natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
96 With regard to the top‐down approach, it is not possible to recalculate the struc‐ tural effort without access to certain key data which were not shared in full with the Member States until the 2015 spring forecast and have still not been made public (see paragraphs 74 and 75). 
96 Glede na pristop od zgoraj navzdol strukturnega napora ni mogoče ponovno izračunati brez dostopa do nekaterih ključnih podatkov, ki do napovedi iz pomladi 2015 niso bili v celoti na voljo državam članicam in še vedno niso javno dostopni (glej odstavka 74 in 75).
97 The Commission used the bottom‐up approach for France in May 2013. 
97 Komisija je pristop od spodaj navzgor za Francijo uporabila maja 2013.
In addition, the impact assessment of revenue measures is a projection, not an ex‐post assessment, and therefore may be overly optimistic compared with the actual outcomes. 
Poleg tega pri oceni učinka ukrepov na strani prihodkov gre za projekcijo in ne za naknadno oceno, zato je lahko v primerjavi z dejanskimi izidi preveč optimistična.
Moreover, the impact of expenditure measures is assessed against a baseline identified by the Commission under the ‘no policy change’ assumption and is a matter for expert judgement. 
Poleg tega se učinek ukrepov na strani odhodkov oceni glede na osnovni scenarij, ki ga je Komisija določila ob predpostavki nespremenjene politike, in je stvar strokovne presoje.
Observations 62 98 The Commission has been making efforts to enhance transparency. 
Opažanja 62 98 Komisija skuša izboljšati preglednost.
In part since the 2014 spring forecast, and in full since the 2015 spring forecast, it has shared with Member States the information they need to replicate its effective action calculation. 
Delno od napovedi iz pomladi 2014 in v celoti od napovedi iz pomladi 2015 državam članicam posreduje informacije, ki jih potrebujejo za ponovni izračun uspešnih ukrepov.
However, as most of this detailed information is not made public, an interested third party would not be able to replicate the assessment. 
Ker večina teh podrobnih informacij ni javno dostopna, pa zainteresirana tretja oseba ocene ne bi mogla ponoviti.
99 In common with the EDP reporting documents submitted by national authorities (see paragraph 86), the Commission assessments reviewed by us contained no detailed (measure‐by‐measure) or quantified ex‐post assessment of the correc‐ tive measures implemented by Member States. ... and its conclusions are not always sufficiently clear or well‐founded 100 Since the entry into force of the ‘Six‐pack’, Member States placed under an EDP or granted an extension have been required to produce a report, within the follow‐ ing six months, on the corrective action taken (see Figure 7 in paragraph 85). 
99 Tako kot poročila o postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, ki so jih predložili nacionalni organi (glej odstavek 86 zgoraj), tudi ocene Komisije, ki jih je pregledalo Sodišče, niso vsebovale nobene podrobne (po posameznih ukrepih) ali količinsko opredeljene naknadne ocene popravljalnih ukrepov, ki so jih izvedle države članice. ... njeni zaključki pa niso vedno dovolj jasni ali utemeljeni 100 Od začetka veljavnosti šesterčka morajo države članice, ki so bile uvrščene v postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem ali jim je bilo odobreno podaljšanje roka, v šestih mesecih pripraviti poročilo o sprejetih popravljalnih ukrepih (glej sliko 7 v odstavku 85).
This concerned two Member States in the sample (Malta and France in October 2013). 
To je zadevalo dve državi članici iz vzorca (Malto in Francijo oktobra 2013).
In both cases, we found that the conclusions of the Commission’s assessment were based on incomplete data. 
V obeh primerih smo ugotovili, da zaključki ocene Komisije temeljijo na nepopolnih podatkih.
In particular: (i) the Commission pointed out that Malta (EDP deadline end of 2014) failed to meet the EDP requirements for 2014 in both nominal and structural terms, and that neither the report on action taken nor the draft budgetary plan provided sufficient detail about the discretionary measures underpinning the budgetary targets; (ii) the Commission’s top‐down assessment showed that, in France (extended EDP deadline end of 2015), the structural effort was insufficient for both 2013 and 2014, but the adjusted structural effort was on target. 
Zlasti: (i) Komisija je opozorila, da Malta (rok za postopek v zvezi čezmernim primanjkljajem konec leta 2014) tako v nominalnem kot v strukturnem smislu ni izpolnila zahtev postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem za leto 2014 in da ne poročilo o sprejetih ukrepih ne osnutek proračunskega načrta nista vsebovala dovolj podrobnosti o diskrecijskih ukrepih, na katerih temeljijo proračunski cilji; (ii) ocena Komisije od zgoraj navzdol je pokazala, da je bil strukturni napor v Franciji (podaljšan rok za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem iz leta 2015) nezadosten tako za leto 2013 kot za leto 2014, prilagojen strukturni napor pa je bil dosežen.
