natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It would also be inconsistent for NCB governors to give accounts of their actions as members of the Governing Council to their national parliaments ;
Prav tako bi bilo nedosledno , če bi guvernerji nacionalnih centralnih bank za svoja dejanja kot člani Sveta ECB morali odgovarjati nacionalnim parlamentom .
indeed , national parliaments lack the legitimacy to judge how NCB governors have performed their « European » duties -- duties which explicitly preclude them from acting as defenders of national interests .
Slednji namreč nimajo legitimnosti , da bi presojali , kako guvernerji izpolnjujejo svoje „evropske » dolžnosti -- dolžnosti , ki jim izrecno prepovedujejo , da bi delovali kot branilci nacionalnih interesov .
A c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r t h e E C B « s s t a t u t o r y m a n d a t e The ECB is held accountable for all activities and tasks which the EC Treaty has assigned to the Eurosystem and , in particular , for the conduct of monetary policy .
Odgovornost za zakonska pooblastila ECB ECB je odgovorna za vse dejavnosti in naloge , ki jih Pogodba ES nalaga Eurosistemu , predvsem za izvajanje denarne politike .
By setting a quantitative definition of price stability , the ECB has created a benchmark against which its performance can be assessed .
Z uvedbo kvantitativne opredelitve cenovne stabilnosti je ECB ponudila merilo , s katerim je mogoče oceniti uspešnost njenega delovanja .
The ECB is also held accountable for all other functions that are performed through the Eurosystem at its behest .
ECB je odgovorna tudi za vse druge naloge , ki se v okviru Eurosistema izvajajo po njenem nalogu .
By contrast , it cannot be held accountable for non-Eurosystem functions that the NCBs perform under Article 14.4 of the Statute of the ESCB .
Nasprotno pa ni odgovorna za naloge , ki niso povezane z Eurosistemom in jih nacionalne centralne banke izvajajo v skladu s členom 14.4 Statuta ESCB .
Indeed , the NCBs concerned perform these functions under their own responsibility and liability and are held accountable for them by the national authorities under the legal and constitutional provisions of the relevant Member State .
Te naloge izvajajo na lastno odgovornost in so zanje odgovorne pristojnim nacionalnim organom v skladu zakonskimi in ustavnimi določbami ustrezne države članice .
To w h o m i s t h e E C B a c c o u n t a b l e ?
Komu je odgovorna ECB ?
As a body established by the Treaty , and acting within the limits of the powers conferred on it , the ECB is accountable first and foremost to citizens of the EU Member States which have concluded and ratified the Treaty .
Kot organ , ki je bil ustanovljen s Pogodbo in deluje v okviru svojih pooblastil , je ECB v prvi vrsti odgovorna državljanom držav članic EU , ki so sprejele in ratificirale Pogodbo .
The Treaty contains extensive reporting obligations ( see the next section below ) which provide a framework for the ECB to be directly scrutinised by the European public .
Ta opredeljuje obsežne obveznosti poročanja ( glej naslednji razdelek ) , ki vzpostavljajo okvir za neposreden nadzor delovanja ECB s strani evropske javnosti .
129 ECB explains and justifies its decisions directly to the public through publications in all official Community languages and speeches given by members of the ECB decision-making bodies in all euro area member countries and elsewhere .
ECB svoje odločitve javnosti neposredno pojasnjuje in utemeljuje v publikacijah v vseh uradnih jezikih Skupnosti in v govorih , ki jih imajo člani organov odločanja v državah članicah euroobmočja in drugod .
In addition , the EC Treaty provides for regular dialogue with the elected representatives of the European citizens , i.e. the European Parliament ( see Section 4.3.1 ) ; just as the national legislative bodies of the United States , Japan and the United Kingdom are the principal addressees of democratic accountability for the central banks of those countries .
