natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Source: ECA. Shaping EUPOL 11 The Council’s decision to launch EUPOL was preceded by a joint EU assessment mission which recommended, inter alia, that the EU consider contributing further to support the Afghan police through a police mission. 
Oblikovanje EUPOL 11 Pred sklepom Sveta o vzpostavitvi EUPOL je potekala skupna ocenjevalna misija EU, ki je med drugim priporočila, naj EU premisli o tem, da bi s policijsko misijo dodatno prispevala k podpori afganistanski policiji.
This was con‐ firmed by the subsequent fact‐finding mission9 in late 2006, which proposed that the EU could provide added value by contributing to a civilian policing mission with linkages to the wider to rule of law. 
To je potrdila tudi nato izvedena misija za ugotavljanje dejstev9 na koncu leta 2006, ki je predlagala, da bi lahko EU zagotovila dodano vrednost s prispevanjem k civilni policijski misiji s povezavami s širšim področjem pravne države.
9 Council of the European Union, Report on the Fact Finding Mission on possible ESDP Mission to Afghanistan, 18 December 2006. Photo 1 
9 Svet Evropske unije, poročilo o misiji za ugotavljanje dejstev o možni misiji EVOP v Afganistanu, 18. decembra 2006. Fotografija 1
Observations 15 12 The two missions were carried out by large and diverse teams of experts in the fields of policing and the rule of law. 
Opažanja 15 12 Misiji sta izvedli veliki in raznoliki ekipi strokovnjakov za področji policijskega dela in pravne države.
This preparatory work leading up to the launch of the mission ensured that EUPOL’s objectives were aligned with the priorities stated in the 2006 Afghan Compact and with the security pillar of the Afghanistan National De‐ velopment Strategy for 2008–13. 
Pripravljalno delo pred začetkom misije je zagotovilo, da so bili cilji EUPOL usklajeni s prednostnimi nalogami, določenimi v afganistanskem dogovoru iz leta 2006, in varnostnim stebrom afganistanske nacionalne razvojne strategije za obdobje 2008–2013.
Given the situation on the ground, security was essential for creating the condi‐ tions for stability, economic growth and poverty reduction. 
Zaradi razmer na terenu je bila varnost bistvenega pomena za ustvarjanje pogojev za stabilnost, gospodarsko rast in zmanjševanje revščine.
13 The preferred approach was to foster the achievements of the German Police Project Office (GPPO), which was al‐ ready well established on the ground, by providing a reinforced and coherent European presence in the security sec‐ tor, in particular in civil policing. 
13 Prednost je bila namenjena pristopu krepitve dosežkov urada projektne skupine nemške policije, ki je bil na terenu že dobro uveljavljen, z zagotavljanjem okrepljene in skladne evropske prisotnosti v varnostnem sektorju, zlasti pri civilnem policijskem delu.
The German police mission was successful in training higher echelons of the hier‐ archy — through providing strategic advice to the Ministry of the Interior and the national police and improving cooperation with international actors rather than training the national police rank and file. 
Nemška policijska misija je bila uspešna pri usposabljanju višje hierarhije – z zagotavljanjem strateških nasvetov ministrstvu za notranje zadeve in nacionalni policiji ter izboljševanjem sodelovanja z mednarodnimi akterji namesto usposabljanja nacionalnih policistov.
EUPOL was welcomed by Afghans and international actors as it provided the building block hitherto missing from ongoing international efforts as a whole. 
Afganistanski in mednarodni akterji so pozdravili EUPOL, saj je zagotovila element, ki je do takrat manjkal v tekočih mednarodnih prizadevanjih kot celoti.
14 However, EUPOL faced a laborious task in delivering its mandate owing to the almost complete lack of a function‐ ing police force. 
14 Vendar pa se je EUPOL pri izvajanju svojega mandata soočala z zahtevno nalogo zaradi skoraj popolnega pomanjkanja delujoče policije.
Other crucial issues included illiteracy rates among police staff of up to 80 %, meaning that many police officers were unable to process evidence or read and write reports. 
Druga bistvena vprašanja so zajemala stopnje nepismenosti, ki so bile med policijskimi uslužbenci do 80-odstotne, kar pomeni, da mnogi policisti niso mogli obravnavati dokazov ali brati in pisati poročil.
