natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Court found instances in which the actual costs incurred were higher than the cost of the alternative options that had been proposed. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo primere dejansko nastalih stroškov, ki so bili višji od stroškov drugih možnosti, ki so bile predlagane.
In other instances, the analysis of the bids did not use comparison with benchmarks to mitigate the risk of awarding the tender to an overpriced bid (see Box 8). 
V drugih primerih pri analizi ponudb ni bila opravljena primerjava z referenčnimi vrednostmi, s katero bi se ublažilo tveganje oddaje naročila ponudniku s previsoko ceno (glej okvir 8).
Additionally, the lack of physical visits by the national authorities constitutes a shortcoming in ensuring the reality and the value for money of the supported NPIs, especially considering the high support rates and the absence of a deterrent factor, such as significant financial participation by beneficiaries. 
Poleg tega nacionalni organi niso opravili fizičnih obiskov, kar pomeni pomanjkljivost pri zagotavljanju resničnosti in stroškovne učinkovitosti neproduktivnih naložb, ki so prejele podporo, zlasti zato, ker so bile stopnje podpore visoke in ker ni bilo odvračilnega dejavnika, kot je bistvena finančna udeležba upravičencev.
Observations 28 Examples of unreasonably high costs — United Kingdom (England) In three of the 10 projects visited on the spot, the tendering documentation showed that the NPI cost was higher than necessary given that other less costly alternatives were available. 
Opažanja 28 Primeri nerazumno visokih stroškov – Združeno kraljestvo (Anglija) Pri treh od desetih projektov, obiskanih na kraju samem, je razpisna dokumentacija pokazala, da so bili stroški neproduktivne naložbe višji, kot bi bilo potrebno, glede na to, da so bile na voljo druge možnosti, ki so bile cenejše.
Examples of this include the use of airlifting services, timber removal and preparatory earthworks and restoration of an historic structure for which the selected bids exceeded the cost of their competitors by 65 %, 139 % and 31 % respectively. 
Tovrstni primeri vključujejo uporabo storitev zračnega transporta, odvoz lesa ter pripravljalna zemeljska dela in obnovo zgodovinskega objekta, pri katerih so izbrane ponudbe presegale stroške konkurentov za 65 %, 139 % oziroma 31 %.
In three other projects visited on the spot, the winning bids represented the lowest cost. 
Pri treh drugih projektih, obiskanih na kraju samem, so imele izbrane ponudbe najnižje stroške.
However, in the absence of a benchmark system for assessing the reasonableness of the costs of the bids, the risk concerning the reasonableness of costs is not mitigated, for instance, in cases where all the bids for an NPI are overpriced. 
Toda ker ni bilo sistema referenčnih vrednosti za ocenjevanje razumnosti stroškov ponudb, tveganje v zvezi z razumnostjo stroškov ni bilo zmanjšano, na primer pri primerih, ko so bile vse ponudbe za neproduktivne naložbe precenjene.
47 In the case of Italy (Puglia), the audit showed that the costs of NPIs concerning dry-stone walls were systematically equal to the maximum eligible unit cost. 
47 V Italiji (Apulija) je revizija pokazala, da so bili stroški za neproduktivne naložbe, ki se nanašajo na suhe zidove, sistematično enaki najvišjim možnim upravičenim stroškom na enoto.
Although the Court only found indications that the maximum eligible unit costs were set at a high level, it is obvious that implementing NPI projects in different conditions, depending on their location (mountain-ous or flat land), accessibility or land conditions, requires differentiation in at least some of the costs of the investments (see Box 9). 
Čeprav je Sodišče ugotovilo le to, da so bili najvišji možni upravičeni stroški na enoto določeni visoko, je očitno, da izvajanje projektov za neproduktivne naložbe v različnih pogojih, ki so odvisni od njihove lokacije (gorato ali ravninsko območje), dostopnosti ali stanja zemljišč, zahteva razlikovanje vsaj pri nekaterih stroških naložb (glej okvir 9).
