natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
133 An analysis of the allocation tables that were available82 revealed that for very small amounts the allocation was 100 %, while there was little consistency in the degree to which larger orders were satisfied. 
133 Analiza razpoložljivih tabel o dodeli-tvi82 je razkrila, da je bila za zelo nizke zneske dodelitev stoodstotna, stopnja izpolnjevanja večjih naročil pa ni bila enotna.
Furthermore, the main orders were placed by specific financial entities (e.g. large investment houses) on behalf of investors. 
Poleg tega so glavna naročila plasirale posebne finančne institucije (npr. večje investicijske hiše) v imenu vlagateljev.
When the final allocation is made, the investment houses allocate the bonds to the investors. 
Ko se opravi končna dodelitev, investicijske hiše dodelijo obveznice vlagateljem.
We did not find evidence that the Commission agreed with the final bond allocation. 
Nismo našli dokazov, da bi se Komisija strinjala s končno dodelitvijo obveznic.
Post-issuance 134 Defining a new bond as liquid in the secondary market means that it can be sold quickly. 
Po izdaji 134 Opredelitev nove obveznice kot likvidne na sekundarnem trgu pomeni, da jo je mogoče hitro prodati.
It is the responsibility of both the issuer and the lead bank to ensure that there is sufficient liquidity in the secondary market for any new issue. 
Naloga izdajatelja in vodilne banke je zagotoviti, da je na sekundarnem trgu dovolj likvidnosti za vsako novo izdajo.
The Commission and lead banks should agree on secondary market commitments in the mandate letters signed for each issue. 
Komisija in vodilne banke bi se morale dogovoriti o zavezah glede sekundarnega trga v mandatnem pismu, podpisanem za vsako izdajo.
Furthermore, the participating lead banks are expected to maintain a similar low bid-offer spread (the difference between the buy and sell price) for at least the first few days of the secondary market. 
Poleg tega se pričakuje, da bodo sodelujoče vodilne banke vzdrževale podobno majhno nakupno-prodajno razliko (razlika med nakupno in prodajno ceno) vsaj prvih nekaj dni na sekundarnem trgu.
135 During the audit, the Commission stated that it examined the liquidity of EU bonds on a quarterly basis, with a more formal examination procedure in place since 2012. 
135 Med revizijo je Komisija navedla, da je preverjala likvidnost obveznic EU na četrtletni ravni, od leta 2012 pa je uporabljala bolj uraden postopek preverjanja.
However, we found no evidence in the borrowing files that it had checked liquidity in the secondary market before 2012. 
Kljub temu v dokumentih o posojilih nismo našli nobenih dokazov, da bi pred letom 2012 preverjala likvidnost na sekundarnem trgu.
136 An analysis of bid and offer prices showed that the closing daily bid-offer spread for the initial 30 days of each issue was relatively low. 
136 Analiza nakupnih in prodajnih cen je pokazala, da je bila razlika med nakupno in prodajno ceno ob zaključku trgovalnega dne prvih 30 dni vsake izdaje razmeroma nizka.
However, the bid-offer spread for each bond was found to vary widely between bro-kers. 
Vendar pa se je razlika med nakupno in prodajno ceno za vsako obveznico zelo razlikovala med posredniki.
For instance, the bid-offer spread ranged from 7 to 30 basis points for one of the bond issues83. 
Razlika med nakupno in prodajno ceno se je na primer gibala od 7 do 30 bazičnih točk za eno od obvezniških izdaj.83 To razliko so opazili celo pri posrednikih, ki so sodelovali kot vodilne banke pri več izdajah EU in so bili zato dolžni spoštovati nekatere zaveze glede sekundarnega trga.
83 3.25 % coupon bond with a maturity date of 4 April 2018. 
83 Obveznica s kuponsko obrestno mero 3,25 % z datumom zapadlosti 4. 4. 2018.
Part IV 57 Programmes met their objectives 137 The overall aims of financial assistance were to return Member States to sound macroeconomic or financial health and restore their capacity to meet their public-sector (euro area) or balance-of-payments (non-euro area) obligations. 
