natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Currently the MTBF index serves a range of purposes, such as peer-reviews in ECOFIN preparatory committees, Commission’s monitoring of NBFs and analytical work. 
Trenutno se indeks kakovosti srednjeročnega proračunskega okvira uporablja za različne namene, kot so medsebojni pregledi v pripravljalnih odborih Sveta ECOFIN, spremljanje nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov, ki ga izvaja Komisija, in analitično delo.
92 While the study does not purport to be a fully-fledged assessment on the application of EU requirements concerning MTBFs, it provides evidence on the effectiveness of national fiscal rules and MTBFs in the EU. 
92 Študija ni mišljena kot celovita ocena uporabe zahtev EU v zvezi s srednjeročnimi proračunskimi okviri, vendar zagotavlja dokaze o učinkovitosti nacionalnih fiskalnih pravil in srednjeročnih proračunskih okvirov v EU.
First indent: The MTBF index is indeed compiled based on information reported by the Member States in the FGD. 
Prva alinea: indeks kakovosti srednjeročnega proračunskega okvira se dejansko izračuna na podlagi podatkov, ki so jih države članice sporočile v zbirko podatkov o fiskalnem upravljanju.
This is in line with the original mandate given by the ECOFIN Council via its conclusions adopted on 5 May 2009. 
SL SL s prvotnim mandatom, ki ga je Svet ECOFIN podelil s sklepi, sprejetimi 5. maja 2009.
In time, and especially after the 2015 FGD review, the amount of MTBF-related information reported in the FGD has increased noticeably and its level of detail justifies continuing to rely on the Member States (i.e. Ministries of Finance) as information providers. 
Sčasoma, zlasti pa po pregledu zbirke podatkov o fiskalnem upravljanju leta 2015, se je količina informacij v tej zbirki, povezanih s srednjeročnimi proračunskimi okviri, opazno povečala, raven podrobnosti teh informacij pa upravičuje nadaljnje opiranje na države članice (tj. ministrstva za finance) kot vire informacij.
It should also be stressed that in recent years the information submitted by Member States has been increasingly verified against in-house Commission knowledge and in many cases corrected before entering the index. 
Poudariti bi bilo treba tudi, da so se v zadnjih letih informacije, ki so jih predložile države članice, vedno bolj preverjale glede na interno znanje Komisije in da so bile pred vnosom v indeks velikokrat popravljene.
This has increased the reliability of the index. 
Zaradi tega se je izboljšala zanesljivost indeksa.
Second indent: As indicated in the reply just above, the MTBF index was designed from the outset to reflect desirable features and best practices for MTBFs. 
Druga alinea: kakor je navedeno v zgornjem odgovoru, je bil indeks kakovosti srednjeročnega proračunskega okvira že od vsega začetka zasnovan tako, da izraža zaželene lastnosti in dobre prakse za srednjeročne proračunske okvire.
Thus, not each and every provision in the Directive is taken into account in the scoring, while in turn some criteria go beyond the scope of the Directive. 
Zato se pri ocenjevanju ne upošteva vsaka določba Direktive, nekatera merila pa presegajo področje njene uporabe.
Third indent: By design, the MTBF index focuses exclusively on elements of design, for which information is available in the FGD. 
Tretja alinea: indeks kakovosti srednjeročnega proračunskega okvira se namenoma osredotoča izključno na elemente zasnove, za katere so na voljo informacije v zbirki podatkov o fiskalnem upravljanju.
Fourth indent: While the MTBF index was neither designed nor used as a measure of the transposition or implementation of the Directive, reforms introduced by the Member States in response to the Directive are reflected by the index as they are adopted and reported in the FGD, independent of the timing of the Directive assessment (the index scoring and the Directive assessment follow separate processes). 
Četrta alinea: indeks kakovosti srednjeročnega proračunskega okvira ni bil zasnovan kot ukrep za prenos ali izvajanje Direktive in se kot tak ni uporabljal, vendar se reforme, ki so jih uvedle države članice kot odziv na Direktivo, izražajo v indeksu, ko so sprejete in sporočene v zbirko podatkov o fiskalnem upravljanju, ne glede na časovni okvir ocene Direktive (indeksiranje in ocenjevanje Direktive sledita ločenim postopkom).