48 Furthermore, the invoices presented by the beneficiaries of four of the six NPIs visited in Italy (Puglia) did not provide enough information to ascertain the quantities of restored dry-stone walls and the location of the works. 
48 Poleg tega računi, ki so jih predložili upravičenci štirih od šestih projektov neproduktivnih naložb, obiskanih v Italiji (Apulija), ne zagotavljajo dovolj informacij za potrditev količine obnovljenih suhih zidov in lokacije opravljenih del.
This meant that the national authorities could not ensure the reasonableness of the costs or the reality of the supported operations. 
To pomeni, da nacionalni organi niso mogli zagotoviti razumnosti stroškov ali resničnosti operacij, ki so prejele podporo.
Examples of unreasonably high costs Italy (Puglia) The support conditions for dry-stone walls allowed beneficiaries to use their own farm labour to justify a part of the costs of the works. 
Primeri nerazumno visokih stroškov v Italiji (Apulija) Pogoji za dodelitev podpore za suhe zidove so upravičencem dovoljevali, da stroške dela delno utemeljijo s svojim lastnim delom na kmetiji.
The remaining costs of the works had to be performed by external contractors, and the expenditure had to be substantiated by invoices. 
Preostale stroške del, ki so jih morali opraviti zunanji izvajalci, in odhodke je bilo treba utemeljiti z računi.
Alongside the systematic alignment of NPI costs with the maximum eligible cost, there was no requirement to use tendering to select external contractors. 
Poleg sistematičnega usklajevanja stroškov za neproduktivne naložbe z najvišjimi možnimi upravičenimi stroški prav tako ni bilo zahtevano, da se za izbiro zunanjih izvajalcev uporabijo razpisni postopki.
An indication that the maximum eligible unit cost set for dry-stone walls was set at a high level is that in the 2011 call for applications, the maximum eligible unit cost was 23 % lower than in the 2009 call for applications. 
Na ugotovitev, da so bili najvišji možni upravičeni stroški na enoto za suhe zidove določeni visoko, je kazalo dejstvo, da so bili najvišji možni upravičeni stroški na enoto v razpisu iz leta 2011 za 23 % nižji kot v razpisu iz leta 2009.
Despite this reduction, the demand for NPI support exceeded the funding that was available. 
Kljub temu zmanjšanju je povpraševanje po podpori za neproduktivne naložbe presegalo razpoložljivo financiranje.
The lack of competitive tenders combined with the systematic alignment of costs with maximum eligible unit costs set at high levels entails a risk to the cost-effectiveness of the support. 
Pomanjkanje konkurenčnih ponudb skupaj s sistematičnim usklajevanjem stroškov z visoko določenimi najvišjimi možnimi upravičenimi stroški na enoto pomeni tveganje za stroškovno učinkovitost podpore.
Observations 29 There were problems with the reasonableness of the costs in most of the NPIs audited by the Court 49 Annex II provides detailed information on the 28 projects that were visited on the spot, as well as individual assessments of whether the projects included productive components and of whether their costs were reasonable. 
Opažanja 29 Pri večini neproduktivnih naložb, ki jih je revidiralo Sodišče, so bile ugotovljene težave v zvezi z razumnostjo stroškov 49 Priloga II vsebuje podrobne informacije o 28 projektih, ki so bili obiskani na kraju samem, ter posamezne ocene o tem, ali so projekti vključevali produktivne elemente in ali so bili njihovi stroški razumni.
It also includes the Court’s overall assessment of their cost-effectiveness. 
Vključuje tudi splošno oceno njihove stroškovne učinkovitosti, ki jo je pripravilo Sodišče.
50 As stated in paragraph 34, 71 % of the projects audited were effective in the sense that they contributed to the achievement of objectives linked to the sustainable use of agricultural land. 
50 Kot je navedeno v odstavku 34, je 71 % revidiranih projektov uspešno prispevalo k doseganju ciljev, povezanih s trajnostno rabo kmetijskih zemljišč.
However, the Court found indications of unreasonable costs in 75 % of these projects. 