Del IV 57 Programi so dosegli svoje cilje 137 Splošna namena finančne pomoči sta bila ponovna vzpostavitev stabilnega makroekonomskega ali finančnega položaja v državah članicah ter obnovitev njihove zmožnosti za izpolnjevanje obveznosti glede javnega sektorja (evrsko območje) ali plačilne bilance (zunaj evrskega območja).
The financial assistance provided a cushion to ease implementation of the adjustment programmes that were necessary in each country to correct underlying problems. 
Finančna pomoč je zagotovila rezervo za lažje izvajanje programov za prilagoditev, ki so bili potrebni v posameznih državah, da bi odpravili temeljne probleme.
We structured our analysis of the programme achievements along four dimensions: (i) analysis of how the overall funding was used and factors that made it sufficient; (ii) compliance with deficit targets and implementation of fiscal adjustment; (iii) compliance with the conditions and implementation of structural reforms; and (iv) changes in countries’ competitiveness. 
Podlaga za našo analizo programskih dosežkov so bile štiri razsežnosti: (i) analiza porabe celotnih sredstev in dejavnikov, zaradi katerih so bila ta zadostna; (ii) skladnost s cilji glede primanjkljaja in izvajanje fiskalnih prilagoditev; (iii) skladnost s pogoji in izvajanje strukturnih reform; (iv) spremembe konkurenčnosti držav.
No need to increase overall funding Funding envelopes proved sufficient, if tight in two Member States 138 In no country did the financing gap evolve as envisaged. 
Ni bilo potrebe po povečanju celotnih sredstev Finančna sredstva so se izkazala za zadostna, čeprav so v dveh državah članicah komaj zadostovala 138 V nobeni državi se finančna vrzel ni spreminjala, kot je bilo predvideno.
However, the programme set-up was sufficiently robust to allow significant discrepancies to be offset within a programme so that funding remained within the initial envelopes (see Figure 10). 
Kljub temu je bila programska zasnova dovolj trdna, da je omogočila izravnavo bistvenih odstopanj v programu, tako da je financiranje ostalo v okviru prvotnih omejitev finančnih sredstev (glej sliko 10).
139 There were, nonetheless, some differences in the level of comfort provided by the financial assistance. 
139 Vseeno so se pokazale nekatere razlike v stopnji rezerve, ki jo je zagotovila finančna pomoč.
The early programmes, designed in the wake of the Lehman collapse, included a substantial safety margin. 
Zgodnji programi, zasnovani po propadu banke Lehman Brothers, so vključevali znatno varnostno rezervo.
Similarly, the Irish programme included a sizeable contingency reserve of 25 billion euro as part of the banking support scheme. 
Podobno je tudi irski program vključeval rezervo za nepredvidene izdatke v višini 25 milijard EUR, ki je bila del sheme za podporo bank.
On the whole, Ireland, Hungary and Latvia benefited from reduced funding needs, which allowed them to: (i) reduce reliance on their own resources (Ireland); (ii) exceed the initial foreign exchange reserve projections (Hungary); (iii) reduce programme financing (Latvia, Hungary); and (iv) repay (or consider repaying) the more expensive IMF loans before their due date (Hungary, Latvia, Ireland). 
Pri Irski, Madžarski in Latviji so se potrebe po financiranju na splošno izkazale za manjše od prvotno ocenjenih, kar je tem državam omogočilo, da so: (i) zmanjšale opiranje na lastne vire (Irska); (ii) presegle začetne projekcije deviznih rezerv (Madžarska); (iii) zmanjšale programsko financiranje (Latvija, Madžarska) ter (iv) vrnile dražja posojila MDS pred datumom zapadlosti (ali pretehtale to možnost) (Madžarska, Latvija, Irska).
Part IV — Programmes met their objectives 58 How was money used? 
Del IV – Programi so dosegli svoje cilje 58 Kako je bil denar porabljen?
Balance-of-payment programmes Key: Hungary ο Contrary to the forecast, foreign banks increased exposure to their subsidiaries at the peak of the crisis and drains from foreign exchange derivatives did not materialise. 
