natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Introduction 15 Focus of programme conditions Programme Fiscal consolidation Structural reforms Financial sector Hungary Yes No significant reforms — Strengthening of regulation and supervision Latvia Yes — Business environment — Active labour market policies — Management of EU funds — Strengthening of regulation and supervision — Bank resolution or consolidation plans Romania I Yes — Business environment — Management of EU funds — Strengthening of regulation and supervision Romania II Yes — Labour market reforms — Competitiveness within the economy No significant reforms Ireland Yes — Labour market reforms — Competitiveness within the economy — Deleveraging — Strengthening of regulation and supervision — Bank resolution or consolidation plans Portugal Yes — Labour market reforms — Competitiveness within the economy and outside — Education — Health sector — Business environment — Judicial reforms — Housing market — Deleveraging — Strengthening of regulation and supervision — Bank resolution or consolidation plans Source: ECA based on relevant Council decisions and initial programme documents. 
Uvod 15 Poudarek programskih pogojev Program Fiskalna konsolidacija Strukturne reforme Finančni sektor Madžarska da brez bistvenih reform – krepitev ureditve in nadzora Latvija da – poslovno okolje – aktivne politike trga dela – upravljanje sredstev EU – krepitev ureditve in nadzora – načrti za reševanje ali konsolidacijo bank Romunija I da – poslovno okolje – upravljanje sredstev EU – krepitev ureditve in nadzora Romunija II da – reforme trga dela – konkurenčnost v gospodarstvu brez bistvenih reform Irska da – reforme trga dela – konkurenčnost v gospodarstvu – razdolževanje – krepitev ureditve in nadzora – načrti za reševanje ali konsolidacijo bank Portugalska da – reforme trga dela – konkurenčnost v gospodarstvu in drugod – izobraževanje – zdravstveni sektor – poslovno okolje – reforme sodstva – stanovanjski trg – razdolževanje – krepitev ureditve in nadzora – načrti za reševanje ali konsolidacijo bank Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče na podlagi zadevnih sklepov Sveta in prvotnih programskih dokumentov.
15 The role of structural conditions is mainly to implement structural reforms aimed at enhancing the long-term sustainability of macroeconomic adjustments. 
15 Namen strukturnih pogojev je v glavnem izvedba strukturnih reform, usmerjenih v krepitev dolgoročne vzdržnosti makroekonomskih prilagoditev.
Financial sector conditions aim to stabilise the financial sector, which often plays a key role at the beginning of a programme, when bank restructuring typically takes place. 
Pogoji za finančni sektor so namenjeni stabilizaciji finančnega sektorja, ki ima pogosto ključno vlogo na začetku programa, ko običajno poteka bančno prestrukturiranje.
Implementation 16 The Commission must verify, at regular intervals, whether the economic policy of the beneficiary Member State complies with its adjustment programme and with the programme conditions. 
Izvajanje 16 Komisija mora redno preverjati, ali je ekonomska politika države članice upravičenke skladna z njenim programom prilagajanja in programskimi pogoji.
The programme conditions are monitored by the Commission18 in coordination with the IMF. To that end, the beneficiary Member States report regularly on the progress of programme implementation19, and the partners undertake monitoring visits. 
Programske pogoje spremlja Komisija v sodelovanju z MDS.18 V ta namen države članice upravičenke redno poročajo o napredku pri izvajanju programa,19 partnerji pa opravljajo nadzorne obiske.
Both the Commission and the IMF prepare their own review reports after their visit. 
Tako Komisija kot MDS po obisku pripravita vsak svoje poročilo o pregledu.
18 In the case of the EFSM, the ECB is also involved in monitoring. 
18 V primeru EFSM je v spremljanje vključena tudi ECB.
19 A memorandum of understanding generally includes an annex with the indicators and data that the country must provide on a regular basis. 
19 Memorandum o soglasju običajno vsebuje prilogo s kazalniki in podatki, ki jih mora država redno zagotavljati.
Introduction 16 17 On the basis of its review, the Commission, after consulting the EFC, decides on the release of further instalments and whether any programme conditions should be modified and/or appended to address unforeseen circumstances such as a change in the macroeconomic situation, significant data revisions or political or institutional factors in the Member State. 
