natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The ECAŐs position 13 The ECAŐs mandate to conduct independent external audits of the ECB is enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.12 It is specified in Art. 27(2) of Protocol No 4, which states: "The provisions of Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shall only apply to an examination of the operational efficiency of the management of the ECB". 
Stališče Evropskega računskega sodišča 13 Pooblastilo sodišča za izvajanje neodvisnih zunanjih revizij ECB je določeno v Pogodbi o delovanju Evropske unije12, in sicer v členu 27(2) Protokola št.
Furthermore, the Regulation establishing the SSM specifically asks the ECA to "[...] take into account the supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation".13 While the word "operational" does not exist in the French and German versions of the Treaty and is not defined in international audit standards, the concept of efficiency has long been clearly defined in international audit standards as well as in the financial regulation applicable to the general budget of the Union and in the ECAŐs publicly available Performance Audit Manual.14 12 Articles 285 and 287(2) TFEU. 
4, v katerem je navedeno: „Določbe člena 287 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije se uporabljajo samo za preverjanje učinkovitosti upravljanja ECB.“ Poleg tega je v uredbi o EMN posebej navedeno, da Računsko sodišče „[...] upošteva tudi nadzorniške naloge, ki se na ECB prenesejo s to uredbo“13. Besede „operativne“ v francoski in nemški (in slovenski, op. p.) različici Pogodbe sicer ni, poleg tega pa ni opredeljena v mednarodnih revizijskih standardih, vendar je pojem učinkovitosti že dolgo jasno opredeljen v mednarodnih 11 Uredba (EU) št.
13 Article 20(7) Regulation (EU) 1024/2013. 
13 Člen 20(7) Uredbe (EU) št.
5 14 The ECA considers that in the area of supervisory activities, the assessment of efficiency implies an assessment of whether the supervising institutions are performing their duties in a manner that minimizes the risk of financial instability and potential cost for budgetary resources.15 The performance audits conducted by the ECA will refrain from assessing the regularity of individual supervisory decisions, thus not performing this aspect of compliance audit, as they are subject to legal review by the ECJ. 
5
Similarly, financial audits will continue to be conducted by independent private auditors, as envisaged in the legislation. 
Podobno bodo revizije računovodskih izkazov še naprej izvajali neodvisni zasebni revizorji, kot je predvideno v zakonodaji.
15 Based on all applicable international standards, it is the responsibility of the auditor to establish the information it needs to perform their tasks and draw conclusions.16 Furthermore, there is international recognition of the importance for Supreme Audit Institutions to have unrestricted access to information.17 This also applies to the ECA, which has the right to request from the ECB "any document or information necessary to carry out its task"18, as enshrined in the Treaty It would therefore be unacceptable if any auditee were to determine the extent of access to documents or restrict access to documents in any way. 
15 Na podlagi vseh veljavnih mednarodnih standardov je revizor odgovoren za določitev tega, katere informacije potrebuje za opravljanje svojih nalog in oblikovanje zaključkov.16 Poleg tega je pomembnost neomejenosti dostopa vrhovnih revizijskih institucij do informacij mednarodno priznana.17 To velja tudi za Računsko sodišče, ki ima pravico od ECB zahtevati „vso dokumentacijo ali vse podatke, ki so potrebni za izvršitev njegove naloge“,18 kot je določeno v Pogodbi. Zato bi bilo nedopustno, da bi kateri koli revidiranec določil obseg dostopa do dokumentov ali kakor koli omejeval dostop do njih.
However, since 2015 the ECB, as auditee, has single-handedly decided which information it deems necessary for the ECA to perform its tasks. 
Toda ECB se je kot revidiranec od leta 2015 dalje sama odločala, katere informacije Računsko sodišče po njenem mnenju potrebuje za opravljanje svojih nalog.
16 In the past, the ECB has argued that being subject to external performance audit would not be compatible with its independence as central bank. 
16 V preteklosti je ECB trdila, da to, da bi bila predmet zunanje revizije smotrnosti poslovanja, ne bi bilo združljivo z neodvisnostjo, ki jo ima kot centralna banka.
