natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
4.1.2 Legal independence The ECB and NCBs enjoy their own legal personality ( see Section 2.1 ) , which is a prerequisite for the independence of the members of the Eurosystem .
4.1.2 Pravna neodvisnost ECB in nacionalne centralne banke so pravne osebe ( glej razdelek 2.1 ) , kar je predpogoj za neodvisnost članic Eurosistema .
For the ECB , legal independence includes the right to bring actions before the European Court of Justice ( ECJ ) in order to uphold its prerogatives if they are impaired by a Community institution or Member State .
Za ECB pravna neodvisnost med drugim pomeni pravico do tožbe na Sodišču Evropskih skupnosti z namenom potrditve svojih posebnih pravic , če jih krati institucija Skupnosti ali država članica .
3 Pe r s o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e To substantiate the institutional independence , the Statute protects the personal independence of the members of the ECB 's decision-making bodies .
4.1.3 Osebna neodvisnost V podkrepitev institucionalne neodvisnosti statut ščiti tudi osebno neodvisnost članov organov odločanja ECB .
It stipulates , in particular , relatively long fixed terms of office : -* a minimum term of office of five years for the NCB governors , which is renewable ;
V tem okviru določa predvsem razmeroma dolge mandate : -* najmanj petletni mandat za guvernerje nacionalnih centralnih bank , ki so lahko ponovno imenovani ;
-* a non-renewable term of office of eight years for the members of the Executive Board .
-* osemletni mandat za člane Izvršilnega odbora ECB1 , ki pa ne morejo biti ponovno imenovani .
1 A member of the ECB 's decision-making bodies may not be dismissed in a discretionary manner on the grounds of past policy performance .
Član organa odločanja ECB ne more biti diskrecijsko razrešen zaradi ( ne ) uspešnosti preteklih politik .
Instead members may only be removed from office if they become unable to fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties or if they are found guilty of serious misconduct .
Razrešen je lahko samo v primeru , da ne izpolnjuje več pogojev , zahtevanih za opravljanje njegovih dolžnosti , ali če je zagrešil hujšo kršitev .
In such cases , the Governing Council or the Executive Board may apply to the ECJ to have the member of the Executive Board compulsorily retired ( Article 11.4 of the Statute of the ESCB ) .
V tem primeru lahko Svet ECB ali Izvršilni odbor zaprosi Evropsko sodišče , da člana Izvršilnega odbora prisilno razreši ( člen 11.4 Statuta ESCB ) .
In the same circumstances , an NCB governor may be relieved from office by the competent national authority in line with the procedures specified in the statute of their respective NCB .
V enakih okoliščinah lahko pristojni nacionalni organ razreši guvernerja nacionalne centralne banke po postopku , ki je določen v statutu te nacionalne centralne banke .
However , the governor concerned or the Governing Council may refer the matter to the Court , which has jurisdiction in such cases ( Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB ) .
Zadevni guverner ali Svet ECB lahko zadevo predloži Sodišču , ki je pristojno za takšne primere ( člen 14.2 Statuta ESCB ) .
The statutes of the NCBs ( as amended in line with Article 109 of the EC Treaty ) extend the protection against discretionary dismissals to the other members of the NCBs » decision-making bodies ; however , the other members do not enjoy the right to refer the matter to the ECJ .
V skladu s statuti nacionalnih centralnih bank ( kot so bili spremenjeni v skladu s členom 109 Pogodbe ES ) so pred diskrecijsko razrešitvijo zaščiteni tudi drugi člani organov odločanja nacionalnih centralnih bank , vendar pa drugi člani nimajo pravice , da zadevo predložijo Evropskemu sodišču .
4.1.4 Functional and operational independence Functional and operational independence is substantiated in several provisions of the Statute of the ESCB .
4.1.4 Funkcionalna in operativna neodvisnost Funkcionalna in operativna neodvisnost je opredeljena v več določilih Statuta ESCB .
To this end , the ECB has been assigned all necessary competences and powers to achieve its primary objective of price stability . For example , the Eurosystem is endowed with the exclusive competence for monetary policy and has a monopoly on banknote issuing .
V ta namen je ECB dobila vse pristojnosti , ki jih potrebuje za izvajanje svojega temeljnega cilja , tj . ohranjanje cenovne stabilnosti .
The Member States » right to mint coins is restricted to low denominations and the volume of coins issued is subject to approval by the ECB .
Tako ima na primer Eurosistem izključno pristojnost za denarno politiko in monopol nad izdajanjem bankovcev .
No legal tender may therefore be created against the ECB 's will , and this gives the ECB full control over the money base in the euro area .
