natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
VIII (b) (iii) The Commission accepts the recommendation and is already implementing it. 
VIII (b) (iii) Komisija sprejema priporočilo in ga že izvaja.
As far as MAPAR is concerned, DG EMPL and DG REGIO will communicate once a year the relevant data on State aid to DG COMP on the basis of a tailor‐made reporting (typologies of State aid findings evidenced by Commission audits). 
GD EMPL in GD REGIO bosta za potrebe orodja MAPAR enkrat letno GD COMP poslala ustrezne podatke o državni pomoči v okviru prilagojenega poročanja (tipologij ugotovitev glede državne pomoči, ki so razvidne iz revizij Komisije).
Regarding the exchange of information between the Commission services, DG REGIO, DG EMPL and DG COMP are increasing their communication channels to share information. 
GD REGIO, GD EMPL in GD COMP širijo svoje komunikacijske kanale za izmenjavo informacij med službami Komisije.
DG EMPL and DG REGIO share results between each other and they consult DG COMP on audit issues related to State Aid when necessary. 
GD EMPL in GD REGIO si izmenjujeta izide in se o revizijskih zadevah, povezanih z državno pomočjo, po potrebi posvetujeta z GD COMP.
VIII (b) (iv) The Commission accepts the recommendation. 
VIII (b) (iv) Komisija sprejema priporočilo.
Reply of the Commission 75 It will follow‐up Member States' capacity to comply with State aid rule, based on the information available in its databases and stemming in particular from available audit findings. 
Odgovori Komisije 75 Spremljala bo zmožnost držav članic za izpolnjevanje pravil o državni pomoči na podlagi podatkov, ki so na voljo v njenih zbirkah podatkov in ki izhajajo zlasti iz razpoložljivih revizijskih ugotovitev.
The Commission will use the results of the follow‐up exercise to better target its monitoring and training activities it offers to the concerned programme authorities in the Member States VIII (c) The Commission accepts the recommendation and has already implemented it since Member States have to dem‐ onstrate that they have thoroughly checked State aid compliance when they submit a major project proposal, regardless of which related decision‐making procedure is chosen under the Common Provisions Regulation, includ‐ ing through State aid notification where needed. 
Komisija bo na podlagi rezultatov nadaljnje obravnave bolje usmerjala svoje dejavnosti spremljanja in usposabljanja, ki jih ponuja organom v državah članicah, udeleženim v teh programih. VIII (c) Komisija sprejema priporočilo in ga je že izvedla, saj so morale države članice dokazati, da so temeljito preverile skladnost državne pomoči, ko se predložile predlog velikega projekta, ne glede na to, kateri sorodni postopek odločanja so izbrale v skladu z uredbo o skupnih določbah, vključno z obvestilom o državni pomoči, kadar je to potrebno.
In case of State aid subject to a Commission decision, the Member State must wait until the State aid decision is approved by the Commission before submitting to the Commission the Major project application or the major pro‐ ject notification. 
Država članica mora v primeru državne pomoči, o kateri mora odločiti Komisija, počakati, da Komisija odobri odločitev, preden predloži vlogo za velik projekt ali obvestilo o velikem projektu.
This is a preventive measure to avoid that State Aid non‐compliant decisions are taken on major projects in 2014 ‐2020. 
Gre za preventivni ukrep z namenom da se v obdobju 2014–2020 prepreči sprejemanje neskladnih odločitev o državni pomoči za velike projekte.
VIII (d) (i) The Commission accepts the recommendation and has already implemented it. 
VIII (d) (i) Komisija sprejema priporočilo in ga je že izvedla.
The Commission examines the quality of the work of audit authorities with regards to State aid in different audit procedures: in the Commission’s risk‐based audits on the work performed by audit authorities, which include an examination of the methodology (including check‐lists) used by audit authorities for system audits and audits of operations; during re‐performance work on audits already done by audit authorities, to check the validity of the reported results; or during the review each year of Annual Control Reports submitted to the Commission by audit authorities, to confirm whether the audit authority’s opinion is solidly grounded on the basis of the results of sys‐ tem and operations audits. 
