natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
68 Although the consequences for private sector organisations can be severe, weaknesses in cyber governance abound. 
68 Čeprav so lahko posledice za organizacije zasebnega sektorja resne, je slabosti v upravljanju kibernetske varnosti veliko.
Nearly nine in ten organisations say their cybersecurity function does not fully meet their needs 93, and cybersecurity officers are often at least two levels removed from the board94. 
Skoraj devet od desetih organizacij navaja, da njihove funkcije za kibernetsko varnost ne izpolnjujejo v celoti njihovih potreb93, uradniki za kibernetsko varnost pa so hierarhično pogosto vsaj dve stopnji pod vodstvom94.
69 The EU’s company law directives set no specific requirements on the disclosure of cyber risks. 
69 V direktivah EU na področju prava družb niso določene nobene posebne zahteve glede razkrivanja kibernetskih tveganj.
In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission recently issued non-binding guidance to assist public companies in preparing disclosures on cybersecurity risks and incidents 95. 
V Združenih državah Amerike je komisija Securities and Exchange Commission nedavno izdala nezavezujoče smernice za pomoč javnim družbam pri pripravi razkritij o kibernetskih tveganjih in incidentih95.
The Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities96 (ESAs)warnedoftheincreasingincyberrisks,encouragedfinancial institutions to improve fragile IT systems, and to explore inherent risks to information security, connectivity, and outsourcing97. 28 
odbor evropskih nadzornih organov96 (ESA) je opozoril na povečanje kibernetskega tveganja in finančne institucije pozval, naj izboljšajo ranljive sisteme IT in preučijo inherentna tveganja za varnost informacij, povezljivost in oddajanje del zunanjim izvajalcem97.
70 Strengthening the information security governance of SMEs is especially difficult since, more often than not, they are unable to implement the appropriate systems. 
70 Krepitev upravljanja varnosti informacij v MSP je še posebej zahtevna, saj ta večinoma ne morejo izvajati ustreznih sistemov.
SMEs lack suitable guidelines on applying information security and privacy requirements and mitigating technology risks 98. 
MSP nimajo ustreznih smernic o izvajanju zahtev v zvezi z varnostjo in zasebnostjo informacij ter o zmanjševanju tehnoloških tveganj98.
Key challenges are therefore better understanding their needs and providing the necessary incentives and support. 
Ključni izzivi so tako boljše razumevanje njihovih potreb in zagotavljanje potrebnih spodbud in podpore.
71 The lack of a coherent, international cybersecurity governance framework impairs the international community’s ability to respond to and limit cyberattacks. 
71 Ker ni koherentnega mednarodnega okvira za upravljanje kibernetske varnosti, je zmožnost mednarodne skupnosti za odziv na kibernetske napade in njihovo omejevanje okrnjena.
It is important, therefore, to forge consensus on such a governance framework that best reflects the EU’s interests and values 99. 
Zato je pomembno, da se doseže soglasje o takem okviru upravljanja, ki bo najbolje odražal interese in vrednote EU99.
Attempts to set binding international cyberspace norms are becoming increasingly fraught, as seen in the lack of consensus within the UN Group of Governmental Experts in 2017 on how international law should apply to state responses to incidents. 
Poskusi za določitev zavezujočih mednarodnih norm za kibernetski prostor so čedalje bolj napeti, kot je razvidno iz tega, da leta 2017 ni bilo mogoče doseči soglasja v okviru skupine vladnih strokovnjakov ZN o tem, kako naj se mednarodno pravo uporablja za nacionalne odzive na incidente.
72 To strengthen its agenda on cyberspace governance, the EU has also formalised six cyber partnerships to establish regular policy dialogues aiming to build trust and common areas for cooperation100. 
72 EU je za okrepitev svoje agende o upravljanju kibernetskega prostora formalizirala tudi šest kibernetskih partnerstev za vzpostavitev rednega dialoga o politikah za vzpostavitev zaupanja in skupnih področij za sodelovanje100.
