natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
VP: Digital Single Market.       Georgieva  Navracsics: Education, Culture, Youth & Sport Bieńkowska: Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship & SMEs 1 Source: ECA, based on Annex 3 of Working Methods of the European Commission 2014-2019, C(2014) 9004. 
Mimica: mednarodno sodelovanje in razvoj Malmström: trgovina Slika 2 Navracsics: izobraževanje, kultura, mladi in šport mmermans Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče na podlagi Priloge 3 k sporočilu The Working Methods of the European Commission 2014-2019 (Delovne metode Evropske komisije za obdobje 2014–2019), C(2014) 9004.
Mogherini Commissioner Hill resigned on 15 July 2016 and his portfolio was taken over by Vice-President Dombrovskis and Commissioner Moscovici.  Vella: Environment, Maritime Affairs & Fisheries Arias Cañete: Climate & Rural Development Creţu: Regional Policy Observations 19 Flows of information on internal control to college Directors General Group Group of Resource Directors Directorate General Director General Resource Director Management groups Secretariat General Central Financial Service OLAF Audit Progress Committee Internal Audit Service ABM Steering Group The college of commissionners Source: ECA. 
Opažanja 19 Pretok informacij o notranji kontroli do kolegija Skupina generalnih direktorjev Skupine za upravljanje Generalni sekretariat Centralna finančna služba Skupina direktorjev za vire OLAF Odbor za spremljanje poteka revizij Služba za notranjo revizijo Usmerjevalna skupina za ABM Kolegij komisarjev Generalni direktorat Generalni direktor Direktor za vire Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče.
Observations 20 19 The Secretariat-General (SG) has responsibility for a number of corporate processes, including decision-making, document management, business continuity arrangements, and strategic planning and programming. 
Opažanja 20 19 Generalni sekretariat je odgovoren za številne procese na ravni organizacije, vključno z odločanjem, upravljanjem dokumentov, zagotavljanjem neprekinjene­ ga poslovanja ter strateškim načrtovanjem in načrtovanjem programov.
It manages the collegial decision-making process and provides support to the President and the Vice-Presidents. 
Upravlja kolegijski proces sprejemanja odločitev in zagotavlja podporo predsedniku in podpredsednikom.
It coordinates activities across policy areas and Commission departments and acts as the Commission’s interface and manages relations with the other European institutions, national parliaments and non-governmental organisations and entities. 
Usklajuje dejavnosti med različnimi področji in službami Komisije, deluje kot posrednik Komisije ter skrbi za odnose z drugimi evropskimi institucijami, nacionalnimi parlamenti, nevladnimi organizacijami in nevladnimi akterji.
This department, located within DG BUDG provides support and advice on financial management, interpretation of financial rules and legislation, internal control and risk management. 
Ta oddelek, ki je del GD BUDG, zagotavlja podporo in svetovanje o finančnem po­ slovanju, razlagi finančnih pravil in zakonodaje, notranji kontroli in obvladovanju tveganja.
21 Until the reform, the Commission’s financial controller was responsible for approving all expenditure. 
21 Do reforme je bil finančni nadzornik Komisije odgovoren za odobravanje vseh odhodkov.
This role led to criticism that DGs saw their responsibility for EU spending as limited essentially to obtaining the financial control-ler’s approval (visa) (see paragraph 4). 
Ta vloga pa je bila kritizirana, ker naj bi GD razumeli svojo obveznost v zvezi s porabo EU kot omejeno zgolj na pridobitev uradne potrditve finančnega nadzornika (glej odstavek 4).
The Commission abolished the financial controller function and moved responsibility for checks to DGs. 
Komisija je ukinila funkcijo finančnega nadzornika in odgovornost za preverjanje prenesla na GD.
The move from a system of centralised ex ante approval to a system of decentralised responsibility, and ex post accountability was a fundamental building block of the reform. 
