natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
These cases are not always flagged as fraudulent, even though the Commission’s guidelines require this. 
Ti primeri niso vedno označeni kot goljufije, čeprav smernice Komisije to zahtevajo.
In addition, some suspected fraudulent cases do not require an OLAF investigation, but are followed-up by DGs through audits. 
Poleg tega za nekatere primere suma goljufije ni potrebna preiskava urada OLAF, ampak jih z revizijami preiščejo generalni direktorati.
These cases are not always included in the reported value of fraudulent spending. 
Ti primeri niso vedno vključeni v prijavljeno vrednost goljufij pri porabi.
The Commission has not yet established clear guidelines on how to compile this data. 
Komisija še ni pripravila jasnih smernic za zbiranje teh podatkov.
The Commission lacks insight into the level of undetected fraud 33 The Commission does not estimate undetected fraud. 
Komisija nima vpogleda v raven neodkritih goljufij 33 Komisija nima ocen, kolikšna je raven neodkritih goljufij.
Nor has it ever carried out a crime victimisation or encounter survey focusing on fraud in EU spending. 
Prav tako nikoli ni izvedla ankete o žrtvah kriminala ali srečevanju z njim na področju goljufij pri porabi EU.
The Commission told us that it did not consider victimisation, encounter or perception surveys to be suitable tools for providing better insight into the overall scale of EU subsidy fraud, because an EU budget fraud victim survey would entail considereable costs and it is not clear to whom such sociological questions should be addressed. 
Sodišču je sporočila, da anket o žrtvah, srečevanju ali zaznavi ne dojema kot primernih pripomočkov za boljši vpogled v skupni obseg goljufij pri subvencijah EU, saj bi anketa o žrtvah goljufij v zvezi s proračunom EU povzročila visoke stroške, pri tem pa ni jasno, na koga naj bi bila taka sociološka vprašanja naslovljena.
34 However, perception and experience-based studies have been used for measuring corruption, which is also a hidden crime. 
34 Po drugi strani so bile ankete o zaznavi in ankete na podlagi izkušenj uporabljene pri merjenju korupcije, ki je prav tako skrito kaznivo dejanje.
Such surveys are not carried out to replace official statistics, but rather to complement them. 
Take ankete se ne izvajajo kot nadomestek uradne statistike, ampak kot dodatek k njej. 19
21 35 On top of perception-based surveys, there have also been some recent studies estimating the level of corruption risk or control of corruption using objective administrative data21. 
20 35 Poleg raziskav na podlagi zaznave je bilo nedavno izvedenih tudi nekaj raziskav o oceni ravni tveganja korupcije ali obvladovanju korupcije.
36 Within the area of Cohesion, DG REGIO has initiated a study assessing the quality of government at regional level, using public procurement data. 
Zanje so bili uporabljeni objektivni upravni podatki.21 36 Na področju kohezije je GD REGIO uvedel študijo za oceno kakovosti upravljanja na regionalni ravni z uporabo podatkov o javnem naročanju.
One of the performance indicators measured was the control of corruption risks (Box 1). 
Eden od merjenih kazalnikov smotrnosti je bil nadzor tveganja korupcije (okvir 1).
Having a view of regional or sectoral variation in this connection is crucial for understanding corruption risks and managing them effectively. 
Vpogled v tozadevne regionalne ali sektorske razlike je ključen za razumevanje in uspešno obvladovanje tveganja korupcije.
Box 1 Study on the quality of government at regional level, using public procurement data In 2017, DG REGIO initiated a region-by-region study on public procurement performance in EU Member States, using an innovative corruption risk indicator developed by the DIGIWHIST research project at the University of Cambridge. 
Okvir 1 Študija o kakovosti upravljanja na regionalni ravni z uporabo podatkov o javnem naročanju GD REGIO je leta 2017 začel izvajati raziskavo o smotrnosti pri javnem naročanju po posameznih regijah v državah članicah EU, pri čemer je uporabil inovativen kazalnik tveganja korupcije, razvit v okviru raziskovalnega projekta DIGIWHIST na Univerzi v Cambridgeu.
