natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
105 Operators of essential services in certain sectors have multiple notification obligations (including to consumers) under existing EU regulations, which may impair the efficiency of the process. 
105 Izvajalci bistvenih storitev v nekaterih sektorjih imajo v okviru obstoječih uredb EU več obveznosti za priglasitev (tudi potrošnikom), ki bi lahko ogrozile učinkovitost procesa.
For example, operators in the financial and banking sectors are subject to different notification criteria, standards, thresholds and time frames under the GDPR, the NIS Directive, the Payment Services Directive, ECB/SSM, Target 2 and the eIDAS Regulation157. 
Na primer, za izvajalce v finančnem in bančnem sektorju veljajo različna merila, standardi, mejne vrednosti in časovni okviri za priglasitev iz splošne uredbe o varstvu podatkov, direktive o varnosti omrežij in informacij, direktive o plačilnih storitvah, ECB/EMN, TARGET2 in uredbe eIDAS157.
It is therefore important to streamline these obligations since, aside from constituting an unnecessary administrative burden, such heterogeneity might lead to fragmented reporting. 
Zato je pomembno, da se te obveznosti racionalizirajo, saj ne povzročajo samo nepotrebne administrativne obremenitve, temveč zaradi te raznolikosti lahko pride do razdrobljenega poročanja.
Coordinated response 106 Development of a European cybersecurity crisis cooperation framework is still a work in progress. 
Usklajen odziv 106 Evropski okvir za sodelovanje na področju kibernetskih kriz se še vedno razvija.
The related ‘blueprint’158 (see paragraph 18) was therefore introduced to inject a cyber-perspective into the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) mechanism, improve situational awareness and ensure better integration with other EU crisis management mechanisms 159. 
Zato je bil predstavljen z njim povezan načrt158 (glej odstavek 18), da bi se v mehanizem enotne ureditve EU za politično odzivanje na krize (IPCR) vključil še kibernetski vidik, da bi se izboljšalo situacijsko zavedanje in zagotovilo boljše povezovanje z drugimi mehanizmi EU za krizno upravljanje159.
The blueprint involves EU institutions, agencies and Member States. 
Načrt vključuje institucije, agencije in države članice EU.
Seamlessly integrating all these crisis response mechanisms is challenging160. 
V celoti povezati vse te mehanizme za odzivanje na krize je izziv160.
107 The EU’s capacity to respond to cyberattacks at the operational and political level in the event of a large-scale, cross-border incident has been labelled “limited”, partly because cybersecurity is not yet integrated into existing EU-level crisis response coordination mechanisms 162. 
107 Zmogljivost EU za odzivanje na kibernetske napade na operativni in politični ravni v primeru velikega čezmejnega incidenta je bila označena kot omejena, deloma zato, ker kibernetska varnost še ni vključena v obstoječe mehanizme za usklajevanje odzivanja na krize na ravni EU162.
The NIS Directive did not address this. 
V direktivi o varnosti omrežij in informacij to vprašanje ni obravnavano.
108 The recently proposed reform of ENISA, which envisaged a greater operational role in handling large-scale cybersecurity incidents, was not supported by the Member States, preferring that the agency’s role should support and complement their own operational action 163. 
108 Nedavno predlagane reforme ENISE, s katero naj bi ta dobila večjo operativno vlogo pri obvladovanju velikih kibernetskih incidentov, države članice niso podprle, saj so želele, da bi agencija podpirala in dopolnjevala njihove lastne operativne ukrepe163.
There are already many CERTs/CSIRTs at the Member State level, but their capacities vary considerably. 
Zdaj na ravni držav članic obstaja že mnogo skupin za odzivanje na računalniške grožnje in skupin za odzivanje na incidente na področju računalniške varnosti, vendar se njihove zmogljivosti zelo razlikujejo.
This constitutes an obstacle to the effective cross-border cooperation needed for large-scale incident responses 164. 
To je ovira za uspešno čezmejno sodelovanje, ki je potrebno za odziv na velike incidente164.