Uvod 16 17 Komisija na podlagi svojega pregleda in po posvetovanju z Ekonomsko-fi-nančnim odborom odloči o sprostitvi sredstev za naslednje obroke in o morebitni spremembi in/ali dopolnitvi programskih pogojev zaradi obravnavanja nepredvidenih okoliščin, kot so sprememba makroekonomskega položaja, pomembne spremembe podatkov ali politični oziroma institucionalni dejavniki v državah članicah.
The initial memorandum of understanding can be revised to account for these new circumstances and secure implementation of the adjustment programme. 
Prvotni memorandum o soglasju je mogoče spremeniti, da se upoštevajo te nove okoliščine in zagotovi izvajanje programa prilagajanja.
18 If the review results in significant amendments to the conditions20, the Council decision must be amended as well. 
18 Če se zaradi pregleda pogoji20 bistveno spremenijo, je treba spremeniti tudi sklep Sveta.
The procedure for amending the Council decision is largely similar to the initial negotiation process (see paragraphs 8 to 10)21. Financial resources Programme financing 19 The amount lent under each assistance programme covers the Member State’s ‘financing gap’ — its financial needs until it is able to finance its government accounts (maturing debt and new deficits) or its external economic position (balance of payments) under normal conditions. 
Postopek za spreminjanje sklepa Sveta je zelo podoben prvotnemu postopku pogajanj (glej odstavke 8 do 10).21 Finančna sredstva Programsko financiranje 19 Znesek, ki se posodi v okviru posameznega programa pomoči, pokriva „finančno vrzel” države članice – njene finančne potrebe, dokler ni zmožna financirati svojih računov sektorja države (zapadlega dolga in novih primanjkljajev) ali svojega zunanjega ekonomskega položaja (plačilna bilan-ca) pod normalnimi pogoji.
20 The external financing of euro area economies goes through the Eurosys-tem22. The financing gaps of euro area countries are therefore limited to the needs of their governments. 
20 Zunanje financiranje gospodarstev evrskega območja poteka v okviru Evrosistema.22 Finančne vrzeli držav evrskega območja so tako omejene na potrebe njihovih sektorjev države.
Outside the euro area, the financing gap includes all external financing needs as presented in a country’s balance of payments. 
Zunaj evrskega območja finančna vrzel vključuje vse zunanje potrebe po financiranju, kot so predstavljene v plačilni bilanci države.
21 During programme negotiation, the partners estimate the financing gap using macroeconomic and fiscal projections and a set of assumptions, such as the rollover rates of debt23. 
21 V okviru pogajanj o programu partnerji ocenijo finančno vrzel na podlagi makroekonomskih in fiskalnih projekcij ter niza predpostavk, kot je stopnja refinanciranja dolga23.
The final level of programme financing is based on this estimate, but it is also subject to negotiation between the partners and the Member State. 
Končna raven programskega financiranja temelji na tej oceni, vendar je tudi predmet pogajanj med partnerji in državo članico.
22 For an overview of the key elements of programme financing, the relative share of each key lender and the amounts of financial assistance disbursed, see Figure 2. 
22 Za pregled ključnih elementov programskega financiranja, relativni delež vsakega ključnega posojilodajalca in zneske izplačane finančne pomoči glej sliko 2.
20 For example if deficit targets are changed. 
20 Npr. če se spremenijo cilji glede primanjkljaja.
21 The Commission carried out 36 formal reviews of the six audited programmes. 
21 Komisija je opravila 36 uradnih pregledov za šest revidiranih programov.
In 16 cases, the review was followed by an amendment to the corresponding Council decision. 
V 16 primerih je pregledu sledila sprememba zadevnega sklepa Sveta.
22 The Eurosystem is the central banking system of the euro area. 
22 Evrosistem je centralni bančni sistem evrskega območja.
It consists of the European Central Bank and national central banks. 
