natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
80 The mandate which was to provide strategic advisory services to the higher echelons of the police hierarchy in the field of policing with linkages to the wider rule of law, ensured EU added value by providing a building block hitherto missing from the ongo‐ ing international efforts at the time. 
80 Mandat, ki je bil zagotavljanje storitev strateškega svetovanja višjim ravnem policijske hierarhije na področju policijskega dela v povezavi s širšo problematiko pravne države, je zagotovil dodano vrednost EU, saj je ponudil element, ki je do takrat manjkal v tekočih mednarodnih prizadevanjih.
However, EUPOL faced a laborious task in delivering its mandate owing to the almost complete lack of a functioning police force, high illiteracy rates and widespread corruption. 
Vendar pa se je EUPOL pri izvajanju svojega mandata soočala z zahtevno nalogo zaradi skoraj popolnega pomanjkanja delujoče policije, visokih stopenj nepismenosti in močno razširjene korupcije.
81 Deployment of the mission was beset with difficulties and EUPOL suffered from inherent limitations relating to the recruitment of staff and logistical problems. 
81 Pri razmestitvi misije so se pojavile težave in EUPOL so ovirale omejitve, povezane z zaposlovanjem in logistiko.
Member States found it hard to supply qualified staff in sufficient numbers and this led to serious delays in reaching the required operational strength. 
Države članice so težko zagotovile dovolj kvalificiranih uslužbencev, kar je privedlo do resnih zamud pri doseganju zahtevane operativne moči.
Deployment in the provinces was equally complicated, mainly due to logistical issues and insecurity. 
Enako zapletena je bila tudi razmestitev v pokrajinah, predvsem zaradi logističnih vprašanj in negotovosti.
In most provinces, EUPOL was unable to deploy sufficient staff to ensure the proper delivery of its mandate (see paragraphs 11 to 21). 
EUPOL v večino pokrajin ni mogla razmestiti dovolj uslužbencev, da bi zagotovila pravilno izvedbo svojega mandata (glej odstavke 11 do 21).
Recommendation 1 The EEAS should work with the Mem‐ ber States to ensure that future CSDP missions receive sufficient logistic, technical and human resources to be able to operate at close to full author‐ ised capacity. 
Priporočilo 1 ESZD naj sodeluje z državami članicami zaradi zagotovitve, da bodo prihodnje misije SVOP deležne dovolj logistič-nih, tehničnih in človeških virov za delovanje, ki bo blizu polne odobrene zmogljivosti.
Conclusions and recommendations 34 82 As regards coordination, EUPOL did not manage to bring together all Euro‐ pean actors under a single European framework to improve Afghan polic‐ ing; it also faced competition from other European bilateral missions and other European and international efforts, such as the EGF. 
Zaključki in priporočila 34 82 Kar zadeva usklajevanje, EUPOL ni uspelo združiti vseh evropskih akterjev v enoten evropski okvir za izboljšanje policijskega dela v Afganistanu. Poleg tega so ji konkurirale druge evropske dvostranske misije ter druga evropska in mednarodna prizadevanja, kot so evropske žandarske sile.
However, EUPOL has made a valiant effort and played an important role in help‐ ing to promote cooperation with EU Member States and it has genuinely sought to promote wider international cooperation. 
Vendar pa je EUPOL izvedla velika prizadevanja in pomembno pripomogla k spodbujanju sodelovanja z državami članicami EU ter se resnično trudila za spodbujanje širšega mednarodnega sodelovanja.
83 Coordination among the various EU bodies was initially poor. 
83 Usklajevanje med različnimi organi EU je bilo v začetku slabo.
Nevertheless, in 2011 the Council’s strategy and the creation of the EEAS cleared the way for improved coordination involving the Member States, the EEAS, the Com‐ mission, the EU Special Representative in Afghanistan, the EU delegation in Kabul and EUPOL. 
Vseeno pa sta strategija Sveta iz leta 2011 in ustanovitev ESZD utrli pot izboljšanemu usklajevanju držav članic, ESZD, Komisije, posebnega predstavnika EU v Afganistanu, delegacije EU v Kabulu in EUPOL.
