natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission could not use its standard Single Support Framework outlining priority sectors on a multi-annual basis to allocate assistance for 2014 and 2015. 
Komisija za dodeljevanje pomoči za leti 2014 in 2015 ni mogla uporabiti svojega običajnega enotnega okvira podpore, v katerem so na večletni podlagi orisani prednostni sektorji.
As provided for in the regulation16 the Commission committed assistance in the form of annual special measures. 
Komisija je prevzela obveznosti za pomoč v obliki letnih posebnih ukrepov, kot določa uredba16.
15 Since 2014, the EIB and EBRD have managed to contract around 940 and 870 million euros of respective project loans (indicative amounts by end of July 2015). 
15 EIB in EBRD je od leta 2014 uspelo skleniti pogodbe za približno 940 milijonov EUR oziroma 870 milijonov EUR projektnih posojil (okvirni zneski do konca julija 2015).
16 Articles 2.5 and 2.1 of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union’s instruments for financing external action (OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p. 
236/2014 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. marca 2014 o določitvi skupnih pravil in postopkov za izvajanje instrumentov Unije za financiranje zunanjega delovanja (UL L 77, 15.3.2014, str.
Specific context of EU assistance to Ukraine 17 The EU set up ad hoc structures to manage its greater involvement in Ukraine 21 In parallel to the significant increase in EU assistance to Ukraine in 2014, the EU established new entities calling upon additional expertise to advise Ukraine on the reform process. 
Specifični kontekst pomoči EU Ukrajini 17 EU je vzpostavila ad hoc strukture za upravljanje svojega povečanega delovanja v Ukrajini 21 Hkrati z znatnim povečanjem pomoči EU Ukrajini v letu 2014 je EU ustanovi­ la nove subjekte za pridobitev dodatnega strokovnega znanja za svetovanje Ukrajini o procesu reform.
The two most notable initiatives are the Support Group for Ukraine (SGUA) from the Commission and the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform (EUAM)17. Both the SGUA and the EUAM significantly enhance EU–Ukraine cooperation. 
Najopaznejši pobudi sta podporna skupina Komisije za Ukrajino in svetovalna misija EU za reformo sektorja civilne varnosti (EUAM).17 Obe pobudi močno krepita sodelovanje med EU in Ukrajino.
They provide expertise in targeted sectors already being assisted by the EU Delegation. 
Zagotavljata stro­ kovno znanje v ciljnih sektorjih, ki jim že pomaga delegacija EU.
We found that there was therefore a risk of overlap with the EU Delegation’s activities and of confusion for the Ukrainian authorities, in particular in the fight against corruption, an area which lies within the remit of all three parties. 
Ugotovili smo, da je zato obstajalo tveganje prekrivanja z dejavnostmi delegacije EU in zmede za ukrajinske organe, zlasti na področju boja proti korupciji, ki je v pristojnosti vseh treh strani.
In 2015, the Commission took steps to address this risk18. 22 To secure the use of increased EU funding, in June 2014 the Commission also envisaged creating a joint, independent body with the Ukrainian authorities to investigate fraud and corruption19. 
Komisija je leta 2015 sprejela ukrepe za obravnavanje tega tveganja.18 22 Za zagotovitev uporabe povečanega financiranja EU je Komisija junija 2014 tudi predvidela, da bo z ukrajinskimi organi oblikovala skupno neodvisno telo, ki bo preiskovalo goljufije in korupcijo.19 Do konca leta 2015 to skupno telo še ni bilo oblikovano.
Donors stepped up their coordination in response to the Ukrainian government’s weakness in this area The Ukrainian government was weak at donor coordination 23 Donor coordination was poorly managed by the Ukrainian authorities. 
Donatorji so okrepili svoje usklajevanje, ker je ukrajinska vlada na tem področju šibka Ukrajinska vlada ni najbolje usklajevala donatorjev 23 Ukrajinski organi so slabo usklajevali donatorje.
There was little communication among ministries, no interlocutor on the Ukrainian side and an unclear attribution of responsibilities. 