Poleg tega Pogodba ES zahteva reden dialog z izvoljenimi predstavniki evropskih državljanov , tj . z Evropskim parlamentom ( glej razdelek 4.3.1 ) , enako kot so nacionalni zakonodajni organi v ZDA , na Japonskem in v Združenem kraljestvu glavni naslovniki za centralne banke svojih držav , ko gre za njihovo demokratično odgovornost .
Over and above the accountability provisions of the EC Treaty , national legislation may require NCBs to present annual reports and may empower the respective parliaments to ask NCB governors to appear before plenary sessions or the relevant parliamentary committees upon request or at the governors » own initiative .
Onkraj določil o odgovornosti iz Pogodbe ES lahko nacionalna zakonodaja centralni banki naloži pripravo letnega poročila ali pooblasti parlament , da povabi guvernerja centralne banke , da se na zahtevo ali na lastno pobudo udeleži plenarnega zasedanja parlamenta ali seje ustreznega parlamentarnega odbora .
National parliaments , however , may only hold NCBs accountable for the functions performed outside the Eurosystem , whereas the ECB is solely accountable for the Eurosystem functions .
Nacionalni parlament lahko nacionalno centralno banko kliče na odgovornost samo za naloge , ki jih izvaja zunaj Eurosistema , medtem ko je za naloge Eurosistema odgovorna izključno ECB .
Nevertheless , although NCB contacts with their national political authorities do not , strictly speaking , form part of the accountability obligation , they do offer prime opportunities to explain the ECB 's decisions and inform national policymakers of the conduct of the single monetary policy and the reasoning behind it .
Stiki nacionalnih centralnih bank z nacionalnimi političnimi organi strogo gledano niso del obveznosti odgovornega ravnanja , vseeno pa predstavljajo odlično priložnost , da predstavniki centralne banke oblikovalcem nacionalnih politik pojasnijo odločitve ECB in jih obveščajo o izvajanju enotne denarne politike in razlogih , na katerih temelji .
Means of discharging the accountability obligation In theory , approval and reward ( if the mandate is successfully fulfilled ) and sanctions ( in the event of sub-optimal performance ) may appear a suitable means of enforcing central bank accountability .
Naãini izvajanja obveznosti odgovornega ravnanja Teoretično so odobravanje in nagrada ( če je mandat uspešno izpolnjen ) oziroma sankcije ( če so rezultati slabši ) primerni načini za zagotavljanje odgovornosti centralne banke .
In practice , however , the specific nature of monetary policy means that certain qualifications should be added .
V praksi pa je zaradi posebne narave denarne politike treba dodati še nekatere druge pogoje . 125
As mentioned in Section 3.1.1 , given the time lags in the transmission process , monetary policy can only affect the price level over the medium term .
Kot je omenjeno v razdelku 3.1.1 , lahko denarna politika zaradi časovnega odloga , do katerega prihaja v transmisijskem procesu , na raven cen vliva samo na srednji rok .
It is therefore impossible for the central bank to offset unanticipated shocks to the price level ( such as those caused by changes in commodity prices ) in the short run .
To pomeni , da centralna banka ne more v celoti preprečiti učinkov nepričakovanih šokov na raven cen ( na primer zaradi sprememb cen surovin ) v kratkoročnem obdobju .
Moreover , given the uncertainty surrounding the transmission mechanism , and given that the appropriate response of monetary policy depends on the nature , duration and size of economic shocks , it does not seem appropriate to specify a fixed horizon for assessing monetary policy .
Še več , zaradi negotovosti v transmisijskem mehanizmu in dejstva , da je ustrezen odziv denarne politike odvisen od narave , trajanja in moči gospodarskega šoka , se ne zdi primerno , da bi določili fiksno obdobje za ocenjevanje denarne politike .
A measurement of the central bank 's performance therefore always requires a balanced and differentiated assessment .
Pri merjenju uspešnosti centralne banke je zato potrebna uravnovešena in razčlenjena ocena .
The use of formal sanction mechanisms would simply be too blunt and may prevent the central bank from fulfilling its mandate properly .
