 in (EU) 2019/876 glede prilagoditev zaradi pandemije COVID-19 (1) (v nadaljnjem besedilu: predlagana uredba).
In order for the exclusion to be fully effective the ECB suggests the following modifications. 
ECB za zagotovitev polne učinkovitosti izključitve predlaga naslednje spremembe.
As a result, compared to international standards, competent authorities are restricted in their available supervisory measures from achieving their objective of maintaining credit institutions' ability to provide market liquidity and to continue market-making activities in extraordinary circumstances, which play a critical role in supporting the real economy. 
Zato imajo pristojni organi v primerjavi z mednarodnimi standardi omejene razpoložljive nadzorniške ukrepe, s katerimi bi lahko dosegli cilj ohranjanja zmožnosti kreditnih institucij za zagotavljanje tržne likvidnosti in ohranjanje dejavnosti vzdrževanja trga v izjemnih okoliščinah, kar je ključno pri podpiranju realnega gospodarstva.
In the case of NPEs guaranteed by ECAs, the part of the exposure covered by such guarantee only needs to be fully deducted after seven years in NPE status, while there is no deduction requirement before that. 
Če za nedonosne izpostavljenosti jamčijo uradne izvozne agencije, je treba del izpostavljenosti, za katerega velja tako jamstvo, v celoti odbiti šele po sedmih letih statusa nedonosne izpostavljenosti, pred tem pa ni nobene zahteve za odbitek.
The dynamic component allows credit institutions to partially neutralise the impact of the additional (i.e. post-day-one) increase in provisions for exposures that are not credit-impaired. 
Dinamična komponenta kreditnim institucijam omogoča, da delno izničijo učinek dodatnega povečanja rezervacij (tj. po prvem dnevu) za izpostavljenosti, katerim se kreditna kakovost ni poslabšala.
The proposed regulation envisages a temporary extension of the specific treatment of NPEs guaranteed by ECAs to NPEs guaranteed by national governments or other public entities, which are eligible as credit protection providers under the credit risk mitigation rules (14) , provided that the guarantee or counter-guarantee is provided as part of support measures to assist borrowers during the COVID-19 pandemic (15) . 
Predlagana uredba predvideva začasno razširitev posebne obravnave nedonosnih izpostavljenosti, za katere jamčijo uradne izvozne agencije, na nedonosne izpostavljenosti, za katere jamči država ali drugi javni subjekti, ki so primerni za dajalce kreditnega zavarovanja v skladu s pravili o zmanjševanju kreditnega tveganja (14) , če je jamstvo ali posredno jamstvo zagotovljeno kot del ukrepov podpore za pomoč kreditojemalcem v času pandemije COVID-19 (15) .
Additional measures, such as disregarding overshootings (resulting from both actual and hypothetical losses) in extraordinary circumstances, would better achieve this objective. 
Ta cilj bi bilo lažje doseči z dodatnimi ukrepi, kot je neupoštevanje preseganj (zaradi dejanskih in hipotetičnih izgub) v izjemnih okoliščinah.
This would allow competent authorities to disregard any day-to-day variation of central bank reserves when setting the new minimum requirement for each institution. 
Zato bi lahko pristojni organi pri določanju nove minimalne zahteve za vsako institucijo zanemarili dnevne spremembe centralnobančnih rezerv.
(17) See proposed amendment to Article 3(5) of Regulation (EU) 2019/876 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards the leverage ratio, the net stable funding ratio, requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities, counterparty credit risk, market risk, exposures to central counterparties, exposures to collective investment undertakings, large exposures, reporting and disclosure requirements, and Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 ( OJ L 150, 7.6.2019, p. 1 ). 
(17) Glej predlagano spremembo člena 3(5) Uredbe (EU) 2019/876 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 20. maja 2019 o spremembi Uredbe (EU) št. 575/2013 v zvezi s količnikom finančnega vzvoda, količnikom neto stabilnega financiranja, zahtevami glede kapitala in kvalificiranih obveznosti, kreditnim tveganjem nasprotne stranke, tržnim tveganjem, izpostavljenostmi do centralnih nasprotnih strank, izpostavljenostmi do kolektivnih naložbenih podjemov, velikimi izpostavljenostmi, zahtevami glede poročanja in razkritja ter Uredbe (EU) št. 648/2012 ( UL L 150, 7.6.2019, str. 1 ).
These developments impact the CET1 ratios of credit institutions and might also impact credit institutions' capacity to continue market making activities and provide market liquidity, adversely affecting the orderly functioning of the market. 
Te spremembe vplivajo na količnike navadnega lastniškega temeljnega kapitala kreditnih institucij, lahko pa bi vplivale tudi na zmožnost kreditnih institucij za nadaljevanje dejavnosti vzdrževanja trga in zagotavljanja tržne likvidnosti, kar bi negativno vplivalo na pravilno delovanje trga.