natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
32 challenges, a key factor keeping them from doing so was the lower than expected carbon market price under EU ETS. 
Poleg številnih drugih pomembnih izzivov je bil glavni dejavnik, ki je to preprečeval, nižja tržna cena ogljikovega dioksida v sistemu EU za trgovanje z emisijami, kot je bila pričakovana.
Figure 9 shows the evolution. 
Na sliki 9 je prikazan razvoj cen.
Figure 9 – Historical price of EU ETS allowances (euros/ tonne of CO2e) 2008-201739 Source: ECA, based on monthly average of seven EUA futures contracts (Quandl). 
Slika 9 – Pretekle cene pravic v sistemu EU za trgovanje z emisijami (v EUR/tono emisij CO2) v obdobju 2008–201739 35 Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče, na podlagi mesečnega povprečja sedmih terminskih pogodb v zvezi emisijskimi kuponi EU (Quandl).
We found that CCS projects when they had applied in 2009 for an EEPR grant had relied on high and increasing carbon prices to underpin their financial plans. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da so se projekti CCS, ki so v letu 2009 zaprosili za nepovratna sredstva programa EEPO, v svojih finančnih načrtih zanašali na visoke in rastoče cene ogljikovega dioksida.
A review of the EEPR grant applications submitted in 2009 by the six promotors that were later awarded grants showed that they expected the carbon price to range between 20 and 40 euro per tonne of CO2 during the construction and demonstration phases. 
Pregled vlog za nepovratna sredstva programa EEPO, ki jih je leta 2009 vložilo šest nosilcev projektov in so bile pozneje odobrene, je pokazal, da so pričakovali, da se bo cena ogljikovega dioksida v fazah gradnje in demonstracije gibala med 20 in 40 EUR na tono CO2.
One project showed how the viability of its financial plan also depended on electricity prices. 
Pri enem od projektov se je pokazalo, da je bila ekonomska vzdržnost njegovega finančnega načrta odvisna tudi od cen električne energije.
39 From mid-2017, the EU ETS carbon market price started to increase, peaking at 16 euro per tonne of CO2 in May. 
Ocenjuje se, da bi le cena 39 Od sredine leta 2017 se je tržna cena ogljikovega dioksida v sistemu EU za trgovanje z emisijami zviševala in maja dosegla rekordnih 16 EUR na tono CO2.
Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17 
Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17
In their financing plans, these projects frequently expected to receive significant funding from NER300 in the future, even though at that time (in 2009) the final design of NER300 was not known. 
V finančnih načrtih teh projektov se je pogosto pričakovalo, da bodo projektom v prihodnosti dodeljena precejšnja sredstva iz programa NER300, čeprav takrat (leta 2009) zasnova programa NER300 še ni bila znana.
Box 8 describes how the carbon market price also determined the maximum size of NER300 grants40. The Commission accepted these highly uncertain financial plans, signed the grant agreements and paid 43 % of the awarded funds under the EEPR. 
V okviru 8 je opisano, kako je tržna cena ogljikovega dioksida določala tudi najvišji znesek nepovratnih sredstev iz programa NER300.40 Komisija je sprejela te zelo negotove finančne načrte, podpisala sporazume o dodelitvi nepovratnih sredstev in izplačala 43 % dodeljenih sredstev v okviru EEPO.
33 Box 8 – The fall in the value of ETS allowances led to smaller NER300 grants Based on Member State confirmation letters and EIB due diligence reports we calculated for eight CCS power sector projects, that the costs41 under NER300 to deploy and operate their CCS infrastructure on average amounted to 1.4 billion euro. 
Okvir 8 – Padec vrednosti pravic v sistemu za trgovanje z emisijami je privedel do nižjih zneskov nepovratnih sredstev v okviru programa NER300 Sodišče je na podlagi potrditvenih dopisov držav članic in poročil EIB o potrebni skrbnosti izračunalo, da so stroški41 za osem projektov iz sektorja električne energije CCS v okviru programa NER300 za uvedbo in delovanje njihove infrastrukture CCS v povprečju znašali 1,4 milijarde EUR.