Vendar je Sodišče pri 75 % teh projektov ugotovilo, da so bili njihovi stroški nerazumni.
The combined analysis of effectiveness and reasonableness of costs shows that overall only 5 of the 28 audited NPI (i.e. 18 %) provided a cost-effective contribution to the achievement of agri-environment objectives. 
Skupna analiza uspešnosti in razumnosti stroškov kaže, da je skupaj le 5 od 28 revidiranih neproduktivnih naložb (tj. 18 %) stroškovno učinkovito prispevalo k doseganju kmetijsko-okoljskih ciljev.
The problems with the reasonableness of costs of investments may not be confined to the sample of projects, since the cases identified stem from the weaknesses in the control systems of Member States described in paragraphs 41 to 48. 
Težave, povezane z razumnostjo stroškov naložb, niso nujno omejene le na vzorec projektov, saj ugotovljeni primeri izhajajo iz slabosti v kontrolnih sistemih držav članic, opisanih v odstavkih 41 do 48.
Weaknesses affecting the cost-effectiveness of NPI support in the 2007-2013 period had not yet been corrected by the start of the 2014-2020 period 51 Since the entry into force of the new 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework, Member States or regions wishing to receive EAFRD funds have had to present their new RDPs to the Commission for approval. 
Slabosti, ki so vplivale na stroškovno učinkovitost pomoči za neproduktivne naložbe v obdobju 2007– 2013, na začetku obdobja 2014–2020 še niso bile odpravljene 51 Od začetka veljavnosti novega večletnega finančnega okvira za obdobje 2014–2020 morajo države članice ali regije, ki želijo prejeti sredstva iz EKSRP, svoje nove programe razvoja podeželja predložiti Komisiji v odobritev.
This represented a unique opportunity for the Commission and the Member States to solve weaknesses in the programming, management, monitoring and evaluation of NPI support from the previous period. 
To je za Komisijo in države članice edinstvena priložnost za odpravo slabosti pri načrtovanju, upravljanju, spremljanju in vrednotenju podpore za neproduktivne naložbe iz prejšnjega obdobja.
This is all the more important in a context where the audited Member States will maintain or extend the range of investments eligible11 for support. 
To je še toliko pomembnejše v primeru, če bodo revidirane države članice ohranile ali razširile obseg naložb, upravičenih11 do podpore.
52 The Court assessed the extent to which the Commission and the visited Member States had identified and corrected the weaknesses highlighted in the two previous sections of this report, with a view to improving the cost-effectiveness of NPI in the new programming period. 
52 Sodišče je ocenilo obseg, v katerem so Komisija in obiskane države članice odkrile in odpravile slabosti, poudarjene v prejšnjih dveh oddelkih tega poročila, da bi se izboljšala stroškovna učinkovitost neproduktivnih naložb v novem programskem obdobju.
This assessment was based on the information contained in the four audited RDPs12, implementing rules, guidelines and management and control procedures available at the time of the audit. 
Ta ocena je temeljila na informacijah iz štirih revidiranih programov razvoja podeželja12, izvedbenih pravilih, smernicah ter upravljavskih in kontrolnih postopkih, ki so bili na voljo v času revizije.
Furthermore, the Court reviewed communications between the Commission and the four Member States resulting from the Commission’s review of draft RDPs. 
Poleg tega je Sodišče pregledalo komunikacijo med Komisijo in zadevnimi štirimi državami članicami, ki je sledila pregledu osnutkov programov razvoja podeželja, ki ga je opravila Komisija.
Overall, the evidence obtained by the Court shows that corrective action has not yet been taken for most of the weaknesses identified by the Court (see paragraphs 60 to 71). 
Dokazi, ki jih je pridobilo Sodišče, na splošno kažejo, da popravljalni ukrepi za odpravo večine slabosti, ki jih je odkrilo Sodišče (glej odstavke 60 do 71), še niso bili sprejeti.
