natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
58 The 2014 reforms package reduced the number of days of annual leave by 42 % (from 3.5 to 2 days per month) for staff in delegations and introduced changes to the calculation of the living conditions allowance. 
58 S svežnjem reform iz leta 2014 je bilo število dni letnega dopusta za uslužbence v delegacijah zmanjšano za 42 % (s 3,5 dneva na dva dneva na mesec), uvedene pa so bile tudi spremembe pri izračunu nadomestila za življenjske razmere.
Overall, the staffŐs perception that working conditions have deteriorated is stronger in delegations than at the Commission as a whole. 
V splošnem je mnenje uslužbencev, da so se delovni pogoji poslabšali, v delegacijah bolj prisotno kot na Komisiji kot celoti.
In 201622, fewer than 50 % of delegation staff considered the Commission to be an attractive workplace, with only 21 % considering that human resources matched the workload. 
Leta 201622 je manj kot 50 % uslužbencev v delegacijah menilo, da je Komisija privlačno delovno okolje, le 21 % pa jih je menilo, da človeški viri ustrezajo delovni obremenitvi.
59 One of the drivers for the changes in the SR revision affecting delegations was to generate cost savings23. 
59 Eden od dejavnikov za spremembe v kadrovskih predpisih, ki so vplivale na delegacije, so bili prihranki pri stroških23.
However, spending on delegation staff accounts for only 4.7 % of all expenditure from the administration budget24. 
Vendar poraba za uslužbence v delegacijah znaša le 4,7 % vseh odhodkov iz upravnega proračuna24.
We found that the small budgetary savings were accompanied by a significant negative impact on staff. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da so majhne proračunske prihranke spremljali bistveni negativni učinki za uslužbence.
Increased contract and pay diversity 60 Staff recruited after 2004 and 2014 are employed under less favourable conditions than applied previously. 
Večja raznolikost pogodb in plač 60 Uslužbenci, zaposleni po letih 2004 in 2014, so bili zaposleni pod manj ugodnimi pogoji kot uslužbenci, zaposleni prej.
For example, GFIV contract staff meeting the same minimum recruitment requirements (education and experience) as junior administrators may earn 28 % less 22 The full results of the 2018 staff survey were not available at the time of the audit: we used the results of the 2016 survey for DG DEVCO. 
Z reformo iz leta 2004 so se znižale plače za 22 Celotni rezultati ankete med uslužbenci iz leta 2018 v času revizije niso bili na voljo; za GD DEVCO je Sodišče uporabilo rezultate ankete iz leta 2016. 23 Glej Uredbo (EU, EURATOM) št.
23 See Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 1023/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013, recital (27) "It is appropriate to modernise working conditions for staff employed in third countries and to render them more cost-effective whilst generating cost savings". 
1023/2013 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 22. oktobra 2013, uvodna izjava 27: „Primerno je posodobiti delovne pogoje za osebje, zaposleno v tretjih državah, in povečati njihovo stroškovno učinkovitost ter hkrati varčevati pri stroških”.
24 Share of spending on delegation staff compared to overall expenditure under Heading 5 (excl. Pensions and European Schools). 
24 Delež porabe za uslužbence delegacij v primerjavi s skupnimi odhodki za razdelek 5 (brez pokojnin in Evropskih šol).
than the latter. Currently around 6 % of staff, all of them GFI and GFII contract staff, earn less than the lowest paid official (AST/SC1, with a basic yearly salary around Ű32 400). 
Zdaj približno 6 % uslužbencev, med katerimi so vsi pogodbeni uslužbenci v funkcionalni skupini GFI in GFII, zaslužijo manj od uradnikov z najnižjo plačo (AST/SC1 z osnovno letno plačo v višini približno 32 400 EUR).
Another third of staff (across all categories) earn up to twice that amount. 
Tretjina uslužbencev (v vseh kategorijah) zasluži do dvakrat več.
