natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
15 FIGURE 4 RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF REASONS FOR CHOOSING UN Speed 5 % Low cost Guidelines 2 % Visibility 3% 2% Experience and expertise 24 % Logistics 14 % Simple procedures 6% Special mandate 6% Coordination/ dialogue 19 % Relevance of proposal 7 % Past performance 12 % S o u r c e : replies by European commission to Eca questionnaires. special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring 
15 DIAGRAM 4 RELATIVNA POMEMBNOST RAZLOGOV ZA IZBIRO ZN Hitrost 5 % Nizki stroški Smernice 2 % Prepoznavnost Izkušenost in strokovno 3% 2% znanje 24 % Logistične zmogljivosti 14 % Enostavni postopki 6% Posebna pooblastila 6% Sposobnost usklajevanja/dialoga 19 % Ustreznost predloga 7 % Pretekla uspešnost 12 % V i r : odgovori komisije na vprašalnike Ers. Posebno poročilo št. 15/2009 - Pomoč Evropske unije, ki se izvaja prek organizacij združenih narodov: odločanje in spremljanje
21. the commission’s strategy, the financial regulation and the fafa require that the decision-making process is objective and transparent and aims for efficiency and effectiveness (see paragraphs 8, 9 and 15). Whilst elements such as cost (see paragraphs 22 and 23), speed (see paragraph 24) and visibility (see paragraph 25) were also considered, in the replies to the court’s questionnaires requesting the three main reasons for choosing the Un these criteria did not feature prominently. 
21. strategija komisije, Finančna uredba in sporazum FaFa zahtevajo, da mora biti postopek odločanja objektiven in pregleden ter da mora stremeti k učinkovitosti in uspešnosti (glej odstavke 8, 9 in 15). čeprav se je upoštevalo tudi elemente, kot so stroški (glej odstavka 22 in 23), hitrost (glej odstavek 24) in prepoznavnost (glej odstavek 25), se v odgovorih na vprašalnike sodišča, ki so zahtevali tri glavne razloge za izbiro zn, ta merila niso uvrstila na vidno mesto.
22. concerning cost, the commission has limited information on the cost efficiency of implementation. the commission makes a contribution, not exceeding 7 % of direct costs, to the Un organisation’s indirect costs11. article 5 of the fafa states that subcontracting should not lead to increased costs over direct implementation by the Un itself. however, when activities are subcontracted, the total level of the contribution to indirect costs for all organisations involved is not reported as, for example, in the case of the interim disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme in sudan, where one Un organisation subcontracted half the activities to another Un organisation which further subcontracted activities to ngos for implementation. 
22. kar zadeva stroške, ima komisija omejene informacije o stroškovni učinkovitosti izvajanja. komisija prispeva h kritju posrednih stroškov organizacije zn, pri čemer ta prispevek ne sme presegati 7 % neposrednih stroškov11. člen 5 sporazuma FaFa določa, da podizvajanje ne sme privesti do stroškov, ki bi bili višji kot pri neposrednem izvajanju s strani zn. vendar pa se pri dejavnostih, ki so oddane podizvajalcem, ne poroča o skupni stopnji prispevka k posrednim stroškom za vse zadevne organizacije, kot na primer pri začasnem programu za razorožitev, demobilizacijo in ponovno vključevanje v sudanu, kjer je neka organizacija zn polovico dejavnosti oddala v podizvajanje drugi organizaciji zn, ki je dejavnosti oddala naprej v podizvajanje nevladnim organizacijam. 23.
23. in addition to its contribution to indirect costs, the commission also funds the support costs of local offices, staff and transport directly related to activities financed. an analysis of projects in sudan showed a range in the level of support costs of between 6 % and 60 % of the total project cost12. the commission does not assess the level of support costs with reference to a normal range or benchmark for the type of project to establish if it is reasonable. 
