natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Types and prevalence of errors found 16 Breakdown of the 5,7 % contribution to the error rate by investment measures Other - 0,5 % Aid ceiling exceeded - 0,5 % Private procurement - 0,6 % Suspected intentional irregularities - 1,1 % Public procurement - 1,1 % Eligibility criteria, public beneficiaries - 0,9 % Eligibility criteria, private beneficiaries - 1 % Area‐related aid 17 For area payments, most of the irregu‐ larities found involved non‐compliance with agri‐environment commitments (obligations concerning land or farm management), ineligible agricultural parcels and over declarations (see Figure 5). 
Vrste in pogostost ugotovljenih napak 16 Razčlenitev 5,7‐odstotnega prispevka k stopnji napake po naložbenih ukrepih drugo 0,5 % presežena zgornja meja pomoči 0,5 % zasebno naročanje 0,6 % domnevne namerne nepravilnosti 1,1 % javna naročila 1,1 % merila za upravičenost – javni upravičenci 0,9 % merila za upravičenost – zasebni upravičenci 1 % Pomoč na površino 17 Za plačila na površino se je večina ugotovljenih nepravilnosti nanašala na neskladnost s kmetijsko-okoljskimi zavezami (obveznosti, povezane z gospodarjenjem z zemljišči ali upravljanjem kmetije), neupravičene kmetijske parcele in previsoke prijave (glej sliko 5).
Errors generally concern a limited area of the farm, resulting in a smaller error rate per payment, as opposed to investment measures, where eligibility breaches affect a higher portion of the payment. 
Napake se na splošno nanašajo na omejeno območje kmetije, zaradi česar je stopnja napake na plačilo manjša kot pri naložbenih ukrepih, kjer kršitve upravičenosti vplivajo na večji delež plačila.
Breakdown of the 2,5 % contribution to the error rate by area‐related aid Other - 0,4 % Farming commitments - 0,9 % Area differences - 0,3 % Eligibility criteria - 0,9 % Figure 5 Figure 4 
Razčlenitev 2,5‐odstotnega prispevka k stopnji napake po plačilih pomoči na površino drugo 0,4 % kmetijske zaveze 0,9 % razlike v površini 0,3 % merila za upravičenost 0,9 % Slika 5 Slika 4
Types and prevalence of errors found 17 Differences in the financial implementation rate and the error rate between groups of Member States 18 The rural development budget for the period 2007–13 (see paragraph 1) is broken down by Member States on an annual basis. 
Odhodki, nastali 15. oktobra 2013, so tako zadnji, ki so še vključeni v to revizijo. držav članic 18 Proračun za razvoj podeželja za obdobje 2007–2013 (glej odstavek 1) vsakoletno razčlenijo države članice.
Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/200510 requires the Commis‐ sion to decommit any portion of an annual commitment which has not been used within a period of 2 years after the year of the commitment (known as the ‘n+2 rule’). 
1290/200510 se zahteva, da Komisija razveljavi vse deleže prevzetih obveznosti za posamezno leto, ki niso bili porabljeni v dveh letih po prevzemu obveznosti (znano kot „pravilo N + 2”).
This rule aims to speed up the implementation of programmes. 
To pravilo naj bi pospešilo izvajanje programov.
19 The Court has compared the Member States’ financial implementation rates (i.e. the ratio of cumulative actual pay‐ ments to plan) with their error rates. 
19 Sodišče je primerjalo stopnjo finančnega izvajanja držav članic (tj. razmerje med kumulativnimi dejanskimi plačili in načrtovanimi plačili) z njihovimi stopnjami napake.
In order to obtain statistically representa‐ tive information, the 27 Member States which had 2007–13 rural development programmes were divided into three groups of nine Member States in de‐ scending order of their financial execu‐ tion rates as at 15 October 2013. 
