natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Figure 2 – Levels of fraud Established by court Prosecuted fraud Investigated fraud Reported fraud Detected fraud Total fraud 13 Undetected fraud ? 
Slika 2 – Ravni goljufije Potrjena na sodišču Pregon goljufije Preiskava goljufije Prijava goljufije Odkrita goljufija Vse goljufije 12 Neodkrite goljufije ?
14 16 Because of its hidden nature, the phenomenon of fraud cannot be estimated purely on the basis of official statistics on reported and investigated cases. 
13 16 Ker je pojav goljufij skrite narave, ga ni mogoče oceniti izključno na podlagi uradnih statističnih podatkov o prijavljenih in preiskanih primerih.
Sociological research methods could provide additional useful insights into the scale and nature of the problem. 
Dodaten koristen vpogled v obseg in naravo problema bi se lahko zagotovil s sociološkimi raziskovalnimi metodami.
17 In relation to EU spending, information on the detected fraud level is recorded within three different databases (Figure 3). 
17 V zvezi s porabo EU so informacije o ravni odkritih goljufij zabeležene v treh različnih podatkovnih zbirkah (slika 3).
Member States and candidate countries are legally14 obliged to report to OLAF, as part of the Commission, all major cases of irregularities that they have detected in EU revenue (Traditional Own Resources) and expenditure (Cohesion, Agriculture and Pre-accession funds). 
Države članice in države kandidatke so uradu OLAF, ki je del Komisije, zakonsko14 zavezane prijaviti vse večje primere nepravilnosti, ki jih odkrijejo v prihodkih (tradicionalna lastna sredstva) in odhodkih EU (kohezija, kmetijstvo in predpristopni skladi).
15 behaviour was intentional (suspected fraud) or whether fraud has been established by a definitive court decision (established fraud). 
Prijaviti morajo tudi, ali zaradi nepravilnosti pride do upravnega ali sodnega postopka na nacionalni ravni, da bi se ugotovilo, ali je bilo nepravilno ravnanje namerno (sum goljufije) oziroma ali je bilo z dokončno odločbo sodišča razsojeno, da gre za goljufijo (ugotovljena goljufija).
Thus, Member States and candidate countries must first register an irregularity and then indicate whether that irregularity was fraudulent (suspected or established fraud) or non-fraudulent. 
14 članice in države kandidatke morajo torej naprej prijaviti nepravilnost in nato navesti, ali gre za goljufijo (sum goljufije ali ugotovljena goljufija) ali ne.
This reporting in respect of expenditure is done through an IT system called the ‘Irregularity Management System’ (IMS). OLAF is in charge of this system. 
Prijavljanje v zvezi z odhodki poteka prek informacijskega sistema, ki se imenuje sistem za upravljanje nepravilnosti (Irregularity Management System (IMS)), zanj pa je odgovoren OLAF.
Reporting in respect of revenue is done via the OWNRES system, which is managed by DG BUDG. 
Prijavljanje v zvezi s prihodki poteka prek sistema OWNRES, ki ga upravlja GD BUDG.
19 OLAF has its own case management system, which provides information on closed and ongoing investigations into fraud, corruption and serious irregularities involving EU money. 
19 OLAF ima svoj sistem vodenja zadev, ki zagotavlja informacije o zaključenih in potekajočih preiskavah goljufij, korupcije in resnih nepravilnosti v zvezi s sredstvi EU.
Member State authorities may also have their own databases for recording suspected fraud cases affecting either the financial interests of the EU or their national budgets. 
Organi držav članic imajo lahko tudi svoje podatkovne zbirke za beleženje primerov suma goljufije, ki škodi finančnim interesom EU ali nacionalnim proračunom.
20 In this section, we examine the quality of information used by the Commission on detected and undetected fraud levels and the type of analysis the Commission carries out in order to identify the most typical fraud patterns and schemes, causes of fraud, and the profile of EU fraudsters. 
20 V tem delu je Sodišče preučilo kakovost informacij o ravneh odkritih in neodkritih goljufij, ki jih uporablja Komisija, ter vrsto analize, ki jo Komisija opravi, da bi ugotovila, kakšni so najznačilnejši vzorci in sistemi goljufij, vzroki goljufij in profil goljufov v EU.
