natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In practice, this means that if a Member State wants to grant State aid, it has to inform the Commission’s Directorate‐General for Competition (DG COMP). 
V praksi to pomeni, da mora država članica, ki želi dodeliti državno pomoč, o tem obvestiti Generalni direktorat Komisije za konkurenco (GD COMP).
This process is called notification. 
Ta postopek se imenuje priglasitev.
10 Once the Member State has notified the planned granting of aid, DG COMP determines whether it constitutes State aid. 
10 Ko država članica priglasi načrtovano dodelitev pomoči, GD COMP določi, ali ta pomoč pomeni državno pomoč.
If it does, it assesses whether the aid is compatible with the internal market by weighing the positive effects of the aid (contribution to the achievement of a well‐defined objective of common interest) against its negative effects (distortion of competition and trade). 
Če ugotovi, da gre za državno pomoč, oceni, ali je ta združljiva z notranjim trgom, in sicer tako, da njene pozitivne učinke (prispevek k doseganju natančno opredeljenega cilja skupnega interesa) primerja z negativnimi (izkrivljanje konkurence in trgovine).
The Commis‐ sion has the exclusive authority to make this compatibility assessment13. 
Ta ocena združljivosti je v izključni pristojnosti Komisije13.
Exemptions to notification 11 While the Treaty in principle prohibits State aid, it also provides a list of aid cat‐ egories which may be compatible with the internal market. 
Izjeme pri priglasitvi 11 Pogodba sicer državno pomoč načeloma prepoveduje, vendar pa določa tudi seznam vrst pomoči, ki so lahko združljive z notranjim trgom.
In this context, the Commission can issue rules which define criteria under which such categories of aid do not need to be notified14. 
V zvezi s tem lahko Komisija izda pravila, ki opredeljujejo merila, na podlagi katerih teh vrst pomoči ni treba priglasiti14.
The Commission develops these rules based on its experience of assessing aid measures, taking into account the case law of the European Court of Justice. 
Komisija ta pravila oblikuje na podlagi svojih izkušenj pri ocenjevanju ukrepov pomoči in pri tem upošteva sodno prakso Sodišča Evropske unije.
9 Article 107 TFEU. 
9 Člen 107 PDEU.
10 See the Commission’s policy brief on the 2014‐2020 regional aid guidelines of September 2014. 
10 Glej poročilo Komisije o smernicah za regionalno pomoč za obdobje 2014–2020 iz septembra 2014.
11 See the Commission’s 2011 and 2015 State aid scoreboard. 
11 Glej pregled stanja na področju državnih pomoči, ki ga je Komisija objavila za leti 2011 in 2015.
12 Article 108(2) and 108(3) TFEU. 
12 Člen 108(2) in (3) PDEU.
13 Article 108 TFEU. 
13 Člen 108 PDEU.
14 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1588 of 13 July 2015 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of horizontal State aid (OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, p. 
14 Uredba Sveta (EU) 2015/1588 z dne 13. julija 2015 o uporabi členov 107 in 108 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije za določene vrste horizontalne državne pomoči (UL L 248, 24.9.2015, str.
1) (codification) replacing Council Regulation (EC) No 994/98 of 7 May 1998 on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty establishing the European Community to certain categories of horizontal State aid and in particular Article 108(4) TFEU. 
1) (kodificirano besedilo), ki nadomešča Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 994/98 z dne 7. maja 1998 o uporabi členov 92 in 93 Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti za določene vrste horizontalne državne pomoči, zlasti člena 108(4) PDEU.
Introduction 18 General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) 12 For categories of aid which the Commission considers likely to be compatible with the internal market, it has adopted a Regulation by which such aid need not be notified provided that all conditions are fulfilled unless the aid amount exceeds the thresholds mentioned therein. 
