natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The analy‐ sis of relevant factors is provided for in the legislation (Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97) according to which the Commission shall take into account all relevant factors in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compli‐ ance with the deficit and debt criteria. 
Analiza pomembnih dejavnikov je določena v zakonodaji (Uredba Sveta (ES) št. 1467/97), v skladu s katero Komisija upošteva vse pomembne dejavnike, če ti znatno vplivajo na oceno skladnosti z merili primanjkljaja in dolga.
Moreover, the legislation requires the Commission to also consider factors deemed relevant by the Member State concerned. 
Poleg tega mora Komisija v skladu z zakonodajo upoštevati tudi dejavnike, ki jih za pomembne šteje zadevna država članica.
This is done in order to ensure an appropriate economic assess‐ ment of the situation before deciding on the opening of an EDP. 
Namen tega je zagotoviti ustrezno ekonomsko oceno stanja pred odločitvijo o začetku postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
In case of a breach of the deficit criterion, the legislation provides a broad list of possible relevant factors, which however is not exhaustive, nor makes reference to any kind of prioritisation. 
Zakonodaja za primer kršitve merila za primanjkljaj določa širok seznam mogočih pomembnih dejavnikov, ki pa ni izčrpen in ne navaja nobene prednostne obravnave.
If the general government debt is above 60% of GDP, the relevant factors will only be considered in the decision regarding whether to launch an EDP if the deficit remains close to the reference value and the breach is judged to be temporary. 
Če javnofinančni dolg presega 60 % BDP, se pomembni dejavniki upoštevajo samo pri odločitvi o tem, ali uvesti postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, če primanjkljaj ostaja blizu referenčne vrednosti in se kršitev šteje za začasno.
In case of a breach of the debt criteria, all relevant factors can be taken into account irrespective of the level of the deficit. 
V primeru kršitve merila dolga se lahko upoštevajo vsi pomembni dejavniki, ne glede na raven primanjkljaja.
In line with the provisions described above, when preparing a report under Article 126 (3), the Commission specifies and to the extent possible estimates the effect of the different relevant factors. 
Komisija v skladu z zgoraj opisanimi določbami pri pripravi poročila v skladu s členom 126(3) navede in, kolikor je to mogoče, oceni učinek različnih pomembnih dejavnikov.
In this respect, the Commission points out that in the reports under Article 126(3) that have been issued on Italy, Belgium (February 2015) and Finland (February, May and November 2015) significant efforts have been put in place to make the analysis of the relevant factors much more extensive and transparent than in the past. 
Komisija v zvezi s tem opozarja, da so bili v poročila na podlagi člena 126(3), izdana za Italijo, Belgijo (februar 2015) in Finsko (februar, maj in november 2015), vložena precejšnja prizadevanja, da bi bila analiza pomembnih dejavnikov veliko obsežnejša in preglednejša kot v preteklosti.
At the same time, and in line with the spirit of the legislation, there is no formula weighting all the different factors leading to an automatic conclusion. 
Hkrati in skladno z duhom zakonodaje ni formule, po kateri bi lahko pretehtali vse različne dejavnike in ki bi vodila do samodejnega zaključka.
74 The Commission endeavours to work closely with Member States in the ongoing process of the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact, including the EDP. 
74 Komisija si prizadeva za tesno sodelovanje z državami članicami v stalnem procesu izvajanja Pakta za stabilnost in rast, vključno s postopkom v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
A crucial element of this cooperative approach is the interaction and discussion facilitated through the relevant economic committees, in particular, the Economic and Financial Committee Alternates (EFC‐A). 
Pri tem sodelovanju sta ključna interakcija in razprava, ki sta mogoči prek zadevnih ekonomskih odborov, zlasti prek namestnikov Ekonomsko-finančnega odbora (EFC-A).
The Commission regularly prepares analytical and operational notes for the EFC‐A in order to explain to Member States the approach it is taking to interpreting and implementing the SGP and obtain their input on the Commission’s rationale. 
Komisija redno pripravlja analitične in operativne dopise za namestnike Ekonomsko-finančnega odbora, da bi državam članicam pojasnila svoj pristop k razlagi in izvajanju Pakta za stabilnost in rast ter pridobila njihovo mnenje o utemeljitvi Komisije.
Reply of the Commission 119 In order to increase transparency, since spring 2014 the Commission has provided Member States with all the nec‐ essary information for them to fully replicate the computation of the effective action assessment thus including detailed excel spreadsheets providing step‐by‐step calculations of both the top‐down and bottom‐up approach. 
