natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This non‐automaticity is explicitly foreseen in the regulation and is economically warranted given that debt developments are (more than deficit developments) not fully under the control of the government. 
Ta nesamodejnost je v Uredbi izrecno predvidena in ekonomsko upravičena glede na to, da gibanje dolga (bolj kot gibanje primanjkljaja) ni v celoti pod nadzorom države.
Indeed, the debt‐to‐GDP ratio is particularly dependent on developments in both real GDP growth and inflation. 
Delež javnega dolga v razmerju do BDP je zlasti odvisen od gibanja realne rasti BDP in inflacije.
In addition, this also concerns the stock‐flow adjustment, which is influenced i.a. by for‐ eign exchange rates and statistical reclassifications. 
Poleg tega se to nanaša tudi na uskladitev stanj in tokov, na katero med drugim vplivajo menjalni tečaji in statistično prerazvrščanje.
Recommendation 8 The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
Priporočilo 8 Komisija sprejema to priporočilo.
Realistic and credible EDP targets should speak to the need for caution in considering the provision of debt‐to‐GDP targets as a component of EDP recommendations. 
Realni in verodostojni cilji v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem bi morali govoriti v prid previdnosti pri premisleku o določitvi ciljev glede deleža javnega dolga v razmerju do BDP kot sestavine priporočil v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
Governments do not exert the same level of control on the development of debt‐to‐GDP ratios as they do in rela‐ tion to the deficit. 
Države nimajo take ravni nadzora nad gibanjem deležev javnega dolga v razmerju do BDP, kot jo imajo glede primanjkljaja.
In particular, non‐deficit related financial transactions (so‐called stock‐flow adjustments) can have a significant impact upon debt‐ratios in a given year. 
Zlasti finančne transakcije, ki niso povezane s primanjkljajem (tako imenovane uskladitve stanj in tokov), lahko znatno vplivajo na deleže dolga v določenem letu.
As it the nature of debt dynamics that one year builds upon the other, such one‐off occurrences can have knock‐on implications for subsequent years that would create an inconsistency between deficit and debt‐based targets. 
Ker je dinamika dolga taka, da je eno leto odvisno od drugega, lahko imajo taki enkratni pojavi posledice več zaporednih let, kar povzroči neskladje med cilji glede primanjkljaja in dolga.
Reply of the Commission 140 144 In terms of enforcement the focus of the legislation which governs the EDP is fiscal outcomes and, as such, the rele‐ vant legislation does not contain specific provision to enforce the implementation of structural reforms. Indeed, the assessment of effective action under an EDP is focussed on the delivery of the required budgetary adjustment and is not affected by the evaluation of structural reforms. 
Odgovori Komisije 140 144 Kar zadeva izvrševanje, je zakonodaja, ki se uporablja za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, osredotočena na fiskalne učinke in kot taka ne vsebuje posebne določbe, s katero bi se zahtevalo izvajanje strukturnih reform. Ocenjevanje uspešnega ukrepanja v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem je osredotočeno na izvedbo zahtevane javnofinančne prilagoditve, vrednotenje strukturnih reform pa nanj ne vpliva.
The implementation of structural reforms, including those undertaken under an Economic Partnership Programme (EPP), is monitored in the context of the European Semes‐ ter. 
Izvajanje strukturnih reform, vključno s tistimi v okviru programa ekonomskega partnerstva, se spremlja v okviru evropskega semestra.
However, the Regulation does not foresee specific steps in cases where structural measures fall short compared to what is recommended in the analysis of the EPP. 
Vendar Uredba ne predvideva posebnih korakov, kadar s strukturnimi ukrepi niso izpolnjena priporočila iz analize programa ekonomskega partnerstva.
145 The need to avoid duplication and unduly complicate surveillance procedures explains why monitoring is not ensured in the EDP related documents. 
