natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
31 EEAS, Strategic review of EUPOL Afghanistan, 13 December 2013. 
31 ESZD, Strategic review of EUPOL Afghanistan, 13. december 2013.
32 Centre of Naval Analyses, Independent Assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces, Washington, January 2014. 
32 Centre of Naval Analyses, Independent Assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces, Washington, januar 2014.
Observations 29 63 According to the EEAS33, 86 % of the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and the national police is provided by international donors, which makes the sustainability of the whole policing sector heavily dependent on support from the international community. 
Opažanja 29 63 Po navedbah ESZD33 86 % proračuna ministrstva za notranje zadeve in nacionalne policije zagotavljajo mednarodni donatorji, zato je trajnost v sektorju policijskega dela močno odvisna od podpore mednarodne skupnosti.
64 Training activities can be expected to be sustainable in the medium term, provided that local conditions do not substantially worsen. 
64 Za dejavnosti usposabljanja je mogoče pričakovati, da bodo srednjeročno trajnostne, če se lokalne razmere ne bodo močno poslabšale.
EUPOL has made a serious effort to involve the Afghan leadership progressively in develop‐ ing training courses and managing the police colleges. 
EUPOL si je zelo prizadevala, da bi afganistansko vodstvo čedalje bolj pritegovala v razvoj tečajev usposabljanja in upravljanje policijskih akademij.
As a result, although EUPOL is still involved in monitoring the training provided in the colleges, the Afghan authorities have largely taken over the planning, conduct and follow‐up of training activities. 
Zato EUPOL sicer še vedno sodeluje pri spremljanju usposabljanja v akademijah, vendar so afganistanski organi v veliki meri prevzeli načrtovanje, izvajanje in nadaljnje spremljanje dejavnosti usposabljanja.
Never‐ theless, the sustainability of training mostly depends on further develop‐ ing genuine ownership on the part of the Afghan authorities. 
Kljub temu pa je trajnost usposabljanja večinoma odvisna od tega, ali bodo afganistanski organi še naprej razvijali dejansko lastno odgovornost.
The audit found that, unless the administrative capacity and financial autonomy of the police colleges are reinforced, the long‐term sustainability of college activities will be jeopardised. 
Pri reviziji je bilo ugotovljeno, da bo dolgoročna trajnost dejavnosti policijskih akademij ogrožena, če ne bosta okrepljeni upravna zmogljivost in finančna avtonomija akademij.
Despite signing a Memorandum of Under‐ standing in which it agreed to bear the operational costs for running the two colleges34, the Ministry of the Interior is reluctant to allocate sufficient finan‐ cial resources, leading to difficulties in handling the required logistics and running costs. 
Čeprav je ministrstvo za notranje zadeve podpisalo memorandum o soglasju, s katerim je privolilo, da bo nosilo operativne stroške delovanja obeh akademij34, pa se obotavlja pri dodelitvi zadostnih finančnih sredstev, kar povzroča težave pri obravnavi logističnih zadev in tekočih stroškov.
65 The sustainability of the outcomes of EUPOL’s mentoring activities and projects is also heavily dependent on Afghan ownership, the development of synergies among the various activi‐ ties, and finally follow‐up and evalua‐ tion efforts. 
65 Trajnost izidov, ki jih EUPOL dosega z dejavnostmi mentorstva in projekti, je močno odvisna tudi od lastne odgovornosti Afganistana, razvoja sinergij med različnimi dejavnostmi ter nazadnje od prizadevanj v zvezi z nadaljnjim spremljanjem in vrednotenjem.
The audit found that these issues were not sufficiently accounted for in mentoring plans or addressed systematically in the early stages of activity planning. 
Pri reviziji je bilo ugotovljeno, da ta vprašanja niso bila dovolj vključena v načrte mentorstva ali sistematično obravnavana v zgodnjih fazah načrtovanja dejavnosti.
66 The Court examined whether the EEAS and the Commission have adequately prepared the phasing out of EUPOL ac‐ cording to a comprehensive plan that firstly, takes into account the overall strategy of the EU and of other actors/ donors and secondly, addresses issues relating to the liquidation of assets. 
