natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the case of six projects audited equipment purchased arrived long after the training courses for which it had been intended had taken place. 
V primeru šestih projektov je kupljena oprema, ki je bila predmet revizije, prispela veliko pozneje, kot so se izvajali tečaji usposabljanja, za katere je bila namenjena.
In five other cases, staff that had defined equipment needs or drawn up the specifications for a contract had left by the time the goods arrived. 
V petih drugih primerih je osebje, ki je opredelilo potrebe po opremi ali pripravilo specifikacije za pogodbo, v času, ko je blago prispelo, že zapustilo misijo.
Newly recruited staff had to take over projects and procedures without having the necessary training, leading to delays in implementing the MissionŐs operations. 
Na novo zaposleno osebje je moralo prevzeti projekte in postopke brez potrebnega usposabljanja, zaradi česar je prihajalo do zamud pri izvajanju operacij misije.
In recognition of the weaknesses observed in setting up CSDP Missions, the EEAS and the Commission stated in their reply to our report on EUPOL Afghanistan that they would develop Ňa shared service centre for all CSDP MissionsÓ and optimise Ňthe use of the CSDP warehouse to manage the assets of ongoing MissionsÓ. 
ESZD in Komisija sta ob priznanju slabosti, ugotovljenih pri ustanavljanju misij v okviru SVOP, v svojem odgovoru na poročilo Računskega sodišča o misiji EUPOL v Afganistanu navedli, da bosta ustanovili enotni skupni storitveni center za vse misije SVOP in zagotovili kar najboljšo uporabo skladišča SVOP pri upravljanju sredstev misij, ki trenutno potekajo.
This was not in place at the time of our audit. 
To v času revizije ni bilo izvedeno.
However, on 13 November 2017 the Council approved the set up of a reinforced Mission Support Platform that is to be completed by May 2018. 
Vendar je Svet 13. novembra 2017 odobril vzpostavitev okrepljene platforme za podporo misijam, ki naj bi bila zaključena do maja 2018.
This Platform will make Ňrapidly deployable assets and planning elements from EU member states, as well as, where agreed, specialised teams and multinational formations such as the European Gendarmerie Force" available to new civilian CSDP Missions. 
Platforma bo zagotovila, da bodo „viri za hitro napotitev in elementi načrtovanja iz držav članic, če je dogovorjeno, pa tudi [...] posebn[e] ekip[e] in večnacionaln[i] sestav[i], kot so evropske žandarske sile”, na voljo za nove civilne misije v okviru SVOP.
The EEAS is also preparing to set up a central warehouse to hold a centralised stock of items for rapid distribution and so reduce the number of procurement procedures conducted by existing Missions. 
ESZD pripravlja tudi vse potrebno za vzpostavitev centralnega skladišča za vodenje centralizirane evidence blaga za hitro distribucijo, s čimer bi se zmanjšalo število postopkov za oddajo javnega naročila, ki se izvajajo v okviru obstoječih misij.
Commission rules and procedures not adapted to conditions in Niger and Mali 28. 
Pravila in postopki Komisije niso prilagojeni razmeram v Nigru in Maliju 28.
The Commission allowed Mission staff in Niger and Mali to apply flexible procurement procedures29 because of the difficult context in which they had to operate30. 
Komisija je zaradi težkih razmer, v katerih sta se misiji izvajali29, dovolila osebju misij v Nigru in Maliju, da uporablja fleksibilne postopke za oddajo javnega naročila30.
21 29 30 rules and procedures were often applied in a way that was unsuited to working conditions in landlocked West African countries. 
Čeprav so se ti postopki uporabljali, je osebje, ki je izvajalo te postopke, menilo, da so se pravila in postopki Službe za instrumente zunanje politike pogosto uporabljali na način, ki ni bil primeren za delovne pogoje v neobalnih zahodnoafriških državah.
In particular: - The budgetary period of one year made it difficult to prepare and complete contracts within the regulatory deadlines in view of the paucity of local suppliers and long delivery times. 
Zlasti: - Enoletno proračunsko obdobje je oteževalo pripravo in sklepanje pogodb v predpisanih rokih zaradi maloštevilnih lokalnih dobaviteljev in dolgih dobavnih rokov.
