natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As regards expenditure growth, Member States are also required by the SGP to respect the EU expenditure benchmark, which links the growth of expenditure with the evolution of the potential output. 
Kar zadeva rast odhodkov, morajo države članice v skladu s Paktom za stabilnost in rast upoštevati merilo rasti odhodkov EU, ki rast odhodkov povezuje z gibanjem potencialnega proizvoda.
35 The Commission was a pioneer in putting forward principles underpinning the establishment of national IFIs, via the June 2012 Communication regarding common principles on national fiscal correction mechanisms. 
35 Komisija je s sporočilom o skupnih načelih za nacionalne fiskalne popravljalne mehanizme iz junija 2012 prva predložila načela, na podlagi katerih so bile ustanovljene nacionalne neodvisne fiskalne institucije.
Those principles were subsequently endorsed by the co-legislators as they were fully taken up in Regulation 473/2013. 
Sozakonodajalca sta nato potrdila navedena načela, saj so se v celoti upoštevala v 5
The specifications in the common principles provide key features for setting up or designating independent and competent bodies to operate in the fiscal policy area. 
473/2013. Specifikacije v skupnih načelih zagotavljajo ključne elemente za ustanovitev ali imenovanje neodvisnih in pristojnih organov za delovanje na področju fiskalne politike.
36 The Commission considers that the principles and desirable features for national IFIs issued by the OECD and IMF are in fact largely consistent with the EU level requirements, while being slightly more granular and operational. 
36 Komisija meni, da so načela in zaželeni elementi za nacionalne neodvisne fiskalne institucije, ki sta jih izdala OECD in MDS, v resnici večinoma skladni z zahtevami na ravni EU, hkrati pa so nekoliko bolj podrobni in operativni.
The differences are explained by the fact that such principles/features are meant to be used as a guidance and not as legally binding requirement. 
Te razlike pojasni dejstvo, da naj bi se taka načela/elementi uporabljali kot smernica, ne pa kot pravno zavezujoča zahteva.
Moreover, not every ideal IFI feature is necessarily suitable for incorporation into EU law as requirement for all Member States, especially on subsidiarity grounds. 
Poleg tega vsak idealni element neodvisne fiskalne institucije ni nujno primeren za vključitev v pravo EU kot zahteva za vse države članice, zlasti zaradi subsidiarnosti.
Having one-size-fits-all IFIs (e.g. by imposing specific requirements on the number and term length of the board members or ways to finance the IFI activities) was therefore not in the Commission’s intention and would have not reflected the will of the Member States at the time. 
Zato namera Komisije ni bila, da se ustanovijo enotne neodvisne fiskalne institucije (npr. z uvedbo posebnih zahtev glede števila in dolžine mandatov članov odborov ali načina glede financiranja dejavnosti neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij), saj s tem ne bi bila izražena takratna volja držav članic.
It should also be stressed that Member States were in favour of retaining a significant degree of freedom in designing their IFIs under the umbrella of common principles. 
Poudariti bi bilo treba tudi, da so bile države članice naklonjene ohranitvi precejšnje svobode pri zasnovi svojih neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij na podlagi skupnih načel.
This should also be seen against the fact that existence of IFIs in some Member States predated the supranational legislation, and some IFIs with varied set-up were operating successfully in diverse national settings. 
Ob tem bi bilo treba upoštevati tudi dejstvo, da so bile neodvisne fiskalne institucije v nekaterih državah članicah ustanovljene pred sprejetjem nadnacionalne zakonodaje in da so nekatere neodvisne fiskalne institucije z različnimi ureditvami uspešno delovale v različnih nacionalnih okoljih.
39 The Commission underlines that the scope of improvements related to IFIs in the draft 2017 Directive is broader than suggested in this paragraph. 
39 Komisija poudarja, da je obseg izboljšav v zvezi z neodvisnimi fiskalnimi institucijami v osnutku direktive iz leta 2017 širši, kot je navedeno v tem odstavku.
Apart from additional competences for IFIs in relation to setting and monitoring key fiscal parameters and the incorporation of the ‘comply-or-explain’ principle into EU law, the proposal brings important qualifications for the independence safeguards as well as the possibility to extend all those IFI requirements to non-euro area Member States. 
Predlog poleg dodatnih pristojnosti za neodvisne fiskalne institucije v zvezi z določitvijo in spremljanjem ključnih fiskalnih parametrov ter vključitve načela „upoštevaj ali pojasni“ v pravo EU prinaša pomembne pogoje glede varoval za neodvisnost, pa tudi možnost razširitve vseh teh zahtev v zvezi z neodvisnimi fiskalnimi institucijami na države članice zunaj euroobmočja.
