natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In order to complete our picture of the EU economic governance, we decided to carry out an audit on arrangements related to fiscal stability. 
Da bi dobilo popolno podobo ekonomskega upravljanja EU, se je odločilo izvesti revizijo ureditev, povezanih s fiskalno stabilnostjo.
12 The audit was aimed at assessing whether the Commission’s actions to strengthen the budgetary framework of EU Member States, with reference to the three key components of (i) the fiscal rules and correction mechanism, (ii) MTBFs and (iii) IFIs (see Box 1), had achieved the intended results. 
12 Namen revizije je bil oceniti, ali so ukrepi Komisije za okrepitev proračunskih okvirov držav članic EU s tremi ključnimi elementi, in sicer (i) fiskalnimi pravili in popravljalnim mehanizmom, (ii) srednjeročnimi proračunskimi okviri in (iii) neodvisnimi fiskalnimi institucijami (glej okvir 1), dosegli načrtovane rezultate.
To this end, we examined whether: (a) the EU legal requirements on NBFs were effective; (b) the NBFs were strengthened through appropriate and clear interaction between the Commission, the IFIs and the EFB and (c) the Commission assessed appropriately how the EU legal requirements have been implemented and applied in the Member States. 
Sodišče je preučilo, ali: (a) so bile pravne zahteve EU glede nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov uspešne; (b) so se nacionalni proračunski okviri okrepili z ustrezno in jasno interakcijo med Komisijo, neodvisnimi fiskalnimi institucijami ter Evropskim fiskalnim odborom; (c) je Komisija ustrezno ocenila, kako se pravne zahteve EU izvajajo in uporabljajo v državah članicah.
13 We focused on the cases of the eight Member States in our audit sample (Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal and the Netherlands)20. Nevertheless, our analysis also addressed, where necessary, the cases of other Member States. 
13 Sodišče se je osredotočilo na osem držav članic v revizijskem vzorcu(Grčijo, Španijo, Francijo, Italijo, Latvijo, Luksemburg, Portugalsko in Nizozemsko)20, vendar je v analizi po potrebi obravnavalo tudi druge države članice.
We also analysed the role and position of the EFB in the EU fiscal framework. 
Poleg tega je analiziralo vlogo in položaj Evropskega fiskalnega odbora v fiskalnem okviru EU.
17 ECA special report 10/2016 ‘Further improvements needed to ensure effective implementation of the excessive deficit procedure’ (http://eca.europa.eu). 
10/2016 – Za zagotovitev uspešnega izvajanja postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem so potrebna dodatna izboljšanja (http://eca.europa.eu).
18 ECA special report 18/2018 ‘Is the main objective of the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact delivered?’ (http://eca.europa.eu). 
18 Posebno poročilo št. 18/2018 – Ali je dosežen glavni cilj preventivnega dela Pakta za stabilnost in rast? (http://eca.europa.eu).
19 ECA special report 03/2018 ‘Audit of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP)’ (http://eca.europa.eu). 
19 Posebno poročilo št. 03/2018 – Revizija postopka v zvezi z makroekonomskimi neravnotežji (http://eca.europa.eu).
20 These were euro-area Member States selected either because they had high debt, because their budgetary frameworks had shown significant improvement or because they had had an IFI in place for a long time. 11 
20 Te države članice euroobmočja so bile izbrane, ker imajo velik dolg, ker so se njihovi proračunski okviri znatno izboljšali ali ker imajo že dolgo vzpostavljeno neodvisno fiskalno institucijo. 11
14 We derived our audit criteria from various sources: (i) legal documents; (ii) Commission documents and benchmarks; and (iii) documents issued and standards developed by different EU Institutions, other international organisations or researchers. 
standardov, ki so jih izdale oziroma razvile različne institucije EU, druge mednarodne organizacije ali raziskovalci.
Further details are provided in the relevant sections of this report. 
Podrobnosti so na voljo v ustreznih delih tega poročila.
