natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
We found that, in cases where the DG had not carried out an audit and the only source of evidence was the OLAF investigation file, it was more difficult for the DG to issue the recovery order for the amount recommended by OLAF as the DG considered the available documentation insufficient. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da v primerih, v katerih generalni direktorat ni opravil revizije in je preiskovalni spis urada OLAF edini vir dokazov, generalni direktorat meni, da je razpoložljiva dokumentacija pomanjkljiva, zato težje izda nalog za izterjavo zneska, ki ga je priporočil Urad.
120 In addition, debtors sometimes bring cases before the European Court of Justice to recover part of the rejected costs and/or damages from the Commission. 
120 Poleg tega dolžniki na Sodišču Evropske unije včasih vložijo tožbo, da bi od Komisije izterjali del zavrnjenih stroškov in/ali odškodnino.
When this happens, the amount recovered cannot be considered final until the ECJ case is closed. 
Kadar se to zgodi, izterjani znesek ne more veljati za končnega, dokler primer na Sodišču EU ni zaključen.
Indirect management (DG DEVCO) 121 Under indirect management, DG DEVCO entrusts budget implementation tasks to beneficiary countries, international organisations and development agencies in non-EU countries. 
Posredno upravljanje (GD DEVCO) 121 Pri neposrednem upravljanju GD DEVCO naloge izvrševanja proračuna zaupa državam upravičenkam, mednarodnim organizacijam in razvojnim agencijam v tretjih državah.
122 Figure 15 shows the total value of OLAF financial recommendations sent to DEVCO between 2012 and 2016, together with the amount recovered up until the time of our audit. 
122 Na sliki 15 sta prikazana skupna vrednost finančnih priporočil, ki jih je OLAF poslal GD DEVCO med letoma 2012 in 2016, ter znesek, ki je bil izterjan do revizije Sodišča.
From these cases, DG DEVCO managed to recover 6 % of the total amount recommended by OLAF. 
V teh primerih je GD DEVCO uspel izterjati 6 % skupnega zneska, ki ga je priporočil OLAF.
Figure 15 – Recoveries by DG DEVCO resulting from 2012-2016 OLAF recommendations Source: ECA based on Commission figures. 123 In cases representing 58 % of the total value of OLAF financial recommendations, DG DEVCO did not recover the EU money concerned, either because it considered there was no legal basis for doing so or because it decided against issuing a recovery order52. 
Slika 15 – Sredstva, ki jih je GD DEVCO izterjal na podlagi priporočil urada OLAF v letih 2012–2016 Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče na podlagi podatkov Komisije 123 V primerih, ki predstavljajo 58 % skupne vrednosti finančnih priporočil urada OLAF, GD DEVCO ni izterjal zadevnih sredstev EU, bodisi ker je menil, da za izterjavo ni pravne podlage, bodisi ker se je odločil proti izdaji naloga za izterjavo.52 Glede na 10 finančnih priporočil urada OLAF, ki jih je preučilo Sodišče, GD DEVCO zneskov, ki jih je priporočil urad OLAF, ni izterjal predvsem zato, ker je menil, da ni zadostnih dokazov.
124 In three out of 10 cases, representing a significant value of OLAF financial recommendations, DG DEVCO decided not to recover. 
124 Generalni direktorat se v treh od 10 primerov priporočil urada z visoko vrednostjo ni odločil za izterjavo.
Given that it operates in a high-risk environment, and given the potential risks to the implementation of its policy, DG DEVCO 51 DG DEVCO also has grant and procurement contracts and budget support operations under direct management. 
Glede na to, da GD DEVCO deluje v zelo tveganem okolju, in ob upoštevanju potencialnih nevarnosti za izvajanje svoje politike se lahko v nekaterih okoliščinah odloči, da sredstev EU ne bo izterjal od upravičencev.
In countries with unstable political and judicial systems, the chances of recovery through a criminal or civil (administrative judicial) procedure are quite clearly low and an OLAF investigation may often be the only way to investigate a fraud allegation. 
