natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For 5 of the 6 indicators the data for 2012 is unchanged from 2011, which the Court found to be unreliable (see Chapter 10 of the An‐ nual Report 2011). 
Pri petih od šestih kazalnikov se podatki za leto 2012 niso spremenili od leta 2011, kar je po mnenju Sodišča nezanesljivo (glej poglavje 10 letnega poročila za leto 2011).
The report’s annexes include selected find‐ ings from external evaluations and result indicators compiled from the Member States’ Annual Progress Reports. 
Priloge k poročilu vključujejo izbrane ugotovitve zunanjih vrednotenj in kazalnike rezultatov, zbrane iz letnih poročil o napredku držav članic.
Activity statements of oper‐ ational expenditure: Working Document accompanying the Draft General Budget To justify the appropriations requested by the Commission in the Draft Budget The statement for the 2013 budget describes ‘major achieve‐ ments’. 
Izjava o dejavnostih za operativne odhodke: delovni dokument k osnutku splošnega proračuna Upravičiti proračunska sredstva, ki jih je zahtevala Komisija v osnutku proračuna.
These relate to the Commission’s activities. 
Izjava k proračunu za leto 2013 opisuje glavne dosežke, ki se nanašajo na dejavnosti Komisije.
No link is made between the activities and the information shown on results, which is an aggregation of the common indicator data. Special Report No 12/2013 – Can the Commission and Member States show that the EU budget allocated to the rural development policy is well spent? 
Med dejavnostmi in prikazanimi informacijami o rezultatih, ki so združeni podatki o skupnih kazalnikih, ni vzpostavljene povezave. Posebno poročilo št. 12/2013 – Ali lahko Komisija in države članice dokažejo, da so bila proračunska sredstva EU, dodeljena za politiko razvoja podeželja, dobro porabljena?
These reports present the available indicator data, and in general give a sufficient description of the implementation of the programmes in terms of the amount spent and the outputs. 
Ta poročila predstavljajo razpoložljive podatke o kazalnikih in v glavnem v zadostni meri opišejo izvajanje programov, kar zadeva porabljene zneske in izložke.
However, the reports display common weaknesses, described in the following paragraphs. 
Vendar pa imajo skupne slabosti, ki so opisane v naslednjih odstavkih.
The reports give insufficient consideration to the reliability of the data sources or methods when presenting the information. 
Poročila pri predstavitvi informacij ne namenjajo dovolj pozornosti zanesljivosti virov podatkov ali metod.
For example, some Member States extrapolated data from just a handful of cases, as did the Commission in its Annual Activity Report12. 
Na primer: nekatere države članice so podatke ekstrapolirale iz peščice primerov, podobno kot Komisija v svojem Letnem poročilu o dejavnostih12.
The poor quality of many of the mid-term evaluations also limits the reliance that can be placed on the evaluation findings but the Member States and Commission did not sufficiently draw attention to this. 
Slaba kakovost mnogih vmesnih vrednotenj prav tako omejuje to, koliko se je mogoče zanesti na ugotovitve vrednotenja, vendar države članice in Komisija na to niso dovolj opozorile.
The Member State and Commission reports show indicator values in relation to targets that the Member States have changed to match the expected results. 
Poročila držav članic in Komisije prikazujejo vrednosti kazalnikov glede na ciljne vrednosti, ki so jih države članice spremenile tako, da ustrezajo pričakovanim rezultatom.
Box 2 explains why this should not be done. 
V okviru 2 je opisano, zakaj se ne bi smelo tako ravnati.
In a recent example the Commission approved an amendment to the Czech Republic RDP that reduces the target for job creation by over 90 % (from 29 000 to 2 700). 
Nedavni primer je, kako je Komisija v programu razvoja podeželja Češke odobrila spremembo, ki je ciljno vrednost za ustvarjanje delovnih mest znižala za več kot 90 % (z 29 000 na 2 700).
If the programme eventually creates 2 700 jobs it will meet just 9 % of the target set in the approved RDP — a poor result. 
Če bo program na koncu ustvaril 2 700 mest, bo izpolnil le 9 % ciljne vrednosti, določene v odobrenem programu razvoja podeželja, kar je slab rezultat.
