natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Observations 27 The specific costs associated with the implementation of cross‐compliance are not sufficiently quantified 59 The Commission needs a reliable estimate of the overall cost of cross‐compliance, aggregating the main stakeholders involved (EU institutions, Member State management and control authorities, and farmers) in order to ensure that the system is cost‐effective. 
Opažanja 27 Specifični stroški, povezani z izvajanjem navzkrižne skladnosti, niso dovolj kvantificirani 59 Komisija potrebuje zanesljivo oceno skupnih stroškov navzkrižne skladnosti, ki bo združevala glavne vključene deležnike (institucije EU, organe držav članic za upravljanje in kontrolo ter kmete), da bi lahko zagotovila, da je sistem stroškovno učinkovit.
60 DG AGRI has estimated that the total costs of managing and controlling agricultural expenditure are close to 4 billion euro or approximately 7 % of the total EU‐funding34. 
60 Po ocenah GD AGRI skupni stroški upravljanja in kontrole kmetijskih odhodkov znašajo skoraj 4 milijarde EUR ali približno 7 % celotnega financiranja EU34.
However, as far as cross‐compliance is concerned, the costs are not quantified and no reliable estimate exists. 
Vendar stroški za navzkrižno skladnost niso kvantificirani in zanje niso na voljo zanesljive ocene.
61 At Member State level, significant costs are due to the requirements of the cross‐compliance control system. 
61 Na ravni držav članic je bistven del stroškov povezan z zahtevami sistema kontrole za navzkrižno skladnost.
Firstly, checks are required for GAEC, which are an additional set of rules applicable only to farmers benefiting from CAP payments. 
Zahtevajo se pregledi za standarde dobrih kmetijskih in okoljskih pogojev, ki so dodaten sklop pravil, ki se uporabljajo le za kmete, ki prejemajo plačila SKP.
Secondly, in relation to SMRs, which are based on existing directives and regulations (‘sectoral legislation’)35, specialised control bodies have to check a minimum control rate of 1 % required under cross‐compliance rules and have additional reporting obligations regarding these checks. 
Poleg tega morajo v zvezi s predpisanimi zahtevami ravnanja, ki temeljijo na veljavnih direktivah in uredbah (t. i. sektorska zakonodaja)35, specializirani kontrolni organi izvajati preglede z najmanj 1-odstotno stopnjo kontrole, kot zahtevajo pravila o navzkrižni skladnosti, poleg tega pa imajo dodatne obveznosti poročanja o teh pregledih.
62 At farm level, the introduction of SMRs created more administrative obligations for farmers, such as record keeping and participating in cross‐compliance inspections36. 
62 Na ravni kmetij je uvedba predpisanih zahtev ravnanja kmetom prinesla več upravnih obveznosti, kot sta vodenje evidenc in sodelovanje pri inšpekcijskih pregledih navzkrižne skladnosti36.
Furthermore, compliance with GAECs, implies costs concerning the agricultural practices required (labour costs, costs of machinery, fuel and other consumables), the income forgone because the GAECs prohibit or impose certain practices (e.g. reduction in yield), but also other costs such as the use of third‐party service providers (e.g. consultants for certain cross‐compliance topics). 
Poleg tega izpolnjevanje standardov dobrih kmetijskih in okoljskih pogojev prinaša stroške v zvezi z zahtevanimi kmetijskimi praksami (stroške dela, stroške strojev, goriva in drugih potrošnih dobrin), izpad prihodkov, ker standardi dobrih kmetijskih in okoljskih pogojev prepovedujejo ali zahtevajo določene prakse (npr. zmanjšanje donosa), pa tudi druge stroške, kot so plačila ponudnikom storitev (npr. svetovalcem za nekatera področja navzkrižne skladnosti).
63 A report commissioned by DG‐AGRI37 and published in 2014 assessed the actual costs that EU farmers incurred in order to comply with selected legislation in the fields of the environment, animal welfare and food safety. 
63 V poročilu, ki ga je naročil GD AGRI37 in je bilo objavljeno leta 2014, so bili ocenjeni dejanski stroški, ki so jih imeli kmetje v EU zaradi izpolnjevanja pravil izbrane zakonodaje na področju okolja, dobrobiti živali in varnosti hrane.