The ETS Directive capped the size of a NER300 grant at 15 % of the 300 million available allowances (i.e. equal to 45 million allowances). 
V direktivi o sistemu trgovanja z emisijami je bil znesek nepovratnih sredstev v okviru programa NER300 omejen na 15 % od 300 milijonov razpoložljivih pravic (tj. enako 45 milijonom pravic).
When the carbon market price dropped from €15 per allowance in 2010 to approximately €7.5 in 2011, this also reduced the expected largest possible size of a NER300 grant from €675 million to €337 million. 
Ko se je tržna cena ogljikovega dioksida znižala s 15 EUR na pravico leta 2010 na približno 7,5 EUR leta 2011, se je tudi pričakovan najvišji mogoč znesek nepovratnih sredstev iz programa NER300 znižal s 675 milijonov EUR na 337 milijonov EUR.
The Commission finally set it at €300 million. 
Komisija je na koncu določila znesek 300 milijonov EUR.
For capital-intensive CCS projects that expected to receive much higher support from NER300, this was a major setback. 
Za kapitalsko intenziven projekt CCS, za katerega se je pričakovalo, da bo prejel precej večjo podporo iz programa NER300, je to pomenilo velik neuspeh.
It happened as project sponsors submitted and awaited the evaluation of their proposals in 2011-2012. 
To se je zgodilo, ko so sponzorji projekta v obdobju 2011–2012 predložili svoje predloge in čakali na njihovo oceno.
The EEPR CCS projects in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (the only ones to continue after 2013) were never able to (re-)establish their financial viability in light of the 40 See the relevant NER300 sections of the evaluation of the EU ETS Directive carried out within the project “Support for the review of the EU Emissions Trading System” of November 2015, prepared by the Austrian Umweltbundesamt in cooperation with Ecologic and SQ Consult in November 2015 under a service contract with the European Commission. 
Ko je Komisija razvrstila projekte CCS in zahtevala potrditev držav članic, je tem državam članicam sporočila, da predvideva, da bodo odpravile nastalo vrzel med pričakovanim najvišjim zneskom nepovratnih sredstev v okviru programa NER300 v višini 337 milijonov EUR in skupnim zneskom 40 Glej ustrezne oddelke o NER300 v oceni direktive o sistemu EU za trgovanje z emisijami, ki je bila izvedena novembra 2015 v okviru projekta z naslovom Support for the review of the EU Emissions Trading System (podpora za pregled sistema EU za trgovanje z emisijami), ki jo je novembra 2015 pripravil avstrijski zvezni urad za okolje v sodelovanju z družbama Ecologic in SQ Consult.
41 Article 3(2) of the NER300 Decision defines as follows for CCS: “The relevant costs of CCS demonstration projects shall be those investment costs which are borne by the project due to the application of CCS net of the net present value of the best estimate of operating benefits and costs arising due to the application of CCS during the first 10 years of operation”. 
41 V členu 3(2) sklepa o programu NER300 je za CCS navedeno naslednje: „Zadevni stroški demonstracijskih projektov CCS so tisti naložbeni stroški, ki jih ima projekt zaradi uporabe CCS, brez sedanje neto vrednosti najboljše ocene koristi in stroškov poslovanja zaradi uporabe CCS v prvih 10 letih delovanja.“ 36
decreasing prices. The expected financial benefits of capturing and storing CO2 and thereby avoiding high costs under the EU ETS would not materialise as expected. 
Pričakovane finančne koristi zajemanja in shranjevanja CO2 ter s tem preprečevanje visokih stroškov v okviru sistema EU za trgovanje z emisijami se niso uresničili, kot je bilo pričakovano.
In 2012, the Commission made an internal assessment42 of the impact of the decreasing carbon market price. 
Komisija je leta 2012 izvedla notranje ocenjevanje42 vpliva nižanja tržne cene ogljikovega dioksida.