Information security at the EU institutions 73 Each EU institution has its own information security governance rules. 
Varnost informacij v institucijah EU 73 Vsaka institucija EU ima svoja pravila za upravljanje varnosti informacij.
An interinstitutional agreement provides for information security assistance from the Commission for the other institutions and agencies. 
Z medinstitucionalnim sporazumom je določeno, da Komisija drugim institucijam in organom zagotavlja pomoč v zvezi z varnostjo informacij.
The EU institutions and bodies have recognised the need to develop their cyber capacities and risk management approaches in a coherent manner. 
Institucije in organi EU so prepoznali potrebo po koherentnem razvoju lastnih kibernetskih zmogljivosti in pristopov za obvladovanje tveganja.
The Commission, Council and EEAS are to present a report in 2020 to the Horizontal Working Party on Cyber Issues on governance and the progress made in clarifying and harmonising cybersecurity governance at the EU institutions and agencies 102. 
Komisija, Svet in ESZD naj bi Horizontalni delovni skupini za kibernetska vprašanja leta 2020 predstavili poročilo o upravljanju in doseženem napredku pri razjasnjevanju in harmonizaciji upravljanja kibernetske varnosti v institucijah in agencijah EU102.
74 Within the Commission, the Directorate-General for Informatics (DIGIT) is responsible for the security of IT infrastructure and services (see Box 3). 
74 Znotraj Komisije je za varnost infrastrukture in storitev IT odgovoren Generalni direktorat za informatiko (DIGIT) (glej okvir 3).
The Commission’s Digital Strategy’s main IT security objectives are embedding IT security in management processes; provision of (cost-) effective infrastructure and resilience; widening the scope of incident detection and response; and integrating IT and security governance103. 
Glavni cilji varnosti IT iz digitalne strategije Komisije so vključitev varnosti IT v upravljavske procese, zagotovitev 30 (stroškovno) učinkovite infrastrukture in odpornosti, razširitev obsega zaznavanja incidentov in odzivanja nanje ter povezovanje upravljanja IT in varnosti103.
The Commission, under its provider contract, ensures that almost all software is actively maintained, and that only vendor-supported software is used104. 29 
Komisija v skladu s svojo pogodbo s ponudnikom zagotavlja, da se skoraj vsa programska oprema dejavno vzdržuje in da se uporablja samo programska oprema s podporo prodajalca104.
75 The importance of protecting the institutions also stretches to the EU’s CSDP missions and structures worldwide. 
75 Pomembnost zaščite institucij Unije velja tudi za misije in strukture EU SVOP po vsem svetu.
One of the priorities of the EU’s Cyber Defence Policy Framework (2018 update) is to enhance the protection of CSDP communication and information systems used by EU entities. 
Ena od prioritet okvira EU za politiko kibernetske obrambe (posodobitev leta 2018) je okrepitev varstva komunikacijskih in informacijskih sistemov SVOP, ki jih uporabljajo subjekti EU.
An internal EEAS Cyber Governance Board is now in place and met for the first time in June 2017105. 
Zdaj je ustanovljen notranji odbor ESZD za upravljanje kibernetske varnosti, ki se je prvič sestal junija 2017105.
30 Box3 Protecting the Commission’s information systems The Commission’s roughly 1 300 systems and 50 000 devices are continuously targeted by cyberattacks. 
31 Okvir 3 Zaščita informacijskih sistemov Komisije Približno 1 300 sistemov in 50 000 naprav Komisije je nenehno tarča kibernetskih napadov.
Responsibility for IT is decentralised, as illustrated in the figure below. 
Odgovornost za IT je decentralizirana, kot je prikazano na sliki spodaj.
Information and IT security are based on a common IT security plan set by DIGIT. 
Varnost informacij in IT temelji na skupnem varnostnem načrtu za IT Generalnega direktorata za informatiko.
The Information Technology and Cybersecurity Board acts as the Commission’s de facto Chief Information Security Officer and links the operational side of IT security to the Commission’s top management, represented by the Corporate Management Board. 
