natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Programme documents had improved with time but still displayed shortcomings Improvements in the quality of programme documents 97 There were marked differences between programmes in terms of the analytical depth of programme documents. 
Programski dokumenti so se sčasoma izboljšali, vendar so še vedno obstajale pomanjkljivosti Izboljšanje kakovosti programskih dokumentov 97 Programi so se zelo razlikovali, kar se tiče analitične globine programskih dokumentov.
Many of these differences were due to the Commission’s improved analytical capacity. 
Veliko teh razlik je pripisati dejstvu, da so se analitične zmogljivosti Komisije izboljšale.
In the first three programmes, the programme documents provided limited information on a number of aspects, including the composition of the fiscal adjustment, analysis of slippages if deficit targets were not met and social impacts. 
Pri prvih treh programih so programski dokumenti vsebovali le omejene informacije glede vrste vidikov, vključno s sestavo fiskalnih prilagoditev, analizami odklonov, kadar cilji glede primanjkljaja niso bili izpolnjeni, in socialnimi učinki.
The analysis given in the two most recent sets of programme documents (Ireland and Portugal) had significantly improved (see Box 6) and was, in many respects, very thorough. 
Analiza, podana v dveh najnovejših sklopih programskih dokumentov (Irska in Portugalska), je bila bistveno boljša (glej okvir 6) in v mnogih pogledih zelo temeljita.
Part II — Processes were generally weak 44 Example of improved analysis in programme documents The initial programme documents for balance-of-payment programmes broadly characterised fiscal consolidation as mainly expenditure driven. 
Del II – Postopki so bili v glavnem šibki 44 Primer izboljšane analize v programskih dokumentih Prvotni programski dokumenti za plačilnobilančne programe so fiskalno konsolidacijo na splošno opredelje-vali kot proces, ki temelji v glavnem na odhodkih.
However, details of the necessary budget measures were fragmentary (Hungary), no such measures were identified at all (Romania) or, if they were identified, there was no estimate of how much they would bring in (Latvia). 
Toda podrobnosti potrebnih proračunskih ukrepov so bile razdrobljene (Madžarska) ali takšni ukrepi sploh niso bili opredeljeni (Romunija), če pa so bili opredeljeni, pa ni bilo ocenjeno, koliko sredstev naj bi prinesli (Latvija).
For the same three countries, the Commission subsequently improved the level of detail in the programme documents by listing and quantifying which measures had been agreed to achieve the deficit targets. 
Za navedene tri države je Komisija pozneje izboljšala raven podrobnosti v programskih dokumentih, tako da je navedla in količinsko opredelila dogovorjene ukrepe za doseganje ciljev glede primanjkljaja.
And in the remaining programmes (Ireland and Portugal) even more detail was the norm. 
Preostala programa (Irska in Portugalska) sta bila še bolj podrobna.
98 In some cases, we found that essential information had been omitted from the programme documents. 
98 V nekaterih primerih je Sodišče ugotovilo, da programski dokumenti niso vsebovali bistvenih informacij.
For instance, the Commission did not always communicate key assumptions underlying the calculation of the financing gap. (i) In the Hungarian programme, the Commission did not communicate details supporting the estimate of 20 billion euro to be provided to Hungary over the programme period. (ii) In the Irish programme, the financing gap calculation used in the initial programme documents gave a cumulative accruals-based European System of Accounts (ESA) deficit of 44 billion euro over the programme period. 
Komisija na primer ni vedno navedla ključnih predpostavk, na katerih je temeljil izračun finančne vrzeli. (i) Pri madžarskem programu Komisija ni navedla podrobnosti v podporo oceni 20 milijard EUR, ki naj bi jih Madžarska prejela v programskem obdobju. (ii) V irskem programu je glede na izračun finančne vrzeli, ki je bil uporabljen v prvotnih programskih dokumentih, skupni primanjkljaj po ESR na podlagi nastanka poslovnega dogodka znašal 44 milijard EUR v programskem obdobju.
