natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For the audit of regional policy, energy and transport, the following specific issues should be noted: (a) the audit involved the examination of a sample of 180 interim and final payments (14) in Member States and at the Commission; (b) the assessment of systems covered: — audit authorities for ERDF, ESF and CF in the 2007-2013 programming period (15), _____________ (14) This sample comprises 180 payments made to 129 ERDF, 39 CF, 8 Energy and 4 Transport projects. 
V zvezi z revizijo regionalne politike, energetike in prometa je treba upoštevati naslednje posebnosti: (a) pri reviziji je bil uporabljen vzorec 180 vmesnih in končnih plačil (14) v državah članicah in Komisiji; (b) ocena sistemov je zajemala: — revizijske organe za ESRR, ESS in KS v programskem obdobju 2007–2013 (15), _____________ (14) Ta vzorec zajema 180 plačil, izvršenih za 129 projektov ESRR, 39 projektov KS, 8 projektov na področju energetike in 4 projekte na področju prometa.
148 of the payments to ERDF/CF projects relate to the 2007-2013 programming period and 20 to the 2000-2006 period. 
148 plačil za projekte ESRR/KS se nanaša na programsko obdobje 2007–2013,20 pa na obdobje 2000–2006.
The sample was drawn from all payments, with the exception of advances which amounted to 1,4 billion euro in 2011. 
Vzorec je bil izbran iz vseh plačil, razen predplačil, ki so v letu 2011 znašala 1,4 milijarde EUR.
(15) The Court’s audit work regarding AAs consisted of: (a) an exam­ ination of a sample of seven AAs (and, where applicable, delegated audit bodies) in seven Member States (Czech Republic, Greece, Italy (Sicily), Latvia, Hungary, Portugal and Romania); and (b) a review of the Commission’s supervisory activities of AAs as a whole. 
(15) Revizijsko delo Sodišča v zvezi z revizijskimi organi je zajemalo: (a) pregled vzorca sedmih revizijskih organov (in po potrebi pooblaščenih revizijskih organov) v sedmih državah članicah (Češka, Grčija, Italija (Sicilija), Latvija, Madžarska, Portugalska in Romunija) in (b) pregled vseh nadzornih dejavnosti Komisije v zvezi z revizijskimi organi.
See the 2010 Annual Report, paragraphs 4.37 to 4.44. 
Glej letno poročilo za proračunsko leto 2010, odstavke 4.37 do 4.44.
EN 12.11.2012 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion C344/127 T H E C O U R T ’ S O B S E R VA T I O N S — the procedures implemented at Commission and Member State level with regard to the programme closure for the 2000-2006 programming period, — a review of the Commission’s management represen­ tations contained in the Annual Activity Reports of DG Regional Policy, DG Mobility and Transport and DG Energy. 
SL 12.11.2012 UradnilistEvropskeunije C344/127 U G O T OV I T V E S O D I Š Č A — postopke, ki se izvajajo na ravni Komisije in držav članic v zvezi z zaključevanjem programov iz program­ skega obdobja 2000–2006, — pregled poslovodskih predstavitev Komisije iz letnih poročil o dejavnostih GD za regionalno politiko, GD za mobilnost in promet ter GD za energetiko.
REGULARITY OF TRANSACTIONS 5.28. Annex 5.1 contains a summary of the results of transaction testing. 
PRAVILNOST TRANSAKCIJ 5.28 V Prilogi 5.1 so povzeti rezultati preizkušanja transak­ cij.
The most likely error estimated by the Court is 6,0 % (16). 
Ocenjuje, da je najverjetnejša stopnja napake 6,0 % (16).
T H E C O M M I S S I O N ’ S R E P L I E S 5.29. For62%oftheregionalpolicytransactionsaffected by error, the Court considers that sufficient information was available for the Member State authorities to have detected and corrected at least some of the errors prior to certifying the expenditure to the Commission. 
O D G O V O R I K O M I S I J E 5.29 Sodišče meni, da so imeli organi držav članic pri 62 % transakcij na področju regionalne politike, na katere so vplivale napake, na voljo dovolj informacij, da bi lahko pred potrditvijo odhodkov Komisiji vsaj nekatere odkrili in popravili.