In other words, for the purposes of the study in question, the MTBF index covers the structural features that were in place in the Member States up until end-2015. 
Povedano drugače, indeks kakovosti srednjeročnega proračunskega okvira za namene zadevne študije vključuje strukturne značilnosti, ki so bile v državah članicah vzpostavljene do konca leta 2015.
Accordingly, subsequently adopted reforms are not covered by the MTBF index series used in the study. 
V skladu s tem naknadno sprejete reforme niso zajete v seriji indeksa kakovosti srednjeročnega proračunskega okvira, uporabljeni v študiji.
Fifth indent: Whereas the MTBF index provides a numerical measure of the design quality of MTBF across Member States, it cannot track the reasons underlying the changes to the index, such as the financial assistance programmes. 
Peta alinea: z indeksom kakovosti srednjeročnega proračunskega okvira se številčno izmeri kakovost zasnove srednjeročnih proračunskih okvirov v državah članicah, vendar indeks ne more slediti razlogom za spremembe indeksa, kot so programi finančne pomoči.
As pointed out in the Commission reply to paragraphs 85 and 86, isolating the specific impact of the Directive 2011/85 from other factors influencing NBF reforms is very challenging methodologically. 
Kot je poudarjeno v odgovoru Komisije na odstavka 85 in 86, je metodološko zelo zahtevno ločiti učinek Direktive 2011/85/EU od drugih dejavnikov, ki vplivajo na reforme nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov.
This is true also for the financial assistance programmes, most of which contained conditionalities that took on board many of the Directive requirements. 
To velja tudi za programe zunanje finančne pomoči, od katerih je večina vsebovala pogoje, v katerih so se upoštevale številne zahteve iz Direktive.
95 As regards the reference to the Contracting Parties’ commitments in the Commission’s assessment, it should be recalled that the Fiscal Compact is not an instrument of Union law. 
95 Kar zadeva sklicevanje na zaveze pogodbenic v oceni Komisije, bi bilo treba spomniti, da fiskalni dogovor ni instrument prava Unije.
The Commission found it therefore appropriate to take a relatively flexible approach, according to which formal commitments and announced plans of the Contracting Parties are considered to complement and reinforce the adopted national provisions. 
Komisija je zato menila, da bi bilo primerno uporabiti razmeroma prožen pristop, v skladu s katerim se za formalne zaveze in napovedane načrte pogodbenic šteje, da dopolnjujejo in krepijo sprejete nacionalne določbe.
The Commission does not consider that the approach led to weakening the requirements applicable to the Contracting Parties. 
Po mnenju Komisije zadevni pristop ni privedel do oslabitve zahtev, ki veljajo za pogodbenice.
The Commission acted in full transparency by publicly referring in the report to the commitments and plans announced by the Contracting Parties. 
Komisija je s tem, ko se je v poročilu javno sklicevala na zaveze in načrte, ki so jih napovedale pogodbenice, ravnala popolnoma pregledno.
That clarity as to the analytical framework used, and as to the specific issues for which the commitments or announced plans were taken into account by the Commission when arriving at its conclusions, left the Contracting Parties (i.e. the intended recipients of that report) fully informed. 
Zaradi navedene jasnosti glede uporabljenega analitičnega okvira in posebnih vprašanj, pri katerih je Komisija pri oblikovanju svojih sklepov upoštevala zaveze ali napovedane načrte, so bile pogodbenice (tj. predvidene prejemnice navedenega poročila) v celoti obveščene. 13
It should also be noted that in the discussions in the ECOFIN preparatory committees which followed the release of the report (i.e. during 2018-2019), the Contracting Parties did not challenge the Commission’s use of commitments in assessing compliance. 
