natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Member States and the Commission invest considerable time and effort in, respectively, preparing and assessing applications for smaller regional disasters that regularly lead to rejections. 
Države članice vložijo veliko časa in truda v pripravo vlog v zvezi z manjšimi regionalnimi nesrečami, službe Komisije pa v ocenjevanje teh vlog, ki so običajno zavrnjene.
In all cases cited where the Commission proposed the mobilisation of the EUSF, this was endorsed by the Council and Parliament. 
V vseh navedenih primerih, v katerih je Komisija predlagala uporabo SSEU, sta Svet in Parlament ta predlog odobrila.
Textbox 3. 
Okvir 3.
One reason for rejecting the Ôforest fireŐ applications in 2005 was that the disasters did not affect a major part of the population. 
Eden od razlogov za zavrnitev vlog v zvezi z „gozdnim požarom“ leta 2005 je bil, da nesreče niso prizadele večjega dela prebivalstva.
Another reason was that there had been no Ôserious and lasting repercussions on living conditions and the economic stability of the regionŐ. 
Drugi razlog je bil, da nesreče niso „resno in trajno vplivale na pogoje za življenje in gospodarsko stabilnost regije“.
C 153/16 EN Official Journal of the European Union 18.6.2008 The case of the Prestige oilspill to which the Court alludes is not comparable to any other application ever treated by the Commission because the Prestige disaster happened at sea where the population criterion cannot reasonably be applied. 
C 153/16 SL Uradni list Evropske unije 18.6.2008 Razlitje nafte s tankerja Prestige, ki ga omenja Računsko sodišče, ni primerljivo z nobeno drugo vlogo, ki jo je kdaj koli obravnavala Komisija, saj se je nesreča s tankerjem Prestige zgodila na morju, zato se merilo glede prebivalstva ne more razumno uporabiti.
As the Court indicates, activating the mechanism for civil protection is not a requirement under the Regulation. 
Kakor navaja Računsko sodišče, sprožitev mehanizma na področju civilne zaščite ni zahteva na podlagi Uredbe.
Thus, the question whether or not the civil protection mechanism was mobilised could not even have been relevant for the decision in both cases. 
Torej vprašanje, ali je bil mehanizem na področju civilne zaščite uporabljen, v nobenem od obeh primerov niti ne bi moglo biti relevantno za odločitev.
The method for calculating the grant was discussed in detail with the Council and has in no case given rise to criticisms from beneficiary countries. 
Metoda za izračun nepovratnih sredstev je bila predmet podrobnih razprav s Svetom in ni nikoli povzročila kritike s strani držav upravičenk.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 42. 
ZAKLJUČEK IN PRIPOROČILA 42.
The issues raised with regard to rapidity are inherent to the conditions and procedures imposed by the Solidarity Fund Regulation. 
Vprašanja, ki se zastavljajo v zvezi s hitrostjo odziva, so neločljivo povezana s pogoji in postopki, ki jih nalaga Uredba SSEU.
As the experience gathered so far shows that there is room Ń and in the CommissionŐs view the need Ń for improvement, the Commission in 2005 presented a proposal for a revised regulation with simpler and clearer criteria for its activation in less time. 
Ker dosedanje izkušnje kažejo, da so še vedno možne izboljšave – po mnenju Komisije pa so te izboljšave tudi potrebne – je Komisija leta 2005 predstavila predlog za revizijo Uredbe, da bi se določila preprostejša in jasnejša merila za njeno sprožitev v krajšem času.
The proposal was very favourably received by the European Parliament but so far there has been no progress in the Council. 
Evropski parlament je predlog sprejel z veliko naklonjenostjo, vendar pa v Svetu do zdaj še ni bilo napredka.
One of the major changes in the proposed, new regulation is therefore to resort only to quantitative thresholds for the level of damage required to trigger utilisation of the Fund, which would improve the transparency of the Fund. 
