natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The ECB’s organisational set-up and resourcing for the assessment of recovery plans and the supervision of banks in crisis are satisfactory, despite weaknesses in initial planning and a need to improve the allocation of staff to the most urgent situations. 
Organizacijska struktura ECB in njeno zagotavljanje virov za ocenjevanje načrtov sanacije in nadzor nad bankami v krizi so zadovoljivi kljub pomanjkljivostim pri začetnem načrtovanju in potrebam po izboljšanju razporeditve zaposlenih na najbolj nujne primere.
The ECB is finalising arrangements for external cooperation and coordination with other supervisory authorities and the Single Resolution Board. Nevertheless, the outstanding issues have the potential to delay and restrict information-sharing and detract from the efficiency of coordination. 10 
Čeprav ECB zaključuje ureditve za zunanje sodelovanje in usklajevanje z drugimi nadzornimi organi in Enotnim odborom za reševanje, bi lahko kljub temu zaradi nerešenih vprašanj prišlo do zamud in omejitev pri izmenjavi informacij ter zmanjšanja učinkovitosti pri usklajevanju.
V. The ECB’s process for the assessment of banks’ recovery plans is positive. 
8 V. Proces ECB za ocenjevanje načrtov sanacije bank je dober.
Submission and monitoring procedures are in place, and assessors have access to useful tools and guidance, even though it could be enhanced, namely for the area of recovery plan indicators. 
Postopka za predložitev in spremljanje sta vzpostavljena, ocenjevalci pa imajo dostop do koristnih orodij in smernic, čeprav bi bilo slednje mogoče poglobiti, in sicer za področje kazalnikov v načrtih sanacije.
Moreover the results of the recovery plan assessments are not systematically used for crisis identification and response. 
Tudi rezultati ocen načrtov sanacije se ne uporabljajo sistematično za ugotavljanje kriz in odziv nanje.
Also, we cannot conclude on the operational efficiency of the management of this process in practice due to lack of evidence provision by the ECB. 
Vendar Sodišče ni moglo sprejeti zaključka o operativni učinkovitosti upravljanja tega procesa v praksi, saj mu ECB ni zagotovila dovolj dokazov.
The ECB’s operational framework for crisis management has some flaws, and there are signs of inefficient implementation. 
Operativni okvir ECB za krizno upravljanje ima nekaj pomanjkljivosti, opaziti pa je tudi znake neučinkovitega izvajanja.
Guidance for early intervention assessments is underdeveloped and does not define objective criteria or indicators for determining that a bank has entered a crisis situation. 
Smernice za oceno v zvezi z zgodnjim posredovanjem niso dovolj izoblikovane in ne določajo objektivnih meril ali kazalnikov za opredelitev, ali je banka v kriznih razmerah.
There is no guidance on the best use of the ECB’s powers or the most appropriate measures to be considered in specific scenarios. 
Ni smernic o čim boljši uporabi pooblastil ECB ali najprimernejših ukrepih, ki jih je treba sprejeti v posameznih scenarijih.
We obtained no comprehensive evidence on the actual use of its powers so we cannot conclude on the efficiency of its management in practice. 
Sodišče ni dobilo izčrpnih dokazov o dejanski uporabi pooblastil ECB, tako da ne more sprejeti zaključka o učinkovitosti njenega upravljanja v praksi.
Access to evidence VII. 
Dostop do dokazov VII.
The ECB refused to provide important evidence which we requested to carry out the audit, which had a negative impact on the audit work. 
ECB je zavrnila izročitev pomembnih dokazov, ki jih je Sodišče zahtevalo za izvedbo revizije, kar je negativno vplivalo na naše revizijsko delo.
This means that our observations and conclusions are provisional. 
To pomeni, da so naša opažanja in zaključki začasni.
We can draw overall conclusions about the design of the ECB’s processes, but we are unable to confirm the operational efficiency of crisis management at the ECB in practice. 