Sestavljajo ga Evropska centralna banka in nacionalne centralne banke.
23 When a country’s debt is about to mature it needs to be ‘rolled over’ into a new debt ,which will cover repayment of the old. 
23 Ko se približuje datum zapadlosti dolga države, je treba dolg refinancirati, tj. pretvoriti v nov dolg, ki bo pokril odplačilo starega.
Rollover brings the risk that the debt may be refinanced at a higher interest rate, thus increasing interest expenditure, or that the borrowing country will not raise enough funds to cover repayment of the old debt in full. 
Refinanciranje dolga prinaša tveganje, da bo dolg refinanciran po višji obrestni meri, zaradi česar bodo odhodki za obresti višji, ali da država posojilojemalka ne bo zbrala dovolj sredstev, da bi v celoti odplačala stari dolg.
24 Although the legal framework allows for the provision of loans by the EU alone, in recent practice assistance has usually been granted in cooperation with the IMF and other international institutions or countries. 
24 Čeprav pravni okvir določa, da posojila zagotovi EU sama, nedavna praksa kaže, da je bila pomoč običajno dodeljena v sodelovanju z MDS in drugimi mednarodnimi institucijami ali državami.
Introduction 17 Programme financing Overall programme financing in euro Hungary Latvia 20 billion 7.5 billion ... as a percentage of each country’s GDP 19 % 40 % Financing committed by the European Union 33 % 41 % 6.5 billion 3.1 billion Disbursements as a percentage of committed financing Hungary Latvia Balance of payments/EFSM 1 Precautionary assistance. 
Uvod 17 Programsko financiranje Celotno programsko financiranje v EUR Madžarska Latvija 20 milijard 7,5 miljarder ... kot odstotni delež BDP posamezne države 19 % 40 % Sredstva, ki jih je dodelila Evropska unija 33 % 41 % 6,5 milijarde 3,1 milijarde Izplačila kot odstotni delež dodeljenih sredstev Madžarska Latvija Plačilnobilančni mehanizem/EFSM 1 Previdnostna pomoč.
Not included in the other charts. 
Ni vključena v druge diagrame.
Romania 20 billion + 5.4 billion1 17 % Ireland 67.5 billion 43 % 33 % (60 % with EFSF) 22.5 (40.2) billion Ireland IMF Portugal 78 billion 46 % 33 % (67%) 26 (52) billion Portugal Other lenders 25 % 5 billion Romania EFSF Source: ECA, data provided by the European Commission and the IMF. 
Romunija 20 milijard + 5,4 milijarde1 17 % Irska 67,5 milijarde 43 % 33 % (60 % v povezavi z EFSF) 22,5 (40,2) milijarde Irska MDS Portugalska 78 milijard 46 % 33 % (67 %) 26 (52) milijard Portugalska Drugi posojilodajalci 25 % 5 milijard Romunija Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče. Podatke sta zagotovila Evropska komisija in MDS.
85 % 72 % 94 % 65 % 100 % 92 % 100 % 100 % 97 % 92 % 100 % 97 % Figure 2 
EFSF 85 % 72 % 94 % 65 % 100 % 92 % 100 % 100 % 97 % 92 % 100 % 97 % Slika 2
Introduction 18 23 The five Member States used 95 % of the financing committed by the European Union, and 13 % of that amount had already been repaid by 31 March 2015 (see Figure 3). 
Uvod 18 23 Zadevnih pet držav članic je porabilo 95 % sredstev, ki jim jih je dodelila Evropska unija. Do 31. marca 2015 je bilo 13 % tega zneska že vrnjenih (glej sliko 3).
Financial assistance: amounts disbursed and repayments outstanding Assistance to be provided by the European Union 63 billion euro Disbursed by country 2.9 Repayments outstanding by country1 5.0 23.9 Romania Portugal Latvia Ireland Hungary 70 % 100 % 24 % 100 % 1.5 3.5 23.9 Amounts borrowed and disbursed 60 billion euro 0.7 22.5 5.5 22.5 27 % 1 Data as of 31 March 2015. 