SL SL Opozoriti bi bilo treba tudi na to, da pogodbenice v razpravah v pripravljalnih odborih Sveta ECOFIN, ki so sledile objavi poročila (tj. v obdobju 2018–2019), niso nasprotovale temu, da je Komisija pri oceni skladnosti uporabila zaveze.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 99 According to the Treaties, it is the Commission’s duty to formally assess compliance with EU fiscal rules in the framework of multilateral budgetary surveillance. 
ZAKLJUČKI IN PRIPOROČILA 99 V skladu s Pogodbama je dolžnost Komisije, da v okviru večstranskega proračunskega nadzora uradno oceni skladnost s fiskalnimi pravili EU.
EU law does not confer upon IFIs any competence related to the process of assessing compliance with EU fiscal rules, even though some IFIs conduct such activities pursuant to a national legal obligation or on a voluntary basis. 
Pravo EU neodvisnim fiskalnim institucijam ne podeljuje nobene pristojnosti v zvezi s postopkom ocenjevanja skladnosti s fiskalnimi pravili EU, čeprav nekatere neodvisne fiskalne institucije take dejavnosti izvajajo v skladu z nacionalno pravno obveznostjo ali prostovoljno.
100 Differences may indeed arise between IFIs' and the Commission's assessments of compliance, for various reasons (see Commission reply to paragraphs 49-51). 
100 Ocene skladnosti, ki jih izvedejo neodvisne fiskalne institucije in Komisija, se lahko iz različnih razlogov dejansko razlikujejo (glej odgovor Komisije na odstavke 49–51).
While the discretion given to the Commission by the legal texts that underlie the SGP can contribute to those differences, the Commission stresses that it undertakes its assessments of Member States’ compliance with the EU fiscal rules in a rigorous and transparent way and making appropriate use of the flexibility existing within the rules, in line with the commonly agreed position endorsed by the Council in February 2016. 
K navedenim razlikam lahko prispeva diskrecijska pravica, ki je Komisiji podeljena s pravnimi besedili, na katerih temelji Pakt za stabilnost in rast, vendar Komisija poudarja, da svoje ocene skladnosti držav članic s fiskalnimi pravili EU izvede strogo in pregledno ter ob ustrezni uporabi prožnosti znotraj pravil v skladu s skupno dogovorjenim stališčem, ki ga je Svet potrdil februarja 2016.
The results of those assessments are subject to consultation with the Council (and through it, with the Member States) through the relevant fora (i.e. ECOFIN and its preparatory committees). 
Rezultati teh ocen so predmet posvetovanja s Svetom (in prek njega z državami članicami) prek ustreznih forumov (tj. Sveta ECOFIN in njegovih pripravljalnih odborov).
In the Commission’s view, the assessment inconsistency risk can be mitigated through regular exchanges and sharing of information between the Commission and the IFIs, as already undertaken by the Commission. 
Po mnenju Komisije se lahko tveganje nekonsistentnosti ocen zmanjša z rednim komuniciranjem in izmenjavo informacij med Komisijo in neodvisnimi fiskalnimi institucijami, kar Komisija že izvaja.
Recommendation 1 – Compliance assessments by the Commission and the independent fiscal institutions The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
Priporočilo 1 – Ocene skladnosti, ki jih izvedejo Komisija in neodvisne fiskalne institucije Komisija sprejema to priporočilo.
The Commission sees close cooperation with IFIs as an important pre-requisite for an effective functioning of the EU and national fiscal frameworks. 
Komisija meni, da je tesno sodelovanje z neodvisnimi fiskalnimi institucijami pomemben predpogoj za učinkovito delovanje fiskalnega okvira EU in nacionalnih fiskalnih okvirov.
101 The basic requirements for MTBFs and the establishing criteria for IFIs are largely consistent with the relevant literature and international practices. 
101 Osnovne zahteve za srednjeročne proračunske okvire in merila za ustanovitev neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij so večinoma skladni z ustrezno literaturo in mednarodnimi praksami.
In fact, in some respects the Union is a standard-setter, most notably as regards the mass establishment of IFI entrusted to monitor national fiscal rules and produce/endorse macroeconomic forecasts for fiscal planning. 