Za pridobitev statistično reprezentativnih informacij je bilo 27 držav članic, ki so imele programe razvoja podeželja za obdobje 2007–2013, razdeljenih v tri skupine s po devetimi državami članicami v padajočem vrstnem redu glede na njihovo stopnjo finančnega izvajanja na dan 15. oktobra 2013.
The information available does not enable showing results on individual Member States. 
Razpoložljive informacije ne omogočajo prikaza rezultatov za posamezne države članice.
The following Member States are represented in the three groups. — Highest financial execution rate: Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Aus‐ tria, Slovakia and Finland. — Medium financial execution rate: Germany, France, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. — Lowest financial execution rate: Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta and Romania. 
V treh skupinah so zastopane naslednje države članice. – Najvišja stopnja finančnega izvajanja: Belgija, Češka, Estonija, Irska, Latvija, Luksemburg, Avstrija, Slovaška in Finska. – Najnižja finančna stopnja finančnega izvajanja: Bolgarija, Danska, Grčija, Španija, Italija, Ciper, Madžarska, Malta in Romunija.
20 Figure 6 presents aggregated figures since the beginning of the program‐ ming period (2007) until the end of the 2013 financial year11; they show a strong negative correlation between financial implementation rates and error rates for the three groups of Member States. 
20 Na sliki 6 so prikazani skupni zneski od začetka programskega obdobja (2007) do konca proračunskega leta 2013,11 ki kažejo močno negativno soodvisnost med stopnjami finančnega izvajanja in stopnjami napake za tri skupine držav članic.
The same analysis was carried out for different dates, and sep‐ arately for investment measures and area‐related aid, with similar results. 
Enaka analiza je bila izvedena za druge datume in ločeno za naložbene ukrepe in pomoč na površino, rezultati pa so bili podobni.
However, area‐related aid is mostly based on multiannual contracts, result‐ ing in relatively stable implementation and error rates. 
Toda pomoč na površino v glavnem temelji na večletnih pogodbah, zaradi česar sta stopnji izvajanja in napake razmeroma stabilni.
The correlation is more pronounced for investment measures, for which implementation rates are lower and error rates are higher. 
Medsebojna odvisnost je izrazitejša pri naložbenih ukrepih, pri katerih so stopnje izvajanja nižje, stopnje napake pa višje.
21 A detailed analysis of the correlation between the financial execution rate and the error rate was not part of the scope of this audit. 
21 Podrobna analiza soodvisnosti med stopnjo finančnega izvajanja in stopnjo napake ni vključena v obseg te revizije.
Types and prevalence of errors found 18 Comparison of financial implementation rates with error rates for three groups of nine Member States 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40 % 30% 20 % 10 % 83,0 % 12 % 10 % 8% 6% error rate 4% 72,3 % 8,6 3,6 % % 10,0 % 57,5 % 2% 0% 0% 9 Member States with highest financial implementation rate 9 Member States with medium financial implementation rate 9 Member States with lowest financial implementation rate Figure 6 
Vrste in pogostost ugotovljenih napak 18 Primerjava stopenj finančnega izvajanja s stopnjami napake za tri skupine s po devetimi državami članicami 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20 % 10 % 83,0 % 12 % 10 % 8% 6% stopnja napake 4% 72,3 % 8,6 3,6 % % 10,0 % 57,5 % 2% 0% 0% 9 držav članic z najvišjo stopnjo finančnega izvajanja 9 držav članic s srednje visoko stopnjo finančnega izvajanja 9 držav članic z najnižjo stopnjo finančnega izvajanja Slika 6
Observations 19 PART I What are the main causes of the error rate in investment measures? 
Opažanja 19 DEL I – Kateri so glavni vzroki za stopnjo napake pri naložbenih ukrepih?
22 This section examines the causes of errors in investment measures, which contributed to two thirds of the error rate (see Figure 2). 
22 V tem oddelku so preučeni vzroki za napake pri naložbenih ukrepih, ki so prispevali k dvema tretjinama stopnje napake (glej sliko 2).
