natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission should also develop procedures in the context of the ‘two-pack’ regulations. (b) The forecasting process should be subject to more systematic quality control. (c) To ensure the factors underlying programme decisions are internally transparent, the Commission should enhance record-keeping and pay attention to it during quality reviews. (d) The Commission should ensure that proper procedures are in place for the quality review of programme management and of the content of programme documents. (e) For budget monitoring purposes, the Commission should include, in memoranda of understanding, variables that it can collect with short time lags. (f) The Commission should distinguish conditions by importance and target the truly important reforms. (g) For any future programmes, the Commission should attempt to formalise interinstitutional cooperation with other programme partners. (h) The debt management process should be more transparent. (i) The Commission should further analyse the key aspects of the countries’ adjustment. 
Poleg tega naj razvije postopke v okviru „dvojčka” uredb. (b) Kontrola kakovosti procesov napovedovanja naj bo bolj sistematična. (c) Da se zagotovi notranja preglednost dejavnikov, na katerih temeljijo programske odločitve, naj Komisija okrepi vodenje evidenc in temu nameni pozornost pri pregledu kakovosti. (d) Komisija naj zagotovi ustrezne postopke za pregled kakovosti upravljanja programov in vsebine programskih dokumentov. (e) Za spremljanje proračuna naj Komisija v memorandume o soglasju vključi spremenljivke, ki jih lahko zbere s kratkimi časovnimi zamiki. (f) Komisija naj pogoje razvrsti po pomembnosti in se osredotoči na resnično pomembne reforme. (g) Pri morebitnih prihodnjih programih naj si Komisija prizadeva za formalizacijo medinstitucionalnega sodelovanja z drugimi programskimi partnerji. (h) Proces upravljanja dolga naj bo preglednejši. (i) Komisija naj nadalje analizira ključne vidike prilagajanja, ki ga izvedejo države.
Introduction 11 The sovereign debt crisis in the EU Member States 01 The financial crisis that hit Europe in 2008 triggered the European sovereign debt crisis. 
Uvod 11 Kriza državnega dolga v državah članicah EU 01 Finančna kriza, ki je leta 2008 prizadela Evropo, je sprožila evropsko krizo državnega dolga.
The sovereign debt crisis had many causes, including weak banking supervision, poor fiscal policies and the difficulties experienced by large financial institutions (the bailout costs of which were borne by the general public). 
Kriza državnega dolga je imela veliko vzrokov, vključno s šibkim bančnim nadzorom, slabimi fiskalnimi politikami in težavami, s katerimi so se spopadale velike finančne institucije (stroške njihovega reševanja je nosila javnost).
The effects of the crisis are still being felt as this report is published, and the resulting loan programmes have since run into the hundreds of billions, bringing onerous management responsibilities for all concerned. 
V času objave tega poročila je učinke krize še vedno čutiti, vrednost programov posojil zaradi krize pa je v tem času narasla na stotine milijard EUR, zato so odgovornosti za upravljanje zahtevne za vse udeležence.
02 The crisis affected the EU Member States in two waves. 
02 Kriza je države članice EU prizadela v dveh valovih.
In the first instance, the contagion of the financial crisis spread through foreign credit and trade channels to a number of non-euro area Member States. 
V prvem valu se je finančna kriza razširila po tujih kreditnih in trgovinskih kanalih v več držav članic zunaj evrskega območja.
The sharp increase in foreign capital outflows and decrease in exports revealed significant external imbalances for some countries, three of which (Hungary, Latvia and Romania) sought financial assistance from the EU’s balance-of-payments mechanism1, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)2 and other sources3. 
Močno povečanje odlivov tujega kapitala in zmanjšanje izvoza sta razkrila znatna zunanja neravnovesja v nekaterih državah, od katerih so tri (Madžarska, Latvija in Romunija) zaprosile za finančno pomoč iz plačilnobilančnega mehanizma EU1, Mednarodnega denarnega sklada2 in drugih virov3.
03 The second wave of the crisis concerned euro area Member States. 
03 Drugi val krize je prizadel države članice evrskega območja.
Although monetary union initially provided some liquidity cushioning, credit agencies started to downgrade several Member States’ sovereign bond ratings in 2009. 
Čeprav je monetarna unija sprva zagotavljala nekaj likvidnostne rezerve, so bonitetne agencije leta 2009 začele zniževati bonitetne ocene več držav članic.
Sovereign debt market interest rates increased sharply in some countries4 but decreased in others5. 
Obre-stne mere na trgu državnih dolžniških instrumentov so v nekaterih državah članicah4 močno narasle, v drugih5 pa so se znižale.