Jasno je, da so v državah z nestabilnim političnim in sodnim sistemom možnosti izterjave s kazenskim ali civilnim (upravnim sodnim) postopkom majhne, preiskave urada OLAF pa so lahko pogosto edini način, da se razišče domnevna goljufija.
OLAF does not analyse in sufficient detail which cases have yielded successful recoveries and what are the reasons for DGs not to proceed with recoveries or only recover a much lower amount than recommended by OLAF. 
OLAF ne analizira dovolj podrobno, kateri primeri so se končali z uspešno izterjavo in kakšne razloge imajo generalni direktorati, da izterjave ne opravijo ali da izterjajo precej nižji znesek od priporočenega.
This would help OLAF to better target its investigations. 
S tako analizo bi lahko Urad bolje ciljno usmerjal svoje preiskave.
Putting EPPO into operation will require coordinated effort 125 In October 2017, twenty Member States adopted a regulation to enhance cooperation on establishing the European Public Prosecutor's Office (‘the EPPO’)53. This will be the EU body with powers to investigate and prosecute crimes against the EU’s financial interests. 
Za zagon Evropskega javnega tožilstva bo potrebno usklajeno prizadevanje 125 Oktobra 2017 je dvajset držav članic53 sprejelo uredbo o okrepljenem sodelovanju za ustanovitev Evropskega javnega tožilstva, ki bo organ EU s pooblastili za preiskovanje in pregon kaznivih dejanj proti finančnih interesom EU.
126 The EPPO is designed to operate at two levels: one centralised and the other decentralised. 
126 Evropsko javno tožilstvo je zasnovano za delovanje na dveh ravneh, in sicer centralizirani in decentralizirani.
The centralised level consists of an European Chief Prosecutor (ECP), and one European Prosecutor (EP) per Member State (two of which will be Deputy Chief Prosecutors) located at the EPPO’s Central Office in Luxembourg, while the decentralised level consists of European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) working in the Member States. 
Na centralizirani ravni ga sestavljajo evropski glavni tožilec in po en evropski tožilec na državo članico (dva od slednjih bosta namestnika glavnega tožilca), ki delujejo na sedežu tožilstva v Luxembourgu, na decentralizirani ravni pa evropski delegirani tožilci, ki delujejo v državah članicah.
The European prosecutors, divided into chambers, will be responsible for supervising the EDPs and, in exceptional cases, will conduct investigations themselves. 
Evropski tožilci, razdeljeni v senate, bodo odgovorni za nadzor evropskih delegiranih tožilcev, v izjemnih primerih pa bodo preiskave izvajali sami.
The EDPs will be in charge of investigations carried out in the Member States concerned (Figure 16). 
Evropski delegirani tožilci bodo odgovorni za preiskave, ki se bodo izvajale v zadevnih državah članicah (slika 16).
53 The Netherlands and Malta have joined the EPPO in the course of 2018. 
47 53 Nizozemska in Malta sta se Evropskemu javnemu tožilstvu pridružili v letu 2018.
Figure 16 – The EPPO’s structure Source: Commission. 127 We have analysed the regulation setting up the EPPO in light of our observations on the current set-up for investigating and prosecuting fraud in EU spending. 
Slika 16 – Struktura Evropskega javnega tožilstva Vir: Komisija 127 Sodišče je analiziralo uredbo o ustanovitvi Evropskega javnega tožilstva ob upoštevanju svojih opažanj o sedanjem sistemu za preiskovanje in pregon goljufij pri porabi EU.
We assessed whether the EPPO will address the following key issues: o the current system, whereby OLAF’s administrative investigation of suspected fraud is followed by a criminal investigation at national level, takes up much time in a considerable number of cases; and o weaknesses in cooperation between OLAF and national authorities. 