109 We tried to map the different roles assigned to the various actors identified in the blueprint, but there were gaps which will need to be filled as implementation advances. 
109 Sodišče je poskusilo kartirati vloge različnih akterjev iz načrta, vendar je ugotovilo vrzeli, ki jih bo treba odpraviti v nadaljnjem izvajanju.
One initially under-addressed area was law enforcement, although the EU Law Enforcement Emergency Response Protocol took effect in December 2018165. 
Področje, ki sprva ni bilo dovolj obravnavano, je kazenski pregon, vendar je decembra 2018 začel veljati protokol EU za odzivanje organov kazenskega pregona na izredne razmere165.
Ensuring that the blueprint is practical and that all parties know what to do is key to its success; this will need extensive testing in the coming years. 
Za 43 uspešnost načrta je ključno, da je praktičen in da vsi udeleženci vedo, kaj so njihove naloge.
110 Effective response is about more than damage containment; assigning responsibility for attacks is also pivotal. 
110 Uspešen odziv je več kot le omejevanje škode, ključno je določanje odgovornosti za napade.
Tracking and identifying perpetrators, above all in a hybrid attack, can be very difficult due to the growing abuse of anonymisation tools, cryptocurrencies and encryption. 
Izsleditev in identifikacija storilcev sta predvsem pri hibridnem napadu lahko zelo težka zaradi vedno pogostejše zlorabe orodij za anonimizacijo, kriptovalut in šifriranja.
This is known as the attribution problem. 
To je znano kot problem pripisa.
Remedying this problem is not just a technical issue; it is also a criminal justice challenge. 
Odprava tega problema ni samo tehnično vprašanje, ampak tudi izziv za kazensko pravosodje.
Legal and procedural differences between countries may impede criminal investigations and the prosecution of suspects. 
Pravne in postopkovne razlike med državami lahko ovirajo kazenske preiskave in pregon osumljencev.
Addressing the attribution problem will need a more formalised operational exchange of information through clearer procedures with Europol or Eurojust’s European Judicial Cybercrime Network, for example. 
Za obravnavo problema pripisa bo npr. potrebna bolj formalizirana operativna izmenjava informacij z jasnejšimi postopki z Europolom ali Evropsko pravosodno mrežo Eurojusta za kibernetsko kriminaliteto.
111 At the political level, the cyber diplomacy toolbox (see Box 6) has been developed in order to support the settlement of international disputes in cyberspace by peaceful means. 
111 Na politični ravni je bila razvita zbirka orodij za kibernetsko diplomacijo (glej okvir 6) za podporo reševanju mednarodnih sporov v kibernetskem prostoru z miroljubnimi sredstvi.
The creation of cyber rapid response teams and an initiative for mutual assistance in cyber security are two projects fostering enhanced information sharing which are being developed under the PESCO framework166. 
Ustanovitev enot za hitro odzivanje na kibernetske grožnje in pobuda za medsebojno pomoč na področju kibernetske varnosti sta projekta, ki spodbujata okrepljeno izmenjavo informacij in ki se razvijata v skladu z okvirom za stalnostrukturno sodelovanje166.
43 Box6 The cyber diplomacy toolbox The EU Joint EU Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities 167, or “cyber diplomacy toolbox”, grew out of the 2015 Council conclusions on cyber diplomacy168. 
44 Okvir 6 Zbirka orodij za kibernetsko diplomacijo Skupen diplomatski odziv EU na zlonamerne kibernetske dejavnosti167 ali zbirka orodij za kibernetsko diplomacijo izhaja iz sklepov Sveta o kibernetski diplomaciji iz leta 2015168.
Cyber diplomacy aims to develop and implement a common and comprehensive approach to cyberspace based on EU values, the rule of law, capacity-building and partnerships, promotion of the multi-stakeholder model of internet governance, and the mitigation of cybersecurity threats and greater stability in international relations. 
