natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
According to the prime minister, Latvia was in need of financial assistance for three reasons: to manage the Parex Bank, to finance the budget deficit and to stabilise the financial market. 
Po navedbah predsednika vlade je Latvija finančno pomoč potrebovala iz treh razlogov: da bi obvladala banko Parex, financirala proračunski primanjkljaj in stabilizirala finančni trg.
Increasing concerns regarding Latvia’s financial system and external debt resulted in the balance of payments and banking crises. 
Vse večje skrbi glede latvijskega finančnega sistema in zunanjega dolga so privedle do plačilnobilančne in bančne krize.
Source: Latvia’s IMF request (2009); Aslund, Anders and Valdis Dombrovskis (2011), How Latvia came through the financial crisis, Peterson Institute for International Economics; Blanchard, Griffiths and Gruss (2013), ’Boom, bust, recovery: forensics of the Latvia crisis’, final conference draft to be presented at the Fall 2013 Brookings Panel on Economic Activity. 
Vir: Prošnja Latvije pri MDS (2009), Aslund, Anders in Valdis Dombrovskis (2011): „How Latvia Came Through The Financial Crisis” (Kako je Latvija premostila finančno krizo?), Peterson Institute for International Economics; Blanchard, Olivier; Mark Griffiths in Bertrand Gruss (2013): „Boom, Bust, Recovery: Forensics of the Latvia Crisis” (razcvet, propad, okrevanje: analiza latvijske krize), končni osnutek, predstavljen na konferenci Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, ki je potekala jeseni 2013.
Romania Balance-of-payment crisis With the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis, domestic financial markets and the banking system came under severe stress. 
Romunija Plačilnobilančna kriza Po izbruhu svetovne finančne krize leta 2008 je na domačih finančnih trgih in v bančnem sistemu zavla-dala huda napetost.
Access to external funding was limited, leading to a spike in interest rates. 
Dostop do zunanjega financiranja je bil omejen, kar je privedlo do porasta obrestnih mer.
The slowdown in capital flows led to large exchange rate depreciation of over 15 %, deteriorating asset quality and the further weakening of bank balance sheets. 
Zaradi upočasnitve kapitalskih tokov se je vrednost realnega menjalnega tečaja znižala za več kot 15 %, kakovost sredstev se je poslabšala, bančne bilance pa so postale še šibkejše.
The central bank intervened to stabilise the Romanian leu. 
Centralna banka je posredovala, da bi stabilizirala romunski RON.
Romania’s credit rating was downgraded to below investment grade, which increased both the risk premium and borrowing costs. 
Bonitetna ocena Romunije se je zmanjšala pod naložbeni razred, kar je povečalo premijo za tveganja in stroške izposoje.
Sovereign yields jumped to 9 %. 
Donosnost državnih vrednostnih papirjev se je povečala na 9 %.
Against a background of strongly increased risk aversion, increased pressures on the exchange rate and increasingly restricted access to the bond market for public borrowing, the Romanian authorities made a request for financial assistance in March 2009. 
Zaradi vse večje nenaklonjenosti tveganju, vse večjih pritiskov na menjalni tečaj in vse bolj omejenega dostopa do trga obveznic za javno izposojanje so romunski organi marca 2009 zaprosili za finančno pomoč.
Source: IMF, Romania: request for a stand-by arrangement (2009); IMF ex post evaluation Romania (2012); European Commission, ‘Overall assessment of the two balance-of-payments assistance programmes for Romania’, European Economy, Occasional Papers 156 (2013). 
Vir: IMF: Romania: Request for Stand-By Arrangement (Romunija: prošnja za aranžma „stand-by”) (2009), IMF Ex-post evaluation Romania (MDS: naknadno ocenjevanje Romunije) (2012), Evropska komisija: Overall assessment of the two balance-of-payments assistance programmes for Romania (splošna ocena dveh programov plačilnobilančne pomoči za Romunijo), European Economy, Occasional Papers 156 (2013).
