natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The implementation of the (structural) reforms was and remains the responsibility of the Greek authorities, whereas the ‘Task Force for Greece’ was available to advise/assist the Greek authorities where requested. 
Izvedba (strukturnih) reform je bila, in še vedno je, odgovornost grških organov, vendar pa jim je bila na voljo „delovna skupina za Grčijo“, ki jim je nudila svetovanje in pomoč, ko so za to zaprosili.
(56) Special report No 18/2015, ‘Financial assistance provided to countries in difficulties’ (http://eca.europa.eu). 
(56) Posebno poročilo št. 18/2015 – Finančna pomoč, zagotovljena državam v težavah (http://eca.europa.eu).
(57) Special report No 19/2015, ‘More attention to results needed to improve the delivery of technical assistance to Greece’ (http://eca. europa.eu). 
(57) Posebno poročilo št. 19/2015 – Za izboljšanje zagotavljanja tehnične pomoči Grčiji bo treba posvetiti več pozornosti rezultatom (http://eca.europa.eu).
(58) Special report No 22/2015, ‘EU supervision of credit rating agencies — well established but not yet fully effective’ (http://eca. europa.eu). 
(58) Posebno poročilo št. 22/2015 – Nadzor EU nad bonitetnimi agencijami – dobro uveljavljen, vendar še ne povsem uspešen (http://eca.europa.eu).
EN 13.10.2016 Official Journal THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS Youth unemployment 3.72. Chronic youth unemployment is a major problem in a number of Member States, and was an issue we identified as one of the priorities for our work in 2015. 
13.10.2016 Uradni list Evropske unije C 375/111 ODGOVORI KOMISIJE SL UGOTOVITVE SODIŠČA Brezposelnost mladih 3.72 Kronično brezposelnost mladih, ki pomeni hudo težavo v več državah članicah, smo opredelili kot eno od prednostnih nalog pri našem delu v letu 2015.
In response, in 2013 the Council recommended that a ‘Youth Guarantee’ be established by the Member States, with a combination of EU and national funding. 
V odziv na brezposelnost mladih je Svet leta 2013 priporočil, naj države članice s kombinacijo financiranja EU in nacionalnega financiranja vzpostavijo jamstvo za mlade.
Under the Guarantee, young people, within four months of leaving education or losing a job, should find a ‘good quality’ job offer or training to help them find employment in the future. 
Jamstvo naj bi mladim omogočilo, da v štirih mesecih po tem, ko prenehajo z izobraževanjem ali postanejo brezposelni, najdejo kakovostno ponudbo za zaposlitev ali nadaljnje usposabljanje, ki bi jim v prihodnosti omogočilo najti zaposlitev.
In our report on this topic (59), we found that the Commission had provided timely and appropriate support to Member States in setting up their guarantee schemes, but pointed to three potential risks that might affect the schemes’ success: the adequacy of total funding, how a good quality offer should be defined, and the Commission’s monitoring and reporting on results. 3.73. 
Sodišče je v poročilu o tej temi (59) ugotovilo, da je Komisija zagotovila pravočasno in ustrezno podporo državam članicam pri vzpostavljanju njihovih programov jamstva, vendar je opozorilo na tri potencialna tveganja za uspešno izvajanje programa: zadostnost skupnega financiranja, način opredelitve kakovostne ponudbe ter način, kako Komisija spremlja rezultate programa in poroča o njih.
We returned to this issue in our report later in 2015 on the Commission’s support for youth action teams(60), an initiative which brought national and Commission experts together in the eight Member States with the highest levels of youth unemployment (61). 
3.73 K temu vprašanju smo se pozneje v letu 2015 vrnili s poročilom o podpori Komisije za skupine za ukrepanje na področju zaposlovanja mladih (60). To je pobuda, ki je združila nacionalne strokovnjake in strokovnjake Komisije v osmih državah članicah z največjimi stopnjami brezposelnosti mla-dih(61).
