natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Special Report No 16/2011 – EU Financial assistance for the decommissioning of nuclear plants in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia: Achievements and Future Challenges (b) Decommissioning plans are expected to contain radioactive waste management plans identifying the specific activities, facilities and technologies required for the dismantling, conditioning, transport, storage and final disposal of all waste types, especially the most critical materials (reactor vessels, primary cooling circuits and other large volume-activated components and high level radiactive waste). 
16/2011 – Finančna pomoč EU za razgradnjo jedrskih elektrarn v Bolgariji, Litvi in na Slovaškem: dosežki in prihodnji izzivi 16 (b) Načrti za razgradnjo naj bi vsebovali načrte za ravnanje z radioaktivnimi odpadki, v katerih so opredeljene posamezne dejavnosti, naprave in tehnologije, ki so potrebni za razstavljanje, pripravo, prevoz, skladiščenje in končno odlaganje vseh vrst odpadkov, zlasti pa najbolj kritičnih materialov (reaktorske posode, primarni hladilni krogi in druge aktivirane komponente velikega obsega ter visoko radioaktivni odpadki).
Even in the only case where the inventory has been completed (Bohunice V1), it has not yet been integrated into a detailed decommissioning plan defining in detail how identified waste will be treated and disposed during the whole duration of the decommissioning process. 
Niti pri edini elektrarni s popolnim popisom odpadkov (Bohunice V1) ta ni bil vključen v podroben načrt razgradnje, v katerem bi bilo podrobno opredeljeno, kako se bo ravnalo z odpadki in kakšno bo njihovo odlaganje med celotnim procesom razgradnje.
The current plan focuses only on the first phase of decommissioning, which almost exclusively covers non-radioactive materials. (c) Decommissioning plans should estimate the full cost of the decommissioning process as a whole and be updated as frequently as required to ensure the validity of the estimations. 
Sedanji načrt se osredotoča samo na prvo fazo razgradnje, ki skoraj izključno zajema samo materiale, ki niso radioaktivni. (c) Načrti za razgradnjo bi morali vsebovati oceno vseh stroškov celotnega procesa razgradnje ter biti posodobljeni tako pogosto, kot je potrebno, da se zagotovi veljavnost teh ocen.
However, the estimates contained in the decommissioning plans available at the end of 2010 are not complete, since the accurate information concerning quantities of each type of radioactive waste to be treated and/or the facilities and technologies required for their treatment is unavailable. 
Vendar ocene v načrtih za razgradnjo, ki so bili na voljo konec leta 2010, niso popolne, saj točni podatki v zvezi s količino posameznih vrst radioaktivnih odpadkov za obdelavo in/ali objekti in tehnologijo, ki so potrebni za njihovo obdelavo, niso na voljo.
Moreover, these plans do not cover the plants’ decommissioning processes in their entirety. (d) In order to monitor adequately the decommissioning process, there should be a link between the individual projects, the activities foreseen in the decommissioning plans and their estimated cost. 
Poleg tega ti načrti ne zajemajo v celoti procesov razgradnje elektrarn. (d) Da bi lahko ustrezno spremljali proces razgradnje, bi morala obstajati povezava med posameznimi projekti, predvidenimi dejavnostmi v načrtih za razgradnjo in ocenjenimi stroški le-teh.
None of the three programmes meets this standard. 
Temu merilu ne ustreza nobeden od teh treh programov.
KOZLODUY PROGRAMME IGNALINA PROGRAMME 16 FIGURE 4 ASSESSMENT OF DECOMMISSIONING PLANNING Audit question COURT'S ASSESSMENT BOHUNICE V1 PROGRAMME Has a complete waste inventory been prepared? 
DIAGRAM 4 Revizijsko vprašanje OCENA SODIŠČA PROGRAM KOZLODUJ (Bolgarija) PROGRAM IGNALINA (Litva) PROGRAM BOHUNICE V1 (Slovaška) Ali je bil izdelan popoln popis odpadkov?
No No Yes Have waste management plans been defined? 
Ne Ne Da Ali so bili opredeljeni načrti ravnanja z odpadki?
No No No Special Report No 16/2011 – EU Financial assistance for the decommissioning of nuclear plants in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia: Achievements and Future Challenges 17 MAJOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS FACE DELAYS AND COST-OVERRUNS 21. 