This method uses big data from large-scale public procurement databases (Tender Electronic Daily), company registry data and financial and ownership data22. This corruption measurement method indicates that the variation between regions or sectors is greater than that between different countries, as comparing differences between countries masks a wide range of differences within those countries themselves. 
Pri tej metodi se uporabljajo masovni podatki iz velikih podatkovnih zbirk o oddaji javnih naročil (Tender Electronic Daily), podatki iz registra podjetij ter podatki o financah in lastništvu.22 Metoda merjenja korupcije kaže, da so razlike med regijami ali sektorji večje kot med državami, saj se pri primerjavi razlik med državami zakrije širok razpon razlik znotraj posamezne države.
37 These examples illustrate that it is in fact possible to gain insight into the scale of undetected fraud or corruption. 
37 Ti primeri kažejo, da je dejansko mogoče pridobiti vpogled v obseg neodkritih goljufij ali korupcije.
21 Fazekas, M., and Kocsis, G., (2017); Fazekas, M., Tóth, I. J., and King, P. L., (2016); Golden, M. and Picci, L. 
39 Komisija analizira različne vrste goljufij, da bi ravnala v skladu s: 21 Fazekas, M. in Kocsis, G. (2017); Fazekas, M., Tóth, I. J. in King, P. L.
The Centre for Counter Fraud Studies at the University of Portsmouth has also developed a fraud loss measurement (FLM) method. 
Center za študije v zvezi z bojem proti goljufijam na Univerzi v Portsmouthu je prav tako razvil metodo za merjenje izgub zaradi goljufij.
See Button, M. and Gee, J. 
Glej Button, M. in Gee, J.
22 Fazekas, M.and Kocsis, G. 
22 Fazekas, M. in Kocsis, G.
(2017); Fazekas, M., Tóth, I. J., and King, P. L.(2016); pp. 369-397. 
(2017); Fazekas, M., Tóth, I. J. in King, P. L. (2016); str. 369–397.
39 The Commission analyses the different types of fraud in order to comply with: o its annual obligation to present to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the measures taken by the Commission and the Member States in the fight against fraud and the result of these actions (in the PIF report) and its obligations under sectoral legislation; o the Commission’s internal control framework, which requires a fraud risk assessment. 
21 o svojo vsakoletno obveznostjo, da Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu predloži poročilo o ukrepih, ki so jih sama in države članice sprejele v boju proti goljufijam, in njihovih rezultatih (v poročilu o zaščiti finančnih interesov) ter svojimi obveznostmi glede na sektorsko zakonodajo; o svojim okvirom notranjega nadzora, ki zahteva oceno tveganja goljufij.
40 The 2016 PIF report includes a section on types of irregularities reported as fraudulent for both Funds in the area of Agriculture, and for the “Research and technological development” (R&TD) priority area for the period 2007-2013 in the case of the Structural Funds. 
40 Poročilo o zaščiti finančnih interesov za leto 2016 vključuje oddelek o vrstah nepravilnosti, ki so bile prijavljene kot goljufive v zvezi s skladoma na področju kmetijstva, v primeru strukturnih skladov pa v zvezi s prednostnim področjem raziskav in tehnološkega razvoja za obdobje 2007–2013.
The report’s analysis of modus operandi includes different types of irregularities reported as fraudulent23. 41 In addition to the PIF report, OLAF has also prepared several analyses, called ‘case compendiums’, covering the main fraud patterns, vulnerabilities and red flags. These case compendiums provide a list of anonymised cases based on OLAF’s investigative work, together with data from Member States. 
V analizo načinov delovanja, ki je objavljena v poročilu, so vključene različne vrste nepravilnosti, ki so bile prijavljene kot goljufive.23 41 OLAF je poleg poročila o zaščiti finančnih interesov pripravil tudi več analiz, ki jih imenuje zbirke primerov, zajemajo pa glavne vzorce goljufij, ranljive točke in opozorilne znake. Zbirke vsebujejo seznam anonimiziranih primerov, sestavljen na podlagi preiskovalnega dela urada OLAF, in podatke iz držav članic.
