natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As the countries of western Balkans recovered from the war, the draft programmes and the related Project Fiches (5) as well as the projects under implementation took into account the ParliamentŐs request to increase the EU assistance from investment support to institution building. 
26. se je pri pripravi osnutkov programov in z njimi povezanih projektnih predlogov (5) ter pri projektih v izvajanju upoštevala zahteva Parlamenta, da se več pomoči EU nameni vzpostavljanju institucij, če je potrebno, s preusmeritvijo od naložbene podpore.
However, in some cases the changes to the planned projects led to decreased emphasis on institution building (see Box 2). 
Vendar so v nekaterih primerih spremembe predvidenih projektov zmanjšale poudarek na vzpostavljanju institucij (glej okvir 2).
Box 2 Redirecting an institution building project Ń Integrated Border Management in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia The Annual Programme for CARDS 2003 in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia envisaged, among other things, to strengthen control of the green border and allocated 2,8 million euro for this purpose. 
Okvir 2 Preusmeritev projekta za vzpostavljanje institucij – Integrirano upravljanje meja v Nekdanji jugoslovanski republiki Makedoniji Letni program za CARDS 2003 v Nekdanji jugoslovanski republiki Makedoniji je med drugim predvideval krepitev kontrole na zeleni meji in za to namenil 2,8 milijona EUR.
According to the Annual Programme, there were a number of short-term actions needed in this area: (1) set-up a dedicated border guard service, (2) improve recruitment procedures, (3) provide basic training and in-depth course on border control and (4) supply equipment for detection of forged or falsified documents and for high-tech vehicle searches, together with corresponding training tools. 
V skladu z letnim programom bi bilo treba na tem področju izvesti več kratkoročnih ukrepov: (1) vzpostaviti namensko mejno stražo, (2) izboljšati postopke zaposlovanja, (3) zagotoviti osnovno usposabljanje in poglobljen tečaj o kontroli meje in (4) dobaviti opremo za odkrivanje ponarejenih ali prenarejenih dokumentov in tehnološko visoko razvito opremo za preiskave vozil, skupaj z ustreznimi orodji usposabljanja.
(5) A project fiche is a short description (4 to 5 pages in average) without specific terms of reference. 
(5) Projektni predlog je kratek opis (povprečno 4–5 strani), brez posebne določitve pooblastil.
The initial description includes the foreseen project intervention logic, project objectives, results and activities. 
Uvodni opis vključuje logiko ukrepa, predvidenega v okviru projekta, ter projektne cilje, rezultate in dejavnosti.
It assesses the project risks and defines objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs) and means to verify these indicators. 
V njem se ocenijo projektna tveganja in opredelijo objektivno preverljivi kazalniki ter načini za preverjanje teh kazalnikov.
27.11.2007 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 285/9 Objectives for this initiative were twofold: (1) To enhance the co-operational capacity of government border services within the existing organisational framework, to fulfil immediate requirements, and (2) to develop a new organisational structure for the border police and operational capacities in compliance with European Union standards. 
27.11.2007 SL Uradni list Evropske unije C 285/9 Cilji te pobude so bili dvojni: (1) okrepiti zmogljivosti vladnih mejnih služb za sodelovanje v obstoječem organizacijskem okviru, da se izpolnijo takojšnje zahteve, in (2) razviti novo organizacijsko strukturo za mejno policijo in operativne zmogljivosti v skladu s standardi Evropske unije.
Instead of consistently addressing the above needs, objectives and priorities, the EAR used the whole amount to purchase vehicles. 
Namesto da bi Evropska agencija za obnovo dosledno obravnavala navedene potrebe, cilje in prednostne naloge, je celoten znesek porabila na nakup vozil.
The Court found no evidence of on-going monitoring of projects by the Management Committee after the approval stage. 
Sodišče ni našlo dokazov, da upravni odbor po odobritvi projektov redno spremlja njihov potek.
In other words the Management Committee did not concern itself with changes to projects once implementation had started. 