66 Sodišče je preučilo, ali sta ESZD in Komisija ustrezno pripravili postopno ukinjanje EUPOL v skladu s celovitim načrtom, v katerem je, prvič, upoštevana splošna strategija EU in drugih akterjev/donatorjev ter so, drugič, obravnavana vprašanja, povezana z likvidacijo sredstev.
33 EEAS, Revised Concept of Operations for EUPOL Afghanistan, June 2014. 
33 ESZD, Revised Concept of Operations for EUPOL Afghanistan, junij 2014.
34 The Police Staff Training College and the Crime Management College. 
34 Akademiji za policijsko osebje in obvladovanje kriminala.
Observations 30 Exit strategy planning is well advanced, but further work is needed 67 In June 2013, the EEAS and the Com‐ mission produced a joint staff working document35 in which they presented the EU’s activities and the remaining related challenges, as well as a num‐ ber of options to be considered for EU support post‐2014. 
Opažanja 30 Načrtovanje izhodne strategije dobro napreduje, toda potrebno je dodatno delo 67 ESZD in Komisija sta junija 2013 pripravili skupni delovni dokument služb35, v katerem sta predstavili dejavnosti EU in preostale s tem povezane izzive, pa tudi številne možnosti za podporo EU po letu 2014, o katerih je treba premis-liti.
In December 2013, the EEAS issued a strategic review36, which was essentially a synthesis of the self‐assessment carried out by EU‐ POL in November 201337. 
Decembra 2013 je ESZD izdala strateški pregled36, ki je bil v bistvu sinteza samoocene, ki jo je novembra 2013 izvedla EUPOL37.
The mission assessed that, by the end of 2014, the average implementation rate for ob‐ jectively verifiable indicators could be expected to be 60 %38. 
Misija je ocenila, da je za povprečno stopnjo izvajanja objektivno preverljivih kazalnikov do konca leta 2014 mogoče pričakovati, da bo znašala 60 %38.
Regarding the progress made by the national police, the assessment concluded that some of the tasks carried out under EUPOL’s three lines of operation could be transferred to the Afghan authorities, in particular training‐related activities, but most should be taken over or built upon by EU bodies or other actors. 
Glede napredka nacionalne policije je bil zaključek ocene, da bi bilo mogoče nekatere naloge, ki se izvajajo v okviru treh linij operacij EUPOL, prenesti na afganistanske organe, zlasti dejavnosti, povezane z usposabljanjem, toda večino nalog bi morali prevzeti in na njih graditi organi EU ali drugi akterji.
68 In June 2014, the Council undertook39 to extend the EUPOL mandate until the end of 2016. 
68 Junija 2014 se je Svet odločil39, da bo podaljšal mandat EUPOL do konca leta 2016.
It also reiterated the EU’s commitment to a comprehensive approach, including an implementa‐ tion plan to be followed by both the EU institutions and the Member States. 
Poleg tega je ponovil, da je EU zavezana celovitemu pristopu, vključno z izvedbenim načrtom, ki bi mu morale slediti institucije in države članice EU.
69 In this context, on 23 June 2014, the Head of the EU delegation in Kabul (also EU Special Representative in Afghanistan) and the Head of EUPOL produced a joint paper40 on reinforc‐ ing the office of the EU Special Repre‐ sentative with a view to building upon EUPOL’s achievements in the sectors of justice and rule of law. 
69 V tem okviru sta 23. junija 2014 vodja delegacije EU v Kabulu (hkrati posebni predstavnik EU v Afganistanu) in vodja EUPOL pripravila skupen dokument40 o krepitvi urada posebnega predstavnika EU, da bi se gradilo na dosežkih EUPOL v sektorjih pravosodja in pravne države.
The paper identified areas in which the office of the EU Special Representative could be involved after the end of EUPOL’s man‐ date. 
V dokumentu so bila opredeljena področja, na katerih bi lahko po izteku mandata EUPOL deloval urad posebnega predstavnika EU.
The main proposal concerned the appointment to the office of a number of international and national experts with duties limited to the level of strategic/political dialogue. 
