natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
To this end, we examined whether: (a) the EU legal requirements on national budgetary frameworks were effective; (b) the national budgetary frameworks were strengthened through appropriate and clear interaction between the Commission, the independent fiscal institutions and the European Fiscal Board; (c) the Commission assessed appropriately how the EU legal requirements have been implemented and applied in the Member States. 
Sodišče je preučilo, ali: (a) so bile pravne zahteve EU glede nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov uspešne; (b) so se nacionalni proračunski okviri okrepili z ustrezno in jasno interakcijo med Komisijo, neodvisnimi fiskalnimi institucijami in Evropskim fiskalnim odborom; (c) je Komisija ustrezno ocenila, kako se pravne zahteve EU izvajajo in uporabljajo v državah članicah.
IV The EU’s legislative action provided impetus to strengthen national budgetary frameworks. However, the legal framework leaves room for improvement. 
IV Zakonodajni ukrepi EU so spodbudili okrepitev nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov, vendar je pravni okvir mogoče izboljšati.
When compared to international standards and best practices, the requirements are softer in several respects, particularly those regarding medium-term budgetary frameworks and independent fiscal institutions. 
V primerjavi z mednarodnimi standardi in najboljšimi praksami so zahteve v več pogledih manj stroge, zlasti kar zadeva srednjeročne proračunske okvire in neodvisne fiskalne institucije.
The Directive proposed by the Commission in 2017 addresses some – but not all – of the weaknesses we observed. 
V direktivi, ki jo je Komisija predlagala leta 2017, so obravnavane nekatere od ugotovljenih slabosti, ne pa vse.
V Independent fiscal institutions assess compliance with national fiscal rules. 
V Neodvisne fiskalne institucije ocenjujejo skladnost z nacionalnimi fiskalnimi pravili.
Moreover, as well as the Commission, some independent national fiscal institutions also assess the Member Sates’ compliance with EU fiscal rules, either because they are obliged to do so by their own legal basis or because they chose to do so on a voluntary basis. 
Skladnost držav članic s fiskalnimi pravili EU poleg Komisije ocenjujejo tudi nekatere 4 neodvisne fiskalne institucije, ker jih k temu zavezuje njihova pravna podlaga ali ker se tako odločijo prostovoljno.
The Commission’s use of its discretionary powers as well as other factors imply a risk of inconsistency between Commission’s and independent fiscal institutions’ assessment of compliance with EU fiscal rules. 
Zaradi tega, ker Komisija uporablja diskrecijsko pravico, in drugih dejavnikov obstaja tveganje nekonsistentnosti med njeno oceno in oceno neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij glede skladnosti s fiskalnimi pravili EU.
Should the risk materialise, the effectiveness of the EU fiscal framework would be reduced. 
Če bi se tveganje uresničilo, bi se uspešnost fiskalnega okvira EU zmanjšala.
VI The ‘Five Presidents’ report’ published in 2015 proposed setting up a European Fiscal Board, which would provide a public and independent performance assessment, at European level, of national budgets and their execution against EU fiscal objectives. 
VI V poročilu petih predsednikov iz leta 2015 je bila predlagana vzpostavitev Evropskega fiskalnega odbora, ki bi na evropski ravni zagotovil javno in neodvisno oceno smotrnosti nacionalnih proračunov in njihovega izvrševanja glede na fiskalne cilje EU.
The Commission established it by means of a Decision in the same year. 
Komisija ga je s sklepom ustanovila isto leto.
The set-up and mandate of the European Fiscal Board fell short of the tasks envisaged in this report. 
Z ustanovitvijo in mandatom Evropskega fiskalnega odbora niso bile izpolnjene naloge, predvidene v poročilu petih predsednikov.
Moreover, the current institutional set-up leaves room for improvement regarding its independence. 
Poleg tega bi bilo mogoče sedanjo institucionalno ureditev izboljšati, in sicer v zvezi z njegovo neodvisnostjo.