Plačilnobilančni programi Legenda: Finančna vrzel Kapitalski in finančni račun Madžarska ο V nasprotju z napovedjo so tuje banke na vrhuncu krize povečale izpostavljenost do svojih podružnic in odlivi iz valutnih izvedenih finančnih instrumentov se niso uresničili.
Therefore no financing was required to cover the capital and financial account. 
Tako niso bila potrebna sredstva za kritje kapitalskega in finančnega računa.
Instead it became a financing source. Latvia Funding gap Capital and financial account Current account Increase in international reserves Other Needs Financing 3.3 2.4 10.7 3.1 Needs Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual 1 19.5 14.2 Financing 7.5 1 2.8 3.7 ο The current account corrected much faster than initially anticipated, becoming a financing source. 
Ravno nasprotno – ta je postal vir financiranja. Latvija Tekoči račun Povečanje mednarodnih rezerv Drugo Potrebe Financiranje 3,3 2,4 10,7 3,1 Potrebe Načrtovano Dejansko 1 Načrtovano Dejansko Načrtovano Dejansko 19,5 14,2 Financiranje 7,5 1 2,8 3,7 ο Tekoči račun si je opomogel veliko hitreje, kot je bilo prvotno pričakovano, in je postal vir financiranja.
This was partially offset by additional funding needs due to the capital and financial account. ο Of the 4.7 billion euro in financial assistance, 3.2 billion euro was used to finance ongoing government deficits and repayments of public debt. 
To izboljšanje je bilo deloma izravnano z dodatnimi finančnimi potrebami zaradi kapitalskega in finančnega računa. ο Od 4,7 milijarde EUR finančne pomoči je bilo 3,2 milijarde EUR porabljenih za financiranje tekočih primanjkljajev sektorja države in poplačila javnega dolga.
The financial sector rescue was less costly than anticipated. 
Reševanje finančnega sektorja je zahtevalo manj sredstev, kot je bilo pričakovano.
1.7 4.7 Romania1 ο The current account corrected faster than anticipated. 
1,7 4,7 Romunija1 ο Tekoči račun si je opomogel hitreje, kot je bilo pričakovano.
This was partially offset by reduced financing through the capital and financial account. 
To izboljšanje je bilo deloma izravnano z zmanjšanim financiranjem prek kapitalskega in finančnega računa.
1 Data cover the first Romanian programme. 
1 Podatki zajemajo prvi romunski program.
Needs Financing 20.0 10.8 5.5 25.3 18.2 4.9 5.5 12.0 0.5 6.2 16.3 2.6 Figure 10 
Potrebe Financiranje 20,0 10,8 5,5 25,3 18,2 4,9 5,5 12,0 0,5 6,2 16,3 2,6 Slika 10
Part IV — Programmes met their objectives 59 Euro area programmes Comparison between planned and actual needs and financing in the government sector. Key: Cash deficit Maturing debt Financial sector needs Funding gap Market financing Own resources Portugal Other Ireland 20 6 35 13 12 18 113 40 38 83 59 52 15 Other public cash needs pertaining to the financing of state-owned enterprises, contributions to the ESM, the repayment of arrears, etc. 
Del IV – Programi so dosegli svoje cilje 59 Programi evrskega območja Primerjava načrtovanih in dejanskih potreb in financiranja v sektorju države Legenda: Primanjkljaj denarnih sredstev Zapadli dolg Potrebe finančnega sektorja Finančna vrzel Tržno financiranje Lastni viri Drugo Irska Portugalska 20 6 35 13 12 18 113 40 38 83 59 52 15 Druge javne potrebe po denarnih sredstvih, povezane s financiranjem podjetij v državni lasti, prispevki za ESM, poplačilom zaostalih plačil itd. 22 27 Načrtovano Dejansko Načrtovano Dejansko 78 47 76 93 12 68 49 68 32 9 18 5 Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče, podatki iz programskih dokumentov, statistike nacionalnih organov.
