natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
31 According to an IMF paper, the lack of integration between medium-term expenditure planning and the budgeting process makes medium-term planning ineffective in constraining fiscal policy27. 
31 V dokumentu MDS je navedeno, da je zaradi pomanjkljive povezanosti načrtovanja srednjeročnih odhodkov in procesa priprave proračuna srednjeročno načrtovanje neuspešno pri omejevanju fiskalne politike27.
However, while article 10 of Directive 2011/85 requires annual budget legislation to be consistent with provisions of the MTBF or duly explain any departure, there is no requirement for an integrated medium-term expenditure planning and budgeting process28. 
V členu 10 Direktive 2011/85 je sicer določeno, da mora biti letna proračunska zakonodaja skladna z določbami, ki izhajajo iz srednjeročnega proračunskega okvira, in da je treba za vsakršno odstopanje od njih navesti ustrezna pojasnila, ne zahteva pa se povezan proces načrtovanja srednjeročnih odhodkov in priprave proračuna28.
Moreover, it does not require that budget documentation include projections and outturns of revenues, expenditures and financing over the medium term on the same basis as the annual budget29. 
Poleg tega se ne zahteva, da mora proračunska dokumentacija vključevati projekcije in izide srednjeročnih prihodkov, odhodkov in financiranja na enaki podlagi kot letni proračun29.
32 Also, according to an IMF paper, four types of forward-looking control mechanisms are important: (i) controls over the accumulation, stock, or drawdown of carryovers, (ii) regular monitoring of consistency of updated medium-term expenditure projections with approved medium-term plans, (iii) sufficient margins between expenditure commitments and expenditure plans to absorb unexpected events without requiring reprioritisation of policies, and (iv) firm controls on ministries’ and agencies’ ability to enter into multi-year expenditure commitments. 
32 V dokumentu MDS je navedeno tudi, da so pomembne štiri vrste v prihodnost usmerjenih nadzornih mehanizmov: (i) nadzor nad akumulacijo, stanjem ali črpanjem prenosov, (ii) redno spremljanje skladnosti posodobljenih projekcij srednjeročnih odhodkov z odobrenimi srednjeročnimi načrti, (iii) zadostne razlike med obveznostmi za odhodke in načrti odhodkov za kritje nepričakovanih dogodkov, ne da bi bila za to potrebna ponovna določitev prednostnih nalog politik, ter (iv) trden nadzor nad sposobnostjo ministrstev in agencij za sklepanje večletnih obveznosti za odhodke.
However, Directive 2011/85 does not provide for the establishment of forward-looking expenditure controls to ensure compliance with the medium-term plans even as external conditions change. 
V Direktivi 2011/85 oblikovanje v prihodnost usmerjenih kontrol odhodkov za zagotavljanje skladnosti s srednjeročnimi načrti ni predvideno niti v primeru sprememb zunanjih okoliščin.
33 Lastly, Directive 2011/85 does not contain any provision addressing the need for national authorities to report budgetary outturns on a comparable basis with multi-year plans, and to comprehensively and transparently reconcile any deviation between multi-year plans and expenditure outcomes. 
33 Direktiva 2011/85 tudi ne vsebuje določb, ki bi obravnavale potrebo po tem, da nacionalni organi poročajo o realizaciji proračuna tako, da bi bilo njihovo poročanje mogoče primerjati z večletnimi načrti, ter da temeljito in transparentno odpravijo vsakršno razhajanje med večletnimi načrti in izidi odhodkov.
Moreover, there is no specific provision requiring governments or those involved in budgetary implementation to be held accountable for any unjustified deviations from multi-year plans. 
Poleg tega ni specifične določbe o tem, da bi morali biti vlade ali organi, vključeni v izvrševanje proračuna, odgovorni za neupravičena odstopanja od večletnih finančnih načrtov.
27 IMF (2013), Cangiano, G. et al., ‘Public Financial Management and its emerging architecture’, p. 
27 MDS (2013), Cangiano, G., et al., Public Financial Management and its emerging architecture, str.
28 OECD (2004), ‘The Legal Framework for Budget Systems’, Box III.4; IMF (2010), Lienert, I. and Fainboim, I., ‘Reforming Budget Systems Laws’, Box 4 and pp. 12-13; IMF (2013), Cangiano, G. et al., ‘Public Financial Management and its emerging architecture’, p. 
