natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The efforts to improve the governance of the gas sector in Ukraine as well as the overall security of supply were impaired until 2014 by Ukraine’s dependence on Russian energy supplies. 
Prizadevanja za izboljšanje upravljanja plinskega sektorja v Ukrajini in splošne varnosti oskrbe z energijo je do leta 2014 ovirala odvisnost Ukrajine od ruske oskrbe z energijo.
Since then, the significant progress achieved in gas market reforms in Ukraine is widely recognised. 
Od takrat je znaten napredek na področju plinskih tržnih reform v Ukrajini splošno priznan.
Since March 2015 a wide ranging gas sector reform plan is being implemented. 
Od marca 2015 se izvaja obširen načrt za reformo plinskega sektorja.
Further to the new gas law, the government adopted the plan for the unbundling of Naftogaz from the transmission system operator in July 2016 which should be implemented by 2017. 
Poleg novega zakona o plinu je vlada julija 2016 sprejela načrt za ločitev Naftogaza od operaterja prenosnega sistema, ki naj bi se izvedla do leta 2017.
The Commission, together with the Energy Community Secretariat and other partners, will continue to push for the completion of the gas sector reforms, to improve transparency and ensure full competitive conditions, including enabling new entrants to the market and increasing the security of gas supply and the reliability of Ukraine’s transit system. 
Komisija si bo skupaj s Sekretariatom Energetske skupnosti in z drugimi partnerji še naprej prizadevala za dokon­ čanje reform plinskega sektorja, izboljšanje preglednosti in za zagotovitev vseh konkurenčnih pogojev, vključno z omogočanjem pristopa novih udeležencev na trg ter izboljšanjem varnosti oskrbe s plinom in zanesljivosti ukrajin­ skega tranzitnega sistema.
Replies of the Commission and of the EEAS 49 Introduction 04 Since mid-2015, Ukraine’s economy has witnessed signs of economic stabilisation following a particularly deep recession that was largely driven by the confidence loss and damage of production capacity associated with the armed conflict in the east. 
OdgovoriKomisijeinEvropskeslužbezazunanjedelovanje 49 Uvod 04 Od sredine leta 2015 se v gospodarstvu v Ukrajini kažejo znaki gospodarske stabilizacije po zelo resni recesiji, ki je bila zlasti posledica izgube zaupanja in poškodovanja proizvodne zmogljivosti, kar je povezano z oboroženim kon­ fliktom na Vzhodu.
The stabilisation reflected a combination of factors such as a strong macroeconomic policy response that was used to address long-term imbalances and large-scale international financial and technical support that was instrumental for reining in the confidence crisis. 
Stabilizacija je posledica kombinacije dejavnikov, kot sta močen odziv makroekonomske politike, ki je bil uporabljen za obravnavanje dolgoročnih neravnovesij, ter obsežna mednarodna finančna in tehnična pod­ pora, ki je bila ključna za obvladovanje krize zaupanja.
Following contraction of 6.6 % in 2014 and 9.9 % in 2015, the economy is expected to return to growth (projected at 1-2 %) in 2016 on the back of gradually improving consumer and investor confidence. 
Po zmanjšanju za 6,6 % v letu 2014 in 9,9 % v letu 2015 se v letu 2016 pričakuje ponovno gospodarsko rast (ocenjena na 1–2 %), ki temelji na postopnem izboljšanju zaupanja potrošnikov in vlagateljev.
GDP increased by 0.1 % in real terms in Q1 2016 and rose by 1.3 % in Q2. 
BDP se je v prvem četrtletju leta 2016 realno povečal za 0,1 %, v drugem četrtletju pa za 1,3 %.
08 Due to the situation in Ukraine, ENI assistance since 2014 has indeed been provided in the form of annual ‘Special Measures’. 
08 Zaradi razmer v Ukrajini je bila od leta 2014 zagotovljena pomoč ENI v obliki letnih „posebnih ukrepov“.
Preparations have now started to return to normal multi-annual programming in the form of a Single Support Framework starting from 2018. 
