natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In some cases, the applicable procedures are not implemented because they are deemed too expensive by the responsible authorities, or are not applied for legal reasons, which prevents any convictions: (a) in the United Kingdom and more specifically in England and Wales, there is no system of administrative sanctions, and decisions to pursue a case are subject to a Ôpublic interestŐ assessment founded, in particular, on whether the ratio between the cost of proceeding and the applicable penalty is considered too high. 
V nekaterih primerih se veljavni postopki ne izvajajo, ker pristojni organi menijo, da so predragi, ali pa se ne izvajajo zaradi pravnih pomislekov, kar preprečuje vsakršno obsodbo: (a) v Združenem kraljestvu in natančneje v Angliji in Walesu ni sistema upravnih kazni, odločitve o uvedbi pregona pa so odvisne od ocenjenega „javnega interesa“, ki temelji predvsem na tem, ali je razmerje med stroški postopka in izrečeno kaznijo preveliko.
Hence, 90 % (3) of infringements identified in 2005 were not pursued through the Courts and led only to a warning from the inspectorate; (b) in France, for legal reasons, anomalies identified in the registration of catch data were not forwarded to the inspectors with a view to possible judicial proceedings (see paragraph 35). 
Zato za 90 % (3) kršitev, ugotovljenih leta 2005, ni bil sprožen pregon, ampak so inšpekcijski organi izrekli samo opozorilo; (b) v Franciji se nepravilnosti, ugotovljene med zbiranjem podatkov o ulovu, zaradi pravnih pomislekov ne pošiljajo inšpektorjem za potrebe morebitnega pregona (glej odstavek 35).
(1) In fact, they are national inspectors designated by each Member State to take part in inspections in the context of operations coordinated by the Agency. 
(1) Grenamrečzanacionalneinšpektorje,kijihvsakadržavačlanicaime-nuje za sodelovanje pri inšpekcijskih pregledih v okviru dejavnosti, ki jih usklajuje Agencija.
(2) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 25. 
(2) Uredba (ES) št. 2371/2002, člen 25.
(3) Out of 202 infringements found during landing inspections (including on-board controls) there were 167 oral warnings, 14 written warnings, 20 cases passed to the judicial authorities and one case pending. 
(3) Za 202 kršitvi, ugotovljeni med inšpekcijskimi pregledi pri iztovarjanju (ki so zajemali tudi kontrole na krovu), je bilo izrečenih 167 ustnih opozoril, 14 pisnih opozoril, 20 primerov je bilo predloženih sodnim organom, v enem primeru pa odločitev še ni bila sprejeta.
Incomplete information about sanctions and previous history 91. 
Nepopolne informacije o kazni in preteklih dejanjih 91.
In several Member States visited, there is no central computerised repository for all the information relating to fisheries offences and perpetrators of them. 
V več obiskanih državah članicah ni centralnega računalniškega registra, v katerem bi se zbirale vse informacije o kršitvah na področju ribištva in njihovih storilcih.
For this reason, prosecuting authorities are not able to base their decision on complete knowledge of the previous history. 
Zato se organi, pristojni za pregon, pri svoji odločitvi ne morejo opreti na celovito poznavanje preteklih dejanj.
Moreover, due to the lack of information about the penalties awarded for each type of offence it is not possible to evaluate the effectiveness of inspection activities, and that same lack is therefore an impediment to good strategic planning and appropriate targeting of inspections (see paragraph 63). 
Poleg tega zaradi pomanjkanja informacij o kaznih, izrečenih za posamezne vrste kršitev, ni mogoče oceniti učinkovitosti inšpekcijskih ukrepov, kar ovira dobro strateško programiranje in ustrezno izbiranje inšpekcijskih pregledov (glej odstavek 63).
In Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom there is no database that contains all sanctions imposed in the area of fisheries. 
V Španiji, Franciji, Italiji in Združenem kraljestvu nimajo podatkovnih zbirk, v katerih bi bili zbrani podatki o vseh kaznih, izrečenih na področju ribištva.