Poleg prispevka k posrednim stroškom komisija financira tudi podporne stroške lokalnih uradov, osebja in prevoza, ki so neposredno povezani s financiranimi dejavnostmi. analiza projektov v sudanu je pokazala, da je stopnja financiranja teh stroškov v razponu od 6 % do 60 % celotnih stroškov projekta12. komisija stopnje podpornih stroškov ne oceni glede na normalni razpon ali primerjalno merilo za vrsto projekta, da bi ugotovila, ali je ta stopnja razumna.
11 article 4.1 of the fafa states that a fixed percentage of direct eligible costs, not exceeding 7 %, shall be eligible to fund the indirect costs of Un organisations. the indirect costs funded by the commission are not separately identified by its financial systems. however, based on annual funding of over 1 billion euro and allowing for some projects which do not receive the 7 % contribution to indirect costs, the court estimates that the total annual contribution to indirect costs of Un organisations is in the order of 50 million euro per year. 
11 člen 4.1 sporazuma FaFa določa, da se lahko za financiranje posrednih stroškov organizacij zn nameni fiksni delež neposrednih upravičenih stroškov, ki ne presega 7 %. Posredni stroški, ki jih krije komisija, v njenih finančnih sistemih niso ločeno zavedeni. vendar pa sodišče na podlagi letnega financiranja, ki znaša nad milijardo Eur, in ob upoštevanju, da nekateri projekti ne dobijo 7-odstotnega prispevka za posredne stroške, ocenjuje, da znaša skupni letni prispevek za posredne stroške organizacij zn približno 50 milijonov Eur.
12 the instance of 60 % support costs related to a food assistance project, and the support costs included local transport, storage and handling. the commission considered that these were extremely high due partly to conditions in darfur, but also to the need to streamline operations to be more cost-effective. 16 special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring 
12 Primer, ko je bilo kritih 60 % podpornih stroškov, se je nanašal na projekt pomoči v hrani, podporni stroški pa so vključevali lokalne prevoz, skladiščenje in rokovanje. komisija je menila, da so bili tako visoki deloma zaradi okoliščin v darfurju, deloma pa tudi zaradi potrebe po poenostavitvi operacij, da bodo stroškovno učinkovitejše. 16 Posebno poročilo št. 15/2009 - Pomoč Evropske unije, ki se izvaja prek organizacij združenih narodov: odločanje in spremljanje
24. concerning speed of implementation, in some cases, for example the large quantities of food transported, the Un has demonstrated its capacity to deliver aid to beneficiaries rapidly. however, examples of slow delivery (see Box 1) should feed into the decision-making process. 
24. kar zadeva hitrost izvajanja, so združeni narodi v nekaterih primerih, na primer pri prevozu velikih količin hrane, dokazali, da lahko pomoč upravičencem zagotovijo hitro. vendar pa je treba pri postopku odločanja upoštevati tudi primere počasnega zagotavljanja pomoči (glej okvir 1).
25. concerning visibility, the commission’s evaluation concluded that, whilst visibility was satisfactory at country level, EU taxpayers were generally not aware of the presence and role of the commission in this type of intervention. in the case of the interim disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme, for example, whilst the role of the Ec was clear at the level of the national administration in sudan, it was rarely mentioned in public and formal documents. the 2006 joint action plan on visibility recognises the risk of reduced visibility and emphasises the importance of addressing this issue. 
25. kar zadeva prepoznavnost, je komisija v svoji oceni zaključila, da je ta na ravni države ustrezna, da pa davkoplačevalci v Eu na splošno ne vedo za prisotnost in vlogo komisije v tovrstnih po-segih. na primer, medtem ko je bila v primeru začasnega programa za razorožitev, demobilizacijo in ponovno vključevanje vloga Evropske komisije jasna na ravni sudanske nacionalne uprave, pa je bila le redko omenjena v javnih in uradnih dokumentih. skupni akcijski načrt o prepoznavnosti iz leta 2006 priznava tveganje za zmanjšano prepoznavnost in poudarja pomembnost reševanja tega vprašanja.
