natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
27 IDENTIfICaTIoN of BoTTlENECKs CoUlD BE IMProVED 33. accurate and reliable analysis is an important prerequisite for the identification of bottleneck sections of the priority projects, and is therefore a key consideration for the prioritisation of eu investment. However, a robust empirical analysis of bottlenecks on key trans-european axes is not available and the commission relies primarily on member states’ own analysis complemented, in recent years, by information gathered by the co-ordinators to identify such bottlenecks. 
27 UGOtavljanje OzkIh Grl je mOGOče IzbOljšatI 33. natančna in zanesljiva analiza je pomemben pogoj za ugotavljanje, kateri odseki pri prednostnih projektih predstavljajo ozka grla, zato je ključna za določanje prednostnih projektov za vlaganja eU. vendar temeljita empirična analiza ozkih grl na ključnih vseevropskih oseh ni na voljo in komisija se zanaša predvsem na analizo držav članic, ki jo v zadnjih letih dopolnjujejo informacije, ki jih za ugotavljanje ozkih grl zbirajo ko-ordinatorji. v POstOPkIh kOmIsIje za IzbIrO In OdObrItev sO bIle slabOstI v okviru kohezijskega sklada so bili odobreni projekTi, ki niso bili TemeljiTo pripravljeni 34. sodišče je preverilo, ali so postopki za odobritev projektov železniške infrastrukture, ki so bili predloženi za sofinanciranje iz kohezijskega sklada in kot veliki projekti esrr, dovolj zanesljivi za ugotavljanje slabosti pri opredelitvi in pripravi projektov. posebno poročilo št.
35. for rail infrastructure projects co-financed by the cohesion fund, the court observed that the evaluation carried out of proposed projects technical aspects was insufficient. In the cases examined, the only review of projects submitted under the cohesion fund was the internal commission so-called inter-service consultation, through which project proposal documents were circulated by dg regional policy to other commission services to obtain an opinion. However, a review of the commission’s files revealed that there is no evidence of a thorough technical review in support of this opinion. as no external rail infrastructure experts were consulted in the process, relying solely on such an internal consultation does not constitute a sufficient mechanism for technical review. moreover, insufficient attention was paid to ensuring that approved projects were adequately prepared. 
8/2010 – Izboljševanje prevozne zmogljivosti na vseevropskih železniških oseh: ali so bile investicije eU v železniško infrastrukturo uspešne? 35. sodišče je pri projektih železniške infrastrukture, ki se sofinancirajo iz kohezijskega sklada, ugotovilo, da ovrednotenje tehničnih vidikov predlaganih projektov ni bilo ustrezno. pri pregledanih predlogih je edini pregled projektov, predloženih v okviru kohezijskega sklada, predstavljalo tako imenovano notranje posvetovanje med službami komisije, pri katerem je gD za regionalno politiko poslal dokumente s predlogi projektov drugim službam komisije, da bi pridobil njihovo mnenje. vendar je pregled dokumentacije komisije pokazal, da ni nobenih dokazov o temeljitem strokovnem pregledu, ki bi utemeljil tako mnenje. v postopku se niso posvetovali z zunanjimi strokovnjaki za železniško infrastrukturo in so se zanašali zgolj na interno posvetovanje, kar pa ni ustrezen mehanizem za strokovni pregled. poleg tega se niso dovolj temeljito prepričali, da so odobreni projekti ustrezno pripravljeni. pri projektu madrid– levante je gD za regionalno politiko evropsko investicijsko banko prosil za nasvet v zvezi s predlogi projekta.
However, despite the eIb raising specific concerns about the extent to which the project had been adequately specified, the project was approved for cohesion funding. the project has subsequently experienced cost escalations of 89 % compared to the amount specified in the project proposal documents (see Box 8). the court notes that the procedure for approving major projects has changed since 2007. project selection procedures under ten-t have been updated but there reMains rooM for further iMproveMent 36. the court reviewed the changes to selection procedures for rail infrastructure project proposals submitted for co-financing under ten-t, in particular, insofar as the weaknesses observed by the court in its previous special report have been addressed. 28 special report no 8/2010 – Improving transport performance on trans-european rail axes: Have eu rail infrastructure investments been effective? 