Yet the Annual Progress Report will compare it with the revised target and consider it a 100 % success. 
Vendar se bo v letnem poročilu o napredku ta rezultat primerjal s spremenjeno ciljno vrednostjo in bo označen kot 100-odstotni uspeh.
The Managing Authority will not have to explain the failure to meet the original target. 
Organu za upravljanje ne bo treba pojasniti, zakaj ni bila dosežena prvotna ciljna vrednost.
This practice devalues the reports to the point that they are of little use for accountability: for showing the extent to which the programme managers have achieved the rural development objectives set. 
Ta praksa poročila razvrednoti do te mere, da nimajo več veliko vrednosti za dokazovanje odgovornosti, saj ne prikazujejo, v kolikšni meri so vodje programa dosegli zastavljene cilje razvoja podeželja.
The Commission reports include a footnote to say that the targets are ‘subject to revision’ but the Member States’ Annual Progress Reports reviewed by the Court do not even mention when targets have been reduced. 
Poročila Komisije vsebujejo opombo (pod črto), kjer je navedeno, da se ciljne vrednosti„lahko spremenijo“, vendar v letnih poročilih o napredku, ki jih je pregledalo Sodišče, ni niti omenjeno, ali so se ciljne vrednosti znižale.
The Annex shows the result indicator targets that have been changed since the initial RDP. 
V Prilogi so prikazane ciljne vrednosti kazalnikov rezultatov, ki so bile spremenjene v primerjavi s prvotnim programom razvoja podeželja.
The evaluation findings presented in the Commission and Member State reports are mostly the work of independent evaluators. 
Ugotovitve vrednotenj, ki so predstavljene v poročilih Komisije in držav članic, večinoma pripravijo neodvisni izvajalci vrednotenja.
However, the reports do not inform the reader of the conclusions the Commission or Member State themselves draw from the evaluations or if the Commission or Member State accepts the evaluation findings as valid13. 
Vendar pa poročila bralca ne seznanijo z zaključki, ki jih na podlagi vrednotenja sprejmejo Komisija ali države članice same, ter z njihovim mnenjem o tehtnosti ugotovitev vrednotenja13.
12 In Chapter 10 of its 2011 Annual Report, the Court found that the 2011 Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development Annual Activity Report presentation of the impact of the programme was based on insufficient data. 
12 Sodišče v poglavju 10 svojega letnega poročila za leto 2011 ugotavlja, da je predstavitev vpliva programa v letnem poročilu o dejavnostih Generalnega direktorata za kmetijstvo in razvoj podeželja za leto 2011 temeljila na nezadostnih podatkih.
For example, the increase in renewable energy was calculated from data for just 9 of the 88 RDPs (OJ C 344, 12.11.2012). 
Na primer povečanje energije iz obnovljivih virov je bilo izračunano iz podatkov za samo devet programov za razvoj podeželja od 88 (UL C 344, 12.11.2012).
13 The Commission publishes the external evaluations, including the ex post evaluation and mid-term evaluation synthesis, with a caveat to the effect that the conclusions are those of the evaluator and not necessarily shared by the Commission. 26 Special Report No 12/2013 – Can the Commission and Member States show that the EU budget allocated to the rural development policy is well spent? 
13 Komisija objavi rezultate zunanjega vrednotenja, vključno s povzetkom naknadnega in vmesnega vrednotenja, skupaj z opozorilom, da so zaključki mnenje izvajalca vrednotenja, s katerim se Komisija morda ne strinja. 26 Posebno poročilo št. 12/2013 – Ali lahko Komisija in države članice dokažejo, da so bila proračunska sredstva EU, dodeljena za politiko razvoja podeželja, dobro porabljena?
Moreover, Member States and the Commission reported only selected evaluation findings — in some cases only the positive findings. 
Še več, države članice in Komisija so poročale samo o izbranih ugotovitvah vrednotenja – v nekaterih primerih le o pozitivnih ugotovitvah.
