natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Part I — The Commission was unprepared for the magnitude of the crisis that broke out 23 38 The estimate of the scale of overheating (the size of a positive output gap30) was in line with the strong increase in the indicators of the overall production capacity of the economy. 
Del I – Komisija ni bila pripravljena na razsežnost krize, ki je izbruhnila 23 38 Ocena stopnje pregrevanja (velikost pozitivne proizvodne vrzeli30) je bila v skladu z veliko rastjo kazalnikov skupnih proizvodnih zmogljivosti gospodarstva.
However, this increase was generated by the housing booms, and investments in housing do not have the same effect on increasing the economy’s potential as other more productive investments. 
Vendar so tej rasti botrovali razcveti na področju nepremičnin, naložbe v nepremičnine pa nimajo enakega učinka na povečanje potenciala gospodarstva kot druge, produktivnejše naložbe.
39 The Commission had focused on assessing the output gap in the real economy, without considering sector imbalances such as in the financial or construction sectors. 
39 Komisija se je osredotočila na ocenjevanje proizvodne vrzeli v realnem sektorju, ne da bi preučila sektorska neravnovesja, kakršna so na primer v finančnem ali gradbenem sektorju.
However, it became clear during the crisis that inflation and output monitoring are not enough to guarantee macroeconomic stability and sustainable fiscal balances. 
Med krizo pa je postalo jasno, da spremljanje inflacije in proizvoda ni dovolj za zagotovitev makroekonomske stabilnosti in vzdržnega fiskalnega salda.
The surveillance framework has since been significantly overhauled to take greater account of financial-sector and macroeconomic risks. 
Nadzorni okvir je bil po tem znatno prenovljen, da bi v večji meri upošteval tveganja finančnega sektorja in makroekonomska tveganja.
Assessments underestimated the potential fiscal risks 41 The Stability and Growth Pact requires Member States to report recent fiscal developments and forecasts in their stability and convergence programmes. 
Ocene so podcenjevale potencialna fiskalna tveganja 41 Pakt za stabilnost in rast od držav članic zahteva, da v svojih programih za stabilnost in konvergenčnih programih poročajo o nedavnem fiskalnem dogajanju in napovedih.
These programmes are assessed by the Commission, which checks the plausibility of the trajectories forecast for GDP and the public budget. 
Komisija te programe oceni in preveri verodostojnost napovedi gibanja BDP in javnega proračuna.
42 One important drawback of the Commission’s assessments prior to 2009 was the lack of reporting on the build-up of contingent public-sector liabil-ities31. Fiscal risks related to financial stability, state-owned enterprises or other public guarantees (e.g. PPPs) were not identified. 
42 Pomembna slabost ocen Komisije pred letom 2009 je bilo nezadostno poročanje o kopičenju pogojnih obveznosti javnega sektorja.31 Tako niso bila opredeljena fiskalna tveganja, povezana s finančno stabilnostjo, podjetji v državni lasti ali drugimi javnimi jamstvi (npr. javno-zasebnimi partnerstvi).
43 The Commission’s surveillance did not adequately assess the implications of the large foreign financial inflows, especially in the form of debt, which were fuelling construction and demand booms and had the potential to disrupt the banking sector in a subsequent bust phase. 
43 Komisija pri svojem nadzoru ni ustrezno ocenila posledic velikih tujih finančnih prilivov, zlasti v obliki dolžniških instrumentov, ki so krepili razcvet gradbeništva in povpraševanja ter bili zmožni porušijo delovanje bančnega sektorja v fazi upada, ki je sledila.
The Commission did not note this link prior to its analysis of Member State requests for financial assistance. 
Komisija pred analizo prošenj za finančno pomoč, ki so jih vložile države članice, ni odkrila te povezave.
30 A positive output gap is the amount by which the actual output of an economy exceeds its potential output. 
30 Pozitivna proizvodna vrzel je količina, za katero dejanski proizvod gospodarstva preseže njegov potencialni proizvod.
31 For example, the long-term liabilities from public pensions or significant future fiscal expenditure resulting from the need to take measures in the event of a bailout. 
31 Na primer: dolgoročne obveznosti za javne pokojnine ali znatni prihodnji fiskalni odhodki zaradi potrebe po ukrepanju v primeru reševanja z javnimi sredstvi.
With the exception of the public pension liabilities, the Commission did not report on other contingent liabilities. 
Z izjemo obveznosti za javne pokojnine Komisija ni poročala o drugih pogojnih obveznostih.
40 The Commission identified some sector booms after the event; for instance, a construction boom was noted in Ireland, Latvia and Romania and private credit booms in all five countries. 
