natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Observations 54 EDP corrective and surveillance actions: reporting by Member States, monitoring and surveillance by the Commission Member States’ reporting on corrective action could be improved Member States’ reporting on EDP corrective action does not provide a sufficiently wide and solid basis for the Commission to implement its monitoring and surveillance tasks 85 The ‘Six‐pack’ and the ‘Two‐pack’ introduced new reporting requirements with the aim of enhancing surveillance of the EDP (see Figure 7). 
Opažanja 54 Popravljalni in nadzorni ukrepi v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem: poročanje držav članic, spremljanje in nadzor Komisije Države članice bi lahko izboljšale poročanje o popravljalnih ukrepih Poročanje držav o popravljalnih ukrepih v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem ne zagotavlja dovolj široke in trdne podlage, da bi lahko Komisija izvajala svoje naloge spremljanja in nadzora 85 S šesterčkom in dvojčkom so bile uvedene nove zahteve glede poročanja, da bi se povečal nadzor nad postopkom v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem (glej sliko 7).
However, there is no statutory arrangement for ensuring that Member States comply with these reporting requirements. 
Ne obstaja pa nobena zakonska ureditev, ki bi zagotavljala, da države članice te zahteve glede poročanja izpolnjujejo.
As a consequence, the Commission does not take any action against Member States which fail to provide the required information. 
Komisija zato ne ukrepa proti državam članicam, ki ne zagotovijo zahtevanih informacij.
Furthermore, our analysis showed that the Commission did not bring this issue to the attention of the European Parliament and the Council in its November 2014 review of economic governance and the application of the ‘Six‐Pack’ and ‘Two‐Pack’. 
Poleg tega je naša analiza pokazala, da Komisija v svojem pregledu ekonomskega upravljanja ter uporabe šesterčka in dvojčka iz novembra 2014 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta ni opozorila na to vprašanje.
The Member States in our sample that are subject to the new re‐ porting requirements45 have not always complied with them (see Figure 8 for examples). 
Državi članici iz našega vzorca, za kateri veljajo nove zahteve glede poročanja45, zahtev nista vedno izpolnjevali (glej sliko 8 s primeri).
New reporting requirements introduced by the ‘Six‐Pack’ and the ‘Two‐Pack’ 45 France and Malta. ‘Six-pack’ (November 2011) ‘Two-pack’ (May 2013) Source: ECA. 
Nove zahteve glede poročanja, ki so bile uvedene s šesterčkom in dvojčkom 45 Francija in Malta. „Šesterček” (november 2011) „Dvojček” (maj 2013) Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče.
Report on action taken (in response to Council recommendation/notice) Economic partnership programme In-year budgetary execution report Report on measures adopted (in response to ACRs) Figure 7 
Poročilo o sprejetih ukrepih (v odziv na priporočilo/poziv Sveta) Program ekonomskega partnerstva Poročilo o izvrševanju proračuna med letom Poročilo o sprejetih ukrepih (v odziv na neodvisno priporočilo Komisije) Slika 7
Observations 55 Examples of Member States’ non‐compliance with reporting obligations In october 2013, France was required to submit three EDP documents: Document to be sent by France in 2013 Finding (i) In-year budgetary execution report (ii) Report on action taken (iii) Economic partnership programme France did not send this document to the Commission. 
Opažanja 55 Primeri, ko države članice ne izpolnjujejo obveznosti poročanja Francija bi morala oktobra 2013 predložiti tri dokumente o postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem: Dokument, ki bi ga morala Francija predložiti leta 2013 (i) Poročilo o izvrševanju proračuna med letom (ii) Poročilo o sprejetih ukrepih (iii) Program ekonomskega partnerstva Ugotovitev Francija tega dokumenta ni predložila Komisiji.
France submitted an extract from its 2014 draft budget, which was meant to replace the report on action taken and the economic partnership programme. 
Francija je predložila izvleček osnutka proračuna za leto 2014, ki naj bi nadomestil poročilo o sprejetih ukrepih in program ekonomskega partnerstva.
However, the extract is not consistent with the required format and content for an economic partnership programme; nor does it disclose sufficient information on corrective measures for the latter years of the period, as is required for the report on action taken. 
