natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Furthermore, the Commission has made available detailed information on the main measures in the Staff Working Documents which accompany new EDP recommendations, including the forecast of key variables for the compu‐ tation of the fiscal effort under the baseline scenario (e.g. the point of reference to which future forecasts will be compared in order to compute both the top‐down and the bottom‐up approach). VII In relation to the implementation of structural reforms, the Commission would like to clarify that although appro‐ priate structural reforms can play a key role in eliminating excessive deficits, their implementation is not a legally relevant component in the abrogation of an EDP. 
Poleg tega je dala Komisija na voljo podrobne informacije o glavnih ukrepih v delovnih dokumentih služb Komisije, ki so priloženi novim priporočilom v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, vključno z napovedjo ključnih spremenljivk za izračun fiskalnega napora po osnovnem scenariju (npr. referenčna točka, s katero se bodo primerjale prihodnje napovedi za izračun po pristopu od zgoraj navzdol in od spodaj navzgor). VII Komisija želi v zvezi z izvajanjem strukturnih reform pojasniti, da izvajanje ustreznih strukturnih reform ni pravno pomemben element pri razveljavitvi postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, čeprav lahko imajo ključno vlogo pri odpravljanju čezmernih primanjkljajev.
In terms of enforcement, the focus of the legislation which governs the EDP is fiscal outcomes and, as such, the relevant legislation does not contain specific provision to enforce the implementation of structural reforms. Indeed, it is important to re‐state that the assessment of effective action under an EDP is focussed on the delivery of the required budgetary adjustment and is not affected by the evaluation of structural reforms. 
Kar zadeva izvrševanje, je zakonodaja, ki se uporablja za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, osredotočena na fiskalne učinke in kot taka ne vsebuje posebne določbe, s katero bi se zahtevalo izvajanje strukturnih reform. Dejansko je treba znova poudariti, da je ocenjevanje uspešnega ukrepanja v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem osredotočeno na izvedbo zahtevane javnofinančne prilagoditve in da vrednotenje strukturnih reform ne vpliva nanj.
The implementation of structural reforms, including those undertaken under an Economic Partnership Programme (EPP), is monitored in the context of the European Semester, including under the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. 
Izvajanje strukturnih reform, vključno s tistimi v okviru programa ekonomskega partnerstva (EPP), se spremlja v okviru evropskega semestra, med drugim tudi v okviru postopka v zvezi z makroekonomskim neravnotežjem.
For countries subject to specific monitoring due to the presence of excessive imbalances, the implementation of reforms is monitored under the Excessive Imbalances Procedure. 
Pri državah, ki se posebej spremljajo zaradi čezmernih neravnotežij, se izvajanje reform spremlja v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim neravnotežjem.
That said, at the point of examining whether an EDP needs to be opened for a given Member State, the Commission analyses carefully all relevant medium‐term developments regarding the economic, budgetary and debt positions. 
Komisija pri ugotavljanju, ali je treba za določeno državo članico začeti postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, temeljito analizira vse pomembne srednjeročne dejavnike v zvezi z gospodarskimi razmerami, proračunskim stanjem in zadolženostjo.
These ‘relevant factors’ include the implementation of structural reforms in the context of the European Semester such as within the Excessive Imbalances Procedure. 
Ti „pomembni dejavniki“ vključujejo izvajanje strukturnih reform v okviru evropskega semestra, kot so reforme v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim neravnotežjem.
The Commission considers that a lack of implementation of structural reforms constitutes an aggravating relevant factor. 
Komisija meni, da je pomanjkljivo izvajanje strukturnih reform oteževalni dejavnik.
Reply of the Commission 105 The Commission does not agree that the EDP over‐emphasises the deficit dimension at the expense of debt. 
Odgovori Komisije 105 Komisija se ne strinja, da je v postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem na račun zadolženosti pretirano poudarjen primanjkljaj.
In particular, since the 2011 reform of the legislation known as ‘the Six‐pack’, the breach of the debt threshold of 60% of GDP has been elevated to the trigger of the EDP. 
Od reforme zakonodaje iz leta 2011, znane kot „šesterček“, se je kršitev praga dolga v višini 60 % BDP stopnjevala do ravni, ki pomeni sprožitev postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
The Commission has opened a debt‐based (and deficit‐based) EDP for Malta in 2013, which has successfully exited the procedure in 2015. 
Komisija je leta 2013 začela postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem na podlagi dolga (in na podlagi primanjkljaja) za Malto, ki je iz postopka uspešno izstopila leta 2015.