Ena večjih sprememb v predlogu za novo uredbo je tako uporaba samo kvantitativnih pragov za raven škode pri sprožitvi uporabe Sklada, s čimer bi se povečala preglednost Sklada.
With the proposed revision of the Solidarity Fund Regulation, the national authorities would have a clearer idea of when the Fund is likely to be able to support them in recovering from a disaster. 
S predlagano revizijo Uredbe SSEU bi imeli nacionalni organi jasnejšo predstavo o tem, kdaj bi jim Sklad lahko nudil podporo pri obnovi po nesreči.
As regards fairness, the prosperity of a country is taken into account mainly in the definition of the Ômajor disasterŐ threshold. 
Kar zadeva pravičnost, se blaginja države upošteva v glavnem v opredelitvi praga za „večjo nesrečo“.
The Commission agrees with the recommendation of the Court. 
Komisija se strinja s priporočilom Računskega sodišča.
It notes however that, shortly after the adoption of the Regulation, it published guidelines for applicant countries and explained in detail in what way it applies the provisions of the Regulation. 
Vendar pa opozarja, da je kmalu po sprejetju Uredbe objavila navodila za države prosilke, v katerih je podrobno pojasnila, na kakšne načine uporablja določbe Uredbe.
In order to simplify the procedure and to help avoid delays in the submission of information, the Commission developed a standard application form as well as a detailed guidance note for applications. 
Da bi poenostavila postopek in pomagala odpravljati zamude pri predložitvi podatkov, je Komisija oblikovala standardni obrazec za vlogo ter podrobna navodila za pripravo vlog.
It is also available on the InfoRegio website. 
Oboje je na voljo na spletni strani InfoRegio.
In many cases however, applications were submitted Ôad hocŐ, without the applicant states seeking any prior contact with the Commission. 
Vendar so bile vloge v veliko primerih predložene ad hoc, ne da bi države prosilke poskušale predhodno stopiti v stik s Komisijo.
The Commission agrees to the recommendation of the Court to establish direct contact with the body responsible for preparing the application. 
Komisija se strinja s priporočilom Računskega sodišča o vzpostavitvi neposrednega stika z organom, ki je odgovoren za pripravo vloge.
In the standard application form the Commission proposes that the applicant state indicates the body introducing the request and an administrative contact. 
V standardnem obrazcu za vlogo Komisija predlaga, da država prosilka navede organ, ki sproža vlogo, in upravno kontaktno točko.
In some cases up to now applicant states preferred that the Commission communicates via the Permanent Representation. 
Doslej so države članice v nekaterih primerih izrazile željo po tem, da jih Komisija obvešča prek stalnih predstavništev.
The Commission intends to extend its application guidelines in order to warn applicant bodies of possible sources of delays in the procedure and in order to stress the importance of sending back the application and any other document requested by the Commission rapidly. 
Komisija namerava razširiti svoja navodila za pripravo vlog, da bi bili organi prosilci opozorjeni glede možnih razlogov za zamude v postopku ter da bi poudarila pomen hitrega pošiljanja vloge in vseh drugih dokumentov, ki jih zahteva Komisija.
EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS EN THE EUROPEAN UNION’S AGENCIES: GETTING RESULTS Special Report No 5 2008 
EVROPSKO RAČUNSKO SODIŠČE SL AGENCIJE EVROPSKE UNIJE: DOSEGANJE REZULTATOV Posebno poročilo št. 5 2008
Special Report No 5 2008 THE EUROPEAN UNION’S AGENCIES: GETTING RESULTS (pursuant to Article 248(4), second subparagraph, EC) EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 
Posebno poročilo št. 5 2008 AGENCIJE EVROPSKE UNIJE: DOSEGANJE REZULTATOV (v skladu z drugim pododstavkom člena 248(4) ES) EVROPSKO RAČUNSKO SODIŠČE
EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 12, rue Alcide De Gasperi L-1615 Luxembourg Tel. 
