natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Recommendation 2 While it is true that a substantial portion of technical assistance is designed to build the capacities of local financial institutions (especially commercial banks and microfinance institutions), with the aim of comprehensively modernising the financial sector in the ACP countries, technical assistance programmes are also directed to a lesser degree towards final beneficiaries, entrepreneurs, to help make more SME investment projects bankable. 
Priporočilo 2 Res je, da je precejšen del tehnične pomoči name‐ njen krepitvi zmogljivosti lokalnih finančnih insti‐ tucij (zlasti komercialnih bank in mikrofinančnih institucij), pri čemer je cilj celovita posodobitev finančnega sektorja v državah AKP, vseeno pa so programi tehnične pomoči v manjšem obsegu usmerjeni tudi h končnim upravičencem, podjet‐ nikom, da bi tako več naložbenih projektov MSP postalo primernih za bančno financiranje.
Our more recent technical assistance operations have already begun to directly target businesses as well. 
Novejše posle tehnične pomoči smo že začeli neposredno usmerjati tudi k podjetjem.
It should be noted, moreover, that under the 11th EDF the EIB intends to deepen its cooperation with the European Commission, particularly on private sector development operations financed under the ‘blending’ heading. 
Poudariti je še treba, da namerava EIB v okviru 11. Evropskega razvojnega sklada poglobiti sodelovanje z Evropsko komisijo, še posebej na področju poslov razvoja zasebnega sektorja, ki so financirani v okviru postavke „kom‐ biniranje“.
This will make it possible to increase the amount and broaden the type of technical assistance provided to the final beneficiaries of Investment Facility funds. 
Na ta način bo mogoče povečati znesek in razširiti vrste tehnične pomoči, zagotovljene končnim upravičencem sredstev iz Sklada za spod‐ bujanje naložb.
Talks on a number of concrete approaches are currently under way. 
Trenutno potekajo pogovori o več konkretnih pristopih.
1 SHELTER-AFRIQUE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT project. 
1 Projekt razvoja skupnosti zatočišča Afrique.
The ACP Investment Facility, managed by EIB, is a risk-bearing revolving fund supporting investments by private and commercially run public entities in the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States. 
Sklad za spodbujanje naložb, ki ga upravlja EIB, je obnovljiv sklad tveganega kapitala, ki podpira naložbe zasebnih in tržno naravnanih javnih subjektov v skupini afriških, karibskih in pacifiških držav.
It provides medium-to long-term financing through various financial instruments and thereby aims at delivering sustainable economic, social and environmental benefits. 
Zagotavlja srednje-in dolgoročno financiranje z različnimi finančnimi instrumenti in si tako prizadeva za trajnostne gospodarske, socialne in okoljske koristi.
The Court concludes that the Investment Facility adds value and its operations are overall coherent with the EU development cooperation with ACP countries. 
Sodišče ugotavlja, da Sklad za spodbujanje naložb zagotavlja dodano vrednost in da so njegove finančne operacije na splošno skladne z razvojnim sodelovanjem EU z državami AKP.
The contractual obligation to inform the end beneficiaries about EIB/Investment Facility funding is however not always followed and technical assistance does not always target small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Vendar pogodbena obveznost, na podlagi katere morajo biti končni upravičenci obveščeni o financiranju EIB/Sklada za spodbujanje naložb, ni vedno upoštevana, tehnična pomoč pa ni vedno usmerjena v mala in srednja podjetja.