Komisija proučuje kakovost dela revizijskih organov glede državne pomoči v različnih revizijskih postopkih: v revizijah Komisije na podlagi tveganja dela revizijskih organov, ki obsegajo pregled metodologije (vključno s kontrolnimi seznami), ki jih uporabljajo revizijski organi pri sistemskih revizijah in revizijah dejavnosti; med ponovnimi ocenami učinkovitosti revizij, ki so jih revizijski organi že izvedli, da preveri veljavnost ugotovitev v poročilih; v vsakoletnem pregledu letnih poročilih o nadzornih pregledih, ki so jih Komisiji predložili revizijski organi, da preveri, ali je mnenje revizijskega organa dobro utemeljeno z ugotovitvami iz sistemskih revizij in revizij dejavnosti.
In some cases, the Commission had already recommended to the audit authorities concerned, to reinforce their check‐lists to better cover the verification of State aid. 
V nekaterih primerih je Komisija tem revizijskim organom že priporočila, naj okrepijo svoje kontrolne sezname za boljše preverjanje državne pomoči.
VIII (d) (ii) The Commission does not accept the recommendation as it goes against the Commission's objective pursued through its guidance given to Member States in 2012 to not systematically re‐examine the projects decided before that date – leaving to the Member States the possibility to notify or not – and to provide stability to Member States and beneficiaries as regards the treatment of such projects. 
VIII (d) (ii) Komisija ne sprejema priporočila, saj je v nasprotju s ciljem Komisije, ki ga je izvedla s smernicami za države članice leta 2012, da jim ni treba sistematično ponovno proučiti projektov, o katerih je bilo odločeno pred tem časom – države članice imajo možnost, da jih priglasijo ali ne – in državam članicam ter upravičenkam zagotoviti stabilnost pri obravnavi takšnih projektov.
Reply of the Commission 76 VIII (d) (iii) The Commission accepts the recommendation and is already implementing it. 
Odgovori Komisije 76 VIII (d) (iii) Komisija sprejema priporočilo in ga že izvaja.
In the context of the implementation of the State aid action plan, the Commission already works on the basis of its State aid decisions which are used as case studies: for instance, over half of the programmes of the thematic semi‐ nars (RDI and Energy have taken place so far) is based on concrete cases (actual State aid decisions). 
Komisija v okviru izvajanja akcijskega načrta državnih pomoči že deluje na podlagi svojih odločitev o državni pomoči, ki se uporabljajo kot študije primerov: na primer več kot polovica programov tematskih seminarjev (do zdaj sta bila izvedena RDI in Energija) temelji na konkretnih primerih (dejanskih odločitvah o državni pomoči).
The Commission services provide also guidance in the form of grids, checklists or quick replies to interpretation questions submitted by aid granting authorities. 
Službe Komisije zagotavljajo tudi smernice v obliki preglednic, kontrolnih seznamov ali hitrih odgovorov za tolmačenje vprašanj organov, ki dodeljujejo pomoč.
The questions and answers serve as the basis for the publication of FAQ documents. 
Vprašanja in odgovori so podlaga za objavo dokumentov s pogostimi vprašanji.
The Commission will continue to update the guidance material for all concerned authorities, including ESIF pro‐ gramme authorities, if developments require it. 
Komisija bo še naprej posodabljala smernice za vse vpletene organe, vključno z organi programov skladov ESI, če bo to potrebno glede na razvoj dogodkov.
Finally, the recently adopted Commission Notice of the Notion of aid provides guidance on when public spending falls within, and outside, the scope of EU State aid control. 
Nedavno sprejeto Obvestilo Komisije o pojmu pomoči zagotavlja smernico o tem, kdaj je javna poraba znotraj in zunaj nadzora državne pomoči na ravni EU.