16/2011 – Finančna pomoč EU za razgradnjo jedrskih elektrarn v Bolgariji, Litvi in na Slovaškem: dosežki in prihodnji izzivi 17 VELIKI INFRASTRUKTURNI PROJEKTI SE SOOČAJO Z ZAMUDAMI IN PREKORAČITVAMI STROŠKOV 21.
As at 31 December 2010, the programmes had launched 101 projects which contributed towards the decommissioning of the eight reactors. 
Do 31. decembra 2010 je bil v okviru programov sprožen 101 projekt, ki je prispeval k razgradnji osmih reaktorjev.
The total value of these projects, which were almost exclusively funded by the EU, was 1 125 million euro. 
Skupna vrednost teh projektov, ki jih je skoraj v celoti financirala EU, je bila 1 125 milijonov EUR.
Figure 5 provides an overview of the decommissioning projects financed by the audited programmes. 
Diagram 5 prikazuje pregled projektov razgradnje, financiranih iz revidiranih programov.
An analysis of the infrastructure projects visited on site (see Annex III) shows delays and cost overruns. 
Analiza infrastrukturnih projektov, obiskanih na kraju samem (glej Prilogo III), kaže zamude in prekoračitve stroškov.
In particular, key projects within the critical path of the decommissioning process are delayed, for example facilities for spent fuel and radioactive waste management (i.e spent fuel storage facilities and facilities for radioactive waste treatment, storage and final disposal). 
Za-mujajo predvsem ključni projekti znotraj kritične poti procesa razgradnje, kot so obrati za ravnanje z izrabljenim gorivom in radioaktivnimi odpadki (t.j. skladišča za izrabljeno gorivo in obrati za obdelavo, skladiščenje in končno odlaganje radioaktivnih odpadkov).
FIGURE 5 Programme Financial channel Number of projects Total project value (million euro) Total EU support (million euro) Kozloduy KIDSF 30 334,1 318,4 Ignalina IIDSF CPMA 17 21 421,9 146,9 390,7 135,3 Bohunice V1 BIDSF 33 222,2 203,7 Total 101 1 125,1 1 048,1 OVERVIEW OF DECOMMISSIONING PROJECTS BY PROGRAMME AND FINANCIAL CHANNEL Source: European Court of Auditors, on the basis of the information provided by the EBRD and the CPMA. Special Report No 16/2011 – EU Financial assistance for the decommissioning of nuclear plants in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia: Achievements and Future Challenges 
DIAGRAM 5 Program Finančni kanal Število projektov Skupna vrednost projektov (v mio EUR) Skupaj podpora EU (v mio EUR) Kozloduj KIDSF 30 334,1 318,4 Ignalina IIDSF CPMA 17 21 421,9 146,9 390,7 135,3 Bohunice V1 BIDSF 33 222,2 203,7 Skupaj 101 1 125,1 1 048,1 PREGLED PROJEKTOV RAZGRADNJE PO PROGRAMIH IN KANALIH FINANCIRANJA Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče, na podlagi podatkov EBOR in Centralne agencije za vodenje projektov. Posebno poročilo št. 16/2011 – Finančna pomoč EU za razgradnjo jedrskih elektrarn v Bolgariji, Litvi in na Slovaškem: dosežki in prihodnji izzivi
In March 2011 the recipient Member States updated their decommissioning cost estimates, to reach 5,3 billion euro18. 
Države članice prejemnice so marca 2011 posodobile svoje ocene stroškov razgradnje, ki so dosegli 5,3 milijarde EUR18.
A comparison with the decommissioning funding currently available at national and programme level suggests a shortfall of around 2,5 billion euro (see Figure 6). 
Primerjava s trenutno razpoložljivimi sredstvi za razgradnjo na nacionalni ravni in ravni programov prikazuje primanjkljaj v višini približno 2,5 milijarde EUR (glej diagram 6).
Slovakia has committed itself to topping up the funding needed for decommissioning19 and has created a specific funding mechanism (a tax on electricity transmission) to contribute towards reducing the funding shortfall. 
Slovaška se je obvezala, da bo dodatna finančna sredstva, ki so še potrebna za razgradnjo19, zagotovila z vzpostavitvijo posebnega mehanizma financiranja (davka na prenos električne energije) in tako prispevala k zmanjšanju primanjkljaja sredstev.
Lithuania and Bulgaria have not put in place any equivalent mechanism. 