We also assess how the Commission incorporates this information into its fraud risk assessments. 
Ocenilo je tudi, kako Komisija te informacije vključuje v svoje ocene tveganja goljufij.
Data on the detected fraud level is incomplete 21 The Commission publishes the value of detected fraud, together with underlying analyses, every year in a report called the ‘PIF report’15. According to this report, detected fraud in EU spending in 2017 amounted to €390.7 million, or 0.29 % of total payments from the EU budget (Figure 4). 
Podatki o ravni odkritih goljufij niso popolni 21 Komisija vrednost odkritih goljufij in analize, na katerih ti podatki temeljijo, vsako leto objavi v poročilu o zaščiti finančnih interesov.15 Glede na podatke v poročilu so odkrite goljufije pri porabi EU leta 2017 znašale 390,7 milijona EUR, kar je 0,29 % vseh plačil iz proračuna EU (slika 4).
15 Protection of the European Union’s financial interests – fight against fraud 2017 Annual Report, COM(2018) 553 final. 
15 Zaščita finančnih interesov Evropske unije – boj proti goljufijam – letno poročilo za leto 2017, COM(2018) 553 final.
Figure 4 – EU spending: detected fraud by spending area (2017) 16 EU spending area From Commission data, Member States’ and candidate countries’ reporting (amount in million euro) As % of payments Cohesion and fisheries* 320* 0.94 %* Natural resources 60 0.11 % Direct expenditure 7 0.04 % Pre-accession 3 0.18 % Total 390 0.29 % *For the cohesion and fisheries spending areas, which are entirely based on multi-annual programmes, the Commission suggests referring to data covering whole programming periods rather than to year-to-year changes. 
Slika 4 – Poraba EU: odkrite goljufije glede na področje porabe (2017) 15 Področje porabe EU Po podatkih Komisije ter prijavah držav članic in držav kandidatk (znesek v milijonih EUR) Kot % plačil Kohezija in ribištvo* 320* 0,94 %* Naravni viri 60 0,11 % Neposredni odhodki 7 0,04 % Pred pristopom k EU 3 0,18 % Skupaj 390 0,29 % *Komisija predlaga, da se za področji porabe kohezija in ribištvo, ki v celoti temeljita na večletnih programih, sklicuje na podatke, ki zajemajo celotna programska obdobja, in ne na spremembe v primerjavi s preteklim letom.
For the whole programming cycle 2007-13, detected fraud represents 0.44 % of the payments. 
Za celotni programski cikel v obdobju 2007–2013 znašajo odkrite goljufije 0,44 % plačil.
Source: ECA based on PIF Report 2017 (pp. 14, 22, 24 and 25) and the Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2018) 386 final "Statistical evaluation of irregularities reported for 2017" (pp. 47, 66, 102, 103 and 106). 
Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče na podlagi poročila o zaščiti finančnih interesov za leto 2017 (str. 14, 22, 24 in 25) in delovni dokument služb Komisije SWD(2018) 386 final z naslovom Statistical evaluation of irregularities reported for 2017 (str.
22 To calculate these figures on detected fraud, the Commission uses its own data in cases where it manages the expenditure directly and, in cases concerning expenditure under shared management, it uses data forwarded to OLAF by Member States and candidate countries via the IMS. 
22 Komisija vrednost odkritih goljufij v primerih, v katerih odhodke upravlja neposredno, izračuna na podlagi lastnih podatkov, v primerih odhodkov z deljenim upravljanjem pa na podlagi podatkov, ki jih države članice in države kandidatke prek sistema za upravljanje nepravilnosti pošljejo uradu OLAF.
23 Based on our audit results, outlined in the following paragraphs, we have concluded that these figures do not provide a complete picture of the detected fraud level in EU spending. 
23 Na podlagi rezultatov revizije, ki so navedeni v naslednjih odstavkih, je Sodišče ugotovilo, da ti podatki ne zagotavljajo popolne slike ravni odkritih goljufij pri porabi EU.
