natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Of the seven catch declarations that provided evidence of the quantities landed, two showed a port in another region. 
V dveh od sedmih poročil o ulovu, v katerih so bile navedene iztovorjene količine, je bilo navedeno pristanišče v drugi regiji.
Analysis of VMS signals did not provide any information about the exact location of the vessels in question on the landing date shown (2). 
Z analizo signalov VMS ni bilo mogoče določiti točnega položaja zadevnih plovil na navedeni datum iztovarjanja (2).
(1) 262,9 thousand tonnes against 431,9 thousand tonnes, a difference of 169,0 thousand tonnes. 
(1) 262 900 proti 431 900 tonam oziroma razlika 169 000 ton.
(2) In fact, two of the vessels were not equipped with this system, and in the case of the five others no signal was received on the day of the landing (in one case the vessel had not emitted any signals for more than three years before the landing date shown, and in another case for more than two years). 
(2) Dve plovili namreč nista bili opremljeni s tem sistemom, od petih drugih pa na dan iztovarjanja ni bil prejet noben signal (v enem primeru plovilo ni oddajalo signalov že več kot 3 leta pred navedenim datumom iztovarjanja, v drugem primeru več kot dve leti).
40. None of the Member States visited had carried out a comprehensive audit of the catch data collection and validation systems to evaluate the quality of the IT applications. 
Nobena od obiskanih držav članic ni izvajala celovite revizije sistema za zbiranje in potrjevanje podatkov o ulovu, s katero bi ocenila zlasti kakovost računalniških aplikacij.
Similarly, the data produced by the systems and forwarded to the Commission had never been subject to a procedure involving certification by an independent body. 
Prav tako podatki iz teh sistemov, ki so bili poslani Komisiji, niso bili nikoli predmet postopka potrjevanja s strani neodvisnega organa.
In the original version of the Regulation on control (3), however, it was stipulated that in the year following the entry into force of the Regulation, each Member State was to submit to the Commission a report describing the way in which data are collected and verified, and specifying the reliability of such data. 
Vendar je bilo v prvotni različici uredbe o nadzoru (3) predvideno, da država članica Komisiji v prvem letu po začetku veljavnosti uredbe predloži poročilo, v katerem opiše način zbiranja in preverjanja podatkov ter navede stopnjo zanesljivosti teh podatkov.
This obligation was not retained in later versions of the text (4). 
Ta obveznost ni bila ohranjena v poznejših različicah besedila (4).
(3) Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93, Article 19(5). 
(3) Uredba (EGS) št. 2847/93, člen 19(5).
(4) Regulation (EC) No 2846/98, Article 1(13)(c). 
(4) Uredba (ES) št.
C 317/12 EN Official Journal of the European Union 28.12.2007 The Commission is aware of this situation. 
C 317/12 SL Uradni list Evropske unije 28.12.2007 Komisija se zaveda tega položaja 42.
The Commission is aware of the unreliable quality of the data that it receives (1), and it has already said so publicly. 
Komisija se zaveda nezanesljivosti podatkov, ki jih prejema in je o tem že javno poročala (1).
Nevertheless it is these data of unreliable quality that are being used by the Commission in trying to prevent and, where appropriate, penalise quota overruns. 
Komisija si na podlagi teh nezanesljivih podatkov vseeno prizadeva, da bi preprečila preseganja kvote in jih kaznovala, kjer je to potrebno.
Insufficient Commission monitoring 44. 
Nezadostno spremljanje s strani Komisije 44.
As the Member States have primary responsibility for managing and monitoring their quotas, it is they who must take the necessary steps to avoid quota overruns, if necessary by closing the fisheries concerned. 
Ker so za upravljanje in spremljanje svojih kvot odgovorne predvsem države članice, morajo sprejeti potrebne predpise, da bi preprečile njihovo preseganje, če je potrebno, tudi s prekinitvijo zadevnih ribolovov.
It is for the Commission, for its part, to verify that the Member States fulfil their obligations. 