Ocenilo je, ali bo tožilstvo obravnavalo naslednja ključna vprašanja: o sedanji sistem, pri katerem upravni preiskavi suma goljufije urada OLAF sledi kazenska preiskava na nacionalni ravni, je v mnogih primerih dolgotrajen, o slabosti pri sodelovanju med uradom OLAF in nacionalnimi organi. 48
51 128 In general terms, we consider establishing the EPPO to be a step in the right direction. However, we would like to highlight several risks that indicate that the EPPO may not address the above-mentioned problems: o The regulation provides that the EPPO chambers will become supervisors of the operational work of the delegated prosecutors. 
128 Sodišče na splošno meni, da je ustanovitev Evropskega javnega tožilstva korak v pravo smer, vendar izpostavlja več tveganj, ki nakazujejo, da Evropsko javno tožilstvo zgornjih problemov morda ne bo obravnavalo, in sicer: o uredba določa, da senati tožilstva nadzorujejo operativno delo delegiranih tožilcev.
In order to challenge the opinion of a delegated prosecutor, or even to discuss it with him or her, the chamber will need adequate expertise in national criminal law and procedure in specific cases, not to mention the need for translation. 
Senat bo za izpodbijanje mnenja delegiranega tožilca ali celo za razpravo o njem v posameznih primerih potreboval primerne strokovnjake za nacionalno kazensko pravo in postopke, potrebno pa bo tudi prevajanje.
This means that, in order to fulfil its supervisory function, the EPPO’s Central Office needs sufficient staff and resources, including national legal experts54. An extensive internal consultation and translation may end up taking too long for criminal procedures, where time is very often the most limited resource. o Under the EPPO Regulation, investigation will be carried out primarily by Member State investigators under the authority of the EPPO. 
To pomeni, da bo za izpolnjevanje nadzorne funkcije tožilstva na njegovem sedežu potrebnega dovolj osebja in virov, vključno z nacionalnimi pravnimi strokovnjaki.54 Poleg tega bi lahko obsežno notranje posvetovanje in prevajanje trajala predolgo za kazenske postopke, v katerih je čas pogosto najbolj omejen vir. o V skladu z uredbo o Evropskem javnem tožilstvu bodo za preiskovanje odgovorni predvsem preiskovalci držav članic pod vodstvom Evropskega javnega tožilstva.
Since a delegated prosecutor will need the support of its relevant national authority to conduct the investigation necessary for bringing the case to court, their effectiveness will remain heavily dependent on national authorities. o The EPPO Regulation55 allows EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies (IBOAs) to have OLAF carry out a pre-evaluation of cases to be forwarded to EPPO. 
Ker bodo delegirani tožilci za preiskavo, ki je potrebna, da primer pride na sodišče, potrebovali podporo ustreznega nacionalnega organa svoje države, bo njihova uspešnost močno odvisna teh organov. o Uredba o Evropskem javnem tožilstvu55 institucijam, organom, uradom in agencijam Unije omogoča, da OLAF uporabijo za predhodno oceno primerov, ki se posredujejo tožilstvu.
Because time is critical to the success of a criminal investigation, excessive use of this option may adversely affect the timeliness of any subsequent action. 
Ker je čas kritičen dejavnik za uspeh kazenske preiskave, bi lahko zaradi prekomerne uporabe te možnosti prišlo do zamude pri poznejših ukrepih.
The future arrangements for cooperation between OLAF and EPPO should make it possible to decide quickly whether to initiate a criminal procedure, or forward the case for investigation by the Member State concerned or by a responsible EU institution by means of an administrative procedure. 
V prihodnje bi moralo biti sodelovanje urada OLAF in Evropskega javnega tožilstva urejeno tako, da bi se bilo mogoče hitro odločiti, ali se sproži kazenski postopek ali se primer posreduje zadevni državi članici ali odgovorni instituciji EU na podlagi upravnega postopka.
54 The Commission estimates the cost of the EPPO, with 115 employees, at €21 million per year. 
49 54 Komisija strošek Evropskega javnega tožilstva s 115 zaposlenimi ocenjuje na 21 milijonov EUR na leto.
55 See recital (51) of Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’). 
55 Glej uvodno izjavo 51 Uredbe Sveta (EU) 2017/1939 z dne 12. oktobra 2017 o izvajanju okrepljenega sodelovanja v zvezi z ustanovitvijo Evropskega javnega tožilstva (EJT).
