natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Following an initial contract of the value of Ű2 million, DG ECHO provided Ű10 million to train Syrian medical personnel (doctors and nurses) so that they could work within the Turkish health system from March 2017 to March 2018. 
GD ECHO je po prvotni pogodbi v višini 2 milijonov EUR od marca 2017 do marca 2018 zagotovil 10 milijonov EUR za usposabljanje sirskega zdravniškega osebja (zdravnikov in medicinskih tehnikov), da bi ti lahko delali v okviru turškega zdravstvenega sistema.
After this date, the training activities continued thanks to an additional Ű11.5 million in funding channelled through EUTF Madad. 
Po tem datumu so se dejavnosti usposabljanja nadaljevale zaradi dodatnega financiranja v višini 11,5 milijona EUR it EUTF Madad.
Once trained, these people were assigned to a migrant health centre. 
Usposobljene osebe so bile dodeljene zdravstvenemu centru za migrante.
Their salaries were then paid by the Ministry of Health using funding received from the Ű300 million direct grant under the IPA special measure. 
Njihove plače je nato izplačevalo ministrstvo za zdravje iz sredstev, ki jih je prejelo iz neposrednih nepovratnih sredstev v višini 300 milijonov EUR iz posebnega ukrepa instrumenta za predpristopno pomoč.
Project 1, the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN, see Box 1), was designed in 2016 to build on existing national capacities with the objective of ensuring its sustainability through the integration of the refugees supported by the ESSN into the national social protection schemes. 
Projekt 1, mreža socialne varnosti v sili (ESSN, glej okvir 1), je bil zasnovan leta 2016, da bi nadgradil obstoječe nacionalne zmogljivosti s ciljem zagotavljati njegovo trajnostnost z vključevanjem beguncev, ki so prejemali podporo v okviru ESSN, v nacionalne sisteme socialne zaščite.
The CommissionŐs guidelines on cash transfers29 state that cash assistance, especially in a protracted crisis, should be provided with the intention that Ôlonger-term development efforts or government interventions [should take] over as soon as possible.Ő At the time of the audit, there was no clear exit strategy in place to set out who would take over responsibility for the ESSN after EU funding ended; and discussions were ongoing. 
Prehod naj bi bil predvidoma zaključen do 31. decembra 2018, z morebitno izjemo nekaterih specialističnih storitev. 27 V smernicah Komisije za nakazovanje sredstev29 je navedeno, da bi bilo treba denarno pomoč, zlasti če je kriza dolgotrajna, zagotavljati z namero, da bi morala to pomoč čim prej nadomestiti dolgoročnejša razvojna prizadevanja ali vladna posredovanja.
Although it was embedded in the national protection system, the ESSN was still totally dependent on EU funding. 
Čeprav je bila mreža ESSN vključena v nacionalni sistem zaščite, je bila še vedno v celoti odvisna od financiranja EU.
In a challenging context, the humanitarian projects helped refugees to address their basic needs, but did not always deliver the expected value for money We assessed the efficiency and effectiveness30 of the humanitarian assistance provided under the Facility, and considered in particular: (a) whether the Commission ensured that the costs of funded projects were reasonable in relation to the expected results, and whether projects were implemented in a timely manner; (b) whether the Commission monitored the FacilityŐs spending in a comprehensive manner and produced sufficient relevant information on the results achieved; and (c) whether the humanitarian projects delivered their intended outputs (i.e. what was produced or accomplished), and achieved their expected outcomes (i.e. changes arising from the outputs). 
Humanitarni projekti so v beguncem v težavnih razmerah pomagali obravnavati njihove osnovne potrebe, vendar niso vedno zagotovili pričakovane vrednosti za denar Sodišče je ocenilo učinkovitost in uspešnost30 humanitarne pomoči, zagotovljene v okviru instrumenta, pri čemer je preučilo zlasti: (a) ali je Komisija zagotovila, da so stroški financiranih projektov razumni glede na pričakovane rezultate in ali so bili projekti izvedeni pravočasno; (b) ali je Komisija celovito spremljala porabo instrumenta in pripravila dovolj relevantnih informacij o doseženih rezultatih ter (c) ali so se s humanitarnimi projekti zagotovili načrtovani izložki (tj. kar je bilo proizvedeno ali doseženo) in dosegli pričakovani izidi (tj. spremembe, ki izhajajo iz izložkov).