EN 2015 Special Report NO 18 Financial assistance provided to countries in difficulties EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 
18 Posebno poročilo SL 2015 Finančna pomoč, zagotovljena državam v težavah EVROPSKO RAČUNSKO SODIŠČE
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015 Print ISBN 978-92-872-3173-4 PDF ISBN 978-92-872-3224-3 EPUB ISBN 978-92-872-3172-7 ISSN 1831-0834 ISSN 1977-5679 ISSN 1977-5679 doi:10.2865/278824 doi:10.2865/66883 doi:10.2865/15592 QJ-AB-15-016-EN-C QJ-AB-15-016-EN-N QJ-AB-15-016-EN-E © European Union, 2015 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
Luxembourg: Urad za publikacije Evropske unije, 2015 Print ISBN 978-92-872-3230-4 PDF ISBN 978-92-872-3183-3 EPUB ISBN 978-92-872-3222-9 ISSN 1831-094X ISSN 1977-5784 ISSN 1977-5784 doi:10.2865/091324 doi:10.2865/874188 doi:10.2865/254390 QJ-AB-15-016-SL-C QJ-AB-15-016-SL-N QJ-AB-15-016-SL-E © Evropska unija, 2015 Reprodukcija je dovoljena z navedbo vira.
EN 2015 Special Report NO 18 Financial assistance provided to countries in difficulties (pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU) 
18 Posebno poročilo SL 2015 Finančna pomoč, zagotovljena državam v težavah (v skladu z drugim pododstavkom člena 287(4) PDEU)
This performance audit was produced by Audit Chamber IV — headed by ECA Member Milan Martin Cvikl — which specialises in auditing revenue, research and internal policies, and European Union’s institutions and bodies. 
To revizijo smotrnosti poslovanja je opravil senat IV, ki ga vodi član Evropskega računskega sodišča Milan Martin Cvikl in ki je specializiran za revidiranje področij prihodkov, raziskav in notranje politike ter institucij in organov EU.
The audit was led by ECA Member Baudilio Tomé Muguruza, supported by the head of his private office, Daniel Costa de Magalhães and Ignacio García de Parada, attaché; Zacharias Kolias, director; Josef Jindra, team leader; Giuseppe Diana, Marco Fians, Daniela Hristova, Didier Lebrun, Ioanna Metaxopoulou, Adrian Savin, Kristian Sniter, auditors. 
Revizijo je vodil član Evropskega računskega sodišča Baudilio Tomé Muguruza, pri njej pa so sodelovali vodja njegovega kabineta Daniel Costa de Magalhães in njegov ataše Ignacio García de Parada, direktor Zacharias Kolias, vodja ekipe Josef Jindra, Giuseppe Diana, Marco Fians, Daniela Hristova ter revizorji Didier Lebrun, Ioanna Metaxopoulou, Adrian Savin in Kristian Sniter.
From left to right: D. Lebrun, I. García de Parada, K. Sniter, J. Jindra, G. Diana, B. Tomé Muguruza, A. Savin, D. Hristova, Z. Kolias, M. Fians, D. Costa de Magalhães. 
Od leve proti desni: D. Lebrun, I. García de Parada, K. Sniter, J. Jindra, G. Diana, B. Tomé Muguruza, A. Savin, D. Hristova, Z. Kolias, M. Fians, D. Costa de Magalhães.
Contents 03 Paragraph Abbreviations I-XIX Executive summary 1-26 Introduction 1-7 The sovereign debt crisis in the EU Member States 8-18 Design and implementation 8-10 Programme design 11-15 Conditions 16-18 Implementation 19-26 Financial resources 19-23 Programme financing 24-26 Borrowing on the markets 27-32 Audit approach 33-47 Part I — The Commission was unprepared for the magnitude of the crisis that 33-44 The Commission underestimated the extent of the fiscal imbalances in the run-up to the crisis 35-40 The Commission estimated the public budgets to be stronger than they actually were 41-44 Assessments underestimated the potential fiscal risks 45-47 As a result the Commission was not ready for the programme management broke out 
Kazalo 03 Odstavek Kratice Povzetek Uvod Kriza državnega dolga v državah članicah EU Zasnova in izvajanje Zasnova programov Pogoji Izvajanje Finančna sredstva Programsko financiranje Zadolževanje na trgih Revizijski pristop Del I – Komisija ni bila pripravljena na razsežnost krize, ki je izbruhnila Komisija je podcenila razsežnost fiskalnih neravnovesij pred krizo Komisija je ocenjevala, da so javni proračuni trdnejši, kot so bili v resnici Ocene so podcenjevale potencialna fiskalna tveganja Komisija zato ni bila pripravljena na upravljanje programa I–XIX 1–26 1–7 8–18 8–10 11–15 16–18 19–26 19–23 24–26 27–32 33–47 33–44 35–40 41–44 45–47
Contents 05 144-154 Updated deficit targets mostly but not always sustainably met 144-148 With some exceptions, revised annual deficit targets were met 149-152 All countries improved their fiscal stance, but to varying degrees 153-154 Countries used one-off measures 155-164 Compliance with the conditions was high 155-158 Member States eventually complied with at least 80 % of conditions 159-164 Programmes prompted reforms, but occasionally the desired effects did not materialise 165-178 How well did countries increase their competitiveness? 