Na Irskem, v Latviji in Romuniji je bil na primer zabeležen razcvet gradbeništva, v vseh petih državah pa razcvet zasebnega kreditiranja.
Part I — The Commission was unprepared for the magnitude of the crisis that broke out 24 44 Neither did the Commission’s assessments examine the sensitivity of budget balances to a sudden hike in the interest rates applied to government debt, or to equally sudden shocks to economic growth or exchange rates. 
Del I – Komisija ni bila pripravljena na razsežnost krize, ki je izbruhnila 24 44 Komisija v svojih ocenah poleg tega ni preučila občutljivosti proračunskega ravnotežja na nenaden porast obrestnih mer za državni dolg ali za enako nenadne pretrese v zvezi z gospodarsko rastjo ali menjalnimi tečaji.
So, providing countries with financial assistance was in effect a new activity for the Commission. 
Zagotavljanje finančne pomoči državam je bila tako dejansko nova dejavnost za Komisijo.
46 Having underestimated the fiscal imbalances and their implications for the Member States, the Commission was unprepared for the task of programme management. 
46 Ker je Komisija podcenjevala fiskalna neravnovesja in njihove posledice za države članice, ni bila pripravljena na nalogo upravljanja programov.
The initial programmes in particular had to be set up under extreme time pressure. 
Zlasti prvi programi so bili pripravljeni v izjemni časovni stiski.
For instance, the proposal for the first programme (Hungary) had to be produced in just a few days. 
Predlog za prvi program (Madžarska) je moral biti na primer pripravljen v le nekaj dneh.
47 During the initial phase, IMF teams helped the Commission to prepare parts of the programme analysis. 
47 V začetni fazi so ekipe MDS Komisiji pomagale pripraviti dele programske analize.
The practices used by the Commission were also developed on the basis of IMF practices (see paragraph 109). 
Tudi prakse, ki jih je uporabila Komisija, so bile razvite na podlagi praks MDS (glej odstavek 109).
32 See, for instance, ‘Fiscal policies and financial markets’ in ECB Monthly Bulletin 02/2006, p. 
32 Glej na primer prispevek o fiskalnih politikah in finančnih trgih z naslovom Fiscal Policies and Financial Markets v mesečnem biltenu ECB št. 02/2006, str.
33 Council Decision 93/67/EEC of 18 January 1993 concerning a Community loan in favour of the Italian Republic (OJ L 22, 30.1.1993, p. 
33 Council Decision 93/67/EEC of 18 January 1993 concerning a Community loan in favour of the Italian Republic (Odločba Sveta 93/67/EGS z dne 18. januarja 1993 o posojilu Skupnosti v korist Italijanske republike) (UL L 22, 30.1.1993, str.
Part II 25 Processes were generally weak 48 The regulations entrust the European Commission with the operational management of financial assistance. 
Del II 25 Postopki so bili v glavnem šibki 48 V skladu s predpisi ima Evropska komisija nalogo operativnega upravljanja finančne pomoči.
A large part of this is about arriving at key programme decisions concerning the initial granting of assistance and (at each review) the continuation of the programme. 
Pomemben del tega je sprejemanje ključnih programskih odločitev, ki se nanašajo na prvotno odobritev pomoči in (ob vsakem pregledu) nadaljevanje programa.
Decision-making requires a sequence of steps and coordination with the Council and the other partners (see Figure 4). 
Sprejemanje odločitev zahteva določeno zaporedje korakov ter usklajevanje s Svetom in partnerjema (glej sliko 4).
Did the interaction with other partners work? Part II — Processes were generally weak 26 Programme decisions A Programme timeline Programme negotiation Decisions on granting assistance What decisions are taken? 
Del II – Postopki so bili v glavnem šibki 26 Programske odločitve A Časovnica programa Pogajanja o programu Sklepi o odobritvi pomoči Kakšni sklepi se sprejemajo?
1st review Decisions on programme continuation 2nd review Decisions on programme continuation Council decision1 nth review B Setting of general programme parameters Drawing up of a detailed reform agenda Overall amount and maturity Deficit targets Broad areas of structural reforms Set out in a memorandum of understanding signed by the Member State and the European Commission Not all decisions are needed at each review. 
Prvi pregled Sklepi o nadaljevanju programa Drugi pregled Sklepi o nadaljevanju programa Sklep Sveta1 N-ti pregled B Določitev splošnih parametrov programa Priprava podrobnega programa reform Celoten znesek in zapadlost Cilji glede primanjkljaja Širša področja strukturnih reform določeno v memorandumu o soglasju, ki ga podpišeta država članica in Evropska komisija Ob vsakem pregledu niso potrebni vsi sklepi.