However, the projected ‘exchequer cash deficit, incl. promissory notes’, which was used for the calculation of funding needs, stood at 58 billion euro. 
Toda napovedani primanjkljaj denarnih sredstev v blagajni, vključno z zadolžnicami, ki je bil uporabljen za izračun potreb po financiranju, je znašal 58 milijard EUR.
The main reasons for this significant difference of 14.1 billion euro (21 % of the initial financing gap) were not explained in the document. 
Glavni razlogi za to bistveno razliko v višini 14,1 milijarde EUR (21 % prvotne finančne vrzeli) v dokumentu niso bili pojasnjeni.
99 The Commission carried out some basic sensitivity tests to assess the impact of a change in one or more parameters on overall funding needs. 
99 Komisija je izvedla nekaj osnovnih preizkusov občutljivosti, da bi ocenila učinek sprememb enega ali več parametrov na celotne potrebe po financiranju.
Although they could have provided valuable information about the risk of possible adverse outcomes, the results were not revealed in the programme documents. 
Čeprav bi preizkusi lahko zagotovili dragocene informacije o tveganju morebitnih negativnih izidov, pa rezultati niso bili objavljeni v programskih dokumentih.
Weaknesses in compliance monitoring and reporting 100 During each programme, the Commission should verify whether the Member State’s economic policy is aligned with the conditions laid down by the Council. 
Slabosti pri spremljanju skladnosti in poročanju o njej 100 Komisija bi morala med vsakim programom preverjati, ali je ekonomska politika države članice usklajena s pogoji, ki jih je določil Svet.
In practice this was done by verifying that the Member State was implementing the conditions in the memorandum of understanding. 
V praksi je to potekalo v obliki preverjanj, ali država članica izvaja pogoje iz memoranduma o soglasju.
Part II — Processes were generally weak 45 The unreliability of using overall deficit targets to monitor fiscal implementation 101 Fiscal consolidation was a key feature of all five programmes, and fiscal performance was a key concern during talks with national authorities and when programme decisions were taken. 
Del II – Postopki so bili v glavnem šibki 45 Nezanesljivost uporabe skupnih ciljev glede primanjkljaja za spremljanje izvajanja fiskalnih ukrepov 101 Fiskalna konsolidacija je bila ključna lastnost vseh petih programov, fiskalna uspešnost pa ključna skrb pri pogovorih z nacionalnimi organi in sprejemanju programskih odločitev.
Deficit targets were typically defined as a deficit expressed — in accordance with the ESA — as a percentage of GDP. 
Cilji glede primanjkljaja so bili običajno opredeljeni kot primanjkljaj, izražen – v skladu z Evropskim sistemom računov (ESR) – kot odstotek BDP.
However, using these estimates entails a risk that the Commission will be unable to report with certainty to the Council that a country’s fiscal policy complies with the adjustment programme. 
Vendar pa uporaba ocen primanjkljaja po ESR prinaša tveganje, da Komisija ne bo mogla z gotovostjo sporočiti Svetu, da je fiskalna politika države skladna s programom za prilagoditev.
On several occasions, including those detailed below, the Commission estimates turned out to be wrong. (i) It was reported in the spring 2009 notification that Hungary’s deficit was within the programme’s 2008 deficit target. 
Ocene Komisije so se večkrat izkazale za na-pačne. Na primer: (i) v obvestilu spomladi leta 2009 je bilo navedeno, da je primanjkljaj Madžarske v skladu s programskim ciljem glede primanjkljaja za leto 2008.
However, the autumn 2009 notification revised the deficit to 3.8 % of GDP, i.e. above the deficit target58. (ii) In January 2010, Romania reported a 2009 cash deficit of 7.3 % of GDP, in line with the IMF target, while the Commission provisionally estimated an ESA deficit in line with the target and stated that the programme was ‘on track’. 