We reviewed 10 humanitarian projects, implemented under indirect (UN agencies) or direct (INGOs) management (See Annex III A). 
Sodišče je pregledalo deset humanitarnih projektov, ki so se izvajali v okviru posrednega (agencije ZN) ali neposrednega (mednarodne nevladne organizacije) upravljanja (glej Usmerjanje za partnerje, ki jih financira GD ECHO, za zagotavljanje srednje velikih do obsežnih nakazil sredstev v okviru načrta izvajanja humanitarne pomoči za leto 2017. „Učinkovitost” je najboljše razmerje med uporabljenimi viri in doseženimi izložki ali rezultati, „uspešnost” pa je to, koliko so bili cilji doseženi.
Despite delays in implementation, nine on-going projects31 were sufficiently advanced for us to report on the outputs delivered and the outcomes achieved at the time of the audit. 
Kljub zamudam pri izvajanju je bilo devet tekočih projektov31 v dovolj napredni fazi, da je Sodišče lahko poročalo o zagotovljenih izložkih in izidih, doseženih do časa revizije.
There is potential to improve the efficiency of projects The CommissionŐs assessment of the reasonableness of costs has weaknesses In the Humanitarian Implementation Plans 2016 and 2017 for Turkey, the Commission stated that supported actions should have an Ôoverarching emphasis on cost efficiency and effectivenessŐ. 
Učinkovitost projektov je mogoče izboljšati Ocena razumnosti stroškov, ki jo je izvedla Komisija, ima slabosti Komisija je v načrtih izvajanja humanitarne pomoči za Turčijo za leti 2016 in 2017 navedla, da bi morali imeti podprti ukrepi splošen poudarek na stroškovni učinkovitosti in uspešnosti.
We found that the Commission did not consistently and comprehensively assess the reasonableness of the budgeted costs when reviewing project proposals. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da Komisija pri pregledu projektnih predlogov ni dosledno in celovito ocenila razumnosti predvidenih stroškov.
In particular: (a) the ratio of administrative costs to operational costs was not appropriately assessed in five out of ten projects; (b) in four out of ten projects, there was no calculation of the cost per beneficiary. 
Zlasti: (a) razmerje med upravnimi in operativnimi stroški pri petih od desetih projektov ni bilo ustrezno ocenjeno; (b) pri štirih od desetih projektov ni bil izračunan strošek na upravičenca.
When the cost per beneficiary was calculated, it did not always lead to an assessment of whether the ratio obtained was reasonable. 
Kadar je bil strošek na upravičenca izračunan, ni bilo vedno ocenjeno, ali je razmerje razumno.
We acknowledge that the different environments in which the Commission works when providing humanitarian assistance can make the use of standard costs or quantitative benchmarks difficult. 
Sodišče priznava, da je lahko uporaba standardnih stroškov ali kvantitativnih meril zaradi različnih okolij, v katerih Komisija zagotavlja humanitarno pomoč, težavna.
Nevertheless, we consider that these tools could indeed be used, particularly for consecutive projects implemented by the same partners. 
Kljub temu meni, da bi ta orodja lahko uporabili, zlasti za zaporedne projekte, ki jih izvajajo isti partnerji.
For the five audited projects in this situation, the Commission did not carry out a thorough comparison between projects. 
Komisija pri petih takih revidiranih projektih ni izvedla temeljite primerjave med projekti.
For humanitarian projects implemented by UN partners, the Commission did not have a complete overview of the costs associated with subcontracting to (local) implementing partners. 
