natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Since 2010, their frequency has increased markedly. Participants take part on site or remotely. 
Od leta 2010 jih je čedalje več. Udeleženci sodelujejo na kraju samem ali na daljavo.
There are post-exercise assessments to identify lessons learned, although these may not yet be percolating fully between the strategic/political, operational and technical layers 127. 
Po vajah se izvede ocenjevanje za opredelitev novega znanja, čeprav to morda še ne združuje strateške/politične, operativne in tehnične ravni127.
EU and NATO’s flagship exercises – the biennial Cyber Europe (operational) and the annual Locked Shields (technical) – garner over 1 000 participants from around 30 participating states. 
Na vodilnih vajah EU in Nata – bienalna vaja Cyber Europe (operativna) in letna vaja Locked Shields (tehnična) – sodeluje več kot 1 000 udeležencev iz približno 30 sodelujočih držav.
Both exercises focus on protecting and maintaining critical infrastructure in simulated attack scenarios. 
Obe vaji sta osredotočeni na zaščito in ohranjanje kritične infrastrukture v simulacijah napada.
The exercises have increased in depth considerably, with both now including media, legal and financial policy elements to improve practitioners’ situational awareness The parallel and coordinated PACE exercises (strategic) test EU-NATO interaction in a hybrid crisis scenario. 
Poglobljenost vaj se je močno povečala in zdaj obe vključujeta medije ter pravne elemente in elemente finančne politike za izboljšanje situacijskega zavedanja strokovnjakov.
35 These are not the only international exercises. 
To pa niso edine mednarodne vaje.
ENISA organises an annual cyber challenge, in which teams compete to solve security-related challenges like web and mobile security, crypto puzzles, reverse engineering, ethics and forensics. 
ENISA organizira letni kibernetski izziv, pri katerem ekipe tekmujejo v reševanju izzivov na področju kibernetske varnosti, npr. v zvezi s spletno in mobilno varnostjo, v reševanju kriptosestavljank, obratnem inženiringu, etiki in forenziki.
The first ministerial-level exercise, EU CYBRID, took place in September 2017, focusing on strategic decision-making. 
Prva vaja na ministrski ravni EU CYBRID je potekala septembra 2017, osredotočena pa je bila na strateško odločanje.
In 2018 the NATO-affiliated exercise, Crossed Swords, was launched to improve the offensive elements of its Locked Shields exercise. 
Leta 2018 se je v povezavi z Natom začela izvajati vaja Crossed Swords za izboljšanje ofenzivnih elementov vaje Locked Shields.
NATO also organises the Cyber Coalition exercises. 
Nato organizira tudi vaje Cyber Coalition.
A key challenge is to ensure the active involvement of all important stakeholders and the coordination of all the exercises, to avoid duplication and share lessons learned efficiently. 
Ključni izziv je zagotoviti dejavno sodelovanje vseh pomembnih deležnikov ter usklajenost vseh vaj, da se prepreči podvajanje in zagotovi učinkovita izmenjava pridobljenega znanja.
Awareness 88 Citizens are often vectors for attacks and spreading disinformation, since they are likely to be unwittingly exposed to vulnerabilities in cheap and widely distributed devices and software or fall victim to social engineering. 
Ozaveščenost 88 Državljani so pogosto prenašalci napadov in dezinformacij, saj je verjetno, da so nevede izpostavljeni ranljivostim v poceni napravah in programski opremi, ki so zelo razširjene, ali pa so žrtve socialnega inženiringa.
Awareness-raising is therefore essential to building effective cyber resilience, yet it is by no means an easy task since it is difficult for non-experts to understand cybersecurity’s complexity and the associated risks. 
Ozaveščanje je zato bistveno za doseganje uspešne kibernetske odpornosti, vendar nikakor ni lahka naloga, saj nestrokovnjaki težko razumejo kompleksnost kibernetske varnosti in z njo povezana tveganja.