Finančna pomoč: izplačani zneski in še neporavnana odplačila Pomoč, ki naj bi jo zagotovila Evropska unija 63 milijard EUR Izplačila po državah 2,9 Romunija Portugalska Latvija Irska Madžarska Še neporavnana odplačila po državah1 70 % 100 % 0,7 24 % 100 % 1,5 5,0 23,9 3,5 23,9 Izposojeni in izplačani zneski 60 milijard EUR 22,5 5,5 1 Podatki z dne 31. marca 2015.
Source: ECA, data provided by the European Commission. 
Podatke je zagotovila Evropska komisija.
Total outstanding 52 billion euro Figure 3 
22,5 27 % Skupna še neporavnana odplačila 52 milijard EUR Slika 3
Introduction 19 Borrowing on the markets 24 To provide its share of total financial assistance, the European Union borrowed on the capital markets and lent the money to the Member States in difficulty on the same terms, i.e. for the same amount and with the same coupon and maturity date. 
Uvod 19 Zadolževanje na trgih 24 Da bi Evropska unija zagotovila svoj delež skupne finančne pomoči, si je izposodila sredstva na kapitalskih trgih in denar državam članicam v težavah posodila pod enakimi pogoji, tj. za enak znesek ter z enakim kuponom in datumom zapadlosti.
By the end of 2014, the EU had made a total of 22 bond issues with a nominal value of 60.1 billion euro. 
Do konca leta 2014 je EU izvedla skupno 22 izdaj obveznic v nominalni vrednosti 60,1 milijarde EUR.
The Commission managed the borrowing on behalf of the EU. 
Izposojanje je v imenu EU upravljala Komisija.
25 Borrowing generally took the form of euro medium-term notes (EMTNs), which are issued on the capital markets and listed on the Luxembourg stock exchange. 
25 Izposojanje je običajno potekalo v obliki evropskih srednjeročnih dolžniških vrednostnih papirjev (EMTN), ki se izdajo na kapitalskih trgih in kotirajo na luksemburški borzi.
European investors represent around 80 % of all investors in EMTNs. 
Delež evropskih vlagateljev med vsemi vlagatelji v EMTN je približno 80 %.
26 The debt servicing of EMTNs remains an obligation of the European Union, which must ensure that all payments are made in a timely manner if the debtor Member State fails to reimburse the capital and/or interest due. 
26 Servisiranje dolga v okviru EMTN ostaja obveznost Evropske unije, ki mora zagotoviti, da se vsa plačila opravijo pravočasno, če država članica dolžnica ne uspe povrniti glavnice in/ali obresti do dogovorjenega roka.
Audit approach 20 27 The audit examined whether the Commission’s management of financial assistance programmes was appropriate. 
Revizijski pristop 20 27 V okviru revizije je Sodišče preučilo, ali je Komisija ustrezno upravljala programe finančne pomoči.
This was addressed by the following sub-questions. (i) Were the growing fiscal risks detected on time? (ii) Were processes sufficiently well designed to make a comprehensive input into programme decisions? (iii) Did the Commission borrow at the best possible rates and in accordance with best debt issuance practices? (iv) Did the financial assistance programmes meet their main objectives? 
V ta namen so bila zastavljena naslednja podvprašanja: (i) Ali so bila vse večja fiskalna tveganja pravočasno zaznana? (ii) Ali so bili procesi dovolj dobro zasnovani za zagotovitev izčrpnih vhodnih podatkov za programske odločitve? (iii) Ali si je Komisija sredstva izposoja-la po najboljših možnih obrestnih merah in v skladu z najboljšo prakso glede izdajanja dolžniških instrumentov? (iv) Ali so programi finančne pomoči izpolnili svoje glavne cilje?
28 The audit covered the Commission’s management of financial assistance provided under the balance-of-payments facility and the EFSM, for which the Commission borrowed on the capital markets using the EU budget as guarantee. 
