natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Moreover, the ‘technical assessment of the 2015 Stability Pro‐ gramme’ features a critical assessment by the Commission of the effectiveness –also in terms of expected revenues‐ of the measures implemented by the Italian government to step up the fights against tax avoidance/evasion (see page 10): ‘measures to improve compliance through communications from the tax administration to the tax payers based on the cross‐check of databases (including the so‐called spesometro) and the subsequent possibility for the latter to autonomously revise their tax return well before the litigation phase (so‐called adempimento volontario). 
Poleg tega „tehnična ocena programa za stabilnost za leto 2015“ vsebuje kritično oceno Komisije glede učinkovitosti – tudi v zvezi s pričakovanimi prihodki – ukrepov, ki jih italijanska vlada izvaja za okrepitev boja proti izogibanju davkom/davčnim utajam (glej stran 10): „ukrepi za izboljšanje skladnosti s sporočili, ki jih davčna uprava davkoplačevalcem pošilja na podlagi navzkrižnega preverjanja zbirk podatkov (tudi tako imenovani spe-sometro), in poznejša možnost, da ti samostojno spremenijo svojo davčno napoved veliko pred fazo pravdnega postopka (tako imenovani adempimento volontario).
While the latter measure, if properly implemented in line with expectations, could be promising, the Commission forecast does not incorporate the related projected revenues from it, considering that implementation is still at the initial phase’. 
Čeprav bi lahko bil ta zadnji ukrep, če bo ustrezno izveden v skladu s pričakovanji, obetaven, napoved Komisije ne vključuje predvidenih prihodkov na njegovi podlagi, saj je njegovo izvajanje šele na začetku“.
Reply to the heading above paragraph 113 In connection with the effectiveness of the EDP, the Commission notes that of the 23 Member States under an EDP in November 2011, 15 exited the procedure by end‐2015, all the member States examined improved both their budget and structural balance. 
Odgovor na naslov pred točko 113 Komisija v zvezi z učinkovitostjo postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem opozarja, da je do konca leta 2015 iz postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem izstopilo 15 od 23 držav članic, ki so bile novembra 2011 v tem postopku, vse preučene države članice pa so izboljšale svoj proračunski in strukturni saldo.
Acccording to the Commission’s 2016 Winter Forecast, in addition to Greece, Spain, France and Finland were the only Member State with a headline deficit still exceeding the 3% threshold in 2015. 
V skladu z zimsko napovedjo Komisije za 2016 sta poleg Grčije in Španije Francija in Finska edini državi članici, katerih nominalni primanjkljaj leta 2015 še vedno presega 3-odstotni prag.
118 In France, general government debt increased in line with the still relatively high general government deficit in a context of low nominal growth. 
118 V Franciji se je javnofinančni dolg povečal skupaj s še vedno razmeroma velikim javnofinančnim primanjkljajem ob majhni nominalni rasti.
In Italy, the debt ratio increased on average by 4.7 pps of GDP per year during the 2008‐2014 crisis period, bring‐ ing the debt‐to‐GDP ratio to just above 132% in 2014 from the pre‐crisis (2007) trough of around 100%. 
V Italiji se je delež dolga povprečno povečal za 4,7 odstotne točke BDP letno v obdobju krize 2008–2014, zaradi česar se je delež javnega dolga v razmerju do BDP leta 2014 povečal na malo več kot 132 % s predkriznega (2007) dna, ko je znašal približno 100 %.
The driver of this substantial increase was the debt‐increasing impact originated by the large difference between rather high implicit interest rates paid on debt (4.2% on average) and nearly zero average annual nominal GDP growth (‐1.3% real and +1.4% deflator), i.e. the so‐called snow‐ball effect. 
Razlog za to veliko povečanje je bil vpliv, ki je povečeval dolg in je izviral iz velike razlike med precej visokimi implicitnimi obrestnimi merami na dolg (povprečno 4,2 %) in skoraj nično povprečno letno nominalno rastjo BDP (realno –1,3 % in deflator +1,4 %), tj. tako imenovani učinek snežne kepe.