Pravica držav članic do izdaje kovancev je omejena na nižje apoene , obseg izdaje pa mora odobriti ECB .
When the ECB was established in 1998 , a system of staggered terms of office was applied for appointments to the Executive Board to ensure continuity . The first ECB President was appointed for eight years and the first Vice-President for four years .
To pomeni , da nobenega zakonitega plačilnega sredstva ni mogoče izdati proti volji ECB , kar daje ECB popoln nadzor nad primarnim denarjem v euroobmočju .
The institutional arrangements in the field of exchange rate policy ensure consistency with the objective of price stability for both the single monetary policy and the exchange rate policy ( Article 4 of the EC Treaty ) .
Institucionalna ureditev na področju tečajne politike zagotavlja skladnost s ciljem ohranjanja cenovne stabilnosti tako za enotno denarno politiko kot tudi za tečajno politiko ( člen 4 Pogodbe ES ) .
To the same end , official foreign reserve holdings are concentrated within the Eurosystem ;
Z istim namenom se uradne devizne rezerve v Eurosistemu koncentrirajo ;
the ECB controls the use of these holdings as well as Member States » residual working balances in foreign currencies ( see Section 3.2 ) .
ECB nadzira njihovo uporabo kot tudi uporabo operativnih deviznih rezerv držav članic ( glej razdelek 3.2 ) .
In addition , Article 101 of the EC Treaty prohibits the Eurosystem from lending to the public sector .
Poleg tega člen 101 Pogodbe ES Eurosistemu prepoveduje dajanje posojil javnemu sektorju .
This prohibition , which came into force at the start of Stage Two of EMU , shields the Eurosystem against pressure from the public sector to grant monetary financing using central bank money , and includes the purchase by the Eurosystem of public debt on the primary market .
Ta prepoved , ki je začela veljati na začetku druge faze ekonomske in monetarne unije , ščiti Eurosistem pred pritiski javnega sektorja po denarnem financiranju z uporabo centralnobančnega denarja in vključuje tudi nakup javnega dolga na primarnem trgu s strani Eurosistema .
The ECB regularly monitors the market for possible circumventions of this prohibition involving purchases of public debt on the secondary market .
ECB redno spremlja tržna dogajanja , da bi odkrila morebitne poskuse zaobiti to prepoved z nakupi državnega dolga na sekundarnem trgu .
The Eurosystem may freely use a wide range of instruments for the implementation of its policies .
Eurosistem lahko pri izvajanju svojih politik uporablja vrsto različnih instrumentov .
This range of instruments includes regulatory powers and the right to impose enforceable sanctions in case of non-compliance with ECB regulations and decisions ( see Section 2.5.3 ) .
Ti vključujejo tudi normativna pooblastila in pravico izrekanja sodno izvršljivih sankcij v primeru nespoštovanja predpisov in sklepov ECB ( glej razdelek 2.5.3 ) .
4.1.5 Financial and organisational independence The ECB and the NCBs have their own financial resources and income and enjoy organisational autonomy .
4.1.5 Finanãna in organizacijska neodvisnost ECB in nacionalne centralne banke imajo lastna finančna sredstva in prihodke ter uživajo organizacijsko avtonomijo .
Their financial and organisational autonomy enables the Eurosystem to perform its tasks as required .
Njihova finančna in organizacijska avtonomija Eurosistemu omogoča , da učinkovito izvaja svoje naloge .
The capital of the ECB is subscribed and paid up by the NCBs .
Kapital ECB vpišejo in vplačajo nacionalne centralne banke .
The ECB has its own budget , independent from that of the EU .
ECB ima svoj lasten proračun , ki je neodvisen od proračuna Evropske unije .
The Statute also allows the ECB to adopt autonomously the conditions of employment for its staff and to organise its internal structure as it sees fit .
Statut ji prav tako dopušča , da samostojno določa pogoje za zaposlitev svojih uslužbencev in svojo notranjo organizacijo , kot se ji zdi primerno .
In addition , as a supranational organisation , the ECB enjoys in the territories of the Member States the privileges and immunities that are necessary for the performance of its tasks .
Poleg tega ECB kot nadnacionalna organizacija na ozemlju držav članic uživa privilegije in imunitete , ki jih potrebuje za izvajanje svojih nalog .
Chapter 1 of the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of the European Communities of 8 April 1965 guarantees , among other things , that the premises and archives of the ECB are inviolable and that its property and assets are intangible .
Poglavje 1 Protokola o privilegijih in imunitetah Evropskih skupnosti z dne 8 . aprila 1965 med drugim določa , da so prostori in arhiv ECB nedotakljivi ter da so njena sredstva , prihodki in drugo premoženje oproščeni vseh neposrednih davkov .
