natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Contents 03 Paragraph Abbreviations and acronyms I-VIII Executive summary 1-10 Introduction 1-3 Geographical and political background 4-5 Economic and financial situation 6-7 EU–Ukraine cooperation framework 8-10 EU financial assistance 11-25 Specific context of EU assistance to Ukraine 11-16 The unstable political, economic and administrative situation hampered EU–Ukraine cooperation 11 Negotiations for the Association Agreement reinforced EU–Ukraine dialogue 12-14 Political and administrative instability slowed the pace of EU–Ukraine dialogue and the progress of reforms 15-16 Since 2010, the Commission has increasingly emphasised the risks posed by the oligarchic system 17-22 The EU response to the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, although prompt, was an emergency solution 17-18 The Commission’s March 2014 financing package consisted mainly of potential loans 19-20 The Commission used special measures to address the crisis in Ukraine rapidly 21-22 The EU set up ad hoc structures to manage its greater involvement in Ukraine 23-25 Donors stepped up their coordination in response to the Ukrainian government’s weakness in this area 23-24 The Ukrainian government was weak at donor coordination 25 Since 2014, the donor community has improved its internal coordination 
Kazalo 03 Odstavek I–VIII 1–10 1–3 4–5 6–7 8–10 11–25 11–16 11 12–14 15–16 17–22 17–18 19–20 21–22 23–25 23–24 25 Kratice in okrajšave Povzetek Uvod Geografsko in politično ozadje Gospodarski in finančni položaj Okvir za sodelovanje med EU in Ukrajino Finančna pomoč EU Specifični kontekst pomoči EU Ukrajini Nestabilnost političnih, gospodarskih in upravnih razmer je ovirala sodelovanje med EU in Ukrajino Pogajanja o pridružitvenem sporazumu so okrepila dialog med EU in Ukrajino Politična in upravna nestabilnost je upočasnila dialog med EU in Ukrajino ter napredek reform Komisija od leta 2010 vse bolj poudarja tveganja, ki jih povzroča oligarhični sistem Odziv EU na ukrajinsko krizo leta 2014 je bil sicer hiter, vendar je bil rešitev v sili Finančni sveženj Komisije iz marca 2014 je v glavnem vseboval morebitna posojila Komisija je uporabila posebne ukrepe za hitro obravnavanje krize v Ukrajini EU je vzpostavila ad hoc strukture za upravljanje svojega povečanega delovanja v Ukrajini Donatorji so okrepili svoje usklajevanje, ker je ukrajinska vlada na tem področju šibka Ukrajinska vlada ni najbolje usklajevala donatorjev Donatorska skupnost je od leta 2014 izboljšala svoje notranje usklajevanje
Abbreviations 05 and acronyms AAP: Annual action programme ACU: Accounting Chamber of Ukraine CRIS: Common Relex Information System CSO: Civil society organisation CSP: Country strategy paper DG: Directorate-general EAMR: External assistance management report EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EEAS: European External Action Service EIB: European Investment Bank ENI: European Neighbourhood Instrument ENPI: European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument EUAM: EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform FAC: Fight against corruption GDP: Gross domestic product GRECO: Group of States against Corruption IMF: International Monetary Fund IFI: International financial institution MFA: Macro-financial assistance NABU: National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine NIP: National indicative programme OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development PCA: Partnership and cooperation agreement PEFA: Public expenditure and financial accountability 
Kratice in okrajšave 05 AAP: letni akcijski program ACU: vrhovna revizijska institucija Ukrajine BDP: bruto domači proizvod CRIS: skupni informacijski sistem RELEX CSO: organizacija civilne družbe CSP: državni strateški dokument DDV: davek na dodano vrednost EAMR: poročilo o upravljanju zunanje pomoči EBRD: Evropska banka za obnovo in razvoj EIB: Evropska investicijska banka ENI: evropski instrument sosedstva ENPI: evropski instrument sosedstva in partnerstva ESZD: Evropska služba za zunanje delovanje EUAM: svetovalna misija EU za reformo sektorja civilne varnosti FAC: boj proti korupciji GD: generalni direktorat GRECO: Skupina držav proti korupciji IFI: mednarodna finančna institucija MDS: Mednarodni denarni sklad MFA: makrofinančna pomoč NABU: nacionalni urad Ukrajine za boj proti korupciji NIP: nacionalni okvirni program OECD: Organizacija za gospodarsko sodelovanje in razvoj PCA: sporazum o partnerstvu in sodelovanju
Abbreviations and acronyms 06 PIFC: Public internal financial control PFM: Public finance management SBC: State building contract SGUA: Support Group for Ukraine SIGMA: Support for improvement in governance and management TACIS: Technical assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia VAT: Value added tax 
Kratice in okrajšave 06 PEFA: javni odhodki in finančna odgovornost PFM: upravljanje javnih financ PIFC: notranji nadzor javnih financ SBC: pogodba o podpori za konsolidacijo države SGUA: podporna skupina za Ukrajino SIGMA: podpora za izboljšanje upravljanja in vodenja TACIS: tehnična pomoč za Skupnost neodvisnih držav in Gruzijo
Executive 07 summary I Ukraine is one of the European Union’s largest and politically most important direct neighbours. 
