natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
7 By mid-April 2016, the Association Agreement had been ratified by the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament of Ukraine), the European Parliament had given its consent to the conclusion of the agreement, and 27 Member States had also ratified it (the Netherlands has not yet taken the final decision on the ratification following the negative outcome of a national referendum). 
7 Do sredine aprila 2016 je ukrajinski parlament ratificiral pridružitveni sporazum, Evropski parlament je odobril njegovo sklenitev, ratificiralo pa ga je tudi 27 držav članic (Nizozemska o tem po negativnem rezultatu nacionalnega referenduma še ni sprejela končne odločitve).
Parts of the Association Agreement have been applied on a provisional basis. 
Deli pridružitvenega sporazuma se začasno uporabljajo.
Introduction 11 EU financial assistance 08 Financial assistance, in the form of grants to help Ukraine implement the Action Plan, was provided mainly by means of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)8, which was replaced by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) in 20149. 
Uvod 11 Finančna pomoč EU 08 Finančna pomoč v obliki nepovratnih sredstev za pomoč Ukrajini pri izvajanju akcijskega načrta se je večinoma zagotavljala iz evropskega instrumenta sosed­ stva in partnerstva (ENPI)8, ki ga je leta 2014 zamenjal evropski instrument sosedstva (ENI)9.
ENPI bilateral assistance to Ukraine was programmed via the 2007-2013 Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and two national indicative programmes (2007-2010 and 2011-2013 NIPs). 
Dvostranska pomoč Ukrajini iz ENPI je bila načrtovana v držav­ nem strateškem dokumentu za obdobje 2007–2013 in dveh nacionalnih okvirnih programih (za obdobji 2007–2010 in 2011–2013).
No new CSP or NIP has been announced since then due to the difficult situation. 
Od takrat zaradi težavnih razmer ni bil najavljen noben nov državni strateški dokument ali nacionalni okvirni pro­ gram.
Most ENPI–ENI assistance (65 %) was granted using a sector budget support approach. 
Večina pomoči iz ENPI in ENI (65 %) je bila odobrena ob uporabi pristopa sektorske proračunske podpore.
Ukraine also received EU grants through the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. 
Ukrajina je nepovratna sredstva EU prejela tudi iz instrumenta za sodelovanje na področju jedrske varnosti ter instrumenta za prispevanje k stabilnosti in miru.
09 In addition to grants, the EU has provided Ukraine with macro-financial assistance (MFA), i.e. loans which are released in several instalments (‘tranches’) upon fulfilment of conditions related to the macro-economic situation and sectoral reforms. 
09 EU je Ukrajini poleg nepovratnih sredstev zagotovila tudi makrofinančno pomoč, tj. posojila, ki se sprostijo v več obrokih (tranšah) ob izpolnitvi pogojev, poveza­ nih z makroekonomskimi razmerami in sektorskimi reformami.
Table 1 shows the distribution of EU financial assistance to Ukraine in grants and loans during the 2007-2015 period. 
V tabeli 1 je prikazana porazdelitev finančne pomoči EU Ukrajini v nepovratnih sredstvih in posojilih v obdobju 2007–2015.
EU bilateral assistance to Ukraine, 2007-2015, allocation by instrument (million euro) 8 Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (OJ L 310, 9.11.2006, p. 
Dvostranska pomoč EU Ukrajini, obdobje 2007–2015, dodelitev po instrumentih (v milijonih EUR) 8 Uredba (ES) št. 1638/2006 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 24. oktobra 2006 o splošnih določbah o ustanovitvi Evropskega instrumenta sosedstva in partnerstva (UL L 310, 9.11.2006, str.
9 Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument (OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p. 
232/2014 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. marca 2014 o vzpostavitvi evropskega instrumenta sosedstva (UL L 77, 15.3.2014, str.
Total grants Total allocations1 Amount Share Overall EU assistance to Ukraine (including MFA) 5 019 100 % 1 609 32 % ENPI/ENI 2 1 330 27 % of which Budget support3, 4 794 16 % Other ENPI/ENI grants 536 11 % Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace Total macro-financial assistance (MFA) loans 54 1% Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 225 4% 3 410 68 % MFA I 610 12 % MFA II 1 000 20 % MFA III 1 800 36 % 1 Data until 30 November 2015. 
