natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Following a case of diphtheria in Spain in 2015, when the treating hospital struggled to get antitoxin in Europe43, the HSC and the Commission decided to look into potential solutions to address such cases in the future. 
Po pojavu davice v Španiji leta 2015, ko je imela bolnišnica, ki je primer obravnavala, velike težave z dostopom do antitoksina v Evropi43, sta se Odbor za zdravstveno varnost in Komisija odločila proučiti možne rešitve za podobne primere v prihodnosti.
The HSC agreed to task its preparedness working group with the development of standard operating procedures for a rapid and consistent Union response in such emergencies. 
Odbor za zdravstveno varnost se je strinjal, da se bo njegova delovna skupina za pripravljenost lotila razvijanja standardnih operativnih postopkov za hiter in skladen odziv Unije v takih izrednih razmerah.
In January 2016, the Commission requested Member States to nominate participants in the HSC preparedness group on a standard operating procedure for exchanging medical countermeasures. 
Januarja leta 2016 je Komisija pozvala države članice, naj imenujejo osebe za sodelovanje v skupini za pripravljenost Odbor za zdravstveno varnost, ki bo pripravila standardni operativni postopek za izmenjavo zdravstvenih protiukrepov.
However, during the audit we could not obtain evidence that the relevant procedure had been agreed or that specific work had been initiated (also see paragraphs 46 and 47). 
Med revizijo pa Sodišče ni našlo dokazov, da je bil sklenjen dogovor o ustreznem postopku ali da so bile v zvezi s tem opravljene specifične dejavnosti (glej tudi odstavka 46 in 47).
Audit observations 25 43 Overall, as regards the implementation of the joint procurement provisions, we found that progress in organising the joint procurement of pandemic influenza vaccine, initiated after the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, had been slow by the time of our audit due to low Member State responsiveness and that there is no mechanism at EU level to address urgent needs for medical countermeasures, potentially reducing the EU’s preparedness for pandemic influenza. 
Revizijska opažanja 25 43 Sodišče je glede izvajanja določb za skupno javno naročanje na splošno ugotovilo, da je bil napredek pri organiziranju skupnega javnega naročanja cepiva proti pandemiji gripe, ki se je začelo po pandemiji H1N1 leta 2009, do časa naše revizije počasen zaradi majhne odzivnosti držav članic ter da na ravni EU ni nobenega mehanizma za obravnavanje nujnih potreb po zdravstvenih protiukrepih, kar lahko negativno vpliva na pripravljenost EU na pandemijo gripe.
Strategic and operational challenges for the formalised Health Security Committee 44 The decision on serious cross-border threats to health establishes the HSC, composed of representatives from the Member States, and chaired by the Commission (see Annex II for a more detailed description of its role and responsibilities). 
Strateški in operativni izzivi za formalizirani Odbor za zdravstveno varnost 44 S sklepom o resnih čezmejnih nevarnostih za zdravje je bil ustanovljen Odbor za zdravstveno varnost, ki ga sestavljajo predstavniki držav članic, predseduje pa mu Komisija (za podrobnejši opis njegove vloge in odgovornosti glej Prilogo II).
45 All Member States have nominated their members of the HSC. 
45 Vse države članice so imenovale svoje predstavnike za Odbor za zdravstveno varnost.
Plenary meetings took place once in 2014 and three times in 2015, as well as a large number of audioconferences, in particular in relation to the evolving Ebola crisis (see Box 4). 
Plenarna zasedanja so potekala enkrat v letu 2014 in trikrat v letu 2015, poleg tega so bile organizirane tudi številne avdiokonference, zlasti v zvezi s krizo zaradi izbruha ebole, ki se je širila (glej okvir 4).
The Health Security Committee and the Ebola outbreak Discussions about Ebola started in the HSC in March 2014, after the initial notification of the outbreak by Guinea to WHO and the issuance of a rapid risk assessment by ECDC. 