In accordance with the rules, a bottom‐up analysis was also carried out to confirm whether the Member State had taken effective action. 
V skladu s pravili je bila izvedena tudi analiza od spodaj navzgor, ki naj bi potrdila, ali je država članica sprejela uspešne ukrepe.
However, the second analy‐ sis showed that for both years the structural effort fell short of the Council recommendations (i.e. the budgetary impact of new discretionary measures was insufficient). 
Vendar je druga analiza pokazala, da strukturni napor v nobenem letu ni dosegel priporočil Sveta (proračunski učinek novih diskrecijskih ukrepov torej ni bil zadosten).
As for 2015, the last year of the EDP period, the Commission warned that ‘a significant set of measures on top of those already specified will be needed to ensure that the target for 2015 is reached’. 
V zvezi z letom 2015, ki je bilo zadnje leto postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, je Komisija opozorila, da bo poleg ukrepov, ki so že določeni, potreben znaten sklop ukrepov, da se zagotovi, da bodo cilji za leto 2015 doseženi.
Notwithstanding these comments on both Malta and France, the Commission’s conclusion for both reports on action taken was that the Member State ‘has taken effective action and no further steps in the procedure are needed at present’. 
Komisija je ne glede na te pripombe v zvezi z Malto in Francijo v obeh poročilih o sprejetih ukrepih ugotovila, da je država članica sprejela uspešne ukrepe in da zaenkrat nadaljnji koraki v okviru postopka niso potrebni.
Observations 63 101 The Commission argued that the assessment of the report on action taken is retrospective. However, this is not in line with the rules set out in the Vademe‐ cum on the SGP (paragraph 232 ‘...the Commission examines [the Member State’s report on action taken] to see whether the Member State has complied with the Article 126(7) recommendations. 
Opažanja 63 101 Komisija je trdila, da je ocena poročila o sprejetih ukrepih retrospektivna, vendar to ni v skladu s pravili, določenimi v priročniku o Paktu za stabilnost in rast (odstavek 232: Komisija preuči (poročilo države članice o sprejetih ukrepih), da bi ugotovila, ali je država članica izpolnila priporočila iz člena 126(7).
This is done by assessing whether the Member State is forecast to meet all the nominal targets, according to the Commission forecasts’), and it also means that setting unambitious targets for the first year of an EDP (when the report falls due) could turn the assessment of the report on action taken into a mere formality that provides no added value. 
To stori tako, da oceni, ali bo država članica po napovedih Komisije izpolnila vse nominalne cilje), in pomeni, da bi zaradi določitve neambicioznih ciljev za prvo leto postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem (ko je treba predložiti poročilo) ocena poročila o sprejetih ukrepih lahko bila zgolj še formalnost brez dodane vrednosti.
In this respect we note, for example, that the Council recommendations issued in June 2013 required France that year to achieve a headline deficit equal to the forecast made for 2013 in the EEF underlying the EDP recommendations, and required only those discretionary measures which the Member State had already approved in its most recent budget at that time. 
V zvezi s tem Sodišče ugotavlja, da bi v skladu s priporočili, ki jih je Svet izdal junija 2013, Francija v navedenem letu morala doseči enak nominalni primanjkljaj kot v evropski gospodarski napovedi za leto 2013, na kateri so temeljila priporočila za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, in da bi morala sprejeti zgolj tiste diskrecijske ukrepe, ki jih je že odobrila v svojem takrat najnovejšem proračunu.
Lastly, the requisite structural effort was simply derived from the headline budget target. 
Poleg tega je bil potreben strukturni napor enostavno izpeljan iz nominalnega proračunskega cilja.
102 The assessment of effective action should allow the procedure to be stepped up if the Member State is missing, or is forecast to miss, all the targets (headline deficit, structural effort, adjusted structural effort and bottom‐up targets). 
102 Ocena uspešnih ukrepov bi morala omogočiti zaostritev postopka, če država članica ne izpolnjuje nobenega cilja (nominalnega primanjkljaja, strukturnega napora, prilagojenega strukturnega napora in ciljev od spodaj navzgor) ali se predvideva, da jih ne bo izpolnjevala.
How‐ ever, we found that this was not the case with the ongoing assessments (‘regular monitoring’) that were made of France50 on the occasion of the 2014 spring and autumn forecasts: although France was missing all its targets, the procedure was not stepped up (see Annex VI). 