Z drugimi besedami, upravni odbor se po začetku izvajanja projektov ni več zanimal za spremembe pri njih.
Efficient management structures ensured speedy delivery of aid but national administrative capacity challenged Management structures not always appropriate 28. 
Učinkovite upravljavske strukture so zagotovile hitro dostavo pomoči, pojavljale pa so se težave z nacionalnimi upravnimi zmogljivostmi Upravljavske strukture niso vedno primerne 28.
In July 1998 the Court published Special Report No 5/98 on reconstruction in former Yugoslavia (period 1996 to 1997). 
Sodišče je julija 1998 objavilo Posebno poročilo št. 5/98 o obnovi v nekdanji Jugoslaviji (obdobje 1996–1997).
The audit covered two countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina and to a lesser extent Croatia. 
Revizija je zajela dve državi: Bosno in Hercegovino ter v manjšem obsegu Hrvaško.
The report criticised that despite the EUŐs clear declarations of intent, the Commission was not successful in deploying sufficient human resources to the task of reconstruction in former Yugoslavia, neither at its headquarters nor in the areas under reconstruction. 
Poročilo je kritiziralo, da Komisija kljub jasnim izjavam EU o nameri za nalogo obnove v nekdanji Jugoslaviji ni uspešno dodelila zadostnih človeških virov, niti na svojem sedežu niti na območjih obnove.
The Court concluded the following: (a) Implementation of the appropriations allocated by the EU for reconstruction was slowed by the lack of an implementation programme, shortage of staff, excessive headquarter centralisation and the institutional weaknesses of the local authorities. (b) In 1997, the disbursement rate of the EUŐs reconstruction programme (29 %) was relatively low compared with the average of other donors (52 %). (c) The co-existence of three separate regulations governing the budget articles used to finance the reconstruction measures hampered the CommissionŐs management. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo naslednje: (a) izvrševanje proračunskih sredstev, ki jih je dodelila EU za obnovo, je potekalo počasi, ker ni bilo izvedbenega programa ter zaradi pomanjkanja osebja, pretirane centralizacije na sedežu in institucionalne šibkosti lokalnih organov; (b) leta 1997 je bila stopnja izplačil programa EU za obnovo (29 %) sorazmerno nizka v primerjavi s povprečjem drugih dajalcev (52 %); (c) soobstoj treh ločenih uredb, ki so urejale člene proračuna o financiranju ukrepov obnove, je oviral upravljanje, ki ga je izvajala Komisija.
To overcome the deficiencies in EU aid delivery, the Court recommended the Commission should devolve management for its aid effort to its Delegations and focus on a smaller number of sectors. 
Da bi se odpravile pomanjkljivosti pri dostavi pomoči EU, je Sodišče priporočilo, naj Komisija prenese upravljanje svojih prizadevanj pri pomoči na svoje delegacije in naj se usmeri v manj sektorjev.
While taking into account the above-mentioned weaknesses, the CourtŐs current audit assessed the extent to which the CARDS management structures were efficient and whether the aid was delivered with sufficient rapidity. 
Ob upoštevanju navedenih pomanjkljivosti je bilo pri sedanji reviziji Sodišča ocenjeno, v kolikšni meri so bile upravljavske strukture programa CARDS učinkovite in ali je bila pomoč dostavljena dovolj hitro.
The audit revealed significant improvement in the efficiency of EU operations in the western Balkans since 1998. 
Revizija je razkrila, da se je učinkovitost dejavnosti EU na zahodnem Balkanu po letu 1998 bistveno povečala.
Major changes took place. 
Zgodile so se velike spremembe.
Firstly, the CARDS regulation unified the legal basis for similar operations. 
Prvič, Uredba CARDS je poenotila pravno podlago za podobne dejavnosti.
Secondly the devolution process was introduced to improve the speed and quality of EC external aid(1). 
Drugič, uveden je bil postopek dekoncentracije, da bi se povečali hitrost in kakovost zunanje pomoči Evropske komisije (1).