89 The annual European Cyber Security Awareness Month (ECSM) and Safer Internet Day are examples of awareness-raising. 
89 Primera dejavnosti ozaveščanja sta vsakoletni evropski mesec kibernetske varnosti in dan varnejšega interneta.
Seven non-EU Member States have now joined the ECSM128. 
Evropskemu mesecu kibernetske varnosti se je zdaj pridružilo sedem držav, ki niso članice EU128.
Europol’s Say No! campaign aims to reduce the risk of children falling victim to sexual coercion and extortion online. 
Europolova kampanja Reci ne! je namenjena zmanjševanju tveganja, da otroci postanejo žrtve spolne prisile in izsiljevanja na spletu.
Reducing the risk is important because at present, few attack victims currently report these crimes to the police129.The Commission acknowledges that the cybersecurity strategy has been only “partially effective” in raising citizens’ and businesses’ awareness 130. 
Zmanjševanje tveganja je pomembno, ker sedaj le malo žrtev napadov te zločine prijavi policiji129. Komisija priznava, da je bila strategija za kibernetsko varnost le delno uspešna pri ozaveščanju državljanov in podjetij130.
This is due to the scale of the task, limited resources, Member States’ uneven engagement, and a lack of scientific evidence on how to best raise and measure awareness. 
To je posledica obsega naloge, omejenih virov, neenakomerne angažiranosti držav članic ter tega, da ni znanstvenih dokazov o tem, kako je najbolje ozaveščati in kako meriti ozaveš čenos t.
90 The challenge for the Commission and relevant agencies is to ensure that awareness-raising measures are: well-targeted and publicised; inclusive; follow the threat landscape; avoid unintended effects like “security fatigue”131; and develop evaluative methods and metrics to assess their effectiveness. 
90 Izziv za Komisijo in relevantne agencije je zagotoviti, da so ukrepi za ozaveščanje dobro usmerjeni in objavljeni, vključujoči in da upoštevajo vrste groženj, ter preprečevati neželene učinke, kot je prenasičenost z varnostnimi ukrepi131, in razviti ocenjevalne metode in metriko za ocenjevanje njihove uspešnosti.
This should apply in equal measure within the EU institutions themselves, where the culture of awareness needs improving132. 
To bi moralo enako veljati tudi v institucijah EU, v katerih je treba izboljšati kulturo ozaveščenosti132.
Challenge 8: better information exchange and coordination 91 Cybersecurity requires cooperation between public and private sectors, primarily in terms of sharing information and exchanging best practices. 
Izziv 8: boljša izmenjava informacij in usklajevanje 91 Za zagotavljanje kibernetske varnosti je potrebno sodelovanje med javnim in zasebnim sektorjem, predvsem si morata izmenjavati informacije in najboljše prakse.
Trust is essential at all levels to create the right environment for the sharing of sensitive information across borders. 
Zaupanje je pri ustvarjanju ustreznega okolja za čezmejno izmenjavo občutljivih informacij bistveno na vseh ravneh.
Poor coordination leads to fragmentation, duplication of efforts and a dispersal of expertise. 
Slabo usklajevanje privede do razdrobljenosti, podvajanja prizadevanj ter razpršitve strokovnega znanja.
Despite the progress achieved in recent years, levels of trust are still “insufficient”134 at the EU level and in some Member States135. 
Kljub napredku, doseženemu v zadnjih letih, so ravni zaupanja še vedno nezadostne134 na ravni EU in v nekaterih državah članicah135. 37
Coordination among EU institutions and with Member States 92 One of the aims of the Cybersecurity Strategy, and the cooperative structures introduced by the NIS Directive, has been to strengthen trust among stakeholders. 
Usklajevanje med institucijami EU in z državami članicami 92 Eden od ciljev strategije za kibernetsko varnost in struktur za sodelovanje, uvedenih z direktivo o varnosti omrežij in informacij, je okrepitev zaupanja med deležniki.
The assessment of the strategy recognised that a foundation for strategic and operational cooperation at the EU level had been laid136. 
V oceni strategije je navedeno, da je bil ustvarjen temelj za strateško in operativno sodelovanje na ravni EU136.