Odgovori Komisije 119 Da bi Komisija povečala preglednost, od pomladi 2014 državam članicam zagotavlja vse potrebne informacije, da lahko te v celoti ponovijo izračun ocene uspešnih ukrepov, torej vključno s podrobnimi Excelovimi preglednicami, ki predstavljajo postopne izračune za pristop od zgoraj navzdol in od spodaj navzgor.
Beside this, all of the data and computations on compliance with the debt‐reduction benchmark and the MLSA are provided to Member States. 
Poleg tega se državam članicam posredujejo vsi podatki in izračuni glede skladnosti z referenčnim merilom za zmanjšanje dolga in minimalno linearno strukturno prilagoditvijo.
However, based on a specific request from the Member States, data are not fully public, but shared via a common platform named CIRCA, to which only the members of the EFC and their alternates are granted access. 
Vendar podatki zaradi posebne zahteve držav članic niso povsem javni, temveč se posredujejo prek skupne platforme CIRCA, do katere imajo dostop samo člani Ekonomsko-finančnega odbora in njihovi namestniki.
75 The Commission acknowledges that the staff working documents published before February 2015 could have been more transparent regarding the data included in the baseline scenario underlying the EDP recommendations. 
75 Komisija priznava, da bi lahko bili delovni dokumenti služb Komisije, objavljeni pred februarjem 2015, preglednejši, kar zadeva podatke, vključene v osnovni scenarij, na katerem temeljijo priporočila v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
How‐ ever, the Commission points out that such information was available from spring 2014 in the detailed excel spread‐ sheet providing step‐by‐step calculation of the Commission’s compliance assessment and circulated to Member States through the CIRCA platform. 
Vendar opozarja, da so bile take informacije od pomladi 2014 na voljo v podrobnih Excelovih preglednicah, ki predstavljajo postopne izračune, ki jih je sama uporabila pri ocenjevanju skladnosti, in so bile državam članicam posredovane prek platforme CIRCA.
As a consequence, Member States enjoyed full access to the set of data needed to replicate the calculations of the fiscal efforts and the other variables underlying the assessment of compliance with the EDP recommendation as in the case of France in February 2015. 
Zato so imele države članice v celoti dostop do sklopa podatkov, potrebnih za ponovitev izračunov fiskalnih naporov in drugih spremenljivk, na katerih temelji ocena skladnosti s priporočili v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, kot v primeru Francije februarja 2015.
Moreover, starting in February 2015, the relevant information is provided in the forecast files published in the public version of AMECO database and accessi‐ ble to the general public. 
Poleg tega so zadevne informacije od februarja 2015 na voljo v datotekah z napovedmi, objavljenih v javni različici zbirke podatkov AMECO in dostopnih splošni javnosti.
The information contained in these files is sufficient to replicate the calculation of the bottom‐up effort as com‐ puted by the Commission. 
Informacije, ki jih vsebujejo te datoteke, zadostujejo za ponovitev izračuna napora od spodaj navzgor, kot ga je izračunala Komisija.
It notably includes the total amount of discretionary measures on the revenue side (including and excluding one‐offs), expenditure developments, interest rates developments and unemployment figures. 
Vključuje predvsem skupni obseg diskrecijskih ukrepov na strani prihodkov (z enkratnimi ukrepi in brez njih), gibanje odhodkov, gibanje obrestnih mer in podatke o brezposelnosti.
These are the only metrics needed to compute the baseline scenario. 
To so edini podatki, potrebni za izračun osnovnega scenarija.
In addition, the staff working docu‐ ment clearly explains how the baseline scenario is built. 
Poleg tega je v delovnem dokumentu služb Komisije jasno obrazloženo, kako je zgrajen osnovni scenarij.
76 The Commission points out that in case of a breach of the debt criteria, the Regulation stipulates that all relevant factors shall be taken into account irrespective of the level of the deficit. 
76 Komisija opozarja, da Uredba določa, da se v primeru kršitve merila dolga upoštevajo vsi pomembni dejavniki, ne glede na raven primanjkljaja.
Box 7 (i) The Commission considers that the cyclically adjusted debt‐reduction benchmark does not fully capture the impact of very low inflation over extended periods. 
Okvir 7 (i) Komisija meni, da ciklično prilagojeno referenčno merilo za zmanjšanje dolga v daljšem časovnem obdobju ne zajame popolnoma vpliva zelo nizke inflacije.
While the cyclically adjusted debt level is developed with the aim of excluding the influence of the economic cycle on the assessment on compliance with the debt rule, it is worth emphasizing that the adjustment only corrects for the difference in the potential and the actual GDP growth rate over three years. 