Čeprav je evropska investicijska banka izrazila pomisleke v zvezi s specifikacijo projekta, je bilo za projekt odobreno financiranje iz kohezijskega sklada. stroški projekta so se kasneje povečali za 89 % v primerjavi z zneskom, ki je bil naveden v dokumentaciji za predlog projekta (glej okvir 8). sodišče opaža, da se je postopek za odobritev velikih projektov od leta 2007 spremenil. izbirni posTopki za projekTe v okviru Ten-T so bili posodobljeni, vendar jih je mogoče še izboljšaTi 36. sodišče je pregledalo spremembe izbirnih postopkov za predloge projektov železniške infrastrukture, ki so bili predloženi za sofinanciranje v okviru ten-t, predvsem pa je preverilo, ali so bile odpravljene slabosti, ki jih je navedlo v predhodnem posebnem poročilu. 28 posebno poročilo št. 8/2010 – Izboljševanje prevozne zmogljivosti na vseevropskih železniških oseh: ali so bile investicije eU v železniško infrastrukturo uspešne?
37. changes have taken place in selection procedures for ten-t projects following the court’s previous recommendations24, in particular: ο the updating of proposals evaluation procedures, in particular to include the use of external experts; ο the contribution made by the co-ordinators in providing contextual information about the situation on the ground on the priority projects; and ο the delegation of a range of tasks to the recently created ten-t executive agency25. 
37. po priporočilih sodišča24, so bili izbirni postopki za projekte ten-t spremenjeni, in sicer so bile uvedene zlasti naslednje spremembe: ο posodobitev postopka vrednotenja predlogov, predvsem zaradi vključitve zunanjih strokovnjakov; ο prispevek koordinatorjev pri zagotavljanju informacij o stanju na terenu za prednostne projekte; ο prenos številnih nalog na nedavno ustanovljeno Izvajalsko agencijo za ten-t25.
It is important that cost benefit analysis, along with environmental and socio-economic analysis, allows for the merits of proposed projects to be compared during the selection procedure. a review of project selection documents revealed that only summary information was submitted regarding a proposed project’s cost benefit analysis and that, in practice, the information contained in these summaries is not consistent in terms of the variables covered, the level of detail or about the assumptions on which the analysis has been based. assumptions made regarding projected future traffic flows are essential elements for such analyses. whilst some initiatives have been taken to ensure that traffic flow assumptions are consistent (for example, in respect of the alpine tunnels), these have been isolated exercises. a coherent model of european rail traffic flows, which could inform overall policy as well as specific project selection, has yet to be developed. 
38. kljub temu je še vedno mogoče izboljšati uporabo analize stroškov in koristi. pomembno je, da analiza stroškov in koristi z okoljsko in socialno-ekonomsko analizo omogoča primerjavo prednosti predlaganih projektov med izbirnim postopkom. pri pregledu dokumentacije za izbiro projektov se je pokazalo, da so bili predloženi le povzetki podatkov iz analize stroškov in koristi za predlagane projekte in da podatki v teh povzetkih v praksi niso dosledni glede zajetih spremenljivk, stopnje podrobnosti ali predpostavk, na katerih je temeljila analiza. predpostavke o predvidenih prihodnjih prometnih tokovih so bistveni elementi takih analiz. bilo je sicer nekaj pobud za zagotavljanje doslednosti predpostavk o prometnih tokovih (na primer v zvezi z alpskimi predori), vendar so bili to osamljeni primeri. koherenten model evropskih železniških prometnih tokov, na katerem bi temeljila splošna politika in izbor posameznih projektov, še ni bil razvit. 24 posebno poročilo št.
24 special report no 6/2005, paragraphs 35, 43, and 52 to 58. 
6/2005, odstavki 35, 43 in od 52 do 58.
25 commissiondecision2007/60/ec of 26 october 2006 establishing the trans-european transport network executive agency pursuant to council regulation (ec) no 58/2003 (oj l 32, 6.2.2007, p. 
25 sklepkomisije2007/60/eszdne 26. oktobra 2006 o ustanovitvi Izvajalske agencije za vseevropsko prometno omrežje na podlagi Uredbe sveta (es) št. 58/2003 (Ul l 32, 6.2.2007, str.
29 special report no 8/2010 – Improving transport performance on trans-european rail axes: Have eu rail infrastructure investments been effective? CoNsTrUCTIoN of EU Co-fINaNCED INfrasTrUCTUrE aCCorDING To sPECIfICaTIoNs aND ITs aVaIlaBIlITy for UsE 39. for each of the co-financed sections sampled for the audit, the court examined the execution of the project insofar as the section infrastructure has been constructed according to specifications, and thereafter whether the infrastructure was made available for use without undue delay. the situation with respect to escalations of project costs was also reviewed. 
