natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
We also expected to see provisions in contracts for both reducing overall financing and moving away from support for operational staff and towards funding specialised staff. 
Sodišče je pričakovalo, da bodo pogodbe vključevale tako določbe za zmanjšanje skupnega financiranja kot tudi preusmeritev podpore s financiranja operativnega osebja na specializirano osebje.
With the AU and the SROs taking over day-to-day running costs32, the EU could then focus on adding value by financing staff trained in specialist skills, such as conflict prevention and resolution. 
18 vsakodnevnih tekočih stroškov32, bi se EU lahko osredotočila na dodano vrednost, ki bi se zagotovila s financiranjem osebja s specializiranimi znanji in spretnostmi, kot sta preprečevanje in reševanje konfliktov.
In most of the contracts we audited this was not the case. 
Pri večini pogodb, ki jih je Sodišče revidiralo, ni bilo tako.
However, Box 4 shows an example where this approach succeeded. 
Vendar pa je v okviru 4 prikazan primer, v katerem je ta pristop uspel.
Box 4 - Increasing the added value of EU support In 2015 donors paid for all short-term staff of the AU CommissionŐs Peace and Security Department under a Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA) Salaries contract. 
Okvir 4 – Povečanje dodane vrednosti podpore EU Leta 2015 so donatorji v okviru pogodbe o plačah, ki je del dogovora o skupnem financiranju, financirali vse osebje, kratkoročno zaposleno v oddelku za mir in varnost Komisije Afriške unije.
Following discussion with the EU and the other donors, in 2017 the AU Commission reduced the number of staff members funded under the donor-funded JFA from 200 to 172 and increased the proportion of staff costs to be met by AU member states33. At the same time, the ratio of support staff to professional staff funded under this contract was reduced from 1:1 to nearly 1:2. 
Po razpravah z EU in drugimi donatorji je Komisija Afriške unije leta 2017 zmanjšala število zaposlenih, ki jih financirajo donatorji v okviru dogovora o skupnem financiranju, z 200 na 172 in povečala delež stroškov za osebje, ki naj bi ga financirale države članice Afriške unije.33 Hkrati je bilo zmanjšano tudi razmerje med podpornim in strokovnim osebjem, ki se financira v okviru te pogodbe, in sicer z 1:1 na skoraj 1:2.
The target from 2017 onwards is 1:334. The allocation of EU support was not sufficiently prioritised 27. 
Cilj za obdobje po letu 2017 je razmerje 1:3.34 Dodeljevanje podpore EU ni dovolj temeljilo na prioritetah 27.
Aware of the risk to EU citizens of conflicts in Africa (violent terrorism, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, and organised crime), the EU has started to channel its support towards preventing such conflicts from happening, and resolving them when they The 2013 APF evaluation recommended that ŇThe EU should explore options to jointly develop with the AU a plan for the latter to progressively assume responsibility for staff positions and the operating costs of key APSA components currently financed through the APFÓ. 
EU se zaveda tveganja, ki ga konflikti v Afriki (nasilni terorizem, razpoložljivost orožja za množično uničevanje in organizirani kriminal) prinašajo za državljane EU, zato je začela svojo podporo usmerjati v preprečevanje tovrstnih konfliktov in njihovo reševanje, kadar pride do njih.35 EU je v skladu s Pariško deklaracijo o učinkovitosti pomoči36 in načeli, določenimi v V oceni mirovne pomoči za Afriko iz leta 2013 je bilo priporočeno, naj EU razišče možnost, da skupaj z Afriško unijo pripravi načrt, kako bi Afriška unija postopno prevzela odgovornost za delovna mesta in operativne stroške ključnih komponent Afriške strukture za mir in varnost, ki se trenutno financirajo v okviru mirovne pomoči za Afriko.
18 do35. In line with the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness36 and the principles set out in the JAES, the EU has in general provided support for the APSA in accordance with the needs expressed by the AU and the SROs in the APSA roadmap. 