The study was built on case studies from the eight most representative agricultural sectors in the EU. 
Raziskava je temeljila na študijah primerov iz osmih najbolj reprezentativnih kmetijskih sektorjev v EU.
It gives an indication of the financial impact such obligations have on farmers (see Box 5 for a summary of the results for the wheat sector). 
Opisuje finančni učinek, ki ga imajo takšne obveznosti na kmete (za povzetek rezultatov za sektor pšenice glej okvir 5).
34 DG AGRI 2014 annual activity report. 
34 Letno poročilo o dejavnostih GD AGRI za leto 2014.
35 For example: Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources (OJ L 375, 31.12.1991, p. 
35 Na primer: Direktiva Sveta 91/676/EGS z dne 12. decembra 1991 o varstvu voda pred onesnaževanjem z nitrati iz kmetijskih virov (UL L 375, 31.12.1991, str.
1); Regulation (EC) No 1760/2000 of European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2000 establishing a system for the identification of bovine animals and regarding the labelling of beef and beef products and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 820/97 (OJ L 204, 11.8.2000, p. 
1), Uredba (ES) št. 1760/2000 Evropskega Parlamenta in Sveta z dne 17. julija 2000 o uvedbi sistema za identifikacijo in registracijo govedi ter o označevanju govejega mesa in proizvodov iz govejega mesa in razveljavitvi Uredbe Sveta (ES) št.
36 Recital 57 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013: The cross‐compliance system implies certain administrative constraints for both beneficiaries and national administrations since records keeping has to be ensured, checks have to be carried out and where necessary penalties have to be applied. 
1306/2013: Sistem navzkrižne skladnosti prinaša določeno upravno breme za upravičence, pa tudi za nacionalne upravne organe, saj je treba zagotoviti vodenje evidenc, izvajati preglede in po potrebi predpisati kazni.
37 ‘Assessing farmers’ cost of compliance with EU legislation in the fields of environment, animal welfare and food safety’ (AGRI‐2011‐EVAL‐08). 
37 Assessing farmers’ cost of compliance with EU legislation in the fields of environment, animal welfare and food safety (Ocena stroškov izpolnjevanja pravil zakonodaje EU na področju okolja, dobrobiti živali in varnosti hrane za kmete) (AGRI-2011-EVAL-08).
Study undertaken by: CRPA ‐ Centro Ricerche Produzioni Animali (IT), in association with: TI ‐ Thünen Institute of Farm Economics (DE), IFCN ‐ International Farm Comparison Network on Dairy (DE), UGHENT – University of Ghent (BE). 
Študijo je izvedel CRPA – Centro Ricerche Produzioni Animali (Italija) v sodelovanju s: TI – inštitut za agrarno ekonomiko v Thünenu (Nemčija), IFCN – mednarodna mreža za primerjavo mlečnih kmetij (Nemčija) in UGHENT – univerza v Gentu (Belgija).
Observations 28 Impact of compliance with selected obligations on production costs in the wheat sector Out of the full cross‐compliance scope applicable until 2013, the study for the wheat sector took into consideration the cumulative effects of five compulsory GAECs (minimum soil cover, land management, establishment of buffer strips and avoiding the encroachment of unwanted vegetation and retention of landscape features), one optional GAEC (crop rotation) and the legislation underlying the basis of two SMRs (the Nitrates Directive and the Regulation on plant protection products). 
Opažanja 28 Učinek izpolnjevanja izbranih obveznosti na stroške proizvodnje v sektorju pšenice Od celotnega področja uporabe navzkrižne skladnosti, ki je veljala do leta 2013, so bili v raziskavi za sektor pšenice obravnavani kumulativni učinki petih obveznih standardov dobrih kmetijskih in okoljskih pogojev (minimalna talna odeja, upravljanje zemljišč, vzpostavitev varovalnih pasov, preprečevanje širitve nezaželene vegetacije in ohranjanje krajinskih značilnosti), enega izbirnega standarda dobrih kmetijskih in okoljskih pogojev (kolobarjenje) ter zakonodaje, iz katere izhajata dve PZR (direktiva o nitratih in uredba o fitofarmacevtskih sredstvih).