However, it is common practice in many advanced economies and in EU Member States for banking supervision to be subject to external public audit, even if the banking supervision is performed by a central bank.19 This proves not only that public external audit is compatible with the independence of central banks and the Basel principles for bank supervisors, but also that it is a fundamental principle of good public administration. 
Vendar je v številnih razvitih gospodarstvih in v državah članicah EU običajno, da je bančni 14 Na podlagi člena 33 finančne uredbe (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 se načelo učinkovitosti „nanaša na najboljše razmerje med uporabljenimi sredstvi, izvedenimi dejavnostmi in doseganjem ciljev“.
In line with these facts, 15 The ECA considers that the interpretation of efficiency in banking supervision is not necessarily the same as in monetary policy. 
15 Računsko sodišče meni, da razlaga učinkovitost bančnega nadzora ni nujno enaka kot v monetarni politiki.
ISA 200, ISSAI 1 and 10. 
16 Npr. MRS 200, ISSAI 1 in 10.
17 ISSAI 1, Section 10; and ISSAI 10, Principle 4 as recognized by the United Nations in resolution A/66/209. 
17 Oddelek 10 ISSAI 1 in ISSAI 10, načelo 4, kot ga priznavajo Združeni narodi v Resoluciji A/66/209.
18 Article 287(3) TFEU, which fully applies to the ECAŐs mandate regarding the ECB. 
18 Člen 287(3) PDEU, ki v celoti velja za pooblastila Računskega sodišča v zvezi z ECB.
7 a Member of the Governing Council of the ECB has also acknowledged the need for adequate accountability requirements, including external public audit (see Box 1).20 Box 1 Extracts from Yves MerschŐs keynote address on ŇCentral bank independence revisitedÓ "Article 130 of the Treaty and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union make it clear that the independence the ECB enjoys is limited to the performance of the tasks conferred on the Eurosystem [...]. 
V skladu s tem je tudi eden od članov Sveta ECB poudaril potrebo po ustreznih zahtevah glede odgovornosti, vključno z zunanjo javno revizijo (glej okvir 1).20 7 Okvir 1 Izvlečki iz osrednjega govora Yvesa Merscha o ponovnem razmisleku o neodvisnosti centralne banke Iz člena 130 Pogodbe in sodne prakse Sodišča Evropske unije je jasno, da je neodvisnost ECB omejena na izvajanje nalog, zaupanih Eurosistemu.
Tasks and functions conferred on the ECB by secondary legislation [such as banking supervision] do not, therefore, fall within the scope of the principle of independence in Article 130 of the Treaty [...].Ó "The ECBŐs accountability for its supervisory tasks is different from and more enhanced than that for its monetary policy task owing to the potential impact on taxpayers [...]Ó 17 Moreover, the Court of Justice of the European Union made it clear that, while the ECB enjoys great independence to perform the tasks conferred on it by the Treaty, this does not "separate it entirely from the EU and exempt it from every rule of EU law". 
Naloge in funkcije, ki se na ECB prenesejo s sekundarno zakonodajo, [kot je bančni nadzor] zato ne spadajo na področje uporabe načela neodvisnosti iz člena 130 Pogodbe.
In particular, the Court of Justice stated that the ECB is subject to "review by the Court of Justice and control by the ECA"21. It also stated that while these tasks may overlap, they are completely different: "[...] the Court of Justice does base its decision in general on the subject-matter of the proceedings. 
Sodišče Evropske unije je izrecno navedlo, da samo izvaja preglede ECB, Evropsko računsko sodišče pa nadzor.21 Navedlo je tudi, da se ti nalogi morda deloma prekrivata, vendar sta povsem drugačni: „Sodišče [Evropske unije] se mora [...] pri izreku sodbe na splošno ravnati po predmetu postopka.
