natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
These rates are applied by the Commission and generally by national authorities when imposing financial corrections for infringements of public procurement rules, including when following up the errors reported by the Court. 
Komisija in na splošno nacionalni organi uporabljajo te pavšalne popravke pri uvedbi finančnih popravkov za kršenje pravil o javnih naročilih, med drugim pri spremljanju napak, ki jih navede Sodišče.
EN 110 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion 10.11.2011 T H E C O U R T ’ S O B S E R VA T I O N S (b) Artificial split of works and services in several tenders: In the case of several ERDF projects in the same OP, works and services related to making a river navigable for cruise ships were contracted out in an irregular manner. 
SL 110 UradnilistEvropskeunije 10.11.2011 U G O T O V I T V E S O D I Š Č A (b) Navidezna razdelitev del in storitev med več ponudni-kov: pri več projektih ESRR v istem operativnem programu so bila naročila za dela in storitve, povezana s pripravo reke za plutje potniških ladij za križarjenje, oddana nepravilno.
The contracting authority apportioned the works and services in such a way as to reduce the contract values below the thresholds specified in EU and national public procurement rules, circumventing thus the normal tendering requirements. 
Naročnik je dela in storitve razdelil tako, da je vrednosti naročil znižal pod prage, določene v pravilih EU in nacionalnih pravilih o javnih naročilih, ter tako zaobšel običajne zahteve za oddajo javnega naročila.
Subsequently, several of these contracts were awarded to the same contractor. (c) Absence of tendering for additional works foreseen by initial tender documentation: In the case of an ERDF project, works related to the renovation of a university building were awarded directly to a contractor. 
Posledično je bilo več teh pogodb dodeljenih istemu izvajalcu. (c) Ni bilo javnih razpisov za dodatna dela, predvidena v prvotni razpisni dokumentaciji: pri enem projektu ESRR so bila dela, povezana z obnovo univerzitetne stavbe, dodeljena neposredno izvajalcu.
Although these works had been planned in the preliminary terms of reference, the contracting authority treated them as additional works that could not have been foreseen when tendering the main contract. 4.27. 
Čeprav so bila ta dela načrtovana v predhodnem opisu del, jih je naročnik obravnaval kot dodatna dela, ki jih ni bilo mogoče predvideti ob objavi razpisa za glavno naročilo.
These errors include cases of non-compliance with the information and publicity requirements (such as late publi­ cation of award notices), shortcomings in the tender specifi­ cation or procedural weaknesses in the evaluation of offers. 
Med temi napakami so bili primeri neskladnosti z zahtevami za obveščanje in ogla­ ševanje (kot je pozna objava obvestil o dodelitvi), pomanjklji­ vosti v razpisni dokumentaciji ali postopkovne slabosti pri ocenjevanju ponudb.
They also cover cases of incorrect transposition of EU Directives into national public procurement laws. 
Zajemajo tudi primere nepravilnega prenosa direktiv EU v nacionalno zakonodajo o javnih naro­ čilih.
These errors are not included in the estimation of the error rate (8). 
Te napake niso zajete v oceni stopnje napake (8).
Ineligible projects account for more than a third of the estimated error rate 4.28. Inaddition,theCourtfoundprojectswhichwere wholly ineligible in 3% of the 243 transactions audited. 
Neupravičeni projekti predstavljajo več kot tretjino ocenjene stopnje napake 4.28 Sodišče je poleg tega v 3 % od 243 revidiranih tran­ sakcij odkrilo projekte, ki so bili povsem neupravičeni.
Such errors account for 14 % of all quantifiable errors and make up approximately 43 % of the estimated error rate for this policy group (see example 4.2). 
Takšne napake predstavljajo 14 % vseh količinsko opredeljivih napak in pomenijo približno 43 % ocenjene stopnje napake za to skupino politik (glej primer 4.2).
T H E C O M M I S S I O N ’ S R E P L I E S _____________ (8) Further information regarding the Court's approach to the quantifi­ cation of public procurement errors is set out in Annex 1.1, paragraphs 1.10 and 1.11. 