Povzetek 07 I Ukrajina je ena od največjih in politično najpomembnejših neposrednih sosed Evropske unije.
Institutional and political instability, governance issues, and economic and financial difficulties predominate in the country. The conflict in eastern Ukraine has greatly exacerbated the economic and financial challenges. 
V državi je zelo veliko institucionalne in politične nestabilnosti, težav v zvezi z upravljanjem ter gospodarskih in finančnih težav, kon­ flikt v vzhodni Ukrajini pa je močno zaostril gospodarske in finančne izzive.
However, Ukraine has launched many significant reforms since the Maidan events of 2014. 
Kljub temu je Ukrajina po majdanskih dogodkih leta 2014 začela veliko pomembnih reform.
II EU–Ukraine cooperation is part of the European Neighbourhood Policy and its eastern dimension, the Eastern Partnership. 
II Sodelovanje EU z Ukrajino je del evropske sosedske politike in njene vzhodne razsežnosti, ki se imenuje vzhodno partnerstvo.
After lengthy negotiations, the Association Agreement signed in 2014 will replace in its entirety the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement once the former enters into force. 
Po dolgotrajnih pogajanjih bo sporazum o partnerstvu in sodelovanju iz leta 1994 v celoti nadomeščen s pridružitvenim sporazumom, ki je bil podpisan leta 2014, čim bo ta začel veljati.
The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, which was replaced by the European Neighbourhood Instrument in 2014, provided most of the bilateral assistance. 
Večina dvostranske pomoči je bila zagotovljena iz evropskega instrumenta sosedstva in partnerstva (ENPI), ki ga je leta 2014 zamenjal evropski instru­ ment sosedstva.
During the audited period (2007-2015), EU financial assistance consisted of 1.6 billion euros in grants, half of which was in the form of budget support, and of 3.4 billion euros in macro-financial loans. 
V revidiranem obdobju (2007–2015) je finančno pomoč EU sestavljalo 1,6 milijarde EUR v nepovrat­ nih sredstvih, od katerih je bila polovica zagotovljena kot proračunska podpora, in 3,4 milijarde EUR v obliki makro­ finančnih posojil.
III Over most of the period audited, the unstable political, legislative and administrative context limited the effectiveness of EU assistance. 
III V večini revidiranega obdobja so uspešnost pomoči EU omejevale nestabilne politične, zakonodajne in upravne razmere.
EU–Ukraine cooperation advanced in the wake of the 2014 Maidan events, but the challenges faced by Ukraine still heavily affect the reform process and the risks posed by the oligarchs remain high. 
Sodelovanje med EU in Ukrajino je po majdanskih dogodkih leta 2014 napredovalo, vendar na proces reform še vedno močno vplivajo izzivi, s katerimi se spopada Ukrajina, veliko pa ostaja tudi tveganje, ki ga pome­ nijo oligarhi.
The EU response to the Ukraine crisis of 2014 (the 2014-2020 package of 11.2 billion euros), although prompt, was an emergency solution. 