At the same time, the concept of debt diminishing at a satisfactory pace was operationalised through the debt‐reduction benchmark and is now assessed as part of the Commission’s regular monitoring of Member States’ fiscal positions. 
Hkrati je bil koncept dovolj hitrega zmanjševanja dolga uveljavljen z referenčnim merilom za zmanjšanje dolga in se zdaj ocenjuje kot del rednega spremljanja fiskalnega stanja držav članic s strani Komisije.
VIII The Commission is committed to equal treatment of Member States. 
VIII Komisija je zavezana enakemu obravnavanju držav članic.
Where shortcomings in this respect have been identified, the Commission has taken action to ensure the consistent application of rules and will continue to do so. 
Kjer so bile ugotovljene pomanjkljivosti v zvezi s tem, je Komisija ukrepala za zagotovitev dosledne uporabe pravil in bo tako ravnala tudi v prihodnje.
The Commission has greatly improved transparency since 2005. 
Komisija je od leta 2005 zelo izboljšala preglednost.
In the field of EDP data and methodological ques‐ tions, the Commission is publishing all mission reports, bilateral advice given to Member States and other relevant information. 
Komisija na področju podatkov in metodoloških vprašanj glede postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem objavlja vsa poročila o misijah, dvostransko svetovanje državam članicam in druge zadevne informacije.
While the Commission acknowledges that there has been a lack of transparency regarding the fiscal surveillance process until a number of years ago, the Commission stresses that these shortcomings have been decisively tackled in recent years through the actions mentioned above (see Commission’s reply to paragraph VI), including the provi‐ sion of more detailed information as well as the advance codification of the key concepts and methodologies. 
Komisija sicer priznava, da je bila preglednost v zvezi s postopkom fiskalnega nadzora še pred nekaj leti pomanjkljiva, vendar poudarja, da so v zadnjih letih odločno začeli reševati te pomanjkljivosti z zgoraj navedenimi ukrepi (glej odgovor Komisije na točko VI), vključno z zagotavljanjem podrobnejših informacij ter predhodno kodifikacijo ključnih konceptov in metodologij.
IX (a) The Commission accepts similar (while not exactly the same) recommendations made in the ‘Conclusions and rec‐ ommendations’ section of the report (recommendations 1 to 4). 
IX (a) Komisija sprejema podobna (čeprav ne povsem enaka) priporočila iz oddelka poročila „Zaključki in priporočila“ (priporočila od 1 do 4).
IX (a) (i) The Commission considers the current quality assessment procedures appropriate. 
IX (a) (i) Komisija meni, da so sedanji postopki ocenjevanja kakovosti ustrezni.
It will continue to endeavour to better document this work. 
Še naprej si bo prizadevala za boljše dokumentiranje tega dela.
IX (a) (ii) The Commission considers that control systems are assessed in the dialogue visits and in specific questionnaires. 
IX (a) (ii) Komisija meni, da so kontrolni sistemi ocenjeni v okviru obiskov za dialog in posebnih vprašalnikov.
IX (a) (iii) The Commissions considers that the on‐spot verifications are effective (fit for purpose) and would like to recall that extensive verification is also done in‐house. 
IX (a) (iii) Komisija meni, da so preverjanja na kraju samem učinkovita (ustrezajo namenu), in želi opozoriti, da se obsežno preverjanje opravlja tudi interno.
This recommendation would not be neutral in terms of resources. 
To priporočilo ne bi bilo nevtralno, kar zadeva sredstva.
IX (b) (i) The Commission only partially accepts the recommendation. 
IX (b) (i) Komisija samo delno sprejema priporočilo.
Due to the significant and effective achievements in recent years in codifying concepts and methodologies used in the assessment of compliance with the EDP and in making available to the Member States all the calculations underpinning its assessments, transparency has already been improved. 
Preglednost je bila že izboljšana zaradi znatnih in učinkovitih dosežkov v zadnjih letih pri kodifikaciji konceptov in metodologij, ki se uporabljajo pri ocenjevanju skladnosti s postopkom v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, ter z dajanjem vseh izračunov, ki so podlaga za ocene, na voljo državam članicam.
The process of independent verification will be strengthened by the recently set up European Fiscal Board as a functionally independent body comprised of five experts, tasked with assessing horizontal consistency of the decisions and implementation of budgetary surveillance. 
Postopek neodvisnega preverjanja bo okrepljen z nedavno ustanovljenim Evropskim fiskalnim odborom kot funkcionalno neodvisnim telesom, ki ga sestavlja pet strokovnjakov, katerih naloga je oceniti horizontalno skladnost odločitev in izvajanja proračunskega nadzora.
