natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
44 Whereas eligibility criteria should exclude projects that do not address the RDP objectives, selection criteria should enable the relative merits of project proposals to be evaluated on an objective and transparent basis, so that Member States spend the available budget on those projects that contribute most to the objectives. 
44 Z merili za upravičenost naj bi se izločili projekti, ki ne obravnavajo ciljev iz programov razvoja podeželja, izbirna merila pa bi morala omogočati, da se relativne prednosti projektnih predlogov vrednotijo objektivno in pregledno, tako da države članice razpoložljiva proračunska sredstva porabijo za projekte, ki najbolj prispevajo k ciljem.
For instance, all else being equal, if one water infrastructure project connects more users than another project, or generates higher water savings, it should be prioritised, if this is in line with the Member State’s strategy for developing infrastructure. 
Na primer, če so vsi drugi dejavniki enaki, je treba dati prednost tistemu projektu vodne infrastrukture, ki povezuje več uporabnikov kot drug ali omogoča večje vodne prihranke, če je to v skladu s strategijo države članice za razvoj infrastrukture.
Effectively applying selection criteria is a requirement of the relevant EU legislation18. Therefore, even in cases when the budget is sufficient to approve all eligible projects at a given time, Member States should set a minimum score (a threshold) that projects would have to reach in order to be selected. 
Uspešna uporaba izbirnih meril je zahtevana v skladu z ustrezno zakonodajo EU18, zato bi morale države članice tudi v primerih, ko proračunska sredstva zadoščajo za odobritev vseh upravičenih projektov v nekem trenutku, določiti minimalno število točk (prag), ki jih morajo izbrani projekti doseči.
18 Article 71(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 states that: ‘Expenditure shall be eligible for EAFRD contribution only where incurred for operations decided on by the Managing Authority of the programme in question or under its responsibility, in accordance with the selection criteria fixed by the competent body.’ 
18 V členu 71(2) Uredbe (ES) št. 1698/2005 je določeno: „Izdatki pridejo v poštev za prispevke iz EKSRP samo, če so nastali pri dejavnostih, za katere se je odločil organ upravljanja zadevnega programa ali programa v okviru njegove odgovornosti na podlagi izbirnih meril, ki jih določi pristojni organ.”
Observations 26 Targeting the aid through an effective selection process PROJECT APPLICATIONS EXCLUDING IRRELEVANT PROJECTS Eligibility criteria ELIGIBLE PROJECTS Selection criteria SELECTING THE BEST PROJECTS BEST PROJECTS ADDRESSING RDP OBJECTIVES Source: European Court of Auditors. 
Opažanja 26 Uporaba uspešnega izbirnega postopka za ciljno usmerjanje pomoči PROJEKTNE VLOGE IZLOČITEV NEUSTREZNIH PROJEKTOV merila za upravičenost UPRAVIČENI PROJEKTI izbirna merila IZBOR NAJBOLJŠIH PROJEKTOV NAJBOLJŠI PROJEKTI, KI OBRAVNAVAJO CILJE IZ PROGRAMOV RAZVOJA PODEŽELJA Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče.
45 The Member States audited either did not set selection criteria or, if they did do so, the criteria set did not always lead to actual prioritisation of projects in relation to the RDP objectives. 
45 Revidirane države članice niso določile izbirnih meril, če pa so jih, pa ta niso vedno pripomogla k dejanski prednostni razporeditvi projektov glede na cilje programa razvoja podeželja.
This happened in cases where the budget programmed for the measures was sufficient to support all eligible project applications and where the selection criteria were not relevant for the RDP objectives. 
To se je zgodilo v primerih, ko so programsko načrtovana proračunska sredstva za projekte zadostovala, da se podpora dodeli vsem upravičenim projektnim vlogam, in ko izbirna merila niso bila ustrezna glede na cilje programov razvoja podeželja.
46 In Germany (Saxony) and Spain (Extremadura), the project selection process was insufficiently documented, not based on specific selection criteria and did not produce a ranking of projects (see Box 8). 