28 OECD (2004), The Legal Framework for Budget Systems, okvir III.4; MDS (2010), Lienert, I., in Fainboim, I., Reforming Budget Systems Laws, okvir 4 in str. 12–13; MDS (2013), Cangiano, G., et al., Public Financial Management and its emerging architecture, str.
156; IMF (2014), ‘Fiscal transparency code’, Principles 2.1.3, 2.3.1 and 2.3.2; World Bank (2013), ‘Beyond the annual budget. 
156; MDS (2014), Fiscal transparency code, načela 2.1.3, 2.3.1 in 2.3.2; Svetovna banka (2013), Beyond the annual budget.
The global experience with medium term expenditure frameworks’, pp. 58-59. 
The global experience with medium term expenditure frameworks, str. 58–59.
29 IMF (2014), ‘Fiscal transparency code’, Principle 2.1.3. 19 
29 MDS (2014), Fiscal transparency code, načelo 2.1.3. 19
34 The 2017 draft Directive introduces the requirement for a binding medium-term expenditure rule set out at the beginning of the legislature. 
34 V osnutku direktive iz leta 2017 je zahteva po zavezujočem pravilu o srednjeročnih odhodkih, določena na začetku zakonodajnega obdobja.
Such a rule would provide more stability for budgetary planning and strengthen the link between budget and MTBF. However, it might put fiscal stability at risk if the growth of expenditure deviates from the potential output30 growth. 
S tem pravilom bi bilo proračunsko načrtovanje stabilnejše, povezava med proračunom in srednjeročnim proračunskim okvirom pa močnejša, vendar bi bila fiskalna stabilnost lahko ogrožena, če bi rast odhodkov odstopala od rasti potencialnega proizvoda30.
The 2017 draft Directive did not address any of the other shortcomings31 indicated in Table 1. 
Druge pomanjkljivosti31 iz tabele 1 v osnutku direktive iz leta 2017 niso bile obravnavane.
Shortcomings in the provisions on the independent fiscal institutions 35 Regulation 473/2013, which is binding for the euro-area Member States, defines the functions that IFIs should assume, as well as features and principles. 
473/2013, ki je zavezujoča za države članice euroobmočja, so opredeljene funkcije, ki jih morajo prevzeti neodvisne fiskalne institucije, pa tudi njihovi elementi in načela.
The latter are in line with the Commission’s common principles. They were added in the course of the legislative process as the principles were adopted after the Commission made its proposal for a regulation. 
Zadnja so v skladu s skupnimi načeli Komisije, dodana pa so bila med zakonodajnim postopkom, saj so bila načela sprejeta po tem, ko je Komisija predložila svoj predlog uredbe.
36 We compared the provisions on IFIs with the international standards and best practices of the IMF32 and the OECD33. 
36 Sodišče je določbe o neodvisnih fiskalnih institucijah primerjalo z mednarodnimi standardi in najboljšimi praksami MDS32 in OECD33.
We observed that EU law lacks requirements with regard to (i) the number and length of the terms of the IFI board members, (ii) IFIs’ human resources policies, (iii) the establishment of the IFIs’ budgets, and 30 The potential output is a theoretical concept of the level of output (GDP) at a given moment that is consistent with stable inflation. 
Ugotovilo je, da pravo EU ne vsebuje zahtev glede (i) števila in dolžine mandatov članov odborov neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij, (ii) kadrovskih politik neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij, (iii) priprave proračunov neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij ali (iv) potrebe po zunanjem pregledu. Zaradi 30 Potencialni proizvod je teoretični koncept ravni proizvoda (BDP) v danem trenutku, ki je skladna s stabilno stopnjo inflacije.
It grows in time at a rate that is not necessarily constant. 
Stopnja njene rasti skozi čas ni nujno stalna.
Both the level and the growth rate cannot be measured directly, but have to be estimated. 