As a result of the decline in private funding and escalating borrowing costs, the governments of Ireland and Portugal, among others6, applied for external financial assistance. 
Zaradi upada zasebnega financiranja in naraščajočih stroškov zadolževanja sta med drugimi vlada-mi6 za zunanjo finančno pomoč zaprosili tudi irska in portugalska vlada.
04 The purpose of this financial assistance was to help countries repay or finance their maturing debt and deficits. 
04 Namen te finančne pomoči je bil pomagati državam, da odplačajo oziroma financirajo svoj zapadli dolg in primanjkljaje.
It provided a cushion to ease implementation of the adjustment programmes that were necessary in each country to correct underlying problems. 
Zagotovila je rezervo za lažje izvajanje programov za prilagoditev, ki so bili potrebni v posameznih državah, da bi odpravili temeljne probleme.
In broad terms, the mechanisms addressed the need to safeguard the stability of the euro area or the EU as a whole, to limit the risk of contagion and to prevent a sudden shock to the economies of beneficiary Member States. 
V širšem smislu so mehanizmi obravnavali potrebo po ohranjanju stabilnosti evrskega območja ali EU kot celote, omejitvi tveganja širjenja krize in preprečevanju nenadnih pretresov za gospodarstva držav članic upravičenk.
The objectives of each programme differed in detail, but the overall aims of financial assistance were to return Member States to sound macroeconomic or financial health and restore their capacity to meet their public-sector (euro area) or balance-of-payments (non-euro area) obligations. 
Cilji posameznih programov so se v podrobnostih sicer razlikovali, toda splošna namena finančne pomoči sta bila ponovna vzpostavitev stabilnega makroekonomskega ali finančnega položaja držav članic ter obnovitev njihove zmožnosti za izpolnjevanje obveznosti javnega sektorja (evrsko območje) ali plačilne bilance (zunaj evrskega območja).
Figure 1 provides a timeline of the financial assistance provided to the five Member States covered in our audit. 
Na sliki 1 je prikazana časovnica finančne pomoči, zagotovljene petim državam članicam, ki jih je zajela revizija Sodišča.
1 Based on Article 143 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
1 Na podlagi člena 143 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije.
2 Poland received access to IMF resources in May 2009 through a flexible credit line, but it did not require EU support. 
2 Poljska je maja 2009 s fleksibilno kreditno linijo dobila dostop do sredstev Mednarodnega denarnega sklada, vendar ni potrebovala pomoči EU.
3 Depending on each programme, other sources of financing were to be provided by the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Poland, Norway and Sweden. 
3 Odvisno od posameznega programa naj bi druge vire financiranja zagotovile Svetovna banka, Evropska banka za obnovo in razvoj, Evropska investicijska banka, Češka, Danska, Finska, Poljska, Norveška in Švedska.
4 Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal. 
4 Irska, Grčija, Španija, Italija in Portugalska.
5 Germany and France. 
5 Nemčija in Francija.
6 In the euro area, Greece, Spain and Cyprus also requested financial assistance. 
6 V evrskem območju so za finančno pomoč zaprosili še Grčija, Španija in Ciper.
Introduction 12 Timeline of financial assistance 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 HU (Nov ’08 – Nov ’10) LV (Jan ’09 – Jan ’12) RO (Jun ’09 – Jun ’11) RO 2 (Jun ’11–Mar ’13) IE (Dec ’10 – Dec ’13) PT (May ’11 – May ’14) Non-euro area Euro area Note: The start date of each programme is the date on which the memorandum of understanding between the Member State and the Commission was signed. Source: ECA. 
Uvod 12 Časovnica finančne pomoči 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 HU (nov. 2008 – nov. 2010) LV (jan. 2009 – jan. 2012) RO (junij 2009 – junij 2011) RO 2 (junij 2011–marec 2013) IE (dec. 2010 – dec. 2013) PT (maj 2011 – maj 2014) Zunaj evrskega območja Evrsko območje Opomba: Začetni datum posameznega programa je datum podpisa memoranduma o soglasju med državo članico in Komisijo.
Non-euro area Member States could take advantage of the existing balance-of-payments mechanism. 
Države članice zunaj evrskega območja so lahko izkoristile obstoječi plačilnobilančni mehanizem.
Ireland and Portugal were helped by the newly created European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). 
Irska in Portugalska sta prejeli pomoč iz na novo vzpostavljenega evropskega mehanizma za finančno stabilizacijo (EFSM) in evropskega instrumenta za finančno stabilnost (EFSF).