Odbor za zdravstveno varnost in izbruh ebole Razprave o eboli v Odboru za zdravstveno varnost so se začele marca leta 2014, po prvotnem obvestilu o izbruhu, ki ga je Gvineja posredovala SZO, in hitri oceni tveganja, ki jo je izdal ECDC.
According to this rapid risk assessment, the risk of transmission to the EU was low, although certain situations could justify measures in the EU, such as tourists returning from Guinea visiting family and friends or exposed persons seeking medical attention in the EU. 
Ta ocena je navajala, da je tveganje za prenos v EU majhno, čeprav bi nekatere razmere lahko upravičevale ukrepanje v EU, npr. turisti, ki so se vrnili iz Gvineje, kjer so obiskali sorodnike in prijatelje, ali osebe, ki so bile izpostavljene virusu in iščejo zdravniško oskrbo v EU.
The Ebola outbreak was declared a PHEIC by WHO on 8 August 2014. 
Zaradi izbruha ebole je SZO 8. avgusta 2014 razglasila izredne razmere mednarodnih razsežnosti na področju javnega zdravja.
A week earlier, the Commission had called an HSC audioconference meeting in view of the quickly deteriorating circumstances in the affected countries. 
Teden dni prej je Komisija zaradi razmer v prizadetih državah, ki so se hitro slabšale, sklicala avdiokonferenco Odbora za zdravstveno varnost.
Many different Commission services, ECDC, WHO and the Member States attended. 
Udeležile so se je številne službe Komisije, ECDC, SZO in države članice.
The objective was to exchange information and coordinate actions on measures being taken and planned, to identify additional actions to strengthen preparedness and to consider assistance to affected countries. 
Avdiokonferenca je bila namenjena izmenjavi informacij in uskladitvi dejavnosti, povezanih s sprejetimi in načrtovanimi ukrepi, opredelitvi dodatnih dejavnosti za izboljšanje pripravljenosti ter razpravi o pomoči za prizadete države.
Options for the medical evacuation of EU/EEA citizens working in them were also discussed. 
Govorili so tudi o zdravstveni evakuaciji državljanov EU/EGP, ki so delali v teh državah.
DG Health and Food Safety, with assistance from ECDC, had drafted a questionnaire on Ebola preparedness (i.e. to obtain an overview of laboratories capacities, hospital facilities for Ebola, suitable transport), which was sent out to the Member States and answered by most of them. 
GD za zdravje in varnost hrane je s pomočjo ECDC pripravil vprašalnik o pripravljenosti na ebolo (da bi dobil pregled nad laboratorijskimi zmogljivostmi bolnišnic v zvezi z ebolo in primernimi možnostmi prevoza), ki ga je poslal državam članicam in ga je večina od njih izpolnila.
After the declaration of the PHEIC by WHO, the frequency of HSC meetings dedicated to Ebola increased significantly (almost weekly until January 2015). 
Ko je SZO razglasila izredne razmere mednarodnih razsežnosti na področju javnega zdravja, se je pogostost sestankov Odbora za zdravstveno varnost, posvečenih eboli, bistveno povečala (do januarja leta 2015 so sestanki potekali skoraj na tedenski ravni).
Only from February 2015, did operational topics return to the HSC agenda, such as joint procurement and the working groups. 
Operativne teme, kot sta skupno javno naročanje in delovne skupine, so se na dnevni red OZV vrnile šele februarja leta 2015.
Audit observations 26 46 At the time of our audit, the terms of reference had been drafted for four working groups under the HSC: a permanent working group on preparedness, a permanent communicators’ network, an ad hoc working group on newly arrived migrants and communicable diseases, and an ad hoc working group on combating antimicrobial resistance (AMR) (see Box 2). 
Revizijska opažanja 26 46 Do časa naše revizije so bili pripravljeni mandati za štiri delovne skupine v okviru Odbora za zdravstveno varnost: stalno delovno skupino za pripravljenost, stalno mrežo poročevalcev, ad hoc delovno skupino za novoprispele migrante in nalezljive bolezni ter ad hoc delovno skupino za preprečevanje protimikrobne odpornosti (glej okvir 2).
