natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
In the projects audited, the Court found that the main reasons for delays were16: (a) the lack of familiarity of the candidate countries with EU procedures and with project preparation and implementation as well as difficulties with procurement procedures (see e.g. Textbox 5) (84 % of the projects in the sample); (b) failure of companies that won tenders to carry out the work (see e.g. Textbox 6) (13 % of the projects in the sample); (c) unrealistic planning (see e.g. Textbox 7) (22 % of the projects in the sample); (d) the change after accession of the ISPA projects into Cohesion Fund projects, which have a different set of rules17. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da so bili pri revidiranih projektih glavni razlogi za zamude16: (a) premajhna seznanjenost držav kandidatk s postopki EU ter s pripravo in izvajanjem projektov, pa tudi težave s postopki javnih naročil (glej npr. okvir 5) (84 % projektov v vzorcu); (b) družbe, ki so z razpisom pridobile naročilo, niso opravile dela (glej npr. okvir 6) (13 % projektov v vzorcu); (c) nestvarno načrtovanje (glej npr. okvir 7) (22 % projektov v vzorcu); (d) popristopna sprememba projektov ISPA v projekte kohezijskega sklada, za katere veljajo drugačna pravila17.
14 A project is considered completed when the infrastructure is in use. Candidate countries had to submit a final report to the Commission at the latest six months after the completion of the project. 
14 Projekt šteje za končanega, ko se infrastruktura začne uporabljati; države kandidatke so morale predložiti končno poročilo Komisiji najpozneje šest mesecev po dokončanju projekta.
15 Out of 32 projects audited, 24 faced delays (75 %). 
15 Od 32 revidiranih projektov se jih je 24 soočalo z zamudami (75 %).
16 Some projects were affected by more than one of the problems described. 
16 Pri nekaterih projektih se je pojavila več kot ena od opisanih težav.
17 E.g. eligibility of durable equipment expenditure (to be solved on a case-by-case basis), modifications of project decisions, procedures for the award of public contracts. 18 Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–06 
17 Npr. upravičenost odhodkov za trajno opremo (kar se rešuje za vsak primer posebej), spremembe projektnih odločitev, postopki za oddajo javnih naročil. 18 Posebno poročilo št. 12/2008 – Instrument strukturnih politik v predpristopnem obdobju (ISPA) 2000–2006
FIGURE 5 AVERAGE DELAYS IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 PL CZ RO LV ENV PL CZ Average per country/sector Average initial duration RO LV Delay TRAN TOTAL TEXTBOX 5 TEXTBOX 6 TEXTBOX 7 19 Years In Latvia, in a project for the development of water services, it took three years to launch the tender procedure after the signature of the financing memorandum. 
SLIKA 5 POVPREČNE ZAMUDE PRI IZVAJANJU PROJEKTOV 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 PL CZ RO LV OKOLJE Povprečje na državo/sektor RO LV Zamuda PROMET SKUPAJ Povprečno prvotno trajanje PL CZ OKVIR 5 OKVIR 6 OKVIR 7 19 Leto Pri projektu za razvoj storitev za rabo vode v Latviji je bil razpisni postopek sprožen šele tri leta po podpisu memoranduma o financiranju.
In Poland, in a project for sewage treatment, the construction suffered an interruption of almost one year during the tendering phase. 
Na Poljskem je bila pri projektu za čiščenje odplak gradnja med razpisno fazo prekinjena za skoraj leto dni.
The project was divided into subcontracts, one of which was co-financed by the EBRD. 
Projekt je bil razdeljen na podpogodbe, od katerih je eno sofinancirala EBOR.
According to the EBRD loan agreement, the bank’s tendering rules should have been applied to the procurement of the whole project. 
V skladu s sporazumom o posojilu, sklenjenim z EBOR, bi morala za javna naročila pri celotnem projektu veljati razpisna pravila banke.
The tendering had to be stopped until the appropriate procedures had been agreed between the donors. 
Razpise je bilo treba ustaviti, dokler se donatorji niso dogovorili o ustreznih postopkih.
A project for the rehabilitation of sewage network and wastewater treatment facilities faced delays in implementation. 
Projekt za sanacijo kanalizacijskega omrežja in čistilnih naprav za odpadne vode se je soočal z zamudami pri izvajanju.
