natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
137 Eurostat only publishes advice in agreement with Member States. 
137 Eurostat nasvete objavi samo v dogovoru z državami članicami.
In a step towards increased transparency, Eurostat has started to include information to the EFC on non‐published advice. 
Za večjo preglednost je Eurostat začel vključevati informacije o neobjavljenih nasvetih, namenjene Ekonomsko-finančnemu odboru.
See Commission replies to paragraphs 57 and 58. 
Glej odgovore Komisije na točki 57 in 58.
Reply of the Commission 135 Recommendation 5 The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
Odgovori Komisije 135 Priporočilo 5 Komisija sprejema to priporočilo.
138 Eurostat has a procedure specifying the steps, timetable and role of each actor for the analysis of the notified EDP data. 
138 Eurostat ima vzpostavljen postopek, v katerem so določeni koraki, časovni razpored in vloga vsakega akterja pri analizi posredovanih podatkov v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
This includes regular meetings with senior management and with the Director General. 
To vključuje redne sestanke z višjim vodstvom in generalnim direktorjem.
A few days before the press release, the Director General, acting as the Chief Statistician of the European Union, assesses the situation for every Member State and decides on reservations and amendments. 
Nekaj dni pred sporočilom za javnost generalni direktor kot glavni statistik Evropske unije oceni stanje za vsako državo članico ter se odloči o pridržkih in spremembah.
Reservations or amendments to the data are based on professional judgment, on the basis of the qualitative and quantitative information available before and during the clarification process. 
Pridržki in spremembe podatkov temeljijo na strokovni presoji na podlagi informacij o kakovosti in količini, ki so na voljo pred postopkom pojasnjevanja in med njim.
This process is done exclusively on a statistical basis, exercising Eurostat’s statistical authority provided for this purpose and enshrined in legislation. 
Ta postopek se izvaja izključno na statistični podlagi z izvajanjem statističnih pristojnosti Eurostata, ki so za ta namen določene v zakonodaji.
See Commission reply to paragraph 65. 
Glej odgovor Komisije na točko 65.
139 Eurostat has a procedure specifying the steps, timetable and role of each actor for the analysis of the notified EDP data. 
139 Eurostat ima vzpostavljen postopek, v katerem so določeni koraki, časovni razpored in vloga vsakega akterja pri analizi posredovanih podatkov v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
This process is done exclusively on a statistical basis, exercising the statistical authority provided to Eurostat for this purpose. 
Ta postopek se izvaja izključno na statistični podlagi z izvajanjem statističnih pristojnosti Eurostata za ta namen.
Recommendation 6 The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
Priporočilo 6 Komisija sprejema to priporočilo.
The Commission ensures that all methodological problems with a potential/actual impact on net lending/net bor‐ rowing are addressed in a consistent way. 
Komisija zagotavlja, da se vse metodološke težave z morebitnim/dejanskim učinkom na neto posojanje / neto izposojanje obravnavajo skladno.
The Commission will however complement the written internal documen‐ tation for setting reservations or amending data where necessary. 
Vendar bo, kjer je to potrebno, dopolnila pisno notranjo dokumentacijo za podajanje pridržkov ali spreminjanje podatkov.
140 The Commission does not agree with the observation that the analysis underlying its recommendations in the context of the EDP lacks transparency. 
140 Komisija se ne strinja z opažanjem, da je analiza, na kateri temeljijo priporočila v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, premalo pregledna.
The transparency of the Commission’s assessments and subsequent recom‐ mendations has significantly increased over the last number of years. 
Preglednost ocen Komisije in poznejših priporočil se je v zadnjih letih znatno povečala.
The legislative changes had to be technically operationalised and methodologies adapted. 
Zakonodajne spremembe je bilo treba tehnično uveljaviti in prilagoditi metodologije.
Reply of the Commission 136 This has involved the Commission setting out the methodologies which it utilises in assessing compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) ‐ such as the effective action methodology for the assessment of compliance in the context of the EDP and the classification principles on one‐off measures as published in the Report on Public Finances in EMU 2015 – and has mainly been facilitated through a series of explanatory notes brought to the com‐ petent instances of the Council, the contents of which are summarised in the Vade Mecum, publicly available on the Commission’s website. The latter will now be updated annually in line with a commitment in the Commission Com‐ munication of 21 October 2015 on Completing EMU. 