Litva in Bolgarija nista uvedli nobenega enakovrednega mehanizma.
The absence of sufficient funding arrangements puts the completion of the decommissioning processes at risk. 
Dokončanje procesov razgradnje je zaradi neustrezne ureditve financiranja ogroženo.
In accordance with the principles of sound financial management, it is a good practice for any spending programme to set its objectives on the basis of a needs assessment20. 
V skladu z načeli dobrega finančnega poslovodenja je dobra praksa, da se cilji vsakega programa porabe določijo na osnovi ocene potreb20.
This implies an evaluation, following international standards, of the consequences of early closure (e.g. loss of electricity power, security of supply). 
To pomeni, da je treba izdelati oceno posledic predčasnega zaprtja (npr. izpada proizvodnje električne energije, zanesljivosti oskrbe) v skladu z mednarodnimi standardi.
The design of potential measures to be undertaken should consider their cost in relation to their mitigation effect21. 
Pri zasnovi potencialnih ukrepov, ki jih je treba sprejeti, bi bilo treba upoštevati razmerje med njihovimi stroški in njihovim blažilnim učinkom21.
The extent of mitigation achieved by funded projects must be assessed in view of determining whether the mitigation objectives may be considered fulfilled. 
Da se določi, ali je cilje blaženja mogoče obravnavati kot izpolnjene, je treba oceniti, kolikšna stopnja ublažitve je bila dosežena s financiranimi projekti.
18 Contributions to the meeting of the Nuclear Decommissioning Assistance Programme Committee of 16 March 2011. 
18 Prispevki k seji odbora programa pomoči za razgradnjo jedrskih elektrarn z dne 16. marca 2011.
19 COM(2004) 624 final of 29 September 2004, p. 
19 COM(2004)624konč.zdne 29.9.2004, str.
20 Footnote 9. 
20 Opomba 9.
21 Commission Recommendation 2006/851/ Euratom. 
21 Priporočilo Komisije 2006/851/Euratom.
Special Report No 16/2011 – EU Financial assistance for the decommissioning of nuclear plants in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia: Achievements and Future Challenges 19 BOX 1 DELAYS AND COST OVERRUNS In Bulgaria, an experimental plasma melting technology was selected in Kozloduy without proper demonstration of its effectiveness and without due consideration of the design and construction costs (some 30 million euro compared to one fifth for traditional technologies). 
16/2011 – Finančna pomoč EU za razgradnjo jedrskih elektrarn v Bolgariji, Litvi in na Slovaškem: dosežki in prihodnji izzivi 19 OKVIR 1 ZAMUDE IN PREKORAČITVE STROŠKOV V bolgarski jedrski elektrarni Kozloduj je bila poskusna tehnologija taljenja s plazmo izbrana brez pravega dokaza o njeni učinkovitosti in brez ustreznega upoštevanja zasnove in gradbenih stroškov (približno 30 milijonov EUR v primerjavi s petino za tradicionalne tehnologije).
In Lithuania, at the time of the audit visit, the major infrastructure projects which are a precondition for the decommissioning of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant were significantly delayed comparing to initial contracts completion dates. 
V Litvi so bili v času revizijskega obiska veliki infrastrukturni projekti, ki so predpogoj za razgradnjo jedrske elektrarne Ignalina, v precejšnji zamudi glede na datume dokončanja iz prvotnih pogodb.
This concerns notably: the interim spent fuel facility — more than 32 months; the solid waste retrieval facility — 44 months; the solid waste treatment and storage facility for the management of short-and long-lived low and intermediate level radioactive waste — 34 months. 
To velja predvsem za: začasni obrat za izrabljeno gorivo – več kot 32 mesecev; obrat za ponovno uporabo trdnih odpadkov – 44 mesecev; obrat za obdelavo in skladiščenje trdnih odpadkov za ravnanje s kratko-in dolgoživimi nizko in srednje radioaktivnimi odpadki – 34 mesecev.
The total project cost of the interim spent fuel facility increased by 22 million euro (15,6 %). 
Skupni strošek projekta začasnega obrata za izrabljeno gorivo se je povečal za 22 milijonov EUR (15,6 %).
In Slovakia, the interim radioactive waste storage at the Bohunice site, initially expected to be commissioned in 2010, was still in procurement process during the audit. 
