natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Article 14.2 of the Statute does not restrict the security of tenure of office to Governors , whilst Article 108 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute refer to « members of the decision-making bodies » of NCBs , rather than to Governors specifically .
Člen 14.2 Statuta ne omejuje varnosti položaja samo na guvernerje , medtem ko člen 108 Pogodbe in člen 7 Statuta omenjata „člane organov odločanja » NCB , ne pa izrecno guvernerjev .
This applies in particular where a Governor is first among equals between colleagues with equivalent voting rights or where such other members may have to deputise for the Governor .
To še zlasti velja , če je guverner prvi med enakimi med sodelavci z enakovrednimi glasovalnimi pravicami ali če bodo drugi člani morda morali nadomeščati guvernerja .
RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW Members of the NCBs » decision-making bodies must have the right to submit any decision to dismiss them to an independent court of law , in order to limit the potential for political discretion in evaluating the grounds for their dismissal .
PRAVICA DO SODNE PRESOJE Člani organov odločanja NCB morajo imeti pravico , da sleherno odločitev o njihovi razrešitvi predložijo neodvisnemu sodišču , da bi se omejila morebitna politična samovolja pri vrednotenju razlogov za njihovo razrešitev .
Article 14.2 of the Statute stipulates that NCB Governors who have been dismissed from their position may refer this decision to the Court of Justice of the European Communities . National legislation should either refer to the Statute or
Člen 14.2 Statuta določa , da lahko guvernerji NCB , ki so bili razrešeni z njihovega položaja , to odločitev predložijo Sodišču Evropskih skupnosti .
ECB Convergence Report May 2006 CHAPTER 2 remain silent on the right to refer the decision to the Court of Justice of the European Communities ( as Article 14.2 of the Statute is directly applicable ) .
Nacionalna zakonodaja bi se morala bodisi sklicevati na Statut bodisi ne bi smela omenjati pravice do predložitve odločitve Sodišču Evropskih skupnosti ( ker se člen 14.2 Statuta uporablja neposredno ) .
National legislation should also provide for a right of review by the national courts of a decision to dismiss any other member of the decision-making bodies of the NCB involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks .
Nacionalna zakonodaja bi morala tudi predvideti pravico , da nacionalna sodišča presojajo odločitev o razrešitvi vseh drugih članov organov odločanja NCB , ki sodelujejo pri opravljanju nalog , povezanih z ESCB .
This right can either be a matter of general law or can take the form of a specific provision in the NCB 's statutes .
Ta pravica je lahko del splošnega prava ali v obliki posebne določbe v statutih NCB .
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST CONFLICT OF INTEREST Personal independence also entails ensuring that no conflict of interest arises between the duties of members of NCB decision-making bodies in relation to their respective NCBs ( and also of Governors in relation to the ECB ) and any other functions which such members of decision-making bodies involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks may have and which may jeopardise their personal independence .
VAROVALA PROTI NAVZKRIŽJU INTERESOV Osebna neodvisnost pomeni tudi zagotavljanje , da ne pride do navzkrižij interesov med dolžnostmi članov organov odločanja NCB v zvezi z njihovimi NCB ( ter guvernerjev v zvezi z ECB ) in drugimi funkcijami , ki jih lahko opravljajo člani organov odločanja , ki sodelujejo pri opravljanju nalog , povezanih z ESCB , in ki bi lahko ogrozile njihovo osebno neodvisnost .
As a matter of principle , membership of a decision-making body involved in the performance of ESCB-related tasks is incompatible with the exercise of other functions that might create a conflict of interest .
Načeloma je članstvo v organu odločanja , ki sodeluje pri opravljanju nalog , povezanih z ESCB , nezdružljivo z izvrševanjem drugih funkcij , ki bi lahko povzročile navzkrižje interesov .
In particular , members of such decision-making bodies may not hold an office or have an interest that may influence their activities , whether as representatives of legislative bodies or governments or through office in the executive or legislative branches of the state , or of regional or local administrations , or with a business organisation .