This is the case for both shared management and other management modes. 
To velja tako za deljeno upravljanje kot tudi za druge načine upravljanja.
24 Within shared management, the Commission’s view is that the main problem of non-reporting concerns cases under investigation by prosecution services of which authorities in charge of implementing the programme in question are not aware16. Nevertheless, we have identified the following additional reasons why the scale of fraud is underreported: o Member State authorities do not report all cases investigated by OLAF. 
24 Pri deljenem upravljanju Komisija meni, da glavni problem neprijavljanja zadeva primere v preiskavah organov pregona, o katerih organi, pristojni za izvajanje programov, niso obveščeni.16 Sodišče je ugotovilo, da za prenizko raven prijavljanja goljufij obstajajo dodatni razlogi: o organi držav članic ne prijavijo vseh primerov, ki jih preiskuje OLAF.
Of the 20 OLAF cases we checked, we identified only three cases that Member State authorities had recorded in the IMS system. 
Organi držav članic so v sistemu za upravljanje nepravilnosti zabeležili le tri od njih.
16 Paragraph 2.4 of Commission Staff Working Document (2016)237 final explains the methodological assumptions behind the analysis of the reported irregularities. 
16 V odstavku 2.4 delovnega dokumenta služb Komisije (2016)237 final so pojasnjene metodološke predpostavke pri analizi prijavljenih nepravilnosti.
17 o Fraudulent cases may also arise from the activities of intermediate public bodies involved in implementing an operational programme through project selection or public tendering: o EU law17 does not require Member States authorities to report fraudulent or non-fraudulent cases where public bodies exercised the powers of a public authority and did not act as an economic operator. 
o Do goljufij lahko pride tudi pri dejavnostih posredniških teles javnega sektorja, ki pri izvajanju operativnega programa sodelujejo z izbiranjem projektov ali oddajanjem javnih naročil: o Zakonodaja EU17 od organov držav članic ne zahteva, da prijavijo primere goljufij ali primere, ki niso goljufije, če so v teh primerih telesa javnega sektorja izvajala pooblastila javnega organa in niso nastopala kot gospodarski subjekt.
We found problems of underreporting in cases where public bodies act as economic operators. o When fraudulent or non-fraudulent irregularities occur in project selection before a given project is awarded any funding, it is not always possible to identify the irregular or fraudulent project concerned in order to enter the necessary data into the IMS. We came across such cases in two Member States. o To reduce their administrative burden, EU law obliges Member State authorities only to report fraudulent or non-fraudulent irregularities involving more than €10 000 in EU money18. For Agriculture and the European Social Fund, there are a large number of payments below the €10 000 threshold and, as a consequence, potentially fraudulent payments below the reporting threshold, which are not reported. 
Sodišče je odkrilo problem prenizke ravni prijavljanja v primerih, v katerih so bili gospodarski subjekti javni organi. o Kadar do nepravilnosti, pri katerih gre za goljufijo, ali tistih, ki ne pomenijo goljufije, pride pri izboru projekta, preden se zadevnemu projektu namenijo finančna sredstva, včasih ni mogoče ugotoviti, s katerimi projekti so te nepravilnosti povezane, da bi to potrebno informacijo lahko vpisali v sistem za upravljanje nepravilnosti. Sodišče je take primere odkrilo v dveh državah članicah. o Da bi se zmanjšala upravna obremenitev organov držav članic, morajo ti v skladu z zakonodajo EU prijavljati le nepravilnosti, pri katerih gre za goljufijo, in tiste, ki ne pomenijo goljufije, če gre za sredstva EU v vrednosti več kot 10 000 EUR.18 S kmetijskim skladom in Evropskim socialnim skladom so povezana številna plačila pod pragom 10 000 EUR in posledično tudi potencialno goljufiva plačila, ki so pod pragom prijavljanja, zato niso prijavljena.
During our audit, we identified one Member State where irregularities reported within IMS for the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund and European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development accounted for only a small share (7 %) of all irregularities detected by the Member State for these two Funds. 