Despite this, coordination in general is “insufficient”137. 
Kljub temu je usklajevanje na splošno ocenjeno kot nezadostno137.
The challenge is to ensure that information exchange is not only meaningful but also permits a complete overview of the big picture. 
Izziv je zagotoviti, da izmenjava informacij ni le smiselna, temveč da omogoča tudi popoln pregled nad celotno situacijo.
Reaching a common understanding based on accepted terminology is an important factor in this regard (see Box 5). 
V tem pogledu je doseganje skupnega razumevanja na podlagi sprejete terminologije pomemben dejavnik (glej okvir 5).
93 The ENISA evaluation noted, however, that the EU’s approach to cybersecurity was not sufficiently coordinated, resulting in a lack of synergies between ENISA’s activities and those of other stakeholders. 
93 V oceni ENISE pa je navedeno, da pristop EU h kibernetski varnosti ni dovolj usklajen, zaradi česar ni dovolj sinergij med dejavnostmi ENISE in dejavnostmi drugih deležnikov.
Cooperation mechanisms are still relatively immature138; the Cybersecurity Act intends to address this by strengthening ENISA’s coordinating role. 
Mehanizmi za sodelovanje so še vedno razmeroma nezreli138, vendar naj bi se to z uredbo o kibernetski varnosti obravnavalo z okrepitvijo usklajevalne vloge ENISE.
The desire to enhance cooperation was the rationale behind the memorandum of understanding signed in 2018 between ENISA, EDA, Europol EC3, and CERT-EU139. 
Želja po okrepitvi sodelovanja je bila razlog za memorandum o soglasju, ki so ga leta 2018 podpisali ENISA, Evropska obrambna agencija, Europolov Evropski center za boj proti kibernetski kriminaliteti in skupina za odzivanje na računalniške grožnje139.
A priority for the Commission in the coming years will be to ensure proper alignment between policy initiatives, needs and investment programmes in order to overcome fragmentation and generate synergies 140. 
V prihodnjih letih bo prioriteta Komisije zagotavljanje ustrezne usklajenosti med pobudami politike, potrebami in naložbenimi programi, da bi se odpravila razdrobljenost in ustvarile sinergije140.
94 Coordination functions are embedded within various institutional bodies. 
94 Usklajevalne funkcije so vključene v različne institucionalne organe.
The Task Force on the Security Union was established to play a central role in coordinating the Commission’s different Directorates-General with a view to supporting the Security Union’s agenda141. 
Delovna skupina za varnostno unijo je bila ustanovljena, da bi prevzela osrednjo vlogo v usklajevanju različnih generalnih direktoratov Komisije za podporo agendi varnostne unije141.
DG CNECT chairs the Task Force’s sub-working group on cybers ecurity. 
GD CNECT predseduje podskupini delovne skupine za kibernetsko varnost.
95 At the Council, cybersecurity is handled by the Horizontal Working Party on Cyber Issues (HWP), which coordinates strategic and horizontal cyber issues, and helps prepare exercises and evaluate their results. 
95 V Svetu kibernetsko varnost obravnava Horizontalna delovna skupina za kibernetska vprašanja, ki usklajuje strateška in horizontalna kibernetska vprašanja ter pomaga pripravljati vaje in ocenjevati njihove rezultate.
It works closely with the Political and 36 Security Committee, which has a central decision-making role in relation to any cyber-related diplomatic measures (see Box 6 in next chapter). 
Tesno sodeluje s Političnim in varnostnim odborom, ki ima osrednjo vlogo odločanja v zvezi z vsemi diplomatskimi ukrepi na področju kibernetske varnosti (glej okvir 6 v naslednjem poglavju).
Since cybersecurity is a cross-cutting subject, coordinating all relevant interests is not straightforward: no fewer than 24 working parties and preparatory bodies have recently dealt with cyber-related issues142. 