46 V Nemčiji (Saška) in Španiji (Ekstremadura) izbirni postopek za projekte ni bil dovolj dokumentiran, ni temeljil na specifičnih izbirnih merilih in ni omogočil prednostne razvrstitve projektov (glej okvir 8).
Observations 27 Examples of non-transparent and unverifiable project selection procedures hindering the selection of the most cost-effective projects Spain (Extremadura) Projects representing 73 % (i.e. 49 out of 67 million euro) of the funds spent under infrastructure measures 125 and 323 were managed directly by the regional administration. 
Opažanja 27 Primeri nepreglednih in nepreverljivih postopkov izbire projektov, ki so oteževali izbor stroškovno najučinkovitejših projektov Španija (Ekstremadura) Projekte, ki so dosegali 73 % (tj. 49 od 67 milijonov EUR) sredstev, porabljenih v okviru infrastrukturnih ukrepov 125 in 323, je neposredno vodila regionalna uprava.
The managing authority collected project proposals (prepared on its own initiative or following the informal requests of municipalities) and subsequently approved projects in a non-transparent and unverifiable way. 
Organ upravljanja je zbral projektne predloge (ki so bili pripravljeni na njegovo lastno pobudo ali na podlagi neuradnega zahtevka občin), projekte pa nato odobril na nepregleden in nepreverljiv način.
The selection procedure was not based on specific selection criteria and did not result in a ranking of projects. 
Postopek izbire ni temelji na specifičnih izbirnih merilih in ni omogočil prednostne razvrstitve projektov.
Germany (Saxony) The selection of projects under measures 321 and 322 was generally19 carried out at two subsequent levels: first at local level by ‘coordination groups’, and then at central level by the managing authority. 
Nemčija (Saška) Izbira projektov v okviru ukrepov 321 in 322 je v splošnem19 potekala na dveh zaporednih ravneh: najprej na lokalni ravni v usklajevalnih skupinah, potem pa na centralni ravni pri organu upravljanja.
The managing authority provided coordination groups their own dedicated budget under which they could fund projects. 
Organ upravljanja je usklajevalnim skupinam zagotovil lasten namenski proračun, v okviru katerega so lahko financirale projekte.
Project applications could be passed on to the central level only if they received a positive vote from the coordination group. 
Projektne vloge so se lahko predale na centralno raven samo, če jih je z glasovanjem odobrila usklajevalna skupina.
The decision process of the coordination groups was insufficiently documented and did not result in a ranking of project applications. 
Postopek odločanja usklajevalnih skupin ni bil zadostno dokumentiran in ni omogočal prednostne razvrstitve projektov.
The managing authority approved all eligible projects with a positive vote from the coordination groups, as sufficient funds were available under these measures. 
Organ upravljanja je odobril vse upravičene projekte, ki so jih z glasovanjem odobrile usklajevalne skupine, saj so bila v okviru teh ukrepov na voljo zadostna sredstva.
19 Only in exceptional cases (e.g. temporary direct funding for school projects) was project selection carried out directly at central level by the managing authority. 
19 Le v izjemnih primerih (npr. začasno neposredno financiranje projektov v zvezi s šolami) je izbor projektov opravil neposredno organ upravljanja na centralni ravni.
47 Poland did not set selection criteria under measure 125, which finances water infrastructure to protect agricultural land from floods. 
47 Poljska ni določila izbirnih meril v okviru ukrepa 125, iz katerega se financira vodna infrastruktura za zaščito kmetijskih zemljišč pred poplavami.
All eligible projects were approved on the basis of the ‘first come, first served’ principle. 
Vsi upravičeni projekti so bili odobreni po načelu „kdor prvi pride, prvi melje”.
In this context, the managing authority did not prioritise the most cost-effective projects; for example, two projects were both approved although their cost-effectiveness ratio was vastly different (150 euro compared to almost 10 000 euro of public support per protected ha). 