Pervasive corruption in law enforce‐ ment and judicial institutions was an additional challenge to the effective delivery of EUPOL’s mandate. 
Dodatni izziv za uspešno izvedbo mandata EUPOL je bila razširjenost korupcije v institucijah kazenskega pregona in pravosodnih institucijah.
Deployment difficulties 15 The EU has managed to set up a civil‐ ian police mission in a very tough and hostile environment. 
Težave pri razmestitvi 15 EU je uspelo vzpostaviti civilno policijsko misijo v zelo težavnem in sovraž-nem okolju.
However, at the time of EUPOL’s launch in June 2007, only 2 months after the Council deci‐ sion setting it up, it was far from ready given the difficult operational context: it had only four staff in Kabul at the time, and they had no access to the Internet and no vehicles. 
Toda ko je bila EUPOL junija 2007, samo dva meseca po sklepu Sveta o njeni ustanovitvi, ustanovljena, zaradi težavnih operativnih razmer še zdaleč ni bila pripravljena za delovanje. V Kabulu je takrat imela samo štiri uslužbence, ki niso imeli dostopa do spleta in niso imeli vozil.
The major‐ ity of EUPOL staff were in fact hastily rebadged seconded police officers from missions of individual EU Member States10. 
Dejansko so bili uslužbenci EUPOL večinoma napoteni policisti, ki so bili na hitro preu-smerjeni iz misij posameznih držav članic EU10.
Few had received instructions on how the new ’European’ mission differed from their previous bilateral arrangements. 
Le malo jih je prejelo navodila o tem, kako se bo nova „evropska” misija razlikovala od njihovih prejšnjih dvostranskih ureditev.
10 Centre for European Reform, Policy Brief, April 2010. 
10 Centre for European Reform, Policy Brief, april 2010.
Observations 16 17 Another factor was the reluctance of Member States to second personnel to the mission, in part because of the dif‐ ficult start‐up EUPOL was experiencing (see also paragraph 25). 
Opažanja 16 17 Naslednji dejavnik je bila nepripravljenost držav članic za napotitev osebja v misijo, deloma zaradi težav pri zagonu EUPOL (glej tudi odstavek 25).
The idea was for the mission to be fully operational and present in Kabul and in specific provinces by the end of March 2008. However, this was not achieved. 
Po načrtih naj bi bila misija v celoti operativna in prisotna v Kabulu in nekaterih pokrajinah pred koncem marca 2008, vendar to ni bilo doseženo.
Its mandated establishment plan, com‐ prising 200 international staff, was not achieved until February 2009 — al‐ most 2 years after the EU intervention began. 
Njen odobreni kadrovski načrt, ki je zajemal 200 mednarodnih uslužbencev, je bil izpolnjen šele februarja 2009, skoraj dve leti po začetku intervencije EU.
18 Although the Council acknowledged as early as 2008 that the original staff complement should be doubled to 400, EUPOL had still not reached the threshold of 300 staff (75 % of the planned capacity) by the end of 2010, and it achieved a peak of 350 staff only in January 2012 and then declined (see Figure 2). 
18 Čeprav je Svet že leta 2008 priznal, da bi bilo treba prvotno število uslužbencev EUPOL podvojiti na 400, EUPOL do konca leta 2010 še vedno ni dosegla praga 300 uslužbencev (75 % načrtovanih zmogljivosti). Najvišje število uslužbencev, 350, je dosegla šele januarja 2012, nato pa se je število spet zmanjšalo (glej sliko 2).
Total international (seconded and contracted) and EU seconded staff in EUPOL on 31 December of each year from 2007 to 2014 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 64 2007 330 341 292 235 206 148 296 272 232 214 2010 2011 238 85 177 185 122 2008 2009 50 0 2012 2013 2014 Total international staff (Seconded and Contracted) Seconded (from EU Member States) Source: EEAS (CPCC). 