19 skupni strategiji EU-Afrika, na splošno zagotovila podporo za Afriško strukturo za mir in varnost v skladu s potrebami, ki so jih izrazile Afriška unija in podregionalne organizacije v strateškem načrtu Afriške strukture za mir in varnost.
However, the needs defined were very broad and the priorities not specific or clear. 
Vendar pa so bile opredeljene potrebe zelo splošne, prioritete pa premalo specifične in jasne.
The EEAS and the Commission did not draw up specific EU funding priorities or develop guidelines for allocating resources to the various APSA components. 
Evropska služba za zunanje delovanje in Komisija nista pripravili specifičnih prioritet za financiranje EU niti smernic za dodeljevanje sredstev za različne komponente Afriške strukture za mir in varnost.
However, the Commission and the EEAS scrutinised funding proposals received from the AU and SROs, and the Political and Security Committee of the Council of the EU assessed the Ňpolitical appropriatenessÓ of providing the funding. 
Sta pa preučili predloge za financiranje, ki so jih predložile Afriška unija in podregionalne organizacije, Politični in varnostni odbor Sveta EU pa je ocenil „politično ustreznost” zagotavljanja finančnih sredstev.
Annex II shows the example of the decision-making procedure of the African Peace Facility. 
V Prilogi II je primer postopka odločanja v okviru mirovne pomoči za Afriko.
We analysed the fourteen contracts audited to see how they reflected the priorities set for the APSA. We found that in eight cases the way in which funds were presented in the contractsŐ budgets made it impossible to see how much money had been allocated to each of the APSA pillars or priorities. 
Ugotovilo je, da v osmih primerih zaradi načina, kako so bila sredstva prikazana v proračunih pogodb, ni bilo mogoče ugotoviti, koliko sredstev je bilo dodeljenih za posamezne stebre ali prioritete Afriške strukture za mir in varnost.
We also found that the individual contracts had a wide scope in terms of targeting priorities: eleven of the fourteen contracts targeted at least four of the five APSA strategic priorities (Annex III). 
Poleg tega je bila pri posameznih pogodbah usmerjenost prioritet zelo široka: 11 od 14 pogodb je bilo ciljno usmerjenih v vsaj štiri od petih strateških prioritet Afriške strukture za mir in varnost (Priloga III).
Risks associated with allocating more funds to regional organisations 30. 
Tveganja, povezana z dodeljevanjem več sredstev regionalnim organizacijam 30.
In the latest programming period, the EU decided to channel a greater proportion of total funding for the APSA through the RIPs (paragraph 10). 
EU se je v zadnjem programskem obdobju odločila, da bo večji delež skupnih finančnih sredstev, namenjenih Afriški strukturi za mir in varnost, dodelila v okviru regionalnih okvirnih programov (odstavek 10).
The aim was to give SROs a greater role in decision-making, in line with the principle of subsidiarity. 
S tem naj bi se skladno z načelom subsidiarnosti povečala vloga podregionalnih organizacij pri sprejemanju odločitev.
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, OECD, 2005 includes the commitments of donors to Ňrespect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise itÓ and to Ňbase their overall support on partner countriesŐ national development strategies, institutions and proceduresÓ, in order to increase the effectiveness and impact of the aid. 35 36 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da je ta sprememba povezana s tveganji. uveljavljanje ter da bodo svojo skupno podporo zasnovali na nacionalnih razvojnih strategijah, institucijah in postopkih partnerskih držav ter tako povečali uspešnost in učinek pomoči.
We found there to be risks associated with this change. (a) The SROs did not, at the time of our audit, have sufficient staff members with the necessary skills to manage the additional funding effectively. (b) The regional institutional framework is very complex. 
20 (a) Podregionalne organizacije v času revizije Sodišča niso imele dovolj osebja z znanji in spretnostmi, potrebnimi za uspešno ravnanje z dodatnimi finančnimi sredstvi. (b) Regionalni institucionalni okvir je zelo kompleksen.