More concretely, the independence requirements were strengthened as follows: a reinforcing adjective was included for describing resources (“stable”) and there were specifications for the right of access to information (“extensive and timely”); these qualifications aim to cater for concerns expressed by IFIs, including via the cited statements of the Network of EU IFIs. 
Natančneje, zahteve v zvezi z neodvisnostjo so bile okrepljene na naslednji način: v opis sredstev je bil vključen pridevnik, ki krepi pomen („stabilna“), in navedene so bile specifikacije glede pravice dostopa do informacij („obsežen in pravočasen“); s temi pogoji naj bi se odpravili pomisleki, ki so jih izrazile neodvisne fiskalne institucije, tudi v navedenih izjavah mreže neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij EU.
42 The EU legislation concerning the multilateral budgetary surveillance lays down the specific responsibilities of the Commission as regards monitoring the Member States’ compliance with the EU fiscal rules. 
42 Zakonodaja EU v zvezi z večstranskim proračunskim nadzorom določa posebne pristojnosti Komisije glede spremljanja skladnosti držav članic s fiskalnimi pravili EU.
While the Commission can take into account all available elements which are deemed useful, including as appropriate the information provided by the national IFIs, the legal framework in force does not foresee a formal involvement of IFIs in the EU budgetary surveillance. 
Čeprav lahko Komisija upošteva vse razpoložljive elemente, ki se zdijo koristni, po potrebi vključno z informacijami, ki jih zagotavljajo nacionalne neodvisne fiskalne institucije, v veljavnem pravnem okviru ni predvidena formalna vključitev neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij v proračunski nadzor EU.
46 While the TSCG, just as the SGP, indeed requires being at the MTO or on the adjustment path towards it, it additionally specifies a lower limit of the structural deficit of 0.5% of the GDP (or 1% under certain circumstances). 
46 S PSUU se tako kot s Paktom za stabilnost in rast dejansko zahteva izpolnitev srednjeročnega proračunskega cilja ali skladnost s prilagoditveno potjo za njegovo dosego, je pa v PSUU dodatno določena nižja spodnja meja strukturnega primanjkljaja na ravni 0,5 % BDP (ali 1 % v nekaterih okoliščinah).
47 The Commission notes that even where IFIs monitor compliance with EU fiscal rules they may not necessarily all publish their assessments of compliance. 
47 Komisija opozarja, da tudi kadar neodvisne fiskalne institucije spremljajo skladnost s fiskalnimi pravili EU, morda vse ne objavijo svoje ocene skladnosti.
49 Common reply to paragraphs 49-51: According to the Treaties, it is the Commission’s duty to formally assess compliance with EU fiscal rules in the framework of multilateral budgetary surveillance. 
49 Skupni odgovor na odstavke 49–51: 6 SL SL V skladu s Pogodbama je dolžnost Komisije, da v okviru večstranskega proračunskega nadzora uradno oceni skladnost s fiskalnimi pravili EU.
EU law does not confer upon IFIs any competence related to the process of assessing compliance with EU fiscal rules. 
Pravo EU neodvisnim fiskalnim institucijam ne podeljuje nobene pristojnosti v zvezi s postopkom ocenjevanja skladnosti s fiskalnimi pravili EU.
In the few cases in which IFIs do conduct such activities, this is either based on a national legal obligation or done on a voluntary basis. 
V redkih primerih, v katerih neodvisne fiskalne institucije izvajajo take dejavnosti, to temelji na nacionalni pravni obveznosti ali pa se izvede prostovoljno.
The Commission acknowledges that, in such cases, differences may arise between IFIs' and the Commission's assessments of compliance. 
Komisija priznava, da se lahko v takih primerih ocene, ki jih pripravijo neodvisne fiskalne institucije in Komisija, razlikujejo.
These may be due to, for example, differences of interpretation of underlying legal texts. 
Razlogi za to so lahko na primer razlike v razlagi temeljnih pravnih besedil.
Conclusions may also diverge because of IFIs using own or adapted methodologies which may not be fully consistent with the methodology used by the Commission for its assessment, or time lags between the assessments (as newer or more complete data can weigh on the assessment). 
Zaključki se lahko razlikujejo tudi zato, ker neodvisne fiskalne institucije uporabljajo svoje ali prilagojene metodologije, ki morda niso v celoti skladne z metodologijo, ki jo je Komisija uporabila pri svoji oceni, ali pa zaradi časovnih zamikov med ocenami (novejši ali popolnejši podatki lahko vplivajo na oceno).
The use by the Commission of the discretion given to it by the legal texts that underlie the SGP can also contribute to such differences. 