Sprejmemo lahko splošne zaključke o zasnovi procesov ECB, vendar ne moremo potrditi operativne učinkovitosti kriznega upravljanja ECB v praksi.
What we recommend VIII. 
Kaj Sodišče priporoča VIII.
We make a number of recommendations to improve crisis management by the ECB. 
Izrekamo več priporočil za izboljšanje kriznega upravljanja ECB.
In the area of co-operation, the ECB should improve co-ordination with external actors and adopt an internal framework for the supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates. 
Na področju sodelovanja naj ECB izboljša usklajevanje z zunanjimi akterji in sprejme interni okvir za dopolnilni nadzor finančnih konglomeratov.
For recovery planning, the ECB should provide additional guidance regarding the calibration of recovery plan indicators. 
Na področju načrtovanja sanacij naj ECB zagotoviti dodatne smernice o kalibraciji kazalnikov v načrtih sanacije.
X. For crisis identification, the ECB should further develop its guidance on early intervention assessments and set indicators for determining deterioration in the financial condition of a 11 bank. 
X. V zvezi z ugotavljanjem krize naj ECB dodatno razvije svoje smernice o oceni v zvezi z zgodnjim posredovanjem in določi kazalnike za ugotavljanje poslabšanja finančnega stanja banke.
It should make systematic use of information from recovery plan assessments in these circumstances too. 
V teh okoliščinah naj tudi sistematično uporablja informacije iz ocen načrtov sanacije.
In the area of crisis response, the ECB should ensure that issues are quantified before crisis response measures are considered, and establish reporting for systematically monitoring asset quality. 
Na področju kriznega odzivanja naj ECB zagotovi, da se problemi količinsko opredelijo pred razmislekom o ukrepih za krizno odzivanje, in uvede poročanje za sistematično spremljanje kakovosti sredstev.
It should also further develop its operational guidance on early intervention assessments, including making systematic use of insight it has gained through the assessment of banks’ recovery plans. 
Nadalje naj pripravi operativne smernice o oceni za zgodnje posredovanje, ki naj vključujejo sistematično uporabo dognanj, ki jih je pridobila pri oceni načrtov za sanacije bank.
Finally, in the area of “failing or likely to fail assessments”, the ECB should further develop its operational guidance. 12 
Na področju ocenjevanja, ali banka propada ali bodo verjetno propadla, naj ECB nadalje razvije svoje operativne smernice. 10
One of the lessons learned from the 2008 financial crisis was that the banking regulatory framework needed to be enhanced to ensure better crisis management. 
Eno od spoznanj, pridobljenih na podlagi finančne krize leta 2008, je bilo, da je treba zaradi boljšega kriznega upravljanja okrepiti bančni regulativni okvir.
In the European Union (EU), this need has been addressed by the transposition into national law of Directive 2014/59/EU, commonly known as the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). 
V Evropski uniji (EU) se je ta potreba obravnavala s prenosom Direktive 2014/59/EU, splošno znane kot direktiva o sanaciji in reševanju bank, v nacionalno zakonodajo.
It establishes a common European recovery and resolution framework. 2. 
Direktiva določa skupni evropski okvir za sanacijo in reševanje. 2.
In line with new global standards, it is composed of three pillars: recovery planning by banks, early intervention by supervisors and resolution as a last resort. 
V skladu z novimi svetovnimi standardi ga sestavljajo trije stebri: načrtovanje sanacije, ki ga opravijo banke, zgodnje posredovanje nadzornikov in reševanje kot zadnja rešitev.
The European Commission has also adopted implementing regulations. 
Evropska komisija je sprejela tudi izvedbene uredbe.
Together with guidelines issued by the European Banking Authority (EBA), these interpret and explain the regulatory framework and seek to ensure its uniform application 3. 
Z njimi in s smernicami, ki jih je izdal Evropski bančni organ, se tolmači in pojasnjuje regulativni okvir in zagotavlja njegova enotna uporaba. 3.
