natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Verifying appli‐ cations for support is a complex and often time‐consuming procedure. 
Preverjanje vlog za podporo je zapleten in pogosto dolgotrajen postopek.
19 See Annex 4.2 of the Court’s Annual Reports for 2011, 2012 and 2013. 
19 Glej Prilogo 4.2 k letnim poročilom Sodišča za proračunska leta 2011, 2012 in 2013.
Box 5 
Okvir 5
Observations 28 53 The Court notes that difficulties encountered at this stage may be partly caused by inefficiencies in paying agencies’ procedures. 
Opažanja 28 53 Sodišče meni, da je do težav, ki so se pojavile v tej fazi, morda delno prišlo zaradi neučinkovitosti v postopkih plačilnih agencij.
Paying agencies typically perform the full set of verifications on applications for support even if, at a certain point in the verification process, it becomes clear that the application is not eligi‐ ble. 
Plačilne agencije običajno opravijo cel sklop preverjanj v zvezi z vlogami za podporo, tudi če se v nekem delu postopka preverjanja izkaže, da vloga ni upravičena.
Thus, any time spent continuing verifications after the ineligibility has been established represents a source of inefficiency. 
Zato je čas, v katerem se preverjanje nadaljuje tudi po tem, ko je bila ugotovljena neupravičenost, vir neučinkovitosti.
54 In the context of limited financial resources, especially at the end of the programming period, it may be that only a small fraction of the applica‐ tions for support can be co‐financed (the applications which receive the highest numbers of selection points). 
54 Glede na omejene finančne vire, zlasti ob koncu programskega obdobja, je mogoče, da se lahko sofinancira le majhen del vlog za podporo (vloge, ki prejmejo največje število točk).
However, some paying agencies per‐ form the full set of verifications on all applications submitted, even if many of the eligible projects will not receive aid because they will not have enough selection points. 
Vseeno pa nekatere plačilne agencije izvajajo celoten sklop preverjanj v zvezi z vsemi predloženimi vlogami, tudi če mnogi upravičeni projekti ne bodo prejeli pomoči, ker ne bodo imeli dovolj točk.
In this context, the paying agency for the Italy‐Sicily region uses an efficient procedure, which is described in Box 6. 
V tem kontekstu plačilna agencija v Italiji za Sicilijo uporablja učinkovit postopek, ki je opisan v okviru 6.
Example of best practice in evaluating applications for support In Italy‐Sicily, applications for support are evaluated in two stages. 
Primer najboljše prakse pri ocenjevanju vlog za podporo V Italiji na Siciliji se vloge za podporo ocenjujejo v dveh fazah.
In the first stage, a limited number of checks are performed on all applications; these are then published in a preliminary selection report. 
V prvi fazi se v zvezi z vsemi vlogami opravi omejeno število pregledov, rezultati pa se objavijo v predhodnem poročilu o izbiri.
Projects are selected in descending order of the number of selection points awarded to them, until the total value of projects selected reaches the allocated budget. 
Projekti se izberejo v padajočem vrstnem redu glede na število dodeljenih točk, dokler skupna vrednost izbranih projektov ne doseže dodeljenih proračunskih sredstev.
In the second stage, full verifications are only performed for those projects which passed the preliminary selection procedure. 
V drugi fazi pa se preverjanje v celoti izvaja samo za tiste projekte, ki so bili izbrani v predhodnem postopku izbire.
If, among these, ineligible projects are found, these are replaced by the highest scoring projects which were not selected initially. 
Če se ugotovi, da so med njimi neupravičeni projekti, se ti nadomestijo s projekti z največjim številom točk, ki sprva niso bili izbrani.
Observations 29 PART II What are the main causes of the error rate in area‐related aid? 
Opažanja 29 DEL II Kateri so glavni vzroki za stopnjo napake pri pomoči na površino?
55 This section examines the causes of errors in area‐related aid. 
55 Ta oddelek obravnava vzroke za napake pri pomoči na površino.
While the total budget is equally split between investment measures and area‐related aid, the latter contributed to only a third of the error rate (see Figure 2). 
