natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Also in its 2012 interim progress report on the implementation of Directive 2011/85 the Commission referred to the integration of MTBF within the annual budget cycle, as well as to fully integrated documentation as key features “to be carefully considered”63. (ii) Forward-looking expenditure controls that ensure compliance with the medium-term plans. 
Tudi v svojem vmesnem poročilu iz leta 2012 o izvajanju Direktive 2011/85 je Komisija navedla, da sta vključitev srednjeročnega proračunskega okvira v letni proračunski cikel in v celoti združena dokumentacija ključna elementa, ki ju je treba skrbno preučiti63. (ii) V prihodnost usmerjene kontrole odhodkov, ki zagotavljajo skladnost s srednjeročnimi načrti.
02 With regard to carryover arrangements the Commission pointed out the need to set limits to unspent appropriations that can be carried over in the next budget year(s), otherwise “such arrangements may somewhat diminish the stringency and predictive power of the framework”64. 
02 Kar zadeva ureditve prenosa, je Komisija poudarila, da je treba določiti omejitve za neporabljena odobrena sredstva, ki jih je mogoče prenesti v naslednje proračunsko leto (ali leta), sicer se lahko strogost in zmožnost predvidevanja okvira zaradi takih ureditev nekoliko zmanjšata64.
Furthermore, the Commission regards “defining appropriate contingency reserves and related access rules” as a necessary feature for a multi-annual framework65. 
Poleg tega Komisija meni, da mora večletni okvir nujno vsebovati opredelitev ustreznih rezerv za nepredvidene dogodke in z njimi povezanih pravil za dostop65.
62 European Commission (2012), ‘Report on public finances in EMU 2011’, p. 
62 Evropska komisija (2012), Report on Public Finances in EMU 2011, str.
63 European Commission (2012), COM(2012) 761 final, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Interim Progress Report on the implementation of Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States’, p. 
63 Evropska komisija (2012), COM(2012) 761 final, poročilo Komisije Svetu in Evropskemu parlamentu z naslovom Vmesno poročilo o napredku pri izvajanju Direktive Sveta 2011/85/EU o zahtevah v zvezi s proračunskimi okviri držav članic, str.
64 European Commission (2015), Sherwood, M., ‘Medium-Term Budgetary Frameworks in the Member States’, discussion paper 021, p. 
64 Evropska komisija (2015), Sherwood, M., Medium-Term Budgetary Frameworks in the Member States, dokument za razpravo 021, str.
65 European Commission (2012), ‘Fiscal frameworks in the European Union: May 2012 update on priority countries (Addendum to occasional paper 91)’, occasional paper 113, p. 
65 Evropska komisija (2012), Fiscal frameworks in the European Union: May 2012 update on priority countries (Addendum to occasional paper 91), priložnostni dokument 113, str.
(iii) Accountability mechanism66. 
(iii) Mehanizem za odgovornost66.
03 It is noted also that lack of provisions concerning the monitoring of multi-annual budgetary implementation is not consistent with the Commission’s position on key requirements for MTBFs. 
03 Ugotovljeno je tudi, da to, da ni določb o spremljanju izvajanja večletnega proračuna, ni skladno s stališčem Komisije glede ključnih zahtev za srednjeročne proračunske okvire.
Indeed, since 2006 the Commission’s methodology for the calculation of the MTBF index considers “monitoring and enforcement of multiannual budgetary targets” one of the five dimensions for assessing the quality of MTBF in the Member States67. 
V skladu z metodologijo Komisije za izračun indeksa kakovosti srednjeročnega proračunskega okvira od leta 2006 sta spremljanje in izvrševanje večletnih proračunskih ciljev ena od petih razsežnosti za ocenjevanje kakovosti srednjeročnega proračunskega okvira v državah članicah67.
Moreover, the Commission acknowledged already back in 2007 that lack of monitoring is a weakness across Member States68. Furthermore, the Commission reiterated in 2010 that analysis of departures from the envisaged fiscal path, as well as monitoring and corrective mechanisms are key elements in the design of MTBFs69. 