17 BOX 1 EXAMPLES OF SLOW IMPLEMENTATION OF AID a november 2006 review of the interim disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme in sudan reported on the high level of frustration with delays and lack of implementation. in december 2007 the sudanese government expressed disappointment at the slow implementation of the programme, which was confirmed by a subsequent commission mission to sudan. in south sudan, Europeaid selected a Un organisation as a partner to supervise the emergency construction of legal offices. 
17 OKVIR 1 PRIMERI POČASNEGA IZVAJANJA POMOČI Pri pregledu začasnega programa za razorožitev, demobilizacijo in ponovno vključevanje v sudanu, ki je bil izveden novembra 2006, so bile ugotovljene znatne težave zaradi zamud in neizvajanja. decembra 2007 je sudanska vlada izrazila razočaranje nad počasnim izvajanjem programa, kar je potrdil tudi naslednji obisk komisije v sudanu. v južnem sudanu je Europeaid izbral eno od organizacij zn kot partnerja pri nadzoru nujne gradnje pisarn za pravosodne službe. upravičenci so se strinjali z montažno konstrukcijo, ki jo je mogoče hitro dostaviti in postaviti. vendar pa so bili razočarani zaradi zamud pri izvajanju, saj so temelje najprej skopali na napačnem kraju, predizdelane plošče so bile dobavljene z zamudo, vodja projekta pa je odpotoval.
Beneficiaries agreed to a prefabricated construction which could be quickly delivered and assembled. however, they were frustrated by delays in implementation as foundations were initially dug in the wrong location, prefabricated panels were delivered late and the project manager departed. the camp development project managed by a Un organisation in the occupied palestinian territory was initially planned for a period of 12 months ending in June 2007 but after two extensions was still continuing at the end of 2008. special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring 
Projekt izgradnje tabora na zasedenem palestinskem ozemlju, ki ga je upravljala neka organizacija zn, naj bi po prvotnih načrtih trajal 12 mesecev in se zaključil v juniju 2007, vendar je bil konec leta 2008 po dveh podaljšanjih še vedno v teku. Posebno poročilo št. 15/2009 - Pomoč Evropske unije, ki se izvaja prek organizacij združenih narodov: odločanje in spremljanje
FORMAL COMPARISON WITH ALTERNATIVE AID DELIVERY MECHANISMS SHOULD BE SYSTEMATIC 26. neither Europeaid nor Echo systematically carries out formal appraisals of alternative aid delivery mechanisms. comparative or standard cost information is not used to analyse the cost-effectiveness of project proposals in order to compensate for the absence of competitive tendering. the choice of using a Un organisation to deliver aid, is not, therefore, supported by conclusive evidence that this approach is more efficient and effective than other ways of delivering aid. 
FORMALNA PRIMERJAVA Z DRUGIMI MEHANIZMI ZA ZAGOTAVLJANJE POMOČI BI MORALA BITI SISTEMATIČNA 26. niti Europeaid niti gd Echo ne izvajata sistematičnih formalnih ocen drugih mehanizmov za zagotavljanje pomoči. za analizo stroškovne učinkovitosti projektnih predlogov ne uporabljata informacij o primerjalnih ali standardnih stroških, kar bi odtehtalo neobstoj konkurenčnih razpisnih postopkov. izbira organizacije zn, ki zagotavlja pomoč, tako ne temelji na trdnih dokazih, da je tak pristop učinkovitejši in uspešnejši kot drugi načini zagotavljanja pomoči.
27. the replies to the court’s questionnaires indicated that where comparisons with alternatives were carried out they were generally not documented. the commission’s evaluation similarly found that there was no formalised appraisal of alternative forms of aid and little information could be found on any analysis of possible alternatives prior to the decision. however, even where there was little record of the decision-making process that had taken place, the commission was satisfied with its choices to deliver aid through Un organisations. channelling aid through the Un was frequently considered to have been the only option, particularly in crisis situations. 