Reply of the Commission 106 IX (b) (ii) The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
Odgovori Komisije 106 IX (b) (ii) Komisija sprejema to priporočilo.
As per the Commission’s reply to paragraph VII, since the 2011 reform of the legislation known as ‘the Six‐pack’, there has been a much greater operational focus upon debt levels. 
Kot pri odgovoru Komisije na točko VII, od reforme zakonodaje iz leta 2011, znane kot „šesterček“, obstaja veliko večja operativna osredotočenost na ravni dolga.
In effect, the breach of the debt threshold of 60% has been elevated to the trigger of the EDP. 
V resnici se je kršitev praga dolga v višini 60 % stopnjevala do ravni, ki pomeni sprožitev postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
Concretely, the Com‐ mission has opened a debt‐based (and deficit‐based) EDP for Malta in 2013, which has successfully exited the proce‐ dure in 2015. 
Konkretno je Komisija leta 2013 začela postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem na podlagi dolga (in na podlagi primanjkljaja) za Malto, ki je iz postopka uspešno izstopila leta 2015.
IX (b) (iii) The Commission partially accepts the recommendation. 
IX (b) (iii) Komisija delno sprejema to priporočilo.
As per reply to paragraph VII, the implementation of struc‐ tural reforms, including those undertaken under an Economic Partnership Programme (EPP), is monitored in the context of the European Semester, including under the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. 
Kot pri odgovoru na točko VII, se izvajanje strukturnih reform, vključno s tistimi v okviru programa ekonomskega partnerstva (EPP), spremlja v okviru evropskega semestra, tudi v okviru postopka v zvezi z makroekonomskim neravnotežjem.
However, Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of 21 May 2013 does not foresee specific steps in cases where the implementation of structural reforms falls short of what is recommended in the analysis of the EPP. 
Vendar člen 9 Uredbe (EU) št. 473/2013 z dne 21. maja 2013 ne predvideva posebnih korakov, kadar z izvajanjem strukturnih reform niso izpolnjena priporočila iz analize programa ekonomskega partnerstva.
The Commission considers that it already operates to the full extent of the powers available to it under the legislation. 
Komisija meni, da že zdaj v celoti izvaja vsa pooblastila, ki so ji dodeljena v skladu z zakonodajo.
IX (b) (iv) The Commission partially accepts the recommendation on its obligations relating to Member States’ reporting as the use of the infringement procedure should be assessed against the requirements of the EDP. 
IX (b) (iv) Komisija delno sprejema priporočilo glede obveznosti v zvezi s poročanjem držav članic, saj bi bilo treba uporabo postopka za ugotavljanje kršitev oceniti glede na zahteve v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
IX (b) (v) The Commission does not accept the recommendation as the stepping‐up of the EDP and the imposition of sanc‐ tions are governed by clear legal rules and processes which the Commission is bound to follow. 
IX (b) (v) Komisija tega priporočila ne sprejema, saj za strožji postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem in uvedbo sankcij veljajo jasna pravna pravila in postopki, ki jih mora Komisija upoštevati.
The Commission will continue to recommend the Council to impose sanctions where appropriate in line with the legislation. 
Komisija bo Svetu še naprej priporočala uvedbo sankcij, kjer je to ustrezno v skladu z zakonodajo.
Introduction 10 The description of Eurostat’s assessments is in fact more complex. 
Uvod 10 Opis ocen Eurostata je dejansko kompleksnejši.
Eurostat’s assessments also include other tools/ steps, such as internal consistency/plausibility checks (both within EDP data and between EDP and GFS data), checks of the quarterly data, etc. 16 The Council sets annual fiscal targets for multi‐annual EDPs, while the Commission may make recommendations in that regard. 
Ocene Eurostata vključujejo tudi druga orodja/korake, kot so preverjanja notranje usklajenosti/verodostojnosti (tako znotraj podatkov v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem kot tudi med temi podatki in podatki o statistiki državnih financ), preverjanja četrtletnih podatkov itd. 16 Svet določa letne fiskalne cilje za večletne postopke v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, medtem ko lahko Komisija v zvezi s tem daje priporočila.
In terms of structural fiscal measures, the Six‐Pack and Two‐Pack include specific requirements on medium‐term fiscal planning. 
V zvezi s strukturnimi fiskalnimi ukrepi šesterček in dvojček vključujeta posebne zahteve glede srednjeročnega fiskalnega načrtovanja.