5.30. In regional policy, weaknesses in verifications by national authorities were detected in particular in the ‘first level checks’ carried out by managing authorities and inter­ mediate bodies. _____________ (16) The Court calculates its estimate of error from a representative statistical sample. 
5.30 Zaregionalnopolitikosobilevpreverjanjih,kijih izvajajo nacionalni organi, ugotovljene slabosti, zlasti v „pre­ gledih na prvi stopnji“, ki jih izvajajo organi upravljanja in posredniška telesa. _____________ (16) Sodišče svojo oceno napake izračuna na podlagi reprezentativnega statističnega vzorca.
The figure quoted is the best estimate (known as the MLE). The Court has 95 % confidence that the rate of error in the population lies between LEL 3,0 % and UEL 9,0 % (the lower and upper error limits respectively). 
Navedeni številčni podatek je najboljša ocena (znana kot najverjetnejša stopnja napake). Sodišče je 95-odstotno prepričano, da je stopnja napake v populaciji med 3,0 % in 9,0 % (spodnja oz. zgornja meja napake).
5.28. As shown in Table 1.3 of Chapter 1, the combined most likely error for regional policy, transport, energy and employment and social affairs also decreased considerably compared to 2010, from 7,7 % to 5,1 %. 
5.28 Kot je prikazano v tabeli 1.3 poglavja 1, je v primerjavi z letom 2010 znatno upadla tudi skupna najverjetnejša stopnja napake za regionalno politiko, promet, energetiko in zaposlovanje ter socialne zadeve, in sicer s 7,7 na 5,1 odstotka.
The Commission will continue to focus its actions on the most risky programmes and/or Member States. 
Komisija bo nadaljevala z usmerjanjem svojih ukrepov na najbolj tvegane programe in/ali države članice.
5.29. The Commission is strictly following up these cases to ensure that the concerned systems better prevent errors before certifi­ cation in the future. 
5.29 Komisija te primere dosledno spremlja za zagotovitev, da bodo zadevni sistemi v prihodnosti bolje preprečevali napake pred potrditvijo.
However, on-the-spot verifications on operations may also intervene at a later stage of project implementation, after certification and up to closure, which explains why part of the errors in the Court’s sample could not be detected (see also Commission replies to paragraphs 5.22 and 5.24). 
Vendar pa se lahko preverjanja na kraju samem izvedejo tudi v poznejši fazi izvajanja projekta, to je v času po potrditvi in vse do zaključka, zato dela napak iz vzorca Sodišča ni bilo mogoče odkriti (glej tudi odgovor Komisije na odstavka 5.22 in 5.24).
The impact of the control system in reducing error rates is usually only seen in subsequent years, after all layers of controls have been implemented. 
Vpliv kontrolnega sistema na zmanjšanje stopnje napak je običajno viden šele v naslednjih letih, ko so izvedene vse plasti kontrol.
The Commission notes that for the third consecutive year, the level of error (MLE 6,0 %) remains well below those reported by the Court in the period 2006-2008. 
Komisija ugotavlja, da je stopnja napake (MLE 6,0 %) tretje leto zapored precej nižja od stopenj, o katerih je Sodišče poro­ čalo v obdobju 2006–2008.
This positive development derives from the reinforced control provisions of the 2007-2013 programming period and its strict policy of interruptions/suspensions when deficiencies are identified, in line with its 2008 Action Plan. 
Do tega pozitivnega razvoja je prišlo zaradi okrepljenih določb o kontroli za programsko obdobje 2007–2013 in stroge politike Komisije pri prekinitvah plačilnih rokov in začasnih ustavitvah plačil, če so odkrite pomanjkljivosti, kar je v skladu z njenim akcijskim načrtom iz leta 2008.
EN C 344/128 Official Journal T H E C O U R T ’ S O B S E R VA T I O N S Failures to respect public procurement rules identified in one quarter of transactions 5.31. Previous years' audits have shown that public procurement procedures are particularly prone to error (17). 