O D G O VO R I KO M I S I J E _____________ (8) Dodatne informacije o pristopu Sodišča h količinskemu opredelje­ vanju napak pri javnih naročilih so v Prilogi 1.1, odstavka 1.10 in 1.11.
The Commission will follow up all errors reported by the Court. 
Komisija bo spremljala vse napake, ki jih je navedlo Sodišče.
However, for some of these errors which are formal, such as late publication of award notices, the Commission would not impose financial corrections. 
Vendar pa za nekatere, ki so formalne narave, na primer pozna objava javnega naročila, ne bo uvedla finančnih popravkov.
4.28. The Court identified different types of ineligible projects under this category. 
4.27 4.28 Sodišče je v okviru te kategorije odkrilo različne vrste neupravičenih projektov.
This shows that management verifications need to be improved in both quality and quantity by the concerned programme authorities in order to detect such projects already at the stage of their selection. 
To kaže, da morajo zadevni organi, pristojni za programe, kvalitativno in kvantitativno izboljšati upravljavska preverjanja, da se taki projekti odkrijejo že na stopnji izbire projektov.
The Commission will follow up these cases with the concerned programme authorities. 4.27. 
Komisija bo te primere spremljala z zadevnimi organi, pristojnimi za program.
EN 10.11.2011 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion 111 T H E C O U R T ’ S O B S E R VA T I O N S T H E C O M M I S S I O N ’ S R E P L I E S Example 4.2 Ineligible projects (a) Project not eligible according to national eligibility rules: In the case of an ERDF project, expenditure for a project which had been approved and completed under the previous 2000-2006 programming period was certified to the Commission under the 2007-2013 OP. 
SL 10.11.2011 UradnilistEvropskeunije 111 U G O T O V I T V E S O D I Š Č A O D G O VO R I KO M I S I J E Primer 4.2 Neupravičeni projekti (a) Projekti, ki v skladu z nacionalnimi pravili o upravičenosti niso upravičeni: pri enem projektu ESRR so bili odhodki za projekt, ki je bil odobren in dokončan v prejšnjem programskem obdobju 2000–2006, potrjeni Ko m i s i j i z a o p e r a t i v n i p r o g r a m z a o b d o b j e 2007–2013.
This was not in line with the national eligibility rules and the project was therefore ineligible. (b) Revenue generating project not eligible according to the outcome of a feasibility study: In the case of an ERDF project, the feasibility study which formed part of the project application, showed that the project was expected to generate revenues exceeding the cost of the project, rendering the project ineligible for ERDF co-financing. (c) Funding of a project where State aid conditions for public co-financing were not fulfilled: In the case of an ERDF project the project would have been carried out even in the absence of EU support. 
To ni bilo v skladu z nacionalnimi pravili o upravičenosti, zato je bil projekt neupravičen. (b) Projekt, ki je ustvarjal prihodke, v skladu z rezultatom študije izvedljivosti ni bil upravičen: pri enem projektu ESRR je študija izvedljivosti, ki je bila del projektne vloge, pokazala, da bo projekt po pričakovanjih ustvarjal prihodke, ki bodo presegli stroške projekta, zaradi česar je bil projekt neupravičen do sofinanciranja iz ESRR. (c) Financiranje projekta, pri katerem niso bili izpolnjeni pogoji v zvezi z državno pomočjo za javno sofinanciranje: pri enem projektu ESRR bi se ta projekt izvedel tudi brez podpore EU.
Therefore the conditions set out in the EU regulations with regard to State aid were not met. 
Zato pogoji, določeni v uredbah EU o državni pomoči, niso bili izpolnjeni.
More than half of all quantifiable errors are due to the declaration of various ineligible costs 4.29. TheCourtfoundvariousineligiblecostsin12%of the transactions audited. 
Več kot polovica vseh količinsko opredeljivih napak je posledica prijave različnih neupravičenih stroškov 4.29 Sodišče je v 12% revidiranih transakcij odkrilo različne neupravičene stroške.
