natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The audit found that while the action plan was a welcome initiative, the results overall were meagre. 
Pri reviziji je bilo ugotovljeno, da je bil akcijski načrt sicer dobrodošla pobuda, vendar so bili rezultati na splošno skromni.
Assistance was not granted to timber-producing countries in accordance with clear criteria, and the impact of the aid was diluted because of the large number of countries competing for assistance. 
Pomoč državam proizvajalkam lesa se ni odobravala v skladu z jasnimi merili, učinek pomoči pa se je zaradi velikega števila držav, ki so tekmovale zanjo, znižal.
The degree of progress in the countries concerned varied considerably. 
Stopnja napredka se je v posameznih državah močno razlikovala.
The lack of adequate planning by the Commission, together with the lack of clear funding priorities towards timber-producing countries, were important factors contributing to this lack of progress. 
Pomembna dejavnika, ki sta prispevala k temu slabemu napredku, sta bila pomanjkanje ustreznega načrtovanja Komisije in pomanjkanje jasnih prioritet za financiranje.
The audit recommended that the Commission should set out clear objectives and the means of achieving them. 
Pri reviziji je bilo priporočeno, naj Komisija določi jasne cilje in načine za njihovo doseganje.
Four Member States still have to fully implement the EU timber regulation, which was introduced to prevent illegal timber entering the EU market. 
Štiri države članice še ne izvajajo v celoti uredbe EU o lesu, ki je bila uvedena za preprečevanje vstopa nezakonitega lesa na trg EU.
Under the action plan, €300 million was allocated to 35 countries between 2003 and 2013. 
Med letoma 2003 in 2013 je bilo v okviru akcijskega načrta 35 državam dodeljenih 300 milijonov EUR.
Two countries, Indonesia and Ghana, made good strides towards full licensing for their timber. 
Dve državi, Indonezija in Gana, sta dosegli precejšen napredek pri uvajanju dovoljenj za svoj les.
But, in general, progress has been very slow and many countries have struggled to overcome the barriers to good governance. 
Na splošno pa je bil napredek zelo počasen in veliko držav je imelo težave pri premagovanju ovir za dobro upravljanje.
In the 12 years since the Commission introduced the action plan, no partner country has obtained fully approved licensing. 
V dvanajstih letih, odkar je Komisija uvedla akcijski načrt, ni nobena država dosegla v celoti odobrenega izdajanja dovoljenj.
Our activities 28 • The ACP Investment Facility: does it provide added value? 
Naše dejavnosti 28 • Ali Sklad za spodbujanje naložb v državah AKP zagotavlja dodano vrednost?
(14/2015) - assessed whether the Investment Facility added value to the EU’s development cooperation with ACP countries. 
(14/2015) – V poročilu je ocenjeno, ali je Sklad za spodbujanje naložb zagotovil dodano vrednost za razvojno sodelovanje EU z državami AKP.
The audit found that the facility does add value to EU development cooperation with ACP countries and fits in well with the EU’s policy objectives. 
Pri reviziji je bilo ugotovljeno, da sklad zagotavlja dodano vrednost za razvojno sodelovanje EU z državami AKP in se ujema s cilji politike.
At the end of 2014, credit lines represented 28 % of the facility’s portfolio, compared with 14 % at the end of 2010. 
Konec leta 2014 so kreditne linije dosegle 28 % portfelja sklada, ob koncu leta 2010 pa 14 %.
The increased share reflects the ongoing importance of the long-term financing offered by the facility. 
Povečani delež kaže, da je vloga sklada pri dolgoročnem financiranju ves čas pomembna.
The facility also had a positive catalytic effect in that it attracted additional funding. 
Poleg tega je sklad imel pozitiven učinek kot katalizator, ker je privabljal dodatno financiranje.