However, the HSC only formally established the communicators’ network and preparedness working group. 
Vendar je odbor formalno vzpostavil le mrežo poročevalcev in delovno skupino za pripravljenost.
Based on their terms of reference, these working groups were to prepare an annual work plan, including performance indicators for evaluation, to be submitted and approved by the HSC, to ensure a structured way of working on these topics. 
V skladu s svojima mandatoma bi morali ti delovni skupini pripraviti letni delovni načrt, vključno s kazalniki uspešnosti za ocenjevanje, ter ga odboru predložiti v odobritev, da bi tako zagotovili strukturirano delo v zvezi z omenjenimi temami.
We found that at the end of the audit (March 2016) no annual work plans with the indicators required under the working groups’ terms or reference had been submitted for approval to the HSC. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da do konca revizije (marca leta 2016) Odboru za zdravstveno varnost v odobritev ni bil predložen noben letni delovni načrt s kazalniki, kot je predvideno v mandatih delovnih skupin.
This means that the work done by these working groups is not implemented in accordance with the terms of reference and that their performance is not measured appropriately. 
To pomeni, da se delo, ki ga opravljajo te skupine, ne izvaja v skladu z njihovimi mandati, uspešnost skupin pa se ne meri ustrezno.
47 Participation in the HSC working groups is voluntary. 
47 Sodelovanje v delovnih skupinah odbora je prostovoljno.
At the end of our audit, all Member States had nominated their participants in the communicators’ network. 
Do konca revizije Sodišča so svoje predstavnike za mrežo poročevalcev imenovale vse države članice.
The Commission had also sent the request to nominate participants to the preparedness working group (also see paragraph 42 above), but by March 2016 only nine EU Member States had done so. 
Komisija je pozvala tudi k imenovanju predstavnikov za delovno skupino za pripravljenost (glej tudi odstavek 42 zgoraj), vendar je do marca leta 2016 to naredilo le devet držav članic EU.
The participation of a large number of Member States is important to ensure that outputs of the working groups are later supported and taken forward by the HSC. 
Sodelovanje velikega števila držav članic je pomembno, da izide delovnih skupin odbor nato podpre in nadalje razvija.
48 We found that when the HSC was still informal and mandated by the terms of reference issued by the Council (i.e. until 2013), it had work programmes with annual objectives and reporting, as well as documented action plans with progress reporting. 
48 Sodišče je ugotovilo, da je imel Odbor za zdravstveno varnost, ko je bil še neformalen in je njegova pooblastila opredeljeval mandat, ki ga je izdal Svet (tj. do leta 2013), delovne programe z letnimi cilji in poročanjem ter dokumentirane akcijske načrte s poročanjem o napredku.
The status and mandate of the current HSC are different under the decision on serious cross-border threats to health. 
Položaj in mandat sedanjega odbora sta v skladu s sklepom o resnih čezmejnih nevarnostih za zdravje drugačna.
However, we did not find evidence in the HSC documents or at the Commission that the HSC currently executes its tasks on the basis of an agreed strategic planning or up-to-date roadmap identifying relevant longer-term strategic topics. 
Ne v dokumentih odbora ne pri Komisiji pa Sodišče ni našlo dokazov, da odbor svoje naloge zdaj opravlja na podlagi dogovorjenega strateškega načrtovanja ali posodobljenega načrta z opredeljenimi pomembnimi dolgoročnejšimi strateškimi temami.
During the course of the audit, Member State representatives also expressed some concern over the nature of the HSC audioconferences, perceived by some to be too focused on technical rather than strategic discussions. 
Med revizijo so predstavniki držav članic izrazili tudi pomisleke glede narave avdiokonferenc Odbora za zdravstveno varnost, za katere nekateri menijo, da so preveč osredotočene na tehnične namesto na strateške razprave.
Audit observations 27 49 Overall, the work of the HSC, in particular in response to the Ebola crisis, has been very important and has initiated the development of collaborative mechanisms, such as for the use of laboratories and for medical evacuation that could be sustained or reactivated for future crises44. 