Nepovratna sredstva skupaj Dodelitve skupaj1 Znesek Delež Skupna pomoč EU Ukrajini (vključno z makrofinančno pomočjo) 5 019 100 % 1 609 32 % ENPI/ENI2 1 330 27 % od tega: proračunska podpora3, 4 794 16 % druga nepovratna sredstva iz ENPI/ENI 536 11 % Instrument za prispevanje k stabilnosti in miru Posojila v okviru makrofinančne pomoči skupaj 54 1% Instrument za sodelovanje na področju jedrske varnosti 225 4% 3 410 68 % Makrofinančna pomoč I (MFA I) 610 12 % Makrofinančna pomoč II (MFA II) 1 000 20 % Makrofinančna pomoč III (MFA III) 1 800 36 % 1 Podatki do 30. novembra 2015.
2 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument/European Neighbourhood Instrument. 
2 Evropski instrument sosedstva in partnerstva/evropski instrument sosedstva.
4 Excludes 29 million euros that were allocated to complementary actions (technical assistance). 
4 Ne zajema 29 milijonov EUR, ki so bili dodeljeni za dopolnilne ukrepe (tehnično pomoč).
Source: CRIS (Common Relex Information System) and DG Economic and Financial Affairs website (MFA). 
Vir: CRIS (skupni informacijski sistem RELEX) in spletna stran GD za gospodarske in finančne zadeve (makrofinančna pomoč).
Introduction 12 10 In March 2014, the Commission announced an indicative Ukraine support package of 11.2 billion euros, including up to 8 billion euros of EIB (European Investment Bank) and EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) loans for the 2014-2020 period to support the reform process (see paragraphs 17 to 18). 
Uvod 12 10 Marca 2014 je Komisija najavila okvirni sveženj podpore za Ukrajino v višini 11,2 milijarde EUR, ki je vključeval do 8 milijard EUR posojil EIB (Evropske inve­ sticijske banke) in EBRD (Evropske banke za obnovo in razvoj) za obdobje 2014– 2020, namenjenih podpori za proces reform (glej odstavka 17 in 18).
Specific context of EU 13 assistance to Ukraine The unstable political, economic and administrative situation hampered EU–Ukraine cooperation Negotiations for the Association Agreement reinforced EU– Ukraine dialogue 11 During the audited period, EU–Ukraine dialogue took place within a broadly structured framework which was shaped by negotiations and the subsequent provisional application of the Association Agreement. 
Specifični kontekst 13 pomoči EU Ukrajini Nestabilnost političnih, gospodarskih in upravnih razmer je ovirala sodelovanje med EU in Ukrajino Pogajanja o pridružitvenem sporazumu so okrepila dialog med EU in Ukrajino 11 V revidiranem obdobju je dialog med EU in Ukrajino potekal v ohlapno struktu­ riranem okviru, ki se je izoblikoval med pogajanji in nato med začasno uporabo pridružitvenega sporazuma.
Current EU–Ukraine cooperation efforts are guided by the Association Agreement signed in 2014 and the 2015 version of the Association Agenda. 
Sedanja prizadevanja za sodelovanje med EU in Ukrajino usmerjata pridružitveni sporazum, ki je bil podpisan leta 2014, in različi­ ca pridružitvenega načrta iz leta 2015.
High-level cooperation was discussed at the annual EU–Ukraine summits and the EU–Ukraine Cooperation/Association Council meetings. 
Razprave o sodelovanju na visoki ravni so potekale na letnih srečanjih na vrhu med EU in Ukrajino ter na zasedanjih svetov za sodelovanje/pridružitvenih svetov EU­Ukrajina.
To assist the Cooperation/Association Council, the EU–Ukraine Cooperation/Association Committee was set up, along with seven subcommittees in charge of monitoring progress on the Action Plan and the Association Agenda10. Visits by Commissioners and senior officials also contributed to the dialogue process. 