Med ministrstvi ni bilo veliko komunikacije, na ukrajinski strani ni bilo sogovornika, dodelitev odgovornosti pa je bila nejasna.
The 2006 and 2011 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessments (see paragraph 46) also critically assessed flows of financial information on external assistance between the Ukrainian government and donors. 
V ocenah javnih odhodkov in finančne odgovornosti (PEFA) leta 2006 in 2011 (glej odstavek 46) je bil kritično ocenjen tudi pretok finančnih informacij o zunanji pomoči med ukrajinsko vlado in donatorji.
Although the Ukrainian government made an attempt to centralise donor coordination in 2008-2009, clear mandates were not allocated and political support shifted quickly, meaning that the initiative failed. 
Čeprav je ukrajin­ ska vlada v letih 2008 in 2009 skušala centralizirati usklajevanje donatorjev, niso bila dana jasna pooblastila, politična podpora pa je bila hitro preusmerjena, zato je pobuda propadla.
17 EUAM is a non-executive, unarmed, common security and defence policy (CSDP) mission supporting, advising and mentoring Ukrainian political and institutional stakeholders on Civilian Security Sector Reform (CSSR) at a strategic level. 
17 EUAM je neizvršilna, neoborožena misija skupne varnostne in obrambne politike (SVOP), ki na strateški ravni podpira ukrajinske politične in institucionalne deležnike pri reformi sektorja civilne varnosti, jim o njej svetuje in jih mentorira.
18 E.g. to limit overlaps, the temporary solution found was that the EUAM would be working on the set-up of the anti-corruption bureau while the SGUA would be dealing with anti-corruption reforms at the level of the ministry of Justice. 
18 Npr. za omejitev prekrivanj se je našla začasna rešitev, v skladu s katero se bo EUAM ukvarjala z vzpostavitvijo protikorupcijskega urada, podporna skupina za Ukrajino pa s protikorupcijskimi reformami na ravni ministrstva za pravosodje.
19 Memo of 25 June 2014 on the European Commission’s support for Ukraine http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_MEMO-14-279_en.htm. 
19 Obvestilo Evropske komisije z dne 25. junija 2014 o podpori EU za Ukrajino (http://europa. eu/rapid/ press­release_MEMO­14­ 279_en.htm).
Specific context of EU assistance to Ukraine 18 24 Since 2014, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade has undertaken a number of donor coordination actions, but their outcomes and sustainability at this time remain uncertain20. The process of drafting the law on international technical assistance, started in 2012, has been suspended since 2014. 
Specifični kontekst pomoči EU Ukrajini 18 24 Od leta 2014 je ministrstvo za gospodarski razvoj in trgovino izvedlo več ukre­ pov usklajevanja donatorjev, vendar so njihovi izidi in trajnost za zdaj negotovi.20 Proces priprave zakona o mednarodni tehnični pomoči, ki se je začel leta 2012, se je leta 2014 ustavil.
Since 2014, the donor community has improved its internal coordination 25 The increasing donor involvement in Ukraine raises additional challenges in terms of coordination within the donor community, and strains an already weak absorption capacity on the ground. 
Donatorska skupnost je od leta 2014 izboljšala svoje notranje usklajevanje 25 Povečano delovanje donatorjev v Ukrajini povzroča dodatne izzive za usklajeva­ nje znotraj donatorske skupnosti in preobremenjuje že sicer šibko absorpcijsko sposobnost na terenu.
Since 2014 the Commission has met frequently with other major donors. 
Od leta 2014 se je Komisija pogosto sestajala z drugimi večjimi donatorji.
Together they produced and are maintaining a map of assistance to Ukraine. 
Skupaj so pripravili in posodabljajo načrt pomoči Ukrajini.
We noticed that the donor map revealed parallel activities, such as EU and USAID (United States Agency for International Development) projects in the area of justice. 
Opazili smo, da je načrt donatorjev pokazal vzporedne dejavnosti, kot sta pro­ jekta EU in USAID (Agencija Združenih držav za mednarodni razvoj) na področju pravosodja.