Kazalo 05 144–154 144–148 149–152 153–154 155–164 155–158 159–164 165–178 165–172 173–174 175–178 179–204 179–180 181–192 193–194 195–204 Posodobljeni cilji glede primanjkljaja so bili večinoma izpolnjeni, vendar ne vedno na vzdržen način Spremenjeni letni cilji glede primanjkljaja so bili z nekaj izjemami izpolnjeni Vse države so izboljšale svojo fiskalno naravnanost, vendar v različni meri Države so uporabile enkratne ukrepe Dobro izpolnjevanje pogojev Države članice so sčasoma izpolnile vsaj 80 % pogojev Programi so sprožili reforme, vendar želeni učinki občasno niso bili doseženi Kako so se države odrezale pri povečevanju svoje konkurenčnosti?
165-172 Competitiveness gains, but to varying degrees 173-174 Internal devaluation worked through the adjustment of the wages of the newly hired 175-178 Foreign exchange loans remained a challenge 179-204 Conclusions and recommendations 179-180 Pre-crisis surveillance 181-192 Programme management processes 193-194 Borrowing operations 195-204 Programme achievements Annex I — Annex II — Annex III — Reasons motivating the request for assistance The lending facilities for the five countries Audit methodology Reply of the Commission 
Večja konkurenčnost, vendar v različni meri Notranja devalvacija se je izvajala s prilagoditvijo plač novozaposlenih Posojila v tujih valutah so še vedno izziv Zaključki in priporočila Nadzor pred krizo Procesi upravljanja programov Dejavnosti zadolževanja Programski dosežki Priloga I Priloga II Priloga III – Razlogi za prošnjo za pomoč – Instrumenti posojanja za zadevnih pet držav – Revizijska metodologija Odgovori Komisije
Abbreviations 06 Council: Council of the European Union — the text uses this term as a shortcut for any Member State decision-making body ECB: European Central Bank EFC: Economic and Financial Committee EFSF: European Financial Stability Facility EFSM: European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism EMTNs: Euro medium-term notes ESA: European System of Accounts EWG: Eurogroup Working Group IMF: International Monetary Fund MoU: Memorandum of understanding SGP: Stability and Growth Pact 
Kratice 06 ECB: Evropska centralna banka EFC: Ekonomsko-finančni odbor EFSF: evropski instrument za finančno stabilnost EFSM: evropski mehanizem za finančno stabilizacijo EMTN: evropski srednjeročni dolžniški vrednostni papirji ESA: Evropski sistem računov EWG: Delovna skupina Evroskupine MoS: memorandum o soglasju Svet: Svet Evropske unije: v tem besedilu se izraz uporablja kot sopomenka za kateri koli organ odločanja držav članic
Executive 07 summary I IV Seven years ago, Europe faced a financial crisis which turned into a sovereign debt crisis. 
Povzetek 07 I IV Pred sedmimi leti se je Evropa spoprijela s finančno krizo, ki je prerasla v krizo državnega dolga.
The sovereign debt crisis was a consequence of various factors, including weak banking supervision, poor fiscal policies and the difficulties experienced by large financial institutions (and the consequent bailout costs borne by the general public). 