Under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)1, the European Central Bank (ECB) was given responsibility for ensuring efficient operational management of tasks related to the assessment of banks’ recovery planning and also for early intervention for significant banks in the euro area since November 2014. 
V okviru enotnega mehanizma nadzora1 je Evropska centralna banka dobila odgovornost za zagotavljanje učinkovitega operativnega upravljanja nalog, povezanih z ocenjevanjem, kako banke načrtujejo sanacije, ter za zgodnje posredovanje pri pomembnih bankah v evroobmočju od novembra leta 2014.
As of July 2017 the ECB directly supervises 120 significant banks in the euro area, holding just over 80 % of banking assets, or about 22 000 billion euro. 
Od julija 2017 ECB neposredno nadzoruje 120 pomembnih bank v evroobmočju, ki imajo v lasti nekaj več kot 80 % bilančne vsote bank ali približno 22 000 milijard EUR.
The ECB estimates its total costs for prudential supervision of the banking system for 2017 at 490 million euro, funded by the banks themselves via levy. 4. 
ECB ocenjuje, da njeni skupni stroški za bonitetni nadzor bančnega sistema za leto 2017 znašajo 490 milijonov EUR, financirajo pa jih banke same z dajatvami. 4.
Recovery planning and early intervention are meant to ensure that a crisis is mitigated, either by the banks themselves or by supervisory measures. 
Načrtovanje sanacije in zgodnje posredovanje sta namenjena zagotavljanju ublažitve krize, bodisi prek bank samih ali z nadzorniškimi ukrepi.
Crisis situations are defined as, for the purpose of this report, when circumstances at a bank deteriorate to a point where its financial condition is under threat. 
V tem poročilu so krizne razmere opredeljene kot razmere v banki, ki so se poslabšale do te mere, da je ogroženo njeno finančno stanje.
This supervisory responsibility requires a crisis management framework. 
Ta nadzorna pristojnost zahteva okvir za krizno upravljanje.
This is the process for preparation for crisis situations, and identification and response to them when they occur. 
To je proces priprave na krizne razmere, ugotavljanja, ali so krizne razmere nastopile, in odziva nanje, kadar se pojavijo.
1 13 SSM refers to the system of banking supervision in the EU. 
1 11 Enotni mehanizem nadzora je sistem nadzora nad bankami v EU.
The SSM comprises the ECB and the national supervisory authorities of participating countries; its main aims are to enhance the stability of the European banking system, increase financial integration and stability and ensure consistent supervision. 
Sestavljajo ga ECB in nacionalni nadzorni organi sodelujočih držav, njegovi glavni cilji pa so okrepiti stabilnosti evropskega bančnega sistema, izboljšati finančno povezanost in stabilnost ter zagotoviti dosleden nadzor.
Recovery planning is a new component of the regulatory framework. 
Načrtovanje sanacije je nov element regulativnega okvira.
Under the BRRD regime, banks are now obliged to develop and maintain recovery plans consisting of measures they intend to take to restore their financial condition as a first response to deterioration. 
V okviru pravil iz direktive o sanaciji in reševanju bank morajo zdaj banke pripraviti in posodabljati načrte sanacije z ukrepi, ki jih nameravajo kot prvi odziv po poslabšanju sprejeti za izboljšanje svojega finančnega položaja.
Bank supervisors assess the quality of these plans and establish whether they are credible and feasible. 
Bančni nadzorniki ocenijo kakovost teh načrtov in ugotovijo, ali so verodostojni in izvedljivi.
In the view of the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS), “Early intervention can prevent an identified weakness from developing into a threat to safety and soundness”2. It is a crucial component of supervisory crisis management. 
Po mnenju Baselskega odbora za bančni nadzor se lahko z zgodnjim posredovanjem prepreči, da bi se ugotovljena slabost razvila v grožnjo za varnost in trdnost.2 To je ključni element nadzorniškega kriznega upravljanja.