While the Commission does not participate in the EBRD Multi-Donor Fund, mechanisms are in place to help the EBRD coordinate its project and programme decisions with the relevant Commission departments. 
Komisija sicer ne sodeluje v večdonatorskem skladu EBRD, vendar so vzpostavljeni mehanizmi za pomoč EBRD pri usklajevanju njenih projektnih in programskih odločitev z ustreznimi oddelki Komisije.
20 At the time of the audit, donor coordination mandates had not yet been assigned and a clear donor coordination policy within the government of Ukraine had not yet emerged. 
20 V času revizije še niso bila podeljena pooblastila za koordinacijo donatorjev, znotraj ukrajinske vlade pa se še ni izoblikovala jasna politika usklajevanja donatorjev.
A high-level meeting to coordinate international support for Ukraine (with representatives from multiple donor countries, the EU, other key international institutions and donor organisations) was held on 8 July 2014 in Brussels. 
8. julija 2014 je v Bruslju potekalo srečanje na visoki ravni za usklajevanje mednarodne podpore za Ukrajino (s predstavniki več držav donatoric, EU, drugih ključnih mednarodnih institucij in donatorskih organizacij).
A donors’ and investors’ conference was convened in autumn 2014 to examine the implementation of Ukraine’s Economic Recovery and Growth Agenda for 2014-2016. 
Jeseni 2014 je bila sklicana konferenca donatorjev in vlagateljev, da bi preučila izvajanje ukrajinskega načrta za gospodarsko okrevanje in rast za obdobje 2014–2016.
It was replaced by an International Conference on Support for Ukraine for the donor/business community and civil society in April 2015. 
Aprila 2015 jo je nadomestila mednarodna konferenca za podporo Ukrajini za donatorsko/poslovno skupnost in civilno družbo.
Audit scope 19 and approach 26 For the 2007-2015 period, we examined whether Commission21 and EEAS assistance, referred to hereafter as EU assistance22, was effective in supporting the transformation of Ukraine into a well-governed state. 
Obseg revizije 19 in revizijski pristop 26 Preučili smo, ali je pomoč Komisije21 in ESZD (v nadaljnjem besedilu: pomoč EU22) v obdobju 2007–2015 uspešno podpirala preobrazbo Ukrajine v državo z dobrim upravljanjem.
We focused on the area of public finance management (PFM) and the fight against corruption (FAC), and on the gas sector and energy efficiency. 
Osredotočili smo se na področji upravljanja javnih financ in boja proti korupciji ter na plinski sektor in energijsko učinkovitost.
These areas, are particularly important to Ukraine’s reform process and have received significant EU assistance. 
Ti področji sta posebno pomembni za proces reform v Ukrajini in sta prejeli znatno pomoč EU.
The aim was to enhance governance by promoting the use of international standards and best practices23. 27 The audit scope included all ENPI and ENI EU budget support and macro-financial assistance programmes initiated since 2007, as well as the instruments from the Commission’s financial package launched in 2014 in response to the crisis situation in Ukraine. 
Cilj je bil okrepiti upravljanje s spodbujanjem uporabe mednarodnih standardov in najboljših praks.23 27 Obseg revizije je zajel vso proračunsko podporo EU iz ENPI in ENI ter programe makrofinančne pomoči, ki so bili uvedeni od leta 2007, pa tudi instrumente iz fi­ nančnega svežnja iz leta 2014, ki je bil sprejet v odziv na krizne razmere v Ukrajini.
The programmes examined are listed in the Annex. 
Preučeni programi so navedeni v Prilogi.
28 We carried out the audit work between June 2014 and December 2015. 
28 Revizijsko delo je bilo opravljeno med junijem 2014 in decembrom 2015.
The audit centred on: — the effectiveness of EU assistance to Ukraine in improving public finance management and the fight against corruption; and — the effectiveness of EU assistance to Ukraine in improving governance in the gas sector and the security of gas supplies to the EU. 