Ne ravni ne stopnje rasti ni mogoče neposredno izmeriti, ampak ju je treba oceniti.
31 The IMF and the OECD updated their standards and best practices for good budgetary governance in 2014 and 2015 respectively to incorporate lessons learnt from the economic and financial crisis. However, the Commission did not reflect this update in the 2017 draft Directive. 
31 MDS in OECD sta svoje standarde in najboljše prakse za dobro proračunsko upravljanje posodobila leta 2014 oziroma 2015 ter vanje vključila izkušnje, pridobljene med gospodarsko in finančno krizo, vendar Komisija v osnutek direktive iz leta 2017 ta posodobitve ni vključena.
32 IMF (2013), ‘The functions and impact of fiscal councils’: “This paper provides the most comprehensive survey of fiscal councils available so far” and also builds on other papers including the OECD’s 2012 draft principles and Kopits, G. 
32 MDS (2013), The functions and impact of fiscal councils: ta dokument vsebuje najcelovitejšo raziskavo fiskalnih svetov doslej ter nadgrajuje druge dokumente, vključno z osnutkom načel OECD iz leta 2012 in dokumentom Kopits, G.
(2011), ‘Independent fiscal institutions: Developing good practices’, pp. 35-52. 
(2011), Independent fiscal institutions: Developing good practices, str. 35–52.
33 OECD principles were already available in 2012 and were adopted in 2014. 
33 Načela OECD so bila na voljo že leta 2012, sprejeta pa leta 2014.
See OECD (2014), ‘Recommendation on Principles for IFIs’. 20 
Glej OECD (2014), Recommendation on Principles for IFIs. 20
This resulted in heterogeneous IFIs being established, as illustrated by Annex III and also highlighted in a Commission discussion paper34. 
21 teh pomanjkljivosti so bile vzpostavljene heterogene neodvisne fiskalne institucije, kot je prikazano v Prilogi III in poudarjeno v dokumentu Komisije za razpravo34.
37 As far back as 2004, the Commission35 highlighted the importance of both macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts being either produced or assessed by an independent institution in order to reduce and possibly eliminate their optimism bias36. 
37 Komisija35 je že leta 2004 poudarila, kako pomembno je, da makroekonomske in proračunske napovedi pripravlja ali ocenjuje neodvisna institucija, da se zmanjša ali celo odpravi pretiran optimizem v njih36.
This was also later confirmed by IMF37 and OECD38 papers. 
To je bilo pozneje potrjeno tudi v dokumentih MDS37 in OECD38.
38 The 2017 Commission discussion paper (see paragraph 36) took the view, among other things, that IFIs could be given a more extensive role in producing or endorsing budgetary forecasts, given their role in relation to macroeconomic forecasts. 
38 V dokumentu Komisije za razpravo iz leta 2017 (glej odstavek 36) je bilo med drugim izraženo stališče, da bi se neodvisnim fiskalnim institucijam zaradi njihove vloge v makroekonomskih napovedih lahko dodelila obsežnejša vloga pri pripravi ali potrjevanju proračunskih napovedi.
IFIs and other stakeholders we met also emphasised this limitation with regard to the budgetary forecasts. 
To omejitev v zvezi s proračunskimi napovedmi so poudarili tudi predstavniki neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij in drugi deležniki, s katerimi se je srečalo Sodišče.
39 In 2016, the Network of EU IFIs, a platform for exchanging views and expertise and pooling resources, proposed a list of minimum standards for IFIs similar to the OECD’s principles, as well as the establishment of “an effective system for their safeguarding”39. 
39 Mreža neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij EU, ki je platforma za izmenjavo mnenj in strokovnega znanja ter združevanje virov, je leta 2016 predlagala seznam minimalnih standardov za neodvisne fiskalne institucije, podoben načelom OECD, ter vzpostavitev uspešnega sistema za njihovo varovanje39, vendar v osnutku direktive iz leta 2017 ta vprašanja niso obravnavana.
However, the 2017 draft Directive does not address these issues: in terms of standards, the only new requirement in the 2017 draft Directive is for Member States to ensure that IFIs comply with the principles for IFIs set in Regulation 473/2013. 