Čeprav je bila ciklično prilagojena raven dolga razvita zato, da bi izključili vpliv gospodarskega cikla na ocenjevanje skladnosti s pravilom o dolgu, je treba poudariti, da se razlika v potencialni in dejanski stopnji rasti BDP s prilagoditvijo odpravi šele v treh letih.
Therefore, the protracted subdued nominal GDP growth experienced by several Member States in the last couple of years can still impact the compliance with the debt rule even when assessed on the basis of the cyclically adjusted debt level. 
Zato lahko dolgotrajna majhna nominalna rast BDP, ki jo v zadnjih letih beleži več držav članic, kljub temu vpliva na skladnost s pravilom o dolgu, čeprav se ocenjuje na podlagi ciklično prilagojene ravni dolga.
In addition, the debt benchmark does not control for the evolution of prices. 
Poleg tega referenčno merilo dolga ne upošteva spreminjanja cen.
The cyclically adjusted debt level uses the outturn GDP deflator, i.e. there is no correction for unexpectedly low infla‐ tion. 
Pri ciklično prilagojeni ravni dolga se uporablja deflator BDP ob realizaciji, kar pomeni, da ni mogoč popravek zaradi nepričakovano nizke inflacije.
However, for several countries the unexpected lowering of inflation has led to a significant increase in the real financing costs on debt. 
Vendar je v več državah nepričakovano znižanje inflacije pomenilo znatno povišanje dejanskih stroškov financiranja dolga.
The increase in difference in the real financing cost and the real GDP growth rate had a substantial negative impact on the debt dynamics for several countries. 
Povečanje razlike v dejanskih stroških financiranja in dejanski stopnji rasti BDP je znatno negativno vplivalo na dinamiko dolga v več državah.
Reply of the Commission 120 Box 7 (ii) Regarding Italy’s compliance with the debt‐reduction benchmark, the Commission underlines that it could not yet carry out an assessment regarding 2016 when the 126(3) report was produced in early 2015. 
Odgovori Komisije 120 Okvir 7 (ii) Komisija v zvezi s skladnostjo Italije z merilom za zmanjšanje dolga poudarja, da še ni mogla izvesti ocenjevanja za leto 2016, ko je bilo na začetku leta 2015 pripravljeno poročilo na podlagi člena 126(3).
Before an assessment for the next year can be made, a legally valid Council requirement has to be set. 
Preden je mogoče izvesti ocenjevanje za naslednje leto, mora biti določena pravno veljavna zahteva Sveta.
Coun‐ cil recommendations are given in spring. 
Svet priporočila poda spomladi.
For Member States in the preventive arm of the SGP, such require‐ ments are set on the basis of the cyclical position of the economy of the Member State concerned (as measured by the output gap) and its sustainability risks (details are found in the Commission Communication on Flex‐ ibility of January 2015 which is available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/ pdf/2015‐01‐13_communication_sgp_flexibility_guidelines_en.pdf The first assessment of compliance for 2016 was done in spring 2015 and pointed to broad compliance with the requirements. 
Za države članice iz preventivnega dela Pakta za stabilnost in rast se te zahteve določijo na podlagi cikličnega stanja gospodarstva zadevne države članice (kakor je izmerjeno glede na proizvodno vrzel) in tveganj glede vzdržnosti – podrobnosti so navedene v sporočilu Komisije o prožnosti iz januarja 2015, ki je na voljo na http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/SL/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0012&qid=1458080409812&from=EN. Prvo ocenjevanje skladnosti za leto 2016 je bilo izvedeno pomladi 2015 in je pokazalo na veliko skladnost z zahtevami.
Details can be found in the relevant SWDs available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ economic_governance/sgp/deficit/countries/italy_en.htm. 
Podrobnosti so navedene v zadevnih delovnih dokumentih služb Komisije, ki so na voljo na http://ec.europa. eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/countries/italy_en.htm.
Box 7 (iii) The Commission underlines that a methodological framework for assessing the impact of structural reforms upon fiscal sustainability was outlined in a note provided to Member States through the EFC‐A in February 2015. 
Okvir 7 (iii) Komisija poudarja, da je bil metodološki okvir za ocenjevanje vpliva strukturnih reform na fiskalno vzdržnost predstavljen v dopisu, posredovanem državam članicam prek namestnikov Ekonomsko-finančnega odbora februarja 2015.