Glavni predlog se je nanašal na imenovanja na funkcije v uradu velikega števila mednarodnih in nacionalnih strokovnjakov z zadolžitvami, omejenimi na raven strateškega/političnega dialoga.
70 In parallel, in the Multiannual Indica‐ tive Programme for 2014–20, the EEAS and the Commission proposed polic‐ ing and rule of law as one of four focal sectors. 
70 Vzporedno sta ESZD in Komisija v večletnem okvirnem programu za obdobje 2014–2020 predlagali, naj bosta policijsko delo in pravna država eden od štirih ključnih sektorjev.
The audit highlighted two key concerns in relation to this plan‐ ning document. 
Pri reviziji sta se jasno pokazala glavna pomisleka v zvezi s tem dokumentom načrtovanja.
Firstly, although the Multiannual Indicative Programme rightly states that ‘... the EU can build on groundwork established by the CSDP Mission (EUPOL) in the sector...’, the proposed result indicators are not related to EUPOL’s civilian policing outcomes, but instead are mostly influ‐ enced by external factors (such as the security situation and military conflict). 
Prvič, v večletnem okvirnem programu je pravilno navedeno, da lahko EU gradi na podlagi, ki jo je v sektorju vzpostavila misija SVOP (EU-POL), vendar predlagani kazalniki rezultatov niso povezani z izidi EUPOL na področju civilnega policijskega dela, pač pa nanje vplivajo predvsem zunanji dejavniki (kot so varnostne razmere in vojaški spopadi).
For example, the indicator ‘number of deaths in armed conflict — civil‐ ian casualties’ is a very generic means of measuring the expected result of reinforcing the ‘capacity of the Afghan police to sustain and maintain security in Afghanistan’. 
Kazalnik „število mrtvih v oboroženih spopadih – civilne žrtve” je na primer zelo splošen način za merjenje pričakovanega rezultata, ki je krepitev zmogljivosti afganistanske policije za vzdrževanje in ohranjanje varnosti v Afganistanu.
It could be argued that deaths in armed conflict also result every day from mainly military opera‐ tions which may continue to exist in Afghanistan in the future and do not constitute an accurate indicator of the national police’s civilian policing capacity. 
Mogoče bi bilo trditi, da so smrti v oboroženih spopadih tudi vsakodnevna posledica večinoma vojaških operacij, ki se bodo v Afganistanu morda dogajale tudi v prihodnje, zato te smrti niso točen kazalnik zmogljivosti nacionalne policije za civilno policijsko delo.
35 EEAS, EU action to support efforts in strengthening civilian policing and rule of law post 2014, 14 June 2013. 
35 ESZD, EU action to support efforts in strengthening civilian policing and rule of law post 2014, 14. junij 2013.
36 EEAS, Strategic review of EUPOL Afghanistan, 13 December 2013. 
36 ESZD, Strategic review of EUPOL Afghanistan, 13. december 2013.
37 EUPOL, CMPD tasking paper, 11 November 2013. 
37 EUPOL, CMPD tasking paper, 11. november 2013.
38 According to the document, at the end of 2014 the implementation rate for objectives and tasks is expected to be on average 60%andtorangefrom31% to85%. 
38 Po navedbah v dokumentu se na koncu leta 2014 za stopnjo izvajanja pri ciljih in nalogah pričakuje, da bo povprečno znašala 60 % in da se bo gibala med31%in85%.
39 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on Afghanistan, 23 June 2014. 
39 Svet Evropske unije, Sklepi Sveta o Afganistanu, 23. junij 2014.
The EUPOL mandate was official extended on 17 December 2014 by Council Decision 2014/922/CFSP. 
Mandat EUPOL je bil uradno podaljšan 17. decembra 2014 s Sklepom Sveta 2014/922/SZVP.
40 ‘Reinforcement of the EU Special Representative Office with a view of building upon EUPOL Afghanistan achievements in the sectors of Justice and rule of law ‘, 23 June 2014. 
40 Reinforcement of the EU Special Representative Office with a view of building upon EUPOL Afghanistan achievements in the sectors of Justice and rule of law, 23. junij 2014.