In particular, the Directive on Budgetary Frameworks (part of the Six‐Pack) lays out (in chapter V) requirements on Medium‐Term Budgetary Frameworks, including procedures for setting multi‐annual objectives for fiscal aggregates, medium‐term policy projections, and assessment of long‐term impacts, while ensuring consistency between annual budgets and multi‐annual figures. 
Zlasti direktiva o proračunskih okvirih (del šesterčka) (v poglavju V) določa zahteve glede srednjeročnih proračunskih okvirov, vključno s postopki za določanje večletnih ciljev za fiskalne agregate, projekcij srednjeročne politike in ocenjevanja dolgoročnih učinkov, hkrati pa zagotavlja usklajenost med letnimi proračuni in večletnimi zneski.
The Two‐Pack also calls for the presenta‐ tion of national medium‐term fiscal plans based on independent forecasts. 
Dvojček poziva tudi k predstavitvi nacionalnih srednjeročnih fiskalnih načrtov na podlagi neodvisnih napovedi.
Reply of the Commission 107 20 The Commission notes that Member States have an obligation to report also on the measures planned and/or adopted and on developments in their fiscal and economic situation. 
Odgovori Komisije 107 20 Komisija opozarja, da morajo države članice poročati tudi o načrtovanih in/ali sprejetih ukrepih ter o razvoju njihovega fiskalnega in gospodarskega stanja.
Observations Reply to the heading above paragraph 32 The framework has undergone several changes in recent years with a view to improving the quality of the EDP data, introducing complementary rules, strengthening compliance mechanisms and raising national ownership. 
Opažanja Odgovor na naslov pred točko 32 V zadnjih letih je bil okvir večkrat spremenjen, da bi se izboljšala kakovost podatkov v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, uvedla dopolnilna pravila, okrepili mehanizmi skladnosti in povečala nacionalna odgovornost.
The budgetary surveillance system in the EU has become thus more complex. 
Sistem proračunskega nadzora v EU je tako postal bolj kompleksen.
This complexity has arisen partly from a desire to better capture the economic reality. 
Ta kompleksnost je deloma nastala zaradi želje po boljšem upoštevanju gospodarskega stanja.
The legislative changes introduced had to be technically operationalised. To this end, the methodologies and clas‐ sifications utilised in assessing compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) had to be adapted. 
Uvedene zakonodajne spremembe je bilo treba tehnično uveljaviti. Za ta namen je bilo treba prilagoditi metodologije in razvrstitve, ki se uporabljajo pri ocenjevanju skladnosti s Paktom za stabilnost in rast (SGP).
Reply of the Commission 108 35 The Commission would like to point out that all relevant documents, including the Code of Conduct and the Vade mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact and the Code of Conduct, as well as other relevant explanatory documents on the functioning of the Stability and Growth Pact are available on the DG ECFIN website http://ec.europa.eu/ economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/legal_texts/index_en.htm. 
Odgovori Komisije 108 35 Komisija želi opozoriti, da so vsi zadevni dokumenti, vključno s Kodeksom ravnanja in Vademekumom o paktu za stabilnost in rast ter drugimi zadevnimi obrazložitvenimi dokumenti o delovanju Pakta za stabilnost in rast, na voljo na spletni strani GD ECFIN http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/legal_texts/ index_en.htm.
41 The Commission points out that the process is already fully transparent vis‐a‐vis all concerned Member States. 
41 Komisija poudarja, da je postopek že zdaj v celoti pregleden v odnosu do vseh zadevnih držav članic.
The Commission services provide the necessary details on forecasting assumptions. 
Službe Komisije zagotavljajo potrebne podrobne podatke o predpostavkah pri napovedih.
42 While the documentation, notably including the country desks assumptions (to be distinguished from the common external assumptions mentioned above) is undoubtedly complex, it has significantly improved in recent years and complies with good practices. 
42 Čeprav je dokumentacija, ki vključuje zlasti predpostavke skupin, zadolženih za posamezne države (ki se razlikujejo od zgoraj navedenih skupnih zunanjih predpostavk), nedvomno kompleksna, se je v zadnjih letih znatno izboljšala in je skladna z dobrimi praksami.
45 The Commission underlines that the assumptions underlying the forecasts are described in the Position Paper that is produced at the beginning of each forecast round. 
45 Komisija poudarja, da so predpostavke, na podlagi katerih so pripravljene napovedi, opisane v dokumentu o stališču, ki se pripravi na začetku vsakega kroga napovedi.
The assumptions are then updated ahead of each subsequent forecast storage, and they are published in each forecast. 
Predpostavke se nato posodobijo pred vsakim poznejšim shranjevanjem napovedi in objavijo v vsaki napovedi.