EVROPSKO RAČUNSKO SODIŠČE 12, rue Alcide De Gasperi L-1615 Luxembourg Tel.
(352) 43 98-45410 Fax (352) 43 98-46430 E-mail: euraud@eca.europa.eu Internet: http://www.eca.europa.eu Special Report No 5 2008 More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). 
(352) 4398 45410 Faks (352) 4398 46430 E-pošta: euraud@eca.europa.eu Internet: http://www.eca.europa.eu Posebno poročilo št. 5 2008 Veliko dodatnih informacij o Evropski uniji je na voljo na internetu. Dostop je mogoč na strežniku Europa (http://europa.eu).
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2008 ISBN 978-92-9207-073-1 © European Communities, 2008 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
Luxembourg: Urad za uradne publikacije Evropskih skupnosti, 2008 ISBN 978-92-9207-088-5 © Evropski skupnosti, 2008 Reprodukcija je dovoljena z navedbo vira.
53–56 DID THE AGENCIES REPORT PROPERLY ON THEIR ACTIVITIES AND EVALUATE THEIR RESULTS? THE AGENCIES’ AND THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES 
53-56 ALI SO AGENCIJE USTREZNO POROČALE O SVOJIH DEJAVNOSTIH IN OCENJEVALE SVOJE REZULTATE? ODGOVORI KOMISIJE IN AGENCIJ
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I. The so-called ‘regulatory’ European agencies are independent, specialised bodies with responsibility for implementing certain aspects of Community sectoral policy. 
POVZETEK I. Tako imenovane regulativne agencije EU so neodvisni in specializirani organi, zadolženi za izvajanje nekaterih vidikov sektorskih politik Skupnosti.
They are different from the executive agencies, which are responsible for implementing Commission programmes financed out of appropriations that remain in the general budget. 
Razlikujejo se od izvajalskih agencij, ki so zadolžene za izvajanje programov Komisije, financiranih s proračunskimi sredstvi iz splošnega proračuna.
The regulatory agencies are subject to the principle of sound financial management. The aim is to guarantee that their results correspond to their objectives. 
Za regulativne agencije se uporablja načelo dobrega finančnega poslovodenja, ki mora zagotavljati ujemanje njihovih rezultatov in ciljev.
With this in mind, the Court considered whether the regulatory agencies subject to its audit: (i) planned their activities adequately; (ii) had introduced sound tools for monitoring their activities; (iii) gave a proper account of their activities and evaluated their results. 
Sodišče je ob upoštevanju tega preučilo, ali so regulativne agencije, ki so predmet njegove revizije: i) ustrezno načrtovale svoje dejavnosti; ii) uvedle zanesljiva orodja za spremljanje svojih dejavnosti; iii) primerno poročale o svojih dejavnostih in ocenjevanju svojih rezultatov.
The Court’s findings relate to eight regulatory agencies (European Agency for Safety and Health at Work; European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States; European Environment Agency; European Food Safety Authority; European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Condi-tions; European Maritime Safety Agency; European Medicines Agency; European Network and Information Security Agency) selected on the basis of a series of criteria such as the type of powers exercised, the length of time they had been established, and the budget or staff numbers. 
Ugotovitve Sodišča zadevajo osem regulativnih agencij (Evropska agencija za okolje; Evropska agencija za varnost hrane; Evropska agencija za zdravila; Evropska agencija za pomorsko varnost; Evropska agencija za varnost omrežij in informacij; Evropska fundacija za izboljšanje življenjskih in delovnih razmer; Evropska agencija za upravljanje in operativno sodelovanje na zunanjih mejah držav članic; Evropska agencija za varnost in zdravje pri delu), izbranih na podlagi niza meril, kot so narava izvrševanih pristojnosti, obdobje delovanja agencije, proračun ali število uslužbencev.
These are the findings covered by this report. 
Ugotovitve so podane v tem poročilu.