Sodišče je v reviziji ugotovilo, da so v eni državi članici nepravilnosti v zvezi z Evropskim kmetijskim jamstvenim skladom in Evropskim kmetijskim skladom za razvoj podeželja, ki so bile prijavljene prek sistema za upravljanje nepravilnosti, znašale le majhen delež (7 %) vseh nepravilnosti, ki jih je država članica odkrila v zvezi s tema skladoma.
On the other hand, from the 7 % of reported irregularities, the Member State qualified a high share (60 %) as suspected fraud. 
Po drugi strani je ta država članica v 7-odstotnem deležu prijavljenih nepravilnosti kar 60 % primerov označila za sum goljufije.
18 Article 3(1)(a) of the Delegated Regulations 2015/1970, 2015/1971, 2015/1972, 2015/1973. 
18 Člen 3(1)(a) delegiranih uredb Komisije (EU) št. 2015/1970, 2015/1971, 2015/1972 in 2015/1973.
19 Handbook on requirement to report irregularities, COCOLAF/23-05-17/8.2/EN; Article 2(b) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/1970, 2015/1971 and 2015/1973. 
19 Handbook on requirement to report irregularities, COCOLAF/23-05-17/8.2/EN ter člen 2(b) delegiranih uredb Komisije (EU) št. 2015/1970, 2015/1971 in 2015/1973.
These definitions are important for determining precisely when an irregularity must be flagged as fraudulent (suspected fraud). 
Ti opredelitvi sta pomembni za natančno določanje, kdaj je treba nepravilnost označiti kot goljufijo (sum goljufije).
The table in Annex 4 shows that some Member States only qualify irregularities as suspected fraud after a final court decision, while others much earlier in the proceeding. 
Iz preglednice v Prilogi 4 je razvidno, da nekatere države članice nepravilnosti opredelijo za sum goljufije šele po pravnomočni odločbi sodišča, druge pa veliko prej v postopku.
26 In order to place greater emphasis on detecting and reporting fraud, in 2015 OLAF introduced two new indicators: the ‘fraud detection rate’ (FDR), which is the value of suspected or established fraud detected in a Member State as a percentage of the total payments made in that country for a given period and the fraud frequency level (FFL), which is the number of suspected or established fraud cases in a Member State as a percentage of the total number of irregularities detected in that country for a given period. 
26 Za večji poudarek na odkrivanju in prijavljanju goljufij je OLAF leta 2015 uvedel nova kazalnika, in sicer „stopnjo odkrivanja goljufij“, ki pomeni vrednost suma goljufije ali ugotovljene goljufije, odkrite v državi članici, v obliki odstotnega deleža vseh plačil v tej državi v izbranem obdobju, ter „raven pogostnosti goljufij“, ki pomeni število primerov sumov goljufije ali ugotovljenih goljufij, odkritih v državi članici, v obliki odstotnega deleža celotnega števila odkritih nepravilnosti v tej državi v izbranem obdobju.
A similar indicator was created for non-fraudulent irregularities (the ‘irregularity detection rate’ or IDR and the ‘irregularity frequency level’ or IFL). 
Podoben kazalnik je bil uveden za nepravilnosti, ki ne pomenijo goljufije („stopnja odkrivanja nepravilnosti“ in „raven pogostosti nepravilnosti“).
Figure 5 includes information on each Member State’s FDR and IDR for the Cohesion area for the period 2007-2013. 
Slika 5 prikazuje informacije o stopnji odkrivanja goljufij in stopnji odkrivanja nepravilnosti v vsaki državi članici na področju kohezije v obdobju 2007– 2013.
27 These indicators highlight that there are significant disparities in the level (value and number of cases) of irregularities and fraud detected and reported by Member States. 
27 Kazalnika izpostavljata velike razlike v ravneh (vrednosti in številu primerov) nepravilnosti in goljufij, ki jih odkrijejo in prijavijo države članice.
For example, ten Member States reported less than ten suspected fraud cases throughout the whole 2007-2013 programme period, and twelve Member States had fraud detection rates of less than 0.1 %. 