By contrast, the primary balance remained on average in surplus (1.2% of GDP), continuing to give a debt‐decreasing contribution. 
Nasprotno je primarni saldo v povprečju ostal presežen (1,2 % BDP) in je še vedno prispeval k zmanjševanju dolga.
The latter was however offset by the large stock‐flow adjustment (SFA) mainly related to the financial support to euro‐area programme countries and the accumulation of liquidity in those years. 
Zadnje navedeno pa je bilo izravnano z veliko uskladitvijo stanj in tokov, večinoma v zvezi s finančno podporo državam iz programa za euroobmočje in akumulacijo likvidnosti v tistih letih.
In Germany, Malta and the Czech Republic (where it remains under the threshold), the increase over the 2008‐2015 period was moderate (1.3% in Malta, 6.6% in Germany and 12.3% in the Czech Republic) and the ratio is now on a downward path. 
V Nemčiji, na Malti in Češkem (kjer je delež še vedno pod pragom) je bilo povečanje v obdobju 2008–2015 zmerno (1,3 % na Malti, 6,6 % v Nemčiji in 12,3 % na Češkem) in delež zdaj upada.
Cyprus has had to cope with an unprecedented banking crisis and experienced an increase of 63.3% in its debt‐to‐GDP ratio from 2008 to 2015, with the sharpest rise coming between 2008 and 2013 (from 45.1% to 102.5%). 
Ciper se je moral spopasti z izjemno hudo bančno krizo, njegov delež javnega dolga v razmerju do BDP pa se je v obdobju 2008–2015 povečal za 63,3 %, največ med letoma 2008 in 2013 (s 45,1 % na 102,5 %).
However, since 2013, when it was placed under a programme of financial assistance, the debt dynamics started turning, and the ratio stabilised in 2014 (108.2%) and 2015 (108.4%). 
Po letu 2013, ko je bila država vključena v program finančne pomoči, pa se je dinamika dolga začela obračati in delež se je v letih 2014 (108,2 %) in 2015 (108,4 %) stabiliziral.
Finally, both, France and Italy experi‐ enced a continuous increase of around 30% in their debt‐to‐GDP ratio over the 2008‐2015 period. 
Tako v Franciji kot tudi v Italiji se je v obdobju 2008–2015 delež javnega dolga v razmerju do BDP stalno povečeval, in sicer za približno 30 %.
Box 12 In relation to Box 12, the Commission would point out that the statistically validated outturn data for 2015 will only be available in April 2016. 
Okvir 12 Komisija želi v zvezi z okvirom 12 opozoriti, da bodo statistično potrjeni podatki o realizaciji za leto 2015 na voljo šele aprila 2016.
Reply of the Commission 131 120 The Commission considers that while high levels of debt in Italy hampered the effectiveness of the Italian EDP, Italy’s 2009 EDP Recommendation set a deadline for correction of 2012 and this was met, with the EDP being abro‐ gated in 2013. 
Odgovori Komisije 131 120 Komisija meni, da čeprav so visoke ravni dolga v Italiji ovirale učinkovitost postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem za Italijo, je bil v priporočilu v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem za Italijo iz leta 2009 določen rok za odpravo leta 2012, ki se je upošteval, zato je bil postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem leta 2013 razveljavljen.
This helped to reduce the risk premium on the high public debt and thus facilitate its reduction. 
To je pripomoglo k zmanjšanju premije za tveganje za velik javni dolg in tako olajšalo njegovo zmanjšanje.
123 The Commission is fully committed to apply sanctions when this is appropriate and foreseen according to the rules. 
123 Komisija je povsem zavezana uporabi sankcij, kadar je to ustrezno in predvideno v skladu s pravili.
Policy measures with a potential fiscal effect and a considerable impact on specific structural areas are monitored in the context of the European Semester. 