Thirdly the Commission delegated part of the implementation of the assistance to a new organisation specially created for this purpose the European Agency for Reconstruction. 
Tretjič, Komisija je prenesla del izvajanja pomoči na novo organizacijo, ki je bila ustanovljena posebej v ta namen, na Evropsko agencijo za obnovo.
All these actions speeded up aid delivery and improved the efficiency of the assistance (see Box 3). 
Vsi ti ukrepi so pospešili dostavo pomoči in izboljšali njeno učinkovitost (glej okvir 3).
Box 3 Example of high contracting rates under CARDS EAR was created as a response to the need to act quickly and efficiently when addressing the urgent post-conflict needs of the population in Kosovo in the immediate aftermath of the 1999 crisis. 
Okvir 3 Primer visoke stopnje sklenjenih pogodb v okviru programa CARDS Evropska agencija za obnovo je bila ustanovljena kot odgovor na potrebo po hitrem in učinkovitem obravnavanju nujnih potreb prebivalstva na Kosovu po spopadih v obdobju neposredno po krizi 1999.
The Court has in its earlier audits concluded that EAR actions in Kosovo immediately after the crisis met the ambitious objectives in the fields of basic services. 
Sodišče je že v svojih predhodnih revizijah ugotovilo, da so ukrepi Evropske agencije za obnovo na Kosovu neposredno po krizi izpolnili ambiciozne cilje na področju osnovnih storitev.
The high contracting rates have been maintained in Kosovo throughout the CARDS programme. 
Visoke stopnje sklenjenih pogodb so se na Kosovu ohranile ves čas izvajanja programa CARDS.
As of November 2006, the EAR has in Kosovo managed over 1 100 million euro on behalf of the Commission, some 91 % of that money has been contracted and some 86 % disbursed. 
Novembra 2006 je Evropska agencija za obnovo na Kosovu v imenu Komisije upravljala več kot 1 100 milijonov EUR, pri čemer so bile za približno 91 % tega denarja sklenjene pogodbe, približno 86 % pa ga je bilo izplačanega.
Along with the KFOR troops, the EUŐs assistance helped normalise life in Kosovo. 
Pomoč EU je skupaj z enotami KFOR pomagala normalizirati življenje na Kosovu.
In total CARDS was implemented using four different methods and structures (see Graph 2), most of which left little room for involvement of the recipient states. 
Program CARDS se je izvajal s skupno štirimi različnimi metodami in strukturami (glej grafični prikaz 2), od katerih večina ni preveč vzpodbujala sodelovanja držav prejemnic.
This was done in order to ensure speedy delivery of aid and reflected the weaknesses of the national administrations. 
Namen takšnega pristopa je bil, da bi se zagotovila hitra dostava pomoči, odražal pa je pomanjkljivosti nacionalnih uprav.
(1) As a result of devolution EC Delegations are responsible for project preparation, contracting, and financial and technical implementation. 
(1) Zaradidekoncentracijesoprevzeleodgovornostzapripravoprojekta, sklenitev pogodb ter finančno in tehnično izvedbo delegacije Evropske komisije.
As a consequence the role of the central services in Brussels evolved away from direct management of projects towards monitoring and supporting Delegations. 
Zato se je vloga centralnih služb v Bruslju spremenila iz neposrednega upravljanja projektov v spremljanje in podporo delegacij.
Regional programmes focus on strengthening administrative capacity e.g. in customs, the fight against organised crime and supporting civil society. (b) Devolved management: The EC Delegations in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia were devolved (1). 
Regionalni programi so usmerjeni v krepitev upravnih zmogljivosti, npr. pri carini, boju proti organiziranemu kriminalu in podpori civilni družbi; dekoncentrirano upravljanje: Naloge so bile v Albaniji, Bosni in Hercegovini ter na Hrvaškem prenesene na delegacije Evropske komisije (1).