Dejansko Unija v nekaterih pogledih določa standarde, zlasti kar zadeva množično ustanavljanje neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij, pooblaščenih za spremljanje nacionalnih fiskalnih pravil in pripravo/potrditev makroekonomskih napovedi za fiskalno načrtovanje.
Given the existing differences among national budgetary systems in the EU and ownership and subsidiarity considerations, not any ideal feature of MTBFs or IFIs would be suitable for incorporation into EU law. 
Glede na obstoječe razlike med nacionalnimi proračunskimi sistemi v EU ter premislekov glede odgovornosti in subsidiarnosti za vključitev v pravo EU ne bi bil primeren vsak idealen element srednjeročnih proračunskih okvirov ali neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij.
In fact, some of the principles/features promoted by the IMF and OECD are sometimes very granular or operational as those are meant to be used as detailed guidance, as opposed to legally binding requirements. 
Dejansko so nekatera načela/elementi, ki jih spodbujata MDS in OECD, včasih zelo podrobni ali operativni, saj naj bi se uporabljali kot podrobne smernice, ne pa kot pravno zavezujoče zahteve.
Notwithstanding this, the Commission does not wish to claim that there is no room to improve EU legal requirements for NBFs (as attested by its 2017 Directive proposal) or the way in which they are applied by the Member States. 
Ne glede na to Komisija ne želi trditi, da ni mogoče izboljšati pravnih zahtev EU za nacionalne proračunske okvire (kakor dokazuje njen predlog direktive iz leta 2017) ali tega, kako jih države članice uporabljajo.
Recommendation 2 – Review requirements for national budgetary frameworks The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
Priporočilo 2 – Pregled zahtev za nacionalne proračunske okvire Komisija sprejema to priporočilo.
The upcoming review of Six-and Two-pack provides the opportunity to identify the strength and weaknesses of NBF requirements based on the experience so far with their transposition and implementation. 
SL SL Prihodnji pregled zakonodajnega šesterčka in dvojčka zagotavlja priložnost za opredelitev prednosti in pomanjkljivosti zahtev za nacionalne proračunske okvire na podlagi do zdaj pridobljenih izkušenj z njunim prenosom in izvajanjem.
102 The EFB’s statutory regime and its resource allocation were carefully designed and calibrated in order to ensure that the Board is fully capable of achieving its mission. 
102 Statutarna ureditev Evropskega fiskalnega odbora in dodelitev sredstev odboru sta bili skrbno zasnovani in določeni tako, da je odbor sposoben v celoti uresničiti svoj namen delovanja.
As regards the ‘comply-or-explain’ principle, the Commission reiterates its view that a strict parallel between the EFB and national fiscal councils cannot be drawn (see Commission reply to paragraphs 66-67). 
Kar zadeva načelo „upoštevaj ali pojasni“, Komisija ponovno poudarja svoje mnenje, da ni mogoče potegniti stroge vzporednice med Evropskim fiskalnim odborom in nacionalnimi neodvisnimi fiskalnimi sveti (glej odgovor Komisije na odstavka 66 in 67).
Recommendation 3 – Strengthen the European Fiscal Board The Commission does not accept the recommendation. 
Priporočilo 3 – Krepitev Evropskega fiskalnega odbora Komisija ne sprejema tega priporočila.
It considers that the current set-up is fit-for-purpose and has not constrained the Board’s analytical and functional independence. 
Meni, da sedanja ureditev ustreza svojemu namenu ter ne omejuje analitične in funkcionalne neodvisnosti odbora.
Moreover, modifying the EFB role and set-up would pre-empt the outcome of the forthcoming review of the Six-and Two-pack, which may have implications for the EFB’s role in the EU fiscal governance framework. 
Poleg tega bi sprememba vloge in ureditve Evropskega fiskalnega odbora posegala v rezultat prihodnjega pregleda zakonodajnega šestorčka in dvojčka, kar bi lahko vplivalo na vlogo Evropskega fiskalnega odbora v okviru EU za fiskalno upravljanje.
The EFB has duly exercised its functional independence and has so far delivered appropriately on its given mandate. 
