natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
73 In four of the nine Article 126(3) reports examined, the Commission concluded that the relevant factors present or seem to present a ‘mixed picture’39, and in three other reports it concluded that the relevant factors seem to present a favourable, or relatively favourable, situation40. 
73 Komisija je v štirih od devetih preučenih poročil iz člena 126(3) ugotovila, da pomembni dejavniki kažejo ali se zdi, da kažejo, mešano sliko39, v treh drugih poročilih pa, da se zdi, da pomembni dejavniki kažejo ugoden ali sorazmerno ugoden položaj40.
However, the reasoning behind these conclusions is unclear, as is the impact of this analysis on the final deci‐ sion whether or not to place a Member State under an EDP or extend the EDP deadline. ... without access to all the data used it is not possible to replicate the underlying calculations, ... 
Vendar pa so razlogi za take ugotovitve nejasni, kakor tudi ni jasen vpliv te analize na končno odločitev, ali bi zadevno državo članico uvrstili v postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem ali podaljšali rok za ta postopek. ... brez dostopa do vseh uporabljenih podatkov ni mogoče ponoviti osnovnih izračunov ...
74 Information on the data used by the Commission in its calculations was often not easily accessible. 
74 Informacije o podatkih, ki jih je Komisija uporabila v svojih izračunih, pogosto niso bile enostavno dostopne.
This finding was corroborated by the representatives of the national authorities of some of the Member States visited. 
To ugotovitev so potrdili predstavniki nacionalnih organov nekaterih obiskanih držav članic.
75 In the case of revised recommendations, for example, the information in the Commission’s relevant staff working document was not sufficient to replicate the calculation of the fiscal effort and other variables that are essential for the assess‐ ment of Member States’ compliance with the original recommendations. 
75 Pri revidiranih priporočilih informacije iz ustreznega delovnega dokumenta služb Komisije na primer niso zadostovale za ponovni izračun fiskalnega napora in drugih spremenljivk, ki so ključne za oceno tega, ali države članice izpolnjujejo prvotna priporočila.
In this regard, the working document underlying the Commission’s recommendation to extend the EDP deadline for France in February 2015 did not contain data in sup‐ port of the baseline scenario41 or any detail of additional discretionary revenue measures, although these data are essential to replicate the assessment of effec‐ tive action which led to the extension. 
V tem smislu delovni dokument, na katerem je temeljilo priporočilo Komisije za podaljšanje roka Franciji za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem iz februarja 2015, ni vseboval podatkov v podporo osnovnemu scenariju41 ali kakršnih koli podrobnosti o diskrecijskih ukrepih na strani prihodkov, čeprav so ti podatki ključni za ponovno izvedbo ocene uspešnih ukrepov, ki je privedla do podaljšanja.
39 Czech Republic (7.10.2009), Italy (7.10.2009), Cyprus (12.5.2010), Malta (13.5.2009). 
39 Češka (7. 10. 2009), Italija (7.
40 Germany (7.10.2009), France (18.2.2009), Malta (18.2.2009). 
2009), Ciper (12. 5. 2010), Malta (13.
41 The baseline scenario was based on the 2013 spring forecast underlying the 2013 EDP recommendations. 
41 Osnovni scenarij se je nanašal na napoved iz pomladi 2013, na kateri temeljijo priporočila za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem iz leta 2013.
Observations 49 ... and decisions are not always based on sufficiently objective arguments. 76 We reviewed the Commission analyses underlying the Council’s EDP decisions and recommendations in respect of the Member States in the sample. 
Opažanja 49 ... odločitve pa ne temeljijo vedno na dovolj objektivnih argumentih 76 Sodišče je pregledalo analize Komisije, na katerih temeljijo sklepi in priporočila Sveta glede postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem za države članice v vzorcu.
The legal framework governing the issue of EDP decisions and recommendations provides room for a relatively high degree of flexibility of interpretation and application. 
