natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For those sectors in which similar obligations already exist , Article 5 ( 2 ) foresees the possibility of being exempted from the OSP obligations based on a decision taken through comitology .
Za tiste sektorje , v katerih podobne obveznosti že obstajajo , člen 5 ( 2 ) predvideva možnost izvzetja iz obveznosti glede VNU na podlagi odločitve , sprejete s postopkom komitologije .
It is acknowledged that Directive 2005/65 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on enhancing port security already satisfies the requirement to establish an Operator Security Plan .
Priznava se , da Direktiva 2005/65 / ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 26 . oktobra 2005 o krepitvi varnosti v pristaniščih že izpolnjuje zahtevo za oblikovanje varnostnega načrta upravljavca .
Once an OSP has been created , each ECI owner / operator should submit the OSP to the relevant Member State authority .
Ko je VNU oblikovan , mora vsak lastnik / upravljavec EKI predložiti VNU zadevnemu organu države članice .
Each Member State will setup a supervisory system concerning OSPs which will ensure that sufficient feedback is given to the ECI owner / operator concerning the quality of the OSP and in particular the adequacy of the risk and threat assessment .
Vsaka država članica bo vzpostavila nadzorni sistem glede VNU , ki bo zagotovil zadostne povratne informacije lastnikom / upravljavcem EKI o kakovosti VNU in zlasti ustreznosti ocene groženj in tveganja .
Article 6 -- the Security Liaison Officer ( SLO ) .
Člen 6 -- varnostni uradnik za zvezo ( VUZ ) .
Article 6 requires all CI owners / operators designated as ECI to appoint an SLO .
Člen 6 od vseh lastnikov / upravljavcev ključne infrastrukture , določene za EKI , zahteva imenovanje VUZ .
The SLO would function as the point of contact for security issues between the ECI and the relevant CIP authorities in the Member States .
VUZ bo deloval kot kontaktna točka za vprašanja varovanja med EKI in zadevnimi organi v državah članicah , odgovornimi za varovanje ključne infrastrukture .
The SLO would therefore receive all relevant CIP related information from the Member State authorities and would be responsible for providing relevant information from the ECI to the Member State .
VUZ bo zato sprejemal vse zadevne informacije , povezane z varovanjem ključne infrastrukture , od organov države članice in bo odgovoren za posredovanje zadevnih informacij o EKI državi članici .
Article 7 -- reporting .
Člen 7 -- poročanje .
Article 7 introduces a series of reporting measures .
Člen 7 uvaja vrsto ukrepov glede poročanja .
Each Member State is required to conduct a risk and threat assessment concerning ECI .
Vsaka država članica mora opraviti oceno groženj in tveganja glede EKI .
This information shall form the basis for the MS » dialogue on security issues ( supervision ) with ECI as indicated in Article 5 .
Te informacije bodo podlaga za dialog držav članic o vprašanjih varovanja ( nadzora ) z EKI , kot je določeno v členu 5 .
Since Article 5 requires ECI owners / operators to establish OSPs and submit them to the MS authorities , each Member State is asked to elaborate a generic overview of the types of vulnerabilities , threats and risks encountered in each CIP sector , and to provide this information to the Commission . This information will form the basis for the Commission 's
Ker člen 5 od lastnikov / upravljavcev EKI zahteva oblikovanje VNU in njihovo posredovanje organom držav članic , je vsaka država članica zaprošena , da oblikuje splošni pregled vseh vrst šibkih točk , groženj in tveganj , ugotovljenih v vsakem sektorju varovanja ključne infrastrukture , in te informacije posreduje Komisiji .
EN assessment whether additional protection measures may be required .
Te informacije bodo podlaga za oceno Komisije o tem , ali so potrebni dodatni varnostni ukrepi .
The information may later be used for the development of impact assessments , which would accompany future proposals in this area .
Informacije se lahko pozneje uporabijo za oblikovanje ocen učinka , ki bodo spremljale nadaljnje predloge na tem področju .
This article also envisages the development of common methodologies for carrying out risk , threat and vulnerability assessments in respect of ECIs .
Ta člen predvideva tudi razvoj skupnih metodologij za izvedbo ocen tveganja , groženj in šibkih točk glede EKI .
Such common methodologies would be adopted through the comitology procedure .
Takšne skupne metodologije bodo sprejete s postopkom komitologije .
Article 8 -- Commission support for ECI .
Člen 8 -- podpora Komisije EKI .
