natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Challenge 1: meaningful evaluation and accountability 26 Establishing a causal relationship between the 2013 strategy and any changes seen is difficult, as the Commission has noted. 
Izziv 1: smiselno ocenjevanje in odgovornost 26 Kot je navedla Komisija, je težko vzpostaviti vzročno zvezo med strategijo iz leta 2013 in morebitnimi spremembami.
The 2013 strategy’s objectives were very broadly formulated, “expressing rather a vision than a measurable target”38. 
Cilji strategije iz leta 2013 so bili določeni zelo široko in so izražali bolj vizijo kot merljivo ciljno vrednost38.
Developing action aligned to these broad aims is a challenge in the absence of measurable objectives. 
Razvijanje ukrepov, usklajenih s temi obsežnimi cilji, je izziv, ker ni merljivih ciljev.
The updated cyber defence policy framework (2018) will aim to develop objectives setting the minimum level of cybersecurity and trust to be achieved. 
Cilj posodobljenega okvira politike za kibernetsko obrambo (2018) bo razvoj ciljev z določeno minimalno ravnjo kibernetske varnosti in zaupanja, ki ga je treba doseči.
However, this will be limited to cyber defence; objectives defining the desired level of resilience for the EU as a whole have not been set. 
Toda to bo omejeno na kibernetsko obrambo; cilji v zvezi z želeno ravnjo odpornosti za EU kot celoto še niso bili določeni.
27 Outcomes are rarely measured and few policy areas have been evaluated39. 
27 Izidi se redko merijo, ocenjenih pa je bilo le malo področij39.
This is partly due to the recent implementation of many of the measures – legislative or otherwise – hindering a full evaluation of their impact. 
To je deloma posledica nedavnega izvajanja mnogih ukrepov – zakonodajnih ali drugih –, kar ovira popolno oceno njihovega učinka.
The challenge is to define meaningful assessment criteria that can help measure impact. 
Izziv je opredeliti smiselna merila za oceno, s katerimi bi bilo mogoče meriti učinek.
Moreover, rigorous evaluation has not yet become the norm for cybersecurity generally. 
Poleg tega strogo ocenjevanje še ni postalo norma za kibernetsko varnost na splošno.
A shift is therefore needed towards a performance culture with embedded evaluation practices and standardised reporting. 
Zato je potreben premik v smeri kulture smotrnosti s praksami za ocenjevanje in standardiziranim poročanjem.
ENISA’s current mandate does not extend to evaluating and monitoring the state of EU cybersecurity and readiness. 
Sedanja pristojnost ENISE ne zajema ocenjevanja in spremljanja stanja kibernetske varnosti in pripravljenosti v EU.
28 Evidence-based policymaking depends on the availability of sufficient reliable data and statistics to help monitor and analyse trends and needs. 
28 Z dokazi podprto oblikovanje politik je odvisno od razpoložljivosti zadostnih in zanesljivih statističnih in drugih podatkov za lažje spremljanje in analiziranje trendov in potreb.
The absence of a compulsory and common monitoring system makes reliable data scarce. 
Ker ni obveznega in skupnega sistema spremljanja, je zanesljivih podatkov malo.
Indicators are often not readily available and are difficult to define40. 
Kazalniki pogosto niso takoj na voljo, poleg tega pa jih je težko opredeliti40.
Specific metrics have been developed in some areas though, such as the EU Policy Cycle, used for tackling serious and organised crime. 
Na nekaterih področjih je bila razvita specifična metrika, kot npr. politični cikel EU, ki se uporablja za boj proti hudim kaznivim dejanjem in organiziranemu kriminalu.
29 Few Member States regularly collect official data on cyber-related matters, hindering comparability. 
29 Le malo držav članic redno zbira uradne podatke o zadevah, povezanih s kibernetskim prostorom, zato je primerljivost okrnjena.
The EU has given to date little indication on the need to consolidate statistics at the European level41. 
EU do zdaj ni jasno izrazila potrebe po združitvi statističnih podatkov na evropski ravni41.
