natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The donors contributing to the JFA for AUC PSD staff salaries during 2015-2016 were the EU, UK, Sweden, Norway, Germany and Netherlands. 
Donatorji, ki so v okviru dogovora o skupnem financiranju prispevali za kritje plač osebja iz oddelka za mir in varnost Komisije Afriške unije v obdobju 2015–2016, so bili EU, Združeno kraljestvo, Švedska, Norveška, Nemčija in Nizozemska.
To ensure that these funds were used efficiently, the AU Commission and its partners regularly discussed the posts to be financed under this arrangement during bi-annual Steering Committee meetings. 
Za zagotovitev učinkovite porabe sredstev Komisija Afriške unije in njeni partnerji na sestankih usmerjevalnega odbora, ki poteka dvakrat letno, redno razpravljajo o delovnih mestih, ki naj bi se financirala v okviru tega dogovora.
Figure 6 - Source of funding for AU Commission Peace and Security Department posts 24 Distribution of staff posts by office / unit JFA AU Regular Budget Total General Service Professional General Service Professional Office of the Commissioner 2 2 1 2 7 Office of the Director including AU LOs to RECs/RMs 9 10 3 1 23 Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division 6 15 7 6 34 Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Division 4 8 1 18 31 Peace Support Operations Division 3 32 6 12 53 Defence and Security Division 2 6 1 3 12 PSC Secretariat 2 6 1 2 11 Project Management Team 2 9 1 2 14 Peace and Security Finance Division 10 14 - - 24 Other (Registry, HR, Internal Audit, etc.) 
Kratkoročna (dogovor o skupnemfinanciranju) 137 35 172 12 mest v postopku zaposlovanja Napotitev 12 12 Ocena iz marca 2017 Skupaj 174 77 251 44 45 Slika 6 – Viri financiranja za delovna mesta v oddelku za mir in varnost Komisije Afriške unije 25 Razporeditev osebja po uradih/enotah Dogovor o skupnem financiranju Redni proračun Afriške unije Skupaj splošne storitve strokovne storitve splošne storitve strokovne storitve Urad komisarja 2 2 1 2 7 Urad direktorja, vključno z uradi Afriške unije za zvezo za regionalne ekonomske skupnosti / regionalne mehanizme 9 10 3 1 23 Oddelek za preprečevanje konfliktov in zgodnje opozarjanje 6 15 7 6 34 Oddelek za krizno upravljanje in obnovo po konfliktih 4 8 1 18 31 Oddelek za mirovne operacije 3 32 6 12 53 Oddelek za obrambo in varnost 2 6 1 3 12 Sekretariat mirovnega in varnostnega sveta 2 6 1 2 11 Ekipa za vodenje projektov 2 9 1 2 14 Oddelek za financiranje miru in varnosti 10 14 – – 24 Drugo (register, kadrovske zadeve, notranja revizija itd.)
20 10 N/A - cross-departmental Total 60 112 21 46 239 Source: Minutes of the 11th Steering Committee meeting on the Joint Financing Arrangement for support to the employment of AUC personnel working in the Peace and Security Programme, April 2017, and PSD staff overview, July 2016. 41. 
20 10 Ni relevantno – medresorsko Skupaj 60 112 21 46 239 Vir: zapisnik 11. sestanka usmerjevalnega odbora za dogovor o skupnem financiranju za podporo zaposlovanja osebja Komisije Afriške unije, ki dela na področju mirovnega in varnostnega programa, iz aprila 2017, in pregled osebja oddelka za mir in varnost iz julija 2016 41.
The EU and other donors also channel money jointly through the AU Commission to support a network of AU Liaison Offices operating in 14 conflict and post-conflict countries in Africa. 
EU in drugi donatorji skupaj usmerjajo sredstva tudi prek Komisije Afriške unije in z njimi podpirajo mrežo uradov Afriške unije za zvezo, ki delujejo v 14 afriških državah, ki so še ali so bile vpletene v konflikte.
The yearly EU contribution to funding the AU Liaison Offices amounts to approximately Ű3.5 million (around 25 % of the annual budget). 