Financing Needs Financing Needs Figure 10 
Financiranje Potrebe Financiranje Potrebe Silka 10
Part IV — Programmes met their objectives 60 140 In contrast, Portugal faced significantly higher financing requirements than initially estimated, and financing was tight during the Portuguese programme. 
Del IV – Programi so dosegli svoje cilje 60 140 Portugalska se je za razliko od omenjenih držav spopadala z bistveno večjimi zahtevami po financiranju, kot je bilo prvotno ocenjeno. Financiranje je bilo pri portugalskem programu komaj zadostno.
To meet its additional requirements, Portugal had to rely on market financing. 
Da bi izpolnila dodatne zahteve, se je Portugalska zanašala na financiranje na trgu.
Monetary relaxation in the euro area in the second half of the programme helped Portugal to make a successful return to the financial markets84. 141 The financial assistance to Romania was sufficient to cover the country’s balance-of-payments needs, but financing of the Romanian public sector proved to be tight during the programme. 
Sprostitev monetarna politike v evrskem območju v drugi polovici programa je Portugalski pomagala pri uspešni vrnitvi na finančne trge.84 141 Finančna pomoč Romuniji je zadoščala za kritje plačilnobilančnih potreb države, toda za romunski javni sektor med izvajanjem programa so sredstva komaj zadostovala.
The government’s additional financing needs were covered in part by indirect support from the central bank. 
Dodatne potrebe vlade po financiranju je deloma pokrila posredna podpora centralne banke.
Certain Member States received more advantageous financial terms than provided for the initial design 142 Portugal and Ireland benefited from reduced interest rates and longer maturities on the EU loans85. The primary aim was to enhance their long-term refinancing prospects86; however, the change also reduced the financial burden of meeting interest payments over the programme period. 
Finančni pogoji za nekatere države članice so bili ugodnejši od tistih, ki so bili predvideni v prvotni zasnovi 142 Za Portugalsko in Irsko so se obrestne mere znižale, roki zapadlosti posojil EU pa so se podaljšali.85 Prvotni namen je bil izboljšati njune obete glede dolgoročnega refinanciranja,86 vendar je ta sprememba zmanjšala tudi finančno breme plačevanja obresti v programskem obdobju.
We estimate that Ireland and Portugal achieved, over the programme period, savings of 2.2 billion euro each. 
Sodišče ocenjuje, da sta Irska in Portugalska v programskem obdobju dosegli prihranke v višini 2,2 milijarde EUR vsaka.
143 Ireland and Romania benefited from the accommodating policies of their central banks. (i) The Central Bank of Ireland agreed to swap non-marketable promissory notes issued to the Anglo Irish Bank for Irish government bonds with longer maturities87. This liberated Ireland from the need to seek market financing for 3.1 billion euro due in 2013. It will also reduce the country’s financing requirements by a total of 30 billion euro over the 2014-2023 period and the deficit by an average of 0.7 % of GDP88. (ii) In November 2009, Romania’s central bank decided to decrease the foreign exchange reserves requirement from 30 % to 25 % (following an earlier decrease from 35 % in August). 
143 Irski in Romuniji sta koristili prilagodlji-vi politiki njunih centralnih bank. (i) Irska centralna banka je privolila v zamenjavo netržljivih zadolžnic, izdanih banki Anglo Irish Bank, za irske državne obveznice z daljšo zapadlostjo.87 Zaradi tega Irski ni bilo treba iskati financiranja na trgu za 3,1 milijarde EUR z zapadlostjo leta 2013, poleg tega pa se bodo zmanjšale njene potrebe po financiranju za skupno 30 milijard EUR v obdobju 2014–2023, primanjkljaj pa za povprečno 0,7 % BDP.88 (ii) Novembra 2009 se je romunska centralna banka odločila zmanjšati zahtevo za devizne rezerve s 30 % na 25 % (po predhodnem zmanjšanju s 35 % v avgustu).
This freed up around 1.3 billion euro in banking loans for government financing. 
To je spro-stilo približno 1,3 milijarde EUR v bančnih posojilih za financiranje sektorja države.
The decision was publicly justified by the postponement of 2009 IMF/EU tranches89. 84 Monetary relaxation also had a positive impact on financing for the Irish government. 
