natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
39 ILO, ‘Youth guarantees: a response to the youth employment crisis?’, 2013 (http://www.ilo.org). 
39 Mednarodna organizacija dela, „Youth guarantees: a response to the youth employment crisis?”, 2013 (http://www.ilo.org/ employment/Whatwedo/ Publications/WCMS_209468/ lang‐‐en/index.htm).
Observations 26 53 This would have allowed the Commis‐ sion to assess if adequate resources were allocated for the Youth Guar‐ antee scheme. 
Opažanja 26 53 To bi Komisiji omogočilo, da oceni, ali so bila za program jamstva za mla‐ de dodeljena zadostna sredstva.
For example, ‘Lack of complementary national funding, which could undermine the implemen‐ tation of the Youth Guarantee in the short‐ and long‐term’40 was identified by the Commission as one of the most important challenges of delivering a Youth Guarantee in Spain. 
Na primer, ugotovila je, da je eden od najpomembnejših izzivov pri izvedbi jamstva za mlade v Španiji pomanjka‐ nje dopolnilnega nacionalnega finan‐ ciranja, kar bi lahko kratko‐ in dolgo‐ ročno spodkopalo jamstvo za mlade40.
Therefore the Court reviewed the YGIPs submit‐ ted by the five Member States covered by this report (Ireland, France, Italy, Lithuania and Portugal) and checked whether any information was provided in relation to the estimated costs of the planned measures and the related sources of funding. 
Zato je Sodišče pregledalo INJM, ki jih je predložilo pet držav članic, zajetih v tem poročilu (Francija, Irska, Italija, Litva in Portugalska), in preverilo, ali so bile zagotovljene informacije o oce‐ njenih stroških načrtovanih ukrepov in s tem povezanih virih financiranja.
54 The Court found that generally Mem‐ ber States provided estimates for the cost of measures aimed at individuals. 
54 Sodišče je ugotovilo, da so države članice na splošno zagotovile ocene stroškov za ukrepe, ki so usmerjeni na posameznike.
For some Member States, however, the YGIPs submitted lacked relevant information such as costs per bene‐ ficiary related to the offers (Ireland and France), the participation targets per measure and the percentage of the target population expected to be reached by the YG (France). 
Toda v predloženih INJM nekaterih držav članic ni bilo relevantnih informacij, kot so stroški na upravičenca, povezani s ponudba‐ mi (Irska in Francija), cilji za udeležbo v posameznem ukrepu in odstotek ciljne populacije, ki naj bi ga doseglo jamstvo za mlade (Francija).
As a result, the absence of such information does not allow early identification by the Commission of possible shortfalls as envisaged. 
Ker teh informacij ni, Komisija ne more zgodaj ugotoviti morebitnih pomanjkljivosti, kot je bilo predvideno.
55 Moreover, none of the five Member States provided information on the estimated implementation cost of the structural reforms required for the de‐ livery of an effective Youth Guarantee in their YGIPs. 
55 Poleg tega nobena od petih držav članic v INJM ni posredovala informacij o oce‐ njenih stroških izvajanja strukturnih reform, ki so potrebne za zagotavljanje uspešnega jamstva za mlade.
56 For three of the five Member States reviewed, the national allocation specified in the YGIP is significantly less than that of the various EU funds, varying between 13 % (for Portugal) and 35 % (for Italy and Lithuania) of the total amount. 
56 Pri treh od petih pregledanih držav čla‐ nic je bila nacionalna dodelitev, dolo‐ čena v INJM, bistveno nižja od dodeli‐ tev iz različnih skladov EU. Gibala se je med 13 % (Portugalska) in 35 % (Italija in Litva) skupnega zneska.
For Ireland, the na‐ tional allocation exceeded that of the EU while for France, the data available did not allow for such comparison. 
Na Irskem je nacionalna dodelitev presegala dodeli‐ tev EU, v Franciji pa razpoložljivi podat‐ ki niso omogočali tovrstne primerjave.
In addition, with the exception of Lithu‐ ania, the Member States declared the EU sources of funding related to the measures globally (under the same heading EU/ESF/YEI). 
Poleg tega so z izjemo Litve države članice tudi priglasile vire financiranja EU za ukrepe na globalen način (pod isto postavko EU/ESS/PZM).