15 We collected our audit evidence based on: (a) a review of relevant Commission and EFB documentation; (b) a review of publications, guidelines and standards from international organisations (the IMF, the OECD, the World Bank) as well as relevant independent institutes and academic literature; (c) an online survey of IFIs in the EU to which 31 IFIs from 26 Member States21 responded; (d) interviews with staff from the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN); (e) interviews with staff from relevant Ministries, IFIs, Central Banks and think tanks in our sample of eight Member States to obtain feedback on the EU requirements and their application. 
15 Sodišče je revizijske dokaze zbralo na podlagi: (a) pregleda ustrezne dokumentacije Komisije in Evropskega fiskalnega odbora; (b) pregleda publikacij, smernic in standardov mednarodnih organizacij (MDS, OECD, Svetovne banke) ter ustreznih neodvisnih inštitutov in akademskih virov; (c) spletne ankete neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij v EU, na katero je odgovorilo 31 teh institucij iz 26 držav članic21; (d) pogovorov z uslužbenci Generalnega direktorata za gospodarske in finančne zadeve; (e) pogovorov z uslužbenci ustreznih ministrstev, neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij, centralnih bank in možganskih trustov v osmih državah članicah v vzorcu za zbiranje povratnih informacij o zahtevah EU in njihovem izvajanju.
16 This special report is intended to contribute to the discussions at the European Parliament and the Council on the 2017 draft Directive on strengthening fiscal responsibility and the medium-term budgetary orientation in the Member States as proposed by the Commission. 
16 Namen tega posebnega poročila je prispevati k razpravam v Evropskem parlamentu in Svetu o osnutku direktive iz leta 2017 o krepitvi fiskalne odgovornosti in srednjeročne proračunske usmerjenosti v državah članicah, ki jo je predlagala Komisija.
12 21 In 5 of the 28 Member States, 2 institutions share the tasks of an IFI. 
12 21 V petih od 28 držav članic si naloge neodvisne fiskalne institucije delita dve instituciji.
Observations The EU legal requirements provided impetus for improving national budgetary frameworks but leave room for improvement 17 As expected, the EU legislative actions (see paragraphs 05 to 10) provided an impetus to strengthening NBFs in EU Member States. 
Opažanja Pravne zahteve EU so spodbudile izboljšanje nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov, ki pa jih je mogoče še izboljšati 17 V skladu s pričakovanji so zakonodajni ukrepi EU (glej odstavke 05 do 10) spodbudili okrepitev nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov v državah članicah EU.
As Figure 1 illustrates, the number of national fiscal rules and IFIs have increased significantly following the adoption of Directive 2011/85. 
Kot je prikazano na sliki 1, se je število nacionalnih fiskalnih pravil in neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij po sprejetju Direktive 2011/85 znatno povečalo.
Figure 1 – National fiscal rules and IFIs in the EU Member States 13 (a) Number of national fiscal rules in Member States by type, 1990-2017 113 (b) Number of IFIs becoming operational in the EU per year 0 1926 1945 1989 1994 2001 2007 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2017 2018 120 100 80 60 40 20 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 64 102 103 106 77 01 1990 1995 2000 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Budget-balance rule Expenditure rule Debt rule Revenue rule Note: In 2011 (red line), Directive 2011/85 was adopted. 
Slika 1 – Nacionalna fiskalna pravila in neodvisne fiskalne institucije v državah članicah EU 13 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 (a) Število nacionalnih fiskalnih pravil v državah članicah glede na vrsto, 1990–2017 113 1990 1995 2000 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Pravilo o uravnoteženem proračunu Pravilo o odhodkih Pravilo o dolgu Pravilo o prihodkih 64 77 102 103 106 (b) Število neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij, ki so začele delovati v EU, po letih 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1926 1945 1989 1994 2001 2007 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2017 2018 Opomba: leta 2011 (rdeča črta) je bila sprejeta Direktiva 2011/85.
Source: ECA based on Commission’s data. 18 However, the different elements of NBFs are currently governed by a fragmented legal framework (see Figure 2). 
Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče na podlagi podatkov Komisije 18 Vendar različne elemente nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov sedaj ureja razdrobljen pravni okvir (glej sliko 2).
These different elements are: (i) the numerical fiscal rules, (ii) the correction mechanism, (iii) the MTBFs, (iv) the IFIs, and (v) the budgetary procedures. 
Ti elementi so: (i) numerična fiskalna pravila, (ii) popravljalni mehanizem, (iii) srednjeročni proračunski okviri, (iv) neodvisne fiskalne institucije in (v) proračunski postopki.
Figure 2 – Fragmentation of legal framework 14 Regulation 473/2013 2017 draft Directive Numerical fiscal rules Directive 2011/85 Fiscal Compact Correction mechanism MTBF IFIs Budgetary procedures ApplicabilitytoMember States 28* 22 (including 19 euro-area Member States) 19 euro-area Member States - Focused on Only vaguely referred to No new requirements Source: ECA, * Some provisions are not applicable for the United Kingdom. 
Slika 2 – Razdrobljenost pravnega okvira 14 Uredba št. 473/2013 Osnutek direktive iz leta 2017 Numerična fiskalna pravila Direktiva 2011/85 Fiskalni dogovor Korekcijski mehanizem Srednjeročni proračunski okvir Neodvisne fiskalne institucije Proračunski postopki Uporabnostv državahčlanicah 28* 22 (vključnoz19 državami članicami euroobmočja) 19 držav članic euroobmočja – Poudarjeno Le bežna omemba Brez novih zahtev Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče. * Nekatere določbe ne veljajo za Združeno kraljestvo.
19 Various acts of different legal nature (EU law and Intergovernmental Treaty) coexist: o o o their degree of enforceability varies (the Court of Justice of the EU can only rule on the transposition of the TSCG; in relation to the application of the TSCG, the EU institutions do not have any power to ensure that the national legislation transposing it is enforced); while certain provisions are enshrined in regulations, which are directly applicable, others are set out in a directive, which Member States are given time to transpose and are free to decide how to apply, resulting in greater heterogeneity of national frameworks; the degree of applicability to certain Member States varies, in particular depending on whether they are in the euro area. 
19 Obstajajo akti različne pravne narave (pravo EU in medvladna pogodba): o o o njihova stopnja izvršljivosti se razlikuje (Sodišče Evropske unije lahko odloča le o prenosu PSUU; kar zadeva uporabo PSUU, institucije EU nimajo pristojnosti, da bi zagotovile njeno izvrševanje), nekatere določbe so vključene v uredbe, ki se uporabljajo neposredno, druge pa so določene v direktivi, za katero imajo države članice čas, da jo prenesejo v svojo zakonodajo, in same odločajo o njeni uporabi, zato so nacionalni okviri bolj heterogeni, stopnja njihove veljavnosti se v nekaterih državah članicah razlikuje, kar je zlasti odvisno od tega, ali so članice euroobmočja.
20 The Commission drafted Directive 2011/85 within a very short period of time (three months). 
20 Komisija je predlog Direktive 2011/85 pripravila v zelo kratkem času (treh mesecih).
It emphasised that Directive 2011/85 should be regarded as a set of “minimum requirements”, rather than as representing best practice, or even the desirable features for an MTBF. 
Poudarila je, da je Direktiva 2011/85 zgolj sklop minimalnih zahtev in ne pomeni najboljše prakse ali celo zaželenih elementov srednjeročnega proračunskega okvira.
It stated that embedding best practices into the EU legal framework “would not have been compatible with the considerable differences across Member States' administrative and institutional structures”22. 
Navedla je, da vključevanje najboljših praks v pravni okvir EU ne bi bilo skladno z velikimi razlikami med upravnimi in institucionalnimi strukturami držav članic22.
22 European Commission (2012), ‘Report on public finances in EMU 2011’, p. 
22 Evropska komisija (2012), Report on Public Finances in EMU 2011, str.
National budgetary frameworks 
Nacionalni proračunski okviri
21 As mentioned in paragraph 09, the 2017 draft Directive was meant to incorporate the substance of the TSCG into EU law. 