Odgovori Komisije 136 Za ta namen je Komisija določila metodologije, ki jih uporablja pri ocenjevanju skladnosti s Paktom za stabilnost in rast – kot so metodologija uspešnih ukrepov za ocenjevanje skladnosti v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem in načela razvrščanja pri enkratnih ukrepih, kot so objavljena v Poročilu o javnih financah v EMU v letu 2015 –, kar so večinoma omogočila najrazličnejša pojasnila, ki so bila predložena pristojnim organom Sveta in katerih vsebina je povzeta v Vademekumu, ki je javno objavljen na spletni strani Komisije. Ta se bo zdaj letno posodabljal v skladu z zavezo iz Sporočila Komisije z dne 21. oktobra 2015 o korakih za dokončanje ekonomske in monetarne unije.
In order to further increase transparency, since spring 2014 the Commission agreed to provide Member States with all the necessary information to replicate the underlying computations related to the compliance assessment with both the preventive and the corrective arm, including detailed excel spreadsheets providing step‐by‐step calcula‐ tions. 
Da bi Komisija nadalje povečala preglednost, od pomladi 2014 državam članicam zagotavlja vse potrebne informacije za ponovitev zadevnih izračunov v zvezi z ocenjevanjem skladnosti, za preventivni in popravljalni del, vključno s podrobnimi Excelovimi preglednicami, ki predstavljajo postopne izračune.
Regarding discretionary measures, the Commission has made fully public aggregate data series on the impact of discretionary measures and the level of one‐offs since spring 2014 and, in line with the Ecofin Council Conclu‐ sions of June 2014, has made further progress by sharing with the Member States the yield of key individual tax measures incorporated in the bottom‐up approach for EDP countries as of spring 2015. Furthermore, the Commission has made available detailed information on the main measures in the Staff Working Documents which accompany new EDP recommendations, including the forecast of key variables for the compu‐ tation of the fiscal effort under the baseline scenario (e.g. the point of reference to which future forecast will be compared with in order to compute both the top‐down and the bottom‐up approach). 
Kar zadeva diskrecijske ukrepe, Komisija od pomladi 2014 v celoti javno objavlja sklope zbirnih podatkov o vplivu diskrecijskih ukrepov in stopnji enkratnih ukrepov ter je v skladu s Sklepi Sveta ECOFIN iz junija 2014 naredila še en korak naprej, saj je od pomladi 2015 države članice obveščala o rezultatih ključnih individualnih davčnih ukrepov, vključenih v pristop od spodaj navzgor za države, vključene v postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem. Poleg tega je dala Komisija na voljo podrobne informacije o glavnih ukrepih v delovnih dokumentih služb Komisije, ki so priloženi novim priporočilom v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, vključno z napovedjo ključnih spremenljivk za izračun fiskalnega napora po osnovnem scenariju (npr. referenčna točka, s katero se bodo primerjale prihodnje napovedi za izračun po pristopu od zgoraj navzdol in od spodaj navzgor).
The Commission recognises that the complexity of the surveillance framework has increased. 
Komisija priznava, da se je kompleksnost okvira nadzora povečala.
Indeed, there is a natural trade‐off between defining rules and approaches as much as possible in terms of capturing the underly‐ ing macroeconomic situation and developments, and the degree of complexity of the entire framework. 
Obstaja naravni kompromis med opredelitvijo pravil in pristopov, ki čim bolj upošteva zadevno makroekonomsko stanje in gibanje, ter stopnjo kompleksnosti celotnega okvira.
Transpar‐ ent codification and publication of the methodologies reduced the discretion and scope for interpretation in the system. 
Pregledna kodifikacija in objava metodologij sta zmanjšali prosto presojo in manevrski prostor za razlago v sistemu.
As indicated in its Communication of 21 October 2015, the Commission intends to make further efforts to improve clarity and reduce the complexity of the existing framework, in cooperation with the Member States, wherever pos‐ sible within the existing legislative framework. 
Kot je Komisija navedla v sporočilu z dne 21. oktobra 2015, si namerava še naprej prizadevati za večjo jasnost in manjšo kompleksnost veljavnega okvira v sodelovanju z državami članicami, kjer je to mogoče v okviru veljavnega zakonodajnega okvira.
The Commission will aim to streamline the methodology for assess‐ ing compliance with the SGP. 
Komisija si bo prizadevala za racionalizacijo metodologije za ocenjevanje skladnosti s Paktom za stabilnost in rast.
141 A large degree of the growing complexity referred to by the Court has arisen as a result of an attempt to provide greater transparency. 