Due to the lack of complete and accurate information, it was therefore not possible for the Commission to assess the suitability of the funding source for the measures or to conclude on the overall feasibility and sustainability of the Youth Guaran‐ tee financial plans. 
Zaradi pomanj‐ kanja popolnih in natančnih informacij Komisija ni mogla oceniti primernosti vira financiranja za ukrepe ali sprejeti zaključkov o splošni izvedljivosti in trajnosti finančnih načrtov jamstva za mlade.
40 European Commission Staff Working Document, SWD(2014) 410 final, p. 
40 Delovni dokument služb Komisije, SWD(2014) 410 final, str.
Observations 27 Specific challenges in verifying the regularity of YEI expenditure 57 According to the ESF regulation41, the programming arrangements of the YEI may take one or more of the following forms (see paragraph 17): — a dedicated operational programme; — a dedicated priority axis within an operational programme; — a part of one or more priority axes. 
Opažanja 27 Posebni izzivi pri preverjanju pravilnosti odhodkov PZM 57 V skladu z uredbo o ESS41 so lahko pro‐ gramske ureditve PMZ v eni ali več od naslednjih oblik (glej odstavek 17): – posebni operativni program; – posebna prednostna os v okviru operativnega programa; – del ene ali več prednostnih osi.
The Court considers that there is a spe‐ cific challenge (as compared to stan‐ dard ESF expenditure) for the Member States and the Commission to effec‐ tively verify the regularity of YEI ex‐ penditure declared. 
Sodišče meni, da obstaja poseben izziv (v primerjavi s standardnimi odhodki iz ESS) pri tem, da države članice in Komisija uspešno preverjajo pravilnost prijavljenih odhodkov PZM.
This is due to more stringent eligibility requirements, the possibility to declare expenditure incurred since September 2013 and, particularly in the last case above, the absence of co‐financing for YEI. 
Tako je zaradi strožjih zahtev glede upraviče‐ nosti, možnosti prijave odhodkov, ki so nastali od septembra 2013, ter, zlasti v zadnjem zgornje navedenem prime‐ ru, odsotnosti sofinanciranja za PZM.
Lack of definition of good quality job offer may ham‐ per the effectiveness of the Youth Guarantee 58 The Court recalls that the Youth Guarantee aims to offer young people a genuine opportunity to increase their employability with a view to sus‐ tainable and rewarding labour market integration, and to consequently boost overall youth employment rates. 
Uspešnosti jamstva za mlade lahko škoduje to, da ni opredelitve kakovostne ponudbe za zaposlitev 58 Sodišče opozarja, da je namen jamstva za mlade ponuditi mladim resnično priložnost za povečanje njihove zapo‐ sljivosti zaradi trajnostne in koristne vključitve na trg dela in posledično povečanja splošnih stopenj zaposle‐ nosti mladih.
The Council recommends therefore that Member States ensure that all young people under the age of 25 receive a ‘good quality’ offer within 4 months of becoming unemployed or leaving formal education. 
Zato Svet priporoča, naj države članice zagotovijo, da vsi mladi do starosti 25 let prejmejo kakovostno ponudbo v štirih mesecih po tem, ko postanejo brezposelni ali prenehajo s formalnim izobraževanjem.
The Council recommendation, however, does not indicate what a ‘good quality’ offer is, or specify who should provide such a definition. 
V priporočilu Sveta pa ni navedeno, kaj je „kakovostna” ponudba ali kdo naj jo opredeli.
59 A number of EU documents (such as the Council Recommendation for a Quality Framework for Traineeships42 and the Council Declaration ‘Europe‐ an Alliance for Apprenticeships’43) set out non‐binding qualitative minimum standards of good quality for trainee‐ ships and apprenticeships to prevent companies exploiting them as cheap sources of labour. 
59 V številnih dokumentih EU (kot sta priporočilo Sveta o okviru za kako‐ vost pripravništev42 in izjava Sveta o evropski koaliciji za vajeništva43) so bili določeni nezavezujoči minimalni standardi dobre kakovosti za priprav‐ ništva in vajeništva, da bi preprečili, da bi podjetja izkoriščala mlade kot vir poceni delovne sile.
