natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
1). in Member States Ő checks on the treatment of waste used for animal feed. 
1). nadzorih obdelave odpadkov , uporabljenih za živalsko krmo, ki jih izvajajo države članice.
In so doing it brought to light the risks associated with this type of feedstuff, but partly only after the crisis. 
S tem je poudaril tveganje, povezano s tovrstno krmo, vendar delno šele po krizi.
The risks associated with this type of animal feed had already been illustrated however in 1997/1998, when there was an outbreak of swine fever in Germany as a consequence of using for pig food catering waste and swill that had been inadequately treated and thus infringed Community legislation. 
Vendar se je tveganje, povezano s to vrsto živalske krme, pokazalo že v obdobju 1997–1998 ob izbruhu prašičje kuge v Nemčiji, ker so za krmljenje prašičev uporabljali nezadostno obdelane pomije in odpadke iz gostinstva, s čimer je bila kršena zakonodaja Skupnosti.
For that reason some Member States had forbidden the use of catering waste on their territory before the 2001 FMD crisis, even if the waste had been treated (France and the Netherlands). Others (Germany and the United Kingdom) had not done so. 
Zato so pred izbruhom slinavke in parkljevke leta 2001 nekatere države članice na svojem ozemlju prepovedale uporabo odpadkov iz gostinstva, čeprav so bili obdelani (Francija in Nizozemska), medtem ko druge tega niso storile (Nemčija in Združeno kraljestvo).
At the Community level, the use of processed catering waste in pig feed was still legal in February 2001 (36), despite the CommissionŐs proposals. 
Uporaba obdelanih odpadkov iz gostinstva za krmljenje prašičev je bila februarja 2001 na ravni Skupnosti še vedno zakonita (36), in to kljub predlogom Komisije.
In practice the farmer collected catering waste from restaurants, hotels, schools and an armed forces establishment in the vicinity, and stored it outside the farm before sending it to two processing establishments close to the farm. 
V praksi je ta rejec odpadke iz gostinstva pobiral v restavracijah, hotelih, šolah in vojašnicah v bližini ter jih, preden jih je poslal v dva obrata za predelavo v bližini gospodarstva, skladiščil pred svojim poslopjem.
However, inspections carried out by the Ministry after the start of the outbreak revealed the presence of abnormal waste in the feeding troughs, clearly demonstrating that the waste had not been adequately treated (37). 
Vendar so nadzori, ki jih je ministrstvo izvedlo po izbruhu krize, pokazali, da so v koritih ostali neobičajni odpadki, ki so jasno dokazovali nezadostno obdelavo odpadkov iz gostinstva (37).
The exact provenance of the pan-Asiatic O type virus could not be established with certainty. 
Natančnega izvora virusa tipa O, seva Pan Asian, ni bilo mogoče z gotovostjo dognati.
The possibility of the virus having entered via BIPs was more or less ruled out and suspicion fell on illegal shipments of products presented as non-food imports for wholesale outlets or for sale to restaurants or canteens (38). 
Možnost, da je virus prišel prek mejnih veterinarskih postaj, je bila izključena; sum (38) je padel na ilegalne pošiljke proizvodov, ki so bile predstavljene kot uvozi neprehrambenih proizvodov za prodajo na debelo restavracijam ali menzam.
(36) The Commission presented a proposal to the Parliament and the Council concerning a ban on the use of catering waste and swill in animal feed (COM (2000) 574) in 2000, but it was not adopted until 2002 (Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002, OJ L 273, 10.10.2002, p. 
(36) Komisija je leta 2000 Parlamentu in Svetu predložila predlog (COM(2000) 574) o prepovedi uporabe odpadkov iz gostinstva in pomij za krmljenje rejnih živali, vendar je bil sprejet šele leta 2002 (Uredba (ES) št.
1). In January 2001, just before the crisis, it also presented a proposal for a ban on the use of catering waste as pig feed, but it was not adopted until 23 October 2001. 