62 In addition, discrepancies between grade and level of responsibility exist among officials. 
62 Poleg tega obstajajo razlike med razredi in stopnjo odgovornosti tudi med uradniki.
Experienced professionals in junior grades (AD6 to AD8) may be assigned greater responsibility than higher graded staff recruited before them. Ń Only 22.4 % of recruitment was at AD7 level between 2012 and 2017, many experienced candidates wishing to work for the Commission applied through entry-grade (AD5/AD6) competitions. 
Izkušeni strokovnjaki v nižjih razredih (AD6 do AD8) imajo lahko več odgovornosti kot uslužbenci v višjih razredih, zaposleni pred njimi. — Ker je bilo med letoma 2012 in 2017 le 22,4 % zaposlovanja na ravni AD7, so se morali številni kandidati z izkušnjami, ki so želeli delati na Komisiji, prijaviti prek natečajev za začetne razrede (AD5/AD6).
Because of their professional background, and performance, these new recruits were often quickly given responsibilities (e.g. head of cooperation in a delegation, team leader in other activities). 
Zaradi njihove strokovnosti in uspešnosti so bile tem novim zaposlenim pogosto hitro dodeljene odgovornosti (npr. vodja sodelovanja v delegaciji, vodja skupine pri drugih dejavnostih).
Pay package less attractive over the years 63 The 2014 revision of the SR aimed at maintaining attractive recruitment conditions. 
Sveženj, s katerim so določene plače, z leti manj privlačen 63 Namen spremembe kadrovskih predpisov iz leta 2014 je bil ohraniti privlačne pogoje zaposlovanja.
Even though overall working conditions (including entry-grade salaries) remain attractive for most EU graduates, the Commission faces difficulties in attracting qualified applicants from certain nationalities and with certain profiles. 
Čeprav splošni delovni pogoji (vključno s plačami za začetne razrede) ostajajo privlačni za večino evropskih diplomantov, se Komisija spopada s težavami pri pritegnitvi kvalificiranih kandidatov iz nekaterih držav članic in z nekaterimi profili.
The attractiveness of salaries partly depends on the purchasing power of EU officials in the different locations where they work. 
Privlačnost plač je deloma odvisna od kupne moči uradnikov EU na različnih lokacijah, kjer delajo.
Salaries are updated annually to ensure 'parallelism' with the changes in pay for national civil servants and to reflect the evolution in the cost of living for EU officials in Belgium and Luxembourg. 
Plače se letno posodabljajo, da se zagotovi vzporednost s spremembami plač javnih uslužbencev v nacionalnih javnih upravah in upošteva razvoj življenjskih stroškov za uradnike EU v Belgiji in Luksemburgu.
64 The annual method for updating the pay and pensions of EU officials was modified in 2004 and again amended in 2014. 
64 Metoda letnega posodabljanja plač in pokojnin uradnikov EU je bila spremenjena leta 2004 in nato ponovno leta 2014.
It now includes two key elements: Ń a global specific indicator (GSI): based on changes in the purchasing power of national civil servants in central government in 11 Member States (previously just eight were used); Ń the joint Belgium-Luxembourg index25 (JBLI) of changes in the cost of living in Belgium and Luxembourg, also taking account of inflation in the two countries. 
Zdaj zajema dva ključna elementa: — globalni posebni kazalnik (GSI): na podlagi sprememb kupne moči javnih uslužbencev na centralni ravni države v 11 državah članicah (pred tem jih je bilo upoštevanih le osem), 36 — skupni belgijsko-luksemburški indeks25 (SBLI) sprememb življenjskih stroškov v Belgiji in Luksemburgu, pri katerem se upošteva tudi inflacija v obeh državah.
65 Outside Belgium and Luxembourg, the pay and pensions of EU staff are corrected to maintain purchasing power parity with reference to Brussels. 
65 Izven Belgije in Luksemburga se plače in pokojnine uslužbencev EU prilagajajo tako, da ohranjajo pariteto kupne moči glede na Bruselj.
For this purpose, Eurostat calculates annual correction coefficients for certain locations. 
V ta namen Eurostat vsako leto izračuna korekcijske koeficiente za posamezne lokacije.
