natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The audit was led by ECA Member Milan Martin Cvikl, supported by the Head of his private office, Kathrine Henderson and Andreja Rovan, Attaché; Zacharias Kolias, Director; Albano Martins Dias da Silva, Head of Task; Giuseppe Diana, Marko Mrkalj, Maria Isabel Quintela, Marion Schiefele, Duarte Semedo Leite and Stefano Sturaro, audi‐ tors; Thomas Everett and Marek Riha, language support. 
Revizijo je vodil član Evropskega računskega sodišča Milan Martin Cvikl, pri njej pa so sodelovali vodja njegovega kabineta Kathrine Henderson in atašejka Andreja Rovan, direktor Zacharias Kolias, vodja naloge Albano Martins Dias da Silva in revizorji Giuseppe Diana, Marko Mrkalj, Maria Isabel Quintela, Marion Schiefele, Duarte Semedo Leite in Stefan Sturaro, jezikovno pomoč pa sta zagotavljala Thomas Everett in Marek Riha.
From left to right: G. Diana, M. Schiefele, A. Rovan, A. Martins Dias da Silva, Z. Kolias, M. M. Cvikl, S. Sturaro, M. I. Quintela, K. Henderson, T. Everett. 
Od leve proti desni: G. Diana, M. Schiefele, A. Rovan, A. Martins Dias da Silva, Z. Kolias, M. M. Cvikl, S. Sturaro, M. I. Quintela, K. Henderson, T. Everett.
Contents 03 Paragraph I– IX 01 –25 01 –04 05 –25 07 –17 18 –24 25 26 –31 26 –29 30 –31 32 –127 32 –84 32 –62 63 –84 Abbreviations and acronyms Glossary Executive summary Introduction Background on economic and fiscal governance policy in the EU The excessive deficit procedure: maintaining the soundness of public finances The EDP process: ensuring data quality, assessing the situation, initiating an EDP Corrective action: reporting by Member States, monitoring and surveillance by the Commission Outcome of the EDP Audit scope, objectives and approach Audit scope and objectives Approach Observations EDP process: improvements needed to strengthen the basis of the EDP and enhance the objectivity of assessments An appropriate framework for decisions, but greater clarity needed Data quality assessments and economic analyses lack transparency; analyses carried out according to the rules, but focused more on government deficit than on debt 
Kazalo 03 Odstavek 1–25 1–4 5–25 7–17 18–24 25 26–31 26–29 30–31 32–127 32–84 32–62 63–84 Kratice in okrajšave Glosar Povzetek Uvod Ozadje ekonomske politike in politike fiskalnega upravljanja v EU Postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem: ohranjanje trdnosti javnih financ Proces postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem: zagotavljanje kakovosti podatkov, ocena razmer, začetek izvajanja postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem Popravljalni ukrepi: poročanje držav članic, spremljanje in nadzor Komisije Rezultat postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem Obseg in cilji revizije ter revizijski pristop Obseg in cilji revizije Pristop Opažanja Proces postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem: za okrepitev podlage postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem in povečanje objektivnosti ocen so potrebne izboljšave Okvir za sklepe je ustrezen, vendar je potrebna večja jasnost Ocene kakovosti podatkov in ekonomske analize niso dovolj pregledne; analize se izvajajo v skladu s pravili, vendar so bolj osredotočene na javnofinančni primanjkljaj kot na dolg
Contents 04 85–112 85–87 88–112 113 –127 113 –127 128 –149 130 –139 130 – 131 132 133 –135 136 137 138 –139 140 –149 140 – 141 142 –143 144 –145 146 – 147 148 –149 EDP corrective and surveillance actions: reporting by Member States, monitoring and surveillance by the Commission Member States’ reporting on corrective action could be improved Monitoring and surveillance by the Commission is subject to increasingly complex rules, lacks transparency and provides a limited assessment of the effect of structural reforms Outcome of the EDP EDP reforms have introduced tools for enhancingbudgetary discipline, but the EDP has not proved fully effective as a corrective mechanism Conclusions and recommendations Eurostat Examination of data Assessment of control systems Dialogue visits and direct verification Action points Guidance Outcome DG Economic and Financial Affairs Transparency Debt criterion Structural reforms Reporting Sanctions 