Poleg tega je Komisija že leta 2007 priznala, da je to, da ni dovolj spremljanja, slabost v vseh državah članicah68, leta 2010 pa je ponovno poudarila, da so analiza odstopanj od predvidene fiskalne poti ter mehanizmi spremljanja in popravljalni mehanizmi ključni elementi v zasnovi srednjeročnih proračunskih okvirov69.
48 66 IMF (2010), Lienert, I. and Fainboim, I., ‘Reforming Budget Systems Laws’, Box 3 and Box 4. 
47 66 MDS (2010), Lienert, I., in Fainboim, I., Reforming Budget Systems Laws, okvir 3 in okvir 4.
67 European Commission (2007), ‘Report on public finances in EMU 2007’, Box III.4.1; European Commission (2015), Sherwood, M., ‘Medium-Term Budgetary Frameworks in the Member States’, discussion paper 021, Box A1.1. 
67 Evropska komisija (2007), Report on Public Finances in EMU 2007, okvir III.4.1; Evropska komisija (2015), Sherwood, M., Medium-Term Budgetary Frameworks in the Member States, dokument za razpravo 021, okvir A1.1.
68 European Commission (2007), ‘Report on public finances in EMU 2007’, p. 
68 Evropska komisija (2007), Report on Public Finances in EMU 2007, str.
69 European Commission (2010), ‘Report on public finances in EMU 2010’, Box II.3.3. 
69 Evropska komisija (2010), Report on Public Finances in EMU 2010, okvir II.3.3.
Source: ECA based on Commission’s data. 
Vir: Evropsko računsko sodišče na podlagi podatkov Komisije
The timeframe for such convergence will be proposed by the Commission taking into consideration country-specific sustainability risks. 
Časovni okvir za približevanje predlaga Komisija ob upoštevanju tveganj glede vzdržnosti, specifičnih za posamezno državo.
Possible temporary deviations from the MTO or the adjustment path towards it in case of: The contracting parties may temporarily deviate from their respective MTO or the adjustment path towards it only in "exceptional circumstances". — Implementation of major structural reforms which have a verifiable impact on the long-term sustainability of public finances – emphasis on pension reform — Unusual event outside the control of the Member State concerned which has a major impact on its financial position — Unusual event outside the control of the contracting party concerned which has a major impact on the financial position of the general government 
Možni začasni odkloni od srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja ali prilagoditvene poti za njegovo dosego v primeru: dbenicam se začasen odklon od njihovega srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja ali prilagoditvene poti za njegovo dosego dovoli le v izjemnih okoliščinah. — izvajanja obsežnih strukturnih reform s preverljivim učinkom na dolgotrajno vzdržnost javnih financ – poudarek na pokojninski reformi; — neobičajnega dogodka, na katerega zadevna država članica ne more vplivati in ki ima pomembne posledice za njeno finančno stanje; — neobičajen dogodek, na katerega zadevna pogodbenica ne more vplivati in ki ima pomembne posledice za finančno stanje sektorja država; o o
51 Preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact Fiscal Compact — Periods of severe economic downturn for the euro area or the Union as a whole provided this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term — Periods of severe economic downturn as set out in the revised SGP, provided that the temporary deviation of the contracting party concerned does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium-term. 
50 Preventivni del Pakta za stabilnost in rast Fiskalni dogovor — obdobij resnega upada gospodarske aktivnosti v euroobmočju ali celotni Uniji, če to ne ogroža srednjeročne fiskalne vzdržnosti. — obdobja resnega upada gospodarske aktivnosti, kot je določeno v spremenjenem Paktu za stabilnost in rast, če začasni odklon zadevne pogodbenice ne ogroža srednjeročne fiskalne vzdržnosti.
23): “compliance with the requirements of the preventive arm is assessed using a two-pillar approach. 
23): Skladnost z zahtevami preventivnega dela se ocenjuje s pristopom, ki temelji na dveh stebrih.