Annex I 
Priloga I
Annexes 80 Member State Type of crisis Key reasons motivating the government request for assistance Ireland Banking crisis From late 2007, investor confidence in Ireland’s property sector had evaporated amid concerns about oversupply and a price bubble. 
Priloge 80 Država Vrsta krize Ključni razlogi za prošnjo vlade za pomoč Irska Bančna kriza Proti koncu leta 2007 je zaupanje vlagateljev v irski nepremičninski sektor izpuhtelo zaradi skrbi glede presežne ponudbe in premoženjskih balonov.
This left Ireland facing two problems: a sharp decline in cyclical construction-related revenues and the sudden emergence of large losses in the domestic banking system. 
Irska se je morala tako spopasti z dvema težavama: naglim upadom cikličnih prihodkov, povezanih z gradbeništvom, in nenadnimi velikimi izgubami v domačem bančnem sektorju.
In 2008-2010 Ireland had taken major measures to strengthen its banking sector. 
Med letoma 2008 in 2010 je Irska uvedla pomembne ukrepe za okrepitev bančnega sektorja.
It provided government guarantees of domestic banks’ liabilities. 
Zagotovila je državna jamstva za obveznosti domačih bank.
It injected capital amounting more to than 20 % of its GDP into the banking sector. 
V bančni sektor je vložila sredstva v višini več kot 20 % svojega BDP.
The National Asset Management Agency took over banks’ distressed land and property development assets. 
Nacionalna agencija za upravljanje premoženja je prevzela slabo premoženje bank v obliki zemljišč in nepremičninskih projektov.
However, the government’s obligations to the financial sector had pushed spreads on government bonds to historic highs and significantly reduced market access for the Member State. 
Kljub temu pa so zaradi državnih obveznosti do finančnega sektorja pribitki za državne obveznice narasli kot še nikoli prej in znatno zmanjšali dostop do trga za to državo.
Source: Ireland: letter of intent (2010); IMF, Ireland: request for an extended arrangement (2010); European Commission (2011). 
Vir: Irska: Letter of Intent (pismo o nameri) (2010), MDS: Irska: Request for an Extended Arrangement (prošnja za razširjen aranžma) (2010), Evropska komisija (2011).
Portugal Sovereign debt crisis The period before the request for financial assistance was marked by unfavourable developments in public finances and a worsening economic outlook. 
Portugalska Kriza državnega dolga Obdobje pred prošnjo za finančno pomoč je zaznamovalo neugodno dogajanje na področju javnih financ in slabšajoči se gospodarski obeti.
This led to a deterioration of confidence and rising market pressures on Portuguese debt, accentuated by the negative developments in euro area sovereign bond markets. 
Zaradi tega se je zmanjšalo zaupanje in povečali so se tržni pritiski na dolg Portugalske, kar se je še poslabšalo zaradi negativnega dogajanja na trgih državnih obveznic evrskega območja.
As market access tightened, the government had increasingly resorted to shorter-term security issuances and other types of financing (such as private placement, syndicated issue and substantial short-term financing from domestic banks). 
Ker je bil dostop do trga vse bolj omejen, se je vlada vse bolj zatekala k izdaji kratkoročnejših vrednostnih papirjev in drugim vrstam financiranja (kot so zasebno plasiranje, sindicirane izdaje in znatno kratkoročno financiranje s strani domačih bank).
In early May 2011, Portuguese 10-year spreads over Bunds increased to 650 basis points. 
Na začetku maja 2011 je pribitek na donosnost portugalskih 10-letnih obveznic glede na nemške narasel na 650 bazičnih točk.
Amidst consecutive downgrading of its sovereign bonds by credit rating agencies, Portugal became unable to refinance itself at rates compatible with long-term fiscal sustainability. 
Ko so bonitetne agencije večkrat zaporedoma znižale ocene portugalskih državnih obveznic, se je Portugalska znašla v položaju, ko se ni mogla refinancirati po obrestnih merah, združljivih s dolgoročno fiskalno vzdržnostjo.
