natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Examples of such factors are: (i) the implementation of major structural reforms; (ii) unusual events; (iii) the need for public investment; (iv) unspecified “other factors”. 
Primerih takih dejavnikov so: (i) izvajanje večjih strukturnih reform; (ii) neobičajni dogodki; (iii) potreba po javnih naložbah; (iv) neopredeljeni drugi dejavniki.
51 Thus, even when a Member State significantly deviates from its required fiscal adjustments (i.e. reduction in government deficit), the Commission might eventually conclude not to take any action and consider the Member State compliant with the EU fiscal rules. 
51 Tudi če država članica znatno odstopa od zahtevanih fiskalnih prilagoditev (tj. zmanjšanja javnofinančnega primanjkljaja), se lahko Komisija nazadnje odloči, da ne bo ukrepala, in šteje, da država članica izpolnjuje fiskalna pravila EU.
52 These issues were also mentioned by IFIs, in their replies to our ECA survey, as weaknesses, which might affect their work. 
52 Ta vprašanja so kot pomanjkljivosti, ki lahko vplivajo na njihovo delo, v svojih odgovorih na anketo Sodišča omenile tudi neodvisne fiskalne institucije.
About 40 % of the responding IFIs considered that these issues may potentially result in their assessment of compliance with the MTO or the adjustment path towards it differing from the Commission’s (see Figure 3). 
Približno 40 % sodelujočih neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij je menilo, da bi lahko ta vprašanja povzročila razlike med njihovo oceno skladnosti s srednjeročnim proračunskim ciljem ali prilagoditveno potjo za njegovo dosego in oceno Komisije (glej sliko 3).
41 In 2015, the Commission published an interpretative Communication on its margin of interpretation, "Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact" COM(2015)12 final. 
41 Komisija je leta 2015 objavila razlagalno sporočilo o svoji diskrecijski pravici z naslovom Kako čim bolje izkoristiti prožnost v okviru obstoječih pravil Pakta za stabilnost in rast, COM(2015) 12 final.
This was subsequently reflected in the commonly agreed position of November 2015 endorsed by the Council in February 2016. 
To je bilo nato izraženo v skupnem stališču iz novembra 2015, ki ga je februarja 2016 odobril Svet.
42 To achieve fast convergence towards the MTO, the benchmark set by the SGP is that Member States should adjust their structural budgetary positions at a rate of 0.5 % of GDP per year. 24 
42 Da se zagotovi hitro približevanje srednjeročnemu proračunskemu cilju, je v Paktu za stabilnost in rast kot referenčna vrednost določeno, da morajo države članice strukturno proračunsko stanje prilagajati po stopnji 0,5 % BDP na leto. 24
Figure 3 – Replies to ECA survey of IFIs Source: ECA survey. 53 Other reasons for divergences (see paragraph 49) are IFIs using their own (i) methodology for calculating the potential output and/or (ii) assumptions and datasets. 
Slika 3 – Odgovori neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij na anketo Evropskega računskega sodišča Vir: anketa Evropskega računskega sodišča 53 Druga razloga za razhajanja (glej odstavek 49) sta, da neodvisne fiskalne institucije uporabljajo (i) svojo metodologijo za izračun potencialnega proizvoda in/ali (ii) svoje domneve in nabore podatkov.
However, the Commission has enhanced its cooperation with IFIs, by explaining its own methodology to help prevent such divergences. 
Vendar je Komisija izboljšala sodelovanje z neodvisnimi fiskalnimi institucijami in pojasnila svojo metodologijo, da bi preprečila taka razhajanja.
54 Lastly, the Commission’s conclusions on Member States’ compliance with EU fiscal rules may take into account discussions between the Commission and that country’s government, in which the IFIs do not take part. 
54 In nazadnje, pri zaključkih Komisije o skladnosti držav članic s fiskalnimi pravili EU se lahko upoštevajo razprave med Komisijo in vlado zadevne države članice, v katerih neodvisne fiskalne institucije ne sodelujejo.