Skupno število mednarodnih (napotenih in pogodbeno zaposlenih) uslužbencev in uslužbencev, napotenih iz držav članic EU, v EUPOL dne 31. decembra vsakega leta od 2007 do 2014 400 350 300 250 200 177 185 150 85 122 64 2007 2008 2009 330 341 292 235 206 148 296 272 232 214 2010 2011 238 100 50 0 Vir: ESZD (civilna zmogljivost za načrtovanje in izvajanje operacij).
Observations 17 19 There are a number of reasons why the mission did not achieve the planned capacity: (a) EUPOL had difficulties in finding volunteers owing to the security situation in Afghanistan; (b) EUPOL was in competition with other CSDP missions in recruiting seconded (and, to a lesser ex‐ tent, contractual) experts; in this respect, Afghanistan was a less at‐ tractive option. 
Opažanja 17 19 Obstaja več razlogov, zakaj misija ni dosegla načrtovane zmogljivosti: (a) EUPOL je imela zaradi varnostnih razmer v Afganistanu težave pri iskanju prostovoljcev; (b) EUPOL so pri zaposlovanju napotenih (in v manjšem obsegu pogodbeno zaposlenih) strokovnjakov konkurirale druge misije SVOP; s tega vidika je bil Afganistan manj privlačna možnost.
EUPOL also had to compete with other international missions, such as the NATO Train‐ ing Mission in Afghanistan (NTM‐A) and United Nations missions; (c) certain seconded positions, such as those requiring knowledge of project analysis and report‐ ing, legal expertise or a rule of law background, were difficult to fill because of low numbers of applicants; (d) owing to the nature of EUPOL’s tasks, some positions required ex‐ perts with experience in national ministries; police mentoring posi‐ tions seconded to the Ministry of the Interior were the most difficult to fill. 
EUPOL je morala tekmovati tudi z drugimi mednarodnimi misijami, kot so Natova misija usposabljanja v Afganistanu (NTM-A) in misije Združenih narodov; (c) nekatera delovna mesta za napotene uslužbence, kot so tista, ki zahtevajo poznavanje projektne analize in poročanja, pravno strokovno znanje ali znanje v zvezi s pravno državo, je bilo zaradi majhnega števila kandidatov težko zapolniti; (d) zaradi narave nalog EUPOL so bili za nekatera delovna mesta potrebni strokovnjaki z izkušnjami iz nacionalnih ministrstev; najtežje je bilo zapolniti delovna mesta za mentorje policistov, napotene na ministrstvo za notranje zadeve.
20 EUPOL is mandated to address police reform at central, regional and provin‐ cial levels. 
20 EUPOL ima mandat za obravnavanje reforme policije na centralni, regionalni in pokrajinski ravni.
However, deployment to the provinces was problematic owing mainly to inadequate security condi‐ tions, logistical challenges and the lack of proper accommodation. 
Vendar je bila razmestitev v pokrajine problematična, zlasti zaradi neustreznih varnostnih razmer, logističnih izzivov ter pomanjkanja ustrezne nastanitve.
21 In this context, EUPOL deployed field offices in 11 provinces11 in 2008 (see Annex IV) and increased the number to 16 in 2009. 
21 V takšnem okviru je EUPOL leta 2008 razmestila terenske urade v 11 po-krajin11 (glej Prilogo IV) in leta 2009 to število povečala na 16.
EUPOL was unable to deploy throughout specific provinces of Afghanistan as planned, because the US and Turkey have not signed Technical Agreements with EUPOL in the provinces where they were pre‐ sent. 
EUPOL se ni mogla razmestiti po posameznih pokrajinah v Afganistanu, kot je bilo načrtovano, ker ZDA in Turčija z njo niso podpisale tehničnih sporazumov za pokrajine, v katerih so bile prisotne.
In addition, most field offices were poorly manned and only two of them (in Herat and Mazar‐e Sharif) were consistently staffed by more than 10 persons. 
Poleg tega večina terenskih uradov ni imela dovolj zaposlenih in le v dveh (v Heratu in Mazar-e Šarifu) je bilo ves čas zaposlenih več kot deset oseb.
This was confirmed by an internal EEAS assessment carried out by the CPCC in 201112 which concluded that delivery of the mission in the provinces to that point in time had been ‘rather poor and its impact mar‐ ginal’. 
Zaključek ocene je bil, da je bila izvedba misije v pokrajinah do takrat dokaj slaba, njen učinek pa zanemarljiv.