Ukrepi politike z morebitnim fiskalnim učinkom in znatnim vplivom na določena strukturna področja se spremljajo v okviru evropskega semestra.
However, for countries subject to specific monitoring due to the presence of excessive imbalances, the implementation of reforms is monitored under this specific process within the overall Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. 
Vendar se pri državah, ki se posebej spremljajo zaradi čezmernih neravnotežij, izvajanje reform spremlja v okviru tega posebnega postopka znotraj splošnega postopka v zvezi s makroekonomskim neravnotežjem.
Different enforcement possibilities exist for SGP and MIP: Fiscal policies: enforcement measures both under the preventive arm and corrective arm of the SGP Macro‐economic imbalances: enforcement measures under the corrective arm (i.e. Excessive Imbalance Procedure) The Commission concurs that the degree of implementation is not adequate and should be improved. 
Za Pakt za stabilnost in rast ter postopek v zvezi z makroekonomskim neravnotežjem obstajajo različne možnosti izvrševanja: fiskalne politike: izvršilni ukrepi v okviru preventivnega in popravljalnega dela Pakta za stabilnost in rast; makroekonomska neravnotežja: izvršilni ukrepi v okviru popravljalnega dela (tj. postopek v zvezi s čezmernim neravnotežjem). Komisija se strinja, da stopnja izvajanja ni ustrezna in bi jo bilo treba izboljšati.
To this aim a number of actions have been undertaken as follows: The Commission supports regular dialogue with Member States (i.e. via bilateral meetings), social partners and stakeholders at all levels to ensure close monitoring and follow‐up, as well as to review performance and support exchange of experience. 
Za ta namen so bili sprejeti številni spodaj navedeni ukrepi. Komisija podpira redni dialog z državami članicami (z dvostranskimi sestanki), socialnimi partnerji in deležniki na vseh ravneh za zagotovitev skrbnega spremljanja in nadaljnjega ukrepanja ter za pregled uspešnosti in pomoč pri izmenjavi izkušenj.
In last year’s European Semester cycle the Commission intensified its contact with the Member States on the recommendations. 
V ciklu evropskega semestra v zadnjem letu je okrepila svoje stike z državami članicami glede priporočil.
In addition, the Commission strengthened its presence in the Member States and stepped up political contacts, including with national Parliaments and social partners. 
Poleg tega je okrepila svojo prisotnost v državah članicah in politične stike, vključno z nacionalnimi parlamenti in socialnimi partnerji.
The new streamlined process followed for last year’s European Semester cycle allows for more time to examine and discuss EU guidance to the Member States. 
Sledil je nov racionaliziran postopek, saj cikel evropskega semestra v zadnjem letu omogoča več časa za preučitev in razpravo o smernicah EU za države članice.
The country‐specific analyses for each Member States (i.e. the Country Reports) are available two and a half months before the CSRs, together with the In‐Depth Reports that follow on the Alert Mechanism Report. 
Analize za posamezne države članice (tj. poročila o državo) so na voljo dva meseca in pol pred priporočili za posamezne države, skupaj s poglobljenimi poročili, ki sledijo poročilom o mehanizmu opozarjanja.
This allows for greater transparency and feedback from the Member States before the adoption of the CSRs and is expected to increase ownership and ultimately the effective implementation of the recommendations. 
To omogoča večjo preglednost in povratne informacije držav članic pred sprejetjem priporočil za posamezne države ter naj bi po pričakovanjih povečalo odgovornost in nazadnje učinkovito izvajanje priporočil.
The Commission is also making sure that EU funding is steered towards EU and national priorities. 
Komisija tudi skrbi, da je financiranje EU usmerjeno k prednostnim nalogam EU in nacionalnim prednostnim nalogam.
The EU’s Struc‐ tural and Investment Funds are the principal EU level investment tools for delivering on the Europe 2020 goals and the CSRs. 