There are also few independent EU-wide 17 analyses available covering key topics such as 42: the economics of cybersecurity, including behavioural aspects (misalignment of incentives, information asymmetries); understanding the impact of cyber-failures and cybercrime; macro-statistics on cyber-trends and expected challenges; and the best solutions to address threats. 
Na voljo je tudi le nekaj neodvisnih analiz za celo EU42, ki obravnavajo ključne teme, kot so: ekonomski vidiki 17 kibernetske varnosti, vključno z vedenjskimi vidiki (neskladnost spodbud, informacijska asimetrija), razumevanje učinka okvar kibernetske infrastrukture in kibernetske kriminalitete, makrostatistični podatki o kibernetskih trendih in pričakovanih izzivih ter najboljše rešitve za obravnavo groženj.
30 In light of the absence of specific objectives and scarcity of reliable data and well-defined indicators, assessment of the strategy’s achievements has been largely qualitative to date. 
30 Ker ni specifičnih ciljev in ker je malo zanesljivih podatkov in dobro opredeljenih kazalnikov, je bila do zdaj ocena dosežkov strategije večinoma kvalitativna.
Progress reports often describe the activities carried out or milestones achieved, without a thorough measure of results. 
V poročilih o napredku so pogosto opisane izvedene dejavnosti ali doseženi mejniki, rezultati pa niso temeljito izmerjeni.
Furthermore, baselines for the assessment of systems’ resilience have not yet been established. 
Poleg tega še niso bila določena izhodišča za ocenjevanje odpornosti sistemov.
In addition, due to the lack of a codified definition of cybercrime it is nearly impossible to find relevant European indicators that would aid monitoring and evaluation. 
Ker ni kodificirane opredelitve kibernetske kriminalitete pa je skoraj nemogoče določiti relevantne evropske kazalnike, s katerimi bi bilo lažje izvajati spremljanje in ocenjevanje.
31 Independent oversight of the implementation of cybersecurity policy differs between Member States. 
31 Neodvisen nadzor izvajanja politike kibernetske varnosti se med državami članicami razlikuje.
We surveyed national audit offices on their experience in auditing this field. 
Sodišče je z anketo zbralo podatke o tem, kakšne izkušnje imajo nacionalni revizijski uradi z revidiranjem tega področja.
Half of all respondents 43 had never audited the area. 
Polovica sodelujočih43 še nikoli ni revidirala tega področja.
For those that had, the main focus of audits had been on: information governance; protection of critical infrastructure; information exchange and coordination between key stakeholders; incident preparedness, notification and response. 
Tisti, ki pa so ga že revidirali, so se pri svojih revizijah osredotočali predvsem na: upravljanje informacij, zaščito kritične infrastrukture, izmenjavo informacij in usklajevanje med ključnimi deležniki, pripravljenost na incidente, priglasitev in odziv.
The results of these audits or evaluations are not always made public on the grounds of national security. 
Rezultati teh revizij ali ocen zaradi nacionalne varnosti niso vedno objavljeni.
A list of published audit reports by national audit offices is included in Annex III. 
Seznam revizijskih poročil, ki so jih nacionalni revizijski uradi objavili, je v Prilogi III.
32 Limitations in cyber-related skills (see also paragraphs 82 to 90) and difficulties in evaluating progress in cybersecurity were perceived as the main challenges to auditing government measures in this field. 
32 Omejitve znanja v zvezi s kibernetskim prostorom (glej tudi odstavke 82 do 90) ter težave pri ocenjevanju napredka na področju kibernetske varnosti so bili po mnenju sodelujočih glavni izzivi za revidiranje vladnih ukrepov na tem področju.
Challenge 2: addressing gaps in EU law and its uneven transposition 33 The speed at which new technologies and threats emerge far outpaces the design and implementation of EU legislation. 
Izziv 2: odpravljanje vrzeli v zakonodaji EU in neenakomeren prenos zakonodaje EU v nacionalno zakonodajo 33 Pojavljanje novih tehnologij in groženj je veliko hitrejše od zasnove in izvajanja zakonodaje EU.