Komisija pa mora preveriti, ali države članice spoštujejo svoje obveznosti.
For this purpose it has the possibility of halting fishing for a particular stock on its own initiative (2). 
V ta namen ima možnost, da na lastno pobudo prekine ribolov določenega staleža (2).
Information system unsatisfactory 45. 
Nezadosten informacijski sistem 45.
There are a number of shortcomings in the information system through which the Commission receives monthly the catch data prepared by the Member States. 
Informacijski sistem, prek katerega Komisija mesečno prejema podatke o ulovu, ki jih pripravijo države članice, ima več pomanjkljivosti.
Firstly, as stated above, the quality of the information forwarded is unreliable. 
Prvič, poslane informacije so, kot je bilo že navedeno, nezanesljive.
Secondly, not all Member States systematically forward their reports within the specified deadlines, thereby reducing the CommissionŐs scope for reaction. 
Drugič, vse države članice poročil ne pošiljajo sistematično v predvidenih rokih, kar omejuje odzivno sposobnost Komisije.
Moreover, since the information is cumulative over the year, it is possible neither to test the consistency of data from one year to the next over specified periods, nor to identify processing delays. 
Ker se poleg tega informacije zbirajo vse leto, ni mogoče preverjati usklajenosti med enim in drugim proračunskim letom v določenih obdobjih ali ugotoviti zamude pri obdelavi.
Lastly, in the absence of some simple logical tests it is not possible to identify even gross misstatements in declarations immediately (3). 
Kot zadnje, ker ni nekaterih preprostih logičnih preizkusov, ni mogoče takoj ugotoviti niti nekaterih velikih netočnosti pri poročanju (3).
Absence of data quality evaluation 46. 
Ni ocenjevanja kakovosti podatkov 46.
Data are forwarded to DG Fish as part of fisheries policy implementation, but the Commission does not cross-check them against similar data received through Eurostat (4), which in some cases are significantly different. 
Komisija ne primerja podatkov, poslanih GD za ribištvo v okviru izvajanja ribiške politike, z enakimi podatki, ki jih prejme Eurostat (4) in se v nekaterih primerih znatno razlikujejo.
Since 1999 the Commission has had a right of access to duplicates of national IT files (5). 
Komisija ima od leta 1999 pravico dostopa do dvojnikov nacionalnih računalniških datotek (5).
This facility should enable it to evaluate the quality of the data forwarded to it. 
Ta možnost bi ji morala omogočiti, da oceni kakovost podatkov, ki se ji pošiljajo.
It was not until 2007, however, that it sent its first request on the subject of catch data to the Member States. 
Vendar je, kar zadeva podatke o ulovu, državam članicam prvo zahtevo v zvezi s tem poslala šele leta 2007.
The Commission attributes the low utilisation of this facility to the fact that its control and inspection units do not have sufficient staff with real data analysis, processing and control skills. 
Komisija pojasnjuje, da to možnost malo uporablja, ker njene nadzorne in inšpekcijske enote nimajo dovolj zaposlenih z resničnim strokovnim znanjem in izkušnjami na področju analize, obdelave in preverjanja teh podatkov.
2005 bluefin tuna (BFT) Member State France Italy Spain Difference (tonnes) % Đ 8,8 % 12,4 % 3,4 % Table 2 Examples of differences between DG Fish data and Eurostat data Quota 6 983 4 888 5 857 DG FISH data 8 936 4 879 5 850 Eurostat Data tonnes 9 726 Đ 791 4 272 607 5 650 200 (1) The Compliance Scoreboard 2005, p. 12, states, ÔThe data forwarded by Member States to the Commission is based on the declarations of catches and landings made by vessel owners or agents. 