11 In UK (England) NPI support will maintain its integration with the new measure 10 ‘Agri-environment-climate’ that replaces the previous measure 214 ‘Agri-environment’ payments, as is the case in Portugal (Mainland). 
11 V Združenem kraljestvu (Anglija) bo podpora za neproduktivne naložbe ohranila svojo povezanost z novim ukrepom 10 „kmetijsko-okoljska-podnebna plačila“, ki nadomešča prejšnji ukrep 214 „kmetijsko-okoljska plačila“. Enako bo tudi na Portugalskem (celina).
In the case of Denmark the support for NPI is maintained on similar terms as in the previous programming period and in Italy (Puglia) the scope of the support is enlarged to include public bodies as potential beneficiaries and new types of NPIs like non-residential stone structures or traditional paths (Tratturi). 
Na Danskem se bo podpora za neproduktivne naložbe še naprej uporabljala pod podobnimi pogoji kot v prejšnjem programskem obdobju, v Italiji (Apulija) pa bo področje uporabe podpore razširjeno in bo vključevalo javne organe kot potencialne upravičence in nove vrste neproduktivnih naložb, kot so nestanovanjske kamnite strukture ali tradicionalne potke (Tratturi).
12 For Denmark, Portugal (Mainland) and UK (England) the approved RDP, for Italy (Puglia) the latest draft available. 
12 Za Dansko, Portugalsko (celina) in Združeno kraljestvo (Anglija) odobreni programi razvoja podeželja, za Italijo (Apulija) zadnji osnutek, ki je bil na voljo.
Observations 30 53 One reason explaining the limited improvement observed so far is that the Commission and the Member States did not do enough to identify possible weaknesses in good time. 
Opažanja 30 53 Eden od razlogov za omejen napredek, ugotovljen do zdaj, je to, da Komisija in države članice niso storile dovolj, da bi pravočasno ugotovile morebitne slabosti.
In particular, national authorities did not analyse sufficiently the causes of the irregularities found during their checks to improve the management of the scheme. 
Zlasti nacionalni organi niso dovolj analizirali vzrokov nepravilnosti, ugotovljenih med njihovimi pregledi, s katerimi bi izboljšali upravljanje sheme.
54 The on-the-spot checks carried out by the national authorities13 showed a significant frequency of irregularities. 
54 Pregledi na kraju samem, ki jih opravljajo nacionalni organi13, so pokazali, da so nepravilnosti precej pogoste.
In Portugal (Mainland), 50 % of the projects examined by the national authorities were affected by irregularities or the final use of the NPI was eminently productive (e.g. generated returns). 
Na Portugalskem (celina) so bile v 50 % projektov, ki so jih preučili nacionalni organi, odkrite nepravilnosti ali pa je bila končna uporaba neproduktivnih naložb izredno produktivna (donosna).
In Italy (Puglia) 27 % of the NPIs examined by the national authorities were affected by irregularities and in the UK (England), breaches of the rules on NPI support occurred in around 10 % of the cases. 
V Italiji (Apulija) so bile pri 27 % neproduktivnih naložb, ki so jih preučili nacionalni organi, odkrite nepravilnosti, v Združenem kraljestvu (Anglija) pa so bila v približno 10 % primerov kršena pravila o podpori za neproduktivne naložbe.
The Court did not obtain data for the controls carried out by the Danish authorities14. 
Sodišče podatkov o kontrolah, ki so jih opravili danski organi, ni pridobilo14.
55 However, with the exception of Denmark, the national authorities made limited use of the irregularities found. 
55 Vendar pa nacionalni organi nobene od zadevnih držav razen Danske niso ugotovljenih nepravilnosti uporabili v zadostni meri.
They basically used them to reduce the amounts to be paid to the affected beneficiaries, but did not analyse the causes of irregularities in order to identify aspects of the scheme management that should be improved. 
Dejansko so jih uporabili za zmanjšanje zneskov, ki naj bi se plačali vpletenim upravičencem, niso pa analizirali vzrokov nepravilnosti, da bi opredelili vidike upravljanja sheme, ki jih je treba izboljšati.