Finally, the Commission can ignore the proposals and recommendations issued by the European Fiscal Board without providing appropriate explanation. 
Komisiji predlogov in priporočil Evropskega fiskalnega odbora ni treba upoštevati, in to brez pojasnila.
VII The Commission has so far only limited assurance that the EU requirements for national budgetary frameworks are properly implemented and applied. Indeed, the assessment of the compliance of national laws with the requirements of Directive 2011/85 has not yet been completed. 
VII Komisija je doslej dobila le omejena zagotovila, da se zahteve EU za nacionalne proračunske okvire ustrezno izvajajo in uporabljajo, ocena skladnosti nacionalnih zakonov z zahtevami Direktive 2011/85 pa še ni dokončana.
The assessments of the application of the EU legal framework have either not yet been carried out or came at too early a stage of implementation to be meaningful. 
Ocene uporabe pravnega okvira EU še niso bile opravljene ali so bile opravljene v prezgodnji fazi izvajanja, zato niso smiselne.
VIII We recommend that the Commission: (a) strengthen cooperation with the independent fiscal institutions in order to minimise divergences between the Commission's and the independent fiscal institutions' assessments of compliance with EU fiscal rules; (b) review requirements for national budgetary frameworks also taking into account international standards and best practices; (c) strengthen the European Fiscal Board; (d) address pending compliance issues and enhance assurance on the functioning of national budgetary frameworks. 5 
VIII Sodišče priporoča Komisiji, naj: (a) okrepi sodelovanje z neodvisnimi fiskalnimi institucijami, da bi kar najbolj zmanjšala razlike med svojimi in njihovimi ocenami glede skladnosti s fiskalnimi pravili EU; (b) pregleda zahteve v zvezi z nacionalnimi proračunskimi okviri in pri tem upošteva tudi mednarodne standarde in najboljše prakse; (c) okrepi Evropski fiskalni odbor; (d) obravnava nerešena vprašanja skladnosti in okrepi zagotovila glede delovanja nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov. 5
Introduction Background 01 As the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in 2009 threatened the stability of the euro area, the EU legislators adopted several legislative acts to improve the EU’s fiscal governance. 
Uvod Ozadje 01 Ko je izbruh krize državnega dolga leta 2009 ogrozil stabilnost euroobmočja, sta zakonodajalca EU sprejela več zakonodajnih aktov za izboljšanje fiskalnega upravljanja v EU.
The aim was to enhance the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and to strengthen the national budgetary frameworks (NBFs)1 (see Box 1 for the components of NBFs). 
Njihov cilj je bil izboljšati izvajanje Pakta za stabilnost in rast ter okrepiti nacionalne proračunske okvire1 (za elemente nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov glej okvir 1).
6 Box 1 - National budgetary frameworks NBFs are the arrangements, procedures, rules and institutions underlying budgetary policies. 
6 Okvir 1 – Nacionalni proračunski okviri Nacionalni proračunski okviri so ureditve, postopki, pravila in institucije, ki so osnova za proračunske politike.
Components of the NBFs Statistics and accounting Independent fiscal i ns ti tuti ons Fiscal rules and correction mechanism National budgetary frameworks Medium-term budgetary framework Forecas ts Annual budgeting Source: ECA. 
Elementi nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov Statistika in ra č unovods tvo Neodvis ne fiskalne institucije Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče Fiskalna pravila in popravljalni mehanizem Nacionalni proračunski okviri Srednjeročni prora č uns ki okvir Zajeto v obseg revizije Napovedi Letni proračuni 1 Evropski svet (2010), Report by the Task Force to the European Council on strengthening economic governance in the EU.
02 There is broad consensus in the economic literature that multi-annual, rule-based budgetary frameworks are associated with stronger fiscal performance2, as they show how current policy decisions and future programmes fit within sustainable medium-term budget allocations. 