The Union’s procedures were not designed with the digital age in mind: developing innovative and flexible procedures to ensure a policy and legal framework that is fit for purpose44 to better anticipate and shape the future, is a critical priority45. 
Postopki Unije niso bili zasnovani za digitalno dobo: pomembna prioriteta je razvoj inovativnih in fleksibilnih postopkov za zagotavljanje okvira politike in pravnega okvira, ki ustrezata svojemu namenu44, za boljše predvidevanje in oblikovanje prihodnosti45.
34 Despite a drive for greater coherence, the legislative framework for cybersecurity remains incomplete (for some examples, see Table 1). Fragmentation and gaps 18 
34 Kljub prizadevanjem za večjo koherentnost je zakonodajni okvir za kibernetsko varnost še vedno nepopoln (za nekaj primerov glej tabelo 1). Razdrobljenost in vrzeli 18
hamper achievement of the overall policy objectives and lead to inefficiencies. 
ovirajo doseganje splošnih ciljev politike in vodijo do neučinkovitosti.
Gaps identified by the Commission in the strategy assessment included the Internet of Things, the balance of responsibilities between users and providers of digital products, and certain aspects left unaddressed by the NIS Directive. 
Vrzeli, ki jih je Komisija opredelila v oceni strategije, so vključevale internet stvari, ravnovesje odgovornosti med uporabniki in ponudniki digitalnih izdelkov ter nekatere vidike, ki niso obravnavani v direktivi o varnosti omrežij in informacij.
The proposed Cybersecurity Act attempts to address this in part by promoting security-by-design through an EU-wide certification scheme. 
To se poskuša deloma obravnavati s predlagano uredbo o kibernetski varnosti, in sicer s spodbujanjem vgrajene varnosti s certifikacijsko shemo za celotno EU.
Some stakeholders believe a clearly defined cyber industrial policy and a common approach to cyberespionage are still noticeably absent46. 
Po mnenju nekaterih deležnikov še vedno ni jasno opredeljene politike v zvezi s kibernetsko industrijo in skupnega pristopa h kibernetskemu vohunjenju46.
Table 1 – Gaps and uneven transposition in the legislative framework (non-exhaustive) 19 Policy area Examples Digital Single Market o The present Consumer Sales Directive does not cover cybersecurity. 
Tabela 1 – Vrzeli in neenakomeren prenos v zakonodajni okvir (neizčrpen seznam) 19 Področje Primeri Enotni digitalni trg o Sedanja direktiva o prodaji potrošniškega blaga ne zajema kibernetske varnosti.
The proposed directives on digital content47 and online sales48 aim to address this gap. o There are limited and diverse legal frameworks for duties of care in EU Member States, giving rise to legal uncertainty and difficulty in enforcing legal remedies49. o Policies on software vulnerability disclosures are being developed at different speeds across Member States, with no overarching legal framework at the EU level to enable a coordinated approach 50. 
S predlaganima direktivama o digitalnih vsebinah47 in spletni prodaji48 naj bi se ta vrzel odpravila. o Obstajajo omejeni in različni pravni okviri za dolžnosti skrbnega ravnanja v državah članicah EU, kar povzroča pravno negotovost in težave pri uveljavljanju pravnih sredstev 49. o Politike o razkrivanju ranljivosti programske opreme se v državah članicah razvijajo različno hitro, na ravni EU pa ni splošnega pravnega okvira, ki bi omogočal usklajen pristop50.
Strengthening network and information security o Member States are free to include sectors omitted from the NIS Directive 51. 
Krepitev varnosti omrežij in informacijskih sistemov o Države članice lahko vključijo sektorje, ki niso vključeni v direktivo o varnosti omrežij in informacij 51.
The accommodation industries, which are not covered, can be a gateway for other crimes, including human and drug trafficking and illegal immigration52. 
Nastanitvena industrija, ki ni vključena, je lahko povezana z drugimi vrstami kriminalitete, vključno s trgovino z ljudmi in drogami ter nezakonitim priseljevanjem52.