84 EUPOL’s comparatively limited fund‐ ing and staff numbers meant that it was difficult, especially in the early stages of the mission, for it to be heard among major actors like the NATO‐led NTM‐A. International actors were unwilling to be coordinated by the IPCB, which was supported by EUPOL. 
84 Razmeroma omejena financiranje in število uslužbencev EUPOL sta pomenila, da se je EUPOL posebno v zgodnjih fazah misije težko uveljavljala med glavnimi akterji, kot je Natova misija usposabljanja v Afganistanu. Mednarodni akterji niso želeli, da bi jih usklajeval Mednarodni odbor za usklajevanje policije v Afganistanu, ki ga je podpirala EUPOL.
The IPCB was therefore largely unsuc‐ cessful in improving coordination and oversight in the sector. 
Zato je bil ta odbor dokaj neuspešen pri izboljševanju usklajevanja in nadzora v policijskem sektorju.
In the last few years, coordination with the main international actors has nevertheless improved considerably (see para‐ graphs 23 to 30). 
Kljub temu pa se je v zadnjih nekaj letih usklajevanje z glavnimi mednarodnimi akterji močno izboljšalo (glej odstavke 23 do 30).
85 In the area of operational support and guidance from headquarters, the Court found that EU Member States and the EEAS were reasonably flexible in pro‐ posing revisions to EUPOL’s mandate and adapting it to the changing situa‐ tion and needs. 
85 Za operativno podporo in usmerjanje s sedeža je Sodišče ugotovilo, da so države članice EU in ESZD pokazale dokajšnjo prožnost pri predlaganju sprememb mandata EUPOL in njegovemu prilagajanju spreminjajočim se razmeram in potrebam.
Prior to 2013, the op‐ erational planning arrangements and indicators were not entirely suitable for steering the mission in an efficient way. However, since 2013 these issues have been extensively addressed. 
Pred letom 2013 ureditve za operativno načrtovanje in kazalniki niso bili povsem primerni za učinkovito usmerjanje misije, od leta 2013 pa so bila ta vprašanja obširno obravnavana.
EU‐ POL’s reporting meets basic account‐ ability requirements, although results indicators could be further fine‐tuned. 
Poročanje EUPOL izpolnjuje osnovne zahteve glede odgovornosti, čeprav bi bilo kazalnike rezultatov mogoče še izpopolniti.
Guidance from headquarters has improved over time. 
Usmerjanje s sedeža se je sčasoma izboljšalo.
The EEAS and the Commission are examining ways of centralising certain support functions through the establishment of a shared service centre, a CSDP warehouse for all ongoing missions and a centralised IT function (see paragraphs 32 to 41). 
ESZD in Komisija preučujeta načine za centralizacijo nekaterih podpornih funkcij z vzpostavitvijo enotnega skupnega storitvenega centra, skladiščem SVOP za vse tekoče misije in centralizirano funkcijo IT (glej odstavke 32 do 41).
Conclusions and recommendations 35 Recommendation 2 The EEAS and the Commission should develop support functions to assist with the rapid, efficient and consistent deployment of CSDP missions. 
Zaključki in priporočila 35 Priporočilo 2 ESZD in Komisija naj razvijeta podporne funkcije za pomoč pri hitrem, učinkovitem in doslednem razmeščanju misij SVOP.
Meas‐ ures should involve: (a) pre‐deployment training for all staff on EU procedures and policies; (b) comprehensive guidelines on operational tasks (such as needs assessments, planning and moni‐ toring of tasks and reporting) and guidelines in administrative areas (such as information technology, finance and asset management and human resources) making maximum use of the lessons learned from previous missions; (c) setting up, on a cost–benefit basis, a shared service centre for all CSDP missions, and optimising the use of the CSDP warehouse to manage the assets of ongoing missions. 
Ukrepi naj zajemajo: (a) usposabljanje o postopkih in politikah EU, ki bi se ga pred razmestitvijo udeležili vsi uslužbenci; (b) izčrpne smernice za operativne naloge (kot so ocene potreb, načrtovanje in spremljanje nalog ter poročanje) in smernice za upravna področja (kot so informacijska tehnologija, upravljanje financ in sredstev ter človeški viri), pri katerih so čim bolje uporabljene izkušnje, pridobljene s prejšnjimi misijami; (c) vzpostavitev – na podlagi stroškov in koristi – enotnega skupnega storitvenega centra za vse misije SVOP in kar najboljša uporaba skladišča SVOP pri upravljanju sredstev tekočih misij.
