natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
incompatible with secondary Community legislation should be brought into line with such secondary legislation .
Da bi se to doseglo , se torej ni dovolj zgolj zanašati na primarnost zakonodaje Skupnosti nad nacionalno zakonodajo . Obveznost v členu 109 Pogodbe obsega samo nezdružljivost s Pogodbo in Statutom , vendar bi bilo treba tudi nacionalno zakonodajo , ki je nezdružljiva s sekundarno zakonodajo Skupnosti , uskladiti s takšno sekundarno zakonodajo .
The primacy of Community law does not affect the obligation to adapt national legislation .
Primarnost zakonodaje Skupnosti namreč ne vpliva na obveznost , da se prilagodi nacionalna zakonodaja .
This general requirement derives not only from Article 109 of the Treaty but also from the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities .
Ta splošna zahteva ne izhaja samo iz člena 109 Pogodbe , temveč tudi iz sodne prakse Sodišča Evropskih skupnosti .
2 The Treaty and the Statute do not prescribe the manner in which national legislation should be adapted .
2 Pogodba in Statut ne predpisujeta načina , kako bi bilo treba prilagoditi nacionalno zakonodajo .
This may be achieved by making references to the Treaty and the Statute or by incorporating provisions thereof and referring to their provenance or by deleting any incompatibility or by a combination of these methods .
To je mogoče doseči s sklicevanjem na Pogodbo in Statut ali z vključevanjem določb iz Pogodbe in Statuta ter navajanjem njihovega vira ali s črtanjem sleherne nezdružljivosti ali s kombinacijo teh metod .
Furthermore , inter alia as a tool to achieve and maintain the compatibility of national legislation with the Treaty and Statute , the ECB must be consulted by the Community institutions and the Member States on draft legislative provisions in its fields of competence , pursuant to Article 105 ( 4 ) of the Treaty and Article 4 of the Statute .
Poleg tega morajo institucije Skupnosti in države članice , med drugim za doseganje in ohranjanje združljivosti nacionalne zakonodaje s Pogodbo in Statutom , zaprositi ECB , da svetuje glede osnutkov pravnih predpisov na področjih iz njene pristojnosti na podlagi člena 105 ( 4 ) Pogodbe in člena 4 Statuta .
Council Decision 98/415 / EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions 3 expressly requires that the Member States take the measures necessary to ensure compliance with this obligation .
Odločba Sveta 98/415 / ES z dne 29 . junija 1998 o posvetovanju nacionalnih organov z Evropsko centralno banko glede osnutkov pravnih predpisov3 izrecno zahteva , da države članice sprejmejo ukrepe , potrebne za zagotovitev spoštovanja te obveznosti .
C O M PAT I B I L I T Y O F N AT I O N A L L E G I S L AT I O N W I T H T H E T R E AT Y 2.2
ZDRUŽLJIVOST NACIONALNE ZAKONODAJE S POGODBO
« COMPATIBILITY » VERSUS « HARMONISATION "
3 NEODVISNOST NCB
Neither the supremacy of the Treaty and the Statute over national legislation , nor the nature of the incompatibility , affects the need to comply with this obligation . The requirement for national legislation to be « compatible » does not mean that the Treaty requires « harmonisation » of the NCB statutes , either with each other or with the Statute .
Glede vprašanj o neodvisnosti centralnih bank in zaupnosti je morala biti nacionalna zakonodaja v državah članicah , ki so se pridružile EU leta 2004 , prilagojena za združljivost z ustreznimi določbami Pogodbe in Statuta in veljavna 1 . maja 2004 .
National particularities may continue to exist to the extent that they do not infringe the Community 's exclusive competence in monetary matters .
Švedska je morala vse potrebne prilagoditve uveljaviti do trenutka ustanovitve ESCB 1 . junija 1998 .
Indeed , Article 14.4 of the Statute permits NCBs to perform functions other than those specified in the Statute , to the extent that these do not interfere with the ESCB 's objectives and tasks . Provisions authorising such additional functions in NCB statutes are a clear example of circumstances in which differences may remain .