It noted that it had become very difficult for these projects to take a final investment decision. 
Ugotovila je, da je pri teh projektih zelo težko sprejeti končno naložbeno odločitev.
It nevertheless maintained EEPR financial support and allowed some work on transport and storage packages in the UK and the Netherlands to continue. 
Vendar je ohranila finančno podporo v okviru EEPO in omogočila nadaljevanje dela na področju prevoza in shranjevanja v Združenem kraljestvu in na Nizozemskem.
The Commission applied the rationale that those projects could potentially benefit other emitters in the same areas if they would enable the construction of infrastructure for shared use. 
To je utemeljila s tem, da bi lahko zadevni projekti koristili drugim subjektom, ki povzročajo emisije na istih območjih, če bi omogočili izgradnjo infrastrukture za skupno rabo.
The Commission and the project sponsor had decided in 2011 to slow down the work of the project in the Netherlands in view of the low carbon market prices. 
Komisija in sponzor projekta sta se leta 2011 odločila, da bosta zaradi nizkih tržnih cen ogljikovega dioksida upočasnila delo v okviru projekta na Nizozemskem.
The Commission made significant efforts in 2015-2017 to identify extra funding sources to cover the gaps. 
Komisija si je v obdobju 2015–2017 močno prizadevala, da bi našla dodatne vire financiranja za odpravo vrzeli.
It organised various roundtable meetings with key industry and Member State stakeholders in Brussels and sought common interests to continue the project. 
V Bruslju je organizirala različne okrogle mize s ključnimi deležniki iz industrije in držav članic ter iskala skupne interese za nadaljevanje projekta.
The goal was to at least construct the required infrastructure and operate it for a short demonstration period. 
Cilj je bil vsaj zgraditi potrebno infrastrukturo, ki bi delovala v kratkem demonstracijskem obdobju.
The project sponsor finally withdrew its support from the project in 2017. 
Sponzor projekta je leta 2017 nazadnje umaknil svojo podporo projektu.
The lack of financial viability is the main blocking factor for CCS deployment in the EU. 
Finančna nevzdržnost je glavni zaviralni dejavnik za uvedbo CCS v EU.
The sharp decrease of the carbon market price and the failure of any EEPR project to secure an adequate amount of extra public funding through NER300 or national programmes by 2012 or other revenues, compromised their viability. 
Zaradi izrazitega znižanja tržne cene ogljikovega dioksida in dejstva, da noben od projektov v okviru programa EEPO ni zagotovil ustreznega zneska dodatnih javnih sredstev v okviru programa NER300 ali nacionalnih programov do leta 2012 ali drugih prihodkov, je bila ogrožena ekonomska vzdržnost.
The Commission did not suspend or terminate its financial support to the demonstration of CCS under EEPR at that time and continued after 2013 to make payments to two projects that ultimately failed. 
37 demonstracijo CCS v okviru programa EEPO in je po letu 2013 še naprej izplačevala sredstva za dva projekta, ki na koncu nista bila uspešna.
The design of NER300 limited the Commission and Member States’ ability to respond to changing circumstances We examined whether the general design of the NER300 programme matched identified needs and whether the project selection procedures ensured that it would award 42 Internal exchanges between DG ENER and DG BUDG about the much lower than expected payment rates in the first years of EEPR. 
Zasnova programa NER300 je omejevala zmožnost Komisije in držav članic za odzivanje na spreminjajoče se okoliščine Sodišče je preučilo, ali je bila splošna zasnova programa NER300 skladna z ugotovljenimi potrebami in ali so postopki za izbiro projektov zagotavljali, da so se nepovratna sredstva dodelila najboljšim razpoložljivim projektom.
grants to the best available projects. We further examined whether the NER300 governance arrangements allowed for an effective and flexible performance of tasks by the entities managing this innovation programme. 
Poleg tega je preučilo, ali so ureditve upravljanja programa NER300 subjektom, ki so upravljali ta program za inovacije, omogočale uspešno in fleksibilno opravljanje nalog.