The Court of Auditors, on the other hand, may also act on its initiative [...] and, in doing so, determine the object of the audit itself, having regard to its powers."22 18 In a statement to a Member of the European Parliament23, the ECB argued that it was not in a position to provide certain information to the ECA due to its confidentiality requirements. 
Računsko sodišče pa lahko nasprotno [...] postane dejavno tudi na lastno pobudo, pri čemer lahko predmet revizije – ob upoštevanju svojih pristojnosti – samo določi.“22 19 Na primer v ZDA in Kanadi (glej Prilogo V k Posebnemu poročilu Evropskega računskega sodišča št.
However, the primary law requires any EU institution to "forward to the 20 Keynote address by Yves Mersch on "Central bank independence revisited" on 30 March 2017. 
20 Osrednji govor Yvesa Merscha o ponovnem razmisleku o neodvisnosti centralne banke dne 30. marca 2017.
21 Judgment of 10 July 2003, Commission/ECB, C-11/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:395, paragraph 135. 
21 Sodba z dne 10. julija 2003, Komisija/ECB, C-11/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:395, odstavek 135.
22 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak delivered on 25 May 2011, European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany, paragraph 71. 
22 Mnenje generalne pravobranilke Trstenjak, predstavljeno 25. maja 2011, Evropska komisija proti Zvezni republiki Nemčiji, odstavek 71.
Court of Auditors, at its request, any document or information necessary to carry out its task."24 Accordingly, the ECA has a broad right to have direct access to all the information it considers necessary in order to perform its audit tasks, including, where necessary, confidential documents and bank-specific information. 
Toda v skladu s primarno zakonodajo vse institucije EU „pošljejo Računskemu sodišču na njegovo zahtevo vso dokumentacijo ali vse podatke, ki so potrebni za izvršitev njegove naloge“24. Zato ima Računsko sodišče široko pravico do neposrednega dostopa do vseh informacij, ki so po njegovem mnenju potrebne za opravljanje njegovih nalog, po potrebi tudi do zaupnih dokumentov in informacij o posameznih bankah.
If in the course of a future audit the ECB refuses to provide audit information to the ECA or takes no action with respect to a request by the ECA to provide it with audit information, the ECA has the option to bring the issue before the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
Če v okviru prihodnje revizije ECB Računskemu sodišču ne bo želela zagotoviti informacij za revizijo ali ne bo ukrepala v zvezi s prošnjo Računskega sodišča, naj mu zagotovi informacije za revizijo, ima Računsko sodišče možnost, da to zadevo vloži na Sodišče Evropske unije.
19 It is therefore standard practice for the ECA to assess and safeguard confidential information. 
19 Računsko sodišče vedno oceni in varuje zaupne informacije.
This has been the case in many audits, including audits of the European Securities and Markets Authority or the Single Resolution Board. 
To se je zgodilo pri mnogih revizijah, vključno z revizijami Evropskega organa za vrednostne papirje in trge ali Enotnega odbora za reševanje.
It should also be highlighted that the ECA and its staff are bound by clear professional secrecy obligations arising directly from the Treaty, the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the ECAŐs ethical framework.25 These provisions provide sufficient safeguards to ensure that confidential documents received by the ECA from its auditees are not shared with any unauthorised parties.26 20 In the past, the ECB has stated that other accountability requirements, such as its annual reports or reviews of the Commission, compensate for the absence of adequate public audit. 
Poudariti je treba tudi, da imajo Računsko sodišče in njegovi uslužbenci jasno obveznost varovanja poslovnih skrivnosti, ki izhaja neposredno iz Pogodbe, Kadrovskih predpisov za uradnike Evropske unije in etičnega okvira Računskega sodišča25. Te določbe zagotavljajo dovolj zaščitnih ukrepov za zagotovitev, da se zaupni dokumenti, ki jih prejme Računsko sodišče od svojih revidirancev, ne posredujejo nobeni nepooblaščeni osebi.26 20 V preteklosti je ECB navedla, da druge zahteve glede odgovornosti, kot so njena letna poročila ali pregledi Komisije, nadomestijo to, da ni ustrezne javne revizije.