Priprave za vrnitev k običajnemu večletnemu načrtovanju v obliki enotnega okvira podpore z začetkom leta 2018 so se že začele.
13 The Commission agrees that the reform commitment of the Ukrainian authorities has greatly improved since 2014. 
13 Komisija se strinja, da se je zavezanost ukrajinskih oblasti reformam od leta 2014 močno izboljšala.
In particular, the current Ukrainian administration is showing a strong commitment to Public Administration Reform (PAR). 
Zlasti trenutna ukrajinska uprava kaže močno zavezanost reformi javne uprave (Public Administration Reform – PAR).
Work is ongoing to design a major EU assistance programme in this area to support and sustain this reform commitment. 
Delo za oblikovanje pomembnega programa pomoči EU na tem področju za podporo in ohranjanje zavezanosti reformam je v teku.
The third MFA programme also contains important PAR commitments, concerning both legislation and implementation 15 MFA does not duplicate IMF conditionality but complements it. 
Tretji program makrofinančne pomoči vsebuje tudi pomembne obveznosti za reformo javne uprave, ki zadevajo zakonodajo in izvajanje.
MFA can only be disbursed if the complementary IMF programme is on track and IMF reviews continue to be concluded. 
Makrofinančno pomoč je mogoče izplačati le, če je dopolnilni program MDS na dobri poti in se revizije MDS še naprej izvajajo.
This implies that the beneficiary must continue to meet IMF conditions in order to benefit from MFA disbursements. 
To pomeni, da mora upravičenec še naprej izpolnjevati pogoje MDS, da je upravičen do izplačil makrofinančne pomoči.
Box 1 — Activation of the Ukrainian authorities’ campaign against the oligarchy The Commission considers that the role and relevance of the Agency for Modernisation are overstated and that there was no risk of confusion with the EU’s official assistance to Ukraine. 
Okvir 1 – Začetek kampanje ukrajinskih organov proti oligarhiji Komisija meni, da sta vloga in pomen agencije za modernizacijo precenjeni in da ne obstaja nevarnost zamenjave z uradno pomočjo EU Ukrajini.
17 The dramatic events in Ukraine at the end of February 2014, namely the ousting of former Ukrainian President Yanu-kovich on 28 February 2014 and the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea in the following days, required a decisive and swift response to mitigate to the extent possible the effects of a dire and unexpected situation. 
17 Dramatični dogodki v Ukrajini konec februarja 2014, in sicer strmoglavljenje nekdanjega ukrajinskega predsednika Janukoviča 28. februarja 2014 in nezakonita ruska priključitev Krima v naslednjih dneh, so zahtevali odločen in hiter odziv, ki bi v največji možni meri ublažil posledice resnih in nepričakovanih razmer.
Replies of the Commission and of the EEAS 50 Although doing so did not provide the Commission with sufficient time to develop a predefined, long-term strategy before announcing an important aid package for Ukraine in March 2014, longer-term planning began in the immediate aftermath and ample strategic discussions have taken place since, also including the involvement of international partners. 
OdgovoriKomisijeinEvropskeslužbezazunanjedelovanje 50 Čeprav to Komisiji ni zagotovilo dovolj časa, da bi razvila vnaprej določeno dolgoročno strategijo pred objavo pomembnega paketa pomoči Ukrajini marca 2014, se je dolgoročnejše načrtovanje začelo takoj po dogodkih; od takrat potekajo obsežne strateške razprave, tudi v sodelovanju z mednarodnimi partnerji.
In addition, following the announcement of the support package, which was of major political relevance, specific EU support programmes were thoroughly designed taking into account and documenting financial risks as well as the activities of other donors. 
Poleg tega so bili po napovedi svežnja podpore, ki je imela velik politični pomen, skrbno zasnovani posebni pod­ porni programi EU, tako da upoštevajo in dokumentirajo finančna tveganja in dejavnosti drugih donatorjev.
18 The objective of the March 2014 financial package was to send a strong signal of political support and at the same time to mobilise short-term budgetary and fiscal as well as more long-term investment and advisory support. 