Such errors account for 59 % of all quantifiable errors and make up approximately 23 % of the estimated error rate for this policy group (see example 4.3). 
Takšne napake predstavljajo 59 % vseh količinsko opredeljivih napak in predstavljajo približno 23 % ocenjene stopnje napake za to skupino politik (glej primer 4.3).
Example 4.3 Declaration of various ineligible costs (a) Equipment deployed (vendor tooling) outside the eligible area: in an ERDF project the expenditure declaration comprised costs related to the purchase of new equipment. 
Primer 4.3 Prijavljanje različnih neupravičenih stroškov (a) Oprema (orodja prodajalcev), nameščena zunaj upravičenega območja: pri enem projektu ESRR je izjava o odhodkih vsebovala stroške, povezane z nakupom nove opreme.
Some of the equipment co-financed was used abroad or in a non-convergence region within the Member State concerned. 
Nekaj te sofinancirane opreme se je uporabljalo v tujini ali v nekonvergenčni regiji zadevne države članice.
This is not in line with the eligibility rules for the OP. 
To ni v skladu s pravili o upravičenosti za zadevni operativni program.
While this was detected by the IB, the expenditure was still declared to the Commission. 
Čeprav je posredniško telo to ugotovilo, je bil odhodek vseeno prijavljen Komisiji.
4.29. The Commission seeks to ensure through training and guidance that programmes managing authorities are well aware of eligibility rules, and that they carry over this knowledge to all bodies in charge of managing the funds. 
4.29 Komisija si z usposabljanji in navodili prizadeva, da organi, ki upravljajo programe, dobro poznajo pravila o upravičenosti ter da svoje znanje posredujejo vsem telesom, pristojnim za upravljanje sred­ stev.
The Commission will continue its training actions and will focus them on programme authorities where risks have been identified. 
Komisija bo še naprej izvajala svoje dejavnosti usposabljanja, ki jih bo osredotočila na organe, pristojne za programe, pri katerih so bila ugotovljena tveganja.
Reference is made to actions quoted in the answer to paragraphs 4.20 and 4.21. 
Pri tem so mišljeni programi, navedeni v odgovoru na odstavka 4.20 in 4.21.
EN 112 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion 10.11.2011 T H E C O U R T ’ S O B S E R VA T I O N S (b) Use of an incorrect co-financing rate: in the case of an ESF project providing training courses for short-time workers, a company benefited from a higher co-financing rate applicable to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), although it was not an SME. (c) Excessive costs charged to project: in the case of an ESF labour market project implemented by a partnership of several organisations, the partners declared costs for co-financing which significantly exceeded the actual costs incurred. (d) Lack of supporting evidence for claimed costs: in the case of an ESF education and training project, costs were claimed on the basis of achieved outcomes for the participants. 
SL 112 UradnilistEvropskeunije 10.11.2011 U G O T O V I T V E S O D I Š Č A (b) Uporaba nepravilne stopnje sofinanciranja: pri enem projektu ESS, v katerem so se izvajala usposabljanja za kratkoročno zaposlene delavce, je podjetje izkoristilo višjo stopnjo sofinanciranja, ki velja za mala in srednje velika podjetja (MSP), čeprav ni bilo MSP. (c) Projektu zaračunani previsoki stroški: v primeru projekta ESS za trg delovne sile, ki ga je izvajalo partnerstvo več organizacij, so partnerji za sofinanciranje prijavili stroške, ki so bistveno presegali dejansko nastale stroške. (d) Pomanjkanje dokazil za prijavljene stroške: v primeru projekta ESS za izobraževanje in usposabljanje se je zahtevalo povračilo stroškov na podlagi doseženih izložkov za udeležence.
However, for several audited participant files, there was no evidence to support the claimed outcome. 
Vendar pri več revidiranih spisih o udeležencih ni bilo nobenih dokazil o izložku, za katerega je bil vložen zahtevek za povračilo.