Toda v obvestilu jeseni 2009 je bil podatek o primanjkljaju spremenjen na 3,8 % BDP, torej na vrednost, višjo od cilja glede primanjkljaja;58 (ii) januarja 2010 je Romunija poročala o primanjkljaju denarnih sredstev v višini 7,3 % BDP za leto 2009 – v skladu s ciljem MDS – medtem ko je Komisija začasno ocenila, da je primanjkljaj po ESR v skladu s ciljem, in navedla, da je program „na pravi poti”.
However, in May 2010 the Commission revised the ESA deficit to 8.3 %. 
Toda maja 2010 je Komisija primanjkljaj po ESR spremenila na 8,3 %.
From autumn 2011, the revised deficit was 9%. (iii) In January 2013, the Commission provisionally calculated that Ireland’s ESA deficit for 2012 was 8.2%,onlytoreviseitto7.7%in April and 8.2 % in autumn 2013. 
Od jeseni 2011 je spremenjeni primanjkljaj znašal 9 %; (iii) januarja 2013 je Komisija začasno izračunala, da irski primanjkljaj po ESR za leto 2012 znaša 8,2 %, vendar je ta podatek aprila spremenila na 7,7 %, jeseni 2013 pa na 8,2 %.
However, the last revision was mainly due to the reclassification of one-off revenue. 
Zadnja sprememba je predvsem posledica prerazvrstitve kategorije enkratnih prihodkov.
103 Another complication was the exclusion of bank support measures from the target definition in euro-area programmes. 
103 Še en zaplet je bila izključitev ukrepov za podporo bankam iz opredelitve cilja v programih evrskega območja.
Fiscal targets defined in such a way should be, in principle, a much better anchor for fiscal policy, as bank support measures are sizeable one-off items which are beyond the direct control of the government. 
Fiskalni cilj, opredeljen na takšen način, bi moral biti načeloma veliko boljši temelj fiskalne politike, saj so ukrepi za podporo bankam znatne enkratne postavke, ki niso pod neposrednim nadzorom vlade.
However, in the case of Ireland the Commission excluded only deficit-increasing capital transfers provided to the banks, but allowed the inclusion of revenues related to bank support measures. 
Toda za Irsko je Komisija izključila le kapitalske transferje bankam, ki povečujejo primanjkljaj, dovolila pa je vključitev prihodkov, povezanih z ukrepi za podporo bankam.
Such targets provide a less clear signal and measure of fiscal performance. 
Takšni cilji so manj jasen signal in merilo fiskalne uspešnosti.
For instance, had all banking related transactions been excluded, the 2012 budget deficit would have been higher by 1 percentage point. 
Če bi bile na primer izključene vse transakcije, povezane z bančništvom, bi bil proračunski primanjkljaj za leto 2012 višji za 1 odstotno točko.
56 The excessive deficit procedure is the EU’s step-by-step procedure for correcting excessive deficit (above 3 % of GDP) or debt levels (above 60 % of GDP). 
56 Postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem je postopek EU v več korakih za zmanjševanje čezmernih stopenj primanjkljaja (nad 3 % BDP) ali dolga (nad 60 % BDP).
Furthermore, estimating ESA deficit requires assumptions to be taken on future decisions on the statistical treatment of some major transactions. 
Poleg tega je treba pri ocenjevanju primanjkljaja po ESR sprejeti predpostavke o prihodnjih odločitvah glede statistične obravnave nekaterih večjih transakcij.
58 According to the Commission, the revision of the 2008 deficit reflected changes in relation to the absorption of EU funds, as some projects had not received the co-financing which had been expected to replace pre-financing from the budget. 
58 Po navedbah Komisije je revizija primanjkljaja za leto 2008 odražala spremembe v zvezi s črpanjem sredstev EU, saj nekateri projekti niso prejeli sofinanciranja, ki naj bi nadomestilo predfinanciranje iz proračuna.
Part II — Processes were generally weak 46 Unsystematic reporting on compliance with conditions 104 Only for Portugal and, in part, for Hungary, Latvia and Ireland, did the Commission systematically report on the Member State’s compliance with structural conditions. 