55 The risk of inconsistency between the conclusions reached by IFIs and by the Commission has already been mentioned by the EFB43 and confirmed by our survey. Indeed, 20 % of the IFIs indicated that they had already experienced such differences. 
55 Možnost neskladij med zaključki neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij in Komisije je omenil že Evropski fiskalni odbor43, anketa Sodišča pa jo je potrdila, saj je 20 % neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij navedlo, da že imajo izkušnje s takimi razlikami.
Box 3 provides examples of differing conclusions. 
V okviru 3 sta primera različnih zaključkov.
25 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% (a) The ECA in its special report 18/2018 identified the following weaknesses on how the Commission implements the preventive armof the SGP, which may affect the work of your institution. 
25 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% (a) Sodišče je v posebnem poročilu št. 18/2018 opredelilo naslednjeslabosti vzvezi s tem, kako Komisijaizvaja preventivni delPaktaza stabilnostinrast,kilahkovplivajo na delo vaše institucije.
Do the specified weaknesses affect your work? 
Ali navedene slabosti vplivajo na vašedelo?
Commission implementation of flexibility: The possibility for further relaxation of adjustment requirements by using the margin of discretion No Yes 15 % 30 % 36 % 87 % 77 % 73 % Commission implementation of flexibility: Absence of clear definition of unusual events Commission’s interpretation of open-ended discretion to use “other factors” for reducing adjustment requirements or postponingplacement of Member States under corrective arm. (b) Do you agree that the above issues can resultinyour IFI's assessmentdiverging from the Commission's? 
Način, kako Komisija izvaja prožnost: možnost dodatne sprostitve zahtev za prilagoditev z uporabo diskrecijske pravice Ne Da (b) Ali se strinjate, da lahko zaradi zgoraj navedenih zadev pridedo razhajanjmedoceno vašeneodvisnefiskalneinstitucijeinoceno Komisije? 3% 15 % 30 % 36 % 87 % 77 % 73 % 40 % Način, kako Komisija izvaja fleksibilnost: manjka jasna opredelitev neobičajnih dogodkov Način, kako si Komisija razlaga odprto diskrecijsko pravico za uporabo drugih dejavnikov za zmanjšanje zahtev za prilagoditev ali odložitev izvajanja ukrepov iz korektivnega dela v državi članici.
3% 40 % Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree 57 % 43 EFB (2018), Annual report 2018, p. 
57 % Strinjam se Ne strinjam se Sem neodločen 43 Evropski fiskalni odbor (2018), Annual report 2018, str.
Establishing the European Fiscal Board was a good step, but there is room for strengthening its role and independence 56 The ‘Five Presidents’ report’ envisaged the following tasks for the EFB: o to coordinate the network of national fiscal councils and conform to the same standard of independence; o to advise on but not implement policy. 
Vzpostavitev Evropskega fiskalnega odbora je bila dober korak, vendar bi bilo njegovo vlogo in neodvisnost mogoče okrepiti 56 V poročilu petih predsednikov so bile za Evropski fiskalni odbor predvidene naslednje naloge: o moral bi koordinirati mrežo nacionalnih fiskalnih odborov in izpolnjevati iste standarde glede neodvisnosti; o moral bi svetovati o politikah, ne pa jih izvajati.
Enforcing the rules should remain the task of the Commission, which should be able to deviate from the views of the EFB provided that it has justifiable reasons and explains them; o to form an economic, rather than a legal, judgement on the appropriate fiscal stance, both at national and euro-area level, against the backdrop of EU fiscal rules. 
Zagotavljanje izvajanja predpisov bi morala ostati naloga Komisije, ki bi morala imeti možnost zagovarjati drugačna stališča kot Evropski fiskalni odbor, če bi imela za to upravičene razloge, ki bi jih obrazložila; o moral bi izvajati ekonomsko, in ne pravno, presojo glede ustrezne fiskalne naravnanosti, tako na nacionalni ravni kot na ravni euroobmočja, ob upoštevanju fiskalnih pravil EU.