The BRRD has introduced a comprehensive set of early intervention tools, the EU Regulation establishing the SSM3 also conferred early intervention powers on the ECB. 
Z direktivo o sanaciji in reševanju bank je bil uveden celovit sklop instrumentov za zgodnje posredovanje, uredba EU o vzpostavitvi enotnega mehanizma nadzora3 pa je prav tako podelila pooblastila za zgodnje posredovanje ECB.
Effective crisis management therefore now depends primarily on the operationally efficient management by the ECB of its extensive powers. 
Uspešno krizno upravljanje je tako zdaj v prvi vrsti odvisno od tega, ali ECB operativno učinkovito upravlja svoje obsežne pristojnosti.
This includes building the supervisory capacity to identify and react to adverse developments at an early stage. 
To vključuje krepitev nadzorniških zmogljivosti za ugotavljanje neugodnih gibanj in odzivanje nanje v zgodnji fazi.
It also entails ensuring an adequate flow of information, both internally and externally, and timely decision-making. 
Zajema tudi zagotavljanje ustreznega pretoka informacij, tako znotraj ECB kot z drugimi deležniki, in pravočasno odločanje.
A final prerequisite for operationally efficient management when handling a crisis situation is the smooth exchange of information and efficient coordination with other supervisors and relevant authorities. 
Zadnji pogoj za operativno učinkovito upravljanje pri obravnavanju kriznih razmer je nemotena izmenjava informacij in učinkovito usklajevanje z drugimi nadzorniki in pristojnimi organi.
The assessment of recovery plans and the determination of crisis situations are sensitive decisions that should rely on a sound process. 
Ocena načrtov sanacije in ugotavljanje kriznih razmer so občutljive odločitve, ki morajo temeljiti na trdnem procesu.
The same applies to the use of discretionary supervisory powers, as measures have to be tailored to address the problem in a targeted and proportionate manner. 
Enako velja za rabo diskrecijskih nadzorniških pooblastil, saj morajo biti ukrepi oblikovani po meri za obravnavanje problema na ciljno usmerjen in sorazmeren način.
A key challenge is to establish criteria that allow for consistency in the treatment of banks with different business models in different markets that are supervised by teams with different supervisory backgrounds. 
Eden od glavnih izzivov je določiti merila, ki omogočajo usklajeno obravnavo bank z različnimi poslovnimi modeli na različnih trgih, ki so pod nadzorom skupin iz različnih nadzorniških okolij.
Thus, there needs to be a balance between criteria that are general and overarching and those that are institution-specific, while allowing for sufficient flexibility in the way they 2 3 BCBS Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (2012), p. 
2 3 BCBS Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (2012), str.
See Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. 14 
1024/2013 z dne 15. oktobra 2013 o prenosu posebnih nalog, ki se nanašajo na politike bonitetnega nadzora kreditnih institucij, na Evropsko centralno banko. 12
are applied. At the same time, all criteria must be explicit and robust enough to ensure supervisory consistency and safeguards against inaction bias (the relative advantages of doing nothing) and regulatory capture (promoting the interests of a bank rather than the public interest). 
Poleg tega pa morajo biti vsa merila izrecna in dovolj trdna, da zagotavljajo skladnost pri nadzoru in zaščito pred nagnjenostjo k nedejavnosti (relativno prednostjo neukrepanja) in nelegitimnim vplivom na vsebino predpisov (uveljavljanje interesov banke in ne javnega interesa).
Roughly two thirds of the banks who were subject to crisis management procedures of the ECB had a Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) score4 of four (the worst classification before a bank is classified as “failing or likely to fail” (FOLTF), and one third scored three. 
Približno dve tretjini bank, ki so bile obravnavane v postopkih kriznega upravljanja ECB, sta pri procesu nadzorniškega pregledovanja in ovrednotenja (SREP)4 dosegli oceno štiri (najslabša uvrstitev pred kategorijo „banka, ki propada ali bo verjetno propadla”), ena tretjina bank pa je dosegla oceno tri.