Komisija za humanitarne projekte, ki jih izvajajo partnerji ZN, ni imela popolnega pregleda nad stroški, povezanimi z oddajanjem v podizvajanje (lokalnim) izvedbenim partnerjem.
Without this overview, the Commission cannot comprehensively assess the reasonableness of costs. 
Brez tega pregleda ne more celovito oceniti razumnosti stroškov.
The ESSN has a high efficiency ratio but it could be more efficient Cash-based assistance allows for a better assessment of cost-efficiency as the level of aid that reached the final beneficiaries is easier to establish. 
ESSN ima visoko razmerje učinkovitosti, vendar bi bila lahko bolj učinkovita Denarna pomoč omogoča boljšo oceno stroškovne učinkovitosti, ker je lažje določiti raven pomoči, ki so jo prejeli končni upravičenci.
The cost-efficiency of the project is measured by comparing the amount directly received by the beneficiaries to other costs of the action (Ôefficiency ratioŐ). 
Stroškovna učinkovitost projekta se meri s primerjavo pomoči, ki jo neposredno prejmejo upravičenci, z drugimi stroški ukrepa („razmerje učinkovitosti”).
For the ESSN (see Box 1), the Commission had set up in 2016 an initial target efficiency ratio of 85:1532. This target ratio was increased to 87.5:12.5 in 2018. 
Komisija je za ESSN (glej okvir 1) leta 2016 določila prvotno ciljno razmerje učinkovitosti 85: 15.32 Leta 2018 se je to ciljno razmerje povečalo na 87,5: 12,5.
The sample included both actual and budgeted efficiency ratios. 
Vzorec je zajemal dejanska in predvidena razmerja učinkovitosti.
27 Box 5 - Examples of insufficient assessment of the reasonableness of costs The Commission neither analysed nor referred to the reasonableness of costs for project 4. 
29 Okvir 5 – Primeri nezadostne ocene razumnosti stroškov Komisija ni analizirala ali omenila razumnosti stroškov za projekt 4.
For project 10, the Commission assessed the ratio of administrative costs to operational costs as acceptable. 
Za projekt 10 je razmerje med upravnimi in operativnimi stroški ocenila kot sprejemljivo.
However, the Commission did not document the underlying analysis supporting the assessment made. 
Vendar Komisija ni dokumentirala analize, ki je bila uporabljena kot podlaga za to oceno.
Project 5 was a follow-up project from two previous grants implemented by the same INGO. 
Projekt 5 je bil nadaljevalni projekt iz dveh predhodnih sklopov nepovratnih sredstev, ki ga je izvajala ista mednarodna nevladna organizacija.
It initially aimed at providing several health services in Turkey, such as lifesaving health, physical rehabilitation, mental health, gender-based violence and protection. 
Prvotno je bil namenjen zagotavljanju več vrst zdravstvenih storitev v Turčiji, kot so zdravstvene storitve, ki rešujejo življenja, telesna rehabilitacija, duševno zdravje, nasilje na podlagi spola in zaščita.
The Commission calculated that the cost per beneficiary was Ű19.50 compared with Ű10.88 and Ű105.11 for the two previous grants. 
Komisija je izračunala, da je strošek na upravičenca znašal 19,50 EUR v primerjavi z 10,88 EUR in 105,11 EUR za predhodna sklopa nepovratnih sredstev.
Even if some activities were not identical, the analysis was not sufficiently documented to identify the reasons for this difference, or to determine whether it was reasonable. 
Tudi če nekatere dejavnosti niso bile enake, analiza ni bila dovolj dokumentirana, da bi se z njo lahko opredelili razlogi za to razliko ali da bi bilo na podlagi nje mogoče ugotoviti, ali je razlika razumna.
These Foundations receive the applications from refugees to join the ESSN, assess their eligibility and conduct household visits, acting through around 1 000 offices in Turkey. 
Te fundacije prejmejo vloge beguncev, ki se želijo vključiti v ESSN, ocenijo njihovo upravičenost in izvajajo obiske gospodinjstev, delujejo pa v okviru približno 1 000 uradov v Turčiji.