The Protocol states further that these must not be subject to any administrative or legal measure of constraint without the authorisation of the ECJ .
Protokol nadalje določa , da ne smejo biti predmet upravnega ali pravnega prisilnega ukrepa brez dovoljenja Sodišča .
As regards the NCBs » financial and budgetary autonomy and the autonomy of their staff , the Member States have a certain influence over NCBs » budgets and the distribution of profits and staffing , be it as ( sometimes sole ) shareholder of their respective NCB or as national legislator .
Na področju finančne in proračunske avtonomije nacionalnih centralnih bank in njihovih uslužbencev imajo države članice določen vpliv na proračun in razdelitev prihodkov ter kadrovske odločitve nacionalnih centralnih bank , bodisi kot ( včasih edine ) delničarke banke ali kot nacionalne zakonodajalke .
However , in line with the statutes of the NCBs , the Member States » rights are subject to the proviso that their exercise is not allowed to impede on the NCBs » capacity to perform their Eurosystem-related functions .
Vendar pa so v skladu s statuti nacionalnih centralnih bank te pravice držav članic omejene z določilom , da njihovo uveljavljanje ne sme zmanjševati sposobnosti nacionalnih centralnih bank za izvajanje nalog , povezanih z Eurosistemom .
2 D E M O C R AT I C A C C O U N TA B I L I T Y Given its exclusive competence for the monetary policy of the euro area , the ECB has been entrusted with a core aspect of monetary sovereignty .
4.2 DEMOKRATIâNA ODGOVORNOST ECB zaradi svoje izključne pristojnosti za denarno politiko euroobmočja uživa denarno suverenost .
Respect for the fundamental principles of democratic societies requires that the ECB is held accountable to the citizens and their democratically elected representatives .
Spoštovanje temeljnih načel demokratičnih družb zahteva , da za svoja dejanja odgovarja državljanom in njihovim demokratično izvoljenim predstavnikom .
Consequently , both the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB contain a number of provisions that require the ECB , just like any other independent central bank , to subject its actions and decisions to public scrutiny .
Tako Pogodba ES kot Statut ESCB zato vsebujeta številne določbe , ki zahtevajo , da ECB , tako kot katera koli druga neodvisna centralna banka , omogoči javno preverjanje svojih dejanj in odločitev .
It is of course in the ECB 's own interest anyway to ensure that its decisions are properly explained and justified so as to foster public support for its policies .
Seveda je tudi v lastnem interesu ECB , da svoje odločitve ustrezno razloži in upraviči , saj s tem krepi javno podporo svojim politikam .
1 A c c o u n t a b i l i t y a s a c o re e l e m e n t o f l e g i t i m a c y Accountability is a basic precondition for democratic legitimacy and a core element of democratic structures .
4.2.1 Odgovornost kot temelj legitimnosti Odgovornost je osnovni predpogoj za demokratično legitimnost in temeljna sestavina demokratičnih struktur .
In a democracy , all power emanates from its citizens and all decisions that bind and affect a community have to be legitimised by the will of the electorate .
V demokraciji vsa oblast izvira iz državljanov , zato morajo legitimnost vseh odločitev , ki skupnost zavezujejo in nanjo vplivajo , s svojo voljo potrditi volivci .
Thus , public policy decisions are legitimate if they are the direct or indirect expression of that will -- this is often referred to as « input legitimacy » or « legitimacy by procedure » -- or if they meet the justified expectations and needs of the citizens -- a notion referred to as « output legitimacy » or « legitimacy by result » .
To pomeni , da so odločitve o politikah legitimne , 122 če predstavljajo posredni ali neposredni izraz te volje ( t.i. „legitimnost na podlagi postopka ") ali če izpolnjujejo upravičena pričakovanja in potrebe državljanov ( t.i. „legitimnost na podlagi rezultatov ") .
As an organisation established by the EC Treaty , which was signed and ratified by all Member States in accordance with their constitutional requirements , the ECB enjoys « input legitimacy » .
Kot organizacija , ustanovljena s Pogodbo ES , ki so jo podpisale in ratificirale vse države članice v skladu s svojimi ustavnimi zahtevami , uživa ECB „legitimnost na podlagi postopka » .
The EU Member States ( acting through their elected representatives ) took a sovereign decision to transfer responsibility for monetary policy and the related tasks to a new Community organisation and to endow it with independence from political interference .
Države članice EU so ( prek svojih izvoljenih predstavnikov ) sprejele suvereno odločitev , da odgovornost za denarno politiko in z njo povezane naloge prenesejo na novo organizacijo Skupnosti ter ji zagotovijo neodvisnost od političnega vmešavanja .