Člani teh organov odločanja zlasti ne smejo imeti funkcije ali interesa , ki bi lahko vplival na njihove dejavnosti , bodisi kot predstavniki zakonodajnih teles ali vlad ali funkcije v izvršilnih ali zakonodajnih vejah države ali regionalnih ali lokalnih uprav bodisi v poslovni organizaciji .
Particular care should be taken to prevent potential conflicts of interest on the part of non-executive members of decisionmaking bodies .
Posebno pozornost je treba posvetiti temu , da se prepreči morebitno navzkrižje interesov pri neizvršilnih članih organov odločanja .
3.1.4 FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE Even if an NCB is fully independent from a functional , institutional and personal point of view ( i.e. this is guaranteed by the NCB 's statutes ) its overall independence would be jeopardised if it could not autonomously avail itself of sufficient financial resources to fulfil its mandate ( i.e. to perform the ESCB-related tasks required of it under the Treaty and the Statute ) .
3.1.4 FINANČNA NEODVISNOST Čeprav je NCB popolnoma neodvisna s funkcionalnega , institucionalnega in osebnega vidika ( tj . to zagotavljajo statuti NCB ) , bi bila njena splošna neodvisnost ogrožena , če ne bi mogla avtonomno črpati dovolj finančnih sredstev za izpolnjevanje svojega mandata ( tj .
Member States may not put their NCBs in a position where they do not have sufficient financial resources to carry out their ESCB - or Eurosystem-related tasks , as applicable .
za opravljanje nalog , povezanih z ESCB , kar se zahteva od nje po Pogodbi in Statutu ) . Države članice ne smejo spraviti svojih NCB v položaj , v katerem ne bi imele dovolj finančnih sredstev za opravljanje njihovih nalog , povezanih z ESCB ali Eurosistemom , kjer je to ustrezno .
It should be noted that Article 28.1 and Article 30.4 of the Statute provide for the possibility of further calls on the NCBs to make contributions to the ECB 's capital and make further transfers of foreign reserves .
Opozoriti velja , da člen 28.1 in člen 30.4 Statuta določata možnost dodatnih zahtev do NCB za prispevke v kapital ECB in za dodatne transferje deviznih rezerv .
4 Moreover , Article 33.2 of the Statute provides 5 that in the event of a loss incurred by the ECB which cannot be fully offset against the general reserve fund , the ECB 's Governing Council may decide to offset the remaining loss against the monetary income of the relevant financial year in proportion and up to the amounts allocated to the NCBs .
4 Poleg tega člen 33.2 Statuta določa5 , da se v primeru , če ima ECB izgubo , ki je ni mogoče v celoti pokriti iz splošnega rezervnega sklada , Svet ECB lahko 4 5 Člen 30.4 Statuta se uporablja samo v okviru Eurosistema .
The principle of financial independence requires that compliance with these provisions leaves an NCB 's ability to perform its functions unimpaired .
POGLAVJE 2 odloči , da bo preostalo izgubo pokril iz denarnih prihodkov v določenem poslovnem letu sorazmerno z višino in do višine zneskov , porazdeljenih NCB . Načelo finančne neodvisnosti zahteva , da skladnost s temi določbami dopušča NCB možnost , da opravlja svoje funkcije v nezmanjšanem obsegu .
Additionally , the principle of f inancial independence implies that an NCB must have sufficient means not only to perform ESCBrelated tasks but also its own national tasks ( e.g. financing its administration and own operations ) .
Poleg tega načelo finančne neodvisnosti pomeni , da mora imeti NCB dovolj sredstev za opravljanje ne le nalog , povezanih z ESCB , temveč tudi svojih nacionalnih nalog ( tj . financiranje svoje uprave in lastnih operacij ) .