Za pomoč svetu za sodelova­ nje/pridružitvenemu svetu je bil ustanovljen odbor za sodelovanje/pridružitveni odbor EU­Ukrajina, pa tudi sedem pododborov, ki so zadolženi za spremljanje napredka pri izvajanju akcijskega načrta in pridružitvenega načrta.10 K procesu dialoga so prispevali tudi obiski komisarjev in višjih uradnikov.
Public finance management, the fight against corruption and energy were formally included within the remit of the dialogue process. 
Naloge v okviru procesa dialoga so formalno vključevale upravljanje javnih financ, boj proti ko­ rupciji in energetiko.
Political and administrative instability slowed the pace of EU–Ukraine dialogue and the progress of reforms 12 Political instability in Ukraine strongly affected the EU–Ukraine cooperation and the implementation of EU assistance. 
Politična in upravna nestabilnost je upočasnila dialog med EU in Ukrajino ter napredek reform 12 Politična nestabilnost v Ukrajini je močno vplivala na sodelovanje med EU in Ukrajino ter na izvajanje pomoči EU.
Between 2004 and 2014, Ukraine experienced three significant political changes (see paragraph 2), leading to major shifts in the political orientation of the country, especially towards its European aspirations. 
Med letoma 2004 in 2014 je v Ukrajini prišlo do treh velikih političnih sprememb (glej odstavek 2), ki so povzročile velike pre­ mike v politični usmeritvi države, predvsem v zvezi z njenimi evropskimi težnja­ mi.
These changes had a significant impact on legislation, such as backtracking on accepted legislation and counter-revisions, and on the stability of public administration, especially at mid-and senior-management levels. 
Te spremembe so močno vplivale na zakonodajo (na primer z razveljavljanjem sprejete zakonodaje in vračanjem spremenjene zakonodaje v prejšnje stanje) in na stabilnost javne uprave, zlasti na ravni srednjega in višjega vodstva.
13 Over the audited period, Ukrainian public administration underwent several attempts at restructuring (e.g. in 2010-2011). 
13 V revidiranem obdobju je bilo več poskusov prestrukturiranja ukrajinske javne uprave (npr. v letih 2010 in 2011).
Until 2014, the restructuring process was hampered by a lack of political will to comply with EU governance standards. 
Do leta 2014 je proces prestrukturiranja oviralo pomanjkanje politične volje za izpolnjevanje standardov EU za upravljanje.
It was carried out in an ineffective manner and affected the implementation of EU programmes on the ground. 
Pro­ ces je bil opravljen neuspešno in je vplival na izvajanje programov EU na terenu.
We found that at the time of the audit, there was a strong political commitment to public administration reform. However, the rotation of mid and senior management jeopardised the reforms supported by EU assistance and the sustainability of results, while low salaries created a potential incentive to corruption. 
Ugotovili smo, da je v času revizije obstajala močna politična zavezanost reformi javne uprave, toda zaradi menjav srednjega in višjega vodstva so bile ogrožene reforme, ki jih je podpirala pomoč EU, in trajnost rezultatov, nizke plače pa so bile potencialna spodbuda za korupcijo.
10 At the time of the audit, the new cooperation entities required by the Association Agenda were in the process of being established. 
10 V času revizije je potekalo ustanavljanje novih organov za sodelovanje, zahtevanih v pridružitvenem načrtu.
Specific context of EU assistance to Ukraine 14 14 We found that in the wake of Maidan, cooperation advanced in a number of areas that had been stagnating throughout the 2007-2013 period (e.g. public procurement reform and reorganisation in the energy sector). 
Specifični kontekst pomoči EU Ukrajini 14 14 Ugotovili smo, da je po majdanskih dogodkih sodelovanje, ki je v celotnem ob­ dobju 2007–2013 stagniralo, napredovalo na več področjih (npr. reforma javnega naročanja in reorganizacija v energetskem sektorju).
However, the economic and geopolitical challenges faced by Ukraine heavily affect government priorities and the activities of the public services. 
Na prioritete vlade in dejav­ nosti javnih služb pa so močno vplivali ukrajinski gospodarski in geopolitični izzivi.