Several meetings during the preparation of the Commis‐ sion’s regular forecasts bring together country desk officers, experts from horizontal units and top management. 
Med pripravo rednih napovedi Komisije se večkrat skupaj sestanejo nacionalni referenti, strokovnjaki iz horizontalnih enot in višje vodstvo.
The discussion of the assumptions underlying the forecasts is a key part of these meetings. 
Glavni del teh sestankov je razprava o predpostavkah, ki so podlaga za napovedi.
48 Eurostat considers that the quality assessments are done in a consistent manner. 
48 Eurostat meni, da se ocenjevanje kakovosti izvaja dosledno.
The in‐house verification is under‐ pinned by ESA 2010 and the Manual on Government Deficit and Debt. 
Interno preverjanje je podprto z ESR 2010 in Priročnikom o javnofinančnem primanjkljaju in dolgu.
Moreover, the consistency of Eurostat’s assessments is ensured by explicit and highly centralised internal proce‐ dures. 
Poleg tega je doslednost ocen Eurostata zagotovljena z jasnimi in zelo centraliziranimi notranjimi postopki.
This includes procedures for analysing and deciding on methodological issues, including in‐house methodo‐ logical meetings, official advice, or findings from EDP visit. 
To vključuje postopke za analizo metodoloških vprašanj in odločanje o njih, vključno z internimi metodološkimi sejami, uradnimi nasveti ali ugotovitvami z obiska v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
Box 2 – First indent The Commission is always and systematically basing its assessment on evidence. 
Okvir 2, prva alinea Komisija svoje ocene vedno in sistematično utemelji z dokazi.
This can take various forms, like full documentation on the particular issue provided by Member States, discussions during the dialogue visits and fur‐ ther explanations in the regular and continuous exchanges with Member States. 
Ti so lahko v različnih oblikah, kot so celovita dokumentacija o določenem vprašanju, ki jo zagotovijo države članice, razprave med obiski za dialog ter nadaljnje obrazložitve v okviru rednih in stalnih izmenjav mnenj med državami članicami.
Overall, classification issues are clarified in comprehensive assessment process. 
Na splošno so vprašanja v zvezi z razvrščanjem pojasnjena v okviru postopka celovitega ocenjevanja.
Box 2 – Fourth indent Eurostat is not making systematic or detailed analysis of the bridge tables for the purpose of EDP. 
Okvir 2, četrta alinea Eurostat ne analizira sistematično ali podrobno premostitvenih preglednic za namene postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
The bridge tables detail all GFS transactions reported in the ESA transmission programme and are generally not relevant for EDP data. 
Premostitvene preglednice vsebujejo vse prenose statistike državnih financ, o katerih se je poročalo v okviru programa za posredovanje po Evropskem sistemu računov, in na splošno niso pomembne za podatke v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
Where it is important, Eurostat may look at a bridge table for clarification. 
Kjer je to pomembno, lahko Eurostat poišče pojasnilo v pre-mostitveni preglednici.
Reply of the Commission 109 49 The Commission does receive mandatory data, which it considers necessary for the purpose of its quality assess‐ ment. 
Odgovori Komisije 109 49 Komisija prejema obvezne podatke, za katere meni, da so potrebni za oceno kakovosti.
For technical reasons, data in EDP tables may not be fully complete, which is usually justified by the data sources and collection system in the specific country, described in the EDP inventory. 
Iz tehničnih razlogov podatki v preglednicah v okviru postopkov v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem morda niso povsem popolni, kar je običajno utemeljeno z viri podatkov in sistemom zbiranja v konkretni državi, opisanimi v evidenci virov in metod za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
For example, in the spring notification data on the year n‐1 is reported for the first time, but not all data sources might be available at that time, making estimates necessary. 
Podatki iz pomladanskega obvestila za leto n–1 so se na primer sporočali prvič, vendar takrat morda niso na voljo vsi viri podatkov, zaradi česar so potrebne ocene.
50 The Commission consistently applies the rules and guidelines across Member States. 
50 Komisija dosledno uporablja pravila in smernice za vse države članice.
The Commission underlines that the delimitation of general government is enshrined in the legal framework. 
Poudarja, da je razmejitev sektorja država določena v pravnem okviru.
ESA, underpinned by the MGDD, specifies the criteria for sector classification, including a very detailed decision tree (which is consistently applied). 
ESR, podprt s Priročnikom o javnofinančnem primanjkljaju in dolgu (MGDD), določa merila za razvrstitev sektorjev, vključno z zelo podrobnim drevesom odločanja (ki se dosledno uporablja).