Revizijska opažanja 27 49 Delo odbora, zlasti v zvezi z odzivom na krizo zaradi izbruha ebole, je bilo na splošno zelo pomembno, sprožilo pa je tudi razvoj sodelovalnih mehanizmov, na primer pri uporabi laboratorijev in zdravstveni evakuaciji, ki bi jih bilo mogoče ohraniti ali ponovno aktivirati v primeru prihodnjih kriz44.
The HSC became a main platform where representatives from relevant Commission services and Member States joined forces and started exchanging information, including with WHO. 
Odbor je postal vodilna platforma, kjer so predstavniki ustreznih služb Komisije in držav članic združili moči ter začeli medsebojno izmenjevati informacije, tudi s SZO.
This further demonstrates the great relevance and importance of the HSC, which was also acknowledged by the Council in its conclusions on the lessons learned for public health from the Ebola outbreak in west Africa45. 
To še dodatno dokazuje velik pomen in vlogo odbora, ki ju je priznal tudi Svet v svojih sklepih o spoznanjih za javno zdravje iz izkušenj z izbruhom ebole v zahodni Afriki45.
50 However, our evidence also shows that from the moment when Ebola was declared a public health emergency of international concern by WHO, for approximately 6 months, most HSC work and its audioconferences focused on the response to the Ebola crisis — which was a low-risk health threat for the EU46. 
50 Toda dokazi Sodišča kažejo tudi, da so se od trenutka, ko je SZO zaradi ebole razglasila izredne razmere mednarodnih razsežnosti na področju javnega zdravja, delo in avdiokonference odbora približno šest mesecev osredotočali na odziv na krizo zaradi izbruha ebole, ki pa je za EU pomenila majhno nevarnost za zdravje46.
As a result, other HSC activities in relation to the strategic development and implementation of the framework of the decision on serious cross-border threats to health were not at the top of the agenda during this period. 
Ostale dejavnosti odbora v zvezi s strateškim razvojem in izvajanjem okvira iz sklepa o resnih čezmejnih nevarnostih za zdravje v tem obdobju posledično niso bile med prednostnimi nalogami.
51 The high incidence of major health events in recent years, such as Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) Corona virus, Ebola and Zika and the absence of strategic planning for the HSC, explain to a certain extent why HSC meetings have often been of a technical, response-oriented nature, rather than strategic. 
51 V preteklih letih so bili pogosti pomembni dogodki na področju zdravja, na primer pojav koronavirusa, ki povzroča bližnjevzhodni respiratorni sindrom (MERS), ebole in zike, odbor pa prav tako nima strateškega načrtovanja, s čimer je mogoče delno pojasniti, zakaj so bili sestanki odbora pogosto tehnične narave in posvečeni odzivanju, ne pa strateškim vprašanjem.
In addition, we identified slow progress on the working groups which should perform or support the HSC’s technical work. 
Poleg tega je Sodišče opazilo počasen napredek delovnih skupin, ki bi morale izvajati ali podpirati tehnično delo odbora.
52 The Commission itself can also still improve how it produces relevant mappings or reports on activities that take place in other Commission services, agencies and programmes in this context (also see paragraphs 96 to 102). 
52 Tudi Komisija lahko še vedno izboljša pripravo ustreznih pregledov dejavnosti ali poročil o dejavnostih, ki v zvezi s tem potekajo v okviru njenih drugih služb, agencij in programov (glej tudi odstavke 96 do 102).
These factors combined indicate that there is still scope for enhancing the HSC’s strategic work. 
Vsi ti dejavniki kažejo, da bi bilo strateško delo Odbora za zdravstveno varnost še mogoče izboljšati.
This is important as the HSC now has a strong mandate, in particular in terms of coordinating, in liaison with the Commission, the preparedness and response planning of the Member States (see paragraph 44) and thereby ensuring the highest possible level of protection against health threats in the EU. 