For example, several mid-term evaluations showed deadweight for the investment measures of around 50 %14 — a conclusion that is important for the effectiveness and efficiency of the programmes — but this was not reported in the Member States’ Annual Progress Reports. 
Več vmesnih vrednotenj je na primer pokazalo, da znašajo mrtve izgube pri naložbenih ukrepih približno 50 %14, kar je zaključek, ki je pomemben za uspešnost in učinkovitost programov, vendar države članice v svojih letnih poročilih o napredku o tem niso poročale.
The reports also do not systematically show the action taken in response to the evaluation findings. 
Poročila tudi sistematično ne navajajo ukrepov, ki so bili sprejeti kot odgovor na ugotovitve vrednotenja.
As such, the reports give little assurance as to how well the Member States and Commission have spent the EU budget15. 
Poročila zato ne dajejo veliko zagotovila o tem, kako dobro so države članice in Komisija porabile proračunska sredstva EU15.
14 See paragraph 61 of Special Report No 1/2013 ‘Has the EU support to the food-processing industry been effective and efficient in adding value to agricultural products?’ 
14 Glej odstavek 61 Posebnega poročila št. 1/2013 – Ali je podpora EU živilskopredelovalni industriji uspešno in učinkovito dodala vrednost kmetijskih proizvodom?
15 Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development’s Annual Activity Report has a ‘Conclusion on the assurance to be taken with regard to shared management of EAGF and EAFRD expenditure’. This concerns only the legality and regularity of the payments. 
15 Letno poročilo o dejavnostih Generalnega direktorata za kmetijstvo in razvoj podeželja vsebuje„Zaključek o zagotovilu v zvezi z deljenim upravljanjem odhodkov za EKJS in EKSRP“, ki pa zadeva samo zakonitost in pravilnost plačil.
There is no equivalent conclusion regarding the results achieved. 
Enakovrednega zaključka v zvezi z doseženimi rezultati ni.
A section on Sound Financial Management considers only implementation issues such as delays in payments. 
Razdelek o dobrem finančnem poslovodenju obravnava le težave pri izvajanju, kot so zamude pri plačilih.
27 BOX 2 THE USE OF INDICATOR TARGETS The Member States should actively manage the measures to ensure that result targets (and hence the EU’s objectives) are met, for example by adjusting eligibility and selection criteria, thus improving the ‘targeting’ of the measures concerned. 
27 OKVIR 2 UPORABA CILJNIH VREDNOSTI KAZALNIKOV Države članice bi morale dejavno upravljati ukrepe, da zagotovijo doseganje ciljnih vrednosti (in s tem ciljev EU), na primer s prilagajanjem meril za upravičenost in izbirnih meril, ter tako izboljšati „ciljno usmerjanje“ zadevnih ukrepov.
Where the targets still cannot be met, despite the Member States’ best efforts, the Member States should explain in the Annual Progress Reports why they were not met and the action that they have taken to try to achieve them. 
Če ciljnih vrednosti kljub najboljšim prizadevanjem držav članic vendarle ni mogoče doseči, bi morale države članice v letnih poročilih o napredku pojasniti, zakaj jih niso dosegle, in navesti ukrepe, ki so jih sprejele, da bi jih dosegle.
Targets should not simply be reduced to reflect the latest projection or a ‘revised estimate’ of the results, as this would give the false impression that the measure had been successful when this was not actually the case. 
Ciljnih vrednosti ni mogoče enostavno znižati, da bi odražale najnovejša predvidevanja ali „spremenjeno oceno“ rezultatov, saj bi to dajalo lažen vtis, da je bil ukrep uspešen, čeprav to ni bilo res.
Reducing results targets represents a reduction in the planned efficiency and effectiveness of the EU budget, as less is being achieved for the same amount of money. 
Zniževanje ciljnih vrednosti rezultatov pomeni znižanje načrtovane učinkovitosti in uspešnosti proračunskih sredstev EU, saj se z enako vsoto denarja doseže manj.
For this reason, targets should only be reduced exceptionally and in clearly justified cases, with the Commission’s approval. 
Zaradi tega se smejo ciljne vrednosti znižati samo izjemoma in v jasno utemeljenih primerih, z odobritvijo Komisije.