In Denmark, it has only existed since 2004. 
Na Danskem imajo takšno zbirko šele od leta 2004.
Lack of integration and harmonisation at Community level 92. 
Na ravni Skupnosti ni povezovanja in usklajevanja 92.
An initial difficulty is that of effectively applying the penalty imposed on a foreign national once he or she is beyond the jurisdiction of the State in which the offence was committed. 
Prva težava je dejanska izvršitev kazni, izrečene tujemu državljanu, ko ta zapusti območje pravne pristojnosti države, kjer je storil kršitev.
A second is the difficulty, or even impossibility, of the authorities in one country taking into account infringements recorded by another Member State, whether for reasons of access to information or for legal reasons. 
Druga je težava ali celo nezmožnost pristojnih organov države, da bi upoštevali kršitve, ki jih je ugotovila druga država članica, bodisi zato ker nimajo dostopa do informacij ali iz pravnih razlogov.
A catalogue of measures to be applied by Member States in relation to serious infringements (4) was to be drawn up by the Council, but has not yet been created. 
Seznam ukrepov, ki bi jih države članice uporabljale za resne kršitve (4) in bi ga moral pripraviti Svet, še ni sestavljen.
To date, the Commission has still not presented the Council with a proposal to this end. 
Komisija do sedaj Svetu še ni podala predloga v zvezi s tem.
Penalties, on the whole, insufficient deterrent, according to the Commission 94. 
Kazni po mnenju Komisije na splošno niso odvračalne 94.
Nevertheless, even without precise tools, the Commission was able to conclude that overall the penalties imposed were not a good deterrent. 
Vendar je Komisija kljub temu, da nima natančnih orodij, ugotovila, da izrečene kazni na splošno niso odvračalne.
It stated it publicly in these terms, Ôthe amount paid by the fisheries industry as a consequence of sanctions imposed [...] is roughly equal to two thousandths of the [...] landing value. 
Javno je to izrazila z naslednjimi besedami: „znesek, ki je bil plačan v okviru ribiške industrije kot posledica [uporabljenih] sankcij [...] [je] skoraj enak dvema tisočinkama vrednosti iztovora [...].
Such an amount entails the risk that the fishing industry may consider penalties imposed for infringements to the CFP rules just as an ordinary running cost for the enterprise and see no real incentive to be compliantŐ (5). 
Tak znesek lahko povzroči, da bo ribiška industrija naložene kazni za kršitve skupne ribiške politike štela za običajen tekoči strošek podjetja in v njih ne bo videla prave spodbude za izpolnjevanje zahtev“ (5).
(4) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 25(4). 
(4) Uredba (ES) št. 2371/2002, člen 25(4).
(5) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Ń Reports from Member States on behaviours which seriously infringed the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy in 2004, COM(2006) 387, 14.7.2006. 
(5) Sporočilo Komisije Svetu in Evropskemu parlamentu – Poročila držav članic o načinih vedenja, ki resno kršijo pravila skupne ribiške politike, za leto 2004, COM(2006) 387, 14.7.2006.
See also third edition of the Common Fisheries Policy Compliance Scoreboard (page 40). 
Glej tudi tretjo izdajo CFP Compliance Scoreboard (str. 40).
C 317/18 EN Official Journal of the European Union 28.12.2007 Means of applying pressure on Member States are effective only exceptionally 95. 
C 317/18 SL Uradni list Evropske unije 28.12.2007 Sredstva za pritisk na države članice so le izjemoma učinkovita 95.
In order to get Member States to respect their obligations, the Commission may either have recourse to the Court of Justice and the general procedure for failure to fulfil an obligation, or it may use one of the procedures specific to the CFP. 
Če želi Komisija države članice pripraviti k spoštovanju njihovih obveznosti, lahko uporabi splošni postopek zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti pred Sodiščem Evropskih skupnosti ali enega od postopkov, ki se uporabljajo na področju SRP.
Each of these procedures, however, has features that make it difficult to use and effective only exceptionally. 