The Court found the main drivers of the error rate to be the type of beneficiary and the type of measure. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da sta glavna povzročitelja stopnje napake vrsta upravičenca in vrsta ukrepa.
Public bodies are a signifi‐ cant source of error because of non‐compliance with public procurement rules 23 The main objectives of aid provided to public bodies for rural development measures are to improve the quality of life in rural areas, to improve and develop agricultural infrastructure, and to restore forestry potential. 
Javni organi so pomemben vir napak zaradi neskladnosti s pravili o javnem naročanju 23 Glavni cilji pomoči javnim organom za ukrepe za razvoj podeželja so izboljšanje kakovosti življenja na podeželskih območjih, izboljšanje in razvoj kmetijske infrastrukture, ter obnavljanje proizvodnega potenciala gozdov.
Measures supporting these objectives represented around a quarter of total investment expenditure. 
Ukrepi za podporo tem ciljem so pomenili približno četrtino vseh odhodkov za naložbe.
In addition, up to 4 % of the total rural develop‐ ment budget may be used by manag‐ ing authorities as ‘technical assistance’ to finance preparation, management, monitoring, evaluation, information and control activities carried out under rural development programmes. 
Poleg tega lahko do 4 % skupnega proračuna za razvoj podeželja uporabijo organi upravljanja kot „teh-nično pomoč” za financiranje priprave, upravljanja, spremljanja, vrednotenja, obveščanja in kontrolnih dejavnosti, ki se izvajajo v okviru programov razvoja podeželja.
24 Most of the audited public bodies were municipalities or associations thereof. 
24 Revidirani javni organi so bili večinoma občine ali njihova združenja.
The Court also audited cen‐ tral, regional and local governments (including paying agencies), as well as other public organisations such as irrigation consortia. 
Sodišče je revidiralo tudi centralne, regionalne in lokalne uprave (vključno s plačilnimi agencijami) ter druge javne organizacije, kot so namakalni konzorciji.
25 Directive 2004/18/EC12 requires Mem‐ ber States to oblige public bodies to conduct competitive public procure‐ ment procedures when awarding con‐ tracts. 
25 V skladu z Direktivo 2004/18/ES12 morajo države članice uvesti obveznost za javne organe, da za oddajo javnega naročila uporabljajo konkurenčne postopke.
It states that exceptions are only permitted in justified circumstances (e.g. for reasons of extreme urgency brought about by unforeseeable events). 
Izjeme so dovoljene le v utemeljenih okoliščinah (npr. zaradi izredne nujnosti, do katere je prišlo zaradi nepredvidljivih dogodkov).
Commission Regulation (EU) No 65/201113 stipulates that investment projects must comply with applicable national public procurement rules. 
65/201113 je določeno, da je treba pri naložbenih projektih upoštevati veljavna nacionalna pravila o javnem naročanju.
26 Errors in public procurement proce‐ dures account for one eighth of the av‐ erage error rate for rural development. 
26 Napake v postopkih oddaje javnega naročila pomenijo osmino povprečne stopnje napake na področju razvoja podeželja.
This figure only includes instances where serious breaches of the public procurement rules influenced the se‐ lection of the successful tenderer. 
Ta podatek vključuje samo primere, v katerih so resne kršitve pravil o javnem naročanju vplivale na izbiro uspešnega ponudnika.
12 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ L 134, 30.4.2004, p. 
12 Direktiva 2004/18/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 31. marca 2004 o usklajevanju postopkov za oddajo javnih naročil gradenj, blaga in storitev (UL L 134, 30.4.2004, str.
13 Commission Regulation (EU) No 65/2011 of 27 January 2011 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, as regards the implementation of control procedures as well as cross‐compliance in respect of rural development support measures (OJ L 25, 28.1.2011, p. 
13 Uredba Komisije (EU) št. 65/2011 z dne 27. januarja 2011 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za izvajanje Uredbe Sveta (ES) št.