Another requirement outside the scope of cross‐compliance was also taken into account: the Directive on the sustainable use of pesticides. 
Upoštevana je bila tudi zahteva, ki ne spada na področje uporabe navzkrižne skladnosti: direktiva o trajnostni rabi pesticidov.
The authors of the survey concluded that the actions taken by farmers to ensure compliance with the rules listed above would increase production costs by amounts ranging from 1.97 % in Hungary to 3.42 % in Denmark. 
Avtorji raziskave so prišli do zaključka, da bi se zaradi ukrepov, ki bi jih kmetje sprejeli za zagotovitev izpolnjevanja zgornjih pravil, stroški proizvodnje povečali za od 1,97 % na Madžarskem do 3,42 % na Danskem.
64 Furthermore, in the view of the majority of the Paying Agencies, the changes in the CAP for the period 2014 – 2020 are not likely to lead to a decrease in costs. 
64 Poleg tega po mnenju večine plačilnih agencij spremembe SKP za obdobje 2014–2020 verjetno ne bodo privedle do znižanja stroškov.
When asked in the survey whether these changes will lead to lower, similar or higher costs for implementing, managing and controlling cross‐compliance obligations, the Paying Agencies’ replies were: Paying Agencies’ estimate of the impact of the CAP 2014– 2020 changes on their cross‐compliance management and control system No opinion; 6 % Higher costs; 14 % Similar costs; 61 % Source: European Court of Auditors. 
Odgovori plačilnih agencij na vprašanje v okviru raziskave, ali bodo te spremembe povzročile nižje, podobno visoke ali višje stroške za izvajanje, upravljanje in kontrolo obveznosti navzkrižne skladnosti, so na sliki 4. Kako so plačilne agencije ocenile učinek sprememb SKP za obdobje 2014–2020 na svoje sisteme upravljanja in kontrole navzkrižne skladnosti Brez mnenja; 6 % Višji stroški; 14 % Podobni stroški; 61 % Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče.
Lower costs; 19 % Figure 4 Box 5 
Nižji stroški; 19 % Slika 4 Okvir 5
Observations 29 The basis for the calculation of cross‐compliance penalties for farmers across the EU is not sufficiently harmonised 65 The EU legislation stipulates that where a farmer does not comply with the rules on cross‐compliance, an administrative penalty should be imposed if the non‐compliance results from an act or an omission directly attributable to that beneficiary. 
Opažanja 29 Osnova za izračun kazni v zvezi z navzkrižno skladnostjo za kmete po EU ni dovolj usklajena 65 Zakonodaja EU določa, da je treba kmetu v primeru, če ne upošteva pravil o navzkrižni skladnosti, naložiti upravno kazen, če je neizpolnjevanje pravil posledica dejanja ali opustitve, za katero je neposredno odgovoren ta upravičenec.
Such penalties should be established having regard to the principle of proportionality (graded according to the seriousness of the non‐compliance committed38 and calculated as a percentage on the CAP payment) and only be applied where the non‐compliance is attributable to the farmer’s actions, committed either negligently or intentionally. 
Takšne kazni bi bilo treba določiti ob upoštevanju načela sorazmernosti (razvrstiti bi jih bilo treba v skladu z resnostjo neizpolnjevanja pogojev38 in izračunati kot odstotek plačila SKP) in jih uporabiti le, ko je mogoče neizpolnjevanje pravil pripisati dejanjem kmeta, storjenim iz malomarnosti ali namerno.
66 When calculating those penalties, account should be taken of the severity, extent, permanence and reoccurrence of the non‐compliance found. 
66 Pri izračunu teh kazni bi bilo treba upoštevati resnost, obseg, stalnost in ponovitev ugotovljenega neupoštevanja pravil.
In the case of non‐compliance due to negligence, the maximum reduction is 5 % and, in the case of reoccurrence, 15 %. 
V primeru neupoštevanja pravil zaradi malomarnosti se lahko uporabi največje znižanje v višini 5 %, v primeru ponovitve pa v višini 15 %.