Ker je kibernetska varnost medsektorska, usklajevanje vseh relevantnih interesov ni enostavno: v zadnjem času je kibernetska vprašanja obravnavalo kar 24 delovnih skupin in pripravljalnih organov142.
96 The two latest legislative proposals on strengthening ENISA (2017) and on establishing a network of cybersecurity competence centres and a research competence centre (2018) are specifically designed to address the fragmentation and duplication of effort. 
96 Zadnja zakonodajna predloga o okrepitvi ENISE (iz leta 2017) ter o vzpostavitvi mreže strokovnih centrov za kibernetsko varnost in raziskovalnega strokovnega centra (iz leta 2018) sta zasnovana specifično za obravnavo razdrobljenosti in podvajanja prizadevanj.
A driving factor behind the network of cybersecurity competence centres and a research competence centre has been the need to fill the gap that the NIS Directive’s cooperative structures do not fill, since they were not designed to support the development of “cutting edge” solutions. 
Spodbuda za mrežo strokovnih centrov za kibernetsko varnost in 38 raziskovalni strokovni center je bila potreba po zapolnitvi vrzeli, ki je strukture sodelovanja iz direktive o varnosti omrežij in informacij niso zapolnile, ker niso bile zasnovane za podporo razvoja visokotehnoloških rešitev.
38 Box5 Attempting to speak the same cyber language: technological coherence Terminological clarity improves situational awareness and coordination143 and helps establish precisely what constitutes a threat and a risk. 
39 Okvir 5 Prizadevanja za isti kibernetski jezik: tehnološka koherentnost Terminološka jasnost izboljšuje situacijsko zavedanje in usklajevanje143 ter pomaga ugotoviti, kaj natančno je grožnja in tveganje.
The Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) has recently developed a revised research taxonomy drawn from different international standards 144. 
Skupno raziskovalno središče Komisije je nedavno razvilo spremenjeno raziskovalno taksonomijo, ki izhaja iz različnih mednarodnih standardov144.
This is changing. 
Zdaj se to spreminja.
In the framework of its blueprint, the Cooperation Group devised an incident taxonomy with the aim of facilitating efficient cross-border collaboration. 
Skupina za sodelovanje je v okviru svojega načrta razvila taksonomijo incidentov, da bi olajšala učinkovito čezmejno sodelovanje.
Cooperation and information exchange with the private sector 97 Cooperation between public authorities and the private sector is essential for strengthening overall levels of cybersecurity. 
Sodelovanje in izmenjava informacij z zasebnim sektorjem 97 Sodelovanje med javnimi organi in zasebnim sektorjem je bistveno za povečanje splošne ravni kibernetske varnosti.
Despite this, in its 2017 assessment of the Cybersecurity Strategy, the Commission found that information exchange between private stakeholders and between public and private sectors was “not yet optimal” due to a “lack of trusted reporting mechanisms and incentives to share information”145, hampering the attainment of strategic goals. 
kibernetsko varnost iz leta 2017 ugotovila, da izmenjava informacij med zasebnimi deležniki ter med javnim in zasebnim sektorjem še ni optimalna, ker ni dovolj zaupanja vrednih mehanizmov poročanja in spodbud za izmenjavo informacij145, kar ovira doseganje strateških ciljev.
The Commission has also noted the absence of an efficient cooperation mechanism by which Member States work together to strategically enhance lasting industrial capabilities at scale146. 
Ugotovila je tudi, da ni učinkovitega mehanizma za sodelovanje, v okviru katerega bi države članice sodelovale za ustrezno strateško okrepitev trajnih industrijskih zmogljivosti146.
98 Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISACs) are organisations set up to provide platforms and resources to facilitate information sharing between the public and private sectors as well as to gather information on cyber threats. 
98 Centri za izmenjavo in analizo informacij so organizacije, ustanovljene za zagotavljanje platform in sredstev za olajšanje izmenjave informacij med javnim in zasebnim sektorjem ter zbiranja informacij o kibernetskih grožnjah.
They aim to build trust through sharing experience, knowledge and analysis, especially about root causes, incidents and threats. 