On the other hand, there are no equivalent documents establishing principles defining a good quality job. 
Po drugi strani pa ni enakovrednih dokumentov, v katerih bi bila določena načela, ki bi opredelje‐ vala kakovostno zaposlitev.
60 In December 2013, the Commission issued guidance according to which a ‘good quality’ offer is an offer which is expected to result in ‘sustainable labour market attachment’ and which should not ‘only have as an immediate effect to reduce the statistics of youth unemployment for a while’ 44. 
60 Komisija je decembra 2013 izdala smer‐ nice, po katerih naj bi bila kakovostna ponudba tista, ki bo po pričakovanjih privedla do trajnostne povezanosti s tr‐ gom dela in naj ne bi le imela takojšnje‐ ga učinka z zmanjšanjem statističnih podatkov o brezposelnosti mladih za nekaj časa44.
41 Article 18 of Regulation (EU) No 1304/2013. 
41 Člen 18 Uredbe (EU) št.
42 Council Recommendation for a Quality Framework for Traineeships, Brussels, 10 March 2014 (http://www. consilium.europa.eu). 
42 Priporočilo Sveta o okviru za kakovost pripravništev, Bruselj, 10. marca 2014 (http://www. consilium.europa.eu).
43 Council Declaration “European Alliance for Apprenticeships”, Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council, Luxembourg, 15 October 2013. 
43 Izjava Sveta o evropski koaliciji za vajeništva, Svet za zaposlovanje, socialno politiko, zdravje in varstvo potrošnikov, Luxembourg, 15. oktober 2013.
44 FAQs on the Youth Guarantee, question 6 (http://www. ec.europa.eu). 
44 Odgovori na pogosto zastavljena vprašanja o jamstvu za mlade, vprašanje 6 (http://www. ec.europa.eu).
Observations 28 61 Based on a review of relevant studies45 in this field, the Court considers that there may be a combination of attri‐ butes which are relevant for defining whether a job offer should be consid‐ ered to be ‘good quality’: namely dura‐ tion of the contract (fixed duration or open‐ended contract), type of contract (part‐time voluntary‐involuntary/ full‐time); remuneration level linked to the cost of living of the Member State in question; the skills content of jobs and the related level and type of qualification required, and availabil‐ ity of additional job‐related training. 
Opažanja 28 61 Sodišče na podlagi pregleda rele‐ vantnih študij45 na tem področju meni, da morda obstaja kombinacija značil‐ nosti, ki so relevantne za opredelitev, ali je ponudba za zaposlitev kakovo‐ stna. Med njimi so trajanje pogodbe (pogodba za določen ali nedoločen čas), vrsta pogodbe (prostovoljno/ neprostovoljno skrajšan delovni čas/ poln delovni čas), stopnja plačila glede na življenjske stroške v zadevni državi članici, znanje in spretnosti, ki jih zah‐ teva delovno mesto, in s tem povezana stopnja in vrsta zahtevane kvalifikacije ter razpoložljivost dodatnega uspo‐ sabljanja, povezanega z delovnim mes‐ tom.
Within the principle of subsidiarity a minimum set of attributes could have been defined at EU level while leaving Member States the flexibility to establish their own standard values for each of these. 
V skladu z načelom subsidiarnosti bi bilo mogoče na ravni EU določiti minimalni sklop značilnosti, hkrati pa državam članicam omogočiti prožnost pri oblikovanju njihovih standardnih vrednosti za vsako od njih.
62 The Court found for example that the Commission, when assessing the draft YGIPs submitted by Italy, would consider an offer of temporary em‐ ployment (5 to 6 months) to be ‘good quality’ even if the salary is below the monthly income poverty threshold in most parts of the country, based on data from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT)46. 
62 Sodišče je na primer ugotovilo, da je Komisija pri ocenjevanju osnutka INJM, ki ga je predložila Italija, za kakovostno štela ponudbo začasne zaposlitve (pet do šest mesecev), četudi je plača po podatkih italijanskega statističnega inštituta (ISTAT)46 v večini delov države pod mesečnim pragom dohodkovne revščine.
No other qualita‐ tive elements were taken into account by the Commission. 