Formalne sankcije so preprosto premalo natančne in lahko centralni banki celo preprečijo , da bi učinkovito izvajala svoj mandat .
Hence , constant scrutiny of the central bank 's actions by parliament and the general public would seem to be the most appropriate method for holding an independent central bank accountable .
Iz tega izhaja , da bi bilo stalno preverjanje delovanja centralne banke , ki ga izvajata parlament in širša javnost , najprimernejša metoda za zagotavljanje odgovornosti centralne banke .
Repor ting obligations The ECB is subject to extensive reporting requirements : -* Article 113 of the EC Treaty requires the ECB to present an annual report on the activities of the ESCB and the monetary policy of both the previous and current year to the European Parliament , the EU Council , the Commission and the European Council ;
Obveznosti poroãanja Za ECB veljajo številne obveznosti poročanja : -* člen 113 Pogodbe ES določa , da mora ECB Evropskemu parlamentu , Svetu EU , Evropski komisiji in Evropskemu svetu predstaviti letno poročilo o dejavnostih ESCB in denarni politiki v preteklem in tekočem letu ;
-* Article 15 of the Statute of the ESCB calls for the publication of quarterly reports and weekly consolidated financial statements for the Eurosystem .
-* člen 15 Statuta ESCB določa , da mora ECB objavljati četrtletna poročila in tedenske konsolidirane računovodske izkaze Eurosistema .
The ECB actually exceeds these statutory obligations by producing a Monthly Bulletin ( rather than just quarterly reports ) and by publishing Working Papers and other publications on its website .
ECB dejansko presega te zakonske obveznosti , saj na svoji spletni strani objavlja mesečni bilten ( in ne le četrtletna poročila ) , delovne zvezke in druge publikacije .
However , unlike the US Federal Reserve System , the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan , the ECB does not publish the minutes of the meetings of its main policy-making body , nor does it publish details of how the members of the Governing Council voted .
Za razliko od ameriške , angleške in japonske centralne banke ECB ne objavlja zapisnikov sej svojih glavnih organov odločanja in podrobnosti o tem , kako je glasoval vsak posamezni član Sveta ECB .
This is consistent with the clear stipulations of Article 10.4 of the Statute of the ESCB , which states that « the proceedings of the meetings shall be confidential » .
To je skladno z jasno zahtevo člena 10.4 Statuta ESCB , ki določa , da „so seje tajne » .
Non-disclosure of voting behaviour also protects the independence of Governing Council members .
Nerazkritje glasovanja ščiti tudi neodvisnost članov Sveta ECB .
The publication of individual voting behaviour could lead to pressure and speculation about the motives behind the decisions of the individual members of the Governing Council .
Objava posamičnih glasov bi lahko povzročila pritiske in špekulacije glede motivov , ki so vodili člane Sveta .
It would even enable the public to see whether any attempts to exercise influence on voting behaviour had had the intended result .
Omogočila bi celo , da javnost vidi , ali so morebitni poskusi vplivanja na glasovanje dosegli želene rezultate .
Although such concerns might not be particularly relevant to central banks operating in « conventional » nation states , NCB governors in the euro area are associated with their home countries .
Medtem ko ta skrb ni posebno velika pri centralnih bankah , ki delujejo v „konvencionalnih » nacionalnih državah , pa se guvernerje nacionalnih centralnih bank euroobmočja povezuje z njihovimi domačimi državami .
There is therefore a risk that the respective NCB governor may be perceived as a « national representative » within the Governing Council and may lead to unjustified attempts to influence them .
Zato obstaja tveganje , da bi javnost v guvernerju nacionalne centralne banke videla „nacionalnega predstavnika » v Svetu ECB , kar bi lahko vodilo do neupravičenih poskusov vplivanja nanj .
However , Article 10.4 of the Statute also states that « the Governing Council may decide to make the outcome of its deliberations public » .
