natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission takes into account all available elements which are deemed useful for its informed decision-making. 
Komisija upošteva vse razpoložljive elemente, za katere se zdi, da ji bodo v pomoč pri sprejemanju dobro utemeljenih odločitev.
This includes the inputs provided by the advisory EFB, where appropriate. 
To vključuje prispevke svetovalnega Evropskega fiskalnega odbora, kadar je to primerno.
However, as far as the application of a ‘comply-or-explain’ principle is concerned, a strict parallel between the EFB and the national independent fiscal councils cannot be drawn. 
Kar zadeva uporabo načela „upoštevaj ali pojasni“, pa ni mogoče potegniti stroge vzporednice med Evropskim fiskalnim odborom in nacionalnimi neodvisnimi fiskalnimi sveti.
VII The Commission has been conducting thorough checks on the transposition of Directive 2011/85, to ensure that the respective requirements are properly embedded into the Member States’ budgetary frameworks. 
VII Komisija izvaja temeljita preverjanja prenosa Direktive 2011/85/EU, da bi zagotovila, da so ustrezne zahteve pravilno vključene v proračunske okvire držav članic.
As the conformity checks are virtually completed for two-thirds of the Member States and ongoing for the remainder, increased attention will be given to monitoring the implementation of the Directive’s requirements by the Member States. 
Ker so preverjanja skladnosti skoraj končana za dve tretjini držav članic, za preostale države članice pa se še izvajajo, se bo večja pozornost namenila spremljanju tega, kako države članice izvajajo zahteve iz Direktive.
More generally, the Commission is also monitoring closely NBF developments via other regular processes such as the European Semester, peer reviews in the ECOFIN preparatory committees, annual updates of the Fiscal Governance Database, etc. 
Komisija spremembe v zvezi z nacionalnimi proračunskimi okviri pozorno spremlja tudi z drugimi rednimi postopki, kot so evropski semester, medsebojni pregledi v pripravljalnih odborih Sveta ECOFIN in letne posodobitve zbirke podatkov o fiskalnem upravljanju.
As regards the assessments mandated by the EU legal framework, the Commission underlines that there are specific review clauses in the Directive 2011/85 and Regulation 473/2013. 
Kar zadeva ocene, ki jih določa pravni okvir EU, Komisija poudarja, da Direktiva 2011/85/EU in Uredba (EU) št.
The review of the Six-and Two-pack will provide an opportunity to take an in-depth and holistic look at what the various requirements on NBFs have delivered so far. 
V okviru pregleda zakonodajnega šesterčka in dvojčka bo mogoče poglobljeno in celovito proučiti, kako so bile do zdaj izpolnjene različne zahteve za nacionalne proračunske okvire.
VIII Please see the Commission replies to the recommendations. 
VIII Glej odgovore Komisije na priporočila.
INTRODUCTION 01 The Commission notes that the ECOFIN Council stated already in March 2005 that NBFs should support the objectives of the SGP and complement the EU fiscal framework (see the ‘Ecofin Council report to the European Council of 22-23 March 2005 on improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact’). 
UVOD 01 Komisija opozarja, da je Svet ECOFIN že marca 2005 navedel, da bi morali nacionalni proračunski okviri podpirati cilje Pakta za stabilnost in rast ter dopolnjevati fiskalni okvir EU (glej poročilo o izboljšanju izvajanja Pakta za stabilnost in rast, ki ga je Svet ECOFIN 22. in 23. marca 2005 predložil Evropskemu svetu).
In May 2010, the Council adopted Conclusions on Domestic Fiscal Frameworks, where it stressed the importance of resilient and effective fiscal frameworks for the implementation of the SGP and the sustainability of public finances . 
Svet je maja 2010 sprejel sklepe o nacionalnih fiskalnih okvirih, v katerih je poudaril, kako pomembni so prožni in učinkoviti nacionalni fiskalni okviri za izvajanje Pakta za stabilnost in rast ter vzdržnost javnih financ.