The Commission will support ECI owners / operators by providing access to available best practices and methodologies related to CIP .
Komisija bo podprla lastnike / upravljavce EKI z zagotavljanjem dostopa do razpoložljivih najboljših praks , ki so na voljo , in metodologij , povezanih z varovanjem ključne infrastrukture .
The Commission will undertake to collect such information from various sources ( e.g. Member States , own development ) and make it available to those concerned .
Komisija bo te informacije zbrala od različnih virov ( npr . države članice , lastni razvoj ) in jih dala na razpolago zainteresiranim stranem .
Article 9 -- CIP Contact Points .
Člen 9 -- kontaktne točke za varovanje ključne infrastrukture .
In order to ensure cooperation and coordination of CIP issues , each Member States is required to designate a CIP Contact Point .
Da se zagotovi sodelovanje in usklajevanje vprašanj varovanja ključne infrastrukture , se zahteva določitev kontaktnih točk za varovanje ključne infrastrukture .
The Contact Point would coordinate CIP issues within the Member State , with other Member States and with the Commission .
Kontaktne točke bodo usklajevale vprašanja varovanje ključne infrastrukture v državi članici z drugimi državami članicami in Komisijo .
Article 10 -- Confidentiality and CIP information exchange .
Člen 10 -- zaupnost in izmenjava informacij o varovanju ključne infrastrukture .
Confidentiality and CIP information exchange is a crucial and sensitive element of work on CIP .
Zaupnost in izmenjava informacij o varovanju ključne infrastrukture je ključen in občutljiv element dela v zvezi z varovanjem ključne infrastrukture .
As a consequence , the Directive requires the Commission and MS to take appropriate measures to protect information .
Zato Direktiva od Komisije in držav članic zahteva sprejetje ustreznih ukrepov za varstvo informacij .
Any personnel handling classified CIP information should have the necessary security vetting provided by the Member State authorities .
Vsako ravnanje osebja z zaupnimi informacijami mora imeti potrebno stopnjo varnosti , ki jo zagotovijo organi države članice .
Article 11 -- Committee .
Člen 11 -- Odbor .
Certain elements of the Directive will be implemented through comitology .
Določeni elementi Direktive bodo izvedeni s postopkom komitologije .
The Committee will be composed of the CIP Contact Points .
Odbor bodo sestavljale kontaktne točke za varovanje ključne infrastrukture .
The advisory procedure will be used for the purpose of Article 5 ( 2 ) that is to exempt particular sectors from the obligation of developing an OSP .
Svetovalni postopek bo uporabljen za namen člena 5 ( 2 ) , in sicer za izvzetje določenih sektorjev iz obveznosti oblikovanja VNU .
The regulatory procedure is envisaged for the following issues : -* Article 3 ( 1 ) -- adoption of the cross-cutting and sector specific criteria to identify ECI -* Article 3 ( 2 ) -- amending the list of CIP sectors found in Annex I. -* Article 4 ( 2 ) -- adoption of the draft list of ECI -* Article 5 ( 2 ) -- development of sector specific requirements concerning OSPs -* Article 7 ( 2 ) -- development of a common template for generic reports concerning identified risks , threats and vulnerabilities -* Article 7 ( 4 ) -- development of common methodologies for carrying out risk , threat and vulnerability assessments .
Regulativni postopek je predviden za naslednja vprašanja : -* Člen 3 ( 1 ) -- sprejetje medsektorskih meril in sektorskih meril za ugotavljanje EKI . -* Člen 3 ( 2 ) -- sprememba seznama sektorjev varovanja ključne infrastrukture iz Priloge 1 .
EN
-* Člen 4 ( 2 ) -- sprejetje osnutka seznama EKI .
2006/0276 ( CNS ) Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE COUNCIL on the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructure and the assessment of the need to improve their protection ( Text with EEA relevance )
2006/0276 ( CNS ) Predlog DIREKTIVA SVETA o ugotavljanju in določanju evropske ključne infrastrukture ter o oceni potrebe za izboljšanju njenega varovanja ( Besedilo velja za EGP )
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION , Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community , and in particular Article 308 thereof , Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community , and in particular Article 203 thereof , Having regard to the proposal from the Commission1 , Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament2 , Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank3 , Whereas : ( 1 ) In June 2004 , the European Council asked for the preparation of an overall strategy to protect critical infrastructures4 .