Uvod 18 Uredba o splošnih skupinskih izjemah (GBER) 12 Komisija je sprejela uredbo, v skladu s katero ni treba priglasiti vrst pomoči, za katere meni, da so verjetno združljive z notranjim trgom, če so izpolnjeni vsi pogoji in če njihov znesek ne presega pragov iz te uredbe.
This Regulation is called the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER)15. 
Imenuje se uredba o splošnih skupinskih izjemah (GBER)15.
Examples of such categories are State aid to culture and environmental protection. 
Primera takih vrst pomoči sta državna pomoč za kulturo in varstvo okolja.
13 The GBER simplifies the work of the Commission and Member States consider‐ ably. 
13 Uredba o splošnih skupinskih izjemah znatno poenostavlja delo Komisije in držav članic.
It allows Member States to carry out many aid measures without going through notification procedures or the Commission’s explicit compatibility assessment. 
Državam članicam omogoča, da izvajajo številne ukrepe pomoči, ne da bi morale uporabiti postopke priglasitve in ne da bi morala Komisija eksplicitno ocenjevati njihovo združljivost.
The GBER sets out a number of general provisions and provisions applicable to each category of aid. 
Uredba o splošnih skupinskih izjemah vsebuje več splošnih določb in določb, ki veljajo za posamezne vrste pomoči.
Nevertheless, for large aid measures (above the notification thresh‐ olds), notification is still required due to the potential of such measures to distort competition16. 
Kljub temu pa je pri obsežnih ukrepih pomoči (ki so nad pragovi za priglasitev) še vedno potrebna priglasitev, saj bi ti lahko izkrivljali konkurenco16.
De minimis aid 14 In addition, the Commission has established that aid of up to 200 000 euro granted to a single beneficiary over a period of three years neither distorts competition nor affects trade between Member States17. 
Pomoč de minimis 14 Poleg tega je Komisija določila, da pomoč v višini do 200 000 EUR, dodeljena enemu samemu upravičencu v obdobju treh let, ne izkrivlja konkurence in ne vpliva na trgovino med državami članicami17.
This type of aid is called ‘de minimis aid’ and since it does not fulfil the State aid criterion of distorting or threatening to distort competition nor the one of affecting trade between Mem‐ ber States, it is not classified as State aid and does not need to be notified to DG COMP. 
Ta vrsta pomoči se imenuje pomoč de minimis ter ni opredeljena kot državna pomoč in je ni treba priglasiti GD COMP, saj ne izpolnjuje merila državne pomoči glede izkrivljanja ali možnosti izkrivljanja konkurence niti merila vplivanja na trgovino med državami članicami.
For services of general economic interest, the aid threshold is increased to 500 000 euro18. 
Pri storitvah splošnega gospodarskega pomena je prag pomoči zvišan na 500 000 EUR18.
Main actors involved in managing operational programmes in cohesion policy 15 The management of ERDF/CF and ESF operational programmes is shared be‐ tween Member States and the Commission. 
Glavni akterji, ki sodelujejo pri upravljanju operativnih programov kohezijske politike 15 Operativne programe ESRR/KS in ESS skupaj upravljajo države članice in Komisija.
Member States select, manage and monitor projects, and the Commission supervises and monitors the Member States’ management and control systems. 
Države članice izberejo, upravljajo in spremljajo projekte, Komisija pa nadzoruje in spremlja sisteme upravljanja in nadzora držav članic.
The Commission bears ultimate re‐ sponsibility for the implementation of the EU budget19. 
Končno odgovornost za izvrševanje proračuna EU ima Komisija19.
15 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p.1). 
651/2014 z dne 17. junija 2014 o razglasitvi nekaterih vrst pomoči za združljive z notranjim trgom pri uporabi členov 107 in 108 Pogodbe (UL L 187, 26.6.2014, str. 1).
16 The thresholds vary from 400 000 euro for certain aid to start‐ups to 150 million euro for certain aid for renewable sources of energy. 
16 Pragovi segajo od 400 000 EUR za nekatere vrste pomoči za novoustanovljena podjetja do 150 milijonov EUR za nekatere vrste pomoči za obnovljive vire energije.