Odziv EU na ukrajinsko krizo leta 2014 (sveženj za obdobje 2014–2020 v vrednosti 11,2 milijarde EUR) je bil sicer hiter, vendar je bil rešitev v sili.
The EU was able to allocate and disburse large amounts of money rapidly and without a predefined strategy. 
EU je uspelo hitro dodeliti in izplačati velike vsote denarja, ne da bi imela vnaprej opredeljeno strategijo.
IV The audit objective was to assess whether Commission and EEAS (European External Action Service) assistance was well prepared, appropriate and effective in supporting the transformation of Ukraine into a well governed state in the area of public finance management (PFM) and the fight against corruption (FAC),as well as in the gas sector during the 2007-2015 period. 
IV Cilj revizije je bil ugotoviti, ali je bila v obdobju 2007–2015 pomoč Komisije in ESZD (Evropska služba za zunanje delovanje) pri podpiranju preobrazbe Ukrajine v državo z dobrim upravljanjem na področju upravljanja javnih financ in boja proti korupciji ter plinskega sektorja dobro pripravljena, ustrezna in uspešna.
The audit scope included all EU budget support and macro-financial assistance programmes initiated since 2007, as well as the financial instruments from the Commission’s package launched in 2014. 
Obseg revizije je zajel vso proračunsko podporo EU in programe makrofinančne pomoči, uvedene od leta 2007, pa tudi finančne instru­ mente iz svežnja, ki ga je Komisija sprejela leta 2014.
V Overall, EU assistance to Ukraine has been partially effective in supporting the transformation of Ukraine into a well governed state in the areas mentioned in paragraph IV. 
V Na splošno je bila pomoč EU Ukrajini pri podpiranju preobrazbe Ukrajine v državo z dobrim upravljanjem na pod­ ročjih, omenjenih v odstavku IV, delno uspešna.
Executive summary 08 VI EU assistance to Ukraine was partially effective in producing tangible and sustainable results in PFM and FAC. 
Povzetek 08 VI Pomoč EU Ukrajini je bila delno uspešna pri doseganju oprijemljivih in trajnostnih rezultatov na področjih upravlja­ nja javnih financ in boja proti korupciji.
Until 2014, the Ukrainian government’s limited commitment to the reform process was reflected in incomplete and delayed outcomes. 
Majhna zavezanost ukrajinske vlade procesu reform se je do leta 2014 kazala v izidih, ki so bili nepopolni in so zamujali.
FAC has been reinforced by the 2011 Visa Liberalisation Action Plan and further accelerated by improved post-Maidan cooperation. 
Boj proti korupciji je bil okrepljen z akcijskim načrtom za liberalizacijo vizumskega režima iz leta 2011, dodatno pa ga je pospešilo izboljšano sodelovanje po majdanskih dogodkih.
Despite the new impetus for reform since 2014, the results achieved so far remain fragile. 
Kljub novemu zagonu za reforme od leta 2014 doslej doseženi rezultati ostajajo nestabilni.
In the case of FAC policy, the results of effective implementation remain to be seen. 
Glede politike na področju boja proti korupciji se bodo rezultati uspešnega upravljanja šele pokazali.
Certain shortcomings in the way conditions were stipulated or in the method their fulfilment was assessed affected the design of the budget support programmes and macro-financial assistance. 
Nekatere pomanjkljivosti v načinu dolo­ čanja pogojev ali v metodi za ocenjevanje njihovega izpolnjevanja so vplivale na zasnovo programov proračunske podpore in makrofinančne pomoči.
Most budget support programmes in Ukraine were designed to disburse a significant proportion of the allocated amount at the beginning of the programme once general conditions had been fulfilled. 
Večina programov proračunske podpore v Ukrajini je bila zasnovana tako, da je bil velik delež dodeljenega zneska izplačan na začetku programa, takoj ko so bili izpolnjeni splošni pogoji.
To address the critical situation of Ukraine in 2014, the Commission focused on rapid disbursement of assistance. 
V Ukrajini so bile v letu 2014 razmere kritične, zato se je Komisija osredotočila na hitro izplačevanje pomoči.
Monitoring of the implementation of EU assistance was largely effective. 
Sprem­ ljanje izvajanja pomoči EU je bilo v veliki meri uspešno.