As a result of devolution, Delegations became responsible for project preparation, contracting, and financial and technical implementation. (c) Decentralised implementation: involves the Commission delegating implementation of some programmes to the recipient country Government in Albania and in Croatia. (d) Indirect centralised management: The European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) (2), an independent agency of the EU, manages the programme in Kosovo (3), Serbia, Montenegro and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
Zaradi dekoncentracije so delegacije postale odgovorne za pripravo projektov, sklenitev pogodb ter finančno in tehnično izvedbo; decentralizirano upravljanje: Komisija je pri tem v Albaniji in na Hrvaškem prenesla izvajanje nekaterih programov na vlado države prejemnice; posredno centralizirano upravljanje: Evropska agencija za obnovo (2), neodvisna agencija EU, upravlja program na Ko-sovu(3), v Srbiji, Črni gori in Nekdanji jugoslovanski republiki Makedoniji.
The EAR is administratively accountable to the European Council and to the European Parliament, but not to the European Commission. 
Evropska agencija za obnovo je upravno odgovorna Evropskemu svetu in Evropskemu parlamentu, ni pa odgovorna Evropski komisiji.
The Court found that devolved and indirect centralisation (EAR) ensured efficient delivery of aid, whereas weaknesses were noted with the other two structures (i.e. centralised and decentralised) (4). 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da sta dekoncentrirano in posredno centralizirano upravljanje (Evropska agencija za obnovo) zagotovila učinkovito dostavo pomoči, medtem ko so bile pri drugih dveh strukturah ugotovljene pomanjkljivosti (pri centraliziranem in decentraliziranem upravljanju) (4).
In both Delegations and the EAR, the speed of project management benefited from the increased capacity in the operational units and from having finance and contracts staff available on the ground. 
Tako v delegacijah kot v Evropski agenciji za obnovo je upravljanje projektov hitrejše, ker so zmogljivosti operativnih enot večje ter zato, ker je osebje, pristojno za finančna sredstva in sklepanje pogodb, na voljo na kraju samem.
The increased contacts with the beneficiary and other relevant parties and better understanding of local conditions, risks and opportunities improved performance while reducing the time needed to solve problems (5). 
Zaradi povečanja stikov s prejemniki in drugimi zadevnimi stranmi ter boljšega razumevanja lokalnih razmer, tveganj in priložnosti se je uspešnost izboljšala, hkrati pa se je skrajšal čas, potreben za rešitev težav (5).
The two other implementation structures Ń although less significant in monetary terms Ń were less effective. 
Drugi dve strukturi izvajanja, ki sta v denarnem smislu manj pomembni, sta bili manj uspešni.
For centralised management Ń centrally managed regional inter-state programme Ń there were several shortcomings: (a) funds allocated to regional cooperation comprised a very small proportion of total expenditure (around 5 %). 
Centralizirano upravljanje – centralno upravljani regionalni meddržavni program – je imelo več pomanjkljivosti: (a) sredstva, dodeljena za regionalno sodelovanje, so vključevala zelo majhen delež skupnih odhodkov (približno 5 %).
Some of this was managed at national rather than regional level, e.g. integrated border management; (b) similarly most of the refugee return programmes which, by definition, have cross-border characteristics were managed separately in each country; (4) The shortcomings are also confirmed by the mid-term CARDS evaluation. 
Nekatera od njih so se upravljala na nacionalni in ne na regionalni ravni, npr. integrirano upravljanje meja; (b) podobno se je večina programov za vrnitev beguncev, ki imajo že po definiciji čezmejne značilnosti, upravljala ločeno po posameznih državah; (4) Pomanjkljivosti je potrdila tudi vmesna ocena programa CARDS.
(5) Reference is made to Special Report No 10/2004 concerning the devolution of EC external aid to the Commission delegations (OJ C 72, 22.3.2005). 
(5) Sklicevanje na Posebno poročilo št.
27.11.2007 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 285/11 (c) while steps were taken in 2003 to involve beneficiary countries more in the programming of CARDS regional allocations, countries generally did not receive sufficient information of the regional projects. account practical operational realities in the Croatian Ministry of Finance. 