Conclusions and recommendations 129 Our audit assessed whether the Commission is properly managing the risk of fraud in EU spending. 
Zaključki in priporočila 129 Pri reviziji je Sodišče ocenilo, ali Komisija ustrezno obvladuje tveganje goljufij pri porabi EU.
We examined in particular the measures taken by the Commission to prevent and deter potential fraudsters and to recover funds where fraud has been committed. 
Preučilo je zlasti ukrepe, ki jih je Komisija sprejela za preprečevanje goljufij, odvračanje potencialnih goljufov in izterjavo sredstev v primerih, v katerih je bila storjena goljufija.
130 Based on our observations, we consider that more drive is needed in the EU to implement an effective strategic framework for managing the risk of fraud based on sound assessments. 
130 Sodišče na podlagi opažanj meni, da je v EU potreben večji zagon za izvajanje uspešnega strateškega okvira za obvladovanje tveganja goljufij na podlagi zanesljivih ocen.
We consider there is a clear need for the Commission to step up its fight against fraud in EU spending by clarifying and reinforcing the responsibilities of the various parties involved in managing the fight against fraud. 
Meni tudi, da obstaja jasna potreba po tem, da Komisija okrepi boj proti goljufijam pri porabi EU, tako da razjasni in okrepi odgovornosti različnih strani, ki sodelujejo pri njegovem obvladovanju.
The Commission’s insight into the scale, nature and causes of fraud is insufficient 131 The Commission does not have comprehensive and comparable information on the detected fraud level in EU spending. 
Komisija ima nezadosten vpogled v obseg, naravo in vzroke goljufij 131 Komisija o stopnji odkritih goljufij pri porabi EU nima izčrpnih in primerljivih podatkov.
The Commission’s own reporting of detected fraud in areas managed directly by it is not complete. 
Njena poročila o odkritih goljufijah na področjih, ki jih sama neposredno upravlja, niso popolna.
Within shared management, the methodologies Member States use to prepare their official statistics on detected fraud differ, and the information reported in the Commission’s Irregularity Management System (IMS) is incomplete. 
Na področju deljenega upravljanja države članice za pripravo uradnih statističnih podatkov o odkritih goljufijah uporabljajo različne metodologije, v sistem Komisije za upravljanje nepravilnosti pa prijavljajo informacije, ki niso popolne.
The Commission does not carry out comprehensive checks to ensure the quality of data reported in the IMS; nor does it ask Member State authorities to provide assurance as to the reliability of the data reported. 
Komisija ne izvaja celovitih preverjanj, da bi zagotovila kakovost podatkov v sistemu za upravljanje nepravilnosti, in ne poziva organov držav članic, naj zagotovijo, da so prijavljeni podatki zanesljivi.
The spending DGs perform partial checks on irregularity reporting systems at national level within the framework of system audits (paragraphs 21 - 32). 
Generalnih direktorati porabniki opravljajo delne preglede nepravilnosti v sistemih prijavljanja na nacionalni ravni v okviru revizij sistemov (odstavki 21–32).
132 The Commission has not yet established a way of gaining insight into undetected fraud in order to complement the official statistics, even though there are several accepted ways to obtain insight into the scale of fraud (paragraphs 33 - 37). 
132 Komisija še ni vzpostavila načina za pridobivanje vpogleda v neodkrite goljufije, ki bi dopolnjeval uradne statistične podatke, čeprav obstaja več uveljavljenih načinov za pridobivanje vpogleda v obseg goljufij (odstavki 33–37).
133 We also consider the available qualitative information on the nature and causes of fraud to be insufficient. 
133 Sodišče tudi meni, da so razpoložljive kvalitativne informacije o naravi in vzrokih goljufij nezadostne.
Some information is available on fraud patterns and schemes used in different sectors, but the information available is not systematically updated. 
Na voljo je nekaj informacij o vzorcih in sistemih goljufij, ki se uporabljajo v različnih sektorjih, vendar te niso sistematično posodobljene.