The assessment of the structural balance, which constitutes one pillar, is complemented by an analysis of the growth rate of an expenditure aggregate net of discretionary revenue measures, which constitutes the other pillar.” 
En steber je ocena strukturnega salda, dopolnjuje pa jo analiza stopnje rasti za celotne odhodke brez diskrecijskih ukrepov na strani prihodkov, ki je drugi steber. , člen 3(1)(b) „Napredek pri doseganju srednjeročnega cilja in njegovo upoštevanje se ocenjujeta na podlagi splošne ocene s strukturnim saldom kot referenco, vključno z analizo odhodkov, zmanjšanih za diskrecijske ukrepe na strani prihodkov, v skladu s spremenjenim Paktom za stabilnost in rast.“ U
Acronyms and abbreviations Council: Council of the EU CSR: Country-specific recommendation DG ECFIN: Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs ECB: European Central Bank Ecofin Council: Economic and Financial Affairs Council EFB: European Fiscal Board GDP: Gross Domestic Product IFI: Independent fiscal institutions IMF: International Monetary Fund MTBF: Medium-term budgetary framework MTO: Medium-term budgetary objective NBF: National budgetary framework OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PEFA: Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability SGP: Stability and Growth Pact TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union TSCG: Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 52 
Kratice in okrajšave BDP: bruto domači proizvod MDS: Mednarodni denarni sklad OECD: Organizacija za gospodarsko sodelovanje in razvoj PDEU: Pogodba o delovanju Evropske unije PSUU: Pogodba o stabilnosti, usklajevanju in upravljanju v ekonomski in monetarni uniji Svet: Svet EU 51
European Fiscal Board (EFB): An advisory body to the Commission that is responsible for evaluating the implementation of EU fiscal rules, proposing changes to the fiscal framework and performing economic assessments. 
Glosar Evropski fiskalni odbor: svetovalni organ Komisije, ki je odgovoren za ocenjevanje izvajanja fiskalnih pravil EU, predloge sprememb fiskalnega okvira in pripravo ekonomskih ocen.
European Semester: The annual cycle that provides a framework for the coordination of the economic policies of EU Member States and for monitoring progress, in particular fiscal policies as determined by the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Evropski semester: letni ciklus, ki zagotavlja okvir za usklajevanje ekonomskih politik držav članic EU in spremljanje napredka, zlasti v primeru fiskalnih politik iz Pakta za stabilnost in rast.
Fiscal Compact: An agreement to strengthen budgetary discipline entered into by 22 contracting parties, out of the 25 that signed the intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. 
Fiskalni dogovor: dogovor za okrepitev proračunske discipline, ki ga je sklenilo 22 od 25 pogodbenic, ki so podpisale medvladno Pogodbo o stabilnosti, usklajevanju in upravljanju v ekonomski in monetarni uniji.
Fiscal rule: A permanent constraint on fiscal policy, often expressed as a numerical ceiling or target in proportion to gross domestic product on a fiscal performance indicator. 
Fiskalno pravilo: stalna omejitev fiskalne politike, pogosto izražena v obliki numerične zgornje meje ali cilja, sorazmernega z bruto domačim proizvodom v kazalniku fiskalne uspešnosti.
Independent fiscal institution (IFI): A public body, which promotes sound fiscal policy and sustainable public finances through performing a variety of tasks, including macroeconomic and budgetary forecasting and fiscal compliance assessments. 
Neodvisna fiskalna institucija: javni organ, ki z izvajanjem različnih nalog, vključno z makroekonomskimi in proračunskimi napovedmi ter ocenami fiskalne skladnosti, spodbuja dobro fiskalno politiko in vzdržne javne finance.
Macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP): The macroeconomic imbalance procedure aims to identify, prevent and address the emergence of potentially harmful macroeconomic imbalances that could adversely affect economic stability in a particular Member State, the euro area, or the EU as a whole. 