17 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid (OJ L 352, 24.12.2013, p. 
1407/2013 z dne 18. decembra 2013 o uporabi členov 107 in 108 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije pri pomoči de minimis (UL L 352, 24.12.2013, str.
19 Article 53 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (OJ L 298, 26.10.2012, p. 
19 Člen 53 Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 966/2012 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 25. oktobra 2012 o finančnih pravilih, ki se uporabljajo za splošni proračun Unije in razveljavitvi Uredbe Sveta (ES, Euratom) št.
Introduction 19 Member State level 16 At Member State level, managing authorities are responsible for the day‐to‐day administration of operational programmes. 
Uvod 19 Raven držav članic 16 Na ravni držav članic so za tekoče vodenje operativnih programov odgovorni organi upravljanja.
They must ensure, through manage‐ ment verifications, that all co‐financed projects are eligible for EU funding and that declared project expenditure complies with eligibility conditions, including compliance with State aid rules. 
S preverjanjem upravljanja morajo zagotoviti, da so vsi sofinancirani projekti upravičeni do sredstev EU in da prijavljeni odhodki projektov izpolnjujejo pogoje za upravičenost, vključno s skladnostjo s pravili o državni pomoči.
Certifying authorities carry out checks on project expenditure claims received from managing authorities and submit them to the Commission for reimbursement. 
Organi za potrjevanje preverjajo zahtevke za odhodke projektov, ki jih prejmejo od organov upravljanja, in jih predložijo Komisiji za povračilo stroškov.
Audit authorities carry out audits of operations (i.e. projects) and of management and control systems and report on them to the Commission through annual control reports (ACRs) and audit opinions20. 
Revizijski organi revidirajo operacije (tj. projekte) in sisteme upravljanja in nadzora ter v letnih poročilih o nadzoru in revizijskih mnenjih o tem poročajo Komisiji20.
17 In addition, national State aid offices can, depending on their mandate, verify compliance of aid schemes at national level (whether or not EU‐co‐financed) or give advice or opinions to other bodies in the Member States. 
17 Poleg tega lahko nacionalni uradi za državno pomoč glede na svoja pooblastila preverijo skladnost shem pomoči na nacionalni ravni (če jih EU sofinancira ali ne) ali dajo nasvete oziroma mnenja drugim organom v državah članicah.
State aid offices ex‐ ist at central level in all Member States with the exception of Belgium, which has its State aid offices at regional level. 
Uradi za državno pomoč delujejo na osrednji ravni v vseh državah članicah, razen v Belgiji, ki ima urade za državno pomoč na regionalni ravni.
In some Member States the State aid office is embedded in ministries for finance or economic affairs, in other Member States it is an independent body or embedded in the national competition authority. 
V nekaterih državah članicah je urad za državno pomoč vključen v ministrstvo za finance ali gospodarske zadeve, v drugih pa je neodvisen organ ali vključen v nacionalni organ za konkurenco.
State aid offices can also act as a contact point for obtaining expert knowledge and help in the design of aid schemes, thereby reducing the risk of non‐compli‐ ance with State aid rules (see Box 1). 
Uradi za državno pomoč lahko delujejo tudi kot kontaktna točka za pridobitev strokovnega znanja ali pomoči pri zasnovi shem pomoči, s čimer se zmanjša tveganje za neskladnost s pravili o državni pomoči (glej okvir 1).
20 ACRs are yearly reports submitted by the audit authorities which set out the findings of all the audits they carried out for a certain or several operational programme(s). 
20 Letna poročila o nadzoru so letna poročila revizijskih organov, v katerih so navedene ugotovitve vseh revizij, ki so jih izvedli za enega ali več operativnih programov.
ACRs are the main document by which the audit authorities provide assurance on the management and control systems of the operational programme(s) concerned as well as on the legality and regularity of the projects co‐financed. 