Prehod s sistema centralizirane predhodne odobritve na sistem decentralizirane pristojnosti in naknadne odgo­ vornosti je bil bistveni element reforme.
But this means that it has not always been made clear whether the responsibility of the Commission as a whole encompasses responsibility for the actions of its directors-general, or is distinct from responsibility of its directors-general (see Figure 4). 
To pa pomeni, da ni bilo vedno jasno, ali odgovornost Komisije kot celote zajema odgovornost za dejanja njenih general­ nih direktorjev ali je od njih ločena (glej sliko 4).
31 Committee of Independent Experts, Second Report on Reform of the Commission, 1999, p. 
31 Odbor neodvisnih strokovnjakov, Second Report on Reform of the Commission (Drugo poročilo o reformi Komisije), 1999, str.
Observations 21 Accountability in the Commission  28 Commissioners ‘The College of Commissioners assumes collective political responsibility but in practice does not itself exercise the budget implementation powers vested in it. 
Opažanja 21 Prevzemanje odgovornosti na Komisiji  28 komisarjev „Kolegij komisarjev nosi kolektivno politično odgovornost, vendar v praksi sam ne izvaja svojih pooblastil za izvrševanje proračuna.
It delegates these tasks each year to individual civil servants’1. 
Te naloge vsako leto prenese na posamezne javne uslužbence“1.
‘Collective political responsibility’1 Responsibility for the ‘entire management process’1 ‘The responsibility of the Authorising Officers covers the entire management process, from determining what needs to be done to achieve the policy objectives set by the institution to managing the activities launched from both an operational and budgetary standpoint’1. 
Kolektivna politična odgovornost1 Odgovornost za celoten postopek upravljanja1 „Odredbodajalci so odgovorni za celotno upravljanje od določanja, kaj je treba narediti za uresničitev ciljev politik, ki jih je zastavila institucija, do upravljanja v ta namen organiziranih dejavnosti z operativnega in proračunskega vidika“1.
The individual civil servants concerned — generally directors-general and heads of service — are known as ‘Authorising Officers by delegation’ or ‘AODs’ or shortened, as in this figure ‘authorising officers’. 
Posamezni javni uslužbenci – v glav­ nem generalni direktorji in vodje služb – so imenovani kot odredbodajalci na podlagi prenosa pooblastil ali AOD ali skrajšano odredbodajalci, kot je na tej sliki.
2 The Authorising Officer for the Commission is the College of the 28 Commissioners. 
2 Odredbodajalec za Komisijo je kolegij 28 komisarjev.
The College through specific decisions delegates tasks of financial management to the directors-general, who thus become the ‘Authorising Officers by Delegation’. 
Kolegij s posameznimi sklepi prenaša naloge v zvezi s finančnim poslovodenjem na gene­ ralne direktorje, ki tako postanejo odredbodajalci na podlagi prenosa pooblastil.
Directors-general delegate further to the directors, heads of units, etc. who thus become the ‘Authorising Officers by Sub-delegation‘, in accordance with Articles 56, 65 and 66 of the Financial Regulation. 
Generalni direktorji te naloge prenesejo naprej na direktorje, vodje enote itd., ki tako postanejo odredbodajalci na podlagi nadaljnjega prenosa pooblastil v skladu s členi 56, 65 in 66 finančne uredbe.
3 Commission 2016 Human Resources Key Figures Staff Members (excluding staff in Executive Agencies). 
3 Uslužbenci glede na ključne podatke o človeških virih na Komisiji za leto 2016 (razen uslužbencev izvajalskih agencij).
Source: ECA, based on Commission information and figures. 
Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče na podlagi informacij in podatkov Komisije.
Observations 22 22 The legal situation is, however, clear. 
Opažanja 22 22 Pravni položaj pa je jasen.