Specific weaknesses in the set-up of financial engineering instru­ ments 4.30. Financialengineeringinstruments(FEIs)canbeused to provide assistance by way of equity investment, loans or guarantees (9). 
Specifične slabosti pri vzpostavljanju instrumentov finančnega inženiringa 4.30 Instrumenti finančnega inženiringa (IFI) se lahko uporabljajo za zagotavljanje pomoči v obliki naložb v lastniške instrumente, posojil ali jamstev (9).
Subsequently financial support can be provided to final recipients and projects for activities which fall within the scope of the OP. 
Posledično lahko zagotavljajo finančno podporo končnim prejemnikom in projektom za dejavnosti, ki sodijo v obseg operativnega programa.
These FEIs are designed to have a revolving character. 
Ti IFI so zasnovani kot obnovljivi instrumenti.
Any resources returned from investments or loans made, including profits, are to accrue to the fund during its existence and after that must be used again for similar purposes. 
Vsa sredstva, ki se povrnejo iz naložb ali posojil, vključno z dobički, se vrnejo v sklad v času njegovega obstoja, potem pa morajo biti ponovno uporabljena za podobne namene.
4.31. TheRegulationspecifiesthatFEIscanbeusedfor three purposes: funds for the support of SMEs (including JEREMIE (Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises) (10)); for urban development (including JESSICA (Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas) (11)) and for the promotion of energy efficiency. _____________ (9) Article 44 of Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006. 
4.31 Uredba določa, da se lahko IFI uporabljajo za tri namene: sredstva za podpiranje MSP (vključno z JEREMIE (skupna evropska sredstva za mikro, mala in srednje velika podjetja) (10); za razvoj urbanih območij (vključno z JESSICA (skupna evropska podpora za trajnostne naložbe v mestna območja) (11) in za spodbujanje energetske učinkovitosti. _____________ (9) Člen 44 Uredbe (ES) št.
(10) JEREMIE is an initiative of the Commission together with the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Investment Fund (EIF) to support additional financing sources for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. 
(10) JEREMIE je skupna pobuda Komisije, Evropske investicijske banke (EIB) in Evropskega investicijskega sklada (EIS) za podpiranje doda­ tnih finančnih virov za mikro, mala in srednje velika podjetja.
(11) JESSICA is an initiative developed by the Commission and the EIB to make repayable investments (in the form of equity, loans or guarantees) in urban development. 
(11) JESSICA je pobuda Komisije in EIB za vračljive naložbe (v obliki lastniškega kapitala, posojil ali jamstev) v razvoj urbanih območij.
These investments are delivered to projects via Urban Development Funds and, if required, Holding Funds. 
Te naložbe so namenjene projektom prek skladov za razvoj urbanih območij in po potrebi prek holdinških skladov.
T H E C O M M I S S I O N ’ S R E P L I E S 4.30. In general, payments to funds are made according to the provisions of funding agreements. 
O D G O VO R I KO M I S I J E 4.30 Plačila za sklade se na splošno izvršijo v skladu z določbami iz sporazumov o financiranju.
In its guidance notes the Commission recommended that managing authorities should proceed prudently with payment of contributions from operational programmes to holding funds and financial engineering instruments in phases and in line with the underlying investment strategy and/or business plan (COCOF note II-2008: Q&A annex reply to question 10; COCOF note III-2011: points 2.4.5, 2.5.5, 2.5.6 and 5.3.6). 
Komisija je v svojih navodilih pripo­ ročila, naj upravljavski organi previdno in v fazah izvršujejo plačila prispevkov iz operativnih programov holdinškim skladom in instru­ mentom finančnega inženiringa ter skladno z ustrezno naložbeno strategijo in/ali poslovnim načrtom (COCOF, navodilo II, 2008, Priloga Vprašanja in odgovori, odgovor na vprašanje 10; COCOF, navodilo III, 2011, 2.4.5, 2.5.5, 2.5.6, 5.3.6).