Pravni okvir, ki ureja vprašanje sklepov in priporočil glede postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, omogoča razmeroma visoko stopnjo prožnosti pri razlagi in uporabi.
This is true for the assessment of the Italian budgetary situation in the Article 126(3) report of 27.2.2015, which concluded that the debt criterion should be considered satisfied. 
To velja za oceno italijanskega proračunskega stanja iz poročila iz člena 126(3) z dne 27. februarja 2015, katere zaključek je bil, da je treba merilo dolga šteti za izpolnjeno.
Box 7 summarises our analysis of the case. 
V okviru 7 je povzeta naša analiza zadeve.
Compliance with the debt criterion – Italy Italy was placed under an EDP in November 2009. 
Izpolnjevanje merila dolga – Italija Italija je bila v postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem uvrščena novembra 2009.
The procedure was lifted in May 2013. 
Postopek je bil ukinjen maja 2013.
Since then, Italy has been required to comply with the three‐year transitional rule for the debt criterion. 
Od takrat mora Italija upoštevati triletno prehodno pravilo za merilo dolga.
In February 2015 the Com‐ mission carried out an assessment and concluded that the Member State was prima facie in breach of the debt criterion. 
Februarja 2015 je Komisija izvedla oceno in ugotovila, da država članica prima facie krši merilo dolga.
However, after taking account of the relevant factors, and in spite of the fact that the debt‐to‐GDP ratio was still increasing, the Commission assessed Italy to be compliant with the debt criterion. 
Komisija je po upoštevanju pomembnih dejavnikov in kljub temu, da se je delež javnega dolga v razmerju do BDP še vedno povečeval, vseeno ocenila, da Italija izpolnjuje merilo dolga.
The decision cited three main relevant factors: (i) The currently unfavourable economic situation, characterised by very low inflation, which make compli‐ ance with the debt rule particularly demanding. 
V odločitvi so bili navedeni trije glavni pomembni dejavniki: (i) Upoštevanje merila dolga je zaradi trenutnih neugodnih gospodarskih razmer, zaznamovanih z zelo nizko inflacijo, še posebej zahtevno.
Our analysis: the debt adjustment benchmark already takes into account the influence of the economic cycle on the pace of debt reduction. 
Analiza Sodišča: Referenčno merilo za prilagoditev dolga že upošteva vpliv gospodarskega cikla na hitrost zmanjševanja dolga.
Rules for doing so are set out in a note addressed to the Economic and Finan‐ cial Committee alternates entitled ‘Operationalising the debt criterion in the Excessive Deficit Procedure’. 
Pravila za to so določena v dopisu, poslanem namestnikom Ekonomsko-finančnega odbora, z naslovom Operationalising the debt criterion in the Excessive Deficit Procedure (operacionalizacija merila dolga v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem).
This document makes it clear that the adjustment of debt for the cycle also factors in the evolution of prices, which is captured by the GDP price deflator. (ii) Adherence to the medium‐term budgetary objective (MTO) or the path of adjustment towards it. 
Iz tega dokumenta je razvidno, da je pri prilagoditvi dolga ciklu upoštevan tudi razvoj cen, ki je zajet v deflatorju cen BDP. (ii) Skladnost s srednjeročnim proračunskim ciljem ali potek prilagoditve v tej smeri.
Accord‐ ing to DG Economic and Financial Affairs, strict compliance or convergence with the MTO implies, under normal macroeconomic circumstances, compliance with the debt criterion in the medium term and debt sustainability. 
Dosledno upoštevanje srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja ali približevanje temu cilju v običajnih makroekonomskih razmerah po mnenju GD za gospodarske in finančne zadeve pomeni izpolnjevanje merila dolga v srednjeročnem obdobju in vzdržnost dolga.
Our analysis: based on the 2015 winter EEF, Italy complied with the MTO in 2014 (in the sense that, its econo‐ my being in recession, it was not required to make any adjustment towards the MTO – the structural balance actually deteriorated by 0.2 %) and was forecast to comply in 2015. 