We also identified the following potential efficiency gains for the ESSN. (a) This project is implemented by a UN organisation that can claim up to 7 % of the total direct project costs to compensate for indirect costs incurred, e.g. management and administration costs incurred at the headquarters level. 
Sodišče je opredelilo tudi naslednje morebitno povečanje učinkovitosti ESSN. (a) Ta projekt izvaja organizacija ZN, ki lahko zahteva do 7 % skupnih neposrednih stroškov projekta za kritje posrednih stroškov, npr. stroškov upravljanja in upravnih stroškov na ravni sedeža.
We found that this percentage, although in accordance with the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement34 between the Commission and the UN, is normally applicable to projects that have a much lower budget. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da je ta delež sicer v skladu z okvirnim finančnim in upravnim sporazumom34 med Komisijo in ZN, vendar se običajno uporablja za projekte z veliko nižjim proračunom.
Because of the large scale of this project35, the budgeted indirect costs for the two phases was Ű64 million36. Despite the size of this amount, no supporting evidence was provided to demonstrate that this cost was reasonable and had been kept to the absolute minimum37. Instead, it was set to the upper limit. (b) The funding of the ESSN is transferred from the UN implementing partner to the bank through a local implementing partner. 
Zaradi velikega obsega tega projekta35 so znašali predvideni posredni stroški za obe fazi 64 milijonov EUR.36 Kljub višini tega zneska niso bila predložena dokazila, da je ta strošek razumen in tako nizek, kot je le mogoče.37 Namesto tega je strošek dosegel zgornjo mejo. (b) Finančna sredstva ESSN se od izvedbenega partnerja ZN na banko nakažejo prek lokalnega izvedbenega partnerja.
For the transfer of the funds, the local implementing partner receives a Ôcash transfer feeŐ, amounting to Ű8.9 million (calculated on the basis of 1 % of the total transfers to be made). 
Za nakazilo sredstev prejme lokalni izvedbeni partner „pristojbino za nakazilo denarja”, ki znaša 8,9 milijona EUR (ki se izračuna na podlagi 1 % skupnih načrtovanih nakazil).
Considering that funds could be transferred directly to the bank without channelling them through the local Article 19.4 of the general conditions of the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement. 
Poleg tega lokalni izvedbeni partner zaračuna še 7-odstotni pavšal za posredne stroške. Člen 19(4) splošnih pogojev okvirnega finančnega in upravnega sporazuma.
The percentage of indirect costs was 7 % under the first phase of the ESSN and 6.5 % under the second phase. 
Delež posrednih stroškov je znašal 7 % v okviru prve faze ESSN in 6,5 % v okviru druge faze.
This was a requirement under the technical annex of the Humanitarian Implementation Plan 2016 which mentioned ÔThe ESSN will, at a minimum, include the following distinctive features: (...) Overhead costs should be kept to an absolute minimum and duly justified.Ő 28 34 35 36 37 
To je bila zahteva iz tehnične priloge k načrtu izvajanja humanitarne pomoči za leto 2016, v kateri je navedeno, da bo imel ESSN med drugim vsaj naslednjo posebnost: režijski stroški bi morali biti čim nižji in ustrezno utemeljeni. 30 34 35 36 37
Furthermore, the local implementing partner charges a further 7 % flat rate for indirect costs. (c) The level of pre-financing paid is not appropriate. 
(c) Stopnja izplačanega predhodnega financiranja ni ustrezna.
In accordance with the legal framework governing the partnership between the EU and the UN, the Commission must pay pre-financing of 80 % of the total contracted amount before projects start. 
Komisija mora v skladu s pravnim okvirom, ki ureja partnerstvo med EU in ZN, pred začetkom projektov zagotoviti predhodno financiranje v višini 80 % skupnega zneska, za katerega so bile sklenjene pogodbe.