VII EU assistance to Ukraine was partially effective in improving governance in the gas sector and in securing gas supplies via Ukraine. 
VII Pomoč EU Ukrajini je bila delno uspešna pri izboljševanju upravljanja v plinskem sektorju in zagotavljanju oskrbe s plinom preko Ukrajine.
EU–Ukraine dialogue on gas covered a broad range of issues but was affected by Ukraine’s wavering commitment and by diverging views among EU stakeholders as regards the security of EU gas supplies via Ukraine. 
Dialog med EU in Ukrajino o plinu je zajel širok razpon vprašanj, vendar so nanj vplivali omahljiva zavezanost Ukrajine in različni pogledi deležnikov v EU v zvezi z zanesljivostjo oskrbe EU s plinom preko Ukrajine.
The design of the reviewed EU assistance to improve governance in the gas sector and the security of gas supplies via Ukraine included certain conditions that were vague and difficult to assess. 
Zasnova pregledane pomoči EU za izboljšanje upravljanja v plinskem sektorju in zanesljivosti oskrbe EU s plinom preko Ukrajine je vključevala nekatere pogoje, ki so bili ohlapni in jih je bilo težko oceniti.
Sometimes, monitoring of the implementation of EU assistance lacked high-quality data and EU–Ukraine joint reporting did not provide a sufficiently detailed explanation of the difficulties experienced in the gas sector. 
Za spremljanje izvajanja pomoči EU je včasih primanjkovalo visokokakovostnih podatkov, s skupnim poročanjem EU in Ukrajine pa niso bile dovolj podrobno pojasnjene težave v plinskem sektorju.
Until 2014, EU assistance had limited impact on the functioning of the Ukrainian gas sector and produced mixed results as regards the security of the EU’s gas supplies via Ukraine. 
Pomoč EU je imela do konca leta 2014 skro­ men učinek na delovanje plinskega sektorja v Ukrajini, njeni rezultati v zvezi z zanesljivostjo oskrbe EU s plinom preko Ukrajine pa so bili mešani.
However, important milestones have since been achieved, notably the adoption of a gas law in April 2015 compliant with the EU third energy package. 
Od takrat so bili doseženi pomembni mejniki, zlasti zakon o plinu, ki je bil sprejet aprila 2015 in je skladen s tretjim energetskim svežnjem EU.
VIII This report sets out five recommendations for improving EU assistance to Ukraine. 
VIII V tem poročilu je navedenih pet priporočil za izboljšanje pomoči EU Ukrajini.
Introduction 09 Geographical and political background 01 Ukraine covers an area of 603 000 km2 and was home to 44.3 million inhabitants in 2014. 
Uvod 09 Geografsko in politično ozadje 01 Ukrajina ima površino 603 000 km.
The country gained full independence in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Država je postala popolnoma neodvisna leta 1991 ob propadu Sovjetske zveze.
Since the 2004 enlargement of the European Union to central and eastern Europe, Ukraine has been one of the Union’s largest and politically most important direct neighbours. 
Odkar so leta 2004 k Evropski uniji pristopile srednje­ in vzhodnoevropske države, je Ukrajina ena od njenih največjih in politično najpomembnejših nepo­ srednih sosed.
02 Political and institutional instability predominates in the country. 
02 V državi je zelo veliko politične in institucionalne nestabilnosti.
Since 2004, three major events have occurred: the Orange Revolution of 2004, the presidential election of 2010 (which was held largely democratically and peacefully) and the Maidan Revolution1 of 2014. 
Od leta 2004 so se tam zgodili trije pomembni dogodki: oranžna revolucija leta 2004, predsedniške volitve leta 2010 (ki so v veliki meri potekale demokratično in mirno) in majdan­ ska revolucija1 leta 2014.
03 Since the beginning of 2014, Ukraine’s territorial integrity has been seriously threatened. 
03 Ozemeljska celovitost Ukrajine je od začetka leta 2014 resno ogrožena.
At the time of the audit, the Ukrainian army was in conflict with Russian-backed separatists in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and Russian forces had annexed the Crimean Peninsula2. Economic and financial situation 04 Ukraine has a track record of poor economic performance since it gained independence in 1991. 