SVET EVROPSKE UNIJE JE -- ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti in zlasti člena 308 Pogodbe , ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o ustanovitvi Evropske skupnosti za atomsko energijo in zlasti člena 203 Pogodbe , ob upoštevanju predloga Komisije1 , ob upoštevanju mnenja Evropskega parlamenta2 , ob upoštevanju mnenja Evropske centralne banke3 , ob upoštevanju naslednjega : ( 1 ) Evropski svet je junija 2004 zaprosil za pripravo splošne strategije varovanja ključnih infrastruktur4 .
In response , on 20 October 2004 , the Commission adopted a Communication on Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Fight against Terrorism5 which put forward suggestions as to what would enhance European prevention of , preparedness for and response to terrorist attacks involving critical infrastructures .
Komisija je v odgovor na to 20 . oktobra 2004 sprejela Sporočilo o varovanju ključne infrastrukture v boju proti terorizmu5 , v katerem je dala jasne predloge o tem , kaj bi okrepilo preprečevanje terorističnih napadov na ključno infrastrukturo , pripravljenost in odziv nanje v Evropi .
On 17 November 2005 the Commission adopted a Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection6 which provided policy options on the establishment of the programme and the Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network ( CIWIN ) .
Komisija je 17 . novembra 2005 sprejela Zeleno knjigo o evropskem programu za varovanje ključne infrastrukture6 , v kateri so bile navedene politične možnosti za oblikovanje programa in informacijskega omrežja za opozarjanje o ključni infrastrukturi ( CIWIN ) .
The responses received to the Green Paper clearly showed the need to set up a Community framework concerning critical infrastructure protection .
Prejeti odgovori na Zeleno knjigo so jasno pokazali potrebo po vzpostavitvi okvira Skupnosti glede varovanja ključne infrastrukture .
The need to increase the critical infrastructure protection capability in Europe and to help reduce vulnerabilities concerning critical infrastructures was
Priznana je bila potreba po povečanju zmogljivosti varovanja ključne infrastrukture v Evropi in po pomoči pri zmanjšanju šibkih točk glede ključnih infrastruktur . Poudarjen je bil pomen načela subsidiarnosti in dialoga med zainteresiranimi stranmi .
Council document 10679/2/04 REV 2 .
Dokument Sveta 10679/2/04 REV 2 .
COM ( 2004 ) 702 .
COM ( 2004 ) 702 .
COM ( 2005 ) 576 .
COM ( 2005 ) 576 .
The importance of the principle of subsidiarity and of stakeholder dialogue was emphasised . ( 3 ) In December 2005 the Justice and Home Affairs Council called upon the Commission to make a proposal for a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection ( EPCIP ) and decided that it should be based on an all-hazards approach while countering threats from terrorism as a priority .
( 3 ) Decembra 2005 je Svet za pravosodje in notranje zadeve pozval Komisijo , naj poda predlog za Evropski program za varovanje ključne infrastrukture ( EPCIP ) in odločil , da mora ta predlog temeljiti na pristopu upoštevanja vseh nevarnosti s prednostno nalogo preprečevanja groženj terorizma .
Under this approach , manmade , technological threats and natural disasters should be taken into account in the critical infrastructure protection process , but the threat of terrorism should be given priority .
V skladu s tem pristopom je treba upoštevati človeške , tehnološke grožnje in naravne nesreče v postopku varovanja ključne infrastrukture , grožnja terorizma pa mora biti na prvem mestu .
If the level of protection measures against a particular high level threat is found to be adequate in a critical infrastructure sector , stakeholders should concentrate on other threats to which they are still vulnerable .
Če se ugotovi , da je stopnja varnostnih ukrepov zoper posebej nevarno grožnjo v sektorju ključne infrastrukture ustrezna , se morajo zainteresirane strani osredotočiti na druge grožnje , ki so jim izpostavljene .
The primary responsibility for protecting critical infrastructures currently falls on the Member States and the owners / operators of critical infrastructures .
Glavna odgovornost glede varovanja ključne infrastrukture je zdaj v rokah držav članic in lastnikov / upravljavcev ključnih infrastruktur .
This should not change .
To se ne sme spremeniti .
There are a certain number of critical infrastructures in the Community , the disruption or destruction of which would affect two or more Member States or a Member State other than that in which the critical infrastructure is located .
V Skupnosti obstaja določeno število ključnih infrastruktur , katerih okvara ali uničenje bi vplivala na dve ali več držav članic ali na državo članico , v kateri se takšna infrastruktura ne nahaja .
This may include transboundary cross-sector effects resulting from interdependencies between interconnected infrastructure .