The tender had to be cancelled and repeated, due to problems with the composition of the evaluation committee. 
Razpis je bilo treba razveljaviti in ponoviti, do česar je prišlo zaradi težav pri sestavi odbora za vrednotenje.
In addition, the company which was awarded the contract in the second tender failed to proceed with the works in accordance with the timetable and failed to comply with several notices by the supervising engineer. 
Poleg tega družba, ki je na drugem razpisu pridobila naročilo, del ni opravila v skladu s časovnim načrtom in ni upoštevala več opozoril nadzornega inženirja.
The contract therefore had to be terminated. 
Zato je bilo pogodbo treba prekiniti.
A third tender had to be organised, but at the time of the audit the project was at a standstill. 
Organizirati je bilo treba tretji razpis, toda v času revizije je projekt miroval.
In Latvia, a project to develop water services was delayed because, amongst other reasons, the cost and the time needed for the study and design work for the pipelines were underestimated. Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–06 
Projekt za razvoj storitev za rabo vode v Latviji je imel zamudo, med drugim zato, ker so bili podcenjeni stroški in čas, ki so potrebni za študijo in projektantsko delo pri cevovodih. Posebno poročilo št. 12/2008 – Instrument strukturnih politik v predpristopnem obdobju (ISPA) 2000–2006
The survey indicates that the main reasons for not respecting the deadlines in the implementation of the projects are, on the one hand, the length of the procedures and, on the other hand, planning reasons (see Figure 6)18. FINANCIAL PLANS NOT IMPLEMENTED AS SCHEDULED 33. 
Anketa kaže, da so med glavnimi razlogi za neupoštevanje rokov pri izvajanju projektov po eni strani dolgotrajni postopki, po drugi strani pa razlogi, povezani z načrtovanjem (glej sliko 6)18.
In 18 out of 32 projects audited the initial financial plan was not respected. 
Pri 18 od 32 revidiranih projektov se ni upoštevalo prvotnega finančnega načrta.
In six cases the total cost increased, and in 12 cases the cost decreased. 
V šestih primerih so se skupni stroški povečali, v 12 primerih pa so se zmanjšali.
When the cost increased and no additional ISPA resources were made available, candidate countries had to finance the additional costs from their own resources (see Textbox 8). 
Kadar so se stroški povečali, dodatna sredstva ISPA pa niso bila dana na voljo, so morale države kandidatke dodatne stroške financirati s svojimi lastnimi sredstvi (glej okvir 8).
18 Problems in project implementation were also pointed out by the Court in its Special Report No 5/2003 (insufficient management resources, delays, difficulties in tendering, paragraphs 35 to 39) but also in its Special Report No 6/2005 (delays in implementation of projects, paragraphs 11 to 25). 
5/2003 (nezadostni upravljavski viri, zamude, težave z razpisi, odstavki 35 do 39), pa tudi v Posebnem poročilu št. 6/2005 (zamude pri izvajanju projektov, odstavki 11 do 25).
20 FIGURE 6 Procedural reasons Planning reasons REASONS FOR DELAYS PROJECT MANAGERS Repetition of the procedure 15 % Appeals from bidders 8% Complicated local law 9% Time-consuming EU procedures 26 % What were the reasons for delays? 
20 SLIKA 6 Postopkovni razlogi Razlogi načrtovanja RAZLOGI ZA ZAMUDE VODJE PROJEKTOV Ponovitev postopka 15 % Kakšni so bili razlogi za zamude?
Other 11 % Frequent changes of PRAG 10 % Unrealistic planning 15 % Low quality of tendering documents 6 % Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–06 
Drugo 11 % Pogoste spremembe PRAG 10 % Nestvarno načrtovanje 15 % Slaba kakovost razpisnih dokumentov 6 % Pritožbe ponudnikov 8% Zapletena lokalna zakonodaja 9% Dolgotrajni postopki EU 26 % Posebno poročilo št. 12/2008 – Instrument strukturnih politik v predpristopnem obdobju (ISPA) 2000–2006
TABLE 1 34. 
TABELA 1 34.
As shown in Table 1 the survey of project managers indicates that for the majority of ISPA projects changes had been made to the original financing plan. 
Kot prikazuje tabela 1, anketa vodij projektov kaže, da so bili prvotni finančni načrti spremenjeni pri večini projektov ISPA.