SL C 344/128 Uradni list Evropske unije U G OT OV I T V E S O D I Š Č A Kršitve pravil javnega naročanja so bile ugotovljene pri četrtini transakcij 5.31 Revizije v prejšnjih letih so pokazale, da je zlasti veliko napak v postopkih javnega naročanja (17).
In 2011, the Court audited 298 public procurement procedures for works and services underlying the expenditure for the 180 transactions certified to the Commission (18). 
Sodišče je za leto 2011 revidiralo 298 postopkov javnega naročanja za dela in storitve, ki so bili osnova za odhodke za 180 transakcij, potr­ jenih Komisiji (18).
The combined estimated contract value for the public procurements audited amounts to 6,7 billion euro (19). 
Skupna ocenjena vrednost naročil pri revi­ diranih postopkih javnega naročanja znaša 6,7 milijarde EUR (19).
5.32. The Court identified instances of non-compliance with EU and national public procurement rules in 25 % of the 180 transactions audited. 
5.32 Sodišče je v 25% od 180 revidiranih transakcij odkrilo primere neskladnosti s pravili EU in nacionalnimi pravili javnega naročanja.
Serious failures to respect these rules were identified in 9 % of the transactions audited (see example 5.1). 
V 9 % revidiranih transakcij so bile ugotovljene resne kršitve teh pravil (glej primer 5.1).
These errors account for 44 % of all quantifiable errors and make up approximately 58 % of the estimated error rate for this policy group. (a) Use of direct award without justification: In the case of an EEPR project concerning the construction of a gas pipeline, the contracts related to the works in the second and third stage of the project were awarded without tendering to the consortium that had been awarded a contract for the first stage of the pipeline five years earlier. 
Te napake predstavljajo 44% vseh količinsko opredeljivih napak in približno 58 % ocenjene stopnje napake v tej skupini politik. Primer 5.1 – Resne kršitve pravil javnega naročanja (a) Uporaba neposredne oddaje brez utemeljitve: Pri projektu EEPO za gradnjo plinovoda so bila naročila za gradbena dela v drugi in tretji fazi projekta brez javnega razpisa oddana konzorciju, ki mu je bilo oddano naročilo za prvo fazo gradnje plinovoda pet let prej.
This is not in line with the applicable EU and national public procurement laws. (b) Direct award of additional works in the absence of unforeseeable circumstances: In the case of a CF project related to road construction, additional works relating to amendments made subsequent to the approval of the original plan were awarded directly to the same contractor. 
To ni skladno z veljavno zakonodajo EU in nacionalnimi zakoni o javnem naročanju. (b) Neposredna oddaja dodatnih del, čeprav ni bilo nepredvidenih okoliščin: Pri projektu KS za gradnjo ceste so bila dodatna dela, povezana s spremembami po odobritvi prvotnega načrta, neposredno oddana istemu izvajalcu.
These additional works were not due to unforeseeable circumstances, therefore a breach of public procurement rules occurred. _____________ (17) See European Commission: ‘Analysis of errors in the Cohesion Policy for the years 2006-2009’ (SEC(2011) 1179, 5.10.2011). 
Ta dodatna dela niso bila posledica nepredvidenih okoliščin, zato je bila to kršitev pravil javnega naročanja. _____________ (17) Glej dokument Evropske komisije: Analysis of errors in the Cohesion Policy for the years 2006-2009 (Analiza napak v kohezijski politiki za obdobje 2006–2009)(SEC(2011)1179, 5.10.2011).
(18) For 41 % of the 298 public procurement procedures audited by the Court the contract value was above the threshold which made them subject to EU public procurement rules as transposed into national law. 
(18) Pri 41 % od 298 postopkov javnega naročanja, ki jih je revidiralo Sodišče, je vrednost naročila presegala mejno vrednost, zaradi česar so zanje veljala pravila EU za javno naročanje, kakor so bila prenesena v nacionalno zakonodajo.
(19) This amount represents the total expenditure for the contracts awarded, part of which has been certified under the audited expen­ diture declarations. of the European Union 12.11.2012 T H E C O M M I S S I O N ’ S R E P L I E S 5.31. 