Letni prispevek EU k financiranju uradov Afriške unije za zvezo znaša približno 3,5 milijona EUR (približno 25 % letnega proračuna).
The network has around 200 members of staff, of which the ratio of support to operational staff is high (about 70:30). 
Mreža ima približno 200 zaposlenih, pri čemer je delež podpore za operativno osebje visok (približno 70: 30).
The PSC sets the mandates of the Liaison Offices, which range from monitoring emerging crises, preventative diplomacy and crisis management to post-conflict reconstruction. 
Mirovni in varnostni svet določa naloge uradov za zvezo, ki segajo od spremljanja nastajajočih kriz, preventivne diplomacije in kriznega upravljanja do obnove po konfliktih.
The offices represent the AU on the ground and have a primarily political role46. 42. 
Uradi zastopajo Afriško unijo na terenu in imajo predvsem politično vlogo.46 42.
A recent EU-financed evaluation47, pointed to the AU Liaison OfficesŐ constructive and significant role in crisis situations in Mali, the Central African Republic, Sudan, South Sudan, the Comoros, Guinea Bissau and Madagascar. 
V nedavni oceni47, ki jo je financirala EU, je bila poudarjena konstruktivna in bistvena vloga uradov za zvezo v kriznih razmerah v Maliju, Srednjeafriški republiki, Sudanu, Južnem Sudanu, na Komorih, v Gvineji Bissau in na Madagaskarju.
However, it also noted that insufficient funds and staffing problems led to operational inefficiencies. The evaluation found that the Liaison OfficesŐ impact had been ŇmixedÓ, but that their work had made Ňa reasonable contribution The role and activities are described in project documents for the JFA AU Liaison Offices and AU Commission Joint Narrative Reports. 
Ugotovljeno je bilo tudi, da je bil učinek uradov za zvezo mešan, vendar je njihovo delo primerno prispevalo k miru in varnosti. Podobno je bilo v nedavnem poročilu Svetovne Vloga in dejavnosti so opisane v projektni dokumentaciji za urade Afriške unije za zvezo, ki spadajo v okvir dogovora o skupnem financiranju, in v skupnih opisnih poročilih Komisije Afriške unije.
Mid-term evaluation, ŇSustaining and strengthening African UnionŐs Liaison Offices in post-conflict countriesÓ, African Union, January 2017. 
Vmesna ocena, Sustaining and strengthening African Union’s Liaison Offices in post-conflict countries, Afriška unija, januar 2017.
The PSC Protocol set up the Panel of the Wise as an advisory organ made up of five respected African personalities. 
S protokolom mirovnega in varnostnega sveta je bila ustanovljena skupina modrih kot svetovalni organ, sestavljen iz petih spoštovanih afriških osebnosti.
Its role is to work towards conflict prevention, which it carried out, for example by convening workshops and high-level retreats. 
Njena naloga je, da si prizadeva za preprečevanje konfliktov, na primer z organizacijo delavnic in srečanj na visoki ravni.
The PanelŐs role has expanded to include pre-election missions and mediation work49. Despite an increasing workload, the PanelŐs resources have not increased. 
Njena vloga je bila razširjena tudi na misije pred volitvami in mediacijo.49 Kljub vse večji delovni obremenitvi skupine se njeni viri niso povečali.
For example, the PanelŐs secretariat has only one political analyst, whose salary is supported by the EU under the JFA. 
Tako ima na primer sekretariat te skupine le enega političnega analitika, katerega plačo financira EU v okviru dogovora o skupnem financiranju.
The Panel has also encountered coordination issues with the PSC and other bodies tasked with conflict prevention and resolution. 
Poleg tega ima skupina težave pri usklajevanju z mirovnim in varnostnim svetom ter drugimi organi, ki delujejo na področju preprečevanja in reševanja konfliktov.
Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) 44. 
Celinski sistem zgodnjega opozarjanja 44.
The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is a system for collecting and analysing data in order to anticipate and prevent conflicts. 
Celinski sistem zgodnjega opozarjanja je sistem za zbiranje in analizo podatkov, namenjenih predvidevanju in preprečevanju konfliktov.