In addition, the requirement (only applied from 2017) to hand over equipment to the beneficiary within the budgetary year had put additional pressure on the Missions, especially in Niger, where equipment is often destined for regions to which transport is not easy to organise. - Strict application of rules and procedures by the FPI had resulted in the cancellation of contracts because of minor inaccuracies in equipment specifications, or slight budget overruns. - The requirement to group similar items (both for the Missions and for beneficiaries) into a single contract caused delays as purchases occurred less frequently. - The obligation to use the CommissionŐs framework contracts had led to problems. 
Poleg tega je zahteva (ki se uporablja šele od leta 2017) glede predaje opreme upravičencu znotraj proračunskega leta ustvarila dodaten pritisk na misije, zlasti v Nigru, kjer je oprema pogosto namenjena regijam, v katere ni enostavno organizirati prevoza. - Stroga uporaba pravil in postopkov s strani Službe za instrumente zunanje politike je privedla do preklica pogodb zaradi manjših nepravilnosti v specifikacijah opreme ali rahlih prekoračitev proračuna. - Zahteva glede združevanja podobnih proizvodov (za misije in upravičence) v enotno pogodbo je povzročila zamude, saj so bili nakupi manj pogosti. - Obvezna uporaba okvirnih pogodb Komisije je privedla do težav.
In one case, EUCAP Sahel Niger ordered equipment but the purchase ceiling of the framework contract had been reached. 
V enem primeru je bila za misijo EUCAP Sahel Niger naročena oprema, vendar je bila dosežena zgornja meja za nakup iz okvirne pogodbe.
As a result, the Mission had to launch procurement procedures for these items locally. 
postopke za oddajo javnega naročila na lokalni ravni.
In other cases, supplies for equipment purchased under the framework contract could not be procured locally. 
V drugih primerih pripomočkov za opremo, kupljeno v skladu z okvirno pogodbo, ni bilo mogoče nabaviti z lokalnim javnim naročanjem.
The EUCAP Sahel Missions require the CommissionŐs prior authorisation for purchases over Ű20 000. 
V misijah EUCAP Sahel se za nakupe nad 20 000 EUR zahteva predhodno dovoljenje Komisije.
This process takes longer than when the Missions make purchases directly. 
Ta postopek traja dlje, kot če bi nakup opravila neposredno misija.
The Commission accepted the recommendation in the ECAŐs 2013 Annual Report that the FPI should accredit all civilian CSDP Missions in accordance with the Ôsix-pillar assessmentŐ31. 
Komisija je sprejela priporočilo iz letnega poročila Evropskega računskega sodišča za leto 2013, da bi morala Služba za instrumente zunanje politike akreditirati vse civilne misije v okviru SVOP v skladu s šeststebrno oceno31.
This means that once the Missions have strengthened their systems to meet the requirements of the assessors, Heads of Mission receive delegated powers to authorise An assessment of key processes by an independent auditor (internal control; accounting; external audit; grants; procurement; financial instruments). 
To pomeni, da se na vodje misij, – potem ko misije toliko okrepijo svoje sisteme, da izpolnjujejo zahteve ocenjevalcev –, prenesejo pooblastila, da odobri nakupe, medtem ko Komisija še naprej izvaja naknadne preglede.
Shortly after our visit to the Missions, both began to undergo the process of six-pillar assessment32. Lack of guidance from EEAS headquarters resulted in weak procedures 30. 
Kmalu po našem obisku misij se je začela za obe izvajati šeststebrna ocena32. Ker sedež ESZD ni pripravil zadostnih smernic, so bili postopki neučinkoviti 30.
We looked at the guidance available to the Missions and found it to be inadequate since it related mainly to administrative procedures33. 
Sodišče je preučilo smernice, ki so na voljo za misiji, in ugotovilo, da so pomanjkljive, saj se večinoma nanašajo na upravne postopke33.
There was little operational guidance, with examples of good practice, or standard templates from the previous civilian CSDP Missions, that could be used to train newly recruited staff. 