Leta 1997 je EMI pripravil seznam značilnosti neodvisnosti centralnih bank ( pozneje podrobno opisane v svojem Konvergenčnem poročilu iz leta 1998 ) , ki so bile podlaga za oceno nacionalne zakonodaje držav članic v tistem času , zlasti statutov NCB .
Rather , the term « compatible » indicates that national legislation and the NCB statutes need to be adjusted to eliminate inconsistencies with the Treaty and the Statute and ensure the necessary degree of integration of the NCBs into the ESCB . In particular , any provisions that infringe an NCB 's independence , as defined in the Treaty , and its role as an integral part of the ESCB should be adjusted .
Koncept neodvisnosti centralnih bank vključuje različne vrste neodvisnosti , ki jih je treba ocenjevati ločeno , in sicer funkcionalno , institucionalno , osebno in finančno neodvisnost . V zadnjih nekaj letih je bila analiza vidikov neodvisnosti centralnih bank podrobneje opravljena v mnenjih , ki jih je sprejela ECB .
It is therefore insufficient to rely solely on the primacy of Community law over national legislation to achieve this . The obligation in Article 109 of the Treaty only covers incompatibility with the Treaty and Statute .
Ti vidiki so podlaga za ocenjevanje ravni konvergence med nacionalno zakonodajo držav članic z odstopanjem na eni strani ter Pogodbo in Statutom na drugi .
See , inter alia , Case 167/73 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [ 1974 ] ECR 359 (' Code du Travail Maritime ') .
Glej med drugim primer 167/73 , Komisija Evropskih skupnosti proti Francoski republiki [ 1974 ] PSES 359 ( „Code du Travail Maritime ") .
ECB Convergence Report May 2006 61
ECB Konvergenčno poročilo maj 2006
3 INDEPENDENCE OF NCBs As far as central bank independence and confidentiality issues are concerned , national legislation in the Member States that joined the EU in 2004 had to be adapted to comply with the relevant provisions of the Treaty and the Statute and be in force on 1 May 2004 . Sweden was obliged to have brought into force the necessary adaptations by the time of establishment of the ESCB on 1 June 1998 .
3.1.1 FUNKCIONALNA NEODVISNOST Neodvisnost centralnih bank ni namenjena sama sebi , temveč je bistvenega pomena za doseganje cilja , ki bi moral biti jasno opredeljen in bi moral prevladati nad vsemi drugimi cilji . Funkcionalna neodvisnost zahteva , da se poglavitni cilj NCB določi jasno in s pravno varnostjo , ter zagotovi tej NCB potrebna sredstva in instrumente za dosego tega cilja neodvisno od drugih oblasti .
that the primary objective of price stability is best served by a fully independent institution with a precise definition of its mandate .
Zahteva Pogodbe po neodvisnosti centralnih bank odraža splošno stališče , da lahko za poglavitni cilj stabilnosti cen najbolje skrbi v celoti neodvisna institucija z natančno opredeljenim mandatom .
Central bank independence is fully compatible with holding NCBs accountable for their decisions , which is an important aspect in enhancing confidence in their independent status .
Neodvisnost centralnih bank je v celoti združljiva z odgovornostjo NCB za njihove odločitve , kar je pomemben vidik pri krepitvi zaupanja v njihov neodvisen status .
This entails transparency and dialogue with third parties .
To zahteva preglednost in dialog s tretjimi osebami .
As regards timing , the Treaty is unclear as to when the NCBs of Member States with a derogation had to comply with the primary objective of price stability set out in Article 105 ( 1 ) of the Treaty and Article 2 of the Statute .
Glede časovnega razporeda je Pogodba nejasna glede tega , kdaj bi morale nacionalne centralne banke držav članic z odstopanjem spoštovati poglavitni cilj stabilnosti cen , določen v členu 105 ( 1 ) Pogodbe in členu 2 Statuta .
In the case of Sweden , the question was whether this obligation should run either from the time the ESCB was established or from adoption of the euro .