Vseeno člen 10.4 Statuta določa tudi , da se „Svet ECB lahko odloči , da rezultate svojih posvetovanj objavi » .
To this end , the President and Vice-President of the ECB hold a press conference immediately after the first Governing Council meeting of each month , a transcript of which is published on the ECB 's website , and the ECB regularly provides comprehensive assessments of monetary and economic issues in its Monthly Bulletin .
S tem namenom imata predsednik in podpredsednik ECB takoj po vsaki prvi seji Sveta ECB v mesecu tiskovno konferenco , katere magnetogram je objavljen na spletni strani ECB , poleg tega pa ECB v svojem mesečnem biltenu redno objavlja celovito oceno denarnih in gospodarskih gibanj .
In terms of timeliness and detail , these communications appear no less capable of explaining policy decisions ( and the reasoning behind them ) than what other central banks would classify as « summary records » . 131
Po hitrosti in podrobnosti te oblike obveščanja enako uspešno predstavljajo odločitve o politiki ( in razlogih zanjo ) kot dokumenti , ki jih druge centralne banke imenujejo „summary records » oziroma kratki zapisniki .
3 D I A L O G U E A N D C O O P E R AT I O N W I T H C O M M U N I T Y I N S T I T U T I O N S AND BODIES Although the EC Treaty clearly divides the policy responsibilities within the framework of EMU , at the same time it also promotes dialogue and cooperation between the different policy-makers through a number of formalised contacts between the ECB and Community institutions and bodies .
4.3 DIALOG TER SODELOVANJE Z INSTITUCIJAMI IN ORGANI SKUPNOSTI Pogodba ES sicer jasno določa pristojnosti glede oblikovanja in izvajanja politik v okviru ekonomske in monetarne unije , vseeno pa hkrati spodbuja dialog in sodelovanje med različnimi oblikovalci politik prek številnih formaliziranih stikov med ECB ter institucijami in organi Skupnosti .
Working relations between the ECB and other policy-making bodies within the EU are necessary for the Eurosystem to fulfil its tasks properly .
Delovni odnosi med ECB in drugimi organi , ki oblikujejo politiko v EU , so nujni za učinkovito delovanje Eurosistema .
This is self-evident for all those tasks where the ECB shares its competences with Community bodies .
To je očitno pri tistih nalogah , pri katerih si ECB pristojnost deli z organi Skupnosti .
In these cases , the Treaty calls for cooperation between the ECB and the institutions or bodies concerned ( e.g. in the field of exchange rate policy , representation of the euro area and statistics ) .
V teh primerih Pogodba določa , da mora ECB sodelovati s pristojnimi institucijami in organi ( na primer na področju tečajne politike , zastopanja euroobmočja in na statističnem področju ) .
However , given the interaction between the single monetary policy and the economic policies in the Community , the ECB also has an interest in maintaining a fruitful dialogue with other policymakers , such as governments or social partners .
Vseeno pa je ECB glede na medsebojni vpliv enotne denarne politike in ekonomskih politik v Skupnosti zainteresirana tudi za ploden dialog z drugimi oblikovalci politik , kot so nacionalne vlade in socialni partnerji .
Regular dialogue between the ECB and other policy-making bodies provides an opportunity to explain the course of monetary policy and improve outsiders » understanding of the ECB 's activities .
Reden dialog z njimi ECB daje priložnost , da podrobneje predstavi usmeritve svoje denarne politike in zunanjim partnerjem omogoča lažje razumevanje svojih dejavnosti .
In this way , the ECB can provide a reliable reference parameter for the decisions of individual actors with the aim of stabilising inflation expectations .
Na ta način lahko ECB zagotovi zanesljivo oporo odločitvam posameznih akterjev in tako prispeva k stabilizaciji inflacijskih pričakovanj .
1 E u ro p e a n P a r l i a m e n t The dialogue between the ECB and the European Parliament is mainly concerned with the fulfilment of the ECB 's mandate and tasks .