In five cases out of the 32 projects of the sample this can be explained by underestimation of inflation (in 16 % of the cases) (see Textbox 9). 
V petih primerih od 32 projektov v vzorcu je to mogoče pojasniti s pod-cenjevanjem inflacije (v 16 % primerov) (glej okvir 9).
CHANGES TO THE ORIGINAL FINANCING PLANS 21 SURVEY OF PROJECT MANAGERS Replies Changes to the original financing plan Maintenance of the original financing plan 123 66 % 34 % TEXTBOX 8 TEXTBOX 9 In Latvia, in a railway project, due to price increases, the ISPA grant was not sufficient to cover all the elements initially foreseen. 
SPREMEMBE PRVOTNIH FINANČNIH NAČRTOV 21 ANKETA MED VODJI PROJEKTOV Odgovori Spremembe prvotnega finančnega načrta Ohranitev prvotnega finančnega načrta 123 66 % 34 % OKVIR 8 OKVIR 9 Pri železniškem projektu v Latviji zaradi povišanj cen donacija ISPA ni zadoščala za kritje vseh prvotno predvidenih sestavnih delov.
The remaining work had to be funded from national resources. 
Preostalo delo je bilo treba financirati iz nacionalnih sredstev.
In Latvia, in a project to develop water services, the contractor repudiated the contract because he was no longer in a position to work at the agreed prices as rapid inflation occurred shortly after the start of the works. 
Pri projektu za razvoj storitev za rabo vode v Latviji je izvajalec zavrnil izvajanje pogodbe, ker je kmalu po začetku del prišlo do hitre pospešitve inflacije, zaradi česar ni več mogel delati po dogovorjenih cenah.
This led to a revision of the contract, with an increased cost. Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–06 
To je privedlo do spremembe pogodbe, s katero so se stroški povečali. Posebno poročilo št. 12/2008 – Instrument strukturnih politik v predpristopnem obdobju (ISPA) 2000–2006
The replies to the survey of project managers indicated that the reasons for cost overruns can be explained mainly by two categories of factors (see Figure 7): (a) problems in project preparation, such as inadequate cost estimates; (b) implementation problems, such as weak monitoring or time delays. 
Odgovori na anketo, izvedeno med vodji projektov, so pokazali, da je razloge za prekoračitve stroškov mogoče pojasniti predvsem z dvema kategorijama dejavnikov (glej sliko 7): (a) težave pri pripravi projektov, kot so neustrezne ocene stroškov; (b) težave pri izvajanju, kot so šibko spremljanje in časovne zamude.
22 FIGURE 7 Planning-related reasons Implementation-related reasons COST OVERRUNS Inadequate cost estimates 20 % Modifications to the project 26 % Other 19 % In case of overruns, what were the main reasons? Technical reasons 9% Time delays 12 % Weak monitoring 14 % Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–06 
22 SLIKA 7 Razlogi v zvezi z načrtovanjem Razlogi v zvezi z izvajanjem PREKORAČITVE STROŠKOV Neustrezne ocene stroškov 20 % Spremembe projekta 26 % Drugo 19 % Tehnični razlogi 9% Časovne zamude 12 % Kakšni so bili glavni razlogi za prekoračitve, če je do njih prišlo? Šibko spremljanje 14 % Posebno poročilo št. 12/2008 – Instrument strukturnih politik v predpristopnem obdobju (ISPA) 2000–2006
WERE PROJECTS CONTRIBUTING TO BENEFICIARY COUNTRIES’ COMPLIANCE WITH THE EU ENVIRONMENTAL DIRECTIVES AND TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF TENT? 
ALI SO PROJEKTI PRISPEVALI K IZPOLNJEVANJU OKOLJSKIH DIREKTIV EU V DRŽAVAH UPRAVIČENKAH IN K IZBOLJŠANJU TENT?
GENERAL FRAMEWORK AND AUDIT CRITERIA 37. 
SPLOŠNI OKVIR IN REVIZIJSKA MERILA 37.
The main objective of ISPA was to help the candidate countries reduce their structural gap in the environment and transport sectors. 
Glavni cilj ISPA je bil pomagati državam kandidatkam pri zmanjšanju njihove strukturne vrzeli v okoljskem in v prometnem sektorju.