Moreover, we did not find detailed analyses or any study by the Commission to identify what causes some recipients of EU money to commit fraud. 
Poleg tega Sodišče ni našlo podrobnih analiz ali študij, s katerimi bi Komisija prepoznala vzroke, ki nekatere prejemnike sredstev EU spodbudijo k goljufanju.
134 Studies using objective corruption proxies have also revealed that the risk of corruption may be increased by discretion in spending and excessive bureaucratic controls, 52 
134 Študije, v katerih so bili uporabljeni objektivni nadomestni kazalniki korupcije, so tudi razkrile, da se lahko tveganje korupcije poveča zaradi proste presoje pri porabi in 50
53 which act as a barrier to market entry for other suppliers, thereby making corrupt deals easier to sustain (paragraphs 38 - 49). 
51 prekomernih birokratskih kontrol, ki ovirajo druge dobavitelje pri vstopu na trg, s tem pa olajšujejo koruptivne dogovore (odstavki 38–49).
Recommendation 1 – Gain better insight into the scale, nature and causes of fraud in EU spending With a view to a properly designed approach to countering fraud against the EU’s financial interests, the Commission should put in place a robust fraud reporting system, providing information to assess the scale, nature and root causes of fraud. 
Priporočilo 1 – Treba je pridobiti boljši vpogled v obseg, naravo in vzroke goljufij pri porabi EU Za primerno zasnovan pristop k preprečevanju goljufij, ki škodijo finančnim interesom EU, bi morala Komisija vzpostaviti zanesljiv sistem za prijavljanje goljufij, ki bo zagotavljal informacije za oceno obsega, narave in temeljnih vzrokov goljufij.
In particular, it should: (a) enhance the Irregularity Management System (IMS) so that information on criminal investigations related to fraud affecting the EU's financial interests are reported in a timely manner by all competent authorities. (b) build its capacity to collect information from different sources on the risk of fraud and corruption against the EU budget; measure this risk on a recurring basis using different methods (encounter surveys and indexes based on administrative data); and consider establishing risk indicators by spending area, country and sector. 
Zlasti bi morala: (a) okrepiti sistem za upravljanje nepravilnosti (IMS), da bi informacije o kazenskih preiskavah v zvezi z goljufijami, ki negativno vplivajo na finančne interese EU, pravočasno sporočali vsi pristojni organi; (b) povečati svojo zmogljivost za zbiranje informacij o tveganju goljufij in korupcije v zvezi s proračunom EU iz različnih virov, to tveganje redno meriti z različnimi metodami (anketami o srečevanju s tema pojavoma in indeksi na podlagi upravnih podatkov) ter razmisliti o določitvi kazalnikov tveganja po področju porabe, državi in sektorju.
Timeframe: end of 2022 There are weaknesses in the Commission’s strategic approach to managing the risk of fraud 135 There are weaknesses in anti-fraud strategies of the Commission and reporting on their effectiveness. 
Časovni okvir: do konca leta 2022 Strateški pristop Komisije k obvladovanju tveganja goljufij ima slabosti 135 Pri strategijah Komisije za boj proti goljufijam in poročanju o njihovi uspešnosti se pojavljajo slabosti.
We note the Commission’s intention to update the CAFS (paragraphs 58 - 64). 
Sodišče ugotavlja, da namerava Komisija posodobiti strategijo za boj proti goljufijam (odstavki 58–64).
The various Commission DGs and services each have their own anti-fraud strategies. 
Različni generalni direktorati in službe Komisije imajo vsak svojo strategijo za boj proti goljufijam.
This could potentially be a role for OLAF (Recommendation 4). 
To vlogo bi morda lahko prevzel OLAF (priporočilo 4).
Strategic fraud risk management and fraud prevention are not specifically mentioned in the portfolios of any single Commissioner (paragraphs 52 - 57). 
Strateško obvladovanje tveganja goljufij in preprečevanje goljufij nista izrecno omenjena v portfelju nobenega komisarja (odstavki 52–57).