Skupni proračun je sicer enakovredno razdeljen med naložbene ukrepe in pomoč na površino, vendar je ta prispevala le k tretjini stopnje napake (glej sliko 2).
The main impact on the error rate was due to non‐compliance with agri‐envi‐ ronment commitments, as opposed to aid for less‐favoured areas. 
Do glavnega učinka na stopnjo napake je za razliko od pomoči za območja z omejenimi možnostmi prišlo zaradi neskladnosti s kmetijsko-okoljskimi zavezami.
Agri‐environment aid is the most error prone area‐related measure 56 Agri‐environment payments are granted to farmers who undertake to comply on a voluntary basis with certain commitments to fulfil envi‐ ronmental objectives. 
Med ukrepi na površino je verjetnost napake naj‐ večja pri kmetijsko‐okoljski pomoči 56 Kmetijsko-okoljska plačila se odobrijo kmetom, ki se zavežejo, da bodo prostovoljno upoštevali nekatere obveznosti za doseganje okoljskih ciljev.
Payments are intended to cover additional costs and income foregone as a result of envi‐ ronmentally friendly farming prac‐ tices undertaken for a period of 5 to 7 years. 
Plačila krijejo dodatne stroške in izpad dohodka, do katerih pride zaradi okolju prijaznih kmetijskih praks, ki se izvajajo v obdobju od petih do sedmih let.
Agri‐environment is the most financially significant rural develop‐ ment measure, to which approximately 20 billion euro has been allocated (a fifth of the total rural development budget for the 2007–13 programming period). 
Kmetijsko-okoljski ukrepi so finančno najpomembnejši ukrep za razvoj podeželja, za katerega je bilo dodeljenih približno 20 milijard EUR (petina skupnega proračuna za razvoj podeželja za programsko obdobje 2007–2013).
57 Infringements of agri‐environment commitments accounted for one eighth of the total error rate. 
57 Kršitve kmetijsko-okoljskih zavez pomenijo osmino skupne stopnje napake.
Errors were primarily the result of non‐re‐ spect of simple commitments (see Box 7), which, however, significantly hampered the achievement of the desired environmental benefits. 
Napake so bile predvsem posledica neupoštevanja preprostih zavez (glej okvir 7), kar pa je bistveno oviralo doseganje želenih okoljskih koristi.
Observations 30 Examples of non‐respect of simple agri‐environment commitments In the Netherlands, a farmer entered into a contract for the ‘Botanical grassland edges’ measure. 
Opažanja 30 Primeri neupoštevanja preprostih kmetijsko‐okoljskih zavez Na Nizozemskem je kmet sklenil pogodbo za ukrep „bota-nični robovi travinj”.
Of the three commitments, one was related to dredging (in order to protect biodiversity, it was prohibited to cover the edge of the meadow with the mud dredged out of the water channels). 
Ena od treh zavez je bila povezana z izkopavanjem (zaradi zaščite biotske raznovrstnosti je bilo prepovedano pokriti rob travnika z blatom, izkopanim iz vodnih kanalov).
During the on‐the‐spot visit, the Court found that instead of being evenly spread, the mud excavated had been deposited on a 2 metre strip of land along more than 4 000 metres of channels. 
Med obiskom na kraju samem je Sodišče ugotovilo, da je bilo izkopano blato, namesto da bi bilo enakomerno po-razdeljeno, odloženo na dvometrski pas zemljišča vzdolž več kot 4 000 m kanalov.
In the United Kingdom (England), a farmer received aid for permanent grassland with very low inputs (e.g. fertilis‐ ers). 
V Združenem kraljestvu (Anglija) je kmet prejel pomoč za trajno travinje z zelo majhnimi vložki (npr. gnojili).
One of the requirements was to avoid overgrazing, so that the growth, quality or diversity of the vegetation is not adversely affected. 
Ena od zahtev je bila preprečevanje prekomerne paše, ki bi negativno vplivala na rast, kakovost ali raznolikost rastlinstva.