Postopek v zvezi z makroekonomskimi neravnotežji: namenjen je ugotavljanju, preprečevanju in obravnavi nastanka potencialno škodljivih makroekonomskih neravnotežij, ki bi lahko negativno vplivala na gospodarsko stabilnost v posamezni državi članici, euroobmočju ali EU kot celoti.
Potential output: A theoretical concept of the level of output (Gross Domestic Product) in at a given moment that is consistent with stable inflation. 
Potencialni proizvod: teoretični koncept ravni proizvoda (bruto domačega proizvoda) v danem trenutku, ki je skladen s stabilno stopnjo inflacije.
It grows in time at a rate that is not necessarily constant. 
Stopnja njegove rasti skozi čas ni nujno stalna.
Preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact: The main objective of the preventive arm, as set in Council Regulation 1466/97 was to ensure that Member States rapidly converged towards a close‐to‐balance or surplus budget position, which would then allow them to deal with normal cyclical fluctuations without breaching the 3 % limit on headline deficit. 
Preventivni del Pakta za stabilnost in rast: glavni cilj preventivnega dela, kot je določen v Uredbi Sveta (ES) št. 1466/97, je zagotoviti hitro približevanje držav članic čim bolj uravnoteženemu proračunskemu stanju ali proračunskemu presežku, kar bi jim nato omogočilo, da obvladajo običajna ciklična nihanja, ne da bi presegle 3-odstotno omejitev pri nominalnem primanjkljaju.
Primary balance: The budget balance net of interest payments on general government debt. 
Primarni saldo: proračunski saldo brez plačil obresti za javnofinančni dolg.
Stability and convergence programmes: Under the Stability and Growth Pact, Member States are obliged to submit a document annually setting out their fiscal plans for the next three years. 
Programi za stabilnost in konvergenco: v skladu s Paktom za stabilnost in rast morajo države članice letno predložiti dokument s fiskalnimi načrti za naslednja tri leta.
Used by the Commission and finance ministers to assess whether countries are on track to reach their medium‐term budgetary objective. 
Komisija in finančni ministri ga uporabljajo, da ocenijo, ali so države pri doseganju svojega srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja na dobri poti.
Euro‐area countries submit “stability programmes”, while Member States that have not adopted the euro produce “convergence programmes”. 
Države članice euroobmočja predložijo programe za stabilnost, države, ki niso članice euroobmočja, pa programe za konvergenco.
Structural balance: The actual budget balance net of the cyclical component and one-off and other temporary measures. 
Strukturni saldo: dejanski proračunski saldo brez cikličnega elementa ter enkratnih in drugih začasnih ukrepov.
Two-Pack: An EU package of two legislative measures (Regulations 472 and 473) adopted in May 2013, aimed at strengthening economic governance in the euro area. 
Zakonodajni dvojček: sveženj dveh zakonodajnih ukrepov EU (uredb št.
56 REPLIES OF THE COMMISSION TO THE SPECIAL REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS “SPECIAL REPORT XX/2019 ON THE EU REQUIREMENTS FOR NATIONAL BUDGETARY FRAMEWORKS: NEED TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THEM AND TO BETTER MONITOR THEIR APPLICATION” EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I The Commission welcomes the ECA performance audit on fiscal stability. 
SL SL ODGOVORI KOMISIJE NA POSEBNO POROČILO EVROPSKEGA RAČUNSKEGA SODIŠČA „POSEBNO POROČILO ŠT. XX/2019 O ZAHTEVAH EU ZA NACIONALNE PRORAČUNSKE OKVIRE: TREBA JIH JE DODATNO OKREPITI, NJIHOVO UPORABO PA BOLJE SPREMLJATI“ POVZETEK I Komisija pozdravlja revizijo smotrnosti, ki jo je Evropsko računsko sodišče izvedlo v zvezi s fiskalno stabilnostjo.
The Commission has been at the forefront of Union’s efforts to improve fiscal governance both at EU and Member States’ level. 