We concluded that the effectiveness of the advisory support provided by the Commission to the Member States in relation to the youth action teams was limited by the level and quality of information available to it on how existing ESF or national measures for young unemployed people work on the ground. 
Prišli smo do zaključka, da sta uspešnost svetovalne podpore Komisije državam članicam glede skupin za ukrepanje na področju zaposlovanja mladih omejevali raven in kakovost razpoložljivih informacij o tem, kako obstoječi ukrepi ESS ali nacionalni ukrepi za brezposelne mlade delujejo v praksi.
Moreover, the Commission’s assessment of the amendments to their programmes proposed by the Member States focused mainly on budgetary aspects rather than on the best use of the ESF funds available. of the European Union C 375/111 THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES 3.72. 
Poleg tega je bila ocena Komisije o spremembah programov, ki so jih predlagale države članice, osredotočena predvsem na proračunske vidike in ne na najboljšo uporabo razpoložljivih sredstev ESS.
Concerning the three potential risks that might affect the youth guarantee schemes’ success identified by the Court, the Commission agrees and would like to point out that: — investing in a youth guarantee is crucial for the EU to preserve its future growth potential. 
3.72 Kar zadeva tri potencialna tveganja, ki bi lahko vplivala na uspeh programa „jamstvo za mlade“ in ki jih je ugotovilo Sodišče, Komisija z njimi soglaša in želi poudariti: — vlaganje v jamstvo za mlade je bistvenega pomena za EU, da ohrani potencial za rast v prihodnosti.
Significant EU financial support is already available, but to make the youth guarantee a reality, Member States also need to prioritise youth employment measures in their national budgets, — ‘good-quality’ is a crucial element for implementing the youth guarantee. 
Znatna finančna pomoč EU je že na voljo, vendar morajo države članice v svojih nacionalnih proračunih prednost nameniti ukrepom za zaposlovanje mladih, da bi jamstvo za mlade lahko postalo resničnost; — „kakovost“ je ključni element za izvajanje jamstva za mlade.
The Commission will further stimulate the reflection around ‘good quality’ offers and provide further guidance to Member States, — a lengthy consensus building exercise was necessary to define a common monitoring framework. 
Komisija bo še naprej spodbujala razmišljanje glede „kakovostnih“ ponudb in državam članicam zagotavljala nadaljnje usmeritve; — za opredelitev skupnega okvira spremljanja je bil potreben dolg postopek doseganja konsenza.
Monitoring activities will feed into the Commission’s assessment of the youth guarantee implementation under future European Semester and its 2016 report on the implementation of the scheme to the European Parliament and the Council through the appropriate channels. 3.73. 
Dejavnosti spremljanja bodo prek ustreznih kanalov prispevale k oceni Komisije o izvajanju jamstva za mlade v okviru prihodnjih evropskih semestrov in njenemu poročilu Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu o izvajanju programa za leto 2016.
The Commission proactively used all the instruments available to it, given the legal framework in place, to achieve the objectives of the YATs initiative and to report on them. 
3.73 Komisija je proaktivno uporabila vse instrumente, ki so ji bili na voljo v veljavnem zakonskem okviru, da bi dosegla cilje pobude za skupine za ukrepanje na področju zaposlovanja mladih in o njih poročala.
In the Commission’s view, the YATs initiative has met the political expectations set out by the European Council in its conclusions of 30 January 2012. 
Stališče komisije je, da je pobuda za skupine za ukrepanje na področju zaposlovanja mladih izpolnila politična pričakovanja, ki jih je določil Evropski svet v svojih sklepih z dne 30. januarja 2012.
The key objective of the joint YATs — an ad hoc, punctual initiative — was to mobilise EU and national instruments, including structural funds, and to discuss policy reforms to be included in youth job plans. 
Glavni cilj skupnih skupin za ukrepanje na področju zaposlovanja mladih – trenutna ad hoc pobuda – je bil mobilizirati instrumente EU in nacionalne instrumente, vključno s strukturnimi skladi, ter razpravljati o reformah politike, ki naj bi bile vključene v načrte za zaposlovanje mladih.