The audit did note that the contractual obligation to inform end beneficiaries about European Investment Bank/Investment Facility funding is not always followed and technical assistance does not always target small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Pri reviziji je bilo poudarjeno, da pogodbena obveznost, na podlagi katere morajo biti končni upravičenci obveščeni o financiranju iz Sklada za spodbujanje naložb/Evropske investicijske banke, ni vedno upoštevana, tehnična pomoč pa ni vedno usmerjena v mala in srednje velika podjetja.
Recommendations were made on how to address these issues. 
Dana so bila priporočila, kako obravnavati ta vprašanja.
Set up in 2003, the ACP Investment Facility obtains its capital from the EDFs and is managed by the European Investment Bank. 
Sklad za spodbujanje naložb v državah AKP, ki je bil ustanovljen leta 2013, prejema svoj kapital iz Evropskega razvojnega sklada, upravlja pa ga Evropska investicijska banka.
The facility has approved €5.7 billion worth of development projects over the last decade. 
V zadnjem desetletju je sklad odobril razvojne projekte v vrednosti 5,7 milijarde EUR.
It provides medium-to long-term financing and aims to deliver sustainable economic, social and environmental benefits. • ACP–EU Energy Facility support for renewable energy in East Africa (15/2015) - assessed whether the Commission successfully used the Energy Facility to increase access to renewable energy for the poor in East Africa. 
Sklad zagotavlja srednje-do dolgoročno financiranje in si tako prizadeva za doseganje trajnostnih gospodarskih, socialnih in okoljskih koristi. • Podpora Energetskega sklada AKP-EU za obnovljive vire energije v vzhodni Afriki (15/2015) – V poročilu je ocenjeno, ali je Komisija uspešno uporabljala Energetski sklad, da bi se povečal dostop do energije iz obnovljivih virov za revne v vzhodni Afriki.
The audit found that the facility achieved some notable successes but still needs better supervision. 
Pri reviziji je bilo ugotovljeno, da je sklad dosegel nekaj vidnih uspehov, vendar je še vedno potreben boljši nadzor.
The Commission had made some good selections among the projects proposed, but failed to monitor progress closely enough. 
Komisija je med predlaganimi projekti izbrala nekaj dobrih, vendar ni dovolj natančno spremljala napredka.
Reports submitted by the project managers were of uneven quality and the Commission did not attempt to enforce compliance with reporting obligations. 
Kakovost poročil, ki so jih predložili vodje projektov, ni bila enotna, Komisija pa ni poskušala uveljaviti spoštovanja obveznosti poročanja.
When projects were known to encounter serious difficulties, Commission staff did not make sufficient use of on-site visits and monitoring reviews to complement the information provided by those responsible. 
Kadar je bilo očitno, da imajo projekti resne težave, uslužbenci Komisije niso dovolj izkoristili možnosti za obisk projektov na kraju samem in preglede v okviru spremljanja, da bi dopolnili informacije, ki so jih predložili tisti, ki so bili odgovorni za projekte.
The report made recommendations for selecting future projects more rigorously, strengthening their monitoring and increasing their sustainability. 
V poročilu so izrečena priporočila za večjo strogost pri izbiri projektov v prihodnosti, krepitev njihovega spremljanja in povečanje njihove trajnosti.
Between 2006 and 2013, the ACP–EU Energy Facility was allocated €475 million of EDFs, mostly for grants to projects in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Med letoma 2006 in 2013 je bilo Energetskemu skladu AKP-EU dodeljenih 475 milijonov EUR iz Evropskega razvojnega sklada, predvsem za nepovratna sredstva za projekte v podsaharski Afriki.
By mid 2014, a total of €268 million had been granted, €106 million for projects in East Africa, which had by far the lowest rate of access to electricity in the region. 
Do sredine leta 2014 je bilo odobrenih skupno 268 milijonov EUR, od tega 106 milijonov EUR za projekte v vzhodni Afriki, ki je imela daleč najnižjo stopnjo dostopa do električne energije v regiji.
