natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Because of this difference, a positive EIB due diligence assessment for a NER300 project did not imply that the project would also qualify for EIB financing (e.g. a loan). 
Zaradi te razlike pozitivna ocena potrebne skrbnosti, ki jo je za projekt v okviru programa NER300 izvedla EIB, ni pomenila, da je bil projekt upravičen tudi do sredstev EIB (npr. posojila).
In its evaluation of the first call for proposals, the EIB flagged significant financial viability issues. 
EIB je v oceni prvega razpisa za oddajo predlogov opozorila na pomembna vprašanja v zvezi s finančno vzdržnostjo.
The EIB advised the Commission to pay attention to the financial risks associated with some projects, mainly because of large amounts of debt finance sought and little evidence of its availability. 
Komisiji je svetovala, naj bo pozorna na finančna tveganja, povezana z nekaterimi projekti, predvsem zaradi povpraševanja po visokih zneskih dolžniškega financiranja in pomanjkanja dokazov o njihovi razpoložljivosti.
Despite these general concerns, the EIB found 88 % of the 47 Article 8(2) of the NER300 Decision provides the definition of the CPUP. 
Kljub tem splošnim pomislekom je EIB ugotovila, da je bilo 88 % projektov (tehnično in finančno) vzdržnih50 in Komisija jih je obravnavala za dodelitev sredstev.
49 The EIB due diligence conclusion could be positive without comments, positive with 38 recommendations to be considered by the Commission, or negative. 
42 49 Sklep EIB o potrebni skrbnosti je lahko pozitiven brez pripomb, pozitiven s priporočili, ki jih mora Komisija upoštevati, ali negativen.
projects to be (technically and financially) viable50 and the Commission considered these for award. Ranking of the available projects After the due diligence assessment, the Commission ranked the eligible and viable projects within their project subcategories based on the CPUP indicator51. The EIB had informed the Commission that there was a significant uncertainty factor for these CPUPs. 
Komisija je potrdila upravičenost 94 projektov, EIB pa 83 (88 %) od teh projektov izdala pozitiven sklep o potrebni skrbnosti. Razvrščanje razpoložljivih projektov Komisija je po oceni potrebne skrbnosti razvrstila upravičene in vzdržne projekte v podkategorije projektov na podlagi kazalnika stroškov na enoto.51 EIB je obvestila Komisijo, da pri teh stroških na enoto obstaja pomemben dejavnik negotovosti.
The submitted projects were generally at an early planning stage. 
Predloženi projekti so bili večinoma v zgodnji fazi načrtovanja.
The cost and expected performance data used to calculate this parameter as well as the required public funding were still very uncertain. 
Podatki o stroških in pričakovani smotrnosti, uporabljeni za izračun tega parametra in potrebnih javnih sredstev so bili še vedno zelo negotovi.
Addressing risks and recommendations before awarding funds We reviewed a sample of 26 EIB reports from the five selected Member States. 
Obravnavanje tveganj in priporočila pred dodelitvijo sredstev Sodišče je pregledalo vzorec 26 poročil EIB iz petih izbranih držav članic.
For seven projects to which the Commission awarded funding, the EIB had explicitly raised important risks for the Commission to consider before taking the award decisions. 
Za sedem projektov, za katere je Komisija dodelila sredstva, je EIB izrecno opozorila na pomembna tveganja, ki jih mora Komisija upoštevati pred sprejetjem sklepov o dodelitvi.
Four of them are now withdrawn. 
Štirje od teh projektov so zdaj umaknjeni.
The annual reports of the same projects show that key risks flagged by the EIB in the relevant due diligence reports actually materialised. 
Letna poročila istih projektov kažejo, da so se pri njih ključna tveganja, na katera je EIB opozorila v svojih poročilih o potrebni skrbnosti, dejansko uresničila.
Box 9 provides examples. 
Primeri so navedeni v okviru 9.
Box 9 – Examples of key risks flagged by the EIB and affecting projects’ progress For the financial planning it had submitted with the grant application, a floating wind project in Spain had expected to get access to a feed-in-tariff. 
Okvir 9 – Primeri ključnih tveganj, na katera je opozorila EIB in ki vplivajo na napredek projekta Za projekt plavajoče vetrne elektrarne v Španiji se je v skladu s finančnim načrtom, predloženim skupaj z vlogo za nepovratna sredstva, pričakovalo, da bo pridobljen dostop do zagotovljene odkupne cene.
The EIB had recommended the Commission to confirm a number of elements before taking the award decision, including the project’s access to a feed-in-tariff. 