Kazalo 04 85–112 85–87 88–112 113–127 113–127 128–149 130–139 130–131 132 133–135 136 137 138–139 140–149 140–141 142–143 144–145 146–147 148–149 Popravljalni in nadzorni ukrepi v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem: poročanje držav članic, spremljanje in nadzor Komisije Države članice bi lahko izboljšale poročanje o popravljalnih ukrepih Pri spremljanju in nadzoru, ki ju izvaja Komisija, so pravila vse bolj zapletena, ni preglednosti, učinek strukturnih reform pa se ocenjuje v omejenem obsegu Rezultat postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem Z reformami postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem so bila uvedena orodja za krepitev proračunske discipline, vendar se postopek ni izkazal za popolnoma uspešen popravljalni mehanizem Zaključki in priporočila Eurostat Preučitev podatkov Ocenjevanje kontrolnih sistemov Obiski za dialog in neposredno preverjanje Ukrepi Smernice Rezultat GD za gospodarske in finančne zadeve Preglednost Merilo dolga Strukturne reforme Poročanje Sankcije
Contents 05 Annex I — Annex II — Annex III — Annex IV — Annex V — Annex VI — Annex VII — Annex VIII — Legislation on the excessive deficit procedure Some examples of missing information in documents from the six Member States examined Some examples of classification weaknesses in documents from the six Member States examined Some examples of action points with a potential impact on the deficit and debt data Annual nominal GDP growth rate Compliance with the nominal and structural targets set in EDP recommendations and EDP deadline extensions Differences between Commission and Council recommendations Implementation of planned structural reforms Reply of the Commission 
Kazalo 05 Priloga I Priloga II Priloga III Priloga IV Priloga V Priloga VI Priloga VII Priloga VIII – Zakonodaja o postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem – Nekaj primerov manjkajočih obveznih informacij v dokumentih preučenih šestih držav članic – Nekaj primerov slabe razvrstitve v dokumentih preučenih šestih držav članic – Nekaj primerov ukrepov s potencialnim učinkom na podatke o primanjkljaju in dolgu – Letna nominalna stopnja rasti BDP – Skladnost z nominalnimi in strukturnimi cilji, določenimi v priporočilih za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, in podaljšanja rokov za postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem – Razlike med priporočili Komisije in Sveta – Izvajanje načrtovanih strukturnih reform Odgovori Komisije
Abbreviations and 06 acronyms ACR: Autonomous Commission recommendation AMECO: Macroeconomic database of the European Commission DG Economic and Financial Affairs: Directorate‐General for Economic and Financial Affairs DG Migration and Home Affairs: Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs ECB: European Central Bank ECOFIN: Economic and Financial Council edp: Excessive deficit procedure EEF: European economic forecast EFC: Economic and Financial Committee EMU: Economic and monetary union EPP: Economic partnership programme ESA: European System of Accounts Eurostat: Statistical Office of the European Union GDP: Gross Domestic Product GFS: Government finance statistics MTO: Medium‐term budgetary objective SCP: Stability or convergence programme SDV: Standard dialogue visit SGP: Stability and Growth Pact TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union UDV: Upstream dialogue visit 
Kratice in okrajšave 06 ACR: Neodvisno priporočilo Komisije AMECO: Makroekonomska zbirka podatkov Evropske komisije BDP: Bruto domači proizvod ECB: Evropska centralna banka Ecofin: Svet za ekonomske in finančne zadeve EDP: Postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem EEF: Evropska gospodarska napoved EFC: Ekonomsko-finančni odbor EMU: Ekonomska in monetarna unija EPP: Program ekonomskega partnerstva ESR: Evropski sistem računov Eurostat: Statistični urad Evropske unije GD za gospodarske in finančne zadeve: Generalni direktorat za gospodarske in finančne zadeve GD za migracije in notranje zadeve: Generalni direktorat za migracije in notranje zadeve MTO: Srednjeročni proračunski cilj PDEU: Pogodba o delovanju Evropske unije SCP: Program stabilnosti ali konvergenčni program SDF: Statistika državnih financ SDV: Standardni obisk za dialog SGP: Pakt za stabilnost in rast UDV: Predhodni obisk za dialog
Cyclical component of budget balance: That part of the change in the budget balance which follows automatically from cyclical elements in the economy, due to the reaction of public revenue and expenditure to changes in the output gap. 