28 Pri reviziji smo preverili, kako je Komisija upravljala finančno pomoč, zagotovljeno v okviru plačilnobilančnega instrumenta in EFSM, za katero si je Komisija izposodila sredstva na kapitalskih trgih in kot jamstvo uporabila proračun EU.
The audit encompassed the financial assistance paid to Hungary, Latvia, Romania (the first two programmes), Ireland and Portugal, with an emphasis on the Commission’s role in these programmes. 
Revizija je zajela finančno pomoč, izplačano Madžarski, Latviji, Romuniji (prva dva programa), Irski in Portugalski, s poudarkom na vlogi Komisije v teh programih.
We also examined the Commission’s cooperation with its partners (the ECB and the IMF), but did not audit the partners. 
Preučili smo tudi sodelovanje Komisije z njenima partnerjema (ECB in MDS), ni pa revidiralo partnerjev.
29 We did not audit the decisions taken at the EU’s political level and we limited the scope of the audit in several aspects. 
29 Sodišče ni revidiralo odločitev, sprejetih na politični ravni EU, obseg revizije pa je bil omejen v več vidikih.
We did not consider the counterfactual scenario of no financial assistance or the feasibility of resolving the crises by other means (e.g. the mutualisation of sovereign debt). 
Prav tako ni obravnavalo hipotetičnega scenarija, po katerem finančna pomoč ne bi bila odobrena, ali izvedljivosti reševanja krize z drugimi sredstvi (npr. z vzajemnim prevzemanjem državnega dolga).
Nor did we assess debt sustainability or the likelihood that the loans will be repaid. 
Poleg tega ni ocenjevalo vzdržnosti dolga ali verjetnosti, da bodo posojila odplačana.
We also did not evaluate if the Council had chosen the most appropriate deficit targets or structural conditions to resolve the crisis. 
Prav tako ni ocenilo, ali je Svet za reševanje krize izbral najustreznejše cilje v zvezi s primanjkljajem ali strukturne pogoje.
When auditing the Commission’s cooperation with other partners, we did not assess whether their involvement was justified. 
Pri reviziji sodelovanja Komisije s partnerjema ni ocenjevalo upravičenosti tega sodelovanja.
30 The audit criteria were derived from the following sources: (i) regulatory requirements (Council regulations, Council decisions, memoranda of understanding between the Commission and the Member States); (ii) the Commission’s internal rules and procedures (internal control standards and guidelines); (iii) good management practices and evaluation criteria derived from evaluations of IMF programmes, ex post evaluations of the EU’s balance-of-payments assistance to non-EU countries, previous Court reports on macrofinancial assistance, guidelines and other publications from independent institutes and think tanks, and academic research; and (iv) best practices suggested in a number of guidelines on public debt management, investor relations and transparency in debt issuance. 
30 Revizijska merila izhajajo iz naslednjih virov: (i) regulativnih zahtev (uredb Sveta, sklepov Sveta, memorandumov o soglasju med Komisijo in državami članicami); (ii) notranjih pravil in postopkov Komisije (standardi in smernice glede notranje kontrole); (iii) dobrih praks upravljanja in meril za vrednotenje, ki izhajajo iz ovrednotenj programov MDS, naknadnih vrednotenj plačilnobilančne pomoči EU tretjim državam, prejšnjih poročil Sodišča o makrofinančni pomoči, smernic in drugih dokumentov neodvisnih inštitutov in možganskih trustov ter akademskih raziskav; (iv) najboljših praks, predlaganih v več smernicah o upravljanju javnega dolga, odnosih z vlagatelji in preglednosti pri izdajanju dolžniških instrumentov.
Audit approach 21 31 Annex III provides further details of the audit methodology. 
Revizijski pristop 21 31 V Prilogi III so navedene dodatne podrobnosti o revizijski metodologiji.
32 The audit evidence was collected on the basis of: (i) a detailed review of documentation relating to the EU’s financial assistance programmes (programme documents, internal Commission analyses, spreadsheet forecasts, evaluations and studies by other organisations); (ii) interviews with the staff of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs; (iii) interviews with the staff of national authorities, such as ministries of finance, central banks, programme coordination units and sector ministries; (iv) a scorecard analysis of programme conditions25 to classify them by characteristics and compliance; and (v) interviews with the staff of the IMF and the ECB. 