For instance if no changes are necessary to the general parameters of assistance, the Council decision does not have to be amended. 
Če na primer ni treba spremeniti splošnih parametrov pomoči, sklepa Sveta ni treba spremeniti.
Each decision consists of three separate acts Release of payment Commission Decision Typically taken by the Vice President on the Commission's behalf 1 In case of the Irish and Portuguese programmes, the general programme parameters were set both by the Council and the EFSF board of directors, i.e. the Eurogroup. 
Vsak sklep sestavljajo trije ločeni dokumenti Sprostitev izplačila Sklep Komisije Običajno ga sprejme podpredsednik v imenu Komisije 1 V primeru irskega in portugalskega programa sta splošne parametre programa določila Svet in upravni odbor EFSF, tj. Euroskupina.
The EFSF decision-making process is separate from the EU decision-making procedure. 
Sprejemanje odločitev znotraj EFSF se razlikuje od sprejemanja odločitev na ravni EU.
Part II — Processes were generally weak 27 C Sequence of steps 1 Defines the mandate for the negotiation team Carried out in parallel with IMF and ECB staff statement by Council or Eurogroup if new programme or important amendment discussion by EFC and EWG2 indications from chair of EFC and EWG Depending on importance, can take different forms: Council position Policy brief update to the negotiation mandate Commissioner EFC and EWG chair Other partners Negotiation of review visit Programme documents Interaction with the other partners to align their positions to reach a common agreement Explanatory note or review report If changes to reform + agenda are necessary + If new programme or Council conditions are to be changed Draft MoU Draft Council decision 2 Audit areas 3 Internal review by the Commission Decision by the College of Commissioners Consultation in the Economic and Financial Committee and Eurogroup Working Group Council decision Signature of MoU Commission decision Source: ECA. 
Del II – Postopki so bili v glavnem šibki 27 C Zaporedje korakov 1 Opredeljuje mandat za pogajalsko ekipo Izvaja se vzporedno z osebjem MDS in ECB Glede na pomembnost ima lahko različne oblike: Izjava Sveta ali Euroskupine v primeru novega programa ali pomembnih sprememb Razprave EFC in EWG2 Navedbe predsednika EFC in EWG Stališče Sveta Dokument o politiki Obisk za potrebe pogajanj ali pregleda Programski dokumenti posodobitev komisar pogajalskega mandata predsednik EFC in EWG Drugi partnerji Sodelovanje z drugimi partnerji, da bi uskladili stališča in dosegli sporazum Obrazložitev ali poročilo o pregledu če so potrebne + spremembe programa reform V primeru novega programa ali spremembe pogojev Sveta Osnutek MoS + Osnutek sklepa Sveta Notranji pregled v Komisiji Sklep kolegija komisarjev 2 Področja revizije 3 Posvetovanje znotraj Ekonomsko-finančnega odbora in delovne skupine Euroskupine Sklep Sveta Podpis MoS Sklep Komisije Obrok se izplača le, če je država članica podpisala nov MoS Na prošnjo države članice Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče.
Process within the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 2. 
Postopek v Generalnem direktoratu za gospodarske in finančne zadeve 2.
Information provided to the Council and the Commissioner responsible 3. 
Informacije, posredovane Svetu in pristojnemu komisarju 3.
Interaction with other partners 2 EFC – Economic and Financial Committee, EWG – Eurogroup Working Group MoU – memorandum of understanding Figure 4 
Sodelovanje z drugimi partnerji Izplačilo 2 EFC - Ekonomsko-finančni odbor, EWG - delovna skupina Euroskupine MoS - memorandum o soglasju Silka 4
Part II — Processes were generally weak 28 The Commission’s processes did not always incorporate sufficient checks and balances 50 The Commission’s processes should ensure — through sufficient checks and balances — that the initial programme design and any updates meet the following criteria: (i) comprehensiveness — relevant information, both in relation to the Member State and from economic research, should be taken on board; (ii) consistency — different elements of the programme should be mutually consistent, with a minimum of conflict between the different programme objectives; (iii) documentation — due record should be kept of the reasoning behind the decisions made on various elements of the programme34; (iv) conformity — the memoranda of understanding should be in line with the Council decisions; (v) even-handedness — as programme conditions are mostly drawn up by Commission’s ‘programme teams’, countries should be treated consistently by the different teams, applying similar conditions in similar circumstances35. 