V primeru Švedske se je postavilo vprašanje , ali bi morala ta obveznost teči od trenutka ustanovitve ESCB ali od sprejetja eura .
For those Member States which joined the EU on 1 May 2004 , the question was whether it should run either from that date or from adoption of the euro .
Za tiste države članice , ki so se EU pridružile 1 . maja 2004 , se je postavilo vprašanje , ali bi morala obveznost teči od navedenega datuma ali od sprejetja eura .
While Article 105 ( 1 ) of the Treaty does not apply to Member States with a derogation ( see Article 122 ( 3 ) of the Treaty ) , Article 2 of the Statute does apply to such Member States ( see Article 43.1 of the Statute ) .
Medtem ko se člen 105 ( 1 ) Pogodbe ne uporablja za države članice z odstopanjem ( glej člen 122 ( 3 ) Pogodbe ) , se člen 2 Statuta uporablja za te države članice ( glej člen 43.1 Statuta ) .
The ECB takes the view that the obligation on NCBs to have price stability as their primary objective runs from 1 June 1998 in the case of Sweden and from 1 May 2004 for the Member States which joined the EU on that date .
ECB meni , da obveznost NCB , da stabilnost cen obravnavajo kot svoj poglavitni cilj , teče od 1 . junija 1998 v primeru Švedske in od 1 .
This is based on the fact that one of the guiding principles of the Community , namely price stability ( Article 4 ( 3 ) of the Treaty ) applies also to Member States with a derogation . It is also based on the Treaty objective that all Member States should strive for macroeconomic convergence , including price stability , which is the intention behind these regular reports of the ECB and the Commission .
maja 2004 za države članice , ki so se pridružile EU na navedeni datum . To temelji na dejstvu , da eno vodilnih načel Skupnosti , namreč stabilnost cen ( člen 4 ( 3 ) Pogodbe ) , velja tudi za države članice z odstopanjem .
This conclusion is also based on the underlying rationale of central bank independence , which is only justified if the overall objective of price stability has primacy . The country assessments in this report are based on these conclusions with regard to the timing of the obligation on NCBs of Member States
Temelji tudi na cilju Pogodbe , da bi si morale vse države članice prizadevati za makroekonomsko konvergenco , vključno s stabilnostjo cen , čemur so namenjena redna poročila ECB in Komisije . Ta ugotovitev temelji tudi na temeljnem načelu neodvisnosti
In 1997 the EMI established a list of features of central bank independence ( later described in detail in its 1998 Convergence Report ) which were the basis for the assessment of the national legislation of the Member States at that time , in particular the NCB statutes .
centralnih bank , ki je upravičena samo , če se splošni cilj stabilnost cen šteje za primarnega .
The concept of central bank independence includes various types of independence that must be assessed separately , namely functional , institutional , personal and financial independence .
Ocene držav v tem poročilu temeljijo na teh ugotovitvah glede časovnega razporeda obveznosti NCB držav članic z odstopanjem , da stabilnost cen obravnavajo kot svoj poglavitni cilj .
Over the past few years , there has been further refinement of the analysis of these aspects of central bank independence in the opinions adopted by the ECB .
3.1.2 INSTITUCIONALNA NEODVISNOST Načelo institucionalne neodvisnosti je izrecno navedeno v členu 108 Pogodbe in v členu 7 Statuta .
These aspects are the basis for assessing the level of convergence between the national legislation of the Member States with a derogation , on the one hand , and the Treaty and Statute , on the other hand . 3.1.1 FUNCTIONAL INDEPENDENCE Central bank independence is not an end in itself but rather is instrumental to achieving a target that should be clearly defined and should prevail over any other objective .
Ta člena nacionalnim centralnim bankam in članom njihovih organov odločanja prepovedujeta , da bi zahtevali ali sprejemali navodila od institucij ali organov Skupnosti , vlad držav članic ali katerih koli drugih organov .