Kriza državnega dolga je bila posledica različnih dejavnikov, vključno s šibkim bančnim nadzorom, slabimi fiskalnimi politikami in težavami, s katerimi so se soočale velike finančne institucije (posledične stroške reševanja je nosila splošna javnost).
The crisis swept across EU Member States in two waves, first affecting the non-euro area countries in 2008-2009 and later spreading to the euro area itself. 
Kriza je zajela države članice EU v dveh valovih – leta 2008 in 2009 je prizadela države zunaj evrskega območja in se nato razširila še na evrsko območje.
In total, eight EU Member States were forced to seek macrofinancial assistance. 
Za makrofinančno pomoč je moralo zaprositi skupaj osem držav članic EU.
We analyse the Commission’s management of the financial assistance provided to five Member States (Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Ireland and Portugal). 
Sodišče je analiziralo, kako je Komisija upravljala finančno pomoč, zagotovljeno petim državam članicam (Madžarski, Latviji, Romuniji, Irski in Portugalski).
Some warning signs went unnoticed III It is important to remember that before the crisis there was already a framework geared towards monitoring the Member States’ budgets. 
Nekateri opozorilni znaki so ostali neopaženi III Velja opozoriti, da je že pred krizo obstajal okvir za spremljanje proračunov držav članic.
Warning the Council about the mounting fiscal imbalances was the Commission’s responsibility. The Commission was not prepared for the first requests for financial assistance. 
Komisija je imela nalogo, da Svet opozori na naraščanje fiskalnih neravnovesij, vendar ni bila pripravljena na prve zahteve za finančno pomoč.
We found that the European Commission estimated the countries’ public budgets to be stronger than they actually turned out to be. 
Ugotovili smo, da je Evropska komisija ocenila, da so javni proračuni držav trdnejši, kot so bili v resnici.
An important weakness of the Commission’s assessments prior to 2009 was the lack of reporting on the build-up of contingent public-sector liabilities, which often became real liabilities during the crisis. 
Ena od glavnih slabosti ocen Komisije pred letom 2009 je bilo nezadostno poročanje o kopičenju pogojnih obveznosti javnega sektorja, ki so med krizo pogosto postale dejanske obveznosti.
Nor did the Commission pay sufficient attention to the link between large foreign financial flows, the health status of the banks and, ultimately, government finances. 
Komisija tudi ni namenjala dovolj pozornosti povezavi med velikimi tujimi finančnimi tokovi, stabilnostjo bank in na koncu javnimi financami.
VReforms to the Stability and Growth Pact in 2011, 2013 and 2014 sought to address the weaknesses of the pre-crisis period by introducing greater macroeconomic surveillance. 
VReforme Pakta za stabilnost in rast v letih 2011, 2013 in 2014 so bile namenjene obravnavi slabosti, ki so se pokazale v obdobju pred krizo, in sicer z uvedbo večjega makroekonomskega nadzora.
However, back in 2008 the Commission found itself unprepared to manage the financial assistance when countries started presenting their requests. 
Vendar pa Komisija leta 2008, ko so države začele vlagati prošnje, ni bila pripravljena na upravljanje finančne pomoči.
Standing up to the challenge Playing catch-up VI The Commission managed to take on its new programme management duties, which included holding talks with the national authorities, preparing programme forecasts, financing gap estimates and identifying the necessary reforms. 
Spoprijem z izzivom Prizadevanja, da se nadoknadi zamujeno VI Komisiji je uspelo prevzeti nove naloge upravljanja programov, ki so vključevale dogovarjanje z nacionalnimi organi, pripravljanje programskih napovedi in ocen finančne vrzeli ter opredeljevanje potrebnih reform.
Given the initial time constraints and limited relevant experience, this was an achievement. 
Glede na začetne časovne omejitve in majhne ustrezne izkušnje je bil to dosežek.
Executive summary 08 VII The Commission was mostly thorough in obtaining the information it needed. 
Povzetek 08 VII Komisija je bila pri pridobivanju informacij, ki jih je potrebovala, večinoma temeljita.