Komisija je v ospredju prizadevanj Unije za izboljšanje fiskalnega upravljanja na ravni EU in na ravni držav članic.
Leveraging its extensive knowledge on the topic of national budgetary frameworks (NBFs), the Commission put forward during the economic crisis legislative proposals introducing key requirements for the Member States’ fiscal frameworks, which were meant to improve the management of domestic public finances and to promote compliance with the EU fiscal rules. 
Med gospodarsko krizo je izkoristila svoje obsežno poznavanje področja nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov in predložila zakonodajne predloge, s katerimi se uvajajo ključne zahteve za fiskalne okvire držav članic ter katerih namen je bilo izboljšanje upravljanja nacionalnih javnih financ in spodbujanje skladnosti s fiskalnimi pravili EU.
However, it should be noted that the Commission’s proposals were developed in a short period of time, under the pressure of the crisis, and were adopted by the co-legislators after protracted discussions and negotiations. 
Vendar bi bilo treba opozoriti, da so bili predlogi Komisije pod pritiskom krize pripravljeni v kratkem času, sozakonodajalca pa sta jih sprejela po dolgotrajnih razpravah in pogajanjih.
The Commission’s subsequent actions focused on the implementation of the agreed framework and should therefore be assessed in this light. 
Nadaljnji ukrepi Komisije so bili osredotočeni na izvajanje dogovorjenega okvira, zato bi jih bilo treba kot take tudi oceniti.
II The perimeter of EU requirements for NBFs extends beyond the areas of independent fiscal institutions, fiscal rules and medium-term budgetary frameworks. 
II Obseg zahtev EU za nacionalne proračunske okvire presega področja neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij, fiskalnih pravil in srednjeročnih proračunskih okvirov.
Notably, important requirements are laid down in relation to forecasting for budgetary purposes, fiscal statistics and accounting, transparency of public finances and a common budgetary timeline for the euro area Member States. 
Zlasti so določene pomembne zahteve v zvezi z napovedovanjem za proračunske namene, s fiskalnimi statističnimi podatki in proračunskim računovodstvom, preglednostjo javnih financ in skupnim proračunskim časovnim okvirom za države članice euroobmočja.
III While the Commission is the institutional addressee of the performance audit, the Member States’ role and contribution need to be properly acknowledged. 
III Komisija je institucionalni naslovnik revizije smotrnosti, vendar je treba ustrezno priznati vlogo in prispevek držav članic.
Firstly, the Member States agreed the set of requirements on NBFs which are enshrined in the relevant EU law and, in an intergovernmental setting, signed up to the intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) and its Fiscal Compact. 
Prvič, države članice so se dogovorile o sklopu zahtev glede nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov, določenih v ustreznem pravu EU, ter v medvladnem okviru podpisale Pogodbo o stabilnosti, usklajevanju in upravljanju v ekonomski in monetarni uniji (PSUU) ter njen fiskalni dogovor.
The way in which Member States implement the requirements has been a decisive factor for the effectiveness of the agreed framework. 
To, kako države članice izvajajo zahteve, odločilno vpliva na uspešnost dogovorjenega okvira.
The Commission is fully committed to further supporting the strengthening of NBFs across the EU, within the scope of powers conferred upon it by the Treaties. 
Komisija je v celoti zavezana nadaljnjemu podpiranju krepitve nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov v vsej EU v okviru pristojnosti, ki so ji dodeljene s Pogodbama.
To this end, the Commission will give due consideration to the findings of the audit and will build on the lessons learnt from how the reinforced budgetary frameworks of the Member States have been performing as well as on relevant international practices. 
V ta namen bo ustrezno proučila ugotovitve revizije in upoštevala izkušnje, pridobljene v zvezi z izvajanjem okrepljenih proračunskih okvirov držav članic, pa tudi ustrezne mednarodne prakse.
IV The current legal provisions introduced a wide range of basic requirements across the main planks of Member States’ fiscal frameworks. 