145 Potreba po preprečevanju podvajanja in nepotrebnega zapletanja nadzornih postopkov pojasnjuje, zakaj v dokumentih, povezanih s postopkom v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, ni zagotovljeno spremljanje.
Such a monitoring is warranted during the European Semester, that was created in order to ensure that economic and budgetary policy are treated in an integrated manner, taking their interactions and interdependencies into account. 
Tako spremljanje je zagotovljeno med evropskim semestrom, ki je bil vzpostavljen za zagotovitev, da se ekonomske in proračunske politike obravnavajo celovito, ob upoštevanju njihovega medsebojnega vplivanja in medsebojne odvisnosti.
The changes introduced by the Commission to the 2015 European Semester aimed at increasing ownership at national level and accountability of European and national decision‐making. 
Namen sprememb, ki jih je Komisija uvedla v evropski semester 2015, je bil povečati odgovornost na nacionalni ravni ter prevzemanje odgovornosti pri odločanju na evropski in nacionalni ravni.
As part of the reinforced European Semester, since 2015, a Country Report is produced for each of the Member States and for the euro area in February each year, identifying country‐specific challenges, notably linked to the reform process, and the progress made in addressing the issues identified in the previous round of Country Specific Recommendations. 
V okviru okrepljenega evropskega semestra se od leta 2015 za vsako državo članico in euroobmočje februarja vsako leto pripravi poročilo o državi, v katerem so navedeni izzivi v posameznih državah, zlasti v zvezi s procesom reform, in napredek pri reševanju vprašanj, opredeljenih v prejšnjem krogu priporočil za posamezne države.
These detailed assessments inform the formulation of the next round of CSRs. Moreover, for countries subject to specific monitoring due to the presence of excessive imbalances, the implemen‐ tation of reforms is monitored under this specific process within the overall Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. 
Te podrobne ocene se upoštevajo pri oblikovanju naslednjega kroga priporočil za posamezne države. Pole tega se pri državah, ki se posebej spremljajo zaradi čezmernih neravnotežij, izvajanje reform spremlja v okviru tega posebnega postopka znotraj splošnega postopka v zvezi s makroekonomskim neravnotežjem.
Concerning the Commission’s recent decision to take greater account of the implementation of structural reforms, it should be stressed that it does not impact the assessment of effective action under the EDP. 
V zvezi z nedavno odločitvijo Komisije, da bolj upošteva izvajanje strukturnih reform, je treba poudariti, da to ne vpliva na ocenjevanje uspešnih ukrepov v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
Recommendation 9 – First paragraph The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
Priporočilo 9, prvi odstavek Komisija sprejema to priporočilo.
The introduction of Economic Partnership Programme (EPPs) is based on the fact that excessive public deficits may be rooted – at least in part – on structural weaknesses. 
Uvedba programa ekonomskega partnerstva temelji na dejstvu, da je mogoče čezmerni javni primanjkljaj vsaj delno pripisati strukturnim slabostim.
If these weaknesses are not directly addressed, budget‐ ary measures may be insufficient to produce a lasting correction of the deficit. 
Če se te slabosti ne odpravljajo neposredno, proračunski ukrepi morda ne bodo zadostovali za trajno odpravo primanjkljaja.
Instead, addressing the underlying weaknesses is likely to be effective and more efficient from an economic point of view, over the medium and longer terms. 
Nasprotno pa bo odpravljanje osnovnih slabosti verjetno uspešno ter srednje-in dolgoročno ekonomsko učinkovitejše.
Since the entry into force of the Two‐pack, Member States for which an EDP has been opened/the EDP dead‐ line has been revised following effective action, shall present an EPP at the same time as the report on action taken that is due 3 to 6 months since EDP steps have been taken. 
Od začetka veljavnosti dvojčka morajo države članice, za katere je bil uveden postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem/za katere je bil rok v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem spremenjen po uspešnih ukrepih, hkrati s poročilom o sprejetih ukrepih, ki ga je treba predložiti v treh do šestih mesecih po sprejetju korakov v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, predložiti še program ekonomskega partnerstva.