141 Velik del naraščajoče kompleksnosti, ki jo omenja Sodišče, je posledica prizadevanj za zagotovitev večje preglednosti.
At the same time, the increased complexity of the surveillance framework called for detailed explanation in a spirit of transparency. 
Hkrati so bila zaradi povečane kompleksnosti okvira za nadzor potrebna dodatna pojasnila v smislu preglednosti.
The Commission considers that transparency has recently been enhanced significantly and while recognising room for improvement, it does not agree that the efforts so far have been insufficient. Indeed, the Commission is fully committed to transparency. 
Komisija meni, da se je preglednost v zadnjem času zelo izboljšala, in čeprav priznava, da jo je mogoče še izboljšati, se ne strinja, da dosedanja prizadevanja niso bila zadostna.
In the statistical field, the Commission publishes methodological advice and guidance, provided it does not breach statistical confidentiality enshrined in Council Regulation 479/2009. 
Na področju statistike objavlja metodološke nasvete in smernice, če s tem ne krši statistične zaupnosti iz Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 479/2009.
Reply of the Commission 137 Moreover, the legislative changes introduced in recent years in the EU fiscal framework had to be technically opera‐ tionalised. 
Odgovori Komisije 137 Poleg tega je bilo treba tehnično uveljaviti zakonodajne spremembe, uvedene v fiskalni okvir EU v zadnjih letih.
The increased complexity of the surveillance framework called for additional explana‐ tion in a spirit of transparency. 
Zaradi povečane kompleksnosti okvira za nadzor so bila potrebna dodatna pojasnila v smislu preglednosti.
The formalisation of such methodologies, however, tends to reduce the discretion and scope for interpretation in the system, due to the imperative to abide by the published methodology. 
Vendar formalizacija takih metodologij običajno zmanjša prosto presojo in manevrski prostor za razlago v sistemu, ker je treba nujno upoštevati objavljeno metodologijo.
Regarding discretionary measures, the Commission has made fully public aggregate data series on the impact of discretionary measures and the level of one‐offs since spring 2014 and, in line with the Ecofin Council Conclu‐ sions of June 2014, has made further progress by sharing with the Member States the yield of key individual tax measures incorporated in the bottom‐up approach for EDP countries as of spring 2015. 
Kar zadeva diskrecijske ukrepe, Komisija od pomladi 2014 v celoti javno objavlja sklope zbirnih podatkov o vplivu diskrecijskih ukrepov in stopnji enkratnih ukrepov ter je v skladu s Sklepi Sveta ECOFIN iz junija 2014 naredila še en korak naprej, saj je od pomladi 2015 države članice obveščala o rezultatih ključnih individualnih davčnih ukrepov, vključenih v pristop od spodaj navzgor za države, vključene v postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
Recommendation 7 – First indent – Assessment process The Commission partially accepts the recommendation given the very substantial progress in making its analyses more transparent. 
Priporočilo 7, prva alinea – proces ocenjevanja Komisija delno sprejema priporočilo glede na znaten napredek pri izboljšanju preglednosti svojih analiz.
In relation to one‐off and temporary measures, the Code of Conduct specifies that one‐off and temporary measures are measures having a transitory budgetary effect that does not lead to a sustained change in the inter‐temporal budgetary position and goes on to provide several examples. 
V kodeksu ravnanja je v zvezi z enkratnimi in začasnimi ukrepi opredeljeno, da so ti ukrepi taki s prehodnimi proračunskimi učinki, ki ne povzročijo trajne spremembe medčasovnega proračunskega stanja, zraven pa je navedenih nekaj primerov.
However, owing to the very wide variation in country specificities, it is eminently possible that measures which do not neatly fit into any previously encountered cat‐ egory will arise and, in such circumstances, it is highly desirable that the Commission retains the leeway to apply its economic judgement. 
Vendar je zaradi zelo velike raznolikosti posebnih značilnosti držav povsem mogoče, da bodo sprejeti ukrepi, ki ne spadajo povsem v nobeno od prejšnjih kategorij, in v takih okoliščinah je zelo zaželeno, da Komisija ohrani manevrski prostor za uporabo svoje ekonomske presoje.
In this regard, the Commission has published work in previous Public Finance Reports which sets out the analytical approach and rationale which is taken and internal work has been undertaken updating this material. 
V zvezi s tem je Komisija v prejšnjih poročilih o javnih financah objavila delo, ki določa analitični pristop in logiko, ki se uporabljata, na notranji ravni pa se je začelo delo za posodobitev tega gradiva.
