natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
However, according to a specific request from the Member States, data are not fully public, but shared via a common platform named CIRCA, to which only the mem‐ bers of the EFC and their alternates in the Ministries are granted access. 
Vendar podatki zaradi posebne zahteve držav članic niso povsem javni, temveč se posredujejo prek skupne platforme CIRCA, do katere imajo dostop samo člani Ekonomsko-finančnega odbora in njihovi namestniki v ministrstvih.
Reply of the Commission 127 99 The ex‐post assessment of the impact of individual measures may not yield conclusive results. 
Odgovori Komisije 127 99 Naknadna ocena vpliva posameznih ukrepov ne da nujno dokončnih rezultatov.
Indeed, such an impact can be difficult to calculate due to problems in isolating the effect of the measure from wider drivers of the changes in revenue and expenditure, such as the economic environment, as against the no‐policy change trend that would have prevailed. 
V resnici je morda težko izračunati tak vpliv, ker je učinek ukrepa težko ločiti od širših dejavnikov, ki vplivajo na spremembe prihodka in odhodka, kot je gospodarsko okolje, v primerjavi s trendom nespremenjene politike, ki bi prevladal.
Generally, the effectiveness of discretionary budgetary measures ex‐post is essentially reflected in the budget execution and in the fulfilment (or not) of the budgetary targets that have been set. 
Na splošno je uspešnost diskrecijskih proračunskih ukrepov naknadno v bistvu izražena v izvrševanju proračuna in (ne)izpolnjevanju zastavljenih proračunskih ciljev.
The Commission assesses whether the Member State has taken sufficient policy measures to meet the recommended budgetary targets based on two complementary tools e.g. the top‐down and the bottom‐up approach for the assessment of effective action. 
Komisija oceni, ali je država članica sprejela zadostne ukrepe politike za doseganje priporočenih proračunskih ciljev na podlagi dveh dopolnjujočih se orodij, na primer s pristopom od zgoraj navzdol in od spodaj navzgor za oceno uspešnih ukrepov.
The Commission (and Member States) also monitor the yield of individual discretionary fiscal measures. 
Komisija (in države članice) spremljajo tudi rezultate posameznih diskrecijskih fiskalnih ukrepov.
Aggregate series are available in the AMECO database. 
Združeni sklopi so na voljo v zbirki podatkov AMECO.
Yields are estimated ex ante and revised as needed during implementa‐ tion (e.g. in case the design of the measures is amended, if these are only partially implemented, if there is ground for the revision of the underlying assumptions, inter alia). 
Rezultati se ocenijo vnaprej in med izvajanjem po potrebi spremenijo (npr. če se spremeni zasnova ukrepov, če so ti izvedeni samo delno, če obstajajo razlogi za spremembo predpostavk).
100 (i) In the case of Malta, the report on action taken was submitted on 1 October 2013 (3 months after the Council rec‐ ommendation of 21 June 2013). 
100 (i) V primeru Malte je bilo poročilo o sprejetih ukrepih predloženo 1. oktobra 2013 (tri mesece po priporočilu Sveta z dne 21. junija 2013).
It specified the measures for 2013 while for 2014 it remained vague. 
V njem so bili navedeni ukrepi za leto 2013, medtem ko je bilo glede leta 2014 nejasno.
In particular, the report announced expansionary measures on the expenditure side compensated by increases in indirect taxation and restrictions to recruitment, but for all the details it just referred to the forthcoming budget. 
Zlasti so bili v poročilu napovedani ekspanzivni ukrepi na strani odhodkov, kompenzirani s povečanji posrednega obdavčenja in omejitvami zaposlovanja, glede vseh podrobnosti pa je poročilo vsebovalo zgolj sklicevanja na prihodnji proračun.
The lack of details was a consequence of the fact that in Malta the budgetary process was not aligned with the European calendar. 
Podrobnosti so manjkale zato, ker na Malti proračunski postopek ni bil usklajen z evropskim koledarjem.
In particular, it was not possible for the Maltese authorities to reveal the budget measures in both the report on action taken and the draft budgetary plan which, therefore, did not provide sufficient details on the discretionary measures underpinning the budgetary targets. 
Malte-ški organi zlasti niso mogli razkriti proračunskih ukrepov v poročilu o sprejetih ukrepih in osnutku proračunskega načrta, ki zato nista vsebovala zadostnih podrobnosti o diskrecijskih ukrepih, na katerih so temeljili proračunski cilji.
All the necessary details were made available only after the presentation of the 2014 budget (that was presented to Parliament on 4 November 2013 and adopted on 21 November 2013). 