Cilj kibernetske diplomacije je razvoj in izvajanje skupnega in celovitega pristopa h kibernetskemu prostoru na podlagi vrednot EU, pravne države, izgradnje zmogljivosti in partnerstev, spodbujanja modela upravljanja interneta z več deležniki ter odprave groženj za kibernetsko varnost in večje stabilnosti mednarodnih odnos ov.
The toolbox allows the EU and its Member States to mount a joint diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities making full use of measures within the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Zbirka orodij EU in njenim državam članicam omogoča skupen diplomatski odziv na zlonamerne kibernetske dejavnosti s celovito uporabo ukrepov v okviru skupne zunanje in varnostne politike.
These can include preventive (e.g. awareness-raising, capacity-building), cooperative, stability and restrictive measures (e.g. travel bans, arms embargoes, freezing funds), or support to Member States’ responses 169. 
Ti lahko vključujejo preventivne ukrepe (npr. ozaveščanje, izgradnjo zmogljivosti), ukrepe sodelovanja, ukrepe za stabilnost in omejevalne ukrepe (npr. prepoved potovanja, embargo na orožje, zamrznitev sredstev) ali podporo za odzive držav članic169.
The idea is that further cooperation to mitigate threats and clearly signalling the likely consequences of a joint response may deter (potentially) aggressive behaviour. 
Nadaljnje sodelovanje za ublažitev groženj in to, da se jasno pove, katere so verjetne posledice skupnega odziva, naj bi (potencialno) odvrnilo od napadalnega vedenja.
A joint EU response to malicious cyber activities would be proportionate to the scope, scale, duration, intensity, complexity, sophistication and impact of the cyber activity. 
45 Skupen odziv EU na zlonamerne kibernetske dejavnosti bi bil sorazmeren z obsegom, stopnjo, trajanjem, intenzivnostjo, kompleksnostjo, sofisticiranostjo in učinkom kibernetske dejavnosti.
Integral to the success of the toolbox will be how well it is interwoven with the blueprint and IPCR (see paragraph 106), how well situational awareness is established through the quick and continuous sharing of information (including on 44 elements of attribution)170 and, finally, effective cooperation. 
Za uspešnost zbirke orodij bo ključno to, kako dobro bo prepletena z načrtom in mehanizmom enotne ureditve EU za politično odzivanje na krize (glej odstavek 106), kako dobro bo s hitro in stalno izmenjavo informacij vzpostavljeno situacijsko zavedanje (vključno z elementi pripisa)170, in nazadnje uspešno sodelovanje.
Also key to the toolbox’s successful deployment is effective and coordinated communication. 
Za uspešno uvedbo zbirke orodij je ključno tudi uspešno in usklajeno komuniciranje.
So far, the toolbox has been used twice: to start a dialogue with the United States after the Wannacry attack171, and to develop Council conclusions condemning the malicious use of ICT172. 
Do zdaj je bila zbirka orodij uporabljena dvakrat: za začetek dialoga z Združenimi državami Amerike po napadu WannaCry171 in za pripravo sklepov Sveta o obsodbi zlonamerne uporabe IKT172.
The operationalisation of the toolbox is ongoing; it remains to be seen how effective it will be in achieving its objectives. 
Operacionalizacija zbirke orodij še poteka in šele pokazalo se bo, kako uspešna bo pri doseganju svojih ciljev.
Challenge 10: protecting critical infrastructure and societal functions Protecting infrastructure 112 Much of the EU’s critical infrastructure is operated through industrial control systems (ICS)173. 
Izziv 10: zaščita kritične infrastrukture in družbenih funkcij Zaščita infrastrukture 112 Večino kritične infrastrukture EU upravljajo industrijski nadzorni sistemi173.
Many of these were designed as stand-alone systems, with limited connectivity to the outside world. 
Mnogi so bili zasnovani kot samostojni sistemi z omejeno povezljivostjo z zunanjim svetom.
As components of ICS have been connected to the internet, they have become more vulnerable to outside interference. 