In order to assess the effectiveness of the projects in terms of concrete contributions to improvement of the environment and transport sectors, the Court examined: (a) whether the environmental projects were consistent with EU directives in the fields of water supply and wastewater; (b) whether transport projects contributed to the completion of the trans-European transport network. 
Da bi ocenilo, kako uspešno so projekti konkretno prispevali k izboljšanju okoljskega in prometnega sektorja, je Sodišče preučilo: (a) ali so bili okoljski projekti skladni z direktivami EU na področjih oskrbe z vodo in odpadnih vod; (b) ali so prometni projekti prispevali k dokončanju vseevropskega prometnega omrežja.
As at the time of the audit final reports were available on only a limited number of the 279 infrastructure projects co-financed by ISPA, only partial conclusions could be drawn. 
Ker so bila v času revizije na voljo končna poročila le za omejeno število od 279 infrastrukturnih projektov, ki jih sofinancira ISPA, je bilo mogoče priti le do delnih zaključkov.
COMPLIANCE WITH EU ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS HAS INCREASED 39. 
SKLADNOST Z OKOLJSKIMI STANDARDI EU SE JE POVEČALA 39.
In the environmental sector, out of 16 projects in the sample, only three were completed at the time of the audit. 
V okoljskem sektorju so bili v času revizije od 16 projektov v vzorcu dokončani le trije.
The assessment of these projects shows that, in spite of some shortcomings, they are contributing to compliance with EU environmental standards (see Textbox 10). 
Ocena teh projektov kaže, da kljub nekaterim pomanjkljivostim prispevajo k skladnosti z okoljskimi standardi EU (glej okvir 10).
23 TEXTBOX 10 In Latvia, the objective of one project was to improve water supply and sewage services, ensuring that drinking water and purified sewage conform to the national legislation and the requirements of the EU directives. 
23 OKVIR 10 Cilj enega projekta v Latviji je bil izboljšati storitve oskrbe z vodo in kanalizacijske storitve ter tako zagotoviti, da pitna voda in prečiščene odplake ustrezajo nacionalni zakonodaji in zahtevam direktiv EU.
According to the final report, the project has ensured adequate quality of the treated water according to the EU urban wastewater treatment directive (91/271/EEC) and of the drinking water. 
Po podatkih v končnem poročilu je projekt zagotovil ustrezno kakovost prečiščene vode v skladu z direktivo EU o čiščenju komunalne odpadne vode (91/271/EGS) ter ustrezno kakovost pitne vode.
In Latvia, the objective of one project was to develop drinking water quality and wastewater services. 
Cilj drugega projekta v Latviji je bil izboljšati kakovost pitne vode in storitev v zvezi z odpadnimi vodami.
The EU standards for drinking water quality have been met. 
Standardi kakovosti pitne vode, ki veljajo v EU, so bili doseženi.
However, for wastewater, full compliance with legal requirements had not yet been achieved. 
Vendar za odpadne vode ni bila dosežena popolna skladnost z zakonskimi zahtevami.
The rehabilitation and upgrading of a biological wastewater treatment plant had been completed but the nitrogen and phosphorus content in the effluent still exceeded the EU and local norms at the time of the audit. Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–06 
Sanacija in posodobitev naprave za biološko čiščenje odpadnih vod sta bili končani, vendar je vsebnost dušika in forforja v iztoku v času revizije še vedno presegala norme EU in lokalne norme. Posebno poročilo št. 12/2008 – Instrument strukturnih politik v predpristopnem obdobju (ISPA) 2000–2006
40. In spite of some shortcomings, the projects that were not completed at the time of the audit, if implemented as planned, are likely to contribute to compliance with EU environmental standards (see Textbox 11). 
OKVIR 11 OKVIR 12 OKVIR 13 40. Projekti, ki v času revizije niso bili končani, bodo kljub nekaterim pomanjkljivostim verjetno prispevali k skladnosti z okoljskimi standardi EU, če bodo izvedeni, kot je bilo načrtovano (glej okvir 11).
IMPROVEMENTS IN LINKS TO THE TRANSEUROPEAN TRANSPORT NETWORK 41. 
IZBOLJŠANJE POVEZAV Z VSEEVROPSKIM PROMETNIM OMREŽJEM 41.
In the transport sector out of 16 projects contained in the sample only two had been completed at the time of the audit. 