Strukturni in investicijski skladi EU so glavno investicijsko orodje na ravni EU za uresničevanje ciljev Evrope 2020 in priporočil za posamezne države.
The new Investment Plan for Europe and the creation of a European Fund for Strategic Investments will also serve this purpose. 
Tudi nov naložbeni načrt za Evropo in ustanovitev Evropskega sklada za strateške naložbe bosta služila temu namenu.
EU funds will be paid out mainly for growth‐boosting investments like the ones identified in the CSRs and that enable the EU meet the Europe 2020 targets. 
Sredstva EU bodo izplačana predvsem za naložbe, ki povečujejo rast, kot so tiste, opredeljene v priporočilih za posamezne države, in ki EU omogočajo uresničevanje ciljev Evrope 2020.
In addition, the Commission has concluded Partner‐ ship Agreements with Member States for these funds only where the conditions are fulfilled. 
Poleg tega Komisija za ta sredstva z državami članicami sklene sporazume o partnerstvu samo, če so izpolnjeni pogoji.
If needed, the Com‐ mission can ask Member States to modify their plans to support key structural reforms and can suspend funding if recommendations are repeatedly and seriously breached. 
Komisija lahko po potrebi od držav članic zahteva, naj svoje načrte prilagodijo v podporo ključnim strukturnim reformam, in lahko financiranje začasno prekine, če so priporočila večkrat in resno kršena.
Finally, to increase the effective implementation of reforms (CSRs) and make the best use of structural funds, the Commission may also provide technical assistance to all Member States upon request. 
Nazadnje lahko Komisija za povečanje učinkovitega izvajanja reform (priporočila za posamezne države) in čim boljšo uporabo strukturnih skladov državam članicam na zahtevo zagotovi tudi tehnično pomoč.
Reply of the Commission 132 127 The Commission underlines the plans for the improving the economic governance framework set out in the Five Presidents’ Report. 
Odgovori Komisije 132 127 Komisija poudarja načrte za izboljšanje okvira ekonomskega upravljanja iz poročila petih predsednikov.
Conclusions and recommendations 128 The Commission highlights the very significant progress in improving the EDP as a tool for economic governance. 
Zaključki in priporočila 128 Komisija poudarja zelo velik napredek pri izboljšanju postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem kot orodja za ekonomsko upravljanje.
Since spring 2014, the Commission has given access to Member States to all relevant data, indicators and the tools for the calculation of the relevant indicators applied in the fiscal surveillance process. 
Komisija od pomladi 2014 državam članicam daje dostop do vseh pomembnih podatkov, kazalnikov in orodij za izračun zadevnih kazalnikov, ki se uporabljajo v postopku fiskalnega nadzora.
On this basis, Member States are able to fully replicate the Commission’s calculations. 
Države članice lahko na tej podlagi v celoti ponovijo izračune Komisije.
In order to further enhance transparency in the EDP, as of the 2015 spring forecast, the Commission also shares with Member States the yield of the key individual discretion‐ ary tax measures for Member States under EDP for which the bottom‐up approach applies. 
Za še večjo preglednost v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem Komisija od spomladanskega poročila 2015 državam članicam posreduje tudi rezultate ključnih posameznih diskrecijskih davčnih ukrepov za države članice v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, za katerega se uporablja pristop od spodaj navzgor.
131 The examination of statistical data is documented in a range of internal and external documents describing the processes for the checking of EDP notifications and questionnaires, and mission guidelines. 
131 Preučitev statističnih podatkov je dokumentirana v različnih internih in zunanjih dokumentih, ki opisujejo postopke za preverjanje obvestil in vprašalnikov v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem ter smernice za misije.
The basis for the delimitation of general government is detailed in ESA2010 and in the MGDD, including a decision tree. 
Podlaga za razmejitev sektorja država je podrobno navedena v ESR 2010 ter Priročniku o javnofinančnem primanjkljaju in dolgu, vključno z drevesom odločanja.