Komisija ni upoštevala nobe‐ nih drugih kvalitativnih elementov.
63 The absence of a set of qualitative attributes for a good quality job offer leads to the risk that the Youth Guar‐ antee schemes might be implemented inconsistently and ineffectively across Member States or even within an individual Member State. 
63 Ker ni sklopa kvalitativnih značilnosti za to, kaj je kakovostna ponudba za zaposlitev, obstaja tveganje, da bo izvajanje programov jamstva za mlade nedosledno in neuspešno med država‐ mi članicami ali celo znotraj posame‐ zne države članice.
While it is obviously possible to check the quality of offers being made in the different Member States ex post (i.e. through evaluations), by that time most of the YEI budget would be already com‐ mitted and/or spent (in view of the frontloading of funds in 2014 and 2015) and any shortcomings impacting the effectiveness of the YEI expenditures would not be addressed. 
Čeprav je seveda mogoče naknadno preveriti kakovost ponudb v različnih državah članicah (tj. z vrednotenji), bodo do takrat že prevzete obveznosti za večino sredstev proračuna PZM in/ali bodo sredstva že porabljena (glede na okrepljeno fi‐ nanciranje v začetni fazi v letih 2014 in 2015), zato pomanjkljivosti, ki vplivajo na uspešnost odhodkov PZM, ne bodo obravnavane.
64 The Court notes that in July 2014 the Commission provided specific guid‐ ance to be used for the evaluation of the YEI47, foreseen in the ESF regula‐ tion48 for the end of 2015 and end of 2018, which requires the evaluators to report on the quality of employment offers received by YEI participants, also taking into account qualitative criteria such as those set out above. 
64 Sodišče ugotavlja, da je Komisija juli‐ ja 2014 pripravila posebne smernice za vrednotenje PZM47, ki je v uredbi o ESS predvideno48 za konec leta 2015 in konec leta 2018. Smernice zahteva‐ jo, da izvajalci vrednotenja poročajo o kakovosti ponudb za zaposlitev, ki jih prejmejo udeleženci PZM, pri tem pa upoštevajo kvalitativna merila, kot so tista, ki so navedena zgoraj.
45 European Parliament, ‘Indicators of Job Quality in the European Union’, PE429.972, 2009 (http://www. europarl.europa.eu); CSES, ‘Study on Measuring Employment Effects’, June 2006; OECD, ‘Local Implementation of Youth Guarantees: Emerging Lessons from European Experiences’, 2014. 
45 Evropski parlament, Kazalniki kakovosti delovnih mest v Evropski uniji, PE429.972, 2009 (http://www.europarl. europa.eu); Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services (CSES), Study on Measuring Employment Effects, junij 2006; Organizacija za gospodarsko sodelovanje in razvoj, Local Implementation of Youth Guarantees: Emerging Lessons from European Experiences, 2014.
46 Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) ‘Calcolo della soglia di povertà assoluta’ (http://www.istat.it). 
46 Italijanski nacionalni statistični inštitut, „Calcolo della soglia di povertà assoluta” (http://www. istat.it).
47 European Commission, ‘Guidance on Evaluation of the Youth Employment Initiative’, July 2014. 
47 Evropska komisija, Smernice za vrednotenje pobude za zaposlovanje mladih, julij 2014.
48 Article 19(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1304/2013. 
48 Člen 19(6) uredbe (EU) št.
Observations 29 Comprehensive Youth Guar‐ antee monitoring and report‐ ing framework still being developed 65 The Court considers that an ongoing assessment of measures under the Youth Guarantee is crucial to ensure that funds are invested wisely and measures are implemented in ways that will make a real difference for young people. 
Opažanja 29 Celovit okvir za spremljanje in poročanje za jamstvo za mlade je še vedno v razvoju 65 Sodišče meni, da je tekoče ocenjevanje ukrepov v okviru jamstva za mlade bistveno za zagotovitev, da so sredstva pametno investirana, ukrepi pa izve‐ deni na način, ki bo prinesel resnične spremembe za mlade.
Robust monitoring mechanisms should therefore be built into the design of Youth Guarantee measures from the beginning49. 
Zato bi bilo treba v oblikovanje ukrepov jamstva za mlade od vsega začetka vključiti dobre mehanizme za spremljanje49.