Navadni tun (BFT), leto 2005 (v tonah) % – 8,8 % 12,4 % 3,4 % Tabela 2 Primeri razlik med podatki GD za ribištvo in pomorske zadeve in Eurostata Država članica Francija Italija Španija Kvota 6 983 4 888 5 857 Podatki Eurostata Ton 9 726 – 791 4 272 607 5 650 200 Podatki GD za ribištvo 8 936 4 879 5 850 Razlika (1) V Compliance Scoreboard 2005 na strani 12, navaja, da podatki, ki jih države članice posredujejo Komisiji, temeljijo na deklaracijah o ulovu in iztovarjanju, ki jih izpolnijo lastniki plovil ali agenti.
The Commission believes that this data may not always reflect reality. 
Komisija meni, da ti podatki morda ne odražajo vedno dejanskega stanja.
Scientific reports have repeatedly emphasised the possibility that misreporting or underreporting of catches or landings may negatively impact the accuracy of vital stock assessments, and this suspicion is supported by the observations made by Commission inspectors over a number of years.Ő http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/control_enforcement/score-board/archives/scoreboard2005/management_en.htm (2) Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93, Article 21(3). 
V znanstvenih poročilih je bila večkrat poudarjena možnost, da bi lahko napačno poročanje ali poročanje o ulovu, manjšem od dejanskega, negativno vplivalo na točnost ocen o vitalnih staležih, ta sum pa podpirajo tudi večletna opažanja inšpektorjev Komisije. http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/ cfp/control_enforcement/scoreboard/archives/scoreboard2005/ma-nagement_en.htm (2) Uredba (EGS) št. 2847/93, člen 21(3).
(3) In 2005 the Italian authorities were thus able to declare catches of bluefin tuna, a quota species, under the heading of non-quota species. 
(3) Tako so leta 2005 italijanski organi lahko sporočili ulov navadnega tuna, vrste, za katero velja kvota, v rubriki „vrste, za katere ne velja kvota“.
(4) Council Regulation (EEC) No 1382/91 of 21 May 1991 on the submission of data on the landings of fishery products in Member States (OJ L 133, 28.5.1991, p. 
1382/91 z dne 21. maja 1991 o predložitvi podatkov o iztovoru ribiških proizvodov v državah članicah (UL L 133, 28.5.1991, str.
(5) Council Regulation (EC) No 2846/98 of 17 December 1998 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 establishing a control system applicable to the common fisheries policy (OJ L 358, 31.12.1998, p. 
2846/98 z dne 17. decembra 1998 o spremembah Uredbe (EGS) št.
28.12.2007 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 317/13 Limited monitoring 48. 
28.12.2007 SL Uradni list Evropske unije C 317/13 Omejeno spremljanje 48.
For each of the stocks subject to quota (1) the early warning and monitoring system established by the Commission consists of automatic comparison of quota totals and reported catches. 
Sistem spremljanja in opozarjanja, ki ga je vzpostavila Komisija, deluje tako, da se za vsak stalež, za katerega velja kvota (1), opravi samodejna primerjava med zneskom kvot in sporočenimi ulovi.
When the uptake level reaches a predefined limit, a warning notice is sent to the Member State concerned, inviting it to forward information about the action that it intends to take. 
Ko stopnja porabe doseže vnaprej določen prag, se zadevni državi članici pošlje opozorilo, s katerim se jo pozove, naj sporoči ukrepe, ki jih namerava sprejeti.
The delays affecting catch declarations and the monitoring of quota trading between Member States, together with the complexity engendered by the existence of special conditions (2), possibilities for compensation, carryovers or proportionate deductions the following year and under various conditions, as well as the low volume of human resources assigned to this procedure, all combine to weaken the effectiveness of this procedure. 
Zamude pri poročilih o ulovu in pri spremljanju trgovanja s kvotami med državami članicami, skupaj z zapleti, nastalimi zaradi posebnih razmer (2), možnostmi odškodnin, prenosov ali ponderiranih zmanjšanj na naslednje leto in pod različnimi pogoji, ter pomanjkanje človeških virov, ki se ukvarjajo s tem, zmanjšujejo učinkovitost tega postopka.
In 2005, the system did not prevent 26 quotas from being officially exceeded, 11 of them significantly so (3). 