Updated and more detailed internal guidance (including a number of guiding principles and typical cases) on one‐off measures have been published externally in the Public Finance Report 2015. 
Posodobljene in podrobnejše notranje smernice (vključno s številnimi vodilnimi načeli in značilnimi primeri) glede enkratnih ukrepov so bile objavljene za zunanjo rabo v Poročilu o javnih financah v letu 2015.
Similarly, the concept of ‘unexpected adverse economic events’ has not been definitively set out in advance as it is not possible to exhaustively define the set of individual country circumstances which this may apply to ex‐ante, par‐ ticularly when considering that these events are by nature unanticipated. 
Podobno koncept „nepričakovanih neugodnih gospodarskih dogodkov“ ni bil dokončno opredeljen vnaprej, saj ni mogoče vnaprej izčrpno opredeliti sklopa okoliščin v posamezni državi, za katere se lahko uporablja, zlasti glede na to, da taki dogodki niso predvideni.
However, the Commission considers that the agreed methodology for assessing effective action provides a comprehensive approach on the matter. 
Vendar Komisija meni, da dogovorjena metodologija za ocenjevanje uspešnih ukrepov določa celovit pristop k temu.
Reply of the Commission 138 The Commission provides the analysis of relevant factors as required by the Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, tak‐ ing into account the factors listed directly in the legislation as well as those deemed relevant by the Member State concerned. The Regulation stipulates that in a case where the deficit criterion is breached and the general government debt is above 60% of GDP, the relevant factors will only be considered in the decision regarding whether to launch an EDP if the deficit remains close to the reference value and the breach is judged to be temporary. 
Odgovori Komisije 138 Komisija zagotavlja analizo pomembnih dejavnikov, kot je zahtevano v Uredbi Sveta (ES) št. 1467/97, ob upoštevanju dejavnikov, ki so navedeni neposredno v zakonodaji, in tistih, ki jih za pomembne šteje zadevna država članica, Uredba določa, da se pomembni dejavniki, če se krši merilo glede primanjkljaja in če javnofinančni dolg presega 60 % BDP, upoštevajo samo pri odločitvi o tem, ali uvesti postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, če primanjkljaj ostane blizu referenčne vrednosti in se kršitev šteje za začasno.
This is a crucial element of accounting for the underlying country‐specific circumstances which differ in their character and gravity across countries, and which may not always be quantifiable. 
To je bistven element pri upoštevanju okoliščin v posamezni državi, ki se med državami razlikujejo glede na svoje značilnosti in težo ter jih ni vedno mogoče količinsko opredeliti.
Moreover, the assessment of effective action on the basis of the top‐down approach also allows to correct for the impact of unexpected events. 
Poleg tega ocenjevanje uspešnih ukrepov s pristopom od zgoraj navzdol omogoča tudi upoštevanje vpliva nepričakovanih dogodkov.
Recommendation 7 – Second indent – Accessibility of data The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
Priporočilo 7, druga alinea – dostopnost podatkov Komisija sprejema to priporočilo.
Recommendation 7 – Third indent – Bottom‐up assessment The Commission does not accept the recommendation as the Commission does not have the legal power to enlist the services of the independent national fiscal councils. 
Priporočilo 7, tretja alinea – ocena od spodaj navzgor Komisija priporočila ne sprejema, saj ni pristojna za vključitev neodvisnih nacionalnih fiskalnih svetov v delo.
Recommendation 7 – Fourth indent – Robustness of analysis The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
Priporočilo 7, četrta alinea – trdnost analize Komisija sprejema to priporočilo.
142 The Court’s observation regarding the focus of the EDP traditionally lying more on government deficits than on debt is well‐founded. 
142 Opažanje Sodišča, da se je postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem tradicionalno bolj osredotočal na javnofinančni primanjkljaj kot na dolg, je utemeljeno.
Prior to the entry into force of the Six‐pack, the debt component of the SGP was insufficiently active in terms of the regular surveillance processes. 
Pred začetkom veljavnosti šesterčka element dolga v Paktu za stabilnost in rast ni bil dovolj dejaven, kar zadeva redne postopke nadzora.
For this reason, one of the key reforms contained within the Six‐pack was the operationalization of the debt‐rule, notably by elevating the breach of the 60% of GDP debt threshold to the EDP trigger and defining what constituted debt that was declining at a sufficiently diminishing pace, as stipulated under the Regulation. 
