natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
169 A number of variables can account for fluctuations in the two components of the trade balance. 
169 Nihanje obeh komponent trgovinske bilance lahko povzroči več spremenljivk.
These include external shocks (affecting exports), an unexpected trend in GDP (affecting imports) and unexpected swings in competitiveness (affecting both). 
Te vključujejo zunanje pretrese (kar vpliva na izvoz), nepričakovano gibanje BDP (kar vpliva na uvoz) in nepričakovana nihanja konkurenčnosti (kar vpliva na oboje).
172 In Portugal and Hungary the trade balance adjustment was more or less in line with projections, but this was achieved only because both exports and imports were below the level initially expected. 
172 Na Portugalskem in Madžarskem je bila prilagoditev salda trgovinske bilance bolj ali manj v skladu s projekcijami, vendar je bilo to doseženo le, ker sta bili ravni izvoza in uvoza manjši, kot je bilo prvotno pričakovano.
Around 80 % of this unexpected contraction in imports can be explained by GDP underperformance. 
Približno 80 % tega nepričakovanega uvoznega krča je mogoče razložiti s podpovprečno uspešnostjo z vidika BDP.
Nevertheless, even for these two countries some competitiveness gains are apparent; for instance the ratio of exports to GDP increased compared with the pre-programme period. 
Kljub temu je celo pri teh dveh državah opaziti določeno povečanje konkurenč-nosti: na primer delež izvoza v BDP se je povečal v primerjavi z obdobjem pred začetkom programa.
Internal devaluation worked through the adjustment of the wages of the newly hired 173 Internal devaluation was a key element of macroeconomic strategy in three countries (Latvia, Ireland and Portugal). 
Notranja devalvacija se je izvajala s prilagoditvijo plač novozaposlenih 173 Notranja devalvacija je bila ključni element makroekonomske strategije v treh državah (Latvija, Irska in Portugalska).
This should occur because public-sector adjustments free up resources, thus increasing labour availability for the private sector and depressing pay levels in the economy at large. 
Do tega bi moralo priti, ker prilagoditve v javnem sektorju sprostijo vire ter tako povečajo razpoložljivost delovne sile za zasebni sektor in znižajo ravni plač v gospodarstvu na splošno.
Reduced aggregate demand should contribute to the price and wage adjustment in the economy. 
Manjše skupno povpraševanje bi moralo prispevati k prilagoditvi cen in plač v gospodarstvu.
In absence of national currencies, internal devaluation is a key strategy for adjustment of price levels within a currency union. 
Ker zadevne države nimajo lastne valute, je notranja devalvacija ključna strategija za prilagoditev ravni cen znotraj valutne unije.
98 As indicated by various macroeconomic indicators of competitiveness, such as the real effective exchange rate, real unit labour costs and labour productivity, as well as composite indicators such as the global competitiveness ranking. 
98 Kot kažejo različni makroekonomski kazalniki konkurenčnosti, kot je realni efektivni menjalni tečaj, realni stroški dela na enoto in produktivnost dela, ter sestavljeni kazalniki, kot je indeks svetovne konkurenčnosti.
99 The main reason was that a large share of total Irish exports goes outside the euro area. 
99 Glavni razlog je bil, da Irska veliko izvaža v države zunaj evrskega območja.
Ireland therefore benefited from the euro’s depreciation against the US dollar, which was not part of the initial programme forecast. 
Irski je tako koristil upad vrednosti EUR v primerjavi z USD, kar ni bilo predvideno v prvotni programski napovedi.
The euro's depreciation also increased the value of imports to Ireland. 
Nižja vrednost EUR je poleg tega povečala vrednost uvoženega blaga na Irsko.
The import content of Ireland’s exports — the proportion of exports produced using imports of intermediate goods and services — is high, at around 50%. 
Delež uvoza v izvozu pri Irski – delež izvoza, proizvedenega z uporabo uvoženega vmesnega blaga in storitev, je visok, in sicer približno 50 %.