It should be noted that annual reports, reviews by legislators and replies to their inquiries are not unique to the EU, as they are common in countries that fully allow performance audits of banking supervisors. 
Povedati je treba, da letna poročila, pregledi s strani zakonodajalcev ter odgovori na njihove poizvedbe niso značilni le za EU, saj so običajni v državah, ki v omogočajo popolne revizije smotrnosti poslovanja bančnih nadzornikov.
More importantly, accountability arrangements that depend on the willingness of the institution to disclose information can hardly be effective. 
In kar je še pomembneje, ureditve odgovornosti, ki so odvisne od pripravljenosti institucije, da razkrije informacije, so težko uspešne.
21 In this context, the ECA must emphasise that international standards clearly require adequate public audit arrangements for public administrations in all democracies (see paragraph 6). Other accountability arrangements cannot replace the right of citizens and parliaments to appropriate public audits, in particular within an area 24 Article 287(3) TFEU. 
Samo z revizijami smotrnosti poslovanja s popolnim 23 Odgovor Danièle Nouy, predsednice enotnega mehanizma nadzora z dne 21. marca 2018 na dopis (QZ006) Miguela Viegasa, poslanca Evropskega parlamenta. 24 Člen 287(3) PDEU.
25 Article 339 TFEU and Article 17 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and Section 4 of the Ethical Guidelines for the European Court of Auditors (Decision No 66-2011). 
25 Člen 339 PDEU in člen 17 Kadrovskih predpisov za uradnike Evropske unije in oddelek 4 Etičnih smernic Evropskega računskega sodišča (Sklep št. 66-2011).
26 In addition, some ECA staff have security clearance (obtained by the Member States) that permits them to access EU classified information up to Confidential or SECRET level. 
26 Poleg tega imajo nekateri uslužbenci Računskega sodišča varnostno dovoljenje (pridobljeno od držav članic), ki jim omogoča dostop do zaupnih podatkov EU do stopnje zaupno ali tajno.
The ECA also has a robust physical, logical and organisational information security policy in place. 8 
Računsko sodišče ima tudi zanesljivo fizično, logično in organizacijsko politiko za varnost informacij. 8
Public audits provide assurance and information on the use of public funds and the risks to which taxpayers are exposed. 
Javno revidiranje daje zagotovilo in informacije o porabi javnih sredstev in tveganjih, ki so jim izpostavljeni davkoplačevalci.
Summary and call for action 22 The ECA has made extensive efforts to fulfil its role and promote accountability and transparency in the area of banking supervision and resolution. 
Povzetek in poziv k ukrepanju 22 Računsko sodišče si je močno prizadevalo, da bi izpolnilo svojo vlogo in spodbujajo odgovornost in transparentnost na področju bančnega nadzora in reševanja bank.
However, the ECBŐs current position regarding the ECAŐs access to audit documents and information prevents the ECA from properly carrying out its statutory responsibilities. 
Toda zaradi sedanjega stališča ECB glede dostopa Računskega sodišča do dokumentov in informacij za revizijo Računsko sodišče ne more ustrezno izvajati svojih zakonskih odgovornosti.
Therefore, in the area of banking supervision, which entails significant risks to the public purse, adequate public audit is still unfeasible and accountability is still insufficient. 
Zato na področju bančnega nadzora, pri katerem obstaja veliko tveganje za javna sredstva, ustrezna javna revizija še vedno ni izvedljiva, zagotavljanje odgovornosti pa je še vedno nezadostno.