This should be done on the basis of the rules set in the SGP; o to be able to issue opinions when it considers this necessary, including in particular, in connection with the assessment of stability programmes and presentation of the annual draft budgetary plans, and the execution of national budgets; 26 Box 3 – Commission and IFI assessments with different conclusions – Examples In its fiscal assessment report of November 2016, the Irish IFI (the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council - IFAC) mentioned that Ireland’s 2017 draft budgetary plan showed “non-compliance with the budgetary rule requirements of the domestic Fiscal Responsibility Act and EU preventive arm for 2016 and 2017”44. 
To bi moral delati na podlagi pravil, določenih v Paktu za stabilnost in rast; 26 Okvir 3 – Ocene Komisije in neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij z različnimi zaključki – primera Irska neodvisna fiskalna institucija (Irish Fiscal Advisory Council – IFAC) je v poročilu o fiskalni oceni iz novembra 2016 navedla, da je bil osnutek proračunskega načrta Irske za leto 2017 neskladen z zahtevami proračunskega pravila nacionalnega zakona o fiskalni odgovornosti in preventivnega dela Pakta za stabilnost in rast za leti 2016 in 201744, Komisija pa je menila, da je osnutek na splošno skladen z določbami Pakta za stabilnost in rast.
The Commission, however, considered it broadly compliant with the provisions of the SGP. The French IFI (the Haut Conseil des finances publiques – HCFP), in its assessment of the French draft budgetary plan in September 2018, stressed that “the structural adjustments planned for 2018 (0.1 percentage point of GDP) and 2019 (0.3 percentage point of GDP), which will be submitted to the Commission for assessment, do not comply with the rules of the preventive arm of the SGP”. 
Francoska neodvisna fiskalna institucija (Haut Conseil des finances publiques – HCFP) je v oceni osnutka proračunskega načrta Francije iz septembra 2018 poudarila, da strukturne prilagoditve, načrtovane za leti 2018 (0,1 odstotne točke BDP) in 2019 (0,3 odstotne točke BDP), ki bodo predložene Komisiji v oceno, niso skladne s pravili preventivnega dela Pakta za stabilnost in rast, Vendar je bilo mnenje Komisije o tem osnutku proračunskega načrta manj jasno, saj je bilo v njem ocenjeno, da za Francijo obstaja tveganje neskladnosti s pravili.
44 Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (2016), ‘Fiscal assessment report’, p. 
44 Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (2016), Fiscal assessment report, str.
57 However, in the EFB Decision, the Commission left out most of the national dimension of these tasks. In particular, it did not task the EFB with issuing opinions on national stability or convergence programmes, draft budgetary plans or the execution of national budgets. 
57 V sklepu o Evropskem fiskalnem odboru je Komisija izpustila skoraj celotno nacionalno razsežnost teh nalog, zlasti pa ni določila, da mora Evropski fiskalni odbor izdajati mnenja o nacionalnih programih za stabilnost ali konvergenco, osnutkih proračunskih načrtov ali izvajanju nacionalnih proračunov.
Moreover, rather than coordinating the IFIs, it stated that the EFB should merely cooperate with them. 
Poleg tega je navedla, da mora Evropski fiskalni odbor le sodelovati z neodvisnimi fiskalnimi institucijami, ne pa jih usklajevati.
We note that IFIs themselves argued against coordination by the EFB because they saw it as going against the goal of increasing national ownership and damaging their independence. 
Sodišče je ugotovilo, da so neodvisne fiskalne institucije nasprotovale usklajevanju Evropskega fiskalnega odbora, saj menijo, da je v nasprotju s ciljem povečati nacionalno odgovornost in da zmanjšuje njihovo neodvisnost.
58 In a speech in November 2015, the President of the Eurogroup considered that there were “merits in having a big European sister of the national fiscal councils, placed outside the Commission to provide independent assessments of the national draft budgets, on the basis of which the Commission gives its (political) opinion”. 
58 Predsednik Euroskupine je v govoru novembra 2015 menil, da je koristno imeti veliko evropsko sestro nacionalnih fiskalnih svetov, ki ne deluje v okviru Komisije in zagotavlja neodvisne ocene osnutkov nacionalnih proračunov, na podlagi katerih Komisija poda svoje (politično) mnenje.