To lahko vključuje čezmejne medsektorske vplive , ki izhajajo iz soodvisnosti med medsebojno povezano infrastrukturo .
Such European critical infrastructures should be identified and designated by means of a common procedure .
Takšno evropsko ključno infrastrukturo je treba ugotoviti in določiti s skupnim postopkom .
The need to improve the protection of such critical infrastructures should be assessed under a common framework .
Potrebo za izboljšanje varovanja takšnih ključnih infrastruktur je treba oceniti v skladu s skupnim okvirom .
Bilateral schemes for cooperation between Member States in the field of critical infrastructure protection constitute a well established and efficient means of dealing with transboundary critical infrastructure .
Dvostranske sheme za sodelovanje med državami članicami na področju varovanja ključne infrastrukture pomenijo uveljavljen in učinkovit način za ravnanje s čezmejno ključno infrastrukturo .
EPCIP should build on such cooperation .
EPCIP mora temeljiti na takšnem sodelovanju .
Since various sectors have particular experience , expertise and requirements concerning critical infrastructure protection , a Community approach to critical infrastructure protection should be developed and implemented taking into account sector specificities and existing sector based measures including those already existing at EU , national or regional level , and where relevant cross-border mutual aid agreements between owners / operators of critical infrastructure already in place .
Ker imajo različni sektorji posebne izkušnje , strokovno znanje in zahteve glede varovanja ključne infrastrukture , je treba oblikovati pristop Skupnosti za varovanje ključne infrastrukture in ga izvajati ob upoštevanju sektorskih posebnosti in obstoječih sektorskih ukrepov na ravni EU in nacionalni ter regionalni ravni in po potrebi tudi obstoječe čezmejne medsebojne dogovore glede pomoči med lastniki / upravljavci ključne infrastrukture .
Given the very significant private sector involvement in overseeing and managing risks , business continuity planning and post-disaster recovery , a Community approach will need to encourage full private sector involvement .
Glede na zelo pomembno vključenost zasebnega sektorja pri nadzoru in upravljanju tveganj , načrtovanju neprekinjenosti delovanja in obnovi po nesrečah , bo pristop Skupnosti moral spodbuditi polno vključenost zasebnega sektorja .
The establishment of a common list of critical infrastructure sectors is necessary in order to facilitate the implementation of the sector-by-sector approach to critical infrastructure protection .
Potrebno je oblikovanje skupnega seznama sektorjev ključne infrastrukture , da se olajša izvajanje pristopa za varovanje ključne infrastrukture po posameznih sektorjih .
Each owner / operator of European critical infrastructure should establish an Operator Security Plan identifying critical assets and laying down relevant security solutions for their protection .
Vsak lastnik / upravljavec evropske ključne infrastrukture mora oblikovati varnostni načrt upravljavca , v katerem bodo ugotovljene ključne infrastrukturne zmogljivosti in navedene ustrezne varnostne rešitve za varovanje teh infrastrukturnih zmogljivosti .
The Operator Security Plan should take into account vulnerability , threat and risk assessments , as well as other relevant information provided by Member State authorities .
Varnostni načrt upravljavca mora upoštevati oceno šibkih točk , groženj in tveganj , kot tudi vse ostale zadevne informacije , ki jih zagotovijo organi države članice .
Each owner / operator of European critical infrastructure should designate a Security Liaison Officer in order to facilitate cooperation and communication with relevant national critical infrastructure protection authorities .
Vsak lastnik / upravljavec evropske ključne infrastrukture mora imenovati varnostnega uradnika za zvezo , da se olajša sodelovanje in komunikacija med zadevnimi organi varovanja nacionalne ključne infrastrukture . Učinkovito ugotavljanje tveganj , groženj in šibkih točk v določenih sektorjih zahteva komunikacijo med lastniki / upravljavci evropske ključne infrastrukture in državami članicami ter med državami članicami in Komisijo .
EN ( 9 )
( 9 ) SL
The efficient identification of risks , threats and vulnerabilities in the particular sectors requires communication both between owners / operators of European critical infrastructure and the Member States , and between the Member States and the Commission . Each Member State should collect information concerning European critical infrastructures located within its territory .
SL ter medsektorskimi odvisnostmi , ki morajo biti podlaga za oblikovanje posebnih predlogov o izboljšanju varovanja EKI , kjer je to potrebno .