Since 2010, the Commission has increasingly emphasised the risks posed by the oligarchic system 15 We found that since 2010, the Commission has been more outspoken about the risks posed by the oligarchic system in Ukraine, such as dysfunctional public administration, top-down corruption and public finances used to advance private goals11. The Commission assessed the risk of conflicts of interest at all levels of Ukrainian administration as very high, and sought to moderate the risk by means of formal dialogue and budget support suspensions. 
Komisija od leta 2010 vse bolj poudarja tveganja, ki jih povzroča oligarhični sistem 15 Ugotovili smo, da Komisija od leta 2010 bolj odkrito omenja tveganja, ki jih povzroča oligarhični sistem v Ukrajini, kot so nedelujoča javna uprava, korupcija od zgoraj navzdol ter uporaba javnih financ za doseganje zasebnih ciljev.11 Komi­ sija je ocenila, da je tveganje nasprotij interesov na vseh ravneh ukrajinske uprave zelo visoko, in si je prizadevala, da bi to tveganje zmanjšala s formalnim dialogom in začasnim zadržanjem proračunske podpore.
Hope was also placed in the implementation of the strategies for public finance management reform (2013) and anti-corruption (2014)12. Regarding the specific issue of privatisation, EU budget support and macro-financial assistance programmes did not include conditions to ensure that future privatisations are open and fair. 
Veliko se je pričakovalo tudi od izvajanja strategije za reformo upravljanja javnih financ (2013) in protikorupcij­ ske strategije (2014).12 Glede privatizacije proračunska podpora EU in programi makrofinančne pomoči niso vsebovali pogojev, s katerimi bi se zagotovili odpr­ tost in poštenost privatizacij v prihodnosti.
However, the Commission supported the IMF’s (International Monetary Fund) privatisation goals by referring to IMF programme implementation in the MFA conditionalities. 
Vseeno pa je Komisija podprla priva­ tizacijske cilje Mednarodnega denarnega sklada tako, da se je pri pogojevanju za makrofinančno pomoč sklicevala na izvajanje njegovega programa.
16 Legal initiatives since the beginning of 2015 have sought to break the oligarchs’ hold over Ukraine’s politics and economy. However, the level of risk remains high (see Box 1) and concrete results are still below expectations (see paragraph 63). 
16 Od začetka leta 2015 se je skušalo s pravnimi pobudami zatreti vpliv oligar­ hov na politiko in gospodarstvo Ukrajine, vendar stopnja tveganja ostaja visoka (glej okvir 1), konkretni rezultati pa so še vedno pod pričakovanji (glej odstavek 63).
11 EAMRs 2010, 2011, 2012 (not publicly available). 
11 Poročila o upravljanju zunanje pomoči 2010, 2011, 2012 (niso javno dostopna).
12 European Commission Risk Management Framework for Ukraine, Risk Register 2012-2014 (not publicly available). 
12 Okvir Evropske komisije za obvladovanje tveganja za Ukrajino, register tveganj 2012–2014 (ni javno dostopen).
Activation of the Ukrainian authorities’ campaign against the oligarchy In 2015, the Ukrainian government initiated a campaign in line with EU requirements to loosen the oligarchs’ grip on the country’s economic and political system. 
Začetek kampanje ukrajinskih organov proti oligarhiji Ukrajinska vlada je leta 2015 v skladu z zahtevami EU začela kampanjo, s katero naj bi zmanjšala moč, ki jo imajo oligarhi v gospodarskem in političnem sistemu države.
Under this initiative, various investigations and prosecutions were launched and the assets of some oligarchs were placed under scrutiny, in particular in the energy sector. 
V okviru te pobude je bilo uvedenih več preiskav in pregonov, premoženje nekaterih oligarhov, zlasti v energetskem sektorju, pa se je začelo nadzorovati.
However, these measures were sporadic and controversial, and faced strong opposition from past and current oligarchs. 
Toda ti ukrepi so bili sporadični in kontroverzni, nekdanji in sedanji oligarhi pa so jim močno nasprotovali.
Some of the oligarchs took their own initiatives for proposing reforms for Ukraine13. 13 For example, the Agency for the Modernisation of Ukraine — a non-governmental organisation headquartered in Vienna and financed by a Ukrainian oligarch active in the energy sector — was launched in March 2015 to present an own, separate Ukraine modernisation action plan and establish a restoration fund. 