Competency for monetary policy is transferred within the limits and the conditions of a mandate which clearly defines the objective of monetary policy and thus limits the amount of legally permitted discretion that the decision-making bodies of the ECB can use in conducting monetary policy .
Pristojnost za denarno politiko je prenesena v okviru omejitev in pogojev mandata , ki jasno določa cilj denarne politike in tako omejuje obseg zakonsko dovoljenega prostega preudarka , ki ga imajo organi odločanja ECB pri izvajanju denarne politike .
Further « input legitimacy » is derived from the procedure for appointing the members of the ECB 's decision-making bodies ; they are all appointed by the democratically elected representatives of the Member States .
Nadalje „legitimnost na podlagi postopka » izhaja iz načina imenovanja članov v organe odločanja ECB -- vse člane imenujejo demokratično izvoljeni predstavniki držav članic .
As already stated , Executive Board members are appointed by common accord of the Member States at the level of the Heads of State or Government ( after consultation of the European Parliament ) ;
Kot je opisano , člane Izvršilnega odbora v medsebojnem soglasju imenujejo države članice na ravni predsednikov držav ali vlad ( po posvetovanju z Evropskim parlamentom ) .
the other members of the Governing Council are appointed by their respective national authorities in line with prevailing procedures .
Druge člane Sveta ECB imenujejo pristojni nacionalni organi v skladu z veljavnimi postopki .
However , the ECB can also derive « output legitimacy » by successfully performing the tasks entrusted to it .
ECB pa lahko doseže tudi „legitimnost na podlagi rezultatov » , če uspešno izvaja naloge , ki so ji zaupane .
The conduct of monetary policy and the performance of other tasks have been made subject to independent decisionmaking for a specific purpose , i.e. maintaining price stability in the euro area .
Pri izvajanju denarne politike in drugih nalog se uporablja postopek neodvisnega odločanja za poseben namen , tj . ohranjanje cenovne stabilnosti v euroobmočju .
As mentioned in Section 4.1 above , the experience of a number of central banks in the post-war period has shown that this objective can be best achieved by having 127
Kot je opisano v razdelku 4.1 , so izkušnje več centralnih bank v povojnem obdobju pokazale , da je ta cilj mogoče najbolje dosegati z neodvisno centralno banko , ki deluje z jasnim in zavezujočim mandatom .
In this way , despite its intentional distance from the normal political process , an independent central bank can enjoy full output legitimacy .
Na ta način lahko neodvisna centralna banka kljub namerni distanci do normalnega političnega procesa uživa popolno legitimnost na podlagi rezultatov .
In addition , the legitimacy of independent central banks rests on a comprehensive framework for holding them accountable .
Poleg tega legitimnost neodvisne centralne banke temelji na celovitem okviru , ki zagotavlja , da prevzema odgovornost za svoje delovanje .
Independence and accountability are two sides of the same coin .
Neodvisnost in odgovornost sta dve strani istega kovanca .
Thus , the ECB is called on to explain and justify to the European citizens and their elected representatives how it uses the powers and prerogatives it has been entrusted with .
Tako lahko evropski državljani in njihovi izvoljeni predstavniki od ECB zahtevajo , da pojasni in utemelji , kako uporablja svoja pooblastila in pravice , ki so ji bile zaupane .
2 N a t u re a n d s c o p e o f t h e E C B « s a c c o u n t a b i l i t y The term « accountability » refers to a concept deeply rooted in the democratic and institutional conventions of English-speaking countries2 .
4.2.2 Narava in obseg odgovornosti ECB Izraz „odgovornost » označuje pojem , ki je trdno zakoreninjen v demokratičnih in institucionalnih konvencijah angleško govorečih držav 2 .
In a European context , the notion of « being accountable » is understood to mean being held responsible for one 's decisions and actions and being required to justify and explain them .
V evropskem kontekstu izraz „biti odgovoren » pomeni sprejemati odgovornost za svoje odločitve in dejanja ter za njihovo upravičevanje in pojasnjevanje .
This concept necessarily refers to an ex post justification and explanation .
Pri tem gre nujno za ex post upravičevanje in pojasnjevanje .
Indeed , if any political body -- such as a parliament or government -- were able to intervene or influence directly the policy-making of the central bank , they would actually be taking part in the decision-making process itself and hence would share the responsibility for the policy outcomes .
Če bi namreč kateri koli politični organ -- na primer parlament ali vlada -- neposredno posegal v oblikovanje politike centralne banke ali neposredno vplival nanje , bi s tem dejansko sodeloval v 2
This would not only contradict the independent status of the central bank , but it would also render the concept of accountability meaningless .