IV Z veljavnimi pravnimi določbami so bile uvedene najrazličnejše osnovne zahteve na glavnih področjih fiskalnih okvirov držav članic.
The basic requirements for medium-term budgetary frameworks (MTBFs) and the establishing criteria for independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) are largely consistent with the relevant literature and international practices; in fact, in some respects the Union is a standard-setter. 
Osnovne zahteve za srednjeročne proračunske okvire in merila za ustanovitev neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij so večinoma skladni z ustrezno literaturo in mednarodnimi praksami; dejansko Unija v nekaterih pogledih določa standarde.
Notwithstanding this, the Commission does not wish to claim that there is no room to improve EU requirements for NBFs (as attested by its 2017 Directive proposal) or the way in which they are applied by the Member States. 
Ne glede na to Komisija ne želi trditi, da ni mogoče izboljšati zahtev EU za nacionalne proračunske okvire (kakor dokazuje njen predlog direktive iz leta 2017) ali tega, kako jih države članice uporabljajo.
The Commission recalls that the 2017 draft Directive aims to incorporate the substance of the TSCG into EU law. 
Komisija opozarja, da je namen osnutka direktive iz leta 2017 vključiti vsebino PSUU v pravo EU.
Its scope is therefore confined to those features of NBFs which the Commission deemed relevant for the incorporation. 
Njegovo področje uporabe je zato omejeno na tiste elemente nacionalnih proračunskih okvirov, ki so po mnenju Komisije pomembni za vključitev. 1
Whereas the discretion given to the Commission by the legal texts that underlie the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) can contribute to such differences, the Commission stresses that it undertakes its assessment of Member States’ compliance with EU fiscal rules in a rigorous and transparent way and making appropriate use of the flexibility existing within the rules, in line with the commonly agreed position endorsed by the Council in February 2016. 
K takim razlikam lahko prispeva diskrecijska pravica, ki je Komisiji podeljena s pravnimi besedili, na katerih temelji Pakt za stabilnost in rast, vendar Komisija poudarja, da svojo oceno skladnosti držav članic s fiskalnimi pravili EU izvede strogo in pregledno ter ob ustrezni uporabi prožnosti znotraj pravil v skladu s skupno dogovorjenim stališčem, ki ga je Svet potrdil februarja 2016.
The Commission considers that the risk of inconsistencies can and should be mitigated or handled efficiently. 
Komisija meni, da je možnost nekonsistentnosti mogoče in treba učinkovito zmanjšati ali obravnavati.
Regular exchanges and sharing of information between the Commission and the IFIs - as already undertaken by the Commission - are among the most effective risk mitigation measures. 
Redno komuniciranje in izmenjava informacij med Komisijo in neodvisnimi fiskalnimi institucijami, kar Komisija že izvaja, spadata med najučinkovitejše ukrepe za zmanjšanje tveganja.
VI The European Fiscal Board (EFB) was envisaged from the outset (i.e. the Five Presidents’ Report) as a body to provide independent advice on the EU fiscal governance framework. 
VI Evropski fiskalni odbor je bil od vsega začetka (tj. v poročilu petih predsednikov) predviden kot organ za neodvisno svetovanje o okviru EU za fiskalno upravljanje.
Its statutory basis (i.e. Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1937) confirms this rationale by setting out the Board’s mission as follows: “The Board shall contribute in an advisory capacity to the exercise of the Commission's functions in the multilateral fiscal surveillance as set out in Articles 121, 126 and 136 TFEU as far as the euro area is concerned.” This is further operationalised into a broad range of tasks and responsibilities. 
Njegova zakonska podlaga (tj. Sklep Komisije (EU) 2015/1937) potrjuje to utemeljitev, saj za namen delovanja odbora določa: „Odbor v svetovalni vlogi prispeva k izvajanju nalog Komisije v okviru večstranskega fiskalnega nadzora v skladu s členi 121, 126 in 136 PDEU v delu, ki zadeva euroobmočje.“ To je nato preoblikovano v najrazličnejše naloge in odgovornosti.