Analiza Sodišča: Italija je leta 2014 glede na evropsko gospodarsko napoved iz zime 2015 izpolnjevala srednjeročni proračunski cilj (v smislu, da ni bila potrebna nobena prilagoditev za doseganje srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja, ker je bilo njeno gospodarstvo v recesiji – strukturni saldo se je dejansko poslabšal za 0,2 %), po napovedih pa naj bi ga izpolnjevala tudi leta 2015.
However, although the 2015 winter EEF also covers 2016, the assessment only takes account of 2014 and 2015. 
Čeprav evropska gospodarska napoved iz zime 2015 zajema tudi leto 2016, pa sta v oceno vključeni zgolj leti 2014 in 2015.
According to the Commission’s fore‐ cast Italy will not be in line with the path of adjustment to the MTO in 2016 (forecast structural effort ‐0.2 % instead of the +0.5 % required). 
Italija leta 2016 po napovedih Komisije ne bo v skladu s potekom prilagoditve za doseganje srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja (napovedan strukturni napor je –0,2 %, zahteva pa se +0,5 %).
Hence, Italy was not forecast to meet the condition of ‘strictly respecting the required adjustment towards the MTO’. 
Italija naj torej ne bi izpolnjevala pogoja strogega spoštovanja zahtevane prilagoditve za doseganje srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja.
Observations 50 (iii) Structural reforms: in a January 2015 communication42, the Commission clarified that the relevant factors to be taken into account when deciding not to launch an EDP include major structural reforms having direct long‐term positive budgetary effects and planned in sufficient detail by the Member State. 
Opažanja 50 (iii) Strukturne reforme: Komisija je v svojem sporočilu iz januarja 201542 pojasnila, da pomembni dejavniki, ki jih je treba upoštevati pri odločitvi o neuvedbi postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, vključujejo izvajanje večjih strukturnih reform, ki imajo neposredne dolgoročne pozitivne proračunske učinke in jih država članica dovolj podrobno načrtuje.
In DG Economic and Financial Affairs’s view, Italy had made progress with the implementation of an extensive reform agenda with measures ‘expected to have a positive impact on growth and therefore on the sus‐ tainability of public finance’. 
Italija je po mnenju GD za gospodarske in finančne zadeve dosegla napredek pri izvajanju obsežnega programa reform z ukrepi, ki naj bi imeli pozitiven učinek na rast in s tem na vzdržnost javnih financ.
Our analysis: the communication does not quantify the terms ‘major positive impact on growth’ and ‘long‐term positive budgetary impact’. 
Analiza Sodišča: V sporočilu pojma „pomembni pozitivni učinek na rast“ in „dolgoročni pozitivni proračunski učinek“ nista količinsko opredeljena.
Italy itself did quantify the expected impact of reforms on growth, but not the long‐term budgetary impact. 
Italija je sama količinsko opredelila pričakovani učinek reform na rast, dolgoročnega proračunskega učinka pa ne.
In addition, the Commission did not share some of the assumptions underlying Italy’s estimate of a positive impact on growth, merely stating that ‘these results have not been en‐ dorsed by any national independent institution and seem to over‐estimate the impact of the reforms’. 
Poleg tega Komisija ni sporočila nekaterih predpostavk, na katerih temelji ocena Italije glede pozitivnega učinka na rast, in je zgolj navedla, da teh rezultatov ni podprla nobena neodvisna nacionalna institucija in da se zdi, da precenjujejo učinek reform.
Finally, there is no methodological framework in place that explains how the budgetary cost of reforms should be estimated and factored into the assessment of compliance with the debt criterion. 
Vzpostavljen ni bil noben metodološki okvir, ki bi pojasnil, kako naj bi se ocenilo proračunske stroške reform in se jih upoštevalo pri oceni izpolnjevanja merila dolga.