The drastic reduction of EUPOL’s field offices was finally dictated by the de facto closure of the European Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the Afghan provinces. 
Zaradi dejanskega zaključka delovanja evropskih ekip za pokrajinsko obnovo v afganistanskih pokrajinah je bilo treba nazadnje močno zmanjšati število terenskih uradov EUPOL.
By 2013, the number of field offices beside Kabul had been cut to only two. 
Do leta 2013 se je njihovo število, če se ne upošteva Kabula, zmanjšalo na samo dva.
11 Out of the 34 provinces in all. 
11 Od skupno 34 pokrajin.
12 CPCC 13077/11, EUPOL Afghanistan operational assessment report, 11 October 2011. 
12 Civilna zmogljivost za načrtovanje in izvajanje operacij 13077/11, poročilo o operativni oceni EUPOL Afghanistan, 11. oktober 2011.
Observations 18 Difficulties with coordinating international efforts 22 The Court examined whether EUPOL was well coordinated with other EU ef‐ forts, other international stakeholders and the Afghan authorities. 
Opažanja 18 Težave pri usklajevanju mednarodnih prizadevanj 22 Sodišče je preučilo, ali je bila EUPOL dobro usklajena z drugimi prizadevanji EU, drugimi mednarodnimi deležniki in afganistanskimi organi.
A European effort, but no overarching European approach 23 The report of the fact‐finding mis‐ sion noted that a crucial factor for the mission’s success was that it should provide a single framework for the Member States by promoting a ‘Eu‐ ropean’ voice on police reform in Af‐ ghanistan. 
Prizadevanja na evropski ravni, vendar brez celovitega evropskega pristopa 23 V poročilu misije za ugotavljanje dejstev je bilo navedeno, da je bistveni dejavnik za uspeh misije to, da zagotovi enoten okvir za države članice s spodbujanjem „evropskega glasu” pri reformi policije v Afganistanu.
Similarly, the Council Joint Action establishing EUPOL13 stipulated that the mission should, as appropri‐ ate, coordinate, facilitate and provide advice on projects implemented by Member States and third states under their responsibility. 
V skupnem ukrepu Sveta o ustanovitvi EUPOL13 je bilo podobno navedeno, da bi misija morala po potrebi poskrbeti za usklajevanje, lajšanje in zagotavljanje svetovanja v zvezi s projekti, ki jih izvajajo države članice in tretje države pod njihovo odgovornostjo.
This proved chal‐ lenging for the following main reasons: the creation of the EEAS in 2011 which provided a structured coordination mechanism and led to a ‘double‐hat‐ ted Ambassador (both EUSR and Head of EU Delegation). 
Ta je zagotovila strukturiran usklajevalni mehanizem in povzročila nastanek mesta „ambasadorja z dvojno nalogo” (hkrati posebni predstavnik EU in vodja delegacije EU).
25 The second challenge was the fact that EU Member States continued their individual actions in parallel to contributing seconded staff to EUPOL. 
25 Drugi izziv je bilo dejstvo, da so države članice EU hkrati s tem, da so napotile uslužbence v EUPOL, še naprej izvajale svoje lastne ukrepe.
Member States had their preferred ac‐ tivities in the police, law enforcement and rule of law sectors in Afghanistan. 
Države članice so imele v sektorjih policije, kazenskega pregona in pravne države v Afganistanu svoje prednostne dejavnosti.
Joining EUPOL, rather than maintain‐ ing bilateral efforts, was sometimes seen as losing national influence and visibility on the ground. 
Pridružitev EUPOL namesto ohranjanja dvostranskih prizadevanj so včasih razumele kot izgubo nacionalnega vpliva in prepoznavnosti na terenu.
26 Over time, EUPOL has made extensive efforts to coordinate its activities with EU Member States in the context of specific projects. 
26 EUPOL si je skozi čas močno prizadevala, da bi svoje dejavnosti pri posameznih projektih usklajevala z državami članicami EU.
One example has been close cooperation between EUPOL and the German Police Project Team (GPPT). 
Eden od primerov je bilo tesno sodelovanje med EUPOL in projektno skupino nemške policije.