TheCommissiondoesnothavedetailedinformation on the funding of FEIs. It estimates that FEIs with a total endowment of approximately 8,1 billion euro have been set up, which by the end of 2010 had received payments of 5,2 billion euro from 2007-2013 OPs. 
Ocenjuje, da so bili ustanovljeni IFI s skupnim dotiranim usta­ novitvenim kapitalom v višini približno 8,1 milijarde EUR, ki so do konca leta 2010 prejeli plačila v višini 5,2 milijarde EUR iz operativnih programov za obdobje 2007–2013.
According to Commission estimates this represents approximately half of the envisaged payments from OPs to funds for the current programming period. 
Po ocenah Komisije to predstavlja približno polovico predvidenih plačil iz operativnih programov v sklade za tekoče programsko obdobje.
The Court found compliance errors in seven of these 13 trans­ actions. 
Sodišče je v sedmih od teh 13 transakcij našlo napake v zvezi s sklad­ nostjo.
Most of these errors were due to the non-respect of regulatory requirements for making the contribution from the OP to the fund (see example 4.4). 
Večina teh napak je bila posledica neupoštevanja zahtev iz uredb glede prispevka iz operativnega programa v sklad (glej primer 4.4).
Example 4.4 Compliance errors in relation to financial engineering instruments (a) Excessive endowment of a guarantee fund managed by a regional financial body: In the case of an ERDF project, the Court found that several required elements (such as the investment strategy and planning, the description of an exit policy and the winding-up provisions) were not in place when the funding agreement was signed by the regional government and the regional agency implementing the fund. 
Primer 4.4 Napake v zvezi s skladnostjo pri instrumentih finančnega inženiringa (a) Previsoko dotiran ustanovitveni kapital jamstvenega sklada, ki ga upravlja regionalni finančni organ: pri enem projektu ESRR je Sodišče ugotovilo, da več zahtevanih elementov (kot so naložbena strategija in načrtovanje, opis izhodne politike in določbe o likvidaciji) še ni bilo določenih, ko sta regionalna vlada in regionalna agencija, ki je izvajala sklad, podpisali sporazum o financiranju.
Following the signature of this funding agreement, in the last week of December 2009, the endowment of the fund was increased from 17 million euro to 233 million euro (corresponding to 14 % of the total budget of the OP for the entire programming period). 
Po podpisu tega sporazuma o financiranju v zadnjem tednu decembra 2009 se je dotirani ustanovitveni kapital sklada povečal s 17 milijonov EUR na 233 milijonov EUR (kar predstavlja 14 % celotnega proračuna operativnega programa za celotno programsko obdobje).
Only in June 2010 was a business plan finally prepared and approved, albeit based on unrealistic assumptions. 
Poslovni načrt je bil končno pripravljen in odobren šele junija 2010 in je temeljil na nestvarnih predpostavkah.
A significant part of the OP’s funding committed by the MA in 2007 had not been spent at the end of 2009. 
Precejšen del sredstev operativnega programa, za katere je organ upravljanja prevzel obveznosti leta 2007, konec leta 2009 še ni bil porabljen.
Increasing the amount allocated to the guarantee fund made it possible to circumvent the n+2 rule in place at the time by which unused funds must be de-committed after 2 years. 
S povečanjem zneska, dodeljenega jamstvenemu skladu, je bilo mogoče zaobiti takrat veljavno pravilo n+2, v skladu s katerim morajo biti neporabljena sredstva po dveh letih razveljavljena.
By mid-2011, 1,5 million euro out of a total endowment of 233 million euro had been pledged against this fund. 
Do sredine leta 2011 je bilo iz tega sklada obljubljenih 1,5 milijona EUR od skupno 233 milijonov EUR dotiranega ustanovitvenega kapitala.
Article 44 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 does not require the Member States to provide such detailed data on FEIs to the Commission. 
1083/2006 ne zahteva, da države članice Komisiji zagotovijo tako natančne podatke o instru­ mentih finančnega inženiringa (IFI).