Ko so bili deli industrijskih nadzornih sistemov povezani z internetom, so postali bolj ranljivi za zunanje poseganje.
Maintaining and patching existing systems may no longer be possible, but upgrading them does not come quickly or cheaply. 
Vzdrževanje obstoječih sistemov in nameščanje popravkov vanje morda nista več mogoča, njihova nadgradnja pa je dolgotrajen in drag proces.
Efforts to enhance the security of critical infrastructure must therefore include the upgrading of ICS. 
Prizadevanja za okrepitev varnosti kritične infrastrukture morajo zato vključevati nadgradnjo industrijskih nadzornih sistemov.
113 As industry continues to digitise (commonly known as “Industry 4.0”), the impact of a large-scale incident in one industrial sector may have knock-on effects elsewhere. 
113 Ker se industrija še vedno digitalizira (znano kot „industrija 4.0“), bi lahko imel obsežen incident v enem industrijskem sektorju posredne učinke tudi v drugih sektorjih.
ENISA has noted the importance of mapping the impact of critical sectors’ mutual dependencies 174. 
ENISA je opozorila na pomembnost kartiranja vpliva vzajemnih odvisnosti ključnih sektorjev174.
This is essential to understanding the potential spread of an incident and underpins well-coordinated responses. 
To je bistveno za razumevanje mogočega širjenja incidenta in temelj dobro usklajenih odzivov.
114 The NIS Directive aims to enhance readiness in key sectors responsible for critical infrastructure. 
114 Cilj direktive o varnosti omrežij in informacij je povečanje pripravljenosti v ključnih sektorjih, odgovornih za kritično infrastrukturo.
However, not all sectors are covered (see Table 1)175, which “reduces the effectiveness of the strategy”176: of particular concern in this regard is protecting the democratic integrity of elections from interference in electoral infrastructure and disinformation (see Box 7). 
V to pa niso zajeti vsi sektorji (glej tabelo 1)175, kar zmanjšuje uspešnost strategije176: v tem pogledu je zlasti zaskrbljujoča zaščita demokratične integritete volitev pred poseganjem v volilno infrastrukturo in širjenjem dezinformacij (glej okvir 7).
Aside from revising existing legislation, therefore, a key challenge will be seeing how to engage these sectors in effective responses to large-scale incidents. 
zakonodaje bo zato ključni izziv to, kako te sektorje vključiti v uspešno odzivanje na velike incidente.
115 Vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure do not stop at Europe’s borders. 
115 Kritična infrastruktura pa ni ranljiva samo znotraj Evrope.
A particular challenge for the Commission is encouraging candidate countries to adopt the same standards as Member States, for example in such areas as cyber-related legislation or the protection of critical infrastructure. 
Poseben izziv za Komisijo je spodbujanje držav kandidatk za članstvo v EU, naj sprejmejo enake standarde kot države članice, na primer na področjih, kot sta zakonodaja na področju kibernetske varnosti ali zaščita kritične infrastrukture.
45 Box7 Protecting critical societal functions: fighting election interference In May 2019, some 400 million voters will go to the polls in the European parliamentary elections, the first to take place under the GDPR. 
46 Okvir 7 Zaščita kritičnih družbenih funkcij: boj proti poseganju v volitve Maja 2019 se bo približno 400 milijonov volivcev udeležilo volitev v Evropski parlament, prvič od začetka veljave splošne uredbe o varstvu podatkov.
These come in the wake of scandals surrounding the abuse of personal data for political micro-targeting and unprecedented coordinated disinformation (“Fake News”) campaigns. 
Te volitve bodo potekale po škandalih v zvezi z zlorabo osebnih podatkov za v posameznike usmerjene politične kampanje in kampanje usklajenega širjenja dezinformacij (lažne novice), kot jih še ni bilo.
The Commission has warned of likely cyber interference in these elections 177; fighting this will require a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. 
Komisija je opozorila na to, da bi lahko prišlo do kibernetskega poseganja v te volitve177, ki ga bo mogoče premagati samo z vsevladnim in vsedružbenim pristopom.