100 The Commission defines internal devaluation as policies aiming ‘to reduce domestic prices either by affecting relative export-import prices or by lowering domestic production costs and thereby yielding a real exchange rate depreciation.’ 
100 Komisija notranjo devalvacijo opredeljuje kot politike, namenjene zmanjševanju domačih cen z vplivanjem na relativne izvozne-uvozne cene ali z nižanjem stroškov domače proizvodnje, s čimer se doseže znižanje realnega menjalnega tečaja.
Source: European Commission: Quarterly report on the euro area, III/2011, Volume 10, p. 
Vir: Evropska komisija: Quarterly Report on the Euro Area (četrtletno poročilo o evrskem območju), III/2011, zvezek 10, str.
Part IV — Programmes met their objectives 69 174 In Latvia, internal devaluation worked mainly by affecting the pay of newly hired workers, while the salaries of incumbent workers in the private sector hardly declined at all. 
Del IV – Programi so dosegli svoje cilje 69 174 V Latviji se je notranja devalvacija izvajala predvsem z zmanjševanjem plač novozaposlenih delavcev, plače že zaposlenih delavcev v zasebnem sektorju pa so komajda kaj upadle.
Part of the wage adjustment happened through the adjustment of undeclared wages, but the magnitude was limited (see Box 11). 
Del prilagoditve plač je pripisati prilagoditvi neprijavljenih plač, vendar v omejenem obsegu (glej okvir 11).
The impact of internal devaluation on pay levels in Latvia Internal devaluation was regarded as a key pillar of the Latvian adjustment. 
Učinek notranje devalvacije na ravni plač v Latviji Notranja devalvacija je bila obravnavana kot ključni steber latvijskega prilagajanja.
One reason why internal devaluation was expected to work was the belief that the labour market is particularly flexible. 
Eden od razlogov za pričakovani uspeh notranje devalvacije je bilo prepričanje, da je trg dela precej prožen.
In practice the reduction observed in private-sector pay was relatively small101. While wage growth slowed quite rapidly in both the public and private sectors as the crisis developed during 2008, turning negative in 2009102, both the depth and the duration of negative wage growth was much smaller in the private sector. 
V praksi je bilo opaženo znižanje plač v zasebnem sektorju razmeroma majhno.101 Ob izbruhu krize leta 2008 se je sicer rast plač dokaj hitro zmanjšala v javnem in zasebnem sektorju in je leta 2009102 postala negativna, vendar sta bila obseg in trajanje negativne rasti plač v zasebnem sektorju veliko manjša kot v javnem.
The largest year-on-year decline in private-sector pay was 6.6 % (in October 2009), while the largest public-sector fall was just over 26 % (in November 2009). 
Največji padec plač v zasebnem sektorju glede na enak čas v predhodnem letu je znašal 6,6 % (oktobra 2009), v javnem sektorju pa nekaj več kot 26 % (novembra 2009).
The aggregate wage dynamics do not capture the underlying process of the adjustment or allow for the possible explanation that it was partly located in the sphere of undeclared wage payments (‘envelope wages’). 
Skupna dinamika plač ne zajema s tem povezanega procesa prilagajanja niti ne upošteva mogoče razlage, da je ta deloma potekala na področju neprijavljenih plač („plač v kuverti”).
The analysis of data on individuals pay103 shows that the wages of workers hired during the recession were significantly lower than those enjoyed by incumbent workers, which hardly declined at all. 
Analiza podatkov o plačah posameznikov103 kaže, da so bile plače delavcev, ki so se zaposlili med recesijo, znatno nižje od plač že zaposlenih delavcev, ki so se komaj kaj zmanjšale.
This result is consistent with evidence found in the relevant literature suggesting that wages at recruitment are more cyclical than those of incumbents and offer a mechanism for reducing costs. 
Rezultat je skladen z dokazi iz ustrezne literature, ki kažejo, da so plače ob zaposlitvi bolj ciklične od plač že zaposlenih delavcev in da bi lahko bile mehanizem za zmanjševanje stroškov.