Evropski fiskalni odbor ustrezno izvaja svojo funkcionalno neodvisnost in je do zdaj ustrezno izpolnil svoj mandat.
Its outputs are duly considered in the EU-level fiscal policy debate and the Chair of the EFB is regularly invited to present the Board’s views at the ECOFIN Council and the Eurogroup. 
Njegovi izložki se ustrezno upoštevajo v razpravi o fiskalni politiki na ravni EU, predsednik Evropskega fiskalnega odbora pa je redno vabljen na zasedanja Sveta ECOFIN in Euroskupine, da predstavi stališča odbora.
103 The Commission has been conducting thorough compliance checks with respect to Directive 2011/85, to ensure that the respective requirements are properly embedded into the Member States’ budgetary frameworks. 
103 Komisija izvaja temeljita preverjanja skladnosti v zvezi z Direktivo 2011/85/EU, da bi zagotovila, da so ustrezne zahteve pravilno vključene v proračunske okvire držav članic.
The conformity checks are virtually completed for two-thirds of the Member States and ongoing for the remainder. 
Preverjanja skladnosti so skoraj končana za dve tretjini držav članic, za preostale države članice pa se še izvajajo.
The Commission services involved (i.e. DG ECFIN) have used effectively the EU Pilot exchanges conducted in the framework of the conformity checks. 
Vključene službe Komisije (npr. GD za gospodarske in finančne zadeve) so učinkovito uporabile izmenjave v okviru postopkov EU Pilot, izvedene v okviru preverjanj skladnosti.
104 The assessments mandated by the EU legal framework are conducted in accordance with the specific review clauses included in both Directive 2011/85 and Regulation 473/2013. 
104 Ocene, ki jih določa pravni okvir EU, se izvedejo v skladu s posebnimi določbami o pregledu, vključenimi v Direktivo 2011/85/EU in Uredbo (EU) št.
Recommendation 4 – Strengthen enforcement of national budgetary frameworks The Commission accepts the recommendation. b) The suitability review will be published together with the review of other parts of the Six and Two-pack. c) The Commission acknowledges the usefulness of collecting on a regular basis information from the Member States on the actual functioning of the NBFs. 
Priporočilo 4 – Krepitev izvrševanja nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov Komisija sprejema to priporočilo. (b) Pregled ustreznosti bo objavljen skupaj s pregledom drugih delov zakonodajnega šesterčka in dvojčka. (c) Komisija priznava uporabnost rednega zbiranja informacij o dejanskem delovanju nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov od držav članic.
The Commission will work to identify the type of information that would be necessary and the most appropriate process and tools for collecting that information. 
Komisija si bo prizadevala opredeliti vrsto informacij, ki bi bile potrebne, ter najprimernejši postopek in orodja za zbiranje navedenih informacij.
Importantly, the Commission stresses that the implementation of this recommendation will hinge on the cooperation of the Member States in providing the necessary information. d) The Commission acknowledges the importance of monitoring more closely the actual functioning of Member States’ budgetary frameworks. 
Poudarja, da bo izvajanje tega priporočila odvisno od sodelovanja držav članic pri zagotavljanju potrebnih informacij. (d) Komisija priznava pomembnost natančnejšega spremljanja dejanskega delovanja proračunskih okvirov držav članic.
It should be noted that such monitoring requires detailed information to be provided by the Member States, which would then be assessed by the Commission based on an appropriate methodology. 
Opozoriti bi bilo treba, da bi morale države članice za tako spremljanje zagotoviti podrobne informacije, ki bi jih Komisija nato ocenila na podlagi ustrezne metodologije. 15
This performance audit was carried out by Audit Chamber IV Regulation of markets and competitive economy, headed by ECA Member Alex Brenninkmeijer. 
To revizijo smotrnosti je opravil revizijski senat IV – regulacija trgov in konkurenčno gospodarstvo, ki ga vodi član Sodišča Alex Brenninkmeijer.