Revizija je bila osredotočena na: — uspešnost pomoči EU Ukrajini pri izboljševanju upravljanja javnih financ in boja proti korupciji ter — uspešnost pomoči EU Ukrajini pri izboljševanju upravljanja v plinskem sektor­ ju in zanesljivosti oskrbe EU s plinom.
29 The audit was based on interviews and exchanges of correspondence with the Commission, the EEAS and the EU Delegation to Ukraine, Ukrainian authorities and agencies, civil society organisations (CSOs), EU Member States24, international financial institutions, and the International Energy Agency, as well as documentary review, including policy and strategy documents and other relevant reports from think tanks and CSOs. 
29 Podlaga za revizijo so bili pogovori in korespondenca s Komisijo, ESZD in dele­ gacijo EU v Ukrajini, ukrajinskimi organi in agencijami, organizacijami civilne družbe, državami članicami EU24, mednarodnimi finančnimi institucijami in Mednarodno agencijo za energijo ter pregled dokumentacije, vključno s politič­ nimi in strateškimi dokumenti in drugimi ustreznimi poročili možganskih trustov in organizacij civilne družbe.
In addition, the audit included a 1-week visit to Kyiv in March 2015. 
Poleg tega je revizija zajemala enotedenski obisk v Kijevu marca 2015.
21 Mainly DGs responsible for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, for Economic and Financial Affairs and for Energy. 
21 Zlasti generalni direktorati za sosedstvo in širitvena pogajanja, gospodarske in finančne zadeve ter za energetiko.
22 Up until the end of 2010 the European Commission was responsible for developing the ENP approach and then programming and implementing the assistance and the overall ENP cooperation framework. 
22 Do konca leta 2010 je bila za razvoj pristopa ESP ter nato za programsko načrtovanje in izvajanje pomoči in skupnega okvira sodelovanja ESP odgovorna Evropska komisija.
Following the establishment of the EEAS in December 2010, the EEAS became responsible for policy development and the overall cooperation framework and the EEAS and Commission shared responsibilities for programming assistance. 
Po ustanovitvi ESZD decembra 2010 je ta prevzela odgovornost za razvoj politik in skupni okvir sodelovanja, pri programskem načrtovanju pomoči pa si odgovornosti deli s Komisijo.
Implementation of assistance remains the responsibility of the Commission. 
Za izvajanje pomoči je še vedno odgovorna Komisija.
23 Examples are: For PFM to implement Intosai standards and methods, harmonise with international standards for public internal control, and work towards approximation with the EU Aquis in public procurement. 
23 Primeri so: za področje upravljanja javnih financ izvajanje standardov in metod Intosai, harmonizacija z mednarodnimi standardi notranjega kontroliranja za javni sektor ter prizadevanje za približevanje pravnemu redu EU pri javnem naročanju.
For FAC ratify and implement the UN Convention against Corruption and the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. 
Za boj proti korupciji ratifikacija in izvajanje Konvencije Združenih narodov proti korupciji in Kazenskopravne konvencije Sveta Evrope o korupciji.
24 France, Italy, Hungary, Slovenia and Sweden. 
24 S Francijo, Italijo, Madžarsko, Slovenijo in Švedsko.
Observations 20 Part I — Effectiveness of EU assistance to Ukraine in improving public finance management and the fight against corruption 30 We examined whether EU–Ukraine dialogue was effective in addressing issues of public finance management and the fight against corruption, whether EU assistance was designed and monitored in such a way as to contribute effectively to the improvement of PFM and the FAC, and whether it produced tangible and sustainable results in these areas. 
87. upravljanja javnih financ in boja proti korupciji 30 Preučili smo, ali je bil dialog med EU in Ukrajino uspešen pri obravnavanju vpra­ šanj, povezanih z upravljanjem javnih financ in bojem proti korupciji, ali se je pomoč EU zasnovala in spremljala tako, da je uspešno prispevala k izboljševanju upravljanja javnih financ in boja proti korupciji, in ali je prinesla oprijemljive in trajnostne rezultate na teh področjih.
The main documentary evidence used for our findings, and discussed with the auditees, were internal sources such as Commission internal management reports — monitoring, annual progress and compliance reports, and external sources such as PEFA, SIGMA, OECD and CSO reports. 