27. odgovori na vprašalnike računskega sodišča so nakazali, da primerjave z drugimi možnostmi, kadar so bile izvedene, na splošno niso bile dokumentirane. Tudi komisija je v svoji oceni ugotovila, da ni bilo formalizirane ocene drugih oblik pomoči in da je na voljo le malo informacij o kakršnikoli analizi drugih možnosti, ki bi bila izvedena pred odločitvijo. vendar pa je bila komisija tudi v primerih, ko ni veliko podatkov o postopku odločanja, zadovoljna z odločitvijo, da se pomoč zagotavlja prek organizacij zn. usmerjanje pomoči prek združenih narodov je pogosto veljalo za edino možnost, zlasti v kriznih razmerah. ko je bilo možnosti več, je komisija večinoma menila, da so bili združeni narodi najboljša izbira, čeprav ob sprejemanju odločitve za to ni bilo sistematično dokumentiranih utemeljitev.
28. implementation by the commission itself is one of the other options for delivering aid. the lead role of the commission in the implementation of the temporary international mechanism in the occupied palestinian territory, through which over 600 million euro were channelled in 2006 and 2007, demonstrates the capacity of the commission to implement and coordinate aid on a large scale in an unstable environment. article 18(1) of the revised financial regulation explicitly states that commission programmes can be financed by financial contributions from member states and other donors, which provides an opportunity to explore the possibility of multi-donor funds managed and coordinated by the commission. 
28. Ena od drugih možnosti zagotavljanja pomoči je izvajanje s strani komisije. vodilna vloga komisije pri izvajanju začasnega mednarodnega mehanizma na zasedenem palestinskem ozemlju, prek katerega je bilo v letih 2006 in 2007 posredovanih več kot 600 milijonov Eur, dokazuje, da je komisija sposobna izvajati in usklajevati obsežen program pomoči v negotovih razmerah. člen 18(1) spremenjene Finančne uredbe izrecno določa, da se lahko programi komisije financirajo iz finančnih prispevkov držav članic in drugih donatorjev, kar nudi priložnost za preučitev možnosti oblikovanja večdonatorskih skladov, ki bi jih upravljala in usklajevala komisija.
SECTION 3.2 SYSTEMS FOR MONITORING AND AUDITING AID DELIVERED THROUGH THE UN 29. robust financial management procedures are a legal and strategic requirement (see paragraphs 8 and 15). they are necessary in order to reduce the risk that commission funding is used uneconom-ically or inappropriately. reliable information on the efficiency of implementation and the achievement of results is necessary in order to ensure that the commission’s objectives have been met. the audit therefore examined whether monitoring and audit arrangements provide assurance on the robustness of financial procedures and on the achievement of results. 
ODDELEK 3.2 SISTEMI SPREMLJANJA IN REVIDIRANJA POMOČI, ZAGOTOVLJENE PREK ZN 29. Trdni postopki finančnega poslovodenja so pravna in strateška zahteva (glej odstavka 8 in 15). Potrebni so zato, da se zmanjša tveganje za negospodarno ali neustrezno porabo sredstev komisije. zanesljive informacije o učinkovitosti izvajanja in doseganju rezultatov so potrebne za zagotavljanje, da so cilji komisije doseženi. zato se je z revizijo preverilo, ali ureditve za spremljanje in revidiranje zagotavljajo zanesljivost glede trdnosti finančnih postopkov in doseganja rezultatov.
30. the commission has responded to the requirement to ensure robust financial management procedures by developing monitoring and control mechanisms which combine prior approval and ex post checks13 (see Figure 5). the commission first carries out an assessment of the financial control systems of its Un partners (the four pillar analysis) to ensure they meet international standards14. in order to ensure that these systems operate in practice, the commission is provided with information by its Un partners through reports. the commission also conducts field monitoring visits and carries out verification missions. although not part of the commission’s monitoring procedures, the court of auditors also checks the eligibility of a sample of expenditure implemented through Un organisations as part of its annual financial audit of the commission’s accounts. 