27 Some Member States14 have also participated in parallel joint European efforts, such as the European Gendar‐ merie Force (EGF)15. 
27 Nekatere države članice14 so sodelovale tudi pri vzporednih skupnih evropskih prizadevanjih, kot so evropske žandarske sile (EGF)15.
EU Member States with a ’gendarmerie‘ model therefore had more in common with the EGF, or NATO’s NTM‐A16 approach, than with the kind of civil policing that EUPOL was trying to achieve. 
Države članice EU z žandarmerijskim modelom so torej imele več skupnega s pristopom evropskih žandarskih sil ali Natove misije usposabljanja v Afganistanu16 kot s civilnim policijskim delom, za katerega si je prizadevala EUPOL.
Some EU Mem‐ ber States interviewed also expressed the view that the ‘gendarmerie’ train‐ ing model was more suitable to the Afghan situation on the ground. 
Nekatere države članice EU, s predstavniki katerih so bili opravljeni pogovori, so menile, da je žandarmerijski model usposabljanja primernejši za afganistanske razmere na terenu.
13 The Joint Action establishing the EUPOL mission stipulated that: ‘The Council and the Commission shall, each in accordance with its respective powers, ensure consistency between the implementation of this Joint Action and external activities of the Community in accordance with Article 3 of the Treaty. 
13 V Skupnem ukrepu o ustanovitvi EUPOL je določeno: „Svet in Komisija v skladu s svojimi pristojnostmi zagotovita usklajenost izvajanja tega skupnega ukrepa z drugimi zunanjepolitičnimi dejavnostmi Skupnosti v skladu s členom 3 Pogodbe.
The Council and the Commission shall cooperate to this end’. 
Svet in Komisija sodelujeta v ta namen.”
14 France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Poland and Spain. 
14 Francija, Italija, Nizozemska, Portugalska, Poljska in Španija.
15 The European Gendarmerie Force (Eurogendfor) is a multinational police force constituted only by elements of police forces with military status. 
15 Evropske žandarske sile (EUROGENDFOR) so večnacionalna policija, ki vključuje samo elemente policijskih sil z vojaškim statusom.
The EGF mostly focused on training and advising. 
Osredotočale so se predvsem na usposabljanje in svetovanje.
Though its experts were part of the national missions, they performed their tasks under the NTM‐A chain of command. 
Čeprav so bili njihovi strokovnjaki del nacionalnih misij, so svoje naloge opravljali v okviru strukture poveljevanja Natove misije usposabljanja v Afganistanu.
The EGF mission deployment peaked at about 400 staff in May 2011 and has declined ever since. 
Razmestitev v misijo evropskih žandarskih sil je maja 2011 dosegla največje število uslužbencev, približno 400, vse od takrat pa upada.
16 The NTM‐A delivered a large‐scale police training initiative which was specifically tailored to the security situation on the ground. 
16 Natova misija usposabljanja v Afganistanu je izvedla obsežno pobudo za usposabljanje policije, ki je bila posebej prilagojena varnostnim razmeram na terenu.
At the end of 2011, the NTM‐A was operating 23 training sites in Afghanistan, with a staff of 778 trainers and 2 825 contractors providing support services. 
Na koncu leta 2011 je v Afganistanu upravljala 23 krajev, na katerih je potekalo usposabljanje, s 778 izvajalci usposabljanja in 2 825 pogodbenimi izvajalci, ki so zagotavljali podporne storitve.
Observations 19 Despite its efforts, EUPOL has had limited scope for influencing major actors 28 In terms of EUPOL’s objective to improve cohesion and coordination among international actors, the mis‐ sion’s limited size was one restricting factor when it came to taking the lead in this area. 
Opažanja 19 EUPOL ima kljub svojim prizadevanjem omejene možnosti za vplivanje na glavne akterje 28 Pri cilju EUPOL za izboljšanje povezanosti in usklajevanja med mednarodnimi akterji je misijo njena majhnost omejevala pri prevzemanju vodstva na tem področju.
Compared to the NATO‐led NTM‐A, EUPOL was a minor player. 
V primerjavi z Natovo misijo usposabljanja v Afganistanu je bila EUPOL manjši akter.
It was difficult for EUPOL to exert much influence over this major international entity. 