Edina nova zahteva glede standardov v tem osnutku direktive je, da morajo države članice zagotoviti, da neodvisne fiskalne institucije izpolnjujejo načela, določena zanje v Uredbi št. 473/2013.
34 European Commission (2017), Jankovics, L. and Sherwood, M., ‘Independent fiscal institutions in the EU Member States: The early years’, discussion paper 067. 
34 Evropska komisija (2017), Jankovics, L., in Sherwood, M., Independent fiscal institutions in the EU Member States: The early years, dokument za razpravo 067.
35 European Commission (2004), Jonung, L. and Larch, M., ‘Improving fiscal policy in the EU: the case for independent forecasts’. 
35 Evropska komisija (2004), Jonung, L., in Larch, M., Improving fiscal policy in the EU: the case for independent forecasts.
36 Optimism bias is the practice of overestimating growth in output and revenue while underestimating non-discretionary expenditure. 
36 Pretiran optimizem pomeni precenjevanje rasti proizvoda in prihodkov ter podcenjevanje nediskrecijskih odhodkov.
37 IMF (2007), ‘Code of good practices on fiscal transparency’, Principle 4.3.4. 
37 MDS (2007), Code of good practices on fiscal transparency, načelo 4.3.4.
38 OECD (2014), ‘Recommendation on Principles for IFIs’, Principle 3.3. 
38 OECD (2014), Recommendation on Principles for IFIs, načelo 3.3.
39 Network of EU IFIs (2016), ‘Defining and enforcing minimum standards for IFIs’. 
39 Mreža neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij EU (2016), Defining and enforcing minimum standards for IFIs.
40 The Network of EU IFIs, while welcoming this new requirement, asked for the “conditions spelled out in the [2017 draft Directive]” to “be complemented with a clearer definition of minimum standards and an effective system for their safeguarding”40. 
40 Mreža neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij EU je novo zahtevo sicer pozdravila, vendar je prosila, naj se pogoji, navedeni v osnutku direktive iz leta 2017, dopolnijo z jasnejšo opredelitvijo minimalnih standardov in uspešnim sistemom za njihovo varovanje40.
The Network of EU IFIs even suggested in this statement that the “proposal could additionally oblige Members States to ensure an ambitious implementation of this principle in national legislation by fixing the procedure and minimum requirements”. 
V isti izjavi je mreža celo predlagala, da bi lahko predlog državam članicam naložil dodatno obveznost, da zagotovijo ambiciozno izvajanje tega načela v nacionalni zakonodaji, tako da določijo postopek in minimalne zahteve.
In January 2019, the Network of EU IFIs reiterated its call for “the development and incorporation possibly into EU legislation of adequate standards for the design and operative capacity of IFIs”. 
Mreža je januarja 2019 ponovila svoj poziv, naj se oblikujejo ustrezni standardi za zasnovo in operativno zmogljivost neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij ter se morda vključijo v zakonodajo EU.
41 Lastly, we acknowledge that the 2017 draft Directive envisaged a wider role for IFIs by charging them (i) to critically assess both ex-ante and ex-post the adequacy of the MTO and the medium-term net expenditure path, (ii) to call for the activation of the correction mechanism and (iii) to monitor its application and outcome. 
41 In nazadnje, Sodišče priznava, da je bila v osnutku direktive iz leta 2017 predvidena večja vloga neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij, ki naj bi v skladu z njim (i) predhodno in naknadno kritično ocenile ustreznost srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja in srednjeročnega načrta neto odhodkov, (II) pozvale k sprožitvi popravljalnega mehanizma ter (iii) spremljale njegovo uporabo in izid.
Moreover, the 2017 draft Directive aimed to introduce in EU law the ‘comply-or-explain’ principle. 
Poleg tega je bil namen osnutka direktive iz leta 2017 uvesti načelo „upoštevaj ali pojasni” v pravo EU.
Inconsistent assessment and weak design create risks for independent fiscal institutions and the European Fiscal Board 42 EU legislation requires Member States to have in place national fiscal rules and assigns distinct monitoring roles to the Commission and to the IFIs. 