Just one bank had a SREP score of two. 
Samo ena banka je dosegla oceno dve.
Most banks were under crisis management for at least one year – and some for the entire period. 
Večina bank je bila v procesu kriznega upravljanja vsaj eno leto, nekatere pa v celotnem obdobju.
The figures for 2016 show that 11 % of banks in Europe had a SREP score of four. 
Podatki za leto 2016 kažejo, da je 11 % bank v Evropi pri procesu nadzorniškega pregledovanja in ovrednotenja doseglo oceno štiri.
In the second quarter of 2016 five banks had capital levels below the MDA trigger. 
V drugem četrtletju leta 2016 je imelo pet bank ravni kapitala nižje od točke sprožitve, ko se omeji maksimalni znesek za razdelitev.
AUDIT APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 11. 
REVIZIJSKI PRISTOP IN METODOLOGIJA 11.
We examined whether, in its supervisory role, the ECB had managed the establishment of an operationally efficient framework for crisis management procedures.5 In particular we focused on: (a) whether the ECB’s supervisory methodologies and related procedures efficiently identify and respond to a material deterioration in the financial condition of a bank; and (b) whether the operational procedures and arrangements for coordination and cooperation both within the ECB and with other relevant actors allow for efficient crisis management. 
Preučili smo, ali je ECB v svoji nadzorniški vlogi uspelo vzpostaviti operativno učinkovit okvir za krizno upravljanje.5 Zlasti smo se osredotočili na to: (a) ali se z nadzorniškimi metodologijami ECB in z njimi povezanimi postopki zagotavlja učinkovito odkrivanje resnih poslabšanj finančnih položajev bank in odzivanje nanje; (b) ali operativni postopki in ureditve za usklajevanje in sodelovanje znotraj ECB in z drugimi zadevnimi akterji zagotavljajo učinkovito krizno upravljanje.
4 5 15 SREP stands for “supervisory review and evaluation process”. 
4 5 13 SREP pomeni „proces nadzorniškega pregledovanja in ovrednotenja”.
The key purpose of the SREP is to ensure that institutions have made adequate arrangements (including strategies, processes and mechanisms) and have sufficient capital and liquidity to ensure the sound management and coverage of their risks. 
Glavni namen tega procesa je zagotoviti, da imajo institucije vzpostavljene ustrezne ureditve (vključno s strategijami, procesi in mehanizmi) ter zadosten kapital in likvidnost za zagotovitev dobrega obvladovanja in kritja svojih tveganj.
Our mandate to audit the operational efficiency of the management of the ECB is explicitly confirmed in Article 27.2 of the Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the ECB and Article 20(7) of the SSM Regulation. 
Naš mandat za revizijo operativne učinkovitosti upravljanja, ki ga izvaja ECB, je izrecno potrjen v členu 27.2 Protokola št.
We collected audit evidence through meetings and interviews with key ECB supervisory staff and by inspecting certain internal documents and publicly available data. 
ECB ter s pregledom nekaterih internih dokumentov in javno dostopnih podatkov.
In addition to our audit work at the ECB, we sent a questionnaire to all significant banks with the aim of obtaining feedback on the efficiency of the recovery planning process. 
Poleg revizijskega dela, opravljenega v ECB, smo poslali vprašalnik vsem pomembnim bankam, da bi dobili povratne informacije o učinkovitosti procesa načrtovanja sanacij.
The audit focused only on the operational efficiency of the ECB’s crisis management of banks under its direct supervision (these are exclusively what is known as “Significant Institutions” (SIs)). 
Revizija je bila usmerjena le na operativno učinkovitost ECB pri kriznem upravljanju bank pod njenim neposrednim nadzorom (to so izključno t. i. „pomembne institucije”).
The scope did not include crisis management activities for “less significant institutions” (LSIs) or the ECB’s interaction with resolution authorities apart from the timely exchange of information. 