66 Use of the method has led to regular nominal salary increases, except when pay was frozen in 2011, 2013 and 2014. 
66 Z uporabo metode so se nominalne plače redno povečevale, razen ko so bile v letih 2011, 2013 in 2014 zamrznjene.
In 2011Đ2018 the salaries of EU officials were adjusted as shown in Table 2. 
V obdobju 2011–2018 so se plače uradnikov EU prilagajale, kot je prikazano v tabeli 2.
Table 2 Đ Annual adjustments to the salaries of EU officials 2011-2018 Source: Eurostat reports on annual updates of remuneration and pensions of EU officials. 67 The purchasing power of central government civil servants across the EU has declined since 2003. 
Tabela 2 – Letne prilagoditve plač uradnikov EU v obdobju 2011–2018 Vir: poročila Eurostata o letni posodobitvi osebnih prejemkov in pokojnin uradnikov EU 67 Kupna moč javnih uslužbencev na centralni ravni države po vsej EU od leta 2003 upada.
Consequently, in line with the parallelism principle, the purchasing power of EU officials has followed a similar path. 
Posledično se je v skladu z načelom vzporednosti podobno razvijala tudi kupna moč uradnikov EU.
However, the 2011, 2013 and 2014 freezes made the decline more pronounced for EU staff (see Figure 18). 
Vendar je zaradi zamrznitev v letih 2011, 2013 in 2014 ta upad za uslužbence EU bolj izrazit (glej sliko 18).
36 Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Annual update coefficient based on GSI and JBLI 0% (freeze) 0.8 % 0% (freeze) 0% (freeze) 2.4 % 3.3 % 1.5 % 1.7 % 
37 Leto 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Letni posodobitveni koeficient na podlagi GSI in SBLI 0% (zamrznitev) 0,8 % 0% (zamrznitev) 0% (zamrznitev) 2,4 % 3,3 % 1,5 % 1,7 % 25 Za referenčno obdobje od 1. julija 2004 do 31. decembra 2012 se je računal bruseljski mednarodni indeks v skladu s Prilogo XI h kadrovskim predpisom, kot so bili spremenjeni z Uredbo št.
Figure 18 Đ Evolution of the purchasing power of EU officials in Brussels and central governments staff in Member States 37 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2% 0% -2% -4% -6% -8% -10 % -12 % -14 % Central Governments staff in Member States (GSI) EU staff in Brussels Source: ECA, based on Eurostat data. 68 Eurostat reports26 provide indicative information on the difference in the purchasing power of EU staff working and living in, respectively, Luxembourg and Brussels. 
Slika 18 – Razvoj kupne moči uradnikov EU v Bruslju in uslužbencev na centralni ravni države v državah članicah 38 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2% 0% -2% -4% -6% -8% -10 % -12 % -14 % Uslužbenci na centralni ravni države v državah članicah (GSI) Uslužbenci EU v Bruslju Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče na podlagi podatkov Eurostata 68 Poročila Eurostata26 zagotavljajo okvirne informacije o razliki v kupni moči med uslužbenci EU, ki delajo in živijo v Luksemburgu, in tistimi, ki delajo in živijo v Bruslju.
This difference mainly results from the faster growth of rental prices in Luxembourg. 
Razlika je večinoma posledica hitrejše rasti najemnin v Luksemburgu.
Once the cost of rentals is excluded, the purchasing power of Luxembourg-based staff was higher in 2017 and lower in 2018. 
Če se stroški najemnin ne upoštevajo, je bila kupna moč uslužbencev v Luksemburgu večja leta 2017 in nižja leta 2018.
Given the scale of the difference, the Commission is carrying out a study of its attractiveness as an institution and the cost of living in Luxembourg. 
Glede na veliko razliko Komisija izvaja študijo o tem, koliko je privlačna kot institucija, in o življenjskih stroških v Luksemburgu.
The study should be completed in the third quarter of 2019. 
Študija naj bi bila končana v tretjem četrtletju leta 2019.
69 The distribution of Commission staff by country of origin reflects the relative attractiveness of the working conditions on offer. 