VIII (d) (iv) The Commission does not accept the recommendation since the de minimis Regulation leaves the choice to Member States whether to set up a central register for monitoring de minimis aid or to work on the basis of other means (e.g. self‐declarations by beneficiaries). 
VIII (d) (iv) Komisija ne sprejema priporočila, saj uredba de minimis državam članicam prepušča izbiro, ali bodo vzpostavile osrednji register za nadzor pomoči de minimis ali delale z drugimi sredstvi (npr. s samoprijavami upravičencev).
While a central register of de minimis aid is preferable, Article 6 of the de minimis Regulation does not oblige the Member State to have such register and allows implementing the cumulation rule with other means. 
Osrednji register za pomoč de minimis je sicer zaželen, vendar člen 6 uredbe de minimis držav članic ne zavezuje, da morajo imeti takšen register in dopušča izvajanje pravila o kumulaciji z drugimi sredstvi.
Leaving the Member States the choice is in line with the general principle that Member States can decide on the most appro‐ priate administrative setting for their Member State. 
Možnost izbire držav članic je v skladu s splošnim načelom, da smejo same odločati o najprimernejšem upravnem sistemu zase.
The Commission also noted the negative reaction of several Member States on the idea to have a mandatory de minimis register in the context of the first consultation for the revision of the de minimis Regulation. (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2013_de_minimis/index_en.html). 
Komisija je opozorila tudi na negativen odziv več držav članic na zamisel o obveznem registru de minimis v okviru prvega posvetovanja za revizijo uredbe de minimis. (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2013_de_minimis/index_en.html).
VIII (d) (v) The Commission does not accept the recommendation as it considers that the Deggendorf principle can only be applied at the level of an individual Member State. 
VIII (v) Komisija ne sprejema priporočila, saj meni, da je mogoče načelo Deggendorf uporabiti samo na ravni posamezne države članice.
The Commission intends to clarify this point in the ongoing review of the 2014 GBER. 
Komisija namerava pojasniti to točko v trenutni reviziji uredbe o splošnih skupinskih izjemah iz leta 2014.
VIII (e) The Commission accepts this recommendation. 
VIII (e) Komisija sprejema priporočilo.
The Directors‐General of the four European Structural and Investment Fund Directorates‐General meet already regularly in the ex‐ante conditionality suspension committee. 
Generalni direktorji štirih generalnih direktoratov evropskih strukturnih in investicijskih skladov se že redno sestajajo v okviru odbora za odpravo predhodne pogojenosti.
The current approach which is both preventive (with the implementation of national action plans for non‐fulfilment of ex ante conditionality) and corrective (with sus‐ pension of payments when necessary), will continue to be applied strictly and consistently. 
Sedanji pristop, ki je preventiven (z izvajanjem nacionalnih akcijskih načrtov za neizpolnjevanje predhodne pogojenosti) in korektiven (z ustavitvijo plačil, kadar je to pot-rebno), bomo še naprej strogo in dosledno izvajali.
Reply of the Commission 77 Common reply to paragraphs 34 to 36 The Commission has carefully followed‐up all State aid issues detected over the last years following the Court's and its own audit findings in this field and requested financial corrections from the concerned Member States and pro‐ grammes, whenever it deemed necessary (see paragraphs 50 and 51). 
Odgovori Komisije 77 Skupni odgovor na odstavke od 34 do 36: Komisija je pozorno spremljala vsa vprašanja državne pomoči, ki jih je zaznala v zadnjih letih v revizijskih ugotovitvah Sodišča in lastnih revizijskih ugotovitvah na tem področju in je od zadevnih držav članic in programov zahtevala finančne popravke, kadar se ji je to zdelo ustrezno (glej odstavka 50 in 51).
The Commission notes nevertheless that as shown by the Court in table 2, the number of State aid errors detected in its samples has recently decreased. 
Komisija vseeno ugotavlja, da se je zmanjšalo število napak pri državni pomoči, zaznanih v lastnih vzorcih, kot je Sodišče prikazalo v preglednici 2.
The number of errors with a financial impact decreased from 5 cases in 2013 to 3 cases in 2014. 