EIB je Komisiji predlagala, naj pred sprejetjem sklepa o dodelitvi potrdi številne elemente, vključno z dostopom projekta do zagotovljene odkupne cene.
The Commission requested the Member State to confirm the project on that basis. 
Komisija je od zadevne države članice zahtevala, naj na podlagi tega potrdi projekt.
While the Member State confirmed support for the project, it stated that a feed-in-tariff would not be available and did not specify alternative funding. 
Država članica je sicer potrdila podporo projektu, vendar je navedla, da zagotovljena odkupna cena ne bo na voljo in ni pa navedla druge možnosti financiranja.
The Commission then awarded the grant. 
Komisija je nato dodelila nepovratna sredstva.
39 award decision, the project reported delays in its annual report on reaching final investment decision and entry into operation as it was unable to secure any feed-in-tariff or alternative sources of funding (also see paragraphs 42 to 48 on the issue of regulatory uncertainty). 
Po sprejetju sklepa o dodelitvi se je v letnem poročilu projekta poročalo o zamudah pri sprejemanju končne naložbene odločitve in začetku izvajanja, saj projekt ni mogel dobiti zagotovljene odkupne cene ali alternativnih virov financiranja (glej tudi odstavke 42 do 48 o vprašanju regulativne negotovosti).
According to the latest available report, the situation was critical in 2016, even if some technical and permitting work continued. 
poročilo je bilo stanje leta 2016 kritično, čeprav se je nekaj tehničnega dela in dela na področju pridobivanja dovoljenj nadaljevalo.
For a bioenergy project in Poland, the EIB raised many issues on the technical and financial viability while concluding that there was a material risk that the reaching of the final investment decision within 24 months of the award decision would not take place should the current market conditions and investors’ appetite not improve. 
V zvezi s projektom na področju bioenergije na Poljskem je EIB poudarila številna vprašanja o tehnični in finančni vzdržnosti ter sklenila, da obstaja veliko tveganje, da končna naložbena odločitev ne bo sprejeta v 24 mesecih od sklepa o dodelitvi, če se sedanji tržni pogoji ne bodo izboljšali in se zanimanje vlagateljev ne bo povečalo.
It also made a range of other recommendations for the Commission to consider before awarding the grant. 
Izdala je tudi številna druga priporočila, ki naj bi jih Komisija obravnavala pred dodelitvijo nepovratnih sredstev.
The Member State confirmed the project and national support, and the Commission awarded the grant. 
Zadevna država članica je potrdila projekt in nacionalno podporo, Komisija pa je dodelila nepovratna sredstva.
However, at the time of the audit, the project was withdrawing because it was not financially viable. 
Vendar je bil projekt v času revizije umaknjen, ker ni bil finančno vzdržen.
In this context, we examined how the Commission and the Member States addressed EIB recommendations before the award decisions. 
V tem kontekstu je Sodišče preučilo, kako so Komisija in države članice obravnavale priporočila EIB pred sprejetjem sklepa o dodelitvi.
We found no evidence that Member States had accessed the EIB due diligence reports when the Commission asked them to reconfirm their support for projects. 
Pri tem ni našlo dokazov, da so države članice dostopale do poročil EIB o skrbnem pregledu, ko jih je Komisija prosila, naj ponovno potrdijo svojo podporo za projekte.
Most Member States requested the confidential EIB files after the award decision. 
Večina držav članic je zaupne spise EIB zahtevala po sklepu o dodelitvi sredstev.
The NER300 project selection and award process was complex and lengthy but failed to address the key issue of economic viability. 
Postopek izbire projektov in dodelitve sredstev v okviru programa NER300 je bil kompleksen in dolgotrajen, vendar se v njem ni obravnavalo ključno vprašanje ekonomske vzdržnosti.
The design of the process also placed insufficient emphasis on the comparative quality, innovation levels and financial viability of projects. 
Postopek je bil zasnovan tako, da ni dovolj poudarjal primerjalne kakovosti, stopnje inovativnosti ter finančne vzdržnosti projektov.
It is also important that the awarding authorities (i.e. Commission and Member States/Climate Change Committee) are fully aware of the project risks as identified during the due diligence assessments before taking their award decisions and signing agreements with these projects. 
Pomembno je tudi to, da so organi, pristojni za dodeljevanje sredstev (tj. Komisija in države članice/Odbor za podnebne spremembe) pred sprejetjem sklepov o dodelitvi in podpisom sporazumov s temi projekti v celoti seznanjeni s tveganji projektov, kot so opredeljena med ocenjevanji potrebne skrbnosti.
Together, these factors may have reduced assurance about whether these projects could meet the intended objectives within the constraints of the programme. 