Observations 20 27 Of the many applicable rules, only three categories of the serious breach‐ es of procurement rules led to this significant impact on the error rate (see Table 1). 
Opažanja 20 27 Od mnogih veljavnih pravil so le tri kategorije resnih kršitev pravil o javnem naročanju privedle do tega bistvenega vpliva na stopnjo napake (glej tabelo 1).
28 The Court found two main reasons that could explain the breaches in public procurement rules. 
28 Sodišče je ugotovilo glavna razloga, ki bi lahko pojasnila kršitev pravil o javnem naročanju.
Firstly, rural infrastructure projects are commonly implemented by small municipalities which often have limited experience of conducting public procurement procedures, and do not have trained and experienced staff at their disposal. 
Prvič, podeželske infrastrukturne projekte običajno izvajajo majhne občine, ki imajo pogosto malo izkušenj z izvajanjem postopkov oddaje javnega naročila in nimajo na voljo usposobljenega in izkušenega osebja.
During the tendering procedure, the national authorities do not provide detailed guidance. 
Med razpisnim postopkom nacionalni organi ne zagotavljajo podrobnih smernic.
Breach of public procurement rule Example Unjustified direct award without a competitive procedure The beneficiary of an investment project, a municipality in the Netherlands, agreed to conduct a tendering procedure and delegated implementation of the project to a foundation. 
Kršitev pravil o javnem naročanju Primer Neupravičena neposredna oddaja naročila brez konkurenčnega postopka Upravičenec naložbenega projekta, občina na Nizozemskem, se je dogovoril, da se izvede razpisni postopek, in prenesel izvajanje projekta na neko fundacijo.
The agreement with the foundation set out the procurement proce‐ dure, specifying that a competitive procedure should be applied which should be published on a dedicated website. 
V sporazu‐ mu s fundacijo je bil določen postopek oddaje javnega naročila, in sicer se je zahtevala uporaba konkurenčnega postopka, ki naj bi bil objavljen na posebni spletni strani.
However, 3 weeks after signing the agreement, the board of the foundation decided to apply a direct award procedure, without publishing this on the dedicated website. 
Toda odbor fundacije se je tri tedne po podpisu sporazuma odločil za uporabo nepo‐ sredne oddaje naročila, ne da bi to objavil na tej spletni strani.
Misapplication of selection and award criteria In Germany (Brandenburg‐Berlin), a municipality organised a competitive procedure to select a broadband Internet supplier. 
Napačna uporaba meril za izbor in dodelitev V Nemčiji (Brandenburg‐Berlin) je občina organizirala konkurenčni postopek za izbiro ponudnika širokopasovnega interneta.
During the evaluation of the offers, the municipality used award criteria other than those published in the tender notice, followed by a negotiated procedure in which only two of the bidders were allowed to participate. 
Pri ocenjevanju ponudb je občina uporabila druga merila za dodelitev, kot so bila objavljena v obvestilu o javnem naročilu, temu pa je sledil postopek s pogajanji, v katerem sta smela sodelovati le dva od ponudnikov.
At the end of the procedure, the municipality did not choose the most economical offer. 
Na koncu postopka občina ni izbrala najugodnejše ponudbe.
Lack of equal treatment of tenderers In Romania, a rural municipality obtained support for an investment project which included a water supply network, a sewage system, improvement of local roads and a community centre. 
Neenakopravna obravnava ponudnikov Podeželska občina v Romuniji je dobila podporo za naložbeni projekt, ki je zajemal vodovodno omrežje, kanalizacijski sistem, izboljšavo lokalnih cest in občinski center.
Seven tenderers submitted offers for the public works contract; the beneficiary rejected five of these on the grounds that they did not fulfil the requirements. 
Ponudbe za javno naročilo gradenj je predložilo sedem ponudnikov; upravičenec jih je pet zavrnil, ker niso izpolnjevale pogojev.