Observations 31 71 Secondly, in principle the EEAS has lim‐ ited alternatives for financing devel‐ opment assistance to Afghanistan for the coming period. 
Opažanja 31 71 Drugič, ESZD ima načeloma omejene možnosti za financiranje razvojne pomoči v Afganistanu v prihajajočem obdobju.
On the one hand, using the budget support instrument cannot be an option for Afghanistan at present. 
Po eni strani za Afganistan zaenkrat ni mogoče uporabiti instrumenta proračunske podpore.
On the other hand, the EEAS considers the project‐based approach to be sub‐optimal owing to difficulties in finding beneficiaries and because of the significant administrative bur‐ den of managing projects. 
Po drugi strani ESZD meni, da pristop, ki temelji na projektih, ni optimalen zaradi težav pri pridobivanju upravičencev in velikega upravnega bremena, ki nastane z upravljanjem projektov.
The EEAS therefore intends to use trust funds, predominantly LOTFA41, as a preferred instrument in the rule of law sector in Afghanistan. 
Zato namerava ESZD v sektorju pravne države v Afganistanu nameniti prednost uporabi instrumenta skrbniških skladov, zlasti LOTFA41.
However, using LOTFA as the main vehicle for financing the Afghan rule of law sector would entail two shortcomings that have to be taken into account: (a) LOTFA has been strongly criticised in the past for mismanagement of funds and lack of transparency by all donors involved — including the EU, which decided to temporarily suspend its payments to the fund; and (b) so far, LOTFA has had very limited experience of capacity building in the sector. 
Uporaba LOTFA kot glavnega sredstva financiranja afganistanskega sektorja pravne države pa bi imela dve pomanjkljivosti, ki ju je treba upoštevati: (a) LOTFA so v preteklosti zaradi nepravilnega upravljanja sredstev in premajhne preglednosti močno kritizirali vsi donatorji, tudi EU, ki se je odločila začasno ustaviti svoja plačila skladu, ter (b) LOTFA je imela do zdaj zelo omejene izkušnje z vzpostavljanjem zmogljivosti v sektorju.
Even though in 2011, Phase IV of LOTFA included a pil‐ lar on capacity development of civilian policing, throughout its life, the trust fund has been used almost exclusively as a payroll mechanism. 
Čeprav je leta 2011 faza IV LOTFA zajela steber razvoja zmogljivosti na področju civilnega policijskega dela, se je skrbniški sklad ves čas svojega obstoja uporabljal skoraj izključno kot mehanizem za izplačilo plač.
For example, in 2013 out of a budget of 524 million USD, an amount of 506 million USD concerned police salaries. 
Leta 2013 je bil na primer od proračuna v višini 524 milijonov USD znesek v višini 506 milijonov USD namenjen policijskim plačam.
In fact, less than 3.5 % has been committed on capacity building and other projects. 
Dejansko je bilo manj kot 3,5 % namenjenega vzpostavljanju zmogljivosti in drugim projektom.
Even in the case that, in the future, the proportion of capacity building budget in LOTFA is increased, the fund is still structured around covering the running cost of the national police rather than building capacity. 
Celo če se bo v prihodnosti delež proračuna LOTFA, ki je namenjen vzpostavljanju zmogljivosti, povečal, je sklad še vedno strukturiran okrog kritja tekočih stroškov nacionalne policije, ne pa vzpostavljanja zmogljivosti.
Liquidation: a coordinated and structured approach is needed 72 The EEAS and the Commission have developed a procedure and guidelines for the closure of CFSP operations. 
Likvidacija: potreben je usklajen in strukturiran pristop 72 ESZD in Komisija sta razvili postopek in smernice za zaključevanje operacij SZVP.
According to these guidelines, EUPOL does not need to submit closure plans, for approval by the Commission, until 3 months before the mandated end of operations. 
V skladu s temi smernicami mora EUPOL predložiti načrte zaključevanja v odobritev Komisiji šele tri mesece pred odobrenim koncem operacij.
The period between 2014 and the end of 2016 will be very important for two rea‐ sons. 
Obdobje od leta 2014 do konca leta 2016 bo zelo pomembno iz dveh razlogov.