Vendar imajo vsi ti postopki določene značilnosti, zaradi katerih se jih težko uporablja in so učinkoviti le izjemoma.
Proceedings for failure to fulfil an obligation are long, cumbersome and effective only exceptionally ... 
Dolgotrajni in težavni postopki zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti, ki so le izjemoma učinkoviti, ...
Proceedings for failure to fulfil an obligation are inherently long. In fact, before they reach the Court of Justice the observed failure must be the subject of a formal notice, then of a reasoned opinion. 
Preden se zadeva predloži Sodišču Evropskih skupnosti, morata biti za ugotovljene neizpolnitve obveznosti izdana najprej pisni opomin in nato obrazloženo mnenje.
Each of these stages not only requires extensive preparatory work and formal consultation between the relevant departments of DG Fish, but also involves the CommissionŐs legal service. 
Vsaka od teh faz zahteva ne samo obsežne priprave in posvetovanje zadevnih služb GD za ribištvo, ampak tudi posredovanje pravne službe Komisije.
The delays inherent in each of these tasks are compounded by the fact that decisions on infringements are taken by the Commission only once in every quarter. 
K rokom, potrebnim za izvedbo vseh teh nalog, je treba prišteti še dejstvo, da Komisija sprejema odločitve v zvezi s kršitvami samo enkrat v vsakem četrtletju.
In total, for fisheries as for other areas, proceedings for failure to fulfil an obligation take several years. 
Skratka, tako na področju ribištva kot na drugih področjih postopki za ugotavljanje kršitev zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti trajajo več let.
Furthermore, proceedings for failure in the implementation of control, inspection or sanctions procedures require a significant volume of inspection work on the part of the Commission. 
Poleg tega postopki zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti zaradi pomanjkljivosti pri izvajanju postopkov nadzora, inšpekcijskih pregledov ali kazni zahtevajo obsežne inšpekcijske dejavnosti s strani Komisije.
Due to the absence of easily verifiable assessment criteria, the Commission has to increase the volume of evidence in order to demonstrate that the failure is both general and permanent. This requires numerous missions; especially as in practice Commission inspectors cannot officially record an infringement without national inspectors being present. 
Ker ni enostavno preverljivih meril vrednotenja, mora Komisija povečati število dokazov, če želi dokazati, da so neizpolnitve obveznosti hkrati splošne in stalne, to pa zahteva številne oglede, zlasti ker inšpektorji Komisije v praksi ne morejo ugotoviti kršitev brez navzočnosti nacionalnih inšpektorjev.
All in all, the size of the task in fact makes it difficult to pursue more than one case of this type at a time (1). 
Tako je zaradi obsežnosti naloge težko naenkrat preganjati več kot en tak primer (1).
And lastly, a judgment of failure to fulfil an obligation (2) is not in itself effective, since the Member StateŐs obligation is confined to taking the measures required to execute the judgment. 
In kot zadnje, obsodba zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti (2) sama po sebi ni učinkovita, ker je obveznost države članice omejena na sprejetje ukrepov za izvršitev sodbe.
In order to result in a financial penalty, the first judgment must be followed by a second one (3), for non-implementation of the provisions of the first one. 
Za izrek denarne kazni mora prvi obsodbi slediti druga (3) zaradi neizvajanja določb prve sodbe.
For that the Commission must bring evidence that the failure has continued without any interruption since the first judgment. 
Zato mora Komisija dokazati, da se je neizpolnjevanje obveznosti od prve sodbe neprekinjeno nadaljevalo.
(1) The Commission estimated that in 2005 15 % of its inspection unitŐs resources had to be assigned to work linked to the legal action against France. 
(1) Komisija ocenjuje, da je morala v letu 2005 njena inšpekcijska enota 15 % svojih virov nameniti delu, povezanemu s pravnim ukrepanjem proti Franciji.
(2) Under Article 226 of the Treaty. 
(2) Na podlagi člena 226 Pogodbe.
(3) Under Article 228 of the Treaty. 
(3) Na podlagi člena 228 Pogodbe.