Odbor za informacijsko tehnologijo in kibernetsko varnost deluje kot dejanski pooblaščenec Komisije za varnost informacij in povezuje operativno stran varnosti IT z višjim vodstvom Komisije, ki ga predstavlja interni upravni odbor.
DG Human Resources and Security’s (DG HR DS) main task is to protect the Commission’s staff, information and assets. 
32 Vir: Evropskoračunskosodiščena podlagisklepovKomisije106 Glavna naloga Generalnega direktorata za človeške vire in varnost (GD HR DS) je varovanje uslužbencev, informacij in sredstev Komisije.
It also carries out security investigations of incidents that have a broader security dimension than IT only, thus feeding into its counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism activities. 
Izvaja tudi varnostne preiskave incidentov, ki presegajo zgolj IT, ter tako prispeva k svojim protiobveščevalnim in protiterorističnim dejavnostim.
31 DIGIT is responsible for IT security and hosts CERT-EU (Computer Emergency Response Team). Established in 2011, CERT-EU runs on an annual budget of about €2.5 million per year and has about 30 staff. 
Generalni direktorat za informatiko je odgovoren za varnost IT in gosti skupino za odzivanje na računalniške grožnje, ki je bila ustanovljena leta 2011 in ima letni proračun v višini približno 2,5 milijona EUR ter približno 30 uslužbencev.
It is the first responder in any information security incident that concerns several institutions yet does not operate on a 24/7 basis. 
Prva se odzove na vsakršen incident v zvezi z varnostjo informacij, ki zadeva več institucij, vendar ne deluje neprekinjeno.
It hosts an information-sharing platform. 
Gosti platformo za izmenjavo informacij.
In 2018, CERT-EU signed a non-binding memorandum of understanding with ENISA, EC3 and the European Defence Agency to strengthen cooperation and coordination. 
Leta 2018 je podpisala nezavezujoč memorandum o soglasju z ENISO, Evropskim centrom za boj proti kibernetski kriminaliteti in Evropsko obrambno agencijo za okrepitev sodelovanja in usklajevanja.
It also has a technical agreement with NATO’s computer incident response capability (NCIRC). 
Poleg tega ima tehnični sporazum s službo zveze NATO za odzivanje na incidente na področju računalniške varnosti.
However, there is no standard approach to classifying and mapping cyber threats or to risk assessments, meaning assessments’ content varies considerably, posing a challenge to a coherent EU-wide approach to cybersecurity107. 
Vendar ni standardnega pristopa za klasificiranje in kartiranje kibernetskih groženj ali za ocene tveganja, zato je vsebina ocen zelo različna, kar pomeni izziv za doseganje koherentnega pristopa h kibernetski varnosti v celotni varnostna navodila svetovanje sodelovanje
Furthermore, they often rely on the same sources or even other threat assessments, resulting in an echo chamber resounding with repeat findings 108, at the risk of paying insufficient attention to other threats. 
EU107. Poleg tega se pogosto zanašajo na iste vire ali celo na druge ocene ogroženosti, zaradi česar se ugotovitve ponavljajo108, drugim grožnjam pa morda ni namenjene dovolj pozornosti.
This is exacerbated by a continued reluctance to share information and under-reporting of incidents. 
Ta položaj poslabšuje tudi to, da organizacije še vedno nerade izmenjavajo informacije in o incidentih ne poročajo dovolj.
77 The Hybrid Fusion Cell109 embedded within the EEAS was established to improve situational awareness and support decision-making through analysis-sharing but needs to broaden its expertise, including in cybersecurity. 
77 Hibridna fuzijska celica109, ki je del ESZD, je bila ustanovljena za izboljšanje situacijskega zavedanja in podporo odločanju z izmenjavo analiz, vendar mora razširiti svoje strokovno znanje, vključno s kibernetsko varnostjo.
In parallel, CERT-EU provides EU institutions, bodies and agencies with reports and briefings regarding cyber threats targeted at them. 