Reply of the Commission 141 The EPPs are one‐off documents whose role is to act as a roadmap for the fiscal structural reforms which Member States consider to be necessary to ensure an efficient and lasting correction of their excessive deficit. 
Odgovori Komisije 141 Programi ekonomskega partnerstva so enkratni dokumenti, katerih naloga je predstaviti načrt za fiskalne strukturne reforme, za katere države članice štejejo, da so potrebne za zagotovitev učinkovite in trajne odprave njihovega čezmernega primanjkljaja.
In their EPP, the Member States should identify and select their priorities in terms of competitiveness, long‐term sustainable growth and addressing their structural weaknesses. 
Države članice bi morale v svojih programih ekonomskega partnerstva opredeliti in izbrati svoje prednostne naloge glede konkurenčnosti, dolgoročne trajnostne rasti in odpravljanja strukturnih slabosti.
The EPP serves to complement the budgetary measures taken over the course of an EDP with a wider strategy aimed at avoiding the occurrence of excessive deficits. 
Program ekonomskega partnerstva dopolnjuje proračunske ukrepe, sprejete med postopkom v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, pri čemer je cilj širše strategije preprečevanje nastanka čezmernega primanjkljaja.
However, its one‐off nature does not imply that there is no follow‐up. 
Vendar ker gre za enkraten program, to ne pomeni, da ni nadaljnjega ukrepanja.
The Commission and the Council monitor the implementa‐ tion of the fiscal‐structural reforms in the context of the European Semester. 
Komisija in Svet spremljata izvajanje fiskalno-struk-turnih reform v okviru evropskega semestra.
In this regard, one should bear in mind the need to avoid duplication and unduly complicated surveillance procedures. 
V zvezi s tem se je treba zavedati, da je treba preprečevati podvajanje in nepotrebno zapletanje nadzornih postopkov.
Recommendation 9 – Second paragraph The Commission does not accept the recommendation as it considers that it already operates to the full extent of the powers available to it under the legislation and has repeatedly publicly stressed the need for Member States to undertake necessary structural reforms. 
Priporočilo 9, drugi odstavek Komisija priporočila ne sprejema, saj meni, da že zdaj v celoti izvaja vsa pooblastila, ki so ji dodeljena v skladu z zakonodajo, in je že večkrat javno poudarila, da morajo države članice uvesti potrebne strukturne reforme.
146 Regarding the new reporting requirements, there are no (explicit) legislative provisions to ensure that Member States comply with them, nor sanctions in case of non‐compliance. 
146 Glede novih zahtev v zvezi s poročanjem ni niti (izrecnih) zakonodajnih določb, ki bi zagotavljale, da jih države članice izpolnjujejo, niti sankcij v primeru njihovega neizpolnjevanja.
However, as this is a requirement stemming from a Regulation they could be enforceable given the possibility for the Commission to launch an infringement procedure in case of non‐compliance. 
Ker pa je to zahteva, ki izhaja iz Uredbe, bi lahko bile izvršljive, saj lahko Komisija v primeru neizpolnjevanja sproži postopek za ugotavljanje kršitev.
The effectiveness of this remedy should be judged against the requirements of the EDP. 
O učinkovitosti tega sredstva je treba presojati glede na zahteve v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
147 As replied to rec. b (iv), the Regulation does not always foresee a systematic evaluation/feedback to be made public by the Commission. 
147 Kot je bilo odgovorjeno na priporočilo b(iv), Uredba ne predvideva vedno, da bi morala Komisija javno objaviti sistematično vrednotenje/povratne informacije.
Additional reporting is fully taken into account by the Commission in its regular surveillance (i.e. in each forecast round; a short assessment is generally provided in the country‐specific section of the ‘ Implications of the forecast for budgetary surveillance’ notes since AF2013). 