Vendar pa je Sodišče ugotovilo, da pri stalnih ocenah (v okviru rednega spremljanja), ki so bile za Francijo50 izvedene ob napovedih iz pomladi in jeseni 2014, to ne drži: čeprav Francija ni izpolnjevala nobenega cilja, postopek ni bil zaostren (glej Prilogo VI).
103 Our analysis of the assessment that the Commission carries out at the expiry of the deadline for revised recommendations (Malta in 2010 and France in 2009, 2013 and 2015) is given in paragraphs 79 et seq. 
103 Naša analiza ocene, ki jo Komisija izvede ob izteku roka za revidirana priporočila (za Malto leta 2010 in za Francijo leta 2009, 2013 in 2015), je navedena v odstavku 79 in naslednjih odstavkih.
50 As can be seen from Annex VI, France is the only Member State in the sample to which this weakness in the ongoing assessment applies. 
50 Kot je razvidno iz Priloge VI, je Francija edina država članica v vzorcu, za katero velja ta slabost stalnega ocenjevanja.
Observations 64 104 On the issue of debt, we found in general that, even after the application of the debt criterion, the analysis of the dynamics of the debt ratio is inconclusive for Member States under an EDP that was already in place in November 2011. 
Opažanja 64 104 V zvezi s vprašanjem dolga je Sodišče na splošno ugotovilo, da analiza dinamike deleža dolga za države članice v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, ki se je že izvajal novembra 2011, tudi po uporabi merila dolga ostaja brez pravega zaključka.
The analysis broadly describes historical and forecast trends in the debt‐to‐GDP ratio, and warns that Member States’ projections might underestimate the debt growth rate and that measures planned in their stability programmes could be insufficient to bring the debt‐to‐GDP ratio down. 
Analiza na splošno opisuje pretekle in napovedane trende za delež javnega dolga v razmerju do BDP ter opozarja, da države članice v svojih projekcijah morda podcenjujejo stopnjo rasti dolga in da ukrepi, ki jih načrtujejo v svojih programih stabilnosti, morda ne zadoščajo za zmanjšanje deleža javnega dolga v razmerju do BDP.
However, the conclusions do not even question whether or not the debt criterion was breached. 
V zaključkih se kljub temu ne pojavlja dvom o tem, ali je bilo merilo dolga kršeno ali ne.
In this respect we also note that, according to the internal version of the Vademecum on SGP, EDPs that were open in November 2011 are to be abrogated on the basis of the deficit criterion only. 
V zvezi s tem Sodišče tudi ugotavlja, da je mogoče v skladu z notranjo različico priročnika o Paktu za stabilnost in rast postopke v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, ki so se izvajali novembra 2011, razveljaviti zgolj na podlagi merila dolga.
Nevertheless, the introduction of annual fiscal targets in EDP recommendations from 2011 onwards provides a clear benchmark for the ongoing assessment of effective action in multiannual EDPs 105 In principle, an EDP should be closed by the end of the year following that in which it was opened. The targets set by EDP recommendations therefore have an annual horizon. 
Uvedba letnih fiskalnih ciljev v priporočilih za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem od leta 2011 kljub temu določa jasno referenčno merilo za stalno ocenjevanje uspešnih ukrepov v večletnih postopkih v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem 105 Načeloma je treba postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem zaključiti do konca leta, ki sledi letu, v katerem je bil postopek uveden.
106 However, in 2009 several EDPs were launched with a multiannual deadline. 
106 Kljub temu se je leta 2009 začelo več postopkov v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem z večletnim rokom.
A general government deficit target was set for the period as a whole, with, to this end, a fiscal effort averaged over the period (see Annex VI, yellow cells). 
Cilj glede javnofinančnega primanjkljaja je bil določen za celotno obdobje, fiskalni napor pa je bil v ta namen izražen kot povprečje za to obdobje (glej rumene celice v Prilogi VI).
The drawback was that this allowed Member States to postpone most corrective action until the last year of the period. 
Slaba stran tega je bila, da so države članice tako lahko z večino popravljalnih ukrepov odlašale do zadnjega leta obdobja.
At that point, the sheer magnitude of the corrections needed made them unrealistic and forced the Council to extend the deadline. 
Takrat so bili potrebni popravki že zaradi samega obsega nerealni in Svet je bil prisiljen, da podaljša rok.
107 To remedy this weakness, since 2011 EDP recommendations have included annual fiscal targets for these multiannual EDPs in both nominal and structural terms, thus restoring the annual benchmark for assessing corrective action as was the case before 2009. 
107 Ta slabost je bila odpravljena tako, da priporočila za postopke v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem od leta 2011 v nominalnem in strukturnem smislu vključujejo letne fiskalne cilje za te večletne postopke.