In practice, in the area of fisheries, there has only been one case in which a Member State was sentenced to pay a financial penalty (4). 
V praksi obstaja na področju ribištva samo en primer, ko je bilo državi članici naloženo plačilo denarne kazni (4).
The judgment in question was delivered in 2005 for non-compliance with a 1991 judgment concerning a case in which the first infringements had been recorded in 1984, 21 years earlier. 
Zadevna sodba je bila izrečena leta 2005 zaradi neizvršitve sodbe iz leta 1991 v zvezi z zadevo, v kateri so bile prve kršitve ugotovljene leta 1984 oziroma 21 let prej.
Nevertheless the impact of this one decision was very important. 
Učinek te edine odločitve je bil vseeno zelo velik.
It allowed national authorities to impose within months the introduction and application of numerous procedures that had previously been absent or deficient, despite having been compulsory for many years, not only in the country fined but also in the other Member States against which similar proceedings were in progress. ... and limited specific procedures which are difficult to implement ... 
Nacionalnim organom je omogočil, da so v nekaj mesecih predpisali vzpostavitev in izvajanje številnih postopkov, ki do tedaj niso obstajali ali so bili pomanjkljivi, čeprav obvezni že dolgo let, in to ne samo v obsojeni državi, ampak tudi v drugih državah članicah, ki so bile predmet podobnega postopka v teku. ... in omejeni posebni postopki, ki jih je težko izvajati ...
One of the specific lines of action available to the Commission is the possibility of taking preventive measures (5) where there a risk that fishing activities pose a serious threat to conservation of resources. 
Eden od posebnih ukrepov, ki jih ima na voljo Komisija, je možnost sprejetja preventivnih ukrepov (5), če obstaja tveganje, da ribolovne dejavnosti resno ogrožajo ohranjanje virov.
But the difficulty of gathering the necessary evidence and observing the principle of proportionality have so far dissuaded the Commission from taking such action, especially as the effect of such a decision would be limited, with a maximum application period of six months. 
Vendar so Komisijo doslej od izvajanja tega ukrepa odvračale težave pri zbiranju potrebnih dokazov in upoštevanju načela soraz-mernosti, zlasti ker bi bil učinek te odločitve omejen zaradi največ šestmesečnega trajanja izvajanja.
On the other hand, where it is found that previous quotas were exceeded (6), the Commission has the power to reduce the future fishing opportunities of the offending Member State (7). 
Poleg tega lahko Komisija, če ugotovi, da so bile prejšnje kvote presežene (6), zmanjša prihodnje ribolovne priložnosti države članice kršiteljice (7).
This possibility requires the Commission to obtain sufficient evidence that the final catch figures submitted by the Member States are erroneous. 
Če želi Komisija uporabiti to možnost, mora pridobiti zadostne dokaze o nepravilnosti dokončnih podatkov o ulovu, ki so jih poslale države članice.
In practice it has been possible to implement this provision only once (8), on the basis of information obtained in national inspections of one of the Member States sanctioned. 
To določbo je bilo v praksi možno izvesti samo enkrat (8) in to na podlagi informacij, pridobljenih v okviru nacionalnih inšpekcij ene od kaznovanih držav članic.
The Commission does not have the possibility of suspending aid allocated to a Member State under the CFP in case of failure to apply the control rules. 
Komisija nima možnosti, da bi ukinila pomoč, dodeljeno državi članici v okviru SRP, če slednja ne izpolnjuje obveznosti o izvajanju pravil o nadzoru.
(4) Case C-304/02 Commission/France; action for failure to fulfil obligations under Article 228 EC; sentenced to pay a lump sum of 20 million euro and a penalty payment of 57,8 million euro for each period of six months (judgment given on 12 July 2005); in fact France paid the lump sum and one penalty payment. 
(4) Zadeva C-304/02 Komisija proti Franciji; tožba zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti na podlagi člena 228 ES; naložitev plačila povprečnine v višini 20 milijonov EUR in denarne kazni v višini 57,8 milijona EUR za vsako šestmesečno obdobje (sodba, izrečena 12. julija 2005); Francija je dejansko plačala povprečnino in denarno kazen.