The concept of financial independence should therefore be assessed from the perspective of whether any third party is able to exercise either direct or indirect influence not only over an NCB 's tasks but also over its ability ( understood both operationally in terms of manpower , and financially in terms of appropriate financial resources ) to fulfil its mandate .
Koncept finančne neodvisnosti bi bilo zato treba oceniti z vidika , ali lahko katera koli tretja oseba bodisi neposredno bodisi posredno vpliva ne le na naloge NCB , temveč tudi na njeno zmožnost ( kar se razume tako operativno v smislu delovne sile kot finančno v smislu ustreznih finančnih sredstev ) za izpolnjevanje svojega mandata .
The four aspects of financial independence set out below are particularly relevant in this respect , and some of them have only been refined quite recently . 6 These are the features of financial independence C O M PAT I B I L I T Y O F N AT I O N A L L E G I S L AT I O N W I T H T H E T R E AT Y
V tem pogledu so še posebej pomembni štirje vidiki finančne neodvisnosti , določeni v nadaljevanju , pri čemer so bili nekateri od njih podrobneje opredeljeni šele pred kratkim .
Article 30.4 of the Statute only applies within the Eurosystem . Article 33.2 of the Statute only applies within the Eurosystem .
6 To so značilnosti finančne neodvisnosti , pri katerih so NCB najbolj izpostavljene zunanjemu vplivu .
where NCBs are most vulnerable to outside influence . DETERMINATION OF BUDGET If a third party has the power to determine or influence the NCB 's budget , this is incompatible with financial independence unless the law provides a safeguard clause to the effect that such a power is without prejudice to the financial means necessary for carrying out the NCB 's ESCB-related tasks .
DOLOČANJE PRORAČUNA Če ima tretja oseba pooblastilo , da določi ali vpliva na proračun NCB , je to nezdružljivo s finančno neodvisnostjo , razen če zakon vsebuje varovalno klavzulo v tem smislu , da takšno pooblastilo ne posega v finančna sredstva , ki so potrebna za izvajanje nalog NCB , povezanih z ESCB . RAČUNOVODSKA PRAVILA Računovodski izkazi se morajo pripravljati v skladu s splošnimi računovodskimi pravili ali v skladu s pravili , ki jih opredelijo organi odločanja NCB .
THE ACCOUNTING RULES The accounts should be drawn up either in accordance with general accounting rules or in accordance with rules specified by an NCB 's decision-making bodies . If such rules are instead specified by third parties , then the rules must at least take into account what was proposed by the NCB 's decision-making bodies .
Če takšna pravila namesto njih opredelijo tretje osebe , morajo pravila vsaj upoštevati predloge organov odločanja NCB . Letne računovodske izkaze bi morali sprejeti organi odločanja NCB s pomočjo neodvisnih računovodij in so lahko predmet naknadne odobritve tretjih oseb ( tj .
The annual accounts should be adopted by the NCB 's decision-making bodies , assisted by independent accountants , and may be subject to ex post approval by third parties ( e.g. shareholders , government ) .
delničarjev , vlade ) . Kar zadeva dobiček , bi morali imeti organi odločanja NCB možnost , da o svojih izračunih odločajo neodvisno in strokovno .
As regards profits , the NCB decision-making bodies should be able to decide on their calculation independently and professionally . Where NCB operations are made subject to the control of a state audit office or similar body charged with controlling the use of public finances , the scope of the control should be clearly defined by the legal framework and should be without prejudice to the activities of the NCB 's independent external auditor as laid down in Article 27.1 of the Statute .
Kadar so operacije NCB predmet nadzora državne revizijske službe ali podobnega organa , ki je zadolžen za nadzor nad uporabo javnih financ , bi moral biti obseg nadzora jasno opredeljen v pravnem okviru in ne bi smel posegati v dejavnosti neodvisnega zunanjega revizorja NCB , kot so določene v členu 27.1 Statuta .
The state audit should be done on a non-political , independent and purely professional basis .