The teams were meant to ‘shake the tree’ by raising awareness at the highest political level, creating a sense of urgency and giving a stronger steer while not creating additional administrative or/ and legal procedures. 
Skupine naj bi spodbudile k ukrepanju z ozaveščanjem na najvišji politični ravni ter ustvarile občutek nujnosti in dale močnejše usmeritve, ne da bi ustvarile dodatne upravne in/ali pravne postopke.
(59) Special report No 3/2015, ‘EU Youth Guarantee: first steps taken but implementation risks ahead’ (http://eca.europa.eu). 
(59) Posebno poročilo št. 3/2015 – Jamstvo EU za mlade: narejeni so bili prvi koraki, vendar se nakazujejo tveganja pri izvajanju (http://eca.europa.eu).
(60) Special report No 17/2015, ‘Commission’s support of youth action teams: redirection of ESF funding achieved, but insufficient focus on results’ (http://eca.europa.eu). 
(60) Posebno poročilo št. 17/2015 – Podpora Komisije za skupine za ukrepanje na področju zaposlovanja mladih: preusmerjanje sredstev ESS doseženo, vendar ni dovolj osredotočenosti na rezultate (http://eca.europa.eu).
(61) Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and Slovakia. 
(61) Irska, Grčija, Španija, Italija, Latvija, Litva, Portugalska in Slovaška.
EN C 375/112 Official Journal THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS The environment, energy and climate change 3.74. The environment and climate change, together with its implications for EU policies in a number of other areas, such as agriculture and energy, is one of the global challenges we are targeting in our 2013-2017 strategy. 
C 375/112 Uradni list Evropske unije 13.10.2016 SL UGOTOVITVE SODIŠČA ODGOVORI KOMISIJE Okolje, energetika in podnebne spremembe 3.74 Področje okolja in podnebnih sprememb ter njegov pomen za politike EU na številnih drugih področjih, kot sta kmetijstvo in energetika, je eden od globalnih izzivov, ki jih obravnavamo v svoji strategiji za obdobje 2013–2017.
So our report on EU-funded waste water treatment plants in the Danube river basin examined whether EU support was helping Member States achieve its waste water policy objectives (62) — a key element of a successful environmental policy. 
Zato smo v poročilu o komunalnih čistilnih napravah v Podonavju, ki jih financira EU, preučili, ali podpora EU pomaga državam članicam pri doseganju njenih ciljev politike na področju odpadne vode(62), kar je ključen element uspešne okoljske politike.
We concluded that while EU financial support had played an important role in bringing forward water collection and treatment, this had not been sufficient to meet the relevant deadlines. 3.75. 
Prišli smo do zaključka, da je imela finančna podpora EU pomembno vlogo pri spodbujanju zbiranja in čiščenja odpadne vode, vendar pa to ni zadostovalo za upoštevanje zadevnih rokov.
A later report in 2015 then examined a different aspect of water quality in the Danube basin: progress by the same four Member States in meeting the requirements of the water framework directive (63), whose main objective from 2000 was to achieve good water quality by 2015 (with some exceptions possible). 
3.75 V drugem poročilu je bil pozneje v letu 2015 preučen drug vidik kakovosti vode v Podonavju: napredek istih štirih držav članic pri izpolnjevanju zahtev okvirne direktive o vodah (63), katere glavni cilj od leta 2000 je doseči dobro kakovost vode do leta 2015 (z nekaj morebitnimi izjemami).
We concluded that the implementation of measures co-funded by the EU had led to little improvement in water quality. 
Prišli smo do zaključka, da se zaradi izvajanja ukrepov, ki jih je sofinancirala EU, kakovost vode ni veliko izboljšala.
Indeed, while the introduction of river basin management plans as a tool for integrated water management had been a strength of the directive, in practice the Member States’ plans suffered from shortcomings in the identification of pollution pressures and in the definition of remedial measures. 