Del II – Postopki so bili v glavnem šibki 46 Nesistematično poročanje o izpolnjevanju pogojev 104 Le pri Portugalski in deloma Madžarski, Latviji in Irski je Komisija sistematično poročala o tem, ali država članica izpolnjuje strukturne pogoje.
105 Non-compliance was rarely reported. 
105 Kadar pogoji niso bili izpolnjeni, je o tem poročala le redko.
Only for a very small number of conditions (4% in the Portuguese programme) did the Commission clearly state ‘not observed’, although almost half of all conditions were not complied with on time. 
Le za zelo majhno število pogojev (4 % pri portugalskem programu) je Komisija jasno navedla, da niso bili upoštevani, čeprav skoraj polovica vseh pogojev ni bila izpolnjena pravočasno.
Many different terms were used to convey this59, leading to confusion. 
Za poročanje o tem je bilo uporabljenih veliko različnih izrazov59, kar povzroča zmedo.
106 For around 30 conditions (8 % of the sample), either no compliance status was reported or the conditions were so vaguely written that compliance could not be effectively monitored (for examples see Box 7)60. 107 A few conditions were reported as complied with but could not be verified. 
106 Za približno 30 pogojev (8 % vzorca) ni bilo navedeno, kakšno je bilo njihovo izpolnjevanje, ali pa so bili pogoji napisani tako ohlapno, da ni bilo mogoče uspešno spremljati njihovega izpolnjevanja (za primere glej okvir 7).60 107 Za nekaj pogojev se je poročalo, da so izpolnjeni, vendar tega ni bilo mogoče preveriti.
For example: (i) In the Irish programme (following the autumn 2012 review), the Commission was still engaging with the Irish authorities to ensure that elements of the multiannual budgetary framework were sufficiently binding and transparent to constitute a credible policy anchor61 in the post-programme period. However, the condition was reported by the Commission to have been fully met. (ii) In Portugal, the condition requiring the production of monthly reports on budget implementation by the national government was progressively enlarged to include all state-owned enterprises and public–private partnerships at national, regional and local government levels. 
Na primer: (i) v irskem programu (po pregledu jeseni 2012) je Komisija še vedno sodelovala z irskimi organi, da bi zagotovila, da so elementi večletnega proračunskega okvira dovolj zavezujoči in pregledni za oblikovanje verodostojnega temelja politike v obdobju po izteku programa.61 Komisija je kljub temu poročala, da je pogoj v celoti izpolnjen; (ii) na Portugalskem je bil pogoj, ki je od nacionalne vlade zahteval, da pripravi mesečno poročilo o izvajanju proračuna, postopoma razširjen na vsa podjetja v državni lasti ter javno-zasebna partnerstva na nacionalni, regionalni in lokalni ravni.
The condition was deemed to have been satisfied after specific reporting was introduced at regional level, even though the requirement for consolidated budget reporting was not met. 
Pogoj je štel za izpolnje-nega, potem ko je bilo uvedeno posebno poročanje na regionalni ravni, čeprav zahteva po konsolidiranih poročilih o proračunu ni bila izpolnjena.
60 Conditions requiring permanent compliance at each review are excluded. 
60 Pogoji, ki zahtevajo stalno skladnost ob vsakem pregledu, so izključeni.
61 A fiscal policy anchor provides a structure for the government’s decision-making on the appropriate size of the budget deficit given the state of the economy and some medium-or long-term objectives for government finances. 
61 Temelj za fiskalno politiko zagotavlja strukturo za vladno odločanje o ustrezni velikosti proračunskega primanjkljaja glede na stanje gospodarstva ter nekatere srednje-ali dolgoročne cilje za javne finance.
Part II — Processes were generally weak 47 Examples of conditions for which compliance was never reported The number of public research and development priorities should be reduced to provide more resources to relevant research fields (Latvia). 
