natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Farms are normally visited only once for cross compliance, but the timing of the visit does not depend on when the requirements or standards can best be checked. 
Kmetije so običajno za navzkrižno skladnost obiskane le enkrat letno, vendar čas obiska ni odvisen od tega, kdaj bi bil najustreznejši čas za preverjanje zahtev ali standardov.
Cross compliance checks are concentrated in a limited period of the year, typically in the summer months. 
Pregledi navzkrižne skladnosti so zgoščeni v omejenem obdobju leta, običajno v poletnih mesecih.
However, a significant number of environmental SMRs and GAEC standards cannot be checked in this period, as they depend on farming practices which belong to other seasons (ploughing, spreading manure, mowing of pastures). 
Toda precejšnjega števila predpisanih zahtev ravnanja glede okolja in standardov za dobre kmetijske in okoljske pogoje v tem obdobju ni mogoče preveriti, saj so odvisni od kmečkih opravil, ki sodijo v druge letne čase (oranje, gnojenje, košnja).
As a result, the number of checks actually carried out for the obligations concerned was low, and, in some cases, reduced to zero. 
Zato so bili dejansko izvedeni pregledi za zadevne obveznosti maloštevilni, v nekaterih primerih pa jih sploh ni bilo.
11 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 
178/2002 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 28. januarja 2002 o določitvi splošnih načel in zahtevah živilske zakonodaje, ustanovitvi Evropske agencije za varnost hrane in postopkih, ki zadevajo varnost hrane (UL L 31, 1.2.2002, str.
27 BOX 3 EXAMPLES OF DIFFERENT USE OF BUFFER STRIPS In Finland, buffer strips of 0,6 metre are required by the GAEC standard for soil erosion. 
27 OKVIR 3 PRIMERI RAZLIČNE RABE VARNOSTNIH OBMOČIJ Na Finskem standard za dobre kmetijske in okoljske pogoje glede erozije tal zahteva varnostna območja širine 0,6 metra.
Agri-environment payments are made for wider buffer strips (at least 1 metre). 
Kmetijsko okoljska plačila se izplačajo za širša varnostna območja (vsaj 1 meter).
Wider buffer strips are compensated under agri-environment schemes. 
Za širša varnostna območja se izplačajo nadomestila v okviru kmetijsko okoljskih shem.
In the Netherlands, fertilisation is not allowed on buffer strips along surface waters under a requirement deriving from the nitrates Directive. 
Na Nizozemskem v skladu z zahtevo, ki izhaja iz direktive o nitratih, ni dovoljeno gnojiti na varnostnih območjih vzdolž površinskih voda.
The width of the strips vary from 0,25–9 metres depending on the crop and the method of applying plant protection products. 
Ta območja so široka od 0,25 metra do 9 metrov, odvisno od poljščine in načina nanosa fitofarmacevtskih sredstev.
There are no agri-environment schemes for buffer strips. 
Za varnostna območja ni kmetijsko okoljskih shem.
In Poland, no obligations were set for buffer strips under cross compliance, but farmers are compensated for buffer strips under an agri-environment scheme. 
Na Poljskem pri navzkrižni skladnosti niso bile določene nobene obveznosti za varnostna območja, vendar kmetje zanje prejmejo nadomestilo v okviru ene od kmetijsko okoljskih shem.
In Slovenia, there are no farmer obligations for buffer strips under cross compliance, and there are also no agri-environment schemes for buffer strips relating to arable land or grassland. 
Kmetje v Sloveniji v okviru navzkrižne skladnosti nimajo nobenih obveznosti za varnostna območja, prav tako pa ni nobenih kmetijsko okoljskih shem za varnostna območja v zvezi z obdelovalnimi površinami ali travišči.
In all Member States visited, the audit also found examples of obligations in the areas of environment and food safety which were difficult to verify, and where clear instructions for inspectors were missing. 
Pri reviziji so bili v vseh obiskanih državah članicah na področjih okolja in varnosti hrane odkriti primeri obveznosti, katerih izpolnjevanje je bilo težko preverjati, inšpektorji pa niso imeli jasnih navodil.