Glavna dokazila, na katerih temeljijo naše ugotovitve in o katerih smo razpravljali z revidiranci, so bili notranji viri, kot so interna poročila Komisije o upravljanju, in sicer poročila o spremljanju, letnem napredku in izpolnjevanju pogojev, ter zunanji viri, kot so poročila o ocenah jav­ nih odhodkov in finančne odgovornosti ter poročila SIGMA, OECD in organizacij civilne družbe.
EU–Ukraine dialogue on public finance management has significantly improved since 2013, and that on fight against corruption since 2011 EU–Ukraine dialogue on public finance management: a fragmented approach and no credible PFM reform strategy until 2013 31 PFM and FAC were formally included within the remit of the dialogue structures (see paragraph 11). However, PFM occupied only a modest place in EU–Ukraine dialogue for most of the audited period. The key EU–Ukraine dialogue documents focused on a limited number of PFM components25. 
Od leta 2013 se je močno izboljšal dialog med EU in Ukrajino o upravljanju javnih financ, od leta 2011 pa dialog o boju proti korupciji Dialog med EU in Ukrajino o upravljanju javnih financ: pristop je razdrobljen in do leta 2013 ni bilo verodostojne strategije reform upravljanja javnih financ 31 Upravljanje javnih financ in boj proti korupciji sta bila formalno vključena med pristojnosti struktur za dialog (glej odstavek 11), toda upravljanje javnih financ je imelo v dialogu med EU in Ukrajino večino revidiranega obdobja le skromno vlogo.
Both PFM and FAC barely featured in the 2007-2013 Country Strategy Paper and in the two national indicative programmes (2007-2010 and 2011-2013 NIPs). 32 The 2010 Evaluation of the European Commission’s Cooperation with Ukraine26 was highly critical of the way the PFM issue was addressed in Ukraine, noting that there was no framework for in-depth policy dialogue with the government of Ukraine on PFM issues. 
Glavni dokumenti o dialogu med EU in Ukrajino so se osredotočali na omejeno število komponent upravljanja javnih financ.25 V državnem strateškem dokumentu za obdobje 2007–2013 in v obeh nacionalnih okvirnih programih (za obdobji 2007–2010 in 2011–2013) sta bila upravljanje javnih financ in boj proti korupciji komaj omenjena. 32 Vrednotenje sodelovanja Evropske komisije z Ukrajino iz leta 201026 je bilo zelo kritično do načina obravnave vprašanja upravljanja javnih financ v Ukrajini.
No specific subcommittee was dedicated to PFM as a whole. 
Ni bilo nobenega posebnega pododbora, ki bi se ukvarjal z upravljanjem javnih financ kot celoto.
PFM components (e.g. audit, financial control and public procurement) were discussed in various relevant subcommittees. 
Razprave o komponentah upravljanja javnih financ (npr. revidiranje, finančni nadzor in javno naročanje) so potekale v različnih ustreznih pododborih.
Neither the Joint Monitoring Groups created to assess progress on implementing the sector budget support programmes nor the Subcommittee on Economic and Social Affairs, Finance and Statistics, which met only once a year and covered a very wide range of topics, were considered by the evaluation an appropriate or sufficient structure for this purpose27. 
V vrednotenju je bilo izraženo mne­ nje, da niti skupne skupine za spremljanje, ki so bile oblikovane za ocenjevanje napredka pri izvajanju programov sektorske proračunske podpore, niti pododbor za gospodarske in socialne zadeve, finance in statistiko, ki se je sestajal samo enkrat letno in obravnaval širok sklop tem, niso ustrezna ali zadostna struktura za ta namen.27
87. Observations 21 33 One long-standing issue was the lack of a credible PFM reform strategy. 
Opažanja 21 33 Eden od dolgotrajnih problemov je bil neobstoj verodostojne strategije re­ form upravljanja javnih financ.
In 2007, the government of Ukraine adopted a PFM strategy that had been prepared with the assistance of the World Bank. 