In the case of intentional non‐compliance, there is a minimum reduction of 20 % and it may go as far as total exclusion from one or several aid schemes for one or more calendar years. 
V primeru namernega neupoštevanja pravil je predvideno minimalno znižanje v višini 20 %, najvišja kazen pa je popolna izključitev iz ene ali več shem pomoči za eno ali več koledarskih let.
67 We found that the practical application of the concept of intentional non‐compliance raises significant uncertainties at Member State level. 
67 Sodišče je ugotovilo, da praktična uporaba koncepta namernega neupoštevanja pravil povzroča veliko negotovost na ravni držav članic.
The representatives of the Paying Agencies and the farmers’ associations in the three Member States visited indicated that the proof of intentionality is difficult to sustain, unless the farmer is caught ‘red‐handed’. 
Predstavniki plačilnih agencij in združenj kmetov v treh obiskanih državah članicah so povedali, da je namernost težko dokazati, razen če je kmet zasačen pri samem dejanju.
68 The review of the control statistics for cross‐compliance shows that some Member States were stricter than others in applying the concept of intentional non‐compliance: no farmer was penalised during the period 2011–2014 for intentional breaches in certain Member States (Czech Republic, Bulgaria), or very few were (Romania, Portugal, Hungary), while other Member States used this concept much more frequently (Lithuania, Greece, Poland, France, Ireland). 
68 Pregled kontrolnih statističnih podatkov za navzkrižno skladnost je pokazal, da so nekatere države članice koncept namernega neupoštevanja pravil uveljavlja-le strožje kot druge: v obdobju 2011–2014 v nekaterih državah članicah zaradi namerne kršitve ni bil kaznovan noben kmet (na Češkem in v Bolgariji) ali pa jih je bilo kaznovanih le nekaj (v Romuniji, na Portugalskem in Madžarskem), medtem ko so druge države članice ta koncept uporabile veliko pogosteje (Litva, Grčija, Poljska, Francija in Irska).
Observations 30 69 To examine how the same types of non‐compliance are assessed by the Member States, the survey we sent to the Paying Agencies contained two case studies on breaches of the SMRs on cattle identification and registration and the Nitrates Directive (full text of the case studies is included in Annex IV). 
Opažanja 30 69 Da bi preučilo, kako države članice ocenjujejo enake vrste neupoštevanja pravil, je Sodišče v anketo, ki jo je poslalo plačilnim agencijam, vključilo dve študiji primera za kršitve PZR v zvezi z identifikacijo in registracijo goveda ter direktivo o nitratih (celotno besedilo študij primera je v Prilogi IV).
The Paying Agencies were asked to quantify the percentage of penalties that would be applied in these two case studies. 
Plačilne agencije so morale opredeliti odstotek kazni, ki bi ju uporabile v teh študijah primera.
Box 6 shows a summary of the case studies presented and the replies received. 
V okviru 6 je prikazan povzetek uporabljenih študij primerov in prejetih odgovorov.
Case studies regarding the penalties applied in Member States Summary of the case studies proposed to the Member States During the calendar year, the farmer sent late notification of the registration of animals for 20 cattle. 
Študiji primera v zvezi s kaznimi, uporabljenimi v državah članicah Povzetek študij primera, predloženih državam članicam V koledarskem letu je kmet za 20 glav goveda prepozno poslal obvestilo o registraciji živali.
The farmer had an average of 75 cattle during the year. 
Kmet je imel med letom v povprečju 75 glav goveda.
During on‐the‐spot checks, the inspectors calculated that the farmer’s manure storage capacity was 10 % less than the minimum required. 
Med pregledi na kraju samem so inšpektorji izračuna-li, da ima kmet za 10 % manjšo zmogljivost skladišča za gnoj od najmanjše zahtevane.
Number of Paying Agencies applying each of the possible reduction percentages 5 3 2 10 10 13 29 0% 1% 3% 5% NR 8 19 29 0% 1% 3% 5% NR NR for ‘No Reply’ – indicates that several Paying Agencies did not quantify the breach. 