Zato je bila uveljavitev pravila o dolgu ena od ključnih reform v okviru šesterčka, zlasti s stopnjevanjem kršitve praga dolga v višini 60 % BDP do ravni, ki pomeni sprožitev postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, in opredelitvijo, kaj je dolg, ki se zmanjšuje dovolj hitro, kot je določeno v Uredbi.
During those three years, compliance with the debt criterion is judged according to whether the Member State in question makes sufficient progress towards compliance. 
V teh treh letih se skladnost z merilom dolga presoja glede na to, ali zadevna država članica dovolj napreduje v smeri skladnosti.
Reply of the Commission 139 This arrangement represents a practical recognition of the fact that Member States which were already in an EDP at the time of the adoption of the Six‐Pack already had agreed fiscal consolidation paths, which were not necessarily in line with the requirements of the newly operationalised debt rule. 
Odgovori Komisije 139 S to ureditvijo je v praksi priznano dejstvo, da so imele države članice, ki so bile v času sprejetja šesterčka že v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, že dogovorjene načine fiskalne konsolidacije, ki niso bili nujno v skladu z zahtevami novouvedenega pravila o dolgu.
Hence, there would have been an inconsist‐ ency between the ongoing EDP procedures and the requirements of the debt rule. 
Zato bi prišlo do neskladnosti med stalnimi postopki v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem in zahtevami pravila o dolgu.
The transition period is therefore a necessary recognition that these Member States require time to adapt their structural adjustments to the level needed to comply with the new benchmark. 
Prehodno obdobje je torej nujno priznanje, da te države članice potrebujejo čas, da svoje strukturne prilagoditve prilagodijo ravni, potrebni za izpolnjevanje novega referenčnega merila.
It is important to note that countries still need to be moving towards compliance during this period and face possible procedural consequences in case of non‐compliance; it is not the case that the debt requirement does not apply at all during the transition. 
Opozoriti je treba, da morajo države v tem obdobju kljub temu delovati v smeri skladnosti in da so v primeru neskladnosti zagrožene morebitne postopkovne posledice; ni res, da zahteva glede dolga v prehodnem obdobju sploh ne velja.
Moreover, although the transition period is defined as lasting three years, during the last year Member States must show compliance with the debt criterion, so that in reality the transitional arrangements only differ from the usual debt reduction benchmark over the first two years. 
Čeprav je opredeljeno, da prehodno obdobje traja tri leta, morajo države članice v zadnjem letu dokazati skladnost z merilom dolga, tako da se prehodna ureditev od običajnega referenčnega merila za zmanjšanje dolga dejansko razlikuje samo v prvih dveh letih.
143 The Commission does not agree that the Communication on making the best use of the flexibility within the exist‐ ing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact has in any way undermined the credibility of the process, or risked debt sustainability. 
143 Komisija se ne strinja, da bi sporočilo „Kako čim bolje izkoristiti prožnost v okviru obstoječih pravil Pakta za stabilnost in rast“ kakor koli ogrozilo verodostojnost procesa ali pomenilo tveganje za vzdržnost dolga.
Indeed, the Communication did not represent a departure from the pre‐existing scenario as it did not extend the concept of factors to be taken into account in the decision not to launch an EDP. 
V resnici to sporočilo ni odstopalo od prejšnjega scenarija, saj ni razširilo koncepta dejavnikov, ki se upoštevajo pri odločanju o neuvedbi postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
Article 2 of Regulation 1467/97, dealing with the launch of an EDP, clearly states that when preparing a report under Article 126(3), the Com‐ mission shall take into account all relevant factors in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria ‐ including developments in medium term potential growth, the implementation of policies in the context of prevention and correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances, and the implemen‐ tation of policies in the context of the common growth strategy of the Union. 
1467/97, ki ureja uvedbo postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, je jasno določeno, da Komisija ob pripravi poročila na podlagi člena 126(3) upošteva vse pomembne dejavnike, če ti pomembno vplivajo na oceno izpolnjevanja meril primanjkljaja in dolga, vključno z razvojem srednjeročne potencialne rasti, izvajanjem politik v okviru preprečevanja in odpravljanja čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij ter izvajanjem politik v okviru skupne strategije Unije za rast.
The debt rule (both the full rule as well as the transitional rule) does not automatically imply that a Member State is put in EDP once the quantified target is missed. 
Pravilo o dolgu (polno pravilo in prehodno pravilo) ne pomeni samodejno, da se za državo članico uvede postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, ko ne izpolni količinsko opredeljenega cilja.