Državna revizija bi morala biti opravljena na nepolitični , neodvisni in izključno strokovni osnovi .
DISTRIBUTION OF PROFITS , NCBs » CAPITAL AND FINANCIAL PROVISIONS With regard to profit allocation , an NCB 's statutes may prescribe how profits are to be allocated .
DELITEV DOBIČKA , KAPITAL NCB IN FINANČNE REZERVACIJE V zvezi z razdelitvijo dobička lahko statuti NCB predpisujejo , kako se dobiček razdeli .
In the absence of such provisions , the decision on allocation of profits should be taken by the NCB 's decision-making body on professional grounds , and should not be subject to the discretion of third parties unless there is an express safeguard clause stating that this is without prejudice to the financial means necessary for carrying out the NCB 's ESCBrelated tasks .
Če takšnih določb ni , bi moral o razdelitvi dobička odločati organ odločanja NCB na strokovni podlagi , ta odločitev pa ne sme biti predmet diskrecije tretjih oseb , razen če obstaja izrecna varovalna klavzula , ki določa , da to ne posega v finančna sredstva , ki so potrebna za izvajanje nalog NCB , povezanih z ESCB .
A Member State may not impose reductions of capital on an NCB without the ex ante agreement of the NCB 's decision-making bodies , which aims to ensure that it retains sufficient financial means to fulfil its mandate under Article 105 ( 2 ) of the Treaty and the Statute as a member of the ESCB . As regards financial provisions or buffers , the NCB must be free independently to create financial provisions to safeguard the real value of its capital and assets .
Država članica ne sme uveljavljati znižanj kapitala NCB brez predhodne privolitve organov odločanja NCB , katerega cilj je zagotoviti , da NCB ohrani dovolj finančnih sredstev za izpolnjevanje svojega mandata po členu 105 ( 2 ) Pogodbe in Statutu kot članice ESCB .
On the other hand , when the law provides for separate decision-making by such supervisory authorities , it is important to ensure that decisions adopted by them do not endanger the finances of the NCB as a whole . In those cases , the national legislation should enable the NCBs to have ultimate control over any decision by the supervisory authorities that could affect the NCB 's independence , in particular its financial independence .
V zvezi s finančnimi rezervacijami ali rezervami morajo biti NCB svobodne , da neodvisno oblikujejo ZDRUŽLJIVOST NACIONALNE ZAKONODAJE S POGODBO
The main formative ECB opinions in this area are the following : -- CON / 2002/16 of 5 June 2002 at the request of the Irish Department of Finance on a draft Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Bill , 2002 ;
Glavna razvojna mnenja ECB na tem področju so naslednja : -- CON / 2002/16 z dne 5 . junija 2002 na zahtevo irskega Ministrstva za finance o osnutku zakona o centralni banki Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland iz leta 2002 ;
-- CON / 2003/22 of 15 October 2003 at the request of the Finnish Ministry of Finance on a draft government proposal to amend the Suomen Pankki Act and other related acts ;
-- CON / 2003/22 z dne 15 . oktobra 2003 na zahtevo finskega Ministrstva za finance o osnutku vladnega predloga za spremembo Zakona o centralni banki Suomen Pankki in drugih sorodnih aktov ;
-- CON / 2003/27 of 2 December 2003 at the request of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance on a draft Federal law on the National Foundation for Research , Technology and Development ;
-- CON / 2003/27 z dne 2 . decembra 2003 na zahtevo avstrijskega Zveznega ministrstva za finance o osnutku zveznega zakona o Nacionalni ustanovi za raziskave , tehnologijo in razvoj ;
and -- CON / 2004/1 of 20 January 2004 at the request of the Economic Committee of the Finnish Parliament on a draft government proposal to amend the Suomen Pankki Act and other related acts . 66
in -- CON / 2004/1 z dne 20 . januarja 2004 na zahtevo ekonomskega odbora finskega parlamenta o osnutku vladnega predloga za spremembo Zakona o centralni banki Suomen Pankki in drugih sorodnih aktov .