Vendar izvleček ni v skladu z zahtevano obliko in vsebino za program ekonomskega partnerstva; prav tako ne razkriva zadostnih informacij o popravljalnih ukrepih za poznejša leta v obdobju, kot je zahtevano za poročilo o sprejetih ukrepih.
In october 2014, France and Malta were required to send the following reports: Document to be submitted in 2014 Finding France: two in-year budgetary execution reports France: report on measures adopted Malta: two in-year budgetary execution reports France did not submit the documents. 
Francija in Malta bi morali leta 2014 posredovati naslednja poročila: Dokument, ki bi moral biti predložen leta 2014 Francija: dve poročili o izvajanju proračuna med letom Francija: poročilo o sprejetih ukrepih Malta: dve poročili o izvajanju proračuna med letom Ugotovitev Francija ni predložila dokumentov.
The Commission required France only to report on measures adopted in its forthcoming stability programme (for 2014) and not, as stipulated by Regulation (EU) No 473/2013, in a report on measures adopted. 
Komisija je od Francije zahtevala, da o sprejetih ukrepih poroča le v svojem prihodnjem programu stabilnosti (za leto 2014) in ne v poročilu o sprejetih ukrepih, kot je določeno v Uredbi št. 473/2013.
The Member State did provide some information in its 2014 stability programme, but this was not as detailed as required by the Regulation. 
Država članica je sicer v programu za stabilnost za leto 2014 predložila nekatere informacije, ki pa niso bile tako natančne, kot zahteva Uredba.
Malta sent both documents, but the reports did not provide the required data on the in-year budgetary impact of discretionary measures for the year 2014. 
Malta je predložila oba dokumenta, vendar poročili nista vsebovali zahtevanih podatkov o proračunskem učinku diskrecijskih ukrepov med letom za leto 2014.
Source: ECA. 
Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče.
Observations 56 86 With the exception of Cyprus (after it agreed to a financial assistance programme in 2013), corrective measures were not sufficiently detailed and/or their fiscal impact was not sufficiently clearly identified or explained (see Box 8) for the Commission to exercise effective supervision. 
Opažanja 56 86 Razen v primeru Cipra (po tem, ko se je leta 2013 dogovoril za program finančne pomoči) popravljalni ukrepi niso bili dovolj podrobni in/ali njihov fiskalni učinek ni bil dovolj jasno opredeljen ali pojasnjen (glej okvir 8), da bi lahko Komisija izvajala uspešen nadzor.
87 Moreover, the deadlines set for the production of European economic forecasts are not aligned with national budgetary deadlines. 
87 Poleg tega roki za pripravo evropskih gospodarskih napovedi niso usklajeni z nacionalnimi proračunskimi roki.
This results in frequent dis‐ crepancies between the Commission forecasts and national budget forecasts, and consequently between budgetary targets and the required EDP adjustment paths. 
Zato pogosto prihaja do razhajanj med napovedmi Komisije in nacionalnimi proračunskimi napovedmi, s tem pa tudi med proračunskimi cilji in zahtevanimi poteki prilagoditve v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
Examples of insufficient detail on corrective measures ο The Czech national reform programme (2012) contained a list of measures, both planned and implement‐ ed, as well as implemented measures with an expected financial impact in 2013 and 2014. However, the programme did not include any estimate of the fiscal impact of these measures. ο The Czech convergence programme (2012) included a table specifying the fiscal impact of measures envis‐ aged for 2013‐2015. 
Primeri premalo podrobnih informacij o popravljalnih ukrepih ο Češki nacionalni reformni program (2012) je vseboval seznam načrtovanih in izvedenih ukrepov ter izvedenih ukrepov s pričakovanim finančnim vplivom v letih 2013 in 2014, ni pa vključeval nobene ocene fiskalnega učinka teh ukrepov. ο Češki konvergenčni program (2012) je vključeval tabelo, v kateri je bil opredeljen fiskalni učinek predvidenih ukrepov za obdobje 2013–2015, vendar podatkov v besedilu ni bilo mogoče uskladiti z informacijami v tabeli.