56 The Commission is responsible for supervising the correct implementation of the NPI schemes in the Member States. 
56 Komisija je odgovorna za nadzor pravilnega izvajanja shem neproduktivnih naložb v državah članicah.
In this respect, audit visits are crucial to identify weaknesses affecting the execution of management procedures (e.g. selection of projects, checks on reasonableness of costs, production of reliable monitoring data, etc.), which cannot be detected through documentary reviews. 
Glede tega so revizijski obiski ključni za ugotavljanje slabosti, ki vplivajo na izvajanje upravljavskih postopkov (npr. izbira projektov, pregled razumnosti stroškov, pridobivanje zanesljivih podatkov o spremljanju itd.), ki jih ni mogoče odkriti z dokumentacijskimi pregledi.
However, the Court found that the Commission’s audits took place too late to help Member States identify and correct the detected shortcomings during the 2007-2013 implementation period. 
Vendar je Sodišče ugotovilo, da je Komisija svoje revizije opravila prepozno, da bi s tem državam članicam pomagala odkriti in odpraviti ugotovljene pomanjkljivosti v obdobju izvajanja 2007–2013.
Furthermore, the results of these audits were not available during the Commission’s review and approval of the 2014-2020 RDPs in any of the Member States audited except Italy (Puglia)15. 
Poleg tega v času, ko je Komisija pregledovala in odobravala programe razvoja podeželja za obdobje 2014–2020, rezultati teh revizij v nobeni od revidiranih držav članic razen Italije (Apulija)15 niso bili na voljo.
This means that the Commission could not use the final results of these audits to request the Member States to reflect in the new RDPs the necessary corrective actions before they were approved. 
To pomeni, da Komisija ni mogla uporabiti končnih rezultatov teh revizij tako, da bi zahtevala, da države članice v svojih novih programih razvoja podeželja upoštevajo potrebne popravljalne ukrepe, preden se ti programi odobrijo.
Once the Commission approves an RDP and the EU funds are made available to the Member State, it is more difficult for the Commission to ensure that the Member States take the necessary corrective actions in good time.16 57 Table 2 shows that for three out of the four audited Member States, the audit results were not available before the approval of the new RDP for 2014-2020. 
Ko Komisija odobri program razvoja podeželja in so sredstva EU dana na voljo državi članici, Komisija težje zagotovi, da države članice pravočasno sprejmejo potrebne popravljalne ukrepe16. 57 V tabeli 2 je prikazano, da pri treh od štirih revidiranih držav članic rezultati revizij niso bili na voljo pred odobritvijo novih programov razvoja podeželja za obdobje 2014–2020.
13 Article 25 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 65/2011 of 27 January 2011, laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, as regards the implementation of control procedures as well as cross-compliance in respect of rural development support measures (OJ L 25, 28.1.2011, p. 
13 Člen 25 Uredbe Komisije (EU) št. 65/2011 z dne 27. januarja 2011 o določitvi podrobnih pravil za izvajanje Uredbe Sveta (ES) št.
14 Additional data regarding the types of error and the financial importance of the irregularities was not made available with the exception of Italy (Puglia), where the most frequent reason for irregularity was the calculation of the cubic meters of restored wall. 
14 Dodatni podatki v zvezi z vrstami napak in finančno pomembnostjo nepravilnosti niso bili na voljo. Izjema pri tem je bila Italija (Apulija), kjer je bil najpogostejši vzrok za nepravilnosti izračun kubičnih metrov obnovljenih zidov.
15 In the case of Italy, the Commission’s services have not audited the implementation of NPI in Puglia. 
15 V primeru Italije službe Komisije niso revidirale izvajanja neproduktivnih naložb v Apuliji.
Instead the Commission’s audit covered the NPI support in Sicily. 
Namesto tega je revizija, ki jo je opravila Komisija, zajemala podporo za neproduktivne naložbe na Siciliji.
As at June 2015, the RDP of Puglia was not yet approved by the Commission. 