The Court found that part of the parcel was damaged due to overgrazing. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da je bil del parcele poškodovan zaradi prekomerne paše.
In Malta, a farmer undertook to refrain from cultivating crops on a strip measuring a minimum of one metre along fences, and to leave this area uncultivated, unploughed, unfertilised and unsprayed. 
Na Malti se je kmet zavezal, da ne bo gojil kulturnih rastlin na vsaj meter širokem pasu vzdolž ograj in da tega pasu ne bo obdeloval, oral, gnojil ali škropil.
This commitment aimed at conserving the biodiversity. 
Namen te zaveze je bila ohranitev biotske raznovrstnosti.
The Court found that the beneficiary did not comply with this obligation on any of the parcels of land subject to this commitment. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da upravičenec ni upošteval te obveznosti na nobeni od parcel, za katere velja ta zaveza.
Box 7 
Okvir 7
Observations 31 58 The Court considers that there are three reasons which, combined, explain the error rate for agri‐environ‐ ment measures. 
Opažanja 31 58 Sodišče meni, da obstajajo trije razlogi, ki skupaj pojasnjujejo stopnjo napake na področju kmetijsko-okoljskih ukrepov.
They are presented graphically in Figure 7 and described in further detail in the following paragraphs. 
Grafično so prikazani na sliki 7, podrobneje pa so opisani v naslednjih odstavkih.
Compliance with commitments does not produce an immediate positive effect for the farmer 59 Farmers are directly impacted by the costs of complying with commitments and/or the loss of revenue because of the lower yields obtained by using more environmentally friendly tech‐ niques. 
Skladnost z zavezami ne prinaša takojšnjega pozitivnega učinka za kmeta 59 Na kmete neposredno vplivajo stroški upoštevanja zavez in/ali izpad dohodkov, ker je njihov pridelek manjši zaradi uporabe okolju prijaznejših tehnik.
In most cases, however, these efforts are not rewarded by immedi‐ ate positive effects on the farm. 
V večini primerov pa za ta prizadevanja niso nagrajeni s takojšnjimi pozitivnimi učinki na kmetiji.
Thus, farmers are less likely to comply when there is no direct immediate rela‐ tionship between the commitments undertaken and the results on their farming activity. 
Zato je manj verjetno, da bodo kmetje upoštevali zaveze, če ni neposrednega takojšnjega razmerja med prevzetimi zavezami in rezultati v njihovi kmetijski dejavnosti.
60 This was the case in 13 out of the 17 errors identified, where the benefits brought about by the measures were far‐reaching, long‐term environmental benefits (such as for example, protect‐ ing biodiversity). 
60 Tako je bilo pri 13 od 17 ugotovljenih napak, pri katerih so ukrepi prinesli daljnosežne in dolgoročne koristi za okolje (kot npr. varstvo biotske raznovrstnosti).
Reasons for the error rate for agri‐environmental payments Low incentive to comply Low sanction rate Low control rate Figure 7 
Razlogi za stopnjo napake na področju kmetijsko‐okoljskih plačil Nizke spodbude za skladnost Nizka stopnja sankcij Nizka stopnja kontrole Slika 7
Observations 32 61 The Court did not find that a lack of knowledge regarding the commit‐ ments was a valid explanation for the majority of infringements made by farmers. 
Opažanja 32 61 Sodišče je ugotovilo, da pomanjkanje znanja o zavezah ni bil resnični razlog za večino kršitev, ki so jih storili kmetje.
Before signing the commit‐ ment, farmers are presented with the detailed list of conditions they must respect. 
Pred podpisom zaveze so kmetje prejeli podroben seznam pogojev, ki so jih morali upoštevati.
Furthermore, in 13 out of the 17 cases, the error applied to large farmers with extensive knowledge and resources. 
Poleg tega se je v 13 od 17 primerov napaka pojavila pri velikih kmetih z obsežnim znanjem in viri.
In fact these farmers had over 50 hectares in area, deriving their main income from agriculture. 