21 Kot je navedeno v odstavku 09, je bil namen osnutka direktive iz leta 2017 vključiti vsebino PSUU v pravo EU.
The Commission did not opt for a word-by-word transposition but for what it calls a “teleological approach”, i.e. incorporation focusing on the Fiscal Compact's underlying objective: convergence to prudent levels of public debt. 
Komisija se ni odločila za dobesedni prenos, ampak za t. i. teleološki pristop, kar pomeni vključevanje s poudarkom na osnovnem cilju fiskalnega dogovora: približevanju preudarnim ravnem javnega dolga.
In practice, the 2017 draft Directive requires, among other things, an MTO in terms of a structural balance that ensures compliance with the debt-to-GDP ceiling enshrined in the TFEU, but without setting any numerical ceiling. 
V praksi je v skladu z osnutkom direktive iz leta 2017 med drugim potreben srednjeročni proračunski cilj v smislu strukturnega salda, ki zagotavlja skladnost z zgornjo mejo razmerja med javnim dolgom in BDP, kot je določeno v PDEU, vendar ne določa numerične zgornje meje.
22 The European Central Bank (ECB) stated in an opinion that “the provisions of this Directive deviate substantially from those of the Fiscal Compact, which may lead to a weakening of the rules of the Fiscal Compact”23. 
22 Evropska centralna banka je v mnenju navedla, da določbe te direktive bistveno odstopajo od določb fiskalnega dogovora, kar lahko privede do oslabitve pravil fiskalnega dogovora23.
In addition, it should be noted that the 2017 draft Directive was proposed before carrying out the review of the suitability of Directive 2011/85 (the “suitability review”) or the assessment on the functioning of the Two-Pack. 
Poleg tega je treba opozoriti na to, da je bil osnutek direktive iz leta 2017 predlagan pred pregledom ustreznosti Direktive 2011/85 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: pregled ustreznosti) in oceno delovanja zakonodajnega dvojčka.
23 We assessed whether requirements in the current legal framework were appropriate and whether the 2017 draft Directive addressed any identified shortcomings. 
23 Sodišče je ocenilo, ali so zahteve v sedanjem pravnem okviru ustrezne in ali so bile v osnutku direktive iz leta 2017 obravnavane katere od ugotovljenih pomanjkljivosti.
We did this for the following three aspects: (a) correction mechanism; (b) medium-term budgetary frameworks; (c) independent fiscal institutions. 
Ocena je bila izvedena za naslednje tri vidike: (a) popravljalni mehanizem; (b) srednjeročne proračunske okvire; (c) neodvisne fiskalne institucije.
Shortcomings in the provisions on the correction mechanism 24 Directive 2011/85 introduced for the first time the concept of a correction mechanism, referred to as “the consequences in the event of non-compliance”. Beyond this, however, it did not lay down specific requirements regarding its design and application. 
Pomanjkljivosti v določbah o popravljalnem mehanizmu 24 Z Direktivo 2011/85 je bil prvič uveden koncept popravljalnega mehanizma, imenovan „posledice v primeru neupoštevanja pravil”, vendar specifične zahteve glede njegove zasnove in uporabe niso bile določene.
25 The TSCG requires an automatic triggering of the correction mechanism in case of significant observed deviations from the MTO. 
25 V PSUU je določeno, da se mora popravljalni mehanizem samodejno sprožiti, če so ugotovljeni znatni odkloni od srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja.
It does not directly lay down specific requirements on the design and application of the mechanism, but tasked the Commission with producing common principles, which Member States should apply in designing national correction mechanisms. 
Specifičnih zahtev glede zasnove in uporabe mehanizma v pogodbi ni, vendar je določeno, da bo Komisija pripravila skupna načela, ki naj jih države članice uporabijo pri zasnovi nacionalnih popravljalnih mehanizmov.
The Commission issued these principles in June 2012. 