Nekateri oligarhi so sami prevzeli pobudo pri predlaganju reform v Ukrajini.13 13 Marca 2015 je bila na primer vzpostavljena agencija za modernizacijo Ukrajine (nevladna organizacija s sedežem na Dunaju; financira jo ukrajinski oligarh v energetskem sektorju), da bi predstavila svoj, ločen načrt za modernizacijo Ukrajine in ustanovila sklad za obnovo.
The Agency hired figures who had formerly been prominent at EU and Member State level. 
Agencija je zaposlila osebe, ki so bile prej na uglednih položajih v EU in državah članicah.
As the Agency’s activities largely duplicate those of the Ukrainian government and the EU, there is a risk of confusion with the EU’s official assistance to Ukraine. 
Dejavnosti agencije v veliki meri podvajajo dejavnosti ukrajinske vlade in EU, zato obstaja tveganje, da jih bodo zamenjevali z uradno pomočjo EU za Ukrajino.
Specific context of EU assistance to Ukraine 15 The EU response to the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, 14 See http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_IP-14-219_ en.htm and, for further details, http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_MEMO-14-159_en.htm. although prompt, was an emergency solution The Commission’s March 2014 financing package consisted mainly of potential loans 17 On 5 March 2014, the Commission announced an indicative package of 11.2 billion euros for 2014-2020 (see Table 2) to help stabilise the economic and financial situation in Ukraine, assist with the transition process, encourage political and economic reforms, and support inclusive development14. 
Specifični kontekst pomoči EU Ukrajini 15 Odziv EU na ukrajinsko krizo leta 2014 je bil sicer hiter, Finančni sveženj Komisije iz marca 2014 je v glavnem vseboval morebitna posojila 17 5. marca 2014 je Komisija napovedala okvirni sveženj za obdobje 2014–2020 z 11,2 milijarde EUR (glej tabelo 2) za stabilizacijo gospodarskih in finančnih razmer v Ukrajini, pomoč pri procesu prehoda v novo družbeno ureditev, spod­ bujanje političnih in gospodarskih reform ter podporo vključujočemu razvoju.14 Glede na nujnost razmer je Komisija hkrati s politično napovedjo (5. marca 2014) pripravila ta sveženj, ne da bi izčrpno analizirala, kako je bila pomoč izračunana ali kakšne so ureditve za sodelovanje z drugimi donatorji, finančna tveganja za EU pa niso bila niti ustrezno upoštevana niti dokumentirana.
Analysis and documentation followed later, accompanying the Commission proposals for legislative acts. 
Analiza in dokumen­ tacija sta bili pripravljeni pozneje, in sicer sta bili priloženi predlogom zakonodaj­ nih aktov, ki jih je pripravila Komisija.
EU support for Ukraine — Indicative Package for 2014-2020, as announced on 5 March 2014 Source of financing Indicative amounts (million euro) I. EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014-2020) I.1 Overall development assistance (grants) 1 565 Bilateral allocation (mainly European Neighbourhood Instrument): - Annual Action Programme (AAP) for 2014 140-200 - AAPs (average) - for 2015-2020 780 - Umbrella programme (‘more for more’) for 2015-2020 240-300 Neighbourhood Investment Facility 200-250 Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) 20 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 15 I.2 Macro-financial assistance (loans)1 1 610 II INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EIB up to 3 000 EBRD 5 000 GRAND TOTAL 11 175 1 In addition, a new MFA loan (MFA III) of 1.8 billion euros was granted in 2015. 