Tako organ upravljanja ni dal prednosti stroškovno najučinkovitejšim projektom: dva projekta, na primer, sta bila oba odobrena, čeprav sta bili njuni razmerji med stroški in učinkovitostjo zelo različni (150 EUR javne pomoči na zaščiten hektar v primerjavi s skoraj 10 000 EUR).
48 Examples were identified where selection criteria were established (in Italy (Sicily), Poland and Romania). 
48 Odkriti so bili primeri, kjer so bila določena izbirna merila (v Italiji (Sicilija), na Poljskem in v Romuniji).
However, in Italy (Sicily), the selection criteria were effectively applied only under sub-measure 125-A, as all eligible projects were approved under the other audited measures. 
Vendar so se v Italiji (Sicilija) izbirna merila uspešno uporabljala samo v okviru podukrepa 125-A, saj so bili v okviru drugih revidiranih ukrepov potrjeni vsi upravičeni projekti.
In Poland and Romania, the selection criteria were generally in line with RDP objectives and a minimum threshold was used to ensure the quality of the selected projects. 
Na Poljskem in v Romuniji so bila izbirna merila v splošnem skladna s cilji programa razvoja podeželja, za zagotovitev kakovosti izbranih projektov pa se je uporabljal spodnji prag.
However, the selection criteria were not always related to the projects’ contribution to the RDP objectives (see Box 9). 
Kljub temu se izbirna merila niso zmeraj nanašala na to, kako projekti prispevajo k ciljem programa razvoja podeželja (glej okvir 9).
Observations 28 Examples of selection criteria which did not prioritise the projects based on their contribution to RDP objectives Poland A selection criterion used under measures 322/323 was designed to first promote larger projects and then (later in the programming period) smaller projects, with the aim of ‘ensuring balanced access to EU funds’. 
Opažanja 28 Primeri izbirnih meril, v skladu s katerimi projekti niso bili prednostno razvrščeni glede na njihov prispevek k ciljem iz programov razvoja podeželja Poljska Izbirno merilo, ki se je uporabljalo v okviru ukrepa 322/323, je bilo oblikovano tako, da je najprej podpiralo večje projekte, nato (v poznejši fazi programskega obdobja) pa manjše projekte, da bi se zagotovil uravnotežen dostop do sredstev EU, kar pa v programu razvoja podeželja ni bilo navedeno.
Italy (Sicily) Under sub-measure 125-B, which finances irrigation systems, the selection criteria were not quantifiable and did not prioritise projects aimed at saving water in areas where there was a greater need to reduce water losses. 
Italija (Sicilija) V okviru podukrepa 125-B, s katerim se financirajo namakalni sistemi, izbirna merila niso bila količinsko opredeljena in niso dajala prednosti projektom za varčevanje z vodo na območjih, kjer je bila potreba po zmanjšanju vodnih izgub večja.
This led to the high ranking of projects in areas not affected by water shortages and the low ranking of projects in areas affected by a serious lack of water. 
Zaradi tega je prišlo do visoke uvrstitve projektov v območjih, ki jih ni prizadelo pomanjkanje vode, in nizke uvrstitve projektov na območjih z resnim pomanjkanjem vode.
Romania A selection criterion under measure 322 prioritised applicants that had not previously received EU support for a similar investment, although this criterion did not reflect the extent to which the project met the RDP objectives. 
Romunija Izbirno merilo v okviru ukrepa 322 je dajalo prednost vlagateljem, ki dotlej niso prejeli podpore EU za podobno naložbo, čeprav to merilo ni odražalo, v kolikšni meri projekt izpolnjuje cilje iz programa razvoja podeželja.
49 Cost-effectiveness criteria prioritising projects offering the highest value for money were identified only in Germany (Saxony) (see Box 10), although these were not applied in practice. 
49 Merila v zvezi s stroškovno učinkovitostjo, ki so dajala prednost projektom z najbolj smotrno porabo, so bila opredeljena le v Nemčiji (Saška) (glej okvir 10), čeprav se v praksi niso uporabljala.