The agencies did not make ex ante evaluations of their programmes, nor did they draw up multiannual programming documents intended to enable them to set medium-term result and impact objectives together with performance indicators. 
Agencije niso izvajale predhodnih ocenjevanj svojih programov. Prav tako niso pripravljale večletnih programov, s katerimi bi lahko določile cilje glede srednjeročnih rezultatov in učinka skupaj s kazalniki uspešnosti.
V. While the agencies all drew up annual work programmes, these provided little precise information concerning the resources to be allocated to the various actions and the results expected. 
V. Vse agencije so pripravljale letne programe dela, vendar je bilo v njih malo natančnih podatkov o virih, namenjenih različnim ukrepom, in o pričakovanih rezultatih.
Monitoring tools were still fairly rudimentary in most of the agencies. 
Orodja za spremljanje so bila v večini agencij še vedno precej elementarna.
Information on the use made of the resources allocated to their activities was often scattered. 
Informacije o uporabi virov, dodeljenih njihovim nalogam, so bile pogosto razpršene.
The Commission’s role could be reviewed in this respect. 
V tem pogledu bi se lahko preučila vloga Komisije.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY VII. 
POVZETEK VII.
The lack of sufficiently structured programming frameworks meant that most of the agencies still did not have the performance indicators required by their financial regulations. 
Ker ni bilo dovolj strukturiranih okvirov za načrtovanje, večina agencij še vedno ni imela kazalnikov uspešnosti, ki jih zahteva finančna uredba.
Furthermore, introducing activity-based budgeting and activity-based management would encourage the agencies to clarify the aims they intend to achieve. 
Poleg tega bi uvedba k dejavnostim usmerjenega proračuna in upravljanja po dejavnostih agencije spodbudila k jasnejši opredelitvi ciljev, ki jih nameravajo doseči.
As regards the reporting obligation, all the agencies submitted the required reports to their supervisory and discharge authorities. 
Kar zadeva obveznost poročanja, so vse agencije pošiljale zahtevana poročila organom, pristojnim za njihov nadzor in razrešnico.
These reports were in most cases descriptive and detailed. 
Ta poročila so bila večinoma opisna in podrobna.
All the agencies provided the external evaluations required by their basic regulations. 
Vse agencije so zagotavljale zunanja ocenjevanja v skladu s svojimi osnovnimi uredbami.
Overall, these evaluations were positive. 
Ta ocenjevanja so bila na splošno pozitivna.
In cases where they tackled the question of the agencies’ effectiveness, the external evaluators said they were hampered by the imprecise nature of the objectives pursued and the lack of tools for measuring the results. 
Vendar so zunanji ocenjevalci izjavili, da jih je pri obravnavi vprašanja uspešnosti agencij motilo to, da cilji niso bili jasno zastavljeni in da ni bilo orodij za merjenje rezultatov.
X. The introduction by the agencies themselves of genuine systems for fixing objectives and assessing results would serve to improve the quality of the annual activity reports and the periodic external evaluations, thus enabling the discharge authority to perform its task in full knowledge of the facts. 
X. Če bi agencije same uvedle prave sisteme za določanje ciljev in ocenjevanje rezultatov, bi izboljšale kakovost letnih poročil o dejavnostih in rednih zunanjih ocenjevanj ter tako organu za razrešnico omogočile, da svojo nalogo izvrši ob poznavanju vseh dejstev.
Showing that results have been achieved has become a priority of public administration. 
Prikazovanje doseženih rezultatov je postalo prednostna naloga javne uprave.
This development is a response to increasing budget tensions and greater demand by citizens for quality public services. 
Ta razvoj je odziv na čedalje večje proračunske napetosti in na povečano zahtevo državljanov po kakovostnih javnih storitvah.
As a result, the Member States have gradually introduced into their own public administrations the management methods used in private companies1 so that, since the 1980s, performance measurement has been a key element of public policy. 