Uvedba načrta upravljanja povodja kot orodja za integrirano upravljanje voda je bila sicer ena od prednosti direktive, vendar so v načrtih držav članic v praksi pomanjkljivosti pri ugotavljanju pritiskov onesnaževanja in opredeljevanju popravljalnih ukrepov.
3.76. On a different theme, we examined the EU’s emissions trading scheme (ETS) (64). 
3.76 V okviru druge teme smo preučili sistem EU za trgovanje z emisijami (ETS) (64).
This is an essential pillar of the EU’s policy to combat climate change, and is designed to promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient way. 
Ta je eden od glavnih stebrov politike EU za boj proti podnebnim spremembam in je zasnovan za zmanjšanje emisij toplogrednih plinov na stroškovno in gospodarsko učinkovit način.
We found that management of the scheme by the Commission and the Member States was not adequate in all respects. 
Ugotovili smo, da Komisija in države članice sistema niso upravljale v vseh pogledih ustrezno.
It was hindered by some issues related to the robustness of the framework for protecting its integrity, such as the absence of EU level oversight of the emissions market, and by significant weaknesses in the implementation of the second phase of the scheme in the period 2008-2012, after the initial preparatory phase. of the European Union THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES 13.10.2016 The Commission is committed to continue improving the EU ETS; it will address the shortcomings identified by the auditors. 
Upravljanje so ovirala nekatera vprašanja, povezana z zanesljivostjo okvira za zaščito celovitosti sistema, kot je to, da na ravni EU ni nadzora trga emisij, in bistvene slabosti pri izvajanju faze II sistema v obdobju 2008–2012, ki je sledilo začetni pripravljalni fazi. 3.76 Komisija si prizadeva nadalje izboljšati sistem EU za trgovanje z emisijami in bo obravnavala pomanjkljivosti, ki so jih ugotovili revizorji.
A number of recommendations are to be implemented by Member States. 
Številna priporočila bodo izvedle države članice.
3.76. Many points noted by the ECA were specific to the period 2008-12 (phase 2) and have already largely been addressed in the current rules for the period 2013-2020 (phase 3). 
Veliko točk, ki jih je navedlo Evropsko računsko sodišče, je bilo značilnih za obdobje 2008–2012 (druga faza) in so večinoma že bile obravnavane v sedanjih pravilih za obdobje 2013–2020 (tretja faza).
Since the audit report, there has been a new legislative proposal on ETS (2) (implementation of the climate and energy objectives for 2030 following the October 2014 European Council conclusions). 
Od predložitve revizijskega poročila je bil pripravljen nov zakonodajni predlog o sistemu za trgovanje z emisijami (2) (uresničevanje podnebnih in energetskih ciljev za leto 2030 po sklepih Evropskega sveta iz oktobra 2014).
(62) Special report No 2/2015, ‘EU-funding of urban waste water treatment plants in the Danube river basin: further efforts needed in helping Member States to achieve EU waste water policy objectives’ (http://eca.europa.eu). 
(62) Posebno poročilo št. 2/2015 – Poraba sredstev EU za komunalne čistilne naprave v Podonavju: potrebna so dodatna prizadevanja za pomoč državam članicam pri doseganju ciljev politike EU na področju odpadne vode (http://eca.europa.eu).
The Member States covered by this audit were the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. 
Države članice, ki jih je zajela ta revizija, so bile Češka, Madžarska, Romunija in Slovaška.
(63) Special report No 23/2015, ‘Water quality in the Danube river basin: progress in implementing the water framework directive (2) but still some way to go’ (http://eca.europa.eu). 
(63) Posebno poročilo št. 23/2015 – Kakovost vode v Podonavju: izvajanje okvirne direktive o vodah napreduje, vendar ostaja še veliko dela (http://eca.europa.eu).
(64) Special report No 6/2015, ‘The integrity and implementation of the EU ETS’ (http://eca.europa.eu). 
6/2015 – Celovitost in izvajanje sistema EU za trgovanje z emisijami (EU ETS) (http://eca.europa.eu).
Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council, submitted by the Commission on 15 July 2015, amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon investments (COM(2015) 337 final). 
(2) Predlog Direktive Evropskega parlamenta In Sveta z dne 15. julija 2015 o spremembi Direktive 2003/87/ES za krepitev stroškovno učinkovitega zmanjšanja emisij in nizkoogljičnih naložb (COM(2015) 337 final).
EN 13.10.2016 Official Journal THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS 3.77. We also published a report about the security of energy supply and the development of the EU internal energy market(65). 
13.10.2016 Uradni list Evropske unije C 375/113 ODGOVORI KOMISIJE SL UGOTOVITVE SODIŠČA 3.77 Objavili smo tudi poročilo o zanesljivosti oskrbe z energijo in razvoju notranjega energetskega trga EU(65).
We found that the EU’s objective of completing the internal energy market by 2014 had not been reached. 
Ugotovili smo, da cilj dokončne vzpostavitve notranjega energetskega trga do leta 2014, ki si ga je zastavila EU, ni bil dosežen.
Energy infrastructure in Europe is generally not well designed for fully integrated markets and therefore does not currently provide effective security of energy supply. 
Energetska infrastruktura v Evropi na splošno ni dobro zasnovana za popolnoma povezane trge in zato za zdaj ne zagotavlja uspešne zanesljive oskrbe z energijo.
The follow-up of special report recommendations 3.78. Following up our performance audit reports is an essential element in the cycle of accountability and helps to encourage the implementation of audit recommendations by the Commission and the Member States. 
Spremljanje izvajanja priporočil iz posebnih poročil 3.78 Spremljanje izvajanja priporočil iz revizijskih poročil o smotrnosti poslovanja je nujen element v ciklu odgovornosti in pripomore k spodbujanju Komisije in držav članic k izvajanju revizijskih priporočil.
3.79. In our 2016 special report on the 2014 follow up exercise (66), we made a number of recommendations, suggesting that the Commission should bring its follow-up practices into line with relevant internal control standards. 
3.79 V posebnem poročilu iz leta 2016 o spremljanju popravljalnih učinkov posebnih poročil iz leta 2014(66) smo izrekli več priporočil, v katerih smo predlagali, naj Komisija uskladi svoje zadevne prakse z ustreznimi standardi notranje kontrole.
The Commission accepted these recommendations and agreed to take corrective actions. of the European Union C 375/113 THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES 3.77. 
Komisija je ta priporočila sprejela in se strinjala z uvedbo popravljalnih ukrepov.
The Commission is taking concrete steps to remove the remaining market barriers to the internal energy market, in particular through regional cooperation frameworks involving different Member States and in the context of preparation of its market design initiative. 
3.77 Komisija sprejema konkretne ukrepe za odpravo preostalih tržnih ovir na notranjem energetskem trgu, še posebej z okviri regionalnega sodelovanja, ki vključujejo različne države članice, ter v okviru priprav njene pobude za zasnovo trga.
With regard to infrastructure, it is important to note that: (a) energy infrastructure is expected to be financed by the market, i.e. user tariffs approved by independent regulators; financial support from EU budget therefore should be the exception rather than the rule; (b) where financial support has been allocated, security of supply has often been significantly improved. 
V zvezi z energetsko infrastrukturo je treba poudariti naslednje: (a) pričakuje se, da bo energetsko infrastrukturo financiral trg, uporabniške tarife pa naj bi tako odobrili neodvisni regulativni organi; finančna podpora iz proračuna EU naj bi bila zato izjema in ne pravilo; (b) v primerih, v katerih je bila dodeljena finančna pomoč, se je zanesljivost oskrbe pogosto bistveno izboljšala.
A good example are the Baltic States where support from both EEPR and CEF to key projects has not only increased security of supply in electricity but also helped wholesale prices to converge. 3.79-3.80. The Commission is committed to ensuring that recommendations made by the Court in its special reports and accepted by the Commission are systematically implemented and followed-up. 