Ta odločitev je bila javno upravičena z odložitvijo tranš MDS/EU za leto 2009.89 84 Sprostitev monetarne politike je pozitivno učinkovala tudi na sredstva za irsko vlado.
85 EFSM loans were initially planned for an average duration of 7.5 years, with interest margins of 2.925 % for Ireland and 2.15 % for Portugal. 
85 Povprečno trajanje posojil EFSM je bilo po prvotnih načrtih 7,5 leta, obrestne marže pa so znašale 2,925 % za Irsko in 2,15 % za Portugalsko.
In October 2011 these interest margins were suppressed, and the average maturity was increased to 19.5 years in June 2013. 
Oktobra 2011 sta se ti obrestni marži znižali, junija 2013 pa se je povprečni rok zapadlosti podaljšal na 19,5 leta.
EFSF loans were also extended, and the interest margins of 2.47 % for Ireland and 2.08 % for Portugal were likewise suppressed. 
Tudi posojila EFSF so bila podaljšana, obrestni marži v višini 2,47 % za Irsko in 2,08 % za Portugalsko pa znižali.
86 This decreased also the expected revenue of the EU budget by 2.2 billion euro in total during in the programme period. 
86 Zaradi tega so se znižali tudi pričakovani prihodki proračuna EU, in sicer za skupno 2,2 milijarde EUR v programskem obdobju.
87 In its 2013 annual report, the ECB considered that ‘The liquidation of the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC) raises serious monetary financing concerns. 
87 ECB je v svojem letnem poročilu za leto 2013 navedla: „Likvidacija institucije Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC) sproža resna vprašanja v zvezi z denarnim financiranjem.
These concerns could be somewhat mitigated by the disposal strategy of the Central Bank of Ireland.’ 
Ta vprašanja je bilo mogoče deloma razrešiti s strategijo odtujitve v centralni banki Banc Ceannais na hÉireann/Central Bank of Ireland.”
88 European Commission, ‘Economic adjustment programme for Ireland — Winter 2012 review’, European Economy, Occasional Papers No 131, 2013. 
88 Evropska komisija: Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland – Winter 2012 Review (Program za ekonomsko prilagoditev za Irsko – pregled pozimi leta 2012), European Economy, Occasional Papers št. 131, 2013.
89 Press release of the Board of the National Bank of Romania of 16 November 2009. 
89 Izjava za tisk odbora romunske centralne banke z dne 16. novembra 2009.
Part IV — Programmes met their objectives 61 Updated deficit targets mostly but not always sustainably met With some exceptions, revised annual deficit targets were met 144 Compliance with the revised targets was generally good, with the exception of the Hungarian programme and some years of the Portuguese and Romanian programmes (see Table 4). 145 However, missed targets did not necessarily mean failure of implementation. 
Del IV – Programi so dosegli svoje cilje 61 Posodobljeni cilji glede primanjkljaja so bili večinoma izpolnjeni, vendar ne vedno 145 Kljub temu pa nedoseganje ciljev ni nujno pomenilo, da je bilo izvajanje neuspešno.
For example, the missed 2008 and 2009 targets in the Hungarian programme can be explained by statistical revisions to the budget deficit. 
Neizpolnjena cilja za leto 2008 in 2009 v madžarskem programu je mogoče pojasniti s statističnimi spremembami proračunskega primanjkljaja.
1 Net lending or borrowing of general government for excessive deficit procedure as of spring 2014. 
1 Neto posojanje ali izposojanje sektorja države za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, podatki za pomlad 2014.
2 Actual deficit as reported by the Commission and in line with the programme definition (see paragraph 91). 
2 Dejanski primanjkljaj, o katerem je poročala Komisija in ki je v skladu s programsko opredelitvijo (glej odstavek 91).
Table 4 
Tabela 4
Part IV — Programmes met their objectives 62 146 To achieve their deficit targets each programme envisaged a specific ex-penditure–revenue mix. 
Del IV – Programi so dosegli svoje cilje 62 146 Da bi države lahko izpolnile svoje cilje glede primanjkljaja, je vsak program predvideval posebno mešanico odhodkov in prihodkov.