Glosar 07 Ciklični element proračunskega salda: Del spremembe v proračunskem saldu, ki samodejno izhaja iz cikličnih elementov v gospodarstvu zaradi odziva javnofinančnih prihodkov in odhodkov na spremembe v proizvodni vrzeli.
See Structural (budget) balance. 
Glej Strukturni (proračunski) saldo.
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC): Formerly the Monetary Committee, the EFC is a Committee of the Council of the European Union set up by Article 134 of TFEU. 
Ekonomsko-finančni odbor: Ekonomsko-finančni odbor, prej Monetarni odbor, je odbor Sveta Evropske unije, ustanovljen v skladu s členom 134 PDEU.
Its main task is to prepare and discuss ECOFIN Council decisions with regard to economic and financial matters. 
Njegova glavna naloga je priprava sklepov Sveta ECOFIN v zvezi z ekonomskimi in finančnimi zadevami ter razpravljanje o njih.
ESA (ESA 95 and ESA 2010): The European system of national and regional accounts is the EU’s internationally compatible accounting framework for the systematic and detailed description of the economies of the EU Member States and regions. 
ESR (ESR 95 in ESR 2010): Evropski sistem nacionalnih in regionalnih računov je mednarodno združljiv računovodski okvir EU za sistematičen in natančen opis gospodarstev držav članic in regij EU.
For most of the audited period the relevant system was ESA 95, which was upgraded in September 2014 to ESA 2010, reflecting developments in measuring modern economies, advances in methodological research and the needs of users. 
Večji del revidiranega obdobja se je uporabljal sistem ESR 95, ki je bil septembra 2014 nadgrajen na ESR 2010, da bi upošteval razvoj na področju merjenja sodobnih gospodarstev, dosežke na področju metodoloških raziskav in potrebe uporabnikov.
While the ESA is broadly consistent with the definitions, accounting rules and classifications applied by the comparable UN system, it also has some specific features which are more in line with EU practices. 
Čeprav je ESR na splošno skladen z opredelitvami, računovodskimi pravili in razvrstitvami, ki jih uporablja primerljiv sistem Združenih narodov, ima tudi nekatere posebne elemente, ki so bolj usklajeni s praksami EU.
European Semester: The annual cycle of economic policy coordination, which takes place over the first six months of the year. 
Evropski semester: Letni cikel usklajevanja ekonomske politike, ki se izvaja prvih šest mesecev v letu.
The European Commission undertakes a detailed analysis of Member States’ programmes of economic and structural policies, and the European Council and the Council of Ministers provide policy advice before Member States finalise their draft budgets. 
Evropska komisija izvede podrobno analizo programov ekonomskih in strukturnih politik držav članic, Evropski svet in Svet ministrov pa zagotovita svetovanje o politikah, preden države članice dokončno oblikujejo predloge proračunov.
Financial/non‐financial corporations: Financial corporations sector (ESA 95, paragraph 2.32) Includes all corporations and quasi‐corporations which are principally engaged in financial intermediation (financial intermediaries) and/or in auxiliary financial activities (financial auxiliaries). 