V času revizije so v nekaterih delih območij Doneck in Lugansk potekali spopadi med ukrajinsko vojsko in separatisti, ki jih podpira Rusija, ruske sile pa so Rusiji priklju­ čile Krimski polotok.2 Gospodarski in finančni položaj 04 Gospodarska uspešnost Ukrajine je od njene neodvisnosti leta 1991 slaba.
Positive economic growth rates in the early 2000s were severely impacted by the 2008 global crisis and have struggled to recover ever since. 
Na pozitivne stopnje gospodarske rasti v začetku 21. stoletja je močno vplivala sve­ tovna kriza leta 2008.
Ukraine’s state finances have deteriorated over the years mainly because of mismanagement of public funds. 
Ukrajinske državne finance so se z leti poslabšale, zlasti zaradi slabega upravljanja javnih sredstev.
In addition, the revenue side of the state’s budget is negatively affected by a significant shadow economy3. 
Poleg tega na državni proračun na strani prihodkov negativno vpliva obsežna siva ekono­ mija3.
Despite reform efforts, Ukraine is still perceived as the most corrupt country in Europe4. 
Na Ukrajino se kljub njenim prizadevanjem za reformo še vedno gleda kot evropsko državo z največ korupcije4.
Oligarchic clans, which have developed considerably since the country became independent, continue to exert a dominant influence on Ukraine’s economy, politics and media. 
Odkar je država neodvisna, so se močno razrasli oligarhični klani, ki imajo še naprej dominanten vpliv na ukrajinsko gospodarstvo, politiko in medije.
1 Other terms are also used, e.g. Euromaidan or the (Euro) Maidan events, protests, demonstration or uprising, and the Revolution of Dignity. 
1 Zanjo se uporabljajo tudi druga imena, npr. Evromajdan ali (evro)majdanski dogodki, protesti, demonstracije ali vstaja ter revolucija dostojanstva.
2 Russia claims that Crimea is part of the Russian Federation on the basis of a referendum held on 16 March 2014, which was condemned as illegal by the Ukrainian Government, the European Union, the United States and the United Nations General Assembly. 
2 Rusija trdi, da je Krim del Ruske federacije, pri čemer se sklicuje na referendum, ki je potekal 16. marca 2014 in ki so ga kot nezakonitega obsodile ukrajinska vlada, Evropska unija, Združene države in Generalna skupščina Združenih narodov.
3 Ukraine’s shadow economy, the largest in Europe, is estimated to account for around 44 % of GDP. 
3 Ukrajinska siva ekonomija je največja v Evropi. Po ocenah znaša približno 44 % BDP.
See Igor Vinnychuk and Serhii Ziukov, ‘Shadow Economy in Ukraine: Modelling and Analysis’, Yurii Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University, 2013. 
Glej Igor Vinnychuk in Serhii Ziukov, Shadow Economy in Ukraine: Modelling and Analysis, Narodna univerza Jurija Fed’koviča v mestu Černivci, 2013.
4 Ukraine was rated 130 out of 168 by Transparency International in 2015 (and 142 out of 175 in 2014) (See http://www.transparency. org/cpi2015/#results-table). 
4 Organizacija Transparency International je Ukrajino leta 2015 med 168 državami uvrstila na 130. mesto (leta 2014 med 175 državami na 142. mesto) (glej http:// www.transparency.org/ cpi2015/#results­table).
Introduction 10 05 The conflict in eastern Ukraine has greatly exacerbated the economic and financial situation, absorbing the country’s limited financial resources and effectively destroying the most important industrial area of the country. 
Uvod 10 05 Konflikti na vzhodu Ukrajine so močno poslabšali gospodarski in finančni polo­ žaj, saj so požirali omejena finančna sredstva države in dejansko uničili najpo­ membnejše industrijsko območje v njej.
In early 2014, the Ukrainian government identified their foreign aid needs to be at around 35 billion US dollars over the period 2014-2015. 
V začetku leta 2014 je ukrajinska vlada ugotovila, da potrebe po tuji pomoči v obdobju 2014–2015 znašajo približno 35 milijard USD.