Election infrastructure Organising elections is complex, and ensuring their protection and integrity is the Member States’ responsibility. 
Volilna infrastruktura Organizacija volitev je kompleksna, zagotavljanje njihove zaščite in integritete pa je odgovornost držav članic.
In the European Parliament elections, protecting the so-called “last mile” (the communication of results from the national capitals to Brussels) is a particularly critical challenge, given that no common security approach exists or has been tested for this178. 
Za volitve v Evropski parlament je posebej kritičen izziv zaščita t. i. zadnjega dela (sporočanja rezultatov iz nacionalnih prestolnic v Bruselj), saj za to ne obstaja niti ni bil preizkušen noben skupni varnostni pristop178.
The Commission’s recent election package included measures to strengthen electoral cybersecurity, such as the appointment of national contact points to coordinate and exchange information in the run-up to the election. 
Nedavni volilni sveženj Komisije je vključeval ukrepe za krepitev volilne kibernetske varnosti, kot je imenovanje nacionalnih kontaktnih točk za usklajevanje in izmenjavo informacij v času pred volitvami.
The sharing of best practices and lessons learned is of particular importance179. 
Izmenjava najboljših praks in izkušenj je posebej pomembna179.
Election systems are not considered part of critical infrastructure180, nor are they covered by the NIS Directive. 
Volilni sistemi ne štejejo za del kritične infrastrukture180 in niso zajeti v direktivo o varnosti omrežij in informacij.
Despite this, the Cooperation Group has developed practical guidance on election technology security to support public authorities. 
Ne glede na to je skupina za sodelovanje v podporo javnim organom pripravila praktične smernice o varnosti volilne tehnologije.
The national contact points are expected to meet in early 2019181. 
Nacionalne kontaktne točke naj bi se sestale v začetku leta 2019181.
Member States are also encouraged to perform risk assessments on cyber threats to their electoral processes. 
Države članice se tudi spodbujajo, naj izvedejo ocene tveganja v zvezi s kibernetskimi grožnjami za svoje volilne procese.
Disinformation Disinformation is an increasingly important element of hybrid attacks that involves cyberattacks and the hacking of networks. 
47 Dezinformacije Dezinformacije so vedno pomembnejši element hibridnih napadov, ki zajemajo kibernetske napade in vdore v omrežja.
These can be used to divide societies, sow mistrust and undermine confidence in democratic processes or other issues (for example, anti-vaccination or climate change). 
Lahko se uporabljajo za razdvojitev družb, vzbujanje nezaupanja in spodkopavanje zaupanja v demokratične procese ali druge zadeve (npr. kampanje proti cepljenju ali zanikanje podnebnih sprememb).
It has grown in scale, speed and range, and poses a genuine security threat to the EU. 
Dezinformacij je vedno več, poleg tega pa postajajo vedno hitrejše in obsežnejše, zato resnično ogrožajo varnost v EU.
The EU has taken a number of measures to address disinformation. 
EU je sprejela več ukrepov za obravnavo dezinformacij.
Starting in 2015, the EEAS-based East StratCom Task Force was set up to challenge Russian disinformation campaigns 182. 
Leta 2015 je bila znotraj ESZD ustanovljena projektna skupina East StratCom za boj proti ruskim kampanjam širjenja dezinformacij182.
Experts have praised its work in promoting EU policies, supporting independent media in the Neighbourhood, and forecasting, tracking and tackling disinformation.183. 
Strokovnjaki so pohvalili njeno delo na področju spodbujanja politike EU, podpiranja neodvisnih medijev v sosedstvu in napovedovanja dezinformacij, sledenja dezinformacijam in boja proti njim183.
Still, the Task Force’s resources are limited relative to the scale and complexity of disinformation campaigns 184. 
Toda viri projektne skupine so glede na količino in kompleksnost kampanj za širjenje dezinformacij relativno skromni184.