Leta 2005 ta sistem ni preprečil uradnega presežka 26 kvot, od katerih jih je bilo 11 znatno preseženih (3).
Limited scope for action 50. 
Omejene možnosti ukrepanja 50.
The Commission has the right to close a fishery on its own initiative (4). 
Komisija ima pravico na lastno pobudo prekiniti ribolov (4).
In practice, because of the necessity of assembling sufficient evidence to provide assurance that a quota has been used up, the scope of this provision is confined to stocks involving a small number of ships and landings. 
Vendar je v praksi zato, ker je treba zbrati zadostne dokaze, ki potrjujejo, da je bila kvota izkoriščena, področje uporabe te določbe omejeno samo na staleže, za katere je značilno majhno število zadevnih plovil in iztovarjanj.
In addition, because of the desire to avoid any legal risk, the Commission sets a very high confidence level as a preliminary to action, thereby deferring the date of its decision and hence reducing the effectiveness of the measure. 
Poleg tega Komisija zaradi skrbi, da bi se izognila vsakršnemu tveganju pravnega postopka, pred ukrepanjem zahteva zelo visoko stopnjo zaupanja, s čimer odlaga datum sprejetja odločitve in posledično zmanjšuje učinkovitost ukrepa.
In conclusion, quota monitoring is deficient because the data on which it is based are of doubtful quality, subject only to limited checks by the Commission and without any real possibility of coercive action. 
Spremljanje kvot je torej pomanjkljivo, ker temelji na podatkih dvomljive kakovosti, ki so predmet le omejenega preverjanja s strani Komisije, in ker dejansko ni možnosti prisilnih ukrepov.
Furthermore, administrative checks, even if they are efficient, do not always guarantee the substance of the information in declarations. 
Poleg tega administrativna preverjanja kljub svoji uspešnosti ne zagotavljajo resničnosti sporočenih informacij v vseh primerih.
They must be supplemented by physical inspections. 
Dopolnjevati jih morajo fizične inšpekcije.
(1) 229 in 2005. 
(1) 229 leta 2005.
(2) For example, it is sometimes possible to charge to certain quotas catches taken in a different zone during a certain period of the year and within a particular limit, or for some species additional catches of certain species are in part incorporated in the authorised quantities of the target species. 
(2) Na primer, včasih je mogoče nekaterim kvotam pripisati ulov, opravljen v drugem območju v določenem obdobju leta in v določenih mejah, za nekatere vrste pa se dodaten ulov nekaterih vrst delno vključi v dovoljene količine za ciljno vrsto.
(3) Significant excess: higher than 5 % of the quota and/or 10 % of the TAC and/or over 100 tonnes; once found each of these 26 excess amounts was deducted from the corresponding 2006 quotas; Regulation (EC) No 742/2006. 
(3) Znatnopreseganje:zavečkot5%kvotein/ali10%TACin/alivečkot 100 ton; ko je bilo preseganje ugotovljeno, se je vsak od teh 26 presežkov odbil od ustrezne kvote za leto 2006; Uredba (ES) št. 742/2006.
(4) Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93, Article 21(3) and Regulation (EC) 2371/2002, Article 26(4). 
(4) Uredba (EGS) št. 2847/93, člen 21(3), in Uredba (ES) št. 2371/2002, člen 26(4).
Limited effectiveness of national inspections 52. 
Omejena učinkovitost nacionalnih inšpekcijskih pregledov 52.
The success of the policy on the sustainable management of fisheries resources depends on effective application of the various regulatory provisions. 
Uspeh politike trajnostnega upravljanja ribolovnih virov je odvisen od učinkovitega izvajanja različnih predpisov.
That presupposes the existence of effective control and inspection systems capable of preventing and detecting infringements. 
To predpostavlja obstoj učinkovitih sistemov nadzora in inšpekcijskih pregledov, ki omogočajo preprečevanje in odkrivanje kršitev.
This requires general reference standards, adequate inspection pressure, and optimisation of inspection activities. 