18 Cilj finančnega paketa iz marca 2014 je bil poslati odločno politično podporo ter hkrati zagotoviti kratkoročno proračunsko in fiskalno podporo ter podporo za dolgoročnejše naložbe in svetovalno podporo.
It hence addressed short-as well as medium-to long-term needs, the latter indeed being subject to sustained reform commitment on the side of the Ukrainian authorities. 
Finančni paket je torej naslovil kratko­ in srednje­ do dolgoročne potrebe; zadnje so predmet trajne zavezanosti reformam ukrajinskih oblasti.
It should be noted that only EUR 1.61 billion of MFA were part of the March 2014 financial package (combined volume of MFA I and MFA II). 
Omeniti je treba, da je bilo samo 1,61 milijarde EUR makrofinančne pomoči del finančnega paketa iz marca 2014 (skupna količina makrofinančne pomoči I in makrofinančne pomoči II).
The proposal for a third MFA operation for Ukraine (with a volume of EUR 1.8 billion) was adopted by the Commission in January 2015, i.e. it was additional to the March 2014 package based on a comprehensive assessment of the assistance provided up to that point, its impact on economic and financial stability in Ukraine since the beginning of the crisis, and in view of the deteriorating financial situation in Ukraine in early 2015. 
Predlog za tretji ukrep makrofinančne pomoči za Ukrajino (v višini 1,8 milijarde EUR) je Komisija sprejela januarja 2015, tj. poleg paketa iz marca 2014 ter na podlagi celovite presoje do takrat dodeljene pomoči in njenega vpliva na gospodarsko pa tudi finančno stabilnost v Ukrajini od začetka krize ter glede na slabšanje finančnega položaja v Ukrajini v začetku leta 2015.
20 The return to multi-annual programming in the form of a Single Support Framework is foreseen as from 2018. 
20 Ponovna vzpostavitev večletnega načrtovanja v obliki enotnega okvira podpore je predvidena od leta 2018.
Preparatory work has already started. 
Priprav­ ljalno delo se je že začelo.
21 While there might have been some initial coordination challenges, activities of the EU Delegation in Kiev, the Support Group for Ukraine and the EU Advisory Mission are now closely coordinated and fully complementary. 
21 Pojavilo se je sicer nekaj začetnih izzivov glede usklajevanja, vendar se zdaj dejavnosti delegacije EU v Kijevu, pod­ porne skupine Komisije za Ukrajino in svetovalne misije EU tesno usklajujejo in v celoti dopolnjujejo.
This is evidenced, e.g. by the joint design of a new anti-corruption support programme, that has been adopted earlier this year (June 2016). 
To se na primer kaže v skupnem oblikovanje novega protikorupcijskega podpornega programa, ki je bil sprejet v letošnjem letu (junij 2016).
22 This initiative has not been further pursued. 
22 Ta pobuda se ne nadaljuje.
The Commission further supports Ukraine in the fight against corruption and fraud through other initiatives, e.g. inter alia support to Ukraine’s new anti-corruption bodies through the anti corruption programme mentioned in the reply to paragraph 21, and support to reform of the judiciary. 
Komisija Ukrajino še naprej podpira v boju proti korupciji in goljufijam v okviru drugih pobud, med drugim na primer s podporo novih ukrajinskih protikorupcijskih organov prek protikorupcijskega pro­ grama, navedenega v odgovoru na odstavek 21, in s podporo reforme sodstva.
24 Donor coordination by the Ukrainian governments was indeed relatively weak over most of the audited period. 
24 Usklajevanje donatorjev s strani ukrajinske vlade je bilo razmeroma šibko, in sicer v velikem delu revidiranega obdobja.
The current Ukrainian government is however taking steps to address and improve the situation and this is starting to have positive effects. 
Vendar zdajšnja ukrajinska vlada sprejema ukrepe za reševanje in izboljšanje položaja, ki že kažejo pozi­ tivne učinke.
Replies of the Commission and of the EEAS 51 25 The Commission has coordinated from the beginning with the EBRD Multi-Donor Fund and has now also adopted a decision (July 2016) to contribute to the Fund. 