Operativnih smernic, ki bi vsebovale primere dobre prakse ali standardne predloge iz prejšnjih civilnih misij v okviru SVOP in bi se lahko uporabljale za usposabljanje na novo zaposlenega osebja, skorajda ni bilo.
Each EUCAP Sahel Mission spent considerable time and resources on defining and setting up its own procedures, which were not always operationally efficient. 
V obeh misijah EUCAP Sahel se je precej časa in sredstev porabilo za opredelitev in vzpostavitev lastnih postopkov, ki niso bili vedno operativno učinkoviti.
The EU member states did not provide enough staff to fill the posts available 31. 
Države članice EU niso zagotovile dovolj osebja za zapolnitev razpoložljivih delovnih mest 31.
The most important resource of the EUCAP Sahel Missions is their staff, both those seconded and paid for by the EU member states and those contracted locally by the Missions and funded out of the EU budget. 
Najpomembnejši vir misij EUCAP Sahel je osebje, in sicer tako osebje, ki je napoteno in ga plačujejo države članice EU, kot lokalno osebje, ki je v okviru misij zaposleno pogodbeno in se financira iz proračuna EU.
The Missions consistently experienced problems filling vacancies for seconded staff. 
Pri misijah se stalno pojavljajo težave z zapolnjevanjem prostih delovnih mest za napoteno osebje.
The EEAS invites the EU member states to provide candidates for secondment through calls for contributions, which are time-consuming and expensive to organise. 
ESZD poziva države članice EU, naj zagotovijo kandidate za napotitev s pozivi za prispevke, katerih organizacija je zamudna in draga.
24 calls for contributions were made for EUCAP Sahel Niger between 2012 and 2016 and 14 for EUCAP Sahel Mali between 2014 and 2016. 
Za misijo EUCAP Sahel Niger je bilo v obdobju 2012–2016 organiziranih 24 pozivov za prispevke, za misijo EUCAP Sahel Mali pa jih je bilo v obdobju 2014–2016 organiziranih 14.
These calls for contributions only resulted in filling half of the vacant posts published for Niger, and only two-thirds for Mali (see Tables 2 and 3). 
Na podlagi teh pozivov za prispevke je bila zapolnjena le polovica prostih delovnih mest, objavljenih za Niger, in le dve tretjini za Mali (glej tabeli 2 in 3).
The CIVCOM decides which posts are published exclusively for seconded staff and which are also open to contracted staff. 
Odbor CIVCOM se odloči, katera delovna mesta se objavijo izključno za napoteno osebje in katera so odprta tudi za pogodbeno osebje.
Contracted staff can only be recruited to posts for seconded staff if two consecutive calls for contributions fail to produce suitable seconded candidates. 
Pogodbeno osebje se lahko zaposli na delovna mesta za napoteno osebje samo, če po dveh zaporednih pozivih za prispevke ni ustreznih napotenih kandidatov.
Table 2 Đ EUCAP Sahel Niger: results of calls for contributions (2012-2016) 24 EUCAP Sahel Niger Ordinary Calls for Contributions Extraordinary Calls for Contributions Total number of posts published 276 59 Published as 'Seconded' 132 48% 20 34% Published as 'Seconded/Contracted' 144 52% 39 66% Posts Filled 163 59% 29 49% Posts Not filled 113 41% 30 51% Posts for which no applications were received 33 12% 9 15% Posts for which only one application was received 71 26% 9 15% Source: EUCAP Sahel Niger. 
Tabela 2 – EUCAP Sahel Niger: rezultati pozivov za prispevke (2012–2016) 24 EUCAP Sahel Niger Redni pozivi za prispevke Izredni pozivi za prispevke Skupno število objavljenih delovnih mest 276 59 Objavljena kot „napotitvena“ 132 48% 20 34% Objavljena kot „napotitvena/pogodbena“ 144 52% 39 66% Zasedena delovna mesta 163 59% 29 49% Nezasedena delovna mesta 113 41% 30 51% Delovna mesta, za katera ni bilo prejetih prijav 33 12% 9 15% Delovna mesta, za katera je bila prejeta samo ena prijava 71 26% 9 15% Vir: EUCAP Sahel Niger.