Where, exceptionally, targets are changed, this should be clearly explained whenever the indicator data is reported in relation to the target. Special Report No 12/2013 – Can the Commission and Member States show that the EU budget allocated to the rural development policy is well spent? 
Če so bile ciljne vrednosti izjemoma spremenjene, je treba to pri poročanju o podatkih o kazalnikih v primerjavi s ciljnimi vrednostmi vedno jasno obrazložiti. Posebno poročilo št. 12/2013 – Ali lahko Komisija in države članice dokažejo, da so bila proračunska sredstva EU, dodeljena za politiko razvoja podeželja, dobro porabljena?
28 HAS MONITORING AND EVALUATION INFORMATION BEEN USED TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF THE EXPENDITURE? 
28 ALI SO BILE INFORMACIJE O SPREMLJANJU IN VREDNOTENJU UPORABLJENE ZA IZBOLJŠANJE USPEŠNOSTI IN UČINKOVITOSTI ODHODKOV?
The previous section examined whether the monitoring and evaluation information met the requirements for accountability: to demonstrate what has been achieved. 
V prejšnjem razdelku je bilo preučeno, ali informacije o spremljanju in vrednotenju ustrezajo zahtevam za dokazovanje odgovornosti, tako da prikažejo, kaj je bilo doseženo.
But the purpose of monitoring and evaluation is not only to provide information for reporting: it should also be used to ensure that the rural development budget is well spent. 
Namen spremljanja in vrednotenja pa ni le pridobivanje informacij za poročanje. Uporabiti ju je treba tudi za zagotavljanje, da so proračunska sredstva za razvoj podeželja dobro porabljena.
Subsequently, the information should alert decision-makers when objectives are not being reached or when the efficiency of the measures is not satisfactory, allowing them to improve the design or the implementation of the measures during the programming period. 
Informacije bi morale služiti tudi kot opozorilo nosilcem odločanja, kadar cilji niso doseženi ali kadar učinkovitost ukrepov ni zadovoljiva, ter jim tako omogočati, da med programskim obdobjem izboljšajo zasnovo ali izvedbo ukrepov.
Member States are required to report in the Annual Progress Report on the steps taken to ensure the quality and effectiveness of programme implementation, and to review progress annually with the Commission. 
Države članice morajo v letnih poročilih o napredku poročati o korakih, ki so jih sprejele za zagotovitev kakovosti in uspešnosti izvajanja programov, ter s Komisijo letno pregledati napredek.
For the 12 selected RDPs, the Court examined Annual Progress Reports and the annual meeting documents for evidence of action taken to improve effectiveness and efficiency. 
Sodišče je preučilo letna poročila o napredku in gradivo za letne seje za 12 izbranih programov razvoja podeželja, da bi našlo dokaze o ukrepih, ki so bili izvedeni za izboljšanje uspešnosti in učinkovitosti.
The Court also reviewed documentation of amendments to the 12 programmes to determine whether they were based on monitoring and evaluation information stemming from the CMEF. 
Sodišče je prav tako pregledalo dokumentacijo o spremembah za 12 programov, da bi ugotovilo, ali so temeljile na informacijah o spremljanju in vrednotenju, pridobljenih s CMEF.
Finally, the Court reviewed the information presented by the Commission in support of its proposals for the 2014–20 programming period. 
Na koncu je Sodišče pregledalo informacije, ki jih je Komisija predstavila v podporo svojim predlogom za programsko obdobje 2014–2020.
THE COMMISSION DID NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MEASURES WHEN INITIALLY APPROVING RDPS 61. 
KOMISIJA PRI PRVOTNI ODOBRITVI PROGRAMOV RAZVOJA PODEŽELJA NI UPOŠTEVALA UČINKOVITOSTI UKREPOV 61.
Where Member States give targets in their RDPs, these can be analysed to indicate whether the programmes represent good value for money in relation to the EU’s priorities and objectives. 
Če države članice v svojih programih za razvoj podeželja določijo ciljne vrednosti, jih je mogoče analizirati, da se ugotovi, ali so programi stroškovno učinkoviti glede na prednostne naloge in cilje EU.