This is the basis for effective, evidence‐based policymaking which should alert the European Parliament and the Council when objectives are not being reached or when the efficiency of the measures is not satisfactory, allowing them to improve the design or the implemen‐ tation of the measures. 
To je os‐ nova za uspešno oblikovanje politike, ki temelji na dokazih, pri katerem bi morala biti Evropski parlament in Svet opozorjena, kadar cilji niso doseženi ali kadar učinkovitost ukrepov ni zadovo‐ ljiva. To bi jima omogočilo, da izboljša‐ ta oblikovanje ali izvedbo ukrepov.
67 The Court assessed the framework established to monitor the implemen‐ tation and results of both the Youth Guarantee as a whole and also in relation to those actions financed by the YEI. 
67 Sodišče je ocenilo okvir, vzpostavljen za spremljanje izvajanja in rezultatov jamstva za mlade kot celote in tudi v zvezi z ukrepi, financiranimi iz PZM.
Comprehensive monitoring and reporting arrangements not built into design of the Youth Guarantee scheme from the beginning 68 Through its recommendation, the Council entrusted the Commission with monitoring the implementa‐ tion of the Youth Guarantee through the multilateral surveillance of the Employment Committee51 (EMCO) within the framework of the European Semester (see Box 5). 
Celovite ureditve za spremljanje in poročanje niso bile sestavni del programa jamstva za mlade od vsega začetka 68 Svet je s svojim priporočilom Komisiji zaupal nalogo, da spremlja izvajanje jamstva za mlade prek večstranske‐ ga nadzora Odbora za zaposlova‐ nje51 v okviru evropskega semestra (glej okvir 5).
According to the Council recommendation, however, it is not planned to report the results of this monitoring to the European Parliament. 
Vendar v priporočilu Sve‐ ta ni predvideno, da bi se o rezultatih tega spremljanja poročalo Evropskemu parlamentu.
49 European Commission, ‘The Youth Guarantee: Making It Happen’, 2014, p. 
49 Evropska komisija, Jamstvo za mlade: doseganje rezultatov, 2014, str.
50 Council Recommendation of 22 April 2013 on establishing a Youth Guarantee, Recommendation 6. 
50 Priporočilo 6 iz Priporočila Sveta z dne 22. aprila 2013 o vzpostavitvi jamstva za mladino.
51 The EMCO was created by Council Decision 2000/98/EC of 24 January 2000 establishing the Employment Committee (OJ L 29, 4.2.2000, p. 
51 Odbor za zaposlovanje je bil ustanovljen s Sklepom Sveta 2000/98/ES z dne 24. januarja 2000 o ustanovitvi Odbora za zaposlovanje (UL L 29, 4.2.2000, str.
21) on the basis of article 150 of the TFEU. 
21) na podlagi člena 150 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije.
Each EU Member State and the Commission nominate two members to EMCO. 
Vsaka država članica in Komisija imenuje po dva člana Odbora.
Role of the Employment Committee (EMCO) EMCO’s primary role is as an advisory committee for Employment and Social Affairs Ministers in the Employ‐ ment and Social Affairs Council (EPSCO). 
Vloga Odbora za zaposlovanje Odbor za zaposlovanje ima predvsem vlogo posvetovalnega odbora za ministre za zaposlovanje in socialne zadeve v okviru Sveta za zaposlovanje in socialne zadeve (EPSCO).
EMCO’s multilateral surveillance helps to assess implementation com‐ prehensively across Member States with similar challenges, together with assessing policy options and plans. 
Njegov večstranski nadzor pomaga pri celovitem ocenjevanju izvajanja v državah članicah, ki se srečujejo s podobnimi izzivi, ob hkratnem ocenjeva‐ nju možnosti in načrtov politike.
One of its subgroups is mandated to select and develop indicators to monitor the employment strategy, which includes monitoring the Youth Guarantee. 
Ena od njegovih podskupin je zadolžena za izbiro in razvoj kazalnikov za spremljanje strategije zaposlovanja, kar vključuje spremljanje jamstva za mlade.
Observations 30 69 Progress on the implementation of the Youth Guarantee was reviewed by EMCO in May 2014, along with an assessment of Member States’ employ‐ ment situation and national reform programmes. 