Zaradi nekonsistentnih ocen in slabe zasnove obstajajo tveganja za neodvisne fiskalne institucije in Evropski fiskalni odbor 42 V skladu z zakonodajo EU morajo imeti države članice vzpostavljena nacionalna fiskalna pravila, Komisija in neodvisne fiskalne institucije pa ločene vloge spremljanja.
While the Commission assesses compliance of draft budgetary plans with EU fiscal rules, IFIs assess compliance with national fiscal rules. 
Komisija ocenjuje skladnost osnutkov proračunskih načrtov s fiskalnimi pravili EU, neodvisne fiskalne institucije pa z nacionalnimi fiskalnimi pravili.
However, the EU law does not provide for a ‘two-tier’ governance structure, where the Commission, for its monitoring role, would rely on the work done by the national IFIs. 
V pravu EU pa ni predvidena dvostopenjska struktura upravljanja, pri kateri bi se Komisija pri opravljanju svoje vloge spremljanja opirala na delo, ki so ga opravile nacionalne neodvisne fiskalne institucije.
43 The EFB was set up with the aim of strengthening the current economic governance framework (see paragraph 10). 
43 Evropski fiskalni odbor je bil ustanovljen za okrepitev sedanjega okvira ekonomskega upravljanja (glej odstavek 10).
Its tasks consist among other things in providing an evaluation of the implementation of the EU fiscal framework and the appropriateness of the actual fiscal stance at euro-area and national level. 
Med drugim naj bi ocenjeval izvajanje fiskalnega okvira EU ter ustreznost dejanske fiskalne naravnanosti na ravni euroobmočja in nacionalni ravni.
40 Network of EU IFIs (2018), Statement by the Network of EU IFIs in response to the Proposal for a Council Directive laying down provisions for strengthening fiscal responsibility and the medium-term budgetary orientation in Member States. 22 
44 Sodišče je zato ocenilo, ali: 40 Mreža neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij EU (2018), Statement by the Network of EU IFIs in response to the Proposal for a Council Directive laying down provisions for strengthening fiscal responsibility and the medium-term budgetary orientation in Member States. 22
44 We therefore assessed whether: (a) there was consistency between the Commission and the IFIs in assessing compliance with EU fiscal rules; (b) the EFB was in a position to provide independent opinions. 
(a) so bile Komisija in neodvisne fiskalne institucije pri ocenjevanju skladnosti s fiskalnimi pravili EU konsistentne; (b) je imel Evropski fiskalni odbor možnost zagotoviti neodvisna mnenja.
Risk of inconsistency between Commission’s and independent fiscal institutions’ assessments on compliance with EU fiscal rules 45 EU law is not prescriptive regarding national fiscal rules (e.g. with regard to number, type and design features) but stipulates that they should effectively promote compliance with the reference values on deficit and debt set in accordance with obligations from the TFEU. 
Tveganje nekonsistentnosti med ocenami Komisije in neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij glede skladnosti s fiskalnimi pravili EU 45 Pravo EU ne predpisuje nacionalnih fiskalnih pravil (npr. glede števila, vrste in zasnove), vendar določa, da morajo uspešno spodbujati skladnost z referenčnimi vrednostmi primanjkljaja in dolga, določenimi v skladu z obveznostmi iz PDEU.
In practice, the parties to the Fiscal Compact (see paragraph 06) adopted national fiscal rules closely linked to those of the preventive arm of the SGP. 
V praksi so pogodbenice fiskalnega dogovora (glej odstavek 06) sprejele nacionalna fiskalna pravila, ki so tesno povezana s fiskalnimi pravili preventivnega dela Pakta za stabilnost in rast.
46 The TSCG, as the preventive arm of the SGP, requires a budgetary position that is “balanced or in surplus”, meaning a structural balance equal to or greater than the MTO, or in line with the adjustment path towards it. 
46 S PSUU kot preventivnim delom Pakta za stabilnost in rast se zahteva proračunsko stanje, ki je uravnoteženo ali v presežku, kar pomeni, da je strukturni saldo enak srednjeročnemu proračunskemu cilju oziroma večji od njega ali pa je v skladu s prilagoditveno potjo za njegovo dosego.