We found that this level of pre-financing is not adapted to the specific spending patterns of both of the audited cash-assistance projects (the ESSN and the CCTE). 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da ta stopnja predhodnega financiranja ni prilagojena posebnim vzorcem porabe obeh revidiranih projektov denarne pomoči (ESSN in CCTE).
For example, under the ESSN, Ű278 million for phase 1 and Ű520 million for phase 2 were paid upfront to the implementing partner. 
Na primer, v okviru ESSN je bilo izvedbenemu partnerju vnaprej izplačanih 278 milijonov EUR za prvo fazo in 520 milijonov EUR za drugo fazo.
However, the funds were to be disbursed on a linear basis over 16 and 13 months respectively. 
Vendar naj bi se sredstva izplačevala linearno v 16 oziroma 13 mesecih.
Under the CCTE phase 2, the Commission paid a Ű40 million advance in December 2017, whereas the first payment round is expected at the end of September 2018. 
Komisija je v okviru druge faze CCTE decembra 2017 zagotovila predplačilo v višini 40 milijonov EUR, prvi krog izplačil pa naj bi bil predvidoma izveden konec septembra 2018.
The eventual interest generated on the advance payments is kept by the implementing partners and is not reinvested in the ESSN or the CCTE. 
Morebitne obresti na predplačila obdržijo izvedbeni partnerji in se ne vložijo nazaj v ESSN ali CCTE.
Implementation delays undermined the efficiency of most audited projects Timeliness is an important aspect of efficiency. 
Zamude pri izvajanju so slabile učinkovitost večine revidiranih projektov Pravočasnost je pomemben vidik učinkovitosti.
It can also have an impact on cost efficiency because when a project is delayed, administrative costs such as rents and salaries may still have to be paid, which could lead to less funding being available for the final beneficiaries. 
Vpliva lahko tudi na stroškovno učinkovitost, saj je pri zamudi projekta mogoče vseeno treba kriti upravne stroške, kot so najemnine in plače, zaradi česar je morda za končne upravičence na voljo manj sredstev.
Nine out of ten audited projects were delayed and had to be extended, on average by 60 %38. In one case, the initial budget was revised upwards and in three cases, the budget was reduced because some of the planned activities could not be implemented (see Annex III A). 
Devet od desetih revidiranih projektov je imelo zamudo in jih je bilo treba podaljšati, v povprečju za 60 %.38 V enem primeru je bil prvotni proračun revidiran navzgor, v treh primerih pa je bil znižan, ker se nekatere načrtovane dejavnosti niso mogle izvesti (glej Prilogo III A).
We identified several reasons for these delays. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo več razlogov za te zamude.
In five cases, the delays were mainly caused by technical and administrative constraints associated with the projects, such as the unavailability of the necessary technical equipment or of experienced staff to implement the 29 38 On average, projects were initially planned for 12 months and were extended by 7 months. 
V petih primerih je do zamud prišlo predvsem zaradi tehničnih in upravnih ovir, povezanih s projekti, kot so nerazpoložljivost potrebne tehnične opreme ali izkušenega osebja za izvajanje projektov.
projects. In one case, the Commission granted an extension to allow a better transfer of activities to the national system. 
V enem primeru je Komisija dovolila podaljšanje, da bi omogočila boljši prenos dejavnosti v nacionalni sistem.
In three cases, constraints linked to the legal and regulatory framework imposed by the Turkish authorities on NGOs impeded the timely implementation of the projects39. 
V treh primerih so ovire, povezane s pravnim in regulativnim okvirom, ki so ga turški organi določili za nevladne organizacije, zavirale pravočasno izvajanje projektov.39 Zato je pri Projekti naj bi se po prvotnih načrtih v povprečju izvajali 12 mesecev, njihovo izvajanje pa se je podaljšalo za sedem mesecev.
Consequently, EU projects implemented by INGOs, which had been working in Turkey until that date, experienced significant delays or reductions in the scope of their activities. 
projektih EU, ki so jih izvajale mednarodne nevladne organizacije, ki so do takrat delale v Turčiji, prišlo do znatnih zamud ali zmanjšanja obsega njihovih dejavnosti.