V prometnem sektorju sta bila v času revizije od 16 projektov v vzorcu dokončana le 2.
The assessment of these projects shows that they are contributing to the completion/ development of trans-European networks (see Figures 8 and 9 and Textboxes 12 and 13). 
Ocena teh projektov kaže, da prispevata k dokon-čanju/razvoju vseevropskih omrežij (glej sliki 8 in 9 ter okvira 12 in 13).
The other projects that at the time of the audit were not completed are consistent with the TEN-T network (see for example Textbox 11 and Figure 11). 
Drugi projekti, ki v času revizije niso bili končani, so skladni z omrežjem TEN-T (glej na primer okvir 11 in sliko 11).
For example in Romania, the Bucharest Cernavoda project should speed up the traffic between Bucarest and Constanta and is expected to contribute to the development of European Transport Corridor No 7, Igumenitsa–Patras–Athens–Sofia–Budapest (see Figure 10). 
Na primer, projekt “Bukare-šta Cernavodă” v Romuniji bi moral pospešiti promet med Bukarešto in Konstanco ter se zanj pričakuje, da bo prispeval k razvoju evropskega prometnega koridorja št. 7, Igumenica–Patras–Atene–Sofija–Budim-pešta (glej sliko 10).
24 TEXTBOX 11 TEXTBOX 12 TEXTBOX 13 In Poland, a wastewater treatment project should increase the percentage of the population of the city of Wrocław who are connected to the sewage network to 97 %. 
24 S projektom naprav za čiščenje odpadnih vod na Poljskem bi se moral odstotek prebivalcev mesta Wrocław s priključkom na kanalizacijsko omrežje povečati na 97 %.
This city, with a population of more than 600 000 inhabitants, was considered the main polluter of the river Odra. 
To mesto, ki ima več kot 600 000 prebivalcev, je štelo za glavnega onesnaževalca reke Odre.
In Romania, a project consisted of the rehabilitation and upgrading of a wastewater treatment plant, a sewage network and a drinking water network. 
Projekt v Romuniji je zajemal sanacijo in posodobitev naprave za čiščenje odpadnih vod, kanalizacijskega omrežja ter omrežja pitne vode.
Due to delays concerning the wastewater treatment plant, the risk of pollution of the river remains. 
Zaradi zamud, do katerih je prišlo pri napravi za čiščenje odpadnih vod, tveganje onesnaženosti reke ostaja.
In the Czech Republic the project ‘Modernisation of the line section Zabori–Prelouc’ is in the pan-European multimodal corridor IV from Dresden to Bratislava. 
Projekt posodobitve železniškega odseka Záboří–Přelouč na Češkem je v vseevropskem multimodalnem koridorju IV, ki sega od Dresdna do Bratislave.
In Figure 8, the projects co-financed by ISPA in the Czech Republic are highlighted. 
Na sliki 8 so označeni projekti, ki jih sofinancirata ISPA in Češka.
In Latvia, the upgrading of the motorway from Riga to Adazi, which is a section of Via Baltica linking Warsaw to Tallinn, improved the traffic and pedestrian safety as well as the traffic fluidity by bringing this road section in compliance with European road standards and norms (see Figure 9). Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–06 
V Latviji je posodobitev avtoceste iz Rige v Ādaži, ki je odsek ceste Via Baltica, povezave med Varšavo in Talinom, izboljšala varnost prometa in pešcev ter pretočnost prometa tako, da je ta odsek ceste uskladila z evropskimi standardi in normami (glej sliko 9). Posebno poročilo št. 12/2008 – Instrument strukturnih politik v predpristopnem obdobju (ISPA) 2000–2006
FIGURE 8 25 ISPA PROJECTS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC Trans-European transport network ISPA projects Ceska Republica D8 motorway Prague – Usti nad Labem – Czech/German border Section 807 Trmice-border Modernisation of the line section Usti nad Orlici – Ceska Trebova Modernisation of the line section Zabori–Prelouc Optimisation of Zabreh na Morave – Krasikov railway section Road R/48 Frydek Mistek – Dobra Road I/48 Belotin by-pass Expressway r48 Dobra–Tosanovice–Zukov, Stage I: Dobra–Tosanovice © EuroGeographics 2001 for the administrative boundaries Cartography: Energy and Transport DG, 15/5/2008 TEN railway TEN road Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–06 
SLIKA 8 25 PROJEKTI ISPA NA ČEŠKEM Trans-European transport network ISPA projects Ceska Republica D8 motorway Prague – Usti nad Labem – Czech/German border Section 807 Trmice-border Modernisation of the line section Usti nad Orlici – Ceska Trebova Modernisation of the line section Zabori–Prelouc Optimisation of Zabreh na Morave – Krasikov railway section Road R/48 Frydek Mistek – Dobra Road I/48 Belotin by-pass Expressway r48 Dobra–Tosanovice–Zukov, Stage I: Dobra–Tosanovice © EuroGeographics 2001 for the administrative boundaries Cartography: Energy and Transport DG, 15/5/2008 TEN railway TEN road Posebno poročilo št.