42 COM(2015) 12 final of 13 January 2015 ‘Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact’. 
42 COM(2015) 12 final z dne 13. januarja 2015 – Kako čim bolje izkoristiti prožnost v okviru obstoječih pravil Pakta za stabilnost in rast.
77 We focused on Italy because, of the Member States in the sample, it was the only one where an EDP was not launched even though the country failed to meet the debt benchmark; the decision was shaped by considerations drawn from the analysis of other relevant factors. 
77 Sodišče se je osredotočilo na Italijo, ker je bila edina izmed držav članic v vzorcu, v kateri se postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem ni začel, čeprav država ni izpolnjevala referenčnega merila dolga; na odločitev so vplivale ugotovitve iz analize drugih pomembnih dejavnikov.
Of the five other Member States, the Czech Republic’s debt‐to‐GDP ratio is below the threshold, and Germany is currently meeting the debt benchmark. 
Med ostalimi petimi državami članicami je na Češkem delež javnega dolga v razmerju do BDP pod pragom, Nemčija pa trenutno izpolnjuje referenčno merilo dolga.
Malta was under an EDP from 2013, when it missed the debt requirement, until 2015, when it too became compliant for both deficit and debt. 
Malta je bila v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem od leta 2013, ko ni izpolnjevala zahteve glede dolga, do leta 2015, ko je začela izpolnjevati zahteve glede primanjkljaja in dolga.
The rules regarding surveillance are different for Cyprus, since it was placed under a financial assistance programme in 2013. 
Pravila o nadzoru so drugačna za Ciper, saj je bil leta 2013 vključen v program finančne pomoči.
Finally, in the case of France, which has been under an EDP since 2009, according to Regulation EC No 1467/97 the debt criterion will only apply when the Member State exits the EDP, i.e. not before 2018. 
Za Francijo, ki je v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem od leta 2009, pa bo v skladu z Uredbo št. 1467/97 merilo dolga veljalo šele, ko bo država članica izstopila iz postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, torej ne pred letom 2018.
Observations 51 78 In the case of Italy, the Commission took advantage of the option of invoking rel‐ evant factors in order to avoid applying the EDP to a Member State which would be highly unlikely to comply with the debt benchmark. 
Opažanja 51 78 Komisija je v primeru Italije izkoristila možnost sklicevanja na pomembne dejavnike, da postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem ne bi uporabila pri državi članici, ki zelo verjetno ne bi izpolnila referenčnega merila dolga.
In other words, rather than addressing the root causes that made compliance with the benchmark very demanding (because, for example, it does not take account of the initial level of debt), the Commission put off the problem by emphasising relevant fac‐ tors which made strict compliance with the benchmark a matter of secondary importance. 
To pomeni, da je Komisija, namesto da bi obravnavala temeljne vzroke, zaradi katerih je referenčno merilo tako težko izpolnjevati (na primer ker ne upošteva začetne ravni dolga), odložila problem, tako da je poudarila pomembne dejavnike, zaradi česar je dosledno upoštevanje referenčnega merila postalo drugotnega pomena.
79 For three of the six Member States in the sample the EDP deadline was extended and revised recommendations were issued (see Table 5). 
79 Za tri od šestih držav članic v vzorcu je bil rok za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem podaljšan in izdana so bila revidirana priporočila (glej tabelo 5).
Revised recommendations Original recommendations Revised recommendations Date Deadline Average annual fiscal effort Commission assessment date Date of recommendation Extension Deadline Average annual fiscal effort November 2009 November 2009 1 year 2013 Above 1 % of GDP over the period 2010-2013 France April 2009 2012 At least 1 % of GDP starting in 2010 May 2013 June 2013 2 years 2015 1.3 % of GDP in 2013, 0.8 % of GDP in 2014, 0.8 % of GDP in 2015 February 2015 March 2015 2 years 2017 at the latest 0.5 % of GDP in 2015, 0.8 % of GDP in 2016, 0.9 % of GDP in 2017 Cyprus July 2010 2012 At least 1.5 % of GDP over the period 2011-2012 May 2013 May 2013 4 years 2016 Not specified Malta July 2009 2010 Not specified February 2010 February 2010 1 year 2011 0.75 % of GDP in 2011 Source: ECA. 