23 Therefore, especially the ECA calls the attention of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission to the lack of progress in discussions with the ECB and asks for: Ľ full support for the ECAŐs tasks and rights to access documents with regard to the ECB and banking supervision in particular Ľ amend Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, establishing the SSM, with a view to clearly stipulating that the ECA is empowered to perform performance audits of the ECBŐs supervisory functions and that, in line with the Treaty, the ECA enjoys full rights to access any document it considers necessary for this purpose. 9 
23 Računsko sodišče želi Evropski parlament, Svet in Komisijo opozoriti na to, da v razpravah z ECB ni napredka in prosi: • za popolno podporo za naloge Računskega sodišča in pravico dostopa do dokumentov v zvezi z ECB in zlasti bančnim nadzorom, • za spremembo Uredbe (EU) št. 1024/2013 o vzpostavitvi enotnega mehanizma nadzora, da bi bilo jasno določeno, da je Računsko sodišče pooblaščeno za opravljanje revizij smotrnosti poslovanja v zvezi z nadzornimi funkcijami ECB ter da ima v skladu s Pogodbo neomejeno pravico do dostopa do vseh dokumentov, za katere meni, da so potrebni za ta namen. 9
Annex I - Timeline of the ECAŐs efforts 10 Date Publication Description October 2011 CC published resolution following ideas for a deeper EMU The CC recognised envisaged changes in the EUŐs financial and economic governance. 
Priloga I – Časovnica prizadevanj Računskega sodišča 1 Datum Objava Opis Oktober 2011 Kontaktni odbor je objavil resolucijo po zamislih za bolj poglobljeno ekonomsko in monetarno unijo. Kontaktni odbor je potrdil predvidene spremembe finančnega in ekonomskega upravljanja EU.
It emphasised that the principles of sufficient transparency, appropriate accountability and adequate public audit were essential. 
Poudaril je, da so načela zadostne transparentnosti, ustrezne odgovornosti in javnega revidiranja bistveni.
December 2012 Council position on the legislative proposals to establish the SSM February 2013 ECA opinion regarding the envisaged audit rights for the SSM The ECA considered that operational efficiency included the audit of sound financial management. 
December 2012 stališče Sveta o zakonodajnih predlogih za ustanovitev enotnega mehanizma nadzora Februar 2013 mnenje Računskega sodišča o predvidenih revizijskih pravicah za enotni mehanizem nadzora Po mnenju Računskega sodišča operativna učinkovitost vključuje revizijo dobrega finančnega poslovodenja.
May 2013 CC published statement on EMU legislative proposals The CC recognised the clear proposals for a deeper EMU. 
Maj 2013 Kontaktni odbor je objavil izjavo o zakonodajnih predlogih za ekonomsko in monetarno unijo.
In this context, it emphasised again the importance of a coherent audit and accountability framework as well as the importance of external audit in EU legislation, in particular regarding the establishment of a Banking Union. 
V tem kontekstu je znova poudaril pomembnost usklajenega okvira za revidiranje in odgovornost ter pomembnost zunanje revizije v zakonodaji EU, zlasti v zvezi z vzpostavitvijo bančne unije.
October 2013 SSM Regulation was published in the OJ June 2014 ECA informed the ECB that it intended to start a performance audit Audit of the operational efficiency of the SSM. 
Oktober 2013 Uredba o EMN je bila objavljena v UL. Junij 2014 Računsko sodišče je obvestilo ECB o tem, da namerava začeti revizijo smotrnosti poslovanja.
July 2014 ECA published special report 05/2014 on the EBA The ECA recommended clear responsibilities between EBA, SSM and NCAs. 
5/2014 o EBA. Računsko sodišče je priporočilo jasno razdeljene odgovornosti EBA, EMN in pristojnih nacionalnih organov.
June 2015 ECA informed the ECB that it had adopted an Audit Planning Memorandum The APM on the SSM was delayed significantly following lengthy discussions with the ECB about the ECA mandate. 
Junij 2015 Računsko sodišče je obvestilo ECB, da je sprejelo revizijski memorandum. Zaradi dolgotrajnih razprav z ECB o pooblastilih Računskega sodišča je pri revizijskem memorandumu o EMN prišlo do velikih zamud.
June 2015 CC published statement on potential audit gap and mapping of SAIs' audit rights on banking supervision The EU SAIs warned that an audit gap regarding banking supervision in Europe might have arisen and called for adequate accountability. 