Za to so potrebni splošni referenčni standardi, zadosten nadzorni pritisk in optimizacija dejavnosti inšpekcijskih pregledov.
None of these three conditions could be substantiated. 
Nobenega od teh treh navedenih pogojev ni bilo mogoče preveriti.
Absence of general control standards The absence of general standards ... 
Ni splošnih nadzornih standardov Ker ni splošnih standardov, ...
Community legislation places an obligation on Member States to take the necessary measures to implement effective control and inspection of CFP rules (5). 
Zakonodaja Skupnosti nalaga državam članicam obveznost, da sprejmejo potrebne ukrepe za učinkovit nadzor in preverjanje izvajanja pravil SRP (5).
However, no guideline as yet defines these concepts. 
Vendar ti koncepti niso opredeljeni v nobenih smernicah.
After the reform of the CFP in 2002, in the recovery plans in particular, the Commission added inspection standards, quantitative control objectives and obligations on the existence of national control programmes to the legislation. 
Komisija je po reformi SRP leta 2002, zlasti v načrte za obnovitev staležev, predpisom dodala inšpekcijske standarde, količinske cilje pri nadzoru ter obveznosti v zvezi z obstojem nacionalnih nadzornih programov.
However, these are still limited to specific cases, and there is a risk that the multiplication of such requirements will merely lead to overlapping and confused obligations that cannot easily be administered and adhered to without significantly weakening the level of control on fisheries that are not targeted by these plans. ... leads to divergent and ill-tolerated practices ... 
Vendar ti ostajajo omejeni na posebne primere, zato obstaja tveganje, da bo povečanje števila teh zahtev povzročilo nalaganje in prepletanje obveznosti, ki jih je težko upravljati in upoštevati, ne da bi občutno oslabili raven nadzora nad tistimi vrstami ribištva, ki niso predmet teh načrtov. ... so posledica raznolike in slabo sprejete prakse ...
In the absence of common standards, each Member State has implemented its own system in its area of responsibility, with its own characteristics. 
Ker ni skupnih standardov, je vsaka država članica na svojem območju pristojnosti vzpostavila svoj sistem z lastnimi značilnostmi.
These multiple national approaches have resulted in varying procedures and practices. 
Posledica različnih nacionalnih ukrepov so različni postopki in prakse.
This diversity gives operators the opportunity to criticise practices which they consider discriminatory and to question the relevance of the CFP, thereby making them less inclined to observe the rules. 
Zaradi te različnosti lahko gospodarski subjekti kritizirajo prakse, ki se jim zdijo diskriminatorne, in dvomijo o ustreznosti SRP, kar zmanjšuje njihovo težnjo k upoštevanju teh pravil.
(5) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 23. 
(5) Uredba (ES) št. 2371/2002, člen 23.
C 317/14 EN Official Journal of the European Union 28.12.2007 ... and limits the scope of the CommissionŐs evaluations 56. 
C 317/14 SL Uradni list Evropske unije 28.12.2007 ... ter omejeno področje vrednotenj, ki jih izvaja Komisija 56.
The task of the Commission is to evaluate and monitor the application of the CFP rules by Member States (1) and, in particular, the way in which they discharge their obligations to implement effective control and inspection systems. 
Naloga Komisije je vrednotiti in nadzirati, kako države članice uporabljajo pravila SRP (1) ter zlasti, kako izpolnjujejo svoje obveznosti glede izvajanja učinkovitega sistema nadzora in inšpekcijskih pregledov.
The results of their work are published in triennial reports (2). 
O svojem delu objavi triletna poročila (2).
Having no legislative norms at its disposal, and not having developed universally accepted standards, the Commission has not carried out general evaluations of the systems in place in the Member States. 
Ker Komisija nima pravnih standardov in ker ni razvila splošno sprejetih standardov, ni izvajala splošnih vrednotenj sistemov, vzpostavljenih v državah članicah.