Table 3 Đ EUCAP Sahel Mali: results of calls for contributions (2014-2016) EUCAP Sahel Mali Ordinary Calls for Contributions Extraordinary Calls for Contributions Total number of posts published 198 21 Published as 'Seconded' 127 64% 5 24% Published as 'Seconded/Contracted' 71 36% 16 76% Posts Filled 139 70% 14 67% Posts Not filled 59 30% 7 33% Posts for which no applications were received 7 4% 0 0% Posts for which only one application was received 26 13% 1 5% Source: EUCAP Sahel Mali. 
Tabela 3 – EUCAP Sahel Mali: rezultati pozivov za prispevke (2014–2016) 25 EUCAP Sahel Mali Redni pozivi za prispevke Izredni pozivi za prispevke Skupno število objavljenih delovnih mest 198 21 Objavljena kot „napotitvena“ 127 64% 5 24% Objavljena kot „napotitvena/pogodbena“ 71 36% 16 76% Zasedena delovna mesta 139 70% 14 67% Nezasedena delovna mesta 59 30% 7 33% Delovna mesta, za katera ni bilo prejetih prijav 7 4% 0 0% Delovna mesta, za katera je bila prejeta samo ena prijava 26 13% 1 5% Vir: EUCAP Sahel Mali.
The difficulties faced by the Missions in Niger and Mali in obtaining seconded staff from EU member states are similar to those faced by previous civilian CSDP Missions34. The reasons include the fact that the qualifications and level of expertise required of such staff are high, and they need to be able to work in French35. Potential candidates also have to consider the precarious safety and living conditions. 
Težave, s katerimi se spopadata misiji v Nigru in Maliju pri pridobivanju napotenega osebja iz držav članic EU, so podobne težavam v prejšnjih civilnih misijah v okviru SVOP.34 Dva od razlogov sta, da je stopnja kvalifikacij in strokovnega znanja, ki se zahteva za tako osebje, visoka in da mora biti osebje sposobno sporazumevati se v francoščini.35 Morebitni kandidati morajo razmisliti tudi o negotovi varnosti in življenjskih razmerah.
Lastly, staffing civilian CSDP Missions is not always a high priority for EU member states. 
Poleg tega iskanje osebja za civilne misije v okviru SVOP ni vedno visoko na seznamu prednostnih nalog držav članic EU.
posts in the EUCAP Sahel Missions in Niger and Mali averaged 72 % and 77 % respectively in the relevant periods. 
Zato so bila delovna mesta v misijah EUCAP Sahel v Nigru in Maliju v zadevnih obdobjih v povprečju zasedena 72-oziroma 77-odstotno.
The length of secondment of staff from EU member states is two years on average or just one year for some EU member states. 
Osebje iz držav članic je v povprečju napoteno za dve leti, iz nekaterih držav članic pa samo za eno leto.
This is not enough time for individuals to build up sufficient knowledge of the various procedures and working conditions. 
To ni dovolj časa, da bi se posamezniki dovolj dobro seznanili z različnimi postopki in delovnimi pogoji.
We found that in addition to the shortness of the secondments, the high vacancy rate had a negative impact on the extent to which the Missions carried out their activities (see Box 3). 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da je poleg kratkotrajnosti napotitev na obseg izvajanja dejavnosti v okviru misij negativno vplivala tudi visoka stopnja nezasedenosti delovnih mest (glej okvir 3).
25 Box 3-Vacancies at the beginning of 2017 Ľ EUCAP Sahel Niger: at the beginning of 2017, the Mission had 39 vacancies (35 %36) in key posts in the operational units as well as in the monitoring, evaluation and procurement departments. 
26 Okvir 3 – Nezasedena delovna mesta na začetku leta 2017 • Misija EUCAP Sahel Niger: na začetku leta 2017 je bilo v misiji 39 nezasedenih delovnih mest (35 %36) na ključih funkcijah v operativnih enotah, pa tudi v oddelkih za spremljanje, ocenjevanje in javno naročanje.
Other vacancies included those for armed protection officers, and a press and public information officer. 
Druga nezasedena delovna mesta so bila delovna mesta za oborožene stražarje ter mesto predstavnika za odnose z mediji in odnose z javnostmi.