Vse potrebne podrobnosti so bile na voljo šele po predstavitvi proračuna za leto 2014 (ki je bil parlamentu predstavljen 4. novembra 2013 in sprejet 21. novembra 2013).
The Commission’s assessment, which was based on the Autumn forecast published on 5 November did not incorporate the measures announced for 2014. 
Ocena Komisije, ki je temeljila na jesenski napovedi, objavljeni 5. novembra, ni vključevala ukrepov, napovedanih za leto 2014.
These measures were finally included in the fol‐ lowing Winter forecast. 
Ti ukrepi so bili nazadnje vključeni v naslednjo zimsko napoved.
100 (ii) The report on action taken submitted by France in October 2013 was indeed merged with the ‘Rapport économ‐ ique social et financier’ (RESF) which routinely provides an assessment on public finances as part of the prepara‐ tion of the draft budget. 
100 (ii) Poročilo o sprejetih ukrepih, ki ga je Francija predložila oktobra 2013, je bilo dejansko združeno s poročilom „Rapport économique social et financier“ (RESF), v katerem je rutinsko navedena ocena javnih financ kot del priprave osnutka proračuna.
In its analysis of the draft budgetary plan, the Commission considered that the document did not breach the formal reporting requirements but rather that, at that stage, the measures outlined were con‐ sidered insufficient to bring the deficit to 3%. 
Komisija je pri analizi osnutka proračunskega načrta menila, da z dokumentom niso bile kršene formalne zahteve glede poročanja, temveč da so bili v tisti fazi predstavljeni ukrepi nezadostni za zmanjšanje primanjkljaja na 3 %.
Being a case of a multi‐annual correction, the assessment focused on 2013 and 2014, as required in the code of conduct. 
Ker je bil to primer večletnih popravljalnih ukrepov, je bilo ocenjevanje osredotočeno na leti 2013 in 2014, kot se zahteva v kodeksu ravnanja.
However, risks associated to the lack of information for the later years were duly flagged in the accompanying Staff Working Document available at: http://ec.europa.eu/ economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/dbp/fr_2013‐11‐15_swd_en.pdf The Commission reassessed again the situation in Malta in the following Winter forecast published in February 2014. 
Vendar je bilo v priloženem delovnem dokumentu služb Komisije, ki je na voljo na spodnjem naslovu, ustrezno opozorjeno na tveganja v zvezi s pomanjkanjem informacij za zadnja leta: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/dbp/fr_2013-11-15_swd_en.pdf. Komisija je stanje na Malti ponovno ocenila v naslednji zimski napovedi, objavljeni februarja 2014.
According to this new deficit forecast, which incorporated the measures announced with the 2014 budget, the EDP requirements for 2014 were fulfilled in nominal terms. 
V skladu s to novo napovedjo primanjkljaja, ki je vključevala ukrepe, napovedane s proračunom za leto 2014, so bile zahteve v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem za leto 2014 nominalno izpolnjene.
Reply of the Commission 128 101 The Commission does not agree with this observation as the assessment of action taken is at the same time back‐ ward and forward‐looking, insofar as it involves an analysis of compliance with EDP targets for the past years (based on outturns) current and future years (based on forecast), notably through the assessment of the adequacy and credibility of the measures envisaged by the Member State in question to achieve future EDP targets. 
Odgovori Komisije 128 101 Komisija se ne strinja s tem opažanjem, saj je ocena sprejetih ukrepov usmerjena hkrati v preteklost in prihodnost, kolikor vključuje analizo skladnosti s cilji postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem za pretekla leta (na podlagi realizacije), tekoče leto in prihodnja leta (na podlagi napovedi), zlasti z ocenjevanjem ustreznosti in verodostojnosti ukrepov, ki jih zadevna država članica predvideva za doseganje prihodnjih ciljev postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
This is the approach generally followed in all related Commission documents such as the Communication on action taken, the SWD accompanying the assessment of the SCP or the Commission opinion on the DBP, including in the ‘Implica‐ tions of the Commission forecast for budgetary surveillance’ notes that regularly provide an overview of compliance with the SGP requirements for all MS after each forecast round and are discussed with the relevant instance in the Council. 
Ta pristop se na splošno uporablja v vseh zadevnih dokumentih Komisije, kot so sporočilo o sprejetih ukrepih, delovni dokument služb Komisije, priložen oceni programa stabilnosti in konvergenčnega programa, ali mnenje Komisije o osnutku proračunskega načrta, vključno z dopisi o „Posledicah napovedi Komisije za proračunski nadzor“, ki redno zagotavljajo pregled skladnosti z zahtevami Pakta za stabilnost in rast za vse države članice po vsakem krogu napovedi ter o katerih se razpravlja z zadevnim organom Sveta.