Komisija je ta načela izdala junija 2012.
26 Despite being endorsed at a political level24, the principles are not binding as they were published in a Commission Communication and thus have no legal effect other than serving as a basis for the mechanisms the contracting parties were to put in place. 
26 Čeprav so bila načela potrjena na politični ravni24, niso zavezujoča, saj so bila objavljena v sporočilu Komisije in torej nimajo pravnega učinka, razen da služijo kot podlaga za mehanizme, ki so jih pogodbenice morale uvesti.
As regards the activation of the correction mechanism (principle 3), the Commission has suggested that the correction mechanism’s trigger points could rely on either EU-level criteria, country-specific criteria, or both. 
Kar zadeva aktivacijo popravljalnega mehanizma (načelo 3), je Komisija predlagala, da bi se lahko pragovi za sprožitev določili bodisi na podlagi meril na ravni EU, meril, specifičnih za vsako državo, ali obojih.
However, two-thirds of Member States opted to mirror the EU-level criteria rather than having specific national ones. As a result, for these Member States, national correction mechanisms are unlikely to be triggered earlier than the EU correction mechanism under the preventive arm of the SGP. 
Dve tretjini držav članic sta se namesto za specifična nacionalna merila odločili za posnemanje meril na ravni EU, zato se za te države članice nacionalni popravljalni mehanizmi verjetno ne bodo sprožili prej kot popravljalni mehanizem EU iz preventivnega dela Pakta za stabilnost in rast.
27 Regulation 473/2013 lays down certain requirements, including the requirement that independent bodies should provide, where appropriate, assessments regarding the triggering and implementation of correction mechanisms. However, it does not fully reflect the Commission’s common principles, which had been issued half a year after the Commission’s proposal for Regulation 473/2013. 
473/2013 so določene nekatere zahteve, vključno z zahtevo, da neodvisni organi, kadar je to ustrezno, zagotovijo ocene o sprožitvi in izvajanju popravljalnih mehanizmov, vendar pa v njej niso v celoti upoštevana vsa skupna načela Komisije, ki so bila izdana pol leta po tem, ko je Komisija pripravila predlog Uredbe št. 473/2013.
For example, it does not indicate that: o the correction should be consistent with any recommendations made by the Commission to the Member State concerned under the SGP in terms of size and timeline (principle 2); o activation triggers may comprise EU-driven or country-specific criteria (principle 3); o larger deviations from the MTO or the adjustment path towards it should lead to larger corrections (principle 4). 
Ni na primer navedeno, da: o morajo biti popravki v smislu obsega in časovnega načrta skladni z morebitnimi priporočili, ki jih Komisija naslovi na zadevno državo članico na podlagi Pakta za stabilnost in rast (načelo 2); o lahko pragovi za sprožitev obsegajo merila, ki jih predlaga EU, ali merila, specifična za vsako državo (načelo 3); o večja odstopanja od srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja in prilagoditvene poti za njegovo dosego zahtevajo tudi obsežnejše popravke (načelo 4).
24 European Commission (2017), C(2017) 1201 final, ‘Report from the Commission presented under Article 8 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union’, p. 
Zahteva po 24 Evropska komisija (2017), C(2017) 1201 final, Report from the Commission presented under Article 8 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, str.
The requirement to take into account the nature and size of a deviation is vague, and may result in correction measures that are very broad and lacking in substance25. 
16 upoštevanju narave in velikosti odklona je nejasna ter lahko povzroči široke popravljalne ukrepe brez vsebine25.
Shortcomings in the provisions on medium-term budgetary frameworks 30 We compared the requirements set by Directive 2011/85 with the standards and best practices recommended by the IMF, the OECD and the World Bank at the time Directive 2011/85 was drafted. 
Pomanjkljivosti v določbah o srednjeročnih proračunskih okvirih 30 Sodišče je zahteve iz Direktive 2011/85 primerjalo s standardi in najboljšimi praksami, ki so jih v času priprave te direktive priporočali MDS, OECD in Svetovna banka.