K takim razlikam lahko prispeva tudi uporaba diskrecijske pravice, ki je Komisiji podeljena s pravnimi besedili, na katerih temelji Pakt za stabilnost in rast.
However, the Commission has made use of the flexibility existing within the SGP in line with the commonly agreed position endorsed by the Council in February 2016. 
Vendar je Komisija prožnost znotraj Pakta za stabilnost in rast uporabila v skladu s skupno dogovorjenim stališčem, ki ga je Svet potrdil februarja 2016.
Accordingly, the Commission’s assessments in recent years have allowed for three factors: 1) cyclical conditions (via the so-called ‘matrix of requirements’); 2) structural reforms; and 3) government investment aiming at, ancillary to, and economically equivalent to major structural reforms. 
V skladu s tem so ocene Komisije v zadnjih letih dopuščale tri dejavnike: (1) ciklične pogoje (prek t.i.matrike zahtev), (2)strukturne reforme ter (3)vladne naložbe, katerih cilj so pomembne strukturne reforme, jih dopolnjujejo in so jim gospodarsko enakovredne.
Decisions taken by the Commission on cases of possible deviations from the required adjustment will be accompanied by a detailed reasoning and will subsequently be extensively discussed with the Member States along the ECOFIN filière. 
Odločitve, ki jih Komisija sprejme glede primerov morebitnih odstopanj od zahtevanih prilagoditev, bo spremljala podrobna utemeljitev, o njih pa se bo z državami članicami obsežno razpravljalo v okviru postopkov Sveta ECOFIN.
Where the Commission has used the discretion given to it, it has provided additional guidance throughout the cycle, thus limiting the uncertainty faced by IFIs in making their assessments. 
Kadar je Komisija uporabila diskrecijsko pravico, ki ji je bila podeljena, je v celotnem ciklu zagotovila dodatne smernice, s čimer je omejila negotovost, s katero se neodvisne fiskalne institucije srečujejo pri pripravi svojih ocen.
Finally, the Commission points out that evidence so far suggests that there have only been a small number of instances when IFIs and the Commission reached different conclusions on Member States' compliance with the EU fiscal rules. 
Nazadnje Komisija poudarja, da je bilo v skladu z dosedanjimi dokazi le malo primerov, v katerih so neodvisne fiskalne institucije in Komisija sprejele različne zaključke o skladnosti držav članic s fiskalnimi pravili EU.
53 The Commission sees close cooperation with IFIs as an important pre-requisite for an effective functioning of the EU and national fiscal frameworks. 
53 Komisija meni, da je tesno sodelovanje z neodvisnimi fiskalnimi institucijami pomemben predpogoj za učinkovito delovanje fiskalnega okvira EU in nacionalnih fiskalnih okvirov.
57 The advisory EFB was envisaged as a body to provide independent advice on the EU fiscal governance framework. 
57 Svetovalni Evropski fiskalni odbor je bil predviden kot organ za neodvisno svetovanje o okviru EU za fiskalno upravljanje.
Its statutory basis (i.e. Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1937) confirms that rationale by setting out the Board’s mission as follows: “The Board shall contribute in an advisory capacity to the exercise of the Commission's functions in the multilateral fiscal surveillance as set out in Articles 121, 126 and 136 TFEU as far as the euro area is concerned.” This is further operationalised into a broad range of tasks and responsibilities (as per Article 2(2) of the cited decision, according to what was deemed essential for fulfilling EFB’s mission. It is in the context of this general mission that the ‘coordination’ of national fiscal councils should be read. 
Njegova zakonska podlaga (tj. Sklep Komisije (EU) 2015/1937) potrjuje navedeno utemeljitev, saj za namen delovanja odbora določa: „Odbor v svetovalni vlogi prispeva k izvajanju nalog Komisije v okviru večstranskega fiskalnega nadzora v skladu s členi 121, 126 in 136 PDEU v delu, ki zadeva euroobmočje.“ To je nato preoblikovano v najrazličnejše naloge in odgovornosti (v skladu s členom 2(2) navedenega sklepa) glede na to, kar se je štelo za bistveno za izpolnjevanje namena delovanja Evropskega fiskalnega odbora. „Usklajevanje“ nacionalnih fiskalnih svetov bi bilo zato treba razlagati ob upoštevanju tega splošnega namena delovanja.
However, conferring upon the advisory EFB a coordination role over independent institutions grounded in national laws (sometimes at constitutional level) would have required EU legislation, i.e. a potentially lengthy legislative process. 