Firstly, the mission will downsize considerably during 2015 and 2016. 
Prvič, misija se bo v letih 2015 in 2016 močno zmanjšala.
As also pointed out also by the European Commission’s Internal Audit Service42, downsizing the mission because of the phase‐out, entails a higher risk for the control environment — due mainly to the reduction of staff in key control functions, staff demotivation, loss of expertise and pressure to spend the remaining procurement budget before the end of the mandate. 
Kot je opozorila tudi služba Evropske Komisije za notranjo revizijo42, zmanjševanje misije zaradi postopnega ukinjanja pomeni večje tveganje za kontrolno okolje, predvsem zaradi zmanjšanja števila uslužbencev, ki zasedajo glavne kontrolne funkcije, izgube motivacije uslužbencev, izgube strokovnega znanja in pritiska, da se preostali proračun za javna naročila porabi pred koncem mandata.
Secondly, the value of the assets involved is considerable. 
Drugič, vrednost zadevnih sredstev je znatna.
Thus it is important that EUPOL’s liquidation planning should be properly coordinated and start well in advance43. 
Zato je pomembno, da se EUPOL pri načrtovanju likvidacije ustrezno usklajuje in da se načrtovanje začne dovolj zgodaj43.
41 LOTFA is a trust fund established by UNDP in 2002. 
41 LOTFA je skrbniški sklad, ki ga je leta 2002 ustanovil UNDP.
It was almost exclusively used as mechanism for coordinating contributions from donors for paying salaries of the Afghan national police. 
Skoraj izključno se je uporabljal kot mehanizem za usklajevanje prispevkov donatorjev za plačevanje osebnih prejemkov afganistanske nacionalne policije.
42 Internal Audit Service Audit Report on FPI — Control Strategy 24/07/2014. 
42 Revizijsko poročilo službe za notranjo revizijo o Službi za instrumente zunanje politike – kontrolna strategija, 24.
43 As early as September 2013, EUPOL obtained FPI approval to sell two used power generators, and it has also donated six vehicles to the EU delegation and two to the office of the Directorate‐ General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection in Afghanistan. 
43 EUPOL je že septembra 2013 dobila odobritev Službe za instrumente zunanje politike, da lahko proda dva rabljena električna generatorja.
Observations 32 73 EUPOL uses cash‐based accounting; its assets, valued at acquisition price, total 49.6 million euro. 
Opažanja 32 73 EUPOL uporablja računovodenje na podlagi plačil; njegova sredstva, ocenjena na podlagi nakupne cene, skupaj znašajo 49,6 milijona EUR.
In terms of value, its most important assets are armoured vehicles (25.2 million euro) and IT communications and security equip‐ ment (15.4 million euro) followed by the buildings in the EUPOL compound (4.8 million euro). 
Po vrednosti so najpomembnejša sredstva oklepna vozila (25,2 milijona EUR) ter informacijsko tehnološka in varnostna oprema (15,4 milijona EUR), ki jim sledijo stavbe v kompleksu EUPOL (4,8 milijona EUR).
Obviously, present‐ ing assets of this type (cars, IT, etc.) at acquisition prices does not reflect their real value. 
Navedena vrednost tovrstnih sredstev (avtomobili, informacijska tehnologija itd.) po nakupnih cenah seveda ne odraža njihove dejanske vrednosti.
74 According to EUPOL’s inventory data, there are 14644 armoured vehicles in Afghanistan of which only a few were in use. 
74 Po podatkih v popisu inventarja EUPOL je v Afganistanu 14644 oklepnih vozil, od katerih so bila samo nekatera v uporabi.
The average mileage of these vehicles was 22 700 km. 
Povprečna prevožena razdalja teh vozil je bila 22 700 km.
EUPOL’s inven‐ tory classifies only seven vehicles as ‘not operational’ and 11 as ‘used’. 
V popisu inventarja EUPOL je samo sedem vozil uvrščenih med „nedelujoča”, 11 pa med „rabljena”.
The rest are either ‘in good condition’ or ‘new’. 
Ostala so uvrščena v kategorijo „v dobrem stanju” ali „nova”.