Del II – Postopki so bili v glavnem šibki 47 Primeri pogojev, za katere nikoli ni bilo poročil o njihovem izpolnjevanju Število javnih raziskovalnih in razvojnih prednostnih nalog je treba zmanjšati, da bi zagotovili več sredstev za ustrezna raziskovalna področja (Latvija).
Strengthen the capacity of the Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund managing authority to control and decide on EU spending (Romania). 
Okrepijo naj se zmogljivosti organa za upravljanje strukturnih skladov in Kohezijskega sklada za kontroliranje porabe EU in odločanje o njej (Romunija).
The government is to adopt legislation to significantly reduce the number of taxes and payments similar to taxes (Romania). 
Vlada naj sprejme zakonodajo za bistveno zmanjšanje števila davkov in davkom podobnih plačil (Romunija).
By July 2012, the government will develop a consolidation plan to reorganise and significantly reduce the number of municipalities (308). 
Do julija 2012 bo vlada pripravila načrt konsolidacije, da bo reorganizirala in zelo zmanjšala število občin (308).
The government will implement these plans and changes will come into effect by the beginning of the next local election cycle (Portugal). 
Vlada bo uresničila te načrte, spremembe pa bodo stopile v veljavo do začetka naslednjega ciklusa lokalnih volitev (Portugalska).
Establishing special chambers within the tax tribunals (Portugal). 
Uvedba posebnih senatov v okviru davčnih sodišč (Portugalska).
Cooperation with the other partners was informal only 108 EU financial assistance was provided together with IMF financial assistance in all programmes. 
Sodelovanje s partnerjema je bilo le neuradno 108 Finančna pomoč EU se je v vseh programih zagotavljala skupaj s finančno pomočjo MDS.
Each institution took independent funding decisions in line with its own statutes and internal procedures. 
Vsaka institucija je sprejemala neodvisne odločitve o financiranju v skladu z lastnimi poslov-niki in notranjimi postopki.
In the case of the Irish and Portuguese programmes, the ECB too was involved in programme management. 
V primeru irskega in portugalskega programa je pri upravljanju programov sodelovala tudi ECB.
109 Working with the IMF helped the Commission in learning how to manage the programmes. 
109 Sodelovanje z MDS je Komisiji pomagalo pri učenju o tem, kako upravljati programe.
We observed several examples of IMF practices that the Commission adopted after the programmes started, for example more detailed forecasting spreadsheets or the use of a resident representative in later programmes. 
Sodišče je opazilo več primerov praks MDS, ki jih je Komisija sprejela po začetku programov, npr. podrobnejše preglednice z napovedmi, uporaba lokalno prisotnega predstavnika v poznejših programih.
Also, the Commission’s programme teams were enlarged, matching the size of the IMF’s teams. 
Poleg tega so bile programske skupine Komisije povečane na velikost ekip MDS.
110 The legal basis allowed the three institutions to decide how cooperation would be organised. 
110 Pravna podlaga je zadevnim trem institucijam omogočila, da se odločijo o načinu organizacije sodelovanja.
In all programmes, the programme teams established informal cooperation arrangements. 
Pri vseh programih so programske skupine oblikovale neuradne ureditve za sodelovanje.
The variety of expertise and experience among the three institutions’ staff made it possible to produce more thorough assessments, which reduced the risk of errors and omissions in programme design and updates. 
Zaradi raznolikosti strokovnega znanja in izkušenj med uslužbenci treh institucij je bilo mogoče opraviti temeljitejše ocene, s katerimi se je zmanjšalo tveganje napak in izpustov v zasnovi in posodobitvah programa.
Part II — Processes were generally weak 48 111 The institutions did not make any formal arrangements concerning cooperation between them on such aspects as the following. (i) Exchange of information. What information (e.g. negotiation mandates, other programme documents, underlying calculations62, information collected from the Member State) should be exchanged with the other partners? 