There are ten SROs with a mandate in peace and security, with overlapping memberships. 
Obstaja deset podregionalnih organizacij z mandatom na področju miru in varnosti, članstvo pa se delno prekriva.
On average, AU states are members of at least two SROs and some states belong to as many as four. 
Države Afriške unije so v povprečju članice najmanj dveh podregionalnih organizacij, nekatere celo štirih.
The lack of clarity leaves some African states unwilling to commit to their SROs, leading to weaknesses in capacity. 
Zaradi pomanjkanja jasnosti se nekatere afriške države niso pripravljene zavezati svojim podregionalnim organizacijam, kar lahko privede do slabosti pri zmogljivostih.
The EU CommissionŐs strategy to deal with this complex regional framework was to support one joint RIP in each region; the EU currently funds the SROs under three RIPs. (c) Four of the ten SROs with a mandate in peace and security are not covered by a RIP and two of these four will continue to receive funding under the APF. 
EU trenutno financira podregionalne organizacije v okviru treh okvirnih regionalnih programov. (c) Štiri od desetih podregionalnih organizacij z mandatom na področju miru in varnosti niso zajete v regionalne okvirne programe, dve od teh štirih pa bosta še naprej prejemali finančna sredstva v okviru mirovne pomoči za Afriko.
In addition, EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa funds capacity-building measures for one SRO (the Intergovernmental Authority on Development) and for organisations outside the APSA framework (for example, the Sahel G537). 
Poleg tega nujni skrbniški sklad EU za Afriko financira ukrepe za krepitev zmogljivosti za eno podregionalno organizacijo (Medvladno agencijo za razvoj) ter za organizacije zunaj okvira Afriške strukture za mir in varnost (na primer Sahel G537).
This could undermine the coherence of the EUŐs funding approach. (d) there is a risk that a reduced role for the AU may weaken overall coherence and coordination of EU support to the APSA. (e) despite the significant increase in the amounts allocated to peace and security measures under the RIPs the number of staff working in the relevant regional EU delegations had not increased accordingly. 
To bi lahko ogrozilo skladnost pristopa EU k financiranju. (d) Obstaja tveganje, da bi zmanjšana vloga Afriške unije lahko oslabila splošno koherentnost in usklajevanje podpore EU za Afriško strukturo za mir in varnost. (e) Kljub znatnemu povečanju zneskov, dodeljenih za mirovne in varnostne ukrepe v okviru regionalnih okvirnih programov, se število osebja, zaposlenega v regionalnih delegacijah EU, ni ustrezno povečalo.
For example, there were no military experts on the staff of the delegations to ECOWAS and ECCAS, meaning that these delegations were relying on military expertise made available by EU Member StatesŐ embassies. 
37 21 vojaških strokovnjakov, kar pomeni, da so se te delegacije opirale na vojaško strokovno znanje, ki so ga zagotavljala veleposlaništva držav članic EU.
37 Despite EU support, the APSA faces several challenges and its operation depends on continued external support 31. 
Afriška struktura za mir in varnost se kljub podpori EU spoprijema s številnimi izzivi, njeno delovanje pa je odvisno od neprekinjene zunanje podpore 31.
In this section, we examine whether EU support contributed to results being achieved. 
V tem delu je preučeno, ali je podpora EU prispevala k doseganju rezultatov.
We look at the extent to which EU-funded contracts delivered support according to the objectives set for those contracts. 
Sodišče je preverilo, v kolikšnem obsegu so pogodbe, ki jih je financirala EU, zagotovile podporo v skladu s cilji, določenimi za te pogodbe.
Finally, we assess whether the EEAS and the Commission had identified and addressed risks to the sustainability of the results of EU support. 
Poleg tega je ocenilo, ali sta Evropska služba za zunanje delovanje in Komisija opredelili in obravnavali tveganja za trajnost rezultatov pomoči EU.
Half of the contracts had delivered at the time of the audit 32. 