8/2010 – Izboljševanje prevozne zmogljivosti na vseevropskih železniških oseh: ali so bile investicije eU v železniško infrastrukturo uspešne? IzGradnja InfrastrUktUre, kI jO sOfInancIra eU, v skladU s sPecIfIkacIjamI In njena PrIPravljenOst za UPOrabO 39. sodišče je za vsak vzorčni sofinanciran odsek pri reviziji preverilo, ali je bil pri projektu odsek infrastrukture zgrajen v skladu s specifikacijami in ali je bila infrastruktura pripravljena za uporabo brez nepotrebnih zamud. preverjalo se je tudi povišanje stroškov projekta.
40. Annex VI shows the status of use of the 21 eu co-financed sections reviewed for the audit. PlaNNED INfrasTrUCTUrE Is DElIVErED IN lINE WITh sPECIfICaTIoN 41. the 14 completed sections in the sample delivered the technical infrastructure defined in the specifications. justifiable amendments to technical specifications were made due to circumstances that came to light during construction. 
40. v Prilogi VI je prikazano stanje glede uporabe 21 odsekov, ki jih je sofinancirala eU, pregledanih med revizijo. načrtOvana InfrastrUktUra je zGrajena v skladU s sPecIfIkacIjamI 41. pri 14 dokončanih odsekih iz vzorca je tehnična infrastruktura zgrajena, kot je bilo opredeljeno v specifikacijah. zaradi okoliščin, ki so se pokazale med gradnjo, so bile tehnične specifikacije upravičeno spremenjene. v enem primeru nekateri tehnični pogoji niso bili v celoti predvideni v specifikacijah projekta (glej okvir 6).
42. the five sections under construction at the time of the audit were also being built as specified. for the two long-term alpine tunnel sections (mont-cenis, brenner (see Photo 5, p. 
42. tudi gradnja petih odsekov, ki v času revizije še ni bila končana, je potekala v skladu s specifikacijami. pri dveh dolgoročnih odsekih alpskih predorov (mont cenis, brenner (glej fotografijo 5, str.
37)), the nature and extent of adjustments to technical specifications that are being made during the planning and exploratory stages are in line with what can be expected given these sections’ particular complexity. these adjustments are being made, for example, in order to take account of environmental concerns or other developments. 
37)) sta narava in obseg prilagoditev tehničnim specifikaci-jam, ki potekajo med načrtovalno in raziskovalno fazo, v skladu s pričakovanji, saj sta ta dva odseka še posebej zapletena. te prilagoditve so potrebne, na primer, za upoštevanje okoljskih zadev in drugih posledic.
43. the court noted the experience of a project supported by the commission to facilitate a network for the dissemination of knowledge on the management and organisation of large infrastructure projects in europe26. It provided useful outcomes in terms of developing contacts between project managers and exchanging practical knowledge, and offers an experience that could be built upon in future initiatives. 
43. sodišče je upoštevalo izkušnjo projekta, ki je prejel podporo komisije, da bi olajšalo vzpostavitev omrežja za širjenje znanja o upravljanju in organizaciji velikih infrastrukturnih projektov v evropi26. ta izkušnja nudi uporabne rezultate v smislu razvijanja stikov med vodji projektov in izmenjave praktičnega znanja ter možnost za prihodnje pobude, da jo nadgradijo.
26 the netlipse project supported under the sixth european framework programme for research and technological development (www.netlipse.eu). 
26 projekt netlIpse je dobil podporo iz šestega evropskega okvirnega programa na področju raziskav in tehnološkega razvoja (www.netlipse.eu).
31 BoX 7 PErPIGNaN-fIGUEras INTErNaTIoNal sECTIoN the perpignan-figueras international section (44 km long including the 8 km perthus tunnel) will allow appropriately equipped uIc-gauge trains to travel between france and spain without stopping and provide for improved flow of freight and passenger traffic. 
31 OkvIr 7 mednarOdnI Odsek PerPIGnan–fIGUeras mednarodni odsek med perpignanom in figuerasom (dolg 44 km, vključno z 8 km dolgim predorom pert-hus) bo ustrezno opremljenim vlakom za standardno tirno širino UIc omogočal potovanje brez ustavljanja med francijo in španijo in zagotovil izboljšan pretok tovornega in potniškega prometa. to je bilo eno redkih javno-zasebnih partnerstev v revizijskem vzorcu.
It was one of the only public-private partnerships in the audit sample, and the contractor completed construction of the infrastructure at the end of 2009. as a result of thorough and detailed preparation, the project was completed more or less on time and on budget. However, whilst the line is connected to the rail network at perpignan, there is, as yet, no connecting line on the spanish side in figueras. the works between barcelona and figueras to make this connection in uIc gauge are ongoing, but will not be completed before 2012. there is, therefore, no prospect of the new international section being available for full use for at least two years after completion. an interim solution involving the installation of a third rail between girona and figueras to allow both uIc and Iberian gauge trains to use the line may be in place by the end of 2010, but, at best, it will provide for only partial use of the new line. 