Finančne/nefinančne družbe Sektor finančnih družb (ESR 95, odstavek 2.32) Vključuje vse družbe in neprave družbe, ki se v glavnem ukvarjajo s finančnem posredništvom (finančni posredniki) in/ali pomožnimi finančnimi dejavnostmi (izvajalci pomožnih finančnih dejavnosti).
Non‐financial corporations sector (ESA 95, paragraph 2.21) Consists of institutional units whose distributive and financial transactions are distinct from those of their owners, and which are market producers whose principal activity is the production of goods and non‐financial services. 
Sektor nefinančnih družb (ESR 95, odstavek 2.21) Vključuje institucionalne enote, katerih razdelitvene in finančne transakcije se razlikujejo od tistih, ki jih izvajajo njihovi lastniki, ki so tržni proizvajalci, katerih glavna dejavnost je proizvodnja blaga in nefinančnih storitev.
Fiscal consolidation: An improvement in the budget balance through measures of discretionary fiscal policy, specified either by the amount of the improvement or the period over which the improvement is sustained. 
Fiskalna konsolidacija: Izboljšanje proračunskega salda z ukrepi diskrecijske fiskalne politike, opredeljenimi glede na obseg izboljšav ali njihovo obdobje trajnosti.
Government debt: The total gross debt at nominal value outstanding at the end of the year and consolidated between and within the sectors of general government as defined in ESA 95. 
Javni dolg: Stanje skupnega bruto dolga v nominalni vrednosti ob koncu leta, potem ko je konsolidiran med sektorji države v širšem smislu in znotraj njih, kakor je opredeljeno v ESR 95.
It comprises currency and deposits, securities other than shares excluding financial derivatives, and loans (Maastricht debt). 
Sestavljajo ga gotovina in vloge, vrednostni papirji razen delnic, brez izvedenih finančnih instrumentov, ter posojila (maastrichtski dolg).
Government deficit: The level of net borrowing as defined in ESA 95/ESA 2010, with certain adjustments. 
Javnofinančni primanjkljaj: Raven neto posojanja iz ESR 95/ESR 2010 z nekaterimi prilagoditvami.
Methodological visit: An exceptional monitoring and verification visit carried out by Eurostat to a Member State where significant risks or problems with regard to data quality have been clearly identified. 
Glej tudi Programi stabilnosti. Metodološki obisk: Izredni nadzorni in preveritveni obisk Eurostata v državi članici, v kateri so bila jasno ugotovljena bistvena tveganja ali težave v zvezi s kakovostjo podatkov.
Potential GDP: The level of real GDP in a given year that is consistent with a stable rate of inflation. 
Potencialni BDP: Raven realnega BDP-ja v danem letu, ki je skladna s stabilno stopnjo inflacije.
If actual output rises above its potential level, constraints on capacity will start to bite and inflationary pressure will build; if output falls below the potential level, resources are lying idle and inflationary pressure will abate. 
Če dejanska proizvodnja preseže potencialno raven, se začne zmanjševati zmogljivost in povečevati inflacijski pritisk; če se proizvodnja zmanjša pod potencialno raven, sredstva ostanejo neizkoriščena, inflacijski pritisk pa se zmanjša.
See also Output gap. 
Glej tudi Proizvodna vrzel.
Glossary 10 Primary (budget) balance: The budget balance net of interest payments on general government debt. 
Primarni (proračunski) saldo: Proračunski saldo brez plačil obresti za javnofinančni dolg.
Primary/upstream data: Data collected by a national statistical institute (e.g. from administrative records, surveys, census) for the purpose of compiling aggregates (such as EDP transactions). 
Primarni/predhodni podatki: Podatki, ki jih zbere nacionalni statistični urad (npr. iz upravnih evidenc, raziskav, popisa itd.) za zbiranje agregatov (kot so transakcije v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem).
The public accounts of government departments, agencies, etc. are an example of primary data. 
Primer primarnih podatkov so javne finance vladnih oddelkov, agencij itd. Programi stabilnosti: Srednjeročne proračunske strategije, ki jih predložijo države članice, ki so uvedle evro.