It has increasingly marshalled internal expertise and engaged with a wide range of stakeholders in the countries which appealed for help. 
Vse bolj je uporabljala notranje strokovno znanje in sodelovala s širokim naborom deležnikov v državah, ki so zaprosile za pomoč.
Complex tools VIII The production of macroeconomic and deficit forecasts was not a new activity. 
Zapletena orodja VIII Priprava makroekonomskih napovedi in napovedi primanjkljajev ni bila nova dejavnost.
Quality control was limited mainly to reconciling the various parts of the forecasts, with no enquiry by management into the reasoning behind the forecasting assumptions. 
Kontrola kakovosti je bila omejena v glavnem na usklajevanje različnih delov napovedi, ne da bi vodstvo preverjalo utemeljitev predpostavk, uporabljenih pri napovedovanju.
It was very difficult to assess the plausibility of key assumptions such as fiscal multipliers, not only in any subsequent review but also, by management, during the actual production of forecasts. 
Zelo težko je bilo ocenjevati verodostojnost ključnih predpostavk, kot so fiskalni multiplikatorji, ne le v okviru naknadnih pregledov, temveč tudi s strani vodstva med dejansko pripravo napovedi.
Teething problems IX The assistance programmes were mostly soundly based, given the prevailing EU-level policies and the economic knowledge at that time. But a common weakness of the Commission process was the lack of documentation. 
Začetniške napake IX Podlaga programov pomoči je bila glede na prevladujoče politike na ravni EU in ekonomsko znanje v tistem času večinoma dobra, toda splošna slabost procesa Komisije je bilo pomanjkanje dokumentacije.
It was not geared towards going back in time to evaluate the decisions taken. 
Zasnova postopka ni omogočala naknadnega vrednotenja sprejetih odločitev.
We could not validate some of the essential information that was forwarded to the Council, such as the initial estimates of the financing gap for some programmes. 
Sodišče ni moglo potrditi nekaterih bistvenih informacij, ki so bile posredovane Svetu, kot so prvotne ocene finančne vrzeli za nekatere programe.
X This can be partly explained by the crisis context, the initial time pressure and the novelty of programme management to the Commission. 
X To je mogoče deloma pojasniti s kriznimi okoliščinami, časovnim pritiskom na začetku in tem, da je bilo upravljanje programa za Komisijo novost.
The availability of records improved with time, but even for the most recent programmes some key documents were missing. 
Razpoložljivost evidenc se je sčasoma izboljšala, vendar so celo pri najnovejših programih manjkali nekateri ključni dokumenti.
XI The conditions in memoranda of understanding were mostly justified by specific reference to the Council decision. However, conditions were not always sufficiently focused on the general economic policy conditions set by the Council. 
XI Pogoji iz memorandumov o soglasju so bili v glavnem utemeljeni z izrecnim sklicevanjem na sklepe Sveta, niso pa se vedno dovolj osredotočali na pogoje splošne ekonomske politike, ki jih je določil Svet.
Different approaches XII We found several examples of countries not being treated in the same way in a comparable situation. 
Različni pristopi XII Sodišče je ugotovilo več primerov, ko države v podobnem položaju niso bile enako obravnavane.
The conditions for assistance were managed differently in each programme. 
Upravljanje pogojev pomoči je bilo v vsakem programu drugačno.
In some programmes they were less stringent overall, which made compliance easier. 
V nekaterih programih so bili pogoji na splošno manj strogi, zaradi česar jih je bilo lažje izpolniti.
When comparing countries with similar structural weaknesses, it was found that the required reforms were not always in proportion to the problems faced or that they pursued widely different paths. 
Ko je Sodišče primerjalo države s podobnimi strukturnimi slabostmi, je ugotovilo, da zahtevane reforme niso bile vedno sorazmerne z obstoječimi težavami ali da so potekale zelo različno.
Some, but not all, countries’ deficit targets were relaxed more than the economic situation would appear to justify. Limited quality control 
Cilji glede primanjkljaja v nekaterih državah – vendar ne v vseh – so bili omiljeni bolj, kot bi bilo pričakovati glede na ekonomski položaj.