Source: European Commission, ‘The economic adjustment programme for Portugal’, European Economy, Occasional Papers 79, (2011); IMF, Portugal: request for arrangement under the extended fund facility (2011). 
Vir: Evropska komisija: The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal (program za ekonomsko prilagoditev za Portugalsko), European Economy, Occasional Papers 79 (2011); IMF: Portugal: Request for Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility (MDS: Portugalska: prošnja za aranžma v okviru razširjenega instrumenta za financiranje) (2011).
1 Claessens and Kose (2013); Laeven and Valencia (2012); Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). 
1 Claessens in Kose (2013); Laeven in Valencia (2012); Kaminsky in Reinhart (1999).
Annexes 81 The lending facilities for the five countries Balance of payments assistance European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) Institutional form EU mechanism EU mechanism Private company owned by euro area countries Capital structure Guaranteed by the EU budget Guaranteed by the EU budget Guarantees from euro area countries Lending capacity in euro 50 billion euro 60 billion euro 440 billion euro Instruments Loans, credit lines Loans, credit lines Loans, bond purchases on the primary and secondary markets Duration Permanent mechanism Temporary mechanism Temporary mechanism Main decision-making bodies Council, acting by qualified majority voting on proposal from European Commission EFSF Board of Directors (i.e. members of the Eurogroup) Legal basis of financing Article 143 TFEU Article 122 TFEU Intergovernmental decision Source: ECA. 
Priloge 81 Instrumenti posojanja za zadevnih pet držav Plačilnobilančna pomoč Evropski mehanizem za finančno stabilizacijo (EFSM) Evropski instrument za finančno stabilnost (EFSF) Institucionalna oblika mehanizem EU mehanizem EU zasebno podjetje v lasti držav evrskega območja Kapitalska struktura jamstvo proračuna EU jamstvo proračuna EU jamstva držav evrskega območja Posojilna zmogljivost v EUR 50 milijard EUR 60 milijard EUR 440 milijard EUR Instrumenti posojila, kreditne linije posojila, kreditne linije posojila, nakup obveznic na primarnih in sekundarnih trgih Trajanje stalen mehanizem začasen mehanizem začasen mehanizem Glavni organi odločanja Svet, ki sprejme odločitve s kvalificirano večino na predlog Evropske komisije upravni odbor EFSF (tj. člani Evroskupine) Pravna podlaga za financiranje člen 143 PDEU člen 122 PDEU medvladni sklep Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče.
The table does not include the other two facilities — intergovernmental loans to Greece and the European Stability Mechanism — which were put in place to provide financial assistance to euro area Member States. 
Tabela ne vključuje drugih dveh instrumentov (medvladnih posojil Grčiji in Evropskega mehanizma za stabilnost), ki sta bila vzpostavljena za zagotavljanje finančne pomoči državam evrskega območja.
Annexes 82 Audit methodology Identification of the audit criteria 1. 
Priloge 82 Revizijska metodologija Opredelitev revizijskih meril 1.
We derived the good management practices and evaluation criteria from evaluations of IMF programmes, ex post evaluations of the EU’s balance-of-payments assistance to non-EU countries, previous Court reports on macrofinancial assistance, guidelines and other publications from independent institutes and think tanks, and academic research. 
Dobre prakse upravljanja in merila vrednotenja izhajajo iz ocen programov MDS, naknadnih vrednotenj plačilnobilančne pomoči EU tretjim državam, prejšnjih poročil Sodišča o makrofinančni pomoči, smernic in drugih dokumentov neodvisnih institucij in možganskih trustov ter akademskih raziskav.
Table 1 provides the most important source documents. 
V Tabeli 1 so navedeni najpomembnejši viri.
Annexes 83 2. 
Priloge 83 2.
To identify the best practices in the area of public debt management, investor relations and transparency in debt issuance, we drew on the relevant work and guidelines of the following organisations: (a) the IMF and the World Bank, in particular the various versions of the guidelines on public debt management (2001, 2003, 2007 and 2014) and on the use of syndications (2010 and 2013); (b) the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, in particular the cross-country analysis of government debt issuance procedures (2009); (c) the Bank for International Settlements; and (d) private-sector associations such as the International Capital Market Association, the Association for Financial Markets in Europe and the Institute of International Finance. 