Nevertheless, the Commission obtained information on payments made to funds implementing FEIs from the managing authorities by the end of 2010, on a voluntary basis, to estimate progress of FEIs in supporting businesses. 
Do konca leta 2010 so upra­ vljavski organi Komisiji kljub temu prostovoljno zagotovili informacije o plačilih skladom, ki izvajajo IFI, da bi ocenila napredek IFI pri podpori podjetij.
The Commission intends to propose to amend the regulation to include appropriate reporting requirements for the rest of the 2007-2013 period. 
Komisija namerava predlagati spremembo Uredbe z vključitvijo ustreznih obveznosti poročanja za preostalo obdobje 2007–2013.
EN 114 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion 10.11.2011 T H E C O U R T ’ S O B S E R VA T I O N S (b) Delays in establishing a JEREMIE holding fund managed by the European Investment Fund (EIF): for this ERDF project a JEREMIE holding fund had been set up through a complex structure involving three OPs and four different Ministries contributing to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to be managed by the EIF. 
SL 114 UradnilistEvropskeunije 10.11.2011 U G O T O V I T V E S O D I Š Č A (b) Zamude pri ustanovitvi holdinškega sklada JEREMIE, ki ga upravlja Evropski investicijski sklad (EIS): za ta projekt ESRR je bil ustanovljen holdinški sklad JEREMIE prek zapletene strukture, ki je zajemala tri operativne programe in štiri različna ministrstva, ki so prispevala v pravno osebo s posebnim namenom listinjenja (special purpose vehicle), ki naj bi jo upravljal EIS.
After the signature of initial funding agreements with the EIF in October 2009, the MAs concerned declared expenditure which was certified to the Commission in December 2009. 
Po podpisu prvotnih sporazumov o financiranju z EIS oktobra 2009 so zadevni organi upravljanja prijavili odhodke, ki so bili Komisiji potrjeni decembra 2009.
This expenditure was related to the contribution to the holding fund from two of the three OPs to a transitional account managed by the EIF. 
Odhodki so se nanašali na prispevek v holdinški sklad iz dveh od treh operativnih programov na prehodni račun, ki ga upravlja EIS.
Negotiations regarding the SPV were, however, still ongoing with one of the Ministries in charge of managing the third OP. 
Vendar so pogajanja v zvezi s pravno osebo s posebnim namenom listinjenja z enim od ministrstev, pristojnim za upravljanje tretjega operativnega programa, še vedno potekala.
The final holding fund agreement between the EIF and the SPV was therefore signed only in late December 2010. 
Končni sporazum o holdinškem skladu sta torej EIS in pravna oseba s posebnim namenom listinjenja podpisala šele pozno decembra 2010.
As a consequence, the structure set up to implement the FEI was not operational during 2010 and the transfer of funds from the transitional account to the SPV took place only in 2011. (c) Irregular winding-up provision: In the case of an ERDF project, the agreement signed by the national ministry and the regional agency implementing the JEREMIE fund specified that, in the case of the winding-up of the fund, the remaining capital would be at the disposal of the regional government and should be transferred to the regional treasury. 
Zato struktura, vzpostavljena za izvajanje IFI, v letu 2010 še ni bila operativna in so bila sredstva s prehodnega računa na pravno osebo s posebnim namenom listinjenja prenesena šele leta 2011. (c) Nepravilna določba o likvidaciji: pri enem projektu ESRR je bilo v sporazumu, ki sta ga podpisala nacionalno ministrstvo in regionalna agencija, ki je izvajala sklad JEREMIE, določeno, da bo v primeru likvidacije sklada preostali kapital na voljo regionalni vladi in prenesen v regionalno zakladnico.
This provision is in breach of the regulatory requirement that resources returned can only be used for the benefit of small and medium-sized enterprises. 4.34. 
Ta določba pomeni kršitev zahteve iz uredbe, da se lahko vrnjena sredstva uporabijo samo v korist malih in srednje velikih podjetij.