Recommendation 2 – Ensure leadership of the Commission’s anti-fraud actions 2.1. 
Priporočilo 2 – Zagotoviti je treba vodenje ukrepov Komisije za boj proti goljufijam 2.1.
To achieve better coordination in tackling fraud, within the context of collegial responsibility for fraud prevention and detection, the Commission should ensure that strategic fraud risk management and fraud prevention would be clearly referred to in the portfolio of one Commissioner. 
Da bi Komisija dosegla boljše usklajevanje pri boju proti goljufijam v kontekstu odgovornosti kolegija za preprečevanje in odkrivanje goljufij, bi morala zagotoviti, da sta strateško obvladovanje tveganja goljufij in preprečevanje goljufij izrecno omenjena v portfelju enega komisarja.
The Commission should ensure that, its new anti-fraud strategy: — is preceded by a comprehensive analysis of fraud risks, using a wide range of data from different sources to establish the scale, nature and causes of fraud in EU spending; — contains meaningful objectives and measurable indicators; and — includes reporting based on the achievement of objectives. 
Komisija bi morala v zvezi s svojo novo strategijo za boj proti goljufijam zagotoviti, da: — je pred njenim sprejetjem izvedena obsežna analiza tveganj goljufij s širokim naborom podatkov iz različnih virov, da bi se ugotovili obseg, narava in vzroki goljufij pri porabi EU; — vsebuje smiselne cilje in merljive kazalnike; — vključuje poročanje na podlagi doseganja ciljev.
Timeframe: end of 2022 Fraud prevention has not received enough attention 137 Although the Commission’s fraud-proofing activities date back to the year 2000, comprehensive anti-fraud provisions were only included for the first time in all top-level regulations for the 2014-2020 period (paragraphs 66 - 70). 
Časovni okvir: do konca leta 2022 Preprečevanju goljufij ni bilo namenjene dovolj pozornosti 137 Čeprav je Komisija dejavnosti za zagotavljanje neprepustnosti za goljufije začela izvajati že leta 2000, so bile izčrpne določbe za boj proti goljufijam v vse uredbe na visoki ravni prvič vključene šele za obdobje 2014–2020 (odstavki 66–70).
138 Assessing the risk of fraud before adopting spending schemes and putting in place anti-fraud controls is potentially an effective way to reduce fraud losses. 
138 Izgube zaradi goljufij bi bilo mogoče uspešno zmanjšati tako, da bi pred sprejetjem shem porabe ocenili tveganje goljufij in vzpostavili kontrole za boj proti njim.
For the 2014-2020 spending programmes, however, the Commission required such an assessment of the draft rules only late in the process. Thus, these will only be implemented for the next generation of financial programmes after 2021. 
Toda za programe porabe za obdobje 2014–2020 je Komisija tako oceno osnutka pravil zahtevala šele pozno v postopku, zato se bodo te izvajale šele za naslednjo generacijo finančnih programov po letu 2021.
In shared management, the Commission did not ask Member States to assess the risk of fraud in their 2014-2020 programmes before adopting them. It is, however, in this area that around 70 % of the EU budget is spent (paragraphs 71 - 75). 
Na področju deljenega upravljanja Komisija ni pozvala držav članic, naj pred sprejetjem svojih programov za obdobje 2014–2020 ocenijo tveganje goljufij v zvezi z njimi, vendar se prav na tem področju porabi približno 70 % proračuna EU (odstavki 71– 75).
139 Using data for fraud prevention and deterrence can be an effective way either to identify risky economic operators before allocation of funds or to improve future compliance by debarring economic operators and individuals who have been detected committing fraud. 
139 Uporaba podatkov za preprečevanje goljufij in odvračanje od njih je lahko uspešen način za prepoznavanje tveganih gospodarskih subjektov pred dodelitvijo sredstev ali za izboljšanje skladnosti v prihodnosti, tako da se izključijo gospodarski subjekti in fizične osebe, ki so bili odkriti pri goljufanju.