Consolidation focused on the expenditure side in the balance-of-payment programmes, but was more uniformly distributed in the EFSM programmes. 
Konsolidacija se je osredotočala na odhodkovno stran plačilnobilančnih programov, vendar je bila bolj enotno porazdeljena v programih EFSM.
The realised compositions of revenue and expenditure broadly correspond to what was initially planned — with the exception of Hungary, which did not achieve the anticipated expenditure consolidation. 
Realizirane sestave prihodkov in odhodkov na splošno ustrezajo prvotnim načrtom – razen za Madžarsko, ki ni dosegla pričakovane odhodkovne konsolidacije.
147 The erosion of tax bases, especially in 2009 in the wake of the sharp economic downturn, often wiped out the revenue gains from important new tax measures. 
147 Krčenje davčnih osnov, zlasti leta 2009 po strmem upadu gospodarske rasti, je pogosto izničilo prihodkovne učinke, ki so jih prinesli pomembni novi davčni ukrepi.
For instance, in 2009 Latvia implemented indirect tax consolidation measures with an estimated impact of 2.5 % of GDP. 
Latvija je leta 2009 na primer uvedla posredne ukrepe za davčno konsolidacijo, katerih učinek na BDP naj bi po oceni znašal 2,5 %.
In 2013 the Commission estimated that these measures had been entirely offset by falling short-term elasticity. 
Leta 2013 je Komisija ocenila, da so bili ti ukrepi v celoti izravnani z upadlo kratkoročno elastičnostjo.
Similarly, the tax-neutral reform implemented in Hungary in mid 2009 caused an estimated deficit slippage of 0.7 % of GDP in 2010. 
Podobno je davčno nevtralna reforma, ki je bila uvedena na Madžarskem sredi leta 2009, leta 2010 povzročila ocenjeno odstopanje od primanjkljaja za 0,7 % BDP.
148 With unchanged deficit targets, a declining tax-to-GDP ratio may create an incentive for tax authorities to counter falling tax revenue by introducing measures other than those agreed in the programme negotiations. 
148 Pri nespremenjenih ciljih glede primanjkljaja se utegne zgoditi, da se davčni organi zaradi nižajočega se deleža davkov v razmerju do BDP poskušajo spopasti z vse nižjimi prihodki od davkov tako, da uvedejo tudi druge ukrepe poleg tistih, o katerih so se dogovorili v okviru pogajanj o programu.
In Romania, for instance, 97 changes were made to the tax code during 2009-2013, with 51 legislative acts enforcing those amendments. 
V Romuniji je bilo na primer v obdobju 2009–2013 izvedenih 97 sprememb davčnega zakonika, za izvrševanje teh sprememb pa je bilo sprejetih 51 zakonodajnih aktov.
The frequency of change created an unstable economic climate for both businesses and individuals. 
Pogostost sprememb je povzročila nestabilno gospodarsko okolje za podjetja in posameznike.
All countries improved their fiscal stance, but to varying degrees 149 Given that the programmes resulted from a loss of market access, the restoration of fiscal sustainability was arguably the most important aim. 
Vse države so izboljšale svojo fiskalno naravnanost, vendar v različni meri 149 Glede na to, da so bili programi oblikovani zaradi izgube dostopa do trga, je bila obnova fiskalne vzdržnosti mogoče najpomembnejši cilj.
Improvement in a country’s structural balance during the programme90 would indicate progress towards more sustainable public budgets. 
Izboljšanje strukturnega salda države med programom90 bi kazalo na približevanje bolj vzdržnim javnim proračunom.
The Commission calculated and published structural balance data91. 150 The structural balance improved in all countries, at an average yearly rate of between 0.7 % of potential GDP in Hungary and 1.9 % in Portugal. 
Komisija je izračunala in objavila podatke o strukturnem saldu.91 150 Strukturni saldo se je izboljšal v vseh državah po povprečni letni stopnji od 0,7 % potencialnega BDP na Madžarskem do 1,9 % na Portugalskem.