Del II – Postopki so bili v glavnem šibki 28 Procesi Komisije niso vedno vključevali dovolj dobrega sistema zavor in ravnotežja 50 Procesi Komisije bi morali z dovolj dobrim sistemom zavor in ravnotežja zagotoviti, da prvotna zasnova programa in vse posodobitve izpolnjujejo naslednja merila: (i) celovitost – upoštevati bi morali ustrezne informacije tako v zvezi z državo članico kot iz ekonomskih raziskav; (ii) skladnost – različni elementi programa bi se morali medsebojno skladati, med različnimi programskimi cilji pa bi moralo biti kar najmanj navzkrižij; (iii) dokumentacija – treba bi bilo voditi ustrezne evidence argumentov za odločitve o različnih elementih programa;34 (iv) skladnost – memorandumi o soglasju bi morali biti usklajeni s sklepi Sveta; (v) nepristranskost – ker programske pogoje v glavnem pripravljajo programske skupine Komisije, bi morale biti različne skupine usklajene pri obravnavi držav in v podobnih okoliščinah uporabiti podobne pogoje.35 51 Delo programskih skupin bi morali preverjati in kritično obravnavati, da bi zagotovili, da skupine spoštujejo ta merila.
The Commission was mostly thorough in obtaining the necessary information for monitoring purposes The Commission extensively relied on internal expertise as well as liaising with a number of actors in Member States 52 The Commission relied on the internal expertise available in the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. 
Komisija je bila večinoma temeljita pri pridobivanju potrebnih informacij za spremljanje Komisija se je močno zanašala na strokovno znanje svojih uslužbencev ter na povezovanje z več akterji v državah članicah 52 Komisija se je zanašala na strokovno znanje uslužbencev Generalnega direktorata za gospodarske in finančne zadeve.
Over time, it also increasingly consulted specialists from other directorates-general. These other experts provided limited input for the initial programmes, mainly through interdepartmental (‘inter-service’) consultation. 
Kasneje se je vse bolj posvetovala tudi s strokovnjaki iz drugih generalnih direktoratov, ki so zagotovili nekaj vhodnih informacij za prvotne programe, in sicer v glavnem s posvetovanjem med službami.
They were more extensively involved in the two euro area programmes. 
Obširneje so bili vključeni v dva programa v okviru evrskega območja.
The use of wider expertise allowed for a more thorough analysis of countries’ problems, especially in the area of structural reforms. 
Uporaba širšega strokovnega znanja je omogočila temeljitejšo analizo problemov posameznih držav, zlasti na področju strukturnih reform.
The Commission’s human resources policy also did not allow greater use of external expertise for specific narrowly defined areas, a practice common in the IMF. 
Politika Komisije glede človeških virov poleg tega ni omogočala večjega angažiranja zunanjih strokovnjakov za posebna ozko opredeljena področja, kar je sicer stalna praksa v MDS.
34 Commission internal control standards Nos 8 and 11. 
34 Standardi za notranji nadzor Komisije št. 8 in 11.
35 Several studies confirm that this risk is real. 
35 Več študij potrjuje, da je to realno tveganje.
For instance, an overview of relevant academic research can be found in Hakan Gunaydin, Compliance with the IMF conditionality: Selection bias and conditions on social policy — Prepared for the PEIO Annual Meeting, 2014. 
Pregled ustreznih akademskih raziskav je na primer v prispevku Hakan Gunaydin: Compliance with the IMF conditions: Selection Bias and Conditions on Social Policy (skladnost s pogoji MDS: pristranskost pri izbiri in pogoji glede socialne politike), pripravljenem za letno konferenco PEIO, 2014.
The Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF also provided an account of lack of even-handedness that it noted in its evaluations. 
Neodvisni urad za vrednotenje pri MDS je prav tako poročal o pomanjkanju nepristranskosti, ki ga je opazil v vrednotenjih.
For more details, see IEO, Recurring issues from a decade of evaluation lessons for the IMF, 2014. 
Za več podrobnosti glej IEO: Recurring Issues from a Decade of Evaluation – Lessons for the IMF (IEO: ponavljajoče se težave, razvidne iz desetletja vrednotenj – spoznanja za MDS), 2014.
Part II — Processes were generally weak 29 53 The regular country visits made by the Commission and the other partners provided the main opportunity for obtaining the necessary information for monitoring. 
Del II – Postopki so bili v glavnem šibki 29 53 Redni obiski držav, ki so jih opravljali Komisija in partnerja, so bili glavna priložnost za pridobivanje potrebnih informacij za spremljanje.
During its negotiation and review visits, the Commission consulted a number of ministries, other government departments and key independent institutions (such as central banks, fiscal councils and supreme audit institutions). 
Med obiski v okviru pogajanj in pregledov se je Komisija posvetovala z več ministrstvi, drugimi vladnimi oddelki in ključnimi neodvisnimi institucijami (kot so centralne banke, fiskalni sveti in vrhovne revizijske institucije).