Junij 2015 Kontaktni odbor je objavil izjavo o morebitni revizijski vrzeli in opredelitvi pravic vrhovnih revizijskih Vrhovne revizijske institucije EU so opozorile na to, da je morda prišlo do revizijske vrzeli v zvezi z bančnim nadzorom v Evropi, in pozvale k zagotovitvi ustrezne odgovornosti.
11 July 2016 Joint letter from the German and Dutch SAIs on behalf of the CC to the European Commission Call for the European Commission to address the problems faced in its review of the SSM Regulation. 
Julij 2016 skupno pismo nizozemske in nemške vrhovne revizijske institucije Evropski komisiji v imenu kontaktnega odbora poziv, naj Evropska komisija obravnava probleme, s katerimi se je srečala pri pregledu uredbe o EMN November 2016 Računsko sodišče je objavilo Posebno poročilo št.
November 2016 ECA published special report 29/2016 on the SSM The report highlighted the ECBŐs refusal to provide essential documents. 
29/2016 o EMN. V poročilu je poudarjeno, da ECB ni želela zagotoviti bistvenih dokumentov.
October 2017 European Commission published review of the SSM Regulation The Commission reiterated the ECAŐs right to access documents and called on the ECB and the ECA to conclude a MoU. 
Komisija je znova poudarila, da ima Računsko sodišče pravico dostopa do dokumentov in pozvala ECB in Računsko sodišče, naj skleneta memorandum o soglasju.
December 2017 Task Force Banking Union of the CC published its report on the parallel audit conducted on banking supervision in the EU The Task Force concluded that an "effective" audit gap had arisen due to the ECBŐs behaviour. 
December 2017 Projektna skupina kontaktnega odbora za bančno unijo je objavila poročilo o vzporedni reviziji v zvezi z bančnim nadzorom v EU. Projektna skupina je zaključila, da je zaradi ravnanja ECB „dejansko“ nastala revizijska vrzel.
December 2017 ECA published special report 23/2017 on the SRB The ECA stated that its access to documents was partially restricted as the SRB redacted information originating from the ECB or failed to provide information. 
23/2017 o Enotnem odboru za reševanje. Računsko sodišče je navedlo, da je bil njegov dostop do dokumentov deloma omejen, saj je Enotni odbor za reševanje redigiral informacije, ki so izhajale iz ECB, ali pa informacij ni predložil.
January 2018 ECA published special report 02/2018 on the ECBŐs crisis management As the ECB refused to provide access to important documents, the ECA concluded that scope would have to be limited and that on certain parts of the ECBŐs work only provisional conclusions were possible. 
02/2018 o kriznem upravljanju ECB. ECB ni dovolila dostopa do pomembnih dokumentov, zato je Računsko sodišče sklenilo, da bo moralo omejiti obseg revizije in da so o nekaterih delih delovanja ECB možne le začasne ugotovitve.
February 2018 ECA provided the ECB with a draft proposal for a MoU The ECA provided the ECB with a five-page draft MoU to clarify access to documents, as proposed by the Commission. 
Februar 2018 Računsko sodišče je ECB poslalo osnutek predloga memoranduma o soglasju. Računsko sodišče je ECB na 5 straneh poslalo osnutek memoranduma o soglasju, s katerim bi se razjasnil dostop do dokumentov, kakor je predlagala Komisija.
March 2018 ECB provided replies to an MEP on questions regarding the ECAŐs access to documents The ECB stated that it only shared limited documents with the ECA as it interpreted the ECAŐs mandate as being very limited. 
ECB je izjavila, da je z Računskim sodiščem delila le omejene dokumente, saj mandat Računskega sodišča razume kot zelo omejen.
April 2018 European Parliament statement within the 2016 discharge procedure The European Parliament acknowledged that the ECB did not respect the ECAŐs right to access information and asked the ECB to cooperate fully. 
April 2018 izjava Evropskega parlamenta v okviru postopka razrešnice za leto 2016 Evropski parlament je potrdil, da ECB ni upoštevala pravice Računskega sodišča do dostopa do informacij, in prosil ECB, naj v celoti sodeluje.