natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
28 As regards any potential EU criteria for preparedness and response planning, on top of the basic criteria in the decision32, the Commission, in its 2011 Impact As-sessment33, referred to the availability of extensive guidance on generic preparedness planning34 for all types of health threats, and the fact that there was no mechanism in place to ensure its implementation in all Member States. 
28 Kar zadeva morebitna merila EU za načrtovanje pripravljenosti in odzivanja poleg osnovnih meril iz sklepa32, je Komisija v svoji oceni učinka za leto 201133 navedla razpoložljivost obsežnega vodnika za načrtovanje splošne pripravljenosti34 za vse vrste nevarnosti za zdravje ter dejstvo, da ni veljavnega mehanizma, ki bi zagotovil njihovo izvajanje v vseh državah članicah.
We found that this guidance was not given any status under the framework of the decision on serious cross-border threats to health and that awareness about its content is generally low, despite significant efforts made by the Commission and several Member States to produce the comprehensive, updated version of 2011 and the translations available on the Commission’s website. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da temu vodniku ni bil dodeljen nikakršen status v okviru sklepa o resnih čezmejnih nevarnostih za zdravje in da je ozaveščenost o njegovi vsebini na splošno slaba, kljub obsežnim prizadevanjem Komisije in več držav članic, da bi pripravile izčrpno, posodobljeno različico vodnika iz leta 2011 ter prevode, dostopne na spletnem mestu Komisije.
If the guide is not used by the Member States, or kept up to date, this significant investment of resources is potentially lost. 
Če države članice vodnika ne uporabljajo in če se ga ne posodablja, se lahko ta velika naložba sredstev izgubi. 32 Člen 4 Sklepa št.
32 Article 4 of Decision No 1082/2013/EU. 
1082/2013/ EU.
33 Page 17 of SEC(2011) 1519 final of 8 December 2011. 
33 Stran 17 SEC(2011) 1519 final z dne 8. decembra 2011.
34 ‘Strategy for Generic Preparedness Planning, Technical guidance on generic preparedness planning for public health emergencies’ (Update 2011). Box 3 
34 Strategija za načrtovanje splošne pripravljenosti, Tehnični vodnik za načrtovanje splošne pripravljenosti ob izrednih razmerah na področju javnega zdravja (posodobitev iz leta 2011). Okvir 3
Audit observations 21 29 Overall we found that the consultation between Member States and the Commission on preparedness and response planning has been initiated as required. However, the procedures for obtaining and exchanging relevant information with a view to better coordinating efforts in relation to preparedness are not yet sufficiently robust and have not yet delivered clear-cut results. 
Revizijska opažanja 21 29 Sodišče je na splošno ugotovilo, da se je posvetovanje med državami članicami in Komisijo o načrtovanju pripravljenosti in odzivanja začelo v skladu z zahtevami, vendar postopki za pridobivanje in izmenjavo pomembnih informacij za boljše usklajevanje prizadevanj glede pripravljenosti še niso dovolj zanesljivi in še niso prinesli jasnih rezultatov.
Weak measurement of performance in preparedness coordination 30 The Commission should measure the effectiveness of Union policies and programmes. 
Slabo merjenje uspešnosti v okviru usklajevanja pripravljenosti 30 Komisija bi morala meriti uspešnost politik in programov Unije.
This also applies to the EU policy objectives of the decision on serious cross-border threats to health, and in particular the efforts made under Article 4 on preparedness and response planning referred to above. 
To velja tudi za cilje politike EU iz sklepa o resnih čezmejnih nevarnostih za zdravje ter zlasti za prizadevanja v skladu s členom 4 glede načrtovanja pripravljenosti in odzivanja, kot je navedeno zgoraj.
SMART35 objectives and indicators therefore need to be defined, in close contact with the Member States, and a methodology to enable a clear progress measurement and evaluation. 
Zato je treba v tesnem sodelovanju z državami članicami opredeliti cilje in kazalnike SMART35, pa tudi metodologijo za jasno merjenje in ocenjevanje napredka.