Our activities 29 • Review of the risks related to a results-oriented approach for EU development and cooperation action (21/2015) - was conducted in the light of recent renewed interest in shifting the focus of EU development and cooperation policies from activities to results. 
Naše dejavnosti 29 • Pregled tveganj za delovanje EU na področju razvoja in sodelovanja, ki so povezana s pristopom, usmerjenim v rezultate (21/2015) – Pregled je bil opravljen zaradi nedavnega ponovnega interesa za preusmeritev težišča politik EU za razvoj in sodelovanje z dejavnosti na rezultate.
The review identified nine key risk areas: inconsistent results-related terminology or failure to establish a clear logical chain between action, outputs, outcome and impact; increased complexity due to the integration of cross-cutting issues in EU programmes; lack of harmonisation between development partners’ aid-delivery instruments, results frameworks and accountability structures; weaknesses in evaluation and results reporting; lack of consolidated reports on or an overview of results achieved by EU aid; lack of sufficient, relevant, reliable and up-to-date data; focusing on budgetary outturn as an objective; and changes in the context of actions. 
Pri pregledu je bilo opredeljenih devet ključnih področij tveganj: nedosledna terminologija v zvezi z rezultati ali nevzpostavitev jasne logične verige med ukrepom, dosežki, izidom in učinkom; večja zapletenost zaradi vključitve medsektorskih vprašanj v programe EU; pomanjkanje usklajenosti med instrumenti razvojnih partnerjev za zagotavljanje pomoči, njihovimi okviri za rezultate in strukturami odgovornosti; slabosti pri vrednotenju in poročanju o rezultatih; neobstoj zbirnih poročil o rezultatih, doseženih s pomočjo EU, in pregleda teh rezultatov; pomanjkanje zadostnih, ustreznih, zanesljivih in najnovejših podatkov; osredotočanje na realizacijo proračuna kot cilja; spremembe v okolju ukrepov.
The review showed that these risk areas had been correctly identified by the Commission in a wide range of documents. 
Pregled je pokazal, da je Komisija v številnih dokumentih ta področja tveganja pravilno opredelila.
Nevertheless, further action remains to be taken in order to harness the full potential of the Commission’s initiatives to improve EU development and cooperation results. 
Da bi se izkoristile vse možnosti pobude Komisije za izboljšanje rezultatov, ki jih EU dosega pri razvoju in sodelovanju, pa so potrebni dodatni ukrepi.
In this context, the review formulated a number of recommendations that the Commission should take into account. 
V skladu s tem je v pregledu več priporočil, ki bi jih Komisija morala upoštevati.
Our activities 30 100 80 60 40 20 0 Financial and economic governance The EU’s economic governance framework aims to address problematic financial and economic trends, such as excessive government deficits or public debt levels, which can hold back growth and puts the sustainability of public finances at risk. 
Naše dejavnosti 30 100 80 60 40 20 0 Finančno in ekonomsko upravljanje Namen okvira EU za ekonomsko upravljanje je obravnavati problematične ekonomske trende, kot je čezmeren javnofinančni primanjkljaj ali javni dolg, ki lahko ovirata rast in ogrožata vzdržnost javnih financ.
It also includes the setting-up of the EU banking union. 
Vključuje tudi vzpostavitev bančne unije EU.
Performance audit in focus: Financial assistance provided to countries in difficulties (18/2015) Our institution has, in recent years, acquired new responsibilities in the area of EU financial and economic governance, and we have responded by building up the required internal expertise. 
Poudarek na reviziji smotrnosti poslovanja: finančna pomoč, zagotovljena državam v težavah (18/2015) Naša institucija je v zadnjih letih dobila nove odgovornosti na področju finančnega in ekonomskega upravljanja EU, na katere smo se odzvali tako, da smo okrepili svoje strokovno znanje, ki je za to potrebno.
This was our second special report published in this area, following the first on the European Banking Authority in 2014. 