An example of cost-effectiveness criterion being set, but not applied in practice Germany (Saxony) Under measure 125, the German authorities set four selection criteria, to be applied to the population of eligible projects in the case of insufficient budget. 
Primer, ko je bilo merilo v zvezi s stroškovno učinkovitostjo opredeljeno, vendar se v praksi ni uporabljalo Nemčija (Saška) Nemški organi so v okviru ukrepa 125 določili štiri izbirna merila, ki naj bi se uporabljala za vse upravičene projekte v primeru nezadostnih proračunskih sredstev.
One of them was a simple cost-effectiveness ratio which prioritised projects costing less per linear metre of forest road built. 
Eno od njih je bilo običajno razmerje med stroški in učinkovitostjo, s katerim se je prednost namenila projektom, ki so stali manj na linearni meter zgrajene gozdne ceste.
However, once the deadline for receiving project applications had elapsed (towards the end of the 2007-2013 programming period), additional funds were shifted to measure 125. 
Ko je pretekel rok za sprejem projektnih vlog (proti koncu programskega obdobja 2007–2013), pa so bila v ukrep 125 prenesena dodatna sredstva.
With sufficient budgetary resources available, all applications were granted funding, and so the ranking produced using this selection criterion was never put into effect. Box 10 Box 9 
Ker je bilo na voljo dovolj proračunskih sredstev, je bilo financiranje odobreno za vse vloge, tako da se prednostna razvrstitev na podlagi izbirnega merila ni nikoli uporabila v praksi. Okvir 10 Okvir 9
Observations 29 Checks on the reasonableness of costs and public procurement procedures did not effectively limit the risk of excessive project costs 50 High aid rates, which are common in infrastructure measures, result in little or no risk for project promoters. 
Opažanja 29 Pregledi razumnosti stroškov in postopkov javnega naročanja niso uspešno omejili tveganja čezmernih projektnih stroškov 50 Visoke stopnje pomoči, ki so običajne za infrastrukturne ukrepe, pomenijo malo ali nič tveganja za nosilce projektov.
This reduces their incentive to limit the project costs. 
Ti imajo zaradi tega manj spodbude, da bi omejili stroške projektov.
It is therefore particularly important that Member States establish proportionate requirements and checks for ensuring reasonableness of costs. 
Zato je zlasti pomembno, da države članice določijo sorazmerne zahteve in preglede, da se zagotovi razumnost stroškov.
The Member States audited generally relied on the use of reference prices and public procurement procedures to ensure the reasonableness of the investment costs20. 
Revidirane države članice so se za zagotovitev razumnosti stroškov naložb20 v glavnem zanašale na uporabo referenčnih cen in postopkov javnega naročanja.
However, these tools were not adequately applied, as the Court has already noted in its previous reports21. 
Vendar pa ta orodja niso bila ustrezno uporabljena, kot je Sodišče že ugotovilo v svojih prejšnjih poročilih21.
Details of the main weaknesses identified by this audit are provided below. 
Podrobnosti o glavnih slabostih, ki so bile ugotovljene med to revizijo, so navedene v nadaljevanju.
51 Although widely used, the systems based on reference prices had serious limitations, mainly because the reference prices were provided by construction companies and were thus likely to overstate the real market prices following negotiations or competitive tenders. 
51 Čeprav so se sistemi, ki temeljijo na referenčnih cenah, pogosto uporabljali, so imeli resne omejitve, predvsem zato, ker so referenčne cene predložila gradbena podjetja in so bile zato zelo verjetno pretirane glede na dejanske tržne cene, dosežene s pogajanji ali na javnih razpisih, ki so odprti za konkurenco.
In Spain (Extremadura), Italy (Sicily) and Poland, the audit identified that average savings of 30 % to 40 % compared to the reference prices were normally obtained following a tender procedure. 