Ti kmetje so imeli več kot 50 hektarjev površin, svoj glavni dohodek pa so zaslužili s kmetijstvom.
Low control rate for agri‐environment commitments 62 Member States verify the respect of most agri‐environment commit‐ ments only during on‐the‐spot checks, which are performed on a sample of 5 % of all beneficiaries receiving aid. 
Nizka stopnja kontrole za kmetijsko‐okoljske obveznosti 62 Države članice preverijo upoštevanje večine kmetijsko-okoljskih zavez šele med pregledi na kraju samem, ki se izvedejo na vzorcu 5 % vseh upravičencev, ki prejemajo pomoč.
This means that, on average, there is a probability that a farmer is checked once every 20 years. 
To pomeni, da bo kmet v povprečju verjetno pregledan vsakih 20 let.
In addition, not all commitments can be checked at any point of time during the year, thereby reducing the scope of controls and the potential of detecting non‐complianc‐ es. 
Poleg tega vseh zavez ni mogoče preveriti v vsakem delu leta, zaradi česar so področje uporabe kontrol in možnosti za odkrivanje neskladnosti manjši.
This low control rate for commit‐ ments is another reason for the error rate found. 
Ta nizka stopnja kontrole za zaveze je dodatni razlog za ugotovljeno stopnjo napake.
63 Among the 17 cases of errors found, the Court identified eight instances where the verification of commitments could have been shifted from the on‐the‐spot controls to administrative controls (see example in Box 8). 
63 Med 17 ugotovljenimi primeri napake je Sodišče ugotovilo 8 primerov, v katerih kontrole na kraju samem ne bi bile nujne, saj bi bilo mogoče preverjanje zavez opraviti z administrativnimi kontrolami (glej primer v okviru 8).
Such a change in procedure would have enabled the Member State authorities to correct and detect the errors during administrative checks, as such checks are performed on 100 % of all benefi‐ ciaries. 
Taka sprememba postopka bi organom držav članic omogočila, da napake odkrijejo in popravijo z administrativnimi pregledi, saj se tako pregleda 100 % vseh upravičencev.
This would be especially appro‐ priate for checks based on documenta‐ ry evidence, such as: activity registers kept by the farmer (fertilisation, animal grazing, grass mowing) and certificates issued by third parties. 
To bi bilo še posebej primerno za preglede na podlagi dokazil, kot so: evidence dejavnosti, ki jih vodi kmet (gnojenje, paša, košnja trave), in certifikati, ki jih izdajo tretje strani.
Example of agri‐environment commitment which could have been verified by administrative checks In Estonia, one of the commitments of the measure was that the farmer should take at least one soil sample for every 5 hectares of land held and send it to an accredited laboratory for analysis of the acidity of the soil and its phosphorus and potassium content. 
Primer kmetijsko‐okoljske zaveze, ki bi jo bilo mogoče preveriti z administrativnimi pregledi V Estoniji je bila ena od zavez v okviru ukrepa, da mora kmet vzeti vsaj en vzorec tal za vsakih pet hektarjev kmetijskega zemljišča in ga poslati v pooblaščeni laboratorij za analizo kislosti tal ter vsebnosti fosforja in ka-lija v njih.
The rules stipulated that the laboratory results were to be kept on the farm and made available to inspectors during on‐the‐spot visits. 
Pravilo je določalo, da je treba rezultate laboratorijskih preiskav hraniti na kmetiji in jih dati na voljo inšpektorjem med obiski na kraju samem.
During the Court‘s auditors on‐the‐spot visit, the farmer presented the laboratory results of the nine soil samples taken. 
Med obiskom revizorjev Sodišča na kraju samem je kmet pokazal rezultate laboratorijskih preiskav za 9 vzorcev tal, ki jih je vzel.
Upon recalculation, it was determined that, based on the area of the parcels, the farmer should have taken 13 samples, rather than just nine. 
Na podlagi ponovnega izračuna je bilo ugotovljeno, da bi moral kmet na podlagi površine parcel vzeti 13 vzorcev in ne le devet.