(19) Znesek pomeni skupne odhodke za oddana naročila, katerih del je bil potrjen v okviru revidiranih izjav o izdatkih.
Public procurement errors relate to non-compliance with internal market rules, and are not specific to cohesion policy, as shown in other chapters of this report. 5.32. 
12.11.2012 O D G O V O R I K O M I S I J E Do napak pri javnem naročanju prihaja zaradi neupošte­ vanja pravil notranjega trga in – kot je prikazano v drugih poglavjih tega poročila – niso posebnost kohezijske politike.
While the Commission and the Court audit compliance with public procurement rules in the same way, the Commission applies proportionate flat-rate corrections in cohesion policy thereby addressing the risk of damage to the EU budget and taking into account the nature and gravity of the irregularities. 
5.32 Medtem ko Komisija in Sodišče na isti način preverjata skladnost s pravili o javnih naročilih, pa Komisija v kohezijski politiki uporablja sorazmerne pavšalne popravke in tako obravnava tveganje škode za proračun EU ter upošteva vrsto in težo nepravilnosti.
These flat rates are applied by the Commission and by most national authorities when imposing financial corrections for infringements of public procurement rules, including when following up all public procurement errors reported by the Court. Example 5.1 — Serious failures to respect public procurement rules 
Komisija in večina nacionalnih organov uporabljajo te pavšalne popravke pri uvedbi finančnih popravkov za kršenje pravil o javnih naročilih, med drugim pri spremljanju vseh napak pri javnem naro­ čanju, ki jih navede Sodišče. 5.31
EN 12.11.2012 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion C344/129 T H E C O U R T ’ S O B S E R VA T I O N S (c) Contract awarded to single bidder without obtaining intended price reduction during negotiations: In the case of a CF project related to the construction of a sludge treatment facility, only one offer was received. 
SL 12.11.2012 UradnilistEvropskeunije C344/129 U G O T OV I T V E S O D I Š Č A (c) Oddaja naročila edinemu ponudniku, ne da bi bilo med pogajanji doseženo načrtovano znižanje cene: Pri projektu KS za gradnjo naprave za obdelavo blata je bila prejeta samo ena ponudba.
The beneficiary judged the offer to be unacceptable due to its high price, which was more than double the estimated budget. 
Upravičenec je presodil, da ponudba zaradi visoke cene, ki je bila več kot dvakrat višja od ocenjenega proračuna, ni sprejemljiva.
Following these negotiations, the contract was awarded with only a 1 % decrease in the offered price. 
Nato je začel pogajanja s tem edinim ponudnikom, po katerih je bilo naročilo oddano s samo 1-odstotnim znižanjem ponujene cene.
Given the lack of success of the negotiations to secure a better price, the beneficiary should have concluded that the tender procedure had been unsuccessful. (d) Artificial split of tenders: In the case of an ERDF project related to the provision of advisory services to a national ministry, several small-scale contracts were directly awarded for similar or identical services. 
Glede na neuspešnost pogajanj pri zagotovitvi boljše cene bi moral upravičenec skleniti, da je bil razpisni postopek neuspešen. (d) Nepotrebno ločevanje naročila na več razpisov: Pri projektu ESRR za zagotavljanje svetovalnih storitev nacionalnemu ministrstvu je bilo za podobne ali enake storitve neposredno oddanih več naročil majhnega obsega.
In accordance with EU and national procurement laws, these services should have been procured together as a single service and, because the aggregate value would then have exceeded a certain threshold, a contract should only have been awarded following a public tendering procedure, allowing more bidders the possibility to submit an offer. (e) Significant changes in scope of the contracted works: In the case of a CF project related to the construction of a new metro line, the scope and budget of a related service contract was changed significantly through the involvement of experts who initially had not been foreseen. 