As a result: - fewer tender procedures were launched than planned meaning the equipment to carry out activities was not available; - there was no evaluation of training or projects; - the Mission was unable to start implementing activities related to arms and drugs trafficking and did not succeed in making activities sustainable. Ľ EUCAP Sahel Mali: at the beginning of 2017, the Mission had 50 vacancies (37 %37), mainly for advisors and trainers in key areas. 
Zato: – je bilo objavljenih manj postopkov za oddajo javnega naročila, kot je bilo načrtovano, kar pomeni, da oprema za izvajanje dejavnosti ni bila na voljo; – se usposabljanja ali projekti niso ocenjevali; – v okviru misije ni bilo mogoče začeti izvajati dejavnosti, povezanih z orožjem in nedovoljenim prometom s prepovedanimi drogami, misija pa ni mogla biti uspešna pri zagotavljanju, da so dejavnosti trajne. • Misija EUCAP Sahel Mali: na začetku leta 2017 je bilo v misiji 50 nezasedenih delovnih mest (37 %37), večinoma za svetovalce in izvajalce usposabljanja na ključnih področjih.
Implementation of some activities was delayed, but the Mission redistributed the workload between existing staff. 
Izvajanje nekaterih dejavnosti je bilo odloženo, vendar se je delovna obremenitev razporedila med obstoječe osebje.
Uncertain lifetime for the Missions made it difficult to plan an exit strategy 34. 
Negotov čas trajanja misij je oteževal načrtovanje izhodne strategije 34.
Based on the proposal of the EEAS (see paragraph 7), the Council set up the two Missions in the Sahel region to strengthen the capacities of the forces responsible for internal security. 
Svet je na podlagi predloga ESZD (glej odstavek 7) ustanovil dve misiji na območju Sahela, da bi okrepil zmogljivosti sil, odgovornih za notranjo varnost.
The Council decisions defined the objectives of the MissionsŐ work, but gave no indication of how long the Missions might exist. 
V sklepih Sveta so bili opredeljeni cilji dela misij, vendar ni bilo navedeno, kako dolgo bi lahko misiji trajali.
The EEAS is required to prepare an exit strategy for when the EU member states decide to end the Missions. 
ESZD mora pripraviti izhodno strategijo za primer, če se države članice odločijo, da bodo končale misiji.
The EEAS described the end state of the Missions. 
ESZD je opisala končno stanje misij, ni pa opredelila jasnega načrta za strategijo prehoda ali izstopa.
Stakeholders38 we interviewed were of the opinion that the Missions would exist in at least the medium-term in order to achieve the objectives set for them. 
Deležniki38, s katerimi smo opravili pogovore, so menili, da bi morali misiji trajati vsaj srednjeročno, da bi se dosegli zanju določeni cilji.
Greater certainty regarding the lifetime of the Missions would allow the Missions to improve the way in which they are run and how they plan operations. 
Večja gotovost v zvezi s trajanjem misij bi omogočila izboljšanje njunega vodenja in načrtovanja njunih operacij.
It would also make it easier to draw up a meaningful exit strategy. 
Poleg tega bi olajšala pripravo smotrne izhodne strategije.
The EUCAP Sahel Missions strengthened the capacity of the security forces, but results were not sustainable 36. 
Misiji EUCAP Sahel sta okrepili zmogljivost varnostnih sil, vendar rezultati niso bili trajni 36.
We examined how the EUCAP Sahel Missions in Niger and Mali carried out the activities planned, how they delivered, monitored and evaluated results, and whether the results were sustainable. 
Sodišče je preučilo, kako so se v okviru misij EUCAP Sahel v Nigru in Maliju izvajale načrtovane dejavnosti, kako so se dosegali, spremljali in ocenjevali rezultati ter ali so bili rezultati trajni.