According to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the Treaty) the Commission is collectively responsible for the execution of the budget32. This is reflected in the Financial Regulation which specifies that ’each institution shall perform the duties of authorising officer‘33. The Commission bears this responsibility notwithstanding its delegation to directors-general (see Box 5) and thus, it is the authorising officer (Commission) who is responsible for ’implementing revenue and expenditure in accordance with the principle of sound financial management and for ensuring compliance with the requirements of legality and regularity’34. 
V skladu s Pogodbo o delovanju Evropske unije (Pogodba) je Komisija kolektivno odgovorna za izvrševanje proračuna.32 To se kaže v finančni uredbi, v kateri je podrobno opredeljeno, da „[v]saka institucija opravlja naloge odredbodajalca.“33 Komisarji so odgovorni ne glede na delegi­ ranje pristojnosti generalnim direktorjem (glej okvir 5), zato je za „izvrševanje prihodkov in odhodkov v skladu z načelom dobrega finančnega poslovodenja in za zagotavljanje, da se upoštevajo zahteve po zakonitosti in pravilnosti“34 odgo­ voren odredbodajalec (Komisija).
32 Article 234 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
32 Člen 234 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije.
33 Article 65.1 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (OJ L 298, 26.10.2012, p. 
33 Člen 65(1) Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 966/2012 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 25. oktobra 2012 o finančnih pravilih, ki se uporabljajo za splošni proračun Unije, in razveljavitvi Uredbe Sveta (ES, Euratom) št.
34 Article 66.1 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012. 
34 Člen 66(1) Uredbe (EU, Euratom) št. 966/2012.
Commission’s responsibility The CIE stressed in 1999 that ‘the font of all authority in the Commission is the college of commissioners itself. 
Odgovornost Komisije Odbor neodvisnih strokovnjakov je leta 1999 poudaril, da je vir celotne oblasti na Komisiji prav kolegij komi­ sarjev.
Ultimately therefore, responsibility for all actions of the administration must find its way back to individual commissioners and through them to the college. [...] 
Zato morajo biti za celotno delovanje uprave dokončno odgovorni posamezni komisarji, prek njih pa kolegij. [...]
The chain of delegation begins at the level of the Commission through the commissioner. 
Linija delegiranja se začne na ravni Komisije in poteka prek komisarja.
She or he thus holds the ultimate responsibility for all financial matters, including for internal control, and as a member of the college’. 
Ta je dokončno odgovoren za vse finančne zadeve, vključno z notranjo kontrolo, in za vse, za kar je odgovoren kot član kolegija.
A 2007 CONT35 Working Document on ‘Governance in the European Commission’36 took a critical view of some elements of the reform. 
Delovni dokument odbora CONT35 iz leta 2007 o vodenju Evropske komisije36 nekatere elemente reforme obravnava kritično.
It stated that ‘The silo structure of the Commission — and the associated concentration of information and power within the directorates-general — should have made it clear to everybody that there would not be any kind of serious governance without functional reporting lines between related services across the directorates-general. 
V njem je navedeno: „Zaradi razvejane strukture služb Komisije – ter z njo povezane količi­ ne informacij in pristojnosti v generalnih direktoratih – bi moralo biti splošno jasno, da brez strokovnih poročil med povezanimi službami v generalnih direktoratih ne bo mogoče vzpostaviti resnega vodenja.
That did not happen. (...)The price for considering each directorate-general as an independent fiefdom, with its own controllers, its own accountants and its own internal auditors only reporting to the director-general, is paid by the institution as a whole and is inconsistent with the Treaty, which gives the college a collective responsibility’. Throughout this report we use the symbol PRESSURE to designate boxes containing examples of pressure from Parliament. 
Ceno za upoštevanje vsakega generalnega direktorata kot samostojne enote z lastnimi nadzorniki, lastnimi računovodji in lastnimi notranjimi revizorji, ki poročajo le generalnemu direktorju, plačuje celotna ustanova in ni v skladu s Pogodbo, ki daje kolegiju kolektivno odgovornost.“ V tem poročilu so s simbolom PARPLRAITMISEKNTA označeni okvirji, v katerih so navedeni primeri pritiska s strani Parlamenta.