Executive summary 09 Room for improvement XIV On the positive side, the programme documents, which provide the basis for the decisions that the Council or the Commission take, have improved significantly since the first request for financial assistance. 
Povzetek 09 Možnosti za izboljšave XIV Pozitivno je, da so se programski dokumenti, ki so osnova za odločitve Sveta ali Komisije, od prve prošnje za finančno pomoč bistveno izboljšali.
This was due to the allocation of additional staff to programme management, more experience gained and better preparation. 
To izboljšanje je pripisati dodelitvi dodatnega osebja za upravljanje programov, večji izkušenosti in boljšim pripravam.
However, even the more recent programme documents lacked some essential information. 
Vseeno pa celo novejši programski dokumenti niso vsebovali nekaterih ključnih informacij.
XV For monitoring, the Commission used accrual-based deficit targets. 
XV Za spremljanje je Komisija uporabila cilje glede primanjkljaja na podlagi nastanka poslovnega dogodka.
This ensures consistency with the excessive deficit procedure, but it also means that, when a decision on programme continuation is to be taken, the Commission cannot report with certainty whether the beneficiary Member State has complied with the deficit target, as accrual-based deficits can only be observed after a certain time has elapsed. 
To zagotavlja skladnost s postopkom v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, vendar tudi pomeni, da Komisija pri sprejemanju odločitve o nadaljevanju programa ne more z gotovostjo poročati, ali je država članica upravičenka izpolnila cilj glede primanjkljaja, saj je mogoče primanjkljaje na podlagi nastanka poslovnega dogodka ugotoviti šele čez nekaj časa.
The manner of reporting on compliance with conditions was not systematic. 
Način poročanja o izpolnjevanju pogojev ni bil sistematičen.
Many different terms were used to convey non-compliance, leading to confusion. 
Za poročanje o njihovem neizpolnjevanju je bilo uporabljenih veliko različnih izrazov, kar povzroča zmedo.
Some conditions were not reported on. 
O nekaterih pogojih se ni poročalo.
A few conditions were reported to have been met when this was not in fact the case. 
O nekaj pogojih se je poročalo, da so izpolnjeni, čeprav niso bili.
Programme met their objectives XVI The revised deficit targets were mostly met, with some exceptions. 
Programi so dosegli svoje cilje XVI Spremenjeni cilji glede primanjkljaja so bili – z nekaj izjemami – večinoma doseženi.
As economic activity declined in 2009, countries suffered losses in revenue, which wiped out any gains from new revenue measures. 
Ko je gospodarska dejavnost leta 2009 upadla, so države utrpele izgube prihodkov, ki so izničile celo izkupiček novih ukrepov na strani prihodkov.
Tax-neutral or tax-offsetting reforms caused additional short-term fiscal costs and some countries took additional tax measures to offset the declining tax-to-GDP ratios. 
Davčno nevtralne reforme ali reforme, ki so izravnavale davke, so povzročile dodane kratkoročne fiskalne stroške in nekatere države so sprejele dodatne davčne ukrepe za izravnavo nižajočega se deleža davkov v razmerju do BDP.
Structural deficits improved but at a varying pace. 
Strukturni primanjkljaji so se izboljšali, vendar različno hitro.
Part of the fiscal adjustment took place in a non-lasting way. 
Del fiskalnih prilagoditev ni bil izveden na trajen način.
Countries used one-off measures to meet the targets. 
Države so za izpolnitev ciljev uporabile enkratne ukrepe.
Executive summary 10 Our recommendations (a) The Commission should establish an institution-wide framework allowing the rapid mobilisation of the Commission’s staff and expertise if a financial assistance programme emerges. 
Povzetek 10 Naša priporočila (a) Komisija naj vzpostavi okvir znotraj celotne institucije, ki bi omogočal hitro mobilizacijo osebja in strokovnega znanja Komisije, če se pokaže potreba po programu finančne pomoči.