We assessed: (a) whether the Missions had strengthened the capacity of the internal security forces; (b) whether the MissionsŐ results were sustainable; (c) whether indicators for monitoring the MissionsŐ results were appropriate; E.g. national ministries in Niger and Mali, embassies of some EU member states and donor organisations, such as GIZ, Civipol and Expertise France. 26 38 
Sodišče je ocenilo: (a) ali sta misiji okrepili zmogljivost notranjih varnostih sil; (b) ali so bili rezultati misij trajni; (c) ali so bili kazalniki za spremljanje rezultatov misij ustrezni; (d) ali so se postopki spremljanja in ocenjevanja v okviru misij osredotočali na učinek; (e) kako smotrni sta bili misiji glede na opažanja drugih deležnikov v obeh državah.
Working in a challenging context, the Missions strengthened the capacity of the security forces, albeit slowly 37. 
Kljub delu v težavnih razmerah sta misiji okrepili zmogljivost varnostnih sil, čeprav počasi 37.
The capacity-building needs of the forces responsible for internal security in both Niger and Mali are high. 
Potrebe sil, odgovornih za notranjo varnost v Nigru in Maliju, po okrepitvi zmogljivosti so velike.
The EUCAP Sahel Missions deliver training, equipment, advice and exercise a coordination function over the internal security forces through a range of tasks and activities. 
Misiji EUCAP Sahel zagotavljata usposabljanje, opremo in nasvete ter opravljata funkcijo usklajevanja notranjih varnostnih sil z različnimi nalogami in dejavnostmi.
The EU also provides support to the internal security sector through instruments such as the European Development Fund and the EU Trust Fund for Africa. 
EU zagotavlja podporo sektorju notranje varnosti z instrumenti, kot sta Evropski razvojni sklad in Skrbniški sklad EU za Afriko.
Living and working in countries on the edge of the Sahara desert with poor infrastructure and weak public administrations presents EUCAP staff with considerable challenges. 
Življenje in delo v državah na robu Sahare s slabo infrastrukturo in slabimi javnimi upravami pomeni za osebje misij EUCAP velik izziv.
Travel is complicated and staff must constantly be vigilant against the threat of terrorist attacks. 
Potovanje je zapleteno, osebje pa mora biti vseskozi pozorno na grožnje terorističnih napadov.
To meet their objectives, the Missions carry out activities, which are mostly ongoing and rolled over from one Council mandate to another and from one budgetary year to the next. 
Da bi izpolnili svoje cilje, misiji izvajata dejavnosti, ki so večinoma stalne ter se prenašajo z enega mandata Sveta na drugega in iz enega proračunskega leta v drugo.
We compared how the Missions carried out the activities planned with results reported and confirmed in interviews we held in Niger and Mali. 
Izvajanje načrtovanih dejavnosti je Sodišče primerjalo z rezultati, ki so bili sporočeni in potrjeni v pogovorih, ki smo jih opravili v Nigru in Maliju.
See Annexes III and IV for details of our findings. 
Za podrobnejše informacije o naših ugotovitvah glej Prilogi III in IV.
In some cases, the Missions made good progress, such as on providing training to fight terrorism and organised crime in Niger. 
Na nekaterih področjih sta misiji dosegli velik napredek, na primer pri zagotavljanju usposabljanja za boj proti terorizmu in organiziranemu kriminalu v Nigru.
In other cases, there was little or no progress, such as on setting up internal control and audit services in the ISFs in Mali. 
Na drugih področjih pa je bil napredek majhen ali ga sploh ni bilo, na primer pri vzpostavljanju služb za notranje kontroliranje in revizijo v notranjih varnostnih silah v Maliju.
Training courses 40. 
Tečaji usposabljanja 40.
We examined a sample of training courses for each of the Missions. 
Sodišče je preučilo vzorec tečajev usposabljanja za obe misiji.
The principal beneficiaries of the courses were the police, the gendarmerie and the national guard. 
Glavni upravičenci tečajev so bili policija, žandarmerija in nacionalna garda.
The training courses covered areas such as arrest techniques, crime scene management, forensic evidence analysis, criminal investigation, vehicle maintenance and detention of irregular 27 migrants. 
Tečaji usposabljanja so zajemali področja, kot so tehnike prijetja, vodenje postopka na kraju kaznivega dejanja, analiza forenzičnih dokazov, preiskovanje kaznivih dejanj, vzdrževanje vozil in pridržanje nezakonitih migrantov.