The chosen NER300 funding model did not effectively de-risk demonstration projects The Commission is required to perform an impact assessment for its most important initiatives and for those that will have the most far-reaching impacts. 
Izbrani model financiranja programa NER300 ni uspešno odpravil tveganja demonstracijskih projektov Komisija mora izvesti oceno učinka za svoje najpomembnejše pobude in za tiste, ki bodo imele najbolj daljnosežno učinke.
This applies to the 2009 amendment of the ETS Directive (which would later become the legal basis for the creation of NER300) as well as to the 2010 Commission decision laying down NER300 implementing provisions. 
To se nanaša na spremembo direktive o sistemu trgovanja z emisijami iz leta 2009 (ki je pozneje postala pravna podlaga za vzpostavitev programa NER300) in na sklep Komisije iz leta 2010 o določitvi izvedbenih določb za program NER300.
When reviewing the impact assessments for the NER300 legal basis prepared by the Commission, we found that the initial proposal43 from the Commission for the EU ETS review did not include a mechanism to incentivise CCS demonstration projects. 
Pri pregledu ocen učinka za pravno podlago programa NER300, ki jih je pripravila Komisija, je Sodišče ugotovilo, da je prvotni predlog43 Komisije za pregled sistema EU za trgovanje z emisijami ni vključeval mehanizma za spodbujanje demonstracijskih projektov CCS.
The accompanying Commission impact assessment44 thus also did not include any relevant needs assessment for the legal basis for NER300. 
Priložena ocena učinka Komisije44 tako tudi ni vključevala nobene relevantne ocene potreb za pravno podlago programa NER300.
Such an assessment would, for example, have mapped the funding needs of demonstration projects in all technology categories envisaged to receive support. 
S tako oceno bi se na primer opredelile potrebe po financiranju demonstracijskih projektov v vseh kategorijah tehnologij, predvidenih za dodelitev podpore.
It would have also identified available national support mechanisms and justified why an EU-level programme was required to supplement these. 
Poleg tega bi se opredelili razpoložljivi nacionalni mehanizmi podpore in utemeljila potreba po programu na ravni EU za njihovo dopolnitev.
43 COM(2008) 16 final of 23 January 2008. 
43 COM(2008) 16 final z dne 23. januarja 2008.
44 Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the EU greenhouse gas emissions allowance trading scheme, Impact Assessment, SEC(2008) 52 of 23 January 2008. 
44 Delovni dokument služb Komisije, priložen predlogu direktive Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o spremembi Direktive 2003/87/ES z namenom izboljšanja in razširitve sistema EU za trgovanje s pravicami do emisij toplogrednih plinov, ocena učinka, SEC(2008) 52 z dne 23. januarja 2008. 38
We found that insufficient evidence was available justifying the need for an additional funding mechanism of this type at EU level. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da ni bilo na voljo dovolj dokazov za utemeljitev potrebe po dodatnem tovrstnem mehanizmu financiranja na ravni EU.
No satisfactory assessment was available to underpin the legal basis of NER300 explaining what type of support early demonstration projects of a wide range of renewable energy technologies and CCS would need and why delivering support after entry into operation would meet the de-risking needs of projects from all categories. 
Prav tako ni bila na voljo zadovoljiva ocena v podkrepitev pravne podlage programa NER300, v kateri bi bilo pojasnjeno, kakšna vrsta podpore bi bila potrebna za projekte v zgodnji demonstracijski fazi zelo raznolikih tehnologij energije iz obnovljivih virov in CCS in zakaj bi bile z dodelitvijo podpore po začetku delovanja izpolnjene potrebe projektov v vseh kategorijah po zmanjšanju tveganja.
We also verified whether the provisions of the new NER300 article in the 2009 update of the ETS Directive prevented the possibility of paying funds at early projects stages. 