Letna poročila o nadzoru so glavni dokumenti, s katerimi revizijski organi dajo zagotovilo glede sistemov upravljanja in nadzora operativnega(-ih) programa(-ov) ter glede zakonitosti in pravilnosti sofinanciranih projektov.
State aid screening by State aid office at the legislative proposal stage (Denmark) All ministries are required to make an initial assessment of State aid relevance when they prepare a legislative proposal. 
Državna pomoč, ki jo je v fazi zakonodajnega predloga pregledal urad za državno pomoč (Danska) Vsa ministrstva morajo pri pripravi zakonodajnega predloga opraviti začetno oceno tega, ali je povezan z državno pomočjo.
This information is sent to the State aid Secretariat (staffed with State aid experts) for assessment. 
Te informacije se pošljejo v oceno sekretariatu za državno pomoč (v katerem so zaposleni strokovnjaki s tega področja).
If it considers that the proposal conflicts with State aid rules, the ministry is required to redraft its legislative proposal. 
Če se ugotovi, da je zakonodajni predlog v nasprotju s pravili o državni pomoči, ga mora ministrstvo preoblikovati.
The State aid secretariat assists the ministry with suggestions and provides advice throughout the legislative process. 
Sekretariat za državno pomoč ministrstvu pomaga s predlogi in mu svetuje v celotnem zakonodajnem postopku.
Introduction 20 Commission level 18 The Directorate‐General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO) is the Commis‐ sion department responsible for promoting economic and social development of the various regions of the European Union, in particular the less‐favoured ones; it manages the ERDF and the CF. 
Uvod 20 Raven Komisije 18 Generalni direktorat za regionalno in mestno politiko (GD REGIO) je odgovoren za spodbujanje gospodarskega in socialnega razvoja različnih regij Evropske unije, zlasti tistih z omejenimi možnostmi.
The Directorate‐General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (DG EMPL) is the Commission department responsible for EU employment and social issues; it manages the ESF. 
Generalni direktorat za zaposlovanje, socialne zadeve in vključevanje (GD EMPL) je odgovoren za zaposlovanje in socialna vprašanja EU ter upravlja ESS.
19 Both Directorates‐General draw their assurance on the compliance of ERDF/ CF and ESF expenditure with the applicable EU and national rules mainly from the work of the audit authorities. 
19 Oba generalna direktorata zagotovilo o skladnosti odhodkov iz ESRR/KS in ESS z veljavnimi pravili EU in nacionalnimi pravili pridobivata predvsem na podlagi dela revizijskih organov.
In addition to reviewing the work of the audit authorities, they also carry out their own audits of operations and systems in the Member States as part of their supervisory work. 
Poleg pregledovanja dela revizijskih organov v okviru svojih nadzornih nalog opravljata lastne revizije operacij in sistemov v državah članicah.
20 DG COMP is the Commission department responsible for ensuring the correct application of EU State aid rules, in all areas except agriculture and fisheries21. 
20 GD COMP je oddelek Komisije, ki je odgovoren za zagotavljanje pravilne uporabe pravil EU o državni pomoči na vseh področjih, razen kmetijstva in ribištva21.
DG COMP develops State aid legislation on the basis of the Treaty and oversees its implementation. In particular, it regularly monitors aid schemes to verify whether and to what extent they respect State aid rules22. 
Na podlagi Pogodbe oblikuje zakonodajo na področju državne pomoči in nadzoruje njeno izvajanje ter redno spremlja sheme pomoči, da bi preveril, ali in v kolikšni meri spoštujejo pravila o državni pomoči22.
In addition, interested parties such as a Member State or a competing company may lodge a complaint with the Commission if they consider aid awarded to a certain beneficiary to be unlawful. 
Poleg tega lahko zainteresirane stranke, kot so države članice ali konkurenčne družbe, vložijo pritožbo pri Komisiji, če menijo, da je pomoč, dodeljena določenemu upravičencu, nezakonita.