Dober primer so baltske države, v katerih je pomoč ključnim projektom iz Evropskega energetskega programa za oživitev in instrumenta za povezovanje Evrope ne le povečala zanesljivost oskrbe z električno energijo, temveč tudi prispevala k temu, da so se veleprodajne cene izravnale. sistematično izvajajo in spremljajo.
The Commission considers that its control arrangements are in line with international control standards and best practices. 
Komisija meni, da so njene ureditve kontrole v skladu z mednarodnimi standardi kontrole in najboljšimi praksami.
However, the Commission is committed to address further challenges concerning the discharge follow-up system and procedures. 
Vendar si Komisija prizadeva, da bi obravnavala nove izzive v zvezi s sistemom in postopki nadaljnjega spremljanja razrešnic.
(65) Special report No 16/2015, ‘Improving the security of energy supply by developing the internal energy market: more efforts needed’ (http://eca.europa.eu). 
(65) Posebno poročilo št. 16/2015 – Izboljšanje zanesljivosti oskrbe z energijo s pomočjo razvoja notranjega energetskega trga: potrebnih je več prizadevanj (http://eca.europa.eu).
(66) Special report No 2/2016, ‘2014 report on the follow-up of the European Court of Auditors’ Special Reports’ (http://eca.europa. eu). 
(66) Posebno poročilo št. 2/2016 – Poročilo za leto 2014 o spremljanju popravnih učinkov posebnih poročil Evropskega računskega sodišča (http://eca.europa.eu).
EN C 375/114 Official Journal of the European Union 13.10.2016 THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS 3.80. We assessed the Commission’s follow up of a sample of 90 audit recommendations from 11 special reports published in the period 2011-2012. 
C 375/114 Uradni list Evropske unije 13.10.2016 SL UGOTOVITVE SODIŠČA 3.80 Ocenili smo, kako je Komisija izvajala priporočila iz vzorca 90 revizijskih priporočil iz 11 posebnih poročil, objavljenih v obdobju 2011–2012.
The sample was selected on the basis of a range of criteria (67). 
Vzorec je bil izbran na podlagi več meril (67).
Of the 83 recommendations that could be verified, we concluded that the Commission fully implemented 63 % of our recommendations, 26 % were implemented in most respects, 10% in some respects while 1% were not implemented. 3.81. 
Za 83 priporočil, ki jih je bilo mogoče preveriti, smo ugotovili, da jih je Komisija v celoti izvedla 63 %, 26 % jih je bilo izvedenih večinoma, 10 % deloma, 1 % pa ni bil izveden.
Although the Commission is our principal auditee, we frequently identify matters which can best be addressed by the Member State authorities or in cooperation with the Commission, given that most EU expenditure is under shared-management arrangements with Member States. 
3.81 Čeprav je Komisija naš glavni revidiranec, pogosto ugotovimo stvari, ki jih lahko najbolje obravnavajo organi držav članic sami ali v sodelovanju s Komisijo, saj se za večino odhodkov EU uporabljajo ureditve deljenega upravljanja z državami članicami.
In our special reports we sometimes also address recommendations to Member States in general. 
V naših posebnih poročilih včasih naslovimo priporočila na države članice na splošno.
We can also direct recommendations to Member States individually although this is rare (68). 
Naslovimo jih lahko tudi na posamezno državo članico, vendar je to redko (68).
Recommendations are communicated to Member State level although formal follow-up is mixed 3.82. When we make recommendations applicable to Member States in general, there are five ways in which these messages may be transmitted (see Figure 3.7). 
Priporočila se sporočijo na raven držav članic, toda formalno izvajanje priporočil je mešano 3.82 Priporočila, ki jih izrečemo za države članice na splošno, je mogoče sporočiti na pet načinov (glej sliko 3.7).
First, each report is sent to the Supreme Audit Institution (the principal national public audit body). 
Prvič, vsako poročilo je poslano vrhovni revizijski instituciji (glavni nacionalni javni revizijski organ).