Pri reviziji je bilo ugotovljeno, da so v Španiji (Ekstremadura), Italiji (Sicilija) in na Poljskem prihranki po izvedbi postopka javnega razpisa v povprečju znašali od 30 % do 40 % v primerjavi z referenčnimi cenami.
52 Only in Romania were reference prices established on the basis of actual transactions between the government and construction companies. 
52 Samo v Romuniji so bile referenčne cene določene na podlagi dejanskih transakcij med vlado in gradbenimi podjetji.
Prices were, however, available only for a limited range of public works and had not been updated since 2009. 
Vendar so bile cene na voljo le za omejeno število javnih gradenj in od leta 2009 niso bile posodobljene.
The managing authority of Germany (Saxony) automatically accepted deviations of up to 50 % compared to the reference prices, without performing further inquiries. 
Organ upravljanja v Nemčiji (Saška) je samodejno sprejemal odstopanja do 50 % v primerjavi z referenčnimi cenami, ne da bi izvedel nadaljnje poizvedbe.
53 While the risk of using inflated reference prices may be mitigated when the final costs are established based on a fair, competitive tender, there is no safeguard for projects that are not subject to a competitive tender (as is the case for certain measures and beneficiaries in Spain (Extremadura) and Italy (Sicily)) and in cases where the public procurement procedures are affected by serious weaknesses. 
53 Tveganje uporabe previsokih referenčnih cen je mogoče zmanjšati, če se končni stroški določijo na podlagi poštenega in za konkurenco odprtega razpisa, ni pa varovala za projekte, za katera se ne uporabljajo za konkurenco odprti razpisi (kot v primeru nekaterih ukrepov in upravičencev v Španiji (Ekstremadura) in Italiji (Sicilija)), ter v primerih, ko imajo postopki javnega naročanja resne slabosti.
54 The audit identified several such weaknesses that hindered fair competition and the reasonableness of costs (see Box 11). 
54 Med revizijo je bilo odkritih več takih slabosti, ki so ovirale pošteno konkurenco in razumnost stroškov (glej okvir 11).
20 Article 24(2)(d) of Commission Regulation (EU) No 65/2011 of 27 January 2011 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, as regards the implementation of control procedures as well as cross-compliance in respect of rural development support measures (OJ L 25, 28.1.2011, p. 
20 Člen 24(2)(d) Uredbe Komisije (EU) št. 65/2011 z dne 27. januarja 2011 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za izvajanje Uredba Sveta (ES) št.
8) specifies that Member States should verify the reasonableness of project costs submitted as part of the administrative checks on applications for support. 
8) določa, da morajo države članice v okviru administrativnih pregledov vlog za podporo preverjati razumnost stroškov projektov.
This evaluation must be performed using a suitable system, such as reference costs, the comparison of a number of offers or an evaluation committee. 
Pri tem vrednotenju je treba uporabiti ustrezen sistem, kot so referenčni stroški, primerjava več ponudb ali ocenjevalni odbor.
Furthermore, Article 24(2)(c) of the same regulation specifies that Member States should check the compliance of the operation for which support is requested with applicable national and Union rules on, in particular, and where relevant, public procurement, State aid and other appropriate obligatory standards established by national legislation or established in the rural development programme. 
Nadalje člen 24(2)(c) iste uredbe določa, da morajo države članice preveriti skladnost dejavnosti, za katero se zahteva podpora, z veljavnimi nacionalnimi pravili in pravili Unije, zlasti, če je ustrezno, s tistimi o javnem naročanju, državni pomoči in drugih ustreznih obveznih standardih, določenih z nacionalno zakonodajo ali v programu razvoja podeželja.
Observations 30 Examples of public procurement procedures that hindered transparency, fair competition and reasonableness of costs Spain (Extremadura) The managing authority arbitrarily decided to award to a state-owned construction company contracts for 18 % (i.e. some 14 million euro) of the allocation to measure 125. 