Functional independence requires that each NCB 's primary objective is clear and legally certain and provides that NCB with the necessary means and instruments to achieve this objective independently of any other authority . The Treaty 's requirement of central bank independence reflects the generally held view
Poleg tega prepovedujeta institucijam in organom Skupnosti ter vladam držav članic , da bi poskušali vplivati na tiste člane organov odločanja NCB , katerih odločitve lahko vplivajo na izpolnjevanje nalog NCB , povezanih z ESCB .
3.1.2 INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE The principle of institutional independence is expressly referred to in Article 108 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute . These two articles prohibit the NCBs and members of their decision-making bodies from seeking or taking instructions from Community institutions or bodies , from any government of a Member State or from any other body .
Če je NCB organizirana kot organ v lasti države , kot poseben organ javnega prava ali preprosto kot delniška družba , obstaja tveganje , da lahko lastnik na podlagi takšnega lastništva vpliva na njeno odločanje v zvezi z nalogami , povezanimi z ESCB .
In addition , they prohibit Community institutions and bodies and the governments of the Member States from seeking to influence those members of the NCBs » decision-making bodies whose decisions may affect the fulfilment of the NCBs » ESCBrelated tasks .
Takšen vpliv lahko , ne glede na to , ali se izvaja prek pravic delničarjev ali kako drugače , vpliva na neodvisnost NCB in bi ga bilo zato treba zakonsko omejiti .
Whether the NCB is organised as a state-owned body , a special public law body or simply a public limited company , there is a risk that influence may be exerted by the owner on its decision-making in relation to ESCB-related tasks by virtue of such ownership .
PREPOVED DAJANJA NAVODIL Pravice tretjih oseb , da dajejo navodila NCB , njihovim organom odločanja ali njihovim članom , so nezdružljive s Pogodbo in Statutom , kar zadeva naloge , povezane z ESCB .
Such influence , whether exercised through shareholders » rights or otherwise , may affect the NCB 's independence and should therefore be limited by law . PROHIBITION ON GIVING INSTRUCTIONS Rights of third parties to give instructions to NCBs , their decision-making bodies or their members are incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute as far as ESCB-related tasks are concerned .
PREPOVED POTRDIT VE , Z ADRŽANJA , RAZVELJAVIT VE ALI ODLOGA ODLOČITEV Pravice tretjih oseb , da potrdijo , zadržijo , razveljavijo ali odložijo odločitve NCB , so nezdružljive s Pogodbo in Statutom , kar zadeva naloge , povezane z ESCB . 60
PROHIBITION ON APPROVING , SUSPENDING , ANNULLING OR DEFERRING DECISIONS Rights of third parties to approve , suspend , annul or defer NCBs » decisions are incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute as far as ESCBrelated tasks are concerned . PROHIBITION ON CENSORING DECISIONS ON -- confidentiality requirements resulting from the Statute are observed .
POGLAVJE 2 PREPOVED CENZURIRANJA ODLOČITEV NA PRAVNI PODLAGI Pravica organov , razen neodvisnih sodišč , da cenzurirajo odločitve , ki se nanašajo na opravljanje nalog , povezanih z ESCB , na pravni podlagi je nezdružljiva s Pogodbo in Statutom , ker opravljanja teh nalog ni dovoljeno ponovno ocenjevati na politični ravni .
LEGAL GROUNDS A right for bodies other than independent courts to censor , on legal grounds , decisions relating to the performance of ESCB-related tasks is incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute since the performance of these tasks may not be re-assessed at the political level . A right of the Governor to suspend the implementation of decisions adopted by ESCB or NCB decisionmaking bodies on legal grounds and subsequently to submit them to political bodies for a final decision would be equivalent to seeking instructions from third parties .
Pravica guvernerja , da zadrži izvajanje odločitev , ki jih sprejmejo organi odločanja ESCB ali NCB , na pravni podlagi in jih naknadno predloži političnim organom v dokončno odločitev , bi bila enakovredna zahtevi za navodila od tretjih oseb .