02 V ekonomski literaturi obstaja široko soglasje, da so večletni proračunski okviri, ki temeljijo na pravilih, povezani z večjo fiskalno uspešnostjo2, saj kažejo, kako trenutne odločitve o politiki in prihodnji programi ustrezajo vzdržnim srednjeročnim proračunskim dodelitvam.
Credible medium-term budgetary frameworks (MTBFs) can also help governments in reconciling requirements for fiscal sustainability with the possible use of fiscal policies to cushion the effects of economic and financial shocks3. 
Verodostojni srednjeročni proračunski okviri lahko vladam tudi pomagajo pri usklajevanju zahtev za fiskalno vzdržnost z možno uporabo fiskalnih politik za blaženje učinkov gospodarskih in finančnih šokov3.
03 Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Member States keep their sovereignty with regard to budgetary policies. Nevertheless, coordination of the policies is needed to avoid negative spill-overs and threats to monetary stability in the euro area. 
03 V skladu s Pogodbo o delovanju Evropske unije (PDEU) države članice obdržijo suverenost na področju proračunskih politik, vendar je treba te politike usklajevati, da bi preprečili negativno prelivanje in nevarnosti za monetarno stabilnost v euroobmočju.
The Commission considered that for this coordination to be successful, EU budgetary goals must be embedded within national budgetary policies4. 
Komisija je menila, da je treba proračunske cilje EU vključiti v nacionalne proračunske politike, da bi bilo to usklajevanje uspešno4.
In 2005, “the Council considered that domestic governance arrangements should complement the EU framework”5. However, at that time, no all-encompassing analysis was provided of (i) weaknesses in the then-existing EU framework or (ii) the future coordination of the two governance arrangements. 
Leta 2005 je Svet menil, da bi morale nacionalne ureditve upravljanja dopolnjevati okvir EU5, vendar takrat ni bila izvedena nobena izčrpna analiza (i) slabosti takratnega okvira EU ali (ii) prihodnjega usklajevanja obeh ureditev upravljanja.
In October 2009, the Council of the EU (the “Council”) again concluded that NBFs should be strengthened to support long-term fiscal sustainability6. 
Svet EU (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Svet) je oktobra 2009 ponovno sklenil, da bi bilo treba nacionalne proračunske okvire okrepiti, da bi podpirali dolgoročno fiskalno vzdržnost6.
04 Since 2006, the Commission has been collecting, through surveys of relevant national authorities, qualitative information and data on the main elements of NBFs (i.e. numerical fiscal rules, independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) and MTBFs). 
04 Komisija od leta 2006 z anketami med ustreznimi nacionalnimi organi, zbira kvalitativne informacije in podatke o glavnih elementih nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov (tj. numeričnih fiskalnih pravilih, neodvisnih fiskalnih institucijah in srednjeročnih proračunskih okvirih).
This information feeds into the Commission’s Fiscal Governance Database and is used to calculate indices on the strength and quality of these elements. 
Pridobljene informacije se shranjujejo v zbirki podatkov Komisije o fiskalnem upravljanju ter se uporabljajo za izračun indeksov moči in kakovosti teh elementov.
For example: Debrun, X. and al. 
Na primer: Debrun, X., et al.
National fiscal rules in the European Union’, economic policy 23/54, pp. 299-362. 
National fiscal rules in the European Union, ekonomska politika 23/54, str. 299–362.
IMF (2013), ‘Reassessing the role and modalities of fiscal policy in advanced economies’, policy paper. 
MDS (2013), Reassessing the role and modalities of fiscal policy in advanced economies, dokument o politiki.
See for example European Commission (2004), ‘Report on public finances in EMU 2004’. 
Glej na primer poročilo Evropske Komisije (2004), Report on Public Finances in EMU 2004.
Council of the EU (2005), ‘Ecofin Council report to the European Council of 22-23 March 2005 on improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact’. 
Svet EU (2005), Ecofin Council report to the European Council of 22-23 March 2005 on improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact.
Council of the EU (2009), ‘2967th Economic and Financial Affairs Council conclusions on fiscal exit strategy’. 