Ukrajinska vlada je leta 2007 sprejela strategijo upravljanja javnih financ, ki je bila pripravljena ob pomoči Svetovne banke.
The EU proposed a budget support programme in PFM during the audited period, in 2007 and 2010. 
EU je v revidiranem obdobju, v letih 2007 in 2010, predlagala program proračunske podpore na področju upravljanja javnih financ.
Both proposals were cancelled because a 50 million US dollar World Bank project launched in January 2008 was expected to cover PFM issues in sufficient depth. However, the World Bank’s Public Finance Modernisation Project did not achieve its objec-tives28. 
Oba predloga sta bila preklicana, ker se je pričakovalo, da bo vprašanja upravljanja javnih financ dovolj temeljito zajel projekt Svetovne banke v vrednosti 50 milijonov USD, ki se je začel janu­ arja 2008.
From 2010, several key studies and evaluations pointed out the weaknesses of the Ukrainian PFM strategy29. 34 In reaction to these criticisms, from 2011 the EU became much more explicit in its demand for PFM reform30. In 2012, the Ministry of Finance set up a working group on PFM in order to draft a reform strategy allowing for the resumption of budget support which had been suspended in 2011 as a consequence of slow progress on PFM, specifically in public procurement. 
Vendar pa projekt Svetovne banke za modernizacijo javnih financ ni dosegel svojih ciljev.28 Od leta 2010 je več ključnih študij in vrednotenj opozorilo na slabosti ukrajinske strategije za področje upravljanja javnih financ.29 34 V odziv na te kritike so od leta 2011 zahteve EU za reformo upravljanja javnih financ veliko izrecnejše.30 Leta 2012 je ministrstvo za finance ustanovilo delovno skupino za upravljanje javnih financ, ki naj bi pripravila strategijo reform. To naj bi omogočilo ponoven začetek proračunske podpore, ki je bila leta 2011 začasno ustavljena zaradi počasnega napredka pri upravljanju javnih financ, natančneje pri javnem naročanju.
The Commission — particularly through the EU Delegation in Kyiv — extensively helped the Ministry of Finance to develop an acceptable PFM reform strategy and action plan before the 2013 Vilnius Summit. 
Komisija je zlasti s pomočjo delegacije EU v Kijevu veli­ ko pomagala ministrstvu za finance pri razvoju sprejemljive strategije reform upravljanja javnih financ in akcijskega načrta pred srečanjem na vrhu v Vilni leta 2013.
EU–Ukraine dialogue on the fight against corruption: a slow start, limited progress despite EU efforts over most of the audited period and a new impetus in the wake of Maidan events 35 FAC was mentioned in the action plans related to the EU–Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1994 and was on the agenda for dialogue with Ukraine. 
Dialog med EU in Ukrajino o boju proti korupciji: počasen začetek, skromen napredek kljub prizadevanjem EU v večini revidiranega obdobja in nov zagon po majdanskih dogodkih 35 Boj proti korupciji je bil omenjen v akcijskih načrtih, povezanih s sporazumom o partnerstvu in sodelovanju med EU in Ukrajino iz leta 1994, in je bil načrtovan kot del dialoga z Ukrajino.
After the 2004 Orange revolution, Ukraine made attempts to boost FAC by creating a new framework based on analyses and recommendations by international organisations. 
Po oranžni revoluciji leta 2004 si je Ukrajina prizade­ vala okrepiti boj proti korupciji z oblikovanjem novega okvira, ki bi temeljil na analizah in priporočilih mednarodnih organizacij.
The EU urged Ukraine to join the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and implement its recommendations, and to ratify the UN’s conventions against corruption. 
EU je priporočila Ukrajini, naj se pridruži Skupini držav proti korupciji (GRECO) Sveta Evrope in izvede njena priporočila ter ratificira konvencije Združenih narodov proti korupciji.
Ukraine became a member of GRECO in 2006 and ratified the UN conventions in 2009. 
Ukrajina je postala članica GRECO leta 2006, konvencijo Združenih narodov pa je ratifici­ rala leta 2009.