The Commission is obliged to examine all such complaints23. 
Komisija mora vse take pritožbe obravnavati23.
21 Figure 4 gives a simplified overview of the actors involved in cohesion policy and the process of granting State aid. 
21 Na sliki 4 je poenostavljen pregled akterjev, vključenih v kohezijsko politiko in v postopek dodelitve državne pomoči.
21 For agriculture and rural development as well as for maritime affairs and fisheries, responsibility for State aid control lies with the Directorates‐General for Agriculture and Rural Development and for Maritime affairs and Fisheries respectively. 
21 Na področjih kmetijstva in razvoja podeželja ter pomorskih zadev in ribištva sta za nadzor državne pomoči odgovorna Generalni direktorat za kmetijstvo in razvoj podeželja oz. Generalni direktorat za pomorske zadeve in ribištvo.
22 An aid scheme is an act or law which defines in general terms what kinds of beneficiary can receive State aid under what terms. 
22 Shema pomoči je akt ali zakon, ki na splošno določa, katere vrste upravičencev lahko prejmejo državno pomoč in pod kakšnimi pogoji.
23 Article 24 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589. 
23 Člen 24 Uredbe Sveta (EU) št. 2015/1589.
Introduction 21 Actors involved in cohesion policy and the process of granting State aid COHESION POLICY FRAMEWORK LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON STATE AID EUROPEAN COMMISSION MEMBER STATES PROJECT LEVEL DG REGIO ERDF and Cohesion Fund Monitor and audit compliance with State aid Project application DG EMPL ESF Notification through permanent representation Compatibility assessment and monitoring DG COMP Supervise and audit compliance with State aid Source: European Court of Auditors. 
Uvod 21 Akterji, vključeni v kohezijsko politiko in v postopek dodelitve državne pomoči OKVIR ZA KOHEZIJSKO POLITIKO PRAVNI OKVIR ZA DRŽAVNO POMOČ EVROPSKA KOMISIJA DRŽAVA ČLANICA RAVEN PROJEKTOV Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče.
Managing authorities Audit authorities Monitor and audit compliance with State aid Advices and opinions National State aid offices State aid Regulations Beneficiary (e.g. company, ministry or charity) Figure 4 Introduction 22 Audits of the European Court of Auditors and Member 24 Special Report No 15/2011 ‘Do the Commission’s procedures ensure effective management of State aid control?’ (http:// eca.europa.eu) 25 See for example chapter 6 of our annual report concerning the financial year 2014 (OJ C 373, 10.11.2015). 
Nadzor in revizije skladnosti s pravili o državni pomoči Spremljanje in revizija skladnosti s pravili o državni pomoči GD REGIO ESRR in Kohezijski sklad GD EMPL ESS Priglasitev preko stalnih predstavništev Ocena združljivosti in spremljanje GD COMP Predpisi o državni pomoči Nadzor in revizije skladnosti s pravili o državni pomoči Izvajanje projektov Svetovanje in mnenja Organi upravljanja Revizijski organi Nacionalni uradi za državno pomoč Upravičenec (npr. podjetje, ministrstvo ali dobrodelna organizacija) Slika 4
26 Supreme audit institutions are national bodies responsible for auditing government revenue and spending. States’ supreme audit institutions on State aid 22 One of our previous special reports in 2011 identified weaknesses in Member States’ systems for ensuring State aid is notified, based mainly on an examination of a number of complaints and monitoring cases for the 2008‐2010 period24. 
Uvod 22 Revizije Evropskega računskega sodišča in vrhovnih revizijskih institucij držav članic na področju državne pomoči 22 Sodišče je v enem od svojih prejšnjih posebnih poročil iz leta 2011 ugotovilo slabosti v sistemih držav članic, s katerimi se zagotavlja, da je državna pomoč prigla-šena, in sicer predvsem na podlagi preučitve več pritožb in primerov spremljanja v obdobju 2008–201024.