Where appropriate, the Commission provided a flexible response by granting contract extensions and in some cases by revising the initial targets set. 
Komisija je, kadar je bilo to ustrezno, zagotovila prožen odziv z omogočanjem podaljšanja pogodb in v nekaterih primerih z revizijo sprva določenih ciljev.
The Commission also faced difficulties in obtaining the Turkish authoritiesŐ approval for the involvement of INGOs at funding stage. 
Komisija je imela tudi težave pri pridobivanju dovoljenja turških organov za sodelovanje mednarodnih nevladnih organizacij v fazi financiranja.
For instance, the MoFSP did not agree to authorise INGOs to carry out certain key protection activities, namely case management and household visits. 
Turško ministrstvo za družinsko in socialno politiko na primer ni hotelo izdati dovoljenj, s katerimi bi mednarodne nevladne organizacije lahko izvajale nekatere ključne dejavnosti zaščite, tj. vodenje zadev in obiske gospodinjstev.
The Commission had to cancel four projects with a total budget of Ű14 million even though they were considered relevant for funding to address the pressing need for protection of the refugee population. 
Komisija je morala odpovedati štiri projekte s skupnim proračunom v višini 14 milijonov EUR, čeprav so veljali za ustrezne za financiranje, saj bi obravnavali nujno potrebo po zaščiti beguncev.
Box 6 presents examples of delays and difficulties faced by projects. 
V okviru 6 so predstavljeni primeri zamud in težave, s katerimi so se soočali projekti.
30 Box 6 Đ Examples of delays and difficulties faced by projects Project 2 Đ Providing protection and durable solutions to refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey A key activity under project 2 was to assist the Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) with the verification, update and correction of the registration data of 2.7 million Syrian refugees. 
32 Okvir 6 – Primeri zamud in težav pri projektih Projekt 2 – Zagotavljanje zaščite in trajne rešitve za begunce in prosilce za azil v Turčiji Ključna dejavnost v okviru projekta 2 je bila pomagati turškemu generalnemu direktoratu za upravljanje migracij (GDMM) pri preverjanju, posodabljanju in popravljanju registracijskih podatkov za 2,7 milijona sirskih beguncev.
This project was implemented by a UN Agency. 
Ta projekt je izvajala agencija ZN.
The start of the verification exercise was delayed by seven months. 
Začetek preverjanja je bil zamaknjen za sedem mesecev.
The main reasons for the delays were the consequences of the July 2016 attempted coup, which led to internal changes within government institutions following the suspension of senior officials in the DGMM and additional security constraints. 
Glavni razlog za zamude so bile posledice poskusa državnega udara julija 2016, zaradi česar je prišlo do notranjih sprememb v vladnih institucijah po suspendiranju višjih uradnikov v generalnem direktoratu za upravljanje migracij in uvedbi dodatnih varnostnih omejitev.
In addition, the timing set at the design phase of the project had been overambitious considering the technical, capacity and administrative constraints, which existed at field level. 
Poleg tega je bil časovni razpored, določen v fazi zasnove projekta, pretirano ambiciozen glede na tehnične in upravne omejitve ter omejitve v zvezi z zmogljivostjo na terenu.
For 39 Many NGOs have been closed through governmental decrees or saw their activities significantly restricted through much stricter application of existing legal requirements or by imposition of new ones. For example, some INGOs had difficulties renewing their registration, opening bank accounts and obtaining work permits or the newly introduced cooperation permit for an INGO to work with local implementing partners. 
Zaradi teh težav je prišlo do dveh sprememb pogodbe, s katerima je bil rok podaljšan za 12 mesecev, proračun pa povečan za 8 milijonov EUR. podaljšanju svoje registracije, odpiranju bančnih računov in pridobivanju delovnih dovoljenj ali novouvedenih dovoljenj za sodelovanje, potrebnih za delo z lokalnimi izvedbenimi partnerji.