Podpora EU za Ukrajino – okvirni sveženj za obdobje 2014–2020, kot je bil napovedan 5. marca 2014 14 Glej http://europa.eu/rapid/ press­release_IP­14­219_ sl.htm, za dodatne podrobnosti pa http://europa. eu/rapid/ press­release_MEMO­14­ 159_en.htm. vendar je bil rešitev v sili Vir financiranja Okvirni zneski (v milijonih EUR) I. EVROPSKA KOMISIJA (2014–2020) I.1 Celotna razvojna pomoč (nepovratna sredstva) 1 565 Dvostransko dodeljena sredstva (predvsem evropski instrument sosedstva): - letni akcijski program za leto 2014 140–200 - letni akcijski programi (v povprečju) za obdobje 2015–2020 780 - krovni program („več za več”) za obdobje 2015–2020 240–300 Sklad za spodbujanje naložb v sosedstvo 200–250 Instrument za prispevanje k stabilnosti in miru 20 Skupna zunanja in varnostna politika (SZVP) 15 I.2 Makrofinančna pomoč (posojila)1 1 610 II. MEDNARODNE FINANČNE INSTITUCIJE EIB do 3 000 EBRD 5 000 SKUPNI SEŠTEVEK 11 175 1 Poleg tega je bilo leta 2015 odobreno novo posojilo v okviru makrofinančne pomoči (MFA III) v višini 1,8 milijarde EUR.
Specific context of EU assistance to Ukraine 16 18 In itself, the March 2014 financial package consisted mostly (71.5 %) of potential loans to Ukraine from the EIB and the EBRD. 
Specifični kontekst pomoči EU Ukrajini 16 18 Finančni sveženj iz marca 2014 je sam po sebi vseboval večinoma (71,5 %) mo­ rebitna posojila EIB in EBRD Ukrajini.
There is no certainty that EIB and EBRD allocations will be fully disbursed15. The package increased the value of grants to around 220 million euros per year until 2020, up from around 140 million euros per year during 2007-2013. 
Nikakršne gotovosti ni, da bodo sredstva, dodeljena EIB in EBRD, v celoti izplačana.15 Sveženj je povečal vrednost nepo­ vratnih sredstev s približno 140 milijonov EUR letno v obdobju 2007–2013 na približno 220 milijonov EUR letno do leta 2020.
However, the grants under the umbrella programme (based on the ‘more for more’ principle) are not guaranteed as they are conditional upon proven progress in deepening democracy and respecting human rights. 
Vendar pa nepovratna sredstva v okviru krovnega programa (ki temelji na načelu „več za več”) niso zajamčena, saj so pogojena z dokazanim napredkom pri poglabljanju demokracije in spošto­ vanju človekovih pravic.
On the other hand, disbursements under MFA (2.21 billion euros out of 3.41 billion euros) already exceed the indicative amount of the package announced in March 2014. 
Po drugi strani izplačila v okviru makrofinančne pomoči (2,21 milijarde EUR od 3,41 milijarde EUR) že presegajo okvirni znesek svežnja, ki je bil napovedan marca 2014.
We found that the macro-financial assistance instrument managed by the Commission was the most effective means of rapidly disbursing the support promised to Ukraine for dealing with its difficult financial situation (see paragraph 43). 
Ugotovili smo, da je bilo najuspešnejše sredstvo za hitro izplačevanje podpore, obljubljene Ukrajini za reševanje njenih težkih finančnih razmer, instrument makrofinančne pomoči, ki ga upravlja Komisija (glej odstavek 43).
The Commission used special measures to address the crisis in Ukraine rapidly 19 EU policy towards Ukraine is supported by a number of strategic documents setting principal objectives and priorities and aiming to make EU policy consistent and effective. 
Komisija je uporabila posebne ukrepe za hitro obravnavanje krize v Ukrajini 19 Podlaga za politiko EU v zvezi z Ukrajino je več strateških dokumentov, v katerih so določeni glavni cilji in prednostne naloge in s katerimi se skuša doseči, da bi bila politika EU dosledna in uspešna.
However, such strategic documents were not designed to guide policymaking in a crisis situation like the one that began in Ukraine in November 2013. 
Takšni strateški dokumenti pa niso zasno­ vani za usmerjanje oblikovanja politik v kriznih razmerah, kakršne so se začele v Ukrajini novembra 2013.
The Commission was obliged to cope with radical changes quickly and without a predefined strategy. 
Komisija se je morala hitro in brez vnaprej oblikovane strategije odzivati na radikalne spremembe.
20 Due to the crisis, the multi-annual programming procedure for Ukraine was put on hold. 
20 Zaradi krize je bil postopek večletnega programskega načrtovanja za Ukrajino ustavljen.