35 European Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control. 
35 Odbor Evropskega parlamenta za proračunski nadzor.
36 PE 393.916v01-00, 3.9.2007, pp. 2-3. 
36 PE 393.916v01­00, 3.9.2007, str. 2–3.
FROM PARLIAMENT Box 5 
Okvir 5
Observations 23 The Commission abolished the financial controller and set up 37 A new Framework for Resource Management and Internal Auditing in the Commission, Final Report of the Planning and Coordination Group ‘Internal Audit’, February 2000, p. 
Opažanja 23 Komisija je ukinila funkcijo finančnega nadzornika in 37 A new Framework for Resource Management and Internal Auditing in the Commission, Final Report of the Planning and Co-ordination Group „Internal Audit“ (Novi okvir za upravljanje sredstev in notranjo revizijo na Komisiji, končno poročilo skupine za načrtovanje in usklajevanje o notranji reviziji), februar 2000, str.
38 Commission Decision, SEC(2000) 560. 
38 Sklep Komisije, SEC(2000) 560.
39 Of the total IAS staff 31 work on the decentralised agencies and other autonomous bodies. 
39 Od vseh zaposlenih v Službi za notranjo revizijo jih 31 obravnava decentralizirane agencije in druge samostojne organe.
Their work is not presented to the Commission’s APC. an internal audit function 23 Abolition of the centralised ex ante financial controller and the creation of a ‘modern Internal Audit Service’37 (see Box 6) was a key element in the Prodi reform. 
Njihovo delo ni prikazano Odboru Komisije za spremljanje poteka revizij. vzpostavila funkcijo notranje revizije 23 Ukinitev centralizirane funkcije finančnega nadzornika, ki se je izvajala pred­ hodno, in uvedba sodobne Službe za notranjo revizijo37 (glej okvir 6) sta ključna elementa Prodijeve reforme.
The Commission established the IAS in April 200138 (it had already appointed an internal auditor (see paragraph 8)). 
Komisija je Službo za notranjo revizijo ustanovila aprila 200138 (notranjega revizorja je že imenovala (glej odstavek 8)).
There was considerable debate as to the form Internal Audit should take (institution-wide, or within individual DGs). 
Glede oblike notranje revizije (na ravni institucij ali znotraj posameznih GD) je potekala obširna razprava.
Eventually the Commission set up a specialised audit capability (IAC), reporting directly to each director-general alongside a central Internal Audit Service. 
Komisija je poleg osrednje Službe za notranjo revizijo nato ustanovila specializirane skupine za revizijo (IAC), ki naj bi neposredno poročale posamez­ nim generalnim direktorjem.
In 2015 the Commission abolished the IACs. 
Komisija je leta 2015 IAC ukinila.
24 The DGs with a significant spending role continue to have ex post verification units and audit directorates which examine spending. 
24 V GD, ki imajo večjo vlogo pri porabi, še vedno obstajajo enote za naknadno pre­ verjanje in direktorati za revizijo, ki preverjajo porabo.
There are for example around 180 staff in such entities in DG DEVCO, 130 in DG AGRI, 100 covering research and 90 in DG REGIO. 
V teh službah je npr. okrog 180 zaposlenih v GD DEVCO, 130 v GD AGRI, 100 za raziskave in 90 v GD REGIO.
In 2016, the IAS had a staff of 14739. GOOD GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES Role of internal audit in the public sector BEST PRACTICE ‘The function of internal auditing is to provide independent, objective assurance and consulting services designed to add value and improve an entity’s operations. 
Leta 2016 je imela Služba za notranjo revizijo 147 zaposlenih.39 Smernice za dobro upravljanje Vloga notranje revizije v javnem sektorju NA JBOL JŠA PRAKSA Funkcija notranje revizije je vzpostaviti neodvisno, objektivno zagotovilo in omogočiti storitve svetovanja, ki omogočajo dodano vrednost in izboljšanje dejavnosti subjekta.