Job cuts and an increase in the share of part-time work also played a part. 
Pri tem sta imela svojo vlogo tudi nižanje števila delovnih mest in višanje deleža dela s skrajšanim delovnim časom.
The retrospective survey of employers gives evidence that the ‘true’ wage-cost decline was between 6 % and 11 % in 2008-2009 and almost flat (below 2 %) in 2009-2010. 
Iz retrospektivne raziskave med delodajalci je razvidno, da je bil resnični padec stroškov plač od 6-do 11-od-stoten med letoma 2008–2009 in skoraj zanemarljiv (manj kot 2 %) med letoma 2009–2010.
Therefore, the decline was larger than suggested by official statistics (growth by 1.3 % in 2009 and decline by 2.9 % in 2010). 
Upad je bil tako večji, kot kažejo uradne statistike (rast za 1,3 % leta 2009 in upad za 2,9 % leta 2010).
This indicates that the private-sector pay did respond to the recession, but the response was not sufficient to prevent a large and prolonged fall in employment. 
To kaže, da so se plače v zasebnem sektorju sicer odzivale na recesijo, vendar odziv ni bil dovolj velik, da bi preprečil velik in dolgotrajen upad zaposlenosti.
Source: ECA, based on a study by Andrejs Semjonovs, Alf Vanags and Anna Zasova, What happened to wages in Latvia’s ‘internal devaluation’?, Baltic International Centre for Economic Policy Studies. 
Vir: ECA na podlagi študije o posledicah notranje devalvacije na plače v Latviji z naslovom What happened to wages in Latvia’s „internal devalu-ation’? (kaj se je zgodilo s plačami med notranjo devalvacijo v Latviji), ki so jo pripravili Andrejs Semjonovs, Alf Vanags in Anna Zasova, Baltic International Centre for Economic Policy Studies.
101 It is the private sector, and in particular the tradable sector, where wage developments determine competitiveness. 
101 V zasebnem sektorju, zlasti v menjalnem sektorju, v katerem gibanje plač določa konkurenčnost.
102 March 2009 in the public sector and July in the private sector. 
102 Marca 2009 v javnem sektorju in julija v zasebnem sektorju.
103 Anonymised records from the Latvian State Social Insurance Agency. Box 11 
103 Anonimizirane evidence latvijske državne agencije za socialno zavarovanje. Okvir 11
Part IV — Programmes met their objectives 70 Foreign exchange loans remained a challenge 175 A common denominator in all three balance-of-payment countries was the high ratio of foreign currency loans to total outstanding loans. 
Del IV – Programi so dosegli svoje cilje 70 Posojila v tujih valutah so še vedno izziv 175 Skupni imenovalec v vseh treh plačilnobilančnih državah je bilo visoko razmerje med posojili v tujih valutah in skupnimi neodplačanimi posojili.
176 During the crisis, central banks could not let the domestic currency depreciate to restore external competitiveness. 
176 Med krizo centralne banke niso mogle dopustiti znižanja vrednosti domače valute, da bi se obnovila zunanja konkurenčnost.
The concern was that depreciation might curb the capacity of borrowers to service their debts in foreign currencies and hence affect the stability of the financial system, which would offset the economic benefits of the policy104. 
178 Skupna vrednost posojil v tujih valutah je ostala ena od skrbi med izvajanjem programov.106 V Romuniji so posojila v tujih valutah v zasebnem sektorju presegala posojila v domači valuti.
The share of foreign currency borrowing started to decline in 2012 in Hungary, but not until 2014 in Romania. 
Delež posojil v tujih valutah je na Madžarskem začel upadati leta 2012, v Romuniji pa šele leta 2014.
104 This challenge was also recognised by the European Systemic Risk Board, in its Recommendation 2011/1, as the risk of ‘hindered monetary policy transmission channels’ stemming from high domestic lending in foreign currencies. 