Da bi opredelili najboljše prakse na področju upravljanja javnega dolga, odnosov z vlagatelji in preglednosti izdajanja dolžniških instrumentov, smo se oprli na delo in smernice naslednjih organizacij: (a) MDS in Svetovne banke, zlasti na različne različice smernic o upravljanju javnega dolga (2001, 2003, 2007 in 2014) in o uporabi sindiciranih izdaj (2010 in 2013), (b) Organizacije za gospodarsko sodelovanje in razvoj, zlasti na primerjavo postopkov izdaje državnih dolžniških instrumentov med državami (2009), (c) Banke za mednarodne poravnave ter (d) združenj iz zasebnega sektorja, kot so International Capital Market Association, Association for Financial Markets in Europe ter Institute of International Finance.
Analysis of structural conditions 3. 
Analiza strukturnih pogojev 3.
The analysis of structural conditions was sample based (see Table 2). 
Analiza strukturnih pogojev je temeljila na vzorcu (glej tabelo 2).
The areas were selected after evaluating their relative importance for each programme. 
Področja so bila izbrana po tem, ko smo vrednotili njihov relativen pomen za vsak program.
Table 2 — Sample overview Hungary Latvia Romania Ireland Portugal Number of analysed conditions 44 56 67 59 135 Approximate coverage (estimate by extrapolation from the sample) 73%1 38% 39% 15% 34% Thematic coverage Public financial management (e.g. fiscal responsibility, public procurement) Structural funds State-owned enterprises, privatisation, public–private partnerships x x x x x x Public service reform and/or wage bill x x x x Pension x x x x x x x x x Business environment x x Labour market (wage setting, active labour market policies, unemployment support) x x x x Financial sector (capital adequacy ratios, banking surveillance) x x x 1 73 % of conditions represent all structural conditions. 
Tabela 2 – Pregled vzorca Madžarska Latvija Romunija Irska Portugalska Število analiziranih pogojev 44 56 67 59 135 Približna pokritost (ocena, pridobljena z ekstrapolacijo vzorca) 73 %1 38 % 39 % 15 % 34 % Tematska pokritost Upravljanje javnih financ (npr. fiskalna disciplina, javno naročanje) Strukturni skladi Podjetja v državni lasti, privatizacija, javno-zasebna partnerstva x x x x x x Reforma javnih služb in/ali masa plač x x x x Pokojnina x x x x x x x x x Poslovno okolje x x Trg dela (določanje plač, aktivne politike trga dela, podpora za brezposelne) x x x x Finančni sektor (količniki kapitalske ustreznosti, bančni nadzor) x x x 1 73 % pogojev predstavlja vse strukturne pogoje.
The remaining 27 % were only fiscal-related conditions. 
Preostalih 27 % so bili izključno pogoji na fiskalnem področju.
Annexes 84 4. 
Priloge 84 4.
Similar conditions in the different versions of the memoranda of understanding were grouped to avoid unnecessary repetitions. 
Podobni pogoji v več različicah memoranduma o soglasju so bili združeni, da bi se izognili nepotrebnemu ponavljanju.
The share of the grouped conditions to the number of conditions in the different memoranda of understanding was used to measure the persistence of conditions. 
Razmerje med združenimi pogoji in številom pogojev v različnih memorandumih o soglasju smo uporabili za merjenje zastopanosti pogojev.
The grouped conditions were classified in three categories of structural content: (i) Low structural content: this category covers conditions that would not bring about any meaningful economic changes by themselves. 
Združeni pogoji so bili glede na strukturno vsebino razvrščeni v tri kategorije: (i) malo strukturne vsebine: ta kategorija zajema pogoje, ki sami po sebi ne prinašajo pomembnih ekonomskih sprememb.
However, these conditions can serve as preparatory steps for more significant reforms. 
Bi pa ti pogoji lahko pomenili pripravljalne korake za bolj bistvene reforme.