23 Moreover, from 2010 to 2014, we examined the compliance with State aid rules for numerous ERDF/CF and ESF projects. 
23 Poleg tega je od leta 2010 do leta 2014 preučevalo skladnost več projektov ESRR/ KS in ESS s pravili o državni pomoči.
The results of these audits formed part of the basis for our specific assessments for the ERDF/CF and the ESF in our an‐ nual reports25. 
Rezultati teh revizij so bili del osnove za posebne ocene ESRR/KS in ESS v njegovih letnih poročilih25.
24 We carried out a survey of 28 supreme audit institutions, of which 22 responded. 
24 Sodišče je anketiralo 28 vrhovnih revizijskih institucij, odgovorilo pa jih je 22.
Most of them stated that they included, to various degrees, checks on State aid as part of their audits26. 
Večina jih je navedla, da so preglede državne pomoči v različni meri vključile v svoje revizije26.
Very few also performed specific audits on State aid. 
Le redke so izvedle tudi posebne revizije državne pomoči.
This report examines whether the Commission has taken sufficient measures to understand why this is the case, and analyses whether the actions taken by the Commission will strengthen its, and the Member States’, capacity to prevent, detect and correct infringements of State aid rules. 
V tem poročilu preučuje, ali je Komisija sprejela dovolj ukrepov, da bi razumela, zakaj do tega prihaja, ter analizira, ali bo Komisija s sprejetimi ukrepi okrepila svojo zmogljivost in zmogljivost držav članic za preprečevanje, odkrivanje in popravljanje kršitev pravil o državni pomoči.
26 Through this audit, we assessed the level of non‐compliance with State aid rules in cohesion policy (i.e. ERDF/CF and ESF) in the 2007‐2013 programme period and the extent to which the Commission was aware of the causes of non‐compliance. 
26 Sodišče je pri tej reviziji ocenilo, kakšna je bila raven neskladnosti s pravili o državni pomoči na področju kohezijske politike (tj. ESRR/Kohezijski sklad in ESS) v programskem obdobju 2007–2013 in v kolikšni meri je Komisija seznanjena z vzroki za to neskladnost.
Our specific analyses focused mainly on the 2010‐2014 period. 
Posamezne analize so se osredotočale predvsem na obdobje 2010–2014.
We also examined whether the actions undertaken by the Commission for the 2014‐2020 pro‐ gramme period are likely to address non‐compliance with State aid rules. 
Preučilo je tudi, ali bodo ukrepi, ki jih je Komisija sprejela za programsko obdobje 2014–2020, lahko odpravili neskladnosti s pravili o državni pomoči.
27 In particular, we examined: (a) whether the Commission had a comprehensive and up‐to‐date overview of the causes of non‐compliance with State aid rules in cohesion policy, and whether Commission DGs and Member States detected infringements of State aid rules. 
27 Preučilo je zlasti: (a) ali je Komisija imela celovit in aktualen pregled nad vzroki za neskladnost s pravili o državni pomoči na področju kohezijske politike ter ali so generalni direktorati Komisije in države članice odkrili kršitve pravil o državni pomoči.
We also examined whether the Commission’s actions in response to State aid errors had led to an appropriate number of corrective actions; and (b) whether the Commission had taken appropriate actions to prevent infringe‐ ments of State aid rules in cohesion policy in future. 
Preučilo je tudi, ali se je Komisija na napake pri državni pomoči odzvala tako, da je sprejela ustrezno število popravljalnih ukrepov, in (b) ali je Komisija sprejela ustrezne ukrepe za preprečevanje kršitev pravil o državni pomoči na področju kohezijske politike v prihodnosti.
28 Moreover, we analysed in detail the findings of our compliance audits and used examples to illustrate frequent State aid errors. 
28 Poleg tega je podrobno analiziralo ugotovitve svojih revizij skladnosti in s primeri ponazorilo pogoste napake pri državni pomoči.