Sodišče je tudi preverilo, ali so določbe iz novega člena o programu NER300 v posodobljeni direktivi o sistemu trgovanja z emisijami iz leta 2009 onemogočale izplačilo sredstev v začetnih fazah projektov.
The Directive determined that grant allocation should occur based on verified avoided CO2 emissions. 
V direktiva je določeno, da bi bilo treba nepovratna sredstva dodeliti na podlagi preverjenih preprečenih emisij CO2.
The Commission’s legal interpretation was that this could be a pre-condition for disbursement but also a condition for repayment in case of project failure. 
Pravna razlaga Komisije je bila, da bi bilo to lahko predpogoj za izplačilo, pa tudi pogoj za vračilo v primeru neuspeha projekta.
In its published impact assessment45, the Commission stated that recovering money from failing projects would be difficult because Member States would have to do it. 
V objavljeni oceni učinka45 je Komisija navedla, da bi bila izterjava denarja od neuspelih projektov težavna, saj bi morale denar izterjati države članice.
The Commission thus favoured the option of disbursing funds after entry-into-operation. 
Komisija je zato dajala prednost možnosti izplačila sredstev po začetku delovanja.
The final NER300 implementing act reflects this choice. 
izvedbeni akt o programu NER300.
It most likely affected the take up of funds by demonstration projects, but has protected the NER300 endowment. 
Odločitev je najverjetneje vplivala na črpanje sredstev za demonstracijske projekte, vendar je zaščitila finančna sredstva programa NER300.
Our document reviews, interviews held as part of our audit work and the replies to our survey confirmed that the design of NER300 as a programme that would deliver financial support to projects after their entry-into-operation did not work very well to de-risk projects. 
Pregledi dokumentacije, ki jih je opravilo Sodišče, pogovori, ki jih je Sodišče izvedlo v okviru revizijskega dela, in odgovori na anketo Sodišča so potrdili, da zasnova programa NER300 kot programa, ki bi zagotovil finančno podporo za projekte po začetku njihovega delovanja, ni najbolje zmanjšala tveganja projektov.
In absence of clear and convincing needs assessments to underpin this key design feature in the legal basis of NER300, its funding approach insufficiently met the de-risking and financing needs of demonstration projects of a wide range of innovative technologies. 
Ker ni bilo jasnih in prepričljivih ocen potreb, ki bi utemeljile ta ključni element zasnove v pravni podlagi programa NER300, njegov pristop financiranja ni dovolj izpolnil potreb demonstracijskih projektov na področju zelo raznolikih inovativnih tehnologij po zmanjšanju tveganja in financiranju.
The NER300 project selection and decision-making processes were complex According to the NER300 Decision, the programme’s aim was to select and support the best possible projects of a wide range of technologies in geographically balanced locations. 
Postopki izbire projektov in odločanja v okviru programa NER300 so bili kompleksni V skladu s sklepom o programu NER300 je bil cilj programa izbrati in podpreti najboljše mogoče projekte na področju različnih tehnologij na geografsko uravnoteženih lokacijah.
Member States, the EIB and the Commission all had roles in the project submission, selection and award process. 
V postopku predložitve vlog za projekte, izbire in dodelitve sredstev so sodelovale države članice, EIB in Komisija.
Figure 10 gives an overview of all roles attributed to the entities involved in the management of NER300. 
Na sliki 10 je pregled vseh vlog, dodeljenih subjektom, vključenim v upravljanje programa NER300.
Figure 10 – Key steps in the NER300 process and assigned roles and responsibilities 37 Commission: overall supervision and reporting/knowledge sharing NER300 Monetisation and asset management (incl. payments to Member States) EIB on behalf of and for the Commission NER300 Calls for proposals (2x) Project identification (e,g. national calls) Eligibility checks and submission to EIB Due diligence Demonstration assessment Ranking projects for award NER300 Projects Confirmation Award Decision Project annual reporting and reaching FID Operation and payment requests 73 Commission supported by EIB Member State authorities EIB on behalf of the Commission Commission based on EIB results Permanent representations Commission as endorsed by CCC Member State verifies payment requests EIB pays Member State Additional eligibility, competitiveness and other checks Legend: Member State signs agreements and monitors project progress. 