Those envisaged benefits motivated the Commission’s choice to include in the Six-Pack a draft directive laying down requirements for NBFs. 
Zaradi navedenih predvidenih koristi se je Komisija odločila, da v zakonodajni šesterček vključi osnutek direktive o določitvi zahtev v zvezi z nacionalnimi proračunskimi okviri. 2
02 With the benefit of its own analytical work, the Commission subscribes unequivocally to the broad consensus on the importance of having in place strong NBFs to enable sound fiscal performance. 
SL SL 02 Komisija na podlagi svojega opravljenega analitičnega dela nedvoumno podpira široko soglasje o pomembnosti vzpostavitve trdnih nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov, ki bodo omogočali dobro fiskalno uspešnost.
03 While an all-encompassing analysis as referred to in paragraph 3 was not prepared, various facets of the EU and national fiscal frameworks were examined at length in different documents (most notably in the annual Report on Public Finances in EMU). 
03 Celovita analiza iz odstavka 3 sicer ni bila pripravljena, so pa bili v različnih dokumentih podrobno proučeni različni vidiki fiskalnega okvira EU in nacionalnih fiskalnih okvirov (zlasti v letnem poročilu o javnih financah v ekonomski in monetarni uniji (EMU)).
The Commission conducted over time - including before the crisis – analytical work confirming the relevance of the two-tier approach to fiscal governance (i.e. at EU and national level) in support of meeting EU budgetary obligations of the Member States. 
Komisija je v daljšem časovnem obdobju – tudi pred krizo – izvajala analitično delo, s katerim je potrdila, da dvostopenjski pristop k fiskalnemu upravljanju (tj. na ravni EU in nacionalni ravni) države članice pomembno podpira pri izpolnjevanju proračunskih obveznosti EU.
That work also highlighted the challenges in the implementation of SGP as it stood at the time and the main weaknesses in the NBFs based on the information collected through the Fiscal Governance Database. 
V okviru navedenega dela so bili na podlagi informacij, zbranih prek zbirke podatkov o fiskalnem upravljanju, izpostavljeni tudi izzivi pri izvajanju Pakta za stabilnost in rast, kakršen je bil takrat, ter glavne pomanjkljivosti nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov.
Box 2 - Concepts explained Concerning the automatic correction mechanism, the Commission underlines that this is an obligation stemming from the TSCG. 
Okvir 2 – Pojasnilo konceptov Kar zadeva samodejni popravljalni mehanizem, Komisija poudarja, da ta obveznost izhaja iz PSUU.
08 Apart from the TSCG-related provisions, Regulation 473/2013 includes other important requirements for NBFs, notably the independent production/endorsement of the macroeconomic forecasts underpinning annual budgets and national medium-term fiscal planning, and a common budgetary timeline for (i) presenting and adopting draft annual budgets and (ii) presenting national medium-term fiscal plans. 
473/2013 poleg določb, povezanih s PSUU, vključuje druge pomembne zahteve za nacionalne proračunske okvire, zlasti neodvisno pripravo/potrditev makroekonomskih napovedi, na katerih temeljita letno načrtovanje proračunov in nacionalno srednjeročno fiskalno načrtovanje, ter skupni proračunski časovni okvir za (i) predložitev in sprejetje predlogov letnih proračunov ter (ii) predložitev nacionalnih srednjeročnih fiskalnih načrtov.
09 The proposal of the Commission responded to the incorporation will expressed by the TSCG Contracting Parties (as enshrined in Article 16 TSCG) and to the calls of the European Parliament for integration into the Union framework. 
09 Predlog Komisije je odziv na voljo glede vključitve, ki so jo izrazile pogodbenice PSUU (kakor je določeno v členu 16 PSUU), in pozive Evropskega parlamenta za vključitev v okvir Unije.
OBSERVATIONS 18 The current set of supranational NBF requirements was developed gradually, alongside the unfolding of the crisis, and had to come in the form of various legal instruments for objective reasons. 