Skupina za odzivanje na računalniške grožnje institucijam, organom in agencijam EU vzporedno zagotavlja poročila in informacije o kibernetskih grožnjah, ki so usmerjene vanje.
78 ENISA has noted in the past that many Member States have a qualitative understanding of threats and that there is a need for more cyber-threat modelling110. 
78 ENISA je v preteklosti ugotovila, da mnoge države članice grožnje razumejo kvalitativno in da obstaja potreba po okrepitvi modeliranja kibernetskih groženj110.
Monitoring capacity for strategic analysis will strengthen overall understanding. 
Spremljanje zmogljivosti za strateške analize bo okrepilo splošno razumevanje.
However, threat assessments could cover not only technological threats, but also socio-political and economic threats to ensure a more comprehensive picture, as well as threat drivers and actors’ motives. 
Toda ocene ogroženosti bi lahko poleg tehnoloških groženj vključevale tudi socialno-politične in gospodarske grožnje, da bi se zagotovil celovitejši pregled, pa tudi informacije o gibalu groženj in motivih akterjev.
Incentives 79 There are still too few legal and economic incentives for organisations to notify and share information about incidents. 
Spodbude 79 Še vedno je premalo pravnih in ekonomskih spodbud, da bi organizacije sporočale in izmenjevale informacije o incidentih.
Fearing reputational damage, many organisations still prefer to handle cyberattacks discretely or to pay off the perpetrators. 
Mnoge organizacije zaradi škode za ugled kibernetske napade še vedno raje obravnavajo diskretno ali pa storilcem plačajo odkupnino.
It remains to be seen how effectively the NIS Directive will be in raising 
Ni še jasno, kako uspešna bo direktiva o varnosti omrežij in informacij pri izboljšanju priglasitev incidentov.
the level of notifications. The Commission expects improvements to materialise primarily at the national level, but the Cybersecurity Act will add an EU-wide view.111 80 By embedding certain standards in its procurement, public authorities have significant leverage over suppliers as buyers of digital products and services through public procurement, and research and programme funding (for example, by requiring the adoption of certain technical standards like Internet Protocol IPv6 to help in the fight against cybercrime). 
Komisija pričakuje, da bo do izboljšav prišlo predvsem na nacionalni ravni, uredba o kibernetski varnosti pa naj bi dodala razsežnost EU111. 80 Javni organi lahko z vključitvijo nekaterih standardov v svoja javna naročila kot kupci digitalnih izdelkov in storitev dosežejo pomemben učinek vzvoda pri dobaviteljih z javnim naročanjem ter sredstvi za raziskave in programe (npr. tako, da zahtevajo sprejetje nekaterih tehničnih standardov, kot je internetni protokol IPv6, za lažji boj proti kibernetski kriminaliteti).
Currently, though, there is no joint procurement framework for cybersecurity infrastructure112. 
Toda zdaj ni skupnega okvira za javna naročila na področju infrastrukture za kibernetsko varnost112.
There is much that the Commission can do in this regard. 
Komisija v zvezi s tem lahko veliko stori.
The proposed DEP for the next multiannual financial framework aims to address the hitherto limited public sector investment in purchasing the latest cybersecurity technology. 
Cilj predlaganega programa za digitalno Evropo za naslednji večletni finančni okvir je obravnava doslej omejenih naložb javnega sektorja v nakup najnovejše tehnologije za kibernetsko varnost.
81 Through its regulatory capacity, the Commission can ensure that the right standards are developed for widespread adoption to enhance security. 
81 Komisija lahko s svojo regulativno vlogo zagotovi, da se razvijejo ustrezni standardi za široko uporabo, s čimer bi se okrepila varnost.
The Commission and Europol work with internet governance bodies like ICANN (see paragraph 38) and RIPE-NCC113, which is essential to putting the right cybercrime architecture in place to support law enforcement and the judicial authorities. 