86 As regards the results achieved and their potential for sustainability, the audit found that the national po‐ lice have made progress in terms of gaining public trust, but systemic weaknesses persist. 
86 Glede doseženih rezultatov in njihovih možnosti za trajnost je bilo pri reviziji ugotovljeno, da je nacionalna policija napredovala pri pridobivanju zaupanja javnosti, toda sistemske slabosti so še vedno prisotne.
Improvements were more notable in the first two of EUPOL’s three lines of operation: Line of Operation 1 (advancing institutional reform of the Ministry of the Interior) and Line of Operation 2 (profession‐ alising the National Police). 
Izboljšave so bile opaznejše pri prvih dveh od treh linij operacij EUPOL: liniji operacij 1 (spodbujanje institucionalne reforme ministrstva za notranje zadeve) in liniji operacij 2 (profesionalizacija nacionalne policije).
Line of Operation 3 (connecting the National Police to the wider justice system) has been the most challenging area and has seen least progress. 
Linija operacij 3 (povezovanje nacionalne policije s širšim pravosodnim sistemom) je bila področje z največjimi izzivi in na njem je bilo doseženega najmanj napredka.
The Court also examined EUPOL’s results per type of activity and found that EUPOL has been largely successful in training‐ related activities but less so in men‐ toring and advising. 
Sodišče je preučilo tudi rezultate EUPOL glede na vrsto dejavnosti in ugotovilo, da je bila EUPOL v veliki meri uspešna pri dejavnostih, povezanih z usposabljanjem, manj pa pri mentorstvu in svetovanju.
Projects did not follow the logical framework structure and were not sufficiently linked to other activities to create synergies (see paragraphs 43 to 60). 
Pri projektih se ni upoštevala struktura logičnega okvira in niso bili dovolj povezani z drugimi dejavnostmi, da bi nastale sinergije (glej odstavke 43 do 60).
Recommendation 3 The EEAS and CSDP missions should work together to further improve the effectiveness of each activity: Training (a) the ‘train‐the‐trainer’ approach has proved its merit and should be the preferred mode of training in difficult circumstances ensuring ownership and sustainability; (b) while respecting EU values, curric‐ ula should take greater account of local culture, customs and religion and include practical examples from everyday life in the country. 
Priporočilo 3 ESZD in misije SVOP naj sodelujejo zaradi dodatnega izboljšanja uspešnosti vsake dejavnosti: Usposabljanje (a) Pristop usposabljanja za izvajalce usposabljanj, ki je preverjeno uspešen, naj bo prednostni pristop k usposabljanju v težavnih razmerah, ki zagotavlja lastno odgovornost in trajnost; (b) programi za usposabljanje naj ob hkratnem spoštovanju vrednot EU bolj upoštevajo lokalno kulturo, običaje in religijo ter vsebujejo praktične primere iz vsakdanjega življenja v državi.
Monitoring/mentoring/advising (c) the mission should periodically carry out a systematic and compre‐ hensive evaluation of the results obtained from mentoring and advising activities; (d) the mentee selection process should be based on a needs as‐ sessment which is properly docu‐ mented in the mentoring files. 
Spremljanje/mentorstvo/svetovanje (c) Misija naj redno opravlja sistematično in celovito vrednotenje rezultatov, pridobljenih z dejavnostmi mentorstva in svetovanja; (d) proces izbora mentorirancev naj temelji na oceni potreb, ki je ustrezno dokumentirana v mentorskih spisih.
Mentoring logbooks should be standardised, structured around time‐bound milestones and sys‐ tematically kept by mentors; 
Mentorski dnevniki naj bodo standardizirani, organizirani glede na časovno opredeljene mejnike, mentorji pa naj jih redno izpolnjujejo;
Conclusions and recommendations 36 (e) in view of the regular rotation of seconded staff, clear and consist‐ ent handover procedures should be established to ensure the smooth continuation of activity and avoid gaps and digressions that could jeopardise the mentor‐ ing relationship. 