Three of these standards and best practices were not taken up in Directive 2011/85 (see Table 1, lines in bold). 
Trije od teh standardov in najboljših praks v Direktivo 2011/85 niso bili vključeni (glej tabelo 1, vrstice v krepkem tisku).
Compared with the latest IMF/OECD standards and best practices, Directive 2011/85 falls short in respect of two more issues. 
V primerjavi z najnovejšimi standardi in najboljšimi praksami MDS/OECD ima Direktiva 2011/85 pomanjkljivosti tudi v zvezi z dodatnima dvema zadevama.
Thus, in total, 5 out of the 13 standards and best practices were not reflected in Directive 2011/85. This is despite the fact that, at the time Directive 2011/85 was drafted, the Commission’s views on these issues (see Annex II) were in line with those of international bodies. 
Vanjo torej ni bilo vključenih pet od 13 standardov in najboljših praks, čeprav so bila v času njene priprave stališča Komisije o teh vprašanjih (glej Prilogo II) v skladu s stališči mednarodnih organov.
17 25 ECB (2018), CON/2018/25. 
17 25 Evropska centralna banka (2018), CON/2018/25.
Table 1 – Differences between IMF/OECD standards and best practices and Directive 2011/85 requirements 18 MTBF Characteristics IMF/OECD Directive 2011/85 At least 3-year MTBF framework  Comprehensive coverage of general government  Full alignment with government's fiscal policy objectives and macroeconomic forecasts  Projections of future revenue and expenditure at current policies distinct from fiscal impact of new policy measures  Estimated cost of tax expenditure  Budget preparation process for capital and recurrent spending fully integrated  Reliable forward estimates of spending in out-years26  Assessment of long-term sustainability of public finance  A single process for preparing MTBF and annual budget, and fully integrated documentation  Forward-looking expenditure controls (carryovers, multiyear expenditure commitments, buffers, etc.)  Monitoring and accountability mechanisms  Indicative ceilings for out-years  Spending estimates for out-years rolled over from one MTBF to the next  Note:: included,: partially included,: not included Source: ECA based on OECD (2004), ‘The Legal Framework for Budget Systems’; IMF (2007), ‘Manual on Fiscal Transparency’; IMF (2010), Lienert, I. and Fainboim, I., ‘Reforming Budget Systems Laws’. 
Tabela 1 – Razlike med standardi in najboljšimi praksami MDS/OECD ter zahtevami Direktive 2011/85 18 Značilnosti srednjeročnega proračunskega okvira MDS/OECD Direktiva 2011/85/ES Vsaj triletni srednjeročni proračunski okvir  Dosledna vključenost sektorja države  Popolna usklajenost ciljev fiskalne politike vlade in makroekonomskih napovedi  Projekcije prihodkov in odhodkov v prihodnosti po trenutnih politikah, ločene od fiskalnega učinka novih ukrepov politike  Ocena stroškov davčnih odhodkov  V celoti povezan proces priprave proračuna za kapitalsko in periodično porabo  Zanesljive vnaprejšnje ocene porabe v letih zunaj proračuna26  Ocena dolgoročne vzdržnosti javnih financ  Enoten proces za pripravo srednjeročnega proračunskega okvira in letnega proračuna ter v celoti povezana dokumentacija  V prihodnost usmerjene kontrole odhodkov (prenosi, večletne obveznosti za odhodke, varovala itd.)  Mehanizmi za spremljanje in odgovornost  Okvirne zgornje meje za leta zunaj proračuna  Ocene porabe za leta zunaj proračuna, prenesene iz enega srednjeročnega proračunskega okvira v naslednjega  Opomba:: vključeno,: delno vključeno,: ni vključeno Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče na podlagi OECD (2004), The Legal Framework for Budget Systems; MDS (2007), Manual on Fiscal Transparency; MDS (2010), Lienert, I., in Fainboim, I., Reforming Budget Systems Laws 26 Vsako prihodnje leto, ki ni tekoče proračunsko/fiskalno leto.