59 Furthermore, the ‘Five Presidents’ report’ had called for the EFB to “conform to the same standard of independence” as national IFIs as set in Regulation 473/2013. 
59 Poleg tega je poročilo petih predsednikov vsebovalo poziv, naj Evropski fiskalni odbor izpolnjuje iste standarde glede neodvisnosti kot nacionalne neodvisne fiskalne institucije, kakor je določeno v Uredbi št. 473/2013.
60 Article 4 of the EFB Decision states that the members of the Board shall act independently. 
60 V členu 4 sklepa o Evropskem fiskalnem odboru je navedeno, da člani odbora delujejo neodvisno.
However, the EFB's independence is limited by its weak statutory regime and scarce resources45: (a) the Chair and the four members of the Board are appointed by the Commission. 
Vendar je neodvisnost Evropskega fiskalnega odbora omejena zaradi njegove slabe statutarne ureditve in skromnih virov45: (a) predsednika in štiri člane odbora imenuje Komisija.
Their mandate is part-time, short (three years) and renewable once, and there is no provision for their removal (such as removal only in the event of incapacity or serious misconduct); (b) since they were established by a Commission Decision, the Commission can amend the rules governing the EFB; 27 45 The EFB consists of a Board and a Secretariat (staffed by a Head of Secretariat and dedicated supporting staff currently limited to five economists and one assistant). (c) the EFB has no financial independence, as it does not have its own budget and cannot freely manage its human resources. 
Njihov mandat, in sicer s krajšim delovnim časom, je kratek (tri leta) in se lahko podaljša le enkrat. Določb o odstranitvi s položaja ni (npr. odstranitev le v primeru nesposobnosti ali resnih kršitev); (b) ker so bila pravila, ki urejajo delovanje Evropskega fiskalnega odbora, določena v sklepu Komisije, jih lahko Komisija spremeni; (c) Evropski fiskalni odbor ni finančno neodvisen, ker nima lastnega proračuna in ne more svobodno upravljati s svojimi kadrovskimi viri.
Its budget falls under the “Euro and Social Dialogue” budget of the cabinet of the Vice-President of the Commission and covers the salaries of the members (who have the status of special advisors) and the costs of their business trips. 
okvir proračuna kabineta podpredsednika Komisije za euro in socialni dialog, pokriva pa plače članov (ki imajo status posebnih svetovalcev) in stroške njihovih službenih poti.
The Secretariat of the EFB is a unit of the Commission’s Secretariat-General. As such, its expenses (business trips, invitation of experts, organisation of workshops, etc.) are covered by the operational budget of the Secretariat-General; (d) the EFB is attached to and located in the premises of the Secretariat General of the Commission, and its website is also hosted by the Commission. 
Sekretariat Evropskega fiskalnega odbora je enota generalnega sekretariata Komisije, zato njegove stroške (službene poti, vabila strokovnjakom, organizacijo delavnic itd.) pokriva proračun za poslovanje generalnega sekretariata; (d) Evropski fiskalni odbor deluje v prostorih generalnega sekretariata Komisije, njegovo spletišče pa gosti Komisija.
61 The above mentioned factors result in a weak institutional set-up, as also pointed out by the ECB: “the creation of the European Fiscal Board on the basis of a Commission decision within its organisational structure is not in line with the standards established for its counterparts at the national level”46. 
61 Zaradi navedenih dejavnikov je institucionalna ureditev slaba, kot je poudarila tudi Evropska centralna banka, ki je navedla, da vzpostavitev Evropskega fiskalnega odbora na podlagi sklepa Komisije v organizacijski strukturi Komisije ni v skladu s standardi, ki veljajo za enakovredne institucije na nacionalni ravni46.
The same issue was raised by the IMF47. 
Na isto vprašanje je opozoril MDS47.
62 Moreover, whereas the ‘Five Presidents’ report’ stipulates that the EFB “should be able to issue opinions when it considers it necessary”, the EFB Decision only makes reference to the publication of an annual report. 