Zaključki in priporočila 36 (e) glede na redno rotacijo napotenih uslužbencev naj se vzpostavijo jasni in dosledni postopki predaje, da se zagotovita gladek potek dejavnosti ter izogibanje vrzelim in oddaljevanjem od teme, ki bi lahko ogrozili odnose pri mentorstvu.
Projects (f) when designing projects, CSDP missions should ensure that they follow the logical framework, create synergies with mentoring activities and contribute to the delivery of the mission objectives via a strong linkage to individual MIP milestones. 
Projekti (f) Misije SVOP naj pri načrtovanju projektov zagotovijo, da bodo sledili logičnemu okviru, ustvarjali sinergije z dejavnostmi mentorstva in z močno povezavo s posameznimi mejniki iz izvedbenega načrta misije prispevali k doseganju ciljev misije.
87 The sustainability of the security sec‐ tor in Afghanistan depends on support from the international community and faces significant challenges. 
87 Trajnost v varnostnem sektorju v Afganistanu je odvisna od podpore mednarodne skupnosti in se sooča z velikimi izzivi.
The pre‐ requisites for a sustainable police force are not yet in place. 
Predpogoji za trajnostno policijo še niso vzpostavljeni.
The long‐term sustainability of EUPOL’s training and mentoring outcomes is therefore at risk (see paragraphs 61 to 65). 
Dolgoročna trajnost izidov, ki jih EUPOL dosega z usposabljanjem in mentorstvom, je torej ogrožena (glej odstavke 61 do 65).
Recommendation 4 In order to improve the sustainability of CSDP mission outcomes, the EEAS should ensure that sustainability aspects are embedded in the opera‐ tional planning of all mission activi‐ ties by systematically assessing the local needs and capacity to sustain outcomes. 
Priporočilo 4 Zaradi izboljšanja trajnosti izidov misije SVOP naj ESZD zagotovi, da bodo vidiki trajnosti vključeni v operativno načrtovanje vseh dejavnosti misije s sistematičnim ocenjevanjem lokalnih potreb in zmogljivosti za trajnostne izide.
88 EUPOL has prepared a comprehensive plan for phasing out its activities by the end of 2016. However, there are concerns as to whether the arrange‐ ments in the Multiannual Indicative Programme for 2014–20 will allow the EU to build upon EUPOL’s achieve‐ ments after 2016. 
88 EUPOL je pripravila celovit načrt za postopno ukinjanje svojih dejavnosti do konca leta 2016, vendar obstajajo pomisleki glede tega, ali bodo ureditve v večletnem okvirnem programu za obdobje 2014–2020 EU omogočile, da bi po letu 2016 gradila na dosežkih EUPOL.
There is coordination between the relevant EU departments, but they have not agreed on common and comprehensive rules that clearly define roles and responsibilities. 
Ustrezna oddelka EU se medsebojno usklajujeta, nista pa se dogovorila o skupnih in celovitih pravilih, v katerih bi bile jasno določene vloge in odgovornosti.
Given the considerable total value of the assets concerned, procedures are not sufficiently or proactively coordinated by headquarters (see paragraphs 67 to 76). 
Glede na znatno skupno vrednost zadevnih sredstev sedež ne usklajuje dovolj postopkov ali jih ne usklajuje proaktivno (glej odstavke 67 do 76).
Recommendation 5 To ensure that the CSDP missions are phased out and related assets liqui‐ dated smoothly: (a) the EEAS and the Commission should work out a common and comprehensive strategy defining roles and responsibilities for the downsizing and closure of CSDP missions. 
Priporočilo 5 Zaradi zagotovitve, da bosta postopno ukinjanje misij SVOP in likvidacija s tem povezanih sredstev potekala gladko, naj: (a) (b) ESZD in Komisija pripravita skupno in celovito strategijo, ki opredeljuje vloge in odgovornosti pri zmanjševanju in zaključevanju misij SVOP.
The strategy would provide for sufficient mission sup‐ port from headquarters and would highlight measures to mitigate specific risks inherent in the down‐ sizing and closure process; (b) the EEAS and the Commission should work closely with CSDP missions from well before the end of the mandate, to avoid assets being accumulated in a way that entails financial risks. 