Število plačilnih agencij, ki so uporabile vsakega od mogočih odstotkov znižanj 5 3 2 10 10 13 29 0% 1% 3% 5% NO 8 19 29 0% 1% 3% 5% NO Oznaka NO za „ni odgovora” – pomeni, da več plačilnih agencij ni količinsko opredelilo kršitve.
Observations 31 70 Thus, for the same breach of 20 cattle not registered in due time, almost half of the Member States would apply a 3 % penalty, whereas a fifth of the Member States would apply a 1 % penalty, with the remaining ones applying either a 0 % or a 5 % reduction. 
Opažanja 31 70 Za isto kršitev prepozne registracije 20 glav goveda bi torej skoraj polovica držav članic uporabila 3-odstotno kazen, medtem ko bi petina držav članic uporabila 1-odstotno kazen, preostale pa bi uporabile znižanje za 0 % ali 5 %.
An insufficient manure storage capacity would be penalised at 1 % by almost half of the Member States, while a third would apply a 3 % penalty, while a sixth of the Member states would apply either a 0 % or 5 % penalty. 
Premajhno zmogljivost skladišča za gnoj bi skoraj polovica držav članic kaznovala z 1-odstotnim znižanjem, medtem ko bi tretjina držav članic uporabila 3-odstotno kazen, šestina pa 0-ali 5-odstotno kazen.
71 Furthermore, the understanding of the severity of a breach varied significantly between Member States, so there is a risk that similar cases were not treated in the same way. 
71 Poleg tega so bile med državami članicami velike razlike pri razumevanju resnosti kršitve, kar pomeni tveganje, da podobni primeri niso bili obravnavani enako.
Such a situation was confirmed by the different sanction rules put in place in the Member States visited, as shown in Box 7. 
To potrjujejo različna pravila o sankcijah, ki se uporabljajo v obiskanih državah članicah, kot je prikazano v okviru 7.
Example of penalty for the late registration of animals In Germany‐ Schleswig‐Holstein, the Paying Agency has established that no penalty is to be applied for late registration, if the number of bovines concerned by the breach represents less than 30 % of the total number of bovines present on the holding. 
Primer kazni za prepozno registracijo živali V nemški zvezni deželi Schleswig-Holstein je plačilna agencija določila, da se kazen za zamudo pri registraciji ne uporabi, če število glav goveda, ki jih zadeva kršitev, predstavlja manj kot 30 % celotnega števila goveda na kmetijskem gospodarstvu.
On the contrary, in Spain‐Catalonia, no such threshold exists. 
Za razliko od tega v Kataloniji (Španija) takega praga ni.
Conclusions and 32 recommendations 72 Cross‐compliance has been applicable since 2005, as a mechanism to link most CAP payments to farmers’ compliance with the rules stemming from the environment, public health, animal health, plant health and animal welfare policies. 
Zaključki in priporočila 32 72 Navzkrižna skladnost se uporablja od leta 2005 kot mehanizem, ki večino plačil SKP povezuje z zahtevo, da morajo kmetje upoštevati pravila, ki izhajajo iz politik na področju okolja, javnega zdravja, zdravja živali, zdravja rastlin in dobrobiti živali.
The objectives of cross‐compliance were to improve the consistency of the CAP with those policies (and thus to respond to the expectations of society) and to make farmers aware of the need to respect those rules (and thus to contribute to the development of sustainable agriculture). 
Cilji navzkrižne skladnosti so bili izboljšati skladnost SKP z navedenimi politikami (in se tako odzvati na pričakovanja družbe) ter ozavestiti kmete, da morajo ta pravila spoštovati (in tako prispevati k razvoju trajnostnega kmetijstva).
The purpose of the report is to assess to what extent the cross‐compliance management and control system has been effective and can be further simplified, and, on that basis, to offer recommendations for improving the implementation of cross‐compliance in the medium and long term. 
Namen poročila je bil oceniti, kako uspešen je bil sistem upravljanja in kontrole navzkrižne skladnosti in koliko bi ga bilo mogoče dodatno poenostaviti, ter na podlagi tega dati priporočila za srednje-in dolgoročno izboljšanje izvajanja navzkrižne skladnosti.