104 Ta izziv je priznal tudi Evropski odbor za sistemska tveganja v svojem priporočilu 2011/1 kot tveganje, da bodo ovirani kanali za transmisijo monetarne politike, ki je posledica obsežnih notranjih posojil v tujih valutah.
105 Recommendation 2011/1 of the European Systemic Risk Board. 
105 Priporočilo 2011/1 Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja.
106 For example, at the end of June 2013 the Hungarian central bank considered the exposure of households and small and medium-sized enterprises to foreign exchange rates to be very high. 
106 Konec junija 2013 je madžarska centralna banka na primer ocenila, da je izpostavljenost gospodinjstev ter malih in srednje velikih podjetij deviznim tečajem zelo velika.
Conclusions and 71 recommendations Pre-crisis surveillance 179 Before the crisis there was already an EU framework geared towards monitoring the public budgets in the Member States. 
Zaključki in priporočila 71 Nadzor pred krizo 179 Že pred krizo je obstajal okvir EU, namenjen spremljanju javnih proračunov v državah članicah.
Warning the Council about mounting fiscal imbalances was the Commission’s responsibility. The Commission was not prepared for the first requests for financial assistance. 
Komisija je imela nalogo, da Svet opozori na vse večja fiskalna neravnovesja, vendar ni bila pripravljena na prve zahteve za finančno pomoč.
180 The Commission fell short in its task of assessing fiscal imbalances in the run-up to the crisis, when it estimated public budgets to be stronger that they actually turned out to be. 
180 Komisija ni ustrezno opravila svoje naloge ocenjevanja fiskalnih neravnovesij pred krizo, saj je ocenila, da so javni proračuni trdnejši, kot so bili v resnici.
One key weakness of the Commission’s assessments prior to 2009 was the lack of reporting on the build-up of contingent public-sector liabilities, which often became real liabilities during the crisis. 
Ena od ključnih slabosti ocen Komisije pred letom 2009 je bilo nezadostno poročanje o kopičenju pogojnih obveznosti javnega sektorja, ki so med krizo pogosto postale dejanske obveznosti.
Nor did the Commission pay sufficient attention to the link between large foreign financial flows, the health status of banks and, ultimately, government finances. 
Komisija tudi ni posvečala dovolj pozornosti povezavi med velikimi tujimi finančnimi tokovi, stabilnostjo bank in na koncu javnimi financami.
These surveillance failings meant that the Commission found itself unprepared for the task of programme management when requests for financial assistance started to arrive (see paragraphs 35 to 47). 
Ta neuspeh pri nadzoru je pomenil, da Komisija ni bila pripravljena na nalogo upravljanja programa, ko so začele pri-hajati prošnje za finančno pomoč (glej odstavke 35 do 47).
Programme management processes 181 The Commission managed to take on its new programme management duties, which included holding talks with the national authorities, preparing programme forecasts and financing gap estimates and identifying the necessary reforms. 
Procesi upravljanja programov 181 Komisiji je uspelo prevzeti nove naloge upravljanja programov, ki so zajemale dogovarjanje z nacionalnimi organi, pripravljanje programskih napovedi in ocen finančne vrzeli ter opredeljevanje potrebnih reform.
Given the initial time constraints and lack of prior experience, this was an achievement (see paragraphs 45 to 50). 
Glede na prvotne časovne omejitve in pomanjkanje predhodnih izkušenj je bil to dosežek (glej odstavke 45 do 50).
182 The Commission was thorough in obtaining the necessary information. 
182 Komisija je bila pri pridobivanju informacij, ki jih je potrebovala, večinoma temeljita.
It increasingly marshalled internal expertise and engaged with a wide range of stakeholders in the beneficiary countries. 
Vse bolj je uporabljala notranje strokovno znanje in sodelovala s širokim naborom deležnikov v državah, ki so zaprosile za pomoč.
However, the Commission did not mobilise the same degree of expertise in 2008 and 2009 as it did later in connection with the euro area programmes, nor could it easily acquire external expertise. 