This non‐compliance with the commitments could have been detected through administrative checks. 
To neskladnost z zavezami bi bilo mogoče ugotoviti z administrativnimi pregledi.
Box 8 
Okvir 8
Observations 33 The system of reductions and sanctions does not have a strong deterrent effect 64 Member States apply a proportional system of reductions and sanctions which, based on the severity, extent and permanence of the infringement, normally results in a partial reduction of the payment made. 
Opažanja 33 Sistem znižanj in sankcij nima močnega odvračilnega učinka 64 Države članice uporabljajo propor-cionalni sistem znižanj in sankcij, pri katerem glede na resnost, obseg in trajanje kršitve običajno pride do delnega znižanja plačila.
For example, in the case described in Box 8, a 5 % reduction for non‐compliance with the commitment was applied. 
Npr. v primeru, opisanem v okviru 8, je bilo uporabljeno 5-odstotno znižanje zaradi neskladnosti z zavezo.
Farmers do not risk losing any of their own money because of non‐compliance, but only risk having to return what has already been paid to them. 
Kmetom zaradi neskladnosti ne grozi nikakršna izguba lastnih sredstev, tvegajo le to, da bi morali vrniti sredstva, ki so jim bila že izplačana.
In extreme cases, where farmers have not performed any of the commitments made and the paying agency decides to recover the entire payment made, the farmers could find themselves in the same situ‐ ation as if they had not entered into any commitment. 
V skrajnih primerih, v katerih kmetje niso izpolnili nobene zaveze in se plačilna agencija odloči za izterjavo celotnega plačila, bi se lahko kmetje znašli v enakem položaju, kot če ne bi sprejeli nobene zaveze.
65 In this context, the frequency of errors (17 out of the 121 payments audited) also points to the fact that the sys‐ tem of reducing payments in cases of non‐compliance has only a limited deterrent effect on farmers (see an example in Box 9). 
65 V tem kontekstu pogostost napak (17 od 121 revidiranih plačil) kaže tudi na to, da ima sistem za znižanje plačil v primerih neskladnosti samo omejen odvračilni učinek na kmete (glej primer v okviru 9).
Payments for less‐favoured areas are less affected by error 66 Payments to farmers in mountain areas and in other areas with natural handi‐ caps (together commonly referred to as ‘less‐favoured areas’ or ‘LFA’) compensate farmers for continuing to farm in these areas. 
Na plačila za območja z omejenimi možnostmi je manj vplivala napaka 66 Plačila kmetom na gorskih območjih in drugih območjih z naravnimi omejitvami (splošno znana kot „območja z omejenimi možnostmi”) so nadomestila za kmete, ker še vedno kmetujejo na teh območjih.
These rural devel‐ opment measures target the sustain‐ able use of agricultural land and thus contribute to improving the environ‐ ment and the countryside. 
Ti ukrepi za razvoj podeželja so usmerjeni v trajnostno rabo kmetijskih zemljišč in tako prispevajo k izboljšanju okolja in podeželja.
Limited financial consequences of an infringement In the United Kingdom, a farmer entered into a commitment related to establishing heathland vegetation on acid grassland. 
Omejene finančne posledice kršitve V Združenem kraljestvu je kmet sprejel zavezo, povezano z vzpostavitvijo rastlinja resav na kislem travinju.
There were only two commitments under the measure: reduction of the stocking density (the number of animals grazing per hectare) and the prohibition of grazing between October and March. 
V okviru tega ukrepa sta bili samo dve zavezi: zmanjšanje gostote živali (števila živali, ki se pasejo na hektar) in prepoved paše med oktobrom in marcem.
The Court visited the farmer in October and found that animals were still grazing on the parcels. 
Sodišče je kmeta obiskalo oktobra in ugotovilo, da so se živali še vedno pasle na parcelah.
The financial consequence for the farmer was a 3 % reduction of the payment. 
Finančna posledica za kmeta je bilo 3-odstotno znižanje plačila.