(5) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 26(3). 
(5) Uredba (ES) št. 2371/2002, člen 26(3).
(6) That is to say, other than those relating to the last complete fisheries year for which an administrative mechanism exists, allowing the reat-tribution, under certain conditions, of excess amounts from one year against the relevant quotas for the following year. 
(6) Se pravi, kvote, ki se ne nanašajo na zadnje zaključeno proračunsko leto, za katero obstaja mehanizem upravljanja, ki omogoča, da se pod nekaterimi pogoji presežki enega leta odštejejo od ustreznih kvot za naslednje proračunsko leto.
(7) Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002, Article 23(4). 
(7) Uredba (ES) št. 2371/2002, člen 23(4).
(8) Commission Regulation (EC) No 147/2007 of 15 February 2007 adapting certain fish quotas from 2007 to 2012 pursuant to Article 23(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy. 
(8) Uredba Komisije (ES) št.
28.12.2007 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 317/19 104. 
28.12.2007 SL Uradni list Evropske unije C 317/19 104.
Furthermore, it has never assessed the extent to which Member States have implemented the obligation imposed upon them to recover aid granted under the fisheries structural funds from beneficiaries who do not comply with CFP rules (1). ... allowing serious shortcomings to persist in the Member States 105. 
Poleg tega ni nikoli ocenila, v kolikšni meri države članice izvajajo naloženo obveznost, da od prejemnikov, ki ne spoštujejo pravil SRP, izterjajo pomoč, dodeljeno v okviru strukturnih skladov za ribištvo (1). ... omogočajo, da v državah članicah še naprej obstajajo hude pomanjkljivosti 105.
Finally, in view of the weaknesses just described in the system of sanctions, it is not surprising that the Court was able to find serious inadequacies in Member StatesŐ application of measures aimed at sustainable management of fisheries resources, even though the Commission has been aware of this situation for several years. 
Glede na navedene pomanjkljivosti sistema kazni torej ni presenetljivo, da je Računsko sodišče lahko odkrilo hude pomanjkljivosti pri izvajanju ukrepov za trajnostno upravljanje ribolovnih virov s strani držav članic, čeprav se Komisija že dolga leta zaveda tega položaja.
This situation is also linked to the fact that, following its inspection reports, the Commission does not formally ask national authorities to comment on the failings found and, where appropriate, present an action plan to rectify them. 
Ta položaj je povezan tudi s tem, da Komisija na podlagi svojih inšpekcijskih poročil uradno ne zahteva od nacionalnih organov, naj sprejmejo stališče o neizpolnjevanju obveznosti, ki so ga odkrile, in po potrebi predložijo akcijski načrt za njegovo odpravo.
The control context: fishing overcapacity jeopardises compliance with rules and effectiveness of controls 107. 
Kontekst kontrol: presežna ribolovna zmogljivost otežuje upoštevanje pravil in učinkovitost kontrol 107.
In addition to the weaknesses described above, the effectiveness of inspection and control systems is impeded by the existence of a very high inherent risk associated with the existence of significant fishing overcapacity. 
Poleg zgoraj opisanih pomanjkljivosti učinkovitost sistemov nadzora in inšpekcijskih pregledov ovira zelo veliko pripadajoče tveganje, povezano z velikimi presežnimi ribolovnimi zmogljivostmi.
Although the situation has been known about for many years, it has not been dealt with effectively. 
Čeprav je takšno stanje znano že leta, doslej ni bilo učinkovito obravnavano.
Examples of differences between scientific opinions and TAC Overcapacity, a major risk factor for the failure of Community action 108. 
Presežna zmogljivost, glavni dejavnik tveganja za neuspeh ukrepanja Skupnosti 108.
Overcapacity may be defined as a fleetŐs excess catch capacity relative to the level of catch that would allow the resource to be sustainably exploited. 
