natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This could compromise the impact of the Commission’s recent decision to take greater ac‐ count of the implementation of structural reforms (see paragraph 112). 
To bi lahko ogrozilo učinek nedavne odločitve Komisije o večjem upoštevanju izvajanja strukturnih reform (glej odstavek 112).
Recommendation 9 In conjunction with the Macro‐Imbalances Procedure, the Commission (DG Economic and Financial Affairs) should make full use of the European Semester in monitoring the implementation of structural reforms for Member States under an EDP, in particular where fiscal structural reforms are included in an economic partnership programme. 
Priporočilo 9 V povezavi s postopkom v zvezi z makroekonomskim neravnotežjem bi morala Komisija (GD za gospodarske in finančne zadeve) pri spremljanju izvajanja strukturnih reform za države članice v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem v celoti izkoristiti evropski semester, zlasti kadar so fiskalne strukturne reforme vključene v program ekonomskega partnerstva.
Besides focusing on legislative aspects, it should seek to assess the effectiveness of the implemented reforms. 
Poleg osredotočanja na zakonodajne vidike bi si morala prizadevati za oceno uspešnosti izvedenih reform.
The Commission should make full use of its powers to ensure that Member States under an EDP meet their commitments with regard to structural reforms. 
Komisija bi morala v celoti izkoristiti svoja pooblastila za zagotavljanje, da države članice v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem izpolnjujejo svoje zaveze v zvezi s strukturnimi reformami.
Conclusions and recommendations 82 Reporting 146 The ‘Six‐pack’ and ‘Two‐pack’ introduced new reporting requirements for Mem‐ ber States with the aim of enhancing the Commission’s surveillance of the EDP. 
Zaključki in priporočila 82 Poročanje 146 S šesterčkom in dvojčkom so bile uvedene nove zahteve glede poročanja za države članice, da bi se povečal nadzor Komisije nad postopkom v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
However, these requirements are non‐enforceable, in that there is no legislative provision to ensure that Member States comply in this regard, or for sanctions against those that do not. 
Vendar te zahteve niso izvršljive, ker ni zakonske določbe, ki bi zagotovila, da jih države članice izpolnjujejo, ali ki bi uvedla sankcije za tiste, ki jih ne.
Thus the effectiveness of the Commission’s surveil‐ lance is dependent on the active cooperation of the Member States. 
Tako je uspešnost nadzora Komisije odvisna od dejavnega sodelovanja držav članic.
We found one case where the Member State had not sent reporting documents as required. However, the Commission has not made this public in its corresponding assess‐ ments (see paragraphs 85 to 86). 
Sodišče je odkrilo primer, ko država članica ni predložila poročil v skladu z zahtevo, Komisija pa tega v zadevnih ocenah ni javno objavila (glej odstavka 85 in 86).
147 Even when it receives full documentation, the Commission does not always as‐ sess or follow up the information supplied, which raises concern that it is failing to make best use of the Member States’ reports or that Member States are being burdened with a needless bureaucratic requirement (see paragraphs 99 and 110). 
147 Celo če Komisija prejme celotno dokumentacijo, predloženih informacij vedno ne oceni ali nadalje spremlja, kar zbuja zaskrbljenost, da poročil držav članic ne izkoristi v celoti ali da so države članice obremenjene z nepotrebno birokratsko zahtevo (glej odstavka 99 in 110).
Recommendation 10 The Commission (DG Economic and Financial Affairs) should always make clear in its assessments whether the Member States have fulfilled their reporting requirements. 
Priporočilo 10 Komisija (GD za gospodarske in finančne zadeve) bi morala v svojih ocenah vedno jasno navesti, ali so države članice izpolnile zahteve glede poročanja.
The Commission should make use of the possibility to launch infringement pro‐ cedures when Member States do not comply with their reporting obligations. 
Uporabiti bi morala možnost uvedbe postopka za ugotavljanje kršitev, kadar države članice ne izpolnjujejo obveznosti glede poročanja.
Sanctions 148 Successive EDP reforms have strengthened sanctions against Member States that do not comply with recommendations, and have eased the conditions for imposing them. 
Sankcije 148 Z zaporednimi reformami postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem so se okrepile sankcije za države članice, ki ne upoštevajo priporočil, in ublažili pogoji za njihovo uvedbo.
Since the EDP’s inception, no sanctions have been applied (see paragraphs 114 and 122). 
Od uvedbe postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem sankcije še nikoli niso bile uporabljene (glej odstavka 114 in 122).