Države so zato v svoje javne uprave postopoma uvedle metode upravljanja, ki se uporabljajo v zasebnih podjetjih 1, tako da je bilo od leta 1980 merjenje uspešnosti osrednji element javne politike.
Such major legislative measures as the UK National Audit Act of 1983, the Performance and Results Act of 1993 in the United States, the Organic Law concerning the Finance Law of 2001 in France or the Public Audit Act of 2001 in New Zealand have accompanied this trend. 
Ta trend so spremljali pomembni zakonodajni akti, kot so britanski „National Audit Act“ iz leta 1983, ameriški „Performance and Results Act“ iz leta 1993, francoski „loi organique relative aux lois de finances“ iz leta 2001 ali novozelandski „Public Audit Act“ iz leta 2001.
Despite this, the concept of ‘results’ remains difficult to define precisely. Whereas in the commercial sector its definition largely corresponds to financial indicators, its meaning in the context of public administration is still a matter for discussion. 
Vendar je sam pojem „rezultatov“ kljub temu še vedno težko natančno opredeliti, saj se njegova opredelitev v trgovskem sektorju namreč v veliki meri ujema s finančnimi kazalniki, medtem ko je njegov pomen v okviru javne uprave še vedno stvar razprave.
When considering the product of a public service, it is clear that taxpayers, users and citizens do not always have the same interests. 
Pri razpravi o izdelku javne uprave je jasno, da davkoplačevalci, uporabniki in državljani nimajo vedno enakih interesov.
For the first group, what matters is the cost of the service, for the second it is the quality of the service and for the third it is the impact of the service on general well-being. 
Za prve je pomemben strošek storitve, za druge njena kakovost, za tretje pa njen vpliv na splošno blaginjo.
It is to reconcile these various perspectives that the concept of performance has been developed. This examines public services from the point of view of ‘inputs’, ‘outputs’, ‘outcomes’ and ‘impact’. 
Za uskladitev teh različnih vidikov je bil izdelan koncept uspešnosti, ki javne storitve obravnava z vidika „vložkov“, „izložkov“, „izidov“ in „učinkov“.
For this reason, public administrators are required to apply indicators to measure their performance not only in terms of appropriations used or human resources deployed but also in terms of the added value for society as a whole. 
Zato morajo zaposleni v javnih upravah svojo uspešnost meriti s kazalniki, in to ne samo pri porabljenih sredstvih ali uporabljenih kadrovskih virih, ampak tudi pri dodani vrednosti za družbo kot celoto.
1 ‘Public sector modernisation: governing for performance»’ Policy Brief, OECD 2004. 3. 
1 „Public Sector Modernisation: governing for performance“ (Prenova javnega sektorja: upravljanje za uspešnost), OECD 2004. 3.
The European Union has not ignored this trend (see Figure 1). 
Ta trend je zajel tudi Evropsko unijo (glej diagram 1).
Whilst the requirement for results applies to its institutions, it also applies to the various decentralised bodies that may be grouped under the heading of the so-called regulatory agencies set up by the European Union (see Box 1). 
Zahteva po rezultatih se nanaša na njene institucije in na različne decentralizirane organe, ki jih je mogoče združiti v okviru tako imenovanih regulativnih agencij, ki jih je ustanovila Evropska unija (glej okvir 1).
The basic acts of these agencies assign them tasks that are usually in the form of general guidelines with the resources for implementing them, with the result that the agencies then have to draw up action strategies and set priorities that are coordinated with the corresponding Community strategies. 
V osnovnih aktih teh agencij so njihove naloge običajno določene v obliki splošnih smernic z viri za njihovo izvedbo, kar od agencij posledično zahteva, da pripravijo strategije delovanja in določijo prednostne naloge v skladu z ustreznimi strategijami Skupnosti.
These agencies mostly work through measures of an incentive nature, such as recommendations, support from scientific authorities, networking, pooling of good practice, checks on the application of the rules, etc. (see Annex I). 