Število napak s finančnim učinkom se je zmanjšalo s 5 primerov v letu 2013 na 3 primere v letu 2014.
The Commission expects this trend to continue also due to the application of the 2014 GBER (Regulation (EU) No 651/2014). 
Komisija pričakuje, da se bo ta trend nadaljeval tudi zaradi izvajanja uredbe o splošnih skupinskih izjemah iz leta 2014 (Uredba (EU) št.
Common reply to paragraphs 37 to 44 The Commission agrees with the typology of errors in the area of State aid presented by the Court and also detected through its own audits (see paragraphs 47 and 48). 
Skupni odgovor na odstavke od 37 do 44: Komisija se strinja s tipologijo napak na področju državne pomoči, ki jo je predstavilo Sodišče in ki jo je zaznala tudi v svojih revizijah (glej odstavka 47 in 48).
Experience from past errors has led the Commission to clarify and simplify rules, in particular on the incentive effect in the 2014 GBER. 
Izkušnje iz preteklih napak Komisijo vodijo k razjasnjevanju in poenostavitvi pravil, zlasti glede spodbujevalnega učinek v uredbi o splošnih skupinskih izjemah iz leta 2014..
53 The Commission notes that, during the period covered by the Court’s report, the Commission’s State aid monitor‐ ing covered roughly 6% to 9% of total expenditure of State aid each year. 
53 Komisija ugotavlja, da je v obdobju, ki ga obravnava poročilo Sodišča, nadzor državne pomoči Komisije pokrival približno 6–9 % celotnih izdatkov za državne pomoči vsako leto.
A significant portion of schemes has been monitored at least once in their lifetime. 
Pomemben del programov je bil spremljan vsaj enkrat v času njihovega izvajanja.
55 Given the limited number of schemes monitored for individual Member States, the ratio of problematic cases should be related to the overall number of schemes monitored. 
55 Zaradi omejenega števila programov, ki se spremljajo v posameznih državah članicah, je treba delež težavnih primerov povezati s skupnim številom programov v nadzoru.
For example, in case of Lithuania and Luxembourg, the 50% ratio of problematic cases is based on the monitoring of four schemes only (i.e. two out of four were found problematic). ‘Problematic’ is a term used by DG COMP to indicate infringements of State aid rules ranging from formal shortcomings such as incorrect formulation of cumulation rules to legal issues such as an absence of GBER conditions reflected in a GBER scheme. 
V primeru Litve in Luksemburga 50 % tako delež težavnih primerov temelji na nadzoru le štirih programov (t. j. težavnost je bila ugotovljena za dva od štirih programov). „Težaven“ je izraz, ki ga GD COMP uporablja za navajanje kršitev pravil o državni pomoči, od formalnih pomanjkljivosti, kot so nepravilno oblikovana pravila o kumulaciji, do pravnih vprašanj, kot je odsotnost pogojev iz uredbe o splošnih skupinskih izjemah v programu, ki ga ta pokriva.
56 DG COMP's monitoring resulted into several corrective measures including voluntary and imposed recovery of incompatible aid. 
56 Spremljanje GD COMP je privedlo do več različnih ukrepov, vključno s prostovoljnimi in obveznimi vračili nezdružljive pomoči.
No separate records are being kept of all cases of voluntary recovery. 
Za vse primere prostovoljnih vračil ni ločene evidence.
In some instances, recovery is not appropriate as the measure although illegal can be found compatible with the internal market, or because the measure once incompatible became compatible due to a later change in State aid rules. 
V nekaterih primerih vračilo ni primerno, saj je lahko ukrep, čeprav nezakonit, združljiv z notranjim trgom, ali pa je ukrep, ki je bil predhodno nezdružljiv, postal združljiv zaradi poznejše spremembe pravil o državni pomoči.
In such cases, the Commission issues recommendations and eventually requests the Member States to change the design of the aid scheme if needed. 
V takih primerih Komisija izda priporočila in sčasoma od držav članic zahteva, da spremenijo obliko programa pomoči.