To je naše drugo posebno poročilo, objavljeno na tem področju. Pred tem smo leta 2014 objavili poročilo o Evropskem bančnem organu.
In 2008, Europe faced a financial crisis which turned into a sovereign debt crisis. 
Leta 2008 se je Evropa spoprijela s finančno krizo, ki je prerasla v krizo državnega dolga.
The sovereign debt crisis was a consequence of various factors, including weak banking supervision, poor fiscal policies, and the difficulties experienced by large financial institutions, and the consequent bailout costs borne by the general public. 
Kriza državnega dolga je bila posledica različnih dejavnikov, vključno s šibkim bančnim nadzorom, slabimi fiskalnimi politikami in težavami, s katerimi so se spopadale velike finančne institucije in katerih stroške reševanja je nato nosila najširša javnost.
The crisis swept across EU Member States in two waves, first affecting the non-euro area countries in 2008-2009 and later spreading to the euro area itself. 
Kriza je zajela države članice EU v dveh valovih: leta 2008 in 2009 je najprej prizadela države zunaj evrskega območja in se nato razširila še na evrsko območje.
Our audit team examined the European Commission’s management of financial assistance during the crisis provided under the balance-of-payments facility and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, for which the Commission borrowed on the capital markets using the EU budget as guarantee. 
Naša revizijska ekipa je preučila, kako je Evropska komisija med krizo upravljala finančno pomoč, zagotovljeno v okviru plačilnobilančnega instrumenta in evropskega mehanizma za finančno stabilizacijo, za katero si je Komisija izposodila sredstva na kapitalskih trgih in kot jamstvo uporabila proračun EU.
The audit encompassed the financial assistance paid to Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Ireland and Portugal, with an emphasis on the Commission’s role in these programmes. 
Revizija je zajela finančno pomoč, izplačano Madžarski, Latviji, Romuniji, Irski in Portugalski, poudarek pa je bil na vlogi Komisije v teh programih.
Our auditors also examined the Commission’s cooperation with its partners — the European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington. 
Naši revizorji so preučili tudi sodelovanje Komisije z njenima partnerjema, in sicer Evropsko centralno banko (ECB) v Frankfurtu in Mednarodnim denarnim skladom v Washingtonu.
They collected audit evidence through detailed paper reviews and documentary analyses, as well as interviewing staff of the Commission, national authorities, ECB and IMF. 
Revizijske dokaze so zbrali s podrobnimi pregledi in analizami dokumentacije ter s pogovori z uslužbenci Komisije, nacionalnih organov, Evropske centralne banke in Mednarodnega denarnega sklada.
They did not audit the partners, or the decisions taken at the EU’s political level. 
Niso pa revidirali partnerjev niti odločitev, sprejetih na politični ravni EU.
Our auditors found that the European Commission was not prepared for the first requests for financial assistance during the 2008 financial crisis because warning signs had passed unnoticed, which largely explains the significant initial weaknesses in its management processes. 
Naši revizorji so ugotovili, da Evropska komisija med finančno krizo leta 2008 ni bila pripravljena na prve zahteve za finančno pomoč, ker opozorilni znaki niso bili opaženi, kar v veliki meri pojasnjuje velike začetne slabosti v procesih upravljanja.
They identified four main areas of concern about the Commission’s handling of the crisis: the different approaches used, limited quality control, weak monitoring and shortcomings in documentation. 
Pri načinu, kako je Komisija reševala krizo, so opredelili štiri glavna področja, ki vzbujajo zaskrbljenost: uporaba različnih pristopov, le delen nadzor kakovosti, šibko spremljanje in pomanjkljivosti v dokumentaciji.
By way of illustrating these weaknesses, our auditors found several examples of countries not being treated in the same way in a comparable situation and that in some programmes, the conditions for assistance were less stringent, which made compliance easier. 
Za ponazoritev teh slabosti naj omenimo, da so naši revizorji odkrili več primerov neenake obravnave držav v primerljivih situacijah, v nekaterih programih pa so bili pogoji manj strogi in jih je bilo lažje izpolnjevati.