Izvajalec je gradnjo infrastrukture zaključil konec leta 2009. zaradi temeljite in podrobne priprave je bil projekt zaključen bolj ali manj pravočasno in v okviru proračuna. proga je sicer pri perpignanu povezana z železniškim omrežjem, vendar na španski strani v figuerasu povezave z omrežjem še ni. gradnja povezave s standardno tirno širino UIc med barcelono in figuerasom poteka, a ne bo zaključena pred letom 2012. zato še najmanj dve leti po izgradnji ni pričakovati, da bo nov mednarodni odsek v celoti pripravljen za uporabo. začasna rešitev, ki pomeni izgradnjo tretjega tira med girono in figuerasom, ki bi ga lahko uporabljali vlaki za standardno tirno širino UIc in taki za tirno širino, ki se uporablja na Iberskem polotoku, bi lahko bila pripravljena do konca leta 2010, vendar bi to tudi v najboljšem primeru omogočilo le delno uporabo nove proge.
Photo 3 – New lines on the Perpignan-Figueras international section not yet used © e ,m © . e u ur r o o p pe e a an n c co ou ur rt to of fa au u d d i it to o r r s s , m a ar rc c h h 2 2 0 00 0 9 9 . special report no 8/2010 – Improving transport performance on trans-european rail axes: Have eu rail infrastructure investments been effective? 32 ThErE arE soMETIMEs DElays BEforE INfrasTrUCTUrE BECoMEs aVaIlaBlE for UsE 44. at the time of the audit, all except two of the 14 completed sections had become available for use. 
Fotografija 3 – Nova proga mednarodnega odseka Perpignan–Figueras, ki se še ne uporablja ©e © 9 e v v r r o o p p s sk k o or r a ač č u u n ns sk ko o s so o d d i iš š č če e, , m m a a r re ec c 2 2 0 0 0 0 9 posebno poročilo št. 8/2010 – Izboljševanje prevozne zmogljivosti na vseevropskih železniških oseh: ali so bile investicije eU v železniško infrastrukturo uspešne?
However, for one important cross-border section (the perpignan-figueras international section between france and spain (see Box 7 and Photo 3), a delay in connecting with neighbouring sections mean that, despite the infrastructure being completed, it has not become available for use. CosT EsCalaTIoNs WErE oBsErVED for all sECTIoNs, MosTly DUE To UNforEsEEaBlE rEasoNs 45. escalations in project costs were observed in all cases (see Box 8). 
32 ObčasnO je InfrastrUktUra z zamUdO PrIPravljena za UPOrabO 44. v času revizije je bilo 12 od 14 zgrajenih odsekov pripravljenih za uporabo. vendar je za en pomemben čezmejni odsek (mednarodni odsek perpignan–figueras med francijo in španijo (glej okvir 7 in fotografijo 3)) zamuda pri povezovanju s sosednjimi odseki pomenila, da infrastruktura ni bila pripravljena za uporabo, čeprav je bila dokončana.
In nearly all cases, these escalations arose for reasons linked to unforeseeable factors that came to light during the construction phase, such as unexpectedly difficult geographical conditions, environmental protection requirements, safety requirements and higher than expected bids from contrac-tors27. 
PrI revIzIjI se je POkazalO, da sO se strOškI POvIšalI PrI vseh OdsekIh, Predvsem Iz nePredvIdljIvIh razlOGOv 45. povišanje stroškov projekta je bilo opaženo v vseh primerih (glej okvir 8). v skoraj vseh primerih je do tega povišanja prišlo zaradi nepredvidljivih dejavnikov, ki so se pokazali v fazi gradnje, kot na primer nepričakovano težki geografski pogoji, okoljevarstvene in varnostne zahteve ter ponudbe izvajalcev, ki so bile dražje od pričakovanih27.
27 academic research reports that mega-projects are very complex undertakings and, historically, escalations of costs significantly beyond initial budgets are very common, indeed ‘cost overruns of50%to100%inrealtermsare common, and overruns above 100 % are not uncommon’. flyberg b, bruzelius n and rothengatter w, ‘megaprojects and risk: an anatomy of ambition’, cambridge university press, 2003, page 44. see also Hugo priemus, bent flyvbjerg, bert van wee: decision-making on mega-projects: cost-benefit analysis, planning and Innovation, edward elgar publishing ltd, 2008, Isbn 1845427378. 