Komisija dodatno poročanje v celoti upošteva pri rednem nadzoru (tj. v vsakem krogu napovedi; kratka ocena je običajno navedena v oddelku za posamezne države v dopisih o „Posledicah napovedi za proračunski nadzor“ od jesenske napovedi 2013).
Only in cases of non‐compliance with the require‐ ments, this would be clearly flagged and pointed out in an appropriate Commission document (depending on the specific situation, this can be either a dedicated note or part of the documents assessing the SCP or DBP). 
Samo v primeru neizpolnjevanja zahtev bi bilo to jasno označeno in poudarjeno v ustreznem dokumentu Komisije (glede na konkretne okoliščine je to lahko poseben dopis ali del dokumentov o oceni programa stabilnosti in konvergenčnega programa ali osnutka proračunskega načrta).
Recommendation 10 – First paragraph The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
Priporočilo 10, prvi odstavek Komisija sprejema to priporočilo.
Recommendation 10 – Second paragraph The Commission does not accept the recommendation since the effectiveness of this remedy should be judged against the requirements of the EDP. 
Priporočilo 10, drugi odstavek Komisija priporočila ne sprejema, ker je treba o učinkovitosti tega sredstva presojati glede na zahteve v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
149 The Commission restates its commitment to apply sanctions as appropriate in line with the provisions of the Six‐pack. 
149 Komisija znova poudarja svojo zavezanost uporabi sankcij, kot je ustrezno v skladu z določbami šesterčka.
Recommendation 11 The Commission does not accept the recommendation. 
Priporočilo 11 Komisija ne sprejema tega priporočila.
The Commission has always acted in compliance with the Treaty. 
Komisija vedno ravna v skladu s Pogodbo.
The Commission will continue to recommend that the Council step up the procedure and apply sanctions where appropriate in line with the legislation. 
Svetu bo še naprej priporočala zaostritev postopka in uporabo sankcij, kjer je to ustrezno v skladu z zakonodajo.
‘The excessive deficit procedure (EDP) is a key element of economic governance in the EU. 
Postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem je ključni element ekonomskega upravljanja v EU.
It is used where necessary to correct the trajectory of deficit and debt in the Member States. 
Po potrebi se uporablja za popravo krivulje primanjkljaja in dolga v državah članicah.
For this audit we examined the quality of the EDP in the difficult recent economic climate, from the data underlying decisions to initiate the procedure through to the final results. 
S to revizijo je Sodišče preučilo kakovost postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem v nedavnih težkih gospodarskih razmerah: od podatkov, na katerih so temeljile odločitve o začetku postopka, do končnih rezultatov.
We found that effective implementation is still a work in progress, but that the Commission is committed to continuing with the necessary improvements.’ 
Ugotovilo je, da si je treba za uspešnost izvajanja še prizadevati, vendar se je Komisija zavezala k nadaljevanju uvajanja potrebnih izboljšav.
EN 2016 Special Report NO 11 Strengthening administrative capacity in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: limited progress in a difficult context EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 
11 Posebno poročilo SL 2016 Krepitev upravne zmogljivosti v nekdanji jugoslovanski republiki Makedoniji: skromen napredek v zahtevnih razmerah EVROPSKO RAČUNSKO SODIŠČE
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016 Print ISBN 978-92-872-4880-0 PDF ISBN 978-92-872-4905-0 EPUB ISBN 978-92-872-4935-7 ISSN 1831-0834 ISSN 1977-5679 ISSN 1977-5679 doi:10.2865/894970 doi:10.2865/54872 doi:10.2865/880213 QJ-AB-16-012-EN-C QJ-AB-16-012-EN-N QJ-AB-16-012-EN-E © European Union, 2016 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
Luxembourg: Urad za publikacije Evropske unije, 2016 Print ISBN 978-92-872-4871-8 PDF ISBN 978-92-872-4892-3 EPUB ISBN 978-92-872-4883-1 ISSN 1831-094X ISSN 1977-5784 ISSN 1977-5784 doi:10.2865/033410 doi:10.2865/135155 doi:10.2865/535389 QJ-AB-16-012-SL-C QJ-AB-16-012-SL-N QJ-AB-16-012-SL-E © Evropska unija, 2016 Reprodukcija je dovoljena z navedbo vira.