Member States in turn then need to demonstrate their progress. 
Nato morajo države članice dokazati svoj napredek.
31 DG Health and Food Safety’s objectives for health in the current programming period (2014-2020) include a specific objective related to the protection of citizens from serious cross-border health threats: to identify and develop coherent approaches and promote their implementation for better preparedness and coordination in health emergencies. 
31 GD za zdravje in varnost hrane med svoje cilje na področju zdravja v sedanjem programskem obdobju (2014–2020) prišteva poseben cilj glede varovanja državljanov pred resnimi čezmejnimi nevarnostmi za zdravje: določiti in oblikovati usklajene pristope za boljšo pripravljenost in usklajevanje v izrednih zdravstvenih razmerah ter si prizadevati za njihovo izvajanje.
The related specific result indicator is: ‘Number of Member States integrating the developed common approaches in the design of their preparedness plans [...]’36. 
Specifičen kazalnik rezultatov, povezan s tem ciljem, je: „[število] držav članic, ki bodo oblikovane skupne pristope vključile v pripravo svojih načrtov pripravljenosti[...]”36.
32 For this specific objective and indicator, the Commission, in its management plans for 2014 and 2015, set the targets at four Member States integrating the developed common approaches in the design of their preparedness plans by 2015, 14 by 2017 and all Member States by 2020. 
32 Za ta posebni cilj in kazalnik je Komisija v svojih načrtih upravljanja za leti 2014 in 2015 določila, da morajo oblikovane skupne pristope v pripravo svojih načrtov pripravljenosti do leta 2015 vključiti štiri države članice, do leta 2017 štirinajst držav članic,do leta 2020 pa vse države članice.
However, the objective and indicator are not included as such in the decision, meaning that Member States are not bound by them. 
Sama cilj in kazalnik pa v sklep nista vključena, kar pomeni, da za države članice nista zavezujoča.
It also does not provide criteria on what constitute integrated common approaches in the design of preparedness plans, which, according to the objective would still have to be identified and developed. 
Sklep prav tako ne vsebuje meril o tem, kaj je upoštevanje usklajenih skupnih pristopov pri pripravi načrtov pripravljenosti, ki bi jih bilo treba v skladu s ciljem še opredeliti in pripraviti.
We found that when the Commission set the indicator targets, neither was this concept of common approaches further developed by the Commission in agreement with the Member States, nor was there a clear and agreed approach to measuring progress. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da Komisija tega pojma skupnih pristopov, potem ko je določila ciljne vrednosti kazalnika, ni razvijala naprej v dogovoru z državami članicami, prav tako pa ni bil dogovorjen jasen pristop k merjenju napredka.
35 Specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound. 
35 Specifični, merljivi, dosegljivi, ustrezni in časovno določeni.
36 The same objective and indicator are also provided in Articles 2 and 3 of Regulation (EU) No 282/2014 to measure the performance of the relevant spending under this objective. 
36 Isti cilj in kazalnik za merjenje uspešnosti ustrezne porabe za ta cilj sta predvidena tudi v členih 2 in 3 Uredbe (EU) št. 282/2014.
Audit observations 22 33 Early in 2016, the Commission refined its methodology to measure the progress under the specific indicator and requested ECDC to perform further analysis on the data received from Member States. 
Revizijska opažanja 22 33 V začetku leta 2016 je Komisija izpopolnila svojo metodologijo za merjenje napredka po posebnem kazalniku in zaprosila ECDC za nadaljnjo analizo podatkov, prejetih od držav članic.
ECDC was asked to measure the number of Member States that had in place the elements of IHR core capacity implementation, interoperability arrangements between sectors and business continuity plans. 
ECDC je bil zaprošen, naj ugotovi število držav članic, ki so sprejele elemente izvajanja osnovnih zmogljivosti iz Mednarodnega zdravstvenega pravilnika, dogovore o interoperabilnosti med sektorji in načrte neprekinjenega delovanja.