Conclusions and recommendations 83 149 While sanctions are also useful as a deterrent, not applying them when Member States fail to fulfil their commitment to budgetary discipline brings the risk that they will be perceived as a tool unlikely to be used. 
Zaključki in priporočila 83 149 Sankcije so sicer koristne tudi zaradi svojega odvračilnega učinka, toda njihova neuporaba, kadar države članice ne izpolnjujejo svoje zaveze k proračunski disciplini, pomeni tveganje, da se jih bo dojemalo kot orodje, ki se verjetno ne bo uporabilo.
This would undermine their credibility and effectiveness, and hence that of the EDP as a whole. 
To bi ogrozilo verodostojnost in uspešnost sankcij ter hkrati celotnega postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
Recommendation 11 In line with existing legislation, the Commission (DG Economic and Financial Affairs) should recommend that the Council step up the procedure and apply sanctions when there is evidence that a Member State has not complied with EDP recommendations and therefore has failed to fulfil its commitment to budgetary discipline under the Treaty. 
Priporočilo 11 V skladu z veljavno zakonodajo bi morala Komisija (GD za gospodarske in finančne zadeve) Svetu priporočiti, naj zaostri postopek in uporabi sankcije, če so na voljo dokazi, da država članica ni upoštevala priporočil v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem in tako ni izpolnila svoje zaveze k proračunski disciplini v skladu s Pogodbo.
This Report was adopted by Chamber IV, headed by Mr Milan Martin CVIKL, Member of the Court of Auditors, in Luxembourg at its meeting of 25 February 2016. 
To poročilo je sprejel senat IV, ki ga vodi Milan Martin CVIKL, član Evropskega računskega sodišča, v Luxembourgu na zasedanju 25. februarja 2016.
Annexes 84 Legislation on the excessive deficit procedure — Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 of 22 November 1993 on the application of the Protocol on the exces‐ sive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community, amended by: √ Council Regulation (EC) No 475/2000 of 28 February 2000. 
3605/93 z dne 22. novembra 1993 o uporabi Protokola o postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, ki je priloga k Pogodbi o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti, kakor je bila spremenjena z: √ Uredbo Sveta (ES) št.
Updated the conceptual framework underlying the EDP to ESA 95. √ Commission Regulation (EC) No 351/2002 of 25 February 2002. 
351/2002 z dne 25. februarja 2002.
Clarified the references to ESA 95 in the context of the EDP by replacing the codes ‘B.9’ and ‘D.41’ with ‘EDP B.9’ and ‘EDP D.41’ respectively. √ Council Regulation (EC) No 2103/2005 of 12 December 2005, on the quality of statistical data in the context of the EDP. 
Z njo so bila razjasnjena sklicevanja na ESR 95 v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, tako da je bila oznaka „B.9“ nadomeščena z oznako „EDP B.9“ in oznaka „D.41“ z oznako „EDP D.41“; √ Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 2103/2005 z dne 12. decembra 2005 glede kakovosti statističnih podatkov v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 of 25 May 2009 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community (replaced amended Regula‐ tion No 3605/93). 
479/2009 z dne 25. maja 2009 o uporabi Protokola o postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, ki je priloga k Pogodbi o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti (ki je nadomestila spremenjeno Uredbo št.
Amended by: √ Council Regulation (EU) No 679/2010 of 26 July 2010 amending Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 as regards the quality of statistical data in the context of the excessive deficit procedure. 
3605/93), kakor je bila spremenjena z: √ Uredbo Sveta (EU) št. 679/2010 z dne 26. julija 2010 o spremembah Uredbe (ES) št. 479/2009 glede kakovosti statističnih podatkov v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, as amended by the Council. 
1467/97 z dne 7. julija 1997 o pospešitvi in razjasnitvi izvajanja postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, kakor jo je spremenil Svet.
Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005 and Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 – the corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
1056/2005 z dne 27. junija 2005 in Uredba (EU) št. 1177/2011 z dne 8. novembra 2011 – korektivni vidik Pakta za stabilnost in rast.
From the ‘Two‐pack’: √ Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provi‐ sions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area. 
Iz „dvojčka“: √ Uredba (EU) št. 473/2013 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 21. maja 2013 o skupnih določbah za spremljanje in ocenjevanje osnutkov proračunskih načrtov ter zagotavljanje zmanjšanja čezmernega primanjkljaja držav članic v euroobmočju.
Intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (Fiscal Compact) – 2 March 2012. — — — — — — Annex I 
Medvladna Pogodba o stabilnosti, usklajevanju in upravljanju v ekonomski in monetarni uniji (fiskalni dogovor) – 2. marec 2012. – – – – – – Priloga I
Annexes 85 Some examples of missing information in documents from the six Member States examined Missing information in the 2012, 2013 and 2014 April notifications For year N-1: — In one Member State: (i) some detailed data for the social security funds sub-sector and for local government (including the working balance) was missing for entities that are not part of local government and for other adjustments to local government data; (ii) no data was provided on the contribution to the debt level by long-term loans (increase and reduction) for all levels of general government (April 2012 only) or on the breakdown of shares and other equity for state and local government. — In another Member State, data were not provided for some sub-sectors (for the working balance, financial transactions included in the working balance and ‘other adjustments’ on state government, local government and social security funds). 
Priloge 85 Nekaj primerov manjkajočih informacij v dokumentih preučenih šestih držav članic Manjkajoče informacije v obvestilih iz aprila 2012, 2013 in 2014 Za leto N–1: – v eni državi članici: (i) nekateri podrobni podatki za podsektor skladov socialne varnosti in za lokalno državo (vključno s tekočim saldom) niso bili zagotovljeni za subjekte, ki niso del lokalne države, in za druge prilagoditve podatkov v zvezi z lokalno državo; (ii) predloženi niso bili nobeni podatki o prispevku dolgoročnih posojil k ravni dolga (povečanju in zmanjšanju) za vse ravni sektorja država (le april 2012) ali o razčlenitvi delnic in drugega lastniškega kapitala za federalno in lokalno državo; – v drugi državi članici podatki niso bili predloženi za nekatere podsektorje (za tekoči saldo, finančne transakcije, vključene v tekoči saldo, in „druge prilagoditve“ v zvezi s centralno in lokalno državo ter skladi socialne varnosti).
For all levels of general government, most of the non-mandatory details requested were missing. 
Za vse ravni sektorja država ni bila predložena večina zahtevanih neobveznih podrobnosti.
Missing data on trade credits and advances (AF.71 L) in table 4 In one Member State no data was provided until 2009, and in another there was none before 2011. 
Manjkajoči podatki o komercialnih kreditih in predujmih (AF.71 L) v preglednici 4 V eni državi članici do leta 2009 niso bili predloženi nobeni podatki, v drugi državi članici pa podatki niso bili predloženi pred letom 2011.
Missing data in EDP questionnaires Five of the six Member States returned EDP questionnaires with incomplete mandatory fields. 
Manjkajoči podatki v vprašalnikih o postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem Pet od šestih držav članic je vprašalnike o postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem vrnilo z nepopolno izpolnjenimi obveznimi polji.
Examples of incomplete information: (i) four Member States sent incomplete data on capital injections, or none at all, for all years, and one Member State for year N-1; (ii) three Member States sent an incomplete table 4 (Breakdown of other accounts receivable/payable reported in EDP tables); (iii) although completeness has improved, two Member States sent incomplete tables 5 (Taxes and social contributions: other accounts receivable/ payable of general government), 8 (Central government claims, debt cancellation) and 9 (Guarantees). 
Primeri nepopolnih informacij: (i) štiri države članice so poslale nepopolne podatke ali niso poslale nobenih podatkov o kapitalskih injekcijah za vsa leta in ena država članica za leto N – 1; (ii) tri države članice so poslale nepopolno preglednico 4 (Razčlenitev drugih terjatev/obveznosti, sporočenih v preglednicah postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem); (iii) čeprav se je popolnost podatkov izboljšala, sta dve državi članici poslali nepopolne preglednice 5 (Davki in socialni prispevki: druge terjatve/ obveznosti sektorja država), 8 (Terjatve centralne države, odpis dolga) in 9 (Jamstva).
Other information During 2008-2014, one Member State did not send the bridge tables1 and the inventory as requested, and three Member States submitted after the deadline. 
Druge informacije V obdobju 2008–2014 ena država članica ni predložila zahtevanih premostitvenih preglednic1 in evidence, tri države članice pa so jih predložile prepozno.
The EDP inventories were due by December 2013, but two Member States sent them after the deadline – one in April and the other in November 2014. 
Rok za predložitev evidenc o postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem je bil december 2013, vendar sta jih dve državi članici poslali pozneje, prva aprila in druga novembra 2014.