62 Poleg tega je v poročilu petih predsednikov določeno, da bi moral imeti Evropski fiskalni odbor možnost izdajati mnenja, ko bi se to mu zdelo potrebno, v sklepu Komisije o Evropskem fiskalnem odboru pa je omenjena le objava letnega poročila.
It does not explicitly mention the option of the EFB publishing assessments in real time or issuing public opinions, which in any case is hampered by its limited resources. 
Možnost, da bi objavljal ocene v realnem času ali izdajal javna mnenja, v sklepu Komisije ni omenjena, v vsakem primeru pa jo omejujejo skromni viri.
63 In practice, the EFB publishes two types of regular reports (1) the EFB’s assessment of the fiscal stance appropriate for the euro area published in June and (2) an annual report, published at the end of the year. 
63 V praksi Evropski fiskalni odbor objavlja dve vrsti rednih poročil, in sicer (1) oceno fiskalne naravnanosti, primerne za euroobmočje, v juniju in (2) letno poročilo na koncu leta.
In addition, the EFB has recently published an assessment of EU fiscal rules48. 
Poleg tega je Evropski fiskalni odbor pred kratkim objavil oceno fiskalnih pravil EU48.
64 Our assessment of the four reports issued in 2017 and 2018 is that they are of good analytical quality. This was confirmed by stakeholders we met in the sampled Member States and by our survey of the IFIs. 
64 V svoji oceni štirih poročil, izdanih leta 2017 in 2018, je Sodišče ugotovilo, da je njihova analitična kakovost dobra, kar so potrdili tudi deležniki iz držav članic v vzorcu in anketa Sodišča med neodvisnimi fiskalnimi institucijami.
Indeed, 87 % of IFIs assessed the quality 46 ECB (2015), ‘Economic Bulletin’, Issue 7, Box 5: The creation of a European Fiscal Board. 
46 Evropska centralna banka (2015), Ekonomski bilten, številka 7, okvir 5: The creation of a European Fiscal Board.
47 IMF (2016), ‘2016 Article IV consultation – euro-area policies’, IMF country report 16/219, p. 
47 MDS (2016), 2016 Article IV consultation – euro-area policies, poročilo MDS o posameznih državah št. 16/219, str.
48 The EFB also published one statement in support of the Danish Fiscal Council in March 2018. 28 
48 Evropski fiskalni odbor je marca 2018 objavil tudi izjavo v podporo danskemu fiskalnemu svetu. 28
of the analysis in the EFB reports as ‘good ’, with 10 % describing it as ‘average’ and only 3 % as ‘poor’. 65 In the annual report, the EFB provides an evaluation of the implementation of the Union fiscal framework. 
65 Evropski fiskalni odbor v letnem poročilu pripravi oceno izvajanja fiskalnega okvira Unije, v posebnem oddelku pa da tudi predloge za njegov nadaljnji razvoj.
However, while the annual reports also contained an evaluation of selected efficiency aspects regarding IFIs, such as their application of the ‘comply-or-explain’ principle and whether their right to access information was guaranteed, the dedicated section on proposals did not include anything on how to improve the IFIs’ situation. 
Letna poročila so sicer vsebovala tudi oceno izbranih vidikov učinkovitosti neodvisnih fiskalnih institucij, kot je njihova uporaba načela „upoštevaj ali pojasni” in to, ali imajo zagotovljeno pravico dostopa do informacij, vendar poseben oddelek o predlogih ni vključeval ničesar o tem, kako izboljšati položaj teh institucij.
66 Moreover, the EFB Decision does not specify how the EFB’s proposals would feed into the Commission’s internal decision-making process. In fact, the Commission can ignore the EFB’s proposals issued without providing any reason since, contrary to what was proposed in the ‘Five Presidents’ report’, it is not bound by the ‘comply-or-explain’ principle. 
Pravzaprav Komisiji predlogov, ki jih izda Evropski fiskalni odbor, ni treba upoštevati, pri čemer ji ni treba navesti razloga, saj zanjo načelo „upoštevaj ali pojasni” v nasprotju s predlogom iz poročila petih predsednikov ni zavezujoče.