OPAŽANJA 18 Veljavni sklop nadnacionalnih zahtev za nacionalne proračunske okvire se je razvijal postopoma, skupaj s krizo, in je moral biti iz objektivnih razlogov v obliki različnih pravnih instrumentov.
Most notably, given the particular fiscal challenges posed by the crisis, the euro area Member States acknowledged the need to adopt specific measures going beyond the provisions applicable to all Member States, including with respect to NBFs. 
Zlasti so države članice euroobmočja zaradi posebnih fiskalnih izzivov, ki jih je povzročila kriza, priznale potrebo po sprejetju posebnih ukrepov, ki presegajo določbe, ki se uporabljajo za vse države članice, vključno v zvezi z nacionalnimi proračunskimi okviri.
19 Second indent: The Commission does not consider that NBFs’ features should be prescribed extensively at supranational level. 
19 Druga alinea: Komisija meni, da elementov nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov ne bi bilo treba obsežno predpisovati na nadnacionalni ravni.
The Commission draws attention to its Report on Public Finances in EMU 2011 (p. 
Opozarja na svoje poročilo o javnih financah v EMU iz leta 2011 (str.
101), which argued that going beyond minimum requirements in the Directive 2011/85 would not have been compatible with the considerable differences across Member States' administrative and institutional structures. 
101), v katerem je navedeno, da preseganje minimalnih zahtev iz Direktive 2011/85/EU ne bi bilo združljivo s precejšnjimi razlikami v upravnih in institucionalnih strukturah držav članic.
The legislative instruments that introduced supranational NBF requirements were developed sequentially and the choice of legal vehicle – specifically, directive or regulation with a different degree of prescriptiveness – was based on content and purpose considerations relevant at the time of drafting. 
Zakonodajni instrumenti, s katerimi so se uvedle nadnacionalne zahteve za nacionalne proračunske okvire, so bili razviti zaporedno, izbira pravnega instrumenta – natančneje, direktive oziroma uredbe z različno stopnjo preskriptivnosti – pa je temeljila na vsebinskih in namenskih premislekih, pomembnih med pripravo besedila.
The Commission considers that the heterogeneity of NBFs should be seen as a way to accommodate the fundamental aim to increase national ownership. 
Po mnenju Komisije bi bilo treba heterogenost nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov obravnavati kot način za doseganje temeljnega cilja povečanja nacionalne odgovornosti.
21 The 2017 draft Directive has indeed a wider scope. 
21 Osnutek direktive iz leta 2017 ima dejansko širše področje uporabe.
Beside a medium-term objective in terms of structural balance, the envisaged framework would include: (i) setting a medium-term growth path of net government expenditure consistent with that medium-term objective and fixed for the whole term of the legislature, (ii) laying down the obligation for annual budgets to respect the medium-term growth path of net expenditure, (iii) having a correction mechanism to deal with deviations over the 
Predvideni okvir bi poleg srednjeročnega cilja v smislu strukturnega salda vključeval: (i) določitev srednjeročnega načrta rasti 3
medium-term. The draft Directive also proposes an extensive involvement of IFIs in fiscal policy making and monitoring of budgetary developments. 
V osnutku direktive je predlagano tudi obsežno vključevanje neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij v oblikovanje fiskalnih politik in spremljanje proračunskih gibanj.
While an explicit numerical constraint is not specified for the medium-term objective, the draft Directive states that the framework of numerical rules should effectively promote compliance with the TFEU budgetary obligations, i.e. including compliance with the MTO as provided for in the SGP. 
Za srednjeročni cilj ni določena izrecna numerična omejitev, vendar je v osnutku direktive navedeno, da bi moral okvir z numeričnimi pravili učinkovito spodbujati spoštovanje proračunskih obveznosti iz PDEU, tj. vključno s skladnostjo s srednjeročnim proračunskim ciljem, kakor je določen v Paktu za stabilnost in rast.
More generally, the absence of an explicit numerical constraint for the medium-term objective could be considered as being outweighed by the draft Directive’s approach of establishing stronger foundations of fiscal discipline through binding medium-term expenditure path and stronger role of IFIs. 