The Court found that the winning tenderer had also failed to fulfil two requirements which had been used as grounds for rejecting other bids. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da tudi izbrani ponudnik ni izpolnil dveh zahtev, kar je bilo uporabljeno kot razlog za zavrnitev drugih ponudb.
Observations 21 29 Secondly, errors are also caused by certain beneficiaries preferring to work with specific contractors, and therefore awarding contracts directly without publishing a contract notice or asking for offers from any other poten‐ tial bidders. 
Opažanja 21 29 Drugič, napake so tudi posledica tega, da se nekateri upravičenci raje odločajo za delo s specifičnimi izvajalci, zato naročila oddajajo neposredno brez objave obvestila o javnem naročilu ali ne zaprosijo za ponudbe drugih potencialnih ponudnikov.
In 80 % of these cases, the successful bidder was one which had previously provided similar goods or services to the beneficiary (see Box 2). 
V 80 % teh primerov je bil izbrani ponudnik tisti, ki je upravičencu že zagotavljal podobno blago ali storitve (glej okvir 2).
The paying agencies did not object to this on any occasion, even though the basic procurement principles of transparency, objectivity, non‐discrim‐ ination and appropriate disclosure had not been fulfilled. 
Plačilne agencije temu nikoli niso ugovarjale, čeprav osnovna načela javnega naročanja, in sicer preglednost, objektivnost, nediskriminacija in ustrezno razkritje, niso bila upoštevana.
Contracts awarded directly to existing suppliers In Sweden, a regional government body implemented a project under the measure ‘Infrastructure related to the development and adaptation of agriculture and forestry‘. 
Naročila, oddana neposredno obstoječim dobaviteljem Na Švedskem je regionalni vladni organ izvajal projekt v okviru infrastrukturnega ukrepa, povezanega z razvojem in prilagoditvijo kmetijstva in gozdarstva.
The audited project was a continuation of a pre‐ vious project. 
Revidirani projekt je bil nadaljevanje prejšnjega projekta.
Swedish public procurement law allows contracts to be directly awarded only in exceptional circumstances, or if the value of the contract is below a certain threshold, in which case the contracting authority must obtain at least three bids. 
Švedski zakon o javnem naročanju dovoljuje neposredno oddajo naročil samo v izjemnih okoliščinah ali če je vrednost naročila pod določenim pragom, v tem primeru pa mora naročnik pridobiti vsaj tri ponudbe.
The beneficiary did not respect these rules and awarded three contracts directly, after having obtained only one offer in each case, namely from the companies which had provided the same services for the previous project. 
Upravičenec teh pravil ni upošteval in je tri naročila oddal neposredno, potem ko je v vsakem primeru pridobil samo po eno ponudbo, in sicer od podjetij, ki so zagotovila enake storitve za prejšnji projekt.
Beneficiaries’ non‐compli‐ ance with eligibility criteria had a significant impact on the error rate 30 The Council regulation on support for rural development14 stipulates that expenditure is eligible only if it has been incurred in accordance with the rules on eligibility and selection criteria established at national level. 
Neskladnost upravičencev z merili za upravičenost je imela znaten učinek na stop‐ njo napake 30 V uredbi Sveta o podpori za razvoj podeželja14 je določeno, da so odhodki upravičeni le, če so nastali v skladu s pravili o upravičenosti in izbirnimi merili, določenimi na nacionalni ravni.
Member States must establish these rules and criteria in order to target limited financial resources towards areas, projects and beneficiaries which contribute most to the objectives of the programme. 
Države članice morajo določiti ta pravila in merila zaradi usmerjanja omejenih finančnih sredstev v področja, projekte in upravičence, ki največ prispevajo k doseganju ciljev programa.
31 Eligibility breaches accounted for a quarter of the error rate for rural development, equally distributed between private and public benefi‐ ciaries. 