For the purpose of checking the delimitation of general government, Eurostat also has at its disposal the regis‐ ter of government entities, part of the EDP Inventory, the questionnaire on government controlled entities classified outside government, available since 2011 and documents on reclassifications requested before EDP visits. 
Eurostat ima za preverjanje razmejitve sektorja država na voljo tudi register državnih subjektov, del evidence virov in metod za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, vprašalnik o državno nadziranih subjektih, razvrščenih zunaj sektorja država, ki je na voljo od leta 2011, in dokumente o prerazvrstitvah, ki se zahtevajo pred obiski v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
Recommendation 1 – First paragraph The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
Priporočilo 1, prvi odstavek Komisija sprejema to priporočilo.
Recommendation 1 – Second paragraph The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
Priporočilo 1, drugi odstavek Komisija sprejema to priporočilo.
The Commission has appropriate internal procedures guiding its quality assessment work. 
Komisija ima ustrezne notranje postopke, ki jih uporablja pri ocenjevanju kakovosti.
They are established by internal documents and are fit for purpose. 
Vzpostavljeni so z notranjimi dokumenti in ustrezajo svojemu namenu.
The Commission will nevertheless review its procedures in these areas and do its utmost to improve them where needed. 
Komisija bo kljub temu pregledala svoje postopke na teh področjih in jih čim bolj izboljšala, kjer je to potrebno.
132 The Commission assesses control systems in Member States during its visits, EDP questionnaires, peer reviews, questionnaires, and other instruments. 
132 Komisija kontrolne sisteme v državah članicah ocenjuje med svojimi obiski ter z uporabo vprašalnikov v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, medsebojnih strokovnih pregledov, vprašalnikov in drugih instrumentov.
As an example, it has promoted the signature of memoranda of understand‐ ing between the main institutions responsible for EDP data, even though it is not a legal obligation. 
Spodbuja na primer podpis memorandumov o soglasju med glavnimi institucijami, odgovornimi za podatke iz postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, čeprav to ni zakonska obveznost.
Accordingly Eurostat’s system, composed of various building blocks, is fit for purpose. 
Zato sistem Eurostata, sestavljen iz različnih gradnikov, ustreza namenu.
The Commission can enhance the documentation on the components identified by the Court, where appropriate (supervisory and control systems in Member States). 
Komisija lahko okrepi dokumentiranje elementov, ki jih je opredelilo Sodišče, kjer je to ustrezno (nadzorni in kontrolni sistemi v državah članicah).
See also Commission reply to paragraph 59. 
Glej tudi odgovor Komisije na točko 59.
Reply of the Commission 133 Recommendation 2 The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
Odgovori Komisije 133 Priporočilo 2 Komisija sprejema to priporočilo.
Institutional arrangements and supervisory and control systems are part of both upstream and standard dialogue visit agendas. 
Institucionalni dogovori ter nadzorni in kontrolni sistemi so na dnevnih redih predhodnih obiskov za dialog in standardnih obiskov za dialog.
The Commission will analyse how this issue could be better documented in the future. 
Komisija bo analizirala, kako bi bilo mogoče v prihodnje to vprašanje bolje dokumentirati.
133 The Commission considers that the duration of the visits is sufficient to adequately examine data quality issues. 
133 Komisija meni, da je trajanje obiskov zadostno za ustrezno preučitev vprašanj glede kakovosti podatkov.
When needed, Eurostat has the possibility to make longer or more frequent visits. 
Eurostat lahko po potrebi obiske podaljša ali jih opravlja pogosteje.
In addition, Eurostat has always managed to adjust agenda points during the missions and, if not the case, to follow up points after the mission. 
Poleg tega mu med misijo vedno uspe prilagoditi točke dnevnega reda, v nasprotnem primeru pa jih obravnava po njej.
This is increasingly effective with available IT technology. 
To je vse bolj učinkovito z razpoložljivo informacijsko tehnologijo.
See also Commission replies to paragraphs 52 and 54. 