Na primer, deset držav članic je v celotnem programskem obdobju 2007–2013 prijavilo manj kot deset sumov goljufije, 12 držav članic pa je beležilo stopnje odkrivanja goljufij nižje od 0,1 %.
Eight Member States categorised more than 10 % of all reported irregularities as suspected fraud, while for 14 other Member States, it was less than 5 %. 
Osem držav članic je za sum goljufije označilo več kot 10 % vseh prijavljenih nepravilnosti, drugih 14 držav članic pa manj kot 5 %.
28 The Commission considers that the significant differences between Member States in terms of reporting on fraud and irregularity may be linked to the national system set-up to counter fraud rather than just to non-harmonised reporting. 
28 Komisija meni, da so velike razlike med državami članicami, kar zadeva prijavljanje goljufij in nepravilnosti, morda povezane z nacionalnimi sistemi za preprečevanje goljufij, ne le z neusklajenim prijavljanjem.
A more detailed analysis on the underlying reasons for these differences was not available from the Commission. 
Podrobnejše analize o osnovnih razlogih za te razlike ni zagotovila.
29 A further indication of problems with reporting or detection is that the correlation between official statistics on reported fraud detection rates and the results of corruption risk indicators is weak (Figure 5): some countries scoring low on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) or the Index of Public Integrity (IPI), and hence considered less transparent, report very few or even zero fraud cases. 
29 Na probleme s prijavljanjem ali odkrivanjem goljufij kaže tudi slaba korelacija med uradnimi statističnimi podatki o prijavljenih stopnjah odkrivanja goljufij in rezultati kazalnikov tveganja korupcije (slika 5), saj nekatere države, za katere zaradi nizkega indeksa zaznave korupcije organizacije Transparency International ali nizkega indeksa javne integritete velja, da imajo manjšo transparentnost, prijavijo zelo malo primerov goljufije ali celo nobenega.
20 Article 2(b) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/1970, 2015/1971, 2015/1972 and 2015/1973 contains a definition of "primary administrative or judicial finding". 
20 Člen 2(b) delegiranih uredb Komisije (EU) št. 2015/1970, 2015/1971 in 2015/1973 vsebuje opredelitev termina prva upravna ali sodna ugotovitev.
These delegated regulations are adopted based on the powers conferred by the relevant basic acts, one of which is the Common Provisions Regulation (Article 122). 
Te delegirane uredbe so bile sprejeti na podlagi pooblastila v zadevnih temeljnih aktih, med katerimi je tudi uredba o skupnih določbah (člen 122).
Figure 5 – Irregularity and fraud detection rate per Member State versus CPI, IPI and Eurobarometer results 19 Slova kia Czechia Spain Greece Romania Latvia Bulgaria Netherlands United Kingdom Austria Lithuania Ireland Malta Poland Italy Slovenia Belgium Hungary Estonia Portugal Cyprus Germany Sweden France Luxembourg Denmark Croatia Finla nd Irregularity detection rate 0.0% 2.5% 5.0% 7.5%10.0% Fraud detection rate 0.0% 2.5% 5.0% 7.5%10.0% CPI 2012-2016 average* EU avg 64 0 50 100 IPI 2015 +2017 average** EU avg 8.33 "EU fraud ... rather frequent?"*** EU avg 71.6 % 0 5 10 0% 50% 100% * Transparency international’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranks countries by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. 
Slika 5 – Stopnji odkrivanja nepravilnosti in goljufij glede na državo članico v primerjavi z rezultati indeksa zaznave korupcije, indeksa javne integritete in raziskave Eurobarometer Indeks javne integritete, „Je problem goljufij EU ... precej povprečje 2015+2017** pogost?“*** Povprečje Povprečje EU 8,33 EU 71,6 % 18 Slova ška Češka republika Špa nija Grčija Romunija Latvija Bolgarija Nizozemska Združeno kraljestvo Avstrija Litva Irska Malta Poljska Italija Slovenija Belgija Madžarska Estonija Portugalska Ciper Nemčija Švedska Francija Luksemburg Danska Hrvaška Finska Stopnja odkrivanja nepravilnosti 0,0% 2,5% 5,0% 7,5% 10,0% Stopnja odkrivanja goljufij 0,0% 2,5% 5,0% 7,5%10,0% Indeks zaznave korupcije, povprečje 2012–2016* Povprečje EU 64 0 50 100 * Z indeksom zaznave korupcije organizacije Transparency International so države razvrščene glede na zaznane ravni korupcije, ki so določene s strokovnimi ocenami in raziskavami javnega mnenja.