42 These are good examples of how OLAF’s investigative knowledge and other intelligence can be used to provide timely information on the key fraud threats to the EU budget. However, these compendiums are one-off documents that are not updated on a continuous basis. 
42 Te zbirke so dober primer, kako je mogoče preiskovalno znanje in druge obveščevalne podatke urada OLAF uporabiti za zagotavljanje pravočasnih informacij o ključnih goljufijah, ki grozijo proračunu EU, vendar gre za enkratne dokumente, ki se ne posodabljajo redno.
OLAF has produced four such case compendiums related to fraud24, published in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively, but has not since published any update. 
OLAF je v zvezi z goljufijami pripravil štiri zbirke primerov24, ki so bile objavljene leta 2010, 2011, 2012 in 2013, od takrat pa ni objavil nobene posodobitve.
For example, the most recent case compendium for Structural Funds, published in 2011, concerns the 1994-1999 and 2000-2006 programme periods. 
Na primer, v najnovejši zbirki primerov za strukturne sklade, ki je bila objavljena leta 2011, sta obravnavani programski obdobji 1994–1999 in 2000–2006.
No central fraud risk assessment is carried out for the Commission as a whole and there is no corporate fraud risk register. 
Za Komisijo kot celoto se osrednje ocene tveganja goljufij ne izvajajo, prav tako pa ne obstaja register tveganj goljufij v podjetjih.
Such information should feed the Commission’s Anti-Fraud Strategy (CAFS). 
Take informacije bi bilo treba vključiti v strategijo Komisije za boj proti goljufijam, ki je bila sprejeta leta 2011.
The CAFS, adopted in 2011, does not include any information on whether any underlying fraud risk analysis exists or on the results of such analysis. 
Strategija ne vključuje informacij o morebitnem obstoju osnovne analize tveganja goljufij ali njenih rezultatih.
44 We reviewed the fraud risk assessments performed by seven Commission DGs. These fraud risk assessments were based solely on an analysis of detected fraud, combining information from different internal sources (e.g. the IMS, OLAF, DGs’ audit results and ECA findings). 
44 Sodišče je pregledalo ocene tveganja goljufij, ki jih je opravilo sedem generalnih direktoratov Komisije izključno na podlagi analize odkritih goljufij, v okviru katere so bile združene informacije iz različnih notranjih virov (npr. sistema za upravljanje nepravilnosti, 23 Glej na primer Delovni dokument služb Komisije SWD(2017) 266 final, del 2/2, preglednica CP16, str.
They do not use other information coming from external sources, such as national crime statistics or official government reports, or analyses and reports by NGOs, corruption risk indicators or surveys, to complement their fraud risk analyses. 
Generalni direktorati teh analiz tveganja goljufij niso dopolnili z drugimi informacijami iz zunanjih virov, kot so nacionalni statistični podatki ali uradna vladna poročila o kaznivih dejanjih, analize in poročila nevladnih organizacij ali kazalniki tveganja korupcije ali ankete o njem.
Therefore, the conclusion drawn by five of the seven spending DGs that the risk of fraud is low is not based on an exhaustive analysis covering all necessary elements25. 45 The information in the global fraud register created by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, together with the accountancy firm Moore Stephens, suggests that the risk of fraud could be high in grant spending (which accounts for a big share of EU spending). 
Pet od sedmih generalnih direktoratov porabnikov je ugotovilo, da je tveganje goljufij majhno, vendar ta ugotovitev ne temelji na izčrpni analizi, ki bi zajela vse potrebne elemente.25 45 Informacije v globalnem registru goljufij, ki ga je vzpostavil Pooblaščeni inštitut za javne finance in računovodstvo Združenega kraljestva v sodelovanju z računovodskim podjetjem Moore Stephens, kažejo, da bi bilo lahko tveganje goljufij veliko pri porabi nepovratnih sredstev (ki pomeni velik delež porabe EU).