Januarja 2001, tik pred začetkom krize, je predložila tudi predlog prepovedi uporabe odpadkov iz gostinstva za krmljenje prašičev, vendar je bil sprejet šele 23. oktobra 2001.
Council Directive 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever (OJ L 316, 1.12.2001, p. 
Direktiva Sveta 2001/89/ES z dne 23. oktobra 2001 o ukrepih Skupnosti za nadzor nad klasično prašičjo kugo (UL L 316, 1.12.2001, str.
(37) Origin of the UK foot-and-mouth disease epidemic in 2001, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), June 2002. 
(37) Origin of the UK Foot and Mouth Disease Epidemic in 2001, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, junij 2002.
(38) Foot-and-mouth disease 2001: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry, p. 
(38) Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry, str.
C 54/12 EN Official Journal of the European Union 3.3.2005 Insufficient checks and criteria for Member StatesŐ contingency plans 29. 
C 54/12 SL Uradni list Evropske unije 3.3.2005 Kriteriji za načrtovanje ukrepov držav članic ob nepredvidljivih dogodkih in kontrola tega načrtovanja so bili neprimerni 29.
In 1990 the Council (39) called on the Member States to draw up contingency plans setting out the action to be taken if an outbreak of FMD occurred. 
Svet (39) je leta 1990 od držav članic zahteval, da pripravijo načrte ukrepov ob nepredvidljivih dogodkih, v katerih bi bili natančno določeni ukrepi, ki bi se izvedli ob pojavu izbruha slinavke in parkljevke.
The plans were to facilitate access to the plant, equipment, personnel and all other appropriate materials necessary for the rapid and efficient eradication of an outbreak. 
Ti načrti bi morali omogočati dostop do zgradb, opreme, osebja in vsega drugega primernega materiala, potrebnih za hitro in učinkovito iztrebljenje izbruha bolezni.
The Commission was to lay down the criteria to be applied in drawing up the plans, examine them in order to determine whether they provided a feasible means of achieving the desired objective, and suggest to the Member States where they could be amended. 
Komisija bi morala pripraviti merila za izdelavo teh načrtov, začeti preučevati te načrte, da bi ugotovila, ali bi omogočili uresničitev določenega cilja, in državi članici predlagati morebitne spremembe.
The Council had provided for the possibility of supplementing or amending the plans later, to take account of any changes in the situation. 
Svet je poleg tega predvidel možnost poznejše dopolnitve ali spremembe načrtov, da bi upoštevali razvoj položaja.
In 1991 the Commission laid down the minimum criteria to be met by Member StatesŐ contingency plans (40). 
Komisija je leta 1991 določila minimalna merila, ki bi jih morali izpolnjevati načrti za ukrepe držav članic ob nepredvidljivih dogodkih (40).
The aim of the criteria was to ensure that the contingency plans allowed rapid mobilisation of the resources needed to eradicate the disease quickly and efficiently in the event of an outbreak of FMD. 
Ta merila bi morala zagotoviti, da načrti ukrepov ob nepredvidljivih dogodkih omogočajo hitro mobilizacijo sredstev, potrebnih za hitro in učinkovito izkoreninjenje bolezni v primeru izbruha slinavke in parkljevke.
Although the Commission required the Member States to establish a basic crisis management structure such as emergency units, local emergency centres and personnel responsible for emergency measures, the Court noted that some important information and conditions for controlling the disease and for efficient financial and administrative organisation had not been required by the Commission at the time, including: (a) details of personnel and resources needed for different scenarios (optimistic, intermediate and pessimistic) and how the personnel and resources were to be mobilised; (b) a review of contingency plans in the light of experience and circulation of them to farmers, together with regular simulation exercises; (c) the criteria in excess of which emergency vaccination would be used; (d) information on the established procedures for recording the number of animals slaughtered, their value, payments made and cross-checks with existing veterinary and animal identification databases; (39) Directive 90/423/EEC. 