The EU contributed technical and financial support towards setting it up and continues to finance operating costs under the JFA Salaries and APSA Support Programme contracts we audited (Annex IV). 
EU je prispevala tehnično in finančno podporo za njegovo vzpostavitev, še naprej pa financira tudi operativne stroške v okviru dogovora o skupnem financiranju za plače in pogodb programa podpore za Afriško strukturo za mir in varnost (Priloga IV).
For example according to the final report for the JFA Salaries II contract (covering 1.4.2013 Đ 1.7.2015), the Panel of the Wise then carried out nine missions to countries preparing for elections as well as six mediation, preventive mediation and Ňgood officesÓ engagements. 
Na primer, glede na končno poročilo o pogodbi za plače II v okviru dogovora o skupnem financiranju (za obdobje od 1.4.2013 do 1.7.2015) je skupina modrih opravila devet misij v državah, ki so se pripravljale na volitve, ter šest mediacij, preventivnih mediacij in posredovanj.
One of the members of the panel undertook good offices missions to the DRC during 2015 and 2016. 
Eden od članov skupine je opravil misije zaradi posredovanja v Demokratični republiki Kongo v letih 2015 in 2016.
26 (a) The APSA roadmap points to the need to address the varying levels of functionality of the regional early warning systems, as well as to improve the connections between central, regional and national systems51. (b) The Peace and Security Council has highlighted Ňa persistent gap between early warning and early responseÓ52, and concluded that AU member states often pay no attention to early warning signals of future crises, thereby undermining the CouncilŐs conflict-prevention capacity, often leading to conflicts53. African Standby Force 46. 
27 napredek pri sodelovanju med podregionalnimi organizacijami in Afriško unijo na področju zgodnjega opozarjanja.50 Vendar pa nekateri dejavniki omejujejo uspešnost sistema. (a) V strateškem načrtu Afriške strukture za mir in varnost je poudarjeno, da je treba obravnavati različne ravni funkcionalnosti regionalnih sistemov zgodnjega opozarjanja ter izboljšati povezave med osrednjimi, regionalnimi in nacionalnimi sistemi.51 (b) Mirovni in varnostni svet je poudaril, da še vedno obstaja vrzel med zgodnjim opozarjanjem in zgodnjim odzivanjem52, ter ugotovil, da države članice Afriške unije pogosto ne upoštevajo zgodnjih opozorilnih znakov za prihodnje krize, s čimer spodkopavajo zmogljivost sveta za preprečevanje konfliktov, kar pogosto vodi v konflikte.53 Afriške sile v pripravljenosti 46.
It includes military, police and civilian units54. EU support funded improvements to the capacity of the African Standby Force and its regional components under the African Peace Facility and the RIPs. 
Vključujejo vojaške, policijske in civilne enote.54 S podporo EU se je financiralo izboljšanje zmogljivosti afriških sil v pripravljenosti in njihovih regionalnih komponent v okviru mirovne pomoči za Afriko in regionalnih okvirnih programov.
Support covered staff costs and operational activities (improving planning, logistics, and policy development and strengthening the police and civilian components) as well as the procurement of IT infrastructure (C3IS) (Annex IV for the list of contracts). 
Podpora je zajemala stroške osebja in operativnih dejavnosti (izboljšanje načrtovanja, logistika, razvoj politike ter krepitev policijske in civilne komponente) ter javno naročilo za infrastrukturo IT (C3IS) (za seznam pogodb glej Prilogo IV).
The EU also funded training to the stand-by forces, including support for field exercises (AMANI AFRICA II Support Programme). 47. 
EU je financirala tudi usposabljanje sil v pripravljenosti, vključno s podporo terenskim vajam (program podpore AMANI AFRICA II).
51 52 601st PSC meeting (30 May 2016) Press Statement, www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-601st-psc-54 
Izjava za javnost s 601. sestanka mirovnega in varnostnega sveta (30. maj 2016), www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-601st-psc-meeting-on-early-warning-30-may-2016.pdf.
Threats to the sustainability of results 48. 
Tveganja za trajnost rezultatov 48.