They are updated annually in accordance with the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Posodabljajo se vsako leto v skladu z določbami Pakta za stabilnost in rast.
See also Convergence programmes. 
Glej tudi Konvergenčni programi.
Structural (budget) balance: The actual budget balance net of the cyclical component and one‐off and other temporary measures. 
Strukturni (proračunski) saldo: Dejanski proračunski saldo brez cikličnega elementa ter enkratnih in drugih začasnih ukrepov.
The structural balance gives a measure of the underlying trend in the budget balance. 
Strukturni saldo izraža osnovno gibanje proračunskega salda.
Working balance: Public accounts revenue minus expenditure. 
Tekoči saldo: Razlika med prihodki in odhodki v javnih financah.
Executive summary 11 IThe Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union establishes it as a basic rule of budgetary policy that Mem‐ ber States must avoid excessive government deficits. 
Povzetek 11 IPogodba o delovanju Evropske unije kot osnovno pravilo proračunske politike določa, da se morajo države članice izogibati čezmernemu javnofinančnemu primanjkljaju.
Accordingly, where the reference values for deficit and debt are exceeded a corrective mechanism may be initiated against the Member State concerned. 
V skladu s tem se lahko v primeru preseženih referenčnih vrednosti za primanjkljaj in dolg v zvezi z zadevno državo članico začne izvajati popravljalni mehanizem.
This mechanism, the excessive deficit procedure, is a key element of the EU’s economic governance framework. 
Ta mehanizem je postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, ki je ključen element okvira ekonomskega upravljanja EU.
II The Commission’s role in implementing the excessive deficit procedure is to check the quality of the data notified by each Member State, to assess whether the reference thresholds have been breached, or risk being breached, and on this basis to address opinions and recommendations to the Council to act accordingly. 
II Naloga Komisije pri izvajanju postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem je preveriti kakovost podatkov, ki jih sporoči vsaka država članica, in oceniti, ali so bili referenčni pragi preseženi oziroma ali za to obstaja tveganje, ter na tej podlagi na Svet nasloviti mnenja in priporočila za ustrezno ukrepanje.
The Council then decides, according to the Treaty provisions, whether or not to adopt the Commission recommendations. 
Svet se nato v skladu z določbami Pogodbe odloči, ali bo priporočila Komisije sprejel ali ne.
III Member States placed under an excessive deficit procedure are given recommendations to remedy the situation, including a deadline by which to correct the situation, a path for correction and an annual fiscal effort to be deliv‐ ered. 
III Državam članicam, za katere se izvaja postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, se posredujejo priporočila za ureditev stanja, vključno z rokom, do katerega morajo stanje popraviti, načrtom za popravo stanja in letnim fiskalnim naporom, ki ga morajo doseči.
The Commission monitors the Member State’s implementation of corrective measures and reports its findings to the Council. 
Komisija spremlja, kako država članica izvaja popravljalne ukrepe, in sporoči svoje ugotovitve Svetu.
The Council, on the basis of Commission proposals, takes further action as appropriate (lifting the procedure, extending the deadline, setting new targets or imposing sanctions). 
Ta nato na podlagi predlogov Komisije po potrebi sprejme dodatne ukrepe (ustavitev postopka, podaljšanje roka, določitev novih ciljev ali uvedba sankcij).
IV The Court examined the Commission’s implementation of the excessive deficit procedure between 2008 and 2015, focusing on six Member States. 
IV Sodišče je preučilo, kako je Komisija izvajala postopek v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem med letoma 2008 in 2015, pri čemer se je osredotočilo na šest držav članic.
We considered the Commission’s quality assessment of Member States’ EDP data, the quality of its own forecast data and models and whether its assessments were in tune with the Council’s deci‐ sions to launch a procedure. 
Obravnavalo je oceno kakovosti podatkov držav članic o postopku v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, ki jo je izvedla Komisija, kakovost njenih podatkov iz napovedi in modelov za napovedi ter skladnost njenih ocen z odločitvami Sveta o začetku postopka.