Examples include: (i) one-off discovery activities such as a single evaluation; (ii) preparation and publication of plans or strategies; and (iii) continuation of given activity. (ii) Medium structural content: this category covers conditions that can potentially have an immediate significant effect on the behaviour of some group of economic agents (e.g. public officials, enterprises, consumers, employees, and holders of licences). 
Taki primeri so: (i) enkratne dejavnosti odkrivanja, kot je enkratno vrednotenje, (ii) priprava in objava načrtov ali strategij ter (iii) nadaljevanje dane dejavnosti; (ii) srednje veliko strukturne vsebine: ta kategorija zajema pogoje, ki bi lahko imeli takojšen bistven učinek na obnašanje določene skupine gospodarskih subjektov (npr. javnih uslužbencev, podjetij, potrošnikov, zaposlenih in imetnikov dovoljenj).
However, for these effects to be long lasting, additional follow-up measures would be required. 
Da pa bi bili ti učinki dolgoročni, so potrebni dodatni ukrepi, s katerimi bi bili nadgrajeni predhodni.
This category includes four types of conditions. 
Ta kategorija zajema štiri vrste pogojev.
Firstly: conditions requiring that the executive branch of the government take actions that are likely to have an immediate effect. 
Prvič: pogoji, ki od izvršilne veje oblasti zahtevajo, da sprejme ukrepe, ki bodo verjetno imeli takojšnji učinek.
Such conditions can even have extremely significant macroeconomic effects (for instance, if the government decides to reduce the minimum wage), but such conditions are easily reversible. 
Tovrstni pogoji imajo lahko celo zelo bistvene makroekonomske učinke (na primer, če se vlada odloči znižati minimalno plačo), vendar jih je mogoče zlahka preklicati.
Secondly: conditions that require the government to repeatedly carry out some activity (e.g. regular budgetary monitoring). 
Drugič: pogoji, ki od vlade zahtevajo, da redno izvaja določeno dejavnost (npr. redno proračunsko spremljanje).
Thirdly: conditions requiring implementation of various administrative measures such as reorganisation within the central government, or measures leading to the implementation of existing legislation. 
Tretjič: pogoji, ki zahtevajo izvajanje različnih upravnih ukrepov, kot je reorganizacija centralne vlade, ali ukrepov, ki vodijo k izvrševanju obstoječe zakonodaje.
Fourthly: all one-off actions. (iii) High structural content: this category covers conditions that would bring long-lasting changes in the economy by themselves. 
Četrtič: vsi enkratni ukrepi; (iii) veliko strukturne vsebine: ta kategorija zajema pogoje, ki sami po sebi prinašajo dolgoročne spremembe gospodarstva.
Such conditions can have very broad and significant effects, but the effects can also be concentrated on a few economic actors. 
Tovrstni pogoji imajo lahko zelo široke in bistvene učinke, vendar so lahko ti učinki včasih osredotočeni na le nekaj gospodarskih subjektov.
Typical conditions in this category require legislative changes by the national Parliament. 
Za pogoje v tej kategoriji je značilno, da mora nacionalni parlament zaradi njih spremeniti zakonodajo.
This category also includes significant changes in the institutional landscape, such as establishment of fiscal council or reorganisation of local government, and privatisation1. 6. 
Ta kategorija vsebuje tudi bistvene spremembe v institucionalni ureditvi, kot so vzpostavitev fiskalnega sveta ali reorganizacija lokalne vlade in privatizacija.1 6.
Compliance was assessed against the original deadline and against the implementation status at the time of the audit. 
Skladnost smo ocenjevali glede na prvotni rok in glede na stanje izvajanja v času revizije.
The assessment was usually based on the available monitoring reports. 
Ocena je običajno temeljila na razpoložljivih poročilih o spremljanju.
The following types of conditions were not considered in the analysis of compliance: (i) vague conditions — i.e. conditions that did not allow for proper classification by the structural content; (ii) permanent conditions — i.e. conditions that require that certain activities be performed at each quarter; and (iii) conditions with no clear deadlines. 