ECDC concluded that 16 Member States declared that they had these elements in place and that the indicator for 2015 was therefore ahead of target (i.e. 14 by 2017). 
ECDC je ugotovil, da je te elemente kot sprejete navedlo 16 držav članic in da je kazalnik za leto 2015 torej presegel zastavljeni cilj (14 držav članic do leta 2017).
However, as illustrated in paragraph 32, we could not confirm that this methodology was discussed with and endorsed by the HSC. 
Kot je navedeno v odstavku 32, pa Sodišče ni moglo potrditi, da je bila ta metodologija predmet razprave z Odborom za zdravstveno varnost in da jo je ta podprl.
34 We were therefore unable to conclude what the reported progress means in terms of performance and whether all definitions and concepts of the objectives, indicators and targets are supported by the Member States. 
34 Sodišče torej ni moglo zaključiti, kaj sporočeni napredek pomeni za uspešnost ter ali države članice podpirajo vse opredelitve in pojme ciljev, kazalnikov in ciljnih vrednosti.
This is especially important as the effective coordination of preparedness and response planning for serious cross-border threats largely depends on them37, and requires stakeholders to work towards the same objectives. 
To je zlasti pomembno, ker je od njih odvisno učinkovito usklajevanje načrtovanja pripravljenosti in odzivanja za resne čezmejne nevarnosti37, za iste cilje pa si morajo prizadevati tudi deležniki.
ECDC’s role in relation to generic preparedness is insufficiently formalised 35 ECDC has a mandate to support Member States and the Commission in preparedness activities. 
Vloga ECDC pri splošni pripravljenosti ni dovolj formalizirana 35 ECDC je pooblaščen, da države članice in Komisijo podpira pri njunih dejavnostih v zvezi s pripravljenostjo.
ECDC’s mandate was traditionally for disease prevention and control and has not been formally updated since its establishment, despite important health security developments, in particular the entry into force of the IHR and the adoption of the decision on serious cross-border threats to health. 
Pooblastila ECDC so bila sprva namenjena preprečevanju in obvladovanju bolezni ter od njegove ustanovitve niso bila formalno posodobljena, čeprav je prišlo do pomembnih sprememb na področju zdravstvene varnosti, zlasti z začetkom veljavnosti Mednarodnega zdravstvenega pravilnika in sprejetjem sklepa o resnih čezmejnih nevarnostih za zdravje.
We therefore examined whether it was sufficiently clear between the Commission and ECDC, as well as vis-à-vis ECDC’s stakeholders, to what extent ECDC can provide expertise in the area of generic preparedness and how it should plan its activities and resources for this purpose. 
Sodišče je glede na to proučilo, ali je dovolj jasno, ko gre za Komisijo in ECDC, pa tudi deležnike ECDC, v kakšnem obsegu lahko ECDC ponudi strokovno znanje na področju splošne pripravljenosti ter kako bi moral načrtovati svoje dejavnosti in sredstva za ta namen.
36 ECDC’s founding regulation states that it can provide scientific and technical expertise to the Member States, the Commission and other Community agencies in the development, regular review and updating of preparedness plans, and also in the development of intervention strategies in the fields within its mission (i.e. protection from infectious diseases and threats of unknown origin). 
36 Uredba o ustanovitvi ECDC navaja, da ta lahko zagotavlja znanstveno in tehnično znanje in izkušnje državam članicam, Komisiji in drugim agencijam Skupnosti pri pripravi, redni reviziji in posodabljanju načrtov pripravljenosti, pa tudi pri pripravi intervencijskih strategij na svojih področjih delovanja (tj. varovanje pred nalezljivimi boleznimi in nevarnostmi neznanega izvora).
The decision on serious cross-border threats to health specifically attributes tasks to ECDC for epidemiological surveillance and early warning and response, but not for support on preparedness planning. 