Strategija bi zagotovila zadostno podporo misiji s sedeža in poudarila ukrepe za zmanjševanje specifičnih tveganj, ki so povezana s procesom zmanjševanja in zaključevanja; ESZD in Komisija že veliko pred koncem mandata tesno sodelujeta z misijami SVOP, da sredstva ne ostanejo na zalogi na način, ki vključuje finančna tveganja.
Conclusions and recommendations 37 This report was adopted by Chamber III, headed by Mr Karel PINXTEN, Member of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 19 May 2015. 
Zaključki in priporočila 37 To poročilo je sprejel senat III, ki ga vodi g. Karel PINXTEN, član Evropskega računskega sodišča, v Luxembourgu na zasedanju 19. maja 2015.
Annexes EUPOL timeline 38 September 2001 – Nineteen members of al-Qaeda commit a series of coordinated suicide attacks in the United States. 
Priloge Časovnica EUPOL 38 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 September 2001 – 19 članov Al Kaide izvede niz usklajenih samomorilskih napadov v Združenih državah.
The strategy is organised around security, governance and economic development Annex I 
Strategija temelji na varnosti, upravljanju in gospodarskem razvoju. Priloga I
It also presents the principal options for a EUPOL exit strategy Dec 2013 – EEAS produces strategic review of EUPOL Afghanistan June 2014 – European Council commits to extend EUPOL’s mandate until end 2016. 
V dokumentu so predstavljene tudi glavne možnosti za izhodno strategijo EUPOL. December 2013 – ESZD pripravi strateški pregled EUPOL Afghanistan.
It also approves a comprehensive EU strategy on Afghanistan for the period 2014-2016 September 2014 – Ashraf Ghani is inaugurated as Afghanistan’s new President, succeeding Hamid Karzai September 2014 – Afghanistan signs a bilateral security agreement with the United States. 
September 2014 – Ašraf Gani prevzame funkcijo kot novi predsednik Afganistana. Na tem mestu nasledi Hamida Karzaja. September 2014 – Afganistan podpiše dvostranski varnostni sporazum z ZDA.
It also signs the Agreement for the NATO Resolute Support Mission. 
Podpiše tudi sporazum o Natovi misiji Resolute Support.
Annexes 40 EUPOL commitments and disbursements by budgetary period Budgetary period June 2007–November 2008 December 2008–May 2010 June 2010–July 2011 August 2011–July 2012 August 2012– May 2013 June 2013–December 2014 Commitments (euro) Disbursements as at 31.12.2014 (euro) Implementation rate 99 % 87% 90 % 86 % 81% 89 % 88 % Totals 43 600 000 81 400 000 54 600 000 60 500 000 56 870 000 95 433 790 392 403 790 43 099 416 71 056 597 49 274 871 51 918 127 46 179 558 84 645 305 346 173 874 Source: EUPOL. 
Priloge 40 Obveznosti in plačila EUPOL po proračunskih obdobjih Proračunsko obdobje Junij 2007–november 2008 December 2008–maj 2010 Junij 2010–julij 2011 Avgust 2011–julij 2012 Avgust 2012–maj 2013 Junij 2013–december 2014 Obveznosti (v EUR) Plačila dne 31. 12. 2014 (v EUR) Stopnja izvrševanja 99 % 87% 90 % 86 % 81% 89 % 88 % Skupaj 43 600 000 81 400 000 54 600 000 60 500 000 56 870 000 95 433 790 392 403 790 43 099 416 71 056 597 49 274 871 51 918 127 46 179 558 84 645 305 346 173 874 Vir: EUPOL.
Annexes 42 EUPOL field offices from 2007 to 2014 2007 2011 2008 2012 2009 2013 2010 2014 Field office with staff < 10 (at 31 December) Field office with staff > 10 (at 31 December) EUPOL headquarters in Kabul Annex IV Source: EUROSTAT. 
Priloge 42 Terenski uradi EUPOL od leta 2007 do leta 2014 2007 2011 2008 2012 2009 2013 2010 2014 Terenski urad z manj kot 10 uslužbenci (stanje 31. decembra) Terenski urad z več kot 10 uslužbenci (stanje 31. decembra) Sedež EUPOL v Kabulu Priloga IV Vir: EUROSTAT.