The deficit of the state-owned gas company Naftogaz has been an increasing drain on the state’s finances, rising from 1.9 % of GDP in 2013 to 5.7 % of GDP in 2014, when it was higher than the overall government deficit of 4.6 %5. EU–Ukraine cooperation framework 06 EU–Ukraine cooperation is part of the European Neighbourhood Policy and its eastern dimension, the Eastern Partnership. 
Z 1,9 % BDP v letu 2013 se je zvišal na 5,7 % BDP v letu 2014, ko je bil večji od skupnega javnofinančnega primanjkljaja v višini 4,6 %.5 Okvir za sodelovanje med EU in Ukrajino 06 Sodelovanje EU z Ukrajino je del evropske sosedske politike in njene vzhodne raz­ sežnosti, ki se imenuje vzhodno partnerstvo.
Cooperation progressed mainly with the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1994, the EU–Ukraine Action Plan in 2005 and the Association Agenda in 20096. 
Sodelovanje je napredovalo pred­ vsem s podpisom sporazuma o partnerstvu in sodelovanju leta 1994, akcijskega načrta EU­Ukrajina leta 2005 in pridružitvenega načrta leta 20096.
07 In March 2007, the EU and Ukraine opened negotiations on a ‘New Enhanced Agreement’ (since September 2008 called Association Agreement) to replace the PCA; negotiations were concluded in December 2011 and the Agreement was initialled. 
07 Marca 2007 sta EU in Ukrajina začeli pogajanja o novem razširjenem sporazumu (ki se od septembra 2008 imenuje pridružitveni sporazum), ki bi nadomestil spo­ razum o partnerstvu in sodelovanju. Ob zaključku teh pogajanj decembra 2011 je bil sporazum parafiran.
As part of the preparations for signing the Agreement at the 16th EU– Ukraine Summit in February 2013, Ukraine confirmed its determination to achieve tangible progress in three areas: remedying electoral shortcomings, addressing the issue of selective justice and preventing its recurrence, and implementing the reforms set out in the Association Agenda. 
Ukrajina je kot del priprav za podpis sporazuma na 16. srečanju na vrhu med EU in Ukrajino februarja 2013 potrdila, da je odločena doseči resničen napredek na treh področjih: odpravljanje pomanjkljivosti pri vo­ litvah, obravnavanje vprašanja selektivnega sodstva in preprečevanje njegovega ponavljanja ter izvajanje reform iz pridružitvenega načrta.
On 21 November 2013, Ukraine decided to suspend preparations for signing the Association Agreement. 
21. novembra 2013 se je Ukrajina odločila začasno ustaviti priprave na podpis pridružitvenega spora­ zuma.
This sudden reversal sparked the massive Maidan demonstration in support of political association and economic integration with the EU. 
Ta nenadni preobrat je povzročil demonstracije na trgu Majdan v podporo političnemu združevanju in gospodarskemu povezovanju z EU.
In the wake of the Maidan events, the EU and Ukraine signed the political provisions of the Association Agreement on 21 March 2014 and the remaining provisions on 27 June 20147. The Agreement provides for the enhancement of EU–Ukraine relations in all areas of cooperation and also constitutes a reform agenda, based on a comprehensive programme to bring Ukrainian legislation into line with EU norms. 
Po majdanskih dogodkih sta EU in Ukrajina 21. marca 2014 podpisali politične določbe pridru­ žitvenega sporazuma, 27. junija 2014 pa še preostale določbe.7 Sporazum določa krepitev odnosov med EU in Ukrajino na vseh področjih sodelovanja, hkrati pa je tudi načrt reform, ki temeljijo na obširnem programu za uskladitev ukrajinske zakonodaje s standardi EU.
5 IMF Country Report No 15/69, ‘Ukraine: Request for Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility and Cancellation of Stand-By Arrangement Staff Report’, International Monetary Fund, March 2015. 
15/69, Ukraine: Request for Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility and Cancellation of Stand-By Arrangement Staff Report, Mednarodni denarni sklad, marec 2015.
6 The 2009 Association Agenda was updated in 2011, 2013 and 2015. 
6 Pridružitveni načrt iz leta 2009 je bil posodobljen v letih 2011, 2013 in 2015.