Lastly, we examined how the Commission monitored the corrective action taken by Member States under an excessive deficit procedure. 
Preučilo je tudi, kako je Komisija spremljala popravljalne ukrepe, ki so jih sprejele države članice v okviru postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem.
VWe found that, although detailed procedures and guidelines exist for most areas of the Commission’s data collec‐ tion and analysis and its assessment of compliance with the rules on budgetary discipline, there are problems with its implementation of these tasks. 
VUgotovili smo, da so za večino področij, za katera Komisija zbira in analizira podatke ter ocenjuje skladnost s pravili o proračunski disciplini, vzpostavljeni podrobni postopki in smernice, vendar se pri njenem izvajanju teh nalog pojavljajo težave.
This is because the Commission did not make full use of its powers to enforce the provision of comprehensive data and compliance with recommendations for corrective action, and because of the failure at times to give adequate feedback on Member States’ reports, the insufficient resources devoted to analys‐ ing and reporting on key data, and poor record‐keeping. 
Razlogi za to so, da Komisija ni zadostno izkoristila svojih pooblastil za izvrševanje zagotavljanja izčrpnih podatkov in skladnosti s priporočili za popravljalne ukrepe in da občasno ni zagotovila ustreznih povratnih informacij o poročilih držav članic, ter nezadostna sredstva, namenjena analizi ključnih podatkov in poročanju o njih, in slabo vodenje evidenc.
Executive summary 12 VI A related issue is that of transparency, where, despite improvements in recent years, too much information is still generally unavailable regarding the Commission’s data assumptions and parameters and its understanding of key concepts. 
Povzetek 12 VI S tem je povezano tudi vprašanje preglednosti, saj kljub izboljšanjem v zadnjih letih na splošno še vedno ni na voljo preveč informacij o predpostavkah in parametrih Komisije v zvezi s podatki ter o njenem razumevanju ključnih poj-mov.
In addition, even where the Commission has set clear internal rules it may decide to depart from the established procedure, which raises questions about the overall reliability of its assessments. 
Komisija se lahko tudi v primerih, v katerih je določila jasna notranja pravila, odloči, da ne bo ravnala v skladu z vzpostavljenim postopkom, kar postavlja pod vprašaj splošno zanesljivost njenih ocen.
VII In the area of monitoring structural reforms, an aspect of corrective action which the Commission recently high‐ lighted as crucial to overcoming an excessive deficit situation, there are signs that the Commission does not go far enough, as it essentially focuses on legislative aspects rather than the actual implementation of reforms. 
VII Na področju spremljanja strukturnih reform, tj. vidika popravljalnih ukrepov, ki ga je Komisija nedavno označila kot bistvenega za odpravo čezmernega primanjkljaja, obstajajo znamenja, da Komisija ne gre dovolj daleč, saj se osredotoča predvsem na zakonodajne vidike namesto na dejansko izvajanje reform.
VIII In conclusion, we find very positive signs in the Commission’s efforts over the years to adapt and rationalise the excessive deficit procedure in response to developments in the EU. 
VIII Ugotavljamo, da je Komisija v zadnjih letih pokazala zelo močno prizadevanje za prilagoditev in racionalizacijo postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem v odziv na razvoj v EU.
The legislative basis is sound and is generally supported by clear internal rules and guidelines. 
Pravna podlaga je trdna ter je na splošno podprta z jasnimi notranjimi pravili in smernicami.
What has been lacking is consistency and transparency in the application of those rules; the Commission does not adequately record its underlying assumptions or share its sur‐ veillance findings for the greater benefit of all Member States. 
Pomanjkljivi sta doslednost in preglednost pri izvajanju teh pravil; Komisija ne evidentira ustrezno svojih osnovnih predpostavk ali razširja ugotovitev, pridobljenih pri nadzoru, v širšo korist vseh držav članic.