A more systematic interaction with existing EU structures and improved strategic communication cooperation is 
Potrebna sta bolj sistematična interakcija z obstoječimi strukturami EU in boljše sodelovanje na področju strateške komunikacije185.
46 needed185 A new action plan186 was endorsed by the European Council in December 2018. 
Evropski svet je nov akcijski načrt186 podprl decembra 2018.
More recently, the Commission, on the back of its April 2018 communication on tackling online disinformation187, has developed a voluntary, self-regulatory code of practice188, based on existing policy instruments, to which online platforms and the advertising industry have signed up189. 
Komisija je pred kratkim poleg svojega sporočila o boju proti dezinformacijam na spletu187 iz aprila 2018 razvila neobvezen samoregulativen kodeks ravnanja188, ki temelji na obstoječih instrumentih politike, ki so se jim zavezale spletne platforme in oglaševalska industrija189.
Action includes helping to increase the trust-worthiness of content and supporting efforts to increase media and news literacy. 
Ukrep zajema pomoč za doseganje tega, da so vsebine bolj vredne zaupanja, in podporo prizadevanjem za povečanje medijske pismenosti in pismenosti v zvezi z novicami.
An independent European network of fact-checkers has also been launched. 
Ustanovljena je bila tudi neodvisna evropska mreža preverjevalcev dejstev.
The Commission has stated that further regulatory measures may follow if the code of practice is not observed. 
Komisija je navedla, da bi lahko sledili dodatni regulativni ukrepi, če se kodeks ravnanja ne bi upošteval.
Determining the effectiveness of measures will prove crucial, particularly deciding how to measure improvements in trust, transparency and accountability. 
Ugotavljanje uspešnosti ukrepov bo ključno, zlasti pri odločanju, kako meriti izboljšanje zaupanja, transparentnosti in odgovornosti.
Another challenge will be finding ways to improve the detection, analysis and exposure of disinformation190. 
Dodaten izziv je iskanje načinov za izboljšanje zaznavanja, analize in razkrivanja dezinformacij190.
Active and strategic monitoring and analysis of open data sources is also needed191. 
Potrebna sta tudi aktivno in strateško spremljanje in analiza odprtih podatkovnih virov191.
Attempts to gain a better understanding of the threat environment should also cover emerging trends, such as “deepfakes” (fake videos made with the help of artificial intelligence and deep machine learning), as well as the tools needed to detect them. 
Prizadevanja za boljše razumevanje groženj bi morala zajemati tudi nove trende, kot so t. i. globoki ponaredki (lažni videi, ustvarjeni s pomočjo umetne inteligence in globokega strojnega učenja), pa tudi orodja, potrebna za njihovo odkrivanje.
Enhancing autonomy 116 The EU is a net importer of cybersecurity products and services, increasing the risk of technological dependence on, and vulnerability to, non-EU operators 192. 
Krepitev avtonomnosti 116 EU je neto uvoznik izdelkov in storitev za kibernetsko varnost, kar povečuje tveganje tehnološke odvisnosti od izvajalcev izven EU in ranljivosti192.
In particular, this reality undermines the security of the EU’s critical infrastructure, which is also supported by complex global supply chains. 
To zmanjšuje varnost kritične infrastrukture EU, ki jo tudi podpirajo kompleksne svetovne dobavne verige.
The risk is further exacerbated where non-EU operators acquire European cybersecurity firms. 
Tveganje se dodatno poveča, kadar izvajalci izven EU kupijo evropska podjetja za kibernetsko varnost.
Member States are responsible for screening Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), and there is currently no EU-wide screening mechanism193. 
Države članice so odgovorne za pregledovanje neposrednih tujih naložb, na ravni EU pa zdaj ni nobenega mehanizma za pregledovanje193.
117 Greater strategic autonomy is an objective in the EU Global Strategy and the 2017 communication Resilience, Deterrence and Defence194. 
117 Večja strateška avtonomnost je cilj globalne strategije EU in sporočila Odpornost, odvračanje in obramba iz leta 2017194.