They also found that the Commission’s teams insufficiently reviewed key documents, that the underlying calculations were not reviewed outside the team and that the work of the experts was not thoroughly scrutinised and the review process not well documented. 
Ugotovili so tudi, da ekipe Komisije niso dovolj natančno pregledale ključnih dokumentov, da izračunov ni pregledal nihče zunaj ekipe, da se nad delom strokovnjakov ni izvajal temeljit nadzor in da postopek pregleda ni bil dobro dokumentiran.
Our activities 31 However, the auditors found that the Commission did succeed in taking on its new management duties in managing assistance programmes which brought about reform, despite its lack of experience, which, given the time constraints, was an achievement. 
Naše dejavnosti 31 Po drugi strani pa so revizorji ugotovili, da je Komisiji je uspelo prevzeti nove naloge pri upravljanju programov pomoči, ki so kljub njenemu pomanjkanju izkušenj privedle do reforme, kar je bil dosežek glede na časovne omejitve.
Moreover, they found that, as the crisis unfolded, the Commission increasingly marshalled internal expertise and engaged with a wide range of stakeholders in the countries concerned, while later reforms also introduced better macroeconomic surveillance. 
Komisija je med krizo vse bolj uporabljala svoje strokovno znanje in sodelovala z vrsto deležnikov v posameznih državah, reforme, uvedene pozneje, pa so privedle tudi do večjega makroekonomskega nadzora.
The auditors also found a number of other positive outcomes, for example the programmes met their objectives, the revised deficit targets were mostly met, structural deficits improved and Member States complied with most conditions set in their programmes, albeit with some delays. 
Revizorji so odkrili tudi številne druge pozitivne rezultate, na primer: programi so dosegli svoje cilje, spremenjeni cilji glede primanjkljaja so bili večinoma doseženi, strukturni primanjkljaji so se izboljšali in države članice so izpolnile večino pogojev, zastavljenih v programu, čeprav z zamudami.
Programmes were successful in prompting reforms and countries mostly continued with the reforms required by the programme conditions, while in four of the five countries the current account adjusted faster than expected. 
Države so večinoma nadaljevale reforme, zahtevane v programskih pogojih, v štirih od petih držav pa je prišlo do prilagoditve tekočega računa plačilne bilance hitreje, kot je bilo pričakovano.
Our auditors noted that a number of weaknesses identified still persist and that the Commission has to strengthen its procedures for the management of financial assistance. 
Naši revizorji so ugotovili, da številne odkrite slabosti še vedno obstajajo in da je Komisija izboljšala svoje postopke za upravljanje finančne pomoči.
We have made a number of recommendations to the European Commission, which are aimed at ensuring more robust management of financial assistance in any future calls for assistance by Member States in difficulties. 
Izrekli smo več priporočil za Evropsko komisijo, katerih namen je zagotoviti zanesljivejše upravljanje finančne pomoči, za katero bi v prihodnosti zaprosile države članice v težavah.
The report obtained wide coverage particularly in the European media, but also in the United States and Australia. 
Poročilo je vzbudilo veliko zanimanje predvsem evropskih medijev, pa tudi medijev v Združenih državah Amerike in Avstraliji.
As is the case for all our special reports, it will be presented to our stakeholders in the Parliament and the Council by our Member responsible for the report, Baudilio Tomé Muguruza. 
Tako kot je navada za naša poročila, je tudi tega član Sodišča Baudilio Tomé Muguruza, ki je zanj pristojen, predstavil našim deležnikom v Evropskem parlamentu in Svetu.
Audit team (left to right): Didier Lebrun, Ignacio García de Parada, Kristian Sniter, Josef Jindra, Giuseppe Diana, Baudilio Tomé Muguruza, Adrian Savin, Daniela Hristova, Zacharias Kolias, Marco Fians, Daniel Costa de Magalhães. 