Svet EU (2009), 2967th Economic and Financial Affairs Council conclusions on fiscal exit strategy.
Legal framework 05 The first step, as a result of political discussions, in developing a common legal framework was the adoption of Directive 2011/857, one of six legislative measures known as the ‘Six-Pack’. 
Pravni okvir 05 Po političnih razpravah je bila kot prvi korak v oblikovanju skupnega pravnega okvira sprejeta Direktiva 2011/857, ki je ena od šestih zakonodajnih ukrepov, znanih kot zakonodajni šestorček.
Directive 2011/85 lays down minimum requirements for the NBFs (for an overview of relevant legal acts and the history of their approval, see Annex I): (i) Member States’ fiscal planning should be based on realistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts provided by a designated institution; (ii) Member States should have specific fiscal rules, compliance with which is to be monitored by independent bodies; (iii) Member States should have a credible and effective MTBF that includes a minimum three-year fiscal planning horizon and (iv) Member States should have comprehensive, consistent and transparent systems for budgetary accounting and statistical reporting. 
V njej so določene minimalne zahteve za nacionalne proračunske okvire (za pregled ustreznih pravnih aktov in zgodovino njihovih odobritev glej Prilogo I): (i) fiskalno načrtovanje držav članic bi moralo temeljiti na realističnih makroekonomskih in proračunskih napovedih, ki jih zagotovi pooblaščena institucija; (ii) države članice bi morale imeti posebna fiskalna pravila, njihovo upoštevanje pa naj nadzirajo neodvisni organi; (iii) države članice bi morale imeti verodostojen in uspešen srednjeročni proračunski okvir, ki vključuje fiskalno načrtovanje za najmanj prihodnja tri leta; (iv) države članice bi morale imeti celovite, dosledne in transparentne sisteme proračunskega računovodstva in statističnega poročanja.
06 The second step was the inter-governmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), signed in March 2012, and in particular, the Fiscal Compact (Title III), complemented by a Commission Communication setting out seven common principles8 in June 2012 (the “Commission’s common principles”). 
06 Drugi korak je bila medvladna Pogodba o stabilnosti, usklajevanju in upravljanju v ekonomski in monetarni uniji (PSUU), podpisana marca 2012, zlasti fiskalni dogovor (naslov III), junija 2012 pa jo je dopolnilo sporočilo Komisije s sedmimi skupnimi načeli8 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: skupna načela Komisije).
The contracting parties bound by the Fiscal Compact (all 19 euro-area Member States, Bulgaria, Denmark and Romania) are required to enshrine in national legislation a structural balanced-budget rule and to set up an automatic correction mechanism, as well as an IFI (see Box 2). 
Pogodbene stranke, ki jih zavezuje fiskalni dogovor (vseh 19 držav članic euroobmočja ter Bolgarija, Danska in Romunija), morajo v nacionalno zakonodajo vključiti pravilo o strukturno uravnoteženem proračunu ter vzpostaviti samodejni popravljalni mehanizem in neodvisno fiskalno institucijo (glej okvir 2).
8 7 8 Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, OJ L 306, 23 November 2011 (referred to in this document as Directive 2011/85). 
8 7 8 Direktiva Sveta 2011/85/EU z dne 8. novembra 2011 o zahtevah v zvezi s proračunskimi okviri držav članic, UL L 306, 23.11.2011 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Direktiva 2011/85).
European Commission (2012), COM(2012) 342 final, ‘Communication from the Commission, Common principles on national fiscal correction mechanisms’. 
Evropska komisija (2012), COM(2012) 342 final, sporočilo Komisije z naslovom Skupna načela za nacionalne fiskalne popravljalne mehanizme.
07 Well-designed IFIs are generally seen as being associated with better fiscal performance9, better compliance with fiscal rules10 and more accurate and less biased macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts11. 