This register is based on a global survey of over 150 accountancy and fraud risk professionals across 37 countries, in order to gauge the most serious risk areas across the globe. 
Register temelji na anketi, izvedeni na svetovni ravni, v kateri je sodelovalo več kot 150 strokovnjakov na področju računovodstva in tveganja goljufij iz 37 držav, da bi ocenili najresnejša področja tveganja po svetu.
Respondents considered 18 different types of fraud and bribery risk, scoring them from 1 (lowest risk) to 5 (highest risk). 
Anketiranci so 18 vrst tveganja goljufij in podkupovanja ocenili z ocenami od 1 (najmanjše tveganje) do 5 (največje tveganje).
Almost half (48 %) of all respondents surveyed said that grant fraud posed a high or very high risk, putting it at number one on the register26. 46 Some of the experts we consulted are of the view that it is important to use several different methods, tailored to the type of spending, to gain a better insight into the risk, scale and nature of fraud in EU spending. 
Skoraj polovica (48 %) anketiranih strokovnjakov je menila, da goljufije v zvezi z nepovratnimi sredstvi pomenijo veliko ali zelo veliko tveganje, zato se je to tveganje v registru uvrstilo na prvo mesto.26 46 Nekateri strokovnjaki, s katerimi se je posvetovalo Sodišče, menijo, da je pomembno uporabljati različne metode, prilagojene vrsti porabe, da bi dobili boljši vpogled v tveganje, obseg in naravo goljufij pri porabi EU.
For example, for the Common Agricultural Policy, where funding is mainly granted through entitlements and there is less discretion in how EU money is allocated, one potential way to measure the scale of fraudulent spending might be by measuring fraud loss. 
Na primer, pri skupni kmetijski politiki, pri kateri se financiranje zagotavlja predvsem prek plačilnih pravic in je pri dodeljevanju sredstev EU manj proste presoje, bi lahko obseg goljufij pri porabi med drugim ugotavljali z merjenjem izgub zaradi goljufij.
For investment projects, it might be possible to establish the risk of fraud and corruption by analysing administrative datasets (big data) such as public tendering 25 DGs EMPL, REGIO, AGRI, RTD and HOME. 
Pri naložbenih projektih bi si pri ugotavljanju tveganja goljufij in korupcije morda lahko pomagali z analizo naborov upravnih podatkov (masovnih podatkov), kot so podatkovne zbirke o javnih razpisih in naročilih, pa tudi vlog za nepovratna sredstva in odločitev o njih.
26 https://www.moorestephens.co.uk/services/governance-risk-and-assurance/rhiza-risk-management-tool/global-fraud-risk-register#. 
26 https://www.moorestephens.co.uk/services/governance-risk-and-assurance/rhiza-risk-management-tool/global-fraud-risk-register.
48 The most frequent type of suspected fraud we identify in our audits is beneficiaries artificially creating conditions to obtain access to EU funds. 
23 48 Najpogostejša vrsta suma goljufije, ki jo je Sodišče prepoznalo pri svojih revizijah, se nanaša na to, da upravičenci umetno ustvarijo pogoje za dostop do sredstev EU.
This modus operandi shows that fraudsters are not always organised criminals, but individuals (beneficiaries of EU funds) who intentionally break the rules in order to receive EU funds to which they believe they are legitimately entitled. 
Ta način delovanja kaže, da goljufi niso vedno organizirani kriminalci, temveč posamezniki (upravičenci do sredstev EU), ki namerno kršijo pravila, da bi prejeli sredstva EU, za katera menijo, da jim upravičeno pripadajo.
Some of the experts highlighted the possibility of a causal link between the complexity of rules and fraud. 
Nekateri strokovnjaki so opozorili na možnost vzročne povezave med zapletenostjo predpisov in goljufijami.
Surveying EU Box 2 Artificially creating conditions to obtain rural development aid A number of groups of people (who were part of the same family or part of the same economic group) set up several entities for the purpose of obtaining aid which exceeds the ceiling allowed under the conditions of the investment measure. 