4.3.1 Evropski parlament Dialog med ECB in Evropskim parlamentom je vezan predvsem na izpolnjevanje mandata in nalog ECB .
As discussed in Section 4.2 above , the European Parliament plays a key role in holding the ECB accountable for the conduct of monetary policy and related tasks .
Kot je opisano v razdelku 4.2 , ima Evropski parlament ključno vlogo pri preverjanju , ali ECB odgovorno izvaja denarno politiko in druge z njo povezane naloge .
D e l i b e r a t i o n o n t h e E C B « s A n n u a l R e p o r t s Under Article 113 ( 3 ) of the EC Treaty , the President of the ECB is required to present the ECB 's Annual Report to the European Parliament at its plenary session .
Razprava o letnem poroãilu ECB V skladu s členom 113 ( 3 ) Pogodbe ES mora predsednik ECB predstaviti letno poročilo ECB Evropskemu parlamentu na plenarnem zasedanju .
After the presentation , Parliament adopts a resolution , which provides a comprehensive assessment of the ECB 's activities and policy conduct .
Po predstavitvi Parlament sprejme resolucijo , v kateri celovito oceni dejavnosti ECB in izvajanje politike .
Te s t i m o ny b e f o re t h e E u ro p e a n P a r l i a m e n t Also under Article 113 ( 3 ) of the Treaty , the President of the ECB and the other members of the Executive Board may , at the request of the European Parliament or on their own initiative , be heard by the competent committees of the Parliament .
Zasli‰anja pred Evropskim parlamentom Člen 113 ( 3 ) tudi določa , da lahko pristojni odbori Evropskega parlamenta zaslišijo predsednika ECB in druge člane Izvršilnega odbora na zahtevo Evropskega parlamenta ali na njihovo lastno pobudo .
In line with this provision , the President of the ECB appears four times a year before Parliament 's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs .
V skladu s tem določilom je predsednik ECB štirikrat na leto povabljen pred Odbor za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve Evropskega parlamenta .
Under Parliament 's Rules of Procedure , this Committee was designated as the committee responsible for relations with the ECB .
Ta odbor je po poslovniku Parlamenta pristojen za stike z ECB .
During these hearings , the President explains the ECB 's policy decisions and answers questions from Committee members .
Na zaslišanjih predsednik pojasni odločitve o politiki ECB in odgovarja na vprašanja članov odbora .
As a result , these quarterly testimonies have become the mainstay of Parliament 's activities in holding the ECB accountable .
Takšna četrtletna zaslišanja so postala glavna dejavnost , s katero Parlament preverja odgovornost delovanja ECB .
Other members of the ECB 's Executive Board also appear before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs .
Odbor za ekonomske in monetarne zadeve občasno zasliši tudi druge člane Izvršilnega odbora ECB .
Over recent years , the Vice-President has generally been invited to present the ECB 's Annual Report to the Committee when preparing the subsequent deliberation in the plenary session .
V zadnjih nekaj letih odbor v okviru priprav na plenarno zasedanje navadno povabi podpredsednika ECB , da predstavi letno poročilo ECB .
Moreover , once a year , the Committee invites the Executive Board member responsible for economics and research to present the ECB 's views on the Commission 's annual review of the EU economy and the draft Broad Economic Policy Guidelines .
Poleg tega enkrat letno povabi člana Izvršilnega odbora , ki je pristojen za ekonomske analize in raziskave , da predstavi stališča ECB glede letnega pregleda gospodarskih razmer v EU , ki ga pripravi Komisija , ter o osnutku širših smernic ekonomskih politik .
On occasion , the Committee has also invited and heard other members of the Executive Board on specific topics relating to the ECB 's competences and tasks .
Na zaslišanje o konkretnih vprašanjih v zvezi s pristojnostmi in nalogami ECB odbor občasno povabi tudi druge člane Izvršilnega odbora .
Committee meetings are normally open to the public and a verbatim report of proceedings is put on the website of the European Parliament shortly after the testimony .