It also held meetings with other bodies, including employers’ associations, trade unions and opposition political parties. 
Organizirala je tudi srečanja z drugimi organi, vključno z združenji delodajalcev, sindikati in opozicijskimi političnimi strankami.
In three of the five countries36 the Commission maintained a resident representative. 
V treh36 od petih držav je imela stalnega lokalno prisotnega predstavnika.
All of this enabled the Commission to stay informed and to identify reforms for inclusion in the programme. 
Vse to ji je omogočilo, da je bila ves čas obveščena in da je ugotovila, katere reforme je bilo treba vključiti v program.
The Commission collected a wide range of information 54 In addition to the information gathered from country visits, each memorandum of understanding specified monitoring reports that the country in question was required to provide to the Commission. 
Komisija je zbrala širok nabor informacij 54 Poleg informacij, zbranih z obiski držav, je vsak memorandum o soglasju določal poročila o spremljanju, ki jih je morala zadevna država članica zagotavljati Komisiji.
The information to be collected in these reports was very broad and touched on many areas. 
Informacije, ki naj bi bile zbrane v teh poročilih, so bile zelo široke in so zadevale mnoga področja.
The Commission requested similar monitoring information in all programmes. 
Komisija je v vseh programih zahtevala podobne informacije o spremljanju.
However, in a few cases key information was not requested or only a limited amount of key information was collected. 
Kljub temu pa v nekaj primerih ključne informacije niso bile zahtevane ali pa je bila zbrana le manjša količina ključnih informacij.
Programme forecasts provide for broad checks of consistency in programme design, but with many caveats which are not verified 55 Good forecasting is essential for programme consistency. However, forecasts are unlikely to be 100 % accurate all the time, as they involve many imponderables which cannot be predicted with any precision. 
Programske napovedi omogočajo široka preverjanja skladnosti zasnove programa, vendar vsebujejo številne nepreverjene predpostavke 55 Dobro napovedovanje je bistveno za konsistentnost programa, vendar so napovedi le redko ves čas stoodstotno točne, saj vključujejo številne elemente, ki jih ni mogoče natančno predvideti.
Instead of focusing on the accuracy of forecasts, we assessed the quality of the forecasting processes and tools applied by the Commission in the programme context. 
Pri reviziji se Sodišče ni osredotočalo na točnost napovedi, temveč je ocenjevalo kakovost postopkov in orodij, ki jih je Komisija uporabila za napovedi v okviru programov.
In practice, the Commission prepares two distinct but closely related forecasts (see Figure 5): (i) a programme forecast (comprising macroeconomic and deficit forecasts); and (ii) a financing gap estimate. 
V praksi Komisija pripravi dve ločeni, vendar tesno povezani napovedi (glej sliko 5): (i) programsko napoved (ki zajema makroekonomske napovedi in napovedi primanjkljaja) ter (ii) oceno finančne vrzeli.
36 Latvia, Ireland and Portugal. 
36 Latvija, Irska in Portugalska.
Part II — Processes were generally weak 30 Links between the programme forecast and financing gap estimate Programme forecast Financing gap estimate Macroeconomic forecast External financing gap estimate If part of forecast Linked through several accounting identities Accrual-based government deficit One-off expenditure due to financial sector rescue Deficit forecast Current account Government sector financing gap estimate Covering all financing needs of the economy Only for countries outside the euro area Other balance-of-payment accounts Net repayments of external government debt Net repayments of all government debt Cash-based government deficit Cash needs due to financial sector rescue Key: Accounting identity Link between two closely related variables Note: Only the key links are depicted. 
Del II – Postopki so bili v glavnem šibki 30 Povezave med programsko napovedjo in oceno finančne vrzeli Programska napoved Ocena finančne vrzeli Makroekonomska napoved Tekoči račun Ocena zunanje finančne vrzeli Če je del napovedi Povezani z več računovodskimi enakostmi Državni primanjkljaj na podlagi poslovnih dogodkov Enkratni odhodki zaradi reševanja finančnega sektorja Napoved primanjkljaja Ocena finančne vrzeli v sektorju države Zajema vse finančne potrebe v gospodarstvu Le za države zunaj euroobmočja Drugi plačilnobilančni računi Neto odplačila zunanjega državnega dolga Neto odplačila vsega državnega dolga Državni primanjkljaj na podlagi denarnih sredstev Denarne potrebe zaradi reševanja finančnega sektorja Legenda: Računovodska enakost Povezava med dvema tesno povezanima spremenljivkama Opomba: Prikazane so le ključne povezave.