Only the balance-of-payments mechanism and the EFSM were established as EU instruments on the basis of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as the EFSF is an intergovernmental vehicle outside the EU framework. 
Kot instrumenta EU sta bila na podlagi Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije vzpostavljena le plačilnobilančni mehanizem in EFSM, saj je EFSF medvladni instrument zunaj okvira EU.
Annex II provides an overview of the legal basis of the three instruments. 
V Prilogi II je pregled pravne podlage za te tri instrumente.
The five countries also received financial assistance from the IMF. 
Zadevnih pet držav je prejelo tudi finančno pomoč MDS.
07 Assistance to non-euro area countries was managed by the Commission and the IMF. 
07 Pomoč državam zunaj evrskega območja sta upravljala Komisija in MDS.
The European Central Bank (ECB) — the third member of the troika of creditors — was involved in the management of financial assistance to Ireland and Portugal. 
Evropska centralna banka (ECB), ki je tretja članica trojke posojilodajalcev, je bila vključena v upravljanje finančne pomoči, dodeljene Irski in Portugalski.
This text refers to these institutions as ‘the partners’. 
V tem besedilu so omenjene institucije imenovane „partnerji”.
Introduction 13 Design and implementation Programme design 08 Requests for financial assistance from the EU are initiated by Member State authorities. 
Uvod 13 Zasnova in izvajanje Zasnova programov 08 Za finančno pomoč EU zaprosijo organi držav članic.
Requests must be submitted to the Commission and to the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC)7 together with a draft economic adjustment programme8. 
Prošnje je treba skupaj z osnutkom programa za ekonomsko prilagoditev7 vložiti pri Komisiji in Ekonomsko-finančnem odboru8.
Commission staff9 prepare the macroeconomic forecasts underpinning each programme and conduct negotiations with the national authorities. 
Uslužbenci Komisije9 pripravijo makroekonomske napovedi, ki so podlaga za posamezen program, in opravijo pogajanja z nacionalnimi organi.
The mandate for those negotiations is set out in advance in a policy brief10. 
Mandat za ta pogajanja je vnaprej določen v dokumentu o politiki10.
The Commission will informally contact other stakeholders (the IMF, the EFC and, in the case of euro area countries, the ECB) to obtain a coordinated position on the programme conditions that will accompany the financial assistance (see paragraph 11). 
Komisija neformalno naveže stik z ostalimi deležniki (Mednarodni denarni sklad, Ekonomsko-finančni odbor in – kadar gre za države evrskega območja – Evropsko centralno banko), da pripravi usklajeno stališče o pogojih za program, ki bo spremljal finančno pomoč (glej odstavek 11).
09 The negotiation visit11 to the country culminates in a set of key documents, listed below. (a) A proposal for a Council decision on the financial assistance, setting out the general economic policy conditions attached to the assistance and the broad financial terms of the loan (financial envelope, instalment arrangements and maximum average maturity12). (b) An explanatory note to the above proposal, presenting the Commission’s assessment of the Member State’s planned economic adjustment programme. 
09 V okviru pogajalskega obiska11 države se pripravi sklop ključnih dokumentov: (a) predlog sklepa Sveta o finančni pomoči, v katerem so navedeni pogoji splošne ekonomske politike, na katere je vezana pomoč, in splošni finančni pogoji posojila (finančna sredstva, ureditev glede obrokov in najdaljša povprečna zapadlost12); (b) obrazložitev zgornjega predloga, v kateri je predstavljena ocena načrtovanega programa za makroekonomsko prilagoditev v državi članici, ki jo je pripravila Komisija.
The assessment is based on internal Commission forecasts, financial and macroeconomic models, Eurostat data and information obtained from the negotiation visit. (c) A memorandum of understanding, which represents a more detailed commitment by the Member State and is typically signed by the Member State authorities and the Commission. 
Ocena temelji na notranjih napovedih Komisije, finančnih in makroekonomskih modelih, podatkih Eurostata in informacijah, pridobljenih v okviru pogajalskega obiska; (c) memorandum o soglasju, ki je podrobnejša zaveza države članice ter ga običajno podpišejo organi države članice in Komisija.
The memorandum of understanding sets precise economic conditions for the disbursement of each instalment and establishes the Member State’s reporting requirements. (d) A loan agreement, containing the technical and legal details of the loan (such as the average maturity calculation, interest rates, disbursement and repayment arrangements13). 
V njem so določeni natančni ekonomski pogoji za izplačilo posameznih obrokov in zahteve za poročanje države članice; (d) sporazum o posojilu13, ki vsebuje tehnične in pravne podrobnosti posojila (kot so izračun povprečne zapadlosti, obrestne mere, ureditev glede izplačevanja in odplačevanja).