Cases in point include obligations such as “to avoid using heavy machines on wet ground”, “food stuffs must be safe”, “agricultural installations must be in good condition”, or “it is forbidden to apply plant protection products during flowering if bees are present in the field”. 
Med takšne primere sodijo obveznosti, kot so „izogibati se uporabi težkih strojev na razmočenem zemljišču“, „živila morajo biti varna“, „kmetijske zmogljivosti morajo biti v dobrem stanju“ ali „nanos fitofarmacevtskih sredstev med cvetenjem je prepovedan, če so na polju prisotne čebele“.
Such conditions are difficult to check, especially in the absence of a definition of the underlying terms and clear instructions as to what constitutes a non-compliance. 
Takšne pogoje je težko preveriti, zlasti če z njimi povezani izrazi niso opredeljeni in ni jasnih navodil o tem, kaj je neskladnost.
However, the problems described above do not exist in all cross compliance areas. 
Vendar se zgoraj opisane težave ne pojavljajo na vseh področjih navzkrižne skladnosti.
The proper identification and registration of animals, for example, can be verified throughout the year, and the related checks are more clearly defined (e.g. all animals must have ear tags or all animals on the farm must be recorded in the holding’s register). 
Ustrezno identifikacijo in registracijo živali je na primer mogoče preveriti kadar koli med letom in pripadajoči pregledi so jasneje opredeljeni (npr. vse živali morajo imeti ušesne znamke ali vse živali na kmetiji morajo biti zabeležene v registru kmetijskega gospodarstva).
The weaknesses identified before that the checks carried out at farm level were often minimal (see paragraphs 39, 59 and 60) concerned in particular the birds and habitats Directives. 
Že omenjene slabosti, da so bili pregledi na ravni kmetij pogosto omejeni (glej odstavke 39, 59 in 60), so zadevale zlasti direktivi o pticah in habitatih.
In Finland, checks were only carried out at farms where it was known that there were protected species, and a visual check while measuring the parcels to see if “anything looked wrong” was the sole check for many of the obligations in practice. 
Na Finskem so bile pregledane le kmetije, za katere se je vedelo, da so na njihovem ozemlju zaščitene vrste, za številne obveznosti pa je bil dejansko opravljen le vizualni pregled med merjenjem parcel, s katerim se je poskušalo ugotoviti, ali se „karkoli zdi narobe“.
In France and the Netherlands parcels are not visited as part of the cross compliance checks for the birds and habitats Directives, even when such parcels are located in Natura 2000 areas. 
Parcele v Franciji in na Nizozemskem niso obiskane v okviru pregledov navzkrižne skladnosti za direktivi o pticah in habitatih niti, če so na območjih Natura 2000.
Requirements and checks in these areas are of key importance to protect birds and habitats. 
Zahteve in pregledi na teh območjih so ključnega pomena za zaščito ptic in habitatov.
Due to the limited number and extent of the checks carried out for these two Directives, only a very low number of infringements was detected in 2005 and 200612. 
Zaradi omejenega števila in obsega pregledov, izvedenih za omenjeni direktivi, je bilo v letih 2005 in 2006 odkritih zelo malo kršitev12.
For example, in Finland, France, Greece and Slovenia not a single infringement was detected in 11 633 cross compliance checks for the birds Directive and 14 896 checks for the habitats Directive. 
Na Finskem, v Franciji, Grčiji in Sloveniji pri 11 633 pregledih navzkrižne skladnosti za direktivo o pticah in 14 896 pregledih za direktivo o habitatih na primer ni bila odkrita niti ena kršitev.
12 Data for 2007 was not yet available at the time of the audit. 28 
12 Podatki za leto 2007 v času revizije še niso bili na voljo. 28
The audit sought to compare the number and results of cross compliance checks with those of other checks. 
Cilj revizije je bila primerjava števila in rezultatov pregledov navzkrižne skladnosti s številom in rezultati drugih pregledov.
Where this information was available, it showed that comparable checks outside cross compliance resulted in significantly higher rates of non-compliance. 