Reply of the Commission 78 57 The Commission notes that both DG REGIO and DG EMPL have made use of databases to record their audit findings under the 2007‐2013 programming period. 
Odgovori Komisije 78 57 Komisija ugotavlja, da sta GD REGIO in GD EMPL za zbiranje revizijskih ugotovitev iz programskega obdobja 2007– 2013 uporabila zbirke podatkov.
While these databases were not intended to serve as tools for an analysis of sources of errors, this did not prevent the Commission from undertaking appropriate and preventive measures addressing recurrent issues in the context of State aid, such as the SME bonus or incentive effect. 
Čeprav te zbirke podatkov niso namenjene kot orodja za analizo virov napak, je Komisija kljub temu izvedla ustrezne in preventivne ukrepe, ki obravnavajo ponavljajoča se vprašanja o državni pomoči, na primer dodatke za mala in srednja podjetja ali spodbujevalni učinek.
For the 2014‐2020 programming period, the internal monitoring tool used by the Commission to follow‐up on its own audit findings has considerably improved with the introduction of a common IT tool to manage and monitor the audit process, called ‘MAPAR’ (Management of Audit Processes, Activities and Resources) for the ERDF, the CF and the ESF. 
Orodje za notranji nadzor, ki ga je Komisija uporabila za nadaljnjo obravnavo na podlagi lastnih revizijskih ugotovitev, je za programsko obdobje 2014–2020 bistveno izboljšano z uvedbo skupnega informacijskega orodja za upravljanje in nadzor procesa revizije, imenovanega „MAPAR“ (Upravljanje revizijskih procesov, dejavnosti in sredstev) za ESRR, KS in ESS.
In order to improve the information flow and analysis capacity of all concerned Commission services, DG EMPL and DG REGIO have agreed with DG COMP in mid‐2016 to annually communicate to DG COMP the relevant data on their State aid audit findings from now on. 
GD EMPL in GD REGIO sta se z GD COMP sredi leta 2016 dogovorila, da bosta GD COMP odslej vsako leto posredovala ustrezne podatke o svojih revizijskih ugotovitvah glede državne pomoči, da bi izboljšali pretok informacij in zmožnosti analize za vse zadevne službe Komisije.
59 IMS is a tool dedicated to the irregularity (including fraud) reporting by Member States. 
59 Sistem za upravljanje nepravilnosti je orodje, namenjeno poročanju držav članic o nepravilnostih (vključno z golju-fijami).
The type of irregularity is indicated via drop‐down‐lists (codes) while the applied modus operandi is described in text which enriches the information provided through codified fields. 
Vrste nepravilnosti so podane v spustnem seznamu (šifer), medtem ko je uporabljeni način ravnanja opisan v dodatnem besedilu ob podatkih, navedenih v šifriranih poljih.
Analysis can be performed on basis of the type of irregularity. 
Na podlagi vrste nepravilnosti je mogoče izvesti analizo.
IMS is not a State‐aid control instrument, but it is possible to add a specific typology for State aid to the already existing drop‐down‐lists. 
Sistem za upravljanje nepravilnosti ni orodje za nadzor državnih pomoči, ampak je v njem mogoče dodajati posebne tipologije državnih pomoči obstoječim spustnim seznamom.
61 The Commission notes that it did take preventive measures addressing recurrent State aid issues during the 2007‐ 2013 period, notably as a result of regular exchanges between the relevant Commission services. 
61 Komisija ugotavlja, da je že sprejela preventivne ukrepe glede ponavljajočih se vprašanj o državni pomoči v obdobju 2007–2013, predvsem v okviru rednih izmenjav med zadevnimi službami Komisije.
The Commission DGs have for example been sharing audit reports since the beginning of the 2007‐2013 programming period. 
Generalni direktorati Komisije si, na primer, revizijska poročila izmenjujejo že od začetka programskega obdobja 2007–2013.
DG COMP is also consulted on audit issues related to State aid when necessary before finalising the audit conclusions. 