Odgovori Komisije in Evropske službe za zunanje delovanje 51 25 Komisija vse od začetka deluje usklajeno z večdonatorskim skladom EBRD in je zdaj sprejela tudi sklep (julij 2016) o prispevanju v sklad.
Observations 34 The EU has indeed been very active to support the development of a PFM strategy in 2012 and 2013 which resulted in the adoption of a good quality document before the Vilnius Summit. 
Opažanja 34 EU je bila zelo dejavna pri podpiranju razvoja strategije upravljanja javnih financ v letih 2012 in 2013, kar je imelo za posledico sprejetje kakovostnega dokumenta pred vrhom v Vilni.
Work is currently underway — again with the help of EU and OECD SIGMA experts — to update and further improve the PFM strategy. 
Trenutno potekata – spet s pomočjo strokovnja­ kov EU in programa OECD SIGMA – posodobitev in nadaljnje izboljšanje strategije za upravljanje javnih financ.
38 Conditions on Public Financial Management and the fight against corruption were at the very centre of a number of EU support programmes, e.g. the State Building contract. 
38 Pogoji za upravljanje javnih financ in boj proti korupciji so v središču številnih evropskih programov podpore, npr. pogodbe o podpori za konsolidacijo držav.
The Commission will continue to improve the way and the criteria used to assess PFM progress. 
Komisija bo še naprej izboljševala način in merila, ki se uporabljajo za oceno napredka pri upravljanju javnih financ.
40 The Commission considers that it used its margin of appreciation appropriately given the exceptional political and financial circumstanes in Ukraine. 
40 Komisija meni, da je glede na izjemne politične in finančne okoliščine v Ukrajini ustrezno uporabila svojo prosto presojo.
Box 2 — Flexibility in setting and assessing the fulfilment of MFA conditions The MoU for MFA I was mainly negotiated in 2010-2012 with a much less reform-oriented Ukrainian government and only ratified by the Ukrainian Parliament in 2014. 
Okvir 2 – Prožnost pri določanju pogojev za makrofinančno pomoč in ocenjevanju njihovega izpolnjevanja Memorandum o soglasju za makrofinančno pomoč I je bil v veliki meri izpogajan v obdobju 2010–2012 z ukrajinsko vlado, ki je bila veliko manj naklonjena reformam, ukrajinski parlament pa ga je ratificiral šele leta 2014.
The approach of including more than one deliverable in a condition renders it possible to state an overarching objective in a specific reform area in order to provide strategic orientation, while still providing clarity and specificity regarding the policy measures that are expected. 
Pristop, ki znotraj enega pogoja predvideva več kot en rezultat, omogoča določanje širšega cilja za določeno pod­ ročje reform, da bi zagotovil strateško usmeritev, hkrati pa še vedno zagotavljal pričakovano jasnost in specifičnost glede političnih ukrepov.
Common reply to paragraphs 41 and 42 The Commission considers that the proportion of frontloading of Sector Budget Support fixed tranches remained in the margins recommended by the Budget Support Guidelines and was justified by the situation in Ukraine. 
Skupni odgovor na odstavka 41 in 42 Komisija meni, da je delež preddobave fiksne tranše sektorske proračunske podpore ostal znotraj meja, ki jih pripo­ ročajo smernice proračunske podpore, in da je bil upravičen zaradi razmer v Ukrajini.
43 The Commission considers that in 2014, Ukraine was on the brink of financial and ultimately political collapse. 
43 Komisija meni, da je bila Ukrajina v letu 2014 na robu finančnega in političnega propada.
In tandem with the IMF and other international donors, the EU responded swiftly to the financial crisis in Ukraine, in particular in 2014 and the first half of 2015. 
Skupaj z MDS in drugimi mednarodnimi donatorji se je EU hitro odzvala na finančno krizo v Ukrajini, zlasti leta 2014 in v prvi polovici leta 2015.
Given the depth of the economic crisis in Ukraine and the size of the country (by far the biggest of the EU’s eastern neighbours), it was necessary to provide significant amounts of macro-financial assistance. 