Revizijska ekipa (od leve proti desni): Didier Lebrun, Ignacio García de Parada, Kristian Sniter, Josef Jindra, Giuseppe Diana, Baudilio Tomé Muguruza, Adrian Savin, Daniela Hristova, Zacharias Kolias, Marco Fians, Daniel Costa de Magalhães.
Our activities 32 • EU supervision of credit rating agencies — well established but not yet fully effective (22/2015) - examined whether the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has successfully established itself as the credit rating agencies watchdog for the EU. 
Naše dejavnosti 32 • Nadzor EU nad bonitetnimi agencijami – dobro uveljavljen, vendar še ne povsem uspešen (22/2015) – V poročilu je preučeno, ali se je Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge (ESMA) uspešno uveljavil kot nadzornik bonitetnih agencij v EU.
The 2008 financial crisis focused attention on the credit rating agencies and their impact on financial markets. 
Finančna kriza leta 2008 je usmerila pozornost na bonitetne agencije in njihov vpliv na finančne trge.
At the time, the agencies were more or less unregulated in Europe. 
Takrat so bile agencije v Evropi skoraj neregulirane.
In 2011, the ESMA was created to register, monitor and supervise them. 
Leta 2011 je bil za njihovo registracijo, spremljanje ter nadziranje ustanovljen Evropski organ za vrednostne papirje in trge.
The audit concluded that while ESMA has laid down good foundations, its rules and guidelines are not yet complete and significant risks remain to be addressed in the future. 
Pri reviziji je bilo ugotovljeno, da je organ ESMA sicer vzpostavil dobre temelje, vendar njegova pravila in smernice niso popolni, bistvena tveganja pa bo treba obravnavati tudi še v prihodnosti.
The audit acknowledges that ESMA has managed to reduce the average duration of the registration process, but says the process remains complex. 
Revizija potrjuje, da je organu ESMA uspelo zmanjšati povprečno trajanje postopka registracije, vendar postopek ostaja zapleten.
Although credit rating methodologies should be rigorous, systematic, continuous and subject to validation, ESMA’s methods focus mainly on rigour. 
Čeprav bi morale biti metodologije bonitetnega ocenjevanja rigoroz-ne, sistematične in ustaljene ter takšne, da jih je mogoče ovrednotiti, se je organ ESMA osredotočal večinoma na rigoroznost.
The current rules of the Eurosystem credit assessment framework do not guarantee that all ESMA-registered agencies are on an equal footing, which creates a two-tier market structure and puts small agencies in an unfavourable situation. 
Trenutna pravila bonitetnega okvira Evrosistema ne zagotavljajo enakopravnosti vseh bonitetnih agencij, registriranih pri organu ESMA, kar ustvarja dvotirno strukturo trga, male bonitetne agencije pa postavlja v neugoden položaj.
The audit made a number of recommendations to ESMA concerning registration, traceability of the risk identification process, supervisory processes and its IT systems. • More attention to results needed to improve the delivery of technical assistance to Greece (19/2015) - examined whether the Task Force for Greece fulfilled its mandate and whether the technical assistance provided for Greece made an effective contribution to the reform process. 
Pri reviziji so bila izrečena številna priporočila za organ ESMA v zvezi z registracijo, sledljivostjo postopka opredelitve tveganj, postopki nadzora in sistemi IT organa. • Za izboljšanje zagotavljanja tehnične pomoči Grčiji bo treba nameniti več pozornosti rezultatom (19/2015) – V poročilu je preučeno, ali je delovna skupina za Grčijo izpolnila svoj mandat in ali je tehnična pomoč Grčiji uspešno prispevala k reformnemu procesu.
The task force was established by the Commission in 2011 to support Greece’s economic adjustment with a broad range of technical assistance. 
Komisija je delovno skupino ustanovila leta 2011 za podporo ekonomski prilagoditvi Grčije s široko paleto tehnične pomoči.