GD COMP je opravil tudi posvetovanja o revizijskih vprašanjih, povezanih z državno pomočjo, kadar je bilo to potrebno pred dokončanjem revizijskih zaključkov.
See also paragraph 60 and Commission reply to paragraph 57. 
Glejte tudi odstavek 60 in odgovor Komisije na odstavek 57.
The Commission services agreed in March 2015 on a State aid action plan with specific targeted actions, based on lessons learned from available audit findings (see the Court's observation under paragraphs 108 to 110). 
Službe Komisije so marca 2015 sprejele akcijski načrt za državne pomoči s posebnimi usmerjenimi ukrepi, ki temeljijo na izkušnjah iz razpoložljivih revizijskih ugotovitev (glejte opombo Sodišča v odstavkih 108–110).
In addition the legislative framework for the 2014‐2020 programming period adopted in December 2013 introduces an ex‐ante conditionality on State aid with a view to enhance the Member States’ capacity to comply with State aid rules ahead of programmes’ implementation. 
Poleg tega zakonodajni okvir za programsko obdobje 2014–2020, sprejet decembra 2013, uvaja predhodno pogojenost državne pomoči, da bi pred izvajanjem programov izboljšal zmožnost držav članic za izpolnjevanje pravil državne pomoči.
62 The Commission notes that the Vademecum refers to the transport sector. 
62 Komisija ugotavlja, da se priročnik nanaša na prometni sektor.
The Commission does not say that State aid rules are not applicable in that sector, but that instead of the general State aid rules, specific State aid (compati‐ bility) rules apply, pursuant to Article 93 TFEU. 
Komisija ne trdi, da pravila o državni pomoči ne veljajo za ta sektor, ampak da namesto splošnih veljajo posebna pravila o državni pomoči (o združljivosti), skladno s členom 93 PDEU.
The statement in the Vademecum should not be understood to mean that the State aid qualification as such is different in the transport sector. 
Izjave v priročniku ne smemo razumeti tako, da je opredelitev državne pomoči kot takšne drugačna za prometni sektor.
Reply of the Commission 79 Common reply to paragraphs 69 to 71 The Commission notes that the obligation to notify State aid measures lies with the Member States and that the decision on the major project is not a decision on compliance of the major project with State aid rules. 
Odgovori Komisije 79 Skupni odgovor na odstavke od 69 do 71: Komisija ugotavlja, da je obveznost obveščanja o ukrepih državne pomoči na državah članicah in da odločitev o velikem projektu ne predstavlja tudi odločitve o skladnosti velikega projekta s pravili o državni pomoči.
A distinction needs to be made between the situation before the Leipzig –Halle judgment and after it and between the 2007‐2013 and the 2014‐2020 programming periods. 
Treba je razlikovati med stanjem pred sodbo Leipzig-Halle in po njej ter med programskima obdobjema 2007–2013 in 2014–2020.
The Commission underlines that the DG COMP was consulted in formal inter‐service consultations by DG REGIO on major projects decisions already before the end of 2012, although not systematically. 
Komisija poudarja, da se je GD COMP v okviru formalnih posvetovanj med službami z GD REGIO o odločitvah za velike projekte posvetoval že pred koncem leta 2012, vendar ne sistematično.
Following the Leipzig‐Halle judgement, DG REGIO and DG COMP have enhanced their cooperation in relation to the assessment of major projects application. 
Po sodbi Leipzig-Halle sta GD REGIO in GD COMP okrepila medsebojno sodelovanje pri ocenjevanju vlog za velike projekte.
The Commission stresses that there is no major project for which the Commission adopted a decision approving ERDF or CF funding in recent years and for which subsequently a nega‐ tive decision under State aid rules was adopted. 
Komisija poudarja, da za nobeden velik projekt, za katerega je Komisija sprejela sklep o odobritvi sredstev ESRR ali KS v zadnjih letih, ni nato prejel negativne odločitve na podlagi pravil o državni pomoči.