Revidirana priporočila Prvotna priporočila Revidirana priporočila Datum Rok Povprečni letni fiskalni napor Datum ocene Komisije Datum priporočila Podaljšanje Rok Povprečni letni fiskalni napor november 2009 november 2009 1 leto 2013 nad 1 % BDP v obdobju 2010–2013 Francija april 2009 2012 vsaj 1 % BDP od leta 2010 maj 2013 junij 2013 2 leti 2015 1,3 % BDP leta 2013, 0,8 % BDP leta 2014, 0,8 % BDP leta 2015 februar 2015 marec 2015 2 leti najpozneje leta 2017 0,5 % BDP leta 2015, 0,8 % BDP leta 2016, 0,9 % BDP leta 2017 Ciper julij 2010 2012 najmanj 1,5 % BDP v obdobju 2011–2012 maj 2013 maj 2013 4 leta 2016 ni opredeljeno Malta julij 2009 2010 ni opredeljeno februar 2010 februar 2010 1 leto 2011 0,75 % BDP leta 2011 Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče.
Table 5 
Tabela 5
In particular, the revised recommendation was based on a bottom‐up assessment which stated that, ‘overall the available evidence does not allow concluding that the recom‐ mended effort has not been delivered in 2013 – 2014’43. 
Revidirano priporočilo je namreč temeljilo na oceni od spodaj navzgor, v kateri je bilo navedeno, da razpoložljivi dokazi na splošno ne omogočajo sklepati, da priporočen napor v letih 2013 in 2014 ni bil izpolnjen43.
This despite the fact that the calculation of structural effort included the effects of a discretionary revenue measure44 which, being temporary (financial impact from 2014 to 2016), should not have been taken into account. 
In to kljub dejstvu, da so bili v izračun strukturnega napora vključeni učinki diskrecijskih ukrepov na strani prihodkov44, ki zaradi svoje začasne narave (finančni vpliv od leta 2014 do leta 2016) ne bi smeli biti upoštevani.
The measure in question was worth 0.1 % of GDP. 
Zadevni ukrep je znašal 0,1 % BDP.
Without it the structural effort would have fallen short of the 1.1 % needed to justify extension of the EDP deadline. 
Strukturni napor brez njega ne bi dosegel 1,1 %, potrebnega za utemeljeno podaljšanje roka za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
81 Moreover, the Commission regarded France as compliant in retrospect and invoked compliance to justify extending the deadline so as to bring the deficit below the threshold at a more relaxed pace. 
81 Poleg tega je Komisija menila, da je Francija izpolnjevala zahteve za nazaj, in se sklicevala na skladnost, da bi utemeljila podaljšanje roka, tako da bi se lahko primanjkljaj pod prag spustil bolj zlagoma.
However, this assessment was based only on 2013 and 2014 data. 
Toda ta ocena je temeljila zgolj na podatkih iz let 2013 in 2014.
The forecasts available for 2015, which showed that France was going to miss its targets, were not taken into account in the Commis‐ sion’s assessment (see Annex VI). 
Napovedi, ki so bile na voljo za leto 2015 in so pokazale, da Francija ne bo dosegla svojih ciljev, niso bile upoštevane v oceni Komisije (glej Prilogo VI).
82 According to the Vademecum on the SGP, the assessment of effective action should be brought forward if there is a risk that the outturn data at the expiry of the deadline will show that the headline deficit target has been missed. 
82 V skladu s priročnikom o Paktu za stabilnost in rast je treba oceno uspešnih ukrepov opraviti, če obstaja tveganje, da bodo podatki o realizaciji ob izteku roka pokazali, da cilj glede nominalnega primanjkljaja ni bil dosežen.