32 Revizijski dokazi so bili zbrani na podlagi: (i) podrobnega pregleda dokumentacije o programih finančne pomoči EU (programskih dokumentov, notranjih analiz Komisije, preglednic z napovedmi, vrednotenj in študij drugih organizacij); (ii) pogovorov z uslužbenci Generalnega direktorata Komisije za gospodarske in finančne zadeve; (iii) pogovorov z uslužbenci nacionalnih organov, kot so ministrstva za finance, centralne banke, enote za usklajevanje znotraj programa in resorna ministrstva; (iv) analize na podlagi kazalnikov, opravljene za programske pogoje25 zaradi razvrstitve pogojev glede na značilnosti in skladnost; (v) pogovorov z uslužbenci MDS in ECB.
25 The sample included 360 unique conditions. 
25 V vzorcu je bilo zajetih 360 posebnih pogojev.
Part I 22 The Commission was unprepared for the magnitude of the crisis that broke out The Commission underestimated the extent of the fiscal imbalances in the run-up to the crisis 33 Warning the Council about mounting fiscal imbalances in the Member States is arguably one of the Commission’s most important activities in the area of economic and financial affairs. 
DelI 22 Komisija ni bila pripravljena na razsežnost krize, ki je izbruhnila Komisija je podcenila razsežnost fiskalnih neravnovesij pred krizo 33 Ena od najpomembnejših nalog Komisije na področju ekonomskih in finančnih zadev je morda ta, da opozarja Svet na naraščajoča fiskalna neravnovesja v državah članicah.
Prior to the crisis, there was already a surveillance framework geared towards monitoring the fiscal situation in the Member States26. 
36 V obdobju pred krizo so bili dejanski fiskalni saldi na splošno ustrezno ocenjeni najkasneje konec zadevnega leta.
This raises a question as to whether the mounting fiscal risks were detected on time and flagged under the surveillance procedures. 37 In its cyclically adjusted balance calculations during 2005-2008, the Commission systematically overestimated the strength of countries’ public finances29. 
37 V svojih izračunih ciklično prilagojenega salda v obdobju 2005–2008 je Komisija sistematično precenjevala trdnost javnih financ v državah.29 To napako so v glavnem povzročile spremembe ocenjenih potencialnih stopenj rasti BDP.
All five countries were experiencing an economic boom, but the Commission initially estimated the scale of overheating to be more modest than, with hindsight, we know it to have been. 
Vseh pet držav je do-življalo gospodarski razcvet, vendar je Komisija prvotno ocenila, da je stopnja pregrevanja manjša, kot je bila v resnici – kot vemo sedaj.
26 This was the ‘preventive arm’ of the Stability and Growth Pact established by Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 
1466/97 z dne 7. julija 1997 o okrepitvi nadzora nad proračunskim stanjem ter o nadzoru in usklajevanju gospodarskih politik (UL L 209, 2.8.1997, str.
The surveillance framework was last reformed in 2005 by Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 (OJ L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 
Nadzorni okvir je bil nazadnje prenovljen leta 2005 z Uredbo Sveta (ES) št. 1055/2005 o spremembi Uredbe (ES) št. 1466/97 (UL L 174, 7.7.2005, str.
27 The financing of running fiscal deficits and the repayment of government debt. 
27 Financiranje tekočih fiskalnih primanjkljajev in odplačilo državnega dolga.
28 European Commission, Ireland — Macro fiscal assessment — an analysis of the December 2007 update of the stability programme, p. 
28 Evropska komisija, Ireland: Macro fiscal assessment. An analysis of the December 2007 update of the stability programme, str.
29 Compare the first estimate made after the year’s end (i.e. in spring forecast) with a recent estimate (i.e. October 2013). 
29 Primerjava med prvo oceno po koncu leta (tj. v spomladanski napovedi) z nedavno oceno (tj. oktobra 2013).