Začasno skladišče za radioaktivne odpadke v jedrski elektrarni Bohunice na Slovaškem, ki naj bi prvotno začelo obratovati leta 2010, je bilo v času revizije še v postopku oddaje javnega naročila.
As a result, the availability of buffer storage areas has been identified as a potential bottleneck. 
Posledično je bila razpoložljivost območij za začasno skladiščenje prepoznana kot možno ozko grlo.
The facility for the free release of decommissioning materials was delayed by more than one year. 
Obrat za sproščanje materialov, ki nastanejo pri razgradnji, v okolje zamuja več kot leto dni.
FIGURE 6 DECOMMISSIONING FUNDING SHORTFALL Estimates in the decommissioning plans (million euro) Latest cost estimate (million euro) Available funding (all sources) (million euro) Funding shortfall (million euro) Kozloduy NPP Units 1 to 4 1 118 1 243 Bohunice V1 Units 1 and 2 2 930 Source: Decommissioning plans and information provided during the Nuclear Decommissioning Assistance Programme Committee meeting of March 2011. 664 1 450 579 Ignalina NPP Units 1 and 2 2 019 1 480 950 1 146 720 426 TOTAL 4 087 5 319 2 834 2 485 Special Report No 16/2011 – EU Financial assistance for the decommissioning of nuclear plants in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia: Achievements and Future Challenges 
DIAGRAM 6 Ocene v načrtih razgradnje (v milijonih EUR) Najnovejše ocene stroškov (v milijonih EUR) Razpoložljiva sredstva (vsi viri) (v milijonih EUR) Primanjkljaj sredstev (v milijonih EUR) JE Kozloduj Enote 1 do 4 1 118 1 243 664 579 JE Ignalina Enoti 1 in 2 2 019 2 930 1 450 1 480 Bohunice V1 Enoti 1 in 2 950 1 146 720 426 SKUPAJ 4 087 5 319 2 834 2 485 PRIMANJKLJAJ SREDSTEV ZA RAZGRADNJO Vir: Načrti za razgradnjo in informacije, pridobljene na seji odbora programa pomoči za razgradnjo jedrskih elektrarn marca 2011. Posebno poročilo št. 16/2011 – Finančna pomoč EU za razgradnjo jedrskih elektrarn v Bolgariji, Litvi in na Slovaškem: dosežki in prihodnji izzivi
Figure 7 summarises the result of the Court’s review of needs assessments underlying the strategic plans defined for the audited programmes. 
V diagramu 7 je povzet rezultat s strani Sodišča opravljenega pregleda ocen potreb, ki so osnova za opredeljene strateške načrte za revidirane programe.
A needs assessment at programme level leading to a concrete mitigation strategy was initially carried out for the Kozloduy programme only. 
Ocena potreb na ravni programa, ki je vodila h konkretni strategiji blaženja posledic, je bila prvotno opravljena samo za program jedrske elektrarne Kozloduj.
However, this needs assessment is outdated and no longer relevant. 
Vendar pa je ta ocena zastarela in ni več pomembna.
As a consequence, any project fitting with the national energy strategy is by definition considered to be a consequence of the closure of the plants. 
Zato se vsak projekt, ki je skladen z nacionalno energetsko strategijo, po definiciji upošteva kot posledica zaprtja jedrskih elektrarn.
An estimate on potential impact of planned projects has been carried by the EBRD in the case of Kozloduy only. 
EBOR je oceno potencialnega učinka načrtovanih projektov izvedla samo v primeru Kozloduja.
As regards the actual achievements of the mitigation actions and their contribution to the programme objectives, neither the implementing bodies (EBRD, CPMA) nor the Commission have assessed them. 
Kar zadeva dejanske dosežke ukrepov blaženja in njihov prispevek k ciljem programa, jih niso ocenili niti izvedbeni organi (EBOR, Centralna agencija za vodenje projektov) niti Komisija.
20 FIGURE 7 Audit question COURT'S ASSESSMENT KOZLODUY PROGRAMME IGNALINA PROGRAMME BOHUNICE PROGRAMME Has a need assessment at programme level been carried out? 
20 DIAGRAM 7 Revizijsko vprašanje OCENA SODIŠČA PROGRAM KOZLODUJ (Bolgarija) PROGRAM IGNALINA (Litva) PROGRAM BOHUNICE V1 (Slovaška) Ali je bila opravljena ocena potreb na ravni programa?