The main risks to the sustainability of the results achieved in building the APSAŐs capacity are rooted in the weak financial, institutional and operational capacity of the AU and SROs, and in the lack of political commitment by a number of AU member states (paragraph 34). 
Glavna tveganja za trajnost rezultatov, doseženih pri krepitvi zmogljivosti Afriške strukture za mir in varnost, izhajajo iz šibke finančne, institucionalne in operativne zmogljivosti Afriške unije in podregionalnih organizacij ter iz pomanjkanja politične zavezanosti več držav članic Afriške unije (odstavek 34).
Reforms planned with the aim of addressing weaknesses in the institutional frameworks of the AU Commission55, ECOWAS56 and ECCAS57 have yielded few results to date. 
Načrtovane reforme, namenjene obravnavanju slabosti v institucionalnih okvirih Komisije Afriške unije55, Gospodarske skupnosti zahodnoafriških držav56 in Gospodarske skupnosti srednjeafriških držav57, so doslej prinesle malo rezultatov.
Technical assistance experts have often acted as project managers, providing a Ňshort-term Decision on the Institutional Reform of the African Union, July 2016, Ref. 
Komisija EU je spodbujala in Decision on the Institutional Reform of the African Union, julij 2016, Ref.
Assembly/AU/Dec.606 (XXVII), followed by the Report on the Proposed Recommendations for the Institutional Reform of the African Union, by H.E. Paul Kagame (29 January 2017). 
Assembly/AU/Dec.606 (XXVII), nato pe še Report on the Proposed Recommendations for the Institutional Reform of the African Union, H.E. Paul Kagame (29. januar 2017).
The audit lasted 2 years and produced three institutional reform options that were presented internally but neither the audit findings nor the recommendations were shared with the EU or the other donors. 
Na podlagi revizije, ki je trajala dve leti, so bile predložene tri možnosti za institucionalno reformo, ki so bile predstavljene interno, EU ali drugim donatorjem pa niso bile posredovane niti revizijske ugotovitve niti priporočila.
At the time of the audit, ECOWAS had not yet formally agreed on one institutional reform option. 
V času revizije, ki jo je opravilo Sodišče, se Gospodarska skupnost zahodnoafriških držav še ni formalno dogovorila za eno od možnih institucionalnih reform.
The institutional audit led to a freeze in recruitment which resulted in over-centralisation and bottlenecks, complicating many ongoing initiatives and funding. 
Zaradi notranje revizije institucije je prišlo do zamrznitve zaposlovanja, kar je privedlo do pretirane centralizacije in ozkih grl, ki otežujejo številne obstoječe pobude in financiranje.
For ECCAS, under the EDF RIP-funded programme, provision was made for a reform of the fundamental texts of the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa, but no result was achieved because of a lack of political will among ECCAS member states. The activity is scheduled again for the current EDF programme. 55 56 57 
Za Gospodarsko skupnost srednjeafriških držav je bila kot del programa, financiranega v okviru regionalnega okvirnega programa Evropskega razvojnega sklada, predvidena reforma temeljnih besedil Mirovnega in varnostnega sveta v Srednjeafriški republiki, kar pa zaradi pomanjkanja politične volje med državami članicami Gospodarske skupnosti srednjeafriških držav ni dalo 55 56 57
28 fixÓ to the internal weaknesses of the implementing organisations. 
Strokovnjaki za tehnično pomoč so pogosto delovali kot vodje projektov, ki zagotavljajo kratkoročno rešitev za notranje slabosti v izvajalskih organizacijah.
The cost of doing so has often been very significant: for example, the amount of the ECOWAS Peace, Security and Stability grant provided by the EU was Ű6.7 million, while the cost of technical assistance for implementing the grant was a further Ű4.9 million: 73 % of the initial grant. 
Stroški so bili pogosto precejšnji: na primer, znesek nepovratnih sredstev za mir, varnost in stabilnost v okviru Gospodarske skupnosti zahodnoafriških držav, ki jih je zagotovila EU, je znašal 6,7 milijona EUR, stroški tehnične pomoči za izvrševanje nepovratnih sredstev pa nadaljnjih 4,9 milijona EUR, kar je 73 % prvotnega zneska nepovratnih sredstev.