Splošneje, za odsotnost izrecne numerične omejitve za srednjeročni cilj bi se lahko štelo, da se izravna s pristopom iz osnutka direktive, ki z zavezujočim srednjeročnim načrtom rasti in pomembnejšo vlogo neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij vzpostavlja trdnejše temelje fiskalne discipline.
22 The Commission acknowledges that the draft Directive departs from the ad litteram reading of the Fiscal Compact, as it proposes different – better, in the Commission’s view – instruments to reach the same objectives. 
22 Komisija priznava, da osnutek direktive odstopa od natančnega branja fiskalnega dogovora, saj so v njem predlagani drugačni – po njenem mnenju boljši – instrumenti za dosego istih ciljev.
However, the Commission does not agree with the quoted opinion of the ECB that the provisions of the draft Directive may lead to weakening of the rules of the Fiscal Compact. 
Vendar se ne strinja z navedenim mnenjem Evropske centralne banke, da lahko določbe osnutka direktive vodijo do oslabitve pravil fiskalnega dogovora.
As to the timing of the proposal, the Commission would like to recall the timeframe set out by Art. 16 TSCG for the Contracting Parties to take steps to incorporate the substance of the Treaty into EU law, which is “within five years at most following the entry into force”. 
Kar zadeva časovnico predloga, želi Komisija opozoriti na časovni okvir, ki ga imajo pogodbenice v skladu s členom 16 PSUU na voljo za sprejetje ukrepov za vključitev vsebine pogodbe v pravo EU, tj. „[v] največ petih letih od datuma začetka veljavnosti“.
By putting forward the proposal in December 2017, which was well before the review of the Six and Two-pack legislation, the Commission sought to allow the Contracting Parties to fulfil their commitment to integrate the Fiscal Compact into EU law (which is also in line with the longstanding Commission position). 
Komisija si je s predložitvijo predloga decembra 2017, kar je bilo precej pred pregledom zakonodajnega šesterčka in dvojčka, prizadevala pogodbenicam omogočiti, da izpolnijo svojo zavezo glede vključitve fiskalnega dogovora v pravo EU (kar je tudi v skladu z dolgoletnim stališčem Komisije).
27 As the common principles were adopted after the Commission’s proposal for Regulation 473/2013, adding new and substantive provisions on national correction mechanisms (of which there was no mention in the original draft Regulation) would have amounted to a significant alteration of the Commission proposal. 
27 Ker so bila skupna načela sprejeta po tem, ko je Komisija pripravila predlog Uredbe (EU) št. 473/2013, bi dodajanje novih in vsebinskih določb o nacionalnih popravljalnih mehanizmih (ki v prvotnem osnutku uredbe niso bili omenjeni) pomenilo veliko spremembo predloga Komisije.
The Commission believes that such alteration would have had negative repercussions on the adoption of the Regulation. 
Komisija meni, da bi taka sprememba negativno vplivala na sprejetje uredbe.
To address the issue, the Commission proposed to bring key features of the correction mechanisms into the fold of EU law at the first regulatory opportunity after the issuance of the common principles, namely via the 2017 draft Directive. 
Za obravnavo tega vprašanja je Komisija predlagala, da se ključne značilnosti popravljalnih mehanizmov v pravo EU vključijo ob prvi regulativni priložnosti po izdaji skupnih načel, tj. z osnutkom direktive iz leta 2017.
28 The 2017 draft Directive sets out key features of correction mechanisms based on the elements envisaged by the common principles – see Articles 3(2)(b), 3(3), 3(4)(c), 5 and 6. 
28 Osnutek direktive iz leta 2017 določa ključne značilnosti popravljalnih mehanizmov na podlagi elementov, predvidenih s skupnimi načeli – glej člen 3(2)(b), člen 3(3) in člen 3(4)(c) ter člena 5 in 6.