Glede na resnost gospodarske krize v Ukrajini in velikost države (daleč največja vzhodna soseda EU) je bilo nujno zagotoviti velike količine makrofinančne pomoči.
Replies of the Commission and of the EEAS 52 46 Budget support disbursements are indeed since 2010 based on a comprehensive PFM assessment which takes into account all relevant analytical material including PEFA assessments. 
Odgovori Komisije in Evropske službe za zunanje delovanje 52 46 Izplačila proračunske podpore se od leta 2010 dejansko izdajajo na podlagi celovite ocene upravljanja javnih financ, ki upošteva ves ustrezen analitični material, vključno z ocenami PEFA.
48 The Commission considers that the 2014 evaluation of budget support operations in Ukraine provided a comprehensive and comparative overview and assessment. 
48 Komisija meni, da je vrednotenje dejavnosti proračunske podpore v Ukrajini iz leta 2014 zagotovilo celovit in primer­ jalni pregled ter oceno.
51 The Commission is aware of this issue which was also highlighted by the budget support evaluation and is advising the Ministry of Finance to find better ways to channel EU resources. 
51 Komisija se zaveda tega problema, ki je bil poudarjen tudi pri vrednotenju proračunske podpore, in ministrstvu za finance svetuje, da poišče boljše načine za usmerjanje sredstev EU.
52 The Commission considers that its assessment ‘broadly fulfilled’ means that, even though not every aspect of the MFA condition has been implemented, the reform objective of the condition in question has been achieved to an extent that it would not be justified to delay the related MFA disbursement. 
52 Komisija meni, da njena ocena „v veliki meri izpolnjeno“ pomeni, da je bil cilj reforme zadevnega pogoja dosežen v takem obsegu, da ne bi bilo upravičeno zavlačevati izplačila povezane makrofinančne pomoči, čeprav vsi vidiki makrofinančne pomoči niso bili izvedeni.
Common Commission reply to paragraphs 67-69 The Commission maintained throughout the audited period a coherent policy in view of the strategic role of the Ukrainian gas transit system and, related to this, the need for fundamental reforms in the gas sector. 
Skupni odgovor Komisije na odstavke 67 do 69 Komisija je v revidiranem obdobju ohranila usklajeno politiko glede strateške vloge ukrajinskega plinskega tran­ zitnega sistema in z njim povezane potrebe po temeljnih reformah v plinskem sektorju.
Member States largely supported the efforts of the Commission. 
Države članice so na splošno podprle prizadevanja Komisije.
The Commission acknowledges however that the priorities of some Member States with regard to cooperation in the gas sector were not always fully aligned with those of the Commission. 
Vendar pa Komisija priznava, da prednostne naloge nekaterih držav članic glede sodelovanja v plinskem sektorju niso bile vedno popolnoma skladne s prednostnimi nalogami Komisije.
Following the crisis of 2006 and of 2009, the Commission did conduct internal risk assessments and sought to assess the lessons learned from the interruption of gas supplies in a Staff Working Paper (Commission Staff Working Paper {COM(2009) 363} SEC (2009) 997). 
Po krizi v letih 2006 in 2009 je Komisija izvedla notranjo oceno tveganja in izkušnje, pridobljene ob prekinitvi dobave plina, poskusila oceniti v delovnem dokumentu služb Komisije (Delovni dokument služb Komisije SEC(2009) 977, priložen COM(2009) 363).
The Commission considers that gas transit interruptions in 2006 and 2009 were a direct result of a commercial dispute between Gazprom and Naftogaz, influenced and exacerbated by the political tensions between Ukraine and Russia. 
Komisija meni, da so bile prekinitve tranzita plina v letih 2006 in 2009 neposredna posledica trgovinskega spora med Gazpromom in ukrajinskim Naftogazom, na katerega so vplivale in ga zaostrile politične napetosti med Ukra­ jino in Rusijo.
The Commission had to take into account the sensitivity of the related information and considers it could, under these circumstances, not have been more explicit. 