31 Kršitve pravil o upravičenosti so pomenile četrtino stopnje napake na področju razvoja podeželja, in sicer enakomerno porazdeljeno med zasebnimi in javnimi upravičenci.
The Court found a wide range of eligibility breaches, reflecting the multitude of investment measures and the large number of implementing rules and criteria applicable to them in Member States. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo mnogo različnih kršitev pravil o upravičenosti, do katerih je prišlo zaradi velikega števila naložbenih ukrepov ter izvedbenih pravil in meril, ki zanje veljajo v državah članicah.
14 Article 71 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (OJ L 277, 21.10.2005, p.1). 
1698/2005 z dne 20. septembra 2005 o podpori za razvoj podeželja iz Evropskega kmetijskega sklada za razvoj podeželja (EKSRP) (UL L 277, 21.10.2005, str. 1). Okvir 2
Observations 22 32 Eligibility breaches can occur at the levels of the beneficiary, of the project and of individual cost items. 
Opažanja 22 32 Do kršitev pravil o upravičenosti lahko pride na ravneh upravičenca, projekta in posameznih stroškovnih postavk.
Table 2 illustrates examples of such cases. 
V tabeli 2 je ponazorjenih nekaj takih primerov.
Level of breach Example Beneficiary In Spain, to benefit from aid for investments in processing facilities for agricultural products, enterprises must have fewer than 750 employees and a turnover of less than 200 million euro. 
Raven, na kateri je prišlo do kršitve Primer Upravičenec V Španiji morajo imeti podjetja, ki želijo izkoristiti pomoč za naložbe v predelovalne obrate za kmetijske proizvode, manj kot 750 zaposlenih in letno realizacijo manj kot 200 milijonov EUR.
Figures for controlling enterprises (up to the ultimate beneficial owner) also have to be taken into account when assessing compliance with these thresholds. 
Pri ugotavljanju skladnosti s tema pragovoma je treba upoštevati tudi podatke za obvladujoče družbe (do končnega dejanskega lastnika).
A beneficiary submitted a project to expand its production facilities. 
Upravičenec je predložil projekt za širitev svojih proizvodnih obratov.
In the application, he included the data for only half of the companies which formed part of the group. 
V vlogo je vključil le podatke o polovici družb, ki so del skupine.
Based on this incomplete information, the beneficiary declared that it complied with the ceilings regarding number of employees and total turnover. 
Na podlagi teh nepopolnih informacij je upravičenec izjavil, da ne presega zgornje meje glede števila zaposlenih in skupne realizacije.
The Court recalculated the indicators by including the data for all companies in the group and found that both ceilings had been breached. 
Sodišče je ponovno izračunalo kazalnike, pri čemer je vključilo podatke za vse družbe v skupini, in ugotovilo, da sta bili preseženi obe zgornji meji.
Project In Poland, several farmers obtained aid for creating a producer group which would acquire ag‐ ricultural products from its members and then sell these to third parties (with the intention of obtaining better prices than each separate farmer would otherwise have been able to obtain). 
Projekt Več kmetov na Poljskem je pridobilo pomoč za ustanovitev skupine proizvajalcev, ki bi od svojih članov kupovala kmetijske proizvode in jih nato prodajala tretjim osebam (z namenom pridobiti boljše cene, kot bi jih sicer lahko dosegel vsak posamezen kmet).
One of the conditions for receiving the aid was that the producer group must sell the products to third parties. 
Eden od pogojev za prejetje pomoči je bil, da mora skupina proizvajalcev proizvode prodajati tretjim osebam.
The Court found that the only client of the producer group was another company which was owned by the same farmers. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da je bila edina stranka skupine proizvajalcev druga družba, ki je bila v lasti istih kmetov.
The audited project was therefore not eligible. 
Revidirani projekt je bil zato neupravičen.
Individual cost items In Portugal, a beneficiary submitted a project involving planting olive trees. 
Posamezne stroškovne postavke Na Portugalskem je upravičenec predložil projekt za sajenje oljk.