Revizija ni obsegala dejavnosti kriznega upravljanja za „manj pomembne institucije” ali interakcije ECB z organi za reševanje, razen pravočasne izmenjave informacij.
We did not audit whether the ECB’s individual supervisory decisions were appropriate or not, but whether the processes in place would allow decisions to be taken at the right time and whether the assessments carried out prior to decision-making allowed well-informed judgments to be made. 
posamezne nadzorniške odločitve ECB ustrezne ali ne, temveč to, ali uvedeni procesi omogočajo, da se odločitve sprejemajo ob pravem času, in to, ali je bilo na podlagi ocen, ki so bile izvedene pred odločanjem, mogoče sprejeti utemeljene odločitve.
We continued to face scope limitations. 
Še naprej smo se soočali z omejenim obsegom revizije.
The ECB did provide extensive documentation for the purposes of this audit, and did apply considerable resources to support our audit, allowing the audit to continue in a timely manner, and cooperative arrangements between ECA and ECB were put in place to ensure the protection of confidential data and the smooth flow of documentation. 
ECB je sicer zagotovila obširno dokumentacijo za to revizijo in namenila precej virov za njeno podporo, s čimer je omogočila, da se je revizija pravočasno nadaljevala, med Sodiščem in ECB pa so bili sklenjeni dogovori o sodelovanju, da bi se zagotovila varstvo zaupnih podatkov in neoviran pretok dokumentacije.
As a result, we did obtain sufficient evidence regarding the design of the system to allow us to draw appropriate conclusions in that regard. 
Tako smo uspeli pridobiti dovolj dokazov o zasnovi sistema, na podlagi katerih smo lahko prišli do ustreznih zaključkov o tem področju.
However, the provision of evidence in the area of tests of controls and substantive testing was insufficient. 
Vendar predloženi dokazi na področjih preizkusov kontrol in preizkušanja podatkov niso bili zadostni.
Full details are given in Annex I. This means that, in relation to the operational efficiency of the implementation in practice of recovery plan assessments and other crisis management activities, the audit evidence to which we had access was limited, and sometimes was not made immediately available. 
Vse podrobnosti so navedene v Prilogi I. To pomeni, da smo imeli omejen dostop do revizijskih dokazov v zvezi z operativno učinkovitostjo tega, kako so se ocene načrtov sanacije in druge dejavnosti kriznega upravljanja izvajale v praksi, ki včasih niso bili takoj dani na voljo.
This means that while we did receive a significant volume of documentation, we could not answer all of our audit questions to the standards appropriate to an audit and that this report must necessarily be regarded as provisional in respect of these areas of the audit. 
Tako kljub velikemu obsegu dokumentacije, ki smo ga prejeli, nismo mogli odgovoriti na vsa svoja revizijska vprašanja v skladu s standardi, ki so primerni za revizije, zato je to poročilo v zvezi z zadevnimi področji treba obravnavati kot začasno.
OBSERVATIONS Organisational set-up, recruitment and allocation of staff for crisis management activities 17. 
OPAŽANJA Organizacijska struktura, zaposlovanje in razporeditev osebja na področje dejavnosti kriznega upravljanja 17.
Overall, the organisational set-up is adequate ... 
Organizacijska struktura je v splošnem ustrezna ...
At the ECB, joint supervisory teams (JSTs) are in charge of ongoing supervision including the exercise of supervisory activities relating to the assessment of banks’ recovery plans, and for crisis management. 
V ECB so skupne nadzorniške skupine odgovorne za izvajanje stalnega nadzora, vključno z nadzorniškimi dejavnostmi v zvezi z oceno načrtov sanacije bank, ter za krizno upravljanje.
The JSTs are always led by ECB personnel. They consist of ECB personnel and staff appointed by participating Member States’ (MS) supervisory authorities. 
Skupne nadzorniške skupine vedno vodi osebje ECB. Sestavljajo jih osebje ECB in osebje, ki 15