Komisija in Europol sodelujeta z organi za upravljanje interneta, kot sta ICANN (glej odstavek 38) in RIPE-NCC113, kar je bistveno za vzpostavitev ustrezne strukture za boj proti kibernetski kriminaliteti v podporo organom kazenskega pregona in sodnim organom.
Challenge 7: raising skills and awareness 82 ENISA has pointed out that users play a critical role against cyberattacks and that strengthening skills, education and awareness is key to building a cyber-resilient society114. 
Izziv 7: pridobivanje znanja in ozaveščanje 82 ENISA je opozorila na to, da imajo uporabniki kritično vlogo v boju proti kibernetskim napadom in da so pridobivanje znanja, izobraževanje in ozaveščanje ključni za vzpostavitev kibernetsko odporne družbe114.
Individuals, at work or at home, who are well-versed in spotting the warning signs and armed with the right techniques can slow down or prevent attacks. 
Posamezniki na delovnem mestu ali doma, ki dobro prepoznavajo opozorilne znake in imajo ustrezne tehnike, lahko upočasnijo ali preprečijo napade.
83 Of particular concern is the growing asymmetry between the know-how needed to commit a cybercrime or launch a cyberattack, and the skills needed to defend against it. 
83 Zlasti je zaskrbljujoča vse večja nesorazmernost med znanjem, potrebnim za izvajanje kibernetske kriminalitete in kibernetskih napadov, ter znanjem, potrebnim za obrambo pred njimi.
The crime-as-a-service model has lowered the barriers of entry to the cybercriminal market: individuals without the technical knowledge to build them can now rent botnets, exploit kits or ransomware packages. 
Model kriminala kot storitve je olajšal vstop na trg kibernetske kriminalitete: posamezniki brez tehničnega znanja za programiranje botnetov, orodij za izkoriščanje ranljivosti ali paketov izsiljevalskega programja jih zdaj lahko najamejo.
Training, skills and capacity development 84 The world faces a growing cybersecurity skills shortfall; the workforce gap has widened by 20 % since 2015115. 
Usposabljanje, znanje in razvoj zmogljivosti 84 Cel svet se srečuje z vedno večjim primanjkljajem znanj na področju kibernetske varnosti, vrzel v delovni sili pa se je od leta 2015 povečala za 20 %115.
Traditional recruitment channels are not meeting demand, including for managerial and interdisciplinary positions 116. 
Tradicionalni načini zaposlovanja ne dohajajo povpraševanja, vključno z vodstvenimi in interdisciplinarnimi položaji116.
Nearly 90 % of the global cybersecurity workforce is male; the persistent lack of gender diversity restricts 32 the talent pool further117. 
Skoraj 90 % globalne delovne sile na področju kibernetske varnosti predstavljajo moški, stalna neuravnotežena zastopanost spolov pa še dodatno omejuje potencial talentov117.
Moreover, at universities, cyber-related subjects are under-represented on non-technical programmes. 
Poleg tega je na univerzah na netehničnih programih premalo predmetov, povezanih s kibernetsko varnostjo.
85 Training and education is needed across the board, among civil servants, law enforcement officers, judicial authorities, the armed forces and educators. 
85 Usposabljanje in izobraževanje sta potrebna na vseh ravneh: med javnimi uslužbenci, uradniki organov kazenskega pregona in pravosodnih organov, uslužbenci oboroženih sil in pedagogi.
For example, the judicial courts need to be able to deal with the fast-changing technical particularities of cybercrime and its victims 118; there are currently no EU-wide standards for training and certification119. 
Sodišča morajo biti sposobna obravnavati hitro spreminjajoče se tehnične posebnosti kibernetske kriminalitete in njenih žrtev118, vendar sedaj na ravni EU ni standardov za usposabljanje in certificiranje119.
At the EU institutions, getting the right skills mix is important. 
V institucijah EU je pomembno zagotavljanje ustrezne kombinacije znanj.
Without the right skills mix in place, the institutions may be unable to properly define scope, identify the right partners and security needs, or lack the capacity to manage programmes. 