However, as procedural EDP steps in case of non‐effective action in response to the Council recommendation have to be based on a solid set of evidence, they have largely been taken based on observed data. 
Vendar ker morajo postopkovni koraki v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem v primeru neuspešnega ukrepanja kot odziv na priporočilo Sveta temeljiti na trdnih dokazih, se večinoma sprejemajo na podlagi ugotovljenih podatkov.
The Commission con‐ siders that the initial assessment of compliance following the report on action taken quoted in the Vademecum has a preliminary character reflecting government announcements, as also explained in the Code of Conduct. 
Komisija meni, da je začetna ocena skladnosti po poročilu o sprejetih ukrepih, navedena v Vademekumu, predhodna ocena in da kaže napovedi vlade, kot je pojasnjeno tudi v kodeksu ravnanja.
Moreover, the Commission would like to recall that, following the entry into force of the Six‐Pack, compliance with the preventive and corrective arms of the Stability and Growth Pact is now subject to continuous monitoring. 
Poleg tega želi Komisija spomniti, da se od začetka veljavnosti šesterčka skladnost s preventivnim in popravljalnim delom Pakta za stabilnost in rast zdaj stalno spremlja.
The Commission forecasts, which are issued three times a year – winter, spring and autumn – constitute the key mile‐ stones for these regular fiscal assessments, including the assessment of effective action for Member States whose EDP is in abeyance. 
Napovedi Komisije, ki se izdajo trikrat letno – pozimi, spomladi in jeseni –, so ključni mejniki za ta redna fiskalna ocenjevanja, vključno z ocenjevanjem uspešnih ukrepov za države članice, za katere je postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem v mirovanju.
Should the Commission assessment conclude on non‐compliance with the EDP recommenda‐ tions this would lead to a stepping up of the EDP. 
Če bi Komisija pri ocenjevanju ugotovila neskladnost s priporočili v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, bi to vodilo do strožjega postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
Therefore, the implications from too relaxed targets for first year are not material to the assessment of effective action. 
Zato posledice premalo zahtevnih ciljev za prvo leto niso bistvene za oceno uspešnih ukrepov.
102 The 2 June 2014 Commission recommendation for a Council recommendation on the national reform programme and the stability programme included the recommendation to ‘reinforce the budgetary strategy, including by further specifying the underlying measures, for the year 2014 and beyond to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit in a sustainable manner by 2015 through achieving the structural adjustment effort specified in the Council recommendation under the EDP’. 
102 Priporočilo Komisije z dne 2. junija 2014 za priporočilo Sveta o nacionalnem programu reform in programu za stabilnost je vključevalo priporočilo, naj država „okrepi proračunsko strategijo, vključno s podrobno opredelitvijo osnovnih ukrepov, za leto 2014 in pozneje za zagotovitev odprave čezmernega primanjkljaja na vzdržen način do leta 2015 z dosego strukturne prilagoditve, določene v priporočilu Sveta v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim pri-manjkljajem“.
Moreover, the Commission adopted its opinion on the Draft Budgetary Plan and published on 28 November 2014 a staff working document. 
Poleg tega je Komisija sprejela mnenje o osnutku proračunskega načrta in 28. novembra 2014 objavila delovni dokument služb Komisije.
Overall, the position of the Commission, based on its forecast, was that France was at risk of non‐compliance with the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact as the headline deficit and the adjustment in the structural balance were projected to fall short of the 2013 recommenda‐ tion. 
Na splošno je Komisija na podlagi svoje napovedi menila, da za Francijo obstaja tveganje neskladnosti z določbami Pakta za stabilnost in rast, saj naj bi v skladu s projekcijami nominalni primanjkljaj in prilagoditev strukturnega salda ne bila skladna s priporočilom iz leta 2013.
The Commission invited the authorities to take the necessary measures within the national budgetary process in order that the 2015 budget will be compliant with the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Komisija je organe države pozvala, naj z ustreznimi ukrepi v okviru nacionalnega proračunskega postopka zagotovijo, da bo proračun za leto 2015 skladen s Paktom za stabilnost in rast.
106 When recommendations were phrased in terms of average annual figures, the Commission noted that it fre‐ quently resulted in a lack of effective action in early years, not giving rise to stepping‐up of the EDP. 
106 Ko so bila priporočila oblikovana glede na povprečne letne zneske, je Komisija opozorila, da to pogosto vodi do premalo učinkovitega ukrepanja v prvih letih, zaradi česar postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem ni poostren.
This is why the Commission decided to revise its practice regarding how to draft EDP recommendations and this explains why, starting from 2011, all the new article 126 (7) recommendations have annual nominal and structural targets over a multi‐annual period. 