Fighting cybercrime o Many Member States have not defined e-evidence in their national legislation53 (see also paragraph 22). o The current framework decision on non-cash payment fraud does not explicitly include non-physical payment instruments such as virtual currencies, e-money and mobile money, nor does it cover such acts as phishing, skimming and the possession and sharing of payer information54. o The Directive on Attacks against Information Systems does not directly address illegal data acquisition from the inside (e.g. cyberespionage), leading to challenges for law enforcement55. o In the wake of the Court of Justice of the European Union judgment on data retention56, differences in the application of the legal framework among Member States has impeded law enforcement, potentially resulting in the loss of investigative leads and impairing effective prosecution of online criminal activity57. 
Boj proti kibernetskemu kriminalu o Številne države članice v svoji zakonodaji niso opredelile elektronskihdokazov53 (glejtudi odstavek22). o Sedanji okvirni sklep o goljufijah pri negotovinskih plačilih ne vključuje izrecno nefizičnih plačilnih instrumentov, kot so virtualne valute, elektronski denar in mobilni denar, poleg tega pa ne zajema lažnega predstavljanja, skimminga ter posedovanja in posredovanja informacij o plačnikih54. o Direktiva o napadih na informacijske sisteme ne obravnava neposredno nezakonitega pridobivanja podatkov od znotraj (npr. kibernetskega vohunjenja), kar ustvarja izzive za organe kazenskega pregona55. o Po razsodbi Sodišča Evropske unije o hrambi podatkov56 so razlike v uporabi pravnega okvira med državami članicami ovirale kazenski pregon, kar bi lahko privedlo do izgube sledi za preiskavo in oviranja uspešnega pregona spletnih kriminalnih dejavnosti 57.
Source: ECA. 
Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče
35 Applying some aspects of legislation remains voluntary both for national authorities and private operators. 
35 Uporaba nekaterih vidikov zakonodaje je še vedno prostovoljna tako za nacionalne organe kot tudi zasebne gospodarske subjekte.
For example, within the framework of the Cooperation Group, evaluating the national strategies on the security of network and information systems and the effectiveness of CSIRTs is voluntary. 
V okviru skupine za sodelovanje je npr. ocenjevanje nacionalnih strategij za varnost omrežij in informacijskih sistemov ter uspešnosti skupin za odzivanje na incidente na področju računalniške varnosti prostovoljno.
Also, under the proposed certification scheme in the Cybersecurity Act, the application of certification for ICT products and services will be voluntary. 
Poleg tega bo v skladu s shemo certificiranja, predlagano v uredbi o kibernetski varnosti, certificiranje izdelkov in storitev IKT pros tovol j no.
36 In the EU, cybersecurity is a prerogative of the Member States. 
36 V EU je kibernetska varnost v pristojnosti držav članic.
Despite this, the EU has a critical role to play in creating the conditions for its Member States’ capacities to improve, and for them to work together and generate trust. 
Kljub temu ima EU pomembno vlogo pri ustvarjanju pogojev za izboljšanje zmogljivosti držav članic in za njihovo sodelovanje in doseganje zaupanja.
Yet given the wide differences among the Member States in terms of capacity and engagement58, the provision of sensitive (national security) information will remain voluntary. 
Kljub velikim razlikam v zmogljivosti in angažiranosti med državami članicami58 bo zagotavljanje občutljivih informacij (v zvezi z nacionalno varnostjo) ostalo prostovoljno.
37 The inconsistent transposition of EU law among Member States can result in legal and operational incoherence, and prevents legislation from reaching its full potential. 
37 Nedosleden prenos prava EU v nacionalne zakonodaje držav članic lahko privede do pravnih in operativnih neskladnosti ter prepreči doseganje polnega potenciala zakonodaje.
For example, Member States have differing interpretations of how dual-use export controls should be applied59, with the result that some EU-based companies may be exporting technologies and services that can be used for cyber-surveillance and human rights violations through censorship or interception. 