30. komisija se je na zahtevo po zagotavljanju trdnih postopkov finančnega poslovodenja odzvala s tem, da je razvila mehanizme spremljanja in kontrole, ki kombinirajo predhodno odobritev in naknadne preglede13 (glej diagram 5). komisija najprej izvede oceno sistemov finančne kontrole partnerjev iz zn (analiza štirih stebrov), s katero se prepriča, ali ustrezajo mednarodnim standar-dom14 komisiji partnerji iz zn prek poročil zagotavljajo informacije, da se zagotovi delovanje teh sistemov v praksi. komisija poleg tega izvaja tudi nadzorne obiske na terenu in obiske, namenjene preverjanju. čeprav to ni del nadzornih postopkov komisije, računsko sodišče v svoji letni reviziji računovodskih izkazov komisije preveri tudi upravičenost vzorca odhodkov, ki so se izvajali prek organizacij zn.
13 article 165 of the financial regulation states that the implementation of actions by international organisations is subject to scrutiny by the commission. such scrutiny shall be exercised either by prior approval, by ex post checks or by a combined procedure. 
13 člen 165 Finančne uredbe določa, da ukrepe, ki jih izvajajo mednarodne organizacije, nadzira komisija. Takšen nadzor se izvaja s predhodnimi odobritvami, naknadnimi pregledi ali kombiniranim postopkom.
14 the commission defined benchmarks relative to each procedure as the basis for this assessment. 
14 kot podlago za takšno oceno je komisija za vsak postopek opredelila primerjalna merila.
19 special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring 
19 Posebno poročilo št. 15/2009 - Pomoč Evropske unije, ki se izvaja prek organizacij združenih narodov: odločanje in spremljanje
THE FOUR PILLAR ANALYSIS DOES NOT COVER SYSTEMS RELATING TO SUBCONTRACTED ACTIVITIES 31. the four pillar analysis assesses the adequacy of the accounting, internal control, external audit and procurement procedures of Un partners. 
ANALIZA ŠTIRIH STEBROV NE ZAJEMA SISTEMOV, POVEZANIH Z DEJAVNOSTMI PODIZVAJANJA 31. z analizo štirih stebrov se oceni ustreznost računovodstva, notranje kontrole, zunanje revizije in postopkov za oddajo javnih naročil partnerjev iz zn. do leta 2008 je bila zaključena za skoraj vsa sredstva komisije, s katerimi se upravlja prek zn. med njenim izvajanjem je komisija še naprej sodelovala z organizacijami zn na podlagi domneve o skladnosti.
32. Un organisations frequently subcontract the implementation of activities to other organisations whose financial control systems have not been reviewed by the commission. for example, in the context of the Echo-financed emergency health care project in sudan, the Un organisation subcontracted activities to ngos which had not entered into a partnership agreement with Echo. the commission relies on the Un organisation’s systems to control the activities of the subcontractors. 
32. organizacije zn izvajanje dejavnosti pogosto oddajo v podizvajanje drugim organizacijam, katerih sistemov finančne kontrole komisija ni pregledala. v okviru projekta nujne zdravstvene oskrbe v sudanu, ki ga je financiral gd Echo, je na primer neka organizacija zn oddala dejavnosti nevladnim organizacijam, ki niso sklenile sporazuma o partnerstvu z gd Echo. komisija se za kontrolo dejavnosti podizvajalcev zanaša na sisteme organizacij zn.
20 FIGURE 5 1. 
20 DIAGRAM 5 1.
Four pillar analysis Commission examination of the four main types of financial control (accounting, internal control, external audit and procurement) of UN organisations to check they meet international standards. 
Analiza štirih stebrov Komisija preveri, ali štiri glavne vrste finančne kontrole (računovodstvo, notranja kontrola, zunanja revizija in javna naročila) organizacij ZN ustrezajo mednarodnim standardom.