V okviru 2 je naveden primer, o katerem je Sodišče poročalo v svojem letnem poročilu za leto 2014.27 Okvir 2 Umetno ustvarjanje pogojev za pridobivanje pomoči za razvoj podeželja Več skupin ljudi (del iste družine ali iste ekonomske skupine) je ustanovilo več subjektov z namenom pridobitve pomoči, ki presega zgornjo mejo, ki jo dovoljujejo pogoji naložbenega ukrepa.
The beneficiaries declared that these entities were operating independently, but this was not the case in practice, as they were designed to function together. 
Upravičenci so izjavili, da ti subjekti delujejo neodvisno, vendar dejansko ni bilo tako, ker so bili zasnovani, da bi delovali skupaj.
They were effectively part of the same economic group, with the same place of business, staff, clients, suppliers and financing sources. 
Praktično so bili del iste ekonomske skupine z istim sedežem podjetja, istimi zaposlenimi, strankami, dobavitelji in viri financiranja.
49 A study on corruption risks in EU Member States suggests that the opportunity for discretionary spending without adequate controls increases the risk of corrupt spending28. Some of the experts highlighted similar kind of risks. 
49 Študija tveganj korupcije v državah članicah EU kaže, da se s priložnostjo za porabo po lastni presoji brez ustreznih kontrol poveča tveganje koruptivne porabe.28 Nekateri strokovnjaki so opozorili na podobno vrsto tveganj.
It would therefore be appropriate for OLAF or the Commission DGs to analyse how the discretion in EU co-financed programmes affects the risk of fraud within a given spending area. 
Glede na to bi bilo primerno, da bi OLAF ali generalni direktorati Komisije analizirali, kako lastna presoja v programih, ki jih sofinancira EU, vpliva na tveganje goljufij na posameznem področju porabe.
This is particularly true in the area of 27 European Court of Auditors, 2014 Annual Report, p. 
Glede na to je dobra praksa, če se določi subjekt ali enega najvišjih vodij, da vodi in nadzoruje 27 Evropsko računsko sodišče, letno poročilo za leto 2014, str.
28 Mungiu-Pippidi, A., (2013), pp. 10-11. 
28 Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2013), str. 10–11.
Clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of the operational units involved is also crucial, as this is the only way to avoid duplicating roles and evaluate the actual impact of each player. 
24 dejavnosti organizacije za boj proti goljufijam.29 Ključna je tudi jasna opredelitev vlog in odgovornosti sodelujočih operativnih enot, saj je le tako mogoče preprečiti podvajanje vlog in oceniti dejanski učinek vsakega akterja.
We also assessed whether the Commission has a well-designed anti-fraud strategy capable of guiding its day-to-day anti-fraud actions, and whether it properly measures the outputs of these actions. 
Poleg tega je ocenilo, ali ima Komisija dobro zasnovano strategijo za boj proti goljufijam, s katero je sposobna usmerjati svoje vsakodnevne ukrepe na tem področju, in ali ustrezno meri izložke teh ukrepov.
Under the Commission’s governance model, responsibilities are split; however, corporate oversight of fraud risk management is insufficient 52 We analysed the various bodies’ typical (most frequent) roles and responsibilities for the key fraud-related outcomes at each of the phases in combating fraud: planning, implementation and reporting (Annex V). 
V okviru modela upravljanja Komisije so odgovornosti razdrobljene, nadzor obvladovanja tveganja goljufij pri podjetjih pa je pomanjkljiv 52 Sodišče je analiziralo tipične (najpogostejše) vloge in odgovornosti različnih organov za ključne rezultate v zvezi z goljufijami v vsaki fazi boja proti goljufijam – načrtovanju, izvajanju in prijavljanju (Priloga V).
53 Under the Commission’s governance model, the roles and responsibilities of the Commission departments involved in anti-fraud actions are split. 
53 V okviru modela upravljanja Komisije so vloge in odgovornosti služb Komisije, ki sodelujejo v ukrepih za boj proti goljufijam, razdrobljene.