Opažanja 30 69 Odbor za zaposlovanje je maja 2014 pregledal napredek pri izvajanju jamstva za mlade, skupaj z oceno stanja na področju zaposlovanja v državah članicah in nacionalnih programov reform.
This took the form of peer reviews and was intended to offer as complete a coverage as possible to identify key challenges in Member States. 
To je bilo izvedeno v obliki medsebojnih pregledov in naj bi zagotovilo čim večjo možno pokri‐ tost zaradi ugotovitve ključnih izzivov v državah članicah.
70 Based on the reports reviewed for the Member States covered by the May exercise, the Court found that the level of detail of this analysis varied significantly. 
70 Sodišče je pregledalo poročila za države članice, ki so bile zajete v pre‐ gled maja 2014, in ugotovilo, da je bila podrobnost analiz zelo različna.
For example, whereas the examination of Ireland focused exten‐ sively on the Youth Guarantee, that of Portugal did not cover the Youth Guarantee at all. 
Preuči‐ tev za Irsko je bila na primer močno osredotočena na jamstvo za mlade, za Portugalsko pa jamstvo za mlade sploh ni bilo vključeno.
71 The Court also notes that a sub group of EMCO has developed specific indi‐ cators to monitor the implementation and results of the Youth Guarantee at EU level52. 
71 Sodišče ugotavlja tudi, da je podsku‐ pina Odbora za zaposlovanje razvila posebne kazalnike za spremljanje izvajanja jamstva za mlade in njegovih rezultatov na ravni EU52.
These are macroeconomic indicators that are expected to com‐ plement indicators that measure the direct impact of policy and the speed of delivery of offers to young people. 
To so makro‐ ekonomski kazalniki, ki naj bi dopol‐ njevali kazalnike, s katerimi se merita neposredni učinek politike in hitrost zagotavljanja ponudb mladim.
The indicators were endorsed by the Council in December 2014. 
Svet jih je potrdil decembra 2014.
A pilot exercise to test the methodology was launched in October 2014 and the result will be evaluated during 2015 which, according to EMCO, may lead to some technical revision of the indica‐ tor framework53. 
Okto‐ bra 2014 se je začelo pilotno izvajanje zaradi preizkušanja metodologije, rezultat pa bo ocenjen leta 2015. Od‐ bor za zaposlovanje navaja, da bo to morda privedlo do nekaterih tehničnih sprememb okvira kazalnikov53.
72 As these indicators are not mandatory, relevant information about the success of the Youth Guarantee as a whole will depend on the continued commit‐ ment of the Member States to provide comprehensive and reliable data. 
72 Ti kazalniki niso obvezni, zato bodo re‐ levantne informacije o uspehu jamstva za mlade kot celote odvisne od nadaljnje zavezanosti držav članic pri zagotavljanju celovitih in zanesljivih podatkov.
The Court also considers that availability of these indicators at an earlier stage would have allowed Member States to include them in their administra‐ tive system at the design stage of the Youth Guarantee scheme. 
Sodišče tudi meni, da bi raz‐ položljivost teh kazalnikov na zgodnej‐ ši stopnji državam članicam omogoči‐ la, da jih vključijo v svoj upravni sistem v fazi oblikovanja programa jamstva za mlade.
Long‐term reforms needed to address Youth Guarantee‐ related country‐specific recommendations 73 In the framework of the European Se‐ mester, the Commission also analyses the impact of employment policies taking into account data reported in the scoreboard (see Box 6) and, where appropriate, points out the weak‐ nesses to the Member States through annual CSRs. 
Za obravnavanje priporočil za posamezne države, povezanih z jamstvom za mlade, so potrebne dolgoročne reforme 73 Komisija v okviru evropskega semestra analizira tudi učinek politik zaposlo‐ vanja, pri čemer upošteva podatke iz pregleda stanja (glej okvir 6) in po potrebi opozori na slabosti v državah članicah z letnimi priporočili za posa‐ mezne države.
74 The Court reviewed how the Youth Guarantee was addressed in the CSRs. 
74 Sodišče je pregledalo, kako je bilo jamstvo za mlade obravnavano v pri‐ poročilih za posamezne države.