PROHIBITION ON PARTICIPATING IN DECISIONMAKING BODIES OF AN NCB WITH A RIGHT TO VOTE Participation by representatives of third parties in an NCB 's decision-making body with a right to vote on matters concerning the exercise by the NCB of ESCB-related tasks , even if this vote is not decisive , is incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute .
PREPOVED SODELOVANJA V ORGANIH ODLOČANJA NCB S PRAVICO GLASOVANJA Sodelovanje predstavnikov tretjih oseb v organih odločanja NCB s pravico glasovanja o zadevah v zvezi z opravljanjem nalog NCB , povezanih z ESCB , tudi če ta glas ni odločilen , je nezdružljivo s Pogodbo in Statutom .
PROHIBITION ON EX ANTE CONSULTATION RELATING TO AN NCB 's DECISION An express statutory obligation for an NCB to consult ex ante third parties provides the latter with a formal mechanism to influence the final decision and is therefore incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute .
PREPOVED PREDHODNEGA POSVETOVANJA GLEDE ODLOČITEV NCB Izrecna zakonska obveznost , da se NCB vnaprej posvetuje s tretjimi osebami , slednjim omogoča formalni mehanizem za vplivanje na dokončno odločitev in je zato nezdružljiva s Pogodbo in Statutom .
However , dialogue between NCBs and third parties , even when based on statutory obligations to provide information and exchange views , is compatible with central bank independence provided that : -- this does not result in interference with the independence of the members of the NCB 's decision-making bodies ;
Dialog med NCB in tretjimi osebami , tudi če temelji na zakonski obveznosti zagotavljanja informacij in izmenjave mnenj , pa je združljiv z neodvisnostjo centralnih bank , pod pogojem , da : -- to ne privede do poseganja v neodvisnost članov organov odločanja NCB ;
-- the special status of Governors in their capacity as members of the ECB 's General Council is fully respected ;
-- je posebni status guvernerjev v njihovi funkciji članov Razširjenega sveta ECB v celoti spoštovan ;
and C O M PAT I B I L I T Y O F N AT I O N A L L E G I S L AT I O N W I T H T H E T R E AT Y
in -- so upoštevane zahteve po zaupnosti , ki izhajajo iz Statuta .
ECB Convergence Report May 2006 63
ODOBRITEV DELA ČLANOV ORGANOV ODLOČANJA NCB Statutarne določbe o odobritvi dela članov organov odločanja NCB ( npr .
DISCHARGE OF DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF THE NCB 's DECISION-MAKING BODIES Statutory provisions regarding the discharge by third parties ( e.g. governments ) of duties of members of the NCB 's decision-making bodies ( e.g. in relation to accounts ) should contain adequate safeguards , so that such a power does not impinge on the capacity of the individual NCB member independently to adopt decisions in respect of ESCB-related tasks ( or implement decisions adopted at ESCB level ) .
v povezavi z računovodskimi izkazi ) s strani tretjih oseb ( npr . vlad ) bi morale vsebovati ustrezna varovala , da takšno pooblastilo ne bi škodljivo vplivalo na možnost člana posamezne NCB , da samostojno sprejema odločitve v zvezi z nalogami , povezanimi z ESCB ( ali izvaja odločitve , sprejete na ravni ESCB ) .
An express provision to this effect in the NCB statutes is recommended .
Priporoča se , da statuti NCB vsebujejo izrecno določbo s tem namenom .
3.1.3 PERSONAL INDEPENDENCE The Statute 's provision on security of tenure for members of the NCB 's decision-making bodies further safeguards central bank independence .
3.1.3 OSEBNA NEODVISNOST Določba Statuta o varnosti položaja za člane organov odločanja NCB dodatno varuje neodvisnost centralnih bank .
Governors are members of the General Council of the ECB .
Guvernerji so člani Razširjenega sveta ECB .
Article 14.2 of the Statute provides that the NCB statutes must , in particular , provide for a minimum term of office of five years for the Governor .
Člen 14.2 Statuta določa , da morajo statuti NCB zlasti predpisovati najmanj petletni mandat za guvernerja .