Reply of the Commission 43 and the EEAS Executive summary IV The initial context of justice institutions and inter‐ national support were very weak and limited (com‐ pared to support provided to the Afghan national police and Ministry of Interior). 
Odgovori Komisije in ESZD 43 Povzetek IV Začetni okvir pravosodnih institucij in mednarodne podpore je bil zelo šibek in omejen (v primerjavi s podporo, ki je bila zagotovljena za afganistansko nacionalno policijo (ANP) in ministrstvo za notranje zadeve (MNZ)).
Providing direct training has been used mainly in the first years of the mission’s mandate, as well as train‐the‐trainers support, which also significantly reduced during the recent years. 
Neposredno usposabljanje se je zagotavljalo predvsem v prvih letih mandata misije, prav tako podpora za usposabljanje inštruktorjev, ki se je v zadnjih letih precej zmanjšala.
For several years now, EUPOL has mainly implemented its mandate by providing advice and mentoring to its Afghan counterparts. 
EUPOL zdaj že nekaj let svoj mandat izvaja predvsem tako, da zagotavlja nasvete in mentorstvo za svoje afganistanske enote.
The EEAS considers that projects managed by the mission’s Project Cell do represent now an impor‐ tant complementary tool for the mission to achieve its objectives comparing to insufficient alignment during the first years of the existence of the Project Cell. 
ESZD meni, da projekti, ki jih upravlja projektna enota misije, zdaj resnično predstavljajo pomembno dopolnilno orodje, ki lahko pomaga doseči misiji njene cilje v primerjavi z nezadostno usklajenostjo v prvih letih obstoja projektne enote.
VI EUPOL strongly supported the establishment and functioning of international coordination structures, like the International Police Coordination Board. 
VI Misija EUPOL je močno podpirala vzpostavitev in delovanje mednarodnih struktur usklajevanja, kot je Mednarodni odbor za usklajevanje policije.
However it was not in its mandate to bring together all EU actors under a single European framework. 
Vendar v njen mandat ni bila zajeta združitev vseh akterjev EU v en evropski okvir.
VII During the last years, the system of EUPOL’s report‐ ing has been refined and evolved from a more descriptive way to an analytical way. 
VII Sistem poročanja misije EUPOL je bil v zadnjih letih izpopolnjen, saj se je iz bolj opisnega sistema razvil v analitični sistem.
Since 2013, the Mission has Objectively Verifiable Indicators both for its own progress and Afghan progress. 
Misija ima od leta 2013 objektivno preverljive kazalnike za svoj napredek in napredek v Afganistanu.
IX and X EUPOL’s phasing out plans have been developed as much as possible at this moment in time, taking into account expected Afghan progresses, interna‐ tional actors/mechanisms existence and evolution. 
IX & X Načrti misije EUPOL za postopno opuščanje so bili razviti v tolikšni meri, kot je trenutno mogoče, ter so upoštevali pričakovan napredek v Afganistanu, mednarodne akterje/obstoj mehanizmov in razvoj.
The EEAS in close cooperation with the Commis‐ sion, responsible for the financial management, and EUPOL have been assessing how to get the best value of EUPOL’s assets according to the Financial Regulation. 
ESZD v tesnem sodelovanju s Komisijo, ki je odgovorna za finančno upravljanje, in EUPOL sta ocenjevala, kako zagotoviti največji izkoristek sredstev misije EUPOL v skladu s finančno uredbo.
Observations 16 As for the leadership problems, indeed the Head of Mission had changed three times but this is to be considered an exceptional and unfortunate circumstance. 
Opažanja 16 Kar zadeva težave z vodstvom, je bil vodja misije res trikrat zamenjan, vendar je šlo za izjemne in nesrečne okoliščine.
28 The EEAS considers that EUPOL’s mandate was lim‐ ited to certain fields (civilian policing, MoI reform, criminal justice); the Mission therefore had no mandate for an overall lead on the (coordination of the) entire MoI/ANP reform/strengthening support. 
28 ESZD meni, da je bil mandat misije EUPOL omejen na določena področja (civilna policija, reforma MNZ, kazensko pravosodje), zato misija ni imela mandata za splošno vodenje (usklajevanje) celotne podpore za reformo/krepitev MNZ/ANP.