The internal audit activity helps an entity accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of governance, risk management, and control processes. 
Notranja revizija prispeva k doseganju ciljev subjekta s sistematičnim, discipliniranim pristopom k ocenjevanju in izboljševanju uspešnosti upravlja­ nja, obvladovanja tveganja in kontrole.
Internal audit reviews can cover a wide range of topics, including those relating to the achievement of value for money and the prevention and detection of fraud and corruption.’40. This definition is in line with the IIA framework: ‘Internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and improve an organisation’s operations. 
Pregledi v okviru notranje revizije lahko zajemajo širok nabor tem, vključno z najboljšim možnim izkoriščanjem finančnih sredstev ter preprečevanjem in odkrivanjem goljufij in korupcije.40 Ta opredelitev je skladna z okvirom IIA: „Funkcija notranje revizije je neodvisno, objektivno zagotovilo in sve­ tovalna dejavnost, oblikovana tako, da omogoča dodano vrednost in izboljša dejavnosti organizacije.
It helps an organisation accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes’. 
Prispe­ va k doseganju ciljev organizacije s sistematičnim, discipliniranim pristopom k ocenjevanju in izboljševanju uspešnosti procesov obvladovanja tveganja, kontrole in upravljanja“.
40 CIPFA/IFAC, ‘International Framework: Good Governance in the Public Sector’, 2014, p. 
40 CIPFA/IFAC, International Framework: Good Governance in the Public Sector (Mednarodni okvir: Dobro upravljanje v javnem sektorju), 2014, str.
Observations 24 The Internal Audit Service initially had a stronger orientation on high level institution-wide governance issues ... 
Opažanja 24 Služba za notranjo revizijo je bila sprva bolj usmerjena v vprašanja v zvezi z upravljanjem na visoki ravni, povezana s celotno institucijo, ...
25 Governance arrangements were of pressing interest to the Commission as it implemented the White Paper. 
25 Med izvajanjem bele knjige se je Komisija zelo zavzemala za ureditve upravlja­ nja.
Thus initially, the IAS had a strong profile on high level, institution-wide governance issues41. In recent years the work of the IAS has covered both issues related to processes in individual DGs and governance. 
Služba za notranjo revizijo je bila sprva bolj usmerjena v vprašanja v zvezi z upravljanjem na visoki ravni, povezana s celotno institucijo.41 V zadnjih letih je njeno delo zajemalo tako zadeve, povezane s procesi v posameznih generalnih direktoratih, kot upravljanje.
Institution-wide governance issues in recent years have included corporate information security (see Box 7). 
Vprašanja v zvezi z upravljanjem na ravni institucije so vključevala informacijsko varnost organizacije (glej okvir 7).
We take note of an IAS recommendation42 for ‘corporate level central measures ... to ensure a consistent reliable complete and comprehensive approach at the operational level and overview on ... Commission wide issues’ such as fraud prevention and detection. A survey of DGs by an external assessor showed that, while there was a high level of appreciation overall for the work of the IAS, appreciation of its impact on corporate governance was significantly lower. 
Sodišče upošteva priporočilo Službe za notranjo revizijo,42 v skladu s katerim naj se na ravni organi­ zacije uvedejo osrednji ukrepi za zagotavljanje doslednega, zanesljivega, celovi­ tega in izčrpnega pristopa na operativni ravni ter pregleda nad zadevami na ravni Komisije, kot sta preprečevanje in odkrivanje goljufij. Anketa, ki jo je med gene­ ralnimi direktorati izvedel zunanji ocenjevalec, je pokazala, da je na splošno delo Službe za notranjo revizijo zelo cenjeno, toda njen učinek na upravljanje organi­ zacije je bistveno manj cenjen.
41 Illustrated, for example, by the 2002 ‘Verstehen’ conference at which the Head of the IAS promoted the ‘single audit’ concept. 