In some respects, the draft Directive actually goes somewhat beyond those elements, e.g. by (i) indicating that the correction mechanism should in particular compensate for deviations from the medium-term government expenditure path, or (ii) establishing the IFIs’ obligation to call upon the budgetary authorities to activate the correction mechanism. 
Osnutek direktive v nekaterih pogledih nekoliko presega navedene elemente, npr. z (i) navedbo, da bi moral popravljalni mehanizem zlasti izravnati učinke odklonov od srednjeročnega načrta rasti javnofinančnih odhodkov ali z (ii) določitvijo obveznosti, da morajo neodvisne fiskalne institucije proračunske organe pozvati k sprožitvi popravljalnega mehanizma.
29 The Commission acknowledges that the draft Directive does not include a definition of the term “significant observed deviation”. 
29 Komisija priznava, da osnutek direktive ne vključuje opredelitve izraza „znatni ugotovljeni odklon“.
While the default understanding is that the term used in the draft Directive could be or could follow closely the concept as currently defined in the Stability and Growth Pact regulations, it could also possibly deviate from that concept. 
Standardno razumevanje je, da bi lahko imel izraz, uporabljen v osnutku direktive, enak ali podoben pomen kot koncept, kakor je trenutno opredeljen v uredbah o Paktu za stabilnost in rast, lahko pa bi od navedenega koncepta tudi odstopal.
In the Commission’s view, the wording of the provision about the nature and size of deviation is appropriate for a Directive. 
Po mnenju Komisije je besedilo določbe o naravi in obsegu odklona primerno za direktivo.
30 Common reply to paragraph 30 and Table 1: The Commission follows closely existing and ongoing analysis on MTBFs and is itself conducting research in this area. 
30 Skupni odgovor na odstavek 30 in tabelo 1: 4 SL SL Komisija pozorno spremlja obstoječe in tekoče analize srednjeročnih proračunskih okvirov ter sama izvaja raziskave na tem področju.
In this context, standards and best practices are given due consideration whenever legislative proposals are initiated. 
V zvezi s tem se vedno, kadar so v pripravi zakonodajni predlogi, ustrezno upoštevajo standardi in dobre prakse.
Directive 2011/85, while being prepared in a very short time, was based on prior analytical work of the Commission, which also incorporated notions from the relevant economic literature. 
Direktiva 2011/85/EU, pripravljena v zelo kratkem času, je temeljila na prejšnjem analitičnem delu Komisije, ki je vključevalo tudi pojme iz ustrezne ekonomske literature.
It is also important to note that, while the literature includes a large variety of concepts and features related to medium-term fiscal planning, a universally accepted set of international best practices does not exist. 
Opozoriti je treba tudi, da literatura sicer vključuje najrazličnejše koncepte in elemente, povezane s srednjeročnim fiskalnim načrtovanjem, splošno sprejet sklop mednarodnih dobrih praks pa ne obstaja.
While acknowledging the importance of the elements presented as ‘differences’ in Table 1, the Commission is of the view that not all of them should necessarily qualify as legally binding EU standard for MTBFs. 
Komisija priznava pomembnost elementov, ki so kot „razlike“ predstavljeni v tabeli 1, vendar meni, da se ne bi smeli vsi nujno šteti za pravno zavezujoč standard EU za srednjeročne proračunske okvire.
When preparing legislative proposals, the Commission has to carefully consider many aspects, including notably the right balance between the desirability of the envisaged requirements and the feasibility of translating them into EU law requirements applicable to all the Member States or the euro area Member States only. 
Komisija mora pri pripravi zakonodajnih predlogov skrbno proučiti številne vidike, ki vključujejo zlasti pravo ravnovesje med zaželenostjo predvidenih zahtev in izvedljivostjo njihovega prenosa v zahteve prava EU, ki veljajo za vse države članice ali le za države članice euroobmočja.
The Commission also stresses the need to make the distinction between the MTBFs in the Commission approach (defined in Article 2(e) of the Directive) and the various concepts used by the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD. 