Presežna zmogljivost se lahko opredeli kot presežek zmogljivosti ladjevja pri ulovu glede na stopnjo ulova, ki ustreza trajnostnemu izkoriščanju virov.
Despite the difficulties in measuring it, the finding of overcapacity in the Community fleet is highlighted in the Green Paper (2). 
Presežna zmogljivost ladjevja Skupnosti je bila izpostavljena tudi v zeleni knjigi (2), čeprav jo je težko izmeriti.
According to the Commission, ÔWhat is clear, in any event, is that the fleet is currently much too largeŐ and Ôthat the necessary reductions of fishing mortality for the prudent management of stocks should be about 40 % and in many cases much higherŐ. 
Po mnenju Komisije je ladjevje Skupnosti trenutno precej preveliko [...]; za previdno upravljanje staležev bi bilo treba pogin rib na splošno zmanjšati za približno 40 %.
Overcapacity encourages over-fishing 109. 
Presežna zmogljivost spodbuja prelov 109.
It influences the behaviour of the industry and the legislator, by reducing the profitability of enterprises in the sector, which have to bear the costs associated with the overcapacity of their means of production. 
Vpliva na ravnanje ribiške industrije in zakonodajalca, saj zmanjšuje donosnost podjetij v sektorju, ki morajo nositi stroške, povezane s presežno zmogljivostjo proizvodnih sredstev.
There is a risk of their underdeclaring their catches or throwing the less profitable part overboard (see paragraph 25). 
Obstaja tveganje, da sporočajo premalo ulova ali manj donosen ulov zavržejo v morje (glej odstavek 25).
When the Council of Ministers adopts the TAC and quotas it acts as an arbiter between divergent short-term interests, environmental on the one hand, and socio-economic on the other. 
Svet ministrov se mora pri sprejemanju TAC in kvot odločati med različnimi kratkoročnimi interesi, ki so na eni strani okoljski, na drugi pa socialno-ekonomski.
In doing so it may authorise catch quantities that are higher than those recommended by the scientists (see Table 3), in order to protect the immediate social and economic interests of those employed in the industry. 
Na podlagi te presoje lahko dovoli večje količine ulova, kot jih priporočajo znanstveniki (glej tabelo 2), da bi se zaščitili kratkoročni interesi ribiške industrije.
Table 3 2006 scientific opinion (tonnes) TAC 2006 (tonnes) 2007 scientific opinion (tonnes) TAC 2007 (tonnes) 0 23 205 0 19 957 Cod North Sea Herring North Sea < 425 000 454 751 < 245 000 341 063 Horse mackerel North Sea < 18 000 42 727 < 18 000 42 727 Whiting North Sea < 17 300 23 800 < 15 100 23 800 (1) Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 of 17 December 1999 laying down the detailed rules and arrangements regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries sector, Article 18 (OJ L 337, 30.12.1999, p. 
Poleg tega se te odločitve sprejemajo brez orodja, ki bi omogočalo objektivno vrednotenje učinka, ki ga bodo sprejete količine ulova imele na ene ali druge od teh interesov. Tabela 3 Primeri razlik med znanstvenimi mnenji in TAC Trska Severno morje Sled Severno morje < 425 000 454 751 < 245 000 341 063 Šur Severno morje < 18 000 42 727 < 18 000 42 727 Mol Severno morje < 17 300 23 800 < 15 100 23 800 Znanstveno mnenje za leto 2006 (v tonah) TAC za leto 2006 (v tonah) Znanstveno mnenje za leto 2007 (v tonah) TAC za leto 2007 (tone) 0 23 205 0 19 957 (1) Uredba Sveta (ES) št.
(2) Green paper on the future of the CFP, COM(2001)135, section 3.3. 
(2) Zelena knjiga o prihodnosti SRP, COM(2001) 135, oddelek 3.3.
C 317/20 EN Official Journal of the European Union 28.12.2007 Failure of past capacity-reduction policies 112. 
C 317/20 SL Uradni list Evropske unije 28.12.2007 Neuspeh preteklih politik za zmanjševanje zmogljivosti 112.