In the assessment of Italy’s Stability Programme, carried out in May 2015, the Commission stated that it had carried out an assessment of the potential impact on public finance sustainability of the structural reforms plan put forward by the authorities and that given the methods used to simulate their effects (in particular QUEST) the quantified impact of the reforms was assessed by the Commission to be plausible. 
Pri ocenjevanju italijanskega programa stabilnosti, izvedenem maja 2015, je navedla, da je ocenila morebitni vpliv na vzdržnost javnih financ iz načrta strukturnih reform, ki so ga predložili organi oblasti, in da je glede na metode, uporabljene za prikaz njihovih učinkov (zlasti QUEST), ocenila, da je količinsko opredeljeni vpliv reform verjeten.
78 The Commission acted in full compliance with the rules. 
78 Komisija je ravnala povsem v skladu s pravili.
The obligation (rather than possibility) of taking into account relevant factors is explicit in the Regulation, which refers to the non‐exhaustive lists of factors to be consid‐ ered. 
Obveznost (in ne možnost) upoštevanja pomembnih dejavnikov je jasno določena v Uredbi, ki navaja neizčrpne sezname dejavnikov, ki jih je treba upoštevati.
Among these, the adjustment toward the MTO, the implementation of policies to prevent and correct imbal‐ ances and the implementation of policies in the context of the common growth strategy of the Union are explicitly mentioned. 
Med njimi so izrecno navedeni prilagajanje srednjeročnemu proračunskemu cilju, izvajanje politik za preprečevanje in odpravljanje neravnotežij ter izvajanje politik v okviru skupne strategije Unije za rast.
The debt rule does not automatically imply that a Member State is put in EDP once the quantified target is missed. 
Pravilo o dolgu ne pomeni, da se za državo članico samodejno uvede postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, ko ta ne izpolni količinsko opredeljenega cilja.
This non‐automaticity is explicitly foreseen in the Regulation. 
Ta nesamodejnost je v Uredbi izrecno predvidena.
80 The Commission considers that the measure concerned should not be classified as a one‐off in line with the guid‐ ing principles updated in the 2015 Report on Public Finances in EMU in order to ensure their consistent application. 
80 Komisija meni, da zadevnega ukrepa ne bi smeli šteti za enkratnega v skladu z vodilnimi načeli, posodobljenimi v Poročilu o javnih financah v EMU v letu 2015, za zagotovitev njihove dosledne uporabe.
According to this guidance, the surcharge was, intrinsically, of neither a temporary nor non‐recurrent nature − it was expected to have a durable impact (from 2012 to 2017) − and, as a result, could not have been classified as a one‐off. 
V skladu s temi smernicami dodatek sam po sebi ni bil niti začasen niti neponavljajoč–, saj naj bi imel po pričakovanjih trajen vpliv (od leta 2012 do leta 2017)– in ga zato ni bilo mogoče šteti za enkratnega.
The 2015 Report on Public Finances is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/ european_economy/public_finances_emu_en.htm 
Poročilu o javnih financah v letu 2015 je na voljo na: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/public_finances_emu_en.htm.
Reply of the Commission 121 81 On 10 March 2015, the Council considered that the available evidence did not allow concluding on no effective action as the cumulated fiscal effort was found to be in line with the level required by the Council (based on the bottom‐up methodology, the top down being impacted by low inflation) and that an extension of the correction deadline was therefore warranted. 
Odgovori Komisije 121 81 Svet je 10. marca 2015 menil, da na podlagi razpoložljivih dokazov ni mogoče sklepati, da ni uspešnega ukrepanja, saj je bilo ugotovljeno, da je skupni fiskalni napor v skladu z ravnjo, ki jo zahteva Svet (na podlagi metodologije od spodaj navzgor, na metodologijo od zgoraj navzdol pa je vplivala nizka inflacija), in da je treba zato podaljšati rok za odpravo.
Moreover, the outturn data (and also the Commission 2015 spring forecast on the headline balance for 2015) was better than expected by the Commission in March 2015. 
Poleg tega so bili podatki o realizaciji (in tudi napoved Komisije pomladi 2015 o nominalnem saldu za leto 2015) boljši, kot je Komisija pričakovala marca 2015.
82 The Commission does not agree with this observation as according to the information available at the time of the assessment, a timely correction by 2015 appeared no longer within reach. 
82 Komisija se s tem opažanjem ne strinja, saj se po informacijah, ki so bile na voljo v času ocenjevanja, pravočasna odprava do leta 2015 ni zdela več mogoča.
In such circumstances, it is appropriate within the legal framework of the SGP: (i) to investigate the causes for this, which resulted in the finding that ‘overall the available evidence does not allow concluding that the recommended effort has not been delivered in 2013 – 2014’, and (ii) to provide a new, valid adjustment path in order to provide adequate policy guidance to the country concerned. 