Kadar so bili takšni podatki na voljo, so pokazali, da so bile pri podobnih pregledih zunaj navzkrižne skladnosti odkrite bistveno višje stopnje neskladnosti.
In the Netherlands, no non-compliance was detected in 2006 for the environmental Directives. 
Na Nizozemskem v letu 2006 za okoljski direktivi ni bila odkrita nobena neskladnost.
Outside the cross compliance control sample, a relatively high number of cases of non-compliance was detected (101 for the nitrates Directive, for instance). 
Zunaj vzorca za kontrolo pri navzkrižni skladnosti so bili odkriti relativno številni primeri neskladnosti (npr. 101 za direktivo o nitratih).
The Dutch authorities could not explain the reasons for this situation. 
Nizozemski organi oblasti niso mogli pojasniti vzrokov za to stanje.
In Finland, not all cases of non-compliance were reported in the cross compliance statistics, yet in 2006 checks for milk hygiene detected 920 infringements, representing 48 % of the farms checked. 
Na Finskem sporočeni statistični podatki o navzkrižni skladnosti niso vsebovali vseh primerov neskladnosti, kljub temu pa je bilo pri pregledih za higieno mleka v letu 2006 odkritih 920 kršitev, kar predstavlja 48 % vseh pregledanih kmetij.
It is a requirement of the regulations that non-compliances with the SMRs detected should result in cross compliance sanctions and be reported to the Commission. 
Uredbe zahtevajo, da se odkrite neskladnosti s predpisanimi zahtevami ravnanja sankcionirajo v okviru navzkrižne skladnosti in sporočijo Komisiji.
However, non-compliance detected in the cross compliance sample and reported to the Commission was only 6 %. 
Vendar je bilo samo 6 % neskladnosti, odkritih v vzorcu, sporočenih Komisiji.
Certain obligations were easier to check, and resulted in higher rates of non-compliance. 
Spoštovanje določenih obveznosti je bilo lažje preveriti in pri teh obveznostih so bile odkrite višje stopnje neskladnosti.
This was generally the case for requirements relating to the identification and registration of animals. 
Tako je bilo običajno pri zahtevah v zvezi z identifikacijo in registracijo živali.
Specific cases of checks which resulted in high rates of non-compliance were found in Slovenia, which carried out administrative controls to check whether or not farms exceeded limits for nitrates resulting from fertilisation with animal manure, and in Greece for crop rotation. 
Posebni primeri pregledov, pri katerih so bile odkrite visoke stopnje neskladnosti, so bili ugotovljeni v Sloveniji, ki je izvajala administrativne kontrole, da bi preverila, ali so kmetije zaradi gnojenja z živalskim gnojem presegale zgornje meje za nitrate, in v Grčiji na področju kolobarjenja.
THE SANCTION SYSTEM IS WEAK AND THE RESULTING REDUCTIONS IN DIRECT PAYMENTS ARE LOW 67. 
SISTEM SANKCIJ JE SLAB, POSLEDIČNA ZNIŽANJA NEPOSREDNIH PLAČIL PA NIZKA 67.
The Council Regulation states that if basic standards are not met, “Member States should withdraw direct aid in whole or in part on the basis of criteria which are proportionate, objective and graduated.” 
Uredba Sveta določa, da „morajo države članice v celoti ali delno odvzeti neposredno pomoč na podlagi sorazmernih, objektivnih in stopnjevitih meril,“ če osnovni standardi niso izpolnjeni.
Article 7 of the Regulation provides for such reductions to be calculated as a percentage of the aid received. 
Člen 7 Uredbe določa, da se takšna znižanja izračunajo kot odstotek prejete pomoči.
This links cross compliance reductions to historical CAP payments, because the latter form the basis for the aid received. 
Tako so znižanja pri navzkrižni skladnosti povezana s preteklimi plačili SKP, saj so slednja osnova za prejeto pomoč.
As a result, reductions in direct aid payments are not based on the cost of compliance nor on the consequences of non-compliance. 
Znižanja plačil neposredne pomoči tako ne temeljijo na strošku skladnosti niti na posledicah neskladnosti.