Naslednje vrste pogojev v analizi skladnosti niso bile obravnavane: (i) nejasni pogoji, tj. pogoji, ki niso omogočali ustrezne razvrstitve glede na strukturno vsebino; (ii) stalni pogoji, tj. pogoji, ki zahtevajo izvajanje določenih dejavnosti vsako četrtletje, ter (iii) pogoji, za katere niso postavljeni jasni roki.
1 Nationalisation or banking support measures are not included in this category. 
1 Nacionalizacija ali ukrepi v podporo bankam niso vključeni v to kategorijo.
Annexes 85 7. 
Priloge 85 7.
To account for situations of unobtainable compliance status, all statistical tests were always performed at least twice: (i) on the basis of data records without those where compliance status could not be obtained; and (ii) on the basis of all data records with missing values treated as non-compliance. 
Zaradi upoštevanja primerov, ko ni bilo mogoče pridobiti stanja glede skladnosti, so bili vsi statistični preizkusi opravljeni najmanj dvakrat: (i) na podlagi zapisov podatkov brez tistih, pri katerih stanja glede skladnosti ni bilo mogoče pridobiti, in (ii) na podlagi vseh zapisov podatkov, pri čemer so bile manjkajoče vrednosti obravnavane kot neskladnost.
Cost of the debt 8. 
Strošek dolga 8.
Concerning the pricing of the borrowings, the swap asset rates were used as the indicator of what markets considered as the prevailing risk-free yield of a given maturity at the time of issuance. 
V zvezi s ceno izposojanja smo uporabili menjalne obrestne mere kot kazalnik, kaj trgi obravnavajo kot prevladujoč netvegan donos pri dani zapadlosti v času izdaje.
The average of bid and ask swap rates (i.e. mid-swap level) was used as the benchmark for the issue yield achieved by the EU and peer issuers2. The data was obtained from Bloomberg or, if not available, calculated as the difference between the issue yield and the mid-swap level on the announcement date. 2 The EIB, the EFSF, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau. 
Povprečje prodajnih in nakupnih menjalnih obrestnih mer (tj. srednjo raven menjalne obrestne mere) smo uporabili kot referenčno merilo za donosnost izdaje, ki so jo dosegli EU in drugi primerljivi izdajatelji.2 Podatke je posredovalo podjetje Bloomberg, če ti niso bili na voljo, pa je bila ustrezna vrednost izračunana kot razlika med donosnostjo izdaje in srednjo ravnjo menjalne obrestne mere na datum objave.
Reply of the 86 Commission Executive summary I The Commission welcomes this ECA performance audit of the programmes supported by balance-of-payments (BoP) and European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) financial assistance. 
Odgovori 86 Komisije Povzetek I Komisija pozdravlja to revizijo uspešnosti programov, podprtih s finančno pomočjo v okviru plačilnobilančnega mehanizma in evropskega mehanizma za finančno stabilizacijo (EFSM), ki jo je izvedlo Evropsko računsko sodišče.
These programmes achieved their core economic objectives, which were for countries to return to financial markets, achieve sustainable public finances and return to growth leading to a fall in unemployment. 
Ti programi so dosegli svoje osnovne ekonomske cilje, in sicer da se države vrnejo na finančne trge, dosežejo vzdržnost javnih financ in znova vzpostavijo rast, ki bo omogočila zmanjšanje brezposelnosti.
The impact and evolution of the crisis was unprecedented, both in Europe and globally. 
Kriza je imela v Evropi in drugod po svetu nepred-stavljiv učinek in razvoj.
Predicting the full consequences of the rapid unwinding of imbalances in advance was very difficult. 
Zelo težko je bilo predvideti vse posledice hitrega razvoja neravnovesij.
In such crisis conditions, standard economic reaction functions lose their ability to adequately describe the interrelationships between a number of economic variables. 
V takih kriznih razmerah standardne gospodarske odzivne funkcije niso bile sposobne ustrezno opisati medsebojnih povezav med številnimi ekonomskimi spremenljivkami.