Zaradi vseh teh dejavnikov skupaj je mogoče, da se je zmanjšalo zagotovilo glede tega, ali bodo ti projekti lahko dosegli načrtovane cilje v okviru omejitev programa.
NER300 decision-making involves many parties In the NER300 governance model, the Commission has the overall responsibility for the programme and leads discussions with Member States and the Climate Change Committee. 40 
V odločanje v okviru programa NER300 je vključenih več strani V modelu upravljanja programa NER300 ima Komisija splošno odgovornost za program ter vodi razprave z državami članicami in Odborom za podnebne spremembe.
While the Commission has this overall coordination role, it does not necessarily receive complete and timely information on the progress of projects. 
Čeprav ima Komisija to splošno usklajevalno vlogo, ni nujno, da prejema popolne in pravočasne informacije o napredku projektov.
Member States send confidential annual progress reports to the Commission. 
Države članice Komisiji pošiljajo zaupna letna poročila o napredku.
The template of the annual report does not require reporting any information on national funding contributions or the financial plan of the project. 
Predloga letnega poročila ne zahteva sporočanja informacij o 44 prispevkih nacionalnega financiranja ali finančnem načrtu projekta.
Such information is thus only available to the Commission if the Member States voluntarily include it. 
Take informacije so zato Komisiji na voljo le, če jih države članice vključijo prostovoljno.
Member States cannot directly respond to essential project change requests as the Commission has a role in reviewing and approving them52. The Commission’s role here is a consequence of the fact that essential changes affecting the award decision (e.g. project size, scope, milestone deadlines) need approval through comitology. 
Države članice ne morejo neposredno odgovarjati na zahtevke za bistvene spremembe projekta, saj Komisija sodeluje pri njihovem pregledovanju in odobritvi.52 Ta vloga Komisije je posledica tega, da je treba bistvene spremembe, ki vplivajo na odločitev o dodelitvi sredstev (npr. velikost projekta, obseg, roki za doseganje mejnikov), odobriti s komitologijo.
Before Member States can apply changes to the agreements they signed with the projects, the Commission needs to adopt implementing decisions amending the relevant award decision. 
Preden lahko države članice uvedejo spremembe sporazumov, ki so jih podpisale s projekti, mora Komisija sprejeti izvedbene sklepe o spremembi ustreznega sklepa o dodelitvi.
This is a heavy procedure involving the Commission, permanent representations of the Member States and project sponsors. 
To je zahteven postopek, ki vključuje Komisijo, stalna predstavništva držav članic in sponzorje projektov.
Innovative projects need quick responses and decision-making from managing authorities in view of rapidly evolving technologies and markets. 
Inovativni projekti zaradi hitro razvijajočih se tehnologij in trgov potrebujejo hitre odzive in hitro odločanje organov upravljanja.
The NER300 governance model insufficiently meets these needs and is overly complex. 
Model upravljanja programa NER300 teh potreb ne zadovoljuje dovolj in je preveč kompleksen.
The Commission also confirmed this in its impact assessment for the EU ETS phase IV review (2021-2030)53. Other NER300 design features slowed down the response to a changing environment Low carbon energy demonstration projects involve many risks. 
Komisija je to potrdila tudi v svoji oceni učinka za pregled faze IV sistema EU za trgovanje z emisijami (2021–2030).53 Drugi elementi zasnove programa NER300 so upočasnjevali odzivanje na spreminjajoče se okolje Demonstracijski projekti na področju nizkoogljične energije vključujejo številna tveganja.
Thus, there is an increased likelihood of changes or failure (i.e. to attract financing or achieve the expected energy outputs) as compared to projects of mature technologies. 
Zato obstaja večja verjetnost sprememb ali neuspeha (tj. pri privabljanju financiranja ali doseganju pričakovane proizvodnje energije) kot pri projektih na področju zrelih tehnologij.
The design of public funding programmes addressing this type of investments should therefore enable managing 52 Section 5 of Annex II to the first (C(2012) 9432 final of 18 December 2012) and second (C2014) 4493 final of 8 July 2014) Award Decision specifies that changes to projects need to be agreed by the Commission. 
52 V oddelku 5 Priloge II k prvemu (C(2012) 9432 final z dne 18. decembra 2012) in drugemu (C2014) 4493 final z dne 8. julija 2014) sklepu o dodelitvi sredstev je določeno, da mora spremembe projektov odobriti Komisija.