Box 9 
Okvir 9
Observations 34 67 The impact of the 78 LFA payments audited on the overall error rate would have been negligible, were it not for two cases where errors were found for non‐respect of additional eligibility conditions imposed by the Member States concerned (see Box 10). 
Opažanja 34 67 Vpliv 78 revidiranih plačil za območja z omejenimi možnostmi na skupno stopnjo napake bi bil zanemarljiv, če ne bi bilo dveh primerov napake, v katerih je bilo ugotovljeno neupoštevanje dodatnih pogojev za upravičenost, ki sta jih določili zadevni državi članici (glej okvir 10).
This illustrates the dilemma that eligibility conditions are required to ensure that the funds are well spent, which may at the same time increase the risk of error. 
To ponazarja dilemo, da bi morali pogoji za upravičenost zagotoviti, da se sredstva dobro porabijo, hkrati pa lahko povečajo tveganje napake.
68 This relatively low error rate is due to the main characteristics of the meas‐ ures concerned: — a small number of detailed eligi‐ bility conditions: the land must be located in a designated area, defined by the Member State and approved by the Commission, and must be maintained in good agricultural and environmental condition; — lump sum payments per hectare, which are degressive. 
68 Ta razmeroma nizka stopnja napake je posledica glavnih značilnosti zadevnih ukrepov: – majhnega števila podrobnih pogojev za upravičenost: zemljišče mora biti na določenem območju, ki ga opredeli država članica in odobri Komisija, ohranjati pa ga je treba v dobrih kmetijskih in okoljskih pogojih; – plačila pavšalnih zneskov na hektar, ki se z večanjem površine znižujejo.
This means that bigger farms will receive lower payments for areas which exceed a certain threshold, and that for such farms potential area differ‐ ences only have a small impact. 
To pomeni, da bodo večje kmetije prejele nižja plačila za površine, ki presegajo nek prag, in da imajo na take kmetije morebitne razlike v površini le majhen učinek.
69 The Court notes that the low error rate for the investment measure ‘setting up of young farmers’ was also explained by these characteristics, i.e. a limited number of detailed requirements, a focused scope and the use of lump sum payments. 
69 Sodišče ugotavlja, da tudi nizko stopnjo napake za naložbeni ukrep „pomoč mladim prevzemnikom kmetij” pojasnjujejo te značilnosti, ki so omejeno število podrobnih zahtev, osredotočeno področje uporabe in uporaba pavšalnih plačil.
Additional eligibility conditions imposed by Member States for LFA payments In Italy and Portugal, the eligibility of pastures in mountain areas was conditional upon the beneficiary own‐ ing a minimum number of animals. 
Dodatni pogoji za upravičenost, ki sta jih določili državi članici za plačila za območja z omejenimi možnostmi V Italiji in na Portugalskem je bil pogoj za upravičenost pašnikov na gorskih območjih, da ima upravičenec minimalno število živali.
During on‐the‐spot visits, the Court found that the farmers concerned did not have the required number of animals and that the pastures were therefore not eligible for support. 
Med obiskoma na kraju samem je Sodišče ugotovilo, da zadevna kmeta nista imela zahtevanega števila živali in da pašnika zato nista bila upravičena do podpore.
These two cases made up the majority of the error rate affecting LFA payments. 
Ta primera pomenita večino stopnje napake, ki je vplivala na plačila za območja z omejenimi možnostmi.
Box 10 
Okvir 10
Observations 35 PART III Do the Member States’ action plans and the new EU legal framework have the potential to address these causes effectively? 
Opažanja 35 DEL III Ali bi akcijski načrti držav članic in nov pravni okvir EU lahko uspešno obravnavali te vzroke?
70 The Commission and the Member States have taken steps to address the causes of error in rural development. 
70 Komisija in države članice so sprejele ukrepe za obravnavo vzrokov za napake na področju razvoja podeželja.
This section examines whether the two main steps — the action plans and the EU legal framework — are likely to be effective. 
V tem oddelku je preučeno, ali je za glavna ukrepa – akcijski načrti in pravni okvir EU – verjetno, da bosta uspešna.