Vendar bi bila za to, da bi se svetovalnemu Evropskemu fiskalnemu odboru podelila vloga usklajevanja neodvisnih institucij, ki izhajajo iz nacionalnih ureditev (včasih na ustavni ravni), potrebna zakonodaja EU, tj. potencialno dolgotrajen zakonodajni postopek.
Moreover, it could have dented the IFIs’ independence and their public perception as home-grown ‘fiscal watchdogs’. 
Še več, lahko bi zmanjšala neodvisnost neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij in vplivala na njihovo javno dojemanje kot domačih „fiskalnih čuvajev“.
60 The Commission underlines that the EFB’s statutory regime and its resource allocation, although not fully conforming to the standards applicable to the national fiscal councils, were carefully designed and calibrated to ensure that the Board is fully capable of achieving its mission while securing the necessary independence standards. 
60 Komisija poudarja, da sta bili statutarna ureditev Evropskega fiskalnega odbora in dodelitev sredstev odboru, čeprav nista bili v celoti skladni s standardi, ki se uporabljajo za nacionalne fiskalne 7 SL SL svete, skrbno zasnovani in določeni tako, da je odbor sposoben v celoti uresničiti svoj namen delovanja ter hkrati zagotavljati potrebne standarde neodvisnosti.
While a strict parallel between the independent advisory EFB and the national independent fiscal councils cannot be drawn, the essence of the principles applicable to the latter is captured in the Board's set-up, with a particular focus on independence and competence and taking into account the specificity of the Board’s mission. a) The specifications regarding the mandates of the Board members are in line with national fiscal council practices in a number of Member States. b) The Commission has a high regard for the EFB’s activity, which brings an additional competent and independent view into the fiscal policy debate. 
Čeprav ni mogoče potegniti stroge vzporednice med neodvisnim svetovalnim Evropskim fiskalnim odborom in nacionalnimi neodvisnimi fiskalnimi sveti, je bistvo načel, ki se uporabljajo za zadevne svete, zajeto v ureditvi odbora s posebnim poudarkom na neodvisnosti in usposobljenosti ter ob upoštevanju posebnosti namena delovanja odbora. (a) Specifikacije v zvezi z mandati članov odbora so v skladu s praksami nacionalnih fiskalnih odborov v več državah članicah. (b) Komisija zelo ceni dejavnost Evropskega fiskalnega odbora, ki k razpravi o fiskalni politiki prispeva dodatno kompetentno in neodvisno mnenje.
The Commission is fully aware of the importance of independence for the reputation and credibility of EFB’s advice. c) Considering the special administrative set-up of the EFB as an advisory body to the Commission, the Secretariat-General of the Commission ensures the management of EFB’s human and budgetary resources according to the Commission’s applicable rules. 
Komisija se v celoti zaveda pomena neodvisnosti za ugled in verodostojnost svetovalnega mnenja Evropskega fiskalnega odbora. (c) Generalni sekretariat Komisije ob upoštevanju posebne upravne ureditve Evropskega fiskalnega odbora kot svetovalnega organa Komisije zagotavlja upravljanje človeških in proračunskih virov Evropskega fiskalnega odbora v skladu z veljavnimi pravili Komisije.
The arrangements in place have not curtailed the operations of the Board and its secretariat. 
Vzpostavljene ureditve ne omejujejo delovanja odbora in njegovega sekretariata.
In fact, the allocations for supporting the activity of the Chair and Board members have been increased significantly since inception. 
Dejansko so se dodelitve za podporo dejavnosti predsednika in članov odbora od začetka delovanja precej povečale.
For example, all mission requests launched by the EFB secretariat have been approved and financed. d) Those administrative support arrangements do not hinder the EFB’s independent work and are actually meant to facilitate the EFB’s operation in a cost-effective manner. 
Vse zahteve za misije, ki jih je vložil sekretariat odbora, so bile odobrene in financirane. (d) Navedene ureditve upravne podpore ne ovirajo neodvisnega dela Evropskega fiskalnega odbora in so dejansko namenjene olajšanju delovanja odbora na stroškovno učinkovit način.
61 As explained in the letter from the Vice-President of the Commission to the Ombudsman referred to in paragraph 67, a strict parallel between the independent advisory EFB and the national independent fiscal councils cannot be drawn. 
61 Kot je pojasnjeno v dopisu podpredsednika Komisije Evropskemu varuhu človekovih pravic iz odstavka 67, ni mogoče potegniti stroge vzporednice med neodvisnim svetovalnim Evropskim fiskalnim odborom in nacionalnimi neodvisnimi fiskalnimi sveti.
In particular, not only the underlying legal bases are different but most importantly their institutional set-up, roles, functioning and powers are different. 