Under the current system, big polluters receiving low amounts of direct aid face low reductions, while small polluters receiving large amounts face higher reductions. 29 
V okviru sedanjega sistema se veliki onesnaževalci, ki prejemajo majhne zneske neposredne pomoči, soočajo z majhnimi znižanji, medtem ko se majhni onesnaževalci, ki prejemajo visoke zneske, soočajo z večjimi znižanji. 29
The Commission Regulation sets the reduction, as a general rule, at 3 % of the amount granted13. 
Uredba Komisije to znižanje na splošno določa v višini 3 % dodeljenega zne-ska13.
Member States may decide not to impose any reduction ortoreducetherateto1%ortoincreaseittoamaximumof5%. 
Države članice se lahko odločijo, da ne naložijo nobenega znižanja ali da stopnjo znižajo na 1 % ali jo zvišajo na največ 5 %.
For many obligations, the cost of compliance is higher than the maximum reduction rate of 5 %. 
Pri številnih obveznostih je strošek skladnosti višji od največje, 5-odstotne stopnje znižanja.
This means that the reductions do not have a deterrent effect. 
To pomeni, da znižanja nimajo odvračilnega učinka.
In the Netherlands, a cross compliance requirement deriving from the nitrates Directive is that the manure storage must have sufficient capacity to store the manure produced in the period September–February. 
Na Nizozemskem ena od zahtev navzkrižne skladnosti, ki izhaja iz direktive o nitratih, določa, da mora imeti skladišče za gnoj dovolj zmogljivosti za skladiščenje gnoja, ki se proizvede od septembra do februarja.
A milk farmer visited estimated that constructing a storage vessel meeting the technical requirement would cost between 20 000 and 30 000 euro. 
Kmet, ki se ukvarja s proizvodnjo mleka in pri katerem je bil izveden obisk, je ocenil, da bi za izdelavo skladiščne posode, ki bi ustrezala tehničnim zahtevam, porabil od 20 000 do 30 000 EUR.
Non-compliance with the requirement only leads to a reduction of 1 %, the average reduction in the Netherlands was 100 euro. 
Neskladnost z omenjeno zahtevo povzroča le 1-odstotno znižanje, pri čemer je povprečno znižanje na Nizozemskem znašalo 100 EUR.
The Council Regulation provides for higher rates of reduction in case of repeated non-compliance. 
Uredba Sveta predvideva višje stopnje znižanja v primeru ponovljene neskladnosti.
Although this should make the system more deterrent, data shows that this is not yet the case. 
Čeprav bi moral sistem zaradi tega delovati bolj odvračilno, podatki kažejo, da to še ni tako.
For instance, in Finland, more than half of the 104 farms that had been sanctioned for non-compliance in 2005 were sanctioned again in 2006. 
Na Finskem je bila na primer več kot polovica od 104 kmetij, ki so bile v letu 2005 sankcionirane zaradi neskladnosti, ponovno sankcioniranih v letu 2006.
The Council Regulation requires that, within the range of 1 % to 5 %, the reduction take account of the severity, extent and permanence of non-compliance. 
Uredba Sveta določa, da se pri znižanju med 1 % in 5 % upoštevajo resnost, obseg in trajnost neskladnosti.
However, the Member States audited generally did not define these terms adequately. 
Vendar revidirane države članice teh izrazov običajno niso ustrezno opredelile.
As a result, the sanctions neither depend on the extent nor on the consequences of the non-compliance, and flat rates, typically of 1 %, were applied. 
Tako sankcije niso odvisne ne od obsega ne od posledic neskladnosti, uporabljale pa so se pavšalne stopnje, običajno v višini 1 %.
For instance, a farmer in Portugal who had not complied with the identification rules for 209 animals received the same sanction (1 %) as a farmer in the same situation with only one animal. 
Kmet na Portugalskem, ki na primer ni spoštoval pravil za identifikacijo pri 209 živalih, je bil deležen enake sankcije (1 %) kot kmet, ki prav tako ni spoštoval teh pravil, vendar je imel le eno žival.
In Poland, a farmer with a higher number of cases of non-compliance may even face lower sanctions than a farmer with less cases of non-compliance. 