Vendar pa v letih 2008 in 2009 ni mobilizirala enake ravni strokovnega znanja, kot je to storila pozneje v zvezi s programi evrskega območja, poleg tega pa ni bilo lahko angažirati zunanje strokovnjake.
The Commission’s human resources policy was not designed to deal with such a large and important European project as the resolution of the sovereign debt crisis clearly was (see paragraphs 52 to 54). 
Politika Komisije glede notranjih virov ni bila zasnovana za upravljanje tako velikega in pomembnega evropskega projekta, kot je reševanje krize državnega dolga (glej odstavke 52 do 54).
Conclusions and recommendations 72 Recommendation 1 The Commission should establish an institution-wide framework allowing rapid mobilisation of appropriate human resources and expertise available in the different parts of the Commission or outside the Commission if a financial assistance programme emerges. 
Zaključki in priporočila 72 Priporočilo 1 Komisija naj vzpostavi okvir znotraj celotne institucije, ki bi omogočal hitro mobilizacijo ustreznih človeških virov in strokovnega znanja, ki so na voljo v različnih oddelkih Komisije ali zunaj Komisije, če se pokaže potreba po programu finančne pomoči.
In relation to Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, the Commission should develop procedures for the enhanced surveillance and management of possible new financial assistance programmes. 
V zvezi z Uredbo (EU) št. 472/2013 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta naj Komisija razvije postopke za okrepljeno nadzorovanje in upravljanje morebitnih novih programov finančne pomoči.
The procedures should explicitly cover the scenario where these activities will be carried out by the EU institutions only. 
Postopki bi morali vsekakor vključevati scenarij, po katerem bodo te dejavnosti izvajale izključno institucije EU.
183 The production of macroeconomic and deficit forecasts was not a new activity. 
183 Priprava makroekonomskih napovedi in napovedi primanjkljajev ni bila nova dejavnost.
Quality control was limited mainly to reconciling the various parts of the forecasts, with no inquiry by management into the reasoning behind the forecasting assumptions. 
Kontrola kakovosti je bila omejena v glavnem na usklajevanje različnih delov napovedi, ne da bi vodstvo preverjalo utemeljitev predpostavk, uporabljenih pri napovedovanju.
It was very difficult to assess the plausibility of key assumptions such as fiscal multipliers, not only in any subsequent review but also, by management, during the actual production of forecasts (see paragraphs 55 to 70). 
Zelo težko je bilo ocenjevati verodostojnost ključnih predpostavk, kot so fiskalni multiplikatorji, ne le v okviru naknadnih pregledov, temveč tudi s strani vodstva med dejansko pripravo napovedi (glej odstavke 55 do 70).
Recommendation 2 Programme teams should be required to record systematically the key assumptions made and work done in preparing forecasts. 
Priporočilo 2 Za programske skupine naj bo obvezno, da sistematično beležijo ključne predpostavke in delo v okviru priprave napovedi.
The Commission should put in place tools to facilitate documentation. 
Komisija naj uvede orodja za lažje dokumentiranja.
This can include the automatic logging of changes made by forecasters. 
To lahko vključuje samodejno beleženje sprememb, ki jih opravijo napovedovalci.
Quality control procedures should incorporate more checks on the key underlying assumptions and parameters chosen by country desks. 
Postopki za kontrolo kakovosti naj zajemajo več pregledov ključnih predpostavk in parametrov, ki jih izberejo skupine, zadolžene za posamezne države.
For instance, a reference model-based forecast could be used in the quality review to flag areas where a judgement-based forecast significantly departs from the model-based forecast. 
Pri pregledu kakovosti bi lahko na primer uporabili napoved na podlagi referenčnega modela, da se označijo področja, kjer napoved na podlagi presoje znatno odstopa od napovedi na podlagi modela.
This would allow for more targeted quality checks. 
To bi omogočilo bolj usmerjene preglede kakovosti.