Moreover, in one case there were no details on the corrective measures proposed. ο The Maltese report on action taken (2013) specified corrective measures for 2013 but was vague about 2014. 
Poleg tega v enem primeru ni bilo nobenih podrobnosti o predlaganih popravljalnih ukrepih. ο V malteškem poročilu o sprejetih ukrepih (2013) so bili opredeljeni popravljalni ukrepi za leto 2013, ukrepi za leto 2014 pa so bili nejasni.
Instead of giving details, the report merely referred to the forthcoming budget. 
Namesto da bi bile v poročilu navedene podrobnosti, se je le sklicevalo na prihodnji proračun.
Therefore the Com‐ mission’s assessment46 did not incorporate the planned measures (they were not included until the winter forecast), which weakened the basis for effective monitoring and surveillance. ο The French stability programmes for 2010 to 2014 did not describe the corrective measures for every year in the requisite detail47. 
Ocena Komisije46 zato ni vsebovala načrtovanih ukrepov (vključeni so bili šele v zimsko napoved), kar je poslabšalo podlago za uspešno spremljanje in nadzor. ο V francoskih programih stabilnosti za obdobje od leta 2010 do leta 2014 popravljalni ukrepi za posamezno leto niso bili dovolj natančno opisani47.
As a consequence, the Commission did not have a sufficient basis for effective supervision or decision‐making. 
Komisija zato ni imela zadostne podlage za uspešen nadzor ali sprejemanje odločitev.
46 Published on 5 November 2013 and based on the autumn forecast. 
46 Objavljena je bila 5. novembra 2013, temeljila pa je na jesenski napovedi.
47 Each successive stability programme covers three years. 
47 Vsak zaporeden program stabilnosti zajema tri leta.
France systematically gave full details for the first year, but not for the second or the third. 
Francija je sistematično zagotovila vse podrobnosti za prvo leto, za drugo in tretje pa ne.
Observations 57 Monitoring and surveillance by the Commission is subject to increasingly complex rules, lacks transparency and provides a limited assessment of the effect of structural reforms 88 This section describes the rules and procedure for assessing effective action, examines the quality of the Commission’s assessments and considers the impact of recent changes. 
Opažanja 57 Pri spremljanju in nadzoru, ki ju izvaja Komisija, so pravila vse bolj zapletena, ni preglednosti, učinek strukturnih reform pa se ocenjuje v omejenem obsegu 88 V tem oddelku so opisana pravila in postopek za ocenjevanje uspešnih ukrepov, preučena pa sta tudi kakovost ocen Komisije in učinek nedavnih sprememb.
89 The rules for assessing effective action have evolved as a result of: (i) the SGP reforms in 2005 and 2011, which complemented the initial deficit benchmark (3 % ‐ SGP 1997) with a top‐down approach based on the struc‐ tural balance; and (ii) additional interpretative guidance, endorsed by the Council in 2014, includ‐ ing a bottom‐up assessment methodology. 
89 Pravila za ocenjevanje uspešnih ukrepov so se spremenila zaradi: (i) reform Pakta za stabilnost in rast v letih 2005 in 2011, ki so prvotno referenčno merilo za primanjkljaj (3 % – Pakt za stabilnost in rast, 1997) dopolnile s pristopom od zgoraj navzdol, ki temelji na strukturnem saldu, in (ii) dodatne razlage, ki jo je Svet odobril leta 2014, vključno z metodologijo ocene od spodaj navzgor.
90 Compliance with the EDP recommendations is checked by assessing whether, on the basis of the actual data and Commission forecasts, the Member State meets the annual deficit targets. 
90 Skladnost s priporočili za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem se pregleda tako, da se na podlagi dejanskih podatkov in napovedi Komisije oceni, ali država članica dosega letne cilje glede primanjkljaja.
If the Member State fails to do so, an assessment of ef‐ fective action is carried out using the top‐down and bottom‐up approaches (see Box 9). 
Če jih država članica ne dosega, se izvede ocena uspešnih ukrepov s pristopoma od zgoraj navzdol in od spodaj navzgor (glej okvir 9).