Observations 65 Structural reforms are now also taken into account in the overall assessment of EDP action taken... 
Opažanja 65 Zdaj se pri splošni oceni ukrepov, sprejetih v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, upoštevajo tudi strukturne reforme ...
108 Excessive public deficits may be rooted – at least in part – in structural weak‐ nesses. 
108 Čezmerni javni primanjkljaj je mogoče vsaj delno pripisati strukturnim slabostim.
Structural reforms address those weaknesses and remove obstacles to the fundamental drivers of growth by, for example, liberalising labour, product and service markets, which in turn encourages job creation and investment and improves productivity. 
Strukturne reforme se osredotočajo na te slabosti in odpravljajo ovire za temeljna gonila rasti, na primer z liberalizacijo trga dela, proizvodov in storitev, s čimer se spodbujajo ustvarjanje delovnih mest in naložbe ter izboljšuje produktivnost.
Thus structural reforms may improve competitiveness, boost growth and, in the medium and long term, contribute to a lasting correc‐ tion of the deficit. 
Tako lahko strukturne reforme izboljšajo konkurenčnost in okrepijo rast, srednje-in dolgoročno pa lahko prispevajo tudi k trajnemu zmanjšanju primanjkljaja.
109 Since May 2013 the Commission has also taken structural reforms into account in the overall assessment of EDP action. It does this by assessing economic partner‐ ship programmes (EPPs). 
109 Komisija od maja 2013 pri splošni oceni ukrepov v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem upošteva tudi strukturne reforme, in sicer z ocenjevanjem programov ekonomskega partnerstva.
Since the entry into force of the ‘Two‐pack’, euro‐area Member States under an EDP have been required, together with their reports on action taken, to submit EPPs, which are a sort of road map of planned structural reforms. 
Od začetka veljavnosti dvojčka morajo države članice euroobmočja, ki so v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, poleg poročil o sprejetih ukrepih predložiti tudi programe ekonomskega partnerstva, ki predstavljajo nekakšen časovni načrt za načrtovane strukturne reforme.
Moreover, since February 2015 the Commission has regarded structural reforms planned in sufficient detail as a relevant factor for not launching an EDP or for granting a multiannual deadline51. ... although the analyses carried out in this regard are still limited and do not take sufficient account of the importance of structural reforms in the context of the EDP. 110 EPP assessments are a one‐off exercise, and the Commission does not systemati‐ cally follow up the weaknesses identified. 
Poleg tega Komisija od februarja 2015 dovolj podrobno načrtovane strukturne reforme obravnava kot pomemben dejavnik pri odločitvah, da ne bo začela postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem ali da bo odobrila večletni rok51. ... čeprav so analize, izvedene v zvezi s tem, še vedno omejene in ne upoštevajo dovolj pomembnosti strukturnih reform v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem 110 Ocene programov ekonomskega partnerstva se izvedejo enkrat, Komisija pa ugotovljenih slabosti ne spremlja sistematično.
For example, in its opinion on the EPP submitted by Malta in October 2013 the Council concluded that all reforms were a work in progress and that implementation remained subject to risks. 
Svet je v svojem mnenju o programu ekonomskega partnerstva, ki ga je oktobra 2013 predložila Malta, na primer ugotovil, da so vse reforme še vedno v teku in da je njihovo izvajanje še vedno podvrženo tveganjem.
In addi‐ tion, some country‐specific recommendations had not yet been fully addressed. 
Poleg tega nekatera priporočila za državo še niso bila v celoti obravnavana.
It therefore invited Malta to provide additional information on the implementa‐ tion of the planned reforms in the upcoming national reform programme and stability programme, while considering additional measures to ensure long‐term public finance sustainability. 
Svet je Malto zato pozval, naj zagotovi dodatne informacije o izvajanju reform, ki jih načrtuje v prihodnjem nacionalnem reformnem programu in programu stabilnosti, pri tem pa naj upošteva dodatne ukrepe, s katerimi bo zagotovila dolgoročno vzdržnost stanja javnih financ.
However, although Malta failed to address all the aspects of the Council’s Opinion in respect of a number of reforms, the Commis‐ sion did not mention the missing details in its assessment of the relevant national reform programme. 
Čeprav Malta pri številnih reformah ni obravnavala vseh vidikov mnenja Sveta, Komisija v svoji oceni njenega nacionalnega reformnega programa ni opozorila na manjkajoče podrobnosti.
Observations 66 111 With the exception of Member States under a financial assistance programme (e.g. Cyprus), follow‐up of the implementation of structural reforms by Member States under an EDP is done only in the context of the European Semester (moni‐ toring of the implementation of country‐specific recommendations) and is no stricter than that carried out in respect of other Member States. 