Njihov cilj je graditi zaupanje z izmenjavo izkušenj, znanja in analiz, zlasti glede temeljnih vzrokov, incidentov in groženj.
National and sectoral ISACs already exist in many Member States, but at the European level, they are still relatively limited147. 
Nacionalni in sektorski centri za izmenjavo in analizo informacij že obstajajo v mnogih državah članicah, na evropski ravni pa jih je še vedno razmeroma malo147.
However, they come with a number of challenges (resourcing constraints, difficulties in evaluating their success, ensuring the right structures to engage both public and private sectors, getting law enforcement authorities involved) that will need to be overcome if they are to contribute to helping implement the NIS Directive and building security capabilities at a European-wide level148. 
Srečujejo se s številnimi izzivi (omejenost virov, težave pri ocenjevanju njihove uspešnosti, zagotavljanje ustreznih struktur za vključitev tako javnega kot tudi zasebnega sektorja, vključevanje organov kazenskega pregona), ki jih bo treba premagati, če naj prispevajo k izvajanju direktive o varnosti omrežij in informacij ter izgradnji varnostnih zmogljivosti na evropski ravni148.
99 Close cooperation with the private sector is particularly vital to combat complex cybercrime, but its efficiency is uneven across Member States and depends on the level of trust149. 
99 Tesno sodelovanje z zasebnim sektorjem je še posebej pomembno za boj proti kompleksni kibernetski kriminaliteti, vendar je njegova učinkovitost v državah članicah različna in odvisna od ravni zaupanja149.
Europol EC3, however, has established a series of advisory groups with private sector operators, EU institutions and agencies, and other international organisations to improve collaboration through networking, strategic intelligence-sharing and cooperation. 
Europolov Evropski center za boj proti kibernetski kriminaliteti pa je s subjekti zasebnega sektorja, institucijami in agencijami EU ter drugimi mednarodnimi organizacijami ustanovil vrsto svetovalnih skupin za izboljšanje sodelovanja z mreženjem, strateško izmenjavo obveščevalnih podatkov in sodelovanjem.
They work to plans aligned with the goals of the EU Policy Cycle150. 
Te skupine delajo v skladu s cilji političnega cikla EU150.
The criminal abuse of encryption is another area ripe with challenges calling for more cooperation with the private sector. 
Kriminalne zlorabe šifriranja so še eno področje, polno izzivov, za katere bo potrebnega več sodelovanja z zasebnim sektorjem.
Europol EC3 is currently examining options to host case-specific short-term attachments to the J-CAT (see paragraph 62) for experts from the private sector and academia. 
Europolov Evropski center za boj proti kibernetski kriminaliteti sedaj preučuje možnost, da bi skupna projektna skupina za ukrepanje na področju kibernetske kriminalitete v specifičnih primerih kratkoročno gostila strokovnjake iz zasebnega sektorja in akademike (glej odstavek 62).
100 A lack of efficient cooperation mechanisms afflicts the civilian and defence communities – both public and private. 
100 To, da ni učinkovitih mehanizmov za sodelovanje je problem tako za civilne kot tudi za obrambne skupnosti – javne in zasebne.
Areas posing a common challenge include cryptography, secure embedded systems, malware detection, simulation techniques, network and systems communication protection and authentication technologies. 
Področja, ki predstavljajo skupen izziv, vključujejo kriptografijo, varne vgrajene sisteme, zaznavanje zlonamerne programske opreme, tehnike simulacije, zaščito omrežij in komunikacijskih sistemov ter tehnologije za avtentikacijo.
Promoting civil-military cooperation and supporting research and technology (in particular by supporting SMEs) are two of the priorities in the updated EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework (2018 update). 
Spodbujanje civilno-vojaškega sodelovanja in podpiranje raziskav in tehnologije (zlasti s podpiranjem MSP) sta dve od prioritet posodobljenega okvira EU za politiko kibernetske obrambe (posodobitev iz leta 2018).