Sodišče je, čeprav je Komisija od držav članic zahtevala vzpostavitev osnovne strukture za upravljanje krize, kot so krizni centri, lokalni centri za nujne primere, osebje, pristojno za izvajanje nujnih ukrepov, ugotovilo, da Komisija tedaj ni zahtevala vrste podatkov ali pogojev, pomembnih za nadzor bolezni in tudi učinkovito finančno in upravno organizacijo, zlasti: (a) podatkov o osebju in sredstvih, potrebnih za različne scenarije (optimistični, srednji in pesimistični), ter način mobilizacije tega osebja in sredstev; (b) ponovnega pregleda načrtov ukrepov ob nepredvidljivih dogodkih z vidika izkušenj, njihovega širjenja med rejci in rednega izvajanja simulacijskih vaj; (c) meril, na podlagi katerih bi se izvedlo cepljenje v nujnih primerih; (d) podatkov o vzpostavljenih postopkih za evidentiranje števila zaklanih živali, njihove vrednosti, izvedenih plačil in opravljenih navzkrižnih preverjanj na podlagi obstoječih veterinarskih podatkovnih baz ali glede označevanja živali; (39) Direktiva 90/423/EGS.
(40) Commission Decision 91/42/EEC of 8 January 1991 laying down the criteria to be applied when drawing up contingency plans for the control of foot-and-mouth disease, in application of Article 5 of Council Directive 90/423/EEC (OJ L 23, 29.1.1991, p. 
(40) Odločba Komisije 91/42/EGS z dne 8. januarja 1991 o določitvi meril za izdelavo načrtov ukrepov ob nepredvidljivih dogodkih za obvladovanje slinavke in parkljevke ob uporabi Direktive Sveta 90/423/EGS (UL L 23, 29.1.1991, str.
29). (e) the system for recruiting valuers in an emergency and the general principles for remunerating them; (f) the farmer compensation system and its use before or after culling. 
29). (e) sistema pridobivanja ocenjevalcev v nujnih primerih in splošnih načel njihovega plačila; (f) sistema nadomestil za rejce in opredelitve, ali se ta nadomestila uporabijo pred zakolom ali po njem.
The Commission has not revised these criteria since 1991. 
Komisija od leta 1991 teh načel ni revidirala.
It adopted Member StatesŐ plans between 1993 and 1995. 
Med letoma 1993 in 1995 je sprejela načrte držav članic.
During that process, however, the Commission confined itself to making documentary checks, with no on-the-spot checks of the effectiveness of the described measures. 
Vendar se je med tem postopkom omejila na pregled dokumentov, ne da bi na kraju samem preverila, ali se opisani ukrepi dejansko izvajajo.
Contrary to the CommissionŐs reply to paragraph 33, its 1995 Guidelines for the preparation of contingency plans (41) only required the Member States to have sufficient veterinary staff to deal with up to 10 outbreaks of disease at any one time, and did not ask them to provide for the number of staff to be increased as a function of the epidemi-ogical situation. 
Komisija se je v nasprotju s svojim odgovorom na odstavek 33 v smernicah leta 1995 za pripravo načrtov za ukrepe ob nepredvidljivih dogodkih (41) omejila na to, da je od držav članic zahtevala, da so njihove veterinarske službe dovolj zmogljive, da lahko kadar koli obravnavajo do deset izbruhov okužbe, ter od njih ni zahtevala načrta za razširitev teh služb glede na epidemiološko situacijo.
Moreover, the first on-the-spot inspections of these plans by the Commission (HVO) in the Member States affected by FMD only took place at the end of 2001 and during the 2002 year, after the crisis. 
Poleg tega je Komisija (Urad za prehrano in veterinarstvo) v državah članicah, prizadetih zaradi slinavke in parkljevke, opravila prve inšpekcije teh načrtov na kraju samem šele konec leta 2001 in v letu 2002, torej po koncu krize.
The Parliament also pointed out that, before the crisis, the Commission did not Ôreview the Member StatesŐ contingency plans within an appropriate periodŐ. 