Težko je kaj dosti vplivala na ta pomemben mednarodni subjekt.
29 Another adverse factor was the largely unsuccessful work carried out by the International Police Coordina‐ tion Board of Afghanistan (IPCB) 17. 
29 Še en negativen dejavnik je bilo precej neuspešno delo Mednarodnega odbora za usklajevanje policije v Afganistanu 17.
Over the past 13 years, more than 37 different international donors have been involved in supporting Afghan police development, most of them by contributing to the NTM‐A, to EUPOL, or to both. 
V zadnjih trinajstih letih je pri podpori razvoju afganistanske policije sodelovalo več kot 37 različnih mednarodnih donatorjev. Večina je prispevala za Natovo misijo usposabljanja v Afganistanu, EUPOL ali za obe.
To ensure coherence, the IPCB was established in 2007 to act as the main body for coordinating police‐related efforts. 
Zaradi zagotovitve skladnosti je bil leta 2007 ustanovljen Mednarodni odbor za usklajevanje policije v Afganistanu, ki naj bi deloval kot osrednji organ za usklajevanje prizadevanj, povezanih s policijo.
Although EUPOL has provided significant capacity and administrative support to the IPCB, the latter has achieved very limited results in terms of promoting cooperation among the international community. 
Čeprav je EUPOL zagotovila Mednarodnemu odboru za usklajevanje policije v Afganistanu velike zmogljivosti in upravno podporo, je ta dosegel zelo omejene rezultate v smislu spodbujanja sodelovanja med člani mednarodne skupnosti.
International stakeholders have been unwilling to be coordinated and have perceived the IPCB as an ambitious effort on the part of the EU to take the lead in the policing sector. 
Mednarodni deležniki niso želeli, da bi se jih usklajevalo, in so Mednarodni odbor za usklajevanje policije v Afganistanu dojemali kot ambiciozno prizadevanje za to, da bi EU prevzela vodilno vlogo v sektorju policijskega dela.
30 The Court found that cooperation with NATO‐led efforts has gradually improved over time. 
30 Sodišče je ugotovilo, da se je sodelovanje s subjekti, ki jih je ustanovil Nato, postopno izboljševalo.
Tangible results of this cooperation extend to security arrangements for EUPOL staff and the agreement to jointly set up the Profes‐ sional Training Board for the devel‐ opment and accreditation of police training curricula. 
Oprijemljivi rezultati tega sodelovanja zajemajo varnostne ureditve za uslužbence EUPOL in sporazum o skupni ustanovitvi odbora za poklicno usposabljanje, namenjenega razvoju in akreditaciji programov za usposabljanje policistov.
Headquarters’ support functions and guidance have improved over time 31 The Court examined whether EU Mem‐ ber States and the EEAS have made the appropriate adjustments to EUPOL’s mandate during the operational phase, whether EUPOL reporting gives a fair account of its achievements and what support and guidance it has received. 
Podporne funkcije in usmerjanje s sedeža so se sčasoma izboljšali 31 Sodišče je preučilo, ali so države članice EU in ESZD uvedle ustrezne prilagoditve mandata EUPOL v operativni fazi, ali poročanje EUPOL pošteno navaja njene dosežke ter kakšne podpore in usmerjanja je bila deležna.
Planning and reporting capabilities have improved, but shortcomings remain 32 The Court found that EU Member States and the EEAS were reasonably flexible in adjusting EUPOL’s mandate in line with changing priorities and conditions on the ground. 
Zmogljivosti za načrtovanje in poročanje so se izboljšale, vendar še vedno obstajajo pomanjkljivosti 32 Sodišče je ugotovilo, da so države članice EU in ESZD pokazale dokajšnjo prožnost pri prilagajanju mandata EUPOL v skladu s spreminjajočimi se prednostnimi nalogami in razmerami na terenu.
17 EUPOL has been a major contributor to the International Police Coordination Board of Afghanistan (IPCB) for example by ensuring the functioning of the IPCB Secretariat. 
17 EUPOL je veliko prispevala k Mednarodnemu odboru za usklajevanje policije v Afganistanu, na primer tako, da je zagotavljala delovanje njegovega sekretariata.