V skladu s pravili EU in nacionalnimi pravili javnega naročanja bi morale biti te storitve naročene skupaj kot ena storitev. Ker bi v tem primeru skupna vrednost presegla določeno mejno vrednost, bi bilo lahko naročilo oddano samo po postopku javnega razpisa, kar bi omogočilo, da bi lahko ponudbo oddalo več ponudnikov. (e) Precejšnje spremembe v obsegu oddanih del: Pri projektu KS za gradnjo nove proge podzemne železnice sta bila zaradi sodelovanja strokovnjakov, ki prvotno niso bili predvideni, močno spremenjena obseg in proračun s tem povezanega naročila storitev.
The additional tasks to be carried out were not due to unforeseeable circumstances, but rather to the way the contracting authority had planned the project. 
Dodatne naloge, ki jih je bilo treba izvesti, niso bile posledica nepredvidljivih okoliščin, ampak tega, kako je naročnik načrtoval projekt.
These errors include cases of non-compliance with the information and publicity requirements (such as late publication of award notices), shortcomings in the tender specification and procedural weaknesses in the evaluation of offers. 
Med temi napakami so bili primeri neskladnosti z zahtevami za obveščanje in oglaševanje (kot je pozna objava obvestil o dodelitvi), pomanjkljivosti v razpisni dokumentaciji in postop­ kovne slabosti pri ocenjevanju ponudb.
These errors do not contribute to the error rate estimated by the Court (see paragraph 5.28) (20). _____________ (20) Further information regarding the Court's approach to the quan­ tification of public procurement errors is set out in Annex 1.1, points 10 and 11. 
Te napake ne prispe­ vajo k stopnji napake, ki jo je ocenilo Sodišče (glej odstavek 5.28) (20).
5.33. EN C 344/130 Official Journal T H E C O U R T ’ S O B S E R VA T I O N S Ineligible costs account for more than half of all quantifiable errors detected by the Court 5.34. 
SL C 344/130 Uradni list Evropske unije U G OT OV I T V E S O D I Š Č A 12.11.2012 Neupravičeni stroški predstavljajo več kot polovico vseh količinsko opredeljivih napak, ki jih je odkrilo Sodišče 5.34 Sodišče je ugotovilo, da so bili v 12 % revidiranih transakcij prijavljeni neupravičeni stroški.
These account for 56 % of all quantifiable errors and make up approximately 42 % of the estimated error rate for this policy group (see example 5.2). of the European Union 12.11.2012 T H E C O M M I S S I O N ’ S R E P L I E S 5.34. 
Ti predstavljajo 56 % vseh količinsko opredeljivih napak in približno 42 % ocenjene stopnje napake v tej skupini politik (glej primer 5.2). 5.34 Kjer bodo ugotovljena tveganja, bo Komisija nadaljevala z usmerja­ njem svojih ukrepov na organe, pristojne za programe (glej tudi odgovora na odstavka 5.24 in 5.28).
The Commission seeks to ensure that beneficiaries and programmes managing authorities are well aware of eligibility rules. 
O D G O V O R I K O M I S I J E Komisija si prizadeva zagotoviti, da upravičenci in organi, ki upravljajo programe, dobro poznajo pravila o upravičenosti.
This can be through training and guidance and, for regional policy, managing authorities should carry over this knowledge to all bodies in charge of managing the funds. 
To je mogoče doseči z usposabljanjem in dajanjem navodil, pri regionalni politiki pa morajo organi upravljanja to znanje posredovati vsem organom, pristojnim za upravljanje sredstev.
For regional policy, when the Commission identifies complex rules at programme level, it also makes recommendations to the Member State to simplify the rules. 
Če Komisija pri regio­ nalni politiki na programski ravni odkrije kompleksna pravila, državam članicam tudi priporoči, naj jih poenostavijo.
Example 5.2 — Ineligible costs (a) Non-compliance with project approval decision: A Financial Engineering Instrument funded by the ERDF to grant financial support to SMEs provided also funding to large enterprises. 
Primer 5.2 – Neupravičeni stroški (a) Neupoštevanje sklepa o odobritvi projekta: Instrument finančnega inženiringa, financiran iz ESRR, za dodeljevanje finančne podpore malim in srednje velikim podjetjem je financiranje zagotavljal tudi velikim podjetjem.