184 The programmes were mostly soundly rooted in EU policy priorities and current economic knowledge. 
184 Programi so imeli večinoma trdno podlago v prioritetah politik EU in obstoječem ekonomskem znanju.
However, the Commission’s procedures were commonly affected by a lack of systematic record-keeping. 
Vendar pa je bilo za postopke Komisije pogosto značilno pomanjkanje sistematičnega vodenja evidenc.
Procedures were not geared towards the retrospective evaluation of decision-making. 
Postopki niso bili usmerjeni v retrospektivno vrednotenje sprejemanja odločitev.
This can be partly explained by the crisis context, the initial time constraints and the novelty, for the Commission, of this type of programme management. 
To je mogoče deloma pojasniti s kriznimi okoliščinami, časovnimi omejitvami na začetku in tem, da je bilo upravljanje tovrstnega programa za Komisijo novost.
The availability of records improved with time, but even for the most recent programmes some key documents were missing (see paragraphs 71 to 75). 
Razpoložljivost evidenc se je sčasoma izboljšala, vendar so celo pri najnovejših programih manjkali nekateri ključni dokumenti (glej odstavke 71 do 75).
Conclusions and recommendations 73 Recommendation 3 To ensure the factors underlying programme decisions are internally transparent: (a) staff involved in programme management should keep all necessary records in relation to the features of the programme design, the selection of conditions and the Commission’s monitoring of programme implementation; and (b) programme heads should be required to document key programme decisions in a decision log so that they are easily traceable. 185 The conditions in memoranda of understanding were mostly justified by specific reference to the Council decision. 
Zaključki in priporočila 73 Priporočilo 3 Da se zagotovi notranja preglednost dejavnikov, na katerih temeljijo programske odločitve: (a) naj uslužbenci, vključeni v upravljanje programa, vodijo vse potrebne evidence, povezane z elementi programske zasnove, izbiro pogojev in spremljanjem izvajanja programa, ki ga opravlja Komisija, ter (b) naj bo za vodje programa obvezno, da dokumentirajo ključne programske odločitve v evidenci odločitev, tako da jim je mogoče zlahka slediti.
However, conditions were not sufficiently focused on the general economic policy conditions set by the Council (see paragraphs 76 to 79). 
185 Pogoji iz memoranduma o soglasju so bili v glavnem utemeljeni z izrecnim sklicevanjem na sklep Sveta, vendar pa niso bili dovolj usmerjeni v splošne pogoje gospodarske politike, ki jih je določil Svet (glej odstavke 76 do 79).
186 The conditions for assistance were managed differently in each programme. 
186 Upravljanje pogojev pomoči je bilo v vsakem programu drugačno.
When comparing countries with similar structural weaknesses, it was found that the required reforms were not always in proportion to the problems faced or that they pursued widely different paths. 
Ko je Sodišče primerjalo države s podobnimi strukturnimi slabostmi, je ugotovilo, da zahtevane reforme niso bile vedno sorazmerne z obstoječimi težavami ali da so potekale na zelo različne načine.
Some, but not all, countries’ deficit targets were relaxed more than the economic situation would appear to justify (see paragraphs 80 to 91). 
Cilji glede primanjkljaja v nekaterih državah – vendar ne vseh – so bili omiljeni bolj, kot bi bilo mogoče pričakovati glede na ekonomski položaj (glej odstavke 80 do 91).
187 The risk of treating different countries inconsistently or demanding unnecessary reforms remains a challenge to the process of programme management. 
187 Tveganje, da države ne bodo enako obravnavane ali da bodo zahtevane nepotrebne reforme, ostaja izziv za postopek upravljanja programa.
The crisis nature of the programmes has made it difficult to develop detailed guidelines to restrict the room for manoeuvre of programme teams and national authorities when preparing and negotiating documents such as Council decisions or memoranda of understanding. 
Zaradi krizne narave programov je bilo težko pripraviti podrobne smernice, s katerimi bi omejili manevrski prostor programskih skupin in nacionalnih organov pri pripravi dokumentov, kot so sklepi Sveta ali memorandumi o soglasju, ali pogajanjih o njih.