Pri polovici pogodb so bili v času revizije rezultati doseženi 32.
Six of them, which mainly concerned staff costs, had mainly delivered their overall expected results by the time of the audit. 
Pri šestih, ki so se nanašale predvsem na stroške za zaposlene, je bila v času revizije dosežena večina splošnih pričakovanih rezultatov.
However, we did not have sufficient information to judge whether each individual output had been achieved (paragraphs 59 and 60). 
Vendar pa Sodišče ni imelo dovolj informacij, da bi presodilo, ali so bili doseženi vsi posamezni izložki (odstavka 59 in 60).
In five cases, implementation delays meant that we could not assess whether the contract had achieved the expected outputs or not (paragraph 53 and Annex IV). 
V petih primerih Sodišče zaradi zamud pri izvajanju pogodb ni moglo oceniti, ali so bili pričakovani izložki doseženi ali ne (odstavek 53 in Priloga IV).
The APSA faces several challenges 33. 
Afriška struktura za mir in varnost se spoprijema s številnimi izzivi 33.
Assessments38 have concluded that the AU and the SROs play an important role in addressing conflicts in Africa. 
Ocene38 so pokazale, da imajo Afriška unija in podregionalne organizacije pomembno vlogo pri reševanju konfliktov v Afriki.
For example, Tana Copenhagen ApS Đ "The Inter-relationship between the African Peace and Security Architecture, the Global Peace and Security Architecture and Regional Initiatives", 2013; Swedish Defence Research Agency Đ "The APSA Đ Discussing the remaining challenges", 2016; European Centre for Development Policy Management, "Conflict management under the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)", Discussion paper No 211, April 2017. 20 38 
Afriška struktura za mir in varnost bi kljub temu, da se Na primer, Tana Copenhagen ApS – The Inter-relationship between the African Peace and Security Architecture, the Global Peace and Security Architecture and Regional Initiatives, 2013; švedska agencija za raziskave na področju obrambe – The APSA – Discussing the remaining challenges, 2016; Evropski center za upravljanje razvojne politike, Conflict management under the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), dokument za razpravo št.
Challenges for the APSA include the following: (a) the financial and institutional capacity of the key bodies involved (the AU and the SROs) need to be strengthened; (b) specific steps are needed to overcome the lack of political will to address certain issues and crises39; (c) there is no mechanism to enforce decisions; (d) there is a need for better cooperation between different bodies and institutions; (e) the relationship between the AU and the SROs should be clarified, particularly regarding subsidiarity40; (f) there should be better coordination with complementary initiatives such as the African Governance Architecture41. 
Izzivi, s katerimi se spoprijema Afriška struktura za mir in varnost: (a) okrepiti je treba finančne in institucionalne zmogljivosti ključnih vključenih organov (Afriške unije in podregionalnih organizacij); (b) potrebni so posebni ukrepi za rešitev problema pomanjkanja politične volje za obravnavo nekaterih vprašanj in kriz;39 (c) uvesti je treba mehanizem za izvrševanje sklepov; (d) potrebno je boljše sodelovanje med različnimi organi in institucijami; (e) pojasniti je treba razmerje med Afriško unijo in podregionalnimi organizacijami, zlasti glede subsidiarnosti;40 (f) potrebno je boljše usklajevanje z dopolnilnimi pobudami, kot je afriška struktura za upravljanje41.
The African Peace Fund did not cover the cost of operating the APSA as had been planned (paragraphs 5 and 6). 
Mirovni sklad Afriške unije ni kril stroškov delovanja Afriške strukture za mir in varnost, kot je bilo načrtovano (odstavka 5 in 6).
Most EU support therefore financed the operational costs of the APSA. Paragraphs 36 to 47 present challenges to the operation of the components of the APSA and the contribution of EU support. Institute for Security Studies, PSC Report 90, "Denialism plagues Africa's early warning system", April 2017. 