Parlament je prav tako ugotovil, da Komisija pred krizo ni „v primernem času preverila načrtov ukrepov držav članic ob nepredvidljivih dogodkih“.
It went on to say, ÔAt the time of the 2001 crisis Đ apart from the assessments in connection with the approval of the contingency plans Đ [the Commission] had still not reviewed the implementation either of the UKŐs contingency plan or of those of the Netherlands or FranceŐ (42). 
Poleg tega je navedel, da „brez upoštevanja preverjanj, opravljenih v okviru odobritve načrtov ukrepov ob nepredvidljivih dogodkih, pred izbruhom epidemije leta 2001 ni bila preverjena vzpostavitev načrta niti v Združenem kraljestvu, niti na Nizozemskem ali v Franciji“ (42).
As a consequence the Member StatesŐ plans, although adopted by the Commission, could not be adapted to a crisis that was unprecedented and on a scale that was difficult to imagine. 
Zato načrti držav članic, čeprav jih je Komisija sprejela, niso bili prilagojeni krizi velikih razsežnosti brez primere, katero je težko predvideti.
The plans had not provided adequately for the worst scenario, made no provision for stepping up the resources to counteract it and did not provide the necessary administrative and financial organisation. 
Zadosti niso predvideli niti pesimističnega scenarija, niti povečanja obsega sredstev, potrebnih za reševanje krize, niti potrebne upravne in finančne organizacije.
(41) Guidelines for the preparation of contingency plans for epidemic diseases, paragraph 6.12: ÔEach Member State should ensure that it has immediately available sufficient trained staff to deal with, at any time, up to 10 outbreaks of disease and to properly maintain surveillance in the 3 km radius protection zone associated with each. 
(41) Guidelines for the preparation of contingency plans for epidemic diseases, odstavek 6.12: „Each Member State should ensure that it has immediately available sufficient trained staff to deal with, at any time, up to 10 outbreaks of disease and to properly maintain surveillance in the 3 km radius protection zone associated with each.
It has been estimated that a trained veterinarian can visit and examine stock at no more than five holdings on one day if he/she properly undertakes the required disinfection procedures at each place.Ő (42) European Parliament, Resolution adopted on 17 December 2002, paragraph 54. 
It has been estimated that a trained veterinarian can visit and examine stock at no more than five holdings on one day if he/she properly undertakes the required disinfection procedures at each place.“ (42) Resolucija Evropskega parlamenta z dne 17. decembra 2002, odstavek 54.
3.3.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 54/13 33. 
3.3.2005 SL Uradni list Evropske unije C 54/13 33.
For example, the plan submitted to the Commission by the United Kingdom had not been substantially reviewed since its adoption in 1991. 
Kot primer navedimo načrt Združenega kraljestva, predložen Komisiji, ki ni bil temeljito pregledan od sprejetja leta 1991.
In line with the CommissionŐs guidelines it did not make provision for a pessimistic scenario (43) and even in the national plan, the basis for plans at local level, the scenario only covered up to ten outbreaks at any one time (44), without establishing any procedures for rapidly increasing the resources needed to handle culling and destruction. 
Pesimistični scenarij v skladu s smernicami Komisije v njem ni bil predviden (43) in je tudi na nacionalni ravni, na kateri temeljijo načrti na lokalni ravni, hkrati pokrival samo deset izbruhov (44), ne da bi vzpostavil postopke, s katerimi bi hitro povečali sredstva, potrebna za zakole in uničenja.
There was no mention of any system for recruiting valuers in an emergency, nor the general principles for paying them. 
Sistem rekrutiranja ocenjevalcev v nujnih primerih in splošna načela njihovega plačila niso bili omenjeni.
The plan had not been issued to farmers or farmersŐ representatives. 
Načrt ni bil razdeljen rejcem ali njihovim zastop-nikom.