8 Article 3(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 332/2002 of 18 February 2002 establishing a facility providing medium-term financial assistance for Member States’ balances of payments (OJ L 53, 23.2.2002, p. 
332/2002 z dne 18. februarja 2002 o ustanovitvi aranžmaja za zagotavljanje srednjeročne finančne pomoči za plačilne bilance držav članic (UL L 53, 23.2.2002, str.
1) and Article 3(1) of Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (OJ L 118, 12.5.2010, p. 
407/2010 z dne 11. maja 2010 o vzpostavitvi Evropskega mehanizma za finančno stabilizacijo (UL L 118, 12.5.2010, str.
The economic adjustment programme is a set of adjustment policies that the country aims to implement to correct underlying problems and re-establish its macroeconomic and financial standing. 
Program za makroekonomsko prilagoditev je sklop politik prilagajanja, ki jih neka država namerava izvesti, da bi odpravila zadevne probleme in ponovno vzpostavila svojo makroekonomsko in fiskalno trdnost.
9 The programme team, the head of the unit responsible for the programme country, the programme head and the director responsible for the programme country. 
9 Programska skupina, vodja enote, pristojne za državo v programu, vodja programa in direktor, pristojen za državo v programu.
10 The policy brief analyses the financial and macroeconomic situation of the Member State and the potential impact of any proposed measures on its economy. 
10 Dokument o politiki analizira finančni in makroekonomski položaj države članice in potencialne učinke predlaganih ukrepov na njeno gospodarstvo.
It also sets out the framework for negotiations with the Member State. 
Določa tudi okvir za pogajanja z državo članico.
The policy brief is approved by the Commissioner responsible after having received the comments from the presidents of the EFC and Eurogroup Working Group (EWG). 
Odobri ga pristojni komisar po prejemu pripomb predsednikov Ekonomsko-finančnega odbora in delovne skupine Evroskupine.
11 The visits are conducted by senior staff from the Commission and the IMF, plus the ECB in the case of euro area countries. 
11 Obiske opravijo visoki uradniki iz Komisije in MDS, obiske v državah evrskega območja pa tudi visoki uradniki iz ECB.
In general, these visits last between 2 and 3 weeks. 
Ti obiski običajno trajajo dva do tri tedne.
12 Each disbursement of the financial assistance can have a different maturity. 
12 Vsako izplačilo finančne pomoči ima lahko drugačno zapadlost.
The weighted average of these maturities must not exceed the maximum average maturity set in the Council decision. 
Ponderirano povprečje teh zapadlosti ne sme presegati najdaljše povprečne zapadlosti, določene v sklepu Sveta.
Introduction 14 10 As the IMF and the EU14 remain responsible for their own lending decisions, two separate sets of programme documents are prepared, one by each of the two institutions. 
Uvod 14 10 Ker MDS in EU14 ostajata odgovorna za svoje odločitve o posojanju, se pripravita dva ločena sklopa programskih dokumentov, in sicer vsaka institucija pripravi svojega.
In the EU, the ultimate decision on granting financial assistance rests with the Council. 
V EU končno odločitev o dodelitvi finančne pomoči sprejme Svet.
Conditions 11 Programme conditions explicitly link the approval or continuation of financing to the implementation of a range of measures, generally those which are important to programme objectives. 
Pogoji 11 Programski pogoji izrecno povezujejo odobritev ali nadaljevanje financiranja z izvajanjem nabora ukrepov, običajno tistih, ki so pomembni za programske cilje.
The programme conditions may also include key data targets that will sound warning bells if policies veer off track (e.g. the inflation target)15. 12 Conditions are either quantitative (e.g. a limit on fiscal deficit) or structural (e.g. greater enforcement of competition law). 
Pogoji lahko zajemajo tudi ključne podatkovne cilje, ki sprožijo alarm, če politike zaidejo s poti (npr. ciljna vrednost inflacije).15 12 Pogoji so bodisi kvantitativni (npr. omejitev fiskalnega primanjkljaja) ali strukturni (npr. okrepljeno izvrševanje konkurenčnega prava).
They also differ by intended function: (a) to correct key imbalances (e.g. fiscal deficit reduction); (b) to prevent imbalances from recurring in the future (e.g. adoption of fiscal responsibility laws); and (c) to detect the scale of imbalances (e.g. a comprehensive assessment of public–private partnerships (PPPs)). 