However, this approach does not allow it to form an opinion of the overall effectiveness of the inspection and control systems that each Member State is obliged to set up under the terms of Community legislation. 
Vendar ji ta pristop ne omogoča, da bi podala mnenje o celotni učinkovitosti sistemov nadzora in inšpekcijskih pregledov, ki jih mora vsaka država članica zagotavljati v skladu s predpisi Skupnosti.
For its part, the Court used the standards applicable to any control system (3) as the basis for its evaluation of the effectiveness of the inspection and control systems of the various Member States visited. 
Računsko sodišče je učinkovitost sistemov inšpekcijskih pregledov in nadzora v različnih obiskanih državah članicah ovrednotilo na podlagi standardov, ki se uporabljajo za vse nadzorne sisteme (3).
These standards fall into two large categories: those which provide adequate overall inspection pressure and those which ensure that inspections are effectively targeted. 
Te lahko razvrstimo v dve veliki kategoriji: eni zagotavljajo zadosten splošen nadzorni pritisk, drugi pa dobro ciljno usmerjenost inšpekcijskih pregledov.
Not every check has to be exhaustive in order to be useful. 
Pregled je lahko koristen tudi, če ni izčrpen.
To be effective, however, each inspection, depending on its nature, must have certain features. 
Vendar mora vsak inšpekcijski pregled glede na svojo naravo izpolnjevati določene značilnosti, sicer ni učinkovit.
For example, a landing inspection where the inspectors are not present from the start to the finish of the operation and do not check the contents of the hold at the end of their work, cannot be used as the basis for an opinion on the accuracy of the catch quantities declared. 
Tako na primer inšpekcijski pregled ob iztovarjanju, kjer inšpektorji niso prisotni od začetka do konca dejavnosti in ob koncu svojega dela ne preverijo vsebine skladišč, ne more biti podlaga za mnenje o točnosti sporočenih količin ulova.
Not all Member States have actually defined the criteria necessary for each of the main types of inspection to be effective. 
Vendar niso vse države članice za vsako od glavnih vrst inšpekcijskih pregledov opredelile meril, potrebnih za njeno učinkovitost.
It was not until 2007 that the Commission took such a step, by defining the criteria to be met by national inspections if they are to be counted as such in its triennial evaluation reports. 
Komisija je s tem začela šele leta 2007, ko je opredelila merila, ki jih morajo izpolnjevati nacionalni inšpekcijski pregledi, da bi bili lahko kot taki upoštevani v triletnih ocenjevalnih poročilih.
However, the weakness of the information systems in place in the Member States could make identification and counting of the inspections that meet these criteria problematic. 
Vendar bi bila lahko zaradi šibkosti informacijskih sistemov, vzpostavljenih v državah članicah, opredelitev in upoštevanje inšpekcijskih pregledov, ki izpolnjujejo ta merila, težavna.
Poorly documented inspections ... 
Slabo dokumentirani inšpekcijski pregledi, ...
Proper documentation of inspections is essential. 
Dobro dokumentiranje posameznih inšpekcijskih pregledov je bistveno.
Firstly, it allows verification of the individual quality and scope of the checks carried out, and it then becomes a vital factor as regards the effectiveness of any action taken in cases of infringement. 
Kot prvo omogoča preverjanje kakovosti in obsega posameznih opravljenih pregledov in kot drugo je nujno potreben element za učinkovitost morebitnih ukrepov v primeru kršitve.
Community Regulations do not provide model inspection forms for use by all inspectorates (4). 
V pravilih Skupnosti niso določeni standardni kontrolni obrazci, ki jih morajo uporabljati vsi nadzorni organi (4).
In the absence of standardised practice, however, this would provide greater transparency and facilitate cooperation between the various inspection bodies in all the Member States. 
Vendar bi to kljub neusklajenim praksam omogočilo večjo preglednost in lažje sodelovanje med različnimi inšpekcijskimi organi vseh držav Nadzorni pritisk je težko ovrednotiti in ni vedno zadosten članic.