CHAPTER 2 3.2 CONFIDENTIALITY and 103 ( 1 )) , which makes clear that the prohibition includes any financing of the public sector 's obligations vis-à-vis third parties .
finančne rezervacije za zaščito realne vrednosti svojega kapitala in sredstev .
The monetary financing prohibition is of essential importance to ensure that the primary objective of monetary policy ( namely to maintain price stability ) is not impeded .
FINANČNA ODGOVORNOST Z A NADZORNE ORGANE V nekaterih državah članicah finančni nadzorni organi delujejo v okviru NCB .
Furthermore , central bank financing of the public sector lessens the pressure for fiscal discipline .
Ko so takšni organi predmet neodvisnega odločanja NCB , to ne povzroča težav .
Therefore the prohibition must be interpreted extensively in order to ensure its strict application , subject only to certain limited exemptions contained in Article 101 ( 2 ) of the Treaty and Regulation ( EC ) No 3603/93 .
Po drugi strani pa je v primerih , ko zakon določa ločeno odločanje takšnih nadzornih organov , pomembno zagotoviti , da njihove odločitve ne ogrožajo financ NCB kot celote .
The ECB 's general stance regarding the compatibility of national legislation with the prohibition has been primarily developed within the framework of consultations of the ECB by Member States on draft national legislation under Article 105 ( 4 ) of the Treaty . 8 7 8 OJ L 332 , 31.12.1993 , p. 1 .
V teh primerih bi morala nacionalna zakonodaja omogočati NCB , da imajo končni nadzor nad vsemi odločitvami nadzornih organov , ki bi lahko vplivale na neodvisnost NCB , predvsem na njeno finančno neodvisnost . 4
Some formative EMI / ECB opinions in this area are the following : -- CON / 95/8 of 10 May 1995 on a consultation from the Swedish Ministry of Finance under Article 109 ( f ) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (" the Treaty ") and Article 5.3 of the Statute of the EMI (" the Statute ") ; on a draft government bill introducing a ban on monetary financing (" the Bill ") ;
PREPOVED DENARNEGA FINANCIRANJA IN PRIVILEGIRANEGA D O S T O PA PREPOVED DENARNEGA FINANCIRANJA 4.1
-- CON / 97/16 of 27 August 1997 on a consultation from the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance under Article 109 ( f ) of the Treaty establishing the European Community ( the « Treaty ") and Article 5.3 of the Statute of the EMI as elaborated in the Council Decision of 22 November 1993 ( 93/717 / EC ) ( the « Decision ") ;
Z AUPNOST Obveznost varovanja poslovne skrivnosti , ki velja za zaposlene ECB in NCB na podlagi člena 38 Statuta , lahko privede do podobnih določb v statutih NCB ali v zakonodaji države članice .
concerning a draft Federal Act on the participation of Austria in the New Arrangement to Borrow with the International Monetary Fund ; -- CON / 2001/32 of 11 October 2001 at the request of the Portuguese Ministry of Finance a draft decree law amending the legal framework of credit institutions and financial companies ;
Primarnost zakonodaje Skupnosti in pravil , sprejetih na njeni podlagi , pomeni tudi , da nacionalni zakoni o dostopu tretjih oseb do dokumentov ne smejo privesti do kršitve ureditve zaupnosti v ESCB .
-- CON / 2003/27 of 2 December 2003 at the request of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance on a draft Federal law on the National Foundation for Research , Technology and Development ; -- CON / 2005/1 of 3 February 2005 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance on a draft law amending Law Decree No 7 of 25 January 1999 , as converted by Law No 74 of 25 March 1999 , concerning urgent provisions on Italian participation in the International Monetary Fund 's interventions to confront severe financial crises of its member countries ;
Prepoved denarnega financiranja je določena v členu 101 ( 1 ) Pogodbe , ki prepoveduje prekoračitve pozitivnega stanja na računu ali druge oblike kreditov pri ECB ali NCB držav članic v korist institucij ali organov Skupnosti , institucionalnih enot centralne , regionalne ali lokalne ravni države ter drugih oseb javnega prava ali v korist javnih podjetij držav članic ;
-- CON / 2005/24 of 15 July 2005 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic on a draft law on the integration of financial market supervisors ;
prav tako je prepovedano , da bi ECB ali NCB neposredno od teh subjektov javnega sektorja kupovale dolžniške instrumente .