However, corporate oversight is insufficient. 
Vendar pa je nadzor nad podjetji nezadosten.
Most bodies have a consultative role. 
Večina organov ima posvetovalno vlogo.
The key players responsible for anti-fraud actions are the College of Commissioners, the DGs and Member State authorities. 
Ključni akterji, odgovorni za ukrepe za boj proti goljufijam, so kolegij komisarjev, generalni direktorati in organi držav članic.
26 54 The President of the Commission sets out each Commissioner’s responsibilities in individual mission letters. 
54 Predsednik Komisije odgovornosti vsakega komisarja navede v poslanici zanj.
He requires all Commissioners to ensure the sound financial management of the programmes under their responsibility, including protecting the EU budget from fraud. 
Od vseh komisarjev zahteva, da zagotovijo dobro finančno poslovodenje programov, za katere so odgovorni, vključno z zaščito proračuna EU pred goljufijami.
The mission letter of the Commissioner for Budget and Human Resources, who is responsible for OLAF, requires him to focus on “strengthening investigation of fraud against the EU budget, corruption and serious misconduct within the European institutions, by supporting the work of OLAF, whose investigative independence must be preserved”. 
V poslanici za komisarja za proračun in človeške vire, ki je odgovoren za OLAF, je navedeno, da se mora osredotočiti na okrepitev preiskovanja goljufij, ki škodijo proračunu EU, korupcije in resnih kršitev v evropskih institucijah, in sicer tako, da podpre delo urada OLAF, ki mora ostati neodvisen preiskovalni organ.
Strategic fraud risk management and fraud prevention are not specifically referred to in the portfolio of this or any other Commissioner. 55 OLAF is the EU’s key anti-fraud body and is required by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 (the ‘OLAF Regulation’) to contribute to developing the Commission’s anti-fraud policy. 
Strateško obvladovanje tveganja goljufij in preprečevanje goljufij nista izrecno omenjena ne v portfelju komisarja za proračun in človeške vire ne v portfeljih drugih komisarjev. 55 OLAF je ključni organ EU za boj proti goljufijam in mora v skladu z Uredbo (EU, Euratom) št.
However, neither OLAF nor any other Commission service plays a major role in overseeing the planning and implementation of the Commission’s anti-fraud actions and the reporting on outputs. 
883/2013 (uredbo o uradu OLAF) prispevati k razvoju politike Komisije na področju boja proti goljufijam, ne OLAF ne nobena druga služba Komisije pa nima velike vloge pri nadzoru načrtovanja in izvajanja ukrepov Komisije za boj proti goljufijam in poročanju o izložkih.
Given the Commission’s governance model, OLAF itself is not responsible for any decision affecting the authorised officers by delegation (AODs) or Member States. 
V skladu z modelom upravljanja Komisije OLAF ni odgovoren za 29 A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programmes, GAO, julij 2015, GAO-15-593SP, str.
It provides guidance and recommendations to those responsible for the various anti-fraud actions (Annex V). 
25 odločitve, ki vplivajo na odredbodajalce na podlagi prenosa pooblastil ali države članice, ampak odgovornim za različne ukrepe za boj proti goljufijam pošilja smernice in priporočila (Priloga V).
56 The Commission shares responsibility for protecting the EU’s financial interests against fraud with Member States in the spending areas of Cohesion and Agriculture. 
56 Komisija si z državami članicami deli odgovornost za zaščito finančnih interesov EU pred goljufijami na področjih porabe kohezije in kmetijstva.
The Commission currently lacks any regular procedures for finding out how well Member States are following up suspected fraud cases. Nor does it have any effective mechanism for prompting Member States to take action against fraud, or for monitoring or influencing such action. 
Trenutno nima niti rednih postopkov, s katerimi bi ugotavljala, kako učinkovito države članice nadalje ukrepajo v zvezi s primeri sumov goljufije, niti uspešnega mehanizma, s katerim bi države članice spodbudila k ukrepanju proti goljufijam ali take ukrepe spremljala in vplivala nanje.