Seje odbora so navadno odprte za javnost in dobesedni zapis razprav je kmalu po zaključku seje objavljen na spletni strani Evropskega parlamenta .
Moreover , the ECB 's Annual Report contains a specific chapter on accountability and the ECB 's relationship with Parliament , which highlights the main issues discussed in the course of this regular dialogue .
Poleg tega letno poročilo ECB vsebuje posebno poglavje o odgovornosti in odnosih ECB s Parlamentom , ki predstavlja glavna vprašanja , o katerih so predstavniki obeh institucij razpravljali v okviru tega rednega dialoga .
Written questions Further to direct interaction and exchange of views between the ECB 's President and members of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs , Parliament 's Rules of Procedure ( new Rule 40a « Questions for written answer to the European Central Bank ") also allow all Members of the European Parliament ( MEPs ) to submit further questions in writing to the ECB via the Committee 's Chair .
Pisna vpra‰anja Poleg neposrednih stikov in izmenjave stališč med predsednikom ECB in člani Odbora za ekonomska in monetarna vprašanja poslovnik Parlamenta ( pravilo 111 , „Vprašanja Evropski centralni banki za pisni odgovor ") članom Evropskega parlamenta tudi dovoljuje , da prek predsednika odbora na ECB naslovijo pisna vprašanja .
These questions , together with the answers prepared by the ECB , are subsequently published in the Official Journal of the European Union .
Ta so skupaj z odgovori , ki jih pripravi ECB , objavljena v Uradnem listu Evropske unije .
They are thereby made available to the public in all official Community languages .
Tako so javnosti na voljo v vseh uradnih jezikih Skupnosti .
Even though neither the Treaty nor the Statute of the ESCB contains any obligations in this respect , the ECB has agreed to this procedure .
Čeprav niti Pogodba niti Statut ESCB tega ne zahtevata , je ECB pristala , da sodeluje v tem postopku .
However , it has emphasised that this should in no way lessen the importance of the regular testimonies where the principal questions regarding the ECB 's policy decisions should continue to be discussed .
Vseeno pa je poudarila , da pisna vprašanja ne smejo kakor koli zmanjšati pomena rednih zaslišanj , kjer se obravnavajo glavna vprašanja v zvezi s politiko ECB .
O t h e r a re a s o f i n t e r a c t i o n There are three further important areas of interaction between the ECB and the European Parliament : 1 .
Druga podroãja sodelovanja ECB sodeluje z Evropskim parlamentom še na treh pomembnih področjih . 1 .
Parliament is consulted on the appointment of the ECB 's President , VicePresident and other members of the Executive Board , ( Article 112 ( 2 ) of the EC Treaty ) .
Parlament sodeluje v posvetovanjih o imenovanju predsednika , podpredsednika in drugih članov Izvršilnega odbora ECB ( člen 112 ( 2 ) Pogodbe ES ) .
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs conducts hearings with the nominees and the plenum of the European Parliament adopts an opinion .
Odbor za ekonomska in monetarna vprašanja zasliši kandidate , plenum Evropskega parlamenta pa sprejme mnenje .
Parliament is involved in Community legislation to amend and complement the Statute of the ESCB ( Articles 10.6 , 41 and 42 of the Statute ) .
Parlament sodeluje pri pripravi zakonodaje Skupnosti , ki spreminja in dopolnjuje Statut ESCB ( členi 10.6 , 41 in 42 Statuta ) .
Its assent is required for amendments to the Statute in line with Article 41 of the Statute , and it must be consulted on amendments to voting rights under Article 10.6 and proposed complementary legislation in line with Article 42 .
Privolitev Parlamenta je potrebna za spremembo Statuta v skladu s členom 41 Statuta , posvetovanje s Parlamentom pa je potrebno pri spremembah volilnih pravic v skladu s členom 10.6 in predlagano dopolnilno zakonodajo v skladu s členom 42 .