EN 2016 Special Report NO 11 Strengthening administrative capacity in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: limited progress in a difficult context (pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU) 
11 Posebno poročilo SL 2016 Krepitev upravne zmogljivosti v nekdanji jugoslovanski republiki Makedoniji: skromen napredek v zahtevnih razmerah (v skladu z drugim pododstavkom člena 287(4) PDEU)
The audit was led by ECA Member Hans Gustaf Wessberg, supported by the Head of his private office, Peter Eklund; Emmanuel-Douglas Hellinakis, Attaché; Torielle Perreur-Lloyd, Head of Task; Stéphanie Girard, Ainhoa Perez Infante, Aurelia Petliza, auditors. 
Revizijo je vodil član Evropskega računskega sodišča Hans Gustaf Wessberg, pri njej pa so sodelovali vodja njegovega kabineta Peter Eklund in ataše Emmanuel-Douglas Hellinakis, vodja naloge Torielle Perreur-Lloyd ter revizorji Stéphanie Girard, Ainhoa Perez Infante in Aurelia Petliza.
From left to right: A. Perez Infante, E.-D. Hellinakis, T. Perreur-Lloyd, H. G. Wessberg, A. Petliza, P. Eklund, S. Girard. 
Od leve proti desni: A. Perez Infante, E.-D. Hellinakis, T. Perreur-Lloyd, H. G. Wessberg, A. Petliza, P. Eklund, S. Girard.
Contents 03 Paragraph I–IX 01–13 01–05 06–10 11–13 14–21 22–66 22–44 23–36 37–38 39–40 41–44 45–55 46–49 50–51 52–55 Abbreviations and acronyms Executive summary Introduction The road to accession The national context of reform EU pre-accession financial assistance Audit scope and approach Observations Part I — The effectiveness of pre-accession financial assistance in contributing towards strengthening administrative capacity Pre-accession financial assistance did not successfully address some of the significant weaknesses in administrative capacity in key areas Most planned outputs were delivered but they were not always exploited The impacts of projects were often limited and not always sustainable Obstacles to progress on strengthening administrative capacity Part II — The use of decentralised management as a means of building capacity The country was not ready for the volume and complexity of IPA funds for which management was decentralised The Commission has taken action but further de-commitment is probable Decentralising management could have been used more widely as a capacity-building tool for the public administration 
Kazalo 03 Odstavek I–IX 1–13 1–5 6–10 11–13 14–21 22–66 22–44 23–36 37–38 39–40 41–44 45–55 46–49 50–51 52–55 Kratice in okrajšave Povzetek Uvod Pot do pristopa k EU Nacionalno ozadje reforme Predpristopna finančna pomoč EU Obseg revizije in revizijski pristop Opažanja Del I – Uspešnost prispevka predpristopne finančne pomoči h krepitvi upravne zmogljivosti Pri obravnavanju nekaterih bistvenih slabosti upravne zmogljivosti na ključnih področjih predpristopna pomoč ni bila uspešna Načrtovani izložki so bili večinoma doseženi, vendar niso bili vedno izkoriščeni Učinki projektov so bili pogosto skromni in ne vedno trajnostni Ovire za napredek pri krepitvi upravne zmogljivosti Del II – Uporaba decentraliziranega upravljanja kot sredstva za gradnjo zmogljivosti Država ni bila pripravljena na obseg in kompleksnost sredstev iz IPA, katerih upravljanje je bilo decentralizirano Komisija je ukrepala, vendar bo verjetno prišlo do dodatnega preklica prevzetih obveznosti Decentralizacija upravljanja bi se lahko širše uporabljala kot orodje za gradnjo zmogljivosti v javni upravi
Contents 04 56–66 57–60 61–66 67–73 Part III — The contribution of political dialogue to strengthening administrative capacity Although well organised, political dialogue did not contribute significantly to an overall strengthening of administrative capacity Other dialogue mechanisms addressed the need to strengthen administrative capacity but did not result in progress towards removing the underlying obstacles Conclusions and recommendations Annex I — Key dates in EU–former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia relations Annex II — Projects audited Reply of the Commission 