The purpose of this recommendation is to prevent any conflict between Article 10(3) of Regulation EC No 1467/97, which requires the EDP to be stepped up immedi‐ ately if, according to the outturn data, the headline target is missed, and Article 3(5) of the same regulation, which allows for an extension of the deadline on the basis that effective action was taken (i.e. the Member State achieved the required fiscal effort as assessed using top‐down and/or bottom‐up indicators). 
Namen tega priporočila je preprečiti neskladje med členom 10(3) Uredbe št. 1467/97, ki določa, da je treba postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem nemudoma zaostriti, če glede na podatke o realizaciji krovni cilj ni bil dosežen, in členom 3(5) iste uredbe, ki dopušča podaljšanje roka, če so bili sprejeti uspešni ukrepi (torej je država članica po oceni s kazalniki od zgoraj navzdol in/ali od spodaj navzgor dosegla zahtevan fiskalni napor).
However, according to the information available at the time of the assessment France was not on course to meet any nominal or structural indicators by the end‐2015 deadline. 
Vendar je glede na informacije, ki so bile na voljo v času ocene, kazalo, da Francija do roka konec leta 2015 ne bo dosegla nominalnih ali strukturnih kazalnikov.
Rather than extending the deadline, therefore, the Commission should have either issued an early warning (through an autonomous recommendation) or stepped up the procedure. 
Komisija bi torej namesto podaljšanja roka morala izdati zgodnje opozorilo (s samostojnim priporočilom) ali zaostriti postopek.
43 SWD(2015) 19 final of 27 February 2015, p. 
43 SWD(2015) 19 final z dne 27. februarja 2015, str.
44 Increase from 5 % to 10.7 % in the rate of the exceptional contribution on corporate income tax (‘Contribution exceptionnelle sur l’impôt sur les societés’). 
44 Povečanje stopnje izrednega prispevka k davku od prihodkov pravnih oseb (Contribution exceptionnelle sur l’impôt sur les societés) s 5 % na 10,7 %.
The measure was introduced on 29 December 2013 and is due to expire on 30 December 2016. 
Ta ukrep je bil uveden 29. decembra 2013, potekel pa bo 30. decembra 2016.
Observations 53 83 The Commission made use of the high degree of flexibility and discretion afford‐ ed by the SGP rules in its assessments of Italy and France. 
Opažanja 53 83 Komisija je v svojih ocenah Italije in Francije uporabila visoko stopnjo prožnosti in proste presoje, ki ju omogočajo pravila Pakta za stabilnost in rast.
Moreover, there were unexplained differences between the EDP decisions and recommendations adopted by the Council and those proposed by the Commission 84 We compared EDP decisions and recommendations in the version finally adopted by the Council with those proposed by the Commission, and found a number of differences for which the available records did not give underlying reasons. 
Poleg tega so bile med sklepi in priporočili glede postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, ki jih je sprejel Svet, in tistimi, ki jih je predlagala Komisija, nepojasnjene razlike 84 Različice sklepov in priporočil glede postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, ki jih je na koncu sprejel Svet, je Sodišče primerjalo s sklepi in priporočili, ki jih je predlagala Komisija.
For example, in the case of Cyprus (06/07/2010) the Commission recommended 1.75 % of GDP over the period 2010‐2012. 
Našlo je več razlik, vendar v razpoložljivih evidencah niso bili navedeni razlogi zanje. Komisija je na primer v primeru Cipra (6.
This was changed in the Council’s rec‐ ommendation to 1.5 % of GDP over the period 2011‐2012. 
V priporočilu Sveta je bil ta odstotek za obdobje 2011–2012 spremenjen na 1,5-odstotni BDP.
For the most relevant discrepancies see Annex VII. 
Najpomembnejša razhajanja so navedena v Prilogi VII.