Zato se je odločila spremeniti svojo prakso glede oblikovanja priporočil v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, in to je razlog, zakaj imajo od leta 2011 vsa nova priporočila na podlagi člena 126(7) letne nominalne in strukturne cilje v večletnem obdobju.
Reply of the Commission 129 Common Commission reply to paragraphs 108 and 109 The Commission would like to clarify the role of structural reforms under an EDP. 
Odgovori Komisije 129 Skupni odgovor Komisije na odstavka 108 in 109 Komisija želi pojasniti vlogo strukturnih reform v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
The Commission highlighted that the implementation of growth‐enhancing structural reforms that can ultimately improve the long‐term sustainability of public finances, as a relevant factor to be considered when deciding whether to open or extend an EDP. 
Komisija je poudarila, da je izvajanje strukturnih reform za povečanje rasti, ki lahko nazadnje izboljšajo dolgoročno vzdržnost javnih financ, pomemben dejavnik, ki ga je treba upoštevati pri odločanju o začetku ali podaljšanju postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
In this regard, it should be noted that the Commission is obliged under Article 2 of Regulation 1467/97 to take account of such relevant factors in making its recommendations. 
V zvezi s tem je treba opozoriti, da mora Komisija v skladu s členom 2 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št.
However, in terms of enforcement, the focus of the legislation which governs the EDP is the fiscal outcome and, as such, the relevant leg‐ islation does not contain specific provision to enforce the implementation of structural reforms. 
Vendar kar zadeva izvrševanje, je zakonodaja, ki se uporablja za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, osredotočena na fiskalne učinke in kot taka ne vsebuje posebne določbe, s katero bi se zahtevalo izvajanje strukturnih reform.
Indeed, it is impor‐ tant to re‐state that the assessment of effective action under an EDP is focussed on the delivery of the required budgetary adjustment and is not affected by the evaluation of structural reforms. 
Dejansko je treba znova poudariti, da je ocenjevanje uspešnega ukrepanja v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem osredotočeno na izvedbo zahtevane javnofinančne prilagoditve in da vrednotenje strukturnih reform ne vpliva nanj.
The implementation of structural reforms, including those undertaken under an Economic Partnership Programme (EPP), is monitored in the context of the European Semester, including through the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. 
Izvajanje strukturnih reform, vključno s tistimi v okviru programa ekonomskega partnerstva (EPP), se spremlja v okviru evropskega semestra, med drugim tudi v okviru postopka v zvezi z makroekonomskim neravnotežjem.
110 In the Opinion on the EPP of December 2013, while acknowledging that all reforms were in progress, the Coun‐ cil pointed to the need to fully address some CSRs, notably the debt bias in corporate taxation in CSR1 and the long‐term sustainability of public finances in CSR2. 
110 Svet je v mnenju o programu ekonomskega partnerstva iz decembra 2013 sicer priznal, da vse reforme potekajo, vendar je opozoril, da je treba celovito obravnavati nekatera priporočila za posamezne države, zlasti obdavčenje dohodka pravnih oseb, ki daje prednost dolgu pred kapitalom, iz prvega priporočila za posamezne države in dolgoročno vzdržnost javnih financ iz drugega priporočila za posamezne države.
In fact, the Commission’s Staff Working Document assesses the authorities’ progress with implementing the previ‐ ous year’s country‐specific recommendations adopted by the Council. 
V delovnem dokumentu služb Komisije je dejansko ocenjen napredek organov države pri izvajanju priporočil za državo iz prejšnjega leta, ki jih je sprejel Svet.
The regulation does not foresee specific fol‐ low up to the Council Opinion on the EPP, neither by the Commission nor by the Member State. 
V Uredbi ni predvideno posebno nadaljnje ukrepanje v zvezi z mnenjem Sveta o programu ekonomskega partnerstva, niti ukrepanje Komisije niti držav članic.
Additional informa‐ tion on the planned and implemented measures after the publication of the previous year’s CSRs was provided in the Annex to the 2014 National Reform Programme, as requested from all Member States. 
Dodatne informacije o načrtovanih in izvedenih ukrepih po objavi priporočil za posamezne države iz prejšnjega leta so bile zagotovljene v prilogi k nacionalnemu programu reform za leto 2014, kot se zahteva od vseh držav članic.
The quality and credibility of the information provided was fully reflected in the assessment of implementation and the Commission proposal for new CSRs. 
Kakovost in verodostojnost posredovanih informacij sta bili v celoti upoštevani pri ocenjevanju izvajanja in v predlogu Komisije za nova priporočila za posamezne države.