75 EUPOL is responsible for exploring the various possibilities for transferring vehicles to EU bodies or embassies of the Member States, or for donating them to other international organisa‐ tions deployed in Afghanistan. 
75 EUPOL je odgovorna za to, da razišče možnosti za prenos vozil na organe EU ali ambasade držav članic ali podaritev vozil drugim mednarodnim organizacijam, razmeščenim v Afganistanu.
It is also responsible for carrying out the necessary administrative procedures for the export of assets that cannot be transferred within Afghanistan. 
Odgovorna je tudi za izvedbo potrebnih upravnih postopkov za izvoz sredstev, ki jih ni mogoče prenesti znotraj Afganistana.
It is es‐ sential, therefore, that the CPCC work closely with the mission — and well in advance of the end of the mandate — to ensure that assets are disposed of smoothly and do not accumulate, in a way that entails risks. 
Zato je bistveno, da civilna zmogljivost za načrtovanje in izvajanje operacij tesno – in veliko pred koncem mandata – sodeluje z misijo, da zagotovi, da bo odtujitev sredstev gladko potekala in da sredstva ne ostanejo na zalogi na način, ki vključuje tveganja.
76 The audit found that, although there is coordination between the relevant EU departments (CPCC and FPI), they have not agreed on common, proactive and comprehensive rules with clearly defined roles and responsibilities. 
76 Pri reviziji je bilo ugotovljeno, da se ustrezna oddelka EU (civilna zmogljivost za načrtovanje in izvajanje operacij ter Služba za instrumente zunanje politike) sicer medsebojno usklajujeta, nista pa se dogovorila o skupnih, proaktivnih in celovitih pravilih, v katerih bi bile jasno določene vloge in odgovornosti.
44 19 cars were bought in 2006, 1 in 2007, 124 in 2008 and 10 in 2012. 
44 19 avtomobilov je bilo kupljenih leta 2006, eden leta 2007, 124 leta 2008 in 10 leta 2012.
Conclusions and 33 recommendations 77 The European Union has managed to establish a European civilian police mission in Afghanistan in a particularly insecure and tough environment. 
Zaključki in priporočila 33 77 EU je uspelo ustanoviti evropsko civilno policijsko misijo v Afganistanu v še posebno nevarnih in težkih razmerah.
After a difficult start, EUPOL has gradually gained recognition from other actors for its expertise and its significant contribution to the ongoing reform of the police sector. 
Po težavnem začetku je EUPOL pri drugih akterjih postopoma pridobila ugled zaradi svojega strokovnega znanja in bistvenega prispevka k tekoči reformi policijskega sektorja.
78 The Court found that EUPOL has been partly effective in delivering its man‐ date. 
78 Sodišče je ugotovilo, da je bila EUPOL delno uspešna pri izvajanju svojega mandata.
Improvements were more nota‐ ble in two of EUPOL’s three main lines of operation. 
Izboljšave so bile opaznejše pri dveh od treh glavnih linij operacij EUPOL.
Concerning its activities, EUPOL has been largely successful in training but less so in mentoring and advising. 
Glede na vrsto dejavnosti je bila EUPOL v veliki meri uspešna pri usposabljanju, manj pa pri mentorstvu in svetovanju.
Projects have had a limited contribution to the mission’s objec‐ tives. While external factors may provide some explanation for this, other shortcomings can be attributed to EUPOL itself. 
Projekti so omejeno prispevali k ciljem misije, kar je deloma morda mogoče pojasniti z zunanjimi dejavniki, vendar je nekatere pomanjkljivosti mogoče pripisati neposredno EUPOL.
79 In the area of planning, EUPOL’s man‐ date was preceded by a thorough as‐ sessment of Afghan needs. 
79 Na področju načrtovanja je bila pred določitvijo mandata EUPOL opravljena temeljita ocena afganistanskih potreb.
Objectives were aligned with the 2006 Afghan Compact and the priorities set out in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. 
Cilji so bili usklajeni z afganistanskim dogovorom iz leta 2006 in prednostnimi nalogami, določenimi v afganistanski nacionalni razvojni strategiji.