This was not permitted under the national approval decision for this project. (b) Revenue from the sale of old machinery that was replaced using ERDF funding was not taken into account: In the case of an ERDF project related to the purchase of metal processing machines, the revenue resulting from the disposal of the old machines that were replaced should have been taken into account and this would have reduced the expenditure declared for the purchase of the new machines. (c) Non-compliance with specific provisions in national eligibility rules: In the case of a CF project related to the construction of a motorway, costs related to financial and insurance services were reimbursed. 
V nacionalnem sklepu o odobritvi tega projekta to ni bilo dovoljeno. (b) Prihodki od prodaje starih strojev, nadomeščenih s pomočjo sredstev iz ESRR, se niso upoštevali: Pri projektu ESRR za nakup strojev za obdelavo kovin bi morali biti upoštevani prihodki od prodaje starih strojev, ki so bili nadomeščeni z novimi, kar bi znižalo odhodke, prijavljene za nakup novih strojev. (c) Neupoštevanje posameznih določb v nacionalnih pravilih o upravičenosti: Pri projektu KS za gradnjo avtoceste so bili povrnjeni stroški, povezani s finančnimi in zavaroval-niškimi storitvami.
Such costs are, however, not eligible according to the national eligibility rules. (d) Declaration of multiple ineligible costs for a project: In the case of a TEN-T project related to preparatory studies for the building of a tunnel, an invoice had been declared twice. 
Vendar v skladu z nacionalnimi pravili o upravičenosti takšni stroški niso upravičeni. (d) Prijavljanje več neupravičenih stroškov za projekt: Pri projektu TEN-T za pripravljalne študije za gradnjo predora je bil račun prijavljen dvakrat.
In addition, key documentation relating to public procurement procedures (such as the report by the evaluation committee and the applicant’s winning offer) was missing. 
Poleg tega ni bilo ključne dokumentacije o postopkih javnega naročanja (kot sta poročilo ocenjevalnega odbora in izbrana ponudba vlagatelja).
Nevertheless, since the overall costs declared were significantly higher than the maximum EU contribution, this over-declaration had no impact on the EU budget (see paragraph 5.25). 
Ker pa so bili skupni prijavljeni stroški veliko višji od najvišjega dovoljenega prispevka EU, ta previsoka prijava ni imela učinka na proračun EU (glej odstavek 5.25).
EN 12.11.2012 OfficialJournaloftheEuropeanUnion C344/131 T H E C O U R T ’ S O B S E R VA T I O N S EFFECTIVENESS OF SYSTEMS Audit authorities 5.35. The regulations defining the rules for the ERDF, ESF and CF for the 2007-2013 programming period introduced important changes with regard to the role and responsibilities of audit authorities (AAs) in the Member States (21). 
SL 12.11.2012 UradnilistEvropskeunije C344/131 U G O T OV I T V E S O D I Š Č A USPEŠNOST SISTEMOV Revizijski organi 5.35 Z uredbami, v katerih so bila določena pravila za ESRR, ESS in KS za programsko obdobje 2007–2013, so bile uvedene pomembne spremembe vloge in odgovornosti revizijskih organov v državah članicah (21).
5.36. Withinthe27MemberStates,112AAshavebeenset up for the 434 OPs of the 2007-2013 programming period. 
5.36 V 27 državah članicah je bilo ustanovljenih 112 revi­ zijskih organov za 434 operativnih programov v programskem obdobju 2007–2013.
More than half of these AAs are responsible for auditing OPs for all three funds within their region (i.e. ERDF, CF and ESF), whilst the remaining AAs audit specific OPs (22) under one fund. 5.37. 
Več kot polovica jih je odgovornih za revidiranje operativnih programov vseh treh skladov v njihovi regiji (tj. ESRR, KS in ESS), preostali pa revidirajo posamezne operativne programe (22) v okviru enega sklada.
ACRsandannualopinionsprovideinformationon the regularity of EU spending under the ERDF, ESF and CF for the 2007-2013 programming period(23). 
5.37 Letna poročila o nadzoru in letna mnenja zagotavljajo informacije o pravilnosti porabe EU v okviru ESRR, ESS in KS v programskem obdobju 2007–2013 (23).