V takih okoliščinah je ustrezno v pravnem okviru Pakta za stabilnost in rast: (i) raziskati vzroke za to, kar kaže na ugotovitev, da „na podlagi razpoložljivih dokazov na splošno ni mogoče sklepati, da priporočena prizadevanja v letih 2013 in 2014 niso bila izpolnjena“, in (ii) zagotoviti nov veljaven način prilagoditve, da se zadevni državi zagotovijo ustrezne smernice glede politike.
83 The Commission recalls its obligation under the Regulation to take account of the relevant factors. 
83 Komisija spominja na svojo obveznost v skladu z Uredbo, da upošteva pomembne dejavnike.
The legislation sets out a non‐exhaustive lists of factors to be considered. 
V zakonodaji so določeni neizčrpni seznami dejavnikov, ki jih je treba upoštevati.
Among these, the adjustment towards the MTO, the implementation of policies to prevent and correct imbalances and the implementation of policies in the context of the common growth strategy of the Union are explicitly mentioned. 
Med njimi so izrecno navedeni prilagajanje srednjeročnemu proračunskemu cilju, izvajanje politik za preprečevanje in odpravljanje neravnotežij ter izvajanje politik v okviru skupne strategije Unije za rast.
For the reasoning applied in the specific cases, the relevant documents are available at http://ec.europa.eu/ economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/countries/france_en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/economy_ finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/countries/italy_en.htm for France and Italy respectively. 
V zvezi z utemeljitvijo, uporabljeno v konkretnih zadevah, sta zadevna dokumenta na voljo na http://ec.europa.eu/ economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/countries/france_en.htm in http://ec.europa.eu/economy_ finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/countries/italy_en.htm za Francijo oziroma Italijo.
84 The Commission underlines that according to the legal framework, the Council is the decision‐making institution. 
84 Komisija poudarja, da je v skladu s pravnim okvirom Svet institucija, ki odloča.
Therefore, it has the right to overrule the Commission’s EDP recommendation and it is not liable to the Commission. 
Zato ima pravico, da ovrže priporočilo Komisije v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, in ni odgovoren Komisiji.
Member States’ reporting on corrective action could be improved The Commission considers that the existing provisions and/or guidelines on the content of fiscal surveillance docu‐ ments, including on reporting on EDP corrective action, provide a solid basis for the Commission to pursue effective fiscal surveillance and monitoring if adequately followed by the Member States. 
Države članice bi lahko izboljšale poročanje o popravljalnih ukrepih Komisija meni, da ji veljavne določbe in/ali smernice o vsebini dokumentov v zvezi s fiskalnim nadzorom, vključno s poročanjem o popravljalnih ukrepih v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, dajejo trdno podlago za učinkovit fiskalni nadzor in spremljanje, če jih države članice ustrezno spoštujejo.
The Commission therefore does not see any specific need to change existing legislation in order to impose stronger reporting obligations on the Member States. 
Zato ne vidi nobene konkretne potrebe po spremembi veljavne zakonodaje, da bi se državam članicam naložile večje obveznosti glede poročanja.
Reply of the Commission 122 85 To enforce compliance with reporting requirements, the possibility for sanctions under the EDP is limited to non‐compliance with the EDP budgetary targets. 
Odgovori Komisije 122 85 Za uveljavljanje skladnosti z zahtevami glede poročanja je možnost sankcij v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem omejena na neskladnost s proračunskimi cilji v okviru navedenega postopka.
However, a lack of adequate reporting can be to the disadvantage of the concerned Member State as a lack of sufficiently detailed information made available to the Commission on action taken and budgetary developments could potentially lead to the stepping up of the EDP if this leads to the conclusion that the EDP targets are not met. 
Vendar lahko pomanjkanje ustreznega poročanja škodi zadevni državi članici, saj lahko pomanjkanje dovolj podrobnih informacij o sprejetih ukrepih in proračunskih gibanjih, danih na voljo Komisiji, vodi do strožjega postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, če se na ta način ugotovi, da cilji navedenega postopka niso doseženi.
In any event, the Commission engages in continuous monitoring of Member States’ fiscal positions through the rele‐ vant country‐desks, which engage in regular surveillance missions to the Member States. 
Komisija vsekakor stalno spremlja fiskalno stanje držav članic prek zadevnih nacionalnih referentov, ki sodelujejo pri rednih nadzornih misijah v državah članicah.