1 Bridge tables show the correspondence between the items in the public accounts and the ESA classifications. 
1 V premostitvenih preglednicah je prikazana usklajenost postavk v javnih financah in razvrstitvah ESR.
Source: ECA, based on Eurostat information. 
Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče na podlagi informacij Eurostata.
Annexes 86 Some examples of classification weaknesses in documents from the six Member States examined Main cases not fully compliant with ESA 95 but accepted by Eurostat ο in three Member States, the statistical register of public units did not provide exhaustive coverage, mainly at local government level; ο one Member State took a prudent approach, that is, automatically allocated to the general government sector – as ancillary units – all public units where sales to general government represented more than 80 % of total revenue, and applied the 50 % criterion to the remaining public units. 
Priloge 86 Nekaj primerov slabe razvrstitve v dokumentih preučenih šestih držav članic Glavni primeri, ki niso v celoti skladni z ESR 95, vendar jih je Eurostat sprejel ο V treh državah članicah statistični register javnih enot ni zagotovil zadostne pokritosti, predvsem na ravni lokalne države. ο Ena država članica je uporabila previdnostni pristop, tj. v sektor država je kot pomožne enote samodejno razvrstila vse javne enote, v katerih je prodaja sektorju država predstavljala več kot 80 % skupnih prihodkov, za preostale javne enote pa je uporabila 50-odstotno merilo.
The prudent approach is an automatic criterion that does not take into consideration the activity of the unit (type of services provided) or other conditions, such as tendering and market. 
Ta previdnostni pristop je samodejno merilo, ki ne upošteva dejavnosti enote (vrste storitev, ki jih opravlja) ali drugih pogojev, kot sta javno naročanje in trg.
The accounting rules do not specify what is to be done in these cases. 
Računovodska pravila ne določajo, kaj je treba narediti v takih primerih.
Moreover, some units were classified on a group basis (e.g. hospitals) instead of being classified individually according to their market/non-market nature; ο one Member State took a prudent approach, but only with units below a certain size; for these units the 50 % criterion was applied so as to exclude ‘other revenue’ from sales and include all types of taxes in the cost of production. 
Poleg tega so bile nekatere enote razvrščene na podlagi skupine (npr. bolnišnice), namesto da bi se razvrstile posamično v skladu z njihovim tržnim/netržnim značajem. ο Ena država članica je uporabila previdnostni pristop, vendar samo pri enotah do določene velikosti; za te enote je uporabila 50-odstotno merilo, tako da je „druge prihodke“ izključila iz prodaje, v strošek proizvodnje pa zajela vse vrste davkov.
However, although all taxes were included on the costs side, according to the accounting rules only ‘other taxes on production’ should have been included. 
Med stroške so bili sicer zajeti vsi davki, vendar bi morali biti v skladu z računovodskimi pravili vključeni le „drugi davki na proizvodnjo“.
Main weaknesses in the classification of public institutional units ο one Member State classified the supervisory unit for financial markets, which is an institutional unit, within the general government sector. 
Glavne slabosti pri razvrščanju javnih institucionalnih enot ο Ena država članica je nadzorno enoto za finančne trge, ki je institucionalna enota, razvrstila v sektor država.
According to ESA 95, units of this kind should be classified outside general government (namely, as financial auxiliaries within the financial corporations sector). 
V skladu z ESR 95 je treba takšne enote razvrstiti zunaj sektorja država (in sicer kot izvajalce pomožnih finančnih dejavnosti v sektorju finančnih družb).
Other Member States correctly classified these institutional units outside general government; ο in one Member State we examined public units that were non-market and had been reclassified in October 2014 following the ESA 2010 benchmark revision. 
Druge države članice so te institucionalne enote pravilno razvrstile zunaj sektorja država. ο V eni državi članici je Sodišče preučilo javne enote, ki so bile netržne in so bile prerazvrščene oktobra 2014 po spremembi referenčnega merila ESR 2010.
The Member State had reclassified a total of 158 public units in the general government sector, 20 because of the new ESA 2010 rules and the remaining 138 as part of a normal benchmark revision. 
Država članica je skupno prerazvrstila 158 javnih enot v sektorju država, 20 zaradi novih pravil ESR 2010, ostalih 138 pa v okviru običajne spremembe referenčnega merila.
The second group would have been reclassified within the general sector if they had previously been analysed correctly. 
Druga skupina javnih enot bi bila prerazvrščena v sektor država, če bi bile te enote predhodno pravilno analizirane.