This issue has been pointed out both by the ECB49 and by the European Ombudsman50. 
Na to zadevo sta opozorila tako Evropski fiskalni odbor49 kot tudi Evropski varuh človekovih pravic50.
67 In his reply to the European Ombudsman, the Vice-President of the European Commission explained that a strict parallel cannot be drawn between the EFB and national IFIs. 
67 V odgovoru Evropskemu varuhu človekovih pravic je podpredsednik Evropske komisije pojasnil, da med Evropskim fiskalnim odborom in nacionalnimi neodvisnimi fiskalnimi institucijami ni mogoče potegniti stroge vzporednice.
National IFIs are watchdogs for monitoring whether national policies are compliant with the fiscal rules. 
Nacionalne neodvisne fiskalne institucije so nadzorni organi za spremljanje skladnosti nacionalnih politik s fiskalnimi pravili.
The EFB does not monitor the EU budget or its implementation - it is an independent advisory body of the Commission. 
Evropski fiskalni odbor ne spremlja proračuna EU ali njegovega izvrševanja, ampak je neodvisen svetovalni organ Komisije.
This is why the Vice-President of the European Commission argued that the ‘comply-or-explain’ principle does not apply in this context. 
Zato je podpredsednik Evropske komisije trdil, da načelo „upoštevaj ali pojasni” v tem primeru ne velja.
68 The quality of the analysis and the critical views expressed by the EFB indicate that, despite being embedded within the Commission, it has been able to form independent opinions. However, this independence relies solely on the EFB’s current membership rather than its institutional set-up. 
68 Kakovost analize in kritični pogledi Evropskega fiskalnega odbora kažejo na to, da je odbor, čeprav je vključen v Komisijo, sposoben oblikovati neodvisna mnenja, vendar je ta neodvisnost v celoti odvisna od trenutnih članov odbora, ne pa od njegove institucionalne ureditve.
Our survey showed that the IFIs’ perception of the EFB’s independence was mixed: 53 % of them consider the EFB to have ‘limited independence’, whereas 47 % consider it to be ‘fully independent’. 
Pri anketi Sodišča se je pokazalo, da imajo neodvisne fiskalne institucije mešano mnenje o neodvisnosti Evropskega fiskalnega odbora: 53 % jih meni, da ima Evropski fiskalni odbor omejeno neodvisnost, 47 % pa, da je popolnoma neodvisen.
49 ECB (2015), ‘Economic Bulletin’, Issue 7, Box 5: The creation of a European Fiscal Board. 
49 Evropska centralna banka (2015), Ekonomski bilten, številka 7, okvir 5: The creation of a European Fiscal Board.
50 European Ombudsman (2016), ‘Letter from the European Ombudsman to the President of the European Commission regarding Transparency of the European Fiscal Board’. 29 
50 Evropski varuh človekovih pravic (2016), Letter from the European Ombudsman to the President of the European Commission regarding Transparency of the European Fiscal Board. 29
The Commission so far has only limited assurance that national budgetary frameworks are properly implemented and applied 69 The initial requirements for Member States’ budgetary frameworks were not set out in a regulation, but took the form of a directive. 
Komisija je doslej dobila le omejena zagotovila, da se nacionalni proračunski okviri ustrezno izvajajo in uporabljajo 69 Prvotne zahteve glede proračunskih okvirov držav članic niso bile določene v uredbi, ampak v direktivi.
Consequently, implementing these requirements takes longer and Member States have discretion as regards how to do so. 
Njihovo izvajanje zato traja dlje, države članice pa o načinu izvajanja odločajo po lastni presoji.
70 However, the Commission stated in the report “public finances in EMU 2011” (published in 2012)51 that the choice of a directive “responded to the need to achieve balance in Member States' requirements”. 
70 Toda Komisija je v poročilu o javnih financah v ekonomski in monetarni uniji za leto 2011 (objavljenem leta 2012)51 navedla, da odločitev za direktivo ustreza potrebi po uravnoteženju zahtev držav članic.