Del II – Postopki so bili v glavnem šibki 48 111 Institucije niso sprejele uradnih ureditev za medsebojno sodelovanja o vidikih, kot so: (i) izmenjava informacij – katere informacije (npr. pogajalski mandati, drugi programski dokumenti, osnovni izračuni,62 informacije, dobljene od države članice) naj bi si partnerji izmenjevali?
How should information received after the cut-off date be treated? (ii) Confidentiality. How should documents originally provided to another institution be treated? 
Kako bi bilo treba obravnavati informacije, prejete po izteku roka; (ii) zaupnost – kako bi bilo treba obravnavati dokumente, ki so bili prvotno poslani drugi instituciji?
What should be done if an institution comes into possession of confidential information not available to the other partners63 which could affect the overall programme design and internal analysis? (iii) Ownership of common work. Some electronic documents were jointly produced by all three partners (e.g. macroeconomic projections, financing gap calculations), but were not fully shared between the institutions. (iv) Mechanisms to resolve disagreements about financing decisions or other key programme parameters. 
Kako bi bilo treba ravnati, kadar institucija pridobi zaupne informacije, ki niso na voljo partnerjema63 in ki bi lahko vplivale na splošno zasnovo programa in notranjo analizo; (iii) lastništvo skupnega dela – nekatere elektronske dokumente so skupaj pripravili vsi trije partnerji (npr. makroekonomske projekcije, izračune finančne vrzeli), vendar si jih institucije niso delile v celoti; (iv) mehanizmi za reševanje sporov glede odločitev o financiranju ali drugih ključnih programskih parametrih.
The ECB’s advisory role was very broad 112 In the area of programme management, the EFSM regulation64 establishes an advisory relationship between the ECB and the Commission: (i) ‘(the general economic policy) conditions [...] will be defined by the Commission, in consultation with the ECB’65; and (ii) ‘the Commission shall re-examine, in consultation with the ECB, the general economic policy conditions’66. 113 ECB staff advised on issues relevant to financial stability and to ensuring that money markets functioned properly. 
Svetovalna vloga ECB je bila zelo široka 112 Na področju upravljanja programov uredba o EFSM64 vzpostavlja svetovalni odnos med ECB in Komisijo, in sicer: (i) splošne pogoje gospodarske politike [...] bo opredelila Komisija v posvetovanju z ECB;65 (ii) Komisija v posvetovanju z ECB ponovno preuči splošne pogoje gospodarske politike.66 113 Uslužbenci ECB so zagotavljali svetovanje v zvezi z vprašanji, pomembnimi za finančno stabilnost in za zagotovitev, da denarni trgi pravilno delujejo.
This included topics such as debt sustainability and the pace of fiscal consolidation67, which were seen by the ECB as important preconditions in both areas of its advisory role. 
To je zajemalo teme, kot sta vzdržnost dolga in hitrost fiskalne konsolidacije,67 ki jih je ECB obravnavala kot pomembne predpogoje na obeh področjih svoje svetovalne vloge.
62 In the balance-of-payments programmes, the actual spreadsheets underlying financing gap estimates were prepared by the IMF and, according to the Commission, were not at the disposal of Commission staff. 
62 V plačilnobilančnih programih je dejanske preglednice, na katerih temeljijo ocene finančne vrzeli, pripravil MDS in po navedbah Komisije niso bile na voljo njenim uslužbencem.
63 For example financial market information in the IMF’s financial sector assessments, information collected by the Directorate-General for Competition, ECB banking data. 
63 Npr. informacije o finančnih trgih v ocenah finančnih sektorjev, ki jih opravi MDS, informacije, ki jih zbere Generalni direktorat za konkurenco, bančni podatki ECB.
64 Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010. 
407/2010.
65 Article 3(3)(b). 
65 Člen 3(3)(b).
66 Article 3(6). 
66 Člen 3(6).
67 For instance, the ECB argued for maintaining deficit targets in the Portuguese programme. 
67 ECB se je na primer zavzela za ohranitev ciljev glede primanjkljaja v portugalskem programu.