27.11.2007 SL Uradni list Evropske unije C 285/11 (c) medtem ko so bili leta 2003 sprejeti ukrepi za večjo vključevanje držav prejemnic v načrtovanje programov za regionalne dodelitve CARDS, države na splošno niso bile dovolj dobro obveščene o regionalnih projektih. ni upoštevala delovna stvarnost v hrvaškem ministrstvu za finance.
As a result the decentralisation process was halted between 2003 to 2005. 
Zato se je postopek decentralizacije med letoma 2003 in 2005 ustavil.
Once the CARDS programme moved from EuropeAid to DG ELARG in early 2005, the Commission re-evaluated the situation and decided in February 2006 to restart decentralisation in Croatia (1). 
Ko se je na začetku leta 2005 program CARDS prenesel z EuropeAid na Generalni direktorat za širitev, je Komisija ponovno ocenila razmere in se februarja 2006 odločila, da ponovno uvede postopek decentralizacije na Hrvaškem (1).
The European Court of Auditors has in its reports concerning external actions (for instance Special Report No 6/2006 on the environmental aspects of the CommissionŐs development cooperation (2)) repeatedly criticised the Commission of delays in contracting and implementation. 
Evropsko računsko sodišče je v svojih poročilih o zunanjih ukrepih (na primer v Posebnem poročilu št. 6/2006 o okoljskih vidikih razvojnega sodelovanja Komisije (2)) večkrat kritiziralo zamude Komisije pri sklepanju pogodb in izvajanju.
In contrast the CARDS programme had a very high contracting speed (see Graph 3) in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia but due to the backlog of earlier programmes a relatively slow start in Albania and Croatia. 
V nasprotju s tem so se pogodbe v okviru programa CARDS zelo hitro sklepale (glej grafični prikaz 3) na Kosovu, v Bosni in Hercegovini ter Srbiji, sorazmerno počasi pa v Albaniji in na Hrvaškem zaradi zaostankov predhodnih programov.
37. and in Croatia also had problems: The decentralised implementation structures in Albania (a) in Albania, programmes involving the Albanian Development Fund (ADF) continued without the Commission having assessed whether the ADF was capable of meeting its responsibilities, according to the provisions of the Financial Regulation applicable in 2003. 
37. izvajanje v Albaniji in na Hrvaškem: Težave so imele tudi strukture za decentralizirano (a) v Albaniji so se programi, pri katerih je sodeloval Albanski razvojni sklad (ARS), nadaljevali, ne da bi Komisija presodila, ali je ARS sposoben izvajati svoje odgovornosti v skladu z določbami Finančne uredbe, ki se uporablja od leta 2003.
Due to the problems encountered with the ADF, the Commission decided to strongly reduce the decentralised part of the Albanian CARDS programme and devolved it to the Delegation; (b) in 2002, in Croatia, specific steps were taken towards formal decentralisation. 
Zaradi težav z ARS se je Komisija odločila zelo zmanjšati decentralizirani del albanskega programa CARDS in je pooblastila prenesla na delegacijo; (b) leta 2002 so bili na Hrvaškem sprejeti posebni ukrepi za formalno decentralizacijo.
However, the speed at which EuropeAid considered it appropriate to decentralise did not take into 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% Graph 3 Contracting rates in CARDS countries Commitments 2002-2004 contracted within one year Albania Bosnia H. Croatia FYROM Kosovo Serbia (1) Reference made to Article 2 in Commission Decision C(2006) 264 (E/148/2006): ÔFor CARDS, this Decision shall apply to a number of projects agreed between the Commission and Croatia in the CARDS Financing Agreement 2003 (signed on 2 September 2003) and in the CARDS Financing Agreement 2004 (signed on 29 November 2004).Ő (2) OJ C 235, 29.9.2006. 