-- CON / 2005/29 of 11 August 2005 at the request of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance concerning a draft Federal law on the payment of a contribution by Austria to the trust fund administered by the International Monetary Fund for low income developing countries affected by natural disasters ;
Pogodba vsebuje dve izjemi od prepovedi : ne uporablja se za kreditne institucije v javni lasti , ki jih je treba pri zagotavljanju rezerv s strani centralnih bank obravnavati enako kakor zasebne kreditne institucije ( člen 101 ( 2 ) Pogodbe ) ;
and -- CON / 2005/60 of 30 December 2005 at the request of Lietuvos bankas on a draft law amending the Lietuvos bankas Act . The obligation of professional secrecy for ECB and NCB staff under Article 38 of the Statute may give rise to similar provisions in the NCB statutes or in the Member State 's legislation .
ter ECB in NCB lahko nastopajo kot fiskalni agenti za zgoraj navedene organe javnega sektorja ( člen 21.2 Statuta ) . Natančno področje uporabe prepovedi denarnega financiranja je opredeljeno tudi v Uredbi Sveta ( ES ) št .
The primacy of Community law and rules adopted thereunder also implies that national laws on access of third parties to documents may not lead to infringements of the ESCB 's confidentiality regime .
3603/93 z dne 13 .
4 PROHIBITION ON MONETARY FINANCING AND PRIVILEGED ACCESS 4.1 PROHIBITION ON MONETARY FINANCING The monetary financing prohibition is laid down in Article 101 ( 1 ) of the Treaty , which prohibits overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the ECB or the NCBs of Member States in favour of Community institutions or bodies , central governments , regional , local or other public authorities , other bodies governed by public law , or public undertakings of Member States ;
decembra 1993 o opredelitvi pojmov za uporabo prepovedi iz členov 104 in 104b ( 1 ) Pogodbe7 ( zdaj členov 101 in 103 ( 1 )) , ki jasno določa , da prepoved vključuje vsako financiranje obveznosti javnega sektorja od tretjih strani . Prepoved denarnega financiranja je bistvenega pomena za zagotovitev , da se ne ovira poglavitnega cilja denarne politike ( namreč ohranjanja stabilnosti cen ) .
and the purchase directly from these public sector entities by the ECB or NCBs of debt instruments .
Poleg tega financiranje javnega sektorja s strani centralne banke zmanjšuje pritisk na davčno disciplino .
The Treaty contains two exemptions from the prohibition : it does not apply to publicly-owned credit institutions which , in the context of the supply of reserves by central banks , must be given the same treatment as private credit institutions ( Article 101 ( 2 ) of the Treaty ) ; and the ECB and the NCBs may act as fiscal agents for the public sector bodies referred to above ( Article 21.2 of the Statute ) .
ECB Konvergenčno poročilo maj 2006 POGLAVJE 2 določene omejene izjeme , vsebovane v členu 101 ( 2 ) Pogodbe in Uredbi ( ES ) št .
The precise scope of application of the monetary financing prohibition is further clarified by Council Regulation ( EC ) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b ( 1 ) of the Treaty 7 ( now Articles 101 ECB Convergence Report May 2006
3603/93 . Splošno stališče ECB glede združljivosti nacionalne zakonodaje s prepovedjo se je najprej razvilo v okviru posvetovanj držav članic z ECB glede osnutkov nacionalne zakonodaje na podlagi člena 105 ( 4 ) Pogodbe .