The audit was led by ECA Member Neven Mates until the end of his mandate (July 2019) and thereafter by ECA Member Mihails Kozlovs, supported by Edite Dzalbe, Head of Private Office and Laura Graudina, Private Office Attaché; Marko Mrkalj, Private Office Attaché; Marion Colonerus, Principal Manager; Stefano Sturaro, Head of Task; Giuseppe Diana, Efstathios Efstathiou and Maëlle Bourque, Auditors. 
Pri reviziji so sodelovali vodja njegovega kabineta Edite Dzalbe, atašejka v njegovem kabinetu Laura Graudina, ataše v kabinetu nekdanjega hrvaškega člana Sodišča Marko Mrkalj, vodilna upravna uslužbenka Marion Colonerus, vodja naloge Stefano Sturaro ter revizorji Giuseppe Diana, Efstathios Efstathiou in Maëlle Bourque.
From left to right: Stefano Sturaro, Marion Colonerus, Mihails Kozlovs, Maëlle Bourque, Giuseppe Diana, Efstathios Efstathiou. 
Od leve proti desni: Stefano Sturaro, Marion Colonerus, Mihails Kozlovs, Maëlle Bourque, Giuseppe Diana, Efstathios Efstathiou.
Timeline Event Date Adoption of Audit Planning Memorandum (APM) / Start of audit 13.12.2018 Official sending of draft report to Commission (or other auditee) 18.7.2019 Adoption of the final report after the adversarial procedure 15.10.2019 Commission’s (or other auditee’s) official replies received in all languages 22.11.2019 
Časovnica Dogodek Datum Sprejetje revizijskega memoranduma/začetek revizije 13. december 2018 Uradno posredovanje osnutka poročila Komisiji (ali drugemu revidirancu) 18. julij 2019 Sprejetje končnega poročila po razčiščevalnem postopku 15. oktober 2019 Prejeti uradni odgovori Komisije (ali drugih revidirancev) v vseh jezikih 22. november 2019
PDF ISBN 978-92-847-3924-0 ISSN 1977-5679 doi:10.2865/871421 QJ-AB-19-018-EN-N HTML ISBN 978-92-847-3894-6 ISSN 1977-5679 doi:10.2865/482842 QJ-AB-19-018-EN-Q 
PDF ISBN 978-92-847-3934-9 ISSN 1977-5784 doi:10.2865/674995 QJ-AB-19-018-SL-N HTML ISBN 978-92-847-3888-5 ISSN 1977-5784 doi:10.2865/53435 QJ-AB-19-018-SL-Q
This report assesses whether the Commission’s post-crisis action to strengthen the EU Member States’ budgetary frameworks achieved the intended results. 
V poročilu je ocenjeno, ali je ukrepanje Komisije po krizi za okrepitev proračunskih okvirov držav članic EU doseglo pričakovane rezultate.
The EU’s legislative action provided impetus; however, the legal framework leaves room for improvement and the Commission has so far only limited assurance that Member States properly apply the EU requirements. 
Zakonodajni ukrepi EU so zagotovili spodbude, vendar bi bilo pravni okvir mogoče izboljšati, Komisija pa je doslej dobila le omejena zagotovila, da države članice ustrezno izvajajo zahteve EU.
Besides, there is a risk of divergences between the Commission’s and the Independent Fiscal Institutions’ assessment of compliance of national annual and medium-term fiscal plans with EU fiscal rules, which could reduce the effectiveness of the EU fiscal framework. 
Poleg tega obstaja tveganje nekonsistentnosti med ocenami Komisije in neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij glede skladnosti nacionalnih letnih in srednjeročnih fiskalnih načrtov s fiskalnimi pravili EU, s čimer bi se lahko zmanjšala uspešnost fiskalnega okvira EU.
Finally, the effectiveness of the European Fiscal Board is limited by its current institutional set-up and the fact that the Commission can ignore its advice without providing appropriate explanation. 
In nazadnje, uspešnost Evropskega fiskalnega odbora je omejena zaradi njegove sedanje institucionalne ureditve in tega, da Komisiji njegovih priporočil ni treba upoštevati, in to brez ustreznega pojasnila.
ECA special report pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU. 60 
Posebno poročilo Sodišča v skladu z drugim pododstavkom člena 287(4) PDEU.