Sklep o resnih čezmejnih nevarnostih za zdravje ECDC izrecno nalaga naloge epidemiološkega spremljanja ter zgodnjega opozarjanja in odzivanja, ne pa tudi podpore pri načrtovanju pripravljenosti.
37 As acknowledged by DG Health and Food Safety in its Annual Activity Report 2015, where it reports on progress for this specific objective and indicator. 
37 Kot je potrdil GD za zdravje in varnost hrane v svojem letnem poročilu o dejavnostih za leto 2015, v katerem poroča o napredku pri tem cilju in kazalniku.
Audit observations 23 37 Following the adoption of the decision on serious cross-border threats to health, ECDC has been working on new tasks38, especially in the area of generic preparedness, addressing the need for the EU to have an all-hazards approach. 
Revizijska opažanja 23 37 Po sprejetju sklepa o resnih čezmejnih nevarnostih za zdravje ECDC opravlja nove naloge38, zlasti na področju splošne pripravljenosti, s čimer odgovarja na potrebo, da mora imeti EU pristop, ki upošteva vse nevarnosti.
However, we found that ECDC’s role and responsibilities in relation to generic preparedness were not formally defined and agreed, either through updates of the relevant legislation or, for example, in a written agreement between the Commission and ECDC, endorsed by ECDC’s stakeholders. 
Sodišče pa je ugotovilo, da vloga in odgovornosti ECDC v zvezi s splošno pripravljenostjo niso bile formalno opredeljene in dogovorjene ne s posodobitvami ustrezne zakonodaje ne na primer s pisnim dogovorom med Komisijo in ECDC, ki bi ga podprli deležniki ECDC.
If there is insufficient formal clarity on ECDC’s role in these activities and how they fit its mission, the organisation may not be able to properly prepare itself for such tasks in the long term, nor to respond effectively to requests for assistance. 
Če vloga ECDC pri teh dejavnostih formalno ni dovolj jasna, hkrati pa ni jasno tudi, kako se te dejavnosti uvrščajo na njegova področja delovanja, se organizacija dolgoročno morda ne bo mogla primerno pripraviti na take naloge ali se učinkovito odzvati na prošnje za pomoč.
The risk stemming from this situation has already materialised in relation to joint work done by ECDC and WHO on a guide for influenza pandemic plan revision, as illustrated below. 38 After the pandemic influenza of 2009 one of the Council’s main recommendations was the adoption of guidance on preparedness plans39. 
Tveganje, ki izhaja iz tega položaja, se je že uresničilo pri skupnem delu, ki sta ga ECDC in SZO opravila pri vodniku za revizijo načrta za primer pandemije gripe, kot je pojasnjeno v nadaljevanju 38 Po pandemiji gripe leta 2009 je bilo med glavnimi priporočili Sveta tudi sprejetje smernic o načrtih pripravljenosti39.
Countries across Europe started revising their pandemic plans based on the lessons learned. 
Na podlagi pridobljenih izkušenj so države po Evropi začele revidirati svoje načrte za primer pandemije.
ECDC and WHO Europe made a substantial effort in organising workshops and review work. 
ECDC in SZO za Evropo sta se zelo potrudila z organizacijo delavnic in pregledovanjem.
They published a joint document in 2012 listing the outcomes of this exer-cise40. 
Leta 2012 sta objavila skupen dokument, v katerem so bili navedeni rezultati tega dela40.
The drafted guide was addressed to all 53 countries in the WHO European region and was developed by experts in pandemic preparedness planning from various countries and organisations. 
Osnutek vodnika je bil namenjen vsem 53 državam v evropski regiji SZO, razvili pa so ga strokovnjaki za načrtovanje pripravljenosti na pandemije iz različnih držav in organizacij.
39 However, the Commission put on hold the publication of the guide by ECDC in March 2014, invoking doubts as regards ECDC’s mandate to issue this type of guidance directly to the Member States and concluding that the HSC is the appropriate and mandated body to discuss matters of preparedness. 