Moreover, progress towards, and fulfilment of, the MTO must be evaluated based on an analysis of compliance with the expenditure benchmark of the SGP, i.e. expenditure should not grow faster than the potential output (Annex IV compares the rules of the SGP preventive arm with those of the TSCG). 
Poleg tega je treba napredek pri doseganju srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja in njegovo izpolnitev ocenjevati na podlagi analize skladnosti z referenčno vrednostjo za odhodke iz Pakta za stabilnost in rast. To pomeni, da odhodki ne smejo rasti hitreje od potencialnega proizvoda (v Prilogi IV je primerjava pravil preventivnega dela Pakta za stabilnost in rast s pravili PSUU).
47 Moreover, in some Member States (e.g. Italy and Portugal), IFIs are mandated to assess compliance with EU fiscal rules. Some IFIs without such mandate (e.g. France’s) do this on a voluntary basis. 
47 V nekaterih državah članicah (npr. v Italiji in na Portugalskem) so neodvisne fiskalne institucije pooblaščene za ocenjevanje skladnosti s fiskalnimi pravili EU, nekatere neodvisne fiskalne institucije brez takih pooblastil (npr. v Franciji) pa to delajo prostovoljno.
Our survey of IFIs showed that half of them monitored compliance with EU numerical fiscal rules. 
Anketa Sodišča med neodvisnimi fiskalnimi institucijami je pokazala, da jih polovica spremlja skladnost z numeričnimi fiskalnimi pravili EU.
48 The IFIs we surveyed considered that their assessment of compliance with EU fiscal rules did not lead to a duplication of roles with the Commission but rather was complementary, as it may foster national ownership of EU fiscal rules. Our interviews with the IFIs confirmed their replies. 
48 Neodvisne fiskalne institucije, med katerimi je Sodišče opravilo anketo, so menile, da z ocenjevanjem skladnosti s fiskalnimi pravili EU ne podvajajo vloge Komisije, ampak jo dopolnjujejo, saj lahko s svojim delom spodbudijo nacionalno odgovornost za izpolnjevanje fiskalnih pravil EU.
However, IFIs that only monitor compliance with national fiscal rules are not in favour of also monitoring compliance with the EU fiscal rules. 
V razgovorih Sodišča s predstavniki neodvisnih fiskalnih institucija so bili ti odgovori potrjeni, vendar pa neodvisne fiskalne institucije, ki spremljajo le skladnost z nacionalnimi fiskalnimi pravili, ne podpirajo hkratnega spremljanja skladnosti s fiskalnimi pravili EU.
One of the reasons they gave for this was reputational risk in the event of diverging assessments. 23 
Med razlogi, ki so jih navedle, je tveganje za ugled v primeru razhajanj med njihovimi ocenami in ocenami Komisije. 23
49 When the Commission and IFIs both assess compliance with EU fiscal rules, they may indeed come to different conclusions. 
49 Kadar skladnost s fiskalnimi pravili EU ocenjujejo tako Komisija kot tudi neodvisne fiskalne institucije, je res, da se njihovi zaključki lahko razlikujejo.
One reason is that the Commission, as we have already observed in our special report 18/2018, made extensive use of its margin of discretion41 when assessing compliance with the EU fiscal rules (i.e. compliance with the adjustment path towards the MTO). 
18/2018, je eden od razlogov za to tudi dejstvo, da je Komisija pri oceni skladnosti s fiskalnimi pravili EU (tj. skladnost s prilagoditveno potjo za dosego srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja) pogosto uporabljala diskrecijsko pravico41.
50 Also, the Regulation establishing the SGP allows for a relatively large margin of deviation from a Member State’s annual benchmark42 by allowing a number of factors to be considered in the assessment of compliance with fiscal rules. 
50 Poleg tega uredba o Paktu za stabilnost in rast omogoča razmeroma velik odklon od letnega referenčnega merila držav članic42, ker dopušča, da se v oceni skladnosti s fiskalnimi pravili upošteva več dejavnikov.