27 v poročilu akademske raziskave je navedeno, da so megaprojekti zelo zapletene naloge in da je po izkušnjah bistveno povišanje stroškov glede na prvotni predračun zelo običajno. običajna je celo prekoračitev stroškov za 50 % do 100 %, prekoračitev nad 100 % pa tudi ni neobičajna. flyberg, b., bruzelius, n. in rothengatter, W.: Megaprojects and risk: An anatomy of ambition (megaprojekti in teveganje). cambridge University press, 2003, stran 44. glej tudi priemus, hugo, flyvbjerg, bent, Wee, bert van: Decision-making on Mega-projects: Cost-benefit Analysis, Planning and Innovation (odločanje pri megaprojektih: analiza stroškov in koristi, načrtovanje in inovacija). edward elgar publishing ltd, 2008, Isbn 1845427378.
11 sections experienced cost escalations of up to 49 %, six sections experienced escalations between 50 % and 100 % and two sections experienced escalations of more than 100 %. overall, the extent of these escalations was in line with those observed in other studies of large scale transport infrastructure projects. of the sections reviewed, the warsaw-gdynia section (funded under cohesion policy) has seen the most significant cost escalation, a rise of 166 % from an estimate of 475 million euro in the project proposal in 2004 to 1 265 million euro according to latest estimates in november 2009. special report no 8/2010 – Improving transport performance on trans-european rail axes: Have eu rail infrastructure investments been effective? 
OkvIr 8 POvIšanje strOškOv, OPaženO PrI OdsekU, kI je bIl PreGledan med revIzIjO podatki o stroških so bili na voljo za 19 od 21 revidiranih odsekov. pri 11 odsekih je prišlo do povišanja stroškov do 49 %, pri šestih odsekih med 50 % in 100 %, pri dveh pa je povišanje znašalo več kot 100 %. na splošno so bila ta povišanja v skladu s povišanji, ki so bila opažena pri drugih velikih projektih prometne infrastrukture. pri revidiranem odseku varšava–gdynia (financiran v okviru kohezijske politike) je prišlo do največjega povišanja stroškov, in sicer so se stroški po zadnjih ocenah iz novembra 2009 povečali s 475 milijonov eUr, predvidenih v predlogu projekta leta 2004, na 1 265 milijonov eUr, kar znaša 166 %. posebno poročilo št. 8/2010 – Izboljševanje prevozne zmogljivosti na vseevropskih železniških oseh: ali so bile investicije eU v železniško infrastrukturo uspešne?
46. projects that were subject to thorough and detailed preparation were less likely to experience escalations; for example, the perpignan-figueras which was completed more or less on time and on budget (see Box 7). In comparison, projects whose preparation was less thorough and detailed faced a higher risk of experiencing more significant escalations; for example, the madrid-levante section, about which the eIb expressed concerns, has to date seen a cost escalation of 89 % (see paragraph 35). 
46. pri projektih, ki so temeljito in podrobno pripravljeni, je bilo manj verjetnosti za povišanje stroškov, na primer odsek perpi-gnan–figueras, ki je bil zaključen bolj ali manj pravočasno in v okviru proračuna (glej okvir 7). pri projektih z manj temeljito in podrobno pripravo pa je bilo tveganje za bistveno povišanje stroškov večje, tako so se na primer pri odseku madrid–levante, v zvezi s katerim je eIb izrazila pomisleke, stroški doslej povišali za 89 % (glej odstavek 35).
47. these cost escalations did not have a direct impact on the eu budget because the investment by the eu was limited to the amounts initially granted. However, they should be considered in the light of the large scale investment needs on the priority projects, and the fact that the attraction of private sector investment has been recognised as being increasingly important. the risk of project cost escalations can exacerbate concerns regarding low rates of return and therefore represent a disincentive for private sector investors. 
47. ta povišanja stroškov niso neposredno vplivala na proračun eU, saj je bilo vlaganje eU omejeno na prvotno odobrene zneske. vendar bi jih bilo treba obravnavati glede na velike potrebe po vlaganjih v prednostne projekte in spoznanje o vse večjem pomenu pridobivanja vlaganj iz zasebnega sektorja. tveganje, da se bodo stroški projekta povišali, lahko poveča pomisleke v zvezi z nizko stopnjo donosa in zato ne deluje spodbudno na vlagatelje iz zasebnega sektorja.
48. In order to take account of the complicated nature of the projects and the risk that cost escalations may be experienced, some projects (for example, brenner base tunnel) set aside contingencies, in order to mitigate the impact that such escalations could have on overall budgets. 
48. zaradi upoštevanja zapletenosti projektov in tveganja povišanja stroškov se pri nekaterih projektih (na primer predor brenner) rezervirajo sredstva za nepredvidene izdatke, da bi ublažili morebiten vpliv takih povišanj na splošni proračun.