3). Slika 10 – Ključni koraki v postopku programa NER300 ter dodeljene vloge in odgovornosti Komisija: splošni nadzor in poročanje/izmenjava znanja Monetizacija in upravljanje premoženja v okviru programa NER300 (vključno s plačili državam članicam) 41 EIB v imenu Komisije in zanjo Razpisi za zbiranje predlogov v okviru programa NER300 (2x) Opredelitev projektov (npr. nacionalni razpisi) Preverjanja upravičenosti in predložitve EIB Ocena potrebne Deskmrbonossttriacija Razvrščanje projektov za dodelitev sredstev Potrditev Sklep o dodelitvi sredstev Letno poročanje o projektu in sprejetje končne naložbene odločitve Delovanje in zahtevki za plačilo 73 Komisija ob podpori EIB Organi države članice EIB v imenu Komisije Komisija na podlagi rezultatov EIB Stalna predstavništva Komisija po potrditvi Odbora za podnebne spremembe Projekti v okviru programa NER300 Država članica podpiše sporazume in spremlja napredek projekta.
77 Annual reports to Commission 78 Change Requests: Commission checks requests before modifying Award Decisions subject to CCC approval NER300 process Commission Member State EIB CCC: Climate Change Committee Note: the red dots refer to paragraph numbers in the text. Source: ECA. 
77 Letna poročila za Komisijo 78 Zahtevki za spremembo: Komisija preveri zahtevke pred spremembo sklepov o dodelitvi, ki jih mora odobriti Odbor za podnebne spremembe Država članica preveri zahtevke za plačilo EIB plača državi članici Dodatna preverjanja upravičenosti, konkurenčnosti in druga preverjanja Legenda: Postopek NER300 Komisija Država članica EIB CCC: Odbor za podnebne spremembe Opomba: Rdeče pike se nanašajo na številke odstavkov v besedilu.
The Commission and EIB developed a Procedures Manual based on which EIB should perform the due diligence (i.e. technical and financial viability) assessment. 
Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče Komisija in EIB sta pripravila priročnik za postopke, na podlagi katerega bi morala EIB izvesti oceno potrebne skrbnosti (tj. tehnične in finančne vzdržnosti).
The EIB should Member State pays project 
Država članica plača projekt
Before taking award decisions based on this ranking, the Commission, in line with NER300 rules48, should re-consult with the Member States to confirm their support. 
razvrstitve ponovno posvetovati z državami članicami, da bi potrdila njihovo podporo.
We consider that the Commission should ensure a compliant and efficient implementation of these procedures. 
Po mnenju Sodišča bi morala Komisija zagotoviti skladno in učinkovito izvajanje teh postopkov.
EIB due diligence assessment EIB carried out the due diligence assessment on behalf of the Commission and following the procedures manual. 
Ocena potrebne skrbnosti, ki jo je izvedla EIB EIB je izvedla oceno potrebne skrbnosti v imenu Komisije in v skladu s priročnikom za postopke.
It was thorough and documented in detailed reports for each project submitted. 
Ta ocena je bila temeljita in dokumentirana v podrobnih poročilih za vsak predložen projekt.
However, the assessment did not score or rate the extent to which the applications met the sub-criteria of the due diligence assessment. 
Vendar v oceni ni bilo navedeno, koliko so vloge izpolnjevale podmerila ocene potrebne skrbnosti.
This is a key element of what banks normally assess as projects’ bankability: i.e. their ability to demonstrate a clear revenue stream allowing them to service their debts and generate a return on investments. 
To je ključni element, ki ga banke običajno ocenijo kot dobičkonosnost projektov, tj. njihovo sposobnost, da demonstrirajo jasen dotok prihodkov, ki jim omogoča, da odplačujejo dolgove in ustvarjajo donosnost naložb.