Opažanja 30 Primeri postopkov javnega naročanja, ki so ovirali preglednost, pošteno konkurenco in razumnost stroškov Španija (Ekstremadura) Organ upravljanja se je samovoljno odločil, da bo državnemu gradbenemu podjetju dodelil pogodbe za 18 % sredstev, namenjenih za ukrep 125 (tj. približno 14 milijonov EUR).
The managing authority justified this based on the ‘urgency’ of the works, ‘specificity/type of works’ and ‘confidentiality’. However, the authorities could not provide any evidence to support such justifications. 
To odločitev je utemeljil z nujnostjo gradenj, specifično naravo/vrsto gradenj in zaupnostjo, vendar za tako utemeljitev ni mogel predložiti dokazov.
The project costs were reimbursed based on a price list agreed between the company and the national authorities. 
Stroški projekta so bili povrnjeni po ceniku, o katerem sta se dogovorila podjetje in nacionalni organ.
While this procedure may be quicker than organising a tender, it does not ensure that the prices obtained are in line with market prices. 
Čeprav je tak postopek morda hitrejši kot organiziranje javnega razpisa, pa ne zagotavlja, da se dosežene cene ujemajo s tržnimi.
Even when formal tenders were organised, award criteria were in some cases insufficiently defined and therefore unverifiable. 
Tudi ko so bili organizirani uradni javni razpisi, so bila merila za oddajo naročila v nekaterih primerih nezadostno določena, zato jih ni bilo mogoče preveriti.
This was the case of an audited project, having an estimated cost of 11 million euro, for which 48 out of 100 scoring points were awarded based on vague criteria, such as ‘the knowledge of the project, the area and the quality of the proposal’, ‘the respect of safety rules’, ‘the environmental measures’ and ‘other improvement proposed’. 
Tako je bilo pri enem od revidiranih projektov: stroški projekta so bili ocenjeni na 11 milijonov EUR, 48 od 100 točk pa je bilo dodeljenih na podlagi neoprijemljivih meril, kot so „poznavanje projekta, območje in kakovost predloga”, „upoštevanje varnostnih predpisov”, „okoljski ukre-pi” in „druge predlagane izboljšave”.
Romania The audit also identified poorly defined award criteria. 
Romunija Pri reviziji so bila ugotovljena slabo opredeljena merila za oddajo naročila.
For example, the ‘shortest duration of the works’ was used as an award criterion in 9 out of the 11 projects reviewed, without indicating acceptable timeframes or checking whether the proposed durations were realistic. 
Na primer, v 9 od 11 projektov je bilo kot merilo za oddajo uporabljeno „najkrajše trajanje gradbenih del”, pri čemer niso bili navedeni sprejemljivi časovni okviri ali izvedeni pregledi, ali je predlagano trajanje realno.
The duration indicated in the winning offers and subsequent contracts was largely exceeded in practice, with works lasting up to eight times longer than the contractual term (24 months instead of 3 months). 
Čas, naveden v izbrani ponudbi in poznejših pogodbah, je bil v praksi precej prekoračen, tako da so gradnje trajale do osemkrat dlje, kot je bilo določeno v pogodbi (24 mesecev namesto 3 mesece).
Adverse weather conditions could only partially explain such delays. 
S slabimi vremenski pogoji je mogoče samo delno obrazložiti takšne zamude.
Italy (Sicily) Contracts for public works were awarded through competitive tenders using a methodology that resulted in the automatic exclusion of the lowest offers22, which were disregarded as ‘abnormal’ without further analysis. 
Italija (Sicilija) Pogodbe za javne gradnje so bile oddane na podlagi za konkurenco odprtih razpisov po metodologiji, s katero so bile samodejno izključene najcenejše ponudbe22, ki brez vsake nadaljnje analize niso bile upoštevane, saj naj bi bile „nenormalne”.
This procedure did not allow for selection of the most economical offer and, in general, does not provide an incentive for the bidders to offer their lowest price. 
Ta postopek ni omogočil izbire najugodnejše ponudbe, ponudnikov pa na splošno ne spodbuja k temu, da bi ponudili najnižjo ceno.