In France the plan made it possible to deal successfully with the two outbreaks that occurred simultaneously, but there was no provision for the increased resources needed to deal with a more pessimistic scenario. 
V primeru Francije je načrt omogočil uspešno obravnavo dveh izbruhov, ki sta se pojavila hkrati, vendar ni omogočil povečanja obsega sredstev, potrebnih v primeru bolj pesimističnega scenarija.
The Irish contingency plan envisaged dealing with ten outbreaks at any one time. 
Irski načrt ukrepov ob nepredvidljivih dogodkih je predvideval hkratno obravnavo desetih izbruhov.
Only the Netherlands had learned from the swine fever crisis and had provided for the necessary resources to be increased to deal with its 26 outbreaks by introducing emergency vaccination as soon as the resources were found to be insufficient to carry out culling immediately. 
Samo Nizozemska, ki je imela izkušnje s krizo prašičje kuge, je predvidela povečanje obsega sredstev, potrebnih za obravnavo 26 izbruhov, tako da je izvedla cepljenje v nujnih primerih, takoj ko se je izkazalo, da sredstva ne zadostujejo za takojšnji zakol.
The CommissionŐs internal audit showed that the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection, which is constantly being confronted with crises in the animal sector, had introduced standardised routines, which were judged effective, but these working procedures had not been documented. 
Notranja revizija Komisije je pokazala, da je Generalni direktorat za zdravje in varstvo potrošnikov, ki se je stalno ukvarjal s krizami na področju živalskih bolezni, vzpostavil standardne metode, ki so bile ocenjene kot učinkovite, vendar pa teh delovnih postopkov ni pisno dokumentiral.
Moreover, crisis management materials and manuals were not available. 
Poleg tega oprema in priročniki za upravljanje kriz niso bili na voljo.
Although the Commission responded rapidly during the crisis (see paragraph 44), the Court considers that good groundwork by the Commission, especially from the point of view of the financial arrangements for the reimbursement to be granted to Member States (see paragraphs 74 to 81), would have made it possible to avoid some of the problems encountered during the 2001 crisis. 
Sodišče meni, da bi, čeprav se je Komisija med krizo hitro odzvala (glej odstavek 44), njena dobra priprava, zlasti z vidika finančnih postopkov povračila, ki se odobri državam članicam (glej odstavke 74–81), preprečila nekatere težave, nastale med krizo leta 2001.
Incomplete identification and inadequate tracing of animals of FMD-sensitive species 35. 
Nepopolna identifikacija in neustrezna sledljivost živalskih vrst, občutljivih na slinavko in parkljevko 35.
At Community level there is a compulsory system for identifying and registering cattle individually (45). 
Na ravni Skupnosti je sistem identificiranja in individualnega registriranja goveda obvezen (45).
However, the (43) The 2001 Outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, 21 June 2002, The Stationery Office, London, p. 4, section 2, third paragraph: ÔThe plans were based on the most likely scenario and other scenarios were not considered. 
Vendar je Sodišče ugotovilo, da ta sistem ne zagotavlja sledljivosti goveda, ki je (43) The 2001 Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, 21. junij 2002, The Stationery Office, London, točka 2, tretja alinea: „The plans were based on the most likely scenario and other scenarios were not considered.
In line with European Commission guidance, the DepartmentŐs plans were based on the supposition that there would not be more than 10 infected premises at any one timeŐ. 
In line with European Commission guidance, the Department’s plans were based on the supposition that there would not be more than 10 infected premises at one time.“ (44) The 2001 Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, 21. junij 2002, The Stationery Office, London, odstavek 2.30.
(45) Regulation (EC) No 1760/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 204, 11.8.2000, p.1) established a system for identifying and registering bovine animals individually. 
(45) Uredba (ES) št. 1760/2000 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta (UL L 204, 11.8.2000, str.
In addition, there are still some weaknesses in its implementation in the Member States (46). 
Poleg tega njegova vzpostavitev v državah članicah še vedno kaže pomanjkljivosti (46).