The implementation of EU support was affected by delays, incoherent use of financing instruments and insufficient information on results achieved 51. 
Na izvrševanje podpore EU so vplivali zamude, nedosledna uporaba instrumentov financiranja in nezadostne informacije o doseženih rezultatih 51.
In this section, we examine whether the Commission provided EU support to the APSA in a timely, predictable and coherent manner and whether the contracts we audited were implemented as planned. 
V tem delu je preučeno, ali je Komisija podporo EU za Afriško strukturo za mir in varnost zagotovila na pravočasen, predvidljiv in usklajen način ter ali so bile pogodbe, ki jih je revidiralo Sodišče, izvedene skladno z načrti.
We assess the monitoring and reporting mechanisms put in place by the Commission, and ask whether they provided adequate information on results achieved. 
Sodišče ocenjuje mehanizme za spremljanje in poročanje, ki jih je vzpostavila Komisija, ter skuša odgovoriti na vprašanje, ali so bile s temi mehanizmi zagotovljene ustrezne informacije o doseženih rezultatih.
Delays in contracting and retroactive financing impaired the implementation of planned activities 52. The beneficiaries of the contracts we audited were the AU and SROs. 
Zamude pri sklepanju pogodb in retroaktivno financiranje so ovirali izvajanje načrtovanih dejavnosti 52.
The aim of the support was to finance and train staff to carry out complex peace and security tasks, and ensure that activities were implemented in a coherent way across the continent. 
Dejavnost je ponovno načrtovana, in sicer v okviru sedanjega programa Evropskega razvojnega sklada. 30 mirovnih in varnostnih nalog ter zagotoviti, da se dejavnosti izvajajo na usklajen način po vsej celini.
The contracts, listed at Annex IV, sought to: (a) strengthen the HR capacity of the AU Commission and the sub-regional organisations (the RECs and the RMs) to prevent and/or respond to crises in Africa; (b) help the AU Liaison Offices to monitor the implementation of peace agreements, support the preparation and monitoring of elections, and to represent the AU in meetings with national bodies and international organisations; (c) put in place a continental structure enabling the AU to rapidly deploy strategic and operational communication, command and control capabilities between the AU in Addis Ababa, the regional level and the missions in the field; (d) provide the AU Commission and SROs with expertise for their peace and security initiatives; 
S pogodbami, naštetimi v Prilogi IV, se je skušalo: (a) okrepiti kadrovske zmogljivosti Komisije Afriške unije in podregionalnih organizacij (regionalnih gospodarskih skupnosti in regionalnih mehanizmov) za preprečevanje kriz v Afriki in/ali odzivanje nanje; (b) pomagati uradom Afriške unije za zvezo pri spremljanju izvajanja mirovnih sporazumov, podpirati pripravo na volitve in njihovo spremljanje ter zastopati Afriško unijo na sestankih z nacionalnimi organi in mednarodnimi organizacijami; (c) vzpostaviti celinsko strukturo, ki bo omogočala, da Afriška unija hitro vzpostavi zmogljivosti za strateško in operativno komuniciranje, poveljevanje in nadzor med Afriško unijo v Adis Abebi, regionalno ravnjo in misijami na terenu; (d) Komisiji Afriške unije in podregionalnim organizacijam zagotoviti strokovno znanje za njihove mirovne in varnostne pobude; (e) podpirati podregionalne organizacije pri krepitvi njihovih zmogljivosti in izvajanju njihovih nalog preprečevanja in reševanja konfliktov.
Timeliness and predictability are essential if institutional support is to have expected results. 
Za dosego pričakovanih rezultatov institucionalne podpore sta bistveni pravočasnost in predvidljivost.
The failure to conclude contracts on time led to implementation delays and meant that financing of activities was not predictable. 
To je tudi pomenilo, da financiranje dejavnosti ni bilo predvidljivo.
Ten out of the fourteen contracts we audited were signed late for one or a combination of the following reasons: (a) the AU Commission and the SROs submitted late or low-quality financing proposals; (b) complicated negotiations concerning contract budgets, activities and financial management; (c) technical problems with the EU CommissionŐs information system. 