FIGURE 9 LATVIJA 26 ROAD NETWORK IN LATVIA LEITSCHEMA DES TRANSEUROPÄISCHEN VERKEHRSNETZES (Horizont 2020) TRANS-EUROPEAN TRANSPORT NETWORK OUTLINE PLAN (2020 horizon) SCHÉMA DU RÉSEAU TRANSEUROPÉEN DE TRANSPORT (horizon 2020) STRASSEN ROADS ROUTES Bestehend Existing Existant Geplant Planned Planifié © EuroGeographics 2001 for the administrative boundaries Cartography: Energy and Transport DG, 29/9/2005 Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–06 
12/2008 – Instrument strukturnih politik v predpristopnem obdobju (ISPA) 2000–2006 SLIKA 9 LATVIJA 26 CESTNO OMREŽJE V LATVIJI LEITSCHEMA DES TRANSEUROPÄISCHEN VERKEHRSNETZES (Horizont 2020) TRANS-EUROPEAN TRANSPORT NETWORK OUTLINE PLAN (2020 horizon) SCHÉMA DU RÉSEAU TRANSEUROPÉEN DE TRANSPORT (horizon 2020) STRASSEN ROADS ROUTES Bestehend Existing Existant Geplant Planned Planifié © EuroGeographics 2001 for the administrative boundaries Cartography: Energy and Transport DG, 29/9/2005 Posebno poročilo št.
FIGURE 10 27 TENT NEWORKS PROJECT No 7 MOTORWAY AXIS Trans-European transport network IGOUMENITSA/PATRA–ATHINA–SOFIA–BUDAPEST © EuroGeographics 2001 for the administrative boundaries Cartography: Energy and Transport DG, 9/3/2005 priority projects Existing Planned Priority axis No 7 Priority sections Other priority axes Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–06 
12/2008 – Instrument strukturnih politik v predpristopnem obdobju (ISPA) 2000–2006 SLIKA 10 27 OMREŽJA TENT MOTORWAY AXIS Trans-European transport network IGOUMENITSA/PATRA–ATHINA–SOFIA–BUDAPEST © EuroGeographics 2001 for the administrative boundaries Cartography: Energy and Transport DG, 9/3/2005 PROJECT No 7 priority projects Existing Planned Priority axis No 7 Priority sections Other priority axes Posebno poročilo št.
FIGURE 11 28 TENT NETWORK © EuroGeographics 2001 for the administrative boundaries Cartography: Energy and Transport DG, 4/6/2008 Special Report No 12/2008 — The Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA), 2000–06 ISPA projects 2004–08 countries ISPA project TEN railway TEN road 
12/2008 – Instrument strukturnih politik v predpristopnem obdobju (ISPA) 2000–2006 SLIKA 11 28 OMREŽJE TENT © EuroGeographics 2001 for the administrative boundaries Cartography: Energy and Transport DG, 4/6/2008 Posebno poročilo št.
29 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 43. The Court’s main conclusions are as follows. (a) A coherent strategic framework was in place and national ISPA strategies proved to be a good programming tool clearly identifying needs, objectives and resources. 
Glavni zaključki Sodišča so: (a) Vzpostavljen je bil skladen strateški okvir, nacionalne strategije ISPA pa so se izkazale za dobro orodje programiranja, ki jasno opredeljuje potrebe, cilje in sredstva.
Nonetheless, projects were not always adequately prepared by applicants. 
Vendar prosilci niso vedno ustrezno pripravili projektov.