53 Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon investments, SWD(2015) 135 final of 15 July 2015. 41 
53 Ocena učinka, priložena predlogu direktive Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o spremembi Direktive 2003/87/ES za krepitev stroškovno učinkovitega zmanjšanja emisij in nizkoogljičnih naložb, SWD(2015) 135 final z dne 15. julija 2015.
authorities to find flexible and timely solutions for keeping the programmes on track to meeting their objectives. Pre-established technology criteria constrained flexibility at programme level The Commission awarded NER300 grants to projects based on a pre-established list of technology categories and thresholds. 
46 Predhodno določena merila za tehnologijo so omejevala fleksibilnost na ravni programa Komisija je projektom dodelila nepovratna sredstva v okviru programa NER300 na podlagi predhodno pripravljenega seznama kategorij tehnologij in pragov.
This 2009 list was the basis for both calls for proposals, to be organised within a two-year period. 
Ta seznam iz leta 2009 je bil podlaga za oba razpisa za zbiranje predlogov, ki ju je bilo treba organizirati v dveh letih.
The legal framework thus did not foresee any future reviews or adjustments of this list. 
Tako pravni okvir ni predvideval morebitnih prihodnjih pregledov ali prilagoditev tega seznama.
However, projects that were classified as first movers in their categories when approved in 2012 and 2014 have often been overtaken by developments in markets and technology sectors before they come on stream. 
Vendar je projekte, ki so bili ob odobritvi v letih 2012 in 2014 razvrščeni kot prvi na trgu v svoji kategoriji, prehitel razvoja na trgih in v sektorjih tehnologije, še preden so začeli delovati.
In some cases, this happens rapidly. 
V nekaterih primerih se to zgodi hitro.
Box 10 provides an example. 
Primer je naveden v okviru 10.
42 Box 10 – Example of offshore wind projects supported by NER300 Two large NER300 offshore wind projects in Germany were ready to become operational at the start of 2018. 
Okvir 10 – Primer projektov pridobivanja vetrne energije na morju, podprtih v okviru programa NER300 V Nemčiji sta bila dva velika projekta za pridobivanje vetrne energije na morju v začetku leta 2018 pripravljena na začetek delovanja.
Even if successful and carrying innovative features, these do not represent a first demonstration of a new technology (i.e. 6 MW turbine) not yet commercially available. 
Čeprav sta uspešna in imata inovativne elemente, ne predstavljata prve demonstracije nove tehnologije (tj. turbina z močjo 6 MW), ki komercialno še ni na voljo.
The offshore wind sector has developed rapidly in the past decade and 6 MW turbines were first installed in Europe in 201254. Had the projects been deployed to meet the initial NER300 deadlines (i.e. by 2016), they could have made a clearer contribution to the NER300 objective of ‘first commercial deployment’ of an innovative technology. 
Sektor pridobivanja vetrne energije na morju se je v zadnjem desetletju hitro razvijal in turbine z močjo 6 MW so bile v Evropi prvič nameščene leta 2012.54 Če bi bila projekta izvedena tako, da bi dosegla prvotne roke programa NER300 (tj. do leta 2016), bi lahko jasneje prispevala k cilju programa NER300, tj. prvi komercialni uporabi inovativne tehnologije.
Fixing very specific technology criteria of a support programme in advance thus has limitations. 
Zato ima predhodno določanje zelo specifičnih meril za tehnologijo v okviru programa podpore omejitve.
Rapid changes in markets and technologies may render projects selected under those criteria less disruptive than intended, in particular when delays occur. 
Zaradi hitrega razvoja na trgih in razvoja tehnologij so lahko projekti, izbrani v skladu s takimi merili, manj inovativni, kot je bilo predvideno, zlasti če prihaja do zamud.
54 Chapter 3.2 of JRC Wind Energy Status Report 2016 Edition, Joint Research Centre 2017. 
54 Poglavje 3.2 poročila Skupnega raziskovalnega središča o stanju na področju vetrne energije za leto 2016, Skupno raziskovalno središče 2017.
Solutions were needed to ensure that unspent funds from withdrawing projects would be spent well on urgent EU priorities The NER300 rules stipulated that after 31 December 2015, any remaining funds would accrue to the Member States. 
Potrebne so bile rešitve za zagotovitev, da bodo neporabljena sredstva iz umaknjenih projektov koristno porabljena za nujne prioritete EU Pravila programa NER300 so določala, da morebitna preostala sredstva po 31. decembru 2015 pripadejo državam članicam.
Despite the earlier amendment of the NER300 Decision to put back deadlines by two years, projects continued to withdraw from NER300 in 2016 due to their inability to meet the deadline for reaching final investment decision. 
Kljub predhodni spremembi sklepa o programu NER300, s katero so bili roki podaljšani za dve leti, so se tudi v letu 2016 projekti iz programa NER300 umikali, ker niso uspeli doseči roka za sprejem končne naložbene odločitve.