Ranking is on a scale from 100 (very clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). ** The index of public integrity (IPI) is a composite index consisting of six components: judicial independence, administrative burden, trade openness, budget transparency, e-citizenship and press freedom. It aims to give an objective and comprehensive picture of the state of control of corruption in 109 countries. 
Lestvica sega od 100 (zelo malo korupcije) do 0 (zelo razširjena korupcija). ** Indeks javne integritete je sestavljen indeks s šestimi elementi, in sicer neodvisnostjo sodstva, upravno obremenitvijo, trgovinsko odprtostjo, proračunsko transparentnostjo, e-državljanstvom in svobodo medijev, ki zagotavlja objektivno in izčrpno podobo stanja obvladovanja korupcije v 109 državah.
Ranking is on a scale from 1 (low control of corruption) to 10 (high control of corruption). *** The 2015 Eurobarometer measures the perception of EU citizens. 
Lestvica sega od 1 (nizko obvladovanje korupcije) do 10 (visoko obvladovanje korupcije). *** V raziskavi Eurobarometer za leto 2015 je izmerjena zaznava državljanov EU.
Q1_B. Defrauding the EU budget: The scale of the problem is rather frequent? 
Vprašanje 1_B. Goljufije v škodo proračuna EU: Je problem precej pogost?
20 30 The Commission does not carry out comprehensive checks on the quality of data reported in the IMS; nor does it ask Member State authorities to provide assurance as to the reliability of the data reported. 
30 Komisija ne izvaja celovitih preverjanj glede kakovosti podatkov v sistemu za upravljanje nepravilnosti in ne poziva organov držav članic, naj zagotovijo, da so prijavljeni podatki zanesljivi.
Partial checks on compliance with reporting obligations are performed within the framework of system audits. 
Delni pregledi o izpolnjevanju obveznosti prijavljanja se izvajajo v okviru revizij sistemov.
31 Neither OLAF nor any other body within the Commission gathers information on criminal cases linked to EU financial interests investigated by national authorities. 
31 Ne OLAF ne noben drug organ Komisije ne zbira informacij o kazenskih zadevah v zvezi s finančnimi interesi EU, ki jih preiskujejo nacionalni organi.
Member States have their own systems for recording cases under investigation, and nearly half of them do not differentiate between financial crimes affecting national interests and those affecting EU interests. 
Države članice imajo lastne sisteme za beleženje preiskovanih zadev, skoraj polovica pa jih ne razlikuje med finančnimi kaznivimi dejanji, ki škodijo nacionalnim interesom, in tistimi, ki škodijo interesom EU.
As a result, neither the Commission nor such Member States have data on fraud in EU spending as a separate category. 
Zato ne Komisija ne te države članice nimajo podatkov o goljufijah pri porabi EU kot ločeni kategoriji.
32 In the area of expenditure, directly managed by the Commission, the value of suspected fraudulent spending is based on amounts flagged as fraudulent and recorded in the Commission’s accounting system. 
32 V zvezi z odhodki, ki jih neposredno upravlja Komisija, je vrednost porabe, za katero obstaja sum goljufije, določena na podlagi zneskov z oznako goljufije in zabeležena v računovodskem sistemu Komisije.
We found that some data is not included in the value of suspected fraudulent spending. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da nekateri podatki niso vključeni v vrednost porabe, za katero obstaja sum goljufije.
In some cases, the Commission claims back fraudulent money by offsetting this amount against future claims without establishing a formal recovery order. 
Komisija v nekaterih primerih z goljufijo pridobljena sredstva izterja tako, da znesek izravna s prihodnjimi terjatvami, ne da bi izdala uradni nalog za izterjavo.