Yes No No Has the mitigation achieved by the programmes been evaluated? Partly No No ASSESSMENT OF MITIGATION PLANNING Special Report No 16/2011 – EU Financial assistance for the decommissioning of nuclear plants in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia: Achievements and Future Challenges 
Da Ne Ne Ali je bil ocenjen učinek blaže-nja, dosežen s programi? Delno Ne Ne OCENA NAČRTOVANJA BLAŽENJA POSLEDIC Posebno poročilo št. 16/2011 – Finančna pomoč EU za razgradnjo jedrskih elektrarn v Bolgariji, Litvi in na Slovaškem: dosežki in prihodnji izzivi
21 BOX 2 WEAK RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MITIGATION ACTIVITIES AND REACTORS’ EARLY CLOSURE In Bulgaria, the programme funded energy efficiency improvements in public buildings (schools, hospitals, ministry buildings, theatres). 
21 OKVIR 2 ŠIBKA POVEZAVA MED DEJAVNOSTMI BLAŽENJA POSLEDIC IN PREDČASNIM ZAPRTJEM REAKTORJEV V Bolgariji je program prispeval sredstva za izboljšanje energetske učinkovitosti v javnih zgradbah (šolah, bolnišnicah, stavbah ministrstev, gledališčih).
The link with the closure of Kozloduy units 1 to 4 is that the energy upgrading will compensate for a small part of the production loss, provided that consumption patterns are maintained. 
Povezavo z zaprtjem enot 1 in 4 jedrske elektrarne Kozloduj predstavlja dejstvo, da bo izboljšanje energetske učinkovitosti nadomestilo manjši del izpada proizvodnje, pod pogojem, da se ohranijo vzorci porabe.
In Lithuania, the programme provided a contribution to the Housing and Urban Development Agency’s mechansim for refurbishment of multi-family buildings, created to upgrade the energy efficiency of 24 000 residential buildings. 
V Litvi je program zagotovil prispevek instrumentu Agencije za stanovanja in razvoj mest, name-njenemu prenovi večdružinskih stavb in ustanovljenemu za izboljšanje energetske učinkovitosti 24 000 stanovanjskih stavb.
The Ignalina programme supported one third of some 570 individual projects actually launched under this scheme. 
Program Ignalina je podprl tretjino od približno 570 posameznih projektov, ki so se že začeli v okviru tega programa.
The link with the closure of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant is that energy upgradings will reduce consumption and therefore compensate part of the production loss. 
Povezavo z zaprtjem jedrske elektrarne Ignalina predstavlja dejstvo, da bo izboljšanje energetske učinkovitosti zmanjšalo porabo energije in tako delno nadomestilo izpad njene proizvodnje.
In September 2009, the mechanism was terminated and replaced by a financial engineering instrument funded by the Structural Funds. 
Septembra 2009 je bil instrument ukinjen, nadomestil pa ga je instrument finančnega inženiringa, ki se financira iz strukturnih skladov.
In Slovakia, the modernisation of the 220kV transmission network was funded by the programme under the consideration that Bohunice V1 was its main power supplier. 
Na Slovaškem je program financiral posodobitev 220 kV prenosnega omrežja, katerega glavni dobavitelj električne energije je bila jedrska elektrarna Bohunice V1.
However, the grid was already obsolete by the time the closure had been decided, and it would have required modernisation even if the plant had been kept operational. 
Vendar pa je bilo omrežje zastarelo že v času odločitve za zaprtje in bi ga bilo treba posodobiti tudi, če bi elektrarna še vedno obratovala.
The upgrading mainly benefited the other contributors to the transmission network (for instance, other nuclear power plants). Special Report No 16/2011 – EU Financial assistance for the decommissioning of nuclear plants in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia: Achievements and Future Challenges 
Posodobitev je večinoma koristila ostalim proizvajalcem, ki prispevajo energijo v prenosno omrežje (npr. drugim jedrskim elektrarnam). Posebno poročilo št. 16/2011 – Finančna pomoč EU za razgradnjo jedrskih elektrarn v Bolgariji, Litvi in na Slovaškem: dosežki in prihodnji izzivi
22 BROAD VARIETY OF MITIGATION ACTIVITIES FINANCED 28. 
22 PESTROST FINANCIRANIH DEJAVNOSTI BLAŽENJA POSLEDIC 28.
The programmes supported a number of measures to mitigate the effects of the loss of electricity production subsequent to the early closure of nuclear plants. 