Opažanja 66 111 Izvajanje strukturnih reform držav članic v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem se, razen pri državah članicah v programu finančne pomoči (npr. pri Cipru), spremlja le v okviru evropskega semestra (spremljanje izvajanja priporočil za posamezno državo) in ni nič strožje kot pri drugih državah članicah.
112 Moreover, the monitoring of country‐specific recommendations does not always extend to the actual implementation of reforms or to assessing their effective‐ ness. 
112 Poleg tega spremljanje priporočil za posamezno državo ne zajema vedno dejanskega izvajanja reform ali ocenjevanja njihove uspešnosti.
It mainly focuses on the steps taken to put the proposed measures into law (see Box 11). 
Večinoma se osredotoča na korake, ki so bili sprejeti za vključitev predlaganih ukrepov v zakonodajo (glej okvir 11).
We consider that weak monitoring could compromise the impact of the Commission’s recent decision to take greater account of the implementation of structural reforms. 
Sodišče meni, da bi lahko šibko spremljanje ogrozilo učinek nedavne odločitve Komisije o večjem upoštevanju izvajanja strukturnih reform.
The Commission’s assessment of structural reforms implemented by Italy By way of illustration of the Commission’s approach to the assessment of structural reforms, reference is made to three reforms regarded as priorities by both Italy and the Commission: ο Spending review: in their 2013 and 2014 national reform programmes the Italian authorities highlighted the appointment of a commissioner to oversee the spending review. 
Ocena, ki jo je Komisija opravila za strukturne reforme, izvedene v Italiji Za ponazoritev pristopa Komisije k ocenjevanju strukturnih reform omenjamo tri reforme, ki sta jih Italija in Komisija obravnavali kot prednostne: ο pregled porabe: italijanski organi so v svojih nacionalnih reformnih programih iz let 2013 in 2014 poudarili imenovanje komisarja, ki naj bi nadziral pregled porabe.
However, the commissioner ap‐ pointed in October 2013 resigned in October 2014 (two years before the end of his mandate) after putting forward a spending review plan. 
Vendar je komisar, ki je bil imenovan oktobra 2013, oktobra 2014 (dve leti pred iztekom svojega mandata), potem ko je objavil načrt pregleda porabe, odstopil.
The Commission in its assessment (COM (2015)113 final) only noted that ‘in the context of the spending review a choice for more political ownership has been made but only some instruments are fully operational’. 
Komisija je v svoji oceni (COM(2015) 113 final) navedla samo, da je bila v okviru pregleda porabe sprejeta odločitev za več politične odgovornosti, vendar so v celoti operativni le nekateri instrumenti.
It did not assess Italy’s progress (or lack of it) in implementing the com‐ missioner’s proposals. 
Komisija ni ocenila (ne)napredka Italije pri izvajanju predlogov komisarja.
A new spending review commissioner was appointed only five months later. ο Tackling corruption: DG Economic and Financial Affairs’s assessment of the anti‐corruption authority failed to detect any weaknesses undermining its effectiveness. 
Nov komisar za pregled porabe je bil imenovan le pet mesecev pozneje. ο boj proti korupciji: v oceni protikorupcijskega organa, ki jo je izvedel GD za gospodarske in finančne zadeve, ni bila ugotovljena nobena slabost, ki bi ovirala njegovo uspešnost.
These weaknesses only came to light in June 2014 after a report by DG Migration and Home Affairs had identified several issues (February 2014) and a major corruption scandal broke in Italy (EXPO 2015 in Milan in April 2014). 
Te slabosti so se pokazale šele junija 2014, ko je bilo v poročilu GD za migracije in notranje zadeve opredeljenih več vprašanj (februarja 2014) in je v Italiji izbruhnil velik korupcijski škandal (EXPO 2015 v Milanu aprila 2014).
Two other major corrup‐ tion cases emerged later the same year (the Mose project in Venice in June, Mafia Capitale in Rome in December). ο Tackling tax evasion: in its assessment the Commission did not examine the figures disclosed by Italy as the outcome of measures implemented under this heading in the stability and national reform programmes. Box 11 
Pozneje istega leta sta se zgodila še dva druga večja primera korupcije (projekt MOSE v Benetkah v juniju in Mafia Capitale v Rimu v decembru); ο boj proti davčnim utajam: Komisija v svoji oceni ni preučila številčnih podatkov, ki jih je Italija razkrila kot rezultat ukrepov, ki so se pod tem naslovom izvajali v programu stabilnosti in nacionalnem reformnem programu. Okvir 11