Observations 58 Assessment of effective action Top‐down approach If the annual deficit targets are not reached, the top‐down approach is used to assess whether the Member State achieved the improvement in the structural balance (‘recommended fiscal effort’ R) required in the EDP recommendations. 
Opažanja 58 Ocena uspešnih ukrepov Pristop od zgoraj navzdol Če letni cilji glede primanjkljaja niso doseženi, se uporabi pristop od zgoraj navzdol, s katerim se oceni, ali je država članica izboljšala strukturni saldo („priporočen fiskalni napor“ P), kot zahtevajo priporočila za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
This is done by comparing R with the observed or forecast change in the structural balance (‘observed fiscal effort’ ΔS) and with the change in the structural balance adjusted for the impact of (a) revisions in potential output growth, (b) revisions in the composition of the economic growth or other windfalls/shortfalls on rev‐ enues, and (c) other unexpected events (‘adjusted fiscal effort’ ΔS*). 
To se izvede tako, da se P primerja z ugotovljeno ali predvideno spremembo strukturnega salda („ugotovljen fiskalni napor“ ΔS) in s spremembo strukturnega salda, ki je prilagojen zaradi vpliva (a) revizij potencialne rasti proizvodnje, (b) revizij sestave gospodarske rasti ali drugih nepričakovanih dobičkov/primanjkljajev pri prihodkih in (c) drugih nepričakovanih dogodkov („prilagojen fiskalni napor“ ΔS*).
If both ΔS and ΔS* are equal to or greater than R, the Member State is considered to have taken effective action and the EDP is held in abeyance. 
Če sta ΔS in ΔS* enaka ali večja kot P, velja, da je država članica sprejela uspešne ukrepe, postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem pa miruje.
In all other cases, the assessment needs to be confirmed by a careful analysis, which is carried out using the top‐down and bottom‐up approaches. 
V vseh drugih primerih je treba oceno potrditi z natančno analizo, ki se izvede s pristopoma od zgoraj navzdol in od spodaj navzgor.
Bottom‐up approach The bottom‐up approach aims at assessing the fiscal effort by providing a direct estimate of the budgetary impact of new fiscal measures implemented by the Member State since the EDP recommendation was issued, or since compliance with the EDP recommendation was last assessed. 
Pristop od spodaj navzgor Cilj pristopa od spodaj navzdol je oceniti fiskalni napor, tako da se neposredno oceni proračunski učinek novih fiskalnih ukrepov, ki jih izvaja država članica, odkar je bilo izdano priporočilo za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem ali odkar je bilo nazadnje ocenjeno upoštevanje tega priporočila.
The fiscal effort is calculated as the sum of (a) the estimated budgetary impact of additional discretionary rev‐ enue measures and (b) the change in nominal expenditure compared to a baseline scenario which the Com‐ mission projected earlier on the assumption of no policy change. 
Fiskalni napor se izračuna kot vsota (a) ocenjenega proračunskega učinka dodatnih diskrecijskih ukrepov na strani prihodkov in (b) sprememb nominalnih odhodkov v primerjavi z osnovnim scenarijem, ki ga je Komisija predhodno projicirala ob predpostavki nespremenjene politike.
Observations 59 The rules for assessing effective action have become increasingly complex 91 Introduction of the top‐down and bottom‐up approaches has made the rules for assessing effective action more complex. 
Opažanja 59 Pravila za ocenjevanje uspešnih ukrepov so čedalje bolj zapletena 91 Zaradi uvedbe pristopov od zgoraj navzdol in od spodaj navzgor so pravila za ocenjevanje uspešnih ukrepov postala bolj zapletena.
92 Top‐down approach: the structural effort depends on an estimate of the output gap, which is understood as the difference between actual and potential output. 
92 Pristop od zgoraj navzdol: strukturni napor je odvisen od ocene proizvodne vrzeli, ki se razume kot razlika med dejansko in potencialno proizvodnjo.
Potential output is defined as the maximum level of output that can be obtained without generating inflationary pressure. 
Potencialna proizvodnja je opredeljena kot najvišja raven proizvodnje, ki se lahko doseže brez inflacijskega pritiska.