Responding effectively to cyber incidents 101 Devising an effective response to cyberattacks is fundamental to stopping them in their tracks as early as possible. 
Uspešno odzivanje na kibernetske incidente 101 Razvoj uspešnega odzivanja na kibernetske napade je temeljen za njihovo čimprejšnjo popolno zaustavitev.
It is especially important that critical sectors, Member States and EU institutions be able to respond in a swift and coordinated way. 
Zlasti je pomembno, da se lahko kritični sektorji, države članice in institucije EU odzovejo hitro in usklajeno.
Challenge 9: effective detection and response Detection and notification 102 Common detection tools help defeat the vast majority of attacks on a daily basis 151. 
Izziv 9: uspešno zaznavanje in odziv Zaznavanje in priglasitev 102 Skupna orodja za zaznavanje vsakodnevno pomagajo premagati veliko večino napadov151.
Nevertheless, digital systems have become so complex that preventing each and every attack is impossible. 
Vendar so digitalni sistemi postali tako kompleksni, da ni mogoče preprečiti vsakega napada.
Experts say, therefore, that the focus should be on rapiddetectionanddefence152.However,somedetectiontools ̶suchasautomation, machine learning and behavioural analytics, which look at reducing risks, and analysing and learning from system behaviour – suffer from low adoption rates by businesses153. 
Strokovnjaki zato menijo, da bi se bilo treba osredotočiti na hitro zaznavanje in obrambo152. Vendar nekatera orodja za zaznavanje, kot so avtomatizacija, strojno učenje in vedenjska analitika, ki si prizadevajo za zmanjševanje tveganj ter analizirajo vedenje sistema in se iz njega učijo, podjetja nerada sprejemajo153.
This is in part due to the generation of false positives, whereby non-threatening activities are mistaken as malicious. 
To je delno posledica ustvarjanja lažnih pozitivnih rezultatov, pri čemer se za dejavnosti, ki ne pomenijo grožnje, zmotno misli, da so zlonamerne.
103 Once a breach has been detected and analysed, swift notification and reporting is necessary so that other public and private entities can take preventive action, and the relevant authorities can support those affected. 
103 Ko se kršitev odkrije in analizira, sta potrebna hitra priglasitev in poročanje, da lahko drugi javni in zasebni subjekti sprejmejo preventivne ukrepe, zadevni organi pa pomagajo prizadetim.
Many organisations are reluctant to acknowledge and report cyber incidents 154. 
Mnoge organizacije nerade priznajo kibernetske incidente in o njih poročajo154.
The early involvement of law enforcement authorities in the initial response to suspected cybercrimes and proactive information exchange with CSIRTs is also essential. 
Bistveni sta tudi zgodnja vključenost organov kazenskega pregona v prvem odzivu na domnevno kibernetsko kriminaliteto in proaktivna izmenjava informacij s skupinami za odzivanje na incidente na področju računalniške varnosti.
104 The previous lack of common EU requirements on incident notification risked delaying the communication of breaches and hindering the response, which the introduction of the NIS Directive sought to address (see paragraph 20). 
104 Ker nekdaj ni bilo skupnih zahtev EU glede priglasitve incidentov, je obstajalo tveganje, da bo sporočanje kršitev pozno in da bo odziv oviran, to pa naj bi se odpravilo z uvedbo direktive o varnosti omrežij in informacij (glej odstavek 20).
Following the 2017 Wannacry attacks, the Commission concluded that the CSIRT network system was “not yet fully operational”155. 
Po napadih WannaCry leta 2017 je Komisija ugotovila, da sistem mreže skupin za odzivanje na incidente na področju računalniške varnosti „še ni bil popolnoma operativen“155.
As the implementation of the Directive continues, it remains to be seen whether the guidance developed by the Cooperation Group will be effective in overcoming the reluctance to report incidents 156. 41 
Izvajanje direktive se nadaljuje, vendar se bo šele pokazalo, ali bodo smernice, ki jih je pripravila skupina za sodelovanje, uspešno odpravile nepripravljenost za poročanje o incidentih156. 42