Glej tudi odgovore Komisije na točki 52 in 54.
The number, length and scope of these visits is dependent on the availability of human and financial resources. 
Število, dolžina in obseg teh obiskov so odvisni od razpoložljivosti človeških in finančnih virov.
134 Direct verification is performed on some issues during the visits (and not only during the visits: for example, when Eurostat officials review contracts for Public‐private Partnerships (PPPs) in the office). 
134 Med obiski se za nekatera vprašanja opravi neposredno preverjanje (in ne samo med obiski: kadar na primer uradniki Eurostata v pisarni pregledajo pogodbe o javno-zasebnih partnerstvih).
High‐risk topics have been included in the agenda for both upstream and standard dialogue visits. 
Teme z velikim tveganjem so vključene na dnevni red predhodnih obiskov za dialog in standardnih obiskov za dialog.
Apart from the general high‐risk issues which are always part of the mission agendas, specific issues based on risks are included. 
Poleg splošnih vprašanj z velikim tveganjem, ki so vedno na dnevnem redu misije, so vključena tudi posebna vprašanja na podlagi tveganj.
See also Commission replies to paragraph 53. 
Glej tudi odgovore Komisije na točko 53.
135 The Commission will ensure that final reports of the dialogue visits are published within a reasonable delay. 
135 Komisija bo poskrbela, da bodo končna poročila o obiskih za dialog objavljena v razumnem roku.
How‐ ever, sharing good‐practices does not hinge on the publication date of the mission report as Member States and the Commission has various well‐established fora to do so (e.g. EDP Working Group, Task Force on methodology etc.). 
Vendar izmenjava dobrih praks ni odvisna od datuma objave poročila o misiji, saj imajo države članice in Komisija za ta namen različne dobro uveljavljene forume (npr. delovna skupina za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, delovna skupina za metodologijo itd.).
See also Commission reply to paragraph 56. 
Glej tudi odgovor Komisije na točko 56.
Reply of the Commission 134 Recommendation 3 – First paragraph The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
Odgovori Komisije 134 Priporočilo 3, prvi odstavek Komisija sprejema to priporočilo.
The Commission considers that the duration of its dialogue visits is appropriate. 
Komisija meni, da je trajanje obiskov za dialog primerno.
More frequent visits would have resource implications, both in human and financial terms. 
Pogostejši obiski bi vplivali na vire, tako človeške kot tudi finančne.
The Commission will bal‐ ance the costs and merits of this recommendation. 
Komisija bo pretehtala stroške in koristi tega priporočila.
Recommendation 3 – Second paragraph The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
Priporočilo 3, drugi odstavek Komisija sprejema to priporočilo.
Recommendation 3 – Third paragraph The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
Priporočilo 3, tretji odstavek Komisija sprejema to priporočilo.
The Commission will ensure that final reports of the dialogue visits are published within a reasonable delay. 136. 
Komisija bo poskrbela, da bodo končna poročila o obiskih za dialog objavljena v razumnem roku.
If an action point concerns a material issue, the Commission always follows it up. 
136 Če se ukrep nanaša na bistveno vprašanje, Komisija vedno nadalje ukrepa.
Sometimes deadlines have to be extended for pragmatic or organisational reasons. 
Včasih je treba roke podaljšati iz pragma-tičnih in organizacijskih razlogov.
Eurostat’s quality assessments include all important and material issues which are addressed that are addressed by action points. 
Eurostatove ocene kakovosti vključujejo vsa pomembna in bistvena vprašanja, na katere se nanašajo ukrepi.
See Commission reply to paragraph 56. 
Glej odgovor Komisije na točko 56.
Recommendation 4 The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
Priporočilo 4 Komisija sprejema to priporočilo.
The Commission will investigate whether and in which areas it should more fully exercise its powers. 
Komisija bo preučila, ali in na katerih področjih bi morala celoviteje uporabiti svoje pristojnosti.