It is an unobservable variable and esti‐ mating it is fraught with uncertainty (see Box 10). 
Gre za nemerljivo spremenljivko, katere ocenjevanje je zelo negotovo (glej okvir 10).
Potential output Since the 2005 reform, potential output has played a crucial role in the EDP. 
Potencialna proizvodnja Potencialna proizvodnja ima po reformi iz leta 2005 pomembno vlogo v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
This theoretical concept is unob‐ servable, even in retrospect, and has to be estimated. 
Ta teoretični koncept je nemerljiv, tudi za nazaj, zato ga je treba oceniti.
There are various methods of estimating potential output. 
Obstaja več metod za ocenjevanje potencialne proizvodnje.
Despite the view of experts that ‘there is significant uncertainty around any estimate of the output gap’ and the fact that ‘it would be unwise to base an assess‐ ment of economic prospects on any single approach alone’48, the ECOFIN Council did adopt such a single approach: the production function methodology. 
Po mnenju strokovnjakov so ocene proizvodne vrzeli precej negotove, ocene gospodarskih obetov pa ne bi bilo pametno osnovati na enem samem pristo-pu48, vendar je Svet ECOFIN kljub temu sprejel en sam pristop: metodologijo produkcijske funkcije.
This methodology uses a pre‐defined functional form for the production function and estimates potential output by combining, after removing their cyclical component, the capital stock, the labour force and the to‐ tal productivity of factors. 
Pri tej metodologiji je za produkcijsko funkcijo uporabljena vnaprej opredeljena funkcijska oblika, potencialna proizvodnja pa je ocenjena tako, da se po izvzetju njihovih cikličnih komponent združijo kapital, delovna sila in skupna faktorska produktivnost.
The same production function applies to all Member States: a Cobb‐Douglas func‐ tion with an output elasticity of labour equal to 0.65 and an output elasticity of capital equal to 0.35. 
Za vse države članice se uporablja ista produkcijska funkcija: Cobb-Dougla-sova funkcija, pri kateri je proizvodna elastičnost dela 0,65, proizvodna elastičnost kapitala pa 0,35.
These values were obtained using ‘the mean wage share for the EU15 over the period 1960‐2003 [...] as the estimate for the output elasticity of labour, which gives a value of 0.63 [...] and, by definition, 0.37 for the output elas‐ ticity of capital.’ 
Ti vrednosti sta bili pridobljeni z uporabo povprečnega deleža plač v EU-15 v obdobju 1960–2003 za oceno proizvodne elastičnosti dela, iz česar izhaja vrednost 0,63, vrednost proizvodne elastičnosti kapitala pa je posledično 0,37.
However, ‘since these values are close to the conventional mean values of 0.65 and 0.35, the latter are imposed for all countries.’49 Revisions of potential output estimates are triggered by the adjustment of past data and the use of new data on output and expected output, but also by other technical issues and underlying hypotheses – such as ex‐ pected changes in inflation. 
Ker sta ti vrednosti blizu konvencionalnima povprečnima vrednostma 0,65 in 0,35, se slednji uporabljata za vse države.49 Do sprememb ocen potencialne proizvodnje pride zaradi prilagoditve preteklih podatkov o proizvodnji in pričakovani proizvodnji ter uporabe novih podatkov, pa tudi zaradi drugih tehničnih vprašanj in osnovnih hipotez, kot so pričakovane spremembe inflacije.
48 UK Office for Budget Responsibility (the UK’s fiscal council), Briefing paper No 2 ‘Estimating the output gap’, April 2011. 
48 Urad za proračunsko odgovornost Združenega kraljestva (fiskalni svet Združenega kraljestva), informativni dokument št. 2, Estimating the output gap (ocenjevanje proizvodne vrzeli), april 2011.
49 ‘The production function methodology for calculating potential output growth and output gaps’, Economic Papers 535, November 2014. 
49 The production function methodology for calculating potential output growth and output gaps (metodologija produkcijske funkcije za izračun potencialne rasti proizvodnje in proizvodnih vrzeli), Economic Papers 535, november 2014.