69 Porazdelitev uslužbencev Komisije po državah izvora odraža relativno privlačnost ponujenih delovnih pogojev.
Similarly, imbalances are visible in 26 Analytical category reports supplementing the reports on annual updates of remuneration and pensions of the EU officials https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/civil-servants-remuneration/publications. 
Podobno so neravnovesja glede državljanstva kandidatov 26 Analitična poročila za posamezne kategorije, priložena poročilom o letni posodobitvi osebnih prejemkov in pokojnin uradnikov EU, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/civil-servants-remuneration/publications.
38 the nationalities of candidates in EPSO competitions, with certain countries (e.g. France, Germany and the Netherlands) under-represented27. 
39 razvidna tudi na natečajih EPSO, na katerih so državljani nekaterih držav (npr. Francije, Nemčije in Nizozemske) premalo zastopani27.
70 We conducted a detailed analysis of the CommissionŐs staff nationality statistics to see what imbalances not justified by objective criteria could be observed. 
70 Sodišče je opravilo podrobno analizo statističnih podatkov glede državljanstva uslužbencev Komisije, da bi ugotovilo, ali so prisotna neravnovesja, ki jih ni mogoče upravičiti z objektivnimi merili.
We compared the share of CommissionŐs staff of each nationality with the corresponding country share of the EUŐs active population (the source of potential recruits), computing how many staff each Member State "should" supply by grade range. 
Sodišče je primerjalo delež uslužbencev Komisije, ki so državljani določene države članice, z ustreznim deležem državljanov zadevne države med aktivnim prebivalstvom EU (virom potencialnih novih zaposlenih), s čimer je izračunalo, koliko uslužbencev v posameznem razponu razredov „naj bi” prispevala vsaka država članica.
Figure 19 presents the results of this analysis. 
Na sliki 19 so predstavljeni rezultati te analize.
27 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council pursuant to Article 27 of the Staff Regulations of Officials and to Article 12 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (Geographical balance), COM(2018) 377 final. 
27 Poročilo Komisije Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu v skladu s členom 27 Kadrovskih predpisov za uradnike Evropske unije in členom 12 Pogojev za zaposlitev drugih uslužbencev Evropske unije (geografska uravnoteženost), COM(2018) 377 final.
71 The distribution of Commission staff by country of origin reveals significant differences between nationalities, with Belgian nationals the most represented28, and UK and German nationals the least represented, at all grades. 
71 Porazdelitev uslužbencev Komisije po državah izvora odkriva bistvene razlike med državljanstvom uslužbencev, pri čemer so državljani Belgije zastopani najbolj28, državljani Združenega kraljestva in Nemčije pa najmanj, in sicer v vseh razredih.
Spanish, French, Polish and Dutch nationals are particularly under-represented in the following grades: Ń in the intermediate AD grades (5-8) for Spain, France and the Netherlands, and Ń in the intermediate AST (5-9) and higher AD (9-12) grades for Poland. 
Državljani Španije, Francije, Poljske in Nizozemske so še zlasti premalo zastopani v naslednjih razredih: — v srednjih razredih skupine AD (5–8) v primeru Španije, Francije in Nizozemske in — v srednjih razredih skupine AST (5–9) in višjih razredih skupine AD (9–12) v primeru Poljske.
72 We found that the pattern of under-and over-representation is not consistent among grades. 
72 Sodišče je ugotovilo, da vzorec premajhne in prevelike zastopanosti ni dosleden med razredi.
Some countries are over-represented in the lower AST grades (Romania and Bulgaria), while other are over-represented in the higher AD grades (most noticeably Sweden, Finland, Greece and Italy). 
Nekatere države članice so prekomerno zastopane v nižjih razredih skupine AST (Romunija in Bolgarija), medtem ko so druge prekomerno zastopane v višjih razredih skupine AD (najbolj očitno Švedska, Finska, Grčija in Italija).
73 Overall, changes in the conditions of employment have reduced the relative attractiveness of working for the EU to some nationalities that are already under-represented. 
73 V splošnem so spremembe pogojev za zaposlitev zmanjšale relativno privlačnost dela za EU pri nekaterih državah članicah, ki so že premalo zastopane.