07 Za dobro zasnovane neodvisne fiskalne institucije običajno velja, da so povezane z večjo fiskalno uspešnostjo9. večjo skladnostjo s fiskalnimi pravili10 ter točnejšimi in manj pristranskimi makroekonomskimi in proračunskimi napovedmi11.
08 The third step was the adoption of Regulation 473/201312, which forms part of the Two-Pack and was meant, among other things, to incorporate into EU law the provisions of the TSCG for the euro-area Member States. 
08 Tretji korak je bilo sprejetje Uredbe št. 473/201312 v okviru zakonodajnega dvojčka, katere cilj je bil med drugim vključiti določbe PSUU za države članice euroobmočja v pravo EU.
Debrun, X. and Kinda, T. 
Debrun, X., in Kinda, T.
(2014), ‘Strengthening post-crisis fiscal credibility: Fiscal Councils on the rise — A new dataset’, IMF working paper 14/58. 
(2014), Strengthening post-crisis fiscal credibility: Fiscal Councils on the rise — A new dataset, delovni dokument MDS 14/58.
10 Beetsma, R. and al. 
10 Beetsma, R., et al.
(2018), ‘The rise of independent fiscal institutions: recent trends and performance’, IMF working paper 18/68. 
(2018), The rise of independent fiscal institutions: recent trends and performance, delovni dokument MDS 18/68.
11 Jonung, L. and Larch, M. 
11 Jonung, L., in Larch, M.
(2006), ‘Improving fiscal policy in the EU: the case for independent forecasts’, economic policy 21/47, pp. 492-534. 
(2006), Improving fiscal policy in the EU: the case for independent forecasts, ekonomska politika 21/47, str. 492–534.
IMF (2013), ‘Case studies of fiscal councils — functions and impact’. 
MDS (2013), Case studies of fiscal councils — functions and impact.
12 Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area, OJ L 140, 17 May 2013 (referred to in this document as Regulation 473/2013). 
473/2013 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 21. maja 2013 o skupnih določbah za spremljanje in ocenjevanje osnutkov proračunskih načrtov ter zagotavljanje zmanjšanja čezmernega primanjkljaja držav članic v euroobmočju, UL L 140, 17.5.2013 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Uredba št.
9 Box 2 - Concepts explained Structural balance: The actual budget balance net of the cyclical component and one-off and other temporary measures. 
9 Okvir 2 – Pojasnilo konceptov Strukturni saldo: dejanski proračunski saldo brez cikličnega elementa ter enkratnih in drugih začasnih ukrepov.
Balanced budget rule: The budgetary position of the general government must be balanced or in surplus. 
Pravilo o uravnoteženem proračunu: proračunsko stanje sektorja države je uravnoteženo ali v presežku.
In both the SGP and the TSCG, this rule is deemed to be complied with if the annual structural balance of the general government is at its medium-term budgetary objective (MTO). 
Tako v Paktu za stabilnost in rast kot tudi v PSUU šteje, da je to pravilo izpolnjeno, če je letni strukturni saldo sektorja države na ravni srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja.
The SGP specifies -1 % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the lower limit of the structural balance for the euro area Member States, which the Fiscal Compact tightens further to -0.5 % (except for Member States with low debt and low sustainability risk). 
V Paktu za stabilnost in rast je spodnja meja strukturnega salda za države članice euroobmočja določena v višini –1 % bruto domačega proizvoda (BDP), v fiskalnem dogovoru pa je ta meja še nižja, in sicer –0,5 % (razen za države članice z nizkim dolgom in nizkim tveganjem glede vzdržnosti).
Automatic correction mechanism: An obligation to implement corrective measures that is automatically triggered in the event of significant observed deviations from the medium-term budgetary objective or the adjustment path towards it. 9 
Samodejni popravljalni mehanizem: obveznost izvajanja popravljalnih ukrepov, ki se samodejno sproži v primeru ugotovljenih znatnih odklonov od srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja ali prilagoditvene poti za njegovo dosego. 9
09 Finally, the Commission submitted a proposal for a Directive to the Council in December 2017 with the aim of incorporating the substance of the TSCG into EU law13 (the “2017 draft Directive”). 