Na Poljskem je lahko kmet z večjim številom primerov neskladnosti celo deležen manjših sankcij kot kmet z manj primeri neskladnosti.
The audit revealed that there was a variety of reasons why detected non-compliance did not result in a reduction of the payment. 
Revizija je pokazala, da so obstajali različni razlogi, zakaj plačilo ni bilo znižano zaradi odkrite neskladnosti.
Some Member States give farmers the possibility to remedy the situation, or have a system of warnings. 
Nekatere države članice kmetom omogočajo, da stanje popravijo ali imajo sistem opominov.
Coordination between the different control bodies did not always function properly, so that detected cases of non-compliance were not reported to the body applying the sanctions. 
Usklajevanje med različnimi kontrolnimi organi ni vedno dobro delovalo, tako da odkriti primeri neskladnosti niso bili sporočeni organom, ki dodeljujejo sankcije.
There are obligations for which non-compliance results in a “sanction” of 0 %. 
Obstajajo tudi obveznosti, pri katerih se neskladnosti „sankcionira“ v višini 0 %.
Poland did not apply a sanction if the agricultural area concerned is less than 0,1 hectare. 
Poljska ni naložila sankcije, če je bila zadevna kmetijska površina manjša od 0,1 hektarja.
In Finland, although a case of non-compliance for groundwater requirements was detected, the sanction was set at 0 % on the grounds that the farmer was absent when his contractor used the prohibited products. 
Na Finskem je kljub odkritemu primeru neskladnosti z zahtevami za podzemno vodo sankcija znašala 0 % s pojasnilom, da je bil kmet odsoten, ko je njegov pogodbeni izvajalec uporabil prepovedana sredstva.
13 Higher rates apply to repeated cases of non-compliance (see paragraph 70) and to cases of non-compliance considered by the Member States as intentional (see paragraph 75). 30 
13 Višje stopnje se uporabljajo za ponovljeno neskladnost (glej odstavek 70) in za neskladnost, ki jo države članice obravnavajo kot namerno (glej odstavek 75). 30
As a result, most sanctions were low, both in relative and absolute terms, including in cases of non-compliance with key requirements such as those relating to the environment or public health. 
Tako je bila večina sankcij nizkih tako z vidika relativnih kot absolutnih vrednosti, čeprav so bili vmes primeri neskladnosti s ključnimi zahtevami, kot so zahteve glede okolja ali javnega zdravja.
As of 1 January 2008, the Council Regulation gives Member States the possibility not to apply a reduction or exclusion amounting to 100 euro or less. 
Uredba Sveta od 1. januarja 2008 državam članicam omogoča, da ne uvelja-vijo znižanja ali ukinitve, ki znaša 100 EUR ali manj.
While this may reduce the administrative burden, this will also significantly reduce the number of sanctions applied, also for non-compliance with key requirements. 
Tako se sicer lahko zmanjša administrativno breme, vendar se bo tudi bistveno zmanjšalo število naloženih sankcij, tudi za neskladnost s ključnimi zahtevami.
For instance, in the Netherlands the average sanction is 100 euro; in Finland, 65 % of the sanctions were below 100 euro while in Poland this rate was as high as 94 %. 
Na Nizozemskem na primer povprečna sankcija znaša 100 EU, na Finskem je bilo 65 % sankcij nižjih od 100 EUR, medtem ko je bilo na Poljskem takšnih sankcij 94 %.
31 BOX 4 EXAMPLES OF LOW SANCTIONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH KEY REQUIREMENTS In Finland, 35,5 % of the number of sanctions in 2006 were 0 %. 
31 OKVIR 4 PRIMERI NIZKIH SANKCIJ ZA NESKLADNOST S KLJUČNIMI ZAHTEVAMI Na Finskem je 35,5 % vseh sankcij v letu 2006 znašalo 0 %.
One of the requirements which is “sanctioned” with 0 % is the use of prohibited plant protection products which have been banned since December 2003. 
Ena od zahtev, ki se „sankcionira“ z 0 %, je uporaba nedovoljenih fitofarmacevtskih sredstev, ki so prepovedana od decembra 2003.