Komisija je morala upoštevati občutljivost zadevnih podatkov in meni, da v teh okoliščinah ne bi mogla biti jasnejša.
70 The Commission acknowledges that the design of assistance programmes relating to the gas sector could have been in some cases better but points to the weak administrative capacity of the concerned Ukrainian ministries in formulating assistance programmes. 
70 Komisija priznava, da bi bilo lahko načrtovanje programov pomoči, ki se nanaša na plinski sektor, v nekaterih prime­ rih boljše, vendar opozarja na šibko upravno zmogljivost zadevnih ukrajinskih ministrstev pri oblikovanju progra­ mov pomoči.
Replies of the Commission and of the EEAS 53 71 The Commission considers that access to data gradually improved during the audited period. 
Odgovori Komisije in Evropske službe za zunanje delovanje 53 71 Komisija meni, da se je dostop do podatkov v revidiranem obdobju postopoma izboljševal.
Since 2015, relevant data regarding gas transit flows as well as market information concerning the Ukrainian gas sector are now publicly accessible, thanks to the cooperation between Ukrainian authorities, the Commission and ENTSO-G (European Network Transmission System Operator-Gas). 
Od leta 2015 so pomembni podatki o tranzitnih plinskih tokovih in tudi tržne informacije o ukrajinskem plinskem sektorju javno dostopni, zahvaljujoč sodelovanju med ukrajinskimi oblastmi, Komisijo in Evropsko mrežo sistemskih operaterjev prenosnih omrežij zemeljskega plina (ENTSO­G).
73 The Commission considers that progress was already made in 2014, including for example the drafting of the new gas law by the government, that enabled the signature of first EIB/EBRD loans for the modernisation of the Gas Transit System in December 2014. (c) The Commission’s efforts to help Ukraine in the modernisation of the gas transit system only generated major concrete investment decisions towards the end of 2014 mainly because previous governments were not forthcoming in implementing key reforms agreed in the Joint Declaration of 2009. (d) (i) The Commission and EEAS consider that the security of the EU’s gas supply via Ukraine was also at risk because of external actors (Russia). 
73 Komisija meni, da je bil napredek dosežen že v letu 2014, vključno na primer z novim zakonom o plinu, ki ga je pri­ pravila vlada in ki je omogočil podpis prvih posojil EIB/EBRD za posodobitev plinskega tranzitnega sistema decem­ bra 2014. (c) Prizadevanja Komisije za pomoč Ukrajini pri modernizaciji plinskega tranzitnega sistema so sprožila večje konkretne naložbene odločitve šele proti koncu leta 2014 – v glavnem zato, ker pretekle vlade niso sodelovale pri izvajanju ključnih reform, dogovorjenih v skupni deklaraciji iz leta 2009. (d) (i) Komisija in ESZD menita, da je bila varnost oskrbe EU s plinom prek Ukrajine ogrožena tudi zaradi zunanjih akterjev (Rusije).
Conclusions and recommendations 74 The Commission and EEAS consider that the EU assistance played a key role in promoting the political association and economic integration of Ukraine with the EU. 
Sklepi in priporočila 74 Komisija in ESZD menita, da je pomoč EU imela ključno vlogo pri spodbujanju političnega pridruževanja in gospo­ darskega povezovanja Ukrajine z EU.
Since the onset of the crisis in 2014, the EU assistance played also a key role in stabilising the situation in Ukraine and in triggering important structural reforms across a wide range of areas and sectors. 
Od začetka krize leta 2014 je imela pomoč EU tudi ključno vlogo pri stabilizaciji razmer v Ukrajini ter doseganju pomembnih strukturnih reform na najrazličnejših področjih in sektorjih.
76 The Commission considers that the fight against corruption and Public Financial Management are key issues in the EU’s dialogue with Ukraine. 
76 Komisija meni, da sta boj proti korupciji in upravljanje javnih financ ključni vprašanji v dialogu EU z Ukrajino.
As a consequence, over the last years a number of important reforms have been launched and are showing important results. 
Zato so bile v zadnjih letih uvedene številne pomembne reforme, ki dosegajo pomembne rezultate.