Te agencije večinoma izvajajo ukrepe spodbujevalne narave, kot so priporočila, podpora strokovnih organov, mrežno povezovanje, združevanje dobrih praks, pregledi uporabe predpisov itd. (glej Prilogo I).
It is clear that measuring the performance of legal entities exercising powers that are so difficult to identify is indeed a considerable challenge; this challenge has been imposed on them by the new Community rules, which, since the reform of 2002, have put the concept of getting results at the heart of public administration in the European Union. 
Merjenje uspešnosti pravnih subjektov, ki izvajajo tako težko opredeljive pristojnosti, je torej velik izziv, ki ga uvajajo novi predpisi Skupnosti, v skladu s katerimi je vse od reforme leta 2002 koncept doseganja rezultatov postavljen v osrčje javne uprave Evropske unije.
The framework financial regulation for the agencies thus specifically emphasises the aspects of work programming, objective setting involving the use of performance indicators to measure the implementation of the objectives and evaluation2. 
Okvirna finančna uredba za agencije tako zlasti poudarja vidike načrtovanja dela, določanja ciljev, katerih doseganje se meri s kazalniki uspešnosti, in ocenjevanja 2.
2 Article 27(3) of Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2343/2002 of 23 December 2002 on the framework financial regulation for the bodies referred to in Article 185 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the financial regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (OJ L 357, 31.12.2002, p. 
2 Člen 27(3) Uredbe Komisije (ES, Euratom) št. 2343/2002 z dne 23. decembra 2002 o okvirni finančni uredbi za organe iz člena 185 Uredbe Sveta (ES, Euratom) št.
7 BOX 1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SO-CALLED REGULATORY AGENCIES The Commission’s working documents distinguish between two types of EU agency: executive agencies and the so-called regulatory agencies. 
7 OKVIR 1 ZNAČILNOSTI TAKO IMENOVANIH REGULATIVNIH AGENCIJ Komisija v svojih delovnih dokumentih razlikuje med dvema vrstama agencij EU: med izvajalskimi agencijami in tako imenovanimi regulativnimi agencijami.
The former are created by decision of the Commission and serve to implement sectoral financial support programmes, the appropriations for which remain in the general budget. 
Prve so ustanovljene s sklepom Komisije in njihova naloga je izvajanje sektorskih programov finančne podpore, pri katerih proračunske odobritve ostanejo del splošnega proračuna.
The latter are set up by Council regulations or by joint decision with the European Parliament. 
Druge so ustanovljene z uredbami Sveta ali po postopku soodločanja z Evropskim parlamentom.
The so-called regulatory agencies can primarily be distinguished by their funding mechanisms. 
Regulativne agencije se v prvi vrsti razlikujejo po svojih mehanizmih financiranja.
Two agencies, the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM, Alicante) and the Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO, Angers) are financially independent and invoice all their services3. 
Dve agenciji, Urad za usklajevanje na notranjem trgu EU (OHMI – Alicante) in Urad Skupnosti za rastlinske sorte (OCVV – Angers), sta finančno neodvisni in zaračunavata vse svoje storitve 3.
The others receive a subsidy from the general budget for all or part of their activities. 
Druge agencije prejemajo subvencijo iz splošnega proračuna za vse svoje dejavnosti ali del njih.
In the first case, discharge is given by their management board; while in the second case, discharge for their management is given by the European Parliament on a recommendation from the Council. 
Izvajal-skim agencijam razrešnico za njihovo upravljanje podeli njihov upravni svet, medtem ko regulativnim agencijam razrešnico za njihovo upravljanje podeli Evropski parlament na priporočilo Sveta.
It is this second group of agencies to which the provisions of Article 185 of the general financial regulation refer. 
Za to drugo skupino agencij se uporabljajo določbe iz člena 185 splošne finančne uredbe.
The nature of the activities carried out by the agencies varies considerably depending on the case. 
Narava dejavnosti, ki jih izvajajo agencije, se od primera do primera zelo razlikuje.