UN reports UN organisations are required to provide annual progress reports plus a final report within six months of the end of implementation (three months for humanitarian assistance). 
Poročila ZN Organizacije ZN morajo posredovati letna poročila o napredku in končno poročilo v šestih mesecih po zaključku izvajanja (pri humanitarni pomoči pa v treh mesecih).
The annual strategy is supported through programming dialogues. 
Letno strategijo se podpira s programskimi dialogi.
Field monitoring Commission visits to projects and meetings with partners to ensure the efficiency of implementation and achievement of objectives. 
Spremljanje na terenu Obiski Komisije pri projektih in srečanja s partnerji, da se zagotovita učinkovito izvajanje in doseganje ciljev.
Includes results-oriented monitoring (ROM). 
Vključujejo spremljanje, usmerjeno k rezultatom (ROM).
Verifications Commission checks, including on the spot, to confirm the adequacy of the procedures identified in the four pillar analysis and to examine whether value for money has been obtained. 
Preverjanja Pregledi Komisije, med drugim na kraju samem, da se zagotovi ustreznost postopkov, opredeljenih v analizi štirih stebrov, in preuči, ali so bila sredstva smotrno porabljena.
In addition, evaluations check the efficiency and effectiveness of aid. 
Poleg tega se z vrednotenji pregleduje učinkovitost in uspešnost pomoči.
MONITORING AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS ■ Prior approval ■ Ex post checks special report no 15/2009 - EU assistance implemented through United nations organisations: decision-making and monitoring 
UREDITVE SPREMLJANJA IN KONTROLIRANJA ■ Predhodna odobritev ■ Naknadni pregledi Posebno poročilo št. 15/2009 - Pomoč Evropske unije, ki se izvaja prek organizacij združenih narodov: odločanje in spremljanje
UN REPORTS PROVIDE INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION ON RESULTS 33. the commission is critical of Un reports which are excessively general, do not communicate problems encountered and are frequently late15. the commission has not succeeded in obtaining adequate information on project achievements because clearly quantified output targets are not developed for all projects. When performance indicators are quantified they focus on the more easily measurable project output rather than project impact. the commission’s project cycle management guidelines (march 2004) distinguish between output indicators, on the one hand, and outcome and impact indicators, on the other. output indicators measure the immediate and concrete consequences of measures taken whilst outcome and impact indicators measure the effect of the project on beneficiaries and the long-term consequences. in some cases impact indicators were included but were not measurable, particularly within the shorter reporting timescale of Echo16 (see Box 2). 
POROČILA ZN NUDIJO PREMALO INFORMACIJ O REZULTATIH 33. komisija je kritična do poročil zn, ki so zelo splošna, ne poročajo o težavah, ki so nastopile, in pogosto zamujajo15. komisiji ni uspelo pridobiti ustreznih informacij o dosežkih projektov, saj predvideni cilji v zvezi z izložki niso jasno količinsko opredeljeni za vse projekte. kadar so kazalniki uspešnosti količinsko opredeljeni, se osredotočajo na lažje merljive izložke projekta in ne toliko na učinek projekta. smernice komisije za upravljanje projektnega cikla (marec 2004) razlikujejo med kazalniki izložkov na eni ter kazalniki izida in učinka na drugi strani. s kazalniki izložkov se meri neposredne in konkretne posledice sprejetih ukrepov, medtem ko se s kazalniki izida in učinka meri vpliv projekta na upravičence ter dolgoročne posledice. kazalniki učinka so bili v nekaterih primerih vključeni, vendar niso bili merljivi, zlasti ne v krajšem obdobju poročanja gd Echo16 (glej okvir 2).
15 over 70 % of the replies to the court’s questionnaires from Echo indicated that Un reports were late. 
15 v več kot 70 % odgovorov gd Echo na vprašalnike sodišča je bilo navedeno, da poročila zn zamujajo.