The absence of an adequate reserve list of relevant projects after the second call for proposals made it impossible for the Commission to replace them by projects already scrutinised by the EIB. 
Ker po drugem razpisu za zbiranje predlogov ni bilo ustreznega rezervnega seznama relevantnih projektov, jih Komisija ni mogla nadomestiti s projekti, ki jih je EIB že pregledala.
The NER300 legal framework also did not include any option for launching an extra call for proposals. 
Poleg tega pravni okvir programa NER300 ni vključeval možnosti objave dodatnega razpisa za zbiranje predlogov.
Project withdrawals are likely to result in at least €840 million of unspent funds by mid-2018 (40 % of the awarded €2.1 billion)55. In this context, the Commission, in accordance with the opinion of the Climate Change Committee, decided56 to make unspent funds from the first call for proposals (at least €436 million) available to top up EIB-managed financial instruments57. 
Zaradi umikov projektov bo do sredine leta 2018 verjetno ostalo neporabljenih najmanj 840 milijonov EUR sredstev (40 % od dodeljenih 2,1 milijarde EUR).55 V zvezi s tem se je Komisija v skladu z mnenjem Odbora za podnebne spremembe odločila56, da bo dala neporabljena sredstva iz prvega razpisa za zbiranje predlogov (vsaj 436 milijonov EUR) na voljo za dopolnitev finančnih instrumentov, ki jih upravlja EIB.57 Tako se bodo lahko neporabljena sredstva programa NER300 do vzpostavitve sklada za inovacije uporabljala za povezane dejavnosti.
56 Commission Decision (EU) 2017/2172 of 20 November 2017 amending Decision 2010/670/EU as regards the deployment of non-disbursed revenues from the first round of calls for proposals (OJ L 306, 22.11.2017, p. 
56 Sklep Komisije (EU) 2017/2172 z dne 20. novembra 2017 o spremembi Sklepa 2010/670/EU v zvezi z razporeditvijo neizplačanih prihodkov iz prvega kroga razpisov za oddajo predlogov (UL L 306, 22.11.2017, str.
57 With priority for InnovFin EDP and the Connecting Europe Facility for transport (i.e. CEF debt instrument). 
57 Pri čemer imata prednost instrument InnovFin za demonstracijske projekte na področju energije in instrument za povezovanje Evrope za promet (tj. dolžniški instrument IPE).
58 E.g. financial instruments cannot achieve a geographical spread of the funds as was the objective of NER300; NER300 should address EU ETS sectors (i.e. power generation and industries, not transport); and, according to the Commission’s interpretation of EU ETS and NER300 rules, NER300 funds should be allocated based on verified avoided CO2 while financial instruments generally finance earlier stages of projects (i.e. before they effectively emit/avoid CO2). 43 
58 Npr. finančni instrumenti ne morejo doseči geografske širitve sredstev, kot je bil cilj programa NER300; program NER300 bi moral obravnavati sektorje iz sistema EU za trgovanje z emisijami (tj. proizvodnjo električne energije, ne pa prometa); v skladu z razlago sistema EU za trgovanje z emisijami in pravil programa NER300, ki jo je navedla Komisija, bi se morala sredstva programa NER300 dodeljevati na podlagi preverjenih preprečenih emisij CO2, medtem ko finančni instrumenti običajno financirajo zgodnejše faze projektov (tj. preden dejansko začnejo povzročati/preprečevati emisije CO2). 47
and the Member States made progress on aligning European public and private action for low-carbon energy innovation. 
Glede na to kompleksno okolje je Sodišče preučilo, ali so Komisija in države članice dosegle napredek pri usklajevanju evropskih javnih in zasebnih ukrepov za inovacije na področju nizkoogljične energije.
We also examined whether Commission services responsible for programmes in relation to accelerating clean energy innovation work together effectively to coordinate their management of on-going programmes such as NER300, H2020 and InnovFin EDP, and exploit their combined expertise to develop coherent funding packages and solutions. 
Preučilo je tudi, ali službe Komisije, odgovorne za programe v zvezi s pospeševanjem inovacij na področju čiste energije, uspešno sodelujejo pri usklajevanju upravljanja tekočih programov, kot so NER300, H2020 in InnovFin za demonstracijske projekte na področju energije, in izkoriščajo svoje skupno strokovno znanje za oblikovanje skladnih paketov in rešitev financiranja.
We further assessed how Member States and the Commission are accountable for the management and results of the NER300 programme. 
Poleg tega je Sodišče ocenilo, kako države članice in Komisija odgovarjajo za upravljanje in rezultate programa NER300.