Variations between RDPs are to be expected, but the Commission should examine any large differences to ensure that they are justified. 
Razlike med programi razvoja podeželja so pričakovane, vendar bi morala Komisija vse velike razlike preučiti, da se prepriča o njihovi utemeljenosti.
Examples of large differences are shown in Box 3. 
Primeri velikih razlik so prikazani v okviru 3.
For example, while there may be specific national priorities justifying the wide variations, the diversification measures in RDPs such as Campania and the Czech Republic appear at first sight to represent a poor use of the EU budget in relation to the EU’s priorities. 
Čeprav morda obstajajo posebne nacionalne prednostne naloge, ki upravičujejo velike razlike, pa ukrepi za diverzifikacijo v programih razvoja podeželja, kot sta programa v Kampaniji in na Češkem, na prvi pogled kažejo na slabo uporabo proračunskih sredstev EU v zvezi s prednostnimi nalogami EU.
Such cases deserve analysis and explanation but the Commission’s assessment of RDP proposals did not include such analysis of the efficiency of the measures. 
Takšne primere je treba analizirati in pojasniti, vendar ocena predlogov za programe razvoja podeželja, ki jo je izdelala Komisija, ni vključevala take analize učinkovitosti ukrepov.
Consequently, cases such as these are not given appropriate attention to ensure that they are effective and efficient means of achieving the EU’s objectives. 
Posledično se takim ukrepom ne posveča dovolj pozornosti, da bi se zagotovila njihova uspešnost in učinkovitost pri doseganju ciljev EU.
MEMBER STATES HAVE USED MONITORING AND EVALUATION INFORMATION TO HELP IMPROVE TAKE‐UP OF THE MEASURES ... 
DRŽAVE ČLANICE SO INFORMACIJE O SPREMLJANJU IN VREDNOTENJU UPORABILE ZA IZBOLJŠANJE SPREJETOSTI UKREPOV ...
Clearly, if the EU budget is not spent, it cannot have any effect. 
Če se proračunska sredstva EU ne porabijo, seveda ne morejo imeti učinka.
Information on take-up is therefore important to alert programme managers that they may need to revise publicity arrangements, eligibility conditions, aid rates or selection criteria to make the measures effective. 
Informacije o sprejetosti so zato pomembno opozorilo vodjem programov, da morajo za uspešnost ukrepov morda spremeniti način oglaševanja, pogoje za upravičenost, stopnje pomoči ali izbirna merila.
The Court found that the Member States were attentive to this, using data from administrative sources to monitor take-up closely in relation to their budgets. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da so države članice temu posvečale pozornost, saj so podatke iz upravnih virov uporabljale za podrobno spremljanje sprejetosti glede na svoje proračune.
Member States also used evaluation information, particularly the mid-term evaluation, to identify reasons for low take-up. 
Države članice so informacije o spremljanju, zlasti o vmesnem spremljanju, uporabile tudi za ugotavljanje razlogov za slabo sprejetost.
29 BOX 3 EXAMPLES OF VARIATIONS BETWEEN RDPS HIGHLIGHTED BY ANALYSIS OF INDICATOR TARGETS The result indicator for the measure for diversifying agricultural activities is the ‘increase in non-agricultural gross value added’ in the farms supported, which can also indicate progress in relation to the EU’s priority of creating the conditions for growth. 
29 OKVIR 3 PRIMERI RAZLIK MED PROGRAMI RAZVOJA PODEŽELJA, KI JIH JE RAZKRILA ANALIZA CILJNIH VREDNOSTI KAZALNIKOV Kazalnik rezultatov za ukrep diverzifikacije kmetijskih dejavnosti je„zvišanje nekmetijske bruto dodane vrednosti“ na podprtih kmetijah, ki lahko kaže tudi napredek pri ustvarjanju pogojev za rast kot prednostni nalogi EU.
The Czech Republic RDP target shows that for every one euro of additional annual ‘gross value added’ to be created, public support of 65 euros is needed. This compares with 3,2 euros of support in Hungary and 0,4 euros in Austria. 