Na primer, države članice različno razumejo, kako je treba izvajati nadzor nad izvozom blaga z dvojno rabo59, zaradi česar nekatera podjetja s sedežem v EU morda izvažajo tehnologije in storitve, ki jih je mogoče uporabiti za kibernetski nadzor in kršenje človekovih pravic s cenzuro ali prestrezanjem.
The European Parliament has expressed concern about this 60. 
Evropski parlament je v zvezi s tem izrazil zaskrbljenost60.
38 In addition, protecting privacy and the freedom of expression calls for a tailored legislative response in order to strike the necessary balance between protecting fundamental values and achieving the EU’s security imperatives. 
38 Poleg tega je zaradi varstva zasebnosti in svobode izražanja potreben prilagojen zakonodajni odziv za dosego potrebnega ravnovesja med varovanjem temeljnih vrednot in doseganjem varnostnih zahtev EU.
For example, how do we ensure end-to-end encryption while finding the best way to support law enforcement? 
Na primer, kako zagotoviti šifriranje od konca do konca, hkrati pa poiskati najboljši način za podpiranje kazenskega pregona?
Or how might we meet the aims of the GDPR while understanding its implications on publicly available information on registrants of domain names and holders of blocks of IP addresses? 
Ali, kako doseči cilje splošne uredbe o varstvu podatkov in hkrati razumeti njen vpliv na javno dostopne podatke o prijaviteljih domenskih imen in imetnikih blokov naslovov IP?
And how this can adversely affect law enforcement investigations 61? 
In kako lahko to negativno vpliva na preiskave organov kazenskega pregona61?
39 Legislation alone does not guarantee resilience. 
39 Samo zakonodaja ne zagotavlja odpornosti.
While the NIS Directive’s objective is to achieve a high level of security across the EU, it explicitly focuses on achieving minimum, not maximum, harmonisation62. 
Cilj direktive o varnosti omrežij in informacij je sicer doseganje visoke ravni varnosti v vsej EU, vendar je izrecno osredotočena na doseganje minimalne, ne maksimalne harmonizacije62.
Gaps will continue to emerge as the cyber-landscape evolves. 20 
Z razvojem kibernetskega prostora se bodo še naprej pojavljale nove vrzeli. 20
21 Reflection points – policy framework - What critical steps are needed to prompt a shift by policy-makers and legislators alike towards a stronger performance culture in cybersecurity, including defining overall resilience? - How can research better contribute to generating the necessary data and statistics to enable meaningful evaluation? - In what ways can the EU’s legislative processes be adapted to be more flexible and take better account of the speed of technological and threat developments? - How can the practice of developing metrics (indicators, targets) in the EU Policy Cycle be adapted, scaled-up and replicated for the cybersecurity domain as a whole? - What can national audit offices learn from each other’s approaches to auditing cybersecurity policies and measures? - Which inconsistencies in the transposition and implementation of the EU legal framework are undermining a more effective response to cybersecurity gaps and cybercrime, and how could this be best addressed by Member States and EU i ns ti tuti ons ? - How effective are EU export controls on cyber goods and services in preventing human rights abuses outside the EU? 
21 Točke za razmislek – okvir politike - Kateri so ključni ukrepi, potrebni za spodbuditev preusmeritve oblikovalcev politik in zakonodajalcev v močnejšo kulturo smotrnosti na področju kibernetske varnosti, vključno z opredelitvijo splošne odpornosti? - Kako bi lahko raziskave več prispevale k ustvarjanju potrebnih statističnih in drugih podatkov, ki bi omogočili smiselno oceno? - Kako bi lahko prilagodili zakonodajne procese EU, da bi bili bolj fleksibilni in da bi bolj upoštevali hitrost razvoja tehnologije in groženj? - Kako bi lahko prakso razvoja metrike (kazalnikov in ciljnih vrednosti) v političnem ciklu EU prilagodili, okrepili in ponovili na celotnem področju kibernetske va rnos ti ? - Kaj se lahko nacionalni revizijski uradi naučijo eden od drugega v zvezi s pristopi k revidiranju politik in ukrepov na področju kibernetske varnosti? - Katere nedoslednosti pri prenosu pravnega okvira EU v nacionalne zakonodaje in njegovem izvajanju ovirajo uspešnejši odziv na vrzeli v kibernetski varnosti in kibernetsko kriminaliteto ter kako bi lahko države članice in institucije EU to najbolje obravnavale? - Kako učinkovit je nadzor EU nad izvozom kibernetskega blaga in storitev pri preprečevanju kršenja človekovih pravic zunaj EU?