The evidence we collected shows disparity in the attractiveness of the Commission for graduates. 
Dokazi, ki jih je Sodišče zbralo, kažejo razlike glede privlačnosti Komisije za diplomante.
The Trendence Institute's graduate barometer listed 'Commission and EU careers' as the 15th most popular potential employer in the EU in 201629. 
Barometer diplomantov, ki ga je pripravil Tredence Institut, poklicne poti na Komisiji in v EU navaja kot 15. najbolj priljubljenega potencialnega delodajalca v EU leta 201629.
The results by country reveal significant disparities in the Commission's perceived attractiveness. 
Rezultati po državah kažejo bistvene razlike glede dojemanja privlačnosti Komisije.
In 2017 the Commission was ranked 6th (7.4 %) in Austria, and in 2016 it was ranked 7th (4.8 %) in France and 15th in Spain (3.5 %), but only 31st (2.2 %) in Germany and 48th (1.5 %) in Poland. 
Leta 2017 je bila Komisija uvrščena na 6. mesto v Avstriji (7,4 %), leta 2016 pa na 7. mesto v Franciji (4,8 %) in 15. v Španiji (3,5 %) ter zgolj na 31. (2,2 %) v Nemčiji in 48. (1,5 %) na Poljskem.
Better preparation of the 2014 package could have helped mitigate its negative consequences 74 Given the size and nature of the potential financial and non-financial impacts of the 2014 reforms package, we would have expected the Commission to have carried out an assessment similar to those made for other major legislative proposals with budgetary implications. 
Boljša priprava svežnja iz leta 2014 bi lahko pripomogla k zmanjšanju njegovih negativnih posledic 74 Glede na obseg in naravo potencialnih finančnih in nefinančnih posledic svežnja reform iz leta 2014 je Sodišče pričakovalo, da je Komisija izvedla oceno, podobno ocenam, izvedenim za druge pomembne zakonodajne predloge s proračunskimi posledicami.
28 Belgium is a host country which has an impact on the number of staff working for the Commission. 
28 Belgija je država članica gostiteljica, kar vpliva na število uslužbencev, ki delajo na Komisiji.
29 In a survey of 300 000 graduates from 24 European countries, the Commission obtained 2.94 % of positive answers, compared to 11.54 % for the first employer cited. 40 
29 V anketi, ki je zajela 300 000 diplomantov iz 24 evropskih držav, je Komisija prejela 2,94 % pozitivnih odgovorov, medtem ko jih je najvišje uvrščeni delodajalec prejel 11,54 %. 41
Low focus on non-financial aspects 75 The Commission considered that there was no legal requirement to carry out an in-depth analysis of potential consequences of the proposed changes. 
Nefinančnim vidikom namenjeno malo pozornosti 75 Komisija je menila, da za izvedbo poglobljene analize morebitnih posledic predlaganih sprememb ni nobene zakonske obveznosti.
As a result, implementation of the 2014 package was not preceded by an overall analysis of either the problems to be addressed or the likely short and long-term consequences of the chosen measures on HR management. 
Posledično pred začetkom izvajanja svežnja iz leta 2014 ni bila opravljena ne splošna analiza težav, ki naj bi jih odpravili, ne analiza verjetnih kratko-in dolgoročnih učinkov izbranih ukrepov na upravljanje človeških virov.
76 The CommissionŐs preparatory analysis focused largely on estimating the likely financial effects of the proposed cost-saving measures. 
76 Pripravljalna analiza Komisije se je v glavnem osredotočala na oceno verjetnih finančnih posledic predlaganih varčevalnih ukrepov.
We found that the analysis of budgetary savings was based on a sound methodology which explained the key assumptions made. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da je analiza proračunskih prihrankov temeljila na trdni metodologiji, kar je pojasnilo ključne predpostavke.
77 Regarding the HR situation, the Commission focused mostly on developing measures to remedy specific consequences of the 2004 reform. 
77 Pri upravljanju človeških virov se je Komisija osredotočila zlasti na pripravo ukrepov, katerih namen je bil odpraviti specifične posledice reforme iz leta 2004.