Ciljna vrednost v programu razvoja podeželja Češke kaže, da je za vsak ustvarjeni euro dodatne letne„bruto dodane vrednosti“ potrebna javna podpora v višini 65 EUR, v primerjavi s 3,2 EUR podpore na Madžarskem in 0,4 EUR v Avstriji.
In relation to the EU’s priority of creating jobs, the result indicator targets for all measures combined show a cost in public support per job created ranging from around 10 000 euros (Andalucía, Czech Republic, England, Romania and Sweden) up to around 90 000 euros (Hungary and Luxembourg). 
V zvezi z ustvarjanjem delovnih mest kot prednostno nalogo EU kažejo ciljne vrednosti kazalnikov rezultatov za vse ukrepe skupaj, da znaša strošek javne podpore za ustvarjeno delovno mesto od okoli 10 000 EUR (Andaluzija, Češka, Anglija, Romunija in Švedska) do okoli 90 000 EUR (Madžarska in Luksemburg).
The value for one RDP (Campania: 203 000 euros) lies far outside this range. Special Report No 12/2013 – Can the Commission and Member States show that the EU budget allocated to the rural development policy is well spent? 
Vrednost pri enem od programov razvoja podeželja (Kampanija: 203 000 EUR) je znatno presegala ta razpon. Posebno poročilo št. 12/2013 – Ali lahko Komisija in države članice dokažejo, da so bila proračunska sredstva EU, dodeljena za politiko razvoja podeželja, dobro porabljena?
The regulation and the CMEF provide a good basis for the Commission’s supervision of the implementation of the Member States’ programmes in financial and output terms. 
Uredba in CMEF predstavljata dobro podlago za nadzor Komisije nad izvajanjem programov držav članic s finančnega vidika in vidika izložkov.
For most of the RDPs reviewed, the Commission has approved one or more amendments that aimed to improve take-up of the measures. ... 
Pri večini pregledanih programov razvoja podeželja je Komisija odobrila eno ali več sprememb, katerih cilj je bil izboljšati sprejetost ukrepov. ...
BUT THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE OF THE MEMBER STATES OR THE COMMISSION USING INFORMATION ON RESULTS TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OR EFFICIENCY OF THE MEASURES 65. 
DOKAZOV, DA DRŽAVE ČLANICE ALI KOMISIJA UPORABLJAJO INFORMACIJE O REZULTATIH ZA IZBOLJŠANJE USPEŠNOSTI ALI UČINKOVITOSTI UKREPOV, PA JE MALO 65.
Improving take-up does not guarantee that the RDP measures will be effective: that the intended results will be achieved. 
Izboljšanje sprejetosti ne zagotavlja, da bodo ukrepi programa razvoja podeželja uspešni, tj. da bodo doseženi načrtovani rezultati.
Timely, reliable and relevant information on results achieved is therefore also necessary. 
Zato so potrebne tudi pravočasne, zanesljive in relevantne informacije o doseženih rezultatih.
The examples in Box 4 illustrate how strong initial targeting combined with monitoring and evaluation of results can be used to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the measures. 
Primeri v okviru 4 kažejo, kako se lahko dobro prvotno ciljno usmerjanje, skupaj s spremljanjem in vrednotenjem rezultatov, uporabi za izboljšanje uspešnosti in učinkovitosti ukrepov.
30 BOX 4 USE OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF THE MEASURES (RDP FOR ENGLAND) For the agri-environment measure, the authorities analysed which activities were most cost-effective in achieving environmental benefits in different geographical areas and prioritised applications on that basis. 
30 OKVIR 4 UPORABA SPREMLJANJA IN VREDNOTENJA ZA IZBOLJŠANJE USPEŠNOSTI IN UČINKOVITOSTI UKREPOV (PROGRAM RAZVOJA PODEŽELJA V ANGLIJI) Organi so pri kmetijsko-okoljskem ukrepu analizirali, katere dejavnosti so bile najbolj stroškovno učinkovite pri doseganju okoljskih koristi na različnih zemljepisnih območjih, in na podlagi tega prednostno razvrstili zahtevke.