Deset od 14 pogodb, ki jih je revidiralo Sodišče, je bilo sklenjenih z zamudo iz enega od naslednjih razlogov ali njihove kombinacije: (a) Komisija Afriške unije in podregionalne organizacije so predloge za financiranje predložile z zamudo ali pa so bili ti slabi; (b) pogajanja o proračunih, dejavnostih in finančnem poslovodenju v zvezi s pogodbami so bila zapletena; (c) obstajale so tehnične težave z informacijskim sistemov Komisije EU.
54. 
31 54.
In addition, eight of these ten contracts had financed activities retroactively58. Three of them were signed only days before the activities financed were due to be completed. 
Poleg tega so se v okviru osmih od teh desetih pogodb dejavnosti financirale retroaktivno.58 Tri od njih so bile sklenjene le nekaj dni pred tem, ko naj bi bile financirane dejavnosti zaključene.
We found that delays in signing contracts, combined with existing internal weaknesses in the AU and the SROs, had a negative impact on the implementation of activities for six out of the fourteen contracts (Annex IV). 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da so zamude pri sklepanju pogodb v povezavi z obstoječimi notranjimi slabostmi Afriške unije in podregionalnih organizacij negativno vplivale na izvajanje dejavnosti šestih od 14 pogodb (Priloga IV).
Box 5 presents the negative impact of contracting delays and of retroactive financing on two APSA Support Programmes. 
V okviru 5 je prikazan negativni učinek zamud pri sklepanju pogodb in retroaktivnega financiranje pri dveh programih podpore za Afriško strukturo za mir in varnost.
Box 5 -Retroactive financing of the APSA Support Programmes Through the APSA Support Programmes, the EU provides financial support to the AU Commission and to SROs to operate the APSA. 
Okvir 5 – Retroaktivno financiranje programov podpore za Afriško strukturo za mir in varnost EU v okviru programov podpore za Afriško strukturo za mir in varnost zagotavlja finančno podporo Komisiji Afriške unije in podregionalnim organizacijam za delovanje Strukture.
We audited the second and third of these contracts, amounting to Ű5 227 335 and Ű28 770 000, respectively. 
Sodišče je revidiralo drugo in tretjo od teh pogodb v vrednosti 5 227 335 EUR oziroma 28 770 000 EUR.
The contract was signed late, meaning many planned activities were not implemented, or had to be financed from other sources. 
Pogodba je bila sklenjena z zamudo, kar pomeni, da številne načrtovane dejavnosti niso bile izvedene ali da jih je bilo treba financirati iz drugih virov.
Despite the delayed receipt of funds, the SROs maintained most of the staff financed under this contract. 
Podregionalne organizacije so kljub zamudam pri prejemanju sredstev ohranile večino osebja, ki se je financiralo v okviru te pogodbe.
30 laid off, resulting in the loss of capacity which had been built up. 
Kljub temu pa so bili nekateri uslužbenci odpuščeni, kar je povzročilo izgubo dotlej ustvarjenih zmogljivosti.
As consequence, only 56 % of the contractŐs budget was consumed. 
Zaradi tega je bilo porabljenega samo 56 % proračuna pogodbe.
The third APSA Support Programme contract was only signed in December 2016, although the implementation period covered 36 months from January 2016. 
Tretja pogodba v okviru programa podpore za Afriško strukturo za mir in varnost je bila sklenjena šele decembra 2016, čeprav je obdobje izvajanja zajemalo 36 mesecev od januarja 2016.
The AU Commission did not pass on funds from the contract to the SROs until May 2017, due to their own contracting delays. 
Komisija Afriške unije je sredstva iz pogodbe prenesla na podregionalne organizacije šele maja 2017, in sicer zaradi njihovih zamud pri sklepanju pogodb.
The shortfall in funding was in some cases met by other donors, or resulted in the postponement of planned activities. 
Pomanjkanje finančnih sredstev so v nekaterih primerih reševali drugi donatorji, v drugih primerih pa so bile zaradi tega načrtovane dejavnosti odložene.