In the case of sheep (the species mainly affected by the 2001 crisis) and pigs, identification was compulsory from 1 January 1995 until November 2003, but only for batches of animals (47). 
Identifikacija ovac, ki jih je kriza leta 2001 najbolj prizadela, in tudi prašičev je bila od 1. januarja 1995 do novembra 2003 obvezna samo za posamezne serije (47).
During the crisis the HVO pointed out that the system of batch identification had been poorly applied in three out of the four Member States affected by FMD (48). 
Urad za prehrano in veterinarstvo je med krizo odkril, da so tri od štirih držav članic, prizadetih zaradi slinavke in parkljevke, slabo uporabile sistem identifikacije serij (48).
The fact that Community regulations did not require sheep to be identified individually, and that there were also shortcomings in the system of batch identification, hampered the tracing of animals that were suspected of being infected and so delayed their slaughter. 
Dejstvo, da predpisi Skupnosti niso zahtevali individualne identifikacije ovac in da je bila poleg tega njihova identifikacija po serijah pomanjkljiva, je oviralo sledenje sumljivih živali in tako zakasnilo njihov zakol.
In the United Kingdom sheep that should have been slaughtered were not killed, so adding to the risk of the virus spreading. 
V Združenem kraljestvu ovac, ki bi jih morali zaklati, niso zaklali, kar je povečalo tveganje širjenja virusa.
(47) Council Directive 92/102/EEC of 27 November 1992 concerning the identification and registration of animals (OJ L 355, 5.12.1992, p. 
(47) Direktiva Sveta 92/102/EGS z dne 27. novembra 1992 o identifikaciji in registraciji živali (UL L 355, 5.12.1992, str.
Individual identification of sheep was made compulsory by Council Directive 2003/85/EC (OJ L 306, 22.11.2003, p. 
Individualna identifikacija ovac je postala obvezna z Direktivo Sveta 2003/85/ES (UL L 306, 22.11.2003, str.
Commission Decision 2000/678/EC required the Member States to establish a database of pig holdings and movements of pigs. 
Odločba Komisije 2000/678/ES je države članice obvezala k uvedbi podatkovnih baz o prašičerejskih obratih in premikih prašičev.
(48) The HVOŐs report on the audit visit to Ireland from 14-17 May 2001 said that before the FMD outbreak Council Directive 92/102/EEC had not been implemented in Ireland as far as sheep and goat identification was concerned. 
(48) Glej poročilo Urada za prehrano in veterinarstvo po obisku na Irskem od 14. do 17. maja 2001: „Pred pojavom krize na Irskem niso izvedli Direktive 92/102/EGS, kar zadeva identifikacijo ovac in koz.“ Glej tudi končno poročilo Urada za prehrano in veterinarstvo po obisku inšpektorjev v Združenem kraljestvu od 12. do 16. marca, str.
See also the HVOŐs final report following an inspection visit to the United Kingdom from 12 to 16 March, pp. 9 and 10, ÔCouncil Directive 92/102/EEC requires identification of small ruminants (sheep and goats) as to their holding of origin (although not on an individual basis). 
9 in 10: „Council Directive 92/102/EEC requires identification of small ruminants (sheep and goats) as to their holding of origin (al-though not on an individual basis).
There is no compulsory requirement for sheep to be accompanied by any form of official documentation during routine movementsŐ; See also the HVOŐs report on its inspection in France from 2 to 6 April 2001, which stated that the national emergency centre (the FMD unit), together with the local emergency centres, had made a great effort to trace animals, both inside and outside France (...). 
There is no compulsory requirement for sheep to be accompanied by any form of official documentation during routine movements.“ Glej tudi poročilo Urada za prehrano in veterinarstvo o inšpekciji v Franciji od 2. do 6. aprila 2001: „Državni krizni center (Enota za slinavko in parkljevko) si je v sodelovanju z lokalnimi kriznimi centri zelo prizadeval za sledenje živali v Franciji in v tujini. (...)