41 To npr. ponazarja konferenca Verstehen iz leta 2002, na kateri je vodja Službe za notranjo revizijo predstavil koncept enotne revizije.
42 The IAS has first made this recommendation in the Working document accompanying the Overall opinion for the year 2010. 
42 Služba za notranjo revizijo je to prvič priporočila v delovnem dokumentu, priloženem splošnemu mnenju za leto 2010.
Some significant IAS recommendations on governance have not been followed In its annual report for 2006 the IAS recommended that the Commission produce an annual governance statement: ‘in order to achieve full maturity and to make its governance architecture and its latest developments known to stakeholders, the Commission should describe its governance policy and practice, preferably in the synthesis report summarising the DGs annual activity reports, make it available on its website and provide for its regular updating’43. The Commission’s governance arrangements were last published in 2007 (see paragraph 45). 
Nekatera pomembna priporočila Službe za notranjo revizijo o upravljanju niso bila upoštevana Služba za notranjo revizijo je v letnem poročilu za leto 2006 Komisiji priporočila, naj pripravi letno izjavo o upravljanju: „Da bi dosegla popolno zrelost in seznanila zainteresirane strani s svojo strukturo vodenja ter najnovejšimi spremembami, mora Komisija opisati svojo politiko upravljanja in ravnanja, po možnosti v zbir­ nem poročilu, v katerem bodo povzeta letna poročila generalnih direktoratov o dejavnosti, to objaviti na svoji spletni strani in poskrbeti za redna posodabljanja.“43 Ureditve upravljanja Komisije so bile nazadnje objavljene leta 2007 (glej odstavek 45).
In its 2009 annual report, the IAS recommended that the overview is necessary at the level of the institution for common processes: ‘Risk Management overview — The role presently played by the SG and DG BUDG should be significantly strengthened so as to assure an effective overview of the implementation of risk management in the Commission, to promote best practices in risk management and to identify risks to which the Commission as a whole is exposed.’44. The Commission’s central departments did not accept this recommendation in its entirety, as they considered it inconsistent with the Commission’s approach of making directorates-general finally responsible45. 
Služba za notranjo revizijo je v letnem poročilu za leto 2009 priporočala pregled skupnih postopkov na ravni institucij: „Pregled obvladovanja tveganja – Sedanjo vlogo GS in GD BUDG bi bilo treba znatno okrepiti, da bi zagotovili uspešen pregled izvajanja obvladovanja tveganja na Komisiji, spodbujali najboljšo prakso pri obvla­ dovanju tveganja in opredelili tveganje, ki mu je izpostavljena Komisija kot celota.“44 Osrednji oddelki Komisije niso sprejeli celotnega priporočila, saj so menili, da ni v skladu s pristopom Komisije, po katerem bi dokončno odgovornost prevzeli generalni direktorati.45 Služba za notranjo revizijo je leta 2015 izvedla revizijo upravljanja informacijske varnosti organizacije.
It tested the adequacy of the governance structure and the measures in place to ensure that appropriate security provisions were implemented in the Commission’s information systems and processes. 
Pre­ izkusila je ustreznost strukture upravljanja in ukrepe za zagotavljanje izvajanja ustreznih določb o varovanju v informacijskih sistemih in procesih Komisije.
Following the IAS recommendation, the Commission set up an Information Security Steering Board (ISSB) and a new IT security directorate. 
Na podlagi priporočila Službe za notranjo revizijo je Komisija ustanovila Usmerjevalni odbor za varnost infor­ macij (ISSB) in nov direktorat za informacijsko varnost.
43 COM(2007) 280 final of 30 May 2007 ‘Annual report to the discharge authority on internal audits carried out in 2006’, p. 
43 COM(2007) 280 final z dne 30. maja 2007, Letno poročilo organu, ki da razrešnico, o notranjih revizijah, opravljenih leta 2006, str.