Razlikujejo se tudi po svojem namenu: (a) odpraviti ključna neravnovesja (npr. zmanjšanje fiskalnega primanjkljaja); (b) preprečiti neravnovesja v prihodnosti (npr. sprejetje zakonodaje za fiskalno disciplino); (c) ugotoviti obseg neravnovesij (npr. celovita ocena javno-zasebnih partnerstev).
13 The conditions set effectively build on the Member State’s economic adjustment programme and the partners’ analysis. 
13 Zastavljeni pogoji dejansko gradijo na programu za ekonomsko prilagoditev države članice in analizi partnerjev.
Thus, each programme will have a different set of conditions focusing on fiscal consolidation, structural reforms to promote economic growth and/or financial sector reforms or support (see Table 1). 
Tako ima vsak program različen niz pogojev, ki se osredotočajo na fiskalno konsolidacijo, strukturne reforme za spodbujanje gospodarske rasti in/ali reforme finančnega sektorja ali podporo zanj (glej tabelo 1).
14 All the assistance programmes targeted fiscal consolidation through the adoption of fiscal policies to reduce government deficits and make debt sustainable. 
14 Vsi programi pomoči so bili usmerjeni v fiskalno konsolidacijo s sprejetjem fiskalnih politik za zmanjšanje državnih primanjkljajev in doseganje vzdržnosti dolga.
Apart from this primary objective, fiscal consolidation is important in the programme context because it can, inter alia: (a) facilitate internal adjustment through various channels (such as a direct reduction in aggregate demand, or the impact of public-sector wages and employment on private-sector labour costs16); (b) facilitate external adjustment by reducing an excessive current-account deficit; (c) help tackle inflation by affecting prices through a range of channels (such as its impact on aggregate demand or on demand for money); (d) free up resources for other sectors if the economy is financially constrained; and (e) inspire confidence — under specific conditions — within the economy and thus have an expansionary effect17. 
Poleg tega poglavitnega cilja je fiskalna konsolidacija v okviru programa pomembna, ker lahko med drugim: (a) omogoča lažje notranje prilagajanje na različne načine (kot je neposredno zmanjšanje skupnega povpraševanja ali učinek plač in zaposlovanja v javnem sektorju na stroške dela v zasebnem sektorju16); (b) omogoča lažje zunanje prilagajanje z zmanjševanjem čezmernega primanjkljaja tekočega računa; (c) prispeva k boju proti inflaciji z vplivanjem na cene na različne načine (kot je njen učinek na skupno povpraševanje ali na povpraševanje po denarju); (d) sprošča sredstva za druge sektorje v primeru finančnih omejitev v go-spodarstvu; ter (e) vzbuja zaupanje – pod posebnimi pogoji – znotraj gospodarstva in ima tako ekspanziven učinek.17 13 Za vsak posamezni obrok se podpiše tudi posojilna pogodba.
14 EFSM funding to Ireland and Portugal was provided in conjunction with EFSF funding, and identical economic conditions applied to both lending sources. 
14 Sredstva iz EFSM za Irsko in Portugalsko so bila zagotovljena v povezavi s sredstvi EFSF. Za oba vira financiranja so veljali enaki ekonomski pogoji.
15 Moon, S. and Bulíř, A., Do IMF-supported programs help make fiscal adjustment more durable?, IMF working paper, 2003. 
15 Moon, S. in Bulíř, A., Do IMF-Supported Programs Help Make Fiscal Adjustment More Durable?, delovni dokument MDS o tem, ali je fiskalna prilagoditev zaradi programov, ki jih podpira IMF, trajnejša, 2003.
16 Hernandéz de Cos, P. and Enrique Moral-Benito, The role of public wages in fiscal consolidation process, workshop ‘Government wage bill: determinants, interactions and effects’ organised by Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2014. 
16 Hernandéz de Cos, P. in Enrique Moral-Benito, „The Role of Public wages in Fiscal Consolidation Process”, prispevek o vlogi plač v javnem sektorju v procesu fiskalne konsolidacije na delavnici o masi plač v javnem sektorju z naslovom Government wage bill: determinants, interactions and effects, ki jo je organiziral Generalni direktorat za gospodarske in finančne zadeve leta 2014.
17 Daniel, J., Davis, J., Fouad, M. and Van Rijckeghem, C.,’Fiscal adjustment for stability and growth’, Pamphlet Series No 55, 2006, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. 
17 Daniel, J., Davis, J., Fouad, M. in Van Rijckeghem, C., „Fiscal Adjustment for Stability and Growth”, Pamphlet Series, št. 55, 2006, Mednarodni denarni sklad, Washington, D.C. Prispevek o fiskalni prilagoditvi za stabilnost in rast.