To je pomembno, saj ima odbor zdaj obširen mandat, zlasti glede usklajevanja načrtovanja pripravljenosti in odzivanja držav članic, ki naj bi ga izvajal skupaj s Komisijo (glej odstavek 44), s čimer naj bi zagotavljal najvišjo možno stopnjo varovanja pred nevarnostmi za zdravje v EU.
44 Without prejudice to the audit findings the Court might raise as a result of its ongoing performance audit of Chamber III on crisis management structures, which also deals with the EU response to the Ebola outbreak. 
44 Brez poseganja v ugotovitve revizije, na katere se lahko sklicuje Sodišče v okviru svoje sedanje revizije uspešnosti struktur za krizno upravljanje, ki jo izvaja Senat III in obravnava tudi odziv EU na izbruh ebole.
45 Council conclusions on ‘Lessons learned for Public Health from the Ebola outbreak in west Africa — Health Security in the European Union’, (2015/C 421/04) of 17 December 2015. 
45 Sklepi Sveta o spoznanjih za javno zdravje iz izkušenj z izbruhom ebole v zahodni Afriki – zdravstvena varnost v Evropski uniji (2015/C 421/04) z dne 17. decembra 2015.
46 See ECDC’s Rapid Risk Assessment ‘Outbreak of Ebola virus disease in west Africa’, fourth update, 3 September 2014, which stated that the risk of Ebola spreading from a patient who arrives in the EU as a result of a planned medical evacuation was considered extremely low. 
46 Glej hitro oceno tveganja ECDC z naslovom Outbreak of Ebola virus disease in West Africa (Izbruh ebole v zahodni Afriki), 4. posodobitev, 3. september 2014, v kateri je navedeno, da tveganje za širjenje ebole prek bolnika, ki z načrtovano zdravstveno evakuacijo prispe v EU, velja za izredno majhno.
Audit observations 28 Applying ‘coordination of response’ rules is difficult in practice 53 The introduction of the decision on serious cross-border threats to health states that although the Member States have a responsibility to manage public health crises at national level, measures taken by individual Member States could damage the interests of other Member States if they are inconsistent with one another or based on diverging risk assessments. 
Revizijska opažanja 28 Pravila glede usklajevanja odzivanja je v praksi težko uporabljati 53 Uvod sklepa o resnih čezmejnih nevarnostih za zdravje navaja, da so države sicer odgovorne za upravljanje kriz na področju javnega zdravja na nacionalni ravni, vendar bi lahko ukrepi, ki jih sprejme posamezna država članica, škodovali interesom drugih držav članic, če med seboj ne bi bili usklajeni ali če bi temeljili na razlikujočih se ocenah tveganja.
Therefore, Member States, when intending to adopt public health measures to combat a serious cross-border threat to health, should47 first inform and consult the other Member States and the Commission on those measures. 
Ko nameravajo države članice sprejeti ukrepe na področju javnega zdravja za preprečevanje resne čezmejne nevarnosti za zdravje, bi morale47 zato najprej obvestiti druge države članice in Komisijo ter se posvetovati z njimi.
If the need to protect public health is so urgent that the immediate adoption of the measures is necessary they may inform the other Member States and the Commission after the adoption. 
Če je potreba po varovanju javnega zdravja tako nujna, da je treba ukrepe sprejeti takoj, se lahko druge države članice in Komisija obvestijo po njihovem sprejetju.
54 Experience during the Ebola crisis showed that this requirement to inform other Member States (i.e. through the HSC) before taking measures at national level is challenging. 
54 Izkušnje, pridobljene med krizo zaradi izbruha ebole, so pokazale, da zahteva po obveščanju drugih držav članic (tj. prek Odbora za zdravstveno varnost) pred sprejemanjem ukrepov na nacionalni ravni pomeni izziv.
Some Member States decided to diverge from ECDC and WHO risk assessments and implemented entry screening of travellers at airports receiving flights from west Africa. 
Nekatere države članice so se odločile, da bodo odstopale od ocen tveganja ECDC in SZO, in so uvedle preglede ob vstopu za potnike na letališčih, kamor prihajajo leti iz zahodne Afrike.