Komisija poudarja tudi, da je treba razlikovati med srednjeročnimi proračunskimi okviri iz njenega pristopa (opredeljenimi v členu 2(e) Direktive) ter različnimi koncepti, ki jih uporabljajo Mednarodni denarni sklad (MDS), Mednarodna banka za obnovo in razvoj (IBRD) ter Organizacija za gospodarsko sodelovanje in razvoj (OECD).
Directive 2011/85 focused on a particular concept of instrument for medium-term fiscal planning (i.e. MTBF) and on related basic principles and components that were deemed crucial to attaining the objective of promoting compliance with the EU fiscal framework. 
Direktiva 2011/85/EU se je osredotočala na poseben koncept instrumenta za srednjeročno fiskalno načrtovanje (tj. srednjeročni proračunski okvir) ter na povezana osnovna načela in sestavne dele, ki so se šteli za ključne za doseganje cilja spodbujanja skladnosti s fiskalnim okvirom EU.
This explains the absence of some of the standards/best practice retained by the above-mentioned international organisations (e.g. carryovers, commitments and buffers). 
To pojasni odsotnost nekaterih standardov/dobre prakse, ki jih ohranjajo navedene mednarodne organizacije (npr. prenosov, obveznosti in varoval).
31 The Commission recognizes that medium-term planning and annual budget preparation should be done in consistency with each other. 
31 Komisija priznava, da bi morala biti srednjeročno načrtovanje in priprava letnega proračuna medsebojno skladna.
Directive 2011/85 militates explicitly for such consistency, notably in Art. 10. 
V Direktivi 2011/85/EU se izrecno zagovarja taka skladnost, zlasti v členu 10.
32 While acknowledging that the principle of ensuring expenditure control in MTBFs is important, the Commission considers that most of the cited control mechanisms would have been too specific/prescriptive to include in the Directive as common requirements for all Member States. 
32 Komisija priznava, da je načelo zagotavljanja kontrole odhodkov v srednjeročnih proračunskih okvirih pomembno, vendar meni, da bi bila večina navedenih nadzornih mehanizmov preveč specifična/preskriptivna, da bi jih v Direktivo vključila kot skupne zahteve za vse države članice.
33 Directive 2011/85 does not foresee an accountability mechanism for ex-post or ex-ante deviations from the multi-year plans. 
33 V Direktivi 2011/85/EU ni predviden mehanizem za odgovornost za naknadna ali predhodna odstopanja od večletnih finančnih načrtov.
However, the Fiscal Compact establishes correction mechanisms which are meant to address those departures from medium-term fiscal plans that would qualify as observed significant deviations from the MTO or the adjustment path towards it. 
Vendar fiskalni dogovor vzpostavlja popravljalne mehanizme, s katerimi naj bi se obravnavala tista odstopanja od srednjeročnih fiskalnih načrtov, ki bi se opredelila za znatne ugotovljene odklone od srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja ali prilagoditvene poti za njegovo dosego.
Related opinions by the national IFIs would also activate the ‘comply-or-explain’ principle and generate a reputational cost for the budgetary authorities. 
Povezana mnenja nacionalnih neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij bi aktivirala tudi načelo „upoštevaj ali pojasni“ in škodila ugledu proračunskih organov.
34 The 2017 draft Directive aimed specifically at strengthening the medium-term orientation of fiscal policy in the Member States by putting forward several key requirements for reinforcing MTBFs (see Commission reply to paragraph 21). 
34 Osnutek direktive iz leta 2017 je bil posebej namenjen krepitvi srednjeročne usmerjenosti fiskalne politike v državah članicah s predložitvijo več ključnih zahtev za okrepitev srednjeročnih proračunskih okvirov (glej odgovor Komisije na odstavek 21).
The Commission stresses the high potential of those provisions to strengthen the MTBFs, despite the fact that they do not match directly the “differences” identified in Table 1. 
Komisija poudarja velik potencial navedenih določb za krepitev srednjeročnih proračunskih okvirov, čeprav se ne ujemajo neposredno z „razlikami“ iz tabele 1.