Brez nje institucije morda ne bodo mogle ustrezno opredeliti obsega, ugotoviti, kateri so ustrezni partnerji in kakšne so varnostne potrebe, poleg tega pa ne bodo imele dovolj 34
This in turn may undermine the effectiveness of EU programmes or policy development. 
To pa bi lahko ogrozilo uspešnost programov ali razvoj politik EU.
86 While Member States are responsible for education policies at the EU level, numerous training activities (see Table 2) and exercises (see Box 4) are already taking place. 
86 Države članice so odgovorne za politike na področju izobraževanja na ravni EU, številne dejavnosti usposabljanja (glej tabelo 2) in vaje (glej okvir 4) pa že potekajo.
The EU can help work EU-wide standards into the learning curricula across all relevant disciplines 120. 
EU lahko pomaga vključiti standarde EU v učne programe za vsa relevantna področja120.
In the area of digital forensics, for example, common training standards are necessary to facilitate the path to evidence admissibility in Member States. 
Npr. na področju digitalne forenzike so skupni standardi usposabljanja potrebni za omogočanje doseganja dopustnosti dokazov v državah članicah.
Due to the cross-border nature of cybercrime multiple jurisdictions can be involved, which requires training at the EU level. 
Zaradi čezmejnosti kibernetske kriminalitete je lahko udeleženih več jurisdikcij, zaradi česar je potrebno usposabljanje na ravni EU.
And yet, CEPOL, the EU’s law enforcement training agency, has noted that more than two-thirds of Member States do not provide regular cyber training to law enforcement officials 121. 
Vendar je CEPOL, agencija EU za usposabljanje na področju kazenskega pregona, ugotovil, da več kot dve tretjini držav članic ne zagotavljata rednega usposabljanja na področju kibernetske varnosti za uradnike organov kazenskega pregona121.
The EU can also potentially identify ways to synergise education and training between the civilian and military spheres 122. 
EU lahko tudi opredeli morebitne načine doseganja sinergij med civilnim in vojaškim izobraževanjem in usposabljanjem122.
That said, ENISA has found that while current training opportunities in critical sectors are extensive, they do not sufficiently target the resilience of critical infrastructure123. 
Poleg tega je ENISA ugotovila, da je v kritičnih sektorjih sicer veliko možnosti za usposabljanje, vendar te niso dovolj usmerjene v odpornost kritične infrastrukture123.
87 The EU has posted counter-terrorism and security experts to 17 delegations to reinforce the link between the EU’s internal and external security125. 
Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče 87 EU je zaposlila strokovnjake za boj proti terorizmu in varnost v 17 delegacijah, da bi okrepila povezavo med notranjo in zunanjo varnostjo EU125.
Notwithstanding resource constraints, greater cyber know-how could help put in place the right projects, as well as identify synergies with other programmes or sources of funding126. 
Boljše znanje na področju kibernetske varnosti bi lahko kljub omejenosti virov pomagalo izbrati in izvesti ustrezne projekte ter poiskati sinergije z drugimi programi ali viri financiranja126.
It could also raise cybersecurity’s profile in political dialogue, although it would have to compete with many other priorities, like migration, organised crime or returning foreign fighters. 
Poleg tega bi lahko to povečalo pomembnost kibernetske varnosti v političnem dialogu, čeprav bi konkurirala mnogim drugim prioritetam, kot so migracije, organizirani kriminal ali bojevniki povratniki.
34 Box4 Exercises Exercises are important elements of cyber education and training, offering prime opportunities to boost preparedness by testing capabilities, offering responses to real-life scenarios and building networks of working relationships. 
36 Okvir 4 Vaje Vaje so pomemben element izobraževanja in usposabljanja na področju kibernetske varnosti, saj omogočajo odlične priložnosti za krepitev pripravljenosti s preizkušanjem zmogljivosti, dajejo odgovore na resnične scenarije in ustvarjajo mreže službenih stikov.