The Commission should receive generic information from the Member States concerning vulnerabilities , threats and risks , including where relevant information on possible gaps and cross-sector dependencies , which should be the basis for the development of specific proposals on improving the protection of ECI , where necessary .
( 10 ) Da se olajša izboljšanje varovanja evropskih ključnih infrastruktur , je treba razviti skupne metodologije za ugotavljanje in razvrščanje šibkih točk , groženj in tveganj za infrastrukturne zmogljivosti .
In order to facilitate improvements in the protection of European critical infrastructures , common methodologies should be developed for the identification and classification of vulnerabilities , threats and risks to infrastructure assets .
Samo skupni okvir lahko zagotovi potrebno podlago za usklajeno izvajanje ukrepov za varovanje evropske ključne infrastrukture in jasno določi odgovornosti vseh zadevnih zainteresiranih strani .
Only a common framework can provide the necessary basis for a coherent implementation of measures to protect European critical infrastructure and clearly define the respective responsibilities of all relevant stakeholders . Owners / operators of European critical infrastructure should be given access to best practices and methodologies concerning critical infrastructure protection .
Lastnikom / upravljavcem evropske ključne infrastrukture mora biti omogočen dostop do najboljših praks in metodologij glede varovanja ključne infrastrukture . Učinkovita zaščita ključne infrastrukture zahteva komunikacijo , usklajevanje in sodelovanje na nacionalni ravni in na ravni Skupnosti .
Effective protection of critical infrastructure requires communication , coordination , and cooperation at national and Community level . This is best achieved through the nomination of CIP Contact Points in each Member State , who should coordinate CIP issues internally , as well as with other Member States and the Commission .
To se najlažje doseže z imenovanjem kontaktnih točk za varovanje ključne infrastrukture v vsaki državi članici , ki morajo uskladiti vprašanja glede varovanja ključne infrastrukture znotraj države , kot tudi z drugimi državami članicami in Komisijo .
In order to develop Critical Infrastructure Protection activities in areas which require a degree of confidentiality , it is appropriate to ensure a coherent and secure information exchange in the framework of this Directive .
Da se razvijejo dejavnosti varovanja ključne infrastrukture na področjih , ki zahtevajo določeno stopnjo zaupnosti , je primerno zagotoviti usklajeno in varno izmenjavo informacij v okviru te direktive .
Certain Critical Infrastructure Protection information is of such nature that its disclosure would undermine the protection of the public interest as regards public security .
Določene informacije o varovanju ključne infrastrukture so takšne , da bi njihovo razkritje ogrozilo zaščito javnega interesa glede javne varnosti .
Specific facts about a critical infrastructure asset , which could be used to plan and act with a view to causing unacceptable consequences for critical infrastructure installations should be classified and access granted only on a need-to-know basis , both at Community level and at Member State level .
Določena dejstva o ključni infrastrukturni zmogljivosti , ki bi jih bilo mogoče uporabiti za načrtovanje in delovanje z namenom povzročanja nesprejemljivih posledic za objekte ključne infrastrukture , morajo biti zaupna , dostop do njih pa dovoljen samo po potrebi tako na ravni Skupnosti kot na ravni države članice .
Information sharing regarding Critical Infrastructure should take place in an environment of trust and security .
Izmenjava informacij v zvezi s ključno infrastrukturo mora potekati v okolju zaupanja in varnosti .
The sharing of information requires a relationship of trust such that companies and organisations know that their sensitive data will be sufficiently protected .
Izmenjava informacij zahteva razmerje zaupanja , da družbe in organizacije vedo , da bodo njihovi občutljivi podatki ustrezno varovani .
To encourage information sharing , it should be clear for the industry that the benefits of providing Critical Infrastructure related information outweigh the costs for the industry and society in general .
Za spodbujanje izmenjave informacij mora biti za gospodarstvo jasno , da koristi od posredovanja informacij o ključni infrastrukturi prevladajo nad stroški za gospodarstvo in družbo na splošno .
Critical Infrastructure Protection information exchange should therefore be encouraged .
Zato je treba izmenjavo informacij o varovanju ključne infrastrukture spodbujati .
This Directive complements existing sectoral measures at Community level and in the Member States .
Ta direktiva dopolnjuje obstoječe sektorske ukrepe na ravni Skupnosti in v državah članicah .
Where Community mechanisms are already in place , they should continue to be used and will contribute to the overall implementation of this Directive .
Če so mehanizmi Skupnosti že vzpostavljeni , bi se morali še naprej uporabljati in pomagati pri splošnemu izvajanju te direktive .