Vendar pa se pri določitvi hitrosti, za katero je EuropeAid menil, da je primerna za decentralizacijo, 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% Grafični prikaz 3 Stopnje sklenjenih pogodb v državah CARDS Obveznosti 2002–2004, za katere so bile pogodbe sklenjene v enem letu Albanija Bosna in Hercegovina Hrvaška NJRM Kosovo Srbija (1) Sklicevanje na člen 2 Odločbe Komisije C(2006) 264 (E/148/2006): Za program CARDS se ta odločba uporablja za več projektov, za katere sta se dogovorili Komisija in Hrvaška v Finančnem sporazumu CARDS iz leta 2003 (podpisan 2. septembra 2003) in v Finančnem sporazumu CARDS iz leta 2004 (podpisan 29. novembra 2004). (2) UL C 235, 29.9.2006.
C 285/12 EN Official Journal of the European Union 27.11.2007 39. 
C 285/12 SL Uradni list Evropske unije 27.11.2007 39.
In Albania the need to compensate this delay led, later on, to a very high concentration of contract signatures: 63 % of the CARDS contracts signed in the period from 2001 to 2005 were signed in 2004, thus leading to the simultaneous implementation of a high number of contracts and an increased challenge to the beneficiariesŐ absorption capacity (1) (see Box 4). 
Zamuda, ki jo je bilo treba nadoknaditi, je v Albaniji pozneje privedla do zelo visoke stopnje podpisovanja pogodb: kar 63 % pogodb CARDS, podpisanih v obdobju med letoma 2001 in 2005, je bilo podpisanih leta 2004, kar je povzročilo sočasno izvajanje velikega števila pogodb in postavilo sposobnost prejemnic za črpanje pomoči pred še večjo preizkušnjo (1) (glej okvir 4).
Delays in the 2001 annual programme meant that in Croatia two annual programmes were implemented at the same time. 
Zamude pri letnem programu za leto 2001 so pomenile, da sta se na Hrvaškem sočasno izvajala dva letna programa.
Box 4 Overstretched national administrative capacity in Albania In Albania in addition to high concentration of projects in a short period of time, most of the assistance was concentrated in the Justice and Home Affairs sector. 
Okvir 4 Preobremenjene nacionalne upravne zmogljivosti v Albaniji Za Albanijo je bilo poleg visoke zgoščenosti projektov v kratkem časovnem obdobju značilno tudi, da je bila večina pomoči usmerjena v sektor za pravosodje in notranje zadeve.
At the time of the audit, there were at least 48 different, simultaneously on-going projects in the Justice and Home AffairsŐ area. 
Med revizijo je na področju pravosodja in notranjih zadev sočasno potekalo najmanj 48 različnih projektov.
13 of them were financed by the EU and 35 by other donors. 
Od tega jih je 13 financirala EU, 35 pa drugi dajalci.
For example in the Euralius project in Albania (European Assistance Mission to the Albanian Justice System), the audit found out that the level of ambition of the project design was very high. 
Pri projektu EURALIUS v Albaniji (Evropska misija za pomoč albanskemu pravosodnemu sistemu) je revizija na primer pokazala, da so bili projekti zelo ambiciozno zasnovani.
Ten specific objectives had to be achieved involving 15 different types of project partners simultaneously. 
Treba bi bilo doseči deset posebnih ciljev, pri čemer naj bi hkrati sodelovalo 15 različnih vrst projektnih partnerjev.
Each of the ten objectives involved numerous different project partners. 
Pri doseganju vsakega od desetih ciljev so sodelovali številni različni projektni partnerji.
As a result, the Ministry of Justice, the principal beneficiary, would be dealing with 78 different foreseen activities. 
Posledično naj bi ministrstvo za pravosodje kot glavni prejemnik obravnavalo 78 različnih predvidenih dejavnosti.
One of the main unintended side effects of the high contracting speed, encouraged by the Commission was that beneficiaries might not fully benefit from the projects, thus reducing their effectiveness and impact. 
Eden od glavnih neželenih stranskih učinkov zelo hitrega sklepanja pogodb, ki ga je spodbujala Komisija, je bil, da prejemniki morda niso mogli v celoti izkoristiti projektov, zato sta bila uspešnost in vpliv projektov zmanjšana.