Ne razlikujejo se namreč le osnovne pravne podlage, ampak, kar je najpomembneje, njihove institucionalne ureditve, vloge, delovanje in pooblastila.
The former is an independent advisory body of the Commission. 
Odbor je neodvisni svetovalni organ Komisije.
The Commission’s responsibilities with respect to the surveillance of fiscal policies of the Member States are enshrined in the Treaty. 
Odgovornosti Komisije glede nadzora nad fiskalnimi politikami držav članic so zapisane v Pogodbi.
At national level, according to the EU law and the intergovernmental TSCG, Member States have put in place independent institutions to monitor national public finances. 
Države članice so na nacionalni ravni v skladu s pravom EU in medvladno PSUU ustanovile neodvisne institucije za spremljanje nacionalnih javnih financ.
Overall, the Commission considers that the Board's set-up takes appropriately into account the relevant standards and lays a solid groundwork for the EFB’s mission. 
Komisija na splošno meni, da se v ureditvi odbora ustrezno upoštevajo ustrezni standardi in da je ureditev trdna podlaga za namen delovanja Evropskega fiskalnega odbora.
62 The Commission underlines that Decision 2015/1937 does not restrict the Board’s actions in the fulfilment of its remit. 
62 Komisija poudarja, da Sklep (EU) 2015/1937 ne omejuje ukrepov odbora pri izpolnjevanju njegovih nalog.
The EFB mandate does not exclude the possibility to formulate advice/opinions in real time. 
Mandat Evropskega fiskalnega odbora ne izključuje možnosti priprave svetovalnih mnenj/mnenj v realnem času.
The Board decided to give preference to an ex-post assessment of the implementation of the Union fiscal rules for at least two important reasons: (i) A real-time assessment of key surveillance decisions at the EU level would be extremely resource intensive. 
Odbor se je odločil, da bo dal prednost naknadni oceni izvajanja fiskalnih pravil Unije iz vsaj dveh pomembnih razlogov: (i) za ocenjevanje ključnih nadzornih odločitev na ravni EU v realnem času bi bilo potrebnih zelo veliko sredstev.
Unlike national fiscal councils, the EFB would have to provide a solid analysis for all Member States in a very short period of time; (ii) Focusing on the ex-post assessment of how the Union fiscal rules are implemented reduces the risk of getting into political debates and bolsters the capacity of any independent fiscal council to provide a non-partisan/independent view. 
Evropski fiskalni odbor bi moral v nasprotju z nacionalnimi fiskalnimi sveti v zelo kratkem času zagotoviti zanesljivo analizo za vse države članice, (ii) z osredotočanjem na naknadno oceno tega, kako se izvajajo fiskalna pravila Unije, se zmanjša tveganje za začetek političnih razprav in poveča zmožnost vsakega neodvisnega fiskalnega sveta, da zagotovi nepristransko/neodvisno mnenje.
Moreover, it is not entirely clear that real-time assessments would have a bigger impact than those delivered ex post. 
Poleg tega ni povsem jasno, ali bi imele ocene v realnem času večji učinek od tistih, opravljenih naknadno.
65 The EFB annual reports do highlight various weaknesses and challenges facing the IFIs, but they also go beyond and put forward suggestions on how to address shortcomings. 
SL SL 65 Evropski fiskalni odbor v letnih poročilih poudari različne slabosti in izzive, s katerimi se srečujejo neodvisne fiskalne institucije, vendar to tudi preseže in poda predloge, kako odpraviti pomanjkljivosti.
For example, the 2017 annual report makes in the dedicated section on IFIs several suggestions for making the ‘comply-or-explain’ principle more effective. 
Letno poročilo za leto 2017 na primer v namenskem oddelku o neodvisnih fiskalnih institucijah vsebuje več predlogov za večjo učinkovitost načela „upoštevaj ali pojasni“.
66 Common reply to paragraphs 66 and 67: The Commission takes into account all available elements which are deemed useful for its informed decision-making. 
66 Skupni odgovor na odstavka 66 in 67: Komisija upošteva vse razpoložljive elemente, za katere se zdi, da ji bodo v pomoč pri sprejemanju dobro utemeljenih odločitev.
However, given that its fiscal surveillance responsibilities are enshrined in the Treaties, the process by which the Commission arrives at decisions in this area cannot be constrained, for example by regulating if, how and when the EFB advice and opinions would be taken into account. 
Vendar glede na to, da so njene obveznosti glede fiskalnega nadzora zapisane v Pogodbah, postopka, s katerim Komisija sprejema odločitve na tem področju, ni mogoče omejiti, na primer z določitvijo, če, kako in kdaj se bodo upoštevala svetovalna mnenja in mnenja Evropskega fiskalnega odbora.