Other weaknesses ο In relation to the procedures and timing for analysing and (re)classifying units within/outside the general government sector, we found different approaches in the six Member States: (i) two Member States analyse and (re)classify units every five years under successive benchmark revisions, but monitors new units every year. 
Druge slabosti ο V zvezi s postopki in časovno razporeditvijo analiziranja in (pre)razvrstitve enot v okviru sektorja država ali zunaj njega smo v šestih državah članicah ugotovili različne pristope: (i) dve državi članici analizirata in (pre)razvrščata enote vsakih pet let glede na naknadne spremembe referenčnega merila, vendar nove enote spremljata vsako leto.
However, in 2011 one had an action point recommending that the 50 % criterion should not exceed a period of 3-4 years, while the other had an action point recommending the market/non-market testing of all public units on an annual basis; (ii) three Member States analyse units every year and reclassify them if their nature (market/non-market) is different for three successive years; (iii) one Member State analyses units twice a year, or when funding conditions change, and reclassifies them when the nature of the units changes. 
Vendar je ena imela leta 2011 določen ukrep s priporočilom, da se 50-odstotno merilo ne sme uveljavljati dlje kot 3–4 leta, medtem ko je imela druga določen ukrep, v skladu s katerim se je priporočilo letno preizkušanje tržnosti/netržnosti vseh javnih enot; (ii) tri države članice analizirajo enote vsako leto in jih prerazvrstijo, če je njihov značaj (tržnost/netržnost) tri zaporedna leta drugačen; (iii) ena država članica enote analizira dvakrat letno ali ob spremembi pogojev financiranja in jih prerazvrsti, ko se spremeni značaj enot.
Source: ECA, based on Eurostat information and documents from the six Member States examined. 
Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče na podlagi informacij Eurostata in dokumentov preučenih šestih držav članic.
Annexes 87 Some examples of action points with a potential impact on the deficit and debt data Czech Republic Application of the market/non‐market test was infrequent and a large number of public units (corporations) were not tested During its visit in 2009, Eurostat found that units with ‘commercial’ legal status (e.g. joint-stock companies, limited companies) had not been tested so far and set an action point accordingly. 
Priloge 87 Nekaj primerov ukrepov s potencialnim učinkom na podatke o primanjkljaju in dolgu Češka Uporaba preizkušanja tržnosti/netržnosti je bila redka in veliko javnih enot (družb) ni bilo preizkušenih Eurostat je med obiskom leta 2009 ugotovil, da enote s „komercialnim“ pravnim statusom (npr. delniške družbe, družbe z omejeno odgovornostjo) do zdaj niso bile preizkušene, in je v skladu s tem določil ukrep.
During the 2012 SDV, Eurostat set an action point because the government control test for large companies that are less than 50 % government-owned was not applied and therefore these units were not analysed. Despite the potential impact no reservation was expressed. 
Med standardnim obiskom za dialog leta 2012 je določil ukrep, ker se preizkušanje nadzora države za velika podjetja, ki so v manj kot 50-odstotni državni lasti, ni izvajalo in zato analize za te enote niso bile opravljene.
Germany Reclassification of non‐market units to the general government sector from the first year of their non‐market status In its February 2014 visit, Eurostat detected the problem and set a deadline for compliance of May 2014. 
Nemčija Prerazvrstitev netržnih enot v sektor država od prvega leta, ko imajo netržni status Eurostat je težavo ugotovil na svojem obisku februarja 2014 in določil, da je treba skladnost zagotoviti do maja 2014.
The matter was considered closed in July 2014. 
Zadeva je julija 2014 veljala za zaključeno.
Clarifications sent in October 2014 showed that the NSI had only applied the action point to units classified after February 2014. 
Pojasnila, predložena oktobra 2014, so pokazala, da je nacionalni statistični urad ukrep uporabil le za enote, razvrščene po februarju 2014.
Despite the potential impact (not known) no reservation was expressed. Unavailability of detailed data for the analysis of capital injections, financial derivatives and distributions Eurostat first raised the problem of unavailable data following its visit in 2007. 
Kljub morebitnemu učinku (ni znan) ni bil izrečen noben pridržek. Nerazpoložljivost podrobnih podatkov za analizo kapitalskih injekcij, izvedenih finančnih instrumentov in porazdelitev sredstev Eurostat je prvič opozoril na težavo v zvezi z nerazpoložljivimi podatki po svojem obisku leta 2007.