Večina podpore EU je bila zato porabljena za kritje operativnih stroškov Afriške strukture za mir in varnost. V odstavkih 36 do 47 so Poročilo 90 mirovnega in varnostnega sveta Inštituta za varnostne študije, Denialism plagues Africa's early warning system, april 2017.
The application of the principle of subsidiarity and the question of leadership between AU and the SROs remains a highly sensitive issue. 
Uporaba načela subsidiarnosti in porazdelitev vodenja med Afriško unijo in podregionalnimi organizacijami sta še vedno zelo občutljivi vprašanji.
A precise definition of roles and responsibilities of institutions on the national, regional, continental and multilateral levels is therefore crucial for the effective implementation of the APSA. 
Natančna opredelitev vlog in odgovornosti institucij na nacionalni, regionalni, celinski in večstranski ravni je zato ključna za uspešno izvajanje Afriške strukture za mir in varnost.
2010 and 2013 APF evaluations recommended clarifying the application of the principle of subsidiarity. 
V ocenah mirovne pomoči za Afriko iz let 2010 in 2013 je bilo priporočeno, naj se pojasni uporaba načela subsidiarnosti.
However, there was little progress in this regard: the APSA roadmap for 2016-2020 still highlighted the lack of common understanding of the principles of subsidiarity as one of APSAŐs weaknesses. 
V strateškem načrtu Afriške strukture za mir in varnost za obdobje 2016–2020 je bilo namreč pomanjkanje skupnega razumevanja načela subsidiarnosti še vedno poudarjeno kot ena od slabosti Afriške strukture za mir in varnost.
The African Governance Architecture is a platform for dialogue between the various stakeholders who are mandated to promote good governance and strengthen democracy in Africa. 
Afriška struktura za upravljanje je platforma za dialog med različnimi deležniki, pooblaščenimi za spodbujanje dobrega upravljanja in krepitev demokracije v Afriki.
See http://aga-platform.org/about. 
Glej http://aga-platform.org/about.
Peace and Security Council 36. 
Mirovni in varnostni svet 36.
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is established in its role as the main decision-making organ of the APSA and has taken positions on key issues by condemning coups and imposing sanctions. 
Mirovni in varnostni svet je bil ustanovljen kot glavni organ odločanja Afriške strukture za mir in varnost in je sprejel že več stališč o ključnih vprašanjih, s katerimi je obsojal državne udare in nalagal sankcije.
It has also contributed to resolving conflicts, for example in Burundi, Mali, and Somalia42. 37. 
Prispeval je tudi k reševanju konfliktov, na primer v Burundiju, Maliju in Somaliji.42 37.
However, the PSC faces challenges and several problems continue to affect its work. 
Vendar pa se mirovni in varnostni svet spoprijema z izzivi in številnimi problemi, ki še vedno vplivajo na njegovo delo.
For example, the Assembly of the African Union Heads of State has frequently failed to adhere to principles set out in the PSC Protocol to assess prospective PSC candidatesŐ compliance with set criteria. 
Na primer, skupščina voditeljev držav Afriške unije se večkrat ni držala načel iz protokola mirovnega in varnostnega sveta, po katerih se ocenjuje, ali potencialni kandidati za članstvo v mirovnem in varnostnem svetu izpolnjujejo določena merila.
This has limited the quality and effectiveness of the PSCŐs decisions. 
To je zmanjšalo kakovost in uspešnost sklepov mirovnega in varnostnega sveta.
This is exacerbated by the lack of political will of some states to take a position on issues which they do not recognise as being in their interest, or if they do not wish to openly confront a fellow member state43. African Union Commission 38. 
Na to slabo vpliva tudi pomanjkanje politične volje v nekaterih državah, da bi zavzele stališče glede vprašanj, za katera menijo, da niso v njihovem interesu, ali kadar se želijo izogniti odkritemu sporu z drugo državo članico.43 Komisija Afriške unije 38.
The AU Commission implements PSC decisions and its Peace and Security Department (PSD) supports the other pillars of the APSA as well as other peace and security programmes, such as the demarcation of borders, and the strategy on small arms and light weapons. 