It also protects against the arbitrary dismissal of Governors , by providing that Governors may only be relieved from office if they no longer fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties or if they have been guilty of serious misconduct , with the possibility of recourse to the Court of Justice of the European Communities .
Ta člen tudi varuje pred samovoljno razrešitvijo guvernerjev , ker določa , da so guvernerji lahko razrešeni funkcije le , če ne izpolnjujejo več pogojev , ki se zahtevajo za opravljanje njihovih dolžnosti , ali če so zagrešili hujšo kršitev , pri čemer imajo možnost zadevo predložiti Sodišču Evropskih skupnosti .
The NCB statutes must comply with this provision as set out below .
Statuti NCB morajo spoštovati to določbo , kot je določeno v nadaljevanju .
MINIMUM TERM OF OFFICE FOR GOVERNORS The NCB statutes must , in accordance with Article 14.2 of the Statute , contain a minimum term of office of five years for a Governor .
MINIMALNO TRAJANJE MANDATA Z A GUVERNERJE Statuti NCB morajo v skladu s členom 14.2 Statuta določiti najmanj petletni mandat za guvernerja .
This does not preclude longer terms of office , whilst an indefinite term of office does not require adaptation of the statutes provided that the grounds for the dismissal of a Governor are in line with those of Article 14.2 of the Statute .
To ne izključuje daljšega mandata , medtem ko zaradi mandata za nedoločen čas statuta ni treba prilagoditi , če so razlogi za razrešitev guvernerja skladni s tistimi iz člena 14.2 Statuta .
When the NCB statutes are amended , the amending law should safeguard the security of tenure of the Governor and of other members of decision-making bodies who may have to deputise for the Governor .
Če so statuti NCB spremenjeni , morajo zakonske spremembe ščititi varnost položaja guvernerja in drugih članov organov odločanja , ki bi morali nadomeščati guvernerja .
GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL OF GOVERNORS NCB statutes must ensure that Governors may not be dismissed for reasons other than those mentioned in Article 14.2 of the Statute .
RAZLOGI Z A RAZREŠITEV GUVERNERJEV Statuti NCB morajo zagotoviti , da guvernerjev ni mogoče razrešiti iz drugih razlogov kot tistih , ki so navedeni v členu 14.2 Statuta .
The purpose of this requirement is to prevent the authorities involved in the appointment of Governors , particularly the government or parliament , from exercising their discretion to dismiss them as Governor .
Namen te zahteve je preprečiti organom , ki sodelujejo pri imenovanju guvernerjev , zlasti vladi ali parlamentu , da bi izvršili svojo diskrecijsko pravico in razrešili guvernerja . Statuti NCB bi morali bodisi vsebovati razloge za razrešitev , ki so združljivi s tistimi iz člena 14.2 Statuta , ECB Konvergenčno poročilo maj 2006
The NCB statutes should either contain grounds for dismissal which are compatible with those laid down in Article 14.2 of the Statute , or omit any mention of grounds for dismissal ( since Article 14.2 is directly applicable ) .
bodisi ne omenjati razlogov za razrešitev ( ker se člen 14.2 uporablja neposredno ) .
SECURITY OF TENURE OF MEMBERS OF NCBs » DECISION-MAKING BODIES , OTHER THAN GOVERNORS , WHO ARE INVOLVED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ESCB-RELATED TASKS Personal independence would be jeopardised if the same rules for the security of tenure of office of Governors did not also apply to other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCBrelated tasks .
VARNOST POLOŽAJA ČLANOV ORGANOV ODLOČANJA NCB , RAZEN GUVERNERJEV , KI SODELUJEJO PRI OPRAVLJANJU NALOG , POVEZ ANIH Z ESCB Osebna neodvisnost bi bila ogrožena , če enaka pravila , ki veljajo za varnost položaja guvernerja , ne bi veljala tudi za druge člane organov odločanja NCB , ki sodelujejo pri opravljanju nalog , povezanih z ESCB .
Various Treaty and Statute provisions require comparable security of tenure .
Različne določbe v Pogodbi in Statutu zahtevajo primerljivo varnost položaja .