France uses a calculation method which has the effect of decreasing the sanctions for the environmental Directives. 
Francija uporablja metodo izračunavanja, ki učinkuje tako, da znižuje sankcije za okoljske direktive.
Severe breaches of the nitrates Directive, such as not respecting the ceiling of 170 kg nitrate per hectare, spreading manure in forbidden periods or using a storage vessel with insufficient capacity lead in practice to a reduction of payments of 1 %. 
Hude kršitve direktive o nitratih, kot so nespoštovanje zgornje meje 170 kg nitratov na hektar, gnojenje v prepovedanih obdobjih ali uporaba skladiščne posode z nezadostnimi zmogljivostmi, v praksi povzročajo 1-odstotna znižanja plačil.
In the Netherlands, regular controls (i.e. outside cross compliance) detected that a farmer used illegal growth hormones. 
Na Nizozemskem je bilo pri rednih kontrolah (tj. zunaj navzkrižne skladnosti) ugotovljeno, da je nek kmet uporabljal nedovoljene rastne hormone za živali.
Non-compliance with requirements for the identification and registration of animals by a farmer in Slovenia resulted in a 1 % reduction rate, which amounted to 0,97 euro. 
Ker kmet v Sloveniji ni spoštoval zahtev za identifikacijo in registracijo živali, je bilo njegovo plačilo znižano za 1 %, kar je znašalo 0,97 EUR.
Another farmer in Slovenia had breached requirements deriving from three legal acts: the nitrates Directive, the Regulation on identification and registration of animals, and the Regulation on food and feed law. 
Drug kmet v Sloveniji je kršil zahteve, ki izhajajo iz treh pravnih aktov: direktive o nitratih, uredbe o identifikaciji in registraciji živali ter uredbe o zakonodaji o krmi in živilih.
The sanction applied was 3 %, the amount concerned 15,26 euro. 
Uporabljena je bila sankcija v višini 3 %, zadevni znesek pa je znašal 15,26 EUR.
The different interpretations given by different Member States to certain elements of the sanction system lead to a situation where farmers are not treated equally for the same infringement. 
Ker si različne države različno razlagajo nekatere dele sistema sankcij, se dogaja, da kmetje za enake kršitve niso enakopravno obravnavani.
For instance, in the Netherlands missing ear tags for fewer than 10 pigs or 5 bovines results in a warning while in Greece a single missing ear tag is sanctioned. 
Na Nizozemskem se na primer izda opomin, če manjkajo ušesne znamke za manj kot deset prašičev ali manj kot pet govedi, medtem ko se v Grčiji sankcionira vsaka manjkajoča ušesna znamka.
The different calculation methods used by the Member States in the case of multiple cases of non-compliance may result in a farmer in one Member State getting twice the sanction rate as the farmer in another Member State. 
Ker države članice pri večkratnih primerih neskladnosti uporabljajo različne metode izračunavanja, se lahko zgodi, da kmet v eni državi članici prejme dvakrat višjo stopnjo sankcije kot kmet v drugi državi članici.
Intentionality is defined differently in different Member States. 
Različne države članice različno opredeljujejo namernost.
Some Member States consider the use of illegal substances such as hormones in stock farming as negligence, leading to a maximum sanction of 5 %. 
Nekatere države članice obravnavajo uporabo nedovoljenih sredstev, kot so hormoni pri živinoreji, kot malomarnost, kar povzroča največ 5-odstotno sankcijo.
Other Member States consider this to be intentional, leading to a sanction of 20 %. 
Druge države članice menijo, da je to namerno, kar povzroča sankcijo v višini 20 %.
The Commission Regulation determines that Member States must report on the number and results of the cross compliance checks, the area and proportion of the land under permanent pasture, and basic elements of the control system. 
Uredba Komisije določa, da morajo države članice poročati o številu pregledov navzkrižne skladnosti in o njihovih rezultatih, površini in deležu trajnih travnikov glede na skupna kmetijska zemljišča ter o osnovnih sestavnih delih sistema kontrole.