39 Komisija pa je marca leta 2014 odložila objavo smernic, pri čemer se je sklicevala na dvome glede pooblastil ECDC za izdajo takih smernic neposredno državam članicam, ter zaključila, da je ustrezni organ s pooblastili za obravnavo vprašanj glede pripravljenosti OZV.
At the time of the audit (2 years later) the timelines for discussion of the guide by the HSC (or its preparedness working group) and its publication were not known. 
V času revizije (dve leti pozneje) roki za razpravo o vodniku v Odboru za zdravstveno varnost (ali njegovi delovni skupini za pripravlje-nost) in njegovo objavo niso bili znani.
Not publishing and promoting this guide would constitute a lost investment in terms of the resources and efforts engaged for its production and means that EU Member States and WHO Europe countries had no access to it even when efforts were made at national level to update pandemic preparedness plans. 
Če vodnik ne bo objavljen in se držav ne bo spodbujalo k njegovi uporabi, bi to pomenilo izgubljeno naložbo sredstev in prizadevanj, vloženih v njegovo pripravo. Poleg tega države članice EU in evropske regije SZO do vodnika ne bodo imele dostopa, čeprav si bodo prizadevale za posodobitev načrtov pripravljenosti na pandemijo na nacionalni ravni.
38 One of these tasks was the assistance provided by ECDC to the Commission in aggregating the data submitted by Member States under Article 4 of Decision No 1082/2013/EU and reporting to the HSC. 
38 Med temi nalogami je bila tudi pomoč, ki jo je ECDC nudil Komisiji pri združevanju podatkov, ki so jih države članice posredovale v skladu s členom 4 Sklepa št.
39 Council conclusions on Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – a strategic approach, paragraph 11, p. 
39 Sklepi Sveta o pandemiji (H1N1) 2009 – strateški pristop, odstavek 11, str.
40 Key changes to pandemic plans by Member States of the WHO European Region based on lessons learnt from the 2009 pandemic, WHO Regional Office for Europe and ECDC, 2012. 
40 Key changes to pandemic plans by Member States of the WHO European Region based on lessons learnt from the 2009 pandemic (Ključne spremembe načrtov za primer pandemije držav članic evropske regije SZO na podlagi izkušenj, pridobljenih med pandemijo leta 2009), Regionalni urad SZO za Evropo in ECDC, 2012.
41 Guide for influenza pandemic plan revision — Applying the lessons learned from the pandemic H1N1(2009): A guide for the Member States of the WHO European Region, European Union and European Economic Area, draft of 2014. 
41 Guide for influenza pandemic plan revision – Applying the lessons learned from the pandemic H1N1 (2009): A guide for the Member States of the WHO European Region, European Union and European Economic Area (Vodnik za revizijo načrta za primer pandemije gripe – Uporaba izkušenj, pridobljenih med pandemijo H1N1 (2009): Vodnik za države članice evropske regije SZO, Evropske unije in Evropskega gospodarskega prostora), osnutek iz leta 2014.
Audit observations 24 42 Council conclusions of 13 September 2010 on lessons learned from the A/H1N1 pandemic — health security in the European Union. 
Revizijska opažanja 24 42 Sklepi Sveta z dne 13. septembra 2010 o izkušnjah, pridobljenih med pandemijo A/H1N1 – zdravstvena varnost v Evropski uniji.
43 See ECDC Rapid Risk Assessment ‘A case of diphtheria in Spain’ of 15 June 2015: ‘The detection, management and public health response to the first case of diphtheria in Spain in nearly 30 years has highlighted challenges for preparedness against diphtheria in the European Union.’ 
43 Glej hitro oceno tveganja ECDC, A case of diphtheria in Spain (Primer davice v Španiji), z dne 15. junija 2015: Odkritje in obvladovanje prvega primera davice v Španiji po skoraj 30 letih ter odziv javnega zdravstva nanj so izpostavili izzive za pripravljenost na davico v Evropski uniji.