Funding and spending 40 The EU has its sights set on becoming the world’s safest online environment. 
Financiranje in poraba 40 EU želi postati najvarnejše spletno okolje na svetu.
Achieving this ambition requires significant efforts from all stakeholders, including a sound and well-managed financial footing. 
Za dosego tega cilja so potrebna velika prizadevanja vseh deležnikov, pa tudi dobra in dobro upravljana finančna podlaga.
Challenge 3: aligning investment levels with goals Scaling up investment 41 Total global cybersecurity spending as a percentage of GDP is estimated to be about 0.1 %. 
Izziv 3: uskladitev ravni naložb s cilji Povečanje naložb 41 Skupna svetovna poraba za kibernetsko varnost kot odstotek BDP je ocenjena na približno 0,1 %.
In the United States 63, this rises to about 0.35 % (including the private sector). 
V Združenih državah Amerike63 je odstotek višji, in sicer približno 0,35 % (vključno z zasebnim sektorjem).
As a percentage of GDP, US federal government spending is around 0.1 %, or around $21 billion budgeted for 201964. 
Poraba zvezne vlade ZDA v odstotkih BDP znaša približno 0,1 % ali približno 21 milijard USD, predvidenih v proračunu za leto 201964.
42 Spending in the EU has been low by comparison, fragmented and often not backed by concerted government-led programmes. 
42 Poraba v EU je bila v primerjavi z ZDA nizka, razdrobljena in nepodprta z usklajenimi vladnimi programi.
Figures are hard to come by, but EU public spending on cybersecurity is estimated to range between one and two billion euros per year65. 
Podatke o zneskih je težko pridobiti, vendar javna poraba EU za kibernetsko varnost po ocenah znaša med eno in dvema milijardama EUR na leto65.
Some Member States’ spending as a percentage of GDP is one-tenth of US levels, or even lower66. 
Poraba nekaterih držav članic v odstotkih BDP znaša le desetino porabe ZDA ali celo še manj66.
The EU and its Member States need to know how much they are investing collectively to know which gaps to close. 
EU in njene države članice morajo vedeti, koliko vlagajo skupaj, da lahko ugotovijo, katere vrzeli je treba zapolniti.
43 It is difficult to form a comprehensive picture in the absence of clear data owing to cybersecurity’s cross-cutting nature and because cybersecurity and general IT spending are often indistinguishable67. 
43 Težko je oblikovati celovit pregled, ker zaradi medsektorske narave kibernetske varnosti in zato, ker pogosto ni mogoče ločiti porabe za kibernetsko varnost od splošne porabe za IT, ni jasnih podatkov67.
Our survey has confirmed that it is difficult to obtain reliable statistics on spending in both the public and private sectors. 
Z anketo, ki jo je opravilo Sodišče, se je potrdilo, da je težko pridobiti zanesljive statistične podatke o porabi tako v javnem kot tudi v zasebnem sektorju.
Three-quarters of the national audit offices reported having no centralised overview of cyber-related government spending, and not one Member State obliged public entities to report cybersecurity expenditure separately in their financial plans. 
Tri četrtine nacionalnih revizijskih uradov so poročale, da nimajo centraliziranega pregleda nad vladno porabo za kibernetsko varnost, poleg tega pa nobena država članica ni uvedla obveznosti javnih subjektov, da v svojih finančnih načrtih ločeno poročajo o odhodkih za kibernetsko varnost.