Box 11 – First indent – Spending review All documents recently issued by the Commission on Italy’s public finances, for instance the Article 126 (3) report of February 2015, the opinions on the DBP of 2015 and of 2016, mention the need to make the spending review an integral part of the budgetary process at all levels of government. 
Okvir 11, prva alinea – pregled porabe V vseh dokumentih, ki jih je Komisija izdala o javnih financah Italije, na primer poročilo na podlagi člena 126(3) iz februarja 2015 ter mnenja o osnutku proračunskega načrta iz let 2015 in 2016, je navedeno, da mora pregled porabe postati sestavni del proračunskega postopka na vseh ravneh države.
Box 11 – Second indent – Tackling corruption The Commission does not agree with the Court’s observation in Box 11, as all assessments produced by the Com‐ mission since the creation of the Italian anti‐corruption authority (ANAC) by the November 2012 anti‐corruption law highlighted the challenges, both procedural and substantial, hindering the operational effectiveness of the new institution. 
Okvir 11, druga alinea – boj proti korupciji Komisija se ne strinja z opažanjem Sodišča iz okvira 11, saj so bili v vseh ocenah, ki jih je izdala od ustanovitve italijanskega protikorupcijskega organa (ANAC) na podlagi protikorupcijskega zakona iz novembra 2012, poudarjeni postopkovni in vsebinski izzivi, ki ovirajo operativno učinkovitost nove institucije.
The Commission staff working document ‘SWD(2013)362final’ of May 2013 already pointed out that, concerning the recently approved anti‐corruption law, ‘not only does the law still require implementing acts but it also does not tackle some critical issues’. 
Že v delovnem dokumentu služb Komisije „SWD(2013) 362 final“ iz maja 2013 je bilo v zvezi z nedavno sprejetim protikorupcijskim zakonom opozorjeno, da „ne samo, da zakonu še vedno manjkajo izvedbeni akti, temveč tudi da sam zakon ne obravnava nekaterih kritičnih vprašanj“.
After the approval of different implementing decrees of the anti‐corruption law, the Commission staff working document ‘SWD(2014)413 final’ of June 2014 highlighted: ‘the National Anti‐corruption Authority for the Evaluation and Transparency of Public Administrations (ANAC), in charge of coordinating preven‐ tive anti‐corruption policies nation‐wide, of which members have been increased from three to five in 2013 counts only limited staff and lacks sanctioning powers’. 
Po sprejetju različnih uredb o izvajanju protikorupcijskega zakona je bilo v delovnem dokumentu služb Komisije „SWD(2014) 413 final“ iz junija 2014 poudarjeno: „Nacionalni protikorupcijski urad za vrednotenje in preglednost javnih uprav (ANAC), ki je pristojen za usklajevanje preventivnih protikorupcijskih politik v vsej državi in katerega število članov se je leta 2013 povečalo s tri na pet, je kadrovsko omejen in nima pristojnosti za sankcioniranje“.
Moreover, the Commission has systematically focussed on the need for Italy to revise its statute of limitations in order to enhance the effectiveness of the repression of corruption since 2012, when a country‐specific recommendation for Italy on this issue was issued for the first time. 
Poleg tega se Komisija že od leta 2012, ko je bilo za Italijo prvič izdano priporočilo o tem vprašanju, sistematično osredotoča na to, da mora Italija spremeniti svoje določbe o zasta-ranju za povečanje učinkovitosti boja proti korupciji.
Reply of the Commission 130 Box 11 – Third indent – Tackling tax evasion The Commission does not agree with any suggestion that it does not pay sufficient attention to tax‐evasion in Italy with the examination of all relevant figures taken account of in the Commission’s broader assessment. 
Odgovori Komisije 130 Okvir 11, tretja alinea – boj proti davčnim utajam Komisija se ne strinja z nobeno trditvijo, da se ne posveča dovolj davčnim utajam v Italiji s preučitvijo vseh zadevnih podatkov, upoštevanih v njeni širši oceni.
For instance, the 2015 Country Report for Italy amply discussed the extent of the challenge represented by tax evasion in Italy. 
V poročilu o državi za Italijo iz leta 2015 je bil na primer obsežno obravnavan obseg izziva, ki ga pomenijo davčne utaje v Italiji.
Namely, it highlighted that ‘tax compliance remains low and time‐consuming, which could harm the level playing field and social equality’ (pages 70 and following). 
Poudarjeno je bilo namreč, da „skladnost z davčnimi predpisi ostaja majhna in zahteva veliko časa, kar lahko škodi enakim konkurenčnim pogojem in socialni enakosti“ (stran 70 in naslednje).