Komisija izvršuje sklepe mirovnega in varnostnega sveta, njen oddelek za mir in varnost pa podpira druge stebre Afriške strukture za mir in varnost ter druge mirovne in varnostne programe, kot so razmejitev meja in strategija o osebnem in lahkem orožju.
The PSD also coordinates relations between the AU and the SROs on peace and security matters. 39. 
Oddelek za mir in varnost usklajuje tudi odnose med Afriško unijo in podregionalnimi organizacijami na področju miru in varnosti.
Institute for Peace and Security Studies, ŇThe African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC): Challenges and Policy OptionsÓ, March/April 2017. 
Inštitut za mirovne in varnostne študije, The African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC): Challenges and Policy Options, marec/april 2017.
22 42 43 
42 43
23 Financing ArrangementÓ (JFA)44. This covered the salary costs of additional 172 Ňshort-termÓ staff members of the PSD (Figure 5). 
V okviru tega mehanizma so se krili stroški plač za dodatnih 172 članov osebja, kratkoročno zaposlenega v mirovnem in varnostnem svetu (slika 5).
Although not all of the posts were filled, the additional staff members allowed the PSD to continue to function45. Figure 5 - AU Commission Peace and Security Department posts and vacancies Source: Minutes of the 11th Steering Committee meeting on the Joint Financing Arrangement for support to the employment of AUC personnel working in the Peace and Security Programme, April 2017, and PSD staff overview, July 2016. 
Čeprav vsa delovna mesta niso bila zapolnjena, pa so dodatni člani osebja mirovnemu in varnostnemu svetu omogočili nadaljnje delovanje.45 Slika 5 – Zasedena in prosta delovna mesta v oddelku za mir in varnost Komisije Afriške unije Vir: zapisnik 11. sestanka usmerjevalnega odbora za dogovor o skupnem financiranju za podporo zaposlovanja osebja Komisije Afriške unije, ki dela na področju mirovnega in varnostnega programa, iz aprila 2017, in pregled osebja oddelka za mir in varnost iz julija 2016 40.
40. The PSD has a limited number of ŇprofessionalÓ staff dealing with core peace and security issues of the African continent. 
V oddelku za mir in varnost je zaposlenih malo strokovnih delavcev, ki se ukvarjajo s temeljnimi mirovnimi in varnostnimi vprašanji afriške celine.
Figure 6 shows the type of staff and how they were funded in 2016. 
Na sliki 6 so predstavljene vrste osebja in način njihovega financiranja v letu 2016.
The main task of the staff is to fulfil the APSAŐs broad 2016-2020 roadmap, a document which specifies 5 strategic priorities, 32 specific objectives and 116 outputs. 
Glavna naloga zaposlenih je izpolnjevanje širokega strateškega načrta Afriške strukture za mir in varnost za obdobje 2016–2020, tj. dokumenta, v katerem je določenih pet strateških prioritet, 32 posebnih ciljev in 116 izložkov.
The inadequate amount of resources allocated and the policy of Ňshort-termÓ staff recruitment (paragraph 57) make this a difficult task. 
Toda zaradi nezadostnih virov in zaposlovanja osebja za kratek čas (odstavek 57) je to težka naloga.
Type of contract Filled posts Vacant Total Remarks AU regular budget 25 42 67 Recruitment process for key posts started Q4/2016 Short-term (JFA) 137 35 172 12 posts under recruitment Secondment 12 12 Estimate March 2017 Total 174 77 251 44 45 JFAs are a form of an enhanced donor support mechanism, through which interested partners can contribute to the agreed costs in a common, predictable and transparent manner. 
Dogovori o skupnem financiranju so mehanizmi za okrepljeno podporo donatorjev, v okviru katerega lahko zainteresirani partnerji na skupen, predvidljiv in pregleden način prispevajo k plačilu dogovorjenih stroškov.