09 Komisija je decembra 2017 Svetu predložila še predlog direktive, s katero naj bi vsebino PSUU vključila v pravo EU13 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: osnutek direktive iz leta 2017).
At the time of writing this report, the adoption process at the Council was on hold pending the Commission’s assessment of the Six-and Two-Packs, which is due by the end of 201914. 
V času priprave tega poročila je bil postopek sprejetja v Svetu začasno ustavljen, in sicer do prejetja ocene zakonodajnega šestorčka in dvojčka, ki naj bi jo Komisija pripravila do konca leta 201914.
The European Parliament has not yet issued its opinion on the proposal either. 
Tudi Evropski parlament svojega mnenja o predlogu še ni predložil.
10 In 2015, the Commission established the European Fiscal Board (EFB) by means of a Decision (the “EFB Decision”)15. 
10 Komisija je leta 2015 s sklepom ustanovila Evropski fiskalni odbor (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sklep o Evropskem fiskalnem odboru)15.
This was based on a recommendation made in the ‘Five Presidents’ report’16 to create an advisory EFB to strengthen the EU governance framework, among other things by coordinating and complementing the national IFIs and by providing public and independent performance assessment of budgets and their execution against EU fiscal objectives. 
Odbor je bil ustanovljen na podlagi priporočila v poročilu petih predsednikov16, naj se vzpostavi svetovalni Evropski fiskalni odbor za okrepitev okvira upravljanja EU, med drugim z usklajevanjem in dopolnjevanjem nacionalnih neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij ter zagotavljanjem javne in neodvisne ocene smotrnosti proračunov in njihovega izvrševanja glede na fiskalne cilje EU.
10 13 European Commission (2017), COM(2017) 824 final, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive laying down provisions for strengthening fiscal responsibility and the medium-term budgetary orientation in the Member States’, p. 
10 13 Evropska komisija (2017), COM(2017) 824 final, predlog direktive Sveta o določbah za krepitev fiskalne odgovornosti in srednjeročne proračunske usmerjenosti v državah članicah, str.
14 Economic and Financial Committee (2019), ‘Draft supplementary EFC findings on the transposition of the Fiscal Compact’, ecfin.cef.cpe(2019)1812588. 
14 Ekonomsko-finančni odbor (2019), Draft supplementary EFC findings on the transposition of the Fiscal Compact, ecfin.cef.cpe(2019)1812588.
15 Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1937 of 21 October 2015 establishing an independent advisory European Fiscal Board; and Commission Decision (EU) 2016/221 of 12 February 2016 amending Decision (EU) 2015/1937 establishing an independent advisory European Fiscal Board. 
15 Sklep Komisije (EU) 2015/1937 z dne 21. oktobra 2015 o vzpostavitvi neodvisnega svetovalnega Evropskega fiskalnega odbora in Sklep Komisije (EU) 2016/221 z dne 12. februarja 2016 o spremembi Sklepa (EU) 2015/1937 o vzpostavitvi neodvisnega svetovalnega Evropskega fiskalnega odbora.
16 Juncker, J.-C., Tusk, D., Dijsselbloem, J., Draghi, M. and Schulz, M. 
16 Juncker, J.-C., Tusk, D., Dijsselbloem, J., Draghi, M., in Schulz, M.
(2015), ‘The Five Presidents’ report: Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union’. 
(2015), Poročilo petih predsednikov: Dokončanje evropske ekonomske in monetarne unije.
Audit scope and approach 11 Between 2016 and 2018, we examined both the corrective17 and the preventive arm18 of the SGP, as well as the macroeconomic imbalance procedure19. 
Obseg revizije in revizijski pristop 11 Sodišče je med letoma 2016 in 2018 preučilo popravljalni17 in preventivni del18 Pakta za stabilnost in rast, pa tudi postopek v zvezi z makroekonomskimi neravnotežji19.