73 We conclude that the information available did not allow the Commission to assess adequately the effectiveness of cross‐compliance. 
73 Zaključili smo, da Komisija na podlagi razpoložljivih informacij ni mogla ustrezno oceniti uspešnosti navzkrižne skladnosti.
Despite the changes made to the CAP for the period 2014–2020, the cross‐compliance management and control system can still be simplified. 
Kljub spremembam SKP za obdobje 2014–2020 bi bilo sistem upravljanja in kontrole navzkrižne skladnosti mogoče dodatno poenostaviti.
74 We found that the performance indicators used by the Commission gave a partial view of the effectiveness of cross‐compliance. 
74 Kazalniki smotrnosti, ki jih je uporabljala Komisija, so omogočili le delen uvid v uspešnost navzkrižne skladnosti.
The indicators did not take into account the level of non‐compliance by farmers (paragraphs 18 to 27). 
Kazalniki niso upoštevali ravni neupoštevanja pravil s strani kmetov (odstavki 18 do 27).
Recommendation 1 The Commission should examine as part of the impact assessment for the CAP post 2020 how to further develop its set of indicators to assess the performance of cross‐compliance and how to take into account farmers’ levels of compliance with the cross‐compliance rules in its indicators. 
Priporočilo 1 Komisija naj v okviru ocene učinka za SKP po letu 2020 preuči, kako bi lahko dodatno razvila svoj sklop kazalnikov za oceno smotrnosti navzkrižne skladnosti in kako bi z njimi lahko zajela podatke o tem, koliko kmetje upoštevajo pravila o navzkrižni skladnosti.
Conclusions and recommendations 33 75 The legislator established an EU framework regarding cross‐compliance. 
Zaključki in priporočila 33 75 Zakonodajalec je vzpostavil okvir EU za navzkrižno skladnost.
However, a quarter of the farmers checked on‐the‐spot during the financial years 2011–2014 had breached at least one of the rules, despite the fact that the underlying purpose of cross‐compliance was to ensure the consistency of the CAP with such rules. 
Toda četrtina kmetov, preverjenih na kraju samem v proračunskih letih 2011–2014, je kršila vsaj eno od pravil kljub temu, da je bil osnovni namen navzkrižne skladnosti zagotoviti skladnost SKP s takimi pravili.
The Commission did not analyse the reasons for the infringements and the means of addressing them (paragraphs 28 to 36). 
Komisija ni analizirala razlogov za kršitve in načinov za njihovo obravnavanje (odstavki 28 do 36).
Recommendation 2 The Commission should from now on improve the sharing of the information on cross‐compliance related infringements between concerned services in order to help them to identify the reasons for breaches and to take appropriate measures to address them. 
Priporočilo 2 Komisija naj odslej izboljša izmenjavo informacij o kršitvah v zvezi z navzkrižno skladnostjo med ustreznimi službami ter jim tako pomaga pri ugotavljanju razlogov za kršitve in sprejemanju ustreznih ukrepov za njihovo obravnavanje.
76 The changes in the CAP for the period 2014–2020 somewhat reduced the number of cross‐compliance rules, by removing requirements which were not sufficiently relevant to the farming activity. 
76 S spremembami SKP za obdobje 2014–2020 se je nekoliko zmanjšalo število pravil o navzkrižni skladnosti, saj so bile odpravljene zahteve, ki niso bile dovolj relevantne za kmetijsko dejavnost.
Even if the control systems were effective, the legislative framework would not allow for a more targeted risk‐based approach according to which certain rules or control points could be checked more or less frequently by taking account, for example, of the level of breaches, the likelihood of a breach, or the magnitude of the effects of a potential breach. 
Tudi če bi bili kontrolni sistemi uspešni, zakonodajni okvir ne bi omogočal bolj ciljno usmerjenega pristopa na podlagi tveganja, s katerim bi se lahko nekatera pravila ali kontrolne točke preverjali bolj ali manj pogosto, ker bi se na primer upoštevali majhno število kršitev, majhna verjetnost kršitev ali razsežnost učinkov morebitne kršitve.