Primerjava z ameriškim sistemom zveznih rezerv , angleško in japonsko centralno banko je predstavljena v članku z naslovom „The accountability of the ECB » , ECB Monthly Bulletin , november 2002 .
To a large extent , accountability goes hand in hand with transparency .
postopku odločanja in bi bil torej soodgovoren za rezultate te politike . To bi bilo v nasprotju z neodvisnim statusom centralne banke , hkrati pa bi pojem odgovornosti postal nesmiseln .
Transparency means not only releasing information , but also structuring that information in such a way that the public can understand it .
Slednja ne pomeni le objavljanja informacij , ampak tudi oblikovanje teh informacij na način , ki je razumljiv splošni javnosti .
Transparency thus facilitates the process of holding an independent central bank accountable .
Preglednost torej javnosti omogoča , da neodvisno centralno banko pokliče na odgovornost .
The Treaty provisions for holding the ECB accountable and the practices and procedures established over the years have been adapted to the specific political , economic and institutional circumstances in which the ECB operates .
Določbe Pogodbe glede odgovornosti ECB ter praks in postopkov , ki so bili oblikovani tekom let , so bile prilagojene posebnim političnim , ekonomskim in institucionalnim pogojem , v katerih deluje ECB .
As already discussed in Section 1.2.2 , the ECB is a supranational central bank that carries out its tasks for the multi-country economy of the euro area ; its audience is not genuinely European , but rather multinational .
Kot je opisano v razdelku 1.2.2 , je ECB nadnacionalna centralna banka , ki svoje naloge izvaja za večdržavno gospodarstvo euroobmočja , njeno občinstvo pa ni zares evropsko , ampak prej večnacionalno .
The ECB has also been given a specific institutional structure with the ex officio participation of the NCB governors in its decision-making .
ECB ima tudi posebno institucionalno strukturo , za katero je značilno , da guvernerji nacionalnih centralnih bank po uradni dolžnosti sodelujejo v njenih postopkih odločanja .
Despite institutional and political differences , the provisions and procedures for holding the ECB accountable ensure that the ECB fulfils its accountability obligations no less effectively and adequately than a « conventional » central bank in a national context .
Kljub institucionalnim in političnim razlikam določbe in postopki za preverjanje odgovornosti ECB zagotavljajo , da ECB svoje obveznosti odgovornega ravnanja izpolnjuje enako učinkovito in primerno kot „konvencionalna » centralna banka v nacionalnem okviru .
4.2.3 Discharge of the accountability obligation C o l l e c t i ve a c c o u n t a b i l i t y o f t h e E C B « s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g b o d i e s As explained in Section 2.5.1 , the ECB 's main decision-making bodies -- the Governing Council and the Executive Board -- are collegiate bodies in which all members are collectively responsible for the proper fulfilment of the ECB 's tasks and functions .
4.2.3 Izvajanje obveznosti odgovornega ravnanja Kolektivna odgovornost organov odloãanja ECB Kot je opisano v razdelku 2.5.1 , delujeta glavna organa odločanja ECB -- Svet ECB in Izvršilni odbor -- kot kolegij , v katerem so vsi člani kolektivno odgovorni za pravilno izvajanje nalog in funkcij ECB .
The members of both these bodies take decisions with exclusive regard to the objectives of the Eurosystem and on the basis of conditions prevailing in the euro area as a whole , and without reference to developments in any particular country .
Člani obeh organov sprejemajo odločitve izključno v skladu s cilji Eurosistema in glede na razmere v euroobmočju kot celoti , ne glede na dogajanja v kateri koli posamezni državi .
The decision-making bodies of the ECB are therefore held collectively accountable for all decisions they take .
Organi odločanja ECB so torej kolektivno odgovorni za vse odločitve , ki jih sprejmejo .
By contrast , a system of individual responsibility , such as that in force in the US Federal Reserve System , the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan , cannot be applied to the ECB as it would be inconsistent with the institutional structure and policy substance .
Sistem individualne odgovornosti , kakršen je v veljavi v ameriški , angleški in japonski centralni banki , za ECB ne more veljati , saj je nezdružljiv z njeno institucionalno strukturo in politiko .
For example , it would be inconsistent to have a system whereby all the members of the Governing Council were held individually accountable to the European Parliament because the EU institutions and bodies are not involved in appointing the governors of any NCB .
Tako bi bilo na primer nedosledno imeti sistem , v katerem so vsi člani Sveta ECB individualno odgovorni Evropskemu parlamentu , saj institucije in organi EU ne sodelujejo pri imenovanju guvernerjev nacionalnih centralnih bank .