Insufficient Member State responsiveness to speed up the joint procurement of pandemic influenza vaccine and absence of an EU mechanism to address urgent needs for medical countermeasures within the framework of the decision on serious cross-border threats to health 40 Following the H1N1 influenza pandemic crisis in 2009, the Council42 invited the Commission to report on and develop, as soon as possible and no later than December 2010, a mechanism for joint procurement of vaccines and antiviral medi-cation. 
Nezadostna odzivnost držav članic za pospešitev skupnega javnega naročanja cepiva proti pandemiji gripe in odsotnost mehanizma EU za obravnavanje nujnih potreb po zdravstvenih protiukrepih v okviru sklepa o resnih čezmejnih nevarnostih za zdravje 40 Po krizi s pandemijo gripe H1N1 leta 2009 je Svet42 pozval Komisijo, naj čim prej in najpozneje do decembra leta 2010 poroča o mehanizmu za skupno javno naročanje cepiv in protivirusnih zdravil ter ga razvije.
Already in 2011, the Commission had invited Member States to provide needs analyses in relation to such a joint procurement procedure. However, it was not until 2013, through the adoption of the decision on serious cross-border threats to health, that there was an EU legal basis for the joint procurement of medical countermeasures. 
Komisija je že leta 2011 pozvala države članice, naj posredujejo analize potreb za tak postopek skupnega javnega naročanja, toda EU je pravno podlago za tako naročanje zdravstvenih protiukrepov pridobila šele leta 2013 s sprejetjem sklepa o resnih čezmejnih nevarnostih za zdravje.
The Commission adopted the Joint Procurement Agreement on 10 April 2014. 
Komisija je 10. aprila 2014 sprejela sporazum o skupnem javnem naročanju.
Countries which have signed the Joint Procurement Agreement can participate in specific joint procurement procedures for medical countermeasures, which require a minimum of four Member States. 
Države, ki so ta sporazum podpisale, lahko sodelujejo v posebnih postopkih skupnega javnega naročanja zdravstvenih protiukrepov, v katerih morajo biti udeležene najmanj štiri države članice.
41 In February 2016, the Commission successfully finalised and published the specifications for the joint procurement of personal protective equipment, initiated in the wake of the Ebola crisis. 
41 Februarja leta 2016 je Komisija uspešno dokončala in objavila specifikacije za skupno javno naročilo osebne zaščitne opreme, ki jih je začela pripravljati po začetku krize zaradi izbruha ebole.
In addition, several other specific joint procurement procedures have been started. 
Poleg tega se je začelo več drugih posebnih postopkov skupnega javnega naročanja.
However, preparation of the specific joint procurement procedure for pandemic influenza vaccine, initially requested by the Council in 2010, was still ongoing. 
Pripravljanje posebnega postopka oddaje skupnega javnega naročila cepiva proti pandemiji gripe, ki ga je Svet zahteval leta 2010, pa je bilo še v teku.
Despite various requests sent by the Commission only five Member State needs assessments had been received by April 2016. 
Čeprav je Komisija poslala več prošenj, je do aprila leta 2016 ocene potreb prejela le od petih držav članic.
Future progress depends on the Member States’ commitment to these procedures. 
Nadaljnji napredek je odvisen od zavezanosti držav članic tem postopkom.
The Commission reported in its Annual Activity Reports for 2014 and 2015 that the targets for joint procurement of pandemic influenza vaccine had not been met. 
Komisija je v svojih letnih poročilih o dejavnostih za leti 2014 in 2015 navedla, da cilji za skupno javno naročilo cepiva proti pandemiji gripe niso bili doseženi.
42 An emergency instrument to address urgent needs of medical countermeasures would require less complexity and provide higher speed and greater flexibility than the joint procurement agreement provides. 
42 Uporaba instrumenta za izredne razmere, s katerim bi obravnavali nujne potrebe po zdravstvenih protiukrepih, bi bila manj zapletena in bi omogočala večjo hitrost in prožnost kot predvideva sporazum o skupnem javnem naročanju.