These measures were motivated by analyses done during 2009-2011, in particular: Ń a Eurostat study on the long-term budgetary implications of pension costs, which addressed the major trends forecast in this area from 2010 to 2059; Ń a report on equivalence between the old (pre-2004) and new career structures, which concluded that equivalence was not maintained for all function groups and there was a need for a clearer correlation between levels of responsibility and levels of pay. 
Ti ukrepi so temeljili na analizah, opravljenih v obdobju 2009–2011, zlasti: — študija Eurostata o dolgoročnih proračunskih posledicah stroškov pokojnin, ki je obravnavala pomembne trende, napovedane na tem področju v obdobju 2010–2059; — poročilo o enakovrednosti stare (pred letom 2004) in nove karierne strukture, v katerem je bilo ugotovljeno, da enakovrednost ni bila ohranjena pri vseh funkcionalnih skupinah in da mora biti korelacija med stopnjami odgovornosti in stopnjami plač jasnejša.
78 However, the HR implications of the cost-saving measures were not all assessed in the same degree of detail. 
78 Vendar vse posledice varčevalnih ukrepov za človeške vire niso bile ocenjene enako podrobno.
In particular, there was no risk analysis or assessment of the positive or negative consequences of the following measures: Ń changes to the criteria for downgrading and dismissal; Ń extension of parental leave; Ń changes to the flexitime recovery rules; Ń reduction in the annual leave entitlement for travel; Ń changes to the terms of employment in delegations, e.g. annual leave and the method for calculating the living conditions allowance. 
Zlasti ni bila opravljena analiza tveganja ali ocena pozitivnih ali negativnih posledic naslednjih ukrepov: — sprememb meril za degradiranje in odpoved delovnega razmerja, — podaljšanje starševskega dopusta, — sprememb pravil v zvezi z obračunom ur pri gibljivem delovnem času, — zmanjšanja tistega dela letnega dopusta, do katerega so upravičeni uslužbenci, ki je namenjen njihovemu potovanju, — sprememb pogojev za zaposlitev v delegacijah, npr. v zvezi z letnim dopustom in metodo za izračun nadomestila za življenjske razmere.
79 As a result, some of the proposed changes to the conditions of employment listed above were not based on an analysis of expected or identified problems. 
79 Posledično nekatere zgoraj navedene predlagane spremembe pogojev za zaposlitev niso temeljile na analizi pričakovanih ali opredeljenih težav.
them were introduced during the trilogue stage and their justification came mainly from the budgetary savings perspective. 
Nekatere so bile uvedene v fazi tristranskih sestankov, upravičene pa so bile predvsem z vidika proračunskih prihrankov.
Insufficient monitoring and reporting on HR consequences 80 We found weaknesses in the CommissionŐs monitoring of the main HR effects of the measures in the 2014 package, such as the increased working week and the 5 % reduction in posts. 
Nezadostno spremljanje posledic za človeške vire in poročanje o njih 80 Sodišče je ugotovilo slabosti pri tem, kako je Komisija spremljala glavne učinke ukrepov svežnja iz leta 2014 na človeške vire, kot sta povečanje števila delovnih ur na teden in zmanjšanje števila delovnih mest za 5 %.
81 To assign staff to priorities, it is necessary to have a system with sufficiently reliable data for assessing workload across the Commission as a whole. 
81 Da bi uslužbence dodelili prednostnim nalogam, je treba vzpostaviti sistem z dovolj zanesljivimi podatki za oceno delovne obremenitve na Komisiji kot celoti.
Information about the resources used for specific tasks (objectives) is a requirement for managerial accountability, which supports the annual declaration of assurance. 
Informacije o virih, porabljenih za specifične naloge (cilje), so pogoj za vodstveno odgovornost, ki je podlaga za letno izjavo o zanesljivosti.
82 The 2014 reforms package introduced a minimum 40-hour working week and included rules on flexible working time arrangements. 
82 S svežnjem reform iz leta 2014 so bili uvedeni minimalno število 40 delovnih ur na teden in pravila v zvezi z ureditvijo gibljivega delovnega časa.