Observations 60 93 This is why potential output estimates are subject to frequent and possibly signif‐ icant revisions which may also affect past estimates. 
Opažanja 60 93 Ocene potencialne proizvodnje so zato pogosto in včasih bistveno spremenjene, kar lahko vpliva tudi na pretekle ocene.
Actual output figures (both historical and forecast) may also be substantially revised. 
Podatki o dejanski proizvodnji (pretekli in iz napovedi) so lahko prav tako močno spremenjeni.
The result of all this is that the output gap is often revised and may fluctuate enormously – in some cases the magnitude of revision is greater than the previous estimate of the out‐ put gap itself. 
Rezultat vsega tega je, da je proizvodna vrzel pogosto spremenjena in lahko zelo močno niha – v nekaterih primerih je sprememba celo obsežnejša kot sama ocena proizvodne vrzeli.
Figure 9 illustrates this volatility. 
Ta nestanovitnost je prikazana na sliki 9.
For example, the 2013 output gap in Cyprus was initially estimated in the 2011 forecast at ‐1.32 %; it fell to ‐6.16 % in the spring 2013 forecast and rose to ‐4.1 % in the spring 2014 forecast. 
Proizvodna vrzel na Cipru za leto 2013 je bila na primer v napovedi iz leta 2011 najprej ocenjena na –1,32 %, v napovedi iz pomladi 2013 je padla na –6,16 %, v napovedi iz pomladi 2014 pa se je dvignila na –4,1 %.
Examples of volatility of the output gap in Commission’s forecasts 2.00 % 1.00 % 0.00 % - 1.00 % - 2.00 % - 3.00 % - 4.00 % - 5.00 % - 6.00 % - 7.00 % Note: A=autumn, S=spring, W=winter Source: Commission’s annual macroeconomic database (AMECO). 
Primeri nestanovitnosti proizvodne vrzeli v napovedih Komisije 2,00 % 1,00 % 0,00 % –1,00 % –2,00 % –3,00 % –4,00 % –5,00 % –6,00 % –7,00 % Opomba: A = jesen, S = pomlad, W = zima Vir: Letna makroekonomska podatkovna zbirka Komisije (AMECO).
2009 2010 2010 2011 2011 2012 2012 2013 2013 2013 2014 2014 ASASASAWSAWS Germany 2011 Italy 2012 Cyprus 2013 Figure 9 
2009 2010 2010 2011 2011 2012 2012 2013 2013 2013 2014 2014 ASASASAWSAWS Nemčija 2011 Italija 2012 Ciper 2013 Slika 9
Observations 61 94 The bottom‐up approach is also somewhat complex, owing mainly to the dif‐ ficulty in defining the impact of revenue measures and to the ‘no policy change’ benchmark against which government actions will be assessed. 
Opažanja 61 94 Tudi pristop od spodaj navzgor je nekoliko zapleten, predvsem zaradi težav pri opredelitvi učinka ukrepov na strani prihodkov in zaradi referenčnega merila nespremenjene politike, po katerem se ocenjujejo vladni ukrepi.
The Commis‐ sion’s scrutiny/certification of the estimated budgetary impact of fiscal measures inevitably depends on information and figures provided by the national authori‐ ties. 
To, kako Komisija nadzoruje/potrjuje ocenjeni proračunski učinek fiskalnih ukrepov, je neizogibno odvisno od informacij in številčnih podatkov, ki jih zagotovijo nacionalni organi.
It is impossible for the Commission to adequately assess the accuracy of these figures with the resources it makes available for the task. 
Komisija točnosti teh podatkov ne more ustrezno oceniti s sredstvi, ki so na voljo za to nalogo.
The Commission’s analyses of the impact of fiscal measures lack transparency... 
Analize učinka fiskalnih ukrepov, ki jih opravlja Komisija, niso dovolj pregledne ...
95 The increased complexity of the rules for assessing effective action has widened the Commission’s scope for interpretation and discretion. 
95 Čedalje bolj zapletena pravila za ocenjevanje uspešnih ukrepov so povečala možnosti Komisije za razlago in prosto presojo.
As a result its analyses have become less transparent. 
Zato so njene analize postale manj pregledne.