In their subsequent risk assessments, ECDC and WHO continuously did not recommend entry screening measures, pointing at the cost implications, poor results and existence of effective exit screening in the affected countries48. 
ECDC in SZO tudi v naslednjih ocenah tveganja nista priporočila ukrepov pregledovanja ob vstopu, kot razloge za to pa sta navedla stroške, slabe rezultate in učinkovite preglede ob izstopu v prizadetih državah48.
The Commission invited EU health ministers to a high-level Ebola coordination meeting on 16 October 2014 where possible entry measures at EU borders were also discussed. 
Komisija je ministre za zdravje držav članic EU povabila na usklajevalno srečanje na visoki ravni o eboli 16. oktobra 2014, na katerem so obravnavali tudi možne ukrepe ob vstopu na mejah EU.
One of the outcomes was for the Commission and WHO to organise an audit on exit screening for Ebola in the affected countries in west Africa. 
Eden od rezultatov srečanja je bil, da sta Komisija in SZO pripravili revizijo pregledov ob izstopu za odkrivanje okužb z virusom ebole v prizadetih državah zahodne Afrike.
The audit concluded that the exit screening processes were well implemented and that the procedures were very likely to catch persons with signs and symptoms of Ebola. 
Pri reviziji je bilo ugotovljeno, da se postopki pregledovanja ob izstopu dobro izvajajo in da je zelo verjetno, da se z njimi prestrežejo osebe z znaki in simptomi ebole.
55 In its 2015 implementation report49 the Commission therefore stated that a major conclusion from the Ebola outbreak was that there was scope for improving the implementation of the provisions which require Member States to coordinate national responses. 
55 V svojem poročilu o izvajanju za leto 201549 je Komisija kot enega glavnih zaključkov v zvezi z izbruhom ebole navedla, da bi bilo izvajanje določb, ki od držav članic zahtevajo usklajevanje nacionalnih odzivov, mogoče izboljšati.
If information on national public health measures which Member States are considering taking or have taken is not adequately shared with other Member States at an early stage, this could impact other Member States. 
Če države članice informacij o nacionalnih ukrepih za javno zdravje, ki so jih sprejele ali o njih razmišljajo, z drugimi državami članicami ne delijo ustrezno in dovolj zgodaj, bi imelo to lahko posledice za druge države članice.
Examples include duplications of checks and tracing of people that have already been checked on their first entry to the EU, requiring additional efforts and resources from other Member States or increased media pressure on public health authorities to explain why certain Member States follow WHO or ECDC scientific advice and others do not. 
Primeri vključujejo podvajanje preverjanj in sledenje ljudi, ki so bili že preverjeni ob prvem vstopu v EU, kar od drugih držav članic zahteva dodatna prizadevanja in vire, ali povečan pritisk medijev na organe javnega zdravstva, naj pojasnijo, zakaj nekatere države članice upoštevajo znanstvene nasvete SZO ali ECDC, druge pa ne.
47 According to Article 11 of Decision No 1082/2013/EU. 
47 V skladu s členom 11 Uredbe št. 1082/2013/EU.
48 ECDC’s Rapid Risk Assessment ‘Outbreak of Ebola virus disease in west Africa’, fourth update, 3 September 2014, or ECDC’s Technical Report ‘Infection prevention and control measures for Ebola virus disease — entry and Exist screening measures’, 12 October 2014. 
48 Hitra ocena tveganja ECDC z naslovom Outbreak of Ebola virus disease in West Africa (Izbruh ebole v zahodni Afriki), 4. posodobitev, 3. september 2014 ali tehnično poročilo ECDC z naslovom Infection prevention and control measures for Ebola virus disease – Entry and exit screening measures (Preprečevanj okužb in nadzorni ukrepi zaradi ebole – ukrepi pregledovanja ob vstopu in izstopu), 12. oktober 2014.
49 Report on the implementation of Decision No 1082/2013/EU, COM(2015) 617 final of 7 December 2015. 
49 Poročilo o izvajanju Sklepa št.