Programi so podpirali številne ukrepe za blaženje učinkov izpada proizvodnje električne energije zaradi predčasnega zaprtja jedrskih elektrarn.
As of 31 December 2010, the programmes had launched 48 projects contributing to the mitigation of the early closure of the three plants. 
Do 31. decembra 2010 je bilo v okviru programov začetih 48 projektov, ki so prispevali k blaženju posledic predčasnega zaprtja teh treh elektrarn.
The total value of these projects was 1,34 billion euro. 
Skupna vrednost teh projektov je znašala 1,34 milijarde EUR.
The EU funded over half of this amount. 
Več kot polovico tega zneska je financirala EU.
Figure 8 provides an overview of the mitigation projects financed by the three audited programmes. 
V diagramu 8 je pregled projektov blaženja posledic, ki so jih financirali ti trije revidirani programi.
The site visits confirmed that the individual projects were in line with the broadly defined priorities of the programmes and contributed to mitigate the effects of the early closure of the eight nuclear reactors (see Annex IV). 
Obiski elektrarn so potrdili, da so posamezni projekti ustrezali grobo opredeljenim prednostnim nalogam programov in prispevali k blaženju učinkov predčasnega zaprtja osmih jedrskih reaktorjev (glej Prilogo IV).
However, the degree of mitigation achieved is not known. 
Vendar raven dosežene ublažitve ni znana.
Moreover, a direct link with the early closure of reactors could not always be established and the existence of a prioritisation of mitigation activities could not be demonstrated (see Box 2). 
Poleg tega ni bilo vedno mogoče vzpostaviti neposredne povezave s predčasnim zaprtjem reaktorjev, prav tako ni bilo mogoče dokazati opredelitve prednostnih dejavnosti blaženja posledic (glej okvir 2).
In a situation where the resources are already insufficient, this risks the achievement of the programmes’ objectives, and delays the completion of the decommissioning process. 
V razmerah, ko sredstva že tako niso zadostna, to ogroža doseganje ciljev programov ter povzroča zamude pri zaključku procesa razgradnje.
FIGURE 8 OVERVIEW OF MITIGATION PROJECTS BY PROGRAMME AND FINANCIAL CHANNEL Programme Financial channel Number of projects Total project value (million euro) Total EU support (million euro) Kozloduy KIDSF 28 454,8 241,8 Ignalina IIDSF CPMA 3 10 475,5 36,1 260,4 36,1 Bohunice V1 BIDSF 7 376,8 190,4 Total Source: European Court of Auditors, on the basis of the information provided by the EBRD and the CPMA. 48 1 343,2 728,8 Special Report No 16/2011 – EU Financial assistance for the decommissioning of nuclear plants in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia: Achievements and Future Challenges 
DIAGRAM 8 Program Finančni kanal Število projektov Skupna vrednost projektov (v mio EUR) Skupaj podpora EU (v mio EUR) Kozloduj KIDSF 28 454,8 241,8 Ignalina IIDSF CPMA 3 10 475,5 36,1 260,4 36,1 Bohunice V1 BIDSF 7 376,8 190,4 Skupaj 48 1 343,2 728,8 PREGLED PROJEKTOV BLAŽENJA POSLEDIC PO PROGRAMIH IN KANALIH FINANCIRANJA Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče, na podlagi informacij, ki sta jih posredovali EBOR in Centralna agencija za vodenje projektov. Posebno poročilo št. 16/2011 – Finančna pomoč EU za razgradnjo jedrskih elektrarn v Bolgariji, Litvi in na Slovaškem: dosežki in prihodnji izzivi
Effective management requires the definition of clear lines of responsibility for the use of programmes’ resources and the achievement of their objectives. 
Učinkovito upravljanje zahteva določitev jasne delitve odgovornosti za uporabo sredstev programov in dosego njihovih ciljev.
Whatever the management method, the Commission should be in a position to exercise its ultimate responsibility for the implementation of the programmes and be held accountable for the use of the funds22. 
Ne glede na način upravljanja, mora imeti končno odgovornost za izvajanje programov Komisija, ki mora tudi odgovarjati za uporabo sredstev22.
The programmes’ management includes several levels. 
Upravljanje programov vključuje več ravni.