Kazalo 04 56–66 57–60 61–66 67–73 Del III – Prispevek političnega dialoga h krepitvi upravne zmogljivosti Čeprav je bil politični dialog dobro organiziran, ni bistveno prispeval k splošni krepitvi upravne zmogljivosti Drugi mehanizmi za dialog so obravnavali potrebo po krepitvi upravne zmogljivosti, niso pa prinesli napredka pri odstranjevanju s tem povezanih ovir Zaključki in priporočila Priloga I – Ključni datumi v odnosih med EU in nekdanjo jugoslovansko republiko Makedonijo Priloga II – Revidirani projekti Odgovori Komisije
Abbreviations and acronyms 05 CSO: Civil Society Organisation DG Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations: Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations DG Regional and Urban Policy: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy HLAD: High Level Accession Dialogue IPA: Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance ITSF: IPA Training and Support Facility PAR: Public Administration Reform PIFC: Public Internal Financial Control PPB: Public Procurement Bureau ReSPA: Regional School of Public Administration SA: Stabilisation and Association SAA: Stabilisation and Association Agreement SAC: State Appeals Commission SAP: Stabilisation and Association Process SCPC: State Commission for Prevention of Corruption SIGMA: Support for Improvement in Governance and Management 
Kratice in okrajšave 05 GD za regionalno in mestno politiko: Generalni direktorat za regionalno in mestno politiko GD za sosedstvo in širitvena pogajanja: Generalni direktorat za sosedstvo in širitvena pogajanja IPA: Instrument za predpristopno pomoč SIGMA: Podpora za izboljšanje upravljanja in vodenja
Executive 06 summary IThe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been a candidate for EU membership since 2005. 
Povzetek 06 INekdanja jugoslovanska republika Makedonija je kandidatka za članstvo v EU od leta 2005.
Every year since 2009, the Commission has reported that the country meets the mandatory political criteria for moving to the next stage of the accession process. 
Komisija je vsako leto od leta 2009 poročala, da država izpolnjuje obvezna politična merila za prehod v naslednjo fazo pristopnega procesa.
The Council has agreed that the country meets the political criteria but has not decided on a framework for opening negotiations. 
Svet se je strinjal, da država izpolnjuje politična merila, ni pa sprejel odločitve o okviru za odprtje pogajanj.
In November 2015 the Commission stated that it was prepared to extend its recommendation to open accession negotiations with the country. However, this was made conditional upon the resolution of the current political crisis in the country and the implementation of a number of urgent reform priorities. 
Novembra 2015 je Komisija navedla, da je pripravljena podaljšati svoje priporočilo o odprtju pogajanj z državo o pristopu, vendar je kot pogoj postavila razrešitev sedanje politične krize v državi in izvedbo več nujnih prednostnih nalog na področju reform.
II During the 2007-2013 period the EU allocated 615 million euros under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA I) to help the country prepare for accession. 
II V obdobju 2007–2013 je Komisija v okviru instrumenta za predpristopno pomoč (IPA I) dodelila 615 milijonov EUR kot pomoč državi pri pripravah na pristop.
The country also received financial support under multilateral programmes covering the whole of the Western Balkans. 
Država je prejemala finančno podporo v okviru večstranskih programov, ki zajemajo ves Zahodni Balkan.