Junija 2015 Komisija še ni odobrila programa razvoja podeželja za Apulijo.
16 As at May 2015, the results of the Commission’s audits regarding UK (England), Portugal (Mainland) and Italy (Sicily) concerning the 2007-2013 period were still being considered by the Commission as part of the decision process that may lead to the application of financial corrections to the Member States in question. 
16 Maja 2015 je Komisija še vedno obravnavala rezultate svojih revizij v zvezi z Združenim kraljestvom (Anglija), Portugalsko (celina) in Italijo (Sicilija) za obdobje 2007–2013, kot del postopka odločanja, ki lahko privede do uvedbe finančnih popravkov za zadevne države članice.
Observations 31 Timing of Commission’s audits of NPI versus 2014-2020 RDP approval dates Member State Date of Commission audit Status of audit Date of approval RDP 2014-2020 Portugal (Mainland) February 2014 Ongoing December 2014 United Kingdom (England) June 2014 Ongoing February 2015 Denmark October 2014 Ongoing December 2014 58 Monitoring and evaluation should also allow the Commission and the Member States to identify problems, learn lessons, and apply this when preparing and reviewing the draft RDP. 
Opažanja 31 Čas revizij neproduktivnih naložb, ki jih je opravila Komisija, v primerjavi s časom odobritve programov razvoja podeželja za obdobje 2014–2020 Država članica Datum revizije Komisije Status revizije Datum odobritve načrta razvoja podeželja 2014–2020 Portugalska (celina) februar 2014 poteka december 2014 Združeno kraljestvo (Anglija) junij 2014 poteka februar 2015 Danska oktober 2014 poteka december 2014 58 Tudi spremljanje in vrednotenje bi morala Komisiji in državam članicam omogočiti, da ugotovijo težave, se učijo na izkušnjah ter to uporabijo pri pripravi in pregledovanju osnutkov programov razvoja podeželja.
However, as reported in paragraphs 25 to 31, monitoring only provided information on expenditure incurred, number of beneficiaries and total investment. 
Vendar so bile, kot je navedeno v odstavkih 25 do 31, s spremljanjem pridobljene samo informacije o nastalih odhodkih, številu upravičencev in skupni višini naložb.
The mid-term evaluations did not provide relevant information on implementation and performance. 
Vmesna vrednotenja niso zagotovila relevantnih informacij o izvajanju in smotrnosti poslovanja.
This represented an additional burden for the timely identification and correction of weaknesses affecting the cost-effectiveness of NPI support. 
To je pomenilo dodatno breme za pravočasno odkritje in odpravo slabosti, ki vplivajo na stroškovno učinkovitost podpore na neproduktivne naložbe.
59 The following paragraphs present the Court’s analysis on the extent to which the Commission and the visited Member States have corrected the weaknesses reported in the two previous sections of this report. 
59 V naslednjih odstavkih je predstavljena analiza Sodišča o obsegu, v katerem so Komisija in obiskane države članice odpravile slabosti, opisane v prejšnjih dveh oddelkih tega poročila.
Complementarity not always achieved at operational level to foster synergies 60 The Court found that two out of the four Member States audited (Denmark and Italy-Puglia) did not implement NPI support in complementarity with other support schemes (see paragraph 20). 
Dopolnjevanje za spodbujanje sinergij na operativni ravni ni bilo vedno doseženo 60 Sodišče je ugotovilo, da dve od štirih revidiranih držav članic (Danska in Italija – Apulija) podpore za neproduktivne naložbe nista izvajali v dopolnjevanju z drugimi shemami podpore (glej odstavek 20).
For the 2014-2020 period, Denmark, like the UK and Portugal, intends to implement NPIs in synergy with other rural development measures or/ and environmental schemes. 
Za obdobje 2014–2020 namerava Danska, tako kot Združeno kraljestvo in Portugalska, izvajati neproduktivne naložbe v sinergiji z drugimi ukrepi in/ali okoljskimi shemami za razvoj podeželja.